# Kissinger Expects Talks To Strengthen Cease-Fire

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 29—Henry A. Kissinger said today that he expected to conclude “new understandings” with Hanoi next week to strengthen the Vietnam cease-fire agreement. In a news conference at the White House, President Nixon's adviser on national security made his first comments on his current round of talks with Hanoi's chief negotiator, Le Duc Tho.

"We expect," he said, that when talks resume next Wednesday in Paris, "we will conclude them satisfactorily."

Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Tho met for nearly a week in Paris earlier this month and said afterward that "significant progress had been achieved."

## Sullivan Visiting Asians

William H. Sullivan, deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, has gone to Southeast Asia to report to the South Vietnamese, Laotians, Cambodians and Thais on the talks. "No doubt Hanoi is discussing it with their friends," Mr. Kissinger said.

Today, because of an agreement with Hanoi not to make public the details of the tentative agreement, Mr. Kissinger spoke mostly in generalities.

He warned that "a great deal depends on whether the new understandings will be implemented because the lack of implementation isn't necessarily a lack of clarity of the old agreement but lack of willingness to observe provisions that are

Continued on Page 7, Column 1

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Fin du sommet de l'O.U.A.
# ISRAËL CONDAMNÉ A L'UNANIMITÉ

mais, derrière les résolutions politiques, ce sont
les préoccupations économiques qui ont dominé les débats

Addis-Abeba, 29 mai. (De notre envoyé spécial.)

C'est fini. Les festivités du dixième anniversaire de l'Organisation de l'unité africaine ont pris fin ce matin et le « sommet » a définitivement clôturé ses travaux, alors qu'une petite pluie fine commençait à tomber sur Addis-Abeba.

Le briquet
VINCI
le complice de votre élégance
un choix très personnel

« Historique » ce sommet, comme l'auraient souhaité les quarante et un pays membres de l'organisme international ? A dire vrai, il lui aura manqué cet « esprit », ce souffle qui avait caractérisé le précédent l'année dernière, à Rabat.

Mais, alors qu'il était menacé d'éclatement, que ses contradi-cions internes semblaient, à l'ube de cette deuxième décen-nie, insurmontables, que la « crise de générations » entre les « pères de l'indépendance » et les nouveaux promus aux postes de commande de l'Afri-que paraissait le vouer à l'échec, il aura en définitive prouvé que le continent africain a enfin acquis sa maturité. Du moins l'âge de raison.

La conciliation et la sagesse, une nouvelle fois, ont triomphé du désordre et de l'aventurisme. La palabre africaine n'a pas été inventé pour rien et les meil-leurs négociateurs de ces as-sises panafricaines l'ont pouvé.

A l'ouverture de ce sommet, deux questions particulièrement graves devaient être débattues: le Proche-Orient et le différend frontalier somalo-éthiopien. Sur ce dernier point, après plus d'une semaine de guérilla dipo-lmatique dans l'hémicycle de l'Africa Hall et de guerre de communiqués entre Mogadiscio et Addis-Abeba, l'abcès a été crevé et une solution — provi-soire, il est vrai — a pu être trouvée. Une commission de « bons offices » va tenter de régler ce contentieux en récon-ciliant les « frères ennemis de la corne de l'Afrique ».

On revient de loin... Car, jusqu'à hier après-midi, un conflit généralisé risquait, à tous moments, d'éclater pour cette portion de territoire

éthiopien, appelé Ogaden, que le gouvernement de Mogadiscio revendique. Il aura fallu toute l'habileté du général Gowon (Nigéria), le nouveau prési-dent de l'O.U.A., pour que l'irréparable ne se produise pas et que les divisions soma-liennes et éthiopiennes concen-trées depuis plusieurs semai-nes aux frontières n'entrent pas en action.

La poignée de main entre l'empereur Haïlè Sélassié Ier et le général Mohamed Siad Barre est le symbole même de la réconciliation. Tout comme celle échangée entre le prési-dent Nyerere (Tanzanie) et le général Idi Amine, après plu-

De notre envoyé spécial
Christian HOCHE

sieurs mois de brouille et de menaces d'affrontement entre les deux pays.

La question du Proche-Orient, quand bien même la résolution finale n'aurait pas satisfait les plus extrémistes, a trouvé une superbe unani-mité pour condamner Israël et menacer l'Etat hébreu de sanctions — « mesures indivi-duelles ou collectives » — s'il n'applique pas désormais la résolution du 22 novembre 1967 du Conseil de sécurité.

Cette prise de position est nouvelle, dans la mesure où tous les Etats africains se sont sentis solidaires du combat de libération de la République d'Egypte pour récupérer ses territoires occupés.

L'offensive diplomatique des pays arabes qui ont, chaque

fois, réaffirmé leur complète appartenance au continent africain à la tribune de l'O.U.A., aura été couronné de succès. Qui dira le rôle d'organisation et d'orchestration de l'Algérie qui préféra laisser la Libye monter en ligne et dénoncer avec une rare violence la col-lusion israélo - éthiopienne, le problème (oh, sacrilège !) de l'Erythrée et inviter « tous les pays frères » à rompre leurs relations diplomatiques avec les « sionnistes » ?

Certes, cette requête n'a pas porté tous les fruits que comp-tait récolter le bouillant col-nel Khadafi, certains pays comme le Zaïre affirmant qu'il s'agissait là d'ingérence dans les affaires intérieures des Etats. Mais pouvait-il imaginer que la Tunisie, par exemple, considérée comme « modéré » adhère aux thèses extrémistes libyennes, jusqu'à les dépasser.

Il est incontestable que le travail en profondeur de la di-plomatie arabe a été payant et le sera davantage encore dans les mois qui viennent. Les posi-tions d'Israël, au sud du Sa-hara, se sont rétrécies comme une peau de chagrin (six pays africains ont rompu, depuis le début de l'année, leurs rapports avec Jérusalem) au point que les observateurs s'ingéniaient à compter celles qui, probable-ment, tomberont très prochainement.

Le Marché
Commun

Mais plus que ces résolutions politiques, avec ses éternelles condamnations — la Rhodésie, l'Afrique du Sud, le Portugal, la France, la Grande-Bretagne — et ses sempiternels sou-tiens aux mouvements de libé-ration, c'est l'aspect écono-mique qui, en filigrane, a domi-né ce 10e « sommet ».

D'Houphouët-Boigny à Hama-ni Diori, en passant par Moha-med Masmoudi et bien d'autres

M. ABBA EBAN : « Israël continue
à demander une solution négociée
au conflit du Proche-Orient »

Gaullists Manques

NYT
5/3/73

There is no particular reason to anticipate that the meeting of Presidents Nixon and Pompidou in the Icelandic capital will be long remembered in diplomatic history. Neither President is leading from personal strength on his homefront; neither seems to feel any of the great outstanding issues can be solved in a summit bargain, after teams of diplomats have allowed any number of specific trans-Atlantic concepts to lie fallow.

