HENRY A. KISSINGER

By Facsimile

(49-69)6788-266

January 6, 1998

Dear Mr. Braun:

I was out of town over the holidays and have only now seen
your thoughtful letter. You probably will have already heard
that the ceremony in Fürth will take place in May, so there
will be no obstacle to our plans in Wiesbaden in October.

You are very gracious to offer assistance with my arrangements
for the World Cup, and I will be so bold as to accept your
offer. I have been in touch with FIFA, which has invited Nancy
and me as their guests, but I know that Joseph Blatter has
many other VIPs to look after as well. Therefore, I would be
extremely grateful if you could keep an eye on what FIFA is
planning to provide for us.

I have requested four tickets to all games in Paris after June
21, four also for the quarter-final and semi-final in Marseilles,
as well as for those games in Lens and Lyon after the 21st when
none are being played in Paris. I realize it might be more
difficult to get four for the 3rd/4th-place game and the final
and would be willing to pay FIFA for the two extra tickets if
it would help.

FIFA has assured me that they will have hotel accommodations for
Nancy and me at the Bristol Hotel, where their guests will be
housed, although specific rooms have not yet been assigned.
And because getting to the stadiums will be a nightmare, an
official car of some sort would be an enormous help. Anything
you can do to see that these arrangements will actually happen
I would greatly appreciate.

I will be at a conference in Spain on June 15 when the Germany-
US game is played but will do my best to fly up for it. It is
one I would hate to miss.

I am very much looking forward to seeing you in June,

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

DEC-29-1997 14:45

KHI DC

212 753 7248

TRANSLATION - jw

17 December 1997

DEC 30 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The Lord Mayor of Fürth advised the German Football Federation and me personally of his intention to award you honorary citizenship of your hometown. In looking for an acceptable date for you, you told him of your plan to participate in the DFB's Bundeskongress in Wiesbaden on October 23, 1998. I was moved to hear the Lord Mayor's office's statement that my date had precedence.

I consider your participation as a high honor--personally as well as for the DFB; the highest respect and appreciation in the entire world is certainly meant for you.

I thank you sincerely and from the heart.

With us, in the meantime, preparations are under way for the World Cup in France. I would like to know your wishes in this regard. For both of us, surely the match of the US and German national teams in the preliminary round is of particular interest. At the moment, the DFB's greatest problem, frankly, is the not too satisfactory request for tickets.

Since I belong to FIFA's organization committee, I would very much like to know as soon as possible your arrangements for the World Cup. I can assure you that everything will be arranged to your liking and, of course, also to that of Lennart Johansson and Mr. Blatter.

I wish you and your wife a peaceful and reflective Christmas holiday and a healthy and happy New Year. Your kindness means a great deal to my family and me.

TOTAL P.03

DEUTSCHER
FUSSBALL-BUND

EGIDIUS BRAUN · PRÄSIDENT

Mr. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
26th Floor
350 Park Avenue

New York 10022
USA

DEC 30 1997

17.12.1997

Sehr geehrter, lieber Herr Dr. Kissinger,

der Oberbürgermeister von Fürth informierte den DFB und mich persönlich über seine
Absicht, Ihnen die Ehrenbürgerschaft Ihrer Heimatstadt zu verleihen. Auf der Suche nach
einem Ihnen genehmen Termin machten Sie ihn auf Ihre Zusage aufmerksam, am Bun-
deskongreß des DFB am 23.10.1998 in Wiesbaden teilzunehmen. Bewegt hat mich in
diesem Zusammenhang die Aussage des Oberbürgermeisterbüros, wonach mein Termin
Vorrang habe.

Diese Ihre Mitteilung betrachte ich als hohe Auszeichnung - sowohl persönlich als auch für den DFB, gilt Ihnen doch, verehrter Herr Dr. Kissinger, in der ganzen Welt höchster Respekt und höchste Anerkennung.

Ich danke Ihnen aufrichtig und von Herzen.

Bei uns laufen mittlerweile die Vorbereitungen für die Weltmeisterschaft in Frankreich an. Ich würde gerne Ihre Wünsche in diesem Zusammenhang wissen. Für uns beide ist sicher das Spiel der Nationalmannschaften der USA und Deutschland's in der Vorrunde von besonderem Interesse. Im Augenblick ist das größte Problem des DFB die einfach nicht zu befriedigenden Nachfrage nach Eintrittskarten.

Da ich der Organisationskommission der FIFA angehöre, würde ich sehr gerne so bald
wie möglich Ihre Dispositionen für die WM erfahren. Alles, das kann ich Ihnen jetzt schon
zusichern, wird in Ihrem Sinne und auch sicher im Sinne von Lennart Johansson und
Herrn Blatter geregelt.

Fußball-WM
2006
Deutschland

WELTMEISTER 1954 · 1974 · 1990

World Cup
2006
Germany

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| NO. | COM | ABBR/NTWK | STATION NAME/ TELEPHONE NO. | PAGES | PRG.NO. | PROGRAM NAME |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 001 | OK | & | 01149696788266 | 001/001 | | |

-KISSINGER ASSOCIATES -

************************************************** - ************************ 212 759 0042- **************

HENRY A. KISSINGER

By Facsimile

(49-69)6788-266

January 6, 1998

Dear Mr. Braun:

DEUTSCHER
FUSSBALL-BUND

EGIDIUS BRAUN · PRÄSIDENT

Herrn
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
26 Floor
350 Park Avenue

New York
USA

MAY 26 1998

14.05.1998

Zu Ihrem 75. Geburtstag gratuliere ich Ihnen sehr herzlich. Von Gesundheit, Wohlergehen und Schaffenskraft mögen Sie auch in den nächsten Lebensjahren begleitet sein.

Hochachtung - dies möchte ich an Ihrem Ehrentag ganz besonders zum Ausdruck bringen: Hochachtung vor einem Mann der Weltpolitik, des Weltgeschehens, der außergewöhnlich ist. Natürlich spricht das hohe Amt des Außenministers der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, das Sie einige Jahre bekleidet haben, für hervorragende Kompetenz, politischen Weitblick und diplomatische Brillanz. Zur Großartigkeit eines Menschen gehört aber mehr: Aura und Humanität. Beide Eigenschaften sind exemplarisch mit Ihnen verbunden und machen Sie zusammen mit Ihrer weltpolitischen Erfahrung auch heute noch unentbehrlich für die Menschen im internationalen Zusammenklang.

