THE REVOLUTION OF 1989:
THE SEED PLOT OF HISTORY

by

Paul H. Nitze

(An edited version of this paper
was published on the Op-Ed page of
the *Washington Post* on
January 10, 1990)

In 1848 the peoples in Austria, Germany, and France
rebelled against the obsolete political arrangements agreed
upon at the Congress of Vienna after the disruptions of the
Napoleonic Wars. Little blood was lost during those
revolts, largely because those in power sensed themselves to
have become politically obsolete and they resisted only
feebly. By the end of 1849, those who seized political
control became conservatives in the new context--the
revolutionary spirit was dead. Nevertheless, in that short
period, the seeds of the major social and political changes
in Europe over the next sixty years were to be found. The
British historian L. B. Namier refers to the revolts of 1848
as "the seed plot of history."

The revolution of 1989 has certain similarities to the
revolts of 1848. There has been relatively little
bloodshed. The obsolete Warsaw Pact communist dictators,
except for Ceausescu in Roumania whose army quickly joined
the protesters, put up little resistance. Gorbachev advised
them not to attempt to suppress the revolution but rather to

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hasten to modernize their party and governmental systems so
as to be in a better position to preserve the Communist
Party organizations in those countries into the future.

Again, as in 1848, a slowing down and consolidation of
the rapid liberalizing changes of the last twelve months is
to be expected. We may, however, see one final burst of
revolutionary activity, if the Russian people in the Russian
Soviet Republic begin a revolution from below. The people
in the non-Russian Soviet republics have already seized a
considerable degree of autonomy. In any case, it is
probable that the events of these few years will be the seed
plot for the future of Europe and much of the rest of the
world for a long time to come.

An insight into the long term aims of Gorbachev and the
nomenklatura (the top part of the Soviet decision-making
apparatus) can give us helpful clues as to the 1989 seeds of
future developments.

In 1950, when I worked with others to define basic U.S.
national security policy in NSC-68, we made a three-fold
distinction as to Soviet aims. We judged that the Soviet
leadership placed its highest priority upon maintaining
control of the Party's power base within the Soviet Union
against internal threats. We judged that its second
priority was to defend that power base against external

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threat in Europe and the Far East. We put in third place
the requirement in Marxist-Leninist doctrine that the
Communist Party play a leading role in creating a world in
which capitalism everywhere had been defeated and class
tensions thus had been permanently eliminated.

Today, different distinctions as to Soviet aims are
pertinent. Recently Brzezinski, Fukuyama, and others,
including myself, have held that the communist presumption
that Marxist-Leninist ideology is destined for eventual
worldwide acceptance is dead, and that the ideology has been
as thoroughly discredited by the events of 1989 as Nazism
and Fascism were by the disasters their followers suffered
in World War II. But there are other ways of looking at
communism. It can be viewed as being not only an ideology
but, perhaps more significantly, a superior method and
organization for conflict management.

Gorbachev and the party nomenklatura see this method as
ideally including the following elements: a government and
a society effectively controlled by a single party with that
party led by a carefully trained and selected elite, bound
together into a system of small cells, organized into a
hierarchical structure, and topped by a political bureau,
which in turn is dominated by a single individual. They see
this type of organization as potentially better able to

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provide unity of command, secrecy, use of surprise and deception, and more effectively coordinated guidance over organs of public information and propaganda than the comparable capabilities of any non-communist organizations with which it might find itself in conflict.

They now know some of the defects of their system: the absence of a selection process giving legitimacy to the system, the danger of the elite becoming corrupt, and the danger that unified control over the organs of information will produce error and stultification. Nevertheless, it is the system that has produced them, and without it they risk losing their sense of identity and purpose.

Back in 1971 I argued about the prospect for the future with Soviet Marshall Nikolai Ogarkov, the principal military member of the Soviet SALT delegation, and subsequently Chief of Staff of Soviet Military Forces. He contended that regardless of the arms control agreements we might reach, they would make little or no difference. In the event of war, he said, the superiority of Soviet communist organization and military doctrine is such that Soviet forces will completely destroy yours.

Later, he came to have greater respect for U.S. nuclear retaliatory capabilities and for our growing technical superiority in certain of our non-nuclear capabilities. But

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the point remains that his views were driven--not by long
term ideological goals--but by a pragmatic military judgment
that their system provided them with a superior organization
to manage and conduct conflict. I found Ogarkov's approach
was shared by a number of the other Soviet negotiators,
including Vladimir Semenov, head of the Soviet SALT
delegation, and Yuli Kvitsinskiy, my opposite in the INF
negotiations.

In attempting to understand the apparent contradictions
in Gorbachev's ideas, this dichotomy between the pretensions
of Marxism-Leninism as destined to become, in the long term,
the world ideology, and the belief in communism as a
superior conflict management organization and system has a
certain tactical relevance. Gorbachev appears to be seeking
to preserve communist organizations in the near term, while
deferring the long term ideological battle to the future.
Despite the events of the last decade, he does not seem to
have given up on the long term communist ideological goal.

In his bitter and angry statement before the Congress
of People's Deputies on December 23, 1989, Gorbachev said,
"I am a Communist, a convinced Communist. For some that may
be a fantasy, but for me it's my main goal which is still
far away." Gorbachev also said his goal was to "cure an
ailing society," adding that to do that the USSR could rely

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neither on "Stalinist values" nor on "the idea of
capitalism."

It is never easy to translate into words comprehensible
to Americans the words and phrases of Gorbachev. From
reports of Gorbachev's conversation with the President at
Malta, it appears that Gorbachev has little understanding of
a free society or of a liberal economy. His idea of
capitalism derives from Marxist-Leninism; it explains his
unwavering rejection of measures such as private ownership
of farm land, private homes or other "means of production"
to make the Soviet economy work. His statement that the
main goal is "far away" indicates that he has not abandoned
the Marxist-Leninist goal of the eventual triumph of
communism.

From a number of Gorbachev's actions, it appears that
his highest tactical priority is to preserve the Communist
Party as a continuing organization, controlling, if
possible, all of the present USSR, but at least the Russian
Republic and the Ukraine, if that is all that is possible.
He also aims to help communist parties remain in being in
each of the Warsaw Pact countries despite the political
upheavals which have overtaken them.

It appears that he wishes to preserve what he can of
the Marxist-Leninist ideology and organization, awaiting the

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eventual re-emergence of conditions in which the presumed
advantages in the management of conflict of communist
organizational principles will give communist parties a
decisive edge in dealing with a potentially fragmented
world.

If Gorbachev's efforts to preserve communist
organization leads to repressive measures--what he calls
"communist discipline"--then we will face the difficult
issue of deciding how to react. On the one hand, we do not
wish to see long extended disruption and possibly chaos
within the territory of the USSR. Such disruption and chaos
could present serious dangers to the U.S. and to our allies.
On the other hand, the resumption of "communist discipline"
would be to deny millions within the territory of the Soviet
Union the prospect of achieving freedom from communist
tyranny.

