15

order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use their weapons, they can become a shield behind which to step up terrorist challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called "private" distribution of Pakistan's nuclear technology to other countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation from spinning out of control.

The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks in Beijing – composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US, and China – seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.

16

The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain, France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating parties do not by themselves have available the combination of incentives and pressures – especially as Iran is a more powerful country than North Korea with a greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a challenge that brooks no delay.

It is not a matter of devising a formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the ongoing diplomacy to UN action.

The fundamental challenge to the Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions: How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation has become irreversible? What incentives and assurances are we prepared to offer? What pressures

17

are we prepared to undertake if incentives do not work? And how do
we prevent negotiation and implementation from becoming a means to
legitimize proliferation rather than avert it?

Failure to answer these questions will face the world community
and the Atlantic Alliance with yet another set of questions: How does
a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How
should the world community react to such an event or to a nuclear war
between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by
emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries?

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to
elaborate a forum for negotiations with Iran that would include nations
with an immediate interest in the subject, which - by analogy to the
Beijing talks - could well include the United States, Russia, and
perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the

18

[Y]

Beijing talks. The next decision will have to be a precise calculus of pressures and incentives.

[China - will be done extemporaneously]

## Conclusion

Will the nations bordering the Atlantic be able to develop the cohesion to address so vast an agenda? Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. The defining characteristic of the traditional international system has been fundamentally altered by contemporary ideology and technology. That system assumed that the domestic jurisdiction of states was beyond international challenge; hence the

19

[Y]

principal threat to international stability was perceived to be the
attempt to change frontiers by force of arms. Neither assumption is
still valid.

Terrorist threats challenge the social cohesion, and weapons of
mass destruction are now able to alter the balance of power and
threaten devastation primarily through technological developments
within the territory of a sovereign state. In those circumstances, the
potential victims cannot wait until the threat has been implemented. A
measure of preemption is inherent in the technology and ideology of
the 21st-century international system. But that challenge should not
be presented as if it were an American dispensation. It cannot be in
America's interest to encourage every nation to define preemption in
purely national terms. It cannot be in Europe's interest to pretend
that the Westphalian system is fully operational. The solution to this

20

[Y]

dispute is to develop together how to apply a new concept long
recognized in international law: the right of self-defense. What the
argument is about is rules for establishing the threshold of when this
principle can be applied under contemporary circumstances.

As the alliance shifts its emphasis from the military to the
political arena, from defending a geopolitical dividing line to what in
NATO parlance used to be called "out of area" conflicts, both sides of
the Atlantic need to define for themselves why NATO is still important.

Foreign policy cannot be based on hegemonic power primarily.

Many of the problems affecting world order are not susceptible to
solution by military means. The United States will not be able to
shape every international problem alone with exhausting itself
physically and psychologically. It will need allies, and the countries
that most share our values and history are the NATO countries. And

21

however much conventional wisdom balks at the concept of a clash of
civilizations, that is what Western societies face together from the
radical, crusading jihadist version of Islam.

The ultimate challenge for allied foreign policy is to turn
dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct
policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the
international order were composed of many centers of power, even
while we are aware of American military preeminence. It implies the
need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate
policy prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of threats
and long-range purposes.

By the same token, Europe must resist the temptation of
"distinctiveness" for its own sake. The alliance needs a clearer
definition of what is intended by a "European" foreign policy and one

22

[Y]

less geared to pacifying domestic pressure groups. Europe must be
allowed scope for disagreeing with its partner. But if distinctiveness is
defined by disagreement for its own sake, Western civilization is on the
road to destroying its substance, as it did in the first half of the 20th
century.

In this context, the debate between multilateralism and
unilateralism assumes a different dimension. Abstract multilateralism
is as incompatible with a vital Atlantic relationship as abstract
unilateralism. The former absorbs energies in a quest for formal
consensus, the latter in overemphasis on special national objectives.
But the Atlantic Alliance, to be meaningful, needs to have a special
character between these two extremes. It must be able to define
common purposes more precise than the attainable international

23

[Y]

consensus and more embracing than the national interest of an
individual partner.

