Rockefeller-Kissinger
REPORT

"THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES"

By Davis Merwin

THE "TRADITIONAL" MISSIONS OF the military services are obsolete, competitive rather than complementary, and out of accord with both weapons technology and the principal military threats to our national safety.

So says the blue ribbon Rockefeller report on defense organization released recently with a Madison Avenue sunburst of publicity.

True to the Madison Avenue belief that the public does not think and that it reads only at the level of newspaper headlines, the report does not confuse the reader by disclosing the basis for its conclusions.

Instead it merely identifies a number of weak areas of weak handling in principle, and not de- states that it could not defend in detail.

The report then is unencumbered by detailed evidence to support its allegations of weakness, or to show that its proposed broad changes would result in greater effectiveness.

This exceptional freedom from detail was possible because the thesis of the Rockefeller report had been limned in, several months prior to the meetings of the panel of distinguished citizens, by its articulate project director, Harvard professor Dr. Henry Kissinger. His reflections and his pen, shaped the report of an earlier panel, meeting under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Rockefeller panel

did little more than embrace the Kissinger conclusions and give them greater currency.

Thus, it is to Kissinger's book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* that one must turn to find the rationale to support the conclusions and recommendations of the Rockefeller Report. By contrast with his masterful treatment of the political aspects of the East-West problem, Kissinger's treatment of the purely military aspects of the problem is superficial and uninformative.

It is not the intent of this article to defend Kissinger or to justify his conclusions. It is to point out that when he started to write, or that his book is only a patchwork of dissonant ideas, presented in a matrix of eloquent grammar.

For the present purposes, however, we are not concerned with Kissinger per se but Kissinger as a key to the Rockefeller report. This article treats one of the areas covered by that report, the roles and missions of the military services, leaving until another time the subject of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Kissinger Jargon

To understand Kissinger, who is a philosopher rather than a military man, one must first understand his unconventional use of certain military terms.

First, "strategic" and "tactical." What is the general meaning of these terms?

In the past, strategy and tactics have related not to weapons, but to objectives in warfare — strategy referring broadly to the grand design, or to major campaigns; tactics to methods of winning particular battles or maneuvers. The strategies have been as individualistic as they come.

In coming of the atomic age, there were no devices described as "strategic weapons" only the use of weapons strategically (for example, the use of warships to enforce economic blockade). Nevertheless, it is still the use of the weapon rather than its nature which determines its classification as "strategic" or "tactical." A "tactical" H-bomb dropped on a fleet or other military concentration would have been a "strategic" H-bomb if delivered on an enemy industrial complex.

No hard and fast line can be drawn between strategy and tactics. Strategic forces or weapons can be used tactically; conversely, tactical forces or weapons can be used strategically. While clearly antipodal examples of strategic and tactical use of weapons can be given, there is a wide area in between where the classification is patently unstable and indistinct.

The fact is, that a nation that attempted to compartment its forces

Marine Corps Gazette • March 1958

21

... a clear distinction must be made between the roles and missions [cc] assigned by law, and the more detailed functions assigned by executive order of the Secretary of Defense

according to whether they would be used strategically or tactically would be putting itself in a strait-jacket. No nation — no individual — has ever proposed it — at least until Dr. Kissinger came along. The label attached to our Strategic Air Command is indicative of its primary role but this does not preclude its use tactically if the need arises.

Once the national decision is made to use force, there should be no arbitrary compartmentation within the military organization which would prohibit the use of any available military power. Obviously, the degree of force to be used is governed by political as well as military considerations. But if the fighter is to have one hand tied, the decision should be made with reference to a particular set of circumstances—not on the basis of a hard and fast rule.

What may be "strategy" on one occasion may be "tactics" on another — the political objectives will in many cases provide the criteria for such classification. In any event, our military forces must be prepared to fight "the war" to whatever extent politically necessary. In each instance there will be the formulation of a strategic plan and application of tactical and strategic means in its execution.

In the light of this background, what is the precise content of the terms "strategic" and "tactical" as used by Kissinger? He appears to have derived his usage from the Air Force division of its forces into the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command. "Strategic" is equated with strategic bombardment. "Tactical" then, by elimination, is synonymous with all military operations except strategic bombardments. A note is needed on continental air defense. By Kissinger this function is regarded as strategic. According to Rockefeller-Kissinger it is neither strategic nor tactical but a separate function.

Next, "total war" and "limited war." Since under our current stra-

tegic concept the principal strategy, at least initially, in a decisive conflict between the Soviet Union and the US is strategic bombing. Kissinger equates the terms "strategic" and "total war." By elimination "tactical" is associated with all aspects of warfare except strategic bombardment—an entity identified as "limited war." More later about this identification of 2 distinct entities "total war" and "limited war."

Thus, by oversimplification of the terms "strategic" and "tactical" and by identifying these oversimplified terms with oversimplified versions of what he identifies as 2 distinct entities, "total war" and "limited war", Kissinger has prepared a basis for his eventual conclusion that the military forces should be placed in 2 compartments, one labeled "Strategic Force—for total war only", the other "Tactical Force—for all but total warfare." The former is virtually synonymous with the Strategic Air and Continental Air Defense Commands; the latter comprises all other air, land and sea forces.

Kissinger recognizes the versatility of the Communist threat. Yet his proposal to reorganize the armed forces into 2 distinct compartments, each self sufficient and earmarked for a specific kind of war, would lead to rigidity rather than versatility in responding to those threats. This rigidity, which would characterize the 2 self-sufficient, mutually-exclusive forces, must result in a much higher cost-price, through enormous duplication of manpower, installations, equipment, maintenance and so on. Yet this higher cost would not be reflected in greater national security. The increase would be needed just to try to keep abreast of present capabilities — a goal which could never be achieved. The best laid plans are worthless, in the absence of national solvency.

