Rough Draft Chapter VII -- Overall Report

November 6, 1957

# CHAPTER VII
## THE NATURE OF THE UPHEaval IN THE UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

### I

When an American citizen attempts to envisage the world situation today he is likely to arrive at an over-simplified image that has been implanted on his consciousness through politics and the press. What he perceives is a globe divided roughly in half between two great poles of antipathetic energy, the U.S. in one hemisphere, the U.S.S.R. in the other, each surrounded by its constellation of allies--in the West the cluster of free nations attracted to the American pole, and in the East the complex of Communist satellites ringing the Russian pole from Prague to Peking. Around the fringes of these rival fields of force he may distinguish in somewhat mistier detail a score or more of remote and rather backward countries whose names have only recently begun to emerge from the intermediate pages of geography books onto the front pages of newspapers throughout the world.

These principalities are the so-called underdeveloped nations of Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Their way of life has been traditionally agricultural, bucolic and in some cases tribal, as opposed to the industrial, urban and cosmopolitan systems of the stronger and more advanced states of Europe and the western hemisphere. Most of them have only recently won independence and national identity by throwing off colonial rule amid the disintegration of the British, French and Dutch empires in the decade following World War II. Others still remain, restless and impatient,

[L]

November 6, 1957

- 2 -

under weakening colonial administration. Most of them are poor or economically vulnerable. Most are overpopulated. And with few exceptions, all are in a state of political adolescence, poised between past and future, uncertain of either their purposes or fate. In the perspective of classic political theory, these newly independent nations constitute a vacuum which the more dynamic powers around them will inevitably fill.

It is at this point that over-simplification produces distortion. For the concept of a vacuum is a passive one, and these nations are by no means passive. Internally unstable, they are driven by inner tensions and driven by aspirations as yet unfulfilled. Externally they inject into their foreign relationships a good deal of the revolutionary fervor that led them to throw off colonial rule. Within a revolutionary world they represent an active and dynamic force--the force of the revolution of rising expectations--manifested politically by their nationalistic drive toward independence and freedom, and on the economic and social plane by their rebellion against racial barriers and standards of living that had been imposed on them, virtually unchanged for centuries. It is by no means accurate, therefore, to envisage these nations as fallow ground, waiting quietly to be ingerminated by the seeds of Communism, or to put forth, overnight, the full foliage of democracy. Although some have responded to the manipulations of the Sino-Soviet bloc, and others have accepted economic and technical assistance from American governmental and private agencies, the course of

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 3 -

their policy cannot be governed from without. Their development has a momentum of its own, engendered by their own necessities, ambitions and collective will.

It would be an error, moreover, to think of the underdeveloped nations as a homogeneous bloc. There is a vast difference in character between the situation in West Africa and that in the Arab states of the Middle East or the countries of Southeast Asia. Each nation is an individual entity; each presents unique economic and political problems; each requires special study and attention. It is only when we envisage them as *uncommitted* nations, encompassing millions of people, crucial natural resources, and militarily important geography which we hope to win for the free world (and which, conversely, the Communist nations hope to attach to their own domain) that they can be contemplated in broader terms. Even so, it must be remembered that at this present interlude of history the dividing line between present "allies" and "neutrals" is a nebulous one; and even more significantly, countries neutral to the United States are by no means always neutral to each other.

II

One of our difficulties stems from the fact that the underdeveloped countries represent a new area of American concern. In the past our foreign policy was focussed almost entirely on the great powers of western Europe, or in the Far East upon China and Japan. We were hardly aware of the rest

[x]

November 6, 1957

- 4 -

of tropical Asia, and thought of Africa and the Middle East as mere provinces
of Whitehall and the Quai d'Orsay. Our leadership role since the end of
the last great war, however, has forced us to adopt a new foreign policy
whose dimensions are literally world-wide.

It was Southeast Asia which first called our attention to the problems
of the underdeveloped countries. Within a very few years after the war, the
rapid withdrawal of western colonial rule made that region one of the key
crisis areas of the world. During the past decade, seven nations have won
their freedom: the Philippines (1946), Burma (1948), Indonesia (1949), the
states of former French Indo-China--Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia (1954), and
the Federation of Malaya (1957). Independence, however, did not bring
tranquility to Southeast Asia. On the contrary the achievement of independence
left in its wake the enormous wreckage of 150 years of colonialism and the
staggering problem of reconstructing the fabric of a society--encompassing
160 million people--on new foundations synthesizing the pre-existing,
traditional elements of Asiatic culture with those features of modern
civilization which had brought about the west's mastery over the east.

