-1-

December 22, 1989

N H K

JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

BEGINNING OF INTERVIEW WITH DR. HENRY KISSINGER

QUESTION:

Happy New Year, Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Happy New Year to you and to all my Japanese
friends.

QUESTION:

Thank you. Last year you made a very good
prediction by score, I think, 98 or 97 [and a A].
Only the minus is prediction on evaluation or
devaluation of the dollar. About Soviet you said
if Gorbachev is not thrown away end of the year, I
mean, end of 1989, something happen and Bush might
negotiate.

He made good meeting with him at the Malta.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

At Malta, yes.

QUESTION:

And on China, you said it depend on Deng Xiaoping.

Herman S. Jaffe

Reporting & Transcribing Services, Inc.

300 West 55th Street, New York, NY 10019

(lc)

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DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

### QUESTION, CONT'D:

Now I like to start with Soviet this year again.
How far Gorbachev like to go? What is planning?
He like to change Soviet into capitalistic free
market society?

### DR. KISSINGER (A):

No, I - I'm sure he does not want to change it
into a capitalist society. He seems to think that
he can keep it as a Communist society on the
political side, and a market-oriented society on
the economic side. And I doubt that that is
possible.

### QUESTION:

Is that similar as social democratic society like
Japanese Socialist Democratic Party or German
Socialist Democratic Party [insist]? It's a
different form?

### DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, I don't think that Gorbachev has yet made
the decision. That the Communist Party should
give up what they call its leading role. In all
Communist systems--in all truly Communist systems,
of which there are fewer and fewer left, it is

Herman S. Jaffe

-3-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

insisted that the Communist Party is--has the
leading role. And that it's not the same as any
other party. I believe that in the Soviet Union
still they believe in the primacy, or at least
Gorbachev believes in the primacy of the Communist
Party.

And he has repeatedly said that he's not ready for
a pluralistic democracy. On the other hand, I
think the forces he has set in motion are going to
push it in the direction of a multi-party system.
And Sakharov, before he died, and many of
Sakharov's friends are insisting on removal of the
so-called Article VI of the Constitution which
asserts that the Communist Party is the dominant
element.

Gorbachev has said in principle that this is
something he might consider, but the time is not
yet appropriate. So that, I think, will be a big
issue in the Soviet Union [INAUDIBLE OVER
INTERVIEWER]

Herman S. Jaffe

-4-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

QUESTION:

Probably you realized that, but on 26 November 1989 Gorbachev wrote an article in Pravda and he said capitalistic and Communistic country have to be integrated. Its mean only economic sphere, not politically.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well up to now it has meant only in the economic sphere, but even in the economic sphere, Prime Minister Ishkov has emphasized that there would be no private property. That there would not be a capitalist credit system. This may not last, but they're a long way from a truly capitalist system.

And I think they have a big crisis ahead of them when they attempt price reform, when they attempt to have a western style economic system.

QUESTION:

And some rumor exist among criminologist in Washington. And next Communist Party the President, mean Gorbachev, is going to change the name of the Communist Party of Soviet and probably rename as Hungarian Communist Party.

Herman S. Jaffe

-5-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

### QUESTION, CONT'D:

How do you think about? Name is not important or
- but -

### DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think - I think there've been so many changes in
the last year that nobody expected, including
Gorbachev. I do not believe that he expected the
changes in Eastern Europe that happened. In my
view he thought that by liberalizing Eastern
Europe he could preserve the dominance of the
Communist Party at less cost.

It has not turned out that the Communist Party was
not viable in Eastern Europe. And in Eastern
Europe the Communist parties are changing their
name because they know they have to stand
elections, and that they could not have any chance
under the name of Communist Party, so they are
changing it to Social Democratic Party or
something like that. Depending on the country.

Now in the Soviet Union--they have not yet
accepted the principle of genuinely free election.

Herman S. Jaffe

-6-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

I would be surprised if they changed the name of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

QUESTION:

I see. Now about survivability of Mr. Gorbachev.
How do you think? He survive 1990?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think--first of all, let me say I have the
highest respect for Mr. Gorbachev. He has shown
great courage in analyzing the problems of his
society and great courage in attempting to remove
the obstacles to growth. He has so far been less
successful in achieving positive objectives. He's
been better at removing underbrush.

Will he survive 1990? I think his position will
get weaker during 1990. He will be blamed,
rightly or wrongly, in the Soviet Union for a
decline in its international position. He will be
attacked by the nationalities, even though he has
created the conditions for their liberalization.

And it often happens that the people who start

Herman S. Jaffe

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DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

revolutions are consumed by what they themselves
have started. Whether he will survive 1990 or not
depends almost on accident. But I think his
position will get weaker.

QUESTION:

But his rivalry--his enemy, mean political enemy,
Legachev or Chedakov--everybody almost in
disgrace.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

No, no. I don't think the alternative to, to
Gorbachev is what we--it's the Brezhnev wing of
the Communist Party. I think the likelihood, if
Brezhnev--if Gorvachev is replaced--will be--I
mean, there are four possibilities. That he
succeeds. That he's replaced by a Brezhnev
person. That he pursues perestroika but abolishes
glasnost. Or that he's replaced by somebody who
pursues perestroika and abolishes glasnost.
That he succeeds in 1990 I consider out of the
question.

