DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Flanigan/Kissinger
morning 12/1/70

F: I presume that the shoes are back in. Byrd voted without turning him around. I got hit by the President this morning at the Leadership meeting. We tried to separate the bills and Scott asked if they were our possible position. I said yes and the President said no.

K: He isn't opposed as you are to the bill. You go in and face him on something he doesn't want and you will not get a straight answer.

F: So shoes are back in the bill. We may or not get a bill.

K: Did you get Fannin turned around?

F: No. On the Japanese. They came in and gave a proposal today which we said they shouldn't make. Intra-group We will take unilateral action. They came down on growth to 9% which is a concession. I said that was no improvement at all. I said I would get back to them on it. I said it was no longer possible for our government to remain silent. He said he hoped we wouldn't be specific. I said we would say we moved to get an agreement. I said he was good about it but stories coming from Tokyo were ??. He was shaken. I plan now to get someone from State and Stans and Neimar and discuss the response and say this is unacceptable and say go back to the position outlined at the previous meeting.

K: I think you should do it. That's my recommendation. You cannot win them all but it would be nice to win occasionally. I will give a course in the psychology of the President sometime.

F: I would be your best pupil. I didn't assume he would veto the bill but we never assumed it wouldn't get on his desk.

K: I didn't assume that either. But leave us not worry. You got great negotiations going with the Japanese. At least you get a counter-proposal. I only get hisses.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
L. Garment/Kissinger
1:10 pm xbc/30x 12/1/70

G: On Max -- I am trying to move our monumental lump of blubber. He is very suspicious about the group.

K: You can't stop people who want to commit suicide.

G: I talked to Mitchell this morning about other things and got an evaluation of what he is doing. Fund-raising and other things. I suggested that he (or I?) might hear from John today or tomorrow.

K: If you make a big deal out of it it serves no purpose anymore. If it sounds like an affair of state we asked for. I am not talking about Max Fisher, you, I am talking about Max Fisher. We are not asking when to constitute the group.

G: It's impossible to have a meeting without him.

K: That's up to you.

G: If it's valuable to have a meeting with him.

K: It's less valuable now. It would have been more valuable 4 weeks ago.

G: I knew nothing about it until this week.

K: It's headed for a series of showdowns and becoming a pressure play.

G: Do you have reason to believe it would be this week.

K: You should go to Mitchell or Finch. Any group he heads I would have my doubts about but let's look at the group.

G: I will keep you posted.

K: Please do.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
2:30 pm 12/1/70

S: The Israelis have brought in a letter from Golda to the President which I am transmitting to you right away.

K: They are going back to the 1676 '67 borders unconditionally!

S: We will develop op a reply.

K: 160 F-4s will do the trick!

S: We will develop a reply promptly so they will have it to discuss at the next Sunday Cabinet meeting. You review it and the President. I will send a copy to the Secy. who will be in Brussels and we don't want to wait until he returns. I will get it to you in 24 hours.

K: We could have a talk Thurs.

S: We will get together. We will make a speech together.

K: Have to go on stage together.

S: Rabin said that Dayan wants to see the President.

K: What do you recommend?

S: Affirmative. Friday, Dec. 11. Thirdly, I am hopefully awaiting a yes on the dinner for Hussein.

K: It's on his desk. I will try to speed it up. How is the AID request for Israel?

S: I sent a bootleg to Saunders 3 days ago. I didn't send it to the Secy. in Fla. and his staff assistant returns today.

K: He wants to deal it out a little at a time.

S: He doesn't want to do anything. He and I don't agree.

K: It will drive him through the roof. The best reply -- what did they ask for?

S: Nothing specific.

K: I thought we should be generous in our response to the AID request and if they are tough we can delay deliveries.

S: The Secy. doesn't agree. That's why I want an off the record chat. He

By NARA, Date 5/26

Sisco/Kissinger

2:30 pm 12/1/70

-2-

S: (cont) doesn't want to loose the leverage and neither does the President.

K: Personally, don't you think this will get into the same screaming match?

S: I think we can get by without making concrete commitments in the letter.

K: It would be stupid to be specific if they aren't.

S: It's a request. I have 2 or 3 alternatives to live with. I want to talk with you.

K: Let's do this. I will schedule a meeting of the Review Group for Thurs. and we will get together 1/2 hour before.

S: Let's call the meeting to up-date but not discuss this reply. I want to send out a letter today. The Secy. is seeing Schumann and Home. They will press him for discussion at the 12/7 meeting that we agree to begin discussions of 4 power settlement. I want to send a cable that says don't make such a commitment because (1) in the fixx first place any indication to the Franch and British that we will talk now will slow down the Israelis and (2) the question of guarantees must be studied carefully. We are putting together a preliminary draft for his review and it needs to go through the NSC before we can make a decision. It's premature to make an agreement on the ground ? ? ? and wxx second that we don't want to make Israelis nervous.

K: I agree. Will he do it?

S: I don't know. I wonder if fixx there's truth to the intercept that gave information he said something to the Soviet Ambassador.

K: I can't believe that a high American official would say to fixx a Soviet that one of his subordinates is out of favor because he is close to another high American official.

S: I don't know. That's why I want to see you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Maxine Cheshire/Kissinger

4:11 pm

12/1/70

C: Gene Patterson and I have discussed your memo to Ben Bradley.

K: I didn't write anything.

C: It's not a memo from him on what you said. I have it here. It says it's a lie. No member of your staff collapsed or taken on a stretcher. I called Larry Eagleburger. The only thing that was wrong was that he was taken first to the infirmary and then taken in a WH car. He could unstand why people would think it was an ambulance.

K: I didn't know what you were talking about. I was out of the office once and when I returned I was told that he went to the infirmary. I even went over to see him but he had left. The rest is a lie. That I said I need him and he cannot go to the hospital is ridiculous.

C: Someone on your staff told me this. It wasn't done with malice. This wasn't the lead of the column. It was buried. He wasn't implying you were the Simon Leagre. I know what it is to work for hard taskmasters.

K: It may depend on the context on which it was put. I have asked my staff members who were here. We didn't think of Larry Eagleburger. I don't want to go into that. I didn't know he was going to the hospital. I didn't know he was in the hospital, only that he'd gone to the dispensary after feeling faint. I went to the dispensary to see him. I have great affection for him and he has asked to come back to work for me. And cables are not cleared that way. It gives the impression that the State Dept. officials bring cables over here and then they bring them back to the Secy.