The full complexity of the problems involved can be appreciated only
when one recalls that the people of Southeast Asia are presently emerging
from two-and-a-half centuries of suppression, during which their lives
were recurrently dislocated and shattered by the impact of western power and
western ideas. Great civilizations had flourished in Burma, Malaya, Cambodia,

[L]

November 6, 1957

- 5 -

Laos, Vietnam and the islands of Indonesia, 1000 years ago. Then, during the 16th and 17th Centuries, these lands fell under the twilight of colonial rule precipitated by the bitter struggles among the Portugese, Dutch and British for control of the spice trade and other commerce of the Orient. In the fierce competition between the East India Company of Great Britain and its Dutch counterpart, local populations were massacred, tortured and enslaved. During the 19th Century cut-throat commercial rivalry was curbed by organized colonial rule which, though more considerate, just and humane, nevertheless remained a system of administration designed to exploit and expropriate indigenous riches, and under which native people toiled for alien masters. It has been only within the last generation or so that the implicit selfishness of colonialism began to be ameliorated by a sense of responsibility for the welfare of the native populations and an awareness of the fact that independence and self-government loomed in the future as imminent ends of an inevitable historic trend. It is a tribute to man's love of freedom that within the short span of ten years so many people were able to recover from the wounds of the past and stand forth proudly independent on the threshold of new greatness.

On the other hand, it is one of the more sardonic jests of history that the embers of nationalism and independence in these erstwhile colonies of the western powers were enkindled by spokesmen of the western powers themselves. For the doctrine of the value of the individual and

[Lc]

November 6, 1957

- 6 -

the ideal of government by consent of the governed, forged in the crucibles
of the French and American revolutions, had been carried around the world
by the spread of colonial government, preparing the way for the destruction
of colonialism itself. The diffusion of these ideas was accelerated after
World War I, when national leaders at the peace conference of Versailles
upheld the right of self-determination, the equality of nations, and other
principles enunciated by Woodrow Wilson as bases for international order.
In recent years many of the native leaders of the countries under colonial
rule went abroad to western schools and universities, and drew their revolution-
ary texts from what they studied there.

Although the translation of western ideals into local action, which
brought about the collapse of colonialism after World War II, was darkened
by bloodshed and strife, one of the most hopeful aspects of the revolution
of the newly independent powers has been the philosophical identify of the
values they proclaim with our own. Nevertheless, the centuries during which
they languished under colonial rule lacerated their minds and spirits, leaving
scars which have not been erased. They are motivated today by a driving,
dynamic nationalism compounded of pride in their cultural heritage and a
determination to achieve progress and prosperity through self-reliant action.
Our overall problem of establishing good relations with these nations is vastly
complicated by their memory of past injustices, their lingering dark suspicion
of the western powers, and by an inherited gall of anti-colonialism that has
not been palliated by time.

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 7 -

It is further complicated by the pushing restless activities of the Sino-Soviet bloc which has held forth with considerable success the panacea of Communism as a solution to the countless, complex economic and social problems that prevail in every one of the nations in these areas.

### III

Almost before their independence had been won, the infant new/nations of Southeast Asia were challenged by a new and different kind of imperialism. Communist-inspired revolutions took place in every one of them with the single exception of Thailand. Although these revolts were, for the most part, contained, Communism still looms as a potent danger to every country on the periphery of Red China. The victory of the Communists in China in 1949 and the collapse of French power in Indo-China in 1954 (despite enormous American material aid) placed in jeopardy the security of the entire Southeast Asian complex. Continuous Communist propaganda has made a deep impression throughout the area. Pyschologically, the Soviet Union exercises a powerful appeal in three ways: by aggressive emphasis on the evils of the colonial system; by professing non-discrimination in color and race (appropriately tainted with anti-semitism, when expedient -- as in the case of the Arab countries); and by ballyhooing itself as an example of a once-backward country which achieved high industrialization in a short span of 25 years. Politcally, as well as psychologically, Russia's most potent instrument is her sheer might -- the size and power of her armed forces and

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 8 -

her possession of the hydrogen bomb and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

At the same time, her spokesmen have carefully refrained from pressing for a tight system of alliances, but have aimed simply to neutralize the countries beyond her immediate reach, thus strengthening the impression of her sincerity in proclaiming principles of peace, the equality of nations and non-interference.