QUESTION:

I see.

Herman S. Jaffe

-8-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER (A):

That he's replaced by a Brezhnev person I also consider out of the question. So the real ques-- problem is, will they try to pursue liberalization and refo--and economic restructuring simultaneously? My suspicion is, not my preference, but my suspicion is that they will find that it is not possible.

Tha't the more concessions they make in the field of decentralization the more the nationality question will arise, the more they will be caught between reformers for whom they move too slow, and conservatives for whom they move too fast.

QUESTION:

I see.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

So I think we will see a tightening of discipline in 1990, probably by Gorbachev, but if not by Gorbachev, he'll be not replaced by a Legachev, but by some figure--maybe the Prime Minister Rizhkov, who is in favor of reform, but also in favor of more discipline.

Herman S. Jaffe

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DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

QUESTION:

Now still Soviet and Gorbachev many problems. I
hope more elaborate on that. The first politics
and economy and religion or nationalistic
movement. First, economy. Economy's getting
worse, but economy was bad before even he took his
office. It mean still he is blamed for that?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

No, with any new leader you can blame things on
your predecessor for only so long. The economy
was, was structurally unsound when he took it
over. But in--because they had a command economy
there was a minimum of consumer goods. And there
was a certain level of equality in the
distribution of consumer goods.

It was not good, but it was predictable and it was
familiar. Now what he has attempted to do is to
increase the production of consumer goods without,
however, establishing a good distribution system.
He's tried to increase investment, but he didn't
increase savings. He's reduced his tax revenues,
by the prohibition on the sale of alcohol or the

Herman S. Jaffe

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DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

reduction of the sale of alcohol. So the result
has been that they've had to print money. And
unlike Western countries, when they print money
there are no bonds with which they can be
absorbed, so the entire money goes into push up
prices. So now they have inflation. They have--
the distribution system doesn't make it possible
to increase the supply of consumer goods.

They've given a certain amount of freedom to the
managers. But this makes the situation worse
because now managers make unwise decisions. And
there's no market. And they're in the unfortunate
position right now that they're caught between the
worst aspects of a planned system and the
beginning of a market system without having
either.

QUESTION:

Best distribution system -

[BOTH SPEAK AT ONCE]

DR. KISSINGER (A):

And I think by now he will get blamed.

Herman S. Jaffe

(c) 1993

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DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

QUESTION:

Best distribution system in Soviet might be free
market system, do you think?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Over a period of five years. I think a greater
emphasis on the market would be, would be best.
But you have a country here in which road
transportation is very poor. I was told the other
day by a leading Soviet economist, by the head of
a Soviet institute, that they have lost 20,000
freight cars that they can't find because their
strikes and their -

So the market alone is not going to cure the
distribution system. And the third problem is the
absense of an entrepreneurial tradition. The
managers who are now managing these affairs are
political people. And they have to replace them.
So they have a very difficult problem, and one has
to have sympathy with them.

I think it will take many years before they can
really get to a market system. The other day a

Herman S. Jaffe

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DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

American leading eco--American economist said to me that he had read thousands of article on a market economy. And he had written many of them himself. But he said he had never seen an article that describes how you go from central planning to market. So there's no model for the Soviets to follow, and it's a tough problem.

QUESTION:

I see. I see.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

And I think that economic difficulties will get worse [next year].

QUESTION:

And don't you think if Gorbachev has a free market system and food and everyday necessity is very, very limited. Kind of [ ? ] or the [bloodshed] happenb to get food. If he has a free market at this time.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

No, no. Whatever he does, he's going to have shortages. Because if he has a centrally planned distribution system there will be an enormous

Herman S. Jaffe

-13-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:
amount of corruption. So he has no good choices.

QUESTION: I
I see.

DR. KISSINGER (A):
And there is a danger that there will be strikes and riots during the next year.

QUESTION:
So actually what he can do about economy if he continue perestroika in economy mean, mean inflation and lack of the money for the government with the tax. And he have to print money to keep the economy and the country going -

DR. KISSINGER (A):
I think he has a tough problem. And I don't think he can solve it within the next--within one year. And I also don't think that outside help can make a decisive difference. We--we--all of us on the outside can alleviate some of its problems. And maybe in two or three years it will get better. But I think he will have a very difficult -

QUESTION:
So probably -

-14-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER (A):

- year.

QUESTION:

- he need wisdom and information and [ ? ]
from the west to start the economy.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, the first thing--he needs a strategy to
which he can stick for an extended period of time.
And I suppose that the Western nations and the
industrial democracies, including Japan, can be
most helpful in helping him define an economic
strategy by making experts available and maybe
even managers of large-scale industrial
enterprises.

Assuming we can come to political understanding,
in which we feel we live in a secure world and are
helping a cooperative country.

QUESTION:

We heard Mr. Greenspan, chairman of Federal
Reserve Board, and other member of the Federal
Reserve Board went to Soviet and advise them to
have gold standard ruble system is better for

Herman S. Jaffe

-15-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

QUESTION, CONT'D:

their economy to improve. How you think about it?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, I don't know what Mr. Greenspan recommended precisely. I have very high regard for Mr. Greenspan. I think what he wants to establish is a limitation on the increase of money supply. And he also probably believes that the Soviet Union should move towards the convertability of the ruble in order to be able to trade internationally and also to be forced to be competitive.

