Ann Black

6 March 1963

CUBA

Table of Contents

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>I. Democratic Platform</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>II. JFK Campaign Promises</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>III. Major Events in U.S.-Cuban relations during the JFK administration</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>A. Aid to Cuban Refugees</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>B. White Paper of April 3, 1961</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>C. Bay of Pigs Cuban rebel invasion, April 17, 1961</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>D. Prisoner Release</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>E. Two Months After the Cuban Invasion</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>F. Steps Toward Complete Economic Sanctions</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>G. Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS to Discuss Cuban situation - Jan. 21-31, 1962</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>H. Trade Embargo - February 7, 1962</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>I. Laird Committee - Declaration of Republican Principles and Policy, June 7, 1962</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>J. Foreign Aid Acts</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>K. First Evidence of Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba - July-August, 1962</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>L. Russian Acknowledgment of Increased Military Aid - September 2, 1962</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>M. Standby Authority to call up Reserves</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>N. NATO Shipping to Cuba</td><td>23</td></tr><tr><td>O. Cuba Resolution</td><td>24</td></tr></tbody></table>

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<table><thead><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>P.</td><td>Cuban Missile Crisis - October, 1962</td><td>25</td></tr><tr><td>Q.</td><td>U.S. - U.S.S.R. - Cuban Negotiations to Resolve the Crisis</td><td>31</td></tr><tr><td>R.</td><td>Aftermath of Cuban Missile Crisis - December, 1962</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>S.</td><td>Prisoner Exchange - December 23-24, 1962</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>T.</td><td>Cuban Task Force</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>U.</td><td>New Issues which have arisen since January 1, 1963</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>1. Charges of the Presence of Offensive Weapons and of a New Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>2. Cuba as a base for subversion</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>3. Continued Presence of Soviet Troops</td><td>50</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>4. Management of the News</td><td>53</td></tr><tr><td>V.</td><td>New Shipping Order</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>ADDENDUM.</td><td>EVOLUTION OF SOVIET MILITARY COMMITMENT TO CUBA</td><td>56</td></tr><tr><td>I.</td><td>Before the Bay of Pigs Invasion</td><td>56</td></tr><tr><td>II.</td><td>After the Bay of Pigs Invasion</td><td>57</td></tr><tr><td>III.</td><td>Before the October 1962 Missile Crisis</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>IV.</td><td>After the October 1962 Missile Crisis</td><td>58</td></tr></tbody></table>

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6 March 1963

CUBA

I. Democratic Platform

"The new Democratic administration will also reaffirm our historic policy of opposition to the establishment anywhere in the Americas of governments dominated by foreign powers, a policy now being undermined by Soviet threats to the freedom and independence of Cuba. The government of the U.S. under a Democratic administration will not be deterred from fulfilling its obligations and solemn responsibilities under its treaties and agreements with the nations of the Western hemisphere. Nor will the U.S., in conformity with its treaty obligations, permit the establishment of a regime dominated by international, atheistic communism in the Western hemisphere."

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## II. JFK Campaign Promise

> "...What do we do about Cuba and Castro now?..."

### A. General

1. "The first thing we have to do is let the Cuban people know our determination that they will someday again be free...We must promptly initiate a major broadcast program for Cuba in particular, and more for the Americas in general. (10/15/60) Johnstown, Pa.

2. "...in regard to Cuba, itself, I feel that the U.S. should sustain the cause of freedom, that we should indicate that we do not believe that Castro believes in freedom, that until he is willing to submit his case to the people in a free election, that we will hold out the hand of friendship to those who have been driven out of Cuba by Castro." (10/3/60) Springfield, Ill.

### B. Military

1. "I have never advocated and I do not now advocate intervention in Cuba in violation of our treaty obligations and in fact stated at Johnstown, Pa., that whatever we did with regard to Cuba should be within the confines of international law. What I have advocated is that we use all available communications -- radio, television, and the press -- and the moral power of the American government -- to let the forces of freedom in Cuba know that we believe that freedom will again rise in their country. (10/23/60) telegram to Nixon.

2. "...we must make it clear...that we will defend our Naval Base at Guantanamo under all circumstances." Cincinnati, Ohio, (10/6/60).

3. "...we must let Mr. Castro know that we do not intend to be pushed around any longer and in particular do not intend to be pushed out of our naval base at Guantanamo, or denied fair compensation for American property he has seized." Johnstown, Pa. (10/15/60)

4. "...we must attempt to strengthen the non-Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus far these fighters for freedom have had virtually no support from our government." (10/20/60) Statement released in N.Y.

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5. "While we cannot violate international law, we must recognize that these exiles and rebels represent the real voice of Cuba, and should not be constantly handicapped by our immigration and Justice Department authorities." (10/15/60) Johnstown, Pa.

6. "...we must end the harassment...of liberty loving anti-Castro forces in Cuba and in other lands..." (10/15/60) Johnstown, Pa.

### C. Economic

1. "We must...continue to seek reparation for his seizures of American property." (10/6/60) Cincinnati, Ohio

2. "Second, we must consider more stringent economic sanctions -- such as the seizing of all Cuban assets in this country to be used to pay off some of the vast sums which Cuba still owes us."

3. "We should also consider measures to prevent goods from being shipped to Castro via a third country. (10/20/60) Statement released in N.Y.

4. "...the Republicans, after two years of inaction since Castro took power, now attempt to make up for this incredible history of blunder...by cutting off several million dollars worth of exports in a move which will have virtually no effect by itself in removing Communist rule from Cuba... This latest policy merely accelerates and aids a long-standing Castro policy -- a policy of eliminating all Cuban dependence on American goods, shifting Cuban trade to the Communist bloc." (10/20/60) Statement released in N.Y.

### D. Resistence to Communist Expansion

1. "...we must firmly resist further Communist encroachment in this hemisphere -- working through a strengthened OAS -- and encouraging those liberty-loving Cubans who are leading the resistance to Castro." (10/6/60) Cincinnati, Ohio

2. "...we must let Mr. Khrushchev know that we are permitting no expansion of his foothold in our hemisphere -- and that the Organization of American States will be given real strength and stature to resist any further communist penetration by whatever means are necessary." (10/15/60) Johnstown, Pa.

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3. "...we will have to work with both the Organization of American States and our European allies in order to promote collective action against communism in the Caribbean. For unless we secure the cooperation of our allies, Mr. Castro will be able to trade at will with the free world rendering our own partial embargo completely futile!" (10/20/60) Statement released in N.Y.

4. "...we must immediately act to prevent communism from taking over other countries in Latin America -- by removing the conditions under which communism thrives." (Statement released in N.Y., October 20, 1960)

5. "...we must strengthen the cause of freedom throughout all Latin America creating an atmosphere where liberty will flourish and where Cuban communism will be resisted, isolated, and left to die on the vine." (Johnstown, Pa., October 15, 1960)

## III. Major Events in U.S.-Cuban relations during the JFK administration

### A. Aid to Cuban Refugees

#### 1. JFK Action

a. In January 1961 Secretary of HEW Ribicoff, acting on orders of JFK, made a 3-day survey of the problems connected with the refugees in the Miami area.

b. On February 3, 1961, JFK issued a series of orders to be followed in order to alleviate the refugee problem. He allotted $4 million for this program from his contingency fund under the Mutual Security program.

c. On July 20, 1961, JFK asked Congress to give special statutory authority to U.S. participation in the Cuban Refugee Program. The program has been financed out of the President's contingency fund under the Mutual Security Program and, as of June 30, had cost about $5 million. The legislation which was requested removes the refugee program from foreign aid and authorizes the expenditure of sufficient funds, as well as loans, food grants and use of local currencies, needed to carry out the respective programs (CQ 8/11/61) (As passed on June 27, 1962 the bill fulfills JFK's request.)

### B. White Paper of April 3, 1961

#### 1. JFK Action

a. The JFK Administration issued a document calling on the Castro regime to sever its link with international Communism and restore the dignity of the original Cuban revolution.

b. The booklet was written largely by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., Richard Goodwin, and Adolph Berle, Jr., but it was closely checked by JFK himself.

### C. Bay of Pigs Cuban rebel invasion -- April 17, 1961

#### 1. JFK Action

a. Five days before the invasion (April 12) JFK at a press conference stated that "there will not be

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under any condition an intervention in Cuba by
the U.S. armed forces." Excerpts of his statement
follow:

"First I want to say that there will not be,
under any conditions, an intervention in Cuba
by the U. S. armed forces. This government
will do every thing it possibly can, and I think
it can meet its responsibilities, to make sure
that there are no Americans involved in any
actions inside Cuba.

"We do not intend to take any action with
respect to the property or other economic
interests which American citizens formerly held
in Cuba, other than formal and normal
negotiations with a free and independent
Cuba.

"The basic issue in Cuba is not one between
the U.S. and Cuba; it is between the Cubans
themselves.

"I would be opposed to mounting an offensive
(against Cuba)."

On April 20 after the failure of the invasion,
JFK clarified this statement:

"Any unilateral American intervention, in
the absence of an external attack upon
ourselves or an ally, would have been contrary
to our traditions and to our international
obligations. But let the record show that our
restraint is not inexhaustible. Should it ever
appear that the inter-American doctrine of
non-interference merely conceals or excuses
a policy of non-action--if the nations of this
hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments
against outside Communist penetration--then I
want it clearly understood that this government
will not hesitate in meeting its primary
obligations which are to the security of our
Nation...

"We intend to profit from this lesson (presence
of a Communist government in Cuba). We intend
to re-examine and reorient our forces of all
kinds--our tactics and other institutions here

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in this community. We intend to intensify
our efforts for a struggle in many ways more
difficult than war, where disappointment will
often accompany us.... Let me make clear as the
President of the U.S. that I am determined
upon our system's survival and success,
regardless of the cost and regardless of the
peril."

b. After conferring with Cabinet members, JFK gave the go-ahead to an invasion of Cuba by a rebel Cuban force which had been financed and equipped by the U.S. and trained over the past two years here and in Guatemala. (U.S. troops were not directly involved, however, it was later revealed that some Americans had volunteered to fly combat missions over Cuba). The invasion was a total fiasco and over 1,000 rebels were taken prisoner by the Castro forces.

c. On April 19 JFK called in Congressional leaders of both parties to brief them for the first time on the situation in Cuba.

d. Between April 20 and 28, JFK conferred with Nixon, Goldwater, NAR, Eisenhower, Hoover and Truman on the Cuban situation. He was given their solid support in the recent actions.

e. On April 22, JFK appointed Gen. Maxwell Taylor to review U.S. intelligence, paramilitary and guerilla warfare capabilities in the light of the abortive invasion attempt. To assist Taylor, JFK later named the then Director of CIA, Allen Dulles; Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations; and Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

f. As a result of the Cuban fiasco a new Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board was set up on May 3,
by JFK. Dr. James Killian, Jr., Chairman of the
Corporation of MIT, is its Director. The new
board is a reactivation "under broadened terms of
reference" of the Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence Activities set up by Eisenhower in 1956

g. From May 1-3 Senate hearings were held in which Secretary of State Rusk and CIA officials briefed Senators.

