[L.C]

KISSINGER PRESS CONFERENCES
1973

BOOK I

1. January 24, 1973 re Vietnam Peace Agreement.

2. February 1, 1973 re Interview with Marvin Kalb, CBS News.

3. February 22, 1973 re Trip to Hanoi and Peking.

4. February 23, 1973 re Interview with Barbara Walters, NBC News

5. April 13, 1973 re Remarks to Federal City Club.

6. April 23, 1973 re Address Delivered to the Associated Annual Luncheon re the Year of Europe.

7. May 2, 1973 re President's Foreign Policy Report.

8. May 3, 1973 re President's Foreign Policy Report.

9. May 12, 1973 re Upcoming Summit Meeting Between US-USSR.

10. May 29, 1973 re Year of Europe.

11. May 31, 1973 re Meeting of the President with President Pompidou of France.

12. June 13, 1973 re Joint Communique on Vietnam.

13. June 14, 1973 re Upcoming US-USSR Summit.

14. June 21, 1973 re Agreement on Basic Principles of Negotiations of Further Limitation for Strategic Offensive Arms and Agreement on Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

15. June 22, 1973 re Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War.

16. June 25, 1973 re Joint Communique re US-USSR Summit.

17. June 29, 1973 re Joint Press Conference with Michel Jobert, Foreign Minister of France.

BOOK II

18. August 2, 1973 re Remarks at International Platform Association.

19. August 23, 1973 re Nomination as Secretary of State.

[10]

BOOK II - cont'd

20 July 6, 1973 re Exchange of Remarks Between Kissinger and White House Press Corps.

21 September 7, 1973 re Statement Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

22 September 22, 1973 re Exchange of Remarks Between President and Kissinger at the Swearing-in Ceremony of Kissinger as Secretary of State.

23 September 24, 1973 re Address Before the 28th United Nations Assembly.

24 September 26, 1973 re US Mission to the United Nations.

25 September 28, 1973 re Remarks Before Department Employees.

26 October 8, 1973 re Speech at Pacem in Terris Conference.

27 October 12, 1973 re Press Conference at International Conference re Personnel, Middle East, NATO, Etc.

28 October 16, 1973 re Remarks On Being Notified of the Award of the Nobel Peace Prize.

29 October 18, 1973 re Remarks Upon Receipt of the George Catlett Marshall Medal of the Association of the United States Army.

30 October 25, 1973 re Middle East Crisis.

31 November 12, 1973 re Interview by ABC, CBS, and NBC in Peking.

32 November 14, 1973 re Joint Communique re China (PRC) Trip.

33 November 16, 1973 re Message on the Occasion of Foreign Service Day.

34 November 21, 1973 re Middle East, South East Asia, and Energy.

35 November 30, 1973 re Remarks at Reception Honoring Chiefs of Mission.

36 December 2, 1973 re Press Conference on Plane Returning from China-PRC- (Seoul to Anchorage) re China.

37 December 6, 1973 re Appointments of Ambassadors, Middle East, Energy, and Korea Talks.

BOOK II cont'd

38 December 12, 1973 re Close of NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Brussels.

39 December 12, 1973 re Address Before A Dinner Meeting of the Pilgrims of Great Britain,

40 December 20, 1973 re Visit to Lisbon, Portugal - Joint Communique.

41 December 22, 1973 Statement to the Opening Session of the Geneva Conference (December 21, 1973).

42 December 27, 1973 re 1973 Year-End Review.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JULY 6, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(San Clemente, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

INFORMAL EXCHANGE OF REMARKS BETWEEN
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
AND
MEMBERS OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS
AT THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE

11:47 A.M. PDT

DR. KISSINGER: Actually, ladies and gentlemen, I can't tell you a great deal about the conversations that are in progress.

The Ambassador and I reviewed the international situation in a friendly and constructive manner. We are going to continue these talks after the Ambassador has seen the President, which will be in the next few minutes.

As you know, I am giving a dinner for him tonight and he is returning to Washington tomorrow.

I will be glad to answer one or two questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are you taking Prince Sihanouk's words seriously yesterday that he will not meet with you?

DR. KISSINGER: That is almost inconceivable to me. I don't want to comment about the negotiations that are now going on, and we will just have to wait for what develops in the next month.

Q Do you expect to see Prince Sihanouk in Peking when you go next month?

DR. KISSINGER: I just cannot speculate on that now, because we are in the process of looking at the diplomatic situation.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you like to see him?

DR. KISSINGER: I just do not want to conduct any discussions with Sihanouk in public.

Q What role could China play in assuring a cease-fire in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think all major countries, as we have expressed repeatedly, that have an interest in Indochina should use their influence in the direction of restraint, which is our policy; and therefore, all of the countries with a stake in peace in Indochina can make a contribution.

Q What about the Phnom Penh offer today? Does that have American support, and are you going to discuss it with the Chinese representative?

MORE

[cc]

- 2 -

DR. KISSINGER: I do not want to go into my discussions with the Chinese representative. We have favored negotiations among the parties, and we favor the earliest end of the fighting in Cambodia.

Q Can he play a role in bringing peace to Cambodia, in your view?

DR. KISSINGER: I just do not want to speculate on the specific steps that can be taken when things are still so sensitive.

Q When you mention "the international situation," we can take it for granted Cambodia was discussed?

DR. KISSINGER: You can assume that Cambodia will be included.

Q When will you be in Peking?

DR. KISSINGER: We haven't set the precise date yet. We will announce it as soon as it is set.

Q Do you expect a precise date to come out of this meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: It won't be announced today.

Q Do you think China is, in fact, playing a restraining role in bringing about a peaceful solution in Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on what other countries may be doing. The public expressions of the Chinese leaders have been in the direction of peace throughout Indochina.

Q When are you going to China?

DR. KISSINGER: The date hasn't been fixed yet.

Q Is there a cooperative effort with the Chinese? Are they cooperating with you?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to characterize what the Chinese policy might be. They pursue their policy and we pursue ours, and we will have to see what results it will produce.

Q Is the possibility of a visit by either Chairman Mao and Premier Chou on your agenda today?

DR. KISSINGER: As Ron has said to you, any speculation about a visit to this country by the Chinese leaders is really groundless at this moment.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you feel you have to get a settlement by August 15th in order to get something workable and viable?

DR. KISSINGER: We are trying to get the quickest possible settlement that meets the basic objectives of all of the parties that can be done, and we won't operate on the basis of any specific deadline.

