TELCON

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

3:55 pm - Oct. 23, 1972

3

K: Yes, I'll have the press conference tomorrow or Thursday, regardless of what happens. I had always intended that.

MK: I see, well---

K: And while I won't be able to give -- what I want to do with the press conference is enough guidance so the people will know the parameters of the game that's being played now.

MK: Well, that would be enormously helpful.

K: And not speculate -- it is not spent widely all over the place, and you know, everybody--the North Vietnamese, the South, and especially the Vietnamese party's have their own audiences to satisfy. And since it's no secret to say what's being intended as a compromise. Neither side is going to have everything it wanted. And, therefore, they both have to posture themselves as this process is being completed. Many of these leaks are pretty self-serving.

MK: Well, I had a talk last night at a dinner with a very respected Communist diplomat who told me that you and Le Duc Tho has pretty well reached a deal, and that there were, according to what he said, very minor things to be taken care of and that he would be astonished if it couldn't be wrapped up very quickly.

K: Well, I wouldn't be quite that optimistic, because as you get to that phase of the negotiation you always want the nuances to start getting important. But, when you compare a situation where you are looking for a change in tense in sentences, you feel that you are making progress.

MK: Exactly.

K: Now, they are talking about refinements and one or two items of some principle. You are really in a different ball game.

MK: Yeah. Well this is--everybody is watching you like crazy.

K: Don't watch me with a November 7th deadline in mind.

MK: That would be foolish?

K: Foolish--maybe yes, maybe no, but it's--we are absolutely not playing for that.

MK: Right.

TELCON
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

3:55 pm - October 23, 1972

K: Hello.

T: Hi.

K: How are you, Bob.

T: All right. Did you bring peace to--

K: Of course.

T: I wonder if I could sort of pick your brains on some of the things that went on.

K: (Laughter) That's what I've been waiting for--for you to phone to pick my brains. They are addled anyway.

T: I can at least try, huh. I'm just wondering--I gather from what I've heard around is that you didn't go to sell any coalition government.

K:

K: That is correct.

T: But going back and reading the January offer that we made, he talked about an electoral commission of all segments--

K: Well, I won't go into what we did discuss. And it isn't so true I was trying to settle or not settle. You know, these were discussions I've been meeting and one shouldn't be surprised that in three days--this is a question of peace and war for a country that's been fighting for ten years. Why shouldn't I take some time to think about it.

T: You mean in terms of what you put on the table.

K: Well in terms of the general discussions.

T: Well, there were some reports that your discussions weren't exactly cordial.

K: Well, they didn't come from me. Because--

T: Well, there was some talk that they weren't as friendly as they could have been, but I really am asking you whether or not there were any hard words spoken.

K: No hard words were spoken. They were very businesslike.

CLASSIFIED

Author: 301-2958
Date: 10/1/70
By: B. MARRIOT

TELCONE

Toth/Kissinger

2

T: Very frank!

K: Very businesslike. This is not for quotation.

T: No.

K: But it is for guidance.

T: Yeah. Did you find that they were resisting the progress that had been made, or just examining it to see all its ramifications?

K: They were examining it. There were certain things that have a different context for them than for us. After a settlement, we will be gone and they will be there so they obviously have to look at certain things more minutely than we would. I mean the South Vietnamese will be there and we will be gone, and all of this was more or less expected.

T: Well, did you go to lay out what had happened in previous sessions with Le Duc Tho? Was that the purpose of it, that is to really fully brief them or were you there to bring them one step further in terms to future negotiations.

K: Well, you know, these two things are hard to separate. They've been kept pretty well informed all along, but of course, there's no substitute, you can't get in all the details by cable.

T: Well, can we expect you to have another session with Le Duc Tho before the, you know, within the next two weeks.

K: You know, we never say this ahead of time.

T: Yeah.

K: You can certainly expect that these exchanges will continue. And that they are in an extremely active <u>strategic</u> phase. And after all, Pham Van Dong said that progress was being made.

T: When will all this be out.

K: In the new we can give that progress, or whatever he called it, that progress is being made.

T: Well, Henry, if significant progress is made, it goes to the President offering--if we had significant progress, well it--he put it another way, unless significant progress is made in the negotiations, the bombing and mining will continue. As there has been significant progress,

TELCONE
Toth/Kissinger

3

this would give credence to the reports that we have curtailed bombing.