Finally, in the economic realm, Russia has demonstrated her ability, though limited, to deliver producer's goods, machinery and arms, and her reciprocal capacity to import the foodstuffs and raw materials which are the main exports of the underdeveloped countries.

The pattern of Soviet policy in these areas suggests that while avoiding any action that might lead to an all-out nulcear war, they have at the same time remained faithful both to their current national objectives and to the ideological goals of the Communist credo. It is often forgotten that Lenin, unlike Marx and Engels, did not regard the highly-developed, capitalist countries as the sole possible seedbeds of the Socialist revolution; on the contrary he felt that the world revolution could also be promoted by upheaveals in those underdeveloped countries which served as sources of raw materials, places of investment and markets for industrial goods. The territorial area of the Revolution would thus steadily expand, while the highly-developed capitalist nations would be cut off from their markets, raw materials and income, becoming themselves an easier target for the revolution. He saw the war of the revolution waged on two fronts: on the one hand a crusade of the urban proletariat against

[LC]

Rough Draft Chapter VII - Overall Report

November 6, 1957

- 9 -

capitalist exploitation, on the other, a struggle of colonial and dependent
nationalists against imperialism. To the Marxist horizontal division of
mankind into exploited and exploiting classes, he added a perpendicular
division of nations into haves and have-nots. "Capitalism," he wrote, "has
grown into a world system of colonial oppression and financial strangulation
of the overwhelming majority of the population of the world by a handful of
'advanced' countries... The world has become divided into a handful of
usurer states and a vast majority of debtor states." Prophesying the future
revolution of rising expectations, (which may ultimately prove as far-reaching
in its consequences as the Marxist social revolution), he foresaw a new
distribution of power and wealth between the countries which were highly
industrialized in his own time and those whose development still lay ahead.

It is possible that the awakening of the non-European countries and
the recovery of political independence by hundreds of millions of people in
former colonial territories, will be regarded by future historians as the most
important development of the Twentieth Century. Russia, an economically
backward country in 1917, and now the second industrial nation of the world,
pointed a pathway to power which China is now pursuing, and down which India
and other underdeveloped countries may quickly follow. The problem at this
moment in history is not whether the industrialization of the underdeveloped
countries will or will not produce a revolutionary change in international rela-
tions -- for this is inevitable -- but whether the change will be accompanied by
a closer cooperation of the underdeveloped countries with the Communist bloc

[lc]

RoughDraft Chapter VII - Overall Report

November 6, 1957

- 10 -

or will take place with the sympathetic help of the highly-industrialized western nations. The stakes are high, for Soviet success would mean nothing less than the merger of the two fronts of the Marxist revolution, and the resulting isolation of the free countries of the west, precisely as Lenin had predicted, when he wrote: "After the period of the awakening of the East during the contemporary revolution, next will come the period of the participation of the East in deciding the fate of the whole world."

Clear evidence that the present Russian leaders have not forgotten Lenin's texts appears in any number of recent utterances by both Khrushchev and Bulganin. In his report to the 20th Congress in 1956, Khrushchev said: "The present breakdown of the colonial system of imperialism represents a world-wide historical event of the present era. A great progress of the awakening of peoples, which were kept for centuries by the colonizers away from the highway of man's progress, is developing. People's China and an independent Indian Republic took their place among the great powers. We witness the political and economic upsurge of the peoples of Southeastern Asia and the Arab East. The process of the awakening of the peoples of Africa has begun. The national liberating movement has gained strength in Brazil, Chile and other countries of Latin America. The new period of world history, which Lenin predicted, has come about, a period when the nations of the East take an active part in deciding the fate of the whole world and become a new powerful factor in international relations."

During their visit to India and Burma in 1955 the Russian leaders stressed

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 11 -

the same theme. Bulganin told the Indian Parliament: "The main aspect of our time is the deep change in the political situation of Asian and all Eastern nations. A great political process of the awakening of nations of the East to an active political life is taking place... This will exert an immense influence on the whole of international life." Both men constantly appealed to local patriotic emotions, harping on memories of colonial times, endorsing true or synthetic resentments against the western powers, and exploiting race problems.

