THE TILT POLICY REVISITED:
NIXON-KISSINGER GEOPOLITICS
AND SOUTH ASIA

Christopher Van Hollen

THE WORD "TILT," now part of the common parlance, was introduced into the American political lexicon just over eight years ago, compliments of columnist Jack Anderson. During the Indo-Pakistan war over Bangladesh, Anderson's columns carried excerpts from secret White House meetings at one of which an exasperated Henry Kissinger warned government officials that he was "getting hell every half hour from the President that we are not being tough enough on India." The President "does not believe we are carrying out his wishes," Kissinger complained. "He wants to tilt in favor of Pakistan."¹ Although Anderson won a Pulitzer Prize for his journalistic coup, his revelations were politically damaging to Richard Nixon, and personally embarrassing to Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs. A few days before, Kissinger had assured a background press conference that the White House was evenhanded, and that charges of an anti-India bias were "totally inaccurate."²

In *White House Years*, Kissinger provides an aggressive defense of the Nixon administration's controversial handling of the nine-month

1 Excerpts from the secret meetings of the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) began to appear in Jack Anderson's syndicated columns in mid-December 1971. On January 4, 1972, Kissinger charged that Anderson's quotations were "out of context," whereupon Anderson released to the press the full texts of the minutes of the WSAG meetings of December 3, 5, 6, and 8. These, and other secret documents, became known as "The Anderson Papers." The WSAG minutes are contained in Marta R. Nicholas and Philip Oldenburg, comps., *Bangladesh: The Birth of a Nation—A Handbook of Background Information and Documentary Sources* (Maidras: M. Seshachalam and Company, 1972), Appendix 10.
2 Believing he was helping the administration, Senator Barry Goldwater inserted Kissinger's background remarks in the *Congressional Record*, December 9, 1971, pp. S21012-S21016.

© 1980 by The Regents of the University of California
0004-4687/80/040339+23$00.50

340 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XX, No. 4, April 1980

Bangladesh crisis in 1971, characterizing it as "perhaps the most com-
plex issue of Nixon's first term."³ Across 76 pages of a chapter appro-
priately titled, "The Tilt," he paints the South Asia scene with broad
and vigorous rhetorical strokes, portraying it as only one part of a much
larger geopolitical canvas. Just as the work of an accomplished muralist
depends for total effect upon the foundation strokes, an acceptance of
Kissinger's claim that the White House's geopolitical design succeeded
in South Asia depends upon an acceptance of his basic assumptions.

The thesis of this essay is that many of Kissinger's assumptions and conclusions are incorrect. Contrary to his claims, the United States did not need to remain mute to the Pakistan army's repressions in East Pakistan to protect the White House opening to China. Washington could have pressed President Yahya Khan harder to make political concessions in East Pakistan. India did not have a grand design to dismember West Pakistan; nor was the Soviet Union urging Indira Gandhi's government in that direction. It was both unnecessary and unwise to raise the Bangladesh regional crisis to the level of global geopolitics. Kissinger is wrong in concluding that Nixon's willingness to risk war with the Soviet Union, including the deployment of a U.S. aircraft carrier to South Asia, saved West Pakistan and preserved the structure of world peace. In sum, the White House policies, so spiritedly defended in Kissinger's memoirs, were badly flawed and ill served the interests of the United States.

White House Perceptions

As *White House Years* makes clear, the secret opening to China was the most important factor shaping Nixon's and Kissinger's reactions to the 1971 events in East Pakistan—an area of no strategic importance to the United States. Nixon had first broached the idea of an American overture to China to President Yahya when he visited Lahore in July 1969; he later used Pakistan, as well as Romania, as a secret channel through which to pass several exploratory messages to China. Although they were unaware of these overtures at the time, members of the National Security Council's Senior Review Group (SRG) were exposed to the White House's sensitivity toward China on March 6, three weeks before the Pakistan civil war broke out. Kissinger convened the SRG meeting, attended by senior representatives from State, Defense, and CIA, to review U.S. options in face of mounting tensions between the two West Pakistani leaders, Yahya Khan and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and the East Pakistani leader, Mujibur Rahman (Mujib). At this first SRG meeting on South Asia, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs

³ Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Kissinger are from chapter XXI of his *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), pp. 842-918.

Alexis Johnson expressed the S
neither an issue between the n
confrontation. The Soviets, I
all considered that their in-
ited Pakistan.⁴

Johnson suggested that o
 courage President Yahya from
Mujib and his Awami League
after Kissinger cautioned SR
Nixon's "special relationship
prised and perplexed the parti
reluctant to suggest that Yahy
ing that the Pakistanis "would
were instructed to weigh in wi
and further discussion of var-
cluded that "massive inaction
States.⁵

In addition to the China
was influenced by his long-sta-
and his warm feelings toward
dent to anyone who had close
credible when he told the pres-
of the President's "preferenc-
ers." Discounting the stereot
in explaining that the "bluff,
more congenial to Nixon that
Brahmin leaders of India." W
1970, Nixon assured him that
who is friendlier to Pakistan."
to White House desires, Nix
was replaced by more unprinta-
Nixon's contrasting feelings t
undoubtedly colored his judg-

⁴ Informal Notes, Senior Review were no formal agreed minutes of c tatives of individual departments t example, were based on Defense I recorded by one or more members f formal Notes."

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Congressional Record, Decem
Bernard Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: L
terviews with Marvin Kalb and two
Bangladesh: The Unfinished Rev
These interviews are reproduced in
disagrees with some of Lifschultz's

⁷ G. W. Choudhury, "Reflective
munity, 7:2 January 1976, p. 266.

