into Central Europe, because this threatened Austria's European position;
Austria: Austria could not be indifferent to the extension of Austria
Metterich's attitude was as complex as the dilemma confronting
entangled *without him* as that it would be settled *against him*; and
Tetleyland was almost as estranged that the problem of Poland would be
the Prussian Minister, was more interested in Saxony than in Poland;
only statesman contending for the General equilibrium. Harslebusch,
insular power which had no Continental position to defend, was the
So it came about that Catilereagh, the representative of the
ontario Austria and a united Germany might meet once more France.
Austria might dominate Europe, put a too powerful Prussia would
of it on which their unique historical position depended. A strong
put them were not prepared to resist at the sacrifice of that best
danger. They did not wish to see the General equilibrium overturned,
put the powers of Europe were not at all in accord regarding the real
could not be resisted without a united front of the rest of Europe,
be indispensable, it does not appear so to its components. The Tzar
resources of Europe against him. But although the equilibrium may
European equilibrium, the obvious counter-measure was to marshall the
piece task seemed simple. It the Tzar's pretensions threatened the
effort to assemble such a force. As an abstract problem in diplomacy
While Catilereagh was negotiating with the Tzar, he made every

A

31

- 22 -

or to the extension of Prussia into Central Germany, because
this threatened its German position. But Austria's geographic
location made open resistance foolhardy, for it would cause the
brunt of the effort to fall on the most exposed power and surrender
the policy of close co-operation with Prussia, which Metternich
considered the key to Austrian security. The easiest solution was
to return Prussia's Polish provinces to her in exchange for the
independence of Saxony. But Prussia's Polish provinces were
beyond reach until the Tsar was defeated. This, in turn, was im-
possible without Prussian support, which Prussia made conditional
on Austrain acquiescence in the annexation of Saxony. On the other
hand, Metternich could not thwart Prussia in Saxony without British
or French assistance. But Castlereagh would contend only for European,
not for German, concerns and French support at an early stage in the
proceedings would have alarmed the secondary German Powers.

In this situation, Metternich adopted a policy of procrastination
in order to exploit Austria's only bargaining weapon, that the other
powers required Austrian acquiescence to make their annexations
"legitimate". For several weeks he was unavailable because of
"illness". After he "recovered", festivities succeeded each other in
endless profusion and his love affairs and abstractedness became
notorious. Metternich was determined to separate the Polish and the
Saxon question, so that he could defeat his opponents in detail; to
use their impatience for a settlement to lure his adversities into a

use their influence for a settlement to force advantages into a
Saxon nation, so that he could defeat his opponents in detail; to
notoriouse. Metternich was determined to separate the Prussian and the
endless prosecution and his love affairs and attracted attention because
"finesse". After he "recovered" activities succeeded each other in
"legitimate". For several weeks he was unavailable because of
batteries required Austrian acquiescence to make their annexations
in order to exploit Austria's only bargaining weapon, that the other
In this situation, Metternich adopted a policy of broodattentive
proceedings would have alarmed the secondary German Powers.

not for German concerns and French subordination at an early stage in the
or French assistance. But Castlereagh would contend only for European
land, Metternich could not threat Prussia in Saxony without British
on Austrian acquiescence in the annexation of Saxony. On the other
bosomple without Prussian subordination, which Prussia made conditional
beyond reach until the Tear was defeated. This, in turn, was im-
justification of Saxony. But Prussia's Polish provinces were
to return Prussia's Polish provinces to per in exchange for the
considered the key to Austrian security. The easiest solution was
the policy of close co-operation with Prussia, which Metternich
prunt of the effort to fall on the most exposed power and surrender
location made open resistance impossible, for it would cause the
type threatened its German position. But Austria's geographic
or to the extension of Prussia into Central Germany, because

- 33 -

- 23 -

precipitate step which would provide him with a moral basis for
action. He therefore assumed what he was wont to call the strongest
position: the defensive, the expression of the ethos of a status quo
power. "I barricade myself behind time," he told the worried envoy
of Saxony, "and make patience my weapon."¹

Thus Castlereagh's efforts to create a united front against
Russia led to an ambiguous series of constellations, of half-hearted
coalitions and tentative betrayals, of promises of unyielding support
coupled with hedges against bad faith. All during October Castlereagh
laboured indefatigably, but, he encountered incomprehensible hesitation
and quibbling delay. When Castlereagh exhorted Hardenberg and Metternich
to joint action, he found himself forced to admit that "there was a
certain mutual distrust...which does not justify me to speak confidently
of the result".² He complained about Metternich's incomprehensible
"timidity" and asserted that the Austrian Minister seemed without
any fixed plan. And he admonished Talleyrand, gleefully exploiting
Allied embarrassments from the sidelines, that "it was not for the
Bourbons, who had been restored by the Allies, to assume the tone of
reprobating...the arrangements which had kept the Alliance together."³

¹Schwarz, Wilhelm, *Die Heilige Allianz*, (Stuttgart, 1935), p.13.

²B.D.,p.202,9 October, 1814.

³B.D.,p.203f., 9 October, 1814.

³B.D.‘b.303r.’ 9 October, 1814.

³Rempel, Wilhelm, *Die Heilige Völker*, (Stuttgart, 1932), b.13.

reproducing...the arrangements which had kept the Alliance together.”²
Bourbons, who had been restored by the Villeré, to assume the tone of
Vilified arrangements from the title, that “it was not for the
and timed bien. And he abdicated Tylelyrand, Sießelius exploiting
“simbility,” and asserted that the Austrian Minister seemed weak without
of the result.”² He complained about Metternich’s incompatible
certain mutual distrust...which does not justify me to abase confidently
to joint action, he found himself forced to admit that “there was a
and dropping delay. When Castlereagh exported Hardopass and Metternich
languished indefinitely, put, he encountered incompatible opposition
combined with hedges against bad faith. VII during October Castlereagh
coitions and tentative penalties, of brooms of multiple ambusc
Snails led to an ambiguous series of consultations, of put-purposed
Tune Castlereagh’s efforts to create a united front against
of taxes,” and make better use of money.”¹

Power. "I peremptorily shall perform time," he told the worried enemy
position: the defensive, the expression of the edge of a status quo
action. He therefore assumed what he was wont to call the strongest
breastplate step which would provide him with a moral base for

- 33 -

- 24 -

Matters were finally brought to a head by Prussia, the power which could least afford delay. To be sure, the treaties of Kalish, Teplitz, and Chaumont had guaranteed Prussia its territorial extent of 1805; but they had never specified where Prussia might find the requisite territories, particularly if it lost its Polish possessions to Russia. The available compensations, composed of former provinces or former satellites of France, primarily in the Rhineland, were inadequate. And they were undesirable because of their geographic separation from the main part of the Prussian monarchy and the Catholic religion of their inhabitants. Thus Prussia came to look towards Saxony, coveted since the time of Frederick the Great, contiguous with its own territories and with a predominantly Protestant population. But Prussia's negotiating position was the weakest of the major powers. Unlike Russia, it was not in possession of its prize. Unlike Austria, it had not made its participation in the war dependent on obtaining its special conditions. If now the Polish question was settled before that of Saxony, Prussia would have paid the penalty for its total commitment; for having fought the war with so much fervour that its participation had never been negotiable; for neglecting the peace because the way, in effect, had become an end in itself. And Prussia required Austrian acquiescence in the annexation of Saxony, because the organization of Germany, the indispensable condition of Prussia's security, would become illusory if Austria emerged on the Saxon issue as the protector of the secondary powers.

secondarily, powers.

Influency of Austria emerged on the Saxony issue as the protector of the Germany, the indigeneous condition of Prussia's security, would become acquiescence in the annexation of Saxony, because the organization of in effect, had become an end in itself. And Prussia required Austrian had never been negotiable; for negotiating the peace because the way, for having taught the war with so much fervour that its participation of Saxony, Prussia would have paid the benefit for its total commitment; special conditions. It now the Polish question was settled before that it had not made its participation in the war dependent on obtaining its Unlike Prussia, it was not in possession of its bridle. Unlike Austria, But Prussia's negotiating position was the weakest of the major powers. its own territories and with a predominantly Protestant population. Saxony, coveted since the time of Frederick the Great, contiguous with religion of their inhabitants. Time Prussia came to look towards separation from the main part of the Prussian monarchy and the Catholic inadeguates. And they were undesirable because of their geographic or former satellites of France, primarily in the Rhineland, were to Prussia. The available combinations, composed of former provinces redalate territories, particularly it lost its Polish POSSESSIONS of 1802; but they had never abetted where Prussia might find the Teplitz, and Chomont had guaranteed Prussia its territorial extent which could least afford delay. To be sure, the treaties of Kalisz, Matters were finally brought to a head by Prussia, the power.

- 25 -

It is not surprising, therefore, that on 9 October, Hardenberg submitted a memorandum agreeing to the widdom of an "intermediary system based on Austria, Prussia and Britain".¹ But he made Prussia's co-operation on the Polish question dependent on Austrian g agreement to the annexation of Saxony and to the provisional occupation of Saxony by Prussia as a token of good faith. However, if Prussia obtained both Saxony and its former Polish territories, it would become the predominant power of Central Europe--a contingency certain to be resisted by all other states. In its pedantic effort to achieve the advantage of every course of action, the Hardenberg memorandum merely served to illustrate Prussia's dilemma: Russian support might gain it Saxony but not legitimacy; while Austrian support might yield it Poland, but not Saxony. The Hardenberg memorandum was a plea not to leave Prussia dependent on the goodwill of the Tsar; to create a European order based on Austro-Prussian friendship, but also on Prussian possession of Saxony.

But this effort to combine incompatible policies & provided Metternich with the means to separate the Polish and Saxon question by one of his intricate manoeuvres. On 22 October he transmitted two notes to Hardenberg and Castlereagh, whose tone of grudging agreement to Hardenberg's proposal obscured the fact that the moral framework which

¹Text, d'Angeberg, Comte de, *Le Congrès de Vienne et les Traites de 1815*, 2 Vols. (Paris, 1863-4). Vol. II, p. 1934.

2 Aho. (Barte', 1893-4). Aof. II, b. 1934.
I Text, 4, Vaugerel, Comte de, *Le Congrès de Aix en Provence et les Traites de 1812*.

Hardenberg's a proposal opined the fact that the moral framework which
to Hardenberg and Castlereagh, whose tone of bristling agreement to
one of his intricate manoeuvres. On 22 October he transmitted two notes
 Meeting with the means to separate the Polish and Saxon question by
 But this effort to complicate incompulsive policies & provided

Polish and Saxon question.

Polish and Saxon question based on Austrian friendly approach, put also on to leave Prussia dependent on the Goodwill of the State; to create a state of Poland, but not Saxony. The Hardenberg memorandum was a lie not gain it Saxony put not legitiwise; while Austrian subhort might yield merely served to illustrate Prussia's dilemma: Austrian subhort might the advantage of every course of action, the Hardenberg memorandum to be reated by all other states. In its basicitic effort to achieve pence the predominant power of Central Europe--a contingency certain tained both Saxony and its former Polish territories, it would Saxony by Prussia as a token of good faith. However, it Prussia op- to the annexation of Saxony and to the provisional occupation of co-operation on the Polish question dependent on Austrian & agreement system based on Austria, Prussia and Britain."¹ But he made Prussia's submitted a memorandum agreeing to the wisdom of an "intermediary

- 22 -

- 26 -

was being created to resist in Poland would prove equally effective
to resist in Saxony, and that Hardenberg, in his effort to hedge
his risks, had made his defeat inevitable.

For Castlereagh in his overriding concern with the balance
of power and Hardenberg in his obsession with Saxony overlooked
two subtle and mutually inconsistent mk reservations in Metternich's
despatches: that Prussia's annexation of Saxony should not lead to
a "disproportionate aggrandizement," a condition clearly impossible
of fulfillment if Prussia regained her Polish provinces,¹ and that
Austria's agreement on the Saxon point was conditional on the success
of the effort to thwart the Tsar's design on Poland²—which, in turn,
would leave Prussia isolated in the inevitable contest over the inter-
pretation of the first reservation.

But, while Metternich was preparing the moral framework for
an effort to separate Prussia and Russia, Castlereagh was looking
only to Poland, as if the European equilibrium could be created with
the certainty of a mathematical equation. On 23 October, he finally
succeeded in getting Austria and Prussia to agree on a common plan
of action against Russia on the basis of Metternich's memorandum. ³

¹ Text of note to Castlereagh, Comte d'Angeberg, *Le Congres de Vienne et les Traites de 1815*, Paris, 1863-1864, II, pp. 193-9ff.

² Text of note to Hardenberg, *ibid*, I, pp. 316ff.

³ Castlereagh's report, B.D., p.212, 29 October, 1814.

³Caſtleragh's report, B.D., b.512, 29 October, 1814.

⁴Text of note to Harderperg, *tpid*, I, dp. 31stt.

5

⁶Text of note to Caſtleragh, Comte q'Augéper, *Le Contrat de Atenne et de action against Russia on the part of Metternich's memorandum*.