## Roles and Missions—General

To establish a basis for the charge that the missions of the military serv-

ices are obsolete, competitive rather than complementary, and out of accord with both weapons technology and the principal military threats to our national safety, Rockefeller-Kissinger inaccurately postulate that the present missions of the Army, Navy and Air Force are based upon their respective modes of transportation. That is, if it walks it's in the Army—if it flies it's in the Air Force and it it floats it's in the Navy.

These are the elemental, earth-air water bins of the original Collins plan, which was carefully studied in the unification hearings of 1946-'47. But the Congress, in the National Security Act of 1947, specifically rejected this elementary tri-dimensional thesis and legislated instead the organization of the military forces on a purposive basis. Examples are the provision of aviation for both the Army and Navy, and the air/ground organization of the Marine Corps.

Before examining the differences between these 2 theories of organization, let's take a look at the roles and missions and their purpose and meaning. Rockefeller-Kissinger do not seem to be very clear on these points.

At the outset a clear distinction must be made between the roles and missions assigned by law, and the more detailed functions assigned by executive order of the Secretary of Defense. The provisions of the law on roles and missions are not narrow or confining, but broad.

With respect to the Army, the law states:

> "It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land."

With respect to the Navy, the law states:

> "The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea."

Referring to the Air Force, the law says:

22

... contrary to the Rockefeller-Kissinger premise, the fighting forces do not find their combatant missions tied to any means of locomotion whatever

"It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations."

It is significant that these provisions use the words "shall be organized, trained and equipped." What this means is that the law does not specify how forces provided by the several services will be employed in combat. Instead, in a Declaration of Policy, Congress specified the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and their operation under unified control. In other words, and contrary to the Rockefeller-Kissinger premise, the fighting forces do not find their combatant missions tied to any means of locomotion whatever.

In the more detailed statement of functions pertaining to each of the armed services, the Secretary of Defense, in the Functions Paper (a DOD directive which amplifies the law), has likewise used the terminology "organized, trained and equipped," and has stated that the functions shall be carried out in such a manner as to achieve "operation of armed forces under unified command, wherever such unified command is in the best interest of national security."

Thus, the assignment of roles and missions by law and the more detailed administrative assignment of functions is not to set arbitrary restrictions on how forces will be employed in combat, a matter which is at the discretion of the unified commanders of the several strategic areas, but rather to decentralize and assign responsibility for training, organization, administration and development of forces for combat. Further, the Functions Paper recognizes that technological developments and other changes may dictate altering the assignment of functions — a duty of the Secretary of Defense. Here there is complete flexibility for making necessary adjustments—there is no bar in law or regulation prohibiting changes in func-

tions by those in a position of responsibility.

Kissinger's erroneous premise that the military forces are organized on the basis of their means of locomotion discloses a failure to grasp fully, America's significant advance beyond the organizational philosophy of the landbound armies of continental Europe. Theirs was the tri-elemental theory which held that the Army, Navy and Air Force should provide forces organized, equipped and trained for the exercise of special skills demonstrated on the ground, on or under the water, and in the air respectively.

This is a theory based on individual weapons — air weapons, ground weapons, water weapons — and if carried to its logical extreme, results in absurdities. For example, air and ship bases would have to be manned by Army personnel; only in the air and at sea could Air Force and Navy personnel take charge. Even the proponents of this elemental approach would not wish to carry their analysis to this ridiculous extreme; they maintain only that the primary criterion for organization should be the element in which the weapons of a given service are used.

Even as a primary criterion, however, the tri-elemental theory can lead to strange thinking. Take for example, rockets which use the air as a medium of travel—are they air

weapons? Or anti-aircraft guns, which shoot down enemy aircraft, are they an air weapon?

The rationale behind the weapons tri-elemental theory is this: warfare itself is purposive at the topmost level—to impose our will on the enemy. Therefore, it is presumed that the next lower level should logically be a process level and the air, sea and land divisions seem made to order.

The reasoning continues by presuming that an Army confined to the use of land-bound weapons, a Navy restricted to sea-bound weapons, and Air Force of air-bound weapons would each furnish contingents of elemental specialists for constitution into combat task forces on the level next below that at which this division into pure elemental forces exists. That is to say, balanced combat task forces would be created next below the level of the Military Departments.

This sort of thinking is sound enough as far as it goes, and is a fair theoretical explanation of how and why joint task forces and unified area commands are organized.

But this theory of organization, which seemed so logical to the theoreticians of the land-bound armies of central Europe prior to the development of the full potential of their air arms, is less than adequate in the air age. It is particularly inadequate

Davis Merwin, publisher and military writer, is a well-known student of national defense, with service in the Marine Corps in both World Wars. In peacetime, he has maintained his active association with the naval service, both in his capacity as a Marine Corps Reserve Officer and as a journalist. He had extensive active service with the Fleet Marine Force in the 1st MarDiv and 1st MAW in Korea and has spent considerable time in the Mediterranean as an observer with the 6th Fleet. A graduate of Harvard and Cal Tech (Aeronautical Engineering), he has been particularly interested in naval aviation and played a prominent part in publicizing the role of the naval aircraft carrier. He is likewise a keen student of defense organization, having participated actively in the recurrent organizational crises beginning with the unification issue of 1946-'47. His broad military experience thus provides him with a unique background for his penetrating analysis of the Rockefeller-Kissinger Report.

