Tet coverage:
a debate
renewed

An ambitious study
charges 'gross misreporting'
of the Vietnam war's
turning point — but
fails to clinch the judgment

by PETER ARNETT

In 1969 Joseph Alsop, described by historian Barbara Tuchman as a journalist "with a tendency to cataclysmic opinions," wrote that the American press was between "the rock and the hard place" over its Vietnam coverage. Alsop argued that if U.S. policy prevailed and the war was won then the press would be criticized for its negative reporting, but that if the war was lost then the reporters would be blamed for contributing to that defeat. The columnist implied that an inquisition similar to that which followed the fall of China might be in store for the press.

I remembered Alsop's warning long after his other predictions on the war had been proved false because I had met many of the principals involved. When I arrived in Southeast Asia in 1958 at age twenty-four, the China experience was still discussed by the hardy corps of old Asia hands traveling the new frontiers of American power in Indochina. I listened with glee and disbelief to Darrell Berrigan's ribald

Peter Arnett, now a special correspondent for the Associated Press, reported from Vietnam for the A.P. from 1962 to 1970.

44

COLUMBIA JOURNALISM REVIEW

rines near Hue aid a fallen comrade during the Tet offensive, February 1968.

tales of the Shanghai whorehouses in the closing days of that war, never dreaming that sixteen years later I would be in debauched Saigon watching a similar cataclysm. And while I marveled at the cool professionalism of men like Arch Steele, Tillman Durdin, and Edgar Snow, their sometimes guarded references to disputes over the "agrarian reformer" label pinned by some on the Chinese communists, and other matters, told me that the wounds ran deep.

These memories came back to me in early autumn when a "new" old Asia hand, Richard Pyle, a former Associated Press bureau chief in Saigon, called me from Washington to read the headline on *AIM Report*, a newsletter published by right-wing Accuracy in Media. AIM is predictably hysterical about the press, but Pyle was astounded, as was I, by the black headline, MISREPORTING THAT DOOMED MILLIONS, over a 4,000-word review of Peter Braestrup's two-volume work, *Big Story: How the American Press and Television Reported and Interpreted the Crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington (Westview Press)*. It was a voice that was frenzied and not entirely alone. Edith Efron wrote in *TV Guide* that "*Big Story* in fact is a superlatively detailed case history of one of the most monumental foulups of contemporary journalism."

The reviewer for *The Washington Monthly* accepted the argument that the press had erred seriously, but found ironic solace. "Suppose the reporters hadn't got the story wrong? General Wheeler would have probably gotten away with sending 200,000 more draftees into that horrible mess. So thank God the press was wrong," he exulted. Columnist John Roche was less jubilant. Declaring that Braestrup had exposed "the power of the American media as a private government," he suggested that "the sensible action would be an investigation by a congressional committee."

But I am not writing a review of the reviews. I quote them to dramatize my own shock and surprise at such reactions to Braestrup's findings, and I asked myself whether I could have been so wrong in believing for the past nine years that our Tet coverage had been one of our finer hours. Was that dire Alsopian warning of retribution coming true?

Nemesis could find no surer hands. Peter Braestrup is a unique critic of the war coverage in that he is truly one of us: He pounded the streets of Saigon for the political story and negotiated the boonies in search of the war with the best of the Vietnam press crew, first for *The New York Times* and then as bureau chief for *The Washington Post*. He wore a scholarly air that belied his military background, and these two aspects of his personality no doubt propelled him toward his massive project in the first place, and shaped its ends. He is as qualified as any reporter to write about his Vietnam colleagues — a fact attested to by the willingness of the major news organizations to weigh him down with raw files and lengthy candid memos when he began his study six years ago. That they are disappointed with his ultimate findings would be putting it mildly. For myself, I do, and will, quarrel with his conclusions.

But from the dedication that lists the names of all the dead and missing newsmen in Indochina, to the picture credits, 1,445 pages later, Braestrup's *Big Story* contains an array of

journalistic trivia and trauma, of mug shots and street scenes, indexes, tables, and appendixes that could and possibly will occupy Vietnam war buffs all winter long. (For those aghast at the $50 price for the two volumes, Braestrup advises that a much cheaper paperback version will be out next year.)

The book idea originally came from the New York-based Freedom House because, as Leonard R. Sussman, the executive director, writes in his introduction, "The Vietnam experience decisively changed the relationship between the press and the American government." Braestrup chose the Tet offensive as an ideal case history for studying press and TV performance under stress because the events were limited in time and occurred in a clearly delineated area, and because historically Tet was highly significant. The subjects of the study were the two wire services, the A.P. and U.P.I.; the newsmagazines, *Time* and *Newsweek*; the television networks, ABC, NBC, and CBS; and *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times*. Braestrup selected eleven basic subjects that he said dominated coverage, from the fight for the American embassy, through Vietnamese, American, and Communist troop performance, to Khe Sanh and pacification. Braestrup seems to have painstakingly analyzed every phrase and adjective of every news report and television tape, and the sheer bulk of his information threatens to intimidate potential critics into silence. He devotes fifty-two pages to analyzing the guerrilla attack on the embassy, over 100 to the siege of Khe Sanh. Perhaps as a result of the book's length, the reviews I have read seemed to have been derived from perusal of the introduction and the conclusion.

That is a pity. From what I could ascertain, the main body of Braestrup's book fails to back up his widely quoted conclusion that "rarely has contemporary crisis journalism turned out in retrospect to have veered so widely from reality." For example, he concludes his chapter on "Psychological Victory or Defeat for Hanoi?" by stating that "once more the media's penchant for self-projection and instant analysis carried the day, and the resulting reporting turned out to be grossly misleading." And yet in the preceding sixteen pages he has praised the wire services, the *Times*, and TV and cited only *Time* and *Newsweek* as seriously erring. Newsmagazines do not necessarily all journalism make.

Discussing North Vietnamese military performance, Braestrup declares, "One of the characteristics of American journalists is their tendency, on occasion, to vastly overrate their country's enemies. This has been particularly true in the case of wars fought with Asians." He concludes this chapter by stating that "the overall impression in all media was that the initial round of Tet attacks left the allies with nothing but problems, and the foe looming larger than life — omniscient, shrewdly holding the 'initiative' and ready to outgeneral the allied commanders again." However, earlier in the chapter he had pointed out that General Westmoreland and his subordinates "publicly focussed not on enemy limitations but on possible enemy targets and 'second waves' — their speculations and warnings being

45

translated into predictions by the media — thus MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] spokesmen in Saigon themselves contributed in February to a general journalistic perception that no logistics, organizational or manpower limitations inhibit the North Vietnamese capacity, even after the first wave, to strike at will." Braestrup then asked why M.A.C.V. officials had done this, and answered, "because under newsmen's questioning they were determined not to be caught [after failing to predict the initial Tet offensive] a second time." Elsewhere in his book Braestrup insists that the press not lay its failings to poor information because it is a journalist's role to ascertain the facts no matter what the obstacles. That seems to be asking a mighty lot of reporters in wartime.

Braestrup does make many telling points. News dispatches written at the height of a crisis tend to look flamboyant nine years after the event when passions have cooled, and certainly the A.P. and U.P.I. sometimes competed for adjectives. And, as Braestrup enthusiastically demonstrates in his chapter "First Reports Are Always Partly Wrong," the wire services reported erroneously that Vietcong guerrillas had penetrated the U.S. Embassy when they had actually occupied the ground and part of an adjoining building. "There is a vast difference between seizing an objective and dying in a bold but abortive attempt to do so. But American newsmen were quick to award Hanoi a major 'psychological' triumph there, if only because they — the newsmen — and LBJ had been taken by surprise. It was a portent of journalistic reactions to come."

