Office of the Chairman

S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc.

Racine, Wisconsin 53403-5011

Raymond F. Farley
President
Chief Operating Officer

MAY 31 1988.

May 27, 1988

VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10022

Dear Henry:

Attached is the original letter to President Nixon and
to you which I sent to your office via facsimile
earlier this week. I am sorry you did not receive the
letters. Apparently we misunderstood the instructions
from your staff.

If you have an opportunity to review the letters prior
to leaving on your trip, I would appreciate your
calling me. However, I recognize that this is a
holiday weekend, and, if your day is anything like mine
just before leaving on a trip, I will certainly
understand if you do not have time to review this. I
may be reached at my home telephone 414/639-8101 or at
my office telephone 414/631-2562.

If I do not hear from you or your staff, I will call
you in the middle of June, after your return, so that
we can discuss the letter.

Best regards,

RFF/blk

Office of the Chairman

S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc.

Racine, Wisconsin 53403-5011

May 24, 1988

Dear Henry:

I very much enjoyed our last conversation, and I am
most appreciative of your offer to help us in our
effort to obtain President Richard Nixon as a guest
speaker at our next conference.

We have attached a proposed letter to President
Nixon which, as you can see, will be signed by Sam
Johnson, our Chairman. We would appreciate your
reviewing this letter, and letting us know if there
is anything in it that you feel is inappropriate and
should either be reworded or removed. For example:

Is it appropriate for Sam Johnson to mention his
and John Louis' support of President Nixon's
campaign? At that time, one could still make
sizable contributions to political campaigns.

Is it appropriate to mention the honorarium and
amount?

Is it appropriate to mention that we would
arrange for a press conference after his
presentation as it is stated in the letter? If
it were a matter of being better able to secure
President Nixon as a speaker, by all means we
could arrange for his presentation to be covered
live by representatives of the media; however,
all things being equal, we would prefer to do it
in a press conference afterwards.

We will be calling you to obtain your reaction.
Since we mention you in our letter, we thought it
appropriate that you feel comfortable with its
approach.

Office of the Chairman

S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc.

Racine, Wisconsin 53403-5011

Samuel C. Johnson
Chairman
Chief Executive Officer

May 27, 1988

President Richard Nixon
26 Federal Plaza
New York, New York 10278

Dear Mr. President:

The purpose of this letter is to ask if you would be
our principal speaker at the Johnson Wax 1989 Global
Conference to be held in Kauai, Hawaii. The
conference is scheduled from February 4-11, 1989, and
we would like to ask you to speak to us on Tuesday,
February 7.

First, let me introduce myself. I am Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of our company, which is a
family-owned, multi-national corporation with
subsidiaries in 46 countries, and which celebrated its
100th anniversary last year. Our newest subsidiary is
based in Shanghai, China, and is a joint venture which
manufactures its own products for sale within China.

As you may recall, you named me to the Advisory
Council for Minority Enterprises in 1969, and wrote to
me in 1971 commending me for helping the minority
community. Also, I personally supported your
Presidential campaign, as did my cousin, John J.
Louis, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to the United
Kingdom.

Our company has been holding conferences of this type
every four years, bringing together our independent
directors from all of our subsidiaries, corporate
officers, and the general managers of our
international companies.

The audience will involve approximately 250 delegates
plus their spouses. It is a very high level body,
which includes among others: Barend W. Biesheuval,
Former Prime Minister of the Netherlands; Hon. Yoshio
Okawara, Former Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.; John
J. Louis, Jr., Former U.S. Ambassador to the U.K.; and
Frederick B. Dent, Former U.S. Secretary of Commerce,
who, incidentally, you appointed to succeed Pete
Peterson.

President Richard Nixon

Page 2

May 27, 1988

Our last conference was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1984. Two of our key speakers for this conference were Henry A. Kissinger and Helmut Schmidt. A more complete list of key speakers and select names of our independent directors is attached.

Our intention is to focus our discussions on the emergence of the Pacific Basin from a political, economic and social perspective and the difficulties and opportunities this will pose for the U.S. and Europe. You were the principal individual involved in opening up business opportunities in China and were absolutely correct and precise in your sense of China's future position in the world. Thus you would be the ideal person to discuss the opportunities in the Pacific; i.e., its global meaningfulness to the rest of the world; how the Pacific is developing and how it will develop; how China is emerging; where the economic and political power centers will be; and perhaps some feel for the timeframe.

In fact, when we mentioned your name to our Japanese company leaders and directors--including former Ambassador Yoshio Okawara--they indicated that you are very popular with the Japanese and are always remembered by them as the first U.S. President to visit China. We feel that your involvement would have an extremely strong impact on our audience.

In addition to your being the principal speaker, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, former President of the French Republic, has agreed to speak on the implications of the developing Pacific to Europe.

Since you receive numerous requests for speaking engagements and our independent Directors as a group are not familiar to you, I thought it would be helpful if Henry Kissinger, who does know us, could provide a perspective on us and the type of high level conference we convene. He has kindly offered to drop you a note in this regard.

President Richard Nixon

Page 3

May 27, 1988

The company, of course, will cover all of your travel and other expenses, as well as provide an honorarium to you, or to the Nixon Library, or to any other organization you so choose in the amount of $50,000. We would also be delighted to have your wife as our guest, and we invite both of you to participate in any or all of the conference. We will provide resources for whatever support--research or otherwise--you may like to call upon to prepare for your presentation.

If your answer is in the affirmative, I would be pleased to come to New York, together with our President, who is chairing the conference, to brief you and/or your staff in more detail on the objectives of the conference, the makeup of the delegates and the subject matter you may wish to address.

The Island of Kauai, as you may know, is very peaceful, only slightly commercialized, and very secure. We will have our own security force and system in place in the hotel--all done very discreetly. We would also be most pleased to pay the expenses and provide rooms for one or more of your own security people if you wish.

We are very excited about the possibility of having you join us in Kauai. We feel that your insights into opportunities in the Pacific are unparalleled and our audience would be most appreciative of hearing your views. While the meeting will be closed to the press, we would be pleased to arrange for a press conference, if you so desire, following your conference presentation.

We will be contacting you through your office in a week or so.

Respectfully yours,

SCJ/blk

Enclosure

c: The Honorable Henry Kissinger

Key Speakers and Topics from the Global Conference
Rio de Janeiro - 1984

- Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State, 1973-77 - Future power shifts likely to result from economic, political and social trends, future of North-South relations, etc.

- Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany, 1974-1982 - Potential Stability in the West

- Roberto de Oliveira Campos, Member, Federal Senate of Brazil - International Finance/Banking and World Ecomomics

- Shirley Williams, President, Social Democratic Party, United Kingdom - Interaction between social and economic issues

- Daniel Yankelovich, Chairman, Yankelovich, Skelly & White, Inc. - Future global issues and trends

- Ambassador Olara Otunnu, Permanent Representative of Uganda in the United Nations - Business investment outlook for Africa, etc.

The select names of our Independent Directors who are particularly well known:

- Barend W. Biesheuval, President, National Investment Bank, The Netherlands; Former Prime Minister, The Netherlands

- Frederick B. Dent, Mayfair Mills, Inc., Former U.S. Secretary of Commerce

- Olivier Giscard d'Estaing, Chairman, European League Economic Cooperation and Vice Chairman, INSEAD

- John J. Louis, Jr., former U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom

- Hon. Yoshio Okawara, Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Former Japanese Ambassador to the U.S.

- Count Jan-Carl von Rosen, Chairman, Karlebo Group, Sweden

- J. Martin Schroder, President, Martinair, Holland N.V.

- J. Paul Sticht, Chairman of the Executive Committee, and former Chairman and CEO of R. J. Reynolds Industries

Moderator: CHRIS WALLACE, NBC News

Panel: TOM BROKAW, NBC News

JOHN CHANCELLOR, NBC News

Executive Producer: BARBARA COHEN

Producer: BETTY COLE DUKERT

Permission is hereby granted to news media and magazines to reproduce in whole or in part. Credit to NBC's MEET THE PRESS will be appreciated.

© National Broadcasting Co., Inc.

All Rights Reserved, 1988

MEET THE PRESS

MR. WALLACE: Former President Richard Nixon, in his first appearance on a Sunday interview program in 20 years. Today, he'll talk about the '88 campaign, U.S.-Soviet relations and his place in history.

Good day and welcome to a special one-hour edition of "Meet the Press." Our guest today, former President Richard Nixon, who was last on this program on November 3, 1968, just two days before he was elected president. Mr. Nixon, who is now 75, has just written his seventh book, "1999, Victory Without War."

Joining me today, two of my NBC colleagues, Tom Brokaw and John Chancellor.

And, Mr. President, welcome. Thank you very much for joining us after much too long a time. We're delighted to have you with us. And as we welcome you, I should also note that your first appearance on "Meet the Press" was back in September of 1952, when you were running for vice president, and we thought you might like to take a look at a brief clip from that program.

LAWRENCE SPIVAK (on tape): "Ladies and gentlemen, our guest on 'Meet the Press' is Senator Richard Nixon, Republican of California."

SENATOR NIXON: (on tape): "I predict that millions of Democrats this year, both north and south, are going to put their country above their party and vote for General Eisenhower, and I believe that that's going to be the decisive factor in an Eisenhower victory."

MR. WALLACE: Well, Mr. President, what do you think of that fellow, compared to the politicians you see these days?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, that's one of the first times I've ever seen myself on television. As I was telling you before the show began, I simply have a phobia about that. But I must say I looked a bit younger then, but I was.

MR. WALLACE: Well, this, of course, is another election year, and we thought we would begin with politics. And before we get into personalities, I'd like to ask you a little bit about the issues of the '88 campaign.

There is an axiom in American politics that peace and prosperity are usually the key issues. Given the fact that the economy is relatively sound, given the fact that U.S.-Soviet relations are on track, shouldn't this be a landslide election year for George Bush?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** It normally should be, because "peace and prosperity" is always a winner. It was, for example, a winner for President Eisenhower when he ran for re-election in 1956. I was having—running with him, I know how powerful an issue it is. But sometimes it is not enough. De Toqueville, many years ago, who, as we know, predicted that the United States and the Soviet Union were going to be adversaries and change the world in the next century, he said—about one of the characteristics of American democracy, was restlessness amidst prosperity.

And I think we have some of that today. I think that's one of the reasons Jesse Jackson has such appeal. He's appealing to those who are restless, despite prosperity. And that is what George Bush must overcome, and that's why I think it's going to be a close election rather than a landslide.

**MR. WALLACE:** Perhaps because the economy and international relations are relatively sound, the Democrats are talking about making a big issue this fall of the so-called sleaze factor, the more than 100 Reagan appointees who have been accused of unethical or illegal behavior. Do you think they're going to be able to make the sleaze factor stick this fall?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** No. It hasn't rubbed off on Reagan yet, and it will not rub off on George Bush, because he has an impeccable record in that respect.

If you look at the sleaze factor over the years in politics, it does not have a negative effect on a candidate unless it is accompanied with some other issue; for example, a recession or, as was the case in 1952, where the Truman 5 percenters was an issue with a Korean war issue. Unless there is something else that people are concerned about, the sleaze factor by itself is not going, I think, to affect the candidate, and particularly not George Bush, because it can't affect him personally.

**MR. WALLACE:** Let me ask you one more question, though, about the sleaze factor. Attorney General Meese is now under fire, and I can tell you there are a lot of Republicans in this town who would love to see him go. Do you think the president should fire him, and, if not, should Meese do the job for the president?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** That's a moot question because the president isn't going to fire him. I would say there are three things we have to

2

consider when we consider whether or not the attorney general should leave. One, is he an honest man; and two, has he been a competent attorney general; and three, is he a political liability?

Now as far as the first one is concerned, I think he's an honest man. As far as the second matter is concerned, President Reagan believes he's a competent attorney general in carrying out his conservative agenda. The third point, however, is the one you're really addressing, and that is, is he a political liability? And that's something only he can answer.

He is a loyal Reagan supporter, has been for 20 years. He has got to consider all these things. It isn't fair that if he is a competent man and if he is an honest man, that he is a political liability—if he finds he is—that he would have to leave. But that's a decision only he can make.

**MR. BROKAW:** Mr. President, you told the *Wall Street Journal* that you don't see in George Bush the drive or the independence to lead the United States in global leadership. You worry that he relies too much on what you call the establishment. Are you suggesting that the Republican Party is about to nominate a weak candidate?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** No. I would say certainly not, because he's going to be a strong candidate. I would say, first of all, that I made that statement at the time that Bush was really in the doldrums. You recall the interview was given during the Iowa caucus, when he was really down. And since that, George Bush has really come into his own.

Winston Churchill has said that there's no part of the education of a politician is—more indispensable than the fighting of elections. George Bush has had a very good education in that respect. Coming back from the defeat in Iowa, he has wiped out the opposition, and he has developed that inner strength and toughness that was not certainly there beforehand.

I think, Tom, that he, therefore, is a strong person but, more important, that voters think that. And that's one of the reasons that I think that he's going to be a very effective candidate.

**MR. BROKAW:** Who do you think Mr. Bush should choose for his vice presidential running mate?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** Who he should choose?

**MR. BROKAW:** Yes.

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** Well, having been a vice president and also having chosen one, I think these are the factors that have to go into

3

that matter: First, the question is, would he make a good president; second, would he make a good vice-president; and, third, of course, would he be a good candidate? And, of course, the third is always the first, because, unless you are a good candidate, you are not going to have a chance to demonstrate either of the other two. I think that George Bush has a number of good people to select from—governors like Deukmejian and Thompson and so forth; a fine senator in Alan Simpson; Howard Baker would be a supurb president or vice-president. I think, however, what he has to consider is who is going to help the ticket, and in that respect people say he couldn't possibly consider Senator Dole because they don't like each other. And I say that's quite irrelevant. I remember very well, back in 1960, I was told that Lyndon Johnson didn't like Jack Kennedy and Jack Kennedy didn't like Lyndon Johnson, and Bobby Kennedy hated Lyndon Johnson. They took him; they needed him; and they won—it made the difference.

And so it is this time. I am not saying that he ought to take Bob Dole, but he's got to remember that one place he's weak is in the farm states. Bob Dole won Iowa; he lost it. He won Minnesota, he won South Dakota, he would hold Nebraska, he would hold Kansas.

So as he considers who to take, he's got to remember that it isn't a question of whether you get along with the person, because, believe me, if they win they will be bosom buddies thereafter.

**MR. BROKAW:** You also say that if Bush is elected, he will only serve for one term, because at age 69 this country is not going to re-elect a 69-year-old man after what they have been through during the second term of Ronald Reagan.

**What are you saying by that, that the president during his second term with his advanced age has not been as on top of complex issues as he ought to be?**

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** No, I wouldn't like to suggest—and I don't mean to suggest that President Reagan has not been an effective president in his second term because of age. Believe me, if any man handles age well, he does—he gives us all hope when you think of what he's been able to do with age. What I am saying is that second terms are not kind to presidents, particularly in this century. We know, for example, the second term was not kind even to Eisenhower, who was enormously popular; a second term was not kind to Harry Truman; we know it wasn't very kind to me; it wasn't kind to Woodrow Wilson, for example, who had very, very serious problems.

What I am suggesting here is that after he finishes the first term, if he has a good first term, he will be re-elected. But the second term is always very difficult.

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**MR. CHANCELLOR:** If Colonel North and Admiral Poindexter are convicted, should they be pardoned?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** The answer to that, of course, is one that only the president should and can give. And the question that he has to ask himself then is: Did these two men do what they did, believing, whether mistakenly or not, that they had the approval of the president, or were acting in order to serve his interests and would get that approval? If the president, after considering that, believes that that was the case, then he, the president, would have a good case for pardoning, because then the so-called crime would lack in intent.

**MR. CHANCELLOR:** Did those thoughts go through your mind when Haldeman was going to jail, and Ehrlichman? They worked for you.

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** They certainly did—and it was a very, very difficult decision for me. Looking back, I probably should have pardoned them. I'm not sure that the country would have taken it at that time—it was a little stirred up, as you might imagine. But, on the other hand, they had not done it for personal gain—that wasn't involved. And that, incidentally, we must make clear, was not involved in the Iran-contra matter. Nobody made any money out of it; they were doing it because they thought they were serving the country. Haldeman, Ehrlichman the same. It was a tragic situation; I wish I could have—but I didn't.

**MR. CHANCELLOR:** If you were president now and you were faced with the decision on whether to pardon or not, when would you pardon, when would be politically the best time to do it?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** Well, it can't be now, because if it were done now it would have the effect of being a cover-up for George Bush, and he doesn't need to answer that. The time to do it is some time, of course, before you leave office, because, unless you do it then, you are not going to have the power to do it.

**MR. WALLACE:** We can't end this segment, Mr. President, without asking you about the other party. You have said that the only thing worse than being wrong in politics is being dull. Is Mike Dukakis too dull to be an effective Democratic nominee?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** Let me answer that question this way: I've often said, too, that the best politics is poetry rather than prose. Jesse Jackson is a poet, Cuomo is a poet, and Dukakis is a word processor—that's what it gets down to. On the other hand, he's cool, he's intelligent, he's tough, he's good in debates. He's going to be a very formidable candidate.

5

MR. WALLACE: All right, you talk about Jesse Jackson—and you have kind of conflicting views, because you have said he is one of the best candidates in either party in this century. But, on the other hand, you say that if he were white, he'd already be out of the race. Explain that.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Candidacy is very different from being one who should be elected. He's a superb candidate. Huey Long was a very good candidate, too. So was George Wallace. But, on the other hand, neither should be president.

What you have here is a situation where it isn't really the messenger, the fact that he is black, but it's the message: he is far to the left of the Democrats, and they are already very far to the left with Dukakis. So, under the circumstances, if he were white, he would have been out already as being too extreme to have a chance to win. That's what I meant by it.

MR. BROKAW: Mr. President, Mayor Koch says in the New York primary that Jews would have to be crazy to vote for Jesse Jackson. Do you think that that's fair of the mayor to say that?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Jesse Jackson's statements with regard to "Hymie-town," as we know, with regard to Israel, and the fact that he, of course, has dealt with Arafat and others, would give certainly most Jews the idea that he is not one that favors their interests. Now, whether or not he should say that they would be crazy to—I notice that there was a Jewish organization—some Jews are endorsing him.

So I'm going to suggest, however, that if you are looking at it from the standpoint of Jewish issues, that Jackson has not been on the side of Jewish issues and that all the other candidates, of course, can't wait but line up for those issues all the way down the line. I think that's the difference.

MR. CHANCELLOR: One very quick one. Democrats win in '88, Republicans win in '88? How does it come out?

PRESIDENT NIXON: It's going to be George Bush—but you are going to have a very long night. It's going to be decided in California, so be planning to spend double time and overtime for your staff over here.

MR. WALLACE: They'll be happy to hear that. George Bush and Dole over—

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, I'm not—as far as who is going to win?

MR. WALLACE: Right.

6

PRESIDENT NIXON: It's going to be Bush with whomever he happens to select—and it might be Dole, it might be Kemp, it might be one of the others. It will be, I believe, however, as far as Dukakis is concerned—Dukakis can't win unless he goes south; his first choice should be Nunn. Nunn will help him not only in the south but also on the issue he's weak on, defense. And his second choice should be Gore.

MR. WALLACE: Mr. President, we have to take a break now, but in a moment we will turn to foreign policy and the U.S. role in the world. That's coming up, when "Meet the Press" returns.

(Announcements)

MR. WALLACE: Mr. President, you disagree with some of Ronald Reagan's—the basic tenets of his foreign policy toward the Soviets. And I'd like to get your thinking on that if I could. First of all, the president's notion that Mikhail Gorbachev has renounced the idea of Soviet domination: you don't agree with that?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, I don't agree with it because of what Mikhail Gorbachev himself has said. I read very carefully the speech that he made at the 70th anniversary of the communist revolution in Russia. And I think I can remember exactly what he said. He said that 70 years ago we parted with the old world once and for all. We are moving toward a new world, the world of communism. We will never turn off that road. Gorbachev may be a number of things. He may be more reasonable and all the rest. But he certainly has the same goal of a communist world, to be accomplished maybe in other ways.

MR. WALLACE: Well, are you troubled to see Ronald Reagan running around the country saying exactly the opposite, that Gorbachev has renounced this goal?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Ronald Reagan is saying, that, and I'm sure that he believes it. On the other hand, he is one who is very shrewd, and he is one who if he gets—if he gets information which indicates that Gorbachev is not following that line, he'll turn on him very, very fast. So I have confidence that Reagan will handle it well.

MR. WALLACE: You also disagree—

PRESIDENT NIXON: Just as he did at Reykjavik.

MR. WALLACE: You also disagree with the president's emotional commitment to a perfect "star wars" defense shield to defend the U.S. against all nuclear missiles.

PRESIDENT NIXON: SDI has served a very useful purpose to date. If it hadn't been for SDI, we wouldn't be having the arms control negotiations we're presently having. What we have to remember, how-

7

ever, that as far as SDI is concerned, what is achievable is not a perfect
shield. That—research should go forward on that. Maybe we will find
something in the next century that will deal with it. But what we can
do immediately is to use SDI for the purpose of protecting our deter-
rent. To think unrealistically that we can substitute SDI for the deter-
rence of our offensive weapons does not serve American foreign policy
well.

