[195] May 14

Public Papers of the Presidents

In pursuing our limited objective, we insist on no rigid diplomatic formula. Peace could be achieved by a formal negotiated settlement. Peace could be achieved by an informal understanding, provided that the understanding is clear, and that there were adequate assurances that it would be observed. Peace on paper is not as important as peace in fact.

And so this brings us to the matter of negotiations.

We must recognize that peace in Vietnam cannot be achieved overnight. A war that has raged for many years will require detailed negotiations and cannot be settled by a single stroke.

What kind of a settlement will permit the South Vietnamese people to determine freely their own political future? Such a settlement will require the withdrawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces, including our own, from South Vietnam, and procedures for political choice that give each significant group in South Vietnam a real opportunity to participate in the political life of the nation.

To implement these principles, I re-affirm now our willingness to withdraw our forces on a specified timetable. We ask only that North Vietnam withdraw its forces from South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos into North Vietnam, also in accordance with a timetable.

We include Cambodia and Laos-to-ensure that these countries would not be used as bases for a renewed war.

Our offer provides for a simultaneous start on withdrawal by both sides, for agreement on a mutually acceptable timetable, and for the withdrawal to be accomplished quickly.

The North Vietnamese delegates have been saying in Paris that political issues

should be discussed along with military issues, and that there must be a political settlement in the South. We do not dispute this, but the military withdrawal involves outside forces, and can, therefore, be properly negotiated by North Vietnam and the United States, with the concurrence of its allies.

The political settlement is an internal matter which ought to be decided among the South Vietnamese themselves, and not imposed by outsiders. However, if our presence at these political negotiations would be helpful, and if the South Vietnamese concerned agreed, we would be willing to participate, along with the representatives of Hanoi, if that also were desired.

Recent statements by President Thieu have gone far toward opening the way to a political settlement. He has publicly declared his Government's willingness to discuss a political solution with the National Liberation Front, and has offered free elections. This was a dramatic step forward, a reasonable offer that could lead to a settlement. The South Vietnamese Government has offered to talk without preconditions. I believe the other side should also be willing to talk without preconditions.

The South Vietnamese Government recognizes, as we do, that a settlement must permit all persons and groups that are prepared to renounce the use of force to participate freely in the political life of South Vietnam. To be effective, such a settlement would require two things: first, a process that would allow the South Vietnamese people to express their choice, and, second, a guarantee that this process would be a fair one.

We do not insist on a particular form

of guarantee. The import of the guarantees should have been clear enough to protect the major South Vietnamese

This, then, is the outcome that we seek to achieve. Its basic terms are very withdrawal of non-South forces from South Vietnam, choice for the people of I believe that the long peace require that we insist that the realities of the world that we seek no more.

And now, to make very clear, I propose the following measures which seem to me to be the principles of all proposals are made on the basis of a consultation with President Ho Chi Minh. —As soon as agreement is reached, all non-South Vietnamese forces will begin withdrawal from South Vietnam.

Over a period of agreed-upon stages, all of all U.S. and non-South Vietnamese forces will be withdrawn. At the month period, the northern forces will be replaced by southern forces, and other northern forces would be withdrawn. The remaining U.S. and southern forces were withdrawn to North Vietnam.

An international supplementary plan for withdrawal is acceptable to both sides.

372

ed along with military
there must be a political
South. We do not dis-
military withdrawal in-
volves, and can, therefore,
iated by North Vietnam
States, with the concur-

settlement is an internal
right to be decided among
South Vietnamese themselves, and
outsiders. However, if our
the political negotiations
and if the South Viet-
nam agreed, we would be
oppose along with the rep-
port that also were

ments by President Thieu
ward opening the way
to a settlement. He has publicly
government's willingness to
a solution with the Na-
Front, and has offered
this was a dramatic step
able offer that could
ment. The South Viet-
nam has offered to talk
tions. I believe the other
be willing to talk with-

Vietnamese Government
do, that a settlement
persons and groups that
enounce the use of force
e in the political life of
To be effective, such a
require two things: first,
would allow the South Viet-
to express their choice,
argue that this process
ne of the way to be
ist on a particular form

of guarantee. The important thing is that
the guarantees should have the confidence
of the South Vietnamese people, and that
they should be broad enough and strong
enough to protect the interests of all
major South Vietnamese groups.

This, then, is the outline of the settle-
ment that we seek to negotiate in Paris.
Its basic terms are very simple: mutual
withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese
forces from South Vietnam and free
choice for the people of South Vietnam.
I believe that the long-term interests of
peace require that we insist on no less, and
that the realities of the situation require
that we seek no more.

And now, to make very concrete what I
have said, I propose the following specific
measures which seem to me consistent
with the principles of all parties. These
proposals are made on the basis of full
consultation with President Thieu.

- As soon as agreement can be reached, all non-South Vietnamese forces would begin withdrawals from South Vietnam.

- Over a period of 12 months, by agreed-upon stages, the major portions of all U.S., allied, and other non-South Vietnamese forces would be withdrawn. At the end of this 12-month period, the remaining U.S., allied, and other non-South Vietnamese forces would move into designated base areas and would not engage in combat operations.

- The remaining U.S. and allied forces would complete their withdrawals as the remaining North Vietnamese forces were withdrawn and returned to North Vietnam.

- An international supervisory body, acceptable to both sides, would be

created for the purpose of verifying
withdrawals, and for any other pur-
poses agreed upon between the two
sides.

- This international body would begin operating in accordance with an agreed timetable and would participate in arranging supervised cease-fires in Vietnam.

- As soon as possible after the international body was functioning, elections would be held under agreed procedures and under the supervision of the international body.

- Arrangements would be made for the release of prisoners of war on both sides at the earliest possible time.

- All parties would agree to observe the Geneva Accords of 1954 regarding South Vietnam and Cambodia, and the Laos Accords of 1962.

I believe this proposal for peace is realistic, and takes account of the legitimate interests of all concerned. It is consistent with President Thieu's six points. It can accommodate the various programs put forth by the other side. We and the Government of South Vietnam are prepared to discuss the details with the other side.

Secretary Rogers is now in Saigon and
he will be discussing with President Thieu
how, together, we may put forward these
proposed measures most usefully in Paris.
He will, as well, be consulting with our
other Asian allies on these measures while
on his Asian trip. However, I would stress
that these proposals are not offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis. We are quite
willing to consider other approaches con-
sistent with our principles.

We are willing to talk about anybody's
program—Hanoi's 4 points, the NLF's

Richard Nixon, 1969

May 14 [195]

ELC3

373

[195] May 14

[National Liberation Front] 10 points—
provided it can be made consistent with
the very few basic principles I have set
forth here tonight.

Despite our disagreement with several
of its points, we welcome the fact that the
NLF has put forward its first comprehen-
sive program. We are studying that pro-
gram carefully. However, we cannot
ignore the fact that immediately after the
offer, the scale of enemy attacks stepped
up and American casualties in Vietnam
increased.

Let me make one point clear. If the
enemy wants peace with the United States,
that is not the way to get it.

I have set forth a peace program tonight
which is generous in its terms. I have in-
dicated our willingness to consider other
proposals. But no greater mistake could
be made than to confuse flexibility with
weakness or of being reasonable with lack
of resolution. I must also make clear, in
all candor, that if the needless suffering
continues, this will affect other decisions.
Nobody has anything to gain by delay.

Reports from Hanoi indicate that the
enemy has given up hope for a military
victory in South Vietnam, but is counting
on a collapse of American will in the
United States. There could be no greater
error in judgment.

Let me be quite blunt. Our fighting
men are not going to be worn down; our
mediators are not going to be talked
down; and our allies are not going to be
let down.

My fellow Americans, I have seen the
ugly face of war in Vietnam. I have seen
the wounded in field hospitals—American
boys, South Vietnamese boys, North Viet-
namese boys. They were different in many
ways—the color of their skins, their
religions, their races; some were enemies;

some were friends.

But the differences were small, com-
pared with how they were alike. They
were brave men, and they were so young.
Their lives—their dreams for the future—
had been shattered by a war over which
they had no control.

With all the moral authority of the
Office which I hold, I say that America
could have no greater and prouder role
than to help to end this war in a way
which will bring nearer that day in which
we can have a world order in which
people can live together in peace and
friendship.

I do not criticize those who disagree
with me on the conduct of our peace nego-
tiations. And I do not ask unlimited
patience from a people whose hopes for
peace have too often been raised and
then cruelly dashed over the past 4 years.

I have tried to present the facts about
Vietnam with complete honesty, and I
shall continue to do so in my reports to
the American people.

Tonight, all I ask is that you consider
these facts, and, whatever our differences,
that you support a program which can
lead to a peace we can live with and a
peace we can be proud of. Nothing could
have a greater effect in convincing the
enemy that he should negotiate in good
faith than to see the American people
united behind a generous and reasonable
peace offer.

In my campaign for the Presidency, I
pledged to end this war in a way that
would increase our chances to win true
and lasting peace in Vietnam, in the
Pacific, and in the world. I am deter-
mined to keep that pledge. If I fail to do
so, I expect the American people to hold
me accountable for that failure.

But while I will never raise false ex-

pectations, my deepest hope
is that you will
not look back on this day,
turning point when Am-
moved us off dead cen-
ters to the time when this
brought to an end and w-
able to devote the unlimited

196 Remarks Follow
Henry Cabot
Peace Talks.

Ladies and gentlemen:

Ambassador Lodge, Mr.
and Mr. Habib were here
of the Cabinet and the Se-
and helped to brief the
situation in Vietnam and in

They are the senior
negotiating team in Paris
ately after this meeting w-
Paris for the plenary session
meeting, which will take p

Ambassador Lodge does

197 Letter Acceptance
Associate Just-
the United St

Dear Mr. Justice Fortas:

I have received your let-
ter and I accept it, effec-
tive date.

With sincere personal re-


RICH

[Mr. Justice Abe Fortas, Un-
preme Court, Washington, D.

NOTE: Justice Abe Fortas' lette-
dated May 14, 1969, and releas-
House Press Office along with

374

Richard Nixon, 1969

May 15 [197]

pectations, my deepest hope, as I speak
to you tonight, is that we shall be able
to look back on this day, at that critical
turning point when American initiative
moved us off dead center, and forward
to the time when this war would be
brought to an end and when we shall be
able to devote the unlimited energies and

dedication of the American people to the
exciting challenges of peace.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10 p.m. in the Theater at the White House. His address was broadcast on radio and television.

On the same day, the White House Press Office released an advance text of the President's address to the Nation on Vietnam.

196 Remarks Following a Meeting With Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge on Vietnam and the Paris Peace Talks. May 15, 1969

Ladies and gentlemen:

Ambassador Lodge, Ambassador Walsh,
and Mr. Habib were here for the meeting
of the Cabinet and the Security Council,
and helped to brief the Council on the
situation in Vietnam and in Paris.

They are the senior members of our
negotiating team in Paris, and immedi-
ately after this meeting will be flying to
Paris for the plenary session of the Paris
meeting, which will take place tomorrow.

Ambassador Lodge does have time to

answer a few questions before he leaves,
and I will present him to you now. &
Mr. Ambassador.

[At this point Ambassador Lodge answered questions from reporters.]

NOTE: The President spoke at 11:55 a.m. in the Rose Garden at the White House. Ambassador Lawrence E. Walsh was Deputy Chief and Philip C. Habib was chief adviser of the U.S. delegation to the Paris meetings on Vietnam.

The text of Ambassador Lodge's news brief-
ing is printed in the Weekly Compilation of
Presidential Documents (vol. 5, p. 699).

197 Letter Accepting the Resignation of Abe Fortas as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. May 15, 1969

Dear Mr. Justice Fortas:

I have received your letter of resigna-
tion and I accept it, effective as of its
date.

With sincere personal regards,

RICHARD NIXON

[Mr. Justice Abe Fortas, United States Su-
preme Court, Washington, D.C.]

NOTE: Justice Abe Fortas' letter of resignation, dated May 14, 1969, and released by the White House Press Office along with the President's

letter on May 15, 1969, read as follows:

My dear Mr. President:

For the reasons expressed in a letter of this
date which I have written to the Chief Justice,
a copy of which, with his permission, I enclose,
I wish hereby to tender my resignation as an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, which,
with your approval, will be effective as of this
date.

I have appreciated the opportunity to serve
the country and the Court during these past
years as an Associate Justice.

Very truly yours,

ABE FORTAS

375

Richard Nixon, 1969

Nov. 3 [425]

As we look together down the closing decades of this century, we see tasks that summon the very best that is in us. But those tasks are difficult precisely because they do mean the difference between despair and fulfillment for most of the 600 million people who will live in Latin America in the year 2000. Those lives are our challenge. Those lives are our hope. And we could ask no prouder reward than to have our efforts crowned by peace, prosperity, and dignity in the lives of those 600 million human beings—

in Latin America and in the United States—each so precious, each so unique—our children and our legacy.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:35 p.m. at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

Copies of the advance text of the President's remarks were sent to Presidents Emilio Garras-tazu Medici of Brazil, Carlos Lleras Restrepo of Colombia, José Joaquín Trejos Fernandez of Costa Rica, and Gustavo Diaz Ordaz of Mexico. Letters of appreciation from the Latin Ameri-can Presidents are printed in the Weekly Com-pilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 5, pp. 1565-1566 and 1627).

## 425 Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam.

November 3, 1969

Good evening, my fellow Americans:

Tonight I want to talk to you on a subject of deep concern to all Americans and to many people in all parts of the world—the war in Vietnam.

I believe that one of the reasons for the deep division about Vietnam is that many Americans have lost confidence in what their Government has told them about our policy. The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace unless they know the truth about that policy.

Tonight, therefore, I would like to answer some of the questions that I know are on the minds of many of you listening to me.

How and why did America get involved in Vietnam in the first place?

How has this administration changed the policy of the previous administration?

What has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battle-front in Vietnam?

What choices do we have if we are to

end the war?

What are the prospects for peace?

Now, let me begin by describing the situation I found when I was inaugurated on January 20.

- The war had been going on for 4 years.

- 31,000 Americans had been killed in action.

- The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule.

- 540,000 Americans were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number.

- No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal.

- The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad.

In view of these circumstances there were some who urged that I end the war at once by ordering the immediate withdrawal of all American forces.

From a political standpoint this would

901

[425] Nov. 3

have been a popular and easy course to follow. After all, we became involved in the war while my predecessor was in office. I could blame the defeat which would be the result of my action on him and come out as the peacemaker. Some put it to me quite bluntly: This was the only way to avoid allowing Johnson's war to become Nixon's war.

But I had a greater obligation than to think only of the years of my administration and of the next election. I had to think of the effect of my decision on the next generation and on the future of peace and freedom in America and in the world.

Let us all understand that the question before us is not whether some Americans are for peace and some Americans are against peace. The question at issue is not whether Johnson's war becomes Nixon's war.

The great question is: How can we win America's peace?

Well, let us turn now to the fundamental issue. Why and how did the United States become involved in Vietnam in the first place?

Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution.

In response to the request of the Government of South Vietnam, President Eisenhower sent economic aid and military equipment to assist the people of South Vietnam in their efforts to prevent a Communist takeover. Seven years ago, President Kennedy sent 16,000 military personnel to Vietnam as combat advisers. Four years ago, President Johnson sent American combat forces to South Vietnam.

Now, many believe that President Johnson's decision to send American combat forces to South Vietnam was wrong. And many others—I among them—have been strongly critical of the way the war has been conducted.

But the question facing us today is: Now that we are in the war, what is the best way to end it?

In January I could only conclude that the precipitate withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would be a disaster not only for South Vietnam but for the United States and for the cause of peace.

For the South Vietnamese, our precipitate withdrawal would inevitably allow the Communists to repeat the massacres which followed their takeover in the North 15 years before.

- They then murdered more than 50,000 people and hundreds of thousands more died in slave labor camps.

- We saw a prelude of what would happen in South Vietnam when the Communists entered the city of Hue last year. During their brief rule there, there was a bloody reign of terror in which 3,000 civilians were clubbed, shot to death, and buried in mass graves.

- With the sudden collapse of our support, these atrocities of Hue would become the nightmare of the entire nation—and particularly for the million and a half Catholic refugees who fled to South Vietnam when the Communists took over in the North.

For the United States, this first defeat in our Nation's history would result in a collapse of confidence in American leadership, not only in Asia but throughout the world.

Three American Presidents have recognized the great stakes involved in Viet-

g02

[LC]

nam and understood what had

In 1963, President Kennedy characteristic eloquence said: "... we want to see an end to the war, and that is what we want to see. We want to see an end to the war and to maintain its national independence."

"We believe strongly in the right to self-determination for all peoples. We believe that not going to withdraw from South Vietnam is not only not going to withdraw from South Vietnam, but it is not going to withdraw from any part of South Vietnam, but we are going to stay there."

President Eisenhower and Johnson expressed the same opinion during their terms of office.

For the future of peace withdrawal would thus be an immense magnitude.

- A nation cannot remain at war without its allies and true friends.

- Our defeat and humiliation in Vietnam without our promoting recklessness of those great powers, yet abandoned their cause of war and their conquest.

- This would spark a war of self-determination in the Middle East, but our commitments to peace—in the Middle East—eventually even in the Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would mean that we would not bring more war.

For these reasons, I recommend that I should immediately withdraw from South Vietnam, and I chose instead to change the nature of our战在 front.

In order to end a war, I initiated a program of withdrawal from many fronts.

[tc]

Richard Nixon, 1969

Nov. 3 [425]

nam and understood what had to be done.

In 1963, President Kennedy, with his characteristic eloquence and clarity, said: "... we want to see a stable government there, carrying on a struggle to maintain its national independence.

"We believe strongly in that. We are not going to withdraw from that effort. In my opinion, for us to withdraw from that effort would mean a collapse not only of South Viet-Nam, but Southeast Asia. So we are going to stay there."

President Eisenhower and President Johnson expressed the same conclusion during their terms of office.

For the future of peace, precipitate withdrawal would thus be a disaster of immense magnitude.

- A nation cannot remain great if it betrays its allies and lets down its friends.

- Our defeat and humiliation in South Vietnam without question would promote recklessness in the councils of those great powers who have not yet abandoned their goals of world conquest.

- This would spark violence wherever our commitments help maintain the peace—in the Middle East, in Berlin, eventually even in the Western Hemisphere.

Ultimately, this would cost more lives. It would not bring peace; it would bring more war.

For these reasons, I rejected the recommendation that I should end the war by immediately withdrawing all of our forces. I chose instead to change American policy on both the negotiating front and battle-front.

In order to end a war fought on many fronts, I initiated a pursuit for peace on many fronts.

In a television speech on May 14, in a speech before the United Nations, and on a number of other occasions I set forth our peace proposals in great detail.

- We have offered the complete withdrawal of all outside forces within 1 year.

- We have proposed a cease-fire under international supervision.

- We have offered free elections under international supervision with the Communists participating in the organization and conduct of the elections as an organized political force. And the Saigon Government has pledged to accept the result of the elections.

We have not put forth our proposals on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. We have indicated that we are willing to discuss the proposals that have been put forth by the other side. We have declared that anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own future. At the Paris peace conference, Ambassador Lodge has demonstrated our flexibility and good faith in 40 public meetings.

Hanoi has refused even to discuss our proposals. They demand our unconditional acceptance of their terms, which are that we withdraw all American forces immediately and unconditionally and that we overthrow the Government of South Vietnam as we leave.

We have not limited our peace initiatives to public forums and public statements. I recognized, in January, that a long and bitter war like this usually cannot be settled in a public forum. That is why in addition to the public statements and negotiations I have explored every possible private avenue that might lead to a settlement.

that President John-1 American combat team was wrong. And giving them—have been the way the war has

facing us today is: the war, what is the

only conclude that withdrawal of American would be a disaster Vietnam but for the cause of peace. Americans, our precipitated inevitably allow repeat the massacres committed by the North

dlered more than hundreds of thousand slave labor camps. The cause of what would Vietnam when the city of Hue and the North their brief rule of a bloody reign of 300 civilians were death, and buried

collapse of our supplies of Hue would share of the entire war. I consider it the millicolic refugees who Vietnam when the war in the North. This first defeat would result in a program of American lead-but throughout

lesions that have recog-

903

[425] Nov. 3

Tonight I am taking the unprecedented step of disclosing to you some of our other initiatives for peace—initiatives we undertook privately and secretly because we thought we thereby might open a door which publicly would be closed.

I did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace.

- Soon after my election, through an individual who is directly in contact on a personal basis with the leaders of North Vietnam, I made two private offers for a rapid, comprehensive settlement. Hanoi's replies called in effect for our surrender before negotiations.

- Since the Soviet Union furnishes most of the military equipment for North Vietnam, Secretary of State Rogers, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Lodge, and I, personally, have met on a number of occasions with representatives of the Soviet Government to enlist their assistance in getting meaningful negotiations started. In addition, we have had extended discussions directed toward that same end with representatives of other governments which have diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. None of these initiatives have to date produced results.

- In mid-July, I became convinced that it was necessary to make a major move to break the deadlock in the Paris talks. I spoke directly in this office, where I am now sitting, with an individual who had known Ho Chi Minh [President, Democratic Republic of Vietnam] on a personal basis for 25 years. Through him I sent a letter to Ho Chi Minh.

I did this outside of the usual

diplomatic channels with the hope that with the necessity of making statements for propaganda removed, there might be constructive progress toward bringing the war to an end. Let me read from that letter to you now.

“Dear Mr. President:

“I realize that it is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war. But precisely because of this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to work for a just peace. I deeply believe that the war in Vietnam has gone on too long and delay in bringing it to an end can benefit no one—least of all the people of Vietnam. . . .

“The time has come to move forward at the conference table toward an early resolution of this tragic war. You will find us forthcoming and open-minded in a common effort to bring the blessings of peace to the brave people of Vietnam. Let history record that at this critical juncture, both sides turned their face toward peace rather than toward conflict and war.”

I received Ho Chi Minh's reply on August 30, 3 days before his death. It simply reiterated the public position North Vietnam had taken at Paris and flatly rejected my initiative.

The full text of both letters is being released to the press.

- In addition to the public meetings that I have referred to, Ambassador Lodge has met with Vietnam's chief negotiator in Paris in 11 private sessions.

- We have taken other significant initiatives which must remain secret

to keep open communication with them be productive.

But the effect of and secret negotiations undertaken since then ago and since this into office on January 1 up in one sentence: [It has been made especially shape of the bargain Well now, who is a party to it? It has become clear that we are negotiating an end to the war, President of the United States, the South Vietnamese.]

The obstacle is the refusal to show the leaders of the United States in seeking a just peace plan do so while it is convenient to do is to wait for and our next concession until it gets everything we want.

There can now be a firm determination that progress is only on Hanoi's decision to negotiate seriously.

I realize that this is not the way on the diplomatic front, but the American people are entitled to the bad news as well as the good news where the lives of all involved.

Now let me turn to the encouraging report of the American people.

At the time we had been working for peace I recognized the need for bringing an end to the Vietnam War. I, therefore, another plan to bring the war to a close, and less of what happens front.

904

["channels with the hope\nnecessity of making\npropaganda removed,\nconstructive progress\nin the war to an end,\nfrom that letter to you", "A\nA\nA\nA\nA\nA\nA\nA\nA\nA\nA

defense.

After I announced this policy, I found
that the leaders of the Philippines, Thai-
land, Vietnam, South Korea, and other
nations which might be threatened by
Communist aggression, welcomed this
new direction in American foreign policy.

The defense of freedom is everybody's
business—not just America's business.
And it is particularly the responsibility of
the people whose freedom is threatened.
In the previous administration, we Amer-
icanized the war in Vietnam. In this ad-
ministration, we are Vietnamizing the
search for peace.

The policy of the previous administra-
tion not only resulted in our assuming the
primary responsibility for fighting the war,
but even more significantly did not ade-
quately stress the goal of strengthening the
South Vietnamese so that they could de-
fend themselves when we left.

The Vietnamization plan was launched
following Secretary Laird's visit to Viet-
nam in March. Under the plan, I ordered
first a substantial increase in the training
and equipment of South Vietnamese
forces.

In July, on my visit to Vietnam, I
changed General Abrams' orders so that
they were consistent with the objectives
of our new policies. Under the new orders,
the primary mission of our troops is to
enable the South Vietnamese forces to
assume the full responsibility for the
security of South Vietnam.

Our air operations have been reduced
by over 20 percent.

And now we have begun to see the
results of this long overdue change in
American policy in Vietnam.

than 15, over 60,000 men will have
been withdrawn from South Viet-
nam—including 20 percent of all of
our combat forces.

-The South Vietnamese have continued to gain in strength. As a result they have been able to take over combat responsibilities from our American troops.

Two other significant developments
have occurred since this administration
took office.

- Enemy infiltration, infiltration which is essential if they are to launch a major attack, over the last 3 months is less than 20 percent of what it was over the same period last year.

-Most important—United States casualties have declined during the last 2 months to the lowest point in 3 years.

Let me now turn to our program for
the future.

We have adopted a plan which we have
worked out in cooperation with the South
Vietnamese for the complete withdrawal
of all U.S. combat ground forces, and
their replacement by South Vietnamese
forces on an orderly scheduled timetable.
This withdrawal will be made from
strength and not from weakness. As South
Vietnamese forces become stronger, the
rate of American withdrawal can become
greater.

I have not and do not intend to an-
nounce the timetable for our program.
And there are obvious reasons for this
decision which I am sure you will under-
stand. As I have indicated on several oc-
casions, the rate of withdrawal will de-
pend on developments on three fronts.

906

my

our withdrawal was
any incentive for us
to an agreement. That
until our forces had
move in.

The other two fac-
base our withdraw-
level of enemy activi-
the training program
namese forces. And
to report tonight pro-
fronts has been gre-
ipated when we sta-
June for withdrawal.
table for withdrawal
now than when we
mates in June. Now,
strates why it is not
on a fixed timetable.

We must retain the
each withdrawal deci-
s as it is at that time r
mates that are no long

Along with this opt-
must—in all candor—
caution.

If the level of ener-
cantly increases we mig-
our timetable according

However, I want the
plenty clear on one po-

At the time of the b
a year ago, there was som
whether there was an u
the part of the enemy th
the bombing of North
would stop the shelling o
Vietnam. I want to be so
no misunderstanding on
enemy with regard to
program.

Richard Nixon, 1969

Nov. 3 [425]

Americans going into
the finally bringing
home. By Decem-
00 men will have
from South Viet-
20 percent of all of
es.

Japanese have con-
strength. As a result
to take over com-
s from our Ameri-

cant developments
this administration

In, infiltration which
they will launch a
for the last 3 months
of what it was
period last year.

—United States
declined during the
lowest point in

our program for

plan which we have
action with the South
complete withdrawal
round forces, and
South Vietnamese
scheduled timetable,
be made from
weakness. As South
ome stronger, the
 withdrawal can become

not intend to an-
for our program.
s reasons for this
you will under-
stand several oc-
th withdrawal will de-
on three fronts.

One of these is the progress which can
be or might be made in the Paris talks.
An announcement of a fixed timetable for
our withdrawal would completely remove
any incentive for the enemy to negotiate
an agreement. They would simply wait
until our forces had withdrawn and then
move in.

The other two factors on which we will
base our withdrawal decisions are the
level of enemy activity and the progress of
the training programs of the South Viet-
namese forces. And I am glad to be able
to report tonight progress on both of these
fronts has been greater than we antic-
ipated when we started the program in
June for withdrawal. As a result, our time-
table for withdrawal is more optimistic
now than when we made our first esti-
mates in June. Now, this clearly demon-
strates why it is not wise to be frozen in
on a fixed timetable.

We must retain the flexibility to base
each withdrawal decision on the situation
as it is at that time rather than on esti-
mates that are no longer valid.

Along with this optimistic estimate, I
must—in all candor—leave one note of
caution.

If the level of enemy activity signifi-
cantly increases we might have to adjust
our timetable accordingly.

However, I want the record to be com-
pletely clear on one point.

At the time of the bombing halt just
a year ago, there was some confusion as to
whether there was an understanding on
the part of the enemy that if we stopped
the bombing of North Vietnam they
would stop the shelling of cities in South
Vietnam. I want to be sure that there is
no misunderstanding on the part of the
enemy with regard to our withdrawal
program.

We have noted the reduced level of
infiltration, the reduction of our casual-
ties, and are basing our withdrawal deci-
sions partially on those factors.

If the level of infiltration or our casual-
ties increase while we are trying to scale
down the fighting, it will be the result of
a conscious decision by the enemy.

Hanoi could make no greater mistake
than to assume that an increase in violence
will be to its advantage. If I conclude that
increased enemy action jeopardizes our
remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not
hesitate to take strong and effective meas-
ures to deal with that situation.

This is not a threat. This is a statement
of policy, which as Commander in Chief
of our Armed Forces, I am making in
meeting my responsibility for the protec-
tion of American fighting men wherever
they may be.

My fellow Americans, I am sure you
can recognize from what I have said that
we really only have two choices open to
us if we want to end this war.

- I can order an immediate, precipitate
withdrawal of all Americans from
Vietnam without regard to the effects
of that action.

- Or we can persist in our search for
a just peace through a negotiated set-
tlement if possible, or through con-
tinued implementation of our plan
for Vietnamization if necessary—a
plan in which we will withdraw all
of our forces from Vietnam on a
schedule in accordance with our pro-
gram, as the South Vietnamese be-
come strong enough to defend their
own freedom.

I have chosen this second course.

It is not the easy way.

It is the right way.

It is a plan which will end the war and

907

[425] Nov. 3

serve the cause of peace—not just in Vietnam but in the Pacific and in the world.

In speaking of the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal, I mentioned that our allies would lose confidence in America.

Far more dangerous, we would lose confidence in ourselves. Oh, the immediate reaction would be a sense of relief that our men were coming home. But as we saw the consequences of what we had done, inevitable remorse and divisive recrimination would scar our spirit as a people.

We have faced other crises in our history and have become stronger by rejecting the easy way out and taking the right way in meeting our challenges. Our greatness as a nation has been our capacity to do what had to be done when we knew our course was right.

I recognize that some of my fellow citizens disagree with the plan for peace I have chosen. Honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved.

In San Francisco a few weeks ago, I saw demonstrators carrying signs reading: "Lose in Vietnam, bring the boys home."

Well, one of the strengths of our free society is that any American has a right to reach that conclusion and to advocate that point of view. But as President of the United States, I would be untrue to my oath of office if I allowed the policy of this Nation to be dictated by the minority who hold that point of view and who try to impose it on the Nation by mounting demonstrations in the street.

For almost 200 years, the policy of this

Nation has been made under our Constitution by those leaders in the Congress and the White House elected by all of the people. If a vocal minority, however fervent its cause, prevails over reason and the will of the majority, this Nation has no future as a free society.

And now I would like to address a word, if I may, to the young people of this Nation who are particularly concerned, and I understand why they are concerned, about this war.

I respect your idealism.

I share your concern for peace.

I want peace as much as you do.

There are powerful personal reasons I want to end this war. This week I will have to sign 83 letters to mothers, fathers, wives, and loved ones of men who have given their lives for America in Vietnam. It is very little satisfaction to me that this is only one-third as many letters as I signed the first week in office. There is nothing I want more than to see the day come when I do not have to write any of those letters.

- I want to end the war to save the lives of those brave young men in Vietnam.

- But I want to end it in a way which will increase the chance that their younger brothers and their sons will not have to fight in some future Vietnam someplace in the world.

- And I want to end the war for another reason. I want to end it so that the energy and dedication of you, our young people, now too often directed into bitter hatred against those responsible for the war, can be turned to the great challenges of peace, a

better life for all people.

I have chosen a plan it will succeed.

If it does succeed now won't matter. anything I say the

I know it may not speak of patriotism these days. But I feel we do so on this occasion.

Two hundred years ago, weak and poor. But was the hope of our Today we have become richest nation in the of destiny has turned the world has for us and freedom will whether the American stamina and the challenge of free

Let historians now America was the most the world we passed the road and allowed peace and freedom to be suffocated by totalitarianism.

And so tonight—most of us majority of my fellow for your support.

I pledged in my Presidency to end the war. We could win the peace plan of action which keep that pledge.

The more support American people, the more we can be redeemed; so we are at home, the

908

under our Constitu-
in the Congress and
lected by all of the
nority, however fer-
tils over reason and
gity, this Nation has
variety.

I take to address a word,
ng people of this Na-
larly concerned, and
they are concerned,

ism.

in for peace.

uch as you do.

I have personal reasons I
to speak, fathers, of men who have
America in Vietnam.
I action to me that this
my letters as I signed
There is nothing
to see the day come
to write any of those

the war to save the
ave young men in

d it in a way which
chance that their
and their sons will
some future Viet-
the world.

nd the war for an-
unt to end it so that
dication of you, our
too often directed
against those
war, can be turned
lenges of peace, a

better life for all Americans, a better
life for all people on this earth.

I have chosen a plan for peace. I believe
it will succeed.

If it does succeed, what the critics say
now won't matter. If it does not succeed,
anything I say then won't matter.

I know it may not be fashionable to
speak of patriotism or national destiny
these days. But I feel it is appropriate to
do so on this occasion

Two hundred years ago this Nation was
weak and poor. But even then, America
was the hope of millions in the world.
Today we have become the strongest and
richest nation in the world. And the wheel
of destiny has turned so that any hope
the world has for the survival of peace
and freedom will be determined by
whether the American people have the
moral stamina and the courage to meet
the challenge of free world leadership.

Let historians not record that when
America was the most powerful nation in
the world we passed on the other side of
the road and allowed the last hopes for
peace and freedom of millions of people
to be suffocated by the forces of
totalitarianism.

And so tonight—to you, the great silent
majority of my fellow Americans—I ask
for your support.

I pledged in my campaign for the
Presidency to end the war in a way that
we could win the peace. I have initiated a
plan of action which will enable me to
keep that pledge.

The more support I can have from the
American people, the sooner that pledge
can be redeemed; for the more divided
we are at home, the less likely the enemy

is to negotiate at Paris.

Let us be united for peace. Let us also
be united against defeat. Because let us
understand: North Vietnam cannot de-
feat or humiliate the United States. Only
Americans can do that.

Fifty years ago, in this room and at this
very desk,¹ President Woodrow Wilson
spoke words which caught the imagina-
tion of a war-weary world. He said: "This
is the war to end war." His dream for
peace after World War I was shattered
on the hard realities of great power politics
and Woodrow Wilson died a broken man.

Tonight I do not tell you that the war
in Vietnam is the war to end wars. But
I do say this: I have initiated a plan which
will end this war in a way that will bring
us closer to that great goal to which Wood-
row Wilson and every American President
in our history has been dedicated—the
goal of a just and lasting peace.

As President I hold the responsibility
for choosing the best path to that goal and
then leading the Nation along it.

I pledge to you tonight that I shall
meet this responsibility with all of the
strength and wisdom I can command in
accordance with your hopes, mindful of
your concerns, sustained by your prayers.

Thank you and goodnight.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9:32 p.m. in his office at the White House. The address was broadcast on radio and television.

On November 3, 1969, the White House
Press Office released an advance text of the
address.

¹Later research indicated that the desk had
not been President Woodrow Wilson's as had
long been assumed but was used by Vice Presi-
dent Henry Wilson during President Grant's
administration.

Richard Nixon, 1969

Nov. 3 [425]

[2c]

909

[426] Nov. 3

426 Letters of the President and President Ho Chi Minh of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

November 3, 1969

Dear Mr. President:

I realize that it is difficult to com-
municate meaningfully across the gulf of
four years of war. But precisely because of
this gulf, I wanted to take this opportunity
to reaffirm in all solemnity my desire to
work for a just peace. I deeply believe that
the war in Vietnam has gone on too long
and delay in bringing it to an end can ben-
efit no one—least of all the people of Viet-
nam. My speech on May 14 laid out a pro-
posal which I believe is fair to all parties.
Other proposals have been made which
attempt to give the people of South Viet-
nam an opportunity to choose their own
future. These proposals take into account
the reasonable conditions of all sides. But
we stand ready to discuss other programs
as well, specifically the 10-point program
of the NLF.

As I have said repeatedly, there is noth-
ing to be gained by waiting. Delay can
only increase the dangers and multiply
the suffering.

The time has come to move forward at
the conference table toward an early reso-
lution of this tragic war. You will find us
forthcoming and open-minded in a com-
mon effort to bring the blessings of peace
to the brave people of Vietnam. Let his-
tory record that at this critical juncture,
both sides turned their face toward peace
rather than toward conflict and war.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON

[His Excellency Ho Chi Minh, President,
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Hanoi]

NOTE: The President's letter was dated July 15, 1969, and released November 3, 1969.

President Ho Chi Minh's reply dated Au-

gust 25, 1969, was released by the White House
Press Office along with the President's letter.
It read as follows:

To His Excellency Richard Milhous Nixon
President of the United States
Washington

Mr. President:

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of
your letter.

The war of aggression of the United States against our people, violating our fundamental national rights, still continues in South Vietnam. The United States continues to intensify military operations, the B-52 bombings and the use of toxic chemical products multiply the crimes against the Vietnamese people. The longer the war goes on, the more it accumulates the mourning and burdens of the American people. I am extremely indignant at the losses and destructions caused by the American troops to our people and our country. I am also deeply touched at the rising toll of death of young Americans who have fallen in Vietnam by reason of the policy of American governing circles.