Whether you do that by the gold standard or some other way is a technical question that I can't answer very well.

[ASIDES]

QUESTION:

And the politics. All political system of the Soviet is improved now after the four years of Gorbachev. Gorbachev is elected as a former President of U.S.S.R. and he is [supreme] over the party politics, so he is stable, is not?

Herman S. Jaffe

-16-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER (A):

No.

QUESTION:

No.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think it's - well, he has attempted to do what the Chinese did not do. He has tried to separate the government from the party. And he has tried to get himself a position that is somewhat independent -

QUESTION:

And he did.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

- of the politburo. And that he has done. On the other hand, that elected party to which the President is responsible, the Supreme Soviet...is a strange party. Because on the one hand, 80% of it, one way or the other, is dominated by the Communist Party. But on the other hand, the Communist Party is losing discipline.

So for example, the Lithuanian Communist Party has declared itself independent. And all over the

Herman S. Jaffe

-17-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

Soviet Union the local party chiefs are playing a
much more autonomous role. So the result is that
he cannot be totally sure of the support of the
Supreme Soviet. The other day, over a third of
the delegates in the Supreme Soviet voted against
him on the issue of the dominance of the Communist
Party. Which is after all a major issue.

So in terms of the legal structure, Gorbachev has
more authority -

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

- than anybody since Stalin. Can he exercise it?
That is the question that he has to solve.

QUESTION:

But his time set for five years and his powers are
- are authorized by Constitution.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

It is a big step forward in terms of
Constitutional practice to have a Soviet leader
who has a legal Constitutional framework. He's

Herman S. Jaffe

-18-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

set for five years and I don't think even the
Supreme Soviet can remove him. The party, of
course, can remove him as General Secretary of the
Party. But the--how that would actually work in
practice if he were removed as General Secretary
of the Party, whether he could stay as President
or whether he could stay as President if the
Supreme Soviet voted against him, even though the
Constitution says he can, that remains to be seen.
But he--this is one of the big changes he has
made.

QUESTION:

I see.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

[INAUDIBLE]

QUESTION:

And the military is supporting him because the
military like to have organization of weapon and a
nuclear forces by -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

My impression is that at this point the military
and the KGB must be supporting him. Because

Herman S. Jaffe

(lc)

-19-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

otherwise the changes in Eastern Europe could not
have taken place.

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

And I can understand that they would support him,
because the KGB has foreign intelligence reports
and they know what the world is like. And the
military have to compete in the real world.

Whether a point will be reached where the military
and maybe even the KGB think that yes, we had to
make concessions, but no, we didn't have to lose
all of Eastern Europe --

And whether they then think he has gone too far or
that he misled them--this I can't judge.

QUESTION:

At this time Soviet military people like to have
more money in modernizing of a nuclear weapon
system and technology and high technology things
rather than a conventional forces buildup, or more
tanks?

Herman S. Jaffe

-20-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think that the Soviet Union appears to have decided. I judge this from their performance in Europe, that to maintain huge conventional forces is too expensive. Secondly, that it does not give them a decisive competitive advantage. Therefore, I have the impression that they're relying on the fact that they have, on the Eurasian continent, in effect, a nuclear monopoly.

And that they can keep things from happening that threaten their security in Eurasia as long as they maintain this huge nuclear superiority over all countries in Eurasia, and that the United States will not initiate nuclear war for matters that affect Eurasia. I think that seems to be their strategy.

So if they have scarce resources they will probably allocate them to high technology and not to manpower.

QUESTION:

This is [ ? ] your territory, but how--how

Herman S. Jaffe

-21-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

QUESTION, CONT'D:

going to be a nuclear strategy of both countries at this time? Soviet and United State. Both of you are going back to the country, the fortress America, fortress Soviet. Increase, modernizing nuclear weapon system and forgetting about conventional forces.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

When you have reductions then there's always a great temptation to cut personnel. And right now in the United States you have an inconsistency between what strategic thinkers are doing and thinking and what military planners are doing. The strategic thinkers for 10, 15 years have been arguing that there should be greater emphasis on conventional forces, and that nuclear weapons cannot be, or should not be relied upon.

And to some extent, this was the military strategy of the United States until fairly recently. Now it seems to me highly likely that many of our forces in Europe will be withdrawn. I think there will be a thinning out in Asia as well. So that

Herman S. Jaffe

(cc)

-22-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

there will be less reliance on conventional forces
and therefore one would think there would have to
be more reliance on nuclear forces or on a kind of
conventional forces or weapons whose
characteristics are very similar to nuclear
weapons and it's very high explosive power.

On the part of the Soviet Union, this is not yet
so self-evident. But I believe that it will
become apparent during the course of 1990 that the
Soviet Union is in military retreat from Eastern
Europe. I do not believe they can maintain their
deployments in the Warsaw Pact at the present
levels, even without an arms control agreement.

