- 2 -

[Y]

provisions that have been made?

The former interpretation is unlikely because Senator Goldwater's task force has called in the President and to reveal existing emergency procedures. This demand demonstrates how dangerous it has been to inject the issue of nuclear control into the campaign. No responsible Administration could possibly reveal what dispositions it has made for the extreme crisis of an enemy attack which incapacitated the President. To do so would gravely jeopardize the national security.

This consideration is reinforced by the more sensible interpretation that Senator Goldwater considers present emergency procedures inadequate. Aside from the fact that it is impossible to debate new emergency procedures responsibly without knowing the existing ones, a serious discussion of the issue would have to deal with the following issues since such information involves the most sensitive area. Senator Goldwater's task force suggests that the NATO commander be given authority to use "battlefield nuclear weapons" should communications between NATO headquarters and Washington be interrupted. They specifically exclude the Polaris weapons which are also under the NATO Commander. However, an attack of a magnitude to interrupt communications between Washington and NATO headquarters would make the short-range battlefield weapons almost irrelevant. Everything would then depend on the disposition of the strategic nuclear weapons which could then be used to counteract this blow. Since these are excepted from the

the situation which would contract this blow. Since these are excepted from the
then depend on the disposition of the strategic nuclear weapons which could
make the short-range battlefield weapons almost irrelevant. Everything would
to interrupt communications between Washington and NATO headquarters would
which are also under the NATO Commander. However, an attack of a magnitude
Washington be interrupted. They specifically exclude the polarize weapons
nuclear weapons", should communications between NATO headquarters and
anagras that the NATO commander be given authority to use "battlefield
tion involves the most sensitive area. Senator Goldwater's task force
the issue would have to deal with the following issue since and informa-
reasonably without knowing the existing ones, a serious discussion of
values from the fact that it is impossible to debate new emergency procedures
that Senator Goldwater considers present emergency procedures inadequate.
This consideration is reinforced by the more sensible interpretation
Bravely jeopardize the national security.

of an enemy attack which incapacitated the President. To do so would
conflict possibly reveal what dispositions it has made for the extreme crisis
the issue of nuclear control into the campaign. No reasonable Administration
procedures. This demand demonstrates how dangerous it has been to inject
task force has called in the President whom to reveal existing emergency
The former interpretation is unlikely because Senator Goldwater's
provisions that have been made?

- 5 -

[x]

- 3 -

from the emergency delegation envisaged by Senator Goldwater and his
advisors, it must be because the communications to them are thought secure.
If communications can be secured to every command except NATO--including
those much more relevant to the mission envisaged by the Republican task
force--why not concentrate on improving communications to NATO headquarters?
What makes Senator Goldwater and his advisors believe that an attack powerful
enough to interrupt communications between NATO headquarters and Washington
would leave intact communications between NATO headquarters and the field
commanders? Or do they propose to delegate authority even further down
the line?

These questions cannot be answered without revealing highly classified
information about the state of our defenses. This is why many who as
the undersigned have in the past publicly criticized certain trends within
NATO agree with former President Eisenhower that the issue of emergency
delegation should never have been raised. To raise it in incomplete form
is inherently misleading. I would like to add that as a long-time student
of NATO I consider the proposed remedy irrelevant to the real problem of
the Atlantic Alliance.

of the Atlantic Alliance.

of NATO I consider the hexamide proposed remedy irrelevant to the real problem a
to inherently misleading. I would like to add that as a long-time student
deblegation should never have been raised. To raise it in incomplete form
NATO agree with former President Ekeadon power that the issue of emergency
the underigned have in the best publicly criticized certain trends within
information about the state of our defenses. This is why many who as

These questions cannot be answered without revealing highly classified
the line?

commanders? Or do they broach to delegate authority even further down
would leave intact communications between NATO headquarters and the field
enough to interrupt communications between NATO headquarters and Washington
What makes Senator Goldwater and his advisors believe that an attack powerful
torce---why not concentrate on improving communications to NATO headquarters?
Those much more relevant to the mission envisaged by the Republican task
It communications can be secured to every command except NATO---including
advisors, it must be because the communications to them are thought secure.
from the emergency delegation envisaged by Senator Goldwater and his

- 3 -

Insert A

QUESTION: "He [Supreme Commander of NATO] should be able to fire an atomic tactical weapon without reference to the White House?"

