TELCORN

Zayyat Secretary Kissinger

Monday, October 8, 1973

1:45 p.m.

K: Mr. Foreign Minister, two things. I have softened the statement we are making to an almost unrecognizable point and I have added another point to you that peace in the Middle East requires observance of all the UN resolutions which I am sure you will recognize the Israelis will not be enthusiastic about.

Z: Thank you. I will hear it.

K: You will find that it is a minimum statement given our conditions here that we can make.

Z: I will have to hear it.

K: I just wnat to tell you and assure you as you will see from my
communication to Izmael that we are trying to maintain.

Z: I am now very disappointed.

K: Mr. Foreign Minister, you should think back to previous meetings.
You will find that this is the least that has ever been done.

Z: I was looking at Life Magazine and I was reading something from
you that we must see how much physical security is necessary to get...

K: That is right.

Z: Now you are really helping them to stay on this false issue of
security.

K: My position is the one I explained to you on Friday and that position
will be maintained. Secondly, the principles we are announcing will
be maintained even if the Israelis are gaining territories.

Z: As I said, we would not allow it.

K: I understand. There would be no one who would understand it.

Z: No one would understand it.

K: I have no question about that. I understand you. Where shall I
send that message to Izmael.

Z: I am here at the Waldorf Towers, 37F.

*

-2-

Zayyat

Oct. 8, 1973

K: O.K. What time would be a good time to deliver it.

Z: Any time. My wife is always here.

K: We can give it to her.

Z: Yes.

K: We will deliver it to the Waldorf at 37F and we have instructed our delegate -- are you planning a reply.

Z: Of course I was going to reply if they want to stay on our land.

K: I think you will find that not the case. You will find enough reference to other resolutions that it will say exactly the opposite. I have done my very best and you will see that we are facing enormous congressional pressure here but we are doing our best and you and I should maintain a contact because we want to move in the direction you and I discussed. Your statement today, I have read and it is a very constructive one.

Z: Thank you.

K: You have behaved throughout in a most statesman like manner.

Z: This I hope so.

K: We will do our best.

Z: All right.

K: You and I should talk every day while this is going on.

Z: It is beginning to be a habit.

K: It is a pleasant habit.

END

TELCONE
The President/Sec. Kssinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

2:35 p.m.

K: I forgot to mention to you this morning that I had worked out with Benites, the President of the GA, that he would recognize only three speakers. We did not want a debate in the General Assembly. It would have been a massacre. The Syrians, Egyptians and Eban spoke and the GA adjourned on that topic. This afternoon at 3:30 we are speaking. We have a rather good statement for the Security Council but it is mild.

N: Yes.

K: So far no one else has asked for the floor. The Soviets are playing the game we discussed this morning. They are laying low.

N: Yes.

K: We will be the only ones speaking and the only one with a proposal. I have just talked to the Egyptian For. Min. and he will not speak unless Eban does. I have a call into Eban to tell him not to speak. I have Waldheim lined up. The tactical situation is that we will be the only one with a proposal on the table. It will not be rejected and will not be voted on. By tomorrow they all will be begging for it.

N: We hope. I had an interesting talk with Kendall on the phone. The day after Schultz left, Brezhnev asked to see Kendall. Kendall had a couple of hours with him and brought in three nice projects. On the MFN he explained the situation that this whole opposition is pretty much the Jewish Community. Some elements of labor which opposed it for reasons that had nothing to do with trade. He said that at the conclusion Brezhnev very warmly said he did not want minorities in either country to destroy this relationship he had established with President Nixon. He is prepared to go further and to work on it. That was his attitude at least.

K: He has a big investment in this.

N: One thing on that I wanted to tell you. The question came up as to whether the trade bill would come down the Jackson/Vanik amendment but with credit in it. I told him if it came in with the credit in it I would veto it. I don't want to start the MFN if credits are in the trade bill. I will veto it. I would rather not have it. You give that signal out.

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>AUTHOR: E01258</td></tr><tr><td>DATE: 10/2/87</td></tr><tr><td>BY: ANA DUE 10/2/87</td></tr></table>

The President/Kissinger

Oct. 8, 1973

K: I will do that. Mansfield and Scott called and the Senate is going to pass a resolution applauding your action up to now and urging us to have a ceasefire and a return to the previous positions which is our position. The reason this is good for us is if we have to turn on the Israelis and turn them back we will have all of the Israeli supporters lined up.

N: They will not know what has hit them. That is good. Fine. Fine.

R: Right Mr. President.

END.

TELCON
Eban/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

2:40 p.m.

K: Mr. For. Minister, I have been told by the Secretary General that he has agreement of the Egyptians not to speak at the Security Council if you will not.

E: I have given my agreement.

K: I think this would work well.

E: It works well in what we are trying to achieve.

K: This is what will happen at the SC unless something unexpected occurs. Scali will put forward opposition and then it will adjourn.

E: I have spoken to the Australian Prime Minister and he is willing to cooperate too.

K: The only items before the SC will be something we are phrasing generally. We are saying Egyptians and Israelis started it. We are not here to assess blame. Our principle is that the Government should set a ceasefire and a lot of words ending up with the Governments should return to the original positions. I think it would be helpful if you would not urge this for awhile so it does not look like American conclusion.

E: I think so. We have made our point. I don't think we have to say anything to anybody today or to the press.

K: We are getting a Congressional resolution passed down here.

E: I have heard from the Ambassador about that.

K: Which urges this.

E: Yes.

K: I don't think there is any need for you to make that point again. We don't want to make it easy for the Egyptians to claim colusion.

E: I want to know whenever silence will be helpful.

REDACTED

Original: E012858
Date: 09/29/73

D. A. Kissinger

TELCON
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

3:00 p.m.

K: The power is getting weak on your line. Both of our intelligence is listening. I want to tell you we are sticking with what I told you this morning. We are making a field statement saying we don't want to assess blame and we are saying some principles of a settlement in a very general way which includes the ideas I gave you but stated so vaguely they are just there to invoke later on. If your representative can restrain himself I think we can have a quiet session. I understand the Egyptian may not speak and we have urged the Israelis not to speak unless the Egyptian speaks. And I understand the Egyptian said he would not speak. If we can get these two quieted down we could have a brief session.

D: You will not propose a resolution.

K: No. We are making a philosophical statement. Just translated from the German.