One, for economic reasons, and second, because
once you have democratic governments in place in
all these countries, they will not want Soviet
troops there. And so I think there is a reversion
to nuclear strategy.

QUESTION:

So in coming few years the transition and kind of

Herman S. Jaffe

(LC)

-23-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

QUESTION, CONT'D:

the confusion of the theory of nuclear strategy
and whole military portion -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, I think starting -

QUESTION:

- of this country -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

- in 1990 there will have to be a reconsideration
of the military strategy. Certainly of the United
States. And I would be astonished if there were
not one of the Soviet Union as well. In fact, it
must be going on now or they wouldn't put
themselves in a position in which they are
jeopardizing their conventional power base in
Eastern Europe.

QUESTION:

What kind of prosket--prospect do you have?
Expenditure is going to be squeezed and whole
number of the troops and nuclear missile going to
be reduced?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, I think it is almost certain, in my view,

Herman S. Jaffe

-24-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

that there will be a strategic arms reduction
agreement when President Gorbachev visits the
United States in June. That reduces the strategic
forces of the United States and the Soviet Union
to something like seven thousand warheads on each
side, which is about half of what it is now.

On the other hand, it's about where it was 10
years ago. And when I was in government, that was
about the number of warheads that existed. And I
can tell you I didn't feel all that secure. So
yes, it will be a somewhat important agreement,
but not decisive. In fact, I believe that one of
the attributes of the changes of 1989 is that arms
control has become a less important subject.

The pressures of the international environment are
in any event in the direction of reductions. With
or without a negotiation.

QUESTION:

It is quite a new era, not only to a Soviet--even
to the Washington and your government. Quite a

Herman S. Jaffe

-25-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

QUESTION, CONT'D:

different atmosphere.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

[OVER INTERVIEWER] - Tokyo.

QUESTION:

So Tokyo is nowhere have been in the peaceful atmosphere. Not pay much attention to nuclear strategy -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

But I think the international environment will be changing radically in 1990. And throughout the 1990s we will--this is one of the most revolutionary periods--certainly the most revolutionary period since the immediate end of, of the Second World War.

QUESTION:

But your politician pay utmost interest to nuclear strategy and military balance of power so -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think our politicians--I think one of the problems with nuclear strategy is that the number of people who have studied it is shrinking. The number of people who understand it is shrinking

Herman S. Jaffe

-26-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

even more. So our politicians understand the budgetary side of it and they would like to reduce our expenditures and get our deficit under control and use reductions in military forces as a means of balance of getting our deficit under control. But the fine points of nuclear strategy are not understood by, say 90% of our politicians.

There are, of course, distinguished people like Senator Nunn or Congressman Aspen who understand it very well. And they are Chairmen of the Armed Services Committee of the Senate and the House. So that is of some importance.

QUESTION:

I see. Now the world change and next I like to ask you about change of Europe. East Europe, West Europe and Germany. I read your article in the Washington post. You said the unification of East/West Germany is inevitable -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Yes.

Herman S. Jaffe

-27-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

QUESTION:

And you have to find a new way of the security in
Europe. And you propose new system.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Yes.

QUESTION:

Can you elaborate on that?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think this: I think that if we like it or not,
East and West Germany are now going to be unified.
They're going to be unified for a number of
reasons. First, there are no borders inside
Germany anymore. East Germans are free to travel
to West Germany and West Germans are free to
travel to East Germany.

Therefore, if economic conditions are not rapidly
improved in East Germany, the major a large part of
the population will move to West Germany. Because
the social legislation is much better in West
Germany and the job opportunities are much better
in West Germany. In order to equalize conditions
they have to have comparable economic policies.

Herman S. Jaffe

-28-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

They can't conduct totally separate economic policies. And since West Germany will be subsidizing East Germany to a considerable extent, that will bring them to a unification.

Secondly, next year there are two elections in Germany. In May in East Germany, in December in West Germany. The West German political parties have decided already that they would campaign actively in East Germany in order to improve their situation in West Germany or their relative situation.

When you have the same parties campaigning in both parts of the country, how can you keep them from coming closer and closer together? And we have seen in the recent visit of some weeks ago of Chancellor Kohl to East Germany what the public reception was. So I think at a minimum, matters are going to move towards a confederation of the two German states. Over, over a, a two-year period. Now then -

Herman S. Jaffe

-1-

December 22, 1989

NHK

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 2/SIDE B

QUESTION:

How many years?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Two to three years.

QUESTION:

Two, three years.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

In my view. Now, the problem is--how about Soviet security? Now then, some people that argue that NATO must be maintained as it is, the Warsaw Pact must be maintained as it is and that the two pacts of either be both dissolved or that they should continue.

I think it's totally unrealistic. I think NATO is a voluntary association of states. The Warsaw Pact always was based on Soviet pre-eminence. And once you have democratic government in Eastern Europe the philosophical basis of the Warsaw Pact

Herman S. Jaffe

-2-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 2/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

will have eroded. And none of these governments
will want to be part of the Warsaw Pact. Now
whether they stay in the Warsaw Pact or not is not
a matter of -

QUESTION:

So in reality, it's difficult for German to
deunify because Soviet has also pact--pact treaty
and [Western has a NATO].

