REFERENCES

Occupation of Germany - Policy and Progress
State Department Publication 2783

European Recovery and American Aid - A Report by the
President's Committee on Foreign
Aid - November 1947

First Report to Congress of the
Economic Cooperation Administration October 4, 1948

Interview with Dr. F. G. A. Kraemer
Political and Economic Advisor to the Assistant Secretary
of the Army

Interview with Prof. C. J. Friedrich

1.

I. Introduction

The history of the U. S. occupation of Germany from
an administrative point-of-view, is a study of the difficulty
of achieving foreign policy coordination in the absence of
clearly defined objectives, with ~~action by~~ the man on the spot imperative in a complete moral, econo-
mic and political void. Whether clearly defined objectives
were attainable in an atmosphere of urgency of war is de-
batable. Whether it is ever possible to shape policy unin-
fluenced by the necessary operational decisions of the day
is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet certain lessons
from the history of the U. S. occupation of Germany seem
inescapable.

It seems strange that the country which had been the
moving force in formulating an 'unconditional surrender'
policy for Germany should have been without clearly defined
concepts of basic policies, in view of the fact that uncon-
ditional surrender involved the total responsibility for all
phases of administration. 'Unconditional surrender' proved
perhaps an effective slogan but its efficacy as a policy
ended with the armistice. If the original conception had
been one of a 'caretaker' Military Government, with major
responsibility for policy formulation in the State Department
and an assumption by the State Department of even the

and an assumption by the State Department of even the
reasonability of policy formulation in the State Department
been one of a 'carpeteer, Military Government, with major
engaged with the amnestic. If the original conception had
bepafta an effective slogan but its efficacy as a policy
principle of administration. 'Unconditional annender, proved
diflional annender involved the total reasonability for all
concepts of basic policies. In view of the fact that uncom-
bohka for Germany should have been without clearly defined
moving force in formulating an 'unconditional annender.

It seems an strange that the country which had been the
ine capable.

from the history of the U. S. occupation of Germany seem
is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet certain lessons
impressed by the necessary operational decisions of the day
were attainable in an atmosphere of urgency of war is de-
mic and political void. Whether clearly defined objectives
the man on the spot imperative in a complete moral, econo-
clearly defined objectives, with the necessity of action by
of achieving foreign policy coordination in the absence of
an administrative point-of-view, is a study of the difficulty
The history of the U. S. occupation of Germany from

I. Introduction

I.

2.

operational aspects of the occupation, the realities of the
situation soon forced a revision. To begin with, decisions
made by Military Government in the interim period, were in
important areas bound to set limits to the possibilities of
policy formulation by other departments. It became soon
apparent, that the State Department was in no position from
an administrative and personnel point-of-view to assume
operational control of the occupation. With the War Depart-
ment, not only the creator of our initial policy - but also
charged with its execution, its share in future policy
decisions was perforce considerable.

To be sure, coordinating devices to make the views
of other departments felt existed. The State-Army-Navy-
Coordinating Committee (SANAC) was charged, by interdepart-
mental agreement, with coordinating occupation policy. In
matters of high policy the National Security Council un-
doubtedly exercised - after 1947 - some direction. The
assignment of a Political Adviser as a State Department
representative to the Military Governor of the U. S. Zone,
sought to integrate operations and policy.

The crucial point in all these coordinating devices,
however, was the practical requirement of unanimous agree-
ment. Failing that, with the necessity of operational
decisions making delay impossible, the War Department was
free to formulate its own policy. Co-ordination was

1. Interview with Prof. C. J. Friedrich.

free to formulate its own policy. Co-ordination was
decisions making delay impossible, the War Department was
ment. Failing that, with the necessity of operational
however, was the practical requirement of unanimous agree-
ment. The fundamental point in all these coordinating devices,
sought to integrate operations and policy.

