Curtis Brown, Ltd. 575 Madison Avenue, New York 10022 PLaza 5-4200

Alan C. Collins, President
Perry H. Knowlton, Vice President
Nellie Sukerman, Secretary

April 6, 1965

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I saw George Brockway and Donald Lamb of Norton this afternoon, asking them specific questions in order to see if they would be as effective under certain circumstances as would be Little, Brown or Harcourt, Brace and World. I am convinced that they would be. They will emphasize your work both as a trade book and a college textbook even to the point of publishing the relevant trade aspects in a separate trade edition. This is a very fluid process almost impossible under houses more departmentalized--as is the case both with Harcourt and Little, Brown.

Norton are convinced that they will give thorough coverage in all universities where your book can be used. What interested me in our conversation was not so much their coverage right now in political science but how they have handled the freshman English market which is so nebulous and diverse in so many universities. A sizeable number of adoptions come from the lesser and larger schools which takes some skill and dexterity to put a book across. Coverage is easier in your own area where the general need is constant according to course emphasis and the faculty (please don't tell Warren house) has more of a discipline and sophistication. Lamb himself would do the actual editing. I was interested to hear from Brockway that his promotion to a house director was based upon his editorial skills rather than strictly upon author procurement.

The second question I asked and the third I list rests with royalty and where Norton would derive their profits. Every large house works on a formula basis

[LC]

2/ Dr. Henry Kissinger

when computing the costs for sales promotion, advertis-
ing and overhead, as well as production. A higher roy-
alty from Norton will not be drawn from these other
activities, since my suspicions on low office overhead
and so on were confirmed. I am referring to my comment
to you where Norton puts their money into books rather
than extraneous matters. Let me add that this is a
wealthy publisher with a high paid staff.

The questions on sales coverage, editing and also
shaving other activities to meet a royalty I found well-
answered. I'll sum it up by saying that I do not think
you can possibly lose no matter which of the three pub-
lishers you choose. But if coordination editorially be-
tween trade and college becomes a factor, Norton is best
suited so far as I am concerned to handle this aspect.

I find it very heartening to hear from you that
you consider writing an international relations text
as an important undertaking, and that it can very well
possess more influence than a trade book. Most books
intended as textbooks fail because of one or all of the
following reasons: the authors writing them are second-
rate; the authors may possess the content but lack writ-
ing ability or vice versa; the books are intended to
be all things to all students and thereby satisfy none
of them. Setting a standard rather than meeting one,
combining scholarship with lucidity, and presenting
provocative material in an interpretive tone were the
guidelines in the Morgenthau book. It is becoming very
much dated, and yours should be the one to replace it.
You will want a quality publisher with standards similar
to your own. Norton is not lacking in this regard.

As I explained to you, I cannot violate the stand-
ard financial arrangement of 10% over a flat fee, and I
feel you are correct by thinking that such a sum may be
too much for what I could for you on your textbook. But

3/ Dr. Henry Kissinger

do look forward to representing you for your trade work.
Most of my authors are on college campuses but over 75%
of them are engaged solely in books for general reader-
ship. With the handling of translation, representation
in Great Britain, and serialization, the 10% certainly
will be offset for you by the additional income that
otherwise would go to the original publisher.

Let me know about your decision. I hope soon after
we may be able to talk about your trade projects, but I
am glad we did not go into too much detail about them yes-
terday since it seems to me settling your decision over
a publisher for your international relations text is the
first publishing matter on the agenda right now.

I should add that Norton will raise the advance to
any figure you suggest.

GFM/ms

HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON, INC. • PUBLISHERS

383 MADISON AVENUE . . . NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

GENERAL BOOKS

TEXTBOOKS

MAGAZINES

4 January 1965

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Professor Kissinger:

You were kind to call me last week and to tell me about the
International Relations text you are writing. I very much hope
that we can be your publisher.

I have set things in motion here so that a contract will be
coming to you shortly. In the meantime, here are the minimum
terms that it will incorporate: a grant-in-aid outright of
$2500 payable upon delivery of the manuscript; an advance
against royalties of $7500, to be paid in three installments of
$2500 each, the first on signing the contract, the second upon
delivery of the final manuscript, the third upon publication
(of course you may decline or defer receiving any part of this
advance if you like); royalty to be paid at the rate of 18 3/4%
of net proceeds from the first copy onwards. Additionally we
will make a contribution of up to $1000 for the cost of any cart-
ographic work and indexing.

Again let me say that for domestic text sales the discount to
the bookseller is twenty percent off list price; therefore 18 3/4%
"net proceeds" on these sales is the exact equivalent of fifteen
percent of list price. The net proceeds formula will give us the
necessary flexibility to promote your book vigorously to special
markets where special pricing is essential.