In Burma, Khrushchev said: "Foreign colonizers sat on your necks for many decades and robbed your country. They say they did it to raise the level of the Burmese civilization." Referring to "the colonizers who believe that their white skin gives them the right to rule over those who are dark-skinned,"

Khrushchev added, "Are not the Burmese as gifted as the Russians or the Englishmen? Nations are not divided into gifted and incapable. If one provides them with equal opportunities, all of them will have success in their development."

Through such motifs as these the Communist leaders have made their most seductive appeals and have most effectively won the interested attention of their listeners. And it has been our mistake to envisage the contest in the incomplete framework of a struggle between capitalism vs. Marxism. The main attraction of Communism in the underdeveloped countries does not lie in overt propaganda about Marxist objectives. For the Communists have learned what we have not yet learned; that the political behavior of most people in the underdeveloped countries is determined less by reasoned judgments of policy, than by their identification with personal and social relationships. The Communists

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 12 -

base their appeals on the quest for a "sense of belonging" on the part of people who have lost their roots in an erratically changing world, who have turned their backs on the social patterns of their forefathers, but who have not yet found their place in the newly emergent world of today. Restless and ambitious, excluded on the one hand from the society (and hence the politics) of the western elite, and on the other hand adrift from the social bonds and traditions of the past, they are susceptible to Communism as a haven or way of life through which they may be able to move into the modern world.

It is highly significant that in recent years--since the end of the Korean war and the war in French Indo-China--the Communists have abandoned violence and insurrection in favor of subtler strategies -- i.e. encouraging tendencies toward neutralism, and discouraging the development of stronger ties with the United Nations. Formal sanction of this approach was given by the 20th Congress of the U.S.S.R. in 1956, which enunciated the novel doctrine that a socialist revolution could be realized through popular elections. Although local Communist parties had participated in elections throughout the world for many years, it had never previously been an accepted tenet of either the Leninist or Stalinist exegesis that a real revolution could result from the "game" of parliamentary democracy. This shift in direction may well have been a consequence of the Russian realization of the nuclear stalemate. In any event they embarked on a new and energetic offensive in the underdeveloped and uncommitted countries which swiftly broke the western monopoly on the provision of economic and technical aid, and in so doing launched a war of attrition to

[Lc]

November 6, 1957

- 13 -

weaken one of the main advantages we still have -- namely, our structure of overseas bases.

Having no allies among the colonial powers, Soviet Russia has had complete freedom in wooing the underdeveloped countries by espousing their anti-colonial claims. America, on the other hand, has encountered serious problems in trying to win the allegiance of these nations by reason of our long traditional friendship with the British, French and Dutch whose now dismembered empires still loom in the memories of the newly-independent populations as symbols of an iniquitous and happily defunct system of exploitation. Because of this factor and our preoccupation with the more immediate conflict in Europe, we were slow to appreciate the full implications of the evolving situation in Southeast Asia, Africa and the Near East, with its insistence on immediate and total independence. Giving priority to rebuilding the economic strength of our western allies, we were reluctant to exert pressure in the direction of any revision of their overseas empires. It was only after the unmistakable emergence of Red China as the dominant, dynamic power on the mainland of Asia that we began to think in terms of a comprehensive defense system against further Communist expansion in the eastern hemisphere. The year 1954 was the turning point in our attitude. The collapse of the French in Indo-China led to a rapid increase in our military, political and economic commitments throughout the entire area.

Although our objectives are still not clearly defined, certain main lines of policy can be discerned. From the military standpoint, our primary objective

[LC]

November 6, 1957

- 14 -

has been to prevent the conquest, either by overt aggression or internal sub-
version, of the Eurasian continent by a power hostile to America. For if unified
and industrially organized into an antagonistic entity, this vast area, with its
enormous populations, would certainly be capable of overwhelming the western
world. Quite apart from this ultimate threat, the nations of Eurasia have high
importance in the calculus of power today. The oil reserves of the Middle East
are paramount in international thought. The rice areas of Southeast Asia cannot
be overlooked in any economic picture of a continent chronically short of
adequate food supplies. The loss of Southeast Asia would deprive the Western
world and Japan of vital markets. And strategically the region lies athwart the
main lines of communication between Europe and the Pacific. Its dominance by
a hostile power would cut the world in two.

