MR. NIXON: Ladies and gentlemen, today I am pleased to announce the first appointment to the White House staff in a major policy position. Dr. Henry Kissinger, Professor of Government at Harvard University, has agreed to come with the White House staff as the Assistant to the President-Elect for National Security Affairs. Dr. Kissinger is a man who is known to all people who are interested in foreign policy as perhaps one of the major scholars in America and the world today in this area. He has never yet had a full time government assignment, and he will bring to this responsibility a fresh approach, and I trust under his direction he will establish a new organization, bring new men and develop new ideas and new policies for the critical problems America has in the field of foreign policy around the

2

world.

We will have an opportunity later to discuss
this in more detail but now I know you would like to
hear from Dr. Kissinger.

DR. KISSINGER: Mr. Nixon, ladies and gentlemen, I am honored by the confidence that the President-Elect has expressed in me, for the opportunity to serve in his administration. The President-Elect and I have had many extensive conversations over the past week about the problems and the opportunities confronting the United States in the international field. He has urged me particularly to bring in new procedures and the best talent in the country, whether or not it agrees with his views. I enthusiastically accept this assignment and I shall serve the President-Elect with all of my energy and dedication. Thank you.

Now I am pleased also to announce that Dr. Richard Allen, who served as Mr. Nixon's foreign policy advisor during the campaign has consented to join my staff as one of my principal aides. I look forward to working with him very closely.

MR. NIXON: Ladies and gentlemen, we can go forward with some questions at this point, and then as Mr. Ziegler has indicated, we will then have an on the record backgrounder for all of you who would like to go

3

into more detail on some of the other areas.

QUESTION: Mr. President-Elect, could you tell us whether you are in favor of President Johnson's reported move to feel out the Senate? Are you in favor of a special session to consider the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?

MR. NIXON: I do not at this time intend to go into any substantive matters of that type. I think Mr. Ziegler has covered that in his briefing previously, and there has been no change in my attitude on it.

MR. ZIEGLER: On this score, we want to concentrate the questions on the subject before us.

QUESTION: I am sorry.

MR. NIXON: There is no problem. Any questions you want you may ask, but at this point we would like to discuss the national security appointment and other areas.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, how would you describe both Dr. Kissinger's and Dr. Allen's general views on negotiations between East and West, and how they are related to yours, just so we can get some feel as to why these people were selected in terms of foreign policy approach?

MR. NIXON: Mr. Kaplow, it would not be appropriate at this time to indicate what Dr. Kissinger's

4

views were to various major problems in the field of foreign policy. This is a matter that he will have responsibility for in terms of mobilizing the White House staff, and also in developing within the administration, with the Department of State, and with the Defense Department and other departments, dealing with foreign affairs, the policy lines that we will be following. As we have indicated in this statement, it is our plan to revitalize the National Security Council, and we are doing that because my eight years on the National Security Council convinced me that it is vitally important to have planning procedures set up so that we may not just react to events when they occur, but that we will have a contingency plan ready to go into effect. We can not, of course, be always sure that that plan will be the right one, but failing to plan I think can be very dangerous to the national security. This one area is one that we are going to concentrate on particularly, the organization of the National Security Council, its restructuring and also revitalizing some of the other planning functions in the State Department, for example, the State Department's Policy Planning Board.

5

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, this spring Dr. Kissinger helped Governor Rockefeller prepare a 4-point program for peace in Vietnam. I wonder if he still adheres to that program and if so, whether you agree to it.

MR. NIXON: Dr. Kissinger was Governor Rockefeller's foreign policy adviser, as you have stated. I discussed Dr. Kissinger's appointment with Governor Rockefeller and Governor Rockefeller enthusiastically recommended Dr. Kissinger for any position in this foreign policy area which I might choose him for.

As far as Dr. Kissinger's views and Governor Rockefeller's views are concerned in this area, I do not intend at this time to go into that. We have a new Administration now. We are going to have a new Secretary of State, a new Secretary of Defense, and as we approach these problems we are going to approach them without any inhibitions with regard to statements that have been made in the past by those in the planning functions.

As far as my statements are concerned, that, of course, is a different matter. I am bound by those.

QUESTION: Mr. President-Elect, there has been some talk that you really intended to serve as your own Secretary of State. Do you have any comment on that as relates to this appointment?

