["of oil to the West and Japan from Iran and the other oil-producing states of the Persian Gulf.", "One of the world's major oil producers, Iran—as a result of negotiations concluded early in the year between oil-producing countries and interested U.S. and other petroleum corporations—will derive substantially larger income from its oil sales. It is in large part Iran's oil income which has provided the financial base for sustaining the momentum of its economic development activities.", "As a result of its own rapid economic growth, Iran no longer requires external aid. In earlier years, the United States made large amounts of aid available to Iran. We now provide Export-Import Bank loans to assist Iran in purchasing both military and commercial equipment and services in the United States. In fiscal year 1971, a total of $295.8 million in such credits was extended to Iran. In 1970, U.S. exports to Iran were at a level of $326 million, and imports $67 million. U.S. direct investment in Iran through 1970 was $688 million.", "Despite difficulties arising from the landings of Iranian forces on three small islands in the Persian Gulf, Iran's overall relations with the Persian Gulf area were constructive. Iran relinquished its claim to Bahrain, facilitating that state's subsequent independence. With the formation of six of the Lower Gulf states into the United Arab Emirates, Iran extended friendly recognition to this entity. These developments were in the interests of all the littoral states and contributed to the U.S. goal of peace and security for the region.", "## TURKEY", "The United States and Turkey share important security interests in addition to their other close ties. Turkish military strength is an essential element in the protection of NATO's southeastern flank. A politically cohesive and economically strong Turkey is a stabilizing factor in the volatile eastern Mediterranean.", "The present shape of our relations with Turkey initially grew out of Soviet threats to the security and integrity of this strategically important part of the world. These relations have developed through joint membership in NATO, cooperation in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and bilateral economic and military cooperation for more than 20 years.", "Because of our close relations, we were able during the past year to devise more effective methods of eliminating illicit diversion of legal opium production from Turkey for processing into heroin in France and sale in the United States. On June 30, 1971, Prime Min-", "106", "ister Nissim Peretz after the war. It was a major outflap of lies having no edible purpose. In 1971, in Turkey, the United States Government came to the conclusion that we were in a million dollar a year four year", "In 1971, of 1975, 1970, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597, 2598, 2599, 2600, 2601, 2602, 2603, 2604, 2605, 2606, 2607, 2608, 2609, 2610, 2611, 2612, 2613, 2614, 2615, 2616, 2617, 2618, 2619, 2620, 2621, 2622, 2623, 2624, 2625, 2626, 2627, 2628, 2629, 2630, 2631, 2632, 2633, 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2639, 2640, 2641, 2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2647, 2648, 2649, 2650, 2651, 2652, 2653, 2654, 2655, 2656, 2657, 2658, 2659, 2660, 2661, 2662, 2663, 2664, 2665, 2666, 2667, 2668, 2669, 2670, 2671, 2672, 2673, 2674, 2675, 2676, 2677, 2678, 2679, 2680, 2681, 2682, 2683, 2684, 2685, 2686, 2687, 2688, 2689, 2690, 2691, 2692, 2693, 2694, 2695, 2696, 2697, 2698, 2699, 2700, 2701, 2702, 2703, 2704, 2705, 2706, 2707, 2708, 2709, 2710, 2711, 2712, 2713, 2714, 2715, 2716, 2717, 2718, 2719, 2720, 2721, 2722, 2723, 2724, 2725, 2726, 2727, 2728, 2729, 2730, 2731, 2732, 2733, 2734, 2735, 2736, 2737, 2738, 2739, 2740, 2741, 2742, 2743, 2744, 2745, 2746, 2747, 2748, 2749, 2750, 2751, 2752, 2753, 2754, 2755, 2756, 2757, 2758, 2759, 2760, 2761, 2762, 2763, 2764, 2765, 2766, 2767,

ister Nihat Erim decreed that the opium poppy would not be planted after the June 1972 harvest. In the words of President Nixon, this was a "courageous, statesmanlike action." The President pointed out that for "hundreds of years, tens of thousands of Turkish families have raised the opium poppy as a legitimate cash crop and for its edible oil and seed."

In recognition of the political and economic difficulties created in Turkey by the decision to prohibit poppy planting, the United States has agreed to provide financial assistance to the Turkish Government to overcome transitional problems in creating new income producing activities in the region affected by the poppy ban. We intend to provide the Turkish Government with a total of $35 million in grant assistance for this purpose over the next three or four years.

A Turkish poppy field

In addition, then U.S. Secretary of Agriculture Hardin in the fall of 1971 headed a study mission to Turkey to assess the prospects for agricultural and agro-industrial development in areas where poppy cultivation will be eliminated. This mission followed President Nixon's pledge of June 30, to put the United States' "best brains" at the disposal of Turkey in helping Turkey meet the problems involved in the abolition of poppy cultivation.

Our economic assistance, which in recent years has averaged about $40 million, now amounts to less than 20 percent of the total aid

107

extended by an OECD Consortium. Our military aid has continued at a substantial level. For some time, there was only limited military assistance extended to Turkey by other NATO countries. Recently, however, Germany has furnished significant and increasing assistance.

U.S. exports to Turkey are estimated at $324 million in 1971, as compared with $315 million the previous year. Imports from Turkey were $70 million in 1970, and are estimated to have been about the same in 1971. There were no significant new American investments in Turkey during 1971; the total American investment is estimated at almost $200 million.

## GREECE

Vice President Agnew's visit to Greece in October 1971 served to emphasize the importance we place upon the close security relationship between our two countries and upon Greece's NATO role on the southern flank of the alliance. As a NATO partner, Greece provides important security facilities to the alliance and to the United States. In addition to preserving the longstanding relationship between the people of Greece and the people of the United States, U.S. policies have been guided, since shortly after World War II, by the goal of preserving and strengthening the relationships within the alliance. With our military assistance, Greece has been able to make a more effective contribution to NATO's military strength. The growth in the Greek economy, an increase of about 8 percent in the GNP in each of the past three years, has allowed us to substitute increasing amounts of credit for grant aid. In fiscal year 1971, grant military aid to Greece totaled $20 million; Foreign Military Sales credits utilized by Greece came to $18 million.

The present extra-constitutional situation and the rate of progress toward restoration of representative government in Greece have been a source of continuing concern both in the United States and in Europe.

## CYPRUS

Although there was no major intercommunal violence in Cyprus in 1971, the situation there continued as a potentially disturbing factor in the international community. In the past, turmoil on the

108

island has rapidly developed into an area crisis threatening a con-
frontation between Greece and Turkey, two important NATO
allies. So long as Greek and Turkish Cypriots are unable to reach a
settlement of their differences, the Cyprus problem will remain a
cause of international tension. Our interest is to encourage both sides
to reach a peaceful settlement. Negotiations between the Greek and
Turk Cypriot communities on the island, initiated in 1968, first
faltered and then deadlocked in September 1971. This created a
situation of tension unalleviated by direct talks between the opposing
sides who remain in armed confrontation.

All concerned parties were involved during the latter part of 1971
in diplomatic efforts to revive negotiations between the Greek and
Turk Cypriots. These efforts centered on the United Nations, which
has been actively engaged in the Cyprus problem since 1964. By
late 1971, agreement in principle was reached among the parties
to resume the negotiations in an expanded form and with the par-
ticipation of the U.N. Secretary General's Special Representative as
well as the representatives of Greece and Turkey. The United States
strongly supported the efforts of the parties to end the cycle of violence
and crisis which has threatened relations between Greece and Turkey
and increased the level of instability in the eastern Mediterranean.

CENTO

The United States, in its observer capacity, fully supported
the activities of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), in
which are allied Great Britain, Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. In-
creasingly in recent years, CENTO has focused on regional economic
cooperation and scientific projects. In 1971 a CENTO-sponsored
rail link opened between Turkey and Iran. Service was inaugurated
by the President of Turkey and the Shah of Iran in September. It
is estimated that transit time for a rail car from Tehran to London
will be trimmed from six weeks to less than one. The United States
furnished $23 million in loans and grants to the project.

Secretary Rogers attended the 18th Council of Ministers meeting in Ankara on April 30-May 1, where CENTO Foreign Ministers reviewed the past year's activities, discussed plans for the year ahead, and exchanged views on such matters of area interest as the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Indo-Pakistani problem, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Cyprus. (See CENTO meeting communique in Annex.)

109

CRISIS IN SOUTH ASIA

A year which began with great promise in south Asia ended in tragedy and war. Early in the year both India and Pakistan seemed poised for a new period of political stability and economic growth aided by democratic institutions and the technology of the Green Revolution. Instead of choosing peaceful solutions to some of their domestic and international issues, however, both countries used force to resolve problems which might have been solved by negotiation.

The Pakistan Government's decision to use military force in East Pakistan to suppress the Awami League, victorious in the December 1970 elections, in order to maintain Pakistan unity, led to a bitter civil war, massive disruption in East Pakistan, and the flow of millions of refugees into India. In response, over the course of several months, the Government of India encouraged and supported an insurgent movement whose principal purpose was the creation of an independent Bangladesh by force of arms. This support culminated in the direct involvement of Indian forces on Pakistani territory and ultimately in full-scale hostilities between India and Pakistan.

We were disturbed by the Pakistan Government's decision to use force to deal with its internal differences, and we publicly expressed our concern over the loss of life, damage, and hardships suffered by the people of Pakistan. We were no less disturbed by India's decision to broaden the crisis by her reluctance to allow the United Nations to become involved. We took exception to Indian escalation of the use of force in pursuit of political goals even at the risk of full-scale hostilities.

The situation concerned the United States, not only because it created one of the most massive humanitarian problems of modern times—the flight of an estimated nine million or more refugees—but also because of the fundamental impact which these events have had and are likely to have on the long-term well-being of the region. As a result of the conflict, the political integrity of an independent nation has been shattered; the principles contained in the U.N. Charter for the peaceful settlement of international disputes have been flouted, and the prospects for the economic development and political stability of the region have been greatly complicated.

We endeavored throughout the period after March 25 to use our diplomacy and relief assistance to avert hostilities and to meet the urgent humanitarian needs created by the crisis. We considered the events in the East Pakistan crisis to have involved internal matters, with which the government and people of Pakistan had to deal.

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110

Nonetheless, we recognized that the consequences of these events—the flight of refugees, the danger of famine, and the growing insurgency—were matters of grave concern to all nations and especially India. We believed that if peaceful conditions were to be restored and if human lives were to be saved, it was clear that:

- Restraint would have to be exercised in the subcontinent by India and Pakistan and by outside powers.

- The international assistance programs would have to be expanded to avert famine and create conditions to encourage the return of the refugees; and

- Efforts toward an effective political settlement in East Pakistan would have to be actively pursued.

We worked toward these ends.

On November 12, the Secretary of State expressed apprehension about the buildup of forces and the rising number of clashes. He said:

> "We are apprehensive that these clashes might lead to an outbreak of hostilities in the days ahead.

> "We believe that a war would solve nothing, but would merely add to the massive problems that already exist in the area.

> "In view of these concerns, we have urgently counselled both sides to exercise maximum restraint.

> "We have also been the principal supporter of an international program designed to meet the problems that have arisen from the huge exodus of refugees from East Pakistan into India; and through quiet diplomacy on both sides, we are seeking to encourage steps which would defuse the situation, get a dialogue going between those principally concerned, with a view to making practical progress toward a political accommodation."

Unfortunately, these efforts proved unavailing, and neither the withdrawal of forces nor the political dialogue which we sought to promote came about. In late November, Indian forces crossed the East Pakistan border at several points in support of insurgent groups. On December 3, full-scale hostilities erupted.

After the outbreak of hostilities, we made repeated efforts through the U.N. Security Council to obtain an immediate cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces. The Soviet Union, unfortunately, vetoed three resolutions which commanded the support of most Security Council members including the United States. With the Security Council immobilized by Soviet vetoes, we took the issue to the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution. There, we and 103

111

other nations supported a resolution calling for a cease-fire and with-
d withdrawal. Finally on December 21 after the fighting had stopped, the
Security Council was able to pass a resolution demanding a with-
d withdrawal of forces, the maintenance of the cease-fire, and urgent
humanitarian efforts. It is on this resolution that we and other mem-
bers of the international community will be building in the year
ahead to restore normal and stable conditions on the subcontinent.

INDIA

In March 1971, for the fifth time since independence, India went
to the polls to elect a new national government. The ruling Congress
Party of Prime Minister Gandhi won an overwhelming victory, in-
cluding two-thirds of the seats in the lower and more influential

Bengali refugees await their fate.

house of Parliament. Mrs. Gandhi emerged from these elections as
India's undisputed national leader, committed to the eradication of
poverty and to more rapid and progressive social and economic
policies. Her victory enhanced prospects for India's future economic
development and political stability. Because of the importance the
United States attached to India's progress, we continued our eco-
nomic assistance to India to help it achieve a rate of growth suf-
ficient to insure a rising standard of living for the Indian population
and political development under democratic institutions. Commit-

112

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ments under A.I.D., Public Law 480, and Export-Import Bank pro-
grams in FY 1971 totaled $434.1 million in addition to U.S. con-
tributions to international lending agencies which also assisted in
India.

These prospects dimmed, however, after the March civil dis-
turbances in East Pakistan when an estimated nine million refugees,
primarily Hindus, fled to politically sensitive and economically de-
pressed eastern India. India subsequently took the position that all
of the refugees would have to return home but only after a political
settlement between the Government of Pakistan and those officials
elected by the people of East Pakistan in December 1970. India
sought international support for its demand for such a settlement.
The Indian Foreign Minister visited Washington in June and Prime
Minister Gandhi in November to convey India's position to the U.S.
Government.

During the Foreign Minister's visit, we indicated our great con-
cern for the burden India had to bear as a result of the refugee in-
flux and told him of our decision to provide $50 million in grant
refugee relief assistance as well as a $20 million development loan
to help offset the strain to the Indian economy. By the outbreak of
hostilities, our grant aid for the relief of refugees in India totaled
over $89 million. Some $250 million more had also been requested
from Congress for future refugee and East Pakistan relief programs.
During Mrs. Gandhi's visit, we discussed several specific proposals
we believed would contribute to a peaceful political solution of the
crisis. We informed her that President Yahya was willing to make
a unilateral withdrawal of his forces from the Indo-West Pakistán
frontier if India would agree to reciprocate subsequently. We also
informed her of proposals we had made to President Yahya for a
political dialogue between his representatives and selected repre-
sentatives of the Bengali people. We stressed to her, as we had to
other Indian representatives earlier, our hope and expectation that
India would act with the utmost restraint while efforts for a political
settlement continued.

On her return to New Delhi, Mrs. Gandhi appealed for a calm
consideration of alternatives. We were hopeful that India would
await the outcome of our efforts, which we believed could lay the
foundation for progress toward a peaceful political settlement. Our
suggestion for a dialogue without preconditions between President
Yahya's representatives and selected representatives of Bangladesh
was a first step in this direction. Unfortunately, while our efforts to
work toward a solution continued, the Indian Government decided

113

to increase its military pressure against East Pakistan. In late No-
vember Indian troops crossed into East Pakistan on several oc-
casions. The military escalation which resulted led to the outbreak
of full-scale ground and air hostilities on December 3, including
Pakistani air attacks on Indian territory near the West Pakistan
border. It was our view that India bore heavy responsibility for this
outbreak of hostilities.

As the crisis deepened, we terminated our sales of military equip-
ment to India and suspended economic assistance worth over $80
million.

PAKISTAN

For Pakistan, 1971 was a troubled year which witnessed the break-
down of the political process, tragic suffering in East Pakistan, and
finally, open hostilities with India that led to the defeat of Pakistani
forces in its eastern reaches. The year began on a hopeful note as
President Yahya Khan's plans for transfer of power to representative
civilian government appeared on the verge of fulfillment. The newly-
elected National Assembly was scheduled to meet in early March.
However, the dominant political parties, the Awami League of
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in East Pakistan, and the Pakistan Peo-
ple's Party of ex-Foreign Minister (now President) Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto in West Pakistan, failed to reconcile their fundamental dif-
ferences over the proposed constitution and related matters. Sub-
sequently, President Yahya postponed indefinitely the convening of
the National Assembly.

In reaction to this postponement, rioting broke out in East Paki-
stan in early March and the Awami League initiated a nonco-
operation protest movement. Last ditch efforts by President Yahya
and the key political figures to negotiate a settlement of the political
crisis failed. The army was ordered to restore the Central Govern-
ment's authority over the restive province. Sheikh Mujibur Rah-
man was arrested, and the Awami League and potential opposition
groups were banned.

The civil strife and repressive measures which ensued resulted
in thousands of deaths and growing unrest. The subsequent un-
precedented outflow of refugees from East Pakistan worsened rela-
tions between India and Pakistan, which already had been tense
following an aerial hijacking incident in February. Cross-border ac-
tivities of Bengali nationalist insurgents, supported by India, caused
still further deterioration in relations between the two countries
and led to a massing of troops in border areas along both the eastern

114

and western frontiers between India and Pakistan. Overt military intervention in East Pakistan by Indian armed forces in late November was followed by the outbreak of hostilities in the West on December 3 and full-scale war in the East. On December 16, Pakistani armed forces in East Pakistan surrendered. Fighting in the West ended December 17 when Pakistan agreed to an Indian ceasefire proposal.

In the aftermath of the war, President Yahya Khan resigned and Z. A. Bhutto was sworn into office as Pakistan's first civilian President since 1958. President Bhutto appointed a Cabinet and took additional steps to civilianize the government including the replacement of provincial military governors with civilians. In the East as the year ended, Pakistani prisoners of war were being transferred to internment camps in India and leaders of the Bangladesh movement had arrived in Dacca to take over the government apparatus.

The United States traditionally has been a major foreign contributor to Pakistan's economic development program. In 1971, however, many A.I.D.-supported development programs in Pakistan were disrupted by the fighting, and the United States has withheld any major new commitments, other than humanitarian relief, pending revised development planning by Pakistan. Total net obligations for Pakistan under U.S. A.I.D., Public Law 480 and Export-Import Bank programs for FY 1970 were $217.7 million and for FY 1971 were $115.3 million almost exclusively humanitarian aid.

The United States has not been a major supplier of arms to Pakistan since the 1965 war between India and Pakistan when a total embargo was imposed on arms shipments to both countries. Since 1967, the United States has sold limited amounts of spare parts for previously supplied equipment. In 1970 a one-time exception was made to sell Pakistan some military aircraft and armored personnel carriers. However, following the events of March 25, 1971, sales under this agreement were held in abeyance, and no new licenses were issued for the export of additional spare parts. On November 8, 1971, all remaining licenses for the export of military supply items to Pakistan were cancelled. Our overall military supply policy for Pakistan remains under continuing review.

## OTHER SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES

### Afghanistan

In 1971, Afghanistan was gripped by the second year of an unprecedented drought. The threat of any extensive starvation has

115

hopefully been averted, however, by vigorous government action and foreign assistance, mostly from the United States. But serious losses were being experienced in livestock and fruit orchards, both of which are critical to Afghanistan's exports and will take years to replace.

A new government under Prime Minister Abdul Zahir took office in July and immediately inaugurated emergency measures to offset the effects of the drought and to use the sense of urgency it created to begin changes in traditional agricultural and bureaucratic methods that have in the past hindered economic development in Afghanistan.

The U.S. Government supported these Afghan efforts with 200,-000 tons of Public Law 480 wheat, half on a grant basis, and with personnel from the Peace Corps and A.I.D. These efforts have resulted in a drought relief program based on self-help, food-for-work projects in rural public works using Afghan, U.S. Peace Corps, U.S. A.I.D., German Development Services, United Nations, and a few other nationalities in a fully cooperative international undertaking.

While economic problems tend to dominate the immediate scene in Afghanistan, it is noteworthy that the King has appointed to the present government men drawn from among the key leadership of his "Experiment in Democracy" which began with the promulgation of a constitution in 1964. Both the King and his ministers, several of whom were educated in the United States, believe that the development of democracy in Afghanistan should proceed hand-in-hand with development of the Afghan economy.

Afghanistan has continued to follow a balanced and neutral foreign policy, both regionally during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, and in the larger arena where Afghanistan maintains friendly relations with the United States and western European countries as well as with both the U.S.S.R. and the People's Republic of China.

## Nepal

At a time of uncertainty in south Asia, we continued to support Nepal's aspirations for political and economic self-reliance, principally through a constructive although small aid program of $7 million composed mostly of U.S.-owned Indian rupees. U.S. aid financed the construction of a major north-south feeder road in remote western Nepal. For the first time in Nepal's history, the road was built entirely by Nepalese engineers and workmen. Through A.I.D. and the Peace Corps, the United States also assists with agriculture, family planning, malaria control, and education.

116

We tend to be somewhat optimistic about the prospects for economic development in the countries of South Asia.

Ceylon's last English colonial administration was established in 1947. During the British administration, the economy of South Asia developed in a manner similar to that of other parts of the world.

In 1956, the British government announced its intention to end colonial administration in South Asia.

Nepal, like other South Asian countries, experienced a period of transition from colonial administration to independent national administration. During this transition, economic development in South Asia as a whole was slow, with some areas showing signs of recovery.

450-783

## Bhutan

We welcomed Bhutan into the international community in September when it joined the United Nations. We have neither formal diplomatic nor bilateral aid relations with Bhutan.

## Ceylon

Ceylon's democratic government came under severe armed attack last April by a radical leftist group. The United States among others responded to Prime Minister Bandaranaike's request for military equipment to help meet this attack. We also continued to provide economic assistance mainly in the form of Public Law 480 loans of approximately $14 million to purchase wheat flour. We hope this assistance will help the Ceylonese Government solve the difficult economic problems which have led to youthful unrest.

Our relations with Ceylon have steadily improved. Prime Minister Bandaranaike's visit to Washington in October provided an opportunity for a valuable exchange of views with President Nixon and the Secretary of State. These discussions brought out a mutuality of interests on which we can continue to build a satisfactory relationship.

## Republic of Maldives

Despite the Republic of Maldives' isolation, we have maintained cordial and friendly relations through our respective Embassies in Colombo, Ceylon.

## Indian Ocean

New attention has been focused on the Indian Ocean in the last year, first because of an increasing Soviet naval presence there and then because of the events in south Asia in December. We believe that the interests of the United States in the Indian Ocean can best be served by normal political, commercial, and military access to the area. At the same time, we seek to avoid military competition with the Soviet Union or other powers in the Indian Ocean.

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450-782 O-72-10

Africa

The major concerns of the nations of Africa—economic and social development, self-determination, and racial equality—are fully shared by the United States. These common interests are central to the concepts governing our African policy:

- avoidance of great power rivalry, dominance, or conflict on the continent;

- self-determination, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of African countries;

- economic and social development in accordance with the aspirations of African peoples;

- mutual understanding of the roles played by the United States and African nations;

- access to resources and markets on an equitable and, in so far as possible, reciprocal basis;

- recognition of Africa's strategic importance in terms of its location, air and sea routes, and U.S. facilities.

Our policy in 1971 was based on mutual respect and a commitment to frankness in our relations with the nations of Africa. We agree wholeheartedly with African aspirations for social justice, self-determination, and economic progress throughout the continent. We have taken concrete steps and have subscribed to peaceful change to support these aims. In all our contacts with the nations of Africa we have opposed the use of force by any party in dealing with the political, economic, and social problems of the continent.

We have emphasized our desire to respond, insofar as our capability permits, to Africa's development needs. At the same time, African states have shown a desire to determine their own priorities and apply their own resources in the development process. We consider this African approach to the continent's social and economic transformation both realistic and practical. It is an approach which we can and shall continue to support.

In 1971, in fact, U.S. activities on the continent increased in tempo, advancing our own major interests and those of the African

159

states in building stronger foundations for cooperation and growth
in the future. Highlights and accomplishments were:

### INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE

In recent years, the United States has been one of the principal sup-
porters of African economic development. In FY-71, U.S. aid
totalled $550 million, up 20 percent over 1970. Despite declines in
U.S. assistance to other areas, development loans to Africa increased
by 30 percent in 1971, and Export-Import Bank long-term credits
rose 140 percent. We estimate that the value of our contribution to
Africa through multilateral organizations is about $200 million.

