PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

January 25, 1963

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL SPEIDEL IN FONTAINEBLEAU,

January 10, 1963

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I had lunch and spent the afternoon of January 10 with General Speidel at Fontainebleau. He had invited me when I met him at the home of General Stehlin some weeks previously.

After lunch Speidel presided at a briefing about the mission of his command. He then took me to his home, saying he wanted to talk privately. He told me that early in December the French had made an offer of atomic cooperation to Germany and that Adenauer had asked his advice. Adenauer had also asked him to give his views about our pressures for a conventional build-up; specifically, what would be accomplished by various levels of forces.

Speidel then showed me in strictest confidence a personal memorandum he had written to Adenauer. The main point was that Germany could not depend on French atomic support. Indeed, the disposition of French conventional forces indicated that France was above all interested in the defense of its own territory. He therefore urged extreme reserve with respect to the French offer.

to the French offer.

territory. He therefore urged extreme reserve with respect
France was above all interested in the defense of its own
the disposition of French conventional forces indicated that
that Germany could not depend on French atomic anabort. Indeed,
memorandum he had written to Adenauer. The main point was

Sheidel then showed me in strictest confidence a personal
py avions levels of forces.

conventional build-up; specifically, what would be accomplished
also asked him to give his views about our breaches for a
Germany and that Adenauer had asked his advice. Adenauer had
Decomper the French had made an offer of atomic cooperation to
he wanted to talk privately. He told me that early in
ماهیو of his command. He then took me to his home, asking

After launch Sheidel presided at a briefing about the
met him at the home of General Stemin in some weeks previously.
General Sheidel at Koutaimepleu. He had invited me when I
I had launch and absent the afternoon of January 10 with

From: Henry A. Krasinger

January 10, 1943

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH GENERAL SHEIDEL IN BONNINERREU

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

January 22, 1943

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with General Speidel -2- January 25, 1963

January 10, 1963

With respect to the conventional build-up, Speidel's analysis was as follows: the present NATO shield forces would permit a defense against Soviet forces now deployed in Eastern Germany only along the line of the Weser. It would require the utilization of tactical nuclear weapons from the outset. The logistic support would permit a defense for only an average of nine days, ranging from three days for the Dutch to upwards of twenty for the United States divisions.

If NATO built up to thirty divisions, Speidel's memorandum continued, it could hold some forty-five Soviet divisions for the same length of time (an average of nine days) by purely conventional means, but only in strictly defensive operations. Such a force would make a forward strategy possible. At the end of about a week if nuclear weapons were not used, the front would disintegrate.

If NATO built up to thirty-six divisions, it could fight against the fifty to fifty-five divisions the Soviets now deploy in Eastern Europe for a period up to two weeks with purely conventional means, provided the logistic support of these divisions were made uniform. This would permit a forward strategy. But without tactical atomic support the battle would be purely defensive and its outcome foreordained after nine

be purely defensive and its outcome foreordained after nine
strategy. But without tactical atomic andport the battle would
divisions were made uniform. This would permit a forward
barely conventional means, provided the logistic andport of these
deploy in Eastern Europe for a period up to two weeks with
against the fifty to fifty-five divisions the Soviets now
front would disintegrate.

and of apout a week if unclear weapons were not used, the
such a force would make a forward strategy possible. At the
conventional means, put only in strictly defensive operations.
the same length of time (an average of nine days) by purely
continued, it could hold some forty-five Soviet divisions for
it NATO built up to thirty divisions, Sbeidel's memorandum
to upwards of twenty for the United States divisions.

average of nine days, ranging from three days for the Dutch
The logistic andport would permit a defense for only an
the utilization of tactical nuclear weapons from the outiet.
Germany only along the lines of the Weas. It would require
permit a defense against Soviet forces now deployed in Eastern
analysis was as follows: the present NATO shield forces would
With respect to the conventional build-up, Sbeidel's

January 10, 1963
Conversation with General Sbeidel
-5-
January 22, 1963

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with General Speidel -3- January 25, 1963

January 10, 1963

days to two weeks.