TILT POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA 341

Alexis Johnson expressed the State Department view that the crisis was neither an issue between the major powers nor a matter of U.S.-Indian confrontation. The Soviets, Indians, and Americans, Johnson asserted, all considered that their interests were served by continuation of a united Pakistan.⁴

Johnson suggested that one option for the U.S. was to try to discourage President Yahya from using force in East Pakistan against Mujib and his Awami League followers. But he did not press the point after Kissinger cautioned SRG members to keep in mind President Nixon's "special relationship" with Yahya—a relationship that surprised and perplexed the participants. The President, he said, would be reluctant to suggest that Yahya exercise restraint in East Pakistan, adding that the Pakistanis "wouldn't give a damn" if the U.S. Ambassador were instructed to weigh in with Yahya. Following this cautionary note, and further discussion of various alternatives, the SRG members concluded that "massive inaction" was the best policy for the United States.⁵

In addition to the China initiative, Nixon's reaction to South Asia was influenced by his long-standing dislike for India and the Indians, and his warm feelings toward Pakistan. Because these feelings were evident to anyone who had close association with Nixon, Kissinger was not credible when he told the press in December 1971 that he was unaware of the President's "preferences for Pakistani leaders over Indian leaders."⁶ Discounting the stereotypes, he is more accurate in his memoirs in explaining that the "bluff, direct military chiefs of Pakistan" were more congenial to Nixon than "the complex and apparently haughty Brahmin leaders of India." When Yahya visited Washington in October 1970, Nixon assured him that "nobody has occupied the White House who is friendlier to Pakistan."⁷ When Mrs. Gandhi's actions ran counter to White House desires, Nixon's customary sobriquet of "that bitch" was replaced by more unprintable epithets. Despite disclaimers, Richard Nixon's contrasting feelings toward the Indian and Pakistani leaders undoubtedly colored his judgments in 1971.

⁴ Informal Notes, Senior Review Group (SRG) meeting, March 6, 1971. There were no formal agreed minutes of either the SRG or the WSAG meetings. Representatives of individual departments took their own notes. The Anderson Papers, for example, were based on Defense Department notes. In this article, similar notes, recorded by one or more members of the State Department, are referred to as "Informal Notes."

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Congressional Record, December 9, 1971, p. S21104. See also Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1974)*, p. 258, and interviews with Marvin Kalb and two State Department officials in Lawrence Lifschultz, *Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution* (London: Zed Press, 1979), pp. 159-161. These interviews are reproduced in the appendix of the Lifschultz book; this author disagrees with some of Lifschultz's interpretations of the 1971 events.

⁷ G. W. Choudhury, "Reflections on Sino-Pakistan Relations," *Pacific Community*, 7:2, January 1976, p. 266.

342 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XX, No. 4, April 1980

The Humanitarian Issue

Kissinger's comments that there was "justified outrage" when reports began to come in of the Pakistani "atrocities" in Bengal are the words of the elder statesman-author, viewing events retrospectively; they were not the words of the Assistant to the President in March-April 1971. At no time during that period is Kissinger on record as voicing outrage or humanitarian concern as the Pakistani armed forces obeyed Yahya's crackdown orders with a vengeance. To escape the repression, millions of the frightened Bengalis, mostly Hindus, poured across the borders into India while the Awami League leaders who were left behind were arrested and, in the case of Mujib, sent to prison in West Pakistan. Outside the confines of the White House Situation Room, substantial parts of the American public, media, and Congress were indeed expressing outrage.

Because the Awami League, which favored greater autonomy for East Pakistan, had won an overwhelming victory in the December 1970 elections—capturing 167 out of 169 seats—the strong emotions in the U.S. reflected a belief that a free political movement was being brutally liquidated by Pakistani military forces.⁸ Of particular concern to Congress, the Pakistan military used American-supplied equipment, M-24 tanks and F-86 aircraft, to suppress the Bengalis.

Outrage at the Pakistani atrocities was also felt within the bureaucracy—especially at middle levels in State and AID—but most directly by members of the American Consulate General in Dacca. The Dacca Americans were already offended by Washington's insistence that the airlift of dependents from Dacca be officially characterized as a "thin-out" rather than an "evacuation" so as not to offend Yahya. As the carnage continued and the White House failed to issue a statement of condemnation, Consul General Archer Blood sent a telegram to Washington, signed by nineteen members of the Consulate-General, registering "strong dissent" with a policy that "serves neither our moral interests, broadly defined, nor our national interests, narrowly defined." It was an eloquent expression of concern, transmitted through the State Department "Dissent Channel" specifically designed for such purposes. But Kissinger denigrates the message, claiming that it was deliberately given low classification to assure that it would be leaked. However, in noting that Nixon ordered the transfer of the Consul General, he acknowledges "there was some merit to the charge of moral insensitivity."⁹

In defending their stance, Kissinger explains that he and Nixon faced a dilemma: "The United States could not condone a brutal mili-

tary repression in which the millions fled to India, "burst upon us while Pakistan no other means of communication was interpreted as concern that the administration's support opinion stemmed largely from a statement of U.S. disapproval to back out of his intermission tapped by Nixon as a comment wanted to retain the goodwill of the second point is factually incorrect." Pakistan on March 25, there the Pakistanis, the other three White House had a "slight preference a month later, when Pakistan reply to Nixon from Zhou Islamabad link.

