CHAPTER VI

# What Price Deterrence - The Problems of Limited War

Another way of putting this problem is to ask under what conditions power and the willingness to use it are most in harmony. There exists no over-all formula for military superiority nor any one military capability which will achieve deterrence in all circumstances. The same military capability which may prevent war in one contingency, may encourage it in another. The same weapons system which it would be folly to challenge given one set of objectives, may be useless to discourage different purposes. Thus a gap is created between the pressures of technology in the direction of the development of maximum power and the realities of the nuclear period that there exist upper limits beyond which increments of destructiveness do not pay strategic returns.

It is therefore no longer possible to speak of military superiority in the abstract. What does being ahead in the nuclear race mean if each side can destroy the other's national substance? What is the significance of increasing the destructiveness of the nuclear arsenal when the enormity of weapons present/systems already tends to paralyze the will? It may be a hard lesson to learn for a nation which has found safety in the magnitude of its power that henceforth security may depend on the nuance and subtlety with which its strength can be applied. The fate of the dinosaur and the mammoth should be sufficient illustration that brute strength does not always supply the mechanism for success in the struggle for survival.

As long as invulnerability was coupled with the ability to assemble overwhelming power, strategy for us resolved itself into deciding on a

overpowering power, strategy, for we resolved itself into deciding on a

mechanism for success in the argument for survival...

...subtle illustration that pure strength does not make a supply for

that preeminent security may depend on the manceuver and apply with which it
to form for a nation which has found safety in the magnitude of its power

present\system already tends to paralyze the will? It may be a hard season

increasing the destructiveness of the nuclear武器 when the enemy of
can destroy the other's national advenues? What is the significance of
in the abstract. "that does not apply in the nuclear race" mean if each side

If it is therefore no longer possible to ask of military superiority
by strategic returns.

there exist upper limits beyond which increments of destructioniveness do not

development of maximum power and the restlessness of the nuclear period that
a state is created between the breather of technology in the direction of the
one set of objectives, may be made to discourage different purposes. Thus
another. The same weapons which it would be difficult to challenge given
causability which may prevent war in one circumstance, may encourage it in
which will achieve deterrence in all circumstances. The same military
over-all formula for military superiority nor any one military causability
power and the willingness to use it are most in harmony. There exists no
another way of putting this problem in such a way under what conditions

CHAPTER VI

VI-2

certain level of military effort. But this condition was a fortunate historical
accident and fleeting by its very nature. Strategy for other nations has always
involved a sense of proportion as much as a sense of scale; it reflected the art
by which a relationship was established between the various elements of a
nation's strength and its willingness to act. And henceforth this will be
the challenge of the nuclear period for American strategy. Any discussion of
methods to overcome or mitigate the dilemmas of strategy in the nuclear age
must therefore begin with a discussion of the components of strategy in general.
Although there exist as many definitions as books on the subject, it may be
useful to state five principles against which to test any proposed solutions:

1. Strategy must seek to determine the opponent's likely mode of action in devising its weapons system and its tactical doctrine. A weapons system cannot be developed in the abstract; it reflects a set of assumptions about the nature of the war in which it will be employed, and these assumptions will also underlie military training, the purpose of which is to permit an effective response to the widest range of circumstances. The effectiveness of the response depends on establishing the patterns of behavior of combat in advance of actual hostilities because the confusion of battle permits only a minimum number of improvisations. Tactical doctrine therefore seeks to anticipate in training and through indoctrination the contingencies which will be confronted in combat.

As a result, the advantage conferred by surprise is not so much the
ability to confront the opponent with overwhelming force, as the opportunity of
presenting unexpected contingencies. "Nothing is easier to effect" said
Machiavelli'than what the enemy thinks you will never attempt to do." An
unexpected mode of action forces improvisation; it therefore deprives the

["unprecedented mode of action forces improvement; it therefore derives its\nbenefits from the enemy drinks you will never attempt to do. An\noutstanding example of this principle is the advance of the enemy.\nMacArthur, in his book, says, \"Nothing is easier to effect, and\nadvisability to conduct the opponent with overwhelming force, as the\nopportunity of the enemy is not so much the difficulty to conduct\nthe combat in the enemy's country.\" The enemy, in his turn, has\nthe advantage of the enemy, which is not so much the difficulty to\nconduct the combat in the enemy's country, as the opportunity of\nthe enemy drinks you will never attempt to do. An\noutstanding example of this principle is the advance of the enemy.\nMacArthur, in his book, says, \"Nothing is easier to effect, and\nadvisability to conduct the opponent with overwhelming force, as the\nopportunity of the enemy is not so much the difficulty to conduct\nthe combat in the enemy's country, as the opportunity of the\nenEMY DRINKS YOU WILL NEVER ATTEMPT TO DO. AN\nUNEXPECTED MODE OF ACTION FORCES IMPROVEMENT; IT THEREFORE DERIVES ITS\nBENEFITS FROM THE ENEMY DRINKS YOU WILL NEVER ATTEMPT TO DO. AN\nUNEXPECTED MODE OF ACTION FORCES IMPROVEMENT; IT THEREFORE DERIVES ITS\nBENEFITS FROM

VI-3

opponent of the advantage of sober calculation. Moreover, while improvisation for the individual may inhibit only his best performance, in a group or organization, it may produce more serious consequences. An organization is distinguished from a collection of individuals by its ability to act purposefully as a unit; it does so by reducing most problems to routine--a standard of average performance. Thus the other members of the group are enabled to take certain patterns of behavior for granted and to adjust their actions accordingly. A great momentum is conferred by coupling the specialization of functions with cooperative effort. This in turn frees energies for the solution of problems which are not routine and for pushing forward areas of knowledge or of competence.