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, I think - first of all, I don't think that
East Germany can stay operationally in the Warsaw
Pact after they have [these pre-elections, been,
seen free elections?]

[NOTE: SOMETHING WRONG WITH SOUND]

QUESTION:

I see.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

In East Germany. No matter what the documents
say. Secondly, I think it is better for West
Germany to stay in NATO than for all of Germany to
be a neutral demilitarized state. Because it
isn't possible totally to demilitarize a country

Herman S. Jaffe

(lc)

-3-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 2/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

of the size of Germany. Its industrial capacity
would be considerable. It would raise all the
question that exist in Japan about the nature of
Japanese defense forces, would then be applied to
German defense forces. So I think we need a new
security system in which the forces of NATO are
reduced.

That will be the [ ? ] in which demilitarized
belts are created in Europe, maybe on the
territory of the present German Democratic
Republic. And maybe some of the East European
states are given the status of Austria. All of
this is possible. But what I would do -

QUESTION:

Dimilitarize, you mean, no military power exists?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

On the territory of the East German state, yes.
However it's defined, that ought to be a
negotiation with the Soviet Union. The real
question is, if the Soviet Union is concerned
about the security of its frontier, it will be

Herman S. Jaffe

-4-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 2/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

possible to find some formula. If we look at this
as a contest in which one side or the other is
going to win over the territory, then it will get
very difficult. But I am of the view that given
the economic situation of the Soviet Union and
given its domestic turmoil, that a serious
discussion on a new European security system with
the Soviet Union, can and will be started next
year.

QUESTION:

So you are fairly--your prediction is the
unification of the sa--Germany have to go along
with the integration of the Warsaw Pact and the
NATO pact.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

No. I think NATO should continue. Whether the
Warsaw Pact continues or not is a problem for the
Soviets to settle with their own allies. It's not
an American problem. I think as a practical
matter, at least East Germany, once it has a
Democratic Government, cannot be operationally in
the Warsaw Pact because you cannot have the same

Herman S. Jaffe

-5-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 2/SIDE B

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

political parties when they govern in East Germany
be in the Warsaw Pact and when they govern in West
Germany be in NATO. That would mean that Germany
is in both treaties with the same people
simultaneously.

[TRANSCRIBER'S NOTE: THIS SIDE APPARENTLY ALREADY
TRANSCRIBED ON TAPE 1/SIDE A; TAPE 1/SIDE B WILL
CONTAIN BEGINNING OF INTERVIEW]

Herman S. Jaffe

-1-

December 22, 1989

NHK

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER (A):

...in which one side or the other is going to win over the territory. Then it will get very difficult. But I am of the view that given the economic situation of the Soviet Union, and given its domestic turmoil, tht a serious discussion on a new European security system with the Soviet Union can and will be started next year.

QUESTION:

So your theory or your prediction is deunification of the sa--the Germany have to go along with deintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO pact.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

No.

QUESTION:

No.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Herman S. Jaffe

-2-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

Pact continues or not is a problem for the Soviets to settle with their own allies. It's not an American problem. I think as a practical matter, at least East Germany, once it has a Democratic government, cannot be operationally in the Warsaw Pact because you cannot have the same political parties when they govern in East Germany be in the Warsaw Pact and when they govern in West Germany be in NATO--that would mean that Germany is in both treaties with the same people simultaneously.

QUESTION:

I see.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Or with the same political structure.

QUESTION:

And once Germany deunified, the danger exist for too strong country born in Europe. West Germany has new skilled labor forces and East Germany has social capital and both country make strong country enough to compete with Soviet and the United States.

Herman S. Jaffe

-3-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, you know, West Germany has a population of 61 million. Which is about 18% of Western Europe. If they add East Germany -

QUESTION:

Seventeen million something.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Something like seventeen million. So that would make it 21%. I'm not sure that 3% will make the difference between German influence and--or not. I think that the Germany--that even West Germany is the strongest nation in, in Western Europe today.

So I'm not sure that this argument is a very good one. But the second point is a more important one. It may be true that Germany will be very strong. And I'm sure that there are many people who are very unhappy that Germany's unified. But that is out of our control now.

And what we must not have is that the Western countries join with the Soviets in delaying German

Herman S. Jaffe

-4-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

unification. Because the end--or preventing it, because the end result of that will be that German nationalism will turn on the Western countries. Without the Western countries having the ability to prevent the trends which are there for all to see.

QUESTION:

I see. I see. But anyway, what the United State and Japan can do on Soviet and East European affairs--what's your -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

The United States and Japan?

QUESTION:

Mmm-hmm. The money or -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, there are two separate problems. The United States should negotiate seriously with the Soviet Union, but a concept for new European security. And while I have often been critical of the Soviet Union when it was an imperialist expansionist country, I think we should show great understanding for the Soviet concern of the

Herman S. Jaffe

-5-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

security of its home territory. They have had
many experiences of foreign invasions. And we
should therefore be understanding. I think such a
dialogue should start fairly soon. I think it
will start in [1992, 1990?]. Japan does not have
to be part of that dialogue, on European security.