Arms and Economic Assistance

Kissinger is highly critical to the crisis, which took the United States to Pakistan and to hold up U.S. actions, which he says were the Department's ignorance of Indian policy. "On one aspect was totally ignorant of later, when Kissinger was in craft for Beijing was the Department for William P. Rogers, informed of important foreign policy in point there is also agreement with soft-headed "Indian lo- reasons for the priority attack."

After the Pakistan military consisting of Harold Saunderson of State, Defense, and Foreign Affairs of Pakistan relations and review conclusion, forwarded to the

⁸ In a White Paper issued in August 1971, the Government of Pakistan stated it had been compelled to take military action because of the "atrocities and acts of lawlessness committed by the Awami League militants prior to 25 March, 1971." Nicholas and Oldenburg, *Bangladesh: The Birth of a Nation*, p. 84.

⁹ The text is in Lifschultz, *Bangladesh: The Unfinished Revolution*, p. 158. Consul General Blood later received the American Foreign Service Association's Herter Award, which is awarded for "intellectual courage and creative dissent."

¹⁰ As G. W. Choudhury, formed was delighted to have this opportunity," *Pacific Community*, 7:2, January.

¹¹ Kissinger, *White House Year*.

TILT POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA 343

tary repression in which thousands of civilians were killed and from
which millions fled to India for safety," but the East Pakistan crisis
"burst upon us while Pakistan was our only channel to China; we had
no other means of communication with Peking." On the first point,
Kissinger is insensitive to the fact that the administration's official si-
lence was interpreted as condoning the atrocities in East Pakistan, and
that the administration's subsequent problems with American public
opinion stemmed largely from this perception. It is most unlikely that
a statement of U.S. disapprobation would have caused President Yahya
to back out of his intermediary role; he was honored to have been
tapped by Nixon as a communications link with China and desperately
wanted to retain the goodwill of both Washington and Beijing.¹⁰ The
second point is factually incorrect. When the fighting broke out in East
Pakistan on March 25, there were two channels to Beijing: one through
the Pakistanis, the other through the Romanians. Of the two, the White
House had a "slight preference for the Pakistani channel."¹¹ Not until
a month later, when Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly delivered a
reply to Nixon from Zhou Enlai, did the White House opt for the
Islamabad link.

Arms and Economic Assistance

Kissinger is highly critical of the State Department's initial reaction
to the crisis, which took the form of actions to stop U.S. military supply
to Pakistan and to hold up U.S. economic assistance. He attributes both
actions, which he says were taken without White House clearance, to
the Department's ignorance of the China initiative and its "traditional
Indian bias." On one aspect there is full agreement: the State Depart-
ment was totally ignorant of the China initiative. Not until three months
later, when Kissinger was in Islamabad about to board a Pakistani air-
craft for Beijing was the Department's hapless leader, Secretary of State
William P. Rogers, informed of Kissinger's secret China trip—the most
important foreign policy initiative of the Nixon years. On the other
point there is also agreement: the State Department did have an "Indian
bias." This was not because, as Nixon was fond of saying, it was staffed
with soft-headed "Indian lovers" but because there were hard-headed
reasons for the priority attached to U.S. relations with India.

After the Pakistan military crackdown, an Interdepartmental Group
consisting of Harold Saunders from Kissinger's NSC staff, and represen-
tatives of State, Defense, AID, CIA, and USIA, met to reassess U.S.-
Pakistan relations and review policy options. The group's unanimous
conclusion, forwarded to the White House for the April 19 Senior Re-

¹⁰ As G. W. Choudhury, formerly a member of Yahya's cabinet, noted: "Pakistan was delighted to have this opportunity . . . it was almost a God-sent gift for Pakistan."

*Pacific Community*, 7:2, January 1976, p. 264.

¹¹ Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 704.

344 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XX, No. 4, April 1980

view Group meeting, was that the Pakistan army's action in East Pakistan had reinforced the relative priority of U.S. interest in India, which had already been apparent because of India's greater size, resources, and political, strategic, and economic potential. In contrast to the deteriorating situation in Pakistan, the group judged that India seemed to be moving into a period of new political stability and was demonstrating a renewed willingness to develop a cooperative relationship with the United States. Thus, on the basis of an objective assessment of the power equation in South Asia, there was government-wide agreement that India merited greater attention in terms of U.S. interests.

The Department of State did not move toward a new arms embargo against Pakistan because it had any emotional bias toward India; instead, in light of clear evidence that U.S.-supplied tanks and aircraft were being used against the Bengalis, and strong media and Congressional reaction to such use, the Department imposed a "hold" on military equipment for Pakistan pending a formal White House decision. But in a textbook example of a bureaucratic snafu, although the State Department thought it had stopped all military supplies to Pakistan—and had conveyed that impression to the Congress and the Indians—small amounts of arms, most of which were outside U.S. government control, were shipped after March 25; this equipment had been purchased under licenses issued before the hold action. When the *New York Times* reported in late June that Pakistani freighters had sailed, or were about to sail, from U.S. ports with arms, a credibility gap was created with Congress and with the Indian government; Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh had just returned to New Delhi from Washington with what he thought were assurances no arms were being shipped.¹²

These State Department actions on military and economic assistance were reported to the White House with the statement that they were "interim decisions which will require formal ratification," and the interim actions were discussed with Kissinger at the April 19 SRG meeting.¹³ General guidance from the President was needed, Kissinger agreed, and promised to talk to the President and Secretary Rogers to determine how to proceed. Unfortunately, the promised guidance in such cases seldom materialized in a form helpful to the bureaucracy, either then or at other times during the nine-month Indo-Pakistan crisis.