Our Vietnamese people are deeply devoted to peace, a real peace with independence and real freedom. They are determined to fight to the end, without fearing the sacrifices and difficulties in order to defend their country and their sacred national rights. The overall solution in 10 points of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam and of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam is a logical and reasonable basis for the settlement of the Vietnamese problem. It has earned the sympathy and support of the peoples of the world.

In your letter you have expressed the desire
to act for a just peace. For this the United
States must cease the war of aggression and
withdraw their troops from South Vietnam,
respect the right of the population of the South
and of the Vietnamese nation to dispose of
themselves, without foreign influence. This is
the correct manner of solving the Vietnamese
problem in conformity with the national rights

910

[LC]

of the Vietnamese people
United States and the rest
peoples of the world. That
allow the United States
with honor.

427 Statement
Voluntary

FROM the beginning
Americans have work-
tarily to help master
problems. A major go-
tration is to recognize
gies and resources of
selves, as well as govern-
of this historic Ameri-
further that goal, I ann-
the initial steps in bu-
Program for Voluntary

For the past 6 months
sultant on Voluntary
Fisher of Detroit, and
of the Department of H
Development, Chairm
Committee on Volunt-
been developing the N
It is based on three assur-
to do.

1. Many Americans
working as volunteers
problems. A recent sur-
two-thirds of us were
regularly if shown some
to do.

2. The role of the
g help these Americans
volunteers—not to dir
impose priorities upon
ganize them in any kind

The government should
 desires of the people, no
 around.

3. For volunteer Amer
effective, they need to

[Lc]

Chi Minh

by the White House
President's letter.

Milhous Nixon
tes

knowledge receipt of

of the United States
ing our fundamental
ues in South Viet-
ontin to intensify
-50,000 admissions and
products, multiply the
amese people. The
more it accumulates
s of the American
ignant at the losses
the American troops
ry. I am also deeply
of death of young
in Vietnam by rea-
n governing circles.
are deeply devoted
in independence and
dermined to fight to
the sacrifices and
fend their country
rights. The overall
National Liberation
of the Provisional
of the Republic of
and reasonable basis
ietnamese problem.
and support of the

expressed the desire
for this the United
of aggression and
in South Vietnam,
lation of the South
tion, dispose of
it. This is
ng Vietnamese
the national rights

Richard Nixon, 1969

Nov. 4 [427]

of the Vietnamese people, the interests of the
United States and the hopes for peace of the
peoples of the world. This is the path that will
allow the United States to get out of the war
with honor.

With good will on both sides we might arrive
at common efforts in view of finding a correct
solution of the Vietnamese problem.

Sincerely,

HO CHI MINH

## 427 Statement About the National Program for Voluntary Action. November 4, 1969

FROM the beginning of our country, Americans have worked together voluntarily to help master common needs and problems. A major goal of this administration is to recognize and enlist the energies and resources of the people themselves, as well as government, in a renewal of this historic American approach. To further that goal, I announced last March the initial steps in building a National Program for Voluntary Action.

For the past 6 months, my Special Consultant on Voluntary Action, Max M. Fisher of Detroit, and Secretary Romney of the Department of Housing and Urban Development, Chairman of the Cabinet Committee on Voluntary Action, have been developing the National Program. It is based on three assumptions:

1. Many Americans would like to start working as volunteers on community problems. A recent survey reported that two-thirds of us were willing to volunteer regularly if shown something worthwhile to do.

2. The role of the government is to help these Americans become effective volunteers—not to direct them, or to impose priorities upon them, or to organize them in any kind of master plan.

The government should respond to the desires of the people, not the other way around.

3. For volunteer Americans to be most effective, they need to be able to draw

upon professional skills and organized experience. Therefore, it is also important to work with existing organizations as well as to encourage new activities.

Mr. Fisher and Secretary Romney have met with hundreds of voluntary action leaders—both from established organizations and emergent groups, representing the broadest cross section of American life. They have sought advice on how best to realize our goal of a “creative partnership” between governmental and private effort to carry out the National Program for Voluntary Action.

As a result of these consultations, private voluntary action leaders now are ready, with our encouragement, to formalize the private part of this national partnership. I am therefore announcing these actions today:

1. Creation of a nonprofit, nonpartisan National Center for Voluntary Action, which will encourage and assist effective voluntary action throughout the private sector. It will be established by distinguished private citizens working with government officials and using private funds.

2. Appointment of Mr. Fisher as Chairman of the National Center for Voluntary Action.

3. Appointment of W. Clement Stone of Chicago, an insurance executive and leader in voluntary action, to serve as Finance Committee Chairman of the

911

January, an hour and a
tonight we have some-
al.

First time in White House
have what is in effect an
e a dress rehearsal. This
been rehearsed before. It
completely unrehearsed and
appen—and it will.

I would simply like
something about Bob Hope.
from television. We know
radio. And we know him,
who has given so much
so much of his energy
This is a contribution
with his appearance at the
night of his trip around

ed me whether or not we
this performance and the
don't have room in the
and the other answer is if
budget, he couldn't af-
taxes he would have to

cent, in presenting the be-
ow, it is my privilege, not
ope, because he doesn't
beginning, but an old
five years ago at Duke
I was a student of law,
through, a man in the
school was working his
with an orchestra—Les

the master of ceremonies.

THE CONCLUSION
PERFORMANCE

am expressing, Bob, the
on this room of ap-
and the wonderful mem-

Richard Nixon, 1949

Dec. 15 [486]

bers of the Bob Hope troupe as you start
this journey around the world.

I just consulted with the Secretary of
Defense; he thinks the boys will get the
message.

I think for you, Bob, I would like to
say that we have a number of very special
guests tonight, the members of the Cabi-
net, of course, the Vice President, and the
members of the Joint Chiefs, and others.
But on this night, too, I think all of the
people here in the room would be very
happy to know that we have one of our
men who served with very great distinc-
tion in Vietnam, made a splendid record
there, and who is now stationed in the
Washington area. He also has another
distinction; he was married in this house.
And we are very happy to have Major
Robb and Lynda Bird Johnson Robb here
tonight.²

Can you come up for a minute?

MR. HOPE. Lynda Robb volunteered to
go with our unit a couple of years ago,

²Maj. Charles S. Robb, USMC, and President Johnson's daughter, Lynda Bird Johnson, were married in the East Room of the White House on December 9, 1967.

and one of these days we are going to
take her. How are you, darling?

He said when he was in Vietnam last
year he couldn't see us from where he was
standing.

THE PRESIDENT. I just want to say,
Bob, as this evening comes to a conclu-
sion, that James Thurber once wrote that
the oldest and most precious national
asset of this country is humor, and that we
must do everything we possibly can to
preserve it. Certainly no man in our gen-
eration has done more to preserve that
asset than you have.

We wish you well as you take it around
the world and bring a very Merry Christ-
mas and Happy New Year to all of our
men abroad.

Thank you very much.

NOTE: The exchange of toasts began at 8:21 p.m. in the State Dining Room at the White House. Following the dinner the President introduced the performance in the East Room at 9:15 p.m. and spoke again at its conclusion at 10:43 p.m.

The show was a final dress rehearsal before
the cast left on a 15-day round-the-world tour
to entertain servicemen abroad. It was Bob
Hope's 21st Christmas tour and his 6th to
Vietnam.

486 Address to the Nation on Progress Toward Peace
in Vietnam. December 15, 1969

I have asked for this television time to-
night to give you a progress report on
our plan to bring a just peace in Vietnam,
which I described in my television address
on November 3.

As you will recall, I said then that we
were proceeding in our pursuit for peace
on two fronts: a peace settlement through
negotiation, or if that fails, ending the war

through Vietnamization, a plan we have
developed with the South Vietnamese for
the complete withdrawal, first, of all U.S.
combat troops, and eventually of other
forces and their replacement by South
Vietnamese forces on an orderly scheduled
timetable.

I must report to you tonight with regret
that there has been no progress whatever
on the negotiating front since Novem-

1025

[486] Dec. 15

ber 3. The enemy still insists on a unilateral, precipitate withdrawal of American forces and on a political settlement which would mean the imposition of a Communist government on the people of South Vietnam against their will, and defeat and humiliation for the United States.

This we cannot and will not accept.

Typical of their attitude is their absolute refusal to talk about the fate of the American prisoners they hold and their refusal even to supply their names so as to ease the anguish of their loved ones in the United States. This cruel, indefensible action is a shocking demonstration of the inflexible attitude they have taken on all issues at the negotiating table in Paris.

But despite their attitude, we shall continue to participate in the Paris talks and to seek a negotiated peace—one which is fair, fair to North Vietnam, fair to the United States, but most important, fair to the people of South Vietnam. Because as I have indicated, anything is negotiable except the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own fate.

As you know, Ambassador Lodge has had to leave his assignment in Paris because of personal reasons. I have designated Philip Habib, one of our most experienced Foreign Service officers who has been participating in the negotiations for over 18 months, as the acting head of our delegation with the personal rank of Ambassador. He has been given full authority to discuss any proposal that will contribute to a just peace.

Let me turn now to the progress of our plan for Vietnamization and our troop withdrawal program.

When I announced this program in

June, I said that the rate of withdrawal would depend on three criteria: progress in the Paris negotiations, progress in the training of South Vietnamese forces, and the level of enemy activity.

Now, while there has been no progress on the negotiating front, I have a much more favorable report to give to you tonight with regard to the training of South Vietnamese forces.

First, let me share with you how I reached this conclusion. In making decisions, I believe a President should listen not only to those who tell him what he wants to hear, but to those who tell him what he needs to hear. It is most important to get independent judgments from individuals who are expert on the factors to be considered, but who are not directly involved in the operations themselves. This is particularly essential when the lives of American men are involved.

Several months ago I read a book by Sir Robert Thompson,¹ a British expert who was one of the major architects of the victory over the Communist guerrillas who attempted to take over Malaya in the 1950's. In his book, which was published just as this administration took office, he was very pessimistic about the conduct of the war in Vietnam. He particularly noted the failure to prepare the South Vietnamese to take over the responsibilities for their own defense.

On October 7, I met with Mr. Thompson and asked him to go to Vietnam and to give me a firsthand, candid, and completely independent report on the situation there. After 5 weeks of intensive in-

¹"No Exit from Vietnam" was published in 1969 by David McKay Company, Inc. (224 pp.).

1026

[Lc]

vestigation he gave me December 3.

His full report, which very constructive recommendation remain confidential since it concerns the security of our men. But let you from his summary of his

"I was very impressed by the military and political situation in Vietnam as compared with previous visits and especially in Saigon, rural areas.

"A winning position in obtaining a just peace (which is not) and of maintaining a non-Communist Vietnam has been achieved but yet through. We are in a period where the greatest confidence. A steady application of your concept with continued support in the background of the confidence already shown by South Vietnam leaders."

Mr. Thompson's report, would describe as cautiously as in line with my own attitude reports I have received from servers and from our civilian and leaders in Vietnam.

Now, there is one disturbance, however, with enemy activity. Enemy infiltration increased substantially. It has reached the point where our leaders believe the enemy has the capability to mount a massive, but we are watching closely to see whether it could go to that extent.

Now for the decision. Taking into consideration developments into consideration, announcing tonight a reduction

the rate of withdrawal
on three criteria: progress
of negotiations, progress in the
Vietnamese forces, and
my activity.

There has been no progress
ing front, I have a much
report to give to you to-
to the training of South
Vets.

Share with you how I
include. In making deci-
President should listen
to those who tell him
hear. It is most impor-
mental judgments from
the report on the factors
but who are not directly
operations themselves.
Essential when the
men are involved.

 ago I read a book by
Thompson,¹ a British expert
the major architects of
the Communist guerrillas
to take over Malaya in
a book, which was pub-
lic administration took of-
 pessimistic about the
war in Vietnam. He par-
te to take over the re-
their own defense.

I met with Mr. Thompson to go to Vietnam and land, candid, and comment report on the situation weeks of intensive in-

"Vietnam" was published in
Kayser-Company, Inc. (224

Richard Nixon, 1969

Dec. 15 [486]

vestigation he gave me his report on
December 3.

His full report, which makes several
very constructive recommendations, must
remain confidential since it bears on the
security of our men. But let me read to
you from his summary of his findings.

"I was very impressed by the improvement in the military and political situation in Vietnam as compared with all previous visits and especially in the security situation, both in Saigon and the rural areas.

"A winning position in the sense of
obtaining a just peace (whether negoti-
ated or not) and of maintaining an in-
dependent, non-Communist South Viet-
nam has been achieved but we are not
yet through. We are in a psychological
period where the greatest need is con-
fidence. A steady application of the 'do it
yourself' concept with continuing U.S.
support in the background will increase
the confidence already shown by many
South Vietnam leaders."

Mr. Thompson's report, which I
would describe as cautiously optimistic,
is in line with my own attitude and with
reports I have received from other ob-
servers and from our civilian and military
leaders in Vietnam.

Now, there is one disturbing new de-
velopment, however, with regard to
enemy activity. Enemy infiltration has
increased substantially. It has not yet
reached the point where our military
leaders believe the enemy has developed
the capability to mount a major offen-
sive, but we are watching the situation
closely to see whether it could develop
to that extent.

Now for the decision. Taking all these
developments into consideration, I am
announcing tonight a reduction in our

troop ceiling of 50,000 more U.S. troops
by April 15 next year. This means that
the ceiling which existed when I took
office on January 20 has now been re-
duced by 115,500 men. This reduction
has been made with the approval of the
Government of South Vietnam, and in
consultation with the other nations which
have combat forces in Vietnam.

Now there are some who believe that
to continue our withdrawals at a time
when enemy infiltration is increasing is
a risk we should not take. However, I have
consistently said we must take risks for
peace.

And in that connection, let me remind
the leaders in Hanoi that if their infiltra-
tion and the level of enemy activity in-
creases while we are reducing our forces
they also will be running a risk. I repeat
the statement I made in my speech on
November 3:

"Hanoi could make no greater mistake
than to assume that an increase in vio-
lence will be to its advantage. If I con-
clude that increased enemy action jeop-
ardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam,
I shall not hesitate to take strong and
effective measures to deal with that
situation."

This reduction in our forces is another
orderly step in our plan for peace in
Vietnam.

It marks further progress toward turn-
ing over the defense of South Vietnam to
the South Vietnamese.

And it is another clear sign of our
readiness to bring an end to the war and
to achieve a just peace.

Before concluding this report, I wish
to express my appreciation to the great
number of people from all over this Na-
tion who have indicated their support for
our program for a just peace since my

1027

[486] Dec. 15

[LC]

speech on November 3.

This support was particularly under-
lined by the action of the House of Rep-
resentatives and the Congress in which a
majority of both Democrats and Repub-
licans voted overwhelmingly 334 to 55
for a resolution supporting the plan for
peace which I announced on November 3.

The leaders in Hanoi have declared on
a number of occasions that division in
the United States would eventually bring
them the victory they cannot win over
our fighting men in Vietnam. This dem-
onstration of support by the American
people for our plan to bring a just peace
has dashed those hopes.

Hanoi should abandon its dreams of
military victory.

It is time for them to join us in serious negotiations.

There is nothing to be gained by delay.

If Hanoi is willing to talk seriously they
will find us flexible and forthcoming.

I am glad that I was able to report to-
night some progress in reaching our goal
of a just peace in Vietnam. After 5 years
of increasing the number of Americans

in Vietnam, we are bringing American
men home.

Our casualties continue to be at the
lowest rate in 3 years.

But I want you to know that despite
this progress, I shall not be satisfied until
we achieve the goal we all want: an end
to the war on a just and lasting basis.

This is the fifth Christmas when Ameri-
cans will be fighting in a war far away
from home.

I know that there is nothing the Amer-
ican people want more, and there is noth-
ing I want more, than to see the day come
when the Christmas message of "peace on
earth, good will to men" will be not just
an eloquent ideal but a reality for Amer-
icans and for all others who cherish peace
and freedom throughout the world.

Your continued support of our plan for
peace will greatly strengthen our hopes
that we can achieve that great goal.

Thank you and goodnight.

NOTE: The President spoke at 6:02 p.m. in his office at the White House. His remarks were broadcast on radio and television.

On the same day the White House released
an advance text of the address.

487 Remarks Following a Meeting With Representative
Rogers C. B. Morton, Chairman, Republican
National Committee. December 16, 1969

Ladies and gentlemen:

There has been considerable specula-
tion about the future of Rogers Morton,
the national chairman of the Republican
Party.

As you know, he is a Congressman from
Maryland and he has been one who has
been mentioned as possibly the strongest

candidate to run for the Senate in Mary-
land in 1970.

It is time now to end that speculation,
and I am going to end it and then see if
the Congressman will corroborate what I
say.

I believe that he would make an out-
standing Senator. He has had 6 years in

the House. I belie-
win, and we need

However, I believ
of the most outst
men that either p
years. He has not
administration, bu
he is presenting a
Republican Party a
has unified the par\my memory has be
recent years.

Under the circum-
ering all the factors,
cision—and it was a
he asked me for my
advice would have be
we say, decisive—that
not only his party and
administration, but al

488 Remarks on
Reserve C
December

I APPRECIATE the
call in this ceremony; and i
could participate in m
proclamation expresses
service rendered, and
volved have completed
have returned to civilia
is their choice.

I should point out, of
are still in the Reserve.
you can still be called, so
know you understand a
know which will always be
tion in this country.

I think it is worth
something about the Rese
that were called up as

1028

imagination, realism and boldness their solutions demand if lasting peace is to come to Asia.

## VIETNAM

"The people of Vietnam, North and South alike, have demonstrated heroism enough to last a century. And I speak from personal observation. I have been to North Vietnam, to Hanoi, in 1953, and all over South Vietnam. I have seen the people of the North and the people of the South. The people of Vietnam, North and South, have endured an unspeakable weight of suffering for a generation. And they deserve a better future."

The President's Address to the 24th Session of the UN General Assembly, September 18, 1969.

A just peace in Vietnam has been, and remains, our goal.

The real issues are the nature of that peace and how to achieve it. In addressing these issues at the beginning of my Administration, I had to consider the great consequences of our decisions.

I stated the consequences of a precipitate withdrawal in these terms in my speech of May 14:

"When we assumed the burden of helping defend South Vietnam, millions of South Vietnamese men, women and children placed their trust in us. To abandon them now would risk a massacre that would shock and dismay everyone in the world who values human life.

"Abandoning the South Vietnamese people, however, would jeopardize more than lives in South Vietnam. It would threaten our long-term

62

hopes for peace in the world. A great nation cannot renege on its pledges. A great nation must be worthy of trust.

"When it comes to maintaining peace, 'prestige' is not an empty word. I am not speaking of false pride or bravado—they should have no place in our policies. I speak, rather, of the respect that one nation has for another's integrity in defending its principles and meeting its obligations.

"If we simply abandoned our effort in Vietnam, the cause of peace might not survive the damage that would be done to other nations' confidence in our reliability.

"Another reason for not withdrawing unilaterally stems from debates within the Communist world. If Hanoi were to succeed in taking over South Vietnam by force—even after the power of the United States had been engaged—it would greatly strengthen those leaders who scorn negotiation, who advocate aggression, who minimize the risks of confrontation with the United States. It would bring peace now but it would enormously increase the danger of a bigger war later."

My trip through Asia last summer made this fact more vivid to me than ever. I did not meet a single Asian leader who urged a precipitate U.S. withdrawal. The closer their nations were to the battlefield, the greater was their concern that America meet its responsibilities in Vietnam.

Less attention had been given to another important consequence of our decisions—within the United States itself. When the Administration took office, Vietnam had already led to a profound national debate. In considering our objectives there, I could only conclude that the

63

peace must not intensify the bitter recrimination and divisions which the war had already inflicted on American society. Were we to purchase peace in Vietnam at the expense of greater suffering later, the American people would inevitably lose confidence in their leaders—not just in the Presidency or in either political party, but in the whole structure of American leadership.

For all these reasons, I resolved to seek a peace which all Americans could support, a peace in which all parties to the conflict would have a stake. I resolved also to be completely candid with the American public and Congress in presenting our policies, except for some details on matters of great sensitivity. I was determined to report the setbacks as well as achievements, the uncertainties as well as the hopeful signs.

To seek a just peace, we pursued two distinct but mutually supporting courses of action: Negotiations and Vietnamization. We want to achieve an early and fair settlement through negotiations. But if the other side refuses, we shall proceed to strengthen the South Vietnamese forces. This will allow us to replace our troops on an orderly timetable. We hope that as Vietnamization proceeds the Government of North Vietnam will realize that it has more to gain in negotiations than in continued fighting.

We do not pretend that our goals in Vietnam have been accomplished, or that the way ahead will be easy.

- In South Vietnam, we have helped the South Vietnamese make progress in increasing their defense capacity, and we have reduced the number of American men and casualties. Yet Vietnamization is still a developing process, and enemy intentions on the battlefield are unclear.

- At the conference table, we have made generous

and reasonable proposals for a settlement. Yet the other side still refuses to negotiate seriously.

Despite these uncertainties, I believe that we are on the right road, and that we are moving toward our goals.

## Negotiations

In seeking a negotiated settlement of the war, we did not underestimate the difficulties ahead:

- We knew that the basic questions at issue in negotiations—particularly the resolution of political power in such a war—were enormously complex. There could be no rigid formula or strict agenda.

- We were aware that Hanoi's actions and doctrinal statements about "protracted conflict" caused it to view negotiations as a means of pressure, rather than as an avenue to a fair compromise.

- We realized that our opponent had sacrificed heavily; he had demonstrated a tenacious commitment to the war, and obviously harbored a deep mistrust of negotiations as a means of settling disputes. As I wrote to the late President Ho Chi Minh last July in an appeal to him to join us in finding a rapid solution: "It is difficult to communicate meaningfully across the gulf of four years of war."

These were formidable obstacles. But we were equally convinced that negotiations offered the best hope of a rapid settlement of the war. The specific issues were complex but could be resolved, once both sides made the fundamental decision to negotiate in a spirit of goodwill. Therefore we and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam moved to demonstrate to a mistrustful adversary our willingness to negotiate seriously and flexibly.

On May 14, I made a number of far-reaching pro-

64

[LC]

65

posals for a settlement. They included a mutual with-
drawal of all non-South Vietnamese forces from South
Vietnam and internationally-supervised free elections.

I also indicated that we seek no bases in Vietnam and
no military ties, that we are willing to agree to neutrality
or to unification of Vietnam if that is what the South
Vietnamese people choose.

In order to encourage the other side to negotiate, I
indicated that our proposals were flexible, and that we
were prepared to consider other approaches consistent
with our principles. We insisted only on one general
proposition for which the Government of North Vietnam
itself has claimed to be fighting—that the people of
South Vietnam be able to decide their own future free
of outside interference.

The proposals I made on May 14 still stand. They
offer all parties an opportunity to end the war quickly
and on an equitable basis.

In a similar spirit, President Thieu of the Republic
of Vietnam on July 11 offered a comprehensive set of
proposals. They include free elections in which all the
people and parties of South Vietnam can participate,
including the National Liberation Front and its ad-
herents, and a mixed Electoral Commission on which all
parties can be represented. We have supported those
proposals.

At Midway, in early June, President Thieu and I both
publicly pledged to accept any outcome of free elec-
tions, regardless of what changes they might bring.

Throughout the year, we explored every means of
engaging the other side in serious negotiations—in the
public talks in Paris, in private conversations, and
through reliable third parties.

To demonstrate our willingness to wind down the
war, I also ordered a reduction in the level of our mili-

tary operations in Vietnam. Our tactical air and D-52
operations have been reduced by over 25 per cent. Our
combat deaths have dropped by two-thirds.

Nor were our proposals put forward on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis. We have repeatedly expressed our willing-
ness to discuss the other side's ten-point program. But
Hanoi has adamantly refused even to discuss our pro-
posals. It has refused to negotiate with the Government
of the Republic of Vietnam, although it had agreed to
do so as one of the "understandings" that led to the
bombing halt. It has insisted that we must uncondi-
tionally and totally accept its demands for unilateral
U.S. withdrawal and for the removal of the leaders of
the Government of South Vietnam. It has demanded
these things as conditions for just beginning negotia-
tions. If we were to accept these demands, we would
have conceded the fundamental points at issue. There
would be nothing left to negotiate.

If the other side is interested in genuine negotiations
there are many ways they can let us know and there
are many channels open to them.

The key to peace lies in Hanoi—in its decision to end
the bloodshed and to negotiate in the true sense of
the word.

The United States has taken three major steps which
we were told repeatedly would lead to serious negotia-
tions. We stopped the bombing of North Vietnam; we
began the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam; and
we agreed to negotiate with the National Liberation
Front as one of the parties to the negotiation. But none
of those moves brought about the response or the reac-
tion which their advocates had claimed. It is time for
Hanoi to heed the concern of mankind and turn our
negotiations into a serious give-and-take. Hanoi will find
us forthcoming and flexible.

66

67

Vietnamization

The other course of action we are pursuing—Vietnamization—is a program to strengthen the ability of the South Vietnamese Government and people to defend themselves. It emphasizes progress in providing physical security for the Vietnamese people and in extending the authority of the South Vietnamese Government throughout the countryside.

Vietnamization is not a substitute for negotiations, but a spur to negotiations. In strengthening the capability of the Government and people of South Vietnam to defend themselves, we provide Hanoi with an authentic incentive to negotiate seriously now. Confronted by Vietnamization, Hanoi's alternative to a reasonable settlement is to continue its costly sacrifices while its bargaining power diminishes.

Vietnamization has two principal components. The first is the strengthening of the armed forces of the South Vietnamese in numbers, equipment, leadership and combat skills, and overall capability. The second component is the extension of the pacification program in South Vietnam.

Tangible progress has been made toward strengthening the South Vietnamese armed forces. Their number has grown, particularly the local and territorial forces. For example the numerical strength of the South Vietnamese Regional Forces and Popular Forces—important elements in resisting guerrilla attacks—has grown by more than 75,000 in the last year. The effectiveness of these forces is improving in most areas. In addition, about 400,000 weapons have been supplied to South Vietnamese villagers who have become part of the Peoples' Self Defense Force, a local militia.

Under the Vietnamization program, we have reversed

68

the trend of American military engagement in Vietnam and the South Vietnamese have assumed a greater role in combat operations. We have cut the authorized strength of American forces by 115,500 as of April 15, 1970. American forces will continue to be withdrawn in accordance with an orderly schedule based on three criteria: the level of enemy activity; progress in the negotiations; and the increasing ability of the South Vietnamese people to assume for themselves the task of their own defense.

During this process, we have kept in close consultations with the allied nations—Australia, Korea, New Zealand, and Thailand—which also contribute troops to assist the Vietnamese. Their forces continue to bear a significant burden in this common struggle.

As the Vietnamese Government bears the growing cost of these augmented forces, and as U.S. military spending in Vietnam is reduced with the continuing reduction of the U.S. military presence there, there will be additional strains on the Vietnamese economy. The Vietnamese will require assistance in dealing with these economic problems. Although our spending for purely military purposes in Vietnam can be expected to decrease substantially during the process of Vietnamization, some increases in our spending for economic purposes will be required.

Vietnamization also involves expansion of the pacification program. Our understanding of the pacification program and of the criteria for measuring its success needed improvement. I therefore ordered a comprehensive study of conditions in the countryside by a committee charged with analyzing the statistics of Vietnam and keeping the situation under constant review.

The study has concluded that the most meaningful criteria for South Vietnamese Government success in

69

the countryside are the establishment in each hamlet of (1) an adequate defense, and (2) a fully functioning government resident in the hamlet 24 hours a day. If the Government can achieve these two objectives, it can prevent the enemy from subverting and terrorizing the population or mobilizing it for its own purposes. The enemy will be denied any but the most limited and furtive access to the people, and will encounter increasing hostility or indifference as they seek the assistance they formerly enjoyed. The enemy forces will be isolated and forced to fight as a conventional expeditionary force, being dependent on external sources of supply and reinforcement.

This is very important: Enemy main force activities have in the past relied on active assistance from the population in the countryside for intelligence, food, money and manpower. This has enabled the enemy to use the countryside as a springboard from which to strike at key Vietnamese cities and installations. If they are forced to fight as a conventional army, with their support provided from their own resources rather than from the population, the enemy will lose momentum as they move forward because their supply lines will lengthen and they will encounter increasing opposition.

To date, the pacification program is succeeding.

Enemy forces have suffered heavy casualties, many in the course of their own offensives of 1968 and early 1969. The operations of U.S. and South Vietnamese troops against enemy main force units have prevented those units from moving freely through the populated areas and have more and more forced them back into bases in remote areas and along the borders of South Vietnam.

Since 1967, the percentage of the rural population living in areas with adequate defense and a fully func-

tioning local government—the two criteria for Government success mentioned above—has more than doubled. By a similar standard, Viet Cong control over the rural population has dropped sharply to less than ten per cent.

The enemy is facing greater difficulty in recruitment and supply. North Vietnamese fillers are being used to bolster Viet Cong main force and local force units, whose strength appears to be declining in most areas. More of the enemy's time is taken up in gaining strength for new offensives which appear to be progressively less efficient.

Claims of progress in Vietnam have been frequent during the course of our involvement there—and have often proved too optimistic. However careful our planning, and however hopeful we are for the progress of these plans, we are conscious of two basic facts:

- We cannot try to fool the enemy, who knows what is actually happening.

- Nor must we fool ourselves. The American people must have the full truth. We cannot afford a loss of confidence in our judgment and in our leadership.

Because the prospects and the progress of Vietnamization demand the most careful study and thoughtful analysis—by ourselves and our critics alike—we have made major efforts to determine the facts.

At my request, Secretary Laird and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Wheeler, have just traveled to Vietnam to look into the situation. Last fall, I asked Sir Robert Thompson, an objective British expert with long experience in the area, to make his own candid and independent appraisal for me.

We have established a Vietnam Special Studies Group

70

CLOJ

71

whose membership includes my Assistant for National Security Affairs as Chairman, the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have directed this group to:

- sponsor and direct on a continuous basis systematic analyses of U.S. programs and activities in Vietnam;

- undertake special analytical studies on a priority basis as required to support broad policy and related program decisions; and

- provide a forum for and encourage systematic interagency analysis of U.S. activities in Vietnam.

Essentially the purpose of this group is to direct studies of the factual situation in Vietnam. These studies are undertaken by analysts and individuals with experience in Vietnam drawn from throughout the Government. Their findings are presented to the Vietnam Special Studies Group and the National Security Council.

As described below, the group has helped us identify problems for the future. It has provoked the most searching questions, as well as measured the progress we have achieved.

## Prisoners of War

In human terms, no other aspect of conflict in Vietnam more deeply troubles thousands of American families than the refusal of North Vietnam to agree to humane treatment of prisoners of war or to provide information about men missing in action. Over 1400 Americans are now listed as missing or captured, some as long as five years, most with no word ever to their families. In the Paris meetings, we have sought repeatedly to raise this subject—to no avail. Far from

72

agreeing to arrangements for the release of prisoners, the other side has failed even to live up to the humane standards of the 1949 Geneva Convention on prisoners of war: the provision of information about all prisoners, the right of all prisoners to correspond with their families and to receive packages, inspection of POW camps by an impartial organization such as the International Red Cross, and the early release of seriously sick and wounded prisoners.

This is not a political or military issue, but a matter of basic humanity. There may be disagreement about other aspects of this conflict, but there can be no disagreement on humane treatment for prisoners of war. I state again our readiness to proceed at once to arrangements for the release of prisoners of war on both sides.

## Tasks for the Future

This Administration is carrying out a concerted and coordinated plan for peace in Vietnam. But the following tasks still remain:

- **Negotiations.** One task is to persuade the North Vietnamese Government to join us in genuine negotiations leading toward a compromise settlement which would assure the self-determination of the South Vietnamese people and would also ensure the continued neutrality of Laos. The fact that it has not yet given any indication of doing so does not necessarily mean that such a decision cannot come at any point. While we harbor no undue optimism, the history of negotiations on Vietnam shows that breakthroughs have always come with little warning after long deadlocks.

Hanoi faces serious and complicated issues in making the fundamental decision to seek a genuine

73

settlement. Allied military pressures, uncertainties in its international support, strains within North Vietnam, the recent display of American public support for a just peace, and the strengthening of the South Vietnamese Government under Vietnamization, all argue for seeking a settlement now. On the other hand, Hanoi's mistrust of our intentions before and after a settlement, its hope that American domestic pressures will force us to withdraw rapidly or make major concessions, its hope for political instability and collapse in South Vietnam, its emotional commitment to the struggle, and its own political weakness in the South must weigh heavily against its willingness to negotiate.

We do not know what choice the North Vietnamese Government will make. For our part, we shall continue to try to make clear to that Government that its true long-range interests lie in the direction of negotiations. As we have often said, we shall be flexible and generous when serious negotiations start at last.

**—Enemy Intentions.** Another crucial task is to evaluate Hanoi's intentions on the battlefield. We hope that the level of combat can be further reduced, but we must be prepared for new enemy offenses. The Government of North Vietnam could make no greater mistake than to assume that an increase in violence would be to its advantage. As I said on November 3, and have repeated since, if I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I will not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

74

**—Vietnamization.** A major problem we must face is whether the Vietnamization program will succeed. The enemy is determined and able, and will continue to fight unless he can be persuaded that negotiation is the best solution. The success of Vietnamization is a basic element in Hanoi's assessment of its policies, just as it is in our own.

**—We are now attempting to determine the depth and durability of the progress which has been made in Vietnam.** We are studying the extent to which it has been dependent on the presence of American combat and support forces as well as on expanded and improved South Vietnamese army and territorial forces. We are asking searching questions:

* What is the enemy's capability to mount sustained operations? Could they succeed in undoing our gains?

* What is the actual extent of improvement in allied capabilities? In particular, are the Vietnamese developing the leadership, logistics capabilities, tactical know-how, and sensitivity to the needs of their own people which are indispensable to continued success?

* What alternative strategies are open to the enemy in the face of continued allied success? If they choose to conduct a protracted, low-intensity war, could they simply wait out U.S. withdrawals and then, through reinvigorated efforts, seize the initiative again and defeat the South Vietnamese forces?

* Most important, what are the attitudes of the Vietnamese people, whose free choice we are

75

fighting to preserve? Are they truly being dis-
affected from the Viet Cong, or are they indif-
ferent to both sides? What do their attitudes
imply about the likelihood that the pacification
gains will stick?

These studies are continuing, as are our studies of
the enemy situation and options. I have made it clear
that I want the Vietnam Special Studies Group and the
other agencies of the U.S. Government to provide the
fullest possible presentation of the facts, whatever their
policy implications might be.

Our task is to continue to proceed carefully in the
policy of Vietnamization, and to find the means which
will best support our purpose of helping the South Viet-
namese to strengthen themselves.

Even as the fighting continues in Vietnam, we must
plan for the transition from war to peace. Much has
already been done to bring relief to suffering people,
to reconstruct war-torn areas and to promote economic
rehabilitation. We have been supporting those efforts.
We shall continue to support them and we shall count
on other nations to help.

I look forward to the day when I shall not have to
report on the problems of ending a complex war but
rather on the opportunities offered by a stable peace,
when the men and nations who have fought so long and
so hard will be reconciled.

I expressed my hope for the future of Vietnam when
I spoke to the United Nations on September 18:

"When the war ends, the United States will stand ready to help the people of Vietnam—all of them—in their tasks of renewal and reconstruction. And when peace comes at last to Vietnam, it can truly come with healing in its wings."

76

THE MIDDLE EAST

"... a peace which speaks not only about the integrity of nations, but also for the integrity of individuals."

Letter to the President of
American Near East Refugee
Aid, October 21, 1969.

"... the peace that is not simply one of words but one which both parties will have a vested interest in maintaining."

Welcoming remarks to Prime
Minister of Israel,
September 25, 1969.

These statements reflect some of my thoughts on the
nature of the peace which must come to the Middle
East. At the same time, this is an area with great
resources and prospects for economic progress. It is
the first region of developing nations that is near to
meeting its capital needs from its own resources.

Yet this area presents one of the sternest tests of
our quest for peace through partnership and accommo-
dation of interests. It combines intense local conflict
with great power involvement. This combination is all
the more dangerous because the outside powers' in-
terests are greater than their control.

Beyond the area of conflict and beyond this era of
conflict, the United States is challenged to find new
relationships in helping all the people of the area
marshal their resources to share in progress.

The most important of the area's conflicts, between
Arabs and Israel, is still far from settlement. It has
serious elements of intractability, but its importance
requires all concerned to devote their energies to help-
ing to resolve it or make it less dangerous.

77

Richard Nixon, 1970

Apr. 20 [126]

et it again. Let us re-
future will be better if
with, develop it in great
Sunday after Sunday,

t spoke at 9:30 a.m. in
a service observing the
Day and Thanksgiving for
Apollo 13 astronauts.

 religious services I have
 have attended a great
 séance.

s on the whole Pacific

t some of the finishing
nam speech this after-
and tomorrow.

is morning was very
out an hour and a half,

: spoke at approximately
Air Force Base.

tch the President referred,
Dr. Abraham K. Akaka
Church in Honolulu, is
ly Compilation of Presi-
ol. 6, p. 551).

ly, the President met with
ain, Jr., Commander in
the Pacific, and other
for a briefing on the
southeast Asia.

n the bench here to
only wish time
everybody who is

here—the question that was asked most
often was, “How are the astronauts?”

I can only tell you that going from
Washington first to Houston and then to
Hawaii and meeting the astronauts when
they returned to the United States was
one of the most memorable events of our
lives, as well as, I am sure, of all of you
who had the opportunity to witness it.

