AMS 32

INDOCHINA-TALKS (SCHEDULED)

BY GILBERT SEDBON

PARIS, MAY 5, REUTER--DR. HENRY KISSINGER, PRESIDENT NIXONS CLOSE ADVISER, IS EXPECTED BACK IN PARIS FOR ANOTHER ROUND OF SECRET TALKS WITH HANOI SENIOR POLITBURO MEMBER LE DUC THO DESPITE THE DRAMATIC BREAKDOWN OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE NEGOTIATIONS ON VIETNAM, DIPLOMATIC SOURCES SAID TODAY.

THEY SAID THEY BELIEVED THAT SECRET CONTACTS MIGHT BE RESUMED SOON.

"THIS IS THE ONLY SENSIBLE WAY OUT OF THE PRESENT IMPASSE," ONE DIPLOMAT STATED.

KISSINGER, WHO MANY BELIEVE WAS IN PARIS LAST TUESDAY, MAY BE BACK HERE SOME TIME BEFORE PRESIDENT NIXON GOES TO MOSCOW FOR HIS UPCOMING TALKS WITH SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF LEONID BRESHNEV, ANOTHER DIPLOMAT SUGGESTED.

THE COLLAPSE OF BOTH THE PEACE CONFERENCE AND THE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS WAS ANNOUNCED BY CHIEF U.S. NEGOTIATOR WILLIAM PORTER AT THE END OF THURSDAYS PUBLIC SESSION OF THE STALLED TALKS.

MANY DIPLOMATS THOUGHT THAT NIXON WOULD NOT GIVE UP THE CONTACTS WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE SO QUICKLY AND THAT YET ANOTHER BID WOULD BE MADE SOON.

MORE LFT/MJ 1527

AMS 33

INDOCHINA-TALKS 2 PARIS

LE DUC THO CONTINUED TO STUDY THE NORTH VIETNAMESE
AND AMERICAN CASE POSITIONS--"VOLUMINOUS DOSSIERS," AS ONE HANOI
OFFICIAL PUT IT.

THE S1 YEAR-OLD POLITBURO ENVOY, WHO FLEW HERE APPARENTLY HOPING
TO BEGIN SECRET TALKS LAST SUNDAY, WAS PREPARED TO STAY IN
PARIS FOR AS LONG AS WAS NECESSARY, BUT WAS ALSO CONSIDERING
THE POSSIBILITY OF RETURNING HOME IF THERE WERE NO SIGNS OF ANY
MOVE FROM THE UNITED STATES.

THE MINIMUM SIGN REQUIRED TO RESUME "SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS"
(COMMUNIST PARLANCE FOR SECRET TALKS) WAS U.S. WILLINGNESS TO
RESUME ITS SEAT AT THE PARIS CONFERENCE, NORTH VIETNAMESE
SPOKESMAN NGUYEN THANH LE SAID.

THE NORTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION TO THE PARIS PEACE TALKS
PERSISTS IN DEMANDING THAT THE NEXT SESSION BE HELD ON THURSDAY,
MAY 1st, AS USUAL.

BUT AS NEXT THURSDAY FALLS ON ASCENSION DAY, NORMALLY A
HOLIDAY IN FRANCE, THE VIETNAM NEGOTIATORS USUALLY GIVE THE DAY OFF
TO THE 300-ODD FRENCH OFFICIALS AND SECURITY MEN CONNECTED WITH
THE PARIS CONFERENCE.

THE MAIN STUMBLING BLOCK IN THE PUBLIC AND SECRET NEGOTIATIONS,
ACCORDING THE DIPLOMATIC SOURCES, IS THE POLITICAL FUTURE
OF SOUTH VIETNAM--CHOOSING WHICH GOVERNMENT WILL CONDUCT ELECTIONS.

THE UNITED STATES IS BELIEVED TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE ONE-MONTH
INTERVAL BETWEEN PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEUS RESIGNATION AND
NEAR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. THIS COULD BE
EXPANDED IN NEGOTIATIONS THE SOURCES SAID.
MORE LFT/MJ 1532

AMS 34

INDOCHINA-TALKS 3 PARIS

BUT THE AMERICANS WILL HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH THE INSTALLATION
OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL CONCORD DEMANDED BY THE VIET CONG
WITH HANOI BACKING.

LE DUC THO HAS GIVEN ASSURANCES THAT NORTH VIETNAM WOULD NOT
IMPOSE A COMMUNIST REGIME IN SAIGON AND THAT THE VIET CONG
DID NOT DEMAND MONOPOLY OF CONTROL ON POLITICAL LIFE IN SOUTH VIETNAM

THE FRENCH NEWSPAPER FRANCE SOIR SAID THAT KISSINGER AND THE
NORTH VIETNAMESE CLEARED CONSIDERABLE GROUND HERE IN SECRET TALKS
EARLIER THIS WEEK AND WERE ABOUT TO REACH A PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT
THEN THEIR TALKS BROKE DOWN.

"THE AMERICANS WERE PREPARED TO AGREE TO REPLACE PRESIDENT THIEU," THE NEWSPAPER SAID.

BUT THE FRANCE-SOIR REPORT WAS DENIED BY THE U.S. DELEGATION
SPOKESMAN STEPHEN LEDOGAR WHO DESCRIBED IT AS "TOTALLY
UNFOUNDED."

REUTER LFT/MJ 1534

Hugh Heyne, The Courier-Journal

'Let us continue to prey for peace.'

In the first place, few citizens really understand the budget. The large negative votes cast in the past were obviously based on an emotional reaction to the bottom-line, tax-rate figure. In the second place, fixed costs make up such a large percentage (about 17 per cent) of the average budget that the school board can't really respond to even the most overwhelmingly negative vote. The best a board can do is to try to find ways to make reductions in the 13 per cent of the spending that it can control.

The votes should be abolished. Until they are, your best bet to vote "yes" the first-time around. That way, you can at least avoid the added cost of further votes.

## Abortion Timing

It is unfortunate that Gov. Rockefeller is encouraging efforts to modify or repeal the state's liberalized abortion law, adding to the intense election-year pressures on those lawmakers who approved the reform two years ago.

In a surprise action last week, the governor issued a statement saying that legal abortions should be limited to the first 16 weeks of pregnancy, instead of 24, as the current law provides. The statement failed to take account of the medical fact that abortions usually cannot be performed between the 12th and 16th weeks. Legal abortions would therefore effectively be limited to 12 weeks, with the likely result that many of the state's youngest, poorest or least sophisticated women would either be shut out or forced into dangerous hands.

The governor's action smacks of an attempt to placate the anti-abortion forces without sufficient regard for medical risks and social realities. Medical, psychological and ethical decisions involving abortion and its timing should not be made by Albany law-

makers or by the governor, but by pregnant women and their doctors. Those who agree should quickly let their assemblymen know, before the Legislature, in the last days of its session, scraps model legislation for something that is archaic, coercive or hazardous.

## American Hospitality

The Immigration and Naturalization Service is currently demonstrating the government's dreary penchant for chasing talent out of the country. Charlie Chaplin, a British subject, couldn't come back to the U.S. in 1952 after a trip to England because his entry permit was rescinded by a U.S. attorney general who liked neither Chaplin's morals nor his politics. Now, the immigration people are trying to deport another talented British subject former Beatle John Lennon, because he was once convicted of marijuana charge in Britain. It's odd that this action comes when Lennon is deep in the anti-war movement and not a year ago when the Beatles were only a fantastically pop singing group.

## Sign of the Times

The following is reprinted in its entirety:

Kissinger Reported In U.S.

Spokesman to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 30—A White House spokesman, after checking with Mr. Kissinger's staff, said that Mr. Kissinger was in Washington today.

and to be offered

RADIO-TV
DEFENSE DIALOG

SUMMARIES ARE
NOT TO BE QUOTED

WEDNESDAY, MAY 10, 1972

(BROADCASTS OF MAY 9)

RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

SUMMARY OF NETWORK NEWS IN THIS ISSUE

GARRICK UTLEY, NBC-TV, Walter CRONKITE, CBS-TV, both report on the mining of NVNese harbor ports where military hardware has been arriving to aid the enemy in their war efforts in the south. The US Navy has issued warnings to all international ships that mine fields around seven NVNese ports will be activated automatically Thursday evening at six o'clock VN time. The initial phase of the mine laying has been completed by US Navy planes flying from aircraft carriers off the NVNese coast. The ports affected are Haiphong, Hon Gai, Cam Pha, Vinh, Quong Ca, Dong Hoi and Thanh Hoa.

RICHARD VALERIANI, NBC-TV, and Bob SCHIEFFER, CBS-TV, both report on Dr. KISSINGER's remarks about the President's decision to mine the harbors and bomb railroad lines inside VNV. KISSINGER spoke with some emotion today which is usually not his trait.

ROBERT GORALSKI, NBC-TV, reports Dr. KISSINGER said this action of mining the harbors is not a military confrontation. But the Soviets, according to GORALSKI, will have to make what KISSINGER calls a critical decision about whether they should challenge the US blockade.

ARTHUR LORD, NBC-TV, reports even though the blockade may be put into affect, there is little chance it will mean much during the current offensive in SVN. The NVNese have plenty of supplies in the south and can keep going for weeks. The next three to four weeks are going to be the critical ones though, LORD goes on.

DAVID BURRINGTON, NBC-TV, reports on actions taken by the enemy's peace delegation in Paris. They issued statements condemning the President's action, saying it is the gravest escalation of the war by President NIXON. A statement by the VC delegation said the blockade would fail, that the current communist offensive will continue inspite of it.

GARRICK UTLEY, NBC-TV, reports President THIEU called on his National Assembly to grant him emergency powers to fight the communist offensive.

GARRICK UTLEY, NBC-TV, reports the Soviet Tass Agency condemned the President's actions, but the Soviet government itself said nothing.

GARRICK UTLEY, NBC-TV, reports In Helsinki, Finland, the SALT talks continued as usual as if nothing was said by the President.

DAVID BRINKLEY, NBC-TV, comments on the move by President NIXON, saying that many of President JOHNSON's military advisors urged him to mine the enemy harbors but he refused. BRINKLEY says the Senate heard GRAVEL read a CIA report saying mining Haiphong and bombing railroad lines would not work.

RON NESSEN, NBC-TV, reports the families of POW's are getting impatient with NIXON over his actions in VN.

WALTER CRONKITE, CBS-TV, reports China charged US planes and warships hit their boats over the weekend.

PUBLISHED BY THE AIR FORCE(SAF-AA)AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DOD TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DEFENSE DEPARTMENT PERSONNEL MATTERS WITHIN THEIR OFFICIAL RESPONSIBILITIES. NO OTHER USE OF THIS PUBLICATION IS AUTHORIZED

FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THIS PUBLICATION CALL MR. HARRY ZUBKOFF, OX 52884

NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC-TV 6:30 PM

US Laying Mines In NVN's Harbors

GARRICK UTLEY: On perhaps the most serious day this country has faced internationally in almost ten years. Then, it was the Cuban missile crisis and confrontation with the Soviet Union.

Today, the possibility of confrontation with Moscow exists again - the reason is the President's decision to mine the ports of NVN.

The Navy has issued warnings to all international ships that mine fields around seven NVNese ports will be activated automatically Thursday evening at six o'clock VN time.

That is six a.m. eastern daylight time.

The ports affected are Haiphong, Hon Gai, Cam Pha, Vinh, Quong Ca (?), Dong Hoi and Thanh Hoa.

The main one, of course, is Haiphong. It is estimated that almost all of NVN's military airports pass through this harbor.

This picture was taken some time back, but at the time of the President's speech, last night, thirty-six merchant ships are believed to be in Haiphong harbor.

They have until Thursday sunset to get out of port or risk being trapped by the mines.

