Vital Speeches of the Day

132

REG. U. S. PAT. OFF.

VOL. XXXVII

JUNE 1, 1971

NO. 11

# The Strategic Balance
## THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM

By HENRY M. JACKSON, United States Senator from Washington

Delivered before The American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, D. C., April 15, 1971

FOR MORE than two decades a central objective of American defense policy has been to prevent a nuclear war by deterring any potential adversary from launching a first strike against us. In accord with this policy we have foresworn development of a capacity to wage preemptive war. We have deliberately sought a defensive, deterrent, second-strike posture—relying on a protected nuclear capacity to launch an overwhelming retaliatory strike against a nuclear aggressor. We have built a mix of strategic forces—land-based and sea-based—so that the exposure of any one element to neutralization or destruction would not negate the entire deterrent. We wanted to permit no doubt as to the certainty and severity of our response in the event that an attack against us should be contemplated—or made.

I believe the American people today are confident that the United States is overwhelmingly superior in military power. Most Americans believe that the military balance leans heavily in our favor, and that in strategic nuclear weapons we have unchallenged supremacy.

Unfortunately what was once true is no longer so. The United States is slipping. The overall strategic balance is tilting in favor of Moscow.

Our deterrent force is only as persuasive as its ability to survive a first strike in sufficient numbers, and to respond effectively. But the capacity of our strategic force to survive is now coming into question. The relentless Soviet strategic and naval build-up poses a serious threat not to just one, but to all three of the elements of our strategic deterrent—ICBMs, bombers and Polaris/Poseidon.

This adverse shift in the strategic equation can hardly help having far-reaching effects upon world politics. A more confident Soviet Union can be expected to throw its weight around more vigorously on behalf of its great power interests,

and to raise its bargaining price at the negotiating table. Thus new elements of risk and turbulence will be introduced into international relations, enhancing the dangers in crisis situations.

If present trends continue the Soviets will achieve a preponderance of strategic power that will leave our security impaired by doubt and uncertainty and our friends and allies exposed and vulnerable. If present trends continue there will be an increasing risk of miscalculation of the sort that could result in war.

Facing this prospect, the prime question is: What does the United States do about it?

Some may urge that we move to an immediate offensive build-up of our own. Even some opponents of our protective defense systems—like the ABM—suggest a better alternative is more offensive systems—like Minuteman or ULMS. But this is a prescription for heating up the costly, offensive arms competition, not cooling it down.

Other people are saying that we should accept the Soviet proposal at the SALT talks for an "ABMs only" agreement. But this would tie our defensive hand while permitting Moscow to continue deploying mammoth offensive missiles—the very weapons that could be aimed at destroying our capacity to strike back.

To counter the dangerous shift in the strategic balance we require first a forthright and unvarnished assessment of some unpalatable military and political facts. Caught in all the current cross fire about "hawks" and "doves" too many politicians are acquiring the protective habits of the ostrich.

The hard fact is that if we are not to be pushed into a whole new build-up of strategic offensive weapons then we must give our most urgent attention to two priorities:

(1) The protection of our deterrent forces, and

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(2) The achievement of an arms control agreement on offensive and defensive nuclear systems that will stabilize the strategic balance and not upset it further in Moscow's favor.

In the space of five years—from 1966 to 1971—the overall strategic balance has moved markedly in favor of the Soviet Union.

In 1966 we had more than 700 long-range bombers, about 600 submarine launched ballistic-missiles, and more than 900 Minuteman intercontinental ballistic-missiles. At the time the Soviets had about 150 long-range bombers, less than 100 SLBMs, and about 250 ICBMs.

Today the United States bomber force is less than 600, our sub-launched missiles have numbered 656 for four years, and our land-based missiles have totaled 1054 for four years. During this time the Soviet bomber force has remained about constant, but their submarine missile force has grown to almost 400 launchers and is expected to overtake ours in two to three years. And the Soviet land-based intercontinental force has risen to over 1440 operational launchers—with more on the way.

Thus while the Soviets are gaining and will soon exceed us in missile weaponry at sea, we have already fallen distinctly behind them on land.

Over this same period the actual destructive power of the U. S. forces has been continually decreased, while the Soviets' destructive power has greatly increased until the total megatonnage that the Soviets could deliver against U. S. targets is several times our own.

The only strategic area in which we are staying ahead is in the number of individual warheads and we are doing that only by going to small-yield multiples. Even here, however, the Soviets could in time overtake us since their missile forces have considerably greater payload capacity than ours.

The United States has been relying on a mix of strategic forces—ICBMs, bombers, and Polaris/Poseidon missiles—in order to maintain confidence in our strategic deterrent and to assure against it being neutralized or destroyed. A mix provides insurance that a technological breakthrough against any one element would not negate the entire deterrent, and gives protection against serious failures of performance of any one element due to unexpected circumstances, such as unanticipated weapons effects or insufficient prior warning.

But the Soviets are increasing their capacity to pose a serious threat not to just one but to all three elements of our strategic force.

*Threat to ICBM Minuteman Force:* We have watched the number of Soviet ICBMs climb steadily since 1966, in spite of four years of American restraint: our total ICBMs is 1054 compared to the Soviet total of over 1440, which includes 300 of the mammoth 25 megaton SS-9s now operational or under construction.

Most recently, there is the disturbing evidence of Soviet construction of a new offensive missile system equal and perhaps superior to the SS-9 capability. We do not yet know exactly what the new system is, but we know it involves missiles not less destructive than the 25 megaton SS-9 and it could mean missiles that are far more destructive than the SS-9. Moreover, the Russians have an ability to deploy between 60 and 70 of these huge new missiles this year. And if they do deploy 70 of the new missiles they would be adding in this one year alone more megatonnage (or destructive power) than the United States has in its entire land-based Minuteman ICBM system.

Since the SS-9 has characteristics that could be well adapted to destroy hardened missile silos in a first strike, but is not at all an efficient weapon for retaliation against cities, one is tempted to conclude that the Soviets are not really committed

to deterrence only. For the purpose of retaliation the Soviets have available more than 900 SS-11 and SS-13 missiles similar to our Minuteman and perfectly adequate as a deterrent force. The continued Soviet deployment of their mammoth offensive missiles is a forbidding fact that places our ICBMs at great risk—unless we continue to deploy ABM defenses around our Minuteman silos and take other prudent measures for their security.

*Threat to SAC Bomber Force:* The growth of the Soviet submarine force poses a severe threat to the second element of our land-based deterrent, the SAC bomber force.

The Soviet Navy can now deploy long-range missiles in submarines hidden underwater along our Atlantic and Pacific coasts and in the Gulf of Mexico. By mid-1971, the Soviets are expected to have operational more than 20 Y Class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines and they are producing them at the rate of about 8 a year. By stationing these Yankee Class submarines off our coasts, each capable of submerged launching of 16 ballistic missiles with an estimated range of 1300 nautical miles, the Soviets can blanket practically the entire United States. When the Soviets have the much longer range missile they have been actively testing, they will be able to do this from either ocean.

The threat to our bombers arises from the extremely short flight time from a submerged submarine off our coasts to our bomber bases. Thus a large fraction of the bomber force would be vulnerable to destruction before it could become airborne. Furthermore, the Soviets have deployed a massive system of air defense which would be arrayed against any reduced numbers of U. S. bombers that survived a missile bombardment and did manage to reach the borders of the Soviet Union. Thus, the effectiveness of our bomber fleet as a deterrent can be seriously downgraded.

*Threat to Polaris/Poseidon:* The third element of our deterrent, the 41 Polaris/Poseidon submarines, has not escaped Soviet developments that raise doubt about its long-term survivability.

Our nuclear submarines are potentially vulnerable to Soviet nuclear attack and cruise-missile submarines, of which the Soviets now have over 60, and are producing at the rate of 6-8 a year. At the same time they are developing more advanced nuclear submarines—including attack submarines that are faster than our own Polaris-types. The Soviets now have the largest and most modern submarine building yards in the world, giving them several times the nuclear submarine construction capacity possessed by the United States.

Moreover, the Soviets are making a massive research and development effort to improve their detection capability of our nuclear submarines. This is especially disturbing because the chief means of defense of the Polaris force is its ability to remain hidden under the seas. If they can be detected they will have lost much of their protective value.

*Threat to U. S. Attack Carrier Forces:* I should add that the Soviet Navy's general purpose forces are no longer just for coastal defense. They now operate on a continuing basis in the Mediterranean and in the Indian Ocean, and periodically in the Caribbean. With these forces built around attack and cruise-missile submarines, surface ships armed with ship-to-ship missiles, and land-based naval bombers, Moscow has a formidable capacity to attack our carrier forces and disrupt our sea lines of communication—and this Soviet capacity continues to grow.

*Vigorous Soviet R&D Effort:* Finally, some facts about the Soviet research and development program need attention.

The massive Soviet R&D effort on offensive and defensive nuclear systems has continued to increase for the past several years. The number of offensive missile test-firings has likewise

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increased substantially. In the last twelve months, the Soviets have conducted extensive tests of various new ABM components, including advanced improved ABM radars.

This huge research and development program, carrier out by a country with a gross national product only half our own, gives some sense of the dynamism and direction of the Soviet military effort.

The central fact is that the Soviet Union has continued to support, at great cost, a comprehensive, forward-moving program of strategic and conventional weapons procurement that is not slowing down. On the contrary, the hopes of those who predicted the Soviet build-up was tapering off have been bitterly disappointed—several times.

The Administration has made the claim that we are leaving an "era of confrontation" and entering an "era of negotiation."

I see scant evidence to support such a sunny forecast concerning our relations with Moscow. The massive Soviet weapons build-up does not suggest to me that with greater strength they will be more wary of confrontations.

It does suggest to me that they will be better equipped to pursue the tactics they have employed ever since World War II—confrontation and negotiation together as partners in advancing their interests. Indeed, to the Kremlin, confrontation tactics are "bargaining" as much as formal talk can be, and the Soviets are experts at deeds and displays to influence the outcome of a negotiation.

Even before the improvement in its relative power position, Soviet leaders periodically pressed a policy of "opportunistic expansion." I have likened the Soviet Union in its foreign relations to a burglar walking down a hotel corridor, trying the door handles. When he finds one unlocked—in he goes.

In past Soviet probings the strategic equation has set limits to the extent of the risks that Moscow was willing to run. Khrushchev's backdown in the 1962 Cuban missile adventure is a classic case in point.

Now, however, the Kremlin can be confident of overall nuclear equality with the United States—and it is ahead of us in some nuclear weapons areas—and it can count on a growing capacity to project naval forces and other elements of its military power into many parts of the world.

In this situation, we would be prudent to assume that the Soviet leadership will be more vigorous in the assertion of what it regards as Soviet interests, and will accept greater risks in order to advance them, thus introducing harder Soviet bargaining at the conference table and new elements of danger and turbulence into international affairs.

Leonard Schapiro, one of Great Britain's most respected Soviet scholars, puts the matter this way:

> "... the Soviet Union derives increasing confidence from the sheer quantity and size of the weapons which it possesses ... as the numbers and strength of Soviet weapons of all kinds, nuclear and non-nuclear as well, increase, so one should expect them to become bolder in their policy and more prepared to take risks."

One would look for such increased Soviet boldness especially in those areas that are without formal defensive ties with the United States, for it is in such areas that the Soviets would be tempted to conclude that the risk of a direct confrontation (perhaps escalating to the nuclear level) is not great. However, in trouble spots like the Middle East, where the Soviets have already invested vast sums of military and economic aid, supplied sophisticated weapons, sent military personnel and taken losses in combat, local instabilities are vastly aggravated with a considerable risk of great power confrontation.

The motto of the Kremlin today is very likely: "No more Cubas." The Soviets may relish the prospect that in future

crisis encounters, we, and not they, will back down and accord diplomatic defeat.

A foretaste of the future could be the brazen contemptuous Soviet violation of the American initiative agreement in the Mideast, in the summer of 1976, the violation executed from the very day of the agreement's signature, and encouraged, I might add, by the agitated effort of some high Washington officials to turn their backs.

Professor Robert Byrnes recently made this pertinent comment:

> "I would assume that some Americans will find the Russians more reasonable as they become more powerful. There is no reason they should, but this will be the interpretation. You know, this happened in the 1930s. The more powerful and threatening Hitler became, the more rational many British leaders in particular found him to be."

Looking ahead, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that our interests and those of our friends and allies would suffer a strategic environment in which the American power position was widely questioned, even though the Soviet Union may no longer have achieved a clear preponderance. We could expect Soviet intransigence in negotiations, and efforts at blackmail and intimidation across a broad range of foreign policy issues, with a consequent rise in the incidence of dangerous situations. Moreover, the element of uncertainty in crisis encounters could become much more severe.

Beyond that, if present trends in the strategic balance continue, we could find ourselves in a situation that encouraged Soviet brinkmanship with a resulting risk of accident, miscalculation and nuclear war.

For nearly a year and a half now we and the Soviets have been meeting in Vienna and Helsinki to discuss the limitation of strategic arms. This seems a long time to a world impatient for signs of progress. But eighteen months is less than a third of the time it took to negotiate the test-ban treaty. Nothing in the arms control area comes quickly or easily. Such success as we have had in past arms control negotiations has been the product of care, deliberation, and, above all, unremitting patience.

It is one of the sad ironies of negotiations such as these that efforts to hasten them may have the effect of encouraging delay and inflexibility on the other side. Thus the more anxious we appear to buy an agreement, the higher the asking price. Unfortunately, the U. S.-Soviet strategic balance, which made the SALT talks possible, is increasingly threatened by the developing Soviet capability to attack and destroy our deterrent.

We must not be intimidated by our own impatience, either to embark upon new strategic programs prematurely or to accept an unsound early agreement in the idle hope that it will lead eventually to a genuinely stabilizing one.

The Soviet Union has proposed that we limit defensive weapons only. Under this proposal the United States would be prohibited from defending its Minuteman missiles with the Safeguard, or any other, ABM system. This proposal comes at a time when the Soviets are deploying new offensive weapons capable of attacking our Minuteman missiles—the very heart of our strategic deterrent. And they press this proposal while refusing to agree to limit their offensive build-up—and in spite of the fact that our defensive weapons add nothing to our capacity to launch a disarming first strike against them.

The simple fact is that we do not have the capability of launching a disarming first strike against the Soviet Union. We are not engaged in programs that could develop that capability. We have deliberately deployed a strategic missile force, land and sea based, with extremely low-yield warheads—

HENRY M. JACKSON

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warheads that are wholly inadequate for the purpose of
attacking Russian missile silos. We know this. And the Soviets
know this too.

By contrast, however, the Soviets are deploying weapons
with characteristics that can be adapted to the purpose of
attacking our Minuteman silos. Their SS-9 missiles can carry
several warheads, each of sufficient yield to destroy a U. S. silo.
All that is needed for them to develop the capability to destroy
Minuteman is an accurate MIRV device—something well
within Soviet technological capabilities.

It is for this reason that I view as unacceptable and even
ominous the Soviet demand for an agreement (1) preventing
the defense of our deterrent but (2) permitting them to
continue deploying offensive missiles. It is unacceptable
because it would diminish our security, and ominous because if
the Soviet Union is truly committed to a policy of deterrence
only, they should welcome our interest in limiting offenses and
treat with indifference our investment to defend our deterrent.
What possible justification is there for the Soviets to delay
further the negotiation of serious limitations on offensive
weapons?

It is remarkable to me that in the face of Soviet refusal to
limit its offensive missile force—a position that must raise
doubts about their intentions—some Americans are arguing
that we should assume their good will and move to limit our
defenses. How would an agreement on our part to leave our
deterrent unprotected increase the Soviets' interest in doing
later what they are evidently unprepared to do now: halt their
offensive build-up?

An agreement limited to defense only, far from slowing the
arms race, would actually accelerate it. To believe otherwise
requires one to place his faith in nothing more tangible than a
dream of Soviet self-restraint.

The Soviets would be free to forge ahead with deployment
of more offensive weapons while we would be prevented from
countering with a defense. Under such circumstances, should
they press their advantage—and I see no logical reason why
they would not—we would be forced to deploy new offensive
systems of our own to balance theirs. Those are the elements
of an expanding arms competition which we should be
bending every effort to avoid rather than create.

I believe that those urging acceptance of the Soviet proposal
have things exactly backwards. If two armies, each armed with
swords and shields wish to disarm, does it make sense to lay
down the shields and keep the swords? Would it not serve the
peace and security of both to lay down their swords—and keep
the shields to discourage rearament?

It has been suggested recently that we ought to accept the
Soviet proposal on the understanding that we and they would
continue thereafter to negotiate limits on offensive forces. In
other words, we must first give up our ABM system in return
for which the Russians would agree merely to more talk about
their offensive deployments. Some bargain! While they
develop their offensive advantage, we both agree to talk about
it.

SALT: *A New Initiative:* The arms race must be brought
under control at the SALT talks. We need to buy more time
for SALT to succeed. Without time—without a pause in the
offense momentum—our best efforts to negotiate a compre-
hensive agreement may be overtaken by the pace of events.

I believe we ought to consider a partial, interim agreement
with the U.S.S.R. that would at once have the effect of slowing
the strategic arms competition and adding to the immediate
security of the strategic balance.

I have in mind an interim agreement that would freeze the
employment of additional land-based offensive weapons in both
the United States and Soviet Union—and it would do so at

once. Specifically, I have proposed a mutual U. S.-Soviet
agreement for an initial period of one year providing the
following:

(1) The United States would immediately halt the deployment of Minuteman III missiles with their MIRV warheads.

(2) The Soviet Union would immediately halt the deployment of new ICBM launchers and missiles including those now under construction.

(3) Both countries would retain the freedom to assure the survivability of their strategic land-based forces so long as they did not add to their offensive potential.

(4) Neither side would deploy a population defending ABM.

Such a program would greatly increase the security of our
strategic forces. Moreover, it should calm any possible Soviet
concern that we might be increasing the offensive potential of
our forces so as to threaten the security of *their* deterrent. I
would hope, therefore, that such a proposal would be
vigorously pressed at the SALT talks.

It seems to me that the risks involved in proposing such an
interim agreement for an initial period of one year are
minimal. The advantage of halting the deployment of Soviet
offensive weapons would be real, immediate, and stabilizing. It
would diminish the pressure that we are now under to press
ahead with new offensive nuclear systems of our own. It would
genuinely add to the security of both countries.

By permitting us to deploy defenses to protect our
Minuteman silos we would be able to counter any likely
qualitative upgrading of the current Soviet offensive forces.
And we could do this without in any way adding to our
capacity to strike the Soviet deterrent.