MORE

- 3 -

Q Dr. Kissinger, the Secretary of Defense said today that, in his view, the President would have to go back to Congress and ask for authority to continue bombing in Cambodia after August 15th. Is this your view?

DR. KISSINGER: I haven't seen what the Secretary of Defense has said. But we have always reserved the right to do this. But I don't want to speculate on this now while we are still engaged in diplomatic efforts.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 11:53 A.M. PDT)

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY

August 2, 1973

REMARKS OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
AT THE
INTERNATIONAL PLATFORM ASSOCIATION
SHERATON PARK HOTEL

Mrs. Longworth, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Roosevelt, ladies and gentlemen.

I am deeply grateful for the honor you have bestowed upon me this evening. It represents something of an encouragement at a time when we in Government are not exactly overwhelmed by expressions of approbation. More importantly, the award bears the name of a man -- Theodore Roosevelt -- whom I have, both as an historian and public servant, admired above most others in our nation's history.

You have flattered me, as well, by seating me next to one of the great ladies of our time, Mrs. Alice Roosevelt Longworth. Mrs. Longworth, who has brought grace and dignity to two already renowned names in American political history, is one of that handful of people who makes living in Washington a worthwhile experience. Her presence here adds luster to the occasion and does honor to us all.

Last week, while I was preparing my remarks for this evening, I spent some time looking for an appropriate Roosevelt quote. One particularly struck a responsive chord, since I had not too many weeks before returned from the latest of my seemingly unending sessions with Le Duc Tho. In 1905, during his mediation of the Russo-Japanese War, the President confided to a friend:

> "Dealing with senators is at times excellent training for the temper, but upon my word dealing with these peace envoys has been an even tougher job. To be polite and sympathetic and patient in explaining for the hundredth time something perfectly obvious, when I really want to give utterance to whoops of rage and jump up and knock their heads together -- well, all I can hope is that the self-repression will be ultimately good for my character."

When I read that passage I felt closer to Teddy Roosevelt than ever before. How often I, like he, was tempted to explode in "whoops of rage and jump up and knock... heads together." I can only hope that my character, too, has been improved by self-repression -- though many of my colleagues would question whether self-repression is my most distinctive trait.

However, given the temper of the times, I do not want to seem disrespectful of the Senate. So let me say for the record that I have never encountered a member of the Upper House who has tested my temper. So one of two things must have changed since Teddy Roosevelt's time; either the nature of Senators or the veracity and courage of public officials. I will let you choose which.

In a more serious vein, something that Theodore Roosevelt once said contains the essence of the idea I would like to place before you this evening. In an 1899 speech in Chicago he said:

(MORE)

"Far better it is to dare mighty things, to win glorious triumphs, even though checkered by failure, than to take rank with those poor spirits who neither enjoy much nor suffer much, because they live in the gray twilight that knows not victory nor defeat."

That statement epitomizes the essence and strength of this nation. In 1893 the great historian Turner wrote an essay about the significance of the frontier in American history. He argued that the disappearance of the frontier would have a profound effect on the American mentality. He was premature. To be sure, the frontier disappeared, in the physical sense, in Teddy Roosevelt's lifetime. But its psychology has remained. The term "frontier" is, in itself, interesting. In Europe, frontier has always indicated something permanent and sacrosanct -- in effect, a barrier. In America it connoted something constantly shifting. In Europe the frontier repelled; in America it beckoned. In Europe the frontier was a physical state; in America it was an emotional commitment -- it implied a belief that greatness is an idea before it can become a reality; that man fulfills himself by striving. This experience of a common challenge was one of the reasons why we never erected the social, economic, and political barriers that afflicted so many other nations with permanent and irreconcilable internal division.

Our experience led us to look upon ourselves and what we did as a nation as having universal meaning -- a relevance that extended beyond national boundaries to encompass the well-being of all mankind. America was not itself unless it had a meaning beyond itself. This is why Americans have always seen their role in the world as the outward manifestation, if I may use an ecclesiastical term, of an inward state of grace. Foreign policy was not the esoteric exercise of one man nor the reflection of one group or one party; it was an expression of the collective spirit and common aspirations of the entire nation.

It is in that context -- the belief that foreign policy is, and must be, the expression of a national and not a partisan purpose -- that I gratefully accept this award tonight.

What is so striking as we look back at the America of Theodore Roosevelt's time is the feeling of self-confidence, the sense of optimism, we displayed as we went about our business, foreign and domestic. Both self-confidence and optimism are far less in evidence today. The consensus that sustained our international participation is in danger of being exhausted. It must be restored.

A series of tragic events over the past decade has contributed to our current uncertainty. A young, dynamic and popular President assassinated; his brother, and a great civil rights leader murdered; Lyndon Johnson returned to office by an overwhelming majority, only to see that vast majority steadily eroded; ever greater involvement in a war which we seemed for too long unable to win or to end; riots and civil disobedience on a massive scale. And the present ordeal of the whole nation is too obvious to require commentary.

The impact of this decade of tragedy and trauma has been profound. We are tired of turmoil and exhausted by effort. The once apparent reservoir of faith in our ability to do, and of confidence that the future would be better than the past, has been seriously taxed. Yet

(MORE)

-3-

our children will not judge us by the magnitude of our ordeal, but
only by the adequacy of the response. If history teaches nothing else,
it makes clear that no great nation can afford to pass by the moment
when, in Teddy Roosevelt's words "mighty things must be dared."
Once the opportunity is past, no rationalization or self-justification
will bring it back.

The United States, in my view, faces such an historic moment. That
moment exists for us as a people, not as partisans of any particular
cause. The consequences of failure will be borne not by this Adminis-
tration, but by its successors in the decades to come, not by our
contemporaries but by future generations.

Over the past four years major changes have been registered in this
nation's international relationships.

-- We have ended the war in Southeast Asia. We now seek to create conditions of stability and accommodation to enable political competition to replace the bloodshed and hatred which for over a generation have torn Indochina.

-- We are building a new relationship with an old adversary --
the People's Republic of China. The hostility of two decades
has been eased, normal relations are approaching, and for
the first time since the end of World War II all great nations
have become full participants in the international system.

-- We have worked persistently to resolve by negotiation many of the political issues which have made our relationship with the Soviet Union contentious, and which for so long threatened world peace. Even more importantly, the very process of negotiation, over a wide range of issues, has created the possibility of a strong and lasting mutual interest in peace and cooperation.

-- We are embarked upon reinvigorating traditional friendships
with our closest friends and allies in the Atlantic Community
and with Japan. It is a journey which we hope will end not
simply in a repetition of familiar liturgies but in a new recog-
nition that what unites a community of free nations far transcends
the secondary issues that divide us.

