Catholic Presbytery,

P.O. Box 281,

9730 Ficksburg,
G. Africa.

December 25, 1973.

Messieurs H.E. Nilson & R Lepine,
79 Proctor Street,
SALEM.

Dear Messieurs Nilson & Lepine,

It is now six o'clock p.m. on Christmas Day itself. I have celebrated the last Mass and the believing members of the Community I am serving have just dispersed. I seize this leisure to write.

Your most precious letter reached my hands a couple of weeks ago. Thank you most sincerely for it and for the priceless message it carried. All men of goodwill are appalled to learn of such atrocities as the massacre of innocent people at Rome International Airport less than fifteen days ago, the assassination of the Premier of Spain, letter-bombs, oil crisis, the situation in the Middle East. Before events such as these "we find ourselves groping to know the full sense and meaning of the times in which we live". But when on the other hand we consider the tireless and painstaking efforts of Doctors Henry Kissinger, K. Waldheim to negotiate for lasting peace, when we read your letter and take into account your benevolence and generous efforts to extend a helping hand as far as here, we are deeply moved and are made to realize that God still has good men and women on our planet. We really feel that the good done outweighs the evil. So life is still worth living. All is not as bad as it may look.

I have sent to you by surface mail a book written by Austin Coates towards the end of 1966, shortly before BASUTOLAND came to be known as LESOTHO. It makes me very happy to see that you wish to know more about us. The reading of that booklet will give you some idea of our country and our people.

LESOTHO came to be known as BASUTOLAND when we became a British Protectorate on March 12, 1868. From then on the territory was run and administered by England. Most unfortunately for us, Colonial Masters neglected altogether our economic and social development. Thus from March 12, 1868 to October 4, 1966, that is, for 93 years our plight remained exactly the same as that of Americans

prior to 1766. Industry and development were not only neglected but also and above all, discouraged and impeded by all means conceivable. Thanks to the Missionaries who came at about the same time to give us education. The latter could open schools for elementary or primary education. It was only in 1930s that the Standard of Education was raised to Junior Secondary and in the 1940s to High School levels. The Missions wanted to puch things forward, but British Administrators did not conceal their indignation at such efforts.

One of the most shining examples was the late Canadian Missionary Bishop Joseph Cyprianus Bonhomme who died at Ste-Agothedes Monts in Quebec earlier this very year 1973, at the age of 84. As early as 1934 this eminent Prelate wanted to initiate industrial development and co-operative movements. He was cunningly repressed and slyly undermined by British Officials. Since he disdained concealment, he openly challenged and questioned their motives. Accusations and allegations against him flooded and inundated Rome and he was deported. A milder term was used and the people were told... Bishop Bonhomme was being recalled. So all efforts at socio-economic development stopped and ended there. Those who succeeded him wanted to be known as men of peace who would not meddle with colonial administrators. They compromised and yielded. So our society languished and stagnated for several decades. It became clearer than ever before that we were not going anywhere...

We attained nationhood without violence or bloodshed on October 4, 1966. We know that Americans, who are so dear to us attained theirs in 1766. So you are senior to us by exactly 200 years. But you had many big advantages: valuable assets over us. You already possessed in 1766 and even before, in an eminent degree, principles of civilization, viable economy, scientific and technological potential, manpower and natural resources.

When we gained political independence seven years ago, we started from scratch. Development therefore is in its embryonic stages; no effort is spared, no stone is left unturned to press forward. We have had no choice but to declare relentless war on ignorance, unemployment, diseases, poverty, famine and misery. When I say "we" I refer to us Churchmen. We cannot look on. We cooperate with all men of goodwill to improve and promote the welfare both spiritual and material of all men. I become extremely happy whenever I can create labour and afford to offer jobs to those I can. They work with joy to earn bread for their families. But these job opportunities provide only a temporary solution since I soon run short of funds and employment ceases until such times as I

may again receive help.

All of us here who can read and write owe an enormous debt of gratitude to the Missionaries who in spite of untold hardships managed to open schools. Every educated man and woman in this country owes his or her education to the Church through her school and nothing at all to colonial administrators and masters. I am a direct product of Church schools. How eager I am to help others get what I received! In my next letter I will say more about myself.

With deep appreciation and heartfelt gratitude for your efforts.

Catholic Presbytery,

P.O. Box 281, Ficksburg, O.F.S.
Southern Africa.

October 23, 1973.

Messieurs R. Lepine & H.E. Nilson,
79 Proctor Street,
Mass 01970.

Dear Messieurs Lepine & Nilson,

I take much pleasure in informing you that the walls of the first building on the new site have just been completed. The enclosed picture will give some idea of how the walls look like.

Thanks to your remarkable generosity. Your donations enabled us to buy well over 16,000 pockets of cement and to transport them. We also with the help your donations afforded to buy steel windowframes and doorframes some which appear clearly on the picture. All doors are on the opposite side; so you cannot see them.

Organized teams of men drew out sand from the riverbed. Close to the wall a galvanized tank can be seen. Ladies both young and old drew water in buckets on their heads fill this tank. The same team of men mixed cement with sand and water to make the blocks which built the walls.

We are grateful to ALL our benefactors for their help; we all are happy with this modest achievement. Of course there remains the big question of covering these walls with the roof. For that which we cannot do except with money, we still depend heavily on the generosity of our benefactors. The rest we do with our own hands. Thus with these God-given instruments of instruments, OUR HANDS, we collected sand, we made blocks and built up the walls. The question of mechanized labour here, is quite inconceivable.

My parishioners and I wish you the fullness of God's blessings during the Christmas Season which is fast approaching.