You asked me to say something about considerations other than
contractual ones that an author should weigh in choosing a publisher,
and I will speak to this point first generally and second with ref-
erence to the strengths of my house.

A good publisher realizes that a text rich in theoretical exposition
such as the one you propose can have a long life if it is carefully

Professor Henry A. Kissinger

-2-

January 4, 1965

handled at every turn. He should be prepared to solicit expert
criticism of the manuscript in as great quantity as the author can
profitably use. Author and publisher together should want to for-
fend criticism wherever possible--though always within the framework
of the author's conception of the book and never at the price of
making a book bland where it should be controversial. The book's
long life depends in part on its critical success, and a good
publisher will offer the author all cooperation in the writing
that will contribute to that.

Careful editing, design and manufacturing are also necessary if
a book is to enjoy its greatest possible success in the market-
place. Copy editing should first of all respect the author's
style while at the same time insuring accuracy in the smallest
details and suggesting possible changes in the interest of clarity.
The physical design of the book should be attractive and practical
for the student reader. The manufacture should be sturdy and hand-
some and should accomplish the ideas of the editor and designer.

The good publisher must be prepared to market the book widely and
enthusiastically. As a matter of routine he must supply copies
to all likely review journals. He should be ready to advertise
the book regularly in appropriate journals and strategically
through mailing pieces, catalogs and the like to potential users.
Nowadays he needs a staff of conscientious representatives to
place examination copies in the hands of every potential user of
the text and to remind them of its critical success and pedagogic
applications.

Holt, Rinehart and Winston seems to me to offer an exceptional
combination of the qualities of a good publisher. You and I
agreed that our resources would be available for soliciting ad hoc
expert opinion of your manuscript. Your book will easily be the
most significant title on my list whether it appears in the fall
of 1967 or the spring of 1968, and all of us here are prepared to
nurture it accordingly. It will be copy edited here in the house,
not free-lanced, by one of the most experienced and able men in
publishing, Mr. Milton Mautner. It will be designed here by one
or another of our staff designers, several of whom regularly win
industry awards for book design. The cartographic work will be
free-lanced, by either of two cartographers who have done excellent
work for us in the past. Our manufacturing department gets excel-
lent work from the printers with whom we contract for book production.
The enclosed "Guide" implies the kind of careful work we want to do
on every College Department publication.

[LC]

Professor Henry A. Kissinger

-3-

January 4, 1965

Our advertising procedures are being overhauled at present and will be arranged to give your book a full advertising program. Gratis copies will go out upon publication to every potential English-language review journal and to several European journals as well. The program of journal advertisements, mailing pieces and catalog advertising will be designed before publication and will not be abridged later on. Since 1958 our annual catalog has been the pacesetter in the industry. The advertising will be done by staff people here at Holt and will be subject to my supervision and through me to your suggestions. I enclose an "Author Questionnaire" form that may give you some idea of what we want to know in order to promote your book most effectively.

Our staff of representatives is among the largest and most able in the country. Four regional managers, four regional editors and more than fifty representatives call regularly on colleges and universities for us. They will see that every instructor teaching or about to teach International Relations receives a complimentary copy of your book upon publication. In Canada three men represent the College Department of Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, Ltd. Seven men travel in the United Kingdom and on the Continent from Holt, Rinehart and Winston of London. Four men represent us in Australia, one in New Zealand, four in India and one in the Caribbean and Latin America. Through our International Division here in New York we will be able to negotiate the sale of translation rights with European and Latin American publishers as soon as page proofs are available. Though we are outnumbered in sales representation by two of our competitors, McGraw Hill and Prentice-Hall, I seriously doubt that we are outperformed in sales promotion, certainly not in political science.

Finally let me make a few remarks about our list of books in political science and about myself. We are the publisher of the late George Sabine's HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY, THIRD EDITION, E. E. Schattschneider's PARTY GOVERNMENT, the Carr, Bernstein and Murphy AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE, Julius Stone's LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, Hans Kelsen's PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, Samuel Falgg Bemis's A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, FOURTH EDITION, and of Richard Snyder and Edgar Furniss's AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: FORMULATION, PRINCIPLES AND PROGRAMS. More recently we published Otto Klineberg's modest little volume THE HUMAN DIMENSION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS and we will shortly publish a contributed volume, INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR, edited by Herbert Kelman for The Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues.

383 MADISON AVENUE...NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

GENERAL BOOKS

TEXTBOOKS

MAGAZINES

March 8, 1965

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Don Gustafson and I thank you for our lunch a week ago Friday. We very much appreciated the opportunity to learn first hand your ideas for the textbook and the chance to tell you more about our organization and our plans for political science publishing.

I am more confident than ever that we would be wise to publish your book, and I have made what I hope is a strong case for my management's consideration. I will have further word for you on the financial questions later this month after I return from the west coast. There will be no difficulty about a clause in our agreement guaranteeing that we will not publish a competing text.

