FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 18, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Tokyo, Japan)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

HOTEL OKURA

AT 3:53 P.M. JAPAN TIME

MR. NESSEN: For a briefing on today's meeting between the President and the Prime Minister, we have Secretary Kissinger. He has another appointment this afternoon and we would like to limit the briefing to 20 minutes. And when the Secretary leaves, I will attempt to answer your other more general questions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen: I will confine myself to the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister this morning which was attended by the two Foreign Ministers and two other individuals on each side.

We concentrated in this initial meeting first on stressing the great importance that the United States attaches to its relationship with Japan for peace in the Pacific, peace in the world, and for the economic progress of our two countries as well as of all other countries.

This led to a discussion of two related questions -- the problem of food and the problem of energy. With respect to the problem of food, the President pointed out the interest that the United States has in an orderly, long-term evolution of world agricultural policy as we have presented it at the World Food Conference, and in this context he assured the Prime Minister that Japan could count on a stable level of supplies of agricultural supplies from the United States.

There were further discussions on agricultural issues, and it was agreed that they would be continued tomorrow when the President and the Prime Minister met again.

With respect to the problem of energy, the President stressed to the Prime Minister the importance the United States attaches to the program that we outlined last week of solidarity among the consumers.

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He made very clear that this is not intended
in any sense to lead to any confrontation with the
producers but rather to pave the way for a constructive
dialogue between consumers and producers for the
common benefit of both.

The Japanese side explained the special
problems of Japan in terms of its heavy dependence on
imported oil and the difference in the proportion of
the consumption of energy between the United States
and Japan in that Japan consumes about 70 percent. of
its oil for industrial consumption and only 30 percent
for personal use, while in the United States the opposite
percentage obtains, so that the margin for reductions
in consumption in Japan is more limited than in the
United States. But within that framework the Japanese
point of view was one that seemed to us sympathetic to
our general approach, and we pointed out that we would
put more emphasis on the development of alternative
sources and that we would share the results of research
and development and technological innovation with
Japan with respect to the new sources of energy.

There was a general recognition that Japan
and the United States should cooperate on the usual
matters of bilateral relations, but also on the whole
area of stability of international affairs and progress
towards peace.

The discussions on all of these items as
well as others will be continued tomorrow morning when
the President, the Prime Minister, and their advisers
will meet again.

I will be glad to take questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, were the Japanese
sympathetic to your specific proposal in Chicago about
the reduction of importing oil, or did their situation
preclude that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we did not have a
chance this morning to go into every aspect of my
proposal. I think that first of all my specific proposal
was that the importation of oil should be kept level
through a combination of measures of conservation and
the development of new sources of energy.

It may be that the mix in Japan between
conservation and development of new sources has to be
different than in the United States. And as far as
the United States is concerned, we do not feel that
exactly the same formula or exactly the same percentage
has to be applied to every country, but that rather there
must be understanding for the particular situation of each
country.

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I would say that there was sympathy to the
general approach and that we will have to work out in
subsequent discussions the particular manner in which
it can be implemented for each country.

Q Mr. Secretary, did your statement to the Japanese indicating they could count on a stable level of agricultural products indicate that Japan is going to have a special position in America's agricultural export market?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As we attempted to make clear at the World Food Conference, we believe that the whole problem of world agriculture has to be approached on a more systematic and planned basis, and the various proposals we make there, some of which got lost in the debate about food aid -- the various proposals that we made there were all designed to assure a stable level of expectations and a more careful systematic approach on an overall basis.

Now on the one hand we, of course, have a free market for agricultural products. On the other hand, we have set up a system which amounts to some voluntary allocations by the contacts between our major companies and the Department of Agriculture.

So without using the word "preferred", I think one can say that the President indicated that the United States insofar as it is within our power of the Government--and the Government will have a considerable voice in it--will see to it that Japan can count on a stable level of ~~implements~~ imports.

Q Dr. Kissinger, will the Japanese agree to import American beef -- or was that discussed?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That question was discussed, yes.

Q What was the conclusion? Were there any indications they might agree to let American meat enter their country?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I don't want to speak for the Japanese Government, but my impression was that the President's point will be taken very seriously.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, does not the promise of a stable supply of U.S. agricultural products mean that we will not resort to putting off imports in order to curb rising food prices as we did with soybeans in 1973 and wheat?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, as you know, we have asked major importers from the United States to give us some indication of their requirements over a period towards which we can plan. It does mean that under foreseeable circumstances we will not impose export control.

