DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Butterfield/Kissinger

11:28 p. a.m.

9/24/70

B: The President would like you to come to dinner tonight. Black tie. Do your soft shoe.

K: He wants me to talk.

B: He doesn't want you to change any major commitments.

K: But there's not way I can be there and talk and not be there, is there?

B: NO.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

11:47 a.m. 9/24/70

K: The President appreciated your suggestion on the carrier and he agreed with it.

L: I thought I should check with you on this visit to Turkey. I have an invitation I am accepting and I don't want to give the impression that it's something we asked for. I am just trying to get State to turn it off and meet with the Defense Minister.

K: You don't want Sisco.

L: In Turkey, fine, but he is poison in Greece. They think he is the reason for the hold up in aid. I am accepting Turkish Defense minister's invitation.

K: How can they think a thing like that. Would he do anything contrary to the President's wishes? We were trying to get rid of him.

L: Send him home.

K: Tell him that he must stay on top of the M. E.

L: Can't have everyone out of town at the same time.

K: I will take the blame. I will tell him the President wants him back here.

Telecon
Joe Sisco

9/24/70 12:10 p.m.

S: There were three things I wanted to mention: first, I am sending to you for your clearance a simple one-page suggestion as to two or three oral points that might be made to Rabin to put a ribbon on our recent effort.

K: The President wants to do that very warmly.

S: Wait till you see it; I have done it very warmly. And if you like, I can make it warmer. Secondly, I have just finished a suggested talking paper for the President for use with the Mediterranean ambassadors, which was rather presumptuous of me.

K: Not at all. That's what I wanted you to do.

S: Am very anxious for him to see this. I think it's got the kind of view which the President and you and I would like to have reflected to the Ambassadors. I will put it in the usual bureaucratic way into the book, but I have also sent you an extra copy.

K: Good.

S: Third, I just got a call in from the field. Palmer suggested, and I think it's very good, that I should brief all the Ambassadors on the Middle East before the President at 11:00.

K: That's a good idea.

S: I thought it was; I just wanted to be sure. I would do it at 9:00.

K: That's terrific. If the Secretary agrees we are strongly in favor, and I don't see how he can not want you to. There were two things I wanted to mention to you/ The President is thinking that you ought to go back after Naples; he wants you here to watch things: we are not that much out of the woods yet.

S: And Laird thinks my presence would give it too much of a Middle Eastern flavor.

K: That I hadn't heard. KXX

S: Let's leave it at that one day in Naples, then I'll come back.

E.O. 12158
DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By AB NARA Date 6/9/70

Telecon
Joe Sisco

9/24/70 12:10 p.m. page 2.

K: We're sending Haig back for that reason.

S: Fine, maybe Al and I can team up to come back.

K: The other thing is strictly personal: I had a visitor today
who was saying that Bergus is talking about me in a very vicious way.

S: I will take care of that.

K: It's awful for an American minister to talk that way. And
he takes credit for starting that campaign on "expel."

S: Let me take care of it. You don't do a thing. I promise you
I'll take care of it.

K: Good. Thank you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Joe Sisco

9/24/70 12:10 p.m.

K: Good.

K: That's a good idea.

K: That I hadn't heard. KMX

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Joe Sisco

9/24/70 12:10 p.m. page 2.

S: I will take care of that.

K: Good. Thank you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Amb. Crnobrjna/Kissinger
12:12 p. m. 9/24/70

K: I had a problem which my people asked me to raise and it hadn't reached me when you were in. A technical problem which the President has great interest in. They usually have a truck full of photo photographers preceeding the President. you usually do not. I don't suppose there's a compromise.

C: It's a difficulty.

K: I understand it's not done in your country.

C: A photo lorry?

K: An ordinary truck. One is enough to get pictures back to the U.S. We had it in Romania.

C: I will send the request to Belgrade but I see no problem. Why not?

K: Your approach (?) is not to allow the press close to the President.

C: Because of reasons of security.

K: This is the sort of thing the President would appreciate and would not violate anything unless a Serbian national custom.

C: I will approve this.

K: Will you let me win one argument so I can prove I am not a complete weakling. You always get your way.