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**Sen. Bridges** (R-NH) called on JFK and Congress to redefine the Monroe Doctrine to make clear that it applies to "Communist subversion and indirect aggression" as well as to direct military action by a foreign power. (Senate GOP Memo 4/27/61)

**Sen. Javits** (R-NY) said the Inter-American Rio Treaty "gives Latin American nations the right to call Cuba to account for threatening the peace of the Western Hemisphere." He urged that this power be exercised, warning: "If this kind of indirect aggression can take place in Cuba, then it can happen in any Latin American country."

**Sen. Keating** (R-NY) said that "if there should be any attempt at Soviet intervention in the Cuban conflict...then the U.S. must not stand idly by. If the Soviet Union makes a single move toward intervention in any form in Cuba or the Caribbean, the U.S. would have a clear and present obligation to blockade the island and prevent the entry of any forces from outside the hemisphere."

## D. Prisoner Release

In the beginning of May 1961 a Committee was formed of Cuban refugees and private American citizens called the Tractors for Freedom Committee, whose main purpose was to raise funds sufficient to purchase 500 tractors which Castro demanded as a trade for the prisoners captured during the April invasion. In July 1961 Castro increased his demands and the committee disbanded.

### 1. JFK Action

On May 24 JFK endorsed the formation and actions of the Tractors for Freedom Committee; however, the Federal government remained apart from it and granted no direct aid. Some members of the government were influential in helping to raise the money.

### 2. Congressional Action and Comment

The Republican Congressmen were almost solidly against the Administration's support for the tractor for

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revoked the Eisenhower plan to have the Cuban freedom fighters protected by American air power. This charge opened the door to a barrage of attacks and counter attacks. The controversy was partisan in nature. (WP 6/13/61)

## F. Steps toward Complete Economic Sanctions

### 1. JFK Action

In order to hold down dollar earnings of the Castro government, JFK ordered two federal agencies to do what they could to stop purchases and use of Cuban molasses by Publicer Chemical Corporation (WSJ 6/22/61)

- The U.S. government proposed to sell surplus corn to Publicer as a substitute for the molasses it uses to make industrial alcohol and liquor.

- The Administration put pressure on Publicer by announcing that imports of Cuban molasses were not in the public interest because they provided money to a dictatorship.

- An agreement between the Government and Publicer was reached at the end of June, 1961.

**Sen. Bennett (R-Utah)** on August 11, 1961 proposed that the U.S. invoke the Trading with the Enemy Act and break off all trade with Cuba. He said that stopping trade with Cuba would serve as an economic blow to the Castro regime and it would satisfy the American people's demand for belligerent action.

**Sen. Fong (R-Hawaii)** on August 12 asked that JFK request the Latin nations to "join us in a Declaration of Contraband whereunder war material from Communist countries "will not be permitted to enter this Hemisphere." He said that such a declaration is "strictly a quarantine measure with no stigma of armed intervention or invasion" and would be easily enforceable. He explained that we could thereby "neutralize the military equipment in Castro's possession" and "block the trans-shipment of arms to Communists in Latin American nations."

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G. Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS to discuss
Cuban situation - Jan. 21-31, 1962

1. <u>JFK Action</u>

a. The U.S. delegation went to the conference hoping to obtain unanimous support for collective diplomatic and economic sanctions against Cuba. However, from the outset the U.S. was forced to back away from its original demands. An initial canvassing by the U.S. on the chances for the collective sanctions revealed a deep division within the Hemisphere. The smaller Caribbean countries, who are most in danger of Castro moves, went along with the U.S. But the larger nations had strong reservations about collective OAS action. Apart from questions of legality and political effectiveness of the action, there was considerable concern in such countries as Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Mexico about pro-Castro sentiment within their borders.

b. Because of the lack of support of the larger, more powerful nations, the U.S. did not publicly propose the original demand for sanctions. Instead the U.S. delegation spent most of its time negotiating behind the scenes trying to arrive at some solution which would censure the Castro regime but which at the same time would bridge the gap between the two opposing sides.

c. The *key provision* which emerged from the negotiations *called for the exclusion of the present government of Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system*. It stated that Cuba's Marxism-Leninism is incompatible with the principles and objectives of the Inter-American system. The vote was 16-1 (Cuba) with 6 abstentions (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico).

d. The U.S. fared better in preliminary voting on other provisions of the resolution; however, the resolutions incorporated in the final declaration did not live up to the U.S. hopes of imposing strict sanctions or taking strong action against Cuba.

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b. In making the announcement JFK said that he was acting under the authority granted him in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. (By not using the Trading with the Enemy Act, he avoided having to freeze the assets of anti-Castro Cubans now in the U.S.). JFK stated that the "embargo was being imposed in accordance with the decisions of the recent meeting of foreign ministers of the Inter-American system at Punta del Este."

N.B. The resolution originally to be proposed by the U.S. at the OAS meeting calling for economic sanctions against Cuba did not meet with the approval of the majority of Latin delegates so it never was proposed.

## 2. Congressional Comment and Action

JFK's action drew no opposition from Congress.

### I. Laird Committee -- Declaration of Republican Principles and Policy, June 7, 1962

On June 7, 1962 the Laird Committee issued a declaration which made the following statements on Cuba:

"Despite this nation's position as the most powerful on earth, the bankruptcy of its leadership was shown at critical times in the past year. It was shown in Berlin and Cuba.

"We oppose the take-over of operational responsibilities by arm-chair policy makers. Failure in Cuba has been traced to that trend. Within the last 18 months a Communist military base has been established 90 miles from the coast of Florida. The tragic timidity of those who withheld support from the Cuban patriots dispatched to free their country permitted the Communists to achieve their greatest triumph in a decade."

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# J. Foreign Aid Acts

## 1. Congressional Action

a. In the 1961 **Foreign Aid Authorization Act** Congress included an amendment which prohibited aid to the current government of Cuba and authorized the President to establish a complete U.S.-Cuba trade embargo, but did not deny aid to nations which assisted Cuba. (8/31/61)

b. The 1961 **Foreign Aid Appropriations Act** provided that no assistance be available to countries supplying arms to Cuba unless the President determined the withholding of such assistance would injure the national interest. (9/26/61)

c. The 1962 **Foreign Aid Authorization Act** required the President to suspend aid to any country which, either through action of the national government or a political subdivision of it, expropriates U.S. property. The aid will be suspended if the aid recipient fails to take steps to make adequate compensation within 6 months. The terms of the amendment were made retroactive to January 1, 1962.

d. The 1962 **Foreign Aid Appropriations bill** also imposed a ban on aid to any countries whose ships carry arms or strategic materials to Cuba and left to the President's discretion whether or not aid would be given to countries trading with Cuba.

# K. First evidence of Soviet Military Build-up in Cuba
July-August 1962

The Cuban crisis, which reached a climax on October 23, 1962, began to develop in the preceding July-August when U. S. intelligence and other sources observed a massive increase in Soviet arms shipments to Cuba.

## 1. JFK Action

When questioned about the increase, JFK at press conferences on August 22 and 29 stated that the U.S. had no information on Russian troops in Cuba, but did have knowledge of an "increased number of technicians". (8/22/62). On the 29th he restated that there was as yet no evidence or information on anti-aircraft missiles or Soviet troops in Cuba. He said: "I am not for invading Cuba at this time".

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L. <ins>Russian Acknowledgment of Increased Military Aid --</ins>
<ins>September 2, 1962</ins>

On September 2 the Soviet new agency Tass published a
joint communique signed by Cuban and Russian officials
acknowledging that the USSR had agreed to send military
aid to Cuba. This public statement drew a very strong
reaction from the American Congress and public.

1. <ins>JFK Action</ins>

a. On September 4 <ins>JFK</ins> issued a statement in which he acknowledged delivery of Russian missiles to Cuba, but said they were anti-aircraft defense missiles with a "slant range" of 25 miles. He said there was no indication of any combat forces but warned that "were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise". He said that the U.S. would use "whatever means may be necessary" to prevent Cuban aggression against any part of the Western Hemisphere. Excerpts of his statement follow:

"Information has reached this government in the last four days from a variety of sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban government with a number of anti-aircraft <u>defense</u> missiles with a slant range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of our NIKE.

"Along with these missiles, the Soviets are
apparently providing the extensive radar and
other electronic equipment which is required
for their operation.

"We can also confirm the presence of several
Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying
ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range
of 15 miles.

"The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or enroute--approximately 3,500--is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment.

"...We shall continue to make information
available as fast as it is obtained and properly
verified.

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"There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country; of military bases provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance. Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise.

"...It continues to be the policy of the U.S. that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere. The U.S., in conjunction with other hemisphere countries, will make sure that while increased Cuban armaments will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba themselves, they will be nothing more."

b. On September 13, 1962, against a background of mounting U.S. public concern over the magnitude of the Soviet military build-up in Cuba and Congressional demands for U.S. counteraction, JFK made the following statements at his news conference:

"Ever since communism moved into Cuba in 1958, Soviet technical and military personnel have moved steadily onto the island in increasing numbers at the invitation of the Cuban government. Now that movement has been increased. It is under our most careful surveillance. But I will repeat the conclusion that I reported last week, that these new shipments do not constitute a serious threat to any other part of this hemisphere.

"If the U.S. ever should find it necessary to take military action against communism in Cuba, all of Castro's Communist-supplied weapons and technicians would not change the result or significantly extend the time required to achieve that result.

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"However, unilateral military intervention on the part of the U.S. cannot currently be either required or justified, and it is regrettable that loose talk about such action in this country might serve to give a thin color of legitimacy to the Communist pretense that such a threat exists.

"But let me make it clear once again: If at any time, the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or become an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies.

"We shall be alert to, and fully capable of dealing swiftly with, any such development. As President and Commander in Chief, I have full authority now to take such action, and I have asked the Congress to authorize me to call up reserve forces should this or any other crisis make it necessary.

"In the meantime, we intend to do everything within our power to prevent such a threat from coming into existence.

"We shall continue to work with Cuban refugee leaders who are dedicated as we are to that nation's future return to freedom. We shall continue to keep the American people and the Congress fully informed. We shall increase our surveillance of the whole Caribbean area. We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere."

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Pressure for U.S. counteraction to the Soviet buildup of Cuban military forces mounted as Republicans and Democrats urged the Administration to take a more aggressive stand. A Soviet warning, issued on Sept. 11, that it would interpret as war any U.S. attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships going to Cuba exacerbated the situation.

### a. GOP

- **Sen. Keating (NY)** led the fight in the Senate for action in Cuba. On September 2 he suggested that "the very least the U.S. can do is call upon the OAS to ... investigate reports of Cuban missile bases. On September 4 he called again for an OAS meeting. He also said the U.S. should insist that its NATO allies stop helping Russia establish a Communist base in Cuba. Finally he said if all else fails the U.S. should consider intercepting all vessels in the area which appear to be carrying arms to Cuba. On September 20 Keating said the Soviet buildup was not defensive and that JFK had made a "tremendous error and a serious concession" in saying that it was defensive.

