# III - Arms Control and Local Aggression

## A. Surprise Attack and Local Aggression

Whatever the utility of any particular scheme, it is essential to understand that a price may have to be paid for each step towards arms control. To the degree that the risk of surprise attack is reduced, the threat of local aggression may be increased. To the extent that the "positive evidence" concept of inspection makes accidental war less likely, it may encourage probing actions and new forms of blackmail. This is a price we should be willing to pay; but we should not deny that it is a price.

One of the key sanctions against local aggression is the fear that neither side (whatever its intentions) may know how to limit conflict. The control measures outlined above would remove a great deal of this hesitation. One of the chief purposes of the "positive evidence" type of inspection is after all to control the scope of any conflict which may break out and to reassure the opponents in tense situations.

Similarly, if inspection of the size of the retaliatory forces is effective, the result must be the total incredibility of the threat of all-out war.

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attack, forces for local defense must be increased. The contribution
of the system of inspection outlined above is not that it ends the
possibility of Communist pressure but that it channels it into an arena
of conflict where the alternatives are less stark and the risks less
dreadful.

Moreover, it would be a mistake to look at the problem only from
the point of view of strategy. A control system against surprise
attack as comprehensive as the one described above could not fail
to have profound political and psychological consequences. If both
sides can cooperate to the extent envisaged here, the solution of many
other issues will become much more likely. A system requiring the degree
of cooperation as described above could not fail to produce a significant
relaxation of tension which would facilitate negotiations on other problems.

B. The Problem of Complete Disarmament

It is important to understand the relevance of arms control negotiations
to the problem of local aggression. As in the case of surprise attack it is
important to guard against simplified answers. The temptation is frequently
overwhelming to cut the Cordian knot with one blow.

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What could be simpler than to escape the difficulty of comparing
different weapons systems by abolishing weapons altogether? Since
war requires arms, why is it not self-evident that total disarmament
would guarantee universal peace?

The attraction of such panaceas has been considerable and it
has been skillfully exploited by Soviet diplomacy. Ever since its
origin the U.S.S.R. has periodically proposed total disarmament.
Despite the Soviet Union's far from pacific record in the interval,
Mr. Khrushchev's similar proposal before the General Assembly of the
United Nations was greeted in many quarters as a significant contribution
to the debate about arms controls. It was felt that whatever Mr.
Khrushchev's sincerity, the West could simply not afford to fail to
associate itself with the goal of total disarmament. "The suggestion,
in short, is that the Soviet Premier is insincere," said the Democratic
Advisory Council. "This may be. But if he is, he is disregarding the
interests of the Russian people. We would do a great deal better to
expose any insincerity which may lie in his proposals rather than dis-
miss them and thereby discredit our position as leaders in the cause of

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preventing war . . . "³ "I say we should accept them in principle.

After all, scrap the lot, all the arms, is surely just what we all want to see; providing it is the lot, everywhere, and they really are scrapped. So I would go for general agreement at the summit, and then the disarmament commission should get down to brass tacks on the details. . . . For goodness sake, let's take him up on it.

We mustn't lose the chance."⁴

But nothing would do a greater disservice to the cause of peace
than for us to proclaim goals for no other reason than that the
Soviet Union has been skillful in mobilizing world opinion. And
the implications of total disarmament are far too little understood
for us to announce it as an immediate end. The prospects of arms
control can be endangered as much-- as more lastingly-- by the
proclamation of vague goals as by the rigid insistence on achieving
security entirely through military means. Mr. Khruschev's proposal

³ *New York Times*, Sept. 24, 1959.

⁴ *London Times*, Sept. 22, 1959.

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may be a subtle maneuver to prevent the adoption of any
meaningful control scheme or at least to turn negotiations
into a propaganda duel. By stating a sweeping goal, which
is clearly unattainable in the immediate future of maximum
danger, attention can be diverted from the more complicated
measures which are required to avoid our *immediate* perils.
If it took us two years of negotiations to define minimum--
and risky-- control requirements for a nuclear test ban,
a decade may be consumed in devising an inspection system for
total disarmament. In the interval the arms race would
continue--perhaps out of control.

We need not attempt to outdo Mr. Khrushchev in generalized
slogans but to seek to conduct negotiations seriously and
responsibly in keeping with the gravity of the situation
we confront. Whether Mr. Khrushchev is sincere or not,
the prospects are equally disquieting; if he is sincere

the broadeas are equally depreciating; it he is sincere
we confront. Whether Mr. Kurnaohes is sincere or not,
reasonably in keeping with the gravity of the situation
slogans put to seek to conduct negotiations seriously and
We need not attempt to outdo Mr. Kurnaohes in generalised
continue--besides out of control.

total disarmament. In the interval the arms race would
a decade may be consummated in devising an inspection system for
and rapidly-- control requirements for a uncertain test pen.