MR. WALLACE: I gather you also think that the president has gone along too much with the Soviet agenda, playing along too much with the emphasis on arms control, and not linking it enough to progress on human rights and regional conflicts.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, the president certainly has been discussing human rights with Gorbachev. I know that from personal conversations I had with the president. And that is the way to handle human rights; not expressly to condition any progress on arms control, for example, on human rights, but to do so in the private conversations that he's having. As far as other matters are concerned, however, I think what we have to remember is that arms control is the top of the Soviet agenda; that's what they want. The top of our agenda are those actions of the Soviet that cause, that make it necessary, to have arms. And for example, as far as nuclear arms are concerned, it is Soviet superiority in conventional weapons that must be dealt with.

MR. WALLACE: Given all of these disagreements, do you have
any concerns about the president going to Moscow and sitting down
again with Mikhail Gorbachev next month?

PRESIDENT NIXON: No, when the president gets there, and after the president has had his briefings, he is going to be, I think, just as tough as he was at Reykjavik, when after going clear to the edge, a nuclear-free world and the rest, he backed off when Gorbachev insisted that he had to give up SDI. And the man that said no to Gorbachev at Reykjavik is going to say no to Gorbachev at Moscow if he believes that Gorbachev is not making the concessions he should on matters that really involve us. And certainly conventional arms involves us, and also what the Soviet Union does in regional issues that could lead to the use of arms.

MR. BROKAW: Mr. President, you talk to the president all the
time, or with some regularity on the telephone about these matters.
This administration, despite your confidence, has rejected linkage
in the past, of linking, for example, human rights or the Third World
or conventional arms to arms control. What makes you so confident
that this time the president will insist on those issues?

8

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, first Tom, I believe that the rejection of linkage has traditionally been the position of the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service at the State Department didn't agree with our going forward with linkage during our administration. It has always been their position. They believe you should go after this agreement or that agreement. Now that isn't the way it works with the Soviets. They link everything in their own minds, and we should do exactly the same thing. What I am saying here, though, that as far as President Reagan is concerned, well, that's the advice that he's getting from the Foreign Service, that President Reagan is a very [canny] politician, and when push comes to shove, I think that he will practice linkage, even though he says he rejects it up to this point because that's the advice he gets from the professionals.

MR. BROKAW: Mr. President, in your book, as you prepare the readers for what they should expect from the Russians, you quote an Italian diplomat with whom you've talked in the late '60s who said, they are "great liars, clever cheaters, magnificent actors. They consider it their duty to cheat and lie." Do you think Mikhail Gorbachev considers it his duty to cheat and lie?

PRESIDENT NIXON: We have to understand that he is many things. He has great charm. He has high intelligence. And also, as distinguished from some of his predecessors, he's a pragmatist who knows he has serious problems, and wants to deal with those problems. Now insofar as tactics are concerned, you have to remember that anybody that studied the Marxist communist philosophy knows that they adopt a philosophy of any means to an end. Any means to an end, you do anything. You lie, you cheat, you do anything else. So under the circumstances, we've got to remember that as far as he's concerned, he's going to practice that. And as far as we're concerned, all we have to do is to make sure he doesn't get away with it.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Sir, I'd like to take you back to August of
1974, couple of days before you left the White House. This is from
Henry Kissinger's memoirs. He said that on August the 6th, the
Tuesday, "President Nixon would cut off all military deliveries to
Israel until it agreed to a comprehensive peace. He regretted not
having done so earlier. He would make up for it now. His successor
would thank him for it. I should prepare the necessary papers."
Kissinger says the relevant papers were prepared but never signed.
Can you tell me what was going on?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, I think that what we were concerned there was with the fact that the Israelis were, we thought, intransigent at that point, and that we had to make a very solid, strong play in order to get them to move off an intransigent position, which I didn't think

9

was in their interest. Let me make a point with regard to Israel. Of
course, as you may remember, I saved Israel, as Golda Meir pointed
out, through the airlift in 1973. We kept the Russians out through the
alert in 1973, and it was a very tough decision, and a very tough political
decision.

MR. CHANCELLOR: A nuclear alert.

PRESIDENT NIXON: That's right, a nuclear alert, just as
Eisenhower kept them out in 1956 and 1958 with, in effect, what was
nuclear warnings. Now, under the circumstances, what Israel has to
understand is that for their own interest they should make a deal now,
because if they don't make it now, they will wait until later. Now,
they've won five wars; they'll win the next one. But in the end, Arabs
will learn to fight, and in the end there are going to be more of them,
and in the end they will lose. And that's why I think we should, cer-
tainly in case of—Israel's own interest, we should press them to make
the deal now with regard to territories, et cetera, rather than waiting
until later until they're forced to make one that will not be in their
interest.

MR. CHANCELLOR: If you had been Senator Nixon this year,
in the U.S. Senate, would you have signed that letter of support
for George Shulz' mission? Thirty Senators signed it.

PRESIDENT NIXON: No, I wouldn't have signed it. I would have agreed with what they were trying to do, but I wouldn't have signed it, because I think that had a counterproductive effect insofar as the Israelis are concerned. You don't deal with them in a heavyhanded way. Shamir is a very proud man, and the minute the letter came out, he reacted exactly the opposite way. When I say, however, the sentiments I well understand, I certainly understand the sentiments, and I know why they signed it. But I wouldn't have signed it myself because I think it would have been bad tactics.

MR. CHANCELLOR: Before we move away from the Middle
East, you say that the Palestinians need self-government, but no
separate homeland. How does that work?

PRESIDENT NIXON: What you have to be concerned about here
is that Israel cannot have an armed Palestinian state in its gut. That's
really what the issue is. On the other hand, Palestinians cannot con-
tinue to have Israelis ruling over them. And so the Palestinians must
have—and I think the term that I use is not so much a homeland,
self-government. And by self-government, I mean that they've got to
have a system set up whereby they govern themselves. But it must be
a neutral government. It must be one that poses no threat to Israel
or to its neighbors. And that, incidentally, is in Israel's interest. But I

10

should also say that accompanying that, Israel must have defensible
borders. This idea that Israel should give up all the occupied territories,
that won't fly with Israel, and it shouldn't. That has to be negotiated.

MR. WALLACE: Mr. President, how well do you think President
Reagan is handling the situation in Panama, and at what point, or
at any point, should he be willing to use force, military force, to
get General Noriega out?

PRESIDENT NIXON: I think he's handling it very well. I know that there are those who believe that he should use military force. I think it'd be a mistake. Noriega is an irritant to us. But we want to remember that in getting rid of that irritant, we don't want to cause much greater difficulties. In other words, the reaction that would occur all over Latin America in the event we used our military force to get rid of this irri- tant. What we have to do is to get rid of Noriega, but to have the Panamanian people do it rather than the U.S. do it.

MR. WALLACE: Are you convinced that the economic tools that
the president is using to try to force Noreiga out—

PRESIDENT NIXON: Economic, diplomatic, and there's one other thing that I haven't seen suggested that I would like to suggest in this program. I notice that several Latin American countries have objected to the United States even using their economic power. They think that's improper, for us to go that far. Why don't they, then, in their inter- ests—they know that Noriega ought to go—they ought to use their influence with Noriega to get him to go. I'd like to see the Latins start to do something about their own problem.

MR. WALLACE: Could you envision a situation where the situa-
tion in Panama is so unstable that the U.S. would have to rethink
giving the canal over to the Panamanians?

PRESIDENT NIXON: I do not think that is going to happen. I think the Panamanians are going to be realistic enough that, before that happens, which of course would destroy their livelihood, that they're going to move on it themselves. But I emphasize again: the United States cannot be heavyhanded in Latin America, particularly with Noriega, as indicated I think by what has happened in Honduras. They had a riot. What was it about? It was about somebody that was thrown out of the country because of drugs. We've got to recognize what they are. We must deal with them as effectively as we can. But sometimes it's much better to do it in a way that gets others to do the work for you, in this case the Panamanians or other Latin American govern- ments, rather than the U.S. going in and doing it.

MR. WALLACE: Mr. President, we have to pause for a moment,

11

but we have many more questions for you, and we'll get to them when
"Meet the Press" returns.

(Announcements)

MR. WALLACE: Mr. President, I wanted to ask you one last follow-up question on the Mideast. Do you think that Secretary Shultz has accomplished anything in these weeks of shuttle diplomacy there?

PRESIDENT NIXON: You have to give him very high marks for trying—and, incidentally, he's an excellent negotiator, as he demonstrated when he was serving as secretary of labor and handled George Meany for us in that period.

I would say, however, we have to realize that the problems in the Mideast are so complex that it can't be done by the secretary of state on a part-time basis, and it can't be done even on a full-time basis by second-level State Department people, no matter how competent they are.

There has to be the appointment of a full-time heavyweight negotiator, and that appointment should be made, I think, to Henry Kissinger. Now, Henry is devious, Henry is difficult, some people think he's obnoxious—but he's a terrific negotiator. And I would suggest that the next president, be it Dukakis or Bush, would be well-advised to give him the title of ambassador plenipotentiary, give him a year, and he will work out some settlement.

MR. WALLACE: What does he think of this idea, let alone the description of him?

PRESIDENT NIXON: He'll kill me if he hears the program.

MR. WALLACE: Well, I suspect it will get back to him.

I would like to change subjects, if I could, and talk to you about the Iran-contra affair. How serious was it as a foreign policy blunder, and how serious was it as a scandal?

PRESIDENT NIXON: It was more serious as a foreign policy blunder. And it was serious not for the points that have been emphasized most in the press, that is, the trading arms for hostages—that certainly was a mistake, or for even the transfer of the arms to the contras, the proceeds from the arms—that might have been illegal.

The fatal flaw in the policy was selling arms to Iran, period, because it is not in the interests of the United States, or of Israel, for that matter, to have Iran win this war. And anything that was done that might have helped them, even marginally, in that respect was not in our interest. That was the basic mistake.

12

MR. WALLACE: How about as a scandal, the president misleading the country, keeping Congress in the dark, laws being broken?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, as far as the scandal is concerned, I think that that has been, if I may be permitted to say so—been built up in the media somewhat more than is justified. These were some very well-intentioned people. They thought they were carrying out and serving in the interest of the country. I think it was a mistake. But I do not believe that it was one of those massive scandals that destroyed confidence of the people in the president of the United States.

MR. WALLACE: Do you really believe that John Poindexter and Bill Casey diverted funds to the contras without telling Richard— without telling Ronald Reagan?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, they said that, and, under the circumstances, I would believe them, because John Poindexter said it under oath.

MR. WALLACE: But, on the other hand—let me just, if I could, one last question, Tom—could that devious, obnoxious Henry Kissinger have carried out those kinds of operations, sensitive, perhaps semi-legal or illegal operations in the White House? Would he have done that without telling you?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Let me say, I am not saying he is devious and obnoxious—other people do say that. But I would say, as far as Henry Kissinger is concerned, he wouldn't do it because he knows that he wouldn't get away with it if I were there.

MR. BROKAW: Mr. President, you are an advocate of a strong presidency, you referred to it as "sovereign." A lot of people, however, see Iran-contra and even Watergate as the tragic byproduct of a presidency that is too strong. People who come through those gates at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, believing that they have no allegiance other than to the president's wishes. Isn't one of the tests of a strong presidency a strong man controlling the people who work for him, and in this case doesn't President Reagan fail that test because he simply didn't know was going on in the basement of the White House?

PRESIDENT NIXON: No, I'm not going to suggest that President Reagan failed the test, because only somebody that is there can really make that judgment. I think we have to understand, though, that we mustn't learn the wrong lessons from what has happened in Iran-contra. Rather than saying that we have to turn over everything to the State Department now and weaken the NSC—that would be a terrible

13

mistake. Let me tell you, we wouldn't have had the opening to China, we wouldn't have had SALT I with the Soviet Union, we wouldn't have had the peace agreement ending the war in Vietnam unless we had a strong NSC, and, of course, strong leadership from the White House.

So we need to strengthen the NSC rather than to weaken it. We need covert actions. We need to limit the number of people that covert actions, of course, are revealed to—I would limit to only four, two in the House and two in the Senate.

But the fact that this went awry must not mean that in the future we are going not to have covert actions or not have bold action. Those are the wrong lessons that could be learned. I would say, however, that you are absolutely right, that a great responsibility is on whoever is president to see that when you have that much power, don't let it get out of line. I made, of course, very grievous errors in the Watergate matter. Fortunately, President Reagan didn't make that kind of error; he didn't have the problem of having to resign.

**MR. CHANCELLOR:** You are a student of history. Was there a Reagan revolution?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** Well, the term "revolution" means many things to different people.

**MR. CHANCELLOR:** But the president's men say there's been a Reagan revolution.

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** The president's men, obviously, are trying to say that Reagan made a difference—and the point is he did make a difference. He made a difference, for example, with regard to the way the United States was perceived all over the world; he re-established within the American people themselves a sense of confidence that had been lost. There was a Reagan revolution insofar as our priorities are concerned. Right now, for example, it's very difficult for people to talk about spending more; they are talking about how they are going to save money. Now, of course, the Reagan deficit is responsible for that, but that also has denied the Democrats their bread-and-butter issue.

And I would say, finally, as far as the Reagan revolution is concerned, the attitudes on some of the social issues have changed. Revolution—I think it would be better stated: there's been a revolution in the way people approach issues, not a revolution in terms of what has been accomplished on those particular issues.

**MR. CHANCELLOR:** Do you think the more than $2 trillion spent on defense in the last seven years has been wisely spent?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** Never. The money spent in the Defense

14

Department is never spent wisely. By that I mean, there are many mistakes that are made. And the reason is that the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps are always fighting for their portion of the pie, more than they are usually fighting for some of the other things they should be fighting for. I don't mean they aren't very loyal, very patriotic people. But that's the way the system works.

It is very difficult to bring the Pentagon into line. I think Cap Weinberger was a fine secretary of defense, but he was representing the Defense Department rather than trying to carry out what I think could have probably served the country better, by knocking heads together and getting more money [sic] for what we were spending on defense.

**MR. CHANCELLOR:** How would you go about solving the country's drug problem?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** I'd appoint a czar. We talk about, for example, the Army, Navy, and the Marine Corps fighting for turf. That, of course, is a Washington disease. And in the drug problem, we've got about 14 or 15 agencies that are so busy fighting each other that they aren't devoting their attention to fighting the common enemy. There should be a czar in the White House who pulls all the drug activities from the Justice Department, the Treasury Department, and the Customs and—all together with complete and total authority and backing by the president.

Now, the other point—I know there is a little controversy in the campaign here as to whether you can use the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines—and I say, yes, they shouldn't be used unless necessary, but we have to remember that the purpose of our armed forces is to deal with an enemy of the United States. And, believe me, those that engage in selling drugs, shipping drugs to this country, are killing people just as much as an enemy kills.

And if a way can be found—if it's necessary, in order to keep our borders clear, to have the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, or whatever to stop the flow of drugs into this country, I would use them.

**MR. WALLACE:** I'd like to go back, if I could, to something that Tom brought up, which is the way Ronald Reagan does his job. I don't mean the big initiatives, but the day-to-day way he does his job, because it seems so different from the way you did the job.

When you read that he's unable to remember whether or not he signed an intelligence finding, when you read that he doesn't know some of the basic facts of arms control. Does that offend you at all?

15

PRESIDENT NIXON: No, it certainly doesn't offend me because he has been very successful. By that, I mean—

MR. WALLACE: But he's had his problems, too, though, as a result of that.

PRESIDENT NIXON: But let's—we've got to look at all of our presidents and their strengths and their weaknesses and so forth. And I had mine and he has his. I'd say, in his case, he just does not spend that much time on details.

MR. WALLACE: Isn't there a danger in that, though, Mr. President?

PRESIDENT NIXON: There can be a danger, particularly if you don't have staff people who spend that time. But Ronald Reagan, when he has good staff and when he can handle the big picture, he does a superb job. When his staff is weak, then you have problems.

MR. WALLACE: What do you make of Mrs. Reagan's role, her influence on policy, her apparently extraordinary clout with the White House staff?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, Mrs. Reagan is to be admired for what's she's done, for example, in the drug program. I admire that. I admire also her enormous loyalty and support to her husband. That's her only interest; she's not interested in herself. And I would say that as far as her influence is concerned, she has pretty good political antenna, and so her advice generally, I think, has been very good.

MR. BROKAW: Mr. President, you made reference in this program to the restlessness in the society, even in a time of prosperity, and Jesse Jackson being able to capitalize on it.

In fact, during the last eight years of Ronald Reagan's administration, the rich have gotten richer, the middle class are struggling harder than they ever have in the past, and the poor are poorer so there is a real foundation for that restlessness. And, in fact, the Republican party, according to Bob Dole, has to reach out to those minority groups and find a way to address the needs of the so-called underclass in America. Do you think that that has been a failure of the Reagan administration?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, what has happened here is that, and we have to realize this, is that in order to afford what we want to do for people, it's necessary to produce wealth. Now, we can talk all we want about how we can distribute wealth, but if we don't have people out there producing wealth, forget it. Now, in this administration, we have to realize the economy has grown, there's been more jobs. We've

been able to afford more, and we don't want to kill the goose that lays the golden egg.

I do say this, and I agree with Bob Dole in this, and I know that George Bush feels the same way. We just don't stand on the record; we've got to build on it. I pointed out a moment ago that Jesse Jackson has struck a responsive chord with the American people because he's talking about family, he's talking about drugs, he's talking about the poor, he's talking about the homeless. They're there.

And I would hope that—and I am confident this will be the case, that in the next Republican administration, they will now be able to devote attention to those that have been left behind, because, you see, conservatism at its best is compassionate.

MR. BROKAW: Do you think this administration has been compassionate enough?

PRESIDENT NIXON: This administration has been compassionate in many ways, but the emphasis in this administration has been primarily, on basically, I would say, to use a term or coin a term, it has been on the supply side. In other words, to build up the wealth of this country so that we can afford to do other things. Now, let's see that we—now that we have done that, I think it's necessary to see what we can do to deal with these other problems.

MR. BROKAW: Some people have called this decade the decade of greed. Is that an apt description?

PRESIDENT NIXON: There's nothing wrong at all with greed, provided that greed is one that contributes to the wealth of the country, so that the wealth of the country can then handle some of the problems that people have. Let me tell you, if some people weren't greedy, we wouldn't have the tax money that we could even be talking about more for education, more for health and the rest.

MR. BROKAW: Mr. President, with the celebration of greed, we're going to have to break in for a moment. But we will be back with some final questions about your place in history in just a moment, when "Meet the Press" returns.

(Announcements)

MR. WALLACE: Mr. President, I talked to so many people this week in preparing for this interview, and I must say—and I'm sure you won't be surprised to hear this—they have very ambivalent feelings about you. They think that you make great sense on foreign policy, perhaps more sense that almost anyone else on the public scene these days. But on the other hand there is still a

16

17

deep feeling about the breach of trust in Watergate. How do people reconcile that?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, it's very difficult to reconcile, and I understand that, because Watergate was a breach of trust. I think to keep it in perspective somewhat, and I think it's important that as we consider this historical segment of the program that we put it into perspective, that 1972, as you know, was a very big year. A lot of things were going on. Winston Churchill once wrote that strong leaders usually do the big things well, but they foul up on small things, and then the small things become big. I should have read that before Watergate happened. In 1972 we went to China. We went to Russia. We ended the Vietnam War effectively by the end of that year. Those were the big things. And here was a small thing, and we fouled it up beyond belief. It was a great mistake. It was wrong, as I've pointed out over and over again. But under the circumstances now, people as they judge that period have to see what we accomplished and what we did wrong. And for the future, I would advise all those that follow me in the position of president: do the big things as well as you can, but when a small thing is there, deal with it, and deal with it fast; get it out of the way. Because if you don't, it's going to become big, and then it may destroy you.

MR. WALLACE: Whenever you go public, and you are going to go public now with a series of interviews in association with the release of this book, 1999, there is a good deal of speculation about Richard Nixon trying to make a comeback. And there's always the question, what does Richard Nixon want? Do you want to erase the stigma of Watergate? Do you want to be a player again at the national table in the debate of national issues? Or are you just trying to sell your book? What does Richard Nixon want?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, as far as selling the book is concerned, that's no problem, because I got a very good advance on it, and it isn't going to make any difference whether it sells that much or not. No, my purpose at the present time is, frankly, to get the message across. I have some very strong feelings about foreign policy. I've had a lot of experience, not just in Soviet-American relations, but in Chinese-American relations, in the Mideast, in Latin America, Africa, et cetera, Europe. I feel I want to pass on that experience before I'm too old to be able to do so, to articulate it. That's why I'm going out. As far as restoring my-making a comeback, what am I going to come back to? We already have a very good mayor in Saddle River, and we have a very good governor, as somebody has suggested, in the state of New Jersey. It isn't a comeback. It isn't to be well thought of. But the purpose is to get a message across. And then let history judge.

18

MR. BROKAW: Mr. President, when you were describing Watergate as a small thing that happened in a busy year, I know that a lot of people will have trouble with that characterization, because it was a break-in, after all, led by the president's men, and it wasn't just 1972. This went on through 1973 and on into 1974 as well. It involved a conspiracy, the misuse of money. It involved perjury. People went to jail for it. Is it fair, really, to characterize it only as a small thing that was a mistake?

PRESIDENT NIXON: Oh, no, I think you misheard me. I said it was a small thing that became a very big thing. It was a small thing, the break-in, and break-ins have occured previously in other campaigns as well. At that point, we should have done something about it. We should have exposed it, found out who did it, rather than attempting, as was-to contain it, to cover it up. It was the cover-up that was wrong, and that was a very big thing; there's no question about that at all. You're absolutely right.

