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IV - DEVELOPING POWER TRENDS

It is against the background of the missions which will likely have to be
performed that we must examine the over-all strategic balance. Its outstanding
characteristic is a military technology in a state of spectacular proliferation.
Starting with World War II scientific research has produced military equipment
and new patterns of military operations at an ever accelerating pace. Four
trends appear to be of particular significance.

1. Weapon technology will become increasingly complex with a corresponding increase in the difficulty of choosing the most effective combination of weapons. And the curve of military technology continues to rise: the crude U.S. bomb of 1945 has been outmoded by a broad range of highly developed weapons. Energy releases have risen from the original 20,000 tons of TNT equivalent to many million tons. The Hiroshima bomb required a large aircraft and crew. Equally powerful warheads have been reduced in size and simplified to the point where they can be employed effectively in anti-aircraft rockets. And with the increasing capacity for the production of fissionable materials, nuclear and thermonuclear weapons have become available in very large quantities.

The outlook is even more portentous than the achievements of the recent
past. Aircraft will be capable of cruising at several times the speed of sound,
of bombing from altitudes of a dozen miles and more, and of carrying air-
launched missiles so that they need not pass directly over heavily defended
target areas. New high energy fuels can give them greatly increased range and

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performance. Nuclear power may even remove the problem of aircraft range entirely.

Within a very short time, a major role in both offense and defense will be played by missiles. It will be possible to produce missiles of almost any desired range, from very short distances analogous to traditional artillery to intercontinental ranges of five thousand miles or more. Because these weapons require much less elaborate installations than airplanes, it will be possible to disperse them more easily and they will therefore be more invulnerable to surprise attack. Earth satellites are a special adaptation of missiles which will be able to accomplish a great deal of uninterrupted reconnaissance.

As nuclear propulsion comes of age submarines will be of increasing importance. They will insure use of the sea where surface ships could not hope to survive. They can pose a threat to our harbors and to our allies by interrupting sea communications. As a platform for missiles they can generate a constant threat of a sudden, devastating blow from unpredictable directions.

These are not dreams of the far distant future. Even the most remote among them is attainable within the next 10-15 years. By that time, many of them will be in the hands of several nations.

2. Technological development will continue to favor the offense relative to the defense. Both will improve. But new offensive weapons, such as missiles, sudden in action, massively destructive, relatively unvulnerable

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either before launching or in flight, will aggravate considerably the problems of defense and greatly increase its costs.

3. The U.S.S.R. and Communist China will continue to gain in overall economic, industrial and technological strength. The present economic superiority of the West will become less significant from the security standpoint. Unless we increase the present pace and level of our military effort the U.S.S.R. will surpass us in major fields of military technology.

4. The Concept of "scarcity" in nuclear weapons will disappear from the calculations of the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and to a lesser extent Britain.

The U.S., the U.S.S.R. and Britain will continue to increase the number and variety of their atomic weapons. Other countries will in due course have their own atomic arms if on a more limited scale.

## Soviet Capabilities

Ever since World War II, the United States has suffered from a tendency to underestimate the military technology of the U.S.S.R. When the Soviet Union produced its first long-range bomber we comforted ourselves with the thought that it was a copy of our B-29. When it developed jet fighters we dismissed it as the imitation of a British design. When our atomic monopoly was ended we took it as a reflection on our security methods rather than as an indication that our technological lead was inherently ephemeral.

In the meantime the Soviet Union has demonstrated that its achievements in the immediate post-war period were far from accidental. Today Soviet

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science is at least equal to our own in most strategically significant categories.
The technological capability of the U.S.S.R. is increasing at a pace obviously
faster than that of the United States. If not reversed this trend alone will place
the free world in dire jeopardy.

The Soviet technological skill is matched by a high order of managerial
ability at least at the level of over-all national priorities. Several times in
recent years the U.S.S.R. has demonstrated a striking ability to surpass the
United States in reducing "lead times": the interval between design and oper-
ational weapon. This seems to be due to two factors: first, the Kremlin's
decisions on new weapons are made with firmness and prosecuted by a system
of effective priorities. And second, the Soviet Union has placed a much greater
emphasis on science, particularly on basic science, than the United States.

The result of the Soviet concentration on military technology is an
impressive military establishment which already poses a mortal threat to the
free world and which is growing larger. Its main features can be summarized
as follows:

The U.S.S.R. has a preponderance of conventional ground forces com-
pared to any similar forces around its periphery and well able to maintain
political control inside the Soviet orbit.

The Soviet shipbuilding program has long concentrated on submarines.
A fleet of over 400 is already in operation. This number is greatly in excess of
the German force which crippled Allied surface shipping during the early years

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of World War II. There is no doubt about the capability of the U.S.S.R. to develop atomic power plants for its navy or to adapt ships and submarines to launch short and medium-range missiles.

Soviet missiles are ahead of our own. This is due, at least in part to the high priority given to the Soviet guided missiles for at least 10 years. During part of this period our own missile program was dormant. As a result, the Soviet Union already possesses operational missiles capable of reaching all of Western Europe, Japan and Taiwan from Russian or Chinese bases. Missiles with intercontinental ranges have been successfully tested. Launched from submarines, even short-range missiles can pose a serious threat to the continental United States.

Soviet airplane development has been impressive and in some respects at least as advanced as our own. The growing Soviet long-range bomber fleet poses an increasingly serious threat.

Soviet air defense is based on a good radar detection and tracking system, supported by a large number of all-weather interceptor aircraft, an increasing proportion of which is supersonic. Ground-to-air missiles are a major element in it and are likely to gain in effectiveness relative to the manned bomber. In short, Soviet military strength is already enormous and growing rapidly.

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U.S. Capabilities

As compared with the U.S.S.R., the United States now has three principal military advantages:

We have superior operational experience in the use of long-range
manned airplanes and geography favors our system of advanced bases.

We have superior and more flexible naval power, especially surface
naval power.

We have more atomic weapons, and a greater variety of them.

However, some of these advantages must be qualified, and others are
only temporary. For example, our long-range bomber is not always in competi-
tion with improving defenses. And our advantage in training is transitory
because missiles will increasingly take over missions heretofore performed by
manned planes. In the interval some U.S. forward bases will be exposed to the
political instability of the areas in which they are located and all of our air
bases are vulnerable to surprise attack, particularly from Soviet missiles.

Nor can we afford to take for granted an indefinite continuation of our
present superiority at sea. The aircraft carrier, around which our naval power
is built, confronts a problem of limited refueling facilities, particularly for its
aircraft complement. The value of its freedom from the political uncertainties
of foreign bases is therefore a matter of degree. Even more importantly, our
anti-submarine capability is not adequate to deal with the growing Soviet
underwater threat.

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The third point of present U.S. military advantage is in the number and variety of atomic weapons. But the U.S.S.R. can make good any strategically meaningful U.S. advantage well within the 10-15 years under consideration in this report.

Thus it appears that the U.S. is losing its lead over the U.S.S.R. in the race of military technology. Unless the trend is altered, the world balance of power will shift in favor of the Soviet bloc. If that should happen we would not be given another chance to remedy our failings.

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V - THE STRATEGY EQUATION

What is the implication of these trends for United States strategy?

The question concerns not the United States alone but the entire non-Communist world whose security and freedom are inextricably bound up with U.S. strength and determination.