It it took us two years of negotiations to define minimum--
mesures which are required to avoid our immediate penalties.
danger, attention can be diverted from the more complicated
its clearly unattainable in the immediate future of maximum
into a propaganda chief. By stating a sweeping goal, which
meaningly control scheme or at least to turn negotiations
may be a useful maneuver to prevent the adoption of any

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because it reveals a substantial ignorance about the
nature of the problem; if he is insincere because it
would indicate that Mr. Khrushchev is turning the gravest
challenge before mankind into a tool of Soviet political
warfare.

Inspection of complete disarmament would have to be
able to account not only for existing weapons systems
but also for possible new technological developments.
And a technological breakthrough would become even more
significant at very low levels of armament. At the
other end of the spectrum, certain weapons made obsolete
by the rapid rate of technological chance would again
become significant if their successors were drastically
reduced in number. A control scheme for total disarmament
will therefore have to include six broad types of inspection:
(1) of weapons stockpiles; (2) of military installations;
(3) of technological progress, particularly in the missile

(3) of technological progress, basically in the massila
(1) of weapons stockpile; (5) of military installations;

will increase the need to include six broad types of inspection:
required in number. A control scheme for total disassembly
become significant if their successors were drastically
by the rapid rate of technological advance would again
other end of the spectrum, certain weapons made obsolete
significant at very low levels of armament. At the
and a technological breakthrough would become even more
put also for possible new technological developments.
appe to account not only for existing weapons systems
invention of complete disassembly would have to be
required.

challenge before manking into a tool of Soviet political
would indicate that Mr. Khrushchev is turning the gravest
nature of the problem! It he is sincere, because it
because it reveals a substantial ignorance about the

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and nuclear fields; (4) of nuclear and missile tests;
(5) of production facilities; (6) of fiscal, budgetary
and procurement documents of the governments concerned.

This is a staggering task which for the United States
alone has been conservatively estimated as requiring at
least thirty thousand highly trained specialists, ex-
clusive of clerical personnel.⁵ The stationing of so
many inspectors in foreign countries would in itself
present problems on which analysis has barely begun.
The shift of control over what used to be considered
the key attributes of sovereignty into foreign hands
would represent an upheaval of international relationships
whose implications have not yet been studied, much less
understood.

The problems of dealing with evasions, or even

⁵ Melman, op. cit., p. 49.

2. Melford, _op. cit._, p. 140.

The problems of dealing withvasations, or even
munderfoot.

whose implications have not yet been studied, much less
would represent an appreciation of international relationships
the key attributes of sovereignty into foreign hands

The shift of control over what used to be considered
breast problems on which analyses has purely begun.

enforce of clerical benevolence.² The stationing of so
ferent thirty thousand highly trained specialists, ex-
ample has been conservatively estimated as requiring at

This is a staggering task which for the United States
and broomment documents of the Governments concerned.

(2) of production facilities; (c) of itself, publicly
and under threat; (d) of unknown and missile threats;

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[Y]

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of defining the nature of an evasion, would be formidable.

In each category where inspection is required it would
be necessary to determine what constitutes a military
application and then to devise means for controlling it.

of defining the nature of an occasion, would be tombleable.

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The impossibility of accounting for all nuclear stockpiles and the
difficulty of establishing criteria for comparing military manpower have
already been touched on.⁶ The distinction between reserve and ready
forces, territorial and standing armies, between para-military organizations
(like the Chinese Communes) and organized armed forces will prove highly
incomplete and/or controlled—

inadequate. A control scheme in this respect may have the ironic consequence of placing a premium on the militarization of a society. Under conditions of total disarmament and in the face of the threat of evasion by the opponent, security can best be maintained by the militarization of what has been traditionally considered the civilian aspects of national life. If the civilian aspects of life are difficult to distinguish from the military, inspection will be complicated or meaningless and the capacity to react to an evasion by the opponent will be at a premium.

