ARMS CONTROL ATTITUDES (1957-1960)

Preliminary.

Any complete compendium of Western (especially American) opinions about disarmament would be a stupendous and confused undertaking. With no other pressing international problem have the shadow and the substance been so distinct from one another. Inevitably, many persons directly concerned with other aspects of political regulation have had to address themselves to this question, often without sufficient background on which to base a judgment. Their statements have gone into the general pool of attitudes which, especially in the absence of a dynamic or consistent U.S. government policy, have clouded and continue to cloud the issue. Within the scope of disarmament, moral, hygienic, strategic, and political imperatives are expounded as holy writ and collide heavily upon each other.

There are many categorical approaches by which these attitudes can be defined, for the ramifications of disarmament are as wide as international politics itself. Such issues as the national economy, disengagement, the evolution of Soviet society, and other famous topics are drawn into the vortex of the disarmament controversy. So is the ideal picture of the world of law we should like to see evolving; so, too, are the various conceptions of the national interest. The method we have chosen is not entirely arbitrary, for it is based on sound empirical criteria. The extensive examination of large amounts of documentation on disarmament has led to the choice of twelve essential categories of argument or discussion which seem to comprehend the virtual whole of this material. Certain others, such as U.S. government organization, could be added, but are in this case passed over as peripheral to the major strategic and political problems raised by possible measures of arms control.

These categories are as follows:

1. Desirability and Utility of the Nuclear Test Ban.

2. The Problems of Surprise Attack and Communications.

3. The Nature of the Nth Country Problem.

4. Arms Control and the National Economy.

5. "Package" and "Piecemeal" Negotiation.

6. The Relation of Disarmament to Political Settlement.

7. Unilateral Restraints and Abstinence from Nuclear Activity.

8. Inspectability and Treaty Problems.

9. General Disarmament vs. Stable Deterrent Systems.

10. The Uses of Negotiation.

11. Dangers in the Absence of Arms Control.

12. Mutual Interest in Arms Control.

It will be seen that certain categories may be subdivided, such as Eight, which includes special points like the Chinese Communist question, and hence impinges on the territory of the Nth Country Problem and the matter of catalytic war. Correspondences between Category One and Category Ten are manifest; likewise the points implicit in Categories Eleven and Twelve and Five and Nine tend to draw together on occasion. We have assigned evidence to the category where it seemed the most relevant.

Disarmament is, of course, a problem in evolution. Yesterday's hypotheses are today's truths and tomorrow's vulgar errors. What seemed brilliant in 1957 may be patently false in 1960. This is not only because of the new vistas afforded by a galloping armaments technology, but also because of progressively deeper insights into some of the abiding problems. For there is a substratum that stays relatively constant, while of course the unmasking of a prior absurdity is no reason whatever for that absurdity to be exorcised, particularly if influential persons or governments have committed themselves to it.

There are many problems and confusions that could be instantly cited in virtually all public and private responses to arms control questions. But the principal one undoubtedly is, on the part of the United States, the failure of the country to profess or articulate a grand strategy in any way consistent with its pathologically repetitive declarations on the subject of arms control. An integrated view of how international relations could be stabilized simply cannot be found in official sources.

The following quoted material should serve to indicate many of the contradictions that have plagued the Western approach to arms control since it became, if not entirely sane, at least serious in early 1957. There is a continuity to this period which makes the background of these observations coherent, since experts and government negotiators and policy-makers were generally aware from this date on of the more basic complexities raised by the prospect of ICBM's, the possibilities of outer space, and the existence of the Nth country problem. Suez and Sputnik circumscribe the year in which these discoveries were made; it may be that the brief era is coming shortly to an end with the deployment of invulnerable deterrent systems, the anticipation of a "neutron bomb," and the race to develop anti-missile defenses.

We present this material without extended comment, in as full a context as seems necessary for avoiding the risk of distortion.

***

3

CATEGORY ONE: DESIRABILITY AND UTILITY OF THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN

[This is the most heated and extended argument that has been waged in the United States in the arms control field, owing to the protracted negotiations with the Soviet Union at Geneva (1958-- ). Arguments for and against the test ban, with processes of reasoning, are presented here, more or less chronologically. See also, Categories Eight and Ten.]

1. Letter from AEC Commissioner Strauss to Senator Humphrey, June 11, 1957, quoted from Control and Reduction of Armaments (hereafter, Control; see explanatory bibliography at rear):

"Although the United States can meet a number of nuclear weapon requirements on the basis of present development, a test cessation would affect the development of improved and new weapons delivery systems. . . that are available and becoming available. . . . Though there can be a very limited extrapolation of present information without testing, a cessation of tests would seriously cripple our development work in this vital defense area."

2. *London Times*, Washington dispatch, April 21, 1958:

"The first and favourite argument advanced by those who have insisted that American tests must continue (notably Mr. Strauss, of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Dr. Teller) has been that 'clean' bombs must be developed. . . . Last month Brigadier-General Starbird, the A.E.C. expert on the military application of nuclear weapons, told the Senate disarmament sub-committee that 'we see no way of making a weapon completely clean,' and the President admitted this month that there was in so-called clean weapons 'a percentage of what you would call a dirty residual.'

"The second line of defence taken by Mr. Strauss and those of his bent has been that there could be no method of inspection that would make impossible breaches of an agreement to suspend tests. The great distances at which subterranean nuclear and chemical explosions have recently been detected have discredited this argument.

"Mr. Strauss has now retreated to a third and perhaps last ditch position, arguing that to suspend tests would leave the United States with 'an obsolete and obsolescent weapons system'; it needed 'light, rugged, and instantly ready' nuclear weapons. . . "

3. Hans Bethe, testimony to Humphrey Subcommittee, quoted by Washington Post, May 7, 1958:

"If testing continues, then they [the Russians] will surely attain the same level of capability as we, and I feel that it is just a matter of simple logic that for the relative standing it is more advantageous to stop when you know that you are still ahead."

4. *New York Times* (Geneva dispatch), November 23, 1958:

"*The supply of nuclear arms for West Germany will not help the United States' moral position in disarmament talks with the Soviet Union, [Senator Humphrey] said. It is one thing for the United States to possess nuclear arms, 'but it is another thing to arm the Germans with them while talking about restriction of nuclear arms,' he commented. . . . (con't. next page)

"He contended that the United States has the most to gain and the least to lose from a [nuclear test] suspension. There are already 'enough weapons to destroy everybody,' he said."

(Note: Senator Humphrey no longer believes in an interminable unilateral test moratorium, however. He feels that if progress towards a treaty in the Geneva talks is not made by June, we should resume underground shots.)

5. Richard M. Nixon, quoted in *NYT*, November 13, 1959:

"Having all the facts [affecting the continuation of the nuclear test moratorium], I can say that the President reached the right decision."

6. Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (Rep.-Ia), interview, *Christian Science Monitor*, March 30, 1960:

"If we can make some real progress in the atomic field [of disarmament], then the offers made by both ourselves and the Russians for what might be considered coincidental disarmament in the ground forces could be taken up-- as each nation approaches the discussions with good faith and there is good will on both sides and a determination for genuine disarmament."

(Note: a version of the familiar argument that one good deed deserves another.)

7. Herbert F. York, testimony to the Senate Space Committee, quoted by *WP*, March 31, 1960:

"We are, I believe, well ahead in this [nuclear] field. When you are ahead, if both sides stop and really stop, it seems reasonable to me that this will leave a permanent advantage with us."

8. Walter Lippmann, *WP*, March 31, 1960:

"Much of the opposition [to the negotiated test ban], as it issues from the Atomic Energy Commission and the Pentagon, is based on the assumption that if we resume the race in the development of nuclear weapons, the United States will surely be the winner of the race. But have we the right to make this optimistic assumption?"

(Note: a curious antithesis of the above.)

9. Warren Umma, "Atomic Tremors," *WP*, April 23, 1960:

"Teller believes that this country should continue testing to develop its tactical weapons. . . Secondarily, Teller doubts that any detection system can be made workable within the next five to 10 years and suspects the Russians always will find a way to cheat on a test ban no matter how good the detection net. . . .

"Apart from the Teller School, there are now two other [scientific] factions:

"1. The group which wants at least a temporary test ban because they think it will be equivalent to quitting while you are ahead. . .

"2. The group of scientists, a good many of them members of the Democratic National Committee Advisory Council's scientific panel, which, primarily, feel that the need to prevent nuclear promiscuity is greater than the risks involved in test ban cheating. . ."

10. Freeman J. Dyson, "The Future Development of Nuclear Weapons," Foreign Affairs, XXXVIII, 3, April 1960:

"Any agreement to cease weapon-testing upon a sound and verifiable basis will require an opening of communications and a breaking down of barriers among the nuclear laboratories of the world. . . . The only wise policy for the United States at present is to continue the exploration of nuclear weapons technology, including the testing of weapons, until a reliable control of testing is established." (pp. 457, 463)

11. James E. Dougherty, in Orbis, Fall 1960, agrees with the Dyson analysis:

"[A rational program] would mean, in the first place, an increasingly li-
beral policy in the release of information on security-related developments. . . .
The essential point is that the flow of information be mutually broadened and
that the process of obtaining information become really free." (pp. 280, 282)

12. NYT, May 19, 1960:

"Dr. [Leo] Szilard, who is seriously ill with cancer, expressed doubt that a test ban was too important from the standpoint of disarmament and was skeptical that it would necessarily stop other nations from developing an atom bomb.

"He said he was fearful that the control system now being proposed, with its control posts manned by the nations of the three atomic powers (sic), 'could lead to friction.'"

13. Edward Teller, in *Daedalus*, Autumn 1960, *passim*:

(p. 787) "The on-site inspection of underground shots has developed into a crucial issue. Yet these inspections, even if they were granted in sufficient numbers, would turn out to be difficult and possible futile. On the other hand, another big area of possible evasion [explosions in interplanetary space] could be adequately policed by a simple and straight-forward method."

(p. 791) "The Russians can violate a treaty in secrecy and with certainty that the violation will not be discovered. This holds even if they perform extended series of nuclear tests. The only question is whether they choose to do so."

(p. 793) "By further nuclear testing we can reduce the weight of our nu-
clear explosives. This will result in smaller and more mobile missiles. The
final effect will be that a second-strike force will cost a fraction of what we
haveto spend for it today. Thus [cf. Category Four], a test ban will not re-
duce the cost of armaments. It will do the opposite: it will force us into a
much more expensive program."

(Ibid.) "Tactical nuclear weapons could enable us to build up a counter-force which would neutralize. . . Soviet advantages. Nuclear warfare makes it both necessary and possible to employ widely dispersed forces. In fact, concentration of forces in a nuclear war becomes quite impractical. . . . These small forces are therefore in possession of very great firepower and they can accomplish the same purposes for which in previous wars we had to employ numerous troops."

