FEATURES COLUMNISTS

NEW YORK TIMES 15 NOVEMBER 1973

# The Myth of American Might

By Stuart H. Loory

COLUMBUS, Ohio—President Nixon's decision to alert American military forces throughout the world at the height of the Middle Eastern crisis provoked the wrong debate.

The most important question was not: Was this alert necessary? As vital as the answer to that question was during these times of distrust of our President, the more pressing question was: What would have happened if the Soviet Union had challenged the American military machine?

The best evidence indicates that in anything short of a nuclear exchange, the American forces would have been severely, if not fatally, mauled. An investigation of the American military machine after Vietnam produces evidence adding up to a harsh indictment: the nation's armed forces dominate society without protecting it. The defense establishment is not capable of defending the United States' true vital interests in the face of an enemy attack.

Many military men, mostly of the younger generation, support this indictment in their contemplative moments. Even Henry A. Kissinger privately tells friends he thinks the military cannot fight.

Here, service by service, is the situation:

* The Air Force is hobbled by a doctrine of "sanctuary basing" for its bombers and fighters—aircraft so sophisticated they can only be maintained under conditions approaching the cleanliness, order and calm of a Swiss watch factory. It is for this reason that most of the Air Force's efforts in Southeast Asia were conducted from bases in Thailand and Guam, which were untouchable by the enemy. To gain relatively minor tactical advantages in a variety of conditions against an enemy, the Air Force, over the years, built even more complex machines. It takes an inventory of 70,000 spare parts, for example, to keep a wing of F-4 Phantom fighters operational in wartime conditions. Such an inventory can only be managed by a computer. Computers do not operate well under the dirty and jarring conditions of a battlefield. And there would be no escaping such conditions in Europe where, the Soviet Union would not permit our Air Force to use sanctuaries.

The Air Force's newest airplanes, such as the F-111 at $15 million apiece, are so expensive and sophisticated that Air Force commanders are actually afraid to fly them for fear of losing one. As a result, training has been cut to a bare minimum for pilots and ground crews alike.

* The Navy, excluding the strategic missile submarine force, has similar

(See MYTH, Page 2-F)

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 15 NOVEMBER 1973

# Detente—picking up the pieces

By Charles W. Yost

New York

When Henry Kissinger returns from China and Japan he will be confronted by two tasks of great delicacy which will challenge his remarkable abilities even more than did the challenge he has met successfully — so far — in the Middle East.

The first is to relaunch the much advertised "Year of Europe." This will now require not only coping with the problems of trade, finance, and military deployment which have for some time threatened to divide the United States from its European allies, but also meeting cooperatively, not competitively, the new oil crisis. The latter includes not only an equitable division of supply but also more genuine consultation among allies about Middle East policy.

The second, and even more difficult, task will be repairing the damaged detente with the Soviet Union. The detente has been most critically damaged by the recent near-confrontation in the Middle East; but it was already in serious trouble before that crisis arose.

Apparently it cannot be too often emphasized that too much must not be expected of Soviet-American detente in any near future, and that attempts on either side to overload it with excess baggage will, if successful, merely cause it to founder completely. Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet Union is going, "at this point in time," to alter its domestic or foreign policies fundamentally. That could only be expected, if at all, after a long period of accommodation and association.

The much more modest objectives of detente at this stage are four: (1) to lessen the likelihood of hostile confrontation and, most of all, of nuclear holocaust — the danger of which has by no means been eliminated; (2) to that end to control and, it is hoped, reduce nuclear and other arsenals through SALT and MBFR agreements; (3) to that end also to attempt to deal cooperatively — through the United Nations whenever possible, rather than unilaterally and competitively — with conflicts in the "third world" likely to embroil the big powers; (4) to commence the weaving of bilateral and multilateral associations in trade and other matters.

(See DETENTE, Page 2-F)

# New steps to normalize U.S.-China tie

By Elizabeth Pond
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Tokyo

New advances have been made toward normal diplomatic relations between the United States and China, according to American officials in the Kissinger party on their way home from Peking.

They point to joint communiqués issued Wednesday in Peking as a concrete expression of this progress.

