TELCONE
Amb. Dinitz/Kissinger

Oct. 12, 1973 - 8:35 a.m.

K: Hello.

D: Dr. Kissinger, good morning. I was supposed to call you at 8:45.

K: I know, I know, but I have to go to a meeting.

D: Just so I didn't delay you.

K: No. No.

D: On the Jordanian thing. Unfortunately, the answer is no. He is also
Field Director to the Prime Minister, and he will get the same answer
the situation there where there is so many forces in battle.
The difficulty to prevent Jordanian troops there from escalating into
involvement of the fighting.

K: But does that mean we'll attack Jordan?

D: No, no. It just means that we are advising them not to take the unit.
The answer is we are absolutely against the ______ of the Jordanian
regiment, of the Jordanian division into Syria.

K: Yeah, but of course will you attack Jordan if it moves?

D: Well, there is no answer to this and I'm, you know, the thing is that
the Prime Minister has been asked the same question by the King
and asked indirectly not to do this. But I don't think that it means that
we are to warn Jordan, no. I will clarify this further. The answer is
that we are against the concept....

K: Well, that's obvious. The question is are you going to attack Jordan if
he transfers the unit?

D: O.K. I'll get this cleared within...

K: Now, secondly, we just had an appeal from Sadat, and he says that
you're bombing civilian populations.

D: I have no information on this.

K: Well, could I urge you not to bomb....

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By NARA Date 01/13/94

-2-

D: In Egypt?

K: Yeah.

D: Alright. I'll check on this, too.

K: Not to bomb civilian targets.

D: I'm pretty sure...

K: I don't believe you are, but I want to make sure that we have transferred the request.

D: Right. On the front, Dr. Kissinger, the battle is advancing, but there are strong counter-attacks. Strong battles and also they are putting their battle, airplanes, they, the pace is a bit slower of the advance, but our people are confident by the end of the day we will reach the original target.

K: Well, Dayan has already announced that again.

D: I understand it came from the Prime Minister saying that she will all the ministers. Is this again, or is this...

K: No, I heard it on Television this morning. That he expects to have broken the Syrians by the end of the day.

D: Well, he did not say mileage. You know, even to me in the cable it didn't say mileage because it confused them so much.

K: No, no. You should know.

D: I know, I know. This is what I have and I probably will have during the morning additional information. There is one more information on the front. During the morning we probably will be confronting the armor division on the Iraqis. I don't know if we will confront them but they will appear in the front area. It is possible that another Iraqi division is already in Syria.

K: Excuse me, the President is calling me, I'll have to call you back.

D: O.K.

TELCONE
President/Kissinger

Oct. 12, 1973 - 8:38 a.m.

K: Mr. President.

P: The morning report.

K: Mr. President, I was just checking ours and just talking to the Israelis to find out what was going on. The Israelis are still advancing into Syria, although they are now getting heavy counter-attacks and the Iraqi armor division is beginning to fight them.

P: The thing we have here from CIA indicates that it was pretty tough up there in the Golan Heights and that sort of thing. So apparently they are having a pretty good fight up there.

K: That's right. But they claim to be advancing and they claim to be reaching their objective. Of course it is obvious that all the fighting is tougher for the Israelis than it has ever been before.

P: Of course.

K: We had a call from Heath yesterday, transferring a request from Jordan which we received already directly that if he is forced to move an armored unit into Syria, whether he could get an assurance from the Israelis that they wouldn't attack him.

P: From Jordan?

K: That was a hell of a question to ask.

P: Of course they'll attack.

K: Well, I asked, I put it to the Israelis and they said they are not trying to add to the divisions facing them from Syria, but they're not looking for an excuse to attack Jordan.

P: No, they don't want to fight another country. Well, it's really going on, isn't it?

K: Oh, yeah, we've had an appeal from Sadat to prevent Israeli attacks on civilian targets and we're sending a reply back saying we've made that appeal to the Israelis. Then we've had an appeal from King Hussein. Today diplomacy is going to begin moving. I'm seeing the press at noon, to see whether they can put up a simple cease-fire.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
Date 6/17/97
XARA Dated 6/17/97

-2-

P: With the idea that the Soviets really would abstain?

K: That's right. That would still pass it.

P: The Soviets certainly wouldn't, unless the Chinese.... But the Soviets
why would they abstain from such a thing? I mean....

K: Well, they just, because right now there's a sort of a balance in the
sense that the Israelis gained in Syria and lost in Egypt.

P: Although they haven't gained in Syria quite as much as we'd hoped
apparently.

K: I can't get a clear report of that.

P: Now what about our own activities with regard to resupply, etc. Has
anything gone forward in that respect?

K: Well, last night we finally told Schlesinger just to charter some of
these civilian air lines, airplanes from civilian air lines for the
Defense Department and then turn them over to the Israelis.

P: Good.

K: We've tried everything else and these civilian airlines just wouldn't
charter to the Israelis directly.

P: That's alright.

K: So that's going to start moving later today.

P: But they have not yet actually run short of equipment?

K: No. And of course the most important assurance you gave them was
that you'd replace the equipment.

P: The planes and tanks, right?

K: Right. So that they can expend what they've got, knowing they'll get
more.

P: The lines that be, it seems to me, if you're .... simply that we're
not going to discuss what's going to be done, but the President has
always said that it is essential to maintain the balance of power in
that area.

K: I'm giving a press conference today.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: ARA Dct 01/13/91

-3-

P: But maintaining the balance of power, do you think that's too provocative?

K: No, we've always said that we....

P: That's what I mean. That's a signal to the Israelis, etc.

K: I'm giving a press conference today. I've got to navigate that one.

P: Yeah. Well, there's no more to be done. Of course I don't know
anybody that's got a better idea as to what we're doing.

