It is the retaliatory power which is the vital factor."

The crucial strategic problem, of course, is to determine in what contingency retaliatory power is the vital factor. The defensive nature of British strategy coupled with a reliance on thermo-nuclear retaliation far from answering this question if anything complicated its solution. For it gave the U.S.S.R. an opportunity either to launch a surprise attack which, given the geographic realities, might well reduce the British counterblow to a level the U.S.S.R. could accept. Or it gave the Soviets the option of starting with a more limited threat, say a conventional or even low-yield nuclear attack on Western Europe and force Britain to decide whether this provocation was "worth" what amounted to national suicide. But even if it should be argued that either of these contingencies would immediately bring the United States into the field, two problems would still remain: why Britain should build up a nuclear striking force which admittedly could not be decisive by itself and why it should maintain substantial conventional forces and a large army on the Continent?

The decision to develop a retaliatory force of its own reflected two problems common to all our European allies: a desire to remain world powers and a lack of certainty either about American intentions or about American strategy. Heretofore a major power was one which could conduct a war on a

Statement on Defense, 1956, p. 4.

basis of relative equality with other major powers, or to put it another way, its survival did not depend entirely on the continual good-will of another sovereign state. With the advent of thermo-nuclear weapons, however, an imbalance has been created between the vulnerability of states and their ability to pose a corresponding threat. All states have become equally vulnerable but only the United States and the U.S.S.R. possess the resources

Threaten similar retaliation

to pose an overwhelming threat because the combination of warning systems, delivery means and weapons which provide the sinews of strategic striking power are too sophisticated and expensive. It is understandable that a power long the center of world affairs should find difficulty in accepting the fact that even its maximum strategic effort could not be decisive. At any rate if

world power was measured by nuclear technology, Great Britain proposed to establish its position by entering the nuclear race: "[W] must make a contribution to the Allied deterrent," said the British Statement on Defense.

Also, the form its contrib. took was not designed to meet its special power requirements of 1956, "commensurate with our standing as a world Power." The British strategic dilemma was however precisely that a commensurate contribution would be inadequate for total war but substantial enough to drain resources from an effort to prepare for other forms of conflict. It was the impossibility of being prepared for every contingency which caused the *Times* of

*British Statement on Defense, 1956, p. 4.*

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67

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London to criticize the British defense program as producing weapons for prestige which might detract from the British ability to deal with the most likely threats. But more important still than Britain's desire to be a world power has been the uncertainty about American intentions and the absence of an agreed strategic doctrine. It reflected Britain's lack of assurance that in a crisis the United States would interpret a vital threat in the same manner as Great Britain or that in time of war it would attack a similar significance to targets considered essential for British survival.

This dual uncertainty about American intentions both with respect to what the United States would consider a casus belli and what it would consider a vital target has caused the British strategic striking force to be conceived almost as much as a weight against the United States as a threat to Russia. It has been built on the assumption that without a nuclear establishment of its own Great Britain would carry no weight in Allied Councils. "There are those who believe or at any rate say," argued Sir Winston Churchill in his speech backing the British defense program cited above, "if we have the protection of the overwhelmingly powerful United States we need not make the hydrogen bomb for ourselves or build a fleet of bombers for its delivery. We can leave that to our friends across the ocean! Personally I cannot feel that we should have ²¹) Weapons for Prestige, The Times, March 9, 1956.

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much influence over their policy or actions, wise or unwise, while we are
largely dependent as we are today upon their protection. We, too, must pos-
sess substantial deterrent power of our own."

This doctrine could have only two meanings: that Britain would build
up a deterrent of its own capable of dealing alone with a Soviet attack or
if a British vital interest were threatened
that it was building a force capable/of unleashing a war of sufficient magni-
tude that the United States would be forced to intervene on Britain's side.
Since a capability to fight an all-out war alone was beyond Britain's economic
resources, only the second explanation is possible. No such explanation was
ever advanced for obvious reasons and the justification for building up the
British nuclear striking force has usually been in terms of obtaining control
over the targets which would ~~be struck~~ have to be hit) at the crucial initial stages of a war:
"There are big administrative and industrial centers behind the Iron Curtain,"
said Sir Winston Churchill presaging arguments made by every British State-
ment on Defense since, "and any effective deterrent policy must have the power
to paralyze them all at the outset, or shortly after. There are also the
Soviet submarine bases and other targets which will need early attention. Un-
less we make a contribution of our own...we cannot be sure that in an emergency

<sup>22)</sup> Hansard (Commons), March 1, 1955.

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348

the resources of other powers would be placed exactly as we would wish, or
that the targets which would threaten us most would be given what we consider
the necessary priority, or the deserved priority, in the first few hours."

What had in effect occurred in Allied relationships between Great
Britain and the United States was the same rivalry to control essential mis-
sions which has characterized the conflict among the services in the United
States. And just as in the United States, the result has been an attempt by
each service to develop an over-all capability because only in this manner
would it be certain that each target essential to the performance of its mis-
sion would in fact be attacked, so it has induced Great Britain to duplicate
at heavy expense, the one strategic capability in which we are strongest. It
would seem that there must be more economical ways to achieve doctrinal har-
mony and agreement on which targets are to be hit than by a proliferation of
first missions just among our own services and then between us and our allies.

Regarding From another aspect, the
This duplication of missions between us and the ally maintaining the
largest military establishment revealed above all a British willingness to
Willingness to draw) share the full implications from the strategic doctrine on which NATO was
based. For there had always been this inconsistency in NATO strategy that

23) Hansard (Commons), March 1, 1955. See also series of articles in the
2/ Manchester Guardian explaining British Bombing Force, December 13 and 14, 1955.

350

doctrine defines as the chief deterrent, there would be no need for a costly duplication of functions. Could the NATO strategic doctrine offer a different solution to Soviet aggression than all-out war, the continental nations would have a greater incentive to undertake local defense. As it is, the strategic doctrine of NATO offers an incentive for a military contribution only in the category where the United States is already strongest. This has caused the same ambivalence to appear in British strategic doctrine between a strategy which would treat an attack on NATO as a cause of all-out war and a strategy which would seek to defend the NATO area on the ground, which has already been noted in U.S. doctrine. And as the United States, Great Britain too has retained conventional military forces, irrelevant for all-out war but unprepared doctrinally for other forms of conflict. For Great Britain, as the United States, has been confronted by the fact that the continental powers were not satisfied with playing the trigger to the strategic striking power of their nuclear allies. They have insisted on a defense on the ground to protect them against Soviet occupation.

You said earlier that our strategy deterred them from making any effort. Whatever the cause, they made much.

If the Continental powers had delivered promised ground forces, resistance might have been possible. But is certainly France or Germany as much as U.S. or Britain who have made a mockery of NATO.

351

Thus was born the British Army of the Rhine or Four divisions just as the American army in Germany comprising five divisions. The real difficulty with these forces is not that they represent a strategic diversion -- although in terms of an all-out wxx strategy they do this too -- but that they constitute less than the expression of a strategic doctrine but a concession to European fears.

They are stationed in Europe as a symbol of the determination of Great Britain and the United States that an attack on Europe would lead to all-out war as a bait to our European allies to increase their own defense contribution.

Actually the force is sufficiently large to give rise to the opposite idea, that perhaps a ground defense would be attempted and it might therefore tempt the Soviets into a probing action. In fact, vis-a-vis the European allies the American and British forces are precisely intended to convey the idea that a ground defense (is) will be intended. The Allied forces in Western Europe thus have a dual and partly contradictory role: to convince the U.S.S.R. that an attack on Western Europe would mean an all-out war and to convince the

Continental powers that Soviet aggression could be contained on the ground.

Both positions are contained in British statements regarding the need for substantial ground forces. The statements of defense for 1954, 1955 and 1956 all maintain that Great Britain require an army for the conduct of limited wars

I do not follow this. Our forces in Europe guarantee our resistance, not all-out war. That would be deplacable on the size of the attack. All through you have a sound argument, stated too categorically.

419

The prerequisite of a policy of alliances then is a readiness on our part to undertake local defense and a military doctrine and capability to give it effect. A strategy looking to local defense is inconsistent, however, with a generalized system of collective security. A world-wide such system of collective security would expand the war politically while we are striving to limit it militarily. To the extent that we involve a maximum number of allies in a conflict we multiply the opportunities for Soviet pressures against them.

In turn, the wider the allied support, the more various the motives which animate the coalition and the more diluted the common purpose. The most effective coalition policy would therefore be based on regional cooperation politically and on a strategy of local defense militarily. Within this regional grouping we should concert our efforts with our allies. Outside that region we must be free to act unilaterally or with a different grouping of powers if our interest so dictates.

Such a policy would take account of the fact that the United States alone of the Powers of the non-Soviet world is strong enough physically and psychologically to play a global role. It would also supply an answer to the question of the relation of members of a regional alliance to problems in other parts

of the relation of members of a regional alliance to problems in other parts
logically to push a global role. It would also imply an answer to the question
of the powers of the now-Soviet world is around enough pacifism andbacho-
 Such a policy would take account of the fact that the United States alone
so dictates.

free to act misappropriately or with a different bromping of powers if our interest
we should concert our efforts with our allies. Outside that region we must be
a strategy of local defense militarily. Within thisxxiiixth regional bromping
coalition policy would therefore be based on regional cooperation politics and
the coalition and the more diluted the common purpose. The most effective

In sum, the wider the allied anborst, the more arduous the moieties which animate
in a conflict we multiply the opportunities for Soviet breaches against them.
limit it militarily. To the extent that we involve a maximum number of allies
collective security would expand the war politically while we are arriving to
a generalized架象 of collective security. A world-wide maximum架象 of
it effect. A strategy looking to local defense is inconsistent, however, with
part to undertake local defense and a military doctrine and capability to give
The breederaitte of a policy of alliance then is a readiness on our

The breederaitte of a policy of alliance then is a readiness on our
it effect. A strategy looking to local defense is inconsistent, however, with
part to undertake local defense and a military doctrine and capability to give
The breederaitte of a policy of alliance then is a readiness on our

773

420

of the world. The simplest answer is that alliances should be confined only
to purposes shared by its members and that each partner should be free to act
in areas of greatest concern to him. This indeed has been the historic pattern
of coalitions. But modern technology presents substantial obstacles to such
a course. Historically, partners of an alliance were free to act unilaterally
outside the area of their common interest because the conséquences of their
actions could not endanger the security of the ally. Unilateral action was
possible because conflicts could be localized geographically either because
of the difficulty of access of other major powers or through a division of
the world into spheres of interest. Thus during the Brench-British entente,
it proved possible for France to take independent actions in Central Africa
and for Britain in Southeast Asia almost without consultation because these
actions did not threaten to involve the ally in a major war. But with modern
technology isolated areas no longer exist, and any military action will always
be overshadowed by the threat of the intervention of a major power. This is
complicated further by the fact that none of our allies can undertake unilateral
action and keep it limited by their own efforts. For without capability for
an all-out war they are at the mercy of an opponent that possesses it. Thus

an all-out war they are at the mercy of an opponent that possesses it. This
action and keep it limited by their own efforts. For without capability for
complicated surrender by the fact that none of our allies can undertake unilateral
be overshadowed by the threat of the intervention of a major power. This is
technology isolated areas no longer exist, and any military action will always
actions did not threaten to involve the ally in a major war. But with modern
and for Britain in Southeast Asia almost without consultation because these
it proved possible for France to take independent action in Central Asia
the world into spheres of interest. This during the French-British offensive,
of the difficulty of access of other major powers or through a division of
possible because conflicts could be localized geographically either because
actions could not endanger the security of the ally. Unilateral action was
outside the area of their common interest because the consequences of their
a course. Historically, barriers of an alliance were free to act unilaterally
of conditions. But modern technology presents substantial obstacles to any
in areas of greatest concern to him. This indeed has been the historic pattern
to purposes shared by its members and that each partner should be free to set
of the world. The simplest answer is that alliances should be confined only

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421

our allies can fight alone only with the support of the United States or the
forbearance of the U.S.S.R. Their dilemma is that they do not have the resources
for all-out war and they cannot fight limited wars except with our con-
currence or under our protection. This, if anything, was the lesson of the
British and French intervention in Egypt.

The growing dependence of our allies on our support has two consequences:
it means that resistance on their part outside their most immediate sphere of
interest becomes increasingly unlikely and this sphere, in the case of our
European allies at least, is constantly shrinking. But even within the area of
most direct concern to them decisive action by our allies is inhibited by their
awareness that they cannot sustain such an effort without U.S. support. Thus
a gap is created between the increasing inability of our allies to play a global
role and the doctrine of collective security. In many areas of the world, even
will be lost
regional defense depends on the willingness of the United States to support
it and in the remainder no kind of defense is possible unless the United States
undertakes it unilaterally. In these circumstances, we cannot give the impression
that defense against Soviet aggression presupposes the consensus of humanity;
because the consensus of humanity depends importantly on American leadership.