14. James E. Dougherty, *op. cit.*, *passim*:

(pp 266-272) "Among [fallacious American] assumptions were the following:

"Fallacy 1: Since we and the Soviets had arrived at a nuclear 'stalemate,' we need not push the development of nuclear weapons and further. . . .

"First of all, we must increase the efficiency and the discriminating

character of our missile warheads, so that they would not contaminate the global atmosphere in case of war. . . .

"The second reason for continuing nuclear explosions is the need for de-signing small atomic weapons. . . .

"The third reason. . . is to perfect the technical defense capabilities which are inherent in nuclear technology. . . .

"Fourthly, the continuation of nuclear testing is necessary for the development of 'third generation' nuclear weapons. . . .

"Fallacy 2: Our technical detection capabilities had progressed to a point where the policing of an all-inclusive test-ban was feasible. Moreover, our unilateral moratorium was perfectly safe from the standpoint of national security because our scientists could certainly tell us whether the Soviets were testing.

"The scientists who advised the President in the spring of 1958 committed a serious blunder: they overestimated our ability to detect underground tests. . . .

". . . . Fallacy 4: The nuclear test ban will provide a significant precedent in international arms control administration and will serve to 'open up' the Soviet's closed society. . . .

"The Soviets obviously have no intention of permitting the international staffs of scientists and technicians to engage in either casual movement or unsupervised contacts. If the cultural exchange programs, which involve a much larger number of persons, have not succeeded in opening 'Western windows' into the U.S.S.R., certainly a test ban treaty cannot."

15. Ex-AEC Commissioner Thomas E. Murray, open letter to the Presidential candidates, September 6, 1960:

"From the military point of view, our present policy, to the extent that it is expressed in a self-imposed ban on underground and outer-space tests, has damaged our military security and imperilled our necessary superiority to the Soviet Union in nuclear technology.

"Second, from the political point of view, our present policy, expressed in a self-denying ordinance against all nuclear tests, has been a complete failure. It has not accomplished, and it is not likely to accomplish, any of its stated or supposed political objectives. . . .

"Has it, for instance, convinced the Russians of our will to end or moderate the arms race? Has it dented their conviction that the 'capitalist camp' is 'hostile,' 'war-mongering,' 'intent on destroying the Socialist camp'? Has it limited the so-called 'nuclear club'? Has it moderated neutralist sentiment? Has it contributed to a relaxation of international tensions? Has it diminished the fear of war, accidental or deliberate? Has it gained the United States the initiative in disarmament negotiations? Has it helped to further the possibility of political negotiations? Has it strengthened the alliance of the free world and reinforced the confidence of our allies in our political wisdom? Has it had any good effect whatever on the whole political situation known as the cold war?"

(Note: Upon receiving what he deemed to be unsatisfactory replies from both candidates, Mr. Murray released another open letter on November 4, 1960, in which he described the dangers of Russian cheating on the ban and the prospect of the 'third generation' of nuclear weapons, i.e. the "neutron bomb.")

***

## CATEGORY TWO: THE PROBLEMS OF SURPRISE ATTACK AND COMMUNICATIONS.

[This is not as controversial an issue as the nuclear test ban, but there is considerable disagreement as to its importance as a discrete issue and as to the methods of inspection and surveillance that could meet the problem. U.S government policy has invariably been to place surprise attack high on the list of critical arms control issues; the Russians, it seems, have also recognized the emergency nature of the problem, but are considerably less worried about it with the prospect of the "missile gap" in the next few years. Many observers feel that unilateral measures are considerably more effective than negotiated arms control in treating the danger of surprise attack.]

1. Secretary of State Dulles, quoted in the *London Times*, July 31, 1957:

"If it be demonstrated that the danger of surprise attacks can be and will be reduced, it should be more possible to make progress in reducing the burden of armament and solving the grave political problems which can endanger peace."

2. Roscoe Drummond, in *WP*, May 7, 1958:

"Q-- If Arctic inspection without the Soviet Union doesn't increase the security of the United States, what good is it?

"A-- There are very tangible advantages. The 'alert' flights of American nuclear bombers over the Arctic cause grave anxiety to many governments and many peoples outside the Soviet bloc. They are cited by political opponents of governments now in office-- governments sympathetic to most aspects of United States foreign policy-- as evidence that the United States is reckless and might accidentally start a war."

3. Western Aide-Memoire presented to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, May 29, 1958:

"Until general controlled disarmament becomes a reality, the surest way toward the development of confidence lies in lifting fears of surprise attack. Growing capabilities of surprise attack on a massive scale underscore the importance of a prompt beginning on measures to deal with this problem. The Western Powers want to meet it on the broadest scale possible."

4. U.S. note regarding conference of technicians on surprise attack, November 8, 1958, quoted *NYT* [E.W. Kenworthy], November 9, 1958:

"The United States assumes that decisions as to measures of disarmament which might accompany measures designed to reduce the possibility of surprise attack are political in nature and would, accordingly, be outside the scope of the present conference." (the article continues:)

"Officials here define 'surprise attack' in these terms: an instantaneous attack of such magnitude that it holds the possibility of destroying the retaliatory means, or even of threatening the survival, of the group attacked.

"The West wants the experts to deal with these factual areas:

1. The instruments used in surprise attack-- intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles, guided missiles and manned bombers.

2. The instruments that could be used for detecting surprise attack, or the preparation for launching one-- radar watch networks, aerial reconnaissance, inspection posts and mobile inspection teams.

3. A system, or systems, combining these detection instruments, with an administrative organization for quickly collecting information and transmitting it to both sides."

5. President Eisenhower, UN speech, September 22, 1960, quoted <u>NYT</u>, Sep 23, 1960:

"The United States wants the Soviet Union and all the nations of the world to know enough about United States defense preparations to be assured that United States forces exist only for deterrence and defense-- not for surprise attack."

6. Jerome B. Wiesner, in *Daedalus*, Autumn 1960 (see below), p. 926:

"An inspection system designed to monitor complete disarmament. . . will have no need for ultra-fast or perfectly reliable electrical communication since nearly all required responses will be measured in days, weeks, or months. In addition, to the best of my present ability to estimate, a total disarmament agreement would probably not require a larger inspection force to monitor it than would be required by the proposed (1958) system to warn of a surprise attack."

7. Thomas C. Schelling, in *World Politics*, Autumn 1960 (see below), p. 18:

"If. . . we acknowledge that unpremeditated war, or inadvertant war, or accidental war, or war resulting from a crisis of some sort is a significant possibility, we can assimilate this possibility to the general problem of surprise attack; and there may be a basis for discussing fairly openly just what kinds of joint measures could be taken to reduce misunderstanding in those cases where war caused by misunderstanding is imminent."

***

## CATEGORY THREE: *THE NATURE OF THE Nth COUNTRY PROBLEM.*

[Acute recognition of this problem dates back to 1957. Much of the discussion of the Nth country problem has been mere polemic against French defense policy; these arguments are not included. Many persons have argued that the uncontrolled spread of nuclear weapons would 1) place such arms in the hands of small, belligerent countries which would not hesitate to use them against each other (e.g., Egypt-Israel); 2) increase the dangers of accidental or catalytic war; 3) or allow unstable secondary powers opportunities of blackmail over the Nuclear Greats. It has been suggested that the negotiation of a universal nuclear test ban treaty would greatly impede the Nth countries from developing their arsenals. Some have thought that the functions of the IAEA might be expanded to assure the control of nuclear transfer. The newly-proposed NATO atom-sharing plan seems to cast the old problem in a somewhat different light.]

1. Dulles, speech on TV, July 22, 1957, quoted by <u>NYT</u>, July 23, 1957:

"As matters are going, the time will come when the pettiest and most irresponsible dictator could get hold of weapons with which to threaten immense harm. We believe that it is possible to prevent a promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons throughout the world. But unless international procedures are now devised to bring nuclear weapons under control, the problem may soon become totally unmanageable and we must anticipate that immense destructive power would come into the hands of those who might be quite irresponsible."

2. Humphrey Subcommittee, "Control and Reduction," 1958, p. 52:

"The idea of nuclear deterrence implies a degree of rationality. It assumes that the leaders of a government realize that their own country cannot escape

the catastrophe of nuclear war and that, consequently, they strive to prevent it from occurring. If nuclear weapons are possessed by many countries with different types of governments, the element of rationality would be reduced. In some cases, there might be the temptation to use such weapons without due concern for the consequences."

3. "The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control," National Planning Association pamphlet No. 104, Washington, January 1960, Note 8 (David H. Frisch), p. xv:

"While we are working toward IAEA and arms control agreements between us and the red bloc, we ought to limit the diffusion of nuclear weapons among NATO and other anti-Communist nations for a very simple reason: Nothing will do more to solidify the Warsaw Pact, inhibit possible liberal development within the U.S.S.R., and repel the neutral nations from us, than to allow Germany and Japan-- and eventually Turkey and Pakistan-- to get nuclear weapons."

4. Ibid., p. xix:

"The Committee concludes. . . that direct control of the spread of independent military nuclear power is possible only in terms of larger disarmament arrangements. The promulgation and enforcement of an effective international accord to cease nuclear tests will tend to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by new countries."

5. Hans J. Morgenthau, letter to NYT, published February 23, 1960:

"A realistic evaluation of the world scene has convinced me since 1955 that if the nuclear armaments race cannot be brought under control before any number of nations will (sic) have nuclear weapons, only a miracle will save mankind. . . . If we fail here, we have in all likelihood sealed our and mankind's doom, and the only issue remaining to be settled will be how and when we shall be doomed."

6. President Eisenhower, news conference, March 30, 1960, quoted NYT, Mar 31:

"I don't think that testing will necessarily make destruction more likely, I mean, of your enemy or of yourself; I mean of anyone, any nation, or this one."

"But the perfection of the peaceful uses of this thing, the perfection of the weapons themselves, in using one pound of something where two pounds was necessary before, that's the kind of thing that goes on all the time."

"If we continue to do that, others are going to test in the fields that we have already covered, you see, and finally there will be any number of nations that have it, and I think it ought to be stopped."

7. James E. Dougherty, op. cit.:

"Fallacy 3: A test ban treaty among the 'Big Three' nuclear powers would resolve the so-called 'Nth Country Problem' by limiting the membership in the 'Nuclear Club.'"

"No one has yet come forth with a politically satisfactory explanation of just how the 'Big Three' solution is to be imposed upon all the other nations of the world, especially those with nuclear-power ambitions who have not been parties to the Geneva negotiations (France and Red China). . . ."

8. Edward Teller, *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 784:

"We could prevent the uncontrolled spread of nuclear arms by replacing it with a controlled sharing of our own knowledge and nuclear resources. If we did this, the incentive for independent development would disappear."