Hanoi radio claimed that two US destroyers shelled Haiphong today, no comment on that from the Pentagon.

And communist China charged that American planes and ships attacked Chinese vessels off the NVNese coast.

And today, US planes carried out air strikes against NVN, including roads and rail lines between Hanoi and China.

Two weeks ago tomorrow, President NIXON spoke to the nation and gave the impression that the war was going well, that the communists offensive would be defeated, that VNization would work.

Last night, the President described a much different situation, one so serious as to require the drastic steps taken.

Today, Henry KISSINGER, the President's advisor spoke to newsmen about the President's decision.

RICHARD VALERIANI: The normally unemotional KISSINGER gave an almost impassioned defense of the President's decision.

## Kissinger Defends Nixon's Decisions

VALERIANI: He conceded it involves risks to American relations with the Soviet Union and communist China.

But he said those risks were obviously judged to be acceptable.

KISSINGER expressed the hope the Russians would understand why the President acted as he did, why regional conflicts should not be allowed with the process of relaxing tensions among the great powers.

He acknowledged that the mining of NVNese harbors would present some short term difficulties to the Soviet leaders, but he said the massive NVNese offensive, fueled by Soviet arms, had caused enormous problems for the US.

As for the summit meeting, KISSINGER said, we see at this moment no reason from our side to postpone it.

But he declined to predict what the Soviet reaction would be.

KISSINGER emphasized the President made his decision only after he became convinced by the last round of private negotiations that Hanoi was interested in nothing less than the imposition of a defacto communist government in Saigon.

He claimed that the Soviet supplies had tipped the military balance in favor of the NVNese in the field and he virtually admitted the Saigon forces could not cope with the full scale communist invasion.

But he indicated the fighting during the next three weeks might not be affected by the new American action. The principle message that KISSINGER seemed to be trying to get across was this.

The US at this stage wants only to get out of VN honorably without humiliation and it is willing to leave a political solution to the VNese themselves.

But Hanoi refused to cooperate so the President had no choice except to take drastic action.

## No Military Confrontation

2

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

ROBERT GORALSKI: KISSINGER says it is not a military confrontation. But the Soviets, will shortly have to make what KISSINGER calls a critical decision.

It is whether to bring in Soviet ships into NVNese waters after tomorrow.

On Thursday, the thousands of half ton mines already laid within the twelve mile territorial limits of NVN will be activated. Ready to be triggered by any ship passing close by.

The US hopes no ships will try to get through.

Should some slip through the mine fields, present US rules of engagement are to let them pass, free from air or naval attack until they are unloaded.

Then, the liters and barges will be subject to attack as they haul their cargo to the docks.

Interdiction raids would be directed against anything moving throughout NVN.

KISSINGER said it is unlikely the moves will have any affect on the current offensive, SVN's military forces are still responsible for halting Hanoi's drive.

Here the prospects are not good. For even Pentagon officials admit Saigon's forces have failed the first real test of VNization.

## Enemy Rejected All Peace Offers

ARTHUR LORD: The plan to blockade NVN was formulated here at the headquarters for the US military assistance command, VN.

Also known as Pentagon East. The largest military headquarters outside of Washington.

The hawks within the military establishment have been pushing for a naval blockade plus increased bombing of the north for years.

Now they finally have what they wanted.

Now that the plan to blockade NVN has been put into action, the question is how effective will it be.

For the immediate future, the blockade will probably have no effect on the NVNese offensive.

Most of the NVNese troops in SVN have plenty of supplies with them - enough perhaps for the next month or so.

Also, the NVNese are believed to

have massive amounts of guns, ammunition and food hidden in caches in SVN. Supplies that have been stored up over the years.

As the NVNese army moves further south, they uncover these secret supply dumps and resupply themselves right on the front line.

Beyond that, the NVNese are also very adept at using captured weapons and the retreating NVNese army has been very accomodating by leaving plenty behind.

There have been some reports of NVNese units operating with captured American tanks and artillery.

If the blockade has any effect at all, the NVNese may start running low on supplies in about a month.

But the SVNese army may not be able to hold on for that long.

The next three to four weeks are going to be of critical importance.

GARRICK UTLEY: In President NIXON's speech, there was appears to be a new peace offer. Mr. NIXON said, if the communist agree to a cease fire, under international supervision, release all American prisoners of war, then all American forces will be out of SVN within four months.

But in Paris today, NVNese and VC peace negotiators were not interested in any peace offers.

BURRINGTON: Members of the NVNese delegation to the Paris peace talks met all day long today at their villa on the outskirts of town.

Then they issued a statement predictably condemning the President's action. The gravest escalation of the war to date, that's how the NVNese described it, and they flatly rejected the President's offer to call off the blockade and pull out all US troops in return for a cease fire and the release of American prisoners.

Both delegations, who's headquarters were under heavy guard, again demanded that the US get rid of SVNese president THIEU, the main stumbling block to a settlement.

But there was no note taken of the fact that this time the President's offer to withdraw US troops made no mention of THIEU.

3

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

All it asks for is a cease fire and the release of American prisoners. Thus there is speculation that hidden within the President's action is actually a new peace offer. One that doesn't include President THIEU.

Such an offer might interest the communists more than they have let on, and even lead to a renewal of peace talks, either here or at some secret location.

## Thieu Calls For Emergency Powers To Fight Communists

UTLEY: And in Saigon tonight, President THIEU called on the National Assembly to grant him emergency powers to fight the communist offensive.

And THIEU blamed his generals for the some of the defeats suffered by government soldiers.

And he said all areas lost to the enemy will be recaptured.

In the fighting today, NVNese soldiers led by ten tanks attacked and overwhelmed a government base near Kontum.

It was the last outpost defending the western approaches to that city.

## Soviets Speak Out Against US Aggression

UTLEY: In Moscow, today, there was official silence on what the Soviet Union might do in the face of President NIXON's action.

Tass, the Soviet Union news agency released a story with a Washington date line. It spoke again of American aggression and the violation of international law and it disputed Mr. NIXON's claim that he wants to end the war.

But from the Soviet government itself, nothing.

In fact, there were celebrations in Russia today, marking the anniversary of the end of WWII in Europe.

## Helsinki Talks Go On

UTLEY: In Helsinki, Finland, today, American and Soviet negotiators talked again about limiting their nuclear weapons.

They went about their work just as though President NIXON said nothing last night.

And sources at the SALT talks said no other issue such as the VN war were discussed.

## Brinkley Comments On War Moves

UTLEY: When Lyndon JOHNSON was President, many of his military advisors told him that one way he could end the war in VN would be to mine Haiphong harbor.

He didn't, but now President NIXON has.

DAVID BRINKLEY: Five, six and seven years ago, there were many advocates of mining Haiphong harbor to cut off NVN's supplies from Russia and China.

There was an argument then about how effective it would be and there is the same argument now.

Senator GRAVEL of Alaska put into the Congressional Record today a secret CIA report saying mining Haiphong and bombing railroad lines would not work.

It said ships could simply anchor farther out and send the stuff in on liters or barges. As for the railroads, NVN has already show it can repair within an hour or two, a railroad line broken by bombing.

And the CIA report said keeping the rails cut would require about two hundred bombing flights a day every day.

Also, supplies are brought in on highways and trails almost impossible to bomb out.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense said this morning that whatever effect mining the harbor might have it would take some time. Others thought it would take weeks, or months.

Furthermore, NVN's army carries far less heavy and complex equipment than the American army and so its supply needs are not as great.

All of this suggest the new tactics President NIXON announced last night may not work. They've already been bombing for seven years trying to keep supplies from reaching the south and it has never worked very well.

And since the President said he would not pull out, this was his only alternative.

And today they went ahead with it.

At present there is no answer to

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

4

ing an agreement on peace.

What appeared to be a major
change in his terms. Release of
prisoners of war remains a prime
factor, but the only other condi-
tion he set was a cease fire, in-
ternationally supervised - a goal
Hanoi itself has enunciated in
the past.

Mr. NIXON dropped his demand
that the Saigon regime have at
least a chance of survival which
has been a big impasse at the Paris
talks.

He assured SVN of firm support
but said agreement on the two
points he made would let Hanoi and
Saigon negotiate their differences.

Nevertheless, the major concern
today has been with the military
situation.

BOB SCHIEFFER: Military offi-
cials have always felt the best
way to cut off supplies to NVN was
to mine the harbors.

Civilian officials, until now,
have rejected the idea, feeling
the job could not be carried ef-
fectively. In addition, they fear-
ed it might provoke a confrontation
with Russian ships.

In all, seven ports have been
seeded. The Defense Department
will not say how many mines were
dropped, but all main ports were
covered.

The main activity, of course,
has been the Haiphong harbor, which
handles eighty percent of NVN's
sea traffic.

Thirty-seven ships from Russia,
China, East Germany, and other
communist countries, are now docked
there.

Several British ships from Hong
Kong are also there.

In addition, twenty-five more
ships loaded with ammunition and
sam missiles are on the way. Two
main rail lines linking NVN with
China - they are being bombed for
the first time since 1968.

On Capitol Hill, the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral
Thomas MOORER, told reporters what
would happen if ships stopped short
of the mined area and tried to
transport war goods to NVNese
boats.

MOORER If the ship attempts to
off load his cargo and an attempt
is made to land it, on the beach,
which would involve, for instance,
liter or small boats taking the

supplies from the ships and trans-
fering it to the beach.

We would take whatever action is
necessary to stop this transfer.

MAN: And that could include the
use of American naval-surface vessels?

MOORER: It could take (unintelligible) could include the use of surface vessels or aircraft that is armed.

***

Well, we will take whatever
action is necessary to keep the
port closed. I assure you.

SCHIEFFER: Administration
spokesmen concede that the quaran-
teen will be economic as well as
military - that ships loaded with
food and other non-military items
will also be unable to cross the
mined areas without running the
risk of being blown up.

China Charges US Attacked Their
Ships

CRONKITE: Even as the mining
went on, communist China charged
that American planes and warships
had attacked two of its merchant
ships off NVN.

Peking said three warships shel-
led the vessels Saturday and that
planes attacked them Sunday and
yesterday.

The ships, it said, were sever-
ely damaged and that some Chinese
crewmen and VNese civilians were
wounded.

In a related matter, Hanoi
claimed it shore battery hit and
set fire to two American warships
that were shelling Haiphong harbor.

No US comment on either story.

Kissinger Concedes Moves Involve
Some Risks

CRONKITE: One of the architects
of the President's move conceded
today that it involves some risk,
but in the words of White House
advisor, Henry KISSINGER, the jud-
gement was that it did not involve
an unacceptable risk.

DAN RATHER: Dr. KISSINGER says
the President is going ahead with
plans for the Moscow summit. No
indication yet, as to what the Rus-
sians may do.

He expects it may be several days
before they decide.

KISSINGER appeared before news-

6

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

the next question.

If, o when, this fails to end
the war, what will they do next?

## June Draft Call Raised

UTLEY: Nine thousand young men with lottery numbers one through thirty-five will be drafted next month.

Selective Service said that the June call would complete the drafting of fifteen thousand men over a three month period.

## Families Of POW's Getting Impatient

UTLEY: Finally, VN again. Last night in his speech, President NIXON called on Americans to support him and his VN policy.

Until recently, he could always count on support from one very concerned group. The wives and families of American prisoners of war, held by the communists.

But as the fighting has dragged on, that support has weakened.

RON NESSEN: Families of Americans captured and missing in VN, have grown impatient waiting for President NIXON to get their men back.

Even the league of families, the largest and oldest organization which always supported the President, now has demanded an appointment to express what it called extreme distress.

And today, leaders of the league, could muster only the most cautious hope that the President's new actions will end the war.

WOMAN: Well, my son is missing in action, so I don't know that anything will bring him home.