Braestrup is critical of the heavy stress "on what AP called the human misery angle" at Tet and suggests that this "compassionate sensationalism" was the result of "genius shock: many reporters were confronted with their first extensive view of war's random destructiveness and waste." He said that "especially on film, this treatment tended to blur or even obliterate the other realities, notably the military outcome and the resilience of the Vietnamese." Earlier, however, Braestrup makes some revealing comments about his own biases. "For example as a former infantryman in Korea I was perhaps less shocked by war's waste and destruction than were my colleagues experiencing these for the first time. I was probably more interested in such military matters as logistics, 'foxhole strength,' enemy tactics and allied deployments than they were."

It is his preoccupation with the military level of the war that I believe is *Big Story's* basic flaw. Maybe it is the methodology required to compute Braestrup's tables of "negative" and "positive" trends in news stories that in retrospect neutralizes the real flavor of our reporting at Tet, and that was the sense that a historical change had taken place in the war. It seemed to me then, and seems to me even more so now that Saigon has fallen, that Westmoreland had little understanding of the need to build a nation in Vietnam, and had faith in his own forces but little use for the Vietnamese army. Only at Tet, when it was too late and the price too high, did the errors of his strategy become apparent, statistical military victory or not.

Which brings me to another of the much-quoted Brae-

strup findings — that while the Tet reporting added up to a portrait of defeat for the allies "historians have concluded that the Tet offensive resulted in a severe military-political setback for Hanoi in the south." What historians? Henry Kissinger? In 1969 he wrote in *Foreign Affairs*, "The Tet offensive brought the compounded weaknesses — or, as the North Vietnamese say, the internal contradictions — of the American position to a head. To be sure, from a strictly military point of view, the offensive was an American victory. Vietcong casualties were very large; in many provinces the Vietcong infrastructure of guerrillas and shadow administrations surfaced and could be severely mauled by American forces. But in a guerrilla war purely military considerations are not decisive; psychological and political factors loom at least as large. On that level the Tet offensive was a political defeat in the countryside for Saigon and the United States."

I would also question Braestrup's technique of giving equal weight statistically to both an on-the-spot news analysis and a presidential news conference, or, for that matter, a Westmoreland news conference. In *The Legacy of Vietnam*, the most brilliant analysis of Vietnam reporting that I have read, Philip Geyelin, editor of *The Washington Post's* editorial page, wrote:

> The government is in a position to deliver its message directly in critical situations, without the filter of a newspaper account or a summary on the evening news. Thus, most of the crucial statements about the war in Vietnam came to us resoundingly and overwhelmingly from the president on nationwide television on all

Black Star

The scene after the Vietcong attacked the U.S. Embassy in Saigon on January 31, 1968.

three networks. It came to us in an address from General William
C. Westmoreland to a joint session of Congress to the drumbeat of
daily briefings by White House spokesmen. It came to us in a care-
fully orchestrated crescendo of public statements by the highest
officials of government and by government surrogates in Con-
gress. It came to us in white papers and in handsomely bound of-
ficial progress reports. It came to us in the evening briefings in
Saigon and at the noon briefings in the State Department in Wash-
ington, and in the chart-and-pointer, spit-and-polish presentations
of the generals and the admirals at the Pentagon, on TV, in living
color. And then, it was relentlessly reinforced by the interview
graciously extended by an otherwise inaccessible and close-
mouthed high official.

Against that kind of barrage, Braestrup offers, for example, a Tom Buckley story that portrayed a heroic picture of the enemy "as ready and willing to die" as an example of press "negativism" as against official "positivism," if I read his methodology right. Certainly the U.S. military and the White House had their say at Tet. The A.P. on February 25, 1968, ran 5,000 words of a General Westmoreland interview with our then general manager, Wes Gallagher. And L.B.J. was a talker, too.

I express my disagreements with the conclusions of Big
Story more in sorrow than in anger. There is much about the
study that is fascinating and illuminating, particularly about
the press years up to Tet, and the techniques of news gather-
ing used by different agencies. As one of the Vietnam war
reporters consulted by Braestrup, I know personally how
faithfully he and his myriad helpers labored over the details
and sought out the views of colleagues. While there is no
mistaking that the book's conclusions are responsible for the
tenor of the majority of the reviews, Braestrup himself is
more moderate than his reviewers, for he concludes that
ideological bias was but a minor factor in the press's per-
formance during Tet. This probably will help save us from
the full fury of those who remember the China experience
and possibly would welcome a repeat performance. Brae-
strup's own view of the war, that "while getting into
Vietnam proved a costly American mistake, simply getting
out did not assure us moral salvation," mirrors the attitude
of many of those who covered Tet.

There is ample evidence in *Big Story* that Braestrup,
now editor of *The Wilson Quarterly* at the Smithso-
nian Institution in Washington, despite his negative
findings remains attached to his old colleagues. In his con-
cluding chapter he concedes that there were "many in-
stances of superior journalistic performance, in terms of
supplying information as opposed to simple drama. There
was scarcely a reporter for the major media who did not
produce some able journalism, whatever his sins on other
occasions. And none, including this writer, was without
sin." Then, rightly in my view, he singles out Charles Mohr
of *The New York Times* as having produced the consistently
best reporting from Vietnam during Tet, and mentions
twenty-five others as commendable, "to recall a few."

My question is, if so many newsmen for the major media
produced superior reporting, how, then, can they, as he
charged, have "veered so widely from reality"? Later in the
chapter he asserts:

We saw at Tet the first show of the more volatile journalistic
style — spurred by managerial exhortation or complaisance — that
has become so popular since the late 1960s. With this style came
often mindless readiness to seek out conflict, to believe the worst
of the government or of authority in general, and on that basis to
divide up the actors on any issue into the good and the bad.

That's heavy stuff, I'd say. Maybe Braestrup singled out
a lot of us for praise at the end because he didn't have the
heart to lower the boom on all of us. For that, I'm grateful.
But if conclusions in one of our Tet stories had been as in-
consistent, he would have nailed us to the masthead. ■

Hearts
and minds

Dispatches (Knopf, $8.95) is Michael Herr's personal ac-
count of the Vietnam war, which Herr covered for Esquire
in 1967 and 1968. Thus, he was in Vietnam during the Tet
offensive and the months-long siege at Khe Sanh.

The book was originally scheduled to appear in 1969; it
took years, however, for Herr to write the powerful opening
and closing chapters, "Breathing In" and "Breathing
Out." ("I found the material just impossible to deal with,"
Herr said.)

Herr reports on an aspect of the war that few journalists
attempted to cover: the effects of combat on the men who
fought it. The terrain explored here is courage, terror,
madness, as well as patches of an eerie calm in a country
where "you could be in the most protected space . . . and
still know that your safety was provisional, that early death,
blindness, loss of legs, arms or balls, major and lasting
disfigurement — the whole rotten deal — could come in on
the freakyfluky as easily as in the so-called expected ways.
. . ." Herr also shows how the war he had come to cover
covered and overwhelmed him and other correspondents.
(See the excerpt below from the chapter "Colleagues.")