- **Rep. Frelinghuysen (NJ)** joined the fight in the house. He called for a special closed session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to get a complete Cuba briefing from the State Department, CIA and other agencies. (HT 9/4/62)

- **Sen. Scott (PA)** urged an immediate meeting of the OAS to draft a "multilateral warning to the Communist states to cease the arming of Cuba". He proposed setting a deadline. If the Communists did not comply by then, the U.S. with or without the Latin nations should "declare foreign military exports to Cuba to be contraband and subject to blockade." (HT 9/6/62)

- **Sen. Goldwater (Ariz)** said September 6 that the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba should have been followed by a blockade, which he preferred to invasion. Cuba, he said was "not a military threat. It is a threat against the Latin

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- American countries." (NYT 9/7/62) On Sept. 14 he criticized JFK's statement of the 13th, saying JFK "virtually promised the Communist world that the U.S. will take no action to remove the threat of Soviet armed might in the Western Hemisphere".

- Sen. Tower (Tex) attacked the JFK Administration. He said that the old Eisenhower policy of "massive retaliation" had now been turned into a policy of "massive appeasement". He added that "the most powerful nation in the world... is acting like the most craven". (HT 9/12/62)

- Sen. Case (NJ) said that he regarded the situation in Cuba as serious, but that the military equipment Cuba was getting from the Soviet Union did not appear to be of a sort that "would be useful for aggressive purposes." (NYT 9/10/62)

- Sen. Javits (NY) said that something must be done soon to stop the military buildup in Cuba. However, he opposed an invasion or a blockade of Cuba, saying he could not "go for such a simple solution". He urged the President to address the nation on the gravity of the situation and to ask for an emergency meeting of the OAS. He said that if the OAS refused to act "the U.S. should move immediately to seek to organize a Central American and Caribbean defense organization pledged and armed to see to it that Castroism and Soviet arms are contained within Cuba and that Castro's power is gradually undermined." Javits criticized the Administration for what he said was downgrading of worry over Soviet arms going to Cuba. He charged the White House had not crystallized U.S. policy on Cuba. (NYT 10/2/62)

- Rep. Broyhill (Va) called for a blockade of Cuba. (10/1/62)

- Sen. Miller (Iowa) sponsored an amendment directing the President to invoke the Monroe Doctrine against Communist control in Cuba. (WP 9/14/62)

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- Sen. Bush (Conn) proposed an amendment which called for the Senate's declaring that, with or without cooperation from other Western Hemisphere nations, the U.S. has the "right and obligation" to end Communist domination of Cuba. (HT 9/13/62)

- Sen. Prouty (Vt) proposed an amendment authorizing JFK to use American troops against Communist aggression "in any area of the world". (HT 9/13/62) (JFK already has this authority)

- Sen. Pearson (Kansas) proposed that the U.S. tell Russia that further shipments will be considered an "aggressive act" and that such ships will be turned back. (HT 9/7/62)

- Sen. Dirksen (Ill) at first did not go along with his party colleagues. He said he was "not aware of any positive and definite information" that the Castro buildup had any offensive intention. He said he did not see how the U.S. could act without evidence of offensive intentions. (HT 9/6/62) However, on September 15 he and Rep. Halleck proposed that Congress adopt a resolution similar to the Taiwan statement of 1955, warning of the U.S. readiness to use military force.

b. **Democrat**

- Sen. Engle (Calif) challenged Keating over the latter's charges that the JFK Administration was withholding facts about the situation. He said "Sen. Keating was wrong." (HT 9/6/62)

- Sen. Morse (Ore) said the U.S. must work in unison with the OAS. Morse said that if a 3/4 OAS vote cannot be had for common action (he said he thought it could be had) "the U.S. will still have the responsibility to take what course of action the facts show may be necessary...to protect the security of the American people from the threat of a Russian Communist beachhead almost on our very own shores." (HT 9/7/62)

- Sen. Hart (Mich) endorsed the President's stand and said that if the situation in Cuba developed

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"into uniform military movement against any nation in this Hemisphere, this we should move in and stop. I hope we would act in concert with other American states." (HT 9/6/62)

- **Rep. Rogers (Fla)** offered a seven-point plant: maximum protection of the American mainland; full-scale U.S. military maneuvers off the coast of Cuba; diplomatic efforts to halt shipments of Soviet goods to Cuba in vessels of NATO countries; evacuation of the families of American men assigned to Guantanamo base in Cuba; American assurance of security of Cuba's neighbors; halting of aid to countries which help Cuba, and demands for just payment for property seized by the Castro regime in Cuba. (HT 9/13/62)

- **Sen. Humphrey (Minn)** declared that the U.S. should not "sit idly and watch the traffic in chains for Cuba." He denounced those allies whose ships carried goods to Cuba. (HT 9/13/62)

- **Sen. Dodd (Conn)** outlined a program of action to contain and turn back the influx of Communist arms. He called for a U.S. commitment to "a declaration of freedom and independence for the Cuban people"; recognition of a provisional Cuban government in exile; invoking the Monroe Doctrine to proclaim a "total embargo" on military shipments to Cuba from Communist states; a greatly expanded propaganda effort directed to both the Cubans and all of Latin America; if necessary later, a total blockade of "all shipments" to Cuba, other than food and consumer goods; open assistance to Cuban freedom fighters. (HT 9/11/62)

- **Sen. Smathers (Fla)** proposed creating a Western Hemisphere military alliance modeled after NATO to deal with Cuba. He maintained that military action would eventually be necessary to overthrow Castro (U.S. military and civilian officials opposed this proposal). (WP 9/20/62)

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M. <u>Standby Authority to call up Reserves</u>

1. <u>JFK Action</u>

On September 7 JFK asked Congress for standby authority to call up 150,000 reserves to meet challenges "in any part of the free world". Although JFK did not directly relate his request to the Cuban situation, the move served to satisfy temporarily the growing GOP demand for action.

2. <u>Congressional Action</u>

Congress granted this authority without any delay.

N. <u>NATO shipping to Cuba</u>

1. <u>JFK Action</u>

In September 1962 Secretary of State Rusk held bilateral talks with foreign ministers of NATO countries to ask them to keep their nationals from chartering vessels to Communist countries to carry goods to Cuba. They were also asked to stop their own exports to Cuba, to eliminate government credits to the Castro regime and to discourage private bankers from issuing credits.
(CSM 9/27/62)

So far West Germany, Italy, Turkey and Greece have made moves to discourage or forbid significant commercial traffic with Cuba. And it is understood that Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands have informally cautioned their shipowners not to create "disturbances" between the U.S. and their countries.

The key nation that has not taken steps as yet to restrict its ships from carrying goods to Cuba is Great Britain. Britain, whose merchant vessels account for the most substantial non-Communist traffic, maintains that legal and moral restraints prevent it from banning non-military shipments.

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[LC]

## 0. Cuba Resolution

Castro's announcement on September 25 of plans to build a port in Cuba for the Soviet Atlantic trawler fleet increased Congressional concern over the Cuban situation. On September 26, the House completed action on a resolution, previously adopted by the Senate, expressing U. S. determination:

(1) "to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force or threat of force its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(2) "to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the U.S.; and

(3) "to work with the OAS and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination."

## 1. JFK Action

The Administration endorsed the resolution; however it was never eager for a resolution of any kind. Only reluctantly did the administration agree to go along with one and Rusk sat in with committees of both houses to make sure that the wording of the document would not interfere with administration policy. (HT 9/27/62)

a. The resolution passed in the Senate by a vote of 86 to 1. Sen. Prouty (R-Vt) cast the sole dissenting vote. He opposed it "in its entirety" because it was not strong enough.

b. There were seven dissenters in the House--all Republican. They were Alger (Tex), Broomfield (Mich), Curtis (Mo), Johansen (Mich), Pillion (NY), Ray (NY) and Utt (Calif) who also opposed it because it was weak.

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[LC]

c. During the House debate each side charged the other with playing politics. Rep. Cramer (R-Fla) accused the Democrats of having drawn up a resolution that "would give the stamp of approval to the arms build-up" in Cuba. Rep. Hayes (D-Ohio) charged some Republicans with trying to strengthen the resolution "to the point where they could make the President declare war and then point to him as the war-party President". (HT 9/27/62)

P. <u>Cuban Missile Crisis - October, 1962</u>

1. <u>JFK Actions</u>

a. On October 22, the Cuban crisis neared the point of explosion. In a special message to the nation JFK revealed the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba and announced the U.S. intention to quarantine Cuba to prevent the arrival there of offensive weapons.

"...Within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation (in Cuba). The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.

"...The characteristics of these new missile sites indicate two distinct types of installations. Several of them include medium-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead for a distance of more than 1,000 miles.

"...Additional sites not yet completed appear to be designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles capable of traveling more than twice as far...In addition, jet bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons, are now being uncrated and assembled in Cuba, while the necessary air bases are being prepared.

"This urgent transformation of Cuba into an important strategic base--by the presence of these large, long-range, and clearly offensive

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[LC]

(6) "We are asking that an emergency meeting of the U.N. Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat...Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of U.N. observers, before the quarantine can be lifted;

(7) "I call upon Chairman Krushchev to halt and eliminate this...threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations."

b. Shortly after JFK delivered his message, the permanent representative of Cuba to the U.N. requested a meeting of the Security Council "to consider the act of war, unilaterally committed by the government of the U.S. in ordering the naval blockade of Cuba".

c. In proposing to quarantine Cuba, JFK called upon the Council of the OAS to meet and take action under articles 6 and 8 of the Rio Treaty. It met on the afternoon of October 23 and unanimously approved the following resolution. (Uruguay abstained because its delegate had difficulty in reaching his government and consequently was without instructions, but it subsequently supported the resolution.)

"The Council of the OAS, meeting as the provisional organ of consultation, resolves:

(1) To call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability;

(2) To recommend that the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the government of Cuba

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[LC]

"...The Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited materiel to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the U.S. in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American states.

"The Secretary of Defense may make such regulations and issue such directives as he deems necessary to ensure the effectiveness of this order, including the designation, within a reasonable distance of Cuba, of prohibited or restricted zones and of prescribed routes.

"Any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search or to proceed as directed. Any vessel or craft which fails or refuses to respond to or comply with directions shall be subject to being taken into custody. Any vessel or craft which it is believed is enroute to Cuba and may be carrying prohibited materiel or may itself constitute such materiel shall, wherever possible, be directed to proceed to another destination of its own choice and shall be taken into custody if it fails or refuses to obey such directions. All vessels or craft taken into custody shall be sent into a port of the U.S. for appropriate disposition.

"In carrying out this order, force shall not be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions, or with regulations or directives of the Secretary of Defense issued hereunder, after reasonable efforts have been made to communicate them to the vessel or craft, or in case of self-defense. In any case, force shall be used only to the extent necessary."

e. On October 23, Ambassador Stevenson submitted a draft resolution to an emergency session of the Security Council calling for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons. It also requested U Thant to send to Cuba a U.N. observer corps to assure and report on compliance with this resolution. It called for the termination of the measures of the quarantine against military shipments, upon U.N. verification of the withdrawal, and it

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[LC]

recommended "that the U.S. and the USSR confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the security and peace of the world and report thereon to the Security Council."

f. On October 24 Assistant Defense Secretary <u>Arthur Sylvester</u> said there was "undeniable evidence" of at least 30 missiles and more than 20 IL-28 jet bombers in Cuba.

g. On October 24, <u>JFK</u> appointed <u>John J. McCloy</u> as Chairman of the President's Cuban Crisis Committee.