On the eve of President Nixon's departure, Mr. Kissinger explained that all the specific problems—the trade, monetary and defense questions—would be worked over, “but we would like to set them into a framework of more long-range objectives . . . to lift the Atlantic debate out of the rut of purely technical controversies.”

This is only proper when two heads of state meet, particularly when neither is a plenipotentiary. Mr. Pompidou cannot claim to speak for “Europe,” as his illustrious predecessor used to bask in the attempt, and Mr. Nixon is on less firm ground than ever before in implying commitments of the United States Government. On the issues most on Mr. Pompidou’s mind—trade negotiations, the future presence of American troops in Europe, nuclear planning—the American Congress has ultimately as much of a say as the President, and the Congress is not now in a mood to give out blank checks.

The real problem in the Atlantic debate is that the controversies outstanding are not trivial for being “technical.” Long-range objectives must be explored, but the leaders of France and the United States might well find themselves embarrassingly close to disagreement. Cohesion of a “Free World” against military or economic aggression no longer strikes a universal chord. In any European-American (and Japanese?) Community, are the interests of the whole necessarily the interests of each member? Are the interests of the European allies only “regional,” in one of Mr. Kissinger’s less fortunate phrases, in contrast to the “global” interests of the United States? A commentator for Le Monde remarked: “Never have such lofty principles been bandied about as a smokescreen for such special pleading.”

Both Presidents Nixon and Pompidou are vulnerable to the charge of asserting their respective national interests as if they embodied the interests of the whole community. The most important task of this American “Year of Europe” is to discover just how much the immediate and particular interests can be made congruent with a less clearly perceived long-range and general interest. It is not at all certain that summit conferences, with their own special preoccupations, are the best occasion for such a search, but it must start somewhere.

The Other News

Aftergate Investigation

esco hints he agrees with
Figueres. Page 32
Government says it heard
lawyer on taps. Page 33

International

Troubled Saigon economy
awaits U.S. help. Page 1
U.S. seeks "confrontation,"
Libya charges. Page 2

Member of Yemen's leadership assassinated. Page 3

I.R.A. wing harasses Roman Catholics at polls. Page 3

Dutch Government plans
social reforms. Page 4

Africa conference survives 2
bitter disputes. Page 6

Cambodian diplomat on mission to Paris. Page 7

Government and Politics

Many are facing food stamp
loss. Page 15

Gallup reports Connally trails
Kennedy. Page 16

House is urged not to curb
abortions. Page 24

Business is reassured by
Mills on taxes. Page 35

Badillo and Biaggi offices in
capital are quiet. Page 36

Badillo calls educational system a "failure." Page 36

Hogan and vanden Heuvel offer endorsements. Page 37

Mayoral candidate works on
TV commercials. Page 37

General

Colonel's charges are denied
by ex-P.O.W.'s. Page 11

Ohio court orders end to
Antioch strike. Page 22

Evacuation was key in fighting train fire. Page 30

Industry and Labor

Two unions expect G.E. contract offer today. Page 34

Education and Welfare

U.S. welfare plan may cost
New Yorkers more. Page 23

Health and Science

Skylab crew begins earth
survey experiment. Page 28

Mt. Sinai medical school to
study asbestos. Page 47

Amusements and the Arts

After Claude," by Iris
Owens, reviewed. Page 45

Quotation of

"We came here to supervise what we have been doing is obvious. Gauvin, chief Canadian delegate to the Commission on Control and Supervision."

"The Hunters Are the Hunted"
on screen. Page 48

Anievas keeps "Rhapsody in
Blue" current. Page 48

"Yin Yang" staged by Negro
Ensemble. Page 48

"Raisin," musical, opens in
Washington. Page 49

Lieberson moves to old C.B.S.
Record's post. Page 49

$1-million gift stirs Papp to
join Lincoln Center. Page 50

City Hall Park is no place
for poets. Page 50

Three TV news specials on
three networks. Page 75

Going Out Guide Page 50

Family/Style

Fancy food doesn't always

mean good food. Page 46

All those dishwashers and no
detergents. Page 46

Obituaries

Jane Bowles, dramatist and
novelist. Page 42

Fyodim Petrov, Soviet revolutionary and editor. Page 42

Financial and Business

People and Business: Exchange elects Poole. Page 57

Stocks slump in year's third
largest loss. Page 59

F.C.C. approves 73 per cent
gas price rise. Page 59

Dollar weakens in Europe as
gold climbs. Page 59

Daane of Reserve sees recent
payments surplus. Page 59

Personal Finance: High closing costs. Page 59

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Advertising News</td><td>68</td><td>Market Averages</td><td>64</td></tr><tr><td>Amer. Exchange</td><td>66</td><td>Market Place</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>Bond Sales</td><td>64</td><td>Money</td><td>64</td></tr><tr><td>Business Briefs</td><td>69</td><td>Mutual Funds</td><td>67</td></tr><tr><td>Commodities</td><td>64</td><td>N.Y. Stock Exch</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>Dividends</td><td>57</td><td>Out-of-Town</td><td>69</td></tr><tr><td>Foreign Exchange</td><td>64</td><td>Over the Counter</td><td>67</td></tr><tr><td>Grains</td><td>64</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Sports

Johncock captures Indy 500;
crewman killed. Page 53

Yanks' Medich faces A's Blue
at Stadium. Page 53

Mets lose to Giants, 3-2; Jones
out a month. Page 53

House Vow:
Farmers

a firm energy policy to encourage everyone to conserve fuel.

Indian Airliner
Crashes, 48 Die

From News Dispatches

NEW DELHI, May 31-An
Indian Airlines Boeing 737,
trying to land at New Delhi's
Palma Airport in a dust
storm, crashed tonight in a
residential area and burned.

At least 48 of the 65 per-
sons aboard, including four
Americans, were killed, In-
dian Airlines officials said.
No injuries were reported on
the ground.

Among those killed in the
crash were India's minister
for steel, S. Mohan Kumara-
mangalam, a cabinet member
considered one of Prime Min-
ister Indira Gandhi's closest
political advisers.

The twin-engine jetliner, on
a flight from Madras, appar-
ently broke apart before
crashing.

Among the survivors were
M. B. Sterling of Edinburg,
Texas, and his son, Lee.
Sterling's wife and three
daughters were killed.

Another survivor was U.S.
Marine Lance Cpl. George
Larson, who was carrying a
diplomatic pouch for the
American embassy. An em-
bassy official said the young
Marine from Minnesota suf-
fered a broken arm and leg.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Friday, June 1, 1973

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# The Great American Foreign Policy Machine

P.R.

## An In-Depth Look at the Personalities and Positions in the Foreign Policy Establishment—Nixon and Kissinger, the Relationship Between the White House and State Department, the Role of Congress, the CIA, and Other Agencies

Washington, June '73

By Tad Szulc

I

Like most things in Washington these days, the conduct of American foreign policy is centered at the White House. At least in theory. The popular image, adroitly constructed during the last four years, is that President Nixon, himself a student of the world and tireless traveler, and Henry A. Kissinger-his principal foreign affairs adviser, plenipotentiary globetrotter, international negotiator extraordinary, and chief public relations expert and news manager-direct the multifaceted United States foreign policy with absolute smoothness and control, meshing together all the diverse strands of national interest into a harmonious and logical whole.