MR. BROKAW: Mr. President, as you know, generations of Americans have been students of Richard Nixon, admirers and detractors. Even your admirers describe you as a complex man. We're all a little self-critical at some time in our lives, some more than others, of course. In the autumn of your years, as you are reflective about your own life's experiences, personal and as a politician, what criticism do you have with your own behavior or style or things that you've done?

PRESIDENT NIXON: As president?

MR. BROKAW: As president or as a human being.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Well, we don't have much time to cover the human being. Let's start with the president. First, naturally, the Watergate matter should have been handled properly. I should have concentrated on it. And apart from the fact it was wrong, it was stupid. And generally I'm called many things, but not often am I called stupid. I would say the major mistake I made as president was one-and this will surprise you--was not doing in early 1969 what I did on May 3rd of 1972, and on December 15th of 1972, and that was, to bomb and mine North Vietnam. I wanted to do it. I talked to Henry Kissinger about it. But we were stuck with the bombing halt that we had inherited from the Johnson administration, with Paris peace talks. I knew that, just like the cease-fire talks down here in Nicaragua, I didn't trust them at all, and they proved to be of course phony. But if we had done that then, I think we would have ended the war in Vietnam in 1969 rather than in 1973; that was my biggest mistake as president.

19

**MR. BROKAW:** And what about when you are self-critical of your personal style or how you treat people, or how you look at the world? Do you see anything that you might have done differently?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** Well, I suppose I could have treated the press better.

**MR. BROKAW:** Well, I wasn't looking for that necessarily.

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** But then they might have treated me better. No, I think under the circumstances it's very difficult for one to psychoanalyze himself. You know, I don't go much for this psycho-history. I don't go much for psycho-TV shows, either. I think they're rather revolting. And as far as sitting down and psychoanalyzing myself and saying, now, how could I have been a better person, it's just not my bag.

**MR. CHANCELLOR:** Well, let me just follow on to what Tom said, how do you think you'll be remembered? You're a pretty good judge. You read a lot of history. Write me a paragraph that might be written around the turn of the century or the next century about Richard Nixon.

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** When you talk about writing a paragraph, John, it would be difficult for me, because writing is very hard for me. I know that you fellows, you just type it right off, it comes off the top of your head.

**MR. CHANCELLOR:** Well, you could just try ad libbing it, sir.

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** But under the circumstances, like this book, it was hard work. I don't think I could do it in a paragraph. People say, will history treat you well? History will treat me fairly. Historians probably won't, because most historians are on the left, and I understand that. I would say as people look back on the Nixon administration, they're probably most likely to remember 50 years from now, 100 years from now, that it made a difference on a very major issue. We changed the world. If it had not been for the China initiative, which only I could do at that point, we would be in a terrible situation today, with China aligned with the Soviet Union and with the Soviet Union's power. The China initiative hasn't brought peace to the world. We can't be sure that will happen. But without it, we would be in a terrible shape.

**MR. WALLACE:** Do you think at all about how different the world would have been had you been able to finish your second term? I was thinking the other day, probably Jimmy Carter would never have been president. Perhaps Ronald Reagan wouldn't have been. Do you have thoughts about what you could have accomplished in

20

the rest of the second term, and how, flowing from that, America would have been so different?

**PRESIDENT NIXON:** My priorities were these. One, interestingly enough, one of the first ones, was the Mideast. I talked about it over and over again with Henry Kissinger in February and March of 1973. Second was, we would not have lost the war in Vietnam. I would have seen to it that we would have forced the North Vietnamese to keep the Paris peace agreement. And that would have meant that we wouldn't have had basically what happened in all the places around the world, Cambodia, Laos, even what happened in Africa and even in Nicaragua. The other part is that we—I think we would have done something at home. There was an area particularly I was interested in, and that was to have a real welfare program. I am concerned about the fact that when you look at blacks, they are worse off today, generally speaking, on an average, than they were in 1966 when the Great Society program started, and the problem is the family. We've got to do something about that, and our Family Assistance Program was the right way to go. I'm glad that Moynihan is following up on it today.

**MR. WALLACE:** Mr. President, I'm sorry, we're going to have to break it off. I want to thank you very much for coming in today and sharing very generously your thoughts with us, appreciate it very much. My thanks also to my colleagues, Tom Brokaw and John Chancellor.

And that's "Meet the Press" for this week. I'm Chris Wallace. For all of us here at NBC NEWS, have a good week.

21

APR 13 1988

ADVANCE REACTION TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S NEW BOOK,
1999: VICTORY WITHOUT WAR

Henry Kissinger: "A masterful work."

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski: "I am much impressed by the scope of the analysis and especially by the experienced wisdom of the recommendations. I hope that U.S. policy makers -- not a single one of whom could have written a comparable book -- have enough sense to read what President Nixon has to say and act accordingly."

Dr. **Jeane Kirkpatrick**, former Ambassador to the United Nations, syndicated columnist: "Nixon's perspective...is independent and probing, and not likely to please completely any political party or group, especially members of the Reagan Administration....[He] demonstrates more clearly than ever that in the domain of foreign affairs he is himself a heavyweight who, though driven from power, still understands the way the world works better than almost all of his countrymen....[His] analysis and his prescription are supremely realistic, more realistic than those offered by candidates of either party in the current campaign and more realistic than those propounded by the Reagan Administration."

Columnist **Cal Thomas**: "...Thoughts about Gorbachev that should be must reading for all Americans, especially every member of Congress....1999 gives the clearest, most concise, and highly readable critique of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev that I have ever read....Nixon has again demonstrated an insight into foreign affairs that is unsurpassed."

**Kirkus Reviews**: "A pragmatic and prescriptive critique that details what the U.S. can do over the next dozen years to ensure peace, prosperity, and related blessings in the 21st century....A geopolitical briefing that's as worldly-wise as it is provocative and instructive."

Dr. **Martin Anderson**, former Reagan domestic affairs advisor: "1999 is an intellectual tour de force, Nixon's masterwork. Beautifully written, brilliant and clear, it lays out a sensible, comprehensive strategy for the West to follow to the 21st century. With this book Richard Nixon secures his place as the foremost foreign policy expert in the world."

Dr. **Jeffrey Hart**, syndicated columnist: "1999 provides a remarkable and tough-minded big-picture analysis of our strategic situation. President Nixon certainly stays 'in the arena', and the country would be better off if it could vote for him in 1988." [letter to author]

The New York Times Magazine / MARCH 13, 1988

DEALING
WITH
GORBACHEV

By Richard Nixon

JEANNE STRONGIN

WE ARE ENTERING A
DANGEROUS NEW STAGE IN
THE SUPERPOWER STRUGGLE,
WARNS THE AUTHOR.

Gorbachev is the antithesis of the bearded Bolshevik, but he still believes Communism is the wave of the future, Nixon says.

SINCE COMING TO power three years ago as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail S. Gorbachev has captured the imagination of many in the West with a personal style that is refreshingly different from that of his predecessors. If we mistake a change in style of leadership for a change in Soviet international goals, Gorbachev may capture the rest of the West as well.

The beginning of the Gorbachev era does not represent the end of the rivalry between the two superpowers. Rather, it represents the beginning of a dangerous, challenging new stage of the struggle. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet Union's foreign policy has been more skillful and subtle than ever. But it has been more aggressive, not less. If his dramatic domestic reforms are successful, we will confront a more productive — and more formidable — Soviet Union.

In the last 40 years, I have met a number of great leaders — Churchill, de Gaulle, Adenauer, de Gasperi, Yoshida, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. Gorbachev is in that league.

I have met with three of the principal postwar leaders of the Soviet Union — Nikita S. Khrushchev in 1959 and 1960, Leonid I. Brezhnev in 1972, 1973, and 1974, and Gorbachev in 1986. Gorbachev is by far the ablest of the three. And, at age 57 — much younger than the others when they became General Secretary — he can expect to rule the Soviet Union for over a generation.

Gorbachev's neatly tailored suits, refined manners, beautiful wife and smooth touch with reporters have made him a star with the press and the diplomatic corps. An American official who met him was impressed by the fact that he had "good eye contact, a firm handshake and a deep, melodious voice." A British politician even remarked that Gorbachev was the man he most admired in the world. A disarmament activist took this a step further, saying: "Gorbachev is like Jesus. He just keeps giving out good things, like arms-control proposals..."

All of that is fatuous nonsense. After meeting Joseph Stalin, an American diplomat commented: "His brown eyes are exceedingly wise and gentle. A child would like to sit on his lap, and a dog would sidle up to him." When Khrushchev rose to power, some pundits wrote him off as a buffer because he wore ill-fitting clothes, was poorly educated, spoke bad Russian, drank too much and had crude manners. Brezhnev received higher marks — he wore silk shirts with French cuffs — but wasridiculed for his earthiness and his awkward public manner. Feature stories on Yuri Andropov, Brezhnev's successor, pointed out his fondness for tennis, jazz, Scotch whisky and abstract art.

Stalin's "gentle" eyes belied his brutal mind. Khrushchev's peasant manners did not stop him from building the Berlin Wall, and Brezhnev's clumsy speech did not prevent him

Richard Nixon is a former President of the United States. This article is adapted from "1999: Victory Without War," to be published next month by Simon and Schuster.

COPYRIGHT © 1988 RICHARD NIXON

26

CYNTHIA JOHNSON/GAMMA LIAISCH

6 WAYS TO COMPETE WITH THE U.S.S.R.

EVEN IF AGREEMENTS ARE worked out on issues such as nuclear-arms control, the United States and the Soviet Union will still be in conflict on others, such as the future of Europe and regional conflicts in the third world. To compete effectively, the United States must develop six key capabilities:

### IDEOLOGICAL POWER.
Our values of freedom and democracy have a tremendous appeal around the world. The strength is that there is no prescription on how

have failed to recognize that diplomacy is not just a means for compromise, but a competitive tactic.

As the Iranian hostage crisis showed, when American interests are challenged, the first — and often only — reaction of many of our diplomats is to negotiate. They reflexively treat disputes as great misunderstandings rather than insurmountable differences. They fail to understand that adversaries sometimes use talks as a play for time. The United States sometimes even has to use force while we negotiate, as we did in December 1972 when it took the bombing of Hanoi to break the stalemate at the Paris peace talks.

### ECONOMIC AID.
With an economy twice the size of the Soviet Union's, the United States has the resources to race ahead of the Soviet Union in this area. In quantitative terms of dollars, we have; but in terms of impact, we have not.

Foreign-aid programs have never been politically popular in the United States, and with the budget deficit, support for such programs is now at an all-time low. They must be radically revived if they are to survive. In doing so, we have to overcome the myth that foreign aid is just a waste of money. True, much of the money we contribute to international agencies for distribution to the governments of developing nations is misspent on boondoggles or diverted by corrupt officials.

But foreign aid is not wasteful if it is spent wisely. Certainly the $14 billion we expended on the postwar reconstruction of Western Europe and Japan was not a waste.

We need to learn to serve our strategic purposes with our foreign aid. Our economic and political support for the Central American democracies is an excellent illustration. It has prevented an economic collapse and a Communist victory in El Salvador. In 1986, we spent $435 million on aid for that

W. BOCXE/JB PICTURES

Our aid to El Salvador bolsters José Napoléon Duarte.

country, which is far less than we would need to spend if a deteriorating situation forced us to use American troops to defend our interests in Central America — and far less than it would cost if we forfeited those interests.

### MILITARY AID.
Americans do not like to think of themselves as arms merchants. But military aid is often the best way to protect our interests and those of our allies. It is also the principal way in which the Soviet Union will seek to challenge our interests in the coming decades.

If we fail to provide our allies and friends with adequate military assistance, Moscow's clients will advance on every front. We will then face a choice of forfeiting our interests or forfeiting the lives of American troops to defend them.

### MILITARY POWER.
We must not allow our failure in Vietnam to blind us to the stark reality that without military power and selectivity in crucial conflicts, we will be routed in our rivalry with the Soviet Union.

Since Vietnam, the American military establishment has concentrated its resources on its forces in Europe and the Far East, devoting a disproportionate share in preparing for the big war that will probably never be fought. It has woefully neglected our ability to intervene in third-world battlegrounds, such as the Persian Gulf, where our nuclear power is useless and where Moscow is most likely to try to outflank us.

### COVERT OPERATIONS.
There are those who argue that the United States should not engage in covert operations, especially after the disastrous Iran-contra affair. But it would be a fatal mistake for the United States to renounce covert action as a foreign-policy instrument, because the Soviets continue to exploit covert operations to arm insurgencies, finance Communist and other leftist parties, disseminate disinformation, train international terrorists and assassinate opponents.

We do not and should not emulate the Soviet Union's behavior. But to abandon covert action would be, in effect, donning a straitjacket.

The hundreds of millions of dollars in covert assistance that the United States has provided to the resistance in Afghanistan has not only helped force Moscow to agree to a withdrawal, but has also inflicted such cost on the Kremlin that its leaders will think twice before again embarking on such an adventure.

— RICHARD NIXON

REUTERS/BETTMANN NEWS/PHOTOS

### Were we ready for trouble in the Persian Gulf?

people should live, only that individuals and nations should be free to choose how they live.

Radio Moscow broadcasts in scores of languages to every corner of the world. In addition, the Soviet Union publishes and distributes thousands of books and newspapers abroad and provides schools at Russian universities for almost 100,000 foreign students.

Too often, the United States steps onto the battlefield of ideas unarmed. One of the most effective foreign-policy programs for the United States has been support for Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which have prevented the complete indoctrination of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

The problem is that these stations stand virtually alone as examples of American ideological action; the programs transmitted on Voice of America are often so trivial that Gorbachev has announced the Soviet Union will no longer bother to jam the frequencies. We do not need to fill the airwaves with crass propaganda, but we should be telling people what their own governments refuse to tell them about their own countries.

### DIPLOMACY.
The Soviet Union has mastered the art of integrating its diplomacy into overall strategy. The United States has had some diplomatic successes, but there have been many instances in which we

from undertaking the greatest military buildup in world history. Andropov's "with it" style could not conceal the fact that he had been the ruthless head of the world's most repressive police force.

Whoever reaches the pinnacle of power in the Kremlin has learned his politics in the toughest school in the world. If we accept the views of Gorbachev propounded by his admirers, we would be leaving ourselves psychologically disarmed before the man who controls the most powerful armed forces in the world.

### WE HAVE AND ALWAYS WILL
have profound differences with Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders. One reason is that we believe in our system and the Soviet Union rejects it. That is easy for most Americans to grasp. But some Americans have more difficulty with the other side of the coin — that the Russians believe their system is superior to ours. No matter how critical we are of the Russians and their actions in the world, we should never be contemptsuous of them. We must respect the Soviet Union as a strong and worthy adversary. Respect is important between friends; it is indispensable between potential enemies in the nuclear age.

Gorbachev himself is a powerful reminder that we underestimate the Soviet Union at our peril. He is a highly intelligent, sophisticated man of the world, and a great communicator — the antithesis of the common perception of a bearded Bolshevik intent on blowing up the world.

In July 1986, I met with Gorbachev for an hour and 45 minutes in the Kremlin. He received me in a more richly decorated room than those in which I had met Khrushchev in 1959 or Brezhnev in 1972 and 1974. Earlier in the week I had had highly detailed, two-hour meetings with Soviet President Andrei A. Gromyko and the foreign-affairs adviser Anatoly F. Dobryin about arms control and a wide range of other issues. Even though Gorbachev had spent the entire previous day with the Politburo, it was clear from his questions and comments that he had acquainted himself with everything that had been said in my earlier meetings. This permitted him to use his own time to refine nuances or to cover

Nixon, on a July 1974 visit to the Soviet Union, talks with Leonid I. Brezhnev.

25

GAMMA-LIAISON

> 'THE MOST IMPRESSIVE PERFORMANCE... IN 40 YEARS OF MEETINGS WITH WORLD LEADERS,' THE AUTHOR SAYS OF HIS SESSION WITH GORBACHEV.

SEMYON RASKIN/MAGNUM

Nixon and Khrushchev held their famous Kitchen Debate in 1959. On the right, Leonid I. Brezhnev.

new ground. All in all, it was the most impressive performance I have witnessed in nearly 40 years of meetings with world leaders.

Gorbachev has supreme self-confidence and iron self-control. He is not as quick as Khrushchev was, but is therefore not as prone to mistakes. He thinks before he speaks. He is good at small talk but prefers to get on with the business at hand. He seldom indulges in humor, preferring to concentrate on the serious issues he has prepared so well to discuss. Some say he has a quick temper, but I disagree. He uses his temper, he seldom loses it, but in the rare occasions he does lose it, he quickly recovers and continues his relentless drive to dominate the dialogue. He may digress from time to time, but only to make his point. He never loses his train of thought. He has an exquisitely disciplined mind.

Khrushchev fulminated about the rightness of Soviet policies, but in my meetings with him he never stepped

beyond the most recent Soviet propaganda line. Brezhnev read prepared statements and then deferred all discussion to his subordinates. When I saw Gorbachev, he did the talking for the Soviet side, without notes, and he exhibited a thorough understanding of all the intricacies of arms control and other issues. He understands power and knows how to use it.

IKE HIS PREDECESSORS, Gorbachev seeks to expand the influence and power of the Soviet Union. Regardless of the refinements he has introduced into Moscow's public-relations techniques, he

has preserved the long-term objective of pushing for global predominance. But he is the first Soviet leader who has faced the fact that his country suffers from fundamental internal problems that threaten its status as a superpower. He is a dedicated Communist, but when he looks at the Soviet position in the world, he wears no ideological blinders.

In the last 15 years the Soviet Union

has increased its superiority in conventional military power. It has expanded its coastal navies into a blue-water navy — the second-largest in the world in terms of tonnage. Most disturbing, it has acquired decisive superiority in the most powerful and accurate nuclear weapons — land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. It has projected its power into Southwest Asia and its proxies have tallied victories in Southeast Asia, southern Africa and Central America. Its sustained political and propaganda offensive in Western Europe has prompted major political parties to adopt essentially neutralist platforms, which, if implemented, would lead to the dissolution of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance.

Communism has proved to be an effective means for winning and keeping power. That experience serves to confirm Gorbachev's ideological beliefs. He knows that the Soviet Union must address great problems, but he still believes it represents the wave of the future.

YET, AS HE SURVEYS THE INTERNATIONAL scene, Gorbachev cannot be encouraged. (Continued on Page 66)

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## GORBACHEV

*Continued from Page 66*

aged. To the west, he sees signs of political unrest in virtually every country of the Soviet bloc, from Poland through Bulgaria. With these uncertain allies at its side, the Soviet Union confronts an alliance that has lasted longer than any other in history. NATO, whose European nations outspent the United States in defense from 1972 to 1982, has significantly strengthened its forces in the field. While the Soviet Union has undermined the international resolve of the Labor Party in Britain and the Social Democratic Party in West Germany, their drift toward neutralism has in turn undercut their electoral appeal. Chancellor Helmut Kohl has been reelected to another four-year term. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher routed her divided opposition at the polls. Under President François Mitterrand and Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, France has bolstered its military forces and increased its cooperation with NATO.

As Gorbachev looks to the east, he sees the enormous challenges posed by China and Japan. China, still a potential enemy of the Soviet Union, does not today represent a military threat, but its huge population and enormous natural resources create an awesome danger for the future. Beijing's economic reforms compound the threat. If the Soviet Union's growth rate continues to lag behind China's as much as it has over the last five years, China will surpass Russia in gross national product by the middle of the next century.

Japan, with few energy resources and less than half the population and one-sixteenth the territory of the Soviet Union, has a per capita income more than twice as high. With its growth far outpacing Moscow's, Japan will leave the Soviet Union hopelessly behind in the next century. More ominous from the Kremlin's point of view, the Japanese Government has recently rescinded the formal limita-

tion keeping defense spending under 1 percent of G.N.P. and has undertaken a significant, though still modest, program to upgrade its defenses.

Beyond its immediate frontiers, Russia's clients in the third world are queuing up for handouts. They are not allies of Moscow, but dependencies; none could survive without massive economic subsidies or military assistance. Lenin wrote that capitalist countries turned to imperialism as a profit-making venture. If that was true, the Communist Revolution in Russia certainly did usher in a new era, because Moscow's empire impoverishes rather than enriches the Kremlin. Vietnam costs the Soviet Union more than $3.5 billion a year; Cuba over $4.9 billion; Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia a total of more than $3 billion, and Nicaragua nearly $1 billion. Its imperial domain costs the Kremlin over $35 million a day.

In the battle of ideas, the Communist ideology has lost its appeal. In the 1950's, many noncommunists in the third world admired the Soviet model of economic development. Today, no developing nation's government appears to become a bureaucratic nightmare like that in the Soviet Union, with its jungles of red tape and its stagnant swamp of an economy. In the 1930's, Americans who spied for Moscow acted out of ideological conviction. Today, Americans who have been convicted of spying for the Russians did it for cash.

Moscow's military power is its only asset. Great as that may be, it cannot be sustained over the long term without matching economic power. The Russians' dilemma is that their assets are ill-suited to solving their problems, and their problems are undetermining their assets.

One of the Soviet Union's biggest problems has been Afghanistan, which Gorbachev has described as "a bleeding wound." He wants to cut his losses there, and we should help him

## Solutions to Last Week's Puzzles

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66

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trol as an end in itself, but the Russians consider it a means to an end. Moscow is right. Arms control alone cannot produce peace or insure our security. But properly negotiated arms-control agreements can help to produce the stability that could reduce the chances of a crisis escalating into a war.

