Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

TELECON
Secretary Laird
5/10/71 8:58 a.m.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

L: Hello Henry.

K: How are you?

L: I'm fine. How are you?

K: Where are you, in your office?

L: Yes. My only problem is I'm having trouble sitting. But I've been reading so much and doing so much at the hospital, I decided to come in and get things straightened out. How are you doing?

K: Fine.

L: Did you have a good rest?

K: Yes, it was necessary and I feel much better.

L: I'm delighted to have you back. That's all I'm calling about.

K: Aren't you nice.

L: Have you got any problems?

K: No, but if any come up I'll let you know.

L: Good, I will always have a White House phone by me. I may be in and out of the hospital half days, but my only problem is sitting.

K: One thing, my impression is that Packard is determined to leave. Am I right? I don't believe the issues he is raising are worth resigning over.

L: I think that's right. He's got other problems. I'm looking for replacements. Rube Miller, do you know him? He's the President of TRW...

K: Oh yes, ...

L: He's a fine young man; I've worked with him a long time. Of course I've worked with Dave since 1958. He is going away now for two weeks. I think when he gets back... I think he is at the end of his rope on this.

K: If it's any particular grievance we can try to meet it.

*

TELECON

Secretary Laird

5/10/71 8:58 a.m.

p. 2

By KML NARA, Date 5/13/04

L: The pressures of the job . . .

K: We can't make the job any easier.

L: I know that. I'm looking for someone. I'll have someone by August. I have to do that Henry. You can't monkey around on these things.

K: Absolutely.

L: But I can handle it. Alde, I'm going to send you a copy of a letter to Bill today. I want to cool our spears on foreign assistance. He thinks the only way to do it is to get it away from the CINCS. And you, know, they've done a good job. McCain and . . .

K: And give it to State?

L: Yes.

K: Impossible! These State guys are ideologically opposed to it.

L: That's right. And if the Nixon Doctrine is going to work we have got to go in the other direction. We are not going to appear with spears tomorrow if he uses this statement. We'll just stay away from it.

K: He can't use that statement. Send it over to me and I'll keep him from using it.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON
William S. White
5/10/71 Noon

W: Just one thing. I was troubled by these pieces this morning about what Stennis said yesterday.

K: So am I.

W: I wanted to ask, as a matter of guidance and not for any other purpose, what is your view of it? It's possible to read it that he's trying to hold off something worse...

K: That's what I read.

W: Is it? It upsets me, but I presume he is trying to hold off something that would kill us in Indochina more directly, and second, he may be trying to be sweetly reasonable to get more help on the budget.

K: That's what I see in it.

W: Okay, thank you.

K: I'd like to see you at the end of the week if that's possible.

W: It's not this week. I'm making a rare speech. But I could do it next week.

K: Fine.

W: Do you want to call me or want me to call you.

K: Why don't you call David Halperin on Monday when you get back?

W: Okay.

*

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
V.P./Kissinger
2:50 p.m. 5/10/71

VP: Are you busy?

K: I have been poaching on your territory.

VP: I hope you have behaved yourself.

K: I have lived up to the best standards of the administration. I really loved it.

VP: It's a shame Lenny Hatten died suddenly. Very close to Sinatra.

K: I didn't see him. I have someone coming in in 5 mins. I could come over at 4:30.

VP: How about tomorrow morning?

K: I'll be going to NY. How about Wed. morning.

VP: I'm going out of town on revenue sharing. I want to talk about -- It's been sometime since we have talked about a foreign trip and it's been sometime since I have been on a foreign trip. There are somethings surfacing around the community as to why I am not. I notice Stans went to Greece and got in trouble with the NYTimes Isn't that ridiculous? He is criticized about someone who has given up 10 divisions for NATO when they are eulogizing Chou En-Lai who has just returned from Hanoi. I am considering going to Greece.

K: I will raise it with the President. Or do you want to talk with me first?

VP: I would like to talk with you first.

K: How about Thursday?

VP: I will call you Thurs. and we will get together sometime.

By KCLW NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCOM

Amb. Cromer/Kissinger

5:12 p.m.

5/10/71

C: I am sorry I have been so elusive.

K: You are very active as befits the British Ambassador. It now appears I will not be going to London this weekend. Ifz As for any other decisions, I am in no position to give them now.

C: Do you hope in June?

K: I will have to say no. We will let it lapse. I amry come. June or appeal to you at a later date.

C: They are longing to see you.

K: That's not the issue. It's a great pleasure to see your colleagues but it; s a thing I can set into many situations.

C: I will let them know and you will get in touch when you are ready to do so. I am sorry for you, it's been so complicated. This visit we were not expecting. We thought it would be later.

K: I understand.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01255

By CHARA Date 01/11/71

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:10 a.m.

5/11/71

K: I just had a talk with Gerry Smith and apparently our channel is not working properly. Semonov is going along accepting my proposition to you which Gerry Smith doesn't know about. Semonov has not said what it is but it's the main lines of my proposition to you. The President will be beside himself because we haven't got a reply yet to our proposal.

D: Semonov didn't have instructions and I have a telegram that says it.