Meanwhile, I wanted you to have the several enclosures that accompany this letter as examples of our work. The spiral-bound catalog goes out annually to college booksellers, many of whom make it available to their faculties. Because it is a complete reference catalog, and a very handsome one, we believe it represents an important source of sales. We have just run out of stock of the individual political science catalogs. New ones, announcing our books for 1965, will be going out in a couple of weeks. The "Art..." catalog will give you some idea how these individual catalogs look. Last spring the individual political science catalog went out to over 7,300 political scientists listed by the Joint Directory of Higher Education. These catalogs are displayed and distributed through the year at national and

March 8, 1965

regional political science meetings. They seem to be more seriously examined by instructors than are the catalogs of some other publishers--for more reason, I hope, than their elegant covers.

The enclosed mailing pieces announcing some of our recent books and the book jacket explain themselves.

I wanted also to remark once more on the question of the relationship of the size of a field staff to the promotion of a specific book. I did not feel that we had expressed ourselves very well on this complex question during lunch.

Though I have not checked the itineraries of our fifty-six United States and Canada representatives, I am confident that we visit every school that teaches international relations at least once each year, and that only the smallest schools (those that enroll five hundred or fewer students, say), are visited only once each year. At major colleges and universities our staff, because of its size, is able to make several visits each year. A staff twenty percent smaller than our probably could not hope to meet eighty percent of the international relations instructors we will see on behalf of your book.

I am very sceptical that the two houses with larger field staffs than ours will reach personally a higher percentage of instructors in international relations than will we. Several factors enter into my judgement here. Both the larger staffs in question have significantly larger annual lists than ours, and the proportion of their list made up of technical, engineering and scientific books is much higher than it is for ours. The percentages of their staffs that concern themselves only with such books is much higher than is ours. Too, because their lists are larger in these areas, even their representatives who promote their entire lists must give less attention to the social sciences and humanities than do our general representatives.

I wish data were available to quantify these statements, but they are not. I am confident, however, that this argument accurately characterizes the differences among the publishers in question and is a valid qualification of the relationship between the size of a field promotion staff and the promotion of any specific title.

Page Three

March 8, 1965

At the risk of repeating myself unnecessarily, let me say
that I think we are agreed about the editorial questions. It
is your book I want to publish, not the drab product of
some editorial board's offhand suggestions. I will not
intrude into your plans for writing and rewriting. Inciden-
tally, one day after our lunch I was telling one of our copy
editors, Mrs. Adrienne Bernstein, how pleasant it was to
talk to a writer who appreciates the need for rewriting. She
tells me that while she worked with Philip Quigg at Foreign
Affairs she once did a little work on a piece for you. Her
comments on your usual writing methods would certainly have
reassured me that I need have no concern for the quality of
the finished product, if I had needed such reassurance.

If you decide to come to a publishing agreement before May,
I hope you will let me know your new timetable. In any case
I will report to you on developments here as soon as pos-
sible, because we very much want to publish your book.

PM:is
Dictated but not read
Enclosures

MCGRAW-HILL BOOK COMPANY

A DIVISION OF McGRAW-HILL, INC.

330 WEST 42ND STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10036

November 5, 1964

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue - Room 105
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Due to an inopportune operation these bedside rattles are a few days later
than I originally promised. As we discussed, I am very excited about
McGraw-Hill's publishing your next book and in addition am convinced that
its publication will satisfy a long apparent need. The chief import of my
comments stems from the preceding sentence and deals with present chapter
one of the manuscript.

I am convinced of the necessity for providing the reader with an historical
background and focus for your analysis of the underlying problems of the
NATO Alliance. As we discussed in your office, the introductory chapter
seemed to lack a hardness of direction which our projected re-organization
seems to satisfy. To whit, my notes call for the first chapter to be split
in two as follows:

I would start the book on page 29 with the first full paragraph
presently ending, "...six years of war." In the same new paragraph
I would then shift to the present page 1 and add the following sen-
tences, "Partly as a result of these far-sighted policies, Europe
today is more prosperous. Significant steps towards European inte-
gration have been taken. The Common Market is a going concern and
European political union seems to be the logical next step." I then
propose you continue with the second paragraph on present page 1,
through present page 6.

Continuing with the first chapter, I would then shift from the end
of the present page 6 to the second paragraph on present page 29 and
start the text with this new topic sentence, "The danger we face is
that, as with all great achievements, the memory of the American
contribution to European recovery may become an obstacle...(and con-
tinued.)" Continuing with the present text up to page 39, I would then
insert after the word "consensus" (four lines down) the material
starting on page 40 and running through the word "answer" on page 50
(three lines down). Following this I would propose inserting the

Professor Henry A. Kissinger

-2-

November 5, 1964

following language from page 39, "Envisioning the future of the
North Atlantic nations, which Atlantic structure is more vital
in the long run--one that deprives all partners (except the United
States) of the capacity of autonomous action, or one that grants
the capacity for autonomous action but seeks to reduce the desire
for it? The answer to this question will determine the shape of
Atlantic relationships for decades to come." (Ending new chapter
one.)