By preventing the deployment of ABM systems for the
purpose of defending populated areas—thick city defenses—
we would diminish the necessity for deploying MIRVs on our
Minuteman force. At the same time we could continue to
deploy the very much smaller warheads of the MIRVed
Poseidon missile on our Polaris submarines so as to increase
the effectiveness of our sea-based deterrent.

Moreover, the discussion surrounding this proposal may
help to illuminate the nature of Soviet strategic objectives. In
spite of the obvious importance of having such knowledge, we
really know very little about Soviet strategic doctrine. My own
view is that we will not emerge from the SALT talks with a
very comprehensive agreement unless we and the Soviets
succeed in arriving at some common understanding as to the
nature and objectives of strategic nuclear forces.

One final word:

The United States is experiencing a wave of hostility to the
military at the moment, a hostility that makes fair and
objective discussion of defense issues a difficult thing to
achieve. From the belief that we have been doing too little to
solve our domestic problems—a view that I share with many
in this country—it is all too easy to pass to a belief that what
we spend on defense is wasted.

The strategic budget is a small fraction of the defense
budget and an even smaller fraction of our gross national
product. About one per cent of the goods and services we will
produce this year is allocated to the procurement, maintenance
and operation of our strategic deterrent.

That one per cent is an essential investment. To fail in the
job of strategic defense is to fail in all our aspirations for
better housing, health, welfare, education and the environ-
ment. I believe that this country is rich enough in moral and
material resources to provide for the security of our people
and resolve our domestic problems as well.

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WASHINGTON POST 18 APRIL 1971

halmers M. Roberts

## Arms Debate Heats Up

THE EYES of America and the world were riveted last week on the ping and pong between Washington and Pекин, surely one of the major events of our times. But here in the capital there is developing a new and grim struggle over a key factor in relations with the Soviet Union. And since it is Moscow, not Pекин, which is the other nuclear super-power, this struggle is immediately more important than the cheery news about future relations with China.

The issue with the Soviet Union is over rivalry in nuclear weapons, about what Defense Secretary Laird calls the "momentum" of Soviet military muscle. It is directly related to the growing demands in the United States, as evidenced in the latest Gallup Poll, to further cut the Pentagon's appropriations in spite of these Soviet gains.

The struggle in Washington is soon to heat up as Senate consideration begins on this year's appropriation for going forward with the next phase of the Safeguard ABM system. It comes at a time when Moscow is pressing for an "ABMs only" agreement at the strategic arms limita-

tion talks (SALT).

Leading the fight to reject the Soviet proposal and keep Safeguard going are President Nixon and Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.). Arrayed against them are all the other potential presidential candidates for 1972 plus many others.

In a speech last week, Jackson said that "the overall strategic balance is tilting in favor of Moscow." He questioned the thesis of the SALT talks, that Moscow, like Washington, accepts the doctrine of mutual deterrence. He forecast years of growing Soviet nuclear blackmail if the trend he sees is allowed to continue.

The American military establishment today sounds like a modern version of Spengler's "Decline of the West" or Gibbon's "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire." Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff see the American star in decline as the Red Star ascends.

THE HEAD of the Strategic Air Command, Gen. Bruce K. Holloway, was reported last week to have expressed fear that if the Soviet Union attains absolute nuclear superiority over the United States, the Russians

would ask for Alaska back, adding: "I ask you, what would you do if they told us to get out of Alaska?"

From Gen. Holloway's SAC headquarters in Omaha, col-umnist Joseph Alsop has been painting a picture of America in such dire trouble that it could end with a Moscow-imposed puppet ruling in Washington. This was a new high for that long-time purveyor of doom.

Opponents of this sort of talk consider the latest round a recurrence of past American estimates that the Soviets are 10 feet tall. They still hope for a SALT agreement, want an "ABMs only" pact as a starter and press for further cuts in the defense budget.

In Moscow the recent Communist Party congress reflected a high note of confidence in Soviet power, reflecting the end of nuclear inferiority that proved so humiliating to Nikita Khrushchev only 7½ years ago during the Cuban missile crisis.

Gen. Holloway said that the Soviets have a timetable for "taking over the world." This charge has often been made in the past 50 years, but without proof. Yet the rise of Soviet power from inferiority to parity with the United States, and with no clear sign that Moscow will not try for superiority, gives the charge a new credence to many.

Jackson and others in and out of the Nixon administration worry about a Soviet nuclear "first strike," a revival of fears of a nuclear Pearl Harbor during the 1950s. Once again mistrust and fear are evident and at a moment when the SALT talks are deadlocked.

History teaches that the Soviets will always seek targets of opportunity, full any power vacuum they spot. It is their current policy. But long before any Kremlin leader is going to consider risking his nation with a "first strike" at the United States, there are plenty of other routes to expanding imperial power.

Of all the verbiage from the party congress, perhaps the most illuminating was a passage in the Central Committee resolution pointing to "forces intent on a revolutionary remaking of society within the capitalist states." The resolution stated the importance for communism "to make fuller use" of the "potentialities" arising from such a "current aggravation" within the capitalist world.

This is a prescription not for nuclear assault but for more of the current kind of tough Soviet diplomacy on every issue. The only response is an American balance between armed strength and domestic reform, a balance this nation has yet to find.

WASHINGTON POST 20 APRIL 1971 Pg 3

# Defense Affirms Opposition To Controls on ABMs Only

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

The Pentagon's top scientist, Dr. John S. Foster Jr., reaffirmed administration opposition yesterday to any arms control agreement with the Russians that was limited strictly to rival anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems.

"The U.S. believes," Foster told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "that if we are to have a stable and satisfactory agreement, it should include limitations on both offensive and defense systems," especially the huge Soviet SS-9 ICBMs which the Pentagon fears could wipe out American retaliatory missiles before they get out of their underground silos.

An agreement limiting ABMs only, Foster said, "even if talks on offensive systems continue," would lessen the incentive for the Russians to come to an agreement to halt building more nuclear-tipped attack missiles as well.

At the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the Soviets thus far have shown interest only in limiting ABMs and not in the broader plan sought by the Nixon administration.

Appearing with Army Secretary Stanley R. Resor at the start of this year's congressional hearings on the U.S. Safeguard ABM network, Foster also rekindled an old argument between those pushing hardest for an arms control agreement and those most sceptical of Russian intentions.

Under lengthy questioning by Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.), the Defense research chief said he would not favor any ABM agreement that did not also somehow prevent the Russians from secretly converting their anti-bomber defenses to serve in an anti-missile role.

The Russians have about 10,000 surface-to-air (SAM) missiles lining their borders, and a few thousand of the latest version, the SA-5, are big enough to be converted to a possible ABM role. A number of arms control experts discount this as unlikely. Foster, however, does not, and also

says it might be very difficult to detect any Soviet attempt to cheat on an ABM ban by improving the SAMs for that role.

Foster also indicated, possibly the first time a Pentagon official has done so publicly, that if an ABM agreement-linked with ICBM and SAM limitations—could be reached, then the U.S. might also agree to cease putting multiple warheads on land-based and submarine-based offensive missiles.

Safeguard is now in its third year of full-scale development, and this year the Pentagon wants $1.4 billion more to continue work under way at three sites, plus a fourth at either Warren AFB, Wyo., or in the Washington area.

Foster revealed that the cost to complete the four-site system is now estimated at $7.1 billion, up from the $6.5 billion estimate made last spring. Some of this increase he attributed to past inflation, but he said most of it reflected new Pentagon estimates that he hoped would take future inflation into account more accurately.

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WASHINGTON POST 21 APRIL 1971 PgC9

# ABM Critics Rap Policy on SALT

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

Critics of the Pentagon's $8 billion Safeguard anti-ballistic missile (ABM) project yesterday challenged administration policy on arms limitations talks with the Russians and also claimed the United States could safely switch to a cheaper, more effective ABM if such a defense proved necessary.

Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, the Pentagon's former top scientist, Herbert F. York, said he believed "most of the hard-liners would prefer now to abandon Safeguard" in favor of the less costly alternative, "but find it politically difficult to do so."

The alternative ABM system, which is getting greatly increased attention within the Pentagon as well, is known as "Hardsite Defense." It is tailored specifically to defending U. S. Minuteman ICBM silos against attack by incoming Russian missiles.

Hardsite would use many small, cheap radars—making it difficult for the Soviets to knock them all out—hundreds of short-range interceptor missiles similar to the Sprint used in Safeguard.

The Safeguard system, originally designed to protect cities but now assigned the primary job of protecting Minuteman, relies on one big and very expensive radar at each Minuteman base and uses both long- and short-range interceptors. in the Pentagon's view, Hardsite is a potential supplement to Safeguard. It would be added to the original Safeguard deployment if the Russian missile build-up continues unabated, into the mid-1970s and multiple-warheads are added to Soviets ICBMs.

Defense officials say that Hardsite, which is still in the

research phase, could not be ready before 1977 or 1978 at the earliest, some three years later than Safeguard, and that it would be too risky to have no ABM at all in those years.

That view, however, was strongly challenged yesterday by both York and another long-time Safeguard critic. Wolfgang Panofsky, director of Stanford University's liner accelerator center.

Panofsky stressed the damage that Russian leaders would have to face from remaining U.S. bombers and Polaris-carrying submarines.

And, even if all but 50 of the 1,000 Minutemen were knocked out in a surprise attack, as the Pentagon believes possible with improved Russian missiles by 1975, those 50 missiles with three warheads each could destroy 150 Soviet cities.

"Somehow, in all these discussions," Panofsky said, "one loses sight of the enormous destructive power we are talking about." To remind the committee, he posted a picture of Nagasake, devastated by a single small atomic bomb.

Panofsky and York both argued that there was nothing remotely in sight that could assure knocking out of U.S. Polaris submarines. However, a pro-Safeguard witness, Lawrence H. O'Neill of the Riverside Research Institute,

Questioned by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) about evidence that the Russians may be building even bigger new missiles, Panofsky agreed that this was not "good news," but he said it would not accelerate the threat against Minuteman since it would still take years for the Russians to test and install those missiles.

Thus, both scientists argued that there was time to thoroughly evaluate the Hardsite system rather than rush Safeguard into place.

And, they maintained, the best solution would be an agreement at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to ban or limit rival ABM systems. Without an ABM on either side, they contend, the Soviets and Americans would both be devastated by even a small number of surviving nuclear weapons since there would be no defense. Therefore, they feel, deterrence would be assured.

The Nixon administration, however, has taken a position that any agreement must include limitations on offensive arms as well. The Russians have expressed interest only in limiting ABMs. argued that if the Russians actually did develop a counter to U.S. subs there might be no way for the U.S. to know of its existence.

WASHINGTON POST 23 APRIL 1971 PAGE 15

# New Soviet ICBM Silos Are Put at 40

By Chalmers M. Roberts

Washington Post Staff Writer

About 40 new silos for Soviet intercontinental missiles have been spotted by U.S. reconnaissance satellites, it was learned yesterday.

It was the photos of these silos on which Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird on Wednesday based his statement that the Soviet Union is "involved in a new—and apparently extensive—ICBM construction program." He said it raises questions about the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT).

The first 10 silos were spotted in late February. Bad weather conditions precluded adequate new photography until recently when the total was up to about 40. The silos are said to be located in both test and operational areas, chiefly in Siberia.

## Disclosed by Jackson

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.), who first disclosed the silo construction on March 7, said in a Boston speech yesterday that "we know this new system involves missiles not less destructive than the 25-megaton SS-9 and it could mean missiles that are far more destructive than the SS-9."

Other sources; however, disputed any such certitude, saying that such a statement could only be an extrapolation from the size of the new silos. Jackson told newsmen in Boston that the silos are empty and that it would probably be 18 months before missiles were emplaced. He also said that there is no direct evidence that the Soviets have flight-tested the new missile.

Jackson also repeated an earlier statement that "the Russians have an ability to deploy at least 60 to 70 of these huge new missiles this year." He told newsmen that these figures were based on the Soviets' past record of SS-9 deployments, not necessarily on the new silo construction rate.

At the Pentagon, spokesman Jerry W. Friedheim refused to add to Laird's Wednesday speech. He described Jackson as "very expert in this field."

Jackson said that continued Soviet silo construction pre-

sents a danger of the Soviet-American arms talks in Vienna "collapsing" and could lead to "a catastrophic situation."

But administration sources showed less alarm yesterday. They said that Washington has yet to conclude that the Soviets deliberately developed a new missile system while using the SALT talks as a cover to preclude a corresponding U. S. weapons development. Laird said Wednesday that unless there is a SALT agreement limiting such offensive weapons, he would have to recommend that the United States begin building new systems of its own.

## Talks are Stalled

The SALT talks are currently stalled because the Soviets are proposing an "ABMs only" agreement leaving control of offensive weapons for later. President Nixon has said that there must be "some mix" of both offensive and defensive weapons in any agreement.

The new Soviet missile work is intensifying the American determination to hold out for inclusion of rival ICBM systems. But Moscow appears to be waiting to see whether pressure in the U. S. Congress will be enough to make Mr. Nixon accept the Soviet proposal. So far there is no sign of that.

Jackson has argued that, in view of the SS-9 threat, the United States must build the Safeguard ABM system to protect its Minuteman missiles. In this, he fully supports Laird and the administration. Laird yesterday had breakfast at the White House with the President, but no information was available on what they discussed.

Soviet ICBM construction of various types has been constantly monitored by the American spy-in-the-sky satellites. No efforts have been made to conceal such construction. It is not known whether this is because of the difficulty in doing so or because Moscow is fully prepared to let Washington know of its growing nuclear power.

## Seen as Pressure

Some persons here have speculated that the new silo work represents pressure on Wash-

ington to agree to its SALT proposals. Others wonder whether the Soviets have decided to go for nuclear superiority rather than settle for the current rough parity. Still others feel the Soviets ICBMs are no more than a response to the multiple warheads the United States already has emplaced on some Minuteman and on Poseidon missiles aboard Polaris submarines. There has been no Soviet explanation at SALT, officials say.

It is becoming evident that the SALT talks are reaching a crucial point. American officials say the Soviets cannot in definitely continue to talk at the table, without agreement, while continuing to deploy new ICBMs.

143

145

SALT SUN 29 APRIL
The Choice

For the second time in less than a week Secretary of Defense Laird has reported increased armament activity in the Soviet Union. Russia, he said, has resumed construction, after the work had been suspended for three years, on anti-ballistic missile bases outside Moscow. He indicated also that there is evidence it has been adding multiple warheads to some of its SS-9 intercontinental missiles. While these warheads may not be of the independently targeted type, Mr. Laird remains of the opinion that MIRV's will be available to Russia by 1972.

It is on the basis of this information that the secretary repeated his warning of last week that unless the talks on limitation of strategic armaments currently going on in Vienna produce an agreement he will find it necessary to ask for an expansion of the United States' defense system. From this it may be gathered that the administration is trying to impress the Russian government with the urgency of coming to some understanding if the competition in weapon building is to be controlled.

Neither nation, it is clear, will tolerate a tipping of the uneasy balance in the other's favor. There are only two ways to keep that balance. One is to limit armaments at their present level, the other is to match them, step by step, at ever higher levels. The choice will be determined by the outcome of the negotiations now in their fourth round. A failure of the SALT talks could be very costly to both countries not only in money but in the rise of mutual fears and distrust.

WASHINGTON STAR 25 APRIL 1971

## Soviet Buildup

The news of a major expansion of the Soviet Union's strategic missile forces has the gravest implications for the United States and for the effort to reach a negotiated agreement on the limitation of nuclear armaments.

High administration sources have recently revealed that the Russians are rapidly expanding construction of new missile silos at a dozen different sites. So far 40 of these new silos, capable of accommodating missiles as big as or bigger than the huge SS-9s, have been spotted by America reconnaissance satellites. It is also believed that the Russians may have begun to equip some of their missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs), capable of striking several targets simultaneously.

Of these developments, Secretary of Defense Laird has warned that the United States may be moving toward a "second-rate strategic position" and that the new Russian construction program raises questions about the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) being conducted in Vienna.

This is putting it mildly. The major question which it raises is whether the Russians are using the talks primarily as a device to lull the United States into a sense of false security while it presses ahead in a determined attempt to achieve a position of decisive strategic nuclear superiority. Administration leaders may not yet have reached that most alarming conclusion, but they are clearly beginning to wonder.

In the light of the evidence, it is incomprehensible that so many prominent Democrats — including a number of presidential hopefuls — should be urging acceptance of Soviet proposals at the SALT negotiations. These proposals are aimed at blocking the deployment of defensive missiles only — a move which would place our retaliatory force of Minuteman missiles at the mercy of the fast-growing Russian arsenal. To accept such a limitation—indeed, to wait much longer before taking the most energetic countermeasures against the Soviet buildup—would be a betrayal of the nation's most basic security.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

26 APRIL 1971

The new Russian missiles

For several months now the Russians have been digging some new and larger holes in the ground of the type one digs for long-range nuclear missiles. The digging has not yet reached the point where it is possible for those who read the pictures, which are sent back from orbiting reconnaissance satellites, to be sure what is supposed some day to be put in the holes. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird does, however, think he can confirm "the sobering fact that the Soviet Union is involved in a new - and apparently extensive - ICBM construction program."

The first thing to be said about this is that it is not surprising. There is a race in long-range nuclear weaponry going on right now between the United States and the Soviet Union. Each deploys as soon as it possibly can any new device which it thinks has been perfected to the point of being useful. The race will go on unless and until there is an agreement to cut it off at some given level and put a lid on top. Right now, there is no lid.

In this condition what one side does is promptly used by the other as reason for spending more money on new types of weapons of its own. Sometimes the other side tends to overreact.

Roughly a year ago the Russians were deploying their big SS-9 missiles and Mr. Laird overreacted. He jumped to the conclusion that they were aiming at a "first strike" nuclear capacity; namely the ability to knock out so many American nuclear weapons that the American deterrent would no longer deter.

This assumption was used to justify more ABMs, faster deployment of Poseidons and the prompt "MIRVing" (multiple warheads in place of single-shot warheads) of the existing American batteries of "Minutemen" ICBMs.

So, in the name of meeting the new

presumed Russian threat things were done from Washington which the Russians could consider to be a threat to them. The MIRVing process was particularly something for them to worry about because they seem not yet to have been able to perfect an effective MIRV. They were catching up with the United States in number of long-range missiles and had, in such terms, approached parity.

But an American MIRV contains at least three independently targetable nuclear shots. Sometimes there are more. Apparently as many as seven can be fitted into a warhead.