Unentbehrlich sind Sie auch „als Fußballer“! Sie lieben diesen Sport, fühlen sich nicht zuletzt durch Ihre eigenen Wurzeln bedingt dem Deutschen Fußball-Bund und unserer Nationalmannschaft sehr verbunden. Dies macht mich stolz und glücklich. Ich freue mich, wenn es Ihnen einmal wieder gelingt, bei uns zu sein, und ich werde persönlich alles dafür tun, daß Sie in unserem Kreis ein wenig Entspannung finden, als Privatperson, als Fußballfreund.

Fußball-WM
2006
Deutschland

World Cup
2006
Germany

DEUTSCHER
FUSSBALL-BUND

EGIDIUS BRAUN · PRÄSIDENT

Prof. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

23rd october, 1998

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

DFB Bundestag in Wiesbaden, October 23/24, 1998

I am very happy that you have accepted my invitation to join the German football community on the occasion of the DFB Bundestag.

With the football season in full swing, and many important decisions to be expected both on and off the field, the 1998 DFB Bundestag will be a milestone on our way to keep football strong, united and prepared to face the challenges from inside and outside the game.

But wait - I have been told that you plan to make your speech in German, and that you would like to have some practise... In Ordnung, dann sollte ich vielleicht lieber auf Deutsch weitermachen! Also:

Lieber Dr. Kissinger, lieber Freund,

Sie sind nun schon seit vielen Jahren ein treuer Begleiter des deutschen Fußballs. Auch ein "proppevoller" Terminkalender kann Sie nicht daran hindern, wichtige Spiele der Deutschen Nationalmannschaft zu besuchen. Am Rande von Europa- und Weltmeisterschaften haben wir uns häufig zu anregenden Gesprächen getroffen, an die ich stets mit Vergnügen zurückdenke.

Vor einiger Zeit schon wuchs in mir die Idee, Sie zum DFB-Bundestag 1998 einzuladen - ein angesichts Ihrer zahlreichen Verpflichtungen fast hoffnungsloses Unterfangen. Daß es dennoch geklappt hat, erfüllt mich mit Freude und Stolz.

Der DFB und der Hessische Fußball-Verband (HFV) hoffen, in der Landeshauptstadt Wiesbaden einen angemessenen Rahmen für unseren Bundestag geschaffen zu haben. Doch vor der Arbeit soll das Zusammensein in einer festlichen, aber auch geselligen Atmosphäre im Vordergrund stehen. Die Veranstaltungen am heutigen Freitagabend bieten sicher Gelegenheit dazu. Mit besonderer Spannung erwarten wir Ihren Beitrag zum Festakt im Hessischen Staatstheater.

Falls Sie Fragen haben oder Hilfe benötigen, stehe ich persönlich, sowie selbstverständlich alle Mitarbeiter des DFB und HFV gern zur Verfügung.

Mit herzlichem Gruß

Ihr

Fußball-WM
2006
Deutschland

World Cup
2006
Germany

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DEUTSCHER
FUSSBALL-BUND

EGIDIUS BRAUN · PRÄSIDENT

Herrn
Prof. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Twenty-Sixth Floor
350 Park Avenue

New York, NY 10022

USA

OCT 30 1998

28. Oktober 1998

das Tagesgeschäft treibt jeden von uns stetig voran, ich möchte es aber nicht ver-
säumen, auch hin und wieder zurückzublicken. Heute tue ich dies mit einigen Zeilen
an Sie, lieber Herr Professor Dr. Kissinger.

Der 36. Ordentliche Bundestag des Deutschen Fußball-Bundes hat durch Sie einen ganz besonderen Glanz bekommen. Ich habe in den vergangenen Tagen noch immer Resonanz im Zusammenhang mit Ihrem Besuch erhalten. Der Besuch einer so außergewöhnlich bedeutenden Persönlichkeit hat den Delegierten unseres Verbandes nicht nur sehr gefallen - Ihr Vortrag war wunderbar, niveauvoll, gelassen und unterhaltsam -, sondern war zugleich Dank und Anerkennung für das ehrenamtliche Engagement.

Lieber Herr Professor Dr. Kissinger, ich bin sehr glücklich, daß Sie meiner Bitte, Gast des DFB-Bundestages zu sein, nachgekommen sind. Ich freue mich auch in Zukunft sehr auf unsere Begegnungen. Sie sind beim Deutschen Fußball-Bund und seiner Nationalmannschaft immer ganz besonders herzlich willkommen.

Alles Gute für Sie persönlich und Ihr gesellschaftspolitisches Wirken. Sie geben den Menschen mit Ihrer hohen Kompetenz, Ihrer politischen Klugheit und Ihrer Menschlichkeit sehr viel.

Mit herzlichen Grüßen

Fußball-WM
2006
Deutschland

World Cup
2006
Germany

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 19, 1998

Dear Lord Sterling:

Several months ago, at the request of the President of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, I organized a small group of international business leaders who met for a day in Brasilia with the President and key members of his government. The goal of that effort was to create a richer dialogue between the President and top international businessmen as the Brazilian economy undergoes dramatic changes.

I am writing to invite you, on behalf of President Cardoso, to participate in a second such meeting which will be held in Salvador, Bahia, on May 8. This meeting will focus on tourism and will provide an opportunity to discuss with the President and his team how they hope to develop the country's potential to become a major international tourist destination. Once again, the idea is to gather a small group of business leaders—in this case of companies in the hotel and other segments of the tourism industry—to initiate a dialogue that will continue into the future. President Cardoso hopes not only to explain his strategies, but to benefit from the experiences of the participants and their companies. I hope your schedule will allow you to join this group in Salvador.

A former colleague of mine, Alan Stoga, is helping the Brazilians organize the meeting. He will shortly be in touch with you to explain further the program and the logistics. A formal invitation from President Cardoso will follow to confirm your participation.

I look forward to seeing you soon.