D: Good.

K: I am counting on you to not come in with a resolution.

D: For all of my information there is none.

K: As I understand it Malik is not a member of the Central Committee and he would not dare overrule you.

D: Definitely.

K: In all seriousness I wanted to know your instructions to avoid any confrontation with Malik. Our statement is phrased in such away that it should provoke no reaction by even the Arabs. We have just one sentence referring to return to previous positions. It is not as a proposal but will facilitate a good atmosphere. In our judgment by tomorrow evening it will be greatly welcomed by your friends.

D: By tomorrow evening?

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E012958</td></tr><tr><td>DATE: 10/19/73</td></tr></table>

2
Dobrynin

Oct. 8, 1973

K: Or Wednesday.

D: You mean the ceasefire.

K: I don't know whether they will want a ceasefire but the military will be such they will not be occupying much of Israeli territory by tomorrow evening. It does not make any difference then, we can drop it; we are not putting in any resolution. After this speech, we will do nothing. I assure you we will not do one other thing today. We do not now plan to put in a resolution.

D: This is the point.

K: As I understand Brezhnev's message this morning it was we should stay in concert with this. Our answer to that is yes. We will do nothing until we hear from you.

D: Have you had a chance to speak to Zayyat?

K: I have talked twice to him.

D: Today?

K: Yes.

D: Is he going to with the war?

K: HA.HA. HA. You must know the present situation of thought is not their most distinguished characteristic. His position is they are going to win the war. I said to him what if the Israelis gain territories. He said we will force them to take Cairo and we will not stop until they have taken Cairo. Because then we won't settle. You must recognize this is a terrible threat to make.

D: Yes. What are you going to do then?

K: If the Israelis take Cairo, I can tell you informally, I will not hold a Security Council meeting on that issue.

D: You will not.

3

Dobrynin

Oct. 8

K: I don't think that is our problem to talk sanely about. Anatol, we will be willing support no matter who is at what side of the line a return to the previous positions. When sanity returns this has to be the outcome. It may be easier for you to support this if the Israelis cross to the otherside.

D: I have no command of this. I understand what you are saying, you are going to leave it with a proposal for the time being.

K: My impression is their assessment is they think they may be winning.

D: He thinks one way publicly and the other way privately. It is difficult to say.

K: He did not make a specific proposal. He was not nasty. He just did not have a specific proposal. It is a new theory of warfare. I don't know if they learned it at your staff college or not. I am convinced that if you start a war you know where you are going.

D: O.K. Be in touch.

K: O.K. We will have a line put in tomorrow.

END

RECLASSIFIED
Author: EO 12958
Date: 6/14/87
D. K.ARA

TELCORN
Scali/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8 5:19:31

2:15 p.m.

K: You got the Statement. It will not shake the world. Our information here is that there is a chance that no one else will speak but in any event if the Egyptian speaks and you feel obliged to reply be very gentle with them. I don't insist that you reply but be very gentle and refer to the fact that the spirit of my conversation about peace is maintained. We don't want a confrontation with the Egyptians. It is my understanding that the Soviets are instructed to lay off us.

S: I was at a lunch with the For. Min. of Sudan and the permanent Rept. Malik left early because he has in scribed himself to speak.

K: When did he do that?

M: About 40 mins ago when he left this lunch.

K: To inscribe himself?

S: Yes. My understanding from the Security Council President.

K: You will have to judge the situation. We don't want a donnybrook with the Soviets this afternoon. If he gets offensive we will have to. If anything, my understanding is he will work over the Israelis. We will say we have deliberately avoided putting blame in our statement and we regret that he has concentrated on the past in such an erroneous way and we urge him to concentrate on the future. O.K.?

S: Right. We know the Syrians and Israelis have asked to participate but with no sign that they will speak today.

K: My information from the Israelis is that if the Egyptians do not speak, even if the Syrians do, Eban may not speak. Eban is confining himself to saying simply what he said this morning.

S: Very well. I have the text of this thing before me. I thought it essential for me to be there at the lunch.

K: You had to do that.

S: I will follow the instructions implicitely.

K: You are doing a great job. I think tomorrow this thing will get lively. I think the Arabs have not yet understood what the military risks are.

10/17/89
AM 10:04
J. ANNA DOR
8/21/89

TELCON
McCloskey/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

3:45 p.m.

Conversation concerning personnel announcement.

M: I was thinking of it for this week.

K: Do you think we should do it in the middle of all of this.

M: Yes.

K: Just because you want to go back to Cyprus.

M: You don't mean that. People will be walking around wondering what is going to happen. Speculation is building up and I am concerned that it will leak out and it will be all screwed up.

K: O.K. Lets plan on it for Thursday.

M: O.K.

END

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E 012958</td></tr><tr><td>DATE: 10/1/73</td></tr><tr><td>ATTN: NARA Dated</td></tr></table>

TELCOM

George Ball/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

3:50 a.m.

B: The only way to break Russell Long off is if you were to call Bennett and Curtis and tell them quite categorically that the Administration needs Hall in this job or if you could get Schultz to call. If Bennett and Curtis come to Long and say they have been told that the Administration really needs Hal Long will crack on this one.

K: Right.

B: Otherwise what he is worried about is that Long is going to hold firm and this will become a cause celebre of Human Events and blow-up into a right wing incident.

K: The hell of it is, I want Hal over here.

B: I appreciate that.

K: And if the crazy bastard had not fought it so stupidly I would have had him by now.

B: I would think there would be no reason for your not saying that.

K: I will get Schultz to call Curtis and Bennett and I will join the calls. It is his Committee and he should call them first.

B: As a matter of courtesy he should.

END.

TELCONE

Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

4:45 p.m.

K: You know the joke where somebody said to the Russians:
They must have taken your advice they are retreating to Cairo
and waiting for the winter.

Z: You don't mind if I say that the President called Scott
and Mansfield.

K: Has the resolution gone through?

Z: Yes.

K: I would not it is better for us to be pushed by the Congress.

Z: You are quoted as saying "I find no fault with the resolution at all."

K: Then he is a horse's %.
I am telling the Egyptians we are being
pushed by the Congress.

Z: The lead is: Resolution believed to reflect the Administration's
opinion and was introduced by Mansfield and Scott and was
passed by a unanimous vote.

K: I was not thinking. They called and asked me if I had any
objections.