A large part of our aid went to agriculture, the source of liveli-
hood for 80 percent of Africa's population. Because of the potential
for the export of livestock, we placed considerable emphasis on pro-
grams to upgrade cattle, control disease, and improve marketing. U.S.
aid also helped build vitally needed roads and telecommunications
links. We assisted manpower training programs in technical, profes-
sional, and managerial skills, and in handicrafts. The Peace Corps'
2,500 volunteers throughout the continent played a large part in
these training programs. Other U.S.-backed efforts were aimed at
social problems which are assuming larger proportions in Africa:
health, family planning, urban growth, and employment.

### EXPANDED TRADE AND INVESTMENT

The United States favorable balance of trade with Africa con-
tinued its long-term climb. Exports to the developing African coun-
tries rose from $913 million to $985 million, while imports increased
from $793 million to $925 million. Trade with South Africa grew
by less than 6 percent; exports rose from $503 million to $622 million
and imports were $287 million, compared to $288 million in 1970.

The Sugar Act Amendments of 1971 more than doubled the for-
eign quota to African countries. Two new quotas were given to
Malawi and Uganda, and the quotas of other states in Africa were
increased. Many countries, such as Mauritius, Malagasy Republic,
and Swaziland, produce sugar as a principal crop. The increases will
provide important benefits to their economic development.

The latest available figures show that U.S. investment in Africa increased in 1970 from $3 to $3.5 billion or 16.5 percent. Investment in the developing African countries rose from $2.2 to $2.6 billion with the petroleum and manufacturing industries accounting for particularly large gains. U.S. investors showed increasing interest in developing natural resources in such countries as Zaire, Ivory Coast, Nigeria,

160

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Libya, followed closely by Nigeria and South Africa.

MEETINGS WITH AFRICAN LEADERS

This Administration has placed emphasis on the individual con-
tact of its senior officials with the leaders and people of Africa.
President Nixon displayed his strong personal interest in the Orga-
nization of African Unity (OAU) by his warm reception at the
White House of President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, (concur-
rently President of the OAU), together with the Foreign Ministers
of Cameroon, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, and Zambia and expressed
our readiness to give serious consideration to OAU views. During
the year, the President also met with President Senghor of Senegal,
President Maga of Dahomey, Prime Minister Laraki of Morocco,
and Prime Minister Busia of Ghana to discuss a broad range of
bilateral and international issues. Since 1969, President Nixon has
met with the leaders of 14 African countries.

The President's selection of Mrs. Nixon to represent him at the
inauguration of Liberian President William Tolbert early in Janu-
ary 1972 and the announcement of her subsequent visits to Ghana
and the Ivory Coast show a continuing high level of U.S. interest in
Africa. This interest was reinforced by the Vice President's visit to
four African countries, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zaire, and Morocco in
July 1971.

Following Secretary of State Rogers' own historic visit to 10
African countries in 1970, other prominent U.S. officials, includ-
ing the Secretary of Agriculture and the Director of the United
States Information Agency, made African tours. The Secretary of
State met with 23 African Foreign Ministers during the 26th Gen-
eral Assembly session in New York.

The United States has diplomatic relations with 38 of the inde-
pendent states of Africa. Despite the absence of diplomatic relations
with two others, Algeria and the Sudan, we have maintained and
expanded our Interests Sections in those countries, located in the
Embassies of Switzerland and the Netherlands respectively, during
the year. Our cooperation with Algeria and the Sudan in economic
and cultural fields increased markedly. At the invitation of President
Nimeri, Assistant Secretary of State David P. Newsom visited the
Sudan, and we are now exploring ways to broaden our cultural and
economic/commercial relations.

Export-Import Bank Chairman and President Henry Kearns
visited Algeria in February, and in subsequent months the Bank

161

has issued a number of important loans and preliminary commit-
ments to Algeria. The executive branch informed the Federal Power
Commission that it had no objection to the approval of two major
projects for the importation of large quantities of Algerian natural
gas in liquefied form to the eastern coast of the United States. If
approved by the Federal Power Commission, the two projects will
require capital investments of over $1.5 billion by Algeria and
American companies.

SUPPORT FOR NAMIBIA

The International Court of Justice held this year that inasmuch
as South Africa's presence in Namibia (formerly South-West Africa)
is illegal, South Africa must withdraw its administration and end
its occupation. The Court held further that U.N. member states are
obliged to refrain from recognizing or supporting South Africa's
presence there. The United States supported reference of these
questions to the Court and voted in the Security Council in October
in support of the Court's conclusions. We have also continued our
policy of discouraging investment in Namibia and undertook to
advise all potential and actual American investors of this policy.
Investment has in fact been inhibited.

OPPOSITION TO BYRD AMENDMENT

The United States supported the Security Council resolutions of 1966 and 1968 which imposed mandatory sanctions against white-dominated Southern Rhodesia, involving an embargo on imports from Southern Rhodesia including chrome. The Administration opposed the Byrd amendment to the 1971 Military Procurement Authorization Act under which the existing embargo on importation of certain "strategic and critical materials," notably chrome ore, from Southern Rhodesia cannot be maintained as long as such imports are not prohibited from the Soviet Union or other Communist states. Nevertheless, the bill passed with the amendment, which came into effect January 1, 1972. Except for the amendment, we have continued effectively to support the U.N. sanctions program and to cooperate closely with the U.N. Sanctions Committee.

We are maintaining our arms embargo against South Africa
consistent with the 1963 recommendatory resolutions of the Security
Council. We also maintain an arms embargo with respect to the
Portuguese territories of Africa, which is consistent with our oppo-
sition to violence on both sides, Portuguese and African. In accord
with our desire to avoid great power confrontation and rivalry, we

162

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vention on any side in Africa. This applies to southern Africa, as
well as to other parts of the continent.

CONTACTS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

During the year, we made some progress in increasing our com-
munication with all of the people of South Africa, regardless of
race. In response to the Administration's efforts, the South African
Government gave visas to Congressman Diggs, Chairman of the
Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, and members of his sub-
committee. Following South Africa's subsequent refusal to approve
a second entry by the Congressman, we urgently requested that the
South African Government reconsider its position. The Administra-
tion also provided facilitative services to a church consultation group
for a factfinding tour of South Africa and to a prominent American
academician long barred from visiting that country. We are encour-
aging American firms operating in South Africa to adopt enlight-
ened employment practices for all their employees.

POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Political Trends

The United States has respected the sovereignty of the African nations. As friends, we are interested in African political stability and in conditions conducive to peaceful development. We recognize that African states themselves should exercise leadership in these matters. We are convinced that the energies of outside powers can best be utilized in Africa to help sustain and encourage the process of economic and social development.

We have sought to avoid confrontation with the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet Union, and eastern European countries in their expanding activities in Africa. The PRC, for example, has strengthened its ties with Tanzania, where it is helping construct the railway to Zambia, and is training and supplying the defense force. We have made clear to African governments, however, that we do not intend to ignore efforts by anyone to plant suspicions or otherwise damage our bilateral relations in Africa. We are encouraged by the Africans' determination to maintain their sovereignty and independence and their resistance to any form of foreign domination.

163

A number of African countries, particularly Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Malagasy Republic, Morocco, Sudan, and Uganda, experienced serious internal security problems last year. The majority of states, however, were able to preserve domestic peace and stability. While bilateral relations were troublesome for us with several African states, they were good with most and included close cooperation on a wide range of matters.

In Uganda a military government came to power in a coup d'état in January. Attempted coups in Morocco and Sudan were put down. Strains also have marred, but not disrupted, bilateral relations between African states. Mediation efforts by African heads of state prevented an open break between the Republic of Zaire and Congo/Brazzaville and calmed disputes between Uganda and its neighbors, Rwanda and Tanzania. Mediation of differences between Libya and Chad also was undertaken. Disputes involving African states which were brought before the U.N. Security Council included charges by Senegal and Guinea that Portugal had violated their territory, and similar charges lodged against South Africa by Zambia.

Among the major African political events in 1971 was the smooth and peaceful transition to new leadership in Liberia following the death of President William V. S. Tubman. Upper Volta, which adopted a constitution and revived its National Assembly in 1970, continued its peaceful transition to civilian control.

## Organization of African Unity

We support the Organization of African Unity (OAU) within the context of the provisions of the U.N. charter, which favor the establishment of regional organizations for settling disputes. We also support the OAU as an organization which enjoys broad African support and which gives expression to the African desire for unity.

The OAU took important initiatives last year toward finding solutions for the two major problems of concern to Africa—colonialism and racial injustice in southern African and the Middle East dispute.

At its Eighth Summit Meeting in Addis Ababa in June, the OAU decided to send a special mission to NATO and other capitals to present its views on southern African problems. The mission, headed by OAU President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, visited Washington on September 28.

The OAU also appointed a Committee of "Wise Men" to assist in achieving a solution to the Middle East problem. Chaired by President Ould Daddah of Mauritania, who is also President of the OAU, the Wise Men included the heads of government of Cameroon,

164

Ethiopia and Zaire.

The Kenyan president, Camels Camels, visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

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450-786

Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Zaire.

The Committee designated a subcommittee, consisting of President Senghor of Senegal (chairman) and Presidents Ahidjo of Cameroon, Gowon of Nigeria, and Mobutu of Zaire, whose members visited Israel and Egypt in November for discussions with Prime Minister Meir and President Sadat.

Following the submission of the subcommittee's report on the Middle East to the United Nations, there was a shift in attitude among the bulk of OAU states in the direction of Egypt's position, which reflected Egypt's membership in the OAU and Arab-African voting patterns in the United Nations. Some of the African states, including two members of the Committee of Wise Men, then supported a resolution which passed the U.N. General Assembly. The principal provisions reaffirmed that territories occupied by force must be restored, called upon Israel to respond favorably to Ambassador Jarring's peace initiative, asked the Secretary General to take the necessary steps to reactivate the Jarring mission, and invited the parties to the conflict to give their full cooperation to Ambassador Jarring to work out practical measures: (a) guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area, (b) guaranteeing territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area. The U.S. abstained on the resolution. The African initiative was a helpful step focusing further attention on this critical problem. As the year ended, the hope remained that the efforts of Dr. Jarring under U.N. Resolution 242 would be resumed in the search for peace.

The Seventh Summit Conference of East and Central African States, held in Somalia in October, issued a strongly worded Mogadiscio Declaration, directed primarily at southern African issues, which its sponsors stated was intended to supersede the Lusaka Manifesto of 1969. The Lusaka Manifesto, a carefully reasoned document, had expressed a clear preference for peaceful solution of the problems of colonialism and racism, although it stated that when progress along peaceful lines was blocked there could be no alternative but support of resistance movements. The Mogadiscio Declaration, on the other hand, concludes that the only road to liberation of southern Africa is through armed struggle, and it rejects the call of some African leaders for a dialogue with South Africa. It is doubtful that the new document has much support among African states in general. The OAU is expected to consider the new declaration at its summit meeting in the summer of 1972. The United States continues to urge peaceful solutions to these problems.

165

450-786 O-72—13

A principal aim of our policy toward the continent is to increase economic relations with Africa. Although U.S. trade and investment continued to expand, progress within Africa during the year was uneven. Most African countries have not yet succeeded in achieving the average annual growth rate of 6 percent which was set as the target for the U.N. Second Development Decade.

Reflecting a growing trend toward African control over the industrial and commercial sectors, some states took steps to increase their role in private enterprise. Nigeria established a national petroleum corporation in April to develop petroleum concessions reserved for the Nigerian Government and to participate with private oil companies in joint ventures. Kenya also acquired a 50 percent equity in the banking and petroleum refining industries.

African countries were not affected to any significant extent by the temporary American import surcharge, announced on August 15. Less than one percent of Africa's total exports to the world were subject to the surcharge, and no single country had more than three percent of its exports affected.

However, most African economies are closely tied to Europe, and currency adjustments after August 15 and the fluctuations in the exchange market which persisted until December 18 created considerable uncertainty in Africa about economic prospects. As the year ended, the uncertainties were being cleared up, and the basic pattern of trade and payments between Africa and the rest of the world was left relatively little changed from the period prior to the beginning of the monetary crisis in May.

Multilateral assistance to Africa has increased. Both investment and assistance from western Europe and Japan have expanded. The United States welcomes the concern of other industrialized nations for African development.

## Regional Cooperation

The United States encourages regional economic development where feasible, an approach to which most African states themselves are committed. In 1971, we contributed $50 million through A.I.D. to regional programs in Africa. This was up from less than $40 million in 1970.

We support the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) through A.I.D.-financed consultants and experts who participate in

seminations in the Economic Commission's agencies.

The United Nations of the African Fund for national development.

The United Nations (SIFIN) is the African effort in the field of international finance and development, and it is institutionalized in the United Nations (OCHA).

The United Nations (Tanzania) and (Uganda) are the (OECD) members, and the United Kingdom is a member in good standing with the United Nations.

The United Nations (Tanzania) and (Uganda) are the (OECD) members, and the United Kingdom is a member in good standing with the United Nations (OCHA).

¹ It was

Senegalese

³C

166

seminars and training courses and assist with research studies. In the past year the ECA commissioned a special study on African economic cooperation to improve its ability to help African governments. It also sponsored conferences, in collaboration with other agencies, on such varied subjects as housing finance, industrialization policies, and rural development.

The African Development Bank approved in July the principles of the proposed African Development Fund which is intended to provide loans on soft terms. We have been providing technical assistance to the Bank and are prepared to contribute to the Development Fund when it is established. The Bank plans to study the possibility of non-African states participating in the ordinary capital of the Bank.

The International Finance Corporation, an affiliate of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, announced in June that it would invest $500,000 in the share capital of the International Financing Company for Investment and Development (SIFIDA). Created with the encouragement and assistance of the African Development Bank in mid-1970, SIFIDA is the first joint effort by leading financial and industrial corporations in 13 developed countries to promote private investment in Africa. Its subscribed and paid-in capital rose last year from $10.5 to $12.5 million. U.S. institutions are among its shareholders.

Subregional African groups continued to play an important, though not always widely publicized, role in Africa. These include the Common Organization of African and Malagasy States (OCAM),¹ the Entente Council,² and the East African Community.

The East African Community, composed of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, experienced internal stress following the military coup in Uganda and the subsequent tensions between the Tanzanian and Ugandan Governments. The Organization of Senegal River States (OERS) was dissolved in December as a result of the persistent differences between certain member states, notably Senegal and Guinea.

While acknowledging that each country should judge how best to serve its own interests, we hope African states will find mutually satisfactory solutions to the problems that impede regional cooperation.

¹ Its members are Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazza-ville), Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malagasy Republic, Mauritius, Niger, Senegal, Togo, Upper Volta, and Zaire.

² Consisting of Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo, and Upper Volta.

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NORTH AFRICA

Algeria

Despite the absence of formal diplomatic relations, U.S.-Algerian relations continued to improve during 1971. Each state expanded its representation in the other's capital, and the number of official visitors increased. Export-Import Bank President and Chairman Henry Kearns visited Algeria in February and was received by President Boumediene and six ministers. Following their fruitful discussions, the Bank in subsequent months issued a number of loans and preliminary commitments, mainly in the supply of U.S. goods and services for the petroleum sector and for the purchase of commercial aircraft.

Plans for the export of large quantities of Algerian natural gas in liquefied form (LNG) to the eastern coast of the United States moved forward during the year. The two major projects now under consideration—El Paso and Distrigas—will require capital investments of over $1.5 billion by Algeria and American companies. The American companies will own no facilities in Algeria, but will be responsible for facilities in the United States and for most of the LNG tankers.

The importance of both projects is that they provide for the first importation of LNG into the United States over an extended period of time. The El Paso applications entail the annual importation of 365 billion cubic feet of LNG for 25 years. The Distrigas application involves the importation of 15.4 billion cubic feet per year for 20 years. The Federal Power Commission has not yet completed its consideration of these applications. Both companies already have contracted with Algeria for substantial additional quantities, contingent upon the Commission's approval.

A dramatic development was the announcement of an $8 billion agreement in December for the delivery of petroleum products by Algeria to the Commonwealth Oil Refining Company. The agreement, for 25 years, is the largest country-to-company supply contract ever concluded. Parts of this agreement may require U.S. Government authorizations. By the year's end, another American company had contracted for long-term crude oil purchases.

The Algerians continued to devote major attention to their economic development and to reinforce their control over all aspects of the economy. In February they nationalized all or part of the French-owned companies in the petroleum and gas sector. The reaction of the French companies, which included boycotting purchases of Algerian crude oil, caused a serious financial crisis in Algeria. The

168

expropriation disputes with the French companies appeared, however, to be resolved by October and crude oil exports—which account for about 70 percent of Algeria's export earnings—were expected to return to normal. In April, Algeria resolved its remaining four-year-old expropriation disputes with U.S. petroleum companies.

## Libya

Our major interests in Libya are economic and commercial. The United States has a larger investment in Libya than in any other African country. The book value of U.S. investments at the beginning of last year was over $1 billion, almost all of which is in petroleum production. This is nearly 30 percent of total U.S. private investment in Africa. U.S. companies produce about 88 percent of Libya's total oil output, which supplies some 20 percent of western European requirements.

An agreement was reached in April between the Libyan Government and international oil companies which increased Libya's revenue of taxes and royalties about 60¢ per barrel, or $500 million per annum at the current rate of production of 2.5 million barrels per day. Total oil revenues for Libya now approach $2 billion annually. The five-year agreement contains automatic increases in payments to the government to offset inflation, as well as other adjustment mechanisms.

In September, Libya and other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) resolved to increase oil earnings because of the decreased purchasing power of dollars in terms of other currencies, following the floating of the dollar and U.S. economic measures of August 15. OPEC members also decided to seek partial ownership in existing oil concessions. Negotiations on these issues are continuing.

In June the Libyan Government greatly limited the role of foreign cultural centers. Accordingly, the United States Information Agency Library in Tripoli and the reading room in Benghazi were closed. Limited cultural relations continue, primarily through private American groups which counsel the rapidly growing number of Libyan students—now some 500—studying in the United States.

## Mauritania

Our desire for frank discussions with African states regarding problems in southern Africa was demonstrated in September by the President's meeting with Mauritanian President Ould Daddah, also current President of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). In

169

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order to strengthen bilateral relations with Mauritania, a state which regards itself as a bridge between Arab Muslim north Africa and black sub-Saharan Africa, relations were established at the Ambas-sadorial level during the year.

Although most of our assistance to Mauritania is channeled through regional A.I.D. projects and international organizations, a number of extremely useful self-help projects have been initiated with U.S. support. Two of the more impressive have been the con-struction of an experimental poultry center and a warehouse for stor-ing food supplies for humanitarian purposes.

## Morocco

The Vice President's visit to Morocco in July, only days after King Hassan had successfully put down an attempted military coup, re-flected the strength of our historic ties with Morocco dating back to Morocco's recognition of our Republic in 1778.

U.S. bilateral assistance concentrated on expansion of agricultural production, aid to family planning, and reduction of unemployment. A $24.9 million Public Law 480 agreement signed in August ac-counted for approximately half of the total U.S. economic assistance during the year. A $15 million credit was extended under the pro visions of the Foreign Military Sales Act to permit the Moroccan armed forces to purchase equipment for their defensive requirements.

By the end of 1971, U.S. private investment in Morocco had reached almost $50 million, primarily concentrated in petroleum distribution, banks, tire manufacturing, and hotel construction. Under Morocco's liberal foreign investment code, private foreign investment promises to become an increasingly important source of development capital.

## Sudan

Formal diplomatic relations between the United States and Sudan, disrupted in June 1967, have not yet been resumed, primarily because of differences over Middle East problems. Nevertheless, the two governments have representation in their respective capitals, and a favorable evolution in our relations is perceptible. Our interest in establishing closer contact was exemplified by the visit of the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs to Khartoum in December at the invitation of the Sudanese Government. The Sudanese have expressed the hope that it will be possible for the United States and Sudan to expand their commercial and cultural relations.

170

The conferral of full recognition by the United States of the独立自主的ally

A recent leadership evaluation, prepared since 1966, shows that the economic reci-ving of credit and the approval of $6 million in loans and appropria-tions by the People's Democratic Republic of Sudan and the People's Democratic Republic of Turkey have been effective. In par-allel with the key role played by the United States in international

WE

United States agencies have been instrumental in helping to hig-hlight the importance of the Middle East問題 to the United States and Sudan to expand their commercial and cultural relations.

The United States follows a policy of noninvolvement in the conflict in the southern Sudan between government forces and secessionists, but continues to hope for its resolution in the interest of all the Sudanese people. President Nimeri has publicly indicated his concern over this problem. We hope that recent meetings between the Sudanese Government and insurgent leaders may lead to a mutually acceptable resolution of the civil strife.

## Tunisia

A decade ago, the United States decided that Tunisia should receive special developmental assistance in view of its progressive leadership and government and its determination to promote rapid economic development. Tunisia has been one of the largest African recipients of U.S. economic assistance, having received $700 million since independence. Principal A.I.D. projects have been in the areas of cereal production, nutrition, family planning, livestock feeding, and agricultural training. In FY 1971, the United States provided approximately $40 million in economic assistance, as well as about $6 million in military assistance.

Prime Minister Hedi Nouira continued to focus his government's efforts on developing a greater role for private enterprise in the country's development and commercial life. Reforms have been undertaken which are designed to increase agricultural production, facilitate the role of small entrepreneurs, and improve Tunisia's foreign reserve position. There has been some improvement in Tunisia's balance of payments, but the foreign debt burden remains heavy.

In October the Destourian Socialist Party, Tunisia's only political party, met for the first time in seven years for an open discussion on key political issues. Under the present constitution, the Prime Minister would succeed President Bourguiba.

## WEST AFRICA

### Dahomey

U.S. relations with Dahomey remained excellent. A.I.D. agreed to help finance the $4.9 million Cotonou dam/bridge if other financing cannot be found and, as part of a larger regional network, a telecommunications link in the interior of the country.

President Maga, first head of the three-man revolving Presidential Council, made a private visit to the United States in December.

171

Efforts at settlement are underway in all current cases in non-Communist countries, and an agreed settlement is considered likely in most cases. India, for example, has stated that it will compensate all insurance firms recently nationalized in repatriable foreign currency.

Prospects for settlement of certain other cases, however, are less encouraging. The dispute involving the International Petroleum Company in Peru has been particularly difficult. In Chile the amount of compensation for expropriated properties of the large copper companies is in serious dispute. (However, agreement has been reached in Chile on compensation for takeovers of some other concerns, including an iron mining company and a bank.)

Our investors ask that developing countries, if they indeed want private investment, establish clear and workable rules for foreign investment, and that they apply these consistently.

Without direct private foreign investment, the task of these governments to meet their own people's demands for a better life through economic development becomes at best most difficult. In most cases, public flows, or foreign assistance, by themselves probably cannot supply the necessary resources in adequate amounts.

The U.S. Government has given careful consideration to the problem of expropriations. When a country expropriates a significant U.S. interest without making reasonable provision for just compensation to U.S. citizens, we will operate on the presumption of not extending new bilateral economic benefits to that country unless and until it is determined that the country is taking reasonable steps to provide adequate compensation or that the national interest requires a different course of action. A similar presumption will govern our actions in the multilateral development banks.

A renewed emphasis has been placed on dispute settlement through internationally acceptable procedures agreed upon in advance. Moreover, American investors have been giving increased attention to new modes of investment which permit the flow of needed capital and technology while minimizing conflicts over national prerogatives. These would include joint ventures with local partners, or perhaps long-term sales contracts coupled with management contracts. In the latter case, local entrepreneurs retain ownership, while the foreign investor is assured of the production and management control.

## INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM DEVELOPMENTS

In 1971, the petroleum producing countries of the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America forced a large increase in the price

01

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216

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of oil. As a result, the cost of oil—and the income of the producing countries—in 1971 rose by an estimated $4.3 billion over that of 1969. Between 1971 and 1975 the increased cost to the importers, and revenue to the exporters, might rise by a total exceeding $30 billion. Most of the increased cost will fall on the consumer in the United States, western Europe, and Japan, but others, including those of many poor countries, will also be adversely affected.

The price rises, significant in themselves, were also symptomatic of a deeper change in the international oil market. The buyers' market of the past two decades is changing—if it has not already done so—to an increasingly strong sellers' market in which a relatively small number of producers have significant ability to prescribe the terms of trade. The producing countries who are members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) control approximately 90 percent of the oil supplies in international trade and the vast bulk of reserves outside of North America and the U.S.S.R.

The effects of this change in the oil market are already beginning to be felt. While the importing countries were able to absorb the higher costs of the 1971 settlement without serious dislocations, they are increasingly concerned at the extent of their dependence on the OPEC countries for stable, secure, and reasonably priced supplies of oil in the future.

Our own reliance on imported oil is increasing. In the past, we have been largely self-sufficient as well as able, in case of need, to make oil supplies available to our allies as we did in the 1956 and 1967 emergencies. Our ability to do so in the future, however, is rapidly diminishing in the face of our own increasing consumption, the depletion of our existing oil reserves, and difficulties in bringing new domestic reserves such as the Alaskan fields into production. In 1971, we imported almost one-quarter of our total consumption of petroleum, and unless substantial new domestic supplies are developed in the coming years, that proportion will certainly rise. Some estimates place our reliance on imported oil as high as 50 percent by 1980, with as much as three-quarters of our imports due to come from Eastern Hemisphere sources.

In the past we have made efforts to import as much of our needs as possible from more secure sources in the Western Hemisphere. Yet, the growing size of our needs will tax the capability of Western Hemisphere suppliers, particularly Venezuela, where any significant increases will depend on large amounts of new investment. An increasing proportion of our imports will consequently—and quite apart from economic factors—have to come from more prolific sources in the Eastern Hemisphere.

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The terms on which oil was sold changed abruptly in 1971. Conditions had begun to alter as early as 1967, when closure of the Suez Canal created strains in the normal transport patterns and limited the flexibility of the international oil companies. Subsequent developments—such as the emergence of a new regime in Libya, rupture of the pipelines supplying the Eastern Mediterranean from the Persian Gulf, and success in earlier price negotiations—strengthened the hand as well as the unity of the OPEC states. When they pressed the oil companies in the early months of the year for major increases in price, the OPEC governments were able to gain a substantial portion of their demands, backed as they were, by threats to cut off the supply.

The U.S. Government took a supportive but significant role in the resolution of these oil price negotiations. Under Secretary of State John Irwin worked with the major producing states of the Persian Gulf to develop long-term agreements which were satisfactory to the companies and the OPEC countries, setting and stabilizing prices for a five-year period.

The 1971 agreements with OPEC, however, have not brought quiet to the international oil picture. As 1971 drew to a close, the oil companies were faced with a new set of demands from the OPEC countries: for a further increase in oil prices to compensate for the effects of dollar devaluation, and for a working equity interest ("participation") in the concessionary companies' operations. Negotiations on both issues began early in 1972. We hope that these negotiations will lead to mutually satisfactory settlements in keeping with the national aspirations of the producing states, but not disruptive to the steady flow of investment necessary to develop supplies to meet the world's growing energy needs.

Other events in the international petroleum industry gave us cause for concern at the end of 1971. In Libya, the government nationalized the interests of British Petroleum for avowedly political reasons. In Venezuela, a series of government decrees effectively imposed a government-controlled marketing system on the companies. Because we believe that a healthy industry is important if we and other oil consuming states are to have a secure and stable supply of oil to meet our expanding needs over the next decades, we are concerned over the implications for the future of these unilateral actions taken by producer state governments.

## OCEAN AFFAIRS

World concern over environmental problems and the depletion of natural resources rose sharply in 1971. The focus of much attention

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United Nations

The United Nations has an important role to play in the transition from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation—a goal central to U.S. foreign policy in 1971. It provides both a forum and a mechanism for the adjustment of disputes and for cooperation in reconciling a broad range of conflicting national interests. In utilizing the United Nations for these purposes, however, realism compels us to acknowledge the organization's present limitations, particularly in the political and security fields.

The prevailing skepticism regarding the organization's potential is largely the result of unrealistic expectations fostered in the past. To perpetuate them now would further reduce its credibility. Acknowledging its weaknesses, on the other hand, does not detract from our strong support for the United Nations. Given our stake in its success, we must work with persistence and determination to overcome its difficulties and to enable it to act with maximum effectiveness in those areas where cooperation among its members makes this possible. Despite its limitations, there are grounds for encouragement in the progress being made in economic development, technical, and social fields.

In the security field, the failure of the United Nations to prevent or to stop the fighting between India and Pakistan further impaired its standing as a peacekeeping body. The General Assembly by an overwhelming majority registered the desire of the world community that the fighting be stopped and troops be withdrawn, but the Assembly can only recommend. The failure to stop the fighting must be squarely attributed to Soviet abuse of the veto in the Security Council. Both in the Security Council and in the Assembly, the United States acted in the forefront of the majority that tried to put an end to the fighting.

During the year, our discussions with the Soviet Union on U.N. peacekeeping rules made no headway, and the ability of the organization to field observers and troops to prevent or damp down conflicts continues to depend on improvisation in each case. Meanwhile, however, the U.N. peacekeeping force in Cyprus provided a buffer between the Turkish and Greek communities while efforts were intensified to foster inter-communal talks. Even if no progress was

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made toward a settlement, the Jarring mission continued and the
cease-fire was maintained in the Middle East.

The most important political development in the United Nations
during 1971 was the entry of the People's Republic of China, which
we supported. There was sharp and justified disappointment in the
United States that a majority of the member states did not agree with
our position that seating of the People's Republic should not be
accomplished at the cost of excluding the Republic of China; but we
accepted the majority decision.

Both the Security Council and the General Assembly devoted a
great deal of attention to African issues, with a disquieting tendency
to call for extreme and impracticable measures in certain instances.
While we were unable to support such measures, we continued to side
with the overwhelming majority in the United Nations that favors
self-determination and respect for human rights in Africa.

The membership of the organization rose to 132 with the admis-
sion of five new members. No progress was made in providing for an
associate status for future applicants who will not have the resources
to discharge their responsibilities as voting members. Particularly
critical is the anomaly whereby an ever larger majority in the General
Assembly is able to recommend programs and vote budgets without
necessarily having the support of the comparative few on whom the
United Nations relies for action and resources to implement its
recommendations. While we intend to continue our substantial sup-
port for voluntary programs, we have decided to work for a reduc-
tion of our assessed contribution to 25 percent as a means of
achieving a better balance between capacity to pay and the responsi-
bilities inherent in the principle of sovereign equality of member
states.

Despite a major effort by the United States and a few others,
only limited progress was made toward reforming wasteful General
Assembly procedures. We shall continue to press for better organi-
zation and reform of procedures.

The financial situation deteriorated further during 1971, eroding
the U.N.'s fiscal position and undermining confidence in its poten-
tial. What is most needed now is assurance of adequate contribu-
tions from those whose withholding of past assessments brought on
the financial crisis. We were heartened by the pledge of the newly
elected Secretary General that restoring financial solvency and

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improving efficiency would be at the top of his list of concerns. Meanwhile, it is essential that the United Nations live within its means and that new activities be financed out of savings derived from eliminating or postponing activities of lower priority.

On the economic and social side, the record was brighter. The U.N. system made good progress during the year in such difficult areas as population and family planning and international control of drug trafficking. The U.N. Fund for Population Activities has programmed about $30 million for projects to be carried out primarily by specialized agencies in assisting countries in this field. A special U.N. fund was established and a plan for concerted action prepared to assist countries in drug control activities. The United Nations Development Program and the U.N. specialized agencies played an increasingly significant and effective role throughout the world.

A key accomplishment—the result of a U.S. initiative—was the strengthening of the capacity of the Economic and Social Council to review and coordinate economic development and the applications of science and technology to the development process. In response to another U.S. initiative, the United Nations established a central mechanism for responding to requests for aid from countries struck by disaster. For the first time, the United Nations now has a high ranking Disaster Relief Coordinator with wide powers to mobilize, direct, and coordinate relief activities in cases of natural disaster and other emergency situations.

The United Nations also made progress in its preparations for major international conferences to be held in 1972 on the preservation of the human environment and in 1973 on the law of the sea to fix boundaries and establish rules for sharing the benefits of the seabed. (See chapter on International Law for details.) Eight years of difficult negotiation culminated in agreement on an Outer Space Liability Convention. In addition, a convention to prevent the production and use of bacteriological weapons was completed. (See chapter on Arms Control and Disarmament for details.)

The record of accomplishment is mixed, but the need is clear. The United Nations must be seen for what it is—an invaluable forum and mechanism for international cooperation, dependent on the cooperation of its member governments. We intend to give it maximum support to act in areas where such cooperation is possible. At the same time we shall work with like-minded governments to cor-

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rect its deficiencies and to strengthen its capacity to deal with issues of peace and security.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

In a major policy statement, the Secretary of State announced in August that the United States would support the participation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the United Nations and the transfer of the Chinese seat in the Security Council to the People's Republic of China. At the same time, the Secretary said the United States would seek to preserve representation for the Government of the Republic of China.

The question of Chinese representation dominated the 26th General Assembly session. In the General Assembly Secretary Rogers pointed out that for more than 20 years two governments had exer-

A new face at the United Nations—People's Republic of China delegate Chiao Kuan-Lua.

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cised in the Third Security Council meeting of the Security Council. At the meeting, the General Assembly decided that the People's Republic of China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, would be considered a strategic friend of the People's Republic of China. While the People's Republic of China was being considered a strategic friend, the People's Republic of China was also being considered a strategic enemy by the United States and by the United Nations.

Indo-Pakistani War

The first major crisis confronting the *United Nations* after the
change in China's representation was the conflict between India and
Pakistan. (See Near East and South Asia for a full review of
issues and events in this conflict.)

Well before the initiation of hostilities, the Secretary General—
with strong U.S. support—had acted quickly to establish a U.N.
framework for coordinating international relief efforts and helping
to overcome the enormous problems which had arisen from the
natural disaster and civil strife in East Pakistan in late 1970 and
1971. His actions reinforced the steps taken by the United States
and others to attempt to restore peace and stability in South Asia
and to assist the refugees in India and East Pakistan.

On May 19 the Secretary General designated Sadruddin Agha Khan, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as the coordinator of U.N. assistance to India in helping to meet the needs of the East Pakistani refugees in that country. He also established a U.N. East Pakistan Relief Operation (UNEPRO) to aid the civilian population in East Pakistan. (See the chapter on International Socio-Political Cooperation, section on Refugees for details on UNHCR and aid to India.) UNEPRO coordinated and monitored foreign relief assistance, initiated programs to establish an effective relief transportation system, a direct feeding program, and other relief projects until the spread of hostilities brought a halt to its operations in late 1971.

These humanitarian efforts demonstrated the utility of the organ-
ization in circumstances where unilateral efforts were largely ruled
out for political reasons. However, its efforts to prevent the outbreak
of hostilities were thwarted from the beginning.

In separate letters to Prime Minister Gandhi and President Yahya Khan in July, the Secretary General urged restraint. In a memorandum to the President of the Security Council, he expressed his concern that the situation presented the international community with a potential threat to peace and security, and he suggested that the Council take the situation in South Asia under consideration. On October 20, well before the conflict erupted, he addressed letters to the Indian and Pakistani leaders reiterating his appeal for restraint and offering to extend his good offices to the two nations. The suggestion for good offices was accepted by Pakistan but not by India. The situation continued to worsen until open warfare broke out in early December.

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retary Rogers issued a statement expressing the hope that "the Council can take prompt action on steps which would bring about a cease-fire, withdrawal of forces, and an amelioration of the present threat to international peace and security."

The Security Council on December 5 considered a draft resolution introduced by the United States embodying these objectives. Eleven members of the Council, including the PRC, voted in favor of the U.S. proposal, but the resolution was vetoed by the Soviet Union, with Poland voting against and the United Kingdom and France abstaining.

At a second meeting of the Security Council, a Soviet draft resolution calling for an East Pakistan political settlement but failing to call for the immediate cease-fire and withdrawal of forces received only two favorable votes. Eight nonpermanent members of the Council then made a further effort to secure approval of a cease-fire resolution, but this effort was blocked by a second Soviet veto.

Late on December 6, the Security Council, with the Soviet Union abstaining, referred the question to the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution, a procedure adopted by the General Assembly in 1950 under which it can act rapidly to recommend measures for the maintenance of international peace and security if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity among the permanent members, fails to exercise its responsibility.

At the end of a lengthy session on December 7, the General Assembly approved a resolution, by a vote of 104 to 11 (Bhutan, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R.) with 10 abstentions—essentially the same as that vetoed in the Security Council—calling for a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, creation of conditions suitable for the voluntary return of refugees, and protection of civilians in the area of conflict.

India refused to heed the Assembly's recommendations or to give clear assurances regarding its intentions to respect the Kashmir cease-fire line. Thus the Security Council again convened on December 12 at the initiative of the United States, which introduced a resolution in language similar to that of the General Assembly resolution. However, divisions within the Council remained unchanged. The resolution was supported by 11 members, but the Soviet Union again exercised its veto.

Several more unsuccessful attempts were made to negotiate a consensus resolution which would not be vetoed by the Soviet Union. Following the implementation of a cease-fire on December 17, the Security Council on December 21 adopted a resolution by a vote

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of 13 to 0, with the U.S.S.R. and Poland abstaining. The resolution demanded that the cease-fire remain in effect until withdrawals took place, as soon as practicable, of all armed forces to their respective territories; called for the preservation of human life and the observance of the Geneva Conventions with respect to the protection of the sick and wounded prisoners of war, and civilian population; and called for international assistance in the relief and rehabilitation of refugees.

## Peacekeeping

That the U.N.'s role as peacemaker is sharply limited when a great power consensus is lacking was made manifest throughout this crisis. Similarly, continuing efforts to lay a stronger basis for the dispatch of U.N. peacekeeping missions were frustrated during the year by the failure of the permanent members of the Security Council to reach agreement on rules for conducting and financing such operations.

During 1971 the United States made a further effort to reach an understanding, initially with the U.S.S.R., on overall guidelines for the conduct of future U.N. peacekeeping operations. As we have repeatedly made clear, the United States retains a strong interest in workable multilateral arrangements for restoring or maintaining peace around the world.

In early 1970, the United States had approached the U.S.S.R. hoping to find a basis for agreement on such arrangements. Soviet representatives did not respond until mid-1971, at which time they insisted that the permanent members of the Security Council must achieve unanimity at almost every stage of any future peacekeeping operation, including the exercise of direct control over detailed operational matters. The U.S.S.R. has so far been unwilling to agree that the Secretary General should retain flexibility to manage an on-going peacekeeping operation in consultation with the Security Council. Pending agreement on such guidelines, the General Assembly's Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations made little progress on improving U.N. peacekeeping capabilities.

Nevertheless, U.N. peacekeeping missions continued during 1971 to operate in areas of tension and conflict. The U.N. Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) played an important role in preventing intercommunal incidents between Greek and Turkish Cypriots from escalating into major civil disturbances. During 1971, eight countries contributed 3,100 troops and police to the Force, whose mandate was extended by the Security Council in June and December for six-month periods. The U.N. Secretary General took an active role in efforts to broaden

and strict settlement of the East and West. In addition, the officers and nization of Israel and the retary sador pursuing the efforts, between the East and West. With the U.N. force linked in that way, the outbreak

The United Nations Assembly, sending this area international conflict, the International Court of Arbitration at a Conference of States Parties. The international legal framework in hostilities during the year outlasted the failed Geneva Conference. Because they are the

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and strengthen discussions among the parties looking toward a peace-
ful settlement of this longstanding dispute. (See chapter on Near
East and South Asia, section on Middle East, for further details.)

In the Middle East, some 16 countries contributed 226 military
officers to serve as observers for the U.N. Truce Supervision Orga-
nization which continued to monitor the cease-fire lines between
Israel and Egypt and between Israel and Syria. In addition, the Sec-
retary General's Special Representative in the Middle East, Ambas-
sador Gunnar Jarring of Sweden, remained available for talks
pursuant to Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.
However, attention focused throughout most of 1971 on intensified
efforts, led by the United States, to achieve an interim agreement
between Israel and Egypt as a step toward overall settlement in
accordance with the Security Council's Resolution 242. (See Near
East and South Asia, section on the Middle East for further details.)

With 45 military observers furnished by 11 member states, the U.N. observer group in Kashmir maintained its posts along the cease-fire line and reported to the Secretary General on military activity in that area until its freedom of movement was suspended by the outbreak of hostilities in December.

Human Rights in Armed Conflicts

The U.N. has in recent years been concerned with the issue of "Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts." The General Assembly has received from the Secretary General three reports presenting a detailed survey of the existing international instruments in this area and making suggestions for additional instruments. Present international law, calling for the humanitarian conduct of armed conflicts and the protection of war victims, is based on the four Geneva Conventions which were drawn up under the auspites of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and adopted at a Conference held in 1949. There are now 130 parties to these treaties.

The U.S. experience with the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and in particular with the Convention relating to prisoners of war, has demonstrated the need for stricter compliance by parties engaged in hostilities. In the U.N. General Assembly we stressed again this year our deep concern over the plight of our prisoners resulting from the failure of North Vietnam to live up to its obligations under the Geneva Convention.

Because the principal instruments governing these human rights
are the Geneva Conventions, the moves to add to or supplement

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nical fields. For example, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) moved ahead with programs in conservation, plant and animal research, and agricultural development planning. The World Health Organization (WHO) stepped up its activities in the field of environmental health, family planning, and health manpower development. The control of communicable diseases continued to be stressed. The success of its smallpox eradication program throughout the world contributed to the Surgeon General's decision to limit vaccinations to persons under special risk, such as travelers to and from countries where the disease is still endemic. During the year, also, the International Atomic Energy Agency made substantial progress in implementing provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by developing expanded safeguards to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons use.

## Refugees and Disaster Relief

It has been a matter of concern that the United Nations has not had a standing capability for responding to requests for assistance from countries struck by disasters. Individual agencies, such as UNICEF, the World Food Program, and the WHO, have taken prompt action, but this sometimes has been inefficient because of the difficulty of assuring a coordinated approach. The United States took the lead to remedy this situation. The Economic and Social Council in July 1971 adopted a resolution subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly, which created the Office of Disaster Relief Coordinator, to be appointed by the U.N. Secretary General, with wide powers to mobilize, direct, and coordinate the relief activities of all organizations in the U.N. system in cases of natural disaster and other emergency situations. He will receive contributions on behalf of the Secretary General, coordinate U.N. assistance with that given by intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, serve as a clearing house for assistance from all sources of external aid, issue calls for assistance in the name of the Secretary General, and help governments in all aspects of pre-disaster planning. The Coordinator will be supported by a small permanent staff and will report directly to the Secretary General. (See chapter on International Socio-Political Cooperation, section on Refugees.)

The 26th General Assembly renewed the mandate of the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) and reaffirmed the longstanding U.N. role in support of these refugees. The United States provided $23 million toward the work of UNRWA in 1971.

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to the General Assembly that the United States will share with the world community the results of its experimental earth resource survey program, we will make available to the Working Group data from our Earth Resource Technology Satellite, ERTS-A, scheduled for flight test in May 1972.

In May, the United States conducted an International Workshop on Earth Resource Survey Systems at the University of Michigan, attended by representatives of 53 countries and international organizations, and sponsored the first U.N. Panel on Remote Sensing dealing with the state of earth survey technology and its potential applications. (See chapter on Science and Technology, section on Space.)

Years of difficult negotiations culminated in 1971 with the adoption by the U.N. Outer Space Committee and endorsement by the General Assembly of a Convention on Liability for Damage Caused by Objects Launched into Outer Space. (See chapter on International Law, section on Outer Space for further details.)

## Narcotics

With active American encouragement as part of the Administration's worldwide campaign against drug abuse, the United Nations has expanded its fight against drug abuse. (For a general discussion of the Administration's policies on the international aspects of narcotics control, see chapter on International Socio-Political Cooperation, section on Drug Control.)

During 1971 the United Nations created a Plan for Concerted Action Against Drug Abuse and set up a special Fund for Drug Abuse Control. The Plan is designed to assist countries to (1) improve their drug control administrations, (2) train police and customs officials, (3) develop adequate national laws, (4) treat and rehabilitate addicts, (5) educate against drug abuse, and (6) promote alternative means of livelihood for farmers now growing opium poppies. The cost of implementing projects under the Plan will be considerable—the U.N. Secretary General estimated some $100 million over a five-year period. The United States made the largest single contribution to the Fund for Drug Abuse Control with a first-year grant of $2 million. Subject to congressional approval, it expects to support the Fund on a continuing basis. Along with the Secretary General we are encouraging other states to make substantial contributions.

One of the first country programs to be financed by the U.N. Fund will be in Thailand, where opium production and illicit traffic are

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substantial. Thailand's location provides a convenient corridor for the movement of opium, morphine, and heroin from Laos and Burma to areas of consumption in the south and in neighboring countries and then to Hong Kong, Japan, Australia, and North America. U.S. servicemen in Vietnam are an important target for this illicit traffic. Representatives of the United Nations, Thailand, and the United States met in Bangkok in November 1971 to coordinate plans for strengthening narcotics law enforcement, replacing opium poppy cultivation with alternative crops and livestock, developing measures to rehabilitate opium and heroin drug addicts and facilitate their social reintegration, and expanding the narcotics educational campaign. The cost of the U.N. contribution to the project is expected to be about $3 million over a five-year period.

To strengthen the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, the United States proposed specific amendments to improve the ability of the International Narcotics Control Board to identify and eradicate illicit traffic in narcotic drugs. Our amendments would:

- enable the Board to require from states details about opium poppy cultivation and opium production—thus permitting the Board access to essential information about narcotics raw material from which illicit diversion occurs;

- accord the Board authority to base its decisions not only on information officially submitted by governments, but also on information which the Board obtains through public or private sources;

- permit the Board, with the consent of the state concerned, to carry out an on-the-spot inquiry on drug-related activities;

- give the Board authority to modify states' annual estimates of intended poppy acreage and opium production, where that production has contributed to illicit activity, with a view to reducing amounts of authorized acreage or production; and

- require the Board to report to U.N. political bodies, with recommendations for appropriate action, on especially serious breaches of the Convention.

In October 1971 the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs held a week-long debate on amendments proposed by the United States, France, Sweden, and Peru. It concluded without opposing vote that a review of the Single Convention was warranted. The U.N. Economic and Social Council has scheduled a plenipotentiary conference for March 1972 in Geneva to consider all the proposals for amending the Single Convention.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs also highlighted problem areas in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and Latin America. On the initiative of Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey, the Commission adopted

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a resolution establishing an ad hoc committee on illicit narcotics traffic in the Middle East to improve cooperation and increase mutual assistance in efforts to eliminate illicit production and traffic in the area.

The United States, which produces a large percentage of the psychotropic substances entering the illicit drug traffic, joined with 22 other nations on February 21, 1971, to sign in Vienna a Convention on Psychotropic Substances. This is the first international instrument for the control of such substances as the hallucinogens (including LSD), amphetamines, barbituarates, and tranquilizers. On June 29 the President submitted the Convention to the Senate for its early advice and consent to ratification.

The Convention, which will come into force three months after 40 nations have ratified it, requires that both the manufacture of and trade in psychotropic substances be licensed and that they be dispensed only by medical prescription. Records must be kept by manufacturers and distributors, and there will be both inspections and required reports. For the more dangerous substances both import and export authorizations will be required. The Convention also calls for measures of prevention and education; the treatment, rehabilitation, and social integration of addicts; coordinated action against illicit traffic; and punishment of violators and the extradition of offenders. Reporting and supervisory functions will be given to the International Narcotics Control Board, while the U.N. Commission on Narcotic Drugs will have decision-making, reviewing, and recommending authority.