Gkx

C: My English is not good (HAK rewords his remark) Oh, I see. Then the balance is restored. I understand fully your interest in that. When I am in Belgrade and can act on the spot -- I will now just mention this. Whether any sort of ______ with first lady is foreseen?

K: Not possible. Scheduling problem. She would be glad to receive your wife afterwards but it may have other advantages.

C: Yes. We have no problem of prestige. It's a humane thing.

K: She appreciated that. It will definitely be worked out after our return.

C: If I have anything after my departure, Dr. ______ will be here and will tell Sonnenfeldt.

TELCONE
Dobrynin/Kissinger
3:04 p.m. 9/24/70

D: You didn't keep your word not to organize anything during my absence.

K: Don't speak about who isn't keeping his word. You stayed away a lot longer
then we thought. Let's not go into this on the phone.

D: I am calling today if it's possible to see the President about two point s--
The summit and things about Jordan.

K: I will talk to him. His schedule is very full. Can you talk to me?

D: Yes but the questions is when I left Moscow they said ? ? ?. Today or tomorrow really. It could wait until tomorrow and it's not urgent.

K: I understand. I will have to ask him.

D: Understand and the timing. 20-25 mins. and then I could talk to you on a more detailed basis.

K: You understand we are leaving town next week.

D: Sunday.

K: Probably, yes.

D: I think's why I am calling. I just arrived late last night.

K: I will check with the President.

D: Let me know when it's possible to arrange it.

K: I will let you know. Will you be seeing others before you see the President?

D: No. Nobody. You are the first I am to call. Perhpas half an hour before I could talk with you.

K: I have no particular need to talk with you. I have to see if the President has time and if not, you may have to talk with me. Today I know is impossible.

D: Tomorrow is no problem. I am not going to see anyone before that. I will await your call.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12158
Authority
By NARA Date 6/9/70

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012368
By CHARA Date 5/20/80

TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

3:04 p.m.

9/24/70

D: I am xdx calling today if it's possible to see the President about two point s--
The summit and things about Jordan.

D: Sunday.

K: Probably, yes.

D: that's why I am calling. I just arrived late last night.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Dobrynin/Kissinger

3:04 p.m.

9/24/70

D: I am xxx calling today if it's possible to see the President about two point s--
The summit and things about Jordan.

D: Sunday.

K: Probably, yes.

D: I hat's why I am calling. I just arrived late last night.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
9/24/70; 6:40 p.m.

K: I had a call from Dobrynin this afternoon and he said he had a message for you on that Summit and also on the Jordanian situation. I was very cool to him and said I didn't know if your schedule permitted you to see him.

P: I will not see him. If he wants to give a message, he can see you. I didn't give him...

K: I handed him the first and Haig handed Vorontsov the second. If you want to come to Map Room after and get...

P: I am not going to go to him and take a message unless it is positive -- I am not going to waste my time.

K: Why don't I tell him you should give me the message?

P: Tell him you would like to take a look at it and that you would look at my schedule. I don't think we want to appear that everytime he comes back I am going to slobber over him. Tell him if there is something substantive that would justify my seeing him, I will, but if it is just routine I can't do it. Let's put it that way.

K: Good, I will call him. I had lunch with the Time people -- I think it went very well. I gave them the same I gave this morning.

P: You think I ought to spend a few minutes with Sidey?

K: I don't think it would hurt.

P: Okay, fine, Henry. We will see you -- you are coming tonight.

K: I will be there by 9:00 p.m.

P: Do about the same as you did.

K: About 20-25 minutes.

P: About 25 minutes -- like you did this morning. No other new developments?

K: No. The army seems to be continuing to clean out the Fedayeen. Some reports that the Iraqis are changing into Fedayeen uniform.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1958
Authority
By: NARA Date 6/9/70

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/The President
9/24/70; 6:40 p.m.

-2-

P: On the Dobrynin thing, let me leave it to your judgment. Take the message and tell him if the message justifies my seeing him you will work it out.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Right. Say, Mr. Ambassador, he is leaving and is cleaning out several things -- which is true. Okay?

K: Right.

feg

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: About 20-25 minutes.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

K: Right, Mr. President.

K: Right.

feg

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

9/24/70 7:00 p.m.

D: You were playing golf with the President?