Without U.S. assistance, Greece and the Republic of Korea, despite their heroism, would have succumbed to communist aggression. Our firm resolve to defend Western Europe may have prevented a Soviet onslaught on our allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Our programs of economic and military aid have been a stabilizing factor in many other regions. And at home we have assumed the burden of a military expenditure in the neighborhood of $40 billion and we have maintained almost three million men under arms.

Against the background of these programs, can there be any basis for concern with U.S. security? Unfortunately, our achievement cannot be measured against the magnitude of our sacrifice. It must be weighed against the vastness of the challenge.

And in these terms there is reason for serious concern. Our strategic striking power, on which we have heretofore relied as the major element of our security, is imperiled by Soviet missile developments and the inadequate dispersal of our Strategic Air Command. Our assumption that we could substitute technology for manpower has been exposed as tenuous. Soviet technological

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skill is growing rapidly and with it the capacity to deliver a mortal blow
against the United States.

We can deter a sudden onslaught only by developing a retaliatory
force so powerful and so well protected that whatever the Soviet central
blow, it will be able to inflict an unacceptable amount of damage in return.
As long as our retaliatory force is composed of manned planes, this places
a premium on the dispersal of our airbases. But the base construction of our
Strategic Air Command has long been out of place with other parts of its
program. As missiles take over many of the tasks of long-range bombers,
the dispersal of launching sites may become simpler particularly for short and
medium range missiles. But the effort to maintain an adequate retaliatory
force must continue unremittingly. For without a capability for all-out war
our national existence will be at the mercy of a group of powers which have
never tired of proclaiming their implacable hostility.

The effort to keep up our retaliatory force will itself require a greater
military effort on our part. Unfortunately, it does not exhaust our strategic
problem. For no matter how vast our over-all strength, we face the dilemma
that the magnitude of the total does not assure its sufficiency in any particular
situation. Even with a military posture which causes all-out war to carry with
it the threat of mutual suicide, our peril remains. Until the development of a
Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver it, our retaliatory force could
serve as the major deterrent to Soviet aggression. But as the Soviet capability

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to attack American cities increases, it will raise the threshold of provocation which would unleash our retaliatory force. It is not that we will not fight if our national survival is threatened; it is simply that we shall interpret the requirements of our survival increasingly stringently if we must weigh all objectives against the destruction of New York or Washington or Chicago. If all-out war becomes our only reposte to aggression, the Soviet Union will be enabled to use its strategic striking force as a shield behind which to expand by more limited methods and to confront us with the alternative of surrender or suicide.

The fundamental problem is as old as history but new to us as a nation. We have been on the small, though victorious, end of limited wars in 1776 and 1812 and on the controlling end of others in 1848 and 1898. But never before Korea had the U.S. been obliged to fight a war on the tacit admission that it was limited by other than logistic considerations. Nevertheless, if the range and power of modern weapons have made it unrealistic to meet any but the most dire threat by all-out war, and if we are unwilling to become reconciled to piecemeal defeat of the non-communist world, then we must face up to the consequences implicit in the possibility the U.S. may have to fight limited wars.

It is imperative that we develop forces which can intervene rapidly and are able to make their power felt with discrimination. We must bring about the airlift to get them rapidly into trouble spots. We are now deficient in the

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capability for fighting local actions of any scale, in tactical support and
in airlift. These forces, it must be emphasized, are not a substitute for
the capacity to conduct all-out war but its complement. A strong retaliatory
force is the prerequisite for more limited conflicts; it is the guarantee that an
enemy cannot profit from expanding the war.

The effectiveness of our power thus depends on our unmistakable
ability and willingness to oppose force with force at whatever level of
intensity may be required. We do not now possess that capability. The
greatest point of concern about the U.S. strategic position is that our
distaste for limited risks may ultimately lead us into surrender or into the
ultimate risk at a rate determined not by us but by Communist policy.

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# VI - THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

One of the most troublesome strategic problems is the role to be played by nuclear weapons in any future conflict. It is complicated by the fact that except for two now obsolete weapons at the end of World War II no nuclear weapons have ever been set off in wartime. The effect of the introduction of nuclear weapons into military operations is therefore to some extent a matter of conjecture. It is argued by some that the use of nuclear weapons marks the dividing line between all-out and limited war. It is feared by others that nuclear weapons would cause such widespread devastation that they would at least devastate the area which is being fought over. Still others maintain that even if there should be an intention to keep the war limited, neither side would accept defeat without resorting to every weapon in its arsenal.

These arguments have great weight. It is important, however, to distinguish between those which apply to limited war as such and those which apply to limited nuclear war only. For example if it is argued that neither side will accept defeat short of having exhausted every means at its disposal, it would not seem to make any difference whether the war started as a conventional or as a nuclear war. A power unwilling to accept defeat in a nuclear war is not likely to be more prepared to accept defeat in a conventional war. This particular argument therefore amounts to a

in a conventional war. This particular argument therefore amounts to a
detect in a nuclear war. It is not likely to be more prepared to accept detect
as a conventional or as a nuclear war. A power unwilling to accept
its disposal, it would not seem to make any difference whether the war
neither side will accept detection, short of having exhausted every means at
which apply to limited nuclear war only. For example if it is argued that
conducting between those which apply to limited war as such and those
These are examples of what we mean when we say, in this context, however,
that every weapon has a limit.

VI - THE SYSTEM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

December 4, 1957
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rejection of <u>any</u> concept of limited war, nuclear or otherwise. It tends to run counter to every experience since World War II. With the horrors of modern technology, it can be expected that both sides will look for excuses to limit, not to expand the war. The possibility of limited war depends on making all-out war or an expansion of hostilities an even more unattractive course.

Thus the issue of the use of nuclear weapons turns on two practical questions: is it practical? Is it wise? In dealing with these problems we come up against the hard fact that the choice of weapons is no longer up to us. Whatever we may decide, the Soviet Union and in time other powers as well may choose to conduct its aggressions with nuclear weapons.

The introduction of nuclear weapons by an opponent would immediately raise the question of our reaction. Would we be prepared to respond with all-out war? And if not, we would be forced into a limited nuclear war under the worst possible circumstances: in the confusion of battle.

It does not seem likely or wise that we would respond to <u>any</u> use of nuclear weapons with all-out war. The decision to engage in a war that stakes our survival and may lead to a basic transformation of our society will depend to a much greater extent on the issues under dispute than on the weapons used. To attempt to keep a limited war conventional by the threat of all-out war would in fact involve all the dilemmas of massive retaliation. It would enable an opponent by increasing the level of risk

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slightly to give us the choice between suicide and surrender. It would
enable him to achieve a decisive victory through the introduction of nuclear
weapons against conventional forces and to leave the next move up to us.

Thus against a nuclear power we must always be prepared to fight
a limited nuclear war. Even should we decide to use conventional weapons
in certain circumstances, we would not dare to do so without a nuclear
establishment ready at hand. And against aggression on any substantial
scale, particularly by the U.S.S.R., we will probably have to use nuclear
weapons from the outset. Any other course would compound the disadvantage
of the defensive with yielding the first nuclear blow. It would open the
entire spectrum of risks to Soviet action and permit them to choose that
which seemed most profitable. It would force the free-world into a military
effort on a scale which no country seems prepared to undertake and which
would not necessarily add to its security if it did.