But we would like to have an informal arrangement with the key importers in which we can have some idea of their requirements over a period of time. This is not a major problem with Japan with which we have a very satisfactory relationship in this respect.

Q Was Korea (Inaudible)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have not yet had a chance to discuss the problem of Korea except in the context of our general desire to maintain peace and stability in the area. This is a subject which, if it comes up, will be discussed in greater detail tomorrow.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you had a chance to discuss China and/or the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There has been a discussion by the President of his meeting with the General Secretary in Vladivostok, and his general approach towards detente and also the connection between our friendship with Japan and the general approach to the Soviet Union.

There has only been a general reference to the relationships with the People's Republic of China. It was agreed, however, that I would stop in Tokyo on my return from Peking to brief the Japanese Government about my meetings in Peking.

Q Can you tell us what is on your agenda with your meeting tonight with the Finance Minister?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Finance Minister was an old friend with whom I worked closely in his previous portfolio. He requested the meeting and it does not have any fixed agenda, but I would assume that we will discuss some of the problems of energy and food and any other subject that he may wish to raise.

But I would expect those two to be the principal items.

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Q Mr. Secretary, on the matter of the
ratio of consumption for industrial versus private
use of fuel, did Prime Minister Tanaka make any
suggestions to President Ford of the possibility of
reducing U.S. consumption in its proportion or ratio?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the goals of
consumption restraint in the United States were
publicly stated by the President in October. They
were reaffirmed by me at the request of the President
in my speech last Thursday. They state both the
restraint on consumption for the next year and the
overall restraints on imports and the development of
new sources of energy over the next ten years.

The President has made clear that these
consumption restraints will be met either by voluntary
action or by other action. There was no discussion of
how this relates at this time to any measures that
other countries would take.

We will, however, have technical discussions
with Japan within the next month to go into the details
of the implications of our proposal and how it could
be put on a multilateral basis.

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Q Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion of
the nuclear controversy or security treaty in general?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was a discussion of
the nuclear problem. The President expressed his understanding
for the special sensitivities of Japan with regard to this
matter. It was agreed that the nuclear issue would be
handled as it has been handled throughout within the frame-
work of the Mutual Security Treaty and that any special
problems in connection with it would be handled on the
basis of bilateral discussions between Foreign Minister
Kimura and myself, and within the framework of American
understanding for the special sensitivities of Japan
with respect to this issue.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you discuss resumed
fighting in the Middle East and did you discuss with the
Japanese your plan for a step-by-step negotiation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have not, first of all,
as I pointed out in Washington before we left, we do not
expect renewed fighting in the Middle East in the immediate
future. We did not yet have an opportunity to go into
detail on the evolution of the negotiations in the Middle
East. There will be a meeting, of course, again between the
Prime Minister and the President tomorrow morning and my
associates and I will be meeting with the Foreign Minister
for several hours in the afternoon and I am certain that by
the end of the day these issues will have been discussed.

Q Mr. Secretary, even though you did not go
into detail, has Japan begun to make any form of a request
for the way that the diplomacy in the Middle East is
to be conducted?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am having trouble hearing
you, Barry.

Q I am sorry. With regard to Japan's need
for oil and their interest in the Middle East, have they
begun to lodge a special appeal with you as to how that
diplomacy should be conducted?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

Q Mr. Secretary, did the President invite the
Emperor to the United States in the near future?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President extended an
invitation to His Majesty to visit the United States
for 1975 and we are pleased to report that this invitation
has been accepted. We look forward to this visit.

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Q Mr. Secretary, I did not quite understand. On the nuclear issue, you mean it has been brought up by the Japanese as a problem?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think I made clear that the issue has been, as I explained, the special sensitivities of Japan with respect to nuclear weapons and then I have explained our reaction.

Q Mr. Secretary, what did the President say about Vladivostok and China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President and the Prime Minister discussed the role of detente in current diplomacy and how we believe that our relations with the Soviet Union, as well as the People's Republic of China, can contribute to stability in the Pacific area. We also stressed, however, that the close friendship between Japan and the United States was one of the prerequisites for the effectiveness of this policy and he gave the Prime Minister a brief preview of the subjects likely to be discussed in Vladivostok.