Herr's prose is not the flat language of the daily press;
tense, rhythmic, inventive, it provides a natural setting for
the jungle language of the "grunts," whose outbursts and
conversations are a vital part of the book. Dispatches is
keenly observed, intensely personal, and written with the
economy of the "black paratrooper with the 101st who
glided by and said, 'I been scaled man, I'm smooth
now'. . . ."

J.S.

At the height of the Tet Offensive alone, there were between
600 and 700 correspondents accredited to the Military As-
sistance Command, Vietnam. Who all of them were and
where all of them went was as much a mystery to me and to
most of the correspondents I knew as it was to the gentle-

Copyright © 1968, 1969, 1970, 1977 by Michael Herr. Reprinted
by permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

47

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE 21 SEPT 1969

# The Vance Plan for A Vietnam Cease-Fire

By ROBERT KLEIMAN

A 30-day race against time brought the first Vietnam war to an end at the 1954 Geneva Conference.

A simple two-word agreement on "temporary partition"—a phrase that never appeared in the official record—made peace possible. The outline of that agreement was found by Pierre Mendès-France in Foreign Ministry notes taken during private conversations held in Geneva, as he prepared to ask the French National Assembly for investiture as Premier. That is what led him to make his famous wager —that he would negotiate a settlement in a month or quit—a wager that won him the Premier-ship and ended the war. Once the principle of partition had been accepted by both sides, Mendès-France realized, all that remained was to settle the details.

Is there a simple key to ending the second Vietnam war in 1969? Ambassador Cyrus R. Vance believes there may be. The former Vietnam peace negotiator thinks that that key is a "standstill cease-fire."

The attractiveness of the Vance Plan is that it is a proposal to negotiate a division of power—and territory—based on current realities. It would, simply, freeze the status quo and establish a modus vivendi between the con-testants in Vietnam's two-decade civil war. Can it be done?

The leopard-spot distribution of Vietcong areas in South Vietnam has led some analysts to dismiss partition as an impossible solution. Most students of the problem in 1954 took the same view—for precisely the same reason. The Communist Vietminh then held areas in South Vietnam almost identical with those held by their Vietcong successors today, and held a similar though stronger position in the North.

But two young Frenchmen—one a diplomat, the other a colonel—believed otherwise, and devised a scheme. Foreign Minister Georges Bidault, a hawk who wanted to

ROBERT KLEIMAN, of The Times Editorial Board, was a diplomatic correspondent for more than two decades, and covered the Geneva conferences of 1954 and 1962.

continue the war, brought it in his pocket to the Geneva conference for use if American intervention could not be obtained. The formula, without details, was suggested privately to a Vietminh delegate, Col. Ha Van Lau, who is now a delegate to the Paris peace talks.

Many weeks later, his agreement in principle was given on condition that the territory allocated to the Vietminh have the "character of a state," which he defined as an area with a capital and a port. It was a clear bid for the region of Tonkin, with its capital at Hanoi and its port at Haiphong.

Ha Van Lau's hand was on a map of Vietnam, covering that northern region, as he spoke. When his French interlocutor asked how far south he proposed to place the partition line, he moved his fingers into Annam Province and out again quickly, replying, "Not very far."

The cease-fire settlement of 1954 evacuated hundreds of thousands of French and Vietnamese troops from North Vietnam to the South, followed by a million civilians, mostly Roman Catholics. In the South, Vietminh forces regrouped into five zones and, later, 80,000 Vietminh troops and many of their families were evacuated to the North.

Beginning on this page are questions I posed to Mr. Vance, and his replies.

Q.—Mr. Vance, why are the peace talks stalemated in Paris?

A.—In my judgment, because there has not yet been proposed a realistic political-military package which could provide the basis for a settlement.

Q.—Our side is proposing mutual withdrawal of external forces and free elections run by a joint electoral commission, including the Communists. The Communists are proposing an interim coalition government to conduct the elections. Is there nothing negotiable here?

A.—As presently formulated, neither proposal is acceptable to the other side. For example, Hanoi and the National Liberation Front (N.L.F.) have made it clear that they are not going to discuss mutual withdrawal until the shape of the political settlement has been generally outlined. On the other hand, Saigon (the G.V.N.) has made it clear that it is not going to agree to the N.L.F. demand that it step aside in favor of a coalition provisional government. A middle ground

has to be found which bridges the differences between the two sides.

Q.—What do you propose?

A.—That we change our strategy so as to cut down the fighting, and also put on the table in Paris a political-military package which proposes negotiation of a standstill cease-fire as the first order of business. This latter element is tremendously important because merely to propose it is to recognize the military, territorial and political status quo. It is necessary, in my judgment, to recognize the status quo to get serious negotiations.

I'm convinced that President Nixon is determined to achieve peace in Vietnam. In order to do this, I believe a new initiative is required.

Q.—What do you mean precisely by a standstill cease-fire?

A.—A simple cease-fire is one in which the writ of the Saigon Government would run throughout the country. Obviously, that would not be accepted by the other side, as they would view it as a surrender.

In contrast, a standstill, or cease-fire in place, recognizes the status quo. Each of the sides remains in place, takes defensive positions and stops all offensive actions. Free movement of trade, civilians and unarmed military personnel would be permitted throughout all areas of South Vietnam. Procedures would be developed to permit the movement of the required logistics for the military forces of both sides. During the winding down process, it would have to be agreed that local incidents of non-compliance would not justify departure from the general cease-fire. Further, the principle that no military or political advantage should be gained by either side throughout the period of the cease-fire would be recognized by the parties.

Q.—How could you assure that?

A.—There would have to be, first, an assurance that no Government troops would enter the areas under N.L.F. control except with the approval of the local government. This is a commitment somewhat like those made in the past to the Hoa Hao and Cao Dai sects and to some of the montagnard provinces. In return, Vietcong terrorism in areas controlled by Saigon would have to cease.

Second, an understanding would be needed that in the areas which are currently under N.L.F. control, the authority of existing local officials of the "liberation committee" would be recognized, pending elections, and that appointments of Saigon Government officials within those territories would not be made over the objections of the local authorities. There is precedent for this. Similar arrangements have been made in the important areas controlled by the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai. The kind of Saigon Government officials that I have

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3-F

VIET CEASE FIRE, CONTINUED

in mind are those from the civilian
ministries, such as Agriculture and Health.

Third, there would be recognition,
pending elections, of N.L.F. control
over taxes in its areas and N.L.F. use
of such taxes for local purposes.
Again, this is a procedure similar to
that currently being used in Saigon-
controlled rural areas. Moreover, the
N.L.F. already collects taxes in these
areas.

Further, you would need a recog-
nition by the Saigon Government of
the legality of decrees by N.L.F. liber-
ation committees on land tenure,
unless Saigon first moves to institute
its own program for land reform.

Q.—Now, isn't this, in effect, a
kind of partition of South Vietnam?

A.—In a sense it's a partition. But
only by recognizing the realities that
exist are you going to find a basis
on which the two sides can negotiate
a settlement.

Q.—The places now partitioned
—Germany, India, Pakistan, Korea,
North and South Vietnam, Berlin, Ire-
land—are divided by a fixed line,
two in the case of India-Pakistan. But
in South Vietnam there is a leopard-
spot division of territories, cutting
across roads, railroads, canals, sepa-
rating cities from their countryside.
How can partition work in that kind
of a jigsaw puzzle?

A.—What I believe you would end
up with is essentially a form of
federation with the various local en-
tities and their people represented
in the national legislature, thus giving
them a voice in the national govern-
ment. At the local level you would
have control resting in the hands of
those who control the territory now.