9. William R. Frye, *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 734:

"Prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons is a measure designed tangentially to ease the 'fifth' (or nth) country problem, that is, to help prevent the spread of nuclear-weapons technology. Few countries will invest the formidable amount of money and man-hours necessary to build a nuclear weapon if they may not legally test that weapon, once produced, and thus become thoroughly familiar with its performance."

10. Paul Doty, *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 826:

"The security interests of the smaller powers lie in keeping nuclear weaponry stored up in a few countries, in which the variables affecting its release remain manageable."

***

## CATEGORY FOUR: ARMS CONTROL AND THE NATIONAL ECONOMY.

[The effect of arms control programs on the economy will of course depend on the type of measure envisaged. When the problem began to be contemplated, it was generally thought that disarmament would inevitably entail an enormous decrease in public spending and consequent economic maladjustments. The Soviets apparently thought also along this line, which dovetailed well with their ideological dogma that a capitalist economy survived on war expenditure. Moreover, the bulk of American Soviet experts concede that the Russian economy could sanely contemplate, with its totalitarian structure, a considerable amount of conversion from military to peacetime industry without any severe disruption. Upon a more sophisticated study of arms control problems, it is now generally, though not universally, conceded that disarmament with inspection could be a very costly procedure indeed. Furthermore, any combination of limited arms control with a stable deterrent system might easily run into more money than the current defense budget allows for purely military activities.]

1. Letter from Robert P. Wolff, Instructor in Philosophy at Harvard, published in *NYT*, September 19, 1955:

"Marx was no fool, and were he alive today he would no doubt amend his dictum to read: capitalism thrives only on preparation for war, whether that war is fought or not. Can we so confidently deny this charge? I wonder."

2. William C. Stringer, *CSM*, January 30, 1960:

"The techniques of inspection are opening up rapidly. Soon, with reconnaissance satellites winging overhead, no country (including the U.S.S.R.) will be able to hide from prying electronic eyes. . . . We are on the threshold of breakthroughs here if we really want, as President Eisenhower has said, to cut down on arms and put the saved money and manpower into aid for the underdeveloped country

tries and higher living standards for all."

3. <u>NYT</u>, August 28, 1960:

"While disarmament readjustments may be painful, they need not be if wise policies are adopted, Professor [Emile] Benoit [of the Columbia University Graduate School of Business] declared. Even if the transition is difficult, he said, it would mean the saving of billions of dollars, which could be diverted to public health, research, education, foreign aid and other worthwhile programs."

4. Jerome B. Wiesner, Foreword to the "Special Issue on Arms Control," *Daedalus*, Autumn 1960, p. 680:

"I am confident that if the nations of the world were to devote one quarter of the effort in terms of manpower and money now being expended in the arms race on the quest for a lasting peace and a better world, the goal, though a difficult one, could be achieved in our lifetime."

5. Ithiel de Sola Pool, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 990:

"The abolition of nuclear warfare is far too important an objective to be entangled in matters of economy. The preservation of mankind is worthwhile even if it costs more than the present arms race-- and it probably will."

## CATEGORY FIVE: "PACKAGE" AND "PIECEMEAL" NEGOTIATION OF ARMS CONTROL.

[Up until the latter part of the London talks, the policy of Western disarmament negotiators was to present a comprehensive "package" program for bargaining; the Soviet Union invariably did likewise, often including political matters in its portfolio. This was not primarily because the Western policy-makers had any severe critical awareness of the technical inter-relation of parts in arms control or any real grasp of the components of deterrent stability. Rather, it was often to reconcile the particular views existing within the Western alliance. In 1958 the legendary "package" was broken, and the test ban and surprise attack were negotiated separately. With the rise of the tendency to desire to create a stable deterrent system in the past two years, many have severely questioned whether any single component of the arms control picture could safely be negotiated in isolation without creating a strategic imbalance. Was not the nuclear test ban treaty a Russian proposal in the first place (actually it was Indian)? This question, it will be seen, has a close relationship with both Categories Six and Nine.]

1. Humphrey Subcommittee report, op. cit., p. 8:

"The subcommittee concurs that steps in the comprehensive disarmament package can be separated with the view to achieving a limited first step disarmament agreement and in order to make some headway toward curbing the armaments race."

2. Ibid., p. 59:

"The subcommittee believes that although it is essential to construct blueprints for a comprehensive plan, it is a mistake to expect that the problem of disarmament can be solved in one sweeping overall agreement, and that the technical negotiations can succeed when the element of trust and confidence does not

exist among the major powers. . . . A limited disarmament agreement has the ad-
vantage of testing the good faith of the parties without, so to speak, putting
all our security eggs in one basket."

3. Neal Stanford, in CSM, March 1, 1958:

"Mr. Stassen holds firmly that it is 'not possible' to negotiate a package disarmament agreement with the Soviets that would link a ban on nuclear production for arms with an end to bomb testing.

"As he told the senators [Humphrey Subcommittee, on February 28], an inspection system for nuclear production is much 'more complicated' than one to spot nuclear testing and could not be installed in less than three years. Therefore, concluded Mr. Stassen, to make a ban on nuclear production a prerequisite to a first step makes it impossible to reach agreement."

4. John Foster Dulles press conference, May 1, 1958, quoted by WP, May 2, 1958:

[A Soviet acceptance of Arctic inspection] "might mark a real turning point
in the whole cold war situation. . . could create, and I believe it would create,
an atmosphere under which a genuine disarmament would in fact take place."

(Note: Dulles was, in fact, reputed to have no love for the idea of partial or "piecemeal" agreements.)

5. Western Aide-Memoire to Gromyko, May 28, 1958, quoted <u>NYT</u>, May 29, 1958:

"If there is an agreement to put an end to the production of new fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, the way lies open to an immediate solution of the problem of nuclear testing. So long as unrestricted manufacture of nuclear weapons continues, and new means are being developed for delivering nuclear weapons rapidly and surely, the suspension of nuclear testing does not constitute disarmament. . . .

"An agreement on initial verifiable reductions of armed forces and their stocks of arms could ease the way toward settlement of problems which create international friction. In their turn, such settlements could set the stage for further reductions. This is a second approach for developing confidence in relations between the countries."

6. U.S. Reply to Soviet Note charging sabotage of Geneva talks, January 24, 1959, quoted by <u>NYT</u>, January 25, 1959:

"On Jan. 19, the United States and the United Kingdom showed clearly their readiness to reach a lasting agreement when they dropped their requirement that any discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests must depend on explicit progress on major disarmament measures. The United States is prepared to conclude an agreement for the indefinite discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests subject only to the satisfactory working of the control system. This certainly is not an unreasonable demand."

7. Frederick M. Eaton, address at opening of the Ten-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva, March 15, 1960, quoted in <u>NYT</u>, March 16, 1960:

"Although we have a great distance to travel, the initial steps must not be overly ambitious. For, until there is some greater degree of confidence and experience with arms control, only carefully measured first steps are feasible. From these can come some reduction in the tensions for which the world so anxiously awaits (sic)."

13

8. Robert R. Bowie, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 722:

"Limited progress in arms control to stabilize the situation will help in providing the time. . . for other actions to produce results."

9. "The Search for Disarmament," British government document (Autumn 1960):

(pp. 9-10) "Western proposals-- and especially the new Western Disarmament Plan of March 1960-- have always suggested that disarmament should begin with relatively simple measures, which can be fairly easily controlled, and proceed step by step to more far-reaching measures which could be carried out as experience is gained and mutual confidence gradually built up."

(p. 13) "Unlike all earlier Western Plans, this new Disarmament Plan [1960] was not a 'package.' While the West put it forward in the hope that agreement might be possible on the Plan as a whole, some individual elements in its first two stages could, if progress on a broad front proved impossible, be put into effect independently of the rest. There were no political conditions attached to the Plan-- earlier plans provided for the settlement of political problems to run parallel with progress in disarmament. This took into account Soviet criticism of earlier Western plans."

10. James E. Dougherty, op. cit., p. 278:

"It is not feasible to single out specific weapons systems or other isolated factors for special agreements."

***

## CATEGORY SIX: THE RELATION OF DISARMAMENT TO POLITICAL SETTLEMENT.

[This appeared to be a particularly burning question in 1957-58. The Geneva Summit of 1955 and the empirical evidence of the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956 led many in the West to believe that the time was ripe to open the Eastern European and German questions with the Soviet Union. Kennan's and other disengagement plans for Central Europe reflected this feeling and gave a vast impetus to it. John Foster Dulles believed that he detected the establishment of those "positions of strength" from which the West could favorably negotiate; others were hopeful that under the impact of the upheavals in the satellite empire the whole Soviet bloc might evolve in a more liberal direction. Political settlement seemed suddenly more desirable and practical than arms control. Today, the pendulum has swung back, and one less frequently hears the question put in these terms. The Soviets have taken a new grip on the captive countries. They threaten the West with the consequences of the "missile gap." They have managed to make the status of West Berlin the cardinal political problem, one whose negotiation promises no good results for the West. Consequently, most observers now think that perhaps various measures of arms control could produce that lessening of tensions which would make political settlement more tractable. But both this and the prior attitude are not permanently operating axioms; they merely reflect the cold facts of international relations at a given time.]

1. George F. Kennan, testimony to the Humphrey Subcommittee, hearings, January 9, 1957 (11th meeting):

"Humphrey: Is it possible to have a legitimate start on a disarmament item in some specific geographic area or in some specific realm of armament?

"Kennan: I think that a reduction of forces might take place as a result of a political agreement about the area-- I am not sure that the reduction would take place as a result of an agreement about disarmament.

"Humphrey: You feel that political settlements have a priority before you can really even move to the questions of disarmament?

"Kennan: The reduction of armaments must await the political settlement."

2. Associate Professor Adam B. Ulam, reply to Humphrey Subcommittee inquiry, quoted in "Control and Reduction," *op. cit.*, p. 443:

"In general I believe that the Russians do not think of disarmament as an isolated subject but in connection with their whole international and even internal situation. Thus, disarmament in a real sense would come only as a part of a general international settlement preceded by the Russians' realization of (a) that the Western Powers are determined and capable of not tolerating any further Soviet expansion, either direct or indirect, and (b) that the West has no intention, once its legitimate interests of self-protection are satisfied, of attempting by force to damage or destroy the legitimate interests of the Soviet Union, that is, physical security of Russia within her present frontiers."

3. Joel H. Spingarn, "The Humphrey Subcommittee: Was It Worthwhile?", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XIII, June 1957, pp. 224-227:

[re: J.F. Dulles testimony]. "In effect, Secretary Dulles made clear that any arms agreement would sooner or later have to include Communist China. Mr. Dulles also made it clear that political settlements must go hand in hand with arms reductions. With reference to Germany, for example, he said that a settlement would not be practical without at least a partial settlement of the armament problem, notably in relation to Europe."