2. <u>Congressional Action and Comment</u>

a. <u>Democratic congressional leaders</u> quickly gave their solid support to <u>JFK</u>. (CSM, 10/23/62)

b. <u>Republican congressional leaders</u> issued a somewhat restrained statement which fell somewhat short of a solid endorsement.

"Americans will support the President on the decision or decisions he makes for the security of our country"

The statement was issued by <u>Sens. Dirksen</u> (Ill), <u>Saltonstall</u> (Mass), <u>Hickenlooper</u> (Iowa), and <u>Wiley</u> (Wis) and <u>Reps. Halleck</u> (Ind), <u>Arends</u> (Ill), <u>Chiperfield</u> (Ill). (CSM 10/23/62)

c. However, statements favoring the moves against Cuba came from a number of GOP congressmen including: <u>Reps. Widnall</u> (NJ), <u>Frelinghuysen</u> (NJ) and from <u>Sen. Tower</u> (Tex). (CSM 10/23/62)

3. <u>Other Political Comment</u>

a. Ex-Presidents Truman, Hoover and Eisenhower supported <u>JFK</u>'s action.

b. NAR made a statement on October 23 which supported <u>JFK</u>:

"The signs of Communist menace from Cuba have been clear and mounting for some time now. They could not be ignored. The President has spoken with vigor and has now made the proof of the danger public and plain. All Americans must stand united behind the President and give him their support for whatever action is necessary in the defense of freedom."
(HT 10/23/62)

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[10]

Q. U.S.-U.S.S.R. - Cuban Negotiations to Resolve the Crisis

a. On October 24, U Thant offered to help resolve the Cuban crisis and sent 2 identically worded messages to JFK and Krushchev in which he asked for a voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba and for a voluntary suspension of the quarantine. At the meeting of the U.N. Security Council on the same day he asked that Cuba suspend the construction and development of major military facilities and installations during the same period.

b. On the following day Krushchev accepted U Thant's proposals while JFK said that he was willing to discuss them.

c. On October 25, U Thant asked JFK to do everything within his power to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days. At the same time he sent an appeal to Krushchev to instruct the Soviet ships enroute to Cuba to stay away from the interception area for a limited time only in order to permit discussions for a settlement. Krushchev accepted U Thant's proposal on the following day.

d. On October 26, U Thant again asked Castro to halt the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba. Castro said that he would comply provided that the U.S. lifted its blockade while the negotiations were in progress and also desisted "from threats and aggressive actions against Cuba."

e. During the last weekend in October, the Cuban crisis took a turn for the better. On October 26 Krushchev sent JFK a message--the text of which has never been made public--agreeing to withdraw offensive weapons from Cuba. On October 27, Krushchev sent still another message, the text of which was first broadcast by Soviet radio, with radically different proposals (see below). A White House statement of October 27 took note of the "conflicting" Soviet positions. However, in his reply, JFK ignored the Krushchev message of the 27th and accepted the proposals contained in the unpublished letter as a basis for negotiating a solution of the crisis. The second letter which Krushchev sent to JFK and which the latter ignored contained the following proposal:

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"We agree to remove those weapons from Cuba which you regard as offensive weapons. We agree to do this and to state this commitment in the U.N. Your representatives will make a statement to the effect that the U.S., on its part, bearing in mind the anxiety and concern of the Soviet state, will evacuate its analogous weapons from Turkey. Let us reach an understanding on what time you and we need to put this into effect.

"After this, representatives of the U.N. Security Council could control on-the-spot the fulfillment of these commitments.

"Of course, it is necessary that the governments of Cuba and Turkey would allow these representatives to come to their countries and check fulfillment of this commitment, which each side undertakes...

"We, having assumed this commitment in order to give satisfaction and hope to the peoples of Cuba and Turkey and to increase their confidence in their security, will make a statement in the Security Council to the effect that the Soviet government gives a solemn pledge to respect the integrity of the frontiers and the sovereignty of Turkey, not to intervene in its domestic affairs, not to invade Turkey, not to make available its territory as a place d'armes for such invasion and also will restrain those who would think of launching an aggression against Turkey either from Soviet territory or from the territory of other states bordering on Turkey.

"The U.S. government will make the same statement in the Security Council with regard to Cuba."

f. JFK did not answer the above letter but instead on October 27 sent the following reply to Krushchev's first (unpublished) letter.

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[LC]

i. To provide a better atmosphere for the mission, JFK agreed to suspend the U.S. naval blockade and aerial surveillance of Cuba beginning October 30 during the two days the UN group was to be in Cuba.

j. Castro, in his talks with U Thant made it clear that he had not been consulted about the proposed U.N. inspection and had no intention of agreeing to it. He would not, he said, interfere with the Soviet removal of the missiles.

k. The U.N. mission returned on November 1 without an agreement. There was growing realization that the crisis was not over after all. The U.S. resumed its sea blockade and air surveillance as soon as the U.N. party left Cuba.

1. On November 2, JFK delivered a message to the nation in which he said that "the Soviet missile bases are being dismantled, the missiles are being crated, and the fixed installations at the sites are being destroyed." JFK said that the information was based on aerial photographs. He added that the aerial and sea surveillance would continue until effective international inspection was arranged. He also suggested that the International Committee of the Red Cross would be "an appropriate agency" for carrying out inspection of Cuba-bound cargoes.

N.B. Red Cross inspection was agreed to by both U.S. and U.S.S.R. However, this kind of inspection still would have left open the question of on-site inspection which Castro would not agree to.

m. On November 7, Krushchev announced that all Soviet rockets had been removed from Cuba. The U.S. and Soviet Union agreed to allow U.S. naval vessels to make contact with Soviet ships leaving Cuba and count the missiles. Negotiations among U.S., U.N. and Soviet officials concerning Red Cross inspection of inbound ships continued.

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n. On November 16, the U.N. made public a statement by Castro that Cuba would not submit to "national or international" inspection; he warned that U.S. surveillance flights ran "the risk of being destroyed" by Cuban anti-aircraft fire. A Defense Department spokesman replied that any interference with the surveillance would be met "with counter-action".

N.B. One U.S. plane, a U-2 reconnaissance craft, was shot down over Cuba during the first week of the crisis.

o. On November 20, JFK lifted the naval quarantine. At his first regular press conference since September 13, JFK announced that Krushchev had informed him that all Soviet jet bombers would be removed from Cuba within 30 days. Consequently, he had lifted the quarantine.

The President added that "the evidence to date indicates that all known offensive missile sites in Cuba have been dismantled. The missiles and their associated equipment have been loaded on Soviet ships. And our inspection at sea of these departing ships has confirmed that the number of missiles reported by the Soviet Union as having been brought into Cuba, which corresponded closely to our own information, has now been removed. In addition, the Soviet Government has stated that all nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from Cuba and no offensive weapons will be reintroduced."

The President also said the Soviets had promised to remove certain Soviet ground combat units in due time. But he said no arrangements had yet been completed for U.N. verification of missile removal and no lasting safeguards established to prevent future reintroduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba, and therefore, U.S. aerial surveillance of Cuba would continue.

JFK repeated that he would not invade Cuba; however, he made it clear that he considered his word binding only if the Soviets removed

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p. Although the critical period had ended and the Soviet weapons were being withdrawn, no arrangements had been made for U.N. on-site inspection, and the U.S. therefore had continued its aerial inspections of Cuba. On November 29 _JFK_ and _Mikoyan_ met in Washington to discuss these outstanding issues. No progress was made at their talks, reportedly because Mikoyan was unable to pledge that Castro would permit on-site inspection.

q. On December 6, the Defense Department announced that Navy planes had counted 42 Soviet bombers aboard three Russian ships leaving Cuba. State and Defense Department officials said the Soviet Union had told U.S. diplomats the bombers were the last of those sent to Cuba.

R. <u>Aftermath of Cuban Missile Crisis - December 1962</u>

1. <u>JFK Actions</u>

a. At a press conference on December 10, Secretary of State Rusk indicated the Administration was prepared to wind up the Cuban crisis finally, even though no on-site inspection had yet been provided. Rusk indicated that while the lack of inspection was a "very serious deficiency", the U.S. would not press hard on the matter but would continue its own aerial inspections. Rusk added, however, that the continued presence of "several thousand" Soviet troops in Cuba was "of great concern to us," and pointed out that _JFK_ (in his November 20 press conference) had stated that the Soviets had promised to remove ground troops from Cuba. "Certainly, we in this hemisphere could not accept as a normal situation any Soviet military presence in Cuba," he said. But the emphasis of his remarks was on winding up the Cuban affair and moving on to other matters.

b. On December 17 in an interview with TV reporters, _JFK_ said: "It is going to be some time before it is possible for us to come to any real understandings with Mr. Krushchev." He said: "The Cuban effort has made it more difficult for us to carry out any successful negotiations because this was an effort to materially change the balance of power, it was done in secret, steps were taken really to deceive us by every means they could, and they were planning in November to open to the world the fact that they

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[LC]

had these missiles so close to the U.S.--not that they were intending to fire them, because if they were going to get into a nuclear struggle, they have their own missiles in the Soviet Union. But it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality."

Asked if agreement to international inspection would have meant a "breakthrough" to greater U.S.-Soviet understanding, JFK said: "No...because I don't think we would have gotten the kind of inspection which really is necessary, because a totalitarian system cannot accept the kind of inspection which really is desirable...(it) must exist only in secrecy." JFK added that "the camera is actually going to be our best inspector."

a. First signs of Republican criticism of JFK's handling of the Cuban situation came on November 5 when Sen. Goldwater (R-Ariz) and Rep. Wilson (R-Calif), chairmen of the Republican Senate and House campaign committees issued a joint statement calling on JFK to withdraw his October 27 pledge not to invade Cuba if Soviet missiles were removed. They said that the no-invasion pledge had "locked Castro and Communism into Latin America and had thrown away the key to their removal. The decision, they said, was "the most serious foreign policy error since the Bay of Pigs fiasco last year."

b. However, in December more Republicans became openly critical of the Administration's handling of the Cuban affair.

- At a meeting of the Republican National Committee in Washington, D.C. on December 7, Rep. Wilson (R-Calif), chairman of the National GOP Congressional Committee, said the Cuban crisis had cost the GOP an additional 20 seats in the House in the November 1962 elections. Wilson said he had nightmares that the Democrats would arrange for a crisis every October in an election year but believed the voters would not "swallow manufactured crises in the future".

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-- On December 8 the <u>GOP National Committee</u> adopted resolutions saying the <u>JFK Administration</u> had been for a long time "stalled in indecision" after the GOP had exposed the Russian arms buildup in Cuba, had "deceived the public" in denying prior to October 22 that Soviet offensive weapons were in Cuba, and had adopted a policy of "managing the news" on Cuba. One resolution also said on-site inspection in Cuba was demanded by U.S. security needs. (WP 12/9/62)

-- <u>Sen. Keating (R-NY)</u> warned that "Cuban affair is not over". He called for effective on-site inspection, continued surveillance of shipments going into Cuba, and immediate implementation of more restrictive shipping regulations. He further warned:

> "If we do not act promptly to demand and, if necessary enforce, an effective form of on-site inspection our friends in this hemisphere may find themselves looking not into a Russian missile but down the barrels of 10,000 Russian guns." However, he stated "I certainly do not advocate an invasion of Cuba at this time."

c. <u>Democrats began to join in the criticism</u> when <u>Sen. Russell (D-Ga)</u> criticized the <u>Administration</u> for not having continued its demand for on-site inspection in Cuba. He said "We have temporized. We have even lifted the quarantine. Frankly, I thought that was a mistake. I didn't think we should lift the quarantine, or make any guarantees as to Cuba until we have had the right of on-site inspection throughout Cuba."