The test of any organization then is twofold: (1) whether what it defines as routine in fact applies to the problems it is most likely to confront; (2) whether the attempt to achieve predictability does not inhibit creativity or spontaneous reactions to unexpected contingencies. The two problems are in fact closely related. If the area of the predictable compared to the unexpected is relatively large, the unforeseen can be integrated into existing patterns of leadership; then mental energies can be devoted to the creative and spontaneous solutions of new problems. If an organization is confronted by too many unexpected contingencies, however, its leadership will no longer be able to draw strength from the cooperative effort; on the contrary, the routine on which its action is based may inhibit adaptation; the machinery for making decisions may become overloaded. In extreme cases, members of the group may take independent action and thus increase the indeterminacy of the over-all performance. Or it may lead to panic: the inability to make any response to a challenge except by fleeing from it.

from it.

basic: the indi-finity to make any response to a challenge except by facing
increase the indeterminacy of the over-all performance. Or it may feed to
extreme cases, members of the group may take independent action and thus
adaptation: the machinery for making decisions may become overloaded. In
effort: on the contrary, the routine on which its action is based may indisturb
federated will no longer be able to draw around from the cooperative
organization is confronted by too many unexposed contingencies, however, if
devoted to the creative and spontaneous solutions of new problems. It is
grated into existing patterns of leadership; then mental energies can be
compared to the unexposed in relatively large, the aforementioned can be inter-
proved are in fact largely reflected. If the area of the predictable
creativity or spontaneous reactions to unexposed contingencies. The two
contront: (2) whether the attempt to achieve predictability does not indisturb
delays as routine in fact applies to the problems if it is most likely to
The test of any organization then is twofold: (1) whether when it
knows or of competence.

solution of problems which are not routine and for handling forward areas of
or functions with cooperative effort. This in turn raises three energies for the
accordingly. A great momentum is conferred by coupling the specialization
take certain patterns of behavior for granted and to actualize their actions
of average performances. Thus the other members of the group are enabled to
fully as a unit; it does so by reducing most problems to routine--a standard
distinguished from a collection of individuals by its adility to not purpose-
organization, if may produce more serious consequences. An organization is
for the individual may indisturb only his best performance, in a group or
opponent of the advantage of superior opinion. However, while improvisation

VI-3

VI-4

The prerequisite of effective organized response then is a concept of the challenge to which strategy is to be directed. The Romans stampeded when they first confronted Hannibal's elephants. This was not because the elephants were a decisive weapon by themselves; it was simply that the Romans had never considered a mode for dealing with the military use of elephants, and their panic reflected their inability to react as a group. Within a few years they had learned to master the charges of the beasts by discipline rather than through flight; the elephants henceforth became part of the expected mode of warfare, a contingency against which to prepare like any other. Similarly, the German tank thrusts in 1940 demoralized the French above all because such rapid maneuver had been explicitly rejected by French doctrine; it therefore appeared "unnatural" to French commanders: they did not possess a mode of action for dealing with it. Thus a weapons system by itself is useless if it cannot be applied to contingencies which are likely to be confronted and if it is not related to a notion of the kind of war in which it will probably be employed.

2. The second postulate is a corollary of the first: **strategy should seek to make the actions of the opponent as predictable as possible.** There are two ways of achieving predictability: by understanding the opponent's behavior or by creating a calculus of risks which will induce him to adopt a desired course of action and which will at the least reduce his options. The former is the passive, the latter the active aspect of predictability. To be sure, it is dangerous in either case to ascribe to the opponent one's own notions of what constitutes rational behavior, particularly if the two sides exhibit different cultural patterns or domestic structures. Nevertheless, an

["exhibit different cultural patterns or domestic structures. Nevertheless, the two sides of the same issue are dangerous in either case to the success of the two sides. To former as the basic, the latter the active side of predictability. To a desired course of action and which will at the least reduce his options. The behavior or, by creating a circumstance of right which will induce him to adopt a two ways of achieving predictability: by understanding the opponent's reaction to make the options of the opponent as favourable as possible. There are some basic points to be observed in the discussion. The second point is that the basic points are to be observed in order to achieve the two sides of the same issue. If it is dangerous in either case to achieve the two sides of the same issue, it is dangerous in order to achieve the two sides of the same issue. It is dangerous in order to achieve the two sides of the same issue, it is dangerous in order to achieve the two sides of

VI-5

any society is capable of only a limited range of responses to a challenge.
This is because the condition of group activity is a degree of predictability
of the behavior of society both towards its components and towards other
groups. A society which behaves completely unpredictably will appear
arbitrary to its members and is dangerous to other groups. It is possible
of course that a society behaves predictably towards its citizens and erratically
towards other societies. To the extent that it does so, it will not lose social
cohesiveness, but it may lose international standing; towards a society
which behaves unpredictably in its international relations other states can
find security only through superior power; relations between it and the rest
of the international community tend to be based on force or the threat of
force. However, from the point of view of strategy, where force already
reigns supreme, unpredictability is an asset because it complicates enemy
calculations. It has been argued that the chief deterrent of the United
States is not so much our power as our unpredictability.

No society can behave totally unpredictably, however, for government
cannot function without a pattern of continuity. Strategy should seek, there-
fore, to discover the opponent's pattern of behavior and channel it in the
most favorable direction. This is all the more important because ultimately
strategy resolves itself into a balancing of risks. Were it possible to be
preponderantly strong everywhere and were this strength always coupled with
the willingness to use it, strategy would be equivalent to assembling
overwhelming power. And this indeed is how it has presented itself to us
in the past. But at the precise moment when the problems of strategy have
become global, it has also become impossible to assemble a strategically
significant over-all superiority. In seeking to defend a perimeter of 20
thousand miles, it is not feasible to be protected against all contingencies.

Significant over-all superfluity. In seeking to defend a parameter of 30

become focal, it has also become impossible to assemble a strategy which

in the past. But as the precise moment when the importance of strategy has

overcome power. And this indeed is not what he presented itself to us

the willingness to use it, strategy would be equivalent to manufacturing

prejudicially against everybody, and were this strategy combined with

strategy resolved itself into a balancing of risks. Here it possible to be

most favorable direction. That is all the more important because it is

there to discover the opposite pattern of behavior and eliminate it. In the

No society can survive successfully, however, for government

causations. It has been argued just fine whether determinant of the United

regime is supreme, unpredictability is an asset because it constitutes enemy

force. However, from the point of view of strategy, where force is ally

find security only throughширerewards; relations between it and the rest

which deviate unpredictably from the international relations other states can

coincidence, but it may face international standing; towards a society

towards other societies. To the extent that it does so, it will not face social

or cause that a society deviates predictably towards the citizens and erratically

of course that a society devotes itself entirely to other groups. If it bottles

up. A society which deviates completely without anyone

to the behavior of society does not forward its components and towards other

that is because the condition of group activity is a degree of predictability

only society is capable of only a limited range of responses to a challenge.