## IMPROVING THE UNITED NATIONS

### Financial and Budgetary Measures

U.N. financial deterioration continued in 1971, eroding its fiscal status and its potential for action, a trend that the United States wished to see reversed. A serious liquidity crisis brought the organization to the verge of bankruptcy. In 1971 the organization's current debt was about $70 million in addition to the long-term obligation to repay the remaining $119 million of the U.N. bond issue. Total arrearages, i.e., unpaid assessments for all purposes owed by members, amounted to $176.7 million as of June 30, 1971. Of this amount, $139.5 million reflected deliberate withholdings, principally by the U.S.S.R., other eastern European states, and France, as a matter of announced policy. The remaining $37.2 million was owed by slow-paying members. However, no member was sufficiently in

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International Carriage by Air (Warsaw Convention) at Guatemala City on March 8. The protocol was the culmination of negotiations conducted under the auspices of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) since 1968. The new protocol revises the Warsaw Convention, increasing from $8,300 to $100,000 the limit of liability of air carriers in the case of death or injury of a passenger on an international flight. An interim agreement of 1966 had increased the limit to $75,000 for flights to and from the United States. The Guatemala Protocol provides that a carrier will be liable without regard to whether it is at fault for the accident. It also provides that a country may adopt a domestic system covering its own citizens to supplement the compensation available to them under the Convention. The revisions agreed to at Guatemala are in accord with the position advocated by this Administration. We believe the results of the Conference will help provide protection for the American traveling public, while recognizing the interests of the air carriers and establishing uniform rules of international air transportation.

The Guatemala Protocol will not become effective as a treaty obligation of the United States until the Senate has approved it. A total of 30 countries must ratify it before the protocol enters into force.

## TERRORISM AND KIDNAPPING

Kidnapping and other crimes of violence against diplomats and other foreign officials were less frequent in 1971, although terrorist activities of this nature remain a problem for some governments. The British Ambassador to Uruguay was kidnapped and held prisoner for seven months; several attempts, one successful, were made against the lives of high Jordanian officials. However, there were no known kidnap attempts directed at U.S. Government officials, and Dr. Claude Fly, kidnapped in 1970 by Uruguayan terrorists, was released during 1971. During the year the United States strongly supported efforts in the Organization of American States (OAS) and in the United Nations to deal with terrorism.

In February the United States, along with 12 other OAS member nations, signed a convention we had worked on to facilitate the extradition and prosecution of persons who have committed crimes of violence against persons to whom a state owes a duty of special protection under international law. Under this convention such acts are treated as common crimes rather than political offenses. A state in which an offender is found has the option of granting his extradi-

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nt of ratification subject to the approval of the United Nations, which is found in number of states that have entered into treaty, but not Argentina. The United States will perform its obligation under the convention.

In force both on aviation deals and on aircraft, the aircraft of the United States are under their

direction. The United States have directed their forces to the attack on aircraft, and have punished those who have engaged in the犯ious act of regarding an aircraft of a foreign Power as a major role in the achievement of the objective of achieving

foreign policy. The United States are seeking safety of life in the air.

The protocol provides, among other things, that the United Nations shall take all measures to prevent and meet the危急情况.

In addition to

tion or submitting the case to its own authorities for prosecution. The convention also provides that the signatory states will try to have such acts included in their own penal laws. The President submitted the OAS Convention to the Senate on May 11 for its approval.

On November 12, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a resolution, cosponsored by the United States, requesting the International Law Commission to prepare a draft convention on crimes against diplomats for early submission to the General Assembly. Such a convention would have worldwide applicability. In the United States protection of any person, including official visitors, is primarily the responsibility of state and local authorities. However, recognizing that local resources of law enforcement are severely burdened, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General submitted legislation in August 1971 which would make federal offenses of kidnapping and other violent assaults and harassment of foreign officials in carrying out their official functions. The proposed legislation would also make destruction of foreign government offices and official residences a federal offense. In view of recent incidents involving foreign government officials in the United States, and threats of future violence against those officials, prompt congressional action is needed to put these laws into force.

## INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

During 1971 the United States pursued its campaign to encourage greater use of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by nations and international organizations. In reply to a questionnaire on the Review of the Role of the ICJ circulated by the Secretary General of the United Nations, the United States submitted recommendations designed to broaden optional access to the Court and to make such access more attractive and less difficult for potential litigants.

In addition the United States proposed during the 26th Session of the U.N. General Assembly that an Ad Hoc Committee be established in order to study further the present operation of the Court, the practices of states with regard to the Court, and means by which the role of the ICJ in the international community could be improved. This proposal was not approved by the General Assembly. Further consideration of the item was postponed until the next session.

The United States also actively participated in the proceedings before the International Court of Justice in the Namibia case (South-West Africa). (See chapter on Africa, section on Southern Africa.)

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# International Socio-Political Cooperation

## EVOLVING ISSUES IN DIPLOMACY

Diplomacy is anything but static. The problems that men must solve in a framework of international cooperation are constantly changing, and with them, the task of the diplomat.

In recent years, the world has become increasingly aware of a series of crises which today threaten the well-being of all mankind and in the future may imperil survival itself. Among these are the deterioration of the environment, the unbearable pressures brought about by burgeoning and displaced populations, and the sudden rise of drug abuse in country after country around the earth.

Developing international collaboration to deal with such issues is a challenging task and one which absorbed more and more of the Department's energies in 1971. Important strides were made in alerting all nations to the dangers of environmental abuse. Recognition of the population factor as an underlying cause of unrest and tension was accompanied by an increase in educational and medical programs in the population field. The illicit international drug traffic became a matter of official concern to many nations for the first time.

The Department's programs in these areas are recounted in the next three sections. Similarly, in 1971, the Department continued its efforts to involve more and more sectors of the population in the work of promoting international cooperation. U.S. initiatives in two such areas, youth and labor, are also outlined here.

## DRUG CONTROL ¹

The rapid growth in the abuse of narcotics and other dangerous drugs has become an alarming worldwide problem calling for effective international cooperation. While a network of controls is required for the full range of harmful substances, a major international effort at this stage must be concentrated on the elimination of illicit opium and thus its derivatives.

¹ For discussion of major multilateral initiatives through the United Nations, see chapter on the United Nations. For detailed discussion of cooperation with such individual countries as Turkey, France, Mexico, and Vietnam, see relevant geographic chapters.

[L.C]

DRUGS

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Estimates of illicit consumers of the world's supply of opium and its derivatives total more than two million persons, and the number is rising. While the majority of the users is in the East and consumes opium in its raw form, there has been a significant shift toward opiate use, primarily heroin, in the West. The U.S. heroin addict population, currently estimated at more than 300,000, exceeds that of any other nation. But the problem is growing elsewhere as well. In western Europe the number of addicts is estimated to be as high as 100,000. Addiction to heroin accounts for a significant and increasing part of the opium consumed in Iran, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Vietnam. Moreover, heroin use among U.S. troops in Vietnam is beginning to spill over to the native population.

Taking full measure of the drug problem and the need for urgent action, the President on June 17, 1971, in a special message to the Congress, called for an all-out effort to find a solution. To back up domestic and international efforts to control the traffic and dry up the demand for drugs and narcotics, he asked for a total of $371 million for FY 1972, double the amount for the previous year ($166 million). A subsequent allocation has raised the FY 1972 total to $475 million. The same day, the President established the Special Action Office of Drug Abuse Prevention in the White House and urged the Congress to approve legislation which would give that office responsibility for all major federal activities in drug abuse prevention, education, treatment, rehabilitation, and research programs.

While our collective efforts are moving ahead at home, much of the production and processing of illicit narcotics and other dangerous drugs takes place in other countries. Furthermore, the present serious situation in the United States could well extend to other nations in the future. Thus the President has also appealed for a worldwide cooperative effort. In this attack on the international front, the Department of State is the primary agency for coordinating international narcotics controls.

Assigning the drug problem high priority among foreign policy issues, the Department last August appointed at the Assistant Secretary level a Senior Adviser to the Secretary and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, Nelson Gross.

Drug Control Coordinators have been designated for the Department's regional and functional bureaus, and in July the regional bureaus began setting up Interagency Narcotics Control Committees with representation from State, A.I.D., Justice, Treasury, Defense, CIA, and USIA. Drug control officers have also been designated at most of our missions to coordinate the Country Team efforts abroad.

In August, the President further strengthened the Department's

318

role in dealing with the foreign supply and international trafficking in drugs and narcotics by establishing the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State. Other members of the Committee are Attorney General John N. Mitchell; Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird; Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally, Jr.; Ambassador George Bush, U.S. Representative to the United Nations; Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; and Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz.

Specifically, the Cabinet Committee will: (1) develop comprehensive plans and programs for drug control; (2) assure the coordination of all activities of international scope; (3) evaluate all such activities and their implementation; (4) make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concerning funding of activities; and (5) make periodic reports on the progress of its operations to the President. The Cabinet Committee is sup-

Part of the solution—U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations George Bush presents U.N. Secretary General U Thant with a check for $1 million, the first contribution to the newly established U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control.

319

["[LJ]", "ported by a Working Group composed of high-level personnel from each of the member agencies plus the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. After three informal meetings, the first formal meeting of the Cabinet Committee was held on September 28 and the second on December 16. The subgroups have met dozens of times.", "A major project initiated by the Cabinet Committee is the preparation of narcotics control action plans for more than 50 countries considered to have a current or potential involvement in the production, processing, consumption, or transiting of illicit hard drugs. The focus is on world supplies, trafficking, and smuggling of heroin and cocaine destined for the U.S. market or U.S. personnel abroad. The action plans include a description of the drug situation, a statement of goals, the strategy to achieve such goals, estimated costs, priorities, and a general timetable for implementation. These plans are being forwarded to Foreign Service posts to serve as a basis for opening discussions with host governments for the negotiation of bilateral narcotics control action programs.", "One of the principal international goals of the United States is an end to opium production and the growing of poppies. The development of effective substitutes for the opium derivatives, particularly codeine, which is now used for medical purposes, would eliminate any valid reason for opium production. In the interim, because there are still indispensable medical uses for opium, and because production of the opium needed for medical purposes is a legitimate source of income in some countries, we are pressing ahead with programs (1) to develop synthetic substitutes for opium derivatives, (2) to assist countries in their efforts to end illicit drug processing and trafficking and illegal opium production, and (3) to make national and international control more effective.", "A major effort is being mounted in the law enforcement field. Intelligence gathering on international narcotics trafficking has been strengthened, and all appropriate law enforcement arms of the U.S. Government—the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), Bureau of Customs, and Public Safety Division of A.I.D.—are stepping up their activities abroad. These efforts have already begun to yield results. Information furnished by French authorities in cooperation with American agencies led to the seizure of the equivalent of over two tons of heroin in 1971. Hong Kong police, in cooperation with our BNDD, seized over 12,000 pounds of opium in 1971 compared with 95 pounds in 1970.", "On a day-to-day basis, the U.S. Government is proceeding both bilaterally and multilaterally against the illicit drug traffic and the", "supplies that ada, Me and special re affects us, important.", "A Frank trol has been made. American and Canadian efforts are now in progress. Canadian efforts are now in

supplies that feed it. Bilateral cooperation has been closest with Canada, Mexico, France, Turkey, and other countries which have a special relationship with us or to the problem of drug control as it affects us. Collaboration with Canada and with Mexico is especially important because of our common frontiers.

A Franco-American Intergovernmental Committee on Drug Control has been meeting periodically to review the cooperative arrangements and to discuss how to improve them. At the invitation of the Americans and French, Canadian representatives from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have also participated in the work of the Committee since November 1970. The primary objective of this tri-lateral cooperative effort is the discovery and closing of heroin conversion laboratories in France and the interception of the illicit heroin traffic to North America. An agreement signed with France in February 1971 provided for French agents to operate in the United States and for U.S. agents to operate in France. The success of this cooperative effort has been demonstrated by substantial heroin seizures made by French and American police.

The Governments of the United States and Mexico have been collaborating in narcotics trafficking programs since 1969 when a Joint Working Group was established. Our cooperative effort has resulted in the seizure and destruction on Mexican soil of large quantities of narcotics and psychotropic substances aimed at the illicit market.

On June 30, the Prime Minister of Turkey announced that the production of opium would be banned in that country. A decree specified that production will be restricted to four provinces for the fall 1971 planting, and that complete abolition of opium production will go into effect when the crop is harvested in June of 1972. Since that announcement, two additional steps have been taken by the Government of Turkey. The first was the passage in August of a strict opium licensing and control law. Secondly, the Turkish opium monopoly has completed purchases of opium gum from the 1971 harvest. The collection of 149 tons, which was more than double the previous year's 61 tons, was larger than any annual collection in the past eight years and represents a significant reduction of leakage into illicit channels.

In response to the Turkish decision to ban opium production, the U.S. Government sent a high-level mission headed by the Secretary of Agriculture to Turkey to provide technical advice on agricultural and agro-industrial development in the area where poppy growing will be eliminated. We have assured Turkey of our readiness to provide financial assistance to help prevent foreign ex-

321

change losses from legitimate exports of opium gum and poppy products and to help establish development activities in the affected areas.

The agreement with Turkey was particularly significant since it will remove the major source of opium for heroin marketed in the United States. We are interested in similar cooperative arrangements with governments of other countries along the illegal trade route which runs from the Middle East through Europe to North America, and increasingly through South America.

We are also seeking cooperative plans with the governments of countries in Southeast Asia where there is substantial illegal or uncontrolled production of opium. That is the area to which the illegal traffickers will turn increasingly as existing sources of supply in the Middle East are closed to them. Two major accomplishments can already be cited. On September 28, the United States and Thailand signed a Memorandum of Understanding by which the two countries pledged mutual action against the supply and trafficking of illicit narcotics and dangerous drugs. Of equal significance, on November 15 the Lao Government implemented a narcotics law which for the first time in Laotian history prohibits the growing, processing, trading, and use of opium and the opiates. These actions will form the basis for cooperative efforts between the two countries and the United States to combat the drug problem in Southeast Asia and reduce the flow of heroin.

In Vietnam the United States is fully supporting the Vietnamese Government's anti-smuggling and narcotics campaign to prevent drug abuse by Vietnamese and Americans alike and eliminate Vietnam as a transshipment point for narcotics to the United States. Among our forces, U.S. military authorities in Vietnam are also applying vigorous control measures to the same end.

In the international field we have been working multilaterally, within the United Nations and other international organizations, and within the framework of the international drug control system established and operating under treaties. International efforts to bring opium and other narcotics under effective control have a long history and have in fact been successful in controlling the legal manufacture of narcotic drugs for medical use. Although world requirements for morphine have increased more than five times since the 1930's, there is no evidence of any substantial leakage to the illicit traffic from the licensed factories. Now the challenge to the international control system is to bring the illegal and uncontrolled production of narcotic raw materials under equally effective control and similarly to extend control over psychotropic or so-called 'mind-bending' substances.

322

During 1971, progress toward international drug control was achieved in three major multilateral initiatives: (1) the strengthening of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, (2) the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control, and (3) the U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances. (For a discussion of these items, see section on United Nations.)

## POPULATION POLICIES AND PROGRAMS

In 1971 the world's population continued to grow at a rate of about 2 percent per year, adding nearly 75 million people and reaching at least 3.7 billion. The belated but by now widespread effort to bring this population explosion under control continued to expand, receiving additional resources and new supporters. Mindful of the serious dimensions of the problem, the United States, with the vigorous bipartisan backing of the Congress, strengthened its own programs and was also successful in stimulating additional multilateral programs and support.

The Congress increased funds earmarked for population matters from $75 million in FY 1970 to $100 million in FY 1971. Pursuant to the President's standing directive to give "high priority for attention, personnel, research and funding" to population and family planning programs, the State Department and A.I.D. continued to increase direct assistance to governments of 33 developing countries, assistance to population programs conducted by U.N. bodies, international organizations, governments of developing countries and private organizations helping developing countries. The rapid expansion in A.I.D.'s application of these funds for a wide range of purposes from demographic studies to a great increase in contraceptive supplies is shown in the following table:

A.I.D. OBLIGATIONS FOR POPULATION/FAMILY PLANNING PROGRAMS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>FY 1969</th><th>FY 1970</th><th>FY 1971</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Country programs</td><td>$12, 731, 000</td><td>$38, 710, 000</td><td>$25, 300, 000</td></tr><tr><td>Technical services (including training)</td><td>12, 098, 000</td><td>16, 967, 000</td><td>32, 200, 000</td></tr><tr><td>Research</td><td>7, 819, 000</td><td>8, 184, 000</td><td>7, 200, 000</td></tr><tr><td>Regional programs</td><td>10, 296, 000</td><td>6, 646, 000</td><td>17, 200, 000</td></tr><tr><td>United Nations</td><td>2, 500, 000</td><td>4, 000, 000</td><td>14, 000, 000</td></tr><tr><td>Total</td><td>45, 444, 000</td><td>74, 507, 000</td><td>95, 900, 000</td></tr></tbody></table>

¹ Includes special $20 million grant to India.

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# A Comprehensive Drug Control Program

## Message From President Nixon, June 17

### To the Congress of the United States:

In New York City more people between the ages of fifteen and thirty-five years die as a result of narcotics than from any other single cause.

In 1960, less than 200 narcotic deaths were recorded in New York City. In 1970, the figure had risen to over 1,000. These statistics do not reflect a problem indigenous to New York City. Although New York is the one major city in the Nation which has kept good statistics on drug addiction, the problem is national and international. We are moving to deal with it on both levels.

As part of this administration's ongoing efforts to stem the tide of drug abuse which has swept America in the last decade, we submitted legislation in July of 1969 for a comprehensive reform of Federal drug enforcement laws. Fifteen months later, in October, 1970, the Congress passed this vitally-needed legislation, and it is now producing excellent results. Nevertheless, in the fifteen months between the submission of that legislation and its passage, much valuable time was lost.

We must now candidly recognize that the deliberate procedures embodied in present efforts to control drug abuse are not sufficient in themselves. The problem has assumed the dimensions of a national emergency. I intend to take every step necessary to deal with this emergency, including asking the Congress for an amendment to my 1972 budget to provide an additional $155 million to carry out these steps. This will provide a total of $371 million for programs to control drug abuse in America.

### A New Approach to Rehabilitation

While experience thus far indicates that the enforcement provisions of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 are effective, they are not sufficient in themselves to eliminate drug abuse. Enforcement must be coupled with a rational approach to the reclamation of the drug user himself. The laws of supply and demand function in the

illegal drug business as in any other. We are taking steps under the Comprehensive Drug Act to deal with the supply side of the equation and I am recommending additional steps to be taken now. But we must also deal with demand. We must rehabilitate the drug user if we are to eliminate drug abuse and all the anti-social activities that flow from drug abuse.

Narcotic addiction is a major contributor to crime. The cost of supplying a narcotic habit can run from $30 a day to $100 a day. This is $210 to $700 a week, or $10,000 a year to over $36,000 a year. Untreated narcotic addicts do not ordinarily hold jobs. Instead, they often turn to shoplifting, mugging, burglary, armed robbery, and so on. They also support themselves by starting other people—young people—on drugs. The financial costs of addiction are more than $2 billion every year, but these costs can at least be measured. The human costs cannot. American society should not be required to bear either cost.

Despite the fact that drug addiction destroys lives, destroys families, and destroys communities, we are still not moving fast enough to meet the problem in an effective way. Our efforts are strained through the Federal bureaucracy. Of those we can reach at all under the present Federal system—and the number is relatively small—of those we try to help and who want help, we cure only a tragically small percentage.

Despite the magnitude of the problem, despite our very limited success in meeting it, and despite the common recognition of both circumstances, we nevertheless have thus far failed to develop a concerted effort to find a better solution to this increasingly grave threat. At present, there are nine Federal agencies involved in one fashion or another with the problem of drug addiction. There are anti-drug abuse efforts in Federal programs ranging from vocational rehabilitation to highway safety. In this manner our efforts have been fragmented through competing priorities, lack of communication, multiple authority, and limited and dispersed resources. The magnitude and the

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HARD NIXON

495

["severity of the present threat will no longer permit this piecemeal and bureaucracially-dispersed effort at drug control. If we cannot destroy the drug menace in America, then it will surely in time destroy us. I am not prepared to accept this alternative.", "Therefore, I am transmitting legislation to the Congress to consolidate at the highest level a full-scale attack on the problem of drug abuse in America. I am proposing the appropriation of additional funds to meet the cost of rehabilitat-ing drug users, and I will ask for additional funds to increase our enforcement efforts to further tighten the noose around the necks of drug peddlers, and thereby loosen the noose around the necks of drug users.", "At the same time I am proposing additional steps to strike at the \"supply\" side of the drug equation—to halt the drug traffic by striking at the illegal producers of drugs, the growing of those plants from which drugs are derived, and trafficking in these drugs beyond our borders.", "America has the largest number of heroin addicts of any nation in the world. And yet, America does not grow opium—of which heroin is a derivative—nor does it manufacture heroin, which is a laboratory process carried out abroad. This deadly poison in the American life-stream is, in other words, a foreign import. In the last year, heroin seizures by Federal agen-cies surpassed the total seized in the previous ten years. Nevertheless, it is estimated that we are stopping less than 20 percent of the drugs aimed at this Nation. No serious attack on our national drug problem can ignore the interna-tional implications of such an effort, nor can the domestic effort succeed without attacking the problem on an international plane. I intend to do that.", "## A Coordinated Federal Response", "Not very long ago, it was possible for Ameri-cans to persuade themselves, with some justifica-tion, that narcotic addiction was a class problem. Whether or not this was an accurate picture is irrelevant today, because now the problem is universal. But despite the increasing dimensions of the problem, and despite increas-ing consciousness of the problem, we have made little headway in understanding what is in-volved in drug abuse or how to deal with it.", "", "The very nature of the drug abuse problem has meant that its extent and seriousness have been shrouded in secrecy, not only by the crim-inal elements who profit from drug use, but by the drug users themselves—the people whom society is attempting to reach and help. This fact has added immeasurably to the difficulties of medical assistance, rehabilitation, and gov-ernment action to counter drug abuse, and to find basic and permanent methods to stop it. Even now, there are no precise national statis-tics as to the number of drug-dependent citizens in the United States, the rate at which drug abuse is increasing, or where and how this in-crease is taking place. Most of what we think we know is extrapolated from those few States and cities where the dimensions of the problem have forced closer attention, including the mainte-nance of statistics.", "A large number of Federal Government agencies are involved in efforts to fight the drug problem either with new programs or by ex-panding existing programs. Many of these pro-grams are still experimental in nature. This is appropriate. The problems of drug abuse must be faced on many fronts at the same time, and we do not yet know which efforts will be most successful. But we must recognize that piece-meal efforts, even where individually success-ful, cannot have a major impact on the drug abuse problem unless and until they are forged together into a broader and more integrated program involving all levels of government and private effort. We need a coordinated effort if we are to move effectively against drug abuse.", "The magnitude of the problem, the national and international implications of the problem, and the limited capacities of States and cities to deal with the problem all reinforce the conclu-sion that coordination of this effort must take place at the highest levels of the Federal Government.", "Therefore, I propose the establishment of a central authority with overall responsibility for all major Federal drug abuse prevention, educa-tion, treatment, rehabilitation, training, and re-search programs in all Federal agencies. This authority would be known as the Special Ac-tion Office of Drug Abuse Prevention. It would be located within the Executive Office of the President and would be headed by a Director accountable to the President. Because this is an emergency response to a national problem which we intend to bring under control, the Of-", "fice would be cased for a period of three years, and the President, tending its life-desirable.", "This Office will be the central leadership organ of the nation in the fight against drug abuse problems and instill a sense of federally-supplied, and local, federal, and state, and local, public and private interest in the problem of drug abuse.", "More specifically, the Office would develop programs to provide guidance and support to the programs through which it would extend its influence, through its programs, to the programs and the data that would determine whether or not the programs were effective. It would also provide the programs with the means to determine whether or not the programs were effective. It would continue to develop programs to provide guidance and support to the programs through which it would extend its influence, through its programs, to the programs and the data that would determine whether or not the programs were effective. It would also provide the programs with the means to determine whether or not the programs were effective.", "It would continue to develop programs to provide guidance and support to the programs through which it would extend its influence, through its programs, to the programs and the data that would determine whether or not the programs were effective. It would also provide the programs with the means to determine whether or not the programs were effective.", "The program will be exercised through the other Federal advantage would be exercised through the other Federal advantage would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Action Office will be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. 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It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. 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It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. It would function in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Bureau of Prisons Act. Presently: it would be exercised through the various Federal agencies that are engaged in drug abuse prevention and control. 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[L]

fice would be established to operate only for a period of three years from its date of enactment, and the President would have the option of extending its life for an additional two years if desirable.