Your grateful Missionary,

SSN/BN

December 12, 1977.

Letters to the Editor
The Washington Post
1150 15th St. NW
Washington, D.C. 20071.

Sir,

As a political scientist and an historian, I regret to see
the ruling made by a federal judge in Washington on December 8, to the
effect that certain transcripts of former Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger's telephone calls during his eight years as top American foreign
affairs adviser do not belong to him.

If the ruling is upheld by higher courts, the long-term effect
will probably be to inhibit officials from making and preserving confi-
dential notes. It will strengthen the kind of attitude expressed by the
late David Bruce, who reportedly discouraged academics interested in inter-
viewing him about his diplomatic experience by remarks like, "I can't stop
you from writing, but I'll do nothing to help." I am afraid the executive
boards of the American Political Science Association and the American
Historical Association have been ill advised to press for a quick release
of the Kissinger notes, since in the long run it will almost certainly
prove detrimental to the common aim of both professions, the greatest
possible elucidation of the political process.

Sten Sparre Nilson
Department of Government and Politics
University of Maryland/University of Oslo

College Park

College Park

University of Maryland/University of Oslo
Department of Government and Politics
Sten Sparre Nilsson

of the Klaasinger notes, since in the long run it will almost certainly

You from writing, but I'll do nothing to help." I am afraid the executive

viewing him about his diplomatic experience by remarks like, " I can't stop

dental notes. It will strengthen the kind of attitude expressed by the

Klaasinger's telephone calls during his eight years as top American foreign

24r.

Washington, D.C. 20071.
1120 12th St. NW
The Washington Post
Letters to the Editor

22M\BM

December 15, 1977.

PAUL H. NITZE

1500 Wilson Blvd.
Suite 1500
Arlington, Va. 22209

November 7, 1977

Mr. Jeremy J. Stone
Federation of American Scientists
307 Massachusetts Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Dear Jeremy:

My November 1st press conference was based upon two
papers. The first set forth as correctly and as precisely
as I could, a description of the current SALT II negotiat-
ing status. The second paper analyzed the probable conse-
quences of an agreement such as that foreshadowed by the
current negotiating posture and recent defense policy
decisions. You incorrectly characterize the second paper
as being "a denunciation." It was intended to be, and was,
a factual and objective analysis. I have yet to see any
constructive suggestions as to how that analysis can be
improved. Just because the analysis leads to legitimate
doubts as to the wisdom of such a treaty does not there-
fore make it a "denunciation." The question at issue is
whether the analysis is or is not sound. We would welcome
your suggestions as to how crisis stability and rough
parity between the two sides are to be maintained under
such a treaty.

Your main complaint, however, seems to be directed
at the completeness and accuracy of the first paper that
dealt with the current status of the negotiations. The
WASHINGTON POST quoted you as saying that it was "shockingly
precise." You do me too much honor. The NEW YORK TIMES
on the following day published an article which reported
Soviet proposals which indicate that my summary was excess-
ively sanguine as to the Soviet position. The TIMES article
indicates that the Soviets are insisting on permission to
test, during the Protocol period, a submarine-launched
missile newer and presumably more technically advanced, in
addition to the one I had referred to in my paper, and that

-2-

they are being even more difficult about testing cruise
missiles and about the definition of a "new" missile than
I had suggested.

I should note that I have seen no classified papers
dealing with the current phase of the SALT negotiations.
The information that the first paper was based upon had
previously been briefed to a number of people, not only
within but also beyond the bounds of government.

The most reasonable charge that you could have made
against me was that I spent more time and energy than
others in putting together into a reasonably clear and
understandable whole what previously was being made
available only partially or in inherently misleading
bits and pieces.

Carl Marcy has indicated, and I take it that you
and your colleagues agree, that he would prefer that
public discussion of SALT issues be curtailed until the
negotiators have everything wrapped up and signed. On
that point, the Committee on the Present Danger has taken
a contrasting view. At its inception, the Committee
described its "basic operational task" as being "to
further the two-way process of communications here at
home on foreign and national security policy matters."
As President Carter said at Notre Dame University,
"We are confident of the good sense of the American
people, and so we let them share in the process of
making foreign policy decisions. We can thus speak with
the voices of 215 million, not just an isolated handful."

F.A.S.

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

307 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20002 (202) 546-3300

Board of Sponsors

(Partial List)

* Christian B. Anfinsen

* Kenneth J. Arrow

* Julius Axelrod

* David Baltimore
  Leona Baumgartner
  Paul Beeson

* Hans A. Bethe

* Konrad Bloch

* Norman E. Borlaug
  Anne Pitts Carter

* Owen Chamberlain
  Abram Chayes
  Mildred Cohn

* Leon N. Cooper

* Carl F. Cori
  Paul B. Cornely

* Andre Courand

* Max Delbruck

* Renato Dulbecco
  Paul R. Ehrlich

* John F. Enders

* Paul J. Flory
  John Kenneth Galbraith
  Richard L. Garwin
  Edward L. Ginzton

* Donald A. Glaser

* H. K. Hartline
  Walter W. Heller

* Alfred D. Hershey
  Hudson Hoagland

* Robert W. Holley
  Marc Kac
  Henry S. Kaplan
  Carl Kaysen

* H. Gobind Khorana
  George B. Kistiakowsky

* Arthur Kornberg

* Polykarp Kusch

* Willis E. Lamb, Jr.

* Wassily W. Leontief

* Fritz Lipmann

* S. E. Luria
  Roy W. Menninger
  Robert Merton
  Matthew S. Meselson

* Neal E. Miller

* Hans J. Morgenthau
  Philip Morrison
  Marston Morse

* Robert S. Mulliken
  Franklin A. Neva

* Marshall Nirenberg

* Severo Ochoa
  Charles E. Osgood

* Linus Pauling
  George Polya
  Oscar Rice

* Burton Richter
  David Riesman, Jr.