We found a world so accustomed to the ubiquity of the Cold War that even the most routine business of peaceful relations among nations was carried on in the shadow of global confrontation. Fundamental problems persist; but they are no longer so pervasive that they dominate the conduct of all international relations. The history of the post-war era has been a never-ending effort to maintain peace through crisis management. The structure of peace we envisage would, instead, be sustained by a growing realization on the part of all nations that they have a stake in stability and that this stability is ensured by acting from a sense of justice and with moderation. The world is beginning to sense that its purposes need not be the captive of its fears, that they can be shaped by its hopes and dreams.

But these are only beginnings, not accomplished facts. Whether the
shoots that have been planted will mature will depend in large measure
upon how we conduct ourselves as a nation over the course of the next

(MORE)

decade. And what we are ten years hence depends upon what we do today, next week, and in the months that follow.

Our influence for good or ill will be measured by the world's judgment of our constancy and self-confidence. Our foreign policy will mean little if other nations see our actions as sporadic initiatives of a small group reflecting no coherent national purpose or consensus. No foreign policy -- no matter how ingenious -- has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none.

Foreign policy must not become an alibi or a distraction from domestic ills. But, equally, domestic problems must not be used as an excuse for abandoning our international responsibilities. There can be no moratorium in the quest for a peaceful world. And as we pursue that quest we will need to draw upon the country's best minds, no matter what their partisan political persuasion -- not on a bipartisan but on a nonpartisan basis. Especially at this moment of necessary self-examination, we must also reaffirm the basis of our national unity.

For the spirit and vitality that Teddy Roosevelt represented still run deep in America. Roosevelt did not insist on moral perfection before action, because he knew that to do so would mean that we would achieve neither perfection nor action. But, equally, he never forgot that we had to strive for moral greatness, for it alone made action worthwhile.

As someone who came to this country as a refugee from totalitarianism, I have a special feeling for what America can still mean to the world, and how a withdrawal of America from the world would deprive mankind of hope and purpose. This is why I pray that we will recapture the spirit that Teddy Roosevelt so well represented, and that once more a generation of Americans will be prepared to "enjoy and suffer much" and will strive mightily on frontiers that are set by our common purposes.

###

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AUGUST 2, 1973

AS DELIVERED REMARKS OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
INTERNATIONAL PLATFORM ASSOCIATION
SHERATON-PARK HOTEL

8:00 P.M. EDT

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Roosevelt, Mrs. Longworth, ladies and gentlemen:

I am very grateful for the honor that has been bestowed on me this evening, especially by the hand of Mrs. Longworth, who, it is true, is, if I may say so, one of my girl friends here. At least she was my first date in Washington.

The second night that President Nixon was at the White House, he gave a private dinner, and we were all still very stage struck, and he said, "Don't bring anyone, I have a date for you," and that date was Mrs. Longworth.

At that time, I thought of myself as a very serious professor, and during the course of the evening, Mrs. Longworth said to me, "You will do all right. You don't take yourself too seriously." (Laughter) She was wrong about the second part.

Now, this award represents something of an encouragement at a time when we in Government are not exactly overwhelmed by expressions of approbation. More importantly, the award bears the name of a man, Theodore Roosevelt, whom I have, both as a historian and as a public servant, admired above most others in our Nation's history.

I have already expressed how delighted I have been to be seated next to one of the great ladies of our time, Mrs. Alice Roosevelt Longworth.

Mrs. Longworth, who has brought grace and dignity to two already renowned names in American political history, is one of the handful of people who makes living in Washington a worthwhile and exciting experience.

Last week, while I was preparing my remarks for this evening, I spent some time looking for an appropriate Roosevelt quote. One particularly struck a responsive chord, since I have not too many weeks ago before this returned from the latest of my seemingly unending sessions with my North Vietnamese counterpart, Le Duc Tho.

In 1905, during his mediation of the Russo-Japanese War, President Roosevelt confided to a friend, "Dealing with Senators is at times an excellent training for the temper, but, upon my word, dealing with these peace envoys has been an even tougher job, to be polite and sympathetic and patient in explaining for the hundredth time that something that is perfectly obvious when I really want to give utterance to whoops of rage and jump up and knock their heads together -- well, all I can hope is that self-repression will ultimately be good for my character."

MORE

[L]

- 2 -

How often I, like he, was tempted to explode in
"whoops of rage and jump up and knock....heads together."
Most of you ladies and gentlemen think that very profound
things go on in these negotiations, and that the conver-
sation is always at a very elevated level, but I can tell
you about one occasion when my opposite number that I
mentioned before said to me, "Let me speak to you honestly,
frankly, open-heartedly. You are a liar." (Laughter and
applause.)

You are not supposed to applaud that. At any
rate, I can only hope that my character has been improved
by self-repression, though many of my colleagues and all of
my staff would question whether self-repression is my most
distinctive trait.

However, given the temper of the times, I do not
want to seem disrespectful of the Senate. So, let me say
for the record that I have never encountered a member of the
Upper House who has tested my temper. Obviously, one of
two things must have changed since Theodore Roosevelt's
time; either the nature of Senators, or the veracity
and courage of public officials. I will let you choose
which.

In a more serious vein, something that Theodore
Roosevelt once said contains the essence of the idea I
would like to place before you this evening. In 1899,
he said in a speech in Chicago: "Far better it is to dare
mighty things, to win glorious triumphs, even though
checkered by failure, than to take rank with those poor
spirits who neither enjoy much nor suffer much, because they
live in the gray twilight that knows not victory nor defeat."

That statement, it seems to me, epitomizes the
essence and the strength of this Nation. In 1893, the great
historian Turner wrote an essay about the significance of
the frontier in American history. He argued that the
disappearance of the frontier would have a profound effect
upon the American mentality. He was premature.

The frontier disappeared, in the physical sense,
in Theodore Roosevelt's lifetime, but its psychology
has remained. The American usage of the term "frontier" is
in itself interesting. In Europe, frontier has always
indicated something permanent and sacrosanct. In America
it connoted something constantly shifting.

In Europe the frontier repelled; in America it
beckoned. In Europe the frontier was a physical state; in
America it was an emotional commitment. It implied a belief
that greatness is an idea before it can become a reality,
that man fulfills himself by striving.

This experience of a common challenge was one
of the reasons why we never erected the social, economic
and political barriers that afflicted so many other
nations with permanent and irreconcilable internal division.