Q.—How would you prevent violations of the agreements?

A.—The most practical mechanism
to guard against violations of the
cease-fire would be a modified Inter-
national Control Commission (I.C.C.).
The I.C.C. created by the 1954 settle-
ment in Geneva consists of three
parties—India, which serves as
chairman, Canada and Poland. This
peace-keeping force—either alone or
in coordination with a joint military
commission similar to that set up by
the French and the Communist Viet-
minh in 1954—would establish and
staff posts in the 43 province capitals
and in the district towns. They would
receive reports and make recommen-
dations for the solution of difficul-
ties and disputes. Local commanders
would be instructed to comply with
the recommendations of the local
peace-keeping unit.

Q.—How many posts would you need?

A.—Perhaps 300 or so.

Q.—How many people would this involve?

A.—About 3,000. The posts could
be small. The peace-keeping units
would have to operate under majority
rule; under the current procedures,
the vote of one member can block
action by the I.C.C. This would have
to be changed. They would be guar-
anteed safe conduct and free move-

ment to investigate reported violations rapidly.

Q.—Do you have any reason to
believe that the Vietcong would ac-
cept majority decisions by the I.C.C.?

A.—They have never said either
that they would or would not. But
the Vietcong would have an interest
in seeing that the peace-keeping force
was effective. If the Vietcong is going
to stop fighting, it will wish to be
sure that its people will be protected,
and therefore that it has effective
machinery in place to which it can
effectively appeal.

Now, I'm not suggesting that the
Vietcong is going to turn in its
arms, because that would be imprac-
tical during the period of working
out the details of the political set-
tlement.

Q.—You mean that they would
continue to retain their own armed
force?

A.—That's right.

Q.—On a permanent basis?

A.—No, on a permanent basis the
nature and size of military forces
that would be permitted is a matter
that would have to be negotiated.
Assuming a confederated type of settle-
ment, one possibility is that the
N.L.F. forces could become the local
element of the national government
forces in the particular area in which
they lived.

Q.—How can you define the status quo territorially when so much of the country is contested territory, under the control of Saigon in the daytime and under the control of the Vietcong at night?

A.—This would have to be nego-
tiated between Saigon and the N.L.F.
in Paris.

Q.—In the end, they would wind
up trading some areas for others—
some areas would be given to the
Vietcong and others would be given
to Saigon?

A.—That's the case in any nego-
tiation. In some disputed areas, the
negotiators might agree to determine
the majority allegiance by local bal-
loting.

The idea of a leopard-spot federal
or confederal solution is not a new
theory, as you undoubtedly know. It
has been discussed in Vietnamese
circles and elsewhere. What has not
always been seen clearly is that a
proposal for a standstill cease-fire
would almost automatically shape
the solution in that way.

Q.—What about the people who
live in these areas? Would they have
to remain there?

A.—There would have to be com-
plete freedom of movement for all
civilians.

Q.—Anybody who didn't want to
stay in a zone allocated to the Viet-
cong could move into another area?

A.—That's correct, and I would
foresee elections in all areas even-
tually so that the people of South
Vietnam would have a voice in deter-
mining their future.

Q.—Do you think this movement
in population would take place before
the elections?

4-F

A.—In a number of areas,
others, there would be little movement. I would expect that local elections would precede national voting. You would first have elections of local representatives at the hamlet and village level, and perhaps at the provincial level as well. The elections, in areas where the N.L.F. is clearly in control, would obviously reflect the realities that exist on the ground. The same would be true in those areas where the Saigon Government is clearly in control.

Then you would have elections for
the National Assembly—both the
lower and upper houses—with all
South Vietnamese entitled to vote.
In this connection, I think you could
expect to see the resulting legislature
composed of various political, reli-
gious and ethnic groups.

Finally, there would be the election
of a President and a Vice President.

Q.—You see this as a series of
elections rather than one election?

A.—Probably. But the timing of
the various elections would be for the
parties to decide. What you would
end up with, then, would be strong
local governments in various areas
which would be controlled and domi-
nated by the N.L.F., as they actually
are on the ground today. The Central
Government's role in these areas
would be a weak one. In other areas
you would see the local governments
dominated by Saigon. And in a third
group of areas you would have sort
of a mixed bag, with a center group
emerging that is not aligned with
either Saigon or the N.L.F. I think
there is a large segment of Buddhist
and others who fall into this cate-
gory. It's a sort of third force that
exists in all parts of South Vietnam.

Q.—Do you think they might be
drawn into some local as well as
national role as a buffer between the
two major political forces that are
armed?

A.—I think that's possible. You
would also probably have Hoa Hao,
Cao Dai and montagnard autonomous
areas in the federation.

Q.—Who would conduct the elec-
tions?

A.—The elections would be con-
ducted under a broadly representative
electoral commission with the N.L.F.
and the Saigon Government partici-
pating, and both sides pledged in
advance to accept the outcome.

I want to make it clear that what
I am suggesting is not a winner-take-
all electoral solution. I don't think
that either side is going to be willing
to accept a winner-take-all election.
The risks to each are too great, be-
cause in one fell swoop either might
lose what it had been fighting and
dying for over many years.

Q.—Is it your assumption that the
N.L.F. would give up the idea of
sharing power nationally through a
coalition government? Are you say-
ing that it would settle for minority
representation in the national parlia-
ment if it were assured virtual local

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## LET CEASE FIRE, CONTINUED

autonomy in the regions that it now
over Controls?

A.—I think so. In the settlement I've outlined, the two sides would divide power and territorial control rather than seek to govern jointly through a coalition government at the start. The N.L.F. would be accepting a trade-off, obtaining local control by giving up its demands for a strong position in the Central Government. It would see the prospect that it might increase its political power later by peaceful competition. Meanwhile, it would be guaranteed what it has achieved on the ground over the years.

Q.—Is this the essence of the political-military package you are proposing for the Paris talks?

A.—Yes. But there are other important elements as well. Let me say first that this plan did not spring to life overnight, nor is the process by which my conclusions evolved in this direction a unique one. The thinking of many students of the problem has helped to shape my thinking. Clark Kerr's Committee for a National Political Settlement in Vietnam, with which I have associated myself recently, saw the need very early for a package proposal of this kind. Similar proposals have been examined within our Government. There are six essential elements in the political-military package:

1) A standstill cease-fire. 2) Self-determination for the South Vietnamese through free elections. 3) A broadly representative electoral commission with N.L.F. participation that could determine what changes are needed in the Constitution and election laws, and could then conduct the elections. 4) An international peace-keeping force. 5) A sweeping land-reform program. 6) Medical aid and relief to North as well as South Vietnam to bind up the wounds of war, along with economic assistance.

Q.—One objection to the cease-fire approach is that the other side is a clandestine movement engaged in subversion and the use of terrorism. It moves by night under cover. Its activities would be difficult to regulate while the movement of the South Vietnamese Army and police in uniform would be controlled by the cease-fire. How would you get around that objection?

A.—From what we have been able to observe over the years, it appears that the North Vietnamese and the N.L.F. have the ability to exercise firm control over the action of their troops in the field. I think there's good reason to believe that an agreement would be carried out if the instructions to do so were given by the commanders of the North Vietnamese and N.L.F. forces. Moreover, you would have the peace-keeping force policing the cease-fire. I want to underscore the fact that the recent three-day truce is not a valid indicator of what might happen in the

future because the G.V.N., according to reports from South Vietnam, did not observe the truce.