A-1-2

V2-6

To attempt to do so can lead only to a dispersion of resources physically or psychologically. "He who defends everything" said Frederick the Great, "defends nothing." Thus strategy can only channel the opponent's moves; it can rarely stalemate all of them. It must therefore choose the areas of greatest concern and the ground where the stand should be taken. In these terms a policy of deterrence involves a balancing of risks according to which aggression, on every calculation, must be made to seem to involve a net loss. If military moves are foreclosed to the other side, the struggle with the Soviet bloc will not be finished, but it may occur on a less cataclysmic plane. In the more likely contingency that only certain moves can be foreclosed, strategy should at least seek to channel the remaining Soviet options into areas which are strategically unproductive.

3. The third postulate is the reverse of the first; if it is advantageous not to be surprised, it is equally profitable strategically to seek to confront the enemy with unforeseen contingencies or ambiguous choices. Surprise can be both military and psychological. Militarily it has two aspects: the unexpected timing and the unexpected nature of the conduct of operations. An enemy may be aware of the probable nature of a military move, but he can still be caught off guard by its timing--the secret of Napoleon's successes was that he confused his enemies by the rapidity of his maneuvers. Conversely, it is possible to be aware that an attack is imminent and yet to be found unprepared by its nature--as happened to us at Pearl Harbor. We knew that the Japanese were planning a military move but our plans did not foresee an attack on Hawaii. The Japanese success would have been impossible without the advantage of surprise.

VI-7

Psychologically the task of strategy is to present the opponent with as many ambiguous choices as possible. For war has two components: a hostile intention and a hostile capability. A military capability is useless unless it is coupled with the will to employ it. Conversely a superior willingness to run risks can compensate to a certain extent for an inferior military capability. History is replete with examples of nations who grew because they outwilled their opponents--the growth of Rome or Prussia from insignificant beginnings can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address itself to two equations: a physical and a psychological one. The material balance determines the feasibility of measures, the psychological equation their nature and the willingness to act.

The temptation of American strategy is to concern itself only with military capability because traditionally we have fought our wars only against overwhelming threats which left no scope for ambiguity and because our victories had been produced as much by our productive capacity as by superior strategic skill. Conversely the Soviets have been extremely skillful in taking advantage of the psychological component of strategy. Wherever we have had a superior military capability they have sought to paralyze the intention to use it as with their campaign to ban nuclear weapons which has attempted to attach a special stigma to atomic warfare, the warfare we are best prepared to fight. And whenever they have presented a challenge, they have done so ambiguously either by leaving doubt about their ultimate intention or by posing risks out of proportion to the issue at dispute or by presenting their claim as the expression of a "legitimate grievance" to be assuaged by individual concessions. To the extent that their aims have been obscure they have furnished us an incentive to defer a show-down to

["oppose them, they have furnished an incentive to depart a direction to\npresent their claims as the expression of a \"legitimate prejudice,\" to be\npresented thereon, and by making risks out of proportion to the base of\ntheir claims. And whenever they have presented a challenge, they\nattended to attach a special attention to atomic issues, the warlike we are\nintended to use, as with their own weapons which can be used by\npresenting a superior military capability, they have sought to paralyze the\nmilitary capability because traditionally we have found them only\nagainst overwhelming enemies which felt no scope for weakness and because\nour victories had been brought as much by our productive capacity as by\nthe power of our military capability. Conversely the Soviet have been extremely\nsuperior in strategic efficiency. Conversely the Japanese have been extremely\nindefeasible in their advantage of the bayological component of strategy.\nHowever, the American strategy is so concerned itself only with\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the material and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nitself to two questions: a physical and a bayological one. The material\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntherefore determines a feasibility of measurement, the bayological equation\n\nbegins with the question of measurement, the bayological equation,\n\ntheir nature and the influences to act.\n\nThe temptation of Americans strategy is to concern itself only with\n\nthe bayological side of strategy. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities. History is replete with examples of nations who drew conclusions from the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\noutwitted their opponents--the growth of home or transats from intangible\n\ncapabilities can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address\n\nbeginnings to the

VI-8

a more propitious moment or to a clearer case. Or else they have forced
us to provide against a maximum number of contingencies. This illustrates
the advantage of initiative: every successful move carries with it the
possibility of several others; it therefore forces the opponent into defending
against an ever-growing number of threats; if carried far enough it will reduce
his strategy to sterility by absorbing all his energies in countermoves.

4. The strategy should be adopted which uses their own advantages to best benefit. Just as it is not possible to be strong everywhere so no nation can be superior in every strategically significant category. As a result, strategy must seek to determine the elements of its own superiority and attempt to force the enemy to fight a war where these can be used to greatest advantage. A technologically inferior nation should seek to choose a terrain or a mode of war where manpower can be substituted for material. A seapower will be strongest in regions which can be affected by navies such as islands or continental peninsulas--this indeed was the strategy of Great Britain for over a century. A power which has a superior military establishment may utilize its advantage by fighting before its enemy has mobilized. A nation which has vast territories may trade space for time--as has been the Soviet strategy against both "apoleon and Hitler. A nation which is impotent militarily may seek to use its negotiating skill to escape the consequences of its weakness--this was the Chinese strategy for a century before the Communist revolution.