Marine Corps Signal Corps, 6 March 1968

23

... only a relatively small percentage of the total action
in war is joint action to any significant degree

for the US surrounded, as it is, by oceans. The air and naval aspects of our defense problem could scarcely have been imagined by those who thought of air and naval forces only as auxiliaries to the principal effort —the defeat by land forces of the enemy's armies.

It was our national experience in WWII, confirmed by more than 3 years of continuous combat in Korea, that there are 3 distinct fields of warfare and that their inter-relationship, while sometimes substantial in a broad sense, is seldom intimate. Indeed, only a relatively small percentage of the total action in war is joint action to any significant degree.

It was this experience, unique perhaps to the US, which made it possible for the Congress to see that the war-making purpose of this most powerful nation is too enormously comprehensive to permit a breakdown at the Departmental level into process type organizations. A breakdown by purposive types was clearly dictated by the scope of the total activity as well as by the fact that this activity naturally fell into 3 broad and largely independent fields.

As was noted in the 1950 Report of the Investigation by the House Armed Services Committee on Unification and Strategy, the military service developed in response to the needs of each of these 3 largely independent fields of warfare "is the repository of a vast amount of skill, or tremendous specialization, in integrated, specialized fields of human effort and endeavor quite as distinct and complicated and as different as, in civil life, the doctor and the lawyer, the minister and the engineer."

The major purpose of each service is to develop forces capable of commanding the element in or on which it primarily operates. But to achieve command of its element, a given service may require instruments or individuals developed and trained for operations in another element — for example, command of the sea

requires airplanes, as does command of the land, and command of the air requires airfields.

Command of the sea is well understood; it has always been the mission of the Navy. Command of the air, as expressed by the term "air superiority" or "air supremacy," means that friendly aircraft are in large part free to use the air at will and that the enemy is in large part denied such use.

Command of the land is an expression not found in military manuals, because command of the sea and command of the air have always been thought of as auxiliary conditions necessary for pushing home the ultimate effort: defeat of the enemy's armies. But command of the sea and air, brought about the defeat of Japan without any land invasion. In modern war, in some instances, land forces may have no greater role than aiding in the defense of air bases — that is, exercising command of the land so that the weapons of air power can be turned on the enemy.

Command of the land, as an expression paralleling the more common expressions, command of the sea and command of the air, does not lose its usefulness in describing major and sustained land operations. It means the ability to carry out ground combat plans against the ground enemy; it could vary in degree, just as do command of the sea and command of the air.

What this means is that the roles of the Army, Navy and Air Force are to provide not walkers, sailors and airmen or tanks, ships and aircraft, but purposive type forces whose respective war missions are to gain and exploit command of the land, sea and air against the enemy. The concrete expressions of service roles and missions are the field army, the balanced fleet and the tactical and strategic air forces.

To be sure, this purposive theory of organization can be carried so far as to claim the right of complete self-sufficiency for each service, a

claim that would be patently absurd. The proper solution is a compromise between the elemental approach and the purposive approach, but with wisdom it is weighted toward the latter.

A primarily purposive approach to the organization of military forces is characterized by little or no duplication of functions, but results in some duplication of means. This planned duplication of means must be carefully controlled so that the increased effectiveness gained through such duplication of instruments among the services does not lead eventually to an over-all increase in forces, placing an unnecessary strain on national resources.

However, because Army forces engage in land operations it is not duplication for the Navy to maintain Fleet Marine Forces adequate to the specific task of seizing and holding naval bases or of projecting naval power onto a hostile shore. And because the Air Force engages in air operations it is not duplication for the Navy to maintain aircraft, which are a major element in naval operations, or for the Army to maintain the aircraft and the anti-aircraft means which are so important in the exercise of modern land power.

The alternative to permitting and even encouraging some duplication of instruments in the interest of effective land power, naval power, and air power would be to rely on the weapons tri-elemental approach to a degree that would reduce the power, flexibility and overall combat effectiveness of our field armies, our balanced fleets and our air forces in their respective roles.

Indeed, it would destroy these concepts for it would require the establishment of task forces at the national level for the accomplishment of any mission or purpose, since the Army, Navy and Air Force could not provide forces capable of any significant combat action without the attachment of elemental specialists from other services.

24

... our military services are organized on a purposive or broad functional basis

But this is not in prospect—unless Congress should abdicate an important part of its responsibility in respect to the military with which it is charged under the Constitution—for, under the organization prescribed by Congress, the role of each of the services is to provide forces organized primarily upon the basis of purpose, that purpose being command of the element in which it primarily operates. This leads to the field army, the balanced fleet and the numbered air force as the organizational expressions of service missions.

Obviously, none of these forces is completely self-sufficient even for its primary purpose and, obviously, each of the 3 broad purposes is interrelated and dependent to a greater or lesser extent upon the others. Consequently, there has been established in each strategic area a unified commander whose duty it is to gain and exploit most effectively the command of the land, sea and air in that strategic area, by directing the operations of the forces of the 3 services and by combining them as appropriate in joint task forces.

In some cases, as in Korea, the field army plays the dominant role. In other cases it may be an air force or a fleet. Finally there are operations—airborne and amphibious operations are the most common—where service elements organized, equipped and trained to fight in different media—land, sea and air are brought together in the face of the enemy in closely co-ordinated action designed to achieve a common goal. These joint task force operations are, by their nature, of limited duration and, upon their completion, the service components of the joint task force resume their normal relationship with other service elements within the strategic area.