This is not to say that every war must necessarily be nuclear. There
are many situations in which the use of nuclear weapons will be unnecessary
or unwise, such as almost all the cases described above as "obscure
wars." But in a war in which the U.S.S.R. is a direct participant, nuclear
weapons will have to be used almost by necessity. In their face the huge
Soviet conventional armament becomes obsolescent. In their absence the
Soviet Union will have the choice of seeking to prevail with its large ground
army and failing that could still introduce nuclear weapons at a moment of

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maximum difficulty for us.

That the Soviet Union is well aware of this is shown by its persistent
"ban the bomb" propaganda. Even an equality in nuclear weapons will not
change the fact that nuclear weapons give an advantage to the defensive
and reduce the blackmail value of Soviet World War II type forces. No
one can look at the prospects of nuclear war with equanimity. It is the
cross our age must bear, however, if it wishes to preserve the peace.

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VII - DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

Because of the tremendous significance of the affairs which center in the Department of Defense, all studies of the national security inevitably concern themselves to some extent with the organization and methods of the Pentagon. The situation is not new; it has been a preoccupation of successive administrations during the ten years since the creation of the original National Military Establishment. It has been the subject of numerous studies which have found the organization of the Department of Defense inadequate to its task.

Several sets of specific suggestions for improvement have been considered in the course of preparing this report. However, detailed organizational recommendations lead quickly to arguments outside the main stream of concern of this panel, which has unconcerned itself with the basic concepts and strategies of security. For this reason, discussion here is restricted to two fundamental points:

1. The roles and missions of the individual military services, as now defined, are out of accord both with the weapons technology and with the principal threats of today.

2. The Department of Defense is not organized structurally to fight a major war.

These points will be discussed in order.

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The Problem of Roles and Missions

The range and destructiveness of modern weapons have tended to overleap the traditional boundaries among the services. As a result, our effort to develop an adequate strategic posture has been beset by interservice rivalry. This rivalry is not due to any "parochialism" on the part of our military leaders; it is built into the present assignment of roles and missions. The historic expression of our strategic doctrine has been the assignment of roles and missions among the services -- the Army, Air Force and the Navy. Each of these services has had the mission of defeating its enemy counterpart; the Army has had primary responsibility for the land battle, the Navy for control of the seas and the Air Force for the control of the air. These missions were based, in effect, on means of locomotion with everything moving by water assigned to the Navy, everything moving by land assigned to the Army and everything moving through the air assigned to the Air Force.

Originally this assignment of roles represented distinguishable strategic tasks. Each service was, therefore, able to control all the weapons it considered essential for achieving its mission. It could in effect develop its own strategy without too much concern with that of the sister service or without too much dependence on the interpretation of a sister service as to what constituted an essential target.

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But the long-range airplane, the ballistic missile and the incomparable destructiveness of weapons have almost obliterated the traditional boundaries among the services. Today, no service can achieve its primary mission without either trespassing on the role of the other services or calling on them for assistance.

As a result, the division of functions which worked relatively smoothly for a century and a half has become a source of bitter rivalry in the nuclear age. Each new weapon has led to a bitter wrangle as to which service should control it. It is inherent in the philosophy and training of each service that it should see in the enemy threat predominantly those elements which its particular professional role seems best adapted to counter. And each organization naturally judges the proper balance of forces to be the one that maximizes its own role.

Such a procedure is costly. It leads to a duplication of weapons systems. (This system prevents us from drawing the full benefit from our military expenditures and in every crisis it confronts our policy makers with conflicting advice.) New weapons are placed into the strait jacket of obsolescent missions instead of fitting missions to revolutionary departures in technology. Given the range and power of modern weapons the attempt by each service to hoard all weapons that can affect a service's primary mission must lead to a tendency for each service to develop a capability for winning a war by itself. Its efforts will be directed toward reducing its reliance on other services.

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Or where there is no competition or duplication of mission, the present organization may leave certain tasks incomplete. An example is the problem of airlift for the ground forces. In one sense this is peripheral to the Air Force's primary mission of defeating the enemy in the air. But our mechanistic assignment of functions has placed everything moving through the air under the control of the Air Force. It is only natural, in these circumstances, that airlift should be assigned low priority however crucial it may prove to our over-all strategic mobility.

As a result our Joint Chiefs of Staff have become, with the best will in the world, essentially advocates of a service point of view. The Joint Chiefs have risen to their position through a lifetime of dedication to one service. They are a product of its problems, its training schools, its environment. Maintaining the morale of their service can never be far from their minds. The test of an organization is how naturally and spontaneously it enables its leadership to address itself to its most severe challenges. There is little in the organization of our national defense establishment that impels the service chiefs in a spontaneous fashion to consider over-all strategic doctrine.

## Defense Organization and the Conduct of War

On the civilian side, the Department of Defense is elaborately organized along industrial lines to manage a vast business enterprise.

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Its controls are mainly financial in nature. As a result very few of the civilian assistants of the Secretary of Defense have duties actually relevant to the conduct of a war. In the event of large-scale hostilities, the bulk of the civilian echelon of the Defense Department could serve only by abdicating.

On the military side, the Secretary of Defense has the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military advice. But the problems of the senior military officers differ from those of the Secretary's office only in degree. They too are heavily burdened with administrative tasks with the result that they are at least as much business offices as combat headquarters. And their day-to-day concern is with missions, which as will be seen below, bear an ever decreasing relationship to the tasks which actually have to be performed.

Thus in case of war both the civilian and military structure of the Defense Department would have to undergo major adjustment. A shift of mission of our military headquarters has, of course, taken place in every war in which we have engaged. But the speed and destructiveness of modern weapons place a premium on a degree of instantaneous readiness beyond the capacity of an organization in the process of changing gears. To be sure, the Defense Department, as the nation's largest business, must be run in a business-like manner.

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But it must not be put in the position of becoming so preoccupied with internal administration that it neglects its primary task of war-readiness. In short, the mission of the organization now largely disciplinary requires a more positive motivation.

## Concept and Strategy

Foremost among the requirements for defense reorganization is to provide a more positive strategic mission to the top level of our defense establishment. The present missions of discipline and adjudication are too negative in the face of the thrusting, separate drives of the services, each anxious to maximize its own contribution to the country's security, and its own role in it. It is in the nature of the referee's position, that problems come to him only after positions have hardened, and insufficient room is left for shaping and influencing decisions in their formative stage.

The objective should be to replace present procedures with a system in which the ultimate formulation of strategic doctrine emanates from the top of the organization. However much conceptual inspiration may originate within the services, strategic doctrine cannot be a patchwork of their individual differences.

The basic difficulty in our defense organization then is that little in the day-to-day concerns of our top military officials leads them

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spontaneously into questions of over-all doctrine and that the segments
to which they do address themselves do not reflect a clearly distinguish-
able strategic option. Moreover both civilian and military officials
are so overwhelmed with housekeeping and management functions that
their energies are diverted from the task of planning national strategy.
Any reorganization of the Department of Defense should therefore set
itself the tasks to provide a structure the subdivisions of which correspond
more closely to the tasks which have actually to be performed.