Nixon appears in this image as the tough and virtually infallible decision maker and Kissinger as a man of unquestioned brilliant intellect and creativity, the grand executor and diplomatic virtuoso solo performer in the field. Their backfield is the White House-based structure of the National Security Council.

Painted in broad impressionist strokes, Nixon's first term has produced great breakthroughs and spectaculars under

the general heading of a "Generation of Peace."

But, as must be the case with every great heroic painting in a gallery-say, Napoleon and Alexander I on the raft at Tilsit or the Rape of the Sabines-a second and more critical look is in order. This is when the awed viewer may better understand the masterwork and notice the detail and, if he is so minded, even suspect flaws and imperfections. And when this is done with the Nixon foreign policy-and the Nixon foreign policy machine-there is the temptation to question quite a few things about the official portrait.

Such a critique inevitably leads to revisionist thoughts because they are perforce immensely relevant to the conduct of foreign policy in the second term, up to early 1977.

In the first place, one must ask how smooth and effective is the Nixon-Kissinger policy process, excluding as it does much actual advice and intellectual input from the State Department and other government agencies and relying to such an overwhelming degree on total secrecy? Always a cruel town, Nixon's Washing-

ton is strewn with the bodies of the fallen mighty and the bruised egos of once-potent bureaucrats.

Then one must wonder how much chaos, confusion, and contradiction prevails behind the facade of this monolithic policy making, especially in the area of foreign economic policy, obviously one of the most crucial international problems of the decade.

There are grave questions, too, to be asked about the function and morale of the State Department, the crisis pervading the United States intelligence community, and the importance of the Pentagon in the formulation of foreign policy. And what about the atrophy of the Congress in its constitutional role of advising, consenting, and funding in the realm of our foreign policy?

Among substantive policy problems it is surely proper to ask searching questions about the great Nixon spectaculars, the political price paid for them by the United States and, therefore, the concrete long-range implications of White House policies. To wit:

-Who benefited most in the long run from the *détente* with Peking and Moscow: Them or us? The summit meetings were probably the easiest part because

for a variety of their own reasons, such as the Peking-Moscow tensions, it suited China and the Soviets to play the symmetry game. Peking won overwhelming international respectability. Moscow received a trade bonanza. But where do we go from here?

—Four months after the Vietnam peace accords, is it really safe to conclude—as the fighting goes on in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—that we achieved “Peace with Honor” and that the chapter of direct US involvement in Indochina has truly ended? To be sure, our troops are out of Vietnam and our war prisoners out of Hanoi, but the Vietnamese truce is illusory. At the end of April the US-supported Cambodian regime was on the verge of collapse (Nixon and Kissinger obviously underestimated the dangers in Cambodia when the immensely ambiguous peace accords were signed with all the fanfare) and Washington and Hanoi exchanged angry accusations of Vietnam ceasefire violations. Further escalation cannot be ruled out. Was all this a triumph?

—How valid were the SALT agreements, especially the interim accord on offensive weapons? Have they actually put a freeze on the arms race with Moscow? Aren't we going for a new generation of weapon systems and isn't the Soviet Union perfecting its MIRV multiple warhead system for intercontinental missiles?

—Hasn't the foreign economy policy been direly mismanaged, as many savvy people in this town are beginning to suspect, what with the United States caught twice, evidently unprepared, in financial crises leading to dollar devaluations? Why was it only in 1973 that the Administration came up with foreign trade legislation? Why did the energy crisis come as such a surprise late in 1972, though it was certainly predictable? Were we wise, from the viewpoint of national interest, to have sold so much wheat to the Russians and so suddenly? And again, where do we go from here both in monetary and trade policies?

—What are the very powerful external pressures affecting the Nixon-Kissinger policy formulations? What are the respective roles of the big corporations—domestic and multinational—labor unions, the farm bloc, other protectionist and free-trade interests, and everybody else on the Washington scene in the conciliation of national policy?

Nobody in his right mind would question that Nixon was wise in having the United States acknowledge, almost a quarter of a century late, the existence of Communist China and drop the pretense that Taiwan was the real China. Nor would any sensible person criticize the Administration for the Soviet détente and the SALT talks, to say nothing of getting the United States out of Vietnam. But the trouble, it seems to me, is that the Administration has succeeded in por-

traying all its positive and negative policy moves and decisions as great firsts and unqualified triumphs—from the Nixon China trip to the dollar devaluations—and that, with the possible exception of Indochina, these claims have been almost uncritically accepted by the public. There has not been enough serious evaluation of the long-range implications of all these policies.

The myth, therefore, persists that whatever else may be wrong with the Nixon Administration—be it Watergate or inflation—the President has constructed at the White House a near-perfect foreign policy mechanism.

Actually, Watergate itself already served to obstruct the process of foreign relations. Nixon, speaking to the nation about Watergate on April 30, admitted that he had been spending too much time on this scandal at the expense of essential foreign and domestic policies. In fact, as the President spoke, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt was in town waiting to see him.

As a result of the Watergate scandal, Nixon had to reshuffle much of the national security establishment. Elliott P. Richardson was removed after three months from his post as defense secretary to be attorney general, and Dr. James R. Schlesinger took over the Pentagon following only two months as director of the Central Intelligence Agency. He was replaced by his recently assigned deputy, William E. Colby, as head of both the intelligence community and the CIA. John Connally, the new convert to the Republican party, joined the White House staff with responsibilities in foreign affairs that at some point may conflict with Kissinger's.

To help in the evaluation of these policies and the dissection of the Nixon-Kissinger myth, let us first ask: What is our foreign policy establishment today, how is it organized, and how does it operate? This being such a personalized government, key personalities and their relative positions in the power constellation are crucial in any assessment of the foreign policy apparatus.

But it is necessary to signal at the outset that foreign policy in the '70s has become such an astonishingly complex operation that, much as the White House insists on being its final arbiter and coordinator, almost every major department and agency of the government is involved to some extent—even if it is only to cater to the insatiable information thirst of the Nixon-Kissinger braintrust.

Not infrequently, an agency is not told why a given piece of information or special study is being requested or to what use it is being put. Senior officials often don't know why they are ordered to perform actions or undertake studies. Ambassadors abroad often work in the dark. A famous case in point was an

order from the National Security Council to the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency as early as 1969 come up with the most complete possible study of the situation in China and even conceivable combination of US policy options toward Peking. But the State Department, even on the highest levels, except for Secretary Rogers, was given clue that this tremendous effort was due to a secret National Security Council view of relations with China, a review based on Nixon's already-taken decisions to seek an accommodation with the mainland. Similarly, the department's senior official in charge of Asian affairs was given only a few hours' telephone not by Rogers in July 1971 that the President was about to go on television to announce that Kissinger had secretly visited Peking and that Nixon himself was to go China. This official was informed an hour ahead of the ambassadors of such countries as the Soviet Union, National China, and Japan.