K: Semonov on a boat trip went into great detail and Smith is so surprised that he has propositions we didn't make to him. Proposed ABM agreement, a freeze on offensive missiles -- Smith never heard of it. He hinted that you would accept a ceiling on xxxx longer ones within this. Smith thinks he will conclude this simultaneously. He didn't object to the proposal but it isn't easy that when he makes a proposal to the Council of Ministers and gets no answer.

D: He has no authority.

K: We are in the position now that as far as Smith is concerned a Soviet proposition exists and the President doesn't have a response to his proposal.

D: They haven't discussed it in the govt. I know what I am telling you. The Minister directed him and he is not authorized. Gromyko is not deceiving me.

K: The President can only conclude one of two things. Either there is confusion in Moscow which we don't believe or a deliberate attempt to mobilize his people against him or by-pass him.

D: It's not so. On this matter Semonov has no authority. What he makes a hint -- I don't know.

K: In order to keep our channel intact and avoid on either side a refusal? Now we are in a position that as far as I am concerned it has to be treated formally. Smith is telling everyone what Semonov said. However, that there should be an ABM agreement and a less formal phrase -- we have discussed it and it's all right. A ceiling which would include large missiles and rader limitations.

D: I don't know what's going on. Does he really make a proposal or just a talk and he picks it up piece by piece.

K: He talked with Smith alone.

-2-

D: Was it a proposal or picked up by Smith?

K: Smith thinks it's a proposal and since it's never been discussed by me and Smith never knew andx or authorized to discuss it -- if Smith had proposed it -- well, you know. But it's so close to what you and I have discussed -- what is the Soviet position and secondly, you may do this deliberately but the President will take this as a personal affront.

D: It's not necessary.

K: What would Brezhnev think if he proposed to us through a channel and we went a subordinate official and made a reply.

D: Only two days ago we got a copy of a telegram where he was denounced in strongest way. I have known Gromyko for 20 years. I am just telling you. It's for my information but it was not for yours. I have the telegram. Direct information from my talk with Haig. It's not to mislead me. Why would they? It's for my information and it's for the record.

K: We have the serious problem now --

D: ? ? ? reply.

K: We have to construct a reply from Smith to Semonov and I can't say it's not the Soviet position because no one knows I have talked with you.

D: I know the story and you must way what you will to the President. Semonov when I was in Moscow he was told not to talk.

K: I don't understand it. You can xerox reject the proposal but why when we are trying to do so many things -- Smith talked about the summit but he might have gotten that himself.

D: Only two days ago I ____ that emphasized the same point. If you do not believe it --

K: There's no sense in your lying. I just want to be sure you want to work with me.

D: This case they discuss through you and me. No reason for misleading me.

K: I now have a message. The problem you have to remember and Moscow must understand is that Smith wants to go to Vienna and give an answer to Semonov.

D: Semonov probably wants to correct it and made it worse.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOL2562
By CHNARA Date STO1

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsom
By: NARA Date: Sept 1

Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:10 a.m. 5/11/71

-3-

K: He went further. Spelled it out in detail. In a telegram two junior members went into detail with Gartov. I will show you.

D: I believe you. He didn't reply to what you proposed.

K: He replied without saying what it was.

D: We didn't discuss the text.

K: No, not a text. He made a proposal identical to what you and I discussed with details.

D: Formally or in discussion?

K: In private discussions with Smith. He described it as elaboration of what he said at dinner. Two junior members spelled out what Gartov said -- freezing and safe guard sites and discussed what a safeguard site might be acceptable.

D: They have that on instructions. Probably we don't understand what they are talking about. Their delegation there has own instructions -- they know nothing about our discussions.

K: They don't mention our discussions. They made a proposal. If we defend ABM 4 is not acceptable but two would be acceptable. Deliberate that Soviet position only refused 4 and 3. How about 2? They said it was deliberate that they mentioned 4 and 3.

D: You have to understand if you base on 4 or 2 they have ? ? ?

K: You can argue with me but the fact is our government believes you have made a formal proposition to which we have to reply and the President believes he made a proposition to you and you are replying in a bureaucratic channel and he will think you are trying to box him in. It's not going to be considered a friendly gesture.

D: What can I say when I tell you it was not an intention? What else can I tell you? Just a delegation fishing. 4 or 2 sites when I know for sure -- otherwise why would we wait so long?

K: Unless you want to ignore the President.

D: We are not children. We know who is boss.

K: It's incomprehensible to me.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E112562
By CNARA Date Stot

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:10 a.m.

4/11/71

-4-

D: We know who is boss in the WH.'

K: I will grant that this was done in good faith on your side. The fact is we now have a problem because we have to give Smith a formal instruction. I don't know really. We can play it your way. Make a proposal to Semonov they we have made to you. No sense any more in discussion. We have to make a reply. I can't say that this -- to ignore Semonov.

D: I know he has no authority.

K: Why don't you do the following. It's a Soviet problem.

D: No problem.

K: What should we do?

D: Was it an official proposal or a guess of Smith? Semonov can discuss many things for 5 hours and you can construe what you want and he will say he said nothing. Was it formal?

K: No. Semonov made the proposal that Haig showed you.

D: It said that Mr. Semonov hinted. This point -- Semonov will say they didn't understand me.