Lord Sterling of Plaistow
President
P&O Bovis
79 Pall Mall
London SW1 Y5EJ
United Kingdom

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 19, 1998

Dear Bill:

Mr. J.W. Marriott, Jr.
Chairman & President
Marriott International Inc.
Marriott Drive
Washington, DC 20058

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 19, 1998

Dear Harvey:

Mr. Harvey Golub
Chairman & CEO
American Express Company
American Express Tower
World Financial Center
New York, NY 10285

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 19, 1998

Dear Bob:

Mr. Robert L. Crandall
Chairman, President, & CEO
American Airline, Inc.
P.O. Box 619616
Ft. Worth Airport
Dallas, TX 75261

HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 19, 1998

Dear Riley:

Mr. Riley P. Bechtel
President & CEO
Bechtel Group, Inc.
P.O. Box 193965
San Francisco, CA 94119

14/12 '98 MON 16:47

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# POINTS TO FILM WITH DR. HENRY KISSINGER

We would like you to tell your personal story - what you did and what you witnessed. Our aim is to take viewers inside meetings at which critical decisions were taken. In our programmes, 'telling it as a story' matters as much as the information itself.

The questions are intended as prompts and will be cut out of the finished programme. So please include the substance of the questions in your answers.

We would like you to think yourself back, picture the scene and tell us about your part in the events below:

## STRATEGIC THINKING BEHIND THE OPENING TO CHINA

1. January 1969. The White House formulates a new policy to China

* How you first heard of the idea of a 'China opening'.

* Why it took the President to do it – and why this particular President was uniquely qualified to do it.

**HAK memoirs:**

Nixon had an extraordinary talent for the jugular... But though I designed many of the moves, I did not have the political strength or bureaucratic clout to pursue such a fundamental shift of policy on my own. Nixon viscerally understood the essence of the opportunity and pushed for it consistently. He had the political base on the right, which protected him from the charge of being "soft on Communism".

* Explain how you and the President discussed the idea and decided it must be kept as the sole preserve of the White House.

* Briefly, and referring if possible to one of your own memos to Nixon, what your reasons were for deciding to improve relations with China.

**For example in your memoirs:**

"To show Moscow that it cannot speak for all communist countries, that it is to their advantage to make

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Brook Lapping Prdns

agreements with us..." "We want to create an incentive for both to improve their relations with us."

HAK memoirs: p178

I challenged what seemed to me excessive emphasis on China's ideology. A nation of 800 millions surrounded by weaker states was a geopolitical problem no matter who governed it. I also questioned the view of most Kremlinologists that any attempt to better our relations with China would ruin relations with the Soviet Union. History suggested that it was usually more advantageous to align oneself with the weaker of two antagonistic partners, because this acted as a restraint on the stronger.

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Kissinger Questions

14/12/98

2. February 1 1969. Nixon's memo encouraged you "to explore rapprochement with the Chinese".

* How you were to do this - and what the maneuver was expected to accomplish it.

HAK memoirs: p169

On February 1, Nixon had written me a memorandum: I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this Administration is "exploring possibilities of rapprochement [sic] with the Chinese". This, of course, should be done privately. I was to plant the idea, moreover, not with friends of the Chinese, but with East Europeans. The maneuver was intended to disquiet the Soviets, and almost certainly - given Nixon's preoccupations - to provide an incentive for them to help us end the war in Vietnam.

3. March 1969. Response to the Sino-Soviet border clashes.

* ** How Dobrynin insisted on giving you a gory account of the Ussuri clash and how you described the conversation to the President: "I suggested that we stood to gain a great deal strategically".

* Spell out what these gains would be. (HAK memoirs: p172)

* * Tell us about how a couple of weeks later, the CIA reported another border clash. Dobrynin now suggested, "that there was still time for the two superpowers to order events, but they might not have this power much longer". What you took Dobrynin to mean, and how you reacted.

HAK memoirs: p173

Summoning all my power to seem enigmatic, I did not respond.

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005

Kissinger Questions

14/12/98

4. August 1969. How you took sinologist Allen Whiting along to San Clemente to brief the President.

* How Whiting's analysis influenced your view in two respects: it confirmed

  - that the Soviet Union and not China was the aggressor in the border clashes

  - that, as a result, China's ally to the west was now a greater threat than her 'enemy' to the east.

* Nixon's response to this meeting.

INITIATING CONTACT WITH THE CHINESE

5. August 1969. President Nixon approaches Pakistan for help.

* Tell us how in Lahore Nixon raised the subject of China with Pakistan's President Yahya Khan.

HAK memoirs p 180:

On August 1, Nixon told President Yahya that it was his personal view - not completely shared by the rest of his government or by many Americans - that Asia could not "move forward" if a nation as large as China remained isolated. ... He asked Yahya to convey his feeling to the Chinese at the highest level. Nixon seemed to think it enhanced his standing with foreign leaders if he acted against the advice of his subordinates.

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Kissinger Questions

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Page 5 of 25

## 6. Sept 9 1969 - February 20 1970. The Warsaw talks resume.

* ** How you had a word with the US Ambassador to Poland, Walter Stoessel, who was home for routine consultations.

**HAK memoirs p 188:**

I urged Stoessel to walk up to the Ambassador of the People's Republic at the next social function they both attended and tell him we were prepared for serious talks.

* ** January 21 1970. How on the day after the renewed Warsaw talks, Dobrynin asked to be briefed.

**HAK memoirs p 688:**

Dobrynin sought a briefing, undeterred by the fact that this was a favour Moscow never vouchsafed to us on any topic. When I evaded his request, he said that he hoped that we were not thinking of 'using' China as a military threat... clearly, Peking was a 'neuralgic' point.

* ** February/March 1970. How, when the State Department released an account of the Warsaw talks to all embassies and many foreign governments, Nixon said to you: "We'll kill this baby before it's even born". Tell us this story.

## 7. October 1970 - April 1971. The Pakistani back channel bears fruit.

* *** On October 25 1970. How you were with Nixon at the White House when he briefed President Yahya Khan privately.

  - How Nixon told him to tell the Chinese that he regarded rapprochement with China as "essential" and how the US would never join forces with the Soviet Union against China. **HAK memoirs p699**

* *** 9 December 1970. How Ambassador Hilaly told you of the first success of the Pakistani backchannel.