4. Walter Lippmann, *WP*, July 25, 1957:

"A simple and obvious agreement in the field of armaments would not be addressed to the quality and quantity of weapons. It would be addressed to the geographical deployment of military forces. . . . In my opinion, this is the type of agreement which holds the greatest promise-- first, that it will be carried out, and second, that it will promote peace."

5. Report No. 1167, September 6, 1957, in "Control and Reduction," p. 50:

"Large-scale reduction of armaments cannot be made without corresponding progress on the resolution of at least some political issues. However, we should not wait for the solution of all outstanding political problems before making a start to control armaments."

6. U.S. State Department reply to Rapacki Plan, May 3, 1958, quoted *NYT*, May 4, 1958:

"An agreement limited to the exclusion of nuclear weapons from the territory indicated by your Government without other types of limitation would, even if it were capable of being inspected, endanger the security of the Western European countries in view of the large and widely deployed military forces of the Soviet Union. Unless equipped with nuclear weapons, Western forces

in Germany would find themselves under present circumstances at a great disadvantage to the numerically greater mass of Soviet troops stationed within easy distance of Western Europe which are, as the Soviet leaders made clear, being equipped with the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds."

7. Roscoe Drummond, *WP*, August 24, 1958, quoting Eisenhower, UN address, Aug 13:

"The picture of today's weapons, the nature of modern communications, and the widening circle of new nations make it plain that we must, in the end, be a world community of open societies.

"The concept of the open society is the ultimate key to a system of arms control we can all trust."

8. "Control and Reduction," *op. cit.*, p. 7:

"The subcommittee. . . firmly believes that experience has shown the efficiency under certain circumstances of the device of a demilitarized or internationalized zone along a sensitive frontier, particularly if such a zone is patrolled by an international peace force. It urges that the United States give support to the creation of such zones in appropriate cases where frontiers are subject to violation by illegal arms traffic or by hostile armed personnel."

9. Herman Kahn, in *SRI Journal*, 1959, vol. 3, p. 140:

". . . Aside from the ideological differences and the problem of security itself, there does not seem to be any objective quarrel between the United States and Russia that justifies the risks and costs that we subject each other to. The big thing that the Soviet Union and the United States have to fear from each other is fear itself."

10. Anthony Nutting, "Disarmament, Europe, and Security," *International Affairs*, XXXVI, 1, January 1960, p. 3:

"The method I advocate is to try to reach agreement on a partial settlement, or a partial package, if you like, consisting of some disarmament, probably an agreement to suspend atomic tests; some disengagement, probably an agreement to limit or to thin out the forces in Central Europe; and some progress towards a European and a German settlement, if only an agreement about West Berlin."

11. Eisenhower, news conference, February 11, 1960, quoted *NYT*, February 12, 1960:

"I think that we should look at disarmament on such a broad scale that we can find the areas where we can make progress but not letting this one (location of pre-existing nuclear materials) bar us from some progress along the line. And only as we make progress of this kind is there going to be a real lessening of tension."

12. A.M. Rosenthal, "The Geneva Impasse," *NYT*, February 20, 1960:

"From the first days of the Geneva talks, the chief obstacle to writing the treaty has been the Soviet fear of inspection-- frequent, effective, unhindered, on the spot.

"This is not a matter of Moscow's being afraid of getting caught in a treaty violation.

"As a matter of fact, most Westerners here think the Soviet Union would not risk tests in violation of a treaty. The problem is the nature of the Soviet dictatorship, which is such that it will not agree to having large bands of foreigners poking about the country."

13. Richard M. Nixon, in _BAS_, XVI, 6, June 1960, p. 216:

"A lasting peace cannot be built on the foundation of disarmament alone. We must continue to work unceasingly to remove those basic tensions which have made the world an armed camp in the first place."

14. Salvador de Madariaga, in _NYT Sunday magazine_, Oct. 11, 1959:

"It is unreasonable to expect nations to disarm. For nations are armed because every one of them keeps for itself the right to decide what is to be done and enforce its decisions to the limits of its power. How could they agree on the merely instrumental when they cannot agree on the essentials that keep them asunder and armed? . . . Much is made in some quarters about control. . . but surely control can only increase the root cause of all armaments, which is mistrust of the other fellow's aims."

15. Paul Doty, _Daedalus_, op. cit., p. 829:

"As the Anglo-American nuclear deterrent becomes less and less credible in the eyes of West Europeans, the land defense of their homeland receives a higher priority. This is compatible with, and could be aided by, the creation of a zone of disengagement in Central Europe. With different reasoning, the East European countries are led to similar conclusions. As time passes, the Soviets have less need on several counts to insist on the political and ideological conformity of the members of the Warsaw Pact."

16. James E. Dougherty, _op. cit._, p. 278:

"We should quench the flickering hope that the sources of the present international conflict can be removed if only the two main competitors can be separated by a sort of _cordon sanitaire_. . . . A man-made military vacuum would not only impose very severe handicaps on defenses; it would also lead to a heightening of tension if one side could fill the vacuum faster than the other. . . ."

### CATEGORY SEVEN: UNILATERAL RESTRAINTS AND ABSTINENCE FROM NUCLEAR ACTIVITY.

[This category is fairly self-explanatory. It suffices to say that it has grown enormously in backing since the development of long-range delivery systems. Not all unilateralists counsel the same unilateral disarmament steps. At the core of this belief is the argument that political systems are transitory, while the human race should not be placed in the position of being so. It is claimed that the risks of the policy of deterrence are greater than those of unilateral disarmament. Most unilateralists also imply that deterrence practiced over a period of time will warp the mentality of the leaders of the country; they feel that any contemplation of a nuclear nightmare is anti-humanistic. Foreign unilateralists (e.g. proponents of the "non-nuclear club") do not necessarily go this far. They feel that a deterrent system will continue to operate, with the United States supplying 100% of the guarantee.]

17

1. P.M.S. Blackett, "Thoughts on British Defence Policy," *The New Statesman* and *Nation*, 1959, 58, p. 783:

"I can see no plausible way in which the European defence community can survive either with its own nuclear forces or with individual national nuclear forces. I feel that the present situation, with an American safety catch on all its nuclear weapons, wherever situated, is much more stable than either of these alternatives. However, to keep it stable, it is essential that Britain renounce her own nuclear forces, otherwise their spread to other countries will never be checked."

2. "The Nth Country Problem and Arms Control," op. cit., p. ix, note 4 (Norman Cousins and David Riesman):

"To take the flat position that all unilateralism is bad could mean, in practice, a serious loss for the United States. Our failure, for example, to take the initiative with respect to a cassation of nuclear weapons testing cost us heavily in a large part of the world."

3. Hanson Baldwin, *NYT*, March 30, 1960:

"An agreement to halt nuclear testing, signed with a flourish at the summit conference, could lead to the same sort of psychological relaxation in the West as occurred after the summit conference in Geneva in 1955. Western military defenses might suffer. It might be difficult to maintain the strength and unity of the West. . ."

(Note: indirect commentary on the psychology of unilateralism.)

4. David Riesman, letter to *NYT*, published March 31, 1960:

"Reliance on deterrence leads in all countries to a garrison state, and to an alleged defense of values that, in a jingoistic milieu, become less and less worth defending-- and, in military terms, less and less technically defensible."

5. Paul Doty, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 824:

"The idea of having a jointly operated nuclear deterrent in Europe. . . does not bear inspection, since it would be too ponderous to be effective and would risk the involvement of all the partners by the careless action of any one."

6. Erich Fromm, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., passim:

*(op. 1017)* "I believe. . . that the risks in the continuation of the armament race are far greater than the very serious risks of unilateral disarmament."

(pp. 1018-1019) "It would sound most unlikely to many students of human nature and psychopathology that human being could cherish freedom, respect for life or love after having witnessed and participated in the unlimited cruelty of man against man which thermonuclear war would mean. . . .

"If we are serious in claiming that our aim is to preserve freedom (that is, to prevent the subordination of the individual under an all-powerful state), we must admit that this freedom will be lost, whether the deterrent works or does not work."

***

18

## CATEGORY EIGHT: INSPECTABILITY AND TREATY PROBLEMS.

[This category comprehends two serious and related problems. First, what is the minimal threshold of a successful inspection system? Is probability of detection a sufficient guarantee, and if so, what constitutes the mathematics of probability? Secondly, since a treaty must essentially be a compromise between two contending positions, on what points can we afford to give ground to the Soviet Union? Is there a danger that these concessions will establish disadvantageous precedents for the future? Most of the controversy surrounding these questions has come up in connection with the nuclear test ban, becoming especially intense when it appeared that a treaty might be in the offing. Intimations of an impending agreement at London in 1957 had thrown the U.S. government into somewhat of a turmoil (aside from the battle raging in the NSC), because executive-legislative liaison during the London talks had not been very successfully provided for. The Senate is a stern (and occasionally unreasonable) watchdog over every provision which might go into a nuclear test or other arms control treaty between East and West.]

1. Sir John Slessor, Air Power, vol. 3, No. 1, October 1955, p. 5:

"A system of control and inspection to be absolutely 100 percent cast-iron-proof against bad faith would mean that the agents of the international control organ would have to be free to go literally anywhere they chose."

2. Commander Allan Noble, quoted NYT, July 30, 1957:

"It is by their response to this question [cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons] that we shall be able to judge whether the Russians really wish to proceed with genuine disarmament or not."

3. "1970 Without Arms Control," NPA pamphlet No. 104 (1958), p. 50:

"A disarmament agreement can be worse than useless unless it provides for safeguards against violations, and unless it effectively assures national security. Its purpose is to diminish, not increase, risks. However, it would be grossly unrealistic for any nation to assume that no risks inhere in the present situation. There are too many risks in the present situation to rely on a leisurely pursuit for perfection in the vaguely distant future."

4. CSM, January 15, 1959 [Cowen]:

"Technically it seems that the new complications [of low-threshold atomic test monitoring] can be resolved. Dr. Hans Bethe, a ranking American atomic expert, says he is confident that the 180-station network recommended last summer can still do the job with improved instrumentation."

5. Policy Statement of the Advisory Committee on Science and Technology of the Democratic Advisory Council, December 27, 1959, p. 5:

"The primary objective of such [disarmament] agreements should be the total elimination of the major tools of sudden mass destruction, in particular, mega-ton warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic missile bases and submarines, together with the means for waging bacteriological and chemical warfare. Such action should be taken with the understanding that no steps can prevent the eventual use of such weapons should a major war break out. In that event, production of such weapons would probably be started quickly. But the re-

19

moval of these weapons would eliminate the serious dangers of massive surprise attack, accidental war, or war precipitated by a third nation. It must be stressed, however, that elimination of weapons is not enough; manpower dedicated to military purposes must be limited."