But, my reaction to the President's speech last night is that I'm frightened. I don't want to see another person killed, whether it be a SNese, a NVNese or an American.

I want to see this conflict ended.

NESSEN: You say you are afraid. What is your fear?

WOMAN: I'm - I just hope that - that it will be accepted in the right way. This is what I mean. I just hope no one will say - I mean I hope it will not be an introduction to another conflict or a greater conflict.

ANOTHER WOMAN: This shows me

something - sincerity on the part of our country and our President to actually end the fighting.

NESSEN: And you think it will?

WOMAN: Yes.

NESSEN: Do you have any fear that it might have the opposite affect as expanding the fighting or prolonging the war?

WOMAN: Oh, yes, I'm afraid of that. But I think we all are - we have to wait and see.

NESSEN: Do you feel satisfied that President NIXON has - has listened to you and has paid attention to your - to your needs and desires?

ANOTHER WOMAN: He has listened and he has paid attention to our needs and desires. But not enough. The men aren't home. The men are not accounted for.

Until that day comes, there is not going to be a man sitting in that office that isn't going to have the challenge of us with him every day.

## CBS EVENING NEWS CBS-TV 7:00 PM

## Communists Not Officially Answering

WALTER CRONKITE: There is still no official reaction from the communist world to President NIXON's newest move in the VN war.

Communist newspapers and broadcasts complain of what they call naked aggression.

They talk of resisting American ultimatums. But the governments of Moscow, Peking and Hanoi have not been heard from.

Soviet party chief BRESHNEV called his ruling politburea into urgent session last night and again today and Hanoi recalled its Paris peace negotiator Xuan THUY for urgent consultations.

Meantime, US military forces are carrying out the big step up of the war of Mr. NIXON's administration.

Navy planes mine NVNese harbors and they will be armed automatically at six p.m. Saigon time, six a.m. eastern time Thursday.

Other jets bombed rail lines in NVN.

Almost hidden by the military aspects of the President's move last night was what may be the biggest concession he has made toward reach-

5

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

men for an hour to background and
explain Mr. NIXON's gamble.

No sound recordings were allow-
ed but his remarks were on the
record.

One of KISSINGER's trademarks
has been seldom showing any emo-
tion in public. Today, though,
his voice often rose in what ap-
peared to be anger.

Calculated or otherwise.

Especially when discussing what
he called, attempts at humiliation
by the other side.

The President tends not to be-
lieve that Moscow conspired with
Hanoi to publicly humiliate the
US, although KISSINGER agrees, that
is realistically, of course, a pos-
sibility.

Whatever the reasons, KISSINGER
says, the NVNese did try to public-
ly humiliate the President by of-
fering him only old negotiating
terms after Moscow got Mr. NIXON
to resume negotiations under pres-
sure from a battlefield offensive.

The NVNese continue to demand
KISSINGER insists, a communist
governmert in Saigon, surrender,
and do so arrogantly.

But Dr. KISSINGER did nothing
to knock down conclusions that at
least as important as the Presi-
dent's decision to mine, is a
softer NIXON negotiating approach
now.

For the first time, the Presi-
dent is offering to stop all acts
of force throughout Indo-China,
including bombing and withdraw all
US troops from SVN within four
months, simply in exchange for the
prisoners and a cease fire.

All of this, before a political
settlement is agreed upon. The
President never before has gone so
far in offering terms.

## Some Countries React To War Move

CRONKITE: While China, Russia
and Hanoi have not reacted offi-
cially to Mr. NIXON's plan, other
nations have.

Britain described it as inevi-
table in light of NVN's aggression.

Other countries were not so
charitable.

The Scandinavians said it was
a dangerous move, so did Japan.

In Paris, the VC delegation to
the suspended peace talks accused
the NIXON Administration of acting

as barbarians.

The VC added that they wouldn't
quit fighting until they reached
their objectives.

At the UN, Secretary General,
called for restraint on all sides
and talked of marshalling the full
machinery of the United Nations to
bring about a cease fire in Indo-
China.

SVN's President THIEU went on
nation-wide radio and television,
to inform his people of Mr. NIXON's
action and to acknowledge, that,
quote, the fatherland is in grave
danger.

The Americans who stand to gain
or lose the most in this new escal-
ation are the GI's in VN.

## GI's Respond To Nixon's Plan

PHIL JONES: This is the first
occasion in a long time that a
Presidential speech on VN has
brought such wide praise and sup-
port from the men who are still in
this country.

For the some sixty thousand GI's
still left in VN, the Presidential
decision on the future course
brought a new ray of hope that this
war might be ended once and for all.

GI: I think it is just fine.
We're trying to pull out of here
and let SVN have their part of VN
and have the kind of government
that they want.

And VN as plain as day is in-
vading SVN and I think it is just
great and we should bomb the heck
out of them - they ask for it and
we should continue till they get
out of SVN.

ANOTHER GI: I think it is a
pretty good deal. I think he just
ought to go all the way because we
got plenty of POW's up there and
the people back in the states are
forgetting about them.

ANOTHER GI: I don't think that
mass increases of bombing here is
going to help as much as everyone
thinks it does.

It has been proven already and
it has been written in the papers
that mass bombing over here does
not have that much effect on them.

I think the only way that we're
going to have to stop this is put
a blocking force in there - that's
not air power, I don't think.

ANOTHER GI: I think it is out-
standing. I think since the bombing

7

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

Hanoi has brought up the morale of most people around here. I know it has at our base.

That's what we want to happen. Want them to blow them all to hell, that's what.

ANOTHER GI: I completely agree with cutting off the resupply ports for instance the harbors mined - mining the harbors.

And it is a bad situation for the civilians around but we're in a war situation - I think this will stop supplies from going - coming down south.

ANOTHER GI: I don't think they should carry out what he said on the radio today.

Because I think that will keep the GI's here longer in VN and this guy has been here for a long time waiting to go home and I would like to get out of here myself, I only been here for three months.

I'm ready to get out of this place right now.

ANOTHER GI: I think it puts a little bit of pride back into the American servicemen over here.

Of course, he doesn't have any morale whatsoever because he is over here and he gets hit at night.

And nobody seems to be doing anything about it.

While the people back home they just - they seem to be taken up with the communists and if a few of them get killed, they bitch about it, but if one of us gets killed, you don't hear any protest about it.

## Increasing Pressure On Kontum City

CRONKITE: Today in SVN's central highlands, there was increasing pressure on Kontum City.

Fourteen miles to the northwest Poleiklong was overrun. A few miles to the south, Benhet was in danger of falling.

Around Hue, the enemy threat continues but no fighting was reported.

## Sevareid Sees Nixon's Move As Sizeable Bet In A High Stakes Game

CRONKITE: In Washington, Eric SEVAREID sees Mr. NIXON's latest move in VN as a sizeable bet in a high stakes game.

ERIC SEVAREID: The President has gambled once more, rolling the

dice this time on the big power table.

Majority opinion at home will probably support him, it nearly always does for a time when the President has made any move in the context of war.

He is not gambling for victory, nor for an end to the VN war, he is gambling for an armistice lasting long enough to get our ground forces out of that country.

He can hope, but not expect, to stop the current Hanoi offensive in the south which has supplies enough for several more weeks.

He does expect to prevent a renewed offensive this fall by shutting off present and future shipments of heavy arms and oil.

He gambles that Moscow will not break off the nuclear arms limitation talks, even should the summit meeting be cancelled or postponed.

Though it has never been more urgent than now.

He must hope that the Russians will not send in their own mine sweepers which could mean serious incidents, and will not organize an air lift across China to help Hanoi.

He gambles that the Congress will be paralyzed and not push on with the various moves to cut off funds for the war.

What he is no longer gambling on is success of his basic policy, the three year old aim of VNization.

When he tells us that after five weeks of offensive, SVN is in danger of conquest and our sixty thousand troops gravely threatened, that is to tell us that inspite of his vastly superior numbers and weaponry, the American created army of SVN cannot be relied upon.

He has used a big stick but offered a big carrot. We are to have all troops out in the see-saw acts of war throughout Indo-China, if they release the prisoners and accept a supervised cease fire.

He no longer emphasizes the integrity of the Saigon government, but also does not pledge that our planes and ships in Thailand and off the coast will be withdrawn.

Or that we will not continue to supply Saigon.

Even if Hanoi accepted the principle of a cease fire and there is no sign they will, its terms would have to be negotiated - a hundred sticking points could arise...

8

Wednesday, May 10, 1972

NEW YORK TIMES

10 May 1972

# Excerpts From Kissinger News Conference on
U.S.-North Vietnamese Exchanges

WASHINGTON, May 9—Following are excerpts from the official transcript of the news conference held today by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, in the White House. Mr. Kissinger's opening remarks are followed by questions and answers.

In order to put into perspective where we are in the peace negotiations, I would like to go through with you the exchanges that have taken place between us and Hanoi since the end of last year, that is to say, since the North Vietnamese canceled the private meeting that was scheduled for Nov. 20, when they canceled it three days before.

As you remember, the President in his speech on Jan. 25 pointed out that after Le Duc Tho had been suddenly taken ill, we offered to resume negotiations any time that he recovered, either with him or any other representative of Hanoi's political leadership, in order to bring about a rapid end of the war.

We insisted on a representative of Hanoi's political leadership because our experience had been that the delegation in Paris simply did not have sufficient authority to make these private talks useful. We never received a reply to this message of Nov. 19.

On Jan. 26, or the day after the President's speech revealing the secret talks, we sent a message to Hanoi indicating our readiness to resume private negotiations. On Feb. 14, there was a reply in which Hanoi indicated its willingness to meet any time from March 15 on.

## March Date Is Suggested

On Feb. 17, that is to say, three days after we received the message, we accepted this proposal and suggested the date of March 20. The reason we suggested March 20 is because it is easier to travel on a weekend and we picked the first weekend after March 15.

In this message we said the following, which has characterized our attitude. We said, "The United States believes that (at this meeting) the proposals of both sides should be considered." In other words, we indicated our readiness to discuss their points. "It expects to negotiate on this basis with an attitude of justice and generosity and with a view to bringing about a rapid end of the war."

On Feb. 29, Hanoi accepted the date of March 20. On March 6, Hanoi postponed the March 20 meeting until April 15. We accepted this on March 13, only pointing out that there were other commitments on April 15 and proposing instead April 24. The other commitment was the trip to Japan that had been planned and which we did not wish to cancel.

We did not hear from Hanoi to our acceptance of their own proposal. So after 10 days, Porter interrupted the plenaries on March 27. Four days after Porter had interrupted the plenaries, Hanoi accepted the date of April 24, provided the United States returned to the plenary.

We called Ambassador Porter back and we sent a message which was delivered on April 2, but which was in fact drafted on March 31, in which we agreed to resume the plenary sessions on April 13 and confirmed the meeting of April 24.

## Unaware of Offensive

When that message was drafted we were not aware of the fact that a major offensive had in fact started at the demilitarized zone, and therefore, some of the press reports that we were tying the resumption of the plenaries to the end of the offensive are totally wrong. In fact, I will read you from our message to the North Vietnamese which will confirm this. It is said as follows:

"In order to demonstrate its positive attitude and explore every possible opportunity for progress in negotiation, Ambassador Porter will propose a plenary session of the Paris conference on Thursday, April 13, 1972.

"On this basis the United States reaffirms its agreement to a meeting between Dr. Kissinger and special adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy on April 24 at the usual location.

"The United States side points out that the military operations launched by the North Vietnamese in recent days near the demilitarized zone and elsewhere and the firing of missiles from North Vietnamese territory into South Vietnamese air space are inconsistent with the purpose of this meeting. The United States side has been showing great restraint in its response in order to give the negotiations every chance to succeed."