Similar problems would exist with respect to determining the size
of standing forces. Obviously there are differences in geographic
location, domestic stability and vulnerability that have to be taken into
account. But the criteria for measuring the security requirements of an

6. See above p.______

g. See note b.

recommends. But the criteria for measuring the security requirements of an
location, domestic stability and vulnerability that have to be taken into
of standing forces. Obviously there are differences in geographical
similar problems would exist with respect to determining the size
to reset to an elevation if the opponent will be at a brazenness.

militarily, insubjection will be combated on meaningful and the expedit
ity. If the civilian subjects of the state are difficult to distinguish from
what has been traditionally considered the civilian subjects of national
by the opponent, security can be maintained by the mobilization of
conditions of total disassembly and in the face of the threat of invasion
sequence of placing a brazenness on the mobilization of a society. Under
enlistment. A contract between the state and the military must have the truism of con-
trary to the Chinese Communist) and organized armed forces will prove highly
force, territorial and standing armies, between para-military organizations
already been touched on. The distinction between reserve and ready
civilization of establishing criteria for combating military manpower has
The infeasibility of accounting for all unformed stockpiles and the
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[A]

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island power against those of a continental state are
not likely to be simpler to determine at low levels
of armament than in an arms race. And how is one to
measure the need for security forces to assure domestic
tranquility? Another ironical result of a total dis-
armament scheme may be that countries will have an
incentive to exaggerate their domestic instability in
order to justify the largest level of military force.

It is not necessary to apply these considerations
in detail to other fields of inspection, many of which
are even more intractable. To cite only one more example:
how would one determine whether a given industrial
product be designed for military or for civilian use?
It is well known that the chassis of Soviet tractors
before World War II was identical with that of Soviet
weapons carriers and anti-tank guns. Is inspection going

Weapons carriers and anti-tank guns. It is inspection going
before World War II was identical with that of Soviet
It is well known that the chassis of Soviet tractors
brought to be designed for military or for civilian use?
Why?

are even more inconsiderable. To cite only one more example:
in detail to other fields of inspection, many of which
It is not necessary to apply these considerations
order to justify the largest level of military force.
incentive to exasperate their domestic instability in
armament scheme may be that countries will have an
instability? Another theoretical result of a total dis-
measure the need for security forces to assume domestic
of armament than in an arms race. And how is one to
not likely to be stronger to determine at low levels
island power against those of a continental state are

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to be so detailed as to prescribe the design of all
products that could have military applications? In
short, total disarmament would require a control system
so complex and the criteria of determining evasions would
be so elusive that it may well compound the feeling of
insecurity. Whatever conclusions a careful study would
reach, it seems obvious that general disarmament
cannot be an immediate goal of serious arms control
negotiations.

The obvious reply is that total disarmament is
feasible if it has the sanction of an international
police force. Superior to any national military establish-
ment or any combination of them, it could enforce the
orders of a central organ and in time even furnish the
mechanism for peaceful change.⁷

⁷ For the most thoughtful study of the possibilities of such a scheme see G. Clark and L.B. Sohn, *World Peace through World Law*, Cambridge, (Mass.), 1958.

World War. Cambridge (Mass.), 1928.
and a someone see G. Clark and R.B. Zoum. World Peace Threshold
for the most thoughtful study of the possibilities of
mechanism for peaceful change.

The opions rely on that total disarmament is
negotiations.
cannot be an immediate goal of serious arms control
reach, it seems opinions that General disarmament
insecurity. Whatever concerns a careful study would
be so elusive that it may well compound the feeling of
so complex and the criteria of determining evasive words
apart, total disarmament require a control adequate
beneath that could have military implications? In
so to be so detailed as to breathe the design of all
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In assessing the contribution of an international police force to stability, two situations must be distinguished: (a) conflict among smaller countries in which the major nuclear powers are not directly involved. (b) conflicts which engage the major nuclear powers directly or indirectly. In the first case -- conflict among smaller countries -- an international police force can be a useful instrument. Situations are conceivable which seem highly dangerous to the major nuclear powers but where direct intervention is impossible for political or psychological reasons. The pressure against Laos could more easily be dealt with under UN or other international auspices than by negotiations among the major protagonists. Similarly an international police force has been useful in current crises in the Middle East. For such limited tasks a stand-by international police force would be an important contribution.

force would be an important contribution
for such limited tasks a stand-by international police
has been made in current class in the Middle East.

moral抱gsonalts. Similarly an international police
international amorphous than dy negotiations among the
lions could more easily be dealt with under U or other
political or pedagogical reasons. The brazenness against
bowers put where direct intervention is impossible for
conceivably which seem so dangerous to the major unclean
police force can be a useful instrument. Situations are
conflict among smaller countries -- an international
bowers directly or indirectly. In the first case --
involved (p) conflicts which engage the major unclean
in which the major unclean bowers are not directly
instigated (a) conflict among smaller countries
bowers force to capitulate, two situations must be

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[y]

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The situation is quite different with respect to conflict among the major nuclear powers. Here the notion that an international police force could serve to overcome tensions confuses the expression of law with its formulation. The notion that the problem of peaceful change can be solved primarily by an enforcement agency could arise only in a society where legal norms are generally accepted and where their observance is unchallenged by an organized minority.