Kissinger sought to exercise close White House control throughout the crisis, but there was no real Presidential leadership through the

National Security Council (NSC) basis. There was little direction from the NSC or the White House on how Kissinger of the NSC meetings, the press and other officials, should press his wishes "as usual" worse." Similarly, little cooperation from the two NSC Group (SRG) and the White House was seen by the NSC. Many of the staff studies and recommendations to the White House were of a technical nature, helpful in providing senior officials with information for their appreciation of the broader implications of the arms programs.

## White House vs. The Bureau of the Budget

By the summer of 1971—except perhaps Cambodia and the Departments so preoccupied with the Vietnam War—he seems unaware of the funding of Kissinger and his team as "trivial issues, a few technicalities to raise to the level of a trivial one, was that of policy and of the NSC. The Department officials were concerned about the crisis short of war, unless there was a diplomatic channels to maintain greater autonomy for the government.

Earlier White House officials were not so comprehensible with the direction Kissinger trip to China via the White House. They were not aware that the U.S. policy toward South China was changing (a direction the Chinese had been warning the U.S. government of), that the new strategy that grew out of the Kissinger return from Beijing advice on such questions as the need for a U.S. base in Japan, would not be amenable to U.S. policy in the Far East, specifically, to Yahya would not be able to control the PRC.

¹² The amount of arms shipped to Pakistan after March 25, 1971 was not large, although the exact amount may never be known. Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts used the figure of $50 million on several occasions, and this figure was given prominence by the Indian press. But a General Accounting Office study, undertaken at Kennedy's request, later reported that $3.8 million in military supplies were exported between March 25 and September 30, 1971 on licenses issued before March 25; it is unlikely that arms shipped after March 25 exceeded $5 million. *New York Times*, February 5, 1972.

¹³ Informal Notes, SRG meeting, April 19, 1971.

¹⁴ The first NSC meeting was the China announcement; the second, in which Pakistan had gone to war, was the decision to deserve the label "NSC meeting" in dealing with South Asia on August 1, 1971.

¹⁵ The membership of the NSC, as defined by the original definition, was JCS, CIA, AID, and NSC. There was no need for a "crisis management" group.

TILT POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA 345

National Security Council (NSC), which met only twice, on an ad hoc basis. There was little direct communication by the President with top officials other than Kissinger.¹⁴ As Kissinger suggests in describing one of the NSC meetings, the problem was that the President's efforts to express his wishes "as usual" were "so ambiguous that they made things worse." Similarly, little coherent policy direction was conveyed by Kissinger through the two NSC committees he chaired: the Senior Review Group (SRG) and the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG).¹⁵ Many of the staff studies and option papers sent from the bureaucracy to the White House were often either ignored or considered irrelevant to the larger, unexplained, Nixon-Kissinger game plan. The essentially technical guidelines transmitted back to the bureaucracy were hardly helpful in providing senior departmental officials with a conceptual appreciation of the broader geopolitical principles, which, one now learns, were the mainsprings of White House policy.

## White House vs. The Bureaucracy

By the summer of 1971, Henry Kissinger writes, on "no other issue —except perhaps Cambodia—was the split between the White House and the Departments so profound as on the Indo-Pakistan crisis." Yet he seems unaware of the fundamental nature of the differences, dismissing them as "trivial issues, any one of which would seem too lightweight or technical to raise to the President." A central issue, and certainly not a trivial one, was that of political accommodation in East Pakistan. State Department officials were convinced it would be impossible to resolve the crisis short of war unless Yahya was encouraged through private diplomatic channels to make genuine political concessions looking toward greater autonomy for East Pakistan.

Earlier White House reluctance to press Yahya harder became more comprehensible with the dramatic July 15 announcement of the secret Kissinger trip to China via Islamabad. Hopes rose among some officials that U.S. policy toward South Asia would no longer be held hostage to the China opening (a direct link to Beijing through Paris was established the day after the announcement), but these hopes were dashed by the new strategy that grew out of Kissinger's visit to the Subcontinent. Kissinger returned from Islamabad convinced that Yahya would accept advice on such questions as relief assistance for East Pakistan, but he would not be amenable to U.S. suggestions for political accommodation; specifically, Yahya would not deal with members of the outlawed Awami

¹⁴ The first NSC meeting was held in San Clemente on July 16, the day after the China announcement; the second was in Washington on December 6, after India and Pakistan had gone to war. Both were essentially ad hoc discussions that did not deserve the label "NSC meetings." In addition, Nixon met briefly with senior officials dealing with South Asia on August 11 and December 9, 1971.

¹⁵ The membership of the SRG and WSAG was essentially the same: State, Defense, JCS, CIA, AID, and NSC staff. The SRG was converted into the WSAG when there was need for "crisis management."

346 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XX, No. 4, April 1980

League—which had won 98% of the seats in the East Pakistan elections.¹⁶

Therefore, the new Nixon-Kissinger strategy was to separate the humanitarian aspects of the policy from the political, a strategy that had a double purpose. By expending large sums of money for the refugees in India, the White House hoped to reduce the barrage of criticism it was receiving from the media and the Congress, led by Senator Edward Kennedy as Chairman of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Refugees. More to the point, it hoped that this strategy would defuse pressures upon the White House to exert influence on Yahya to make meaningful political concessions.