* J. Robert Schrieffer

* Julian Schwinger
  Herbert Scoville, Jr.
  Alice Kimball Smith

* William H. Stein

* Albert Szent-Gyorgyi

* Howard M. Temin
  James Tobin

* Charles H. Townes

* Harold C. Erey

* George Wald
  Milton E. Wegman
  Victor F. Weisskopf
  Jerome B. Wiesner
  Robert R. Wilson
  C. S. Wu

Alfred Yankauer
Herbert F. York

*Other laureates

George W. Rathjens
Chairman

John T. Edsall
Secretary

Jerome D. Frank
Vice-Chairman

Frank von Hippel
Treasurer

Jeremy J. Stone
Director

November 2, 1977

Dear _________________

We understand very well that the Committee on the Present Danger is composed of fully responsible citizens. We know that it has its own point of view on SALT and the strategic balance. We welcome its expressing its view, as we intend to express our own. We therefore looked forward to reading the calculations of Mr. Paul Nitze at his November 1 press conference.

The Committee released a denunciation of the projected SALT Treaty. This is its right. But, in addition, it released seven pages of the most tightly held information in Washington on the status of the negotiations themselves. Paragraph after paragraph purporting to be exactly what is in dispute at SALT and what is proposed on each side was distributed. In precision and detail this went far beyond anything already in the press. Had this been done by a dovish group, about a treaty looked on with favor by hawks, it would have been considered subversive indeed.

Why was this done? Mr. Nitze is a former member of the U.S. SALT negotiating team. He knows, as a negotiator, how mischievous such a release can be to the negotiating teams on both sides.

Based on one leak to the *New York Times* about the general form of the Treaty, the domestic debate over the Treaty has begun before it could be signed. This is unfair enough to the Administration. But, with the CPD release, the debate could now preclude the very completion of the Treaty. No SALT Treaty can be arrived at in public negotiations. Premature release of negotiating details can transmute criticism into sabotage.

Does the Committee plan to continue functioning in this way? Does it owe some explanation to the Administration? These are questions for CPD to decide. To the extent that this letter to you as a CPD member is an intrusion into the internal affairs of the Committee, forgive us. But we thought this matter of such importance that it warranted a direct appeal to your sense of propriety and citizenship.

Sincerely,

Jeremy J. Stone
National Council Members (Elected)

Ruth S. Adams

Bruce Ames

Lipman Bers

Nina Byers

Geoffrey Chew

Thomas Eisner

Rose E. Frisch

Morton H. Halperin

William A. Higinbotham

John P. Holdren

Myra Karstadt

Daniel Koshland, Jr.

Victor Rabinowitch

Leonard Rodberg

Arthur H. Rosenfeld

Carl Sagan

Joseph L. Sax

William Shurcliff

George A. Silver

Jeremy J. Stone

Frank von Hippel

Myron E. Wegman

Alvin Weinberg

Robert H. Williams

Paul H. Nitze

November 1, 1977

CURRENT SALT II NEGOTIATING POSTURE

The negotiations are intended to produce a SALT II Treaty, a Protocol, and a Statement of Principles.

1. THE SALT II TREATY

The Treaty is to run for eight years, counted presumably from the date of expiration of the Interim Agreement of 1972--that is, to October 3, 1985. Significant points regarding its contents--including matters agreed on for inclusion and matters still under negotiation--follow:

a. The aggregate number of strategic nuclear launch vehicles (SNLVs)* --i.e., launchers for intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), plus launchers for submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), plus heavy bombers--is to be limited initially to 2,400 each for the United States and the Soviet Union.

b. The extent and pace of reduction from the initially authorized total of 2,400 SNLVs are not as yet settled. The United States proposes a reduction to a number in the range of 2,160 by October 3, 1980. The Soviet Union proposes a reduction to 2,250 by 1982. A compromise is still to be negotiated.

c. Within the permitted aggregate number of SNLVs, a sublimit of 1,320 will be placed on the number of launchers for ICBMs carrying multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs), launchers for MIRVed SLBMs, and heavy bombers carrying armed air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) of intermediate range. (With respect to ICBMs, intercontinental range is specified as being 5,500 kilometers or more. No specification has been agreed as to the range cutoff distinguishing SLBMs classed as SNLVs and submarine-launched missiles considered to be for tactical use only. With respect to the definition of "heavy" bomber, of "armed," and of "range" in connection with ALCMs, see (i) below.)

* The phrase strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVs) is often, but less precisely, used to describe this aggregate.

d. A sublimit is to be placed on the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers plus MIRVed SLBM launchers, but the specific number is still under negotiation. The United States proposes a limit of 1,200. The Soviet Union proposes a limit of 1,250.

e. A sublimit of 820 is to be placed on the number of MIRVed ICBM launchers. The United States' proposal was for a limit of 800, the Soviet Union proposed a higher limit; 820 has now been accepted by both sides. Within this 820 limit, the Soviet Union will be permitted to have a number of modern large ballistic missile (MLBM) launchers equal to their present force level--which is 308 or 326, depending on whether 18 operational MLBM launchers at the Soviet test range are counted. The United States--which has no MLBM launchers--will be permitted none in the future. Ballistic missiles with useful payloads (throw-weight) greater than that of the Soviet SS-19 will be considered to be MLBMs, and ballistic missiles with useful payloads greater than that of the Soviet SS-18 will be banned.