Trusting nobody outside the innermost circle and obsessively fearful of new leaks—this is the way the White House likes to operate nowadays. Kissinger strictly forbids NSC staff members to talk to newsmen or even socialize with them. Aside from formal White House announcements and briefings, Kissinger the only high Administration official authorized to explain and discuss foreign policy in background sessions, news conferences, or, when it suits him, in private meetings or lunches or telephone conversations with handpicked correspondents. Under this system there is no “doubt check” alternative for newsmen. Kissinger, often quoted as a “high Administration source,” must be taken on faith.

The President, of course, makes formal pronouncements only when he is ready to announce a policy or utter a threat. He and Kissinger thus control the flow of information to the nation. The public ignores policy options available to the United States except when newsmen start putting two and two together and the antennae tell them there is something the air. But, to the great delight of the White House, newsmen sometimes conclude that two and two make five.

The Nixon foreign policy establishment thus not only excludes traditional public debate—Kissinger has never appeared formally before a congressional committee and Rogers has often refused to do so—but it has deliberately acquired a protective grayness and anonymity that fit well the overall dullness of the who Administration. The famous Georgetown dinners during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, when top people make themselves available for intelligent discussion in social surroundings, may not have been a good idea. The Nixon crowd, never quite at ease in Washington, takes a dim view of this institution. In the end, the only touches of contrived color or humanity surrounding the co-

duct of foreign affairs are the amusing platitudes delivered by Kissinger at formal receptions, the tired jokes that "Henry is hiding in Havana," and his public appearances here and there in the company of beautiful women.

To quit toing and froing the line is the road to political suicide. This was discovered by Peter Peterson, briefly the Secretary of Commerce, who not only developed his own clout through his trade negotiations with the Russians in 1972, but also dared to be a personage in his own right. He insisted on a voice in formulating foreign economic policy in general and, sin of sins, he accepted invitations from people he liked and actually talked about his work. Peterson, not undeservedly, saw himself as Kissinger's opposite number in the international economic area. All this was too much for the White House: He suddenly loomed as Kissinger's rival in the eyes of the public opinion and—in making economic policy—as the rival of Peter Flanigan, the White House Special Assistant and former international investment banker. Peterson was promptly cut down at the knees and replaced at Commerce by a political nonentity.

Perhaps in tune with the prevailing Washington spirit, foreign ambassadors here are mostly a dull lot. Their governments obviously realize that all serious business is transacted by White House flying emissaries. In Moscow, for example, the American ambassador met only once with Brezhnev in four years. I can think of no more than half-a-dozen truly first-rate—and interesting—ambassadors serving in this town. I would include in this group, first and foremost, the Soviet ambassador, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, a veteran of thirteen years in Washington under three presidents and a remarkably perceptive observer of the American scene. Romania's ambassador, Corneliu Bogdan, is one of the best professional diplomats I've ever met. The new Pakistani ambassador, Sultan M. Khan, is also an exceptional diplomatist—he served as ambassador in Peking and later, as foreign minister, helped to arrange Kissinger's first secret trip there. The recently departed Israeli ambassador, Yitzhak Rabin, certainly belonged to this select group, as does the Spanish ambassador, Angel Sagaz, and the Brazilian envoy, João Augusto de Araujo Castro. Japan's Nobuhiko Ushiba and Chile's Orlando Letelier almost make the first team. But six first-class diplomats out of 112 ambassadors accredited here is quite a comedown from the old days in Washington. Life along Embassy Row is rich in ennui.

This pervasive sense of boredom is the fate of the State Department too. Secretary Rogers' news conferences are rare and, when held, they seldom produce news or even insight into the Administration's policy thinking. The State Depart-

ment invariably defers to the White House. Though Rogers, an affable and courteous man who gets along with newsmen and Congressmen better than most senior Administration officials, is occasionally accessible on a personal basis, he has shied away from the useful custom followed by his predecessor, Dean Rusk, of inviting State Department correspondents for informal five o'clock drinks in his office almost every Friday to chew over foreign policy on an off-the-record basis. To use the French expression, diplomats, newsmen, and even members of Congress find it impossible, except when Kissinger so desires, to have an *interlocuteur valable* for serious discussions of international problems. It is no secret that every foreign ambassador in town would rather see Kissinger once a week than Rogers every day.

## II

At the apex of the White House foreign policy operation is the President himself. He is a foreign affairs "activist" in the sense that he is a serious student of foreign problems—certainly more than Dwight Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson and possibly even more than John Kennedy—and has had an extraordinary exposure to the outside world in his travels as Vice President between 1953 and 1960, as a private citizen during his time out of power, and finally as President during his

## The Key Players

**Henry Kissinger**—Principal foreign policy thinker and international negotiator for Nixon. ... A practical diplomat with formidable intellectual equipment and broad vision of history, past and future. ... Highly esteemed by adversaries and allies alike. ... Possible weakness: limited instinct in American domestic politics.

**William Rogers**—As Secretary of State and Nixon's trusted personal friend, he may be more useful to the President in assessing domestic impact of foreign policies. ... He has not publicly challenged Kissinger's pre-eminence in the conceptual formulation of new policies. ... An affable team player, but burdened with serious morale problems at the State Department.

**James Schlesinger**—The new boss of the Defense Department is a no-nonsense economic and military strategist. ... Enjoying Nixon's full confidence, he rose quickly into the Budget Bureau to the AEC to the CIA to the Pentagon. ... Had great impact in his two months at CIA, pruning down agency and retiring old-line intelligence "romantics."

**George Shultz**—As Treasury Secretary he has acquired a dominant role in international as well as domestic economic policy. ... Because trade and monetary problems are already overshadowing other areas of foreign policy, Shultz is a key influence in overall planning in international relations. He fits into the same category of pragmatic technocrats as Kissinger, Richardson, Schlesinger, and Haig.

first term. Foreign statesmen who received him during his lean years—and to this day he tends to favor those who treated him well—and American ambassadors whom he visited on his private tours remember his intense curiosity, his searching questions, and the ever-present yellow-ruled pad on which he noted his impressions. He later had his notes transcribed to serve as an arsenal of informed views in his relentless pursuit of the Presidency. An ambassador I know, then stationed in Asia, told me Nixon kept him up until four o'clock one morning, peppering him with questions. Nixon also has kept in mind the ambassadors who gave generously of their time to Richard Nixon, private citizen, and most of these have prospered in his Administration.

As President, Nixon has gone to Asia, Eastern and Western Europe, and Canada in a series of exhausting trips aboard his Air Force One. He has traveled to the Portuguese Azores and to Bermuda to confer with chiefs of state. He even landed on an aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean during a Middle East crisis in 1971. Curiously restless and devoted to personal diplomacy, he plans a new European trip this fall after Brezhnev comes here in the early summer. At the White House Nixon has received hundreds of presidents, kings, premiers, foreign ministers, and special envoys.