Almost to a person, the officials working on South Asia were convinced that the White House strategy would not work. They recognized the limited influence the U.S. could bring to bear on Yahya; the Pakistani president's flexibility was circumscribed by important West Pakistani political and military leaders who, understandably, were reluctant to countenance the break up of their country. Nonetheless, Under Secretary of State John Irwin and other senior U.S. officials believed a greater effort should be made to persuade Yahya to face up to the helplessness of his army's military position in East Pakistan, and to encourage Yahya to deal realistically with some of the more moderate elements of the Awami League. Unless there was genuine progress on the political front, the refugees would not return to East Pakistan, India would not stop supporting the guerrillas, it would be impossible to administer humanitarian relief in East Pakistan—and the prospects of war would mount.¹⁷ This belief that the United States should make a greater effort to awaken Yahya to political realities was reinforced by the Pakistan president's sudden decision to hold a secret treason trial for Mujibur Rahman.

## The First Tilt

Another difference between the White House and the bureaucracy was their midsummer assessments of Indian and Soviet intentions. In building his case in *White House Years*, Kissinger indicates that by the middle of 1971 Indian leaders had made a decision to launch an attack on East Pakistan; he believes they were also considering the destruction of West Pakistan as well, and were being encouraged by the Soviet Union, which “played a highly inflammatory role . . . acting throughout like a pyromaniac.” Although the Indians were engaged in military contingency planning, and Mrs. Gandhi was under strong political pressure to act more decisively, there is no firm evidence that India by mid-summer had made a definite decision to go to war or that the Soviets wanted war. In fact, contrary assessments were put forward by CIA

16 Informal Notes, SRG meetings, July 23, 1971 and July 31, 1971.

17 *Ibid*.

Director Richard Helms and Al the two Senior Review Group (S.R.G.)

Against a background of the Kissinger's remarks at the July vealing. They belie his later stances to tilt were taken "out of context" pursuing an evenhanded policy. Maurice Williams made the move to Yahya that he remove the anti-East Pakistan so that relief snapped back: "Why is it our adding, in the first use of the word, to tilt toward Pakistan, but even if it is the bureaucracy to tilt toward it that gave any hope of avoiding

Kissinger's treatment of August 9, 1971, illustrates his order to develop a dramatic plan to plain the White House's tilt create a significant stir in White House. Kissinger now believes that "Moscow threw a lighted match as "fatuous" a CIA intelligence agency to the Soviets may have regarded which they could exercise restive over that the treaty was not a react

It is true that a treaty been under consideration for "bomb shell" that converted it undoubtedly the surprise announcement. The treaty gave Mrs. Kissinger for a weak-kneed policy toward India with an offset to emerging Washington-Islamabad of continuing U.S. arms supply that would have to be seen as a reaction to the

18 *Ibid*.

19 Informal Notes, SRG Meetings, July 23, 1971.

20 The CIA report was leaked in the CIA. See *New York Times, Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms, 1979*, p. 206.

TILT POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA 347

Director Richard Helms and Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco at the two Senior Review Group (SRG) meetings in late July.¹⁸

Against a background of these CIA/State Department assessments, Kissinger's remarks at the July 31 SRG meeting are particularly revealing. They belie his later statement that his celebrated instructions to tilt were taken "out of context," and that the White House had been pursuing an evenhanded policy. When Deputy AID Administrator Maurice Williams made the modest suggestion that the U.S. recommend to Yahya that he remove the army from civilian-type administration in East Pakistan so that relief assistance could go forward, Kissinger snapped back: "Why is it our business how they govern themselves?," adding, in the first use of the word "tilt," that "the President always says to tilt toward Pakistan, but every proposal I get is in the opposite direction. Sometimes I think I am in a nut house."¹⁹ In short, after the China announcement had presumably lessened U.S. obligations toward Yahya, and before the Indo-Soviet Treaty was signed, and at a time when both State and CIA judged war not imminent, Henry Kissinger was exhorting the bureaucracy to tilt toward Pakistan and discouraging any serious efforts to move Yahya toward political accommodation—the only route that gave any hope of avoiding war.

Kissinger's treatment of the Soviet-Indian Friendship Treaty of August 9, 1971, illustrates his technique of reinterpreting history in order to develop a dramatic geopolitical scenario against which to explain the White House's tilt policy. At the time, the treaty did not create a significant stir in Washington, either inside or outside the White House. Kissinger now describes it as a "bomb shell," charging that "Moscow threw a lighted match into the powder keg." He dismisses as "fatuous" a CIA intelligence report at the time that suggested that the Soviets may have regarded the treaty as an instrument through which they could exercise restraint over the Indians; he also contends that the treaty was not a reaction to American policy.²⁰

It is true that a treaty between the Soviet Union and India had been under consideration for more than a year, but if there was any "bomb shell" that converted discussions into a formal text, it was undoubtedly the surprise announcement of Nixon's forthcoming visit to Beijing. The treaty gave Mrs. Gandhi, who was being attacked at home for a weak-kneed policy toward Pakistan, a diplomatic triumph by providing India with an offset to what many Indians perceived to be an emerging Washington-Islamabad-Beijing axis. Against the background of continuing U.S. arms supply to Pakistan, however small, and evidence that Islamabad was seeking a Chinese commitment to intervene

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ Informal Notes, SRG Meeting, July 31, 1971.

²⁰ The CIA report was leaked to the press, causing considerable consternation in the CIA. See *New York Times*, August 15, 1971 and Thomas Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 206.