N.B. This sums up the opinion of many Americans- it is felt that the U.S. gave up its trump card when it withdrew its blockade and demobilized its troops. Whether the step was taken as a trade or a concession has never been revealed. U Thant spoke of a "compromise" on Cuba and the "principle of give and take".

Sen. Russell now accuses the <u>Administration</u> of having made a blunder in withdrawing before on-site inspection was granted. He feels that our present

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position is a concession to Communism. Here three months ago we were pledged to see that Castroism in this hemisphere was destroyed. We have now been put "into the position of babysitting for Castro and guaranteeing the integrity of the Communist regime in Cuba, and we don't know for a positive fact that the missiles and the bombers have been removed. I assume they have, but all we have seen is a box that they said contained the bomber and a long metal container that they said contained the missile". (HT 12/7/62)

S. Prisoner Exchange - December 23-24, 1962

1. JFK Actions

a. In an exchange negotiated on December 23-24 by the Castro government and the Cuban Families Committee, represented by NY lawyer, James B. Donovan, Castro freed 1,113 prisoners which his forces had captured during the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Castro in return received $53 million in food and drugs and $2.9 million in cash which the Cuban Families Committee had raised in donations from firms and individuals with the unofficial assistance of the Justice Department.

b. On December 29 in a speech to the returned prisoners, JFK, referring to the group's flag, said: "I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Havana," but made no specific commitments to act against Castro.

T. Cuban Task Force

In January JFK appointed Sterling J. Cottrell to head up a Cuban Task Force. His title will be Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, which makes him No. 2 man on Latin Affairs under Martin. He will be assisted by Robert Hurwitch. Both men are Foreign Service Officers.

Contingency planning will be main concern of the new task force, which must face up to issues of the continued presence of Soviet troops and technicians in Cuba, continued Soviet military aid to Castro, and what use the Cuba leader may make subversively or militarily of men and materiel on the Latin American mainland.

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U. New Issues which have arisen since January 1, 1963

i. Charges of the Presence of Offensive Weapons and of
a New Soviet Military Buildup in Cuba

a. Congressional Action and Comment

On January 8, 1963 official sources in Washington hinted there might be 17,000 Soviet troops in Cuba instead of the 8,000 to 10,000 estimated before and during the Cuban crisis. (CSM 1/24/63) This revised figure drew Congressional charges of a new military buildup in Cuba. The charges came primarily from Republicans and some Southern Democrats.

- <u>Sen. Keating</u> (R-NY) warned that there had been a new military buildup in Cuba consisting of tanks, fighter planes and other weapons but not long-range missiles and bombers. He said that he had learned that Soviet military activity in Cuba is 10 times greater than it was last July 1, 1962. (WP 1/25/63) On January 30 Keating warned that there is "continuing absolutely confirmed and undeniable evidence that the Russians have kept their medium missile sites in Cuba, although the Defense Department maintains 'offensive weapons are not re-entering the island'." (Phila. Inq. 2/4/63)

- <u>Sen. Thurmond (D-SC)</u> followed up Keating charges saying that he had been informed by reliable sources that there are forces of 40,000 to 50,000 men under the command of Russian Gen. C. O. Slazenko. Thurmond also claimed that there are about 600 Russian tanks in Cuba, but this is disputed by the Pentagon, which says there are only 400. (Phila. Inq. 2/4/63)

- <u>Sen. Aiken (R-Vt)</u> charged that the Russians have built "an enormously powerful military and political base in Cuba--much stronger than it was six months ago."

- <u>Sen. Dirksen (R-Ill)</u> called Cuba a "military bastion" that constitutes a serious threat to the Western world, particularly the nations of Latin America. (WP 1/13/63)

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[L.C]

- Sen. Stennis (D-Miss) also said that Cuba, with the help of Russia is rapidly becoming the second strongest military power in the Western Hemisphere. (Phila. Inq. 2/4/63)

- Sen. Goldwater (R-Ariz) said he feared the military hardware in Cuba "will be used to supply revolts in other Latin American nations". (Phila. Inq. 2/4/63)

- Rep. Bruce (R-Ind) On February 4, said that there were 40 to 50 offensive missiles still in Cuba "and the highest officials of the U.S. Government know it". Bruce said "highly placed officials in Cuba from several major Western powers friendly to the U.S. counted the unloading from Soviet vessels in Cuba of 82 to 88 Soviet missiles--not 42." The Defense Department promptly denied the charge, saying "No friendly government has so informed the U.S."

- Sen. Symington (D-Mo) said "there is a big Soviet military complex in Cuba" that was built over the last six months. (WP 1/26/63)

- Rep. Miller (R-NY) Chairman of the GOP National Committee, said that Cuba now has 14,000 troops and "enough nuclear warheads to blow the roof off the Kennedy mansion in Palm Beach". (WP 1/26/63)

- Rep. Cramer (R-Fla) introduced a resolution demanding "the restatement and full implementation" of the Monroe Doctrine and calling on the Government, "bilaterally or unilaterally, to take whatever steps are necessary to rid the Hemisphere of the Castro-Communist threat."

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[LC]

b. **JFK Action**

(1) JFK, at his January 24 press conference, stated: "there has not been a military buildup in that sense of the equipment coming in from outside of Cuba". He estimated the present size of Cuba's military might as: approximately 16,000 or 17,000 Russians... the Soviets are continuing to operate the SAM (surface-to-air missile) sites and other technical pieces of equipment, and there are some organized units, the same organized units we have described before, which are still on the territory of Cuba. They are exercising, building some barracks. That is the kind of activity which is going on. There is no influx of military equipment".

(2) **McCone and McNamara briefings** -- To support the Administration's contention that all offensive weapons had been removed from Cuba and that there was no new military buildup, on February 6, CIA Director McCone outlined the current military situation in Cuba to the Senate Armed Services Committee. A censored version of his speech was released to the press. On the same day, Secretary of Defense McNamara held a 2-hour nationally televised press conference and intelligence briefing to inform the public on the military status of Cuba.

-- Both McCone and McNamara gave essentially the same data about the Soviet military might in Cuba. They estimated it as follows:

17,000 Soviet Troops

24 operational anti-aircraft missile sites, each with six launchers

500 SAM missiles

42 MIG-21 fighters

60 MIG 15/17/19 (introduced before July 1962)

4 operational costal defense missile sites with 150 missiles

12 Komar guided missile patrol boats

4 armored groups with a total strength of about 6,000 men in all

[L.C.]

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complete and unarguable assurance which
only open and fully effective on-site
inspection can give. Our necessary and
extensive surveillance of that island is
being sustained with energy, and it is
effective within the limits described last
week by Secretary McNamara and Director
McCone, but rumor persists--and concern
must be real--because of the past record
of attempted deception and the continuing
refusal of complete on-the-spot
verification."

(5) Secretary of State Rusk, on February 13, also voiced his doubts about the effectiveness of the present U.S. system of aerial inspection. He said: 'we cannot, of course, be absolutely certain that none (offensive weapons) remains, in the absence of on-the-spot inspection' (NYT 2/14/62)

(6) Chief of Army Intelligence, Major General Fitch, in testimony before the Senate Armed Forces Preparedness Committee threw some new light on the issue of Soviet weaponry presently in Cuba. He testified that there was no indication that the Russians had removed any ground force units other than those associated with the dismantled offensive missile systems. He also said that the Russians were using thousands of natural caves in Cuba for underground storage of ammunition, vehicles and even aircraft. He stated that some of the modern weaponry sent from Russia has a nuclear capability. (NYT 3/11/63)

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## 2. Cuba as a base for subversion

The result of all of the top-level briefing on Cuba by the Administration did not dissolve either the threat or concern that exists from continued Soviet military presence. If it lessened concern over the Soviet "offensive" threat, it increased concern over the "defensive" Soviet resources still in Cuba and illustrated that the JFK classification of weapons as offensive and defensive has little meaning. There are increasing signs that the Soviet Union is transforming Cuba into a strong military base, despite the withdrawal of the medium and intermediate range missiles and the IL-28 bombers. And it is concern over what the Russians intend doing with these "defensive" weapons that disturbs both the Administration and Congress.

### a. JFK Action

(1) Secretary of Defense McNamara, in his TV intelligence briefing on February 6, stated there was no evidence that Cuba was being used as a base for subversion directed against the other nations of the hemisphere. He said:
> "There are no amphibious capabilities or no capabilities in Cuba such that they could move any of this equipment to any part of the hemisphere. The President has stated that it is this government's policy to insure that the Island of Cuba will not be used as a base for subversion or overt or covert aggression directed against any duly constituted government of any nation in this hemisphere."

> "I have no evidence that Cuba is being used as a base for subversion directed against other Latin American countries. It is a matter that is of constant interest to us and one we are monitoring continuously."

(2) On February 13, Secretary of State Rusk reaffirmed the Administration's policy that "Cuba will not become a base for offensive military operations against other countries of this hemisphere."

- 47 -

(3) At his February 14 press conference _JFK_ contradicted McNamara's denial of evidence of subversion by Cuban Communists. _JFK_ acknowledged that "1,200 students from Latin America" went into Cuba last year for political indoctrination or "for training in more direct forms of political action". However, he said that "we should not regard the communist threat as primarily based on Cuba...there is a good deal... unrelated to Cuba which continues and which feeds on the hardships of the people there, northeast Brazil and other places."

(4) On February 19, _CIA Director_ _McCone_, in a testimony before the _House Foreign Affairs_ Committee and released on March 1, _gave detailed information on subversive activities going on in_ Cuba. He said: "At least 1,000 to 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present."

McCone said that the "one salient conclusion" that evolved from public and secret information was "that Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Communists and other revolutionaries to overthrow and seize control of the governments of Latin America."

He also stated that while "we have evidence that in principle Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents at present, we have no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creating uprisings in Latin American countries."

N.B.: _McCone_'s statement directly contradicts McNamara's of February 6.

- 51 -

[LC]

barracks suggested they might be dragging their feet in the removal of the troops. He said that the U.S. will "give very serious consideration" to evidence that the Soviet troops are in Cuba to stay. Such a development might indicate that Cuba is being converted into an advance base for the subversion of other hemisphere countries, he added. (NYT 2/2/63)

(3) When asked what he intended to do about the continued presence of Soviet military personnel at his February 7 press conference, JFK said:... "We have been carrying out a good many policies in the last four months, since October. We were able to effect the withdrawal of the planes. There has been a reduction of 4,500 in the number of personnel...The continued presence of Soviet military personnel is of concern to us." Later he said that "we ought to keep a sense of proportion about the size of the force we are talking about. We are talking about four groups, 1,100 to 1,200 men each. Those are the organized military units. That is about 6,000 men. Obviously, those forces cannot be used to invade another country. They may be used to maintain some sort of control within Cuba, but obviously, they are not a force that can be used externally."

