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Henry A. Kissinger

Henry Alfred Kissinger was born in Fürth, Bavaria, in 1923. In 1938 his family emigrated to the United States and in 1943 he became a naturalised American citizen. He studied at Harvard and graduated as a Doctor of Philosophy in 1954. From 1954 until 1969 he lectured on Political Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.

Kissinger served as a consultant for questions of foreign policy and affairs of security under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. Even in this capacity Kissinger played a decisive role in the determination of the course of American foreign policy. He was mainly active in the field of East-West détente, in the rapprochement between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, and in the Vietnamisation of the Vietnam War. In 1973 he was appointed Secretary of State. In the same year the Nobel Peace Prize was jointly awarded to Dr. Kissinger and to Le Duc Tho for the armistice they had engineered. This treaty led to the withdrawal of the USA from South-East Asia. During his period of office as Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger also mediated in the settlement of the Middle East conflict, after the 1973 October War his mediation efforts took the form of shuttle diplomacy.

Upon leaving active politics in 1977 he accepted an appointment lecturing on International Diplomacy at Georgetown University. He also acts as counsellor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies at the same university.

In 1983 President Reagan appointed Dr. Kissinger Chairman of the National Bipartisan Committee on Central America.

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# Introduction

by Christian Beurle,
President of the Federation of Austrian Industrialists

Mr President, Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, after paying due respect to and welcoming the President of the Republic of Austria, who accords us the honour attending this lecture, it is indeed a great pleasure and privilege for me to extend on behalf of the Federation of Austrian Industrialists, a very cordial welcome to our guest of honour tonight, Professor Dr. Henry Kissinger.

We greatly appreciate it that Dr. Kissinger has kindly accepted the invitation extended by Forum Schwarzenbergplatz and Forum CA to give a lecture on "The Eighties: The Challenge for the Western World".

We at the Federation of Austrian Industrialists consider it a particular honour to have you, dear Dr. Kissinger, here at the House of Industry, the headquarters of Austrian industry. Let me just add a few words about this historic building which was opened by Emperor Francis Joseph I in 1911 to serve as the headquarters for the central organisations of Austrian industry. In Austria's recent history, the building had an important role to the play: after World War II, during Austria's occupation, it was the seat of the Allied Council for ten years. Thus, it served as the meeting place for the final phase of negotiations on the Austrian State Treaty. These negotiations were led by the Deputy Foreign Ministers and the Foreign Ministers of the countries concerned and finally facilitated the signing of the State Treaty in the nearby Belvedere Palace on 15 May 1955.

In the spring of 1956, the Federation of Austrian Industrialists set up its headquarters in the House of Industry, the traditional seat of this country's industry.

Dr. Kissinger, I believe that – on behalf of your audience here tonight – I can assure you that we are looking forward to your lecture with the utmost interest.

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# Introduction

by Hannes Androsch,
Chairman of the Managing Board of Creditanstalt

Mr President, Excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, it is a very great pleasure and privilege for us that Professor Dr. Kissinger has accepted the invitation of the Federation of Austrian Industrialists and of Creditanstalt and that he will talk to us on 'The Eighties: The Challenge for the Western World'. There is certainly no need for me to introduce Professor Kissinger to you - this would mean carrying coals to Newcastle, so to speak. Dr. Kissinger, in your lecture you will be dealing with the problems facing the Western World in its entirety. Before you start, let me just touch upon this subject as seen from a European's point of view.

The magazine 'Newsweek' recently published a cover story with the title 'The Decline of Europe'. Europe shows an extraordinary capacity to blame the United States for every problem occuring today. On behalf of the Austrians I think I am entitled to say that we have achieved quite a lot since World War II. We would not have achieved these successes without the overwhelming help of the American people through the Marshall Plan. We will never forget it and we are still very grateful for what your country has done for us.

It is my firm belief that the Western World will only be able to master the challenges lying ahead of it if Europe realizes that the utmost efforts will be necessary if it wants to remain a strong partner in the worldwide play of forces. On our old continent we seem to be hardly aware that the forces in world politics and in the world economy are shifting at an ever-swifter pace. On account of the dynamic development which East and South-East Asia have been undergoing the United States nowadays turns its eyes to the Pacific rather than across the Atlantic. A generation is growing up in America to which, say, Japan means more than France or Germany.

However, the Western World simply cannot exist without Europe because there are many things in the intellectual and spiritual sphere that are only partially comprehensible in East and South-East Asia and can thus be adopted there only with limitation. Hence it is Europe's duty to summon its strength so as to regain its status as a determinant force. This requires, first and foremost, new dynamism in the economy. Openmindedness to innovations in all spheres of life and progress in European integration are the commands of the hour. Conversely, if Europe abides self-contentedly by what it believes to be valuable traditions and achievements, and fences these in, as it were, by a wall of

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protectionism, it might eventually end up in the role of a quantité negligable in world politics.