K: If it stopped there, no problem. On Friday -- I will ____ you. Take the proposal that Semonov made because it's very important.

D: Who said?

K: I will get you the memos. On Sunday on the ____ boat Semonov went into great detail. Smith talking with -- all right first. I will read the first paragraph. May 6 -- "At dinner for the Soviet delegation May 4 Semonov from a written brief and new instructions introduced coupling of offensive ? ? ? ? ? ? ? "

D: I received a telegram on that. What happened next?

K: This is May 6. "At Soviet Reception Timberov and K____ took initiative in taking Gartov aside on new Soviet proposal and they emphasized? ? ? ? ? to the general approach? ? ? ? " On the evening of the 6th.

D: What these two boys really -- Semonov wouldn't show them the telegram.

K: On Sunday Semonov spoke with Smith for 5 hours and gave him the details of what he considers the new Soviet proposal.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E1-2562
By: CHNARA Date: Stet

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:10 a.m.

5/11/71

-5-

D: He went more and more?

K: He did that on a boat and not a plenary session and there's not a record but when a Deputy Minister speaks for 5 hours he must have something to say.

D: It's not necessary. The thing is Semonov could speak for 5 hours is well known in my govt. He can talk on anything he likes. He wouldn't know anything about the military thing but he can philosophize many things. They will be very strongly scolded and he is my friend. Was it a proposal or did Smith think so?

K: It's not a difficulty because Mr. Smith thinks he has and we must now respond. If I do nothing else now you will get a formal answer to Semonov from Smith.

D: A telegram coming in now. Will you hold a minute?

K: Yes.

D: So I will sum up this way. Smith gets a definite proposal and Semonov continued to elaborate. But he didn't say we are ready to make this proposal.

K: He thinks that if we now say all right we can accept an agreement on ABM and freeze, he thinks there will be an agreement. Smith feels we can get an agreement along the lines of what you and I talked about. Simultaneous freeze. ABM vs. Moscow. That's what he thinks.

D: No authority because it contradicts his instructions. If I mention this to Gromyko, he will say Smith invented it.

K: Smith believes it's an ABM agreement with offensive freeze concluded simultaneously with limitations on radar and limitations of texting of surface to air missiles (which we haven't discussed).

D: He has instructions not to discuss specifics.

K: I just finished talking with Smith. This is not something he asked Smith to raise with him and not our major issue.

D: I have the telegram. This is a copy from Moxcow on what Semonov reports. Acting in accordance with instructions and said nothing more. _________ minister and discuss with Smith what we didn't talk through Smith and Semonov (?) Semonov emphatically denies he talked with Smith about it.

K: I don't know what to do now.

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:10 a.m. 5/11/71

-6-

D: I could tell you from this telegram that answer to what your proposed is still not approved. This telegram is the second from Gromyko. He emphatically denies it here.

K: What's going to happen -- if we don't straighten this out we will be forced to give a formal answer in Vienna and it will be total confusion.

D: Smith is confused and trying to present a case he didn't know.

K: A case he didn't advocate before. He had other ideas before.

D: Safeguards against Moscow.

K: The he wouldn't get if Semonov --

D: Everything you mentioned was his interpretation.

K: Semonov made those points on the boat.

D: He has his instructions. I don't know whether -- I don't know. Semonov has to follow instructions or he will lose his job. When he denies it I am sure Semonov will not on a second time report the same story. What he said could do if they discussed in detail, he will see how Smith will react and then report back to Moscow. What's important and you should ask Smith was there an official proposal?

K: No text. I will get his memo.

D: It would be helpful to me.

K: I will have it by the end of the day.

D: A brief summary.

K: I have to tell you that the -- your formal position I understand but the fact is that Smith believes sincerely and since he doesn't know I ever discussed it and he has had different ones --

D: I can now finish this telegram. Semonov said he discussed only what was discussed before. He emphasized that he was on previous position which I gave to you before and that freezing would be settled after ABM. You check it. Semonov said simultaneously or before.

K: I can tell you that really there's a hell of a strange feeling. We find it strange that there should be an answer if we are as far down as Gartov. (cont.)

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1-2358
By CNARA Date 5/11/71

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012557
By CHNARA Date 05/11/71

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:10 a.m. 5/11/71

-7-

K: (cont) And Arbatov is going around that the WH channel is not functioning properly. To Ruina and others. He shouldn't even know there is a WH channel.

D: Did he mention who?

K: Mx He mentioned specifically and to people who don't know it.

D: This is strange. I will speak with him.

K: After Haig mentioned to you outside of our channel should stop and there are two more discussions -- the same range of issues. When you make a proposal to me on Berlin and I send Rush to Zorin or ______ rather then answering Gromyko, it would create a bad impression in Moscow.

D: It's very clear that they discussed freezing and so on but they have no instructions to discuss it. Such an idea of freezing would be after ABM is signed. Did anytone tell him or subordinates that this freezing would be before?

K: They think it's manageable. What matters to me is that when you and I have confidential negotiations we agree in principle and then it's presented to our bureaucracy. If in good faith it's not possible that high ? ? ? ? or subordinate officials. Gartov had no instructions.

D: They discuss many things. Fishing with each other. Officials are one thing -

K: You said they were instructed to discuss freezing.