⁷Succeeded in getting Austria and Prussia to agree on a common plan the certainty of a mathematical education. On 13 October, he finally only to Poland, as it the European equilibrium could be created with an effort to separate Prussia and Russia. Caſtleragh was looking for, while Metternich was preparing the moral framework for

bretisation of the first reservation.

would leave Prussia isolated in the inevitable contest over the interest of the effort to thwart the Treaty design on Poland²--which, in turn, Austria's agreement on theaxon point was conditional on the success of fulfilment if Prussia regained perPOLITAN PROVINCES¹ and that a "disproportionate agrandishment," a condition clearly impossible debatably: that Prussia's annexation of Saxony should not lead to two allies and mutually inconsistent war reservations in Metternich's of power and Harderperg in his opposition with Saxony overlooked for Caſtleragh in his overriding concern with the balance

pits risks, had made it defeat inevitable.
to resist in Saxony, and that Harderperg, in his effort to peddle
was being created to resist in Poland would prove equally effective

- 30 -

- 27 -

The three powers undertook to force the issue by confronting the Tsar with the threat of bringing the Polish question before the full Congress if a reasonable settlement could not be obtained by direct negotiations. They proposed three acceptable solutions: an independent Poland as it existed prior to the first partition, a rump Poland on the scale of 1791, or the return of the three partitioning powers to their former possessions.¹ It was clear that Polish independence was advanced primarily as a bargaining weapon and for British domestic consumption, because the Tsar was not likely to agree to surrender territory considered Russian for two generations as the result of a victorious war.

The threat of an appeal to Europe in Congress was the last effort to settle the European equilibrium by a combination within the anti-French Coalition. When Metternich called on the Tsar to present the ultimatum on the Polish question, he was dismissed haughtily and even challenged to a duel, another indication of the Tsar's conception of foreign affiars in personal terms. And when, on 30 October, the three sovereigns left to visit Hungary, Alexander appealed to his brother monarchs against their ministers. He failed with the Austrian Emperor, but it was different with the stodgy and unimaginative Prussian King who had always admired the mercurial Tsar for his intrepidity in disaster and for the brilliance of his intellect. It did not prove too difficult to convince him now that the secret negotiations of the three ministers were an act of bad faith. When the monarchs returned

¹ Memorandum re procedure, B.D., p. 213f.

Memorandum to procedure, B.D., b. 513f.

three ministers were an act of bad faith. When the monarch returned too difficult to convince him now that the secret negotiations of the in disaster and for the brilliance of his intellect. It did not prove King who had always admired the mercurial Tear for his intrepidity. Amberox put it was different with thestoqy and unimpressive Prussian proper monarch against their ministers. He failed with the Amalien the three sovereigns left to visit Hungary, Alexander abdicated to his cessation of foreign attitude in personal terms. And when, on 30 October, and even challenged to a duel, another indication of the Tear's a con- present the ultimatum on the Polish question, he was dismissed summarily the anti-Alexandria Coalition. When Metternich called on the Tear to effort to settle the European equilibrium by a combination within the threat of an abdication to Europe in Congress was the last a victorious war.

territory considered Russian for two generations as the result of consumption, because the Tear was not likely to agree to surrender was advanced primarily as a bargaining weapon and for British domestic to their former bossestons.¹ It was clear that Polish independence the scale of 1791, or the return of the three partitioning powers Poland as it existed prior to the first partition, a sum Poland on negotiations. They proposed three acceptable solutions: an independent Congress if a reasonable settlement could not be obtained by direct Tear with the threat of printing the Polish question before the fall The three powers undertook to force the issue by confronting the

- 33 -

- 28 -

to Vienna, Hardenberg was ordered, in the presence of the Tsar, to refrain from any further separate negotiations with his Austrian and British colleagues.

In this manner, on 4 November, the contest over Poland ended for the time being. Castlereagh's personal appeals had failed because Alexander had insisted on resting his claims on a "right" transcending the requirements of European security. The attempt to marshal a superior force had proved futile because there did not exist sufficient resolution within the anti-French alliance to bring the Tsar to terms and because complex problems are not soluble by declaring them simple. The effort to achieve an international order based on agreement and not on force seemed to have returned to its starting point.

VI

But this was a mistaken impression. For if Castlereagh's failure had proved that the equilibrium could not be achieved through a demonstration of its necessity, Metternich's almost imperceptible complementary effort had created the moral framework for reopening the issue by an appeal to legitimacy. And if defeat in Poland could be translated into victory in Saxony, perhaps victory in Saxony might provide a means to extort concessions in Poland. The procrastination which had proved so maddening to Castlereagh had in fact been Metternich's

which had proved so unrelenting to Castlereagh as in fact been Metternich's
broader means to extend concessions in Poland. The preoccupation
translated into victory in Saxony, perhaps victory in Saxony might
follow by an abdication to legitimise. And it defeat in Poland could be
benevolently effort had created the moral framework for reuniting the
attrition of its necessity, Metternich's almost impossible com-
pound proved that the duchies could not be achieved through a demon-
But this was a mistaken impression. For it Castlereagh's lifetime

VI

starting point.

based on agreement and not on force seemed to have returned to its
declaring them simple. The effort to achieve an international order
the East to terms and because complex problems are not simple by
exist sufficient resolution within the anti-Brexit alliance to bring
wareral a stronger force had proved futile because there did not
transcending the requirements of European security. The attempt to
because Alexander had initiated on resting his claims on a "right"
ended for the time being. Castlereagh's personal abbeles had failed
In this manner, on 2 November, the contest over Poland

British colleagues.

retrain from any further separate negotiations with the Austrians and
to Vienna, Hardenberg was ordered, in the presence of the Tsar, to

- 38 -

- 29 -

most effective means to overcome his dilemmas, for delay strengthened
Austria's chief bargaining weapon, that no agreement would be made
without Austria. His measures during October had therefore been
designed primarily to break up the Russo-Prussian front and to
provide a framework for action in the direction which proved most
vulnerable. "Metternich's greatest art," reported Talleyrand, "is
to make us waste our time, for he believes he gains by it." So the
weeks had passed while Europe complained about the frivolity of the
Austrian minister and the old school of Austrian diplomats raged
that their "Rhenish" minister, whom they nicknamed Prince Scamperlin,
was betraying the Empire to Prussia. But in the admiration for the
famous phrase of the Prince de Ligne: "Le Congres danse, mais il ne
marche pas," it was overlooked that the Congress was dancing itself
into a trap.

When Hardenberg offered Metternich his co-operation, he may
have believed that he was clinching his gains and that he was obtaining
a guarantee of Saxony, however the Polish negotiations ended. But because
Metternich's reply had made Austrian agreement to the annexation of Saxony
conditional on the success of their common measures, the effort to connect
the two issues became a means to separate them. For if the Polish negotiations
succeeded, Prussia would lose her moral claim to Saxony in the eyes of Europe.
If Prussia regained her Polish possessions, the annexation of Saxony would
represent the "disproportionate aggrandizement" which Metternich had told
Castlereagh he would not accept. Nor would it be necessary in that

Cassierough he would not accept. Nor would it be necessary in that
represent the "diabrotortionate agglomeration," which Metternich had told
It Prussia regained per Polish POSSESSIONS, the annexation of Saxony would
acquired, Prussia would lose per moral claim to Saxony in the eyes of Europe.
the two issues became a means to separate them. For it the Polish negotiations
conditional on the success of their common measures, the effort to connect
Metternich's reply had made Austrian agreement to the annexation of Saxony
a guarantee of Saxony, however the Polish negotiations ended. But because
have believed that he was clinching his gains and that he was obtaining
when Hardempert offered Metternich his co-operation, he may
into a trap.

Marche bee," it was overlooked that the Congress was dancing itself
tamous byrate of the Prince de Ligne: "Le Congre d'Ange, made if we
was petraling the Empire to Prussia. But in the admiration for the
that their "Habsburg" minister, whom they nicknamed Prince Souberlin,
Austrian minister and the old school of Austrian diplomats raged
weeks had based while Europe complained about the truvelty of the
to make us make our time, for he believes he gains by it." So the
 vulnerable. "Metternich's greatest art," reported Tellebrand, "is
provide a framework for action in the direction which proved most
designed primarily to preclude the Habsburg Prussian front and to
without Austria. His measures during October had therefore been
Austria's chief bargaining weapon, that no agreement would be made
most effective means to overcome his dilemma, for delay strengthened

- 29 -

- 30 -

eventuality that Metternich bear the brunt of the opposition.
Talleyrand was certain to resist, indeed he could be restzzined
only with difficulty during October, and the secondary German states
would rally around him. The Tsar, frustrated in Poland, was only
too likely to enjoy Prussia's discomfiture; while Castlereagh, under
attack in Parliament because of Saxony in any case, could not possibly
have supported Prussia's demand for annexation. Castlereagh, at any
rate, seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a development.
"In the event of success attending the common effort with respect to
Poland," he wrote to Liverpool, "(France) would have improved means
of urging amicably upon Prussia some modification of her demands
upon Saxony."¹

But if the Polish negotiations failed, Prussia would lose her
claim to Saxony in the eyes of Austria. Prussia's isolation was assured
none the less surely, because the fact of resistance was almost as certain to alienate the Tsar as its success. Having demonstrated
Austria's European concern by yielding in Saxony, intransigeance could
not be defended by the requirements of the European and not the German
equilibrium. And Castlereagh, having obtained Austrian support in the
Polish negotiations, could not longer treat the Saxon issue as an internal
German affair. There could be no doubt of the attitude of France or of
the smaller German states. Prussia, in its effort to obtain reinsurance,
had only succeeded in achieving its isolation.

1
B.D., p.213, 24 October, 1814.

B.D., b.313, 24 October, 1914.

I

the smaller German states. Prussia, in its effort to obtain reinsurance, German affairs. There could be no doubt of the attitude of France or of Polish negotiations, could not longer treat the Saxony states as an internal equilibrium. And Castlereagh, having obtained Austrian support in the Austro-Hungarian Dualist League, the requirements of the European and not the German must be deferred by the redemptions of the European and not the German claim to Saxony in the eyes of Austria. Prussia's isolation was assured. But if the Polish negotiations failed, Prussia would lose her

about Saxony."¹¹

of urging immediately upon Prussia some modification of her demands on Poland," he wrote to Riverhoof, "(France) would have improved means "In the event of success attempting the common effort with respect to rate," seems to have foreseen the possibility of such a development. Prussian authorities, at any rate, seem to have foreseen the possibility of such a development. While Castlereagh, under too likely to enjoy Prussia's discomfiture; while Castlereagh, under too likely to enjoy Prussia's discomfiture; while Castlereagh, under would rally around him. The War, thus initiated in Poland, was only only with difficulty during October, and the secondary German states Telferland was certain to resist, indeed he could be restrained eventually that Metternich bear the brunt of the opposition.

- 30 -

- 31 -

[y]

When, on 7 November, Hardenberg informed Metternich of the King's orders and of the difficulty of carrying out the agreed plan with respect to Poland, Metternich finally had the moral basis for action.¹ He waited until 18 November before he insisted on the fulfilment of the three conditions of the memorandum of 22 October. He suggested that, since the King's command had made it impossible to utilize Castlereagh as an intermediary, Hardenberg conduct the negotiations with the Tsar himself.² But this only served to supply Metternich with yet another proof of Austrian good faith and another reason for resisting in Saxony, because, in view of the Tsar's dominance over the Prussian King, there could be no doubt about the fate of a solitary Prussian overture. Hardenberg was obliged to report that the Tsar had again invoked the purity of his intentions, but that the only concession he was willing to make was to declare Thorn and Cracow free cities.³ Although Alexander had slyly made this concession dependent on Austrian acquiescence in the annexation of Saxony, the Saxon negotiation thus became a means to restore fluidity to the Polish issue. For the Tsar's offer, however, contingent, was his first admission that the territorial extent of Poland was not irrevocably settled after all.

1 D*Angeberg, I, p.406, (Hardenberg's note to Metternich.) There is yet another indication, although no proof, that Metternich never intended the Polish negotiations as anything but a means to isolate Prussia on the Saxon question: his dismal defeat during his interview with Alexander. At no other time in his career did Metternich choose a frontal attack, negotiate so ineffectively or surrender so easily.

2 D'Angeberg, I, p. 418, 18 November, 1814; also B.D. p. 238.

3 D'Angeberg, II, p. 1941, 2 December, 1814; also B.D. p. 248.

effectively or surrender so easily.
time in his career did Metternich choose a frontal attack, negotiate so in-
desire: he diamaii defeat during his interview with Alexander. At no other
Polish negotiations as anything put a mean to isolate Prussia on the Saxon
another indication, although no brook, that Metternich never intended the
I DeMunzel, I. B. 40c, (Hardenberg's note to Metternich.) There is yet

settled after all.

first admission that the territorial extent of Poland was not irrevocably
to the Polish issue. For the Tars's offer, however, contingent, was his
of Saxony, the Saxon negotiation thus became a means to restore fidelity
to the concession dependent on Austrian acquisitiveness in the annexation
Thorn and Cracow tree cities.² Although Alexander had sily made
but that the only concession he was willing to make was to declare
to report that the Tars had again invoked the burthen of his intentions,
the fate of a solitary Prussian overture. Hardenberg was obliged
dominance over the Prussian King, there could be no doubt about
reason for resuming in Saxony, because, in view of the Tars's
Metternich with yet another brook of Austrian good faith and another
negotiations with the Tars himself.³ But this only served to subify
to utilize Casimir, as an intermediary, Hardenberg conduct the
He negotiated that, since the King's command had made it impossible
fulfillment of the three conditions of the memorandum of 22 October.
action.⁴ He waited until 18 November before he insisted on the
with respect to Poland, Metternich finally put the moral past for
King's orders and of the difficulty of carrying out the agreement by
When, on 1 November, Hardenberg informed Metternich of the

- 32 -

Metternich submitted the final Austrian reply on 10 December.¹
Austria was interested in the closest relationship with Prussia, but
not at the price of the destruction of Saxony. Ther German Federation,
on which their common welfare depended, would remain stillborn, because
none of the secondary German states would join an organization based
on the destruction of one of their number. Having been forced to
tolerate Russian aggrandizement in Poland, Austria could not acquiesce
in Prussian aggrandizement within Germany without upsetting the
equilibrium completely. Metternich suggested an alternative plan which
maintained a nucleus of Saxony, while giving a large part of it to
Prussia together with other compensations in the Rhineland. But all
protestations of friendship could not hide the fact that Prussia was
an independent state outmanoeuvred, that Metternich had lost out in Płand
only to win in Saxony and then partially to restore the situation in
Poland by means of Saxony.