6. Eisenhower, news conference, February 11, 1960, quoted <u>NYT</u>, Feb. 12, 1960:

"I believe that we are probably tackling the most difficult of all problems in this disarmament thing when we put all our attention on the nuclear testing and nuclear use."

7. <u>Ibid.</u>

"... Such a great population [Red China] could not be ignored when you are talking about disarmament. And once that we can make any kind of progress between the West and the Soviets and its satellites, I think that there will have to be some kind of mechanism in which we can bring these people into some kind of agreement, if it is going to be successful."

(Note: Of course, the Red China problem is one of the most crucial elements of the treaty-making affair in arms control, as well as the spectre which lurks behind all discussion of the Nth country problem.)

8. Walter Lippmann, <u>WP</u>, February 16, 1960:

"The abstract logic of our position-- ban only what surely can be detected-- is perfect in itself. But there is a very good reason to think that it is unrealistic and that, if we hold to it inflexibly, refusing to work out any one of the many compromises which are quite conceivable, it will prove to be an unwise position. For it is based on the assumption that no treaty is better than an imperfect treaty."

9. Lincoln White, State Dept. press officer, quoted <u>CSM</u>, January 22, 1960:

"Let us establish at the Geneva conference the intention of the Communist side to join with us in a workable disarmament program. . . Then, if substantial progress is made toward a workable and adequately controlled disarmament program, that is the time to consider participation by the other countries, including Red China."

10. Eisenhower, news conference, March 14, 1960, quoted <u>NYT</u>, March 15, 1960:

"I should say that in our thinking there has to be a very great deal of progress [on disarmament] before we are into the stage of worrying too much about Red China."

11. Hans A. Bethe, letter to <u>NYT</u>, published March 29, 1960:

"No international agreement can be entirely fool-proof. It must always be partly based on faith in the other party's good intentions. The only thing that technical methods of inspection can do is to reduce the area in which one needs to rely on good faith. . . . The present Russian compromise proposal. . . seems to me an entirely acceptable risk."

12. Jerome B. Wiesner, in <u>Daedalus</u>, op. cit., p. 931:

"It is certainly hard to believe that a nation would deliberately eliminate a large share of the military force it has worked hard to create and then take an action that would start a new arms contest."

20

13. Ithiel de Sola Pool, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 995:

"By strongly posing the issue of inspection to provide security against surprise attack and by keeping discussion of that issue going in the world over a period of years, we would be able to make it a recognized consideration in internal Soviet opinion."

14. *Ibid.*, p. 998:

"In the absence of vigorous terror the probability of Soviet citizen co-operation with foreign inspectors is at least as great if not greater than it would be in a free country. Alienation of the people from the regime has ever been a price of totalitarian control."

15. Robert R. Bowie, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 715:

"Infallibility is not the proper criterion. Inspection should be viewed as a technique for reinforcing and maintaining the self-interest of the parties in the continued effective operation of the system. The restrictions and the related inspection should be considered as a system of deterrence."

16. *Ibid.*, p. 718:

"A tribunal could be available for resolving disputes about the terms of the agreement or the evidence of violations; but the parties might still have the right to suspend or cancel the agreement if the result seemed to require it for the protection of their security."

17. James E. Dougherty, *op. cit.*, p. 265:

"Within recent years, many Western experts have toyed with statistical sampling techniques which, combined with the power of world political opinion, would probably serve to discourage any potential violations. But probability calculus is not at all applicable to this problem. There is no guarantee of security in 'probable deterrence.'"

18. *Ibid*, p. 279:

"It is no longer possible to draw a neat distinction between military weapons and civilian-industrial capabilities. We cannot, for example, eliminate all production of fissionable materials for warlike purposes and keep developing nuclear technology for its peaceful applications. ...

"Since all inspection systems must of necessity incorporate standardized procedures, foolproof arms control arrangements are out of the question. ...

"Arms control systems cannot be policed. The only sanction, once we have discovered a violation by the other side, is to scrap the agreement and resume the arms race."

***

21

CATEGORY NINE: GENERAL DISARMAMENT VS. STABLE DETERRENT SYSTEMS.

[The fully elaborated idea of stable deterrent systems (which would probably involve a certain measure of limited and "stabilizing" disarmament) has grown up in the past two and a half years in response to the strategic possibility of having mutually invulnerable retaliatory systems. Thus, it is argued, deterrence can be improved and perpetuated if each side recognizes and applies unilaterally or through an agreement certain practices. A stable deterrent system means especially that general disarmament is abandoned as a goal, since it is thought to be unverifiable, unstabilizing, and dangerous. No proponent of a stable deterrent system probably now believes that it can operate indefinitely without the intervention of a sufficient measure of inspected arms control, enough, for example, to cope with technological breakthrough. The best that is hoped for the future is that it will begin to induce a more favorable political climate in which more lasting steps can be taken. The opponents of stable deterrent systems argue that they are expensive (which they unquestionably would be), that they are apt to be transitory, that they are demoralizing, and that they necessarily rigidify the present political dualism. All serious proponents of arms control that consider strategy to be a guideline, however, recognize that in the phasing down to a condition of general disarmament the same kind of equilibrium recommended by the advocates of stable deterrence would have to be maintained at each step. Essentially, the stable deterrent people are more prone to think that the Russians can only be persuaded by force and that they are apt to cheat in their own interests wherever they think they can get away with it.]

1. General P.-M. Gallois, "Les Consequences Stratégiques et Politiques des Armes Nouvelles," Politique Etrangère, 2, 1958, p. 170:

"Le seul inconvenient (du désarmement) c'est que je saisis mal, en regrettant la carte d'Europe, comment cette portion de territoire, extrêmement riche, si convoitée, groupant 200 millions d'individus certes mais incapable, par suite de leur évolution sociale, de mettre sur pied plus de 25 ou 30 divisions, je ne vois pas comment cette Europe pourrait survivre dans sa situation présente, face à des peuples moins évolués et capables pour cette raison même d'aligner des combattants par millions."

2. Walter Lippmann, WP, April 3, 1958:

[re Soviet suspension of nuclear tests] "If we cannot or will not revise our policies, Mr. Dulles would do better to be candid and to tell the world frankly that we cannot suspend tests because we cannot abolish nuclear weapons without a revolutionary change in our foreign policy. He could then argue that the Russians with their massive conventional forces and their interior lines cannot be contained without nuclear weapons. This would not make him beloved in the world. But it would make him believed."

3. "The Nth Country Problem," American Academy of Arts and Sciences, September 1958 (privately circulated), by William C. Davidon and Cristoph Hohenemser, p. II-5:

"Those who advocate wider distribution of nuclear weapons in order to increase military stability generally make an important assumption, and this is: there will be no significant disarmament achieved in the near future. It is well to keep in mind that this assumption, even if realistic, will itself contribute to the failure of an early disarmament agreement, since acting on this assumption will create more possessors of nuclear weapons."

22

4. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study No. 8, Johns Hopkins Center of Foreign Policy Research (1959), quoted by NYT, December 6, 1959:

"In a totally disarmed world even a small number of secreted or clandestinely manufactured nuclear weapons could disrupt the international order and allow one power to dominate its more trusting adversaries."

5. Ibid. (original document), p. 95:

"An arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which permitted each side to retain a number of retaliatory systems capable of surviving a first strike from the other, but which were insufficient in number, destructive power, and accuracy to execute a first strike themselves, could create a ratio of controlled to uncontrollable force favorable to nuclear stability. ...

"Unless a determined effort is made to achieve some form of nuclear stability, the prospect for the next decade is one of high instability and consequent risk of all out nuclear war. We will have to run very hard in the arms race just to keep the very dangerous position which we now occupy from becoming even more dangerous. The second consideration is that other nations in addition to the United States have an interest in reducing the instability of the nuclear relationship."

6. Dr. Edward Teller, speech to the alumni of Fordham University, January 26, 1960, quoted CSM, January 27, 1960:

"It seems hopeless to control disarmament at a time when we do not even know what fantastic weapons our controls should try to discover."

(Note; response to Khrushchev's "fantastic weapon" declaration of January 14, 1960)

7. Erich Fromm, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 1019:

"Without achieving complete disarmament, the armaments race will continue and lead to the destruction of our civilization as well as that of the Russians or, even without the outbreak of a war, will slowly undermine and eventually destroy the values in defense of which we are risking our physical existence."

8. Thomas C. Schelling, "Arms Control-- Proposal for a Special Surveillance Force," *World Politics*, XIII, 1, October 1960:

(p. 1) "Any real stimulus to arms-control or arms-tranquilization measures would likely come in an unforeseen crisis that developed rapidly. There is not now a powerful belief in arms control as a necessary alternative to general war; but events could occur-- technological events or political events-- that would make the balance of deterrence much more unstable. ... The demand for disarmament may come suddenly when it comes, and not be able to wait."

(p. 5) "We may have to stop relying on inertia as a supplement to mutual deterrence, and plan to live on the brink of general war. At such a point we might decide that nothing the Russians could ever do would reassure us, since efforts to reassure us would naturally be associated with definite plans to attack us; we might also conclude that no moderate arms-control measures could be of any significance. At that point drastic disarmament, negotiated under the threat of immediate general war, with drastic implications for the political balance of the world and without regard to the sensitivities of neutrals and allies, may suddenly be recognized as the alternative to war."

23

9. Bernard T. Feld, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., pp. 861-862:

"It would be less than candid of me not to admit to the conviction that the possible solutions that have the greatest future, now and in the foreseeable future, lie more in the direction of disarmament than in deterrence through mutual terror. This conviction is based mainly on two considerations: first, I feel that any system, no matter how ingeniously contrived or how meticulously constructed and balanced, is inherently too dangerous if it contains within it the possibility that a single nation, through unilateral action, can touch off a rapid chain of world-wide destruction. . . . The second consideration pointing toward the importance of disarmament measures is essentially a political one. The great powers and their leaders are all publicly and firmly committed to the aim of comprehensive disarmament. Talks are now going on, and, regardless of any mental reservations either side may harbor, there is a firm moral commitment to continue to seek measures leading to the elimination of armaments, together with some kind of control."

10. Jerome B. Wiesner, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 922:

"Clearly many partial measures will improve the national security in the short run, but in the long run only a cessation of the arms race and a great reduction-- or, hopefully, the elimination-- of all major weapons, in the framework of an international security system capable of preventing the reappearance of large-scale national military forces anywhere can guarantee military security."

11. Thomas C. Schelling, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 899:

"There has been almost no public discussion of whether the further testing of weapons and weapons effects would really be conducive to the development of greater bilateral military stability or instability over the coming years."