**HAK memoirs p700 - 701:**

I invited Hilaly to the White House the next day, he produced an envelope containing a handwritten missive on white, blue-lined paper which had been carried to him by hand. Yahya not trusting the security of cable communications. Hilaly said he was not authorised to leave the document with me. He therefore had to dictate it, speaking slowly as I copied it down. We were so preoccupied that we did not notice the incongruity of the phenomenon that in an age of instantaneous

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007

Kissinger Questions

14/12/98

Page 6 of 25

communication we had returned to the diplomatic methods of the previous century - the handwritten note delivered by messenger and read aloud.

* How you took the news straight to the President.

HAK memoirs p 702:

The moment Hilaly left I walked down the hall to the Oval Office, [Nixon and I] were as one in our readiness to accept the invitation. We could not, we agreed, confine an agenda to Taiwan, and were certain that this reflected Chinese preferences. I therefore drafted a reply that I handed to Hilaly on December 16 typed on Xerox paper without a letterhead.

* *** How you and the President replied.

HAK memoirs:

Our reply made clear that the United States would be prepared for high-level talks in Peking.

> ... the meeting in Peking would not be limited only to the Taiwan question but would encompass other steps designed to improve relations and reduce tensions. With respect to the U.S. military presence on Taiwan, however, the policy of the United States Government is to reduce its military presence as tensions in this region diminish.

(The last sentence was designed to encourage Chinese interest in a settlement of the war in Vietnam by tying troop withdrawals from Taiwan to an end of the conflict in Indochina.)

* 27 April 1971. How nothing happened for four months - and how Hilaly brought the reply.

HAK memoirs p 714:

He handed me a handwritten two-page aide-memoire conveying a message from Chou Enlai in. The message, in elegant handwriting, read exactly as follows:

> ... if the relations between China and the USA are to be restored fundamentally, the US must withdraw all its Armed forces from China's Taiwan and Taiwan Straits area. ... the Chinese Govt reaffirms its willingness to receive publicly in Peking a special envoy of the President of the US (for instance, Mr Kissinger) or the US Secretary of State or even the President of the US himself for a direct meeting and discussions.

* How you went straight to tell the President.

> ... Hilaly left my office after a bare twenty minutes. I immediately went to see the President. I found him in

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008

Kissinger Questions

14/12/98

Lincoln Sitting Room and read him the message. There was little need for conversation. The message spoke for itself.

Restraining our excitement, we talked of the significance of the occasion. Nixon thought that our firmness on Vietnam had paved the way strategically even if here and there it caused a brief delay. Only an America that was strong in Asia could be taken seriously by the Chinese. I told the President that the tide was turning; we were beginning to see the outline of a new international order.

* ** The designated emissary nearly wasn't you. How Bush and Rockefeller etc were considered, and how it was that you were finally chosen to undertake the mission.

**HAK memoirs:**

Within an hour, Nixon called me back on the telephone. Even great events ultimately reduce themselves to operational questions; our first was whom to send to China. Originally, there was no thought of sending me ... The Secretary of State's name did not come up; nor could it have given Nixon's determination that he, not the State Department, should be seen - justly - as the originator of China policy.

# YOUR SECRET VISIT TO CHINA

## 8. Spring 1971. Preparations for the trip

* ** The plan you agreed with the US Embassy in Islamabad.

**HAK memoirs:**

The most effective plan would be to have me arrive in Pakistan on a Friday morning. The Ambassador would schedule a full day of activities both with the Embassy and with the Pakistani government. If President Yahya agreed, he might invite me to spend the weekend in some suitable retreat, say the Khyber Pass or some hill station. I would leave my plane at a conspicuous location at the airport. I would go to China in an American, Pakistani or Chinese plane pre-positioned in Pakistan: we would make the final decision after we knew the venue and had looked into the feasibility. I would conspicuously reappear after an absence of no more than thirty-six hours and proceed westward to Paris. The Ambassador thought all this manageable; he promised to contact Yahya immediately upon his return.

Upon arrival I would plead a stomach ache. The Embassy dispensary would be asked for medication. My discomfort

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Kissinger Questions

14/12/98

would get progressively worse until Yahya would invite
me over dinner to use the Presidential rest house in
Nathiagali in the mountains to recover. Under this
pretext I could add an extra day to my Pakistan stay and
disappear for two days to Peking.

9. June 2 1971. How Ambassador Hilaly brought the invitation from Chou.

* What it said.

HAK memoirs p 726:

Hilaly hurried to see me with Chou Enlai's reply at
8:10pm on June 2:

Chairman Mao Tse-Tung has indicated that he welcomes
President Nixon's visit and looks forward to that
occasion when he may have direct conversation with His
Excellency the President, in which each side would be
free to raise the principal issue of concern to it.

The Chinese leaders could not have gone so far were they
not willing, even eager, for a fundamental reappraisal
of [our] relationship. ...

* What you told the President.

This is the most important message to an American
President since World War II.

* How the President responded [with brandy].

10. ** June 8 1971. How you took Dobrynin to Camp David to discuss the Moscow summit.

HAK memoirs:

He continued his cat-and-mouse game about a Moscow
summit. Had he responded favourably, we would have had
a tricky problem in deciding which summit should have
precedence. The Soviets again inadvertently solved the
problem for us. I tried to imagine Dobrynin's reaction
if I had suddenly told him where I meant to be in a
month's time.

11. ** June 13 1970. The Pentagon Papers. The day after Nixon's daughter was married at the White House, the story broke in the New York Times. You rushed in to see Nixon and expressed your concerns:

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010

Kissinger Questions

14/12/98

that these leaks could undermine Chinese confidence in the agreed secrecy.

12. July 8/9 1971. Your route via Pakistan. How you pulled off the ruse.

* What you agreed with the President about telling Secretary of State Rogers. (HAK memoirs p739)

One of my last communications from San Clemente before my departure informed me that the President had at last - on July 8 - informed his Secretary of State of my China trip, putting it that the visit was a last minute decision in response to an invitation I had received while in Pakistan.

* July 8. How, when you arrived in Pakistan, the ruse worked: the stomach upset, the hill station retreat and the excitement you felt.

- The genuine stomachache.

- Yaha Khan's delight in 'the cops and robbers'.

- Your diplomatic stomachache appears at dinner.

HAK memoirs:

Nothing could still my sense of excitement and anticipation as I retired around 11:00 p.m. after my dinner with Yahya. For the only time in office I had difficulty sleeping. I tried to imagine what lay ahead. For the only time, too, I had a feeling of some insecurity about so momentous a mission in an unknown capital where I would be cut off from all communication.