This Office would provide strengthened Federal leadership in finding solutions to drug abuse problems. It would establish priorities and instill a sense of urgency in Federal and federally-supported drug abuse programs, and it would increase coordination between Federal, State, and local rehabilitation efforts.

More specifically, the Special Action Office would develop overall Federal strategy for drug abuse prevention programs, set program goals, objectives and priorities, carry out programs through other Federal agencies, develop guidance and standards for operating agencies, and evaluate performance of all programs to determine where success is being achieved. It would extend its efforts into research, prevention, training, education, treatment, rehabilitation, and the development of necessary reports, statistics, and social indicators for use by all public and private groups. It would not be directly concerned with the problems of reducing drug supply, or with the law enforcement aspects of drug abuse control.

It would concentrate on the "demand" side of the drug equation—the use and the user of drugs.

The program authority of the Director would be exercised through working agreements with other Federal agencies. In this fashion, full advantage would be taken of the skills and resources these agencies can bring to bear on solving drug abuse problems by linking them with a highly goal-oriented authority capable of functioning across departmental lines. By eliminating bureaucratic red tape, and jurisdictional disputes between agencies, the Special Action Office would do what cannot be done presently: it would mount a wholly coordinated national attack on a national problem. It would use all available resources of the Federal Government to identify the problems precisely, and it would allocate resources to attack those problems. In practice, implementing departments and agencies would be bound to meet specific terms and standards for performance. These terms and standards would be set forth under inter-agency agreement through a Program Plan defining objectives, costs, schedule, performance requirements, technical limits, and other factors essential to program success.

With the authority of the Program Plan, the Director of the Special Action Office could demand performance instead of hoping for it. Agencies would receive money based on performance and their retention of funding and program authority would depend upon periodic appraisal of their performance.

In order to meet the need for realistic central program appraisal, the Office would develop special program monitoring and evaluation capabilities so that it could realistically determine which activities and techniques were producing results. This evaluation would be tied to the planning process so that knowledge about success/failure results could guide the selection of future plans and priorities.

In addition to the inter-agency agreement and Program Plan approach described above, the Office would have direct authority to let grants or make contracts with industrial, commercial, or non-profit organizations. This authority would be used in specific instances where there is no appropriate Federal agency prepared to undertake a program, or where for some other reason it would be faster, cheaper, or more effective to grant or contract directly.

Within the broad mission of the Special Action Office, the Director would set specific objectives for accomplishment during the first three years of Office activity. These objectives would target such areas as reduction in the overall national rate of drug addiction, reduction in drug-related deaths, reduction of drug use in schools, impact on the number of men rejected for military duty because of drug abuse, and so forth. A primary objective of the Office would be the development of a reliable set of social indicators which accurately show the nature, extent, and trends in the drug abuse problem.

These specific targets for accomplishment would act to focus the efforts of the drug abuse prevention program, not on intermediate achievements such as numbers of treatments given or educational programs conducted, but rather on ultimate "payoff" accomplishments in the reduction of the human and social costs of drug abuse. Our programs cannot be judged on the fulfillment of quotas and other bureaucratic indexes of accomplishment. They must be judged by the number of human beings who are brought out of the hell of addiction, and

seriousness have only by the crim-drug use, but by the people whom he and help. This is to the difficulties litigation, and gov-drug abuse, and to methods to stop it. The national statis-dependent citizens are at which drug and how this in-what we think we use few States and the problem have ended the maintenance

Government to fight the drug programs or by ex-Any of these problems in nature. This is a drug abuse must be the same time, and efforts will be most effective that piece-vidually success-impact on the drug will they are forged more integrated of government and coordinated effort if against drug abuse. Problem, the national goals of the problem, States and cities to enforce the conclu-Is effort must take place of the Federal

establishment of a social responsibility for prevention, education, training, and re- Federal agencies. This is the Special Action. It would be the Special Action Office of the State, and the Federal agencies. Because this is an national problem, the social problem, the social control, the Office

497

by the number of human beings who are dis-
suaded from entering that hell.

I urge the Congress to give this proposal the highest priority, and I trust it will do so. Nevertheless, due to the need for immediate action, I am issuing today, June 17, an Executive Order establishing within the Executive Office of the President a Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention. Until the Congress passes the legislation giving full authority to this Office, a Special Consultant to the President for Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs will institute to the extent legally possible the functions of the Special Action Office.

Rehabilitation: A New Priority

When traffic in narcotics is no longer profit-
able, then that traffic will cease. Increased en-
forcement and vigorous application of the full-
est penalties "provided, by law are two of the
steps in rendering narcotics trade unprofitable.
But as long as there is a demand, there will be
those willing to take the risks of meeting the
demand. So we must also act to destroy the
market for drugs, and this means the preven-
tion of new addicts, and the rehabilitation of
those who are addicted.

To do this, I am asking the Congress for a
total of $105 million in addition to funds al-
ready contained in my 1972 budget to be used
solely for the treatment and rehabilitation of
drug-addicted individuals.

I will also ask the Congress to provide an additional $10 million in funds to increase and improve education and training in the field of dangerous drugs. This will increase the money available for education and training to more than $24 million. It has become fashionable to suppose that no drugs are as dangerous as they are commonly thought to be, and that the use of some drugs entails no risk at all. These are misconceptions, and every day we reap the tragic results of these misconceptions when young people are "turned on" to drugs believing that narcotics addiction is something that happens to other people. We need an expanded effort to show that addiction is all too often a one-way street beginning with "innocent" experimentation and ending in death. Between these extremes is the degradation that addiction inflicts on those who believed that it could not happen to them.

While by no means a major part of the Amer-

ican narcotics problem, an especially disheart-
ening aspect of that problem involves those of
our men in Vietnam who have used drugs. Peer
pressures combine with easy availability to fos-
ter drug use. We are taking steps to end the
availability of drugs in South Vietnam but, in
addition, the nature of drug addiction, and the
peculiar aspects of the present problem as it
involves veterans, make it imperative that re-
habilitation procedures be undertaken immedi-
ately. In Vietnam, for example, heroin is cheap
and 95 percent pure, and its effects are com-
monly achieved through smoking or "snorting"
the drug. In the United States, the drug is
impure, consisting of only about 5 percent
heroin, and it must be "mainlined" or injected
into the bloodstream to achieve an effect com-
parable to that which may have been experi-
enced in Vietnam. Further, a habit which costs
$5 a day to maintain in Vietnam can cost $100
a day to maintain in the United States, and
those who continue to use heroin slip into the
twilight world of crime, bad drugs, and all too
often a premature death.

In order to expedite the rehabilitation proc-
ess of Vietnam veterans, I have ordered the
immediate establishment of testing procedures
and initial rehabilitation efforts to be taken in
Vietnam. This procedure is under way and test-
ing will commence in a matter of days. The
Department of Defense will provide rehabilita-
tion programs to all servicemen being re-
turned for discharge who want this help, and
we will be requesting legislation to permit the
military services to retain for treatment any
individual due for discharge who is a narcotic
addict. All of our servicemen must be accorded
the right to rehabilitation.

Rehabilitation procedures, which are required subsequent to discharge, will be effected under the aegis of the Director of the Special Action Office who will have the authority to refer patients to private hospitals as well as VA hospitals as circumstances require.

The Veterans Administration medical facili-
ties are a great national resource which can be
of immeasurable assistance in the effort against
this grave national problem. Restrictive and
exclusionary use of these facilities under pres-
ent statutes means that we are wasting a
critically needed national resource. We are com-
monly closing the doors to those who need help
the most. This is a luxury we cannot afford.

Authority will be sought to make the facilities of the
City available to all of drug rehabilita-
tion of their discharge from

I am asking the Com-
ent budget of the VA
$14 million to permit
of this program. The
assist in the immedi-
placement of VA re-
will permit both in-
of addicts in a comm-

I am also asking the Narcotic Addict to broaden the authority to the use of methadone. These programs will be the most rigid standards to constant and proper their effectiveness. indicates that methadone is the work of rehabilitators. It is a tool that ought to be available to authorities and others to do this work.

Finally, I will in-
ant for Narcotics ar-
view immediately a
re to rehabilitation an-
lation needed to ex-
itative role, and
authorities and oth-

Additional Enforce-

The Comprehensive and Control Act of 1968 for the attack on the use of narcotics in America and more enforcement of the Act contains cre- ation of a commission against violators of its provisions. Sanctions are provided for the violation of this Act, and the commission is to a minor, and the transaction is part of a criminal enterprise.

These new penal-
ution, which we fe-

[L.C]

498

[L]

specially disheart-
involves those of
used drugs. Peer
availability to fos-
steps to end the
Vietnam but, in
addiction, and the
int problem as it
operative that re-
ertaken immedi-
te, heroin is cheap
effects are com-
ing or "smorting"
ates, the drug is
about 5 percent
lined" or injected
ave an effect com-
have been experi-
habit which costs
ham can cost $100
ited States, and
roin slip into the
drugs, and all too

nabilization proc-
have ordered the
esting procedures
to be taken in
ider way and test-
ter of days. The
provide rehabili-
ticemen being re-
ant this help, and
ion to permit the
or treatment any
who is a narcotic
must be accorded

which are required
be effected under
the Special Action
nority to refer pa-
s well as VA hos-
re.

tion medical facili-
source which can be
the effort against
n. Restrictive and
ilities under pres-
are wasting a
source. We are com-
ose who need help
we cannot afford.

Authority will be sought by the new Office to
make the facilities of the Veterans Administra-
tion available to all former servicemen in need
of drug rehabilitation, regardless of the nature
of their discharge from the service.

I am asking the Congress to increase the pres-
ent budget of the Veterans Administration by
$14 million to permit the immediate initiation
of this program. This money would be used to
assist in the immediate development and em-
placement of VA rehabilitation centers which
will permit both inpatient and outpatient care
of addicts in a community setting.

I am also asking that the Congress amend the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966 to broaden the authority under this Act for the use of methadone maintenance programs. These programs would be carried out under the most rigid standards and would be subjected to constant and painstaking reevaluation of their effectiveness. At this time, the evidence indicates that methadone is a useful tool in the work of rehabilitating heroin addicts, and that tool ought to be available to those who must do this work.

Finally, I will instruct the Special Consult-
ant for Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to re-
view immediately all Federal laws pertaining
to rehabilitation and I will submit any legis-
lation needed to expedite the Federal rehabilit-
itative role, and to correct overlapping
authorities and other shortcomings.

Additional Enforcement Needs

The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 provides a sound base for the attack on the problem of the availability of narcotics in America. In addition to tighter and more enforceable regulatory controls, the measure provides law enforcement with stronger and better tools. Equally important, the Act contains credible and proper penalties against violators of the drug law. Severe punishments are invoked against the drug pushers and peddlers while more lenient and flexible sanctions are provided for the users. A seller can receive fifteen years for a first offense involving hard narcotics, thirty years if the sale is to a minor, and up to life in prison if the transaction is part of a continuing criminal enterprise.

These new penalties allow judges more dis-
cretion, which we feel will restore credibility to

the drug control laws and eliminate some of the
difficulties prosecutors and judges have had in
the past arising out of minimum mandatory
penalties for all violators.

The penalty structure in the 1970 Drug Act became effective on May 1 of this year. While it is too soon to assess its effect, I expect it to help enable us to deter or remove from our midst those who traffic in narcotics and other dangerous drugs.

To complement the new Federal drug law, a uniform State drug control law has been drafted and recommended to the States. Nineteen States have already adopted it and others have it under active consideration. Adoption of this uniform law will facilitate joint and effective action by all levels of government.

Although I do not presently anticipate a
necessity for alteration of the purposes or prin-
ciples of existing enforcement statutes, there
is a clear need for some additional enforcement
legislation.

To help expedite the prosecution of narcotic trafficking cases, we are asking the Congress to provide legislation which would permit the United States Government to utilize information obtained by foreign police, provided that such information was obtained in compliance with the laws of that country.

We are also asking that the Congress pro-
vide legislation which would permit a chemist
to submit written findings of his analysis in
drug cases. This would speed the process of
criminal justice.

The problems of addict identification are
equalled and surpassed by the problem of drug
identification. To expedite work in this area
of narcotics enforcement, I am asking the Con-
gress to provide $2 million to be allotted to
the research and development of equipment and
techniques for the detection of illegal drugs and
drug traffic.

I am asking the Congress to provide $2 mil-
lion to the Department of Agriculture for re-
search and development of herbicides which
can be used to destroy growths of narcotics-
producing plants without adverse ecological
effects.

I am asking the Congress to authorize and
fund 325 additional positions within the Bureau
of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to increase
their capacity for apprehending those engaged
in narcotics trafficking here and abroad and to

499

[LC]

investigate domestic industrial producers of
drugs.

Finally, I am asking the Congress to provide
a supplemental appropriation of $25.6 million
for the Treasury Department. This will in-
crease funds available to this Department for
drug abuse control to nearly $45 million. Of
this sum, $18.1 million would be used to enable
the Bureau of Customs to develop the technical
capacity to deal with smuggling by air and sea,
to increase the investigative staff charged with
pursuit and apprehension of smugglers, and to
increase inspection personnel who search per-
sons, baggage, and cargo entering the country.
The remaining $7.5 million would permit the
Internal Revenue Service to intensify investi-
gation of persons involved in large-scale nar-
cotics trafficking.

These steps would strengthen our efforts to
root out the cancerous growth of narcotics ad-
diction in America. It is impossible to say that
the enforcement legislation I have asked for
here will be conclusive—that we will not need
further legislation. We cannot fully know at
this time what further steps will be necessary.
As those steps define themselves, we will be
prepared to seek further legislation to take any
action and every action necessary to wipe out
the menace of drug addiction in America. But
domestic enforcement alone cannot do the job.
If we are to stop the flow of narcotics into the
lifeblood of this country, I believe we must stop
it at the source.

International

There are several broad categories of drugs: those of the cannabis family—such as marijuana and hashish; those which are used as sedatives, such as the barbiturates and certain tranquilizers; those which elevate mood and suppress appetite, such as the amphetamines; and, drugs such as LSD and mescaline, which are commonly called hallucinogens. Finally, there are the narcotic analgesics, including opium and its derivatives—morphine and codeine. Heroin is made from morphine.

Heroin addiction is the most difficult to con-
trol and the most socially destructive form of
addiction in America today. Heroin is a fact
of life and a cause of death among an increas-
ing number of citizens in America, and it is
heroin addiction that must command priority
in the struggle against drugs.

To wage an effective war against heroin ad-
diction, we must have international cooperation.
In order to secure such cooperation, I am initi-
ating a worldwide escalation in our existing
programs for the control of narcotics traffic,
and I am proposing a number of new steps for
this purpose.

First, on Monday, June 14, I recalled the
United States Ambassadors to Turkey, France,
Mexico, Luxembourg, Thailand, the Republic
of Vietnam, and the United Nations for con-
sultations on how we can better cooperate with
other nations in the effort to regulate the pres-
ent substantial world opium output and nar-
cotics trafficking. I sought to make it equally
clear that I consider the heroin addiction of
American citizens an international problem of
grave concern to this Nation, and I instructed
our Ambassadors to make this clear to their
host governments. We want good relations with
other countries, but we cannot buy good rela-
tions at the expense of temporizing on this
problem.

Second, United States Ambassadors to all
East Asian governments will meet in Bangkok,
Thailand, tomorrow, June 18, to review the in-
creasing problem in that area, with particular
concern for the effects of this problem on Amer-
ican servicemen in Southeast Asia.

Third, it is clear that the only really effective
way to end heroin production is to end opium
production and the growing of poppies. I will
propose that as an international goal. It is es-
sential to recognize that opium is, at present, a
legitimate source of income to many of those
nations which produce it. Morphine and codeine
both have legitimate medical applications.

It is the production of morphine and codeine
for medical purposes which justifies the main-
tenance of opium production, and it is this pro-
duction which in turn contributes to the world's
heroin supply. The development of effective
substitutes for these derivatives would elimi-
nate any valid reason for opium production.
While modern medicine has developed effective
and broadly-used substitutes for morphine, it
has yet to provide a fully acceptable substitute
for codeine. Therefore, I am directing that Fed-
eral research efforts in the United States be
intensified with the aim of developing at the
earliest possible date synthetic substitutes for
all opium derivatives. At the same time I am
requesting the Director General of the World

500

Health Care
of experts
in the field
of opiate use
as soon as
possible.

Fourth, by the end of the year, the Bureau of Drugs for the United States would prepare a program of treatment for drug abusers, well as the hundreds of thousands of users of other drugs in the United States.

Fifth, I ask you, as the President and as the Congress, to pass a bill of rights for the American people, which will give them the right to be secure from the危害 of any drug addiction.

Sixth, we ask you, as the Congress, to pass a bill of rights for the American people, which will give them the right to be secure from the危害 of any drug addiction.

Seventh, we ask you, as the Congress, to pass a bill of rights for the American people, which will give them the right to be secure from the危害 of any drug addiction.

450-786

[Lc]

ve war against heroin ad-
international cooperation.
cooperation, I am initi-
 escalation in our existing
control of narcotics traffic,
number of new steps for

June 14, I recalled the
adors to Turkey, France,
Thailand, the Republic
United Nations for con-
han better cooperate with
ort to regulate the pres-
opium output and nar-
gh to make it equally
the heroin addiction of
international problem of
ation, and I instructed
ake this clear to their
ant good relations with
cannot buy good rela-
temporizing on this

Ambassadors to all
will meet in Bangkok,
18, to review the in-
area, with particular
is problem on Amer-
 East Asia.

only really effective
tion is to end opium
ing of poppies. I will
onal goal. It is es-
ium is, at present, a
to many of those
morphine and codeine
al applications.
morphine and codeine
justifies the main-
and it is this pro-
butes to the world's
ment of effective
dives would elimi-
opium production.
developed effective
for morphine, it
adept substitute
drecting that Fed-
United States be
developing at the
c substitutes for
same time I am
al of the World

Health Organization to appoint a study panel
of experts to make periodic technical assess-
ments of ary synthetics which might replace
opiates with the aim of effecting substitutions
as soon as possible.

Fourth, I am requesting $1 million to be used
by the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs for training of foreign narcotics enforce-
ment officers. Additional personnel within the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
would permit the strengthening of the investi-
gative capacities of BNDD offices in the U.S., as
well as their ability to assist host governments
in the hiring, training, and deployment of per-
sonnel and the procurement of necessary equip-
ment for drug abuse control.

Fifth, I am asking the Congress to amend
and approve the International Security Assist-
ance Act of 1971 and the International Devel-
opment and Humanitarian Assistance Act of
1971 to permit assistance to presently pro-
scribed nations in their efforts to end drug traf-
ficking. The drug problem crosses ideological
boundaries and surmounts national differences.
If we are barred in any way in our effort to deal
with this matter, our efforts will be crippled,
and our will subject to question. I intend to
leave no room for other nations to question our
commitment to this matter.

Sixth, we must recognize that cooperation in
control of dangerous drugs works both ways.
While the sources of our chief narcotics problem
are foreign, the United States is a source of il-
legal psychotropic drugs which afflict other na-
tions. If we expect other governments to help
stop the flow of heroin to our shores, we must
act with equal vigor to prevent equally danger-
ous substances from going into their nations
from our own. Accordingly, I am submitting
to the Senate for its advice and consent the
Convention on Psychotropic Substances which
was recently signed by the United States and
22 other nations. In addition, I will submit to
the Congress any legislation made necessary by
the Convention including the complete licens-
ing, inspection, and control of the manufac-
ture, distribution, and trade in dangerous
synthetic drugs.

Seventh, the United States has already
pledged $2 million to a Special Fund created on
April 1 of this year by the Secretary General
of the United Nations and aimed at planning
and executing a concerted UN effort against

the world drug problem. We will continue our
strong backing of UN drug-control efforts by
encouraging other countries to contribute and
by requesting the Congress to make additional
contributions to this fund as their need is
demonstrated.

Finally, we have proposed, and we are
strongly urging multilateral support for,
amendments to the Single Convention on Nar-
cotics which would enable the International
Narcotics Control Board to:

- require from signatories details about opium poppy cultivation and opium production —thus permitting the Board access to essential information about narcotics raw materials from which illicit diversion occurs;

- base its decisions about the various nations' activities with narcotic drugs not only as at present on information officially submitted by the governments, but also on information which the Board obtains through public or private sources—thus enhancing data available to the Board in regard to illicit traffic;

- carry out, with the consent of the nation concerned, on-the-spot inquiries on drug related activities;

- modify signatories' annual estimates of intended poppy acreage and opium production with a view to reducing acreage or production; and

- in extreme cases, require signatories to em-
bargo the export and/or import of drugs to or
from a particular country that has failed to
meet its obligations under the Convention.

I believe the foregoing proposals establish a
new and needed dimension in the international
effort to halt drug production, drug traffic, and
drug abuse. These proposals put the problems
and the search for solutions in proper perspec-
tive, and will give this Nation its best opportu-
nity to end the flow of drugs, and most
particularly heroin, into America, by literally
cutting it off root and branch at the source.

## Conclusion

Narcotics addiction is a problem which afflicts
both the body and the soul of America. It is
a problem which baffles many Americans. In
our history we have faced great difficulties again
and again, wars and depressions and divisions
among our people have tested our will as a
people—and we have prevailed.

501

450-786 O-72—34

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

FEBRUARY 27, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Shanghai, People's Republic of China)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

OF

DR. HENRY KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

AND
MARSHALL GREEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

INDUSTRIAL EXHIBITION CENTER BANQUET HALL

AT 5:50 P.M. China Time

MR. ZIEGLER: You have had a chance to read over the communique. Dr. Kissinger is here to discuss it with you and take your questions. What Dr. Kissinger says is on the record. Together with Dr. Kissinger is Assistant Secretary of State, Marshall Green, who, as you know, participated in all the meetings with Secretary of State Rogers when he met with the Foreign Minister, and he is here also to discuss the communique with you and to take your questions, together with Dr. Kissinger.

We will begin with Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make a few preliminary observations before we go to your questions. Let me do it in two parts. The process, and there is obviously the communique produced, and secondly, what does it mean in general terms. Then I believe that I will be prepared to answer questions.

First, how was the communique produced? From the beginning of our contacts with the People's Republic of China, there were some obvious general considerations of what the outcome of a meeting between the President and the leaders of the People's Republic might be.

During the interim visit there were some exploratory conversations of an outcome in the conventional sense in which both sides tend to state general positions which they afterwards choose to interpret, each in their own way.

It was, therefore, decided early in the meetings in communication between the President and Prime Minister that such an approach would make no sense. It would not be worthy of the purposes that were attempted to be served.

It was therefore decided that each side would state its position on issues in a section which it would produce more or less independent of the other. It would not pretend to an agreement that did not exist and which would have to be interpreted away in the subsequent implementation. Therefore, the beginning part of the communique represents, in effect, a statement by each side of some of its general principles.

On our side, they were deliberately not phrased in a pretentious way. While in discussions some of the arguments MADE by the Chinese side were, of course, rebutted, we did not

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feel that this was the appropriate vehicle to do so, but rather
to state what our positive view was.