When you ask how they are, I can tell
you that physically they look as if they
had just been on—well, I was going to
say on the way from San Clemente to Los
Angeles, but that is a pretty hard ride—
but when they came off the plane it was
obvious that their spirit was high.

It was also quite clear that these men
who had suffered such a great ordeal and
confronted such a tremendous problem
had come through with the great Ameri-
can ability to surmount a difficulty—to
surmount it and come out stronger as a
result of it.

I just want to say this: That as I met
them I felt enormously proud of this coun-
try, proud that this Nation produces men
like that, men who despite the mechanical
backing that they had, and all the scien-

tific genius that made their flight possible,
who, when that mechanical failure no
longer came through for them, that they
responded with the individual capacity
that they had within them.

I also would like to point out as I did
when I was in Houston yesterday, and as
they themselves said, as Captain Lovell
said when I presented the Medal of Free-
dom to him, that it would not have been
possible for them to return to earth had
it not been for the fact that there in Hous-
ton and at tracking stations around the
world, there were hundreds, yes, thou-
sands of people on the ground who did the
planning and who helped make the deci-
sions that brought them back.

This was truly a great team effort. It
was a great triumph for the spirit of
America. It made you realize why this is
a really great country. I am very proud to
have been there to give your greetings to
them, and I can tell you that they send
their very best to you, as I return to
California.

Thank you.

NOTE: The President spoke at 5:31 p.m. at El Toro Marine Corps Air Station.

126 Address to the Nation on Progress Toward Peace in
Vietnam. April 20, 1970

I have requested this television and radio time tonight to give you a progress report on our plan to bring a just peace to Vietnam.

When I first outlined our program last
June, I stated that the rate of American
withdrawals from Vietnam would depend
on three criteria: progress in the train-
ing of the South Vietnamese, progress in
the Paris negotiations, and the level of
enemy activity.

Tonight I am pleased to report that
progress in training and equipping South
Vietnamese forces has substantially ex-
ceeded our original expectations last June.

Very significant advances have also
been made in pacification.

Although we recognize that problems
remain, these are encouraging trends.

However, I must report with regret
that no progress has taken place on the
negotiating front. The enemy still de-
mands that we unilaterally and uncondi-

373

[126] Apr. 20

tionally withdraw all American forces, that in the process we overthrow the elected Government of South Vietnam, and that the United States accept a political settlement that would have the practical consequence of the forcible imposition of a Communist government upon the people of South Vietnam.

That would mean humiliation and defeat for the United States. This we cannot and will not accept.

Let me now turn to the third criteria for troop withdrawals—the level of enemy activity. In several areas since December, that level has substantially increased.

In recent months Hanoi has sent thousands more of their soldiers to launch new offensives in neutral Laos in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1962 to which they were signatories.

South of Laos, almost 40,000 Communist troops are now conducting overt aggression against Cambodia, a small neutralist country that the Communists have used for years as a base for attack upon South Vietnam in violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 to which they were also signatories.

This follows the consistent pattern of North Vietnamese aggression in Indonesia. During the past 8 years they have sent tens of thousands of troops into all three countries of the peninsula and across every single common border.

Men and supplies continue to pour down the Ho Chi Minh Trail; and in the past 2 weeks, the Communists have stepped up their attacks upon allied forces in South Vietnam.

However, despite this new enemy activity, there has been an overall decline in enemy force levels in South Vietnam since December.

As the enemy force levels have declined

and as the South Vietnamese have assumed more of the burden of battle, American casualties have declined.

I am glad to be able to report tonight that in the first 3 months of 1970, the number of Americans killed in action dropped to the lowest first quarter level in 5 years.

In June, a year ago, when we began troop withdrawals, we did so on a "cut and try" basis—with no certainty that the program would be successful. In June we announced withdrawal of 25,000 American troops; in September another 35,000 and then in December 50,000 more. These withdrawals have now been completed and as of April 15, a total of 115,500 men have returned home from Vietnam.

We have now reached a point where we can confidently move from a period of "cut and try" to a longer-range program for the replacement of Americans by South Vietnamese troops.

I am, therefore, tonight announcing plans for the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops to be completed during the spring of next year. This will bring a total reduction of 265,500 men in our Armed Forces in Vietnam below the level that existed when we took office 15 months ago.

The timing and pace of these new withdrawals within the overall schedule will be determined by our best judgment of the current military and diplomatic situation.

This far-reaching decision was made after consultation with our commanders in the field, and it has the approval of the Government of South Vietnam.

Now, viewed against the enemy's escalation in Laos and Cambodia, and in view of the stepped-up attacks this month in South Vietnam, this decision clearly in-

volves risks.

But I again remind the leaders of Vietnam that while we are at risks for peace, they will be risks should they attempt tozion to jeopardize the security of the remaining forces in Vietnam, military action in Vietnam, or in Laos.

I repeat what I said November 15th. If I continue to see increased enemy action jeopardizing the remaining forces in Vietnam, I hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation. My responsibility as Chief of our Armed Forces is of our men, and I shall meet any possibility. The decision I have tonight to withdraw 150,000 men over the next year is based on the progress of our Vietnamization.

There is a better, shorter peace—through negotiation, withdraw more than 150,000 men a year if we make progress at the front.

Had the other side responded to our offer of May 1st, most American and foreign leaders would have left South Vietnam by the same route. A political settlement is the matter. That is what the fighting in China has been about over the years.

Now, we have noted with recent statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Malik concern over the new Geneva conference on Iran.

We do not yet know the terms of this statement. It is of the letters I wrote on April 15th to the governments of the 1962 Geneva Accords and observations on the negotiations and observations.

374

Richard Nixon, 1970

Apr. 20 [126]

South Vietnamese have at
of the burden of, battle,
alties have declined.
to be able to report tonight
last 3 months of 1970, the
Americans killed in action
lowest first quarter level in

year ago, when we began
qals, we did so on a "cut-
with no certainty that the
be successful. In June we
withdrawal of 25,000 Ameri-
September another 35,000
ember 50,000 more. These
have now been completed
150,000 of 115,500 men
crossed from Vietnam.
reached a point where
only move from a period of
a longer range program
ment of Americans by
these troops.

ore, tonight announcing
drawal of an additional
to be completed
ng of next year. This will
ction of 265,500 men in
ies in Vietnam below the
when we took office 15

d pace of these new with-
the overall schedule will
your best judgment of
litary and diplomatic

ing decision was made
with our commanders
has the approval of the
South Vietnam.

ainst the enemy's escala-
Carolina, and in view
of this month in
his decision clearly in-

volves risks.

But I again remind the leaders of North Vietnam that while we are taking these risks for peace, they will be taking grave risks should they attempt to use the occasion to jeopardize the security of our remaining forces in Vietnam by increased military action in Vietnam, in Cambodia, or in Laos.

I repeat what I said November 3d and December 15th. If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation.

My responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces is for the safety of our men, and I shall meet that responsibility. The decision I have announced tonight to withdraw 150,000 more men over the next year is based entirely on the progress of our Vietnamization program.

There is a better, shorter path to
peace—through negotiations. We shall
withdraw more than 150,000 over the next
year if we make progress at the negotiating
front.

Had the other side responded positively at Paris to our offer of May 14 last year, most American and foreign troops would have left South Vietnam by now.

A political settlement is the heart of the
matter. That is what the fighting in Indo-
china has been about over the past 30
years.

Now, we have noted with interest the
recent statement by Soviet Deputy For-
eign Minister Malik concerning a possible
new Geneva conference on Indochina.

We do not yet know the full implica-
tions of this statement. It is in the spirit
of the letters I wrote on April 7, to signa-
tories of the 1962 Geneva Accords urging
consultations and observance of the Ac-

cords. We have consistently said we were
willing to explore any reasonable path to
peace. We are in the process of exploring
this one.

But whatever the fate of this particular
move we are ready for a settlement fair to
everyone.

Let me briefly review for you the prin-
ciples that govern our view of a just polit-
ical settlement.

First, our overriding objective is a polit-
ical solution that reflects the will of the
South Vietnamese people and allows them
to determine their future without out-
side interference.

I again reaffirm this Government's ac-
ceptance of eventual, total withdrawal of
American troops. In turn, we must see
the permanent withdrawal of all North
Vietnamese troops and be given reason-
able assurances that they will not return.

Second, a fair political solution should
reflect the existing relationship of political
forces within South Vietnam. We recog-
nize the complexity of shaping machinery
that would fairly apportion political
power in South Vietnam. We are flexi-
ble; we have offered nothing on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis.

And third, we will abide by the out-
come of the political process agreed upon.
President Thieu and I have repeatedly
stated our willingness to accept the free
decision of the South Vietnamese people.
But we will not agree to the arrogant de-
mand that the elected leaders of the Gov-
ernment of Vietnam be overthrown before
real negotiations begin.

Let me briefly review the record of our
efforts to end the war in Vietnam through
negotiations.

We were told repeatedly in the past that
our adversaries would negotiate seriously
—if only we stopped the bombing of

375

[126] Apr. 20

North Vietnam;

- if only we began withdrawing our forces from South Vietnam;

- if only we dealt with the National Liberation Front as one of the parties to the negotiations;

- if only we would agree in principle to removal of all of our forces from Vietnam.

We have taken all these steps.

The United States, over a year and a half ago, stopped all bombing of North Vietnam. Long ago we agreed to negotiate with the National Liberation Front as one of the parties. We have already withdrawn 115,500 American troops. Tonight I have announced a decision to reduce American force levels by a quarter of a million men from what they were 15 months ago. We have offered repeatedly to withdraw all of our troops if the North Vietnamese would withdraw theirs. We have taken risks for peace that every fair and objective man can readily recognize.

And still there is no progress at the negotiating table.

It is Hanoi and Hanoi alone that stands today blocking the path to a just peace for all the peoples of Southeast Asia.

When our astronauts returned safely to earth last Friday, the whole world rejoiced with us. We could have had no more eloquent demonstration of a profound truth—that the greatest force working for peace in the world today is the fact that men and women everywhere, regardless of differences in race, religion, nationality, or political philosophy, value the life of a human being. We were as one as we thought of those brave men, their wives, their children, their parents.

The death of a single man in war, whether he is an American, a South Viet-

namese, a Vietcong, or a North Vietnamese, is a human tragedy. That is why we want to end this war and achieve a just peace. We call upon our adversaries to join us in working at the conference table toward that goal.

No Presidential statement on Vietnam would be complete without an expression of our concern for the fate of the American prisoners of war.

The callous exploitation of the anxieties and anguish of the parents, the wives, the children of these brave men, as negotiating pawns, is an unforgivable breach of the elementary rules of conduct between civilized peoples. We shall continue to make every possible effort to get Hanoi to provide information on the whereabouts of all prisoners, to allow them to communicate with their families, to permit inspection of prisoners-of-war camps, and to provide for the early release of at least the sick and the wounded.

My fellow Americans, 5 years ago American combat troops were first sent to Vietnam. The war since that time has been the longest and one of the most costly and difficult conflicts in our history.

The decision I have announced tonight means that we finally have in sight the just peace we are seeking. We can now say with confidence that pacification is succeeding. We can now say with confidence that the South Vietnamese can develop the capability for their own defense. And we can say with confidence that all American combat forces can and will be withdrawn.

I could not make these statements tonight had it not been for the dedication, the bravery, the sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of young men who have served in Vietnam. Nor could I have made it had it not been for the perseverance of mil-

lions of Americans at home. When men write the Nation, they will record the annals of time made in a more selfless cause than the people sacrificed for the Nation: in a faraway land, in a position of Communist power and for the right of determine their own future interference.

The enemy has failed Vietnam because of their strategy.

They thought they could win a victory. They have failed.

They thought they could win in South Vietnam. They do so.

They thought they could win in the United States. They are most fatal miscalculation.

In this great free country, debate—we disagree, so we must debate in a free country.

## 127 Statement on Non-Public

THE NON-PUBLIC elementary schools in the United States long been an integral part of our educational establishment in an important way: our public school system is a diverse one, and our diversity would otherwise lack. The competition to the through which education come; both systems benefit from results.

Should any single school

376

56-087-71-28

[LC]

Richard Nixon, 1970

Apr. 21 [127]

ing, or a North Viet-
neg tragedy. That is why
this war and achieve a
will upon our adversaries
ing at the conference
goal.

A statement on Vietnam
without an expression
the fate of the American

citation of the anxieties
parents, the wives, the
brave men, as negotiat-
ing unforgivable breach of
ies of conduct between
We shall continue to
enjoy the peace of Hanoi to
on the whereabouts
allow them to com-
families, to permit in-
of-war camps, and to
release of at least the
U.S. troops.

Americans, 5 years ago
roops were first sent
since that time has
one of the most costly
s in our history.

We announced tonight
have in sight the just
ing. We can now say
pacification is suc-
say with confidence
names can develop
their own defense. And
dence that all Ameri-
can and will be

these statements to-
ken for the dedication,
ifice of hundreds of
men have served
I have made it had
perseverance of mil-

lions of Americans at home.

When men write the history of this
Nation, they will record that no people in
the annals of time made greater sacrifices
in a more selfless cause than the American
people sacrificed for the right of 18 million
people in a faraway land to avoid the im-
position of Communist rule against their
will and for the right of those people to
determine their own future free of outside
interference.

The enemy has failed to win the war in
Vietnam because of three basic errors in
their strategy.

They thought they could win a military
victory. They have failed to do so.

They thought they could win politically
in South Vietnam. They have failed to
do so.

They thought they could win politically
in the United States. This proved to be
their most fatal miscalculation.

In this great free country of ours, we
debate—we disagree, sometimes violently,
but the mistake the totalitarians make
over and over again is to conclude that
debate in a free country is proof of weak-

ness. We are not a weak people. We are a
strong people. America has never been
defeated in the proud 190-year history of
this country, and we shall not be defeated
in Vietnam.

Tonight I want to thank the American
people for the support you have given so
generously to the cause of a just peace in
Vietnam.

It is your steadiness and your stamina
that the leaders of North Vietnam are
watching tonight. It is these qualities, as
much as any proposals, that will bring
them to negotiate.

It is America's resolve, as well as Amer-
ica's reasonableness, that will achieve our
goal of a just peace in Vietnam and
strengthen the foundations of a just and
lasting peace in the Pacific and through-
out the world.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 6 p.m. in his office at the Western White House in San Clemente, Calif. The address was broadcast live on radio and television.

On the same day, the White House Press
Office released an advance text of the address.

127 Statement on Establishing the President's Panel on
Non-Public Education. April 21, 1970

THE NON-PUBLIC elementary and sec-
ondary schools in the United States have
long been an integral part of the Nation's
educational establishment. They supple-
ment in an important way the main task of
our public school system. They provide a
diversity which our educational system
would otherwise lack. They give a spur of
competition to the public schools—
through which educational innovations
come; both systems benefit, and progress
results.

Should any single school system—pub-

lic or private—ever acquire a complete
monopoly over the education of our chil-
dren, the result would neither be good for
that school system nor good for the
country.

The non-public schools also give par-
ents the opportunity to send children to
a school of their own choice, and of their
own religious denomination. They offer
a wider range of possibilities for educa-
tional experimentation and special oppor-
tunities, especially for Spanish-speaking
Americans and black Americans.

56-087-71-28

377

ts

—and they voice serious
only for the integrity of the
but also for the authority of
should be sustained.
In, it would be enacted under
stitutional cloud, with its
ous doubt. Even those who
legislation most vigorously
the existence of a serious
question.

would throw the electoral
errormil during a protracted
uncertainty, and finally
frustrated, embit-
tess.

ge:

18-year-old vote rider be
from his bill extending the
rights Act.

Voting Rights Bill be

less proceed expeditiously
vote for the Nation's 18,-
year-olds in the one way
only provided for in the
, and the one way that
, doubt as to its validity:
aal amendment.

RICHARD NIXON

text of identical letters ad-
試able John W. McCormack,
the Honorable Carl Al-
ly Leader, and the Honor-
, House Minority Leader.

nal

duals who took risks—
of their activities over
re to see. In less
simal product will
urs.

Richard Nixon, 1970

Apr. 30 [139]

The need for investment in America is
by no means ended. Although our capacity
and our product far exceed that of any
other nation, our national needs and na-
tional goals have also grown apace. Al-
though public policy has an important
role in the meeting of these goals, without
private enterprise the goals themselves
would be meaningless. For we depend
upon private investment to provide us the
capital to produce goods, to provide jobs,
to build houses, to support the nation's
public debt, and, most important, to main-

tain the growth of product and income
that yields benefits for all Americans. In
short, without the private investor, Amer-
ica would simply not be the country we
know and love.

The future holds many challenges, both
for public policy and for the private inves-
tor. But, in the great tradition of this
Nation, I am sure that history will record
that both were equal to the task.

RICHARD NIXON

NOTE: National Invest-in-America Week was
April 26 to May 2.

138 Letter to the Secretary of Defense Deactivating the Presidential Cabin Cruisers. April 28, 1970

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In order to effect a saving in money
and manpower, I have decided to de-
activate the Presidential cabin cruisers
Patricia and Julie, which are operated by
the Naval Administrative Unit.

You are, therefore, directed to offer
these craft for disposal outside of the De-
partment of Defense in a manner appro-
priate and befitting of their service to the
administrations of five Presidents.

By separate correspondence, my Mili-
tary Assistant will effect concurrent

personnel reductions for the Naval
Administrative Unit.

Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON

[Honorable Melvin Laird, Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D.C.]

NOTE: The letter was dated April 15, 1970, and released on April 28 along with background information on the Presidential cabin cruisers *Patricia* and *Julie*, as well as *Sequoia*, the only remaining Presidential vessel. The background information is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 6, p. 591).

A fact sheet on Presidential yachts was also
released by the White House on April 28.

139 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia. April 30, 1970

Good evening my fellow Americans:

Ten days ago, in my report to the Nation
on Vietnam, I announced a decision to
withdraw an additional 150,000 Ameri-
cans from Vietnam over the next year. I
said then that I was making that decision
despite our concern over increased enemy

activity in Laos, in Cambodia, and in
South Vietnam.

At that time, I warned that if I con-
cluded that increased enemy activity in
any of these areas endangered the lives of
Americans remaining in Vietnam, I would
not hesitate to take strong and effective

405

[139] Apr. 3

Despite that warning, North Vietnam
has increased its military aggression in all
these areas, and particularly in Cambodia.

After full consultation with the Na-
tional Security Council, Ambassador
Bunker, General Abrams, and my other
advisers, I have concluded that the actions
of the enemy in the last 10 days clearly
endanger the lives of Americans who are
in Vietnam now and would constitute an
unacceptable risk to those who will be
there after withdrawal of another 150,000.

To protect our men who are in Vietnam
and to guarantee the continued success of
our withdrawal and Vietnamization pro-
grams, I have concluded that the time has
come for action.

Tonight, I shall describe the actions of
the enemy, the actions I have ordered to
deal with that situation, and the reasons
for my decision.

Cambodia, a small country of 7 million
people, has been a neutral nation since the
Geneva agreement of 1954—an agree-
ment, incidentally, which was signed by
the Government of North Vietnam.

American policy since then has been to
scrupulously respect the neutrality of the
Cambodian people. We have maintained
a skeleton diplomatic mission of fewer
than 15 in Cambodia's capital, and that
only since last August. For the previous 4
years, from 1965 to 1969, we did not have
any diplomatic mission whatever in Cam-
bodia. And for the past 5 years, we have
provided no military assistance whatever
and no economic assistance to Cambodia.

North Vietnam, however, has not re-
spected that neutrality.

For the past 5 years—as indicated on
this map that you see here—North Viet-
nam has occupied military sanctuaries all
along the Cambodian frontier with South

Vietnam. Some of these extend up to 20
miles into Cambodia. The sanctuaries are
in red and, as you note, they are on both
sides of the border. They are used for hit
and run attacks on American and South
Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.

These Communist occupied territories
contain major base camps, training sites,
logistics facilities, weapons and ammuni-
tion factories, airstrips, and prisoner-of-
war compounds.

For 5 years, neither the United States
nor South Vietnam has moved against
these enemy sanctuaries because we did
not wish to violate the territory of a neu-
tral nation. Even after the Vietnamese
Communists began to expand these sanc-
tuaries 4 weeks ago, we counseled patience
to our South Vietnamese allies and im-
posed restraints on our own commanders.

In contrast to our policy, the enemy in
the past 2 weeks has stepped up his guer-
rilla actions and he is concentrating his
main forces in these sanctuaries that you
see on this map where they are building
up to launch massive attacks on our forces
and those of South Vietnam.

North Vietnam in the last 2 weeks has
stripped away all pretense of respecting
the sovereignty or the neutrality of Cam-
bodia. Thousands of their soldiers are in-
vading the country from the sanctuaries;
they are encircling the capital of Phnom
Penh. Coming from these sanctuaries, as
you see here, they have moved into Cam-
bodia and are encircling the capital.

Cambodia, as a result of this, has sent
out a call to the United States, to a num-
ber of other nations, for assistance.
Because if this enemy effort succeeds,
Cambodia would become a vast enemy
staging area and a springboard for attacks
on South Vietnam along 600 miles of
frontier—a refuge where enemy troops

could return from combat
retaliation.

North Vietnamese men
could then be poured into
jeopardizing not only the F-
men but the people of South
well.

Now confronted with the
have three options.

First, we can do nothing
mate result of that course or
Unless we indulge in wishful
lives of Americans remaining
after our next withdrawal
would be gravely threaten

Let us go to the map
South Vietnam. Here is N-
orth Vietnam already oc-
of Laos. If North Vietnan-
this whole band in Cambo-
tire country, it would me-
Vietnam was completely o-
the forces of Americans i
well as the South Vietnan-
in an untenable military p-
Our second choice is to
military assistance to Ca-
Now unfortunately, while
pathize with the plight of
bodians whose country is
massive amounts of mil-
could not be rapidly and
lized by the small Can-
against the immediate thr
nations, we shall do our
the small arms and other eq-
the Cambodian Army of 40
can use for its defense. But
provide will be limited to
enabling Cambodia to def-
ity and not for the purpo-
an active belligerent on c
other.

Our third choice is to go

[2c]

406

[2]

Richard Nixon, 1970

Apr. 30 [139]

of these extend up to 20
media. The sanctuaries are
a note, they are on both
r. They are used for hit
on American and South
in South Vietnam.
nist occupied territories
these camps, training sites,
weapons and ammuni-
strips, and prisoner-of-
ther the United States
has moved against
ritaries because we did
the territory of a neu-
after the Vietnamese
to and these sanc-
tioned patience
nese allies and im-
our own commanders.
policy, the enemy in
stepped up his guer-
 is concentrating his
 sanctuaries that you
here they are building
the attacks on our forces
Vietnam.

In the last 2 weeks has
prense of respecting
the neutrality of Cam-
f their soldiers are in-
from the sanctuaries;
the capital of Phnom
these sanctuaries, as
have moved into Cam-
ling the capital.

Result of this, has sent
ted States, to a num-
ons, for assistance.
my effort succeeds,
come a vast enemy
ing for attacks
along 100 miles of
here enemy troops

could return from combat without fear of
retaliation.

North Vietnamese men and supplies
could then be poured into that country,
jeopardizing not only the lives of our own
men but the people of South Vietnam as
well.

Now confronted with this situation, we
have three options.

First, we can do nothing. Well, the ulti-
mate result of that course of action is clear.
Unless we indulge in wishful thinking, the
lives of Americans remaining in Vietnam
after our next withdrawal of 150,000
would be gravely threatened.

Let us go to the map again. Here is
South Vietnam. Here is North Vietnam.
North Vietnam already occupies this part
of Laos. If North Vietnam also occupied
this whole band in Cambodia, or the en-
tire country, it would mean that South
Vietnam was completely outflanked and
the forces of Americans in this area, as
well as the South Vietnamese, would be
in an untenable military position.

Our second choice is to provide massive
military assistance to Cambodia itself.
Now unfortunately, while we deeply sym-
pathize with the plight of 7 million Cam-
bodians whose country is being invaded,
massive amounts of military assistance
could not be rapidly and effectively uti-
lized by the small Cambodian Army
against the immediate threat. With other
nations, we shall do our best to provide
the small arms and other equipment which
the Cambodian Army of 40,000 needs and
can use for its defense. But the aid we will
provide will be limited to the purpose of
enabling Cambodia to defend its neutral-
ity and not for the purpose of making it
an active belligerent on one side or the
other.

Our third choice is to go to the heart of

the trouble. That means cleaning out
major North Vietnamese and Vietcong
occupied territories—these sanctuaries
which serve as bases for attacks on both
Cambodia and American and South Viet-
namese forces in South Vietnam. Some of
these, incidentally, are as close to Saigon
as Baltimore is to Washington. This one,
for example [indicating], is called the Par-
rot's Beak. It is only 33 miles from Saigon.

Now faced with these three options, this
is the decision I have made.

In cooperation with the armed forces
of South Vietnam, attacks are being
launched this week to clean out major
enemy sanctuaries on the Cambodian-
Vietnam border.

A major responsibility for the ground
operations is being assumed by South
Vietnamese forces. For example, the at-
tacks in several areas, including the Par-
rot's Beak that I referred to a moment
ago, are exclusively South Vietnamese
ground operations under South Viet-
namese command with the United States
providing air and logistical support.

There is one area, however, immedi-
ately above Parrot's Beak, where I have
concluded that a combined American
and South Vietnamese operation is
necessary.

Tonight, American and South Viet-
namese units will attack the headquarters
for the entire Communist military opera-
tion in South Vietnam. This key control
center has been occupied by the North
Vietnamese and Vietcong for 5 years in
blatant violation of Cambodia's neutrality.

This is not an invasion of Cambodia.
The areas in which these attacks will be
launched are completely occupied and
controlled by North Vietnamese forces.
Our purpose is not to occupy the areas.
Once enemy forces are driven out of these

407

[139] Apr. 30

sanctuaries and once their military supplies are destroyed, we will withdraw.

These actions are in no way directed to the security interests of any nation. Any government that chooses to use these actions as a pretext for harming relations with the United States will be doing so on its own responsibility, and on its own initiative, and we will draw the appropriate conclusions.

Now let me give you the reasons for my decision.

A majority of the American people, a majority of you listening to me, are for the withdrawal of our forces from Vietnam. The action I have taken tonight is indispensable for the continuing success of that withdrawal program.

A majority of the American people want to end this war rather than to have it drag on interminably. The action I have taken tonight will serve that purpose.

A majority of the American people want to keep the casualties of our brave men in Vietnam at an absolute minimum. The action I take tonight is essential if we are to accomplish that goal.

We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cambodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam and winning the just peace we all desire. We have made—we will continue to make every possible effort to end this war through negotiation at the conference table rather than through more fighting on the battlefield.

Let us look again at the record. We have stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. We have cut air operations by over 20 percent. We have announced withdrawal of over 250,000 of our men. We have offered to withdraw all of our men if they

will withdraw theirs. We have offered to negotiate all issues with only one condition—and that is that the future of South Vietnam be determined not by North Vietnam, and not by the United States, but by the people of South Vietnam themselves.

The answer of the enemy has been intransigence at the conference table, belligerence in Hanoi, massive military aggression in Laos and Cambodia, and stepped-up attacks in South Vietnam, designed to increase American casualties.

This attitude has become intolerable. We will not react to this threat to American lives merely by plaintive diplomatic protests. If we did, the credibility of the United States would be destroyed in every area of the world where only the power of the United States deters aggression.

Tonight, I again warn the North Vietnamese that if they continue to escalate the fighting when the United States is withdrawing its forces, I shall meet my responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces to take the action I consider necessary to defend the security of our American men.

The action that I have announced tonight puts the leaders of North Vietnam on notice that we will be patient in working for peace; we will be conciliatory at the conference table, but we will not be humiliated. We will not be defeated. We will not allow American men by the thousands to be killed by an enemy from privileged sanctuaries.

The time came long ago to end this war through peaceful negotiations. We stand ready for those negotiations. We have made major efforts, many of which must remain secret. I say tonight: All the offers

and approaches made on the conference table is ready to negotiate so

But if the enemy re-conciliatory offers for continues to be to incite humiliate and defeat accordingly.

My fellow Americans of anarchy, both abroad and at home in the United States, are being systemically destroyed. Small nations all over the world are beingungs from without.

If, when the chips are most powerful, the chips of America, acts like a giant, the forces of anarchy will threaten all institutions throughout the

It is not our power character that is being question all Americans' answer tonight is: Do you have the strongest nation in the world to challenge by a group which to win a just peace, ignore tramples on solemn agreements on the neutrality of an unequaled power, uses our prisoners as hosts?

If we fail to meet other nations will be on its overwhelming power when a real crisis comes wanting.

During my campaign, I pledged to bring

408

50-057-71-30

We have offered to
with only one condi-
t that the future of South
 Vietnam not by North
y the United States,
of South Vietnam

 enemy has been in-
 conference table,
 with, massive military
 and Cambodia, and
 in South Vietnam,
 American casualties.
 become intolerable.
 this threat to Ameri-
 pliaine diplomatic
 the ability of the
to be destroyed in every
are only the power of the
ers aggression.

earn the North Viet-
continue to escalate
the United States is
, I shall meet my
mander in Chief of
 take the action I
defend the security

have announced to
of North Vietnam
be patient in work-
I be conciliatory at
but we will not be
not be defeated. We
men by the thou-
an enemy from

ago to end this war
iations. We stand
iations. We have
any of which must
ignor the offers

and approaches made previously remain
on the conference table whenever Hanoi
is ready to negotiate seriously.

But if the enemy response to our most
conciliatory offers for peaceful negotiation
continues to be to increase its attacks and
humiliate and defeat us, we shall react
accordingly.

My fellow Americans, we live in an age
of anarchy, both abroad and at home. We
see mindless attacks on all the great in-
stitutions which have been created by free
civilizations in the last 500 years. Even
here in the United States, great univer-
sities are being systematically destroyed.
Small nations all over the world find them-
selves under attack from within and from
without.

If, when the chips are down, the world's
most powerful nation, the United States
of America, acts like a pitiful, helpless
giant, the forces of totalitarianism and
anarchy will threaten free nations and free
institutions throughout the world.

It is not our power but our will and
character that is being tested tonight. The
question all Americans must ask and an-
swer tonight is this: Does the richest and
strongest nation in the history of the world
have the character to meet a direct chal-
lenge by a group which rejects every effort
to win a just peace, ignores our warning,
tramples on solemn agreements, violates
the neutrality of an unarmed people, and
uses our prisoners as hostages?

If we fail to meet this challenge, all
other nations will be on notice that despite
its overwhelming power the United States,
when a real crisis comes, will be found
wanting.

During my campaign for the Presi-
dency, I pledged to bring Americans home

from Vietnam. They are coming home.

I promised to end this war. I shall keep
that promise.

I promised to win a just peace. I shall
keep that promise.

We shall avoid a wider war. But we are
also determined to put an end to this war.

In this room, Woodrow Wilson made
the great decisions which led to victory in
World War I. Franklin Roosevelt made
the decisions which led to our victory in
World War II. Dwight D. Eisenhower
made decisions which ended the war in
Korea and avoided war in the Middle
East. John F. Kennedy, in his finest hour,
made the great decision which removed
Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba and
the Western Hemisphere.

I have noted that there has been a great
deal of discussion with regard to this
decision that I have made and I should
point out that I do not contend that it is
in the same magnitude as these decisions
that I have just mentioned. But between
those decisions and this decision there is a
difference that is very fundamental. In
those decisions, the American people were
not assailed by counsels of doubt and de-
feat from some of the most widely known
opinion leaders of the Nation.

I have noted, for example, that a Re-
publican Senator has said that this action
I have taken means that my party has lost
all chance of winning the November elec-
tions. And others are saying today that
this move against enemy sanctuaries will
make me a one-term President.

No one is more aware than I am of the
political consequences of the action I have
taken. It is tempting to take the easy
political path to blame this war on previ-
ous administrations and to bring all of

5G-087-71-30

409

[139] Apr. 30

our men home immediately, regardless of
the consequences, even though that would
mean defeat for the United States; to
desert 18 million South Vietnamese peo-
ple, who have put their trust in us and to
expose them to the same slaughter and
savagery which the leaders of North Viet-
nam inflicted on hundreds of thousands
of North Vietnamese who chose freedom
when the Communists took over North
Vietnam in 1954; to get peace at any price
now, even though I know that a peace of
humiliation for the United States would
lead to a bigger war or surrender later.

I have rejected all political considera-
tions in making this decision.

Whether my party gains in November
is nothing compared to the lives of 400,000
brave Americans fighting for our country
and for the cause of peace and freedom in
Vietnam. Whether I may be a one-term
President is insignificant compared to
whether by our failure to act in this crisis
the United States proves itself to be un-
worthy to lead the forces of freedom in
this critical period in world history. I
would rather be a one-term President and
do what I believe is right than to be a
two-term President at the cost of seeing
America become a second-rate power and
to see this Nation accept the first defeat in
its proud 190-year history.

I realize that in this war there are honest
and deep differences in this country about
whether we should have become involved,
that there are differences as to how the
war should have been conducted. But the
decision I announce tonight transcends
those differences.

For the lives of American men are in-

volved. The opportunity for 150,000
Americans to come home in the next
12 months is involved. The future of 18
million people in South Vietnam and 7
million people in Cambodia is involved.
The possibility of winning a just peace in
Vietnam and in the Pacific is at stake.

It is customary to conclude a speech
from the White House by asking support
for the President of the United States.
Tonight, I depart from that precedent.
What I ask is far more important. I ask
for your support for our brave men fight-
ing tonight halfway around the world—
not for territory—not for glory—but so
that their younger brothers and their sons
and your sons can have a chance to grow
up in a world of peace and freedom and
justice.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9 p.m. in his office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on radio and television.

On the same day, the White House Press
Office released an advance text of the Presi-
dent's address.

On May 5, 1970, the President met on two
separate occasions with congressional leaders
to discuss the Southeast Asian operations. The
White House released transcripts of news brief-
ings following these meetings: The first by
Senator John G. Tower of Texas and Repre-
sentatives L. Mendel Rivers of South Carolina
and Leslie C. Arends of Illinois on the meeting
with the Members of the Senate and House
Armed Services Committees; the second by
Senators George D. Aiken of Vermont and
Robert P. Griffin of Michigan and Representa-
tives Thomas E. Morgan of Pennsylvania and
E. Ross Adair of Indiana on the meeting with
the Members of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee and the House Foreign Affairs
Committee.

410

[1c]

140 Statement
State Univ

THIS should remind
that when dissent tur
invites tragedy. It is
tragic and unfortunate
strengthen the determ
Nation's campuses—al
ulty, and students alik

141 Remarks to
States Inte

Senator Mansfield, and
guished guests today:

I am very honored to
the White House, to
Rose Garden but whic
garden.

We are particularly
are here on a great holi
memoration for your
Mayo. When we reme
that occasion, Preside
member that he and ou
lived at about the same
of our respective cou
are remembered by th
lowed them in their cou
saved their countries.
appropriate that we w
can Parliamentary de
such a day.

If I could be per
personal word, I am
delegation are so many
not only to those fro
Senate, but some of t
friends from Mexico,
distinguished man, the
Foreign Relations Co
Foreign Minister of yo

Richard Nixon, 1970

May 5 [141]

140 Statement on the Deaths of Four Students at Kent State University, Kent, Ohio. May 4, 1970

THIS should remind us all once again that when dissent turns to violence, it invites tragedy. It is my hope that this tragic and unfortunate incident will strengthen the determination of all the Nation's campuses—administrators, faculty, and students alike—to stand firmly

for the right which exists in this country of peaceful dissent and just as strongly against the resort to violence as a means of such expression.

NOTE: The statement was read by Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler at his regular afternoon news briefing.

141 Remarks to Members of the Tenth Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Conference. May 5, 1970

Senator Mansfield, and all of our distinguished guests today:

I am very honored to welcome you here to the White House, to what is called the Rose Garden but which today is a tulip garden.

We are particularly honored that you are here on a great holiday, a day of commemoration for your country, Cinco de Mayo. When we remember the hero of that occasion, President Juárez, we remember that he and our President Lincoln lived at about the same time in the history of our respective countries. They both are remembered by those who have followed them in their countries as men who saved their countries. It is particularly appropriate that we welcome the Mexican Parliamentary delegation here on such a day.

If I could be permitted just a brief personal word, I am glad that in this delegation are so many old friends. I refer not only to those from our House and Senate, but some of those who are my friends from Mexico, including a very distinguished man, the Chairman of your Foreign Relations Committee who was Foreign Minister of your country when I

first knew him, Ambassador to the United States, Senator Tello.¹

He will recall the first visit that I made to your country, then as Vice President-elect of the United States. I recall the many times that my wife and I were guests at the embassy when he was Ambassador. I mention this because this indicates the feeling of very great closeness that I personally have for the people of Mexico, not only for your governmental representatives but for our good friends.

We are geographical neighbors, but I trust also we are neighbors in the heart. I want to say finally that I feel very appreciative of the fact that Senator Mansfield and the members of our delegation have worked with Senator Aguirre and the members of your delegation in this 10th Parliamentary Conference, because as legislators meet together, we recognize that legislators are closer to the people, closer than Ambassadors and closer than other elected representatives. As our Senators and Congressmen learn to know each other and to work together, so our govern-

¹ Senator Manuel Tello Barraud served as Ambassador to the United States from 1952 to 1958.

opportunity for 150,000 come home in the next evolved. The future of 18 South Vietnam and 70 Cambodia is involved. If winning a just peace in the Pacific is at stake, we must try to conclude a speech House by asking support of the United States from that precedent. More important. I ask for our brave men fight- day around the world— not for glory—but so they may have a chance to grow peace and freedom and

good night.