K: There's nothing else to be done, Mr. President. After all....

P: In terms of intervention, that's out of the question.

K: Impossible.

P: In terms of massive open support for Israel, that will just bring
massive open support by the Russians.

K: And it wouldn't change the situation in the next two or three days, which
is what we're talking about.

P: .... the Israelis are not looking at two or three days. That's our
problem, isn't it? They may be looking at two or three weeks before
they can really start clobbering these people.

K: In two or three weeks the international presses will become
unmanageable.

P: I see. Well then, if it's two or three days then the Israelis have just got
to win something on the Syrian front. Right?

K: That's right.

P: That's the point.

K: That's exactly it.

P: Do the Israelis know that the international pressure will become im-
possible?

K: Well, you know, they keep telling us to take care of them but that's
great for them.

P: That's right. No way. Well, anyway, good luck. Call me back.

K: I'll call you back.

TELCORN

Amb. McCloskey/ Joe Sisco/ Secy Kissinger

8:46 a.m., October 12, 1973

M: Good morning, Sir.

K: How are you?

M: Fine. Joe Sisco is on the line with me.

S: Good morning, Mr. Secretary.

M: We're calling to get Joe a little advice on his session this morning, particularly on the arms to Israel question. Joe, go ahead.

S: Mr. Secretary, with all these articles that came out this morning -- they seem to be Pentagon sources to me. I'm assuming that this has not been deliberate on our part. Is that correct?

K: I haven't seen any but --

S: Yeah, well, there's a Getler article in the Washington Post.

K: Oh, those sons of bitches.

S: Yeah. The burden of the articles is that we are getting close to a decision. What I'd like a little guidance on is this, I was going to play it in the lowest possible key.

K: That is correct.

S: Even though it's a secret session, it isn't going to be a secret session with that many Congressmen on hand. Will the United States supply military equipment losses of Israel? I was just going to say what you would normally say on it publicly. I'm really not going to get into this thing and that the focus of our efforts is to get the fighting stopped and that's where we really want to keep it. Now, of course, there's a lot of heat there on the Hill on this one as you well know. Do you want me to go a little shade further or not?

K: How would you go a shade further, Joe?

S: Well, let me try it out. You know what our policy is --

K: Because I have a press conference too and I don't want --

S: That's why I'm checking. Because if I say one thing and then you and I are different, it will -- I was going to say something like this: Well, you know what our policy has been and I am not aware of any change in our policy.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: A MARA Date 6/12/73

Amb. McCloskey/Sisco/Secy Kissinger

2

K: Of military supply.

S: We're just talking about that. How does that sound to you?

K: That's good and I'll say the same thing.

M: I think you have to say that much.

S: Now on the Russians, can I stick basically low key with what Bob said?

K: Yeah. But say we have warned them and it is too early to make a judgment whether they have in fact acted irresponsibly.

S: Yeah. Too early and could I add the sentence that Bob said that of course, if it were to become massive -- that is, if they press me, I'm not going to say any more than I have to -- why obviously, this puts a new face on the thing.

K: That's right.

S: Okay. I think that's about all I need, Mr. Secretary.

K: Okay, Joe.

M: Mr. Secretary, I have the room set up for you downstairs. Do you have any particular feelings about the Great Seal. We now have it mounted behind you. We could take that down --

K: For all I care, you could get one from the zoo and put a thing around it's neck and say this is the Seal of the United States.

M: You told me the other day you want to see things done with style and I want to be sure that it's done correctly. We could take that down and hang a smaller one in front of the lectern or do you want to leave it all in my hands?

K: Well, I don't care so much about the Seal as long as there are two heralds in front of me when I come in.

M: I can't find them yet this morning.

K: Irishmen ought to know what heralds are.

M: I know what they are, I just can't find them this morning.

K: Okay. Listen, Bob, I need about half an hour with you before the press conference.

M: OK. I'll be here.

K: And get a little guidance in terms... since I don't/briefings.

M: OK.

K: To stay consistent with what you've said. Joe, all the best this morning.

S: With your support I'll do alright.

K: You'll do great with or without my support.

S: Thank you.

*

DECLASSIFIED

E01295C

Authority

BY: NARA Doc: 6/17/67

TELCOM
Reston/Sec. Kissinger

Friday, Oct. 12, 1973

10:35 a.m.

R: When am I going to see you in your new splendor.

K: I would be more than happy to see you. How about next week?

R: I think so, Henry. I will be going to California this weekend and coming back toward the end of the week. I begin to get the impression that our friend really has a chance.

K: In NY? You mean for the nomination.

R: Yes.

K: You mean now?

R: Yes.

K: I am not being cute. I talked briefly to him yesterday and he made an enigmatic reference that almost suggested that. I mean our friend.

R: We have cased it very, very carefully on the Hill and Connally is a non-starter. He is going to run into one hell of a battle if he tried to ram Connally through.

K: Really?

R: Yes.

K: I have not been told a thing. I have been at State practically all the time with this present mess.

R: How does it look today?

K: I think if we can hold it together--by holding together I mean without irrevocable damage with any of the parties involved or the Soviets -- for another 72 hours we may begin to get out of it.

R: Is the battlefield situation holding in the Sinai.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized E01295C

D: 12 MARA Date: 6/13/73

2

Reston

Oct. 12, 1973

K: Yes. That is stable. The Israelis seem to be advancing in Syria.

R: Let me come to see you...

K: I am going to China. When are you coming back.

R: Wednesday night. When are you going to China?

K: The following Monday night.

R: Do you think you will have any time?

K: Let's have breakfast at the Metropolitan Club Thursday morning at 7:45

R: That's great.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
D: XARA Dts: 6/17/73

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger

October 12, 1973

11:04:5 m.