The significant thing is that even with the global sweep of US respon-

sibilities, few of our combat operations are joint in this intimate sense. Take Korea, for example. Only for amphibious and airborne operations were joint task forces established. For the rest—the great bulk of the action—the 8th Army conducted the land war, while the 5th Air Force finally took control of the air war, and supported the 8th Army by providing interdiction and direct support of the troops, and the Fleet conducted the sea war, at the same time supporting the 8th Army logistically and with aviation and naval gunfire. All were under the direction of the unified theater commander who, balancing the requirements of the ground war against those of the air war and the sea war, could direct any shift in emphasis he thought desirable.

Kissinger's premise then is wrong. Our military services are not organized on the basis of their means of locomotion. Instead, they are organized on a purposive or broad functional basis—to provide forces to command the land, to command the sea and to command the air. And finally—a point which Kissinger completely ignores—these forces are assigned to unified commands where all are under the command of one officer with a joint staff.

## Roles and Missions Out of Accord with Principal Military Threats to National Security

Passing off strategic air and continental air defense as representing one integrated strategic mission, Kissinger postulates just one additional integrated strategic mission, "limited war." But Rockefeller Kissinger do not look at "limited war" from the standpoint of the European Command, the Atlantic Command or the Pacific Command—united commands established within certain strategic areas for the precise purpose of conducting "limited war;" that is, if we

include in "limited war" all warfare except strategic bombardment.

Instead, Rockefeller Kissinger & Co. appear to survey the globe from the continental US and in so doing overlook the existing unified commands. They see various potential trouble spots but not the balanced forces already in those strategic areas: tactical air, fleet units, the 5 divisions in Western Europe and 5 in the Pacific.

They overlook the fact that each hypothetical trouble spot is even now the responsibility of a Unified Commander, who already has substantial forces at his disposal to meet any threat within his strategic area.

The net result is that Kissinger appears to visualize limited war primarily in terms of ground action by US troops overseas. That is, he devises an "integrated strategic mission" in which the ultimate effort is ground action for which command of the air and sea are auxiliary conditions. By this means, air power and sea power are cast in the light of supporting forces and land power assigned a role out of proportion to its actual significance in meeting the military threats to our security.

Kissinger's integrated strategic mission would subordinate our fleets and our tactical air forces in precisely the same manner that the German Army harnessed air and sea forces to a ground strategy. It was this type of thinking which resulted in Germany's failure to develop a maritime strategy that might have cut Europe off from the support provided by the US, or the air strategy that might have brought Great Britain to its knees. Wehrmacht "war force," in Germany, meant land force, tightly supported by sea and air, and it spelled Germany's defeat.

But this philosophy meets our strategic needs even less. It does not even recognize the largely independ-

Marine Corps Gazette in March 1958

25

... operations of the fleets are conducted by unified commanders in the two great ocean theaters in accordance with the strategic direction of the JCS as transmitted through the Department of the Navy

ent sea and air wars which must be conducted even before troops can be transported to the combat zone. In fact, it links the transportation of the troops not with the sea or air war in the areas through which the transports, with their helpless passengers, must pass but with the combatant functions of land forces after their delivery to the zone of ground combat. Realistically such movements are an exercise in sea power or air power, requiring the use of combatant instruments in no way related to land power.

It is the scope and importance of sea and air tasks and their inter-relationship with land force that the tri-elementalist often overlooks. For example, take the globally deployed units of the US fleets. Upon them has fallen the heavy task performed so many years by the British Navy. Our fleets are the guarantor of the freedom of the seas and it is this freedom which gives coherence to the defensive efforts of the whole free world.

If our command of the seas were to be challenged by the Soviets — a not unreasonable hypothesis in view of the critical importance of sea transport in our commerce and defensive efforts — we must use the massive deterrent, fight a protracted war at sea or watch helplessly while the free world alliances dissolve and their members are drawn into the Communist orbit by economic and military blackmail. And all this without a single movement on the part of land forces.

Operations of the fleets are conducted by unified commanders in the 2 great ocean theaters in accordance with the strategic direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as transmitted through the Department of the Navv. What possible gain in effectiveness could result from submerging the direction of these operations in a new hybrid headquarters made up of an equal number of officers from all 3 services? Similarly, the operations of the European Com-

mand, a command in which land force interests predominate, would be less effective if the present executive agency responsibility were taken from the Department of the Army and vested in a new tri-service headquarters.

Turn now more directly to the Rockefeller-Kissinger charge that the current roles and missions are out of accord with the principal military threats to our security. This charge is based, in the first instance, upon the erroneous assumption that the roles of the services are the product of their means of locomotion. As we have seen, their missions are rather to produce service components organized, equipped and trained to command the air, command the land, and command the sea.

The charge is based, in the second instance, upon Kissinger's wholly unsuccessful effort to divide warfare into 2 distinct and unrelated entities styled "total war" and "limited war." On the basis of these 2 entities, Kissinger jumps to the conclusion that we need not have 3 services but rather 2 distinct and separate forces — one for each of the 2 so-called "integrated missions." Thus, one compartment labeled "Strategic Force — for total war only" and another labeled variously "limited war force," "peripheral war force" or "all but total war force."

The idea that compartmentation of the military forces on this basis would respond more effectively to the principal military threats to our national security than compartmentation on the basis of the 3 services, does not stand up under analysis.