So the Russians instead of being level with the Americans suddenly found themselves pushed way back down the ladder again, in terms of numbers of nuclear shots aimed at targets in their country.

The only question was how soon and what would be their answer.

The first thing they did was knock off deploying the SS-9's. That caused some trouble at the Pentagon because a lot of planning, and publicity, had already been based on the assumption of a massive further Russian deployment of SS-9's.

Now, it seems that what they did was scrap an early model of a new generation of ICBMs and wait until something better was ready. The new holes are presumably intended for the second model of the big missiles.

So now the question is what will Washington's answer be to Russia's new answer to the American deployment of MIRVs and Poseidons (also MIRVed).

Needless to say hopes are high among the weaponeers. All sorts of projects left on the shelf for shortage of funds and insufficient justification are now being dusted off again.

If they have their way the answer to their answer to our answer, etc., will include:

* A new and bigger missile launching submarine.

* More ABMs.

* A new manned bomber for the Air Force.

The cost of such new hardware could run up the military budget by much more than can possibly be saved from winding down the Vietnam war.

For the sake of the American taxpayer may we hope that Mr. Nixon does not let himself get rushed by the Pentagon into buying more of these new weapons than are truly needed. Considering how Mr. Laird overreacted last year, Mr. Nixon can afford to take his time and wait at least until we find out just what the Russians are digging those holes for. After all, it is even possible that the ultimate targets of those holes are in China, not in the United States at all.

146

NEW YORK TIMES

29 APRIL 71 pl

SOVIET PROPOSES
A 5-YEAR TREATY
FOR CURB ON ABM'S

By WILLIAM BEECHER
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 28—

The Soviet Union has proposed to the United States a detailed five-year treaty limiting their missile defenses to 100 inter- ceptor missiles protecting each nation's capital, Administration officials revealed today.

The Soviet proposal, which some officials described as a draft treaty, was offered dur- ing the fourth round of the two nations' talks on limitation of strategic armaments, which began March 15 in Vienna. It adds two major details—time span and number of missiles —to a very general Soviet statement expressing prefer- ence for a defense-only agree- ment, protecting only the cap- itals, made at the previous round of talks in Helsinki, last fall.

Soviet Vie wCriticized

Some Administration plan-
ners, while pleased that the
Russians have decided to be
more specific than they were
before, expressed disappoint-
ment that the very limited
offer was advanced despite
President Nixon's firm public
rejection of any agreement
that does not limit both of-
fensive and defensive strategic
weapons.

In his State of the World
Message on Feb. 25, Mr. Nixon
declared: "To limit only one
side of the offense-defense
equation could rechannel the
arms competition rather than
effectively curtail it."

Officials say that American
negotiators have reiterated the
President's position at Vienna
but have agreed to continue
discussing a broad range of po-
ential missile defense agree-
ments, with the understanding
that this didn't signify aban-
donment of American insist-
ence on a more comprehensive
clement.

New ABM Work Reported

For their part, Soviet nego-
tiators have continued to dis-
cuss possible agreements on
limiting intercontinental mis-
siles, missile submarines and
strategic bombers, officials say.
But according to these sources,
the Russians have declined to
specify numerical limitations
that might be acceptable so
long as the United States re-
fuses to include in the category
of strategic weapons its Euro-
pean-based fighter-bomb-
ers, which are capable of de-
levering nuclear weapons
against the Soviet Union.

Officials pointed out that the
new Soviet proposals at Vienna
was in keeping with the ap-
parent resumption of construc-
tion at antimissile sites around
Moscow. Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird, disclosing this
construction work yesterday,
said it appeared that the Rus-
sians might be preparing to de-
ploy an improved interception
missile.

The Soviet proposal would
require the United States to
abandon initial owrk on missile
defenses designed to protect
three Minuteman missile com-
plexes in the northwest, moving
its defensive installations to the
Washington area. The Minute-
man, an offensive weapon, is
an intercontinental ballistic
missile launched from under-
ground silos.

Officials here acknowledge
that the United States proposed
last August an agreement that
would either have banned anti-
ballistic missiles entirely or lim-
ited them to the acres of the
two capitals. But they stress
that this offer was tied specifi-
cally to a proposed freeze on
offensive missiles.

"We were willing to trade away our missile defenses protecting the Minuteman, if we could effectively limit the ability of the Russians to destroy our land-based force in a first strike," one planner said.

President Nixon, in his Feb.
25 statement, discussed the re-
lationship between the elements
of offense and defense in these
erms:

"The strategic balance would be endangered if we limited defensive forces alone and left the offensive threat to our strategic forces unconstrained. It would also be dangerous, however, if only offensive forces were restrained, while defenses were allowed to become so strong that one side might no longer be deterred from striking first."

Two leading contenders for
the Democratic Presidential
nomination, Senator Edmund S.
Muskie of Maine and Senator
Hubert H. Humphrey of Min-
nesota, are on record as favor-
ing a "first step" treaty on de-
fensive missiles, while negotia-
tions continue toward an agree-
ment limiting offensive systems.

Some Administration offi-
cials, particularly in the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agen-
cy, are said to be attracted to
the defense-only proposal as a
means of creating a better at-
mosphere under which further
agreements might be achiev-
able.

Separate Accord Opposed

Others, particularly in the Pentagon and the White House, argue that the principal Soviet interest in the arms control talks is to insure that the United States will not be in a position to deploy an extensive missile defense system to protect American cities. If the missile defense issue is settled separately, they say, there is little leverage left with which to obtain a limitation on offensive systems.

For the time being, at least,
Mr. Nixon appears to have
sided with the latter group, as
indicated by his public state-
ments.

Secretary Laird recently has disclosed information on the resumption of work on antimissile installations around Moscow after a three-year hiatus, and Administration officials have also reported the apparent installation of multiple warheads on big Soviet SS-9 missiles and the rapid expansion of construction of large silos believed destined to house either an improved SS-9 or an entirely new intercontinental missile.

Some analysts who oppose
the Soviet missile-defense pro-
posal point out that the offer
puts no limitation on the num-
ber, type and location of early-
warning and missile-tracking
radar installations. They note
that radar is the key element
for a heavy missile-defense
system and takes longest to
deploy.

They also note that the So-
viet proposal simply limits the
number of antimissile missiles
that may be installed on
launchers. Presumably this
would allow either side to build
and stockpile as many defen-
sive missiles as it wishes, so
long as they are not deployed.

These officials are uneasy
about the possibility of a
sudden Soviet abrogation of the
treaty, followed by a rapid de-
ployment of missile-defense
systems, or of such a deploy-
ment being carried out after
the five-year treaty period has
lapsed.

Other officials insist that if
the United States were inter-
ested in concluding a defense-
only agreement, it could insist
on restrictions both on radar
and on the manufacture of anti-
missile missiles.

Senator Henry M. Jackson of
Washington, a possible con-
tender for the Democratic Pres-
idential nomination, recently
proposed a one-year agreement
with the Soviet Union freezing
the deployment of most land-
based missiles.

But officials say that for the
time being the Administration
prefers to stand on its proposal
for a treaty limiting both of-
fensive and defensive strategic
weapons, rather than move to
a partial moratorium pending
further negotiations.

147

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 1 MAY 1971 (4)

# Mr. Nixon on Russia ...

President Nixon was wise to adjust the American attitude toward Russia, while talking about China to the press.

Any time a great world power changes its policy toward one or more other great powers there are strains. These can be dangerous. A generation of American diplomats has grown up worrying about what would happen when the inevitable time came for a change in American policy toward mainland China.

That change has long been seen to be coming. And it was bound to cause deep concern in Moscow. In fact one reason for the delay in resuming normal relations with China has been concern over Moscow's reaction. It was always possible that Moscow would "overreact."

Secretary of State William P. Rogers got into dangerous waters in London when he allowed himself, in what was presumably a slip of the tongue, to say that it would be a "dividend" for the United States if our effort to get along with both China and Russia should "irritate" one or the other.

Granted, there may well be more than one "dividend" for the United States now in the change of policy toward China. China might well respond by encouraging Hanoi to less rather than to more war. And it is conceivable that Russia will consider it prudent to be more, not less, reasonable about the Middle East and nuclear weapons.

But to talk about "dividends" is like feeding fire to war hawks, of whom there are many in Moscow. If they began to imagine Washington and Peking "ganging up" against Russia, they could well do something extremely dangerous.

Thus it is most important that Mr. Nixon pursue his more normal relations with China without making it sound or look like a hostile move against Russia. It is one thing for the United States to be equally "normal" with both Russia and China. It would be quite another for it to side with China against Russia. The Chinese used to complain that we were "in collusion" with Russia against them. It was largely, not entirely, untrue. But to appear to swing the other way suddenly could be —deadly.

Washington was getting dangerously close to that appearance. Making friends with an old enemy is of course novel, and exciting. It was moving too fast.

Mr. Nixon, rightly, checked that tendency with the timely reminder that world peace and stability require not only easier relations between Washington and Peking, and Washington and Moscow, but also between Peking and Moscow.

"It would make no sense for the United States... to try to get the two at each other's throats because we would be involved in the controversy ourselves."

Indeed we would.

148

WASHINGTON POST 2 May 1971 P3

Arms Race Surge Is Feared

149

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

A number of top-level U.S. defense planners believe that unless fundamental decisions on limiting nuclear weaponry are made by this fall in the Kremlin and the White House, another enormously expensive surge in the arms race will be unavoidable.

Despite President Nixon's reiteration at an April 29 press conference that he was "not discouraged" by the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, several high-ranking officials say they sense that time is running out.

As they see it, the critical weapons systems both sides are using as bargaining chips in SALT—the huge Soviet offensive missiles and the U.S. Safeguard missile defense designed to protect Minuteman ICBMs—are developing a momentum of their own that now threatens to outpace the talks.

If a breakthrough is to come, officials believe it will have to be this year. After that, few administration experts expect the President to ask further delay in ordering speedup on new U.S. weapons—bombers, missile-firing submarines and a still thicker ABM defense around Minuteman—to offset the recently discovered Soviet advances.

### New Silos Spotted

In recent months, U.S. reconnaissance satellites have spotted at least 40 new underground silos being dug in the Soviet Union for what could be a new and still larger version of the big SS-9 ICBM. Knowledgeable officials say they expect to find even more holes in coming months as satellite coverage is expanded.

There is also evidence—although it is still ambiguous—that the Soviets may have begun installing multiple warheads on some existing SS-9 missiles. It has also been disclosed that work has resumed on the long-delayed ABM ring to protect Moscow from missile attack.

On the U.S. side, work continues on Safeguard, and multiple warheads of the MIRV-type that can be sent to widely separate targets continue to go to sea aboard Poseidon-carrying submarines and into Minuteman III land-based missiles.

Against the backdrop of this action reaction weapons buildup, SALT remains snagged on many of the same issues that

were apparent when the talks began in late 1969.

Officials concede, however, that those issues are now at least better defined. They add that prospects of finding a way out of the impasse are not entirely gloomy.

U.S. defense planners are now considering a number of potential counterproposals to the latest Soviet offer at SALT.

That proposal, made within the last few weeks at the Vienna conference site, essentially was a renewed bid — in the form of a draft treaty — to get the United States to agree to a limitation on rival ABMs to protect the Moscow and Washington areas only.

The Nixon administration has consistently rejected this kind of agreement unless it was also tied to specific limits on the size and number of offensive missiles that could theoretically be used to wipe out American missiles and bombers in a surprise attack. No such limitations were included in the latest Soviet draft.

Contrary to one oblished report, high-level officials say the Soviet proposal did not include a five-year limit on the treaty. The draft did suggest that the rival ABMs be limited to roughly 100 interceptor missiles each. That limit was first suggested, however, by the United States last year, when mutual Washington-Moscow ABM limitations were proposed by U.S. negotiators as part of a broader agreement that would have covered ICBMs, too.

### No Radar Limits

The new Soviet proposal also fails to put limits on ABM radars, another commission troubling some U.S. defense planners. The radars take much longer to produce than ABM missiles and launchers. Those suspicious of Soviet intentions say that unless the radars are also curbed, the Soviets could deploy an ABM much faster than this country could if relations eventually deteriorated.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that the recent Soviet offer came well before the President's news conference assurance that he was not discouraged over SALT. The President, in fact, volunteered his views on the talks. No reporter asked his opinion on SALT at the press conference.

Informed officials say privately that "it is not conceivable" that the United States would agree to an ABM-only agreement. But they hold out little hope for the kind of accord the Soviets are pressing for.

These officials say that a potential agreement might be worked out if, as part of an ABM limit, the treaty also committed the Soviets to immediate further negotiations on offensive systems as well, with a very strict—and probably short—time limit put on those negotiations.

These officials stress that they are talking about what may be possible in their view. No one is willing to second-guess the President's readiness to depart in any degree from his earlier insistence that any treaty must not be limited to defensive weapons.

Domestic political factors also complicate predictions on the President's course. Two leading Democratic presidential contenders—Sens. Hubert Humphrey (Minn.) and Edmund Muskie (Maine)—have made a political issue over the stalled SALT talks, arguing for an ABM-only agreement.

Officials say three separate ABM-only possibilities are getting fresh study by U.S. defense planners:
* A "zero-ABM" agreement, which would mean none on either side. With no ABMs, a country springing a surprise attack could still be devastated in return, even if only a small fraction of the enemy's missiles survived.

Administration sources say this approach has been pushed hard by U.S. negotiators in the past, although little public attention has focused on it.

* An agreement that would essentially allow the United States and Soviet Union to finish the limited ABMs both are already building, one around Moscow and the other around the four Minuteman bases in this country.

* The Soviet proposal for protecting the two capitals. It is given virtually no chance to succeed by administration sources unless linked directly to an agreement on offensive weapons.

Planners say that even in the first two cases, the United States probably would insist on a time-limited agreement to continue talking about a halt in ICBMs.

Whether any of these proposals actually emerge from the White House, or whether the Soviets will budge at all from their current position, remains to be seen. Some Kremlin watchers also fear that the Soviet negotiators may not be able to respond to a new U.S. offer without another long recess to gather instructions. And during that time, the weapons would continue accumulating.

WASHINGTON POST - 4 MAY 1971 P-2

151

# Symington Assails Arms Control Stand

By George C. Wilson

Washington Post Staff Writer

Sen. Stuart Symington (D-Mo.) accused the Nixon administration yesterday of being so negative about arms control that "I don't think we have any chance of making an agreement."

At the same Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on the defense budget, Dr. Herbert Scoville Jr. said the Soviet SS-9 missile buildup is lagging behind earlier Pentagon projections but is still being cited to justify a new round of American weapons-building.

Scoville, who testified on behalf of the Federation of American Scientists, used to be assistant director for science and technology at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Symington based his gloomy assessment on the administration's policy statements and on his own recent talks in Vienna with arms control negotiators.

He said that when administration officials insist on linking offensive and defensive weapons together in any agreement with Moscow, they "are in effect saying we are not making any agreement in arms control at all."

Because several H-bombs can be housed inside one missile warhead casing without being detected by observation, Symington said, an agreement on offensive weapons is difficult to achieve. But because defensive anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) can be observed, it is feasible to negotiate a limit on them.

The American Safeguard ABM is no good anyhow, Symington said. Soviet missiles, including those smaller than the intercontinental SS-9, could knock out the ABM radar, and then "Safeguard is dead."

Also, he said, the Soviet Union could employ the American strategy of overwhelming an ABM by firing more warheads at it than the defending missiles could handle. Once the defending missiles are used up, other ICBMs can come in behind the first wave unimpeded.

"I don't see why the American people should be slugged into spending $8 billion for a system which offers no additional protection," Symington said of Safeguard.

Scoville said it was "absolutely fantastic" for U.S. military leaders to argue that the Russian Tailline bomber defense could be upgraded to stop American ICBMs.

If this were a real threat, Scoville said, the United States could upgrade its own anti-bomber aircraft instead of building an ABM. As it is, Scoville added, the U.S. Air Force thinks so little of the Soviet anti-aircraft missiles in the Tallinn system that it is building a bomber with confidence it could penetrate the Soviet defense.

Scoville urged senators to cut the defense budget instead of falling "into the trap of perennial compulsive reaction to time-worn exaggerated threats."

150

WASHINGTON POST 3 MAY 1971

PAGE 21

Joseph Alsop

## Nation's Darkest Time

THE CHANCES are disingraceably high that the present may be remembered as the darkest time in the American story. In too many ways, it too much resembles the time in the British story, when government and people refused to respond to the grim challenge of Adolf Hitler-until it was much too late, and there was no possible response except a second World War.

The young fools (most of whom have never even heard of Adolf Hitler) demonstrate around the Capitol. Within the Capitol, the old fools prate of peace. Meanwhile, if facts mean anything at all, the vast power of the Soviet Union is being mainly used for military preparations which could end in war.

Facts probably do not mean anything at all, in view of the condition of wishful somnambulism that now afflicts so many politicians, almost all American intellectuals, and large sectors of the media. Yet the facts deserve to be clearly set out for consideration by the non-somnambulists. So here they are.

SOME MONTHS AGO, to begin with, one of the American reconnaissance satel-

lites brought back evidence that the Soviets had halted deployment of their huge SS-9 missiles at the 300-level. The SS-9 is what the Pentagon calls a "counterforce weapon," specifically designed to break the backbone of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, the Minuteman ICBM system.

The federal Arms Control Agency, the bastion of wishfulness in the Nixon administration, promptly circulated a secret memorandum that the halt in SS-9 deployment meant the arms race was over. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird also announced the halt to the public, in a tone of cautious hope. The cheers were deafening.

A little later this winter, a second reconnaissance satellite brought back very different news. Having ceased to dig silos for the SS-9 missiles, the Soviets were now digging even bigger silos, with several special features. The news plainly indicated that the Soviets would soon be deploying quite new missiles, even more powerful and threatening than the SS-9s.

In consequence, this reporter went to the most normally realistic men in the government, to ask what future numbers they were

thinking about. These men replied that the Soviets could hardly prepare to deploy more than 20 of the new missile-monsters this year-or not enough to be unduly alarmed about immediately.

Yet a little later, once again, there was still more news, this time of a truly appealing nature. The news was that the Soviets were already digging silos for twice the maximum expected number of the new monster-missiles-or above 40 in all. If this tempo continues, therefore, the Soviets may perhaps prepare for deployment of anywhere between 80 and 100 of their new monster-missiles before the year ends.

THE WISER ANALYSTS do not expect the monster-missiles to be mere improved SS-9s. They expect altogether new weapons, certainly "mired," and quite possibly carrying up to 10 one-megaton warheads apiece. When the new silos receive the new missiles that are destined for them -which takes about 18 months-that will then give the Soviets more than enough power to destroy the Minuteman system.