C: No, No. Someone who walked into the room when the cable was under discussion and the person who told me this --

K: He is a liar. Great cocktail conversation. If you know how cables are cleared it cannot happen this way. It's handled by LDX and the staff. If I should have to talk to the Secy. I would call him. To think that I would tell a junior officer?

C: So the person on your staff who says this is a liar.

K: He may have done it as a joke. It may be that I run into people who I don't recognize as a member of my staff. That part I don't deny. I wouldn't recognize everyone of the junior members of my staff. But this doesn't happen.

C: But does it happen upset you that someone who holds you in affection --

By NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

K: I don't want two stories out of this. I don't like my life being dragged around through the press. I took objection to this story on Sunday that had a nasty connotation. It gave the impression that I am an insensitive dictator.

C: I didn't intend it this way or my editors.

K: I am a telephone call away. What would you lose by calling me? Then you could ask me and If I deny it you could say it as you once did before. I don't really like that but it's better than this sort of thing. I suppose you cannot write this column without stepping on toes.

C: I didn't intend to. I have the most enourmous respect for you. I didn't write it --

K: Except for with one column you are gentle with me.

C: Our editors didn't see it. All of us realize you work 18 hours a day. I have worked for hard task masters.

K: I am and I admit this.

C: We weren't trying to put you in a bad light. I know how high in regard you are held by this man. I thought it was amusing.

K: It sounds like cocktail party conversation and they are not true.

C: What do you want me to say about them. In view of the fact that I called the man back and say that it didn't happen and it's true about Eagleburger thing. If you want a retraction we owe you that. On the other hand a staff member says he did see it and it was so trivial that you might not remember.

K: No one unless he works in my outer office would know what I said about Larry Eagleburger. So this is how it starts. The other thing -- it's impossible to prove the negative and if you dredge someone up to prove the positive that doesn't make it true.

C: But what to do since he insists he was there.

K: He was there and he said that Eagleburger --

C: No, No. About the other -- lecturing the other member of your staff who says Dr. Kissinger I am working for you.

K: Maybe he was talking to someone who said -- there was no incident in which I said go back to the Secy. of State and tell him and then it turns out he was on

By NARA, Date 5/26

-3-

K: (cont) my staff.

C: Maybe he worked somewhere else.

K: No. I may be hard on my own staff but not on members of other departments. I am much gentler to other department members then people on my staff. I can only tell you that no such incident happened. I have asked Al Haig and no one on the staff remembers such an incident. That's the situation. On the other hand I don't want another story and have it go on. So either a retraction or nothing.

C: I will tell Mr. Patterson. I wish he called you but he rather that I did.

K: I would rather talk to you.

C: I am sorry about it. If you knew the circumstances and the nice way in which it was put. I wasn't calling to confirm a nasty story --

K: If you read it again it isn't told as a joke but as a manical tendency.

C: I will certainly call you again no matter what.

K: If you don't mention me I will not be hurt.

C: I started to use it on TV.

K: When are you on TV?

C: Mon., Wed., and Fri. at 12:15 and 6:15 on WTOP. I did something that got a response from a Catholic priest. I even forget what I said. We were stricken (?) that a man like that would care enough to say that it was the best yet. I did say I adore you. The thing that makes it difficult --

K: I know why Patterson asked you to call me because if I talk another 5 mins. I will confirm something that didn't happen.

C: I didn't consider it mean and the person who told me didn't mean that. If you knew the person you would agree. Maybe faulty _____. They didn't intend to embarras you. This man was appalled when I said you are outraged.

K: I won't make him my public relations advisor. Does it make things worse?

C: I will tell him what you have said.

K: I maintain my position.

NARA, Date 5/26

Cheshire/Kissinger

4:11 pm

12/1/70

-4-

C: That it didn't happen.

K: But I am not eager to have a statement from me saying it didn't happen because it will be petty. So if that's the best you can do, I would rather you drop it.

C: We could drop it but if it's not true -- I think there has to be a misunderstanding --

K: I don't doubt there are storeis about me told affectionately about me by my mistreated staff.

C: Someone down there I am told there's a keeper of HAK files. He is so fascinated about you he has collected trivia. Not on your staff. When he puts your witticisms together he will out sell Art Buchwald.

K: Or a great case of libel.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Joseph Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

4:35 p.m., December 1, 1970

K: I'm terribly sorry to call you back so late.

J: You have many reasons for not calling back.

K: I was told that David Young had talked to you and his passing on of your concern of Bunche's successor was all you wanted. I hadn't understood. I would always call you back.

J: There are several things -- (1) nobody knows how soon the need may arise and obviously one doesn't like to talk about it. It makes it difficult for Ralph. It seems to me it's terribly important that the U.S. be prepared quickly to put someone in or suggest or endorse someone who can go to the 38th floor and will be accepted. It would be a great mistake to let that go vacant or to not fill it with a first-class person. We should be prepared to move instantaneously. People whom I see often are deeply concerned. People read things to RJB. It's very serious. I talked to Charlie and DePalma. DePalma said by all means call Henry. The person who seems to be perfect for the job and for whom everybody has the highest regard is Bill Buffum, who has just gone to Lebanon. He has the qualities. One of the things about Ralph is he's tough with everybody; he is willing to stand up and talk to the US and other governments. He is respected by everybody including our friends east of the Oder-Neisse line. Most people would agree that Bill Buffum has the knowledge and qualities. He would be more than acceptable across the street from here.

K: Better than Charlie Yost?

J: Charlie has not quite the same qualities or toughness as Bill. When you asked me about Charlie Yost two years ago -- I haven't changed my view.

K: These two recommendations are not mutually exclusive.

J: I have talked to people and I don't know anybody as good as Bill. I know Sam would agree with this and Charlie also. People whom I respect and count on across the street would agree.

K: I appreciate this very much.

By ____ NARA, Date 5/26

Joseph Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

4:35 p.m., December 1, 1970

- 2 -

J: I wanted to get this word to you.

K: If you hadn't done so, his name would not have occurred
to me. That is very important -- I appreciate it. If you ever call and
I don't call back, assume it is a technical snafu. In this case, there
was a misunderstanding. I just thought you wanted me to be aware
this would come up.

J: We are squared away now. Thank you very much.

K: I hope to see you soon.