In such circumstances, violations will always appear clear and unambiguous. Enforcement becomes a technical problem of detecting the wrong-doer and of assembling overwhelming power against him. In less stable societies, the police force is not nearly so benevolent. In the absence of agreed values those who control the tools of power

agreed to allow those who control the tools of power
to be not merely so benevolent. In the absence of
power against him. In fees simple societies, the bovine
or detecting the wrong-doer and of attempting overwhelming
and unmitigable. Enforcement becomes a technical problem
In such circumstances, violations will always appear of
evidence is unchallenged by an organized minority.
Legal ones are generally accepted and where their
enforcement agency compels only in a society where
ol. because change can be achieved gradually by an
with its formulation. The notion that the problem
to overcome burdens continues the expression of law
notion that an international police force could serve
conflict among the major uncleanbowes. Here the
The situation is quite different with respect to
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[x]

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are in a position to impose their will almost arbitrarily.

This would be a special problem with an international
police organization. To be effective, such a force would
have to be decisively superior to any potential violator.
It would have to be capable of

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recognizing violations quickly. It would have to be in a position to move
decisively and overwhelmingly. It would have to function in an environ-
ment where the criteria for action were clearly understood. Each of these
conditions is extremely difficult to fulfill.

The international police force would have to be strong enough to defeat
an aggressor even when he has secreted a perhaps fairly substantial number
of nuclear weapons. This would involve the creation of a retaliatory force
with its own nuclear stockpile, its own warning net, and, under international
control, To state the problem is to define its complexity. What areas
would be considered sufficiently disinterested to serve as bases for the
international force? Who would man it? How could it be commanded so that
it would react quickly and be attacked without at the same time
becoming a menace for the world?

It seems inconceivable that powers whose distrust has sparked the arms
race could agree on turning over the essential control over their survival
to an international organization, even assuming good will, the composition,
basing and protection of such a force would present difficulties exceeding

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those of any scheme discussed in this chapter. Obviously these forces
cannot be stationed in the territory of the major contenders for that
would make them susceptible to pressure, perhaps to capture, during periods
of tension. But to station them elsewhere might easily reduce their
responsiveness to control and it would place a premium on the actions
of regions whose understanding of the issues at stake may not be
commensurate with their new-found power.

The control of this force would become even more a subject of
contention than its composition. Few countries will be willing to subject
their survival to majority votes in the General Assembly (even weighted
majorities requiring two-thirds of the membership.) But unless there is
some system of majority vote the countries which are most likely to disturb
the peace would have a veto over the international police force. Indeed,
Countries sufficiently concerned about their survival to demand a veto--
and this will probably include all major powers--are unlikely to be satisfied
with procedural safeguards. As long as physical control over the international
force lies elsewhere they know that it could be used against them in an

["force free ofense, find that it could not be used against them in an\nwith brooching establlshment. We know as best that control over the international\nand there will probably increase all motor powers--the unlike to be established\nin some states of majority vote the countries whom are most likely to disturb\nthe balance would have a vote over the international police force. Indeed,\nthe country sufficiently concerned about their survival to demand a vote...\nDomestically sufficiently concerned about their survival to demand a vote...\nthe balance would have a vote over the international police force. Indeed,\nthe country sufficiently concerned about

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extremity regardless of voting arrangements. They could protect them-
selves against this contingency only by exercising a measure of physical
control--a least sufficient to prevent the international force from being
used against their will. This alone would tend to reduce its effectiveness
to situations where the major powers agree--the situations, in short,
which are most amenable to settlement now. It would be least useful to
deal with disputes that threaten the world with cataclysm and which
have produced the arms race.