Z: Goes on to say White House and Kissinger were called.

K: I think, stick with that. That is good.

Z: If they ask...

K: Say they asked me if I was bothered by that resolution but it
was their jurisdiction.

Z: Has the SC met?

K: No. The Arabs think they are winning. I have asked for more time
to be in better shape.

Z: They are not, are they?

K: No they are getting creamed.

TELECON, October 8, 1973, 4:55 p.m.

Secretary/ SecGen Waldheim

W. I should inform you of recent developments. The Council President postponed the meeting till 6 o'clock. Scali is upset. There was a rumor that the non-aligneds wanted to prepare a draft resolution. I checked with Minic, the Yugoslav and he said no, this is not their intention. It seems that the reason they asked for the postponement is that they heard that Zayyat was informed by you that in the statement which Scali is going to make there will be a call for a return to the 1967 lines.

K. That is not true. . .

W. He said if this is true he needed new instructions from Cairo. He cannot accept this without making an adequate answer to the American speech. So I thought I should let you know immediately.

K. The non-aligned intend to place a res.

W. To give Zayyat time to prepare a statement--to get in touch with Cairo on how to behave when

K. I guess I shouldn't have told him what we were going to do. It is a very general statement making general principles. It does not say what we will accept or not accept.

W. Could you instruct Scali to get in touch--perhaps it's better to call Zayyat. This is the information I got from the Yugoslav.

K. OK. Fine. Thanks--thank you very much Mr. Secretary General.

mj

WELLA SUBMITTED

Author: EO 12858
Date: 09/04/84
By: ANNA

TELCON

Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

5:05 p.m.

D: We have received a full account of today's battle for delivery to you. I will do that later. I am telling you no in answer to the specific question that our ground forces are not repeat not operating on the western side of the Canal.

K: Good. I don't know why I am saying good. That is up to you.

D: I am calling your attention to what our Chief of Staff said in answer to that question he said not yet. The cable I have said not operating yet. I presume we are now busy mopping up the remainder of the Egyptian forces down our side of the Canal.

K: May I make one other suggestion. It would help if your Foreign Minister in New York would not make a proposal.

D: I want to make that point. He told me you talked to him.

K: It puts us in the position of having aligned ourselves with you which we don't object to but it is in our common interest to keep precipitating.

D: Absolutely. He said this to me and I confirmed no need for him to talk. Now he called me and said the rumor at the UN is that the Syrians, the French and British will probably talk. Even if the Syrians do talk we prefer they do not but their is still the possibility we will say nothing.

K: I don't object to your talking as long as you do not put forth a definite proposal.

D: No. I suggested to Eban and said if the Syrians do talk he said he would say what he said this morning and reserve rights for future meetings of the Council.

K: I think it would be better.

D: Is there any information that the Syrians will be talking.

K: My information from the Sec. Gen. is that no one would talk.

DAILY NEWSPAPER

August 8, 1973

By ANA B. Dure

8:00 AM

TELECON, October 8, 1973, 5:00 p.m.

Secretary/ Zayyat

K. We're getting to know each other very well.

Z. Yes, we are.

K. Mr. Foreign Minister, in the rumor mill at the UN I have heard that you have heard that we will make certain statements that you will not accept. This is false. We are making a general statement.

Z. Yes, I got that.

K. I just wanted you to know that what we're saying is so vague-- it will leave all options open. I just want you to understand so that you don't get upset.

Z. No, no, I understood that. I know that.

K. Thank you very much.

mj

2
Dinitz

Oct 8, 1973

D: Even if you can influence the British and French not to talk it would be better. If the Syrians do talk and the information we have concluded with the For. Min., even in this case, unless something gets out of hand, will not talk but at best he will say what he said this morning.

K: I am not in contact with the French but I will call the British.

D: I will tell Eban we are of the opinion that no one will talk. If the Syrians talk and he feels it necessary to say something he will say something about this morning.

K: No concrete proposals. You will find our statement extremely mild but our major point is to prevent the Russians from replying. The less we do now to precipitate the better.

D: The exercise is to be very conservative.

K: Yes.

D: I can call latter with news of the battles.

K: Call Scowcroft and tell him you have talked to me. Discuss with him about the movement of some of the ammunition and electronics.

D: I will call him now.

END

DECLASSIFIED
RECEIVED

E012958

30 MAR 1973 10:04:04

TELCORN
Amb. Scali/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8 1973 1

5:30 p. m.

S: The Secretary General has confirmed to me that El Zayyat definitely took what you said to mean...

K: I know. I have explained to the Sec. Gen. and I have called back Zayyat so the record is clear. There are too many busy bodies in New York.

S: You are right. May I make a suggestion. We have one line in here where we say the least damaging way to bring this about is to bring the parties to the cease-fire line.

K: We want that to stay.

S: I understand it is not a demand.

K: If he interprets it as not a demand.

S: Once in confrontation with me he said I had given him an ultimatum. When we say the least damaging way to do it this means there may be 50 other ways but this is the least damaging. Does not mean we will settle for something when we are trying to force them back. Or he said we presented him with an ultimatum.

K: That is the chance we have to take.

S: We will take the chance.

K: Yes.

S: I am prepared to go ahead.

K: I think you should make noise but no drama.

S: Of course not.

K: If you don't get to give the speech, if there is no meeting, then you should protest. You should say we wanted to say that we were set for a constructive meeting. Don't give the impression that it is the end of the world. Should be statesmanlike and cool. If we cannot get it today we will get it tomorrow.

*

2

Scali

Monday, Oct. 8

S: We would hope that the other side would agree tomorrow.

K: Right.

S: Do you think you have modified El Zayyat.

K: No. He wants not to be mollified.

S: He will put out a statement saying you have given him an ultimatum.

K: That would be a lie. Why would I.

S: I am telling you what his tactics are.

K: How can he claim that we have given him an ultimatum when we want give him a speech. If he listens to it and claims we have given him an ultimatum, we will handle it.

S: Misinterpretation of the English language.

K: Totally misunderstanding. We have other ideas. We wanted to say that (-- no resolution or proposal. Certainly the Sec. Gen. said he also understood it that way.

S: Zayyat?

K: I don't know about him.

S: O.K. The latest is Mosjov is spreading rumors that he has had a second call from Kissinger and he is deleting that part of the statement.