These are questions not only significant to the Western alliance but, in addition, of fundamental importance for the survival of all free communities in Europe. And it is for this very reason that neutral Austria has a fervent interest in preserving and strengthening Europe as a main pillar of the Western World. We know that our contributions can only be of a modest nature. However, we should – indeed, we have to – use all the possibilities open to us: in our economy we must eradicate rigidities that have developed over years and we must resist the temptation of regarding things that we have attained as safely in our hands for a long time. Simultaneously, fresh contributions will always be necessary in order that Europe has a share in shaping thought content in the United States, which has come to be the center of the Western World. This will require tireless efforts, in the fields of economy, politics and culture. In short: Europe must not be allowed to become a "retired continent".

May I now ask you to begin.

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# The Eighties: The Challenge for the Western World

by Henry A. Kissinger

Mr President, Mr Chairman, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen. Ich werde mir erlauben, einige Worte auf deutsch zu sagen. Sie werden sich vielleicht wundern, warum ich, obwohl ich in Deutschland aufgewachsen bin, überhaupt auf englisch spreche. Es gibt dafür verschiedene Gründe. Erstens, weil mir Dr. Androsch verboten hat, auf deutsch zu sprechen, und ich sehr diszipliniert bin. Zweitens bin ich in Bayern aufgewachsen, über das ein Österreicher gesagt haben soll, es ist nicht mehr Deutschland, aber noch nicht Österreich, und mein Deutsch war niemals völlig verständlich. Drittens war ich 15 Jahre alt, als ich Deutschland verlassen habe, und mein Vokabular ist sehr gut für Fußball, aber nicht so gut für komplizierte Probleme. Ich denke über diese Probleme auf englisch, und deshalb erlaube ich mir, zu Ihnen auf englisch zu sprechen.

Dr. Androsch said that few people need an introduction less and I was very flattered by that remark; it is also true that even fewer people enjoy an introduction more, especially if it is done so elegantly and contains so many adjectives.

For the peace of mind of the Ambassadress who is present and other official Americans let me make clear that I speak here as a private citizen, I am not an official. If I should be deviating from what you have heard elsewhere, that is of course the truth.

I speak here as an independent intellectual and as someone who has supported the Reagan administration and will support it in the elections in the fall. I say this only so you can understand my general orientation.

Let me make a few observations about the major problems of American foreign policy, and the major challenges to American foreign policy as I see them. I will talk about a few general philosophical points, East-West relations, Transatlantic relations, a few words about Central America and I'm sure I'll be finished before midnight.

First, a few philosophical points. My critics in the United States like to give the impression that I come to Vienna once a year to burn candles at the altar of Prince Metternich, because they allege that I am particularly attracted to the sort of foreign policy that emphasizes equilibrium and balance and the resulting elements of peace; and they have a point except that unfortunately I have not been here every year. That particular criticism reflects the philosophical problems

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the Americans have with the very conduct of foreign policy. When I travel abroad I read often about American masterplans to achieve this or that in the world. The fact of the matter is that the secret dream of most Americans is not to have to have any foreign policy at all.

For the United States, involvement in world affairs began in 1945, but even then it was under very unusual circumstances. Militarily we had a nuclear monopoly and a huge nuclear superiority. Economically, as late as 1950 we produced 52 % of all the goods and services of the entire world. In those circumstances foreign policy was analogous to domestic policy; it was a challenge of identifying problems and then overwhelming them with resources.

It is only in the last decade that the United States has had to come to grips with conducting foreign policy the way Europeans, located in the center of the continent, have had to carry it out throughout their history. Every decade since 1950 our relative share of the world's gross national product has declined by 10%. We had some 40% in 1960, some 30% in 1970, and now we have between 22% and 25%, depending on how you count in the 80ies. We have lost our nuclear monopoly, and our huge nuclear superiority. And there are some debates in America whether we are ahead or behind in the nuclear field, but the very fact of that debate means that we have lost any unambiguous advantage. This means that for Americans in the foreseeable future the problem of the balance of power is the same as it has been for other nations. It is a global phenomenon and not a Central European phenomenon. And when you are concerned with a balance of power globally or at all, it means that you must act on the basis of assessments you cannot prove true when you make them. For statesmen, when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge is at a minimum; when the knowledge is greatest, the scope for creative action has often disappeared. Nobody could prove in 1936 that the reoccupation of the Rheinland by German troops would put Eastern Europe, including this country, at the mercy of expansionism; but by the time this was clear, the sacrifices to rectify the situation became enormous. We face that problem at all times, including right now in Central America, as I will explain a little later. As a result the United States is also forced to conduct a foreign policy that will have no end, but will require continuing effort.

