Are you sure you want to do this?
Do you have any other way to end the interview?

CLASS: O
E.O. 12/93, Sept. 3.6

By: KLW
NASHA, Date: 5/13/94

TELCOM
Clark Mollenhoff/Kissinger

9/8/72

2

M: All completed by July-20th.

K: I mean all of these events happened between July 5-20 and I didn't know anything since then, I was astonished by the news stories as everyone else was.

M: Well, this is rather typical of Hoffa - I dealt with him -

K: This is not an interview - you can't quote me.

M: No no I understand this - just for background in setting out the facts on it.

K: You know why would I send Hoffa who is on parole and who has no record of involvement in international affairs - what conceivable would we have to have him in Hanoi?

M: Well there couldn't be - the fact of the matter is though, within his union he is sold generally as a tough negotiator and an able negotiator - I know that this is crap too.

K: I am not questioning that but I remember I said to Gibbons when he was there - I said look I am supposed to be a good negotiator would you ask me to negotiate your next contract with the companies. You know he doesn't know anything about the subject. I don't want to get into a fight with Hoffa - my only argument is that the National Security Adviser of the President did not ask Hoffa to intercede for him - to intercede for the U.S. Government in Hanoi. That is the only issue involved.

M: Did you ever talk with Rogers about this or about the fact that he might go over there in some capacity.

K: NO. Frankly Clark is between you and me, I was absolutely confident that the legal people wouldn't clear him. So it never occurred to me that he could get a passport unless we asked for it and I had no intention of asking for it.

M: Well it surprised me - but you see I am aware of how Hoffa is.

I*

TELECON

Clark Mollenhoff/Kissinger

9/8/72

3

K: But it never occurred to me that any agency of the government would give a passport without checking with us - that what he presented was really true. See, I thought I had it turned off.

M: The first thing you knew -

K: There was no reason to tell Rogers because I had told Hoffa and Taub that we didn't want it - I didn't think he would go to any other agency to ask for a passport claiming he was sent by us. I am not sure he did that - I don't know why he got the passport.

M: Well he managed one way or the other to ______ them up there in the Pardon Office in the Detroit area and he got one by them apparently representing that he had White House clearance on this whole thing and he had been going around making the kind of misrepresentation that usually represents only trouble for those who deal with him.

K: The only thing we dealt with him was one meeting and one phone conversation.

M: Did you talk to Hoffa personally?

K: I have never talked to Hoffa.

M: You talked only with --

K: I talked with Taub personally once and to --
if you

M: Do you know who he tried to speak to/on Wednesday?

K: This week? To the best of my knowledge no.

M: Apparently there is some indication that he tried to reach you and talked to somebody in your office.

K: I don't believe that.

The president of the open house
of the son of aOMB
President John F. Kennedy

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.H.Y

NASA Date: 5/12/04

9/8/72

4

M: Well I know he at least represented this to the people he was with.

K: Hoffa?

M: Hoffa said he was calling Dr. Kissinger at the White House and went over to use the telephone and apparently came back and said that he didn't get through but he talked to somebody in your office.

K: Impossible - that I would know. XXX He certainly didn't talk to me.

M: Well no he didn't represent that he had talked to you.

K: Well I didn't get a message that Hoffa had called.

M: This is the kind of thing that represented the kind of problems when Bobby Kennedy had not time for him after a period of time because he lies through his teeth on things when he doesn't even have to lie.

K: Look I know nothing about Hoffa, I've got nothing to do with Hoffa and I have no interest in Hoffa, he is totally out of my field and I have no reason to be involved with him that is absolutely all I wanted was to have him do whatever he wants to do as a private citizen and to do it in a legal way.

M: Have you had any conversations with Rogers about this? Since it happened?

K: Haig has. It hasn't been a White House issue.

M: Well the _______________ of the sentence intially was handled through the President's office.

K: I had nothing to do with it.

M: I know that and the terms were very strict on his travel and that was pointed to last December as one of the megating circumstances and then subsequently this thing goes through.

K: I did not talk to Rogers about his passport at all.

TELCONE
Clark Mollenhoff/Kissinger

9/8/72

5

M: You did not.

K: No.

M: Okay fine.

K: No one notified my office until after it had happened.

M: What was the nature of the conversation with Haig?

K: Well we just wanted to find out what had happened and why.
Because we were astonished by this as much as anybody.
We were under the impression that he couldn't travel.
We thought all of this was a ploy to get him off parole.

M: Well I think your assumption there is probably correct because he wanted to get respectability. There is no question about that and with Gibbons would have been seeking in every way to have him noted as a great international figure and at that point he probably acted to those active in the political sphere that this might benefit the Administration although I can't see how the hell it would.

K: Not at all.

M: Well it certainly doesn't make your tasks any easier.

K: Well we did what we could - we even told the North Vietnamese - I mean we passed the message to them that he didn't represent us.

M: That would have been at what stage?

K: Before July 25th. All of this happened in the month of July.

M: Okay Henry I think that basically takes care of all the problems that I have in connection with this - I won't quote you on it but I am going to use the information itself.

K: You can it is understood.

M: Okay fine

It is possible to send a message by telephone
in a few seconds, and at a cost of less than
one cent per word.
Please read this article!

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELCOM

Senator Mansfield/Mr. Kissinger

11:08 a.m., September 8, 1972

By: KHLW NAVAQ. Date: 5/13/04

K: Senator, how are you?

M: Fine. Listen, I'd like to see you sometime briefing either before you go or after you come back. And I know you're rushed right now.

K: Well, can we do it right after I get back?

M: Sure.

K: It's about your trip?

M: Yeah.

K: Could you give me your preliminary view now because between you and me, I'm going to see the Chinese Ambassador this afternoon.

M: Oh. Are you going to see him down here?

K: No, I'm going to New York. That's why my day today is very rushed.

M: That's understandable. But I don't know -- what I was thinking of I don't think it would look good for Scott and me together to repeat the trip.

K: I agree with you.

M: I think that George would be lovely to go with but I'm worried about his age and health.

K: Right.

M: I don't know but how about a fellow like Percy? Some enthusiasm there?

K: (laughs) You're more bipartisan than he is. I'm just thinking of the President's reaction, not of mine. I like Chuck, he's a good friend of mine.

M: Well, I just haven't got any names. Cooper would be a good name but he's going out.

K: He's going out.

The president should be open to
get the job done or I could be
Pretend to do it?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.M.L. (NASIA Date: 5/12/94)

TELCOM

11:08 a.m., September 8, 1972

M: ... I don't think would be interested. ______ is going to the UN and that's about it.

K: Why don't I talk to the President about the possibility of Percy going with you?

M: Well, that's just a suggestion; I haven't even talked to him.

K: Yeah. Actually from our point of view, we have no reason -- the only problem with the Chinese is they don't want to get involved in our partisan politics.

M: Right.

K: The one way they can turn off candidates is by saying they never have single people.

M: They have a point.

K: And that way they'll be safe through 76 you see.

M: That's right.

K: And given the tenor shift of our relations -- this has nothing to do with this campaign when it couldn't happen anyway.

M: Oh, no; I can appreciate it and sympathize with the point of view expressed.

K: But in the runoff toward the 76 campaign, I'm sure they'll want a lot of candidates going there and using them as a platform.

M: Oh, I see. Oh, you're looking on Percy as one of these.

K: No, no, no, no. As long as they pair people -- No, that's why they don't want you alone. It has nothing to do with you alone.

M: Yeah, yeah.

K: But let me talk to the President. If we could find some way of which we've asked you or something like that.

M: Yeah. Well, you know, that's what we were talking about in the beginning, Henry.

H. J. Kissinger, the President

President's Office

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

TELCONE

11:08 a.m., September 8, 1972

By: KMLV
NASA Date: 5/12/72

K: Yeah.

M: I'm just interested in a followup because my primary interest is in that area. I think it would be beneficial to you and the President.

K: There's absolutely no question about it. And if the election goes the way the polls indicate, we really want to work very closely with you because we have to restore some bipartisan -- some greater bipartisanship to our foreign policy than, you know, than events permitted.

M: Yeah, yeah. Well, I wouldn't worry too much about the campaign but I wouldn't overkill as those boys down there are doing because they're going to build a little David out of their opponent.

K: Really. In what field are you talking about?

M: The Presidential race.

K: No, no; I mean in which -- on what subject?

M: Oh, no; everything he makes a statement, they come back with a statement or the President does something and they sort of overpower him. And it's awfully smooth. I think a little bit too smooth, Henry. They ought to go up for air once in a while. Otherwise, they're going to make little David.

K: Right.

M: But they should know what they're doing.

K: Well, I've happily nothing to do with this.

M: (laughter)

K: I don't think my nerves would be equal to --

M: Yeah. Well, Henry, do the best you can.

K: Look, I will have a frank talk with him this afternoon. And I may, if I have a chance, call you tomorrow. Otherwise, I will call you as soon as I get back.

M: All right. When do you get back?

The president of the republic is the
president of the country.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

By: KMLV
NASA Date: 5/12/84

- 4 -

TELCON

11:08 am, September 8, 1972

K: I'll be back by the end of next week.

M: Yeah, okay. I'm glad you're seeing the Ambassador this afternoon.

K: Senator, could I raise one other question with you which I'm not really authorized to do?

M: Okay.

K: Which has to do with that damn SALT agreement.

M: Oh, Lord.

K: We really would like to get the goddamn thing ratified.

M: Well, what we're going to do, Henry --

K: We don't mind -- between you and me now -- if this thing drops out in the Conference.

M: Oh, I understand.

K: In fact that's what we sort of expect.

M: But the trouble is, Henry, we've got two small boys in Jackson and Fulbright. And what we're going to do is to lay it aside until we get the revenue sharing bill out of the way which will be Monday or Tuesday.

K: Right

M: We're going back on the SALT agreement and we're going to stay with that exclusively till it's finished.

K: Let me tell you what we would really like to do. What the Soviets have asked us to do. Gromyko is over here at the end of September and they would like to get this ratified by then and perhaps do it on that occasion.

M: We'll have it by then, Henry.

K: And what we would also like to do is to get SALT II underway.

M: Right.