For that matter, the Chinese side did not rebut
arguments which we made in our section that they did not parti-
cularly agree with.

In order to present these two views on an equal
basis, it has been decided that in the text issued by the
American Government, the U.S. position would be stated first, and
in the text to be issued by the Chinese government, the Chinese
version would be stated first.

I mention this only to point it out so that you will
not be surprised if the Chinese version follows a different
sequence from the American version. This is by agreement. Both
versions are official and are being put out on the basis of this
agreement.

The procedure that was followed here was that issues
of general principle were first discussed in the meetings between
the President and the Prime Minister. They were then, after
they had been explored for sometime, transferred to the meetings
chaired by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of
the People's Republic of China. Then, if any additional issues
arose, they might be referred back to the meeting of the
President and the Prime Minister.

In drafting the communique, various sections were
produced by various elements of the American side. I played
the role of go-between on our side and the Vice Foreign Minister,
whose name I despair of ever learning to pronounce, on the
Chinese side.

In this manner, as we put together the various
paragraphs that were supplied to us on our side by various
individuals, if we reached a point at which agreement seemed
near or possible, we would then go back to our principals and
to the Secretary of State. Through this process, the communique was
finally achieved.

For example, some of the sections were quite prolonged.
The last few nights the sessions went on until the early hours of
the morning with the President. In Peking, the Chinese delegation had a house in the guest complex, and most of the sessions took place in that house. As a paragraph was finished, it would typically go back then to the President who was in the next house, and this went on Friday night until about 5:00 in the morning.

So much for the procedure. Let me say something about
the content. Obviously neither side would have written this
communique this way if it had been able to draft it entirely
by itself. Therefore, it represented an attempt by two countries
that had been out of contact for a long time to find a basis to
convey first some immediate understandings, but beyond that,
to start a process by which they could bring about a closer
relationship over a period of time and by which they could,
where interests converged, act in a more nearly parallel fashion
and where interests differed, to mitigate the consequences of
those disagreements.

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[lc]

So the communique ought to be seen in two aspects: First, in terms of the specific principles and conclusions it states, and secondly, in terms of the direction to which it seeks to point. It is on that basis that we are presenting it to the American people and on which the People's Republic is presenting it as well.

Now, this is all that I want to say by way of introduction. I wonder whether Marshall Green would like to add a few words, and then we will be glad to answer questions.

MR. GREEN: I have just a few words. First of all, with regard to the PRC authority with whom Dr. Kissinger was maintaining the discussions, it was Chiao -- just to clarify that point.

I don't think I really have much to add. Our talks under Secretary Rogers on our side, and Foreign Minister Chi Feng-fei for the People's Republic of China, extended over, I believe, ten hours all together.

But it was not just the talks themselves. We had frequent occasion, as you could imagine with all the fine food you have eaten -- occasionally waiting to have that fine food, to have extensive talks also, and a number of matters could be discussed in that context.

Also, it was not just that, but the Secretary did have a chance to meet on a number of occasions with the Prime Minister. Most recently, coming down on the plane he had an hour and a half from Peking to Hangchow. And then today the Prime Minister called on him in his hotel room for about 40 minutes.

I would say that the talks and the counterpart meetings were characterized by candor, friendliness and courtesy and hospitality, as I am sure you have all seen on the part of our Chinese hosts. There was no pulling of punches, not physically, of course. They were outspoken, no effort to cover up or paper over differences, but to have it out. It is good for the system. I think in so doing one has a much better appreciation of the other person's point of view.

As far as the specifics were concerned, in the talks, I really can't say much more than what already appears in the communique itself, although some of the points may or may not raise questions.

Q On Page 4, in stating that the United States will progressively reduce its forces in military installations on Taiwan, was that decision a result of the discussions here in China?

DR. KISSINGER: No, this is a general statement of our policy which we have enunciated on innumerable occasions in innumerable forums. It says that we maintain the amount of forces that is required by the general situation and not by any abstract determination. It is our statement of our general policy, but not a mutual decision.

Q Is there any sign now that the conditions would lead to a reduction of the American military forces in Taiwan shortly?

NCR-E

[L]

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on what will be done over a period of time, but if you speak about "shortly," I would not expect that.

Q. Why did not the United States Government affirm its treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President and you have done on numerous occasions?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me take this occasion to deal with that particular aspect, and let me deal with it once, and not answer it in innumerable elliptical forms in which, no __________ it will be presented.

The particular issue which Mr. Kraslow raised is, of course, an extraordinarily difficult one to discuss on the territory of a country with which we do not maintain formal diplomatic relations and for which this particular issue is a matter of profound principle.

Let me, therefore, state in response to this and any related question -- and let me do it once and not repeat it -- we stated our basic position with respect to this issue in the President's World Report in which we say that this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed on that position.

But I would appreciate it if that would be all that I would be asked to say about it in these circumstances. But the position of the World Report stands and has been unaltered.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the possibility is mentioned of the United States sending a representative to Peking from time to time. Is there any likelihood that this process might be reversed and Peking might send a representative to Washington?

DR. KISSINGER: The situation of the two sides is not exactly equal in this respect because in Washington there is a Chinese representation different from that that would be sent under the hypothesis which you mention. However, when we envisage is the establishment of a contact point, to begin with, in which the discussions about the exchanges and trade that are mentioned in the preceding paragraphs will be formally conducted and as soon as this contact point has been established, it will be announced and the visit of a U. S. representative to Peking would take place as the need arises, and as particular issues of great importance need to be discussed. This, however, is not to the exclusion of any other possibility.

Q. What do you mean by "a contact point"?

DR. KISSINGER: For example, there existed for a while, and formally still exists, a forum in Warsaw where U. S. and Chinese officials met -- something of this kind. As soon as that is established, which we expect will be in the reasonably near future, we will announce it.

Q. Will that be established in the United States or Canada or some other country?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't expect it to be in the United States, but I don't want to speculate beyond that.

H011

[L.C]

Q Can we assume that the President and Prime Minister discussed all these differences face-to-face, specifically their differences over Vietnam and the reduction of troops on Taiwan? Here these positions stated openly?

DR. KISSINGER: All differences were discussed by the President and the Prime Minister face to face, candidly and seriously, including those which you mentioned.

Q Can you point to anything in this document in which the People's Republic of China goes any significant step beyond its position at the time of the first ping pong exchanges?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me say two things: We are not approaching this from the point of view of a scoreboard of seeing who scored how many points on which issue. At the time of the first ping pong exchange, if I understand the position of the People's Republic of China, it was that some very low level people-to-people exchanges would occur.

The formalization of exchanges encouraged by the two governments, the opening of trade encouraged by the two governments, the establishment of a diplomatic mechanism for continued contact, the joint statement of some general principles of international relations, the joint statement of some basic approaches to the view of the world with respect to, for example, the section which includes the reference to hegemony -- these, I believe, are matters that most of us would have considered unthinkable at the time of the invitation to the ping pong team.

But I would put them on the basis of mutuality rather than of any unilateral movement on the part of the People's Republic of China.

Q Henry, is this the first time that a President of the United States has formally picked up the language of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence?

DR. KISSINGER: I have to say I am simply not sure. All I would reply, again, would be an answer in the same terms as I did to Mr. Frankel. The question is not who put forward the proposals. The question is: Does it contain principles that we can live by and since we have said we are prepared to apply these principles during the next one on the non-use of force, and since both sides have stated this, it does not really make a crucial difference who put it forward first.

Q How much progress was there made in advancing the ball? How much further did we go this time than in your original talks with Premier Chou?

DR. KISSINGER: The character of the discussions inevitably is entirely different when the President of the United States talks than when an assistant talks who cannot make any definitive statement. The basic objective of this trip was to set in motion a train of events and an evolution in the policy of our two countries which both sides recognized would be slow at first and present many difficulties and in which a great deal depended on the assessment by each side of the understanding by the other what was involved in this process and of the assessment by each side of the reliability of the other in being able to pursue this for the amount of time necessary to see it prevail.

HOPK.

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In this sense it almost had to be conducted by the heads of the two governments and in this sense I would say that in the depth and seriousness of the discussions it went, obviously beyond what had been discussed in my visits and beyond our expectations.

Q Did Chairman Mao participate? Did his participation go to the detailed substance of this matter or was it largely philosophical and general?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't believe that it would be appropriate for me to go into detail about the content of the conversation with Chairman Mao. I may say, however, that Chairman Mao and the President discussed each of the essential categories in a general way and we have every reason to believe that the Prime Minister checked with the Chairman at every step along the way. But it was not just a vague philosophical discussion.

Q The assertion of respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, combined with the statement of respect for one China, could that be construed as meaning that the United States notes the claim of the Government of the People's Republic of China, its claim to sovereignty over Taiwan?

DR. KISSINGER: Our view with respect to Taiwan has been exhaustively stated in that paragraph you refer to and we add nothing to it.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us whether there is any timetable under which you are going to undertake to facilitate the contacts and exchanges in the cultural, sports and journalistic areas?

DR. KISSINGER: There is no precise timetable, Walter, but I think it is correct to say that both sides understand that this will be pursued with some dispatch.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in the light of the statement by the Government of China that the Chinese side said that the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations, does this timetable depend on further progress in the solution of the Taiwan question?

DR. KISSINGER: No. That is independent of the other, though at what point the two would become interdependent again I cannot judge. But as this is written now, my answer to Walter Cronkite stands on its own feet.

Q Dr. Kissinger, where the communique states, "Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest," was that a result of your talks about Sino-Soviet tensions or was the Soviet Union involved in the talks? Does this refer to how the United States view the relationship between China and the U. S. and the Soviet Union?

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DR. KISSINGER: We have said on many occasions, and I will say it again here, that as far as the United States is concerned, our relationship with the Peoples Republic of China is not directed against the Soviet Union and while the Peoples Republic is well able to speak for itself, and my megalomania has not reached the point where I believe that I can speak for it, I believe that it is clear to us that neither is the policy of the Peoples Republic of China in its relations with us directed against the Soviet Union.

We are pursuing our policy with the Peoples Republic of China on the ground that a stable peace in the world is difficult to envisage if 800 million people are excluded from a dialogue with the most powerful nation in the world and we are conducting our discussions with the Peoples Republic entirely on the merits of that relationship.

The paragraph on hegemony will arise only if any country should seek it, but we had no particular country in mind when it was being drafted.

Q In the paragraph referring to the reduction of forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes, is this an exclusive reference to Indo-China as the area?

DR. KISSINGER: No. It is a reference to the general area. It is not a reference to any particular part of Asia.

Q What conditions in that area would keep American troops on Taiwan? What tensions in the area of Taiwan now require the presence of American troops there?

DR. KISSINGER: We are talking about the general state of relationships in Asia and in the world. It is in reference to that, that our general decisions on deployments will be made.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the President said in a television interview the beginning of January that he would bring up the question of American prisoners of war in Vietnam when he came to China. Can you tell us if it came up and what the reaction was?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously, as the communique makes clear, the issue of Vietnam was discussed and it is also clear that we would not discuss it without mentioning our concern with respect to the prisoners. The position of the Peoples Republic is as stated in the communique that it supports the seven-point proposal made by the PRG, and I think it is a fair characterization of the basic positions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, there is a paragraph that says "International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use of threat or force." Since the Peoples Republic says the difficulty with us on Taiwan is an international issue, does this mean that they have agreed not to use force or the threat of force in settling or solving that?

DR. KISSINGER: The formal position of the Peoples Republic of China with respect to Taiwan is a matter, of course, of extreme delicacy for us to discuss here at all. Clearly, they do not, as they have stated in their part of the section on Taiwan, consider it an international problem in any normal sense. Clearly, the formal statements with respect to this issue have to be drafted with the various perspectives in mind.

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1469

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:27 A.M. EDT

JUNE 14, 1972

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: As I think you know, we announced earlier that Dr. Kissinger would be going to the People's Republic of China from June 19th to the 23rd. That was a joint announcement that was made in Washington and in Peking at 11:00 Eastern time this morning.

For those of you not here at the time we made the announcement, I will reread the text of that joint announcement for your information.

In accordance with the United States-People's Republic of China Joint Communique of February, 1972, Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the United States President for National Security Affairs, will visit the People's Republic of China from June 19th to the 23rd, 1972, for concrete consultations with Chinese leaders to further the normalization of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

That is the end of the joint announcement. I also mentioned and referred to the fact that in February when President Nixon was in the People's Republic of China -- as you know, he was there from the 21st of February to the 28th of February of this year -- on February 27th, in the Joint Communique that was issued in Shanghai, both sides, the United States and the People's Republic of China, stated that the two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior United States representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

I also pointed out earlier that Dr. Kissinger would be leaving Washington, either tomorrow afternoon or Friday morning. He has not decided that yet and will make a brief stopover in Hawaii. He will leave Hawaii Sunday morning, refuel in Guam en route to the People's Republic of China, and he will arrive in Shanghai at about 5 p.m. China time, on Monday. That is 5 a.m. Eastern time on Monday. As you know, he will cross the International Dateline en route to the People's Republic of China. Dr. Kissinger will fly directly back to Washington on Friday, June 23rd.

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Also, tomorrow, as we have announced previously, the President will meet with President Echeverria of Mexico. The President of Mexico is scheduled to arrive at Andrews at 5:30 this afternoon and will spend the evening at Camp David. President Echeverria and his party will leave Camp David tomorrow morning and will helicopter from Camp David to the White House and arrive here in time for a 10 a.m. arrival ceremony that will take place on the South Lawn.

The President of Mexico will be greeted by President and Mrs. Nixon. Then President Echeverria and President Nixon will meet at 10:30 tomorrow morning.

Tomorrow night, President Nixon will host a state dinner at the White House for the President of Mexico and his wife and the two Presidents will then meet again on Friday at 11:30 in the morning.

Q What time is the state dinner, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: The state dinner is at 8:00.

Also tomorrow, the Apollo 16 astronauts and NASA Director James Fletcher will meet with the President. That is scheduled to begin at about 12:30 tomorrow. The astronauts are John Young, Charles Duke, and Ken Mattingly. Their Apollo 16 trip lasted 12 days from April 16th to April 27th. Shortly after the splash down in the Pacific, President Nixon talked to them by phone and invited the astronauts and their wives to attend the state dinner here at the White House which will be held here tomorrow night. I think there is a possibility that they will go to Camp David after that dinner.

At 3:00 tomorrow, the President will also meet with Prince Sultan, the Saudia Arabian Minister of Defense and Aviation. Prince Sultan is in the United States as a guest of Secretary Laird and met with Secretary Laird yesterday. The Prince will call on the President to exchange views on the world situation, particularly in regard to the Middle East.

Then on Friday morning there will be a Cabinet meeting at 8:30 a.m. here at the White House.

That is a general rundown on the President's schedule for this week. We will announce additions to that as they come to the calendar.

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This Copy For

#1454

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

10:48 A.M. (Iranian Time)

MAY 31, 1972

WEDNESDAY

(Tehran, Iran)

MR. ZIEGLER: We have given you the communique which we are issuing in relation to the visit here to Iran. As you know, the President and the Shah met last night after the arrival for about one hour and 45 minutes. They are meeting again this morning at the palace where the President is staying.

I believe most of you know that the President's departure for the Tomb of Reza Shah the Great was delayed about 45 minutes this morning. There was an incident which occurred near the tomb, but not in precise proximity to the tomb. I believe it was some distance from where the President would visit. The matter was checked out by both the Iranian security and the United States security, and it was determined that there was no problem

The President wanted to proceed, and, of course, the Shah very much wanted him to visit the tomb, so he did. He has now returned to the palace. He arrived back at the palace at about 10:30 and went directly into the final meeting with the Shah.

I should add that the President has very much enjoyed his return to Tehran, and has particularly appreciated the opportunity that he has had to talk with the Shah. He has been heartened by the warm reception of Their Majesties and the Government of Iran, and also the friendliness of the greeting that the many people of Tehran have given him on his arrival here, and both Mrs. Nixon and the President very much appreciated the friendly way in which they have been received here by both the Government and the people of Tehran.

The communique which you have reflects not only the close relationship which exists between the President and the Shah, and our two countries, but also the many common interests which the United States and Iran share. Our objectives in the world, the objectives of the United States and Iran, are parallel in many areas, and the President has high regard for the stability and progress in Iran under the Shah's leadership. I believe that was a view expressed by the President last night in his toast.

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As you know, there are no outstanding bilateral issues between the United States and Iran, so the talks between President Nixon and the Shah are ranging over the broad questions relating to efforts to achieve a more peaceful world. As the President said again in his toast last night, he values the consultation he is able to have with the Shah and to receive the Shah's assessment of both international and bilateral concerns.

I believe that the communique which you have reflects the tone and scope of the exchange between the Shah and President Nixon.

Just one comment in relation to the incident today in the area of the tomb which the President visited, and the other incidents that have occurred here in Tehran, which most of you are aware of. There is no question about the fact, after the checks that we have made, that this is the activity of a very small group who, not only on this occasion but in the past, have engaged in terrorist activities, and the United States is confident, and indeed sure, that this is the activity of a few, and does not reflect in any way the attitude of the people of Iran or the people of Tehran toward the United States and toward the President.

I said that President and Mrs. Nixon have enjoyed their visit here and appreciate the warm reception which they have received.

Q In view of your last remarks, are you implying that there was an attempt on the life of the President this morning?

MR. ZIEGLER: Absolutely not. There is no indication whatsoever that any of the reported incidents today were aimed at the well being of the President of the United States or any members of his party.

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Q Would you describe what went off at the cemetery and how big it was?

MR. ZIEGLER: This is not an official statement, but as I understand it from the reports I have it was a very small explosion that occurred some distance from the area that the President was to visit, and indeed did visit. A very thorough and quick check was made by the security personnel, by the Iranian Government and United States security personnel, and it was determined that there was no danger at all in the area around the tomb.

I would like to emphasize again that this is the action of a small group and does not reflect the attitude of this country.

Q Do you have any details on the other incidents?

MR. ZIEGLER: We can confirm, and I believe that the Government of Iran has already confirmed and others here in Iran have confirmed, the fact that there was an explosion in the alley along the south side of the USIS at about 5:45 A.M. this morning which resulted in, I understand, breakage of glass in the windows of USIS. So that occurred this morning.

Q How about the General's car?

MR. ZIEGLER: Also a car carrying Brigadier General Harold L. Price, who is an advisor to the Iranian Air Force, was damaged when it hit an explosive device in the road.

I understand in this particular incident, unfortunately, one Iranian woman was killed and another injured. General Price suffered two broken legs and lacerations and his driver also suffered lacerations.

Q What is your view of what motivated these explosions?

MR. ZIEGLER: I really would hesitate to give a view except to express the fact that those who are aware of the activities of a small group of terrorists here know that this type of activity has been occurring from time to time. It has again today.

But I think my earlier remarks are an effort to put this in perspective for you. The incidents that have occurred, as I said earlier, after careful checks by our security people and by the Iranian security people, the incidents in no way have been directed at the President or his party.

Q What is the General's assignment? Is the Air Force or Army?

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MR. ZIEGLER: Brigadier General Price is an advisor to the Iranian Air Force. He is a United States Air Force General.

It is my understanding that it was damaged when it hit an explosive device in the road.

Q How did they know where he was driving, was it on the way to his office?

MR. ZIEGLER: These are all the details I have.

Q Was it in the line of the motorcade?

MR. ZIEGLER: It was not in any way related to the Presidential motorcade.

Q We have one at a hotel called International and one at a Pepsi-Cola plant. Can you confirm that?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am unable to confirm that. I can only confirm those incidents that relate to USIS and Brigadier General Price.

Q Are these supposedly Communists or Maoists doing this or anit-Shah elements? You seem to know they are small groups not directed against the Americans, so who are they?

MR. ZIEGLER: Not being directed involved in the investigations of who perpetrated the incident, I would hesitate to say who the individuals are.

Q How do you know who they are not, if you don't know who they are?

MR. ZIEGLER: We were informed by the Iranian Government that they felt that the perpetrators of these incidents were the small group of terrorists that engage in this activity from time to time here in Iran.

I should say on all occasions the reports that I have had indicate that in all cases the explosions or the devices were very small; in other words not of high explosive capacity.

Q For some quick background, could you perhaps get somebody from USIS in here and tell us what has been going on in the last few weeks? I understand five of these extremists were executed last week. They must have some information on it.

MR. ZIEGLER: We are not prepared to present to you something that is the responsibility of the Government of Iran. Perhaps you could request somebody from the Iranian Government to speak to you, but the United States Government will not.

Q Can we have a time on the Price incident?

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Q. They say it was 100 feet. Was the distance
about that?

MR. ZIEGLER: I understand it was behind the wall and
a good distance from the area.

Q. Is the President going on with his schedule as planned?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President will depart for Warsaw
according to the schedule. I believe you know the first press
bus leaves at noon, and Pan Am leaves at 1:00. The second press
bus leaves at 1:00 and the TWA plane departs for Warsaw at 1:30,
so the schedule will be followed as you received it.

Q. It was not quite clear, reading the schedule
that we were given last night, that there would be press buses
in the motorcade from the airport. Will that be the situation?

MR. ZIEGLER: We have talked to our advance people
there this morning, and efforts are being made to accomplish
that. I believe there will be, Chuck.

Q. As a practical matter, there may be a story there
and it would be very beneficial.

MR. ZIEGLER: I understand. We are making arrangements
to have special poolers as far up in the motorcade as possible.

Q. There was reference to press buses leaving for
the signing of the Consular Convention, but I didn't see any-
thing in the schedule about the Consular Convention.

MR. ZIEGLER: Sometimes my staff is over-efficient.
The signing of the Consular Treaty is indicated to be sometime
this evening. This will, of course, depend on some discussions
that have to occur there. We will provide you with the information when we arrive.

Q. It was reported out of Warsaw that Secretary
Rogers will, indeed, sign the treaty.

MR. ZIEGLER: I was not referring to that. I was
referring to the exact time and your mechanical processes.
But it is planned that a Consular Treaty will be signed in
Poland sometime today by Secretary Rogers. It relates to the
ongoing discussions that have been occurring between the United
States and Poland in terms of signing the Consular Convention,
the establishment of the Consulate in New York City and the
United States Consulate in Krakow, in Poland.

Q. Did Joe Sisco sit in on the talks this morning?

MR. ZIEGLER: Mr. Sisco did not sit in on the direct
talks between the President and the Shah, but he has, while he
has been in Iran, met with officials from the government to
talk about matters between the two countries.

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Incidentally, just to conclude the information on the Consular Convention, it will constitute a formal agreement governing the conduct of consular relations between the United States and Poland, and the functions, privileges and immunities of our respective consular offices.

Q Ron, why is it that you can say you are so confident that none of these explosions were directed at the President's party when every single one of them was directed at U.S. personnel, installations and places where the President will be?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is not true, that every single one of them occurred where the President would be.

Q No, but the others were aimed at personnel or U.S. property.

MR. ZIEGLER: Our security assessment, as I gave it to you earlier, and the security assessment of the Iranian Government, was and is that none of these incidents were directed at the Presidential party or the party accompanying him.

Q Do you know if any arrests have been made?

MR. ZIEGLER: That information would have to be provided to you by the Government of Iran.

Q How will we get that? Are they going to brief
here today?

MR. ZIEGLER: I do not know. I am sure they will be providing that through their processes.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END

(AT 11:07 A.M.)

#1454

RELEASED AT 12:00 NOON TEHRAN TIME

May 31, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Tehran, Iran)

THE WHITE HOUSE

TEXT OF JOINT US-IRANIAN COMMUNIQUE

At the invitation of His Imperial Majesty the Shanshah Arya Mehr and Her Imperial Majesty the Shabanou of Iran, the President of the United States of America and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to Iran from May 30 to May 31, 1972. The President and Mrs. Nixon were received with exceptional friendliness and warmth by their Imperial Majesties and by the government and people of Iran.

During his visit the President held discussions with His Imperial
Majesty the Shanshah in a warm and cordial atmosphere, reflecting
the close and friendly relations that exist between the two
countries.