With tactical nuclear support, some offensive operations
might be possible, designed to break the back of the Soviet
offensive. I asked Speidel what he meant by this. He
showed me on the map a pincer movement towards Leipzig.

Speidel also showed me in strictest confidence a letter
he had written to Strauss about the state of the various NATO
divisions. It was extremely critical of the French deployment
as well as of the readiness of French forces. It rated the
United States divisions very high and the German divisions
next. One Dutch division was rated high, the other very low.
It argued that the weakest point at the front was the part
covered by the British, (the French not having any of their
troops in forward positions).

In the rest of his conversation with me, Speidel said
that he thought very poorly of the Berlin contingency planning.
He believed that a movement by anything more than a battalion
on the Autobahn would so upset his deployment as to make him
vulnerable to a massive Soviet attack. He also thought very
little of schemes to pinch off a part of Eastern Germany in
reprisal for a blockade. He thought the outcome would be the

retrial for a blockade. He thought the outcome would be the
little of schemes to pinch off a part of Eastern Germany in
vulnerable to a massive Soviet attack. He also thought very
on the Autopahn would so upset his deployment as to make him
He believed that a movement by anything more than a battalion
that he thought very poorly of the Berlin contingency planning.
In the rest of his conversation with me, Speidel said
troops in forward positions).

covered by the British, (the French not having any of their
It argued that the weakest point at the front was the part
next. One Dutch division was rated high, the other very low.
United States divisions very high and the German divisions
as well as of the readiness of French forces. It rated the
divisions. It was extremely critical of the French deployment
he had written to Strasbourg about the state of the various NATO
Speidel also showed me in strictest confidence a letter
showed me on the map a bincer movement towards Leipzig.
offensive. I asked Speidel what he meant by this. He
might be possible, designed to preclude the pack of the Soviet
With tactical nuclear support, some offensive operations
days to two weeks.

January 10, 1943
Conversation with General Speidel

January 22, 1943
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PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Conversation with General Speidel -4- January 25, 1963

January 10, 1963

loss of Berlin and a subsequent Soviet offensive against the
NATO salient which could not fail to be successful.

As for the forward defense, he thought that a thirty
division build-up would permit a defense of Hamburg against
an attack by up to four divisions. The real problem in the
defense of Hamburg, however, was that the boundary of the
Northern command of NATO and the central command passed
through Hamburg. He thought the most likely attack would
come in the sector of the Northern command and that, therefore,
the thirty division goal was not strictly relevant to the
defense of Hamburg.

NOTE: THIS CONVERSATION WAS IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE.
SPEIDEL IMPLORED ME NOT TO MAKE ANY USE OF THE INFORMA-\TION HE GAVE ME. I CANNOT JUSTIFY KEEPING IT TO MYSELF,
BUT I WOULD FIND IT EXTREMELY REGRETTABLE IF ANY OF THIS
WERE TO GET BACK TO HIM.

WERE TO GET BACK TO HIM.
BUT I WOULD FIND IT EXTREMELY REGRETTABLE IF ANY OF THIS
TION HE GAVE ME. I CANNOT JUSTLY KEEP IT TO MYSELF,
SPEIDEL IMPLORED ME NOT TO MAKE ANY USE OF THE INFORMA-
NOTE: THIS CONVERSATION WAS IN THE STRICTEST CONFIDENCE.

defense of Hamburg.
the thirty division goal was not strictly relevant to the
come in the sector of the Northern command and that, therefore,
through Hamburg. He thought the most likely attack would
Northern command of NATO and the central command based
defense of Hamburg, however, was that the punyary of the
an attack by nb to four divisions. The real problem in the
division build-up would permit a defense of Hamburg against
As for the forward defense, he thought that a thirty
NATO salient which could not fail to be successful.
loss of Berlin and a impending Soviet offensive against the

January 10, 1943
Conversation with General Speidel
-4- January 22, 1943

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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