K: No, I don't play. I just talked to the President and he is extremely occupied tomorrow and is going to Camp David tomorrow night. What he wonders is if you could give me the messages. If there is anything warranting a personal reply from him he will see you later in the day. That's his position.

D: I have to check it with Moscow, if you don't mind.

K: No.

D: In this particular case when I left they asked me to ask for an audience with him. I would have to ask my government in this case.

K: I understand, but you recognize that he is leaving Friday night for Camp David.

D: That's why they asked me to come earlier back to Washington. But it's up to the President.

K: If a written reply is needed we will give that; if something else... But under no circumstances will he have much time. Why don't you ask Moscow if you can tell me, then we can have 15 minutes later in the day for you to get his reactions.

D: It is up to Moscow; it is nptt up to me. This is really the question. I can't decide myself. It is not that they don't want me to speak with you.

K: Of course, if there is something in your communication that warrants his reaction, he will, of course, see you, but not for long.

D: The question is how he will react on this, not just telling him the things and nothing else.

K: If it requires a significant reaction he will react, but first he wants to see what it is. Call me in the morning and see if you can give it to me; if so, I propose 10:30.

D: I will check with Moscow. When will he be back?

K: October 6.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1258
Authority
By AS NARA Date 6/9/70

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

9/24/70 7:00 p.m. page 2

D: He is not going anyplace after the 6th?

K: He will be in and out. We told you his schedule was very
crowded for October and November. November is the political cam-
paign and he will be taking several trips.

D: I understand, but it is a question of a 10-minute talk.

K: We don't reject the idea of a 10-minute talk. We just want to see if there's something to talk about.

D: All right. I will check with Moscow and call you tomorrow
morning before 10:00 to clarify the situation from my side.

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

9/24/70 7:00 p.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOU-2557

By CHNARA Date 09/24/70

K: No.

K: If a written reply is needed we will give that; if something else . . . But under no circumstances will he have much time. Why don't you ask Moscow if you can tell me, then we can have 15 minutes later in the day for you to get his reactions.

D: It is up to Moscow; it is up to me. This is really the question. I can't decide myself. It is not that they don't want me to speak with you.

K: October 6.

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

9/24/70 7:00 p.m. page 2

K: He will be in and out. We told you his schedule was very crowded for October and November. November is the political campaign and he will be taking several trips.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012567

By

CHNARA Date 090125

By NARA, Dato 5/26

K: No.

K: October 6.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

9/24/70 7:00 p.m. page 2

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Under Secretary John Irwin
9/24/70; 8:50 p.m.

I: Back to our conversation, I would like very much to start the meetings anytime it is convenient.

K: Why don't we do it the Thursday of my return.

I: That will be great. I hope you have a very good trip.

K: Thank you. I always met with Elliot on Thursdays -- is that a good day for you?

I: Good -- Thursday luncheon.

K: Yes. We sort of alternated with his place and mine.

I: Fine.

feg

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Amb. Freeman/Kissinger
afternoon 9/24/70

K: Can you stand it if I discuss serious business with you?

F: A pleasant change.

K: It's a slightly sensitive thing having to do with Chile. It's for the Prime Minister or Foreign Secy. only. Our understanding here is that your Ambassador there holds the view we should come together with Allende. It makes it look that you are for an Allende & victory. It can be twisted to mean discouraging any other efforts. This is not the President's view although it's not out of line with others in our government. You have your own policy but I want you to know what we think.

F: It's very delicate. I have not read these communications.

K: If you want to know what the President thinks I can send over a backgrounder I gave in Chicago. Most is repetition --

F: Just send the relevant passage. That would help substantiate the case.

K: I have nothing to substantiate the roll of your Ambassador. Frankly, this is just from our Ambassador who seems to have lose his sanity.

F: Ours is a new man but extremely senior and serious.

K: Our assumptions are stated in this backgrounder.

F: If necessary, our taking a little of what the realities are. I don't think my government would look with favor on not having the Ambassador say what he thinks.

K: We think whatever he says to your government is up to him. Its what he says to the Chileans. He may say something other than what he thinks. What he says to your government is of no concern to us.

F: Thank you. I will mention this when we next meet.

K: The President may wish to raise it with the Prime Minister. The concern is that the clock is running and not much time.

F: You are going off on Sun.?

K: I am leaving Sat. for Paris.