K: Fine.

S: We can live with that?

K: Of course, we can. We don't have to answer every idiosy of the Yugoslavs. Now I gave him an ultimatum and now I have deleted it. Now he can go to the meeting. Just don't delete anything from the speech. Now there is no ultimatum in the speech. He will claim he got it taken out by me. Great. Shows I am conciliatory. You are very scrupulous by keeping me informed.

RECLASSIFIED

Author: E012858
Date: 10/29/97
Title: AMRA Doc 69797

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

Monday, Oct. 8, 1973

5:40 p.m.

(not on first minute)

D: I want to tell you that they are expecting this information. We are not
going to do anything at the Council. No kind of resolution in the
Security Council. Our representative in the SC has instructions not
to have any problems with the American representative. Meanwhile
we continue to consult urgently with the Arab side. In this connection,
we would like and hope that you will do everything not to force the
SC to accept any resolutions.

K: You can count on that.

D: Until we have finished our consultations with our allies.

K: May I make a suggestion to you. Your Arab friends are going
around New York saying I am giving them an ultimatum.

D: In New York?

K: Yes. I thought we had an agreement specifically.

D: They are trying to delay the SC meeting.

K: It is not going on yet.

D: No?

K: It has been delayed. My own recommendation is we don't care
whether it take place or not much. Let's have it, get it over and
adjourn it. I promise you we will not introduce a resolution.

D: I can give instructions along those lines. In Moscow it is now
______ hours.

K: Let's see what happens. You can promise Moscow flatly there will
not be a resolution in the near future. There will not be a resolution.
We are making a very mild statement.

D: I understand.

vague

K: It states our general position in such a/way. We are not saying
there must be a return to the ceasefire line. Just saying one way to
achieve peace.

2
Dobrynin

Oct. 8

D: I understand. We would like to have consultation.

K: I promise you we will not introduce a resolution. I would hope
you would not spring one on us.

D: I have specific assurances on this.

K: Let's have an understanding that neither one of us will introduce
a resolution without giving the other one notice.

D: Exactly my instructions from Moscow.

K: We will not do it I promise you without giving you time to
consult with Moscow. You do the same for us.

D: Good.

K: Fine.

END

*

TELCONE

The President/Secy Kissinger

7:08 p.m., October 8, 1973

P: Hi, Henry. What's the latest news? I got the military news.

K: Yeah. Well, on the diplomatic front we had another message from Brezhnev asking us not to table a Resolution and promising us he would not table a Resolution without consulting with us, telling us they are using a great effort on the Arabs.

P: Yeah.

K: First of all, if this turns out to be true -- Well, first of all, we're in no hurry to table anything.

P: No.

K: We're making our record. We're the only ones that are pushing for anything.

P: Yeah, yeah.

K: But if we bring it off -- By Thursday it will be over in my view.

P: Oh, sure.

K: If we bring it off, Mr. President, if this thing ends without a blowup without either the Arabs or the Soviets, it will be a miracle and a triumph.

P: Right. The one thing we have to be concerned about, which you and I know looking down the road, is that the Israelis when they finish clobbering the Egyptians and the Syrians, which they will do, will be even more impossible to deal with than before and you and I have got to determine in our own minds, we must have a diplomatic settlement there.

K: I agree with you.

P: We must have. We must not tell them that now but we have got to do it. You see, they could feel so strong as a result of this, they'd say: Well, why do we have to settle? Understand? We must not, we must not under any circumstances allow them because of the victory that they're going to win - and they'll win it, thank God, they should - but we must not get away with just having this thing hang over for another four years and have us at odds with the Arab world. We're not going to do it anymore.

*

The President/Secy Kissinger

2

K: I agree with that completely, Mr. President. But what we are doing this week is putting us in a position to do --

P: To do something, that's right.

K: To do something.

P: And to do something with the Russians too.

K: Exactly.

P: I'm not tough on the Israelis. Fortunately, the Israelis will beat these guys/badly I hope that we can make sort of a reasonable -- You and I both know they can't go back to the other borders. But we must not, on the other hand, say that because the Israelis win this war as they won the '67 war, that we just go on with status quo. It can't be done.

K: I couldn't agree more. I think what we are doing this week will help us next month.

P: Maybe. I hope so. But in any event, on Brezhnev, he may be wanting -- Of course, the other thing that Brezhnev may be thinking of, his clients are going to get clobbered. You know, that's the only reason Kosygin came to see Johnson.

K: Yeah, but in '67 they were scheming their fleet around, they were threatening war, they were castigating us at the Security Council ... breaking diplomatic relations with us, threatening our oil installations. And no one has made a peep against us yet.

P: That's great.

K: And that's a major triumph for our policy and we can use it in the MFN fight.

P: Thank God, yeah. You've got the Congress in good shape and you've got ...

K: I had a talk with Stennis.

P: How good? Does he think we're doing the right thing?

K: Oh, he says he's marking it down on his calendar. He said it's a great day.

P: Because why?

*

The President/Secy Kissinger

3

K: Because he thinks we're in control and we're handling it well.

P: Right. Good, good, good. That's good. Actually though, the Israelis are really moving now, aren't they?

K: Well, they will be by tomorrow morning. I mean, they're in a position now from which they will --

P: They'll cut the Egyptians off. Poor dumb Egyptians getting across the Canal and all the bridges will be blown up. They'll cut them all off -- 30 or 40 thousand of them. Go over and destroy the SAM sites. The Syrians will probably go rushing back across now.

K: No, the Syrians -- that will turn into a turkey shoot by Wednesday.

P: Yeah, yeah. .... surrender.

K: Either surrender or a terrific shellacking.

P: Just so the Israelis don't get to the point where they say to us: We will not settle except on the basis of everything we got. They can't do that, Henry. They can't do that to us again. They've done it to us for four years but no more.

K: The first thing we've got to do is to get them back to their lines prior to the ceasefire.

P: I agree.

K: Which this they've promised us. But no one else knows we're going to manage it. And the next step then will be to start the diplomatic offensive.

P: Right.

K: Right after the election, which is two weeks from now.

P: That's right. Oh, I know, you've got to wait until after that. The first of November.

K: Right.

P: Good. Let me know if anything comes along.

K: But if we can hold this present situation another 48 hours, Mr. President it will be a great triumph for you.