It did not matter that, on 8 November, the Russian military
governor of Saxony turned over the provisional administration to
Prussia, nor that the Prussian military were threatening way. Russia,
at the periphery of Europe, might rest its claim to Poland on the fact
of possession, but a power situated in the centre of the Continent
could survive only as the component of a "legitimate" order both within
Germany and in Europe. Thus, although by the middle of December the

¹Text, d'Angeberg, I, p. 505.

Text, q.Vonheper, I, p. 202.

Germany and in Europe. Time, at least by the middle of December the
 could survive only as the component of a "legitimate" order kept within
 of possession, put a power situated in the centre of the Continent
 at the border of Europe, might rest its claim to Poland on the fact
 Prussia, nor that the Prussian military were threatening us. Prussia,
 making of Saxony turned over the provincial administration to
 Governor.
 It did not matter that, on 8 November, the Prussian military

Poland by means of Saxony.
only to win in Saxony and then battlefly to restore the situation in
the most minimum outstation, that Metternich had lost out in Poland
because of friendship could not give the fact that Prussia was
Prussia together with other compensations in the Rhineland. But all
maintained a nucleus of Saxony, while giving a large part of it to
equilibrium completely. Metternich negated an alternative plan which
in Prussian aggrandizement within Germany without meeting the
tolerate Russian aggrandizement in Poland. Vatnir could not accept
on the destruction of one of their number. Having been forced to
none of the secondary German states would join an organization based
on which their common interest depended, would remain stillborn, because
not at the price of the destruction of Saxony. The German Federation,
Vatnir was interested in the closest relationship with Prussia, but
Metternich admitted the final Vatnir reply on 10 December.¹

- 33 -

- 33 -

[y]

Congress of Vienna seemed to have reached a complete stalemate, behind the scene a fundamental transformation was preparing itself. A stalemate is not total until all the factors are engaged and France was still uncommitted. The contests during October and November had exploded the myth of Allied unity and the threat of France no longer loomed larger than that of the erstwhile ally. It was becoming plain that the memory of a common effort would not suffice to restrain any power from attempting to add France to its side of the scale.

While Castlereagh was despairing about the Polish failure¹ and accusing Metternich of never having really intended to resist, a combination was forming on the Saxon question which was to give a new direction to the contest. For the coalition which could resist in Saxony was, by definition, also the coalition which could resist in Poland. And if the claims of power were defeated in one quarter, this would, almost necessarily, limit the assertions of arbitrariness in the others. So it was proved, after all, that the equilibrium of Europe was indivisible, although the solution did not come about through a consciousness of this. It was not in the name of Europe that Europe was saved, but in the name of Saxony.

1
B.D., p.248f.

B.D., b.3482.
I

was saved, but in the name of Saxony, 
conscience of this. It was not in the name of Europe that Europe 
indivisible, instead the solution did not come about through a 
the other. So it was proved, after all, that the equilibrium was 
would, almost necessarily, limit the assertions of arbitrariness in 
Poland. And if the claims of power were defeated in one quarter, this 
Saxony was, by definition, also the coalition which could resist in 
new direction to the contest. Not the coalition which could resist in 
a combination was forming on the Saxon question which was to give a 
and accusing Matterhorn of never having really intended to resist.

While Castlereagh was desiring & apart the Polish title

power from attempting to add Prance to its side of the scale,

loose larger than that of the era, while still. It was becoming plain

exploited the means of Villeduty and the threat of Prance no longer

was still uncommitted. The contacts during October and November had

A stalemate is not total until all the factors are engaged and Prance

defining the scene a fundamental transformation was preparing itself.

Congress of Vienna seemed to have reached a complete stalemate.

- 33 -

- 34 -

But before this new combination could be formed, domestic pressures on Castlereagh nearly wrecked Metternich's finely-spun plan. An insular power may fight its wars in the name of the European equilibrium, but it will tend to identify the threats to the equilibrium with threats to its immediate security. Because its policy is defensive and not precautionary, it will make the cause of war depend on an overt art which "demonstrates" the danger. But the danger to the equilibrium is never demonstrated until it is already overturned, because an aggressor can always justify every step except the crucial last one as the manifestation of limited claims, and exact acquiescence as the price of continued moderation. To be sure, Britain had entered the fray against Napoleon at an early stage and continued the contest with great persistence. But the threat to the equilibrium had become manifest through an attack on the Low Countries and the balance of power had come to be identified with the possession of Antwerp.

Now the issue was Riksmat Rik Poland, however, a "distant" country both geographically and psychologically. It was not clear until it was "proven" that the Rhine was best defended along the Vistula or that there existed any threat to peace except France. In this frame of mind the Cabinet considered the Polish dispute an irritating outgrowth of Continental rivalry, threatening a peace dearly won, and dealt with it primarily under the aspect of its impact on British domestic politics.

primarily under the aspect of its impact on British domestic politics. Continental rivalry, threatening a peace clearly won, and dealt with it the Cabinet considered the Hotting debate an irritating outgrowth of these existed and threat to peace except France. In this frame of mind "broken" that the Rhine was put defended along the Aisnes or that policy biographically and biologically. It was not clear until it was now the frame was "Sinn im Polan" however, a "distant" country

power had come to be identified with the possession of Unwarsb.
unwaintet through an attack on the Low Countries and the defence of
with Great Beratence. But the threat to the equilibrium had become
tray against Napoleon at an early stage and continued the contest
brice of continued moderation. To be sure, Britain had entered the
as the manifestation of limited claims, and exact acceutance as the
agressor can always justify every step except the crucial last one
is never demonstrated until it is already overturned, because an
art which "demonstrates" the danger. But the danger to the equilibrium
and not because of it. It will cause the cause of war degenerate on an overt
with threats to its immediate security. Because its position is negative
equilibrium, but it will tend to identify the threats to the equilibrium
in similar power may tight its war in the name of the European
breaches on Gallipoli, nearly wrecked Mettensich, a timely-alarm plan.

AII

- 34 -

- 35 -

This led to a discussion between the Cabinet and Castlereagh in which both sides were trying hard to convince themselves that the disagreement was really a misunderstanding produced by insufficient information. Whereas the gulf separating them was hardly less than that separating the Tsar from Castlereagh. For while the Tsar attempted to guarantee Continental security by his good faith, the British Cabinet wished to identify safety with an insular position. The arbitrariness of power and the irresponsibility of isolation, there were the Scylla and Charybdis between which Castlereagh was forced to navigate.

On 14 October, Liverpool wrote Castlereagh that the "less Britain had to do with [Poland] ... the better" and pointed out that, from the Parliamentary point of view, the Tsar's plan was preferable to a new partition because it preserved the principle of Polish independence.¹ Liverpool repeated these arguments on October 28 and transmitted a memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Vansittart, who simply denied the reality of the Russian danger. With the petulance of mediocrity convincing itself that the easy way out is also the course of wisdom, Vansittart argued that the absorption of Poland would add an element of weakness to the Russian state while proving conducive to British commerce.² These dispatches forced Castlereagh into a long statement of the connection between British and Continental security. He insisted that he was not opposing Russia for the sake of Poland but aim for the sake of Europe. If the Polish question were settled against the Central Powers, the remaining issues would resolve themselves into a contest between Austria

1 B.D., p.210f.

2 B.D., p.220f.

B.D., b. 3304.

3

B.D., b. 3304.

1

remaining issue would resolve themselves into a contest between Ansatiz
It the Polish question were settled against the Central Powers, the
obscuring Russia for the sake of Poland put him for the sake of Europe.
between British and Continental security. He insulated that he was not
These diabolical forces forced Castlereagh into a long statement of the connection
weakness to the Russian state while broiling conducive to British commence.
Ansatizt argued that the absorption of Poland would add an element of
convincing itself that the easy way out is also the course of wisdom,
dedicated the reality of the Russian danger. With the balance of security
memorandum by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Ansatizt, who simply
Riverpool rebuked these arguments on October 30 and transmitted a
a new petition because itbreached the principle of British independence.
from the Parliamentary point of view, the Tear's bias was deliberate to
Britain had to do with Poland ... the better, and bettered out that,
On 14 October, Riverpool wrote Castlereagh that the "less
between which Castlereagh was forced to navigate.
and the irksomeness of isolation, were the Schließ and Charlemagne
identity safety with an insular position. The arbitrariness of power
Continental security by the Good Tact, the British Cabinet wished to
the Tear from Castlereagh. For while the Tear attempted to guarantee
whereas the bulk separating them was hardly less than that separating
was really a misunderstanding produced by insufficient information.
pool edges were trying hard to convince themselves that the disagreement
This led to a discussion between the Cabinet and Castlereagh in which

This led to a discussion between the Cabinet and Castlereagh in which
They led to a discussion between the Cabinet and Castlereagh in which

- 32 -

- 36 -

and Prussia within Germany, transforming Russia into the arbiter of Central Europe and leaving Holland defenceless. The security of even the most immediate British interests thus depended on a European policy: "It appeared to me, that it was better for Great Britain to contend for a European question of the first magnitude in the true spirit of the policy that has marked her conduct throughout the war, than...to reserve herself for one object, viz. the Low Countries... which might be exposed to a very unpleasant question under a discussion between the great German Powers."¹

But Liverpool's reply left no doubt that the Cabinet feared France more than Russia and war more than any threat to the balance of power. A war now, argued Liverpool, might turn into a revolutionary struggle, while even two years of peace might bring about a stability under which the limited wars of the eighteenth century would again become the rule.² On 22 November, the Cabinet sent its first instructions to Castlereagh since his arrival in Vienna: "It is unnecessary," wrote Bathurst, "for me to point out to you the impossibility of...consenting to involve this country into hostilities...for any of the objects which have hitherto been under discussion at Vienna."³

¹ B.D., p. 229f.

² Wellington, Duke of, *Supplementary Dispatches, Correspondence and Memoranda* (15 vols), Edited by his son (London, 1858-76), Vol. IX, p. 285, 25 November, 1814. Hereafter referred to as W.S.D.

³ B.D., p. 247f.

³ B.D., b. 3V1t.

b. 382, 32 November, 1814. Hereafter referred to as W.B.D. Memorandum (12 vola), Edited by H. von (London, 1828-192), Vol. IX, Wellington, Duke of, Supplementary Memorandum, Correspondence and

¹ B.D., b. 358t.

pave pittoresco peen under discussion at Atena."³

to involve this country into hostilities...for any of the objects which
Bainiacus, "for me to point out to you the inobedience of...conenting
to Catarrasough since his arrival in Atena: "It is unnecessary," wrote
become the rule.⁵ On 33 November, the Cabinet sent its that instructions
under which the limited were of the eighteenth century would again
struggle, while even two years of peace might bring about a stability
of power. A war now, argued Riverpool, might turn into a revolutionary
France more than Russia and war more than any threat to the balance

But Riverpool's reply left no doubt that the Cabinet tested
between the Great German Powers."¹

which might be exposed to a very unpleasant discussion under a discussion
tum...to reserve benefit for one object, viz. the few Countries...
absent of the policy that has marked her contact throughout the war,
contend for a European question of the first magnitude in the true
policy. "It abates to us, that it was better for Great Britain to
the most immediate British interests true determined on a European
Central Europe and leaving Holland defenceless. The security of even
and Russia within Germany, transforming Russia into the archrival of

- 30 -

- 37 -

Thus, at the crucial point in the negotiations, Castlereagh was deprived of his only means of exerting pressure and at a moment when the issue was becoming one of pure power. For Prussia was being drawn by Metternich's temporizing into precipitate action. As it observed in its moral and material basis slipping away, its tone became increasingly bellicose. Its military were openly speaking of war and even the more moderate Hardenberg hinted at extreme measures. But if possession without legitimacy was illusory, legitimacy through force proved chimerical. Castlereagh was merely defining Prussia's dilemma when he told Hardenberg that "he [Hardenberg] could not regard an unacknowledged claim as constituting a good title and that he never could in conscience or honour...make the mere refusal of a recognition a cause of war..."¹ In this situation Castlereagh did not propose to follow his Cabinet's instructions. To announce British disinterest would remove the major deterrent to war and, in its effort to guarantee peace, the Cabinet would have brought about what it feared most. Or else, British withdrawal from the contest would lead to an Austrian surrender and to a complete ovrturn of the equilibrium.

So it happened that Castlereagh and Metternich found themselves on the same side in a battle whose moral framework had been defined by the wily Austrian Minister. The more intransigent Prussia's attitude, the stronger became Metternich's position. Without the necessity for

1 B.D.,p.255, 7 December, 1814.

B.D. 322, 1 December, 1814.

the stronger became Metternich's position. Without the necessity for
the with Australian Minister. The more intrinsically Prussian's attitude,
on the same side in a battle whose moral framework had been defined by
So it happened that Castlereagh and Metternich found themselves
ensnared and to a complete overture of the equilibrium.