This detracts more than it adds.

because the consignments of humanity degenerate importantly on American leadership.

that defense against Soviet aggression breaches the consensuses of humanity; undertakes it militarily. In these circumstances, we cannot give the impression it and in the remainder no kind of defense is possible unless the United States regional defense degenerates on the willingness of the United States to support role and the doctrine of collective security. In many areas of the world, even a war is created between the increasing inaptitude of our allies to play a global awareness that they cannot sustain and an effort without U.S. support. Time most direct concern to them decisive action by our allies is inhibited by their European allies at least, is constantly shrinking. But even within the area of interest becomes increasingly unlikely and this sphere in the case of our it means that resistance on their part outside their most immediate sphere of

The growing degeneration of our allies on our abhorrent has two consequences:

British and French intervention in Iraq.

consequence or under our protection. This is anything was the lesson of thexxx for all-out war and they cannot fight limited wars except with our con-ferrence of the U.S.A.R. Their dilemma is that they do not have the resources our allies can fight alone only with the abhorrent of the United States or the

42la

The United States attitude towards unilateral action and towards
regional defense therefore reveals two sides of the same coin. We must be
prepared to act unilaterally because we alone of the Powers of the non-Soviet
world are strong enough physically and psychologically to take a global view.
The operational expression of this is that some areas may strike us as more "vital"
than they do our allies so that the attempt to gear our policy to theirs would
lower action to the level of the ally prepared to run the fewest risks. Conversely,
within their sphere of primary interest, which is more and more becoming identified
with a limited geographic region, our allies may well be more sensitive than we.
Here we must be prepared to make some concessions to our allies' view of their
essential interests if we want to maintain the alliance. As leaders of the
alliance we cannot insist on defining all the issues for which to contend; unless
our allies see some benefit for themselves on problems they consider vital, their
sense of impotence may turn into neutralism. This does not mean that
we must support our allies, however arbitrary their behavior. It does imply
that both partners must become aware of the potential disparity between their
views of their essential interests. Our allies must be willing to let us act
unilaterally outside the area of regional cooperation and we cannot be too purist
in assessing the interests of our allies within that region. Any other approach
would make for paralysis: it would cause the alliance to hamstring us outside
the area of mutual concern and it would cause us to paralyze our allies within it.

Since resistance is impossible or unlikely without our assistance a great
deal depends on our own answer to the two problems posed at the beginning of
this chapter: the nature of aggression and the consequences flowing from the
determination that a given fact is in fact aggression.

In the task of elaborating a concept of aggression which addresses to
the most likely dangers, the United States faces peculiar difficulties. Our
concept of aggression was formed during our period of invulnerability when our
objectives with respect to the rest of the world were primarily motivated by
a desire to be left alone by it. Foreign policy, with the exception perhaps
of Western Hemisphere relations was not conducted as long-range strategy, but
as a response to a developing situation. Until the end of World War II, the
security conferred by two great oceans contributed to the illusion that the
extent of our foreign commitments was entirely up to us. In these circum-
stances it was natural that we developed a concept of aggression as an armed
attack across a sovereign boundary. Moreover, even though we disapproved of
such actions, our concept of aggression did not enjoin us to resist all forms
of it, but only overt challenges to our national existence.

This essentially legalistic notion of aggression always had the drumback

that it left us defenseless against strategic transformations by increments, any one of which would not threaten our survival, but the cumulative impact of which might well upset the strategic balance. In the past, this was obscured by the fact that there existed many intermediary powers which would be threatened by transformations not large enough to be a memex menace to us. They would be certain to result and therefore acted as safety indicators. We could afford a "purist" concept of aggression which insisted on an unambiguous threat, because other powers accomplished the indispensable function of a policy of not clear PRECAUTION for us. [For insistance that aggression had to be overt, which denied the prequestionary element of policy, was always somewhat misleading. It fitted the circumstances of a particular period when we could concede the first blow secure in the knowledge that it could not be decisive and that we would have time to mobilize our resources undisturbed. Less fortunately situated nations have never been able to afford so "purist" a concept. A state, whose fate is which may be decided by a single battle and which may be fundamentally threatened by a slight shift in the balance of power cannot regard a prebuild-up on its borders with equanimity. If it permits the threat to become unambiguous it may jeopardize its existence. Or put another way, it considers a challenge unambiguous which may be much more obscure to Powers with a wider margin of safety.]

424

This, in fact, has been precisely the history of our participation in the two
world wars. In both wars, the European powers took up the gauntlet against
an aggression which to us was not sufficiently unambiguous; they had to fight
alone until the threat to us became more overt or their defeat threatened us
with isolation.

But in the nuclear age we no longer possess this margin of safety; we
no longer possess the "safety-indicators" of our more secure past. The inter-
mediary powers having lost either the ability or the will to resist alone, our
insistence on an unambiguous concept of aggression will ensure that in many
areas no resistance will take place at all. Henceforth, we cannot afford to
stand apart while we assess the meaning of events. Any conflict will involve
us in the first instance or it will lead to surrender. Moreover, as our margin
of safety has shrunk, the forms of aggression have multiplied. In the past,
a nation could dominate another only by annexation or defeating it in war.

But in the age of "volunteers" and "arms bases", of internal subversion and
economic penetration, the strategic balance may be upset without a clear-out
issue ever being presented. Is Soviet repression of satellite revolts aggression?
Is a Soviet base in the Middle East aggression when it is stocked with weapons
or only when Soviet troops appear against the will of the indigenous

["or only when Soviet troops appear against the will of the indigenous\nor only

I do not believe "increments" can stand alone
without a modifying prepositional phrase.

425

government? Is a Communist uprising in Burma aggression or civil war?

None of these questions can be answered on the basis of fact alone; they
depend on a concept of aggression. To adopt too purist a notion of aggression
aids the Soviet strategy of upsetting the strategic balance by (increments.)

It plays into Soviet hands because in every xixkixccente crisis it will provide
an argument for deferring a show-down to a more propitious moment. To limit
aggression to an attack across a sovereign boundary may lead to a gradual trans-
formation of the strategic balance through internal subversion without any
possibility of effective counter-action, as has indeed happened in the Middle
East. To reject completely the precautionary element of policy is to resign
the initiative. It will ensure that we will always have to fight our military
actions at moments of maximum disadvantage. And it is far from clear that
it is possible to hold a perimeter of twenty thousand miles entirely on the
defensive, either physically or psychologically. In a short, with the end
of our invulnerability we have lost the opportunity to make simple moral
 choices; we can no longer count on clear challenges to impel our actions.
It is therefore imperative for the United States to become clear in our own
minds about the nature of aggression and then to convey our conclusions and

426

and the consequences we propose to draw from them to the outside world.

For the problem of resisting aggression is as much a question of concept as of power: even the best military establishment will prove *xxx* futile in resisting aggression, if the political leadership cannot *recognize* aggression.

To be sure, we should seek the widest possible consensus both in defining aggression and in the resistance to it. But we must also be prepared to act alone if this is the only means *in* of preserving the strategic balance.

We cannot permit the Soviets to achieve a predominant position for the sake of allied unity or

of allied nations or

We cannot permit the Soviet to achieve a predominant position on the stage to set alone it apart from the only means of preserving the strategic balance, deterring aggression and in the restatement to it. But we must also be prepared

To be sure, we should seek the widest possible consensus both in
resterating aggression, if the political leadership cannot recognize aggression.

of power: even the best military establishment will prove too little in
For the problem of repressing aggression is so much a question of concept as
and the consequences we propose to draw from them to the outside world.

TSC

for the approbation of the rest of the world. The penalty of our power may
well be leadership; a leader must resign himself to be alone part of the time?
at least while he starts the road. The failure to exercise leadership will
not result in a consensus of humanity; but it will lead to the creation of
a vacuum.
VII

VII

But would not a more independent policy antagonize, if not our allies, at
least the uncommitted third of the world? The importance of the belt of newly
independent states streching across the southern borders of Eurasia x cannot be
doubted. It is equally beyond question that it is to the American interest
to identify itself with the hopes and aspirations of that area and to prevent
an alignment of the white against the colored races of the world. The con-
sequences that flow from this realization are much less obvious, however. it
provides an argument for deferring a showdown to a more propitious moment and
therefore aids the Soviet strategy of upsetting the strategic balance by
increment. For to master a revolution such as is in the under-
developed third of the world, pop ularity may not be enough; indeed the attempt
be popular
to the popu larity may be self-defeating or aggravate the situation, both psy-
chologically and politically. The short-term swings of public opinion in
these areas may be much less significant than the ability to give them a
sense of direction over a longer period of time consistent with our values

and our interests. Any policy toward the uncommitted third of the world must therefore begin with an understanding of the tendencies they represent.

The revolution that is taking place in the newly independent and still dependent states can only be narrowly understood as a revolution against colonialism. In a real sense it is a continuation of a revolution started by the colonial powers and carried on under their aegis. Moreover, not all the protest movements of formerly subjugated people are either of the same order or represent the same phenomenon: there is a basic difference between areas in which colonialism ruled directly and those in which it governed indirectly.

The remarkable aspect of colonialism from its beginning was the imposition of rule by a very small group of Europeans over vast populations. This was possible due to not so much because of it because of the military superiority of the West -- in many respects this is greater today than it was in the 19th century -- as to the fact that the European powers displaced an existing ruling group in a society where the mass of the population neither possessed nor expected direct participation in government. The structure of government in what is now the uncommitted third of the world had been feudal for centuries and in their first appearance the Europeans appeared as only a new governing group substituting itself for the existing one according to a pattern which had characterized wars in these areas for many generations. The

government of vast territories by small groups of Europeans was possible precisely because they were not considered as "foreign"; the notion of their foreignness was introduced in the first instance not by the government but by their rulers. For the Europeans were not content with displacing a feudal upper class. They brought with them the twin doctrines of rational administration and popular participation in government which in time had inevitably to prove inconsistent with this their continued domination. The rationalizing of administration led to the consolidation of many areas into viable units for the first time in their history; Indonesia for example was nothing but a geographic expression until the Dutch found it more efficient to consolidate the islands of the Indies into a single administrative unit. At the same time other colonial powers trained a group of indigenous leaders in European universities where they absorbed the doctrines of the right of self-government, human dignity and economic advancement which had been the rallying points for European revolutionary and progressive movements throughout the nineteenth century.

The result was two sets of paradoxes: in its revolutionary aspect colonialism represents one of the greatest conversions of history. Almost without exception the leaders of the newly independent states as well as the heads of

anti-colonial uprisings in still dependent countries are opposing the present or former matters in terms of values they have learned from them. Their challenge to the West is not in terms of a different set of beliefs; it is for the West to live up to its own principles. The leaders in the uncommitted third of the world are playing a role drawn from a Western script. As the ideals of the British, French and American revolution became diffused partly through the very spread of colonialism, the seeds were sewn for the destruction of colonialism itself. The more successful the teachings of the colonial powers, the more untenable their positions became. What is taking place in the areas once under direct colonial rule is the second stage of the revolution started by the colonial powers; it is an attempt by the leaders of the newly independent states to spread among the masses of their people the values which they themselves acquired from the colonial power and which furnished the original impetus of the revolution.

This leads to the second paradox of the uncommitted third of the world: that the position of areas which had been under direct colonial rule is more advantageous than that of countries where the colonial powers exercised their influence only indirectly. The territories governed directly benefitted through administrative consolidation and the overthrow of the old feudal order by an

over and against a long period of time. There, too, while a legalistic concept of sovereignty and aggression may be a stabilizing element in South-East Asia, it is a revolutionary force in areas like the Middle East because it works counter to the consolidation of inherently worthwhile and economically unviable units.

It is the revolution occuring in these countries, however different in its nature, which makes the quest for popularity and a teacher's course. A revolution is usually characterized by a coming together of all dissatisfactions which join in protest against the existing order but which cannot necessarily offer a clear substitute. The history of revolutions indicates moreover that after the initial phase of sweeping away the prevailing institutions/government usually falls into the hands of a small minority which can give a sense of direction to popular resentments and aspirations. And the same may be true of the international revolution now taking place on a global scale. The United States will have to give it a sense of direction or be engulfed by it eventually. It cannot do so, however, by basing its policy on an inquiry into what people desire; the situation is revolutionary precisely because old orders are desintegrating and millions are groping for a new orientation. In the uncommitted areas, popularity may therefore prove less important than respect.