## Roles and Missions, Compartmentation and Development of Military Doctrine

Regardless of the ultimate use of forces, certain areas of responsibility for the development of military doctrines and techniques and for the provision of trained components must be assigned. Currently these areas of responsibility are expressed

in the broad statutory "roles and missions" and the more specific administrative delineation of "functions" discussed above.

The assignment of roles and missions, the nature of administrative compartmentation within the structure of the armed forces, and the effective development of doctrines and techniques for the conduct of modern warfare are all interrelated. Since the end result is effectiveness in battle, the development of effective doctrines and techniques is the end to which broad missions and administrative compartmentation must be responsive.

## Development of Military Doctrine

Although the principles of war constitute broad guidelines for conduct of military operations, techniques and procedures of a more transitory nature and more specific application are continuously evolved in the military profession. These doctrines, which guide the conduct of specific types of operations or broad tasks, are subject to constant revision to reflect the impact of new weapons, new concepts, or other changing conditions.

Thus, military doctrines generally are transitory products of a continuous evolution, and their validity at any time depends upon their currency. France's Maginot Line fixation prior to WWII is an example of a failure of the evolutionary process and of a tendency for doctrines to become rigid and unresponsive to changing factors and conditions. This is a constant danger and the validity of military doctrine depends to a great extent on close association in combat or in training exercises of individuals and weapon systems relating to closely associated processes.

If the term doctrine seems remote and esoteric just remember that it is doctrine that specifies the number and types of units to be maintained and their composition, the training to be given, the equipment to be developed and procured and the types

26

... Much of the discussion regarding the organizational structure of the armed forces stems from failure to understand the doctrinal problem

and amounts of supplies to be distributed.

Literally everything a military service does stems from its doctrine. Recall, too, that the development of doctrine for combat is the major activity of a military service in peacetime. The service schools, its developmental centers, its field forces and its service headquarters all devote the major part of their time to the improvement of the Service's doctrine.

## Nature of Compartmentation Within Armed Forces Structure

The administrative compartmentation which will be most effective in developing military doctrine must reflect the functional grouping of weapons and personnel. These groupings should embrace those processes which are closely associated in the conduct of operations of various broad types. Any type of administrative compartmentation which significantly separates these functional groupings must inevitably operate to the detriment of the armed forces' overall effectiveness by compromising their ability to develop sound doctrines.

Much of the discussion regarding the organizational structure of the armed forces stems from failure to understand the doctrinal problem. This is reflected in suggestions for administrative reorganization along weapons tri-elemental lines, based on whether the weapons operate in the air, on the water, or on the land; geographic lines, where task forces reflecting area requirements are constituted; process lines, providing groupings in numerous co-equal categories, such as anti-submarine forces and airborne forces.

Under the first method, the weapons tri-elemental compartmentation would emphasize the elimination of any duplication of weapon systems at the expense of the development of doctrines for the coordinated employment of various weapon systems. In the second method the geographic compartmentation dilutes the devel-

opment of sound doctrine through emphasizing doctrinal application in a specific geographical area. In the third method, the various forces involved, of which there would quite obviously be many, would emphasize the accomplishment of specific processes, at the expense of the development of doctrinal concepts relating to closely associated processes.

As was demonstrated above, the combat processes fall naturally into 3 broad groups. Probably as much as 90 per cent of the total combat action is conducted by ground forces, air forces and sea forces each acting in its own element and quite independent of the processes of another service.

For example, an infantry battalion is organized, equipped and trained for ground combat. It employs the doctrine for ground combat developed by the Army which has the mission to prepare such doctrine. By contrast, an aircraft squadron is organized, equipped and trained primarily for air combat. It employs doctrines developed by the Air Force for this purpose. Even if an infantry battalion and an aircraft squadron were placed together in the same administrative compartment, each would spend at least 90 per cent of its training and administrative time preparing for combat processes which are totally unrelated to those of the other unit but which are an integral part of a larger doctrinal fabric for air war or for ground war.

Even in joint operations where elements organized for combat in different media are combined to perform a common task, subordinate units employ the doctrine of the element for combat in which they have been organized, equipped and trained, with only such modifications as are necessary to accommodate to the situation.

The intimate association in actual combat operations of the processes which naturally fall into 3 broad functional groupings have resulted in the current administrative compartmentation of the forces at both

the national level and at the level of the unified commands. Further, compartmentation internally groups personnel and weapons along process lines for efficient detailed training and standardization of related techniques.

Valid arguments may be presented regarding the proper balance between and within the broad compartments, the achievement of maximum economy consistent with optimum effectiveness, standardization of truly common requirements, and general improvement in detailed organization. However, functional compartmentation on the broad bases of air power, sea power, and land power provides the best organizational environment for the development of effective military doctrine, without which our military forces must inevitably become ineffective.

The view of Messrs. Rockefeller and Kissinger that an amorphous generalization "all but total war" constitutes an integrated military mission, upon the basis of which most of our existing military forces should be placed in a single compartment, neglects the doctrinal problems entirely.

So far as the organization of military forces are concerned, the phrases "all but total war" or "limited war" are largely meaningless generalizations. From the standpoint of organization, the military threats to the national security are certain distinct enemy capabilities at sea, in the air and on the ground. These enemy capabilities are best assayed by experts in combat in these media. Similarly, these experts are best qualified to determine the requirements, and develop the means to counter these threats.

It is the genius of the present organizational structure of the armed forces that it recognizes and responds to the military threats to the national security in meaningful military terms and, at the same time, provides the means to coordinate our responses to these threats in terms of an integrated whole—a military

27

... all differences of opinion relating to air, sea and land war would be decided, not as under the present system (by reference to a politically accountable Secretary of Defense, along with all relevant points of view) but by fiat of the commander of the "all but total war force"

strategy to meet the threat effectively, whatever its form. This results from designing the forces at the national level and at the operational level on the broad bases of air, naval and land power with unified direction provided at the national level by the Secretary of Defense, advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and direction at the operational level by the unified commander of the strategic area.