K: I am on my way to a press conference.

D: OK, I just wanted to tell you we are 30 kilometers from Damascas.
We are shelling the airport of Damascus which is a military airport
not of the city.

K: OK.

D: Something other things I want to tell you, but I will tell you
when you come back.

K: When you get into the outskirts you can take public transportation.

D: On the way to Egypt there are now 13-14 (Soviet) transports.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: NARA Doc. No. 6/13/73

TELCON
Gen. Haig - Secretary Kissinger

October 12, 1973

12:55 p. m.

K: How are things going?

H: Good, good. How about you, how did the press conference go?

K: I sort of was very even handed so the Jewish Community. They might be mad. I think my task is to keep the Arabs quiet and the Soviets quiet while slowing.... stop there.

H: You know the Soviets have alerted three airborne divisions.

K: Well, I am seeing Dobrynin for lunch. If they did that, that's it.

H: They are going to force us to counter. We can't ignore that.

K: How did you learn about it.

H: Latest SitRep.

K: Absolutely. If they do that we are going in. Tell that to Dobrynin at lunch, but we better alert some of ours.

H: Yep. Well, I think, if it's true, I haven't seen it...

K: It's one of those code word exercises.... Is he going to announce the Vice President at 8:30?

H: 9:00.

K: I thought it was 8:30.

H: It's always been 9:00.

K: I was told to be there at 8:30. East Room?

H: We want you there and seated for preliminary camera work, etc.

K: Has he decided?

H: Yes, he has decided. You won't be unhappy, you won't be happy but you won't be unhappy.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority FO1295F

Date 6/17/67

By: XARA

2.

K: If it isn't Conally I will be all right. That's a no no. I think if it's a neutral choice. I told him when he asked me Thursday I preferred Rockefeller. From his point of view, I could see having someone permitted a campaign between Conally and Rockefeller after 74. ... no that gives me no pain.

H: like our aim you know,

K: I am not saying a thing...

H: Absolutely. He's not telling anybody, not Laird, not Ron, nobody.

K: Look, I'm not going to say a thing. I have the Saudi Foreign Minister...

H: OK, Henry, I haven't told him anything about the Soviet thing.

K: I will increase the readiness of our forces.

H: Something they can read, but no one else can.

K: Yah.

TELCON
Senator Humphrey - Secretary Kissinger

October 12, 1973

2:30 p. m.

(in 8th floor Dining Room with Amb. Dobrynin present)

H: I know you are very busy, Henery, but I felt it necessary to call you since I can't make it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee meeting this afternoon. I feel very strongly that we should insure prompt delivery of the necessary planes for Israel. I understand we are making deliveries right now, but that they are rather slow and may be strung out over several months. I would like to see a number of planes made available promptly.

K: Hubert, that is not exactly what is being done. You understand, keep in mind that whatever we do give them, they come back the next day asking for 5 times as much.

H: But I understand the Russians are replenishing the Arab stocks. Some Senators up here on the Hill have heard that they are taking delivery on SAM-6 missiles and that several Antonov planes are landing daily.

K: From what we can tell, most of these deliveries are consumables. If we are wrong, that is some thing we will have to look at.

H: I just don't think we can let that little country that we have so much invested in get clobbered.

K: Hubert, let me say something as a friend, we have to navigate carefully.

H: How do we know the Russians aren't fooling us?

K: If the Russians are fooling us we know what we will have to do. Any time you have any suggestions, feel perfectly free to call me.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
Dated: 6/13/97

NARA Doc. 6/13/97

TELCORN
Shalev/Sec. Kissinger

Friday, Oct. 12, 1973

3:15 p.m.

K: I wanted to check your message to Eagleburger.

S: Yes.

K: Does that mean we can move any time? Because so far
we have been delaying.

S: That means that the latest proposal you made us about time
table which would sort of bring us up to tomorrow evening I
thought.

K: Is that what you accept.

S: We accept that. We are not urging you for any further....

K: Good. That is the course on which I will stay. Thank you.
I have some information for you.

S: Yes.

K: We have information that the Soviets have mobilized three
airborne divisions and when I called this to the attention of the
Soviet Ambassador he made some extremely threatening noises.
I told him we would not tolerate it.

S: Yes, sir.

K: I wanted you to be aware of this development. If they inter-
veve we will be forced to do something drastic. But you should
know it. He also wants you to know they are against your getting
close to Damascus. I am just passing this on to you for informa-
tion. If you want to pass anything on to me for them I will do it.
I told him it would lead to severe deterioration of relations with
us and we would take action if they put in combat units.

S: Let me get that.

K: Look, I have to run to see the President, now.

S: Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12950

Date 01/12/73

By: XIRA

TELECON
Schlesinger/Kissinger

October 12, 1973

5:40

S. What did you think about the Ambassador's emotional scene?

K. About being brutalized by the Foreign Relations Committee?

S. Yes.... I guess Burns outlined the package. Have you talked to Burns?

K. No.

S. We have a package of replacements work about $500 million along the lines of... meeting. Jackson wants 50 Phantoms within 24 hours.

K. Tell him to go screw himself. I don't mind you making a commitment to whatever package seems reasonable. I still think we ought to get something moving but not in quantities that would get this blown sky high.

S. We are moving in the Azores. I will call you back after I check with him. Did you have anything else?

K. I just returned your call.

S. Good. We will go ahead with the package which consists of 30 Skyhawks A-4s, 16 Phantoms, 125 tanks, including 65 M60s and a whole range of other things, 3 Hawk fighters and so on.