MORE

[LC]

- 3 -

Our experience led us to look upon ourselves and
what we did as having universal meaning, a relevance that
extended beyond national boundaries to encompass the well
being of all mankind. America was not itself unless it
had a meaning beyond itself.

This is why Americans have always seen their
role in the world as the outward manifestation of an inward
state of grace, if I may use an ecclesiastical term.
Foreign policy was not the exercise of one man, nor the
reflection of one group, or one party. It was the
expression of the collective spirit and the common
aspirations of the entire Nation.

It is in that context -- the belief that
foreign policy is, and must be, the expression of a national
and not a partisan purpose -- that I have accepted this
award tonight.

What is so striking as we look back at the America
of Theodore Roosevelt is the feeling of self-confidence, the
sense of optimism, we displayed as we went about our
business, foreign and domestic. Both self-confidence and
optimism are far less in evidence today. The consensus
that sustained our international participation is in danger
of being exhausted, and it must be restored.

A series of tragic events over the past decade has
contributed to this sense of uncertainty. A young, dynamic
and popular President assassinated; his brother and a great
civil rights leader, murdered; Lyndon Johnson returned to
office by an overwhelming majority, only to see that vast
majority steadily eroded; ever greater involvement in a war
which we seemed for too long unable to win or to end, and
the present ordeal of the whole Nation is too obvious to
require commentary.

The impact of this decade of tragedy has been
profound. The once apparently inexhaustible reservoir of
faith in our ability to do, and of confidence that the future
would be better than the past, has been seriously taxed.

Yet, the future will not judge us by the magnitude
of these trials, only by the adequacy of the response. If
history teaches nothing else, it makes clear that no great
nation can afford to pass by the moment when, in Theodore
Roosevelt's words, "mighty things must be dared." Once
the opportunity is past, no rationalization or self-
justification will bring it back.

MORE

The United States, in my view, faces such an historic moment. It exists for us as a people, not as partisans of any particular cause. The consequences of failure to grasp it will be borne not by this Administration, but by its successors in the decades to come, not by our contemporaries but by future generations.

- We have ended the war in Southeast Asia. We now seek to create conditions of stability to replace the bloodshed and hatred which for over a generation have torn Indochina.

- We have worked persistently to resolve by negotiation many of the political issues which have made our relationship with the Soviet Union contentious, and which for so long threatened world peace. The very process of negotiation, over a wide range of issues, has created the possibility of a strong and lasting mutual interest in peace and cooperation.

- We are embarked upon reinvigorating traditional friendships with our closest friends and allies in the Atlantic Community and with Japan. It is a journey which we hope will end not simply in a repetition of familiar liturgies but in a new recognition that what unites a community of free nations far transcends the secondary issues that divide us.

We found a world so accustomed to the Cold War that even the most routine business of peaceful relations among nations was carried on in the shadow of global confrontation. Fundamental problems persist; but they no longer dominate the conduct of all international affairs. The history of the post-war period has been a never-ending effort to maintain peace through crisis management. The peace we envisage would, instead, be sustained by a growing realization on the part of all nations that they have a stake in stability and that stability is ensured by acting from a sense of justice and with moderation. The world is beginning to sense that its purposes need not be the captive of its fears; that they can be shaped by its hopes and dreams.

But these prospects are only beginnings; they are not yet accomplished facts. Whether the shoots that have been planted will mature will depend in large measure upon how we conduct ourselves as a nation over the course of the next decade. And what we are 10 years hence depends upon what we do today, next week, and in the months that follow.

MORE

Foreign policy must not become an alibi or a distrac-
tion from domestic ill. But equally, domestic problems must
not be used as an excuse for abandoning our international
responsibilities. There can be no moratorium in the quest
for world peace. And as we pursue that quest, we will need
to draw upon the country's best minds, no matter what their
political persuasion -- not on a bipartisan but on a non-
partisan basis. Especially at this moment of necessary self-
examination, it is essential that we also reaffirm the basis
of our national unity, for the spirit and vitality that Teddy
Roosevelt represented still run deep in America.

As someone who came to this country as a refugee
from totalitarianism, I have a special feeling for what
America can mean to the world, and how a withdrawal of
America from the world would deprive mankind of hope and
purpose. This is why I hope deeply that we will recapture
the spirit that Theodore Roosevelt so well represented, and
that once more a generation of Americans will be prepared to
"enjoy and suffer much" as they strive mightily on frontiers
that are set by our common purposes.

Thank you.

END

(AT 3:17 P.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AUGUST 2, 1973

5:00 P.M. EDT

Now, this aware represents something of an encouragement at a time when we in Government are not exactly overwhelmed by expressions of approbation. More importantly, the award bears the name of a man, Theodore Roosevelt, whom I have both as a historian and as a public servant, admired above most others in our Nation's history.

Mrs. Longworth, who has brought grace and dignity in two already renowned names in American political history, is one of the handful of people who makes living in Washington a worthwhile and exciting experience.

MORE

How often I, like he, was tempted to explode in
"whoops of rage and jump up and knock....heads together."
Most of you ladies and gentlemen think that very profound
things go on in these negotiations, and that the conver-
sation is always at a very elevated level, but I can tell
you about one occasion when my opposite number that I
mentioned before said to me, "Let me speak to you honestly,
frankly, open-heartedly. You are a lier." (Laughter and
applause.)

You are not supposed to applaud that. At any
rate, I can only hope that my character has been improved
by self-regression, though many of my colleagues and all of
my staff would question whether self-repression is my most
distinctive trait.

This experience of a common challenge was one
of the reasons why we never elected the social, economic
and political barriers that afflicted so many other
nations with permanent and irreconcilable internal division.

MORE

- 3 -

This is why Americans have always seen their
role in the world as the outward manifestation of an inward
state of grace, if I may use an ecclesiastical term.
Foreign policy was not the exercise of one man, nor the
reflection of one group, or one party. It was the
expression of the collective spirit and the commonest
aspirations of the entire Nation.

A series of tragic events over the past decade has
contributed to this sense of uncertainty. A young, dynamic
and popular President assassinated; his brotehr, and a great
civil rights leader, murdered; Lyndon Johnson returned to
office by an overwhelming majority, only to see that vast
majority steadily eroded; ever greater involvement in a war
which we seemed for too long unable to win or to end, and
the present ordeal of the whole Nation is too obvious to
require commentary.

Yet, the future will not judge us by the magnitude
of these trials, only by the adequacy of the response. If
history teaches nothing else, it makes clear that no great
nation can afford to pass by the moment when, in Theodore
Roosevelt's words, "mighty things must be dated." Once
the opportunity is past, no rationalization or self-
justification will bring it back.