If these facts are not enough to frighten non-somnambulists, there are still

worse facts to come. Briefly, the Soviets are going to the immense expense of digging their new missile silos with out having finally tested the monster-missiles the silos are to hold.

This strange phenomenon of heavy spending in preparation for deployment, before any test of the weapon to be deployed, has been seen before in the Soviet Union. To be specific, it was seen in the early stages, just after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, when the Soviets were carrying on their nuclear-strategic buildup with great urgency.

The fact that the same strange phenomenon is being seen again, in immeasurably more dangerous circumstances, obviously means two things. It means that the Soviets have great confidence in their new monster-missile, whatever its form may be. And it also means that there is again urgency-that for reasons of their own, in fact, the Soviet military planners have some sort of deadline in mind.

If there is such a deadline, that also has a logical meaning. It means that the Soviets are preparing for positive action of some sort. Just possibly, they are preparing an attempted first strike, to knock out U.S. nuclear-strategic power. More probably, they have in mind some sort of hideously grave confrontation with this country, with overwhelming power on their side.

So this time of somnambulism may well be remembered as very dark indeed!

UPI

4 May 1971

152

WASHINGTON (UPI) -- TWO KEY CRITICS OF THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
SAY THEY HAVE LOST HOPE FOR A SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENT TO LIMIT
NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

SEN. STUART SYMINGTON, D-MO., SIAD THE ADMINISTRATION WAS
"PLANNING DELIBERATELY NOT TO HAVE ANY ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT AT
ALL" AT THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS (SALT). SEN. J.
WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, D-ARK., SAID IN AN INTERVIEW HE WAS SO
DISCOURAGED BY THE VIENNA TALKS THAT HE NO LONGER READS NEWS
ACCOUNTS ABOUT THEM.

SYMINGTON, WHO MET RECENTLY WITH U.S. NEGOTIATORS AT THE
VIENNA DISCUSSIONS, MONDAY GAVE ONE OF THE GLOOMIEST ACCOUNTS TO
DATE OF THE SITUATION.

HE TOLD THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE THAT AT LEAST
ONE OF THE ADVISERS TO CHIEF U.S. NEGOTIATOR GERARD G. SMITH WAS
A LEADING PROPONENT OF THE SAFEGUARD ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM (ABM).

BY RULING OUT AN INITIAL AGREEMENT LIMITED TO ABM DEFENSES,
SYMINGTON SAID, THE UNITED STATES PROBABLY HAS DOOMED SALT.

"I HAD GREAT HOPES FOR SALT," HE SAID. "TO PUT IT MILDLY,
THOSE HOPES HAVE BEEN DISTURBED ... I DON'T THINK WE HAVE ANY
CHANCE OF REACHING AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION UNDER THE
SALT TALKS."

FULBRIGHT, MEANWHILE, SAID THE CONTINUATION OF THE ARMS RACE
WHILE THE TWO SIDES NEGOTIATED WAS "INSANITY." HE SAID HE DID
NOT KNOW WHETHER THE REPORTED DISCOVERY OF 40 NEW SOVIET MISSILE
SILOS WAS FACTUALLY ACCURATE.

BUT HE SAID IF BOTH SIDES ARE DELIBERATELY ESCALATING THE ARMS
RACE IN AN EFFORT TO GAIN ADVANTAGE AT THE TALKS, THEY SHOULD BE
BROKEN OFF.

DR. HERBERT SCOVILLE JR., FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, TESTIFIED MONDAY THAT THE 40 NEW
SILOS CITED BY U.S. INTELLIGENCE DID NOT REPRESENT A THREAT TO
U.S. SECURITY. HE SAID IT SIMPLY MAY BE AN EFFORT BY THE
SOVIET UNION TO BUILD HARDER SILOS TO PROTECT ITS SS9 MISSILES
AGAINST ANY FIRST STRIKE BY THE UNITED STATES.

SCOVILLE CONTENDED THAT EVEN CONSIDERING THE NEW HOLES, THE
SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF MISSILES HAS BEEN SLOWED DURING THE ARMS
CONTROL TALKS. BETWEEN DEC. 30, 1970 AND MID-1971, HE SAID, THE
UNITED STATES WILL HAVE DEPLOYED 600 NEW WARHEADS, WHILE THE SOVIETS
IN THE SAME PERIOD INCREASED THEIR WARHEADS BY 400.

May 6, 1971

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE

Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, the nuclear arms race has taught us a valuable lesson, and it is time that we took this lesson to heart. It has taught us that buying more arms does not necessarily buy us more security; it may only lead to new and more chilling forms of insecurity.

The nuclear arms race should have taught us by now that in the long run, the control of arms can provide us with a more stable peace and more security than the best weapons money can buy and the minds of men can devise.

We have seen that this is true as we have watched each side develop new strategic weapons systems in response to real or imagined programs by the other side. The net effect has been, at least, a tragic waste of valuable resources. At worst, it could mean catastrophe for all mankind.

Too often, nations have resisted the idea of arms control in the mistaken belief that it would mean unilateral disarmament. And we have sometimes thought of arms control in terms only of reaching agreements and signing treaties. As in the case of the current SALT negotiations, reaching such agreements is an urgent need.

There is, however, a further dimension to arms control. Even in those areas of competitive strategic military spending not covered by treaty or agreement, we should try to establish a pattern of mutual self-restraint with other nations. We should recognize that the other side can and often does react to what we do. A pattern of mutual restraint would enhance our security as well as the security of others. Moreover, the unilateral defense program decisions we make now can alter the prospects for agreement in the future.

It is important, therefore, that we consider the effects of our strategic defense budget on the prospects for agreement at the SALT talks now and in the future and on the military spending decisions of other nations, particularly the Soviet Union.

Actions which we and the Soviets have taken since the SALT talk began have

13880

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

May 6, 1971

155

already adversely affected the prospects for agreement.

While the talks go on, the Soviets may be making changes in their offensive weapon deployments. We do not yet know what these changes will prove to be. Whatever they are, they increase our uncertainty as to Soviet intentions, and they make it more difficult for us to conclude an agreement to halt the arms race. They have also resumed work on their ABM system centered on Moscow.

Since the talks began, the United States has begun to deploy a vastly improved new warhead system, the MIRV—a multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicle—and pressed ahead with the ABM program.

In a talk which I gave in Philadelphia early last month I emphasized the urgency of making progress at the current round of the SALT negotiations. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have that speech and two earlier speeches which I delivered on SALT inserted into the Record at the conclusion of these remarks.

I emphasize this urgency again.

Thus far, little progress appears to have been made at this round of SALT. The Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control will be holding public hearings at an appropriate time to explore what progress has been made and what the obstacles to agreement are. Among other questions, we will want to consider the desirability of separating out ABM systems for limitation as a first step toward a more comprehensive agreement.

While pressing for agreement at SALT, we must not lose sight of the fact that the defense programs authorized and funded by the Congress affect the prospects for agreement. This is an area of clear congressional responsibility.

The Congress of the United States in the last few years has begun to subject the defense budget to the scrutiny formerly given only to the domestic budget. The defense budget has proven no more complex than a health bill or a program to rejuvenate our cities.

In exercising the congressional prerogative on the defense budget, we have looked at:

*   Technical problems—will the weapon work? Is it needed or superfluous?

*   Economic problems—how much does it cost?

*   Foreign policy problems—how does the budget affect our commitments?

What has been missing is the arms control perspective—how our defense budget affects the possibilities for sound arms control. Too often, this perspective has been applied only after the decision to proceed with a new program has been applied only after the decision to proceed with a new program has been made and carried out.

Mr. President, the Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Arms Control will be holding two sets of hearings.

The coming months: first, one on the arms control implications of the administration's defense program as submitted to the Congress; and, second, on the advisability and feasibility of extending the present limited test ban treaty to prohibit

all testing of nuclear weapons in any environment including underground.

I want today to outline briefly the kinds of questions these hearings will explore.

First, the subcommittee will investigate the arms control implications of the defense budget. The focus of these hearings will not be whether the weapons work or how much they cost. We will want to look at the net effect of the deployment of these weapons on the arms race and thus on United States security. If we deploy new weapons knowing full well that Soviet deployment of similar weapons will follow, will the result be more or less security for our Nation?

We want to apply a new perspective and a new set of criteria to judge the billions we spend on defense. By this new measure—the effects of weapons deployment on arms control—we may find that some weapons actually reduce security precisely because they might work and the Soviets would deploy them as well; and that certain weapons, despite their high costs, actually stabilize the arms race and enhance the prospects for peace.

We have been generally aware that these problems existed, but there has never before been any really systematic examination by the Congress of these weapons systems from the arms control perspective.

The United States, ever since the beginning of the nuclear era, has been committed officially to the search for control of these armaments. Progress, though significant in some areas, has been dangerously slow and limited.

A great part of the difficulty lies with the Soviet and our own failure to see that when either makes certain military decisions, it—quite unwittingly—forecloses future arms control possibilities. They may do that directly or because of the response they induce from other countries. Too often, each side fails to analyze how its weapons decisions will look to the other side.

In this sense, arms control begins not at a bargaining table in Vienna or Helsinki, but at home in Moscow and Washington. It begins in our defense budgets and in our national debates about how we can make our Nation more secure.

There are a number of specific issues the subcommittee hopes to examine in some detail. They are:

First, the multiple-deterrence triad. It has in the past been the policy of the United States to maintain not one but three essentially independent nuclear deterrent forces, in addition to our nuclear forces in Europe. These are our Minuteman land-based missiles, our bombers, and our Poseidon and Polaris missile-carrying submarines. The fiscal year 1972 budget and the President's discussion of strategic policy in his latest annual foreign policy message make it clear that the administration proposes to continue to maintain and modernize all three systems.

Since the Safeguard ABM is admittedly inadequate, the new hard-site ABM system is being proposed to help keep the Minuteman viable for the indefinite future. The new B-1 bomber is to be developed eventually to replace the

B-52's and FB-111's we now have. The new ULMS submarine missile system is to be developed as a successor to the Poseidon/Polaris force.

All this will be very expensive, and there may be technical doubts about the feasibility or wisdom of some of the specific programs. Our hearings are not going to concentrate on those economic and technical issues. They will explore the basic policy problem of what it means for the arms race and arms control if we continue to seek to maintain three essentially independent deterrent forces. I hope we can determine the answers to such questions as:

What is the effect of having these three systems on the possibilities for arms control agreements? Does our desire have to have triple redundancy in our deterrent add to the difficulties of agreeing with the Soviets on strategic arms limitation in the immediate future? In the long run?

What response are the Soviets likely to make if we carry through three independently sufficient programs? What counter-responses will we then feel compelled to take?

What, from the arms control point of view, should be the relative priorities of each of these three forces?

Assuming we do want to maintain all three forces, what is the leadtime for the threat to each system? That is, how can we react fast enough to protect our security yet avoid acting prematurely and provoking a response from the Soviets negating any added security from our own efforts?

Second, Mirv's. The deployment of MIRV's on both our land- and our sea-based missiles proceeds apace. This is an area where we are far ahead. We are already deploying operational units; the first Soviet test of a true MIRV may have come late last year or it may not have come yet. The multiple warhead previously tested was only a MRV, that is, a multiple reentry vehicle from which each warhead cannot be aimed at a separate target. We have had such a MRV system deployed on our submarines—not simply in tests—for more than 5 years.

The administration rejected the desire of many in the Senate, in the Nation, and in the world for a suspension of our deployment schedule to improve the chances of an agreement to ban MIRV's. A MIRV ban, if it has not been abandoned entirely, seems to have a very low priority in both Soviet and United States thinking about SALT. Nevertheless, the chances for agreement may not be entirely lost yet.

This is a program where current action is helping to close the door on a possible arms control agreement of potentially great importance. Before that door is finally closed, we must understand what is being done. This points up, once again, the problems of technology and of considering SALT agreements solely in quantitative and not in qualitative terms as well.

In examining the MIRV problem, the subcommittee will consider such issues as:

*   Does our MIRV program seriously threaten the chances of a genuinely comprehensive agreement at SALT?

BALTIMORE SUN

7 MAY 1971

Soviet Missiles

It is apparent that President Nixon and the American people must come to grips with the grim subject of Soviet nuclear power. And one of the first steps must be to bring the facts out into the open, or at least as nearly into the open as possible, so that the dimensions of the subject are better understood than at present—so that the need for measures to augment American nuclear strength can be balanced against the possible consequences of inaction.

We have all been living in the shadow of the nuclear cloud since the Soviet Union exploded its first bomb in 1949. We have become insured to an uneasy balance of power, assured on our side of the balance by a belief that the deterrent effect of American weapons was sufficient to avert a nuclear war. The balance, however, has gradually shifted, from an overwhelming superiority on the American side toward an acceptance of something like parity. And now, we are being told Soviet superiority is in prospect.

Senator Jackson of Washington, a responsible and well-informed senator, sounded a warning several weeks ago that the Soviet Union is preparing for a major expansion of its ballistic missile system. Mr. Laird, the Secretary of Defense, has been rather cautiously edging up to the subject. Two experienced Washington correspondents whose columns appear regularly on the page opposite, Joseph Alsop and Richard Wilson, believe the matter is so serious that it must be put into plainer words than the Nixon administration has been using. Mr. Wilson put it this way yesterday:

The Nixon administration already has held up too long in being completely frank with the American public on the requirements of the future. No war protests, no national sentiment for peace and disarmament, no weariness with the horror of the bomb could possibly excuse an administration for falling to act in the present nuclear crisis.

It has been clear for the past several years that while the United States was preoccupied with Southeast Asia, devoting much of its national energy and many billions of dollars to an endless war, the Soviet Union has been strengthening its own political and military posture. It has established itself as a world naval power and it has built a position of strength in the Middle East. If it is intent now on a nuclear missile superiority through larger, multi-headed missiles, as we are being warned, the fact simply must be faced. Is there no hope for an agreement in the strategic arms limitation talks? Is a new expansion of our nuclear missile systems, to match the Soviet expansion, the only feasible course of action for the United States? The facts will determine the answers.

NEWSWEEK 10 MAY 1971 (4)

BY STEWART ALSOP

162

# WHAT'S GOING IN THE HOLES?

WASHINGTON—In recent weeks, a shudder of uneasiness has passed through the tiny community of people who know, and care, about the nuclear-strategic balance between this country and the Soviet Union. The uneasiness has been reflected in veiled hints from Secretary of Defense Laird, Senator Jackson and others. It is important to understand the realities that lie behind the hints.

Until a few months ago, when the Russians were installing one of their huge, 25-megaton SS-9 missiles, they always went about the business in precisely the same way. First they would build two fences, sometimes three, around a 100-acre site. Then they would dig a big, flat hole, about 100 feet across and 25 feet deep. This hole, easily detectable to the all-seeing eyes of the intelligence satellites, was always a signal to the intelligence analysts that another SS-9 was going on.

Inside the first hole, the Russians would then dig another, deeper, hole, about 30 feet across and 120 feet down. They would line the hole with concrete, put a steel liner inside that and then lower the big missile into the liner. In the remaining empty space of the first big hole, they would build a complex of work rooms, generators, fuel pumps and so on, and cover the whole thing with a thick, steel sliding door.

Then they were in business, with an operational weapon about twenty times as powerful as the American Minuteman missile. Between 1965, when they planted their first SS-9, and last autumn, the Russians had gone through this procedure in precisely the same way again and again, installing some 275 SS-9 missiles.

## WORK STOPS

Last autumn, digging had started on eighteen more SS-9 sites, and the intelligence analysts assumed that the Russians would soon raise SS-9 deployment to more than 300. Then, in October, work on these eighteen holes stopped, totally and abruptly—the empty holes are still there, easily visible in the satellite photographs.

Perhaps, it was thought, this was good news. Perhaps it was a signal from the Russians that they were serious about limiting strategic weapons through the SALT talks. But then something happened to cause the shudder. The Russians started to dig a new kind of hole. This new kind of hole is about

the same size as the second, deep hole that houses the SS-9—but it lacks the first, big, shallow hole.

These different holes have been dug at a furious pace—41 of them at last count, suggesting that the schedule calls for at least 70 a year. The holes have been dug among the six existing SS-9 complexes in South Central Russia, and they could be for some new kind of point-defense anti-missile missile. But the experts think the odds are heavy that the holes are, instead, for intercontinental missiles.

## TESTS CONDUCTED

At about the same time the Soviets stopped construction on the eighteen SS-9 holes, they conducted a series of 21 tests of their MRV's—multipule re-entry vehicles. The Russian MRV's, controlled by a rather primitive but effective system of pointing rails, are designed to fall in a predetermined fixed pattern on their targets—the primary targets, the experts unanimously believe, being the thousand U.S. Minuteman missiles that constitute our chief nuclear deterrent.

Because the pattern is fixed, the MRV's are relatively vulnerable to our now-building ABM system. But two of the 21 tests appeared to be, not MRV's, but MIRV's—multiple, independently targeted, re-entry vehicles. The MIRV's would be far less vulnerable to a missile defense—it was to counter the expanding Soviet ABM system that our Minuteman 3 and Poseidon missiles were equipped with MIRV's.

It is possible that the two seeming MIRV's were simply malfunctioning MRV's. Perhaps the Soviets are simply redesigning their SS-9 configuration—the upper hole and its contents are more vulnerable to a near miss than the missile itself, despite the steel door. But if this is the case, certain questions remain unanswered.

Why should the Russians wholly abandon the eighteen SS-9 holes and start digging new and different holes? Why not simply move the contents of the upper hole to another place? And why the extraordinary haste to dig the new holes?

The experts have a working hypothesis to answer these questions—that the new holes are for a newly designed, multi-MIRVed missile, at least as powerful as the SS-9. If the hypothesis is correct, the MIRV's will almost certainly be in multiples of more than three, since the 25-megaton SS-9 warhead

provides a much bigger nuclear pie to slice, as it were, than the 1-megaton Minuteman. The new missile could be ten-MIRVed, or twelve-MIRVed, or more, but the usual guess is that it will be six-MIRVed. A six-MIRVed SS-9-sized missile would provide six nuclear warheads each more powerful—about a megaton and a half—than a single Minuteman warhead.

If a multi-MIRVed, 25-megaton Soviet missile is what is going to be put into those new holes, that means the end of our Minuteman complex as a credible nuclear deterrent, perhaps within three years, or even two. The peculiar nuclear mathematics make that almost totally predictable. If the Russians are as methodical as usual, we shall know what is going into the new holes by next autumn. According to the almost unvarying Soviet schedule, that will be the time for operational testing of the new missile—if that is what it is.