Thus strategy should seek to utilize its advantages by forcing the
enemy to fight at a time of its choosing, or at a place of its choosing, or
with methods of its choosing. And in the thermo-nuclear age a new dimension
has been added: it is now part of a proper strategy: to make the enemy fight
with a weapons system of one's choosing. When weapons technology was

with a weapons station of one's choosing. Which weapon technology was
not adopted: if it is now part of a proper strategy, to make the enemy fight
with methods of its choosing. And in the thermo-nuclear age a new dimension
enemy to fight at a time of its choosing, or at a place of its choosing, or
This strategy should seek to utilize its advantages by forcing the
Communist revolution.

of its economy--this was the Chinese strategy for a century before the
militarily may seek to use its negotiating ability to escape the consequences
Soviet strategy against both 

Britain for over a century. A power which has a superior military strength
as far as continental power--this indeed was the strategy of Great
A seapower will be strongest in regions which can be selected by states and
a terrain or a mode of war where manpower can be applied for materiel.

greatest advantage. A technologically inferior nation should seek to choose
and attempt to force the enemy to fight a war where these can be used to
win, strategy must seek to determine the elements of its own authority
nation can be superior in every strategyically significant category. As a
to what benefit, that is if it is not possible to be strong everywhere so no
4. The strategy should be adopted which fight one's advantages
the strategy to aerify by describing all the energies in countermeasures
against an ever-growing number of threats: it carried far enough if it will reduce
possibility of several others: if therefore forces the opponent into defending
the advantage of initiatives: every successful move carries with it the
use to provide against a maximum number of contingencies. This illustrates
a more advantageous moment or to a greater case. Or else they have forces
VI-8

VI-9

relatively stable, the choice of weapons systems was dictated by its avail-
ability. Today, however, there exist weapons systems ranging from conventional
weapons of high complexity, to nuclear weapons with destructive powers from
a kiloton and below to megaton weapons of no inherent upper limit. Each of
these weapons systems, or their combination, has its own consequences for
strategy. An all-out war fought with thermo-nuclear weapons would reduce
the importance of industrial potential; it, therefore, gives relative advantage
to the side with inferior resources as long as it can create a force-in-being
adequate to inflict catastrophic blows on its opponent. The crucial decision
for our strategy is therefore the selection of a weapons system that will
prevent war from assuming the character of a national catastrophe but
which at the same time utilizes the national resources or special abilities
to best advantage. The degree to which these two objectives are reconciled
will give a maximum flexibility to both diplomacy and to strategy.

5. If two strategies are available to achieve the same objective the less costly one should be chosen. This principle is almost at the level of common sense: it implies no more than that national policy should aim for its objectives without paying an exorbitant price. It is the classic principle of the economy of force. The cost of a strategy is determined by two related factors: the nature of objectives and the destructiveness of the weapons systems employed. The more unlimited the objective, the more costly the war, at least against a major enemy. For a war ends only when acceptances of peace terms seem more advantageous or less costly than continued resistance; the more total the victory sought, the more absolute the alternatives which have to be posed. Conversely, the greater the destructiveness of weapons, the

Conversely, the greater the destructive force of weapons, the
the more fatal the victory amounts, the more adequate the alternatives which have
of, because forces seem more advantageous or less costly than continued recalcitrance;
the war at least against a major enemy. On a war ends only when acceptance
of weapons systems employed. This more unlimited the objective, the more costly
two related factors: the nature of objectives and the destructive effect of the
principle of the economy of force. The cost of a strategy is determined by
the objectives without paying an excessive price. If the objective
of common sense: it implies no more than that national policy should aim for
the fairest cost. One should be chosen. This principle is almost at the level
of strategy, but it is available to states, too. If two strategies are available to achieve the same objective
will give a maximum flexibility to both diplomacy and to strategy.
To bear advantage to which these two objectives are reconciled
which at the same time willise the national resources or special difficulties
behind war from assuming the character of a national catastrophe but
for our strategy is therefore the selection of a weapons system that will
absorb to inflict catastrophic damage on the opponent. The crucial decision
to the side with inferior resources as found as it can create a force-in-dealing
the importance of industrial potential; if, therefore, gives relative advantage
strategically. An effort-out war fought with thermo-nuclear weapons would reduce
the weapons system, or their combination, into an consequence for
a kiloton and below to medium weapons of no inherent danger. Right of
weapons of high complexity, to nuclear weapons with destructive powers from


VI-3

VI-10

more unlimited the objectives of the war tend to become. The more intense
the suffering, the more extreme the peace terms. If a nation can no longer
profit from war, it will tend to derive at least the degree of consolation
conferred by the humiliation of the opponent. The costliness of war is
therefore determined by the degree to which a balance is established between
its objectives and the weapons systems employed. A war of annihilation
fought with weapons of small destructiveness may turn into an exhausting
war of attrition--as happened in the religious wars of the 17th century. A
war for initially limited objectives that inflicts enormous suffering will
soon assume a total character--as was the case with World War I. Thus the
prerequisite of effective strategy is a clear understanding of the national
purpose and the development of a weapons system which is adequate to achieve it.

["VI-10", " purposes and the development of a program which is adequate to achieve it. The more objectives of the program tend to become more satisfied by the administration of the opposite party. The achievement of this end is the chief objective of the program. The more explicit the program is, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The administration of the program must be satisfied that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the program, the more objectives of the program are achieved, the more difficult it will be to achieve at least the degree of concurrence which is necessary to assure the achievement of the program's objectives. The more objectives of the program are achieved, the more satisfied the administration will be that the program is being fully administered and that the objectives of the program are being achieved. A program which is not fully administered will not achieve its objectives. As a result of the administration of the

II

VI-11

The five postulates of strategy thus fall into three groups: the first two deal with the consequence of the enemy's actions; the next two involve the flexibility of one's own behavior; the third determines the cost to be paid. The art of strategy is to establish a balance between these considerations in creating a doctrine where power and the willingness to use it are most in harmony.

The reliance on all-out nuclear war inhibits the establishment of this balance, however. By insisting on a single method for dealing with every challenge, it seeks to escape the necessity for gearing strategy to the likely danger or for establishing a relationship between objectives and the force appropriate for them. Its assertion that every threat can be dealt with by overpowering force on the basis of purely military considerations reflects the lessons of our history which has never known a mortal external danger and which has always sought to identify strategic superiority with overwhelming strength.