MORE

But these prospects are only beginnings; they are not yet accomplished facts. Whether the shots that have been planted will mature will depend in large measure upon how we conduct ourselves as a nation over the course of the next decade. And what we are 10 years hence depends upon what we do today, next week, and in the months that follow.

MORE

Foreign policy must not become an alibi or a distrac-
tion from domestic ills. But equally, domestic problems must
not be used as an excuse for abandoning our international
responsibilities. There can be no moratorium in the quest
for world peace. And as we pursue that quest, we will need
to draw upon the country's best minds, no matter what their
political persuasion -- not on a bipartisan but on a non-
partisan basis. Especially at this moment of necessary self-
examination, it is essential that we also reaffirm the basis
of our national unity, for the spirit and vitality that Teddy
Roosevelt represented still run deep in America.

Thank you.

END

(AT 5:17 P.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AUGUST 22, 1973

Office of the White House Press Secretary
(San Clemente, California)

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT AND
SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM P. ROGERS

August 20, 1973

Dear Bill:

It is with the greatest reluctance and regret that I accept your resignation as Secretary of State.

I cannot do so without thinking back gratefully on our quarter century of close personal friendship, on the battles we have fought together and the crises we have weathered together, and on your unwavering good spirits, good judgment and good sense.

I vividly recall that you were the first person I turned to for advice and counsel after receiving the terrible news of President Eisenhower's heart attack in 1955, and I recall how much your calm, reasoned encouragement meant to me as I sought to do what was right in the course of that ordeal. But that was only one of many times, before and since, when I have instinctively turned to you for advice and relied heavily on your judgment at those critical moments that are the truest test not only of an associate's friendship, but also of his character.

Few men have given so much of themselves to their country as you have, with your eight years of distinguished service as Deputy Attorney General and Attorney General in President Eisenhower's Administration, and now having carried the heavy responsibilities of Secretary of State for four and a half years at a particularly crucial time in the evolution of the Nation's foreign policies. Throughout, your service has been completely dedicated and completely selfless. The Nation owes you an enormous debt of gratitude.

As Secretary of State, you have represented this country abroad with great skill. You have played an historic role in the formulation and execution of those policies which I believe, and I know you believe, can at long last produce a structure of peace in the world that will endure long into the future, and that will make it possible for differences among nations to be settled at the negotiating table rather than on the battlefield. This is an achievement of which you should be immensely proud, just as I am immensely proud of the vital contribution you have made to it.

Not only in foreign policy, but also on the wide range of other issues on which I have sought your advice, it has always been given with candor and courage and with exceptional insight. I have appreciated this greatly, and the Nation is much the better for your service -- service which I know has been at great personal sacrifice.

Pat joins me in wishing you and Adele the very best in the years ahead, and in trusting that we will continue to see both of you often.

With warmest regards,

****************

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August 16, 1973

Dear Mr. President:

I herewith submit my resignation as Secretary of State effective September 3, 1973.

Because of our personal friendship which has extended over such a long period of time I take this action with a bit of sadness. You will recall, though, that when I accepted the post I did it with a firm resolve to return to the private practice of the law at the end of your first term of office. However, because of several pressing matters, particularly the closing phase of our involvement in the war in Viet-Nam, an uncertain cease-fire in the Middle East, the initial phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the need for immediate attention to our relations with NATO, CENTO, Japan, South Korea and our Latin American allies it was agreed that I should stay on for awhile.

Now that the United States has ended its long war in Indochina; that the cease-fire in the Middle East has had its third anniversary; that the first phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has ended satisfactorily; and that our relations with our allies as well as with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China are on a good basis I believe the time is right for a change.

It has been a great privilege and honor to serve the nation as Secretary of State during the last four and one-half years. Under your strong and effective leadership the conduct of our foreign affairs has been marked with extra-ordinary success. Because of your policies, initiative and resolve, and the loyal support and assistance of many others including those in the State Department with whom I have been privileged to be associated, the world is a much more peaceful place than it was four and one-half years ago.

Under your leadership we are on the way to constructing a structure of international relationships which gives hope of providing peace and stability for future generations. It is the completion of this task especially which is so important to all mankind and which will continue to command great public support during the remainder of your term.

Please accept my thanks and deep appreciation for giving me the opportunity to serve the country during these critical and important years in our nation's history. Adele joins me in sending you and Pat our warmest personal regards.

The President,
The White House

# # #

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AUGUST 23, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

OF

DR. HENRY KISSINGER

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

AND SECRETARY OF STATE-DESIGNATE

THE WESTERN WHITE HOUSE

11:10 A.M. PDT

MR. WARREN: Ladies and Gentlemen, as you know, the President yesterday announced his intention to nominate Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to be Secretary of State.

Dr. Kissinger is here to take your questions this morning.

He will have a few observations for you, and then open it up for questions.

Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: First, I wanted to say that the President has done me great honor to nominate me for a position that was held by such great Americans as Secretary Stimson, George Marshall, Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, all of whom were united in one basic approach: That the foreign policy of the United States is not a partisan matter; it concerns the whole nation, that the future of our country transcends any particular Administration.

That is the spirit in which, if the Senate confirms me, I will attempt to conduct the office of Secretary of State.

I would also like to say a few words about the outgoing Secretary of State, William Rogers. Many of you, for 4-1/2 years, have commented about the difficult relationship between the White House Staff and the Secretary of State. And it is, of course, true -- you wouldn't believe me if I said anything else -- that there is an institutional problem when there is a strong White House operation and a strong Secretary of State, which is one reason why we have combined these positions now.

I would like to say on this occasion that these difficulties which are inherent in the arrangement were at an absolute minimum. The Secretary of State has conducted his affairs with enormous dignity, grace, wisdom, and above all, humanity.

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I had a long talk with him on the telephone yesterday and I look forward to his continued advice and participation in a policy in which he played such a large role, in which he was perhaps more instrumental in shaping than he often received credit.

Now, let me say a few things about what is ahead. Any Administration wants to leave the world better than it found it, and the most important challenge before our country in the field of foreign policy is to bring about a stable peace.

In the first term of the President, many important and some revolutionary changes were made. These required, to considerable extent, secret diplomacy and they were conducted on a rather restricted basis. But now, we are in a different phase. The foundations that have been laid must now lead to the building of a more permanent structure. What has been started is still very tender.