New chapter two will then consist of present pages 7 through 28.

Having had the opportunity to read the manuscript again, I am further convinced of its great merit and have the conviction I best be true to one of the most stable maxims of the editorial profession--having the intelligence not to meddle with an essentially excellent piece of work.

Two further thoughts do occur, however--that the present chapter three, the political issues, should be a new chapter three again helping to impart to the reader the entire history of the problem and, more importantly, provide a key to understanding the actions of General de Gaulle. I would then make old chapter two new chapter four. From a rather narrow point of view the manuscript does need some tightening, and this primarily refers to a recapitulation of your statements on American hegemony and its psychological aspects and in addition to some repetitiveness in language. Since we are in quite some haste, I think checking this in galleys will probably suffice.

Throughout my reading the thought kept coming back that this is exactly the kind of book the intelligent layman needs. To supplement his understanding, however, it is necessary that terms and abbreviations used for the first time should be spelled out. I have in mind such things as "the Kennedy Round," "O.E.F.C.," etc. Again, as far as highlighting the material, we must be wary of extended references to General de Gaulle as there is a remarkable exposition of his stand in a later chapter. I have some further notes keyed to the manuscript; yet they do require your viewing them, and I am most anxious to have your reactions to this re-organization so that we can proceed along on schedule. What I do suggest, since we are anxious to get into the galley stage, is that I keep sending notes up to you which if accepted can be altered in galleys. These involve primarily word changes and explanations which are minimal at best.

My last rather large comment--large in the sense that it covers a number of pages--is that the first twelve pages of chapter four--NATO's nuclear dilemma--are repetitive of much that is in present chapter two. I would suggest starting with an introductory paragraph encompassing the sense of pages 11 and 12--the fundamental political problem--and immediately go on to a discussion of the multi-lateral force.

My reading of the manuscript, combined with daily events and the impatience of General de Gaulle, convinces me even more of the necessity for fast but

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

LEhigh 5-3300

HAROLD VAN B. CLEVELAND
Director, Atlantic Policy Studies Program

October 30, 1964

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Henry:

This letter contains my comments on Chapter 4, NATO's Nuclear Dilemma. I have not yet collected my thoughts sufficiently on Chapters 2 and 3 but will send them along very soon.

Section 1, Background. The chapter would be strengthened if this introductory section contained a precise statement of how you see the dilemma. As it now stands, the section is essentially historical; the nature of the control dilemma is implied, not stated.

The dilemma of nuclear control can be put many ways. I think of it as follows. The only way in which the *common* security and political interests of the alliance could be reconciled with the separate *national* interests of all the allies with respect to the question of nuclear control would be through a democratic supranational authority over nuclear weapons -- a supranational political and defense community which would be, essentially, a limited federal government. Since this is patently impossible, it follows that the common and separate interests involved cannot in fact all be reconciled. One cannot reconcile (1) centralized control, which is desirable for military efficiency and even more for effective deterrence and controlled response, with (2) each ally having a proportionate voice in defining the *casus belli*, with (3) each ally sharing equitably in the prestige and the political power that control of nuclear weapons confers. Thus you have a true dilemma (more precisely, a trilemma), in that there is no feasible scheme which can resolve the contradictions among these three desiderata to every one's reasonable satisfaction.

A rather neutral statement of the problem (such as the above) might be more helpful to the uncommitted reader than a statement like that in the full paragraph on page IV-6 which implies that the dilemma could be resolved if the United States would yield some sovereignty. Our failure, it seems to me, has not been our unwillingness to yield sovereignty, which is probably not a real possibility, at least for this period. It has been our blindness to the existence of genuine conflicts of political and military interest among the allies, and our insistence that the only valid criterion is centralized control, coupled with our even less admirable failure to acknowledge that in

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so insisting we are furthering our own military and political interests at
the expense of our European allies This can be said without leaving the
implication that the dilemma could be resolved to the satisfaction of all
parties if only the United States would come down off its high sovereignty
horse.

Another general point. The term "sovereignty", or the phrase "yielding"
or "sharing sovereignty" appears many times in this and other chapters.
Sometimes "sovereignty" seems to be used somewhat poetically as a synonym
for freedom of action. At other times it seems to mean the absence of supra-
national authority. The risk is that the reader may believe you are talking
about supranational authority, or its absence, when you may mean the presence
or absence of intergovernmental agreements or consultation, by which de facto
freedom of action is reduced, while formal sovereignty is not affected. I
expect it would be useful to use the terms "yielding" or "sharing sovereignty"
only when something supranational is meant.