D: No, if it arises then Semonov has instructions. If it arises then it's to be discussed only after.

K: They raised it and we didn't. The way this looks to the President is that we in carrying it out have been very rigid to give your a Politburo every opportunity but you do this and if it makes leaks to the press it will look that you are bringing pressure on us. We have explained the point. As far as Smith is concerned he believes that there was a formal proposal.

D: On what?

K: ABM.

D: They have discussed it for 4 months.

K: ABM coupled with offensive freeze.

D: Before or after?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012358
By CHARA Date 6/10/71

Amb. Dobrynin/Kiissinger

9:10 a.m.

5/11/71

-8-

K: The formal freeze is after but he thinks it's manageable.

D: That's all he said?

K: Semonov went into great detail with him.

D: That's why he thinks it's manageable.

K: That's what he thinks.

D: I can tell you you have nothing. This decision was not made. You have to accept it or not.

K: It's not in the good of our relationship that while you and I are discussing something, subordinates are discussing the same thing.

D: I don't know. I said no. I have what he said officially. We cannot accept ABM without an offensive. So he asked what are the compromises and one said something about freezing. Semonov probably said OK, we will do it afterwards. This was the position two months ago. He didn't know it.

K: It's known to me but no one here knows we decided this.

D: We sent our delegation -- agreement on ABM. What do you want then? Your delegation says no.

K: You make up your mind with whom you are talking. If it's me, we will instruct our delegation.

D: We have not reached a decision on the proposal. Therefore, we can tell our delegation to do nothing.

K: You could. (You could discuss ABM).

K: But your delegation refused to discuss ABM. Then we will have to go back and through official negotiations. It's a question of the real thing.

K: The President feels in our discussions we have had that this could have been a good turning point. We have to succeed sometimes. He has tried to be very careful of your concerns and we are now in this position which in fact will be treated in our govt. as a formal Soviet proposal. What Semonov did was propose the last draft of the letter you brought me from Moscow. Not the one I suggested. It has to look to the President as if rejecting it, you have introduced it to our bureaucracy (to see what they do).

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: FOLIO/ST
By: CNAR A Date: 6/14/71

-9-

D: That makes no sense.

K: It embarrasses the President.

D: ? ? ? ?

K: What Semonov proposed was what you brought back from Moscow.

D: What he could say from instructions was ABM and only that.

K: That was in the letter.

D: No it went about before freezing.

K: No, it's what I asked you to put in.

D: That part that I said fine if we ? ? ? ? . Otherwise it was all right with you.
Just the two points and we announced it two weeks ago.

K: Are you telling me that you are accepting the two agreements should be
signed simultaneously?

D: Before signing on ABM we will reach details before signing the agreement.
First we have to sign ABM and its details. That's Semonov.

K: Nxx Just look at the mess this creates. By Semonov raising this. Suppose
Smith backs this position, we will have a problem here.

D: Semonov has instructions that are two months old deliberately. Any
decisions on freezing would be after ABM signed.

K: I think we understand the problem.

D: What he said was this should be done before the signing. On this point
Semonov couldn't say a point.

K: So it's the one sentence.

D: If you accept it but you made it again difficult. Those two points. The
govt. is meeting. I am now waiting. I have to receive an answer on this point.
Otherwise you said it was acceptable to you.

K: I have explained to you the impression it makes here. I understand but it
will be hard to explain. Such fine points it will be hard for our people to follow
it. I understand it and you can report it to Moscow.

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:10 a.m.

5/11/71

-10-

D: I don't know what to report. Semonov only reported something two months old.

K: Smith thinks it's a formal proposal. This will force us to respond in plenary session. Then you reject it and everyone knows we have a deadlock.

D: We can work it. Semonov is telling you a position two months old. Ther's nothing about the proposal that's new. Only two men here know.

K: It's funny that what he thinks is what I know to be true.

D: The difference between us was before or after ABM, the freezing. You raised it last moment less ______ the two cities. We have done what your govt. has asked. Semonov said nothing about that.

K: I told the President three weeks ago that you were making (promising) moves and we were going to make progress. It will raise --

D: They are talking different things. It's an old position.

K: I can hold Smith here until Tues of next week. If we don't have a reply form you we will have to give him a reply. You know what it will be and it will be in that channel.

D: I can make it easier. You listen to Smith and ask him the crucial question. Does he understand?

K: He thinks it can be negotiated.

D: Then let's discuss it with Semonov again and repeat it. He will say it will be no. You will have an offical anser from me. Semonov will not have it officially. Then they can clarify the points. He can ask before or after. Then you will have reply. It will be for their own amusement.

K: I will discuss it with the President. It's a bureaucratic fine point. The fact of the matter is that in a matter we have handled with discretion here is now a part of the record of our bureaucracy. It creates internal problems for us which we can handle but we could have gone to Semonov first.

D: You can do that. He can hahdle it.

K: Do you want to deal with the President or the bureaucracy?

D: Semonov says he discussed what was before.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012327
By CHNARA Date 5/11/71

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:10 a.m.

5/11/71

-11-

K: I understand.

D: Now you do not care but it was a major point for two months. This was a point. Then I brought you an answer, yes, and Semonov is discussing after the decision.