It spoke at 9 p.m. in his House. His address was radio and television.

the White House Press

The President met on two 24th congressional leaders and 25th Asian operations. The transcripts of news brief-meetings: The first by 10 o'clock of Texas and Repre-sentatives of South Carolina and Illinois on the meeting of the Senate and House committees; the second by 11 o'clock of Vermont and Michigan and Representa-tives of Pennsylvania and Iowa on the meeting with State Foreign Relations House Foreign Affairs

ELC 7

411

[174] June 3 Public Paper of the Presidents

174 Statement on Signing Bills Relating to District Judges and Customs Courts. June 3, 1970

I HAVE SIGNED into law two important bills which will greatly improve the administration of justice in this country: S. 952, which provides for the appointment of additional district judges, and S. 2624, the Customs Courts Act of 1970 and the Customs Administrative Act of 1970.

These two measures will help to reduce the tremendous backlogs of cases which currently clog the calendars of these courts. In the Customs Court, filings have risen from 35,000 in fiscal 1963 to more than 75,000 in fiscal 1969 with an ending caseload of over 431,000 cases as of July 1, 1969. In the United States district courts, civil and criminal filings increased by 14 percent for a total of 61,000 in the first half of fiscal 1970—up 24 percent in 4 years—leaving more than 110,000 cases pending on December 31, 1969, the largest number in history.

"Justice delayed is justice denied." That is a maxim I learned even before I attended law school. But its universal

familiarity makes it no less valid. When parties to civil cases are denied prompt judicial determination of their rights and liabilities, interruption of commerce and personal frustration are the result. When delays occur between indictment and trial in criminal cases, innocent persons are required to wait many painful months before their good names may be cleared, and the community as a whole is subjected to the risk of repeated criminal acts committed by some persons free awaiting trial.

It is toward the solving of these problems that these two bills are directed. This is a most important step in our common goal of insuring that the courts of this Nation are able to give to the cases which are brought before them the most thoughtful and prompt scrutiny possible.

NOTE: As enacted, S. 952 is Public Law 91-272 (84 Stat. 294), and S. 2624 is Public Law 91-271 (84 Stat. 274), both approved on June 2, 1970.

175 Address to the Nation on the Cambodian Sanctuary Operation. June 3, 1970

One month ago, I announced a decision ordering American participation with South Vietnamese forces in a series of operations against Communist-occupied areas in Cambodia which have been used for 5 years as bases for attacks on our forces in South Vietnam.

This past weekend, in the Western White House in California, I met with Secretary Laird, General Abrams, and

other senior advisers to receive a first-hand report on the progress of this operation.

Based on General Abrams' report, I can now state that this has been the most successful operation of this long and very difficult war.

Before going into the details which form the basis for this conclusion, I believe it would be helpful to review briefly why I considered it necessary to make this

decision, what our objectives.

You will recall that nounced the withdrawal of 150,000 American troops within a year—which is a total number withdrawn office, to 260,000. I that occasion our promotion peace. At the time I warned that if we take advantage of our gram by increased attack of Laos, or South Vietnam, dangered the lives of our forces in South Vietnam, I will be as Commander in Chief of our Forces, take strong action against that threat.

Between April 20th and 27th, Communist forces launched attacks against a number of neutral Cambodia. Though unmistakable—to link them with South Vietnam, I had maintained in Ca in violation of Cambodia's international laws, the withdrawal of our forces in South Vietnam, and the continuous hostileтер to launch assaults upon our allied forces.

This posed an unusual situation for our remaining forces. It would have meant that they would have had to withdraw for a longer war. And the face of an explicit Government—failure to meet the enemy action would have greatly lowered the credibility of the United States in the entire world.

After very intensive

476

Richard Nixon, 1970

June 3 [175]

## District Judges

no less valid. When they are denied prompt ion of their rights and ion of commerce and are the result. When an indictment and trial of innocent persons are re- ly painful months be- y as a whole is sub- ject to repeated criminal ly some persons free

some of these prob- bills are directed. This step in our common at the courts of this Na- tive to the cases which ore them the most ompt scrutiny possible.

952 is Public Law 91- and S. 2624 is Public Law 74), both approved on

decision, what our objectives were, and the prospects for achieving those objectives.

You will recall that on April 20, I an- nounced the withdrawal of an additional 150,000 American troops from Vietnam within a year—which will bring the to- tal number withdrawn, since I have taken office, to 260,000. I also reaffirmed on that occasion our proposals for a nego- tiated peace. At the time of this announce- ment I warned that if the enemy tried to take advantage of our withdrawal pro- gram by increased attacks in Cambodia, Laos, or South Vietnam in a way that en- dangered the lives of our men remaining in South Vietnam, I would, in my capac- ity as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, take strong action to deal with that threat.

Between April 20th and April 30th, Communist forces launched a series of attacks against a number of key cities in neutral Cambodia. Their objective was unmistakable—to link together bases they had maintained in Cambodia for 5 years in violation of Cambodian neutrality. The entire 600-mile Cambodian-South Viet- nam border would then have become one continuous hostile territory from which to launch assaults upon American and allied forces.

This posed an unacceptable threat to our remaining forces in South Vietnam. It would have meant higher casualties. It would have jeopardized our program for troop withdrawals. It would have meant a longer war. And—carried out in the face of an explicit warning from this Government—failure to deal with the enemy action would have eroded the credibility of the United States before the entire world.

After very intensive consultations with

my top advisers, I directed that American troops join the South Vietnamese in de- stroying these major enemy bases along the Cambodian frontier. I said when I made this announcement, “Our purpose is not to occupy the areas. Once enemy forces are driven out of these sanctuaries and once their military supplies are de- stroyed, we will withdraw.” That pledge is being kept. I said further on that occa- sion, “We take this action not for the purpose of expanding the war into Cam- bodia but for the purpose of ending the war in Vietnam.” That purpose is being advanced.

As of today I can report that all of our major military objectives have been achieved. Forty-three thousand South Vietnamese took part in these operations, along with 31,000 Americans. Our com- bined forces have moved with greater speed and success than we had planned; we have captured and destroyed far more in war material than we anticipated; and American and allied casualties have been far lower than we expected.

In the month of May, in Cambodia alone, we captured a total amount of enemy arms, equipment, ammunition, and food nearly equal to what we cap- tured in all of Vietnam in all of last year.

Here is some film of the war material that has been captured.

[At this point, Department of Defense films were shown while the President continued speaking.]

This is some ammunition you see. We have captured more than 10 million rounds of ammunition. That is equal to the enemy's expenditures of ammunition for 9 months.

And here also you see a few of the over 15,000 rifles and machine guns and other weapons we have captured. They will

## Sanctuary

ers to receive a first- the progress of this

ral Abrams' report, I this has been the most of this long and very

to the details which the conclusion, I be- lieve, should be reviewed briefly necessary to make this

477

[175] June 3

never be used against American boys in
Vietnam.

This reality was brought home directly
to me a few days ago. I was talking with
a union leader from New York. His son
died in Vietnam this past February. He
told me that had we moved earlier in
Cambodia, we might have captured the
enemy weapon that killed his son.

And now you are looking at some of the
heavy mortars and rocket launchers and
recoilless rifles that have shelled U.S. base
camps and Vietnamese towns. We have
seized over 2,000 of these along with
90,000 rounds of ammunition. That is as
much as the enemy fires in a whole year.
Had this war material made its way into
South Vietnam and had it been used
against American and allied troops, U.S.
casualties would have been vastly
increased.

And here you see rice, more than 11
million pounds of rice we have obtained.
This is more than enough rice to feed all
the enemy's combat battalions in Viet-
nam for over 3 months. But this rice you
see will not be feeding enemy troops now,
rather the war refugees you saw a minute
ago.

With the rainy season now beginning,
it will take the enemy months to rebuild
his shattered installations and to replace
the equipment we have captured or
destroyed.

The success of these operations to date
has guaranteed that the June 30 deadline
I set for withdrawal of all American
forces from Cambodia will be met. Gen-
eral Abrams advises me that 17,000 of the
31,000 Americans who entered Cambodia
have already returned to Vietnam. The
remainder will return by the end of this
month. This includes all American air
support, logistics, and military advisory

personnel.

The only remaining American activity
in Cambodia after July 1 will be air mis-
sions to interdict the movement of enemy
troops and material where I find that is
necessary to protect the lives and security
of our men in South Vietnam.

Our discussions with the South Viet-
namese Government indicate that their
primary objective remains the security of
South Vietnam, and that their activity in
Cambodia in the future—after their with-
d withdrawal from the sanctuaries—will be
determined by the actions of the enemy in
Cambodia.

When this operation was announced,
the critics charged that it would increase
American casualties, that it would widen
the war, that it would lengthen our in-
volvement, that it might postpone troop
withdrawals. But the operation was under-
taken for precisely the opposite reasons—
and it has had precisely the opposite effect.

Let us examine the long-range impact
of this operation.

First, we have eliminated an immediate
danger to the security of the remaining
Americans in Vietnam, and thereby re-
duced our future casualties. Seizing these
weapons and ammunition will save Ameri-
can lives. Because of this operation, Amer-
ican soldiers who might not otherwise be
ever coming home, will now be coming
home.

Second, we have won some precious
time for the South Vietnamese to train
and prepare themselves to carry the bur-
den of their national defense, so that our
American forces can be withdrawn.

From General Abrams' reports and
from our advisers in the field, one of the
most dramatic and heartening develop-
ments of the operation has been the splen-
did performance of the South Vietnamese

Army. Sixty percent
volved in the Cambod-
South Vietnamese. T
skill, the valor with w
exceeded our expec-
and morale in the
Army has been greatly
eration has clearly de
Vietnamization progr

Third, we have insu-
and success of our tro-
gram. On April 20, I
ditional 150,000 An
home within a year. A
cess of the Cambodiar-
tary Laird has resumed
American forces fro
thousand of the 150,0
April 20 will now be c

As long as the war
expect some setbacks
But, following the suc-
can say now with confi
keep our timetable for

Secretary Rogers an
ticularly encouraged by
Asian countries at the
ence to seek a solution
Cambodia. Cambodia
tunity for these 11 Asia
as other countries of the
in supporting the Cam-
ment's effort to main-
neutrality, its independ-
ritorial integrity. We sha
to make it possible for t
ives to succeed.

To the North Vietnar
again: The door to a
remains wide open. Every
made at the conference
privately, I herewith re
ready to negotiate wh
ready to negotiate.

[LC]

478

ing American activity

July I will be air mis-
the movement of enemy
where I find that is
the lives and security
in Vietnam.

with the South Viet-
iet indicate that their
remains the security of
that their activity in
ature—after their with-
sanctuaries—will be
of the enemy in

tion was announced;
that it would increase
that it would widen
would lengthen our in-
light postpone troop
operation was under-
e opposite reasons—
ly the opposite effect.
the long-range impact

nated an immediate
y of the remaining
m, and thereby re-
alties. Seizing these
tion will save Ameri-
is operation, Amer-
not otherwise be
ill now be coming

on some precious
Vietnamese to train
s to carry the bur-
efense, so that our
wِtdrawn.

mports and
the field, one of the
artening develop-
as been the splen-
South Vietnamese

Richard Nixon, 1970

June 3 [175]

Army. Sixty percent of all the troops in-
volved in the Cambodian operations were
South Vietnamese. The effectiveness, the
skill, the valor with which they fought far
exceeded our expectations. Confidence
and morale in the South Vietnamese
Army has been greatly bolstered. This op-
eration has clearly demonstrated that our
Vietnamization program is succeeding.

Third, we have insured the continuance
and success of our troop withdrawal pro-
gram. On April 20, I announced an ad-
ditional 150,000 Americans would be
home within a year. As a result of the suc-
cess of the Cambodian operations, Secre-
tary Laird has resumed the withdrawal of
American forces from Vietnam. Fifty
thousand of the 150,000 I announced on
April 20 will now be out by October 15.

As long as the war goes on, we can
expect some setbacks and some reversals.
But, following the success of this effort, we
can say now with confidence that we will
keep our timetable for troop withdrawals.

Secretary Rogers and I have been par-
ticularly encouraged by the resolve of 11
Asian countries at the Djakarta Confer-
ence to seek a solution to the problem of
Cambodia. Cambodia offers an oppor-
tunity for these 11 Asian nations, as well
as other countries of the area, to cooperate
in supporting the Cambodian Govern-
ment's effort to maintain Cambodia's
neutrality, its independence, and its ter-
ritorial integrity. We shall do what we can
to make it possible for these Asian initia-
tives to succeed.

To the North Vietnamese tonight I say
again: The door to a negotiated peace
remains wide open. Every offer we have
made at the conference table, publicly or
privately, I herewith reaffirm. We are
ready to negotiate whenever they are
ready to negotiate.

However, if their answer to our troop
withdrawal program and to our offer to
negotiate is to increase their attacks in a
way that jeopardizes the safety of our
remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall, as
my action 5 weeks ago clearly demon-
strated, take strong and effective measures
to deal with that situation.

As all of you know, when I first an-
nounced the decision on Cambodia, it was
subjected to an unprecedented barrage of
criticism in this country. I want to express
tonight my deep appreciation to the mil-
lions of Americans who supported me then
and who have supported me since in our
efforts to win a just peace.

But I also understand the deep divisions
in this country over the war. I realize that
many Americans are deeply troubled.
They want peace. They want to bring the
boys home. Let us understand once and
for all that no group has a monopoly on
those concerns. Every American shares
those desires; I share them very deeply.

Our differences are over the best means
to achieve a just peace.

As President, I have a responsibility to
listen to those in this country who disagree
with my policies. But I also have a solemn
obligation to make the hard decisions
which I find are necessary to protect the
lives of 400,000 American men remaining
in Vietnam.

When I spoke to you a month ago, a
clear threat was emerging in Cambodia
to the security of our men in Vietnam.

Ask yourselves this question: If an
American President had failed to meet this
threat to 400,000 American men in Viet-
nam, would those nations and peoples who
rely on America's power and treaty com-
mitments for their security—in Latin
America, Europe, the Mideast, or other
parts of Asia—retain any confidence in

479

[175] June 3

the United States? That is why I deeply
believe that a just peace in Vietnam is
essential if there is to be a lasting peace in
other parts of the world.

With this announcement tonight, we
have kept the pledge I made when I
ordered this operation, that we would
withdraw from Cambodia on a scheduled
timetable—just as this administration has
kept every pledge it has made to the
American people regarding the war in
Vietnam and the return of American
troops.

Let us look at the record.

In June of 1969, I pledged a with-
d withdrawal of 25,000 troops. They came home.
In September of the same year I said I
would bring home an additional 35,000.
They came home. In December I said an
additional 50,000 Americans were coming
out of Vietnam. They, too, have come
home.

There is one commitment yet to be ful-
filled. I have pledged to end this war. I
shall keep that promise. But I am deter-

mined to end the war in a way that will
promote peace rather than conflict
throughout the world. I am determined to
end it in a way that will bring an era of
reconciliation to our people and not an
era of furious recrimination.

In seeking peace, let us remember that
at this time only this administration can
end this war and bring peace. We have a
program for peace—and the greater the
support the administration receives in its
efforts, the greater the opportunity to win
that just peace we all desire.

Peace is the goal that unites us. Peace is
the goal toward which we are working.
And peace is the goal this Government
will pursue until the day that we reach it.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9 p.m. in his
office at the White House. His remarks were
broadcast live on radio and television.

An inventory of captured or destroyed enemy
equipment and enemy casualties was released
on the same day and is printed in the Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol.
6, p. 725).

176 Remarks to the Presidential Scholars of 1970.

June 4, 1970

Dr. Wallis, Presidential Scholars, and our
guests:

I appreciate this opportunity to come
over and personally to congratulate you
for the awards you have received. As you
can imagine in a day in the life of a Presi-
dent, he has many meetings of this kind
and each time I get a little folder telling
me about the group that I am to receive.
Usually it indicates that those who are
being honored are being honored in a very
material way, I mean by that a prize of
money or some fancy gift or something
like that.

So, I looked over this group and I saw
that it was the elite of all of the high school
and secondary graduates for the year
1970. Out of 3 million the 119 that are
here, according to Dr. Wallis, these are
the best. So, I thought, of course, that
since you were selected as the best out of
3 million, that you would be receiving
something that was something you could
take home with you.

I find you get a medallion. I find, on
the other hand, that there is no award in
the material sense that we usually think
of awards, no money prize, no grand state-

gift, such as Presic
with the President
just escorted out
few moments ago.
me that to you, th
of 1970, what you
recognition you re
than a prize of mat-

The medallion, the
tinguished group
ected you from all
scholars in the cou
that money cannot
that money cannot
also that you will c
of your lives, I hope
we expect a great
much expect that s
tenter public life. So
office. Some of you
will lose. I have don
can happen.

Some of you will
and maybe the Sen-
you may be standing
not sure. But, what
the fact that you h
Presidential Schola-
tion has a stake in
the leaders of the
10, 15, 20 years fro
ing the great deci
and the world.

I would like to te
is going to look like
is going to look lik
15 years from now.
are trying, as we can
make this Nation an
place for you to live

The war, the very
we are presently eng
cluded, of course. W
conclude it in a wa

480

[LC]

Richard Nixon 1970

Oct. 7 [335]

new authorities for the
Protection Agency. I be-
that in this recommended
I be acting—rather than
ent pollution before it
the waters that are so
ng things.

RICHARD NIXON

entitled "Ocean Dump-
-A Report to the Presi-
c Council on Environ-
er 1970" (Government
).

White House released
briefing by Russell E.
council on Environmental

1970.

some better leaders

her newspaper-
at their delivery
c in their chosen

RICHARD NIXON
tested for the press.

concerned about
iture years. In
last January,
jects in con-
planning to
engineers and

the Bureau of Reclamation. Seen through
to completion, these new projects would
cost over the years a total of $1.3 billion.
The Congress increased the number of
starts to 102 new projects which would
ultimately cost $4.5 billion. The extra $3.2
billion is now committed by the Congress.

Many of these added starts are for proj-
ects which would benefit some par-
ticularly interested group but would be of
little value to the people generally. There

is too much pork in this barrel.

... It is my intention to consider all means
possible to minimize the impact of these
inflationary and unnecessary appropria-
tions, including the deferment of the pro-
posed starts and the withholding of funds.
There are too many top priority demands
on our resources to permit this kind of
spending.

NOTE: As enacted, H.R. 18127 is Public Law 91-439 (84 Stat. 890).

335 Address to the Nation About a New Initiative for Peace
in Southeast Asia. October 7, 1970

Tonight I would like to talk to you
about a major new initiative for peace.

When I authorized operations against
the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia last
April, I also directed that an intensive ef-
fort be launched to develop new ap-
proaches for peace in Indochina.

In Ireland on Sunday, I met with the
chiefs of our delegation to the Paris talks.
This meeting marked the culmination of a
Government-wide effort begun last spring
on the negotiation front. After consider-
ing the recommendations of all my prin-
cipal advisers, I am tonight announcing
new proposals for peace in Indochina.

This new peace initiative has been dis-
cussed with the Governments of South
Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. All sup-
port it. It has been made possible in large
part by the remarkable success of the
Vietnamization program over the past 18
months. Tonight I want to tell you what
these proposals are and what they mean.

First, I propose that all armed forces
throughout Indochina cease firing their
weapons and remain in the positions they

now hold. This would be a "cease-fire-in-
place." It would not in itself be an end to
the conflict, but it would accomplish one
goal all of us have been working toward:
an end to the killing.

I do not minimize the difficulty of main-
taining a cease-fire in a guerrilla war
where there are no frontlines. But an un-
conventional war may require an un-
conventional truce; our side is ready to
stand still and cease firing.

I ask that this proposal for a cease-
fire-in-place be the subject for immediate
negotiation. And my hope is that it will
break the logjam in all the negotiations.

This cease-fire proposal is put forth
without preconditions. The general prin-
ciples that should apply are these:

A cease-fire must be effectively super-
vised by international observers, as well as
by the parties themselves. Without effec-
tive supervision a cease-fire runs the con-
stant risk of breaking down. All concerned
must be confident that the cease-fire will
be maintained and that any local breaches
of it will be quickly and fairly repaired.

A cease-fire should not be the means by

56-087-71-53

825

[335] Oct. 7

which either side builds up its strength by an increase in outside combat forces in any of the nations of Indochina.

And a cease-fire should cause all kinds of warfare to stop. This covers the full range of actions that have typified this war, including bombing and acts of terror.

A cease-fire should encompass not only the fighting in Vietnam but in all of Indochina. Conflicts in this region are closely related. The United States has never sought to widen the war. What we do seek is to widen the peace.

Finally, a cease-fire should be part of a general move to end the war in Indochina.

A cease-fire-in-place would undoubtedly create a host of problems in its maintenance. But it's always been easier to make war than to make a truce. To build an honorable peace, we must accept the challenge of long and difficult negotiations.

By agreeing to stop the shooting, we can set the stage for agreements on other matters.

A second point of the new initiative for peace is this:

I propose an Indochina Peace Conference. At the Paris talks today, we are talking about Vietnam. But North Vietnamese troops are not only infiltrating, crossing borders, and establishing bases in South Vietnam—they are carrying on their aggression in Laos and Cambodia as well.

An international conference is needed to deal with the conflict in all three states of Indochina. The war in Indochina has been proved to be of one piece; it cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of outbreak.

The essential elements of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962 remain valid as

a basis for settlement of problems between states in the Indochina area. And we shall accept the results of agreements reached between these states.

While we pursue the convening of an Indochina Peace Conference, we will continue the negotiations in Paris. Our proposal for a larger conference can be discussed there as well as through other diplomatic channels. The Paris talks will remain our primary forum for reaching a negotiated settlement, until such time as a broader international conference produces serious negotiations.

The third part of our peace initiative has to do with the United States forces in South Vietnam.

In the past 20 months, I have reduced our troop ceilings in South Vietnam by 165,000 men. During the spring of next year, these withdrawals will have totaled more than 260,000 men—about one-half the number that were in South Vietnam when I took office.

As the American combat role and presence have decreased, American casualties have also decreased. Our casualties since the completion of the Cambodian operation were the lowest for a comparable period in the last 4½ years.

We are ready now to negotiate an agreed timetable for complete withdrawals as part of an overall settlement. We are prepared to withdraw all our forces as part of a settlement based on the principles I spelled out previously and the proposals I am making tonight.

Fourth, I ask the other side to join us in a search for a political settlement that truly meets the aspirations of all South Vietnamese.

Three principles govern our approach:

—We seek a political solution that re-

[LC]

flects the will of the Vietnamese people.

—A fair political system is needed to ensure the existing forces in South Vietnam.

—And we will take the political process to its logical conclusion.

Let there be no essential point: The objecting to a false South Vietnamese want to dismantle Communist parties over by their partners right to exclude whom the government.

This patently untotalizing, totally unacceptable

As my proposals prepared to be flexible, but we stand firm South Vietnamese themselves the kind of people who want.

We have no intention of settling at the cost of more bloodletting, more killing, more suffering, more pain, than one which feasible concerns of both sides that when the conflict will still be there. settlement that will leave both sides with as much power as they want.

Finally, I propose an unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides.

War and imprisonment for all these prisoners and their families have already been shown to be counterproductive.

I propose that all out exceptions, with the exception of the one made possible by the return of the choice.

And I propose that

826

[LC]

Richard Nixon, 1970

Oct. 7 [335]

problems between area. And we shall agreements reached

the convening of an conference, we will con- in Paris. Our pro- conference can be as through other the Paris talks will sum for reaching a until such time as a conference produces

our peace initiative on United States forces in

Is, I have reduced South Vietnam by the spring of next year—about one-half of South Vietnam

combat role and raised, American increased. Our casualty of the Cam- the lowest for a e last 4½ years.

to negotiate an complete with- overall settlement. to withdraw all our from based on the previously and the

our side to join us in a settlement that solutions of all South

my approach: solution that re-

flects the will of the South Vietnamese people.

-A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces in South Vietnam.

-And we will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon.

Let there be no mistake about one essential point: The other side is not merely objecting to a few personalities in the South Vietnamese Government. They want to dismantle the organized non-Communist parties and insure the takeover by their party. They demand the right to exclude whomever they wish from government.

This patently unreasonable demand is totally unacceptable.

As my proposals today indicate, we are prepared to be flexible on many matters. But we stand firm for the right of all the South Vietnamese people to determine for themselves the kind of government they want.

We have no intention of seeking any settlement at the conference table other than one which fairly meets the reasonable concerns of both sides. We know that when the conflict ends, the other side will still be there. And the only kind of settlement that will endure is one that both sides have an interest in preserving.

Finally, I propose the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides.

War and imprisonment should be over for all these prisoners. They and their families have already suffered too much.

I propose that all prisoners of war, without exception, without condition, be released now to return to the place of their choice.

And I propose that all journalists and

other innocent civilian victims of the conflict be released immediately as well.

The immediate release of all prisoners of war would be a simple act of humanity.

But it could be even more. It could serve to establish good faith, the intent to make progress, and thus improve the prospects for negotiation.

We are prepared to discuss specific procedures to complete the speedy release of all prisoners.

The five proposals that I have made tonight can open the door to an enduring peace in Indochina.

Ambassador Bruce will present these proposals formally to the other side in Paris tomorrow. He will be joined in that presentation by Ambassador Lam ¹ representing South Vietnam.

Let us consider for a moment what the acceptance of these proposals would mean.

Since the end of World War II, there's always been a war going on somewhere in the world. The guns have never stopped firing. By achieving a cease-fire in Indonesia, and by holding firmly to the cease-fire in the Middle East, we could hear the welcome sound of peace throughout the world for the first time in a generation.

We could have some reason to hope that we had reached the beginning of the end of war in this century. We might then be on the threshold of a generation of peace.

The proposals I have made tonight are designed to end the fighting throughout Indochina and to end the impasse in negotiations in Paris. Nobody has anything to gain by delay and only lives to lose.

There are many nations involved in the fighting in Indochina. Tonight, all those

¹ Ambassador Pham Dang Lam, Head of the Republic of Vietnam delegation to the Paris talks on Vietnam.

827

[335] Oct. 7

nations, except one, announce their readi-
ness to agree to a cease-fire. The time has
come for the Government of North Viet-
nam to join its neighbors in a proposal to
quit making war and to start making
peace.

As you know, I have just returned from
a trip which took me to Italy, Spain,
Yugoslavia, England, and Ireland.

Hundreds of thousands of people
cheered me as I drove through the cities
of those countries.

They were not cheering for me as an
individual. They were cheering for the
country I was proud to represent—the
United States of America. For millions
of people in the free world, the nonaligned
world, and the Communist world, Amer-
ica is the land of freedom, of opportunity,
of progress.

I believe there is another reason they
welcomed me so warmly in every coun-
try I visited, despite their wide differ-
ences in political systems and national
backgrounds.

In my talks with leaders all over the
world, I find that there are those who
may not agree with all of our policies. But
no world leader to whom I have talked
fears that the United States will use its
great power to dominate another country

or to destroy its independence. We can
be proud that this is the cornerstone of
America's foreign policy.

There is no goal to which this Nation
is more dedicated and to which I am more
dedicated than to build a new structure of
peace in the world where every nation,
including North Vietnam as well as South
Vietnam, can be free and independent
with no fear of foreign aggression or for-
eign domination.

I believe every American deeply be-
lieves in his heart that the proudest legacy
the United States can leave during this pe-
riod when we are the strongest nation of
the world is that our power was used to
defend freedom, not to destroy it; to pre-
serve the peace, not to break the peace.

It is in that spirit that I make this pro-
posal for a just peace in Vietnam and in
Indochina.

I ask that the leaders in Hanoi respond
to this proposal in the same spirit. Let us
give our children what we have not had
in this century, a chance to enjoy a
generation of peace.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9 p.m. in his of-
fice at the White House. The address was broad-
cast live on radio and television. An advance
text was released on the same day.

336 Reply to Reporter About Reaction to Address on Southeast Asia. October 8, 1970

REPORTER. Have you heard any com-
ment on your speech last night from the
North Vietnamese or the rest of the
world?

THE PRESIDENT. The rest of the world,
yes. The North Vietnamese, I think, made
a brief comment this morning, indicating

that they, of course, will look at the [pro-
posal] next week.

We don't expect a formal comment
from them until next week when they
come back to the Paris conference. But the
rest, the reaction in the world and in the
Nation, has been extremely favorable.

[LC]

We are particularly
at the strong support
the bipartisan support
hopes that the Nation
had is that by all
depending States they will get
conference table a
they could get now.

We have made a
posal, and the fac
partisan support w
Hanoi. I appreci
Democratic leader
as well as Republi
dorsed it, and Con
of both sides. It w
There was no pa
people are workin
politics in that.

World reaction,
the Secretary of
naturally, it takes
up, but it's been
out the world up
usual reactions that
some areas, but ve
pean, Latin Ameri
sources. This also
means now that th
States on Vietna
broad support wi

337 Reply to Reporter About Address on Southeast Asia. October 8, 1970

THE PRESIDENT.
Rogers this mor
pleased with the
course, all of the
but up to this tim
good reaction fr

828

Richard Nixon, 1970

Oct. 8 [337]

pendence. We can
the cornerstone of
ity.

which this Nation
to which I am more
a new structure of
where every nation,
am as well as South
and independent
aggression or for-

American deeply be-
the proudest legacy
ave during this pe-
strongest nation of
power was used to
destroy it; to pre-
bust the peace.
t I am for this pro-
 Vietnam and in

in Hanoi respond
ame spirit. Let us
we have not had
ence to enjoy a
light.

at 9 p.m. in his of-
address was broad-
vision. An advance
day.

son

look at the [pro-

ormal comment
week when they
ference. But the
world and in the
ly favorable.

We are particularly pleased, naturally,
at the strong support within the Nation,
the bipartisan support, because one of the
hopes that the North Vietnamese have
had is that by division in the United
States they will get what they want at the
conference table and a better deal than
they could get now.

We have made a very forthcoming pro-
posal, and the fact that it has wide bi-
partisan support will not go unnoticed in
Hanoi. I appreciate the fact that our
Democratic leaders like Mike Mansfield,
as well as Republican leaders, have en-
dorsed it, and Congressmen and Senators
of both sides. It was a bipartisan speech.
There was no partisanship in it. When
people are working for peace, there's no
politics in that.

World reaction, of course—I talked to
the Secretary of State this morning—
naturally, it takes a little time to pick that
up, but it's been very favorable through-
out the world up to this point, with the
usual reactions that you might expect from
some areas, but very favorable from Euro-
pean, Latin American, African, and Asian
sources. This also is important because it
means now that the position of the United
States on Vietnam, diplomatically, has
broad support within the world commu-

nity. We had strong support before, and
considerable understanding, but now that
we have taken this diplomatic initiative,
world leaders generally, I think, will give
us support who might previously have
waited or hedged on doing so because
they may have felt that we had not gone
as far as we could at the conference table.

No one now can raise a question on
that. Well, they can raise a question, but
serious questions will not be raised be-
cause whether it is a cease-fire or a total
withdrawal of all of our forces, or whether
it is a political settlement, or the offer with
regard to prisoners of war, the United
States has made a very forthcoming pro-
posal. We would expect that the North
Vietnamese, after their first, shall we say,
reaction indicating that they do not see
much new in it—which we would nat-
urally expect at first blush—that as they
consider it we would hope that they would
take it as seriously as we took it when we
made it, as world leaders have responded
to it, as leaders in both parties here have
responded to it, including critics of the
Vietnam war, as well as those who sup-
port it.

REPORTER. Thank you, Mr. President.

NOTE: The President responded to the report-
er's question at 11:30 a.m. on his arrival at
Hunter Army Airfield, Savannah, Ga.

337 Replies to Reporters' Questions About Reaction to
Address on Southeast Asia. October 8, 1970

THE PRESIDENT. I talked to Secretary
Rogers this morning and he was very
pleased with the reaction, worldwide. Of
course, all of the messages are not yet in,
but up to this time it has been a very, very
good reaction from leaders all over the

world supporting the peace initiative that
we have taken.

The other thing that is significant is
that we had very good support in the
House and Senate. That is significant be-
cause the leaders in Hanoi have said over

829

[337] Oct. 8

and over again, publicly, and all the experts say that they believe this, that they are going to wait for political division in the United States to get them at the conference table what they can't win on the battlefield.

The fact that Americans of both parties supported this peace initiative, people like Senator Mansfield, the leader of the Senate, and others, this is, of course, very important in presenting a united front on the peace initiative. So we were glad that we had support at home, support abroad, good editorial support from those that I saw in the United States.

The immediate reaction in Hanoi, of course, is no indication of what their reaction will be later. The immediate reaction always has to be one of what appears to be rejection in such a case.

But if the situation continues as we think it will, of broad world support for the peace initiative, and broad support within the United States, I believe that Hanoi will recognize that this is a very serious proposal. It is one that is fair to them and fair to us, and it is one that they should seriously consider rather than simply to repeat the same old lines that they have repeated previously.

We have made some new proposals and now we think that they have the opportunity to make some new proposals. If they do, we can make some progress. That is the way we are going to play it.

We didn't make this simply to have a propaganda line, as I pointed out. We made this proposal because we wanted to cover every base that we could. And so, that is why we offered the cease-fire, a total cease-fire. That is why we offered a total withdrawal of all of our forces, something we have never offered before, if we

had mutual withdrawal on the other side. That is why we had a very forthcoming position on the release of all prisoners without regard to trading one for one or two for one. We will release all we have; they will release all they have. That means not only we, but the South Vietnamese as well—and an all-Indochina conference.

And while we indicated, too, that we were flexible on these matters, it seems under these circumstances that this is now the chance, the time, to make some progress at the peace table.

Next week we will get the official response from Hanoi in the public session and we would hope that it would indicate some progress. But whether it does or it does not we intend to continue to press this. It takes a long time to get a peace proposal like this, after a long war, on the tracks, to get progress on it.

We are not going to be discouraged by rejections. We are not going to be discouraged by attitudes that we would expect. Because we feel so strongly that this is a fair proposal we are going to continue to press it in every world forum, in Paris, and, of course, in the event that the opportunity is presented, to the North Vietnamese and other channels.

**REPORTER.** Mr. President, I realize you are deliberately not trying to connect any local political considerations, domestic political considerations. But as a pragmatist, Mr. President, do you feel there will be a spin-off from this in your own personal popularity in the weeks ahead? Do you think that will be of any benefit to the Republican Party as you move around and try to support and help some of these candidates?

**THE PRESIDENT.** I don't think that it has that kind of effect. I feel that it was

not, of course, intended it for enough astute men to 4 days before they not have known they have been and their hopes rather

We did this at a standpoint of trying the negotiations of our advisers to go without jeopardizing Vietnam.

Now having

338 REMARKS
ON
SCIENCE
AND
POLITICS
IN
SPAIN

Mr. Chairman,
gressman Hagar
guests on the floor
gentlemen:

As you know, a long trip abroad and a number of contacts on television, Mr. Hagar heartened by the news received in Madrid, Italy and Spain.

I recall when, at the Irish dail, I said nothing like an I say that after trading with the government of Savannah, to you that have I and you had to tell you that nevertheless, to come out here, remember I understand,

830

on the other side. Very forthcoming are of all prisoners going one for one or release all we have; have. That means with Vietnamese as our conference. United, too, that we matters, it seems are that this is now to make some prog-

get the official version of the public session that it would indicate whether it does or it could to press for a peace proposal to get a peace treaty, on the other side.

be discouraged by going to be dis-This is what we would strongly suggest that this going to continue should go on, in Paris, event that the offer to the North Vietnamers.

I am, I realize, trying to connect you with the negotiations, domestic. But as a pragma- you feel there will be a lot of things in your own personal weeks ahead? Do you think any benefit to the cause of peace you move around will help some of these negotiations?

I don't think that it is possible that it was

Richard Nixon, 1970

Oct. 8 [338]

not, of course, intended for that. If we had intended it for that, I am politically enough astute to have done it just about 4 days before the election. Then we would not have known what the result would have been and people would have voted their hopes rather than the realities.

We did this at the right time, from the standpoint of trying to make progress in the negotiations, and at a time when all of our advisers thought it could be made without jeopardizing our forces in Vietnam.

Now having done that, the effect, politically, I do not think is going to be particularly significant at this time, and particularly in view of the fact that we have bipartisan support for it. If the other side, if other candidates were to make it a political issue, then it would be politically significant. But since there is bipartisan support for this proposal, I believe that it is not going to have any particular effect on the campaign one way or another.

REPORTER. Thank you.

NOTE: The exchange took place at 1:55 p.m. as the President arrived at Skidaway Island near Savannah, Ga.

## 338 Remarks at the Dedication of the Site of the Ocean Science Center of the Atlantic Commission, Skidaway Island, Georgia. October 8, 1970

Mr. Chairman, Governor Maddox, Congressman Hagan, all of the distinguished guests on the platform, and ladies and gentlemen:

As you know, I have just returned from a long trip abroad which took us to a number of countries. As I said last night on television, Mrs. Nixon and I were very heartened by the wonderful welcomes we received in countries like Yugoslavia and Italy and Spain and Ireland and England.

I recall when we were in Ireland, I said at the Irish dinner that there is really nothing like an Irish welcome. And I must say that after traveling through the streets of Savannah today, and then seeing all of you that have come out to this island, and you had to come here by boat—I understand that is going to change—but nevertheless, to see all of you that came out here, recognizing that some of you, I understand, have been here since 9 o'clock this morning, I've got to say after this there is nothing like a Georgia welcome.