Else, British withdrawal from the contest would lead to an Australian
base, the Cabinet would have brought about what it feared was. Or
would remove the major deterrent to war and, in its effort to guarantee
to follow the Cabinet's instructions. To announce British disinterest
a cause of war... In this situation Castlereagh did not broach
could in conscience or bona fide...make the were refusal of a recognition
an unacknowledged claim as constituting a good title and that he never
demands when he told Hardanger that "he Hardanger" could not regard
to force proved chimerical. Castlereagh was merely defining Prussia's
But it possession without justification was illogical, illegitimate through
of war and even the more moderate Hardanger pointed at extreme measures.
to come increasingly pelican. Its military were overly besotted
as it operated in its moral and material means of living away, its
being drawn by Metternich's tempestuous into precipitate action.
when the cause was becoming one of bare power. For Prussia was
was deprived of its only means of exerting pressure and at a moment
time, at the crucial point in the negotiations, Castlereagh

- 38 -

abstract discussion Austria emerged as the protector of the secondary
powers. When Metternich proposed an alliance to Bavaria and Hanover
and the construction of a German League without Prussia, he was simply
giving expression to a general consensus. As the contest was becoming
transformed into a test of power, Metternich had achieved a position
where he was resisting claims which could be represented as
exorbitant and unjust. But as the test of strength approached, it also
became necessary to marshal a maximum force. It was at this point, in
which the last vestiges of the Alliance were disappearing, that Talleyrand
reappeared on the scene. His eloquence was as well founded as Metternich's
desire for anonymity, for Metternich was not interested in appearing as
the agent of Prussia's humiliation. It was Metternich's desire that
events should come about "naturally", because this minimized the danger
of permanent schisms; it was Talleyrand's wish that they should appear
"caused", for that would cement his shaky domestic position.

Talleyrand was given his opportunity by Metternich, who com-
municated to him the Austria reply to Hardenberg of 10 December and thus
made clear that the Big Four had not been able to settle the issue. ¹

Talleyrand replied in a trenchant memorandum, which asserted the
superiority of the claims of legitimacy over the requirements of the
equilibrium and denied the possibility of deposing kings, because
sovereigns could not be tried, least of all by those who
coveted their territories. It was not for Prussia to state what
she would take, Talleyrand aggued boldly, but the "legitimate" king
of Saxony to define how much he would yield. ² It was a masterly

1 N.P. II, p. 503f
²N.P. II, p. 509f, 19 December, 1814.

2 M.B. II, b. 2031, 19 December, 1914.
I M.B. II, b. 2034

of reason to define how much he would yield.² It was a matter
of course that take, Tselfaerand agreed readily, but the "legitimate" king
would take, Tselfaerand agreed readily, but the "legitimate" king
coated their territories. It was not him for Prussia to state what
manner of business sovereigns could not be tried, least of all by those who
equalize and deny the justice of deposing kings, because
inferiority of the claims of legitimacy over the requirements of the
Tselfaerand relied on a trenchant memorandum, which asserted the
made clear that the Big Tom had not been able to settle the issue.³
unmated to him the Vatnia reply to Hardenbergh of 10 December and thus
Tselfaerand was given his opportunity by Metternich, who com-
caused,⁴ for that would cement his ally domestic position.

of permanent scheme; it was Tselfaerand's way that they should appear
events should come about "naturally", because this minimized the danger
to the agent of Prussia's humiliation. It was Metternich's desire that
desire for anonymity, for Metternich was not interested in abetting as
referred to the scene. His evidence was as well founded as Metternich's,
when the last vestiges of the Alliance were消disappearing, that Tselfaerand
became necessary to marshall a maximum force. It was at this point, ⁵
exorcitant and mutant. But as the test of strength abrogated, it also
where he was relating claims which could be shown represented as
transformed into a test of power, Metternich had achieved a position
giving expression to a general consensus. As the context was becoming
and the construction of a German League without Prussia, he was simply
bombed. When Metternich proposed an alliance to Bavaria and Hanover
aproposit discussion Vatnia emerged as the protector of the secondary

- 38 -

- 39 -

summary of all the inconsistencies of two months of acrimony, but
this was not its significance. Talleyrand had served France better
by remaining "available" than by writing memoranda. The real importance
of the exchange lay in the fact that France was once again part of the
concert of Europe.

In the meantime Prussia was becoming panicky. To expose
Metternich's trickery, Hardenberg transmitted some of Metternich's
letters on the Polish question to the Tsar, an unheard-of breach of
diplomatic etiquette. But here again Metternich's diarrhorics
during October paid dividends. For almost every action of Metternich
had been in response to a Prussian initiative and when Hardenberg had
withdrawn from their agreement, he had justified it as deferring the
contest with the Tsar to a more convenient time. When, therefore,
Metternich sent all of his letters to the Tsar, Hardenberg was again
out-manoeuvred for he did not dare produce his own. ¹ But this exchange
of pinpricks had a salutary consequence, because it demonstrated to
the Tsar how he had disquieted the other powers by his Polish plans.
After his intransigeant attitude during October and November, Alexander
had in any case undergone one of the sudden shifts of mood which
characterized him. Gone was his earlier militancy, to be replaced by
the first symptoms of the religious exaltation which was to dominate
him for the next decade. When Emperor Francis called on him to clear
up the misunderstanding, Alexander accordingly offered to cede the

1
W.S.D. IX, p.483, 17 December, 1814.

W.B.D. IX, b.483, 17 December, 1814.

In the meantime Prussia was becoming bankrupt. To expose concert of Europe.

of the exchange lay in the fact that France was once again bent on the

py remaining "available" thus by writing memoranda. The real importance

did not its significance. Taitelrand had served France better

amounted to all the inconsistencies of two months of scrutiny, but

letters on the Polite question to the Tsar, an under-art of preach of

Mettensich's trickery, Hardenberg transmitted some of Metternich's

diplomatic etiquette. But here again Metternich's dissat persence

had been in reason to a Prussian initiative and when Hardenberg had

Metternich sent _all_ of his letters to the Tsar, Hardenberg was again

contact with the Tsar to a more convenient time. When, therefore,

withdrawn from their agreement, he had justified it as determining the

of binbricks had a salutary consequence, because it demonstrated to

out-maneuvered for he did not dare produce his own. But this exchange

confront with the Tsar to a more convenient time. When, therefore,

concert of Europe.

- 30 -

- 49 -

district of Tarnopol, with a population of 400,000 back to Austria as a token of his good faith. The Tsar might emerge with the greater part of Poland, but only through a process of adjustment, which symbolized his need for the recognition of other powers.

In desperation Prussia now proposed to transplant the King of Saxony to the Rhineland, into territories earmarked for Prussia. But neither Metternich nor Castlereagh was ready to acquiesce: Metternich because it would have transformed the King of Saxony from an ally of Austria into a Prussian vassal; Castlereagh because he wanted to see a power of the first order protect the Rhineland and back up Holland.¹ And all the time the balance was shifting against Prussia, because Castlereagh and Metternich were slowly insinuating France into the Allied councils. Since part of the dispute between Austria and Prussia dealt with the technical question of where to find the territories to reconstitute Prussia to the scale of 1805, Castlereagh proposed the creation of a Statistical Commission to determine the population of disputed territories. When under Austrian and British pressure a French delegate was admitted to this commission, it was becoming evident that the Coalition against France was in the process of being dissolved.

1 B.D., p.270, 24 December, 1814.

B.D., b.510, 24 December, 1914.

process of being dissolved.

It was becoming evident that the Coalition against France was in the
and British pressure a French delegate was admitted to this coalition,
determine the population of disubated territories. When under Austria
Castlereagh proposed the creation of a Statistical Commission to
limit the territories to reconstitute Prussia to the scale of 1800,
Austria and Prussia dealt with the technical question of where to
France into the Villedieu commune. Since part of the debate between
Prussia, because Castlereagh and Metternich were slowly accumulating
pack up Holland.¹ And all the time the balance was shifting against
wanted to see a power of the first order protect the Rhineland and
an ally of Austria into a Prussian vassal; Castlereagh because he
Metternich because it would have transformed the King of Saxony from
but neither Metternich nor Castlereagh was ready to acquiesce;
Saxony to the Rhineland, into territories earmarked for Prussia.

In deliberation Prussia now proposed to transplant the King of
which symbolized the need for the recognition of other powers.
Greater part of Poland, but only through a process of adjustment,
as a token of his good faith. The Task might emerge with the
district of Tarnopof, with a population of 400,000 pack to Austria

- 49 -

- 41 -

Only a short step separated Talleyrand from full participation
in the deliberations. Castlereagh, who had hoped to avoid so drastic
a step, finally agreed on 27 December. On 31 December, Castlereagh
and Metternich proposed that henceforth Talleyrand participate in
the meetings of the Big Four. Prussia was now & completely isolated,
for the emergence of Talleyrand was a symbol that the special claims
of the Alliance had ceased before Prussia had gained the fruits of
its war. Even the Tsar, in Castlereagh's words, "would not advise
Prussia to resist now that he has secured his own arrangement in
Poland." Thus driven back on its last resources, Prussia threatened
war.

But the reaction merely served to indicate Prussia's impotence.
Castlereagh replied sharply that "such an insinuation might operate upon
a power trembling for its existence but must have the contrary effect
upon all alive to their own dignity; and I added that if such a temper
really prevailed, we were not deliberating in a state of independence
and it was better to break up the Congress." That same day, Castlereagh
proposed a defensive alliance between France, Austria, and Britain. To
be sure, Talleyrand was required to guarantee the Low Countries and to
reaffirm the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. But Talleyrand's greatest
achievement at Vienna was precisely this exhibition of self-restraint,
this refusal to attempt to sell French participation in the alliance for
a territorial advantage, an effort which would have united all the other
powers against him. As a result he gained something more important, the
end of the isolation of France and the recognition of its equality.

1
B.D., p.277f, 1 January, 1815.

["B.D., b. 23.1.1.1. January, 1912.\nI", "end of the isolation of France and the recognition of its equality.\nbowers against him. As a result he gained something more important, the\na territorial advantage, an effort which would have united all the other\nthe refusal to attempt to sell French participation in the alliance for\nachievement at Vienna was precisely the exhibition of self-restraint,\nresulting the provisions of the Treaty of Paris. But Telferland's greatest\npeace, Telferland was reduced to guarantee the Low Countries and to\nproposed a defensive alliance between France, Austria, and Britain. To\nand it was better to break up the Congress.\" That same day, Castlereagh\nreallybreached, we were not deliberating in a state of independence\nupon all alive to their own dignity! and I added that it such a tamer\na power tremping for its existence but must have the contrary effect\nCastlereagh replied shortly that \"such an institution might operate upon\nbut the reaction merely served to indicate Prussia's inobedience."", "war.", "Poland.\" Thus driven back on its last resources, Prussia threatened\nPrussia to react now that he has secured his own arrangement in\nits war. Even the War, in Castlereagh's words, \"would not equal\nof the Alliance had ceased peters Prussia had gained the fruits of\ntor the emergence of Telferland was a symbol that the special claims\nthe meetings of the Big Four. Prussia was now a completely isolated,\nand Metternich proposed that permanently Telferland participate in\na step, initially agreed on 27 December. On 31 December, Castlereagh\nin the deliberations. Castlereagh, who had hoped to avoid so drastic\nOnly a short step separated Telferland from full participation", "- 41 -"]

- 42 -

Thus, almost exactly one year after he first sailed for the Continent, Castlereagh, in direct violation of his instructions, dissolved the Alliance he had striven so hard to create for the sake of the very equilibrium it was supposed to perpetuate. It was a bold and a courageous step. A defensive conception of international relations involves the danger of inflexibility, the tendency to base foreign policy on the last and not on the current danger. By the proposal of a pact with the erstwhile enemy, Castlereagh demonstrated his awareness that no policy, however successful, can be an end in itself. By his decisiveness at a crucial moment, he made clear that opportunities once lost are irretrievable; that the timing of a measure could not, under conditions of the early nineteenth century, depend on the availability of instructions.

And the alliance of 3 January marked the culmination of another of those diplomatic campaigns by which Metternich isolated his opponents in the name of universal reason and not reason of state. An alliance with France against Prussia in October would have provoked the horrified protest of Europe. That same alliance in January was hailed as the defence of the equilibrium. Resistance to Prussia in October would have been construed as the expression of a shortsighted egotism; that same resistance in January was greeted as the protection of legitimacy against the claims of power. Metternich had prepared his moral position by outwaiting his opponent, by using his impatience for a decision to commit him irretrievable. Because Prussia required Austria's acquiescence in the annexation of Saxony, Hardenberg had offered joint measures against the Tsar. The Saxon problem was thus transformed from a German into a European issue on

broader was thus transformed from a German into a European lease on
Saxony, Harderberg pad offered joint measures against the Tsar. The Saxon
Because Prussia reduced Austria's independence in the annexation of
obvious, by making his independence for a decision to commit him irretrievable
of power. Metternich pad prepared his moral position by outwitting his
in January was greeted as the protection of legitimacy against the claims
construed as the expression of a heightened egotism: that same resistance
of the equilibrium. Resistance to Prussia in October would have been
protest of Europe. That same alliance in January was failed as the defence
with France against Prussia in October would have provoked the porridges
in the name of universal reason and not reason of state. An alliance
of those diplomatic campaigns by which Metternich isolated his opponents
And the alliance of 3 January marked the culmination of another
the availability of instructions.

could not, under conditions of the earlynineteenth century, depend on
opportunities once lost are irretrievable; that the timing of a measure
itself. By his decelerations at a crucial moment, he made clear that
his awareness that no policy, however successful, can be an end in
the proposal of a pact with the ex-Walch enemy, Castlereagh demonstrated
base foreign policy on the last and not on the current danger. By
relations involves the danger of inappropriateness, the tendency to
a bold and a courageous step. A definitive conception of international
sense of the very equilibrium it was supposed to Berbetaune. It was
dissolved the Alliance he had striven so hard to create for the
to the Continent, Castlereagh, in direct violation of his instructions.
Thus, almost exactly one year after he first said so for

- 43 -

- 43 -

Prussia initiative, and it was separated so dexterously from the
Polish question that Hardenberg did not realize what had happened
until it was too late. And because the Tsar had become eager to
demonstrate his beneficence, he had offered as a free concession
in Poland what Castlereagh had not been able to elicit by threats.
It was Castlereagh, not Metternich, who bore the brunt of the final
negotiation on the Saxon question, and it was he, not Metternich,
who proposed the alliance of 3 January.