Since he is a private person, there is no question that Nixon makes his own foreign policy decisions after studying material submitted to him by Kissinger and the NSC staff and occasionally hearing out the views of his narrow circle of advisers. Much as he sees Kissinger, it does not follow that he always accepts his advice. Kissinger claims that he never actually presents advice but instead offers a series of reasoned options from which Nixon selects the one he considers the most suitable. It goes without saying, however, that Kissinger is so attuned to the President's thinking that he can probably guess which option Nixon will favor and chances are that it will be the one he, too, prefers. Kissinger, whose modest title is Assistant for National Security Affairs but whose power is that of a prime minister of the realm, always has refused to discuss his relationship with the President.

So overwhelming is the secrecy surrounding the White House decision-making process that it is impossible to distinguish between decisions taken personally by Nixon and the more formal National Security Council Decision Memorandums, known as NSDMs or more colloquially as NISDOMs, which also become Presidential decisions. In the latter case, the NSC, which includes the secretaries of State and Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, may discuss a situation on the basis of a "Nissom"—a NSC study memorandum cranked up by Kissinger's indefatigable

NSC staff—and recommend a course of action.

In four years the NSC staff has produced more than a hundred Nissoms and scores of others are always in the works. They may deal with anything from China and Indochina to European security negotiations, the Middle East, the flow of narcotics, and foreign policy considerations of the energy crisis. The first such study, NSSM-1, dealt with the effectiveness of the American bombing in North Vietnam. This memorandum, with separate contributions from Defense and State departments, the American Embassy in Saigon, the CIA, and others, formed a fat book. Interestingly, the consensus was that the 1965-1968 bombings during the Johnson Administration were not particularly effective—the CIA felt the strongest on this point. But then the United States never bombed North Vietnam as hard as it did in 1972.

Crisis management in the White House is handled by an emergency task force known as WASAG, the Washington Special Action Group. The President may or may not be involved in WASAG meetings—some have been held rather informally aboard the Presidential yacht Sequoia as she cruised up and down the Potomac—but Kissinger is always present. WASAG's membership on a given occasion may vary from secretaries or under secretaries of State and Defense to top intelligence, military, and foreign policy specialists. Early in the Administration Nixon had John Mitchell sit in on WASAG sessions. WASAG meetings are not always publicly announced, but they were held on the eve of the 1970 incursion into Cambodia, during the 1971 Jordan and India-Pakistan crises, and in connection with the windup of the Vietnam war.

Nixon's Cabinet, which meets with decreasing frequency, is almost never summoned to participate as a whole in basic foreign policy decisions. Major recommendations are made by the NSC and/or the WASAG. Having heard or read them, the President retires to his hideout suite of rooms at the Executive Office Building to reach his final decision alone or with Kissinger.

Henry Kissinger, as I said, functions as a prime minister of the realm under a powerful monarch and his powers obviously extend beyond a narrowly defined area of international affairs inasmuch as almost everything in Washington nowadays is affected by foreign policy. Both the President and Kissinger are history conscious and tend to identify with great statesmen of the past. Nixon, his intimates suggest, likes to think of himself in terms of Benjamin Disraeli, Queen Victoria's Prime Minister, who brought greatness to nineteenth-century England.

Kissinger has abstained from self-identifications, but he is not known to have

protested facile comparisons with Prince Clément Wenceslaus Lothaire Népomucène Metternich, for 37 years the Austrian Foreign Minister and one of the principal architects of the Congress of Vienna. I suppose that in the sense of being a brilliant and foxy diplomat, Kissinger has an intellectual and cultural link with Metternich.

Where the parallels between Kissinger, still a European *par excellence*, and the Vienna Congress statesman may apply is that Metternich—as well as Castlereagh and Talleyrand—had the concept of the “Concert of Nations” more than 150 years ago. Metternich, Talleyrand, and Castlereagh, aside from their individual national and ideological interests, strove for a continental generation of peace after the Napoleonic wars. Kissinger, on Nixon's behalf, also is devoted to the concept of a “concert” of powers persuaded by their respective nuclear deterrents to maintain peace. This was the intellectual conceptuality of the SALT negotiations and of the general *détente* efforts with the Soviet Union and China. The Chinese breakthrough, engineered in its final stages by Kissinger, ended the postwar era of American-Soviet bipolarity. In broader power terms, Nixon and Kissinger now think of a pentagonal world formed by the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the enlarged European Common Market.

Kissinger's increasingly powerful role in Washington suggests a total affinity between him and Nixon, whom he hardly knew before 1969. But their exact relationship is a mystery. I have in vain asked a number of senior officials who are close to the White House operation whether Nixon or Kissinger is the truly creative foreign policy mind. The question, in effect, is whether Kissinger proposes and Nixon disposes or Nixon proposes and Kissinger executes. But nobody seems to know the answer. The best guess is that both men are strong on creativity with Kissinger providing the extra dimension of professional expertise. One official observed that “chances are that neither Nixon nor Kissinger could provide a precise answer because they are probably past the point where they can separate each other's thoughts.”

In his White House position, Kissinger personally oversees every aspect of foreign policy operations. There is no question that Kissinger's influence on Nixon is immeasurably greater than Secretary Rogers' and that the only other man who enjoys Nixon's equal professional esteem is John Connally. But there appears to be no danger that the President would pit two such powerful personages against each other by naming Connally to be Secretary of State. It would be totally counterproductive. Those in the White House who profess to be well informed tend to discount published reports that Kissinger lost some of Nixon's trust when the Vietnam peace negotiations be-

came stated between October 1972 and January 1973. But there may be some truth in reports that Kissinger opposed the renewed bombing of North Vietnam last December. If so, Kissinger kept this view to himself.

Kissinger has pre-empted the State Department's creative role in foreign policy to an unprecedented extent and his instrument for so doing was the creation of a powerful and intricate apparatus under the National Security Council. It operates as a “Little State Department” in the West Wing of the White House, where Kissinger sits, and in the maze of offices in the Executive Office Building. In practice, the system is based on the NSC Operations Staff, a group of some 60 specialists drawn mainly from the Foreign Service (the White House does not mind raiding the State Department for its best talent), and on at least six senior committees linked to the NSC. Kissinger heads the Operations Staff as well as all the special committees, some of which have interlocking memberships.

The White House regularly publishes the names of NSC staffers, distributed along geographic lines, but little is said about the special committees. Probably the best known is the WASAG, the crisis management group that meets only as required. Another occasional Kissinger committee is the Under Secretaries' Committee, an interdepartmental body headed by the Deputy Secretary of State, currently Kenneth Rush, which supposedly deals with broad policy issues. When John N. Irwin II, who turned invisibility into an art, served as Deputy Secretary of State, the Under Secretaries' Committee existed chiefly in name. Rush, a much more assertive man who has already breathed some new life into the State Department, may give this group a shot in the arm.