K: Well, it might give credence to them, yes.

T: But, is that a fair conclusion that the bombings has been--there have been reports that the bombing around Hanoi is eased as a gesture, is that right?

K: Well, that seems to be right reading the daily reports.

T: Would expect any further sort of de-escalation of the conflict before an overall settlement is at least agreed in principle?

K: I don't go into that. I'm going to have a press conference anyway in a couple of days--either tomorrow or Thursday.

T: Big news?

K: No. Just to put it into context.

T: Uh huh. Well, you don't want to talk about the coalition business at all.

K: Not particularly.

T: Because, you can get into this area of how you can compromise, it seems like we backed off on terms of Presidential elections in favor of a constituent assembly election.

K: Well, that's what some newspapers say, it doesn't mean that we've done it.

T: Oh. Well, can you give me any guidance on that?

K: I won't give you any guidance on that but I will tell you to stay away from any specific formula.

T: Oh, I see, that had been printed. Well, that's fair enough. The talk about an imminent end of the hostilities, before implementation of the political settlement begins, is that pretty far off speculation.

K: Well, I won't go into any other discussion. Don't draw any conclusion from that, but any intelligent man is going to narrow it to two or three issues and if I deny some and no comment the others you can know where we are.

T: I wish I were that clever.

CLASSIFIED

AUTHOR: E017958
BANK: ARA DATE: 5/1/69

I*

TELCONE

4

Toth/Kissinger

T: But, I'm going to sit back and think about what you said for about
two hours before I--

I

K: Bob, you've been closer to correct than any other journalist. /Hand it to:
You were the only one who understood what I was saying in September.

T: Well, I have to submit all my pieces for---
the pulitzer

K: And, all the issue are to subtle/they are too subtle for the people won't understand.

[Laughter]

T: Listen, my people don't understand it.

K: I know, because they have certain fixed ideas as to what was possible,
how it could be done.

T: A little while ago, I made a series of paragraphs in my stories, you
know, the only thing you have in this business is your byline. You
get kinda [illegible] serious when--

K: You actually put in their own paragraphs.

I

T: They actually did it, the insisted on it, they/said take my byline off,
they said we need your byline, can't we negotiate this. But is was
serving an inocuous paragraph at the same it made me look a little
foolish. It was unclear what this means. Well, if it was unclear
what it means, and my explanation that followed (laughter)

K: Really, I tell you--this is not to flatter you--but your judgment
has been very good and your instinct on this, I told them that. No
matter how improper it looks in the light of what you read in--most
of the newsmen are sucking their own thumbs and are writing the stuff
they said was going to happen as already having happened.

T: Yes, that's true. I can see that and some of them are very good
friends of mine.

K: Many of them are extremely able journalists, it's no reflection on
them.

T: Yeah. Well, Henry, thanks a lot and I look forward to your press
conference.

K: Good, bye.

T: Bye.

UNCLASSIFIED
Date: 01/29/95
Box: 7413
Page-header: 01/29/95

BROOKLYN DAILY NEWSPAPER

TELCORN

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

D: ... brother and his wife.

K: Oh, you were at that ...

D: And they think that you are traveling too much.

K: (laughter)

D: That's why he said he was really much more thinner than you are.
And he said, "Well, I have some responsibility and he's just traveling
around the world."

K: (laughter) Somebody asked him why he didn't have an accent and I did
and he said, "Because he's the Kissinger who listens."

D: (laughter) ... talk along those lines.

K: Anatol, I called you -- I just got in.

D: Yes, so I imagine.

K: And I will see you tomorrow.

D: Yes. When do you want me to come?

K: Actually, I think I'm free for lunch. Are you free for lunch?

D: Tomorrow, yes.

K: Why don't you come over here for lunch.

D: Okay. Will be fine with me. One o'clock?

K: One o'clock. But what I wanted to do is to see whether I could tell you
the following tonight because time is of some importance.

D: Yes, I understand, so go ahead.

K: We received a somewhat threatening message from Hanoi and the
situation is this.

D: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
by: MW P. Sze C0304

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

- 2 -

K: They don't understand the American domestic situation at all.

D: Yeah.