Re: what time did you call
so Mr. Smith can get in?
Re:Phone call to Senator Kissinger

TELCORN

11:08 a.m., September 8, 1972

By: KMH NASA Date: 5/13/04

- 5 -

K: Which we can't do until this is ratified.

M: Well, I'm just as interested as you are.

K: I know you are and I know this isn't a partisan issue. This is something that got way off the rails.

M: That's right.

K: Between you and me we weren't watching it and we thought there would be an up and down vote, that it would cost an afternoon. We never thought it would cost three weeks.

M: Well, I know. But you've got, as I said, two small boys we have to contend with. But we're going to get on it and we're going to -- Scott and I are going to try and broke cloture next week if we can make no progress. Well, I feel certain that we will get it --

K: I really think it would be a national service if we could get it done.

M: The sooner, the better.

K: Right.

M: Okay, Henry.

K: Good, Senator.

M: Fine, Henry, thank you.

It's just so many things that happen at once.
In the time it takes to read this.
Make it short and simple.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.L.W. NASA Data: 5/13/04

TELCOM

Harold Gibbons/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m., September 8, 1972

G: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Do you think you can bring that lawyer under control?

G: Taub?

K: Yeah.

G: I don't know how the hell I can.

K: You know what he's putting out is a lot of bullshit.

G: I know it. I know it but --

K: You know I never encouraged him to go there.

G: That's exactly right; I was there.

K: I don't want to take on Hoffa; I've got nothing against Hoffa. In fact, I have always felt sort of sorry for him.

G: Right.

K: If this keeps up, I'm going to get embroiled with Hoffa. It won't do him any good.

G: What is he doing now?

K: Well, he's saying I encouraged him. He's saying he went around the government here saying he should get a passport because I wanted him to go. And he keeps putting out statement after statement. I won't lose from this --

G: No, but Hoffa shouldn't be made the victim of it either, Henry.

K: But I really believe Hoffa will be the victim of it because our Justice Department will start slamming restrictions on him. I don't know whether they will but you know, it's the obvious response.

G: Yeah, yeah. Well, I wish I could be helpful but the son-of-a-bitch, I don't know him -- When I brought him into you, Henry, it was only because --

H. J. Kissinger, Ph.D., General Counsel
and Assistant General Counsel
for the President and Chief Legal Officer
University of Wisconsin
Tel.: (618) 653-1200
Fax: (618) 653-1201

TELCOM

Harold Gibbons/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m., September 8, 1972

By: KML V
NWSA Date: 5/12/04

K: You brought him in for humanitarian reasons the way I --

G: . . an idea and maybe it will work and I just wanted you to evaluate it.

K: . . the way you came to me before you went to Hanoi and we've had
a perfectly decent relationship on it.

G: Right, right.

K: You went as a private citizen. You reported to me before and after.

G: Right.

K: You never pretended you were an American spokesman; I never
claimed you were. It was exactly right.

G: That's right.

K: Well, look, if you can't do anything -- But your recollection is like
mine, I told him he couldn't speak for us.

G: You told him repeatedly a dozen times.

K: Right. Well, that's what I thought.

G: Right.

K: Okay, Harold. I hope to see you sometime when you come through
here.

G: Okay, Henry. Good, see you then.

K: Okay, bye.

["A. M. E. T. C. U. S. A. S. O. U. S. A. S. O. U. S

The position of President of the Republic of Vietnam
Receives Special Privilege

By: KMLV NASA Date: 5/12/84

TELCOM

Chuck Mollenhoff/Mr. Kissinger

2:48 p.m. 9/8/72

CM: Henry, do you know the date that you sent that message to Janoi?

HK: I won't give it to you.

CM: You won't give it to me. I expected to try. (laughing).

HK: I don't want to give the date and don't say that I sent the message. Just say that "word was passed to North Vietnam that he does not represent the United States. You don't want to say who did it.

CM: No. Say, I note that Ziegler said that Al Haig also had some conversations on this--was that more than one conversation --

HK: Yes. He talked to Taub and Hoffa.

CM: Taub and Hoffa?

HK: Yes. Right.

CM: Would that had been--

HK: All of this happened before the 20th. Our interest was to get this thing cleaned up before my meetings.

CM: To get what thing cleaned up?

HK: Not to get any confused impressions, as to who represented whom, and who was speaking for whom.

CM: What would have Gibbons (?) argument been had--

HK: Gibbons had no role in this.

CM: Gibbons had no role?

HK: Gibbons had only the role of bringing Taub by to see whether Taub really had some messages. Gibbons didn't press any of this.

Hai, da nhan vi tinh nhan hieh
thoi tie nhan vi tinh nhan hieh
dac nhan vi tinh nhan hieh

Phan vi tinh nhan hieh?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NASA Date: 5/12/04

Page 2

CM: What would have Taub's argument have been on behalf of this thing generally?

HK: Well, that Hoffa was a good negotiator--that he had a special --that the North Vietnamese were particularly interested in him. But I don't want to get into a big'affair with you.

CM: No, no, what I am trying to do is simply get for background purposes with the general tenor of these conversations as to what issues --

HK: A lot of people offered to help out and that is necessarily bad, we usually turn them off. But we do want to find out whether they have any genuine messages, who you know these North Vietnamese are so wierd, so we usually find out, do they have a genuine feeler from the North Vietnamese.

CM: Um huh. This would have been just an exploring--whether it was a genuine feeler from the--

HK: Well, when I saw him I didn't know what it was because he had, I was just told he had something of importance.

CM: But then, how many conversations would you have had with him then?

HK: I think I have had two conversations--one personally and one on the phone, at his initiative.

CM: Gibbons was there for the personal conversation?

HK: Yeh.

CM: Would it have been after that that Haig handled the last conversations with Taub and with Hoffa?

HK: Yes, right.

CM: There was no question in your mind that this was not a signal from Hanoi.

HK: No question.

CM: And this would not be a proper person to be handling it.

HK: Well, you know there is no proper person for handling it. We don't accept the proposition that Hanoi can take whom they will negotiate with. Or that somebody can appoint himself a negotiator.

CM: You said this morning that Haig had a contact with Rogers.

HK: Well, that was yesterday afternoon.

I*

Page 3

CM: Was that the friendly conversation?

HK: Oh yeh.

CM: It was--he exhibited no concern--

HK: Rogers?

CM: Yes.

HK: Why should Rogers exhibit concern?

CM: He had apparently no knowledge of this at all until after--

HK: Yeh, but why should he--there are 100 guys who come around and offer to do things--we don't expect them to be issued passports--we never asked that a passport be issued. If I walked into the State Department and said I--ah the White House wants me to have a passport and if they don't check here, I mean that's just nonsense.

CM: Well, here is the letter that went to Rogers on September 6. "This will befer to the negotiations with the US Attorney General in behalf of James R. Hoffa to visit Hanoi. (This was by Taub). Please be advised that Mr. Hoffa has accepted an invitation extended by the Vietnam Trade Union of the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam to visit Hanoi. The purpose of this trip via the auspices of the Vietnam Trade Union will be to visit the American prisoners and negotiate for their early release. Mr. Hoffa has received official authorization and unlimited travel to depart the USA on Thursday, September 7, 1972, for Hanoi traveling via Paris. Accompanying Mr. Hoffa will be Harold Gibbons of St. Louis and William L. Taub, New York, all USA citizens. A copy of this formal notification is also being sent to the Attorney General."

I take it that the use of the term negotiate would have been Taub's own --I mean it might be misconstrued and it was probably intended to be a little deceptive.

HK: I don't know about that.

CM: Well, I'm just saying---

HK: My own---

CM: If you use the terms negotiate---

H. P. I. T. V. R. E. L. C.
S. M. O. F. O. R. O. C.
R. E. C. S. O. U.?

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KHLW NAFU, Date: 5/12/04

Page 4

HK: My office was out of this at the end of--from the latter half of July on.

CM: Yeah, well ah--

HK: We had no interest in it.

CM: Well I had just wanted to clear up those two or three points and just precisely what had taken place, the number of conversations that there were.

HK: Well, the first was, you know, the second he called me to see whether he could arrange a meeting between Hoffa and me and that was all. That was the only contact.

CM: Well to see if he could arrange a meeting between Hoffa and you?

HK: Yeah.

CM: And this was rejected?

HK: Yes.

CM: But you did agree to see someone on behalf of Hoffa?

HK: No. I didn't agree to see anybody.

CM: Well, now I'm ---we're not communicating. Gibbons had contacted you initially, relative to talking with Taub.

HK: He didn't tell me whom he was bringing.

CM: Yeah, he said he had something of importance.

HK: Right.

CM: And at that point then he came then announced out to San Clemente.

HK: Yes, that may have been a misunderstanding.

CM: Yes. And but he had Taub with him?

HK: Right.

CM: And then you did discuss with Taub. How long a conversation was that?

HK: Maybe an hour.

Hanoi, Vietnam, September 15, 1993

U.S. Army

Operations in Indochina

By: K.M.L. NAFU, Date: 5/13/94

CM: And then in that conversation did you make clear at that stage--

HK: Absolutely that we were not---I'm sure Gibbons will confirm that.

CM: Yeah. On this whole thing now you didn't tell him that he couldn't go.

HK: I told him--no--I told him he could not go as our representative.

CM: But you were drawing the line here between going as our representative

HK: Or speaking for us. And I said whether he went as a private citizen was between him and the legal agencies of the government and not between him and me.

CM: Yeah. I understand it. These are important distinctions and your reason for not rejecting it in sharper terms would have been that the whole idea in sharper terms was because you believed that the legal agencies of government would have so many problems to surmount that it would be impossible for him to go.

HK: That's right and because I don't think it's my job to determine whether somebody should go to Hanoi as a private citizen.

CM: Yeah. OK, fine Henry I think that takes care of it.

HK: But I did tell him I didn't want--you know--that even as a private citizen I'd have major difficulties until July 20.

CM: Why July 20?

HK: Because I was meeting them on July 19.

CM: Even on a private basis?

HK: Yes, I just didn't want anyone to confuse them.

CM: OK, fine, I think that takes care of me.

HK: Thank you.

CM: OK, thank you.

HK: Bye.

CM: Bye.

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

Re: [insert telephone number here]

Is that Mr. or Mrs. [insert name here]?