Q.—How could you control political infiltration and terrorism, and the use of threats, to extend N.L.F. political control during a period of cease-fire?

A.—As I have indicated, you would have either the I.C.C. or the I.C.C. together with a joint military commission, which would police the cease-fire and to whom complaints could be made about violations. In my judgment, this would act as a deterrent.

I'm not suggesting that there might not be a rather messy situation when the cease-fire was put into effect. There undoubtedly would be violations, and people would be injured and killed in the process. It would be misleading if I didn't make it very clear that this is to be expected.

On the other hand, as the situation exists today, taking the total casualties on both sides, many hundreds are being wounded or killed each week. If there were a standstill cease-fire, the casualties would be very substantially reduced—if not eliminated—even with the violations you would have to expect.

Q.—I suppose you would have as a deterrent the fact that Saigon's forces could always resume the fighting if they felt the Communists were taking advantage of the cease-fire?

A.—Yes.

Q.—The Saigon secret police would also, presumably, be functioning. Might there be a kind of tong warfare and clandestine undercover fighting going on in some of these areas?

A.—I'm sure you would have all kinds of violations of the cease-fire from time to time in various places throughout the country.

Q.—Now, another objection that is raised is this: If you had a standstill cease-fire, the N.L.F., which has set up a phantom provisional government, would be able to announce a capital and proclaim themselves there as the Government of South Vietnam. This is something they have not been able to do at present. Although they control large regions clandestinely, there is no part of the country which the South Vietnamese Army and the American forces cannot seize if they wish. But if there were a cease-fire, the army of Saigon would not be permitted to enter N.L.F. areas. The argument made by the Saigon Government is that the political position of the N.L.F. would be upgraded very substantially, if it could set up a secure capital. What do you think of this argument?

A.—It is possible that the N.L.F. might take that action. But assuming that were done, I believe it is questionable that it would materially change the situation.

Q.—The final argument that's made against the cease-fire approach

is that all these arrangements would weaken the Saigon Government, and its position might disintegrate. Is the Saigon Government that weak?

A.—If the G.V.N. broadens its political base and takes the initiative for peace, it should be able to win the support of a broad spectrum of the South Vietnamese people. But it must broaden its political base.

Q.—Do you see any broadening in the new Cabinet and in the replacement of a civilian Prime Minister with General Khiem?

A.—No, I think it was a step backward. In my judgment, it is essential that President Thieu promptly name a strong advisory council with a very broad political and religious base.

Q.—If the United States is withdrawing from Vietnam, does it have the right any longer to tell the Saigon leaders how to constitute their Government? We can't have it both ways, can we?

A.—The United States has made a great expenditure of lives and blood in Vietnam, and I think we have the right to urge what we believe is required to end the fighting and give some hope of stability for the future.

Q.—In other words, unilateral withdrawal or even a mutual withdrawal of the American and North Vietnamese forces might lead, not to peace, but to a continuation of the war?

A.—If you could get mutual withdrawal of North Vietnamese and United States forces, it might put pressure on both the N.L.F. and the G.V.N. to reach a political accommodation. But most important, we must try to stop the fighting now and capture the initiative for peace. If the United States were to come forward with a proposal calling for a standstill cease-fire, it could have a profound impact throughout the world. In my judgment, it would gain the support of world opinion. And even if the cease-fire proposal were turned down initially, it could be left on the table and world opinion would in time have its effect on the parties. As you know, both the North and South Vietnamese are very sensitive to world opinion.

Vietnam has been riven by war for many, many years. I think there's a great desire for peace among the Vietnamese people, North and South, running from the grass roots right up through all segments of the society. If a broadened Saigon Government were to offer the country peace and land reform, the other side would have to respond.

Q.—How does land reform fit into the peace negotiation package you are proposing?

A.—I hope that it will pass the Saigon legislature quickly, transferring all tenant-farmed land to the

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5-F

VIET CEASE FIRE, CONTINUED

peasants who are tilling it. In my judgment, the land-reform program would have a major political effect throughout South Vietnam. I would think it would be of great concern to the N.L.F., and it could become a useful subject of negotiation with them. You might offer to withhold putting the program into effect in N.L.F. areas, pending a working out of the political settlement with the other side.

Q.—How could the N.L.F. come out against distributing the land to the peasants?

A.—They would claim they already had done that and that it was unnecessary for the Saigon Government to take any action in their areas.

Q.—What makes you think Hanoi wants to negotiate a settlement? Might they not think now that they only have to sit tight and the United States will pull out?

A.—They might, but one indicator is that they have shown great interest on a number of occasions in economic and technical assistance from the United States in the postwar period. Another indicator is the quality of the negotiators Hanoi has sent to Paris, which leads me to believe they have come to make a settlement, not to stall indefinitely. We were impressed by their serious attitude, their skill and precision and their courtesy. I also want to make it clear that the G.V.N. has also sent very able people to Paris.

Q.—Do you think American aid to North and South Vietnam would help to guarantee that the peace agreements would be carried out?

A.—It could have an important effect. I believe that the North Vietnamese want to remain independent of both China and the Soviet Union. To the extent that they could receive assistance elsewhere, it would fortify and strengthen this position. You will recall that both Hanoi and the N.L.F. have said that they look forward to good relations with the United States after the war.

Q.—Do you think the N.L.F. is serious about its stated desire to assume a neutral posture along with the rest of Southeast Asia?

A.—I hope so, but only time can tell.

Q.—The settlement you propose, then, would not terminate the political or economic role that the United States plays in Southeast Asia in support of national independence by countries in the area?

A.—No. Our Government has said on many occasions that it is prepared to take a very active role in supporting economic development for all of the peoples in Southeast Asia, including the North Vietnamese.

Q.—Would the federation within South Vietnam that you foresee ultimately join in a confederation with North Vietnam, or unite with it in some other way?

A.—That would be up to the North and the South to negotiate.

My own feeling is that both North and South want some form of eventual unification. Indeed, I have heard individuals on both sides say that they wish to see North and South Vietnam eventually joined together in some way. Members of the N.L.F. have spoken to the press about a period of five or ten years before unification with the North.

Q.—Is there a political inhibition against early reunification?

A.—I think there's little question but that Southerners are Southerners in Vietnam. They want to pull themselves together politically so that they can deal with North Vietnam on an equal basis, rather than be taken over. The Saigon Government and the N.L.F., too, I believe, have suggested that the first steps be trade, exchange of letters, the movement of families back and forth from North Vietnam to South Vietnam and vice versa. The fact that South Vietnam had abundant rice was a very important factor in the past in trade with the North.

Q.—If Hanoi doesn't respond to all our offers, do you think we ought to continue unilateral withdrawal?

A.—Yes. I think that we can and should remove substantially larger forces than we have so far. We must try to bring about an end to the fighting now, but, if we can't, we ought to turn it over to the G.V.N. as rapidly as possible.

Q.—Would your objective in pulling out be to force Saigon to negotiate seriously?

A.—In part.

Q.—Do you think we are now in a period of de-escalation, and that if we reciprocate...?

A.—The only way we'll ever know is to test it. That's why we ought to come forward at this point and put on the table a proposal for a standstill cease-fire and for a realistic political settlement. We have nothing to lose by doing it, and everything to gain.

Q.—What would you do to de-escalate in response to a lull?

A.—I would cut back on the search and destroy operations, and cut back further on the B-52 operations.

Q.—Why would you cut back on the B-52 operations?