K. If you could tell him this was White House orders this will help us enormously.

S. I'll do that. Delighted to talk with you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized

Date 01/12/95

By: MIRA

TELECON

Scalkissinger

October 12, 1973

5:50

K. Hi, John. How are you?

S. Fine. What was it you called about.

K. You called me.

S. You just called me off the Council floor. (Malik?) Just said there will be grave consequences if the Israelis continue to hit civilian targets in Syria, Egypt and thinks like Soviet ships and targets.

K. We don't reply.

S. No, I don't intend to reply.

K. If they make an overt threat of any reaction by them you better warn them.

S. I will... They just said there will be grave consequences to which I will not reply. If this meeting ends I may be in town tonight for the Vice President thing.

K. I thought you would be the one.

S. Maybe I am. I have been told to come.

K. So have I. See you soon, John.

S. I will be in touch.

DECLASSIFIED

Authentic EO12957
D: 12/12/91

I*

TELCONE
Foreign Minister Eban - Secretary Kissinger

October 12, 1973

5:53 p. m.

E: I know you have a great variety of problems at this moment.

K: That's right.

E: I refer to the message I asked Minister Shalev to send you this
morning about what ought to ensue in the Security Council

K: Right.

E: I would very much like before anything is done a chance to
consult with you, perhaps....

K: My understanding on this is not to happen until tomorrow.

E: Yes, there is still a round of speeches... low profile on which...
if I could come in tomorrow morning.

K: Not before tomorrow late afternoon.

E: Coudn't come in in the morning, anyway you would like to
arrange...

K: I don't mind you coming in openly.

E: Perhaps I could do that. There are one or two things Mrs. Meir
asked me to put to you...

K: All I need is the time to do it. How about 9:00.

E: Later would be better.

K: Unfortunately have Bourguiba Jr. coming at 10:00 and I have
changed him twice already.

E: All right, at 9:00 then.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz.
E012109
B: 12 MARA DEC 01 13:07

TELCORN
C. Douglas Dillon - Secretary Kissinger

October 12, 1973

6:13 p.m.

K: How are you?

D: Fine. Good to hear from you. How was your dinner at the
Metropolitan.

K: Marvelous.

D: Delighted to hear it went well.

K: It went very well.

D: I'm delighted to hear it. Sorry I couldn't be there.

K: I am calling you on behalf of the President and of course on
my own behalf. As you may know, I made a number of changes
in the Department today, you may not know. One involved bringing
back our Ambassador to Japan for the Assistant Secretary for
East Asian Affairs. That leaves the post in Japan open. The
President and I were hoping very much you might consider taking
that...

D: That's very flattering, very difficult for me to do anything right
now. Naturally don't want to...

K: Oh, I don't expect an answer right this minute. Let me say that
as far as I am concerned it is one of the two or three top Ambassadorial
posts in which the Ambassador really makes enourmous amount of
difference...

D: I would agree with you on that and...

K: in which he would have considerable scope... not one of those
things were instructions are sent in excruciating detail.

D: I can see that, I think you are right about that but it is, I am
flattered and pleased that you would and that the President would...

K: Really very impressed by our talk and I think you would
make a really great national service if you would consider it.

D: Very difficult. If I find ...find I can't do it, out of respect
and to work with you and the President, but I am deeply involved
in, ....... and family problems.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12955
Date 01/13/94

BY XENA DAE 01/13/94

2.

K: But do give it some thought.

D: ... not get that far away. I would like, naturally, but its
such a surprise, naturally want to think about it. Don't know
how quickly you want an answer.

K: I am going to China at the end of next week, back early the
following week. Perhaps we can talk again before that.

D: All right. By the end of next week I think.... I am at home
now, out in the country... I can talk to my wife, and my father...
problems there. I will have a clear idea by Monday. Thank
you for calling. I appreciate it. You must be having quite a
hard baptism.

K: If I make it through this crises without the Arabs, Soviets
or even the Israelis blowing up...

D: Really be something.

K: Look forward to talking to you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12952
B: NARA DEPT. 9/14/97

TELCON
Lord Cromer - Secretary Kissinger

October 12, 1973

6:50 p. m.

K: ... nominated as Vice President, thought I ought to...

C: You what?

K: I'm joking.

C: Heard nothing from London. Will you be at hand...

K: I can be reached through the White House board.

C: OK, Just as soon as I get anything I'll let you know. I passed on the second thing you gave me..

K: Not necessary to do it tonight, but it would be hell pful to get to get a preliminary reaction. What is your personal reaction.

C: My personal reaction is in favor. It seems a sensible thing to do. I think it is a role we could usefully play.

K: If they give us any trouble, you and I, why don't we just go ahead on our own.

C: Right. Get set up with our own office in the UN.
One of the problems ... slowly at home logistically is damned party conference at Blackpool. but the communications are quite good and I hope to hear this evening.

K: Good because we need to design our strategy.

C: I think the options for the future are extremely difficult.
Not looked at the ... paper we gave you in New York on guarantees.

K: Oh yes, it's a lot more relevant now than then.

C: That's what I mean.

K: In fact I want to talk to you about that. I was looking forward to talking to Alec about it.

C: I am at your disposition whenever you want to talk...

K: Let me get this operation under way first, then turn energetically to that aspect ...

DECLASSIFIED
Author: J. E. B. Stedman
Date: 09-12-73

TELCORN

Yuri Vorontsov - Secretary Kissinger

October 12, 1973

7:00 p. m.

V: What are you doing in town?

K: Only leave time... get damned Middle East thing....

V: I decided to stay and shoot it out.

K: One of the worst threats ever made against me.

V: I am a secret weapon and they use me ....

K: Where is the Ambassador?

V: He's opening a youth exposition, but he plans to visit you this evening. Wants to talk to you urgently. Will it be possible to reach you ... in an hour's time.