There is another fact to be considered. In March, the Russians successfully completed their third test series of a non-nuclear satellite intercept vehicle. These then are the facts that have caused the shudder—and they are facts, for the intelligence in these matters is now absolutely “hard.” No one will know, until or unless the Soviets test a new missile, just what these facts mean. But any reader of detective stories will discern a pattern of clues, all pointing in the same direction.

## A SOVIET CAPABILITY?

The Soviets are bargaining at the SALT talks for eliminating ABM protection for the Minuteman deterrent complex. At the same time, they have probably already achieved the capability (which we lack against them) to blind our intelligence satellites. And the experts are betting about 2 to 1 that they are also on the way to achieving the capability to knock out, with very powerful multi-MIRVed missiles, our land-based nuclear deterrent.

In short, the available clues suggest that the Russians are now going all-out to achieve in the near future a really decisive nuclear-strategic superiority. This is no cause for panic—it does not mean that the Russians are planning to knock out the U.S. in a first strike. Even so, serious people do have a duty to examine the facts seriously, without ducking behind the currently fashionable clichés, about cold-war thinking and the military-industrial complex.

163

BALTIMORE SUN 11 May 1971 P17

Joseph Kraft

Russian Expert's U.S. Visit Reflects Continuing Tension

Washington.

Russia's leading American-
ologist, Georgi Arbatov, of the
U.S.A. Institute in Moscow, re-
cently has been making the
rounds in Washington and
New York. And his encounters
with the leading Americans
express with high fidelity the
tragic incongruity of outlook
that promotes impasse in Big
Two relations.

Mr. Arbatov has been re-
ceived cordially in very high
places. He had lunca with
Henry A. Kissinger, of the
White House staff. He saw
elected officials and foreign
policy specialists. He met with
business tycoons at a confer-
ence on East-West trade in
New York.

At all these meetings, Mr. Arbatov stressed the Soviet interest in harmonious dealings with the United States. He cited passages favoring better relations from the speech delivered by Leonid I. Brezhnev, general secretary, to the 24th Communist party congress held in Moscow a month ago. He represented Mr. Brezhnev as a figure chiefly interested in the welfare of ordinary Russians—a peace-and-prosperity kind of guy.

But difficulties rose when-

ever conversations came
round to specifics. A particu-
larly thorny subject was the
matter of strategic arms. For
the Russians appear to be
forcing the pace in the arms
race with the new holes appar-
ently set out for deployment of
an improved SS-9 or some oth-
er monster weapon.

In responding to American
questions about the new holes,
Mr. Arbatov emphasized over-
and over again the present
American lead in strategic
weapons. He pointed out that
besides the land-based Minute-
man III missiles which might
be threatened by the SS-9, the
United States had two other
systems for delivery of nuclear
weapons — the Polaris-Posei-
don submarine fleet and the
strategic bombing force.

He went on to assert that
the United States recently had
tripled the power of its nucle-
ar punch by the so-called
MIRV device for putting many
warheads on a single missile.
While holding out some hope
for an agreement on defensive
weapons—or anti-ballistic mis-
siles—he left the strong im-
pression that the Russians
would make no agreement on
offensive weapons until they

had caught up with the Ameri-
can MIRV lead.

The same kind of go-around
followed on European mat-
ters. Apart from indicating a
general interest in easing ten-
sion in Europe, Mr. Arbatov
suggested to some of his inter-
locutors that Russia might be
willing to work together with
the United States in a mutual
winding down of troops in Eu-
rope.

But the subject of a new Big
Four arrangement on Berlin
inevitably came up, since it is
a condition for West German
ratification of the recent bor-
der treaty with Russia. Mr.
Arbatov acted as though a
new arrangement somehow
would challenge Russia's pres-
ence in Eastern Europe. At
one point he warned that there
would be serious trouble for
anybody who played around in
the East European backyard.

Even on trade — the ostensi-
ble purpose of his visit — Mr.
Arbatov showed touchiness.
While he expressed a Russian
interest in a larger flow of
goods, he went out of his way
to make it plain that the Rus-
sians did not need trade with
the United States. He said
they were interested in trade
mainly as a test of whether
the United States truly wanted
to improve political relations.

What emerges from all this
is the psychological aspect of
Big Two tension. The Russians
are highly sensitive about
being second; they want to do

everything the United States
dees. Since that aspiration
means deploying missiles and
maintaining fleets and fiddling
around in distant countries, it
is itself a source of tension.

The United States, in deal-
ing with Russia's forward
thrust, can afford to be broad-
minded. This country is, after
all, way ahead. To demand
concession for concession in
an explicit one-for-one way, as
the linkage theory of the Nix-
on administration provides, is
a recipe for getting nowhere.

But at some point, Washing-
ton has to draw lines. On some
issues, Washington has to take
stands. And at present, with
Russia pushing forward and
Mr. Nixon nursing his con-
servative base for the 1972
election, the outlook is much
more for tension than for ac-
cord.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

12 MAY 1971

Weaponry, 1971

Every year at about the same season, usually just when the cherry blossoms are opening along the Potomac, a new round is opened in the old argument over how many weapons of what kind the United States needs in view of whatever its arch rival in power, the Soviet Union, is doing or is believed, by some, to be doing.

The 1971 debate is a rerun of the 1970 round, with a difference.

The 1970 round was opened by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on April 29 with the assertion that the Soviets were engaged in a massive expansion of their nuclear striking force. He suggested the distressing possibility that they were seriously seeking a "first strike capability" against the United States.

This was based on a presumed continuing deployment of Russian SS-9 intercontinental missiles. These are the world's largest, carrying a nuclear warhead with an estimated power of 20 to 25 megatons. The heaviest megatonnage in the American arsenal is one to two, on a Minuteman 2.

The Russians were then said to be deploying SS-9 missiles at the rate of 50 to 60 per year whereas the United States had at that time stabilized its long range missile force and was deploying nothing new at all.

The 1970 round ended with the admission that instead of continuing SS-9 deployment, there had been none since August of 1969. Thus the 1970 case was built on a false assumption about what the Russians were in fact doing.

The 1971 round was opened by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D) of Washington on March 7 with the disclosure that the Russians were digging some new holes in the ground which suggested that they were engaging in deploying "an advanced generation" of missiles; i.e., something beyond the huge SS-9.

This was later confirmed from the Pentagon with some details.

The essential published facts are that the Russians have dug 40 new holes of the same size previously used for the SS-9 type missiles, but with different surroundings.

These diggings are detected by aerial photography from orbiting American reconnaissance satellites. These satellites are constantly photographing everything of military interest going on in the Soviet Union. (The U.S.S.R. does the same.)

There are conflicting theories about the purpose of these holes in the ground. At one end of the spectrum is Senator Jackson and the theory of an "advanced generation" of Russian missiles. At the other end is the theory that the Russians are trying to protect what they have by getting ready to move 40 of their existing SS-9 missiles from old-style silos into new stronger and harder ones with a better radar detection system.

The Russians do have reason to think about the validity of their own deterrent. While they were not deploying any new SS-9 missiles the United States was fitting new warheads to its Minuteman missiles. These new heads contain three or more independently targetable (MIRV) nuclear devices. Also, the Navy began deploying its new Poseidon missiles, also fitted with MIRV heads.

Thus, while the Russians were deploying nothing, the United States were multiplying their nuclear striking power by a factor of roughly three times.

It would not be surprising, therefore, if the Russians were putting their best effort not into a "new generation", but rather into trying to save what they have.

Personalties are getting involved, as they always do in such matters. It is now disclosed that behind Senator Jackson's opening move this year is John S. Foster Jr., Director of Research and Engineering, Department of Defense. A public counter blow has been aimed at him directly by an organization called the Federation of American Scientists.

According to the federation, Mr. Foster is guilty of "a classic numbers game featuring selective disclosure, questionable assumptions, exaggeratedly precise estimates, misleading language and alarmist non sequitur conclusions." Prof. George W. Rathjens who helped draft this unflattering opinion of Mr. Foster's work adds that the SS-9, instead of being the super-weapon Pentagon spokesmen brandish before anxious congressional eyes, is actually an obsolete type which the United States could have had long ago, but rejected in favor of the more efficient, and less costly, Minuteman. The huge megatonnage of the SS-9 is dismissed by the critics of Mr. Foster as "overkill."

At State Department, Treasury, Bureau of the Budget, and the White House are people who prefer not to talk out in public, but are delighted to have the Federation of Scientists speak out on what is a highly controversial subject. The Bureau of the Budget, for example, wants to save all the money it safely can, but is in a poor position to argue in public against Pentagon assertions about the latest form of the "Russian menace." The federation acts, therefore, as the public front for the opposition inside the administration to a new and bigger weapons program.

We who are on the outside and do not possess the top-secret information available to the President and his key advisers cannot be sure which view is correct, the alarums of Senator Jackson and Mr. Foster, or the reassurances of their critics.

But there are helpful opinions from authoritative sources. The Institute of Strategic Studies, in London, is widely regarded as the most responsible public source for defense information and analysis. In its current annual "Strategic Survey" it explores a possible Soviet try at a "first strike capability" and observes:

"Certain aspects of the Soviet program were certainly calculated to generate such fears, but the evidence which they provided was never better than ambiguous and was certainly not stronger than that which the Soviet Union might itself have adduced, oversuspiciously, from American strategic programs and statements in the past."

And as for anyone ever getting a "first strike capability": to have one would mean the ability to knock out every missile in the arsenal of the other side. If even one escaped, the "first strike" would be meaningless because, to quote former presidential adviser McGeorge Bundy: "a decision that would bring even one hydrogen bomb on one city of one's own country would be recognized in advance as a catastrophic blunder."

The most reasonable conclusion is that neither Russia nor the United States has any real chance of getting a "first strike" and it is highly doubtful that either is really trying. Each will inevitably suspect the other and thus keep up the race in technology to the point where there is some cutoff in the nuclear arms race.

As we read the existing and publicly available evidence it seems that the United States is probably holding its technological advantage over Russia, perhaps even widening it.

If true, it would be to Russia's advantage to agree to a cutoff date in the SALT talks. We can only watch with fascination to see what the Russians do agree to. It will be the best possible measure of which side is leading in the nuclear race.

164

BALTIMORE SUN - 16 MAY 1971

165

# As a matter of fact, the U.S. is widening the missile gap

By HERBERT SCOVILLE, Jr.

As the first salvo in the campaign to obtain larger appropriations this year for strategic weapons systems, Senator Henry Jackson (D., Wash.) announced March 7 that the Soviets were deploying a new generation of offensive missiles which could be as large or larger than their SS-9's. He submitted that this could be the missile for MIRV's (multiple, independently targetable, reentry vehicles) which the Russians were developing as a first strike weapon against the U.S. Minuteman. This initial announcement was quickly followed by a statement from Admiral Thomas Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Soviets had begun a new ICBM silo construction program. However, the admiral considerably softened Senator Jackson's warning by adding "... we do not know what these silos are intended for."

The admiral's statement and other releases have made it clear that the Soviets have not developed or tested a new missile for those launchers. Indeed, Senator Jackson later admitted that there is no direct evidence that the Soviets have flight-tested a new missile, and that it would probably be 18 months before such missiles were emplaced. Nevertheless, reference to new Soviet construction was made frequently in the course of the recent hearings before the Armed Services Committee, and on April 21 Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told the American Newspaper Publishers Association that "this new ICBM construction effort, coupled with additional momentum in the strategic defensive area ... must be of major concern."

Finally on April 27 'he secretary announced that the Soviets had recommended ABM deployment with advanced hardware, after a lull of more than three years.

Parallel to this scare campaign about large Soviet missiles, there have been renewed attempts to raise fears about another missile gap. Gen. (Bruce K.) Holway, commander of Strategic Air Command, has been reported as deploing the growing Soviet strategic superiority. The Defense Department on March 11 released a report written six months earlier by a jump group of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, whose charter was to study DOD organization, not policy.

This document grossly exaggerated Soviet capabilities, downgraded U.S. deterrent strength, called for increased military expenditures to prevent the U.S. from becoming a second-class power, and summoned us to regain and retain a clearly superior strategic capability.

In view of the competing needs for funds and resources to cope with our internal problems, it is important to analyze calmly the validity of all these claims and avoid being panicked into unnecessary spending on new and more dangerous weapons. The renewed deployment of additional Soviet ICBM launchers, particularly for new large missiles is, of course, a step in the wrong direction. At the same time, however, the Russian SS-11 small-missile program appears to have leveled off and the rate of new silo construction for even the large ICBM's (SS-9's or bigger) has actually decreased in recent years.

## 50 New Launchers

Previous to 1969, the Soviets were said to have been building 50 to 60 SS-9 silos per year. But as of August, 1969, no new construction was observed until May, 1970, when about 20 new starts were reported. This past winter, the Defense Department announced that construction on some of these new silos may have been suspended and that the program had leveled off below 300.

The new large-silo construction is currently reported to be limited to several tens of launchers. Thus, it would appear that at the most, during the past 21 months, the Soviets have initiated construction on about 50 new large launchers, a considerable reduction from previous years and far below the level predicted by Secretary Laird in 1969 in his original justification for the Safeguard ABM program.

At this rate of construction it would not be until 1975/76 that the U.S.S.R. would have the 420 operational missiles which Secretary Laird postulated would be required, with three MIRV's on each, to threaten our Minuteman force. While the program could accelerate faster than the rate of the last two years, it would be almost impossible for the 420 to be achieved before 1974, the date originally predicted....

The U.S. strategic weapons program has been pursued during the past few years at an augment pace and, if anything, a "missile gap" is rapidly developing in our favor. Secretary Laird himself points out in this year's posture statement that between December 30, 1970, and mid-1971, our offensive strategic nuclear weapons will increase from 4,000 to 4,600, while the Soviets' during the same period will only increase from 1,800 to 2,000, an addition of 600 for the U.S. as compared to 200 for the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, this rapid U.S. acceleration is only the beginning of a vast program; during the next five years U.S. missile warheads will increase to more than 7,000 as we place MIRV's on our Minuteman III ICBM's and Poseidon submarine missiles.

Mr. Scoville has been assistant director for science and technology of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and deputy director for research of CIA. This article is excerpted by permission of the New Republic, copyright 1971, Harrison-Blaine of New Jersey, Inc.

## Big Megatonnage Outdated

This buildup cannot be discounted by saying that the number of warheads is not as important as megatonnage. Each of these MIRV warheads has an explosive force at least several times that of the explosions which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the early Sixties, virtually all U.S. authorities reached the conclusion that our security would be enhanced by substituting multiple small bombs for a very high yield single weapon in our B-52 loads, 64 hardened Minuteman missiles in lieu of the larger Titans, and by MIRV's with lower yields in place of single bigger warheads. Senator Jackson, in hearings of the Senate Armed

Services Committee, confirmed that he had endorsed this concept. Megatonnage has long been outdated as a critical measure of relative strength.

How can one say that a missile gap in favor of the Soviet Union is developing when the U.S. is adding to its warheads at the rate of 1,200 per year, while the present rise in Soviet warhead strength is no more than 400 per year? While the Russian program certainly has strong momentum, so does ours. In time, of course, the Soviet MIRV program could approach and even surpass our present one, but the Russians are, at a minimum, several years behind us in this area.

## New Increases Unjustified

It is this long-range and as yet unrealized Soviet potential that poses the true risk to our security and demonstrates the recklessness and tragedy of our failure to negotiate seriously a limitation on MIRV's at the SALT talks. President Nixon's refusal to negotiate an "ABM only" limitation as a first stage of an arms limitation agreement may now have reaped its harvest with the resumption of Russian ABM deployment, making agreement in this area and perhaps others more difficult than before. Arms limitation is still much the best but most neglected way of protecting U.S. security and avoiding the panicky over-response which seems always to be the trademark of an unrestricted arms race, and of the annual military budget debate.

In sum, U.S. strategic programs have long been under way to cope with threats far beyond those envisioned by any of these recent alarms about new Soviet weapons, and none of these alarms justifies new increases in U.S. strategic force levels.

TIME MAGAZINE 17 MAY 1971 (12)

# Disarmament: SALT Up to Date

ACROSS broad conference tables in Helsinki and Vienna, U.S. and Soviet negotiators have faced each other 68 times since the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks began 18 months ago. Last week the two sides permitted themselves a change of scene. As guests of the Austrian government, 146 delegates and wives set out from Vienna for a spring weekend in the historic province of Carinthia aboard a special train complete with private compartments, dining cars and a dance band.

Superficially, at least, the most important disarmament negotiations in history have come to resemble that eight-hour round-trip train ride: they have covered a lot of ground without really seeming to get very far. Though the talks began with hopeful signals, the only thing the two sides have definitely agreed on to date is the need to improve the Washington-Moscow hot line to enable officials to find out quickly whether an unidentified missile has been fired accidentally by the other superpower—or deliberately by China. Reflecting concern about the future of the talks, the coolly patient U.S. chief negotiator, Gerard C. Smith, will fly to Washington this week for White House-level consultations on where SALT goes next.

**Pretty Good Idea.** The chief worry is that if there is no progress, the rough equilibrium in nuclear weapons that now exists between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will eventually be upset. Already, both sides have started running the next lap in the arms race: the U.S. has begun deploying Hydraheaded, almost unstoppable MIRV (for multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle) missiles in the Minuteman 3 and Poseidon submarine programs, and the Soviets may be on the verge of fitting their giant SS-9 missiles with multiple warheads.

The basic U.S. proposal at the talks is for a flat limit on the number of nuclear delivery systems (land-based ICBMs, submarine-carried missiles, airborne bombs) that either side would be allowed to maintain. The suggested ceiling: 1,900. There would also be a "sublimit" prohibiting the Soviets from assembling more than, say, 250 missiles in the size range of the huge SS-9, whose 25-megaton warheads can wipe out U.S. ICBMs even in the hardest silos. As part of the total U.S. package, the American delegation last year proposed that ABM systems be either banned outright or limited to the defense of Moscow and Washington.

Last month the Soviets countered the U.S. proposal with a draft treaty dealing only with ABMs. Moscow's idea was to confine the ABMs to the vicinity of the two countries' capitals, limiting each network to about 100 missiles. The Soviets had a pretty good idea, however, that the U.S. would reject the treaty: President Nixon had said in February that the U.S. believed that any

satisfactory SALT agreement should cover offensive as well as defensive weapons. The Soviets have made another demand that Washington considers totally unacceptable. They want all nuclear weapons systems capable of reaching Soviet soil—including the 600 U.S. tactical aircraft on NATO bases in Europe and aboard Sixth Fleet carriers—written into any SALT agreement on offensive weapons. Yet they refuse to concede that intermediate-range Soviet

missiles capable of hitting Western Europe should also be limited.