GOLDWATER: "That's my opinion, and it's also the opinion of the commanders of NATO." (Press Conference, Concord, New Hampshire January 7, 1964)

January 7, 1964)

of the commanders of NATO." (Press Conference, Concord, New Hampshire
GOLDWATER: "That's my opinion, and it's also the opinion

Insert A

SENATOR GOLDWATER AND THE ISSUE OF NUCLEAR CONTROL

**Background:** Those of us who for years have publicly challenged some aspects of current NATO policy have perhaps particularly cause for dismay at the irrelevance of the criticisms that the campaign has elicited and at the unreality of remedies which have been suggested. The issue of nuclear control in NATO was first raised by Senator Goldwater during the New Hampshire primary campaign. At a press conference in Concord, New Hampshire, the following exchange took place:

GOLDWATER: "That's my opinion, and it's also the opinion of the commanders of NATO." [Press Conference, Concord, New Hampshire, January 7, 1964]

In the following months, Senator Goldwater repeatedly advocated greater latitude for the NATO commander in the use of tactical nuclear weapons. He did not specify what he meant by latitude nor how he defined tactical nuclear weapons except during his presentation to the platform committee at the

- 2

[Y]

Republican Convention as "-weapons small enough to be carried on the shoulders, small enough to be launched from aircraft." Since the largest thermonuclear weapons are in fact carried by airplanes, this definition was not very restrictive. During the Presidential campaign, Senator Goldwater has argued that small nuclear weapons are no more powerful than "the fire-power you have faced on the battlefield. They simply come in a smaller package." Finally, a task force established by Senator Goldwater and headed by former Secretary of Defense McElroy made the following recommendations:

(1) The President should inform the American people about procedures for emergencies involving Presidential death and disability. (2) Authority should be delegated to the NATO commander for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in circumstances which might preclude consultation with the President. (3) "Actual" as opposed to "theoretical" Presidential control over nuclear weapons should not be extended to battlefield nuclear weapons.

(4) The President should give assurances that "concern for remote possibilities of accidental or unauthorized firing...will not result in the imposition of safeguard systems which impair our deterrent capability."

This last recommendation was directed against the Permissive Action Links, electronic locks on nuclear weapons which can be unlocked only by a coded signal issuing from Washington.

These recommendations raise many perplexing questions which will be dealt with by grouping them into four broad categories: Emergency use of nuclear weapons; delegation of authority to the NATO commander over the use of nuclear weapons; the problem of the Permissive Action Links; and the real problems of NATO.

## A. Emergency Use of Nuclear Weapons!

It is easy to share former President Eisenhower's publicly expressed dismay that the issue was ever raised. For it is impossible to discuss this problem responsibly without getting into the most sensitive areas of national security. No Administration could possibly comply with the demand that it reveal its procedures for the case of Presidential incapacity without giving a would-be aggressor vital information.

Since it is impossible to state the problem responsibly, proposed remedies are inevitably misleading. Senator Goldwater's task force suggests

- 4

that the NATO commander be given authority to use "battlefield nuclear weapons" should communications between NATO headquarters and Washington be interrupted. They specifically exclude the Polaris weapons which may be placed under the NATO Commander if the NATO Multilateral Force comes into being.

However, an attack of a magnitude great enough to interrupt communications between Washington and NATO headquarters would make short-range battlefield weapons almost irrelevant. The effectiveness of a counterblow would then depend primarily on strategic nuclear weapons which are specifically excepted from the emergency delegation envisaged by Senator Goldwater's task force. Stockpile備妥 Is it because communications between SAC headquarters and Washington are thought to be more secure than between Washington and NATO headquarters? And what happens, then, to the strategic weapons which are already under NATO command? If communications can be secured to every command except NATO—including those much more relevant to the mission envisaged by Senator Goldwater's task force—why not concentrate on improving communications to NATO headquarters? Finally,

what makes Senator Goldwater and his advisors believe that an attack power-
ful enough to interrupt communications between NATO headquarters and
Washington would leave intact communications between NATO headquarters
and the field commanders? Or do they propose to delegate authority even
further down the line?