K: I tell you honestly that the President will not engage in many more exchanges when it gets so complicated. He will probably decide to handle it formally.

D: I tried to explain to you but you don't listen. The disagreement was whether to accept before or after.

K: The crucial point is after 2 and a half years and months of discussions with you and me, we will get something important. We are one sentence away from that. One sentence that commits you to nothing. At that precise moment the issue goes into the bureaucracy and deprives it of the symbolic thing which could have had or a start in our relationship for significant progress. All the rest is legalistic. You can say he stayed within the instructions. I will not accuse him of not. But while the President is waiting for a reply from you to receive 3 telegrams in succession that Soviet diplomats discussed what he is waiting for and that Soviets have made no move, he will not understand. You can explain or I can but he doesn't read --

D: Your President can be told it's ...

K: The idea made on freeze before this.

D: After or before this is it really. Our delegation (discussions) are 3 months old.

K: Our delegation doesn't even know about the freeze.

D: Whether on or off the record it's 3 months old.

K: You will find the correct way of reporting our feelings.

D: I don't see what it is. Semonov didn't raise after the decisions.

K: He talked for 5 hours. Smith considers it important enough to tell the Secy. of State, Secy. of Defense and the President. Smith isn't a fool. He doesn't report to these people unless he thinks there's a new proposal. Whether legally Semonov stayed within his instructions.

D: You check with Smith if it was before or after.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EOL2558
By CNARA Date Stated

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1-12362
By CHNARA Date 5/11/71

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:10 a.m.

5/11/71

-12-

K: He is not just a one exchange behind you and me.

D: We can have agreement 4 months ago. You raised this question.

K: Do you want the President to think that after he turned it down you are then raising it with one of his diplomats to see if they will raise it?

D: Why? Our diplomats don't know what's going on through this channel.

K: After Haig talked with you it's raised two more themes. After I raised (an item on Berlin) you stopped it. (So it can be done.)

D: No, he didn't say anything on the crucial points.

K: Sure, he raised something that was turned down.

D: You will turn it down again?

K: Of course. (I would like to see what would happen if you in our channel opposed something and then we raised it in a lower level.)

D: He has no instructions. It's just talks. Feel out the timing.

K: It's a curious coincidence. Smith said it was a written brief and some new instructions.

D: It's Smith's interpretation. He didn't have any new instructions.

K: You are doing a great job.

D: You don't have to believe me. It's a very sensible explanation. They don't know what's going on. How could we believe that a second rate diplomat can make a decision you cannot get from the President?

K: There are 50 explanations.

D: They don't know what's going on! Why go through you or Smith on a 3 months old position?

K: You have to believe me. Our feeling here is that I talked with the President on the basis of the two cables yesterday. We just have a grave doubt whether there is an attempt to make a departure and we can see this as good faith. We have tried very hard.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E10258
By CNARA Date 6/26/87

-13-

D: If you accepted text --

K: We never agreed on NCA. We want each side to reserve their position.

D: Our govt. has not decided.

K: That's where we will be in practice. Even if you don't agree, we will adopt the decision.

not

D: I can/make the decision for the govt.

K: While you were discussing it and while we were stopping the bureaucracy process to decide it they can throw in new things for them. (?) The fact I heard it 3 months ago means nothing.

D: You only have to discuss ABM. You can tell them.

K: You can waste two weeks if you want.

D: It's the decision about after.

K: The only thing -- we are going over old ground. I have told you what will happen. I will hold Smith until Tues. We will have to send him back with new instructions. You can decide if it's handled in Vienna or here.

D: I am not responsible for there. If you want ____ it's all right with me and my govt. You can tell Semonov no. We don't care.

K: But it's a problem here because our officials will run around --

D: Tell Smith to check with Semonov again. Then just say we cannot accept this after. Then say before we will discuss. Semonov will say no. He doesn't know about this and it will be closed chapter. It will happen. I know. You are looking suspiciously of things that are not.

K: In Smith's mind it's a new offer and it's considered bad faith by the President and we tried to work with you. I can produce a stalemate 50 ways in Vienna. What's hard for him to achieve progress. Whether you get a reply or not I have not pressed you on that. We wanted silence until it was a reply.

D: You asked me to tell you. I have read the telegram from Gromyko. Semonov has no authority.

K: Whether he had authority or not he has produced the impression.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By CHARA Date El01

Amb. Dobrynin/Kissinger

9:10 a.m.

5/11/71

-14-

D: That's difficult to catch.

K: It's the impression that has been created. That impression has made irritation in this building.

D: When you report to the President, report what I have said. Privately between you and me I have a telegram to tell you that Semonov has not authority. What they discussed on freezing. sbonxx On agreements with offensive missiles only after ABM.

K: The fact of enforcing us to reject it is unfriendly. If I surfaced the letter you didn't accept and forced you to reject it --

D: There was no proposal from Semonov.inx

K: Smith has a misapprehension.

D: You can tell Smith you ran into me and --

K: No, it puts me in a position of thwarting initiative.

B: I will talk with Smith.

K: No, just ask that there be no further discussion with Americans at any level until we hear from you.

D: Not to discuss anything xxx except ABM?