***

CATEGORY TEN: *THE USES OF NEGOTIATION*

[In spite of the majority consensus of experts that there are certain areas of arms control which it might benefit both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to negotiate (see ahead-- Category Twelve) there has always been the more-than-lingering suspicion that Russia has used arms control negotiations for more devious purposes: a) to improve its relative strategic position, especially during the unilateral nuclear test ban; b) as a device of self-interested propaganda. The following excerpts represent opinions on this question.]

1. John Foster Dulles, news conference, March 4, 1958, quoted *NYT*, March 5, 1958:

"When we come along with more serious proposals which may really promote peace-- and let me say promoting peace is not just getting up and shouting about peace-- those do not attract the same attention throughout the world, they don't make headlines as readily as do the Soviet proposals."

2. Drew Middleton, Geneva dispatch, *NYT*, November 12, 1958:

"One of the penalties of a rational, far-sighted disarmament policy in the divided world of today is that it seldom makes good propaganda. This is being demonstrated daily to the United States delegations at two conferences with the Soviet Union here."

3. CSM, March 24, 1959 [Cowen]:

"Among those who are sympathetic to arms limitation, there are some who feel that the Soviets are either not seriously interested in this, could not be trusted to carry out even a limited disarmament agreement, or both. They feel that the only wise policy is for the United States to maintain strength especially for the big retaliatory punch.

"On the other side, there is the conviction that a continued arms race will lead to a holocaust and that a halt to that race is an overriding necessity. They see a nuclear test ban with adequate inspection as a possible first step in direction (sic). It would open the way to further negotiations. It would establish a precedent for more far-reaching inspection systems. And it would test the good faith of East and West."

4. Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Strategy of Disarmament," in *American Strategy for the Nuclear Age*, ed. Hahn and Neff, New York, 1960:

(p. 148) "A drawn-out period of negotiations on the crucial issue of disarmament might also hold another interesting prospect for the Communists. . . . For example, the 'missile lag,' which is calculated to grow to Soviet advantage in the early sixties, would coincide with a series of disarmament discussions. If the talks themselves yielded nothing but interminable sparring over control and inspection problems like the Geneva nuclear-test-ban negotiations, they might nevertheless take the steam out of Western attempts to overcome the Soviet missile lead while, behind the curtain of Soviet secrecy, Soviet missile plants and research establishments would go on preparing further 'surprises' for the West at the negotiating table."

5. James W. Wadsworth, quoted by Roscoe Drummond, WP, February 3, 1960:

"No, I don't see anything sinister in it (Soviet refusal to discuss means of detection of underground testing) because they say at the same time that once the treaty has been signed and we start building our control system, they will then be willing to talk with our experts about improving it."

6. Joseph C. Harsch, CSM, February 19, 1960:

"Freedom to resume testing in the absence of a satisfactory agreement is actually nowhere near so assured as the United States position seems to assume. . . . In the absence of a clearly proved Soviet test, Washington would be seriously embarrassed were it to initiate a resumption of testing. The price would be very high."

7. Stringer, CSM, February 25, 1960:

"There are those in Washington who hold that even Moscow, which has always believed that the giant powers should handle the global security picture, is concerned at the prospective multiplication of atom-armed nations. . . . All of which is why a few Washington experts think it just possible that a nuclear-test ban will finally be agreed to by the Soviet Union, the United States and Britain."

8. Rosenthal, NYT, March 28, 1960:

"The Western opinion is that if specific disarmament steps are agreed upon at an early stage, public pressure will build up for carrying them out despite the loopholes in control and inspection that might develop."

9. Eisenhower, news conference, March 30, 1960, quoted <u>NYT</u>, March 31, 1960:

"They [the U.S.S.R.] have come a long way since they said, 'now we are ready to establish these mutual systems,' and so the very fact that they have made this concession means that they want to negotiate further; no question in my mind."

10. Secretary of State Herter, news conference, August 9, 1960, quoted <u>NYT</u>, August 10, 1960:

"Sometimes one doubts whether or not the Russians have any intention of signing up [to a treaty] or prefer to keep the negotiations going and profit indirectly by the status quo which means no testing as of now as a result."

11. Chalmers M. Roberts, <u>WP</u>, August 19, 1960:

"American officials say there is absolutely no evidence to support hints from Sen. Henry H. Jackson (D-Wash.), a member of the Joint Atomic Committee, that the Soviets even now may be secretly testing new weapons underground. There is no evidence one way or the other, it is said here."

12. James E. Dougherty, op. cit., p. 262:

"Five years of intensive communist disarmament propaganda have persuaded large segments of Western public opinion of the inadequacy of military budgets, if not of their 'downright wastefulness.'"

13. Ibid., pp. 262-264:

"A fresh approach to arms-security negotiations must start from the frank recognition that the commonly accepted philosophy of disarmament or 'arms control' agreements is invalid for three reasons. The first is the increasing complexity of modern weapons technology, which makes comprehensive arms control plans more unwieldy than ever. The single sector approach is patently unsatisfactory, since it invariably renders the proposing nation subject to the suspicion that it is seeking to enhance a military advantage which it already enjoys or to remove a relative disadvantage under which it labors. . . .

"The second obstacle is the absence of an adequate basis for a world system of law. . . .

"The third obstacle to international arms control agreements is the disparity between the capabilities of the Western alliance and the Sino-Soviet bloc for carrying on the power struggle by non-military means. The Western nations have been compelled to proceed with extreme caution in disarmament negotiations, for, though most successful in preventing large-scale military aggression, they have fumbled repeatedly in lesser conflict. . . ."

14. Ibid., p. 273:

"One of the reasons (but certainly not the only one) why the Soviets have been able to maintain the initiative in the negotiations for nuclear arms control has been their acknowledged superiority in the realm of non-nuclear conflict capabilities."

***

CATEGORY ELEVEN: DANGERS IN THE ABSENCE OF ARMS CONTROL.

[This category is self-explanatory.]

1. Humphrey Subcommittee, "Control and Reduction," op. cit., p. 13:

"The risks resulting from continuation of an armaments race based on mutual endeavors to pile up increasingly destructive weapons and on the inevitable spread of modern weapons know-how to other countries must be balanced against the risk of entering into limited arms control agreements which provide for effective inspection."

2. Jules Moch, "Les Consequences Stratégiques et Politiques des Armes Nouvelles," Politique Etrangère, 2, 1958, p. 165:

"Je crois au désarmement parce qu'il n'est pas d'autre solution à l'aggravation du risque, a l'angoisse croissante de nombre d'hommes, au désastre d'une nouvelle guerre mondiale pour cette génération, et a ce moment-là, à cause de l'abondance des radiations, pour les générations suivantes."

3. Eisenhower, cable to departing delegates to scientific conference on atomic test suspension, June 26, 1958, quoted CSM, June 27, 1958:

"I want you and your associates to know that controlled disarmament is so vital that we are going to persevere in the face of whatever difficulties the Soviets may raise."

4. E. Finley Carter, SRI Journal, vol. 3, 1959, p. 198:

"In the search for security through the application of technology to weapons for destruction, the Soviet bloc and the Western allies have created a mortal common enemy-- the threat of accidental nuclear war."

5. Secretary Herter, address to 46th National Foreign Trade Convention, November 15, 1959, quoted CSM, November 16, 1959:

"Unless the course of events is changed, and changed soon, both sides face unacceptable risks of general nuclear war, which would approximate mutual suicide."

6. Eisenhower, letter to Senator Humphrey, November 17, 1959, quoted NYT, November 27, 1959:

"One must ponder, in reaching decisions on the very complex and difficult subject of arms control, the enormous risks entailed if reasonable steps are not taken to curb the international competition in armaments and to move effectively in the direction of disarmament."

7. Advisor on Science and Technology to the Democratic Advisory Council, December 27, 1959:

"All-out nuclear war seems not only possible but probable as long as we pursue our present military policies and fail to achieve international agreements of broad scope designed to alleviate this unstable situation. The triggering of a nuclear war by mistake, by misadventure or by miscalculation is a consistent danger."

8. Secretary Herter, speech to National Press Club, February 17, 1960, quoted CSM, February 18, 1960:

"Spiraling competition in strategic delivery systems with ever shorter reaction times could lead to war by miscalculation. . . . The more nations that have the power to trigger off a nuclear war, the greater the chance that some nation might use this power in haste or blind folly."

9. Erich Fromm, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 1016:

"The expectation is that the Russians are as willing as we to avoid war, hence that they will begin to reciprocate [with unilateral measures of disarmament] and that once the course of mutual suspicion has been reversed, bigger steps can be taken which may lead to complete bilateral disarmament."

10. *Ibid.*, p. 1018:

"From the standpoint of the proponents of unilateral disarmament, to continue the armament race is catastrophic, whether the deterrent works or not. In the first place, they have little faith that the deterrent will prevent the outbreak of a thermonuclear war. They believe that the results of a thermonuclear war would be such that in the very 'best' case they completely belie the idea that we ought to fight such a war to save our democratic way of life."

11. Eisenhower, UN speech, September 22, 1960, quoted *NYT*, September 23, 1960:

"To seek to maintain a society in which a military move can be taken in complete secrecy, while prefessing a desire to reduce the risk of war through arms control, is a contradiction."

***

## CATEGORY TWELVE: MUTUAL INTEREST IN ARMS CONTROL

[The argument here is that all-out nuclear war is too dreadful a prospect for either side to contemplate, and that they must both, therefore, be interested in certain stabilization measures, especially those relating to accidental and cataclytic war. This has provided some observers with a quotient of optimism regarding the negotiation of the nuclear test ban treaty, for they see in it a means for preventing the promiscuous spread of nuclear weapons to "Nth" countries.]

1. Testimony of Soviet experts to the Humphrey Subcommittee, in "Control and Reduction," op. cit.:

(a) Prof. Frederick C. Barghoorn, Yale University, January 13, 1957 (p. 366):

"I have not the slightest doubt that the Soviet leaders realize as well as the leaders of other major powers that modern weapons, if used on a large scale, mean suicide for civilization. In my opinion, Soviet policy has always been based as much on fear of war as on any other factor."

(b) Asst. Prof. Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Harvard University, Jan 4, 1957, (p. 376):

"There have been a number of indications that the Soviet leaders are beginning to appreciate the threat of mutual annihilation through the use of nuclear weapons."

(c) Prof. Harold H. Fisher, Stanford University, Feb. 16, 1957 (p. 386):

28

"I believe that the leaders of the Soviet Union recognize the threat of mutual destruction in the new weapons. The 'softer policy' advertised by Khrushchev and Bulganin was inspired in part, in my opinion, by a recognition that the destructiveness of the new weapons makes it even more impossible than ever to 'win' a total war."