As the alliance increases its political consultation, it will have to
decide in what manner Europe plays its role, whether as a political unit
or on a more ad hoc basis through a series of contact groups of the
willing. Importantly, this will depend on the political evolution of
Europe. In the interim, outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
suggested at this year's *Wehrkunde* conference that a panel of senior
former officials or other respected nongovernmental personnel might
develop some of the options.

Is this possible? We cannot know the answer today, but the
future of our societies requires that we make the effort. In
undertaking that task, we should remember a quote from Winston

# NATO's Place within the Global Context

Partial Text of SHAPE Lecture
(may add some comments on Palestine and China extemporaneously)
November 4, 2005 - Brussels
Henry A. Kissinger

On April 23, 1973 – 32 years ago – while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon – I addressed an Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: "There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies – also in the name of Atlantic unity."

I recall these quotes to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic relations is not as unique as it appears in the aftermath of the tensions

2

[\]Y]

of 2003. The circumstances that caused the debate were, however,
quite different.

Then the disputes arose because of a perception of growing
Soviet strength, especially in the nuclear strategic field. Today it is
fostered by the collapse of Soviet military power and hence the
disappearance of an agreed military threat.

Then European integration was just beginning. Today it is far
advanced and, with all its recent setbacks, approaching a point of
culmination.

Then European nations - whatever their differences with the
United States - were anxious to sustain America's continued
commitment to their defense. Today many allies are anxious lest they
are drawn into conflicts that involve American interests but not
necessarily their own.

Then the center of gravity of world affairs was the Atlantic.
Today the seminal fact is that the center of gravity is shifting to the
Pacific basin.

Then the Atlantic nations thought they needed a nuclear strategy
to resist their adversaries' presumed superiority in conventional
weapons. Today many nations seek nuclear weapons to offset

3

America's presumed superiority in advanced precise conventional weapons.

These changed policy perspectives reflect changes in the political evolution on both sides of the Atlantic.

The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century. European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not so much traditional diplomacy as esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European allies tend to apply their new approach to the international arena.

This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be legitimized by the UN Security Council - in other words, an international consensus separate from the alliance structure. The proposition that the alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America

4

applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War and subjected its actions to a Soviet veto. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between its past based on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy and its future integrated institutions without being as yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic foreign policy. With an overall European interest yet to be defined, these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply embedded in European public opinion.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent on the sovereign right to define the ultimate threats to its security. How to reconcile the non-state aspect of European unification with the experience of a country driven by state concepts or with the notion of alliance as traditionally conceived is the challenge of the next phase of Atlantic relations.

Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan, and India still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema; it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion. The balance of power still affects their calculations.

5

Therefore, in the controversy between unilateralism and multilateralism, the real issue is not procedural. No serious leader prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available. The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the requirements of security. The challenge before the alliance, therefore, is whether it is possible to reachieve a common purpose in designing a global order and how to implement it.

## Evolution of Alliance Strategic Thought

When NATO was founded, the assumption was that Soviet manpower and conventional forces were overwhelming and had to be balanced by nuclear weapons -- hence the doctrine of massive retaliation by American strategic power. Conventional NATO buildup was conceived as a tripwire and, in its more sophisticated versions, a threshold for resort to strategic weapons.

From the beginning, this produced a credibility problem. In its early phase, was the United States prepared to inflict the tens of millions of casualties such a strategy implied on moral grounds? And

6

as the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew through the 1950s, was anyone prepared to accept the casualties this strategy implied?

This credibility problem led to three decisions: (1) to increase conventional forces; (2) to develop a strategy of flexible response; and (3) to deploy nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe. Conventional forces were intended to raise the threshold for nuclear war; flexible response was supposed to provide more acceptable options; and nuclear missiles were intended to link the defense of America to that of Europe organically.

None of these goals was fully reached. Conventional forces rarely reached planned levels; flexible response was, to some extent, negated by the increased power of the weapons. The placement of missiles came closest to achieving its aim. The Soviet Union could not attack Europe without attacking the missiles, and this in turn would trigger a response by the remaining force together with the Strategic Air Command.

Still the strategy saw NATO through three Berlin crises, the Hungarian revolution, and a number of technically out-of-area crises in the Middle East and the Caribbean. Victory in the Cold War was importantly the result of allied cohesion.