At that time, some of you who called me will know, we were not sure that this was a full-scale offensive until Easter Sunday. Maybe we should have. But we were not certain that this was an offensive across the demilitarized zone.

## Move to Avoid Pressure

The purpose of this message was to prevent military pressure from being put by either side.

I would also like to point out that during March, while we knew that a military build-up was going on, we nevertheless showed very great restraint. In fact, we did not authorize attacks into North Vietnam except the normal protective reaction, but nothing against supply installations or missile sites, because of our concern for our relationships that had been established in Peking and that we were trying to develop in Moscow.

I have mentioned all of this to stress that what has happened was not done lightly, whatever judgments people may make.

Then during April there was an exchange of many messages which revolved around the question of whether there should be a private meeting before a plenary session or a plenary session before a private meeting, which did not however add a great deal to the substance that I have already pointed out to you.

## Six Messages Exchanged

There were a total of six messages that were going back and forth in April. This was the situation when I went to Moscow.

As has been reported, the problem of Vietnam was discussed at considerable length. We pointed out to the Soviet leader the extraordinary complexity that was posed for us by a massive invasion of the entire North Vietnamese field army against South Vietnam, an invasion that if it achieved its objective was bound to jeopardize the security of 60,000 Americans, and the impact that such developments had to have on our attempts to move forward on a broad front.

While I do not want to go into the details of the discussion, the Soviet leaders felt that every effort should be made to resume negotiations, and on this basis, and in order not to be hung up on a procedural point, we proposed that we would return to the plenaries, if we received a firm assurance that a private meeting would follow rapidly.

We left no doubt that we were not concerned only or primarily with the fact of a private meeting, but with the results of a private meeting. We made it very clear that we were prepared to consider any reasonable approach that would lead either to a reduction in the violence, to an end of military operations, to a discussion of the military issues alone or to a discussion of the entire complex issues with only one proviso. We would not impose a Communist government on Saigon; we wanted a genuine political solution. With that one proviso we indicated a readiness to discuss any possible approach.

The meetings took place, as you know. There were two plenary sessions and a private session. We again went through every conceivable approach for ending the military situation and we indicated a readiness to examine any political proposal other than the imposition of a Communist government.

We were confronted by the reading to us of the published Communist statement. It had taken us six months to set up the meeting and innumerable exchanges and when we got there, what we heard could have been clipped from a newspaper and sent to us in the mail. This was the situation we confronted last week.

## Demands Are Listed

What is it that the other side is asking of us that we have rejected? The other side has asked us, prior to a cease-fire, that the following steps must be taken:

The President of South Vietnam must resign. What is called the other side "the machinery of oppression of the government must be disbanded. Pacification must be stopped. Vietnamization must be stopped, which means the end of American military and economic aid. All persons who have been arrested on political grounds should be set free. Then a government should be formed which is composed of all those who favor peace, independence, neutrality and democracy, presumably, by definition, including the Communists.

23

In that government, in other words, the Communists would be the only organized force, since all the organized non-Communist forces would have been disbanded by definition.

All of this is prior to a cease-fire. Then this government is supposed to negotiate with the Communists a final solution. In other words, this is only the thinnest veneer; this government, which already contains the Communists, is then supposed to negotiate with the provincial revolutionary government, which at that moment will be the only force in the country which has an army, which is backed by the North Vietnamese Army. It will be the only force in the country that has any physical strength, and it is supposed to negotiate with them a final settlement. And all of his, ladies and gentlemen, is before a cease-fire.

## A Refusal to Discuss

That is what we have rejected. That is what we call the imposition, under the thinnest veneer, of a Communist government. This is the ending of American economic and military aid, the disbanding of the government that exists in South Vietnam, as a prelude to negotiation. That is the only issue on which negotiations have broken down.

On the whole complex of military issues, we have indicated total readiness for discussion and our proposals have not been rejected; there has been a total refusal even to discuss them. We have not been told what is wrong with our proposals. There has been an absolute unwillingness to discuss any one of them, or to give us any reason why it was unacceptable so that we could continue the discussions.

This was the background against which the Presidential decision had to be seen. No one can believe that two weeks before a summit meeting that it has taken us two years to set up that the President would lightly engage in the sort of decisions he had taken.

We were confronted with the fact that an opponent was insisting on continuing an all-out military offensive which he would stop only on terms that no American President can be asked to accept, and this is why, with enormous pain and great reluctance, this Administration was forced into those decisions.

For two years we have been engaged in negotiations on a broad range of issues with the Soviet Union. We are on the verge not just of success in this or that negotiation, but of what could be a new relationship of benefits to all of mankind, a new relationship in which, on both sides, whenever there is a danger of crisis, there will be enough people who have a commitment to constructive programs so that they could exercise a restraining influence. But in order for such a policy to succeed, it cannot be accepted that one country can be oblivious to the impact on another of the actions of its friends, particularly when those friends are armed with the weapons of this country.

I ask you to consider what you would think, in the months before a summit meeting, if an American ally, armed with American weapons, attacked a Soviet ally and put into jeopardy the tens of thousands of Soviet troops, whether you would not ask yourself whether we should have exercised some restraint.

## 'Decision Was Very Difficult'

I am not saying that at that time when I was in Moscow the Soviet ability to exercise restraint was very great. I am saying that the decision was very difficult, but it had to be taken for these reasons:

First, you must not conclude from this decision that we are assuming that the battle in the South cannot be stabilized. What we are trying to prevent by this decision is an endless continuation of this process by which one attack after another takes place over a period of months without serious negotiation, and without any prospect for a settlement.

But we also want to be in a position that if our assessment is incorrect, and things should turn out not as well as we hope, that we have some bargaining position left on behalf of the Americans who will then be threatened, and of the Americans who are now prisoners.

What we have done must be seen not in the context of a country which is trying to impose its will. It has to be seen in the context of the proposals which the President made in his speech.

## Effort to End 'Agony'

What is it that we are asking of the North Vietnamese? What is it in those proposals that a country cannot honorably accept? We are saying that if our prisoners are returned, and if there is an end to the fighting, that we will withdraw all our forces from South Vietnam in four months, and that we will stop all acts of force throughout Indochina. Why is it that these proposals should not be accepted?

They would leave the determination of the political future to the Vietnamese. They would enable us to withdraw with honor and they would at least put an end to the fighting. So it is incorrect to say that we have embarked on a course designed to impose our solution. We have embarked on a course to try to bring an end to this agony, and, in a way, to this deception, where there is the constant delusion that there is just one formula that has somehow eluded us, where for months we have attempted in good faith to set up a serious negotiation, where our proposals are not even discussed, and where everything is staked by the other side on a pure military move. So both we and other major powers are at this moment at a critical decision.

It is this decision that is compared by some to the Cuban missile crisis, but there are very important differences.

We do not view this as a confrontation between us and the Soviet Union. We are not attempting by these actions to impose a one-sided solution. We are trying to work out some principles of international conduct and an end to a conflict which threatens, alike, our interests as well as the interest of other countries that have a stake in the preservation of peace.

Those were the reasons, in summary, that led to the President's speech last night, and now I will be delighted to answer questions.

## 'In a Generous Spirit'

Q. Would a cease-fire have to be established along the present line of military forces or would the North Vietnamese have to withdraw to North Vietnam?

A. We will be delighted to spell out the details of our proposal as soon as a serious negotiation starts, but I can only repeat that we would approach negotiations in a generous spirit and with the attitude of bringing about a rapid end to the war.

Q. Do you expect the summit meeting with the Soviet Union to go forward, and have you had any indication either way?

A. To take the second question first, we have had no indication from the Soviet Union, and it will probably be a day or so before we receive one.

With respect to the first question, we

are proceeding with the summit preparations, and we see at this moment no reason from our side to postpone the summit meeting. We recognize that the decisions we have taken present some short-term difficulties to the Soviet leaders, but we also believe that the situation that they permitted to evolve presented massive difficulties for us, and both sides have faced the problem throughout of making some real choices; that is to say, if one wants a genuine improvement in relations, as we do, one cannot also at the same time maximize the pressures all around the periphery.

## The Discussion in Moscow

Q. When you were in Moscow, did you inform the Soviet leaders of the possibility of the military action which you have now taken?

A. I cannot go into the details of the discussion. I do not believe that there could be any doubt in the minds of the Soviet leaders of the gravity with which we would view an unchecked continuation of a major North Vietnamese offensive and of an attempt by the North Vietnamese to put everything on the military scales.

The precise action we would take had obviously not been decided upon at the time, and, therefore, could not be discussed. But I do not believe that the Soviet leaders could be under any misapprehension of how seriously it would be viewed if this offensive continued.

Now, let me point out, in addition, that after my visit to Moscow, and after that agreement to resume talks, the North Vietnamese launched three major onslaughts. They launched an attack on Kontum the day we informed them privately that we would return to the plenaries. They launched an attack on Dongha four days later on the eve of the plenary session, and they launched their attack on Quangtri on the eve of the private session. Now, these are facts.

Q. Did anyone in the inner councils dissent from this decision, and did anyone point out that Senator Goldwater offered this solution in 1964 when it was rejected by the country?

A. I never discuss the internal deliberations of the Government.

## Issue of Stopping Ships

Q. Could you spell out for us, with some more degree of clarity—the President, I believe, did not use the word "blockade." What have we said that we would do should Soviet vessels bearing war materiel, bear down and enter into one of the ports? Will we stop that ship, and how?

A. No, I will not go into the precise rules of engagement. At this point, the instructions are to warn all foreign ships of the existence of these minefields, but not to interfere with them if they decide to proceed into the minefields at their own risk.

Q. Is it now fairly safe to conclude that Vietnamization has been pretty much of a failure?

A. No. What it is safe to conclude is that when there is a massive attack by the entire North Vietnamese field army, every last division equipped with the most modern weapons, that a very precarious situation will develop, the outcome of which is uncertain. That is the only thing that it is safe to conclude at this moment.

## Amount of Supplies

Q. Could you give us an estimate of the amount of supplies, in terms of days, that are actually in the pipeline now, that have already been unloaded off of Soviet ships, and based on that, how long do you think it will take before the blockade, or whatever you want to call it, takes effect?

A. These assessments, of course,

24

would differ in relation to critical items, and it has happened before that our estimates had a certain margin of latitude, so I do not want to tie myself to any specific figures. But it has to be analyzed, whatever the figure is, in two ways: There is a tendency to say that there are X months of supplies, and, therefore, they can go for this many months before there is any effect. That is probably a wrong way of looking at it, because if there are only so many months of supplies, it must affect decisions before they run out.

It is unlikely that anybody would run down his supplies to the zero level before he made another decision. Now, at what point that decision has to be made, it is difficult to predict. We do not believe that anything that was done will affect the battle that may now be taking place in the next three weeks. It could affect and should affect the next round.

This modification of our peace proposal, a modification which corresponds with what was the accepted wisdom everywhere only a little while ago, has to be seen in the context of the cut-off supplies. So we think that in this next round, the effect would only be indirect. In the round after that, the effect should make itself felt.

## Areas of Unloading

Q. Will the U.S. Navy attempt to prevent the offloading of supplies outside the minefields?

A. In reply to your specific question, there is only so much you can offload across beaches, and if your remember that a large percentage of the imports concern petroleum, I think there are certain physical limitations, but we would interfere with it to the maximum degree possible.

Q. This concerns the President's speech and something you said before about the Vietnamese can negotiate a settlement between themselves after a cease-fire and withdrawal. Does this mean we would totally withdraw from the negotiating table?

A. We have always indicated that we are prepared to pursue two courses: we are either prepared to negotiate a comprehensive settlement, or we are prepared to negotiate the military issues alone.

Now, the difficulty has been that the only comprehensive settlement that the other side has ever proposed to us is the one I described to you earlier, the one that begins with de facto imposition of a Communist government, after which they settle all other issues. After that, there are no other issues left to settle, because after that, we won't have any negotiating power.