*

The President/Secy Kissinger

4

P: Maybe that's right.

K: No. Yeah, because we can brief the hell out of this one.

P: Why?

K: Just compare it to '67.

P: Yeah, I guess so. Well, we thought we could brief the #@*! out of Jordan. It didn't help much.

K: Jordan we never briefed much.

P: Never did, did we?

K: No.

P: That was really a good one though.

K: But there we couldn't tell the truth.

P: We really with no cards at all - just like India/Pakistan - played a hell of a game.

K: Exactly.

P: This time we don't have any cards either.

K: We're playing a pretty good game.

P: That's right. Okay, Henry, thank you.

K: Right.

TELCORN
The President/Secy Kissinger

7:14 p.m., October 8, 1973

P: Henry, I thought you would be intrigued to know that Tricia called me last night. She had to go to the Italian Columbus Day parade -- she knew the press would grab her. I just talked to her a few minutes ago and she said all they asked about in addition to how did you like the parade was Israel. She had asked me last night what should I say. I said just tell them that your father says that the survival of Israel is a cornerstone of American foreign policy so she told them that. She said they just went away just thinking that was great. That really covers the New York situation. Also, that will get back to Golda.

K: Well, it will get back to her and Dinitz is going around town - You know, know, about 20 Senators have called him to ask him what to do.

P: Is that right?

K: And he says just support the President.

P: Great, great. Dinitz is all right then.

K: Oh, he's terrific.

P: But you see that little statement -- you can read it tomorrow -- used it with Pakistan, used it again -- the survival of Israel is a cornerstone of American foreign policy. That's all you have to say.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Okay. Good.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

SANITIZED COPY

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER 1 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN Form 101 (revised 6-85)

DECLASSIFIED

E 012358

Dated: 6/24/94

*

Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger

2

S: But glean through the message when you come back tonight is the point I'm making. I'll just position it in the White House for you.

K: Okay.

S: Good.

K: Right, thank you.

S: Thank you very much. And have a good speech.

K: Wait a minute! The Israelis have formally replied on Lebanon.

S: Oh, good.

K: You can get a message off. They promised to guarantee its sovereignty and independence.

S: Guarantee sovereignty and independence.

K: The only thing they ask, provided that Lebanon undertakes no military actions of its own against Israel.

S: Provided that it does not undertake any military action of its own against Israel. Okay.

K: And they authorize us to communicate that to the Lebanese.

S: Good. I'll send that out.

K: Right.

S: Thank you.

K: Thank you.

TELCORN

Amb. Dinitz (Israel)/ Secy Kissinger (at home)

1:45 a.m., October 9, 1973

D: I hope I didn't wake you.

K: It's all right.

D: I didn't want to wake you up but your secretary said ............ The reason I am disturbing you, we have an evaluation of the situation up to midnight. I am sitting here with the Military Attache who was the Commander of our ............ The situation really is placing us a number of difficult situations which to make a long story short, whether we will be able to get the parts we need as well as the planes. But I thought if it is not possible now, maybe very early in the morning I would like to bring the Military Attache with the material to you for you to get a complete picture and together we can then cable the Prime Minister the situation we are facing.

K: All right. Let me see, let's aim for about 8:00 -- shortly after 8:00 in the Map Room of the White House.

D: Fine, I will be there.

K: Is it a difficult situation?

D: Difficult in the choices that we are facing. To make it simple, in the Canal we have ............ 5 divisions of Infantry, which means about 50,000 people and 700 tanks. Although the bridges are destroyed behind them, the choice is then to press forward with the Canal behind them. The question that we are facing is how to handle the situation and that depends on what we will be able to get .... planes and etc.

K: Anti-tanks is easier than planes in the short time.

D: I suggest that we wait until the morning. If you think it is advisable that Haig (I believe he means Scowcroft) participate too because I will bring my General.

K: Let me see what I find in the morning.

D: Thank you very much. I will see you in the morning.

wgh

TELCOM

Ken Rush/HAK

October 9, 1973/9:20 a.m.

R: Hello

K: Ken, I have just had some very personal information to the President from the Israelis which isn't too good but which I ~~want~~ you to share and which I don't want to repeat on the telephone.

R: Alright.

K: But I'm holding a meeting of the principals only of WSAG and therefore none of you. Maybe we could treat you as a principal for this purpose Why don't you get over here.

R: What time is it?

K: Immediately. And without any debriefing in State. Don't say you're coming over to see me.

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

11:29 a.m., October 9, 1973

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

D: Thank you very much. Are you in White House now or you already
have connections with State Department?

K: No, no, I'm in the White House. Anatol, I just got a message from
Amman.

D: Yes, saying what? What's happening there?

K: Well, saying that your Charge -- Let me read it to you.

D: Okay.

K: "The Soviet Charge asked to see King and was received this morning.
Charge said Soviets fully support Arabs in conflict with Israel.
He said Soviet Union thought all Arab States should enter battle now."

D: Soviet, what?

K: "Soviet Union thought all Arab . . . "

D: Soviet Union?

K: Yes.

D: Thought or fought?

K: Recommending to the King.

D: Un-huh.

K: "King considers this a Soviet request for him to send his army into
action."

D: We asked King to go into action?

K: Yeah.

D: Unbelievable story. Was it ours . . ? I don't have any information
at all. I could quite [readily accept] that we discuss with them and saying

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012058
By: WWAPAD 00304

DECLASSIFIED
 authority E012058
By: MWAPD 04-03-04

Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

2

D: (cont'd) that we ____ our support of Arab countries is nothing new.
But as you said we asked King to send......... yes?

K: That's right.

D: I will check with Moscow right now. It was our initiative or it was --

K: No, it was your initiative.

D: It's an unbelievable story, I should say.

K: You know, I'm not drawing any conclusions but we really urge you to
keep people calm.

D: No, no. May I have a second try once again? Soviet Union thought . . .

K: "Soviet Union thought all Arab States should enter the battle now."

D: Enter the battle?

K: Yes.

D: He actually mentioned to the King?

K: Yes.

D: Okay, I will check this with Moscow right away. It's an unbelievable
story.

K: Okay.

D: I'm sure on this country I should know. (laughs) I think this is really
unbelievable, that he asked him to do this. He may just say in general.
Well, I will check with Moscow, then I will be back with you, all right?

K: Okay, good.

D: There is for the time being nothing new I understand.