IV

By the same token, the continent of Africa has assumed an importance
in international affairs scarcely dreamed of before 1939. It has been difficult
for the west to realize that this vast, relatively empty continent, which was so
long regarded as a proper preserve for European colonialism is now gradually
assuming its place as an independent projector of political power. Its popula-
tion of 170 million people is quantitatively equivalent to that of the U.S., or
of the U.S.S.R., or of the combined nations of Southeast Asia. The introduc-
tion of new crops and methods of modern technology into a continent where 90
percent of the people are still dependent on agriculture for their livelihood has

[Lc]

November 6, 1957

- 15 -

helped to lift its inhabitants above mere subsistence levels for the first time in history. New roads have pushed into the interior; new cities have sprung up on the coasts. The spread of education has imparted to ever-increasing numbers of Africans not only technical knowledge but an awareness of their ability to manage their own political affairs. Nationalism and the demand for self-government have grown with economic prosperity. Economic development has produced far-reaching transformations in the social structure. Older concepts of tribal or communal relationships have given way to the individualistic structure of modern capitalism.

Like the revolutions in Asia, the political awakening of Africa has had a profound influence on our overall political perspectives. In the past we had never had any specific interest in the African continent save indirectly as an aggregate of colonial dominions of Europe. But the political upheavals of recent years plus the evident interest of Russia in the future of colonial Africa have combined to impress on us the realization that we can no longer stand by as an interested if somewhat confused observer. The Soviets have made it reasonably clear that they are prepared to take advantage of any opportunity afforded by nationalist agitation to further their own interests, and they have already made overtures in the direction of former colonies which have recently attained an independent status. One of our crucial aims, therefore, is to prevent the inevitable future struggles for liberation in Africa from leaving behind a legacy of bitterness against the western powers so powerful that the newly independent states will join forces with the Sino-Soviet bloc and their allies

[LC]

November 6, 1957

- 16 -

in the East. And here, more than in Asia, the racial policies and attitudes of
the United States may prove the most important factor.

In South Africa the white community is outnumbered by the native Negro
population by a ratio of approximately four to one. In Central Africa the ratio
of whites to Negroes is approximately thirty-three to one. In both areas the
white residents are determined to hold fast. But there is a basic difference in
approach. In South Africa the white man is uncompromising in his refusal to
relinquish one iota of political power. In Central Africa the white community
accepts the fact that over a period of time -- perhaps in the next century or
two, a policy of multi-racial partnership must emerge. The eventual resolution
of tension will be a protracted and perhaps agonizing or violent process in both
areas. But one thing is certain -- that here -- to a greater degree than in Asia
or anywhere else in the world -- the upsurge of nationalism, the revolt against
existing standards of living, and the drive toward universal acknowledgement
of the individual's right to freedom and dignity, cannot be slowed, diverted or
altered in any degree by mere technical assistance or economic aid. The
crucial dilemma here is the race question; and it can be resolved only by a
fundamental change in the attitude of the white man toward his millions of
fellows with pigmented skins. It is a problem which we must eventually face,
both in foreign policy and at home. Indeed one of the most important things
which America can do in the realm of international relations is to demonstrate
our devotion to the democratic and ethical values we proclaim by swift and

[LC]

November 6, 1957

- 17 -

forthright action with respect to the Negro in the American South. Testimony to this effect is abundant in reports submitted by foreign service officials the world around. An American consul in one of the newly independent countries of Africa related recently that at the end of a conference with respect to shipments of American arms, an official of the local government said, "Tell me something. Do you suppose you and I could dine together in Little Rock?"

V

There are many respects in which we have failed to read correctly the new chapter of history which is being written in all of the once overlooked areas of the world. It was not long ago that we first began to appreciate the importance of the Latin American nations as equal partners and collaborators of the United States in the preservation of peace and in furthering the progress and prosperity of mankind. Now it is equally evident that the countries of South and Southeast Asia will increasingly influence the course of world events, both individually and collectively. It is, indeed, quite possible that we are in the midst of an "Asian era," which in the next decade will come to flower.