Under the present system, military doctrine, techniques and equipment are developed at the departmental level through an infinitely complex interplay between the field forces, the military schools, and various developmental agencies. In this way there is an unbroken service responsibility for doctrinal development, training and logistic and administrative support.

The Rockefeller report would have the military departments retain control of training and doctrinal development as well as procurement and supply. Kissinger, however, goes all the way, assigning both training and doctrine to the commander of his proposed Limited War Force, feeling that it would be unrealistic to expect him to bear the responsibility for the performance of his forces in battle, using ready made forces and doctrine. Eventually, despite the current Rockefeller reservations, training and doctrines must soon come under the control of this new command. In fact, this command could, with some logic, claim control over all factors affecting the performance of its forces including logistics and research and development.

With the establishment of an "all but total war force" it would be necessary, on the basis of the most elementary operational and administrative considerations, to decentralize that force at the national level and at the level of the unified com-

mands in strategic areas into air, ground and sea components. This means going from the air, ground, sea compartments of the existing unified commands to a unified "all but total war force," thence back to the air, ground and sea component within such a force.

What is added by this progression is an additional headquarters—an "all but total war headquarters" with global responsibilities. Its relationships with the unified commanders in the several strategic areas, the Military Departments, the global Strategic Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense promise to be a rich source of confusion.

What is lost by the interposition of a commander of the "all but total war force" is now the vital relationship between the present military departments and their components in the strategic commands—a relationship which produces the doctrines, tactics, techniques and equipment to make these components effective each in its distinctive role. All these must eventually become the domain of the new commander who must then become the source of all intelligence, all doctrine, and all requirements for air, land and sea forces.

The new headquarters would absorb not only the intelligence, doctrinal and requirements role of the present military departments but also most of the strategic direction role of the present JCS. Thus all differences of opinion relating to air, sea and land war would be decided, not as under the present system (by reference to a politically accountable Secretary of Defense, along with all relevant points of view) but by fiat of the commander of the "all but total war force." While this type of decision may be desirable at the combat level the headquarters of this limited war force is far from being

a combat headquarters and arbitrary Hitler-like decisions at the national level promise to be right only 20 to 25 per cent of the time.

It is not overstatement to predict that the establishment of a so-called "operational" commander of the scope of the "limited war force" must lead quickly to the crumbling of the Departmental lines along which the Defense Department is now decentralized.

Indeed, the "integrated mission" of the Rockefeller-Kissinger report, which has no real validity as a touchstone for the organization and development of our military forces, could well be identified as the little Collins plan. It would create a single military commander for the lion's share of our land, sea and air forces and reduce the military departments to supply agencies. It would produce not effective forces for the largely unrelated combatant roles, command of the sea, command of the air and command of the land, but an amorphous agglomerate known to the Prussian military theorists as "war power."

The arguments against any such organizational changes are numerous. But the most important is that the resulting organization would respond poorly to the principal military threats to our national security which are measurable enemy capabilities on the sea, on the land and in the air, not a meaningless generality such as "limited war."

## The Charge That Missions Are Not In Accord With Technology

The Rockefeller-Kissinger claim that the roles and missions are out of accord with weapons technology is as far off base as their premise that the armed forces are organized on a tri-elemental basis.

In fact, it is only with reference to this elemental theory that the authors could observe with feigned sur-

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Marine Corps Gazette 3 March 1958

... the touchstone is combat effectiveness, not administrative tidiness or compatibility with a neat symmetrical organizational diagram

prise that there are aircraft in all the military services, that the Navy has its organic landing force and that Army AAA units participate in air defense.

What the report does, in this regard, is to confuse instruments with missions; means with employment. Surely the authors know that such duplications as the above are not simply the result of careless drafting by the Congress and the insatiable desire of the Services to be self-sufficient. Surely they know that Congress considered the matter of Naval and Army aviation and the Marine Corps in great detail. Certainly they know that some duplication of instruments is planned into our defense structure simply because it results in far greater effectiveness than if the same means were distributed among the elemental land, air, sea bins.

This does not mean that such duplications should not be kept under strict surveillance, and reexamined from time to time. But they should be examined on their individual merits, not by an arbitrary rule of thumb; and the touchstone is combat effectiveness, not administrative tidiness or compatibility with a neat symmetrical organizational diagram worked out by someone who has no real knowledge of military operations.

It was Herr Goebbels who observed that propaganda must always be simple and repetitious—that public opinion could be influenced only by forever repeating a thesis in the most simplified terms. That this principle is observed by the Rockefeller report as well as the Kissinger book cannot be gainsaid.

No less than 12 times there appears in the report in one form or another the unsupported statement, "revolutionary advances in weapons

have rendered obsolete the present missions of the military services."

Actually there is considerable ground for postulating just the opposite; that advances in weapons have actually validated the original service missions. For example, the developments of the surface to surface missile and anti-aircraft missile have made the Field Army more self-sufficient and lessened its dependence on the Air Force for tactical air support and air defense. The ICBM, with its intercontinental range, has lessened the Air Force's dependence upon the Army and the Navy for protecting or for seizing advance bases. Mass destruction weapons and missile development have reduced the requirements of both the Air Force and the Navy for aircraft so that this long smouldering jurisdictional dispute will eventually be alleviated.