B. Delegation of Authority over the Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

The issue of when to use nuclear weapons is an important one that the Atlantic Alliance will have to solve. Delegation of authority to the NATO commander to initiate nuclear war is the least effective way. For one thing, the NATO commander is an allied officer; he is not in the American chain of command. He is responsible to the NATO Council, not to the United

obscured
States President. This distinction has been obscured in the past because
the United States commander in Europe has heretofore doubled his in brass
as NATO commander. This is not inevitable, however. Whatever our decision
about delegating authority to go to nuclear war to a military commander, many
of our allies are almost certain to refuse to give a military commander
this authority. Whatever their view about the American veto, they have

been reluctant to give us theirs. This is why General Norstad has proposed
that a political body composed of major NATO countries including the United
States make the decision to go to nuclear war.

This proposal is in line with the strategic realities. Predelegation
in the nature of things must be confined to the most obvious cases, leav-
ing in doubt the ambiguous ones which have caused much greater worries.

Moreover, no NATO commander would wish to use nuclear weapons in Europe
without alerting SAC. But if communications are adequate for this purpose,
they are also adequate for political control to be exercised.

### C. Permissive Action Link

Senator Goldwater has expressed concern that the safeguards on
our nuclear weapons--specifically the Permissive Action Link--may prevent
their use. It is impossible to evaluate this charge without much more
knowledge of the state of communications between Washington and NATO
headquarters and NATO headquarters and the field commanders--information
which, whatever the Administration, must be highly classified. However,
this issue is essentially separate from who has the authority to release

- 7

nuclear weapons. Even if authority were delegated to the NATO commander,
he would require safeguards with respect to his subordinates. The NATO
commander would then face the same problem of control towards his in
local commanders that the President now confronts with respect to him. If
permissive links are removed, nuclear weapons would have to be deployed
further back in order to prevent local fluctuations from enforcing their
use. Thus any fair evaluation of permissive action links would have to
weigh the constraints, if any, over their use against the greater
flexibility they give to deployment. It is no accident that the
Permissive Action Link has not yet been figured significantly in any inter-
Allied debate.

d. <u>The Issue before NATO</u>

Many other questions are raised by the task force report including
the intriguing distinction between "theoretical" and "actual" Presidential
control which is rejected for battlefield weapons. But the produndest
problem is the irrelevance of the recommendations to the very real
problems before the Atlantic Alliance.

The French nuclear program started in 1957 long before Permissive
Action Links were invented or even talked about. Delegating authority
over the use of battlefield nuclear weapons to the NATO commander
would not affect the current debate within NATO which has dealt almost
exclusively with strategic weapons. This is because the debate is not
primarily about military operations but about the relative weight of
various countries within the Alliance. Our allies are more concerned
about their influence in peace-time or during crises than about the
mechanics of conducting a nuclear war. The nuclear issue has arisen
in part because some of our allies believe that influence within the

Alliance depends on the possession of nuclear weapons while the United States fears that to grant this proposition will make the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Alliance inevitable. In so far as the issue of nuclear control has a military foundation, it is produced primarily by the large force of Soviet medium range ballistic missiles stationed in Russia and aimed at Europe. In order to counteract these, some Europeans have demanded nuclear weapons of their own. These would not be battlefield weapons, however, but essentially strategic ones and they have been in any case specifically excluded from the recommendations of both Senator Goldwater and his task force.

Some of us have pointed out for years that the Atlantic Alliance faces serious problems. It must adjust its relations to the growth of European strength and self-confidence. It must find a political mechanism to behave purposefully during crises and without illusion during periods of relaxation of tension. It badly needs an agreed strategic doctrine. The issue of the NATO multilateral force requires

**Background:** Those of us who for years have publicly challenged some aspects of current NATO policy have perhaps particular cause for dismay at the irrelevance of the criticisms that the campaign has elicited and at the unreality of remedies which have been suggested. The issue of nuclear control in NATO was first raised by Senator Goldwater during the New Hampshire primary campaign. At a press conference in Concord, New Hampshire, the following exchange took place:

**QUESTION:** "He [Supreme Commander of NATO] should be able to fire an atomic tactical weapon without reference to the White House?"