I remember when my good friend Hal Suit¹ suggested that I should come down to Georgia, he said—and I am sure, incidentally, that Governor Maddox would agree with this, that makes it bipartisan—he said, “Everybody goes to Atlanta.” He said, “Why don't you come to Savannah?” So that is why I am in Savannah, and I am glad to be here.

As you know, I am here for a purpose that is very important to the future of this State, of this country, and particularly the future of our children. I was delighted to see the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts, and all the young people that are here today, because my remarks, and they will

¹ Mr. Suit was the Republican candidate for the governorship of Georgia.

831

INDOCHINA

Vietnam

"There are many nations involved in the fighting in Indochina. Tonight, all those nations, except one, announce their readiness to agree to a cease-fire. The time has come for the Government of North Vietnam to join its neighbors in a proposal to quit making war and to start making peace."

Address to the Nation

October 7, 1970

"The allied sweeps into the North Vietnamese and Vietcong base areas along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese border:

- will save American and allied lives in the future;

- will assure that the withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam can proceed on schedule;

- will enable our program of Vietnamization to continue on its current timetable;

- should enhance the prospects for a just peace."

Report to the Nation

June 30, 1970

These passages concern the two most important events of our Indochina policy during 1970. The first refers to our initiative for a ceasefire-in-place throughout Indochina, the centerpiece of the comprehensive peace proposals that I set forth on October 7. These proposals could end the war rapidly for all participants through negotiations.

The second describes the purposes of the allied operations last spring against enemy bases in Cambodia which helped to assure the progress of Vietnamization and our withdrawal program. These operations were crucial to our

58

effort to reduce our involvement in the war in the absence of negotiations.

The Cambodian operations have borne immediate fruit while our Indochina peace proposals have not yet done so. These two events thus symbolize what has been true in Vietnam since this Administration took office: The South Vietnamese have made great progress in assuming the burdens of the war, a process which is in their hands and ours, but we have made little progress toward a negotiated peace, a process which requires Hanoi's participation.

After two years of the mandate from the American electorate, we can look back with satisfaction on the great distance we have travelled. This is my tenth major report on Indochina to the American people. The overall trend is consistent and unmistakable.

What We Found and Where We Are

Understanding our purposes in Vietnam must begin with a look at the situation we found when we took office and the situation today. Let us compare them in concrete terms.

Two years ago the authorized troop strength for Americans in Vietnam was 549,500. Troop levels had risen steadily for five years. On January 1, 1971, that authorized level was 344,000, and on May 1, 1971, there will be a new ceiling of 284,000. Troop levels have dropped at a steady rate. The process will continue.

Two years ago American combat deaths for the previous twelve months were 14,561 and averaged 278 weekly. In 1969 the figures were 9,367 and 180, respectively. In 1970 they were 4,183 and 80; and indeed in the last six months they were 1,337 and 51. The decline has been constant.

Two years ago the enemy could launch major offensives in most parts of Vietnam. The pacification program was just beginning to recover from the setbacks of the 1968 Tet offensive. Now the enemy mounts very few significant

59

operations and is particularly quiescent in Military Regions III and IV in southern South Vietnam, which contain two-thirds of the population. Pacification has made steady progress throughout these two years.

Two years ago there was no comprehensive allied peace plan for ending the war. Now, as the result of several initiatives by the Republic of Vietnam and ourselves, we have laid out a comprehensive and flexible framework for a negotiated settlement.

Two years ago the additional demands of the Vietnam War were costing us approximately 22 billion dollars per year. Today they are costing us approximately half that.

Two years ago the ratio of South Vietnamese forces to American forces in Vietnam was less than 2 to 1. Today it is more than 3½ to 1.

Two years ago the ratio of South Vietnamese to American major engagements with the enemy was about 7 to 1. Now it is about 16 to 1.

Two years ago there was no assurance that the South Vietnamese could undertake large-scale military operations on their own. Now, they have proven their ability to do so.

Two years ago the South Vietnamese constitutional system was just beginning to take hold. Since then the National Assembly and the Supreme Court have played increasingly meaningful roles, and there has been a series of elections at the province, village, and hamlet levels. Today, the political focus in South Vietnam for almost all forces except the Communists is within the established system.

Two years ago large areas of South Vietnam were unsafe and many routes impassable. Now, while there are still many dangerous pockets, the vast bulk of the country is secure.

This progress has been made possible largely by the efforts of the South Vietnamese. It is they who have compensated for the reduced U.S. effort. It is they who now carry the major part of the burden and are progressively taking on more.

In short, with assistance from us and other allies, the South Vietnamese have made their country the most dramatic and concrete example of the partnership principle of the Nixon Doctrine.

## Our Choices and Our Objectives

These facts show substantial advance. But to confine discussion of Vietnam to a recital of statistics, however impressive, would be inadequate, even irresponsible. While figures reflect policies, they do not fully define purposes.

Thus, this brief record of achievements is not meant to ignore the serious difficulties that remain. We do not intend to add to a painful record of prematurely optimistic assessments on Vietnam; we will discuss the problems and uncertainties as well as the advances.

The above record does recall the situation we inherited two years ago. I will not dwell on events leading up to January, 1969, but rather on the choices we had in selecting our course.

The conflict had been costly and frustrating for Americans, and many believed that this Administration should move to end immediately either the conflict or American involvement in it.

Some urged that we escalate in an attempt to impose a military solution on the battlefield. We ruled out this approach because of the nature of the conflict and of the enemy, the costs of such a policy, the risks of a wider war, and the deeply held convictions of many of our people. Increased military pressure could not alone win a struggle that was in part guerrilla war as well as conventional invasion, and included political as well as military aspects. It would have entailed a greatly increased toll in lives, treasure, and diplomatic objectives. It would have heightened the prospects of direct intervention by Hanoi's allies. It would have split apart our own society.

Others urged that we liquidate our presence immediately, cut our losses, and leave the South Vietnamese on

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their own. I have repeatedly explained why I considered
this a disastrous path: For the South Vietnamese people,
who would have lost their collective political choice and
countless individual lives. For other non-Communist
countries, especially in Asia, among whom not a single
leader recommended such a policy. For the global credi-
bility of the U.S. word. For those Americans who had
made such heavy sacrifices. And for the integrity of
American society in the post-Vietnam era.

Thus we rejected both of these routes. Yet we knew
that we could not continue previous policies which offered
no hope for either peace or reduced American involve-
ment.

We chose instead what we considered the most respon-
sible course left to us. We sought above all a rapid nego-
tiated solution to the conflict by progressively defining
the terms of a settlement that would accommodate the
legitimate interests of both sides. And in the absence of
a settlement we sought, through Vietnamization, to shift
American responsibilities to the South Vietnamese.

In charting this course we recognized the following
realities:

- The way we treated the most painful vestige of the previous era was crucial for a successful transition to a new foreign policy for a new era.

- The other side which had fought for two decades would agree to a negotiated settlement only if the terms were generous, and if the battlefield looked less promising than the conference table.

- Progressive turnover of the burden to the Vietnam-
ese themselves, however uncertain, was the only
policy available once we had rejected the status quo,
escalation, and capitulation.

- The support of the American people during the re-
mainder of the conflict required a diminishing U.S.
involvement.

- The health of the American society after the conflict

called for a solution that would not mock the sacri-
fices that had been made.

There has been one guiding principle, one irreducible
objective, for both our negotiations and Vietnamization. I
stated it on May 14, 1969, and consistently since: "We
seek the opportunity for the South Vietnamese people to
determine their own political future without outside
interference."

In our search for a negotiated solution we have
stretched our positions towards those of the other side.
But we have not agreed to their demand that we impose
a political future on the South Vietnamese at the confer-
ence table.

In Vietnamization we have withdrawn our forces as rap-
idly as the South Vietnamese could compensate for our
presence. But we have not withdrawn them so as to allow
the North Vietnamese to impose a political future on the
battlefield.

A peaceful settlement will remain our overwhelming
preference. We will not give up our search. But in the
meantime we will not let down our friends.

Our policy has not satisfied—and cannot satisfy—
either those who believe in a military solution or those
who press for an immediate end to our involvement. For
the vast majority of Americans who prefer a just peace
to capitulation, there is, of course, still room for debate
and criticism. But we ask these Americans to recall the
situation we found two years ago, to judge the soundness
of our purposes, and to measure the record to date
against these purposes. They can be sure that we shall
keep our promises in the future, as we have kept them in
the past.

Negotiations

From the outset our constant primary goal has been a
negotiated end to the war for all participants. We would
take no satisfaction in the fact that after U.S. involve-

ment and casualties were ended, Vietnamese continued to fight Vietnamese.

However, it takes two sides to negotiate, and Hanoi's attitude has been consistently intransigent. No progress has been made despite the advancement in 1970 of the two elements which might make the North Vietnamese consider negotiations to be in their interest:

- the creation of conditions which give them incentive to turn to negotiations rather than protracted war—the tremendous drain on their manpower and resources, the growing strength of the South Vietnamese military forces and political system, and the continuing support of the American people for our Indochina policy.

- the elaboration of our various proposals which are designed to make clear to the other side that they will have a fair chance for political power to the extent desired by popular will.

Since 1968 the U.S. has done almost everything that various parties—including Hanoi—told us would kindle negotiations. We halted the bombing and other acts of force against North Vietnam. We agreed to NLF participation in the Paris talks. We agreed to the principle of withdrawal and made initial withdrawals of American troops. We made substantial withdrawals, soon to total 265,000. We agreed in principle to remove all our troops. We took a series of de-escalatory steps, such as cutting back our B-52 and tactical air sorties. And we appointed a new senior negotiator in Paris.

These steps, except for the bombing halt, were unilateral measures, designed not only to reduce our involvement, but also to open the door to negotiations. Each of them was urged by the other side as a constructive contribution. None of them has generated movement by the other side.

In an effort to make progress in Paris, we have offered broad proposals for a negotiated solution to the war. On May 14, 1969, I proposed a plan which would remove all

outside forces from South Vietnam and allow the people freely to decide their political future through internationally supervised elections. On July 11, 1969, President Thieu invited the other side to participate in the political life of South Vietnam.

These proposals laid out the framework for what we believed would be a resolution of the conflict equitable to all parties. We recognized, however, that a political settlement was the heart of the matter; it is what the fighting has been all about. And we knew that the other side suspected the electoral process and doubted that it would have a fair chance at political power.

We thus moved to define more precisely the political solution we envisaged. On April 20, 1970, I set forth the principles that we think should govern a fair political settlement in South Vietnam:

- A political solution must reflect the will of the South Vietnamese people and allow them to determine their future without outside interference.

- A fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of political forces within South Vietnam.

- We will abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon.

Having defined our principles on the central political issue, we looked for a comprehensive approach that might provide both the structure and stimulus for genuine negotiations. During the Cambodian operations I ordered a thorough review within the government of all possible initiatives that might engage the other side in meaningful dialogue. After summer-long studies and meetings, on October 7, 1970, I presented a broad five-point peace plan with the concurrence of the governments of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia:

- An internationally supervised cease-in-place throughout Indochina, governed by principles which would make it acceptable and credible to both sides. This was designed to stop the fighting at once and

ECS

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hopefully create new conditions and avenues for a negotiated settlement.

- An Indochina Peace Conference. This reflected the facts that North Vietnamese forces were in Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam and that a stable peace in one required a stable peace in all.

- The withdrawal of all American forces from South Vietnam on a timetable to be negotiated as part of an overall settlement. This was to make clear that we were prepared to remove all American troops.

- A political settlement in South Vietnam based on the political principles I had stated on April 20. This was to reaffirm to the other side our willingness to search for a political process that would meet their concerns.

- The immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war, journalists, and other innocent civilian victims held by both sides. This was to underline our view that the prisoner issue was strictly humanitarian and need not await resolution of other problems.

Months of analytical work had laid the groundwork for the ceasefire proposal. We projected for a year into the future the possible developments on the ground under different ceasefire conditions. We deliberately recognized the other side's essential conditions. And we rejected ceasefire proposals that looked more advantageous for our side in security terms in order to place the greatest possible emphasis on negotiability.

In making our formal proposals and throughout the last two years we have emphasized, both privately and publicly, that we and the Republic of Vietnam would be flexible and generous once serious negotiations were under way.

The other side's constant response has been to demand that we unconditionally withdraw all U.S. forces and replace the leaders of the Republic of Vietnam with a coalition government. Their position is unacceptable to us on several counts.

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First, the substance of their demands. They say nothing about what they will do about North Vietnamese forces, when we believe the South Vietnamese should be free of all outside intervention. They ask us to impose a future on South Vietnam, when we believe the people should choose that future.

Secondly, their view of the negotiating process. The Communists pose their demands as **preconditions** to negotiations. If we were to pay this price there would be nothing left to negotiate.

Thirdly, the incompatibility of their demands. Even if we were to agree to their first demand and pull out internationally, we would have absolutely no incentive to agree to their second demand of assuring their political victory in South Vietnam. This would be their problem, not ours. It would be up to them to compete with the growing strength of the South Vietnamese.

Lastly, the Communist definition of a coalition government. Their definition makes a mockery of the concept itself. They prescribe that one-third of the coalition government would be from the NLF, one-third from those people in the "Saigon Administration" who stand for "peace, independence, and neutrality," and one-third from other forces who also stand for these principles.

Since the Communists reserve the right to define the principles of peace, independence, and neutrality" and to decide which people support these principles, their proposal for a coalition government boils down to a demand that they nominate one-third of the government without restrictions and have a veto power over the other two-thirds. It is a formula for a guaranteed political takeover.

Thus, the issue is not, as some would have it, a question of a few personalities in the Saigon government standing in the way of a peaceful solution. The Communists seek not only the removal of the elected leaders of the present Government but the disruption of all organized non-Communist forces.

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The fundamental question in the negotiations, in short, is the means of allocating political power in South Vietnam. The other side wants to negotiate in Paris an allotment of power that would assure their dominance. Our proposals call for a fair competitive process that would consult the will of the South Vietnamese people and reflect the existing relationship of political forces.

We recognize that finding an appropriate and equitable means of expressing South Vietnamese political will is a complex task. There is little guidance to be drawn from Vietnamese history. Nevertheless, if our adversaries ever make a political decision to negotiate seriously, I believe we could find a way to reach a solution fair for all parties. We know that after we leave, the other side will still be there. We know that for a settlement to endure all parties must want it to endure.

We remain prepared to make a major effort in the shaping of such a settlement.

## Vietnamization

Although committed to a maximum effort to reach a negotiated end to the war, we needed an alternative.

For negotiations were not entirely in our hands. North Vietnamese history and doctrine did not make for encouraging prospects. Their calculus of the situation in South Vietnam, and more particularly in the United States, probably made them believe that time was on their side. And even if a settlement did come through negotiations, it might take a long period.

At home we did not have the option of continuing as we had—and the enemy knew it. So we chose a policy that we believed would gain the sustained support of the American people and thus give us a chance both to fulfill our objectives in Vietnam and to demonstrate to the other side that time was not necessarily with them. Such a policy seemed the only chance of giving the South Vietnamese a fair chance, and the best hope of inducing the North Vietnamese to negotiate.

Thus the alternative, and hopefully the spur, to negotiations, is Vietnamization that I have described on several occasions.

This policy fulfills our objective of reducing American involvement. It cannot, except over a long period, end the war altogether. Still, if Vietnamization leads to perpetuating the war, it is not by our design but because the other side refuses to settle for anything less than a guaranteed takeover.

In last year's report I described the successes of this program during its first months, and attempted to determine the depth and durability of this progress. We posed four central uncertainties for the future:

- the enemy's capability to mount sustained operations and undo our gains.

- the actual improvement in allied capabilities, particularly Vietnamese leadership, logistics, tactics, and political sensitivity.

- the alternative strategies open to the enemy, including protracted warfare, in which they could wait out our withdrawals and then, with reinvigorated efforts, once again seize the initiative.

- most importantly, the attitudes of the Vietnamese people toward both sides and the likelihood that pacification gains would stick.

These issues certainly cannot be resolved in one year. However, on all there was encouraging progress during 1970:

- The enemy, partly because of strategy, but in great measure due to limited capability, did not mount sustained large-scale operations. This was partly the result of the Cambodian operations.

- A marked improvement in South Vietnamese performance was shown repeatedly in large-scale operations both in Vietnam and in Cambodia, and in their increasing tactical and logistic skills.

- The enemy chose a protracted warfare strategy. We still face the question of whether he might

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regain the initiative once the bulk of our forces
have left, but the growing capabilities of the South
Vietnamese must give Hanoi pause.

—The attitude of the Vietnamese people remains
crucial and difficult to judge, but rural security
grew and pacification gains were sustained.

During 1970, concrete results of Vietnamization punc-
tuated these trends. Our withdrawal program proceeded
on schedule with the April 20 announcement of the with-
d withdrawal of another 150,000 Americans below the author-
ized ceiling, bringing total reductions since the start of
Vietnamization to 265,500 by May 1, 1971. The very fact
that we could project our withdrawals a year in advance
was a sign of major progress.

As we have moved ahead with this program we have
continued to confer not only with the South Vietnam-
ese but also the other allies who have sent troops to
help South Vietnam—Australia, Korea, New Zealand,
and Thailand.

South Vietnamese forces showed themselves in-
creasingly capable of providing security for their coun-
try. There are now 1.1 million men bearing arms for
the Government—200,000 more than in 1968. The
continued strengthening of local and territorial forces
freed more and more South Vietnamese regular units
for combat against regular North Vietnamese Army
units. The South Vietnamese accounted for a growing
bulk of combat engagements. They took over more of
our bases. They completely assumed naval operational
responsibilities inside the country. And they substan-
tially stepped up the role of their air forces, flying
almost half the sorties in South Vietnam. More intangible,
but equally significant, were their greatly increased self-
confidence and initiative.

The level of fighting dropped greatly, especially in
the southern portions of South Vietnam. And Ameri-
can casualties continued their steady decline, a result
of lesser enemy activity, fewer Americans, and the in-

creased share of the combat burden picked up by the
South Vietnamese.

## Pacification

American withdrawal is the primary reflection of
Vietnamization while pacification is its primary goal.

Our withdrawal program poses two fundamental is-
sues. First, at what pace can we take out our forces?
We base our decisions on the above considerations
backed up by various studies, such as a recently com-
pleted analysis of the large unit war situation in each
of South Vietnam's four military regions.

Then, how do we protect those forces who remain?
We are confident that the steadily growing strength of
the South Vietnamese and the impact of the sanctuary
sweeps are sufficient to handle possible threats. Never-
theless, North Vietnam might try to take advantage
of our redeployments by building up its strength in
the South and launching new attacks. In this case,
I have made clear on a dozen occasions that I would
take strong and effective measures to prevent the
enemy from jeopardizing our remaining forces.

The other important aspect of Vietnamization is
pacification, which in broadest terms concerns the situ-
ation in the countryside—physical security, popular
allegiance, and the military, administrative, and political
effectiveness of both sides. As the enemy's main force
units have been pushed farther away from population
centers, the task of extending governmental presence
has become progressively easier.

In order to assess the progress in the countryside
we developed a new indicator to measure the portions
of population under Government control, under the in-
fluence of both sides, and under the control of the
other side. The basic criteria are whether a hamlet has
adequate defense and a fully functioning Government
official resident both at day and at night. We devised
tough and realistic measures of these two criteria.

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In mid-1969 the indicator showed roughly 40% of the rural population under South Vietnamese control, 50% under the influence of both sides, and 10% under the control of the other side. Recently these proportions were respectively 65%, 30%, and 5%. When South Vietnam's urban population of six million, all under government control, is added to the over seven million rural population in that category, roughly 80% of the total population of South Vietnam is controlled by the Government.

This indicator cannot tell us precisely what is going on in the countryside. It does give us a good grasp of trends—and the trends have been favorable. We are confident that real and substantial progress has been made.

Honest observers can differ on quantitative measures of success in pacification; it is even more difficult to appraise such intangible factors as rural attitudes toward the central government and confidence in its ability to guide the country's affairs. But today more South Vietnamese receive governmental protection and services than at any time in the past six years.

Pacification progress has been slower, however, in certain key provinces in the northern half of South Vietnam, closer to the enemy's staging areas in North Vietnam and Laos. The supply bases in southern Laos perform the function of the destroyed sanctuaries in Cambodia. In these northern provinces the ravages of war have been more severe and the Communist infrastructure has been deeply rooted for over 20 years. Here especially the South Vietnamese Government must increase its efforts to develop capable forces and implement programs to gain the support of the rural population.

## Cambodian Sanctuary Operations

Much of this accelerated progress in Vietnamization was due to the now indisputable military success of the

allied operations against the enemy sanctuaries in Cambodia last spring.

The March 18 deposition of Prince Sihanouk caught us, as well as everyone else, completely by surprise. The situation that had existed in Cambodia, with the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong occupying a series of enclaves along the border, represented a troublesome but not insuperable obstacle to our efforts in South Vietnam. Our first reaction to Prince Sihanouk's removal was to encourage the negotiations which the Cambodian government was seeking with the Communists. However, Hanoi flatly refused such a course and rapidly spread out its forces to link up its base areas and pose a growing threat to the neutral government in Phnom Penh.

As I pointed out in my final report on the Cambodian operations, enemy actions during April and captured enemy documents unmistakably show their intentions. We faced the prospect of one large enemy base camp 600 miles along South Vietnam's flank; a solid supply route from the port of Sihanoukville through which most of the war materiel for the southern half of South Vietnam had come in the previous six years; and a vast staging and sanctuary area from which to attack allied forces in Vietnam with impunity. This would have meant increased enemy attacks, higher casualties among our men and our allies, and a clear threat to Vietnamization, the withdrawal program, and the security of South Vietnam.

Our choice, though difficult, seemed the more necessary the longer we pondered it. If we wished to pursue the policy of turning over responsibilities to the South Vietnamese and withdrawing our troops, we had to clear out the enemy sanctuaries. The alternative was to allow the enemy to build up this threat without challenge, to increase his attacks, and to raise allied casualties. This would sooner or later have confronted

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us with the choice of either halting our withdrawals, or continuing them but jeopardizing the lives of those remaining behind.

I preferred to make a difficult decision in April rather than magnifying our dilemma by postponement.

The results of our joint two-month operations with the South Vietnamese, and the subsequent sweeps of the sanctuaries by South Vietnamese forces, removed this threat. There were as well these positive results:

- greatly reduced American casualties; in the six months before the sanctuary operations the average weekly casualties were 93, in the six months after they were 51.

- extensive materiel and manpower losses for the enemy which they are taking a long time to replace.

- the ending of the concept of immune Cambodian sanctuaries.

- the dislocation of enemy supply lines and strategy in the Saigon and Mekong Delta regions; as a result the main forces war substantially ended for the southern half of the country during 1970.

- precluded the enemy from reopening his route of supply by sea.

- separation of Communist main force and guerrilla units and a boost to pacification efforts in the southern half of the Republic of Vietnam.

- insurance that our troop withdrawals would continue.

- increased time for the South Vietnamese to strengthen themselves.

- a tremendous lift in the morale and self-confidence of the South Vietnamese.

My decision to send U.S. ground forces into Cambodia, though clearly required because of these factors, was nevertheless anguishing because of the domestic reaction.

At the time those who urged an immediate American pullout from Vietnam were joined in protest by some who generally support our phased withdrawals but misread the Cambodian operations as a return to a policy of escalation. I believed then that the impact of these actions—reduced enemy activity, lowered U.S. casualties, and continued withdrawals—would ultimately persuade some of the latter of the wisdom of our decision.

While many Americans may still disagree with that decision, I think the facts since June 30 have conclusively demonstrated not only the tactical success of the operations, but also their strategic purpose of reducing American involvement in Vietnam.

## Political and Economic Issues

Vietnamization has political and economic dimensions in addition to military ones. They will become increasingly important as the war winds down.

Political development in any newly independent country is a challenging task. When that country is under fire from a determined enemy, the difficulties are multiplied. The government sees its first priority as providing security. Military considerations are likely to dominate the time of officials, the content of programs, and the freedom of political life.

Nevertheless, political development in a paramilitary conflict is a crucial ingredient of a government's effort. It is increasingly important in Vietnam as the military struggle subsides. Ultimately, the fate of Vietnam will turn on political factors—the motivation of the people during the conflict; the cohesion of non-Communist political forces in a possible electoral competition with the Communists; the solidity of the political institutions during and after the war.

There has been a steady political evolution in South Vietnam beginning with the election of a Constitutional Assembly in 1966 and of the President and National Assembly in 1967. In 1970 there were continued signs

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of a growing commitment to the political institutions established by the 1967 Constitution. Elections for hamlet chiefs and for Village, Municipal, and Provincial Councils took place throughout the country. There were also elections for half the seats in the Upper House, which attracted a wide spectrum of non-Communist political forces.

1970 saw enactment of Land-to-the-Tiller legislation, a sweeping land reform program which will give land to tenant farmers and could have significant political impact. It has our full support.

The Presidential and Lower House elections this year will further test the fabric of the constitutional system, the strengths of the various political factions, and the allegiance of the people. 1971 will show the extent of political development in South Vietnam. Vietnamese people of all factions will judge the responsiveness of the political process and register their verdicts. The enemy will seek to exploit the political currents of an election year. But it will also be watching—and perhaps drawing conclusions from—the stability of the system.

The maintenance of a sound South Vietnamese economy is crucial for Vietnamization. This problem was of great concern in 1970, but the Government moved on it with some encouraging results.

Our extensive review of the economic situation in July, 1970, made it abundantly clear that the key Vietnamization goals of constructive political change and increased South Vietnamese military performance were intimately linked to the goal of a sound economy.

Prices rose by over fifty percent in the twelve months up to mid-1970. These increases were eroding the purchasing power of the already near-subsistence pay received by many soldiers and civil servants at the very time they were being tasked with the growing burdens of Vietnamization. Moreover, if inflation had continued, the economic security of other major groups, such as farmers, veterans, and urban workers, could have been jeopardized.

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In the fall of 1970, the South Vietnamese Government took strong fiscal and monetary actions, including an important reform of the exchange rate. These difficult steps, supplemented by a slight increase in our assistance to offset the increased budgetary costs of Vietnamization, dramatically arrested an accelerating inflation. The price level rose by only about four percent in the last half of the year, setting the stage for policies that can lead to more enduring economic stability.

There are two lessons to be drawn from these developments:

- First, Vietnamization of the economy and the war cannot be accomplished at the same time without our economic assistance. As the South Vietnamese take on more of the fighting they divert more resources from internal production. Our assistance, by providing the external resources to help maintain internal levels of consumption for soldiers, farmers and workers, is a vital aspect of Vietnamization. We will provide external support commensurate with the military burden borne by the economy and people in this difficult period of transition.

- Second, we can do no more for the Vietnamese economy than it does for itself. The enterprise and resourcefulness of the Vietnamese people are widely acknowledged. Thus, as demonstrated in 1970, the vital link between our assistance and a sound economy is the Vietnamese Government's economic policy. We will continue to expect the Government to take all reasonable self-help measures.

While we provide assistance to support Vietnamization, we are looking towards the time when the economy can become self-sufficient. The date depends not only on the course of the war but on the pace of economic development. The country's potential is great.

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For example, even as the war has continued, increasing domestic rice production will cause rice imports to decline from over 700,000 annual tons in the late 1960's to about 100,000 tons in 1971 and zero in 1972. Together with the South Vietnamese we are analyzing the development prospects and plan to begin discussions this year on measures, to include additional funding, that can be taken to hasten the process. We believe other countries will want to participate in this effort.

We look forward to the day when the peoples of Vietnam, South and North, can turn from the waste of war to the constructive tasks of peace.

## Prisoners of War

We have the deepest concern for the plight of our prisoners of war in Indochina. Some 1600 Americans, including pilots and soldiers and some 40 civilians, are missing or held in North Vietnam, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Some have been held as long as six years, longer than for any other prisoners of war in our history.

The enemy violates specific requirements of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention, by which they are bound. They violate common standards of decency as well.

They have not permitted impartial inspection of prison camps despite constant attempts to arrange such visits. They have refused to repatriate seriously sick and wounded prisoners. They have failed to identify all prisoners and to allow many of them to correspond with their families.

We and the South Vietnamese have made intensive efforts this past year to secure better treatment and the release of allied prisoners—through global diplomacy, through proposals in Paris, and through the courageous raid at Son Tay. Congressional expressions have been valuable in underlining American public concern. The world increasingly condemned the other

side's practices, and the UN General Assembly passed a resolution this fall which underscored the international obligation to treat prisoners humanely.

I repeat my October 7 proposal for the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war held by both sides. All prisoners, journalists, and other civilian captives should be released now to return to the place of their choice. Such action would not only meet humanitarian concerns; it might also lead to progress on other aspects of a peace settlement.

As first steps, the Republic of Vietnam, with our support, has offered to repatriate all sick and wounded prisoners of war. It has unilaterally returned groups of such prisoners, despite North Vietnam's refusal to make orderly arrangements for their repatriation. And it has proposed the release of all North Vietnamese prisoners of war in return for all U.S. and allied prisoners in Indochina and any South Vietnamese prisoners held outside South Vietnam. We profoundly regret the other side's refusal to respond to these initiatives.

The treatment of prisoners of war anywhere is not a political or military issue, but a matter of simple humanity. As I said on October 7:

> "War and imprisonment should be over for all these prisoners. They and their families have already suffered too much."

This government will continue to take all possible measures to secure the end of imprisonment as well as the end of the war.

No discussion of Vietnam would be complete without paying tribute to the brave Americans who have served there. Many have sacrificed years of their lives. Others have sacrificed life itself.

These Americans have fought in a war which differed from our previous experience. We have not sought a traditional military victory. The complex nature of this conflict posed unprecedented difficulties for those involved.

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It is to their lasting credit that Americans in Vietnam have overcome these difficulties and conducted themselves in our best tradition.

## Problems for the Future

There are sobering problems still remaining in Vietnam:

- **Enemy Capabilities and Intentions.** Despite heavy losses, the North Vietnamese have the manpower, the logistical network, and the dedication to continue fighting if they wish. Although their main force units have been greatly reduced, they still pose a considerable threat, especially in Military Regions I and II in South Vietnam. Hanoi could instead use its buildup of forces in South Laos and Northeastern Cambodia to step up its pressures against the Cambodian government or to increase its hold on Cambodian territory. In any event, Communist terrorist activities, assassinations, and kidnappings continue to exact a tragic toll from the Vietnamese people.

- **The Vietnamization Process.** Vietnamization made very encouraging advances during 1970. The fundamental question remains: can the South Vietnamese fully stand on their own against a determined enemy? We—and more importantly the South Vietnamese—are confident that they can. Substantial problems remain, however: improving the leadership of South Vietnamese forces at all levels; enhancing their ability to take on support as well as combat functions; providing assistance to Cambodia and bettering Vietnamese-Cambodian understanding; rooting out the Viet Cong infrastructure in the countryside; assuring political stability in the cities; managing the strains on the Vietnamese economy as we continue to Vietnamize other aspects of the conflict; and moving

against corruption which not only poisons the moral atmosphere but also carries potential political impact. This is a formidable agenda, but South Vietnamese accomplishments to date demonstrate their capacity to deal with it.

- **The Negotiating Stalemate.** Our intensive efforts in 1970 failed to yield progress in the Paris negotiations. We frankly expected that our elaboration of political principles, the appointment of Ambassador Bruce, and the October 7 peace initiative would produce some movement from the other side. We will not give up on negotiations, though the past year indicated that it will be extremely difficult to overcome the enemy's mix of doctrine, calculations, and suspicion. There is the additional fact that as our forces decline, the role we can play on many aspects of a settlement is also bound to decline.

The substantial record of achievement in the first two years of this Administration cannot obscure one fundamental fact—the fighting continues.

If winding down the war is my greatest satisfaction in foreign policy, the failure to end it is my deepest disappointment. We will not be content until all conflict is stilled. This sentiment was the driving force behind our proposal for a ceasefire. It is at the core of our policy, for as I said on April 20:

> "The death of a single man in war, whether he is an American, a South Vietnamese, a Viet Cong, or a North Vietnamese, is a human tragedy. That is why we want to end this war and achieve a just peace. We call upon our adversaries to join us in working at the conference table toward that goal."

I once again ask the other side to work for a settlement that will stop the fighting, meet the concerns of all parties, and last because all want it to last.

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Laos and Cambodia

"The war in Indochina has been proved to be of one piece; it cannot be cured by treating only one of its areas of outbreak."

Address by the President
October 7, 1970

Enduring peace will come for Vietnam only when there is peace for its neighbors.

Hanoi has made the war an Indochina conflict. In South Vietnam there are some 100,000 North Vietnamese troops. In Laos there are about 90,000. In Cambodia there are over 50,000 North Vietnamese and Viet Cong. These troops challenge the legitimate governments of Laos and Cambodia, and they menace South Vietnam from within and without.

The situations in Laos and Cambodia are comparable:

- Neither one poses any threat to North Vietnam.

- North Vietnam, nevertheless, has for years been violating their neutrality and independence, guaranteed in international accords which Hanoi and its allies signed.

- In both countries North Vietnamese regular troops strip away any pretense of civil war. In Laos indigenous Pathet Lao play an insignificant military role, while in Cambodia only small numbers of Cambodians help the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong.

- In both countries Hanoi has two aims. First, and primarily, to use them as infiltration routes, staking bases, and sanctuaries for attacks against South Vietnam. Secondly, to erode governmental control in order to aid their efforts in South Vietnam and perhaps take over Laos and Cambodia themselves.

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United States Policy

This canvas poses two fundamental questions for the United States:

- What should be our policy toward Laos and Cambodia as countries under external attack?

- How do we deal with the major implications for our policy in South Vietnam?

North Vietnam's aggression against Laos and Cambodia and its violation of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Agreements are important. We care about the preservation of international agreements and the independence of these nations. But our immediate concern is that North Vietnam uses them as springboards for assaults on a country where we have a firm commitment, have invested lives, treasure, and prestige, and have Americans to protect as we progressively withdraw. Furthermore, if Hanoi were to gain control of Laos and Cambodia, a large portion of the more than 140,000 Communist troops now engaged in these countries would be freed to fight in South Vietnam.

As we pursued our policy of Vietnamization and negotiation for Vietnam we could not ignore these unavoidable facts on its flank. Our basic choices for Laos and Cambodia became:

- to seek diplomatic settlements for both countries, either as part of an all-Indochina arrangement or separately.

- to provide military support both to Laos and Cambodia and to South Vietnamese defensive operations, without U.S. ground combat involvement.

We have always wished to stabilize the borders of South Vietnam and to insure the neutrality of its neighbors by diplomatic means. My October 7 peace initiative, supported by the three governments, proposed for all of Indochina:

- a ceasefire to stop the fighting.

- an international conference to seal the peace.

- the immediate release of all prisoners of war.

83

This comprehensive approach came against a back-
ground of consistent efforts to reach diplomatic solu-
tions. From the outset, this Administration has contin-
ued American support for the efforts of Prime Minister
Souvanna Phouma to reconstitute the 1962 Geneva
Agreements guaranteeing his country's neutrality, inde-
pendence and territorial integrity. In Cambodia we long
tolerated a difficult military situation and encouraged
negotiations when Prince Sihanouk was removed.

To date, Hanoi has rejected diplomacy and spread
the conflict. The Lao government for many years, and
the Cambodian government this year, have turned to
us and others for assistance.

These developments left us with the choice between
military options. After our one-time sweep against the
Communist bases in Cambodia, we have ruled out
American ground combat troops in either Laos or Cam-
bodia for several reasons. Our fundamental Vietnam-
related objectives are served by other means. In any
event, we believe the two governments can survive
through their own efforts, our various kinds of assist-
ance, and that of other friends. We look to them to
shoulder the primary combat responsibilities for their
own defense.

Moreover, the enemy has its own problems. Despite
its ability and willingness to pour thousands of troops
into all three countries, North Vietnam faces certain
limits imposed by manpower drain and long supply
lines. Lack of indigenous support in Laos and Cam-
bodia severely hampers Communist troop movements.
And we do not assume that Hanoi's allies want Laos
and Cambodia removed from the map of Southeast
Asia.

Thus we did not oppose Congressional restrictions
this past year on the use of U.S. ground combat forces
in those countries, even though we had strong reserva-
tions about the principle of circumscribing executive
authority.

Instead of deploying our troops, we have helped those

countries help themselves. In Cambodia, South-
nam's preemptive thrusts have been crucial for their
mutual defense.

Three arguments are raised against these South
Vietnamese operations outside their borders:

- That they spread South Vietnamese forces thin. On the contrary, by striking against the enemy's supply system and reducing the border threat, these actions contract the territory that the South Vietnamese army must defend. The alternative of inviolate enemy sanctuaries along a front of 600 miles would stretch South Vietnamese forces much more severely.

- That South Vietnam is expanding the war. Its troops have gone only where the North Vietnamese have been entrenched and violating one country's territory to attack another. It is Hanoi which expanded the war years ago.

- That our support of the South Vietnamese will draw us into wider war. If we are to reduce our involvement in Indochina, we must shield our withdrawals by backing these sweeps against potential threats. At a time when we are cutting our military presence in one country, we are naturally reluctant to send troops into neighboring ones—on grounds both of strategy and American domestic support. It would make little sense for us, while withdrawing hundreds of thousands of ground combat troops from Vietnam, to reintroduce a few into Laos or Cambodia.