By: KHLW

NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

TELCOM
Senator Mike Mansfield/Mr. Kissinger
3:07 p.m. 9/8/72

HK: Hello.

MM: Yes, Henry.

HK: Senator, I'm sorry to have kept you on the phone, I didn't know you were---

MM: That's OK I just got on.

HK: Good. I talked to the President about our conversation this morning.

MM: Um hum..

HK: And his view is that it's really going to be hard to find a Republican of comparable stature unless it was Scott and he can see why, just repeating the same thing, doesn't make too much sense.

MM: Yeah.

HK: And he was wondering whether we could handle it in the way I mentioned it to you where you're going at our request. In other words, it isn't that the Chinese are inviting you.

MM: That would be splendid, Henry.

HK: It's that you are going at the request of the President to look into you know we don't want to preclude frankly my going back afterwards to negotiate some details but to look into the long term evolution of Sino-American relations or something like that.

MM: Good enough.

HK: And if you did that, then I would raise that this afternoon and get their reaction. Then they could maintain the position that they only invite bipartisan groups.

MM: Yes.

HK: But, of course, we can send anyone we want.

MM: That's right, that's right. That sounds splendid, Henry.

HK: Now that, however, involves--and I wanted to make--be scrupulous about this is that would mean that the announcement of your trip would be made during the campaign. If you want to leave that day.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

It appears there is no text in the image.

By: KM.L

NASA Date: 5/12/04

Page 2

MM: Yeah.

HK: It doesn't give us any pain but I just wanted to make absolutely sure.

MM: Now, I'm just trying to think of the political implications during the course of the campaign.

HK: If you want to leave on election day.

MM: The day after or the next day.

HK: Well, you know, then it's got to be announced at least a week before.

MM: Well that poses a question which is only political.

HK: That's right. Now our offer is good in any event. We're not doing it in order to be able to make---

MM: No, no I understand because you don't need that.

HK: That's right.

MM: But I was just thinking of the effect personally and politically on me

HK: You must, this is why I raised it with you. I raised it with you, you didn't raise it with me.

MM: Well, I know but---

HK: We could leave it at this, Senator. We don't have to fix the date now.

MM: XXX No.

HK: I could raise the idea with the Chinese.

MM: Good enough.

HK: I don't want you to make a decision while you're on---

MM: Personally, I have no qualms, Henry. I'm just thinking of what might happen incidental to it.

HK: Exactly.

MM: From my point of view.

HK: Of course and you know, our interest is to preserve you as a national asset.

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

It is understood that the open line in the first item of the list means that the item is to be considered in its entirety.

By: K.H. W. NARA. Data: 5/13/04

Page 4.

MM: Yeah.

HK: And, therefore, may I suggest this; why don't I mention the idea to the Chinese

MM: I wish you would.

HK: And leave open the precise date and tell them the exact truth. I've always found that the truth is the best that if you go as our representative we might want to slip it by a week.

MM: Yes.

HK: They don't have to worry about that aspect of it and that you will let me know at the end, say in another week.

MM: When you return.

HK: When I return we'll schedule you. You know, what you want.

MM: Sure, fine.

HK: And they could in the meantime get the idea settled in principle.

MM: That's fine. They might have a definite answer then.

HK: That's right. At any rate it will save us one week in their machinery.

MM: That's right. So what you're saying in effect then is that it might be a week after the election.

HK: What I'm saying is if this is worth doing we certainly will not take the position that we are interested only if we can make an announcement before the election.

MM: Of course.

HK: That would be a preposterous position for us to take.

MM: Yes. It's not needed.

HK: It's not needed and we wouldn't play that sort of game anyway.

MM: No, no it isn't you and me or you and me and the President. It's the incidental factor that I'm trying to--

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6", "H. E. L. Y. H. K. H. O. P. B. O. U. N. A. A. S. U. N. A. S. U. N. A. S. U. N.

Telcon

Wiley Buchanan/Kissinger

9/8/72 - 3:15 p.m.

B: Thank you very much for calling me Henry. I realize how busy you are. I wanted to discuss with you this whole business about the Hoffa thing which I had only read in the paper and bring you up to date. Back in the last go-around in 1968 I had been working since the Eisenhower days we had a fellow in the Labor Department which was very dependable and he got us in touch with Hoffa's people and I finally got in touch with him which was the basis of a role. Since that time we have been working and trying to get his parole lifted so that he could come out directly for the President because part of the deal when he was put up there was that he couldn't do any political activities. Obviously he made a deal to protect himself and I know he has been playing golf out at Burning ______ with Kleindinst and the rest of them. But we've also got a deal here now where I think -

K: You really ought to talk to Clark McGregor if it is a political thing.

B: Well I was just going to give you this background about the whether or not you - I thought it might be of interest to you to know this aspect that we had been working on about this part about whether he would and make this trip to Vietnam. This is the reason I called you about it.

K: We have no interest in his taking this trip to Vietnam.

B: That won't be coming off?

K: No.

B: Well, that answers my question. I just felt there might be something that you should know if something like that was in the offering.

K: Yeah, but we cannot have him take a trip. We cannot encourage private negotiation.

B: Yes I understand that but I just thought since I had been working on this thing a long time it was something I should at least let you know -

["H. J. M. S. T. J. M. S. T. J. M. S. T

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12959, Sec. 3.6

Telcon
Henry Hubbard/Kissinger
9/8/72 - 3:50 p.m.

By: KMHV, NAVAQ Date: 5/12/04

K: Hello.

H: Hi Henry.

K: Is Joe Blocker still with you?

H: No, no CBS.

K: Oh well then that is unnecessary because Joe Blocker just called Harold Gibbons to tell him about the July 12th meeting between me and Hoffa. There was no July 12th meeting. I just wanted to make sure you didn't get that <u>kind</u> confused.

H: No I am not doing that story now. The only question I have in my mind when Taub called with that threat.

K: Just don't go into all that detail. I just gave that to you for background.

H: Well it is pretty obvious that he played a pretty heavy handed game. Ziegler made that apparent this morning.

K: Yeah. But tone that down a bit will you?

H: OH.

K: I mean don't use the word threat.

H: Alright I won't.

K: He made that comment to my secretary. After he had made that threat I told my secretary that the next time he called to have Haig tell him that this was it.

H: Okay.

K: Haig just told him that he wouldn't deal with him.

H: Alright very good. That is interesting about Blocker. One of the reasons he is not with the magazine anymore. Too creative.

K: Somehow after I put in the call I seemed to remember that he wasn't with you anymore.

H: Okay very good. Bye

K: Bye

OCLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.5

Telcon
Ambassador Jha/Kissinger

9/8/72 - 3:55 p.m.

K: Hello

J: Hello

K: How are you?

J: I am fine.

K: I told you I was going to call you about this business. Well it is difficult to do something about one installment of a payment because of the need to maintain some sort of solidarity with the other countries. But what we can do, just for your information, is first of all to place no obstacles in the meeting of the consortium at the end of the month. And secondly to take a somewhat forthcoming position at that meeting. And I think you can on a very private basis inform your government that will be our attitude. We are talking about the $30 million scheduling, whatever it is $30 or $40 million.

J: Okay that is fine.

K: And secondly we will send Maury Williams around the middle of October to India, Bangladesh and Pakistan to look at the aid situation.

J: I have one comment on that came from Haksar. He said that if Maury Williams comes to India it will be the inevitable fate of press speculation about the worked-out outcome. So if some preliminary ground is covered so that we know that the visit you know can be constructive, then it is helpful. Otherwise might just create more inclusive and you know unproductive then we may get an unnecessary setback. Now and if you agree, what we might do is while you are away Maury and I get the to look at the kind of things they will be talking about we can make the visit a constructive one. How do you think about it?

K: Right, well you know you would have to do it with the understanding that we haven't made any decisions yet on any of the items you and I discussed. Why don't you wait until I come back and can talk to Maury. Do it the week I am back.

J: Alright, well at the moment Maury's visit.

K: Now thirdly, we are prepared to create a somewhat easier atmosphere in our bilateral relations. But you know along the lines you indicated.

J: Good.

K: It may would be helpful if on your side, because you can have some influence on it, there would be of a press campaign. I recognize you can't do too much. To the extent that is somewhat visible that our relations are improving, without going overboard.

J: Good, thank you.

K: And I will see you the week I come back.

Telcon
Secretary Shultz/Kissinger

9/8/72 - 4:15 p.m.

K: Hello

S: Hello

K: George

S: Hi Henry.

K: I wonder ______ of the office.

S: Well I have perhaps a trivial question for you but anyway
I would like to get a little guidance. It is being proposed
to me.

K: I will not take the position of head of the IMF so don't.

S: It is being proposed to me that we organize a trip for
Congressmen and Senators both authorizing and appropriating
Committees w that would visit mostly in Asia and Africa,
after the election and before the next session.

K: Visit what?

S: Visit projects and headquarters being sponsored by the Asian
development bank who proposes in an African development bank
that is -

K: Who is proposing it?

S: This is being proposed by Treasury people and largely in our
groups that works with these banks and also works with the
Congress on the appropriations for the banks. The notion
obviously is to visit and see projects as well as the institutions
to abandon different projects and to indicate to the Congressmen
on foreign affairs, particularly the multilateral institutions -
their strengths and weaknesses. Now I know the President's view
seems to have shifted from the Peterson report emphasis on
multilateral to more bilateral.

K: That's right.

Telcon
Secretary Shultz/Kissinger
9/8/72 - 4:15 pm

S: But nevertheless we have these institutions out there and we are working with them.

K: I wouldn't oppose it.

S: You would be inclined to go ahead with it?

K: Right I wouldn't put an enormous priority on it but I would go ahead with it.

S: Alright, the process of working with NSC on it we of course will keep you informed but you think we can just go ahead with it without bothering further.

K: I think so - I would check with the Congressional people.

S: Right.
Have a good trip and I wish you the best of success. I hope your deal that you were telling me about works out.

K: Thank you. Bye

S: Bye

TELCONE

Ambassador Dobrynin/Kissinger

10:20 a. m. 10/15/72

AD: Yes.

HK: Anatol?

RE: Yes.