K: No. On my promise, we will make no move.

D: No.

K: Now, let me tell you something -- We're assuming when you say this
and we're having this arrangement that we will not be confronted with an
Egyptian move which you support.

Amb. Dobrynin/Secy Kissinger

3

D: Well, you see the situation, I don't want really to do this in any way because I don't know what Egyptians will do and quite frankly [as a matter of fact] sometimes even Moscow doesn't know. I don't want you to [later on] tell me I am sorry you give me a solemn promise which I couldn't keep. In a sense I couldn't keep, not deliberately; we have an agreement but simply Zayat is uncontrollable. Today he refused -- Yesterday he refused to come which you mentioned when he spoke with the President of the country. He was not intending to make a speech in Security Council but then he consented to make it. On the General Assembly again he refused to have it in the morning or to make his speech when we asked him to find out what he's going to say he was unavailable. So this is like you say he may come with a resolution or situation which overall the principal of support against the aggression and Malack will be forced to support. I'm speaking from this end. But Malack in a specific agreement to do something to put you in an embarrassing situation I......

K: You have to help us study the problem you know.

D: I know because with the telegram going to Moscow I tell you very frankly that we will prepare to keep our part of the bargain but sometimes it could happen that U.N. will allow something that I couldn't control in Moscow.

K: Anatol, we will keep our side of the promise.

D: We will do the same.

K: Move up the Israelis restraint in so far as we can.

D: Henry, this is the impression I get that they are beginning to bomb civilialns. That's not a very good idea. I have instructions. My remarks are off. Damascus and somewhere in Cairo. It was an article that was published for the Republic of Science.

K: We'll wait until we hear from you. OK. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: EA12058
By: NNPA 5-30

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER ____ ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

DECLASSIFIED

Author:
E 0 1 2 9 5 8
D: NARA Date Col 1/97

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELCONE
Amb. Dinitz/HAK

Oct. 9, 1973 - 11:37 a.m.

UNCLASSIFIED

K: Hello.

D: Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yes, Mr. Ambassador. We have to meet with the President, that won't be possible because of the visit of the Ivory Coast President until 4:00 this afternoon. You will hear from me sometime afterwards.

D: After 4:00.

K: Yes.

D: Fine.

K: The most accurate information you can give me about the real military situation before then would be very important.

D: Fine. At 4:00 you will get it.

K: Well get it for me by 3:00 if you can.

D: Fine. I will do this and then you will get back to me after the meeting.

K: I'll get back to you after the meeting. I don't whether you have a correct assessment about domestic situation here. If you do, I don't think they have in Jerusalem.

D: About what?

K: About what is possible in our government.

SANITIZED

DECLASSIFIED ON 9/2/03 by
NARA on the recommendation of the
NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958

D: ... I wanted to ask you, Tuesday morning I had a stream of calls from the Senate and the House - individuals, asking what they can do and what the situation is.

RECLASSIFIED

Author: E 012858

Date: 09/29/97

TELCONE

Senator Church/Secy Kissinger

11:48 a.m., October 9, 1973

K: Hello, Frank, how are you?

C: Well, I'm fine. I know you're a very busy man, Henry, and I won't take much of your time.

K: Not at all, always happy to hear from you.

C: More on the Middle East. Now that it has broken out and you're right in the midst of it, I think the only good that might come of it is that these Egyptian and Syrian forces are broken sufficiently to eliminate the threat for a long time to come. I was wondering about the losses that the Israeli Government has sustained in the air and what we can do about helping replace those losses.

K: Well, of course, we have two problems, Frank. One is to help and the other to start a massive influx of equipment while the battle is going on is a rather serious matter.

C: But the Phantoms, is there a way that they can be slipped in? Because I understand the Egyptian and Syrian forces are getting rapid replacement from their Arab allies.

K: Well, frankly, we are looking into it today. And we are, incidentally, on other equipment not inactive.

C: Uh-huh.

K: And it's a difficult thing to discuss on the telephone.

C: I understand.

K: But I understand what you are saying.

C: Well, I just wanted to express my concern about it and I think its a tragedy that this thing has broken out again but that's it. If we act more decisive, the victory I think the better under the circumstances.

K: I agree.

C: All right.

K: I think on the strategy we are in substantial agreement.

TELECON

David Frost/Secretary Kissinger

October 9, 1973

1:45 pm

F: I was calling you as we said we would talk today on your movements.

K: I'm still not sure. Can you call me tomorrow or I'll call you.

F: Easily. Easily. I'll call you tomorrow and if you're not there I'll leave the number with your secretary.

K: That's fine.

F: Well, have a good luncheon, Henry. Oh, I gave your greetings to John.

K: I was hoping to see him.

F: Perhaps we can get together if you're free on the night of the 14th.

K: Let's aim for something like that.

F: Lovely, Lovely. I'll get John to reserve a date. I'll call you tomorrow. Goodbye.

K: Fine, goodbye David.

END

TELCOM

Amb. Dinitz/HAK

10/9/73 - 3:45 p.m.

K: Hello.

D: Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yes.

D: I explained to Eagleburger a few lines on the current situation in...

K: Yeah, come on, I'm in a great hurry. What is it?

D: There are no basic changes on the ground. The major thing is we have destroyed a hundred Syrian tanks today. Only 30 Syrian tanks remained in the Golan Heights.

K: You destroyed 100 today?

D: We destroyed 100 today. Only 30 Syrian tanks remained within our area of the Golan Heights. There are more outside. Our losses in planes increased to 49 from the beginning of the war. We lost 11 today. All of them six ____ Syria. The rest can... not meaningful, the rest of the changes. The Egyptian front remains steady. They lost several dozens of tanks when they tried to cross the bridges today. On the ground there was no change.

K: We have a report here that you hit the Soviet Embassy in Damascus.

D: Somebody just heard it on the radio, but we have no report of this whatsoever. I would inquire of course in Israel.

K: O.K. Well, I have to run to see the President.

D: Fine. I'll expect to hear from you. Thank you.

TELCOM

Ziegler/HAK

10/9/73 - 5:47 p.m.

K: Hello.

Z: Hi, Henry.

K: Yes, Ron.

Z: What is your judgment about announcing the Leadership Meeting tonight?

K: I'd announce it, well....

Z: You know, it's 9:00 in the morning.