K: Look, I have to be at the White House at 8:30. Tell him if he can arrange for me to be a member of the Politburo I can make him Vice President.

V: He only has an hour to make a decision.

K: Tell him to come to the State Department at 8:00.

V: And you have to be at the White House at 8:30?

K: And I can't be reached there. Have you got the message.

V: Yes, we have got the message and it is being translated now. By 8:00 he will have it ... at the State Department.

K: Tell him to come....

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
D: 12 MAR 1973
Page 1 of 2

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 12, 1973

7:45 p. m.

K. Hello.

D. Dr. Kissinger. I just came back from Clement. I mean Schlesinger and Clement was there, and I also had a talk with the Prime Minister. When can you see me?

K. We have a few other problems tonight.

D. I understand this. I am not trying to.... I thought I had some important things on the political situation.

K. I have Dobrynin coming in a few minutes with a very important message.

D. It might be related.

K. Can you tell me about it now?

D. We regard the message that your people sent us as very serious about the threat and the Prime Minister hopes that you are regarding reacting to it very strongly.

K. There is no question of that. I was very upset about the harrassment from the pro-Jewis senators this afternoon. As if we had not done enough.

D. The Committee, or two or three members, knew exactly what you had done. They were concerned with two Phantoms a day and that shipment did not get out even today. That was Symington and Javits. I felt I had to tell them.... and also emphasized what you had done to help.

K. We will not heed to Soviet threats and we are staying on the schedule we discussed with you.

D. The Prime Minister said we could start the schedule today.

K. It is now too late for that. Especially after the threat we should show no nervousness.

D. You can start any time.

K. Once you have been threatened it is better to stick to your course.
One thing that Javitz said was that we would make you pay for your
diplomatic gains. We got the Soviet message Wednesday morning
and here we are in Friday.

D. I did not enter into the political arena at all.

K. You and I will remain good friends.

D. Yes. We are very candid with each other.

K. As long as we understand each other. We know the situation.
If there is time before I go to the White House after I have talked
to Dobrynin I will call you.

D. I will wait for your call.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized E01295C

BY XARA Date 6/13/01

TELECON
Lord Cromer/Kissinger

October 12, 1973

8:15 p. m.

C.... That the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State issued these
proposals. However, our information, which is recently good, is that
Israel's attitude does not say that. Our firm impression is that Egypt
at this stage would only be interested in what we are talking about if
the terms were to regain their '67 position.

K. That will be their formal position but I think they will accept this.
Just as the Israelis' formal position will be the other one. I have
just had Dobrynin in atain and he again confirmed it.

C. The Israelis are less firm and our impression is they would only
be interested if limited to swap of Syrian gains to Egyptian losses.
We can.... I am seeking from our Ambassador in Egypt some ideas
on Sadat's thinking.

K. You will probably not get the right answer. Let me get back to
Dobrynin and check with you an hour after the broadcast.

C. I will be hearing from you this evening.

K. I am positive on the Egyptian side.

C. This is our information, we think it is firm.

K. Let me talk to Dobrynin again and I will call you by 9:00.

C. I will be waiting.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz.
EO1295F
By: MRA Dated: 6/1/73

45-S

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

TELECON

DinitzKissinger
October 12, 1973
8:25 p. m.

K. I have to be very brief again because I have to run off to the White House.

D. I know.

K. I had a talk with Dobrynin. He had two messages. One to protest against our resupply and the second extremely threatening about your bombing of civilian targets and threatening that Tel Aviv will not be spared if this continues. I said that if any Soviet planes are seen over the area... there will be direct American involvement.

D. Let me get this down.

K. We are moving an aircraft carrier from Gibraltar to the... If any Soviet personnel, plans or ground personnel appear in the area the US will intervene. I have no authority to say this. I would not want to have Dayan hold a press conference.

D. What Dayan says never relates to our cables. That is the problem.

K. Why You can believe this is true. I have discussed it with the President this afternoon but I would not like it to get out, especially on the day the Congress passed the War Powers Bill.

D. What?

K. A bill that limits the President's power to make way. A second problem on the scenario, I have discussed with you. We are not triggering it tonight under any circumstances. But I may do it tomorrow and can I tell the British that I have discussed it with you?

D. For instance, Eban suggested that we may do this with the Australians instead of the British.

K.

D. Do you think the British will be reliable?

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12957

BY NARA Doc 613/01

PARTIALLY DECLASSIFIED ON 9/1/03
by NARA on the recommendation of the
NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958

K. SANITIZED

D. I will have to.... Maybe we will leave this question open until we reach.....

K. ... talk with them already. They called about... It won't happen until tomorrow anyway. I think we should get some diplomatic process before this gets out of hand.

D. It is imperative that we meet tonight some time because I have a very clear scenario from the Prime Minister directly.

K. We will meet between 11 and 12 sometime.

D. Can you fix a meeting with Eban?

K. I would just as soon not see him. It is just a waste of my time.

D. Well, he is flying in tonight. I cannot bring him to the meeting tonight I guess, but from now on he will have to be involved with the diplomatic procedure.

K. I must get to the White House. I cannot be late.

D. Let us talk when you get back from the White House. Good night.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295C

Dated: 6/13/97

By: XUARA

TELCORN

Lord Cromer/Kissinger

October 12, 1973 - 9:33 p.m.

C: Ah, look, have you got anything from Dobrynin?

K: Yes, I've had a word with Dobrynin. And he says this, he said your information is correct, but irrelevant.

C: What does he mean by that?

K: He means that, he asked me to say that they had no right to say flatly that the Egyptians will accept it, but they do say that if you put it forward on the assumption that the Egyptians will accept it it would be a very good gamble.

C: A very good gamble?