Q Mr. Secretary, you said that the President had told the Prime Minister about our own program for restricting our own oil consumption through voluntary and other means. Did the President indicate that we would be going to involuntary means shortly?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Excuse me, Mr. Elfin. I did not say that the President explained our program. The question to which I replied was whether we would allocate consumption restraints on the basis of the relative personal users and I said that our overall program of consumption restraints, of import restraints involved both restraint on consumption as well as the development of new sources, that with respect to that, the American goal for consumption restraint had been publicly stated. It was not, as a matter of fact, repeated to the Prime Minister because it is well known. And I pointed out that the President is committed to achieving these restraints on consumption for next year, and on imports over a 10-year period through a combination of consumption restraints and new sources and that he will achieve it either through voluntary restraints or through other measures that have not yet been decided upon.

I am afraid I can take only one more question because I have to meet Ex-Prime Minister Sato.

Q Mr. Secretary, I have a question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I will take two, then. This gentleman and you.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, in connection with the
sources of energy for Japan and the United States, was there
any discussion of the Siberian oil fields and possible
development? Was that reviewed in any way?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is one of the issues
which we expect to discuss before we leave here. It has
not, as yet, come out but we are prepared to discuss it.

Q What are we prepared to say?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will discuss it at the
briefing after our meeting.

Q Mr. Secretary, in connection with the nuclear
question, and your sensitivity to the Japanese sensitivity
since their introduction of nuclear weapons, did you assure
the Japanese that we have never, and would never, intro-
duce nuclear weapons even in a transit situation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I will not go beyond
what I have said. The question of nuclear weapons
will be discussed within the context of the Mutual
Security Treaty and it will be handled as it has been
handled within that framework.

I am afraid I must turn it over to Ron Nessen.
Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END (AT 4:08 P.M. Japan Time)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1974

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE

11 OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

HOTEL OKURA

5:25 P.M. (JAPAN TIME)

MR. NESSIN: Ladies and gentlemen, as we promised for the report on today's meeting with the Prime Minister and the President and on the final communique which has been issued, we have Dr. Kissinger. And there is a dinner tonight at the Akasaka Palace which Dr. Kissinger has to go and prepare for, so he would like to stay with you about a maximum of 30 minutes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, let me sum up the communique, the meeting of the President with the Prime Minister this morning, and the meeting between the Foreign Minister and myself this afternoon because they all cover similar topics.

First of all, let me take this occasion on behalf of everybody on the American delegation to thank the Japanese Government for the excellence of the arrangements, cordiality, the hospitality with which we have been received, and for the meticulousness of the planning.

Secondly, before I get into any of the specifics, I would like to say that perhaps the most important result of the visit-beyond any of the specifics that were discussed--has been the frankness, cordiality and completeness of our exchanges. And the reference in the communique to the fact that this first visit by the incumbent President will add a new page to the history of affinity between the two countries was put into practice in the discussions.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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The discussions today concentrated primarily in the morning on an elaboration of the review of the international situation that was begun yesterday which is based on the premise that Japan and the United States must understand each other's purposes and harmonize them in the common interest of the two countries and of world peace.

There was a review of Chinese relationships, Soviet relationships, and indeed a review of the whole world situation. There were discussions of the Middle East. Foreign Minister Kimura told us about his meetings with the Egyptian leaders on his recent trip and we exchanged views as to the prospects of peace in the Middle East. And we believe that there are possibilities for hopeful negotiations.

But there was a general understanding that security in the present age cannot be confined to military matters, but that the cooperation between Japan and the United States in the field of energy, in the field of food, represent a new and positive dimension of the security which must be added to this already established military security--traditional security--relationship.

There was, as I have pointed out, an exchange of views in which the Japanese told us about developments in the Far East, exchanges in September on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly and Japanese and Chinese relationships, and we did the same with respect to U.S.-Chinese relationships.

Of course, as you know, at the request of the President, I am returning here after the trip to Vladivostok and after my visit to Peking to brief the Japanese leaders about those developments.

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We consider the exchanges here to have been of an extraordinarily useful and important character and they lay the basis for a new era of partnership between Japan and the United States.

Now, I will be glad to answer your questions.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the results of the visit exceeded the expectations of the President, and if so, in what specific ways?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would say that the results of the visit achieved perhaps the optimum of what one had hoped for. We have always attached the greatest importance to the friendship between Japan and the United States.

One can never, in advance of any visit or any exchange of views, predict how intense and how far-ranging the exchange will actually be. But I would say this exchange has been as candid, as frank and as constructive as any I have attended since I have been in Washington and has had the most positive results.