Americans have a tendency to believe that problems are solvable, that at the same point you can say that an international issue is terminated. But when one manages a global equilibrium every solution is an admission ticket to another set of problems. – All of this is very familiar here and I would not dare to make a speech on it at your Diplomatic Academy, but it explains the bitterness of some of the internal American debate about foreign policy.

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Presidential aspirants in the United States give the impression not only that they will improve conditions, but also that they will solve all problems and have answers to all difficulties. There is a nostalgia in America that it is unusual to be constantly engaged in foreign policy, and there is therefore a rebellion against this involvement. Americans tend to be divided between those who think foreign policy is a subdivision of psychiatry and others who think foreign policy is a subdivision of theology. It is this debate which must be understood by our European friends and that is why our European friends should show some compassion for the effort to deal with the questions of equilibrium and of progress in a large continental country that has not had any previous necessity to deal with these issues.

With this as a background let me talk about East-West relations:

I find in many countries in Europe that I visit the belief that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have never been worse. I find the argument that there is a growing danger of nuclear war and a tendency to allege that an America run by slightly undisciplined "cowboys" should be moderated and brought back to its senses by European wisdom. Let me deal with some of these propositions:

First, there is no doubt that the rhetoric of East-West relations right now is very unfortunate, but I also believe that within a measurable period of time, indeed, within the next 15 months, serious negotiations between us and the Soviet Union are inevitable.

Second, I do not believe that there is an increased danger of nuclear war. I think it is no more likely today than it was 10 or 20 years ago that either of the two superpowers will attack each other. The major danger of war is in conflicts in third areas that will grow imperceptibly out of control and that may be encouraged by outside influences. In other words the model that we should worry about is less World War II than the outbreak of World War I.

Third, it is a great mistake to believe that the personalities of particular leaders are the fundamental cause of current international tensions. I am of the view that some of the earlier rhetoric of the Reagan administration was perhaps unnecessarily muscular, but if you look at the actions of the administration rather than at the earlier rhetoric, they have been invariably moderate in East-West relations; and the earlier rhetoric has been succeeded by a whole series of conciliatory statements in the last eight months, inviting a dialogue. I read occasionally about President Reagan's comment that the Soviet Union represents the focus of evil in the world. I repeat I don't know whether I would

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have drafted that particular speech in exactly that manner, but if you read
"Prawda" for a month or the statements of the Politbureau over any period of
time I am sure you can find more damaging statements about the United States
in a week than we have made over a period of several years. It is a
misunderstanding to believe that Soviet leaders are so sensitive that one remark
by the President of the United States will offend them for all eternity. And it is
rather an example of Western masochism to focus on this particular problem.
Above all, let us not be mesmerized by the current debate. I believe that, from
our perspective, negotiations are inevitable for a number of reasons: The
democracies know that they cannot hold their people together without a
demonstration of their dedication to peace; the democracies, including the
American democracy, are dedicated to peace; and everyone knows that they
have an obligation to prevent a nuclear holocaust.

I believe negotiations, from the Soviet perspective, are also inevitable, first,
because the Soviet Union is confronted with a permanent succession crisis. The
Soviet Union has had three leaders in the space of three years. Institutionally, a
modern state cannot be governed indefinitely by a system of leadership that
permits no replacement except through death or cult-like procedures. If one
looks over the roster of present Soviet leaders, one knows, and every Soviet
citizen knows, that within the next five years a number of changes will have to be
made, because of age, if for no other reason. I cannot believe that these changes
will be accomplished in an atmosphere of permanent international confrontation
with the United States.

Second, if the post-war period has shown anything, it is that the dilemma of the
communist economy is that you cannot run a modern economy by total planning,
and the open question is whether you can run a communist state without total
planning. Unless the Soviet Union and other communist states introduce some
elements of incentive into their system, their economies are bound to fall more
and more behind. It is a paradox of the modern world economy that a state that
can produce intercontinental rockets cannot produce a single manufactured article
for export that can compete on world markets - except in the most backward
countries, or in countries under its political domination - with a manufactured
article of market economies. Therefore sooner or later, either before the changes
or after the changes of Soviet leadership, some period of relaxation seems to me
necessary.

I believe that what is holding up this new period of – may I mention the forbidden
word in the presence of the ambassadress – of détente are two factors. One is
the American election: I do not think that the Soviet Union wants President
Reagan to be able to say that his policies succeeded in promoting both a strong
America and a successful negotiation.

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Second, the Soviet Union has not yet given up the hope that it can split Europe from the United States by creating the impression that it is American intransigence which is the cause of all world tensions. As soon as these two illusions are removed, we will see a return to normal diplomatic contacts between East and West. The big problem for the West in this connection at this moment is not to have a nervous breakdown over the issue of the paralysis of negotiations. It is rather to develop positions which we can sustain once the negotiations resume; and in this connection I would like to make a few general observations.