1ds

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
H. Klein/Kissinger
6:26 pm 12/1/70

K: You called me first thing this morning.

HAK: I am going to Chicago.

K: On the 22nd.

HAK: I am willing to meet with the press for a backgrounder or do a TV prograr

K: I have talked with Cuffson.

HAK: I will do that if it's not a panel.

K: Head to head and not on substance.

HAK: He is appealing to Jill St. John.

K: He has a very pretty wife. I will tell him you appeal to her.

HAK: You think I should do it?

K: Yes. Good format for you and the President would like it because he is fond of Irv. Set up to go directly from the Harvard group lunch to tape it with him.

HAK: I am not so eager to do the Council on Foreign Relations.

K: I would rather you do a newspaper backgrounder. It will do more good.

HAK: I will do that.

K: Maybe something before the Harvard group and after the show. Will use your time out there.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

Prof Milton Katz/Mr. Kissinger

6:40 p.m., December 1, 1970

K: I'm sorry I've been so difficult to reach.

Katz: I'm going to be in Washington Thursday and Friday morning. I'm scheduled out of Washington sometime Friday morning. If convenient, I would like to see you.

K: Around 11:00 Friday morning, unless you hear from me, you are going to be down anyway?

Katz: I will confirm it late Thursday afternoon. We picked Tom Hughes for the Endowment.

K: That was a good choice. I have been hearing so much about the President of Harvard, but some of the names make me doubt they are serious.

Katz: They are even insulting. We sent out 2000 letters and talked to a few. They felt every name recommended must be included in the list. They are manifesting signs of a loss of confidence in themselves. Then they got a list of 900 names. They seem to feel before the knock a name off, they have to check on him. They got the list down to 69 -- that list contains names that are silly and perhaps even insulting.

K: Whom do you recommend?

Katz: Nobody in particular; there are 4 or 5 I would be glad to see get it. The latest list of 29 names contain some foolish names.

K: I'll see you Friday.

lds

By NARA, Dalo 5/86

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

6:45 p.m., December 1, 1970

K: Mr. President.

P: Any late development today?

K: No, I sent off this thing to Ladd. I expect an answer. I talked with Helms along the lines of our conversation and your note to me. Three people almost immediately in his key positions and on his own I have asked him to identify some more.

P: What did he say?

K: He said he would do it, he was so relieved that he is staying. I told him you never heard a word of complaint about your ________ shop.

P: Okay, good.

K: Karamessines is first class and energetic but on the estimate side there is a great weakness. Said we wanted to cut down some of their activities and told him about your strong feeling on that. I met with that group that Congressman Marsh is putting together. A counter to some of these liberal groups. They have $20 million ....

P: $20 million.

K: $18 million Scaife is willing to put into it.

P: Boy!

K: Ought to be able to do something with that.

P: What are they going to do, set up a foundation?

K: They have some pretty *good* ideas, they want to take over some of the existing groups, form a series of foundations, then a series of professional groups taking over some of the world affair groups. Would then hold conferences and ...

P: Should be very effective.

K: ... and would give us a chance to give ???? Ladd's ???? Have appointed a member of my staff to be in touch with him. Said on 3 days notice, can get at almost anything.

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

6:45 p.m., December 1, 1970

By NARA, Date 5/26

P: On this Cambodian side, more than these people had anything to do with it?

K: I have a cable here from Swank -- there isn't anything of major significance going on. Some roads are closed but that has always been the case. The Soviets in Helsinki today has resurrected that ABM in my channel and have also indicated a willingness to discuss the accidental war problem ...

P: Accidental war doesn't mean third parties. They are not taking in the subject of ...

K: The other one has the other meaning -- provocative attack. That one we have taken care of by telling Dobrynin we are taking care of that in another channel. Might want to consider either -- we want the accidental war agreement. It might make the Defense Budget now -- we can get it at any moment then.

P: Got to take ABM along.

K: ? ? ?

P: Nobody is certainly suggesting that are they? Smith?

K: Smith wouldn't want it. No negotiations if we do that. This way if a missile is launched by mistake ...

P: Don't know if that adds anything.

K: We can do that at any point.

P: Think they are just mosing along.

K: Would just look at it as a propaganda exercise. There was an attempt to kidnap our Ambassador in Iran but it failed.

P: Yeah.

K: We have checked on this Lowenstein and two staff members and got a reply that it is absolutely mischievous, no possible basis for that.

P: Would you call Aiken and Cooper?

K: Yes, I will do that.

P: Hate to spend your time but you were there. They put some emphasis that we were getting ...

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/The President
6:45 p.m., December 1, 1970

K: Said we were getting ready to have military advisors and ...

P: You see that's two guys that are -- remember Symington's guys did the same kind of thing. These people are all out Doves and do this to embarass us.

K: No mistake about it. Earlier this year they came back with all this misleading information from Cambodia that we had to spend all this time straightening out.

P: I wonder if they are responsible for all this other stuff. How did this story originate? If this AP guy is the one that is doing it, let's find out.

K: I am checking into the AP guy now. I have talked with Mitchell and he is going to check this out.

P: Good, good. Okay, Henry.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

B. Haldeman/Kissinger

morning 12/2/70

K: I wanted to ask you if you have word on California. Still no?

H: Yep.

K: Wonder what he would think if I went with my children? They have their
hearts set on it.

H: Go. He might think you are finking out -- no, you should take some time.

K: He might change his mind.

H: I doubt it.

K: I don't see the sense in it.

H: He just doesn't want to go.

K: Public image problem is negligible.

H: That's not all part of it but he doesn't want to do it. Getting trapped by
Californians and having the Drowns there.

K: Can't they be kept under control?

H: No.

K: They are driving him crazy.

H: To the point that he is not using the house.

K: Where do they live?

H: Palos Verdes. They can get to San Clemente on short notice. The instant
he hits there so do they. They think they are good for him.

K: I don't know him.

SANITIZED

H: He is okay. Bebe stays out of things but they tell him what to do.

SANITIZED

K: He may never go again.

H: That's a possibility.

K: I will wait a few weeks and see if he minds. This has the great advantage
that there are things for children to do.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Volpe/Kissinger

9:26 am 12/2/70

K: You called a few times yesterday and we never connected.