Q: Are there any specific results you can cite?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that the approach that was taken to the question of energy, the question of food, to the realization of the interdependence of the present world economy and world political structure was of very considerable scope.

Q: Mr. Secretary, were your meetings with officials other than the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister -- specifically the International Trade Minister and Mr. Ohira -- designed to determine in any way whether Japanese policy would continue as it is regardless of what happened?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The meeting with Finance Minister Ohira and Minister Nakasone were at the request of those two Ministers and they were not initiated by us. They were, however, natural requests. The Finance Minister, as you know, was Foreign Minister until August, and I worked closely with him until that time.

We established a very close working relationship and, of course, the problem of energy and food has implications also for finance.

Minister Nakasone was a student of mine at Harvard and I have never been in Japan without having seen him and it would have been unnatural for me to refuse to see him when he suggested a meeting.

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In other words, the meetings were in no way
designed to deal with the Japanese domestic situation
or to gain any particular reassurances. We believe the
Japanese policy is likely to remain stable.

Peter?

Q: Was the Japanese Foreign Minister speaking about the prospects of a peaceful negotiation in the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the Japanese Foreign Minister ought to speak for himself and he, of course, visited in the Middle East only Cairo.

As far as I am concerned, I don't know if sanguine is exactly the right word. I have indicated that I believe there are possibilities for a step-by-step approach. I recognize that the situation in the Middle East is extremely complicated and that there are many issues involved.

I do believe, however, that with the determination and the good will, there are possibilities for progress in the Middle East and I think the Japanese Foreign Minister should speak for himself, though I did not have the impression that he disagreed with my views.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you seek a specific commitment from the Japanese Government to participate in the financial safety net and, if so, what was the Government's reaction?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We did not go into the detail of every individual measure that I have proposed. We discussed, in general terms, the importance of consumer cooperation along the lines of my speech and of a dialogue that would grow out of this with the producer.

We will have further discussions on the individual measures and on the implementation of the program, but I had the impression that there was a general sympathy to the approach.

Q: Mr. Secretary, was there anything in Section 3 of the Communique dealing with nuclear weapons control that should be interpreted as referring to the question of transit of nuclear weapons in Japan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I discussed that subject yesterday.

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I understand, but the Communique did not refer to that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not beyond anything I have said since yesterday.

As specifically as you can, were any assurances given Japan about pooling of energy resources by the United States should there be another oil squeeze?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I must say, beginning a question as specifically as you have wounded me deeply. It is also against my professional training.

As generally as you would like.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The sharing of oil supplies is part of the emergency program that was ratified last week and that will be formally adopted this week. There were no additional commitments made.

However, the United States has made it clear that it believes that consumer solidarity is an important element in overcoming the difficulties produced by the energy crisis and that it will work closely with the Japanese Government and other interested governments in dealing with this issue on the basis of consumer solidarity and I repeat, I believe we had very fruitful and constructive exchanges on that range of issues.

Were there any additional agreements?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was no discussion on going beyond the emergency program that has just been adopted three or four days ago, so there was no reason to reach any additional agreements.

You said the United States is prepared to maintain a stable food supply to Japan. Do you contemplate being able to increase the level of supply to meet the increasing demand in Japan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER. Let me explain the United States basic approach to the food problem which we reviewed again today in some detail in my meeting with the Foreign Minister, and on which I believe there is a general agreement.

And it is an approach that got overshadowed by the debate on food aid. The United States believes that the basic problem of world food supply requires some structural adjustment. There is now in the underdeveloped countries a food shortage of about 25 million tons which will increase, may increase, to as much as 85 million tons over a decade.

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We, therefore, believe that it is important to increase agricultural production in the underdeveloped countries and to provide food reserves to cushion against emergencies.

In both of these efforts, we believe that the Japanese Government will cooperate with us, especially with respect to the underdeveloped countries which is a problem of technology. And we will have some exchanges on that subject.

To the degree that food production rises in those countries, more food supplies will also become available in the United States.¹ To answer your question specifically, we will give special attention to the needs of Japan. We will, in planning our own export, also try to do this on a more long-term basis than has been the case in the past and we will have intense consultations with Japan on what can be done to assure their needs.