K: Right now we have Smith here.

D: Semonov can receive a telegram to discuss nothing but ABM.

K: There's no way of avoiding instructions to Smith now.

D: No official proposal made of any kind. It's on the record. It's up to you to handle your case. xibackx He didn't mention any specific proposal. It's for your understanding. How you handle it is up to you. How you handle it is your business.

K: Smith goes back next week. If no answer from you I will tell you what his instructions are. I will also tell you then if we are interested in handling it in our channel.

D: That's fair enough.

K: Now that's been thrown into Vienna channel we will have to bring it to a conclusion in ours before it goes further.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Amb. Smith/Kissinger
11:30 a. m. -ish 5/11/71

S: The General Advisory Committee meets tomorrow and wants a report. I said since I have not seen the President that it's bad and I told him the WH didn't want to talk to anyone until talking to him.

K: The President feels strongly. And if Ruina goes running about --

S: I will say I haven't seen the President until the Committee is out of town.

K: The President wants to wait until after the Verification Panel. Hethoughtif you would wait until Mon. or Tues., he would prefer it. He wants to study the papers and meet Mon. or Tues.

S: If we get inquiries from the Hill --

K: Say you are leaving the end of the week and we will hold you over.

By KHL

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON

J. Schlessinger/Kissinger

11:35 a.m.

5/11/71

K: I am going to NY this afternoon and back tomorrow. I ask you don't make a final decision until we can talk. The place you will be most useful would be at ________ assessments. If it's a case of levels we can settle it. I have talked with Haldeman about it. Finances can be fixed.

S: You have to deal with Congress more. They tend to foul up the mechanics.

K: Don't commit yourself until we can talk tomorrow or the next day.

S: You bet.

By KWL NARA, Date 5/12/84

TELCON
Geo. Ball/Kissinger
10:20 a.m. 5/12/71

K: I am claling for a little help. Your Democratic friends are going crazy on NATO.

B: I will be glad to help.

K: It looks as if they have a majority. We are trying to hold the Senate Republicans. I can't hold it without support on the Democrat side.

B: All right.

K: Some sense of the gravity of what we are up against, the Republicans are suggesting a compromise to the Mansfield thing -- "Congress finds the amount of funds maintaining forces in Europe ? ? ? ? . It's therefore the sense of the Congress to withdraw from Europe a substantial portion ? ? ? ? ?." You can imggine what the others are like. I am talking out of school. I have the Republican leadership to reject for a week any compromise of any kind and I will move to get public pressure against them and I will report in 48 hours.

B: I need from you the XXX nose count of who is the best people to hit.

K: I don't have it here. I will get it for you.

B: I need some kind of current briefing on balance of payments and offset and maybe the best things is to come down and go to work.

K: What gxxx can we get into the media. Can you work on the NYTimes?

B: Sure. I will call Oakes this afternoon.

K: And senior people along the same line.

B: At the Times?

K: No. People who help run foreign policy.

B: Cy Vance and Dean Acheson. When I get to NYC I will start.

K: Let me know what you can do. VN is trivia compared to this.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Rogers/Kissinger

5/12/71 10:55 a.m.

K: I was just calling you. I had a talk with the President. I guess we're talking about the same thing.

R: Yes, he called me about it. I want all our ducks in a row. I think I should do it initially.

K: I wanted to discuss that with you. The President wanted me to discuss this: You should handle all contacts with the Senators except the ones he should make himself and ...

R: It may well be that he should get involved. But right now may be too soon. It might seem frenetic.

K: We have scheduled a meeting here on the substantive positions at the end of which assignment for Senatorial contacts will be given to State. This is simply so that MacGregor is clued in to it and also so we can plan what outside groups should get involved.

R: Let's not plan that wixxx till we know what we want to do. I think the first thing is for me to see Mansfield and talk to him. The second important thing is to urge the Senate to delay, for the obvious reason that this is a major step and if the Senate is thinking of such broad action they should at least hold hearings and give us a chance to testify. I don't see how Mansfield can avoid that kind of appeal. But the first thing is to keep others out of it for the moment. I thought I'd get in touch with Mansfield, Scott and Griffin.

K: We have had Scott and Griffin here this morning. They are willing for a delay, but they are worried about the Senate situation.

R: Well, I'll keep you and Clark posted. Let me first talk to Scott and if he doesn't oppose it I'll talk to Mansfield. I'll appeal to his judgment, ask him to at least hold hearings. It destroys the idea of a European Security Conference. Cause we don't have any chips. I said we would have a conference but the principal subject would be xixx mutual balanced force reductions. This destroys that.

S

K: Well, keep me posted.

R: Sure will. Say Henry, I've called Al Haig, but I didn't get him yet. Did you see the memo about Korry?

K: No.

By KLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Secretary Rogers
5/12/71 10:55 a.m.
pa. 2

R: Well Korry wrote this long bleeding letter...

K: Yes, I've seen the letter.

R: It just confirms what my suspicions are -- I think he's crazy. But the memo said we should find a place for him. I've got the perfect recommendation: I think he should take Frances Kinght's place. [laughter]

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Dean Acheson/Kissinger
11:20 a. m. 5/12/71

K: I was going to ask you for some help. I don't know whether you followed the Mansfield resolution.