HK: We're putting together that letter about the postponement.
What years do your records show that we agreed on?

AD: Well, I don't have it here, I just will try to recall---
I remember it was, I think one year was including--
well I don't even, Henry, I am afraid--do you not have it
on your own?

HK: Well, I'll find it, I just thought you might have it easier
than I did.

AD: Well, I don't have it just unfortunately right now. I am afraid
I just don't--

HK: OK, I'll

AD: I do remember but I'm not so sure.

HK: I'll find it.

AD: There is, I think, a six-year--well including all the years
including one---'75, you remember.

HK: I know '75 and '77 are years.

AD: Yes, will I don't know, you look in your files. We don't
have any files here with me today.

HK: Good, thank you.

AD: Thank you very much.

The position of White House press secretary is not as
high as that of a confidential
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12058, Sept. 3.6

By: K.M.L. NARA. Dated: 5/12/04

TELCONE

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

September 16, 1972 12:55 p.m.

BT: Hi, did you get the pictures?

HK: Hello Bob, yes. I cannot tell you how much I appreciate this
--I am writing a Bill Donovan. His blowups are really touching.

BT: Well that's good. I was just telling your secretary the difficult
time I had dropping them off (laughing). Nobody wanted to accept
them!.

HK: Well, I am really grateful.

BT: Okay, well you write to him so--

HK: I will write to him, but tell him in the meantime because by the
time this gets typed and gets through my pedantic machinery--

BT: (laughing) all right. Dr. Kissinger, can you give me any guidance
beyond what you said at the press conference?

HK: On what area?

BT: I am particularly interested in whether or not you had come back
with any greater feeling of optimism than you did when you left
as far as prospects or a settlement this year is concerned.

HK: In Vietnam?

BT: Yeh.

HK: I just don't want to comment about it. I really can't. I just
don't want to get into a position of breaking my word.

BT: Hm huh. But can I take it from that though that there is no reason
for dimunition of your feelings.

HK: Well, what do you feel my feelings were?

BT: Ah, it seems to me that when we spoke the last time you thought
there was a possibility of a settlement before the election or
a probability of a settlement before the end of the year.

The following are the conversations between the President and the Vice President:
President's Office

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

TELCONE

6.11.11 WASH. OAK 5/13/04

Page 2

HK: No, not before the end of the year, but within a reasonable time after the election.

BT: You said a reasonable time--would that be by the end of the year?

HK: Not necessarily. I just hate to give deadlines.

BT: Hm huh, hm huh. But there is no reason to change that--your evaluation of--

HK: Look, I mean strictly off-the-record, it's obvious we must be talking about something.

BT: Absolutely.

HK: You know. Amateurs say it is an election stunt and so forth; what interest do they have to participate in an election stunt?

BT: Well, I know, this is the problem I have been having, in writing this stuff, that I am way out of step with everybody else. Because I do have a feeling--

HK: I am not saying it's going to get settled. It's a hell of a problem.

BT: Hm huh. But there is no reason for them to cooperate in his reelection.

HK: That's right and there is no point in our sitting there--you know we are not playing pinochle.

BT: Do you feel they finished their reassessment when he came back and talked to you now?

HK: Yeh, I think that is a reasonable thing to assume.

BT: And does one have to assume that they have changed--can one assume--

HK: That is the part I don't want to comment on.

BT: All right. But one doesn't take as face value their private position and their public position being the same thing--I mean, that is the Viet Cong statement and the statement of September 2--does that represent their private position as well?

H. J. Kissinger, the end of the story is in
the copy of the original
PRESIDENT'S OFFICE?

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.6

TelCon:1:28-9/16/72
Mr. Kissinger/
Minister Idan

By: K.L. W.

NASA Date 5/13/64

K: Thank you for calling. You probably know what I am calling you about.

I: I have a good impression(?) that you don't want to tell me what you did in Paris.

K: That is right. I wanted to say two things. One, first in Moscow we acted in a sense that I know you will highly approve of and I will tell the Ambassador when he gets back.

I: You acted - we will not approve?

K: That you will highly approve of.

I: Highly.

K: Yes.

I: I see.

K: But if you do not stop these actions - I must tell you you are running an enormous risk in your relations with the President. You launched an action the day before I go to Moscow and you launch an action the day after I come back at a time when we are taking an all-out diplomatic position in your defense and are preventing - going into actions. We cannot take this. Now there is no President who has done more for you and I can tell you I have just come from the President and he asked me to call you.

I: Yes. Well, I will immediately transmit what you said.

K: Now that is a private communication that should not be in your newspaper.

I: Of course. This(?) I know.

K: But I don't know what the background for this particular action is.

I: The background is that in the last few days since the tragedy in Munich, there has been four in persons(?) and actions by the terrorists across the Lebanonese border and we lost within five days three lives, and two wounded through terrorists actions. And you know w exactly where they come from.

The President's Office
The State Department
U.S. Department of State

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.1

By: K.L.V. NASA Date: 5/12/84

K: But if you prepared us a little bit for it. I mean we have certainly been very candid with you about our most secret things. You know the President feels you totally misled him last week. I know there was a traumatic(?) sentence that if I had understood it properly I should have known, but I took it at face value and reported it like that. It is a very dangerous game.

I: I don't think that anybody wanted to mislead. This I must say.

K: No, if you had said we will do something but it will not upset the balance(?). You know

I: That's right. That's what

K: We would have understood it, we wouldn't have welcomed it, but we would have understood it.

I: If I remember correctly,

K: He said you would do nothing to

I: Upset the tranquility or something like that.

K: That is right, but that passed me by that subtlety.

I: Because you know after things like that it is just impossible not to react at all and I can tell you from what I have heard and I am sure you will approve of that part of the story that what you are doing now is also limited actions and we have been told

K: We are not children and we know what your needs are but we also have a very tough situation with the Soviets and you know we are delaying actions on a lot of things but the price for that is that we cannot have them totally publicly humiliated.

I: Yes.

K: When I come - the Ambassador, when will he be back.

I: Surely I think he will be back on Tuesday night.

K: Well I will show you some things that happened in Moscow that will explain to you why this is a very very unfortunate time.

I: Yes. Well, I will transmit this immediately Dr. Kissinger.

The position of the U. S. in the Middle East and its implications for the Security Council?

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sect. 3.6

- 3 -

By: J.N.Y. NAVA Date: 5/12/04

K: But in Moscow itself, I think you will approve of what was done.

I: Yes. I can assure you - I think that - now I am not using any traumatic(?) sentences, but in accordance what I have read in our cables this will all be over in a few hours.

K: Yes, but (spelling ???)

I: And it is both locally and time wise limited to the Potafland?? area.

K: But the trouble is that it will force us now to take another public position. that the Lebanese

I: That is possible because I understand/XXXXXXXXX and XXXXXXXX are going again to the Security Council.

K: Yes, and it will force us into a public position with the Soviets again.

I: I understand, but I really understand, but I think that you do understand that it is impossible for Israel not to react to such provocations(?)

K: Yes, but maybe if we could at least have a rough idea that something is happening. OK, well we will discuss that when the Ambassador comes back.

I: OK.

K: I am assuming this will not go into too many people in your government.

I: It won't go anywhere. There is no difference in that respect if Rabin or I handle it.

K: Good, well that is what I wanted to make

I: Rest assure that we are in this respect interchangeable.

K: Good. Wonderful.

I: Not in other things, but in this respect we are certainly interchangeable.

K: Well, we have a very high regard for you.

I: You may trust me on that.

K: I trust you in everything.

Thank you very much.

I:

By: KHLW NASHA, DATED: 5/13/04

TELCONE

Nicholas von Hoffman/Dr. Kissinger

9/18/72 - 10:55 a.m.

K: Hello.

vH: Hi.

K: How are you?

vH: Pretty good, how are you?

K: You're determined to ruin me aren't you?

vH: Oh, I--Henry, my God, do you realize how great I'd be if I could ruin you.

K: We're talking on two tapped phones.

vH: You're phone isn't tapped is it?

K: Why not.

vH: Mine can't be.

K: Why?

vH: Because I cannot believe that there's any agency or power that would be interested in the garbage that flows on my line.

K: I like your comment on spectrum today. The quadri---

vH: You don't get up that early do you?

K: Yeah, I have to be in my office at quarter to eight.

vH: Henry, that's terrible.

K: I know it

vH: They're not after you. At least my forces are not after you.

K: My forces are after me. One of my colleagues said to me the other day I'm right behind you. It was one of the most frightening things I've ever heard. All of this is off the record.

vH: Well, it's off my record. I don't know about these other records.

The following are the open lines
of the Net, and of the機械
ferrocon Steel.

- 2 -

By: J. M. W. NASHA, O.B. 5/12/04

K: When are we going to be able to get together?

vH: Well, that's what I was calling about.

K: What's better for you, lunch or dinner?

vH: Dinner is always better for me. By then I've woken up.

K: How about--I'm not 100% sure--but how about tentatively Thursday?

vH: Splendid.

K: Good. Shall we call each other Thursday?

vH: OK, fine, very good. I'll call you Thursday morning.

K: Great.

vH: Good. Talk to you then. Do you have my number.

K: I don't know.

vH: SANITIZED

K: If I don't call you that means I lost it. Will you call me back?

vH: Sure.

K: Good.

vH: Okey-doak.

K: Terrific. Look forward to it.

vH: Bye.

K: Bye,

The President's Office of the Vice President
for the Commanding General
Operations Staff

CLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6

TELCORN

Director Helms/Mr. Kissinger

11:15 a.m., September 18, 1972

By: K.L. V. NASA Data 5/12/04

K: I just found out that you had asked me to come to some ceremony over there.

H: That's right. This is our 25th anniversary. I invited you some time ago.

K: Well, you probably did. Did you do it personally?

H: Yes, I wrote you a letter.

K: Well, you don't expect that that would reach me quickly, do you? In my well-organized way.

H: I thought you had accepted several weeks ago.

K: Right. Well, at any rate, I understand they cancelled it but if I can keep my participation brief, I'd be glad to come over.

H: Well, I wish you could. It can be just as brief as you like. The minute you arrive -- if you arrive here at 12 o'clock, which I hope you could -- we'll go right into the auditorium; I'll introduce you immediately. You speak as long or as short as you like and then we will leave.