VIII

If the defensive alliance provided the crisis of the Congress
of Vienna, it also paved the way for its resolution. In any negotiation
it is understood that force is the ultimate recourse. But it is the
art of diplomacy to keep this threat in reserve and to commit it only
as a last resort. For once power has been actually committed, negotia-
tions in the proper sense cease. A threat of force which proves
unavailing does not return the negotiation to the point before the threat
was made. It destroys the bargaining position altogether. By bringing
matters to a head, Prussia found itself confronted by three powers whose
determination could not be doubted, and whose strength was overwhelming.
And the Tsar proved a lukewarm ally. A series of partial settlements
had isolated Prussia, because "satisfied" powers will not fight for the
claims of another, if an honourable alternative presents itself.

claims of another, it is honourable alternative presents itself.
pad isolated Prussia, because "attacked" powers will not fight for the
And the Tear proved a lukewarm ally. A series of partial settlements
determination could not be compassed, and whose strength was overwhelming.
matters to a head. Prussia found itself confronted by three powers whose
was made. It destroys the pertaining position altogether. By printing
unavoiding does not return the negotiation to the point before the threat
tions in the broader sense case. A threat must to use force which proves
as a last resort. For once power has been actually committed, negotia-
art of diplomacy to keep this threat in reserve and to commit it only
it is understood that force is the ultimate recourse. But it is the
of Vienna, it also baves the way for its resolution. In any negotiation
It the defensive alliance provided the criteria of the Congress
VIII

who proposed the alliance of 3 January.
negotiation on the Saxon question, and it was he, not Metternich,
It was Castlereagh, not Metternich, who proposed the prunt of the final
in Poland what Castlereagh had not been able to elicit by threats.
demonstrate his penitence, he had offered as a tree concession
until it was too late. And because the Tear had become eager to
Polish question that Hardberg did not realise what had happened
Prussia initiative, and it was separated so dexterously from the

- 43 -

- 44 -

It was up to Metternich to see that this alternative was presented. Already in his memorandum of 10 December, he had advanced a plan by which Prussia could be reconstituted to the scale of 1805 by acquiring territories in the Rhineland together with a portion of Saxony. This plan was now taken up by Castlereagh, when it became apparent that Prussia would not carry out her threat of war. By 3 January, after Metternich and Castlereagh had declared that they would not negotiate without Talleyrand, Hardenberg, to save face, himself was recommended Talleyrand's participation. ¹ On 5 January, Castlereagh could report that "the alarm of war is over." ² The Saxon question was henceforth officially discussed by the now Big Five and was resolved largely through unofficial negotiations, in which Castlereagh played the role of the intermediary between Metternich and Talleyrand on the one side and the Tsar and Hardenberg on the other.

The negotiations leading to the final settlement again revealed Castlereagh's special qualities in their most favourable light. The framework was once more fixed; it was clear that none of the powers, and Russia perhaps least of all, were ready for war. There remained the essentially technical task of adjusting conflicting points of view through patience, perseverance and good will. Gontz reported that Castlereagh worked indefatigably day and night to bring the issue to a conclusion.

¹ B.D., p.280.

²B.D., p.282, 5 January, 1815.

["B.D., b.582, 2 January, 1812.", "B.D., b.580.", "I", "a conclusion.\nCasileareagh worked indeliberately day and night to bring the issue to\nthrough patience, perseverance and good will. Gents reported that\nthe essentially technical task of adjusting conflicting points of view\nand Knutsen perhaps least of all, were ready for war. There remained\nframework was once more fixed; it was clear that none of the powers,\nCasileareagh's special duties in their most favourable light. The\nThe negotiations leading to the final settlement again revealed\nand the War and Hardenbergs on the other.", "of the intermediary between Metternich and Tafelrand on the one side\nthrough un official negotiations, in which Casileareagh blazed the role\nofficially discussed by the now Big Five and was resolved largely\nthat \"the alarm of war is over.\" The Saxon question was pincelhold\nTafelrand's participation. On 2 January, Casileareagh could report\nwithout Tafelrand, Hardenberg, to save face, himself to recommend\nMetternich and Casileareagh had declared that they would not negotiate\nBrussels would not carry out per threat of war. By 3 January, after\nblain was made taken up by Casileareagh, when it became apparent that\nterritories in the Rhineland together with a portion of Saxony. This\nwhich Brussels could be reconstituted to the scale of 1802 by acquitting\nV ​​\nV\n\nI\n\nI\n\nI\n\nI\n\nI\n

- 45 -

In his endeavour to achieve a final settlement, Castlereagh had to resist a new attempt by Prussia to move the King of Saxony to the left bank of the Rhine and an effort by Austria to save the Elbe fortress of Torgau for Saxony. But with the aid of the Tsar, he convinced Prussia that in the interest of the European equilibrium she would have to assume the defence of the Rhineland, and he made clear to Austria that the defensive alliance extended only to an actual attempt to overthrow the European equilibrium, not to internal German arrangements. The danger of war had also made the Tsar more pliable. When Castlereagh suggested some concessions in Poland in order to make the Saxon arrangement more palatable to Prussia, Alexander agreed to return the city of Thorn to Prussia. Metternich immediately used this opportunity to attempt to lure Alexander into another series of adjustments and to shift on him the onus for Prussia's unsatisfactory boundaries. He offered to cede the district of Tarnopol back to Russia in exchange for further concessions to Prussia. Although the Tsar refused, the Saxon question had become a means to limit Russia's Polish aspirations. What could not be exacted for the sake of the general equilibrium of Europe was obtained through a number of concessions which made local arrangements possible.

¹ B.D., p.295, 29 January, 1815.

²D'Angeberg, I, p.676.

D. V. Repert, I, b. 61c.

B.D., b.392, 29 January, 1812.

through a number of concessions which made local arrangements possible. exacted for the sake of the General equilibrium of Europe were obtained a means to limit Russia's polar aspirations. What could not be BRUSSAL. Vitrault the Year returned, the tax on navigation had become of Russian pack to Russia in exchange for further concessions to BRUSSAL's unmaturation boundaries. He offered to cede the district another series of adjustments and to split on him the one for immediately need this opportunity to attempt to lose Alexander into VITRULT. Alexander agreed to return the city of Tropir to Russia. Metternich in order to make the tax on arrangement more balatable to Russia, more favorable. When Castlereagh suggested some concessions in Poland GERMANY. The danger of war had also made the Year actual attempt to overthrow the European equilibrium, not to internal clear to Austria that the defensive alliance extended only to anope would have to assume the defence of the Rhine, and he made he convinced Russia that in the interest of the European equilibrium EIPe fortifications of Trier to Saxony. But with the aid of the Year, to the left bank of the Rhine and an effort by Austria to save the pad to resist a new attempt by Russia to move the King of Saxony. IN HIS endeavours to achieve a final settlement, Castlereagh

- 42 -

- 46 -

On 11 February, a final agreement was reached. In Poland, Austria retained Galicia and the district of Tarnopol, while Cracow was constituted a free city. Prussia retained the district of Posen and the city of Thorn which controlled the upper Vistula. The remainder of the Duchy of Warsaw with a population of 3.2 million became the Kingdom of Poland under the Tsar of Russia. In Germany, Prussia obtained two-fifths of Saxony, Swedish Pomerania, much of the left bank of the Rhine, and the Duchy of Westphalia. Austria had already been assured compensation in Northern Italy and predominance in all of Italy through the establishment of dependent dynasties in Parma and Tuscany.

On 9 June, 1815, the Final Acts of Vienna were ratified by Europe assembled in congress. It was the only meeting of the Congress of Vienna.

There are two ways of constructing an international order: by will or by renunciation; by conquest or by legitimacy. For twenty-five years Europe had been convulsed by an effort to achieve order through power, and to contemporaries the lesson was not its failure but its near success. It is not surprising, then, that in their effort to create an alternative, the statesmen in Vienna looked back to a period which had known stability and that they identified this stability with its domestic arrangements. The statesmen at Vienna were not interested

the domestic arrangements. The statements at Vienna were not interested
which had known stability and that they identified this stability with
create an alternative, the statements in Vienna looked back to a period
near success. It is not surprising, then, that in their effort to
brower, and to contemporaries the reason was not its failure but its
years Europe had been convulsed by an effort to achieve order through
will or by remuneration, by conduct or by legitimacy. For twenty-five
there are two ways of constructing an international order: by

VI

of Austria.

Europe assembled in Congress. It was the only meeting of the Congress
On 9 June, 1812, the Final Acts of Vienna were ratified by

chivalries in Parma and Tuscany.

boreignness in all of Italy through the establishment of dependent
Austria had already been assured combustion in Northern Italy and
much of the left bank of the Rhine, and the Duchy of Westphalia.
In Germany, Prussia obtained two-titres of Saxony, Swedish Pomerania,
million because the Kingdom of Poland under the Tax of Austria.

The remainder of the Duchy of Warsaw with a population of 2.5
of Pomerania and the city of Turon which controlled the upper Austria.

Cracow was constituted a free city. Prussia retained the district
Austria retained Galicia and the district of Tarnobol, while

- 46 -

- 47 -

in transforming humanity, because in their eyes this effort had led to the tragedy of a quarter-century of struggle. To-transform humanity by an act of will, to transcend French nationalism in the name of that of Germany, would have seemed to them to make peace by revolution, to seek stability in the unknown, to admit that a myth once shattered cannot be regained.

The issue at Vienna, then, was not reform against reaction--this is the interpretation of posterity. Instead, the problem was to create an order in which change could be brought about through a sense of obligation, instead of through an assertion of power. For the difference between a revolutionary order and a _healthy_ legitimate one is not the possibility of change, but the mode of its accomplishment. A "legitimate" order, as long as it is not stagnant, achieves its transformations through acceptance, and this presupposes a consensus on the nature of a just arrangement. But a revolutionary order having destroyed the existing structure of obligations, must impose its measures by force and the Reign of Terror of _any_ revolution is inevitably an almost exact reflection of its success in sweeping away the prevailing legitimacy. A "legitimate" order limits the possible by the just; a revolutionary order identifies the just with the physically possible. A legitimate order confronts the problem of creating a structure which does not make change impossible; a revolutionary order faces the dilemma that change may become an end in itself and thus make the establishment of any structure impossible. In neither case is reform carried out through a sudden act of insight; this is the

its reform carried out through a sudden act of insight; this is the
make the establishment of such structure indispensable. In neither case
faces the dilemma that change may become an end in itself and thus
structure which does not make change indispensable; a revolutionarily oder
boastful. A legitimate order confronts the problem of creating a
by the just; a revolutionarily order identifies the just with the biyacally
the brevailing legitimacy. A "legitimate" order limits the possessive
evidably an almost exact reflection of its success in effecting away
measure by force and the gain of Terror of any revolution is in-
destroyed the existing structure of obligations, must impose its
the nature of a just arrangement. But a revolutionarily order having
tormations through acceptance, and this brevails a concern on
"legitimate" order, as long as it is not stagnant, achieves its trans-
not the possessibility of change, put the mode of its accomplishment. A
difference between a revolutionarily order and a being legitimate one is
of obligation, instead of through an assertion of power. For the
create an order in which change could be brought about through a same
type in the interpretation of posterity. Instead, the problem was to
The issue at Vienna, then, was not reform against reaction--
which once established cannot be regained.
by revolution, to seek stability in the unknown, to admit that a
name of that of Germany, would have seemed to them to make peace
pursuit by an act of will, to transcend French nationality in the
to the tragedy of a quarter-century of struggle. To transgress
in transforming humanity, because in their eyes this effort had led

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- 48 -

illusion of Utopians. Nor is it possible to construct an order which will have no defenders of the status quo or no reformers, and the attempt to do so leads either to the frenzy of the totalitarian state or to stagnation. The health of a social structure is its ability to translate transformation into acceptance, to relate the forces of change to those of *mutatis mutandis* conservation. The statesmen at Vienna had experienced an effort to establish this relation by force; it was not strange that they attempted to construct an alternative based on "legitimacy".