It is my opinion that, if it comes to a necessary
choice, we in the United States should not acquiesce in the
reimposition of "communist discipline." If Gorbachev turns
in that direction, our policy should be one of unambiguous
opposition. I believe that we should accept the real
dangers of disruption and possible chaos within the
territory of the USSR rather than accept the violation of
principle inherent in giving support to the reimposition of
"communist discipline."

6/4/90

HAK: Letter from Paul Nitze

Attached from Paul Nitze commenting on
your de Gaulle article and sending you
his view of US policy for the future.

Having defended containment, he foresees
a future US role of protecting 'diversity
within a general framework of required
order' and an active role for supra-
national institutions. He argues against
isolationist tendencies in America but
also says "I am proposing active US
participation in cooperative efforts...
I am not proposing unilateral US action."

A brief acknowledgement is attached.

Rosemary

As delivered

After Containment, What?

by Paul H. Nitze

George C. Marshall Foundation
Washington, D.C. - May 16, 1990

## Introduction

For the forty years of the Cold War era, U.S. foreign and defense policy has been guided by a central theme, a well-defined strategic objective. That goal was for the United States to lead in building a liberal economic and political world while defending that world against totalitarian communist attack. The single word best defining that policy is "containment."

But now the political-strategic situation has changed and a new concept may therefore be required as we face a future not dominated by an ideologically driven USSR.

## Origins of the Containment Policy

In the summer and fall of 1943, it seemed to a number of us in Washington that it was not too early to think about what kind of peace and what kind of relations among the leading powers we wished to see established in the postwar world.

A key participant in this debate was, of course, George Kennan, who had recently served in our embassy in Moscow and had sent back from there what became known as the Long Telegram. It contained a penetrating description of Stalinist policy, its origins, its evils, and its dangers. It recommended that our policy be one of containment. It argued that Stalin's expansionism had become more powerful as it fed upon its successes. If the West were to succeed in resisting and containing that expansionism, the people of Russia would eventually look inward and see what was happening to Russian institutions and to Russian culture; they would then withdraw their support from Stalinesque policies. But that policy did not immediately find majority support in Washington. There was a shift toward it in 1946 when General Marshall returned from the unsuccessful Foreign Ministers' meeting at Moscow. At that meeting he became persuaded of Stalin and Molotov's adamanty in refusing to consider any reasonable accommodation with the West.

The decisive shift came in April of 1947, when the British government informed President Truman that it could no longer sustain the burden of assisting Greece and Turkey in resisting an intense campaign against their security by the Soviets and

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Soviet-supported guerrilla units; if such assistance were to be
continued, it would have to be done by the U.S. This decision by
Britain brought the postwar crisis to a head.

President Truman responded by deciding the U.S. would
promptly com to the aid of the Greeks and the Turks. This
decision was crucial; it implied approval of the containment
policy, of a European Economic Recovery Program, and more
generally, of the United States assuming a leadership position
aimed at the creation of a new postwar world order.

Implementation of Containment

The next fifteen weeks saw a whirlwind of activity. The
President announced the Greek-Turkish Aid Program and the Truman
Doctrine declaring U.S. willingness to consider such aid as we
could prudently make available to any country subject to
aggression or intimidating pressure and prepared to act in its
own defense. Acheson outlined in a speech at Cleveland,
Mississippi, the rationale for a general program of European
Economic Aid and General Marshall's Harvard speech set forth the
concept of that program.

The Congress passed the 1947 Defense Act, which created the
Department of Defense, the institution of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, an Air Force independent from the Army, and the CIA.
Shortly thereafter, work began on the negotiation of the North
Atlantic Treaty and then of NATO. Concurrently, we began work to
bring both Germany and Japan back to economic self-support and,
step by step, back into the community of nations.

In the spring of 1950 we prepared a basic review of our
national security policy called NSC 68. With appropriate
amendments it has been the backbone of our national security
policy ever since.

To our surprise, bipartisan support for this ambitious
program developed in the Congress and the necessary Congressional
authorizations and appropriations were approved.

To maintain the policy of containment during the thirty
years after Mr. Truman's presidency required great perseverance
on the part of the United States as a nation. During the Korean
War, it was necessary for us materially to expand the level of
our military expenditures. During the Eisenhower years, we had
significantly to expand our efforts on our strategic nuclear
capabilities to offset the extraordinary efforts of the Soviets
to obtain nuclear superiority.

In 1969, we began serious negotiations with the Soviets to
agree on balanced limitations of nuclear systems. But the
inventories of nuclear offensive weapons continued to grow. By

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1981, both sides had shifted their prime focus to limiting and eventually reducing intermediate-range nuclear weapons.

In 1983, the Soviets walked out of the INF negotiations just as we were to begin deployment of our Pershing II's in Europe to offset the earlier Soviet deployment of longer-range MIRVed INF missiles in the center of Europe. The NATO alliance didn't flinch. This check to Soviet policy seems to me to have been the turning point in the long, continuing Western effort to contain Soviet expansionism.

Today, the tenacity with which the United States persevered with the policy of containment has succeeded in achieving its principal aim; the leaders of the USSR finally looked inward and did not like what they saw. The communist totalitarian ideology may well be in final decline, much as Nazism and Fascism were at the end of World War II. The non-Soviet part of the Warsaw Pact has lost its strategic significance. It is therefore time to reexamine our long-standing central strategic theme and devise a new U.S., and perhaps Western, strategic concept more appropriate to the changing future.

## A New Strategic Concept

We must ask ourselves: What type of world climate would we like to see prevail in the year 2000 and beyond? What role should the U.S. play in fostering and preserving such a climate?

The new strategic concept I propose is captured in the following four sentences:

The central theme of U.S. policy should be the accommodation and protection of diversity within a general framework of required order. The aim would be a world climate in which a large array of political groupings can exist, each with its own individual, and perhaps eccentric, way. Supranational institutions such as the U.N. and its organs, NATO, the European Community, CSCE, and OECD should concurrently have the task of providing stability and forward movement on important global and regional issues, those transcending national or ethnic boundaries. In such a world, the U.S., with first-class military potential, inherent political, economic and cultural strengths, and no territorial or ideological ambitions, can play a unique role in bringing its latent power to the support of order and diversity among diffuse and varied groupings.

This proposal raises several questions: Why should we focus on diversity? What precise role can supranational institutions play? Why should the U.S. take on the burden of supporting international order and diversity? Let me address each of these questions in turn.

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## The Importance of Diversity

Why should we focus on diversity? One of the most important lessons of the past few years is the near-impossibility of erasing cultural ties, ethnic identities and social practices, especially in a world in which communications and, thus, ideas cannot be suppressed. In country after country in Eastern Europe, and within the Soviet Union itself, beliefs and practices that had been long dormant under the yoke of oppression rose quickly to the surface once constraints were loosened. The decades-long efforts of communist leaders to impose a common culture and society on their subjects and to eliminate ethnic heritages were found to have failed.

Once again, we see emerging the Europe of the past, with its rich mix of nationalities and cultures. Not only are individual aspirations once again being realized, the constellation of the various cultures promises to enrich us all.