The very power of modern weapons has made it very difficult, however, to assemble a strategically significant superiority against a major enemy and this in turn has brought into sharp focus the basic problem of strategy in the nuclear age: the relationship between a policy of deterrence and the strategy we are prepared to implement should deterrence fail. A policy of deterrence, moreover, is peculiarly dependent on an assessment of the opponent's intentions and mode of behavior. Since its aim is to keep the opponent from taking action, it must convey to the aggressor that any military move will involve a net loss. And

aggressor that any military move will involve a net loss. And
is to keep the opponent from taking action, it must convey to the
of the opponent's intentions and mode of behavior. Since its aim
deterrence, moreover, is beneficially dependent on an assessment
are prepared to implement should deterrence fail. A policy of
relationship between a policy of deterrence and the strategy we
focus the basic problem of strategy in the nuclear age: the re-
against a major enemy and this in turn has brought into sharp
cult, however, to assume a strategically significant superiority

The very power of modern weapons has made it very difficult
identity, strategic superiority with overwhelming strength.
known a mortal external danger and which has always sought to
siderations reflects the lessons of our history which has never
with by overpowering force on the basis of purely military con-
briate for them. Its assertion that every threat can be dealt
causing a relationship between objectives and the force appro-
necessity for bearing strategy to the likely danger or for ea-
method for dealing with every challenge, it seeks to escape the
iltment of this balance, however. By initiating on a single
The reliance on all-out nuclear war inhibits the eating
it are most in harmony.

The reliance on all-out nuclear war inhibits the eating
it are most in harmony.
in creating a doctrine where power and the willingness to use
strategy is to establish a balance between these considerations
favor; the third determines the cost to be paid. The art of
action; the next two involve the flexibility of one's own pe-
atura: the first two deal with the consequence of the enemy's

II

A1-11

VI-41

But is it possible to bring about a climate in which national survival is thought not to be at stake? Pressures severe enough to cause withdrawal may, after all, be severe enough to be thought to threaten survival, especially in a regime like that in Soviet Russia. On the other hand, the problem is not how to reassure the Soviets, which is probably a well-nigh impossible effort, but how to give effect to the one interest we presumably have in common: that we both wish to avoid all-out thermo-nuclear war. Given this attitude, total war is likely in only two contingencies: if the Soviets see an opportunity to achieve hegemony in Eurasia by peripheral actions which we are not able to deal with by a graduated employment of force; or if the U.S.S.R. should misunderstand our intentions and treat our every military move as if it were the prelude to an all-out war.

It therefore becomes the task of our diplomacy to convey to the Soviet bloc that we are capable of courses other than all-out war or inaction, and that we intend to use this capability. Fortunately, the imbalance in our national strategy has been caused less by our diplomacy than by our military policy. Indeed, our difficulty has been precisely the fact that our moderate pronouncements have seemed incongruous in the face of an all-or-nothing military policy and that our diplomacy has been deprived of flexibility because "massive retaliation" has had as its logical corollary the slogan "there is no alternative to peace." A modification of our military doctrine would therefore go a long way towards creating a framework of limited objectives; the next step would be to convey this change to the outside world and to the Soviet bloc.

This raises immediately the question which has been at the root of many of our pronouncements with respect to the course of action we propose to follow in case of Soviet aggression: the degree of ambiguity desirable. There has been a general belief that a degree of ambiguity about our intentions is a

VI-42

factor of deterrence because the aggressor cannot be certain that an attack will not involve an all-out response. We have therefore carefully refrained from announcing which areas we proposed to defend locally or what strategy we would pursue in case we did engage in limited war. But the ambiguity of our statements which seeks to keep our options open may cause us to inherit the worst of both worlds. It may cause the aggressor to believe that aggression will involve only local resistance for why else would we qualify our announcements of massive retaliation? If then we react totally, our ambiguity will have encouraged a perhaps unnecessary all-out war. On the other hand, an aggressor interprets our ambiguity as a token of our reliance on an all-out strategy, he may treat every U.S. counter-move to aggression as a prelude to all-out war and deal with it accordingly. The ambiguity of our pronouncements therefore introduces an element of instability no matter how it is interpreted. As a result, just as we have to moderate the sanctions of deterrence in order to mitigate the consequences of war should deterrence fail, we may have to make our intentions explicit to avail the penalties of misunderstanding.

To be sure, a diplomatic program which seeks to sketch the political and psychological framework of limited war will not inevitably prevent an all-out war. If the Soviets feel strong enough to knock us out by surprise attack, they will presumably do so -- and no effort should therefore be spared to maintain the level of all-out war capability described in the previous chapter. But it may prevent an all-out war caused by our failure to develop alternatives or by Soviet miscalculation or misunderstanding of our intentions.

The same program which may reduce the danger of miscalculation would also go a long way towards educating public opinion in the realities of the nuclear period. This is of course less of a problem in the Soviet bloc where the absolutism of dictatorship confers a much greater freedom of action. In the

VI-43

Western world, however, and particularly in the United States, a considerable
change in the concept of war is required. It is important not only for our
leadership to understand that total victory is no longer possible but also for
the public to become aware of the dangers of pressing for such a course. A
long history of invulnerability causes our public opinion to look at war more
in terms of the damage we can inflict than in terms of the losses we might
suffer and to react to frustration abroad by a demand for absolute solutions. It
is the essence of a policy of limited war, on the other hand, that there are
no final answers; and this is not the result of a policy but of necessity. The
public must therefore be made aware that our real option is not between a
strategy of all-out or of limited war, but between a strategy of limited war or
inaction. It would be tragic if our government were deprived of its freedom of
maneuver by the ignorance on the part of the public of the consequences of a
course of action before which they would recoil were they aware of all its
implications; all the more so as the same ignorance which underlies the demand
for all-or-nothing solutions may also produce panic in the face of the
unexpected consequences of thermo-nuclear war. Conversely a public made aware
of the dangers confronting it and given a measure of security by an adequate
civil defense program will furnish a better support for the measures our
leadership deems necessary.

VII

But whatever the theoretical advantages of peripheral actions, are they
practically feasible? Does not a policy of limited war run counter to the
geographic realities, specifically that the Soviet bloc possesses interior
lines of communication and can therefore assemble a superior force at any given
point? Can we afford a policy of limited war or will it not exceed our resources

VI-44

as surely as all-out thermo-nuclear war? Does not this concern with local
resistance mistake the real problem in major areas which is internal develop-
ment and political instability?