F: Then I will see you in London.

K: At Chequers. And I may be in London for Sunday and Monday morning.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Lord Kennett (Weyland Young) (Telephone in London: PAddington 2020)

9/25/70 8:00 a.m.

K: I find that in my overwhelming bureaucracy I have never
answered your letter of some weeks ago. As my organization gets
larger its humanity drops.

Y: But you've called me; that's very human.

K: I may be in London on October 3. Will you be there?

Y: Yes I will.

K: That would be a week from Sunday. I will be there privately
so I shouldn't have the usual entourage. Would love to see you.

Y: I would love to see you too. Do you need a bed?

K: No, I'll be staying at a hotel. But why don't we fix a time in
the later afternoon on Sunday.

Y: We would love to have you for dinner.

K: I may have to cancel the dinner part, but I definitely want to
see you. I will have our Embassy get in touch with you.

Y: Good. I very much want to see you. I am starting a new life.
Is there anyone you want to see especially? Opposition people or bright
young people?

K: I would say bright young people.

Y: Okay. You'll be alone?

K: Yes. I may have a young assistant with me, but he can take
care of himself.

Y: All right. Bring him if you like or don't if you don't want to.

TELCOM
President/Kissinger
9:50 a.m. 9/25/70

K: Did you get my message about hostages? They have released 20. That means a real victory. But no Americans.

P: The King is surviving well. It's the hard game.

K: No question.

P: Can you get one that across? Are you having your backgrounder today?

K: Yes. I am leaving tonight.

P: I will see you after you see Dobrynin. I am briefing at 10:00. Dobrynin at 10:30 and I will see you after Dobrynin. I will make it very short with Dobrynin.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1458
By NARA Date 6/2/70

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger
9:50 a.m. 9/25/70

K: No question.

P: Can you get an xerox that across? Are you having your backgrounder today?

K: Yes. I am leaving tonight.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon
Margaret Osmer
9/25/70 12:05 p.m.

O: How are you?

K: I don't know; how am I?

O: I hear you are packing up and leaving town.

K: I've had a rough week.

O: I know and I thought you needed a change of pace.

K: Are you propositioning me again?

O: No and stop passing those stories around. I have a favor to ask.

K: In return for not using Nancy?

O: I'm going to drop "Paranoid" from the script if you'll do something for me.

K: What are you talking about?

O: That part where Schelling said you were paranoid; you said you didn't like it. You know that marvelous thing some lady made you for your birthday? Can I borrow it?

K: Yes.

O: Does it have pictures?

K: Just one of me.

O: Not with Jill St. John?

K: No. I have no pictures of me with Jill St. John.

O: Can I borrow it?

K: Yes.

O: Can Julie send it to me?

K: No.

O: Time Magazine (?) asked me if my relationship with you was professional.

K: You should have said absolutely not. What did you say?

By

NARA

Date 5/26

Telecon
Margaret Osmer

9/25/70 12:05 p.m. page 2

O: I just panicked.

K: Again? They are confusing you with Charlotte Ford.

O: I thought they were confusing me with Viki.

K: Yes, I had lunch with her the other day. Say, somebody said it's dangerous to have my children on TV. The kooks will go after them. Are they in there a lot?

O: No, just two minutes to the whole sequence. And I have said very little about them, just that they live in Massachusetts with their mother. More about them has been said in magazines.

K: How much of the interview is in?

O: Eight minutes and in one place I'm using a voice-over of you talking about the President and showing pictures of you with the President.

K: Is it friendly?

O: The interview?

K: No, what I am saying about the President.

O: Yes, that he's marvelous to work with, that he's competent, cool...

K: Eight minutes! But you and I have a deal with my seeing what you have me saying.

O: Okay, the part about the American people during the Cambodian decision, the American sense of tragedy and what would make you leave, which you said very well.

K: You're trying to make me leave.

O: No, you can't leave for awhile.

K: Why not?

O: We have a deal.

K: Oh for you! You are trying to get rid of me. You are with some other man.

By

NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Margaret Osmer

9/25/70 12:05 p.m. page 3

O: I am not. I am just embarrassed to call you in the middle of all this crisis. But then I found out this morning that you are leaving the country and so I had to call.

K: To use me.