A.—B-52 operations was one of the subjects that the other side raised many times in Paris. Because of the importance the other side attaches to these operations, cutting them back further might provide the initiative for the cutting down of hostilities by mutual example. It is important to remember that it would be unrealistic to expect an immediate response from the other side. These things take time.

Q.—What effect will Ho Chi

6-F

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON.
20 SEPT 1969

Johnson writes foreword to anti-Viet-policy book

By the Associated Press

New York

Former President Lyndon B. Johnson has penned a favorable foreword to a book by Eugene R. Black, former president of the World Bank, critical of the policies which led to big-scale United States involvement in Vietnam.

In the book "Alternative in Southeast Asia," Mr. Black said the attempt to beat off the Communists through counterinsurgency "proved faulty in Vietnam and, in the process, helped to destroy much public support for the whole idea of foreign aid."

Mr. Black, once a Johnson adviser on economic development in Southeast Asia, suggests instead of "an overwhelming American presence a multilateral framework for a policy of regional cooperation."

Mr. Johnson's foreword comments: "Whether one agrees or not with all of his analyses and prescriptions, no reader will put this book down without being left with a whole winter's cupboard full of food for thought."

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

20 SEPT 1969

Those heavy B-52 bombing strikes in Vietnam and Laos will stop — if Hanoi' new leaders continue to reduce the level of violence and show a willingness to compromise.

Meanwhile, the United States stands prepared to discuss compromise, beyond the formal proposals it has already made.

This is one meaning of the 36-hour halt in the bombings after the pause during the funeral of Ho Chi Minh.

The White House has clearly signaled this message to Hanoi by more than one means.

Minh's death have on the Vietnam war and the Paris peace negotiations?

A.—I don't know. The death of a charismatic leader who over the years was strong enough to reach compromises, as he did, with the French in the nineteen-forties and nineteen-fifties may lessen the chance for peace. On the other hand, there will undoubtedly be a period of uncertainty in the aftermath of his death during which there will be a struggle for succession. It may well be, therefore, that the collective leadership, while sorting out their own relationships and those of their country with other countries, may want to take a fresh look at the situation.

In any event, we should seize this opportunity to open up a new path toward peace. To this end, we should propose a practical political-military package which could provide a basis for a settlement. ■

U.S. IS REPORTED
READY TO EXTEND
PAUSE IN COMBAT

Officials Say No New Action
Would Begin if Vietcong
Agree to Continuation

PLAN IS VIEWED AS TEST

Allies Say in Vietnam That
Level of Truce Fighting
Is Up to Other Side

By RICHARD HALLORAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 8—
Authoritative United States of-
ficials said today that if enemy
forces in South Vietnam main-
tained a low level of military
action after their declared 72-
hour cease-fire, the United
States "will do its share" in
not raising the level of fight-
ing.

The sources, who have access to the thinking at the top levels of Government, said that if the enemy held off a resumption of combat after the expiration of the cease-fire at 1 A.M. Thursday, (1 P.M. Wednesday New York time), American forces would not initiate new actions. In Saigon, both United States and South Vietnamese commands said that their levels of fighting during the cease-fire would be determined by enemy activity.

The Washington sources said that while the United States continued to prefer a reduction of fighting by agreement, a de facto de-escalation was acceptable.

Position Termed Consistent

The general feeling here was, however, that the North Vietnamese and Vietcong were not disposed to making the cease-fire a step toward peace, in light of their own calls to continue the war.

The position of the Administration, officials here said, is consistent with that taken since President Nixon said in Saigon recently that the next move must come from the other side. They repeated that the enemy would find the United States responsive to such a move.

The sources emphasized that the United States was not signaling to North Vietnam that Washington was trying to prolong the cease-fire, which was to mark the death of President Ho Chi Minh of North Vietnam. But they indicated that the Administration saw the cease-fire as an opportunity for North Vietnam to keep the fighting down and as a test of North Vietnamese willingness to de-escalate.

Officials here said, however, that this was the first time that the United States had been willing to have a cease-fire extended. They said the Administration's position was similar

Continued on Page 2, Column 4

A TIME-Louis Harris Poll

Americans on the War:
Divided, Glum, Unwilling to Quit

NEARLY five years after the 1965 buildup, Americans are increasingly impatient for a way out of Viet Nam, skeptical about the outcome of the fighting and ambivalent about the means of ending it. More than a third of the public want immediate, unconditional withdrawal of U.S. forces—a sizable figure in support of a policy that until recently was overwhelmingly held to be unthinkable and disastrous.

Yet, considering the outpouring of antiwar feeling on Moratorium Day, it is remarkable how much support remains for the policy of ending the war in honorable fashion, short of complete abandonment of

Still, reports Harris, a mood of pessimism—not unlike that of France following its 1954 debacle in Indo-China—pervades the country. “The irony,” says Harris, “is that the American mood is as pessimistic as it is without a Dienbienphu.”

The results of the poll demonstrate the extent to which the war has divided the American people. The country's leadership group, for the most part, is far more impatient about the war, far more cynical about the prospects of peace, than the general public. Antiwar sentiment is higher among blacks than whites, more pronounced among the young than the old, stronger in the East and West than the South and Midwest.

PUBLIC POSITION ON BRINGING FORCES HOME

South Viet Nam. The President enjoys considerable support; a majority backs him on the rate of troop withdrawal and on the matter of self-determination for South Viet Nam.

Seeming contradictions abound in the American mood. Four-fifths of the nation profess to be “fed up and tired of the war”; yet half do not want to see the U.S. “cut and run” from Southeast Asia, and more than half believe the present pace of troop withdrawals is about right or too fast. Nearly half of the public would favor continued withdrawal even if it meant collapse of the Saigon government, and more than 40% feel that the country will probably go Communist despite U.S. efforts. Yet a majority still hope to preserve a non-Communist regime in Saigon.

These are findings of a new TIME-Louis Harris poll to determine how much support exists among Americans for the war and for alternatives in pursuing or ending it. In order to identify the differences between the general public and those expected to be better informed on the war's complexities, the TIME-Harris interviewers polled two samples—1,650 members of a cross section of the entire population and 1,118 national and community leaders. The second group included only public officials, chiefs of minority and dissident organizations, business executives, editors, leaders of educational and voluntary institutions—those whose collective voice registers loudest in public debate.

The results suggest that growing impatience with the war—especially among the leaders—could undermine President Nixon's efforts to carry out a program of controlled disengagement. But they also show that Nixon has managed to win broad support for two crucial points of his Viet Nam policy—withdrawal of American troops pegged to “Vietnamization” of the war, and holding out for the right of South Vietnamese self-determination. Fully three-quarters of the public polled favor the President's program of troop withdrawals. But half of the general public would be willing to back Nixon in one last attempt to escalate and win.

## Support for the President

Overall, Nixon has gained rather than lost ground recently. Nixon's positive rating on the conduct of the war jumped ten points from a low of 35% in September to 45% on Oct. 14, the last day of interviewing for the poll and the day before the Viet Nam moratorium. Yet 50% of the general public and 53% of the leaders gave him a negative rating, proving that he is still highly vulnerable on the war issue. Nixon's handling of the negotiations to end the war won him no more kudos. Only 45% of the general public and 43% of the leaders approved his handling of the negotiations, while 49% of the public and 53% of the leaders gave him negative marks.