Since 1945 there have been many urgent recommendations to
promote this end. They include a single chief of staff and staff for the
armed forces; a single uniform; a military staff and/or board of strategic
advisors for the Secretary of Defense; divorce of the Joint Chiefs from
their service responsibilities. Among the many proposals considered
by this panel three have struck us with special force. They are:

a) The operational military forces should be organized into
functional commands to perform the missions which seem called for by
our strategic requirements. No foreseeable conflict will fit the category
of land, sea or air battle. As a result, unified commands are essential
for the conduct of military operations. The exact nature of these
commands would require careful study and should be flexible, so that
it can be adapted to changing strategic requirements. Each command

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should include all the units from each service required to perform
the mission. The logistics, planning and administration of each
command should be uniform. The units assigned to each functional
commander should be organic to his command and not simply placed
under his operational control.

In such an organization officers would be brought more
naturally to address themselves to strategic doctrine. To be sure,
it is possible that there would be the same rivalry between the
functional commands as among the existing services; competition is
a healthy concomitant of high morale. But with each functional area
representing a distinguishable strategic option, the requirements of
self-interest and of strategic doctrine would be much more in harmony
than now.

b) The chain of operational command should be from the President through the Secretary of Defense directly to the functional commands. Any modern war requires a rapid reaction time and this can be achieved only if there are a minimum number of organizational layers. Since the present division of functions among the military services represents no distinguishable strategic option, the separate military departments should be relieved from responsibility for military operations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs could act as the executive agent of the Secretary of Defense in advising on and dealing with the unified commands.

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c) At the same time the existing military departments should be continued for functions of a logistics and administrative nature. Freed from the responsibility for military operations the service chiefs and their civilian superior could concentrate on tasks of management and logistics. Each department would continue to administer procurement, organization and manpower. The relations of the functional command to existing departments would be analogous to that of the Strategic Air Command to the Air Force or of the fleet to the Navy Department.

d) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should be given a stronger role, specifically by giving him full control over the joint staff and putting this staff on a unified basis. One major organizational problem is to overcome a situation in which officers on interservice committees are negotiators rather than planners and tend to represent the point of view of a service rather than over-all approach. A unified staff under the direct control of the Chairman would remove at least some of the service pressures on the members of the staff. Another useful device would be to have the first promotion after service on the Joint Staff controlled by the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense.

An even more drastic proposal to achieve this end was placed before this committee and is recommended here for careful study.

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It would be the creation of a single service for all general officers above the rank of Brigadier General or its equivalent. The commanders for the functional commands would be chosen from this service and so would the Joint Chiefs. This procedure would retain the specialization necessary to command specific units and the morale which goes with membership in a service. At the higher levels, however, where the requirement is for an over-all view there would exist a group of officers whose primary loyalties transcend service boundaries. Since entry into this group would be the goal of all officers throughout their careers, junior officers would have an incentive to take an over-all view. Their future would depend not as is so frequently the case today on their ability to defend the point of view of their service on interdepartmental committees. Rather they would be encouraged to consider problems from the aspect of broad strategy. This proposal takes cognizance of the great impetus derived from service experience and motivation; but service experience will be most effective if it can be freed from the necessity of adhering to current instructions of individual services.

e) Another device for achieving greater cohesiveness within the Department of Defense is by preparing and presenting the budget in more meaningful terms. At present the budget is prepared according to general categories which bear little relationship to the functional tasks

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which are actually performed. A budget which followed the same
breakdown as the operational commands would gear budgetary con-
siderations more closely to strategic doctrine. This problem is
discussed at greater length in Section XII -- The Budget.

To work out the details of these proposals would go beyond
the bounds of this Report. This panel will have achieved its primary
purpose if it has made one point: that the present organization fails
to foster the use of our best minds, civilian and military, in solving
our most difficult problems. The whole organization of our defense
establishment must be given more positive goals. Control cannot
remain its primary motivation.

A Purpose Through Technology

One of the outstanding characteristics of the present period
is the integral connection between strategy and technology. When
technology was relatively stable, the technical aspect of military
planning usually involved problems either of procurement or of
engineering. But today with technology developing at an explosive
rate, the direction of its change is itself a primary strategic concern.
As a result, the next war may well be won or lost in the laboratories
and on the drawing boards. Our failure to understand the importance
of basic research and at times its subordination to interservice rivalry

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has permitted the USSR to score substantial successes and to close
the gap in the technological race.

This poses a particular challenge to our military establishment.
In the fields of engineering and procurement where most of its
experience lies, goals are fixed and progress can be gauged by well-
understood criteria. By contrast, it is the nature of basic research
that its results are uncertain and that together with its very discoveries
it produces the criteria for judging them. A bureaucratic approach to
it can only stifle creativity. The mode of organization and the pattern
of creativity therefore tend to clash and when they do bureaucratic
norms should be subordinate. With respect to our fundamental problem
of regaining our technological supremacy, it is the task of our
military establishment -- as of the national government -- to bring
about an environment conducive to real creativity. Competitive
development among the services is not bad in itself as long as it is
confined to the realm of technology and as long as it is not conceived
as a substitute for strategic thought. But ultimately development must
be related to an over-all national purpose.

The same problem is involved in the issue of lead-times: the
interval between conception and operational weapons. Creativity
by itself will be futile unless it is recognized at the operational level

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and unless we possess an organization which can translate it into
operational designs. Many of our difficulties have been caused not
so much by the unavailability of good ideas as by the obstacles
against gaining acceptance for them and of implementing them once
accepted in principle. The appointment of a Special Assistant to the
President on Science is a hopeful step in tightening up our organization
and should go far in setting the tone for scientific activities throughout
the government and especially in the Department of Defense.

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# VIII - ALLIANCES AND THE ROLE OF FORCE

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has entered into a wide variety of military agreements with other states ranging from the sweeping multilateral defense arrangements of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Association to a large number of bilateral agreements with individual nations. Integral to the U.S. system of alliances are the U.S. overseas bases including strategic air bases, naval installations, and supply areas. Our five divisions in Europe are a token of our determination to resist any attack on our NATO allies.

## The Basis of the U.S. System of Alliances

Strategically, the U.S. system of alliances is invaluable in the overall world-balance of power. Our overseas bases provide advanced observation and warning posts against Soviet aggression. They furnish valuable dispersal areas for the SAC. They bring U.S. striking forces closer to enemy targets, thus complicating the opponent's defensive problem. They permit employment of medium-range bombers as well as easier refueling of long-range bombers based in the U.S. Overseas bases will be an essential element of our effective striking power for at least the next decade. The advent of missiles will only increase their importance. On the one hand, missiles will enable the Soviet bloc to make many of our overseas airbases untenable. On the other hand, intermediate and

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short-range missiles can blanket almost all of the U.S.S.R. from our present overseas bases. The geographic relationship is such that intermediate range missiles in our possession or in the hands of our allies have the same strategic significance as intercontinental missiles in the hands of the U.S.S.R. And the shorter range the missile, the more mobile its launching site and, therefore, the more invulnerable to Soviet surprise attack. Thus while the development of missiles will greatly reduce the value of overseas airbases, it will also greatly enhance the importance of overseas missile launching sites.

Moreover, to the degree that the horrors of all-out war increase the likelihood of other forms of conflict, alliances take on an added dimension. As long as the United States possessed an atomic monopoly, the chief significance of alliances was in furnishing a *casus belli* for American action. In the face of the conviction that the chief deterrent to Soviet aggression resided in U.S. strategic superiority, there was an understandable reluctance on the part of our allies to make a major military effort of their own. As long as it was believed that the issue of a war would be deviated elsewhere, few of our allies saw a significance in a military contribution of their own. The reliance on an all-out strategy tended to run counter to a coalition policy.