Our errors have been numerous. Intimately connected with our unfortunate myopia on race matters, is our abysmal lack of knowledge concerning the past history, culture and civilization of great areas which flourished for centuries before the awakening of the west. We have tended to think of their people as "natives" -- in the disparaging colonial connotation -- and hence

[Lc]

November 6, 1957

- 18 -

inferior. In consequence most Americans were surprised, when they succeeded
in attaining independence, by the vehemence of their nationalism, the vigor
of their demands for equality in the family of nations, and their determination
to steer an independent course. We were surprised because we knew nothing
about them. And to this day there is a deplorable lack of qualified personnel
in our government service with a broad knowledge of the language, culture and
history of these nations, or even of the requisite understanding and sympathy
that generate confidence and good will.

In view of these shortcomings our attempts at propaganda -- which has
consisted in great measure of anti-Communist booklets, posters, lectures and
broadcasts -- have done little to counteract that of the Communists themselves.
While our efforts have sometimes engendered only boredom, confusion or
indifference, the continually reiterated Communist support of the local peoples
in their struggle to throw off colonial rule has made a profound impression. It
has gone far to convince them that the Communist countries best understand
the grievances and injustices of Asia. Unhappily it appears today to hundreds
of millions of Asians -- and perhaps to Africans tomorrow - that we have failed
as champions of justice, and that it is the Communists, against whom we
constantly inveigh, who are upholding the principles of liberty, equality and
self-determination.

It would be unfair, however, to attribute our mistakes altogether, or
even in preponderant measure, to insensitivity or ignorance. They stem in
great degree from the undeniable fact that our cultural, economic and historic

[L]

November 6, 1957

- 19 -

ties are most closely knitted with Europe and in particular Great Britain and the other English-speaking nations of the world with whom we share a common language and common traditions. There is no question that our foreign policy has been based on the attempt to build up the defenses of Europe through NATO and to strengthen the economy of those nations which have seemed all important as bastions of democracy and freedom. It is for this reason that a conflicting dualism has characterized our relations with the underdeveloped countries.

We have endeavored to manifest friendship toward them; at the same time we have not wished to offend our allies, the colonial powers. It is important to realize, however, that our support of the western powers on certain colonial issues has not stemmed solely from traditional friendship, but also from the fear that if we fail to support them they may collapse and thus lay open the citadel of western Europe to Soviet Russia and her satellites.

It is here that our most crucial dilemma lies. For the fear is genuine, and the possibility of its realization is actual. At the same time we are faced with a historic trend which is everywhere being manifested by the disintegration of the system of empire and the lowering of the curtain on the whole colonial era. In attempting to meet this trend we have not adapted our policies to the deep transformations involved. On the contrary we have attempted to employ the same ideas and implements we have used in the western hemisphere -- i.e. to build a defensive ring to contain further Communist expansion. But SEATO has not proved as successful as NATO; it has not attracted the majority of the Southeast countries nor proved to be the anti-Communist magnet

[L]

Rought Draft Chapter VII - Overall Report

November 6, 1957

- 20 -

envisaged by its architects. While Thailand and South Vietnam support the
Manila Pact (of September 8, 1954), Burma and Indonesia have opposed it;
Cambodia and Laos have indicated that they would rather dispense with SEATO's
"protective umbrella"; and India has been openly hostile to SEATO. Their
attitudes are understandable. The mere fact that Great Britain and France,
former colonial masters, are members of SEATO, and that the West originally
conceived and now dominates the alliance, explains their suspicion and dislike
of the organization.

To generalize: it is clear that the system of defensive military pacts
which has been such a vital factor in our European policy is not suited to the
nationalistic, anti-colonial and sensitive people of the newly-independent
lands. Their desire to avoid entangling military alliances and to pursue an
independent course is obvious and strong. It is rather curious, in view of our
own historic tradition of non-involvement in the struggles of foreign nations,
formulated when America was young and weak and faithfully followed for a
century and a half, that we have been unable to understand and respect the
feelings of the new nations in their present stage of development. Although
the task of winning the friendship and good will of the underdeveloped nations,
particularly those of Southeast Asia, involves immense complexities and
scrupulous delicacy of approach, one thing is certain -- that the approach
must not be a purely negative one based solely on defense against Communism.