If the other side is prepared to discuss with us a political process which gives the real political forces an opportunity to express themselves, we are prepared to discuss it.

## 'Difficult Problem' Recognized

We recognize it is a difficult problem. We know that some of our Western forms have another connotation in Vietnam. Maybe we don't have enough imagination. We are prepared to listen to another proposal. We have never had one except this particular formulation, despite repeated attempts on our part to suggest our best judgment or to invite them to make an alternative proposal.

If the political route is closed, we are prepared to discuss the military issues alone, and on that hypothesis, we would negotiate our disengagement from the war on the terms I have indicated, and leave the political negotiations to the Vietnamese.

Q. May we infer from the President's third numbered point that rail and all other communications would be cut off to the maximum extent possible, that the restrictions on Air Force strikes of rail lines close to the Chinese border have now been lifted?

A. I obviously cannot go into the details of operations, but we will take great care that the People's Republic will not misunderstand our actions.

Q. In the light of the long history of misassessments about the Vietnam War, on what does the President base his confidence that this present move will work or might work?

A. These decisions have to be seen in the context of the choices that are available. No action is also a decision and no action is subject to exactly the same question which you have just raised, and therefore, this was the decision reached prayerfully and on the best belief that it will work, but only events will prove whether it will.

Q. The proposal of the concept of mining the harbors and seeking the cut-off of supplies into North Vietnam has been kicking around ever since we became involved in that conflict nearly 10 years ago, and it has always been rejected by this Administration and the previous Administration up until now on the ground, as far as we're able to learn, that it imposed an unacceptable risk of conflict with the Soviet Union or confrontation with the Soviet Union. Can you tell us what has changed to make that risk now acceptable? Is the risk less than it has been in the past or are the circumstances such as to warrant greater risks than we have been willing to undertake in the past?

A. The question is, do we believe it involves unacceptable risks with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. As I pointed out, it of course involves some risks. The judgment was that it did not involve an unacceptable risk, especially compared to the risks of the situation where for the second time since the summit meeting was arranged Soviet arms fueled a military upheaval, and no one has had that this decision was lightly arrived at. The judgment has been, obviously, that the risks were not unacceptable.

Q. Do you still rule out the possible reintroduction of U.S. ground forces and the use of nuclear weapons?

A. That has been ruled out by the President, yes.

## No Mention of Elections

Q. Last night he said nothing whatever about the previous conditions of free election country-wide. What is our attitude now toward that particular proposal?

A. Our attitude is that if the other side is prepared to discuss political issues, we will discuss our proposal of Jan. 25, or some variation of it, or listen to their counter-proposal to it. If the other side insists that the only political solution is the one that they have proposed, which is a de facto imposition of their Government by us, then we suggest we have a deadlock in the political field and we solve the military problem.

Q. The President told us many times that his preference was for negotiation but that he is willing to go to the Vietnamization route if that didn't succeed. Did that Vietnamization program assume that the North Vietnamese would not at some time fight with all of their might and means?

A. We had hoped that in the light of the proposals we had made that there would be a possibility for a negotiated outcome. We had also perhaps under estimated the massive influx of offensive weapons, particularly from the Soviet Union, weapons that came in

quantities and of a type that changed the military balance and that in many respects, especially artillery and heavy tanks, tipped the balance in the North Vietnamese direction.

Let me give you our assessment of the Soviet role so that we don't misunderstand each other.

There are two schools of thought. One school of thought maintains that this operation was supplied, conceived, and planned by the Soviet Union in order to impose a maximum humiliation on us prior to the summit.

Another school of thought maintains that, to be sure, the Soviet Union supplied the weapons, and therefore has to be held responsible for some of the consequences but that it did not plan this operation, that it could not have considered it in its interest for it to take this extreme form, and that what we face here is one of the problems great powers have in dealing with their clients—that the client looks at problems from its own regional or national perspective, while the great powers may take actions in a much wider one.

We tend to lean towards the latter interpretation. We do not argue that this was a deliberate plan to inflict a humiliation on the United States. We are saying that any thoughtful national leader looking at the masses of offensive equipment might have considered the consequences and, prior to a meeting that had, and still has such high prospects, one should ask oneself whether it can be in the interest of either party to impose a major setback on the other.

## No 'Dunkirk' Foresee

Q. Dou you foresee the possibility of a victory by the Hanoi forces of such magnitude that we would have to have a Dunkirk type of operation to withdraw our troops?

A. No, we do not foresee a victory of such magnitude, but one has to say that their behavior suggests that such a victory may be their intention and therefore it had to be considered by us.

Q. For months you have expressed a personal view that this war will be resolved by negotiation. Two parts in this question: Do you still feel that is a probability and, secondly, given the breaking off of this private session, have you hopes that it can be reviewed in the future, the idea of private negotiations, with yourself playing a part?

A. Leaving aside how possible it is to have really complete private meetings under present circumstances, we believe that the most effective way of ending the war, the most certain way, is by negotiations. We respect Le Duc Tho as a serious, dedicated spokesman for his side, and we are prepared on our side to resume negotiations with him at any time that he is prepared to discuss propositions that are consistent with our principles. And we would make every effort to understand his point of view.

Do I still believe that there is hope for negotiations? I have always based my hope of negotiations on the fact that even in Vietnam there must be some realities that transcend the parochial concern of the contestants and that a point must be reached where a balance is so clearly established that if we can make generous and far-seeing proposals that a solution may be possible.

I still have hope that we can do this. And that we may be able to do it soon. I expect that when the present turmoil has subsided that both sides will make efforts to resume the negotiation.

25

he expects from
he will be prepared
terrible things to
Vietnam.

brings us to the
ill point — the mat-
d death and destruc-
th have tried not to be
stic about the Viet-
War. I do not see
uch is accomplished
xing indignant about
ject as tired and
tex as Vietnam. I
tremendous admira-
for the diplomatic
of Kissinger.

dplomatic skills are
enough. There are
principles at stake,
the true source of my
lies in the feeling
the country is now
ing a crunch in which
principles are not re-
ning the national
ship.

act is that decency
no excuse for the
ent's willingness to
cities the better to
he is tough. Honor
no support for the
hat it is all right to
y a country to main-
what Mr. Nixon is
to call "respect
presidency."

d's of brains

are three kinds of
One understands
self; another can be
to understand, and
third can neither un-
and of itself or be
to understand,
Jo Machiavelli

That should have told
somebody something
about how hard it is to
change from the old to the
new.

Now we're in the middle
of still another presiden-
tial-campaign time, and
there are a lot of things

machine, and that means
some 75,000 jobs under his
patronage. Just before the
primary last week, the
governor was busily "mac-
ing" state employees for
contributions to his favor-
ite presidential hopeful,
and old politics won again.

This is important to keep
some perspective and look
at politics and politicians
in a sensible way. If you
can do that, then you have
to admit there must be
something attractive
about old politics: So
many good men find it ap-
pealing.

be.

It would probably be an easier task to rekindle fervor for
the old holy days than to create new ones. The institu-
tional church is the only agency that could possibly lead
such an effort. It is just possible that many persons,
tired of celebrating themselves and the human won-
ders of the world, would welcome a return to the cele-
bration of God's goodness to man.

Stand up and be counted, Henry Kissinger

By George McCormick
Of the editorial page staff

"Hi there, fellow Ameri-
cans! This is Ron Ziegler,
your host for another ex-
citing round of the na-
tion's favorite game show,
'To Tell the Truth.'

"Our panel today is made
up of representatives of
the White House press
corps. And here, to chal-
lenge their wits, is our set
of mystery guests. No. 1,
will you stand, please, and
state your name?"

"My name is Henry Kissinger."

"Thank you, No. 1. And
No. 2..."

"My name is Henry Kissinger."

"That's fine, No. 2. What
about you, No. 3?"

"My name is Henry Kissinger."

"Thank you, No. 3. And
now I'll read our guest's
statement: 'I, Henry Kis-
singer, am a well-known
scholar who left academia

to become President Nixon's most trusted adviser on foreign affairs. I carry out many secret assignments for him throughout the world. But I know that all work and no play makes Henry a dull boy, so I've also become the biggest swinger in the Nixon administration. The only one, in fact..."

"Well, there you have
it, panel. Let's start the
questions."

"Thank you, Ron. I'd like
to start by asking No. 1,
were you in Moscow last
weekend?"

"No, I was in Camp David
with the President."

"No. 2 — the same ques-
tion: Were you in Moscow
last weekend?"

"Yes, I was, and I had a
nice time talking impor-
tant things over with the
Soviet leaders."

"What did you talk about,
No. 3?"

"Who, me? I wasn't in
Moscow. I was in Camp

David."

"I thought you said you
were in Moscow."

"No, that was No. 2."

"Well then, No. 2 — what
did you talk about?"

"Where?"

"Forget it. I don't have
any more questions."

"I do, then. Here's one for
you, No. 1: What do you
do for the President?"

"Oh, I hang around the
White House and advise
him."

"And No. 2 — what do
you do for him?"

"I can't tell you because
it's all a big secret. But I'll
say this: Travel really is
broadening — especially
the way they feed you in
Peking, if you get what I
mean."

"And you, No. 3?..."

"Oh, I improve his admin-
istration's image by going
to a lot of parties, by tak-

ing pretty girls to dinner
at the Sans Souci, by
dancing until dawn at 'in'
places — things like that."

"No. 1, how do you find
energy for all that?"

"All what? What's a little
advice?"

"What about you, No. 2?"

"It's tough, I'll admit, but
I sleep on the plane when-
ever I can."

"No. 3? ..."

"I just keep reminding
myself that no sacrifice is
too great for my Presi-
dent."

"Wait a minute, Ron. Each
of these guys is talking
about just one phase of
Henry Kissinger's activi-
ties, but the real Henry
Kissinger does all those
things, doesn't he? And
wouldn't a routine like
that exhaust any one per-
son?"

"Well, I'm not really sup-
posed to be answering any
questions, but I guess I
can say that you're sort of

right when you say that
the real Henry Kissinger
does all those things, and
you're entirely right when
you say that a routine like
that would exhaust any-
one."

"What do you mean, sort
of right?"

"I can't say anymore. But
I'll tell you what I'll do —
I'll ask the real Henry Kis-
singer to stand up right
now, without waiting for
you to guess which is he."

"My gosh, Ron! They're
all standing up!"

"That's right, panel — no
one man could possibly do
everything that Henry
Kissinger does, and be in
all the places he's sup-
posed to be at the same
time. That's why this ad-
ministration has three real
Henry Kissingers on duty
at all times."

"Three Henry Kissingers!
That's unbelievable Ron!"

"Aw, when have I lied to
you — lately?"

Minn. Tribune • 4/30/72

SPECTRUM
Varying shades of personal opinion on current issues

JOHN K. JESSUP

CBS RADIO NETWORK

MAY 4, 1972

I am John K. Jessup.

Henry Kissinger deserves generally high marks for the skill and energy with which he performs foreign policy chores for the President. He has proved that a thinker can also be a doer, that the scholarly theorist from Harvard can also be a practical diplomat and negotiator in Peking, Paris or Moscow. He is the Bright Star of the Nixon Administration.

But I heard something recently about Henry Kissinger that made me wonder whether all this prominence has begun to stuff his shirt. As we know from his and Nixon's own statements, the old bi-polar confrontation between two nuclear superpowers, the US-Russian cold war for the allegiance of the world, has been giving way to a new five-cornered pattern in which the superpowers are joined by China, Japan and Europe in a sort of political minuet. The classical name for this emerging pattern is Balance of Power. But Henry, I hear, now deplores and discourages the use of that term. He says we can refer to the "structure of relationships" among the five players, but not the Balance of Power. Yet Henry has been a student and admirer of Metternich, Canning and the other great statesmen who kept the peace of Europe for a hundred years after Waterloo by quite consciously maintaining a balance of power.