6

MR. NIXON: Dr. Kissinger will serve as my chief foreign policy adviser within the White House. Of course, the Secretary of State is the chief foreign policy adviser to the President of the United States.

As far as the government is concerned generally, there must be the very closest relationship between the Secretary of State and the White House Staff.

Dr. Kissinger is keenly aware of the necessity not to set himself up as a wall between the President and the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense. I do not think we will have a problem.

As far as your question with regard to my serving as my own Secretary of State, I can only say, based on my experience, that the Presidency is more than a full-time job. Certainly the Secretary of State is the most back-breaking job within the Cabinet. I think it takes two men, and I intend to have a very strong Secretary of State.

QUESTION: Can I ask you one question?

It says here there will be a complete reorganization and restructuring of the entire White House security planning machinery. Just exactly, could you elaborate on that just a little bit more, comparing it with the future and the past?

7

(LC)

MR. NIXON: I would prefer that we do that when we go into the informal session. That is one of the questions we can go into in some detail, but I prefer we do that when we go into the writing press and the reporting press session.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, have you changed your position about the war in Vietnam? What kind of advice do you intend to offer in that general area in the Nixon Administration?

DR. KISSINGER: I believe very strongly that the position of a White House Assistant is inconsistent with making public statements on substantive issues. Therefore, I hope you will forgive me if I don't answer your question.

QUESTION: Could I ask one more question? I think some people have felt that both Dr. Kissinger and Dr. Allen lean more toward the harder line of negotiating than many others. What is your comment on that, Doctor?

DR. KISSINGER: I have been expressing my views publicly on international affairs for the last 15 years, and I have tried to avoid labels like "hard" and "soft" and express my best judgment on the substance. Therefore, I find it very difficult to characterize myself.

MR. NIXON: I should emphasize, Mr. Kaplow, in answer to that question, that one of the major responsibilities that Dr. Kissinger will undertake will be to bring

8

to the White House, in his own small staff, points of view that are not compartmentalized. We want a broad spectrum within the White House Staff. In addition to that, he is going to bring to the President the points of view outside the Government, the great well of knowledge that exists, for example, in the educational institutions, and in other areas in this Nation, and also from experts in foreign policy abroad, which will be a new departure.

I am one who likes to get a broad range of viewpoints expressed, and Dr. Kissinger has set up what I believe, or is setting up at the present time, a very exciting new procedure for seeing to it that the next President of the United States does not hear just what he wants to hear, which is always a temptation for White House staffers, but that he hears points of view covering the spectrum so that the President can make the decision which he must make after he has heard all of the arguments.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, would you identify for us where you will regard the most troublesome areas in the foreign policy field when your Administration takes over -- what areas?

MR. NIXON: Yes, I can go into that without going into, of course, the substantive angles, which would not be appropriate at this time, until the Inauguration.

9

The areas of the world are those that I identi-
fied during the campaign. We begin, of course, with
Vietnam, the most immediate and pressing problem.

The next area of importance is East-West relations,
the upcoming negotiations, if those negotiations do material-
ize, between the United States and the Soviet Union in a
number of areas, including the problems of national defense,
the offensive and defensive missile discussions, and so forth.

The third area, very close to the second, and
directly related to it, and an area in which I think action
must take place before too much progress can be made in the
second area, is that of strengthening and revitalizing the
NATO organization, our relations with Western Europe.

Then beyond that, there are the areas which we
all are aware of, the problems of Latin America. I have
indicated the necessity for a new approach to the problems
of Latin America, including a new approach to the Alliance
for Progress; the problems of Africa, and then in a special-
ized sense the area of the Mid-East, which I should perhaps
move up on that scale.

If you are going to say one is more important
than the other, in terms of an urgent and immediate problem,
you would have to have Vietnam first, the Mid-East second,
and then, of course, these other areas that I have mentioned

11

MR. ZIEGLER: Let us go into the informal portion of the discussion.

MR. NIXON: I think you might be interested to know how I first became acquainted with Dr. Kissinger. He tells me this is the first time I met him, and sometimes you meet people when you are in government without remembering when or where, but I met him for the first time at a Christmas party at Claire Booth Luce's apartment in New York last year. But I met him before that, and I felt I knew him through his writings and his books in 1957. Dr. Kissinger said I wrote him a letter, in fact. I remembered writing it, but I was glad he remembered it.