f. The Soviet BACKFIRE bomber is not to be counted within the number of SNLVs. The Soviet Union has indicated willingness to make an informal declaration--outside the contractual forms of the Treaty--of intentions not to employ the BACKFIRE in an intercontinental role, not to deploy it in a fashion threatening the United States, and not to raise the production rate above the present level, which the Soviet Union refuses to disclose. According to Soviet assertions, planned increases of the BACKFIRE's asserted present operational radius of 2,200 kilometers will not be large enough to give it an unrefueled intercontinental operational radius. (No U.S. bombers are capable, without refueling, of striking their designated targets within the USSR and returning to the bases from which they took off.)

g. Soviet heavy bomber variants (these are heavy bombers, numbering 90 to 100, reconfigured for reconnaissance and antisubmarine roles

2

but still retaining their bomb bays) are not to be counted against
the permitted aggregate of SNLVs. A question not as yet determined
concerns whether United States B-52 bombers in protective storage
are to be counted. At lower levels, Soviet negotiators have insisted
that the B-52s concerned must be counted or destroyed, but the
question has not been raised at higher levels.

h. The rules governing what ICBM launchers are to be counted launchers for MIRVed missiles are still being negotiated. Such rules are of potential importance in determining whether all or only a portion of the SS-18 launchers deployed by the Soviet Union are to be counted as being launchers for MIRVed missiles.

i. The testing and deployment of armed ALCMs with a range greater than 600 kilometers is to be restricted to heavy bombers and the development, testing, and deployment of all armed cruise missiles with a range greater than 2,500 kilometers is to be banned, at least during the period of the Protocol. These provisions, however, involve problems of definition and interpretation not as yet settled. Which of the pertinent definitions and limitations are to appear in the Treaty and which in the Protocol has also not been settled.

* No specification of a cutoff line to distinguish "heavy" bombers from other bombers has been agreed. In the Soviet view, both sides "know" what today are "heavy" bombers--to wit, B-52s and B-1s for the United States, and BEARS and BISONS for the Soviet Union. Under this interpretation, the question whether any future bomber is to be classified as "heavy" and therefore qualified as a carrier of permitted ALCMs is to be determined by agreement between the two sides. The United States position on this subject is reported to be that each side will declare which of its bombers are to be counted as "heavy."

* In the Soviet interpretation, United States FB-111H bombers and wide-body jets, not having been agreed by both sides to be "heavy" bombers, are disqualified for carrying ALCMs with the pertinent capabilities. In the United States' interpretation, such aircraft are eligible as carriers of such ALCMs on the condition of their being unilaterally declared

3

to be "heavy" and counted against the restrictions on the
numbers of SNVLs and, as appropriate, of MIRVed launchers.

* Whether all bombers of a type eligible for carrying such ALCMs or only those assigned to such a role are to be counted against the limits imposed on MIRVed launchers has apparently not been discussed in the negotiations. Almost any bomber capable of carrying external weapons is readily adaptable for carrying such ALCMs.

* The meaning of "armed," whether it is to cover not only nuclear but also conventional warheads during the full Treaty period or only during the Protocol period is not yet settled.

* The United States has proposed that cruise missile "range" be defined as "maximum system operational range"--that is, the maximum range when the cruise missile is employed in its normal designed operational mode--and that each side specify what the maximum operational range of its cruise missile is. The Soviet side has suggested that "range" be defined as range to fuel burnout on the intended operational profile.

j. Excess ICBMs and storage facilities at launching sites and the development, testing, and deployment of rapid reload systems will be prohibited.

k. Provisions to restrict or forbid the transference to third countries of equipment and technology within the purview of the SALT II limitations are still being negotiated. It is understood that the Soviet side is urging acceptance of a provision prohibiting transfer to third parties of weapons limited by the Treaty, and of components, blueprints, and technology pertinent to such weapons.

l. Obligations for reciprocal disclosures of pertinent data are still being negotiated. Up to now the Soviet Union has insistently withheld disclosure of such data.

m. Obligations to refrain from interfering with techniques unilaterally controlled by the respective sides for verification of performance of the other side are still being negotiated.

2. THE PROTOCOL

The Protocol is to be in effect for three years, but the base date is
still undetermined. The United States' proposal favors the date of expira-
tion of the Interim Agreement of 1972--thus with the terminal date to be
October 3, 1980. The Soviet Union's preference is for the base date to be
the date of the exchange of ratifications, whenever that may occur. To
have the date of signature as the base date has been suggested as a compro-
mise. Significant provisions agreed on for inclusion or still subject to
negotiation are as follows:

a. Testing, development, and deployment of armed cruise missiles with a range exceeding 2,500 kilometers will be banned--irrespective of whether they carry nuclear or conventional charges. Whether the definition of cruise missile range is to appear in the Treaty or in the Protocol has not yet been decided.

b. Testing and deployment of cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers on platforms other than heavy bombers will be banned. This provision, however, is the focus of differences between the two sides. The United States has proposed that the testing and deployment of such missiles, including the TOMAHAWK missile, originally designed for ship launch, be permitted on heavy bombers including wide-body jets, within such other limits as prescribed by the Treaty and the Protocol. The Soviet Union is understood to insist on banning the testing of all cruise missiles designed for ship or ground launch and on excluding wide-body jets as heavy bombers within the meaning of the provision.

c. A ban on testing and deployment of "new" ICBMs is still under negotiation. It is understood that the United States' proposal calls for no testing of types not tested, and no deployment of types not deployed at the time the agreement is signed. The Soviet position is that there be no testing of MIRVed new types. The United States formulation would prohibit testing of mobile ICBMs whether single or MIRVed; the Soviet formulation would

5

appear to permit the testing and deployment of new ICBMs, whether or not mobile, if not MIRVed. After the expiration of the Protocol, the Treaty language would permit the development, testing, and deployment of mobile ICBMs, but they would have to be counted under the pertinent limits. Both sides apparently are agreed that the testing of mobile launchers for mobile ICBMs during the Protocol period is not prohibited, provided that no missile is fired from the launcher. The specifications of what constitutes "testing," what is a "new" missile, and what is a missile "type" are yet to be worked out.

d. A ban on testing or deployment of new SLBMs except for TRIDENT I and SSNX-18 (a new Soviet SLBM with a range said to be as great as that of our projected TRIDENT II missile, the testing of which would be prohibited) will be included.