Q Mr. Secretary, Japanese officials were basically sympathetic to your oil proposal. What have they learned since last Friday when they were basically unsympathetic?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was not here last Friday so I don't know what they said last Friday. I can only say what they said this week.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you had any requests for a meeting by either Mr. Fukuda or Mr. Miki, and in particular, Mr. Shima? If so, have you met them, or have you talked with them any other way?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not had a request for a meeting. I have run into Mr. Fukuda at social functions as I have also with Mr. Miki, but just to exchange a few words and neither of them requested a meeting.

Q Were there any discussions on Korea?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was just a very brief discussion about the relationship between Korean security and the security of Japan, but there was no detailed further discussions.

Helen?

Q Do you have any plans to see Le Due Tho in Peking?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

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Q When you are traveling there?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

Q In Moscow?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have no plans to see Le Duc Tho anywhere.

Q Never?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Never is a very long time, but I have no plans to see Le Duc Tho on his current trip, which I understand is to last two weeks. I read that in the newspapers. But I have no plans to meet Le Duc Tho.

Q Mr. Secretary, the President seems to spend a lot of his time in ceremonial activities here. Wasn't it an unusual sort of program?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the President spent a considerable amount of time on the bilateral talks. In addition, he spent some time on ceremonial activities which, as I explained before we came here, constitute an important element in the symbolism of the relationship and in the mood which is such an important attribute in which decisions tend to be made in this country.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why Mr. Rumefeld is accompanying you to China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When we were flying across the Pacific, Mr. Rumefeld suggested that maybe on my next trip to China I would take him along. I then said, "Well, as long as you are here this time, why don't we see whether we can still arrange it?"

I asked the President what he thought about it and the President thought it would be a good idea if his Chief of Staff had some exposure to China. The explanation is as simple as this: It was an off-the-cuff idea that occurred to us as we were crossing the Pacific. I believe it will be helpful to have the President's Chief of Staff have some exposure to China but it has no profound significance beyond this.

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Q On the nuclear issue, what kind of further understandings came out between you and the President and the Japanese leaders?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mentioned yesterday the discussions and, of course, there are always discussions within the framework -- the mutual security treaty that permits issues to be raised and, as I have said, we will take into account the very special sensitivities of the Japanese people with respect to nuclear weapons.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you talk about U.S. and Japan's general approach to Siberian development planning?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Japanese side explained to us the general approach to Siberian development planning. We are in no position to make any judgments until the trade bill and the export-import bank bill have been passed by our Congress. And therefore we will have to defer any decision and consideration of these issues until that time.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions with Japanese officials and former officials, have you made any inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic politics?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't made any inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic politics. It is impossible to have lunch with press people without being told certain things, but you must be as familiar with those as I am.

Q Mr. Secretary, the answer that the President gave in Phoenix on the subject of the PLO was a bit confusing. At one point he referred to the desirability of Israel negotiating with the parties, and another time he was saying negotiations among nations. Could you say whether the United States favors negotiations with Israel and the PLO?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think I went into that issue in detail at my press conference on Friday before we left Washington. I made clear then that the United States is not urging anybody to negotiate with anybody else, and any negotiation is, of course, up to the parties concerned. And it is our understanding that Israel has refused to negotiate with the PLO.

Q What was meant when the President said today at the Press Club, "We will not compete with our friends for their markets or for their resources." Is there a carving up of sections of the world into Japanese markets and into American markets?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think what the President had in mind is we do not look at our relationship with Japan in terms of competition but that the relationship between the industrial nations and especially between Japan and the United States in the Pacific area should be on the basis of cooperation, and that in an expanding world economy, there is sufficient place for both of us.

There is no carving up of markets that was discussed or is contemplated.

V. Mr. Secretary, do you think the make time an American President visits Japan, visits Tokyo, he could do it without having 25,000 police mobilized for his visit?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, the security arrangements for the visit of any President are, of course, up to the host government, and it is natural that they would tend to over-insure his safety.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to say further, your statement yesterday about the United States position on industrial oil consumers and their cooperation seems milder than the tone of your speech in Chicago just before you left.

Is that a correct interpretation, and if so, has the position softened as a result of talks with the Japanese?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our position is unchanged. Our position is that the industrial oil consumers have to cooperate and establish some basic principles before there can be a productive dialogue with the producers. This position has not softened. It is not a position of confrontation either, because we believe that the ultimate solution must be found on a cooperative basis.