The importance of United States leadership is all the greater because of
the unfamiliarity of many of the leaders of the newly independent nations with
the elements of international stability and occasionally their irresponsibility.
Many of the leaders of the newly independent states have found the temptation to
play a major role in international affairs almost overwhelming. Domestically,
their problems are intractable; even a major economic advance would still
probably fall far short of the aspirations of their peoples and in many coun-
tries will have a serious problem to keep up with rising birth-rate. In
domestic policy each action has a price and sometimes a high one; even so
well-established a leader as Nehru found that so relatively technical a problem
as reshaping the boundaries of the Indian states could provoke major communal
riots. But in the international field the division of the world into two con-
tending camps exalts the role of the uncommitted and the collapse of the
structure of the old international system creates a fertile field of mani-
pulations for ambitious men. This produces an accumulating overehelming
difficult the solution of difficult domestic problems by entering the international
arena, to solidify a complicated domestic position by triumphs in the international
field.

This attitude might be more constructive were it not combined with the

a lack of understanding of the nature of modern power relationships, indeed with a
denial of this reality. The leaders of the newly independent states achieved their
positions by distinguishing themselves in the struggle with the former colonial
powers. But the independence movements almost without exception provided a poor
preparation for an understanding of the element of power in international relations.
Based on the dogmas of late nineteenth century liberalism, especially its paci-
fism, the independence movements relied more on ideological agreement than on
an evaluation of power factors and to this day the claim to superior spirituality
remains the battle cry of Asian nationalism. Moreover, the bad conscience of the
colonial Powers and their preoccupation with European problems gave the struggle
for independence more the character of a domestic debate than of a power dis-
pute. To be sure, many of the leaders of the newly independent Powers spent
years in jail and suffered heroically for their cause. It is not to deny the
measure of their dedication to assert that the results achieved were out of
proportion to their suffering. Empires which had held vast dominions for
hundreds of years disappeared without a battle being fought.

And if it is difficult for the leaders to retain a sense of proportion,
it is next to impossible for the mass of the people. On the whole, they were
involved in the struggle for independence only with their sympathies; to them

the disappearance of the colonial Powers must seem nothing short of
miraculous. Moreover, Most of the people of the newly independent states
live in pre-industrial societies. It would be difficult enough for them to
grasp the full impact of industrialism; it is too much to expect them to
understand the meaning of nuclear technology. It is therefore understandable
that in most former colonial areas there is an overestimation of what can be
accomplished by the power of words alone. Nor is this tendency diminished
by the rewards that fall to the uncommitted in the struggle for allegiance
by the two big power centers.

But however understandable, it is a dangerous trend. If this were
a tranquil period, nothing would be involved but minor irritations. In the
present revolutionary situation, however, the degeneration of the newly
independent states makes them susceptible to Soviet "peace offensives" and
their lack of appreciation of power relationships causes them to over-
estimate the protection afforded by moral precepts. Indeed their very
insistence on principle contributes to the demoralization of international
politics for it tempts them to accept at face value protestations of peaceful /
or legitimate grievances with which the Soviets inevitably accompany their ag-
gressive moves. It reinforces the quest for a "pure" case of aggression

which almost insures that the actual aggressions which may take place will not
be dealt with and in many instances not even be recognized as aggression.

Against the masters of ambiguity in the Kremlin and in Peiping, the
insistance on absolute answers makes it likely that no answers will be given
at all. And this in turn will affect the willingness to resist of
threatened countries. They know that in any concrete case the pressure of
the uncommitted part of the world will be exerted in favor of a policy
of minimum risk and they will not be reassured by homilies which may be
proclaimed at their wake.

Moreover, such understanding of power as the newly independent states
do possess does not favor the United States. The power, chiefly visible to
the newly independent states are the Chinese or Soviet armies on their
borders. This is a category of power which is both concrete and in keeping
with their historical experience. By contrast the power of the United States
is highly abstract and nearly invisible. Two hundred Chinese divisions repre
sent a familiar element of power; by comparison the destructive capability
of a B-52 and or the strategic impact of ballistic missile is esoteric and
difficult to grasp. Thus considerations of both power and principle combine
to inspire the newly independent nations with caution. In every crisis they

super powers, they chose in every crisis to direct their pressures against us as a means to preserve the peace or to resolve an issue. To the degree that we can project a greater sense of purpose some of these pressures may be diverted against the Soviet bloc. A revolution like Egypt's or even India's cannot be managed by understanding alone; it also requires a readiness on our part to bear the psychological burden of difficult decisions.

VIII

The problem of American relations both with our allies and the uncommitted therefore depends on a close relationship of power and policy. Without a military policy which poses less fearful risks than all-out war, our alliances will be in jeopardy, and the uncommitted areas will vacillate between protestations of

Very good, in spite of the principle and a consciousness of their impotence. But even if the wisest military policy will prove sterile, if our diplomacy cannot elaborate a concept of aggression which is directed to the most likely dangers. In our relation to both our allies and the uncommitted, we must realize that common action depends on common purposes and that it is the task of policy to set the frame-work of common purpose, if necessary by an act of leadership that permits no further equivocation.

Relations both with our allies and the uncommitted and the development of the proper strategy derive their particular urgency not so much from the revolution going on in the colonial areas or from the shrinking power of Europe

Going on in the
colonial areas or from the springing bower of Emobe

broadly指泛指 their baronies,即不拘从 these relations
refations pot with om. effea and the uncommitted and the deactivation of the
necessity of an act of registration that permits no further enfranchisement.

and that it is the task of baron to set the frame-work of common bndboses
and the uncommitted, we must realize that common section gebenge on common bndboses
which is directed to the most timely changes. In om. relation to pot om. effea
borach will prove sterile, it om. fertility cannot espouse a concept of affluence
principle and a conscience of their imbalance. But even then the waste written
Jedediah, and the uncommitted areas will alleviate between protestations of
borach which bodes rease teratant risks from sit-on war, om. affluences will be in
therefore gebenge on a close relationship of bower and borach. Without aจรity
the problem of American relations pot with om. effea and the uncommitted
pungen of sufficient decimation.

AIII

understanding alone; it is clear requires a readiness on om. part to bear the負
the Soviet proc. A revolution like Egy's, or even India's cannot be managed by
project a greater sense of bndboses some of whose bndboses may be diverted against
a means to preserve the bodes or to resolve an issue. To the degree that we can
understand, find chosen in every criteria to direct their bndboses against us so

CHAPTER V

All-Out War
The Esoteric Strategy — Principles of Strategic Air Warfare

of course,

Stalemates have occurred frequently in the history of warfare. Usually they have been brought about, however, by a balance between offense and defense on the battlefield. The distinguishing feature of the current use of the term is that it refers not to a balance on the battlefield, but to a calculus of risks: with each side possessing the capability to inflict catastrophic blows on the other, war is said to be no longer a rational course of action. To be sure, even if a nuclear stalemate does exist, it would not make for stability in the present volatile state of technology, much less for a sense of harmony. The spectre of a technological breakthrough by the other side would always loom large; it would give an apocalyptic quality to all international relations.

It is important to be precise, however, about the effect of the nuclear stalemate. For A great deal will depend on the correctness of our assessment. If what the stalemate deters and whether this exhausts the strategic options of either side.

The whole notion of a stalemate is repugnant, of course, to our military

The whole notion of a stade mature is rebjuvant, of course, to our military

either side.

what the stade mature deters and whether this deters the strategic options of

stade mature. For a great deal will depend on the correctness of our assessment of

If it is important to be precise, however, about the effect of the unclear
all international relations.

other side would always seem too far; it would give an apocryphal quality to
for a sense of harmony. The spectrum of a technological breakthrough by the
make for stability in the present volatile state of technology, much less
of action. To be sure, even if a nuclear stade mature does exist, it would not
catastrophic flows on the other, war is said to be no longer a rational course
causes of risks: with each side bessuing the capability to inflict
of the term is that it refers not to a balance on the battlefield, but to a
defense on the battlefield. The distinguishing feature of the current race
they have been brought about, however, by a balance between offense and

stade matures have occurred frequently in the history of warfare. Usually
of course,

The Eclectic Strategy - Principles of Strategic Air Warfights
All-Of't Mar

CHAPTER A

133

thought, based as it is on the literal application of Clausewitz's dictum
that the purpose of war is to break the enemy's will to resist. It has been
overlooked that Clausewitz had considered his postulate merely as an expression
of pure theory which, in actuality, would never be realized. He had asserted,
to be sure, that war tends towards maximum violence but also that, in fact,
it never reached maximum violence because of the state of international
complexity of alliances or most importantly because of a limitation on war aims. 1)
And the history of warfare prior to World War I seemed to confirm this. For
over a century prior to World War I war was considered an extension of policy.

it was
Because they were fought for specific objectives, there existed a rough
commensurability between the force employed and the goal sought. But with
the outbreak of World War I war suddenly seemed to become an end in itself.
After the first few months of the war, none of the protagonists would have
been able to name an objective other than the total defeat of the enemy or
at least which they would have named objectives, such as the German demand for
the annexation of Belgium, which amounted to unconditional surrender. This
was all the more remarkable because none of the political leaders had prepared

1. Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, p. 8.

for anything but a war in the 19th century style with rapid moments and
quick decisions so that the stalemate of the first winter was primarily due
to the exhaustion of munitions supplies. 2) There had in fact occurred a
hiatus between military and political planning which has never been bridged.

The military staffs had developed plans for total victory because it is in
such plans that all factors are under the control of the military. But the
political leadership proved incapable of giving this conception a concrete
expression in terms of peace aims. It was forgotten that rapid decisions of
had been above all
19th century warfare were due more to the readiness with which defeat was
acknowledged than to the strategy employed. And defeat was acknowledged relatively
easily, because the consequences of it did not threaten national survival.

When the purpose of war became total victory, however, the result was a conflict
of ever-increasing violence which carried its hatreds into a peace treaty that
considered more the redressing of sacrifices than the stability of the international
order.

It was overlooked moreover, that
Withal, the incidence on total victory was possible only through a
fortuitous combination of circumstances. Historically our relative strength

2. See Aron - *A Century of Total War*, p.

we were misled by our experience in the wars in our hemisphere where our relative strength vis-a-vis our opponents was so great that we could achieve total victory with only a portion of our resources: the war was total only in relation to our enemies, not to us. And technologically, the strategy of of the two World wars presupposed two related factors: a productive process which yielded a substantial surplus above bare subsistence and weapons of relatively small destructiveness so that any increment in strength was still could prove (strategically significant. Even then the insistence on all-out victory would probably have produced a stalemate had not the addition of the United States to the Allied side given them a crushing margin in industrial potential. For the purpose of war can be equated with total victory only if the victor possesses an unambiguous advantage in relative strength at the end of the war and sufficient physical resources to make this margin effective. And the margin has to be great in proportion as the defeat sought to be imposed is total. The objective of 19th century warfare was to create a calculus of risks according to which continued resistance would appear more costly than the conditions sought to be imposed. The more moderate the conditions the smaller

136

the margin of superiority required to reach this point. The war ended when a sovereign government agreed to the victor's terms and thereby assumed responsibility for their execution. The victor's task in these circumstances was to supervise the actions of a government which in turn retained control over its own population.

With the coming of total war, however, war ceased to be an effort to affect the actions of a government; its goal has become, almost invariably, to overthrow the enemy leadership. This has not only transformed every war into a variety of civil war, it has also increased the margin of superiority required to impose the victor's will. For success in overthrowing the enemy government has in effect forced the responsibility for the civil administration of the defeated. We must could afford to do so at the end of World War II because neither our social nor our material structure was seriously impaired by the war; if anything, they were strengthened by it. But at the scale of catastrophe produced by an all-out thermo-nuclear war it is doubtful whether any society will retain either the physical or the psychological resources to project itself abroad. When energies will be absorbed in problems of bare survival, it is difficult to conceive a sustained effort to assume responsibility for the government of an enemy country.

137

Where, moreover, the social disintegration and physical destruction is
likely far to exceed that of Germany and Japan after World War II. And in
the absence of physical occupation, victory may prove illusory. It may create
a vacuum exploited by powers whose position relative to the contenders has
been improved by the thermo-nuclear exchange. The decline of Europe started
with the exhaustion produced by the first World war in which even the victors
were weakened in relation to the non-European powers.