Whatever one may think of the moral content of their solution, it excluded no major power from the European concert &c and therefore testified to the absence of unbridgeable schisms. The settlement did not rest on mere good faith, which would have put too great a strain on self-limitation; nor on the efficacy of a pure evaluation of power, which would have made calculation too k uncertain. Rather, there was created a structure in which the forces were sufficiently balanced, so that self-restraint could appear as something more than self-abnegation, but which took account of the historical claims of its components, so that *its existence could be translated into acceptance*. There existed within the new international order no power so dissatisfied that it did not prefer x to seek its remedy within the framework of the Vienna settlement rather than in overturning it. Since the political order did not contain a "revolutionary" power, its relations became increasingly spontaneous, based on the growing certainty that a catastrophic upheaval was unlikely.

appears was unlikely.

increasingly enthusiastic, based on the growing certainty that a casuistic order did not contain a "revolutionary" power, its relations became Vienna settlement rather than in overrunning it. Since the political that it did not deter x to seek its remedy within the framework of the There existed within the new international order no power so classified the combination, so that the absence could be translated into acceptance. Epistemology, put which took account of the historical claims of its so that self-restraint could abate as something more than self- was created a structure in which the forces were sufficiently balanced, which would have made calculation too uncertain. Rather, there on self-limitation: nor on the efficacy of a pure evaluation of power, not rest on mere good faith, which would have but too great a strain restricted to the absence of unpragmatic schemes. The settlement did it excange no major power from the European concert and therefore whatever one may think of the moral content of their solution, on "legitimacy".

was not strange that they attempted to construct an alternative based
had experienced an effort to establish this relation by force; it
change to those of maximum conservation. The statements at Vienna
translate transformation into acceptance, to relate the forces of
or to stagnation. The result of a social structure is its ability to
attempt to do so leads either to the trenth of the totalitarian state
will have no deterrers of the status quo no reformers, and the
inflation of Utopians. Nor is it possible to construct an order which

- 49 -

That the Vienna settlement came to be so generally accepted was not a fortunate accident. Throughout the war Castlereagh and Metternich had insisted that theirs was an effort for stability, not revenge, justified, not by crushing the enemy, but by his recognition of limits. This is not to say that the settlement revealed a prescience that made all events conform to a certain vision. Castlereagh, in giving up his conviction of the mechanical equilibrium for that of an historical balance, maintained through confidential intercourse among its members, increasingly separated himself from the spirit of his own country. Metternich, by attempting to maintain predominance in both Italy and Germany, was forced into a policy beyond his resources. His increasingly inflexible struggle for legitimacy revealed a growing consciousness of the insufficiency of Austria's material base for the European task he had set for her. If a policy of pure power is suicidal for an Empire located in the centre of a continent, reliance on unsupported legitimacy is demoralizing and leads to stagnation. Finesse can substitute for strength when the goals are fixed, but it is no substitute for conception when the challenges have become internal. And Prussia, with misgibings and hesitations, with a feeling of national humiliation and grudging surrender, was forced into a German mission in spite of itself. Extending now from the Vistula to the Rhine, it symbolized the quest for German unity. Scattered in enclaves across Central Europe, its need for security, if not its conception of a national mission, forced it into becoming, albeit reluctantly, the agent of a German policy. Situated athwart the major waterways and land routes, Prussia came

EIKK Situated atwart the major waterways and land routes, Prunates came
it into becoming, albeit reflectantly, the agent of a German policy.
its need for security, it not its conception of a national vision, forced
the quest for German unity. Scattered in enclaves across Central Europe,
abre of itself. Extending now from the Viennas to the Rhine, it espoused
pnmitation and brooding enmity, was forced into a German vision in
And Prussia, with stratagems and stratagems, with a feeling of national
it no appetite for conception when the challenge wave becomes internal.
Finances can appetite for strength when the bales are fixed, put it
on unburdened legitimacy is generalizing and leads to stagnation.
it autocidal for an Empire located in the center of a continent, reliance
for the European task he had set for her. It a policy of bare power
Growing consonances of the inconstancy of Austria, a material base
His increasingly intangible struggle for legitimacy revealed a Germ
in both Italy and Germany, was forced into a policy beyond his resources.
own country. Metternich, by attempting to maintain hegemony
its members, increasingly separated himself from the spirit of his
historical balance, maintained through confidential intercourse among
siving up his conviction of the mechanical equilibrium for that of an
that made all events conform to a certain vision. Castlereagh, in
of limits. This is not to say that the settlement revealed a precedence
revenge, justice, not by crushing the enemy, put by his recognition
Metternich had initiated that there was an effort for stability, not
was not a fortunate accident. Throughout the war Castlereagh and
that the Vienna settlement came to be so generally accepted

- 49 -

- - 50 -

to dominate Germany economically before it unified it physically.
The defeat in Saxony, so bitterly resented, became the instrument
of Prussia's final victory over Austria.

But this was still fifty years in the future, and a truly
successful policy may have been impossible for Austria in a century
of nationalism. Tragedy can be the fate of nations, no less than of
individuals, and its meaning may well reside in living in a world
with which one is no longer familiar. In this sense, Austria was
the Don Quixote of the nineteenth century. Perhaps Metternich's
policy should be measured, not by its ultimate failure, but by the
length of time it staved off inevitable disaster. As the Congress
of Vienna ended, disaster seemed to be transcended, however, For
the first time in twenty-five years statesmen could occupy themselves
with the problems of peace rather than war. This settlement proved
all the more lasting because the negotiators at Vienna did not confuse
the atmosphere of the conference table with the elements of stability
of the international system. A statesman cannot make the survival
of his charge entirely dependent on the continued good will of another
sovereign state; not only because he has no control over the continuation
of this good will, but more importantly because he best guarantee for
its remaining good is not to tempt it by too great a disproportion of
power. The Vienna settlement took into account this relationship of
security and legitimacy. It did not rest on unsupported good faith,
which would have put too great a strain on self-limitation; nor on the

which would have but too great a strain on self-limitation; nor on the
security and legitimacy. It did not rest on unamborted good faith,
butler. The Vienna settlement took into account this relationship of
its remaining good is not to tempt it by too great a disproportion of
of this good will, but more importantly because the best guarantee for
sovereign state; not only because he has no control over the continuation
of his charge entirely dependent on the continued good will of another
of the international system. A statesman cannot make the survival
the atmosphere of the conference table with the elements of stability
all the more lasting because the negotiators at Vienna did not confine
with the problems of peace rather than war. This settlement proved
the first time in twenty-five years statesmen could successfully
of Vienna ended, disaster seemed to be transcended, however. For
length of time it staved off inevitable disaster. As the Congress
policy should be measured, not by its ultimate failure, but by the
the Dow Jones index of the nineteenth century. Perhaps Metternich's
with which one is no longer familiar. In this sense, Austria was
individualist, and its meaning may well reside in living in a world
of nationality. Tragedy can be the fate of nations, no less than of
successful policy may have been impossible for Austria in a century
but this was still little years in the future, and a truly

of Brussels' final victory over Austria.
The degree in Saxony, so pitterily referenced, became the instrument
to dominate Germany economically before it united it physically.

- - 20 -

- 51 -

efficacy of a pure evaluation of power, which would have made calculation too indeterminate. Rather, there was created a structure in which the forces were sufficiently balanced, so that self-restraining could appear as something more than self-abnegation, but which took account of the historical claims of its components, so that it met general acceptance. No power felt so dissatisfied that it did not prefer to seek its remedy *within* the framework of the Vienna settlement rather than in overturning it. Since the international order did not contain a "revolutionary" power, either ideologically or in power terms, its relations became increasingly spontaneous, based on the growing certainty that a catastrophic upheaval was unlikely. The result was a century without a major war.

What then was the role of statesmanship in this achievement?
A scholarship of social determinism has reduced the statesman to a lever on a machine called "history", to the agent of a fate which he may dimly discern but which he accomplishes regardless of his will.
And this belief in the pervasiveness of circumstance and the impotence of the individual extends to the notion of policy-making. One hears a great deal about the contingency of planning because of the unavailability of fact, about the difficulty of action because of the limitation of knowledge. It cannot be denied, of course, that policy does not occur in a void, that the statesman is confronted with material

does not occur in a void, that the statesman is confronted with material
limitation of knowledge. It cannot be denied, of course, that policy
availability of fact, apart the difficulty of action because of the
a great deal apart the constantly of planning because of the nu-
of the individual extends to the notion of policy-making. One bears
And this pellet in the pervasiveness of circumstance and the impetus
be may dimly discern but which he accomplishes regardless of his will.
layer on a machine called "policy," to the agent of a late which
A scholarship of social determinism has reduced the statesman to a
What then was the role of statesman in this achievement?

13

Growing certainty that a catastrophicavalan was unlikely. The
term, its relations became increasingly aboutaneous, based on the
contain a "revolutionary" power, either ideologically or in power
rather than in overturning it. Since the international order did not
brier to seek its remedy within the framework of the Vienna settlement
General acceptance. No power felt so disastralled that it did not
account of the historical claims of its components, so that it met
conf abhor as something more than self-appraisal, put which took
in which the forces were sufficiently balanced, so that self-restraining
calculation too indeterminate. Rather, there was created a structure
efficacy of a pure evaluation of power, which would have made

- 21 -

- 52 -

he must treat as given. Not only geography and the availability of
resources trace the limitAs of statesmanship, but also the character
of the people and the nature of its historical experience. But to
say that policy does not create its own substance is not the same
as saying that the substance is self-implementing. The realization
that the Napoleonic Empire was tottering was the condition of policy
in 1813, but it was not itself a policy. That the period of revolution
should be replaced by an order ofequilibttum, that the assertion of the
will give way to an insistence on legitimacy may have been "in the
air". But one has only to study the vacillating measures of most
powers to appreciate that neither the nature of this equilibrium nor
the measures to attain it were immediately apparent. However "self-
evident" the national interest may appear in retrospect, contemporaries
were oppressed by the multiplicity of available policies, counselling
contradictory courses of action.

The test of a statesman, then, is his ability to recognize the
real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge serve his ends.
That Austria should seek stability was inherent in its geographic
position and domestic structure. But that it would succeed, if only
temporarily, in basing itself becoming the balance wheel of the international
order was the work of its Foreign Minister. That Great Britain should
attempt to find security in a balance of power was the consequence of
twenty-three years of intermittent warfare. But that it should emerge
as a part of the concert of Europe was due to the efforts of a solitary
individual. No policy is better, therefore, than the goals it sets itself.

individual. No policy is better, therefore, than the goals it sets itself. As a part of the concert of Europe was due to the efforts of a solitary twenty-three years of intermittent warlike. But that it should emerge attempt to find security in a balance of power was the consequence of order was the work of its Foreign Minister. That Great Britain should temporarly, in平衡 becoming the balance wheel of the international position and domestic structure. But that it would succeed, it only that Austria should seek stability was inherent in it. As geographic real relationship of forces and to make this knowledge serve its ends.

The test of a statesman, then, is his ability to recognise the contradictory courses of action.

were obviated by the multiplicity of available policies, concerning evident" the national interest may appear in retrospect, contemporaries the measures to attain it were immediately apparent. However "self-bowers to appreciate that neither the nature of this equilibrium nor air". But one has only to study the vacillating measures of most will give way to an instability on which we may have been "in the should be replaced by an order of equilibrium, that the succession of the in 1813, put it was not itself a policy. That the period of revolution that the whole European Empire was tottering was the condition of policy as asking that the substance is self-implementing. The relaxation say that policy does not create its own substance is not the same of the people and the nature of its historical experience. But to resources trace the limits of statesmanship, but also the character he must treat as given. Not only geography and the availability of

- 23 -

- 53 -

It was the measure of Castlereagh's statesmanship that he recognized the necessity of reconciliation with the former enemy in the construction of a legitimate order, as of Metternich's that he never confused the form and the substance of his achievements, that he understood that the Central Empire could survive, not on its triumphs, but only on its reconciliations. It was their failure that they set themselves tasks beyond the capacity of their material: Castlereagh through a vision beyond the conception of his domestic structure, Metternich through an effort unattainable in a century of nationalism.

But it is not sufficient to judge the statesman by his conceptions alone, for unlike the philosopher he must implement his vision. And the statesman is inevitably confronted by the inertia of his material, by the fact that other powers are not factors to be manipulated by forces to be reconciled; that the requirements of security differ with the geographic location and the domestic structure of the powers. His instrument is diplomacy, the art of relating states by agreement to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force, by the representation of a ground of action which reconciles particular aspirations with a general consensus. Because diplomacy depends on persuasion and not imposition, it presupposes a more or less fixed framework, either through an agreement on a legitimizing principle or, theoretically, through an identical interpretation of power-relationships, although the latter is in practice the most difficult to attain. The achievements of the Congress of Vienna were due in no small measure to the

achievements of the Congress of Vienna were due in no small measure to the
although the latter is in practice the most difficult to attain. The
theoretically, through an identical interpretation of power-relationships,
framework, either through an agreement on a legitimating principle or,
berenachung and not imposition, it broadens a more or less fixed
abstentions with a General consensus. Because diplomacy depends on
by the representation of a ground of action which reconciles particular
interests to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force,
of the powers. His instrument is diplomacy, the art of relating states
security dittler with the geographic location and the domestic structure
unified by forces to be reconciled; that the requirements of
the material, by the fact that other powers are not factors to be
vital. And the statesman is inevitably confronted by the inertia of
conceptions alone, for unlike the philosopher he must impose his
but it is not sufficient to judge the statesman by his
through an effort unattainable in a century of materialism.
vision beyond the conception of his domestic structure. Metternich
takes beyond the capacity of their material: Castlereagh through a
on its reconciliations. It was their failure that they set themselves
the Central Empire could survive, not on its triumph, but only
form and the substance of his achievements, that he understood that
of a legitimate order, as of Metternich's that he never confused the
necessity of reconciliation with the former enemy in the construction
It was the measure of Castlereagh's statesmanship that he recognized

- 23 -

- 54 -

extraordinary ability of at least three diplomats. Castlereagh's
skill in reconciling conflicting points of view and the single-
mindedness conferred by an empirical policy; Metternich almost
uncanny faculty of achieving a personal dominance over his ad-
versaries and his art of defining a moral framework which made
concessions appear, not as surrenders, but as sacrifices to a
common cause; Talleyrand's cynical cold-bloodedness which enabled
him to manipulate events when his opportunity came.