The arguments against South Vietnam's defensive
actions suggest that Hanoi has the right—without provo-
cation and with complete immunity—to send its forces
into Laos and Cambodia, threaten their governments,
and prepare to bring its full strength to bear on South
Vietnam itself.

The choice for South Vietnam is not between limit-
ing and expanding the war. It is between what it is

84

85

ing in self-defense and passively watching the menace grow along its borders.

In time the combined populations of 28 million in South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, with assistance from their regional partners, should more than balance the resources of North Vietnam, with its population of 20 million. During this transition period, however, our own defensive supporting actions are important. Let me briefly review them.

## Cambodia

In Cambodia we pursued the policy of the previous Administration until North Vietnamese actions after Prince Sihanouk was deposed made this impossible.

In the previous chapter on Vietnam I briefly recalled the background and results of the allied sweeps against the Communist sanctuaries which were so vital to Vietnamization. With the operations concluded, our policy for Cambodia took shape as follows:

- No U.S. ground combat personnel in the country, and no U.S. advisors with Cambodian units.

- Air missions against enemy supplies and personnel that pose a potential threat to South Vietnam or seek to establish base areas relevant to Vietnam.

- Military assistance to the Cambodian Government in amounts and types suitable for their army.

- Encourage other countries of the region to give diplomatic assistance.

- Encourage and support the efforts of third countries who wish to furnish troops or material.

The loss of the use of Sihanoukville, as well as the base areas, was a serious setback for Hanoi. For many years almost all North Vietnamese supplies for Military Regions III and IV in South Vietnam passed through the port. Accordingly, during the latter part of 1970 the North Vietnamese stepped up their efforts to reestablish sanctuaries and their attacks on the Cambodian

86

Government. They sought either to reopen their supply lines to southern South Vietnam or to install a government in Phnom Penh that would accomplish the same purpose. They failed to do either, but they posed significant threats.

To deny them renewed use of these assets we helped the Cambodians defend themselves and we supported South Vietnam's operations. Substantially greater military and economic assistance was needed to support the Cambodian army, which was growing from some 40,000 to over 200,000 in a very short period of time. The quarter billion dollars that Congress appropriated as part of the foreign assistance supplemental recognized that Cambodia was facing outright aggression, that it was doing everything possible on its own, and that our assistance was appropriate for its self-defense and to aid Vietnamization and our withdrawals from South Vietnam.

This past year there were also encouraging signs of regional cooperation:

- The South Vietnamese, at Cambodia's request, continued to sweep the sanctuary areas, conduct ground operations in support of Cambodian forces, and provide air and logistic support and training.

- Other Asian countries, such as Thailand, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of China, supplied various forms of assistance.

- Eleven Asian nations met on their own initiative at Djakarta last spring and sought through diplomatic means to preserve Cambodia's neutrality and independence.

Cambodia is, in short, a concrete illustration of Nixon Doctrine principles:

- assumption of primary responsibility for its own defense.

- help from regional friends.

- our support through military and economic assistance.

87

The objective of all our activities related to Cambodia remains constant: to bar the reestablishment of secure Communist base areas that could jeopardize allied forces in Vietnam. Together with the South Vietnamese, we are trying to prevent the enemy from building up their capabilities for major offensives. Our aim is to destroy their supplies and disrupt their planning for assaults on allied forces in South Vietnam. Communist movements may require fluctuations in the level of our air activities as well as our increased material assistance. They will not deflect us from our overall course of phased withdrawal from Indochina.

## Laos

On March 6, 1970, I gave the first comprehensive accounting of our activities in Laos that has ever been made to the American people. I traced the pattern of subversion and then invasion by North Vietnam. I reviewed U.S. efforts under previous administrations to help the legitimate government. When we took office, there had already been a U.S. military assistance program for six years and increasing U.S. air operations for four.

Since early 1963 the North Vietnamese have in effect conducted two wars in Laos. In the north they have kept up constant pressure against the neutralist government established in 1962 at their own urging. In the south they have occupied and fortified the Ho Chi Minh Trail area to attack South Vietnam.

In the face of these continuing North Vietnamese actions, we believed that the U.S. role we inherited remained important. Our material aid and air operations in the north were needed to support the Royal Lao Government and preserve the 1962 Geneva Agreements. In the south, Vietnamization called for continued air strikes against the enemy to protect allied forces. Since 1965 at least 630,000 North Vietnamese troops have streamed down the Trail. They have

brought with them more than 400,000 weapons, 100 million pounds of ammunition, and at least 200 million pounds of food.

Our defensive and supportive policy was outlined in the March 6 statement:

- no American ground combat forces.

- minimum American presence.

- military assistance for regular and irregular Lao forces when requested by the Lao government.

- reconnaissance flights and air operations to interdict North Vietnamese troops and supplies on the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

- logistic and air support for Lao forces when requested by the government.

Within this framework we have maintained our military aid and air operations during the past year in response to increased North Vietnamese levels of infiltration and aggression.

Southern Laos became critical for Hanoi after the allied Cambodian operations deprived it of the port of Sihanoukville and the border sanctuaries. They swelled their forces in the area by more than 25,000, captured the towns of Saravane and Attopeu, and intensively built up their supplies and their logistics network. Whereas for years southern Laos had been central to Hanoi's operations in northern South Vietnam, at the end of 1970 it was becoming the hub and crossroads of Hanoi's campaigns throughout Indochina. Almost all of its men and supplies were now flowing through this area. The strategic principles that applied to the enemy's bases in Cambodia were valid as well for southern Laos. Hanoi deepened the area's part in the Vietnam war, with direct implications for Vietnamization and our withdrawals.

## The Prospects

We do not underestimate the difficulties ahead for Laos and Cambodia. Hanoi has intensified the war on

88

89

The fronts and its focus is likely to remain there in the coming months.

The Lao government has already demonstrated determination to preserve its independence in the face of overt aggression, diplomatically if possible, militarily if necessary. The Cambodians also have the essential ingredients for success—national unity, maximum self-help, and the support of friends. The country's small, unprepared army is gaining both in size and ability, and the spirit of its people continues to inspire all observers. We can expect major testing of Cambodia over the coming months, but we believe that time is on its side.

Our future policy in Laos and Cambodia will follow the lines we have established. We face some very serious problems:

- At the conference table. Even if Hanoi were to negotiate genuinely about Vietnam, difficult issues remain concerning its neighbors: the removal of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops, thesecuring of South Vietnam's borders, and the reestablishment of the Geneva Agreements.

- On the battlefield. Enemy intentions and capabilities in Indochina will pose some hard choices about the deployment of allied troops as we pursue our own withdrawals. While North Vietnamese activities have subsided in South Vietnam, some of their 60,000 troops massed in southern Laos could move into South Vietnam, or into Cambodia, or against northern Laos. In Cambodia we can expect sustained enemy thrusts against the government.

- In the United States. We will have the continuing responsibility of explaining the purpose and extent of our activities in Laos and Cambodia. North Vietnamese actions could require high levels of American assistance and air operations in order to further Vietnamization and our withdrawals.

90

I will continue to do what is necessary to protect American men as they leave Vietnam. Throughout I will keep the American people and the Congress fully informed.

A negotiated settlement for all Indochina remains our highest priority. But if the other side leaves us no choice, we will follow the alternate route to peace—phasing out our involvement while giving the region's friendly countries the time and the means to defend themselves.

## EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

"Today, as we look to the future of the Pacific, we recognize that whether peace survives in the last third of the century will depend more on what happens in the Pacific than in any other area of the world."

Remarks Upon the Arrival of Prime Minister Sato of Japan
November 19, 1969

The home of almost half the population of the earth, second to none in the richness of its human talents and energy, possessing vast material resources, and encompassing the central land mass of the earth, Asia and the Pacific region lie at the heart of the task of creating a stable structure of world peace. Since the Second World War, it is only in this region that developments have impelled America to send her sons to war. Asia and the Pacific includes territories of the seven most populous and the three wealthiest powers, with all that implies for the vital nature of their interests. A Pacific power ourselves, our security and economic interests are inextricably involved with the future of Asia.

It is therefore essential to our national well-being that we accept the truth—and that our policies reflect the fact—that an era has ended in Asia.

91

[134] Apr. 7 Public Papers of the Presidents

the development of marine science policy,
the coordination of federal programs,
and the effecting of an orderly transition
during the reorganization of Federal
agencies in the marine sciences. As the
Council now completes its work, we can
take pride in the new policies and pro-
grams that fulfill the objectives of the
Marine Resources and Engineering De-
velopment Act. The Council deserves our
gratitude for a job well done.

My budget request for fiscal year 1972
provides $609.1 million for marine sci-
ence, technology and services—an in-
crease of more than $70 million over my
request of a year ago. These funds would
permit NOAA to undertake priority pro-
grams of fundamental importance to the
Nation's marine science interests; they
will permit us to continue the accomplish-
ments of the Sea Grant program; to fur-
ther our participation in the International
Decade of Ocean Exploration; to insure
that necessary marine research and de-

velopment is conducted for national se-
curity purposes; and to make certain that
marine research and development, gen-
erally, continue to make productive con-
tributions to our growing use of the sea.

We have embarked on a strong marine
science program for the 1970s. In the
year ahead the Federal Government will
build on these accomplishments. And we
will look to all sectors of the Nation's
marine science community—State and
local governments, industry and the uni-
versities—to contribute to the fullest to
the United States' efforts to make better
use of the oceans and to provide world
leadership on the major ocean issues be-
fore the community of nations.

RICHARD NINON

The White House

April 7, 1971

NOTE: The report is entitled "Marine Science Affairs: Annual Report of the President to the Congress on Marine Resources and Engineering Development" (Government Printing Office, 114 pp.).

135 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia. April 7, 1971

GOOD EVENING my fellow Americans.
Over the past several weeks you have
heard a number of reports on TV, radio,
and in your newspapers on the situation
in Southeast Asia.

I think the time has come for me as
President and as Commander in Chief
of our Armed Forces to put these reports
in perspective, to lay all the pertinent
facts before you and to let you judge for
yourselves as to the success or failure of
our policy.

I am glad to be able to begin my re-
port tonight by announcing that I have

decided to increase the rate of American
troop withdrawals for the period from
May 1 to December 1. Before going into
details, I would like to review briefly what
I found when I came into office, the prog-
ress we have made to date in reducing
American forces, and the reason why I
am able to announce a stepped-up with-
d withdrawal without jeopardizing our remain-
ing forces in Vietnam and without en-
dangering our ultimate goal of ending
American involvement in a way which
will increase the chances for a lasting
peace in the Pacific and in the world.

When I left Washington
1961, after serving 8 year-
dent under President E-
ctor. were no American comb-
nam. No Americans had
in Vietnam.

When I returned to
President 8 years later, the
American troops in Viet-
thousand had died there.
Americans were being
and there was no compr
end the United States in
war.

I implemented a plan
equip the South Vietnam-
American forces, and to
involvement in the war
the South Vietnamese ha
capacity to defend their
Communist aggression. G-
my right, you can see how
succeeded. In June of 19-
a withdrawal of 25,000 in-
ber, 40,000; December,
1970, 150,000. By the first
May 1, we will have bro-
than 265,000 Americans-
the troops in Vietnam wh

Now another indication
we have made is in red
casualties. Casualties we
great in the first 3 month
were in the first 3 month
South Vietnamese cau-
dropped significantly in
One American dying in c
many. But our goal is no
ing man dying anyplac
Every decision I have m
and every decision I ma
will have the purpose o
goal.

Let me review now tw

522

[LC]

Richard Nixon, 1971

Apr. 7 [135]

for national se-
ake certain that
velopment, gen-
productive con-
g use of the sea.
a strong marine
e 1970s. In the
Government will
ments. And we
of the Nation's
ity—State and
try and the uni-
to the fullest to
s to make better
to provide world
ocean issues be-
ties
RICHARD NIXON

ed "Marine Science
of the President to
Resources and En-
(Government Print-

rate of American
to the period from
Before going into
review briefly what
into office, the prog-
date in reducing
the reason why I
a stepped-up with-
dizing our remain-
and without en-
ate goal of ending
it in a way which
and for a lasting
nd in the world.

When I left Washington in January of
1961, after serving 8 years as Vice Presi-
dent under President Eisenhower, there
were no American combat forces in Viet-
nam. No Americans had died in combat
in Vietnam.

When I returned to Washington as
President 8 years later, there were 540,000
American troops in Vietnam. Thirty-one
thousand had died there. Three hundred
Americans were being lost every week
and there was no comprehensive plan to
end the United States involvement in the
war.

I implemented a plan to train and
equip the South Vietnamese, to withdraw
American forces, and to end American
involvement in the war just as soon as
the South Vietnamese had developed the
capacity to defend their country against
Communist aggression. On this chart on
my right, you can see how our plan has
succeeded. In June of 1969, I announced
a withdrawal of 25,000 men; in Septem-
ber, 40,000; December, 50,000; April of
1970, 150,000. By the first of next month,
May 1, we will have brought home more
than 265,000 Americans—almost half of
the troops in Vietnam when I took office.

Now another indication of the progress
we have made is in reducing American
casualties. Casualties were five times as
great in the first 3 months of 1969 as they
were in the first 3 months this year, 1971.
South Vietnamese casualties have also
dropped significantly in the past 2 years.
One American dying in combat is one too
many. But our goal is no American fight-
ing man dying anyplace in the world.
Every decision I have made in the past
and every decision I make in the future
will have the purpose of achieving that
goal.

Let me review now two decisions I have

made which have contributed to the
achievements of our goals in Vietnam that
you have seen on this chart.

The first was the destruction of enemy
bases in Cambodia. You will recall that
at the time of that decision, many ex-
pressed fears that we had widened the
war, that our casualties would increase,
that our troop withdrawal program would
be delayed. Now I don't question the sin-
cerity of those who expressed these fears.
But we can see now they were wrong.
American troops were out of Cambodia in
60 days, just as I pledged they would be.
American casualties did not rise; they
were cut in half. American troop with-
drawals were not halted or delayed; they
continued at an accelerated pace.

Now let me turn to the Laotian opera-
tion. As you know, this was undertaken
by South Vietnamese ground forces with
American air support against North Viet-
namese troops which had been using Lao-
tian territory for 6 years to attack
American forces and allied forces in South
Vietnam. Since the completion of that
operation, there has been a great deal of
understandable speculation—just as there
was after Cambodia—whether or not it
was a success or a failure, a victory or a
defeat. But, as in Cambodia, what is im-
portant is not the instant analysis of the
moment, but what happens in the future.

Did the Laotian operation contribute
to the goals we sought? I have just com-
pleted my assessment of that operation
and here are my conclusions:

First, the South Vietnamese demon-
strated that without American advisers
they could fight effectively against the
very best troops North Vietnam could put
in the field.

Second, the South Vietnamese suffered
heavy casualties, but by every conservative

523

[135] Apr. 7

estimate the casualties suffered by the enemy were far heavier.

Third, and most important, the disruption of enemy supply lines, the consumption of ammunition and arms in the battle has been even more damaging to the capability of the North Vietnamese to sustain major offensives in South Vietnam than were the operations in Cambodia 10 months ago.

Consequently, tonight I can report that Vietnamization has succeeded. Because of the increased strength of the South Vietnamese, because of the success of the Cambodian operation, because of the achievements of the South Vietnamese operation in Laos, I am announcing an increase in the rate of American withdrawals. Between May 1 and December 1 of this year, 100,000 more American troops will be brought home from South Vietnam. This will bring the total number of American troops withdrawn from South Vietnam to 365,000. Now that is over two-thirds of the number who were there when I came into office, as you can see from this chart on my left. The Government of South Vietnam fully supports the decision I have just announced.

Now, let's look at the future:

As you can see from the progress we have made to date and by this announcement tonight, the American involvement in Vietnam is coming to an end. The day the South Vietnamese can take over their own defense is in sight. Our goal is a total American withdrawal from Vietnam. We can and we will reach that goal through our program of Vietnamization if necessary.

But we would infinitely prefer to reach it even sooner—through negotiations. I am sure most of you will recall that on October 7 of last year in a national TV

broadcast, I proposed an immediate ceasefire throughout Indochina, the immediate release of all prisoners of war in the Indo-China area, an all-Indochina peace conference, the complete withdrawal of all outside forces, and a political settlement. Tonight I again call on Hanoi to engage in serious negotiations to speed the end of this war. I especially call on Hanoi to agree to the immediate and unconditional release of all prisoners of war throughout Indochina. It is time for Hanoi to end the barbaric use of our prisoners as negotiating pawns and to join us in a humane act that will free their men as well as ours.

Let me turn now to a proposal which at first glance has a great deal of popular appeal. If our goal is a total withdrawal of all our forces, why don't I announce a date now for ending our involvement? Well, the difficulty in making such an announcement to the American people is that I would also be making that announcement to the enemy. And it would serve the enemy's purpose and not our own.

If the United States should announce that we will quit regardless of what the enemy does, we would have thrown away our principal bargaining counter to win the release of American prisoners of war, we would remove the enemy's strongest incentive to end the war sooner by negotiation, and we will have given enemy commanders the exact information they need to marshal their attacks against our remaining forces at their most vulnerable time.

The issue very simply is this: Shall we leave Vietnam in a way that—by our own actions—consciously turns the country over to the Communists? Or shall we leave in a way that gives the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive as a free

people? My plan of involvement in a war that chance. And I end it precipitately: the Communists.

In a deeper sense of ending our involvement, a note of despair or believe, as Thomas American will always despair. We have it Vietnam in a way that people a realistic have it in our own friends in the world of responsibility, remeet single hope of people.

And above all, we must to close a difficult history, not meanlessly each one of us can gain experience with our Nation, confident acter, and hope for the future of America.

I know there are many who believe that I should war without regard to South Vietnam. There are our friends. But we would abandon plunge from the a nightmare of recrimination for this another, respect for human life.

I understand that you have been raised in the reports of brutal me put this into practice.

I have visited many places, and speaking now and as Commander Forces, I feel it is my

[LC]

524

Richard Nixon, 1971

Apr. 7 [135]

people? My plan will end American involvement in a way that would provide that chance. And the other plan would end it precipitately and give victory to the Communists.

In a deeper sense, we have the choice of ending our involvement in this war on a note of despair or on a note of hope. I believe, as Thomas Jefferson did, that Americans will always choose hope over despair. We have it in our power to leave Vietnam in a way that offers a brave people a realistic hope of freedom. We have it in our power to prove to our friends in the world that America's sense of responsibility remains the world's greatest single hope of peace.

And above all, we have it in our power to close a difficult chapter in American history, not meanly but nobly—so that each one of us can come out of this searing experience with a measure of pride in our Nation, confidence in our own character, and hope for the future of the spirit of America.

I know there are those who honestly believe that I should move to end this war without regard to what happens to South Vietnam. This way would abandon our friends. But even more important, we would abandon ourselves. We would plunge from the anguish of war into a nightmare of recrimination. We would lose respect for this Nation, respect for one another, respect for ourselves.

I understand the deep concerns which have been raised in this country, fanned by reports of brutalities in Vietnam. Let me put this into perspective.

I have visited Vietnam many times, and, speaking now from that experience and as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces, I feel it is my duty to speak up for

the two and a half million fine young Americans who have served in Vietnam. The atrocity charges in individual cases should not and cannot be allowed to reflect on their courage and their self-sacrifice. War is a terrible and cruel experience for a nation, and it is particularly terrible and cruel for those who bear the burden of fighting.

But never in history have men fought for less selfish motives—not for conquest, not for glory, but only for the right of a people far away to choose the kind of government they want.

While we hear and read much of isolated acts of cruelty, we do not hear enough of the tens of thousands of individual American soldiers—I have seen them there—building schools, roads, hospitals, clinics, who, through countless acts of generosity and kindness, have tried to help the people of South Vietnam. We can and we should be very proud of these men. They deserve not our scorn, but they deserve our admiration and our deepest appreciation.

The way to express that appreciation is to end America's participation in this conflict not in failure or in defeat, but in achievement of the great goals for which they fought: a South Vietnam free to determine its own future and an America no longer divided by war but united in peace.

That is why it is so important how we end this war. By our decision we will demonstrate the kind of people we are and the kind of country we will become.

That is why I have chartered the course I have laid out tonight: to end this war—but end it in a way that will strengthen trust for America around the world, not undermine it, in a way that will redeem

immediate cease-fire, the immediate end of the war in the Indo-China peace conference, the withdrawal of all military settlement. Hanoi to engage in a settlement that would end all hostilities on Hanoi to end the war throughout all of Vietnam to end the imprisonment of us in a humane way as well as ours. The proposal which at first seemed popular to many in the United States would end the withdrawal of American forces from South Vietnam. I announce a new involvement in such an American people is making that analysis. And it would be a wise one. We should not let our

this: Shall we continue to live in this country as free people? Shall we continue to leave our children to be raised in a foreign land?

Etc

525

[135] Apr. 7

the sacrifices that have been made, not
insult them, in a way that will heal this
Nation, not tear it apart.

I can assure you tonight with confi-
dence that American involvement in this
war is coming to an end.

But can you believe this? I understand
why this question is raised by many very
honest and sincere people. Because many
times in the past in this long and difficult
war, actions have been announced from
Washington which were supposed to lead
to a reduction of American involvement
in Vietnam. And over and over these ac-
tions resulted in more Americans going
to Vietnam and more casualties in
Vietnam.

Tonight I do not ask you to take what I say on faith. Look at the record. Look again at this chart on my left. Every action taken by this Administration, every decision made, has accomplished what I said it would accomplish. They have reduced American involvement. They have drastically reduced our casualties.

In my campaign for the Presidency, I
pledged to end American involvement in
this war. I am keeping that pledge. And
I expect to be held accountable by the
American people if I fail.

I am often asked what I would like to
accomplish more than anything else while
serving as President of the United States.
And I always give the same answer: to
bring peace—peace abroad, peace at
home for America. The reason I am so
deeply committed to peace goes far be-
yond political considerations or my con-
cern about my place in history, or the
other reasons that political scientists
usually say are the motivations of
Presidents.

Every time I talk to a brave wife of an
American POW, every time I write a

letter to the mother of a boy who has
been killed in Vietnam, I become more
deeply committed to end this war, and to
end it in a way that we can build lasting
peace.

I think the hardest thing that a Presi-
dent has to do is to present posthumously
the Nation's highest honor, the Medal
of Honor, to mothers or fathers or widows
of men who have lost their lives, but in
the process have saved the lives of others.

We had an award ceremony in the East
Room of the White House just a few
weeks ago.¹ And at that ceremony I re-
member one of the recipients, Mrs. Karl
Taylor, from Pennsylvania. Her husband
was a Marine sergeant, Sergeant Karl
Taylor. He charged an enemy machine-
gun singlehanded and knocked it out. He
lost his life. But in the process the lives
of several wounded Marines in the range
of that machinegun were saved.

After I presented her the Medal, I
shook hands with their two children,
Karl, Jr.—he was 8 years old—and Kevin,
who was 4. As I was about to move to
the next recipient, Kevin suddenly stood
at attention and saluted. I found it rather
difficult to get my thoughts together for
the next presentation.

My fellow Americans, I want to end
this war in a way that is worthy of the
sacrifice of Karl Taylor, and I think he
would want me to end it in a way that
would increase the chances that Kevin
and Karl, and all those children like them
here and around the world, could grow
up in a world where none of them would
have to die in war; that would increase

¹ The private ceremony took place on February 16, 1971. The text of the citation of Sergeant Taylor's posthumous award is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 7, p. 229).

526

the chance for Am-
has not had in this
eration of peace.

We have come a
2 years toward that
tinued support, I be
that goal. And gen-
will look back at this
in America's histo-
proud that we dem-

136 Statement of Disadvantage

FOR YOUNG people the disadvantaged, of frustration and have to be. It can opportunity:

- It can be a t
the youth to l
test his skills i

- It can provide
  to contribute
  others, thus
  lives and eni

- It can open up
  in physical f
  ganized recre

I am pleased to
for 1971 summ
vantaged youth w
these opportuni

I will transmit
as it returns from
plemental request
provide an additi
hood Youth Cor
opportunities for
to finance the Re
gram in the la
Nation.

Combined wit
sources, these su-

[20] Jan. 24

## 20 Statement Urging the Congress To Enact a Ceiling on Government Spending. January 24, 1972

THE BUDGET I send to the Congress requires spending more than we will collect in taxes.

It will be a job-creating budget and a noninflationary budget only if spending is limited to the amount the tax system would produce if the economy were operating at full employment.

Those who increase spending beyond that amount will be responsible for causing more inflation.

It is vital that the Executive and the Congress act together to stop raids on the Treasury which would trigger another inflationary spiral.

In submitting this budget I am there-

fore urging the Congress, before it considers any appropriations bills, to enact a rigid ceiling on outlays that will prevent the Government spending more than the $246 billion requested in this budget. That ceiling on expenditures should apply equally to the Congress and to the executive branch.

We urgently need an absolute limit on Government spending. Only thus can we end inflation, stabilize the economy, and provide employment and real prosperity for all.

NOTE: On the same day, the White House released the transcript of a news briefing by George P. Shultz, Director, Office of Management and Budget, on the President's statement.

## 21 Address to the Nation Making Public a Plan for Peace in Vietnam. January 25, 1972

Good evening:

I have asked for this television time tonight to make public a plan for peace that can end the war in Vietnam.

The offer that I shall now present, on behalf of the Government of the United States and the Government of South Vietnam, with the full knowledge and approval of President Thieu, is both generous and far-reaching.

It is a plan to end the war now; it includes an offer to withdraw all American forces within 6 months of an agreement; its acceptance would mean the speedy return of all the prisoners of war to their homes.

Three years ago when I took office, there were 550,000 Americans in Vietnam; the number killed in action was run-

ning as high as 300 a week; there were no plans to bring any Americans home, and the only thing that had been settled in Paris was the shape of the conference table.

I immediately moved to fulfill a pledge I had made to the American people: to bring about a peace that could last, not only for the United States, but for the long-suffering people of Southeast Asia.

There were two honorable paths open to us.

The path of negotiation was, and is, the path we prefer. But it takes two to negotiate; there had to be another way in case the other side refused to negotiate.

That path we called Vietnamization. What it meant was training and equipping the South Vietnamese to defend them-

selves, and steadily cans, as they develop do so.

The path of Vietnam successful. Two weeks I announced that by forces in Vietnam 69,000. That means 16,000. That is 1/2 of the 300 a week have be 95 percent—to less than 1/2 of the 300 a week have be

But the path of been the long voyage the patience and test of the American people's shortcut, the shortcut of negotiation?

Progress here has The American people going of why it has been night I intend to give and in so doing, I am the deadlock in the

We have made a posals designed to conflict. But early in after 10 months of no lic Paris talks, I bec it was necessary to of negotiating in pri whether it would be public deadlock.

After consultation: State Rogers, our An and our chief nego with the full knowle President Thieu, I s Paris as my person August 4, 1969, 30 these secret peace ne

Since that time, traveled to Paris 12

100

Ceiling on

press, before it con-
ons bills, to enact a
s that will prevent
ling more than the
in this budget. That
ures should apply
s and to the execu-

n absolute limit on
Only thus can we
the economy, and
and real prosperity

the White House re-
a briefing by
of Manage-
President's statement.

an for

week; there were no
nericans home, and
had been settled in
of the conference

I to fulfill a pledge
American people: to
hat could last, not
states, but for the
Southeast Asia.
curable paths open

on was, and is, the
takes two to nego-
other way in case
g negotiate.
I Vietnamization.
ing and equipping
to and them-

Richard Nixon, 1972

Jan. 25 [21]

selves, and steadily withdrawing Ameri-
cans, as they developed the capability to
do so.

The path of Vietnamization has been
successful. Two weeks ago, you will recall,
I announced that by May 1, American
forces in Vietnam would be down to
69,000. That means almost one-half mil-
lion Americans will have been brought
home from Vietnam over the past 3 years.
In terms of American lives, the losses of
300 a week have been reduced by over
95 percent—to less than 10 a week.

But the path of Vietnamization has
been the long voyage home. It has strained
the patience and tested the perseverance
of the American people. What of the
shortcut, the shortcut we prefer, the path
of negotiation?

Progress here has been disappointing.
The American people deserve an account-
ing of why it has been disappointing. To-
night I intend to give you that accounting,
and in so doing, I am going to try to break
the deadlock in the negotiations.

We have made a series of public pro-
posals designed to bring an end to the
conflict. But early in this Administration,
after 10 months of no progress in the pub-
lic Paris talks, I became convinced that
it was necessary to explore the possibility
of negotiating in private channels, to see
whether it would be possible to end the
public deadlock.

After consultation with Secretary of
State Rogers, our Ambassador in Saigon,
and our chief negotiator in Paris, and
with the full knowledge and approval of
President Thieu, I sent Dr. Kissinger to
Paris as my personal representative on
August 4, 1969, 30 months ago, to begin
these secret peace negotiations.

Since that time, Dr. Kissinger has
traveled to Paris 12 times on these secret

missions. He has met seven times with Le
Duc Tho, one of Hanoi's top political
leaders, and Minister Xuan Thuy, head of
the North Vietnamese delegation to the
Paris talks, and he has met with Minister
Xuan Thuy five times alone. I would like,
incidentally, to take this opportunity to
thank President Pompidou of France for
his personal assistance in helping to make
the arrangements for these secret talks.

This is why I initiated these private
negotiations: Privately, both sides can be
more flexible in offering new approaches
and also private discussions allow both
sides to talk frankly, to take positions free
from the pressure of public debate.

In seeking peace in Vietnam, with so
many lives at stake, I felt we could not
afford to let any opportunity go by—
private or public—to negotiate a settle-
ment. As I have stated on a number of
occasions, I was prepared and I remain
prepared to explore any avenue, public
or private, to speed negotiations to end
the war.

For 30 months, whenever Secretary
Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, or I were asked
about secret negotiations we would only
say we were pursuing every possible chan-
nel in our search for peace. There was
never a leak, because we were determined
not to jeopardize the secret negotiations.
Until recently, this course showed signs of
yielding some progress.

Now, however, it is my judgment that
the purposes of peace will best be served
by bringing out publicly the proposals we
have been making in private.

Nothing is served by silence when the
other side exploits our good faith to divide
America and to avoid the conference
table. Nothing is served by silence when
it misleads some Americans into accusing
their own government of failing to do

101

[21] Jan. 25

what it has already done. Nothing is
served by silence when it enables the other
side to imply possible solutions publicly
that it has already flatly rejected privately.

The time has come to lay the record of
our secret negotiations on the table. Just
as secret negotiations can sometimes break
a public deadlock, public disclosure may
help to break a secret deadlock.

Some Americans, who believed what
the North Vietnamese led them to be-
lieve, have charged that the United States
has not pursued negotiations intensively.
As the record that I now will disclose will
show, just the opposite is true.

Questions have been raised as to why
we have not proposed a deadline for the
withdrawal of all American forces in ex-
change for a cease-fire and the return of
our prisoners of war; why we have not
discussed the seven-point proposal made
by the Vietcong last July in Paris; why
we have not submitted a new plan of our
own to move the negotiations off dead
center.

As the private record will show, we
have taken all these steps and more—
and have been flatly rejected or ignored
by the other side.

On May 31, 1971, 8 months ago, at one
of the secret meetings in Paris, we offered
specifically to agree to a deadline for the
withdrawal of all American forces in ex-
change for the release of all prisoners of
war and a cease-fire.

At the next private meeting, on June
26, the North Vietnamese rejected our
offer. They privately proposed instead
their own nine-point plan which insisted
that we overthrow the Government of
South Vietnam.

Five days later, on July 1, the enemy
publicly presented a different package of

proposals—the seven-point Vietcong
plan.

That posed a dilemma: Which pack-
age should we respond to, the public plan
or the secret plan?

On July 12, at another private meeting
in Paris, Dr. Kissinger put that question
to the North Vietnamese directly. They
said we should deal with their nine-point
secret plan, because it covered all of Indo-
china including Laos and Cambodia,
while the Vietcong seven-point proposal
was limited to Vietnam.

So that is what we did. But we went
even beyond that, dealing with some of
the points in the public plan that were
not covered in the secret plan.

On August 16, at another private meet-
ing, we went further. We offered the com-
plete withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces
within 9 months after an agreement on
an overall settlement. On September 13,
the North Vietnamese rejected that pro-
posal. They continued to insist that we
overthrow the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment.

Now, what has been the result of these
private efforts? For months, the North
Vietnamese have been berating us at the
public sessions for not responding to their
side's publicly presented seven-point plan.

The truth is that we did respond to the
enemy's plan, in the manner they wanted
us to respond—secretly. In full possession
of our complete response, the North Viet-
namese publicly denounced us for not hav-
ing responded at all. They induced many
Americans in the press and the Congress
into echoing their propaganda—Ameri-
cans who could not know they were being
falsely used by the enemy to stir up divi-
siveness in this country.

I decided in October that we should

make another attempt
lock. I consulted with
who concurred fully
October 11, I sent a
tion to the North V
tained new element
negotiations forward
on November 1 between
Special Adviser Le
other appropriate off

On October 25, the
agreed to meet and
by 20 as the time for
vember 17, just 3 da
uled meeting, they so
ill. We offered to me
covered, either with
with any other aut
could come from Han

Two months have
called off that meeting
our plan has been an
filtration from North
munist military offe
cambodia. Our pro
answered by a step-up
part.

That is where matters
are being asked to
proposals that we
some respects accept

We are being asked
to proposals that we
some respects accept
private.

We are being asked
terminal date for our
we already offered or

And the most com
of this conflict lies
channel, while the e
military victory.

That is why I have
sado r Porter to pres
at this Thursday's

102

point Vietcong

na: Which pack-
to, the public plan

er private meeting put that question directly. They in their nine-point covered all of Indo-
and Cambodia,
en-point proposal

Did. But we went
ing with some of
plan that were
t plan
the late meet-
e offered the com-
and allied forces
an agreement on
September 13,
rejected that pro-
to insist that we
Vietnamese Govern-

The result of these
months, the North
operating us at the
responding to their
seven-point plan.
they respond to the
nner they wanted
In full possession
the North Viet-
ied us for not hav-
ley induced many
and the Congress
paganda—Ameri-
 they were being
y to stir up divi-

the result should

make another attempt to break the dead-
lock. I consulted with President Thieu,
who concurred fully in a new plan. On
October 11, I sent a private communica-
tion to the North Vietnamese that con-
tained new elements that could move
negotiations forward. I urged a meeting
on November 1 between Dr. Kissinger and
Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, or some
other appropriate official from Hanoi.

On October 25, the North Vietnamese agreed to meet and suggested November 20 as the time for a meeting. On November 17, just 3 days before the scheduled meeting, they said Le Duc Tho was ill. We offered to meet as soon as he recovered, either with him, or immediately with any other authorized leader who could come from Hanoi.

Two months have passed since they
called off that meeting. The only reply to
our plan has been an increase in troop in-
filtration from North Vietnam and Com-
munist military offensives in Laos and
Cambodia. Our proposal for peace was
answered by a step-up in the war on their
part.

That is where matters stand today.

We are being asked publicly to respond
to proposals that we answered, and in
some respects accepted, months ago in
private.

We are being asked publicly to set a
terminal date for our withdrawals when
we already offered one in private.

And the most comprehensive peace plan
of this conflict lies ignored in a secret
channel, while the enemy tries again for
military victory.

That is why I have instructed Ambas-
sador Porter to present our plan publicly
at this Thursday's session of the Paris

peace talks, along with alternatives to
make it even more flexible.

We are publishing the full details of our
plan tonight. It will prove beyond doubt
which side has made every effort to make
these negotiations succeed. It will show
unmistakably that Hanoi—not Washing-
ton or Saigon—has made the war go on.

Here is the essence of our peace plan;
public disclosure may gain it the attention
it deserves in Hanoi.

Within 6 months of an agreement:

- We shall withdraw all U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam.

- We shall exchange all prisoners of war.

- There shall be a cease-fire throughout Indochina.

- There shall be a new presidential election in South Vietnam.

President Thieu will announce the ele-
ments of this election. These include
international supervision and an inde-
pendent body to organize and run the
election, representing all political forces
in South Vietnam, including the National
Liberation Front.

Furthermore, President Thieu has in-
formed me that within the framework of
the agreement outlined above, he makes
the following offer: He and Vice Presi-
dent Huong would be ready to resign one
month before the new election. The Chair-
man of the Senate, as caretaker head of
the Government, would assume adminis-
trative responsibilities in South Vietnam,
but the election would be the sole respon-
sibility of the independent election body
I have just described.

There are several other proposals in our
new peace plan; for example, as we of-
fered privately on July 26 of last year, we
remain prepared to undertake a major re-
construction program throughout Indo-

Richard Nixon, 1972

Jan. 25 [21]

103

[21] Jan. 25

china, including North Vietnam, to help all these peoples recover from the ravages of a generation of war.

We will pursue any approach that will speed negotiations.

We are ready to negotiate the plan I have outlined tonight and conclude a comprehensive agreement on all military and political issues. Because some parts of this agreement could prove more difficult to negotiate than others, we would be willing to begin implementing certain military aspects while negotiations continue on the implementation of other issues, just as we suggested in our private proposal in October.

Or, as we proposed last May, we remain willing to settle only the military issues and leave the political issues to the Vietnamese alone. Under this approach, we would withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within 6 months in exchange for an Indonesia cease-fire and the release of all prisoners.

The choice is up to the enemy.

This is a settlement offer which is fair to North Vietnam and fair to South Vietnam. It deserves the light of public scrutiny by these nations and by other nations throughout the world. And it deserves the united support of the American people.