Even if the technical and procedural problems and command arrangements
could be solved, the problem of defining or recognizing aggression is likely
to prove intractable. Whatever the strength of the international force,
its composition and the safeguards against arbitrary use would make it
more unresponsive to crises than national military establishments or
coalitions of countries with similar interests. Under some circumstances
this may be an asset. It would reduce at least the danger of accidental war
or of a conflict which breaks out because countries seek to protect their
retaliatory force. However, the same qualities may expand the scope of

regardless force. However, the same duties may expand the scope of
or, of a conflict, which causes out because countries seek to project their
force may be an asset. It would become at least the danger of accidental war
conditions of countries with similar interests. Under some circumstances
more unresistible to arise than national military establishments or
its composition and the algorithms against which we would make it
to prove intractable. Whatever the strength of the international force,
could be solved, the problem of defining or recognizing attraction is finally
benevolent and procedure problem and command arrangements
have been produced the same race.

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blackmail. Asian and African countries would be hardly
as sensitive to pressure against Europe as NATO and
by the maxims of disinterestedness or even of majority
rule, they would have the decisive vote. An international
police force would not be the cause but the expression of
an end of tensions. It would be effective only if there
is a consensus among the nations making possible the
institution of world government.

C. Stabilizing Balance of Local Power

Complete disarmament has all the difficulties of
a deterrent equation stabilized at very low levels.
A relatively minor violation could confer a substantial,
perhaps a decisive, advantage. The problem is further
complicated by the difficulty of determining what con-
stitutes an evasion. The solution is similar to that for
dealing with surprise attack. The equilibrium of

dealing with umbrella attack. The equilibrium of
attributes an invasion. The solution is similar to that for
completed by the difficulty of determining what con-
cludes a geckoe, advantage. The problem is further
relatively minor violation could occur a substantial
a deterrent education stabilized at very low levels.

Complete disarmament has all the difficulties of
O. Staffing Balance of Local Power.

Institution of world government.

is a consensus among the nations making possible the
an end of tensions. It would be effective only if there
force would not be the cause but the expression of
rule, they would have the decisive vote. An international
by the maximum of disinterestedness or even of majority
as sensitive to balance against Europe as NATO and
discrimination. Asian and African countries would be hard
by

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forces suitable for local conflict should be stabilized
at a level where the demands made on the inspection system
are not so severe as to magnify insecurity. The evasion
required to upset the equilibrium should be sufficiently
large so that they could not fail to be detected. And
even then a violation should not confer a decisive
superiority. As in the case of the balance for all-
out war, a violation should start an arms race, not a war.

However, it is necessary to recognize the paradoxical
fact that forces suitable for local conflict are less
amenable to inspection than the retaliatory forces.
For one thing, tactical warning may be even less significant
than in the case of surprise attack. Before the attack
on Belgium and Holland in May, 1940, the Low Countries
were well aware that a German blow was imminent. Indeed
six months previously a German courier plane landed in
Belgium by error with the plans for the attack, though the
Belgians believed this to be a feint, they could hardly have

Belgium preferred this to be a letdown, they could hardly have
Belgium pay attention with the bane for the attack. (through the
six months previously a German counterpane bane landed in
were well aware that a German pilot was imminent. Indeed
on Belgium and Holland in May, 1940, the low Countries
than in the case of ambuscade attack. Before the attack
for one thing, tactical meaning may be even less significant
than the reticency of the Belgians.

that Belgians antitapie for focal conflict are less
than that Belgians antitapie for focal conflict are less
anymore to inaction than the reticency of the Belgians.

However, if it is necessary to recognize the baneful
out war, a violation should start an arms race, not a war.

even then a violation should not concur a decisive
far as that they could not fail to be detected. And
required to meet the equilibrium should be sufficiently
safe not so severe as to magnify insecurity. The evasion
at a level where the demand made on the inaction system
forces antitapie for focal conflict should be satisfied

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doubted that some aggression was being planned.

Nevertheless the German attack was almost completely successful. The reason was not lack of information but inadequate strength and doctrine. Similarly the successful Soviet offensives against Germany in World War II were preceded by weeks if not months of preparation which could not be hidden. And the weakness of NATO is not due to ignorance about Soviet power. It is rather due to the inability to contain forces whose strengths and dispositions are reasonably well-known. Even the most perfect inspection system cannot protect a decisively inferior force because it may only reveal to it the extent of its peril.

This is why the Soviet proposal of fixed inspection posts at major rail and communications centers will ameliorate the danger of local aggression only if the balance of local forces is redressed. The reason is not,

balance of local forces is redeveloped. The reason is not
emphasize the danger of local aggression only if the
boots at major rear and communications centers will

This is why the Soviet proposal of fixed inspection
extent of its border.

interior force because it may only reveal to it the
benign inspection system cannot protect a decisively
dispositions are reasonably well-known. Even the most
confident do not be broken. And the weakness of NATO is not
brought by weeks if not months of preparation which
Soviet offensives against Germany in World War II were
insubordinate strength and doctrine. Similarly the successful
successful. The reason was not lack of information but
Nevertheless the German attack was almost completely
completed that some aggression was being pursued.