Our focus should be on how to negotiate in a way that serves our interests. We need to develop the capacity to craft proposals that both achieve our goals and create political pressures on the Soviet Union to accept our terms. Then, if Kremlin leaders turn us down, we gain in the political competition; if they accept our offer, we gain our objectives.

Gorbachev has proved to be a master at this maneuver. When the United States proposed, in November 1981, the zero-option — which called for no American or Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Europe — it did so not because policy makers thought that such a solution served Western interests but because it expected the Russians to reject the idea and suffer politically for doing so. It was assumed that the proposal would score political points in Europe and enable the United States to station intermediate-range nuclear forces in NATO countries. That tactic worked as long as the Soviet Union remained obstinate at the negotiating table.

But Gorbachev soon figured out that a zero-zero solution ultimately favored Moscow, eliminating American capabilities to retaliate from Europe without affecting Soviet capabilities to strike. When Gorbachev accepted the American offer, the Reagan Administration felt it had no choice but to proceed with the agreement, despite serious reservations in parts of the Department of Defense, by the former NATO commander Bernard Rogers and allies in Europe. One of the principal reasons reluctant supporters of the accord, such as Henry Kissinger and myself, used to rationalize our position was that for the United States to refuse its own offer would be too costly in terms of public opinion in Western Europe.

HOW CAN WE PUT political pressure on Soviet leaders to make the deals we want at the price we want to pay? This requires that American policy makers understand Soviet motivations and vul-

Power moves the world for good or ill, and no nation will give up any of its power.

nerabilities. It also requires a keen sense of gamesmanship. Most importantly, it requires an ability to package proposals with a sense for public relations. We cannot negotiate successfully unless the peoples of the West support our initiatives. A united front of Western powers — which a politically attuned proposal can galvanize — places maximum pressure for the Soviet Union to negotiate on our terms.

Before entering negotiations, we should have a thorough understanding of what the two superpowers can agree about and what we cannot agree about, and we need to define in very specific terms what we want to achieve.

We can agree on measures to reduce the likelihood of accidental nuclear war; on ways to reduce and stabilize the strategic nuclear balance; on the means to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons; on ways to resolve some — but not all — conflicts in contentious regions of the world, and on ways to structure mutually beneficial relations, such as trade and cultural exchange.

The United States and the Soviet Union will not be able to agree on total disarmament.

In talks on strategic weapons, it makes no sense to pursue an across-the-board reduction of 50 percent in the arsenals of the two superpowers. Such a reduction would codify the decisive Soviet superiority in land-based first-strike nuclear weapons. Our primary goal should be to achieve a large cutback in Soviet first-strike weapons, so that Moscow does not ever have enough for a credible first-strike capability. None of the current Administration proposals that have surfaced in the press meets that test. Also, we must not risk overlooking this issue by permitting verification to dominate the debate. Just because a bad agreement can be verified does not make it a good agreement.

It also makes no sense to

try to convince the Russians that both countries should pursue an abstract concept, such as strategic stability. Gorbachev is not interested in what we think is “good” — but rather in what he thinks he will get. To achieve the zero-zero INF deal he wanted, he was willing to give up several times as many warheads as we did. Kremlin leaders will strike deals, but they will never give up something for nothing. Neither should we.

The United States should give Gorbachev what he wants — a relaxation of tensions with the West and an expansion of economic ties — only if he gives us what we want: the elimination of Soviet superiority in first-strike land-based nuclear missiles; a reduction in Soviet repression at home as called for by the Helsinki accords, and a halt to Soviet aggression abroad.

Moscow has made arms control its first priority in United States-Soviet negotiations in part to distract attention from the vital political issues. We must not allow the Russians to achieve this objective by treating the questions of Soviet expansionism and repression as unfortunate obstacles to progress in arms control. We must force the Kremlin to address our concerns, and linkage is the only means of doing so. If they are to benefit the cause of real peace, arms deals should not be concluded unless the Soviet Union cooperates in a reduction of the political tensions that are the root cause of the conflict between the superpowers.

AMERICANS TEND to believe that conflict is unnatural, that people from all nations are basically alike, that differences are products of misunderstanding, and that permanent and perfect peace is a reachable goal.

But what moves the world for good or ill is power, and no

sovereign nation will give up any of its power — not now and not ever. This is an immutable aspect of national character.

André Malraux once told me, “The United States is the first nation in history to become a world power without trying to do so.” Whether we like it or not, the task of leadership has devolved upon us. The sooner we face it — and the sooner the people of great nations, especially those in the West, stop feeling guilty about being powerful — the sooner a genuine international order, based on a stable balance of national power, will be achieved.

It is often said today that Americans' pride in their nation has been restored. It would be more accurate to say that after several years of steady economic growth, and because most of the bad news from abroad — at least as far as Americans are involved — has been of relatively isolated incidents, many of us have the sense that things are better than they were eight years ago.

But national pride not tempered by adversity is sterile. National pride that lacks awareness of our international responsibilities is empty. National pride without the impulse to share that of which we are so proud is selfish. Too often, what we have called a restoration of national pride has been no more than complacent, comfortable smugness. Real pride comes not from avoiding the fray but from being in the middle of it, fighting for our principles, our interests and our friends.

It will take more than a few successful but relatively minor military missions like the invasion of Grenada and the raid on Libya to build lasting new confidence in the United States. Almost nowhere else on earth are people as secure and as prosperous as in the United States. Both our power and our blessings challenge us to adopt policies whose ultimate goal is to make the world safer and better. The stakes in this struggle for peace with freedom are far higher than they were in any of history's armed struggles.

Those who ask whether Mikhail Gorbachev is sincere in his desire for peace beg the question. He sincerely does not want war. But he just as sincerely wants victory. The Soviet Union seeks victory without war. If we seek peace without victory we are doomed to defeat. ■

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Nation

Advice from the Third Man

How Nixon mediated between Reagan and Gorbachev

The two leaders who are planning to meet in Washington next month are already one of the great odd couples of history: Ronald Reagan, the septuagenarian American conservative with his high-noon view of the superpower competition, and Mikhail Gorbachev, the youthful Soviet reformer with his reassuring slogans about “new thinking” and “mutual security.” If, as both hope, they hold a fourth summit before Reagan leaves office, perhaps in Moscow, they will have met more often than any of their predecessors. And if the intermediate-range nuclear forces treaty that they are about to sign leads to a strategic arms agreement next year, their relationship will have proved far more productive than anyone anticipated.

One little-known feature of their relationship has been the quiet mediation of a third man, the past master of summitry, Richard Nixon. The former President has taken it on himself to explain Reagan and Gorbachev to each other, coaxing them toward accommodation where possible. Nixon has found an attentive hearing in the White House and the Kremlin alike.

TIME has obtained a confidential memorandum that Nixon sent to Reagan in July 1986 after a session with Gorbachev in Moscow. The 26-page document captures the essence of Nixon's exercise in discreet diplomacy. It shows him trying to persuade Gorbachev that he can do business with Reagan precisely because Reagan is a conservative. And then, in reporting on the meeting, it shows him trying to persuade the President that he should seek a major strategic arms deal, which Nixon implied could be achieved with only minor concessions on Reagan's cherished Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the Star Wars antimissile program.

Nixon wrote the memo when Reagan and Gorbachev were both riding high. Anatoly Dobrynin, the longtime Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., whom Gorbachev had recalled to Moscow, told Nixon that Gorbachev was “politically very strong, and President Reagan should seize the opportunity to deal with him.” Nixon’s memo implicitly endorsed Dobrynin’s advice. Nixon said he found Gorbachev in person to be “either the greatest actor the political world has produced or ... a man totally in charge with the power and ability to chart his own course.”

Nixon's depiction of Reagan to Gorbachev was similar. The former President told the Soviet leader that Reagan was "enormously popular, with the highest public approval rating of any President in his second term." Therefore Reagan, unlike Jimmy Carter, "could get Senate approval of any agreement he made." Moreover, Nixon continued, "I told [Gorbachev] that after President Reagan left office, he would be enormously popular and would have great influence on public issues due to his incomparable communication skills. It was, therefore,

very much in Gorbachev's interest that President Reagan have a stake in a new, improved U.S.-Soviet relationship which he would have initiated. This would ensure that he would strongly support his successor's efforts to carry out the Reagan initiatives. On the other hand, failure to reach agreement while President Reagan is in office might run the risk of developing a situation where President Reagan might become a powerful critic.” Gorbachev seemed impressed. “I don’t believe anything I said during the conversation had a greater impact on him,” wrote Nixon.

For Nixon and Gorbachev, SDI was “the only major substantive issue we discussed.” Nixon’s memo summarized Gorbachev’s forceful objections to the program in a way that seemed calculated to make it difficult for Reagan to dismiss them as unreasonable.

According to Nixon, Gorbachev “said

it was simply a myth that the Soviet Union opposed SDI because they feared the enormous cost to their economy. He went on to say that his opposition to SDI was not based on his fear of its [offensive] military potential or of our technological edge. He said, ‘We have our own space defense program and our research is making progress in different ways than yours is. In any event,’ he added, ‘we will be able to evade and overcome any SDI system that the U.S. might eventually deploy.’”

“His major objection to SDI,” Nixon wrote, was “because he believed that if SDI went forward there would be a massive spiral in the arms race.” Once again, Nixon’s memo implied that he agreed with Gorbachev, and he urged Reagan to consider a strategic arms deal that would protect the U.S.’s right to continue “pur-

 poseful research” in SDI while trading restrictions on deployment for reductions in Soviet missiles.

The memo also contained a number of personalized grace notes that could only have been flattering to Reagan—and therefore might have made him more receptive to Nixon's advice that he should deal with Gorbachev: “I sensed that Gorbachev's attitude toward the President and the First Lady was one of genuine affection. His last words to me as I was leaving his office in the Kremlin were, ‘Give my warmest regards to President Reagan and to Lady Nancy.’”

But the hard edge returned when Nixon compared Gorbachev with two other Soviet leaders he had dealt with: “Unlike [Nikita] Khrushchev, he has no inferiority complex. He is totally confident, in command, and secure ... Gorbachev is as tough as [Leonid]

Brezhnev but better educated, more skillful, more subtle ... Brezhnev used a meat axe in his negotiations. Gorbachev uses a stiletto. But beneath the velvet glove he always wears there is a steel fist.”

The memo concludes with a pungent reminder—to Reagan and to history—that Richard Nixon, while priding himself on his pragmatism and statesmanship, yields to no one in his basic distrust of all Soviets, including Gorbachev. “He is the most affable of all the Soviet leaders I have met, but at the same time without question the most formidable because his goals are the same as theirs and he will be more effective in attempting to achieve them,” Nixon wrote. “What we must always bear in mind in dealing with the Spiesviets is that while lying is an accepted practice in the art of diplomacy, there is a difference where the Communists are concerned. They believe their lies.”
—By Strobe Talbott/Washington

Half the equation: with Dobrynin and Gorbachev in Moscow

Using flattery and grit to bring both sides to the table.

18

TIME, NOVEMBER 30, 1987

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Richard Nixon

SUPERPOWER SUMMITRY

Forty years ago, U.S. nuclear power was indispensable in ending World War II. In the postwar era, American nuclear superiority was indispensable in deterring Soviet probes that might have led to World War III. But that era is over, and we live in the age of nuclear parity, when each superpower has the means to destroy the other and the rest of the world.

In these strategic circumstances, summit meetings between leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union have become essential if peace is to be preserved. Such meetings will contribute to the cause of peace, however, only if both leaders recognize that tensions between the two nations are due not to the fact that we do *not* understand each other but to the fact that we *do* understand that we have diametrically opposed ideological and geopolitical interests. Most of our differences will never be resolved. But the United States and the Soviet Union have one major goal in common: survival. Each has the key to the other's survival. The purpose of summit meetings is to develop rules of engagement that could prevent our profound differences from bringing us into armed conflict that could destroy us both.

With this limited but crucially important goal in mind, we must disabuse ourselves from the start of the much too prevalent view that if only the two leaders, as they get to know each other, could develop a new "tone" or a new "spirit" in their relationship, our problems would be solved and tensions reduced. If history is any guide, evaluating a summit meeting in terms of the "spirit" it produces is evidence of failure rather than success. The spirits of Geneva in 1955, of Camp David in 1959, of Vienna in 1961 and of Glassboro in 1967 each produced a brief improvement in the atmosphere, but no significant progress on resolving major issues. Spirit and tone matter only when two leaders of nations with similar interests have a misunderstanding that can be resolved by their getting to know each other. Such factors are irrelevant when nations have irreconcilable differences, which is the case as far as the United States and the Soviet Union are concerned.

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The obsession with style over substance among some observers is ludicrous. The fact that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has a firm handshake, excellent eye contact, a good sense of humor and dresses fashionably is no more relevant to his policies than the fact that Khrushchev wore ill-fitting clothes, drank too much and spoke a crude Russian. Anyone who reaches the top in the Soviet hierarchy is bound to be a dedicated communist and a strong, ruthless leader who supports the Soviet foreign policy of extending Soviet domination into the non-communist world. We can "do business" with Gorbachev, but only if we recognize that the business we have to deal with involves intractable differences between competitive states.

President Reagan will be urged to prove to Mr. Gorbachev that he is sincerely dedicated to peace and that, despite his tough rhetoric, he is really a very nice man. President Reagan does not have to prove that he is for peace. Mr. Gorbachev knows that. What is vitally important is that he also understand that President Reagan is a strong leader, one who is fair and reasonable, but who will, without question, take action to protect American interests when they are threatened.

Debates about ideology will serve no useful purpose. Mr. Gorbachev is as dedicated to his ideology as President Reagan is to his. Neither is going to convert the other.

In the postwar era, no two leaders come to a summit with more political support at home or more endowed with charm and charisma. But for one to try to charm the other would bring not affection but contempt; this would certainly be Mr. Gorbachev's reaction. An essential element of a new relationship is not sentimental expressions of friendship but hard-headed mutual respect. In 1959, before I met Khrushchev, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan told me that he sensed in his meetings with the Soviet leaders that, above all, they "wanted to be admitted as members of the club." This is a small price to pay for laying the foundations for a new structure of peace in the world.

## II

Can two powers with diametrically opposed geopolitical interests avoid war and develop a peaceful relationship? It is important to recognize clearly the major dangers which could lead to nuclear war. In descending order of likelihood they are:

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1) War by accident, where one side launches a nuclear attack because a mechanical malfunction creates the mistaken impression that the other side has launched an attack;

2) Nuclear proliferation, which could put nuclear weapons in the hands of a leader of a minor revolutionary or terrorist power who would be less restrained from using nuclear weapons than the major powers have been;

3) Escalation of small wars in areas where the interests of the superpowers are both involved, such as the Middle East and the Persian Gulf;

4) War by miscalculation, where a leader of one superpower underestimates the will of the leader of the other to take ultimate risks to defend his interests.

In all four of these scenarios, the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual interest in reducing the danger and risks which could lead to a nuclear war. They are, therefore, areas where tough-minded diplomacy culminating in agreements at the summit level can play a constructive role.

The next most likely danger is a Soviet preemptive strike to liquidate the Chinese nuclear arsenal. This is not a danger at the present time because China lacks the industrial base and military capacity to be a serious threat to the Soviet Union. But as China begins to develop such a capacity in the future, a Soviet leader could decide that it is better to strike before China becomes a major nuclear power. A nuclear war between major powers, like the Soviet Union and China, could escalate into a world war. That is why it is in the interests of the United States and the West to welcome, not oppose, efforts on the part of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China to reduce tensions.

The least likely danger of nuclear war is a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe or the United States. The Soviet leaders are and will continue to be dedicated to extending communist domination over non-communist nations. But they are not madmen, and they are not fools. No matter how confident they are that they can win a nuclear war, it would be at the risk of great destruction to the Soviet homeland. Having Europe and the United States reduced to nuclear wastelands would be the bitter fruit of such a "victory." World war has become obsolete as an instrument of policy between the two superpowers. That is why the primary danger, as far as the United States and Western Europe are concerned, is not destruction in war but surrender to nuclear coercion.

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arsenal. The United States has no missiles of this size which
would allow us to match such an action by the Soviets.

Looking to the future, without a new arms control agree-
ment, even if the United States were to continue its own arms
program at the levels requested by President Reagan rather
than the far lower levels approved by Congress, and if the
Soviets were to continue their programs at current levels, the
Soviet Union will be further ahead in nuclear missiles in 1990
than it is today.

If we are to prevent otherwise inevitable Soviet superiority,
our only option is to negotiate a new, verifiable arms control
agreement based on strict parity that denies a first-strike ca-
pability to the Soviet Union as well as to ourselves. What is
most urgent is to remove the threat of the SS-18s and the new
ICBMS, the SS-24 and SS-25, which are designed not to attack
our cities in retaliation for an attack on the Soviet Union but
for a decisive first strike against our missile sites. Many senators
and congressmen have voted for the 40 MX missiles in the hope
that they would be an effective bargaining chip in the Geneva
negotiations. But the Soviets are not philanthropists. They will
not cut back their 300 SS-18s to only 40 without getting
something in return.

That is why, contrary to the critics' contention, the Presi-
dent's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is indispensable to arms
control. Without it, the Soviet Union would have no incentive
to limit its offensive weapons. It is important, however, to
distinguish among three different defensive systems.

A defensive system to protect our entire population would
make nuclear weapons obsolete and thus replace deterrence as
our defense against nuclear weapons. But for such a system to
be effective against an all-out Soviet attack, it would have to
be virtually leakproof. In view of the dramatic scientific break-
throughs made in my lifetime, I do not contend, as some do,
that this is impossible. But we cannot base our *current* strategic
planning on a system which, at best, will not be ready for full
deployment until the next century.

A system that defends our missile sites, however, is possible
in ten years or less. Even if it is only 30-percent effective, it
would effectively deny the Soviet Union a first-strike capability
against our missile sites. The purpose of such a defensive system
would be not to replace deterrence but to strengthen it.

The third kind of system, a thin population defense, which
would not be adequate against an all-out Soviet attack but

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Reducing the danger of nuclear war involves arms control, but it is a mistake to support arms control as desirable in itself and to believe that any agreement is better than none. The primary purpose of arms control is to reduce the danger of war. It is not the existence of arms, but political differences that lead to their use, which leads to war. A bad agreement that opens the way to Soviet superiority increases the danger of war. Even a good agreement will not prevent war if political differences lead to armed conflict. Thus, an agreement reducing arms but not linked to restraints on political conduct would not contribute to peace. If political differences escalate into war, it is no comfort to know that each side has the capacity to destroy the other only two times rather than twenty times.

President Reagan has been unfairly criticized for adhering to the SALT II (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) treaty negotiated by President Jimmy Carter but not approved by the Senate. The critics contend that the reason the Soviet Union is ahead and that we are behind in land-based strategic missiles is because the Soviets are cheating on the arms control agreements and because those agreements restricted our strategic programs. There is no question that the Soviets will do all that is allowed under an arms control agreement and will stretch it to the outer limits and indeed will cheat if they can get away with it. But they gained their superiority in strategic land-based missiles not because of what *they* did in violation of arms control agreements but because of what *we* did *not* do within the limits allowed by the agreements. We must also face up to the hard reality that without a credible arms control initiative, it would be impossible to get congressional approval for adequate defense budgets to match the Soviet effort or to retain the support of our allies.

It is contended that because of the flaws in the agreements and the Soviet practice of violating them, the United States would be better off without any agreement. Yet, while there is strong evidence that the Soviet Union is probably violating provisions of SALT I and SALT II, it is complying with the limits on the fractionation of warheads agreed to in SALT II. If President Reagan had decided not to continue complying with SALT II, the Soviet Union would not consider itself to be bound by these provisions and limitations either; it could attach 30 warheads to each of its 300 giant SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles rather than the 10 allowed under the treaty. This would mean an increase of 6,000 warheads in the Soviet

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would be effective against an accidental launch or an attack by a minor nuclear power, is also feasible within the next ten years. This is an area where the Soviet Union could agree with us that developing and deploying such a limited system is in their interest as well as ours.

President Reagan is correct in insisting that research on all aspects of the SDI is not negotiable, both because a ban on research is not verifiable and because if there is even a remote chance to develop a total population defense it should be a priority goal of our defense establishment. We also must have in mind that the Soviet Union is spending twice as much as we are on defense against nuclear weapons.

But deployment, as distinguished from research, for defense of our missile fields is the ultimate bargaining chip, just as was the case with SALT I. We should agree to limit our deployment of defensive weapons only if the Soviets significantly reduce and limit their offensive weapons. The choice is Gorbachev's. Either the Soviets cut back on their offensive forces or we will deploy defensive forces to match their buildup.

### III

Arms control and political issues must go forward together. Progress on arms control can lead to stability and the reduction of political tensions. Reduction of political tensions can lead to a better climate for reaching an arms control agreement that is fair to both sides. Those who contend that we should seek arms control regardless of what happens on political issues should bear in mind that what destroyed any chance for Senate approval of the SALT II treaty was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Today, there is no chance that the Senate would approve an arms control treaty at a time when the Soviet Union is supporting anti-U.S. forces in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

A summit agenda, therefore, should have as its first priority not arms control but the potential flash points for U.S.-Soviet conflicts. It is highly doubtful that we would have agreed to SALT I in 1972 had we not settled in the Berlin Agreement of 1971 those issues which had led to so many crises since the end of World War II. A similar opportunity is presented in the Middle East and Central America today.