(4) On February 9, Secretary of State Rusk called Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to the State Department and asked him when the USSR planned to withdraw Soviet troops from the island. Reportedly, Dobrynin was unable to give Rusk a firm answer. He told Rusk that the Soviet troops were in Cuba for training purposes only. (CQ 2/15/63)

(5) On February 13, Rusk speaking at a State Department foreign policy conference, called for the early withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba. He said: "We in the Western Hemisphere cannot accept as normal any Soviet military presence in this Hemisphere. The authorities in Moscow and Havana must recognize that Soviet military elements in Cuba do not insure the peace of Cuba but poison the atmosphere and increase the dangers. The sooner this source of potential trouble is eliminated, the better for everyone concerned."

[LC]

- 52 -

(6) On February 19 JFK received a promise from the Soviet Union that several thousand Soviet troops would be withdrawn from Cuba by March 15. No further information on the agreement was made public; however, it was reported that the promise was not a new commitment but rather a follow-up of the earlier promise during the negotiations in October. (NYT 2/20/63)

b. <u>Congressional Action and Comment</u>

(1) <u>Sens. Keating</u> (R-NY), <u>Thurmond</u> (D-SC), <u>Stennis</u> (D-Miss) and <u>Reps. Cramer</u> (R-Fla), <u>Gross</u> (R-Iowa) and <u>Selden</u> (D-Ala) participated in a nationwide TV program, which was billed as the answer to McNamara's intelligence briefing. They demanded tougher Administration action to get the Soviet troops out of Cuba and largely repeated previous comments on the inadequacy of JFK's program.

- Gross urged the establishment of an "ironclad blockade" against Cuba with the "hope this will avoid war."

(2) <u>Sen. Javits</u> (R-NY) recommended a series of gradual steps designed to increase pressure on the Soviet Union to remove its troops and weapons from Cuba. No further details have been given on his plan. (CSM 2/14/63)

(3) <u>Sen. Cooper</u> (R-Ky) said the U.S. should impose another blockade of Cuba to force out Soviet troops if diplomatic maneuvers fail to dislodge the Russians. "If we will establish the position that we will not accept and tolerate a Russian base in Cuba, we can maintain it as a policy for the Western Hemisphere." (WP 2/12/63)

(4) <u>Sen. Stennis</u> (D-Miss) said that steps to combat the Soviet position in Cuba should include "first economic pressure, and getting the OAS to cooperate on that as far as they will...and I think unless we get results otherwise we will be driven to a blockade and one step will have to follow another unless results are obtained.
(CSM 2/19/63)

[LC]

- 53 -

(5) Rep. Miller (R-NY) said that the U.S. should consider reimposition of the naval quarantine to remove the troops from Cuba. In addition, he feels that the U.S. should work with the OAS to invoke economic sanctions against Cuba. (CSM 2/19/63)

(6) The Soviet announcement of the proposed removal of troops did not quiet the Administration's critics. The general tenor of Congressional criticism is reflected in the following statements: (NYT 2/20/63)

-- Sen. Dirksen (R-Ill) said there was "no indication in the (Soviet) message of how many troops or what kind, will be withdrawn or when. What the people are interested in is withdrawal of all Soviet troops of all kinds from Cuba at the earliest possible date."

-- Sen. Stennis (D-Miss) welcomed the Soviet message; however, he cautioned that more was needed. He said he would like to know which troops would be removed--whether combat or not--and termed the whole matter "just one step".

-- Sen. Lausche (D-Ohio) called the message "a good start" but warned that "a token withdrawal to put us at ease is not what is needed".

## 4. Management of the News

During the Cuban crisis the Administration severely restricted the flow of information on the naval quarantine, the U.S. military buildup in Florida, negotiations and other matters and later even ordered State and Defense officials to report to their superiors on their talks with newsmen.

This policy aroused considerable controversy particularly after Assistant Defense Secretary Arthur Sylvester was reported as calling the Administration's handling of the news during the crisis a form of weaponry.
(CQ 1962 Almanac p 339)

- 54 -

a. <u>JFK Action</u>

(1) When asked about his policy of "managing the news" at his February 21 press conference, <u>JFK</u> replied: "Let me say we have had very limited success in managing the news, if that is what we have been trying to do."

(2) Assistant Secretary of State Robert Manning termed the policy of managing the news as bringing orderly coherence out of a mass of facts to present a clear picture of a government's position. He said that if the U.S. position were not presented "in a way that leaves no mistake" in the mind of the U.S. public and abroad, "I think we would have chaos and a great dangerous state of affairs."
(NY Standard 3/11/63)

b. <u>NAR Comment</u>

In his speech to the N.Y. State Publishers Association on January 29, NAR attacked JFK's information policies. He called them "fundamentally and dangerously wrong". He demanded to know when the public will be told what the true situation is in Cuba.

c. <u>Congressional Comment</u>

(1) <u>Sen. Stennis (D-Miss)</u> said: "I do not think the people of the U.S. have been told all the facts (on Cuba)...I don't think the Congress has a sufficient knowledge of the facts as a whole." (NYT 2/4/63)

(2) <u>Sen. Keating (R-NY)</u> also has criticized the Administration's information policies.

(3) <u>Sen. Goldwater (R-Ariz)</u> said that he still questions "how much we actually do know" about what is going on in Cuba. "Under our controlled news policy I think we are not getting what our intelligence does know." He added he would press for a full investigation by the Senate Armed Services Committee. (CSM 1/26/63)

- 55 -

(4) The House Government Information Subcommittee is planning a public hearing on the Administration's information policy during the Cuban crisis. (NYT 1/13/63)

V. New Shipping Order

1. JFK Action

On February 6, 1963 JFK issued an order denying Government-financed cargoes to foreign merchant vessels engaged in trade with Cuba. (The actual effect of the regulation, sources said, is likely to be minimal)

The order will apply only to individual vessels that still trade with Cuba. They will be denied the right to carry cargoes partly or wholly financed by the U.S., including subsidized farm products, military and civilian goods shipped under U.S. foreign aid programs and various other Government property.

It was understood that enforcement of the order would be left largely to U.S. shipping brokers who assign cargoes to foreign merchant vessels. Enforcement will be supervised by Government agencies involved in international traffic, including the Departments of State, Defense, Agriculture, the General Services Administration and AID. (NYT 2/7/62)

N.B.: The shipping order was a scaled-down version of a series of restrictions the Administration had planned to issue before the missile crisis in October. Those restrictions would have closed U.S. ports to any ship also stopping in Cuba on the same voyage and to all ships of any country delivering arms to Cuba. It also would have denied Government-financed cargoes to all vessels of any shipper engaged in trade with Cuba.

On February 7 Reps. Watson (D-SC), Pelly (R-Wash) Cramer (R-Fla), and Rogers (D-Fla) criticized the shipping order. Watson said: "I submit that the President's order makes a mockery of economic sanctions. Under it a foreign company or country made trade indefinitely with both Cuba and with this nation, because the order is directed toward individual vessels rather than companies or countries."

- 56 -

ADDENDUM

# EVOLUTION OF SOVIET MILITARY COMMITMENT TO CUBA

## I. Before the Bay of Pigs Invasion

a. July 9, 1960 -- Krushchev in a televised speech to the Soviet teachers' convention warned that the USSR would support the Castro regime with rockets against US intervention in Cuba. He asserted that the Soviet Union would back Castro against "the intrigue of imperialists" and that "figuratively speaking, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire."

Krushchev said that the US reduction of Cuban sugar imports was intended "to strangle the economy of Cuba" and could be a prelude to military intervention against Castro. He said the USSR had "rockets which can land precisely in a...target 13,000 km. away" and "this...is a warning to those who would like to solve international problems by force and not by reason."

b. July 12, 1960 -- Krushchev at a Kremlin news conference said that "should the US imperialists undertake aggressive action against the Cuban people upholding their national independence, we should support the Cuban people." He made it clear that this support would extend to Cuban efforts to evict the US from its naval base at Guantánamo Bay, but he denied as "silly fabrication" the idea that the USSR itself wanted military bases in Cuba. The USSR's "best base is the Soviet Union, from which Soviet rockets can hit unerringly any sector in any part of the globe."

c. September 25, 1960 -- Krushchev stated that the USSR's threat to come to the aid of Cuba with rockets was in "reciprocity" for similar US defense agreements with Iran and Turkey.

d. October 28, 1960 -- The Soviet news agency Tass published two versions of Krushchev's clarification of his July 9 statement which was made in Moscow on October 22 in an interview with a Cuban newsmen. In a summary of the interview released by Tass on October 28, Krushchev was quoted as saying that he would like his promise to defend Cuba to be regarded as a "symbolic" offer. Tass added: "For this purpose Krushchev said it is essential that the imperialists' threat of (military) intervention against Cuba should not materialize. and then there will be no need to confirm the reality of our statement about armed assistance to...Cuba."

- 57 -

[LC]

In the full text of the interview released by Tass on
October 29, Krushchev was quoted as agreeing with the
Cuba newsmen that "if this (military) threat is carried
out (against Cuba), (Soviet) rockets are adequately
prepared" to come to Cuba's defense.

## II. After the Bay of Pigs Invasion

a. April 18, 1961 -- Krushchev sent a message to JFK appealing to the latter "to call a halt to the aggression" Cuba. In this letter he stated the Soviet Union's position in regard to Cuba:

> "As to the Soviet Union there should be no misunderstanding of our position: we shall render the Cuban people and their Government all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack on Cuba.

> "We are sincerely interested in a relaxation of international tension, but if others aggravate it, we shall reply in full measure."

On the same day, Krushchev issued a statement in which the USSR demanded "the urgent study by the UN General Assembly of the question of aggressive action of the US, which has prepared and unleashed intervention against Cuba...The Soviet Government reserves the right, if armed intervention in the affairs of the Cuban people is not cut short, to take together with other countries all steps to render the necessary aid to the Republic of Cuba."

b. April 22, 1961 -- Krushchev charged that the US is following a "slippery and dangerous path that could lead to a world war". He made no further mention of Soviet readiness to assist the Castro government, but he told JFK it would be "dangerous" to claim rights toward Cuba merely because its territory might in theory be used as a missile-launching site against the US. (NYT 4/23/61)

c. April 26, 1961 -- Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to the UN, said that the Soviet Union was ready to come to Cuba's aid in the event of an attack. "If the Soviet Union says it will extend assistance, it will extend assistance." He also stated that any interference by the US or other countries in Cuba's affairs would lead to strife and conflict "whose limits could not be predetermined." (NYT 4/27/61)

d. September 7, 1961 -- Krushchev in an interview with C. L. Sulzberger said: "We recognize Cuba as an independent nation and she has the right to establish the internal system her people may choose. If she is attacked, she may count on the help of all peace-loving nations ready to fight against aggression. "We have no treaties with Cuba, but if she appeals to us for help in case of aggression against her, we will of course not leave such an appeal unanswered."