Page IV-6. The thought in the last sentence on this page is a little
compressed. You might want to add an explanation of why the management of
political crises becomes more significant in conditions of nuclear "parity",
especially with many tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe.

Page IV-7. The first sentence on this page might be better if you stated
the nature of the American failure more precisely as a failure to admit to
ourselves and to others that real conflicts of national security and political-
prestige interest were involved in the nuclear control question. Also, isn't
the point you are making in this paragraph not that "disputes" arose over
ear-marking and assignment, but that our efforts of this kind were evasions
of the real conflicts of interest involved and attempts to paper over the
cracks by symbolic and largely meaningless "assignments"?

Page IV-8. The material in pencilled brackets on this page seems to
be out of place. The main subject of the paragraph is the assignment of
submarines; the question of the meaning of another phrase in the communique
on a different subject does not seem pertinent at this point.

Page IV-9. In the last full paragraph on this page, the flow of the
argument would be clearer if you omitted the material in pencilled brackets,
beginning with the second sentence of this paragraph through the end of the
paragraph at the top of the next page. This would get you immediately to the
main point of the discussion: that the joint preparation of guidelines does
not satisfy the political desire of the Europeans to share in nuclear control
unless the guidelines constitute a delegation of authority. But if that were
their nature, they would become politically unfeasible for the United States,
and perhaps for other allies as well.

Page IV-10. In the same connection, the argument would be clarified
by inserting, after the first sentence of the second full paragraph on page
IV-10, the statement that participation in contingency war planning which
does not result in a formal delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons
hardly satisfies the political and psychological desires of the European allies.

- 3 -

The pencilled suggestions for the first sentence on page IV-11 have the same purpose and are also meant to clarify the relationship between this paragraph and the preceding argument and to relate it more directly to the main subject of the chapter.

Page IV-12. The full paragraph on this page would connect better with what goes before if the first sentence were modified as shown on the draft and if the position of the second sentence were moved further down the paragraph, as shown. On the same page, I am not clear about the connection between the first full sentence on the page (beginning "and the refusal") and the question of guidelines and nuclear control, which is the subject of your discussion at this point. Could this relationship be clarified, or if not, could this sentence be omitted or put somewhere else?

Section 2, The Multilateral Force. A general comment on this section. To the uncommitted reader, this section as it stands will sound somewhat one-sided. It would seem more balanced if you presented, along with your substantive criticisms of the MLF, the treatment of the control problem which you would have preferred, were that option still open. With the MLF likely to go through in some form, it may seem a bit academic to argue what you would have done had the MLF been rejected. Nevertheless, I think a question of fairness and above all of persuasiveness is involved -- the more so as you are known as a long time critic of the MLF.

To put it another way, we know that in this field of nuclear strategy and control of nuclear weapons it is much easier to tear someone else's proposal apart than it is to make one's own stand up. No proposal can solve the control problem, for the problem is not solvable -- it is a genuine dilemma. Every proposal therefore has its weaknesses and inconsistencies. Thus one can persuade the uncommitted reader only by a comparative analysis of two or more proposals. After a discussion of this kind, you might then explain that your present recommendations for nuclear control assume the existence of an MLF, but with a somewhat different and reduced emphasis on its role.

Another general point. In your treatment of the MLF, it is not always made clear when you are talking about the substance of the proposal itself, apart from the claims made for it by its advocates, and when you are criticizing the exaggerated nature of some of those claims and extrapolations. If that distinction were brought out more clearly, the treatment would seem less polemical and its persuasive value would be enhanced.

A third general thought. The section as it stands is open to the criticism that you are arguing vigorously against a proposal which, in the end, you come very close to accepting as useful, provided only that its goals are made more modest and U.S. sales pressure is reduced. When the reader reaches page 12 of Section 3, he is surprised to find that, after all, you do not seem any longer to object in principle to the MLF concept and see a useful role for it in the structure of control arrangements you recommend. This comes as a considerable anti-climax after the vigorous criticism of MLF in Section 2. I am not clear whether there is a substantive inconsistency

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here or whether it is simply a question of having to accept MLF as a fact and
make the best of it.

On page 5 of Section 2, the quotation from Alastair Buchan seems a bit
strong. I do feel that his strictures against Bob Bowie, Henry Owen and company
are a considerable overstatement. Be it said, too, that given the glacial
inertia of the Washington bureaucracy, few if any important new projects are
ever adopted as U.S. policy without a great deal of pressure and enthusiasm
from a small group of supporters. I can recall several instances of this kind
in my relatively short career as a bureaucrat. The MLF is not as unique in
this regard as Alastair's remark suggests. In the same connection, it is surely
legitimate to refer to our friends as "enthusiasts", but perhaps a bit gratuitous
to use that term more than once in Section 2.