**Bargaining Chip.** The White House insists, for several reasons, on considering the whole mix of offensive and defensive weapons simultaneously. For one thing, many U.S. disarmament experts warn that the Soviets, by improving the radar and rocketry in the SA-5 surface-to-air missiles now located around Russia's western cities, could upgrade that antiaircraft system into an instant ABM network. More important is the argument that an ABM-only agreement would squander a bargaining chip. That chip is the U.S.'s Safeguard ABM, now under construction at Air Force bases in North Dakota, Montana and Missouri, which could be useful in getting the Russians to agree on a limit to their SS-9s.

Moreover, if an ABM-only treaty were signed, many U.S. experts believe, the Russians might never come back to the bargaining table. Having stripped U.S. ICBM sites of their ABM protection, the argument goes, the Russians would proceed full blast with deployment of the SS-9 and even bigger missiles. Defense Secretary Melvin Laird recently reported that an "apparently extensive" new Soviet ICBM construction program is already in progress in south-central Russia.

Hard-liners in the Administration are convinced that the Soviets developed the SS-9 for one purpose: to enable the U.S.S.R. to knock out U.S. missiles in their silos, thus giving Moscow a clear first-strike capability without fear of a devastating retaliatory strike. They maintain that the Soviets see SALT not as a way to cut down a bloated defense budget but as a means to achieve demonstrable superiority over the U.S. The kind of superiority the Russians may be trying to engineer, argues Columbia University Sovietologist Zbigniew Brzezinski, would be aimed not at winning wars so much as at prevailing in more subtle psychological showdowns, like the Cuban missile confrontation that so deeply humiliated Nikita Khrushchev in 1962.

Soviet hard-liners, however, could make a comparable case. They could argue that Safeguard, which was rammed through Congress just before SALT began, may be the first step in a "heavy" system designed to make American cities safe from Soviet attack, thus

opening the way for a U.S. first strike against Russia. The Russians are also distressed by the fact that even as the SALT talks have dragged on, the Pentagon has been pushing for stepped-up development of bigger and better strategic weapons. Meanwhile, the Air Force has deployed its first squadron of 50 Minuteman 3 missiles at Minot Air Force Base, N. Dak., and the Navy has sent on patrol a Poseidon-equipped submarine with 16 MIRV missiles carrying ten to twelve warheads apiece.

**Missile Moratorium.** Ironically, such developments have tended to weaken the Administration's already questionable case for refusing to consider the Soviet ABM-only proposal. Missouri Democrat Stuart Symington points out that Washington's stubbornness on the ABM raises suspicions about whether the U.S. ultimately wants a SALT agreement. More fundamentally, many respected disarmament experts, including Herbert F. York and Herbert Scoville Jr., argue that an initial ABM agreement would achieve an important break in the so-called "action-reaction" cycle that keeps the arms race in motion. Even if the basest motives attributed to the Soviets are correct, they argue, the U.S.'s formidable sublaunched-missile capacity alone could serve as a credible deterrent to a Soviet attack for the next decade at least.

Overall, the U.S. has a comfortable lead in strategic nuclear warheads of all kinds (5,130 v. 2,280 for the Soviets). In missile technology, the U.S. is about a year and a half ahead of Russia. While curbing the big Soviet ICBMs is still the primary Administration concern, Negotiator Smith and White House planners will be discussing a number of new proposals aimed at getting SALT moving. One of them is a ban on ABM deployment for perhaps a two-year period, during which the SALT talkers would be free to tackle the question of offensive weapons.

A possible variation would be for the U.S. to sign an ABM treaty, with the understanding that it would not be sent to the Senate for ratification until the Soviets agreed to a treaty on other weapons. Then again, some Administration SALT strategists favor something along the lines of Washington Democrat Henry M. Jackson's proposal for an experimental one-year moratorium on deployment of Minuteman 3s in the U.S., of new ICBMs of any kind in Russia and of ABMs around population centers in both countries. During the moratorium, the two sides would work toward a formal SALT treaty.

Whatever tack the U.S. decides upon, SALT does not have forever to show results. U.S. experts point out that 18 to 24 months from now the Administration will be under pressure to decide whether or not to go ahead with the undersea long-range missile systems (ULMS) and the B-1 supersonic bomber. Unless a SALT agreement is reached, still another lap in the arms race is almost sure to begin.

166

168

WASHINGTON POST 18 MAY 1971 (19)

Missile "Superiority"

In his otherwise excellent article, "A New
Debate on U.S. Weaponry" (The Washington
Post, May 9), Chalmers Roberts unfortun-
ately makes the common error of attributing
the U.S. success in the Cuban missile crisis
to President Kennedy's widely quoted threat
"to regard any nuclear missile launched
from Cuba against any nation in the West-
ern Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet
Union on the United States, requiring a full
retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union."
In doing so, he unwittingly accepts the fal-
lacy that nuclear weapons remain politically
exploitable under conditions of mutual de-
terrence and, in the process, lends unde-
served (and no doubt unintended) aid and
comfort to those officials in the Nixon ad-
ministration who advocate the re-establish-
ment of U.S. strategic "superiority" over the
Soviet Union.

President Kennedy's threat plainly did not
address the main U.S. objective of getting
the Soviet missiles physically removed from
Cuba. It not only promised the Soviets a nu-
clear retaliation in the event that those mis-
siles were fired, and concern that the Sovi-
ets would actually use them militarily was

hardly the major-element in the crisis. Had
the threat of a direct U.S. nuclear attack
against the Soviet Union in fact been re-
sorted to as an instrument for inducing So-
viet cooperativeness, moreover, it would
only have been patently unconvincing to
Khrushchev. However numerically superior
the American strategic capability may have
been, it still could not have met the precon-
ditions for a successful first strike.

The United States came out ahead in the Cu-
ban missile episode not because of its quanti-
tative missile supremacy but simply because
it was able to demonstrate that its commit-
ment to getting the missiles removed was
manifestly greater than the Soviet interest
in keeping them in. Furthermore, the event
occurred close enough to home that we
could quickly mobilize the required local
preponderance of force to give that commit-
ment respectability. Had the crisis been
played out in an area of the world closer to
the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, the
odds would have been much less dispropor-
tionately balanced in our favor.

The historical precedent clearly reveals
the groundlessness of those American alarm-
ists who maintain that "in some future crisis
it will be Moscow that threatens to rain nu-
clear fire on the U.S., thereby forcing sub-
mission to Soviet demands as Kennedy was
able to do less than nine years ago the other
way around." The persistence of East-West
mutual deterrence, in which even the stra-
tegically inferior side can deliver unendura-
ble nuclear retaliation following a first
strike, continues to make the use of such
threats impossible, just as it did during the
Cuban confrontation nearly a decade past.

BENJAMIN S. LAMBETH,

Graduate Research Associate.
Harvard University Center for International Affairs.
Cambridge.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE 5/20/71 P20

RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR
SURGE

Had Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist Party boss, offered to defuse Russia's powerful new intercontinental ballistic missile in his latest appearance on Russian TV, his proposal would have drawn intense interest in the west. As it was, western leaders expressed only a polite interest in Brezhnev's suggestion that the West start talks about reducing armaments and troops in central Europe. There was nothing new in this suggestion; it had been made repeatedly.

What is new is the "apparently exten-
sive" ICBM system, Secretary of Defense
Melvin R. Laird officially reported is now
being installed by the Russians. Laird re-
cently confirmed the existence of the new
Soviet system, first disclosed publicly
March 7 by Sen. Henry M. Jackson [D.,
Wash.]. Intelligence sources picked up
indications of the system in December at
a time when the Kremlin's feverish de-
ployment of ICBMs, including its fright-
ening SS-9 city smasher, appeared to be
slowing down. Now there are 60 new
launching pads for the new ICBM.

"This new ICBM construction effort," Laird told the American Newspaper Publishers Association, "coupled with additional momentum in the strategic defensive area [antimissile defenses and radars]—all clearly planned months ago —must be of major concern."

And so it must, whether the missile sys-
tem is brand new—as Jackson said he be-
lieved it to be—or an advance model of
the SS-9, which can carry a 25 megaton
warhead, immensely more destructive
than the smaller warheads in our Minute-
man III ICBMs.

For, as Laird said, the new construction
program has been under way for months,
far longer even than the continuing
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [SALT]
between the U. S. S. R. and the U. S. A.,
now in their fourth round at Vienna.

At the last session, in Helsinki, the Rus-
sians proposed that a preliminary SALT
agreement be reached on limiting or
eliminating antiballistic missile [ABM]
systems alone. The Americans, fearful of
the 300 SS-9 missiles already on the
launching pads, have insisted that any
agreement also cover such offensive
weapons.

Thus the introduction of another strategic
ICBM, possibly even more deadly than the
SS-9, poses a challenge to the credibility
of the Russians' position that they actually
are seeking a limitation on the nuclear
destructive ability of each nation.

It also brings closer the time for Presi-
dent Nixon to make a decision on whether
to continue talking fruitlessly at SALT or
get on with providing new weapon systems
to match or excel those the Kremlin is
now putting into the field.

This comes at a time when the whole
strategic arms balance is tilting in favor
of Russia. The Soviet Union's land-based
ICBM force now numbers 400 more than
ours. Its fleet of missile-launching nu-
clear submarines is rapidly closing the
gap on our Polaris-Poseidon fleet and is
expected to have the advantage by 1973 or
1974. And Russia's scientists are testing
[and possibly even installing] multiple-
target warheads, moving in on this area
where at the moment the United States
holds the lead.

It was just a year ago that Laird told
the same publishers that, at the rate of
Soviet progress, the United States could
well find itself in a second-rate strategic
position by the middle '70s. Now he reports
that nothing has happened in the inter-
vening 12 months to lessen that concern.

169

ABC EVENING NEWS ABC-TV 6:30 PM

New Announcement On Arms Limitations

HOWARD K. SMITH: President NIXON went on television at noon today to announce some news that brought him more favorable comment from his critics than he's heard in two years.

Said Senate Democratic Leader MANSFIELD, prospects look very good. Frank CHURCH of Idaho, it is welcome news.

Harold HUGHES of Iowa, it is historic good news.

A rarely invited guest at the White House this morning - J. William FULBRIGHT, said nothing but he looked pleased.

Here's what the President said that solicited that response:

PRESIDENT NIXON: The governments of the US and the Soviet Union after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, ABM's.

They have also agreed that together with concluding an agreement to limit ABM's, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms.

These negotiations will be actively pursued.

This agreement is a major step in breaking the stalemate on nuclear arms talks.

Intensive negotiations, however, will be required to translate this understanding into a concrete agreement.

This statement that I have just read expresses the commitment of the Soviet and American governments at the highest levels to achieve that goal.

If we succeed, this joint statement that has been issued today may well be remembered as the beginning of a new era in which all nations will devote more of their energies and their resources, not

to the weapons of war, but to the works of peace.

TOM JERRIEL: High officials here concede they don't know yet if today's development is merely a flash in the pan (?) or a significant move toward a meaningful control agreement.

Negotiations during the next few months will supply that answer.

The White House sees a significant political decision by the Russians linked to today's joint announcement.

However, the carefully worded statement was left intentionally fuzzy to keep either side from claiming one-up on the other.

There was compromise on both sides to break the year old deadlock.

The Russians, with a strong network of defensive, or anti-missile missiles, might get a full limit on ABM's first.

The US, strong with offensive nuclear capability, might get a partial freeze in that area.

White House officials are hopeful of an interim agreement within a year which would be an enormous political asset for the President.

The White House will not attempt a linkage between the strategic arms limitation talks and the bilateral reduction of forces in Europe.

However, the hope is being expressed here that the framework of negotiations set now might one day be followed in bargaining for a reduced level of US and Russian troops in Europe.

## New Urgency In Arms Talks

SMITH: The talks on arms limitations takes on new urgency for two special reasons.

One, US intelligence experts believe that the Russians are about to test a new, bigger than ever IC-IBM and two, at the same time, the Soviets are working to double the anti-missile defenses of Leningrad and Moscow.

## What Is New In Russian Weapons?

JULES BERGMAN: The biggest missile in the Soviet weapons arsenal and the most accurate is the giant SS-9 rocket.

Friday, May 21, 1971

It can carry a twenty-five mega-ton warhead or a numerous, multiple warhead.

The newest weapon is the savage solid fuel rocket, almost a dead ringer for America's minutemen.

Launched from underground silos, hard to detech, its accuracy has been vastly increased over the past few years.

Russia's deploying them, replacing earlier liquid fueled rockets.

US experts rate it as a first rate weapon.

Like America's polaris and positioned (?) submarine launched rocket, Russia's underwater missiles are carried sixteen to each nuclear sub.

Seventeen of the subs are already operational. By 1974, defense experts feel, their force will equal ours.

Russia's alauch (?) anti-bal listic missile already deployed at sixty-four sites around Moscow, is now being expanded to sixty-four more sites.

The launches are rapidly reloadable. In ABM's, Russia is ahead of the US. In ICBM's both nations are about equal.

Friday, May 21, 1971

NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC-TV 6:30 PM

Arms Limitations Agreements

JOHN CHANCELLOR: The governments of the US and the Soviet Union made separate but identical announcements today that a major corner has been turned in the deadlock talks to limit nuclear weapons - so-called SALT talks.

The change is that after eighteen months of arguing about what to negotiate, the two countries now have agreed to discuss both defensive and offensive weapons.

(President NIXON speaking - contained elsewhere in dialogue)

White House officials said today that they hope for some kind of agreement this year within the next seven months on both offensive and defensive weapons.

They said that these tricky and extremely important negotiations would be much harder to carry out next year when we are having a presidential election.

That is why, according to these officials that President NIXON moved last January to see if he could break the deadlock.

The heart of the deadlock was the Russian demand that anti-missile systems would have to be

dealt with before offensive missiles could be discussed.

The American argument was that both kinds of weapons would have to be talked about at the same time.

At the White House today, officials insisted that this will now be done.

That negotiations on both defensive and offensive weapons will be parallel and concurrent.

If that sounds as if the Russians gave in, the Russians aren't acting that way.

Radio Moscow said today an agreement on anti-missile systems would come first.

At any case there is a kind of weary optimism in Washington tonight and hopes for the first time in a long time, that the SALT talks may be getting somewhere.

Congressional Leaders Pleased With Development

FRANK MCGEE: Congressional leaders from both parties pronounced themselves pleased with the development.

Republican Senate Leader, Hugh SCOTT said, the President and the Russians with equal credit decided to break the log jam.

It is a development of considerable importance but there is still a long road ahead.

SCOTT said we're hopeful but not euphoric.

The Democratic Senate Leader, Mike MANSFIELD said, the prospects of achieving something of substantial value this year in terms of both offensive and defensive missiles seem to look very good.

MANSFIELD said there was no connection whatever between the break in the arms talks and the debate over his proposal to reduce American troop strength in Europe.

Defeat of that move pleased West Germany, the NATO members and even some American servicemen in Europe.

Deadlock On Arms Limitations Broken

CRONKITE: The strategic arms limitation talks, potentially the most important negotiations ever for the peace of mankind, have been stalled for about a year now.

The snag has been over what nuclear missiles to discuss.

Well, today in simultaneous announcements, the US and Russia said they will talk about both defensive and offensive weapons.

DAN RATHER: The President early this morning requested nationwide radio and television facilities.

He would not say what he wanted to announce. At noon, eastern time, he stepped before White House microphones and cameras.

(President NIXON giving speech - contained elsewhere in dialogue)

The background of this is, when strategic arms limitation talks first began, Moscow wanted to discuss offensive and defensive missiles.

Washington wanted to talk only about defensive systems - the so-called ABM's.

The Soviets eventually changed, said they would talk about defensive missiles only.

Washington by that time had changed and wanted a mix - discussion of both kinds of weapons.

Now, the White House indicates, Moscow finally has agreed to talk about limiting defensive missiles of all kinds, plus short and medium range offensive weapons.

The White House is hopeful that an agreement can be reached by the end of this year with agreement on long range offensive missiles to come sometime later.

That hope, the hope for a limited, interim, strategic arms agreement sometime this year, is what the President was talking about when he spoke of a break in the deadlock.

US Safeguard System Is What Is Being Considered In Talks

CRONKITE: The ABM phase of the negotiations will involve the American safeguard system for which the first site now is being built and its Russian counterpart.

Now this is goloush (?), the Soviet anti-missile. Russia put several dozen ABM's around Moscow and Leningrad in the late '60's and then stopped, but early this year, the Pentagon said the Russians had resumed their ABM program.

Here is how the American anti-missile system is designed to work:

Suppose that across the world, an enemy fires a salvo of rockets carrying hydrogen warheads against the US.

They'd be picked up on a giant radar computer, guarding our intercontinental missiles.

This is the prototype on quadruangle atol (?), the computer, perhaps the most complex instrument ever built can track dozens or hundreds of attacking rockets and plot intercept courses.

The first line of defense, the spartan rocket, shown here in a spectacular double launch from quadruangle.

Spartan is designed to fly hundreds of miles into space and try to seek out incoming warheads from the clutter of decoys and rocket parts falling through the sky.

Spartan already has intercepted test missiles one at a time, but of course has never been tried against the dozens or hundreds of warheads that would make up a real attack.

Some of the attackers would get through. As each incoming rocket began to feel atmosphere twenty miles up, the heavy warhead would tend to pull out in front, identifying itself.

Here the American system, unlike what we know of Russia's has a second line of defense, sprint, shown here at one-fifteenth the normal speed.

Sprint's one of the fastest things ever built. It's suppose to catch incoming warheads in the last seconds of flight and deactivate them with clean nuclear explosives that hopefully wouldn't do too much damage below.***

173

Friday, May 21, 1971

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS-TV 7:00 PM

## Sevareid Comments On Arms Talks

ERIC SEVAREID: The diplomatic communique is an old art form unchanged through the years.

No communique has ever yet won a Nobel or any other prize for literature.

The words in a two government communique are usually designed to reveal a minimum feasible agreement and to conceal any maximum disagreements in order that life and diplomacy may go on.

The President took to live television today to read out the joint US - Russian statement on limiting nuclear weapons and called it a major breakthrough.

That was all.

At that point, ninety-nine out of a hundred listening citizens must have felt totally baffled.

But then comes the second wave, explanations by journalists who questioned officials here before the TV talk and after it.

The communique says Washington and Moscow have agreed to concentrate this year in the so-called SALT talks on limiting defensive weapons - the anti-ballistic missile systems.

