OFFICIAL USE ONLY

influence in Indonesia, in part to block the Chinese, but even so they probably regard their Indonesian policy as a low cost venture for a potentially high profit rather than as a matter of vital concern. The French recognition of China, in the context of its continuing position in Hanoi and its quiet activities in Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam, may not involve an intention to take further diplomatic steps in the near future, but it does set up conditions under which de Gaulle, if he chooses, can move gradually toward the creation of new equilibrium in the Far East and particularly in Southeast Asia.

## VI. SOME IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW RELATIONS OF POWER

52. The preceding paragraphs clearly indicate that the structure of world power -- which had already undergone profound changes during the 1950's -- is again undergoing major modifications. The fact that the two great powers have found it difficult to bring their very substantial military power to bear in order to achieve their objectives, or to project this power into parts of the world where they have an interest, has had important consequences. It has deterred the major powers from undertaking which might call their military capabilities into action. This in turn has enhanced the role of discussion, diplomacy, and negotiation at the great power level. At the same time, the natural centrifugal

- 33 -

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

or to renounce its objectives, but it makes progress more difficult and inhibitions more compulsive. Discord within the West is not destroying NATO or undermining the predominant role of the US in the non-Communist world, but it is forcing the Western nations to recognize the underlying diversity of their concerns. The rise of independent nationalisms and centers of power outside the North Atlantic basin does not foreshadow a great decline in Western influence, but it does greatly reduce the chances that Western political concepts will gain wide acceptance.

55. The Soviet leaders themselves appear to have come to a new appreciation of the world situation. In the months following the Cuban crisis Khrushchev was apparently under some attack at home and apparently won his battle. The battle was probably not so much over his personal position as it was over the domestic, intrabloc, and foreign policies the USER should follow. The result was a decision to hold the line on defense expenditures, a determination to stand fast against Chinese and Chinese-inspired attack upon Soviet policies, and a decision to seek better relations with the West in general and the US in particular. While this stance may persist for some time to come, particularly since it derives from a recognition of factors which are unlikely to change in the short

- 40 -

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

term, it does not in itself signal a broader withdrawal of the
USSR from its basically hostile attitude toward the West or from
its revolutionary goals.

56. Even as the Soviet leaders were conforming their policies to the changing atmosphere and power relations of the world, Western leaders were doing likewise. President Kennedy's style and approach, and particularly his capacity to combine firmness with restraint, both encouraged the Soviets to seek a new kind of relationship with the US and made clear the limits of American patience and hopes. General de Gaulle, now pre-eminent in Europe and driven by a sense of historic mission, has moved with boldness and stubbornness not only to reconstruct France, but Europe as well. De Gaulle's policies and manner are widely deplored in the West, particularly because of their effect upon the Atlantic alliance and because of their patently nationalist motivation. But de Gaulle is probably also convinced that his policies are right, and that, in the present world context, they will lead to a new and preferable world equilibrium.

57. Despite these changes in the world situation and in the manner in which the world's leaders look upon it, the danger of a general nuclear war with all its horrible consequences will continue to be the overriding problem of our time. This danger

- 41 -

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

will continue to arise, as in the past, not from a deliberate
attempt to destroy a competitor, but from undertakings and
occurrences of a more limited character. The problem of calculating
the risks involved in such undertakings and occurrences will remain
a major concern of policy-makers.

58. In any event, the problems which will increasingly preoccupy policy-makers will be those which arise from the diversity of interests which has developed and the proliferation of power which has occurred. Events similar to those which recently occurred in East Africa and Panama will flare up in the many places which continue to be unstable. Often an event occurring through accident or irrational action will trigger political developments throughout an entire area and provide opportunities for political adventures or revolutionaries who otherwise would have remained obscure and ineffectual. Aside from alarms and excursions of this nature, tensions are likely to flare up from time to time over the many continuing problems of international politics -- Berlin, Cuba, Vietnam, et al. Some may produce open military confrontations between the great powers despite the strong interest of both sides in not permitting such confrontations to develop.

59. Indeed, despite any disinclination to get involved in crises or any interest in a detente which may exist, the

- 42 -

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

situation in most of the underdeveloped world is so disorderly that
many situations are likely to develop from which the great powers
will have difficulty remaining aloof or which they will have
difficulty controlling if they do get involved. Individuals and
groups calling themselves Castroists or Communists might stage
revolutionary attempts or initiate guerrilla movements, not on the
orders of Moscow, Peiping, or Havana, but in the hope of gaining
their support. Similarly, individuals and groups may organize or
execute plots simply to gain US support. In some cases, of course,
the instigation will have come from the outside, and in many cases
support will be forthcoming. Once outside powers do become involved,
whether by accident or design, crises can develop which will engage
their prestige to a degree incommensurate with the intrinsic or
strategic value of the area itself.

60. One consequence of this disorder and of the inhibitions upon open involvement is likely to be an increase in clandestine activities designed to influence the course of events in a desired direction or to block similar activities by other powers. In many places the situation may be so soft, the issues so undefined, and the parties so difficult to identify that outside powers will be unable to develop an acceptable rationale for intervention. Thus, many situations will be resolved by local leaders or groups

- 43 -

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

sponsored and supported covertly from the outside. This will be
an attractive course of action, not only because of the inhibi-
tions upon open intervention, but because it will often cost so
little in money and effort if an investment is made early enough
to be effective.

61. It is possible in the present context of Soviet policy -- particularly to the extent that this policy derives from the USSR's appreciation of the military situation and from its own difficulties at home and within the Communist world -- that some movement toward the settlement of some international issues will occur. But the obstacles to a general detente are very great, not only because of the key character of such problems as Berlin, but because of the new tensions and problems which will arise from the disorderly character of so much of the world. Thus, the US will probably be confronted with many serious challenges to its interests in many parts of the world and will have to live with the paradox that --while it disposes greater power than any nation ever had -- it is greatly inhibited in the use of that power to advance or to protect its interests.

62. Over the longer run, the chances are good that the gradual changes taking place in the USSR will diminish its

- 44 -

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

hostility to the West and vigor of its revolutionary effort outside the Communist world. In particular, the climate of opinion within the USSR, the greater intellectual freedom permitted, the sensitivity of the regime to intellectual opinion and popular pre-occupations with peace and a better life, the greater weight accorded to national interests and conventional modes of international conduct -- all these have already contributed to the decline of Soviet aggressiveness and to a realistic appreciation of the nature of the modern world. This process of change may be slowed from time to time, or even halted, but it is probably irreversible. But whether it proceeds or halts, the evolution which has taken place, together with the changes which have occurred within the Communist camp and in the world at large, suggest that for the next several years at least the world may be replete with strife and disorder but not on the verge of nuclear disaster.

- 45 -

OFFICIAL USE ONLY