### III. Before the October 1962 Missile Crisis

a. September 11, 1962 -- The Soviet government warned the US that any US attack on Cuba or on Soviet ships carrying supplies to Cuba would result in nuclear war. The USSR also charged that JFK's request that Congress give him stand-by authority to order 150,000 military reservists to active duty was a "screen for aggressive plans" that would "inevitably lead to aggravating the international atmosphere."

b. September 22, 1962 -- Gromyko, in a statement before the UN, said that "...the Soviet government believes it is necessary to raise its voice in warning...An attack on Cuba would have implications about which the Soviet government warned the whole world in the well-known statement issued on September 11, 1962". (see above)

### IV. After the October 1962 Missile Crisis

a. December 12, 1962 -- Krushchev in his address to the Supreme Soviet stated:

1. "Our only aim was the defense of Cuba

"Rockets were placed there so that the American imperialists, if they really decided on invasion, should feel that the war which they were threatening stands on their own frontier and so that they should have a more realistic idea of the danger of thermonuclear war

2. "The President (JFK) reaffirmed (on November 20) the US undertaking not to invade Cuba

- 59 -

3. "The US gave before the world a public statement not to attack the Cuba Republic and to restrain their allies from doing so.

4. "The Soviet government hopes that the pledges assumed by the US with regard to Cuba will be strictly observed because the breaking of these pledges would be dangerous not only to that particular region and because it would inevitably give rise to another acute conflict and create a new threat to peace.

5. "On our part we shall firmly adhere to the agreement that has been achieved as a result of the exchange of messages with the US President. We would like to issue a clear warning that our pledges remain in force so long as the other side abides by this agreement.

6. "In the event of these pledges not being respected by the other party, we would be forced to take such actions as would be required from us in the circumstances. It must be clear to all that our country will never leave revolutionary Cuba in trouble.

7. "One is nevertheless justified in wondering. We managed to prevent the unleashing of war in the case of Cuba with the aid of a sensible compromise, but the world was literally on the very brink of that war, and if the imperialists again tighten the knot will it be possible even to slacken it? One cannot swear to it...One can say to such people: Maybe you think that we shall undertake, under pressure from you, to withdraw rockets from the Soviet Union or that we shall be scared by the threat of being bombed. I tell you straight...if you build your policy on such calculations as this you will make a big mistake.

8. "The Soviet Union acted differently. It not only exposed the imperialist maneuvers of the US against revolutionary Cuba, but it sent its weapons to Cuba. It sent its men, who were ready to give their lives in struggle in defense of Cuba. And when a threat loomed over Cuba our men received orders to defend Cuba against invasion.

9. "It (US) understood that if its forces had sparked off the fire of war in Cuba and both Cuban and Soviet people in Cuba were burned in that fire, then no force could have restrained the Soviet Union from delivering a crushing retaliatory blow.

- 60 -

10. "We have conviction in the ultimate victory of our ideas. We do not seek these victories on roads to war but on the paths of peaceful competition with capitalism. We not only reject a world thermonuclear war, but in general, all wars between states, with the exception of a just liberation war and a defensive war which people subjected to aggression are forced to wage.

b. **January 1, 1963** -- Krushchev, in his New Year's message to Cuba, reiterated Soviet support for Castro's demands on the US which include evacuation of Guantanamo and said they represented a "good foundation" for peace in the Caribbean. The message, which stressed "unbreakable, brotherly Soviet-Cuban friendship" was coupled with a further assurance in the military newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda that the Soviet Union "will never leave Cuba in the lurch, that Revolutionary Cuba will not remain defenseless." (NYT 1/2/63)

c. **January 16, 1963** -- Krushchev said in reply to Communist China's charges of a "Munich" in Cuba: "If we had put the missiles in Cuba to start a nuclear war on the US and then had withdrawn them, it would look as if we had given up our aims...(But) the Soviet Union never had such an aim. We wanted only to prevent an invasion of Cuba by the imperialists. Judging events from this point of view... we have won". The best proof of the USSR's success is the fact that "revolutionary Cuba exists and is being strengthened"..."It is true that we made a concession, but it was in reply to a concession by the other side". JFK had "undertaken an obligation before the whole world" not to invade Cuba; JFK's concession made unnecessary the continued presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba.

d. **February 22, 1963** -- Defense Minister Malinovsky in a speech marking the 45th anniversary of the Soviet Army and Navy made the most direct public pledge ever given by Moscow to intervene on behalf of the Castro regime if Cuba came under US attack. (NYT 2/23/63)

He warned the US "that an attack on Cuba would mean a third world war. If such an attack is made, the peace-loving forces of the world would not confine themselves to protests and demonstrations. They will rise in defense of the victim of aggression and the Soviet Union will be in the first ranks of those who will come to its assistance."

- 61 -

[LC]

He added: "If the aggressive forces of imperialism refuse to adhere to the principle of the UN and start a war, this war will be waged not only on the territory of Cuba but also on the territory of the US."

e. February 27, 1963 -- In an election campaign speech, Krushchev made the following statements: (Phila Inq 2/28/63)

1. "It will be recalled that the President of the US pledged himself not to invade Cuba, while we agreed to withdraw strategic missiles and IL-28 bombers from Cuba and did withdraw them.

2. "If, however, the imperialists violate the right of the peoples to choose the socio-political system they want, if they try to impose their will on the peoples, this will lead to a world thermonuclear war.

3. This is why we resolutely warn Messrs. Imperialists: "If an attack is made on Cuba...the Soviet Union will come to the assistance of its friends and strike a devastating blow at the aggressors."

JFK'S DEMANDS FOR INSPECTION

AT THE TIME OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

1. On October 22, 1962, in his special message to the nation, JFK stated:

> "We are asking that an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council be convoked without delay to take action against this latest Soviet threat...Our resolution will call for the prompt dismantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of UN observers, before the quarantine can be lifted;

> "I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this... threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations."

2. On October 27, 1963, in response to an unpublished letter from Khrushchev, JFK made the following provisions for the settlement of the crisis:

> "...The first thing that needs to be done...is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under effective UN arrangements.

> "Assuming this is done promptly, I have given my representatives in New York instructions that will permit them to work out... an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cuban problem along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26...The key elements of your proposals which seem generally acceptable... are as follows:

(1) You would agree to remove these weapon systems from Cuba under appropriate UN observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba."

further introduction of such weapons systems into Cops."
and undertake, with attitude, to permit the
Cops under appropriate UN observation and arbitration;
(1) You would agree to remove these weapon systems from

are as follows:

Key elements of your proposals which seem generally acceptable...
along the lines suggested in your letter of October 26...The
an arrangement for a permanent solution to the Cops problem
in New York instructions that will permit them to work out...
"Agreeing this to be done promptly." I have given my representatives

effective UN arrangements.

in Cops capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable, under
on offensive missile peace in Cops and for all weapons systems
"...The first thing that needs to be done...is for work to cease

of the crisis:

Khrushchev, JAK made the following brochures for the settlement
On October 21, 1963, in response to an unoffended letter from

nations.

threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two
"I call upon Chairman Khrushchev to halt and eliminate this...

can be fitted;

under the supervision of UN operators, before the quarantine
diamantling and withdrawal of all offensive weapons in Cops,
latest Soviet thrust...Our resolution will call for the prompt
Council be convoked without delay to take action against this
"We are asking that an emergency meeting of the UN Security

1. On October 22, 1963, in his special message to the nation, JAK stated:

AT THE TIME OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
JAK'S DEMANDS FOR INJECTION

[10]

"(2) We, on our part, would agree--upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the UN to insure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments--(a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba. I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise."

3. On November 2, JFK delivered a message to the nation in which he said that:"

N.B. Red Cross inspection was agreed to by both US and USSR. However, this kind of inspection still would have left open the question of on-site inspection which Castro would not agree to.

4. On November 20, JFK lifted the naval quarantine. At his first regular press conference since September 13, JFK announced that Khrushchev had informed him that all Soviet jet bombers would be removed from Cuba within 30 days. Consequently, he had lifted the quarantine. The President added that:

-2-

[L.C.]

The President also said the Soviets had promised to remove certain Soviet ground combat units in due time. But he said no arrangements had yet been completed for UN verification of missile removal and no lasting safeguards established to prevent future reintroduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba; and therefore, US aerial surveillance of Cuba would continue.

JFK repeated that he would not invade Cuba; however, he made it clear that he considered his word binding only if the Soviets removed all offensive weapons from Cuba and kept them out under some form of inspection, and only if Cuba was not used as a base for Communist activities against other hemisphere governments. Moreover, he said, even after such a pledge went into effect, the US would continue other anti-Castro activities short of invasion. His exact words were:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And as I said in September, we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere."

5. Although the critical period had ended and the Soviet weapons were being withdrawn, no arrangements had been made for UN on-site inspection, and the US therefore had continued its aerial inspections of Cuba. On November 29 JFK and Mikoyan met in Washington to discuss these outstanding issues. No progress was made at their talks, reportedly because Mikoyan was unable to pledge that Castro would permit on-site inspection.

6. At a press conference on December 10, Secretary of State Rusk indicated the Administration was prepared to wind up the Cuban crisis finally, even though no on-site inspection had yet been provided. Rusk indicated that while the lack of inspection was a "very serious deficiency," the US would not press hard on the matter but would continue its own aerial inspections. Rusk added, however,

-3-

that the continued presence of "several thousand" Soviet troops
in Cuba was "of great concern to us," and pointed out that JFK
(Xin his November 20 press conference) had stated that the Soviets
had promised to remove ground troops from Cuba. "Certainly, we
in this hemisphere could not accept as a normal situation any
Soviet military presence in Cuba," he said. But the emphasis
of his remarks was on winding up the Cuban affair and moving on
to other matters.

7. On December 17, in an interview with TV reporters, JFK said:

"It is going to be some time before it is possible for us to come to any real understandings with Mr. Khrushchev...The Cuban effort has made it more difficult for us to carry out any successful negotiations because this was an effort to materially change the balance of power, it was done in secret, steps were taken really to deceive us by every means they could, and they were planning in November to open to the world the fact that they had these missiles so close to the US -- not that they were intending to fire them, because if they were going to get into a nuclear struggle, they have their own missiles in the Soviet Union. But it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality."

Asked if agreement to international inspection would have meant
a "breakthrough" to greater US-Soviet understanding, JFK said:

-4-

3. On the same day the Council, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation on behalf of the foreign ministers, authorized the appointment of a special committee to investigate Venezuela's charges. The vote was 16 to 0.

-- Mexico abstained.

-- Brazil voted in favor of the inquiry after demanding assurances that Cuba would be given an opportunity to present her case.

4. On December 8 the special committee, headed by Rodolfo Weidemann, Agrentine Ambassador to the OAS, went to Venezuela for five days. The committee's report will not be concluded until the end of January of early February. However, according to a New York Times article (1/6/64), "committee members have let it be known that they are convinced of the authenticity of the Venezuelan charges."

5. Following the issuance of the report, it is expected that a special meeting of the foreign ministers will be held, probably in mid-February.

Attached are:

1. Venezuela's request for the special meeting of the Organ of Consultation. Since the only available text is in Spanish, I have made a rough translation of it.

2. Resolutions adopted by the OAS Council;

3. Resolutions adopted by the Organ of Consultation.

I will advise you of any new developments on this issue.

cc: Roswell Perkins
June Goldthwart
Douglas Bailey

March 5, 1964

ALLIED TRADE WITH CUBA

The security of the Free World depends upon our alliances.
The future of the North Atlantic area, and with it the future of
the world as we know it depend upon the combined strength of the
United States and its allies.