*Is Nixon following the policies of the Johnson Administration in Viet Nam?*

The people say no. Sixty percent of the total public and 53% of the leadership group believe that Nixon

## Do you favor immediate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Viet Nam?

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Public</th><th colspan="3">Leaders</th></tr><tr><th>Favor %</th><th>Oppose %</th><th>Not Sure %</th><th>Favor %</th><th>Oppose %</th><th>Not Sure %</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Nationwide</td><td>36</td><td>57</td><td>7</td><td>32</td><td>61</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>East</td><td>45</td><td>47</td><td>8</td><td>40</td><td>51</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Midwest</td><td>30</td><td>63</td><td>7</td><td>34</td><td>59</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>South</td><td>33</td><td>57</td><td>10</td><td>21</td><td>74</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>West</td><td>33</td><td>60</td><td>7</td><td>33</td><td>64</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Cities</td><td>47</td><td>48</td><td>5</td><td>36</td><td>58</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>Suburbs</td><td>33</td><td>61</td><td>6</td><td>31</td><td>61</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Towns and rural</td><td>31</td><td>59</td><td>10</td><td>18</td><td>74</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Under 30</td><td>35</td><td>58</td><td>7</td><td>34</td><td>59</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>30 to 49</td><td>34</td><td>59</td><td>7</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>50 and over</td><td>38</td><td>51</td><td>11</td><td>27</td><td>67</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>White</td><td>34</td><td>58</td><td>8</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Black</td><td>50</td><td>41</td><td>9</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Republicans</td><td>28</td><td>64</td><td>8</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Democrats</td><td>38</td><td>54</td><td>8</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>8th grade</td><td>39</td><td>52</td><td>9</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>High School</td><td>34</td><td>58</td><td>8</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>College</td><td>36</td><td>58</td><td>6</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Public Officials</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>23</td><td>70</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Minority and dissident leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>69</td><td>24</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Communications leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>28</td><td>69</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Business leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>26</td><td>66</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Education and religious leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>33</td><td>59</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Voluntary organizations</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>31</td><td>63</td><td>6</td></tr></tbody></table>

TIME, OCTOBER 31, 1969

13

has broken with his predecessor to follow his own policy in Southeast Asia.

The President's plan to bring home the troops has strong support throughout the country. When asked directly, 76% of both the public and the leaders agreed, at least in principle, with the Nixon policy on troop withdrawals. But pressure to step up their pace seems likely to intensify. Only 6% of the public thought the withdrawals were proceeding too quickly, while 49% found the pace "about right"; 29%, however, felt the pace too slow. Among leaders, the pressure is even stronger. Although 39% were satisfied with the rate at which American manpower was being pulled out of Viet Nam, only 4% thought things were moving too rapidly, while 38% felt they were going too slowly.

### How quickly should the troops be withdrawn?

Thirty-six percent of the public and 32% of the leaders favored immediate total withdrawal of U.S. troops

from Viet Nam. Of several hypothetical situations that might justify an immediate U.S. pullout, only a seizure of the Vietnamese government by hard-line generals determined to fight indefinitely found a majority willing to back an instant U.S. withdrawal. The majority of Amer-

icans and their leaders favored phased withdrawals. "It's too late to suddenly just drop it," said Mrs. James A. Deines of Bird City, Kans. "The only alternative we've got left is to end it as honorably and as quickly as possible." Sixty-one percent of the public and 58% of the leaders believed that an American pullout should be timed according to increasing South Vietnamese strength—though patience with the Vietnamization effort is strictly limited.

Q: Is Nixon following Johnson's policies on Viet Nam?

### Do you approve of the present rate of troop withdrawals?

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="4">Public</th><th colspan="4">Leaders</th></tr><tr><th>Too Fast %</th><th>Too Slow %</th><th>About Right %</th><th>Not Sure %</th><th>Too Fast %</th><th>Too Slow %</th><th>About Right %</th><th>Not Sure %</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Nationwide</td><td>6</td><td>29</td><td>49</td><td>16</td><td>4</td><td>38</td><td>39</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>East</td><td>5</td><td>37</td><td>42</td><td>16</td><td>3</td><td>45</td><td>31</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>Midwest</td><td>5</td><td>28</td><td>51</td><td>16</td><td>4</td><td>35</td><td>39</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>South</td><td>5</td><td>22</td><td>58</td><td>15</td><td>5</td><td>29</td><td>47</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>West</td><td>9</td><td>29</td><td>45</td><td>17</td><td>1</td><td>45</td><td>38</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>Cities</td><td>5</td><td>40</td><td>44</td><td>11</td><td>3</td><td>43</td><td>35</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Suburbs</td><td>5</td><td>30</td><td>44</td><td>21</td><td>4</td><td>36</td><td>41</td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>Towns and Rural</td><td>6</td><td>22</td><td>54</td><td>18</td><td>8</td><td>22</td><td>49</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>Under 30</td><td>6</td><td>33</td><td>49</td><td>12</td><td>3</td><td>42</td><td>37</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>30 to 49</td><td>6</td><td>28</td><td>47</td><td>19</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>50 and over</td><td>5</td><td>25</td><td>53</td><td>17</td><td>5</td><td>30</td><td>43</td><td>22</td></tr><tr><td>White</td><td>6</td><td>28</td><td>49</td><td>17</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Black</td><td>4</td><td>33</td><td>55</td><td>8</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Republicans</td><td>6</td><td>21</td><td>56</td><td>17</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Democrats</td><td>7</td><td>31</td><td>46</td><td>16</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>8th grade</td><td>5</td><td>18</td><td>61</td><td>16</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>High school</td><td>7</td><td>27</td><td>51</td><td>15</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>College</td><td>4</td><td>36</td><td>42</td><td>18</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Public officials</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>4</td><td>33</td><td>40</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>Minority and dissident leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>2</td><td>66</td><td>15</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>Communications leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>2</td><td>37</td><td>44</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>Business leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>5</td><td>29</td><td>48</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>Education and religious leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>3</td><td>43</td><td>34</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>Voluntary organizations</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>3</td><td>39</td><td>39</td><td>19</td></tr></tbody></table>

### How strong is the commitment to withdrawal?

Forty-seven percent of the public would follow a pre-arranged withdrawal timetable, even if the Saigon government were to collapse as a result; only 38% would alter the schedule to save the Thieu regime. Among leaders, the commitment is even firmer: 56% opted to pull out in the face of a government disaster; only 31% agreed to stay.

As the poll makes clear, Nixon could buy more time and support for his program of troop withdrawal by turning the fighting over to volunteers. Fifty-two percent of the public favored a voluntary force for Viet Nam; 46% of the leaders were willing to go along. Most would be willing to leave a volunteer army in Viet Nam for another year.

Although few people seem to be thinking in terms of a specific time limit for an end to U.S. involvement in Viet Nam, well under a majority of either the public or the leaders were willing to let the President maintain existing troop strength for more than a year. No more than 23% of the public and 18% of the leaders agreed to leave troops at the present 500,000 level for more than a year, although 10% were willing to keep them there for as long as five years. Nor are many more willing to tolerate what is reported to be the President's fallback position on troop reductions. Only 27% of the public and 25% of the leaders agreed to keeping a substantially lower 200,000-troop level in Viet Nam beyond next fall. By much the same proportions, Americans rejected the long-term use of a mixed force of volunteers and draftees. Just 28% of the public and 27% of the leaders agreed to keep a mixture of 125,000 volunteers and 75,000 draftees in Southeast Asia for more than a year. However, 37% of the public and 33% of the leaders were willing to leave a 200,000-man all-volunteer force in Viet Nam for at least two more years, and 16% were agreeable to letting them stay for five.