But unfortunately, we are also seeing a resurgence of some of the tensions between nationalities that diversity in Europe generated in the past. Such tensions can be a threat to peace over the years ahead.

Although the renewal of diversity has been most evident in Europe, we are witnessing a similar process on other continents as well, most notably in Africa. And, as in Europe, the realization of national aspirations elsewhere is also accompanied by tensions between ethnic groups.

Thus, the new diversity presents us with a mixed bag of effects. As a democratic nation that honors freedom and the protection of the right to be different, the U.S. supports this development. As a people who can learn from the ways of others, we welcome it. As students of history, we understand that it cannot be long suppressed in any event. But as realists, we should recognize and try to deal with the dangers that accompany it and can threaten to destroy it.

This leads to the central element of my theme -- among U.S. tasks of the future should be the accommodation of, and protection of, diversity.

## The Role of Supranational Institutions

Let me turn now to the second question: What precise role should and can supranational institutions play?

Many problems we now face cut across national boundaries and affect many cultures. Among these are economic problems, environmental problems, terrorism, and drugs. Still other

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problems that may be faced by individual nations, such as hunger, can be best addressed through international action. Certain regional problems call for regional organizations. New problems of all these various types are likely to arise in the future.

Supranational institutions can deal with these problems more efficiently and effectively than individual nations acting without central coordination; however, this approach implies some loss of sovereignty for individual nations and thus some constraint on diversity. We must, therefore, balance the gains against the costs in each case.

The gains deriving from supranational authority most clearly outweigh the costs in the environmental area. National efforts to reverse the growing damage to the world ecology can be easily undercut by the negligence of other countries. We simply must have a coordinated, international effort if we are to solve global ecological problems.

Similar considerations apply in the realm of economics. In an increasingly integrated world economy, the need for international coordination of fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policies is widely accepted. Consideration is also being given to greater international harmonization of banking regulations and other domestic policies such as anti-trust legislation, health and safety standards and the protection of intellectual property.

## The U.S. Role

My final question dealt with the role the U.S. should play -- using its latent power in the direction of preserving diversity within order among diffuse and varied groupings. Why should the U.S. take on much of this burden?

Many Americans argue that the current mood among the American public favors a withdrawal of the country from its leading role in international affairs. Their reasoning is that the great threat to U.S. interests has collapsed, that no comparable threat is now evident, and that the U.S. should therefore feel free to retreat from world affairs and tend to its own internal problems.

I believe this outlook is short-sighted. Today, the forces of freedom have won a peaceful victory over the threat of communist totalitarian expansionism. But that is as yet only a partial and uncertain victory. One can see a whole new panoply of real or potential problems arising.

Many of these problems will deeply affect U.S. interests. I believe that we remain capable, in conjunction with others, of contributing to the effective solutions of these problems and that nobody else can, without us, do the job as well as it can be

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done with active U.S. participation.

A few examples of such problems come quickly to mind. There are today somewhere near 30,000 nuclear warheads in storage somewhere in the Soviet Union. Even if our current proposals in the START negotiations are generally accepted, the Soviets will retain, and are currently modernizing, a large number of long-range heavy missiles and aircraft capable of delivering them on targets worldwide. Exacerbating the problem is that, due to the current instability in the Soviet Union, no one can be sure into whose hands these weapons will eventually fall. Thus, for the foreseeable future, they will continue to present a potential threat to the U.S. and to our friends and allies everywhere.

To deal with this problem, the U.S. today is striving to maintain forces both to deter use of the Soviet weapons and to provide the necessary leverage to negotiate their reduction in a stabilizing manner. No other country is capable of relieving us of this burden now and none is likely to be able to do so in the future, nor would we want any other country to deploy the nuclear arsenal needed to assume that role alone. Therefore, in the future as much as in the past, the U.S. should not shy away from this task.

On the European continent, the nationalist tensions I cited earlier could erupt into civil or cross-border warfare. Peace throughout Europe and beyond could be threatened. To forestall such problems, efforts should be made to encourage and facilitate the peaceful resolution of these tensions. Should warfare erupt, efforts would be needed to contain and terminate the conflicts quickly.

In the absence of the U.S., Germany would seem to have the greatest military, political and economic clout in such a situation. But leadership in such a situation is not a role for which Germany is well suited. Suspicions of German intentions, whether justified or not, remain too high among the nations of Europe for Germany to be effective in the role of honest broker.

Therefore, the U.S. should remain in a position to contribute to this task should the European nations, including Germany, wish us to do so. This does not necessarily mean the continued presence of large numbers of American troops in Europe; we will keep only such forces there as are wanted and for only as long as they are wanted. A constructive U.S. role in European affairs can derive from much more than just the number of forces deployed; potential power can be symbolized by the presence of forces of limited size.

Similar examples of problems meriting a U.S. role exist in other regions of the world. In the Middle East, whose strategic importance is obvious, the U.S. is currently actively supporting

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the peace process, working with Israel, Egypt and the PLO. It is
not evident that any other country has the clout needed to assume
this role.

In the Far East, our leading role could, perhaps, in time be
assumed by Japan. But this would raise considerable concern
among other Asian nations, especially those who have fallen under
Japanese domination in the past. Further, I doubt whether the
Japanese would find it feasible to consider the interests of
others as being comparable to Japanese interests.

All of this argues for the U.S. role proposed in the
suggested strategic concept. But let me make clear the
constraints on such a role. I am proposing active U.S.
participation in cooperative efforts among varying groups of
sovereign nations to deal constructively with common problems; I
am not proposing unilateral U.S. action.

Conclusion

As we enter the post-Cold War era, the U.S., and the West
generally, confront new opportunities to resolve longstanding
problems, as well as new challenges presented by emerging
problems. In an increasingly interdependent world, where our
neighbor's problems, and even the problems of those far away, are
more and more our own, this is not the time for the U.S. to
retreat from the world stage. Rather, it is a time for wise
leadership to bring the great American potential to bear so that
the many benefits promised by a free and diverse world can be
realized. To create the public foundation for such action, we
need to build a wide consensus on a new strategic concept and,
based upon it, a new and common resolve.

I believe General Marshall, were he alive, would approve of
such a position.

5/16/90

HENRY A. KISSINGER

November 9, 1990

Dear Peggy:

Bill Buckley, a friend of longer standing than I dare to admit, has done me the honor of letting me give a dinner to mark his retirement as editor of *National Review*. And he wanted to have with him at this occasion representatives of the next wave of those who share his general concerns. Therefore he and I would be most pleased if you would reserve the evening of January 8th at 8 p.m. in my home, 435 E. 52nd Street. In order to permit the largest number that my apartment accommodates, it was our thought to have an evening without spouses.

Bill and I hope very much that you can make it. Please RSVP to Mrs. Jody Williams, 202/872-0300.

Ms. Peggy Noonan
340 East 64th Street - #25
New York, New York 10021

SUITE 1021 • 1800 K STREET, N. W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 • (202) 872-0300

HENRY A. KISSINGER

November 9, 1990

Dear Mr. Norman:

Mr. Geoffrey Norman
Dorset Hollow Road
Dorset, Vermont 05251

2/13/90

Katie Nouril phoned from London. She & her husband Raphael met HK at reception prior to Oxford Union speech Thurs Feb 8th & showed him a portrait Raphael had painted of HK which he expressed interest in.