The most difficult and potentially dangerous issue which brings the two nations into confrontation is the Soviet policy of supporting revolutionary movements against non-communist governments in the Third World. The Brezhnev Doctrine

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of 1968, announced after Soviet troops crushed a rebellion
against the communist government of Czechoslovakia, pro-
claimed that Soviet conquests in Eastern Europe were irrevers-
ible. Putting it simply, Brezhnev said, "what's mine is mine."
By Soviet probes in Latin America, Africa, the Persian Gulf
and the Mideast against allies and friends of the United States,
that doctrine has been extended to mean "what's yours is
mine." The Soviet leaders must be made to understand that it
would be both irrational and immoral for the United States
and the West to accept the doctrine that the Soviet Union has
a right to support wars of liberation in the non-communist
world without insisting on our right to defend our allies and
friends under assault and to support true liberation movements
against pro-Soviet regimes in the Third World.

We cannot expect the Soviets to cease being communists,
dedicated to expanding communist influence and domination
in the world. But we must make it clear to the Soviets that
military adventurism will destroy the chances for better rela-
tions between the United States and the Soviet Union. We
must also make it clear that the revised Brezhnev Doctrine of
not only defending but extending communism will be answered
by a Reagan Doctrine of defending and extending freedom.
Our only common interest is to conduct ourselves in such a
way that such conflicts do not escalate into nuclear confronta-
tion.

In view of the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons,
both nations have a mutual interest in working together to
combat international terrorism, whether promoted by states or
individuals. With the progress that is being made in the tech-
nology of miniaturization, the time is not far off when the
danger of breaking the nuclear threshold will come from
individuals and not only nations. If the nuclear genie gets out
of the bottle, the fallout could affect all nations and particularly
those which have nuclear weapons. The Soviets should be asked
to join us in a declaration that terrorists and those who give
aid and comfort to terrorists are guilty of an international
crime and should be dealt with accordingly.

While we should hold the Soviets accountable for the actions
they take that are opposed to our interests, we should recognize
that they are not responsible for all of the troubles in the world.
The income gap between nations that produce raw materials
and those that consume them, famine due to climatic causes,
radical Muslim fundamentalist and terrorist movements ema-

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nating from Libya and Iran—all of these problems would exist even if the Soviet Union did not exist. But rather than exploiting such problems, the Soviet Union should join the United States and other Western nations in combating them. The Soviets should be especially concerned about the rise of Muslim fundamentalism not only because one-third of the population of the Soviet Union is Muslim, but also because the Muslim revolution competes with the Soviet revolution for the support of people in Third World nations.

There is one phase of our competition which should be brought under control—competing with each other in fueling the arms race in the Third World. U.S. and Soviet arms sales to Third World countries run to billions of dollars. Most of these countries are desperately poor, and they need economic assistance far more than they need additional arms. For the Soviet Union to arm India, while the United States arms Pakistan, can only end in tragedy for the people of both countries. Even though these are only non-nuclear arms, they are instruments of war, and small wars always have the potential of escalating into nuclear wars. There is no prospect for reducing arms sales soon, if at all, but both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have an interest in controlling them and not letting them drag us into conflict.

## IV

Turning to collateral issues, while it is an illusion that trade by itself will lead to peace, an increase in unsubsidized trade in nonmilitary items can provide a strong incentive for the Soviet Union to avoid conduct that increases political tensions between our two countries. Trade and political issues are inexorably linked. For the United States to increase trade, which the Soviets need and want, at a time when they are engaging in political activities that are opposed to our interests, would be stupid and dangerous. No nation should subsidize its own destruction.

One of the most widely held misconceptions is that person-to-person programs and cultural exchange will significantly reduce tensions. As a longtime supporter of such programs, I must reluctantly point out that this is not the case. "Getting to know you" is not the issue between the Soviet Union and the United States. What are called the three Cs—consular, cultural and commercial issues—will and should receive appropriate attention at summit meetings. But since Soviet authorities

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decide who is to go to the United States and what and whom
foreigners can see in the Soviet Union, no one should be under
any illusion that agreements in such peripheral areas by them-
selves have any significant effect on the nature of the conflict
between the two superpowers.

The most highly charged emotional issue is that of human
rights abuses in the Soviet Union. The Soviets insist that under
no circumstances will they allow their internal policies to be a
subject for negotiation with another government. We should
make human rights a top-priority *private* issue but not a *public*
issue. We saw this principle in practice in 1972. In my summit
conversations with Brezhnev, I privately urged that he lift
limitations on Jewish emigration in order to gain support for
détente in the United States. A record 37,000 exit visas were
granted in that year. The following year, the Jackson-Vanik
Amendment to the trade bill put public pressure on the Soviets
to increase Jewish emigration. The Soviets reacted by sharply
*reducing* the number of visas rather than *increasing* them.

V

For the past five years I have strongly urged holding annual
summit meetings. Such meetings can serve useful purposes
apart from reaching any major substantive agreements. Most
important, they can substantially reduce the risk of war from
miscalculation. This will be the case not because the two leaders
will charm each other or find that they like each other but
because they will understand each other's interests, respect
each other's strength, and know the limits beyond which they
cannot go without running the risk of armed conflict. This was
a factor after the 1973 summit which probably helped to
convince Brezhnev that I was not bluffing later in the year
(October 1973) when I ordered an alert of our forces to back
up our demand that he not intervene unilaterally in the Middle
East war.

Moreover, when a summit meeting is scheduled, it inhibits
one side from engaging in actions that would be clearly against
the interests of the other during the period before the meeting;
thus each party will have an incentive to avoid conduct which
might poison the atmosphere. This factor probably also played
a role in cooling the 1973 crisis.

A summit meeting is also a very useful tool to get a bureau-
cracy moving. The Soviet bureaucracy is notoriously and mad-
deningly slow, rigid and inflexible. The U.S. bureaucracy is

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not free of such faults. There is nothing like the deadline of a summit to knock heads together and to shape up a bureaucracy. The danger which must be avoided is pressure, especially from the bureaucracy, for agreements for agreements' sake to ensure the success of the summit. It is far better to have no agreement at all than to negotiate a bad one.

VI

One hundred and fifty years ago, Alexis de Tocqueville observed with incredible foresight:

> There are at the present time two great nations in the world which seem to bend toward the same end although they start from different points: I allude to the Russians and the Americans—the Anglo-American relies upon personal interest to accomplish his ends and gives free scope to the unguided exertions and common sense of the citizens; the Russian centers all the authority of society in a single arm: the principal instrument of the former is freedom, of the latter servitude. Their starting point is different and their courses are not the same; yet each of them seems to be marked out by the will of heaven to sway the destinies of half the globe.

This was written long before the communists came to power in Russia. We must recognize that while Russians and Americans can be friends, our governments are destined by history to be adversaries. Yet while we are destined to be adversaries, we have a mutual interest in avoiding becoming enemies in a suicidal war. This requires a candid and honest recognition of our irreconcilable and permanent differences, not a superficial glossing-over of them. A difference not recognized can be dangerous. A difference recognized can be controlled.

The one absolute certainty about the Soviet-American relationship is that the struggle in which we are engaged will last not just for years but for decades. In such a struggle, one advantage the Soviet Union has over the United States is that its foreign policy has consistency and continuity. The leaders change but the policies remain the same. Khrushchev wore short-sleeved shirts and Brezhnev wore French cuffs, but both set the same foreign policy goals: the extension of Soviet domination and influence in the world.

Every eight years and sometimes every four years, American policy, with bipartisanship virtually ended by the Vietnam War, oscillates between extremes of underestimating and overestimating the Soviet threat. What is needed is a steady, consistent policy with bipartisan support that does not change from one

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 9, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE EAST ROOM

AT 11:20 A.M. EDT

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger will have brief remarks and then will take your questions. What he says to you today is on the record for direct quotation.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen: In order to put these decisions into context, I wanted to put before you the efforts the Administration has made in recent months to begin serious and constructive negotiations with the other side. I also wanted to put before you the considerations that led to the President's decision and to his speech and the reasoning and then I will answer your questions.

I need hardly emphasize that this was a very painful and difficult decision to make, which was taken only because it was believed that no other honorable alternative was available. This Administration has invested an enormous amount of effort and conviction in our relations with the major Communist countries.

We have attempted, since coming into office, to open a new era in international relations and we are determined insofar as it depends on us to continue these efforts. But we have also had the problem that one small country has resisted all efforts to find an honorable way out of the situation of Southeast Asia.

It has been supported with equipment and offensive weapons by some major powers and this is what has produced the situation we face today.

Now, in order to put into perspective where we are in the peace negotiations, I would like to go through with you the exchanges that have taken place between us and Hanoi since the end of last year, that is to say, since the North Vietnamese cancelled the private meeting that was scheduled for November 20th, when they cancelled it three days before.

As you remember, the President in his speech on January 25th pointed out that after Le Duc Tho had been suddenly taken ill, we offered to resume negotiations any time that he recovered, either with him or any other representative of Hanoi's political leadership, in order to bring about a rapid end of the war.

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We insisted on a representative of Hanoi's political leadership because our experience had been that the delegation in Paris simply did not have sufficient authority to make these private talks useful. We never received a reply to this message of November 19th.

On January 26th, or the day after the President's speech revealing the secret talks, we sent a message to Hanoi indicating our readiness to resume private negotiations. On February 14th, there was a reply in which Hanoi indicated its willingness to meet any time from March 15th on.

On February 17th, that is to say, three days after we received the message, we accepted this proposal and suggested the date of March 20th. The reason we suggested March 20th is because it is easier to travel on a weekend and we picked the first weekend after March 15th.

In this message we said the following, which has characterized our attitude. We said, "The United States believes that (at this meeting) the proposals of both sides should be considered." In other words, we indicated our readiness to discuss their points, "It expects to negotiate on this basis with an attitude of justice and generosity and with a view to bringing about a rapid end of the war."

On February 29th, Hanoi accepted the date of March 20th. On March 6th, Hanoi postponed the March 20th meeting until April 15th. We accepted this on March 13th, only pointing out that there were other commitments on April 15th and proposing instead April 24th. The other commitment was the trip to Japan that had been planned and which we did not wish to cancel.

We did not hear from Hanoi to our acceptance of their own proposal. So after 10 days, Porter interrupted the plenaries on March 27th. Four days after Porter had interrupted the plenaries, Hanoi accepted the date of April 24th, provided the United States returned to the plenary.

We called Ambassador Porter back and we sent a message which was delivered on April 2nd, but which was in fact drafted on March 31st, in which we agreed to resume the plenary sessions on April 13th and confirmed the meeting of April 24th.

When that message was drafted we were not aware of the fact that a major offensive had in fact started at the Demilitarized Zone, and therefore, some of the press reports that we were tying the resumption of the plenaries to the end of the offensive are totally wrong, in fact, I will read you from our message to the North Vietnamese which will confirm this. It said as follows:

"In order to demonstrate its positive attitude and explore every possible opportunity for progress in negotiation, Ambassador Porder will propose a plenary session of the Paris Conference on Thursday, April 13th, 1972.

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"On this basis the United States reaffirms its agreement to a meeting between Dr. Kissinger and Special Advisor Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy on April 24th at the usual location."

"The U.S. side points out that the military operations launched by the North Vietnamese in recent days near the Demilitarized Zone and elsewhere and the firing of missiles from North Vietnamese territory into South Vietnamese air space are inconsistent with the purpose of this meeting. The U.S. side has been showing great restraint in its response in order to give the negotiations every chance to succeed."

At that time, some of you who called me will know we were not sure that this was a full scale offensive until Easter Sunday. Maybe we should have. But we were not certain that this was an offensive across the Demilitarized Zone.

The purpose of this message was to prevent military pressure from being put by either side.

I would also like to point out that during March, while we knew that a military build up was going on, we nevertheless, showed very great restraint. In fact, we did not authorize attacks into North Vietnam except the normal protective reaction, but nothing against supply installations or missile sites, because of our concern for our relationships that had been established in Peking and that we were trying to develop in Moscow.

I have mentioned all of this to stress that what has happened was not done lightly, whatever judgments people may make.

Then during April there was an exchange of many messages which revolved around the question of whether there should be a private meeting before a plenary session or a plenary session before a private meeting which did not however add a great deal to the substance that I have already pointed out to you.

There were a total of six messages that were going back and forth in April. This was the situation when I went to Moscow.

As has been reported, the problem of Vietnam was discussed at considerable length. We pointed out to the Soviet leaders the extraordinary complexity that was posed for us by a massive invasion of the entire North Vietnamese field army against South Vietnam, an invasion that if it achieved its objective was bound to jeopardize the security of 60,000 Americans, and the impact that such developments had to have on our attempts to move forward on a broad front.

While I do not want to go into the details of the discussion, the Soviet leaders felt that every effort should be made to resume negotiations, and on this basis, and in order not to be hung up on a procedural point, we proposed that we would return to the plSecretaries, if we received a firm assurance that a private meeting would follow rapidly.

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We left no doubt that we were not concerned only or primarily with the fact of a private meeting, but with the results of a private meeting. We made it very clear that we were prepared to consider any reasonable approach that would lead either to a reduction in the violence, to an end of military operations, to a discussion of the military issues alone or to a discussion of the entire complex of issues with only one proviso. We would not impose a Communist Government on Saigon, we wanted a genuine political solution. With that one proviso we indicated a readiness to discuss any possible approach.

The meetings took place, as you know. There were two plenary sessions and a private session. We again went through every conceivable approach for ending the military situation and we indicated a readiness to examine any political proposal other than the imposition of a Communist Government.

We were confronted by the reading to us of the published Communist statement. It had taken us six months to set up the meeting and innumerable exchanges and when we got there, what we heard could have been clipped from a newspaper and sent to us in the mail. This was the situation we confronted last week.

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What is it that the other side is asking of us that we have rejected? The other side has asked of us, prior to a cease-fire, that the following steps must be taken:

The President of South Vietnam must resign. What is called by the other side "the machinery of oppression of the government" must be disbanded. Pacification must be stopped. Vietnamization must be stopped, which means the end of American military and economic aid. All persons who have been arrested on political grounds should be set free. Then a government should be formed which is composed of all those who favor peace, independence, neutrality and democracy, presumably, by definition, including the Communists.

In that government, in other words, the Communists would be the only organized force, since all the organized non-Communist forces would have been disbanded by definition.

All of this is prior to a cease-fire. Then this government is supposed to negotiate with the Communists a final solution. In other words, this is only the thinnest veneer; this government, which already contains the Communists, is then supposed to negotiate with the Provincial Revolutionary Government, which at that moment will be the only force in the country which has an army, which is backed by the North Vietnamese army. It will be the only force in the country that has any physical strength, and it is supposed to negotiate with them a final settlement. And all of this, ladies and gentlemen, is before a cease-fire.

That is what we have rejected. That is what we call the imposition, under the thinnest veneer, of a Communist government. That is the ending of American economic and military aid, the disbanding of the government that exists in South Vietnam, as a prelude to negotiation. That is the only issue on which negotiations have broken down.

On the whole complex of military issues, we have indicated total readiness for discussion and our proposals have not been rejected; there has been a total refusal even to discuss them. We have not been told what is wrong with our proposals. There has been an absolute unwillingness to discuss any one of them, or to give us any reason why it was unacceptable so that we could continue the discussions.

This was the background against which the Presidential decision had to be seen. No one can believe that two weeks before a summit meeting that it has taken us two years to set up that the President would lightly engage in the sort of decisions he had taken.

We were confronted with the fact that an opponent was insisting on continuing an all-out military offensive which he would stop only on terms that no American President can be asked to accept, and this is why, with enormous pain and great reluctance, this Administration was forced into those decisions.

For two years we have been engaged in negotiations on a broad range of issues with the Soviet Union. We are on the verge not just of success in this or that negotiation, but of what could be a new relationship of benefit to all of mankind, a new relationship in which, on both sides, whenever there is a danger

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of crisis, there will be enough people who have a commitment to constructive programs so that they could exercise a restraining influence. But in order for such a policy to succeed, it cannot be accepted that one country can be oblivious to the impact on another of the actions of its friends, particularly when those friends are armed with the weapons of this country.

I ask you to consider what you would think, in the months before a summit meeting, if an American ally, armed with American weapons, attacked a Soviet ally and put into jeopardy the tens of thousands of Soviet troops, whether you would not ask yourself whether we should have exercised some restraint.

I am not saying that at the point when I was in Moscow the Soviet ability to exercise restraint was very great. I am saying that the decision was very difficult, but it had to be taken for these reasons:

First, you must not conclude from this decision that we are assuming that the battle in the South cannot be stabilized. What we are trying to prevent by this decision is an endless continuation of this process by which one attack after another takes place over a period of months without serious negotiation, and without any prospect for a settlement. But we also want to be in a position that if our assessment is incorrect, and things should turn out not as well as we hope, that we have some bargaining position left on behalf of the Americans who will then be threatened, and of the Americans who are now prisoners.

What we have done must be seen not in the context of a country which is trying to impose its will. It has to be seen in the context of the proposals which the President made in his speech.

What is it that we are asking of the North Vietnamese? What is it in those proposals that a country cannot honorably accept? We are saying that if our prisoners are returned, and if there is an end to the fighting, that we will withdraw all our forces from South Vietnam in four months, and that we will stop all acts of force throughout Indochina. Why is it that these proposals should not be accepted?

They would leave the determination of the political future to the Vietnamese. They would enable us to withdraw with honor and they would at least put an end to the fighting. So it is incorrect to say that we have embarked on a course designed to impose our solution. We have embarked on a course to try to bring an end to this agony, and, in a way, to this deception, where there is the constant delusion that there is just one formula that has somehow eluded us, where for months we have attempted in good faith to set up a serious negotiation, where our proposals are not even discussed, land where everything is staked by the other side on a pure military move. So both we and other major powers are at this moment at a critical decision.

It is this decision that is compared by some to the Cuban missile crisis, but there are very important differences.

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We do not view this as a confrontation between us and the Soviet Union. We are not attempting by these actions to impose a one-sided solution. We are trying to work out some principles of international conduct and an end to a conflict which threatens, alike, our interests as well as the interest of other countries that have a stake in the preservation of peace.

Those were the reasons, in summary, that led to the President's speech last night, and now I will be delighted to answer questions.

Q Would a cease-fire have to be established along the present line of military forces or would the North Vietnamese have to withdraw to North Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: We will be delighted to spell out the details of our proposal as soon as a serious negotiation starts, but I can only repeat that we would approach negotiations in a generous spirit and with the attitude of bringing about a rapid end to the war.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you expect the summit meeting with the Soviet Union to go forward, and have you had any indication either way?

DR. KISSINGER: To take the second question first, we have had no indication from the Soviet Union, and it will probably be a day or so before we receive one.

With respect to the first question, we are proceeding with the summit preparations, and we see at this moment no reason from our side to postpone the summit meeting. We recognize that the decisions we have taken present some short-term difficulties to the Soviet leaders, but we also believe that the situation that they permitted to evolve presented massive difficulties for us, and both sides have faced the problem throughout of making some real choices; that is to say, if one wants a genuine improvement in relations, as we do, one cannot also at the same time maximize the pressures all around the periphery, so I am not, of course, able to predict what the Soviet reaction will be. Whatever it will be, I can only affirm that as far as we are concerned, we still believe that a new era in East-West relations is possible, and as far as we are concerned, we will place no obstacles in its way, but, rather, we will pursue it with the same intensity as before.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when you were in Moscow, did you inform the Soviet leaders of the possibility of the military action which you have now taken?

DR. KISSINGER: I cannot go into the details of the discussion. I do not believe that there could be any doubt in the minds of the Soviet leaders of the gravity with which we would view an unchecked continuation of a major North Vietnamese offensive and of an attempt by the North Vietnamese to put everything on the military scales.

The precise actions we would take had obviously not been decided upon at the time, and, therefore, could not be discussed. But I do not believe that the Soviet leaders could be under any misapprehension of how seriously it would be viewed if this offensive continued.

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Now, let me point out, in addition, that after my visit to Moscow, and after we had agreed to resume talks, the North Vietnamese launched three major onslaughts. They launched an attack on Kontum the day we informed them privately that we would return to the plenaries. They launched an attack on Dongha four days later on the eve of the plenary session, and they launched their attack on Quang Tri on the eve of the private session. Now, these are facts.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did anyone in the inner councils dissent from this decision, and did anyone point out that Senator Goldwater offered this solution in 1964 when it was rejected by the country?

DR. KISSINGER: I never discuss the internal deliberations of the Government.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you spell out for us, with some more degree of clarity--the President, I believe, did not use the word "blockade." What have we said that we would do should Soviet vessels bearing war materiels, bear down and enter into one of the ports? Will we stop that ship, and how?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I will not go into the precise rules of engagement. At this point, the instructions are to warn all foreign ships of the existence of these minefields, but not to interfere with them if they decide to proceed into the minefields at their own risk.

Q Doctor, is it now fairly safe to conclude that Vietnamization has been pretty much of a failure?

DR. KISSINGER: No. What it is safe to conclude is that when there is a massive attack by the entire North Vietnamese field army, every last division equipped with the most modern weapons, that a very precarious situation will develop, the outcome of which is uncertain. That is the only thing that it is safe to conclude at this moment.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you give us an estimate of the amount of supplies, in terms of days, that are actually in the pipeline now, that have already been unloaded off of Soviet ships, and based on that, how long do you think it will take before the blockade, or whatever you want to call it, takes effect?