### Changing Attitudes on the War

Fully 80% of the public and 81% of the leadership group are simply tired of the war. They feel that it was a mistake to begin with, and has been a needless waste of lives. Said Harris: "The basic rationale and justification for the Vietnamese war are rapidly fading from the consciousness of the people." Where two years ago 83% of the public agreed that the war was necessary to resist Communist aggression in Asia, today only 55% of the general public and 49% of the leadership accept this explanation. Even fewer said that Viet Nam is crucial to U.S. interests. Only 41% of the public and 32% of the leadership agreed with the proposition that the war is necessary to guarantee national security.

The public and the leaders held divergent views on both the necessity for "saving face" and the firmness of the U.S. commitment to remain in Southeast Asia. Half of the public accepted the idea that the U.S. has placed its reputation on the line in Viet Nam and could not leave until it had assured South Vietnamese independence; 54% of the leaders disagreed. Nearly half (48%) of the public went along with the proposition that the U.S. presence in Viet Nam was a commitment not just to the Vietnamese, but to the world; 54% of the leaders rejected this, too.

### Has this new mood helped the antiwar movement?

Skepticism about the reasons for the war has created a climate of tolerance for the dissenters whom Vice President Spiro Agnew attacked last week. Seventy percent of the leaders refused to buy the argument that opposition to the war is led by radicals

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TIME, OCTOBER 31, 1969

Q: Is war necessary to resist Communist aggression in Asia?

who do not care what happens to the U.S. Forty-nine percent of the public went along with them.

The leadership also rejected, by a margin of 72% to 20%, the idea that antiwar sentiment is playing too large a part in Nixon's war decisions. The public agreed with the leaders by a margin of 49% to 35%.

Majorities of both the public and the leaders felt that the tragedy of the war was that it had divided the American people and agreed that it should be ended because it has kept the country from doing more about its domestic problems. "It's drained too many resources from this country—its manpower, its leadership, its resources," said Isaac Young, mayor of Olivette, Mo. "It's set this country back many years in solving its own problems."

## No Illusions About Saigon

Angered by the intransigence of South Viet Nam's leaders and shocked by tales of graft and corruption, Americans seem to be losing the good will they once felt for their ally. By 42% to 21%, respondents said that the South Vietnamese government has hindered rather than helped the U.S. in its search for peace. The leadership group went the same way, 55% to 20%. Neither the leaders nor the public expressed any illusions about freedom in North Viet Nam, and both agreed that the Hanoi government commands more loyalty from its citizens than the Saigon regime. Said Ralph Comfortes of Los Angeles: "We are supporting a government that has no support from the Buddhists. We don't have the support of the Viet peasant."

Sixty-four percent of the public and 74% of the leaders favored replacing the Thieu government with one more representative of the South Vietnamese people. However, the public found itself nearly evenly divided when asked if it thought that the South Vietnamese army would fight better under a new government, while only a small plurality of the leaders felt it would.

## What are acceptable settlement terms?

American attitudes toward the South Vietnamese government have had a profound influence on the type of settlement the country is willing to accept to end the war. While 55% of the leaders and 58% of the public voiced support of the President in maintaining that South Viet Nam's right of self-determination is not negotiable, those polled showed great flexibility on the meaning of the term.

The public would accept a neutralist government, committed neither to the U.S. nor the Communists, by a 71% to 12% margin. However, the public is willing, by 47% to 26%, to sacrifice the present Saigon government if that is the only way to peace, while the leaders, 62% to 22%, are even more agreeable to the idea. The partitioning of South Viet Nam, under which the Viet Cong would rule those parts of the country it controlled and the Saigon government the rest, is supported by a 42% to 29% margin among the people and 53% to 33% among the leaders.

But on the question of whether Communists should be allowed into a new South Vietnamese government, the public and the leaders partied ways decisively. The public opposed letting the Communists into the government 49% to 33%; the leaders favored such a com-

promise 62% to 28%. The public also rejected a government with a Communist majority 62% to 21%. The leaders split, 44% in favor, 45% opposed.

## Nixon's Dilemma

Embroiled in a war they cannot win under the rules of engagement and do not wish to lose, Americans find themselves confused as they look to the future. Al-

though most have abandoned hope for a military victory, only a minority expect the Paris negotiations to produce an "honorable settlement."

This contradiction confronts Nixon with riddles as he looks toward 1972. Ninety-four percent of the public and 91% of the leaders

say they would support Nixon if he ends the war this year on honorable terms, a condition that seems impossible to meet. Sixty percent of the public and leaders are willing to support him whether he ends the war or not as long as he gets American troops out of Viet Nam. A surprising 52% of the public would be willing to support him in one last-ditch attempt to gain a military victory; 53% of the leaders would oppose such a move. Sixty percent of the leaders and 67% of the public said that they would oppose him if the Communists took over the South Vietnamese government. The fact that a plurality of both public and leaders believe that South Viet Nam will ultimately go Communist anyway only underscores the U.S.'s dilemma—and Nixon's.

## Should the President order a unilateral cease-fire?

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="3">Public</th><th colspan="3">Leaders</th></tr><tr><th>Favor %</th><th>Oppose %</th><th>Not Sure %</th><th>Favor %</th><th>Oppose %</th><th>Not Sure %</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Nationwide</td><td>44</td><td>44</td><td>12</td><td>44</td><td>45</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>East</td><td>54</td><td>33</td><td>13</td><td>47</td><td>39</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>Midwest</td><td>45</td><td>44</td><td>11</td><td>52</td><td>38</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>South</td><td>32</td><td>52</td><td>16</td><td>33</td><td>60</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>West</td><td>45</td><td>47</td><td>8</td><td>46</td><td>43</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Cities</td><td>54</td><td>35</td><td>11</td><td>48</td><td>42</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>Suburbs</td><td>47</td><td>43</td><td>10</td><td>45</td><td>43</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Towns and rural</td><td>38</td><td>48</td><td>14</td><td>32</td><td>60</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>Under 30</td><td>45</td><td>46</td><td>9</td><td>45</td><td>45</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>30 to 49</td><td>43</td><td>48</td><td>9</td><td>45</td><td>45</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>50 and over</td><td>48</td><td>37</td><td>15</td><td>43</td><td>45</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Men</td><td>44</td><td>48</td><td>8</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Women</td><td>45</td><td>39</td><td>16</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>White</td><td>43</td><td>45</td><td>12</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Black</td><td>56</td><td>29</td><td>15</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Eighth grade</td><td>48</td><td>36</td><td>16</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>High School</td><td>43</td><td>46</td><td>11</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>College</td><td>45</td><td>45</td><td>10</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Republican</td><td>42</td><td>47</td><td>11</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Democrat</td><td>46</td><td>43</td><td>11</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Veterans</td><td>40</td><td>53</td><td>7</td><td>38</td><td>52</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>Voted Nixon</td><td>40</td><td>49</td><td>11</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Voted Humphrey</td><td>50</td><td>39</td><td>11</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td></tr><tr><td>Public officials</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>42</td><td>45</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Minority and dissident leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>47</td><td>42</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Communications leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>48</td><td>45</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Business leaders</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>40</td><td>53</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Education and religion</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>49</td><td>39</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>Voluntary organizations</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>X</td><td>45</td><td>42</td><td>13</td></tr></tbody></table>

TIME, OCTOBER 31, 1969

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