She was calling to check how best to get it to him.

Raphael was the Royal Artist in Iran -- has painted Shah & other notables. Current work in progress is portrait of Joan Collins which will be released to public in a few months.

She will send to DC office bio on Raphael.

I asked what cost of portrait was or was this intended as a gift. She indicated his price list would be included w/ bio but that they'd very much like for HK to have it--closing with, "whatever he wishes".

Need to get back in touch w/ her at some point.

Home/studio: 27 Linden Lea
London N2 0RS
England
TF: 011/44/1/455-0875

APR 1 1990

Katie E. Nouril
27 Linden Lea
Hampstead Garden Suburb
London N2 0RF
Tel: 081-455 0875

29th March1990

Dr. H. Kissinger,
Suite 1021
1800 K Street NW
Washington DC 20006
USA

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I am writing with regard to Raphael Nouril, the Artist, who 15
years after having painted your portrait and keeping it amongst
his collection ever since, had the honour of meeting you at the
Oxford University Union in February.

Indeed, Raphael also had the pleasure of showing you the portrait
at the reception, and if I (Raphael's wife) remember correctly you
liked the portrait immensely, using words like 'incredible' and
'beautiful'. You also said that you were interested in acquiring
the painting.

In the past, Raphael has painted many interesting and diverse
personalities, ranging from the late Shah of Iran to the
Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi M. Schneerson, and more recently the
actress Joan Collins. The latest public exhibition of his work was
at the House of Commons, last month and Raphael hopes to be
commissioned by the House in the future.

I am enclosing, for your interest, some samples of Raphael's work,
including a photograph of your portrait, a photograph of you
beside the portrait at the Oxford Union, as well as a copy of his
biography. I also enclose a list of portrait prices which
correspond to different sizes. The size of the portrait of
yourself is 23" x 28" but as Raphael is keen for you to have this
painting (having always refused offers to sell it) hanging in your
home or in your office, and because we know you appreciate the
high quality of the work we are willing to leave the price up to
you.

Therefore, I would be grateful if you would contact me to arrange
delivery of the painting, framed, to yourself.

Thank you.

Yours sincerely,

Katie E. Nouril

Raphael & Katie Nouril

27 Linden Lea

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P.S. Raphael's work is permanently on show at the National
Heritage Gallery of Fine Art on Rodeo Drive, Beverley Hills.

Also, when you are next in London, it would be our pleasure to
 invite you to our home to view samples of Raphael's private
collection.

BIOGRAPHY OF THE ARTIST: RAPHAEL NOURIL

Raphael Nouril was born in the city of Tabriz, Azerbaijan, Iran in 1940. He was educated at the Kurosh School in Teheran, where he was brought up and he began to paint seriously at a very early age.

At the age of eight he began drawing portraits. His first portraits were of famous movie characters such as Tarzan. He drew incredible likenesses without the aid of photographs or books, but just from memory after seeing a film. He also began to paint religious and historical figures such as Moses. A picture drawn at this time which won him high marks from a good - humoured and intelligent teacher was of that teacher himself dozing off while his students were taking a test. From the ages of fourteen to eighteen, he studied art with Reza Samimi, an eminent Iranian artist. His style developed. It is classical and realistic, traditional yet very vibrant. He specialises in portraits and still lifes. As a teenager he represented his school, year after year, winning the highest points for his school in competitions with all the other schools of the country, as well as many trophies for himself.

At twenty he began to exhibit in different art centres around Teheran. Finally, in 1965, he went to Paris to study at L'Ecole des Beaux Arts, a world-renowned college of the arts. The quality and standard of his style was already such that he was told that they could not really teach him. He was advised by the school officials to spend the year studying the work of the Old Masters in the museums and libraries on his own, and to return to take the final examinations. After a lonely year in Paris he decided to visit some family members in Israel. Here the time was right for him to meet a lovely singer named Esther, whom he married in October 1966. They went together to meet his family in Iran.

Raphael worked and taught in Teheran for a few years, receiving much recognition as well as a commission to paint the late Shah of Iran. However, he kept feeling the need to expand and become connected with the European art world. In 1970 he and his wife, pregnant with their second child, emigrated to London. His first exhibition in England was held a year later at the London Hilton art gallery. It was internationally acclaimed, and he remained in London to work and continue to exhibit. The Balfour and Norman Fine Art Gallery in London, which specialise in antiques, made an exception of Raphael as his work harmonised so well with their traditional pieces. They have shown his work repeatedly. He has since painted many well known personalities including Dr. Henry Kissinger, and the families of Lemos and Paternas, the Greek shipping owners.

One of Raphael's most stunning portraits is of Rabbi Menachem M. Schnnerson, the world's leader of Chabad, the Jewish Orthodox Educational Movement, who is also known as the Lubavitcher Rebbe. When the Rebbe saw his portrait he was very impressed, as had been many who had seen it, with a special spiritual quality which seemed to animate the excellent likeness. His response on intently viewing it was, "It's better than the original!" A remark picked up by the news media and printed around the world. Raphael's own experience of creating this work brought him personally closer to Judaism and influenced his future work.

In 1984 an early painting done when Raphael was sixteen was sold at auction at the Versailles Palace in France. In 1985 he exhibited his work at the Art Gallery of Harrods which was well received and from 1986 his work has been on permanent exhibition at the National Heritage Gallery of Fine Art on Rodeo Drive, Beverly Hill.

More recently, Raphael was invited to Oxford University Union to exhibit his work which produced a very warm reaction and aroused a high level of interest.

Raphael was invited also in 1990 to show his famous painting of the Lubavitcher Rebbe at the House of Commons on the occasion of the Jewish Festival of Purim where it was admired and praised highly by the M.P.'s present.

CYJ

4/12/90

HAK: Thank you to Joe Nye

Nye sent his latest book, inscribed to you "For Henry, My former teacher. Hope I pass your exam again! With best regards, Joe"

Attached a suggested reply. Nye had sent you the manuscript last fall for a possible blurb but in the end you were not able to do it.

Rosemary

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BOUND TO LEAD

JOSEPH S.
NYE, JR.

BASIC
BOOKS

"Joe Nye refuses to join the doomsayers. Instead he convincingly makes the case that the United States still has the *basic capacity* to lead. He is equally insistent that no potential rival has the resources, tangible or intangible, to take up the role we have played in the post-war world. What is in question is whether we still have the *will* to lead. Do we *understand* the nature of the new challenges of the world we have done so much to create? The issue of will won't be resolved by Joe Nye, or any book. But *Bound To Lead* contributes mightily to the needed understanding, and it couldn't be more timely."—PAUL VOLCKER, former Chairman, Federal Reserve Board

"Joe Nye has given us a tonic for the current pessimism about 'America's decline,' but not a magic elixir. This clear-eyed analysis makes plain that America has the resources to meet the challenges of the next century—if it has the political leadership and strategic vision to go with them."—LES ASPIN, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee

"A timely and forceful response to the doomsayers who have proclaimed the inevitability of America's alleged decline."—ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Washington, D.C.