DR. KISSINGER: These assessments, of course, would differ in relation to critical items, and it has happened before that our estimates had a certain margin of latitutde, so I do not want to tie myself to any specific figures. But it has to be analyzed, whatever the figure is, in two ways: There is a tendency to say that there are X months of supplies, and, therefore, they can go for this many months before there is any effect. That is probably a wrong way of looking at it, because if there are only so many months of supplies, it must effect decisions before they run out.

It is unlikely that anybody would run down his supplies to the zero level before he made another decision. Now, at what point that decision has to be made, it is difficult to predict. We do not believe that anything that was done will affect the battle that may now be taking place in the next three weeks. It could affect and should affect the next round, and I

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repeat: What decision Hanoi makes depends on two factors, one, on the constraints that are placed on it, but secondly, what it is that we are asking of it, and after all, it is not the most onerous condition to ask that we withdraw within four months in return for a cease-fire and a return of prisoners.

This modification of our peace proposal, a modification which corresponds with what was the accepted wisdom everywhere only a little while ago, has to be seen in the context of the cut-off of supplies. So we think that in this next round, the effect would only be indirect. In the round after that, the effect should make itself felt.

Q Dr. Kissinger, will the U.S. Navy attempt to prevent the offloading of supplies outside the minefields?

DR. KISSINGER: Obviously, it wouldn't serve any useful purpose if I went into every detail of what will or will not be done in given circumstances. What I was trying to convey is that every country now has an important decision to make of what interest it may have to keep this war going at all cost when we are trying to bring it to a conclusion on a basis which seems to us is just to all the parties.

Now, in reply to your specific question, there is only so much you can offload across the beaches, and if you remember that a large percentage of the imports concern petroleum, I think there are certain physical limitations, but we would interfere with it to the maximum degree possible.

Q Dr. Kissinger, to follow that other question, in your first National Security Council memorandum, which has been given some publicity lately, the CIA estimated bombing Haiphong harbor would have only a temporary effect, for two or three months and the North Vietnamese will quickly find alternative routes of supply. Why do you think it would work, in view of that?

DR. KISSINGER: These assessments of what can be shaped by alternative routes were, of course, carefully considered and much more detailed studies were made before this decision was reached. One always has to distinguish, in these systems analyses, between theoretical capacity and practical capacity, and between general availability and specific availability of specific items.

All I can say is that these memoranda were made available to all the principles who reached the decisions, and they were fully discussed.

Q This concerns the President's speech and something you said before about the Vietnamese can negotiate a settlement between themselves after a cease-fire and withdrawal. Does this mean we would totally withdraw from the negotiating table?

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- 10 -

DR. KISSINGER: We have always indicated that we are prepared to pursue two courses: We are either prepared to negotiate a comprehensive settlement, or we are prepared to negotiate the military issues alone.

Now, the difficulty has been that the only comprehensive settlement that the other side has ever proposed to us is the one I described to you earlier, the one that begins with a de facto imposition of a Communist government after which they settle all other issues. After that, there are no other issues left to settle, because after that, we won't have any negotiating power.

If the other side is prepared to discuss with us a political process which gives the real political forces an opportunity to express themselves, we are prepared to discuss it.

We recognize it is a difficult problem. We know that some of our Western forms have another connotation in Vietnam. Maybe we don't have enough imagination. We are prepared to listen to another proposal. We have never had one except this particular formulation, despite repeated attempts on our part to suggest our best judgment or to invite them to make an alternative proposal.

If the political route is closed, we are prepared to discuss the military issues alone and on that hypothesis, we would negotiate our disengagement from the war on the terms I have indicated, and leave the political negotiations to the Vietnamese.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, may we infer from the President's third numbered point that rail and all other communications would be cut off to the maximum extent possible, that the restrictions on Air Force strikes of rail lines close to the Chinese border have now been lifted?

DR. KISSINGER: I obviously cannot go into the details of operations, but we will take great care that the People's Republic will not misunderstand our actions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in the light of the long history of misassessments about the Vietnam war, on what does the President base his confidence that this present move will work or might work?

DR. KISSINGER: Peter, these decisions have to be seen in the context of the choices that are available. No action is also a decision and no action is subject to exactly the same question which you have just raised and therefore, this was the decision reached prayerfully and on the best belief that it will work, but only events will prove whether it will.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the proposal of the concept of mining the harbors and seeking the cut-off of supplies into North Vietnam has been kicking around ever since we became involved in that conflict nearly 10 years ago and it has always been rejected by this Administration and the previous Administration up until now on the grounds, as far as we were able to learn, that it imposed an unacceptable risk of conflict with the Soviet Union or confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Can you tell us what has changed to make that risk now acceptable? Is the risk less than it has been in the past or are the circumstances such as to warrant greater risks than we have been willing to undertake in the past?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course you ladies and gentlemen have access to sources that are sometimes closed to me. So you may know the reason why things were rejected that didn't totally percolate to us.

But the question is do we believe it involves unacceptable risks with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

As I pointed out, it, of course, involves some risks. The judgment was that it did not involve an unacceptable risk, especially compared to the risks of the situation where for the second time since the summit meeting was arranged Soviet arms fueled a military upheaval, and no one has pretended that this decision was lightly arrived at. The judgment has been obviously, that the risks were not unacceptable.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, do you still rule out the
possible reintroduction of U.S. ground forces and the use
of nuclear weapons?

DR. KISSINGER: That has been ruled out by the
President, yes.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you tell me how the
proposal that the President made last night, the conditions
he stated for the four-month withdrawal, differ from the
proposals you made on May 31st in the secret military
proposals and can you also say why you think that they might
be more acceptable now to the other side than they were then?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not saying they might be more
acceptable now. Of course, the deadline has been shortened,
certain events have happened since then which might make
the other side believe that it has now proved its military
capacity to a point where it could afford a purely military
solution, but we have to face this fact: If we can make only
proposals that the other side has said it will accept, we will
be pushed into the position of sooner or later accepting their
political formulation.

We are not saying that the other side will accept it.
We are saying this is a fair proposal and it should accept it.
We are not saying that we know the other side will do this,
we are saying that looking at the situation and the need to
end this war, there is no reason for the other side not to accept it.
We think it is a just proposal. We are not saying it is at this
moment an acceptable proposal, but we hope it will be an acceptable
proposal.

Q Last night he said nothing whatever about the
previous condition of free election country-wide. What is
our attitude now toward that particular proposal?

DR. KISSINGER: Our attitude is that if the other
side is prepared to discuss political issues, we will discuss
our proposal of January 25th, or some variation of it, or
listen to their counter-proposal to it. If the other side
insists that the only political solution is the one that they
have proposed, which is a definite imposition of their government
by us, then we suggest we have a deadlock in the political
field and we solve the military problem.

As far as the United States is concerned, we are
prepared to pursue an alternative approach; either a compre-
hensive solution or a purely military solution. Since the other
side totally rejected a political approach last time, or
insisted that there had to be a literal acceptance of its
published program, the President did not refer to it yesterday --
but we are prepared to continue.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, the President told us many times that his preference was for negotiation but that he is willing to go the Vietnamization route if that didn't succeed. Did that Vietnamization program assume that the North Vietnamese would not at some time fight with all of their might and means?

DR. KISSINGER: We had hoped that in the light of the proposals we had made that there would be a possibility for a negotiated outcome. We had also perhaps underestimated the massive influx of offensive weapons particularly from the Soviet Union, weapons that came in in quantities and of a type that changed the military balance and that in many respects, especially artillery and heavy tanks, tipped the balance in the North Vietnamese direction.

Now, while I have a chance to talk about Soviet supplies, and with Ron looming over me, let me give you our assessment of the Soviet role so that we don't misunderstand each other.

There are two schools of thought. One school of thought maintains that this operation was supplied, conceived, and planned by the Soviet Union in order to impose a maximum humiliation on us prior to the Summit.

Another school of thought maintains that, to be sure, the Soviet Union supplied the weapons, and therefore has to be held responsible for some of the consequences. But that it did not plan this operation, that it could not have considered it in its interest for it to take this extreme form, and that what we face here is one of the problems great powers have in dealing with their clients, that the client looks at problems from its own regional or national perspective, while the great powers may take actions in a much wider one.

We tend to lean towards the latter interpretation. We do not argue that this was a deliberate plan to inflict a humiliation on the United States. We are saying that any thoughtful national leader looking at the masses of offensive equipment might have considered the consequences and, prior to a meeting that had, and still has such high prospects, one should ask oneself whether it can be in the interest of either party to impose a major setback on the other.

This has been our concern, vis a vis the Soviet Union and this has been the reason for our occasional criticism. Not the charge that this is a massive all-out conspiracy.

Q Do you foresee the possibility of a victory by the Hanoi forces of such magnitude that we would have to have a Dunkirk type of operation to withdraw our troops?

DR. KISSINGER: No, we do not foresee a victory of such magnitude, but one has to say that their behavior suggests that such a victory may be their intention and therefore it has to be considered by us. We don't foresee it though.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, for months you have expressed a personal view and conviction that this war will be resolved by negotiation, perhaps at the Summit. Two parts in this question: Do you still feel that is a probability and secondly, given the breaking off of this private session, have you hopes that it can be revived in the future, the idea of private negotiations, with yourself playing a part?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, to take the last part first, these private negotiations haven't remained very private lately. For example, after the last meeting at the insistent request of the North Vietnamese, we did not announce the fact of a meeting, even though we had proposed that to them. Then we were forced to confirm it by their own announcement of it.

Now, leaving aside how possible it is to have really complete private meetings under present circumstances, we believe that the most effective way of ending the war, the most certain way, is by negotiations. We respect Le Duc Tho as a serious, dedicated spokesman for his side, and we are prepared on our side to resume negotiations with him at any time that he is prepared to discuss propositions that are consistent with our principles. And we would make every effort to understand his point of view.

Therefore, on our side, we will never break off the channel of communications and we will always be ready to talk to them.

Now, do I still believe that there is hope for negotiations? I have always based my hope of negotiations on the fact that even in Vietnam there must be some realities that transcend the parochial concern of the contestants and that a point must be reached where a balance is so clearly established that if we can make generous and farseeing proposals that a solution may be possible.

I still have hope that we can do this. And that we may be able to do it soon. I expect that when the present turmoil has subsided that both sides will make efforts to resume the negotiation.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END

(AT 12:15 P.M. EDT)

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Richard Nixon, 1972

May 8 [147]

147 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia. May 8, 1972

Good evening:

Five weeks ago, on Easter weekend, the Communist armies of North Vietnam launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam, an invasion that was made possible by tanks, artillery, and other advanced offensive weapons supplied to Hanoi by the Soviet Union and other Communist nations.

The South Vietnamese have fought bravely to repel this brutal assault. Casualties on both sides have been very high. Most tragically, there have been over 20,000 civilian casualties, including women and children, in the cities which the North Vietnamese have shelled in wanton disregard of human life.

As I announced in my report to the Nation 12 days ago, the role of the United States in resisting this invasion has been limited to air and naval strikes on military targets in North and South Vietnam. As I also pointed out in that report, we have responded to North Vietnam's massive military offensive by undertaking wide-ranging new peace efforts aimed at ending the war through negotiation.

On April 20, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Moscow for 4 days of meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. I instructed him to emphasize our desire for a rapid solution to the war and our willingness to look at all possible approaches. At that time, the Soviet leaders showed an interest in bringing the war to an end on a basis just to both sides. They urged resumption of negotiations in Paris, and they indicated they would use their constructive influence.

I authorized Dr. Kissinger to meet privately with the top North Vietnamese negotiator, Le Duc Tho, on Tuesday, May 2, in Paris.

Ambassador Porter, as you know, resumed the public peace negotiations in Paris on April 27 and again on May 4. At those meetings, both public and private, all we heard from the enemy was bombastic rhetoric and a replaying of their demands for surrender. For example, at the May 2 secret meeting, I authorized Dr. Kissinger to talk about every conceivable avenue toward peace. The North Vietnamese flatly refused to consider any of these approaches. They refused to offer any new approach of their own. Instead, they simply read verbatim their previous public demands.

Here is what over 3 years of public and private negotiations with Hanoi has come down to: The United States, with the full concurrence of our South Vietnamese allies, has offered the maximum of what any President of the United States could offer.

We have offered a deescalation of the fighting. We have offered a cease-fire with a deadline for withdrawal of all American forces. We have offered new elections which would be internationally supervised with the Communists participating both in the supervisory body and in the elections themselves.

President Thieu has offered to resign one month before the elections. We have offered an exchange of prisoners of war in a ratio of 10 North Vietnamese prisoners for every one American prisoner that they release. And North Vietnam has met each of these offers with insolence and insult. They have flatly and arrogantly refused to negotiate an end to the war and

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[147] May 8

Public Papers of the Presidents

bring peace. Their answer to every peace
offer we have made has been to escalate
the war.

In the 2 weeks alone since I offered to resume negotiations, Hanoi has launched three new military offensives in South Vietnam. In those 2 weeks the risk that a Communist government may be imposed on the 17 million people of South Vietnam has increased, and the Communist offensive has now reached the point that it gravely threatens the lives of 60,000 American troops who are still in Vietnam.

There are only two issues left for us in this war. First, in the face of a massive invasion do we stand by, jeopardize the lives of 60,000 Americans, and leave the South Vietnamese to a long night of terror? This will not happen. We shall do whatever is required to safeguard American lives and American honor.

Second, in the face of complete intran-
sigence at the conference table do we join
with our enemy to install a Communist
government in South Vietnam? This, too,
will not happen. We will not cross the
line from generosity to treachery.

We now have a clear, hard choice
among three courses of action: Immedi-
ate withdrawal of all American forces,
continued attempts at negotiation, or de-
cisive military action to end the war.

I know that many Americans favor the first course of action, immediate withdrawal. They believe the way to end the war is for the United States to get out, and to remove the threat to our remaining forces by simply withdrawing them.

From a political standpoint, this would be a very easy choice for me to accept. After all, I did not send over one-half million Americans to Vietnam. I have brought 500,000 men home from Viet-

nam since I took office. But, abandoning
our commitment in Vietnam here and
now would mean turning 17 million South
Vietnamese over to Communist tyranny
and terror. It would mean leaving hun-
dreds of American prisoners in Com-
munist hands with no bargaining leverage
to get them released.

An American defeat in Vietnam would encourage this kind of aggression all over the world, aggression in which smaller nations armed by their major allies, could be tempted to attack neighboring nations at will in the Mideast, in Europe, and other areas. World peace would be in grave jeopardy.

The second course of action is to keep on trying to negotiate a settlement. Now this is the course we have preferred from the beginning and we shall continue to pursue it. We want to negotiate, but we have made every reasonable offer and tried every possible path for ending this war at the conference table.

The problem is, as you all know, it takes two to negotiate and now, as throughout the past 4 years, the North Vietnamese arrogantly refuse to negotiate anything but an imposition, an ultimatum that the United States impose a Communist regime on 17 million people in South Vietnam who do not want a Communist government.

It is plain then that what appears to be a choice among three courses of action for the United States is really no choice at all. The killing in this tragic war must stop. By simply getting out, we would only worsen the bloodshed. By relying solely on negotiations, we would give an intran- sigent enemy the time he needs to press his aggression on the battlefield.

There is only one way to stop the killing.

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May 8 [147]

That is to keep the weapons of war out of
the hands of the international outlaws of
North Vietnam.

Throughout the war in Vietnam, the United States has exercised a degree of restraint unprecedented in the annals of war. That was our responsibility as a great Nation, a Nation which is interested— and we can be proud of this as Americans—as America has always been, in peace not conquest.

However, when the enemy abandons all restraint, throws its whole army into battle in the territory of its neighbor, refuses to negotiate, we simply face a new situation.

In these circumstances, with 60,000 Americans threatened, any President who failed to act decisively would have betrayed the trust of his country and betrayed the cause of world peace.

I therefore concluded that Hanoi must be denied the weapons and supplies it needs to continue the aggression. In full coordination with the Republic of Vietnam, I have ordered the following measures which are being implemented as I am speaking to you.

All entrances to North Vietnamese ports will be mined to prevent access to these ports and North Vietnamese naval operations from these ports. United States forces have been directed to take appropriate measures within the internal and claimed territorial waters of North Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any supplies. Rail and all other communications will be cut off to the maximum extent possible. Air and naval strikes against military targets in North Vietnam will continue.

These actions are not directed against any other nation. Countries with ships

presently in North Vietnamese ports have already been notified that their ships will have three daylight periods to leave in safety. After that time, the mines will become active and any ships attempting to leave or enter these ports will do so at their own risk.

These actions I have ordered will cease when the following conditions are met:

First, all American prisoners of war must be returned.

Second, there must be an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina.

Once prisoners of war are released, once the internationally supervised cease-fire has begun, we will stop all acts of force throughout Indochina, and at that time we will proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam within 4 months.

Now, these terms are generous terms. They are terms which would not require surrender and humiliation on the part of anybody. They would permit the United States to withdraw with honor. They would end the killing. They would bring our POW's home. They would allow negotiations on a political settlement between the Vietnamese themselves. They would permit all the nations which have suffered in this long war—Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam—to turn at last to the urgent works of healing and of peace. They deserve immediate acceptance by North Vietnam.

It is appropriate to conclude my remarks tonight with some comments directed individually to each of the major parties involved in the continuing tragedy of the Vietnam war.

First, to the leaders of Hanoi, your people have already suffered too much in

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[147] May 8

your pursuit of conquest. Do not com-
pound their agony with continued ar-
rogance; choose instead the path of a
peace that redeems your sacrifices, guar-
antees true independence for your coun-
try, and ushers in an era of reconciliation.

To the people of South Vietnam, you
shall continue to have our firm support in
your resistance against aggression. It is
your spirit that will determine the out-
come of the battle. It is your will that will
shape the future of your country.

To other nations, especially those which
are allied with North Vietnam, the ac-
tions I have announced tonight are not
directed against you. Their sole purpose is
to protect the lives of 60,000 Americans,
who would be gravely endangered in the
event that the Communist offensive con-
tinues to roll forward, and to prevent the
imposition of a Communist government
by brutal aggression upon 17 million
people.

I particularly direct my comments to-
night to the Soviet Union. We respect the
Soviet Union as a great power. We recog-
nize the right of the Soviet Union to de-
fend its interests when they are threat-
ened. The Soviet Union in turn must
recognize our right to defend our
interests.

No Soviet soldiers are threatened in
Vietnam. Sixty thousand Americans are
threatened. We expect you to help your
allies, and you cannot expect us to do
other than to continue to help our allies,
but let us, and let all great powers, help
our allies only for the purpose of their de-
fense, not for the purpose of launching
invasions against their neighbors.

Otherwise the cause of peace, the cause
in which we both have so great a stake,
will be seriously jeopardized.

Our two nations have made significant
progress in our negotiations in recent
months. We are near major agreements
on nuclear arms limitation, on trade, on a
host of other issues.

Let us not slide back toward the dark
shadows of a previous age. We do not ask
you to sacrifice your principles, or your
friends, but neither should you permit
Hanoi's intransigence to blot out the
prospects we together have so patiently
prepared.

We, the United States and the Soviet
Union, are on the threshold of a new rela-
tionship that can serve not only the inter-
ests of our two countries, but the cause of
world peace. We are prepared to continue
to build this relationship. The responsibil-
ity is yours if we fail to do so.

And finally, may I say to the American
people, I ask you for the same strong sup-
port you have always given your Presi-
dent in difficult moments. It is you most of
all that the world will be watching.

I know how much you want to end this
war. I know how much you want to bring
our men home. And I think you know
from all that I have said and done these
past 3½ years how much I, too, want to
end the war to bring our men home.

You want peace. I want peace. But, you
also want honor and not defeat. You want
a genuine peace, not a peace that is
merely a prelude to another war.

At this moment, we must stand to-
gether in purpose and resolve. As so often
in the past, we Americans did not choose
to resort to war. It has been forced upon
us by an enemy that has shown utter con-
tempt toward every overture we have
made for peace. And that is why, my fel-
low Americans, tonight I ask for your
support of this decision, a decision which

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Richard Nixon, 1972

May 10 [148]

has only one purpose, not to expand the war, not to escalate the war, but to end this war and to win the kind of peace that will last.

With God's help, with your support, we will accomplish that great goal.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on radio and television. He

spoke from a prepared text.

Before delivering his address to the Nation, the President met with the bipartisan leadership of the Congress to discuss its contents.

On May 9, 1972, the White House released the transcript of a news briefing by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, on the situation in Southeast Asia. The transcript is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 8, p. 842).

to
come

## 148 Statement About Proposed Legislation Authorizing Continued Government Support of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. May 10, 1972

UNDER Public Law 92-264, which I signed on March 30, 1972, grants in support of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were authorized through the end of fiscal year 1972.

The decision to continue Government support for these radios was approved by large majorities in Congress and reflects the judgment that has been expressed overwhelmingly by newspapers throughout this country and by leading citizens in all walks of life that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty continue to perform a unique and valuable service. As I stated in a recent letter to the chairman of the Radio Free Europe Fund:

> "... we have followed closely the work of RFE and are satisfied that it continues to serve a fundamental national interest."

I also said that:

> "... the free flow of information and ideas among nations is indispensable to more normal relations between East and West and to better prospects for an enduring peace."

I have therefore asked the Secretary of State to submit today a bill which would continue Government support to the radios through fiscal year 1973. As with the fiscal year 1972 authorization, this bill would make the grants to the radios through the Secretary of State under such terms and conditions he deems appropriate.