In respect to missiles and aircraft, there will still be some duplication of instruments between the services but it is because such instruments are a part of an integrated fabric of weapons for air war, sea war and land war. It is up to the services and to the Secretary of Defense to guide this weapons development so as to prevent duplications which do not spell increased effectiveness.

To give Kissinger his due, there are some grounds for the observation that the military services have been competing with one another in the development of weapons for an identical function . . . but such competition is not inherent in the roles and missions. However, given certain circumstances, the technical developments of one military service toward the fulfillment of its legitimate mission may impinge on the mission of another to an extent resulting in wasteful duplication. The Army's development of Jupiter, a

1500-mile IRBM, is an example. In developing weapons to "command the land," the Army progressed from Corporal to Sergeant to Redstone, a 200-mile surface missile. Then its engineers and scientists, always striving for something bigger and better, saw possibilities for, and eventually developed the Jupiter.

Here, advancing technology clearly crossed a service boundary — the Army got into the Air Force's assigned business — a development which was encouraged by the Air Force's failure to appreciate the potentialities of the ballistic missile. But here the Secretary of Defense stepped in and by firm decision put a stop to the Army's duplication of an Air Force mission.

Another example of overstepping the bounds of roles and missions is to be found in the air defense field. By the most reasonable interpretation of the Functions Paper, the defense of the US against air attack is an Air Force job. Yet the Army's development effort in Nike, Nike Hercules and Nike Zeus is headed in that direction.

Here again it was the failure of the Air Force to stay ahead in new weapons that created the vacuum which the Army effort sought to satisfy.

A final example of intrusion into a field which can not be identified with its prescribed functions is the Army's earth satellite venture. But while there is nothing in the roles and missions to warrant Army ventures in this field, who is there who can blame the Army for stepping into the breach and improving our security posture?

The fault then is not in the roles and missions, but in failure to observe these terms. To be sure, even with the best of good will on the part of the Services, decisions must

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> ... while air transport is feasible for small troop units, it is not feasible for large scale movements. Sea lift will get them there first, with more assurance and greater economy

be made from time to time as to which service or services will employ this weapon or that. These same decisions would have to be made regardless of the organization of the armed forces. And the fact that decisions such as these must be made from time to time with advances in technology does not invalidate the basic missions of the services, which are as sound now as when they were formulated 10 years ago.

To better control this type of duplication which results not from any flaw in the roles and missions, but from unreasonable and overzealous interpretations, new weapons development has recently been taken out of the military services. Now when a new weapon has been developed and is ready for introduction into the defense structure, a hard decision can be made as to which service or services will employ it. But the decision will be sound only if the military experts are given their day in court.

## Roles and Missions Result in Neglect of Certain Vital Tasks

Complementing its contention that their roles and missions make inevitable the duplication of functions by the four armed services, the Rockefeller report charges that they also lead to the neglect of certain vital tasks. Cited as an example is airlift for land forces. Noting that this is the responsibility of the Air Force, the report alleges that the Air Force has failed to meet the requirements because of its greater concern with its primary task of defeating the enemy in the air. This is less than accurate.

To begin with, the provision of air lift is a combatant function only in the same sense as the provision of sea lift. Essentially, it is an administrative function — one which has been placed under the single management of the Air Force.

Next, the matter of airlift for the strategic movement of land forces has been the subject of numerous studies, all of which have been essentially negative as to its feasibility. The fact is, that airlift of the scope envisaged by some enthusiasts is just

not feasible. In the present state of the art of aircraft design, the cost would be prohibitive, even if fuel and maintenance facilities could be moved in sufficient quantity and flexibility.

It is not solely a question of economics; there is the lack, at potential destinations, of the major airfield complexes needed to handle the great numbers of large aircraft required for a major airlift. While air transport is feasible for small troop units, it is not feasible for large scale movements. Sea lift will get them there first, with more assurance and greater economy.

Finally, decisions as to the amount of airlift to be maintained have not been left to the Air Force, which would be more than happy to attempt to meet any requirement levied upon it, provided it were given the means. The decisions have been made by the Secretary of Defense, after consideration of all relevant views. These decisions in turn have been ratified by the Congress in its action upon budget requests and Congress was not uninformed in the premises, for it has repeatedly probed the amount of airlift to be maintained. Thus, there is just no basis in fact for the claim that air lift has been neglected as a result of service missions.

## No "Limited War" Doctrine

Associated in a general way with roles and missions as treated by Kissinger, is his charge that the US has no doctrine for limited war. In fact, this charge becomes his principal basis for rationalizing his "limited war force." Create a command, he says, and the doctrine will follow. This thesis overlooks the fact that if you were to place in one compartment all our military forces except SAC and CONAD you would put in the same compartment hundreds of volumes of doctrine - doctrine for land warfare, for tactical air warfare, for naval warfare and for joint operations.

There is no shortage of doctrine for fighting limited war and it is good doctrine expressed in meaning-

ful military terms. But we can agree with Kissinger that there does not exist at the present time, specifically oriented to his purposes, a highly rationalized doctrine for attempting to limit a limited war. If this is needed, such a doctrine can be developed without destroying our present compartmentation for effective military action.

But its desirability is at least open to question. While the concept of limited war is a valid one within reason, it is extremely unlikely that operations of the scope visualized by Kissinger could be conducted without spreading. Moreover, developing a doctrine for limiting war so as to permit, let us say, a nice Marquis of Queensbury atomic war in Western Europe would, if it could be done at all, simply rob our massive deterrent of its capacity to deter any aggressive Soviet action short of the initiation of the hydrogen exchange of mutual extinction itself. Thus, it would encourage the Soviets in military activities in which their capabilities are greater than ours by virtue of their interior lines, shorter lines of communication and greater manpower.