The question then arises: in what way can we develop and expand
those relationships which hold the greatest promise of winning the allegiance

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 21 -

of the new nations? It is very evident that the principal preoccupation of
these countries centers around economic development. Having achieved
independence, they are still faced with gigantic problems of creating modern,
effective political institutions and of achieving a new social synthesis -- and
both of these problems they feel may be solved by first developing their back-
ward economies. They foresee the possibility of progress in every area of
human life through the building of more schools, more hospitals, more factories.
Industrialization and production have become their transcendent and immediate
ambitions. Lacking capital, lacking technical knowledge, and lacking skilled
manpower, they need outside assistance to realize these ambitions. It there-
fore becomes a basic interest of the United States to encourage and foster the
economic development of these countries, and in so doing help them evolve
into stable, free and progressive national entities, determined to resist all
pressures from without and the danger of subversion from within.

The concept of aiding free nations to develop and strengthen their
economies in order to remain free and independent is a sound one that accrues
not only to their best interests but also to our own. It is perhaps one of the
best possible antidotes to Communist activities. But it also involves tact and
sensitivity in application. For it has become very clear recently that however
much the underdeveloped nations desire capital, technical guidance and other
forms of economic aid, they want it on their own terms, without strings attached.
And it has also become clear that our programs of economic aid, under Point Four,
have not won us the measure of good will and friendship we desired. Nor have

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 22 -

they proved effective in forestalling the shrewd and successful countermeasures employed by our Communist rivals.

VI

A number of specific criticisms have been levelled at the American aid programs in recent months, and the criticisms have come from both hemispheres. It has been said that our assistance has been more military than economic; that it is too much unilateral or bilateral rather than multilateral or international; that it has been too much fettered by political provisos and stipulations; that it has failed to reach the common people; that we have controlled our bequests too rigidly and thus caused resentment; that we have controlled them too little and thereby caused waste and graft; and finally, that we have subjected ourselves to a kind of extortion by any country that wishes to be compensated for renouncing association with the Communist bloc.

There are other shortcomings that may be noted. Recurrently our efforts to render scientific and technical aid to the underdeveloped countries have been delayed by dilatory action in Congress, soured by the annual uncertainty concerning appropriations, and vitiated by slow and faulty execution in the field. Of these unhappy circumstances, the last has proved the most serious. For, however virtuous our motives, the ultimate dispensation of our bounty by a crew of impatient American technicians, intolerant of inefficiency, ignorant of the local language, openly critical of their living conditions, ostentatious with money, and contemptuous of the local population, has repeatedly served

[L]

November 6, 1957

- 23 -

not only to generate ill will and antagonism but, in the case of Burma,
resulted in the rejection of further U.S. aid.

As a consequence of these tactical errors many of the newly independent
nations have come to look on our whole operation as a self-centered, anti-
Soviet effort devoid of any genuine interest in the economic growth of their
countries or the welfare of their people. Worse still, these unhappy reactions
have been seized on by the Communists and aggravated by skillful propaganda
which urged the Asians to beware of us as new and incipient colonial masters.
It has become obvious, therefore, that we cannot win friends or cement durable
alliances with dollars alone. For the new nations of Asia are extremely sensi-
tive to the idea of dependence and well aware of the difference between true
friendship and a desire for popularity. Any aspiration we may entertain toward
popularity is indeed a futile one -- impeded by the gulf between our wealth and
their poverty, our clearly demonstrated belief in the superiority of white skin,
and our identification with colonialism, imperialism and the exploitation of
underdeveloped areas. Finally, it must be said that no American aid program
of moderate size -- say from $500 million to $5 billion a year -- for the coun-
tries of Asia and Africa could directly raise standards of living sufficiently to
eliminate the discontent, agitation and social disruption that now threaten the
stability of those areas.

One may inquire, therefore, what are the ultimate objectives of an
American aid program? Is the giving of aid a humanitarian activity which asks

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 24 -

no gratitude, or an act of political self-interest which coldly evaluates potential political profits? Perhaps it embodies a bit of both these elements. The long-range purpose of American aid is to encourage the people of these new countries to develop confidence in their own ability to evolve economically, while at the same time maintaining the independence and freedom of their people. Our immediate aim is to initiate some kind of cumulative process that will lead them ultimately to self-sufficiency on the basis of their own resources. The question is not one of sharing our income in order to alleviate discontent, but rather of investing a portion of our income in a process of development that can eventually sustain itself on its own momentum. The way in which our assistance is administered will determine whether this process will be orderly, gradual, stable, and constructive, or alternatively violent, repressive, escapist and politically explosive. It can effect the difference between hope and hopelessness. Although it can ease existing problems, on the other hand it can make them more difficult.