First, I do not believe that the desirability of negotiations should be a subject of domestic debates either in our countries or between our countries. We should reach the point where that can be taken for granted. Second, I believe that entirely too much emphasis has been given to arms control negotiations as the solvant of all international difficulties. Yes, I favour arms control negotiations; I have been personally involved in many of them and I have great regard for the dedicated ambassadors who are here in Vienna engaged in some of them and who are ready in other forums to resume. But let us be realistic: there are in the world today some 25,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of the United States, and some 25,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union. I do not know anybody who believes that they can be reduced by 3/5 in, let us say, the space of three or four years. But assuming they were, and we would reduce the number of warheads to 10,000 on each side, would the danger of nuclear destruction be significantly less? In 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy thought he stood on the verge of Armageddon. At that time we had about 3,000 warheads. I say this not to downgrade arms control, but only to avoid placing a burden on it that cannot possibly be met. The difficulty with arms control is that as an isolated negotiation it creates too big a gap between the understanding of experts and the requirements of statesmen. It encourages in each country an endless debate about this or that technical benefit that is supposed to flow for one side or the other. The significance of arms control negotiations is in large part their contribution as a political symbol that relations have eased. Nobody should underrate this and therefore they should be pursued. But to believe that nuclear accounting can solve the nuclear problem is a great mistake.

The biggest problem in relations between East and West today is the absence of any political dialogue at high levels. It is the fermenting of political tensions, threatening the equilibrium globally by indirect means, that produces distrust and the conviction that there is a deliberate undermining of security. I know that many previous efforts to establish rules of international conduct have failed and it would be naive to believe that one can do this in a conclusive manner that ends all tensions. The Soviet Union and we are superpowers and therefore we are bound to impinge on each other in many parts of the world. Still, unless we come

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to some understanding of permissible methods in the pursuit of our interests and of limits which we put on the execution of our convictions, I do not think that technical arms control negotiations by themselves can solve the problem.

I do not here in a neutral country want to assess ultimate blame, though I do think that the Soviet system through its tendency towards stagnation in recent years has certainly complicated matters. I would say that the fundamental decision the Soviet Union has to make is whether it is a country or whether it is a cause. If it is a country, we can have serious, difficult, but ultimately successful negotiations. If it is a cause that must ferment revolutions and upheavals everywhere, then a continuation of tensions is nearly inevitable. If it wants to behave like a great power, we have an obligation, which I am sure we will fulfill, of meeting its legitimate security concerns. But: no nation has a right to define security in such a manner that everybody else is insecure. And if the Soviet Union is satisfied, as all nations have had to be in history, with relative security, then I am reasonably optimistic.

In any event, those are the issues which we should be debating today, not whether there is some gimmick we can put forward to lure the Soviets back to the negotiating table, or whether we can invent some new weapon that we can throw on the table. Foreign policy is not like a detective story in which one side throws out vague clues and the other one has to guess the answer. Foreign policy has to be based on realities — the realities will make for negotiations. Their success will depend on whether we can in a cool, correct and careful assessment of power relationships and other factors achieve a balanced agreement. I believe that this is possible.

Now let me say a few words about Transatlantic relations:

America's relations with Europe in the post-war period have been one of the great success stories of that time. There has been a longer period of peace in Europe than at any time in modern European history, and relations between Europe and the United States have been on the whole constructive and creative. Yet, no relationship can forever continue on a pattern that was established in different circumstances, and there are a number of aspects of the current Transatlantic relationship that require attention.

First, there is the issue of military strategy. Austria is of course not part of any military alliances and I speak here of the problem of NATO. — The problem is this: NATO was developed during the period of American nuclear superiority. Its strategy relied on the immediate or at any rate very early use of nuclear weapons. Conventional forces were created in part to supply a trigger for these nuclear

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forces, and throughout the whole period the various countries, though there
have been slight adaptations in the doctrine, have never deviated from the view
or at least the practice that would imperil an early use of nuclear weapons. At the
same time there has developed what is in effect nuclear parity, which means that
a nuclear war would involve casualties unprecedented in human history and
therefore require decisions which no statesman has ever had to make before.

Second, there has developed in each country a growing nuclear pacifism. More
and more groups have dedicated themselves to the propositions that nuclear
weapons should be abolished, that their first use should be renounced, and that
the greatest danger to the existence of mankind are the weapons by which it is
defended. There is a theoretical recognition that conventional defences should
be built up. And it is finally true that in no country of the NATO alliance can you
find a statesman today who would publicly state what his decisions make
necessary, namely (except in America) that the common defence requires the
early use of nuclear weapons. This creates a situation that in the long run must
be disastrous. Everybody calls for conventional defence and yet nobody
undertakes a serious major effort to bring it about. Many people condemn
nuclear weapons, but they are not prepared to achieve their alternative. The
result is a de-facto-pacifism, a kind of self-paralysis of the will, which must
encourage blackmail over a period of time.