The decision to ask him to come on the staff was reached after considering a number of people who could have taken this assignment. I felt in Dr. Kissinger's case these factors motivated me. There were several men who I considered who could have, I think, served this function well, but most of them had been in government quite recently or in foreign policy and had had major responsibilities in the past. I felt at this time there was a need to bring to government someone who had never had that responsibility before, so that there would be no question about bringing a new approach, looking at the organization without being inhibited by what had gone on before. Dr. Kissinger I thought would bring that kind of

12

approach.

Now, if I could go on just a bit more as to why I thought he could bring a new approach, there was a study that was made by a group -- and I think this is the first time such a study has been made for a President-Elect -- which began 15 months ago at Harvard University. This study was made by the Harvard Institute of Politics. The Harvard Institute of Politics commissioned a study for the President-Elect, whoever that President-Elect might be. In January of this year, Frank Lindsay of ITEC Corporation a man I met many years ago when he was a staff assistant to the Herter Committee -- we went to Europe together -- came to my office and asked if I was interested in such a study if I won the nomination and the election. I indicated great interest. He also made the same proposal to the other potential nominees on the Democratic and Republican side. All welcomed the study.

After the election I received the results of the study. The men who made this study were Frank Lindsay, who was chairman of the group, and then three men from the Harvard staff, Dr. Philip Areta, Dr. Kissinger in the field of foreign policy, and the other gentleman is Professor Maij from the History Department at Harvard.

These studies cover the whole transition period

13

with recommendations as to how the transition could be
carried on smoothly and we have taken many of those
recommendations. They covered areas far beyond the national
security area, making recommendations for the reorganization
of the White House staff and for reorganization in
government generally, but particularly directed to the
White House staff relations to other agencies of government.

Many of those recommendations we have adopted, but what
particularly interested me about the study was the national
security section, because what this group did was analyze
the development of the White House staff in national
security areas since World War II. It analyzed quite
objectively and critically, I thought, the staffs under
President Kennedy and President Johnson, pointing out
strengths and weaknesses and also pointing out the fact that
each staff must be different because it had to relate to
whoever might be President. One President might want one
kind of a staff, and another another kind of staff. It
was at this time I contacted Mr. Lindsay and found that
Dr. Kissinger had done a great deal of work on that study.
I met with the whole group and that triggered my thinking
in that direction.

Dr. Kissinger, would you like to talk a bit about
what we have in mind as far as the reorganization of the
National Security Council?

14

DR. KISSINGER: The chief instruction which the President-elect has given to me, and which I enthuſtically support, is to make certain that the planning mechanism of the Government functions more effectively and present to the President all of the relevant contingencies and choices.

I would intend that on the staff of the National Security Council and of the White House, to elevate the planning function and to encourage planning functions through-out the Government.

Another effort which will be a very high priority one is the one that the President-elect mentioned before, which is to draw in the best talent in the country, whatever their point of view, and to bring their thinking to bear on the issues confronting the United States.

We will try to avoid orienting the whole National Security Council machinery to its solution of the immediate problem, and try to develop middle-term and long-range policy and contingency plans for foreseeable emergencies.

Another prospect that I find exciting is the request of the President-elect that we draw in the best talent not only in the United States, but from all over the world. There are many friends of ours who feel that their fate is closely connected with ours, and who can make a major contribution. They have not been tapped in any systematic manner or on any

15

official basis in the past.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, does Dr. Kissinger know who will be the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense?

MR. NIXON: He doesn't, because I haven't told him yet, and I don't know.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, you say there will be some people from other countries brought in. Do you have anyone specifically in mind or can you tell us in general what type of people these might be?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I have a very wide acquaintance all over the world among leading intellectuals of all points of view, with many of whom I have been meeting for a long time.

I think it would be unfair to mention their names before they have been formally requested to serve, but I have no doubt whatever that we will collect an exciting group.

MR. NIXON: Let me perhaps respond to that also. What led me to emphasize this point in my discussions with Dr. Kissinger were my own travels abroad. I have found that in addition to talking to governmental figures -- and what we are talking about here we must make very clear is not, of course, to infringe upon the responsibility of the State Department to conduct negotiations with Government officials -- what we are referring to are people outside of Government

16

who can make that kind of contribution. But I have found
in my visits to world capitals, to London and Paris and the
rest, that outside of government there are in other coun-
tries, as there are in the United States, foreign policy
experts who can make a very significant contribution to a
discussion.