In developing cooperation among the consumers, obviously consideration has to be given to the special circumstances of individual countries in applying these various measures that were proposed. This is what I intended to point out yesterday. But the position remains as I outlined it on Thursday.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been renewed speculation -- I know you answered this last Friday -- but there has been renewed speculation that the fact that you and the President are meeting Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok has been a source of irritation in Peking. Is there any substance to that?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have had no indication whatever from Peking directly or indirectly through any sources that have reached us that it is a source of irritation to Peking. I repeat, we have had opportunity to obtain Peking's views,

Q Mr. Secretary, on your Chicago speech, you said you had the impression the Japanese Government was sympathetic to the approach spelled out in that speech. When do you anticipate seeing some concrete evidence of that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that over the next month concrete exchanges will begin on the implementation of these ideas with various consuming countries and I think that my statement will then be proved correct.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in view of the Japanese expression yesterday of their difficulty with reducing their energy consumption by the standards you outlined in Chicago, did you give them any refinement, especially for Japan to think about over the next month or so?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it is very important to separate two things -- the basic approach and individual technical applications of it on a Presidential trip with the relatively limited amount of time that is available.

The conversations have to concentrate on the basic approach. They cannot go into the details of all the technical matters.

Secondly, as I pointed out yesterday, we did not say consumption had to be reduced by 10 percent in every country. We said that over a period of ten years, imports should be kept level by the whole group on the basis of consumption restraints and the development of new sources of energy.

The precise apportionment within the group of either consumption restraints or the bringing into being of new sources of energy has to be discussed.

I would like to remind you the same problems existed when the emergency sharing program was first proposed last February and it took about three or four months to work out all the details. This is a technically highly complex issue, but we are on the whole encouraged by the talk that took place here.

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Q. Mr. Secretary, how does the President feel about his first big foreign trip?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think he feels ex-
tremely good about it.

Q. Did he talk to you about it and say why?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He talked to me about it in the two minutes from the South Wing of the Okura to the main building and, therefore, I don't think he could give me all the refinements of his judgement in that period.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that we are going to leave Japan and go to Korea, can you tell us whether the President is going to express any degree of dissatisfaction with the degree of political oppression in South Korea?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have stated the importance that we attach to the security of South Korea. We have also, I believe, made clear our general view with respect to the form of domestic conduct we prefer but I do not want to predict now what the President will discuss in his private talks with President Park.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been considerable talk in the Defense Department over the last few years about reducing the size of U.S. troops in South Korea. Are we about to do that now, has the decision been made to do that? Is that why you are going to Korea?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are not going to South Korea in order to discuss much less to announce any reduction of forces. We are going to South Korea for the reason that I indicated before. It is an ally. It is a country whose security is important not only to the United States but also to Japan and it would have created all the wrong impressions for the President to be in Japan and not pay the visit over such a short distance to Korea.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the President and Tanaka discuss the implications of the India nuclear explosion?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not in my presence, and
I was present at all the meetings.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, I believe you did not answer the last question, which was: Are we going to reduce the troops in South Korea?

Your answer was, "We are not going to discuss, much less announce it."

But are we going to reduce?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I know of no plans. There are no plans to reduce troops in Korea.

I will take two more questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding that Israel is refusing to negotiate with PLO, Palestinians in general, or only those Palestinians who want a separate Palestinian state?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I haven't had an opportunity to learn all the refinements of the Israeli position on that point. My understanding is that they will not negotiate with the PLO and I am not familiar with any other group that labels itself Palestinian that has come forward as a candidate for negotiations.

Last question.

Q. Have you received any explanation why the Japanese Parliament hasn't yet been presented with a bill to ratify the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and are you satisfied with the explanations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Since we have not received such an explanation on this trip, I can't, obviously, express any satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it. The United States favors the ratification of the non-proliferation treaty.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 5:08 P.M. Japan Time)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

NOVEMBER 20, 1974

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

HOTEL OKURA

5:25 P.M. (JAPAN TIME)

MR. NESSEN: Ladies and gentlemen, as we promised for the report on today's meeting with the Prime Minister and the President and on the final communique which has been issued, we have Dr. Kissinger. And there is a dinner tonight at the Akasaka Palace which Dr. Kissinger has to go and prepare for, so he would like to stay with you about a maximum of 30 minutes.

Secondly, before I get into any of the specifics, I would like to say that perhaps the most important result of the visit--beyond any of the specifics that were discussed--has been the frankness, cordiality and completeness of our exchanges. And the reference in the communique to the fact that this first visit by the incumbent President will add a new page to the history of amity between the two countries was put into practice in the discussions.