K: Okay, I'll come. How long will it take me to get over there?

H: About -- it will take you no more than 15 minutes. Why don't you bring Tom Latimer with you so he can show exactly where to come.

K: Okay, I'll bring Tom with me. What do you want me to say?

H: What we're going to have is in the auditorium today in large part people who have been around here for about 20-25 years and then some of the young people in a kind of a reasonable mix of the Agency. And what I had in mind actually was the hope that you would simply speak about the work they've done in support of you and the President and so forth, nothing more complicated than that.

K: Right, right. 5 or 10 minutes is enough, isn't it?

H: If you could make it 10 minutes, that would be just great.

K: Okay, fine.

H: And I appreciate it very much, Henry.

The president, the vice president and the secretary are the only ones authorized to speak to the public. Any other communication must go through the appropriate channel.

TELCONE

Secretary Peterson/Dr. Kissinger

9/18/72 - 11:25 am

P: Hello.

K: Pete.

P: Yes sir.

K: How are you?

P: Fine.

K: I'm excited by the idea of speaking to Cabinet member.

P: I wish you'd personalize it more than than, Henry. I like to know the depth of your feeling for me.

K: Well, then this Cabinet member. Two things: one on this Jewish issue

P: Yeah.

K: My judgment is that it's a mistake to engage in a negotiation on it now because first of all I don't you mentally but I just don't believe that Percy is going to be helpful in a way that's really going to help. He's going to make conditions that we can't meet.

P: Yeah. It's Ribicoff and Javits that I'm concerned about.

K: My instinct is--first of all let me talk to Rabin on Wednesday and we'll know what the situation is and secondly I think that to get turned down by them is worse than never to have raised it.

P: The Soviets do you mean?

K: No, no by Javits and the other guy. Above all since I think our best strategy is not to come have it come up in this session.

P: Yes, except they say they're going to do it. Now the purpose of my meeting could be a listening meeting, you know and not a negotiating one.

K: Is it possible for you to put it off until say Friday because I'll see Rabin on Wednesday. He isn't coming back until then.

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12938, Sect. 3.6

H. O. MCKENZIE
The State of the Union Address
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

By: K.M.W.
NASA Date: 5/13/04

P: I suppose I could, yes.

K: And then I could give you a feel for what his attitude is.

P: All right. OK.

K: Secondly, you were going to send me over some notes.

P: I'm in the final paragraph. It'll be over at ten of twelve.

K: OK. That's going to be quite a feat if you're in the final paragraph.

P: Oh, I'm not as valuable as you think, Henry. It's a short paragraph.

K: I don't think you're valuable. You're problem on your valuable isn't with me.

P: OK.

K: It's the ex-Secretary of the Treasury who has implanted that thought.

P: I see.

K: That I think will be my problem from now on and not yours.

P: It's time he had a worthy adversary is what I say. He brings out the best in both of you.

K: Pete I don't---

P: Or should I say the worst in both of you.

K: Pete, I don't have your integrity. I'm not crazy enough to fight him.

P: You know, the thought of the battle bringing out the worst in Connally and Kissinger is enough to terrify me. Oh, my God, it would shatter the faith in the democratic process in the American community if that were to happen.

K: I wouldn't be in the least league with him. On the best maybe, but on the worst I couldn't even begin to touch it. I enjoyed Saturday.

P: It was great to have you. OK, it will be right over.

K: OK, thank you.

TELCOM

Senator Humphrey/Dr. Kissinger

9/18/72 - 11:31 a.m.

K: Hello.

H: Henry?

K: How are you.

H: Welcome home.

K: Thank you.

H: I take it you've been travelling about.

K: Yes, I've been

H: Nice to hear your voice.

K: Nice to talk to you. I'm calling you about the letter you wrote the President a week or so ago about the Jewish problem in the Soviet Union.

H: Yes.

K: And I just wanted to tell you personally I don't want to have it made public that I did raise it in a number of meetings.

H: Fine Henry.

K: The problem is that I think we've got to lower the visibility of the debate because they can't yield to pressures from a foreign country. I'm not saying they're going to yield anyway. I'm not asking you to lower this.

H: Listen, I understand that.

K: As a government we have to do it in as quiet a way as we can. We could score a lot of points in the campaign by saying what I said and to whom I said it.

H: Yes.

K: But we're not going to say anything publicly. I wanted you to know though that something has been done.

H: That's very good of you.

K: And I'm not asking you to repeat that or anything like that.

["H. E. S. I. H. E. S. I. H. E. S. I. H

It is known to the best of my knowledge
that the person I speak to is a real
Militia Officer

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 1296, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L.S. NASHA, Date: 5/23/04

K: I think it would be a good contribution.

H: Very good. I didn't want to do it if I thought it was going to be--

K: That I think would be a good contribution.

H: On the matter of your visit, ---

K: You can say, I said in a press conference that I raised it.

H: Fine, I just thought maybe it might even be a little bit helpful.

K: I just didn't say with whom I raised it.

H: No, I understand that. I just wanted to---I think it's better for the Administration too if we can that look our letter was received, it was considered and that Mr. Kissinger did raise this matter.

K: That's right.

H: And we're following through on some other ideas.

K: You can say that. I'm not asking you to say it, it would be somewhat helpful but the main reason I'm calling you is just to let you know that your concerns were expressed and so that you know what's going on.

H: Yes. Allright, my friend, we will handle which I don't think will be offensive to you folks at all.

K: And I hope to see you soon after this campaign is over.

H: God, yes I'll be glad when this whole ordeal is over.

K: God, if we all live through it.

H: It's oh, my God, you can imagine what I'm feeling.

K: I know what you're going through and I admire you for the way you conducted yourself.

H: Well, one of these days I maybe may just give you a buzz.

K: Look, as far as I'm concerned it's always a pleasure to see you. I'll see you during the campaign. But I just don't want to put you into a difficult position.

Request for reissue of this record
If this has appeared in error,
Please correct it.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sept. 3.6

By: KML, V NASA Date: 5/12/64

H: I understand that, Henry. I really do and we'll watch our p's and q's here and get back together with you when it's proper.

K: Good, wonderful.

H: And thank you much. It was kind and thoughtful of you.

K: Nice to talk to you. Well, I've always been an admirer, as you know

H: I know that and we appreciate the chance to work with you.

K: Good,

H: Bye-bye.

K: Bye.

I want to say to you anything publicly. I wanted you to know though
something has been done.

It's very good of you.

The president of the open is a
the son of a public
President of the

CLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sec. 3.6

By: KHLW
NASA Date: 5/13/64

TELCOM

Norman Mailer/Mr. Kissinger

12:35 p.m., September 18, 1972

K: Norman, how are you?

M: Listen, one of us is telepathic; I was just going over the notes.

K: What?

M: One of us is telepathic, I was just going over the interview. I was just working on it. How are you?

K: I'm fine.

M: Trip tiring?

K: Yeah, but I'm somehow reaching a stage where the time changes don't hit me as hard anymore.

M: Oh, that's the secret I guess of being part of the jet set.

K: Well, there's nothing you can't achieve if you're compulsive enough.

M: Well, we all try to be the instrument of our own will, don't we?

K: In a way. Did your secretary give you my comments?

M: Yes, yes. Now, there's a problem on that line I take it and that was the line I was working on.

K: On page 203.

M: Yeah, yeah. I have the thing right in front of me. Henry, give me 10 seconds; I've got the page on my desk.

K: Right, sure.

M: It seems to disappear -- I always do those things. Well, I was looking over it. The line you say is impossible for you, is that right?

K: Where you have me say, "Let us say that he is not primarily a moral leader."

M: All right. Now I was going over it. And how would it read it if we put it this way? "You don't argue," said Kissinger "because he is not primarily a moral leader but I do not wish to agree. I might go so far as to say he is a political genius."

The position of President of the United States is notional.

TELCOM

Norman Mailer/Mr. Kissinger

By: KML WRIA Date: 5/12/04

K: Yeah, that's okay.

M: All right, good. I was going to hand him these paintings by the way because I felt, you know, I entered the ______ today or a large bulk of it to the . . .

K: Then there's another quote just before that where you have me say, "In the absolute chance it could be true that in the Presidency one needs to have a man --"

M: Yeah, yeah.

K: But that is a sentence I don't object to, except it injects the position to your view point.

M: Right. Well, I think I can turn that around by having you again put it into my mough. Where as I say, "Nixon gives too little." And you could say, "It is in your point of view that in the Presidency . . . have a man --"

K: Yeah, that would be all right.

M: All right. "In the Presidency we . . . have a man and he's worth being liked."

K: And then you would say, "Yes, Nixon --"

M: "Yes, Nixon offers nothing authentic of himself."

K: And then how would the next thing read? "I can't agree with that --"

M: "Although he's . . . of himself." And you say -- I pick up with Kissinger -- "You've argued he's not primarily a moral leader . . "

K: I cannot agree --

M: "I do not wish to agree; I might go so far as to say he has political genius."

K: Yes.

M: And then I'll take out --

K: No, but why don't you say, "I cannot agree with this but you will probably agree that he is a political genius" or something like that.

The New York Times and The Times of London
Published Daily
PUBLISHED

By: K.M. W. NASHUA, Okt. 5/13/94

TELCOM

Norman Mailer/Mr. Kissinger

M: All right, sure.

K: Could you say it that way?

M: Let's see, "Do you know he's not primarily a moral leader but I would not wish to agree --" How do you want to put it?

K: And then I could say, "But you probably will agree with me when I say that he's a political genius."

M: All right. How's this? "You know he is not primarily a moral leader. I do not wish to agree but you will probably agree with me that he is a political genius."

K: You don't even have to say genius. That he is politically extraordinarily able or something like that.

M: Well, I want point of views. Actually, I use it; happily heroic, and happily --

K: Well, that's all right. I don't insist on that.

M: But I do, I use it all through the book after that. What I do think of the genius. You'll see when you read it. I'm not absolutely enraptured with this political genius.

K: The other point I had -- Oh, the hell with it. You know, it's on Chou En-lai -- I hate to say something that sounds very invidious of the Russians.