V: I know what you have and don't worry about it. A couple of quickies from yesterday. Alex Johnson was over here and we were in the middle of decision of things that happened in Boston. Sen. Kennedy called yesterday and wants me to appear at a hearing today or tomorrow. I said we are in the process of conducting an investigation and the President wants a report and I shouldn't see them first.

K: When will it be completed?

V: Tonight.

K: What's the recommended action?

V: Want to ask you -- in the investigation conducted in Boston, because you could prejudice the case against those not conducting themselves properly --

K: What do you recommend?

V: We will get the final material about noon and there will be the question of the 2 or 3 civilians who refuse to testify unless it's an open hearing. One was a pilot of a fishing vessel --

K: That has nothing to do with the orders.

V: That's correct. At this time do you feel we should make recommendations from --

K: You are responsible for the Coast Guard and Alex has none. He is covering up for State.

V: We have one (or a short) item on what took place between the two agencies. There was no guidance on the record and the Coast Guard has never been tied into the Op Center at State and they have been instructed to contact the desk responsible when there's a problem and they contacted the Soviet desk. If the fellow jumps in the water they have to send in for instructions. They would pick him up of course no matter what his nationality. But this guy didn't jump into the water. But the fault of the Coast Guard was that as the situation changes, keep us advised. They didn't.

K: If you don't encourage defection that doesn't mean you give him back. We want some disciplinary action. This is outrageous.

V: We have taken some action.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Volpe/Kissinger

9:26 am

12/2/70

-2-

K: Suspended some.

V: The boss and District Commander. I don't know about military action sufficiently to say whether you can take action without a court martial.

K: I don't know -- transfer them to --

V: The District Commander has served 38 years and is retiring in June.

K: The President must announce something tomorrow.

V: I will have recommendations.

K: I can hold him until tomorrow morning but he wants to do it this afternoon.

V: I will try for late this afternoon but instructions say COB.

K: That's right. I was just asked if we could announce something this afternoon but I want you to make --

V: We don't want holes in it. One other thing -- you agree to conclusion that I shouldn't go to the Hill before the President has made the report. One other thing -- you know Minister Andreotti. He was premier designate but because of the tax stand Columbo has had to take and he may not last and this man may be the new premier but if the President had a few moments on an unofficial basis and could be worked in, he would like that.

K: I will do my best.

V: Coming to town today and here tomorrow.

K: I will let you know at the end of the day.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Richardson/Kissinger
10:07 am 12/2/70

R: Don't hear your voice often enough now adays.

K: I constantly point out that the worst mistake I made was not to keep you over here.

R: I am beginning to sympathize with the myself. I just got a memo that you might want to know about -- results of Massachusetts referendum on VN. The figures are not final. Three choices -- military victory, planned withdrawal, and last was immediate withdrawal. 190,000 - 717,000 - 440,000.

K: 2-1 if you combine immediate victory with immediate withdrawal.

R: 5-3, planned withdrawal over immediate. That's amazing for Mass.

K: On a ballot?

R: In referendum. They voted on it when they elected the governor. Want me to send it over?

K: I would appreicate it and I will get it to the President right away.

R: Another thing. Korry. The one in Peru -- no, Chile. Is he too cut up now to be a useful property in another Administration post?

K: Have you somethingin mind?

R: Director of Public Relations here.

K: He lost his cool down there but people up here x who kept their cool were wrong. It was a sad record on the part of ARA. He started flapping when it happened but I think it would be a good solution, I like him.

R: He is very bright.

K: And very talented in this. I would like to keep him in the Administration. Don't want hem running with dissat disaffection and he doesn't deserve it. I will ask the President.

R: If you have the chance that would be good. Thanks.

By

NARA

Date 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger
afternoon 12/2/70

P: Who did we give $10 million for flood relief -- Rumania or Yugoslavia?

K: Rumania but max more than $10 million.

P: Anything to Yugoslavia?

K: No, they didn't have a flood.

P: Peru?

K: No. $15 million approximately. Yugoslavia didn't have a flood.

P: Safire's researchers said Yugoslavia but I thought it was Rumania.
They said they checked it with you.

K: No, they didn't.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM

Sen. Harry Byrd/Kissinger
12:40 pm 12/2/70

K: I am calling you about something that is generally outside my field but I am taking the liberty of calling you. It's the trade bill and the inclusion of the shoe quota in the bill. I am not an economisxt and I will not make that case. I am mostly concerned about relations with Spain and Italy. Spain will construe this as contravening the arrangement when we established the bases and Italy will be pushed further over the brink. I wonder if national security considerations could be taken into account.

B: Let me give you my thinking. Some months ago I had a great many people come to see me about adding things to the trade bill which was under consideration by the House. Basically I am a free trader. We have to temper high wages but basically I am a free trader and I felt that the least protectionist bill we could get from this Congress was the bill that Mills presented and so people trying to add to it I said I would not go beyond the House bill and would support it. That was my thinking yesterday. Textiles we are committed --

K: We have no problem. We made a try at voluntary arrangements and the Japanese have been tough as hell.

B: Yesterday what persuaded me on that, having said I would support the House bill I would be in an awkward position to vote against a part of it. I did it with the idea of preventing having it added to.

K: We thought this was your general attitude. Our problem is that the Spanish Foreign Minister has already said they will retaliate strongly. In Italy the shoe quotas would hit in the Red Belt and we cannot separate these two countries and they are the bulk of the imports. I don't know the legislative history for this and I understand there's another vote --

B: Could be but presumably this ended it. Of course a member could get it opened up again.

K: I don't know whether you could take into account what I have mentioned to you --

B: It would put me in an awkward position. After saying I would support the House bill. I will give it some thought.

K: I would appreciate it. I don't normally engage in this activity but based on the trip to Europe -- I am not normally involved in economic matters but I am persuaded this is necessary.

B: I will think about it. It's been a pleasure to chat with you.

By NARA, Date 5/20

TELCORN

Secy. Irwin/Kissinger

2:55 pm

12/2/70

I: I have a matter on a question of the Ambassador to Chile. I have had it
come up in a vague way. I was asked if you mentioned it to me at lunch because
they thought you had. I said no. They understand that Amb. Davis is not --
the WH has a question about him. We ought to begin moving on it and instead
of waiting which would be easier if I called you.

K: The President didn't like Davis.

I: I have a comment but go ahead.

K: For a reason number of reasons, one of which I would rather tell you
personally.