It must be admitted that we alone cannot possibly defend the Soviet
periphery by local actions and that the present period of revolutionary change
will not be managed by a military doctrine alone. Our task must be to shore
up the indigenous will to resist which in the underdeveloped third of the world
means all the measures on which a substantial consensus seems to exist: a
political program to gain the confidence of local populations and to remove the
stigma of colonialism from us, together with the degree of economic assistance
which will help bring about political stability. But though a political program
may be essential, it will prove useless without an increase in our capacity for
local defense. We always seem in danger of focussing so much attention on the
current Soviet threat that we are taken unaware by the Soviet Union's frequent
changes of tactics. During the period of Soviet militancy we were so pre-
occupied with building defensive barriers that we neglected the supporting
political and psychological framework. And with the Soviet emphasis on more
indirect methods of penetration, we stand in danger of forgetting that economic
development presupposes a modicum of security against foreign invasion. Few
political leaders will run the risk of foreign occupation even though libera-
tion is to follow eventually. The promise of victory in a general war will
mean little to the leader of a country which meanwhile is Sovietized. For us the
crucial victory is the last, but for the leaders of the countries around the
Soviet periphery the fate of their countries will seem to hinge on the first
battle. This was well expressed in an editorial in a leading German newspaper:
"We must oppose any strategy, the basic postulate of which involves giving up

VI-45

our territory. Our partnership in the Atlantic alliance means more to us than
that our 12 divisions represent a strategic asset for the West; it includes a
demand for the protection of the German people... A substantial retreat is
equivalent to our moral and physical destruction."¹⁰)

The argument thus runs in a circle: Can the peripheral areas be defended,
assuming the willingness of the countries concerned to resist and our readiness
to help them? To support a negative answer such factors are cited as the
"unlimited" Soviet manpower or the vast distances of the threatened areas
from the centers of our strength. But while underestimating an adversary may
be disastrous, overestimating his resources may lead to a needless paralysis of
policy. Absolute numbers are important, but only the part which can be utilized
effectively is strategically significant. In these terms Sino-Soviet manpower
is limited by the capacity of the Soviet bloc to equip and train it, and
Chinese effectiveness by the difficulty of communications and supply. The
vision of hordes of Chinese or even Soviet soldiers streaming into what has
come to be known as the "grey areas" is unrealistic. If it were possible to
develop indigenous armies of moderate size but substantial firepower these
should be able to fight delaying actions until the arrival of reinforcements,
particularly if American air power (perhaps carrier-based) were hampering
Chinese movements.

Nor can the Soviets keep pouring in men and supplies so far from their
own centers of production, despite the seemingly contrary lessons of the war in
Korea. After the beginning of the armistice negotiations, the Korean war was
fought under conditions nearly ideal for an army with inferior technology and
air power: actions were always confined to a small segment of the front; they

10) *Frankfurter Allgemeine*. December 2, 1954.

VI-46

could be delayed until there had been an adequate build-up; they could be broken off when stocks were depleted. The risks were always tactical and not strategic; the penalty for failure was limited by the self-imposed restrictions of the armistice negotiations. "Operation Strangle," the attempt of our air force to interdict Chinese communications, therefore did not represent a fair test of the Chinese ability to sustain a major effort over a considerable period of time and in the face of superior air power. The only continuous drain on Chinese supplies occurred after the front was stabilized in March 1951, and from then until the beginning of the armistice negotiations in June the Chinese were much closer to a decisive defeat than we. Had we committed even four more divisions, indeed even if we had put a time limit on the truce negotiations, we might have achieved a substantial military victory.

To be sure, the limitations imposed on the Chinese freedom of manoeuvre by the narrow peninsula and the proximity of our bases in Japan gave us an advantage in Korea which probably could not be duplicated in other areas. On the other hand, certain circumstances were propitious for the Chinese also. Korea was close to their main production centers and the Russian supply lines, and communications between Korea and China were good. Neither of these conditions would be duplicated in, for example, Southeast Asia. We thus might say that these are two prerequisites of effective local action by the United States: indigenous governments of sufficient stability so that the Soviets can take over only by open aggression, and indigenous military forces capable of fighting a delaying action. If these conditions are met, the American contribution to the defense of the "grey areas" will involve the creation of a strategic reserve capable of redressing the balance and of a weapons system capable of translating our technological advantage into local superiority.

VI-47

The most difficult problem will be to develop the weapons system appro-
priate for a limited war. For with the complexity of modern weapons limited war
can generally not be fought by using a part of the strategic retaliatory force.
Even if technically feasible, this would be weakening the main deterrent
against expanding the war. Thus the fact that our forces had been reduced in
the immediate post-war period to levels barely able to undertake retaliatory
blows against the U.S.S.R. were the chief reasons advanced by General Vandenberg
against expanding the Korean war. Moreover, the nature of the weapons, the
training and the concept for their employment differ radically between forces
useful for an all-out war and those which should be ready for a limited war.
The weapons system for all-out war is designed to inflict maximum destruction
and to do so in the shortest possible time. In a limited war, on the other
hand, the weapons system should exhibit discrimination and flexibility. In an
all-out war the targets are known in advance, in fact our SAC crews are training
with mock-ups of Soviet targets in their bomb sights. Everything depends there-
fore on the efficiency with which a pre-planned strike can be launched. ¹¹)
But in a limited war neither the locale of the conflict nor the targets can
be predetermined; everything here depends on the rapidity with which planning
can adjust to a developing situation. In an all-out war, the chief problem is
to deliver the largest increment of destruction as rapidly as possible in order
to eliminate the enemy's retaliatory force before it has done too much damage.
But the problem in limited war is to be able to apply graduated increments of
destruction in phased amounts to keep the war limited and also to permit the
necessary breathing-spaces for political contacts. ¹²)

A weapons system for limited war is therefore a more complex and subtle
problem than to develop a retaliatory force. The requirement for limited wars

11. Richard S. Meryman, Jr. "The Guardians," *Harper's Magazine*. October 1955, p. 39.

12. See Chapter below.

VI-48

is not one all-purpose force which we will always be rightly tempted to conserve
for a major show-down, but units of high mobility and considerable firepower
which can be quickly moved to trouble spots. Given the power of modern weapons
and the speed of movement of military units everything depends on establishing
a position as rapidly as possible because it will be very difficult to dislodge
an enemy once he has become entrenched. Moreover the capability for rapid de-
ployment is crucial for psychological reasons as well. In a real sense, a
limited war is a gauge of the determination of the contenders; in fact, it is
unlikely to occur unless either side doubts either the capability or the willing-
ness of its opponent to resist. An ability to intervene rapidly even with rela-
tively small forces can serve as such a gauge and afford the possibility of
reestablishing an equilibrium before either side becomes too heavily engaged.