### 3. THE STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES

The negotiations for the next stage in SALT, with the Principles serving as guidelines, are anticipated to follow-on soon after the completion of SALT II.

a. The United States has proposed the following principles, or targets:

* A reduction in the aggregate number of SNDVs to a range of 1,800 to 2,000.

* A reduction in the MIRVed missile launcher limit to a range of 1,000 to 1,100.

* A lowered MIRVed ICBM launcher sublimit.

* An MLBM launcher limit lower than the present Soviet deployed number.

* Provisions further restricting the development, testing, and deployment of new ICBMs and SLBMs.

* Provisions restricting the flight testing of ICBMs and SLBMs.

* Further restrictions on strategic defenses, including air and civil defenses.

* Steps to strengthen verification.

6

Paul H. Nitze

1 November 1977

CONSEQUENCES OF AN AGREEMENT:

Such as That Foreshadowed by the Current
SALT II Negotiating Posture in the Context
of Recent Defense Policy Decisions

OUTLINE

1. The ICBM Balance to be Expected by 1985, MIRVed and unMIRVed.

2. The SLBM Balance in 1985, MIRVed and unMIRVed.

3. The Bomber/Cruise Missile Balance in 1985.

4. The Definition and Verification Problem.

5. The Passive and Civil Defense Aspects of the Problem.

6. The Break-out Problem.

7. The Continuing Negotiation Problem.

8. The Impact of the Agreement Upon the U.S. Ability to Reverse Current Trends.

9. The Relation of the Strategic Nuclear Balance to the Theater Balance, Conventional and Nuclear.

10. The Political and Diplomatic Consequences of the Strategic Balance.

CONSEQUENCES OF AN AGREEMENT: Such as that Foreshadowed by the Current SALT II Negotiating Posture in the Context of Recent Defense Policy Decisions

(a) The MIRVed ICBM Balance

The U.S. has closed down the MINUTEMAN III production line and has delayed the initial operating capability (IOC) date of the MX missile to 1986. Therefore, there is essentially no possibility of the U.S. having any deployed MIRVed ICBM launchers by the expiration date of the Treaty in 1985 other than the 550 MINUTEMAN III silos currently deployed. Some improvement of the accuracy of the MINUTEMAN III is planned and it has been planned to substitute MARK-12A warheads, with a somewhat higher yield, for a portion of the MARK-12 warheads currently deployed on the MINUTEMAN IIIs. It is possible, however, that the restrictions on testing or deploying "new" missiles to be included in the Protocol could include modifications of old missiles and delay or prohibit either or both of these changes. The useful payload of the MINUTEMAN III is approximately 2,200 pounds. The maximum number of reentry vehicles on the MINUTEMAN III is three RVs. The aggregate useful payload (throw-weight) of the U.S. MIRVed ICBM force in 1985 will therefore not exceed 550 x 2,200, which equals approximately a million and a quarter pounds. The aggregate number of MIRVed ICBM warheads in the U.S. force will not exceed 550 x 3, which equals 1,650 RVs.

The USSR is permitted by the proposed terms of the agreement to deploy in excess of 300 MLBMs and approximately 500 SS-19s, -17s, or follow-on MIRVed ICBMs of approximately the same size. It is possible, however, depending on the counting rules finally agreed, that they would choose to deploy some hundred or more of their MLBMs as single RVs with very high yields in excess of 20 megatons, and therefore would be more likely to deploy some 200 or so MIRVed SS-18s, some 220 MIRVed SS-17s,

and some 400 SS-19s. The SS-18s have a useful payload approxi-
mating 16,000 pounds, the SS-17s and -19s have a useful payload
approximating 7 to 8,000 pounds, respectively. The SS-18s can
deploy as many as eight to ten RVs, the SS-17s four RVs, the
SS-19s six RVs. It can therefore be anticipated that the aggre-
gate throwweight of the Soviet Union's MIRVed ICBM force will
approximate eight million pounds of throwweight by 1985, and that
the number of RVs deployed on those MIRVed missiles will approxi-
mate 5,000, each RV having a yield several times that of the
U.S. RVs. There is no reason to believe that the accuracy of the
Soviet MIRVed RVs by 1985 will be significantly less than that
of the MINUTEMAN III RVs. The U.S. is developing its more radical
accuracy improvements for incorporation in the MX missile.

Until Soviet accuracy is improved to better than approximately a
fifth of a mile it will be difficult for them to eliminate more
than half of our MINUTEMAN silos in an initial strike, even if
they target two of their RVs on each silo. When their accuracy
approximates fifteen hundredths of a mile, around 90 percent
of our silos would be vulnerable to such a two-on-one attack.
A two-on-one attack would require less than half of the MIRVed
ICBM RVs they are expected to have available by 1985. If and
when their accuracy approximates a tenth of a mile, around
90 percent of our silos would be vulnerable to an attack by a
single RV against each silo, provided that additional RVs are
programmed to substitute for missiles that fail during their
launch phase.