**GOLDWATER:** "That's my opinion, and it's also the opinion of the commanders of NATO." (Press Conference, Concord, New Hampshire, January 7, 1964)

- 2

Republican Convention as "-weapons small enough to be carried on the shoulders, small enough to be launched from aircraft." Since even the largest thermonuclear weapons are in fact carried by airplanes, this definition was not very restrictive. During the Presidential campaign, Senator Goldwater has argued that small nuclear weapons are no more powerful than "the fire-power you have faced on the battlefield. They simply come in a smaller package." Finally, a task force established by Senator Goldwater and headed by former Secretary of Defense McElroy made the following recommendations:

(a) The President should inform the American people about procedures for emergencies involving Presidential death and disability; (2) Authority should be delegated to the NATO commander for the use of tactical nuclear weapons in circumstances which might preclude consultation with the President; (3) "Actual" as opposed to "theoretical" Presidential control over nuclear weapons should not be extended to battlefield nuclear weapons; and (4) The President should give assurances that "concern for remote possibilities of accidental or unauthorized firing...will not result in the imposition of safeguards systems which impair our deterrent capability."

["This last recommendation was directed against the Permissive Action Links,
electronic locks on nuclear weapons which can be unlocked only by a coded\nsignal issuing from Washington.", "These recommendations raise many perplexing questions which will be\ndealt with by grouping them into four broad categories: Emergency use\nof nuclear weapons; delegation of authority to the NATO commander over\nthe use of nuclear weapons; the problem of the Permissive Action Links; and\nthe real problems of NATO.", "A. <u>Emergency Use of Nuclear Weapons</u>", "It is easy to share former President Eisenhower's publicly expressed\ndismay that the issue was ever raised. For it is impossible to discuss\nthis problem responsibly without getting into the most sensitive areas of\nnational security. No Administration could possibly comply with the demand\nthat it reveal its procedures for the case of Presidential incapacity with-\nout giving a would-be aggressor vital information.", "Since it is impossible to state the problem responsibly, proposed\nremedies are inevitably misleading. Senator Goldwater's task force suggests"]

Since it is impossible to state the problem reasonably, broached

out giving a world-pe agressor vital information.

that it reveals its procedures for the case of Presidential insolvency with-
national security. No Administration could possibly comply with the demand

this problem reasonably without getting into the most sensitive areas of
drama that the issue was ever raised. For it is impossible to discuss

It is easy to share former President Eisenhower's explicitly expressed

V. Emergency Use of Unclear Weapons

the real problem of NATO.

the use of unclear weapons; the problem of the Permissive Action Links; and

of unclear weapons; delegation of authority to the NATO commander over
debt with pyromania into four proud categories: Emergency use

These recommendations raise many hermeneutic questions which will be

electronic locks on unclear weapons which can be unlocked only by a coded

This last recommendation was directed against the Permissive Action Links.

- 3

- 4

However, an attack of a magnitude great enough to interrupt communications between Washington and NATO headquarters would make short-range battlefield weapons almost irrelevant. The effectiveness of a counterblow would then depend primarily on strategic nuclear weapons which are specifically excepted from the emergency delegation envisaged by Senator Goldwater's task force. Is it because communications between SAC headquarters and Washington are thought to be more secure than between Washington and NATO headquarters? And what happens then to the strategic weapons which are already under NATO command? If communications can be secured to every command except NATO—including those much more relevant to the mission envisaged by Senator Goldwater's task force—why not concentrate on improving communications to NATO headquarters? Finally,