I am not talking about next year or the year after, I am talking about a ten year
perspective. There is therefore the urgent necessity that we bring our actions
into line with our professions. I have opposed, and I believe responsible
governments must oppose, the facil declarations that we should renounce the
first use of nuclear weapons. If we renounce this, we are saying that we would
rather be defeated with conventional weapons, and therefore once we have
admitted the possibility of defeat, it becomes a legalistic argument to say that we
will resist defeat with one kind of weapon, but not with another. I do not think we
should renounce these weapons, but I do think we should put ourselves into a
position where we do not have to resort to them at the early stage that present
deployments and present efforts make necessary.

I fear also, and have said so publicly, that if this rationalisation is not achieved
over some reasonable period of time, it will be difficult to convince the American
people that they must maintain their present deployment in Europe in an
unchanged fashion as long as it has no military rational. I would much prefer to
give it a military rational.

The third problem in Transatlantic relations has to do with the perception of East-West relations, which I have already covered. I do not think it is healthy for so

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many Europeans to create the impression that it is the foolishness and the
verbosity of Americans that produce international tensions. We should have a
serious dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic of what we consider to be
the elements of danger and the elements of solution, and not exhaust ourselves
in finding gimmicks for this or that negotiation.

Fourth, there is the problem of the fundamental relationship between Europe
and the United States. I think it is healthier for the Transatlantic relationship for
Europe to develop a greater identity, including a greater identity in the defence
sphere. The United States cannot be asked to make all decisions around every
critical area of the world at every moment of time, as unilateral American policy
decisions. I know it is always said that we should consult but consultation is not
the same as dealing with a partner who is perceived to have other options. I am
not afraid of a Europe that asserts its own identity in the field of defence; I know
no rational European who would not prefer co-operation with the United States in
the defence field to going it alone, and therefore European political unity, if it
cannot be achieved on the basis of the ten, then it must evolve on the basis of
the largest group that is achievable. European political unity seems to me an
imperative for a successful Transatlantic relationship and a wise America will
encourage it, and a confident Europe will try to achieve it. It must achieve it also,
because the slow-down or the relative decline in the economic field of Europe
has objective causes.

In the 19th century the European nation state was the optimum size compatible
with communications technology of that period. Europe had a technological
advantage and Europe had a monopoly in the production of energy. It was the
Saudi Arabia in terms of an energy based on coal. All of these advantages have
disappeared, and if Europe is to progress in the economic field, and if Europe is
to get the full benefits of the new technologies, at least a nucleus of it has to get
the economies of scale that are inseparable from ready union. But I think that
these problems are being recognized and are being worked on.

Now let me deal with a last problem which appears as a peculiarly American
problem, which is the issue of Central America:

Last year, over my enormous reluctance I was asked by President Reagan to be
head of a bipartisan Commission that dealt with Central America. That
Commission included such well-known admirers of President Reagan as Lane
Kirkland, the head of the AFL-CIO; Robert Strauss, the former Chairman of the
Democratic National Committee; and four other Democratic individuals, who had
distinguished themselves by vocal opposition to many policies of the Reagan
administration. I mention this because when all was over, that Commission

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reached unanimous conclusions, and from this you can draw two views: One, that with all the noise you hear in an election year, America is basically healthy and basically united. Two, that when the problem of Central America is studied, objective conclusions will rally around a central core, and that the degree of deviation from it cannot be all that great, unless one is fairly ignorant of what is going on there.

Let me state a few of our conclusions, though I cannot do justice to them. And let me add that I am not involved in the policies on a day-to-day basis.

First: All 12 American leaders involved agreed that Central America represents a vital American interest. This should not be so strange if one looks at a map. It is a region geographically very close to the United States and one in which there are many factors of turmoil, and in which therefore an American abdication or failure would have profound consequences for issues in larger countries, of even more fundamental significance.

Second, there was a general agreement that there are many causes for upheaval in Central America that are not produced by Moscow or by Havana. There is a history of colonialism, there is a history of unwise American policies, there are social inequalities, there are undemocratic governments – in sum, there are many reasons that produce causes for upheaval that must be dealt with.

Our Commission proposed a five-year-program, for which Nicaragua, too, is eligible, which will seek to return Central America by 1990 to the economic conditions it enjoyed in 1978. This is a very ambitious objective, unless you realize that between 1978 and the current period the per capita gross domestic product of these countries declined on an average of 20%. And if that process continues, no policy can possibly succeed. We believe that this program can help alleviate social inequalities and we have tied it to the establishment of pluralistic institutions over a period of five years, in all of these countries. It is a very detailed program which has been accepted by President Reagan and put forward to the countries.