But with the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the means to deliver it, all members of the alliance have an equal interest in removing any Soviet illusion that it might use its nuclear capability as a shield

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behind which to expand by more limited means, they also share an interest
to keep any war that does break out to the smallest possible proportions.

This is possible only to the extent that local resistance is feasible.

Alliance arrangements can provide local forces to deter or check limited
aggression. They can strengthen local will to resist because they guar-
antee that a threatened country would not stand alone. The efficacy of
our alliance policy may not only determine victory or defeat in limited war;
it is a good insurance against such wars breaking out in the first place.

Pressures on Our Alliance System

Nevertheless it would be idle to pretend that the growing Soviet
power inevitably produces a heightened determination on the part of our
allies. On the contrary, Soviet blackmail, nuclear and otherwise may
bring about an atmosphere of defeatism and an attempt to seek safety in
neutrality.

In the past a nation threatened with attack would generally resist
because the worst that could happen to it as the result of an unsuccessful
war was national disintegration. But when national disintegration is
increasingly identified with the outbreak of a war, neutrality can be
expected to become an increasingly attractive cause. Aggravating the
other pressures on our alliance arrangements is the concept of aggression
which underlies them. Essentially restricted to the crossing of frontiers
by armed regular troops, such a definition renders it extremely difficult

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to prepare adequate counters against a whole range of communist aggressive techniques, from civil war to slow takeovers by communist-guided and communist-armed fifth columns.

As a result the Communist Bloc has learned that if it keeps its challenges sufficiently ambiguous and below the level which the non-communist world considers to warrant major war, we and our allies may prove unable or unwilling to take effective action. Neither Korea nor Indochina, for example, seemed to some members of our alliances worth a major military effort. And Suez presented an even more difficult problem. Confronted by an ambiguous threat, even a group of nations whose interests are very kindred find it exceedingly difficult to achieve an effective concerted response, especially if this response involves major risks.

Thus the continued effectiveness of our alliance policy depends on two factors: (a) on our ability to establish a concept of aggression addressed to the most likely threats to our security; (b) on our ability to develop, together with our allies, a military capability which offers less drastic alternatives than surrender or suicide. With the partial exception of the NATO alliance, our present security arrangements do not effect a common concept. It is not clear whether our alliances are a device to insure that the U.S. will visit massive retaliation on the U.S.S.R. in case of aggression; or whether they are pacts whose existence legitimizes our intervention on foreign territories; or, finally, whether they are designed to combine the strength of all allies to defeat or deter communist aggression.

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Until we and our allies become clear about the *purpose* of our security arrangements, our alliances are likely to be beset by vacillation. Unless we can develop common military policies, many of our alliances will amount to little more than unilateral U.S. guarantees. If our security pacts do not seem equally meaningful to us and our partners, there will be weaknesses, indecisions and contradictions in all concrete issues likely to arise.

Thus many of the difficulties of our alliance structure resemble the disputes among our own military services. There is the same dispute about the relative efficacy of limited and all-out war; the same uncertainty about the relative emphasis on nuclear or conventional weapons. And the result is that in every crisis policymakers are overwhelmed by conflicting advice; the weight of unresolved disputes inhibits decisive action.

It therefore becomes imperative that the United States make a joint effort with its allies to develop a common strategy. The act of consultation will be itself of great significance for one of the reasons for the sense of impotence of many of our allies is ignorance about the nature of modern military technology and a sense of being left out from decisions which deeply affect their fate.

We should have no illusions about the ease with which concerted measures can be developed particularly with some of our allies in the industrially less developed areas. To the degree that we rely on nuclear weapons, many of our allies will be able to make less and less of a contribution to the success of combined operations. Nevertheless, it should

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be our goal to assist in the development of allied units capable of acting in concert with U.S. forces particularly in limited and concealed wars.

This does not mean that we should equip all allied elements along the lines of comparable U.S. units. To the maximum degree possible both the types and levels of equipment provided allied forces should be tailored to the missions which they are expected to perform in their particular regions. And we should not set standards for our allies based on our own levels of technology. But we must establish a measure of harmony between our tactical doctrine and that of our allies. In some areas, particularly in NATO, this implies a concept embracing atomic warfare.

As a result, the cost of military aid programs will necessarily be large. The U.S. will have to provide -- either directly or indirectly -- a great deal of the military equipment and even more importantly of the technical know-how. The actions involved will not be easy or cheap and many of them will be perplexing. Nor are military measures sufficient by themselves. They must be supplemented by preventive programs: economic and technical assistance and education to improve governmental administration discussed more fully by other groups of the overall study project of which this report is one product.

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IX - THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF NATO

In order to appreciate the importance of NATO we need only to
contemplate our situation if Western Europe were in hostile hands or lay
divided and helpless before Soviet aggression: The Communist Bloc would
then command an industrial potential equal to our own; it would straddle the
world's main communications lines and flank the weak and divided Middle
East from both north and east, able to manipulate the manpower, factories
and cultural prestige of Europe, to dominate Africa and infiltrate South America.
It is easy to visualize the loss of Western Europe as prelude to a beleaguered
United States, forced to retire to what it would hope would remain Fortress
America, but a fortress to which the surrounding Communist World could
largely forbid trade and raw materials.

The Weaknesses of NATO

The factors which made the NATO area essential to U.S. security
also create difficulties and complications. For Western Europe is deeply
affected by the revolutionary transformation going on in the world. European
political and economic power have been weakened basically by the large and
continuing loss of colonial possessions in Asia, the Middle East and Africa.
The change of international climate since the Geneva "summit" Conference has
tended to dissolve the sense of urgency upon which NATO was founded and to
revive a number of rivalries and irritations between NATO members. The

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dispute over Cyprus was permitted to fester to the detriment of NATO.
France has withdrawn most of her European divisions to Algeria. Germany
is offered the choice of unification on Soviet terms or continued membership
in NATO and no unification. The Anglo-French adventure in Suez strained
NATO ties. And the 1957 British White Paper on Defense promptly announced
sharp reductions of British forces in Germany.

Sentiment toward neutralism, or at least toward a more passive
membership, has been growing in some NATO countries. Many factors
contribute to this psychological retreat from nuclear reality, including the
relative weakness of our NATO partners. Perhaps the most important reason
is a paradoxical ambivalence: Europeans recoil from the damage and destruc-
tion they believe would result from the abundant use of tactical atomic weapons
in Europe. But they are also beginning to be afraid that the growing Soviet
nuclear stockpile will make the U.S. reluctant to risk devastation of the
American mainland in order to protect Europe.

If there is a means of resolving this political-psychological problem,
it would seem to lie first in clarifying NATO strategy; for it is evident that
the trend of military thinking in the two leading NATO countries (U.S. and
Britain) has produced a profound confusion among the European members of
NATO as to what kind of war they are being asked to plan and make sacrifices
for. They are still being asked to provide conventional ground forces for a
protective forward shield of a minimum of thirty divisions, but both the U.S.
and U.K. seem increasingly to discount the efficacy of ground forces and to

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rest their faith on the massive deterrent. Moreover, both the U.S. and U.K. have been equipping their forces with nuclear weapons, further reducing the significance of conventional divisions.