M: Well, You know, I thought about that. Henry, look, you know the Russians. I don't have to tell you -- you know 3 times as much about them as I do but I'm willing to bet that they'll go through so many hoops over that line. There's so much inner work that they need it that in effect they'll wonder what you're up to in making that announcement. They'll have the pleasure of saying, "This time we do not ask for our comma"-- do you see what I mean?

K: Yeah.

M: I think it will just enter the history of the given -- I can't see it affecting the --

TELCORN

Norman Mailer/Mr. Kissinger

- 4 -

K: Yeah. In what is this going to appear?

M: This is going to be in a book which will be coming out in about two weeks. And if you would like, I'll send it to Life and see if they want to print this section by itself. That's up to you.

K: No, that's up to you.

M: Well, I think I'll show it to them. You know, I don't know -- they may not want to print it because it's not that deep an article and they would have to get it out in the next two weeks.

K: Yeah.

M: It might be worth a try, you know. Let me just make sure I've got that last part right. I'll read it through to you, all right?

K: Right.

M: "Is it your point of view then that in the Presidency we ______ have a man that is worth being liked," that's your remark.

K: Right.

M: I say, "Yes, Nixon offers nothing authentic of himself." Next line, "You argue that he is not primarily a moral leader but I do not wish to agree but you will probably agree with me that he is a political genius."

K: Then you say, "Absolutely."

M: Yes.

K: That would be great.

M: I wouldn't say, "Absolutely." You know, I keep the "Absolutely" --

K: Or you say anything you want.

M: But you were putting in "political genius" it's clear as an opinion. I'll work out whatever it is. It's just a matter of the ribbons there and then the staff work for me.

K: Can you go back to page 199 for one minute?

The telephone is a tool used in
international business and political
agreements.

TELCOM

Norman Mailer/Mr. Kissinger

NABIA, Date 5/12/04

M: Sure. Henry, there's one thing I do want to go through here though. There are two "agrees." "He's primarily a moral leader but I do not wish to agree but you will probably agree --" Two "agrees" don't sound good. I want to use some other word but I don't want to put a word of my own in because these are your words.

K: Well, I could get worse advice than from you on style.

M: Well, you've helped me on foreign policy. (laughter)

K: Or you can say, "I do not see it that way," or something like that.

M: All right, I'll do something [in piece] to that exact sentence. You see, ......... It's just a matter of avoiding the double "agree." It has a kind of "agree" to "agree" sound that hurts the sentence.

K: Yeah. May I make one suggestion on page 199 which I don't think affects anything of yours.

M: All right.

K: If you could drop that sentence, "I found them immensely impressive."

M: All right.

K: If you simply go, "In the beginning I made the mistake of assuming --". Just let out that one line. The Russians are almost paranoid about being compared.

M: Uh-huh.

K: You know you can say, "But the Chinese --". If you could leave out "The Chinese are exceptional --". If you simply go from talk about to in the beginning my worries are over.

M: Let's see. You want to say "They will talk about --".

K: "In the beginning I made the mistake of assuming that they negotiate like the Russians and they don't." You see, if I can get the -- But I thought it really, you know, without any rhetoric, I thought it was a very strong and perceptive piece.

The telephone is a tool of the mind, not of the body.

Prepared by: A. Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED
E.O 12939, Sept. 3.6

By: K.L. V. NAEK. Date: 5/12/94

TELCOM

Norman Mailer/Mr. Kissinger

M: Oh, no. You know, I liked it. The one thing I wasn't happy with in it is I usually like to characterize much more. You know, usually the way one breaks a piece of bread and all that.

K: Of course one is a bad judge of pieces about one's self but I think you are conveying more than a lot of people who have attempted to characterize.

M: Well, I think nobody has ever really tried. God, the pieces I see about you, they are all dreadful, you know.

K: Oh, they're awful.

M: You know, they're just all just foul. But, no, I'm glad you've -- I really always try to be fair on interviews because I --

K: Look, I've read your writings before and this is why I saw you. Let's stay in touch even when you don't write anything.

M: Fine, love to.

K: Do you come down sometimes?

M: Yes, I'll send you the book because I think you will read over the author's amusement and horror. You know, it's quite a book in a way because it was written in a month. And I'll call you when I get to Washington.

K: Will you do that?

M: Certainly. We'll stay in touch.

K: Good, I would love to stay in touch with you.

M: All right, I owe you a lunch you know.

K: Well, fine.

M: All right, Henry.

K: Good, let's get together soon. Do send me the book.

M: I certainly will.

K: And I appreciate the way you've handled this.

M: Thank you.

The president of The Institute for Advanced Study is a guest of the University. Please note that:

~~President's Note~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12959, Sect. 3.6

TELCOM

Secretary Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

12:45 p.m., September 18, 1972

By: KML
N/A: Date: 5/12/04

P: Henry, I have something that I did not put in this memo intentionally that hopefully you have by now on Dobrynin.

K: No, what is it?

P: Well, the thing I didn't -- the memo is the list of points I promised you on Saturday.

K: Yeah, I got that.

P: All right. The one I did not comment on has to do with the concept of an agreement on the postponements. The more I think about that, Henry, the more I'd like to review whether you think that is absolutely necessary because if you get what I would like you to get, that they can have four and can get them as long as they make them up by 2001, the presence of that other agreement unless they insist on it as an act of faith could put some of us in a very awkward position, you know. I don't mean that it's in an agreement but I mean that its mere existence in writing. Do you think it's essential to have that?

K: Well, we weren't going to put it in writing.

P: I thought you said there would be a letter.

K: That's something you have to let me handle, Pete. I cannot negotiate that one.

P: Yeah. In other words, you have to have that in writing?

K: I don't know how I am going to have it but I'm not going to tell you what I'm going to do so you'll be clean.

P: Yeah. All right, fine. Because I'm sure we'll be called up to testify. I think we will.

K: Right.

P: All right.

K: It doesn't make any difference. They have the right to do it anyway.

The President's Office
The Department of Defense
Publicity Statement

NASA, Dja 5/12/04

- 2 -

TELCORN

P: My point is they have the right to do it and as long as it's not in writing so much the better unless you have to do it for your own reasons. I'm getting into your business but I don't -- I just expressed an opinion.

K: No, I understand it, Pete. But at any rate, you don't raise it at all with them.

P: Precisely.

K: So you don't ever discuss it and I may tell you at dinner sometime what I've done.

P: But if you do it the way I'm talking about in there, they have the right to do whatever they want.

K: I understand.

P: Okay.

K: Good, thank you.

****************

12:50 p.m., September 18, 1972

[Continued Conversation]

K: Pete.

P: Yes, sir.

K: One other thing. On the gas thing, all I promised Brezhnev is that it would be done within two weeks afterwards. We don't have to announce its establishment the same day.

P: Fine.

K: It's better if we -- first, we get another ride. Secondly, it's better if we do it as if it didn't look like a direct package deal.

P: Right. The purpose of my including this, you know, in your note was for you to show good faith and progress on your account.

Hanoi, 17 June 1969, the 3rd day after the fall of Saigon, South of thedmnital

Posterscript

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12938, Sept. 3.5

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Admiral Moorer
9/18/72; 3:00 p.m.
(Secure Phone)

M: I think we had a very good week or more. We have really been turning it on in the area you were concerned about. The Marines have really done a hell of a job in Quang Tri. They captured about 750 weapons out of 1,000 killed. It is indicative that these people did break and run. We are going to watch this. I think the 304 Division might try to come in between Quang Tri and Hue. So we are watching all of that. I just wanted to touch base with you.

K: I think that sounds good. I suppose we could use some Marines to fill any holes in that area. I saw a UPI story in which Air Force officials said we would turn on bombing after elections, use B-52's, etc.

M: I saw the one about holding up on Hanoi because of POW's. Was the UPI today?

K: Yes. Could you let us have a report on it.

M: Yes, I will check into it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01287
By CHNARA Date 09/18/72

TELCONE

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

3:30 p.m., September 18, 1972

D: Hello, Henry. You called me.

K: Yes. Oh, you don't take my calls anymore right away.

D: (laughter) I didn't arrive yet. Nobody expected here to --

K: Okay. I just wanted you to know this thing is coming over.

D: Yeah, you will send with a messenger?

K: Yeah. It's leaving this minute. I'm just giving you the operative paragraph. There is some garbage in there before and we can get that dropped out. If we can get that operative paragraph, which you will see is really pretty close to yours, we could come to a rapid conclusion.

D: Okay, so it will be as you mention operative and there was some introduction, so to speak.

K: Yeah. But the introductory part, don't worry about it. If you disagree, we can get it out.

D: But it is two ways as you discussed. You could present now or make a proposal very close.

K: Yeah. If you could get in the words "practices and procedures," it would save us a two-week turn around.

D: Yeah, I understand. Okay, thank you very much. I will receive and I will today show it to Gromyko and then I will be in touch with you by telephone, right?

K: Excellent.

D: From New York. You have by the way -- I received an invitation here for a celebration the day after tomorrow. I mean, for some kind of a lunch time dealing with not exactly with a paradise but opposite part and you are the hero of this one.

K: Oh, oh, yeah. Are you coming?

D: Well, I will be there but what kind of a --

K: I was asked to have some friends of mine invited and I thought --

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By CHNARA Date StatoL

TELCOM

3:30 p.m., September 18, 1972

D: Oh, I see. So they mention you. I will check with Gromyko. If he will not occupy me with his personal business, I will try to be here. It will be I guess a nice occasion.

K: It should be a pleasant occasion.

D: Yeah. It's at lunch time.

K: Yes.

D: Okay, I will try to do my best to be here. I really enjoy this kind of thing usually. Okay, Henry.

K: Good.

D: So I will receive this message of yours.

K: Good.

D: Thank you very much for everything.

K: Bye, bye.

Hquidun Tnme o1 epepe Iko
4gile, Sein o1 epepe
Nepocet Sui!

OCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

By: KHL NASA Date: 5/12/94

TELCOM

3:30 p.m., September 18, 1972

K: Excellent.

The President's Office is open 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. except on weekends and holidays.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: K.M.V. NAFU, Date: 5/12/72

TELCOM

3:30 p. m., September 18, 1972

D: Yeah. It's at lunch time.