If we were to use all our MINUTEMAN IIIs, assuming improved
accuracy and the substitution of MARK-12A for MARK-12 RVs, against
Soviet silos it is unlikely we could destroy more than 60 percent
of them.

(b) The UnMIRVed ICBM Balance

By 1985 the U.S. is expected to have 450 MINUTEMAN II, each with
a throwweight of less than 2,000 pounds and carrying a single RV

The Soviet side will be authorized approximately 400 MIRVed SLBMs if they deploy the full 820 MIRVed ICBMs which they are likely to be authorized. It is expected that the new Soviet TYPHOON submarine will be significantly larger than the present Soviet SLBM submarines and will carry 20 to 24 missiles.

It is probable, however, that the U.S. will continue to have a lead in the number of MIRVed SLBM tubes and RVs into the 1985 time period. However, the accuracy and yield of U.S. SLBM RVs is substantially less than that of its ICBMs and is expected to continue to be so beyond 1985. The U.S. SLBM force does not now have and is not expected by 1985 to have any significant capability against Soviet hard targets, such as hardened silos.

b. <u>UnMIRVed SLBMs</u>

The U.S. is expected to phase out its unMIRVed POLARIS force by about 1985 and thus will have no or very few unMIRVed SLBMs by that time.

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is expected to retain some 500 unMIRVed SLBM tubes. Some of these may carry MRVs as our POLARIS missiles do today. Such missiles may be as useful as MIRVed missiles against area targets that are not very hard, such as airfields.

3. <u>The Bomber/Cruise Missile Balance in 1985</u>

The B-1 issue was incorrectly stated by the administration as being a choice between relatively cheap cruise missiles and expensive B-1s. Cruise missiles of intermediate range have to be launched from some kind of platform. The Executive Branch's position is that this should be an aircraft. Thus, one requires a bomber/cruise missile system consisting of bombers that are based so that their prelaunch survivability is likely, bombers that are hardened so that it becomes difficult to barrage their escape routes, bombers that are able to penetrate close enough to the target to launch cruise missiles without being shot down, bombers that are able to

4

launch enough cruise missiles to overload the defenses, and cruise missiles able to penetrate area and local defenses, and accurate enough to kill the targets they are aimed at. The cruise missile is thus only part of the system. The bomber that launches it is an equally essential part of the system. The system is greatly improved if some of the bombers are able to penetrate the defenses sufficiently to launch SRAMs or gravity bombs.

The B-1 program having been cancelled, the 1985 bomber/cruise missile balance depends critically on whether a Soviet barrier defense around the northern perimeter, and of the eastern and western flanks, of the Soviet Union against B-52s is possible, upon the number of B-52s equipped with cruise missiles that we deploy and the range limitation on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs).

Recent analyses indicate that a barrier defense against B-52s may be possible out to many hundreds of miles beyond the Soviet periphery. The Executive Branch, which earlier thought a 2,500-kilometer range was adequate, believes that this range limit may not be sufficient beyond 1981. The problem thus becomes one of being able to prevent the 2,500-kilometer range limitation from being fixed in the Treaty and the precedent set in the Protocol from being carried over beyond the term of the Protocol, as happened to the wholly unequal MLBM provisions in the Interim Agreement, which were carried over to Vladivostok and thence to the new agreement.

The terms of the new agreement suggest that we contemplate deploying 120 B-52s equipped with ALCMs. Otherwise we will have to phase out significant numbers of MIRVed MINUTEMAN IIIs or of POSEIDON SLBMs in order to make room for additional B-52s under the 1,320 ceiling. It is highly unlikely that the Air Force or the Navy would recommend doing so.

With 120 deployed B-52s it would be unlikely that more than some 50 percent would be on continuous alert or that more than some 70 percent could be brought to readiness under conditions calling for fully-generated strategic forces.

The Soviet Union faces a much simpler problem. The U.S. has no substantial air defenses and the BACKFIREs deployed are not to be counted under the proposed launcher limits. Even if BACKFIRE production is limited as proposed by the United States, the potential by 1985 of the

(lc)

BACKFIRE to deliver megatonnage on U.S. targets is substantially greater
than the U.S. capability to deliver megatonnage on Soviet targets with
B-52s carrying cruise missiles.

Whether the FB-111H (which is 40 percent the size of the BACKFIRE)
can penetrate depends in part on whether U.S. tankers can survive in suf-
ficient numbers for the required multiple refueling of the FB-111Hs.

It is impossible to verify compliance unless what is to be limited
and the nature of the limitation have been clearly defined and the defini-
tion agreed in depth between the parties.

As can be seen from the current state of the negotiation, difficult if
not insuperable, problems in definition are evident. What is a "heavy"
bomber? Apparently what each side says it is. What is the range of a
cruise missile? Apparently what each side says is its range in its
intended normal operational mode. What bombers capable of carrying cruise
missiles are to be counted under the 1,320 ceiling? In effect, what each
side says should be counted. What launchers capable of carrying MIRVed
missiles are to be counted under the 820 ceiling? The answer is not yet
clear, but possibly only those in silo fields in which other MIRVed missiles
have been deployed. What is the permitted production rate of BACKFIRE
bombers? Presumably the current rate; but the Soviet side will not say
what that is. What is the permitted throwweight of a "small" missile; i.e.,
below what would cause it to be classed as an MLBM? Apparently the throw-
weight of an SS-19. But the Soviets will not tell us what they assess that
to be. Etcetera.