Thus the destructiveness of modern weapons deprives victory of its
historical meaning because even the side which inflicts a greater devastation
than its opponent may not have a sufficient margin left to impose its will.
And the same exorbitant destructiveness has altered the significance of the
industrial potential on which we have traditionally relied for victory. Our
strategic doctrine had always been built around the proposition that our
forces-in-being at the beginning of a war need only be large enough to avoid
disaster and that we could then crush the enemy by mobilizing our industrial
potential. The strategic significance of industrial potential presupposed
a fortuitous combination of circumstances, however: our invulnerability, the
existence of allies to hold a line while we mobilized, and above all a certain
stage of technological development.

stage of technological development. However, the
existence of affords to hold a line while we mobilised, and above all a certain
a fortuitous combination of circumstances, however, our invulnerability, the
potential. The strategic significance of industrial potential brexploited
disaster and that we could then crush the enemy by modifying our industrial
forces-in-pink at the beginning of a war need only be large enough to each
strategic doctrine had always been built around the proposition that our
industrial potential on which we have traditionally relied for victory. Our
And the same expeditant destruction has offered the significance of the
danish the opponent may not have a sufficient margin left to impose it will.
historical meaning because even the side which inflicts a greater devastation
Time the destruction of modern weapons deprives victory of its
were weakened in relation to the now-European powers.
with the exsauation produced by the first World war in which even the victors
been improved by the thermo-nuclear exchange. The decline of Europe after
a vacuum exploited by powers whose position relative to the contenders has
the absence of physical occupation, victory may prove illusory. It may create
likely far to exceed that of Germany and Japan after World War II. And in
Where, moreover, the social differentiation and physical destruction is

138

industrial potential is the determining factor when attrition in material is decisive. When weapons are very simple and easy to manufacture and when their destructive power is low, trained manpower is scarcer than military equipment. Under such circumstances the significant attrition is in manpower and conversely military superiority depends on human rather than material resources.

Thus Russia became a major power in the 19th century despite an almost complete lack of industry, therefore too the decisions in war until the middle of the 19th century reflected superior manpower or superior strategy, rarely a superior industrial capacity.

In order to put a premium on industrial potential - weapons system most should be sufficiently complex to require a substantial production effort, but not so destructive as to drain the national substance before industrial mobilization can make itself felt. As a result, Thus our industrial potential proved strategically most significant when there existed a certain balance between the destructiveness of weapons and the complexity of means of delivery. Then any increment either in the power of weapons or in their number could be translated into a strategic advantage. But when weapons become extremely powerful there is an upper limit

139

beyond which increased destructiveness pays diminishing returns. When both sides are capable of inflicting catastrophic losses on each other with their forces-in-being, any increment of destructive power may be strategically insignificant. Moreover, the greater the power of individual weapons the greater the relative advantage of the side with the weaker delivery system. When one plane can carry a weapon capable of destroying a city, the side with the larger number of planes will derive little benefit from them if its opponent has a quantity sufficient to inflict a devastating blow.

Thus an all-out war fought with thermo-nuclear weapons will be decided by the forces-in-being -- this was perhaps the only point on which all the witnesses before the Symington Committee agreed. The *this importance of forces-coupled with the destructiveness of modern weapons in-being makes it impossible to identify victory with a superior offensive effort.*

also inapplicable
It makes^Douhet's classic description of air strategy: "In air war we

must resign ourselves to offensives the enemy inflicts on us while bending every effort to inflict heavier ones on him." The *this was in effect the air*

as long as
strategy of World War II. It made sense only if a superior load of explosives represented an absolute margin of effective power; it could be effective only to the degree that attrition of industrial potential was significant. In a

140

thermo-nuclear war, however, the significant attrition is that which reduces
not the industrial potential, but
^the forces-in-being, for the social structure is likely to reach a breaking
point long before the stockpiles of weapons are exhausted.

The importance of forces-in-being compared to industrial potential has
another en paradoxical consequence: it means that war can continue long after victory
has become meaningless. It is possible for example that a surprise attack would
destroy the 50 most important metropolitan centers in the United States with
the consequences described in the previous chapter. While this could produce
social disintegration, it would probably not affect the ability of our Strategic
Air Command to retaliate and the result of such an exchange of blows might well
be the social collapse of both contenders. The fact that an all-out strategy
can be implemented after the social basis for it has disappeared gives it
the quality to air strategy of all-out war and tends to transform it into an end in itself.
It has been compared to a situation where two hostile tribes armed with poison
darts face each other across a canyon. The poison takes several hours to be
effective but is fatal afterwards. In these circumstances, landing the first
blow will be strategically insignificant: it will ruin the "economy" but the
weapons are still useful and they can launch a corresponding counterblow. 2)

2. C. R. Sherwin. "Securing Peace Through Military Technology," *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, May 1956.

141

Thus victory can be achieved only if one side succeeds in destroying the other's poison darts--its forces-in-being--*before* they are launched.

This, however, merely defines another dilemma of all-out thermo-nuclear war.

In the past, the strategy for avoiding defeat was the same as that which aimed for victory. In an all-out thermo-nuclear war, however, the strategies for achieving victory and for avoiding defeat differ. Victory, in the sense of being able to impose one's will on the defeated can be achieved only by destroying the opponent's force-in-being or by reducing it to a size which can be contained by the defense system. The destruction of the retaliatory force in turn almost requires a surprise attack. For if the opponent has adequate warning he can disperse or launch his force-in-being and alert his defenses. He will then be able to start his retaliatory strike even before the first bombs of the aggressor have hit their targets. By contrast, the strategy for *resisting* a surprise attack is different from that which aims for victory. The side which has suffered a surprise attack has already received a heavy and perhaps a devastating blow. Its task is not so much to wipe out the enemy retaliatory force as to deprive the aggressor of the fruits of his assault. It may seek to counteract the *threat* of thermo-nuclear extinction by inflicting its *actuality* on the enemy. To be sure, such a strategy cannot achieve victory; but it can avoid defeat by inflicting the greatest possible damage it may deprive the enemy of the resources to impose its will.

because damage it was depriving the enemy of the resources to impose its will. It cannot achieve victory; but it can avoid defeat by initiating the greatest extinction by initiating its attack on the enemy. To do so, such a strategy of his assault. It may seek to counteract the threat of thermo-nuclear wipe out the enemy retaliatory force as to deprive the aggressor of the truce received a heavy and perhaps a devastating blow. Its task is not so much to aim for victory. The side which has offered a surprise attack has already the strategy for relating a surprise attack is different from that which the first pomsa of the aggressor have hit their targets. By contrast, defenses. He will then be able to start his retaliatory strike even before adequate warning he can diabeate or launch his force-in-keeping and alert his force in turn almost requires a surprise attack. For if the opponent has can be contained by the defense system. The destruction of the retaliatory destroying the opponent's force-in-keeping or by reducing it to a size which of peing able to impose one's will on the defeated can be achieved only by for achieving victory and for avoiding defeat still. Victory, in the sense aimed for victory. In an all-out thermo-nuclear war, however, the strategies in the past, the strategy for avoiding defeat was the same as that which this, however, merely delineates another dilemma of all-out thermo-nuclear war. other's a poison gulf--its forces-in-keeping--before they are launched. This victory can be achieved only if one side succeeds in destroying the

142

strategy for the side which has suffered the surprise attack is to deprive the aggressor of the fruits of his assault. It may seek to counteract the *threat* of thermo-nuclear extinction by inflicting its *actuality* on the enemy; such a strategy cannot achieve victory; but it can avoid defeat; it may prevent the enemy from being able to exercise his will.

It is necessary to consider the strategic problem of all-out thermo-nuclear war against this background. The above analysis makes clear that such a war will primarily be an air war or at least a war of strategic striking forces and *that* it will be decided by the forces-in-being. As for the United States, our strategic problem is complicated by the fact that we have explicitly rejected surprise attack as an instrument of our policy. This is confirmed, not only by every statement of policy, but by our whole past behavior. If we did not utilize our atomic monopoly at a time when the Soviet capability to retaliate was almost non-existent, it is against all probability that we should do so now. But the side which concedes the first blow also concedes the margin for imposing its will; unless our air defense is capable of a rate of attrition which reduces the enemy blow below the level of catastrophe, the strategic problem of all-out war presents itself for us not in terms of a strategy to achieve victory but

war breaks out. Then we not in terms of a strategy to achieve victory but
the enemy flow below the level of saturation, the strategic problem of all-out
its will; unless our air defense is capable of a rate of attrition which reduces
but the side which concedes the first flow also concedes the margin for imposing
was almost non-existent, it is against all propriety that we should do so now.
utilize our atomic monopoly at a time when the Soviet capability to repatriate
by every statement of policy, put by our whole best peacemaker. If we did not
ambrose attack as an instrument of our policy. This is confirmed, not only
our strategic problem is complicated by the fact that we have explicitly rejected
and sent it will be decided by the forces-in-being. As for the United States,
will primarily be an air war or at least a war of strategic striking forces
war against this background. The above analysis makes of that one war
IF ALL OUT

If it is necessary to consider the strategic problem of all-out thermo-unclear
being able to exercise his will.

cannot achieve victory; put it can avoid defeat; it may prevent the enemy from
thermo-unclear extinction by influencing its actuality on the enemy; such a strategy
aggression of the trunca of its assault. It may seek to counteract the first of
strategy for the side which has antecedent the ambrose attack is to deprive the

JTS

143

of a strategy to avoid defeat. The purpose of our all-out war capability
will be to deter war by developing a retaliatory force of a size which can
inflict an unacceptable amount of damage on the enemy, no matter what destruction
he accomplishes by surprise attack. "A deterrent force" said General LeMay
is one that is large enough and efficient enough that no matter what the
enemy force does either offensively or defensively he still will receive a
quantity of bomb he is not willing to accept. Therefore, he never starts
a war." 3)

II

In determining the nature of a deterrent force, it is not sufficient
to compare the opposing retaliatory forces, for deterrence reflects a
complex interrelationship of offensive and defensive capabilities. Theore-
tically at least, the destruction of the enemy's forces-in-being can be achieved
by an effective defense as well as by a sudden offense. In certain circumstances
indeed defense may be the most efficient strategy. In 1940, for example, Britain

3. Symington Hearings, p. 202.

3. Winston Churchill, p. 505.

Indeed, defense may be the most efficient strategy. In 1940, for example, Britain put an effective defense as well as a sudden offense. In certain circumstances, to the least, the destructional the enemy's forces—in-peting can be achieved complex and interrelationship of offensive and defensive capabilities. Therefore, to compare the obsoving retaliatory forces, for defense reflects a

II

a war." 3)

quantity of power he is not willing to accept. Therefore, he never starts enemy force does either offensive or defensively. He still will receive a
is one that is large enough and efficient enough that no matter what the
he accomplishes by surprise attack. "A deterrent force" said General Perley
inflict an unacceptable amount of damage on the enemy, no matter what destruction
will be to deter war by developing a retaliatory force of a size which can
of a strategy to avoid defeat. The purpose of our all-out war capability

173

144

was saved by its Fighter and not its Bomber Command. It can be argued, of
course, that this was due to the British weakness in bombers. But given the
relative geographic positions and the state of technology it is doubtful that
even a much larger British bombing effort could have staved off disaster: The
German forces-in-being were so large and so ~~relatively~~ well-dispersed, the
attrition to be achieved by conventional bombs so slow that Britain might well
have collapsed before its offensive effort could have become effective. To be
sure, in World War II the defensive problem was simpler than today for a rate of attrition
of 10 per cent was considered unacceptable. With conventional weapons the cost
of producing the plane and training of the crew were so high in relation to
the damage which could be inflicted by them/a single raid, that unless a plane
could perform several missions on a statistical average before being shot down,
strategic bombing became a waste of effort. When one plane can carry a
weapon capable of destroying a city much heavier demands are placed on an air-
defense system, however. To produce significant attrition, it must be able to
reduce the damage an enemy can inflict to a level society can accept. Against
a strategic air/force armed with thermo-nuclear weapons even an attrition rate
of 80 per cent may not prevent devastating blows.

of 80 her ton may not prevent devastating blows.

a strategic air/force armed with thermo-nuclear weapons when an attrition rate
reduce the damage an enemy can inflict to a level society can accept. Against
defense systems, however. To produce significant attrition, it must be able to
weapon capable of destroying a city much heavier demands are placed on an air-
atrangc pompking because a materialized operation. When one plane can carry a
confliction several misfortunes on a statistical average before peking not down,
the damage which could be inflicted by them, a single raid, that unless a plane
of producing the plane and training of the crew were so high in relation to
of 10 her ton was considered unacceptable. With conventional weapons the cost
of, in World War II, the defensive problem was simpler for a rate of attrition
have coifished before its offensive effort could have become effective. To be
aggression to be achieved by conventional pompe so low that Britain might well
german forces-in-keeping were so large and so relatively well-dispersed, the
even a much larger British pumping effort could have saved oil disaster: The
relative geographic positions and the state of technology it is difficult that
conquer, that this was due to the British weakness in pompe. But given the
was saved by its fighter and not its Bomber Command. It can be argued, of

of 10 her ton was considered unacceptable. With conventional weapons the cost
of World War II the defensive problem was simpler for a rate of attrition
have coifished before its offensive effort could have become effective. To be
aggression to be achieved by conventional pompe so low that Britain might well
german forces-in-keeping were so large and so relatively well-dispersed, the
even a much larger British pumping effort could have saved oil disaster: The
relative geographic positions and the state of technology it is difficult that
conquer, that this was due to the British weakness in pompe. But given the
was saved by its fighter and not its Bomber Command. It can be argued, of