7

This does not mean that the strategy was unchallenged. The formation of NATO encountered demonstrations accusing the allied governments of provoking, rather than easing, Soviet pressures. Massive demonstrations sought to prevent the deployment of missiles with the argument - among many - that Europe could find safety better by delinking its defense from the nuclear strategy of the United States - a forerunner of more contemporary debates.

The dominant international order was based on the notion of sovereignty that evolved after the Treat of Westphalia, which ended the Thirty Years' War. Aggression was viewed as the crossing of borders of a sovereign country. September 11 changed all this. The defining characteristic of the traditional international system has been fundamentally altered by contemporary ideology and technology. That system assumed that the domestic jurisdiction of states was beyond international challenge; hence the principal threat to international stability was perceived to be the attempt to change frontiers by force of arms. Neither assumption is still valid.

8

within the territory of a sovereign state. In those circumstances, the potential victims cannot wait until the threat has been implemented. A measure of preemption is inherent in the technology and ideology of the 21st-century international system. But that challenge should not be presented as if it were an American dispensation. It cannot be in America's interest to encourage every nation to define preemption in purely national terms. It cannot be in Europe's interest to pretend that the Westphalian system is fully operational. The solution to this dispute is to develop together how to apply a new concept long recognized in international law: the right of self-defense. What the argument is about is rules for establishing the threshold of when this principle can be applied under contemporary circumstances.

Some current debates very similar to preceding ones attempt to delink the safety of the Europe from the actions of the United States.

As a result, the political and military aspects of the alliance are no longer as fully synchronized as during the Cold War. The military

9

command is pursuing with considerable success three initiatives: the
Prague Capabilities commitment; the establishment of a NATO
Response Force; and the Headquarters for Allied Command
Transformation.

The political side of the alliance has greatly improved its
cohesion but still faces legacies of the crisis of 2003.

I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not
only a strategic but also a moral and psychological imperative. The
conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a
partnership freed of many of the calculations that had led to two world
wars. Disputes – as described in my opening paragraphs –
occasionally occurred, but they generally concerned disagreements
about agreed goals, rarely the goals themselves.

The generations that followed us, having experienced neither the
war nor the beginning of the Cold War, were more shaped by the
controversies surrounding Vietnam and missile deployment. Thus a
shared interpretation of the new international environment has been
more difficult and disputes more intense.

The question before the Atlantic Alliance is whether it is possible
to relink policy and strategy.

10

This is not the occasion to put forward a detailed blueprint for
the next phase of foreign policy. Rather, let me stress, as a believer in
Atlantic cooperation based on parallel histories and shared values, two
tasks among many that are before us and how they need, in my
opinion, to be addressed.

Iraq

I have been warned not to talk about Iraq to a predominantly
European audience. Fatigue has set in, I am told, and there is a
growing desire to end the conflict. I have rejected that advice because
the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental
geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in
this room. Whatever the merit of the original decision to intervene -
which I supported - or the arguments of the controversies of 2003,
current thinking must deal with the impact of possible outcomes,
especially catastrophic ones. Because of the long reach of the Islamist
challenge, American abdication in Iraq will have global consequences.
If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to
emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple
through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or

11

Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and New Delhi demonstrate the worldwide scope of the *jihad* challenge.

Much will depend on whether the reasonably stable institutions can emerge in Iraq after the parliamentary elections scheduled for December 15. The mechanical part of success is relatively easy to define: establishment of a government considered sufficiently legitimate by the Iraqi people to permit recruitment of an army willing and able to defend its institutions.

What is such a government? And what are the obstacles that need to be overcome? Western democracy developed in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal

12

dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an
alternative version of the oppression of the weak by the powerful. In
multiethnic societies, minority rights must be protected by structural
and constitutional safeguards.

Political progress in Iraq can be defined in terms of four
objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process
to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis;
(2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as
havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite
government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4)
to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic
process.

I have gone into Iraq at such length despite the reservations
some in this audience have expressed in the past because there is no
escaping the dilemma: a catastrophic outcome in Iraq would affect
directly or indirectly all the members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as
countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The
belief that accommodation to the *jihad* agenda provides immunity
confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. This is why the next
phase of the Iraq conflict requires some degree of internationalization.