That sounds like a tactical victory for the Russians who have wanted agreement on the ABM's before dealing with offensive weapons.

But Mr. NIXON has been insisting on some mix of the two in any agreement so the statement adds that the two governments will also agree on certain measures with respect to limiting the offensive weapons.

Face is saved all around but the important thing seems to be that the negotiations themselves are saved.

What has happened is that after eighteen months of meetings the two sides have agreed, not on how to limit the arms race, but on how to seriously negotiate on how to limit the arms race.

For the first time, these negotiations have a substantive framework in which to proceed.

Till now the talk has dealt with weapons definitions and the technical artifacts in the balance of terror.

All of it useful, but peripheral.

What is aimed for now is a definitive agreement by the end of the year on the defensive systems, the simpler side of the coin, and some partial agreements on the far more complicated questions involved in the offensive weapons.

In life and death dealings between weary and alien powers, there are many slips between cup and lip.

But the President's people would seem to have some justification for the temptation to add up some hopeful "ifs".

If we get a measure of big weapons limitation - if the Russians really do negotiate seriously for mutual troop reductions in Europe - if the new thaw between the US and China continues - if the previous Mid East peace continues - if Saigon holds steady as Americans withdraw and none of this is impossible, then the world's prospects would look a lot better one year from now and so would Mr. NIXON's prospects.

WASHINGTON (UPI) --THE PENTAGON BELIEVES RECENT IMPROVEMENTS IN U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS HELPED BRING ABOUT THE SOVIET-AMERICAN AGREEMENT TO MOVE TOWARDS SOME KIND OF ARMS LIMITATION.

ON MARCH 31 AND ON APRIL 26 THE FIRST TWO U.S. SUBMARINES WERE FITTED WITH POSEIDON MISSILES -- A NEW GENERATION OF WEAPON CAPABLE OF HURLING UP TO 10 NUCLEAR WARHEADS AT SEPARATE TARGETS FROM BENEATH THE OCEAN SURFACE.

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS ALSO FEEL THE INTRODUCTION OF THE MINUTEMAN III -- WHICH CARRIES A TRIPLE NUCLEAR WARHEAD AND IS BASED ON LAND -- ALSO PLAYED A ROLE IN THE BREAKTHROUGH. ANOTHER FACTOR, THEY FEEL, IS THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL TEST OF THE SAFEGUARD ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM.

ON CAPITOL HILL THE ARMS DEVELOPMENT DREW PRAISE. HOUSE REPUBLICAN LEADER GERALD R. FORD OF MICHIGAN CALLED IT "ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT BREAKTHROUGHS FOR PEACE IN THE HISTORY OF THE MODERN WORLD."

SEN. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, D-ARK., SAID HE WAS "ENCOURAGED" BY THE DEVELOPMENT SINCE IT SEEMS TO INDICATE BOTH THE U.S. AND SOVIET GOVERNMENTS HAVE MADE CONCESSIONS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENT ARE IMPROVED.

SEN. EDMUND S. MUSKIE, D-MAINE, CALLED THE NEWS "A GOOD FIRST STEP" AND SAID HE HOPED BOTH NATIONS WOULD SHOW MUTUAL RESTRAINT IN DEVELOPING AND DEPLOYING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WHILE THE NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE.

SEN. HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, D-MINN., SAID THE NEXT STEP SHOULD BE AN UNDERSTANDING, RIGHT NOW, THAT NO MORE OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE WEAPONS WILL BE DEPLOYED.

WASHINGTON POST - 21 MAY 1971 P-1

177

# U.S. Goals Stress ✓ ABM, SS-9 Limits

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

Hopes in Washington for an unprecedented agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for slowing down the nuclear arms race revolve around a new American plan which would limit the planned U.S. Safeguard antiballistic missile (ABM) system in return for a freeze on the number of huge Soviet SS-9 ICBMs.

This plan, described by high-level administration officials, remains to be negotiated, and there is no guarantee that it will not be upset or that the Soviets will agree. However, U.S. officials say its broad outlines are well understood by the Soviets and reflect what, in the United States' opinion, is a workable approach, taking into account Soviet views, as well.

Here, as U.S. officials describe them, are the general dimensions of the plan:

* The idea of limiting rival ABM systems to Moscow and Washington, which has been part of both the U.S. and Soviet negotiating positions for some time, would be scrapped.

* Instead, the Soviets would expand slightly their existing ABM system around Moscow from its current four sites to six. This expansion has already begun.

* The United States would cut back to two its currently planned four, Safeguard sites, each of which is intended to protect a separate Minuteman ICBM base from Soviet SS-9 missile attack.

* The number of ABM interceptor missile launchers and big radars for detecting enemy attackers would be kept at about the same level by both countries.

* In conjunction with the ABM limitations, there would also be an agreement to limit future installation of the SS-9 ICBMs, probably limiting the number of these missiles to 300 or slightly more.

While details on this remain very touchy, U.S. officials say that "in the context of what has been worked out over a long period of time, the message is clear that there will be a freeze on ICBM launchers."

* Two other major weapon

carriers—missile-firing submarines and U.S. fighter-bombers based in Europe capable of carrying nuclear bombs into Russia—would

probably be left out of the initial agreement officials hope to conclude by the end of this year.

These officials explain that both hose weapons systems present serious negotiating obstacles.

The Soviet Union now is building its own version of Polaris submarines at a rapid pace, but it is still well behind the United States. U.S. defense planners do not believe the Soviets would ever agree to remain inferior in this vital area of weaponry.

Many defense planners, in fact, believe that if both sides would eventually concentrate on undersea weapons—which are very hard to detect—the likelihood of nuclear war would be sharply reduced simply because it would be virtually impossible to destroy all these submarines in a surprise attack. Thus, any attacking nation would be certain to suffer catastrophic retaliation.

The fighter-bombers, known as "forward-based systems" in the parlance of SALT, are a major thorn in the side of the Soviets. The United States and NATO view these planes as "tactical" for use in a war in central Europe. But they are viewed as "strategic" by the Soviets since they also could reach Moscow.

Solution of this issue is expected to take more time and could possibly come if talks begin on mutual balanced force reductions between the Atlantic alliance and the Warsaw Pact.

If the plan now broadly outlined is actually accepted by both sides, it would in effect reduce the ability of the United States to protect its Minuteman missiles in return for a balanced Soviet limit on the number of SS-9 missiles, regarded as the chief threat to Minuteman.

The Soviets now have about 276 SS-9s operational with work continuing on another 12 underground silos begun more than a year ago—bringing to

288 the total soon to be on the firing line. Each of those missiles is capable of carrying three or more warheads, each of which could knock out one of the 1,000 U.S. Minuteman missile silos.

Last year, the Soviets unexpectedly stopped work on 18 more SS-9 silos, but then early this year new, even larger holes in the ground were spotted by U.S. intelligence. There are now about 60 of those holes.

Under the potential arms agreement, the Soviets would be pressed not to resume construction on the 18 silos stopped last year and to limit the number of missiles that go into the new holes to a number which would keep the total of SS-9s at around 300, officials say.

There is still considerable uncertainty among U.S. defense analysts on what the new holes are meant to contain.

There is the possibility that the Soviets have an entirely new, larger ICBM, but a number of planners now believe that the construction may be an improved, "hardened" silo, possibly for a better version of the SS-9.

The most likely improvement would be a more sophisticated type of multiple warhead which could separate far enough in flight so that the blast of a single U.S. ABM interceptor could not knock all of the warheads down.

U.S. officials view the prospect of the Soviets modernizing their SS-9 force as less provocative and dangerous than a continuing build-up in the number of ICBMs.

Putting their missiles in stronger silos is viewed by some officials as evidence that the Soviets are more interested in preserving them for a counterattack against the United States rather than for a first strike.

On the other hand, the Soviets might want to protect some of their missiles from U.S. retaliation for any second round in a nuclear exchange.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird announced earlier this month that the Soviets had resumed work on their Moscow ABM defenses after a three-year layoff.

Officials say, however, that the work is confined to completing work at two sites. The Soviets, in the early 1960s, started work on an eight-site defensive ring around Moscow. In 1968, they stopped after completing four sites containing a total of 64 interceptor missiles.

The recent resumption is only at two of the four uncompleted sites the radar at one of the new sites, it has been learned, faces in the direction that ICBMs would travel if launched from China, rather than the United States.

The Soviets also are said to be building some other ABM radars which face China.

Even with six sites completed, officials say, the Soviets would still have fewer than 100 launchers in their ABM system. This is the figure that the United States initially proposed as an ABM limitation and that the Soviets seemed to agree to in their most recent response.

If the arms limitation plan is approved by both sides, the U.S. Safeguard system would be limited to Minuteman bases at Grand Forks AFB, N.D., and Malmstrom AFB, Mort. Two other proposed sites at

Whiteman AFB, Mo., and Warren AFB, Wyo., would be dropped.

With a limitation on ABM launchers, however, the protection would be very thin at best.

The two-site Safeguard defense would also further protect the underground headquarters of the North American Air Defense Command buried in Cheyenne Mountain in Wyoming, providing a place for U.S. civilian leaders to go in a crisis, balancing the protection of Moscow.

One administration official, obviously buoyant over the prospects for containing the arms race, stressed that the proposed plan "is clearly not an ABM-only agreement. They know is and we know it. We are going to get something that is clearly in the best interest of both countries."

WASHINGTON POST 21 MAY 1971

# U.S. and Russia
Agree to Press
For ABM Curb

## Offensive
Arms Pact
Also Sought

By Chalmers M. Nixon

Washington Post Staff Writer

The United States and the Soviet Union announced yesterday that they have agreed to "concentrate this year" on producing an agreement to limit rival antimissile (ABM) systems and that they also hope to conclude some form of accord on some offensive nuclear weapons systems.

President Nixon appeared in the White House press room at noon to read the two-paragraph agreed-on statement released simultaneously in Moscow and Washington. But Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin, with whom the agreement was worked out, avoided any personal association with it.

In effect, Mr. Nixon is taking what American officials yesterday characterized as a political, gamble in hopes that it will provide what he publicly described as "a significant development in breaking the deadlock" at the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). They have been going on for nearly 19 months without agreement.

In accepting a vaguely worded link between offensive and defensive systems, the United States lowered its demands for limitations on the Soviet missiles, land-based and sea-based and including the giant SS-9s, while the Soviet Union recognized the American determination to have some form of linkage of offensive systems with the defensive systems of the two superpowers, one official said.

Another official said that, in essence, Mr. Nixon had now agreed to the Soviet demand

for an ABM agreement as quickly as possible, with the stipulation that if some limitation on offensive systems is not later accepted by Moscow within a specified reasonable time the ABM agreement would become inoperative.

None of these points, however, were spelled out by administration officials who briefed newsmen. Their emphasis was on the agreement as a means of breaking the deadlock at what the President called "the highest levels" of the two governments.

They explained that the President early in January had taken the initiative to break the deadlock. That was a month after Moscow had proposed an ABMs-only agreement as a starter, a proposal Mr. Nixon publicly rejected earlier this year.

About 10 days ago, the agreement made public yesterday was formulated but the final language was not settled until a day or two before the joint announcement.

The announcement, as issued by the White House and the Soviet Embassy here, clearly put the limitation of offensive systems in a secondary position to control of ABMs. American officials insisted, however, that there was a clear Soviet-American understanding to conclude the two parts of an agreement simultaneously and they, said that to do so would require simultaneous negotiation, probably beginning when SALT resumes in Helsinki, most likely in July. The current Vienna round will end very shortly.

Tass, the Soviet news agency, circulated an English version that differed from those of the White House and the Soviet Embassy.

The Tass version said that, "when concluding" an ABM agreement, "certain measures will be agreed upon in the sphere of limiting strategic offensive armaments," whereas the official version linked the two agreements with the word "together."

The Tass version, possibly because of faulty translation,

caused some consternation at the White House where the embassy's version was passed out as a counter. It also was reported that Tass had later reverted to what was termed the authentic version, but efforts to check that last night were unavailing.

## Reference to Negotiations

Mr. Nixon himself, in his added remarks, referred to intensive negotiations ahead that would be required to "translate this understanding into a concrete agreement." However, White House officials indicated that there might be two separate agreements and that perhaps only the ABM part would be submitted to the Senate as a treaty.

White House officials also strove to avoid any characterization of yesterday's announcement as a concession by one side or the other. But there seemed to be no doubt from what they and other officials said that it was Mr. Nixon who has accepted the bigger change.

Initial reaction at the Capitol was almost totally favorable to the move. Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.), who had been told a day earlier by Secretary of State William P. Rogers what was coming, said that the agreement makes prospects "for achieving something of substantial value this year" on both offensive and defensive controls "seem very good."

Sens. Edmund S. Muskie (D-Maine) and Hubert H. Humphrey (D-Minn.), who had urged acceptance of the Soviet ABMs-only offer, said the announcement was welcome news. But Chairman F. Edward Hebert (D?La.) of the House Armed Services Committee commented, "It's all well and good, but let's keep our powder dry."

## Deployment to Continue

Administration officials said they thought it possible that some agreement could be reached this year. Meanwhile, it was said, both sides will

go ahead with their current weapons and ABM deployments. There is no prospect controlling multiple warheads (MIRVs) in the agreements discussed yesterday.

Because of the struggle over the language in the announcement linking ABMs to offensive weapons, a struggle that produced awkward sentences, there was uncertainty here as to exactly what Moscow has in mind.

Therefore, officials said that it should be obvious in a few months whether the agreement between the leaders of the two nations will produce agreement by their negotiators. The chief American negotiator, Gerard C. Smith, and his team have been here to help in reaching the agreement announced yesterday and will return to Vienna today.

It was stressed that in those few months the Soviet Union could not build sufficient new missiles to make any difference in the current general weapons parity. White House officials were uncertain how the new agreement would affect the congressional bottle over continuing the American Safeguard ABM system, but there was no doubt that Mr. Nixon will fight to keep it going until an agreement is reached setting limitations.

There are lots of highly technical issues yet to be resolved at SALT, it was said, but the hope here is that the top-level political boost yesterday will mean rapid progress.

Officials intimately concerned made these points yesterday:

There is still a problem of understanding the extent of controls on Soviet offensive weapons that can be achieved at SALT. However, there is now evidence that some controls are attainable.

Until the United States knows exactly what Moscow will agree to include, it is difficult for Washington to decide what level of ABMs should be included in any agreement. But there is no possibility of banning ABMs entirely.

Furthermore, there is what is termed an inherent asymmetry in that the Soviets are continuing to build new missile silos while the United States is not constructing new offensive weapons, although it is placing MIRVs on its Minute Man III and Poseidon submarine missiles. Possibly, it was said, neither of these systems would be covered in an initial agreement.

It was also noted that the projected ABM pact would substantially cover all aspects of defensive systems, whereas the possible limitation on offensive weapons systems will not include all such weapons.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

NEW YORK TIMES
21 May 1971 P1

SOVIET CAUTIOUS

Moscow Gives Little
Prominence to the
Announcement

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, May 20—The Soviet-American move on arms limitation announced today was viewed by observers here as having strengthened the position of those Soviet leaders who have been pressing for weapons-control agreements and improved relations with the United States.

But the Kremlin, apparently concerned that it might create a premature sense of cordiality toward the United States, treated the agreement in a gingerly manner tonight.

The statement was read by an announcer during the 7 P.M. newscast, at about the same time—noon in Washington—that President Nixon was addressing American audiences. But subsequent newscasts, including the late news roundup on television, watched by millions of Soviet citizens, did not mention the agreement, a clear sign that at least for the moment Soviet leaders had decided against attaching much public importance on the interim steps.

Tass Switches Texts

Tass, the Soviet press agency, originally distributed its own translation of the Russian-language text of the agreement in its English-language service, and that version differed from the one read by Mr. Nixon. But later, Tass distributed the "official" translation, which was what Mr. Nixon read.

The reluctance of the Soviet leaders to give the accord the same kind of publicity afforded it in the United States is believed to reflect the Kremlin's own propaganda considerations. The Soviet Union, while expressing its desire for lessening tensions in the world, has continued to attack the United States as opposing such steps. If much attention were drawn to the interim agreement, this might cause problems for propagandists, it is believed.

Likewise, in recent days, no attention has been paid here publicly to President Nixon's statement welcoming the call last week by the Soviet Communist party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, for talks on reducing levels of troops and armaments in Central Europe. The Soviet media have accused the United States of not wanting such reductions.

Western diplomats, however, believe that the Soviet leaders, while continuing to impugn American motives, are seeking to broaden the dialogue between the two countries, particularly in the area of arms control and disarmament.

* Move to Reduce Tension

They believe that within the top leadership, a decision was made before the recent 24th Congress of the Communist Party—and made clear at the Congress—to seek to reduce world tensions and thereby increase chances for increasing Soviet influence in such areas as Western Europe.

Soviet leaders are thought to recognize that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization tends to loosen its ties at times of reduced tensions and tighten them during other periods. By maintaining negotiations with the United States at the strategic-arms talks and pressing for negotiations on reduction of forces, Moscow is able to at least create the impression of Soviet goodwill, diplomats said.

Diplomats tend to believe that some within the Soviet leadership are doubtful of the value of such tactics, which, they argue, lead to problems in keeping Soviet-bloc nations in line and to problems within the Soviet Union as well. These conservatives could argue that better relations with the West inevitably lead to calls from intellectuals for more freedom at home and pressure from the population as a whole for a higher standard of living.

But Mr. Brezhnev and Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin have given no indication recently that they share these fears. In fact, Prime Minister Pierre

Elliott Trudeau of Canada was reportedly impressed during his visit here by the sincerity expressed by the Soviet leaders in calling for troop reductions and other such steps as a way of cutting down the costs of maintaining military forces.

Private Meetings

Diplomats here also attribute the recent sense of movement in Soviet diplomacy to a desire

by the Kremlin to maintain a show of activity in the wake of the party congress. In recent weeks Soviet officials have met privately with American diplomats to inform them that Moscow was serious about concluding agreements with the United States.

It is also expected here that the Soviet leaders will make similar gestures to Communist China in an attempt to break the deadlock in the two nations' talks on border and other issues. But the Chinese are regarded as less likely than the United States to respond quickly to such gestures.

Regarding the specifics of the arms accord, diplomats see it as a classic case of diplomatic compromise. The Americans agreed to give priority to the Soviet plan for an accord on antiballistic missiles and the Russians agreed that there could be no final pact in that area without at least a partial agreement on offensive weapons.

At the party congress, Mr. Brezhnev said of the talks on limiting strategic arms that "we are seeking to have the negotiations produce positive results."