A: I am aware of it.

K: It's to cut our forces in Europe by half. It's not just another resolution because it has a good chance of passing. It's before the Senate. To give you some idea of the sense of the panic that seizes our people, they are playing with a compromise resolution -- it says they should be cut in half. Immediately cut off a substantial part of it and our people think it would be a compromise. I have done the following: I talked with Scott and Griffin this morning and said weblee on this last 20 years ago. I said there's no compromise and so I said let me see if the wise men can influence this. Some editorials into the press and contacts with Senators. We are holding firm here. We are not going along with anything.

A: I will do what I can. What do you want? You can use me or quote me.

K: Any Senators to whom you are close?

A: Those that are close are for you. Jackson. Symington is no good.

K: If you could say something publicly. I will think about it and alert you now. I will call you back.

A: I am in the country in the house now because it's raining but when it's nice I will be out. I will be back.

K: You will be back later?

A: after 5:00.

K: I will call then and let you know where we stand.

A: This is very important and I will do what I can. I had a letter in Sunday's paper on the riots. I have on on VN I'm thinking of. I am on your side in this.

K: We will hold firm here.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

McGeo. Bundy/Kissinger
11:30 a.m. 5/12/71

B: What city are you in?

K: Back in Washington.

B: Swung back to work.

K: I was in NY when I --

B: Just for Kitty you came.

K: She is nice but I didn't come for her. We need some establishment help with a problem. I don't know if you have followed the Mansfield resolution. He has tacked an amendment on the draft bill for a cut in half of our forces in a year in Europe. It has a chance of passing. I talked with Scott and Griff and they are going on a compromise resolution. Their idea of a compromise is to go from ______ to sense of Congress and a substantial cut immediately. I have told them and the President's firm that this would undermine the whole post-war policy. It's one thing to debate how quickly the cancer in VN should be cut out but to make a decision of this magnitude by rolling it through Congress would be a disaster. Do you agree?

B: I do. It's partly an inherited deal. The Executive Branch has never paid much attention to him (Mansfield) and never had a chance of a lot. He is not aiming this at the President but a faceless force that keeps 6 divisions in Europe forever. He feels it's not necessary. I don't know what your level of communication with Mike is.

K: We have good communications with him. The President sees him often an this is sprung on us without warning. We saw him two weeks ago on China and we were helpful to him. I have gotten Scott and Griffin to hold off for a week with the argument that people who have been concerned share our concern about this action and I was certain that whatever divisions are on VN and other issues that on structure of the Atlantic Alliance there can be no dispute and a wide consequence on this. The Gallop Polls show ??-??-??-. I am not looking for a public statement but know some articles in papers. TIMEs and NEWSWEEK. If you could help us -- not only us but a sane foreign policy. It could be anquishing or painful but we can't get out and find we are out of everywhere else.

B: 50% by the end of '71 out of W. Europe?

K: That's right. The compromise says that amount spent by US ''7 1 - - - - '' It's therefore the sense of the Congress that the President should take immediate action to withdraw from Europe at the earliest practical date - - - - - - - It's a little better.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

Bundy/Kissinger

11:30 a.m.

5/12/71

-2-

B: Quite a little better because it's hooked to things that could be said to be under control ? ? ? and the political aspects of it. What's the effort exact status -- how do the West Europeans perceive keeping exactly the same number of troops there?

K: We have no intention -- we are not mindlessly keeping 6 divisions there as figure.

B: We did so I thought you might be!

K: Se made a detailed study of NATO requirements and what Europeans have to do for capability there. The way strategic balance is going it's ridiculous to ______ for the defense of Europe. We have that program underway. We'll make the most painstaking approach for mutual force reductions from the Soviets and from interest there including public ones. We are willing to deal with them on that.

B: Does Congress know that?

K: Yes and they will know more clearly. Rogees will be active on that.

B: It's the best way -- for Rogers to show there's double activity and I think the negotiator needs time.

K: What we need this week that there's some support and not just ______ opposition to all foreign policy.

B: I will talk with Geyelin and see what I can get.

K: It's better not to turn this into a partisan issue.

B: I don't find Kleiman very useful now a days. But I can feel him out.

K: Anything that could be done -- it will make so many -- it makes SEA problems easier if it's clear that it's a basis for our foreign policy.

B: It counts the other way too because I don't think the present position will hold and I will have to reach out for Mansfield on SEA. How would go for that. If we showed we were getting out he would bear with you on NATO.

K: The President feels he has been reaching out for two years.

B: That's how the WH always feels. Perceiving the world too much --

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Bundy/Kissinger

11:30 a.m.

5/12/71

K: You can argue the President hasn't out enough. I remember the ceasefire was only thing that separated us from Mansfield.

B: I xx always thought that argument didn't work.

K: 6 weeks is useful at this point.

B: The relationship between the end of US combat involvement and what else we need to do. I will send you a copy of my lecture on this subject. I agree with you on this and if it's tied with leather on SEA but you need time on this I agree.

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Amb. Smith/Kissinger
11:30 a.m. -ish 5/11/71

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

J. Schlessinger/Kissinger

11:35 a.m.

5/11/71

S: You bet.