European disquiet about atomic warfare is thus aggravated by the feeling that NATO planning is based exclusively on an "all-out" nuclear response to any war situation that might arise in Europe; that the strategy is inflexible, permitting no provision for limited hostilities, but leading automatically and inexorably to a war of total destruction. This is not in fact the strategy of the NATO planners, who are acutely aware that there exists both a political and a military need for flexibility and limited response. They understand that only a strong shield of ground forces in central Europe could give the free world, in the event of a limited Soviet advance, a broader choice than the extremes of passive acceptance or a global holocaust. The fact is, however, that recent trends in U.S. military policy, and perhaps even more in British military policy, have done much to obscure the NATO doctrine; and to deprive it of the forces to make it meaningful. The official military policy of both countries has tended to weaken the NATO shield precisely when, in the face of Soviet technological advances, it should be strongest.

What is the essence of the shield concept? To be effective it does not have to provide a force that can "defend" Europe in the sense of being able to hold the NATO area inviolate against Soviet penetration and bombardment, although this would be the optimum situation. Instead the prevailing idea is to provide a force of sufficient strength (a) to deal firmly with a probing action,

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whether deliberate or accidental; (b) to hold long enough, in the event of
full-scale attack, to provide the elements of time and information that would
enable Washington, London and the NATO Council to assess the situation and
make strategic decisions; and (c) to hold long enough, again in the event of
full-scale attack, for our air-atomic counterblows to have their effect and
thus to bring the Soviet offensive to a halt. To perform these tasks, there
must exist a shield of respectable power. A mere thin screen of forces
comprising what has been called a "tripwire" or a "plate glass window" would
be wholly inadequate because it would restrict NATO, in the event of even a
minor violation of its territory, to the stark choice of accepting the violation
or calling down the nuclear holocaust.

A flexible strategy made possible by a strong shield would afford at
least a modest range of choice; and it is the existence of some choice of
response which will make the difference between a cohesive alliance with a
will to fight and a coalition of fearful partners half-ready to turn neutralist
at the onset of a serious crisis.

The U.S. can contribute to such a flexible strategy by fully endorsing
a strong NATO shield. This would mean accepting without reservation the
military, political and psychological necessity of substantial U.S. military
forces in Europe for the indefinite future. It would also be most helpful if we
could reassure our allies that we intend to fit our military response to the size
and nature of a particular military threat that may arise; that we do not rule out

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the possibility of non-atomic and localized response to certain situations
(although we properly refuse to give any pledge not to use atomic weapons);
above all, that it is our policy to do everything possible, consistent with
effective reaction to aggression, to limit the scope and destructiveness of
war in Europe. The U.S. should be able to approach this task with conviction,
for it is equally in our interest to see that a conflict arising in Europe does
not automatically spread to world-wide hydrogen war.

A corollary of this central problem of an adequate NATO shield is to
provide within Europe and controlled by Europeans a military capability that
will substantially reduce Europe's dependence on U.S. strategic airpower.
This is necessary both to restore the declining power position of NATO vis-a-vis
the U.S.S.R. and to bolster the European sense of hope and of participation,
which are basic ingredients of the will to resist. It has become imperative
with the development of a Soviet missile threat. To counteract any possibility
of Soviet blackmail, Europe should be placed in a position to exercise more
influence over the means and scale of its own defense by obtaining tactical
atomic weapons and intermediate-range missiles, and the necessary training
in their use. This would reduce the disparity in effective power between Russia
and Europe and it would counterbalance the Soviet lead in intercontinental
missiles during the interim period in which they are ahead.

A substantial military establishment on the continent of Europe has
become all the more important in the face of the growing Soviet naval strength.
The day may not be too far distant when a combination of submarine threats

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and the mining of European harbors would seal off the continent from its allies across the seas, at least for a limited time. In such circumstances, resistance to Soviet pressures may be possible only if there exists an integrated NATO force on the continent.

For a great many reasons related broadly to United States economic and political interests and the development of self-confidence and responsibility in Europe, it would be very desirable if a military strengthening of NATO were achieved in substantial part through a greater European contribution. It is unlikely, however, that Europe will undertake full participation unless it is made clear that it will have access to atomic weapons. This problem can not be resolved except by steps to surmount the legal obstacles such as the MacMahon Act, and then to begin providing the Europeans with nuclear weapons. When we have done this, we can call upon them to carry a larger share of the NATO burden. At the same time our allies must realize that a continued avoidance of heavier defense burdens will imperil the joint security and may bring on the most catastrophic kind of war. The chief problem of NATO is a question of will even more than of power.

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# X - DISARMAMENT

## The Problem of Disarmament

Ever since 1920, but particularly since World War II the United States has sought for disarmament agreements on the control and reduction of armaments. We have been motivated by a desire to decrease the amount of resources devoted to military purposes. We have also believed that a rising level of armaments breeds insecurity. Finally, we have wished to give the Kremlin every opportunity to negotiate a reduction of tensions. But while spurred on by knowledge of the disastrous consequences of large-scale use of nuclear weapons we have been conscious that a spurious agreement to disarm would be worse than the reality of peril.

Unfortunately, disarmament plans, always a difficult matter to control, have become more complicated by the increasingly rapid rate of technological change. Scientific research and development can decide the armament race. Hence no reduction in standing forces, however scrupulously carried out, can altogether protect a nation against a technological breakthrough by enemy scientists. The fact that so much of the armaments race occurs in laboratories also inhibits control and inspection. It is difficult to find something when one does not know what it is one is looking for.

In addition to the technological problems, the structure of international relations works against reductions in forces beyond a certain point. For example, nothing is likely to induce the Soviets to accept a level of armaments

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which curtailed their ability to control the satellites or to play a major role in areas like the Middle East. But forces sufficient to accomplish this task are also sufficient to imperil all the peripheral powers of Eurasia. And a reduction of forces which does not affect the Soviet position relative to weaker powers will not diminish the basic security problems of the non-Soviet world.

## The Problem of Surprise Attack

It is precisely because a cut in forces has proved so nearly impossible to negotiate that the major emphasis of disarmament efforts has turned to the prevention of surprise attack. Since -- so the argument goes -- a prime cause of present tensions is insecurity stemming from fear of imminent catastrophe, an inspection system which reduced the danger of surprise attack would also remove some of the urgent strains from international relationships.

There is no doubt that the danger of surprise attack contributes to the tensions of the nuclear age. But inspection schemes so far proposed do not significantly reduce the element of surprise. The high state of readiness required of strategic striking forces means that they need no noticeable mobilization to launch their blow. And as the normal peacetime maneuvers of a strategic striking force come to approximate its wartime behavior, an enemy will be unable to tell until his early warning line is crossed, whether a given flight is on a training mission or is launching a surprise attack.

Moreover, as the speed of planes increases, the warning time afforded by even a perfect inspection system will be progressively reduced. And in the

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age of the Inter-continental Ballistic Missile the maximum warning time possible would be half an hour, the period of time the missile would be in transit. Under such circumstances, even a foolproof inspection system will tell largely what is already known: that the opponent possesses the capability to launch a devastating attack on very short notice with a minimum of warning.