IVV

145

Does this mean then that the balance of all-out war depends entirely on the relative strengths of the opposing retaliatory striking forces? The difficulty of complete attrition should not be confused with the strategic importance of an effective air defense system, however. A country which staked everything on its offensive airpower would be simplifying the strategic problem of its opponent. Against such a country, it would be possible to calculate precisely the number of planes required for maximum destructiveness. They could operate at optimum levels of performance using the most efficient tactics. They could feint at one target and hit another. Except for mechanical failure they would suffer no losses and their bombing accuracy would be high. Nor would the country which placed all its bets on offensive air power gain a significant advantage by being able to utilize the resources it could have devoted to defense for its strategic striking force. For with thermo-nuclear weapons the point of diminishing returns in increased offensive power is reached fairly quickly. Thus the best strategic posture for an all-out thermo-nuclear war depends on the proper "mix" of offensive and defensive capabilities. If so many resources are devoted to defense that the offensive striking force can no longer inflict an unacceptable degree of damage, the enemy may be tempted to attack. For freed of the danger of retaliation the worst that can happen

to attack. For free of the danger of retaliation the worst that can happen
no longer inflict an unacceptable degree of damage, the enemy may be embittered
many reasons are devoted to defense that the offensive striking force can
debound on the prober "mix" of offensive and defensive capabilities. It so
duokly. Thus the best strategic posture for an all-out air thermo-nuclear war
point of diminishing returns in increased offensive power is reached fairly
delense for its strategic striking force. For with thermo-nuclear weapons the
advantage by being able to utilise the reasonces it could have devoted to
the country which placed all its pets on offensive air power gain a significant
they would suffer no losses and wage bombing accordingly would be high. Nor would
they could dent at one target and hit another. Except for mechanical failure
conflict operate at optimum levels of performance, making the most efficient tactics
and;

of its opponent. Against such a country, it would be possible to offsetate
everything on its offensive airpower would be offsetting the strategic problem
importance of an effective air defense system, however. A country which affected
difficultly of complete attrition should not be confused with the strategic
the relative strengths of the obsolescing retaliatory striking force? The

Does this mean then that the balance of all-out war degenerates entirely on

172

146

reach to him would be his inability to get through to the target. If the defense is slighted, too great a demand is put on the powers of resistance of the social fabric. The ideal offense-defense relationship is one in which the defense can reduce the enemy thrust to acceptable levels while the offense cannot be so contained by the enemy's defense.

This ideal mix is unattainable in practice of course. Nevertheless the mere existence of an air defense system forces the enemy to divert more resources to his offensive striking force in order to de-flict the unopposed case. A defense capable of exacting 50 per cent attrition will require an enemy to more than double his offensive striking force in order to inflict the damage he calculates as necessary to achieve his objectives against the opposition.

The effort will have to be twice as large as the unopposed case, because the very existence of an air defense throws off an attacker's calculations. It introduces a factor outside his direct control; he cannot be certain about the effectiveness of the defense until he has tested it and he must, therefore, allow a larger margin for error then in the unopposed case. Against a determined defense, moreover, an enemy cannot pursue his most efficient tactics; his des-tructiveness will, therefore, be reduced. Thus let us assume the enemy calculates

["frustrativeness will, therefore, be reduced. Thus far assume the enemy calculates\ndefense, moreover, an enemy cannot harm his most efficient tactical his des-\nallow a larger margin for error than in the unboasted case. Against a determined\nthe effectiveness of the defense until he has tested it and he must, therefore,\nintroduces a factor outside his direct control: he cannot be certain about\nvery existence of an air defense throws off an attacker's calculations. It", "The effort will have to be twice as large as the unboasted case, because the\nhe calculates as necessarily to achieve his objectives against the opposition.\nso", "more than double his offensive striking force in order to inflict the damage\nA defense capable of exacting 20 per cent attrition will require an enemy to\nresources to his offensive striking force in order to be equivalent damage\nmore existence of an air defense system forces the enemy to divert more\nmore existence of an

147

that in order to destroy the United States he requires 300 high-yield weapons.

In the unopposed case, the enemy might then build his long-range air force
and stockpile to a level of about 300 to 450 long-range bombers. In the
absence of attrition he might be able to count on each plane performing two
missions and such a force would leave him a margin for mechanical failure,
bombing inaccuracy and navigational error. An air defense capable of exacting
a 30 per cent attrition would probably force him to double this figure; an
air defense capable of exacting 50 per cent attrition would require a striking
force of probably 1000 to 1200 planes; and an air defense capable of exacting
80 per cent losses (considered to be a feasible level) would push the
enemy investment in offensive air power to over 2000. And this increase in
offensive strength would enable the enemy only to stay even with the rate
of damage he could have inflicted in the unopposed case. Moreover,

4. He would have to include in his attack pattern both the bases of the Strategic Air Command and the major industrial centers. A successful attack on SAC bases would not prove decisive if it were not known at the same time that the enemy has a remaining stockpile and delivery system to devastate the United States.

that same time that the enemy has a remaining stockpile and delivery

⁷. He would have to include in his attack pattern both the phases of the strategic Air Command and the major industrial centers. A successful attack on BAC phases would not prove decisive if it were not known at

of damage he could have inflicted in the mobbosed case. Moreover, offensive strength would enable the enemy only to attack even with the rate enemy investment in offensive air power to over 5000%. And this increase in 30 ber cent losses (considered to be a least possible level) would bring the force of properly 1000 to 1500 planes; and an air defense cabble of exacting air defense cabble of exacting 20 ber cent attrition would require a striking 30 ber cent attrition would properly force him to complete this figure; an pumping incoherent and navigational error. An air defense cabble of exacting massive and enough a force would leave him a margin for mechanical fatigue, absence of attrition he might be able to combat on each plane performing two and stockpile to a level of about 300 to 720 long-range planes. In the In the mobbosed case, the enemy might then build his long-range air force

⁷) that in order to destroy the United States he requires 300 high-field weapons.

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148

the larger the enemy striking force the more obvious the preparation he has
to make prior to attack, the easier to detect the attack, and the greater the chances
of obtaining warning. Finally, as the defense gains in effectiveness the
attacker has to divert resources to combat it and this will further decrease
the strategic effectiveness of the offensive. To be sure, as Paul Nitze has
shown in a brilliant paper, the attrition rate of defense will not remain fixed
at the same percentage regardless of the nature of the attack. 5) Beyond a
certain scale of attack, it is possible to overwhelm the opposing defense:
it may exact 80 per cent attrition of the first 2000 planes but only 20 per cent
of the next 1000. But the basic relation still holds: at a maximum to reduce
the enemy attack to acceptable levels; at a minimum it is the task of defense
against air attacks to ensure a minimum of defense mission without improving his strategic position.

These objectives can be achieved by two kinds of defense: active and
passive defense. Active defense involves the direct attrition of enemy planes;
in the intermediary period until Ballistic Missiles are developed it requires
a system of early warning, fighter planes with performances superior to the
bombers and anti-aircraft missiles, either fired from the ground or from planes.
the
Because of high speed of modern planes the interception by manned fighters
by Paul Nitze

149

is becoming increasingly difficult: both the Bison, the Soviet heavy jet bomber and the B-52, our intercontinental jet bomber, approach the speed of sound; an opposing fighter plane must therefore be able to maneuver very quickly to get into position and even in the best of cases will be able to make only one pass. On the other hand, the rapid development of missiles operating at speeds that well above the speed of sound will soon make the life of a manned bomber difficultly complicated. Equipped with automatic "homing" devices which electronically direct the missile to the target, these missiles will be able to exact a substantial attrition which many experts estimate may reach 80 per cent. While such a rate of losses might not discourage pilots in the first wave of attack who are presumably unacquainted with the risks confroting them, there is at least some doubt about their morale once the attrition rate becomes known. Thus the limiting condition of strategic air attack with manned planes may well be not the shortage of planes and weapons but pilot morale.

In addition to the attrition of enemy personnel and equipment defense can use up hostile resources through passive measures. The destructiveness of the new weapons tends to give an advantage to the offense because even a single successful attack can inflict catastrophic damage. It is the task of passive defense to disperse the targets as much as possible so that the enemy

basal defense to diabetes, the targets are much as possible so that the enemy
single sufficient attack can inflict catastrophic damage. It is the task of
of the new weapons tends to give an advantage to the offense because even a
can use mb hostile reëntries through basalive measures. The destructions
In addition to the attrition of enemy personnel and equipment defense
may well be not the shortage of planes and weapons but pilot morale.

Known. Due the limiting condition of strategic air attack with manned planes
there is at least some doubt about their morale once the attrition rate becomes
attack atmosphere are presumably uncoordinated with the risks controlling them,
while and a rate of losses might not discourage pilots in the first wave of
exact a substantial attrition which many experts estimate may reach 80 per cent.

fronchnally direct the attack to the target, these missiles will be able to
exceedingly accurately equipped with automatic "homing" devices which elec-
well above the speed of sound will soon make the life of a manned pomper
hot.

On the other hand, the rapid development of missiles operating at speeds
Get into position and even in the past of cases will be able to make only one
obscuring lighter plane must therefore be able to maneuver very quickly to
and the B-25, our intercontinental jet pomper, approach the speed of sound; an
is becoming increasingly difficult: both the B-55, the Soviet heavy jet pomper

T10

150

is forced to devote the maximum number of weapons to the destruction of the target system. A country whose steel industry of which can be wiped out in one attack is more vulnerable than a country whose steel industry of which is dispersed over twenty different locations. A country whose strategic airpower is concentrated on a few bases, is more vulnerable than an opponent whose striking force is better dispersed. Thus an offensive striking force of 1000 planes dispersed over 100 bases may prove strategically more significant than 2000 planes which have available only 30 bases, for the smaller force has much fewer targets to attack.

In addition to forcing the enemy to expand more resources on the same target system, passive defense can mitigate the consequences of a successful attack. Against an unprepared population a thermo-nuclear explosion could be devastating. An attempt to evacuate a city like New York would clog all traffic arteries and prevent effective assistance. In the absence of shelters the casualties from heat and blast would be enormous. Without knowledge of fall-out effects people might behave in precisely the manner calculated to bring about the highest level of casualties. For example, an attempt to flee the fall-out area during the first two days of maximum radioactivity would expose an individual to the largest dosage of radiation. An insufficient awareness

an individual to the largest degree of radiation. An insufficient awareness

of the highest level of casualties. For example, an attempt to free the
out effects people might prove in precisely the manner calculated to bring
casualties from heat and plasma would be enormous. Without knowledge of self-
arteries and prevent effective assistance. In the absence of shelters the
devastating. An attempt to evacuate a city like New York would clog all traffic
attack. Against an unprepared population a thermo-uncertain explosion could be
targeted. In such a case defense can mitigate the consequences of a successful

In addition to forcing the enemy to expend more resources on the same
fewer targets to attack.

planes which have available only 30 planes, for the smaller force has much
disbursed over 100 planes may prove strategically more significant than 5000
force is better disbursed. Thus an alternative striking force of 1000 planes
tried on a few planes, is more vulnerable than an opponent whose striking

over twenty different locations. A country whose strategic power in concern-
attack is more vulnerable than a country the steel industry of which is dispirited
is more vulnerable than a country the steel industry of which can be wiped out in one

A country the steel industry of which can be wiped out in one
is forced to devote the maximum number of weapons to the destruction of the

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151

of the nature of radioactive contamination would multiply casualties.

The absence of a tested communications system, would put the population at the mercy of rumor (1) and prevent any concerted effort to allievate suffering. Conversely, could reduce casualties both from the blast and from fall-out; an educational program would make possible the most rational behavior; a communications system built with an eye to the greatest immunity from nuclear attack would permit the organized activity at the earliest moment. In short, passive defense will reduce the effectiveness of an attack and therefore contributes indirectly to the attrition of enemy resources.