I refer, for example, to men like Alistair Buchan
of the London Institute of Strategic Studies. It is this
kind of man that we from time to time, when they are visiting
the United States, whose knowledge we hope to tap.

QUESTION: They would not be on a paid capacity?

MR. NIXON: No, not in a paid capacity. This is
all in terms of simply trying to pick the brains of the best
people in the world.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, you have made a study
of the National Security Council machinery. Can you tell us,
or can you describe this machinery to us in the White House
now, how many people there are, what they do, and how you
are going to change this?

DR. KISSINGER: The President-elect has asked me
to make recommendations to him well before Inauguration, and
I have not at this time. I am not at this time ready to
give you a detailed answer. At this moment, the staff of the
National Security Council is very small, and I am determined

17

to keep it very small.

QUESTION: Can you tell us how many people?

DR. KISSINGER: There are about 20 people, I think.

The major differences that I foresee in the operation of
the National Security Council staff and the White House staff
in Mr. Nixon's Administration is that there will be a much
more conscious emphasis on planning, and that the operating
functions will be pushed as far as possible into the depart-
ments.

Mr. Nixon in all of our talks, if I may repeat that
part of them, urged me to make sure that his staff and his
advisers free themselves for long-term thinking, to prevent
crises from happening rather than spend all of their energies
on managing crises which might have been avoided.

Again, I enthusiastically support that.

MR. NIXON: If I can use one example that members
of the press will appreciate, one statistic that intrigued
me in the study that was made by the planning group that I
referred to was that the amount of cable traffic -- this is
cable traffic from American installations abroad -- that now
comes to the White House each day is more in volume than all
of the wire service and other newspaper reports combined
around the world.

18

When I saw that monumental statistic, it brought me to the point that used to trouble me during the years I was in Government -- the fact that men in positions of responsibility and men who really have the ability to do creative thinking too often get bogged down in reading the interminable telegrams, most of which are not really relevant to the problems that they are concerned with, to dotting "i's" and crossing "t's" and preparing papers to come up the line and then to be approved.

What Dr. Kissinger, was referring to, I didn't want him to get down to the Situation Room in the White House and spend too much time there going through cables and the rest. I want him and the top policy planners, not only here but, of course, in the State Department, to be free as much as possible to do some creative thinking, and to have some creative discussions in these areas.

This, of course, is the objective I am sure every President and every executive has. But based on my experience and based on Dr. Kissinger's having found this particular problem, I think we will make some progress on it.

19

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger is known as a European, North Atlantic specialist. Does this mean you are going to have more emphasis on that part of the world in your administration?

MR. NIXON: You ladies and gentlemen will have noted that during the campaign I emphasized the imperative necessity for the United States to get on the front burner the problems of Western Europe and to strengthen our ties and associations with Western Europe in order to be able to develop effectively what we all want, the position from which we can negotiate the reduction of world tensions in the East-West conflicts.

So, Dr. Kissinger's views and mine are very close together on this point. The answer would be that one of the first responsibilities as far as not only the State Department's policy planning board, but the National Security Council's policy planning board, is to examine our relations with Europe and make recommendations as to how they can be strengthened.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, one of the problems that has been discussed before has been that our main problem is General de Gaulle. Do you feel that way?

MR. NIXON: He may feel that way. Seriously, when we look at the problems of Europe, I don't think they can be

20

summarized and blamed on one man. I think as we examine
what has happened over the past years that we have to take
some blame, we in the broadest sense, the United States, and
all administrations have made some mistakes.

I have often said, and I say it again, I do not
believe that Europe, speaking of Europe as an entity, can go
forward without France. By the same token, I don't believe
France can go forward without Europe. I am confident that
General de Gaulle also has that belief. I think there is a
possibility for a common meeting place someday.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, earlier, in talking about East-West relations as one of the major problems you will face, you talked about up-coming negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union. Could you say what negotiations you are referring to?

MR. NIXON: There are a number of areas. There has been public discussion, and I will limit my answer to that public discussion. There has been public discussion with regard to the possibility of negotiations on the Mid-East crisis and the offensive-defensive missile system. These are two areas that I would have in mind.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, you say you do not yet know who your Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense will be, yet we have the naming of Dr. Kissinger as your Assistant for National Security matters. Just what will Dr. Kissinger's standing be

21

within your administration in relation to the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of State? Will his opinions carry
equal weight and will he be co-equal?