Thus, inspection systems are becoming increasingly less useful in giving direct warning of impending attack although they may have values as indicators of political intent and as sources of military intelligence. Their value will depend far less on giving specific notice of the departure of enemy aircraft or missiles than in affording trained operatives a chance to detect all of the intangibles of nervousness, tension and different patterns of activity which might betray a hostile intent. This report, much as it would like to be more optimistic, cannot see how present vigilance could be reduced, or insecurity be removed, by any inspection system now in prospect.

## The Problem of War Limitation

Since all-out war could start not only by surprise attack but also by the spreading of a small war, it would seem wise for the U.S. to include on the agenda of disarmament negotiations constructive proposals to mitigate the horrors of war. Despite the poor record of the human race in this regard a program to mitigate the horrors of war might be used to clarify the intentions of the opposing sides and thus might help prevent the catastrophe of an all-out war caused by miscalculation.

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Even a unilateral U.S. declaration would accomplish a great deal because it would provide a strong incentive to the other side to consider the same ground rules. The experience of the Hague convention regarding the humane conduct of man supports this, for even powers which refused to join generally obeyed its rules.

The establishment of some concept of war limitation is all the more important because as long as both major powers possess nuclear weapons, it is likely that even a limited war involving them will include the use of nuclear weapons. Under present conditions, the sudden employment of nuclear weapons might unnecessarily unleash an all-out war. It is therefore imperative to establish in advance as much as possible of the psychological and political framework of such a conflict.

Such a course would also enable us to make a distinction between disagreement proposals and communist ban-the-bomb propaganda. We would leave no doubt that aggression by the communist bloc would be resisted with nuclear weapons if necessary, but we would make clear to the rest of the world that we were making every effort to limit the effect of nuclear weapons and to protect civilian populations. Of course if the U.S.S.R. launched an all-out surprise attack, we would react by using every weapon in our arsenal. But in the case of a local communist attack, we would fight a limited war according to rules established in advance -- as long as the enemy observed the same rules.

It is possible that the Soviet Government would not formally accept such a proposal. The Soviet leaders have every interest in painting the

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consequences of any war in the most drastic terms: the belief of the non-Soviet world in the inevitable horror of nuclear war is the prerequisite of Soviet atomic blackmail. But whatever the utility of the pronouncements of impending doom for paralyzing resistance, the Soviet leaders would face a considerable dilemma if we reiterated our position even in the face of a Soviet rejection. Whatever their distrust, if a limited war came they would possess a powerful incentive to fight it according to the rules we had laid down. It must be stressed that war would be kept limited not through an agreement but through mutual self-interest because of the fear of the consequences of an expanded war. But negotiations may avoid misunderstanding and miscalculation.

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XI - CIVIL DEFENSE

There are few problems of the atomic age with which the United States
has had greater difficulty in coming to grips than civil defense. Our traditional
invulnerability to direct military attack and our predilection for the offensive
over the defensive have combined to cause us to treat civil defense as a minor
adjunct of our overall strategic posture both in terms of planning and in
resources allocated to it.

The study on which this report is based has been directed primarily
toward U.S. international strategic objectives. The full civil defense problem
is well beyond its scope. The technical possibilities of defending our cities
and homes, the costs, the impact on our national psychology and ways of
working and living -- these present a complex of both broad and specialist
considerations deserving detailed and separate examination. Nevertheless,
the connection between civil defense and the other elements of our national
security requires a general evaluation of the possibilities.

If relations with the Soviet bloc ever reach the showdown stage, the
edge of difference which may be very fine, may well depend on the strength
of the competing wills. This in turn will depend importantly on relative
vulnerabilities. It is an oppressive thought that such circumstances might
arrive in fact, but it would be feckless to suggest that they cannot. And
courage in crisis, if it is to be effective and continuing, must rest on at
least a modicum of hope.

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Deterrence depends on a combination of power and will. The factor of power requires a retaliatory capability sufficient to overcome any enemy defense, and as invulnerable as possible to surprise attack. The factor of will may hinge importantly on a reasonable combination of passive and active defense measures. An enemy who felt confident that he could disrupt and disorganize our society while preserving the substance of his own would be tempted to launch an all-out blow. Conversely the ability to protect our population may enable us in times of crisis to act with firmness and resolution. In the age of the ballistic missile the known capability of a society to withstand attack will become an increasingly important deterrent.

Even a modest civil defense will not be easy, and it can never be complete. Protecting against massively destructive weapons is an enormous problem. A 20-megaton thermonuclear weapon, for example, with a radius of total destruction of between five to eight miles will inevitably have devastating consequences. The impact of chemical or biological warfare is even more difficult to calculate.

Difficulty does not mean impotence, however. While it may be very
expensive to protect the population against the blast and heat of a direct
atomic explosion, protection against radioactive fall-out and other contamina-
tion appears to be a great deal easier. Above all, it is essential that our
people understand the dangers of modern weapons and the possibilities of
mitigating their effects, so that we may respond with discipline and so that
no enemy can assume that a sudden attack would disorganize our society.

[L.C.]

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While the whole field of civil defense requires, above all, the most careful study, it is possible to state a few general principles in relation to it:

1. Civil defense must be considered as part of the overall U.S. strategic posture. It should therefore be part of our _defense_ planning and included in our overall strategic plans. The expense involved should be treated as an addition to existing military outlays.

2. The American people need to be told more clearly the dimensions of the problem of civil defense and what can be done to reduce them. Any effective civil defense program will have as a pre-requisite a perceptive program of public information supported by the Federal Government and carried through at all levels.

3. A civil defense program should be integrated with the construction program needed for the normal development of our expanding population and economy.

An effective civil defense program can be separated into three stages:

1. <u>To provide warning and to give advice on how to behave most effectively.</u> This requires an attack-proof warning system and radio net to broadcast information and instructions during and after an attack. The cost of such a program would be reasonable.

2. <u>Protection against contamination.</u> It has been estimated that half of the casualties of a large-scale atomic attack might result from

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radioactive fall-out. Moreover, it would be essential that
individuals in an area contaminated by radioactivity, chemicals,
or biological agents behave with discipline and effectiveness.
A monitoring system for radiological levels will be needed.
Simple home shelters can add greatly to the general safety.
A proportion of this program could be locally financed. The
role of the Federal Government in this regard lies in setting
the example, in public information, and in creating incentives
in the form of loans, tax relief or similar measures.

3. Protection against atomic blast and heat. This is a major problem, particularly in our big urban concentrations. A case can be made that it is possible to construct shelters capable of resisting even a direct hit, located so that they can be reached within 15 to 30 minutes by the population they serve, and useful meanwhile for peacetime purposes, such as underground passages. The subject is of such complexity, however, and the costs are so very large that this report cannot plausibly go further than to commend such a deep shelter program for careful study. If indeed it is feasible it will add greatly to our security as a nation.

The immediate task is to create an attack-proof warning
system and radio and to begin on a program of fall-out shelters.
Before any long-range progress can be made in civil defense,

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however, the problem must be treated as an integral part of
our defense planning. It is not reasonable that our large
military defense effort should lack a complementary effort
for the direct protection of our most important resource:
our civilian population.

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# XII - BUDGET FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Achievement of the objectives of our national security programs in the years ahead hinges on the availability of financial resources and the manner in which they are applied. There is grave reason for concern with respect to recent levels of military appropriations as well as with respect to the workings of the budgetary process.