K: Yeah. I don't know. What do you think?

Z: If we don't announce it tonight it will spring as a real surprise in the morning.

K: Well then announce it - too late for the evening....

Z: That's what I thought. I said maybe we'd announce it about 7:00 or 7:30.

K: Just a special meeting.

Z: Bi-partisan leadership meeting.

K: Right.

Z: Subject - Middle East.

K: Right.

Z: Now do you still expect to hold a news conference this week?

K: Well, that's what I wanted to ask you. What do you think?

Z: I think you should definitely leave your option open to do it later in the week.

DECLASSIFIED

Author: EO 12958

Date: 10/19/94

-2-

K: Well, it's scheduled now for 11:00 on Thursday.

Z: Well, let's discuss it tomorrow afternoon, don't you think?

K: I was going to make personnel announcements then. This isn't a good week for it though.

Z: Absolutely not.

K: O.K. Fine.

Z: Don't do that. I expect McCloskey would agree with that.

K: No, he wants it done.

Z: He wants personnel announcements?

K: Yeah. But I think.... ;You see, I'll have to cancel my trip to Europe. I won't be able to go to Europe Saturday morning, Ron.

Z: Not if things keep going the way they are, no sir.

K: The earliest they can now break is Thursday night. You know, by Thursday night if the Israelis haven't won, they have lost. And then it will take us 4 or 5 days to wrap it up. You know, to go through the maneuvers.

Z: Right.

K: O.K. I agree with you.

Z: O.K. But we can discuss it tomorrow.

K: Right. Bye.

TELCOM
Rush/HAK

Oct. 9, 1973 - 5:55 p.m.

K: Ken?

R: Yes, Henry.

K: Ken, over here people are leaning towards my holding back on the personnel announcement.

R: Well, I can understand that and I certainly don't want to rush it because I....

K: So let's not send out any ______ stuff.

R: Alright. That suits me very much. I want to talk to you before we do it anyway.

K: Well, I just thought this thing might sort of move along.

R: No, no, I've done nothing and I as you know have my own doubts as to the timing.

K: It seems to me now, looking at it realistically, that I'll have to cancel my trip to Europe.

R: You think so?

K: Well, I don't see how I can be out of town for four days, for three days, Saturday, Sunday and Monday.

R: I don't see, really, how you can either.

K: Because this thing, I thought it would be wound up by Thursday, but it now looks like there won't be a military outcome before Thursday night which means there won't be a diplomatic outcome for another 5 or 6 days.

R: That's right. I think this is right, Henry. In that case the urgency is pretty well diluted I think. I also have very serious doubts about doing this at a time when it won't even be noticed. Because I want to see you get some real impact from it.

TELCOM
Ambassador Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger

October 9, 1973

7:25 p. m.

K: Mr. Ambassador. I have talked to Schlesinger. You can now go ahead. The only other thing I would like to point out to you is a situation now developing in which it is very hard for us to resist a cease-fire in place proposal. Therefore in designing your strategy you should keep that in mind.

D: Cease-fire in place, you mean back to the lines...

K: Cease-fire to whatever line they are at... Eban and I discussed. You might be ready to accept Tuesday night.

D: Next week?

K: It depends on the tactical position. It's a hell of a position for the United States to take. ... Our tactical assessment is that we may be in a position where we veto a resolution urging you to go back to '67 borders.

D: Yes, but nobody takes that seriously.

K: Maybe not, but we can get a majority vote. May not be serious but it will pass unless we veto it. ... going back to the line, also their staying where they are after weeks of fighting it will be a hell of a thing to defend in public opinion. There is no reason to suppose that will develop. If I were an Egyptian with some sense of balance, I might at some point tell the Russians...

D: When I last talked to Eban he was under the notion that such a resolution would be vetoed by you.

K: That was on Sunday. He told me he..... Tuesday. Here it is Tuesday... until Thursday or Friday. Going to be extremely tough. at that point.

D: Naturally we will do our best.

K: I am referring to one particular comment you made.

D: About letting...

K: letting the situation develop slowly.

TELCORN
B/G Scowcroft - Secretary Kissinger

October 9, 1973

7:35 p. m.

S: I think so. I did mention it to him and he said OK, if that's
the way Henry wants to do it.

K: I don't really object to keeping a clear line, not get any argument.

S: ...carefully controlled.

K: But if he wants to, I don't object to their being there.

S: I can run it past him again.

K: Of course, I think I could give a more coherent picture without
them.

S: OK, I'll check it with him.

<table><tr><td>RECEIVED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: EO 12958</td></tr><tr><td>DATE: 10/1/73</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

Cromer/HAK

October 9, 1973/11:38 p. m.

K: Hello

C: Oh, Henry, I didn't want to intrude on your evening.

K: Not at all. I was at a dinner for the President of the Ivory Coast.

C: It sounds immensely rewarding.

K: Mercifully. It just ended. He thought it was necessary for him to speak for half an hour in French with another one half hour translation.

C: We're very alone on the line aren't we.

K: Yes.

C: It's merely this. You and I talked about this thing between the ceasefire lines one way or the other. Eban made some remarks in New York which would point that if the politicians in Israel have their way they'll stop on the line and if they do that and this is an entirely a ______ remark. It's not HMG at all. I think its very important that the U.S. and/or the west get its credit for them stopping on that line. I think we want to think about some wording for that.

K: Let me understand it.

C: If the Israelis can push the Arabs back to the line and stop there and don't go beyond it (which is what we were talking about before). We want to get some credit if we can for the U.S. and all of us for having started them to do just that.

K: I agree. That's been our strategy all along.

C: But have we worked on any wording on this. Because it could happen suddenly.

K: Is that what you think?

C: Well, it's my personal thought. It's not my government's thought. It could happen quite suddenly and very soon that they get to the ceasefire lines, the Israelis, and they stay put. And then this sort of strategy we were talking about before really doesn't work very well. Do you see what I mean?

K: Yes. I see what you mean.

C: If it was either one way or the other way we have the problem that you and I discussed that if the Israelis push them back to the line and then the Israelis stay on that line and don't push further then we've got a new situation in a kind of way which we need diplomatically before we review our situation with the Arabs. I mean to take credit for if we can contrive to do so.

K: I couldn't agree more.
minds

C: Are we work the same way.

they'll

K: And I can tell you that if the Israelis cross the line we move against us.

