PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

March 30, 1965

Meeting with Minister Heinrich Krone - New York, March 25, 1965.

The meeting took place at Mr. Krone's request. Mr. Krone began the conversation by summarizing his conversations in Washington, particularly with Secretaries McNamara and Rusk and with Mr. Bundy. He said that one of the preconceptions with which he had arrived had been substantially removed by these conversations, namely that Washington was preoccupied entirely by domestic matters. In fact his impression was that those closest to the President had the deepest concern for foreign policy and the most realistic approach. He was reassured by Secretary McNamara's assurance that the United States remained committed to the forward strategy and that there was no intention of withdrawing troops. He was somewhat unhappy about Secretary Rusk's comment that the only reason we had not settled with France was concern for the Federal Republic. The opposite would more nearly correspond to German interests. He was content with letting France retain nuclear weapons. The best solution would be to coordinate the British, French and American nuclear forces with the Federal Republic participating in joint planning.

The only jarring note in the official conversations was American preoccupation with Vietnam. Of course, the Federal Republic being itself divided and threatened had deep sympathy for America's efforts on behalf of freedom in South East Asia. His concerns were two-fold: (1) The Middle East imbroglio had proved that the Federal Republic could not assume responsibilities outside Europe. He hoped no request to that effect

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would be made. (2) He feared that the United States might become so absorbed in South East Asia that it would reduce its interest in Europe.

The conversations which bothered Mr. Krone most were with Acheson, McCloy and Clay. He thought that the anti-de Gaulle tirades of these men went beyond all reasonable bounds. He was particularly angered by a comment that De Gaulle did not even deserve to be called a 19th century man because the 19th century had produced Bismarck who understood the facts of power.

Turning to the German domestic situation Krone foresaw a narrow CDU victory with a reduced plurality. Schroeder would certainly not be Foreign Minister and efforts would be made to replace von Hassel as well. He said that he doubted that President Lübke would agree to appoint Schroeder to any ministry. Such refusal was of questionable constitutionality but it would not be overridden if there was a CDU majority. He thought that the FDP would gain votes because of the extension of the statute of limitations.

As for the nuclear issue, Krone said that he was extremely suspicious of the British proposals. As far as he could see they multiplied vetoes, removed all nuclear weapons from SACEUR's control and were the first step toward nuclear disengagement. He specifically affirmed that he understood Britain to want to place all nuclear weapons

assumed that he understood Britain to want to place all nuclear weapons
were the first step toward nuclear disarmament. He specifically
multiplied votes, removed all nuclear weapons from SILENT'S control and
substituted the British proposals. As far as he could see they

extremism of the statute of limitations.

majority. He thought that the UK would gain votes because of the
constitucionality but it would not be overruled if there was a CDU
abbandon Schröder to any ministry. Such refusal was of questionable
use well. He said that he adopted that President Lüde would agree to
not be Foreign Minister and efforts would be made to replace von Haasei
narrow CDU victory with a reduced bination. Schröder would certainly
turning to the German domestic situation Krone foresees a

a 19th century man because the 19th century had produced Bismarck who
engaged in a comment that De Gaulle did not even deserve to be called
of these men went beyond all reasonable pounds. He was particularly
Vonkerson, McCly and Clay. He thought that the anti-de Gaulle strategies
The conversations which prepared Mr. Krone most were with
Europe.

so absorbed in South East Asia that it would reduce its interest in
would be made. (S) He feared that the United States might become

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--including tactical ones--under a separate command. When asked whether he would object to grouping strategic weapons including some from the United States, he replied that the United States would never agree to such a scheme.

Krone asserted that the entire German cabinet except Schroeder and von Hassel were against the ANF. He claimed that General Trettner and even Ambassador Grewe were opposed to the British plan. Everybody--except Schroeder and to a lesser degree von Hassel--was convinced that the MLF was dead and, at this stage, undesirable. Erhard was vacillating as always. Schroeder had been instructed prior to the Wilson visit to agree to no further negotiation on the ANF. Nevertheless he had signed a communique which committed the Federal Republic to negotiations to which the majority of the Cabinet was opposed. Krone insisted that a complete Cabinet reorganization was necessary. He mentioned Gerstenmaier, Hallestein and Barzel as potential Foreign Ministers. He added that Strauss had behaved very well on the issue of Israel but that he could not be considered for a cabinet post impinging on Foreign Policy.

He made a plea for Franco-American talks insisting that we never approached De Gaulle in a psychologically acceptable way. I said that I had been as sympathetic to the French position as anyone. However, French actions on Vietnam struck me as inexcusable. They made a serious dialogue much more difficult. Krone said he would try to get Adenauer to write De Gaulle to that effect.

dialogue and more difficult. Knaus said he would try to get Adenauer to
Kreyen action on Vietnam attack as inexcusable. They made a serious
I had been as unsubstantive to the French position as anyone. However,
abrogated De Gaulle in a psychologically acceptable way. I said that
He made a lie for Franco-American rales insulating that we never
influencing on French policy.

Issue of Israel put that he could not be considered for a cabinet post
Korethu Ministers. He added that Strasburg had prepared very well on the
necessity. He mentioned Gerstenmayer, Helmutiund Barzel as potential
obvious. Knaus insinuated that a complete Cabinet reorganization was
requisite to negotiations to which the majority of the Cabinet was
Nevertheless he had signed a communique which committed the Federal
to the Wilson visit to agree to no further negotiation on the AM.
Erdharcz was vacillating as always. Schroeder had been instructed prior
was convinced that the NLA was dead and, at this stage, unfeasible.
Ehrlich--except Schroeder and to a lesser degree von Haseel--
General Treptner and even Ambassador Grune were opposed to the British
Schroeder and von Haseel were against the AM. He claimed that
Knaus asserted that the entire German cabinet except
never agree to such a scheme.

some from the United States, he replied that the United States would
whether he would opt to brooding strategic weapons including
--including tactical ones--under a separate command. When asked

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