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But there was a general understanding that security in the present age cannot be confined to military matters, but that the cooperation between Japan and the United States in the field of energy, in the field of food, represent a new and positive dimension of the security which must be added to this already established military security--traditional security -- relationship.

There was, as I have pointed out, an exchange of views in which the Japanese told us about developments in the latest exchanges in September on the occasion of the United Nations General Assembly and Japanese and Chinese relationships, and we did the same with respect to U.S.-Chinese relationships.

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Q Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the
results of the visit exceeded the expectations of the
President, and if so, in what specific ways?

Q Are there any specific results you can cite?

Q Mr. Secretary, were your meetings with
officials other than the Prime Minister and the Foreign
Minister -- specifically the International Trade Minister
and Mr. Ohira -- designed to determine in any way whether
Japanese policy would continue as it is regardless of
what happened?

We established a very close working relationship
and, of course, the problem of energy and food has impli-
cations also for finance.

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Peter?

Q Was the Japanese Foreign Minister sanguine about the prospects of a peaceful negotiation in the Middle East?

Q Mr. Secretary, did you seek a specific commitment from the Japanese Government to participate in the financial safety net and, if so, what was the Government's reaction?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We did not go into the
detail of every individual measure that I have proposed.
We discussed, in general terms, the importance of consumer
cooperation along the lines of my speech and of a dialogue
that would grow out of this with the producers.

Q Mr. Secretary, was there anything in Section
3 of the Communique dealing with nuclear weapons control
that should be interpreted as referring to the question
of transit of nuclear weapons in Japan?

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Q I understand, but the Communique did not refer to that.

Q As specifically as you can, were any assurances given Japan about pooling of energy resources by the United States should there be another oil squeeze?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I must say, beginning a question as specifically as you have wounds me deeply. It is also against my professorial training.

Q As generally as you would like.

Q Were there any additional agreements?

Q You said the United States is prepared to maintain a stable food supply to Japan. Do you contemplate being able to increase the level of supply to meet the increasing demand in Japan?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let me explain the United States basic approach to the food problem which we reviewed again today in some detail in my meeting with the Foreign Minister, and on which I believe there is a general agreement.

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In both of these efforts, we believe that the
Japanese Government will cooperate with us, especially
with respect to the underdeveloped countries which is
a problem of technology. And we will have some exchanges
on that subjects

To the degree that food production rises in
those countries, more food supplies will also become
available in the United States. To answer your question
specifically, we will give special attention to the
needs of Japan. We will, in planning our own export,
also try to do this on a more long-term basis than has
been the case in the past and we will have intense consul-
tations with Japan on what can be done to assure their
needs.

Q Mr. Secretary, have you had any requests for
a meeting by either Mr. Fukuda or Mr. Miki, and in
particular, Mr. Shina? If so, have you met them, or have you
talked with them any other way?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There was just a very
brief discussion about the relationship between Korean
security and the security of Japan, but there was no
detailed, further discussions.

Helen?

Q Do you have any plans to see Le Duc Tho
in Peking?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

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- 6-A -

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No.

Q In Moscow?

Q Never?

Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why Mr. Rumsfeld is accompanying you to China?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When we were flying
across the Pacific, Mr. Rumsfeld suggested that maybe on
my next trip to China I would take him along. I then
said, "Well, as long as you are here this time, why don't
we see whether we can still arrange it?"

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: I mentioned yesterday the discussions and, of course, there are always discussions within the framework -- the mutual security treaty that permits issues to be raised -- and, as I have said, we will take into account the very special sensitivities of the Japanese people with respect to nuclear weapons.

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Q Mr. Secretary, do you think the next time an American President visits Japan, visits Tokyo, he could do it without having 25,000 police mobilized for his visit?

Q Dr. Kissinger, I would like to say further, your statement yesterday about the United States position on industrial oil consumers and their cooperation seems milder than the tone of your speech in Chicago just before you left.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been renewed speculation -- I know you answered this last Friday -- but there has been renewed speculation that the fact that you and the President are meeting Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok has been a source of irritation in Peking. Is there any substance to that?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have had no indication whatever from Peking directly or indirectly through any sources that have reached us that it is a source of irritation to Peking. I repeat, we have had opportunity to obtain Peking's views.