K: Yeah. But what he was really trying to tell me is, now I know the Israeli attitude which will be yes, but. They may raise one or two....

C: Well, yes, we've been explaining this to our Ambassador in Tel Aviv. I certainly didn't tell him what was going on, but he seen the Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Kidron earlier in the day. And they were just playing hard to get. They said, of course, they were under great pressure from the military as they were expected to be. They should go through with it.

K: What you people have to assume is that we wouldn't ask you to do this if we didn't think there was a reasonable possibility.

C: No, no, no, that I take 100 percent. I mean there's no problem with that at all. We have to take a little bit. I don't mean this with any mistrust of your information.

K: No, no, it's entirely up to you. I'm just giving you the answers I receive.

C: Yes, sure. When you say the information is correct but irrelevant, I'm a little bit perplexed by that.

K: They seemed to be convinced that the Egyptians do not want to be in the position of, they do not want to....

C: They do not want to be ....

K: They do not want to be in the position of having asked for it. But

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12950
By: XARA Date: 6/17/91

they apparently would accept it if the Security Council passed it without
their indicating that they wanted it.

C: Yes. Imposed by the Security Council. I mean, without their asking for it.

K: That is correct.

C: I get the sense of that and they wouldn't come out in refutation of it in other words, obviously. I mean they might make a bad public demonstration but in reality they wouldn't.

K: Eventually they will accept it.

C: You still feel this is right Henry, don't you?

K: I would not have...

C: I mean in your own judgment.

K: My own judgment is that it is the right thing to do. I believe it is the way to peace or at least a good gamble on it and I think it would be a useful role to play and the reason we have asked you is because we thought you were the most trustworthy of the members of the Security Council.

C: I thank you Sir.

K: No, I am serious.

C: But, no, I take that in all seriousness too.

K: We have no interest in playing games with this.

C: I realize that no but there will be a pretty difficult balance, you will see. The balance on the issues and the balance on the timing and the timing on the ground is something that is really going to be the decision isn't it. That neither party on the ground wants to take it any further.

K: My judgment is... I've had very extensive conversations with the Isra elis. They are aware of this scenario. They authorized me to trigger it. They did not say they would accept it.

C: No, they wouldn't.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz
E01295C
BY: MARA DeC. 6/13/94

- 3 -

K: But they wouldn't.

C: Naturally not.

K: But I would obviously not move if I thought this would get us into a total confrontation with the Israelis.

C: But I have from our people in Tel Aviv from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, from Kidron, is that they would be prepared to look at it unless they could do some sort of trade between the North and the South.

K: First of all....

C: This is generalistic.

K: First of all Rollie I don't believe that the Ministry would know it as well as the Prime Minister with whom I am in close contact almost 3 or 4 times a day. Secondly, I don't want to mislead you. I'm not saying that the Israelis are in fact going to accept it but we believe it may start a negotiation.

C: I think that's right. In reading this telegram from Tel Aviv of what the Ministry said it is what you expect a Ministry official to say.

K: Especially a Ministry official who to my certain knowledge, since the foreign Minister isn't being kept fully informed, the Ministry isn't.

C: It's a democratic answer again. That I agree with. Alright Henry, let me get back to London on this.

K: Let me see whether I can find the piece of paper from the Soviets that I can read to you and I'll call you right back.

C: Alright. Fine Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
BY MIRA Date 6/14/69

TELCONE
Cromer/HAK

October 12, 1973/9:43 p.m.

K: Hello.

C: Yes Henry.

K: Let me read you from what is called an oral note which Dobrynin handed me. "Acting in the spirit of understanding which is characteristic of our relations with the President (don't throw up please) we were consulting during the last several days with the leaders of Egypt and Syria on the question of termination of hostilities. Frankly speaking the conversations were protracted and not easy but nevertheless we are now able to say to the President that the Soviet Union is ready not to block adoption of the ceasefire resolution in the Security Council. The President of course understands that in the present situation the Soviet Union cannot vote in the Security Council in favor of the ceasefire resolution but the main thing is that we will not vote against it. Our representative will abstain during the vote." Now this of course is in total strictest confidence.

C: Of course. Now, as far as the participants in the event of consent, I won't claim hard to get in the slightest intention but we obviously have to get our lines fairly straight.

K: I think after you have decided to proceed we will then instruct Scali to talk to Madlen.

C: That's fine. It's what is on the ground that worries me.

K: What happens on the ground is that they will probably continue fighting until it is adopted.

C: I'm sure they will. There is no doubt about that. The question is will they go on afterwards and repute any of this. But I don't believe they will personally.

K: My smell Rollie is that this is going to do it.

C: I think its well worth the effort.

K: I don't see what we have to lose.

C: The reaction from London is thoroughly encouraging but they....

K: Will you transmit this to them.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01295C
BY NARA Date 01/12/73

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12951
D: 12 MARA Date 01/14/14

C: Oh sure, of course.

K: OK.

C: Right away and...

K: I urge you not to trigger anything without further consultation with me.

C: What do you mean by that?

K: I mean don't have Madelin go to Scali without...

C: No...

K: We should aim for a Security Council late tomorrow.

C: Your Congressional situation here is alright.

K: We'll be alright for the weekend and I've made some preparations.

C: I made it very clear to London it needs to be over the weekend.

K: It would be helpful to be over the weekend. If you wanted Sunday that's alright too.

C: To be sure but before they go back to business.

K: But my smell of it is that we should start triggering this procedure before any of these maniacal parties changes their mind.

C: I agree. I mean I think that tomorrow is perfectly alright.

K: Because this will also give the King of Jordan and the King of Saudi Arabia an opportunity to delay.

C: Exactly.

K: OK.

C: Of course it wouldn't reach the light of day. I will start mainly in the morning I would imagine.