C: If they do that.

K: I see, but if they don't you want us to take credit for it.

C: That's my suggestion. It's not my view.

K: But how would we do it?

C: I don't know. That's why I think why we want to apply our minds to wording which is directly what we hoped would happen.

K: What is your view -- well it's happening now.

C: Well, Eban's remarks in New York that implied they might do that. He made that today....

K: That they might stop at the line?

C: Yes.

K: OH, yes, that I think is possible and that we strongly urged him to do.

C: Oh you have done.

K: Yes.

take

C: Then you can/credit for it.

K: Oh yes we can take credit for it.

C: Well that's fine.

K: I thought you wanted some public statement.

C: Yes. If it does happen because I think they'll have political problems in Israel. I think the military will want to go on further.

K: Well, what do you think is going to happen in the Security Council? Are you people planning to put forward some resolutions.

C: No, not at all.

K: Because you think it would be vetoed.

C: I don't think we have any particular proposition to put forward.

K: You mean like the straight ceasefire.

C: Well, we could do that but I think you felt, and I think we say in view of that was rather too simple. But I think if the Israelis stop on the line the sort of statutes that you and I were discussing a couple days ago are slightly overtaken by events. Because We were thinking either it would swing one way or the other.

K: Right.

C: But if they do, I mean, it saves self-restraint that they do do that and in a way makes the western diplomacy more difficult. With the Arabs I mean.

K: I think I agree with.

C: It's still a question of just trying our minds of that contingency and if we have any ideas. I haven't gone to London mind you. If we have any ideas on that it could happen quite abruptly see and we ought to take advantage of it from the relations with the Arab world and everyone else.

r

K: Are you people surprised at the course of hostilities.

C: No. They are going rather slower than I think we anticipated.

K: Us too.

C: That's the only element of surprise in it.

- 3 -

K: But that makes a lot of difference.

C: Yes, but it also gives us a little bit of opportunity to think out what we're going to do.

K: Exactly.

C: I do emphasize that this is really my own personal thinking and not based on any instructions I've had.

K: I fully understand that but our thinking is exactly on the same direction as mine.

C: Fine. and if I can think of any formula. That could pose a new question so to speak in the posture we end up with, if the Israelis just stop on the ceasefire lines.

K: I agree. If they could stop there that would be the easiest way to end it.

C: It's the easiest way to end it but in a way will leave more things unresolved.

K: I think Rollie, the situation has changed fundamentally. This has been such a brutal fight for the Israelis. They will not have the same cockiness again.

C: No, but I think that this does, if they were to do that, it does provide quite an opportunity for you to step in if you want too.

K: That's right. And that's our intention.

C: That was the thought that was put in my mind by me I thought.

K: Exactly. Thank you.

RECLASSIFIED
8/21/87

TELECON, Oct. 9, 1973

Secretary/Secretary Schlesinger

K. I have talked to Dinitz in the sense that you and I talked and they ~~will~~ be getting in touch with your people. He also said that at some point somebody on your staff should suggest that he see you and I strongly favor that.

X.

X.

S. ....

S. I'm for it.

K. . . . might institute what might have to take on an emergency basis on the heavy stuff

S. That's right. You understand we'll have to take over the equipment of the (?) for the M'28's. We'll have to stand down a division.

K. Give them some M-48's.

S. We're pretty well clean of that

K. They seem to have enough airplanes. . they are willing

S. With this kind of movement we won't be able to keep it *in* quiet. With all the Israeli planes flying around it will be impossible for the Arabs not to find out.

K. It's extremely important to keep it low key as we possibly can.

S. Right.

K. If we can get through this crisis with antagonizing the Arabs

S. The Russians are acting up

K. Yes, I'm going to scare the bejesus out of Dobrynin in about 5 minutes.

....

TELCORN

Michael Sterner (State Mid-East Task Force)/Secy Kissinger

October , 1973/

K: Hello.

R: Yes Mr. Secretary.

K: I just wanted to find out what happened at the Security Council.

R: Well, we made our statement. The Egyptians then spoke and they -- Zayyat said that he -- they would not accept a ceasefire resolution or call for any return to the status quo ante unless we meant by that a return to the June 5, 1967, lines.

K: Did he leave open that ______ accept a straight ceasefire resolution.

R: No he did not. Oh did he leave open. Yes he did. He didn't really give any hope that he would but he didn't rule it out.

K: Was it nasty or was it in sorrow or in anger.

R: I would say it was mostly pretty straight. The one thing that seemed to anger him was when he spoke about our trying to pin the blame for starting the hostilities on the Egyptians at which point his voice rose a couple of decibals and he said, you know, let the U.N. speak for itself let's not site evidence which they themselves have not put forward on this point. Then the Chinese spoke. I didn't hear that one sir but I don't believe it was... someone told me it was pretty much a straight Chinese line.

K: Which is what.

R: You know, it was blaming the super powers both of them for the situation and calling on the Israelis to withdraw in saying this is all the Israelis fault but I do not have the details on that.

K: How was it left.

R: I gather that no resolutions were put forward. The Egyptians said that they were not going to put a resolution forward. Eban spoke briefly and said merely that what they had said about the Israelis beginning the hostilities was a lie but that he would reserve any further statements until a later time. I'm not absolutely certain, there may have been another speaker because we were tied up at the time but I'm told the U.K. spoke. I'm sorry I don't know exactly what the U.K. said. I was told Mr. Secretary that no one put forward on this occasion any specific draft resolutions or anything more specific than we really did in indicating that return to the previous conditions would be the least damaging way to.

K: He supported that?

R: Did the U.K. support? I don't know and I can try to find out for you.

K: It's not important. It's just how to understand what's on the Arab mind because by Wednesday that's going to be the Arabs the Arabs are going to be thrown out of everything and the Israelis will be in Arab territory.

R: Well, I think it sounds likely that that's the case although we have some interesting late reports that the Israelis have taken quite a beating not only in aircraft which you know about but you may not have seen the latest thing which says that on the Syrian front they lost 150 tanks.

K: Really.

R: And they have reduced the estimate of Syrian losses from 400 to 300 which is the ratio which means the Israelis have taken quite a beating in relative terms you know compared to anything before. Are you reading me Sir, there seems to be a lot of static.

K: No, I understand I was just thinking. OK. Thank you very much.