While everyone would agree that we ought to be prepared to respond to Soviet recourse to limited war, this is a very different thing from deliberately setting out to expand the probability of war.

## Inadequate Limited War Forces

A derivative of Kissinger's purported rediscovery of limited war is his claim that our strategic concept has over-emphasized the massive deterrent to the point of seriously neglecting limited war forces. It is quite possible to agree with Kissinger that there has been far too much talk about the massive deterrent. But ever since the exposure of the shortcomings of the strategy of massive deterrence at the time of the Korean War, the US has maintained substantially improved "limited war" capabilities. Nevertheless there is room for significant extension of mobility — inherent in sea going forces, and applicable to the full

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... The "numbers-of-divisions" gauge, which is grossly misleading, should be discarded as a measure of quantitative strengths

spectrum of modern warfare.

As of today, the US has approximate numerical air parity with the Soviet Union and, if experience in the Korean War is valid, a clear superiority in pilot competence. The US has a decisive naval superiority including a significant capability to project naval power ashore. In fact, it was Congressional appreciation of the increased need for ready expeditionary forces for limited war situations, that caused Congress in 1952 to enact legislation to increase significantly the size of the Fleet Marine Forces and to specify that they should not be reduced below 3 divisions and 3 air wings.

As for the Army, the numerical superiority of some 175 Soviet divisions to some 17 American is grossly misleading. The Red Army actually requires vast supporting establishments similar to those of other modern armies, and a major segment of its over-all strength must in fact be diverted to non-tactical functions. The explanation of how the 2½ million-man Red Army achieves 10 times more divisions than the US Army of almost half its strength, lies in differences of organizational policy; many of the so-called Soviet divisions are merely "cadre" units, and other full active divisions are fractionally manned.

Additionally, Red Army divisions are provided less tactical and logistical support units, and thus have less staying-power than American units. Thus, the numbers of divisions are more reflective of organizational and manning policy differences than relative quantitative strengths. The "numbers-of-divisions" gauge, which is grossly misleading, should be discarded as a measure of quantitative strengths in favor of army wide strengths-now a little better than two-to-one in numerical favor of the Soviets.

And this is the US alone. There is no time here to inventory the free world forces allied with us or to examine the forces of the satellites which are at best a dubious asset to the Soviets and may be a source of weakness. This is not necessary to the conclusion that the US actually

has in being very substantial limited war capabilities.

## Conclusions

1. Contrary to the Rockefeller-Kissinger assumption, the military services are not organized on the basis of their means of locomotion but on a purposive basis-to provide forces organized, equipped and trained primarily to command the sea, to command the land and to command the air.

2. Contrary to the Rockefeller-Kissinger assertion, there is in this purposive type of organization little duplication of functions. The planned duplication of instruments results in greater overall effectiveness without an increase in total means. Reorganization along tri-elemental lines would not result in economy-only a less effective distribution of instruments.

3. A fact apparently overlooked by Rockefeller-Kissinger-the Army has not been assigned the task of winning a war on land, the Navy at sea, the Air Force in the air. These tasks are the responsibility of unified commanders appointed in each strategic area. The services merely provide forces for what is, in effect, a task organization tailored for a specific, integrated mission.

4. The Rockefeller-Kissinger effort to divide the whole spectrum of warfare into distinct and separate entities "total war" and "limited war" is unrealistic. Moreover, to attempt, as they propose, to compartment our military forces on this basis would produce rigidity in place of flexibility in responding to the versatile Communist threat, and to maintain 2 completely self-sufficient forces would greatly increase the cost of the armed forces.

5. The administrative compartmentation of the armed forces on the broad bases of land power, sea power and air power is far more responsive to the principal military threats to our national security than would be compartmentation, as proposed by Rockefeller-Kissinger, on the basis of 2 distinct entities, "total war" and an amorphous agglomerate, "limited war."

6. The so-called "traditional" roles and missions, which were actually established in 1947, far from being outmoded by new weapons, as charged by Rockefeller-Kissinger, have actually been validated by the new weapons, particularly missiles. Decisions are needed from time to time as to what service or services will use a new weapon, but this does not invalidate the roles and missions. The same type of decisions would have to be made within the "limited war force" and between that force and the "total war force."

7. Destructive competition between the services is not inherent in the roles and missions, as alleged by Rockefeller-Kissinger, but results from defiance of the roles and missions by an over-zealous service. In most cases, notably Jupiter, Nike Zeus and the earth satellite, these challenges have been invited by neglect on the part of the service with primary responsibility for development in a certain field, and the challenges by another service have speeded the development of new weapons and strengthened our military posture.

8. Contrary to Rockefeller-Kissinger, the roles and missions have not resulted in the neglect of certain vital tasks. For example, the amount of air lift to be maintained was decided by the politically accountable civilian Secretary of Defense with the benefit of all relevant points of view.

9. Contrary to Kissinger, there exists a large body of doctrine for limited war. A more highly rationed doctrine for attempting to limit a limited war could be developed, if it were determined to be desirable, without a revolutionary reorganization of the military forces.

10. Although the strategy of the massive deterrent has been highly publicized, the need for a capacity for limited war has never been forgotten. Kissinger notwithstanding, the US has maintained, since the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, tremendous capabilities for conducting limited war-though they demand continuing improvement.

US MC

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