Page 9, Section 2. In talking with some German defense ministry officials last summer, I had the impression that they were neither opposed nor lukewarm to MLF, but perhaps your remark in the first paragraph on this page refers to an earlier time. Also, European defense ministries have vested interests against MLF also, since it competes for scarce funds with other projects. Budgetary considerations rather than purely military ones seemed to me, after talking with defense people in Europe last summer, to be uppermost in their minds, although budgetary arguments are often used to express conclusions reached on other grounds.

Page 14, Section 2. I have the feeling that you make a bit too much of the argument about the military necessity for MLF, which begins on the bottom of this page. Since you conclude on page 16, that this argument is not in any event decisive, the effect of devoting a page and a half to it is to give an argumentative tone to the discussion which does not add to its persuasiveness.

Page 16, Section 2. In the discussion which begins with the first full paragraph on this page, the reader may not be clear whether you are dealing with the substantive merits of the MLF project or with the arguments made for it by its advocates. This may also be the point in the chapter at which a comparison of the alternative you would have proposed, in terms of its political plusses and minuses, would fit in. You give, in Section 3, arguments why the French and British independent deterrents are not so bad, and why a European nuclear force of some kind might be good. I take it that U.S. support for something of this sort would have been preferable in your mind to MLF. If so, this alternative could here be laid along side of the MLF, with negative as well as positive features brought out.

Page 21, Section 2. The discussion of the political control problem beginning at the bottom of this page raises a question in my mind. The text seems to imply that the political control issue should be faced and finally settled now in an unspecified manner different from the rule of unanimity which is likely to come out of the present negotiations. For example, near the bottom of page 22, the text refers to the weakening of the U.S. bargaining position as time goes on, with the implication that there is a control arrangement which we should obtain now which would be better than the unanimity

[x]

- 5 -

rule. What is it? If the only possible agreement now is on the unanimity
rule, in what sense can the political control problem be faced more fully
than it has been? In the circumstances, cannot a respectable argument be
made that it is better to by-pass this issue, since a European desire for
some kind of majority rule (if it exists) could not in any event be satisfied?
By-passing an issue which cannot be settled is unavoidable. It is not
necessarily an evasion, as one sentence in the last paragraph on page 22
seems to suggest.

Page 23, Section 2. On this page the text returns again to the question of the manner in which MLF has been presented, as distinguished from the merits of the proposal. It may be confusing to the reader to move back and forth several times between these two levels of discourse.

Page 24, Section 2. I found the first paragraph on this page too argu-
mentative to be persuasive. The first sentence of the paragraph seems to
imply that it is self-evident that the MLF merely perpetuates the present
state of affairs as to nuclear control, and that it is otherwise of no real
value to the Europeans. Are these points entirely true? If they were, would
the MLF ever be set up? I agree that there is a serious inconsistency in
advertising the MLF as a major departure in sharing of nuclear control while
maintaining the rule of unanimity, with the intention of probably retaining
it indefinitely. But some degree of inconsistency and fuzziness about what
"sharing" means is inherent in the whole problem of nuclear control. If the
argument is simply for greater honesty, I agree. But the tone of the pre-
sentation suggests that a more genuine "sharing" is thought to be possible.
If that is intended, it would be better to show how.

Page 26, Section 2. Point (a) in the second line of this paragraph seems to suggest that there is something inherently bad about increasing the size of the MLF, but no reasons are given. The second paragraph on this page seems out of place here. It might be better as a transition between Sections 2 and 3.

Page 30, Section 2. You may overinterpret the June 1, 1964 Monnet Committee Resolution on MLF a bit. Both Max Kohnstamm and Fritz Erler told me last summer that the Resolution does not support a European deterrent, to which they are personally strongly opposed. They consider the resolution as deliberately ambiguous on the point, since many members of the Committee were opposed to a separate European nuclear force, while others felt that such a force was an essential feature of the future United States of Europe.

Page 34, Section 2. The first full paragraph on this page is a good,
clear statement but shouldn't you say where you stand on this crucial choice?
And would it not also be well to indicate that it is not surprising that this
issue remains unsettled, since views differ on it sharply not only in Europe
but in the U.S. Government? Indeed, as you know, there are those in Europe
and Washington who consider one of the MLF's principal virtues that it straddles
this ambiguity. I would guess that this ambiguity is inevitable if there is
to be an MLF.

The final pages of Section 2, beginning with the second full paragraph on page 34, run downhill rather badly. I believe their omission would strengthen the section as a whole.