K: Well, we should start murmuring in the middle of the afternoon.

C: It might get out before then. Does that worry you.

K: How could it?

C: It'll be the middle of the afternoon here. That's alright but I don't know whether...what I don't know is whether they need to assign anybody else in the Security Council before they finally make up their minds to do it.

K: I think the other members...

C: You think it is a mistake.

K: I think it is a mistake because the other members of the ... will be bided by what the Soviets and we do.

C: If you and the Soviets made the right noises they would probably lose their minds.

K: My judgment is that if you start canvassing you'll get a negative reaction while if you propose it and then we and the Soviets indicate reluctant approval...

C: I'm with you. see

K: You/what I mean.

C: I'm with you entirely. Fine. Well, we'll work on that basis Henry...

K: But since I have to keep my maniacal parties here in line you will make sure that before you move with any other party you let me know.

C: Henry, we don't need other parties.

K: Yes.

C: Henry, or any other nationality.

K: Yes.

C: OK. I will. We'll be the two participants.

K: Yes.

C: Alright. Fine. Thank you Henry.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295C

Date 01/13/69

By: XARA

TelCon:10/12/73-11:45 p.m.

Secretary Kissinger/
Secretary Schlesinger

K: Hello Jim.

S: Hi Henry.

K: I've just been meeting on an urgent basis with Dinitz, who says they are running out substantially of ammunition. They based their strategy on the assumption that they would get the ammunition replaced this week, as the President had promised them on Tuesday, and that they are stopping their offensive in Syria because they can't move because of lack of supplies. And the Egyptians have transferred artillery over and now they are saying this is a problem of a major thrust into the Sinai. And it is true we gave them our assurances.

S: Well, what do you want to do?

K: Well, I don't know what I want to do. I just feel that we did make some undertaking - you know it would help us. I was raising hell with them for not keeping their offensive going for a day while we were setting up the scenario on diplomacy. And now they have got to stop it.

S: Well, we can ...

K: Are you sure that your people, I know that you are serious, but I frankly have no confidence that Clements and Hill and Company aren't sabotaging this every step of the way. If you want my candid opinion.

S: Well ...

K: I just don't find the initiative. If something were to happen then, it would.

S: You mean on the obtaining of charter flights?

K: Well, on just getting along, you know some way in four days could have been found. I don't know what it is, it isn't my job. I just don't see, except for you, I don't know anyone over there who has any intention of making this happen. You know that Clements would just as soon move them the other way.

- 2 -

S: Well, ~~the~~ he will do what the President wants.

K: Yea, but the way he interprets what the President wants is not
necessarily what the President wants.

S: Well, we have the possibility of just telling the U.S. aircraft to go on whatever they need.

K: I just find it hard to believe that every company would ~~refuse~~ charter unless somebody sort of told them in a half-ass way.

S: Well, the problem with that is that they have good business outside. Unlike other circumstances, back during the Vietnamese war when they agreed to charter, they were going around with their feet - equivalent half empty on the charter flights.

K: For example, did anyone talk to - you know I never objected the question by the fella I had - who is head of Continental Airlines?
S: No, I did.

S: Sicks, right.

K: Bob: Now I know Goddamn well he is a great patriot and if somebody told him we needed airplanes, I just can't believe that he wouldn't do it, unless you winked at him and said but if it doesn't happen until next week my heart won't be broken.

S: Well, it is - what is - when are they going to start running out of reserves?

K: They are out now. They have stopped their offensive. And they are now in deep trouble in the Sinai. I am basing this on a message from the Prime Minister to the President. And you know maybe it is not true, but it is a hell of a responsibility to take.

S: Well, if we started now and really turned the screws on these guys, I suspect that we can collect a few aircraft for tomorrow. But I think if you want to do something about it, you better let a U.S. aircraft fly all the way in.

K: That I would have to discuss ~~with~~ the President.

- 3 -

S: Or another thing we could do ...

screws

K: But can't we turn the screws on these charter companies. I am just convinced that if the screws were turned, they would have produced.

S: I think that that may be right. We never went back at them again because of the decision to go with the Military Airlift command to...

K: Well then ______. They could then pick it up in the Azores if they wanted to. It is already there.

S: The stuffs in the Azores. What do you mean they? Are you talking about the charters?

K: Well, if the charters picked it up here and the Israelis picked up what is already in the Azores, that would at least put some steam behind it.

S: Well, how much do they need.

K: I have no estimates of that.

S: OK. let me see what I can do. One thing we could do we could take these ten or 12 C-130s that we are planning to give them and load them up and let them go all the way.

K: Well, let's do that. Well, I will call Dinitz and tell him to have his military guy get in touch with you.

S: OK.

K: But will you tell Smoller (II) for Christ sakes to get off his ass because if a catastrophe happens there is going to be some accounting. From our point of view we needed the Israeli offensive moving. If the Israelis are on their knees tomorrow night we are not going to...

S: Well, Henry it would have been desirable for them to tell us that they were going to run out of ammunition.

K: Well, on the other hand I must tell you we told them every day that this stuff was coming. There wasn't a day that we didn't tell them

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295C
By: NARA Date 6/13/61

that they had 20 aircraft in the morning and then they didn't have them in the evening.

S: I really can't say that that was the case until the night before last it was assumed that these guys were going to be able to haul them themselves along with the aircraft that they would round up. It wasn't until yesterday that we - the night before - that we started this search for aircraft on their behalf. So, ah, the situation ...

K: We can reconstruct what went wrong later. Let's see what we can get going here.

S: OK

K: Because this whole diplomacy is going to come apart if they look impotent. It can only work if they look as if they were gaining, not if they look as if they were losing.