O: No, I have a proper amount of respect for you and the position you hold.

K: Eight minutes! What you did was just to sucker me into an interview.

O: No, we may have 30 minutesX!

K: But you think my children are no problem?

O: No.

K: You told me Schelling said I had kept something from the President on Cambodia. Are you going to use that.

O: No, don't worry about.

K: Those are pretty strong words. I have already called Schelling and complained.

O: You can't! I can't tell you anything any more.

K: Oh Margaret. You are gullible. I've got to teach you some things. My pride wouldn't let me call him even if there were no other reason not to.

O: Okay. I can borrow that thing?

K: Yes.

O: How will I get it?

K: I'll get it to you somehow, but can I get it back?

O: Absolutely. The best thing to do is to send it Special Delivery to my home--then it's never out of my hands.

K: This is just that picture of me on the phone. Then there was a whole page of all the gossip items. Is the print big enough to pick up?

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Margaret Osmer

9/25/70 12:05 p.m. page 4

O: Probably. Because we've got no pictures of you going out and we need something to lead into the Barbara Howar interview. She was so sweet.

K: She's a nice girl; I like her.

O: She said Henry Kissinger doesn't have time to be a swinger. You'll be pleased to know there are a couple of things she said that we've left out.

K: Abbut "politics makes strange bedfellows?"

O: Yes.

K: I like that.

O: Well we left that out and also the one about the "Nixon Administration isn't exactly one orgy after another." What's happening in the Middle East?

K: For once we've done something right. Out motto is "You can't lose them all."

O: May I quote you?

K: Of course.

By

NARA, Date

5/26

Telecon
Dave Packard

9/25/70 1:30 p.m.

K: Have you seen what Jerry Friedheim put out today?

P: No.

K: He spilled his guts, put out everything we know about that business.

P: Cuba?

K: Everything: barges, U-2 intelligence . . .

P: My God no. Let me check on this.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sect. 3.6

k

By 5 NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Packard/Kissinger
1:50 p.m. 9/25/70

P: We told Jerry not to say anything before clearance from the WH. This memo we talked about yesterday was LDX'd over. The covering note didn't get to him.

K: It said that's all he should say.

P: He called Houdek who said to go ahead. The thing that slipped up was that it wasn't made clear this is all he should say. It got out of channels and here we are. I have talked to Mel. At this point we can only hold tight.

K: How did he get the facts?

P: A lot of people have the facts. We told him not to go out and he didn't know how he went beyond that paragraph. Your instructions are fine. I don't know how he got further than that.

K: Obviously when Houdek said go ahead, he meant just the guidance. Houdek doesn't know any more about it than that.

P: Of course. We told Jerry to hold it tight. We only Say only what he was told.

K: It's done now.

P: No problem blame on it but I don't as of now we will have to hold tight and decide what we can do.

K: Going on a trip now may look frivolous.

P: I haven't seen it.

K: He said everything we know.

P: Let me get it out. I will talk with Mel and see what specific steps we should be done.

K: No one should say one more word until we have worked it out.

P: Don't worry. We have that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9/25/70 4:50 p.m.

K: I just wanted to tell you, and I tried immediately after the briefing. . . The President said if I was pressed to follow the guidance. The question is, two inconsistent questions: How are you able to take this trip . . . let me read it to you and then get it over to you immediately. (Mr. Kissinger read from the transcript.) That's what we agreed to yesterday.

R: I told my people to have no comment at all about anything. What's the explanation at Defense?

K: Then they asked the question again about the trip. I said "Let's be careful; we are watching closely . . . [Mr. Kissinger read again from the transcript]. The Defense explanation is that they got the guidance this morning and Jerry Friedheim went beyond it. I think though that they had material prepositioned, because how would Friedheim know about the barges?

R: I just don't see why everybody can't say "no comment." Why do we talk so much?

K: For once, I am in 100 percent agreement. Here we are confronted with a major story. He said there is a submarine base; we know their intentions, but we are not saying. That just makes it worse.

R: It's perfectly easy to say nothing. It might cause embarrassment, but we shouldn't say we aren't saying anything.

K: I think we should say nothing at all.

R: Well okay Henry. I must say my worst fears have been realized.

K: I agree. The President can tell you all the truth.