13

As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about the direction of Iraq's evolution should be attempted. Whether to do this in the NATO Council or via some more restricted contact group goes beyond the scope of this speech. Whatever the approach, the consultative process should then lead to a degree of internationalization of the political process. Security will increasingly shift into Iraqi responsibility backed by American forces. But the political stability of emerging institutions depends ultimately on international acceptance. The United States should be prepared to share defined responsibilities in political reconstruction with its allies and the international community. Atlantic consultations could lead to an international contact group under UN auspices to advise on Iraq's political evolution. Logical members would include countries that have experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq - such as India, Turkey, and Russia - together with key NATO countries.

## Proliferation

As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold War, the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent

14

nightmare. In a speech here in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the
nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties
incompatible with any sense of moral responsibility, but abdication
from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless
and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma
was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made approximately
the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them
pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled.
But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation, deterrence will
lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-to-state
relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer be clear
who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means. Second-
order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The possibilities of
miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries do not use
their weapons, they can become a shield behind which to step up
terrorist challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called
"private" distribution of Pakistan's nuclear technology to other
countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation
from spinning out of control.

15

16

incentives and assurances are we prepared to offer? What pressures
are we prepared to undertake if incentives do not work? And how do
we prevent negotiation and implementation from becoming a means to
legitimize proliferation rather than avert it?

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to
elaborate a forum for negotiations with Iran that would include nations
with an immediate interest in the subject, which - by analogy to the
Beijing talks - could well include the United States, Russia, and
perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the
Beijing talks. The next decision will have to be a precise calculus of
pressures and incentives.

[China - may be done extemporaneously]

17

## Conclusion

Foreign policy cannot be based on hegemonic power primarily. Many of the problems affecting world order are not susceptible to solution by military means. The United States will not be able to shape every international problem alone with exhausting itself physically and psychologically. It will need allies, and the countries that most share our values and history are the NATO countries. And however much conventional wisdom balks at the concept of a clash of civilizations, that is what Western societies face together from the radical, crusading jihadist version of Islam.

18

By the same token, Europe must resist the temptation of
"distinctiveness" for its own sake. The alliance needs a clearer
definition of what is intended by a "European" foreign policy and one
less geared to pacifying domestic pressure groups. Europe must be
allowed scope for disagreeing with its partner. But if distinctiveness is
defined by disagreement for its own sake, Western civilization is on the
road to destroying its substance, as it did in the first half of the 20th
century.

19

As the alliance increases its political consultation, it will have to
decide in what manner Europe plays its role, whether as a political unit
or on a more ad hoc basis through a series of contact groups of the
willing. Importantly, this will depend on the political evolution of
Europe. In the interim, outgoing Chancellor Gerhard Schröder
suggested at this year's Wehrkunde conference that a panel of senior
former officials or other respected nongovernmental personnel might
develop some of the options.

Is this possible? We cannot know the answer today, but the
future of our societies requires that we make the effort. In
undertaking that task, we should remember a quote from Winston
Churchill: "It is not always enough to do our best; sometimes we
have to do what is required."

3. NOV. 2005 7:52

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 5415 S. 1

November 4, 2005 - Brussels

Henry A. Kissinger

On April 23, 1973 - 32 years ago - while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon - I addressed an Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: "There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their

3. NOV. 2005 7:52

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 5415 S. 2

2

independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name
of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our
independent policies - also in the name of Atlantic unity."

I recall these quotes to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic
relations is not as unique as it appears in the aftermath of the tensions
of 2003. The circumstances that caused the debate were, however,
quite different.

3. NOV. 2005 7:52

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 5415 S. 3

3

Then the Atlantic nations thought they needed a nuclear strategy to resist their adversaries' presumed superiority in conventional weapons. Today many nations seek nuclear weapons to offset America's presumed superiority in advanced precise conventional weapons.

3. NOV. 2005 7:52

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 5415 S. 4

4

3. NOV. 2005 7:53

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 5415 S. 5

legitimized by the UN Security Council - in other words, an
international consensus separate from the alliance structure. The
proposition that the alliance involves no special obligations would have
sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America
applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War and subjected its
actions to a Soviet veto. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe
finds itself suspended between its past based on the erosion of historic
convictions about a national foreign policy and its future integrated
institutions without being as yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic
foreign policy. With an overall European interest yet to be defined,
these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming
deeply embedded in European public opinion.