Section 3, Outline for NATO's Nuclear Arrangements. The transition into Section 3 might be improved if at the beginning of the section you indicated that you would offer your recommendations on the assumption that the MLF will come into existence in some form, even though you would have preferred a different approach to the control question.

Page 2, Section 3. The first full paragraph on this page makes a solid point which would be more effective if it were made clear that the paragraph is describing a debate rather than evaluating real tendencies in the world of facts. The Labour Party's position is a natural rejoinder to the American position concerning the indivisibility of nuclear strategy. But a U.S. government is in a far stronger position to make its view -- a U.S. monopoly or near-monopoly -- prevail than is a British government. The final result is likely to continue to be much closer to the American position than to the British Labour notion of some kind of supranational control of the entire NATO deterrent power. This fact might be recognized, lest you seem to give undue importance to arguments and not enough to political realities.

Page 3, Section 3, first full paragraph. There is a *logical* contradiction between insisting on both indivisible strategy and undiluted sovereignty. The contradiction in the world of facts, however, is much less if it is the United States that is doing the insisting, since we are able to make our position stick, very largely at any rate. As a criticism of U.S. *logic* and *attitude*, I agree entirely with this paragraph and the one that precedes it. We should show a lot more understanding of the problems and needs of our allies. But if we are honest with ourselves and with them, we shall have to say that the nearer we can come to an indivisible strategy under our control, the better it is for us -- and we can, by virtue of Western Europe's heavy dependence on us, come pretty close to making them accept it.

A general point about Section 3. The heading of the section suggests that it is about "arrangements" -- i.e., a prescription what to do about the nuclear control problem. Yet the bulk of the discussion is not of this character. Much of the discussion of strategic nuclear war, and nearly all of the discussion of tactical nuclear weapons is about strategy. The material beginning with the first full paragraph on page 2 of Section 3 through the first full paragraph on page 9 of Section 3, is about the strategic debate and contains almost no prescription about nuclear control. The subsection on Tactical Nuclear War becomes prescriptive only beginning with the second full paragraph on page 26. You might consider whether that part of this discussion which is primarily about strategy rather than control arrangements ought not be in Chapter II, leaving for Chapter IV only material which is primarily prescriptive.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

58 EAST 68TH STREET

CABLE ADDRESS: FORAFFAIRS, NEW YORK
AREA CODE 212 LEhigh 5-3300

December 2, 1964

Dear Henry:

Thank you for your letter of November 25th. As you know, I have been deeply distressed by our whole series of telephone calls and correspondence, and I know you have been equally so. When you first called me on September 1st, you indicated that you had spent more time than you expected on the book for our Atlantic Policy Studies and raised two questions: 1) that your royalty rate should certainly be as great as you ordinarily receive from Harper's and 2) that the paperback edition not be published for six months after the cloth edition. You also indicated that you did not, however, want to ask for any more guarantee money than the $7,500 indicated in Van's letter of March 19th. As I wanted to be sure that there would be no slip-up on the arrangements on the royalty rate or the timing of the paperback edition, I dictated a memorandum of our conversation both to Van Cleveland and John Swing from some detailed notes I made while we were talking.

I made the notes because there were a number of things, such as the length of the book, the date you planned to have the manuscript ready, royalty arrangements with Harper's, etc., which I did not dare trust to my memory. You yourself weren't quite sure of the arrangements with Harper's, however, so you agreed to follow up our conversation with a letter. In your letter of September 2nd, you asked that profit, referring to the concept as defined in Van's letter of March 19th, "be determined so that it is no less than my contract with Harper Bros.", and you also indicated in a long-hand postscript "I do feel very strongly that there not be a simultaneous paperback version. I would like the usual six months' interval after the hard cover edition has appeared". All of this was, of course, in line with our talk of the day before.

Page 2

We went to McGraw-Hill and absolutely insisted that they give us special royalty rates on your book, greater than those for any of our other Atlantic Studies and matching what you would get from Harper's. They agreed, and they are also planning to put a very special degree of extra promotion effort behind your book to launch it and our whole series. They also agreed, as you requested, not to put out a paperback edition until six months after the hard cover edition.

In your letter of September 2nd, contrary to what I clearly understood in our phone conversation the previous day, you did suggest a revision of the guarantee, that "the Council pay me a fee" (guarantee) "comparable to that of other authors of the series of similar standing, or $7,500, whichever is higher". You left shortly for Europe, so we did not get together on the telephone until September 30th. I felt it would be impossible for the Council to change at this time the guarantee arrangements outlined by Van Cleveland in his letter of March 19th, because, among other reasons, the budget for the Atlantic project was fully committed and I had told Van he must hold the line with all the authors. It seemed to me impossible to make an exception in your case, even though I did realize you did much more work than you originally intended, and though the manuscript would be longer than the 200 pages which Van mentioned in his letter of March 19th, setting forth the terms of your understanding about payment. I also read to you on the phone the payments being made for other manuscripts of various lengths under the project, and you agreed that the $7,500 guarantee would be all right. You then changed your views on this again, for reasons with which I am not unsympathetic, but which I don't feel I can do anything about.