K: If I had wanted to protract the negotiations, I could have easily
protracted them without this theater.

D: Without?

K: Without going through all this exercise.

D: I understand.

K: Because I could have just haggled over every paragraph for weeks.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: So what we wanted to do is to settle it.

D: Yeah.

K: On the other hand, what we cannot do is to have a public confrontation
with the South Vietnamese in the last two weeks of the elections and
be accused of everyone of undermining the people for whom we've been
fighting for 4 years. Now that is a fact of life.

D: Yes.

K: Therefore if Hanoi forces us to choose between a confrontation with
South Vietnam and a confrontation with North Vietnam, we will
unhesitatingly choose a confrontation with North Vietnam because that's
what we've been having.

D: Yeah.

K: Now I have made a serious effort.

D: Yes.

K: And there have been certain difficulties which I will discuss with you
tomorrow.

D: Yes.

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

K: But for the moment what I want to say is this, we have proposed to them that they meet us again next week.

D: Not this week?

K: Or any time they want to, let them give the date. I'll meet them this weekend if they want. To work out some of these issues. It is my judgment that most of them or all of them are a lot easier than the issues we've already settled.

D: Yes. What was really the issues, Henry? Because I've tried to get from General Haig but I . . .

K: Well, I'll go into details with you tomorrow.

D: For me it was important only one thing really. The question on the schedule -- your schedule with them on October 10th or it's rather as I understood yesterday and today from General Haig you would like to discuss a new question -- well, this is not really new one but to the extent that you would like some kind of commitment on the issue of their troops so what is really the issue because . .

K: What I want to discuss with them -- three categories of problems. One are simply drafting changes which some are almost entirely cosmetic.

D: In agreement which you make, huh?

K: Yes. They are of no consequence and I won't bore you with them.

D: Yeah, okay.

K: I am sure they will accept 80% of those.

D: Yeah.

K: I mean, they really are the sort of thing that come up at the end of every agreement but that would enable the South Vietnamese to say they made a contribution.

D: Yeah.

K: The second is a proposal by me on how we could redraft the political -- one political paragraph that has some substantive meaning -- it will not change the outcome but it would change the presentation a little bit.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By N.W.APA 5/24/72

["TELCORN", "Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger", "11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972", "- 4 -", "D: But the paragraph is in the agreement?", "K: Yes. And the third has to do with some practical arrangement about their troops. I will make a very concrete proposal to you that does not have to go into the agreement.", "D: Yeah.", "K: And I think it can be worked out also.", "D: Yeah.", "K: Now if we then can agree on that document, then we believe we have discharged our responsibilities towards our allies. And we will then be able to proceed in returning to Saigon and bringing about a succession.", "D: I understand. You see the question really is what --", "K: They have really an important choice to make. If they think -- they may think we are deliberately delaying it beyond November 7th so we can bomb them or do something. I give you the solemn assurance of the President that this is not the case and make an engagement to your government on that issue. Second, we have an obligation to our allies, however, and we cannot act in an unprincipled way. And we always told them we would have to discuss it with our allies. Now they must have enough sources of information in Saigon to know what difficulties I have had. And I must say that the interview which Pham Van Dong gave at the critical moment certainly made life even harder.", "D: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

- 5 -

K: Now what you can add to it is, when we next agree on a document it will have included all the objections other allies have made and we can then proceed with great confidence. Secondly, that we are not delaying it frivolously. And thirdly, that if they take us on in the interval, we will just 100% back Saigon.

D: Well, actually the point but it is rather __________ matter of ________ and they really felt before ________ are the topics ________ they were representing the case that they were making __________ not only there but in Moscow that they made several concessions to you.

K: They have made concessions --

D: Point 7, point 10, and this ________ about Laos and Cambodia thing. So to us they tell us that everything now match -- and ours and you really proposal from your side have a ________ agreement so this --

K: No, what's in the agreement is very easy to handle.

D: Yes.

K: It's very easy to handle, you just have to take my word for it. Except possibly one point which is also nothing compared to what we have already settled.

D: So what really to proceed --

K: Well, I want to keep them -- I cannot get a message back to them for about 24 to 36 hours because I have to meet with the President tomorrow who has been in New York today.