3. NOV. 2005 7:53

FRANKFURTER HOF TZI

NR. 5415 S. 6

6

03/11 2005 D0 6:05 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

001/019 [CY]

Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan, and India
still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European
states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema;
It is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The
concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion.
The balance of power still affects their calculations.

03/11 2005 D0 6:06

FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

☑002/019

incompatible - definitions of the national interest and of the
requirements of security. The challenge before the alliance, therefore,
is whether it is possible to reachieve a common purpose in designing a
global order and how to implement it.

I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not only a strategic but a moral and psychological imperative. The conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a partnership freed of many of the calculations that had led to two world wars. Disputes - as described in my opening paragraphs - occasionally occurred, but they generally concerned disagreements about agreed goals, rarely the goals themselves.

03/11 2005 DO 6:06 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

☑003/019

The question before the Atlantic Alliance is whether it is possible
to achieve a common purpose and by what methods.

## Iraq

03/11 2005 D0 6:07 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

☑004/019

the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of the original decision to intervene – which I supported – or the arguments of the controversies of 2003, current thinking must deal with the impact of possible outcomes, especially catastrophic ones. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, American abdication in Iraq will have global consequences.

If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul,

03/11 2005 DO 6:07 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

☑005/019

10

Madrid, London, and New Delhi demonstrate the worldwide scope of
the **jihad** challenge.

03/11 2005 DO 6:08 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

☑006/019 [Y]

11

where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression of the weak by the powerful. In multiethnic societies, minority rights must be protected by structural and constitutional safeguards.

007/019

I have gone into Iraq at such length despite the reservations
some in this audience have expressed in the past because there is no
escaping the dilemma: a catastrophic outcome in Iraq would affect
directly or indirectly all the members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as
countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The
belief that accommodation to the *jihad* agenda provides immunity
confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. This is why the next
phase of the Iraq conflict requires some degree of Internationalization.
As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about
the direction of Iraq's evolution should be attempted. Whether to do
this in the NATO Council or via some more restricted contact group
goes beyond the scope of this speech. Whatever the approach, the
consultative process should then lead to a degree of
internationalization of the political process. Security will increasingly

03/11 2005 DO 6:09 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

☑008/019

13

[Palestine - will be done extemporaneously]

Proliferation

03/11 2005 D0 6:09 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

009/019

14

As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold
War, the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent
nightmare. In a speech here in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the
nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties
incompatible with any sense of moral responsibility, but abdication
from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless
and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma
was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made approximately
the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them
pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled.
But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation, deterrence will
lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-to-state
relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer be clear
who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means. Second-

010/019 [Y]

15

The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks in Beijing - composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the US, and China - seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.

03/11 2005 DO 6:10 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

011/019

The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain,
France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of
the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One
problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating
parties do not by themselves have available the combination of
incentives and pressures - especially as Iran is a more powerful
country than North Korea with a greater ability to offer incentives.
Nevertheless, proliferation is a challenge that brooks no delay.

03/11 2005 DO 6:11 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

012/019 CY3

013/019

Conclusion

014/019 C Y J

19

03/11 2005 DO 6:12 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

015/019 C Y J

20

016/019

21

03/11 2005 DO 6:13 FAX +49 69 690 70369 FRA Airport VIP-SERVICE

017/019

018/019 cy3

3060 WORDS

11/2/05-#2

On April 23, 1973 - 32 years ago - while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon - I addressed an Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: "There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name

2

of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our
independent policies – also in the name of Atlantic unity.”

I recall these quotes to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic
relations was not as unique as it appears today. The circumstances
that caused the debate were, however, quite different.

Then European nations – whatever their differences with the
United States – were anxious to sustain America's continued

3

[Y]

4

The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the 17th century, when the Treaty of Westphalia created an international system based on the notion of sovereignty. European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not as much traditional diplomacy but esoteric constitutional arrangements.

Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European diplomacy seek to apply their new approach to the international arena. This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be legitimized by the UN Security Council - in other words, an international consensus separate from the

5

alliance structure. The proposition that the alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War and subjected its actions to a Soviet veto. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between its past based on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy and its future *integrated* without *being as yet sufficiently cohesive* for a strategic foreign policy. ↗

*An overall*

With a European *national* interest yet to be defined, these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply embedded in European public opinion. How to reconcile the non-state aspect of European unification with the experience of a country driven

6

is the challenge of the next place of Atlanticism
conceived... [INCOMPLETE THOUGHT]

The balance of power [still] affects their calculations. When they differ
with America it is more over protective than over all
Therefore

At the heart of the controversy between unilateralism and
multilateralism, the real issue is not procedural. No serious leader
prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available.

The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps
incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the
requirements of security. The issue before the alliance, therefore, is

7

[Y]

I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not
only a strategic but a moral and psychological imperative. Having
experienced dictatorship and war, we considered Atlantic cooperation
an essential building bloc for a new system of international relations.

The conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a
partnership freed of many of the procedures of traditional diplomacy.
to some程度

8

[y]

## Iraq

I have been warned not to talk about Iraq to a [predominantly] European audience. Fatigue has set in, I am told, and there is a growing desire to end the conflict. I have rejected that advice because

9

[4]

the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of the original decision to intervene - [which] I supported - or the arguments of the controversies of 2003, current thinking must deal with the impact of possible outcomes, especially catastrophic ones. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have global consequences. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul,

10

[y]

What is such a government? Western democracy developed in
homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable
because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities
were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary
status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an
equation does not operate where minority status is permanently

11

12

[Y]

this in the NATO Council or via some more restricted contact group
What if we approach it this way? The consultative process could still go
goes beyond the scope of this speech. The consultative process could still
then lead to a degree of internationalization of the political process.

13

[Y]

American forces. But the political stability of emerging institutions
depends ultimately on international acceptance. The United States
should be prepared to share defined responsibilities in political
reconstruction with its allies and the international community. Atlantic
consultations could lead to an international contact group under UN
auspices to advise on Iraq's political evolution. Logical members
would include countries that have experience with militant Islam and
much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq – [such as] India, Turkey,
and Russia – together with key NATO countries.

Proliferation

14

15

[Y]

16

country with a greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a challenge that brooks no delay.

It is not a matter of devising a formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the ongoing diplomacy to UN action. The fundamental challenge to the Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions: How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation in Iran has become irreversible? What incentives and assurances are we prepared to offer? What

17

[Y]

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to
elaborate a forum for negotiations with [Iran] that would include
nations with an immediate interest in the subject, which - by analogy
to the Beijing talks - could well include the United States, Russia, and

18

Beijing talks.

Conclusion

The fundamental question remains whether the Atlantic Alliance can develop the cohesion to address so vast an agenda. For in addition to the topics discussed here are such issues as the rise of Asia, the equitable distribution of energy, and the entry of billions of new workers into the global economy.

Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. It is in that context that the debate over preemption should be redefined.

19

That system assumed that the domestic jurisdiction of states was
beyond international challenge; hence the principal threat to
international stability was perceived to be the attempt to change
frontiers by force of arms. Neither assumption is still valid.

Terrorist threats challenge the social cohesion, and weapons of
mass destruction ~~can~~ *are now able to* alter the balance of power and threaten
devastation primarily through technological developments within the
territory of a sovereign state. In those circumstances, the potential
victims cannot wait until the threat has been implemented. A means of
Preemption is inherent in the technology and ideology of the 21st-
century international system. But that challenge should not be
presented as if it were an American dispensation. It cannot be in
America's interest to encourage every nation to define preemption in

20

purely national terms. The solution to this dispute is to develop

together some principles of preemption.

For in the end, preemption is not so much a new concept as the
application of a norm long recognized in international law: the right of
self-defense. What the argument is about is rules for establishing the
threshold of when this principle can be applied under contemporary
circumstances.

Foreign policy cannot be based on hegemonic power. Many of
the problems affecting world order are not susceptible to solution by
military means. The United States will not be able to shape every

[Y]

The ultimate challenge for allied foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. It implies the need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of threats and long-range purposes.

22

[Y]

In this context, the debate between multilateralism and unilateralism assumes a different dimension. Abstract multilateralism is as incompatible with a ~~new~~ *relat*
unilateralism. The former absorbs *enragé* purpose in a quest for a ~~formal~~ *general* global consensus, the latter in overemphasis on a *special* national *religion*. But the Atlantic Alliance, to be meaningful, needs to have a

23

special character between these two extremes. It must be able to
define common purposes more precise than the attainable
international consensus and more embracing than the national interest
of an individual partner.