The President and His Imperial Majesty discussed recent develop-
ments on the international scene. The President told his
Imperial Majesty of his visits to Moscow and Peking and of his
efforts to reduce East-West tensions and restore peace and
stability to southeast Asia. They held the view that the con-
flict in Indochina should be settled through negotiations and
that the Geneva agreements could serve as a basis for resolving
problems among the States in the area and for guaranteeing their
right of self-determination without any outside interference.

The President and His Imperial Majesty also discussed develop-
ments in the Middle East. They were gratified that a cease-fire
continues to be observed but expressed their concern over the
serious situation existing in the Middle East and reaffirmed
their support for a peaceful settlement in accordance with
Security Council Resolution 242.

The President and His Imperial Majesty agreed that the security
and stability of the Persian Gulf is of vital importance to the
littoral States. Both were of the view that the littoral States
bore the primary responsibility for the security of the Persian
Gulf.

His Imperial Majesty reaffirmed Iran's determination to bear its
share of this responsibility.

The President and His Imperial Majesty also agreed that the
economic development and welfare of the bordering States of the
Persian Gulf are of importance to the stability of the region.
Iran declared itself ready and willing to cooperate with its
neighbors in fostering an atmosphere in which stability and
progress can flourish.

The President and His Imperial Majesty voiced the hope that
Pakistan and India would find ways to reach a just and honorable
settlement of the existing issues. They noted with satisfaction
the initiative taken by both countries for meetings which hold
the promise through further talks of progress toward a peaceful
settlement in south Asia built on lasting relationships of
friendship and mutual respect.

The President expressed his admiration for Iran's impressive
record in the development of a strong economy and the successful
implementation of His Imperial Majesty's "White Revolution".
His Imperial Majesty outlined the main features of Iran's new
five year plan with particular emphasis on Agro-Industry and
socio-economic projects. The President reiterated the readiness
of the United States to cooperate with Iran as appropriate in
this extensive program and important enterprise.

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The President and His Imperial Majesty also discussed the world-
wide narcotics problem. They noted that Iran and the United
States were taking vigorous action against the illicit inter-
national narcotics traffic. Both took satisfaction in Iran's
effective measures to control domestic opium production. The
President expressed understanding of Iran's declared policy to
cease internal cultivation of the opium poppy when Iran's
neighbors also cease internal cultivation of the opium poppy.
They agreed that the two governments should continue their close
cooperation in international forums dealing with narcotic matters.
The President noted with appreciation the active support provided
by Iran at the recent United Nations conference which adopted
a protocol amending the 1961 single convention on narcotic drugs.
The President reaffirmed United States' support for regional
cooperation in solving international narcotics problems.

Both sides expressed deep satisfaction over the excellence of
relations between their two countries and the expectation that
they would continue in the future. His Imperial Majesty stressed
once again Iran's determination to strengthen its defensive
capability to ensure the nation's security. The President con-
firmed that the United States would, as in the past, continue
to cooperate with Iran in strengthening its defenses. They
reaffirmed their respect for the sovereign right of every nation
to choose its own destiny in its own way without any outside
interference.

In expressing appreciation for the warm hospitality shown him
and Mrs. Nixon, the President invited their Imperial Majesties
to visit the United States at a mutually convenient time. The
invitation was accepted with deep appreciation.

#####

May 31, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

At the invitation of His Imperial Majesty the Shanshah Arya Mehr and Her Imperial Majesty the Shbanou of Iran, the President of the United States of America and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to Iran from May 30 to May 31, 1972. The President and Mrs. Nixon were received with exceptional friendliness and warmth by their Imperial Majesties and by the government and people of Iran.

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#####

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 15, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING BY
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
THE STATE DINING ROOM

9:30 A.M. EDT

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, the President has asked me to present to you the White House perspective on these agreements, and the general background, with the technical information and some more of the details to be supplied by the formal witnesses before your various committees.

I will read a statement to you which we will distribute. It is still in the process of being typed.

In considering the two agreements before the Congress, the treaty on the limitation of antiballistic missile systems and the interim agreement on the limitation of offensive arms, the overriding questions are these: Do these agreements permit the United States to maintain a defense posture that guarantees our security and protects our vital interests? Second, will they lead to a more enduring structure of peace?

In the course of the formal hearings over the coming days and weeks, the Administration will demonstrate conclusively that they serve both of these ends. I will begin that process this morning by offering some general remarks on the agreement, after which I will be happy to take your questions.

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE 1970'S

The first part of my remarks will deal with U.S.-Soviet relations as they affect these agreements. The agreement which was signed 46 minutes before midnight in Moscow on the evening of May 26th by President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev is without precedent in the nuclear age; indeed, in all relevant modern history.

Never before have the world's two most powerful nations, divided by ideology, history and conflicting interests, placed their central armaments under formally agreed limitation and restraint. It is fair to ask: What new conditions now prevail to have made this step commend itself to the calculated self-interests of both of the so-called superpowers, as it so clearly must have done for both willingly to undertake it?

Let me start, therefore, with a sketch of the broad design of what the President has been trying to achieve in this country's relations with the Soviet Union, since at each important turning point in the SALT negotiations we were guided not so much by the tactical solution that seemed most equitable or prudent, important as it was, but by an underlying philosophy and a specific perception of international reality.

The international situation has been undergoing a profound structural change since at least the mid-1960s. The post-World War II pattern of relations among the great powers had been altered to the point that when this Administration took office, a major reassessment was clearly in order.

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The nations that had been prostrate in 1945 had regained their economic strength and their political vitality. The Communist bloc was divided into contending factions, and nationalistic forces and social and economic pressures were reasserting themselves within the individual Communist states.

Perhaps most important for the United States, our undisputed strategic predominance was declining just at a time when there was rising domestic resistance to military programs, and impatience for redistribution of resources from national defense to social demands.

Amidst all of this profound change, however, there was one important constant -- the continuing dependence of most of the world's hopes for stability and peace upon the ability to reduce the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The factors which perpetuated that rivalry remain real and deep.

-- We are ideological adversaries, and we will in all likelihood remain so for the foreseeable future.

-- We are political and military competitors, and neither can be indifferent to advances by the other in either of these fields.

-- We each have allies whose association we value and whose interests and activities of each impinge on those of the other at numerous points.

-- We each possess an awesome nuclear force created and designed to meet the threat implicit in the other's strength and aims.

Each of us has thus come into possession of power singlehandedly capable of exterminating the human race. Paradoxically, this very fact, and the global interests of both sides, create a certain commonality of outlook, a sort of interdependence for survival between the two of us.

Although we compete, the conflict will not admit of resolution by victory in the classical sense. We are compelled to coexist. We have an inescapable obligation to build jointly a structure for peace. Recognition of this reality is the beginning of wisdom for a sane and effective foreign policy today.

President Nixon has made it the starting point of the United States policy since 1969. This Administration's policy is occasionally characterized as being based on the principles of the classical balance of power. To the extent that that term implies a belief that security requires a measure of equilibrium, it has a certain validity. No national leader has the right to mortgage the survival of his people to the good will of another state. We must seek firmer restraints on the actions of potentially hostile states than a sanguine appeal to their good nature.

But to the extent that balance of power means constant jockeying for marginal advantages over an opponent, it no longer applies. The reason is that the determination of national

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power has changed fundamentally in the nuclear age. Throughout history, the primary concern of most national leaders has been to accumulate geopolitical and military power. It would have seemed inconceivable even a generation ago that such power once gained could not be translated directly into advantage over one's opponent. But now both we and the Soviet Union have begun to find that each increment of power does not necessarily represent an increment of usable political strength.

With modern weapons, a potentially decisive advantage requires a change of such magnitude that the mere effort to obtain it can produce disaster. The simple tit-for-tat reaction to each other's programs of a decade ago is in danger of being overtaken by a more or less simultaneous and continuous process of technological advance, which opens more and more temptations for seeking decisive advantage.

A premium is put on striking first and on creating a defense to blunt the other side's retaliatory capability. In other words, marginal additions of power cannot be decisive. Potentially decisive additions are extremely dangerous, and the quest for them are destabilizing. The argument that arms races produce war has often been exaggerated. The nuclear age is over shadowed by its peril.

All of this was in the President's mind as he mapped the new directions of American policy at the outset of this Administration. There was reason to believe that the Soviet leadership might also be thinking along similar lines as the repeated failure of their attempts to gain marginal advantage in local crises or in military competition underlined the limitation of old policy approaches.

The President, therefore, decided that the United States should work to create a set of circumstances which would offer the Soviet leaders an opportunity to move away from confrontation through carefully prepared negotiations. From the first, we rejected the notion that what was lacking was a cordial climate for conducting negotiations.

Past experience has amply shown that much heralded changes in atmospherics, but not buttressed by concrete progress, will revert to previous patterns at the first subsequent clash of interests.

We have, instead, sought to move forward across a broad range of issues so that progress in one area would add momentum to the progress of other areas.

We hoped that the Soviet Union would acquire a stake in a wide spectrum of negotiations and that it would become convinced that its interests would be best served if the entire process unfolded. We have sought, in short, to create a vested interest in mutual restraint.

At the same time, we were acutely conscious of the contradictory tendencies at work in Soviet policy. Some factors--such as the fear of nuclear war; the emerging consumer economy, and the increased pressures of a technological, administrative society -- have encouraged the Soviet leaders to seek a more stable relationship with the United States. Other factors --such as ideology, bureaucratic inertia, and the catalytic effect of turmoil in peripheral areas -- have prompted pressures for tactical gains.

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The President has met each of these manifestations on its own terms, demonstrating receptivity to constructive Soviet initiatives and firmness in the face of provocations or adventurism. He has kept open a private channel through which the two sides could communicate candidly and settle matters rapidly. The President was convinced that agreements dealing with questions of armaments in isolation do not, in fact, produce lasting inhibitions on military competition because they contribute little to the kind of stability that makes crises less likely. In recent months, major progress was achieved in moving toward a broadly-based accommodation of interests with the USSR, in which an arms limitation agreement could be a central element.

This approach was called linkage, not by the Administration, and became the object of considerable debate in 1969. Now, three years later, the SALT agreement does not stand alone, isolated and incongruous in the relationship of hostility, vulnerable at any moment to the shock of some sudden crisis. It stands, rather, linked organically, to a chain of agreements and to a broad understanding about international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age.

The agreements on the limitation of strategic arms is, thus, not merely a technical accomplishment, although it is that in part, but it must be seen as a political event of some magnitude. This is relevant to the question of whether the agreements will be easily breached or circumvented. Given the past, no one can answer that question with certainty, but it can be said with some assurance that any country which contemplates a rupture of the agreement or a circumvention of its letter and spirit must now face the fact that it will be placing in jeopardy not only a limited arms control agreement, but a broad political relationship.

## PREPARATIONS FOR THE ARMS TALKS

Let me turn now to the more specific decisions we had to make about what the agreement should do and how it could be achieved.

We knew that any negotiations on arms control, especially ones involving those central weapons systems which guarantee each side's security, were found to be sensitive and complicated, requiring frequent high-level decisions.

The possibility of a deadlock would be ever present, and the repercussions of a deadlock could not help but affect U.S.-Soviet relations across the board. We had to begin, therefore, by assessing what the situation was in terms of armaments in place and under construction; what realistic alternatives we had at the negotiating table; and how a tentative or partial agreement would compare with no agreement at all.

For various reasons during the 1960s, the United States had, as you know, made the strategic decision to terminate its building programs in major offensive systems and to rely instead on qualitative improvements. By 1969, therefore, we had no active or planned programs for deploying additional ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles or bombers. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had dynamic and accelerated deployment programs in both land-based and sea-based missiles. You know, too, that the interval between conception and deployment of strategic weapons systems is generally five to ten years.

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A further complication was that the composition of forces on the two sides was not symmetrical. The Soviet Union had given priority to systems controlled within its own territory while the United States had turned increasingly to sea-based systems.

The result was that they had a panoply of different ICBM's while we essentially had one general class of ICBM's, the Minuteman, together with a more effective and modern submarine force operating from bases overseas and equipped with longer-range missiles.

All of this meant that even arriving at a basic definition of strategic equivalency would be technically demanding and politically intricate.

Looking beyond to the desired limitations, it appeared that neither side was going to make major unilateral concessions. When the national survival is at stake, such a step could not contribute to stability. The final outcome would have to be equitable and to offer a more reliable prospect for maintaining security than could be achieved without the agreements.

With these facts in view, the President, in the spring of 1969, established a group of senior officials responsible for preparing and conducting the SALT negotiations.

I acted as Chairman and the other members included the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

This group, called the Verification Panel, has the task of analyzing the issues and factors and submitting for the President's decisions those options which commanded support in the various departments and agencies.

The Verification Panel analyzed each of the weapons systems which could conceivably be involved in an agreement. It compared the effect of different limitations on our program and on the Soviet programs, and weighed the resulting balance. It analyzed the possibilities of verification, and the precise risk of evasion, seeking to determine at what point evasion could be detected and what measures would be available for a response. This was done in various combinations so that if one piece of the equation changed, say the ABM level, the Government would be able to determine the effect of that change upon the other components of a particular negotiating package.

Our aim was to be in a position to give the negotiations a momentum. We wanted to be sure that when stalemates developed, the point at issue would not be largely tactical, and that the alternative solutions would be analysed ahead of time and ready for immediate decision by the President.

## SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

In the first round of the talks, which began in November of 1969, the two sides established a work program and

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reached some tentative understanding of strategic principles.

For example, both sides more or less agreed at the outset that a very heavy ABM system could be a destabilizing factor, but that the precise level of ABM limitations would have to be set according to our success in agreeing on offensive limitations.

In the spring and summer of 1970, each country put forward more concrete proposals, translating some of the agreed principles into negotiating packages. During this period, we, on the American side, had hopes of reaching a comprehensive limitation. However, the initial search for a comprehensive solution gradually broke down over the question of defining the scope of the forces to be included.

The Soviets believed that strategic meant any weapons system capable of reaching the Soviet Union or the United States. This would have included our forward-based aircraft and carrier forces, but excluded Soviet intermediate range rockets aimed at Europe and other areas.

We opposed this approach, since it would have prejudiced our alliance commitments and raised a distinction between our own security and that of our European allies.

We offered a verifiable ban on the deployment and testing of Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicles. The Soviets countered by offering a totally unverifiable production ban, while insisting on the freedom to test, thus placing the control of MIRV's effectively out of reach.

At this juncture, early in 1971, with the stalemate threatening, the President took a major new initiative by opening direct contact with the Soviet leaders to stimulate the SALT discussions and for that matter, the Berlin negotiations, and providing progress could be achieved on these two issues, to explore the feasibility of a summit meeting.

The Soviet leaders' first response was to insist that only the ABM's should be limited, and that offensive systems should be left aside. But as far as we were concerned, the still incipient ABM systems on both sides were far from the most dynamic or dangerous factors in the strategic equation. It was the Soviet offensive programs, moving ahead at the average rate of over 200 land-based and 100 sea-based missiles a year, which we felt constituted the most urgent issue. To limit our option of developing the ABM system without at the same time checking the growth of the Soviet offensive threat was unacceptable.

Exchanges between the President and the Soviet leaders embodying these views produced the understanding of May 20, 1971. As any workable compromise in the field must do, that understanding met each side's essential concerns. Since the offensive systems were complex and since agreement with respect to all of them had proved impossible, it was agreed that the initial offensive settlement would be an interim agreement and not a permanent treaty, and that it would freeze only selected categories at agreed levels.

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On the defensive side, the understanding called for negotiations towards a permanent ABM solution with talks on both issues to proceed simultaneously to a common conclusion.

This left two major issues for the negotiators, the precise level of the allowed ABM's, and the scope of the interim agreement, specifically what weapons would be included in the freeze.

Devising an equitable agreement on ABM's proved extremely difficult. The United States had virtually completed its ABM site at Grand Forks, and we were working on the second site at Malmstrom. Hence, we proposed freezing deployments at levels operational or under construction, that is to say, two ICBM sites on our side, and the Moscow defense on the other.

The Soviets objected this would deny them the right to have any protection for their ICBM's, a new formula was then devised allowing each side to choose two sites, one each for national capital and ICBM defense or both for ICBM defense. The resolution of the ABM issue was completed after our Chiefs of Staff, supported by the Secretary of Defense, decided that a site in Washington to defend the National Command Authority was to be preferred over the second ICBM-protective site at Malmstrom. They reasoned that while a limited defense would not assure the ultimate survival of the National Command Authority, it would buy time against a major attack while the radars in both the NCA defense and the defense of ICBM's would provide valuable warning. Moreover, an NCA defense would protect the National Command Authority in the event of a small attack by some third country or even an accidental or unauthorized launch of a weapon toward the United States.

The President accepted their recommendation.

What about the offensive weapons freeze? Early in the discussions about the implementation of this portion of the May 20 understanding between the President and the Soviet leaders, it was decided to exclude from the freeze bombers and so-called forward-based systems. To exclude, that is, the weapons in which this country holds an advantage.

We urged the Congress to keep this fact in mind, when assessing the numerical ratios of weapons which are subject to the offensive freeze.

There was also relatively rapid agreement following the May 20 breakthrough that intercontinental ballistic missiles would be covered. This left the issue of the inclusion of submarines.

With respect to ICBM's in submarines, the situation was as follows: The Soviet Union had been deploying at the average annual rate of 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles and 100 sea-based ballistic missiles a year. The U.S. had completed deployments of Minuteman and the 41 Polaris submarines in 1967. Of course, as you know, we are engaged in increasing the number of warheads on both our ICBM's and submarine-launched missiles. We were, and are, developing a new submarine system, although it cannot be deployed until 1978 or until after the end of the freeze. In other words, as a result of decisions made in the 1960's, and not reversible with the time-frame of the protected agreement, there would be a numerical gap against us in the two categories of land- and sea-based missile systems whether or not there was an agreement. Without an agreement, the gap would steadily widen.

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The agreement would not create the gap. It would prevent its enlargement to our disadvantage. In short, a freeze of ICIMs and sea-based systems would be overwhelmingly in the United States' interest.

These basic considerations undoubtedly impelled the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that any freeze which was to command their support must include the submarine-based system. The only possible alternative was a crash program for building additional missile-launching submarines. The President explored this idea with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations. Their firm judgment was that such a program was undesirable. It could not produce results before 1976 -- that is, toward the very end of a projected freeze -- and only by building a type of submarine similar to our current fleet, and without many of the features most needed for the 1980s and beyond.

The President once again used his direct channel to the Soviet leaders, this time to urge the inclusion of missile-launching submarines in the offensive agreement.

After a long period of hesitation, the Soviet leaders agreed in principle at the end of April. Final details were worked out in Moscow between the President and the Soviet leaders.

My purpose in dwelling at such length upon the details of our internal deliberations and negotiations has been to make one crucial point: Neither the freeze of ICBMs nor the freeze of submarine-launched missiles was a Soviet idea, and hence, it is not an American concession. On the contrary, in both cases it was the Soviet Union which reluctantly acceded to American proposals afterlong and painful deliberation.

## PROVISIONS OF THE AGREEMENT

I will not spend this group's time in further review of the frequently arduous negotiations in Vienna, Helsinki, and during the summit in Moscow leading to the final agreement. I do want to pay tribute on behalf of the President to Ambassador Smith and his delegation, whose dedication, negotiating skill and patience contributed decisively to the outcome.

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Let me summarize the principal provisions of the documents as signed. The ABM treaty allows each side to have one ABM site for the defense of its national command authority and another site for defense of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The two must be at least 1,300 kilometers, or 800 miles apart in order to prevent the development of a territorial defense. Each ABM site can have 100 ABM interceptors.

The treaty contains additional provisions which effectively prohibit either the establishment of a radar base for the defense of populated areas or the attainment of capabilities to intercept ballistic missiles by conversion of air defense missiles to anti-ballistic missiles.

It provides for withdrawal by either party on six months' notice, if supreme national interests are judged to have been jeopardized by extraordinary events. By setting a limit to ABM defenses the treaty not only eliminates one area of potentially dangerous defensive competition, but it reduces the incentive for continuing deployment of offensive systems.

As long as it lasts, offensive missile forces have, in effect, a free ride to their targets. Beyond a certain level of sufficiency, differences in numbers are therefore not conclusive.

The interim agreement on offensive arms is to run for five years, unless replaced by a more comprehensive permanent agreement which will be the subject of further negotiations, or unless terminated by notification similar to that for the treaty.

In essence this agreement will freeze the numbers of strategic offensive missiles on both sides at approximately the levels currently operational and under construction. For ICBM's, this is 1054 for the United States and 1618 for the Soviet Union. Within this overall limitation, the Soviet Union has accepted a freeze of its heavy ICBM launchers, the weapons most threatening to our strategic forces.

There is also a prohibition on conversion of light ICBM's into heavy missiles. These provisions are buttressed by verifiable provisions and criteria, specifically the prohibition against any significant enlargement of missile silos.

The submarine limitations are more complicated. In brief, the Soviets are frozen to their claimed current level, operational and under construction, of about 740 missiles, some of them on an older type nuclear submarine. They are permitted to build to a ceiling of 62 boats and 950 missiles, but only if they dismantle older ICBM's or submarine-based missiles to offset the new construction.

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This would mean dismantling 210 ICBM's and some
30 missiles on some nine older nuclear submarines. Bombers
and other aircraft are not included in this agreement.

In sum, the interim offensive agreement will keep
the overall number of strategic ballistic missile launchers
both on land and at sea within an agreed ceiling which
is essentially the current level, operational or under
construction. It will not prohibit the United States
from continuing current and planned strategic offensive
programs, since neither the multiple-warhead conversion,
nor the B-1 is within the purview of the freeze and since
the ULMS submarine system is not, or never was planned
for deployment until after 1977. The agreement will stop
the Soviet Union from increasing the existing numerical
gap in missile launchers.

Finally, there are a number of interpretative
statements which were provided to the Congress along
with the agreements. These interpretations are in several
forms: Agreed statements initialed by the delegations,
agreed interpretations or common understandings which
were not set down formally and initialed, unilateral
interpretations to make our position clear in instances
where we could not get total agreement.

In any negotiation of this complexity, there will
inevitably be details upon which the parties cannot agree.
We made certain unilateral statements in order to insure
that our positions on these details was included in the
negotiating record and understood by the other side.

The agreed interpretations and common understandings
for the most part deal with detailed technical aspects of
limitations on ABM systems and offensive weapons. For
example, it was agreed that the size of missile silos
could not be significantly increased and that "significantly"
meant not more than 10 to 15 percent.

In the more important unilateral declarations we
made clear to the Soviets that the introduction of land
mobile ICBM's would be inconsistent with the agreement.
Since the publication of the various unilateral interpretative
statements, suggestions have been heard that the language
of the treaty and agreement in fact hide deep-seated
disagreements. But it must be recognized that in any
limited agreements, which are between old time adversaries,
there are bound to be certain gaps.

In this case the gaps relate not so much to the
terms themselves, but rather to what it was impossible
to include. The interpretations do not vitiate these
agreements, but they expand and add to the agreements.

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WHAT DO THE AGREEMENTS MEAN?

Taking the longer perspective, what can we say has
been accomplished?

First, it is clear that the agreement will enhance
the security of both sides. No agreement which fails to do so
could have been signed in the first place or stood any chance
of lasting after it was signed. An attempt to gain a unilateral
advantage in the strategic field must be self-defeating.

The President has given the most careful consideration
to the final terms. He has asked me to reiterate most
emphatically this morning his conviction that the agreements
fully protect our national security and our vital interests.

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Secondly, the President is determined that our security and vital interests shall remain fully protected. If the Senate consents to ratification of the treaty and if the Congress approves the interim agreement, the Administration will, therefore, pursue two parallel courses.

On the one hand, we shall push the next phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the same energy and conviction that have produced these initial agreements.

On the other hand, until further Arms limits are negotiated, we shall push research and development and the production capacity to remain in a fully protected strategic posture should follow-on agreements prove unattainable and so as to avoid giving the other side a temptation to break out of the agreement.