2. Humphrey Subcommittee, "Control and Reduction," op. cit., p. 51:

"Under present world conditions a disarmament agreement could not be guaranteed by enforcement measures. Enforcement must rest on agreements which are mutually advantageous and which contain effective inspection provisions."

3. Joseph C. Harsch, CSM, March 16, 1960:

"The Western delegations here at Geneva are interested above all in cutting of the race between inner and outer space. The Soviets are interested in getting manpower from obsolete formations for industry. Conceivably these interests can be balanced off and some safeguard achieved against still newer types of weapons."

4. Eisenhower, speech to the UN, September 22, 1960, quoted NYT, September 23, 1960:

"Today the danger of war by miscalculation could be reduced, in times of crisis, by the intervention, when requested by any nation seeking to prove its own peaceful intention, of an appropriate United Nations surveillance body. The question of methods can be left to the experts."

5. John F. Kennedy, BAS, XVI, 6, June 1960, p. 217:

"I do not say that our dangers have receded or that our enemy has become benevolent. But I do believe that today's international climate, more than ever before, holds out the possibility for an effective start on arms control."

6. Thomas C. Schelling, in World Politics, op. cit., pp. 2-3:

"There are things that the United States and the USSR might do co-operatively in anticipation of a sudden possible need to meet unforeseen emergencies. . . . (The possibility of a nuclear accident, or of nuclear mischief by some third party, suggests one type of situation for which standby observation teams of a versatile and flexible sort could be useful in the process of mutual reassurance.)...

"There may be a legitimate basis for considering with the Russians the possibility that we and they might want to respond co-operatively in the face of certain events, certain uncertainties, certain 'crises.' At least this may be true of those contingencies in which there is a strong presumption that neither side is on the verge of unpremeditated war."

7. Edward Teller, in Daedalus, op. cit., p. 782:

"I believe that an extensive shelter program would save the great majority of the people in the United States even in the case of a most ferocious attack. It is certain that such an attack would wipe out our industries, but past experience as well as some research on the question of possible reconstruction have shown that the United States could recover from an all-out attack in a small number of years."

8. Robert R. Bowie, in *Daedalus*, op. cit., p. 709:

"Measures for arms control should be reliable if they can be so devised that compliance will be more in the Soviet interest than evasion or violation."

9. Ibid., p. 712:

"Arms-control measures broaden the arsenal of instruments available for constructing and reinforcing a viable deterrent system by means of agreed standards, limitations, or safeguards. They may serve to reduce the likelihood of war, or (possibly) the burden of effective deterrence. But any proposed system of arms control must be judged by whether it makes it more attractive to the parties (in terms of their own interests) to maintain the system and its safeguards than to disrupt it by resorting to violence or evasion."

10. James E. Dougherty, *op. cit.*, p. 277:

"For the United States, there is promise in an approach which might be called 'security by consent.' This concept is based on the assumption that the major powers have a common interest in the promotion of their own security and in the avoidance of general nuclear war."

***

30

APPENDIX ONE

The following, quoted from "Control and Reduction of Armaments, Interim Report, dated September 7, 1956, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee on Disarmament Final Report, dated October 13, 1958," pp. 80-84, although in numerous respects dated and reflective of the unsophisticated attitudes of the period, is cited for its interest as a catalogue of opinions on arms control by solicited experts. If any of these positions intrigue you, they can undoubtedly be traced to their source, or in some cases a full chronology of the point of view can be established, extending into the present period:

* * * V. VIEWS OF NONOFFICIAL WITNESSES AND CORRESPONDENTS

As noted earlier, the subcommittee has received communications from many private organizations and individuals. In addition, the testimony of about 75 private witnesses has been taken in public hearings. The subcommittee wishes to thank the groups and individual citizens who have cooperated in this fashion. They have provided the subcommittee with an extensive documentation on the problem of disarmament.

Listed below is the substance of the comments, proposals and ideas on disarmament which emerge from an analysis of this documentation. This listing is limited to views on disarmament. It does not include the many ideas which have been presented on other aspects of United States policy. The list is set forth here for purposes of information and further study. The subcommittee emphasizes that the listing represents the views of interested groups and citizens who have taken the trouble to make their ideas available to the subcommittee. It does not necessarily reflect in any way the views of the subcommittee or any of its members.

### Disarmament, security, and peaceful settlement

All official disarmament plans are deficient in that none provides for the transformation of the United Nations into a governmental organization.

Disarmament, in reality a synonym for unpreparedness, is a well-tried formula for failure as a preventive of war.

All disarmament proposals must be mutually advantageous to both the Soviet Union and the United States.

Disarmament would involve reduction of free world cohesion.

United States security requires overwhelming air superiority.

There should be a limit to the size and number of large thermonuclear weapons in the United States stockpile, but an increase in the number of small nuclear weapons.

We are fast reaching a nuclear stalemate and, as a consequence, will be forced into a conventional arms race.

Reductions of military manpower would require much more unification of the armed services than now exists.

If a general universal disarmament agreement cannot be reached in the immediate future, we should adopt a policy of unilateral disarmament.

The United States should foster through the United Nations constitutional renunciation by all governments of the right to embark upon aggression except upon the express mandate of a majority of their citizens by popular vote.

We should spend a small percentage of our defense budget exclusively for disarmament studies. We should have a permanent disarmament institute which would be disassociated from any branch of the Armed Forces.

would be dissociated from any branch of the Armed Forces.

We should absorb a small percentage of our defense budget exclusively for
about the expense made up of a majority of their citizens by bohemian acts.

remuneration by all governments of the right to export upon aggregation except

The United States should enter through the United Nations constitutional
measure into force, we should absorb a bohemian act of unilateral disarmament.

It is a general universal disarmament agreement cannot be reached in the im-
the armed services than now exists.

Requisitions of militarily munitions would require much more notification of
forced into a conventional arms race.

We are fast reaching a nuclear arms race, as a consequence, will be
almost nuclear weapons.

Weapons in the United States a stockpile, put an increase in the number of
There should be a limit to the size and number of large quantities.

Disarmament would involve reduction of free world cooperation.

All disarmament proposals must be mutually advantageous to both the 20-
team for failure as a prevention of war.

Disarmament, in reality, a ponies for subterfuges, is a well-tried
transformation of the United Nations into a governmental organization.

All official disarmament plans are deficient in that none provides for the
Disarmament, security, and peaceful settlement
of its memphs.

It does not necessarily reflect in such a manner the areas of the anpcommittee or any
where we have taken the trouble to make their ideas available to the anpcommittee.

Emphasizes that the listing represents the views of interested groups and citi-
ghtly here for burials of information and further study. The anpcommittee

have been presented on other subjects of United States policy. The list is set
is limited to views on disarmament. It does not include the many ideas which
disarmament which emerge from an analysis of this documentation. This listing

listed below is the apsistance of the comments, proposals and ideas on

They have broadened the anpcommittee with an extensive documentation
wishes to think the groups and individual citizens who have cooperated in this
the private organizations and individuals. In addition, the testimony of some

We noted earlier, the anpcommittee has received communications from many

A. AIMS OF NONOFFICIAL USES 1922-23 AND CORRESPONDENCE 1923

ent period:

chronology of the point of view can be summarized, extending into the pre-
lon, which can undoubtedly be traced to their source, or in some cases a full
on arms control by soliciting experts. It is said that these hotheons involve
affinities of the period, is cited for its interest as a catalogue of obvious
aitpoints in numerous respects given and reflective of the unappreciated
committee on Disarmament (Sinn Reeborg, dated October 13, 1928, "bb. 80-84,
Reeborg, dated September 1, 1928, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Supp-
the following, dropped from "Control and Regulation of Armament," interim

VOLUME ONE

30

31

Disarmament requires universal membership in the United Nations; all countries should be included.

Mutual atomic terror will not suffice as a guaranty against the outbreak of limited wars.

We should try to unite nations in terms of universal interests rather than relying on a series of regional pacts.

The maximum objective of Soviet military policy is to achieve a technological superiority that would enable the U.S.S.R. to deliver a knock-out blow to the United States. The minimum objective is to achieve a parity in weapons and to use that as a basis for Soviet foreign policy. So long as the Soviet leaders have not ruled out one or both objectives they are unlikely to accept effective arms control.

## Disarmament and political settlements

Rearmament of Germany will increase tension and make disarmament more difficult to achieve.

In case of a European conflict American neutrality must be insured.

The United States should work for a ban on arms sales to both Israel and Arab nations in the Middle East.

Armaments are a symptom of underlying tensions, but at a certain level they become a contributing cause to those tensions. Disarmament is not a technical problem, but essentially a political one. Both the causes of war and the weapons of war must be dealt with concurrently.

Controversial political issues, such as the unification of Germany, Korea, and Vietnam and the problem of East-West trade, cannot be solved except in the context of universal enforceable disarmament.

Political settlements need not precede agreements on disarmament.

## Stages of Disarmament

Disarmament should be reached in stages with the time limit of each stage as short as possible.

The period of actual disarmament should be preceded by several preliminary steps, i.e. creation of inspection machinery, an arms census, and an arms truce.

A relatively long period for the implementation of the disarmament agreement would have the advantage of assuring to each nation that it would not risk too much in each phase and would provide sufficient time for the necessary shift from military to civilian production.

A comprehensive plan is a prerequisite to progress on disarmament.

## Control of weapons

The mission and quality of weapons are more important to consider than actual numbers; the existence of modern weapons reduces the importance of numbers of men and increases the importance of quality, continuity of service and specialized training.

The United States should propose to the Soviet Union that nuclear and conventional armaments be reduced down to the level of rifles.

We should have an international ban on the testing of intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The testing of large thermonuclear weapons should cease.

The United States should be trying now to negotiate an agreement for stopping the development of the "surprise" weapons of the future.

All weapons of mass destruction should be eliminated and prohibited.

Nuclear bomb tests should be discontinued, principally through international agreement.

The United States should be trying now to negotiate an agreement for abating the development of the "authorities" weapons of the future.

Prolific missiles.

We should have an international ban on the testing of intercontinental
explosive weapons be reduced down to the level of missiles.

The United States should ban weapons to the Soviet Union that nuclear and conventional training.

Of men and increases the importance of quality, continuity of service and abetment numbers; the existence of modern weapons reduces the importance of numbers. The mission and quality of weapons are more important to consider than security.

## Control of weapons

A comprehensive ban is a prerequisite to progress on disarmament from military to civilian production.

Theban would have the advantage of being able to each nation that it would not risk ment would have the advantage of being able to each nation that it would not risk war. Relatively long periods for the implementation of the disarmament agreement, i.e. creation of inspection machinery, an arms censure, and an arms trade. The period of actual disarmament should be preceded by several preliminaries as short as possible.

## Stages of disarmament

Political settlements need not precede agreements on disarmament, context of national enforceable disarmament.