So his new aversion for the term seems a strange sort of nice-nellyism. Maybe it reflects a private prejudice of his boss, since Richard Nixon was a youthful admirer of Woodrow Wilson's, and Wilson was about the only American President who thought Balance of Power was a dirty word. But it isn't. It's the right word for the kind of peace Nixon and Kissinger are trying to bring to birth in this era of five-way conciliation.

True, the present balance is more complex and shifting than was 19th Century Europe's. The players are bigger and the game is more nearly global. It's risky and changeable, but it's a lot more interesting and stable than the old bi-polar struggle. And since Nixon and Kissinger were so quick and farsighted in recognizing this new structure of world politics, why don't they want us to call it by its right name? It's a balance of power, and let's be sure America does its full part to maintain the equilibrium.

I'm John K. Jessup with Spectrum.

All rights of opinions expressed on SPECTRUM are those of the commentators themselves and should not be attributed to CBS or any of its affiliates

Produced under the supervision of CBS News, 524 West 57 Street, New York, New York 10019 (212) 765-4321

THIS IS RECYCLED PAPER

13

For the past two decades most countries have been arguing for a three, six or 12 nautical mile limit. Indeed, the international conference on the Law of the Sea in 1960 failed by one vote to obtain a 12 nautical mile limit.

But if territorial sea limits provide an opportunity for some interesting debates, there should not be many disagreements on the uses of the seabed beyond "the limits of national jurisdiction." This in fact is what concerns the present UN committee most. Peking's proposition that the areas outside territorial limits and national jurisdiction

"are in principle commonly owned by all the peoples of the world" is identical to the views held by the US, the Soviet Union and most Western countries. The US draft convention on the question suggests that it should be the "common heritage of all mankind." (The US has also suggested that the international seabed area should extend from the areas outside the continental shelves.) And Britain is one step ahead of most countries: it already has submitted a working paper for the establishment of an international body to oversee the "peaceful" exploration of the seabed.

China, which claimed a 12-mile territorial sea limit in 1958, may attempt to insist that no agreement on the seabed can be made until the right of each sovereign state to fix its territorial sea has been agreed. In any event, the vital point is that China is using its new UN status to challenge a central concept of international law. And there can be no doubt that as Peking continues to adjust itself to its UN influence and authority, it will not cease to question international rules and principles long held "sacred" by most Western countries.

PREMIER Chou En-lai: May I invite your attention, Chairman, to alarm and despondency in the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee over the Paris talks between us and the United States?

Chairman Mao: Despondency? Fair enough. Alarm? Don't tell me it's serious. Anyway that foreign devil Kissinger will soothe them. He's a good, round turtle's egg; we could use him in the Party.

Chou: It is a question of drunkenness, Chairman. Drunkenness. Not any suggestion of a confidence breach between the People's Republic and the White House.

Mao (halting his half-raised glass of *mao tai* in midair and slapping it on a fat, dusty file marked "Liu Shao-chi, Lin Piao, et al"): What do you mean? I can drink what I like. If the foreign devils object -- (Hunanese obscenity).

Chou (eyes rolling): I apologise for the misunderstanding, Chairman. The US senators are alarmed and despondent because their new Ambassador in Paris, who opened the negotiations, is reported to have been drunken and abusive in public on an international flight to Washington.

Mao (gulping with a snort of laughter): Good on him. What's his name?

Chou (consulting his file): Someone called Watson.

Mao (surprised and suspicious): Watson? Wasn't he a running dog for that London CIA fellow Sherlock Holmes? I thought he was dead. He is older than I am.

Chou (patiently): No, Chairman. This is an Arthur Watson, a recent personal appointment by President Nixon himself to the post of ambassador in Paris. There has been some high-level agitation in Washington -- expressed chiefly by Senator Fulbright, whom we have invited to China, and by Secretary of State

RICHARD HUGHES

William Rogers, who has already visited us, you remember...

Mao (mystified): Never heard of him.

Chou (a cough): To continue, Chairman; these admirable, cooperative, senatorial Americans are alarmed because they do not believe that we would welcome negotiations with an envoy who was "flagrantly drunk in public." They fear that we have no respect for drunkards. A Senator Church —

Mao (a hiccough): Trust the Church to spoil things.

Chou: A Senator *Frank* Church has referred to "the disdain of the Chinese for flagrant drunkenness in public."

Mao (refilling his *mao-tai* cup): I have never heard such -- (Hunanese) nonsense. I'd have liked Nixon more if he had had more to drink. Wasn't that turtle's egg, Doster Fulles or Foster Dulles, a teetotaller? Our old comrade, Chen Yi, certainly wasn't. May his ascent of the dragon have been well-lubricated and comfortable. I went to his funeral, didn't I? I reckon he was one of our best Foreign Ministry negotiators. No reflection on you, of course, Comrade Chou, as you well know. Sure you wouldn't like a shot? (Extends the *mao-tai* tin.)

Chou (with a bow): No, thank you, Chairman. Pray excuse me; I have a working schedule until 0400 tomorrow; some American students are arriving. But I second your fraternal toast...

To resume, should we transmit a discreet cable to the White House? Assuring them that our hopes for world peace, Presidential re-election and Soviet rebuff from these continuing negotiations in Paris are unaffected by the fleeting indisposition of this man Watson — which might have been corrected by acupuncture? I should add that

Secretary of State Rogers has said that Watson, anyway, was "never intended" to be the continuing Paris negotiator.

Mao: Now I am the one who is alarmed and despondent. I would rather have had a drunken negotiator. I dislike the cold sober Americans. You remember, comrade, what that old foreign-devil — Quincey or Quancey, who ate opium — said: "Men are not disguised in liquor but by sobriety." I say, let us have around us enemies who are fat and not disguised. (Beginning to ramble) Remember the good old Yenan Caves? I wonder whatever happened to that old distillery up there. Did Chu Teh put any Party money into it? I wouldn't put it past him. And of course (an old gleam in his eye) that was where I first met —

Chou (swiftly): Chairman, your warm human sentiments are always the foundation of the People's Republic and mean certain victory for world revolution. But, to close this minor incident, may I suggest that we "indicate" to the White House that the man Watson's excesses — if proven — do not decrease our cautious confidence in — nor increase our "tensions" over — the promises extended in Peking?

Mao (relaxed): Fair enough. And tell them we'll provide the *mao-tai* for the Paris talks. What's that Ambassador drink? Gibson? But isn't that his name? Oh, *Watson*. Queer lingo. Let's give them the old *mao-tai*. What about one for you for the Long March, comrade? (A tucket sounds. Chou exits. Madam Mao enters. Curtain.)

now sat down to fill out
a form, discovered, what with
the way she had lived the year
over to year level.

surprised her. She hadn't
been impoverished. A bit

of money, having tried it

on some perverse plea-
ragerly. But she is, as I

n't her dominant trait.
the beauty of the other
a woman without wishing she
drink his booze with-
the bottle home.

She was a dropout. She
lives indignant. Loves

been an avid contend-

ing that a job is
the best, but the world
to a career girl.

that in her secret
City as a slave mar-
sold ourselves to our

the sees as Egyptian
rows of faces in the
good trusty status, al-
though but only on
by lock-step time

(Or is she? Some-

Or is she? Some-
self jobless for
d a lot of reading,
doesn't usually

year of poverty
poverty, and that

She thought about all the members of
minorities who are hungering for jobs,
yearning for a place in the rat race.

"Gee," she said, "I'd be glad to give one
of those people my job.

"I mean, I've done it, I've been there,
and I don't think it's so great. They
haven't, and they think it would be. And
maybe for them it would.

"So instead of putting them on welfare,
when what they want is a job, why not have
the government give me a living allowance,
and in exchange I would give someone my
job.

"It doesn't have to be a big allowance.
About what I drew on unemployment would
be okay."

SHE THEN BEGAN to expand on the
idea.

"There must be lots of people who feel
the way I do," she said, "people who get no
thrill out of the nine-to-five thing. They
would be glad to give their seat in the slave
galley to someone else if they just had
enough to live on.

"So why not put them on welfare, or
whatever you want to call it, and give their
jobs to people who are being discriminated
against?

"For them it would be no stigma to take
the money. By giving up their jobs they
would perform a patriotic service."

She paused and looked at me sharply.

"You're laughing at me," she said.

"No," I said, "I think it's a novel idea."

"So do I," she said.

And then she confided that she had
phoned one of our leaders in the field of
civil rights and equal opportunity to discuss
her novel idea with him.

"What was his reaction?" I asked.

"It was odd," she replied. "Poor fellow,
I think he felt endangered."

© Bildarchiv, Germany, 1970

"Naturally, the fans resent you! ... A mere um-
pire sending their $150,000-a-year idol to the
showers!"

Bob Considine

xerox
PR

The Non-Powers
Behind Thrones

Beautiful Cindy Adams, hostess on a segment of this weekend's NBC's "Monitor" program, asked me what I knew about "powers behind the throne."

Sounded pretty sinister, but all I could think of was
tame stuff.

Like Henry Kissinger. He must be the closest thing
we've got to an old-style Svengali. There are people in
Washington who swear he has the same malignant influ-
ence over President Nixon as Rasputin had over Czarina
Alexandra and Czar Nicholas.

At a recent dinner in Washington, which Kissinger
attended, Senator Barry Goldwater said, in the course of
his talk, "Feed a German a Chinese meal and — one
hour later — he's hungry for power."

Everybody laughed, including Kissinger. The Senator
from Arizona had cut close to the bone, but there were no
exchanges of cards for a duel the following morning. The
general outlook is that Kissinger is not at all like a Colo-
nel House, who is believed to have run the executive
office of the government during the period when a stroke
rendered President Woodrow Wilson non compos mentis.

Kissinger prefers the public life. He likes pretty girls,
likes to take them out on the town. He laughs, and he
says things that all identified "men behind the throne"
would never have dared say.

arris

Fuzz Be Fuzzy

a policeman in
to file suit in
order to compel
a permit longer.

or fuzz if they
wer seen a photo
of 1890 or so is
virtually every
andlebar mus-
gave them an
look.

Since more than half all the crimes in
the U.S. are committed by youths under 21,
one of the most important tools in crime
prevention, it would seem, is for the police
to relate more effectively to the youth com-
munity. But actually, as we know, there
has been a growing estrangement between
police and youth in the U.S. over the last
decade.

WHILE IT would be naive to assume

THE
member
more th

The
Ass
one of
minister

At the
applica-
tion of
qualified
trust ag

About
that his
that his
within ty

He did
pension
thereup
were he
band's p

Kissinger
touch
some
azzi,
Fy

12

The Boston Globe

Friday, May 19, 1972

# Bok leads Ivy leaders in talk with Kissinger

The Presidents of all eight Ivy League colleges and Stanford University met with presidential adviser Henry Kissinger and several congressional leaders during an antiwar lobbying effort in Washington earlier this week.

Harvard President Derek Bok set up the Wednesday meeting with Kissinger, a government professor on leave from Harvard.

Their 90-minute discussion was made completely off the record at Kissinger's request.

The nine college presidents wanted to dramatize the fact that antiwar sentiment is still very strong on college campuses.

They also met with Republican Congressmen John B. Anderson of Illinois, William S. Mailliard of California, and Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford of Michigan.

Before their conference with Kissinger, the group met with House Majority Whip Thomas P. O'Neill (D-Mass.) to discuss their lobbying strategy.

# Camelio says city drivers entered cars they towed

The attorney for 14 tow truck drivers employed by the Boston Police Dept. yesterday admitted that his clients did enter cars they towed to the city garage at Kneeland and Atlantic avenue, and occasionally opened the glove compartments.