Third, the President believes that these agreements, embedded as they are in the fabric of an emerging new relationship, can hold tremendous political and historical significance in the coming decades. For the first time, two great powers, deeply divided by their divergent values, philosophies, and social systems, have agreed to restrain the very armaments which their national survival depends. No decision of this magnitude could have been taken unless it had been part of a larger decision to place relations on a new foundation of restraint, cooperation and steadily evolving confidence. A spectrum of agreements on joint efforts with regard to the environment, space, health, and promising negotiations on economic relations provides a prospect for avoiding the failure of the Washington Naval Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand pact outlawing war which collapsed in part for lack of an adequate political foundation.

The final verdict must wait on events, but there is at least reason to hope that these accords represent a major break in the pattern of suspicion, hostility, and confrontation which has dominated U.S.-Soviet relations for a generation. The two great nuclear powers must not let this opportunity slip away by jockeying for marginal advantages.

Inevitably an agreement of such consequence raises serious questions on the part of concerned individuals of quite different persuasions. I cannot do justice to all of them here. Let me deal with some of the most frequently asked since the agreements were signed three weeks ago.

Who won?

The President has already answered this question. He has stressed that it is inappropriate to pose the question in terms of victory or defeat. In an agreement of this kind, either both sides win, or both sides lose. This will either be a serious attempt to turn the world away from time-worn practices of jockeying for power, or there will be endless, wasteful and purposeless competition in the acquisition of armaments.

Does the agreement perpetuate a U.S. strategic disadvantage?

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We reject the premise of that question on two grounds. First, the present situation is on balance advantageous to the United States. Second, the Interim Agreement perpetuates nothing which did not already exist in fact and which could only have gotten worse without an agreement.

Our present strategic military situation is sound. Much of the criticism has focused on the imbalance in number of missiles between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But, this only examines one aspect of the problem. To assess the overall balance it is necessary to consider those forces not in the agreement; our bomber force which is substantially larger and more effective than the Soviet bomber force, and our forward bases systems,

The quality of the weapons must also be weighed. We are confident we have a major advantage in nuclear weapons technology and in warhead accuracy. Also, with our MIRV's we have a two-to-one lead today in numbers of warheads and this lead will be maintained during the period of the agreement, even if the Soviets develop and deploy MIRV's of their own.

Then there are such factors as deployment characteristics. For example, because of the difference in geography and basing, it has been estimated that the Soviet Union requires three submarines for two of ours to be able to keep an equal number on station.

When the total picture is viewed, our strategic forces are seen to be completely sufficient.

The Soviets have more missile launchers, but when other relevant systems such as bombers are counted there are roughly the same number of launchers on each side. We have a big advantage on warheads. The Soviets have an advantage on megatonnage.

What is disadvantageous to us, though, is the trend of new weapons deployment by the Soviet Union and the projected imbalance five years hence based on that trend. The relevant question to ask, therefore, is what the freeze prevents; where would we be by 1977 without a freeze? Considering the current momentum by the Soviet Union, in both ICBM's and submarine launched ballistic missiles, the ceiling set in the Interim Agreement can only be interpreted as a sound arrangement that makes a major contribution to our national security.

Does the agreement jeopardize our security in the future?

The current arms race compounds numbers by technology. The Soviet Union has proved that it can best compete in sheer numbers. This is the area which is limited by the agreement.

Thus the agreement confines the competition with the Soviets to the area of technology? And, heretofore, we have had a significant advantage.

The follow-on negotiations will attempt to bring

the technological race under control. Until these
negotiations succeed, we must take care not to anticipate
their outcome by unilateral decisions.

Can we trust the Soviets?

The possibility always exists that the Soviets will treat
the Moscow agreements as they have sometimes treated earlier
ones, as just another tactical opportunity in the protracted
conflict. If this happens, the United States will have to
respond. This we shall plan to prepare to do psychologically
and strategically and provided the Congress accepts the
strategic programs on which the acceptance of the agreements
was predicated.

I have said enough to indicate we advocate these
agreements not on the basis of trust, but on the basis of
the enlightened self-interests of both sides. This self-
interest is reinforced by the carefully drafted verification
provisions in the agreement. Beyond the legal obligations,
both sides have a stake in all of the agreements that have
been signed, and a large stake in the broad process of
improvement in relations that has begun. The Soviet leaders
are serious men, and we are confident that they will not lightly
abandon the course that has led to the summit meeting and to
these initial agreements. For our own part, we will not abandon
this course without major provocation, because it is in the
interest of this country and in the interest of mankind to
pursue it.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

At the conclusion of the Moscow summit, the President
and General Secretary Brezhnev signed a Declaration of
Principles to govern the future relationship between the
United States and the Soviet Union. These principles state
that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence in the
nuclear age. They commit both sides to avoid direct
armed confrontation, to use restraint in local conflicts,
to assert no special claims in derogation of the sovereign
equality of all nations, to stress cooperation and negotiation
at all points of our relationship.

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At this point, these principles reflect an aspiration and an attitude. This Administration will spare no effort to translate the aspiration into reality. We shall strive with determination to overcome further the miasma of suspicion and self-confirming preemptive actions which have characterized the Cold War.

Of course the temptation is to continue along well worn paths. The status quo has the advantage of reality, but history is strewn with the wreckage of nations which sought their future in their past. Catastrophe has resulted far less often from conscious decisions than from the fear of breaking loose from established patterns through the inexorable march towards cataclysm because nobody knew what else to do. The paralysis of policy which destroyed Europe in 1914 would surely destroy the world if we let it happen again in the nuclear age.

Thus the deepest question we ask is not whether we can trust the Soviets, but whether we can trust ourselves. Some have expressed concern about the agreements not because they object to their terms, but because they are afraid of the euphoria that these agreements might produce.

But surely we cannot be asked to maintain unavoidable tension just to carry out programs which our national survival should dictate in any event. We must not develop a national psychology by which we can act only on the basis of what we are against and not on what we are for.

Our challenges then are: Can we chart a new course with hope but without illusion, with large purposes but without sentimentality? Can we be both generous and strong? It is not often that a country has the opportunity to answer such questions meaningfully. We are now at such a juncture where peace and progress depend on our faith and our fortitude.

It is in this spirit that the President has negotiated the agreements. It is in this spirit that he asks the approval of the treaty and the Interim Agreement and that I now stand ready to answer your questions.

END

(AT 10:45 a.m. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 15, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
AFTER A BRIEFING BY
DR. HENRY KISSINGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

STATE DINING ROOM

MR. MacGREGOR: Gentlemen, as the President indicated in his report to the Joint Session of Congress two weeks ago tonight, he places the highest importance on executive-legislative partnership in the further carrying forward of the constitutional process with respect to the treaty and the agreement.

This session this morning is designed to further that commitment on the President's part and to give to you and through you the American people, an opportunity for the fullest possible debate and the fullest range of questions.

The President has asked me, and I would like to do so, to recognize the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Fulbright.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Thank you, Mr. MacGregor.

Dr. Kissinger, first, may I say I think that was an extraordinarily thorough and enlightening statement. The only regret I have is that he didn't make it public so all the country could have heard it, because I think it is a very great description, I think, of what these agreements mean.

I am thoroughly in accord with the spirit with which you have given them and the way the President has presented this agreement for our country. I have only one serious question about it.

There does appear to me to be an inherent inconsistency in the attitude as expressed by the Secretary of Defense the other day. For background, I will read one sentence. This is a quote from his testimony before the Armed Services Committee: "I could not support the agreements if the Congress fails to act on movement forward of the Trident system, the B-1 bombers or other programs that we have outlined to improve our strategic offensive systems during this five-year period."

Now, the explanation that Mr. Kissinger has made about maintaining our security during the five-year period I accept as a general statement, but in view of the fact that we know the Soviets have no aircraft carriers whatever, they have a very small and not very modern bomber force, they have no forward bases similar to ours, unless you consider Cuba perhaps a forward base.

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But so far, we have no evidence that it is being
so prepared. They are not planning a Trident system
that I know of. Their system of submarines is traditional
and similar to the ones they already have.

In view of all this, it seems to me to couple
the approval of the ABM and the interim agreement with
Congressional approval of these vastly expensive programs
raises a serious question about our determination to accept
this agreement in the spirit in which I think it was
negotiated and the spirit which you have stated. That is
a gradual relaxation of the tensions, and not to use these
agreements as an excuse for a greatly enlarged arms system
of our own.

This is the only thing that has bothered me about
them. I, of course, am personally extremely pleased with
the overall agreements with the sole exception, do we mean
it, as I have said, and you yourself so offer, put yourself
in the place of the Russians, if we proceed immediately
to a very large expansion of our weapons systems, would
this not leave in the mind of General Grechko and his
colleagues a question about our sincerity in really
moving toward a reduction in the arms race.

This is the only question I have and it is the
one which bothers me and I wish you would enlarge
upon the necessity of proceeding at once and tying these
agreements with the approval of programs about which there
were serious questions even before this agreement was made,
there were very serious questions about the A-14 and B-1
before these negotiations were agreed on.

Now, we seem to be put in the position of being
pressured into that in order to get an agreement with which
I am thoroughly in accord.

DR. KISSINGER: As the President pointed out, and
as I also said in my statement, Mr. Chairman, we intend
to move on two tracks: One, we hope to start the second
round of SALT negotiations as soon as the Senate ratifies
the treaty and the Congress approves the interim agreement.

If the schedule that was tentatively suggested to
you by the President were met, that is to say, approval by
the end of August, we would hope to have the first session
of the second round of SALT sometime during October and then
to begin the process again. We will pursue those nego-
tiations with the attitude towards bringing about a change
in the international climate that I have described.

At the same time, the question arises of what
we should do in our national defense posture while we engage
in these negotiations. It has been the judgment of this
Administration that we must continue those programs which
preserve our strategic position. I do not, in this setting,
want to go into each individual weapon system because I
believe that the appropriate committees will examine the
Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff with respect to them.

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MR. MacGREGOR: I am sure if the President were
here, he would like to have recognized the Chairman of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee, Chairman Morgan.

CONGRESSMAN MORGAN: Thank you, Clark, and I want to
thank Dr. Kissinger in inviting us to brief us on it.

When the President appeared here in the short
appearance he made before this group, he spelled out the reason
why this had to be done in Moscow at such a high level, because
it crossed over so many agencies and because of the form of
government of the Soviet Union.

He also ended up by saying that you would not be
available for testimony on Capitol Hill, in which I agree. But
I just wondered, with the five committees who are represented
here today, who are going to consider over in the Senate side
the Treaty of the ABM's and over on the House side this, the
limitation that has been set by you and the President, of
September 1, whether you would be available by these committees
for consultation as we go along.

DR. KISSINGER: I would be delighted to meet with
members of these committees in groups, on an individual basis,
or in the kind of setting that we have worked out before, in
which I will meet with the committees at the invitation of the
Chairman in some setting that maintains the position of Executive
privilege.

But I will be fully available to answer any questions
and we are prepared to go as far as is humanly possible with
respect to Executive privilege.

Certainly, to make available to the Congress any
answers that we can.

CONGRESSMAN MORGAN: I want to assure you that the
Committee on Foreign Affairs will go to work on this as soon
as we get back from the Democratic Convention.

MR. MacGREGOR: I am sure we would like to hear from
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, the
Honorable John Stennis.

SENATOR STENNIS: Well, Mr. Chairman, and colleagues
of the Congress, I certainly didn't come here to make a statement.
I came to listen and to learn. I did respond when I walked in, to
a request that I would say just a word.

Gentlemen and ladies here in the Congress, I have
been on the Armed Services Committee since before we had ICBM's
and I have thought many times the growing realization I had of
what these could mean and now what they do mean in our hands and
then this same weapon in the hands of our adversaries.

So, I have been driven into a corner of wanting
very much to have some kind of an agreement that would be the
germ, perhaps, of something that would relieve the tensions
and assure our safety.

I do have one major reservation about this situation
I am going to mention, but I do believe if we can approve it,
it is a start, maybe not much of a start, but it is a start.

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That is the biggest thing I see about it.

May I just respond one moment to the very major
point that the Senator from Arkansas made, about if we get these
agreements, why go on with the ULM's. I remember so well the
ABM debate that we had in the Senate. The most outstanding
point in my mind, I was convinced that the great probability
was that by putting in the ABM for whatever it was worth,
it might increase the chances of getting some kind of a start on
agreements.

Not that I have any perception, but as I have under-
stood, from the President at other briefings, they thought that
was a major point in getting this.

This same reasoning applies, I think. I am going to
support the B-1 and the ULM's and frankly, I am going all of the
way on ULM's now, even though I had in mind supporting it only
for a limited amount this year, and not on an all-out program.

I have in mind now, the statement you made, Dr. Kissinger, but I am not under its impact exactly, and I have said these things because they were old thoughts. But it is quite helpful.

By the way, is this an open meeting, is the
press here? Anyway, the reservation I have is on this
surveillance, our power to detect any cheating. That hadn't
been gone into here and it hasn't been gone into in other
briefings that I have been to, and I don't insist on any
question being answered on it, but I raise that point.

If you want to comment on it, you may. I want to
make this observation. I think that we are more than doers
out there in the Congress. We are not going to say just Yes
or No. We have to actively make up our mind on this, and take
a position for future generations.

I believe that will help us approach it. Do you
want to comment on that detection and surveillance?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, I am sure that when Mr. Holms testifies in executive sessions, that he can go into more detail than I can. In fact, all I can do is to make the statement that we are confident that national means of verification are sufficient to monitor the numerical limitations of this agreement.

We studied this problem in great detail before we
entered negotiations, and determined for each category of
weapon the margin of error that we thought our collection
systems had and what we could do to react once we found out
that there had been a violation.

In each of these cases, we found that the
margin was well within tolerable limits. In this case, however,
where we are dealing with numbers, we are confident that the
national means of verification are sufficient to give us the
highest degree of confidence that this agreement will be lived
up to, or that we will know it almost immediately if it is
not lived up to.

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MR. MacGREGOR: The President is aware that the members of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy have developed a tremendous expertise which applies directly to the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty and to the interim agreement and we are delighted to see the Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, the Honorable John Pastore, from Rhode Island.

Senator Pastore, do you have a question?

SENATOR PASTORE: Not exactly a question for the moment because I have asked it before and I think it has been answered. I think the one dominant question here is whether or not in these agreements we have reserved to ourselves the military potential that will constitute a deterrent against an attack upon us, and also whether or not in consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff they are all unanimous that this is a good agreement.

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, we would not have entered into this agreement if we thought it impaired our capacity for deterrence. As was pointed out in my statement, we believe that it maintains the capacity of deterrence and at the same time, enables the world to start toward turning away from the arms race as well as improving the whole international climate.

Secondly, at every stage of this agreement we consulted in the greatest detail with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This has been pointed out, both in my statement, but it was done throughout the work of the Verification Panel in which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is represented and at every decision that the President made, the International Security Council.

I do not know of any significant decision -- I don't know of any decision with respect to this agreement that was made which the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not unanimously supported.

During the final stages of the negotiation in Moscow, we were in direct touch with the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the various proposals unfolded, and, of course, you will be calling Admiral Moorer yourself, but I am certain that he will confirm the unanimous support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for this agreement.

MR. MacGREGOR: Yes, Congressman.

CONGRESSMAN NEDZI: Dr. Kissinger, on March 14, the President gave as a rationale for the broad safeguard system, part of his rationale, was the defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which the People's Republic of China is likely to be able to mount within the decade.

Has anything happened to that threat, and in that connection, are you able to tell us anything about your forthcoming visit to China?

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DR. KISSINGER: Our estimate of the Chinese
nuclear capability is still approximately what it was at the
time that Safeguard was developed. Our estimate of the like-
lihood of our being involved in any nuclear conflict with
the People's Republic of China is considerably less than it was
at the time that the Safeguard program was submitted to the
Congress, because of the political developments that have
happened since then, specifically the opening toward China.

Therefore, we accept now that in the overall con-
text of the contribution that this agreement could make toward
world peace and toward improving general relationships, and in
the light, also, of improvement of relations with the People's
Republic of China, that we could pay this price of foregoing
the additional protection that the President requested in his
original statement.

We could do this all the more so because if our
estimates turn out to be incorrect, we have such an over-
whelming retaliatory capability vis-a-vis any other country
other than the Soviet Union, that the idea of a third nuclear
country attacking the United States is a rather remote possi-
bility.

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CONGRESSMAN NEDZI: Didn't we have it three months ago?

DR. KISSINGER: I was talking about the justification which the President gave when he started the Safeguard Program. I don't know what March 14th statement you are talking about. It must have been March 14, 1969.

CONGRESSMAN NEDZI: My apologies.

DR. KISSINGER: It was not March 14th of this year.

CONGRESSMAN NEDZI: I stand corrected.

DR. KISSINGER: That was 1969. Then with respect to my visit to the Peoples Republic of China, it was foreseen in the Shanghai Communique. It was tentatively agreed to at the time of the President's visit to Peking that sometime during the course of the summer we would send a senior representative to the Peoples Republic. We intend to review the whole range of international problems as they affect American-Chinese relationships.

MR. MacGREGOR: When I recognized Congressman Nedzi, I was looking unsuccessfully for the Chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, Congressman Hebert of Louisiana. I don't see Eddie, but I do see the ranking majority Member of the Committee, and the Vice Chairman of the Committee on Atomic Energy. I would like to recognize Congressman Mel Price.

CONGRESSMAN PRICE: Mr. MacGregor, Mr. Hebert has important business in Louisiana today and could not be here. But I would like to advise the group that the committee will mark up the Procurement Bill and all the items in there are going to be approved this afternoon.

SENATOR BENNETT: My question is partly a request for additional clarification. Do I understand that Mr. Kissinger's statement will be available to us as well as that of the President?

DR. KISSINGER: That is correct.

CONGRESSMAN HANSON: Dr. Kissinger, as I understand the ABM Treaty, it anticipates the construction of an ABM site at the capital of each of the two countries, plus one other site.

CONGRESSMAN HANSON: With respect to an ABM system to protect our Nation's Capital, is it the intention of the Administration to push forward for authorization and construction of this system around Washington and how important is it to the credible defense to which reference was made that we do proceed to authorize and construct this protection for the Nation's Capital? Will our position be significantly weakened in terms of future negotiations if we fail to take this step?

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DR. KISSINGER: First of all, we will request this authorization. Secondly, it was the judgment of our senior military leaders that a second site in the Capital area would be more useful than a second site in Malstrom. It would give additional warning time in case of a major attack and it would give protection against an attack by a third country. It is for this reason that we are recommending to the Congress and requesting the Congress to authorize its construction.

SENATOR JACKSON: Dr. Kissinger, first I want to compliment you on a very fine statement. I think we all want to see an end to the arms race, but I think we all should agree that if you are going to have an agreement it should be one that will stabilize and not destabilize. When you have a number of ambiguities such as we have in the present arrangement, I think it is fraught with some trouble.

For example, I just want to illustrate a couple: There are a lot of them. But we do have, for example, a bilateral understanding on the number of advanced strategic type submarines, the Y Class, Polaris. That is defined specifically. But there is no specific limitation other than our unilateral statement as to the number of land-based missiles, intercontinental, that are permitted.

Would you comment? The same is true of "What is a heavy missile?"

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the numbers of missiles actually being deployed, the Soviet Union has been extremely reluctant to specify precise numbers, that is true. We have operated with a number of 1618. There is absolutely no question that if our intelligence should reveal that the Soviet numbers significantly exceed that figure that the whole premise of the agreement will be in question.

Now, what will maintain this agreement is not the fact that we can wave these provisions and take it to court at any particular moment, but what will maintain this agreement is the consequences the other side will face if it turns out that it has turned into a scrap of paper and that it is being circumvented.

If this agreement were being circumvented, obviously we would have to take compensatory steps in the strategic field. But beyond that, as is pointed out in my statement, the two countries have a unique opportunity right now to move into an entirely different relationship of building additional trust.

If it turns out that through legalistic interpretations of provisions of the agreement of through failing to specify numbers about which we have left absolutely no doubt as to our interpretation and where are hereby reaffirmed, if it should turn out that those numbers are being challenged in any significant way at all, then this would cast a doubt. It would not only threaten disagreement, but it would threaten the whole basis of this new relationship which I have described.

We are very confident that our national means of detection give us the highest degree of confidence that these numbers cannot be exceeded without our knowing and that if they are exceeded that the consequences I described will follow.

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Now, with respect to the definition of heavy missiles, this was the subject of extensive discussions at Vienna and Helsinki, and finally, Moscow. No doubt, one of the reasons for the Soviet reluctance to specify a precise characteristic is because undoubtedly they are planning to modernize within the existing framework some of the weapons they now possess.

The agreement specifically permits the modernization of weapons. There are, however, a number of safeguards. First there is the safeguard that no missile larger than the heaviest light missile that now exists can be substituted.

Secondly, there is the provision that the silo configuration cannot be changed in a significant way and then the agreed interpretive statement or the interpretive statement which we made, which the other side stated reflected its views also, that this meant that it could not be increased by more than 10 to 15 percent.

We believe that these two statements, taken in conjunction, give us an adequate safeguard against a substantial substitution of heavy missiles for light missiles. So, we think we have adequate safeguards with respect to that issue.

It is, however, true, Senator Jackson, that within these limitations, improvements, qualitative improvements, are possible which will increase the capabilities of each of these missiles and this is one of the reasons why we have advocated qualitative improvements in our strategic forces. But as far as the break between the light and the heavy missiles is concerned, we believe that we have assurances through the two safeguards that I have mentioned to you.

CONGRESSMAN STRATTON: Dr. Kissinger, I have one question with regard to one of the unilateral statements that was published the other day. Under the agreement, as I understand it, we have 41 Polaris submarines and we could go to 44 if we turned in our old Titans. But the Soviets say that they are considering the British and the French Polaris submarines to be part of our force and that if the total goes over 50 they will consider the agreement breached. The British have four. The French have one and three others in construction, which means that if the French ones are completed, then we could only have 42 without putting it over the total of 50.

Could you comment on how we can hold down the British and French as part of this agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, the Soviet Union has not said that they would consider the agreement breached. The Soviet Union has said that they would then reserve the right to ask for additional compensation.

Secondly, we have emphatically rejected that interpretative recitation and have written our rejection of that into the record. So, we do not consider that we have agreed to this Soviet interpretation. You have to remember the interpretative statements are in a number of categories. There are those that are agreed and initialled. There are those orally agreed. There are those that are unilateral and not challenged and then there are those that are unilateral and challenged.

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I would think that a unilateral statement that was
challenged at the time it was made would not be the most
determining feature in our own policy with respect to this.

But, finally, the provisions that permit the trading
in of one type of missile for another do not have to be
implemented. We have the right, but we don't have the
obligation, to trade in the Titans for additional submarines
and given our construction program at this moment, with no
additional submarines of the Polaris type being built, we
may well decide not to exercise this option and keep the
Titans, in which case your question would be moot.

But in any event, we have not accepted this Soviet
interpretation.

CONGRESSMAN PIKE: Dr. Kissinger, if I understand the
philosophy whereby one of these agreements requires a treaty
and the other is an executive agreement, it has to do with
the fact that the executive agreement is limited to a term
of years. As we look ahead to SALT II, I would like to ask
this question: For how long a period of years could an execu-
tive agreement be made which was not required to be a treaty?
Could it be for 25 years, for example?

I would also like to ask a question in this regard:
The tentative agreement was fairly well leaked or publicized
in some manner before the President went to Moscow. I would
simply like to ask whether there were any substantive changes
made at Moscow.

DR. KISSINGER: The first question is an important
Constitutional question: At what point does an executive
agreement achieve character of such permanence that it should
really more properly be in the form of a treaty?

There were two reasons why the executive agreement
was put into that form. One was because of its limited
duration and secondly because of its limited scope. That is
to say, here we had an agreement, the major categories of
which were going to be included again in a more comprehensive
negotiation leading to a more permanent arrangement.

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