Controversial political issues, and as the notification of Germany, Korea, Japan, and the problem of East-West trade, cannot be solved except in the Controversial political issues, and as the notification of Germany, Korea, Japan, and the problem of East-West trade, cannot be solved except in the Controversial political issues, and as the notification of Germany, Korea, Japan, and the problem of East-West trade, cannot be solved except in the

nuclear problem, put essentially a political one. Both the causes of war and the problem become a contributing cause to those tensions. Disarmament is not a technicality, but a symptom of underlying tensions, put at a certain level. War nations in the Middle East.

The United States should work for a ban on arms sales to both Iran and Iraq in case of a European conflict. American neutrality would be insured, and to achieve this, the U.S. atomic force will not suffice as a guarantee against the outbreak of limited war.

Reimbursement of Germany will increase tension and make disarmament more difficult to achieve.

Effective arms control.

Leaders have not ruled out one or both objectives that are unlikely to accept and to use that as a basis for Soviet foreign policy. So long as the Soviet Union is the minimum objective, it is to achieve a parity in weapons and superiority that would enable the U.S. to deliver a knock-out blow to the maximum objective of Soviet military policy. It is to achieve a technological reliance on a series of regional wars.

We should try to unite nations in terms of universal interests rather than of limited war.

Mutual atomic terror will not suffice as a guarantee against the outbreak of limited war.

32

Control against future production of nuclear weapons could be limited to
the nuclear materials themselves as distinguished from the facilities for pro-
duction.

All Western Powers should announce that they will not use mass weapons for
nonmilitary destruction unless first attacked in that way, but that we are armed
and ready to use new tactical nuclear weapons against aggression.

We should negotiate as to what constitutes open cities as contrasted with
legitimate targets.

The United States should obtain agreement to ban the intercontinental bal-
listic missile (ICBM) even if agreement is not possible to ban the intermediate-
range missile (IRBM).

## Inspection

Inspection and reduction of armaments should proceed simultaneously; it is
undesirable that one should precede the other.

Aerial inspection is both workable and desirable, especially when coupled
with ground inspection.

Budgetary controls should be used as a basis for a reduction in armaments.

Present plans for the inspection and control of either nuclear or conven-
tional weapons would not be effective.

Aerial inspection, although it cannot do the entire job in an inspection
system, can detect the initiation of an air or ground attack.

Aerial inspection cannot distinguish the difference between a potential
attack and a maneuver.

If it is to prove effective the inspection must be in operation before in-
tercontinental ballistic missiles are included in weapons systems.

An international corps of skilled personnel is needed for aerial inspection.
This could be built by a trial inspection with a friendly country like Belgium
or Canada.

Aerial inspection should be made a function of the United Nations.

An International Armaments Control Agency should administer a system of
international registration, licensing, and regulation of armaments. For every
million dollars of weapons, each nation would post with the international agency
a bond guaranteeing the faithful performance of the nation's obligations. In-
ternational courts, police inspectors would be created to implement the proposal.

To assuage Russian fears that aerial reconnaissance is only for military
intelligence, the photographs might be interpreted within the borders of the So-
viet Union or the taking and possession of them could be made a function of the
United Nations.

The inspection service should be under the direction of a commission com-
posed of nationals of the small nations, not the big powers.

An international conference should be held to deal with the technical prob-
lems of disarmament, including the problem of detection of nuclear weapons.

## Enforcement

Enforcible disarmament in any community demands agencies of government con-
stituted to do the enforcing; disarmament should be total, universal, and con-
trolled, enforced by law and a United Nations police force.

In a disarmament agreement, weapons should be transferred from member states
to United Nations police force bases strategically located throughout the globe.

A United Nations police force could be established to help prevent local
conflicts, this to be done regardless of a general disarmament agreement.

All rules and penalties would be futile unless there can be developed a
will for the abolition of war as an instrument of human society.

["will for the abolition of war as an instrument of human society.", "VII. Rules and penalties would be flexible unless there can be developed a conflict of interest, due to be done regardless of a general disarmament agreement.", "A United Nations police force could be established to hold preventive local to United Nations police force passes automatically located throughout the kloep.", "In a disarmament agreement, weapons should be restructured from nuclear states to the more powerful, enforced law and a United Nations police force.", "Attitude to do the enforcing? disarmament should be total, universal, and controlled to do the enforcing? disarmament should be

33

## Economy

Studies should be made to determine the effects of disarmament on the economy.

Savings from a reduction in defense spending should be used in the United States.

Resources saved through disarmament should be used for welfare purposes in less developed countries.

Individuals should set up planning commissions of their own to study how to meet the problems of unemployment of capital and labor which may result from disarmament.

Our present prosperity is not dependent on arms expenditures. To meet problems raised by disarmament we must further genuine democratic values in the organization of industry and the distribution of its products.

## Other

The Soviet Government is prepared to continue to accept the costs of the arms race by holding down the level of welfare in the Soviet Union and the rate of growth in industries other than those connected with armaments.

In disarmament negotiations the Western nations and the Soviet Union may need a third point of view to create a synthesis of the proposals of the two sides.

The proposal for a United Nations atomic energy pool for peaceful purposes should be pursued.

The United States and the U.S.S.R. should have a large exchange of their citizens and these would be located around the major military targets of the respective countries. Such an exchange should be carried on between other nations unfriendly to each other.

Disarmament should be made more specific and related to other aspects of American foreign policy.

Present policies on secrecy in the field of nuclear developments are excessive.

More emphasis in disarmament talks should be placed on spiritual values and less on gradualist and mechanical controls.

This country should develop a Washington project for peace similar to the Manhattan project on atomic weapons (sic!).

United States citizens are willing to relinquish some national sovereignty in return for a genuine and effective disarmament agreement.

The United States Information Agency can be of value in promoting the cause of disarmament.

Define aggression to include certain preparatory acts of a nation which if practiced would constitute a violation of an agreement. Such a procedure would allow other nations time to apply various enforcement measures.

The United States should exert more leadership in an effort to reach agreement. The appointment of a presidential assistant for disarmament is commendable but he should have more help, funds, and support within the government.

A President's commission on disarmament should be created to resolve the confusion and conflict within the executive branch on matters that can only be decided by the people.

The work of the United Nations should be supplemented by private diplomatic talks, followed by quiet negotiations.

[Extraordinary, what? What strikes me is not so much the naivete of 90% of these, but rather the simplistic instrumentalism they share or that the researcher has made them share. Some survive today in more sophisticated form.]

searcher has made them share. Some arrive first in more complicated form. [Extraordinarily, what? What affirms we is not so much the nature of 80% of

matic talks, followed by chief negotiations.

The work of the United Nations should be accomplished by private diplo-

mation and conflict within the executive branch on matters that can only

A President's commission on disarmament should be created to resolve the
dissue put to him should have more help, funds, and endport within the Government.
The appointment of a presidential representative for disarmament is common-

The United States should exert more leadership in an effort to reach agree-

would allow other nations time to abdicate various enforcement measures.

It practiced would constitute a violation of an agreement. And a procedure

Deligne aggression to include certain barterly acts of a nation which

cause of disarmament.

The United States Information Agency can do so well as does in promoting the

United States citizens are willing to relieve some national severities

the Manhattan project on atomic weapons (AeC).

This country should develop a Washington project for peace similiar to

and less on quadratic and mechanical controls.

More emphasis in disarmament talks should be placed on aboriginal airlines

excessives.

Present policies on aeronautics in the field of nuclear developments are

of American foreign policy.

Disarmament should be made more specific and related to other subjects

international friendly to each other.

Regional countries. Such an exchange should be carried on between other
citizens and these would be located around the world, similarly, regions of the

The United States and the U.2.S.R. should have a large exchange of their

should be bartered.

The bronto seal for a United Nations atomic energy pool for peacefuluses

sides.

need a third point of view to create a synthesis of the bronto seal of the two

In disarmament negotiations the Western nations and the Soviet Union wish

other.

Other.

Problems related to disarmament are further genuine democratic airlines in

Our present broadly is not adequate on arms expenditures. To meet

from disarmament.

to meet the problem of unemployment of capital and labor, which must remain

India should set up planning commissions of their own to study how

in less developed countries.

Reasons added through disarmament should be need for welfare programmes

fed States.

Savings from a reduction in defense spending should be used in the Uni-
economy.

Economical

APPENDIX TWO

[Two other items that do not easily fit elsewhere.]

1. NYT, November 3, 1959:

"[Senator Kennedy] outlined this four-point nuclear policy:

"1. The United States should suspend all nuclear tests as long as the Soviet Union does not resume tests and negotiations for a permanent ban are proceeding amicably.

"2. The United States must intensify efforts to have nuclear tests banned under a system of international inspection and control.

"3. If negotiations collapse, the United States should confine its atomic testing to underground and outer-space explosions.

"4. National and international studies of the effects of radioactive fall-out must be stepped up."

2. NYT, April 23, 1960:

"The [Washington Star] said the [Coolidge] report contained the following recommendations:

"*The United States should accept proposals for a partly disarmed zone through central Europe to help protect both sides against surprise attack.

"*Conventional forces should be increased before any arms control agreement is signed.

"*The United States should agree to keep nuclear weapons out of earth satellites.

"*The United States should agree to ban testing of atomic weapons, both on the earth's surface and in outer space.

"*The United States should agree to strengthen the World Court.

"*The United States should agree to make greater use of the 'United Nations presence' in disputed areas.

"The United States should help codify international law as a step toward substituting the rule of law for the rule of force in international affairs."

***

## EXPLANATORY BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. References given as "Control and Reduction" pertain to the document "Control and Reduction of Armaments," Final Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Disarmament, October 13, 1958.

2. Specific references in *Daedalus*, Fall 1960 ("Special Issue on Arms Control") are made to the following articles:

1. Robert R. Bowie, "Basic Requirements for Arms Control," pp. 708-722.

2. William R. Frye, "Characteristics of Recent Arms-Control Proposals and Agreements," pp. 723-743.

3. Edward Teller, "The Heasibility of Arms Control and the Principle of Openness," pp. 781-799.

4. Paul M. Doty, "The Role of the Smaller Powers," pp. 818-830.

5. Bernard T. Feld, "Inspection Techniques of Arms Control," pp. 860-878.

6. Thomas C. Schelling, "Reciprocal Measures for Arms Stabilization," pp. 892-914.

7. Jerome B. Wiesner, "Comprehensive Arms-Limitation Systems," pp. 915-950.

8. Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Public Opinion and the Control of Armaments," pp. 984-999.

9. Erich Fromm, "The Case for Unilateral Disarmament," pp. 1015-1028.

3. Abbreviations frequently used are the following: NYT (New York Times), CSM (Christian Science Monitor), WP (Washington Post, *not* World Politics), B&S (Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists).

***