Augustus Camelio, counsel for the American Federation of state, county and municipal employees in a hearing before Boston Police Cmmr. Edmund L McNamara, said, however, his clients were unaware that such entries violated regulations. The alleged violations occurred from Feb. 22 to March 16, 1972.

The drivers, who were suspended with pay last month, are charged with violating departmental regulations which prohibit

had instructed drivers to enter cars to remove registration certificates and valuables. The valuables were then stored for safekeeping in the Traffic and Parking Commission trailer located on the parking lot, they said.

McNamara said he would give a decision on the case in a "couple of days."

Make $250 work like $1,000.

Mike
Royko

The reading
of the will

"If you will be seated, sir, I will read the will."

"Will this take long?"

"Not at all, Mr. President."

"Good. I'm new on the job and I've got a lot to do."

"I understand."

"To tell the truth, I didn't even know a will was involved."

"There has to be a will, sir. The new administration always inherits various things from the outgoing administration. And that wouldn't be legal without a will."

"Then let's get on with it."

"Of course. Let me see, here . . . being of sound mind, I, the undersigned . . ."

"Skip the legalities and just tell me what I'm inheriting."

"Surely. Ah, here's the part . . . And I do bequeath to my successor, the mounting inflation, rising unemployment and, of course, the war."

"The what?"

"The war."

"Wait a minute, I don't want that thing."

"But you have inherited it, sir."

"Do I have to take it?"

"OF COURSE. AS YOU KNOW, President Kennedy left it to President Johnson. And he left it to President Nixon. And President Nixon left it to his successor, and he passed it on to the next man, and he did the same, and so on and so on. And now it has been handed down to you. If I may say so, it is one of the oldest parts of the estate."

"How about if I just give it away. Would that be legal?"

"Yes, but I don't think you'll find anyone who wants it. It is quite expensive to maintain, you know. The French had it for awhile, and they finally abandoned it. That's when we assumed title, and it has been ours ever since."

"Well, how about if I just sort of quietly lose it?"

"Oh, you surely don't want to be the first President to do that. What would history say?"

"Then what am I going to do with the thing? It's a white elephant."

"Not necessarily. It's very useful in such matters as seeking a just and a lasting peace. Without it, you couldn't go looking for a just and lasting peace, a peace with honor."

"But if I didn't have it, I wouldn't have to look for peace because we'd already have peace."

"Ah, but you would not have provided it. Don't you want to be the one who gets credit for obtaining a just and a lasting peace with honor?"

"That would be nice, I guess, for the scrapbook."

"Of course it would."

"WELL, THEN, HOW DO YOU SUGGEST I use it to get a just and a lasting peace with honor?"

"I'm afraid you can't. It's too late for that now. If you win at all costs, it may not be considered just, or lasting."

"Then what do I do with the thing?"

"If you learn to operate it properly, you might find it serviceable and useful."

"An old war?"

"Oh, yes. You can always make it smaller — wind it down, as they say. Then you will be praised as a man of peace who is extricating us from a difficult and tragic situation."

"That sounds good."

"Or you can make it bigger — escalate it, as they say. Then everyone will rally around you, as is the tradition, and hail you as a man of courage who must make agonizing decisions in the world's loneliest job."

"I like that, too. Which one do you suggest?"

"You can do both. Experience has shown this to be best. Wind it down for awhile, then escalate it for awhile, then wind it down again."

"What's the good of that?"

"Public opinion. By alternating, at any given moment you will either be hailed as a man of peace or a courageous leader making agonizing decisions."

"In the world's loneliest job?"

"RIGHT. OR ANOTHER EXCELLENT approach is to wind it down and escalate it at the same time. This is done by adding more ground troops, while reducing bombing, or reducing the ground troops while increasing the bombing. That way you are always winding something down, which means you are seeking peace, and you are always escalating it and making an agonizing decision."

"Right."

"Well, I'll tell you what I think. It's a lot of bother for such an old war."

"True. Which leaves you another option."

"What's that?"

"You can trade this one in for a newer and bigger one."

"That's a thought. We'll have to talk about that. Say, what's your name?"

"Henry."

"What do you do around here, Henry?"

"This."

National Association of Newspaper Publishers,
and Amalgamated Publishers, Inc. (API).

New Church Power

Abandoning all efforts to cover its tracks, the Catholic Church bluffed, bamboozled and bulldozed its way through the frightened state legislature last week to roll back the liberal achievements of recent years. Legislators who wanted to stand their ground were threatened with a church-backed campaign in their districts this year. Even during the sophisticated heyday of the late Cardinal Spellman, the church maintained a facade of decorum and hid its activities behind acceptable alternatives. It often refused to use naked power and Cardinal Spellman knew when to quietly retreat for fear that a blatant church entry into politics would anger not only others in the state but his own constituency, which time and time again has shown its distatate for those who mix religion and politics.

The campaign to repeal the abortion law went as far as the White House. At a critical moment in the debate, President Nixon's letter to Cardinal Cooke was "inadvertently" released due to "bad staff work." The net effect was to warn the ambitious Governor of the President's personal feelings on the subject.

When Governor Rockefeller courageously raised his back, the White House retreated and said the letter was a "private" one and should not have been released. But the damage was done. The power of the Church was demonstrated and the frightened legislators ran for the hills.

Church lobbyists in Albany also reminded frightened legislators of what happened to their former colleague, who cast the winning vote for Abortion Reform in 1970. He lost his seat in the Assembly, his law practice broke up, he was ostracized in his own community, and "as God would have it," they said, he was in a serious automobile accident.

Next on the lobbyists' agenda was aid to

power 15 defeat but in the interim all the carefully stored good will between religions and races is bartered for the hard goods of power. Unless the church turns back and keeps its hands out of politics, it will lose more, in the long run, than it gains.

Kissinger's Strategy

For those stunned and confused by the President's sudden escalation of the war, some comfort can be found by reading the collected works of Henry Kissinger. The President's top foreign policy advisor is intellectually enamored of the concept of achieving international stability by dividing up the world into spheres of compatible interest. What is needed to make his theory work are large, ambitious powers and small, frightened nations. The big powers get together and decide on their spheres of influence and once an accomodation is made, the smaller nations, with no real power (money, arms, men) must abide.

That theory was moved towards real life by the President's successful visit to China and the Russian lack of retaliatory action in the face of President Nixon's provocative escalation of the war. It is reliably reported that a Russian ship was sunk and two damaged in recent raids, and the Chinese have charged that two of their ships were also hit. Only a few months ago that would have triggered an atomic alert in this nation, but not with Kissinger at the helm.

In what may have been a master stroke, the Russian naval leaders were in Washington and watched the President's talk in the home of an administration aide, quietly sipping their drinks and hibbling on snacks. In the grand old days of Kissinger-like politics, this would have been a forceful sign that an accomodation had been reached.

In what may turn out to be the irony of the century, North and South Vietnam may suddenly have a common interest. World accomodation can not be disturbed by warring nations. In the

attempted into open Gallo pro- portunity. The major lea- pectedly, the Gallo organized fearing for and finger- guts about

What has acceptable police-MA- formed of the killers first time continue cumstanc- that a k protection out the w

The N. newspape the esca- the inform story. But times in the inside least one and sur- made kno in traffic.

The peo- tipped I cooperate be assu- relations

It is ev- top of the tradition. But unde- are the m police d

The po- the leak d under co- Until that of two ci-

May 13, 1972, MANHATTAN TRIBUNE, Page 5

3, 1972

parochial schools. Although the court has consistently ruled that such assistance is illegal, the Church mounted a campaign, using the children from the parochial schools and confrontation tactics to express its displeasure with the Courts. Cynical politicians (including, in this instance, the Governor), pandered to the pressure of the Church and assembled new legislation which is clearly unconstitutional. President Nixon once again came to the aid of the Church and announced that he would seek Constitutional means to provide federal revenues to keep the parochial system alive. Privately the legislators conceded that the proposed legislation would be thrown out by the courts, but they cynically said their actions now would "keep the Church happy."

Minority representatives in Albany saw the Church's efforts against legislation they considered vital as a racial attack, again stirring up bitter old arguments which had begun to heal early this year.

Ironically, lobbyists who were campaigning for the repeal of the abortion law and drafting devious legislation for new state aid to parochial schools, were simultaneously currying around the corridors of the Legislature making deals to defeat no-fault insurance, a cause in which the church has no interest at all, causing observers to wonder if a deal had been made between the two groups.

And to top it off, the same group was campaigning for a return of the death penalty.

There is room in New York politics for dissent, but this opposition takes on a new character when it involves the raw use of power by a religious institution. That is what happened in Albany this year.

There will be a counter-attack on many fronts because of the blatant efforts of the church, but the main attack must come from within the diocese itself. Catholics in this state have time and time again demonstrated their distaste for the church's role in politics. Almost every time a church supported issue directly reaches the voters, it is overwhelmingly defeated in the Catholic precincts. The same courage is not reflected in the Legislature, where the treat of a well-financed emotional campaign looms as the penalty for any man who defines the church's desire.

The inevitable conclusion of these attempts at

long run these nations must settle down or the big powers, on whom they must depend, will withdraw their support.

Yet the nuclear stakes are too high to remain calm in the wake of the Kissinger academic efforts. The North Vietnamese have launched an invasion which they knew would trigger a violent response from the President. They knew their continued success was dependent on supplies from the Soviet Union (and to a lesser extent, from China). They could have predicted that these supplies would have been challenged, and they knew they would eventually force their allies to choose between support of their war and disruption of the Kissinger plan. The consequences of that decision could be a third world war.

Unexplained, to this date, is the timing of the North Vietnamese invasion, the relatively quiet response of China and Russia, and the secret agreements which Kissinger may have negotiated in the President's name and without Congressional approval.

## Connally Again

Treasury Secretary Connally took another long stride towards abandoning his Democratic base when he said, in the wake of the President's escalation of the war and the Democratic reaction, that the Democrats should abandon their own views and patriotically support Mr. Nixon. As he rambled on, he pictured those who oppose the President's actions as being less than traitors — but not by much.

The explanation for his own escalation of rhetoric may lie in the fact that his own political base in Texas was shattered last week when reformers won an upset victory.

The Tribune respectfully suggests that the immaculate, grey-haired Texas dandy stop calling himself a Democrat and finally bite the Nixon bullet.

## Mafia & Police

The gangland warfare that started with the

Red and scarlet the process.

# Anthony Lewis

## Continued Illusion

LONDON

VIETNAM WILL NOT BE AN issue in the campaign as far as this administration is concerned, because we will have brought the American involvement to an end.

—Richard Nixon, December, 1971.

The Nixon withdrawal from Vietnam has always had something of an illusory character. While American ground troops left, other military involvement continued or intensified. From carriers and from enlarged bases in Thailand, American bombers attacked Laos and both parts of Vietnam. American planes and supplies supported a larger war effort in Cambodia. The Phantom CIA army fought in Laos.

Many Americans nevertheless believed—because their President said so and they wanted to believe—that their part in the Indochina war would soon be over. Now that belief must

Lewis

be dead—gone the way of all the other officially propagated about Vietnam.

The South Vietnamese, we had been told, were making remarkable progress, their million-man army confident, their political situation stable. The Communists had never rebuilt their Southern infrastructure after the losses of TET 1968. The war was going better than we had hoped.

It took less than a week for the new Communist offensive to shatter that picture and to send President Thieu of South Vietnam crying for help. Of course he cried to Richard Nixon. The response was the familiar one: more B-52's, more destroyers, more carriers, more close air support, more bombing of the north, more U.S. involvement.

## SURELY NOW THERE CANNOT be any informed person on earth who fails to understand what is the result of the Nixon-Kissinger formula for "peace" and "stability" in Indochina: perpetual war and perpetual American involvement. Unless the war ends on our terms, with Communist acceptance of the Thieu government, we shall keep killing the inhabitants of Indochina — from a distance..