K: Yes.

K: Good.

K: Good.

K: Bye, bye.

["H. E. B. T. H. E. H. B. H. T. H. E. H. B. H. T. H

H. J. S.UNITED STATES SENATE

112TH CONGRESS

September 18, 1972

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12950, Sept. 3.6

TELCON

Senator Fulbright/Mr. Kissinger

4:18 p.m., September 18, 1972

NASA Date 5/12/72

F: (cont'd) be well over it by that time.

K: And if my colleagues here fire me as a result of it, you take -- you look after me.

F: Would you rather have it up here?

K: No, no; I'm joking. I'm joking. I'm proud to be seen with you.

F: (laughter) I'll be there at One o'clock.

The president of the open class
of the House of Representatives of the United States

TELCORN

Bill Timmons/Mr. Kissinger

4:23 p.m., September 18, 1972

K: Bill, who programmed the President to call Jackson today?

T: Who did what?

K: You know that the President called Jackson?

T: Yeah, the President called me and told me.

K: I hope you realize that this breaks a direct promise I made to Brezhnev.

T: To do what?

K: That we were not going to get ourselves officially behind the Jackson Amendment.

T: Well, we're not out in front here. We've pulled off on it. I talked to Haig the other day --

K: Didn't the President tell Jackson he was behind it and he was going to do everything he could to pass it through the House?

T: Well, I don't know what he said; I wasn't present.

K: But you urged him to call him, that's what I want to know.

T: We put in a proposed request some time ago that after the damn thing passed the Senate, that the President might want to call him and thank him for it.

K: Well, you know, if you guys for little moves are going to jeopardize things on which everything depends, we've got all of October programmed with Soviet co-operative efforts with us.

T: Well, we're not doing a thing on the Hill, Henry. We've just pulled off completely. Haig --

K: Well, goddammit, why didn't you tell me that he was going to call Jackson?

T: This had gone in a long time ago; you were gone!

K: Well --

The president of the open house
at the White House of the
United States?

CLASSIFIED
E.O 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELCORN

Bill Timmons/Mr. Kissinger

4:23 p.m., September 18, 1972

By: K.M.W. NAVA Date: 5/13/04

T: We put in requests all the time for him to call people when they
do things of help to the President.

K: The issue was that this was not of so much help to the President.
He shouldn't have been in it to begin with. I have now within 3 days
of leaving Moscow violated a promise I made to Brezhnev on behalf
of the President and it's going to make us look like the worse
triple-crossers ever.

T: Has Scoop said anything?

K: You know goddamn well he will.

T: We'll call him and get it set up.

K: How? I mean, with what argument?

T: Just tell him that we've got things working in the House and just
forget it and stay out of it and let it take its course. He'll understand.
You see, we're not working on the House side now. Ford and those
guys have already worked out to try to get the House to take the Senate
version. And then he called the other night when he passed that --

K: That's all right; I've worked it out with the Russians. If it happens,
it's a natural event.

T: Right.

K: But if Jackson can say he had a call from the President congratulating
him, we are in deep trouble.

T: We'll call Scoop and make sure that he doesn't do that.

K: Well, I don't see how you can.

T: No, we just call and ask him and tell him it's very delicate in the
House side and we'd appreciate it that if the President called any
Republicans and would you just shut up about it so we can get the damn
thing through.

K: After it's through, will he not say that the President was delighted?

T: Oh, I don't know. I don't know. But I think we ought to keep him
quiet for the next few days.

The name of the person being called is confidential.
This document is not to be read or used in any court of law.
Do not read this document until specifically told to do so.

TELCOM

Bill Timmons/Mr. Kissinger

4:23 p.m., September 18, 1972

By: K.H. W. NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

K: Well, I don't care so much. I'm telling you we have something precariously worked out with the Soviets which is not in their interest but in ours and if there's one thing we don't need it's a double-cross.

T: Well, you know when the President called me a half-hour ago or so and said he had talked to Scoop and he wanted me to know that by God we should do everything in our power to get the House to take the Senate version.

K: Yeah, but the mistake was to let him call Scoop. Once he gets on the phone, there's no telling what he will say.

T: Yeah, but he called me and said he wanted the Senate version. He wanted the House to do it.

K: Look, 5 minutes after he talks to me, he will be on his goddamn knees begging you to call the House off so that doesn't mean anything.

T: Well, what should we do? You want me to call Scoop? That's the best thing to do now isn't it?

K: Yeah.

T: Okay.

K: But anything that touches foreign policy, please check with Haig and me. The President just doesn't know all the details.

T: Okay. And anything that touches Congressional relations, you'll check with me, right?

K: Yes, I will. And if I don't, I'm just as much at fault as you are.

T: Okay. Right-O.

K: Right.

TELCONE

Darwin Cuthbert/Mr. Kissinger

4:40 p.m., September 18, 1972

K: Hello!

C: Dr. Kissinger?

K: Yes.

C: This is Darwin Cuthbert, I am the father of Major Richard
Cuthbert of the MIE.

K: Yes.

C: And I, of course, you know we are all concerned about it. What
is--I mean, this is what you might call a hard core reasoning on
sacrificing our boys to the Vietnamese. Is there any expectation
at all of softening this or something?

K: What is the reference to hard core, what?

C: Well, you know, a sort of hard core reasoning on bringing the
Thieu government in there and I know the Vietnamese will not--
I was just wondering if there's going--

K: Well, I cannot go into the details of negotiations but I can tell
you that there is nothing that is more important to us than to
get his release, but I cannot go into the details of the negotia-
tions. Does that answer your question?

C: I know you can't do that, but of course we had a POW meeting
yesterday with the families and everybody in--and these wives--
they are on the point of nervous breakdowns, and of course you
know that too. But, you can't say whether they are getting a
settlement or getting any closer or what?

K: We can't believe what the press says, because they don't know
anything. We are making a major effort right now but I cannot
go into what our position is.

C: Any chance of my daughter-in-law and I coming up and talking
to the President, or anything, and getting any views, and so forth.

K: Well, let me see what I can do.

C: Then, you'll let me know, or what?

K: Yes, do we have your address?

TELCORN

Darwin Cuthbert/Mr. Kissinger

4:40 p.m., September 18, 1972

C: My address? It is 2710 Avenue C, Port Madison, Iowa.

K: Well, I appreciate your calling me and I'll see what I can do.

C: I would appreciate it---I'll tell you another thing, we have been trying to get a confirmation of him being over there because on the 69th film from Hanoi that ______ brought back, we identified him--our family all over the U.S. has identified him--it is a clear picture--is there any way of getting an identification?

K: Well, let me look into that too.

C: Okay, and you will also look into the other think?

K: Yes, I shall.

C: Well, I appreciate the time and help and thank you for calling me.

K: Not at all.

C: Thank you very much, goodbye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: Folsom
By: LO NARA
Date: September 18, 1972

TELCORN

5:00 p.m., September 18, 1972

K: Anatol, why are you always so surprised when I'm at the other end?

D: Why I'm not surprised at all. On the contrary, when I'm meeting you I'm rather surprised that you don't call me back.

K: When what?

D: I'm rather surprised that you didn't call me back before I leave for New York.

K: Well, I am calling you now.

D: Well, this was a surprise. On the contrary, I even delayed my departure waiting for your call.

K: On what?

D: First, maybe you will tell me about SALT -- Not SALT, but about the ratification.

K: Yeah, I'll have a definite answer by tomorrow evening.

D: Oh, I see.

K: But I think we can manage it by the end of this week but I'll give you a definite date tomorrow.

D: Because this is really for our ratification.

K: Yeah, I understand that. I'm calling you about something else which is slightly embarrassing to me in the light of my discussions in Moscow.

D: What about?

K: It's the following -- whenever they pass something through the Congress, our Congressional liaison people just type up a note for the President and get him to make a phone call to the sponsor saying, you know, he's glad it passed and I found out to my horror that the people did that with the Jackson Amendment and so he called Jackson today.

D: Uh-ooh!

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E10258
By CNAR Date 9/1/87

TELCOM

Ambassador Dobrynin /Mr. Kissinger

5:00 p.m., September 18, 1972

- 2 -

K: And I, you know, hope it won't come out but if it does come out, I want you to know how it happened.

D: Yeah.

K: I found --

D: ... with the President?

K: Yeah.

D: Yeah.

K: I'm raising unshirted hell here.

D: Why don't you control them? I think you usually have very good control.

K: I have a good control, Anatol, of anything that I can imagine happening. I do not have a good control over things I can't imagine.

D: Yeah.

K: This could never have happened if I had known about it.

D: Yeah, this is the point. You give them too much liberty to do on their own.

K: Well, the trouble is, Anatol, I can stop anything I can imagine but when I don't imagine, you know, I don't prohibit them from assassinating the President either.

D: (laughter) Well, I will take a little note about it and mention to Gromyko.

K: Well, I want to express my apologies.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: And it is no indication -- it is so stupid that I don't know how to express it but it may not come out publicly but I wanted you to hear it from me.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Foi:2357
By: L.P. NARA Date: 9-17-67

TELCON

5:00 p.m., September 18, 1972

- 3 -

D: Yeah, I understand. It is better not to come but if it comes, what could you do? Nothing really.

K: No. But I want you to know that I am mortified -- when I found out about it, it was when I tried to make arrangement for this ratification. Somebody said, "Well, it's going to be easy because Jackson is happy." I said, "Why should Jackson be happy?"

D: (laughter)

K: (laughter)

D: Well, now we know exactly why he's happy so now we both are happy but -- well, but two minus gives one plus.

K: Tell Gromyko I arranged the double negatives unintentionally.

D: ... impression of exactly what you have arranged.

K: Unintentionally.

D: (laughter) I will mention to him, all right. Okay.

K: And I will let you know, I hope by this time tomorrow about the exact schedule.

D: Yes. What telephone I have to call you in case I need you from New York?

K: 456-2235.

D: Oh, yes; this is your own. Just in case I'll need to be in touch with you.

K: Good.

D: Okay. Thank you very much. Yes, about this hearing, Mr. Vorontsov just mentioned to me and he asked me about the Ivanov case. (laughter) And the reason only is that he just received a call from our lawyer to say that he isn't (?) making appeal before the 22nd of September.