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as is frequently maintained, that the information
obtained from fixed inspection stations would be
insufficient. The Soviet leaders are probably correct
in pointing out that such inspection posts could not
fail to reveal significant troop movements. The difficulty
is that given the present relation of forces, the inspection
system proposed by the Soviets safeguards the West only
against surprise, not against local preponderance.
But protection against surprise attack is helpful only
if surprise is itself a decisive factor. It is useless
if the aggressor is so much stronger that he will prevail
regardless of what information the opponent possesses.

To be sure, an equilibrium can be brought about
in part through negotiated agreements. But when the dis-
parity in local strength is as large as it is now, what is
required is a certain build-up of Western local power
coupled with a reduction of Communist conventional strength
to be monitored by an inspection system.

combined with a regulation of Communist conventional strength
required is a certain minimum of Western local power.

barely in force, strength is as far as it is now, what is
in but through negotiated agreements. But when the dis-
to be same, an equilibrium can be brought about.

it the aggressor is so much stronger that he will break
it, the ambrose is itself a decisive factor. It is useless
but protection against ambrose attack is wholly only
against ambrose, not against local preponderance.

system proposed by the Soviets suggests the West only
is that given the present relation of forces, the invasion
let to reveal significant troop movements. The difficulty
in pointing out that such invasion beats could not
insignificant. The Soviet leaders are properly correct
obtained from fixed inspection stations would be
as it frequently maintained, that the information

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Even then it is important to be clear that few measures are more difficult to inspect than the size of a standing army or of stores of conventional weapons. At the end of World War I, Germany agreed to limit its forces and it was subject to a rigorous system of inspection. Nevertheless, even before its open abrogation of the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had succeeded in evading the inspection system and to build forces far in excess of permissible levels.

It will be difficult in the extreme to establish a stable balance of local power, even more complex to devise adequate inspections. Even if the Soviet Union were to reduce its forces to the levels described in Mr. Khrushchev's speech of January 14, 1960, there will still be the pressure of the vast speedily mobilizable Soviet reserve strength. This problem is complicated even further by the repeated statements of Soviet leaders whenever

Unfairly by the rebranded statements of Soviet refugees whenever
soviet reserve strength. This problem is complicated even
will still be the measure of the act, abetify modifiable
Mr. Khrushchev, a speaker of Soviet Union, 1960, there
were to reduce its forces to the level described in
deviate adequate inspections. Even if the Soviet Union
attempts balance of focal power, even more complex to
be will be difficult in the extreme to accomplish if
forces are in excess of belligerent levels.

succeeded in evading the inspection system and to bring
restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany had
Nevertheless, even before its own specification of the
it was subject to a rigorous system of inspection.

of World War I, Germany agreed to limit its forces and
army or of forces of conventional weapons. At the end
are more difficult to inspect than the size of a standing
Even then it is important to be certain that few measures

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they have reduced their forces that military training
would now have to be furnished outside the regular
military establishment. In his speech announcing a cut
in the standing army Mr. Khrushchev declared: "Looking
ahead, we can visualize military units being formed
on the territorial principle. Their effectives will get
their military training outside their working hours and,
whenever necessary, the required means of transportation,
such as aircraft and other military technique, will enable
the forces to be massed whenever required."

Mr. Khrushchev did not make clear whether he considered
these territorial units part of the standing army or
an extension of it.

Even greater difficulties are presented by Communist
China. Every member of a commune is known to receive

⁸ *New York Herald Tribune*, February 29, 1960.

8

New York Herald Tribune, February 5th, 1920.

China. Every member of a commune is known to receive
Even greater difficulties are presented by Communist
an extension of it.
these territorial units but of the standing army on
Mr. Kuanchen did not make clear whether he considered
the forces to be increased whenever required." 3
such as aircraft and other military technique, will enable
whenever necessary, the required means of transportation,
their military training outside their working hours and,
on the territorial principle. Their effectiveness will be
seen, we can visualize military units being formed
in the standing army Mr. Kuanchen declared: "Looking
military exploitation. In his absence announcing a new
world now have to be furnished outside the regimen
they have reduced their forces that military training

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