S: OK. The first thing to do is to have those C-130s that we turn over carrying ammo. Do you want US pilots to fly in those C-130s? I don't see any reason why not.

K: I've never thought this thing through from that point of view. Why don't you work that out with their military attache?

S: OK, very good.

K: OK, good.

S: OK.

K: Thank you.

S: You bet.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: XARA Date: 6/13/91

Telcon:10/12/73:11:54 p.m.

Mr. Kissinger/
General Haig

K: Hello.

H: Hi, Henry.

K: Al, you know having a massive problem with the Israelis because the sons of bitches in Defense have been stalling for four days and not one airplane has moved.

H: Oh no.

K: Oh yes. After the decision on Tuesday not one God ☞ damn shipload - not one has moved. And they are now out of ammunition. They are stopping their Syrian offensive. The Egyptians have transferred artillery to the other side of the Canal.

H: Oh boy.

K: And may start an offensive tomorrow so now the question is whether they are going to collapse in the Sinai, and you know what this does to the diplomatic scenario I described to you.

H: Yes, yeah.

K: Which absolutely required an Israeli offensive.

H: Yep.

K: And they told us they were running out of ammunition. They conducted the operation on the assumption that it would be replenished by the end of this week. That is a combination of Clements, Hill and Noyes. Now my orders apparently just aren't carried out over there.

H: All right. Do you want me to call ☞ Jim right away.?

K: ☞ Well, I have called Jim. Will you call Clements and throw the fear of God into him.?

H: Yes, sure.

K: And also throw the fear of God into Schlesinger.

H: Right, I will do that.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
By: NARA Date: 6/17/73

TELCONE

Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger

S: How are you proceeding in relation to plans for re-supply
We've got four more Phantoms to augment the ten we discussed
this morning. Shall we send them in tomorrow?

K: I would send them in tomorrow, then have a day's pause, or
a day's pause tomorrow and send them Tuesday.

S: That would bring the total up to twenty, if we should want to
do it. On another item, the Tows. As you know, they have
never appeared out there before so there will be a certain
dramatic effect. We are prepared to strip down our inventory
a bit and...

K: What are they exactly?

S: It's an anti-tank missile, guided missile... much better,
longer range and far more accurate.

K: Longer range than, oh...

S: 2-3,000 meters range.

K: But your question is not numbers, your question is wisdom
of sending them. What's your instinct?

S: My instinct is yes.

K: My instinct is now we have started we had better win.

S: Well, I just want to be in line with the diplomatic timing.

K: The diplomatic timing is... I told the Russians that if they
want to effect anything here... by tomorrow morning. It doesn't
hurt to teach them that when they cross us something violent
happens.

S: Your inclination then is to drag out some and send them off
on an early flight.

K: Anything else, Jim?

S: No Henry. Thanks.

TelCon:12:32-10/13/73

Secretary Kissinger/
Ambassador Dinitz

K: Hello, Mr. Ambassador.

D: Yes, Dr. Kissinger.

K: A number of things. We are going to fly three C-5As today.

D: The Cs - the big ones with 60 tons.

K: Right. And we are just going to fly them through the Portugese base <ins>SANITIZED</ins> And we are going to fly at least three of the C-141s that are in the Azores to Israel and we have increased the number of phantoms to 14.

D: Fourteen.

K: They will be there by Monday night.

D: Monday night.

K: Now, in the meantime, however, I must ask something of you Mr. Ambassador. I just again have been called by Jackson threatened with a Congressional investigation, being told this is a lousy example of crisis management and he is going to demand an overall of the national security system. I must say this - if I get one more <ins>going</ins> threatening call by anybody I am <ins>giving</ins> out of the supply business. And with all my friendship I am not going to stand for it.

D: Dr. Kissinger, I really want you to believe me that I have not talked not - yesterday I didn't even see him. I talked to Symington and to Javits yesterday and I haven't seen him yesterday or today - haven't spoken one word to him.

K: Well that may be but someone has to get the word to him as to what is going on.

D: I am willing to call him and explain to him exactly what the situation is and when I talked to him three days ago the one thing I said was that we never had a better friend than Dr. Kissinger. And I can repeat it in his eyes. So I am willing to call him right now and say to him exactly what the situation is but I am not calling any Senators.

*

- 2 -

K: Well the major point is we cannot hold still for a situation in which a massive attack is launched on our handling of this crisis. First of all I think it has been handled rather well. Even with some delays of delivery.

D: Exceptional ________ yes.

K: Well - but this item has been ________ recovered now by flying in C-5s.

D: Right

K: And ah

D: Can I ask you on this supply thing sir so that I will be completely clear. The three C5s will fly today. You don't have an estimate morning - night- or something.

K: By this evening I am certain.

D: By evening. The three C-141s - this is an additional element, right.

K: Yes.

D: And that will also go out today from the Azores.

K: Yes.

D: Where will they pick up the supplies.

K: They brought the supplies to the Azores for you to pick up yesterday.

D: They have got the supplies.

K: And they are just going on with the supplies they brought to the Azores.

D: I see. Going on. I see. I didn't know this. Frankly you - on the charters?

K: And we are going to get 20 charters. This time I am sure we will get them.

D: All right. Do I have to tell our ________ people anything.

K: Well you just tell all of this to General Gerher(?? sp). If there is any problem you let me know.

D: Fine.

K: You know I have to tell you this. Our whole foreign policy position depends on our not being represented as having screwed up a crisis and with all affection for Israel, if it turns out that we are going to be under attack for mismanagement in a crisis, we will have to turn on you. I don't care who does it, if that happens, we will defend ourselves.

D: I understand this but there is no one - not only me - there is no one from our Embassy I can assure you. I beg of you to believe me - I know you do what

K:

D:

K:

D:

K:

D:

K:

SANITIZED