K: I'll tell you what the trouble is -- If your lawyer ..

D: No, no; I am just telling you what he just finished on the telephone. He is/isn't (?) making an appeal before 22nd of September, 4 days

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E01258
By: CNARA Date 09/18/87

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger
5:00 p.m., September 18, 1972

- 4 -

D: (cont'd) from now, the judge will announce that we recognize the sentence and automatically he is to begin to serve his sentence. This is the only thing he really -- nothing else.

K: All right, then appeal it.

D: Huh?

K: Appeal it.

D: Appeal it?

K: Yes.

D: For what?

K: The reason our Justice Department is so reluctant to proceed is because they want the case to go to the Supreme Court.

D: The Supreme Court?

K: Yes, because they want a legal determination of some question connected with the case.

D: Yeah, but then it will take a year. If you understand --

K: No, no; but there are two separate questions. One is can the case be kept alive? Second, can you get your money back?

D: Well, it's the money I think we almost -- but we would like simply to close the issue. The way you feel it's better really. We don't really particularly on . .

K: Well, appeal it and I will do my best in October to get it dismissed.

D: In October?

K: Yes.

D: Okay, I will tell him.

The position of the operator in the
army, Navy or of commercial
Pilotage Staff?

By: K.H. W. NASA Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

9/18/72 5:25 p.m.

BW: ...secretary, tell him if it is not urgent, it is as easy for him to reach me tonight. I know he's terribly busy--so are you very busy?

HK: No, where are you? How are you?

BW: I'm in New York. I'm fine. I feel still asking you how you are. I know how you are--I read absolutely everything about you and I know you are fine. You sound very well, with these reporters.

HK: I know they want me to tell them every detail.

BW: They want you to tell them you have arranged for peace on November 6.

HK: Yeh. I know. I know. What they haven't explained to me is-- It was your guy that Valerianai-- who said it was all a political game. What they haven't explained is why Le Duc Tho should play it.

BW: Except that if it were a political game, you'd be a little more definite than you've been. I heard that you weren't very encouraging.

HK: I was nothing--neither encouraging nor discouraging. I just refused to say anything.

BW: The NYTimes sort of gave us the feeling that you were not--

HK: Yeh, but the LATimes said the opposite.

BW: Sorry folks, I just read the NYTimes.

HK: When am I going to see you?

BW: I also wondered if all this information today about the Soviet Union and ____ would make a public reaction.

HK: I haven't seen it here.

BW: That they were giving arms to the Palestinian guerrillas--

HK: Oh really, I haven't seen that. No one tells me anything.

The following are the words used in the sample.

The first two are in red.

Please read them out loud.

By: KH.Y. NASHA, Date: 5/13/04

Page 2

BW: You're just going to have to read the papers.

HK: I tell you *ar* watch the Today Show--but you weren't on the Today Show--today.

BW: No, I was not on the show this morning. I had a very strange feeling this morning. I don't observe any of the holidays and it doesn't have that kind of a feeling to me, but I think there are enough people who know that I'm Jewish and that I should stay home on a holiday on this--so I come to work where it doesn't matter, but I don't go on the air.

HK: No, I think that's right.

BW: I'm calling on part business and obviously never all business. Did you talk to Bob (?) doing something with us in October--

HK: Let me talk to Haldemand--I'll almost certainly do it.

BW: Now are you also doing something with CBS?

HK: They've now proposed it for a Sunday evening at 6:00 which is a lousy time.

BW: Yes, it's not a very good time. But have you accepted that?

HK: Sort of in a half pegged way, but I'm now thinking of dropping it again.

BW: What did you have in mind for us.

HK: Well you made the suggestion, what did you have in mind?

BW: I had mind that we'd come to Washington and sit down and talk with you and you know, whenever we can, the day after you've talked.

HK: May I buy you a cup of coffee afterwards?

BW: Well I don't know, that's awfully personal.

HK: I know, I know and you always try to keep your feelings out--

BW: I almost sent you a couple of clippings, because after you left, I was going to send this and say you see I'm so pure at heart that no matter what we do--there was a picture of us that was taken at

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KML
NWSA Date: 5/12/04

The play was written by the opening actor, Mr. and Mrs. Charles M. Stine, of the commercial playwriting contest.

Page 3

Taft House.

HK: I have never seen that/

BW: Well there we were and--

HK: Is that were I had my arms around you? (laughing)

BW: No, I was standing next to the Senator and you were standing next his wife. And there was a big blab and the woman who gave it who was a lady whom you may be call was south American or Latin American said "Although Dr. Kissinger and Barbara Walters came in together, it was absolutely and totally coincidental. They just happened to walk in together.

HK: Isn't that rude?

BW: I was very disappointed by it.

HK: All I can say is that I spend more time in a crowd with you than with any other person in years.

BW: My goodness and think of all the things I forgot to ask you. I am going on vacation which is why I am calling you now about it. I will be on vacation the week of the 5th of October--now I could still come and do it--

HK: No, no, we'll do it the next week.

BW: Now the next week which is the week of the 9th--I'm going to be in California.

HK: Then let's do it on the following week.

BW: I'll be back on the 16th and in Washington as a matter of fact on the 17th because I'm going to be covering the opening of the Arthur Miller play and interviewing him the next day. It opens at the Kennedy Center--

HK: Do you want to stay and have dinner with me the next day--

BW: You mean the 17th?

HK: You're covering the play on the 17th aren't you?

BW: Yes, the play opens on the 17th.

["CLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6", "A\nb\no\ns\nt\nh\no\nm\ne\nl\na\nm\no\nn\ni\na\nm\no\nn\ni\na\n

Page 5

BW: **SANITIZED** (home phone.) You know it will be Molly and the Javit's and that whole thing and lots of others. Just call at the last minute, come whatever, you know where I live. And if not, I will talk with you before I go on vacation or you'll call me as soon as Haldeman has said something.

HK: Where are you going?

B&W: I'm staying in New York one week because I haven't had time here and do you know Artie and Harriet Deutch--

HK: I know who they are, but I don't

BW: He had asked me to come out--

HK: I had met them but I don't know where they are living. In Beverly Hills don't they?

BW: They wanted me to speak to a group and I never do, but I thought well--

HK: Oh, I know that group--isn't it that 400 Club. They also asked me.

BW: It was a good time for me to take a vacation--I have all this time coming to me--I have six weeks. I'm in Washington next week and will call you from there maybe.

HK: What day?

BW: On Thursday--for the interview with the McGovern kids.

HK: Want to have lunch.

BW: I can't on Friday--because I will be doing the "Not for Women Only" thing as well and will stay on and tape the whole day of that so it'll be an all day--I won't be finished until 5:00--

HK: Call me let's see if we can get a glimpse of each other anyway.

BW: I call when I am there. What I had planned to do at this point was to leave right after and get home. If you find you have a half hour or something I will take a later shuttle, but don't--

HK: If I don't have a half hour for an old friend.

BW: I'd love to see you if I can--I'll call Thursday or Friday.

It's your last chance to make a mistake
in the life of a consummate
Patriotic Citizen?

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. VanderBuegel

9/18/72 5:45 p.m.

HK: Ernst, how are you?

EV: I'm fine and you? You look fine. I can judge that.

HK: I'm gaining weight.

EV: Are you in Washington Sunday?

HK: Yes, but frankly I was going to go to a football game that starts around lunchtime.

EV: Then we must change it. What about Saturday?

HK: Saturday would be great. Why don't you come for dinner.

EV: Could it be an early dinner--no, not an --I come for dinner and I take a room in Washington.

HK: All right.

EV: And leave the next morning. Is that all right? Why time? Anything is right for me.

HK: Any time--do you want me to get some theater tickets--no

EV: No, I wish not.

HK: Okay.

EV: Then we can spend a quiet evening together.

HK: Anytime--7:00-7:30-8:00

EV: 7:30 White House or in your house?

HK: My house is an unbelievable mess

EV: Shall we say 7:30 in the White House.

HK: Why don't I pick you up whatever hotel you are staying at.

EV: Okay, I'll let you know where I am.

Page 2

HK: If you let me know when you arrive, I'll send a car for you.

EV: Okay, I'll probably come by metroliner. I'll fix that with your secretary.

HK: Terrific. It will be marvelous to see you. Nancy will probably be down here.

EV: Oh marvelous--and then you go to the football game and I leave on Sunday. And we have a quiet eveing.

HK: That will be very good to see you again.

EV: And I'll let you know exactly when I arrive and where we will meet.

HK: How have you been?

EV: I'm fine. Excellent.

HK: We'll talk about everything Saturday.

EV: Whom shall I talk with in your office--you have so many.

HK: Mr. Campbell--or Miss Pineau.
And if your lucky, they'll let me know two days after you have left when you have arrived here.

EV: All right. I'll fix it.

There is no text in the image.

TELCOM

Charles Bludhorn/Mr. Kissinger

7:53 p.m., September 18, 1972

B: Henry, how are you?

K: Okay, how are you?

B: You're a world traveler. You know, I thought that I sort of posted a few miles but you've got me by a long shot. Of course, you've got 4 jets; I only got 2 on mine.

K: It helps.

B: It helps a lot. How are you feeling?

K: Okay.

B: Feeling all right after all the traveling?

K: Yeah, I feel fine.

B: Henry, I got back now and I'm going to be in New York for a while and there's nothing specific that I have to bother you with or anything like that but I just wanted to visit in with you to just be sure that if you get up to New York at all on any occasion and you've got a few minutes you may want to get together for a few minutes.

K: Okay.

B: I don't know whether you are in any position to talk a couple of minutes, are you?

K: Actually you called me on the way out.

B: Well, all right. That's what I know, I think you was just about -- I just spilled something all over the place while I was talking to you. No, I'm not going to hold you up because I have nothing specific to discuss with you. I just wanted to know if there was any -- if in the interim period if there's any additional information or any damn thing you want.

K: No, I have all the information I need and I really am in no position now to do anything until after the election.

B: No, no, no, no; I'm well aware of that. I'm quite well aware of that because you made that very, very clear to me. But I know you were doing a little bit of interim work and if you need anything at all, you

["H. E. L. H. H. E. L. H. H. E. L. H. H