The most important NSC committees are the Senior Review Group, which approves most of the policy papers for the full Council and includes representatives from State and Defense departments, the CIA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Defense Review Group, specializing in military affairs; and the so-called “40 Committee,” whose responsibility is for major clandestine intelligence operations overseas. Finally there is the Verification Panel, in charge of formulating and approving United States negotiating policies in nuclear limitation talks. As a matter of course, the full NSC confirms the recommendations of the special committees.

On paper—and as seen from within the White House—the NSC system is a perfectly oiled machine, a blend of a sophisticated computer and the Prussian General Staff. The human talent is for the most part first rate and Kissinger works his people to the limits of physical and mental endurance.

continued on page 104

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from page 74

But there are growing suspicions, some
fed by former Kissinger staffers, that the
system may become self-defeating. A
computer reads out only what it has
been programmed to read out. And no-
body outside Kissinger's most intimate
circle really knows how the program-
ming is done. This may be the NSC's
chief problem. As Washington's princi-
pal consumer of intelligence data, the
White House may choose what to feed
into the option-making apparatus on any
given occasion and discard what it does
not see fit to be considered. Since intelli-
gence estimates from different agencies
often are at variance with each other on
subjects vital to decision making, it is
Kissinger and his top assistants, acting as
traffic cops for the flow of intelligence,
who determine to a significant extent
what is believable and should be sub-
mitted to the President in the form of
options.

In practice, this may deprive the President of judgments with which the NSC staff disagree, though it is impossible to document this assertion. But something of a pattern seemed to have developed in the last four years—a White House tendency to doubt CIA assessments. In most situations affecting the Indochina war, for example, the White House favored military intelligence—the Defense Intelligence Agency—over the CIA. This was true in the case of the 1969 analysis of bombing effectiveness, the CIA's deep reservations over the degree of pacification in Vietnam claimed by Saigon and accepted in Washington, the agency's discouraging reports on the Viet Cong eradication program, its lack of enthusiasm over the 1970 Cambodia and the 1971 Laos incursions, and its doubts over the wisdom of attempting what turned out to be the abortive raid to free POWs in North Vietnam. It may be argued that nobody likes bearers of ill tidings. Or the pattern may have developed because neither Nixon nor Kissinger ever established a satisfactory personal rapport with Richard Helms, who was the director of the CIA until early this year.

State Department advice, often volunteered, has been repeatedly disregarded. The department's drafters of position papers frequently never found out if their material reached the top echelon. One result of keeping the State Department out of major policy decisions was that it evidently never occurred to Kissinger that Japan should be kept informed of the general drift of the new China policy. The department feels very strongly about this point and it began ringing alarm bells about "what do we tell the Japanese now" as soon as Nixon produced his Chinese *coup de théâtre* in 1971 and followed it up with the equally unexpected move of slapping import surcharges on foreign goods. The depart-

ment saw no advantage in making
Tokyo lose face in situations of intense
concern to it. The list of such examples
is infinite.

Because the NSC apparatus commands the full resources of the State and Defense departments and the intelligence community—even if it does not always heed their advice—it exercises extraordinary power in the field of foreign policy. NSC staffers not uncommonly instruct Assistant Secretaries of State to prepare position papers for them. Practically every non-routine telegram from Secretary Rogers to an ambassador abroad requires White House clearance; in the past only the most important messages were thus cleared. The NSC staff also insists on clearing even routine public speeches by Assistant Secretaries of State, something of an affront to the career diplomats who usually outrank the NSC staffers. Thus the White House keeps the State Department on the shortest of leashes; it is not necessary to spell out what this does to the creativity and morale in the State Department.

Kissinger requires total dedication and loyalty from his men. The best of them are well rewarded. Thus, Alexander M. Haig, who was Kissinger's deputy, was jumped from Brigadier to full General and named Vice Chief of Staff of the Army. But Nixon and Kissinger still use Haig, one of the most brilliant military officers, on sensitive diplomatic missions. He assisted Kissinger in the final phase of the Vietnam peace negotiations, flew to Saigon to persuade President Nguyen Van Thieu to accept the package, and in April went back on an emergency mission to Southeast Asia. Haig's latest mission illustrated the White House approach to its ambassadors abroad. Thus Kissinger made no bones about saying privately that whereas Haig knew the whole US strategy in Asia, individual ambassadors were familiar only with their own bailiwicks. Nixon's regard for the 48-year-old Haig was shown again when he was summoned back from the Pentagon at the height of the Watergate crisis to assume the management of the White House domestic operation after the resignations of H. R. Haldeman and John Erlichman.

Instead of replacing Haig as his deputy, Kissinger recently chose to name five deputies. The principal deputy is Brigadier General Brent Scowcroft, formerly the President's military assistant, little known outside the White House circle. The other deputies are Lawrence S. Eagleburger, a career State Department official who worked earlier for Kissinger and then went over to the Defense Department, now in charge of NSC operations; Richard T. Kennedy, a retired Army colonel who is considered a "comer" and retains his post as head of the NSC Planning Group; Charles A. Cooper, formerly principal economic

104

officer in the American Embassy in Sa-
gon who now handles international eco-
nomic affairs for Kissinger; and Philip
A. Odeen, who was promoted in the NSC
hierarchy but remains in charge of pro-
gram analysis. This group will run the
NSC machinery for Kissinger.

A mysterious promotion was handed Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Kissinger's staff chief for European and Soviet affairs. Sonnenfeldt, who started out as a State Department intelligence analyst, was appointed by Nixon to be Under Secretary of the Treasury, the third highest post there. It is a matter of Washington gossip whether Sonnenfeldt was reassigned to "infiltrate" the Treasury on Kissinger's behalf (Kissinger and the Treasury, extremely powerful in international economic matters, do not always see eye to eye) or was exiled there as a compromise. The latter theory is that Sonnenfeldt aspired to replace Haig but Kissinger refused because he regarded his German-born European expert as a potential rival and settled in stead on five deputies.

Some White House insiders believe that the NSC operation has been weakened with the recent changes and that this may be reflected in an inferior policy product being prepared for Nixon in the second term. Aside from the fact that Kissinger must feel the fatigue of his four frantic years, there is some doubt whether his five new deputies will be as effective as General Haig was alone. The NSC also will feel the loss of Sonnenfeldt and John H. Holdridge, who headed the East Asia staff and is now one of the two deputies to Ambassador David Bruce in the liaison mission in Peking. W. Richard Smyser, a top expert on Japanese affairs, left some time ago for private life. W. Marshall Wright, formerly in charge of African and United Nations affairs, returned to the State Department to be Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations. Viron P. Vaky, the only first-rate Latin American specialist Kissinger ever had, has been Ambassador to Costa Rica since last year. Inexplicably, John D. Negroponte, who was on the NSC Planning Group and served as Kissinger's principal adviser on Vietnam during the peace talks, was assigned to the embassy in Ecuador as the deputy chief of mission.

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basis with those outside the inner sanctum; a lot of valuable thought, I suspect, is lost in the process.