I: OK. There are reasons why you need tell me. Apparently there are two
Davis'.

K: Dick and Nat. I wanted to check out first that there wasn't a misapprehension.

I: Bill Macomber thinks there may be a mistake in identity. Dick Davis was
Ambassador to Rumania and Nat in Bulgaria. '

K: The initial reason was premised on mistaken identity.

I: That's what Bill thought because he knew of the problem with Dick.

K: There are other problems not on mistaken identity. I would rather talk to
you in person. I will be in the Department tomorrow and I will stop in.

I: Fine.

K: I have a suggestion that has come to me. I don't know the name -- Bodler.

I: Bill Boudler. Davis and Bouller were at the top of our list. Charlie Meyer and I knew Boudler and Alec and Meyer and someone else knew Davis. They thought they were the same. The others who knew both said they were equal but that they would give balance because of Iron Curtain country experience to Davis.

K: I have no preference except for one item which came up independehtly. It
did come to the President.

I: I want to move ahead on the overall thing and get something moving.

K: Don't forget Vaky.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Secy. Irwin/Kissinger
2:55 pm 12/2/70

-2-

I: I have asked them to keep that in mind. Everyone -- Alec, Bill Macomber and myself like him.

K: And since TIME has said that the Secy. said something nice about me, working for me might not be a barrier. I will --

I: I will speak to Bill Macomber about it.

K: I will see you tomorrow after my briefing.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Eolasex
By: CHARA Date: 9/2/70

TELCOM
Dobrynin/Kissinger
4:02 pm 12/2/70

K: How are you?

D: Fine.

K: I understand that Semenov is seeing Smith tomorrow evening for a private meeting and in addition to whatever formal proposal you make on Friday he has something private. I hope that a provocative issue will be raised through our channel.

D: That was the understanding. When was that last meeting?

K: Yesterday.

D: I received information on that but nothing on the talks tomorrow. I will finish his expose in next two meetings.

K: XX ABM proposal.

D: Some of your people have hinted to our delegation that they don't want to raise it themselves but if we do, they will discuss it.

K: Provocative attack? If you lend us Siberia for a couple of years, I have some people to send there.

D: It's very nice there now. I wouldn't interfere really because I received information on talks but it takes me a few days after each talk. I have this information --

K: Do you think Semenov--

D: Your man mentioned in your delegation that they are prepared to discuss the question but not prepared to raise it. I only have information but nothing about whether we will say it or not. Maybe they took it as an indication they are prepared --

K: They have no authority and not given authority and will not be given authority.

D: As of now we have not raised this question. Raised informally by your side.

K: You don't want to tell me who the people are?

D: Don't want to put them on the spot. The cocktail party there were talks on the record along the lines I said to you.

Dobryhin /Kissinger

4:02 pm

12/2/70

-2-

K: I don't care what Semenov raises but this is element we said to raise in separate channel and if you have been given contrary picture it's only over-eagerness.

D: ? ? ? ?

K: ABM or accidental we will discuss there too but not provocative attack.

D: Up to now I have no indication we will raise it. Maybe it will not be raised tomorrow.

K: Only supposition that he said he had something important to raise.

D: I have information for last 2 days. I never raised this issue before. Or anyone of delegation. Maybe he was mislead by the fact I doubt he will raise it. On the level of Groymko and he knows the business.

K: I will see you Monday at 1:00 where we usually meet.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Folsinger
By NARA Date 12/2/70

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Dobrynin/Kissinger

4:02 pm

12/2/70

K: How are you?

D: Fine.

K: I understand that Semenov is seeing Smith tomorrow evening for a private meeting and in addition to whatever formal proposal you make on Friday he has something private. I hope that a provocative issue will be raised through our channel. only.

K: Yesterday.

K: XX ABM proposal.

K: Do you think Semenov--

By NARA, Dalo 5/20

Dobryhin /Kissinger

4:02 pm 12/2/70

-2-

D: ? ? ? ?

K: ABM or accidental war we will discuss there too but not provocative attack.

D: I have information for last 2 days. I never raised this issue before. Or anyone of delegation. Maybe he was mislead by your people. I doubt he will raise it. On the level of Groymko and he knows the business.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Otto Passman
12/2/70 4:15 p.m.

P: Have you got three minutes. It might save you a billion dollars.
Does that sound like a bargain.

K: Yes, sir.

P: Are you going to be seeing the President today?

K: I can.

P: He said he wanted the supplemental in tact?

K: That's right.

P: I managed to bring it out completely in tact so it meets the
☑️ President's request. This is good for you and the President to know
and no one else.

K: I will tell him right away.

P: One other thing. You were worried about military sales?

K: Yes.

P: Well, the House passed its bill and we put it in there. Then the
Senate passed its bill and left it out. I met with the right man at the right
time and I scratched his back and he is scratching mine. He was willing
to take 200 million [or billion?]. I am going to deliver to the Pres-
ident two hundred [billion?] dollars in military sales.

K: Aren't you tremendous!

P: McGee agreed that he'd give me two hundred [billion?]. . . . .
Now do you understand what this is about?

K: Oh yes. That's tremendous.

P: Now, who do you have who can help America -- I don't care about
Otto Passman -- I'm talking about somebody who can help America. We've
got this got this surplus of rice, 200 thousand pounds. Hannah has ap-
proved money to make a loan to buy rice. These guys in Agriculture think
they're going to stop it . . . . . . . . . . . . I'm going to work with your
people and be completely ethical as you know me to be. It would help if
you could send somebody down to talk about this.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

K: I will send somebody down to talk about this.

P: I kept the bill in tact and I'm putting in the 200,000 dollars.
This is between Dr. Kissinger, Otto Passman and the President of the
United States.

K: I understand. I will ask my Deputy, Haig, to call you tomorrow.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Amb. Freeman/Kissinger

5:48 pm

12/2/70

F: I only wanted to take 15 seconds of your time to say that next week I will be in London but I wonder if subject to pressures of today if you could find 10 minutes to have John Thompson greet you.

K: I counted on half an hour.

F: The Prime Minister is taking close personal interest in this and he will feel better if you take time to see him.

K: Be glad to. Is the trip under control? Who will go to Camp David? You tell me who Prime Minister wants there.

F: I don't have that established. I am dealing with Mosbacker and so you will be asked who the President will bring.

K: We want to know who the Prime Minister wants there.