Secondly, Japan--I think both the United States
and Japan should reflect about what they can do to
prevent a crisis in the Soviet economy. What can
be done to assist in the distribution of consumer
goods. And what could be done to shorten the
interval between a planned system and a market
system on the assumption that Soviet military
expenditures are going to be substantially
reduced.

We have no interest in pouring resources into a
country that then diverts many of them to military
purposes. But that too can be done.

Third, I believe a point will be reached,

Herman S. Jaffe

-6-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

, CONT'D:

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

certainly no later than the visit of Gorbachev to
Japan, in which Japan will participate in the
security discussions in Asia. Right now a very
substantial proportion of the Soviet armed forces-
-something like a third is aimed at Asia. And
it's not part of--and many of those are in the
Maritime--most of those are in the Maritime
Provinces, facing Japan.

And they are not part of any arms control
negotiation at this moment. So I think Japan can
participate in the discussion of an Asian security
system.

QUESTION:

And many Japanese, eager for [ ? ] island. So
you think--it is realistically realized--you a
specialist on the reality of international
politics and powers. And is it feasible and
realistic?

Herman S. Jaffe

(CC)

-7-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I believe that the Soviets would never have agreed to begin discussions with Japan on the subject if they were not willing to make some concessions. And in the end, the only concession that really will work is to return the islands to Japan. Now it may be that there's an intermediate period that has to--of some joined condominium over these islands, and almost certainly they have to be demilitarized.

And almost certainly there will be, as a result of such an agreement, a Japanese willingness to give economic assistance to the Soviet Union. On a scale that does not exist when they occupied the [four northern islands]. So all of this, I think, will be part of a package. I don't think it will be completed in 1990, but I -

QUESTION:

At the beginning?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

But I think it will begin in 1990 and it will be concluded whenever Gorbachev visits Japan.

Herman S. Jaffe

-8-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

QUESTION:

I see. So about Soviet. Your prediction of 1990.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Major economic difficulties. Actually weakening of the position of Gorbachev. Discussions with the United--success of a start agreement. A number of other agreements of a symbolic nature. Beginning of serious discussions about a new security system, especially in Europe. But perhaps towards the end of the year, beginning also about, about Asia.

But also increasing domestic turmoil in the Soviet Union, and I believe increasing emphasis on domestic discipline within the Soviet Union, including some attempts at repression.

QUESTION:

I see. Now I'd like to ask you about your prediction on China. You visited China and met leaders and Deng Xiaoping. Do you think they want to make a new start for a new China under this Administration?

Herman S. Jaffe

-9-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Yes, I do. I think that if Deng Xiaoping lives, and if the present power structure remains, then I believe that they will try to get back to the economic reform measures of before the Tiananmen Square upheavals. And they will try to liberalize the economy. They will not do the same in the political field. Certainly not while Deng Xiaoping is alive.

But it seems to me that liberalizing the economy means that there will be many centers of decision, both in industry and in the provinces. And therefore, it would create the objective circumstances that will make it easier towards a more pluralistic society in the post-Deng Xiaoping period.

QUESTION:

How do you evaluate movement of Chinese Government? After 10 years of new economy and they have to make such a kind of repression on the people. It's a complete failure or what? What do you -

Herman S. Jaffe

-10-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think the problem was--as often happens in revolution, it was a combination of objective circumstances and accidents. The objective circumstances were that when you move from a planned economy to a market economy there is a period of extreme difficulty.

Because you haven't enough planning anymore to control everything, and you haven't got enough of a market yet to absorb everything. So therefore, there is a tendency towards inflation, unemployment and austerity for an interim period. And the Chinese got caught in that economically.

And I think the most dangerous opponents of the Chinese Government were not the students, but the workers who actually fought the troops. Now--so that was one problem.

The accident was that the presence of Gorbachev in the Asian development tank in Beijing brought very many journalists. And so there was a very intense

Herman S. Jaffe

(cc)

-11-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

coverage of what was going on, which normally
would not happen. And also weakened the capacity
of the Chinese Government to deal with the
uprising at an early stage when it was still
containable. But every Communist society faces
the problem of how do you go to a market economy,
and secondly, can you then still run the country
as a one-party system?

The Chinese were beginning to do better on the
economic side than any other Communist country.
But their political progress did not match their
economic progress.

QUESTION:

I see. So you don't think that incident--that the
Tiananmen is completely change of history, of the
change of the Chinese movement [INAUDIBLE OVER
INTERVIEWEE]

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think the incident was extremely unfortunate and
I regret it deeply. As a friend of the Chinese,
it hurts me to see that they fell into such

Herman S. Jaffe

-12-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

internal strife. But no, I don't think that it
necessarily stops a movement towards reform. And
I think in fact that it's a big challenge to see
whether it can move forward towards reform.

QUESTION:

I see. Your Congress is very critical on this
Chinese Government, and they say if we help China,
we cannot accuse South Africa. And -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well -

QUESTION:

- so they do not understand exactly what happening
in China. You very angry on them. I look at
television--you talk with some Congressmen, and
you said Congress should not decide [INAUDIBLE
OVER INTERVIEWEE]

DR. KISSINGER (A):

No, I'm not angry. I'm not angry. I'm trying to
be realistic. There are a billion, two hundred
million Chinese. They have been for four thousand
years the most important country in Asia. They're
the one country in Asia that Japan takes extremely

Herman S. Jaffe

-13-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

seriously because of the cultural tradition. They have a huge influence in Southeast Asia and in Korea. It would therefore be extremely dangerous for the United States to adopt a posture of hostility towards China, and for us to say that we can determine what its internal policies should be is a very major undertaking.