Specifically, they refer to:

1. A different nuance in China's wording of its precondition for full and normal relations.

2. Broader emphasis on the importance of "frequent contact at authoritative levels."

3. Expanded application of the general principles stated in the 1972 Shanghai communique, beyond the Asian-Pacific region to the world in general.

4. Projections for a quantitative and qualitative upgrading of the two countries' liaison offices.

In a Tokyo press briefing on Wednesday, the American officials declined to be more specific in defining China's change of nuance on the key issue of normalization. But they said this nuance would permit a definite further evolution in relations between the two countries.

The officials would not speculate on whether this might include a bending by Peking in its present refusal to establish full diplomatic relations as long as the U.S. recognizes Taiwan. But they spoke of the new commune as establishing principles that now will be explored further for concrete implementation.

In particular, they pointed to the difference between last year's and this year's Chinese statements on the subject:

(See STEPS, Page 3-F)

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

24 November 1973 (21)

# The Year Of Europe?

"No aspect of US foreign policy commands greater attention and care than our relations with Western Europe," the President said last spring. Henry Kissinger matched that statement with an appeal for a new Atlantic Charter that, his publicists contended, would equal and perhaps surpass the Marshall Plan as a testament to partnership. As Kissinger outlined the new relationship in a speech in New York, the Americans and the West Europeans in 1973 would redefine, reorganize and revitalize their alliance through negotiations, climaxed by a summit meeting of the President and the leaders of Europe. That grand design has since been marred by misperceptions, caustic talk, and above all conflicting interests. As a consequence the much vaunted "Year of Europe" as it was labeled is rapidly running out with little prospect that the problems it was supposed to resolve will be settled within the foreseeable future. US ties with Western Europe are more tenuous than at any time since World War II, and nothing has served to dramatize this more starkly than the Middle East war.

That war revealed, in the first place, that the West Europeans—despite their allegiance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or their reliance on the US for other forms of defense—are not about to underwrite the whole of US foreign policy. Most of them not only refused to cooperate with the administration's determination to supply Israel with weapons but, in some instances, actively thwarted US diplomatic maneuvers. Shortly after the Arabs attacked, British Prime Minister Heath declined to support a US proposal for a United Nations cease-fire resolution, and neither he nor French President Pompidou went along with Washington's desire to block a Soviet move to include both American and Russian troops in an international emergency force created to supervise a cease-fire. The West Germans, though they at first tolerated shipment of US equipment to Israel through their country, later rejected American requests to continue using the port of Bremerhaven; they were determined "not to be drawn into the Middle East conflict" and would stick by their "neutrality." The Greeks and Turks, both NATO members, denied US transport aircraft the right to fly over their territory en route to Israel. They did not, however, protest against Soviet planes loaded with weapons for Egypt violating their airspace. The Portuguese permitted the refueling of US aircraft at Lajes Field in the Azores, but afterward they put a price tag on their generosity by asking Washington to provide them with sophisticated arms to combat guerrillas in their African colonies.

Kissinger had pointed out in his Atlantic Charter speech that the US has "global responsibilities," while its European allies have "regional interests." The two, he said, are not "automatically identical." During the Middle East crisis his position in that respect appeared confused, even contradictory. On the one hand he implied that the Europeans had only "regional interests," by failing to inform them in advance of the administration's decision to place US armed forces on alert. Yet he complained that the Europeans were not sharing America's "global" responsibilities by lining up behind American policy. The Europeans showed themselves to be similarly inconsistent. They resented not being consulted on tactics to meet a world crisis, but when asked to contribute to the US effort to counter the Soviet build-up, they backed away on the grounds that the Middle East war was a local conflict that did not fall under the terms of the NATO contract.

Nobody was fooling anybody. Oil in this instance

3-E

was not a lubricant but an abrasive. In contrast to the US, which relies on the Arab producers for about 10 percent of its petroleum, Western Europe imports more than a third of its oil from the Middle East. The Europeans not only put self-interest first, but they carried that interest further by refusing to pool oil with their Common Market compatriots. French Premier Messmer took the lead when he said early this month that oil-sharing could not begin until Western Europe had shaped a common energy policy. The British said amen. Yet there is in fact an oil-sharing program within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, whose 24 members include the Common Market countries. The French and British have resisted implementation of that program for the simple reason that they do not want to antagonize the Arabs. The chief victim of the Arab boycott is the Netherlands, which is being deprived of two-thirds of its oil imports as a penalty for having been pro-Israel.