As the alliance increases its political consultation, it will have to
decide in what manner Europe plays its role, whether as a political unit
or on a more ad hoc basis. Importantly, this will depend on the
political evolution of Europe. In the interim, outgoing Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder suggested at this year's Wehrkunde conference that
a panel of senior former officials or other respected nongovernmental
personnel might develop some of the options.

Is this possible? We cannot know the answer today, but the
future of our civilization requires that we make the effort. In
undertaking that task, we should remember a quote from Winston

3060 WORDS

11/2/05-#2

2

[y]

3

4

The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of
the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international
politics and the focus of political loyalties since the 17th century when
the Treaty of Westphalia created an international system based on the
notion of sovereignty. European leaders spend more time on issues of
European unification than any other. And these issues involve not
traditional diplomacy but esoteric constitutional arrangements.

Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a
transnational consensus, European diplomats seek to apply their new
experience to the international arena. This has changed the attitude
to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic
pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left
to an alliance decision but must be legitimized by the UN Security
Council - in other words, an international consensus separate from the

5

alliance structure. The proposition that the alliance involves no special
obligations would have sent shivers down the spines of European
statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold
War and subjected its actions to a Soviet veto. In short, on issues of
war and peace, Europe finds itself suspended between its past based
on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy
and its future ______ institutions not yet sufficiently cohesive for a
strategic foreign policy.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent
on the sovereign right to define the ultimate threats to its security.
With a European national interest yet to be defined, these non-state
attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply
embedded in European public opinion. How to reconcile the non-state
aspect of European unification with the experience of a country driven

6

[Y]

by state concepts or with the notion of alliance as traditionally
conceived... [INCOMPLETE THOUGHT]

Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan, and India
still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European
states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema;
it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The
concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion.
The balance of power [still] affects their calculations.

7

The conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a
partnership freed of many of the pressures of traditional diplomacy.

8

## Iraq

9

the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of the original decision to intervene – [which] I supported – or the arguments of the controversies of 2003, current thinking must deal with the impact of possible outcomes, especially catastrophic ones. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have global consequences. If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul,

10

11

12

As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about
the direction of Iraq's evolution should be attempted. Whether to do
this in the NATO Council or via some more restricted contact group
goes beyond the scope of this speech. The consultative process could
then lead to a degree of internationalization of the political process.

13

Proliferation

14

As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold
War, the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent
nightmare. In a speech here in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the
nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties
incompatible with any sense of moral responsibility, but abdication
from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless
and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma
was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made approximately
the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them
pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled.

15

16

The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain, France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating parties do not by themselves have available the combination of incentives and pressures – especially as Iran is a more powerful country with a greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a challenge that brooks no delay.

17

18

perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the
Beijing talks.

Conclusion

Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They
have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a
generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. It is
in that context that the debate over preemption should be redefined.
The defining characteristic of the traditional international system has

19

Terrorist threats challenge the social cohesion, and weapons of
mass destruction can alter the balance of power and threaten
devastation primarily through technological developments within the
territory of a sovereign state. In those circumstances, the potential
victims cannot wait until the threat has been implemented.

20

21

international problem alone with exhausting itself physically and psychologically. It will need allies, and the countries that most share our values and history are the NATO countries. And however much conventional wisdom balks at the concept of a clash of civilizations, that is what Western societies face together from the radical, crusading *jihadist* version of Islam.

22

In this context, the debate between multilateralism and
unilateralism assumes a different dimension. Abstract multilateralism
is as incompatible with a new Atlantic relationship as abstract
unilateralism. The former absorbs purpose in a quest for a general
global consensus, the latter in overemphasis on a special national
character. But the Atlantic Alliance, to be meaningful, needs to have a

23

2497 WORDS

11/1/05

# NATO's Place within the Strategic Contemporary Context

On April 23, 1973 - 32 years ago - while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon - I addressed [an] Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: "There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name

2

I recall these quotes not to demonstrate my undiminished
eloquence but to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic relations was
not as unique as it appears today. The circumstances that caused the
debate were, however, quite different.