Military strength is vital to an alliance. And military
strength we have and will continue to have. But the most precious
asset of any alliance is confidence. The alliance is only as
strong as the mutual confidence of its members. When we are con-
fused and erratic in our actions, confidence in us suffers.

In spite of these facts the Democratic Administration has
been almost constantly at loggerheads with one or another of our
allies on a series of issues from Skybolt to the French recognition
of Communist China.

Once again we are locked in a policy dispute with our NATO
allies, this time on trading policy with Cuba. In essence, the
difference of policy between us and our allies is that we have
refused to trade at all with Cuba -- technically, in all goods
except food and medicines, but practically, a complete embargo --
whereas our allies see no reason why they should not engage in
the Cuban trade as long as they apply to Cuba the same restrictions
they apply to trade with other Communist countries.

Recent events have shown that the confusion and vacillation
of our policy have placed further stresses on our NATO alliance.

1. Cutoff of aid to Britain and France

Our British and French allies could not but have been
confused and angered when it was announced on February 18th that
the U.S. had terminated all foreign aid to Britain and France in
retaliation for their trade with Cuba. The assistance to Britain
and France amounted to, at most, $100,000 each of military aid.

Apparently we are willing to invoke sanctions big enough
to annoy, but too trivial to be effective. The principal effect
of our action is a further rending of the Western Alliance.

We could have acted in a way which would have cemented
the Alliance rather than causing further cracks in it. We should
have done so. We should have called for a common policy with our
allies on trade with Cuba and reached agreement through negotiation
with them on such a policy.

[LC]

- 2 -

Moreover, it seems extraordinary that aid to Britain and France has been cut off when the Administration is yet to cut off aid to Indonesia, which daily is committing aggression against Malaysia, a trusted and valuable friend of the West.

## 2. Aid to Spain

At the same time that aid to Britain and France was cut, the Administration announced that no new aid commitments would be made to Spain or Morocco. However, five days later it was reported that the Administration was preparing to reverse its position on stopping aid to Spain. It had apparently become clear that halting military aid to Spain, which amounted to $30 million in 1963 and was expected to be larger in 1964, would endanger our bases there.

It is a symptom of the confusion of our policy that Spain, the largest trader with Cuba, has apparently been excepted from the aid cutoff because we have bases there, while such traditional allies as Britain and France have had their aid ended.

## 3. The question of a consumer boycott

The question of our allies' trade with Cuba was further confused by contradictory statements emerging from the State Department on encouragement of a consumer boycott of foreign firms trading with Cuba. The Secretary of State seemed to encourage such a boycott at one instance, but was contradicted four days later by an official spokesman of the State Department.

- On February 15th, Secretary Rusk said: "Well, we don't ourselves plan to organize any boycott against the goods of countries that may be engaged in that trade. I think it is possible there may be some consumer reaction in this country, here and there, with respect to firms that specifically engage in that trade."

- On February 20th, an official spokesman of the State Department contradicted Secretary Rusk: "The United States does not favor consumer boycotts."

In view of our vacillations in policy, it is small wonder that our allies do not know when we announce a policy whether we intend to adhere to it.

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4. U.S. shipment of lard to Cuba

There was further confusion over a proposed shipment of
$2 million of lard to Cuba by two U.S. companies. This sale
would have been the largest movement of U.S. goods to Cuba since
the food and medical shipments used to ransom the prisoners of
the Bay of Pigs attempted invasion.

On February 28th it was revealed that the U.S. companies
were negotiating for the sale. A State Department official stated:
"...the deal would be within the letter of the law."

Later in the same day the sale of lard was stopped by
the Department of Commerce.

5. The U.S. wheat deal

The question of allied trading with Cuba has been further
complicated by our position on selling wheat to the Soviet Union.

On February 25th Secretary Rusk said that the wheat deal
was a question of the "Yankee trading viewpoint" of "swapping
surplus foddstuffs for gold and hard currency which help to
balance our international payments."

This assessment of the wheat deal completely misrepresents
the significance of that transaction. Trading with the Communists
is a problem for the joint action of all our allies. In the ab-
sence of a common policy, each ally will consult only its own
interests. Therefore, if we extend government credit for the sale
of wheat to the largest Communist country, the Soviet Union, we
must not be surprised if our allies trade with and extend credit
to Cuba.

* * * * *

Is it any wonder that our capacity for world leadership
is increasingly being questioned?

We should have a clear policy, including a trading policy
with Cuba. There should be a set of priorities which is under-
stood by both ourselves and our allies. Without such a formula-
tion of objectives, our allies will never be able to comprehend
our policies and will always be confused when we announce a policy
as to whether we really mean to adhere to it.

May 13, 1964

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Cuba Government in Exile

I have not included in the present draft of the Cuba statement a recommendation to establish a government in exile. Instead, I have proposed the following text:

"The United States should urge the following graduated steps, all of which are consistent with the Rio Treaty, the Act of Bogota and the Punta del Este Resolution:

1. Encouragement of the various Cuban groups in exile to commit themselves to a program of democracy and social progress for the day that Cuba returns to the community of free nations. Such a program would demonstrate to the Cuban people that the overthrow of Castro would not mean a return to the conditions prior to his revolution.

2. An OAS announcement that a Cuban government adopting such a program would be welcomed again as a valued member of the Organization of American States."

My reason is as follows:

1. You have often said that you wanted to say nothing as a candidate that you are not prepared to implement as President.

2. I do not believe any of the major Latin American governments would support such an approach.

3. If a government in exile did exist but was unsuccessful or inactive, the goal of getting rid of Communism in the Hemisphere would become even more difficult than it is now.

4. The proper approach in my opinion would be to urge the refugee groups to form a committee and specify a program of democracy and reform which they would support if Castro fell.

This approach is now in the prepared speech. It would be perfectly consistent to add to what is now in the speech the following sentence:

Following sentence:

This approach is now in the prepared speech. It would be:

4. The proper approach in my opinion would be to urge the refugees to form a committee and abdicate a program of democracy. It would be:

3. If a government in exile did exist but was unsuccessful or
inoperative, the goal of getting rid of Communism in the

President.

1. You have often said that you wanted to say nothing as a
candidate that you are not prepared to implement as a

My reason is as follows:

such a program would be welcomed again as a valued
2. An OAS announcement that a Cuban government adopting

to his revolution.

Castro would not mean a return to the conditions prior
demonstrate to the Cuban people that the overthrow of
the community of free nations. Such a program would
social progress for the day that Cuba returns to
commit themselves to a program of democracy and
encouragement of the various Cuban groups in exile

steps, all of which are consistent with the Rio Treaty.

statement a recommendation to establish a government in exile.
I have not included in the present draft of the Cops

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Klaeiger

May 13, 1964

- 2 -

"When and if the Cuban exile groups have established their unity and defined the programs they would support in Cuba, the United States and the Latin American governments can consider the advisability of recognizing the united refugee movement as the legitimate government of Cuba in exile."

5. Our present draft contains several proposals for joint action based on a quarantine of Cuba. Without them, a government in exile would be futile. If adopted, a government in exile would be most useful after they are implemented.

- 2 -

CYP

May 18, 1964

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

My reason for advising against going further and urging a government in exile is as follows:

- 2 -

June 16, 1964

TO: THE GOVERNOR

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Cuba: Proposals of the Republican Citizens Committee's Critical Issues Council

On May 1, 1964, the Critical Issues Council, sponsored by the Republican Citizens Committee, issued a paper criticizing the Administration's handling of the Cuban situation and offering a series of proposals to deal with the problem.

A. **Criticism of the Administration's Cuban policy:** The Administration has failed to formulate a clear and firm policy toward Cuba. It has relied on improvisations as evidenced by its actions at the time of the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis. Consequently, the US has lost the initiative.

1. **The economic embargo against Cuba** has not succeeded, partly because the Administration has not used the power it has available to assure its success.

Under the Foreign Aid Appropriations Act of 1963, the President has the authority to cut off aid to any countries which trade with Cuba. However, "except for the ineffectual gestures to reduce minimal aid to a few allies, this Administration has not seen fit to...enforce its trade restrictions policy."

2. **The prevention of attacks on Cuba by Cuban patriots** is an ill-conceived policy. While there may be legal and strategic reasons for not permitting the Cuban exiles to use the US as the base for their raids, there is no reason for US Immigration and Border Patrol officials to thwart refugee raiding parties leaving other nations. In view of Cuba's grave economic problems, the sabotage and harrassment by Cuban exiles can create painful economic problems for Castro, foster unrest among the Cuban people and contribute to Castro's ultimate downfall.

3. **An inter-American approach to the Cuban problem** is an essential element in any policy toward Cuba. Unfortunately the US has not exerted the kind of leadership necessary to bring about concerted and tough OAS action against Cuba.

- 2 -

4. The Alliance for Progress has not produced "the dramatic improvement in the conditions which would certainly strengthen the US in its struggle against Castro-Communism."

B. The Council's Proposed Program

1. The principle objective of the United States must be the ultimate removal of International Communism from Cuba. So long as the Soviet Union maintains a base for subversor and military operations in this hemisphere neither the United States nor its Latin American neighbors will be safe.

2. The US must make clear that it is prepared, as a last resort, to use military force to remove Communism from Cuba. The possible use of force is the foundation of NATO, SEATO and the OAS and the known willingness to use force is the best guarantee that it will not be needed.

3. The US and all other free nations should help form a Cuban government-in-exile and recognize and support it as the only true representative of the Cuban people.

a. Representatives of this government-in-exile should travel to all the countries of Latin America to tell the truth about what has happened in Cuba and enlist support for their cause.

b. It should be based in a Latin American country.

c. It should have at its command powerful radio transmitters to reach regularly all the people of Cuba, keeping them informed of the activities and progress of the new government.

4. The US should begin immediately to work for the unification of exile patriot groups and should give substantial support to the provisional government, either directly or indirectly.

5. The US should end immediately its program of halting attacks on Cuba by refugee groups which leave from nations other than the US. And the Cuban government-in-exile should increase the number and effectiveness of such raids.

- 3 -

6. The US must do everything in its power to persuade the Free World to stop trading with Communist Cuba. The Administration must mobilize US allies into a unified and effective economic quarantine of Cuba. Under the Foreign Aid Act of 1963, the United States can (and must, or show cause otherwise) withhold aid from nations which trade with Cuba.

7. If the other Free World nations continue to put national interest above the common good, the US would be justified in selectively withdrawing its aid and power now committed to the protection of certain other areas so that it could concentrate its energies in protecting its own highest-priority interests.

8. The President of the US should take the lead in calling diplomatic conference of the leading free nations of the world for the purpose of reaching a common agreement to work together constantly and persistently in meeting each serious Communist probe.

9. The US should take the initiative within the OAS to strengthen the policy of collective action, to isolate Cuba completely from the remainder of Latin American, to restrict all travel between Cuba and the remainder of the hemisphere, to persuade the other American republics to withdraw recognition from Castro, and to recognize and aid a government-in-exile.

10. The US, with the cooperation of the OAS and especially with the Cuban government-in-exile, should greatly intensify its counter-propaganda in Latin America.

11. Finally, the US must re-assess the Alliance for Progress and seek new ways to make it effective. The Alliance cannot succeed unless it is a cooperative program among the nations of Latin American and the US. US aid should be given liberally to those nations which live up to their part of the bargain, and withheld from those which do not.