D: Yeah, I understand. Really, Henry, situations like this one I simply would like to check it with you. Okay? The general message is that you called and really you expressed it must be in a certain way but practically the same message. I send this telegram to Moscow. So I am prepared to send once again just saying that you spoke with me and you are really just repeating on your own what's said because there is nothing specifically. But the question really is first do you think it could be done everything or is now doesn't look __________ practical but they sometimes interests me, before the election or after the election?

K: I think the final signature should now be after the election.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MWAGA 5/30/72

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

- 6 -

D: But the agreements, I mean --

K: But we could agree on the document we will support in Saigon and we will assume the responsibility and we will not have to go back to them.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: But they will have to give us a few weeks to get it done.

D: You mean after?

K: Yes. We will do it as fast as possible but we have to do it in our own way.

D: But your old schedule which .................... is it really do you think everything is kept as it was before except final signature or you have some . . .

K: No after -- Supposing Le Duc Tho and I met next week and supposing we could agree, then the only thing that has to be obtained is the agreement of our allies. There will not be another appeal for changes.

D: I understand.

K: And we will make that as a flat commitment to you, not just to them.

D: Yeah, that after agreement with them, you will only ......

K: And they have always known that I would have to go to Saigon. But now that I have all of Saigon's comments, but I'm not supporting all of them. If we can work out something, that will be then the final text as far as we are concerned.

D: .................... After the talk with them, you are going to Saigon and if they make ............ you come back with another one?

K: You can guarantee that if we talk to them, I will not ask them for anymore changes.

D: ...... unfortunately, they were under the impression ....................

K: I have trouble hearing you.

D: You see unfortunate, Henry, that they got the impression and we to o from them and from you rather --

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By M.W. CAPTAIN CO. 304

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

K: The ambiguity was always this, I have always told them that I had to
    to to Saigon and that I would do my best. Now you can read from the
    newspapers that I have met with the Saigon people 15 hours a day for
    4 days. Now you have dealt with Vietnamese and you know it doesn't
    work so fast.

D: Yeah. So if I might shorten your message in this way because it's now
in Moscow already 8 o'clock in the morning so if we take into
consideration some urgence of the message. So I may put it this way,
you called and ........ received some messages from my co-government
and you feel it's rather threatening and may have on the whole ............
but what you are suggesting now is really to
give a chance to meet once more and to discuss some maybe changes
which you feel as you put it are rather cosmetic ones.

K: That is correct.

D: Yes, and that's why you really like them not to be hasty in their decision
but rather to look further into this -- to the ______ commitment or
rather statement you make that you are serious and once you really
come to agreement, then there will be no any more changes.

K: I will make a commitment that we will not ask for any more changes.

D: Yes, this is it. And you are going to tell me tomorrow what really it's all about?

K: Exactly.

D: What is the major issue, which you think is difficult? Could you
    mention to me right now? Is it their troops?

K: Well, the major issue is to do something about their troops, not all of them.

D: Yes. . . . . some but it's not to be in a --

K: And it's not to be written in the agreement.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: And another issue is, you know, where we talk about this Committee.

D: Committee of what?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MN APL SDE: 00304

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

- 8 -

K: Of National Reconciliation.

D: Oh, yes, yes, yes.

K: If we could find a synonym for three equal segments, without changing
the substance.

D: What do you mean synonyms?

K: You know, some phrase that means the same thing without using that phrase.

D: About Committee?

K: No, equal segments.

D: Oh, I understand.

K: Because Thieu has said he will never accept that. Now in practice he will almost certainly be prepared to accept the substance if we can find some phrases other than that word. And all the rest is really of a nature that I shouldn't have to bother you with.

D: No, no, I don't think really because what I would like to mention to Moscow because I have to make a decision now. Because if then that's everything, so now they have to -- rather to give the messages to you really. I've got to do in this case -- up to now we just make it in our own way but this to understand really I've got to use this occasion because otherwise it . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 hours coming and then of course our own command as you would like to make it.

K: Yes. Now, of course, we will send our own message also.

D: I understand. I understand but ours could be there as soon.

K: But yours will be there faster because I have to catch some time with the President for the exact text tomorrow.

D: Yeah, I understand. Their answer was about. . .

K: Well, their answer was only that they are very serious and we should keep to the schedule and that we are responsible for the consequences.