F: I think -- I am perturbed that Annenberg is coming over. So the Prime Minister, Foreign Secy., and Bert Erend.

K: So the Secy. of State and myself.

F: That would seem sensible and I could take that that would be acceptable to us. I don't know and maybe you don't, whether the Prime Minister wants part of the time in absolute privacy.

K: How would I?

F: No, I mean the President. Purely political talk.

K: That might not be bad. He hasn't focused. I think they should be alone part of the time but I wondered about the record.

F: Make a distinction between subjects that would be on record and those that they can discuss alone. Then I can steer the PM in the right direction.

K: The President plans to have me present for a meeting with the Prime Minister and Trend in the oval office. Then Camp David as you suggest. Maybe the President and Prime Minister could take a little walk. The President is planning to stay for lunch and leave after.

F: We are told that. One other point -- They are now going to have plenty of time together with the Camp David added on. It might be a good idea if we use the same technique as when ______ was there to invite them out of the oval office for lunch. That gave a better understanding of not

By

NARA, Date 5/20

Amb. Freeman/Kissinger

5:48 pm

12/2/70

-2-

F: (cont.) completely private things they have said to each other.

K: I wish I could have you at Camp David but I don't see how we can do it.

F: I would have liked to take part but you can't do it with Annenberg here. It's out of the question. I have no interest in suggesting it.

K: I know but I wasn't really being selfish.

F: The President will have lunch with a handful of people up there.

K: That's the plan. It's not a very elaborate establishment.

F: That will be all right with us. I will tell the PM that's what you have in mind.

K: The Prime Minister hasn't decided if he will stay overnight?

F: Yes, we have let Protocol at State know. He appreciates the offer but must go back to London.

K: Then he will wish to leave early.

F: About the same time as the President.

K: Then we have everything undercontrol. When will you be back?

F: I will be away the whole of next week and back the week after.

K: That gives us the following week.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Peter Flanigan (I. O.)

7:06 p.m., December 2, 1970

F: ... essentially unsettled, not responsive at all.

K: You are not going to call them in.

F: I am going to call them in and say frankly their response anything but responsive -- non-substance. Can not accept this as their response. In addition that I should appear before the press because Ron Ziegler has suggested it might be time to make a report. Number of things started in very high hopes before negotiations opened up [and we thought that an agreement could be reached] but as it transpires we have come only a little way. We have made every effort to accommodate but the basic difference between us still is substantial. We are continuing our discussions but we made a very forthcoming offer to the Japanese and they came back in essence with no motion.

K: I agree, I think that's good.

F: I talked to Frank Shakespeare about putting Shaheen on his board of five because you wouldn't put him on your board of 12.

K: He would have seen too much secret information and I have heard he is a blabber mouth.

F: Can Frank have him there?

K: Sure, I'll see that Frank doesn't give him any classified information.

wgh

By NARA, Dated 5/20

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Charles Tanguy
12/2/70; 7:10 p. m.

T: I just wanted to tell you that I had an interesting chat with Pierre Guillet. He said he enjoyed talking to you and that he hoped to come to State sometime in the new year.

K: Yes, I told him if he did I would be happy to see him. I would be delighted to see him. I like him.

T: He is a likeable fellow and very close to the President.

K: Keep in touch with me on it.

feg

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Cong. Arends
7:13 p.m., December 2, 1970

K: Sorry I was not able to get back to you sooner.

A: That's all right, it's been a busy day. Thinking about a couple of off the record meetings with Zumwalt and others. Think we ought to know a little bit more about the situation now. It is up to you as to who you have in.

K: I will get it set up but there are some developments just right now. What I would like to do is wait until the middle of next week.

A: Will be here a week to 10 days. I was down there today and spoke to the President and I just mentioned it to him, the agreement.

K: He wants him on USIA Board or some senior board in the next few weeks. He will be on one of the senior boards and will have access to classified information. Flanigan will be in touch with you about this.

wgh

TELECON (Tape)

The President/Mr. Kissinger

December 2, 1970

P: Hello, Henry,

K: Mr. President.

P: How was your game at Philadelphia?

K: That was a great game. You know, the teams aren't all that good, but when they are evenly matched, you can't tell the difference.

P: No, that's right. I saw most of it on television.

K: It was an exciting game.

P: Oh, yes, yes; it sure was, and I think the best thing the Navy did was to go for that 2 points which gave them a psychological advantage.

K: Exactly.

P: If they hadn't made it, it wouldn't have made any difference anyway. What was the thing at half-time they had -- I didn't see it, but they apparently had something...

K: They had something on the prisoners. They had a brief ceremony for the prisoners and Admiral Moorer made a rather pointed little speech in which he said, 'Most Americans welcomed the bravery of these men.' Hugh Scott was on the train going up there with me, and --you know, he's an opportunist-- but he said that Muskie and Kennedy are all on the wrong side of that issue, and they are pulling back like crazy.

P: He said they are pulling back?

K: Yeah.

P: Very interesting.

K: And he's attacking which is another sign that it must be pretty safe.

P: Well, did the audience react?

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F0 12958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/10/70

The President/Mr. Kissinger

- 2 -

K: Oh, yes, very strongly.

P: That crowd is not necessarily... It's a football crowd.

K: It was very strongly.

P: When they brought the prisoner thing in?

K: A tremendous ovation. And I've talked to five of these wives whom Admiral Zumwalt had on the train going up with him. These are really moving ladies.

P: Oh, boy, yeah.

K: I said to one of these girls -- some of them don't even know if their husband is alive or not -- you know, what is really moving is that you don't bring any pressure on us to just end the war so that you get your husbands back. They said that would be denying everything he believes in, and we'd be betraying him if we did that.

P: Boy, aren't they something!

K: Then, when you see these cheap little bastards...

P: Yeah, well, the cheap ones like the Muskies and the Teddy Kennedys...

K: And the Fulbrights...

P: ...and the silly little columnists and so forth -- the Sevareids and the rest. Good God, I mean... You know, Henry, it's no credit to them that they begin to sort of crawl off that position when public opinion ...

K: Not at all.

P: The bastards -- that shows they have no principle at all. That's not a good reason to crawl off it. If they believe it was a mistake and this and that, they should stick to it.

K: Of course, it shows only that they...

P: It's very interesting, though, that they did that at the game. I wonder how that was arranged. I suppose they just up and decided to do it.