The Communist offensive did put Nixon in a difficult position. No American President wants to be seen abandoning a policy under duress, this one least of all. But it was Nixon and Henry Kissinger who painted themselves into the corner where they have no options except more of the destruction that everyone knows is morally outrageous and politically useless.

When Nixon took office three years ago, he could have recognized the political realities of Vietnam and left the internal forces there to work out their own balance. Instead he has continued to make the attempt to impose our solution.

## HE DID SO, ACCORDING TO REPORT, on the advice of Henry Kissinger that the other side could not indefinitely withstand our superior force and would have to agree to terms. In short, he could bomb them into settling.

But that was the oldest, most tattered official illusion of them all. From Lyndon Johnson's tragedy came the lesson that in a limited war the United States has limited power to impose its terms. If Henry Kissinger did indeed ignore that lesson, he will have a heavy reckoning to pay in history for three more years of pointless death in Indochina — or four or five or ten. For on the present policy, how can anyone pick a date when the war will end?

The Kissinger-Nixon justification for going on in Vietnam is that we must preserve our credibility as a world power. But a great country can justify such relentless destruction of another only if its own safety, its vital strategic interest, is urgently at stake. And virtually no one believes that about Vietnam any more.

St. Louis Post-Dispatch 4/10/72

Miami Herald 4/19/72

PEOPLE

MEREDITH

Meredith:
A Return
To Ole Miss

THE MAN who made civil rights history when he integrated the University of Mississippi in 1962 returned to Ole Miss Tuesday, this time to teach history.

James Meredith was due on the Oxford campus for the first time since he became the university's first black graduate in 1963.

He said at his home in Jackson, Miss., that he had been asked to teach a class on Mississippi history during his visit.

"I will probably review the political history of Mississippi . . . probably from territorial days, certainly from pre-Civil War days," he said.

Meredith's trip to Oxford was also to formally launch his campaign for the Republican nomination for the U.S. Senate seat now held by Sen. James O. Eastland, a Democrat.

Meredith entered Ole Miss in 1962 behind federal troops, federalized National Guardsmen and federal marshals. A riot occurred on the campus, in which two persons died.

'Dear Henry,' Did you
Treat the Lady Dirty?

A FRENCH paperback book published this week in Paris gives a portrait of Henry Kissinger by a French woman journalist who fell in love with him while on assignment in Washington.

"Dear Henry" tells of the unrequited love of 49-year-old Danielle Hunebelle, journalist, author and film producer, for President Nixon's national security adviser.

Miss Hunebelle said she wrote the book because she "could not forgive" Kissinger for betraying "the sacred character of friendship."

She referred to an incident when Kissinger passed through Paris last July on his way back from Peking. She said the "betrayal" was Kissinger's dining out with Margaret Osmer,

an associate producer for CBS television, during his short stopover in Paris.

"The shock traumatized me. I could not eat for a week," Miss Hunebelle said.

The book gives a series of anecdotes concerning Kissinger, 48, during their meetings in Washington, Los Angeles and Paris.

Mostly flattering, Miss Hunebelle occasionally became caustic and at one point charged Kissinger with having "as much finesse as a tank."

The dedication is "To Henry."

KISSINGER

of Fighting

soon it's all
up, 23, of Kilgore,
the Huey's other
reported it was
Vietnamese anti-
lances like this,"
ing from a chain
says he isn't
cared every time
the ground. Not
"

aircraft position, dropped a Willie Pete
(white phosphorous) smoke grenade and zig-
zagged away to let the Cobras have a shot.

The Cobras' bullets left puffs of red
marker smoke in the sky as they whooshed
downward and blew apart the gun emplace-
ment.

Two North Vietnamese soldiers suddenly
jumped from a bunker and tried to make it
across the beach to the cover of underbrush.

The Loach twisted down and opened up
with machine-gun fire, killing one of the sol-
diers. The other managed to dive into the
brush.

ns 100's have
than:
ngs,

S,
ers.
flavor
em.

cotine.

Menthol too.

Filter and Menthol, 16 mg. "tar", 1.1 mg. nicotine av. per cigarette, FTC Report Aug. 71.

'Dear
Henry'
Kissinger

PARIS (UPI) — A French paperback published this week gives a portrait of Henry Kissinger by a French woman journalist who fell in love with him while on assignment in Washington.

"Dear Henry," tells of the unrequited love of 49-year-old Danielle Hunebelle, journalist, author and film producer, for President Nixon's national security adviser.

She referred to an incident when Kissinger passed through Paris last July on his way back, as it was later disclosed, from Peking. She said the "betrayal" was Kissinger's dining out with Margaret Osmer, an associate producer for Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) television, during his short stopover in Paris.

"The shock traumatized me. I could not eat for a week," Miss Hunebelle says.

Jacksonville Journal 4/18/72

The latest Pentagon procurement controversy. That is obvious to Mr. Laird and to Mr. Aspin, and the latter's critical counterpart in the Senate, William Proxmire, also a Wisconsin Democrat. But we believe it is politics at its most valuable, and urge Messrs. Proxmire and Aspin on.

There has been a wealth of cumulative evidence in the last few months that the Pentagon procurement fraternity—and its bosses, including inevitably Mr. Laird—are unable to operate on any basis even approaching soundness.

The most recent of that evidence came in a letter from Mr. Aspin to Mr. Laird, charging that "apparently inter-service rivalry between the Army and Navy will again cost the taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars" in connection with heavy-lift helicopter development.

In simplified essence, the Army has been seeking a helicopter which can raise loads weighing 22.5 tons. The Navy had a need for a lift capacity of 16 tons, and has contended that the Army's plans

the armed services.

Last December, the appropriations committees of both the House and Senate—acting in conference to resolve different versions of last year's defense appropriations bill—specifically instructed the Pentagon to go ahead on the development of a single helicopter.

A month later, the Defense Department ordered the Army and Navy to proceed with development of completely separate machines. Congress was not consulted.

In assessing the effect, Mr. Aspin, a former Defense Department systems analyst, asserted that "if the Pentagon successfully defies Congress, it may cost the taxpayers as much as $1 billion."

We shudder at that—but we think there would be an even greater cost in the constitutional precedent which would be set by such arrogant defiance of the will of Congress by the Executive.

If Mr. Laird does not act swiftly and firmly to reverse the order and discipline those responsible, Congress should take action to force him to do so.

## Mr. Specter raises a question

Philadelphia District Attorney Arlen Specter, with klieg lights and fanfare, has charged a reporter for the Philadelphia Bulletin with illegally recording telephone conversations without permission of the people he was talking with. Mr. Specter has embarked on a perilous course.

We have no taste for settling here a number of questions raised by Mr. Specter's action, and which properly will be answered by judicial process.

Among those issues are the guilt or innocence of Greg Walter, the reporter involved; the legitimacy of the method in which the alleged evidence was obtained by the Police Department and Mr. Specter; and the constitutionality of the statute under which Mr. Walter was arrested, as it applies to the circumstances of the case against him.

## Cheers & jeers

**CHEERS:** To Mrs. Leon Sullivan for graduating from Beaver College after 20 years of part-time study and unflagging determination to earn a bachelor's degree.

**JEERS:** To the city bureaucrats involved in giving the stadium parking contract to a firm with reputed connections with organized criminal elements and...

**CHEERS:** To Mayor Rizzo for cracking down on them.

**JEERS:** To postal authorities in Northern Ireland for refusing to deliver government leaflets telling homeowners how to reduce bomb casualties because the leaflets violated advertising regulations by naming suppliers of materials.

Each of these questions will be examined in the weeks ahead. That is time enough for considering their merits.

What disturbs us now is the question of motive and intent. It was raised by Sandy Oppenheimer, president-elect of the local chapter of Sigma Delta Chi, the national professional journalists' society.

"It seems odd," Mr. Oppenheimer said, that the law under which Mr. Walter is being prosecuted "would suddenly be applied to a reporter conducting an investigation with the knowledge of the State Crime Commission."

The investigation, of course, concerned allegations of systematic corruption in the Philadelphia Police Department. It was an extension of one begun and still pursued by this newspaper, and which has been pressed forward by others, including the Bulletin.

In the course of the investigation, we believe, constructive initiative has been taken by the Pennsylvania State Crime Commission and by Shane Creamer, state attorney general. Mr. Specter's response, however, has been generally less enterprising, although his office has proceeded on some specific cases against allegedly corrupt policemen, many of them after disclosure in newspapers.

It was in this context that Mr. Oppenheimer pledged that "Sigma Delta Chi will be watching this case closely to determine whether the law is being used to protect or, instead, to abuse the public's interest."

As will we. For if future developments should support the latter conclusion, they will raise grave questions about Mr. Specter's judgment as a public servant.

Itty. Political candidates who feel it an advantage to "press the flesh" through all kinds of maneuvers involving diverse assemblies of the curious need to appraise the practicality of such tactics.

Thoughtful citizens simply are not impressed with conventional ballyhoo, whether in shopping-center rallies, blaring sound trucks, or the inane gimmicks which for too long have constituted the bag of tricks conceived and executed by the promotional people for candidates, irrespectively of party.

CHARLES U. SHELLENBERGER Ardsley.

## Where is lottery?

To the Editor:

Can someone explain why the welfare system in our state is broke?

## Loss of the Expo

## Why can't nation celebrate

AVTH

To the Editor:

The reason for the hysteria over the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission's decision in Boston is obscure to me. No objection has been raised to Philadelphia's being the focal point for the 1976 celebrations. No prohibition has yet been placed on the visit by people from anywhere in the world to join us in celebrating our country's birthday.

The Paris-based International Exposition group, however, did object to our using an international expo program indorsed by them as a 200th birthday celebration for the United States. Russia and England would have refused to participate, and Japan objected to the presence of American concepts in the theme.

The commission in Boston rightly refused to approve plans which would have sacrificed our history for the sake of foreign ideologies related to the intellectual climate in Europe our forefathers sought to escape by establishing a new nation on the North American continent.

JOSEPH PAUL MORRIS JR.

Ambler.

To the Editor:

In Philadelphia in 1976, the 200th birthday of this great nation, there will be no celebration. The Bicentennial International Exposition with its theme of peace for all mankind is dead.

It is terribly shocking and disheartening, for the

## Know the

To the Editor:

In reply to Arlen Specter's May 17, may I add that 55 percent of our readers accept assassins as public understanding, and that the product of a diseased society is not a cure.

But isn't it better to be public understanding than a diseased society?

Only by knowing and devise and prevention, including rific media system, the knowledge and means for cure.

This is encouraging, but who are students of history?

Newark, Del.

Who is getting the money from the Pennsylvania Lottery? Was it not for the aged and the poor? Have the buyers of lottery tickets lost faith in the Pennsylvania Lottery?

Something must be very wrong in this lottery.

JOE J. GILLE

Philadelphia.

## Lindsey article

To the Editor:

Having read the Opp-Ed Page article by Mr. Richard W. Lindsey, chairman of the state Board of Probation and Parole, I must say that the statistics he cites are quite impressive.

I would like to see Mr. Lindsey write more articles. Perhaps then the public will become aware of just how

the lack of federal funding for "nervous nellies". Mr. Bunting, chairman of the Bicentennial Corporation, dealt the death blow to ical reasons, nor tified.

For the information we the people lieve that the purpose of the Nixon Administration is peace, the world.

Yet this same and this same cally or other million to the people for the purpose of national expositio

Billions upon billions of people, desiring land in the nation, can commit themselves to it is necessary that the responsibility of the strongest, striving to maintain the life of the nation, can but unive

But if this America and the United States, the birth of a new nation, to vision and this individual enjoy?

Philadelphia