Even were the limitations clearly defined, compliance is in many cases
difficult to verify. How do you verify the range of a cruise missile, no
matter how precise the definition? How do you distinguish an ALCM from a
GLCM or SLCM, or assure that an ALCM cannot be launched from a sea- or land-
based launcher? How do you distinguish a transporter/erector for an SS-20
from one for an SS-16? How do you determine that a new missile having the
throwweight of an SS-19 and carrying the SS-19 bus, with but a single RV, is

6

not capable of being deployed as a MIRVed missile? How do you determine
that retired missiles or missiles taken out of retired launchers or extra
newly-produced missiles are not stockpiled and available for relatively
prompt deployment on soft pads or reloaded in launchers using the cold
launch technique?

5. The Passive Defense and Civil Defense Aspects of the Problem

The U.S. has put its ABM efforts very much on the back burner. The
Soviet Union has continued to expand its efforts in ABM research and develop-
ment and is significantly increasing the capabilities of its ABM "early
warning" radars around the periphery of the USSR. This is permitted under
the ABM Treaty, on the assumption that, in the event of war, this network,
being close to the periphery, could be destroyed. It is also assumed that
the powerful radars in the Moscow area could, with some effort, be destroyed.
However, the number of U.S. RVs required for these tasks is rarely taken
into account.

Even more important are the civil defense aspects of the problem.
Everyone who has studied the problem carefully agrees that a well executed
civil defense program can potentially reduce casualties and damage by a
factor of roughly ten. There is now little doubt that the Soviet Union is
working on civil defense much harder than was realized by the Executive
Branch as recently as two years ago.

6. The Break-out Problem

Fred Ikle, former director of ACDA, in an article in the October issue
of FORTUNE magazine, reminds us that the essential effort in the ABM Treaty
negotiation was to assure that neither side could break out of the agree-
ment and rapidly deploy a significant ABM defense. That was why the main
emphasis was on preventing deployment of a widespread ABM-capable radar
network, the element requiring the longest lead-time.

The Executive Branch seems largely to have forgotten this break-out
problem in connection with the current negotiations. They seem to be satis-
fied with provisions that would make rapid break-out by the Soviet Union
entirely feasible.

7

The proposed provisions designed to limit Soviet ability to reload their silos could not be counted on to be effective for any extended period of time.

The U.S. negotiators appear to rely on such phrases as "cruise missiles can be carried only by heavy bombers." Those who actually have worked on and designed cruise missiles say that any bomber with hard points on its wings can rapidly be converted to carry cruise missiles and that any cruise missile operable from a plane can rapidly be adapted to be launched from ground- or sea-based launchers.

They seem not to be concerned with the potential conversion to a damage-limiting ABM system of new air defense systems, designed to counter the U.S. SRAM/cruise missiles.

## 7. The Continuing Negotiation Problem

The most important problem may well be that of future negotiations and the context in which those negotiations are apt to take place.

It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union does not propose to reduce the aggregate of its nuclear delivery vehicles below 2,400 until after the expiration of the Protocol. Is it inconceivable that in the event we do not wish to renew certain provisions of the Protocol when it expires, the Soviets might see some necessity to review the treaty terms?

With the worsening nuclear balance projected for the period covered by the Treaty, how do we expect later to negotiate a SALT III Treaty more favorable to us than what is now negotiable? Do we really believe that the Soviets will agree to an extension of the Treaty which allows us to deploy a mobile MX system in 1986 and thereby reverse the overwhelmingly favorable ratios they would have attained by 1985? What incentives would there be for them to do so?

## 8. The Impact of the Agreement Upon the U.S. Ability to Reverse Current Trends

The Vladivostok Accord did not restrict the ability of the U.S. to deploy the B-1, the MINUTEMAN III and the MX missile in a mobile mode,

TRIDENT II, or ALCMs, GLCM, or SLCMs. It did not restrict the USSR from deploying those new weapon systems it planned to deploy, but neither did it restrict us from deploying those weapon systems necessary to maintain stability and rough equivalence, and thus reversing current trends.

Recent U.S. program decisions plus the terms of the probable SALT agreement make it virtually impossible to maintain crisis stability, rough equivalence, or to reverse presently unfavorable trends during the period of the agreements.

It is argued by some that all the restrictions in the Protocol, as they apply to the U.S., are of little significance; they do not keep us from doing anything we want to do during the next three years, and the Protocol will expire in three years and thereafter will not affect us. Does the Soviet side look at it that way? Once something is agreed at the highest level by both sides, they act on the presumption it will continue indefinitely, unless payments greater than the cost of giving up the provision are made to them elsewhere. At all times, they expect the pressure of the real correlation of forces, as they affect the two sides, to be reflected in the agreements reached.

Once we have agreed to a three-year ban on the deployment of mobile missiles, it becomes uncertain that that ban can be eliminated in future negotiations. Under the now most likely provisions of a SALT II agreement we run a high risk of having no B-1, no cruise missiles adequate in numbers and range to penetrate Soviet defenses, no follow-on to the aging MINUTEMAN III, and a SLBM force at sea of less than 25 boats, each constituting four percent of our only reliable deterrent power and thus worth enormous Soviet efforts to negate.

## 9. The Relation of the Strategic Nuclear Balance to the Theater Balance, Conventional and Nuclear

At all times since World War II the Soviet Union has been in a superior position as to non-nuclear force relationships on the European central front and on the northern and southern flanks. This has, in part, been due to geography, the USSR enjoying the central position and interior lines, and,

in part, to the greater effort that has been made by the USSR and its Warsaw
Pact partners than has been made by the NATO partners.