* July 9. How the Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan drove you to Chaklallah airport in military vehicles, and what you were wearing as a disguise. (HAK memoirs p7)

* You were met by an 'honour guard' of Chinese to "escort the barbarians to the capital". (They were Chang Wen-chin, the 'Spanish cardinal'; Nancy Tang the translator; Wang Hairung, said to be Mao's grandniece; and Tang Longbin, from Protocol)

HAK memoirs:

I had never met any Chinese Communists; neither I must add, had the members of my Secret Service details, who had not been told of my destination and who nearly had heart attacks. Their charge was not merely flying in a foreign airplane - which was contrary to all the

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Page 10 of 25

principles of their training - but was being whisked by
a group of Communist Chinese.

* ** The "saga" of your shirts and how you had to borrow John Holdridge's.

HAK memoirs p 753:

Souvenir photos taken by the Chinese of my party in
shirt-sleeves on our tour of the Forbidden City show me
smiling enigmatically, in garments that left me with the
appearance of having no neck. Their size was the least
of it; for these shirts, belonging to an old Asia hand
were prominently labelled 'Made in Taiwan'. I was
telling the literal truth when I told our hosts that
Taiwan was a matter close to me.

13. July 9 1971. Your arrival in Beijing and first meeting Chou Enlai.

* *** Describe where and when you met Chou Enlai, and what happened.

HAK memoirs p 746-748:

Chou set the tone within the first half-hour of our
encounter. I had prepared a long and slightly pedantic
opening statement, reciting the history of US-Chinese
relations that had led up to the present meeting. At
the end of its introductory part I said with an attempt
at eloquence: "Many visitors have come to this
beautiful, and to us, mysterious land." Chou held up
his hand: "You will find it not mysterious. When you
have become familiar with it, it will not be as
mysterious as before." I was taken aback, but Chou was
certainly right.

Chou Enlai and I began our first talk on the afternoon
of July 9 at my guest house about four hours after my
arrival in Beijing. We faced each other across a green-
covered table, seated incongruously in large wicker
chairs of the kind one finds in old-fashioned summer
resorts. ... I had before me the voluminous briefing
book. Chou, as always, used only a single sheet of
paper with a few words on it, presumably the general
headings he wanted to discuss.

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But Huang Hua did not show up right away. The inexplicable waiting was all the more ominous because we were talking not about an elaborate communique but about a statement of a paragraph or two announcing a Presidential visit to Beijing ... We never found out whether it was a deliberate tactic to unsettle us, whether there was a Politburo meeting...

Finally Huang Hua showed up with a draft communique that produced immediate controversy. In best Middle Kingdom tradition it suggested that Nixon had solicited the invitation. The purpose was stated to be a discussion of Taiwan as a prelude to the normalisation of relations. I rejected both...

We would not appear in Beijing as supplicants. We would not come for the sole purpose of discussing Taiwan or simply to seek 'normalisation of relations'. There had to be a reference to other issues of common concern, Huang Hua, in a gesture wise, practical and characteristic, suggested that we put aside the drafting and each tell the other frankly what his needs were. Clearly, neither side wanted to appear the supplicant; both wanted a positive outcome; it was in nobody's interest to imply that the agenda would be one-sided. We spent two hours on this. I explained our concerns of principle and domestic requirements; we would not appear as having solicited the invitation; Taiwan could not be the sole agenda item. ... At about 1:40 am Huang Hua proposed a thirty minute recess in which they would try to work out language suitable to us, and left the room. We took another walk in the grounds and returned to await their arrival; at 3:00 am we learned that they had left and would not return until 9:00 am.

* ** July 11, 1971. How, on the last morning, Chou said the renunciation of force must be dependent on the settling of the Taiwan issue. You in turn made it a condition that the Taiwan issue could only be settled peacefully.

Add Rand memo here.

Excerpted transcript of this meeting

**Dr Kissinger:** We are prepared, when the President visits, to discuss and sign an agreement for the mutual renouncing of force between our two countries.

**Chou Enlai:** This question must be linked to the Taiwan question and the question of China's internal affairs...

**Dr Kissinger:** We hope very much that the Taiwan issue will be solved peacefully.

**Chou Enlai:** We are doing our best to do so.

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15. July 11 1971. Leaving Beijing and securing the Presidential invitation

* ***You sent a one-word cable to the President. (Eureka). (HAK memoirs p758)

* In Pakistan. How you briefed President Yahya Khan and assured him of both Chinese and US support in the event of a war with India.

  - What form of support?

16. July 15 1971. Announcing the news from San Clemente.

* ** How you called Dobrynin to the White House for 9am. What you said, and his response.

17. July 19 1971. Your meeting with Dobrynin four days later in the White House

* ** He was suddenly anxious for a Moscow summit. In less than a month, a date for the Moscow summit was agreed.

HAK memoirs p 766:

Suddenly, the Moscow summit was not elusive. Would the President, inquired Dobrynin, consider visiting Moscow before Beijing? My answer was identical to that given Chou Enlai: The summits would take place in the order in which they were announced. Other negotiations with the Soviets deadlocked for months began magically to unfreeze: Berlin, for example, and the talks to guard against nuclear war. ... Both these negotiations moved rapidly to completion within weeks of the Beijing announcement.

PREPARING FOR PRESIDENT NIXON'S VISIT

18. October 1971. Your second visit to Beijing begins.

* Before the visit Nixon was insistent that you arrange a solo meeting for him with both Chou and Mao. How this came up, and his reason.

* How you were greeted at the guesthouse with pamphlets attacking the US in the old-style invective. Your reaction.

HAK memoirs p 777:

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I had no intention of accepting insults, no matter how much importance I attached to US-Chinese relations. I instructed a member of my staff to hand my pamphlet to a Chinese protocol officer with the remark that it must have been left there by the previous party.

* At the Summer Palace, you decided to wave to the spectators. Why, and how they responded?

* *** October 24. How Chou Enlai, speaking for Chairman Mao, rejected the American draft for the Shanghai Communiqué and submitted an unusual draft. How you responded.