I would like to remind you the same problems existed when the emergency sharing program was first proposed last February and it took about three or four months to work out all the details. This is a technically highly complex issue, but we are on, the whole encouraged by the talks that took place here.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: We are not going to South
Korea in order to discuss--much less to announce any
reduction of forces. We are going to South Korea for
the reason that I indicated before. It is an ally. It
is a country whose security is important not only to the
United States but also to Japan and it would have created
all the wrong impressions for the President to be in
Japan and not pay the visit over such a short distance to
Korea.

But are we going to reduce?

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Q Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding that Israel is refusing to negotiate with PLO, Palestinians in general, or only those Palestinians who want a separate Palestinian state?

Last question.

Q Have you received any explanation why the Japanese Parliament hasn't yet been presented with a bill to ratify the nuclear non-proliferation treat and are you satisfied with the explanations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Since we have not received such an explanation on this trip, I can't, obviously, express any satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it. The United States favors the ratification of the non-proliferation treat.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 5:08 P.M. Japan Time)

November 20, 1974

Statement by Secretary Henry A. Kissinger

I have just learned with shock and dismay the tragic news of the death of Darius Jhabvala. As past President of the State Department's Correspondents Association, and as one of the most regular of the regulars covering the Department, I valued Darius as an outstanding journalist and as a friend. He will be missed not only for the highest professional standards he set for himself, but also for the warmth and gentleness for which he was held in such high esteem by all of us in the Department.

Darius was a great human being. We have all lost a unique friend.

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE
UNTIL 7:00 P.M. LOCAL TIME
(4:00 A.M. EST)

NOVEMBER 24, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Vladivostok, U.S.S.R.)

THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER,
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

4:18 P.M. (U.S.S.R. Time)

MR. NESSEN: Let me have one second before the Secretary talks to you.

Let me just talk to you for one minute, please. Now, you have in your hands the Joint Statement. There is going to be one other longer document which is the Joint Communique. The Joint Statement is the important document and it is the one that Secretary Kissinger will talk to you from. You will get the Joint Communique very shortly, as soon as we can finish running it off and stapling it and passing it out.

Both of these statements are for 7:00 p.m., local time, release. Dr. Kissinger's remarks are also for 7:00 p.m. local time release.

Now, if you want to take just a moment to look through it and then Dr. Kissinger will talk to you.

All right. Are we clear now on what is happening? Both pieces of paper plus the Secretary's remarks are for release at 7:00 tonight local time.

Q Filing?

MR. NESSEN: We have a lot of events yet to go. I will tell you about that later.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If you are all through with reading the Joint Statement, let me deal with that. There is also a communique which we will distribute and if it should not be finished by the time when I get through with the Joint Statement, I will talk from it.

The Joint Statement, in our judgment, marks the breakthrough with the SALT negotiations that we have sought to achieve in recent years and produces a very strong possibility of agreement, to be signed in 1975.

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Perhaps the best way to talk about it would be to go back to the history of the negotiations, starting with the summit in July and the conclusion of the discussions since then, in relation to some specific issues before us.

In all of the discussion on SALT, there is the problem of aggregate numbers and then there is the problem of the numbers of weapons with certain special characteristics such as MIRVs. And finally, there is the problem of duration of the agreement.

In July, we were talking about an extension of the interim agreement for a period of two to three years and we attempted to compensate for the inequality of numbers in the interim agreement by negotiating a differential in our favor of missiles with multiple warheads.

This negotiation was making some progress, but it was very difficult to establish a relationship between aggregate numbers. It would be an advantage on aggregate numbers on one side and an advantage in multiple warheads on the other, all the more so as we were talking about a time period between 1974 and at the end of 1979 during which various new programs of both sides were going into production at the precise moment that the agreement would have lapsed. That is to say, the United States was developing the Trident and the B-1, both of which will be deployed in the period after 1979 and the Soviet MIRV development would really not reach its full evolution until the period 1978 to 1979.

In other words, while we were negotiating the 5-year agreement we became extremely conscious of the fact that it would lapse at the moment that both sides would have the greatest concern about the weapons programs of the other. And this was the origin of the 10-year proposal and the negotiation for a 10-year agreement that emerged out of the July summit.

No preparatory work of any significance could be undertaken in July on the summit, so that when President Ford came into office, the preparations for a 10-year agreement started practically from scratch.

Now, in a period of 10 years, the problem of numbers has a different significance than in the shorter period because over that period of time, one would have to account, really, for two deployments of a cycle that is usually a 5-year effort. And also, inequalities that might be bearable for either side in a 5-year period would become much more difficult if they were trying over a 10-year period.

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