We made the substance of this generous offer privately over 3 months ago. It has not been rejected, but it has been ignored. I reiterate that peace offer tonight. It can no longer be ignored.

The only thing this plan does not do is to join our enemy to overthrow our ally, which the United States of America will never do. If the enemy wants peace, it will have to recognize the important difference between settlement and surrender.

This has been a long and agonizing

struggle. But it is difficult to see how anyone, regardless of his past position on the war, could now say that we have not gone the extra mile in offering a settlement that is fair, fair to everybody concerned.

By the steadiness of our withdrawal of troops, America has proved its resolution to end our involvement in the war; by our readiness to act in the spirit of conciliation, America has proved its desire to be involved in the building of a permanent peace throughout Indochina.

We are ready to negotiate peace immediately.

If the enemy rejects our offer to negotiate, we shall continue our program of ending American involvement in the war by withdrawing our remaining forces as the South Vietnamese develop the capability to defend themselves.

If the enemy's answer to our peace offer is to step up their military attacks, I shall fully meet my responsibility as Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces to protect our remaining troops.

We do not prefer this course of action.

We want to end the war not only for America but for all the people of Indonesia. The plan I have proposed tonight can accomplish that goal.

Some of our citizens have become accustomed to thinking that whatever our Government says must be false, and whatever our enemies say must be true, as far as this war is concerned. Well, the record I have revealed tonight proves the contrary. We can now demonstrate publicly what we have long been demonstrating privately—that America has taken the initiative not only to end our participation in this war, but to end the war itself for all concerned.

This has been the longest, the most

difficult war in America.

Honest and patriotic, disagreed as to whether we should become involved at all, but there has been disagreement of the war. This made tonight one of all agree.

Let us unite now, for peace—a peace sides—a peace that can.

Thank you and go

NOTE: The President saw the Oval Office at the dress was broadcast television.

Before delivering the bipartisan leaders'

The President spoke an advance text of his on the same day, as was joint U.S.-South Vietnam read as follows:

1. There will be a South Vietnam of all foreign forces allied with South Vietnam with an agreement.

2. The release of innocent civilians captured in South Vietnam will be carried over to troop withdrawals men sides will present a common and innocent civilian on the day the South will begin troop withdrawals and they are completed.

3. The following political future of South Vietnam: The political future of South Vietnam be left for the South to decide for themselves interference.

There will be a free, democratic election in South Vietnam in six months of an agreed

[2C]

104

Richard Nixon, 1972

Jan. 25 [21]

to see how any-
past position on the
that we have not gone
ing a settlement that
body concerned.

Our withdrawal of
proved its resolution
ent in the war; by
the spirit of concil-
oved its desire to be
ing of a permanent
ochina.

We negotiate peace

Our offer to nego-
tiate our program of
vement in the war
using forces as
the develop the capa-
cies.

ter to our peace offer
ary attacks, I shall
onsibility as Com-
air Armed Forces to
troops.

This course of action.
the war not only for
the people of Indo-
ne proposed tonight
al.

Is have become ac-
that whatever our
be false, and what-
must be true, as far
Well, the record
ght proves the con-
 demonstrate publicly
ve demonstrating
a has taken the ini-
d our participation
the war itself for

Is the most

difficult war in American history.

Honest and patriotic Americans have
disagreed as to whether we should have
become involved at all 9 years ago; and
there has been disagreement on the con-
duct of the war. The proposal I have
made tonight is one on which we all can
agree.

Let us unite now, unite in our search
for peace—a peace that is fair to both
sides—a peace that can last.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 8:30 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. The address was broadcast live on radio and television.

Before delivering the address, he met with
the bipartisan leadership of the Congress.

The President spoke from a prepared text.
An advance text of his address was released
on the same day, as well as the text of the
joint U.S.-South Vietnam peace proposal which
read as follows:

1. There will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other foreign forces allied with the Government of South Vietnam within 6 months of an agreement.

2. The release of all military men and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina will be carried out in parallel with the troop withdrawals mentioned in point 1. Both sides will present a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day the agreement is signed. The release will begin on the same day as the troop withdrawals and will be completed when they are completed.

3. The following principles will govern the
political future of South Vietnam:

The political future of South Vietnam will
be left for the South Vietnamese people to
decide for themselves, free from outside
interference.

There will be a free and democratic Presi-
dential election in South Vietnam within 6
months of an agreement. This election will be

organized and run by an independent body
representing all political forces in South Viet-
nam which will assume its responsibilities on
the date of the agreement. This body will,
among other responsibilities, determine the
qualification of candidates. All political forces
in South Vietnam can participate in the elec-
tion and present candidates. There will be in-
ternational supervision of this election.

One month before the Presidential election
takes place, the incumbent President and Vice
President of South Vietnam will resign. The
Chairman of the Senate, as caretaker head of
the Government, will assume administrative
responsibilities except for those pertaining to
the election, which will remain with the inde-
pendent election body.

The United States, for its part, declares
that it:

- will support no candidate and will remain
completely neutral in the election,

- will abide by the outcome of this election
and any other political processes shaped
by the South Vietnamese people them-
selves,

- is prepared to define its military and eco-
nomic assistance relationship with any
government that exists in South Vietnam.

Both sides agree that:

- South Vietnam, together with the other
countries of Indochina, should adopt a
foreign policy consistent with the military
provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

- Reunification of Vietnam should be de-
cided on the basis of discussions and agree-
ments between North and South Vietnam
without constraint and annexation from
either party, and without foreign inter-
ference.

4. Both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva
Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on
Laos. There will be no foreign intervention in
the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese
peoples will be left to settle their own affairs
by themselves.

5. The problems existing among the Indo-
chinese countries will be settled by the Indo-
chinese parties on the basis of mutual respect
for independence, sovereignty, territorial in-
tegrity, and non-interference in each other's
affairs. Among the problems that will be settled

105

[21] Jan. 25

is the implementation of the principle that all
armed forces of the countries of Indochina must
remain within their national frontiers.

6. There will be a general cease-fire through-
out Indochina, to begin when the agreement is
signed. As part of the cease-fire, there will be
no further infiltration of outside forces into any
of the countries of Indochina.

7. There will be international supervision of the military aspects of this agreement including the cease-fire and its provisions, the release of prisoners of war and innocent civilians, the withdrawal of outside forces from Indochina, and the implementation of the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.

8. There will be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indo-chinese peoples, the status of all the countries in

Indochina, and lasting peace in this region.

Both sides express their willingness to par-
ticipate in an international conference for this
and other appropriate purposes.

On January 26, the White House released the transcript of a news briefing on the secret negotiations in Paris by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Dr. Kissinger's news briefing is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 8, p. 126). On the same day, the White House also released the transcript of a news briefing on the President's plan for peace by Republican Congressional Leaders Senator Hugh Scott and Representative Gerald R. Ford following a meeting with the President.

## 22 Statement About the Death of Former Senator Carl Hayden. January 26, 1972

FOR 57 years, the energy and devotion of Carl Hayden strengthened and enriched the Congress of the United States. In the Congress—and in the country—he helped to keep alive the spirit and the character of the old West.

Senator Hayden told generations of newcomers to the Congress that it was better to be a workhorse than a show-horse—and he followed that adage in every aspect of his life. As a result, his influence for good reached into every corner of our national experience. Quietly, but firmly, he made his lasting imprint on our history.

Carl Hayden entered the Congress a year before I was born. The first man to represent Arizona in the House of Representatives, his name became synonymous with the development of that State. With

his death, Arizona and the Nation have lost another great link with our pioneering past.

Carl Hayden became a legendary figure for his countrymen even before his active years were over. Today, the entire Nation mourns his passing. But we know that as long as the Nation lives his legend will live on.

NOTE: Senator Hayden, 94, died after a prolonged illness in Mesa, Ariz., on January 25, 1972.

He served in the House of Representatives from 1912 to 1927, and in the Senate from 1927 to 1969 when he retired. He was President pro tempore of the Senate from January 1957 until his retirement.

Deputy Attorney General Richard G. Klein-
dienst represented the President at the funeral
services.

106

## 23 Remarks on Executive

Ladies and gentlemen,

As you can see from surround me, this a surprise. Having returned from Europe, we have been speculating that would be made to the Secretary of Commerce.

Secretary Stans is and his resignation, completed when his successor, his leaving the Cabinet very deep regrets, became one of my closest political, friends. He has the position of Secretary. He has initiated a program which have 15,000-word reports the Congress just a few days ago. I know, in any position that he can be expected to perform a pertinent job.

As you know, through the years of administration, and through the years we worked together in political campaign, 1968 when he was campaign to a very great victory in 1969 through 3 years in the Congress, that I have announced my position, and I will do so again in Commerce, once I have proved, will become

Due to the fact that I have announced my position, and I will do so again in the convention, I will repeat the position that he will simply say to the Commerce, once he has proved, will become

INDOCHINA

Vietnam

"To end this war—but to end it in a way that will strengthen trust for America around the world, not undermine it; in a way that will redeem the sacrifices that have been made, not insult them; in a way that will heal this Nation, not tear it apart."

Address to the Nation

April 7, 1971

The essential international challenge when this Administration took office was to shape a new American role in the world, to share responsibilities in creative partnerships with our friends, and to move from confrontation to negotiation with our opponents. But as we set out on this road in January 1969, we faced the hard realities of a seemingly open ended war in Indochina.

- Five years of steadily rising American troop levels in Vietnam had brought our authorized strength there to 549,500.

- American combat deaths during 1968 had averaged 278 weekly.

- Americans were flying about 33,000 tactical air sorties each month in Indochina, including 18,500 in South Vietnam.

- U.S. monthly draft calls in 1968 averaged over 30,000.

- In mid-1969, roughly 40 percent of South Vietnam's rural population was under government control, with 50 percent contested and ten percent under the control of the other side. As the enemy's general offensives of 1968 demonstrated, the urban population of six million was by no means secure from attack.

- Straining under the burdens of war, the South Vietnamese economy was wracked by inflation running at a rate of 35-40 percent. There was little planning to overcome this problem, let alone to provide for long range economic development.

- The additional costs of the Vietnam War to the United States had reached $22 billion a year.

- There was no comprehensive plan for lowering American involvement and no suggestion that American troop levels could be reduced. Indeed in September 1968, the then Secretary of Defense stated: "We have not yet reached the level of 549,500 in South Viet-

nam. We intend to continue to build toward that We have no intention of lowering that level, either by next June or at any time in the foreseeable future."

- The expanded Paris peace talks were just beginning and had settled only on procedures. There were no negotiating proposals on the conference table to end the conflict.

- Our domestic fabric was severely strained by dissent over the conflict, and increasing numbers of Americans were pressing for the extreme solutions of escalation or immediate disengagement.

How we dealt with this issue would be crucial to our efforts to shape a new role for America in the 1970's and beyond. Obviously we wanted to end the war. But we knew that the way we ended the war, or our involvement in it, would fundamentally affect our broader international effort.

There were no easy choices. Further escalation of our military efforts would deepen the divisions in our society, could not assure success in a conflict which was as much political as military, and could risk a wider war.

Continuing on the same path offered no clear prospect either of ending American involvement or of ending the war. Such a course could not have commanded American domestic support.

Precipitate disengagement, without regard to consequences, would have made impossible our efforts to forge a new foreign policy. It might have been domestically popular for a short term, but as its consequences became clear, the agony of recrimination would have replaced the agony of war. Overseas, this course would have shaken the trust of our friends and earned the contempt of our adversaries. We could not begin to build new partnerships by turning our back on people who had come to count on our support. And we could not set out to negotiate with adversaries by abandoning allies.

There were, however, two possible courses of action that would be internationally responsible and responsive to domestic opinion. The fastest and most decisive course was to negotiate a settlement to end the war for all participants. We progressively defined the terms of a settlement publicly and privately to Hanoi. This effort culminated in the comprehensive U.S.-South Vietnamese proposal which I made public on January 25, 1972.

However, we could not afford to rely solely on North Vietnamese willingness to reach a settlement. We needed an alternative. Thus we launched the process of progressively turning over defense responsibilities to the South Vietnamese and thereby reducing U.S. involvement. We also hoped this course would stimulate negotiation.

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Progress in Vietnamization

We have come a long way.

- There has been a steady decline in American forces over the past three years, with over 400,000 of our troops withdrawn. The authorized American troop level on February 1, 1972 was 139,000. On January 13, 1972 I announced a further withdrawal which by May 1, 1972 will bring our forces down to 69,000, or an 87 percent reduction from the authorized level this Administration inherited.

- American combat deaths averaged 278 per week in 1968. In 1971, they were down to an average of 26, and in the last six months of 1971 were 11 per week. Close to 60 percent of all U.S. casualties during this Administration occurred in 1969, including 40 percent during the first six months—before our programs had a chance to take hold. Despite its vastly greater role in the war, South Vietnam's casualties have also dropped from the 1968 level.

- In 1971 Americans flew a monthly average of 11,000 attack sorties in Indochina, including only 1,500 in South Vietnam, representing declines of about 70 percent and 90 percent respectively of the comparable 1968 figures.

- Average monthly U.S. draft calls declined to 7,500 in 1971, one-fourth the 1968 figure.

- During 1971 the South Vietnamese army, up to 1.1 million from the 1968 level of 800,000, conducted twenty major combat engagements for every one involving U.S. forces. By year's end U.S. forces had shifted essentially to a defensive and base security role.

- In the countryside, at the close of 1971 approximately 73 percent of the rural population was under South Vietnamese government control, with 24 percent contested and 3 percent still in enemy hands. Added to the now secure urban population of 6 million, this represents over 80 percent of the total South Vietnamese population under GVN control.

- South Vietnamese economic reforms have reduced inflation to 15 percent annually, turned over more than 800,000 acres of land to tenant farmers, and laid the grounds for long range economic development.

- The additional costs of the war have steadily dropped and total $8 billion in the current fiscal year, down by almost 65 percent from the costs three years ago.

This is the record of our Vietnamization policy. It has now effectively concluded the U.S. ground combat responsibility. Our other activities

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are being transferred to the South Vietnamese. We are ending American involvement in the war while making it possible for those who do not wish to be dominated by outside forces to carry on their own defense.

Negotiations

We would greatly prefer to see the conflict end for Asians as well as for Americans. Thus we have pressed intensive secret negotiations since August 1969. The thirty-month record of these negotiations and the comprehensive peace plan that I announced on January 25, 1972, underline a fundamental aspect of our Vietnam policy: our first priority and our preferred solution has always been a negotiated settlement of the conflict.

Together with the South Vietnamese, we have always been prepared to make a generous settlement. We have hoped that the steady success of Vietnamization and the prospect of South Vietnamese self-reliance would give the other side an incentive to negotiate. Our objective has been to convince Hanoi that it had better prospects at the conference table than on the battlefield.

We knew from the beginning that the negotiations faced formidable obstacles. The North Vietnamese view negotiations as an alternative route to victory, not a compromise with opponents. For them, negotiations are a continuation of the military struggle by other means, rather than an effort to bridge the gap between positions.

The North Vietnamese have also calculated that they could achieve their aims through military pressures that would eventually cause the collapse of American domestic support and the unraveling of the political fabric in South Vietnam.

The gathering momentum of Vietnamization clearly faces our adversaries with the prospect of an increasingly stronger and self-reliant South Vietnam. Yet Hanoi chooses to fight on instead of seeking a negotiated settlement. Our sweeping proposals offer them a fair chance to compete for political power in South Vietnam. Yet they maintain their patently unacceptable demand that we guarantee a Communist takeover.

**Unilateral Initiatives for Peace.** Both the Communist side and other parties have suggested a long series of measures the U.S. should take to launch meaningful negotiations. We have taken nearly all of them. But each move on our part has only brought fresh demands from the other side.

- Thus, the bombing halt and the agreement to expand the Paris Peace Talks in 1968 were made on the assumption that genuine negotiations would take place at the talks. They never have.

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—Thus, the U.S. not only agreed to the principle of withdrawal but actually began withdrawals of American troops. The response was that more substantial withdrawals were required.

—Thus, the U.S. continued withdrawals and has now brought home over three-quarters of our men. The response was that we should remove *all* our troops.

—Thus, we have agreed to remove all U.S. forces as part of an overall settlement. The response was that we should do so unconditionally.

—Thus, we offered an immediate ceasefire throughout Indochina which would end all U.S. military activities in the region. There has never been any positive response to this proposal.

**Public Initiatives for Peace.** In addition to these various unilateral measures, we have publicly offered a series of increasingly comprehensive negotiating proposals for an overall solution to the war.

On May 14, 1969 I proposed that all outside forces be removed from South Vietnam and that the South Vietnamese be allowed freely to choose their future through internationally supervised elections.

On July 11, 1969 President Thieu offered elections, with all parties including the NLF free to participate and to sit on a Mixed Electoral Commission.

On April 20, 1970 I spelled out the principles for a fair political solution.

—It must reflect the will of the South Vietnamese people and allow them to determine their own future without outside interference.

—It should reflect the existing relationship of political forces within South Vietnam.

—We will abide by the outcome of any political process agreed upon.

On October 7, 1970 in the hope of stimulating genuine negotiations, I presented a comprehensive proposal for an overall settlement.

—An internationally supervised ceasefire-in-place throughout Indochina.

—An Indochina Peace Conference.

—The withdrawal of all American forces from South Vietnam on a schedule to be worked out as part of an overall settlement.

—A political settlement in South Vietnam based on the principles that I had outlined on April 20.

—The immediate unconditional release of all prisoners of war.

**Secret Initiatives for Peace.** We were determined not to pass up any opportunity—public or private—to negotiate a settlement. Early

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in this Administration, after ten months of no progress in supplementary sessions at Paris, I decided to establish a private and secret channel so that both sides could talk frankly, free from the pressures of public debate.

With the full knowledge and approval of President Thieu, my Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Kissinger, traveled to Paris for secret meetings with the North Vietnamese on twelve occasions between August 1969 and September 1971. He met seven times with both Le Duc Tho, of Hanoi's political leadership, and Minister Xuan Thuy, head of the North Vietnamese delegation in Paris. He had five additional meetings with Minister Xuan Thuy.

The tone and spirit of our approach to these meetings were carefully designed to establish a framework for agreement. We made no take-it-or-leave-it proposals. We stressed our interest in a settlement they would genuinely want to keep. And, as our talks proceeded, we shaped our offers in response to their expressed preference for a comprehensive settlement. The following chronology is illustrative.

—On May 31, 1971 we offered a total U.S. withdrawal in return for a prisoner exchange and an Indochina ceasefire, leaving the other outstanding issues for subsequent resolution among the Indochinese parties themselves.

—In their response, the North Vietnamese insisted that political questions had to be incorporated in any settlement.

—On June 26, therefore, they tabled their own nine point plan, which included the demand for the removal of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as part of any settlement. In order to speed negotiations, we agreed to depart from the approach of our May 31 proposal and to deal with the political as well as the military issues. In effect, we accepted their nine points as a basis for negotiation; and from that time, every American proposal has followed both the sequence and subject matter of the North Vietnamese plan.

—Five days later, on July 1, at the Paris Peace talks, the other side *publicly* presented another set of proposals—the National Liberation Front's Seven Points. On a number of issues the substance was the same, although the formulations were different. However, there were some points in each plan which were not in the other. The NLF plan focused on issues pertaining to South Vietnam, while Hanoi's secret proposal dealt with all of Indochina.

—We were thus faced with a secret proposal in a private channel, and a different public proposal in the open negotiations. On July 12 we asked the North Vietnamese which plan they wanted us to address. They replied they wished us to respond to their secret proposal. We

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and so, and also incorporated in our reply some aspects of the public
seven points which were not covered in the secret nine points.

—On July 12, and again on July 26, we went through each of the nine points, item by item, seeking to bridge the gap between our positions. We sought to shape an agreement in principle which both sides could sign, and then introduce into the public talks as the basis for a detailed negotiation of a final agreement.

In pursuing this goal, on August 16, we tabled a new eight point proposal:

—We offered to withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within 9 months of the date of an agreement. We suggested a terminal date of August 1, 1972, provided an agreement was signed by November 1, 1971.

—We made specific proposals to ensure a fair political process in South Vietnam based on a number of political principles meeting both North Vietnamese and NLF concerns. These included (1) total U.S. neutrality in Vietnamese elections; (2) acceptance of the outcome of their results; (3) limitations on foreign military aid to South Vietnam if North Vietnam would accept similar restrictions; (4) non-alignment for South Vietnam together with the other countries of Indochina; and (5) reunification on terms for the North and South to work out.

—I also gave my personal undertaking to request from the Congress, immediately after the signing of an agreement in principle, a five-year reconstruction program for Indochina.

—At the next secret meeting, on September 13, Hanoi turned down our proposal. They cited two main reasons. First, they said the interval before total withdrawal (9 months) was too long, and that we had been unclear about how we defined total withdrawal. Secondly, they rejected our political principles as insufficient. They repeated their demand that we replace the Thieu government.

We reflected on these two issues and consulted closely with President Thieu. On October 11, we conveyed to the North Vietnamese a new proposal in one more attempt to break the deadlock. We proposed a November 1 meeting with Mr. Le Duc Tho, or any other appropriate North Vietnamese political leader, together with Minister Xuan Thuy. They countered with a proposal for a November 20 meeting. We accepted.

On November 17, just three days before the scheduled meeting, the North Vietnamese advised us that Mr. Le Duc Tho was unable to attend the meeting. We responded that we stood ready to meet at any time with

Mr. Tho or any other member of Hanoi's political leaders together with Minister Xuan Thuy.

Since that time there has been no response to our October 11 proposal or a suggestion for a meeting. It was that fact which finally led me to make our proposals public. We owed the American people an account of where we stood.

For we had paid a considerable price all those months for respecting the confidential nature of our private talks. The North Vietnamese themselves constantly berated us in public for not responding to the NLF's public proposal, even though they had asked us instead to respond to their private proposal, and we had done so. This propaganda tactic created a serious divergence between American public understanding and the factual situation. It led some Americans into believing that their Government was not doing all it should to reach a negotiated settlement.

Continued silence on our part would only have perpetuated the domestic confusion concerning our negotiating position and efforts. Moreover, by committing ourselves publicly and formally to a new plan, we could also erase any possible doubts Hanoi might have about our willingness to back up our private offers.

**Our Eight Point Proposal.** On January 25, President Thieu and I publicly offered a new eight point peace proposal which was presented in detail at the Paris Peace Talks two days later. Its main elements provide that, *within six months* of an agreement, there shall be:

—A complete withdrawal of all U.S. and allied forces from South Vietnam;

—An exchange of all prisoners throughout Indochina;

—A cease fire throughout Indochina;

—A new presidential election in South Vietnam.

The proposal also calls for respect for the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the Laos agreements of 1962; settlement by the Indochinese parties themselves of problems existing between them, including the role of North Vietnamese forces; international supervision, as necessary, of the agreement; and an international guarantee which could involve an international conference. I also reaffirmed our willingness to undertake a reconstruction program for Indochina, including North Vietnam.

The provisions of our proposal regarding the presidential election in Vietnam deserve special attention.

—The election would be organized and conducted by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam, including

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The National Liberation Front. This body would begin its work the day an agreement was signed.

- One month before the election, President Thieu and Vice President Huong would resign. The Chairman of the Senate would assume the administrative responsibilities of the government except for those pertaining to the election, which would remain with the independent election body.

- The election would be internationally supervised.

- All U.S. troops would be out of South Vietnam before the election. We would remain completely neutral and support no candidate in the election. We would abide by its result, or the outcome of any other political process shaped by the South Vietnamese people themselves.

Because some elements could prove more difficult to negotiate than others, we indicated our willingness to proceed with the implementation of certain military aspects while negotiations continue on other issues. Thus, we are prepared to begin troop withdrawals and prisoner exchanges immediately upon signature of an agreement in principle, and to complete that process within the specified six-month period, provided final agreement has been reached on the other aspects of an overall settlement.

Alternatively we remain willing, as we proposed secretly last May, to settle only the military issues and leave the political issues to be resolved separately. Under this approach we would withdraw all U.S. and allied forces within six months, in exchange for an Indochina-wide ceasefire and the release of all prisoners.

The choice is up to Hanoi.

**Our Peace Plan Is New, Comprehensive, and Flexible.** Since the last private meeting in September we have essentially met all of Hanoi's proposals on military issues except the requirement that we withdraw equipment and cease our aid to South Vietnam. We and the South Vietnamese have offered every reasonable means of ensuring that the political process will be fair to all parties, and that the incumbent government will have no undue advantage. Past statements of principle have now been made specific. We have designed our formulations to meet the stated requirements of the other side; and we have made clear in our communications that we remain prepared to listen to additional suggestions from them. The following are new elements of our proposal,

- The U.S. and the other countries allied with the Republic of Vietnam offer a fixed date of six months for total withdrawal either as part of an overall agreement or an agreement on military issues alone.

- These withdrawals would take place *before* the withdrawals of other outside forces and *before* the new presidential election.

- President Thieu's secret offer to step down one month before the new presidential election is unprecedented; his willingness to make that offer public is an important political fact in itself.

- We are ready to accept limitations on military and economic aid to South Vietnam if North Vietnam will accept limitations on the nearly one billion dollars of aid it receives annually from its allies.

- We are prepared to undertake a massive 7½ billion dollar five-year reconstruction program in conjunction with an overall agreement, in which North Vietnam could share up to two and a half billion dollars.

I believe the record of secret negotiations and our new peace proposals make unmistakably clear that we have been and are ready to conclude a fair settlement. The stubborn reality is that the North Vietnamese have blocked all possible openings so far. They have continued to insist not only that we withdraw unconditionally but that as we do we replace the present leadership in South Vietnam. They offer no political process except one that will ensure in advance that the Communists rule the South.

In our view, there is only one fundamental issue left—*will we collude with our enemies to overturn our friends? Will we impose a future on the Vietnamese people that the other side has been unable to gain militarily or politically? This we shall never do.*

So long as the other side insists on a settlement that is a thinly veiled formula for their takeover with our assistance, negotiations cannot succeed. If instead they are willing to compete fairly in the political arena in South Vietnam, they will find our side forthcoming in meeting their concerns.

## Prisoners of War

No single issue has received greater attention or been the subject of more intense efforts in this Administration than the plight of our prisoners of war in Indochina.

About 1,500 of our armed forces and some 40 U.S. civilians remain captured or missing in territory held by North Vietnam and its allies. The other side is holding the prisoners of war under circumstances which violate humanitarian principles and the Geneva Conventions on POW's agreed to by North Vietnam. The enemy has refused to allow international inspection of its prisoner camps. It has refused to furnish to the International Red Cross or to other impartial agencies complete lists of the prisoners it holds. Moreover, it has provided no lists at all for the

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prison it holds in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. It has curtailed the regular flow of mail between the men and their families.

At the end of 1971 the other side finally released a large number of letters. They included the first evidence ever received that some of our men held in South Vietnam were still alive. While we welcomed this development, it also underlined the cruel and unnecessary anguish caused to American families by Hanoi's withholding for so long the fact that these men were alive.

Neither identifying all of our men held by the Communists nor providing their total numbers could have any military significance. It is their suffering and the anguish of their families which give them value as hostages for Hanoi and its allies. The requirements of international law and decency are clear; the Communist side stands in violation of universally accepted standards. Their policy has set a grim precedent.

This Administration has moved on many fronts to deal with this problem. Our basic position is that this issue should be treated on a humanitarian basis and separated from other military and political issues in the conflict. As I said in my peace initiative of October 7, 1970:

> "The immediate release of all prisoners of war would be a simple act of humanity. But it could serve even more. It could serve to establish good faith, the intent to make progress, and thus to improve the prospects for negotiation."

The plight of our prisoners has aroused the widest concern. There have been hearings and resolutions in the Congress. The International Red Cross has made known its concern. The United Nations has adopted a strong resolution calling for compliance with the Geneva Convention, and specifically proposing that seriously sick and wounded prisoners, and those held for long periods, be interned in neutral nations. Many governments have publicly offered such neutral internment, subject to the agreement of both sides. We regret North Vietnam's failure to respond constructively to these humanitarian moves.

In addition to our formal initiatives, the South Vietnamese have, with our support, taken a long series of unilateral steps in an attempt to prompt the early release of prisoners. Over the past five years they have released over 4,000 POWs in South Vietnam and some 250 to North Vietnam. Just in the last year and a half alone, South Vietnam initiated the following moves.

- On July 8, 1970 it returned 62 North Vietnamese sick and wounded prisoners to North Vietnam, along with 24 North Vietnamese fishermen who had been rescued in South Vietnamese waters.

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- On October 8, 1970 the Government of South Vietnam filed in the U.S. proposal for the total and prompt release of all prisoners of war held by all sides.

- On December 10, 1970 it proposed the release of all North Vietnamese prisoners it holds in return for the release of all U.S. and free world prisoners and all South Vietnamese prisoners of war held outside South Vietnam.

- On January 24, 1971 it released 35 more North Vietnamese prisoners of war.

- On January 26, 1971 it offered to repatriate all sick and wounded POW's and called for similar action by the other side.

- On April 8, 1971 South Vietnam proposed that sick and wounded prisoners as well as prisoners held in captivity for a long period of time be interned in a neutral country, a proposal supported by the U.S. Government on the same date at the Paris Peace Talks.

- On April 29, 1971 South Vietnam offered to return 570 sick and wounded North Vietnamese prisoners to North Vietnam and to intern in a neutral country 1,200 North Vietnamese prisoners held four years or longer.

- On November 1, 1971 on the occasion of President Thieu's inauguration, it announced the freeing of almost 3,000 Viet Cong prisoners of war in South Vietnam.

We have reinforced these initiatives: special envoys, such as Astronaut Frank Borman and Postmaster General Blount, have gone abroad to seek support for proper POW treatment; a dramatic rescue attempt was made at Son Tay in November 1970.

We have explored all possible channels and all responsible means of gaining freedom for the men. I have reaffirmed my personal commitment. In meeting with a group of POW/MIA families on September 28, 1971, I told them:

> "... I have considered the problem of obtaining the release of our POW's and missing in action as being one that has Presidential priority.

> "I can assure you that every negotiating channel ... including many private channels that have not yet been disclosed, have been pursued, are being pursued, and will be pursued. ..."

Despite the other side's behavior thus far, this Administration will continue to use every means to press for proper treatment and prompt release of all Americans held in captivity. I have said that Americans in significant numbers will remain in South Vietnam until we secure the release of our imprisoned men.

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At the same time, we will continue to work for a responsible settlement to the Indochina conflict which will give the people of that area the opportunity to determine freely their own future and speed the return of all our men to their families.

## South Vietnam's Growing Capacity to Protect Itself

Public attention naturally has focused on the withdrawal of American forces, the transfer of combat responsibilities to the South Vietnamese and the resulting decline in American involvement. But this is only one aspect of Vietnamization; there are psychological, political, and economic dimensions as well as military ones.

The Vietnamization program in its broadest sense means establishing security and winning allegiance in the countryside; developing responsive political institutions; managing a war-torn economy and steering it toward longer range development. Progress in these efforts will determine South Vietnam's future.

As the withdrawal of most American forces from Vietnam has proceeded, we have seen to it that those remaining are not jeopardized by North Vietnamese efforts to build up their strength and launch new offensives. We continue to work closely with the other countries who have had troops in Vietnam: Australia, Korea, New Zealand, and Thailand. These nations are also withdrawing their forces as South Vietnam's defense capabilities grow.

Much of the progress in 1971 can be traced to the disruption of the enemy's network in southern Laos a year ago, just as similar operations in Cambodia two years ago accelerated Vietnamization in 1970.

Last year I recalled the purposes and the results of the joint U.S.-South Vietnamese operations against the North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia in the spring of 1970. They greatly reduced American casualties, inflicted extensive material and manpower losses on the enemy, ended the concept of immune sanctuaries, dislocated enemy supply lines and strategy, ensured the continuance of our troop withdrawal program, and bought time and confidence for the South Vietnamese armed forces.

In many respects the South Vietnamese incursions into Southern Laos, or LAMSON 719, in early February 1971 paralleled the Cambodian sanctuary operations of the previous year.

- Both operations were defensive in nature. The South Vietnamese pursued North Vietnamese forces only where they had been camped for years, attacking South Vietnam without fear of reprisal.

- On both occasions the purpose of the sweep was to destroy enemy communications, destroy enemy supplies, and thus blunt the possibility of future enemy offensives during the following months. Without these operations the Communists would have had the option of launching major attacks on South Vietnamese and U.S. forces in 1970 and 1971.

- In both cases the very substantial impact was measured in following months by reduced enemy military activity in South Vietnam, accelerated Vietnamization and increased U.S. withdrawals. And on both occasions U.S. casualties declined sharply after the operations. During the six months before the Cambodian operations U.S. combat deaths averaged 93 a week; in the six months after they were 51. U.S. combat deaths before LAMSON 719 averaged 44 a week; afterward they averaged 26.

The one major difference between the Cambodian and Laos operations reflects the success of Vietnamization. Unlike the 1970 Cambodian sweeps, which included U.S. combat troops, LAMSON 719 was entirely conducted by South Vietnamese ground forces, with the U.S. strictly in a supporting role. The South Vietnamese mounted complex multi-division operations in difficult terrain, in adverse weather and against a well-prepared enemy.

LAMSON 719 thus underlined major progress. Three years previously the South Vietnamese were fighting enemy units in and close to South Vietnam's own population centers. Now they were dealing with the enemy threat in remote sanctuary areas, without the support of U.S. ground combat forces or advisers, and keeping their own territory pacified at the same time. I summed up the impact of the Laotian operations in my April 7 address to the Nation when I announced that the American withdrawal rate would be increased and that 100,000 more American troops would be brought home from South Vietnam by December 1.

The trends in South Vietnam since that time have remained positive. American casualties have declined further. We continued to step up the rate of American withdrawals during 1971. Enemy offensive activity in South Vietnam stayed low. The situation in the countryside has continued to show progress.

In coming months the enemy can be expected to pose maximum challenges to Vietnamization. At the turn of the year there were many signs that the enemy was preparing for major offensives, especially in the northern half of South Vietnam. As U.S. withdrawals cut our presence down to a minimum level, Hanoi would still like to discredit the rec-

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ord these past three years and shake the widespread confidence that the
South Vietnamese can defend themselves.

Our friends are bound to suffer some isolated setbacks. But these should
not distort the overall picture of growing self-sufficiency and security. We
and the South Vietnamese are both confident of their ability to handle
the North Vietnamese challenge.

By the close of 1971 the U.S. ground combat role was effectively
completed. The year saw a constant advance toward the goal I discussed
on April 7:

> "As you can see from the progress we have made to date and by this
> announcement tonight, the American involvement in Vietnam is
> coming to an end. The day the South Vietnamese can take over their
> own defense is in sight. Our goal is a total American withdrawal
> from Vietnam. We can and will reach that goal through our pro-
> gram of Vietnamization if necessary."

## The Situation in the Countryside

No aspect of the conflict, and no measure of Vietnamization, is more
important than the relentless, if unpublicized, struggle for the South Viet-
namese living in the countryside, commonly called pacification.

Pacification involves the situation in rural areas in all its dimensions—
physical security, popular allegiance, and the military, administrative,
and political effectiveness of both sides. A successful pacification effort
permits the villager to return to his land and improve his farm, confident
that he will be able to harvest and market his crops in security.

During the past year, the South Vietnamese faced a crucial challenge:
to keep up the momentum of pacification, while simultaneously taking
over an increasing share of combat responsibilities as U.S. and other al-
lied forces rapidly withdrew. In most areas, this challenge was met
successfully.

To measure progress in the countryside we developed in 1969 complex
criteria which weigh various factors indicative of control. The basic
criterion, which we measure rigidly, is whether a hamlet has adequate
defense and a fully functioning government official resident both day
and night. Throughout this Administration we have also sent teams from
Washington to South Vietnam to make candid on-the-scene assessments
and verify reports from the field.

In mid-1969, our indicator showed roughly 40 percent of the rural
population under South Vietnamese control, 50 percent contested, and
10 percent under the control of the other side. By the end of 1970 these
percentages were respectively 65, 30, and 5.

We did not expect pacification to progress at the same rate in 1971.
The remaining contested areas are those in which the other side is
firmly rooted, where the Communist infrastructure has been established
for as long as two decades, and where enemy bases and infiltration routes
are closest to the rural population. Nevertheless, in 1971 the South Viet-
namese Government increased its control over the rural population from
65 percent to 73 percent. At year's end the Government's control was
under 60 percent in only seven of the 44 provinces, compared with 15
provinces in December 1970. Government control was over 80 percent
in 20 provinces compared with nine a year earlier.

Over 80 percent of the total population of South Vietnam, including
the six million urban dwellers and eight million in rural areas, is under
effective Government control.

Despite the substantial overall progress in pacification, there were
also some setbacks. The percentage of the rural population under uncon-
tested Government of Vietnam control declined in five of the seven
most northern provinces, closest to the enemy's staging areas in North
Vietnam and Laos. We hope that the formation of an additional division
in the northern sector and other recent steps by the Government will
reverse that trend.

More South Vietnamese now receive government protection and
services than at any time in the past decade. A majority of the population
has participated in national and local elections. Rice production has
risen to the highest level in history. A major land reform program has
resulted in distribution of more than 850,000 acres of land to over
275,000 farm families.

And perhaps most significantly of all, the government has the con-
fidence to hand over nearly 600,000 weapons to peasants who serve as
a local militia, the People's Self-Defense Forces. A government un-
popular with its people would never dare to arm them.

These are the actions of a government that is increasingly sure of al-
legiance and taking the steps to deserve that allegiance.