Further, we have proposed a negotiating program to address the two security problems in the area: One, the guerrilla war in Salvador, and two, the problem posed by Nicaragua.

Let me say a word about Nicaragua. Too often in Europe the impression is created as if the United States is driving Nicaragua to communism. The fact is that the United States gave 120 million Dollars of economic aid to Nicaragua in the first two years of its existence. It offered a peace corps and food aid. The

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victory of the Sandinistas was welcomed by the previous American administra-
tion. But the Sandinistas have prefered association with a militant version of
Cuba. In Nicaragua today there are more Cubans, East-Germans, Bulgarians,
Libyans and others, than the size of the Nicaraguan Army under Somoza – over
10,000 (the Nicaraguan army has grown to a 100,000). We have therefore
proposed a substantial disarmament of all of Central America, that all armies be
reduced to 1979 levels, that no foreign country (including the United States)
introduce new armaments beyond a certain level, and that all foreign countries
(including the United States) call back their military advisors. That program has
been accepted by the administration. And only in the absence of the
achievement of these objectives and in the absence of the end of Nicaraguan
intervention in Salvador does the problem of American military assistance
become relevant. Until that is achieved we indeed do not believe in any of these
gimmicks that would in fact turn over Salvador to the same fate as Nicaragua.

I must tell you if the Europeans want to avoid conflict in Central America, they have to understand that the American concerns have a large measure of reality and that the conclusions of our Commission represent a central view of a vast majority of Americans, not of those who happen to make most noise, but of those who will sooner or later be essential for the conduct of government. We cannot just separate the realities of security and the realities of diplomacy, as is so often done here in the public debate. We cannot use our past failings as an excuse for inaction. If Europeans who have an influence in Central America want to be helpful, let them urge all countries, those on our side as well as Nicaragua, to move towards pluralism, let them urge all sides to reduce their dependence on foreign military advisors, let them urge all sides to stop intervening in neighbouring countries. No European can have an interest in an American failure in Central America. Anybody who knows the situation further south and further north must realize not only that there are potential guerrilla movements in many of these countries, but also that the economic problem that is simplified in the words "debt problem" can easily lead to political upheavals directed against the vital concerns not just of the United States, but also of the world economy. So, in this sense what goes on in Central America is of global importance and nobody should believe that the United States can possibly be eager for military intervention, after what we have gone through in Vietnam, and after that we know of the attitudes in other countries.

It cannot be an American desire, but it also cannot be in the interest of our friends
that we abdicate areas so close to our borders and turn them over to what we
believe is an organized movement by a small minority. Certainly the inequalities
were not caused by the communists, but that does not mean that the guerrilla
movements cannot be run by them and that is the central immediate issue in
Salvador.

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I have described a number of problems to you – East-West and Transatlantic relations and Central America. Many of them are extremely difficult, but all of them have a very hopeful side. The hopeful side is this: With respect to East-West relations I think that a fundamental dialogue between the West and the Soviet Union must start in the foreseeable future – not about the adequacy of this or that weapon, but about where we want to be in ten years, and then work our way back from that to concrete solutions. Many of the ideas that I have discussed with respect to Transatlantic relations and European unification are becoming more and more widely discussed and some variation of them is in the process of being implemented. Central America is not some mystery; it is a test as to whether we can combine humanitarian, economic, political negotiation and security concerns into a coherent policy on a unified basis in our country and at least have some understanding from our allies. That too is achievable.

So when you look at the catalogue of the challenges before the industrial democracies, they all are capable of solution by our initiative and by our purpose. I have a Chinese friend who claims that there is the following Chinese proverb. I say claims, because I'm not so sure that Chinese proverbs really all exist. I think they always make them up to impress us Westerners, but whatever, that proverb allegedly goes like this:

> "When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are treated as if they were big problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems, and little problems need not preoccupy us."

The final idea I want to leave with you is that I have every confidence that our country, its allies and its friends have an opportunity over the next decade to bring about order under the heavens. Thank you very much.

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Mit Beiträgen von:

Kurt H. Biedenkopf · Wolfgang Brezinka

Fritjof Capra · S. H., der XIV. Dalai Lama

Hoimar v. Ditfurth · Wolfram Engels

Harald Frittsch · Michael Grant · Jeanne

Hersch · Ivan Illich · William M. Johnston

Henry A. Kissinger · Lew Kopelew · Walter

Laqueur · Rupert Lay · Norbert Leser

Claudio Magris · Hans Mark · Elisabeth

Noelle-Neumann · Hans Noll · Bruce

Nussbaum · Günter Rohrmoser · Hartmut

Schiedermair · Gesine Schwan

Karl Steinbuch

20807218

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Weltoffenheit und geistige Toleranz sind die Kennzeichen des Wiener »Forum Schwarzenbergplatz« der Vereinigung Österreichischer Industrieller. Seit November 1980 haben hier prominente Vertreter aus Wissenschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik, Kultur und Religion zu kontroversen Fragen von allgemeiner Bedeutung Stellung genommen und in öffentlicher Diskussion Rede und Antwort gestanden. Inzwischen ist das »Forum Schwarzenbergplatz« als Stätte der persönlichen und geistigen Begegnung von Menschen unterschiedlicher Positionen und Weltanschauungen zu einer eta-blierten Einrichtung am Schnitt-punkt von Ost und West geworden. Der vorliegende Band vereinigt eine Auswahl von Vorträgen, die seit dem Bestehen des »Forum Schwarzenbergplatz« dort gehalten wurden und über den aktuellen Anlaß hin-aus weiteres Interesse beanspruchen können.

Professor Herbert Krejci

Geboren 1922 in Wien. Ab 1946 Re-dakteur, später Ressortleiter für Au-ßenpolitik der Tageszeitung »Wie-ner Kurier«. Seit 1956 Mitarbeiter der Vereinigung Österreichischer Industrieller, seit 1980 deren Gene-

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ralsekretär. Außerdem zehnjährige Tätigkeit als Lehrbeauftragter, später Universitätslektor für Public Relations an der Wirtschaftsuniversität Wien.

### Dr. Theodor Faulhaber

Geboren 1949 in Wien. Studium der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften in Wien. 1973 Eintritt in die Presseabteilung der Vereinigung Österreichischer Industrieller. Seit 1978 Chefredakteur des Instituts für Wirtschaft und Politik in Wien, der »Österreichischen Politischen Korrespondenz« und der Zweimonnatsschrift »Conturen«. Gestalter der Veranstaltungsreihe »Forum Schwarzenbergplatz«. Publikationen: »Die Vereinigung Österreichischer Industrieller, Wien 1981, Signum; »Die Kampagne. Kurt Waldheim - Opfer oder Täter?« (Herausgeber mit A. Khol und G. Ofner), Berlin-München 1987, Herbig.

### Adelbert Reif

Geboren 1936 in Berlin. Wissenschaftspublizist und Herausgeber in München. Freier Mitarbeiter des Instituts für Wirtschaft und Politik in Wien. Ständiger Autor für »Conturen« und »Industrie«, »Report« (München) und »Schweizerische Handels Zeitung« (Zürich).

Henry A. Kissinger:

For the United States, involvement in world affairs began in 1945, but even then it was under very unusual circumstances. Militarily we had a nuclear monopoly and a huge nuclear superiority. Economically, as late as 1950 we produced 52 per cent of all the goods and services of the entire world. In those circumstances foreign policy was analogous to domestic policy; it was a challenge of identifying problems and then overwhelming them with resources.

It is only in the last decade that the United States has had to come to grips with conducting foreign policy the way Europeans, located in the center of the continent, have had to carry it out throughout their history. Every decade since 1950 our relative share of the world's gross national product has declined by ten per cent. We had some 40 per cent in 1960, some 30 per cent in 1970, and now we have between 22 per cent and 25 per cent, depending on how you count in the eighties. We have lost our nuclear monopoly, and our huge nuclear superiority. And there are some debates in America whether we are ahead or behind in the nuclear field, but the very fact of that debate means that we have lost any unambiguous advantage. This means that for Americans in the foreseeable future the problem of the balance of power is the same as it has been for other nations. It is a global phenomenon and not a Central European phenomenon. And when you are concerned with a balance of power globally or at all, it means that you must act on the basis of assessments you cannot prove true when you make them. For statesmen, when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge is at a minimum; when the knowledge is greatest, the scope for creative action has often disappeared. Nobody could prove in 1936 that the reoccupation of the Rheinland by German troops would put Eastern Europe, including this country, at the mercy of expansionism; but by the time this was clear, the sacrifices to rectify the situation became enormous. We face that problem at all times, including right now in

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Central America. As a result the United States is also forced to conduct a foreign policy that will have no end, but will require continuing effort.

Americans have a tendency to believe that problems are solvable, that at the same point you can say that an international issue is terminated. But when one manages a global equilibrium every solution is an admission ticket to another set of problems. All of this is very familiar here and I would not dare to make a speech on it at your Diplomatic Academy, but it explains the bitterness of some of the internal American debates about foreign policy.

## East-West Relations

I find in many countries in Europe that I visit the belief that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have never been worse. I find the argument that there is a growing danger of nuclear war and a tendency to allege that an America run by slightly undisciplined »cowboys« should be moderated and brought back to its senses by European wisdom. Let me deal with some of these propositions:

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Second, I do not believe that there is an increased danger of nuclear war. I think it is no more likely today than it was ten or 20 years ago that either of the two superpowers will attack each other. The major danger of war is in conflicts in third areas that will grow imperceptibly out of control and that may be encouraged by outside influences. In other words the model that we should worry about is less World War II than the outbreak of World War I.