If you think back, it is only three years that we had simultaneous crises in the Caribbean, in the Middle East, and in Berlin. It is only two years that we first opened relations with the People's Republic of China and in the same period, relations with our traditional friends have undergone enormous transformation.

So, what we are going to try to do is to solidify what has been started, to put more emphasis on our relationship with Europe and with Japan, and to conclude during the term of the President, the building of a structure that we can pass on to succeeding Administrations so that the world will be a safer place when they take over.

Now, this requires that there will be a greater institutionalization of foreign policy than has been the case up to now. One of the challenges in going to the State Department will be the ability now to work with the great professionals in the Foreign Service who will be here after this Administration has left, and who, hopefully, will carry on the traditions that are valid, that will, by then, have been established.

It is worthwhile remembering that about 70 percent of my staff has been composed of Foreign Service officers to begin with, and, therefore, now that the entire Foreign Service can be brought more closely into the operation, we should get even more momentum behind our foreign policy.

Those who are worried whether the existing bureaucracy will be used should consult the members of my staff, and my advice to them will be to get to know their wives very well before the confirmation because afterwards, they may not see as much of them as until now.

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The role of the National Security Council's staff will continue to be interdepartmental. There will be a greater exchange between the State Department and the National Security Council staff and personnel than has been possible up to now, but the details of this, I would like to defer until after the confirmation.

Another important aspect in the institutionalization of foreign policy will be to bring the Congress into a close partnership in the developments, planning and execution, of our foreign policy.

Yesterday, I called every member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and key members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and I told them all what I am saying to you ladies and gentlemen today.

The foreign policy of this Administration is designed not on a partisan basis, but on a national basis, and it is essential that the Congress fully understand what we are attempting to do. Even in my present position as Assistant to the President, I meet regularly with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at first in Chairman Fulbright's house, and later, in a committee room in the Senate.

At first, on a very informal basis, but later, with very full notes being taken by the committee staff. I therefore welcome the opportunity of being able to testify regularly and as frequently as the Chairman and the Members of the committee consider desirable, about the purposes and policies of the President and the Administration.

There has been some question about whether the dual position of Assistant to the President and Secretary of State may cause me to invoke executive privilege. Let me answer this now: The purpose of combining the two positions is, as the President pointed out yesterday, an attempt to move policy-making from the White House into the Department and, therefore, to make it more accessible to Congressional and public scrutiny.

I would, therefore, expect to testify about all matters that Secretaries of State have traditionally testified. In addition, I would feel it appropriate to testify about those interdepartmental matters with respect to which I spoke informally previously to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I would not be able to testify about personal conversations between the President and myself, or about direct advice I gave to the President, but I could not testify with respect to this in any event, and no Cabinet Member is ever asked to testify with respect to conversations he has with the President. So, I know the President's intention in combining these two positions is to increase the information available to the Congress.

And the President, whom I have seen only a few minutes ago, has asked me to say that executive privilege will not be invoked except with respect to the range of issues that I have mentioned. The practical consequences of it will be that more information will be available to the Congressional committees than before.

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The intention of the President and my intention is to establish a new and full partnership with the Congress in developing policies which are in the national interest, and now that the Vietnamese war is behind us, and therefore the major source of division in the country about foreign policy, we know that we will be able to work out such an arrangement with the members of the Congressional committees, and all of whom I know personally and have worked with in the past.

Now a word about the relationship of the department and of our foreign policy to the public. If we are going to achieve the lasting peace which we seek, and if we are going to leave behind a foreign policy tradition that will be carried on in a nonpartisan basis in succeeding Administrations, we have an obligation to explain our philosophy and purposes and policies to the public, and after my confirmation I intend to invite leaders of various opinion-forming elements in this country to the State Department to advise us on how we can most effectively discharge this responsibility.

We will do our best to conduct foreign policy in as open a manner as is consistent with the goal which we all share, which is to bring about a lasting peace. The overriding goal, as I have said at the beginning, of any Administration must be to distinguish the fluctuations of the day to day headlines from the more lasting achievement, and any serious person will remember and will keep in mind that what any Administration will be remembered for will be the things that last, and that are of benefit to our children, and all I can say is that we will make a major effort to leave behind a more peaceful world, and a better America, and that is all that I wanted to say.

Now I will take a few questions, but I would like to have you understand that I will have to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for confirmation. I don't think it would be appropriate to go into detail about questions that the Senators will want to ask me, and to create the impression that I want to take a public position before they have an opportunity to formulate their stand, so I hope you will excuse me if I do not go into detail on some of the questions.

Q Mr. Secretary Designate, you will excuse us if we try to go into detail on some questions in any case.

DR. KISSINGER: Certainly. I expect that.

Q Prince Sihanouk has said in Peking recently that President Nixon was not telling the truth about the secret bombing of Cambodia, that in fact Prince Sihanouk did not approve of or condone in any way the secret bombing. Could you clarify that for us?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, Prince Sihanouk has a rather difficult position right now in the sense that the people that are now supporting him inside Cambodia, he had sentenced to death for treason a few years previously, and

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therefore we have to understand the delicacy of his position.

Prince Sihanouk always took the view that he would protest any air operations that involved Cambodians. He also took the position that the bombing of areas in which there were no Cambodians he would not protest. I think if you look at the record over the year that we are talking about that there was no Cambodian protest about the B-52 bombing. There were Cambodian protests when tactical air strayed across the border, and got outside of the zone in which the B-52 operations took place.

Q On that point, Doctor, was there a zone ten miles, or were there not fighter-bomber raids closer to Phnom Pen and other operations in Cambodia during this 14 months?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether there were fighter-bomber raids closer to Phnom Pen than the 10 to 15 miles.

I will take this question, but I am sure that the Senate will also want to ask about it, and therefore I don't want to go into all the details, and also I have not consulted all the records.

The B-52 operations were confined to an area within 10 miles. Occasionally, and I think very rarely, there were some tactical air operations when there were military activities on one side of the border that continued in which the sequence of military operations continued across the border. The tactical air operations were not initiated unless there were North Vietnamese units that came across the border and in the pursuit of them occasionally, but very rarely, some tactical air operations took place. They could have been deeper than 10 miles, but I doubt that they were very much deeper.

Q Doctor, when are you going to Peking, and are you going to Peking?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is when am I going to Peking, and am I going to Peking.

I plan to go to Peking, and the date now has to be subject to Senate confirmation, because I don't think it would be appropriate for me to go before I have been confirmed by the Senate. We expect to set a date soon after my confirmation has been achieved.

Q Dr. Kissinger, a clarifying question about your opening statement. You left out Dean Rusk. Did you do that through inadvertence?