By KHC NARA, Dato

5/13/04

TELECON

Senator Javits/Mr. Kissinger

11:55 a.m., May 12, 1971

K: Jack, how are you?

J: Scott and Griffin briefed me on the trouble with Mansfield. I came up with a possible alternate -- 'The President has requested to negotiate within NATO for the mutual and balanced forces with the Soviets for greater troop responsibility with our other NATO partners for money with respect to the U.S. balance of payments... and a report will be made to the Congress every 90 days.'

K: We would not go along with that. you're

J: Why? I'm not saying/going to do it. I have no interest in doing it unless you people approve.

K: It puts us under the gun on our negotiations with the Russians.

J: We could leave out the Russians.

K: And under the gun with regard to progress on troop withdrawals. We wouldn't want to do that. This goes to the heart of the Atlantic structure and for that to be considered without hearings is almost inconceivable. If we lose, we will lose and then we will know why foreign policy isn't possible.

J: Then you want to fight frontly.

K: This is the basis for our post-war foreign policy. We are prepared to discuss with the Soviets. If Congress wants to run off before we even start negotiations, the present inclination of the President is if Congress wants to take that responsibility, there is nothing he can do.

J: What about negotiations in NATO for example of more responsibility

K: That is what we are trying to do.

J: I mean putting that in words.

K: I would have to see what the words are. We might look at that.

J: What about the Mathias substitute?

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Senator Javits/XMK Mr. Kissinger

11:55 a.m., May 12, 1971

K: At this stage, the President is of a mind where he feels that this is the worst moment to open the NATO issue without any preparation or warning. At the end of a year where we got the Europeans to commit themselves to strengthen their forces, and at a time when we are entering negotiations with the Russians on MBFR, we find it hard to understand.

J: The case is with you. I am going to vote against all these resolutions. But we are talking about what is to be done. Let me try my hand at some language. Understand that I am acting as a lawyer.

K: I know your views on NATO.

J: I will be against all of them.

K: So will we.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TLECON
Secy. Connally

12:06 p.m.

5/12/71

K: I want to find out whether you have anything on the Pakistan problem.

C: I have but it's not satisfactory. We are looking working on it. They are ready to send a mission over -- IMF and World Bank. Our people are working on it. We don't Ought to have better ideas this afternoon. I will let you know.

K: That's what I wanted to check with you.

TELECON
Secretary Rogers

5/12/71 1:00pm

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

R: ________ just told me what you did with the Treasury. I
wanted to thank you.

K: I am on your side; I'll do anything you want.

R: It's really the President's side.

K: Oh that's right; we're all together on this. I'll do what I can
to keep the other departments in line. They can't take the position
that they want to reserve and then do anyway what Mansfield is recom-
mending.

R: I know. We're going to have difficulty enough meeting it
without rivalry in our ranks. Well thank you very much Henry.

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON
Senator Javits
5/12/71 1:10pm

J: Let me read this to you. You can leave out the first clause if you want: "The President is requested to negotiate within NATO for the assumption of greater troop levels by the other NATO members and financial arrangements consistent with the balance of payments situation of the United States; and, to withdraw U.S. forces in Europe to the extent made possible by such negotiations. The President shall report to the Congress in 90 days, and each 90 days thereafter, on the progress of such negotiations." (Verbatim-- read to jlp after conversation)

K: Which clause can come out?

J: The first. If you don't want to say anything about that it's okay. I don't think it does any harm . . .

K: Of course it does.

J: To leave it in?

K: Yes.

J: Okay, then it would read this way: " . . . .

K: Let me take it up with my colleagues. I want to give it the attention it deserves. I do not believe we are going to go along with it.

J: That's okay. We just wanted you to know what we are thinking. Scott, Griffin and Stennis . . . If you don't like it just tell Scott no. He may say we like this but if you don't give us something better.

K: We'll take it up with the President.

J: Another thing -- I applied to the Russians for a visa. They are giving me hell in Israel. I've gotten the visa but I'm inclined not to go unless I get Dobrynin's and everyone's understanding that I will be well received. What do you think?

K: It depends on what you mean by everyone.

J: I mean that I will be reasonably received by the people I'm going to see.

K: Why are they giving you hell?

J: They're saying I'm the Senator from Tel Aviv.

K: Don't go unless you know they will treat you respectfully.

By KLC W

NARA, Dale

5/12/04

## Section 401 (A)

The President is requested to negotiate within NATO for the assumption of greater troop levels by other NATO members and financial arrangements consistent with the balance of payments situation of the United States; and, to withdraw U. S. forces in Europe to the extent made possible by such negotiations.

## Section 401 (B)

Senator Javits' office:

going to give text to Senator Scott and tell him that Mr. Kissinger has it and he will get back to Scott as to whether the White House wants to go with it. Senators Scott, Griffin and Stennis are quite anxious to have this introduced this afternoon. Best person to get back to is Senator Scott.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

WASHINGTON

May 12, 1971, 1:19pm

Mr. Kissinger:

Dave Abshire just (1:18) called with the
message that Senators Scott and Griffin have
not seen or signed on to the language of the
amendment given to you by Javits. Only
Javits and Stennis have signed on to it.

Julie