MJA FO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/9/04

The President/Mr. Kissinger

K: That's right; they had the two officers there and the two
... one of the enlisted men.

P: They did? And they presented them and then what happened?
I missed the half-time ceremony.

K: There was another tremendous ovation.

P: And they introduced them, huh?

K: Yes.

P: How did they introduce them?

K: These were the men who made the daring raid, and there was
a standing ovation, wild cheering -- it was very...

P: Well, that's good, because about 25,000,000 people heard it
on TV.

K: That's right, and because they saw the Seese fellow(?).

P: That ought to drive the critics wild. The New York Times XIX ha to put a little piece on the front page talking about who had planned it and so forth and so on, as if we were trying to exploit the God-damned thing. That's all right. Let them... People want to cheer.

K: They are going to nitpick us; they are trying to create a credibility gap about the ordnance that was expended. I've asked Moorer to give us a list of everything that was expended north of the 19th parallel which is so trivial. Laird didn't handle it very well; that's the one thing.

P: What did he do -- leave it more to the... The point that I have always pursued was they were diversionary movements, but actually that there was nothing done of any significance.

K: That's exactly right but first they said nothing and then they said some ordnance was expended. Well some ordnance doesn't mean anything, they should have said 3 Shrike missiles, which is all that was expended. And two noise maker bombs. Well, we're going to get the list and we are going to make them put it out tomorrow and that's going to end it. It's not a big deal.

P: No, no, no. As far as the people are concerned, they would just as soon you'd bomb the whole damm place.

MJD E0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/4/04

The President/Mr. Kissinger

K: Exactly, they don't care where ...

P: But I would -- don't let them have any credibility, say now look since you've raised so much question that it was primarily for the purpose of the diversion. Well, I'll tell you it's interesting to note -- you take a look at the New York Times and the Washington Post today. The Times is getting off of it in its news coverage. The Post is trying to make something of it but they're just desperate as hell that's all because you know the credibility and all that crap.

K: And the Post is just an organ of the Democratic community.

P: Sure, sure. Well, but also they are just absolutely finatical on this subject and on anything that is done but on the ordnance thing I'd just say well now here's the facts ...

K: That's right.

P: Have it done at Defense though not at the White House.

K: Oh, no Defense, we should stay out of it entirely.

P: Let them just take care of it.

K: That's right. One thing that I thought Bruce ought to do at the meeting on Thursday in addition to what we had already planned to say, he should say that it is bad enough that you don't release the prisoners but there is no excuse whatever for not giving the list of prisoners and I hereby call on you at least put these wives out of their misery, you know something like that. It's inhumane, this is behaving like the Nazis did in World War II.

P: Good, use exactly that phrase.

K: Because that's what the Nazis did with Soviet prisoners, they wouldn't release their names.

P: Is that right?

K: Yeah.

P: Well, why don't you just use that. I think we have got to get a hell of a lot rougher you know. Lodge used to make these pleading little noises about prisoners over there and that didn't do any good.

K: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: FO 12958
By: NARA Date 6/9/04

The President/Mr. Kissinger - 5 -

P: Now let's try the other thing.

K: I must say once you meet those wives, which I hadn't done before
you really get a different ....

P: You're damn right. Those wives were something, well were some
of them -- were they the ones that were at the White House that day?

K: Two of them were at the White House.

P: They certainly approved of it didn't they?

K: Every one of these five approved of it.

P: Yeah, all the way.

K: Then they hadn't heard from their husbands in three years and
they said we don't know how but we know they know it now and that's the
best thing you could have done and we believe ...

P: That must have been an interesting experience going up on the
train with all the boys and everything.

K: Oh, it was very moving. I did it to -- I accepted it to please the
military but I really tremendously enjoyed it.

P: Well, I'll tell you this has had a very dramatic effect as you were
saying yesterday on the military, the morale and everything and that's
worth it, just like Cambodia gave it a shot in the arm, this is giving it
a shot in the arm.

K: No question.

P: These people need it.

K: I got a kick out of -- I think it was the New York Times today, they
said just as a matter of fact, they said Cambodia got the President a
year to implement his withdrawal program and now he is looking for
something else to give him another year. You know as if this were a
matter of course, as if they hadn't been screaming against it when it
happened.

P: Of course we are in this position now too where we got the enemy
just bamboozled as to what's going to happen because on the one hand
Rogers in court testifies that we don't plan to escalate and haven't and
Laird says we might, well that's find, let them think both. The point is

MJD F0 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/4/04

The President/Mr. Kissinger - 6 -

P: (cont'd) that we are -- Rogers says that for domestic consumption and we're going to say the other for theirs but I want Bruce to make no damm bones about it when he gets up there.

K: No question.

P: He's got to take the line that we've got other options, you know what I mean. And look here, how long are we going to sit here and talk. He's got to really -- I think we have leave him start laying the groundwork for a break-off of the negotiations if necessary.

K: I do too.

P: Cause you see, it's a lot different from last year. If we had broke them off last year, people would have still thought there was hope but at this point the time -- every day that goes on, the incentive for us to negotiate goes down.

K: That's right.

P: Hell fire, If we're going to get out anyway, what the hell we got to negotiate about?

K: That's right. And what they are asking of us is ridiculous, to get out we don't need to negotiate and to impose a communist government, let them do that if they can do it.

P: What significance do you attach to the German action on Autobahn?

K: That was -- did -- you see the German Bundestag is still CDU controlled and they were going to have some committee meetings in Berlin and this is their way of showing ...

P: Oh, I see.

K: the pressure. This is a retaliation for -- but this proves what they can do anytime, with or without an agreement.

P: Typical of what they're up to.

K: An agreement won't stop this sort of bureaucratic harassment because they're using the pretext of checking the papers very carefully, they are not stopping the traffic, just checking the papers.

P: Yeah, yeah.

MJD 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

The President/Mr. Kissinger

K: I mean it shows really how -- that these negotiations are missing the essential point, that the Germans are pressing for.

P: It's interesting, getting back to your thing that Scott -- Scott is a bell-weather; that's for sure; he never moves on anything unless it's popular.

K: That's right.

P: And he felt those other guys were trying to climb back?

K: Oh, yes and the rest -- I haven't checked it -- that he's making statements every day attacking them.

P: Good, Good. Urge him; egg him on. I hope you did.