"Professor Nye has taken on the much-discussed issue of America's 'decline' with his characteristic mixture of passion and reason. The result is... an indispensable contribution to public and scholarly debate."—SIR RALF DAHRENDORF, Warden, St. Antony's College, Oxford University, England

"Dr. Nye has made a timely and useful contribution to the current debate on the future role and direction of American international leadership into the twenty-first century. *Bound To Lead* is required reading for policymakers and politicians, purported and actual."—JOHN W. WARNER, ranking Republican, Senate Armed Services Committee

"*Bound To Lead* represents a refreshing break with the doom and gloom of the prophets of the inevitability of decline. Professor Nye pulls off the brilliant feat of presenting a host of complex, multi-dimensional issues, in clear and understandable language. His book is required reading for all of those interested in America's future role in a fast-changing world."—FRANÇOIS HEISBOURG, Director, Institute of Strategic Studies

ISBN 0-465-00743-0

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viii

Contents

## PART II
New Challengers?

4. Communist Challengers
*The Soviet Union*
*China*
*Conclusion*
115

5. Allied Challengers
*The European Community*
*Japan*
141

## PART III
New Challenges

6. The Transformation of Power
*Interdependence and Changing Politics*
*Power Diffusion*
*Power Revisited*
173

7. Domestic Challenges
*Economic Sclerosis?*
*Competitiveness*
*Political Sclerosis?*
202

8. Future Worlds and American Choices
*Four Visions of the Future*
*American Interests and a New Strategy*
*Geopolitical Balance*
*An Open International Economy*
*Institutions to Govern Interdependence*
*Conclusions*
231

NOTES 263

INDEX 293

## Preface

Americans are worried about national security. They believe that the country is overextending its military power, reducing its external commitments. But the growing interdependence among nations is the wrong answer, and U.S. decline is not the solution. Not only is the premise debatable, but our attention away from the real power changing in modern international affairs, the theories about the rise and fall of the old order, could lead Americans to pursue the wrong path. The new politics of the twenty-first century is clear: the United States must be a force for good, not a force for evil. For two decades, I have taught these ideas about international politics. I tell my students they can understand change in politics, and I grasp the traditional theories about foreign policy, the traditional view that the United States must be involved in half the story of contemporary international affairs, and when opinion makers and public figures are mired in historically traditional views.

## Contents

### PART II
New Challengers?

Challengers
* Union 115

Challengers
* Community 141

### PART III
New Challenges

ation of Power 173
and Changing Politics

Challenges 202

The Future 231

and a New Strategy 231

Economic 231
and Interdependence

263
293

[le]

# Preface

Americans are worried about national decline. Many believe that the country is overextended and should reduce its external commitments. But in a world of growing interdependence among nations, this advice is the wrong answer, and U.S. decline is the wrong question. Not only is the premise debatable, but it diverts our attention away from the real question: How is power changing in modern international politics? Traditional theories about the rise and fall of great powers could lead Americans to pursue the wrong strategies in the new politics of the twenty-first century.

For two decades, I have taught Harvard undergraduates about international politics. I tell them that before they can understand change in politics, they must first grasp the traditional theories about power that date back to ancient Greece. However, I also tell them that the traditional view will allow them to understand only half the story of contemporary international politics. And when opinion makers and public officials become mired in historically traditional views and base policies

x

PREFACE

on analogies about decline, the problem is no longer
academic.

My concern about the current American debate over
decline is not merely parochial. Given the size of the
United States, most other nations have an interest in
Americans understanding their role. If the most pow-
erful country fails to lead, the consequences for the rest
of the world may be disastrous. Typically, periods of
anxiety about the decline and rise of nations have been
periods of tension and miscalculation. In a world with
more than 50,000 nuclear weapons, such miscalcula-
tions could be fatal to more than just the United States.

Bound to Lead has grown out of my long-standing
concern about how to understand change in world pol-
itics, and more immediately out of the Avoiding Nuclear
War Project at Harvard's Center for Science and Inter-
national Affairs. Financed by the Carnegie Corporation,
the project has one strand devoted to understanding the
long-term conditions for international stability. In 1988,
Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale, and I edited Fate-
ful Visions, a collection of essays on the long-term
nuclear future. Although that book raises a number of
questions about the decline of Soviet power and the
implications for stability of shifting from a bipolar to a
multipolar world, it says little about the United States.
Bound to Lead develops the same theme but in the
context of the current public debate about American
decline. I was also stimulated by Paul Kennedy's history
of The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. While I dis-
agree with some of his conclusions, I found his book
challenging. My tribute is that I have taken his work
seriously.

[LC]

PREFACE

I am endebted to a surprisingly
ple for such a small book. David
Mosher of the Carnegie Corpora-
of the Hewlett Foundation provide
support. Teaching a graduate se-
Haggard helped hone my realizat-
of the prevalent theories of war a
politics. My students and research
educate me. Ralph Dahrendorf pi-
setting for a month of rewriting at
in Oxford.

I wish to thank the many people
I have had the privilege to work with:
Alic, Graham Allison, Robert Art, B.
James Blight, Robert Bowie, Har-
Carnesale, Houchang Chehabi, Rich-
Dahrendorf, Michael Doyle, Richard
Feaver, Thomas Graham, John Halli-
Samuel Huntington, Helge Hveem, V.
esa Johnson, Peter Katzenstein, Ste-
Kennedy, Robert Keohane, Martin K.
Khong, Sean Lynn-Jones, Lisa Ma-
mara, Molly Nye, Patrick O'Brien, R.
bert Paarlberg, Adam Roberts, Henry
Skolnikoff, Roger Smith, David SPIR-
mers, Raymond Vernon, Ezra Vogel,

I also benefited greatly from the in-
goodwill of three excellent assistants,
Kathleen O'Reilly, and Melissa Baum.

I am especially grateful to my coll-
Bowie, Stanley Hoffmann, and Robert
their help in shaping this book before

## PREFACE

about the current American debate over
hereely parochial. Given the size of the
most other nations have an interest in
standing their role. If the most pow-
ers to lead, the consequences for the rest
may be disastrous. Typically, periods of
decline and rise of nations have been
and miscalculation. In a world with
nuclear weapons, such miscalcula-
tion to more than just the United States.

It has grown out of my long-standing
view to understand change in world pol-
icy. Immediately out of the Avoiding Nuclear
Warren's Center for Science and Inter-
national Security, the Carnegie Corporation,
the strand devoted to understanding the
plans for international stability. In 1988,
Albert Carnesale, and I edited *Fate-
lection of essays on the long-term*
though that book raises a number of
the decline of Soviet power and the
utility of shifting from a bipolar to a
says little about the United States.
Develops the same theme but in the
ent public debate about American
simulated by Paul Kennedy's history
of the Great Powers. While I dis-
miss his conclusions, I found his book
ate is that I have taken his work

## PREFACE

xi

I am endebted to a surprisingly large number of people for such a small book. David Hamburg and Fritz Mosher of the Carnegie Corporation and Clint Smith of the Hewlett Foundation provided financial and moral support. Teaching a graduate seminar with Stephan Haggard helped hone my realization of the inadequacy of the prevalent theories of war and change in world politics. My students and research fellows did much to educate me. Ralph Dahrendorf provided a wonderful setting for a month of rewriting at St. Antony's College in Oxford.