DR. KISSINGER: Dean Rusk is a man I admire greatly and a good personal friend of mine. I just gave a few examples and he was a distinguished Secretary of State.

Q Dr. Kissinger, a spokesman for the President of France said yesterday firstly that while he would welcome

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a visit, he really thought that it was more of an exchange of
information, that there was really no agreement to be worked
out and that he was specifically opposed to the Atlantic
summit that you sought, particularly. How does this affect the
Year of Europe as you see it?

DR. KISSINGER: The European Foreign Ministers are
meeting in September to develop a European response to our
proposal, and I don't think I should make a comment until we
see what their response will be, because there are many points
of view in Europe.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you now call off Cambodian
negotiations, to remain stalled until your trip to Peking,
or do you think they might get under way? I am referring to
the secret negotiations. Do you think they might get under
way again before the trip to Peking?

DR. KISSINGER: The Cambodian negotiations now
inevitably with the end of American bombing will depend
more on the decision of the Cambodian parties than on
American decisions, and if the Congressional intent means
anything, it is that the United States should not play the
principal role in these activities.

I would therefore not tie any possible negotiations
in Cambodia inevitably to my trip to Peking, and it will
depend to a great extent on the decisions of the Cambodian
parties.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if I may, can you forecast on
a scale of optimism and pessimism as to whether these things
can be begun again?

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DR. KISSINGER: The discussion, I think it is
too early to tell.

Helen, and then Murrey.

Q Has Watergate seriously damaged foreign policy, and also, since you submitted names to be wire-tapped, and you were tapped yourself, do you think this country, or the White House, is obsessed with national security?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I am certain that the question of the measures that were taken to protect the security of the office, which, after all, had the most sensitive information in the Government, will be discussed at the Senate hearing and on that occasion, I will give my -- I will answer questions with respect to that.

Any government has to strike a balance between the requirements of national security and the requirements of individual freedom, and that balance should be carefully drawn, and one should hope that one could justify individual decisions on the ground of their necessity.

In those activities of which I was aware, which were conducted by processes that were considered legal at that time, according to legal processes, I will be prepared to account fully to the appropriate committees of the Senate.

Now, your other question on the impact of Watergate on foreign policy. The foreign countries have to assess what sort of a country they are dealing with, how steady it can be in the carrying out of its commitments, and the degree of authority possessed by its leaders.

To the extent that these are affected, there is a long-term effect on foreign policy.

Our intention will be, as I have stated prior to this appointment, to emphasize those aspects of foreign policy on which most Americans agree to carry out a foreign policy that has the widest possible support on a bipartisan basis, and since I am confident that that can be achieved, I believe that the effect of Watergate on the conduct of foreign policy can be minimized.

Murrey?

Q Dr. Kissinger, a related question: You have publicly pressed concern that the consensus in the United States on the formulation of foreign policy has been eroding. You also have expressed concern about an orgy of recrimination setting in. Have we not been experiencing some considerable recrimination with the President, himself, attacking Congress over his policy in Indochina?

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DR. KISSINGER: That last question about the
orgy of recrimination, or the comment about "orgy of
recrimination", I was asked very early in the Watergate
affair at the end of April, whether it might have an effect
on foreign policy.

At the time, one's knowledge of it was confined
essentially to the break-in of Democratic campaign
headquarters.

At that time, I said that, if an orgy of recrimina-
tion set in, it might have an effect on foreign policy.
Now, there is no question if the divisions in a country
grow too deep and, then the conduct of foreign policy
will be affected, and then people will have to decide
whether the issues on which they are being divided are
worth it.

On this, I am not taking a position. I am just
stating the facts analytically.

Now, it is true that the consensus on which foreign
policy was conducted in the late 1940s, and through the
1950s and 1960s, is eroding in part because the conditions
in the world have changed so enormously. In the late 1940s
and in the 1950s, foreign policy was essentially designed
to prevent what was considered a monolythic Communism
from militarily overrunning the world. Today, we are
conducting a foreign policy in which, at one and the
same time, we are engaged in detente with the Soviet
Union and the People's Republic of China, and on the other
hand, we are trying to strengthen the traditional friend-
ships with Europe and Japan.

On the one hand, we are stressing the need for
adequate defense budgets and on the other, we are conducting
negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms. This
requires a complexity of thought and a sophistication
on the part of the American public that was not called for
in the 1940s and 1950s.

We have had the legacy of a war that bitterly
divided Americans and that has to be healed. And therefore,
one of the prime objectives of the Administration will
have to be to create a consensus in which the American
people and the American Congress can understand and will
support the necessity of carrying on adequate defense
programs and disarmament negotiations. Friendship,
strengthening friendship with traditional allies and
nevertheless, a policy of reconciliation with former
enemies and in that sense, we have to create a new
consensus which can give a new impetus and a new
excitement to our foreign policy for the next decade
or two.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, a question on the Middle East. For the past four years, you have maintained a low profile in this particular area. Do you plan to continue that, or will you become a more public figure in pursuing settlement of the Middle East situation?

DR. KISSINGER: The President has repeatedly stated that the Middle East is an important area, and perhaps the most dangerous area, and I will pursue, under the President's direction, those policies which are considered necessary and in the past, that has sometimes meant a less than restrained profile.

Q Dr. Kissinger, may I follow on to that? How do you plan to put to rest the apprehensions that have been expressed by some Arab leaders about your family heritage and how that might affect our policy in the Middle East?

DR. KISSINGER: I am asked to conduct the foreign policy of the United States, and I will conduct the foreign policy of the United States regardless of religious and national heritage.

There is no other country in the world in which a man of my background could be considered for an office such as the one for which I have been nominated, and that imposes on me a very grave responsibility which I will pursue in the national interest.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, how close, or how close do you think you were to a settlement in Cambodia, a negotiated settlement at the time the Congress imposed a deadline on bombing?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think I want to speculate on that on this occasion. What I hope to achieve in the relations with Chariman Fulbright and other members of his committee is an ability by which we can lay out our general strategy with respect to key areas so that when individual decisions come up for Congressional vote, they will know what this overall design is rather than be confronted with a series of individual pressures.

Q Dr. Kissinger, why did the President cancel plans for a trip to Latin America?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is why did the President cancel plans for a trip to Latin America. Because he has been preoccupied with domestic matters.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if I may, sir, a couple of very quick questions. Is the United States willing to allow Prince Sihanouk to return to power and what is it the U.S. wants that Sihanouk does not find acceptable?