348 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XX, No. 4, April 1980

militarily should India attack, the treaty provided the Gandhi govern-
ment the reassurance it needed—a warning to Beijing that any Chinese
military moves against India might lead to a Soviet response. Further-
more, the limited increase in Soviet arms that followed the signing
strengthened India's military position at a time when Kissinger had
made it clear to the Indian government that, unlike 1962, India would
not receive support from Washington in case of Chinese intervention.

The treaty did not mean unequivocal Soviet support for India nor
a cessation of Moscow's efforts to encourage a political settlement. The
Soviets continued to provide economic assistance to Pakistan, referred to
"East Pakistan" rather than "Bangladesh," and called for a solution
agreeable to "the entire people of Pakistan." To the displeasure of the
Indian government, these general themes were reiterated by the Soviets
in an exchange of top-level visits between New Delhi and Moscow dur-
ing September and October as Moscow continued to counsel against use
of force. Continued Soviet military supply to India was not inconsistent
with this objective; in the Soviets' eyes, it enhanced India's sense of
security—psychologically as well as militarily—and strengthened Mos-
cow's ability to influence New Delhi.²¹

The Drift Toward War

Although Nixon in August told a rump NSC meeting in San
Clemente that there could be no war between India and Pakistan, by
early fall it was clear that the prospects of war were increasing. Kissin-
ger's thesis is that while U.S. diplomacy worked actively during this
period to urge restraint on all parties, and persuaded Yahya to make
significant political concessions, Mrs. Gandhi, despite professions of
peace, had already made a decision to go to war to establish Indian
supremacy on the Subcontinent.

When she came to Washington on November 4-5 for "the two
most unfortunate meetings Nixon had with any foreign leader," Mrs.
Gandhi was told by the President what the United States had accom-
plished "through persuasion" with Yahya, including appointment of a
civilian governor for East Pakistan, proclamation of an amnesty, the
promise not to execute Mujib, and Yahya's willingness to talk to some
Bengali leaders. Mrs. Gandhi and her senior advisers also were assured
that Yahya had a clear timetable for a political solution: civilian gov-
ernment would be established in Pakistan by March, with independence
shortly thereafter.²² But according to Kissinger, Mrs. Gandhi listened

to this presentation with
cessions "aggravated" he
would lead to a favorab
he says, "not because she
feared our success."

This is an extraor
Foreign Policy Report
staff, candidly admitted
the steps it proposed w
such a negotiation would
Revisionist, now asserts
success" drove Mrs. Gan-
any negotiations—which
succeeded, even if the
picture. Earlier contact
cutta and some Bengali
trolling elements within
backed off from these c
permanent Bangladesh as
aged contacts with the A
have settled for less than
any negotiations were
they never occurred.

Similarly, it is high
evolution would have
that the civilian govern-
 included any Awami L
man. Since the Awami
pect would have been
of the political aspirati
of any concession by Ya
anticipation of early a
expressed to the press i
recognized," Kissinger
quired to bring about
the Indian capacity to
gees."²⁴

Nixon believes that
while they were talking
and advisers were plan-

²¹ On the Indo-Soviet treaty, see William J. Barnds, "Moscow and South Asia, Problems of Communism, Vol. 21, May-June 1972, pp. 24-25; also Robert Jackson, South Asia Crisis: India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 72-73; and pp. 84-87.

²² In his book, Kissinger gives the impression that the President did most of the talking in "one of Nixon's better presentations." Mrs. Gandhi reports otherwise: "... it was not so much Mr. Nixon talking as Mr. Kissinger, because Mr. Nixon

would talk a few minutes
then on . . . I would talk
can Jonathan Power of the In
Post, December 30, 1979.

²³ U.S. Foreign Policy
port by Richard Nixon to

²⁴ Congressional Rec

TILT POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA 349

to this presentation with "aloof indifference." Yahya's mounting concessions "aggravated" her problem because of the "near certainty" they would lead to a favorable outcome. "Mrs. Gandhi was going to war," he says, "not because she was convinced of our failure, but because she feared our success."

This is an extraordinary claim. The President's February 1972 Foreign Policy Report to the Congress, written by Kissinger and his staff, candidly admitted that the "United States cannot be certain that the steps it proposed would have brought about a negotiation, or that such a negotiation would have produced a settlement."²³ Kissinger, the Revisionist, now asserts emphatically that the "near certainty" of "our success" drove Mrs. Gandhi to war. In fact, it is most improbable that any negotiations—which had not even begun at the time—would have succeeded, even if the imprisoned Mujib had been brought into the picture. Earlier contacts between the U.S. Consulate General in Calcutta and some Bengali representatives had proved abortive; the controlling elements within the Bangladesh government-in-exile apparently backed off from these discussions because they did not have an independent Bangladesh as their objective, and because the Indians discouraged contacts with the Americans. Since Mujib by late 1971 would not have settled for less than independence, a demand Yahya could not meet, any negotiations were doomed to failure—which helps explain why they never occurred.

Similarly, it is highly unlikely that Yahya's timetable for political evolution would have succeeded. There was, first of all, no assurance that the civilian government he planned for late December would have included any Awami Leaguers who reflected the views of Mujibur Rahman. Since the Awami League had been banned, the most likely prospect would have been some type of puppet representation, unreflective of the political aspirations of the Bengalis. Given the unlikely prospect of any concession by Yahya on this point, there is no basis for Kissinger's anticipation of early autonomy for East Pakistan. The judgment he expressed to the press in December 1971 was closer to reality: "The U.S. recognized," Kissinger said in a prepared statement, "that the time required to bring about a political evolution . . . might be longer than the Indian capacity to withstand the pressures generated by the refugees."²⁴

Nixon believes that Mrs. Gandhi purposely deceived him and that while they were talking in the White House she knew that her generals and advisers were planning to intervene in East Pakistan and were con-

would talk a 'few minutes and would then say, 'Isn't that right, Henry?' and from then on . . . I would talk with Henry rather than Nixon." Gandhi interview with Jonathan Power of the *International Herald Tribune*, reprinted in the *Washington Post*, December 30, 1979.