MR. NIXON: This is a problem that always comes up
with any White House advisor. Any White House advisor to the
President has great responsibility to see to it that in
advising the President he does so without derogating the
primary responsibility of a Cabinet Officer to be the primary
advisor in those areas. I would say that as far as the views
are concerned, naturally the views of Dr. Kissinger will
have great weight with me because he will be on the White House
staff and will be studying these matters. But I see no real
possibility of conflict with the Department of State in this
respect. I think the reason that I do not see that is that
Dr. Kissinger, in the paper I referred to, he and his colleagues
recognized that problem. It is only when an individual on a
White House staff does not recognize the problem that you have
the inevitable competition, empire-building and then the buffer
between the President and his Secretary.

I think you might respond to that, too, Dr. Kissinger,
your role vis-a-vis the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense.

22

DR. KISSINGER: The Secretary of State, as the President-Elect has said, is the principal advisor to the President. I have worked as a consultant in the State Department. I recognize that the operation of our foreign policy can only be conducted through the State Department, and that the White House assistants should not interpose themselves between the President and the Department.

My function as I see it is to make certain that among the range of issues that come before the President, all of the options are considered, that the long range considerations are given adequate weight. But there is no prospect as far as I can see of any competition between myself and the Secretaries of State and Defense. I think we complement each other, and it is my job to help them be more effective.

MR. NIXON: I could add one point on that, just to dissect the problem a bit. All of you who have covered foreign policy know that a traditional battle is always in the wings, and sometimes on stage, between the Planning Board of the National Security Council, or the group of consultants for the National Security Council, the full time staff, and the State Department's Policy Planning Board. What we want to do is not only to strengthen the quality

23

of the Policy Planning Board and the National Security Council, but also it is Dr. Kissinger's assignment to do everything possible, as he indicated in his statement, to revitalize and to give greater responsibility to the State Department's Policy Planning Board.

What this really involves is my concern that when great decisions have to be made over these years ahead, I am not presented with a paper that represents a consensus, the least common denominator of what the various departments are able to negotiate between themselves. Defense and State, for example, get into these battles from time to time, and finally they come up with a bland paper that really does not meet the problem as effectively as it might.

I want to have the conflicts. The honest differences of opinion which we know do exist between the departments, or within a department, I want laid before the National Security Council, and particularly before the President, so that he will know what the arguments are, so that he can make the determination as to what the policy should be.

It is this point that Dr. Kissinger completely agrees with. I think he, too, is sensitive on the point of the State Department's Policy Planning Board and the group in the Defense Department, the necessity of seeing to

24

it that they are part of the team, that they will know
that their input is going to be considered and not brushed
aside and be lost in a maze as eventually the paper comes
up to the President at the highest level as an accomplished
fact, without his considering the arguments that went into
it pro and con.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, will Dr. Kissinger begin functioning full time immediately, and will he have any liaison with Walter Rostow?

MR. NIXON: The answer is yes to both questions.
His first assignment will be to go to Washington I hope
immediately. Incidentally, Walter Rostow has been most
cooperative in offering his assistance in this assignment.
He will go there for the purpose, of course, of examining
the staff facilities, and for talking with Dr. Rostow on
the organizational problems. Over the next three to four
weeks he will continue the study that has already been
initiated with regard to the staff, the organization of the
NSC and the other responsibilities that he will have.

Then he will make those recommendations to the
President-Elect prior to the Inauguration, so that on
January 20th we will be able to go forward with the new
organization plan.

In addition to that, he will be available to me.

25

over these next few weeks to advise me on substantive
matters if I believe that such advice is needed.

I should also point out this. Dr. Kissinger's
assignment in no way is in conflict with that of Ambassador
Murphy. Ambassador Murphy between now and January 20th will
continue to be the President-Elect's representative in the
State Department, and with President Johnson on matters that
the President-Elect should be informed of or consulted on
prior to January 20th.

MR. ZIEGLER. Could we just take one more question?

QUESTION: Do you expect to have a task force
between now and the Inauguration to advise you on foreign
policy, comparable to the ten that you have already
appointed on domestic affairs?

MR. NIXON: Dr. Kissinger will be making a
recommendation to me on that. I think it is possible that
there will be. But I think there is very likely to be
more than one in the field of foreign policy, that is,
more than one task force.

MR. CORMIER: Thank you very much.

10:50 AM

END