representative to the Military Governor of the U. S. Zone,
assignment of a Political Advisor as a State Department
disposition exercised - after 1944 - some direction. The
matters of high policy the National Security Council nu-
mental agreement, with coordinating occupation policy. In
Coordinating Committee (SAMAC) was changed, by interdepar-
tment of other departments felt existed. The State-Army-Milit-
To be anne, coordinating devices to make the views
decisions was pertinent considerable.

changed with its execution, its share in future policy
ment, not only the creator of our initial policy - but also
operational control of the occupation. With the War Depart-
ern administrative and personnel point-of-view to same
assemment, that the State Department was in no position to
policy formulation by other departments. It became a con-
important areas pound to set limits to the possibilities of
made by Military Government in the interim period, were in
situation soon forced a revision. To begin with, decisions
operations aspects of the occupation, the realities of the

3.

3.

effective therefore, only in integrating already harmonious
views. Nothing illustrates better the difficulty of coor-
dinating operations in the absence of a clearly defined
policy and with interdepartmental committees when the con-
trol of personnel is completely under one of the departments
to be integrated.

The study of occupation policy becomes then an analy-
sis of the administrative fitness of the War Department in
implementing its policy. The relations of the Department of
State and newer agencies, such as the ECA will be summarily
treated. But occupation policy has been effectively War
Department policy. This paper will be an examination of
the organs available for implementing that policy, some of
the difficulties encountered in selected areas, and their
implications on the larger aspect of U.S. foreign relations.

implications on the longer aspect of U.S. foreign relations.
the difficulties encountered in selected areas, and their
the organs available for implementing that policy, some of
Department policy. This paper will be an examination of
 treated. But occupation policy has been effectively used
State and newer agencies, such as the ECA will be summarily
 implementing its policy. The relations of the Department of
 affairs of the administrative fitness of the War Department in
 to be integrated.
The study of occupation policy becomes them an analysis
 of personnel is completely under one of the departments
 policy and with interdepartmental committees when the com-
dating operations in the absence of a clearly defined
 views. Nothing illustrates better the difficulty of coor-
d effective therefore, only in integrating already harmonious
 3.

3.

4.

1

## II. Background

There are two aspects to U. S. policy in Germany. One involves U.S. as a party to international agreements and as such required international Control Machinery. Common policy with respect to Germany was the primary concern of the major nations participating in the war: the U.S., Great Britain, the U.S.S.R., and after Potsdam, France. It was elaborated in a number of conferences between the heads of governments. The most significant policy decisions were set forth in the Crimea declaration of February 1945 and the Potsdam Declaration of August 1945. The Crimea declaration provided for unconditional surrender and the destruction of Nazism, its laws and institutions, complete disarmament and the eradication of military influence from public and cultural life. Reparations were to be made in kind. An economy adequate to sustain the German people was to be retained, but German power to sustain war eliminated. These somewhat contradictory pronouncements of general policy, were followed by the Potsdam Declaration. This elaborated the political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period and included agreements about reparations, disposition of German eastern areas, transfer of populations and punishment of war criminals. To provide coordination, an Allied Control

1. A good summary is to be found in "Occupation of Germany", State Department publication 2783, August 1948.

State Department publication S482, August 1948.
J. A good summary is to be found in "Occupation of Germany".

war criminals. To provide coordination, an Allied Control
eastern areas' transfer of populations and annihilation of
included agreements about reparations, disposition of German
the treatment of Germany in the initial control period and
elaborated the political and economic principles to govern
policy, were followed by the Potadam Declaration. This
was followed by the Potadam Declaration of August 1948.
The crimes declared set forth in the Crimes declaration of February 1948 and
the Potadam Declaration of August 1948. The crimes declared
the major nations participating in the war: the U.3., Great
Britain, the U.3.8.1. and after Potadam, France. It was
decalsated in a number of conferences between the heads of
the major nations participating in the war: the U.3., Great
Britain with respect to Germany was the primary concern of
and so on and so forth. International Control Machinery. Common
One involves U.3. as a party to international agreements
there are two aspects to U. 3. policy in Germany.