Third, it is a great mistake to believe that the personalities of particular leaders are the fundamental cause of current international tensions. I am of the view that some of the earlier rhetoric of the Reagan administration was perhaps unnecessarily muscular, but if you look at the actions of the administration rather that at the earlier rhetoric, they have been invariably moderate in East-West relations; and the earlier rhetoric has been succeeded by a whole series of conciliatory statements in the last eight months, inviting a dialogue. I read occasionally about President Reagan's comment that the Soviet Union represents the focus of evil in the world. I repeat I don't know whether I would have drafted that particular speech in exactly that manner, but if you read »Pravda« for a month or the statements of the Politbureau over any period of time I am sure you can find more damaging statements about the United States in a week than we have made over a period of several years. It is a misunderstanding to believe that Soviet leaders are so sensitive that one remark by the President of the United States will offend them for all eternity. And it is rather an example of Western masochism to focus on this particular problem. Above all, let us not be mesmerized by the current debate. I believe that, from our perspective, negotiations are inevitable for a number of reasons: The democracies know that they cannot hold their people together without a demonstration of their dedication to peace; the democracies, including the American democracy, are dedicated to peace; and everyone knows that they have an obligation to prevent a nuclear holocaust.

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replacement except through death or cult-like procedures. If one looks over the roster of present Soviet leaders, one knows, and every Soviet citizen knows, that within the next five years a number of changes will have to be made, because of age, if for no other reason. I cannot believe that these changes will be accomplished in a atmosphere of permanent international confrontation with the United States.

Second, if the post-war period has shown anything, it is that the dilemma of the communist economy is that you cannot run a modern economy by total planning, and the open question is whether you can run a communist state without total planning. Unless the Soviet Union and other communist states introduce some elements of incentive into their system, their economies are bound to fall more and more behind. It is a paradox of the modern world economy that a state that can produce intercontinental rockets cannot produce a single manufactured article for export that can compete on world markets – except in the most backward countries, or in countries under its political domination – with a manufactured article of market economies. Therefore sooner or later, either before the changes or after the changes of Soviet leadership, some period of relaxation seems to me necessary.

I believe that what is holding up this new period of détente are two factors. One is the American election: I do not think that the Soviet Union wants President Reagan to be able to say that his policies succeeded in promoting both a strong America and a successful negotiation.

Second the Soviet Union has not yet given up the hope that it can split Europe from the United States by creating the impression that it is American intransigence which is the cause of all world tensions. As soon as these two illusions are removed, we will see a return to normal diplomatic contacts between East and West. The big problem for the West in this connection at this moment is not to have a nervous breakdown over the issue of the paralysis of negotiations. It is rather to develop positions which we can sustain once the negotiations resume; and in this connection I would like to make a few general observations.

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countries. We should reach the point where that can be taken for granted. Second, I believe that entirely too much emphasis has been given to arms control negotiations as the solvant of all international difficulties. Yes, I favour arms control negotiations; I have been personally involved in many of them and I have great regard for the dedicated ambassadors who are here in Vienna engaged in some of them and who are ready in other forums to resume. But let us be realistic: There are in the world today some 25,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of the United States, and some 25,000 nuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union. I do not know anybody who believes that they can be reduced by three fifths in, let us say, the space of three or four years. But assuming they were, and we would reduce the number of warheads to 10,000 on each side, would the danger of nuclear destruction be significantly less? In 1962 during the Cuban missile crisis, President Kennedy thought he stood on the verge of Armageddon. At that time we had about 3,000 warheads. I say this not to downgrade arms control, but only to avoid placing a burden on it that cannot possibly be met. The difficulty with arms control is that as an isolated negotiation it creates too big a gap between the understanding of experts and the requirements of statesmen. It encourages in each country an endless debate about this or that technical benefit that is supposed to flow for one side or the other. The significance of arms control negotiations is in large part their contribution as a political symbol that relations have eased. Nobody should underrate this and therefore they should be pursued. But to believe that nuclear accounting can solve the nuclear problem is a great mistake.

The biggest problem in relations between East and West today is the absence of any political dialogue at high levels. It is the fermenting of political tensions, threatening the equilibrium globally by indirect means, that produces distrust and the conviction that there is a deliberate undermining of security. I know that many previous efforts to establish rules of international conduct have failed and it would be naive to believe that one can do this in a conclusive manner that ends all tensions. The Soviet Union and we are superpowers and therefore we are bound to impinge on each other in many parts of the world. Still, unless we come to some understanding of permissible methods in the pursuit of our interests and of limits

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