It is therefore imperative that each service develop units capable of
fighting local actions and that these units are not considered by the strategic
doctrine as part of the over-all retaliatory force. To be sure, as missiles
become operative, the distinction between weapons suitable mainly for strategic
operations and those of a local nature will diminish in significance. But in
the intermediary period the biggest gap in our defense structure is for forces
capable of fighting local actions. The army is too small and its organization
too cumbersome; the Air Force too preoccupied with all-out war and with a
doctrine of complete air superiority; only the Navy possesses a force capable of
sufficient discrimination, but it is inherently a supporting element, by its
very nature the Navy will be most effective in aiding the other services to
establish an equilibrium on land.

Our army at the moment is too cumbersome and perhaps too small to fight
a limited war and it will probably not be needed in an all-out war. The army
consists of 19 divisions; allowing for trainees only 14 can be said to be ready
for combat. It may be argued that this force does not from the purely military

VI-63

weapons is that they shift the contest to a plane where our technological superiority over the Soviet bloc is at a premium. When the destructiveness of individual weapons is small, the significant attrition of war is in manpower and an increment of manpower introduced into a war may overturn the strategic balance. If the destructiveness of weapons is too large, a relatively few weapons will suffice to establish an equilibrium. But in an intermediary range of destructiveness, weapons are sufficiently complex to require highly trained manpower yet discriminating enough to permit the establishment of a significant margin of superiority.

Thus while the growth of the Soviet strategic air force and nuclear stockpile should cause us to revise our concepts of all-out war, the introduction of nuclear weapons on a battlefield will shake the very basis of Soviet tactical doctrine. No longer will the Soviet bloc be able to rely on massed manpower as in World War II and in Korea. On a nuclear battlefield, dispersion is the key to survival and mobility the prerequisite of success. A great deal depends on leadership of a high order, personal initiative and mechanical aptitude, all qualities in which our military organization probably excels that of the U.S.S.R. To attempt to defend a perimeter like that of the Soviet bloc with conventional forces would impose a staggering drain on our manpower and would likely produce casualties far exceeding those of a short sharp nuclear war. Moreover, in a limited war the ability to establish an equilibrium rapidly is itself a factor of limitation. Small, highly mobile units of very great firepower which impose a large measure of dispersal on the enemy offer a better means of achieving this than the much more cumbersome conventional forces.

It may be true, as is frequently argued, that a nuclear war also requires substantial manpower and that its net effect may well involve an expansion of our

VI-64

military establishment. The significant point, however, is not the quantity of manpower, but where this manpower is utilized: in a conventional war manpower is required to establish an equilibrium on the battlefield. In a nuclear war, it is needed in supporting technical units. Nuclear war would therefore enable us to utilize our large reservoir of technically trained manpower to best advantage; for despite great strides the U.S.S.R. has made in the training of scientists and technicians in recent years, there can be little doubt that on the over-all balance the Free World possesses an infinitely larger pool of technically trained manpower; and the disparity in the familiarity with technology on the part of the mass of the population which may prove even more important is more pronounced still. To be sure, our technological superiority may be fleeting; with the spread of nuclear power technology many nations may come to possess plutonium and thereby the werewithal to make nuclear weapons. But it is one thing to master the manufacture of nuclear weapons; it is quite another to develop the whole range of supporting paraphenalia: the electronics for control, the light planes for maneuverability, the complex interrelationship between fire and movement. The history of the Soviet arms deal with Egypt illustrates the difficulty of technologically backward nations in operating even complicated conventional equipment. Even should a rough balance in technical manpower and competence exist in time, this would do no more than establish an equilibrium; nuclear war favors the defensive and it is therefore to our net advantage since we are more likely to resist than to initiate aggression. The possibility of a military stalemate all around the Soviet periphery would represent a net strategic advantage for us.

Nuclear war favors the defensive not only because it facilitates the establishment of an equilibrium but also because it may deprive aggression of one of its objectives: to control territory. The same esoteric quality which

VI-65

we have seen to characterize all-out thermo-nuclear war, will tend to distinguish limited nuclear war as well. Small, highly mobile units will be excellent tools for fighting their enemy counterparts; they are not efficient means for controlling territory or for rapid strikes to destroy important objectives. The experience of the Hungarian revolution demonstrates the difficulty of a highly mechanized army of controlling even against a practically unarmed population.

In the event the Red Army had to concentrate fifteen armored divisions to occupy a territory without modern arms. Such a concentration against an army equipped with nuclear weapons would be disastrous, however. Thus if nuclear units of high mobility to control the countryside are supported by more stationary types of organizations to man hedgehogs and to prevent a sudden coup against the cities a very difficult problem is posed for an aggressor. From the military point of view he requires highly mobile, small units. From the point of view of controlling territory against a hostile population or even one covered with fortified hedgehogs he requires massive forces. Against a determined enemy it will be very difficult to combine these two objectives; a determined defensive should be able to keep the aggressor constantly off balance by never permitting him to consolidate any gain. And if this is coupled with rapid thrusts by small units deep into enemy territory which, in Europe at least, can be assumed to be hostile to the U.S.S.R. the Soviets might soon face a perhaps untenable situation. The purpose of mobile units in a limited nuclear war would be to disorganize the enemy's rear through the sudden destruction of key installations and the creation of centers of resistance. Our technological superiority, the superior initiative of our people, and the greater social cohesiveness of the Free World should give us a decided advantage in a limited nuclear war. Limited nuclear war would therefore be conducted by small, highly mobile units; its analogy is not traditional land warfare, but naval warfare where self-contained units of high

VI-68

result, a much more substantial degree of dispersion of troops than envisaged in
any previous war will be required to prevent one nuclear weapon from inflicting
exorbitant casualties. And dispersion must be coupled with a high degree of
mobility so that a target is not stationary long enough to invite attack. The
army is currently thinking in terms of battalions spaced more than two miles
apart so that a Hiroshima-type bomb would not be able to destroy more than one
batallion at a time.