But the psychological effects of passive defense may prove even more important. One of the great dangers of an all-out thermo-nuclear war is social disintegration and panic. In a previous chapter panic has been defined as an attempt of an organism faced with catastrophe to escape into a familiar environment. If it cannot find a familiar environment it may disintegrate or at least act irrationally. Since the physical effect of an all-out war with modern weapons will inevitably be devastating, the individual will therefore necessarily be confronted with the collapse of all the material objects which he

be confronted with the collapse of all the material objects which he
inevitably be devastating, the individual will therefore necessarily
the physical effect of an all-out war with modern weapons will
environment it may disintegrate or at least act irrationally. Since

to escape into a similar environment. If it cannot find a familiar
has been defined as an attempt of an organism faced with catastrophe
war is social disintegration and panic. In a previous chapter basic
more important. One of the great dangers of an all-out thermo-nuclear
But the psychological effect of passive defense may prove even
indirectly to the attrition of enemy resources.

reduce the effectiveness of an attack and therefore contributes
activity at the earliest moment. In short, passive defense will
to the greatest immunity from nuclear attack would permit him organized
the most rational behavior: a communications system built with an eye
plast and from fall-out; an educational program would make possible
anulling. Conversely, could reduce casualties both from the

at the mercy of rumor and prevent any concerted effort to alleviate
The absence of a tested communications system, would but the population
of the nature of radioactive contamination would multiply casualties.

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152

had associated with the ordered flow of life. His reaction will
depend to a considerable extent on how well he has been prepared
psychologically. For the break in what has come to seem natural
well as reflects a state of mind as a state of fact; it will appear vast in
proportion that the catastrophe is great but also to the extent that
it is unexpected. A disaster which is foreseen may shake confidence
also in the physical processes of society; it may bring home to the
individual the resilience and the value of the intangible relationships
of society as well. World War II produced a much smaller social
dislocation than World War I although its destruction was at least
as great, because the peoples entered it with fewer illusions:
the psychological crisis after World War I was caused as much by the
Incongruity between performance and aspiration as the casualty lists,
as much by the fatuousness of the ideals of a rational harmonious
world as by the realities of trench warfare with which they were
inevitably prepared. A thermo-nuclear war which broke over a
psychologically unprepared population might lead to a loss of faith
in society and in government. It is important, therefore, to prepare

in society and in government. It is important, therefore, to prepare
psychologically unprepared population might lead to a loss of faith
inevitably unprepared (cf. A thermo-nuclear war which broke over a
world as by the realities of french warfare with which they were
as much by the fatuousness of the ideals of a rational harmonious
incongruity between performance and aspiration against the casualty life,
the psychological crisis after World War I was caused as much by the
as great, because the peoples entered it with fewer illusions:
dialocation than World War I although its destruction was at least
of society as well. World War II produced a much smaller social
individual the resilience and the value of the intangible relationships
in the physical processes of society: it may bring home to the
it is unexpected. A disaster which is foreseen may make confidence
proportion that the catastrophe is great but also to the extent that
reflects a state of mind as a state of fact: it will abhor vast in
psychologically. For the press in what has come to seem natural
debend to a considerable extent on how well he has been prepared
has associated with the ordered flow of life. His reaction will

153

a "familiar environment" in advance of such a catastrophe; to prevent panic by intellectual discipline even when many of the physical objects which confer a feeling of security have disappeared. Even then the effect on society of a catastrophe on the scale of a thermo-nuclear attack should not be underrated. History seems to prove that suffering beyond a certain point inevitably leads to political or social trans-formation. For society can exact a measure of sacrifice because of a concession on the importance of maintaining it and a shared historical experience. However, suffering which is caused not by natural disasters but by the existence of society itself, such as war, tends to undermine the social fabric: However just a war may appear at the beginning, it may be ascribed in retrospect to inadequate leadership if the losses it causes are thought excessive. Nevertheless within limits defense can contribute to the cohesiveness of society in the face of shock: While it will not be able to eliminate the traumatic effect of the physical destruction, it may make the difference between survival of society and its collapse.

Thus the strategic equation of all-out war cannot be determined by the comparative size of bombing fleets. It results from a complex

by the comparative size of pumping fleets. It results in a complex
situation which is combined from the
This the strategic equation of all-out war cannot be determined

Shock : While it will not be able to eliminate the traumatic effect
defense can contribute to the cohesiveness of society in the face of
within limits
leadership if the losses it causes are thought excessive. A passive

at the beginning, it may be observed in retrospect to inadequate
tends to undermine the social fabric: However just a war may appear
natural disasters but by the existence of society itself, even as war,
historical experience. However, suffering which is caused not by
a concession (a) on the importance of maintaining it and a third
CONSEQUENCE
formation. For society can exact a measure of sacrifice because of
beyond a certain point inevitably leads to political or social trans-

attack should not be underestimated. History seems to prove that suffering
effect on society of a catastrophe on the scale of a thermo-nuclear
which confer a feeling of security have disappeared. Even then the
basic by intellectual discipline even when many of the physical objects
a "familiar environment" in advance of such a catastrophe; to prevent

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154

relationship of offense to defense and the relative vulnerability of the contenders. The crucial problem for a policy of deterrence then becomes whether the U.S.S.R. can calculate a sufficient margin of certainty to make an all-out war seem a worthwhile risk. To be sure, such a question assumes a certain amount of rationality in an enemy. But planning can only calculate with a somewhat rational enemy; nothing can deter an enemy bent on self-destruction.

### III

What is a sufficient degree of certainty and how can it be achieved? Obviously the ability to inflict greater damage than one suffers no longer supplies the basis of victory; a margin in damage inflicted will be meaningless if the victor does not retain sufficient resources at the end of the war, to impose his will. An enemy trying to decide whether to launch an all-out war must therefore be able to count on a combination of the following factors: he must be certain that he will reduce our forces-in-being to a level where his defense can contain them or they are no longer able to inflict unacceptable damage; he must make sure that attrition will not reduce his attacking force to a level where it will no longer be able to inflict the amount of damage he calculates

he calculates
force to a level where it will no longer be able to inflict the amount of damage
damage; he must make sure that attrition will not reduce his attacking
his defense can contain them or they are no longer able to inflict unacceptable
he must be certain that he will reduce our forces-in-pending to a level where
war must therefore be able to count on a combination of the following factors:

to impose his will. An enemy trying to decide whether to launch an all-out
if the victor doesn't retain sufficient resources at the end of the war,
subplies the forces of victory; a margin in damage inflicted will be meaningless
Optionally the ability to inflict greater damage than one另 inserts no longer
What is a sufficient degree of certainty and how can it be achieved?

### III

pent on self-deception.
only calculate with a somewhat rational enemy; nothing can deter an enemy
assumes a certain amount of rationality in an enemy. But planning can
an X all-out war seem a muchworse risk. Tope ame, and a question
whether the U.3.2.9. can calculate a sufficient margin of certainty to make
contenders. The crucial problem for a policy of deference then becomes
relationship of offense to defense and the relative adaptability of the

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155

degree of certainty
as necessary to impose his will. The margin, moreover, must be
almost foolproof: a slight probability will not be sufficient, for
the attacker is staking not his chances of victory but his national
survival. An aggressor will have great difficulty, however, in achieving
strong probability of success is difficult to achieve,
however, if we behave reasonably effectively. A moderately good
defense system will make enemy calculating more uncertain; a dispersal
of bases and industrial facilities will complicate his offensive task;
and even our present retaliatory force will not be easy to eliminate.
Moreover, the psychological equation will be on the side of the
defensive. The attacker will be animated by a will to victory--
a desire to improve his relative position. The defender's impetus
is to avoid defeat--to maintain his national identity. The attacker
will have two choices: to attack or not to attack; the defender can
resist or surrender. Thus the alternatives will present themselves
much more unambiguously to the side which is attacked and the decision
to launch the first blow will always be inhibited because the margin
of success may not seem sufficient. In fact, the task of the side
which concedes the first blow is so to balance the opponent's risks
that he will always have strong inducements to postpone a show-down

that he will always have strong inducements to boathouse a show-down
which concedes the first blow if so to balance the opponent's risks
of success may not seem sufficient. In fact, the task of the side
to launch the first blow will always be inducted because the margin
much more unsmpliQUONALLY to the side which is attacked and the decision
react or surrender. Thus the alternatives will present themselves
will have two choices: to attack or not to attack; the defender can
is to avoid defeat--to maintain his national identity. The attacker
a desire to <u>improve</u> his relative position. The defender's impetus
defensive. The attacker will be animated by a will to victory--
Moreover, the psychological education will be on the side of the
and even our present retaliatory force will not be easy to eliminate.
of base and industrial facilities will complicate his offensive task;
defense system will make enemy calculating more uncertain; a dispiral
to the left if we pose reasonably effectively. A moderately good
survival. A strong propability of success is difficult to achieve.
An aggressor will have great difficulty, however, in achieving
the attacker is asking not his chance of \ but his national
victory
almost foolproof: a slight propability will not be sufficient, for
as necessary to impose his will. The margin, moreover, must be
degraded of certainty.

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156

to a more propitious moment.

An all-out attack by the U.S.S.R. could, therefore, be impelled
only by a consciousness of overwhelming power, great U.S. vulnerability
or the fear of an imminent U.S. attack. The last contingency is a
special case and will be discussed separately. Can the U.S.S.R.
then calculate an overwhelming superiority? Many witnesses before
the Symington Hearings agreed as to if military superiority depended
almost entirely on numbers of airplanes, particularly long-range
bombers. "The only thing I can say," testified General Le May, "is
that from 1958 on, he [the U.S.S.R.] had stronger in long-range
air power then we are, and it naturally follows that if he is stronger,
he may feel that he should attack."

But this does not follow naturally at all. For superiority
cannot be measured in numbers; it depends on the composition
of forces. And even under conditions of optimum composition, if
superiority in number may be offset by superior quality or
a superior base system or by the fact that with
because of the superior quality of our planes and more importantly
because of the power of modern weapons makes superiority in all-out war
numerical

Symington Hearings, p. 213.

157

irrelevant
meaningless beyond a certain point. Almost the most meaningless
comparison, in fact, is the size of the opposing strategic air forces,
for the bombers of one side are pitted not against the bombers of the
other, but against its vulnerability and its air defense. Still the
strategic airforces determine part of the price that must be paid for
an attempted all-out wax victory and any discussion of the military
equation in an all out war must start with them.

The Soviet Long-Range Airforce is a comparatively recent develop-
ment, dating in effect from 1954. To be sure, ever since 1948 the
U.S.S.R. possessed a moderate quantity of TU '4's' (for which the
NATO code name was Bull). This was a copy of our B-29, one of which
had fallen into Soviet hands during the war when it had to make an
emergency landing in Siberia. The range of these planes was 2,200
miles and their performance made them highly vulnerable to jet inter-
ceptions. The TU-4 could therefore not reach the U.S. from Soviet
territory except on one-way missions and even then only a very small
portion of the U.S. There was a great deal of speculation at the time
that the destructiveness of nuclear weapons made one-way missions a
profitable strategy and this argument was repeated during the

profitable strategy and this argument was repeated during the
that the destructiveness of nuclear weapons made one-way missions a
portion of the U.2. There was a great deal of speculation at the time
territory except on one-way missions and even then only a very small
options. The TU-4 could therefore not reach the U.2. from Soviet
miles and their performance made them highly vulnerable to jet inter-
emergency landing in Siberia. The range of these planes was 5,500
had fallen into Soviet hands during the war when it had to make an
NATO code name was Bull). This was a copy of our B-52, one of which
U.2.2.R. possessed a moderate quantity of TU '4's' (for which the
ment, dating in effect from 1944. To be sure, ever since 1948 the

The Soviet Long-Range Airforce is a comparatively recent development in an all out war must start with them.

strategic airforces determine part of the price that must be paid for
other, but against its vulnerability and its air defense. Still the
for the Bombers of one side are pitted not against the Bombers of the
comparison, in fact, is the size of the opposing strategic air forces,
meaningless beyond a certain point. Almost the most meaningless
it is said.

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158

Symington Hearings with respect to the present Soviet heavy bomber. But one-way missions are uneconomical given the cost and complexity of modern bombers. They can be ~~xmf~ successful only if the aggressor possesses a really staggering number of planes. Even then unless the attack is crushing, every raid would shift the strategic balance against the aggressor: the side which used up its striking force on one-way missions would have done all the damage it is capable of doing; it could not pose any additional ~~challenge~~ threat and if the opponent has any offensive resources left he would have a decisive advantage. Even should only part of the striking force be utilized on one-way missions, the opponent will know that the enemy offensive power would decline with every attack. One way-missions are suitable for a strategy of desperation. They represent the most wasteful and difficult means of imposing a power's will.

by the U.S.S. R.

20 The development of long-range planes capable of undertaking two-way missions therefore represented the basic strategic transformation of the post-war period. Henceforth, in every case which involved a decision of peace or war we had to weigh our risks in terms of the

1/ Symington Hearings, p.