And what about Kissinger? If his nerves and his body can take four more years of round-the-clock work and jet lags, chances are that he will remain at Nixon's side until 1977. The President's need of Kissinger's advice and services—as well as the high regard in which he is held from Moscow to Peking and Hanoi—are certain to assure his continued tenure, if he desires it. But the second term may be a difficult time for Kissinger. The great foreign policy speculars are already behind him and it is a moot point whether he will have the patience to supervise the implementation of all these new policies. There is the risk that the Indochina peace will remain as elusive as ever, Kissinger's Paris negotiations notwithstanding, and it may be painful and embarrassing to pick up the pieces.

Evidently, however, Nixon and Kissinger still have the need for the *grand geste*. Late in April, Kissinger announced that the United States planned to build a "new Atlantic charter" with Western Europe in 1973. But even if Brezhnev visits here and Nixon goes to Europe as planned, chances are that the signing of still another grandiloquent document will not remove the deep-rooted causes of uneasiness between the US and the West Europeans, a problem related to hard facts of international economics.

### III

It is now necessary to look at the rest of the foreign policy establishment, an enormous bureaucracy wielding varying degrees of positive and negative power.

Here one must start with the State Department, although it already has been clearly established that its role in policy formulation is at best ancillary. Still, State cannot be ignored: Bureaucracies, as a matter of biology, survive Presidential assistants and administrations.

It is an understatement to say that under Nixon and Kissinger the State Department has developed an inferiority complex as well as an alarming case of sagging morale. In all fairness, however, two points should be made.

With the usual ups and downs peculiar to any bureaucracy the department has had morale problems ever since Dean Acheson's departure twenty years ago. Under John Foster Dulles, who galloped down the cold war path with his brother Allen Dulles, then CIA Director, much of the discontent was political. Secretary Dulles busily signed up Asian and Middle Eastern countries for regional defensive pacts and neutralism was a dirty word. It was the aftermath of the Korean War and it was symbolized by John Foster Dulles' public refusal to shake hands with Chou En-lai at the Geneva Conference, which ended the first Indochina war. Then Dulles under-

mined efforts—largely managed by the CIA—toward cooperation with Egypt's Nasser. The U-2 incident, a by-product of brother Allen's CIA operations, forced the cancellation of the planned Eisenhower-Khrushchev summit. Later, Eisenhower decided to keep the State Department out of preparations for the abortive 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Only Rusk knew about it and he was politely invited to withhold any advice he might have to offer.

In short, State Department professionals—already mangled by the McCarthy investigations—tended to regard the Eisenhower foreign policy as hopelessly unsophisticated and unsuited to the changing world. Under Kennedy and Johnson, morale was only marginally better. McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow were Kissinger's forerunners in centering decision-making processes in the White House, and their power inevitably aroused State Department resentments. Successive internal reorganizations only seemed to complicate the administrative workings of the department. I covered the State Department under four presidents, and I must confess I do not remember any time when its morale was very high. In fact, the State Department resembles a permanently dissatisfied and resentful spinster.

The second point is that, paradoxically, the best State Department professionals admire Kissinger—more or less grudgingly—as a talented and creative diplomatist, even if many of them have disagreed with certain White House policies, particularly during succeeding episodes of the Indochina war. The State Department is extremely unhappy these days because, with rare exceptions, it is isolated from the Kissinger policy-making process.

Because Secretary Rogers is personally well liked by his subordinates, there is widespread frustration over his failure or refusal to become more assertive. State Department people would like to see him fully involved with Nixon and Kissinger in top policy planning. What actually happens is that the White House methodically goes through the motions of inviting him to meetings where Kissinger reports to the President on his latest missions. Another point should be made in this connection: It would have been unwise to engage Rogers, the ranking Cabinet member, in secret trips, meetings, and negotiations. If Rogers had been involved the failure of any of these missions would have been a serious embarrassment to the United States government. Kissinger, on the other hand, is in this special sense more expandable. He can afford a public failure better than Rogers in terms of conventional diplomacy as he is "only" a Presidential assistant.

Nevertheless, such relationships produce dynamics of their own. To be sure, it was Rogers who ceremoniously

signed the Vietnam peace accords nego-
tiated by Kissinger. But Kissinger, not
Rogers, went with Nixon to meet with
Chairman Mao Tse-tung during the Pe-
king visit. Rogers attended lower-level
sessions. It is to Rogers' credit that he has
never publicly shown any sign of irrita-
tion about his secondary role in policy
formulation. He is, of course, a loyal
Nixon man, one of the reasons why he
agreed to stay on for at least part of the
second term, fully aware that his stature
would not grow. In the opening years of
the Nixon Presidency, Rogers was highly
vulnerable to press criticism of his status
in the Administration and he made this
known to close associates. Later, how-
ever, he mellowed and decided not to let
himself be annoyed by the poisoned
darts of the Washington press corps. In
other words, he came to terms with
himself. Interestingly, Rogers was virtu-
ally Nixon's only close friend available
for private consultations when the Presi-
dent was deciding how to handle the
Watergate situation late in April.

The only instance I know of Rogers'
irritation with Kissinger came during a
flying tour of Asia in 1970 when he read
a remark Kissinger had made at a back-
ground briefing in San Clemente. Kis-
singer had said the Russians should be
"expelled" from the Middle East. Rogers
was negotiating a Middle East truce,
probably his outstanding personal suc-
cess in broad diplomacy, and he hit the
roof. Ironically, the Egyptians them-
selves expelled the Soviet military two
years later, a move that gave Rogers a
sense of quiet satisfaction and a new de-
termination to pursue a fuller peace in
the Middle East.

One naturally assumes that Nixon
keeps Rogers posted about his foreign
policy plans. The two men often talk by
telephone (Kissinger, who sits a hundred
yards away from Nixon's office, sees the
President several times a day) and this
satisfies Rogers. The Secretary is reluc-
tant to discuss his relations with the
President, but he once told an inquiring
visitor that he doesn't have to "measure
the temperature of the water" every
day by counting the times he talks with
Nixon.

Below Rogers' level, however, the
State Department is seldom informed of
major policy trends in the making. I have
mentioned the case of the 1971 China
announcement; the same secretive pat-
tern prevailed during the Vietnam nego-
tiations. Only late in September did Kis-
singer ask the State Department Vietnam
Working Group to prepare position
papers. He then added William H. Sul-
livan, a Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs,
to his Paris negotiating team. Sullivan,
who served as Ambassador to Laos
and helped W. Averell Harriman nego-
tiate the leaky Laos agreement in Geneva
in 1962, headed the working group and

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was widely known as a Vietnam hawk. But Sullivan's immediate boss, Marshall Green, was not taken into confidence until sometime later. Late in 1972 I asked a senior State Department official to brief me on the march of the Paris talks. He replied, "I don't know the answer and, furthermore, I'm not even ashamed to say it to you."