We don't understand it well enough. I would prefer democracy in China. But I do not want the United States to go back to a period of hostility to China. I would rely on evolution in China and on the good sense of the Chinese people, and on the individualism of the Chinese people.

So I'm reluctant to have sanctions. And I don't believe that many nations in the world will go along with us on sanctions. I don't think Japan will go along with us for any length of time and I don't think Europe will go along with us.

QUESTION:

So what's your prediction, what happened in China

Herman S. Jaffe

-14-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

QUESTION, CONT'D:

and -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well -

QUESTION:

- relationship with the world.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think next--I think in 1990 China will make some overtures to the United States. They will try to show that they understand some of our human rights concerns. I expect that they will let that dissident who is in our embassy, go. I expect that they will ease or eliminate martial law.

I expect that they'll make a number of other gestures. Then it will be a very tough fight for President Bush with the Congress. Because the Congress will say that isn't enough. And they will ask for more and more. And I think it's a--going to be a close case.

If we didn't have President Bush, I would be very pessimistic about the future of Sino-American

-15-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

relations. But I think President Bush, having
served in Beijing, is so determined to maintain
the relationship that I believe that unless Deng
Xiaoping dies, relations between the United States
and China will gradually improve and reform will
begin.

But if the Congress passes additional sanctions,
then I would be very pessimistic.

QUESTION:

Now a final portion of Dr. Kissinger's prediction
on 1990. Japan. Everyone in the Congress say
this might be worst year and serious confrontation
between the U.S. Congress and Japan, because Japan
never opened the market and never change
distribution system, and never change banking
system and making too much money and spending too
little.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, there are two things. One, there are many
things Japan does that we have a right to object
to. The market is not sufficiently open. On the

Herman S. Jaffe

-16-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

other hand--so I support some of the criticisms
that are being made. On the other hand, the best
studies that I've seen show that even if Japan
opened its market totally, that would not help our
deficit by more than 20%.

QUESTION:

Mmm-hmm. Yes.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

So - or some such figure. Some five billion
dollrs. That--it does--wouldn't solve our
problem.

But then there's an even more important problem.
The difficulties caused in part by Japanese
practices, but in part by low American
productivity. Japan imports 80,000 cars a year.
You can say that's not enough. The other hand--
of those 80,000 only 2,500 are American. That's
not Japanese discrimination; that shows what the
Japanese buyers--public thinks of the quality of
American cars.

Herman S. Jaffe

-17-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

And unless we improve the quality of our cars and
the quality of our other products, we couldn't
compete, even if the market were open.

QUESTION:

But another difficult problem is investment from
Japan make some concern in this country. And we
purchased Rockefeller Center and Columbia.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, I'll tell you frankly. If anybody had asked
my opinion, either the Rockefellers or Mitsubishi,
I would have told both of them not to do it for
symbolic reasons. Not because it really gives
Japan such a huge influence, but because it's the
sort of thing that people can understand.

I must say Japanese real estate investment in the
United States doesn't bother me particularly. It
doesn't bother me at all, as a matter of fact.
It's the sort of thing--in fact, it helps the
balance of payments. It improves the links
between our two countries. But each nation has
nationalistic sides.

Herman S. Jaffe

-18-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

And I think both sides ought to be careful to--
not to make transactions which offend
sensibilities of major segments, even if they're
economically justified. But that part of it--the
Japanese investment in the United States--I think
the objections to that, except in certain sectors,
you know, like defense industry or communications,
I believe should be left to commercial priorities.

QUESTION:

How about emotional [sense, things?]? Before, you
know, Japan the enemy of the United State and the
people say bad thing about [behind]. But now
Japan is getting rich, and ordinary [ordinarily?]
don't like rich Japan buying [INAUDIBLE OVER
INTERVIEWEE]

DR. KISSINGER (A):

The ordinary American people really don't, don't
know what it means--rich Japan--because the
ordinary American people, except for the very
poor, think they are fairly well off. So whether

Herman S. Jaffe

-19-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:
the Japanese are better off or worse off -

QUESTION:

I see.

DR. KISSINGER (A):
Really it's hard to, to under--to--to--to
understand. I think the important--the
relationship between Japan and the United States
is so important that the leaders of both countries
have a high obligation to make sure that short-
term passions do not dominate us.

And I think they ought to work on us during the
next year. Now every year that I'm on this
program I say the same thing. Let's get away from
these technical discussions and discuss a basic
approach in which we can--so that we are not
constantly arguing about airport construction
and...

QUESTION:
Oh, yes.

DR. KISSINGER (A):
And forest imports. Because on a case-by-case

(L)

-20-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

basis, it is endless. The trouble is that neither
the Japanese nor the American mentality lends
itself very well to an overall approach for
different cultural reasons. But that's what we
ought to do.