In the years up to the early 1950s this was offset by the U.S. nuclear
monopoly. Later the conventional deficiency was in large measure offset by
U.S. superiority in theater nuclear weapons. Today that theater superiority
has disappeared and it has proved necessary to assign certain of our strate-
gic nuclear forces, such as a number of our POLARIS/POSEIDON submarines to
cover NATO targets and thus maintain a theater balance. As the Soviets
deploy increasing numbers of SS-20 MIRVed missiles and BACKFIRE and other
bombers, maintaining a theater nuclear balance will become increasingly
difficult. More and more of our surviving strategic nuclear forces will be
called upon for assignment to that task. This consideration is rarely taken
into account when the strategic nuclear balance is being examined; it should
be.

There could, moreover, be a serious negative effect upon the evolution
of the conventional balance due to the SALT II agreement. The European NATO
countries have hoped to exploit the cruise missile technology in its theater,
conventional weapon applications. The fact that cruise missiles with a range
greater than 600 kilometers are to be limited in SALT favors the Soviet side;
it supports the erroneous Soviet claim that weapons with ranges up to 5,500
kilometers are not "strategic" if in Soviet hands while those over 600
kilometers in range are strategic if in NATO hands.

In specific terms, the SALT II agreements may prevent the U.S. from
transferring technology important to the conventional defense of Europe
because of limitations on the transfer of weapons, components, or technical
information relating to weapons limited by the SALT Treaty.

10. The Political and Diplomatic Consequences of a Shift in the Strategic Nuclear Balance

Some proponents, rather than taking exception to the main thrust
of the analysis contained in the preceding nine sections, argue a different
series of points along the following line:

10

(a) The U.S.'s March comprehensive proposal leaned over backward in attempting to be fair to the Soviet Union. It offered them complete assurance against any significant counterforce threat from the United States while not assuring comparable protection for the United States.

(b) That proposal was wholly unacceptable to the USSR, and any proposal which would in fact assure stability and rough equivalence at lower levels of nuclear armaments would be even more unnegotiable.

(c) To insist on such an equitable agreement would assure that there would be no success, at least in the next few years, in negotiating a SALT II set of agreements. Such a delay would risk a breakdown of detente.

(d) They believe it to be wiser to negotiate the best deal that is now reachable, preserve at least the outward forms of detente, and open the way to follow-on negotiations for a better deal in the future.

(e) And in any case, a deterioration in the state of the strategic nuclear balance will have no adverse political or diplomatic consequences.

To those who lived through the Berlin crisis in 1961, the Cuban crisis in 1962, or the Middle East crisis in 1973, the last and key judgment in this chain of reasoning--that an adverse shift in the strategic nuclear balance will have no political or diplomatic consequences--will come as a shock. In the Berlin crisis of 1961 our theater position was clearly unfavorable; we relied entirely on our position of strategic nuclear superiority to face down Chairman Khrushchev's ultimatum. In Cuba the Soviet Union faced a position of both theater inferiority and strategic inferiority; they withdrew the missiles they were deploying. In the 1973 Middle East crisis, the theater and the strategic nuclear balances were more balanced; both sides compromised.

It is hard to see what factors in the future are apt to disconnect
international politics and diplomacy from a consideration of the underlying
real power balances. The nuclear balance is only one element in the overall
power balance. But in the Soviet view, it is the fulcrum upon which all
other levers of influence--military, economic, or political--rest.

Figure 4. Capability to Redress Imbalance

LESTER L. WOLFF
6TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK

MEMBER:
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CHAIRMAN:
SUBCOMMITTEE FUTURE FOREIGN
POLICY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

MEMBER:
SUBCOMMITTEE
INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS

COMMITTEE ON
VETERANS' AFFAIRS

SUBCOMMITTEES:
HOSPITALS
EDUCATION AND TRAINING

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

OFFICES:

2453 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C.
202-225-5956

156A MAIN STREET
PORT WASHINGTON, NEW YORK 11050
516-767-4343

214-07 42ND AVENUE
BAYSIDE, NEW YORK 11361
212-423-1050

1ST VICE CHAIRMAN N.Y. STATE
DEMOCRATIC DELEGATION

MEMBER:
BOARD OF VISITORS
U.S. MERCHANT MARINE ACADEMY

Feb. 22, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

I hope that the New Year finds you and your family in good health. Over here, the New Year has brought a reorganization of the International Relations Committee, on which I am now Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.

One of the first items on the Subcommittee's agenda will be the question of normalization of relations with the Government of Vietnam. It is my understanding that in February, 1973, you may have communicated with Premier Phan Van Dong, discussing among other matters the subject of future reconstruction aid. In any event, in 1975 the Vietnamese made reference to such a communication.

In view of the present Administration's intention of examining the normalization of relations with Vietnam, it would be extremely helpful to the Subcommittee if you could reconstruct your communication with Premier Phan Van Dong, so that, so far as is possible, we can document Vietnamese expectations in this matter.

I hope that you will be able to help us in this matter, which is so vital to our nation's interests.

Again, please extend my best wishes to your family.

Hon. Richard M. Nixon
"Casa Pacifica"
San Clemente, California 92672

LLW:cn

202-334-5868

700 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037

May 30th

Dear Henry,

After Mr. Nixon's interview with Frost
on foreign policy I wrote him a brief letter
saying that it simply wasn't true that you
had ever been disloyal to him in your
conversations at "Georgetown dinner parties"
and that I was a good witness as I had been
lucky to attend lots of Georgetown dinner
parties at which you were present, some of
which were in Joe's and my house, and that
never once during or after Watergate had I
heard you say one word that could be construed
as disloyal.

I am furious that he remembered your
birthday and I didn't, but it is not too late
to wish you a very very fond HAPPY BIRTHDAY.

[LC]