A number of different views have been expressed in Congress as to how the radios might best be funded for the future. No consensus on this important matter has emerged. The House version of the fiscal year 1972 authorization and Senate Resolution 272 make clear that majorities in both Houses believe this should be given further study before a definitive solution is adopted.

To this end, I plan to appoint a Presidential study commission¹ with in-

¹A White House announcement of the establishment and membership of the Commission on International Radio Broadcasting was released on August 10, 1972, and is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 8, p. 1221).

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JANUARY 26, 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

OF

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

THE EAST ROOM

AT 11:06 A.M. EST

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger will be on the record this morning. He will make a brief statement and then we will go directly to your questions.

DR. KISSINGER: I would like to make a few extemporaneous remarks and I hope you will let me move the verbs around in the transcript.

I wanted to say something first of all about the spirit in which we approached these secret negotiations, then I want to tell you where we stand in our judgment, and then I will take your questions.

As you remember from the many briefings that we have had on Vietnam, there has been no issue of greater concern to this Administration than to end the war in Vietnam on a negotiated basis. We have done so because of what we felt the war was doing to us as a people and because we felt that it was essential that whatever differences that may have existed about how we ended the war and how we conducted the war, that we ended it in a way that showed that we had been fair, that we had been reasonable, and that all concerned people could support.

We have not approached these negotiations in order to score debating points. We have not conducted these negotiations in order to gain any domestic benefits. In the very first meeting that we conducted with the other side, we mentioned these principles: We said, one, we want a just settlement. Secondly, we recognize you will be there after we have left and therefore, it is in our interest that we make a settlement that you will want to keep.

We have said that we will try to make a settlement that takes account of your sacrifices and of your concerns. I mentioned principles that were advanced in meetings that were not intended for publication at a time when we would have liked nothing better than to be able to conclude secretly what has been, for many of us, the greatest goal that we have set for ourselves in this Administration.

I mention that because whatever the debates now should be--and even though we don't argue that other proposals are not possible, we put these proposals forward with the intention to be fair, to be just--that if we do not succeed in convincing fair-minded Americans that we have made a serious effort, then no matter what debating points we score besides are irrelevant.

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- 2 -

I think this is important to understand, the spirit in which we approach it. And in order to illustrate this spirit, let me read you the two notes, one with which we transmitted our last proposal to the other side and the other one in which we proposed that we were ready for a meeting.

The note which we transmitted with our October 11th proposal read as follows: "At the September 13th meeting, Minister Xuan Thuy stated that the U.S. side should review the various suggestions made by the North Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese side has also said that it would be forthcoming if a generous proposal is made by the U.S. side. The U.S. believe that this new proposal..." which is the one we made yesterday, more or less, "...goes to the limits of possible generosity and fully takes into account North Vietnamese propositions. The United States hopes that the North Vietnamese response will reflect the same attitude. Dr. Kissinger is prepared to meet on November 1st with Mr. Le Duc Tho or some other appropriate official from Hanoi together with Minister Xuan Thuy. He will be prepared at that meeting also to take into account other points that have been discussed in previous meetings in this channel."

In other words, we were not offering it on a take it or leave it basis.

"In the interim, it is expected that both sides will refrain from bringing pressure from public statements which can only serve to complicate the situation."

This was to avoid having a public and secret proposal simultaneously.

"The U.S. side is putting forth these proposals as one last attempt to negotiate a just settlement before the end of 1971."

In other words, this was not a bellicose take it or leave it statement.

"Then when on November 17th we were told that Mr. Le Duc Tho was ill, on November 19th, we transmitted the following message: "On October 11, 1971, the U.S. side made a comprehensive proposal designed to bring a rapid end to the war on a basis just for all parties. The United States proposal took fully into account the propositions of the North Vietnamese side, including all the concerns raised at the last private meeting on September 13, 1971."

"The U.S. side further indicated that it would be prepared to take account of other points that had been discussed in previous meetings in this channel. The U.S. proposed a meeting on November 1, 1971, between Dr. Kissinger and Special Adviser Le Duc Tho or some other appropriate official from Hanoi, together with Minister Xuan Thuy."

"The North Vietnamese... in an October 25, 1971, message said that Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy agreed to meet with Dr. Kissinger on November 20, 1971. The U.S. side accepted this date.

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- 3 -

"On November 17, 1971, the North Vietnamese side informed the U.S. side that Special Adviser Le Duc Tho was now ill and unable to attend the November 20th meeting. The U.S. side regrets his illness. Under these circumstances, no point would be served by a meeting.

"The U.S. side stands ready to meet with Special Advisor Le Duc Tho or any other representative of the North Vietnamese political leadership, together with Minister Xuan Thuy, in order to bring a rapid end to the war on a basis just to all parties. It will wait to hear recommendations from the North Vietnamese side as to a suitable date."

I mention these to indicate the tone and the spirit in which we have attempted to approach this issue, and the tone and the spirit in which we would like to conduct the domestic debate in this country, because we think the issue is much too important for anyone to win or lose simply a tactical argument.

Now, then, ladies and gentlemen, let me tell you where I believe we stand today, how we got there, and what the remaining issues are.

You are all familiar with the proposal that the President advanced in his address yesterday. In short, it calls for a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. and other foreign forces allied with the Government of South Vietnam within six months after an agreement.

It proposes the release of all prisoners of war. The language is more complex, but I am just trying to summarize it.

It advances certain principles which should govern the political future of South Vietnam, which include limitations on military and economic assistance, to a policy of, in effect, nonalignment for all the countries of Southeast Asia, including, of course, South Vietnam.

Most importantly, it includes a new election for a new political leadership in South Vietnam. There are two provisions with respect to this. One is the creation immediately, upon signing of an agreement, of an Electoral Commission, including all political forces of South Vietnam, including the National Liberation Front. That commission would have sole responsibility for organizing and supervising the election so that the government in office would have no responsibility for organizing the election and no power with respect to supervising it. That commission begins operating the day the agreement is signed.

Secondly, it proposes, and President Thieu has proposed, that a month before the election, five months after the agreement is signed, or at any rate one month before the election, if the election is held sooner, he will resign and so will the elected Vice President of South Vietnam.

The day-to-day administration would be in the hands of a caretaker government headed by the President of the Senate. The election, however, would be run, organized, and supervised by the Electoral Commission, which will have been operating in any event for five months.

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- 4 -

Fourthly, there is a provision for a cease-fire throughout Indochina. And then there are other provisions such as the negotiation among the countries of Indochina about various steps to guarantee their sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs, international supervision, and an international guarantee.

So we can narrow the issues, let me explain to you how we got to where we are. I will not discuss the six private meetings that took place in 1969 and 1970, because they are not relevant to our immediate concern, even though they, too, invariably broke down on the same issue that has characterized these. But let me talk about the six private meetings that took place in 1971, on May 31, June 26, July 12, July 26, August 16, and September 13.

I will not describe each of these meetings, because as I said yesterday, we will attempt to maintain as much of the confidentiality of this channel as is compatible with the necessity of explaining our position to our public, but I will give, in gross terms, the main issues.

On May 31, we proposed a withdrawal of American forces. We were prepared to set a deadline for the withdrawal of American forces in return for a cease-fire and the exchange of prisoners. This was the first time that the United States had indicated a willingness to set a date, the first time that the United States had indicated that it was prepared to do so unilaterally; that is to say, without an equivalent assurance of withdrawal from the other side.

Things moved so fast that the breakthroughs of one year tend to be overlooked the following year. The North Vietnamese response was not that there was this or that element of the proposal that was unacceptable. They did not say "Cease-fire is difficult for us." The North Vietnamese said that any proposal that did not include political elements could not even be negotiated. So our attempt to negotiate the military issue separately was simply rejected.

The North Vietnamese, I repeat, insisted that any settlement had to include political aspects. Ladies and gentlemen, I have noticed in some commentaries a reference to the fact that our proposal yesterday is complex; why didn't we put forward a simplified proposal?

We put forward a simplified proposal. It was not negotiated. It is the other side which has insisted that the only possible proposal is one that includes the political elements. I may say that this is the one position, or one of the positions which they have never altered, on which they have never shown the slightest give, and it is, therefore, our attempt to accommodate to their position, not our attempt to complicate the situation, that accounts for the nature of our proposal yesterday.

Now, then, as we told you yesterday, at the next private meeting on June 26th, they put forward their 9-point proposal which, indeed, linked together the political and military issues.

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- 5 -

Now, consistent with our attempt to protect the confidentiality of these negotiations to the maximum, we are not releasing their 9-point proposal, although I repeat on the record what I said to you on background yesterday; that is to say, if the other side -- (Laughter).

I noticed that one of the newspapers said "A White House official who participated in the negotiations" -- (Laughter) -- and since we have not revealed Ziegler's participation, it had to be me. (Laughter)

In any event, I will say that if the other side wishes to release its 9-point proposal, we have no objection. As the President pointed out to you yesterday, four days later the other side published a 7-point proposal which presented us with a slight difficulty: that we had a secret proposal in the private channel and a public proposal in the public channel; that we were accused of not responding to the public proposal while we were negotiating the private proposal.

I was asked yesterday what the difference is between the 9- and 7-point proposals. I will sum it up as follows:

First, the grammar of the nine points is somewhat easier to grasp for the American mind. It is less ambiguous because it was not intended for publication, and, therefore, from a negotiating point of view, as one was negotiating it, the formulations were simply quite different, even when the substance was the same. On a number of issues the substance was the same, although the formulation was different.

On the political solution, that is, on the political content of the future of South Vietnam, the seven points are much more detailed than the nine points.

On the cease-fire, the nine points are more detailed than the seven points; indeed, the seven points, in effect, are a truce made with American forces while we withdraw. The nine points are a cease-fire in our sense, to be concluded together with the overall settlement. So, therefore, the cease-fire is not in itself an issue in the negotiations, the principle of the cease-fire.

Then there are some points covered in the nine points that are not covered in the seven points, such as international supervision, respect for the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962, and a general statement about the problems of Indochina.

I have gone into this detail because at the June 26th meeting we agreed, contrary to our May 31st proposal, that we would lump the political and military issues together; that is to say, we accepted the nine points as a basis for negotiation, and from then on, every American proposal has followed the sequence and the subject matter of the nine points.

Now, you can ask me "Why do we have eight and they have nine if we have followed the sequence and the subject matter of their points?" The answer is, one of their nine points is a demand for reparations as part of a settlement, as it is, indeed, in the seven points. We took the position that we could not, in honor, make a peace settlement in which we would be obligated under the terms of the peace settlement to pay reparations.

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We did, however, tell the other side that while we would not include the reparations as part of the peace settlement, we could give and undertake, a voluntary undertaking by the President, that there would be a massive reconstruction program for all of Indochina in which North Vietnam could share to the extent of several billion dollars.

So this is the only difference in the sequence and in the content of the points. Therefore, if you want to know why do we have eight points, why are they complex, why did we follow them in this sequence, it is our attempt not to be complicated but our attempt to be conciliatory. It is our attempt to go the extra mile.

Now, then, in June and July we went through the nine points, point by point. We followed the strategy of seeing whether we could get an agreement in principle, and then if we got an agreement in principle, our intention was, our mutual intention was, to pass the implementation into the public forum where the experts could deal with the matter on a more sustained basis than on these rather complicated and difficult secret trips to Paris.

After having gone through every point of the nine points, and in those categories where the seven points were more specific than the nine points -- that is to say, those categories that pertain to the political future of South Vietnam and to its legal status -- with respect to those we answered the seven points. We then tabled an eight-point proposal, and now you understand why it was eight points, on August 16th.

That proposal set a date for withdrawal which was nine months after signing an agreement, or to put it another way, we said "We are prepared to withdraw by August 1, 1972, provided an agreement is reached by November 1, 1971." It included specific proposals for American neutrality in the forthcoming South Vietnamese elections, and for the first time introduced a number of political principles, such as a declaration of the American willingness to limit our aid to South Vietnam if North Vietnam would agree to a limitation; and secondly, it agreed to the principle of nonalignment for South Vietnam as long as all the other countries of Indochina agreed to the principle of nonalignment.

We pointed out that the publication of such principles was, in itself, a political fact, and would, in itself, affect the political evolution, and we formally stated that we were prepared to have an economic reconstruction program along the lines of what had been orally discussed before.

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This was turned down on September 13th, essentially on two grounds, that the withdrawal date was too long, and that we had been unclear about how we defined total withdrawal, that is to say, whether any forces would remain in an individual capacity, and secondly, on the ground that a simple declaration of American political neutrality while the existing government stayed in office would not overcome the advantage of the existing government in running and being in office.

We therefore reflected about these two objections and we submitted, in early October, October 11th, the proposal which you have, essentially, before you, indicating that we were prepared to implement it in stages.

In this proposal, we met the first point by indicating that we were talking about the total withdrawal of all U.S. and allied forces. We shortened the deadline. We gave a precise description of how the political process might operate, that is to say, we put forward the Electoral Commission and we indicated that President Thieu had agreed that he would resign prior to the election.

And we also indicated that we were prepared, once the global agreement was signed in principle, to begin implementing the withdrawal and prisoner exchange portions, even while the other elements were still being ironed out, provided that the final agreement would be reached within that six-month period in which the withdrawals were running.

Yesterday's proposal is essentially the proposal we made October 11th, to which we have never had a response. It added, as a new element, the public commitment of the United States and of the Government of South Vietnam, which is a crucial new element, because it is of profound significance to the political evolution of South Vietnam.

So, this is where we are today.

Now, let me sum up what the two contentious issues are so that we can narrow the debate. There is no debate -- I have watched some commentaries and read some newspapers -- about the cease-fire as part of the settlement. We may well differ about how we define the cease-fire, but that is not a contentious issue.

In fact, of the nine points of the other side, seven have been more or less -- I don't want to say agreed to, but the differences have been narrowed to manageable proportions. There are two issues, one is the withdrawal, the other is the political evolution.

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With respect to the withdrawal, there is an ambiguity about the word "date certain". The North Vietnamese position is that we should set a date, that we will implement it, regardless of what else happens, regardless of whether there is a prisoner exchange, regardless of how they negotiate their own proposal. In other words, that we should get out unilaterally.

Moreover, they define withdrawal not just as the withdrawal of American forces, but the withdrawal of all American equipment, all economic aid, all military aid, which is, in considering the fact that they receive from $800 million to $1 billion worth of aid from their allies, a prescription for a unilateral term.

On the political evolution, our basic principle has been a principle we have been prepared to sign together with them, that we are not committed to any one political structure or government in South Vietnam. Our principle has been that we want a political evolution that gives the people of South Vietnam a genuine opportunity to express their preferences.

We have pointed out, in innumerable meetings, that we recognize that this is a tough problem. We have indicated with extraordinary repetitiveness, as those of you who have heard me will not challenge, with extraordinary repetitiveness, that we know that Vietnamese traditions are different and that we are prepared to listen to their version of what a free political process might be like.

We have searched our souls to try to come up with a proposal that seems free to us and after all, the agreement by the existing government--to have a commission comprising the people that wish to overthrow them run, organize, and supervise the election to put the election under international supervision and to resign a month before the election--is not just a trivial proposal.

The North Vietnamese position has been that they want us to agree with them, first, on replacing the existing government and secondly, on a structure in which the probability of their taking over is closed to certainty.

They want us, in other words, to do in the political field the same thing that they are asking us to do in the military field, to negotiate the terms of the turnover to them, regardless of what the people may think.

Now, the North Vietnamese had proved to be masters in ambiguity. Throughout these months while we were negotiating the nine points and they were lacerating us for not responding to the seven points, successions of Americans came back from Paris, saying that they knew that if we would just make a proposal in the military field this would unlock the door. At the precise moment they had told us, with even greater repetitiveness than I am capable of, that there was no solution that did not include a political element; that there was no military proposal, as indeed, they have now said publicly to the New York Times and yesterday in anticipation of what they thought might be the President proposal last night.

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They have said that they want a government composed of people who stand for peace, neutrality, and independence. There is another magic word which eludes me at the moment. And Americans cannot object to this proposal. The only thing is, they are the only ones who know who stands for peace, neutrality, and independence.

Whenever in these negotiations we have said, "All right, you don't like Thieu. How about this fellow, or that fellow, or that fellow?" there is almost no one that we know who they believe stands for peace, neutrality, and independence.

So I would like to express this to you. The issue is to us: We are prepared, in all conscience and in all seriousness, to negotiate with them immediately any scheme that any reasonable person can say leaves open the political future of South Vietnam to the people of South Vietnam, just as we are not prepared to withdraw without knowing anything at all of what is going to happen next. So we are not prepared to end this war by turning over the Government of South Vietnam as part of a political deal.

We are prepared to have a political process in which they can have a chance of winning, which is not loaded in any direction. We have given our views of what this political process might be. We are prepared to listen to their views of what that political process might be. And we said in both notes of last fall, notes that were not intended for publication, at a time when we were hoping to be able to step before you with an agreement, that we are prepared to listen to their points.

Now, there has been some question of, "Did they ask us to replace or overthrow" -- or whatever the word is -- "the existing government in South Vietnam?"

We have every interest in stepping before you with total honesty. They have asked two things of us:

One, an indirect overthrow of the government; that is to say, that we have to withdraw. The way they phrase it, we would have to withdraw all American equipment, even that which the South Vietnamese Army has. They have asked us to withdraw all equipment, all future military aid, all future economic aid, and the practical consequence of that proposal, while they are receiving close to $1 billion worth of foreign aid, would be the indirect overthrow of the Government of South Vietnam, something about which there can be no question.

But they have further asked us, and we do not want to be forced to prove it, to change the government directly, generously leaving the method to us, and, therefore, the President's statement was true and is supportable.

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We have no interest in engaging in a debate with the North Vietnamese that would force any more of this record into the open. We do have an interest that the American public understand exactly what is at issue today.

So, I repeat, on the political side, the war is not continuing because we want to maintain a government. We said on July 26th and on August 16th, on July 26th orally and on August 16th in writing, that we would abide by the outcome of any political process in South Vietnam and that they were not committed to any particular government.

We have, in the proposals of October 11th and in the proposals we shall make tomorrow, that is to say, January 27th--the proposal the President made last night--we have outlined a detailed process by which immediately upon signature of an agreement, one of the most important aspects of sovereignty, the organizing and running of elections, would be put outside the existing government, and where the existing government would resign a month before the election, and we have told the other side that we are prepared to consider other proposals.

So, this is where we stand today. I am sorry that I have taken so much time in explaining it, but I think it is important that we understand what the issues are and that we debate them in the spirit in which we have tried to advance them, which is to find a just settlement that can bring real peace to Indochina and that can unite our own people.

Now, I will be glad to take questions.

Peter.

Q Dr. Kissinger, knowing the attitude now of the North Vietnamese as you do, could you give us a prognosis of what you expect the full exposure of the secret negotiations really to accomplish, beyond what I think you have implied here, of composing some of the domestic disharmony that has been caused by the Vietnam war?

DR. KISSINGER: Of course, we would have to say that composing the domestic disharmony is a very major objective of our entire policy. If we can end the war that has divided us so much as a united people and with some dignity, then that is of very profound significance for America.

So we admit, this is one motive. The other is, we had reached a point at which our public and our private positions were diverging so much that rather than accelerating a settlement, the secret negotiations had the practical consequence of making it more difficult.

The great advantage of secret negotiations is that you can leapfrog public positions without the turmoil that any change in positions brings about internationally and domestically in some of the countries concerned.

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- 11 -

But here we were in a situation in which we were
being pressed by sincere Americans at least to answer a
proposal which we were already dealing with and in which
a whole liturgy was developing on the negotiations with
perfect good faith, and in which the resulting division
made the other side believe that the negotiations really
were a form more of psychological warfare than of negotiations.

Thirdly, it is conceivable to us, since the
Vietnamese did not survive 2,000 years under foreign pressure
by developing qualities of excessive trust in foreigners,
it is conceivable to us that they may have considered our
proposals of October 11th a negotiating ploy and therefore,
by making them public and by President Thieu publicly
committing himself to this evolution, we added a crucial
new ingredient to the situation which we hope may unlock
some of the problems.

We may be unduly influenced by our own bureaucratic
experience, but it is not unknown that governments delay acting on
things unless there is some impetus that requires a decision
and that if something is painful or difficult, there is a
tendency to push it into the future, especially in countries
that don't have a NSC system as we do. (Laughter)

So, by making the proposal public, and by making clear
that we will negotiate it in the spirit with which we trans-
mitted it, that we might force a consideration in Hanoi
on a somewhat more urgent basis than when they felt, well, if
we don't answer it this month, we will answer it next month.

These were some of the principal reasons that caused
us to do this.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how did a well known, famous man like
you slip into Paris so many times: unobserved and during this
Administration, did you ever go secretly to Hanoi?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the last part of
the question, I have not been in Hanoi during this Adminis-
tration. With respect to the first question, I must say on
the trip around the world in July, the hardest part was
not to get into Peking unobserved, the hardest part was
to get to see the North Vietnamese unobserved since a
few hundred of you were chasing me around Paris rather
intensely.

Now, of these 12 visits, I was in Paris secretly
ten times and twice I was there publicly, but the meetings
were conducted secretly. So, for example, I saw the North
Vietnamese on July 12th on my way back from my trip around
the world and my visit in Paris was known and some newspapers
criticized my choice of dinner companions. The dinner,
I may say took place after I had already seen the North Vietnamese
for four hours.