I wish to thank the many people who made important comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript: John Alic, Graham Allison, Robert Art, Benina Berger-Gould, James Blight, Robert Bowie, Harvey Brooks, Albert Carnesale, Houchang Chehabi, Richard Cooper, Ralph Dahrendorf, Michael Doyle, Richard Eichenberg, Peter Feaver, Thomas Graham, John Hall, Stanley Hoffmann, Samuel Huntington, Helge Hveem, William Jarosz, Teresa Johnson, Peter Katzenstein, Stephen Kelman, Paul Kennedy, Robert Keohane, Martin Kessler, Yuen Foong Khong, Sean Lynn-Jones, Lisa Martin, Kerry McNamara, Molly Nye, Patrick O'Brien, Robert O'Neill, Robert Paarlberg, Adam Roberts, Henry Rosovsky, Eugene Skolnikoff, Roger Smith, David Spiro, Lawrence Summers, Raymond Vernon, Ezra Vogel, and David Welch.

I also benefited greatly from the intelligence, skill, and goodwill of three excellent assistants, Veronica McClure, Kathleen O'Reilly, and Melissa Bauman.

I am especially grateful to my colleagues Robert R. Bowie, Stanley Hoffmann, and Robert O. Keohane, for their help in shaping this book before and during the

xii

PREFACE

writing. And, as with everything, Molly Harding Nye
lived and shared this book with me.

The rare occasions when one stops and acknowledges
one's debts to others are humbling, but rewarding. What
a blessing to be surrounded by so many good people! I
hope these pages are some repayment.

INTRODUCTION

# The Debate and Decline

In 1941, *Life* magazine proclaimed the
century.”¹ The United States emerged
II with its armies victorious and the d
Historian Arnold Toynbee argued that
had to succeed Britain as the leader of
ident Truman accepted that challenge
the United States replaced waning Brit
and Turkey. By the mid-1960s, Under
Eugene Rostow claimed that “the U
now occupied the role of chief police
world for about twenty years. The off
diplomatic and military exertions of us
of conflicts—from Iran, Lebanon, Tur
to Berlin, Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam.
time, Harvard Professor Samuel Huntin
“by the year 2000 it should be clear that
the dominant feature of international po

["300", "Japan (continued)\nwomen, 164\nworld product, 141-42, 157, 224", "\"Japanese Era,\" 29-30, 33", "Joffe, Joseph, 280n, 290n", "Johnson, Chalmers A., 282n", "Johnson, Lyndon, 93, 101", "Joint Economic Committee of Congress,\n271n, 276n, 278n", "Kahn, Herman, 154, 279n, 280n", "Kaplan, Stephen, 103, 104, 275n", "Karber, Phillip A., 276n", "Kato, Mikio, 283n", "Katzenstein, Peter, 285n", "Keizai Koho Center, 144n", "Kenjiro, Hayashi, 280n", "Kennan, George, 232, 265n, 272n, 274n,\n290n", "Kennedy, John F., 93, 99, 255", "Kennedy, Paul, 3, 6, 46, 162, 263n, 264n,\n269n, 270n, 271n, 272n, 273n, 282n", "Keohane, Robert, 39, 51, 92, 266n, 267n,\n269n, 271n, 273n, 274n, 283n, 285n,\n292n", "Keynes, John Maynard, 238", "Khrushchev, Nikita, 116, 138, 234", "Kindleberger, Charles, 50, 269n", "Kishimoto, Yoriko, 280n, 281n, 285n", "Kissinger, Henry, 176, 235, 283n, 291n", "Klein, Donald, 275n", "Knorr, Klaus, 266n", "Kobrin, Steve, 285n", "Korea, 136", "Korean War, 85, 100, 160", "Kotkin, Joel, 280n, 281n, 285n", "Krasner, Stephen D., 267n", "Kravis, Irving, 206, 207, 216, 286n, 287n,\n288n, 292n", "Krugman, Paul, 287n, 288n", "Kugler, Jacek, 267n", "Kuznets, Simon, 74", "Labor, in Japan, 156", "Labor Department, 215", "Labor productivity, United States, 204,\n210", "Lake, Anthony, 289n", "Lamm, Richard D., 202, 285n, 286n", "Lawrence, Robert Z., 264n, 279n, 282n,\n287n, 288n", "Lawson, Nigel, 148", "Layne, Christopher, 264n", "Leadership, 239", "American, 258-59", "managing interdependence, 239", "Leading sectors\nexport shares of technology intensive\nproducts, 77-78", "share of the leading sectors in, 76-78", "League of Nations, 177, 221", "Lebanon, 101", "\"Left-wing nationalism,\" 165", "Lend-Lease, 59", "Index", "Lester, Richard, 282n, 285n, 286n, 287n,\n288n, 290n", "Levy, Jack S., 265n, 269n", "Lewis, Sir W. Arthur, 60, 270n, 271n", "Liberal Democratic party, 167", "Liberalism, 177-80", "Liberties, United States, 222, 231", "Life, 1", "Life expectancy", "Soviet Union, 124", "United States, 203", "Lagachev, Yegor K., 278n", "Lin, Chong-pin, 279n", "Lincoln, Edward J., 281n", "Lindbergh, Charles, 183", "Linkage, 180-81", "Lipsey, Robert E., 206, 207, 216, 286n,\n287n, 288n, 292n", "Literacy, 133", "Japan, 156", "Living standards, Japan, 164", "Lodge, George C. 269n, 272n", "Lopez, Laura Amparano, 288n", "Luce, Henry R., 263n", "Ludlow, Peter, 280n", "Luttwak, Edward, 249, 291n", "Lysenko, Trofim, 123", "McCarthyism, 222", "McCracken, Paul, 202, 285n", "McCulloch, Rachel, 273n", "Machiavelli, 177", "McKeon, Timothy, 51, 269n", "Mackinder, Sir Halford J., 45, 268n", "MacMullen, Ramsay, 265n", "McNaugher, Thomas L., 286n", "McNeil, William, 263n", "\"the Madisonian system,\" 221", "Maekawa Commission, 165", "Maier, Charles, 92, 96, 274n", "Mandelbaum, Michael, 277n", "Manufacturing\nUnited States, 204, 209, 210", "March, James, 266n", "Marquand, David, 271n", "Marshall Plan, 91, 92", "Mitarra, John, 290n", "Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2,\n208", "Massachusetts Institute of Technology\nCommission on Industrial\nProductivity, 208, 209, 213, 215, 229", "Mastanduno, Michael, 95, 273n", "Matthews, Jessica Tuchman, 289n", "Maynes, William C., 21, 266n", "Mead, Walter R., 4, 264n", "Mearsheimer, John J., 273n", "Measures of power, 7-9", "Meyer, Stephen, 277n", "Military balance of power, 239, 241, 275n", "Military expenditures", "Japan, 157, 247", "share of global GNP, 83-85", "Soviet Union, 242", "unreliability of estimates, 83", "United States, 176", "[LC]", "Index", "Military force\nas a source of power, 30-