Two consequences result: the great dispersion of a nuclear battlefield
makes it impossible to think any longer of a continuous front. The task of
denying territory to an enemy must be accomplished by preventing him from
assembling sufficient force to control it. Dispersal henceforth must be not
only between units but also in depth, with small detachments capable of making
rapid penetrations and equally rapid departures. The second conclusion involves
the consequences of mobility. Current army planning envisions helicopters
capable of carrying ____ men and small field guns, the "flying platform" which
enables an individual to move through the air in a rudimentary fashion for a
distance of ____ miles at a speed of ____ miles. Vertical take-off aircraft
will confer tactical mobility independent of the availability of airfields. Every
 combat team will soon be equipped with missiles of ranges between 10 to 400 miles
capable of carrying nuclear warheads. And sophisticated communications systems
permit coordinated action of widely dispersed units.²¹)

These measures, while useful, only constitute a beginning. The ultimate
aim must be to create units which carry the analogy of naval warfare even further.
They should be self-contained both with respect to their supply and their mainte-
nance. Since they will operate without a logistic system in the traditional

21. Symington Hearings, p. (Lt. General Gavin).

VI-69

sense and often deep inside enemy territory, they should be able to repair their own equipment and to support themselves from their own supplies. They would therefore approximate a naval vessel as a tactical formation and like a naval vessel they should be able by their very existence and mobility to deny the control of vast areas to an enemy. Since they will be operating in populated regions they will also have to be trained in an understanding of political relationships, hitherto thought outside military concerns. To the extent that they are able to distinguish friend from foe and to draw the consequences from it, they will complicate enemy moves and the reverse would equally be true. The experience of Hungary has shown the difficulty of sustaining warfare against determined civilian resistance. A few U.S. units with the fire-power, mobility and discrimination described here might have made the Soviet position untenable.²²

In this type of warfare many of the targets of traditional warfare have ceased to be strategically productive. One of the reasons for the estimates of high casualties is the belief that in a nuclear war cities would be hit with atomic weapons,³ But this literal application of the tactics appropriate to conventional war does not follow. In conventional war the large number of troops, their cumbersome equipment and the complicated logistic system confined most movement to road or rail. In these circumstances, it made sense to attempt to interdict maneuver by bombing transportation centers. But when units achieve the degree of mobility envisaged by the armies of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. the bombardment of communication centers may prove unnecessary and militarily unproductive. And on the battlefield, dispersion and mobility should be used to set an upper limit to the size of weapons it is profitable to employ.

22. I am indebted to Dr. Edward Teller for some of these ideas.

VI-70

Military formations can thus be protected by the uncertainty of the enemy regarding their location.

It may be objected that whatever the rate of casualties among troops the losses suffered by the civilian population will be enormous because of the necessity of gaining air superiority and the proximity of airfields to centers of population in densely populated Western Europe. Neither the need for air supremacy nor the bombing of airfields are as inevitable as classic air strategy maintains, however. The concept of air supremacy by bombing air fields is itself a symptom of an obsolescent strategy. It was valid only so long as it was more economical to destroy a plane on the ground than in the air, as long, in short, as planes had to be concentrated on a relatively few bases for efficient operation. But the concurrent development of vertical take-off aircraft and anti-aircraft missiles seem to make the destruction of planes in flight at least as economical as the destruction of airfields. Against vertical take-off aircraft there will be no runway left to crater or concentration of planes to hit; it will be possible to achieve almost the degree of dispersion where one weapon can destroy only one plane (which is exactly the relation which obtains in attacking a plane in flight). And within ten years anti-aircraft missiles can make the life of any manned plane exceedingly difficult. In such a situation, tactical air support will have changed its meaning: it will either be accomplished by missiles or by vertical take-off aircraft. It will then become meaningless to speak of air supremacy in the traditional sense. Missile launching sites can be so dispersed and they can be made so mobile that it will be very difficult to locate them and impossible to destroy them all. This is not to say that nuclear war will not be costly, only that its cost should be weighed against the tactics appropriate to it. In any case, compared to the casualties of an all-out thermonuclear war those produced by a limited nuclear war would still appear mild.

VI-71

Limited nuclear war becomes attractive only compared to the cataclysm which a
total war would produce.

One other aspect of limited nuclear war must be considered: the premium
it places on surprise attack both for psychological as well as for strategic
reasons. It is important psychologically because if the fighting can be trans-
ferred into the opponent's territory, his inhibitions against using nuclear
weapons will be magnified by the concern for his own population. The psycho-
logical balance in the use of nuclear weapons thus favors the aggressor -- a
point explicitly recognized in Soviet doctrine.²³) And the psychological
importance is reinforced by considerations of strategy. In an all-out war a
surprise attack will prove strategically unproductive if it cannot reduce the
counterblow to unacceptable proportions. And as we have seen this will become
increasingly difficult to accomplish. But in limited war a sudden thrust and a
rapid consolidation may permit the aggressor to assume the defensive to hold
what he just captured. And the defensive in a limited nuclear war has a decided
advantage. The rewards for initiative are therefore greater in limited nuclear
war than even in conventional war. For this reason, the side whose doctrine
yields the first blow to its opponent must pay particular attention that both
its military capability and its process for arriving at decisions permit it to
act rapidly enough to prevent the aggressor from consolidating his gain. It is
the paradoxical consequence of a period when technology has never been more
complicated that its effectiveness depends to such an extent on intangibles: on
the subtlety of the leadership and on its conception of alternatives.

23. See below, Chapter