## II. Background

I

4.

5.

Council and an Inter-Allied Reparations Commission were created. Faced with the necessity of unanimous agreement, the experience with international control was not a satisfactory one. The basic agreements were interpreted by the respective occupation powers to suit their own ends and the policy of the U. S. Zone became primarily the policy of the U.S.

U. S. policy can be roughly divided into two periods. The first was characterized by the "Morgenthau" conception of the treatment to be accorded Germany and is exemplified by JCS 1067. This derived the power of the Military Governor from the Unconditional Surrender of Germany. It clothed the Military Governor with supreme legislative, executive and judiciary authority with particular emphasis on the punitive aspects of the Crimea Declaration. Within Germany it was characterized by the policy of the four D's: Denazification, de-industrialization, de-militarization and demilitarization. In the economic field it was marked by the removal of plants for reparation and the setting of a level of industry at 80% of the 1936 level.

The second stage was ushered in by Byrnes' Stuttgart speech of September 6, 1946. This contained assurances of U. S. interest in seeing a democratic Germany find her place

U. 3. interest in seeing a democratic Germany land per place speech of September 3, 1948. This contained assurances of The second stage was nashed in by Barnes' Stuttgart of the 1938 level.

In the economic field it was marked by the removal of plants de-industrialisation, de-militarisation and demilitarisation. characterised by the policy of the four Ds: Demilitarisation, aspects of the Crimees Declaration. Within Germany it was judiciary authority with particular emphasis on the punitive Military Governor with supreme legislative, executive and from the Unconditional Surrender of Germany. It clothed the by 103 1067. This derived the power of the Military Governor of the treatment to be accorded Germany and is exemplified The first was characterised by the "Morgenthau" conception U. 3. policy can be roughly divided into two periods.

U. 3.

policy of the U. 3. None became primarily the policy of the respective occupation powers to suit their own ends and the factory one. The basic agreements were interpreted by the the experience with international control was not a static- created. Faced with the necessity of unanimous agreement, Council and an Inter-Allied Reparations Commission were

3.

6.

again in the family of nations and pledged U. S. support
to a democratic government in the revitalization of the
German economy. It is probably fair to say that Stuttgart
marked the end of any attempt to rule Germany by quadri-
partite agreement. The period since 1946 has been marked
by an ever increasing assumption of authority on the part
of elected German governmental organs, culminating in the
call for a constituent Western German assembly and the fram-
ing of a Constitution for a Western German State.

Economically the Western Zones of Germany have made
a startling recovery. The level of Industry agreement of
1945 has been superseded by several other plans, the real
limiting factor being no longer Allied control, except in
the case of certain select industries such as synthetic oil,
but German capacity to produce up to permitted levels.

This consolidation of Western Germany has not
occurred without serious repercussions on U. S. relations
with other nations. The U.S.S.R. has consistently opposed
efforts aimed at the economic and political integration of
the Western occupation zones. In an effort to block the
creation of a Western German state, the Soviet Command
interrupted U.S. rail communications with Berlin for almost
eleven months. The lifting of the blockade has not, how-
ever, lessened Russia's bargaining position for she can

even, threatened Russia's bearing position for she can
intimidate U.2. rail communications with Berlin for a short
term, and then, if she has not, how-
ever months. The fighting of the blockade has not, how-
ever, been a success in the Eastern Front.

put German capacity to produce up to committed levels.

the case of certain select industries such as synthetic oil,
limiting factor being no longer Allied control, except in
1943 has been annealed by several other planes, the real
a startling recovery. The level of industry agreement of
Economically the Western Zones of Germany have made
in ink of a Constitution for a Western German State.

call for a constituent Western German assembly and the firm-
old of elected German governmental organs, culminating in the
by an ever increasing assumption of authority on the part
partite agreement. The period since 1948 has been marked
marked the end of any attempt to rule Germany by dictat-
German economy. It is properly fair to ask that Stuttgart
to a democratic government in the revitalization of the
again in the family of nations and bled U. 2. support

6.