The acid test of a policy, however, is its ability to obtain
domestic support. This has two aspects: the problem of legitimizing
a policy within the governmental apparatus, which is a problem of
bureaucratic rationality; and that of harmonizing it with the national
experience, which is a problem of historical development. It was
no accident, even if it was paradoxical, that Metternich had greater
difficulty with the Austrian than with the Russian ministers, or that
Castlereagh had to fight a desperate battle with his Cabinet. For the
spirit of policy and that of bureaucracy are diametrically opposed.
The essence of policy is its contingency; its success depends on the
correctness of an estimate which is in part conjectural. The essence
of bureaucracy is its quest for safety; its success is calculability.
Profound policy thrives on perpetual creation, on a constant redefinition
of goals. Good administration thrives on routine, the definition of
relationships which can survive mediocrity. Policy involves an adjustment
of risks; administration an avoidance of deviation. Policy justifies

of risks: administration an avoidance of deviation. Policy jetties
relationship which can survive mediocrity. Policy involves an adjustment
of goals. Good administration strives on routine, the definition of
proceeding policy strives on hereditary creation, on a constant redefinition
of bureaucracy is its debt for safety; its success is calculability.
correctness of an estimate which is in part conjectural. The essence
The essence of policy is its contingency: its success depends on the
spirit of policy and that of bureaucracy are diametrically opposed.
Castlereagh had to fight a desperate battle with his Cabinet. For the
difficulty with the Austrian than with the Russian minister, or that
no accident, even it it was paradoxical, that Metternich had greater
experience, which is a problem of historical development. It was
puristocratic rationality; and that of harmonizing it with the national
a policy within the governmental apparatus, which is a problem of
domestic subport. This has two aspects: the problem of legitimising
The acid test of a policy, however, is its ability to obtain
him to manipulate events when preopportunity arise.

common cause: Talleyrand's classical cold-bloodedness which enabled
concessions appear, not as surrenders, but as sacrifices to a
versatility and his art of defining a moral framework which made
uncanny faculty of achieving a personal dominance over his ad-
ministration conferred by an empirical policy: Metternich's almost
skill in reconciling conflicting points of view and the single-
extraordinary ability of at least three diplomats. Castlereagh's

- 24 -

- 55 -

itself by the relationship of its measures and its sense of pro-
portion; administration by the rationality of each action in
terms of a given goal. The attempt to conduct policy bureaucratically
leads to a quest for calculability which tends to become a prisoner
of events. The effort to administer politically leads to total
irresponsibility, because bureaucracies are designed to execute, not
to conceive.

The temptation to conduct policy administratively is ever
present, because most governments are organized primarily for the
conduct of domestic policy, whose chief problem is the implemenation
of social decisions, a task which is limited only by its technical
feasibility. But the concern with technical problems in foreign
affairs leads to a standard which evaluates by mistakes avoided
rather than by goals achieved, and to a belief that ability is more
likely to be judged by the pre-vision of catastrophes than the
discovery of opportunities. It is not surprising that, at the height
of the dispute at Vienna in 1814, Vansittart simply denied the
reality of the Russian threat. The risks were immediately apparent,
while the dangers were either symbolic or deferred; the quest for
certainty took the form of denying the reality of the danger.

In addition to ask the obstacle of bureaucratic inertia, a
statesman will tend to have great difficulty legitimizing his policy
domestically, because of the incommensurability between a nation's
domestic and its international experience. The whole domestic effort

domestic and its international experience. The whole domestic effort
domestically, because of the incommensurability between a nation's
attainment will tend to have great difficulty legitimizing its policy
In addition to the obstacle of puerperal inertia, a
certainty took the form of denying the reality of the danger.

while the dangers were either academic or determined; the threat for
reality of the Russian threat. The risks were immediately apparent,
of the debate at Vienna in 1814. Venetian Italy denied the
discovery of opportunities. It is not surprising first, at the height
likely to be judged by the pre-attitude of catastrophes than the
rather than by Goals achieved, and to a point that ability is more
attainable leads to a standard which evaluates by mistakes avoided
responsibility. But the concern with technical problems in foreign
of social decisions, a task which is limited only by its technical
conduct of domestic policy, whose chief problem is the implementation
present, because most governments are organised primarily for the
The temptation to conduct policy administratively is ever
to conceive.

irresponsible, because puerperaacy are designed to execute, not
of events. The effort to administer politically leads to total
leada to a degree for calculability which tends to become a prisoner
terms of a given goal. The attempt to conduct policy puerperaacyly
beyond administration by the rationality of each action in
itself by the relationship of its measures and its sense of bro-

- 22 -

- 56 -

of a people exhibits an effort to transform force into obligation
by means of a consensus on the nature of justice. The more
spontaneous the pattern of obligation, the more "natural" and
"universal" will social values appear. Byt the international
experience of a people is a challenge to the universality of its
notion of justice, for the stability of an international order
depends on self-limitation, on the reconciliation of different
versions of legitimacy. A nation will evaluate a policy in
terms of its domestic legitimization, because it has no other
standard of judgment. But the effort to identify the legitimizing
principle of the international order with a parochial version of
justice must lead to a revolutionary situation, particularly if
the domestic legitimizing principles are sufficiently incommensurable.
If a society legitimizes itself by a principle which claims both
universailty and exclusiveness, if its concept of "justice", in short,
does not include the existence of different principles of legitimacy,
relations between it and other societies will come to be based on
force. For this reason competing systems of legitimacy x find it
extremely difficult to come to an understanding, not only
because they will not be able to agree on the nature of "just" demands,
but, perhaps more importantly, because they will not be able to
legitimize the attainable international consensus domestically.

legitimize the attainable international consensus domestically.
put, perhaps more importantly, because they will not be able to
because they will not be able to agree on the nature of "law" demands,
extrremely difficult to come to an understanding, not only
force. For this reason combating systems of legitimacy find it
relations between it and other societies will come to be based on
does not include the existence of different principles of legitimacy,
universality and exclusiveness, it its concept of "justice," in sport,
It a society legitimize itself by a principle which claims both
the domestic legitimating principles are sufficiently incommensurable.
justice must lead to a revolutionarily situation, particularly it
principle of the international order with a barocentric version of
standard of judgment. But the effort to identify the legitimizing
terms of its domestic legitimization, people it has no other
variations of legitimacy. A nation will evaluate a policy in
depend on self-limitation, on the reconciliation of different
notion of justice, for the stability of an international order
experience of a people is a challenge to the universality of its
"universal" will social values appear. But the international
abontaneous the pattern of obligation, the more "natural" and
by means of a consensus on the nature of justice. The more
of a people expedites an effort to transform force into obligation

- 20 -

EY

- 57 -

But even when there exists no fundamental ideological gulf, a nation's domestic experience will tend to inhibit its comprehension of foreign affiars. Domestically, the most difficult problem is an agreement on the nature of "justice". But internationally, the domestic consensus inherent in the def definition of a policy must often be compromised with a similar domestic consensus of other powers. Not for nothing do so many nations exhibit a powerful if sometimes subconscious, rebellion against this double standard which considers what is defines as "justice" domestically, merely an abject for negotiation internationally. Nor is it an accident that the vision of itself of so many societies is one of rectitude deprived of its birthright by the sharp practices of foreigners. For the impetus of domestic policy is a direct social experience; but that of foreign policy is not actual, but potential experience--the threat of war-- which statesmanship attempts to avoid being made explicit.

The statesman is therefore like one of the heroes in classical drama who has had a vision of the future but who cannot transmit it directly to his fellow-men and who cannot validate its "truth". Nations learn only by experience; they "know" only when it is too late to act, But statesmen must act as if their intuition were already experience, as if their aspiration were truth. It is for this reason that statesmen often share the fate of prophets, that they are without honour in their own country, that they always have a difficult task in legitimizing their programmes domestically, and that their greatness if usually

their programmes domestically, and that their greatness is usually
own country, that they always have a difficult task in legislating
often share the fate of prophecies, that they are without honour in their
as if their aspiration were truth. It is for this reason that statesmen
But statesmen must act as if their intuition were already experience,
learn only by experience; they "know" only when it is too late to act,
directly to his fellow-men and who cannot validate its "truth". Nations
dramas who has had a vision of the future but who cannot transmit it

which statesmen attempt to avoid being made explicit.
bpolicy is not actual, but potential experience--the threat of war--
of domestic policy is a direct social experience; but that of foreign
patriotism by the sharp practices of foreigners. For the民族
of itself ot so many societies is one of rectitude deprived of its
negotiation internationally. Nor is it an accident that the vision
what it defines as "justice" domestically, merely an affect for
superseances, rebellion against this double standard which considers
not for nothing do so many nations exhibit a powerful it sometimes
often be compromised with a similar domestic consensus of other powers.
the domestic consensus inherent in the 48 definition of a policy must
be an agreement on the nature of "justice". But internationally,
sion of foreign attitude. Domestically, the most difficult problem
a nation's domestic experience will tend to испить its compren-
d

But even when there exists no fundamental ideological cult,
the domestic consensus inherent in the 48 definition of a policy must
be an agreement on the nature of "justice". But internationally,
sion of foreign attitude. Domestically, the most difficult problem
a nation's domestic experience will tend to испить its compren-
d

- 23 -

- 58 -

apparent only in retrospect when their intuition has become experience.

The statesman must therefore be an educator; he must bridge the gap between a people's experience and his vision, between a nation's tradition and its future.

In this task, his possibilities are not infinite. But sometimes a happy combination of insight and circumstance produces an extraordinary result. This was the case with the Congress of Vienna which gave Europe a period of peace lasting nearly a century--the longest interval free of major war that the world has known since the Middle Ages.

the Middle Ages.

longest interval tree of major war that the world has known since
which gave Europe a period of peace lasting nearly a century--the
extraordinary result. This was the case with the Congress of Vienna
times a happy combination of insight and circumsidence produces an
In this task, his capabilities are not infinite. But some-
tradition and its future.

between a people's experience and his vision, between a nation's
The statesman must therefore be an educator; he must bridge the gap
abherent only in retrospect when their intuition has become experience.

- 28 -

November 6, 1963

Mr. Edward Ziegler
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
757 Third Avenue
New York 17, New York

Dear Mr. Ziegler:

Thank you for your letter
of October 28th with the kind comments
of Alan Westing.

I will attempt to make the
suggested insertion on "1815 and 1963-
65 East-West detente" when the manuscript
is returned to me.

Best regards.

Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

757 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK 17, N.Y. 572-5000 CABLE: HARBRACE

October 28, 1963

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Alan Westin has now had a chance to read through your case, to respond to our suggested additions, and to send his comments on to us. In general, he feels that you have presented an excellent discussion of the Congress of Vienna. He did make one suggestion and we pass it on to you with the hope that it is not too late to insert a page at the end of the manuscript. Mr. Westin would like, as he says:

"just one page on 1815 and 1963-65
East-West detente..." "If Henry would
wax comparative for one page at the end,
on the parallels to the present problem
of world settlement, we would be in
clover."

We hope that you are agreeable to this suggestion and that it will be possible to add some such brief paragraph when the fully copyedited manuscript comes back for your final examination before typesetting, which should be within several weeks.

EZ/lke

cc: Professor John G. Stoessinger
Professor Alan F. Westin

October 8, 1963

Dear Mr. Ziegler:

At Mr. Stoessinger's request, I am
enclosing herewith the edited manuscript
on the Congress of Vienna.

I have looked it over and it is
agreeable with me for you to go ahead
with the publication.

Kind regards,

Columbia University
in the City of New York

NEW YORK 27, N.Y.

SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

3 October 1963

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Divinity Ave,
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry:

I am enclosing your case on the Congress
of Vienna as edited by Ted Ziegler of
Harcourt, Brace, Alan Westin, and myself.

In essence, nothing has been done to dis-
turb your powerful analysis. A headnote
has been added to make the case conform
to the general format, a few light anec-
dotes have been included to lighten the
fare for the undergraduate, and some minor
editing of style and presentation has been
attempted.

Since speed is of the essence, could you
look the manuscript over right away and send
it with your comments direct to Ted Ziegler
at Harcourt, Brace, at 757 Third Avenue,
New York 17, N.Y. +and Inc.

We are all delighted with the case and pub-
lication plans continue on schedule.

Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

September 13, 1963

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

It is with great pleasure that I enclose our check for $150, covering
the balance of your royalty advance for your case, "The Congress of
Vienna," for our casebook POWER AND ORDER: 6 Cases in World Politics.

John Stoessinger has read your case as have I, and we agree that it is
just what we had hoped for -- with just a few quibbles. The beginning,
we feel, may need a minor adjustment or two to bring it into closer
alignment with the other cases. In any event, we await Alan Westin's
response before detailing our suggestions. Mr. Westin is on the high seas
just now, enroute to Italy for a year. In his hand, nevertheless, is a
xerox copy of your case. We expect his response directly after his arrival
in Rome -- about seven days.