## The Budgetary Level

Programs of great importance to U.S. security now suffer from insufficient funds, and at present budgetary levels our prospects are bleak.

Several reasons have brought about this state of affairs. It was natural for the American people, when the Korean war ended, to demand that military expenditures be drastically cut. But the execution of these reductions, displaying less accuracy than force, had serious consequences, although they did not become evident for some time. For example, the momentum of the Air Force build-up continued until unspent appropriations from 1952 to 1953 ran out and, where major procurement is concerned, the Army has been living off its pre-1954 appropriations.

Another cause has been the continuing technological revolution -- with its inevitable consequences of rising military costs.

The downward trend has yet to be arrested; the upturn may be too little and too late. With due recognition that the budgetary level depends

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on judgments of great technical complexity, this report cannot conclude
without pointing to what seems the principal weak points and to indicate
the approximate magnitude of effort required to overcome these deficiencies.

Strategic Forces

Deterrence

1. Unless aircraft procurement to modernize existing units is authorized into the 1960's, a gap in ready forces between the latest types of manned aircraft and the operational stage of ballistic missiles seems unavoidable. We cannot risk obsolescence of present weapons before new ones are ready.

2. The SAC base structure, long out of phase with other elements in its program, should be made less vulnerable to surprise attack through dispersion and other protective measures.

3. Accelerated research and development support should be provided for such key programs as missiles and advance reconnaissance systems.

Active Defense

Early warning and anti-missile defense systems, anti-submarine
measures require greater attention.

Tactical Forces

To provide something more than the token mobile units presently in
being, additional troop lift should be authorized in the form both of modern

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aircraft and modern ships.

The Army should be permitted to speed up the modernization of its
division structure. Its present authorized divisions should be brought to
full strength.

Navy

Anti-submarine warfare requires additional funds. The program of
equipping both surface and underwater ships with missiles of various types
should be accelerated.

Personnel

Present pay scales are inadequate to retain the skilled officers and
men necessary to an effective and economic military establishment. Neither
are we attracting a sufficient number of the best of our youth to military
careers.

Civil Defense

A start should be made on the federal government's proper share in
funding a home shelter construction program and related warning and
communications equipment.

This report is based on testimony that most of the deficiencies noted
above can be remedied through successive increments on the order of $3
billion a year in the Defense budget for the next several fiscal years. As

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applied to the present Defense Department budget, such an increment would represent an increase of about 8 per cent. Looking beyond 1960, it seems inevitable that, unless there is an agreement on disarmament, the cost of military programs will continue to rise with no level-off occurring before 1965. Much of the increase is due to the fact that we must maintain our present forces, particularly of manned planes, even while we go into production in missiles. Thus, three years hence the combined Defense Department and Civil Defense budgets may well reach $50 billion to which should be added the $4 billion for military programs of the Atomic Energy Commission and for military aid to our allies. Together these would make a total of about $54 billion. This is a heavy burden. But it is essential for our survival.

To speak solely in terms of dollars is misleading, however, A better gauge for measuring the budgetary burden is by relating it to the Gross National Product. By this standard, even with the increases thus proposed, defense expenditures by 1962 would amount to only 12 per cent of the Gross National Product predicted for that time,* a percentage no

* This is a smaller percentage than the U.S.S.R. is spending even now. Moreover in terms of pay and subsistence, an American soldier received 2-1/2 times as much as his Russian counterpart, and our aircraft technicians are paid five times as much. Thus, even though Soviet total national income is less than ours, any given percentage of Soviet GNP may buy more military strength than an equivalent percentage of our GNP.

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higher than defense expenditures in 1952. And this does not take into
account savings which would result from a retailoring of military roles
and missions and from improvements in the organization of the Defense
Department.

The Budgetary Process

Increased defense expenditures will not be fully effective however
unless they are accompanied by the organizational changes outlined in
Section VII. These in turn can be prompted by improvements of existing
methods of presenting the budget.

The budgetary process could be greatly improved if military budgets
were prepared and presented in more meaningful terms. The present method
of preparation does not give the President, the Secretary of Defense,
Congress or the public a clear indication of what the funds requested will
accomplish in terms of military missions or effective units. As a result, it
is natural for Congress to make reductions by percentage cuts across-the-
board, rather than by selective examinations of individual programs.

Complete budgetary reform may not be immediately feasible. However,
a start can be made toward a system that corresponds more closely to the
general strategic philosophy of this report. It should not be too difficult,
for example, to restate the presentation of the Air Force budget, so that
instead of the present categories of "aircraft and related procurement,"

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"procurement other than aircraft," "operation and maintenance," "military personnel," etc., there would be a clear indication of how much goes to strategic air, to air defense, to tactical air, and to air transport. The present budget structures of the other services are equally far from indicating expenditures along mission lines.

Another highly desirable change is to transform the present one-year budget cycle to two years. Under present rules, the top personnel of the services spend the first six months of every year preparing, justifying and revising the budgetary requests of their departments. The next six months are consumed in testifying before congressional committees and otherwise defending the service budgets as approved by the President. If the budgetary process would extend over an entire congressional term, the energies of key personnel could be directed towards strategic doctrine and over-all management. At the same time congressional control would be more meaningful because the examination of requests could then be more careful.

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XIII - CONCLUSION -- THE PROBLEM OF POWER

No aspect of America's problems presents a deeper challenge than the field of national security. It is not because the technical problems are so complex, though an accellerating technology will test severly our wisdom and our ability to make choices. Nor is the economic challenge the most complicated one we face, though the price of security in the nuclear age is high and likely to increase. It is not even the field of strategic doctrine which presents our deepest problem though military strength is sterile without a doctrine for employing it.

Rather our chief difficulty resides in our whole approach to the problem of power and it reflects some of the most attractive qualities of American society. We like to believe that reasonable men can settle all disputes through good-will and compromise and that power should be invoked only as a last resort. We therefore tend to think of diplomacy and force as successive and separate phases of national policy. Unfortunately the position in which we find ourselves does not permit such absolute distinctions. In a revolutionary period the ability and willingness to use force is in itself a factor of stability. To a world threatened by aggression and infiltration, American strength and resolution is a guarantee of security.

To be sure, this may not always be apparent in the public declarations of other nations. To countries primarily concerned with domestic development foreign aggression may seem unreal and the measures required to resist it may appear as irritating interruptions of more primary tasks.

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But while we should have full understanding for the psychology which pro-
duces these reactions, we would be wrong to gear our policy to it. Force
will not solve the problems of this period but the willingness to use it may
afford the breathing spell in which nations can work out their own destiny
without foreign interference. We must not forget that the neutrality of many
nations is possible only as long as we are strong, just as for a century and
a half the British navy made possible our neutrality. Many of our most
vocal critics would be deeply troubled were our military protection suddenly
withdrawn.

Our power is a fact. Its existence cannot be undone by a refusal to
recognize it. The dilemmas which it imposes will not solve themselves by
shutting our eyes. The moral quandary which power brings is the manner
in which it will be used, and the degree of responsibility which will
accompany its use. The moral problem will not vanish if we refrain from
applying our power. Abdication is a course involving responsibility just
as much as action. We will better show our national stature by our willing-
ness to expose our morality in the selection of the ends which we avow,
and in the constraint and wisdom with which our power will be applied to
achieve them.