I believe McGraw-Hill will do a good job for you - that is the reason we chose them - and I hope that this whole matter of the guarantee may, therefore, from the financial point of view, turn out to be academic. However, I know it is the human question and the question of principle, rather than the financial one, which bothers you.

whether the dilemma is precisely as you have defined it. I am sure
that if Kissinger were political advisor to the commander of that force,
he could think up more alternatives then you have listed on page 8, and
not all of them would be entirely without merit.

Page 20. You say "if the Soviet Union had made a German nuclear program a casus belli. . . " Do you mean that the Soviets threaten worldwide thermonuclear warfare if the German program goes ahead, or threaten to attack Germany, or that the Soviets have already launched the war? The whole problem of the nuclear age seems to be that it is difficult to make anything a casus belli in a credible way in advance; and I really don't see how the Soviets, just by saying so, could make anybody believe that they would launch a nuclear war in destruction of, or in reprisal against, a German nuclear program. I can imagine that they would make some pretty scary threats about it, but I don't think I would use the language of a casus belli in describing it. The term tends to suggest that the Soviets construed a prior action, as with a war, and went ahead with it; and I find that a little implausible, and in any case it deserves being spelled out in more detail.

Page 35. I think you go a little too far, and possibly you really don't mean to include this in the book, but said it just for the fun of saying it in the draft. You want the President to study the process by which Bowie and Schaetzel got away with a conspiracy to propagandize in the manner of Harriet Beecher Stowe. I don't really think you want to say this. It must be just a rhetorical proposal, even so, since you have identified Bowie by name, and he is a colleague of yours at the Center, and particularly if the

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[4]

book is published under the auspices of the Center, this will be read as
a vicious side-swipe at a man for whom you already have a reputation for
disagreeing with sufficiently. But you needn't wave it in public here.
I am sure you got pleasure out of writing it, now I suggest you delete it.

Page 36. I wonder how serious you are about the impossibility of pulling back. You say that if the MLF were to collapse, our capacity for leadership in the Alliance would be cast into fundamental question. If you really believed that, Henry, should you be contributing so vigorously to its collapse? Are you so committed, as a scholar, to what you believe to be the truth, that you must devote thirty-five pages of your undoubtedly influential book to ridiculing the MLF, and then, having had the satisfaction of demolishing it, acknowledge that our capacity for leadership in the Alliance depends on the success--in some fashion--of the MLF itself? Should you talk about finding a context for it that minimizes its "dangers," when your book it addressed precisely to the people who will determine whether or not the MLF collapses, if you believe what you have said?

This is up to you. You have a perfect right to expose, even if you
exaggerate, all the falacies of the MLF, even though you think that to do
so jeopardizes the goal to which your book is supposed to be contributing.
But I really think you ought to consider once again whether you are not
taking more pride in a personal tour de force, your expose of the ludicrous
MLF and the sinister forces behind it, then you ought to allow yourself.
You had your fun in the Reporter article, and maybe you shouldn't go through
all that with quite so much enthusiasm again. To tell the Europeans on
page 35 that the MLF represents the almost incomprehensible success of a

fantastically ill-advised scheme promoted by a bunch of people who ought to
be investigated and then to think that they can cheer up on page 36 and go
forward with the MLF, minimizing its dangers as they go, hardly seems a
prescription for maintaining our leadership in the Alliance. But, as I
said, this is up to you.

Page III-1, bottom of page, says that each major member of the Alliance
has two contradictory aims, one of which is to be sure of the nuclear support
of its allies when its vital interests are at stake. I think possibly what
you mean is that it wants to be sure of the _appearance_ of nuclear support.
There is no easy way to tell, but I suppose that the French and the British,
possibly the Germans, want a sufficient appearance of nuclear support so,
that the Russians never challenge their vital interest, but if they could
have everything they want, would also like to be sure the nuclear weapons
never go off, no matter what interests are at stake. In other words, they
want to prevent being forced into war against their will, they want to be
sure that the Russians are sure that aggression means nuclear war, and finally
they want to be sure that they are never forced into nuclear war, even when
their vital interests are at stake. This may be a little unkind to them and
probably somewhat unfair. Nevertheless, I do not think it is easy to prove
that any of those countries really want to defend themselves with nuclear
weapons, or to be defended with nuclear weapons. Often their lack of
interest in "flexible response," which we talked about in connection with
Chapter II, is simply evidence that they want to bet everything on deterrence,
trusting that it works, and have never faced up to the choice of whether
they genuinely want nuclear support if it should actually come to war.