The other question is, how much of a factor in U.S. foreign policy has grain sales become and is it being used to divide the ailing American dollar and, if so, how long will this go on?

Q Yes or no?

DR. KISSINGER: Can I answer it yes or no? (Laughter)

The first question I am sure will be discussed at the Senate hearings and is a rather delicate subject which will lead, we expect at some point, to some negotiation and, therefore, I don't think I should comment on it.

With respect to the grain sales, I think it is important to understand that there are major areas of American foreign policy -- or let me rather put it, of the American position in the world in which approach and reality are fundamentally changing. For example, for the entire post-war period and the entire first term of this Administration, it was considered axiomatic that the United States could never sell too much grain.

The entire foreign policy, and the entire foreign policy as it was expressed in -- as it related to agricultural policy proceeded from the assumption that with our huge surpluses and our huge productivity, we should stand for three months. For our almost entire post-war history we have considered ourselves more or less sufficient in raw materials.

Now we find a greater dependency on foreign sources of energy. We find that for the first time, because of a combination of factors, there is a shortage of American food for export and this has profound consequences for the conduct of our foreign policy when free access to foreign markets had been one of the cardinal tenets of our foreign policy previously.

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Q -Dr. Kissinger, did you get any comments from the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about how quickly they would act on your nomination and what the outcome would be?

DR. KISSINGER: I did not think it was appropriate for me to raise the question of my confirmation. I did call all the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and told them about the philosophy that would animate my conduct of the Office of Secretary of State if they confirmed me. I did not raise the issue of a schedule nor did I ask them how they would vote, and I might add that I do not intend to do this.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when does the President plan to go to Europe and what are the prospects now for some kind of statement of principles while he is there?

Q Question.

DR. KISSINGER: The question is when is the President likely to go to Europe and what is the prospect for a statement of principles while he is there.

The decision as to the timing will be made after the meeting of the European foreign ministers which is taking place in September and on that occasion he can also answer what will emerge, but we would expect that when the President goes to Europe it will be for a significant substantive result and not simply on a grand tour.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when your change has been consummated will the national security staff remain in and around the White House or will it be shifted with you to the State Department?

DR. KISSINGER: I plan to maintain an office in the White House and to spend some of my time in the White House on interdepartmental matters and on being available to the President. I would expect that some of my associates would join me in the State Department to ease the cultural shock and I also would expect that some of the best people in the State Department would move to the White House in order to see the interdepartmental operation from a White House prospective but we would keep the agency structure in place for the interdepartmental business and for the presidential business. We would hope to give even more vitality to the operation of the State Department and I can only reiterate that if what has been done can be built on and if it is to last, it must engage the commitment of the professionals who will have to carry it on over a period of time and this will be one of my principal purposes at the State Department.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you played a major role in reopening the door to China. What can you tell us about reopening the door to Cuba?

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FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AUGUST 23, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

11:10 A.M. PDT

Dr. Kissinger.

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Another important aspect in the institutionaliza-
tion of foreign policy will be to bring the Congress
into a close partnership in the development, planning
and execution, of our foreign policy.

The foreign policy of this Administration is designed not on a partisan basis, but on a national basis, and it is essential that the Congress fully understand what we are attempting to do. Even in my present position as Assistant to the President, I met regularly with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, at first in Chairman Fulbright's house, and later, in a committee room in the Senate, at first on a very informal basis, but later, with very full notes being taken by the committee staff. I therefore welcome the opportunity of being able to testify regularly and as frequently as the Chairman and the Members of the committee consider desirable, about the purposes and policies of the President and the Administration.

I would, therefore, expect to testify
about all matters that Secretaries of State have
traditionally testified. In addition, I would feel
it appropriate to testify about those interdepartmental
matters with respect to which I spoke informally previously
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I would not
be able to testify about personal conversations between
the President and myself, or about direct advice I gave to
the President, but I could not testify with respect to
this in any event, and no Cabinet Member is ever asked
to testify with respect to conversations he has with the
President. So, I know the President's intention in
combining these two positions is to increase the informa-
tion available to the Congress.

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I am certain that I will be able to work out
with the chairmen of the appropriate committees and with
the leadership of the Senate and the House a division
between the testimony that should be in executive
session and that which should be public, but this
is an inevitable arrangement that will have to be
made between Cabinet Members and congressional
committees.

Now a word about the relationship of the department
and of our foreign policy to the public. If we are going to
achieve the lasting peace which we seek, and if we are going
to leave behind a foreign policy tradition that will be
carried on in a non-partisan basis in succeeding Administra-
tions, we have an obligation to explain our philosophy and pur-
poses and policies to the public, and after my confirmation I
intend to invite leaders of various opinion-forming elements
in this country to the State Department to advise us on how
we can most effectively discharge this responsibility.

We will do our best to conduct foreign policy in
as open a manner as is consistent with the goal which we all
share, which is to bring about a lasting peace. The over-
riding goal, as I have said at the beginning, of any
Administration must be to distinguish the fluctuations of the
day to day headlines from the more lasting achievement, and
any serious person will remember and will keep in mind that
what any Administration will be remembered for will be the
things that last, and that are of benefit to our children,
and all I can say is that we will make a major effort to
leave behind a more peaceful world, and a better America, and
that is all that I wanted to say.

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DR. KISSINGER: Well, Prince Sihanouk has a rather difficult position right now in the sense that the people that are now supporting him inside Cambodia, he had sentenced to death for treason a few years previously, and therefore we have to understand the delicacy of his position.

Q On that point, Doctor, was there a zone of ten miles, or were there not fighter-bomber raids closer to Phnom Penh and other operations in Cambodia during this 14 months?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether there were fighter-bomber raids closer to Phnom Penh than the 10 to 15 miles.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, a spokesman for the President
of France said yesterday firstly that while he would welcome
a visit, he really thought that it was more of an exchange of
information, that there was really no agreement to be worked
out and that he was specifically opposed to the Atlantic
summit that you sought, particularly he spoke about it in
Reykjavik. How does this bode for your Year of Europe as
you see it?

Q Mr. Secretary, do you expect the now-called-off
Cambodian negotiations to remain stalled until your trip to
Peking, or do you think they might get under way? I am
referring to the secret negotiations. Do you think they might
get under way again before the trip to Peking?

DR. KISSINGER: The discussion? I think it is
too early to tell.

Helen, and then Murrey.

Q Has Watergate severely damaged foreign
policy, and also, since you submitted names to be wire-
tapped, and you were tapped yourself, do you think this
country, or the White House, is obsessed with national
security?

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