Although the Middle East crisis brought to the surface Western Europe's differences with the US as well as its own internal strains, these have existed for some time. The nine members of the European community have been slow to surrender sovereignty to a supranational unity. Germany has gone its own way in pursuit of reconciliation with the Kremlin. France has developed its own nuclear arsenal—both meanwhile counting on US patronage for protection. The Europeans worry that Congress may vote for unilateral troop withdrawals, and they are concerned that the Watergate scandals may bring into the White House an occupant whose attitude toward Europe may differ from that of Mr. Nixon, the devil they know. At the same time they grumble, as French Foreign Minister Jobert did last week, that the "condominium" erected by Washington and Moscow has rendered Western Europe helpless.

Kissinger's Atlantic oration ran into trouble almost immediately. It was sprung on the Europeans without prior consultation, leaving many of them with the impression that it represented an ultimatum rather than an appeal for cooperation. The Kissinger statement that "political, military and economic issues... are linked by reality" seemed to say that the US was seeking to make its defense contribution contingent on the settlement of trade and monetary questions. The Europeans were likewise piqued by the suggestion that once negotiations were concluded, they would be summoned to the summit like tributaries paying homage. Their response to the US bid was neither quick nor friendly, and Kissinger was annoyed.

By the middle of September the West Europeans had finished a draft of a Common Market proposal for relations with the US. It was to be separate from a NATO document dealing with defense matters, and it emphasized that the European community would function "in world affairs as a distinct entity" and would cooperate with the US on "an equal basis." This autonomous tone apparently rubbed Kissinger the wrong way. The Europeans believed that their declaration marked the start of a dialogue. Kissinger wanted something more definite. The Europeans began to suspect that Mr. Nixon was less interested in a renovated alliance than in having a dazzling international

CONTINUED PAGE 4-E

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS

30 November 1973 P5

# NATO Europe's Security

The European Alliance, cornerstone of American foreign policy, took a beating during the recent Middle East war. But the divisions only reflect a far deeper rift between the two sides of the Atlantic over how to organize a genuine partnership. The following is the first of two articles on problems and prospects for NATO in the era of detente.

By George Sherman

Star-News Staff Writer

As President Nixon's Year of Europe groans into its final month, the Atlantic Alliance is under the greatest strain in its nearly quarter-century history.

"Secretary of State Rusk had it with the allies over the Vietnam war, now Kissinger has had it over the Middle East and the energy crisis," said one ranking U.S. aide.

"We just cannot escape it the alliance was formed for the defense of West Europe. It has never worked outside that area."

This is the reality under the debris of rhetoric covering the battered remains of the Year of Europe and there lies the challenge as U.S. and European diplomats look to what can be done to salvage the alliance.

Last April Henry A. Kissinger, as presidential adviser, launched a White House crusade for a new "Atlantic Charter" (a name now dropped) to take the alliance out of what was felt was its regional straitjacket. The time had come for shared responsibility in this new world of detente.

IN OCTOBER came the Mideast war and the big test. By November, Kissinger — now the secretary of State — was bemoaning to a press conference "melancholy conclusions" that major European allies had broken ranks with the United States at a time of high crisis in order to preserve their Arab oil supplies. To a disillusioned Washington,

the Europeans had pursued narrow self-interest at a time of confrontation with the Soviet Union affecting the whole alliance.

But, according to insiders, the psychological setting for this drama of divisiveness actually had been building for months. October only brought to the surface underlying cracks. The United States and its allies already were conducting hard arguments not only over the grand declarations of global coordination, but also over the very guts of the alliance — nuts-and-bolts policies for the defense of trans-Atlantica.

The security discussions had been much quieter. But almost from the day he took

over the Defense department early last summer James R. Schlesinger has shouldered the task of talking straight and tough to the European partners. His first move was to tell a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Brussels in June that the time has come for them to stop poor-mouthing the defense capabilities of the alliance.

BY EUROPEAN accounts, it was a shocking performance — so shocking that Schlesinger has spent a good deal of time in the intervening months with individual allied defense ministers explaining exactly

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