**HAK memoirs:**

To my surprise, at the appointed hour the Premier himself showed up. Quite uncharacteristically, he made a scorching one-hour speech - at the express direction of Mao, he said. He declared that our approach was unacceptable. The communiqué had to set forth fundamental differences; otherwise the wording would have an untruthful appearance.

After stuffing us with roast duck, Chou submitted his paper in the evening. It was unprecedented in design. It stated the Chinese position on a whole host of issues in extremely uncompromising terms. It left blank pages for our position, which was assumed to be contrary. It was intransigent on Taiwan. At first I was taken aback. To end a Presidential visit with a catalogue of disagreements was extraordinary; it was also, I thought, unacceptable internationally and domestically. But as I reflected further I began to see that the very novelty of the approach might solve our perplexities.

I promised to submit a counterdraft the next morning. It turned into a contest of physical endurance. Lord redrafted the communiqué while I got three hours of sleep. Then he went to bed and I reworked his draft for the remainder of the night.

Our counterdraft of October 25 ushered in a session that lasted the whole day, interrupted occasionally for several hours while the Chinese translated our text, studied it, and, no doubt, cleared their position with Mao. We outlined the key joint positions, especially the paragraph concerning both countries' opposition to hegemony. (Though this later became a hallowed Chinese word, it actually was introduced first by us). [Please explain this term]

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* The negotiations over Taiwan for what was to be the Shanghai Communiqué were very tough. What you remember as the trickiest moments.

- How you presented the renunciation of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan as the prize for the peaceful settlement of Taiwan issue.

- How, Chou Enlai proposed peaceful settlement of Taiwan to be the *intention* of China. How you aimed to firm this up and make it a condition.

- *** The Chinese all claim that you made the breakthrough with the phrase "all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits..." Please describe how this phrase avoided inflaming the sensitivities of both countries and how it had in fact originated in the State Department language of the last Warsaw talks.

HAK memoirs p 784:

Taiwan, as expected, provided the most difficult issue. We needed a formula acknowledging the unity of China, which was the one point on which Taipei and Beijing agreed, without supporting the claim of either. I finally put forward the American position on Taiwan as follows: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain there is but one China. The United States government does not challenge that position." I do not think anything I did or said impressed Chou as much as this ambiguous formula with which both sides were able to live for nearly a decade. (In fairness I must say that I adapted it from a State Department planning document for negotiations, which aborted in the Fifties.)

The Chinese asked for a recess at 11:35pm at 4:45 am we were given a new Chinese draft and by 5:30 am Chou returned. He and I refined the text for several more hours until 8:20 am, concluding a nearly non-stop session of twenty-four hours, we had agreed on the main outline of what came to be known as the Shanghai Communiqué.

19. October 25, 1971. Taiwan is expelled from the UN and the People's Republic of China is admitted

* How you heard the result of the UN vote.

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My plane was barely airborne for home when the teletype
chattered out the news that in the United States we had
lost the battle to preserve Taiwan's seat. Chou told me
later that he had learned of the vote just before my
departure but that he did not want to embarrass me by
being the first to inform me.

* How George Bush and the UN team reacted to this formally.

* To what extent was the timing of your Beijing visit and the UN vote a coincidence?

Haldeman's diary: "Henry is convinced that Rogers pushed the UN vote for Monday night so as to downgrade Henry's trip and give Henry's trip the blame for the Taiwan loss," Haldeman wrote in his diary.

20. November/December 1971. The US 'tilt' in the Indo-Pakistan conflict.

* How the rapprochement with China and the upcoming summit in February guided you to 'tilt' towards Pakistan in this crisis.

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Nixon's hand in both his own and welcoming him in front of the photographers with great cordiality - in itself an event of considerable symbolic significance.

* How Mao referred to the opponents of his rapprochement to the US.

**HAK memoirs:**

Mao used a teasing conversation about Nixon's political prospects to mention there was a "reactionary group which is opposed to our contract with you", he said. "The result was that they got on an airplane and fled abroad". The plane crashed in Outer Mongolia, Mao and Chou explained, in case we had missed the reference to Lin Piao. China had been "bureaucratic" in its approach, he said, in insisting all along that major issues had to be settled before smaller issues like trade. "Later on I saw you were right, and we played table tennis."

* How Mao made it clear: "the small issue is Taiwan, the big issue is the world (i.e. the USSR)".

**HAK memoirs:**

Mao didn't indicate any impatience over Taiwan, set any time limits, make any threats, or treat it as the touchstone of our relationship. "We can do without them for the time being, and let it come after 100 years". "Why such great haste.

23. February 24-28 1972. Working out the Shanghai Communiqué.

* **How the toughest problem was Taiwan. Describe how you advanced from what had been agreed in October.

- How the Chinese initially wanted an unconditional US withdrawal from Taiwan.

- How Qiao agreed to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue so long as the US withdrew all its forces.

- How you reached the compromise that the US would gradually withdraw its forces "as tensions in the area diminish."

**HAK memoirs:** (We do not expect you to say all of the following, but include it as an aide-memoire).

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The Chinese wanted us to state that a peaceful solution was our "hope". We insisted on affirming that it was a continuing commitment. The Chinese wanted us to commit ourselves unconditionally to the total withdrawal of forces from Taiwan. We were willing to go no further than to describe our withdrawal as an objective, and even then we insisted on linking it both to a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem and to the easing of tensions in Asia in general.

On the third day of our negotiation, February 24, Nixon and his party were sightseeing at the Great Wall. With only some thirty-six hours left the real negotiation between Qiao and me now began. In a two-an-a-half-hour session that morning Qiao put forward once again the formula that the United States "hoped" for a peaceful Taiwan solution. He asked us to assert - unrelated to any other conditions - that the United States "will progressively reduce and finally withdraw all the US troops and military installations from Taiwan." I rejected the formulation, saying that it jeopardised the entire relationship because the American public opinion would never stand for it. ... Qiao promised to study the proposal.

After midnight, following another banquet, Qiao rejected it. With only about eighteen hours of negotiating time left, we were stuck. ... That afternoon, Qiao and I met twice more, while Nixon was resting. At 2:53 p.m. Qiao came forward with a formulation which for the first time met our basic principle. China would no longer object if we affirmed our interest in the peaceful solution of the Taiwan issue so long as it also included a reference to total withdrawal of United States forces. I promised him a quick reply.