176

NEW CHALLENGES

groups, and transnational special interests and commu-
nities would all be vying for the support and loyalty of
individuals, and conflicts would have to be resolved pri-
marily on the basis of ad hoc bargaining in a shifting
context of power relationships.”² Even Henry Kissinger,
with his deeply rooted belief in classical balance-of-
power politics, argued in 1975 that “we are entering a
new era. Old international patterns are crumbling. . . .
The world has become interdependent in economics, in
communications, in human aspirations.”³

By the late 1970s, however, the American mood in
politics had shifted. Iran's seizure of the American
embassy and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979
seemed to restore the role of military force and the pri-
macy of the traditional security agenda. Ronald
Reagan's election to the presidency accentuated these
trends in the early 1980s. The U.S. defense budget
increased in real terms for five straight years, arms con-
trol was downgraded, and nuclear forces and deterrence
aroused public anxieties. Conventional military force
was used successfully, albeit against the extremely weak
states of Grenada and Libya. The shifting agenda of
world politics discredited the 1970s' concern with inter-
dependence and restored the traditional emphasis on
military power. But the world of the 1980s was not a
return to the 1950s. Public mood shifted more than
power resources. Interdependence in finance and trade
continued to increase rapidly, and trade deficits and
international debt put new pressures on governments.
Despite the political rhetoric of the time, the relations
between the two superpowers did not return to the
Cold War period. In the 1980s, the United States and
Soviet Union had far more contact and communication,
both private and governmental, than had ever existed
in the 1950s.⁴

[lc]

The Transformation of Power

In a sense, the difference between
1980s was merely the latest oscillation
argument between realists and liberal
tional relations.⁵ Realism, with its focus
of military force to balance power in
system of states, has been the dominant
back to such classic philosophers as Th
avelli, and Hobbes. The liberal tradition
secondary strand, associated with such
tius, Cobden, and Woodrow Wilson
impact on states of societal contacts,
dependence, and international institutions
plest form, liberal theories of stability
discredited. A high level of trade, for
prevent the great powers from going to
the League of Nations' collective security
not prevent the outbreak of World
However, the sharp disagreement between
proaches to international affairs is obvious
tend to take national interests for granted
ers note how interdependence and institutions
influence states' definitions of
interests. How states define their national
how those interests change have always
in the realist approach. The latter approaches
recognize how contacts among different
troduce new ideas about national interest.

According to Robert Gilpin, “one
whether or not twentieth-century studies
of international relations know anything that Thu
fifth-century compatriots did not know
behavior of states.”⁷ Gilpin has a point
politics does not appeal to a higher government
its conflicts. In this realm of self-ho

## NEW CHALLENGES

ed from the simplifying calculus of well will states handle a nuclear bal- to consider many powers simulta- ipolarity is the reason the world has is debatable, but even if true, it still other bipolarity will continue in the

terms in the Soviet Union may be could be removed from power as fore him. But Gorbachev's successor chose to erase completely the recent Soviet Union, for this would probably stem the decline of Soviet power. In 4, the Soviet lag in adapting to the revolution and in developing an economy are the results of problems Soviet political economy. Any con- that did not address these prob- ably restore a sense of Soviet threat to democracies (unless, perhaps, the isophilic and inward-oriented), but bipolarity in the longer term. It is not unlikely that the elements of bipolarity will continue, military level, and that concerns will emerge. But are unlikely to be sufficient to is the central strategic concept for

vers assume that since the future is bipolar, it can best be described by theorists argue that the flexible associated with the classical multi-

## Future Worlds and American Choices

polar balance of power will be a new source of stability in global politics.⁹ In 1971, Richard Nixon argued that “it would be a better and safer world if we have a strong healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China and Japan, each balancing the other.”¹⁰ More recently, Henry Kissinger predicted the erosion of the domi- nance of the two superpowers in the 1990s: “You will have the U.S., Soviet Union, China, India, Europe. All of which will be simultaneously economic, political and military powers.”¹¹

However, as suggested in part II, the development of a true multipolarity of five countries (much less a sixth, India), with similar levels of power resources in several categories, is not likely to occur in the coming decades. As Stanley Hoffmann observed, “old-fashioned multi- polarity resulted from the distribution of coercive power, but this polycentrism results from the devalua- tion of coercive powers.”¹² According to The Econo- mist, “‘multipolarity’ is not only bad English, it is sloppy thinking,”¹³ covering a multitude of different visions. At one extreme, multipolarity merely refers to the diffusion of power. At the other, it refers to a num- ber of roughly equal powers, able and willing to shift alliances frequently to maintain their equilibrium. As argued in chapter 6, some of these countries are likely to be deficient in significant power resources, so the analogy to a classical military, multipolar balance of power is highly misleading. Even if such a situation did come about, the effect of rapidly shifting alliances on nuclear stability would certainly be open to question. As one Asian leader put it, “if America stops being the anchorman, if the Japanese start feeling they have to provide for their own security, it would be a disaster. ... The Chinese fear a Japan with nuclear bombs even

[LC]