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- 12 -

I don't want to go into all the details of how it was done, because we may want to do it again. (Laughter) But we generally flew to American military bases and then transferred once or twice until we wound up, through the cooperation of President Pompidou, at some little-used air fields near Paris and then we generally stayed in the outskirts with the people we used as contacts.

So, it was usually a rather hectic thing to accomplish all of this in two days and we generally met in a meeting place furnished by the other side and I must say there has never been a leak.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you described a process of negotiation that was taking place secretly over a period of several months and then it suddenly stopped. You have received no answer from the other side from November on. Why do you think the process stopped?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me be precise about what happened. The easy explanation is that they objected to our proposal, but that could not be true, because we submitted our proposal on October 11th. We received a rather conciliatory reply, not as to substance, but as to the willingness to meet, on October 25th, as I recall, in which they pointed out to us that our proposed date of November 1st was not possible and for the first time in our experience with them, even gave us the reasons why it was not possible.

Our experience has been that they would never accept the date we proposed. That has never happened, so they gave us another date and explained why that other date was preferable for them. We accepted that other date, which was November 20th.

On November 17th, or three days before that meeting, they notified us that Le Duc Tho was ill. Now everyone who has been engaged in these negotiations knows that in his absence, no major change can occur. We tested it ourselves in our experience by meeting five times alone with Minister Xuan Thuy, whom we respect. It is no reflection on Minister Xuan Thuy, it is simply a fact of the power relationship in Hanoi, that Le Duc Tho, being a member of the Politburo, has authority that no official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has.

So, therefore, it is a very interesting question, Marvin, what happened between October 25th and November 17th. I don't want to speculate on that, because it is a question that also occupies us.

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- 13 -

Q What have you done to try to contact them to try to get it started again?

DR. KISSINGER: As I have pointed out, after they turned it down on November 17th, we told them on November 19th that we stood ready to meet at any time, and that we were awaiting their recommendations. We reiterated what I had said previously. We reiterated that we were not offering this proposal on a take-it-or-leave-it basis; but that we were prepared to consider other proposals that they might choose to make. This is the one to which they have never responded.

Since then, we have indirectly pointed out to them that the channel was still open through a number of devices that I cannot explain to you, but which were not formal communications. But there can be no question that they can be under no misapprehension that we have been prepared to meet, and I can reiterate that today.

We are still ready to resume talks in either public or private channels, or by other methods with which they are familiar. So there is no question about our readiness to negotiate.

Q Two specific, related questions: One, is there any specific significance to the particular timing of this revolution; and two, given the deterioration of the military situation in Laos and Cambodia and the apparent impending military build-up on the other side for Tet, what prospect, if any, is there for getting them to terms?

DR. KISSINGER: We had always thought that if our negotiations with the other side, our secret negotiations, would not make some significant progress by the time Congress returned, we would owe it to the public and to the Congress to put before them the framework within which negotiations had been conducted. It was not fair to our public debate to engage in a series of battles with the Senate in which we were trying to protect a channel that was not active.

We went through last year without answering months of criticism of refusal to respond to the seven points. We are not blaming the people who did it, because they had no other evidence to go on. But we endured months of criticism about deadlocks, about failure to respond to the seven points, about lack of imagination, because we thought that there was a chance of making progress and, therefore, this decision was made at the end of December, at a time when we actually did not think that there would be major offensive, but a series of high points.

Now, the fact that there may be an offensive impending may add another element to it in this sense: This war has to end sometime, and sometime it must end through negotiations. It is not we who are looking for a military victory. We have tried to end it on the basis of the principles which we put before the North Vietnamese months ago. I don't mean the formal principles, but the principles of justice, of recognition that they would be there, of recognition that while they may have reason to be suspicious, we know that if they don't have an interest in maintaining the settlement, we will have a continuation of what happened in 1954.

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- 14 -

People say they were tricked in 1954. I don't want to enter that debate as to whether they were or not. All I want to say is if they feel that they were taken advantage of, then within a foreseeable future the war will start again. So it is in our interest to have a settlement that takes this into account.

Now the question is: Is there to be another round of warfare? We believe that we can contain the offensive, and it is even possible, maybe even probable, that the reason they make the offensive is as a prelude to a subsequent negotiation. This at least has been their pattern in 1954 and was their pattern in 1968.

So this is an attempt to say to them once again, "It is not necessary. Let's get the war over with now." But our basic decision was made at a time prior to the event.

Q Dr. Kissinger, President Nixon has referred to two occasions on which you discussed the prisoner of war issue on your visit to Peking. Would you tell us whether you discussed at the same time the broader questions that you have gone into here?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me just say we will not discuss here any discussions we may have had with any other government. We have had discussions with several other governments on this issue. We will not name them. We will not discuss them because we feel that the secrecy of those discussions must be protected.

Q I just wanted to add to the last part of that, could you tell us whether you foresee what effect the disclosures here might have on the President's trip to Peking, if any?

DR. KISSINGER: I said when I returned from Peking the second time -- it was not connected; it just happened to come up at a press conference, that was prior to the cancellation of the meeting by the North Vietnamese--that we expect to settle the war in Vietnam with Hanoi, not with Moscow and not with Peking, and that remains our position. Our trip to Peking does not revolve around the situation in Indochina. It is not the central issue of the trip and, therefore, we do not expect that these disclosures will affect the trip.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can you give us, sir, in your judgment, the reason why the North Vietnamese, in dealing with the United States, would insist on the United States reaching comprehensive solutions, including a political solution? Why are they unwilling to negotiate with us, in your judgment, on the military issue and take their chances in settling the political issues with the South Vietnamese?

DR. KISSINGER: The only explanation which I have, and there may be better ones, is that they apparently are not confident that if military and economic aid continues to South Vietnam that they can win their war with the South Vietnamese, because if they were, there is no reason why they should not accept our proposal, as you indicated. What they are, in effect, asking from us is precisely what the President said yesterday:

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- 15 -

They are asking us to align ourselves with them, to
overthrow the people that have been counting on us in South
Vietnam. They are asking us to accomplish for them what they
seem not confident of being able to achieve for themselves.

That is the only explanation I can give, but I do
not absolutely insist on it. It is a curious phenomenon; that
is, it is they who have insisted that we deliver on the
political process, rather than rely on themselves.

Q Dr. Kissinger, doesn't your interpretation make the prospects rather bleak that they will accept the proposal?

DR. KISSINGER: No. It makes it bleak that they will accept this proposal as long as they believe we may do it for them. If we will not do it for them, then the longer the war continues, the worse that situation gets which they are trying to avoid, and they may settle for a political process which gives them less than 100 percent guarantee, but a fair crack at the political issue.

Q In view of the criticism you said you endured last year, and in view of your great concern today about undermining the belief of the American people, why did the Administration so vigorously fight things such as the Mansfield amendment and other resolutions of that nature?

DR. KISSINGER: Because there were many variations of the Mansfield amendment. The difficulty has been that we did not want to give the other side the impression that we were in a position where we were forced to accept the withdrawal demand and not be able to discuss the other aspects, and because the precision of their knowledge of the relative constitutional provisions of balance between the Congress and Executive was not so clear.

We did this to maintain the balance. We did inform the Congressional leaders that secret negotiations were going on, but they did not know all the details.

Q About the time you were opposing the Mansfield resolution, the bombing was also resumed in North Vietnam at the end of December. Could these two things have had any influence on the North Vietnamese to stop the secret talks?

DR. KISSINGER: The bombings took place five weeks after the reported talk, and when there was an enormous step-up in their infiltration, so that one could say the response to the most sweeping offer we had made was a massive step-up in their infiltration and a move toward a military solution. I think you have cause and effect in the reverse order.

Q Who would decide the composition of the Electoral Commission, the members of it?

DR. KISSINGER: The composition of the Electoral Commission would not be decided by the Saigon Government. The composition of the Electoral Commission would be subject to negotiation at the conference and, therefore, would have to be acceptable to the other side before the agreement could be implemented.

MORE

Q Doctor, I believe it was said that the new
proposals were being accompanied by some alternatives. Are
these continuing to be discussed?

DR. KISSINGER: The new proposal was accompanied, in the speech, first by a renewed offer to discuss the military issues alone, just in case the North Vietnamese have changed their minds on this, which we think is unlikely, but we just want to make sure that this was true; and secondly, we have offered, on October 11th, and we will repeat that offer tomorrow in Paris, a staged approach to the implementation of this agreement by which the withdrawal and exchanges could begin while the other details were still in the process of negotiation, as long as they were completed within the six-month period.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 12:20 P.M. EST)

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21 Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace in Vietnam. January 25, 1972

Good evening:

I have asked for this television time tonight to make public a plan for peace that can end the war in Vietnam.

The offer that I shall now present, on behalf of the Government of the United States and the Government of South Vietnam, with the full knowledge and approval of President Thieu, is both generous and far-reaching.

It is a plan to end the war now; it includes an offer to withdraw all American forces within 6 months of an agreement; its acceptance would mean the speedy return of all the prisoners of war to their homes.

Three years ago when I took office, there were 550,000 Americans in Vietnam; the number killed in action was running

as high as 300 a week; there were no plans to bring any Americans home, and the only thing that had been settled in Paris was the shape of the conference table.

I immediately moved to fulfill a pledge I had made to the American people: to bring about a peace that could last, not only for the United States, but for the long-suffering people of Southeast Asia.

There were two honorable paths open to us.

The path of negotiation was, and is, the path we prefer. But it takes two to negotiate; there had to be another way in case the other side refused to negotiate.

That path we called Vietnamization. What it meant was training and equipping the South Vietnamese to defend them-

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Jan. 25 [21]

selves, and steadily withdrawing Americans, as they developed the capability to do so.

The path of Vietnamization has been successful. Two weeks ago, you will recall, I announced that by May 1, American forces in Vietnam would be down to 69,000. That means almost one-half million Americans will have been brought home from Vietnam over the past 3 years. In terms of American lives, the losses of 300 a week have been reduced by over 95 percent—to less than 10 a week.

But the path of Vietnamization has been the long voyage home. It has strained the patience and tested the perseverance of the American people. What of the shortcut, the shortcut we prefer, the path of negotiation?

Progress here has been disappointing. The American people deserve an accounting of why it has been disappointing. Tonight I intend to give you that accounting, and in so doing, I am going to try to break the deadlock in the negotiations.

We have made a series of public proposals designed to bring an end to the conflict. But early in this Administration, after 10 months of no progress in the public Paris talks, I became convinced that it was necessary to explore the possibility of negotiating in private channels, to see whether it would be possible to end the public deadlock.

After consultation with Secretary of State Rogers, our Ambassador in Saigon, and our chief negotiator in Paris, and with the full knowledge and approval of President Thieu, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Paris as my personal representative on August 4, 1969, 30 months ago, to begin these secret peace negotiations.

Since that time, Dr. Kissinger has traveled to Paris 12 times on these secret

missions. He has met seven times with Le Duc Tho, one of Hanoi's top political leaders, and Minister Xuan Thuy, head of the North Vietnamese delegation to the Paris talks, and he has met with Minister Xuan Thuy five times alone. I would like, incidentally, to take this opportunity to thank President Pompidou of France for his personal assistance in helping to make the arrangements for these secret talks.

This is why I initiated these private negotiations: Privately, both sides can be more flexible in offering new approaches and also private discussions allow both sides to talk frankly, to take positions free from the pressure of public debate.

In seeking peace in Vietnam, with so many lives at stake, I felt we could not afford to let any opportunity go by—private or public—to negotiate a settlement. As I have stated on a number of occasions, I was prepared and I remain prepared to explore any avenue, public or private, to speed negotiations to end the war.

For 30 months, whenever Secretary Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, or I were asked about secret negotiations we would only say we were pursuing every possible channel in our search for peace. There was never a leak, because we were determined not to jeopardize the secret negotiations. Until recently, this course showed signs of yielding some progress.

Now, however, it is my judgment that the purposes of peace will best be served by bringing out publicly the proposals we have been making in private.

Nothing is served by silence when the other side exploits our good faith to divide America and to avoid the conference table. Nothing is served by silence when it misleads some Americans into accusing their own government of failing to do

JAN-23-1996 16:28

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[21] Jan. 25

what it has already done. Nothing is
served by silence when it enables the other
side to imply possible solutions publicly
that it has already flatly rejected privately.

The time has come to lay the record of
our secret negotiations on the table. Just
as secret negotiations can sometimes break
a public deadlock, public disclosure may
help to break a secret deadlock.

Some Americans, who believed what
the North Vietnamese led them to be-
lieve, have charged that the United States
has not pursued negotiations intensively.
As the record that I now will disclose will
show, just the opposite is true.

Questions have been raised as to why
we have not proposed a deadline for the
withdrawal of all American forces in ex-
change for a cease-fire and the return of
our prisoners of war; why we have not
discussed the seven-point proposal made
by the Vietcong last July in Paris; why
we have not submitted a new plan of our
own to move the negotiations off dead
center.

As the private record will show, we
have taken all these steps and more—
and have been flatly rejected or ignored
by the other side.

On May 31, 1971, 8 months ago, at one
of the secret meetings in Paris, we offered
specifically to agree to a deadline for the
withdrawal of all American forces in ex-
change for the release of all prisoners of
war and a cease-fire.

At the next private meeting, on June
26, the North Vietnamese rejected our
offer. They privately proposed instead
their own nine-point plan which insisted
that we overthrow the Government of
South Vietnam.

Five days later, on July 1, the enemy
publicly presented a different package of

proposals—the seven-point Vietcong
plan.

That posed a dilemma: Which pack-
age should we respond to, the public plan
or the secret plan?

On July 12, at another private meeting
in Paris, Dr. Kissinger put that question
to the North Vietnamese directly. They
said we should deal with their nine-point
secret plan, because it covered all of Indo-
china including Laos and Cambodia,
while the Vietcong seven-point proposal
was limited to Vietnam.

So that is what we did. But we went
even beyond that, dealing with some of
the points in the public plan that were
not covered in the secret plan.

On August 16, at another private meet-
ing, we went further. We offered the com-
plete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces
within 9 months after an agreement on
an overall settlement. On September 13,
the North Vietnamese rejected that pro-
posal. They continued to insist that we
overthrow the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment.

Now, what has been the result of these
private efforts? For months, the North
Vietnamese have been berating us at the
public sessions for not responding to their
side's publicly presented seven-point plan.

The truth is that we did respond to the
enemy's plan, in the manner they wanted
us to respond—secretly. In full possession
of our complete response, the North Viet-
namese publicly denounced us for not hav-
ing responded at all. They induced many
Americans in the press and the Congress
into echoing their propaganda—Ameri-
cans who could not know they were being
falsely used by the enemy to stir up divi-
siveness in this country.

I decided in October that we should

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make another attempt to break the dead-
lock. I consulted with President Thieu,
who concurred fully in a new plan. On
October 11, I sent a private communica-
tion to the North Vietnamese that con-
tained new elements that could move
negotiations forward. I urged a meeting
on November 1 between Dr. Kissinger and
Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, or some
other appropriate official from Hanoi.

On October 25, the North Vietnamese agreed to meet and suggested November 20 as the time for a meeting. On November 17, just 3 days before the scheduled meeting, they said Le Duc Tho was ill. We offered to meet as soon as he recovered, either with him, or immediately with any other authorized leader who could come from Hanoi.

Two months have passed since they
called off that meeting. The only reply to
our plan has been an increase in troop in-
filtration from North Vietnam and Com-
munist military offensives in Laos and
Cambodia. Our proposal for peace was
answered by a step-up in the war on their
part.

That is where matters stand today.

We are being asked publicly to respond
to proposals that we answered, and in
some respects accepted, months ago in
private.

We are being asked publicly to set a
terminal date for our withdrawals when
we already offered one in private.

And the most comprehensive peace plan
of this conflict lies ignored in a secret
channel, while the enemy tries again for
military victory.

That is why I have instructed Ambas-
sador Porter to present our plan publicly
at this Thursday's session of the Paris

peace talks, along with alternatives to
make it even more flexible.

We are publishing the full details of our
plan tonight. It will prove beyond doubt
which side has made every effort to make
these negotiations succeed. It will show
unmistakably that Hanoi—not Washing-
ton or Saigon—has made the war go on.

Here is the essence of our peace plan;
public disclosure may gain it the attention
it deserves in Hanoi.

Within 6 months of an agreement:

- We shall withdraw all U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam.

- We shall exchange all prisoners of war.

- There shall be a cease-fire through-
out Indochina.

- There shall be a new presidential election in South Vietnam.

President Thieu will announce the ele-
ments of this election. These include
international supervision and an inde-
pendent body to organize and run the
election, representing all political forces
in South Vietnam, including the National
Liberation Front.

Furthermore, President Thieu has in-
formed me that within the framework of
the agreement outlined above, he makes
the following offer: He and Vice Presi-
dent Huong would be ready to resign one
month before the new election. The Chair-
man of the Senate, as caretaker head of
the Government, would assume adminis-
trative responsibilities in South Vietnam,
but the election would be the sole respon-
sibility of the independent election body
I have just described.

There are several other proposals in our
new peace plan; for example, as we of-
fered privately on July 26 of last year, we
remain prepared to undertake a major re-
construction program throughout Indo-

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[21] Jan. 25

china, including North Vietnam, to help all these peoples recover from the ravages of a generation of war.

We will pursue any approach that will speed negotiations.

We are ready to negotiate the plan I have outlined tonight and conclude a comprehensive agreement on all military and political issues. Because some parts of this agreement could prove more difficult to negotiate than others, we would be willing to begin implementing certain military aspects while negotiations continue on the implementation of other issues, just as we suggested in our private proposal in October.

Or, as we proposed last May, we remain willing to settle only the military issues and leave the political issues to the Vietnamese alone. Under this approach, we would withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within 6 months in exchange for an Indonesia cease-fire and the release of all prisoners.

The choice is up to the enemy.

This is a settlement offer which is fair to North Vietnam and fair to South Vietnam. It deserves the light of public scrutiny by these nations and by other nations throughout the world. And it deserves the united support of the American people.

We made the substance of this generous offer privately over 3 months ago. It has not been rejected, but it has been ignored. I reiterate that peace offer tonight. It can no longer be ignored.

The only thing this plan does not do is to join our enemy to overthrow our ally, which the United States of America will never do. If the enemy wants peace, it will have to recognize the important difference between settlement and surrender.

This has been a long and agonizing

struggle. But it is difficult to see how anyone, regardless of his past position on the war, could now say that we have not gone the extra mile in offering a settlement that is fair, fair to everybody concerned.

By the steadiness of our withdrawal of troops, America has proved its resolution to end our involvement in the war; by our readiness to act in the spirit of conciliation, America has proved its desire to be involved in the building of a permanent peace throughout Indochina.

We are ready to negotiate peace immediately.

If the enemy rejects our offer to negotiate, we shall continue our program of ending American involvement in the war by withdrawing our remaining forces as the South Vietnamese develop the capability to defend themselves.

If the enemy's answer to our peace offer is to step up their military attacks, I shall fully meet my responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces to protect our remaining troops.

We do not prefer this course of action.

We want to end the war not only for America but for all the people of Indonesia. The plan I have proposed tonight can accomplish that goal.

Some of our citizens have become accustomed to thinking that whatever our Government says must be false, and whatever our enemies say must be true, as far as this war is concerned. Well, the record I have revealed tonight proves the contrary. We can now demonstrate publicly what we have long been demonstrating privately—that America has taken the initiative not only to end our participation in this war, but to end the war itself for all concerned.

This has been the longest, the most

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Jan. 25 [21]

difficult war in American history.

Honest and patriotic Americans have disagreed as to whether we should have become involved at all 9 years ago; and there has been disagreement on the conduct of the war. The proposal I have made tonight is one on which we all can agree.

Let us unite now, unite in our search for peace—a peace that is fair to both sides—a peace that can last.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 8:30 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. The address was broadcast live on radio and television.

Before delivering the address, he met with the bipartisan leadership of the Congress.

The President spoke from a prepared text. An advance text of his address was released on the same day, as well as the text of the joint U.S.-South Vietnam peace proposal which read as follows:

1. There will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other foreign forces allied with the Government of South Vietnam within 6 months of an agreement.

2. The release of all military men and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina will be carried out in parallel with the troop withdrawals mentioned in point 1. Both sides will present a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day the agreement is signed. The release will begin on the same day as the troop withdrawals and will be completed when they are completed.

3. The following principles will govern the political future of South Vietnam:

The political future of South Vietnam will be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

There will be a free and democratic Presidential election in South Vietnam within 6 months of an agreement. This election will be

organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the date of the agreement. This body will, among other responsibilities, determine the qualification of candidates. All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates. There will be international supervision of this election.

One month before the Presidential election takes place, the incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam will resign. The Chairman of the Senate, as caretaker head of the Government, will assume administrative responsibilities except for those pertaining to the election, which will remain with the independent election body.

The United States, for its part, declares that it:

- will support no candidate and will remain completely neutral in the election,

- will abide by the outcome of this election and any other political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese people themselves,

- is prepared to define its military and economic assistance relationship with any government that exists in South Vietnam.

Both sides agree that:

- South Vietnam, together with the other countries of Indochina, should adopt a foreign policy consistent with the military provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

- Reunification of Vietnam should be decided on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam without constraint and annexation from either party, and without foreign interference.

4. Both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. There will be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese peoples will be left to settle their own affairs by themselves.

5. The problems existing among the Indo-chinese countries will be settled by the Indo-chinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's affairs. Among the problems that will be settled

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