²³ U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: The Emerging Structure of Power, A Report by Richard Nixon to the Congress, February 9, 1972, p. 145.

²⁴ *Congressional Record*, December 9, 1971, p. S21015.

350 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XX, No. 4, April 1980

sidering contingency plans for the West.²⁵ On her part, Mrs. Gandhi returned to New Delhi unconvinced that there was any prospect for a viable political settlement. By that time, a combination of factors combined to make the military option increasingly attractive to India: unrelieved pressure of the refugees, a perceived lack of progress toward political accommodation, assurances derived from the Indo-Soviet Treaty, and the probability that the Chinese would not intervene.

Most detached accounts of the Indo-Pakistan conflict set December 3 as the date the war formally began. On that day, Pakistani aircraft launched a surprise attack on eight Indian airfields in northern and western India, and Pakistani army units made limited strikes across the West Pakistan-Indian border. India retaliated with an all-out invasion of East Pakistan, with air strikes in the west, and with an essentially holding action on the ground in the west.

In Kissinger's book, the war begins on November 22 when Washington received reports that regular Indian army units had crossed into East Pakistan in support of the Mukti Bahini guerrilla forces. Despite denials, Indian forces did make cross-border forays—ostensibly to quell the shelling of Indian territory from East Pakistan, but undoubtedly also to tighten the screws on the Pakistan army. Some troops remained in East Pakistan until December 3.²⁶ However, the situation in late November was ambiguous at best, as Kissinger acknowledges in explaining that he successfully dissuaded Nixon from terminating U.S. aid to India until the provocation "was unambiguous and the facts uncontestable."

Between November 23 and December 3, despite bureaucratic clashes between the White House and the State Department, the Nixon administration undertook a number of even-handed moves in a final effort to prevent hostilities. Nixon sent messages urging restraint to India, the Soviet Union, and Pakistan, and the Chinese were kept informed of these actions by Kissinger, who held his first secret meeting in New York with Huang Hua, the new PRC Permanent Representative to the United Nations. But these actions were of no avail. Although Nixon's message to Yahya tried to dissuade him from attacking India in the west to relieve the pressures in the east, the Pakistani President, in a desperate, suicidal move, ordered military attacks against western India that were doomed to failure. These actions gave India the *causus belli* it needed to move openly against East Pakistan.

## A CIA Report That Counted

Shortly after war broke out on December 3, rapid Indian military successes in East Pakistan rekindled White House suspicions that this

might be only the first step in Pakistan and convert it into suspicions were unclear. They were unclear earlier conversations with India's acceptance of the cessions in China, and from May 1971 in November about the fragility of the British administration. Whatever the origin, the 

On the basis of information Prime Minister Indira Gandhi told a December 8 WSAG cease-fire, she intends to strike Kashmir. It is reported that Gandhi intends to attempt capabilities."²⁸ Kissinger has meant that Mrs. Gandhi plans to use it as to be "dismembered."

Two points should be port's authenticity, it is quite accurately reflected in the Indian istan phase of the fighting, alone in the U.S. government.

Entirely separate from of bitter dispute between and had been fought over all of the area, including claimed "Indian-occupied part of Indian Kashmir" in the restive to "straighten out the logical military and political hoped to dislodge the Indian mir. Similarly, the Indian

²⁵ Richard Nixon, RN: *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), pp. 525-526.

²⁶ Lachhman Singh, *Indian Sword Strikes in East Pakistan* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979), pp. 66-81.

²⁷ Powers, *The Man Who long standing controversy that the source of the report in August that the Soviets viewed the India.) Indira Gandhi injected the CIA. New York Times*, N.Y.

²⁸ Nicholas and Oldenburg.

²⁹ *Ibid.* For example, in Sisco expressed doubts that India, state.”

TILT POLICY IN SOUTH ASIA 351

might be only the first step in India's grand design to dismember West Pakistan and convert it into a "vassal state." The origins of these suspicions were unclear. They probably stem from Nixon and Kissinger's earlier conversations with Pakistani leaders, who had always questioned India's acceptance of the creation of Pakistan, from Kissinger's discussions in China, and from Mrs. Gandhi's remarks at the White House in November about the fragility and artificiality of the Pakistan state. Whatever the origin, the "dismemberment" thesis became an idée fixe for both Nixon and Kissinger. It helps explain their reflex reaction to a CIA Intelligence Report, received in Washington a few days after the fighting began, which Nixon considered "one of the few really timely pieces of intelligence the CIA had ever given him."²⁷

On the basis of information purportedly obtained from within Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's cabinet, CIA Director Richard Helms told a December 8 WSAG meeting that "before heeding a UN call for cease-fire, she intends to straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir. It is reported that prior to terminating present hostilities, Mrs. Gandhi intends to attempt to eliminate Pakistan's armor and air force capabilities."²⁸ Kissinger interpreted the report ominously; to him it meant that Mrs. Gandhi planned to reduce West Pakistan to impotence; it was to be "dismembered and rendered defenseless."