He added: "However, one should like to emphasize that disarmament talks in general, to say nothing of those involving discussion of highly delicate military-technical aspects, can be productive only if equal consideration is given to the security interests of the parties, and if no one seeks to obtain unilateral advantages."

This is believed to be the basic Soviet position, and it is a cautious one. Therefore, diplomats here believe that talks will remain difficult and that progress will take time.

182

BALTIMORE SUN - 21 MAY 1971 P-1

# U.S., Soviet Union
Agree On Format/
For Arms Talks

## Nixon Calls Accord 'A Major Step In Breaking Stalemate'; 2-Pronged Approach To Include Anti-Ballistic Missiles, Offensive Weapons

By JOHN S. CARROLL

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, May 20—The United States and the Soviet Union announced a procedural agreement today to break the year-long deadlock in the strategic arms limitation talks.

In a delicately worded communique issued here and in Moscow, the two governments outlined what appeared to be a compromise between the U.S. insistence on talking about a broad agreement on both offensive and defensive weapons and the Soviet desire to work first on defensive weapons, namely anti-ballistic missiles.

### "Certain Measures"

The statement, which President Nixon read at noon on live television, said the governments would "concentrate this year" on an anti-ballistic-missile agreement. It went on to say that "together with concluding" the anti-ballistic-missile agreement, the two sides would agree on "certain measures to limit offensive weapons."

Upon reading the prepared statement, Mr. Nixon called the agreement "a major step in breaking the stalemate." He added that intensive negotiations would be needed to "translate this understanding into a concrete agreement."

"This statement that I have just read expresses the commitment of the Soviet and American governments at the highest levels to achieve that goal," he said. "If we succeed, this joint statement that has been issued today may well be remembered as the beginning of a new era in which all nations devoted more of their energies and their resources not to the weapons of war, but to the works of peace."

### The Will Of Both Sides

At a White House background briefing for reporters, an official

said the move was more than just a procedural step. Rather, he said, it underscores the will of both sides to go ahead with attempts to agree on mutual arms reductions.

The briefer, who under the briefing rules cannot be identified or quoted directly said the agreement on concentrating this year on an anti-ballistic-missile accord does not necessarily mean that agreement will be reached within the year.

Although the two governments' statements were supposed to be identical, the text Mr. Nixon read differed somewhat from the English translation of its Russian counterpart supplied by Tass, the Soviet news agency. Official analysis of the message differed still more in the two capitals.

One of the differences in the text was this: Tass said that "when concluding" a "treaty" on anti-ballistic missiles, other measures "will be agreed upon" in the area of offensive weapons; Mr. Nixon said that "together with concluding" an anti-ballistic-missile "agreement," the two sides "will agree on" certain measures to limit offensive strategic weapons.

In analyzing the statement, Moscow Radio said the negotiations would be a two-step procedure, dealing first with anti-bal-

listic missiles before tackling offensive weapons, according to the Associated Press.

The White House briefer, on the other hand, said it would be a misreading of the statement to infer that the anti-ballistic-missile issue is being split away from the broader offensive-defensive agreement the U.S. is seeking. The agreements are to be concluded concurrently, he said.

The administration's most recent policy statement on this was given by Mr. Nixon at a news conference March 4. In referring to talks on offensive and defensive weapons, he said:

"I should add that I know that the suggestion has been made that we might negotiate a separate agreement on defensive weapons alone. We reject that proposal. We will negotiate an agreement that is not comprehensive but it must include offensive as well as defensive weapons, some mix."

### Mansfield Hopeful

Today's announcement was received favorably by key members of Congress. Mike Mansfield (D., Mont.), the Senate majority leader, said: "The prospects for achieving something of substantial value this year in terms of both offensive and defensive missiles seem to look very good."

His Republican counterpart, Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, said it was a "development of considerable importance." He described himself as "hopeful but not euphoric."

Senator Edmund S. Muskie (D., Maine) called the statement "welcome news," while Senator J. William Fulbright (D., Ark.), the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said he would reserve judgment.

"I don't want to throw cold water on it when I don't understand it," he said. "It's just not clear to me what the significance is."

### Briefing For Leaders

President Nixon discussed the agreement in an hour-long Cabinet meeting and then called in congressional leaders for a special briefing before the public announcement.

At the United Nations a spokesman for U Thant, the secretary general, said the agreement "may well represent a breakthrough."

In discussing the agreement privately, administration sources said they were pleased that the impasse had been broken while maintaining the "linage" that the U.S. wants between negotiations on offensive and defensive weapons.

In the arms-limitation talks, which have been going on since November, 1969, the Russians have shown their greatest interest in halting the American anti-ballistic missile system—the only new system the U.S. has under development.

### Washington, Moscow

The Russians have proposed limiting anti-ballistic missile systems to those protecting only Washington and Moscow. This would allow the Russian anti-ballistic system already around Moscow to stay in place, while the U.S. would have to dismanole its anti-ballistic sites under development in the Midwest and build in the Washington area instead.

In addition, American sources point out, the Soviet system would protect offensive missile sites in the Moscow vicinity, as well as the Soviet capital itself.

On the other side of the coin, the U.S. is interested in halting the side of the arms race in which the Russians are building —offensive missile systems—in particular, the SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile.

The White House briefer said he expected today's announcement to be followed by an acceleration in the pace of negotiations. This acceleration probably will not be felt in the talks now coming to an end in Vienna, he explained, but will be significant when the talks reopen in Helsinki early this summer.

### Meetings With Smith

The official said a general agreement was reached between Washington and Moscow about 10 days ago. Final details, such as the timing of the announcement, were settled Tuesday.

The President has been meeting here this week with Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, the head of the U.S. delegation at the arms-limitation talks, and other high officials.

The White House would not provide details on how the agreement was reached, beyond President Nixon's statement that it involved "the highest level of both governments."

185

BALTIMORE SUN 21 MAY 1971

## Politically, Nixon Gains

By PETER J. KUMPA

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington, May 20—President Nixon appears to have shut off serious Democratic criticism of his negotiating position with the Soviet Union by today's high-level political agreement between Moscow and Washington for a new strategic-arms negotiating framework.

Several prominent Democrats have criticized Mr. Nixon for insisting on a package deal with the Russians on strategic arms, including both defensive and offensive weapons.

### Political Points

And he may win further political points if the agreement unlocks the door to other negotiations with the Russians, especially on mutual reductions of U.S. and Soviet forces in Europe.

There is a close connection between the strategic arms limitation talks and force reductions.

The Russians consistently have shown an interest in reaching an agreement to limit American land and carrier-based nuclear weapons systems in Europe, other than ICBM'S, which the Russians hold are strategic since they can reach Russia. The United States has held that Europe-based bombers and short-range missiles are tactical and properly belong in negotiations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact.

Such an incentive may help explain recent statements by the Soviet party general secretary,

Leonid I. Brezhnev, and Premier Alexei Kosygin that they are willing to talk on mutual force reductions, presumably without or before a European security conference.

White House officials agree that it is plausible to have parallel negotiations on mutual force reductions in view of the political impetus given by today's procedural strategic-arms agreement. They point out that not only has NATO called for such talks twice but that the administration has been making careful interagency studies of the problem for well over a year.

White House officials say no dramatic progress can be expected in the troop reduction field, as positions first must be very carefully worked out with NATO allies. The Russians also are expected to take some time to coordinate their negotiating stance with the Warsaw Pact countries.

If, as it appears, the most important aspect of today's announcement is confirmation of a political will in both capitals to continue with negotiations toward general disengagement, then there might be further beenfits.

The Berlin talks are stalled, while there still is wide disagreement between the two superpowers over a Middle Eastern settlement. But officials here caution against any expectations of breakthroughs in these discussions because of difficult special local considerations.

Two possible reasons are given for what seems to be a softer Moscow line. One is the continuing need for the Soviet Union to divert some of its resources from its military and security budget into more productive

consumer-oriented spending. The other is the continuing menace of Communist China.

At home, President Nixon has been assailed during the past few months over the stalled strategic-arms talks by such leading Democratic presidential hopefuls as Senators Edmund S. Muskie (D., Maine) and Hubert H. Humphrey (D., Minn.).

Both have urged him to accept an agreement limiting anti-ballistic missile systems as the first step toward a comprehensive strategic arms deal with the Russians.

Senator Humphrey criticized the administration for taking an "all-or-nothing" approach at the strategic-arms talks. Senator Muskie, generally credited with being the front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination, has made similar charges.

By agreeing to "concentrate" first on an anti-ballistic-missile agreement the administration has agreed to do with the Russians just about what Senators Humphrey and Muskie have advocated.

The President now also can defend his anti-ballistic-missile stand, particularly his contention that it gave him a "negotiable chip" in the strategic-arms talks.

Without the start of an anti-ballistic system, the administration might have saved several billion dollars and reached agreement with the Soviet Union on limitations of multiple nuclear warhead missiles such as the multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle and the Russian SS-9. But this is a hypothetical question and a difficult campaign issue.

Although the President succeeded in defeating Senate

moves to cut U.S. forces in Europe unilaterally, an examination of the various votes shows that a significant majority of senators favored some change in the status quo.

The mood in the country, reflected by the Senate vote, is for a decrease in the burden of arms and defense of Europe even if a majority of senators did not want to rebuke the administration at this time.

By moving toward arms limitation and reduction talks, the President is disarming his critics at home.

"Let's face it," one informed official said, "this decision is 80 per cent political."

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BOSTON GLOBE 21 May 1971 P7 (25)

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# SALT still peppered with many obstacles

By Darius S. Jhabvala
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — The US-Soviet agreement to begin negotiations for limitations on a mix of defense weapons is a breakthrough in the two-year deadlock in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks. It may well become an historic milestone in the world's search for disarmament, as President Nixon yesterday indicated.

But to translate this understanding into concrete agreement is something quite different. There is hope, given the fact that a political decision has been taken at the highest levels in Moscow and Washington, that limitations on some weapons will, in fact, begin.

But the road ahead is strewn with difficulties which arise not only from the security and strategic needs of each nation, but also from the highly-technical nature of the negotiations and the complicated weapons systems they seek to curb.

US officials, explaining what the agreement means, dispelled first of all the suspicion that Moscow and Washington have exchanged some quid pro quos for sacrifices made.

Yet the tacitly conceded that each has revised its position in the "stately minuet" which began with SALT on Nov. 17 1969.

To put it roughly, the US first insisted that there be a limitation on the antibal listic missiles (ABM). This was, when the Russians were expanding their Galosh missile network around their principal cities.

The Soviets then argued for a halt to both defensive and offensive weapons development because of a concern over the growing American offensive capabilities, principally the Minuteman, the submarine-launched missiles and the B52 heavy bombers.

Last year the positions reversed as each eyed the other's offensive and defensive capabilities. The US felt concern over the Soviet SS13, SS11 and the more accurate SS9 and the Russians worried over the American Safeguard system, which includes Spartan and Sprint missiles and radar systems.

The new understanding lays down the framework but not the procedure. Discussions will be held on the ABM and a selected variety of offensive weapons and concurrent agreements on both would constitute one package, presumably two documents with one covering protocol.

So there has been an accommodation, but officials say it "should not be considered as a sacrifice, rather it is based on a judgment by both sides to negotiate on those specifics which lend to possible success."

Given the framework, then, what are some of the hardware that are scheduled for limitations?

High on the list are the ABMs. They would include the 64 Soviet Galosh, the US Spartans and Sprints for the Safeguard and the air defense systems of each. In the last category are some 3300 Soviet fighter-interceptors to the 599 of the United States and 10,000 Soviet surface-to-air missile launchers versus America's 1136.

Delineation of offensive

weapons are far more difficult because of the thin line that separates the defensive from the offensive.

By and large they would include 1500 Soviet ICBMs (SS13, SS11 and SS9), the 1000 American Minutemen and 54 Titans, some with warheads, the Russian's 400 submarine-launched balistic missiles and the United States' 656, including 41 Polaris and Poseidon nuclear missile submarines, the 195 Soviet heavy bombers (Slogger and Blender) and the 505 US B52s and 35 FB111s.

Also included in the offensive category are the 7000 US nuclear warheads for NATO and an undetermined number of like Soviet weapons in the Warsaw Pact countries.

The weapons to be curbed are a significant part, though not all, of the national arsenal. Each side has enough weapons to destroy the population and the industry of the other several times over.

But which of these will be selected for negotiations is not known. Officials are hopeful, however, that agreement is possible within a year.

One important side effect of any forward movement is that it may improve the atmosphere between the nuclear powers on other issues such as reduction of forces in Europe and the Middle East.

NEW YORK TIMES

21 MAY 1971

Summit Accord on SALT

The Soviet-American accord on the scope of a possible agreement to limit nuclear weapons is in itself a major forward step, but its real importance lies in the political decisions at the top that seem to be involved. It appears now that at "the highest level" of both governments the decision has been made to stop fencing and conclude a limited, interim pact.

The shape of that pact, as revealed by the joint statement of the two governments, is vague so far. The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) will concentrate this year on working out an agreement limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, as Moscow has proposed. They will also take "certain measures" limiting some offensive strategic delivery systems as Washington has argued.

The Soviet Union apparently has given up its insistence on curbing American tactical nuclear weapons in Europe at this stage. The United States has postponed its effort to impose an over-all numerical limit on all types of strategic offensive delivery systems. This seems firm.

What is not clear is whether there is an understanding at the top that goes beyond this vague outline. But American officials see a possibility of an agreement that would do two things. First, it would limit ABM's to Moscow and one or two Minuteman sites in the United States. Secondly, it would freeze land-based missiles in both countries. The United States presumably would give up further deployment of Minuteman III missiles with their MIRV multiple warheads in return for Soviet acceptance of a ceiling on its huge SS-9 ICBM's and later version, presumably armed with MIRV, for which new silos now are being constructed.

If this outline is confirmed on the Soviet side, intensive negotiation starting in Helsinki in July could make agreement possible by the end of the year. The offensive missile restrictions would not halt the arms race in submarine-based missiles, MIRV warheads nor long-range bombers. But the ABM limitation would have major importance in discouraging both sides from wasting money on more offensive weapons to add to the present overkill.

Difficult issues have yet to be resolved, even to achieve such a limited accord. But if, as the White House believes, a political decision has been reached at the top on both sides to press forward, that agreement should be possible. It would not bring the millenium. But it would be the most important breakthrough toward nuclear arms control since the atomic test ban treaty of 1963.

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WALL
STREET
JOURNAL

21

MAY

1971

A BREAKTHROUGH in arms control talks came with agreement on their scope.

Washington and Moscow simultaneously announced that any arms-limitation talks should cover offensive as well as defensive weapons. Until now, the Russians have insisted the talks be limited to defensive weapons. President Nixon broadcast the announcement, calling it "a major step in breaking the stalemate" in 17 months of off-and-on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The two nations agreed this year's talks would try to settle on curbs for antiballistic missiles as well as for offensive weapons, possibly including multiple-targeted missiles.

U.S. sources said this country had won an important concession in getting the Soviets to link offensive and defensive weapons.

Congress generally greeted the arms talks breakthrough announcement with praise and optimism. Senate Democratic Leader Mansfield spoke of "prospects for achieving something of substantial value this year." Senate Republican Leader Scott called it "a development of considerable importance." But Sen. Fulbright, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said he didn't know whether the new development was significant.

E

BALTIMORE SUN

21 MAY 1971

SALT in Motion

The announcement made simultaneously in Washington and Moscow yesterday gives a sense of motion and immediate purpose to the strategic arms limitation talks between the two great nuclear powers. It is an important breakthrough, as President Nixon said, in the process of the negotiations. The goal of an agreement on nuclear arms remains to be negotiated, and there is no reason to think that the negotiations will be quick or easy, but now the United States and the Soviet Union intend to negotiate intensively toward a critical first step, an agreement to limit anti-missile defenses. If an agreement can be reached on this point, the two governments will move on to the larger issue of limiting nuclear weapons in general, that is, offensive missiles as well as ABM's.

In appraising the significance of these developments, some weight must be given to the evidence that both governments show a willingness publicly to modify previous positions. If there has been in fact a compromise of sorts in this respect, a present willingness to work toward a compromise on the arms limitation issue itself would seem to be indicated. As to the process of negotiations, the United States up to now has been arguing for a limitation on offensive and defensive nuclear missiles in the same package; that is, overall limitations. The Soviet Union has been arguing for a limitation on ABM's—defense missiles—without, as it is generally understood, an agreement as to going on to offensive missiles.

Thus, on the face of it, the two governments have worked out a common-sense way of getting around what looked to be an impasse in the arms talks. This is good news.

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EDITORIALS

WASHINGTON STAR

21 MAY 1971

The Breakthrough

There is good reason to believe that something hopeful has happened in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. President Nixon cleared the airways at high noon to announce that "a major step in breaking the stalemate" has been taken. The congressional leaders of both parties hailed the statement. Potential rivals for Mr. Nixon's job offered their congratulations.

It must be said, however, that any sense of relief is based solely on circumstantial evidence, the reaction of those who are presumed to be in a position to know what has happened. The direct evidence — the official statement issued simultaneously in Moscow and Washington — is a masterpiece of diplomatic obfuscation, contrived to produce profound bewilderment.

First, there is a bow to the Russian position that the first discussion must be limited to antiballistic missiles: Both sides, the statement says, "have agreed to concentrate this year" on limiting ABMs. Score one for the Soviets.

The statement continues. "They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement for the limitation of strategic armaments, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons." Score one for confusion.

It could mean, as some White House interpreters insist, that separate and simultaneous talks will be held on the

limitation of both defensive and offensive weapons. It could mean, as Moscow's instant analysts claim, that offensive weapons will be discussed only after ABM agreement is reached. It is even possible to read into the statement a hint that some specific progress has already been made in the limitation of offensive weapons, but that it won't be announced until the ABM problem has been settled.

One thing is certain: The obscurity of the official statement was no accident. It was carefully incorporated in order to conceal any retreat by either side from previously entrenched positions. It has succeeded admirably.

But it is only reasonable to accept, as an act of faith, that behind the smoke screen is a warm and hopeful fire. And it is safe to assume, too, that whatever concessions the United States has made to break the logjam, they do not include a total acceptance of the Soviet proposal that we should both agree to scrap our ABMs, and then see if anything is to be gained by a discussion of offensive weapons.

The irreducible U.S. demand must be that no freeze and no reduction in defensive arms will take place until agreement on offensive weapons has been signed, sealed and delivered. Otherwise, Mr. Nixon's vision of "a new era . . . of peace" could quickly be transformed into a final nuclear nightmare.