K: Oh, yeah. Brezhnev made a speech yesterday in which he attacked our bombing.

P: The bombing?

K: And the raid.

P: On what ground did he attack it?

K: On the ground that we are claiming rights in the sovereign space of another country and that the Soviet Union will give all fraternal assistance.

P: well, that's not unusual, is it? Haven't they been saying that all along? They have to, don't they?

K: They have to do something like that. What was most interesting in the speech, thought, was he praised the Europeans to the sky and said that the detente in Europe was proceeding. So they are clearly trying to drive a wedge between us and the Europeans, and what I had mentioned to you earlier that we may be the ones that pay for the European detente policy, including the Oft-Politik(?)

P: Yeah. Because basically if they can get Europe without help from us, they don't have to do anything for us. They can get it by themselves.

MJD FE 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Author
By NARA Date 6/4/04

The President/Mr. Kissinger

K: They can cover their rear in Europe. The nuclear stalemate guarantees that we can't do anything to them in a nuclear field.

P: They can turn around and handle the Chinese...

K: That's right. I think that's their basic strategy now.

P: Yeah; they've got to be doing a lot of thinking about these things. You'll find some more of... he'll give you a little more guidance when you talk to Dobrynin on that. Listen to him; see what he has to say. They are now playing a waiting game; we'll play a waiting game, too. That's all there is to it.

K: Well, there's another week. That lunch isn't until the 7th.

P: Okay, Henry, fine.

K: Right, Mr. President.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FEO 2958
Authority
By NARA Date 6/4/04

Mr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

December 2, 1970 (at home)

J.J.

Y: Hello, I should like to convey the following message to you from my friend. He has expressed his deep personal appreciation to you for what you have done for him.

K: Right

Y: He is most grateful to you for the amount of interest and effort you have so far put in for common cause not only on this particular issue but on the epic making achievements of last year.

K: Right

Y: So while he understands and appreciates why you felt you'd better get away from this issue all together from now on and leave the matter to the hands of our experts my friend would - should very much like to ask you what the development and if possible and necessary to continue to guide this difficult issue toward an early agreement. In this sense my friend would like to ask you to keep this channel open and when and if necessary may have to ask for your advice and intervention. From not technical but political standpoint. And in the meanwhile your expert has got in touch with our expert and we now have the cable from our of your proposal.

K: Right

two

Y: Under the firm and fresh order given by my friend our/top aides are working very hard at this very moment in order to draft a revised and perhaps the last comprehensive counter-proposal of ours to be sent to our expert hopefully tomorrow of our time and based on this our counter-proposal we do hope that this would prove to be good enough toward the successful negotiation by breaking the deadlock.

K: Yes, well. I will keep an eye on it and I will certainly - I certainly believe in the friendship of our ~~people~~ two countries and I will always do what I can to promote it.

Y: I would like~~A~~ to tell you to do that. My friend specifically called me and asked me to convey that this is the message that I have just given to you.

K: Yes

Y: He appreciates your position very well and he on our side do his utmost and his two top aides are ~~really~~ now working very hard and we will be able to propose a revised comprehensive not on categories but ~~all as I think~~ -comprehensive counter proposal.

K: Yes, although it has nothing to do with what we discussed last weekend now. Well, frankly I don't want to get into it anymore because I will let the experts - whatever is agreeable with them is fine with me.

MJD F.O. 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/9/04

Y: Yes. I am still convinced that what we discussed is the best way but apparently in the light of the strong opposition of one of our top aides my friend had to change his stance in the light of how to implement the agreement we have got - but in any case I am doing still my utmost within very limited influence I can ...

K: No, I understand your position and this is all very understandable. And ...

Y: I don't want to take even a minute of your very precious time but what we discussed Sunday was one time almost the final proposal by my friend and was taken up by his top aides and discussed intensively and he couldn't persuade one of his aides who is in charge of this entire matter so I was not able to make that idea as official counter proposal.

K: No, No. I understand that. And that is why I think that since that top aide is the determining man anyway that he should do the negotiation.

Y: That's right. You are absolutely right. I think your idea is right that the two experts should work out the acceptable. - You see I am now giving my own advice to my friend, that our expert in your place should be given more authority or discretion, what you might call it, the discretionary authority to be with

K: Your expert?

Y: For negotiations. (K: Yes) And apparently he will get from/fresh instructions to be sent to him shortly. Tomorrow our time I hope.

K: Right.

Y: In any case I want to thank you very much.

K: I appreciate your phone call and I hope to see you when you come to the United States.

Y: Please accept the message from my friend. It is not my own. It has nothing to do with me but my friend's message to you personally.

K: I appreciate that.

Y: Thank you and I hope that I will be able to talk with you again for successful agreement on this issue.

K: certainly.

Y: I haven't given up my hope yet. I would never do that.

K: No you mustn't but one has to know when to stop something that isn't

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority MWO EO 12958
 By NARA Date 6/4/04

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Irwin/Johnson/Kissinger

9:10 am

12/3/70

I: Our concern is the Soviet defector. Today Macomber was asked up to the
Hayes Committee on this situation. Eliot has been deferring Kennedy since
Monday. We both feel it would be helpful if the reports could be released
to the public. What is in State's has been made public.

K: By whom?

J: The press conference statement made on Monday was constant with the
report. Nobody released this report.

K: One sentence dealing with my staff which was highly misleading.

J: In what way?

K: This happened 36 hours after the event so it's irrelevant. Nov. 25 after he was returned. Whatever was said was irrelevant and does not constitute WH consultation.

JP It didn't say it was.

K: My fellow was talking to yours about Berlin access. We have a defector
case and my man said good luck. We never made an issue of not being
notified after the event so it's not an issue. The concern of the President
was the handling of the case to save the defector. No one reading this would
realize it was 36 hours after the event.

J: I think it's clear. It's in chronological form. We covered everything.
That says there was no notification of NSC STAFF.

I: There's no indication to drag you or the NSC into it. -- or make us look
better.

K: This came up as peripheral remark. Your fellow didn't even call us.
He was asked what else was new.

J: There's no -- we aren't trying to justify ourselves. We just sent every
fact.

K: We don't blame you so there's no blame attached to post-event procedures.
It's neither here nor there. Never heard President mention what happened
afterwards. His concern is with the 10 hour period while the fellow was
trying to defect. If it comes up in questioning I would appreciate your making
clear it happened after the event.