235

["[lc]", "NOTES", "an Tries to Balance No-War Ethics, Arms\nMay 1988, pp. A21 and A28; Motoo Shiina,\nMarch, 1989.", "Nuclear Option: Japan Be a State!" *Japan Echo*", "Uniqueness,\" p. 43.", "*Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic*\n*from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House,*", "The Rise of the Trading State (New York: Basic\nretreat from Doomsday (New York: Basic Books,", "to U.S.-Japan Program, Harvard University,", "MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of\nStanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1982).\nily Yomiuri, 8 June 1988, p. 6.", "Choices,\" *Foreign Affairs* 65 (5 [Summer 1987]):\n*Trading Places* (New York: Basic Books, 1988).\n*National Borders* (Homewood, Ill.: Dow Jones-", "Robert Z. Lawrence, \"America in the World\n7 (Winter 1988/89): 45.", "World Economy, chap. 4.", "Japanese Economy in Transition,\" *Japan and*\n*1988): 107-8.", "ces,\" p. 931. See also Ohmae, *National Borders,*", "nomy,\" p. 109; Fred Hiatt, \"Japan: Is the Sun\nExpansion?\" *International Herald Tribune*, 16", "and the World: The Debate in Japan,\" *Harvard\n*May 1988): 35-38.", "n.,\" *The Economist*, 17 December 1988, p. 69.\nthe fall in oil prices, which reduced the share\ntransport bill.\n*ndation, International Science and Technology\nC.: GPO, 1989), p. 94.", "d Nicholas Bayne, *Hanging Together: Cooperation-Power Summits* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989); *Wall Street Journal*, 31 March 1989; Lester, and Robert Solow, *Made in America*, 1989), p. 85.", "", "Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explain-\n*World Politics* 40 (4 [July 1988]): 517-41; Nakatani", "283", "NOTES", "Iwao, \"Can Japan Support the World Economy?\" *Japan Echo* 14 (4 [1987]): 16.", "78. Quoted in \"Japan Carving New Global Role and a Niche as Peace-\nmaker,\" *Boston Globe*, 25 July 1988, p. 9.", "79. James Fallows, \"For Those Who Have a Yen for the Japanese Way: Think Twice,\" *Washington Post* (national weekly edition), 20 February 1989, pp. 23-24; Haberman, \"Presumed Uniqueness,\" p. 53.", "80. Mikio Kato et al., \"The Memory of and Some Conditions for Inter-\nnationalization,\" *NIRA Research Output* 1 (1 [1988]): 52-56.", "81. Ohmae, *National Borders*, p. 128. For opposite views of the rate of\nchange, see Karel van Wolferen, *The Enigma of Japanese Power* (London:\nMacmillan, 1989) and Bill Emmott, *The Sun Also Sets* (New York: Simon and\nShuster, 1989).", "82. \"A Survey of Japan,\" *The Economist*, 5 December 1987, p. 34.", "83. Akio Morita and Shintaro Ishihara, *The Japan That Can Say \"No\"*\n(Tokyo 1989, unauthorized translation); Ayako Doi, \"Japan: Now Is the Sea-\nson for America-Bashing,\" *International Herald Tribune*, 17 July 1989, p. 6.", "84. \"A Survey of Japan,\" *The Economist*, 5 December 1987, p. 4.", "CHAPTER 6: THE TRANSFORMATION OF\nPOWER", "1. Samuel P. Huntington, \"The U.S.—Decline or Renewal?\" *Foreign Affairs* 67 (Winter 1988/89): 76-96; Karen House, \"The '90s and Beyond,\" *Wall Street Journal*, 21 February 1989.", "2. Seyom Brown, *New Forces in World Politics* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 186.", "3. Henry Kissinger, *A New National Partnership* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Office of Media Services, 1975), p. 1.", "4. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., \"Can America Manage Its Soviet Policy?\" in *The Making of America's Soviet Policy*, ed. Joseph S. Nye (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 325-54.", "5. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., \"Neorealism and Neoliberalism,\" *World Politics* 40 (January 1988): 235-51; Kalevi J. Holsti, *The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory* (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985); Stanley Hoffmann, *Janus and Minerva* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), chap. 18; Michael Doyle, \"Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,\" *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12 (Summer 1983): 205-35.", "6. See Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds., *Transnational Relations and World Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970).", "7. Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 227.", "8. \"The World's 50 Biggest Industrial Corporations,\" *Fortune*, 1 August 1988, p. D3."]

NOTES

"Government Should Spend More—Not Less," 
by 1981, p. A13.

ment Council, *Foreign Aid Review* (Washington, p. 1.)

the Rich, They Consume Too Much," *New York F2*.

February 1989; "A Portrait of America's New
nomist, 4 June 1988, p. 57; "U.S. Chips Are Qui-
Market," *Wall Street Journal*, 22 March 1989, p.
in Fighting Shape," *Fortune*, 24 April 1989, pp.

Lester, and Solow, *Made in America*, pp. 8, 126.
ving and Economic Growth, pp. 78-82.

FUTURE WORLDS AND
RICAN CHOICES

The President: *Office and Powers, 1787-1957: His-
and Opinion* (New York: New York University

erican Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New York: New
10.

'National Security Strategy for the 1990s," in
*New Agenda*, ed. Edward K. Hamilton (New
p. 210.

ow the Cold War Might End," *Atlantic Monthly*,

"Soviet Strife, U.S. Caution," *New York Times*,
R. Kennan. "The Soviet Union Today Is Only
national Herald Tribune, 11 April 1989, p. 6.
Limited Power of an Ordinary State," *New Per-
imer 1988*): 31.

an Public Opinion," in Hamilton, ed., *America's*

Origins of War in Neorealist Theory," *Journal of*
[Spring 1988]): 615-28.

J. David Singer, "Multiple Power Systems and
Politics 16 (April 1964): 390-406.

own, *New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of*
Scott Foresman, 1988), p. 234.

ew," *Christian Science Monitor*, 6 January 1989,

Elliver's Troubles (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968),

NOTES

13. "America, Asia and Europe," *The Economist*, 24 December 1988, p. 33.

14. Ibid., p. 41.

15. Lester Thurow, quoted in *International Herald Tribune*, 31 January 1989, p. 1.

16. Wan Guong, "China's Foreign Policy Goals," *Harvard International Review* 11 (2 [Spring 1989]): 30.

17. Brown, *New Forces*, p. 242.

18. Ibid.

19. David M. Gordon, "Do We Need To Be No. 1?" *Atlantic Monthly*, April 1986, p. 100.

20. Alan Tonelson, "The End of Internationalism?" *New Republic*, 13 February 1989, p. 25.

21. Josef Joffe, "America: Europe's Pacifier," *Foreign Policy* 54 (Spring 1984): 64-82.

22. Kurt M. Campbell, "Prospects and Consequences of Soviet Decline," in *Fateful Visions: Avoiding Nuclear Catastrophe*, ed. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Graham T. Allison, and Albert Carnesale (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 153-69; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Gorbachev's Russia and U.S. Options," in Gorbachev's *Russia and U.S. Foreign Policy*, ed. Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1988), pp. 385-408.

23. "Windows of Opportunity," joint statement of the John F. Kennedy School, Harvard University, and the Soviet Academy of Science, reprinted in Graham T. Allison and William Ury, eds., *Windows of Opportunity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1989). See also Abraham Becker and Arnold Horelick, *Managing U.S.-Soviet Relations in the 1990s* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1989).

24. Ed A. Hewett, "An Idle U.S. Debate about Gorbachev," *New York Times*, 30 March 1989, p. A25.

25. Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Rise of Market Forces," in *Thinking about America: The United States in the 1990s*, ed. Annelise Anderson and Dennis L. Bark (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution, 1988), p. 188.

26. Nye, Allison, and Carnesale, eds., *Fateful Visions*, chaps. 2, 10.

27. This follows the proposal of Valery Giscard d'Estaing, *Henry Kissinger, and Yasuhiro Nakasone to the Trilateral Commission (International Herald Tribune*, 11 April 1989, p. 1).

28. François Heisbourg, "Now for NATO's Next 40 Years," [London] *Times* 4 April 1989, p. 12.

29. James M. Fallows, "Let Them Defend Themselves," *Atlantic Monthly*, April 1989, p. 17.

30. Edward Luttwak, "Do We Need a New Grand Strategy?" *National Interest* 15 (Spring 1989): 13.

31. Gary Hufbauer, quoted in "Burger Flippers Take the Heat," *New York Times*, 26 April 1989, p. D2; "Assessing Reaganomics: The Trouble with Theories," *The Economist*, 21 January 1989, p. 75.

32. Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline*, 1895-1905 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), chap. 2.

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