The issue of when to use nuclear weapons is an important one that the Atlantic Alliance will have to solve. Delegation of authority to the NATO commander to initiate nuclear war is the least effective way. For one thing, the NATO commander is an allied officer; he is not in the American chain of command. He is responsible to the NATO Council, not to the United States President. This distinction has been obscured in the past because the United States commander in Europe has heretofore doubled his in brass as NATO commander. This is not inevitable, however. Whatever our decision about delegating authority to go to nuclear war to a military commander, many of our allies are almost certain to refuse to give a military commander this authority. Whatever their view about the American veto, they have

this authority. Whatever their view about the American veto, they have
of our allies are almost certain to refuse to give a military commander
apost delegating authority to go to nuclear war to a military commander, may
as NATO commander. This is not inevitable, however. Whatever our decision
the United States commander in Europe has heretofore coupled us in press
States President. This distinction has been emphasized in the best because
of command. He is reasonable to the NATO Council, not to the United
the NATO commander is an efficient officer; he is not in the American chain
commander to initiate nuclear war is the least effective way. For one thing,
Atlantic Alliance will have to solve. Delegation of authority to the NATO
The issue of when to use nuclear weapons is an important one that the
B. Delegation of Authority over the Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons
enjoys down the line?

and the field commanders? Or do they probe to delegate authority even
Washington would leave in fact communications between NATO headquarters
and the field commanders. Or do they probe to delegate authority even
what makes Senator Goldwater and his associates believe that an attack power-

- 2 -

C. <u>Permissive Action Link</u>

nuclear weapons. Even if authority were delegated to the NATO commander, he would require safeguards with respect to his subordinates. The NATO commander would then face the same problem of control towards his local commanders that the President now confronts with respect to him. If permissive links are removed, nuclear weapons would have to be deployed further back in order to prevent local emergencies from initiating fluctuations from enforcing their use. Thus any fair evaluation of permissive action links would have to weigh the constraints, if any, over their use against the greater flexibility they give to deployment. It is no accident that the Permissive Action Link has not been figured significantly in any inter-Allied debate.

Vilified deputé.

Bemerkende Action Link has not yet signified significantly in any inter-
likeness they give to deployment. It is no accident that the
weight the constraints, it and, over them, their use against the greater
use. Time and fair evaluation of bemerkende action links would have to
further pack in order to prevent local (fluctuations from enforcing their
bemerkende links are removed, unless message would have to be deployed
local commanders that the President now confronts with respect to him. It
commander would then face the same problem of control towards him in
be would require agreement with respect to the superordinates. The NATO
nuclear message. Even if authority were delegated to the NATO commander,

[4]

The French nuclear program started in 1957 long before Permissive
Action links were invented or even talked about. Delegating authority
over the use of battlefield nuclear weapons to the NATO commander
would not affect the current debate within NATO which has dealt almost
exclusively with strategic weapons. This is because the debate is not
primarily about military operations but about the relative weight of
various countries within the Alliance. Our allies are more concerned
about their influence in peace-time or during crises than about the
mechanics of conducting a nuclear war. The nuclear issue has arisen
in part because some of our allies believe that influence within the

Alliance depends on the possession of nuclear weapons while the United States fears that to recognize this proposition would make the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Alliance inevitable. In so far as the issue of nuclear control has a military foundation, it is produced primarily by the large force of Soviet medium range ballistic missiles stationed in Russia and aimed at Europe. In order to counteract these some Europeans have demanded nuclear weapons of their own. These would not be battlefield weapons, however, but essentially strategic ones and they have been in any case specifically excluded from the recommendations of both Senator Goldwater and his task force.

strategic doctrine. The issue of the NATO multilateral force requires
during periods of relaxation of tension. It partly needs an agreed
mechanism to compensate burdofully during crises and without influence
of European strength and self-confidence. It must find a political
facing serious problems. It must adjust its relations to the growth
of water and pie task force.

specifically excluded from the recommendations of both Senator
but essentially strategic ones and they have been in any case
of their own. These would not be battlefield weapons, however,
to counteract these some Europeans have demanded nuclear weapons
palliative measures stationed in Russia and aimed at Europe. In order
it is produced primarily by the large force of Soviet medium range
so far as the issue of nuclear control has a military foundation,
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Alliance inevitable. In
United States fears that to grant this prohibition will make the
Villiance debate on the possession of nuclear weapons while the