[BOTH SPEAK AT ONCE]

QUESTION:

Well, how is -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

If we are in conflict, whom can it possibly
benefit? Not our two people.

QUESTION:

How do you think about--still I think emotional
conflict is very important because, you know, the
people--people are most important factor.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Well, emotional conflict--it is easy. If you want
to explain difficulties economically, it's always
easier to blame a foreigner than to blame
yourself.

QUESTION:

Yeah, that's true.

Herman S. Jaffe

(cc)

-21-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER (A):

And it always the temptation of politicians to
blame a foreigner. They blame Japanese, they
blame Koreans. Now they're beginning to go to
work on the Germans. Certainly we were enemies
nearly 50 years ago. But we can't keep that--but
we have now cooperated for 40-plus years. And
that must count for more than what happened 50
years ago.

And I think it is inappropriate to raise issues
that arose in different circumstances 50 years
after the event.

QUESTION:

So yo don't care much about, say, emotional
conflict between -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I care about it. It worries me. I don't like it
when it--it's here and I don't like some of the
Japanese material that I see.

QUESTION:

Did you read the book written by Mr. Morita [Molitar] and
Congressman [Ishihara]?

Herman S. Jaffe

(L)

-22-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Yes, I read it. And actually, if you had permitted it to be published here fewer people would have read it. As it is, everybody reads it in, in manuscript form. I think there were some things said in there that were unwise.

QUESTION:

Pentagon people told me that not translated by Pentagon or Commerce. It's translated by Japanese journalist and distributed among the American Congressmen to raise a question. Is that true?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

And I would separate, incidentally, two things: Morita didn't say anything in this book that's very different from what he's been saying for a long time. What Ishihara said was a little--was more offensive.

QUESTION:

But that book caused emotional conflict between two countries?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

It certainly has been used in that way. And I've been at meetings where some Japanese made very

Herman S. Jaffe

-23-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

aggressive statements. But I've also been at
meetings where Americans made very aggressive
statements. And each side ought to ask itself--
after you blame the other, where are you going to
go? Are we going to have a confrontation with
each other, or are we going to have cooperation?
I hope that the next year will be a period of
cooperation.

QUESTION:

So your prediction on Japan.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

My prediction is that there will be many tensions,
many criticisms. But my prediction is also that
the Bush Administration will make a big effort to
have a cooperative relationship. After your
elections when the political situation in Japan
has been clarified, I am sure that a significant effort
will be made to have an improvement of relations
with Japan.

QUESTION:

I see. Now I'd like to ask you very brief a
prediction of yours. First, election of your

Herman S. Jaffe

-24-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

QUESTION, CONT'D:

country this year. A Democrat is going to win?
House and Senate.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

They'll win in the House and Senate. I think that
they--the Republicans may pick up--may--up to two
Senate seats, but not enough to gain control of
the Senate.

QUESTION:

How about -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

In the House there will not be many changes.

QUESTION:

How about the dollar? Is going to be strong?

[LAUGHTER]

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I tell you, I--I know last year I predicted that
the dollar would weaken, and it was apparently
premature. But I still expect it to weaken this
year.

QUESTION:

I see. As an economy, the prediction.

-25-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think the economy will be stable. It will not
grow as much. But I don't think there'll be a
significant recession.

QUESTION:

So no -

DR. KISSINGER (A):

And I think that's another factor to keep in mind
- the European economies, especially the German
ones, will get a, a significant improvement as a
result of the need to rebuild Eastern Europe. And
the American, and therefore, also the Japanese
economies will benefit indirectly from that.

QUESTION:

And oil price. It's stable?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Stable with a mod--with a gradual increase.

QUESTION:

Anything happen in mid--mideast?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I don't--I don't think that there will be--you
know, that's the most unpredictable area, but I
don't expect a major--I certainly don't expect a

Herman S. Jaffe

-26-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER, CONT'D:

middle east war.

QUESTION:

So PLO affair is going to be settled down on the
West Jordan River?

DR. KISSINGER (A):

No. I think there'll be the beginning of a - a
negotiation between - the United States will
manage to get Egypt, Israel--and Israel together
and its [ ? ] to begin a discussion about a
negotiation on the West Bank. But it will be very
difficult and it will certainly not be -

QUESTION:

Any explosion of Israel for conflict or is there
any...

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I don't expect that.

QUESTION:

So fairly calm.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

Not very calm, but not unusually difficult.

QUESTION:

So final, overall, your prediction of 1990. What?

Herman S. Jaffe

-27-

DR. KISSINGER

TAPE 1/SIDE A

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I think 1990 will show that we're living in the most revolutionary period since the end of World War II. That there'll be changes discussed of a nature that would have been inconceivable a year ago. It will begin very calm. I think towards the second half of the year it will become apparent that when you have that many changes occurring simultaneously, that they cannot happen without some turmoil.

But even that--it's the beginning of a new international system. And has its positive aspects.

QUESTION:

From the end of last year you have been very busy moving around about Europe and Central America and Hawaii and difficult for us to catch you. But I hope you can come back next year once again to give us a prediction.

DR. KISSINGER (A):

I always count on it and thank you for the excellent way you conduct the interview.

Herman S. Jaffe