After I conferred with my associates and then with the President, we me again at about 3:30 p.m. I had hit upon the idea of separating the two problems - the final objective of total withdrawal and our willingness to withdraw troops gradually in the interval, which up to now has been in the same sentence. My proposal was to tie the final withdrawal to the premise of peaceful settlement, and to link the progressive reduction of forces to the gradual diminution of "tension in the area".

Qiao showed some interest. He came up with a variation. He preferred to speak of the "prospect" of a peaceful settlement, rather than "premise", claiming that it had a more active and more bilateral connotation; "premise" sounded like a unilateral imposition by Washington.

Qiao and I met again at 10:30 p.m. after this Friday banquet and settled the key issue in fifteen minutes.

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He immediately accepted all the American formulations as I had explained them to Chou. In the process, we secured Qiao's agreement to stating that we acknowledged Taiwan as a "part" rather than a "province" of China, thus eliminating a suggestion of subordination.

The relevant paragraph now read as follows: The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

Now the point of decision had been reached. We had a draft that I considered acceptable.

* *** How you and Nixon left out the Taiwan Defense Treaty, and the State Department were furious. As you left Beijing for Hangchou on the morning of the 26th February, a row erupted.

- Describe the objections from State to the Communiqué as it stood.

- How Nixon, in Hangchou, paced up and down in his underwear, cursing

HAK memoirs:

No sooner had we arrived in Hangchou than Secretary Rogers informed the President that the communiqué was unsatisfactory. He submitted a list of amendments prepared by his staff, as numerous as they were trivial. For example, his experts objected to the phrase that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintained that there was but one China. It seemed to them too inclusive; there might be some Chinese who disagreed. They proposed that we replace "all Chinese" with "the Chinese" - a distinction beyond the grasp of my untrained mind. Another recommendation was to drop the word "position" in the phrase "does not challenge that position". There were about fifteen changes of the same order of magnitude.

Nixon was beside himself.

He was so exercised that he started storming about the beautiful guesthouse in Hangchou in his underwear. He

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Kissinger Questions

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would "do something" about the State Department at the
first opportunity.

* *** February 26. Describe the late night session with Qiao Guang-Hua after the banquet in Hangchou.

- How you had to tell the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister that you wished to go back on the agreed words because the State Department was not happy.

HAK memoirs:

HAK memoirs:
My arguments did not exactly overwhelm Qiao. He replied
sharply that both sides had come very far and China had
made many concessions in response to American wishes.
The Politburo had approved the text the previous night
on the basis of our assurance that the President had
accepted it. How could we reopen it less than twenty-
four hours before the communiqué was to be published.

We were thus landed into another late night session.

Rand Corporation Chronology

HAK requests changes in the Taiwan paragraph (from 'all Chinese' to 'the Chinese')... After facing the prospect of collapse of the communiqué HAK withdraws request for Taiwan paragraph change.

* How you agreed not to mention the Taiwan Defence Treaty other than verbally in the final press conference.

* October 28, Shanghai. How the final press conference in the Industrial Exhibition Center Banquet Hall required some diplomatic juggling.

HAK memoirs:

HAK memoirs:
My news conference was surely one of the most
paradoxical events to take place on Chinese soil since
the revolution. A foreign official explained that his
country would continue to recognise a government which
was the rival to that with which he had been
negotiating, and would defend it with military force
against his hosts. I reiterated the continued validity
of the [Taiwan] defense treaty by reaffirming the
appropriate sections in the President's Foreign Policy
Report published just weeks previously. And it is a
measure of their wisdom that there was no Chinese
reaction. Our hosts understood their priorities.

24. February 1972. Intelligence sharing.

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* How the nature of the new Sino-US relationship was sealed through an agreement on intelligence sharing on the subject of USSR.

25. February 27/28 1972. Your negotiation on Vietnam.

* How Qiao took a conciliatory line.

HAK memoirs:

Qiao and I had seemingly become so habituated to our late night sessions that we could not do without another one. I explained our determination to defeat an offensive by all available means should Hanoi seek a military resolution. Qiao repeated China's moral and material support for North Vietnam but, following Chou, dissociated China from Hanoi's negotiating position. This was a matter between us and the North Vietnamese on which China would express no views. He issued no warnings. He indicated no penalty if we carried out our threat.

* Nixon was very fond of cottage cheese, and took a good supply to China. The Chinese don't like cheese. Your memories of this?

FACING THE SOVIET UNION AFTER THE CHINA SUMMIT

26. March/April 1972. Planning the American response to the North Vietnamese offensive.

* *** March 31, you learnt of the North Vietnamese invasion across the demilitarized zones while sitting in the Oval Office with President Nixon. How you saw the Moscow Summit threatened.

* * April 3. How you and Nixon had a difference of opinion on the best tactical response. Pursuing your preferred policy of isolating Hanoi, you called in Dobrynin.

HAK memoirs:

I saw Dobrynin and accused the Soviet Union of complicity in Hanoi's attack. If the offensive continued, we would be forced into measures certain to present Moscow with difficult choices before the summit.

* ** On the same day - April 3. How Winston Lord handed Huang Hua 'an oral note'.

HAK memoirs:

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before a speech he knew it would be bad news. I joked
that normally he was out of town in a crisis and let his
deputy bear the brunt; we had obviously caught him
unaware. I handed him a letter from Nixon to Brezhnev.
At once firm and conciliatory, it pointed out that
Brezhnev's message of May 6 did not change the
situation; indeed it confirmed it.

* *** Dobrynin writes that you and he had a bet about the Soviet response on the Summit taking place.

*** Dobrynin's memoirs:

"The next time we met, I was carrying the much-agonised-over Soviet answer on the Summit. I knew the Politburo and even the whole Central Committee had discussed it to distraction. I asked HK what he thought the Politburo had decided. K said 'Let's bet a case of champagne on it. I'll write the answer on a piece of paper, then you tell me'. I showed him the note: the Summit was on. He said: I've written that they will postpone it, but it will take place. I've got K's piece of paper, but I never got the champagne!"

- How you remember that story:

HAK memoirs:

I replied that I would place my answer in a sealed envelope for both of us to look at when the crisis was over. (I never did, but if I had, the note would have predicted that Moscow would postpone the summit to a fixed earlier date.) I reminded him of the President's interest in a new era in our relations. Dobrynin asked detailed questions about our cease-fire proposal. We both spoke delicately about the discussions what would take place "if" the two leaders met.