7.

now appear at the Council of Foreign Ministers as the champion of German unity.

U. S. relations with other European countries were also seriously affected by U. S. occupation policy. France, with a static population, overrun three times in 70 years by the German army can not remain indifferent to the resurgence of even a Western German state, which harbors greater manpower and economic potentials than France. Other European countries, even outside the Russian orbit, have objected to certain phases of U. S. policy. They question, in view of their recent experience with German military might, whether German economic recovery is the sole key to a peaceful Europe.

On the other hand the importance of Germany to Europe both economically and politically can not be overstated. The European coal and steel deficit since 1945 can almost be expressed as the decline in German coal and steel production. The export trade of such countries as Italy has been traditionally predicated on barter agreements with Germany. Until their resumption an essential element in Italian economic recovery will be lacking. The great Dutch port of Rotterdam has derived its major revenue from German trade flowing down the Rhine.

Politically Germany's position is hardly less crucial. It has been the traditional center of Marxist agitation, conceived as the key to an eventual communization of Europe.

conceived as the key to an eventual communication of Europe.
It has been the traditional center of Marxist agitation.

Politically Germany's position is hardly less crucial.
trade flowing down the Rhine.

Port of Rotterdam has denied its major revenue from German
Italian economic recovery will be lacking. The Great Dutch
Germany. Until their resumption an essential element in
has been traditionally predicated on permanent agreements with
production. The export trade of such countries as Italy
almost be expressed as the decline in German coal and steel
atlas. The European coal and steel deficit since 1948 can
Europe both economically and politically can not be over-

German economic recovery is the sole key to a peaceful Europe.
their recent experience with German military might, whether
certain phases of U. S. policy. They question, in view of
countries, even outside the Russian orbit, have objected to
power and economic potentials than France. Other European
of even a Western German state, which harbors greater men-
the German army can not remain indolent to the teamwork
with a static population, overrun three times in 40 years by
also nationally affected by U. S. occupation policy. France.

U. S. relations with other European countries were
pion of German unity.

now appear at the Council of Foreign Ministers as the cham-

7.

[y]

8.

The U. S. has sought to combat this trend by restoring as large a measure of self-government as conditions permitted, thus giving the Germans a stake in their own continued in-dependence.

The U. S. is thus faced in Germany with the problem of deciding between several possible policies, though the introduction of a new factor in the practically independent Western German state serves to further limit U. S. freedom of action. The U. S. can press the creation of a Western German State integrated in a larger Western European system, the recipient of benefits of the Marshall plan, though the direct subsidy represented by the Gariola funds may be pro-gressively lessened. It is hoped that such a policy may eventually create a Western Germany of such strength that the Eastern occupation zones could not resist its attraction.

The U. S. could alternatively attempt a policy de-signed to achieve a basis of cooperation with the U.S.S.R., resulting perhaps in the development of a joint policy, though previous experience with quadri-partite control augurs not too well for such efforts. This might go hand in hand with a European policy with France as a cornerstone in contrast with present conceptions of Germany as the most effective barrier to further Russian expansion.

in contrast with present concepts of Germany as the most
in hand with a European policy with France as a counterstone
angle not too well for such efforts. This might be hard
though previous experience with great-partite control
resulting phenomena in the development of a joint policy,
signed to achieve a basis of cooperation with the U.S.S.R.,

The U. S. could alternatively attempt a policy de-
the Eastern occupation zones could not resist its attraction,
eventually create a Western Germany of such strength that
greatly loosened. If it is hoped that such a policy may
directly and indirectly represented by the German funds may be pro-
the recipient of penalties of the Marshall plan, though the
German State integrated in a larger Western European system,
of action. The U. S. can press the creation of a Western
Western German state serves to further limit U. S. freedom
introduction of a new factor in the practically independent
of deciding between several possible policies, though the

dependence.

thus giving the Germans a stake in their own continued in-
range a measure of self-government as conditions permitted.
The U. S. has sought to combat this trend by reasoning as

8.