R: The President called a little while ago. He is really concerned about it. Even for background purposes I am telling my people not to say anything. If we keep talking about how serious it might be then what do we do about it.

K: The only good that might come out of this is that they may decide to pull their tender out.

R: But the trouble with these confrontation is that if we say "you have got to do something" and they don't, then we've got to do something. In a showdown you either shoot it out or you look silly.

K: I agree. Well, let's see how it plays.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Laird/Kissinger

5:05 p.m.

9/25/70

K: I gave a backgrounder this afternoon on the trip. Before I went in the President asked me that I should not say anything about the base but if I was pressed to hard line it. There were a lot of questions saying in view of the Defense statement and the base there --

L: They hedged that.

K: I am not complaining. I lined up with you. I am standing with you. I get a number of statements saying we are watching the activity. I pulled back and said we wtkx are watching construction there and the Soviet Union can be under no thought that we would observe any building of strategic bases there if ? ? ? I want you to be aware of it.

L: A bad day.

K: I couldn't very well not say it. After the Defense story and I said I didn't know about this, it would have reflected on the President. I will read you a question: "? ? ? ? isn't this a bad thing to be taking a trip?" I said let's be careful. We are watching events in Cuba and at the right moment we will take action. In close touch with the situation. "With announcement today with the possibility of submarine base in Cuba ? ? ? ? ? " That's when I made the Kennedy statement. I had no choice, did I?

L: No.

K: I wanted you to know wer are both in it.

L: Okay.

K: These things happen and it maybe a blessing in disguise.

L: This disconnect that took place bothers me. I didn't told Dave to gex forget about it but I felt I should have told Freidheim about the meeting.

K: We have been under such stress it's inevitable that something would blow.

L: Freidheim didn't know there was a meeting not to do anything. But we will have to go from here.

K: We wtkx are behind you.

L: I appreciate that. It's a bad day.

K: For everybody.

Telecon
Governor Dewey
9/25/70 6:00 p.m.

D: Welcome back to the East. They warmed up the atmosphere for you a bit didn't they?

K: They sure did. I think we've made it.

D: I spent last evening at the Council with Abba Eban, just a small group, 25 or so. He's quite a different fellow from the last meeting.

K: They've had some scaring influences.

D: He glitters as beautifully as ever, you've seen him.

K: No, he hasn't been in Washington, or if he was I haven't seen him.

D: Oh he wasn't with Golda?

K: No, I don't think he and she get along very well.

D: He glitters with charm, but he almost sounds a little shrill and less convinced.

K: They are in a tough spot, and realize they have to do something.

D: They are realizing that a war of attrition with them isn't working. You can't really ______ and Arab.

K: Not when you have two million and they have 80. I think events of the last two weeks have helped.

D: They must have. And the hijackings I think are the best thing to happen to the Israelis. Most importantly they made the world hate the Fedayeen. And they made the Fedayeen realize that the Israelis aren't by themselves. Anyhow I called to say that Lucius and I would like to come down at a convenient time.

K: Let me get David Young to call you next week and we'll set a date for after we get back.

D: Okay. I spoke to Lucius today and he thought the 8th or the 9th of October would be okay for him.

K: At this point, one looks as good as the other. Why don't we say the 8th... no, the 9th.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12/58
Authority
By: NARA Date 6/29/61

By NARA, Dale 5/26

D: Oh he wasn't with Golda?

K: At this point, one looks as good as the other. Why don't we say the 8th ... no, the 9th.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Charles Meyer

9/25/70 6:25 p.m.

K: The major point is that, unbelievable as this may be in Foggy
Bottom, all my backgrounders are carefully checked in advance with the
President and reflect his views. Therefore I think John Lodge ought to
be authorized to state this view to officials.

M: I have just been at the UN pinch-hitting for my boss. Nobody
asked about the conflict.

K: Well, if the Tadd Schultz story is the only one that appears, I
will assume he did it on his own. But if his is not the only one I will
assume something else.

M: There is one other--in the Star.

K: If you could let Lodge state that, everyone would be happier.

M: Okay. If I showed lack of confidence in your discretion, forgive me.

K: No, you are not my problem at State, but every time I see a news
story my paranoia comes out.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Amb. William Sullivan
9/25/70; 7:30 p. m.