1. Siamington Herringa, b.

decision of peace or war we had to weigh our risks in terms of the
the boat-war period. Henceforth, in every case which involved a
way misactions therefore represented the basic strategic transformation of
The development of long-range planes capable of undertaking two-
means of imposing a power's will.

strategically of desperation. They represent the most careful and difficult
decline with every attack. One way-misactions are suitable for a
misactions, the opponent will know that the enemy offensive power would
Even should only part of the striking force be utilized in one-way
has any offensive resources left he would have a decisive advantage.

doing: it could not pose any additional difficulty and if the opponent
on one-way misactions would have done all the damage it is capable of

against the aggressor: the side which used up its striking force
attack is crushing, every raid would shift the strategic balance
boreasaaes a really staggering number of planes. Even then unless the
of modern pommers. They can be extremely successful only if the aggressor
But one-way misactions are uneconomical given the cost and complexity
Siamington Herringa with respect to the present Soviet heavy pommers.

128

growth of the Soviet 159 Long-Range Air Force which occurred at the precise moment that weapons reached their present destructive power. They, therefore, reduced the credibility of our deterrent policy based on all-out war and they increased our reluctance to engage in any conflict which might lead to all-out war. The Soviet Long-Range Airforce is composed of two basic types of present planes: a turbo-propeller-driven plane of very long range, for which the NATO code word is Bear and a heavy jet bomber, which the NATO code name is Bison. The U.S. Airforce has no equivalent for the Bear, whose major asset is its long range. Because of its relatively slow speed compared to that of modern jet planes, its losses against high performance fighters and missiles would be considerable. The Bison was first seen in quantity during the May Day parade of 1955 when 13 flew over Moscow. The Bison is estimated to have a range of around 3,500 miles and a top speed of 560 miles per hour. Thus the Bison cannot reach the U.S. even from Soviet advance bases without aerial refueling except on one-way missions. The Bear can cover a third to one-half of U.S. territory from advanced Soviet bases without aerial refueling. With one aerial refueling the Bison

Stockwell Soviet Airpower (Appendix).

Rockwell Soviet Airpower (Appendix).

phase without aerial refueling. With one aerial refueling the Biaon
can cover a third to one-half of U.S. territory from advanced Soviet
phase without aerial refueling except on one-way missions. The Bear

Thus the Biaon cannot reach the U.S. even from Soviet advance
hour. To have a range of around 3,500 miles and a top speed of 500 miles per
Day, range of 1922 when 13 flew over Moscow. The Biaon is estimated
considerable. The Biaon was first seen in quantity during the May
its losses against high performance fighters and missiles would be
of its relatively slow speed compared to that of modern jet planes,
equivalent for the Bear, whose major asset is its long range. Because
pomper, which the NATO code name is Biaon. The U.S. Airforce has no
very long range, for which the NATO code word is Bear and a heavy jet
passive type of present planes: a turbo-brodeiler-driven plane of
for all-out war. The Soviet Long-Range Airforce is composed of two
ingrassed our reliance to engage in such conflict which might lead
gregriffity of our deterrent policy based on all-out war and they
destruction of New York or Chicago. Therefore, reduced the
air major cities

to all-out war. The Soviet Long-Range Airforce is composed of two
ingrassed our reliance to engage in such conflict which might lead
gregriffity of our deterrent policy based on all-out war and they
destruction of New York or Chicago. Therefore, reduced the
air major cities

160

can cover seven-eighths of the U.S. from the Chukotski (2) peninsula and all of the U.S. with two refuelings. From the Kola peninsula (3) and the Bering strait (4) and the Bering strait (5) the Bison can cover one-third of the U.S. with one refueling and all except the southern tip of Texas in a twice-refueled mission.

(See map.)

The U.S. strategic Airforce possesses three basic types of planes: the B-47 which has a top speed of ____ miles and a range of ____; the obsolescent B-36 which has a top speed of ____ miles and a range of ____ miles and the new B-52 which has a range of ____ miles and a top speed of ____. The B-47, of course, is not an intercontinental bomber. It requires aerial refueling to reach Soviet targets from U.S. territory although it can cover most of Soviet territory from our overseas bases. The B-52 is an intercontinental bomber whose effectiveness will be increased by our overseas base structure. We now possess 33 wings of B-47 with 45 planes in a wing; 5 of these are reconnaissance wings so that the effective bombing force of B-47's is 1,410 planes. Our B-36's are organized in 11 wings of 30 planes. As they are replaced by B-52's, the number of planes in a wing will go up to 45. By 1959 when our heavy bomber

1/ Symington Hearings, p. 175.

10/ *Ibid.*, p. 1810.

Ibid.* b. 1810.

Salmontou Hesringa, b. 112.

of blanes in a wing will go up to 42°. By 1928 when in our heavy pomper
in 11 wings of 30 blanes. As they are replaced by B-25's, the numper
pomping force of B-47's is 1,410 blanes. Our B-30's are organized
wing; 3 of these are reconnaissance wings so that the effective
base structure. We now have 33 wings of B-47 with 45 blanes in a
b02222

tinentsl pomper whose effectiveness will be multiplied by our overseas
Soviet territory from our overseas pases. The B-25 is an intercon-
Soviet targets from U.S. territory although it can cover most of
an intercontinental pomper. It requires serial refueling to reach
______ miles and a top speed of ______. The B-47, of course, is not
and a range of ______ miles and the new B-25 which has a range of
______ ; the opalescent B-36 which has a top speed of ______ miles
blane; the B-47 which has a top speed of ______ miles and a range of
The U.S. strategic Airforce bosesases three basic types of

(see wsb.)

the B-25 can cover one-third of the U.S. with one refueling and all
and all of the N.S. with two refueling. From the Kola beninans the
B25 can cover seven-eighths of the U.S. from the Chukotak (X) beninans

190

161

wings will be all jet, we will have about 500 B-52's. The consensus
of Airforce testimony at the Symington Hearing, however, was that by
1959 the Soviet Long-Range Airforce would outnumber ours and that
for this reason we would be in dire peril.

Strategic superiority cannot be determined numerically, however.
It depends on Soviet ability to destroy enough of our retaliatory
power so that our resulting counterblow can be contained or reduced
to acceptable levels. This could be achieved only by a crushing
surprise attack coupled with a highly effective air defense. Neither
condition seems in prospect for the U.S.S.R. The numerical superiority
of the U.S.S.R. is confined, to begin with, to the category of heavy
bombers: the B-52 as compared to the combined numbers of BisonX and
Bears. To be sure, the Soviet Airforce also has a substantial number
of medium-range jet bombers, code-named Badger, but since none of them
the range to could reach the U.S. even on one-way missions, they do not enter the
strategic equation of all-out war. Our medium bombers, on the other
hand, are capable of striking Soviet targets either from our overseas

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
1/ Symington, op.cit., p. 117.
2/ Ibid., p. 212, xxxii (General Map), p. 818 (General Twining).

IPIq* b. 515, kxx818 (General) Wplb, b. 818 (General Lmning).
2number 2Smyington, ob.cif., b. 117.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

hand, are capable of striking Soviet targets either from our overseas
strategic education of all-out war. Our medium pompera, on the other
side, reach the U.S. even on one-way missions, they do not enter the
corridor to the south to the north from present Soviet bases.

To be sure, the Soviet Airforce also use a napätantial number
pompera: the B-25 as compared to the combined numbers of Biaoux and
of the U.S.2.R. is confined to begin with, to the category of heavy
condition seems in prospect for the U.S.2.R. The numerical superiority
embarrass attack coupled with a highly effective air defense. Neither
to acceptable levels. This could be achieved only by a crushing
power so that our resulting counterflow can be contained or reduced
It depends on Soviet ability to destroy enough of our retaliatory
strategic superiority cannot be determined numerically, however,
for this reason we would be in dire need of

1950 the Soviet Long-Range Airforce would outnumber ours and that
of Airforce testimony at the Smyington Hearing, however, was that by
wings will be all jet, we will have a total of 500 B-25's. The consequent
consequences

IET

162

by using aerial refueling
bases or refueled from the U.S. As a result even on a quantitative
basis the strategic equation is not as foreboding as a comparison
of heavy bomber forces would make it appear.

Moreover, a Soviet attack on the U.S. is technically more complex
than performance figures of planes indicated. In order to achieve
and to cut warning time to a minimum
maximum surprise, an all-out attack should be launched from the bases,
where
at which planes are based for training, because this cuts warning time
to a minimum. But neither the Bison nor the Bear can reach any
part of the U.S. except the tip of Maine from the interior of the
U.S.S.R. without aerial refueling.¹/ To launch a massive blow they
would have to be staged to advance bases on the Kola or Chukotski
peninsulas: This in turn would give us strategic warning; at a
minimum it would cause a larger proportion of the U.S.
Strategic Airforce to be placed on the alert than usual, under certain
it might induce us to launch a preventive attack.
conditions at most an anticipatory strike on our part. Even from
advance bases the Soviet heavy bombers cannot reach major U.S. targets without at least one aerial refueling. There is little

Symington Hearings, p. 175.

R. Summerton Herring, b. 1925.

targets without at least one serial refueling. There is little
advance pases the Soviet heavy pompera cannot reach major U.S. xxxm
conditions at most an anticipatory strike on our part. Even from
it might induce us to launch a preventive attack.

benanulae: This in turn would give us strategic warning: at a
would have to be acted to advance pases on the Kols or Chunkotki
U.S.2.R. without serial refueling. To launch a massive blow they
part of the U.S. except the tip of Maine from the interior of the

to a minimum. But maximum neither the Blaum nor the Bear can reach any
at which pases are passed for training, because this cuts warning time
where

maximum airtime, an all-out attack should be launched from the pases
and to cut warning time to a minimum
than performance figure of pases indicated. In order to achieve

Moreover, a Soviet attack on the U.S. is technically more complex
of heavy pomper forces would make it abber.

pases the strategic edustion is not as forepoing as a comparison
pases or补救 from the U.S. As a result even an unsuitatively
by using aerial refueling

1925

163

evidence, however, that the Soviet airforce has mastered the intricate
technique of aerial refueling; indeed it is not certain even that
they possess any substantial number of tankers. Moreover, even if the
Soviets have a capability for aerial refueling, they may be prevented
by geography from deriving full benefits from it. A plane which is
refueling is extremely vulnerable; it should therefore do so in an
area relatively immune from hostile interference. This is all the
more important because the meeting between tanker and bomber must be
precisely calculated and has to take place on schedule. Diversionary
tactics forced on either plane can wreak havoc with refueling plans.
A look at the map demonstrates that in an attack on the U.S., the
Soviet Long-Range Airforce would leave its safe areas with its advance
bases. It would have to refuel over hostile territory exposed to
constant attack. This would reduce the effectiveness of the attack,
increase the rate of attrition and minimize the possibility of surprise.
Aerial refueling, in short, is not an efficient Soviet tactic and one-
way missions are strategically unproductive.

These considerations apply, of course, only to the present family
of airplanes. New bombers with longer range might eliminate the

of airplanes. New pompers with longer range might eliminate the

which are almost certainly on the drawing board.

Aerial refueling, in short, is not an efficient Soviet tactic and one-
increase the rate of attrition and minimize the possibility of surprise.
constant attack. This would reduce the effectiveness of the attack,
passes. It would have to refuel over hostile territory exposed to
Soviet Long-Range Airforce would leave its safe area with its advance

tactic forced on either plane can wreak havoc with refueling planes.

precisely calculated and has to take place on schedule. Diversely
more important because the meeting between tanker and pomper must be
areas relatively immune from hostile interference. This is all the
refueling is extremely vulnerable; it should therefore do so in an
by geography from deriving full benefits from it. A plane which is

Soviets have a capability for aerial refueling, they may be prevented
they boarss any substantial number of tankers. Moreover, even if the
technique of aerial refueling; indeed it is not certain even that

evidence, however, that the Soviet airforce has matered the intricate

193

164

refueling problem and perhaps enable the Soviets to launch their
attack from the interior of metropolitan Russia. Even then complete
surprise will be difficult to achieve. For one thing, there is only
one direction from which a Soviet attack on the U.S. can take place--
across the Polar Icecap. Since we are able to gear our air defense to
only one threat equivalent resources put into defense will yield
greater strategic returns for us than for the U.S.S.R. which has
a periphery to defend.

Work on the U.S. air defense system did not start seriously
until 1952, when we first became concerned about the Soviet Long-Range Air Force,
interception and destruction of hostile aircraft. The magnitude of
the problem is shown by the fact that on the average day
there are 30 thousand domestic and 600 foreign in the U.S. which have
to be monitored at least as they approach sensitive areas.
Detection is crucial not only for effective interception but also to
give sufficient warning time to prevent our retaliatory force from
being caught on the ground and to reduce civilian casualties by
passive defense measures. By 1958, the U.S. will possess a detection

For a very good description of our Air Defense System, see
Symington Hearings, p. 303 and testimony of General Partridge.