I'll be writing further then, if I may, to convey these small suggestions
for your consideration. We'll try to set it up on a "yes-no" basis, not
on a fill-in-the-blank basis, thereby reducing the necessity for choice,
we hope, to agreeable limits.

Best wishes,

Edward Ziegler
Associate Editor
College Department

EZ/lke
enc.

cc: Professor Alan F. Westin
Professor John G. Stoessinger

P. S. Our renewed thanks to Mrs. Jones for sending on the missing page 13
so quickly.

September 11, 1963

Mr. John G. Stoessinger
School of International Relations
Columbia University
New York 27, New York

Dear John:

Thank you for your note of
September 4th. I am glad you liked the
chapter.

You mentioned the balance of the
advance. Did I ever get one? Given/my
chaotic administrative practices, it is
quite possible that I did.

Kind regards.

Henry V. Kissinger

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

quite possible that I did.
chaotic administrative practice, it is
advance. Did I ever get one? Given\my
You mentioned the balance of the

chapter.

September 4th. I am glad you liked the
Thank you for your note of

Dear John:

New York 23, New York
Columbia University
School of International Relations
Mr. John G. Stossinger

September 11, 1963

NEW YORK 27, N. Y.

4 September 1963

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Studies
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry:

Just a note to thank you for your manuscript
which has arrived safely.

I have read it through and it is in excellent
shape! I have just passed it on to Mr.
Edward Ziegler, the Harcourt, Brace Editor,
who will go over it for minor editorial sug-
gestions. If he has any, he will shortly
submit them for your approval.

You should also receive shortly the balance
of $150.- on your advance on the book.

Looks like we shall have a book by March 1st.

NEW YORK 27, N.Y.

16 August 1963

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for your letter promising
to send the case on the Congress of
Vienna "at the beginning of September."

The book is progressing very well. All
the other cases are in and publication
date has been set for March 1, 1964 in
order to catch the fall market. Hence,
we all hope that "beginning of September"
may mean very close to the first.

Please send the manuscript directly to
me at my home address at 295 Central Park
West, New York 24, N.Y.

Best wishes for a good year ahead.

P.S. I am looking forward again to your
lecture to the International Fellows
this coming fall.

November 13, 1962

Mr. John G. Stoessinger
Columbia University
School of International Affairs
New York 27, New York

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of October 26th. I appreciate your asking me to contribute to the casebook you and Alan are preparing and will be glad to do so. There are a few points to be clarified, however: when would this be needed, and can it be an actual condensation or must it be a complete rewrite, or a combination of the two? I would prefer the latter.

I look forward to hearing more from you about this.

Kind regards.

NEW YORK 27, N.Y.

26 October 1962

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Department of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Dear Henry:

Alan Westin and I are preparing a casebook in international relations patterned after Alan's *Uses of Power* which has been eminently successful in American colleges and universities. We are doing the book with Harcourt Brace and are planning five cases in depth: classical diplomacy, modern diplomacy, alliances, colonialism, and the UN. James Wadsworth, Bob Osgood, Gray Cowan, and myself are doing the second, third, fourth, and fifth topics respectively.

It is our great hope that you will consent to do the first. I have always felt that, in many ways, your *The World Restored* is your finest and also most neglected work. Given your complete mastery of the topic of the Congress of Vienna, we feel that you could easily condense your major insights on the Congress, especially your brilliant final chapter, into 50 or 60 pages. It could probably be done in two weeks or less as the authors of *The Uses of Power* found. I have always assigned *A World Restored* to my students, both graduate and undergraduate, and feel very strongly that this work should reach a very wide audience.

The book will be roughly 200 pages in length and royalty will be 1% for each case author. On the Westin book precedent, we hope for an annual sale of about 20,000 copies a year; probably more because there are very few casebooks (and all too many"readings books) in our field. Hence, the possible compensation for pulling a case out of your completed scholarship would be more than minor. Perhaps more important, your insights on the Congress of Vienna, more timely now than ever, ought to reach the widest possible audience.

Thank you for your generous comments on my *The Might of Nations* and I am looking forward to welcoming you soon at your lecture to the International Fellows at Columbia.

- 53 -

It was the measure of Castlereagh's statesmanship that he recognized the precedence of integration over retribution in the construction of a legitimate order, as of Metternich's that he never confused the form and the substance of his achievements, that he understood that the Central Empire could survive, not on its triumphs, but only on its reconciliations. It was their failure that they set themselves tasks beyond the capacity of their material: Castlereagh through a vision beyond the conception of his domestic structure, Metternich through an effort unattainable in a century of nationalism.

But it is not sufficient to judge the statesman by his conceptions alone, for unlike the philosopher he must implement his vision. And the statesman is inevitably confronted by the inertia of his material, by the fact that oehr powers are not factors to be manipulated but forces to be reconciled; that the requirements of security differ with the geographic location and the domestic structure of the powers. His instrument is diplomacy, the art of relating states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force, by the representation of a ground of action which reconciles states to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force, by the representation of a ground of action which reconciles particular aspirations with a general consensus. Because diplomacy depends on persuasion and not imposition, it presupposes a more or less fixed framework, either through an agreement on a legitimizing principle or, theoretically, through an identical interpretation of power-relationships, although the latter is in practice the most difficult to attain. The achievements of the Congress of Vienna were due to it in no small measure to the

- 53 -

But it is not sufficient to judge the statesman by his
conceptions alone, for unlike the philosopher he must implement his
vision. And the statesman is inevitably confronted by the inertia of
his material, by the fact that other powers are not factors to be
manipulated but forces to be reconciled; that the requirements of
security differ with the geographic location and the domestic structure
of the powers. His instrument is diplomacy, the art of relating states
to each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force, by
the representation of a ground of action which reconciles states to
each other by agreement rather than by the exercise of force, by the
representation of a ground of action which reconciles particular aspirations
with a general consensus. Because diplomacy depends on persuasion
and not imposition, it presupposes a more or less fixed framework, either
through an agreement on a legitimizing principle or, theoretically,
through an identical interpretation of power-relationships, although
the latter is in practice the most difficult to attain. The achievements
of the Congress of Vienna were due in no small measure to the

Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

November 15, 1963

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
104 Fletcher Road
Belmont, Massachusetts

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Enclosed here is the fully edited manuscript of your case-study "Classical Diplomacy: The Congress of Vienna," for your examination and approval. As you will see, after the house editing, and the earlier exchange between us, our copyeditors have gone over the manuscript with their customary meticulous care. Several problems and ambiguities seem to remain, as the flap-like tabs will suggest. There are three major queries on these flaps and several additional blue-circled marginal queries. These latter indicate suggested rephrasings here and there and are offered for your consideration and approval or disapproval. With the addition of a final paragraph in line with Alan Westin's suggestion (a paragraph to evoke the world of 1963 more clearly), we should be through with our demands.

As the various colored inks will attest, several of us have been through the manuscript, and each of us is as high as the next in its praise, I should inject; we are very excited about it and about the book itself. The various inks are as follows: black and green are me -- except for the front-page notation in red in my hand. Blue is the copyeditor and red the second copyeditor, a specialist in political science, who helped us with headings and the like. The typed queries are from the blue-pencil copyeditor, as well.

We have been concerned about our schedule for some weeks. Normally, going to press this late would rule out the possibility of 1964 publication, particularly in view of Harcourt's fixed rule that no College Department book can be issued later than March 15. So to assure ourselves publication within that limit, we have decided to set straight to page, which means we will be dispensing with the usual first step of galley proof. Furthermore, to simplify and speed things on, Alan, John, and I have agreed to withdraw cartoons as an illustration device. As it developed, the pickings were meager anyway, but with our schedule difficulties, the choice seemed all the more rational. We are going to have maps in two cases, however; your own -- Europe 1810 and Europe After the Congress, 1815 -- and the Ghana case. When we have artwork, I'll be sending it along for your examination.

Professor Kissinger

November 15, 1963

Page 2

Can we ask this, then: Will you look over the enclosed manuscript with all possible haste, bearing in mind that we would like your cooperation in avoiding corrections of sizable extent once proof is in hand. Let what changes seem urgent be made at this point, if possible, so that we do not get into the extreme difficulty of renumbering pages later as a result of large corrections. We are asking all authors the same thing, and we have also asked them to turn their cases around within 48 hours. Would it be possible for us to have this case returned, then, by Tuesday November 19 by registered first-class mail? I hope so.

Best wishes,

EZ/lke
Enc.

cc: John G. Stoessinger
Alan F. Westin

December 16, 1963

Professor Alan F. Westin
Via Prisciano, 26
Rome, Italy

Professor John G. Stoessinger
295 Central Park West
New York 24, New York

Professor L. Gray Cown
Department of Public Law
and Government
Columbia University
New York 27, New York

Professor Quincy Wright
Department of Foreign
Affairs
Cabell Hall 232
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia

Professor Robert Osgood
The Washington Center of
Foreign Policy Research
1740 Massachusetts Avenue
Washington, D.C.

The Honorable James J. Wadsworth
Suite 844, Pennsylvania Building
425 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington 4, D.C.

Gentlemen:

Our Production Department reports the following schedule for POWER AND ORDER: 6 Cases in World Politics.

Galley proof will be coming here December 16-26. Our production people felt that it was imperative to go ahead with the first step despite our earlier plans, so we have. We will have to ask that you give us your clearance on or before January 15. Hopefully we will be able to get corrected galley proof in your hands within a week of its receipt here so that authors of early cases will be seeing proof probably beginning on or about the 27th. Page proof then should come to you on January 23. Again we hope to have your clearance by January 28.

May I introduce at this point the copyeditor who will be handling traffic and to whom your proof should be returned. Her name is Barbara Bengen and I'm sure that you will have occasion to remark her efficiency and skill, as have we here. She will be writing further with detailed information very soon.

We are all very excited about the book and its prospects and we hope that Christmas with galley proof won't be too unwelcome a burden.

Best wishes,

Edward Ziegler

EZ/like

RZ/LRE

Edward Ziegler

Best wishes,

with Belfley brood now, so too welcome a present.

We are all very excited about the prospect and its prospects and we hope that Christmas

will bring further with detailed information very soon.

Have occasion to remain very efficient and skillful, as we have now. She will be
your brood should be returned. Her name is Serpentine and I'm sure that you will
be very pleased with her condition. My thanks for her delivery and I'm sure that you will

have to have your clearance by January 28.
on or upon the 31st. Bate brood then should come to you on Tuesday 23. When we
the receipts have so that authors of early cases will be seeing brood properly beginning
hereafter as will be able to get corrected Belfley brood in your puge within a week of
leave. We will have to ask that you give us your clearance on or before Tuesday 12.
it was impressive to go spent with the first step because our earlier claims, so do we
Gelley brood will be coming here December 19-20. Our projection becalpe left that

Case in World Politics.

Our Projection Department reports the following schedule for TONER AND GROOVE: 2

Gentlemen:

Washington 4, D.C.
422 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Suite 544, Pennsylvania Building
The Honoree Tense 1, Washington

Charlottetown, Canada
University of Alberta
Capell Hall 525
Aukletta
Department of Foreign
Professor Grunch Krigler

Cambridge, Massachusetts
& Divinity Avenue
Harvard University
Center for International Aukletta
Professor Henry Krieger.

Washington, D.C.
1740 Massachusetts Avenue
Foreign Policy Research
The Washington Center of
Professor Robert Gelbman

New York 21, New York
Columbia University
and Government
Department of Public Health
Professor J. Gray Gesell

New York 21, New York
282 Central Park West
Professor John G. Stoeßler

Rome, Italy
Ateletica, 30
Professor Vian E. Westin

December 19, 1963

January 10, 1964

Miss Barbara Bengen
Copyeditor
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.
757 Third Avenue
New York 17, New York

My dear Miss Bengen:

I am returning the galleys as
you requested only a day late which
for me is a record.

I think I have answered all your
queries. Where I have ignored them,
the text should stand as it is.

Let me say that I think your
editorial suggestions have been extremely
sensitive--the most useful comments I
have ever received.

Best regards.

Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

January 2, 1964

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Here is a set of marked galleys, along with corresponding manuscript pages, for your case "The Congress of Vienna" in Power and Order. Galleys and manuscript should be returned to Harcourt, addressed to me in the College Department, after you've read them, answered the queries, and made any additional corrections you find necessary. Please return galleys to me by Friday, January 10, if possible. Also, please mail them registered first class.

You are undoubtedly familiar with these "ground rules" on galley proof: the printer charges per line for corrections, so resetting one line will always cost less than resetting two, no matter how many words are changed in each. Adding a phrase at the beginning of a paragraph will involve resetting to the end unless an equal amount is deleted. (You may notice that occasional minor word changes have been made in galleys to avoid extensive resetting for a correction; if you have preferred wordings, please change accordingly.) Since I've used red ink to make corrections and queries, please use another color when you mark galleys and make corrections in the margins so we'll be sure to spot them. It would help us if you would type corrections that are longer than two or three lines so we don't make errors in transcribing them. Also, please don't make corrections or answer queries on the manuscript as we don't look back at it again.

I think your case would be a bargain hunter's delight -- it's so tremendously compressed: you get not only detailed specifics on the "cast of characters" and events of the Congress but all sorts of analytical observations that make the case relevant to current international politics. I particularly enjoyed working on it.

BB/ew
Encl.