## Political Development

In last year's Report I pointed out that the political dimension was
crucial for South Vietnam's future and would take on increasing im-
portance as the military efforts wound down. Noting the upcoming
Presidential and lower house elections, I said that, "1971 will show the
extent of political development in South Vietnam."

The results this past year have been mixed. There are areas in which
political freedom and development still need to be advanced in South

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Vietnam. And the cohesiveness of the non-Communist political force remains to be tested.

But this should not obscure some fundamental facts. In just a few short years, South Vietnam has made remarkable progress building toward democracy in the midst of a war. The past four years have been characterized by basic political stability in South Vietnam rather than the turbulence of the previous period. The Constitution is proving effective, and participation in the political process is broadening.

A consistent political evolution has taken place in the period since the election of a Constitutional Assembly in 1966 and of the President and a National Assembly in 1967. The numbers of voters and candidates participating has been exceptionally high in the numerous national and local elections held during the last five years, despite the announced Communist intent to disrupt elections and to attack candidates. Over 95 percent of the elections for hamlet chiefs and village councils have been completed. Councils have been elected in all provinces and municipalities.

This trend was furthered in the August 1971 national elections for South Vietnam's lower house. There was lively competition, and 78 percent of the eligible voters turned out. As in the Senate elections a year earlier, where an opposition slate led the returns, groups critical of the Government won significant victories and increased their substantial representation in the Legislature, a fact that attests to the fairness of these contests.

More international attention was devoted to the South Vietnamese presidential election in October 1971. We hoped that this election would be vigorously contested. We have stressed the concept of free choice in South Vietnam. We believed that a contested election would leave the resulting South Vietnamese Government in a stronger position than an unopposed victory. We had an obligation to make our views known, publicly and privately. We emphasized our view that there should be more than one candidate, and we worked diligently to encourage opponents of President Thieu to remain in the race.

But at this stage in South Vietnam's political development, a contested election depends upon the personal motives and calculations of individuals. South Vietnam lacks well established political parties capable of guaranteeing alternative candidates. The interplay of personalities and circumstances in South Vietnam last year simply failed to produce a contest. Some observers believed that President Thieu's use of governmental powers was primarily responsible. Others believed that opponents deliberately chose to embarrass President Thieu rather than contest an election they expected to lose in any case.

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We were disappointed that the election was uncontested, so we rejected the view that we should intervene directly or cut off South Vietnam. In the final phases of American involvement, we were determined to avoid the practices which helped produce our involvement in the first place.

We thus preferred the disappointment of an uncontested election to the probably fatal mistake of attempted manipulation of the South Vietnamese political scene. In the final analysis, it is to the credit of the South Vietnamese—opponents as well as supporters of the regime—that they emerged from a trying and uncertain summer with their political stability and constitutional structure intact. Despite its remaining problems, South Vietnam's political development contrasts favorably, indeed, with North Vietnam, where there are no true elections at all.

## Economic Development

A sound Vietnamese economy is crucial for political stability and a viable government. Last year I recounted the successful efforts of the South Vietnamese to brake the rampant inflation that had plagued that nation for years. This effort was continued in 1971. Further actions were taken to lay the groundwork for long range economic development.

The achievements in 1971 were especially striking, in view of the need to support a large military establishment and the dislocations resulting from large U.S. troop withdrawals.

- Domestic tax receipts increased 25 percent.

- Prices increased less than 15 percent.

- Production of rice, lumber, fish and textiles rose.

- New plants were built to produce textiles, plywood, electric power, plastic products and flour.

On November 15, in his first address to the legislature after his inauguration, President Thieu made economic development and eventual economic self-sufficiency major national goals. He announced comprehensive economic reforms to increase savings and investment, to raise domestic tax collections, and to encourage exports, industrialization and private foreign investment. The program included a major devaluation of the piaster, a difficult but essential step.

It is a courageous undertaking to move forward rapidly on development when almost half of the country's able-bodied men are needed for the military effort and the costs of security impose a tremendous burden on the economy. The Vietnamese look to their friends to assist them in their development efforts.

127

We hoped to respond promptly by diverting some assistance funds in 1972 to support Vietnamese development. The unwise Congressional reduction of foreign assistance funds has hampered this effort. In the current budget, I am requesting funds specifically for economic development in Vietnam.

South Vietnam will continue to need substantial U.S. support to fill the gap between government revenues and defense costs. This form of U.S. assistance can be reduced over the next several years as the program for internal development takes hold and the economic and tax reforms yield larger revenues. We must not expect instantaneous results, however, so long as the South Vietnamese are forced to devote a major portion of their national effort to defending against North Vietnamese aggression.

South Vietnam has been plagued with war for three and a half decades. It remains a poor country with per capita income of less than $150. But it has rich potential and an industrious people. The ending of hostilities would allow the full utilization of these resources. We stand ready to assist all Vietnamese in peaceful development.

## Remaining Problems

Each of the past three years has shown accelerating progress in Vietnam. However, we are under no illusions about the stubbornness and gravity of the remaining problems.

- **Breaking the Negotiating Impasse.** A negotiated settlement remains the quickest and most humane way to end the conflict. It holds out the only real promise that the war will soon cease for Asians as well as for Americans, for Laos and Cambodia as well as for Vietnam. However, three years of unilateral moves, secret talks, negotiating proposals, and Vietnamization progress have failed to induce the other side to join with us in settling the struggle at the conference table. We have reduced the issues to a single crucial question: will the political future of South Vietnam be imposed by outsiders or will it be competitively shaped by the South Vietnamese? The other side has consistently been unyielding on this political issue. We will nevertheless continue our efforts, in any promising forum.

- **Retrieving Our Men.** Either as part of an overall settlement, or through other means, we shall secure the release of American prisoners held throughout Indochina. The other side continues to exploit this issue and to manipulate the sentiments of the American people. Hanoi has demonstrated that it will try to extract maximum advantages by using our men as bargaining pawns. So long as they hold our men there will be American forces in South Vietnam. We will pursue every honorable path until we succeed in returning these prisoners to their families.

128

- **Completing the Transfer of Defense Responsibilities.** Last year brought the effective conclusion of the American ground combat role in South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese assumed that burden, and a steadily increasing share of all other responsibilities in the conflict. The remaining problems include completion of the transfer of air and logistic support to the South Vietnamese; improving the pacification situation in the northern provinces; building more cohesive non-Communist political forces; and setting in train the long term development of South Vietnam.

Major tests can be expected in coming months. Only the sustained will of the South Vietnamese can meet that challenge. As we complete the Vietnamization process, we will need the continued understanding of the American people to finish the process which has brought us so far, to redeem our sacrifices, and to contribute to the building of a more stable peace.

## Laos and Cambodia

Vietnam is the central theater in what is, in fact, a wider war. For Hanoi has made the war an Indochina conflict by spreading its troops throughout the peninsula.

In 1971, with their position deteriorating in South Vietnam itself, the North Vietnamese continued, and have now stepped up, their aggression in Laos and Cambodia. Hanoi maintains over 60,000 troops in Cambodia and more North Vietnamese troops in Laos, some 100,000, than in South Vietnam.

The situation in Laos and Cambodia are similar in many respects:

- Both of these countries have totally defensive military establishments; neither poses any conceivable threat to North Vietnam.

- The neutrality, independence, and territorial integrity of both countries have been inscribed in international agreements which Hanoi signed, but contemptuously ignores.

- North Vietnamese troops for years have used both countries as infiltration corridors, staging bases, and sanctuaries for attacks against South Vietnam.

- North Vietnam continues to threaten the legitimate governments in both countries in order to further its attacks on South Vietnam, but also perhaps with the intention of taking Laos and Cambodia themselves.

129

—The overwhelming numbers of North Vietnamese troops in both countries strip away any pretense that the conflicts in Laos and Cambodia are civil wars.

The Lao and Cambodian governments have tried to restore their independence and neutrality through diplomatic means; failing that, they have been forced to turn to their friends for support of their defense. The United States and other nations have responded to their requests for assistance. We have supported both diplomatic efforts to bring peace to Laos and Cambodia, and defensive military efforts in the absence of a settlement.

On the diplomatic front, we have always backed the efforts of Lao Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma—the neutralist leader supported by Hanoi at the time of the 1962 Geneva Accords—to reinstitute those Accords. In Cambodia we long tolerated a difficult military situation and we encouraged negotiations when Prince Sihanouk was first deposed by the National Assembly in March 1970.

Our negotiating proposals on Vietnam have consistently been addressed to the broader Indochina context. In the face of North Vietnam's refusal to address these problems at the conference table, we have continued the policies of previous Administrations in extending military and economic support to the Royal Lao Government. We have provided military assistance for Cambodia since the spring of 1970, when North Vietnamese troops moved out of the border sanctuaries and extended their operations into broader areas of Cambodia.

Our constant objectives in both countries have been to ensure the momentum of Vietnamization and our withdrawals, to protect American and allied lives, and to help maintain the precarious balance within these two countries as they fight to restore their independence and neutrality.

In both countries our activities are limited, requested, supportive, and defensive.

**Laos and Cambodia Provide for Their Own Defense.** In Laos, government forces continue to offer a tenacious defense despite years of combat against a numerically superior enemy. The struggle there ebbs and flows on a seasonal basis. The Laotian conflict is, in effect, two wars. In the north, North Vietnamese troops maintain pressure on the very government which Hanoi helped to create in 1962. In the south, the enemy concentrates on expanding and protecting the Ho Chi Minh trail complex which is vital to its military strength in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

The Cambodian Government, faced with the assault on its independence, has rallied the population to the cause of national survival. From

a lightly-equipped and largely ceremonial force of 35,000 men in 1970, the Cambodian army has now grown to approximately 200,000, for the most part volunteers.

The army has fought bravely, but it lacks training, equipment, and experience. And it faces over 60,000 well-equipped North Vietnamese troops, hardened and experienced by years of war.

Despite the measures which they are taking in their own defense, these two countries are clearly no match for a much larger North Vietnam, and they must have external assistance to survive. It would be a grim development indeed if these two small nations, so clearly the victims of external aggression, were overwhelmed because of restrictions placed on American and other allied aid while North Vietnam continued to receive the full backing of its own allies.

Neither country has requested the deployment of U.S. troops. They are manning the front lines. Thus, there are not—and there will not be—any U.S. ground combat troops in either country.

**Together With Other Countries, We Provide Military And Economic Assistance.** In Laos, this remains as outlined in my comprehensive report of March 1970—military aid for regular and irregular Lao forces when requested by the Lao Government; reconnaissance flights and air operations to interdict North Vietnamese troops and supplies on the Ho Chi Minh Trail; logistic and air support for Lao forces when requested by the Government. We also provide economic assistance to control inflation, support essential Government services, and assist economic development.

In Cambodia, we have given military assistance since April 1970 and economic assistance and PL 480 programs since March 1971. With the approval of the government we are also conducting air interdiction missions against enemy personnel and supplies that are, or can be, used in offensives against American and allied forces in South Vietnam.

**South Vietnam Has Mounted Defensive Operations Against North Vietnamese Forces in Their Laotian and Cambodian Base Areas.** I have already described the purposes of these operations and noted the increasing South Vietnamese capabilities that they have demonstrated. In Cambodia, operations are at the request of the Government and serve to relieve enemy pressures against Cambodia as well as South Vietnam. In Laos, the South Vietnamese operations were strictly limited in objective and duration.

It is senseless to claim that these operations against enemy sanctuaries serve to widen the Vietnam war. Not a single South Vietnamese soldier has gone anywhere except where tens of thousands of North Vietnamese

130

131

tried to have been entrenched for years, violating one country's territory to attack another. It is Hanoi which widened the conflict long ago. As I said in last year's Foreign Policy Report:

"The arguments against South Vietnam's defensive actions suggest that Hanoi has the right—without provocation and with complete immunity—to send its forces into Laos and Cambodia, threaten their governments, and prepare to bring its full strength to bear on South Vietnam itself.

"The choice for South Vietnam is not between limiting and expanding the war. It is between what it is doing in self-defense and passively watching the menace grow along its borders."

The presence and activities of North Vietnamese troops in Laos and Cambodia are indefensible. Nevertheless, we can expect the Lao and Cambodian peoples to be subjected to additional attacks as Hanoi pursues its aims in the region. These countries ask nothing but to be left alone to shape their own destinies. They have demonstrated their courage, and their determination to try to provide for their own defense. Together with others, we shall continue to provide the support that will help to sustain them in their struggle.

* * *

I once again appeal to the other side to join in the search for peace in Indochina. Proposals now on the negotiating table could end this conflict on a basis that would respect the sacrifices of all participants.

*It is long past time to still the sound of war, to return the men of both sides to their families, and to devote the energies of all to the fruitful tasks of peace.*

132

## MIDDLE EAST

"What I am saying to you today is not that I predict a Middle Eastern settlement. I do say that it is in the interests of both major powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, not to allow that very explosive part of the world to drive them into a confrontation that neither of them wants, although our interests are very diametrically opposed in that part of the world—except our common interest in not becoming involved in a war."

Media Briefing
Rochester, New York
June 18, 1971

Soon after taking office, I pledged that we would "pursue every possible avenue to peace in the Mideast that we can."

An end to the perpetual state of crisis in the Middle East would be a major contribution to the stability of global peace. It would free energies and resources for the building of a better life for the people of the area. It would reduce the danger of a new clash and spreading war. It would remove a major obstacle to the fuller development of productive ties between the countries of the region and the outside world.

I also pledged that the United States would now assume the initiative. Inaction was unlikely to promote peace; it was more likely to allow the situation to deteriorate once again into war as it did in 1967. It was our responsibility to engage actively in the search for a settlement, in full awareness of the difficulties we would face.

In 1971, the danger of war was contained, although the risk remained high. New approaches to a settlement were explored, although up to now without result.

- The ceasefire between Israel and its neighbors, brought about by our initiative the previous year, endured through 1971. It has now lasted 18 months. It was in the interest of each side to maintain it, and to make it possible for the other side to do so.

- Efforts to achieve an overall Arab-Israeli settlement lost momentum. Egypt and Israel, with our help, then explored the possibility of an interim agreement—a set of concrete steps toward peace which did not require addressing all the issues of a comprehensive settlement at the outset.

- Despite our restraint in our military supply policy, substantial new Soviet pledges and shipments of arms to Egypt continued the arms

133

[127] Apr. 26

ing cancer research result into regular
clinical and public health practices.

I urge the Congress to give these re-
quests prompt and favorable attention so

that we can continue to move forward as
rapidly as possible in our campaign
against cancer.

128 Statement on the Death of Arthur E. Summerfield.

April 26, 1972

MRS. NIXON and I join with fellow
citizens across the country in mourning
the death of Arthur Summerfield, and in
expressing our deepest sympathy to his
family.

He was a loyal and good friend. He was
an ardent and dedicated Republican. He
was devoted to his country, and in his
service to both party and country he
earned the high admiration of men and

women from both sides of the political
aisle. He will be remembered by history
as a great American whose career was
symbolic of the finest aspects of our na-
tional character.

NOTE: Mr. Summerfield, 73, died of pneumonia at Good Samaritan Hospital, West Palm Beach, Fla.

He served as chairman of the Republican National Committee, 1952-53, and as Postmaster General, 1953-61.

to move forward
in our camp

nerfield.

ides of the polit-
embered by his
whose career
 aspects of our

73, died of pneum
ital, West Palm Be

kan of the Repub
1952-53, and as I
f.

tland was 549,600
running as high
 thousand yo
ing drafted e

later, through
ization—helping
develop the capab
les—the number
by Monday, Ma
bed to 69,000. (I
ing the present,
have been reduc
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men a month,
to zero next y
y television add
January 25, we h
rous peace term

129 Address to the Nation on Vietnam.

April 26, 1972

Good evening:

During the past 3 weeks you have been
reading and hearing about the massive
invasion of South Vietnam by the Com-
munist armies of North Vietnam.

Tonight, I want to give you a first-
hand report on the military situation in
Vietnam, the decisions I have made with
regard to the role of the United States in
the conflict, and the efforts we are mak-
ing to bring peace at the negotiating
table.

Let me begin briefly by reviewing what
the situation was when I took office and
what we have done since then to end
American involvement in the war and to
bring peace to the long-suffering people
of Southeast Asia.

On January 20, 1969, the American

troop ceiling in Vietnam was 549,000.
Our casualties were running as high as
300 a week. Thirty thousand young
Americans were being drafted every
month.

Today, 39 months later, through our
program of Vietnamization—helping the
South Vietnamese develop the capability
of defending themselves—the number of
Americans in Vietnam by Monday, May 1,
will have been reduced to 69,000. Our
casualties—even during the present, all-
out enemy offensive—have been reduced
by 95 percent. And draft calls now aver-
age fewer than 5,000 men a month, and
we expect to bring them to zero next year.

As I reported in my television address
to the Nation on January 25, we have
offered the most generous peace terms in

550

[2c]

Richard Nixon, 1972

Apr. 26 [129]

Government of South Vietnam and to impose a Communist dictatorship in its place.

As you will recall, I have warned on a number of occasions over the past 3 years that if the enemy responded to our efforts to bring peace by stepping up the war, I would act to meet that attack, for these three very good reasons: first, to protect our remaining American forces; second, to permit continuation of our withdrawal program; and third, to prevent the imposition of a Communist regime on the people of South Vietnam against their will, with the inevitable bloodbath that would follow for hundreds of thousands who have dared to oppose Communist aggression.

The air and naval strikes of recent weeks have been carried out to achieve these objectives. They have been directed only against military targets which support the invasion of South Vietnam and they will not stop until the invasion stops.

The Communists have failed in their efforts to win over the people of South Vietnam politically. And General Abrams believes that they will fail in their efforts to conquer South Vietnam militarily. Their one remaining hope is to win in the Congress of the United States and among the people of the United States the victory they cannot win among the people of South Vietnam or on the battlefield in South Vietnam.

The great question then is how we, the American people, will respond to this final challenge.

Let us look at what the stakes are— not just for South Vietnam, but for the United States and for the cause of peace in the world. If one country, armed with the most modern weapons by major powers, can invade another nation and

succeed in conquering it, other countries will be encouraged to do exactly the same thing—in the Mideast, in Europe, and in other international danger spots. If the Communists win militarily in Vietnam, the risk of war in other parts of the world would be enormously increased. But if, on the other hand, Communist aggression fails in Vietnam, it will be discouraged elsewhere, and the chance for peace will be increased.

We are not trying to conquer North Vietnam or any other country in this world. We want no territory. We seek no bases. We have offered the most generous peace terms—peace with honor for both sides—with South Vietnam and North Vietnam each respecting the other's independence.

But we will not be defeated, and we will never surrender our friends to Communist aggression.

We have come a long way in this conflict. The South Vietnamese have made great progress; they are now bearing the brunt of the battle. We can now see the day when no more Americans will be involved there at all.

But as we come to the end of this long and difficult struggle, we must be steadfast. And we must not falter. For all that we have risked and all that we have gained over the years now hangs in the balance during the coming weeks and months. If we now let down our friends, we shall surely be letting down ourselves and our future as well. If we now persist, future generations will thank America for her courage and her vision in this time of testing.

That is why I say to you tonight, let us bring our men home from Vietnam; let us end the war in Vietnam. But let us end it in such a way that the younger brothers

but with one very mind. We are not talks simply in order to propaganda and North Vietnamese and to get on with the of making peace. Paris talks with the productive talks progress will follow channels. As far as first order of business to halt his enemy and to return to of war.

We have said that our air military installations are being destroyed until the offensive in

the proposal that North Vietnam as long to the negotiator that package to the core, in 1968, and it again in 1972.

A record. By July 1, over 90 percent of Vietnam in 1969. Invasion began, we in half. We have numerous terms for the have refused to enemy's demand fully constituted

the Secretary Ronald Reagan agreement by the public of Vietnam to of the Paris peace accord is printed in the official Documents

553

[129] Apr. 26

and the sons of the brave men who have fought in Vietnam will not have to fight again in some other Vietnam at some time in the future.

Any man who sits here in this office feels a profound sense of obligation to future generations. No man who sits here has the right to take any action which would abdicate America's great tradition of world leadership or weaken respect for the Office of President of the United States.

Earlier this year I traveled to Peking on an historic journey for peace. Next month I shall travel to Moscow on what I hope will also be a journey for peace. In the 18 countries I have visited as President I have found great respect for the Office of President of the United States. I have reason to expect, based on Dr. Kissinger's report, that I shall find that same respect for the office I hold when I visit Moscow.
I do not know who will be in this office in the years ahead. But I do know that future Presidents will travel to nations abroad as I have on journeys for peace. If the United States betrays the millions of people who have relied on us in Vietnam,

the President of the United States, who-ever he is, will not deserve nor receive the respect which is essential if the United States is to continue to play the great role we are destined to play of helping to build a new structure of peace in the world. It would amount to a renunciation of our morality, an abdication of our leadership among nations, and an invitation for the mighty to prey upon the weak all around the world. It would be to deny peace the chance peace deserves to have. This we shall never do.

My fellow Americans, let us therefore unite as a nation in a firm and wise policy of real peace—not the peace of surrender, but peace with honor—not just peace in our time, but peace for generations to come.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on radio and television.

The President spoke from a prepared text. An advance text of his address was released on the same day.

The White House also released the transcript of a news briefing on the President's address by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

## 130 Letters to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the House Committee on Banking and Currency About Proposed Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Legislation. April 27, 1972

Dear Wright:

On March 18, 1972, when I sent a message to the Congress on the subject of Minority Business Enterprise, I urged swift approval by the Congress of the Minority Enterprise Small Business Investment Act of 1972.

At that time it was my understanding

that the MESBIC legislation was to be given early hearings before the Subcommittee on Small Business, of your Committee on Banking and Currency. I was most gratified to know that your Committee would be giving prompt attention to this vital legislation. As my message indicated, I believe the proposed MESBIC

554

[LC]

legislation will vastly nities for minority en expansion should no

The Minority Ente Investment Act, as y within the purview of the Small Busines ministrator Thomas to testify in suppor which is urgently ne your invitation.

Not only will the expand available car businessmen a great tion," but it will in employment of min provide inroads in high unemployment

I am most hopeful and the Subcommittee will schedule the M hearings in early M presented at an ear- tion by the House certainly hope that join with me to ach goal of providing ex- nities for minority A Sincerely,

[Honorable Wright Pa

## 131 Statements Represent Whaling

I AM pleased to an Honorable Russell of the Council on Ex- will serve as my sp the meeting in Lor International Whal-

[L.C]

Richard Nixon, 1942

May 8 [147]

## 147 Address to the Nation on the Situation in Southeast Asia. May 8, 1972

Good evening:

Five weeks ago, on Easter weekend, the Communist armies of North Vietnam launched a massive invasion of South Vietnam, an invasion that was made possible by tanks, artillery, and other advanced offensive weapons supplied to Hanoi by the Soviet Union and other Communist nations.

The South Vietnamese have fought bravely to repel this brutal assault. Casualties on both sides have been very high. Most tragically, there have been over 20,000 civilian casualties, including women and children, in the cities which the North Vietnamese have shelled in wanton disregard of human life.

As I announced in my report to the Nation 12 days ago, the role of the United States in resisting this invasion has been limited to air and naval strikes on military targets in North and South Vietnam. As I also pointed out in that report, we have responded to North Vietnam's massive military offensive by undertaking wide-ranging new peace efforts aimed at ending the war through negotiation.

On April 20, I sent Dr. Kissinger to Moscow for 4 days of meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders. I instructed him to emphasize our desire for a rapid solution to the war and our willingness to look at all possible approaches. At that time, the Soviet leaders showed an interest in bringing the war to an end on a basis just to both sides. They urged resumption of negotiations in Paris, and they indicated they would use their constructive influence.

I authorized Dr. Kissinger to meet privately with the top North Vietnamese negotiator, Le Duc Tho, on Tuesday, May 2, in Paris.

Ambassador Porter, as you know, resumed the public peace negotiations in Paris on April 27 and again on May 4. At those meetings, both public and private, all we heard from the enemy was bombastic rhetoric and a replaying of their demands for surrender. For example, at the May 2 secret meeting, I authorized Dr. Kissinger to talk about every conceivable avenue toward peace. The North Vietnamese flatly refused to consider any of these approaches. They refused to offer any new approach of their own. Instead, they simply read verbatim their previous public demands.

Here is what over 3 years of public and private negotiations with Hanoi has come down to: The United States, with the full concurrence of our South Vietnamese allies, has offered the maximum of what any President of the United States could offer.

We have offered a deescalation of the fighting. We have offered a cease-fire with a deadline for withdrawal of all American forces. We have offered new elections which would be internationally supervised with the Communists participating both in the supervisory body and in the elections themselves.

President Thieu has offered to resign one month before the elections. We have offered an exchange of prisoners of war in a ratio of 10 North Vietnamese prisoners for every one American prisoner that they release. And North Vietnam has met each of these offers with insolence and insult. They have flatly and arrogantly refused to negotiate an end to the war and

know that I can put our full energies into our government agencies on this campaign.

RICHARD NIXON

Nixon, Secretary of State [210]

May 5, 1972, and

House released a lot of a news brief for Veterans Pro news briefing were they, and Malcolm R. Carsly for Manpower, Donald E. Johnson, and Affairs.

## Report of

resulted from the action of the Committee on Executive Agencies, and the move you share my concerns which not government a better provided sharpensiveness to the analytic needs of the

RICHARD NIXON

1 "A Pace-Settingement; 88th Announced June 30, 1971, Commission" (79

583

[147] May 8

bring peace. Their answer to every peace offer we have made has been to escalate the war.

In the 2 weeks alone since I offered to resume negotiations, Hanoi has launched three new military offensives in South Vietnam. In those 2 weeks the risk that a Communist government may be imposed on the 17 million people of South Vietnam has increased, and the Communist offensive has now reached the point that it gravely threatens the lives of 60,000 American troops who are still in Vietnam.

There are only two issues left for us in this war. First, in the face of a massive invasion do we stand by, jeopardize the lives of 60,000 Americans, and leave the South Vietnamese to a long night of terror? This will not happen. We shall do whatever is required to safeguard American lives and American honor.

Second, in the face of complete intransigence at the conference table do we join with our enemy to install a Communist government in South Vietnam? This, too, will not happen. We will not cross the line from generosity to treachery.

We now have a clear, hard choice among three courses of action: Immediate withdrawal of all American forces, continued attempts at negotiation, or decisive military action to end the war.

I know that many Americans favor the first course of action, immediate withdrawal. They believe the way to end the war is for the United States to get out, and to remove the threat to our remaining forces by simply withdrawing them.

From a political standpoint, this would be a very easy choice for me to accept. After all, I did not send over one-half million Americans to Vietnam. I have brought 500,000 men home from Viet-

nam since I took office. But, abandoning our commitment in Vietnam here and now would mean turning 17 million South Vietnamese over to Communist tyranny and terror. It would mean leaving hundreds of American prisoners in Communist hands with no bargaining leverage to get them released.

An American defeat in Vietnam would encourage this kind of aggression all over the world, aggression in which smaller nations armed by their major allies, could be tempted to attack neighboring nations at will in the Mideast, in Europe, and other areas. World peace would be in grave jeopardy.

The second course of action is to keep on trying to negotiate a settlement. Now this is the course we have preferred from the beginning and we shall continue to pursue it. We want to negotiate, but we have made every reasonable offer and tried every possible path for ending this war at the conference table.

The problem is, as you all know, it takes two to negotiate and now, as throughout the past 4 years, the North Vietnamese arrogantly refuse to negotiate anything but an imposition, an ultimatum that the United States impose a Communist regime on 17 million people in South Vietnam who do not want a Communist government.

It is plain then that what appears to be a choice among three courses of action for the United States is really no choice at all. The killing in this tragic war must stop. By simply getting out, we would only worsen the bloodshed. By relying solely on negotiations, we would give an intransigent enemy the time he needs to press his aggression on the battlefield.

There is only one way to stop the killing.

That is to keep the hands of the North Vietnam.

Throughout the United States has restraint unprecedented. That was our Nation, a Nation and we can be precise—as Americans—as America peace not conquest.

However, when all restraint, throw battle in the territo, fuses to negotiate, situation.

In these circumstances, Americans threatened failed to act decisively. They trayed the trust betrayed the cause.

I therefore conclude, we need not continue coordination with North Vietnam, I have ordered which are being spoken to you.

All entrances to these ports will be mined. Our operations from States forces have appropriate measures and claimed territory. Vietnam to interdict supplies. Rail and tions will be cut off. All possible. Air and military targets in continue.

These actions are directed at any other nation.

[2C]

584

at, abandoning
Nam here and
7 million South
nunist tyranny
a leaving hun-
ners in Com-
aining leverage

Vietnam would
pression all over
which smaller
ior allies, could
aboring nations
Europe, and
would be in

action is to keep
firm. Now
prevented from
all continue to
gotiate, but we
can offer and
for ending this
e.

I know, it
and now, as
cars, the North
use to negotiate
an ultimatum
dose a Commu-
people in South
a Communist

It appears to be
sues of action for
no choice at all.
war must stop.
we would only
relying solely on
give an intran-
needs to press his
id.
sure killing.

Richard Nixon, 1972

May 8 [147]

That is to keep the weapons of war out of
the hands of the international outlaws of
North Vietnam.

Throughout the war in Vietnam, the
United States has exercised a degree of
restraint unprecedented in the annals of
war. That was our responsibility as a great
Nation, a Nation which is interested—
and we can be proud of this as Ameri-
cans—as America has always been, in
peace not conquest.

However, when the enemy abandons
all restraint, throws its whole army into
battle in the territory of its neighbor, re-
fuses to negotiate, we simply face a new
situation.

In these circumstances, with 60,000
Americans threatened, any President who
failed to act decisively would have be-
trayed the trust of his country and
betrayed the cause of world peace.

I therefore concluded that Hanoi must
be denied the weapons and supplies it
needs to continue the aggression. In full
coordination with the Republic of Viet-
nam, I have ordered the following meas-
ures which are being implemented as I
am speaking to you.

All entrances to North Vietnamese
ports will be mined to prevent access to
these ports and North Vietnamese naval
operations from these ports. United
States forces have been directed to take
appropriate measures within the internal
and claimed territorial waters of North
Vietnam to interdict the delivery of any
supplies. Rail and all other communica-
tions will be cut off to the maximum ex-
tent possible. Air and naval strikes against
military targets in North Vietnam will
continue.

These actions are not directed against
any other nation. Countries with ships

presently in North Vietnamese ports have
already been notified that their ships will
have three daylight periods to leave in
safety. After that time, the mines will be-
come active and any ships attempting to
leave or enter these ports will do so at
their own risk.

These actions I have ordered will cease
when the following conditions are met:

First, all American prisoners of war
must be returned.

Second, there must be an internation-
ally supervised cease-fire throughout
Indochina.

Once prisoners of war are released,
once the internationally supervised cease-
fire has begun, we will stop all acts of
force throughout Indochina, and at that
time we will proceed with a complete
withdrawal of all American forces from
Vietnam within 4 months.

Now, these terms are generous terms.
They are terms which would not require
surrender and humiliation on the part of
anybody. They would permit the United
States to withdraw with honor. They
would end the killing. They would bring
our POW's home. They would allow ne-
gotiations on a political settlement be-
tween the Vietnamese themselves. They
would permit all the nations which have
suffered in this long war—Cambodia,
Laos, North Vietnam, South Vietnam—
to turn at last to the urgent works of heal-
ing and of peace. They deserve immediate
acceptance by North Vietnam.

It is appropriate to conclude my re-
marks tonight with some comments di-
rected individually to each of the major
parties involved in the continuing tragedy
of the Vietnam war.

First, to the leaders of Hanoi, your peo-
ple have already suffered too much in

585

[147] May 8

your pursuit of conquest. Do not compound their agony with continued arrogance; choose instead the path of a peace that redeems your sacrifices, guarantees true independence for your country, and ushers in an era of reconciliation.

To the people of South Vietnam, you shall continue to have our firm support in your resistance against aggression. It is your spirit that will determine the outcome of the battle. It is your will that will shape the future of your country.

To other nations, especially those which are allied with North Vietnam, the actions I have announced tonight are not directed against you. Their sole purpose is to protect the lives of 60,000 Americans, who would be gravely endangered in the event that the Communist offensive continues to roll forward, and to prevent the imposition of a Communist government by brutal aggression upon 17 million people.

I particularly direct my comments tonight to the Soviet Union. We respect the Soviet Union as a great power. We recognize the right of the Soviet Union to defend its interests when they are threatened. The Soviet Union in turn must recognize our right to defend our interests.

No Soviet soldiers are threatened in Vietnam. Sixty thousand Americans are threatened. We expect you to help your allies, and you cannot expect us to do other than to continue to help our allies, but let us, and let all great powers, help our allies only for the purpose of their defense, not for the purpose of launching invasions against their neighbors.

Otherwise the cause of peace, the cause in which we both have so great a stake, will be seriously jeopardized.

Our two nations have made significant progress in our negotiations in recent months. We are near major agreements on nuclear arms limitation, on trade, on a host of other issues.

Let us not slide back toward the dark shadows of a previous age. We do not ask you to sacrifice your principles, or your friends, but neither should you permit Hanoi's intransigence to blot out the prospects we together have so patiently prepared.

We, the United States and the Soviet Union, are on the threshold of a new relationship that can serve not only the interests of our two countries, but the cause of world peace. We are prepared to continue to build this relationship. The responsibility is yours if we fail to do so.

And finally, may I say to the American people, I ask you for the same strong support you have always given your President in difficult moments. It is your most of all that the world will be watching.

I know how much you want to end this war. I know how much you want to bring our men home. And I think you know from all that I have said and done these past 3½ years how much I, too, want to end the war to bring our men home.

You want peace. I want peace. But, you also want honor and not defeat. You want a genuine peace, not a peace that is merely a prelude to another war.

At this moment, we must stand together in purpose and resolve. As so often in the past, we Americans did not choose to resort to war. It has been forced upon us by an enemy that has shown utter contempt toward every overture we have made for peace. And that is why, my fellow Americans, tonight I ask for your support of this decision, a decision which

has only one purpose, not to escalate this war and to win it. Will that be enough?

With God's help, we will accomplish that. Thank you and

NOTE: The President's Oval Office at the was broadcast live on

148 Statements of the President of the Republic of the越南越

UNDER Publicly signed on March 13, 1972, the port of Radio Free Asia Liberty were authorized to of fiscal year 1972.

The decision to support for these large majorities in the judgment that overwhelmingly put this country at all walks of life, and Radio Liberty, unique and valuable to a recent letter to Radio Free Europe, "... we have found to be of RFE and an interest."

I also said that:

"... the free flow of ideas among nations, more normal relations, West and to better understanding during peace."

586

made significant
ations in recent
major agreements
on, on trade, on a
toward the dark
come. We do not ask
principles, or your
would you permit
to blot out the
cave so patiently

and the Soviet
old of a new rela-
not only the inter-
but the cause of
pared to continue
The responsible
do to the American
same strong sup-
iven your Presi-
It is you most of
watching.
want to end this
you want to bring
think you know
and done these
I, too, want to
men home.
t peace. But, you
leafeat. You want
a peace that is
her war.
must stand to-
olve. As so often
I did not choose
ten forced upon
hown utter con-
verture we have
is why, my fel-
I ask for your
desire which

Richard Nixon, 1972

May 10 [148]

has only one purpose, not to expand the
war, not to escalate the war, but to end
this war and to win the kind of peace that
will last.

With God's help, with your support, we
will accomplish that great goal.

Thank you and good night.

NOTE: The President spoke at 9 p.m. in the
Oval Office at the White House. His address
was broadcast live on radio and television. He

spoke from a prepared text.

Before delivering his address to the Nation,
the President met with the bipartisan leader-
ship of the Congress to discuss its contents.

On May 9, 1972, the White House released
the transcript of a news briefing by Henry
A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs, on the situation in
Southeast Asia. The transcript is printed in the
Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents
(vol. 8, p. 842).

148 Statement About Proposed Legislation Authorizing
Continued Government Support of Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty. May 10, 1972

UNDER Public Law 92-264, which I
signed on March 30, 1972, grants in sup-
port of Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty were authorized through the end
of fiscal year 1972.

The decision to continue Government
support for these radios was approved by
large majorities in Congress and reflects
the judgment that has been expressed
overwhelmingly by newspapers through-
out this country and by leading citizens in
all walks of life that Radio Free Europe
and Radio Liberty continue to perform a
unique and valuable service. As I stated in
a recent letter to the chairman of the
Radio Free Europe Fund:

> "... we have followed closely the work of RFE and are satisfied that it continues to serve a fundamental national interest."

I also said that:

> "... the free flow of information and ideas among nations is indispensable to more normal relations between East and West and to better prospects for an enduring peace."

I have therefore asked the Secretary of
State to submit today a bill which would
continue Government support to the
radios through fiscal year 1973. As with
the fiscal year 1972 authorization, this bill
would make the grants to the radios
through the Secretary of State under
such terms and conditions he deems
appropriate.

A number of different views have been
expressed in Congress as to how the radios
might best be funded for the future. No
consensus on this important matter has
emerged. The House version of the fiscal
year 1972 authorization and Senate Reso-
lution 272 make clear that majorities in
both Houses believe this should be given
further study before a definitive solution
is adopted.

To this end, I plan to appoint a
Presidential study commission ¹ with in-

¹ A White House announcement of the establishment and membership of the Commission on International Radio Broadcasting was released on August 10, 1972, and is printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 8, p. 1221).

587