S: Did you have a chance to read the Bruce conversation with Ky?

K: I glanced at it.

S: The essence is that he called off his call here but intends to put forward his own peace initiative.

K: Don't you think we can stall this for a week.

S: I think so. Secretary Rogers asked me to call you -- thinks on your arrival that you should talk to him. However, there is a risk that he may be taping a TV show before you arrive there. So, I told him if they could stall off until you get there. One sticky feature -- we are not sure what Thieu has told Ky and how much Ky is doing this under Thieu's guidance. Okay, I will send that cable along. Have a good trip and don't go to Cuba.

K: Okay -- fine!

feg

By NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
U. Alexis Johnson
9/25/70; 8:00 p.m.

K: I am leaving -- you will be delighted to know.

J: When, now?

K: In another hour or so. I wanted to touch some bases with you. On the situation we were discussing yesterday afternoon -- not the one in which our guidance was so scrupulously followed -- the other one. I think he has flipped his lid!

J: I am thoroughly baffled. Charlie is coming back in the morning. Tom Karamessines' man is coming in tomorrow afternoon. I want to get together with him.

K: The only immediate action that I remember is to try to get them to turn off water in some places.

J: That doesn't change anything. I looked into the question of aid. We are doing nothing new. We have projects in course down there. Almost all of the disbursements are obligated -- we are not obligating anything new. Most are to American companies.

K: How about the MAP program?

J: There is not anything -- $500,000. I get it -- trying to read all that stuff -- what he is saying is that he just doesn't see any mileage in trying to frustrate... now he is talking about how we make trouble for him once he gets in.

K: I know nothing about it. Why don't we at least see what we can do about cutting off those water funds? I mean these international institutions.

J: I am told they are making no loans. He goes up and down. One day he wants to make a big settlement and the next day he wants them to go on strike.

K: Can you sort of take over the 40 Committee while I am gone.

J: Let's say I will do my best on it.

K: I will have Haig sit in for me. If you can have one or two meetings to say that something is reasonably being done.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/U. Alexis Johnson
9/25/70; 8:00 p.m.

- 2 -

J: Where do we come out on the other thing? Where does that all stand?

K: You know what happened? The President urgently instructs us that we keep our mouths shut! I think we should stand on what was said today.

J: Boy! Boy! God! We had that so carefully worked out.

K: The trouble is that after the Defense Department, we had to say something here or be badgered.

J: Dave Packard said he is just standing on his head over there. Everything went bad.

K: I find out now that they gave pictures on the barges and showed them on TV.

J: Oh, no! Oh, God!

K: So they must have had a package ready. When we sent over guidance, they must have thought this is it -- they could go. If we had anything beautifully set, this was it.

J: There is nothing we worked on more carefully than this.

K: What we said was ~~nearly~~ nicely threatening to the Soviets and nicely reassuring to us. Have you any suggestions as to what we can do?

J: No, except keep our mouths shut.

K: Right. I know from Secretary Rogers if anyone opens his mouth he will hang him!

J: I spent 2-1/2 hours with our principal oil companies. We are facing a real problem if our major oil companies hold out against Libyan demands. They all agree that prices will shoot up and there will be severe shortages. The independents (?) have already given way in Libya. California and Texaco have to give their answers tonight. To my mind, the lesser of the evils is to give in. They asked to see Abe Lincoln. I briefed Abe on my meeting. I asked him to call your office to brief someone in your office on this.

K: My office will go along with you on this. Peter Flanigan is your major problem if there is one.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

9/25/70; 8:00 p.m.

J: Obviously we have to be damn careful what we say to them.

K: Alex, you juggle more balls than we do.

J: It's going to mean higher prices here in the U. S., too. Abe is really the fellow. Jack McCloy has kept in touch with Mitchell -- anti-trust.

K: We will go along with what is reasonable on this. I appreciate everything you have done in the last two weeks, sometimes under trying conditions.

J: This is what we get paid for.

K: You don't get paid for being in cross-fire.

J: I really hope they worked out the Ky problem before you get there.

K: They have. All he wants to do is not come and launch a new peace initiative next week.

J: Have they found out if Thieu briefed him?

K: They are trying to find that out. If you will handle the 40 Committee, that will be terrific.

feg