9.

In any case it will be necessary to conceive of
German policy apart from mere German necessities and fit it
into a frame-work of larger foreign policy concepts. The
next chapter will deal with instruments presently available,
as well as the adequacy of past occupation policy instru-
ments.

In any case it will be necessary to conceive of
as well as the adequacy of past occupation policy inatru-
ment. next chapter will deal with instruments presently available,
into a frame-work of longer foreign policy concepts. The
German policy apart from were German necessities and fit it

9

10.

III. Instrument of Foreign Policy in Germany.

The instruments of foreign policy in Germany cor-
respond to the two aspects of occupation discussed in the
previous section. There are organs for the implementation
of Allied decisions and purely U. S. instruments. Allied
coordinating agencies are characterized by the necessity
for unanimity and by the absence of a deciding authority
in case of conflicting interpretations of agreement. The
chief instrument of U. S. occupation policy has been the
War Department.

1
a. Allied Commissions.

The agency for coordinating Allied policy for Germany
prior to the surrender was the European Advisory Commission,
created by the Moscow conference of November 1943. It in-
cluded representatives of the U.S., Great Britain, the
U.S.S.R. and, in its later stages, France. The Commission
met in London from December 1943 to July 1945. Its prin-
cipal achievements were the formulation of terms governing
the surrender of Germany and the assumption of supreme
authority by the four chief Allied powers, the determina-
tion of zones of occupation, the creation of control mach-
inery and the drafting of additional requirements to be
imposed upon Germany after surrender. In the atmosphere

1. See Appendix A.

I. See Appendix A.

imposed upon Germany after surrender. In the atmosphere
inured and the drafting of additional requirements to be
tion of zones of occupation, the creation of control mech-
authority by the four chief Allied powers, the determine-
the surrender of Germany and the assumption of supreme
capital achievements were the formulation of terms governing
met in London from December 1943 to July 1948. Its prin-
U.S. B.R. and, in its later stages, France. The Commission
cloned representatives of the U.S., Great Britain, the
created by the Moscow conference of November 1948. It in-
prior to the surrender was the European Advisory Commission.
The agency for coordinating Allied policy for Germany
s. Allied Commissions.
I

War Department.

Chief instrument of U. S. occupation policy has been the
in case of conflicting interpretations of agreement. The
tor unanimity and by the absence of a deciding authority
coordinating agencies are characterised by the necessity
of Allied decisions and namely U. S. instruments. Allied
prelims section. There are organs for the implementation
reason to the two aspects of occupation discussed in the
The instruments of foreign policy in Germany con-

10.

11.

of immediacy engendered by the war, confining itself to
problems of a very general nature, which gave wide scope
to future variations in interpretation, the work of this
Commission was largely successful.

Its task was assumed in July 1945 by the Council
of Foreign Ministers. For nearly two years no place was
found on its agenda for the German problem. When finally,
starting with the Moscow conference of March 1947, the
German question was taken up, it required only two confer-
ences to produce a deadlock. No meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers has occurred since December 1947. Quadri-
partite policy formulation has thereby become inoperative.

The agency responsible for operational integration
of Allied policy in Germany has been, since July 1945, the
Allied Control Authority. It is composed of a Control
Council consisting of the four Allied Commanders-in-Chief,
a Coordinating Committee composed of the four deputy com-
manders and a Control Staff consisting of 12 divisions or
directorates on which the four powers are equally represented.
Decisions of the Control Council as of each the quadri-partite
organs must be unanimous.

The Control Council is the repository of supreme
authority in Germany and acts in lieu of a central German

1. See Appendix A for organization of the Control Authority.