28. February 1973. Your return to China.

* You came back to America, claiming to Nixon to be 'tacit allies'. What did this mean, in nuts and bolts, and how was it achieved?

* ** "With conscientious attention to both capitals", you wrote to Nixon in 1973, "we should be able to have our mao tai and our vodka too." What you meant by this.

AFTERMATH OF TIANANMEN SQUARE

29. June - Fall 1989. Your response to the crackdown.

* ** Your public statement

BROOK LAPPING

Dr Henry Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
26th Floor
New York, NY 10022-6022

SEP 17 1998

11 September 1998

Dear Dr Kissinger,

FROM ENEMY TO FRIEND: AMERICA AND CHINA

You may remember that you gave us an interview for our Middle East series earlier this year. I treasure my copy of *The White House Years* which you signed 'to Norma who was promised 15 minutes and got 55'. I enclose a US standard video of programmes 3 & 4 of THE 50 YEARS WAR in which the interview appeared so you can judge whether in fact it was worth the extension.

The series has already been shown on the BBC, nine countries in Europe, Australia, Japan and on MBC satellite to the Arab world. (I enclose some of the reviews so you can get a sample of the response.) Israel will broadcast our series in November, the PBS network on the 25 January.

We are now embarking on a project which I hope you might think worthy of even more of your time.

We have been asked to prepare two television programmes on how diplomatic relations were established with China, starting with your ground breaking visit in 1971. The entire first programme tells this story and how you engineered the presidential visit with which the programme ends.

What is unusual about our programmes is that they rely as far as possible on detailed first hand accounts from the key decision makers. Obviously we hope you will play a central role - it is, above all, your story, and marks a seachange in 20th century international relations. We would like to do a proper job of telling it.

We are writing now to request an interview, if possible, during our planned filming trip in December.

Our team will be coming to New York and Washington for a three week research trip beginning on 22 September. As there is some material that has come to light since your memoirs were published it would be very nice to have a chance to meet you to go over some of the points we would like to cover.

I look forward to seeing you again - and I hope a new inscription.

6 Anglers Lane, Kentish Town, London NW5 3DG. Fax: 0171-284 0626. Telephone: 0171-428 3100

Directors: Winston Fletcher (Chairman), Anne Lapping, Brian Lapping, Norma Percy, Ashok Shah, Susan Temple, Phillip Whitehead
Brook Lapping Productions Limited. Registered No: 2800925. Registered Office: 9 Mansfield Street, London W1M 9FH. VAT No: 626 1610 64

THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

1775 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036-2188

TELEPHONE: 202/797-6000 FAX: 202/797-6004

World Wide Web: http://www.brook.edu/

Via Fax: 212/759-0042

February 19, 1998

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
26th Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

FEB 20 1998

Dear Henry:

Thanks very much for agreeing to give the keynote luncheon address during our March 4th program with the WTO to commemorate the 50th anniversary of GATT. The program will be held in Washington at the Mayflower Hotel, 1127 Connecticut Avenue. The luncheon will commence at 12:00, and end at 1:30 p.m. I am hoping you'll give about 20 minutes of remarks followed by responses to questions from the audience.

As for the content of your remarks, you are the best judge of what needs to be said at an occasion celebrating the contribution GATT has made to the peace and prosperity of the post war international system. Though Hank Greenberg might welcome your using the occasion to press for a wider opening in overseas insurance markets, I think it more fitting that you offer a political and strategic argument for continued American leadership in promoting free flows of goods, services, capital and technology in a global economy. You had a superb piece in the *Washington Post* on February 9th concerning the political dimensions of the Asian currency crisis. I would think remarks that addressed the political challenge we face in assuring that the global trading system is up to the demands of the 21st century would be right on target.

I've sent along an internal planning document outlining the schedule. Needless to add, we would be delighted to have you come as early and stay as late as your schedule permits. I look forward to seeing you on March 4th.

Warm regards,

Michael H. Armacost
President

Enclosure

# The Global Trading System
## A GATT 50th Anniversary Forum

Wednesday, March 4, 1998
9:00 a.m. - 4:00 p.m.

The Mayflower Hotel
1127 Connecticut Ave., NW
Washington, D.C. 20036

**9:00-9:15 a.m. Welcome and Introductory Remarks**
* Bailey Morris-Eck, Vice President-Communications, The Brookings Institution
* Michael H. Armacost, President, The Brookings Institution
* Renato Ruggiero, Director General, World Trade Organization

**9:15-9:45 a.m. Keynote Address**
Introduction: James A. Johnson, Chairman and CEO, Fannie Mae; Chairman of the Board, The Brookings Institution (invited)
* Charlene Barshefsky, United States Trade Representative

**9:45-10:45 a.m. Panel I: Globaphobia: Confronting Fears About Open Trade**
* Robert E. Litan, Director, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution
* Robert Z. Lawrence, Harvard University and The Brookings Institution
* Other invited speakers

**10:45-11:00 a.m. Break**

**11:00-Noon Panel II: U.S. Trade Policymakers: Looking Forward, Looking Back**
Moderated by: Bill Emmott, The Economist (invited)

* Mickey Kantor, United States Trade Representative 1993-1996

* Carla A. Hills, United States Trade Representative 1989-1993

* Clayton K. Yeutter, United States Trade Representative 1985-1989

* William E. Brock, III, United States Trade Representative 1981-1985

* Robert S. Strauss, Special Trade Representative 1977-1979

* William D. Eberle, Special Trade Representative 1971-1975

**Noon-1:30 p.m. Luncheon**
Introduction: Michael H. Armacost, President, The Brookings Institution
* Speaker: Henry Kissinger, Henry Kissinger Associates

**1:30-2:15 p.m. Panel III: The View From the Private Sector**

**2:15-2:45 p.m. Panel IV: The View From Congress**
* Senator Chuck Hagel, United States Senate (R-Neb.)
* Representative Robert T. Matsui, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Calif.)
* Other invited speakers

**2:45-3:45 p.m. Keynote Address**
Introduction: Michael H. Armacost, President, The Brookings Institution
* Renato Ruggiero, Director General, World Trade Organization

**4:00 p.m. Reception**