TELCON

Ambassador Debrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

D: ... brother and his wife.

K: Oh, you were at that ...

K: (laughter)

D: Yes, so I imagine.

D: Tomorrow, yes.

D: Yes.

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kiseinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

D: Yeah.

D: Without?

D: I understand.

D: Yeah, I understand.

D: Yeah.

D: Yes.

D: Yeah.

D: Yes.

D: Yes.

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p. m., October 23, 1972

- 3 -

K: Put for the moment what I want to say is this, we have proposed to them that they meet us again next week.

D: Not this week?

D: Yes. What was really the issue, Henry? Because I've tried to get from General Haig but I...

D: For me it was important only one thing really. The question on the schedule -- your schedule with them on October 10th or it's rather as I understood yesterday and today from General Haig you would like to discuss a new question -- well, this is not really new one but to the extent that you would like some kind of commitment on the issue of their troops so what is really the issue because...

K: What I want to discuss with them -- three categories of problems. One is simply drafting changes which some are almost entirely cosmetic.

D: Yeah, okay.

D: Yeah.

D: Yeah.

95CLASSIFIED

Auth: 3012958

B: NARA Date 5/1/74

["TELCON", "Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger", "11:22 p. m., October 23, 1972", "- 4 -", "D: But the paragraph is in the agreement?", "K: Yes. And the third has to do with some practical arrangement about their troops. I will make a very concrete proposal to you that does not have to go into the agreement.", "D: Yeah.", "K: And I think it can be worked out also.", "D: Yeah.", "K: Now if we then can agree on that document, then we believe we have discharged our responsibilities towards our allies. And we will then be able to proceed in returning to Saigon and bringing about a succession.", "D: I understand. You see the question really is what --", "K: They have really an important choice to make. If they think -- they may think we are deliberately delaying it beyond November 7th so we can bomb them or do something. I give you the solemn assurance of the President that this is not the case and make an engagement to your government on that issue. Second, we have an obligation to our allies, however, and we cannot act in an unprincipled way. And we always told them we would have to discuss it with our allies. Now they must have enough sources of information in Saigon to know what difficulties I have had. And I must say that the interview which Pham Van Dong gave at the critical moment certainly made life even harder.", "D: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p. m., October 23, 1972

D: Well, actually the point but it is rather ... matter of ... and they really felt before ... are the topics ... they were representing the case that they were making ... not only there but in Moscow that they made several concessions to you.

D: Point 7, point 10, and this ... about Laos and Cambodia thing. So to us they tell us that everything now match -- and ours and you really proposal from your side have a ... agreement so this --

D: Yes.

D: Yeah, I understand. Really, Henry, situations like this one I simply would like to check it with you. Okay? The general message is that you called and really you expressed it must be in a certain way but practically the same message. I send this telegram to Moscow. So I am prepared to send once again just saying that you spoke with me and you are really just repeating on your own what's said because there is nothing specifically. But the question really is first do you think it could be done everything or is now doesn't look ... practical but they sometimes interests me, before the election or after the election?

BECOME INSISTENGS

By: J. B. M. Dic. 5/10/0

BRAUN

TELCORN

Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Kiesinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

D: Yeah, I understand.

D: You mean after?

H: But your old schedule which .................... is it really do you think everything is kept as it was before except final signature or you have some . . .

K: No after -- Supposing Le Due The and I met next week and supposing we could agree, then the only thing that has to be obtained is the agreement of our allies. There will not be another appeal for changes.

D: I understand.

D: You see unfortunate, Henry, that they got the impression and we to a
from them and from you rather --

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:22 p.m., October 23, 1972

- 8 -

D: Oh, yes, yes, yes.

D: What do you mean synonyms?

D: About Committee?

K: No, equal segments.

D: Oh, I understand.

K: Because Thisou has said he will never accept that. Now in practice he will almost certainly be prepared to accept the substance if we can find some phrases other than that word. And all the rest is really of a nature that I shouldn't have to bother you with.

D: No, no, I don't think really because what I would like to mention to Moscow because I have to make a decision now. Because if that's everything, so now they have to -- rather to give the messages to you really. I've got to do in this case -- up to now we just make it in our own way but this to understand really I've got to use this occasion because otherwise it . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 hours coming and then of course our own command as you would like to make it.