Quite apart from difficulties already discussed, one of the major hazards confronting the newly independent nations derives from their own internal pressures. All of them are in the throes of the revolution of rising expectations. All are impelled by strong political and economic forces within themselves to industrialize as swiftly as possible. Their population is increasing so explosively that substantial economic growth is necessary to keep living standards from falling, and extremely rapid development is required to

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 25 -

effect the improvements which they all demand. All are convinced that industrialization is the prerequisite of economic and political independence.

It is here that another question arises with respect to the premises of the American aid program. Against the argument that economic development will lead to stability and independence, stands the counterargument that rapid industrialization is more likely to contribute to social and political instability and discontent. For industrialization raises the aspirations of workers, breaks down traditional social structures, and superimposes new systems of relationships between man and man. As people earn more, they desire more. An old apothegm states, "An adequate standard of living for any person is 25 per cent more than he has." Moreover industrial development requires educational expansion to supply the skilled labor and trained supervisory and managerial personnel needed to operate modern machinery and technical equipment. Both demand changes in pre-existing attitudes, customs and folkways. By no means opiates, education and industrialization are strong stimulants of man's desire for more.

For these reasons it seems evident that the industrialization of the underdeveloped countries provides per se no certain bulwark against the inroads of Communism. If anything, it makes them more receptive to outside agitation. While affording greater opportunities to the people, it does not automatically afford them greater freedom. On the contrary, it may lead to suppression of workers by authoritarian regimes. Even if successful, swift

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 26 -

economic development can be an unsettling process. If it meets with failure
it may render a country more vulnerable to Communist influences than one
which remains economically stagnant.

VII

Perhaps the gravest problem presented by the industrialization of the
underdeveloped countries is their present unawareness of the long-range
necessity of developing high-level manpower. Eager to build dams, power
plants, roads and factories with maximum speed, they fail to realize that the
money invested in such material symbols may be wasted if they neglect to
make correspondingly large-scale investments in the education of the kind of
people which modern technology demands. Some of the more rampantly
nationalistic countries are impatient to evict foreign managers and advisors
before they have developed the means to replace them. And in their haste
to draft labor, discipline is often enforced by repressive measures, training
programs are drastically curtailed, safety precautions are disregarded, and
human rights generally ignored. As of today it appears an unlikely prospect
that the economic growth of the underdeveloped countries will be accompanied
by the early emergence of any real industrial democracy.

It is in this area, however, that we may be able to render our greatest
assistance. For the new countries are not only compelled to purchase their
machinery and equipment from the advanced countries, but to import foreign
specialists to put their plants in operation. In addition to technicians,

[lc]

November 6, 1957

- 27 -

managerial experts are provided under the aid programs of the United Nations and the United States. From the strictly technological standpoint it makes little difference whether the new countries purchase their machinery and obtain their technological knowledge from the democratic nations or from the totalitarian bloc. The critical issue is the extent to which the advanced countries, in exporting their machinery and industrial techniques, also export ideas which may influence the growth of social and political institutions in the newly developing lands. As late-comers to industrialization, the new countries can choose from competing philosophies. From the U.S. they can learn about free unions and collective bargaining; from the Soviet Union they can learn about the use of unions as instruments of a totalitarian system.

It would be foolish for us, therefore, to assume that the interests of the free world will be automatically served by the industrialization and economic development of backward countries. We would be doing ourselves and our democratic allies a disservice to help a nation increase its productivity if in the process the freedom and dignity of human beings were disregarded, liberty suppressed and working people enslaved. Our interests in the underdeveloped countries extend far deeper than the superficial ends of preventing the spread of Communism or retaining access to raw materials.

America's greatest achievement at home has been its development of an industrial system which -- quite apart from material triumphs -- has enhanced the worth and freedom of man. Our concern is clear: to use our economic aid and technical assistance as the means of encouraging a kind of growth consistent with the democratic and humanitarian values of the free world.