Saminatou Hesirina, b. 303 and testimonial of General Partridge.
For a very good description of our Air Defense System, see

basic defense measures. By 1968, the U.S. will possess a detection
being caught on the ground and to reduce civilian casualties by
give sufficient running time to prevent our retaliatory force from
Detection is crucial not only for effective interception but also to
to be monitored at least as they approach sensitive areas.

There are 30 thousand domestic and 600 foreign in the U.S. which have
the problem is shown shown by the fact that on the average day
interception and destruction of hostile aircraft. The magnitude of
until 1965. Its primary functions are detection, identification,
when we first became concerned about the Soviet Long-range Air Force.
Work on the U.S. air defense system did not start seriously

a periphery to defend.
Greater strategic returns for us than for the U.S. Air Force, which has
only one threat equivalent resources but into defense will yield
across the Polar Icecap. Since we are able to deal with our defense to
one direction from which a Soviet attack on the U.S. can take place--
surprise will be difficult to achieve. For one thing, there is only
attack from the interior of metropolitan Russia. Even then complete
refueling problem and perhaps enable the Soviets to launch their

165

system against which surprise attack will be almost impossible and
supported by impose a
it will be tied into a defensive effort that should greatly complicate
substantial attrition,
any attack.

The U.S. air defense system is based on four lines: two
primarily for detection and the other two for interception as well.
The final detection apparatus is at the Distant Early Warning Line
which extends across the Arctic circle. This is a network of heavy
as supported by an elaborate
radio stations with an adequate communications system. When fully
developed, it should be able to detect a Soviet attack very soon
after it leaves its advance bases. The DEW Line is backed up by
aware another series of detection stations from the base of Hudson's
Bay across Canada. The mid-Canada line like the DEW Line is designed
for detection only, although given the power of modern weapons and
the effects of fall-out, it would be desirable to destroy hostile
planes as far away from their targets as possible and over relatively
uninhabited regions. It has been proposed for this reason to move the
first fighting line into Canada and this may be the case by 1961 when
the detection system is fully developed. At present, the first sus-
tained interception--except for Canadian efforts-- will occur at
a line along the U.S.-Canadian borders. Facilities here include

a line along the U.S.-Canadian borders. Facilities here include
trained interception--except for Canadian efforts-- will occur at
the detection system is fully developed. At present, the first ans-
first fighting line into Canada and this may be the case by 1961 when
minunspited regions. It has been proposed for this reason to move the
plane as far away from their targets as possible and over relatively
the effects of fall-out, it would be desirable to destroy hostile
for detection only, although given the power of modern weapons and
Bay across Canada. The -Canada line like the DEM Line is described
another series of detection stations from the base of Hudson's
after it leaves the advance base. The DEM Line is backed up by
developed, it should be able to detect a Soviet attack very soon
radio stations with an appropriate communications system. When fully
which extends across the Arctic circle. This is a network of heavy
The final detection apparatus is at the Distant Early Warning Line
primarily for detection and the other two for interception as well.
The U.S. air defense system is based on four lines: two
any attack.
spatial attrition.
it will be tied into a defensive effort that should greatly complicate
system against which surprise attack will be almost impossible and

192

166

more complete radar installations for detecting, tracking aircraft and vectoring aircraft supplemented by picket ships and planes and "Texas Tower" radar stations along both coasts. These facilities will be coordinated by a semi-automatic control system--the so-called SAGE system which will track planes and direct interception. From its first contact with this line, enemy planes will be exposed to sustained interceptor attacks. As they approach sensitive areas, they will be subject to anti-aircraft fire which by 1959 will be almost entirely composed of guided missiles: either the Mxx Army Nikes or the Airforce TALOS and other missiles still under development. With a range of 60-100 miles, soon to be extended, and atomic war-heads which can destroy anything within a cubic mile of air, the missile defenses are becoming increasingly formidable.

Two conclusions emerge from this brief sketch of the U.S. air defenses: (1) The strategically significant area of the Soviet Long-Range Airforce resides not in its total numbers but in that part of it which can escape attrition. Estimates of the attrition rate when the Air Defense system are as high as 80% by 1959--the time when according to testimony the Soviet heavy bomber fleet is supposed to exceed ours.

to testimony the Soviet heavy bomber fleet is subjected to exceed our
Air Defense system are so high as 80% by 1950--the time when according
can escape attrition. Estimates of the attrition rate will be given later.
Airforce 15,000 not in its total numbers but in that part of it which
defenses: (1) The strategically significance of the Soviet Land-Range
Two conclusions emerge from this brief study of the U.S. air
defenses are becoming increasingly formidable.

which can destroy anything within a couple of miles, the missile
range of 60-100 miles, soon to be extended, and atomic war-heads
the Airforce TALO and other missiles still under development. With a
entirely composed of guided missiles: either the M2X Army Mike or
will be subject to anti-aircraft fire which by 1950 will be almost
ensured interceptor attacks. As they approach sensitive areas, they
from its first contact with this line, enemy planes will be exposed to
SAE system which will track planes and direct interception. M2X/M2X
coordinated by 1950 as a semi-automatic control system--the so-called
the air defense system will be coordinated
Tower" radar stations along both coasts. These facilities will be
aircraft supplemented by ticket agents and planes and "Texas
more complete radar inattention for detecting, tracking, #8 and

 Tower" radar stations along both coasts. These facilities will be
 the air defense system will be coordinated
coordinated by 1950 as a semi-automatic control system--the so-called
 these facilities will be
aircraft supplemented by ticket agents and planes and "Texas
more complete radar inattention for detecting, tracking, #8 and

100

167

(2) Whatever the attrition rate, the U.S.S.R. will find it almost impossible to achieve complete surprise. Against the present family of Soviet bombers targets in the northern part of the United States should have at least two hours warning and targets in the southern part where most of our SAC bases are located <sup>15)</sup> would have 3 to 4 hours warning. If we are reasonably effective, such a warning time in turn should enable us to launch a substantial proportion of our retaliatory force and this together with the portion of SAC airborne at any moment on training missions should enable us to inflict a devastating counterblow.

There exists, moreover, another reason why the U.S.S.R. will have great difficulty either in achieving surprise or wiping out our force-in-being: our system of overseas airbases. Since the aggressor cannot know the precise pattern of dispersal of our retaliatory force, he must, in order to have a calculable margin of success strike all our bases in the continental United States and abroad, preferably simultaneously. But their geographic location to all practical purposes prevents a simultaneous attack on all U.S. bases. Most SAC bases in the continental U.S. are located at a distance of three to four hours from the DEW line while many of our overseas bases are much closer to Soviet territory. Thus the Soviet Long-

15. Symington Hearings, p.

12. Sumteron Herring's, b.

Soviet territory. The Soviet Long-range from the DM line while most of our overseas passes are much closer to SVC passes in the continental U.S. are located at a distance of three to four practical distances whereas a simultaneous attack on all U.S. passes. Most and spread, preferably simultaneously. But their geographic location to all overseas areas in the Pacific affords us in the continental United States a pattern of greater control of our overseas passes in the continental United States our system of overseas passes. Since the aggressor cannot know the precise difficulty either in achieving surprise or wiping out our force-in-force.

There exists, moreover, another reason why the U.S. Air Force will have great confusion.

at any moment on training missions should enable us to inflict a devastating
of our retaliatory force and this together with the portion of SVC airborne
and a warning time in turn should enable us to launch a substantial proportion
would have 3 to 7 hours warning. If we are reasonably effective,
home warning and targets in the southern part where most of our SVC passes
targets in the northern part of the United States should have at least two
to achieve complete surprise. Against the present family of Soviet pomeres
(S) Whatever the attrition rate, the U.S. Air Force will find it almost impossible
to locate them.

103

169

To be sure we possess several vulnerabilities of which the <u>adequate</u>
dispersal of our SAC bases is the most dangerous. Our Strategic
Airforce of over 2,000 planes, of which the B-52 <u>for example</u> costs $8,000,000
each <u>dollars</u> are located on some 30 bases. And today equipment costing
300 million dollars is often located on a base costing 40 million
dollars. The expenditure of another 40 million dollars would halt
the <u>vulnerability</u> of the <u>vulnerability</u>. In 1952, when we had only 18 SAC bases a tornado
disabled 85% of our strategic bombing force. <u>The</u> <u>concentration</u>
of so much expensive equipment on such <u>few</u> bases is the only part of
the situation which gives the Soviets even a slight <u>chance</u> to succeed
with a surprise attack. <u>The</u> <u>Strategic Air Force</u>
<u>inadequate dispersal of SAC</u>, improves the
<u>it enables them to obtain</u>
economics of a Soviet attack because <u>it gives them</u> a greater return
for the same investment of attacking resources. Another source of
vulnerability is the inadequacy of our civil defense. An all-out
Soviet attack in the present state of public education and the absence
of effective shelter program would produce appalling casualties,
close to the maximum figures for fall-out and blast described in the
previous chapter. Although this would not be decisive by itself if
we retain a sufficient force-in-being, an aggressor may count on

["we retain a sufficient force-in-being, an addressor may count on\nprevious chapter. Although this would not be decisive by itself if\nclose to the maximum figure for fall-out and blast described in the\nof effective shelter program would produce abpanying casualties,\nSoviet attack in the present state of public education and the absence\nanulsersbility is the insadency of our civil defense. An all-out\nfor the same investment of attacking resources. Another source of\neconomics of a Soviet attack because it gives them a greater return\nwith a surprise attack. Still, insaduate diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. 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The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic diheresal of Sve, improves the\nthe situation which gives the Soviets even a slight chance to succeed\nof so much expensive equipment on such a few bases if the only part of\ndisabled 83% of our strategic pumping force. The concentration\nof our strategic di

168

Range Airforce would have two options: It could launch its attacks simultaneously with the result that our overseas bases would be hit before our domestic ones, thus adding to our alert time. Or they could attempt to arrange their flight plans in such a way that all planes would reach their targets simultaneously, in which case our overseas bases would have the same warning time as those within territorial U.S.; the time it takes a jet bomber to cover the distance between the DEW line and the target. In the former contingency is the more rational course of action, because an attempt to strike all targets simultaneously expose would force the Soviets to calculate with a U.S. anticipatory blow launched from our overseas bases while the Soviet planes are still crossing Canada. But surprise against our overseas airbases will not be very easy to achieve. Because they are located at the periphery of Eurasia, any attack against them must cross intervening friendly territory and this in turn should give them between 1-2 hours warning. And even a successful attack against our overseas bases would still leave the retaliatory force in the U.S. to be reckoned with.

to be reckoned with.

overseas passes would still leave the retaliatory force in the U.S.
I-2 hours warning. ~~KXK~~ And even a successful attack against our

vening friendly territory and there in turn should give them between
the periphery of Eurasia, any attack against them must cross inter-
not be very easy to achieve.~~KXK~~ Because they are located at the
crossing Canada. But surprise against our overseas~~X~~ air passes will
launched from our overseas passes while the Soviet planes are still
would force the Soviets to calculate with a U.S. anti-aircraft blow
explore counterblow

course of action, because an attempt to strike all targets simultaneously
DEW line and the target. In the former contingency is the more rational
the time it takes a jet bomber to cover the distance between the
passes would have the same warning time as within territorial U.S.;

would reach their targets simultaneously, in which case our overseas~~X~~
attempt to arrange their flight plane in such a way that all planes
before our domestic ones, thus adding to our start time. Or they could
simultaneously with the result that ~~KXK~~ overseas passes would be hit
Range Airforce would have two options: It could launch its attacks

198

170

social disintegration in the face of such a catastrophic blow.

Nevertheless, despite these vulnerabilities, it is difficult to see how an aggressor could calculate on victory from a surprise attack alone. He would know that complete surprise is unattainable at least until the advent of ballistic missiles, that our force-in-being could not be destroyed (X) if it acts effectively. Hope for victory *winwinx* would therefore have to derive from the aggressor's confidence that his air defense could reduce our counter-blow to acceptable levels and that this coupled with the losses *inficted* on us in the surprise attack would induce us to surrender.

But the Soviet defensive problem is much more complicated than ours. While we have to defend only one approach, the Soviet Union must be prepared to repel raids from all directions because our overseas bases ring the Soviet periphery. The existence of our carrier task forces soon to be equipped with *attack* planes with a combat radius in access of 1,500 adds to the Soviet problem. And our control of the seas makes *aerial* refueling a much more useful tactic for us than for the U.S.S.R; even should we be forced to launch our retaliatory blow from the U.S. our *max* planes could refuel over friendly areas out of