Two points should be made: first, regardless of the intelligence report's authenticity, it is quite possible that the substance of the report accurately reflected Indian contingency planning for a post-East Pakistan phase of the fighting; second, Nixon and Kissinger were virtually alone in the U.S. government in interpreting the report as they did.²⁹

Entirely separate from West Pakistan, Kashmir had been the object of bitter dispute between India and Pakistan since their independence and had been fought over in two wars—in 1948 and 1965. India claimed all of the area, including the Pakistan-held "Azad Kashmir"; Pakistan claimed "Indian-occupied Kashmir." Pakistani military forces had advanced across the Kashmir cease-fire line on December 3 and occupied parts of Indian Kashmir in the Chhamb region. Thus an Indian objective to "straighten out the southern border of Azad Kashmir" was a logical military and political goal, just as the Pakistanis undoubtedly hoped to dislodge the Indians from areas they occupied in Azad Kashmir. Similarly, the Indian military objective of trying to destroy Pak-

27 Powers, *The Man Who Kept the Secrets*, p. 206. The Powers book revived the long standing controversy that has surrounded this CIA report. (The source was also the source of the report in August—which Kissinger labeled as "fatuous"—that said that the Soviets viewed the Indo-Soviet treaty as an instrument of restraint on India.) Indira Gandhi injected the report into the last Indian election campaign, alleging that some of her political opponents might have provided information to the CIA. *New York Times*, November 20 and 21, 1979.

28 Nicholas and Oldenburg, *Bangladesh: The Birth of a Nation*, p. 128.

29 *Ibid*. For example, in the December 8 WSAG meeting, Assistant Secretary Sisco expressed doubts that India planned to convert West Pakistan into a "client state."

352 ASIAN SURVEY, Vol. XX, No. 4, April 1980

istani aircraft and armor capabilities (Kissinger incorrectly substitutes "army" for armor) was not illogical, because planes and tanks had spearheaded the Pakistan attack on December 3.

There is no evidence for Kissinger's claim that India had a definite war aim to dismember West Pakistan. The Indian government shifted from support for a united Pakistan before the civil war to support for an independent Bangladesh because it judged that the uncertainties about the political orientation of a new nation on its flank would be offset by the restoration of stability in Eastern India through the return of the refugees. In the process, India could attain unquestioned supremacy in the Subcontinent. Having achieved these objectives, there would be no clear Indian interest in dismembering West Pakistan. The breakup of West Pakistan into four separate states would pose threats to the integrity of the Indian union, already facing fissiparous tendencies.

The White House nonetheless persisted in its conviction that India sought the destruction of West Pakistan, despite bilateral assurances to the contrary from Indian Ambassador L. K. Jha and Foreign Minister Swaran Singh, and a public statement by Mrs. Gandhi in New Delhi on December 12 denying any territorial ambitions in West Pakistan. Aside from the questions of West Pakistan, Kissinger emphasizes that Indian officials would not deny that India had aspirations in Kashmir. But the reasons should have been obvious. Because India had always claimed all of Kashmir as Indian territory, just as the Pakistanis made the reverse claim, no Indian official would be likely to give such assurances—nor would any Pakistani. He fails to mention that the State Department did not reply to Ambassador Jha's request for assurances that Pakistan would vacate those areas of Indian Kashmir its forces had occupied.⁸⁰

## Pakistan As An "Ally"

The CIA report also caused Kissinger to try to promote a close U.S. alliance relationship with Pakistan suggesting that, if India attacked West Pakistan, the United States was committed by prior agreements to come to its defense. But he misunderstands the evolution—and the devolution—of the U.S.-Pakistan alliance relationship and its inapPLICABILITY to the situation in 1971.

Describing the establishment of the U.S.-Pakistan military supply relationship in the 1950s, and Pakistan's decision to join CENTO and SEATO, he makes the surprising judgment that there "was no recognition that most Pakistanis considered their real security threat to be India," and that India "viewed our arming of Pakistan as a challenge undermining our attempt to nurture its favor." Anyone who dealt with South Asia during the 1950s clearly recognized that there was a dual perception, tacitly accepted by both sides: the U.S. supplied Pakistan

⁸⁰ L. K. Jha, "Kissinger and I," *India Today*, November 1-15, 1979, p. 55. See also Jha's interview in *The Hindustan Times*, November 26, 1979.

with military equipment as monolithic Sino-Soviet threat, this anti-Communist theme, security shield against India, was when Pakistan moved to the U.S. supported India against cut off military supply to both

A limited arms supply report that war, but by 1971 Pakistan port it in 1965—was playing Kissinger is wrong in suggesting Agreement committed the United States of an Indo-Pakistan war (during come into force). The language is carefully drafted so that there any such obligation; rather, "as is envisaged" in the Middle East directed against attacks by中国人民 accept Kissinger's view, who aggressor in late 1971? And what commitment, have been supplied

In keeping with his strategy, Pakistan had another reason for promoting to demonstrate to Beijing the time of need. During his pre-versations in Beijing in July, that the Chinese placed a pre-try's actions.⁸² Consequently, strongly influenced by a sense of being viewed through the Chinese seemed to have overemphasized Subcontinent on the prospect of Washington-Beijing relationship. Kissinger said that he did not have agreement with the United States on a successful visit," a judgment for the Nixon trip had Vietnam, nor UN issues on Chinese had a strong independence as an offset to the Soviet

⁸¹ For the text, see *Congressional Record*,

⁸² On the importance of assuming the interview with Winston Churchill on his trips to Beijing. L. K. Jha.

⁸³ *Congressional Record*, December 7, 1973, pp. 704, 710.