Access to the President obviously makes much difference in the respective power positions of Kissinger and the State Department. Here is an example. A departing Latin American ambassador repeatedly asked the department to arrange a farewell call on Nixon. After two weeks, he was finally told the President was too busy. The day before his departure he mentioned this as he was taking leave of Kissinger. Kissinger winked, picked up the telephone, whispered something to the President, and Nixon received the Latin American envoy the following morning. There are many other such instances.

Because Rogers hasn't the patience to administer his vast domain, in-house problems have continually plagued the department. During the brief tenure in the post of Under Secretary of State Elliot Richardson (later HEW Secretary then briefly Secretary of Defense, now Attorney General), things worked considerably better and the State Department hoped that some of the structural problems would finally be resolved. But John Irwin, his successor, was content to let nature take its course. William B. Macomber Jr., the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, played with reorganization plans, but morale took another downward plunge. In 1973, to the general relief of the department, Macomber was made Ambassador to Turkey. Present plans are to let Curtis W. Tarr, Under Secretary for Security Assistance (who has plenty of time on his hands because the Pentagon does most security assistance work), handle the administration of the Department.

The only other strong man in the Department during the first term was U. Alexis Johnson, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who, according to many officials, was Kissinger's man in Foggy Bottom. Johnson, an experienced career diplomat, is considerably involved in WASAG and other White House policy committees. But in 1973 Nixon sent him to head the delegation to the second phase of the SALT talks. This was part of a complex maneuver designed to eviscerate the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Johnson replaced Gerard Smith, who was both Director of ACDA and chief SALT negotiator. The word was that Smith, often too independent to suit the White House, was forced to resign from both posts. For one thing, Smith disagreed with the Nixon theory that the nuclear ante must be raised—in other words that the US must keep developing new weapons systems—to extract an agreement from the

Russians to limit offensive strategic arms. To preside over the moribund ACDA, Nixon chose Dr. Fred Charles Ikle, a distinguished disarmament scholar whose pragmatic thought processes fit better with White House philosophy. SALT II, therefore, will be run by Johnson and Ikle under Nixon-Kissinger inspirational guidance.

All the recent appointments emphasized a tough management responsive to the White House's penchant for super-technocracy.

In the State Department the key supporting players will be Kenneth Rush, the new Deputy Secretary who held a similar post in the Defense Department, and William J. Porter, the new Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the third highest job in this hierarchy. Porter, a tough career diplomat, caught Kissinger's attention when he headed the American negotiating team in the Vietnam peace talks in Paris while Kissinger was doing his parallel secret negotiating with Hanoi's Le Duc Tho.

Though it may seem a contradiction in terms of the White House predilection for hard-headed professionals, Nixon has loaded the Foreign Service with political appointees as ambassadors abroad—in most cases important campaign contributors—in a move that further deepened the gloom among senior career officers with hopes for ambassadorships.

The selling of embassies, of course, is as old as the Republic, but Nixon has considerably exceeded the practice followed by Kennedy and Johnson. As of late April there were 36 non-career ambassadors representing the United States abroad and before international organizations, the highest number ever, with the likelihood of more to come—perhaps as many as twelve embassies are either vacant or about to be.

The juiciest embassies are in non-career hands. Walter H. Annenberg remains in London, having contributed $254,000 last year to the Republican war chest. John Irwin went to Paris to replace his brother-in-law, Arthur Watson, head of IBM International. John A. Volpe, a Massachusetts politician and former Transportation Secretary, has Rome. Horacio Rivero, a retired admiral of Puerto Rican descent, is in Madrid. India went to Daniel P. Moynihan who served Nixon as domestic affairs adviser. Israel was given to former New York Senator Kenneth Keating, who earlier served in India. Vienna is the embassy of John P. Humes, who gave the Republicans $159,500. Buenos Aires is held by John Davis Lodge, former Connecticut governor and once ambassador to Spain, but he is to be replaced soon. John D. J. Moore, a businessman, is in Ireland. Ex-CIA boss Helms is in Teheran. Robert S. Ingersoll, a Chicago business executive, is ambassador to Tokyo, a crucial post. Mrs. George Farkas, a so-

108

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ciologist married to a New York department-store millionaire, went to Luxembourg after she made a $300,000 contribution to Nixon's re-election.

Donald Rumsfeld, a Nixon favorite in the domestic economic area, is now ambassador to NATO. John A. Scali became ambassador to the United Nations, a Cabinet-rank post, after serving as Nixon's foreign policy consultant following a long career in journalism. Phillip V. Sanchez was sent to Honduras after Nixon dismantled the Office of Economic Opportunity he headed. This was a gesture toward the Chicano community, which the White House has long been courting. Robert McCloskey, the best spokesman the State Department has ever had, was named ambassador to Cyprus.

It is true, of course, that there have been great ambassadors who were political appointees. Harriman and Ellsworth Bunker were the most famous ones and I think Nixon had an inspiration in naming David K. E. Bruce, who brilliantly served four presidents, as head of the so-called Liaison Mission to Peking.

As of this writing, however, no decision has been made about replacing Jacob D. Beam, a career ambassador, as envoy to Moscow. There have been good and bad career and political ambassadors to the Soviet Union, but the State Department is fervently hoping for a professional at this time of complex détente problems. Still unfilled, among others, are Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Panama. Mexico and Peru are about to open up.

Nixon's pragmatic approach to diplomacy has produced some solid career appointments as well. Graham Martin, a first-rate professional, is to replace Bunker in Saigon. Charles Whitehead, a former CIA official with experience in Vietnam, will go to Laos. William Sullivan, Kissinger's fellow negotiator in Paris, is slated for Manila, a singularly hard post in a country with two parallel civil wars.

## IV

As I noted earlier, the foreign policy establishment is all over Washington. There are the Defense Department, the intelligence community, and a multiplicity of other agencies with varying degrees of input in foreign policy making.

The Atomic Energy Commission is crucial both in the formulation of disarmament policies and in the worldwide programs of peaceful uses of atomic energy. Treasury plays an overwhelming role in international monetary and trade negotiations in concert, and sometimes in rivalry, with the White House and the State and Commerce departments. The Agriculture Department is involved in sales of US farm commodities abroad as it was in the grain deals with Moscow. The Agency for International Development, sometimes used as a cover by the CIA, is in charge of foreign economic assistance under the State Department's aegis. The Export-Import Bank is a component part of foreign aid programs. The United States Information Agency with a new conservative boss, James Keogh, who replaced the equally conservative Frank Shakespeare, is supposed to project the American image abroad. The Peace Corps and the Food-for-Peace program fit into the foreign aid picture.

Then there is the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs cooperating with the CIA and the State Department in fighting the world traffic in narcotics. The Civil Aeronautics Board works with the State Department on international civil aviation agreements. The Interior Department and the Federal Power Commission are concerned with imports of fuel and energy from abroad. The General Services Administration stockpiles strategic materials bought abroad. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is part of the United States Intelligence Board, but it also maintains agents abroad, known as legal attachés, at various embassies, to deal with criminal extradition problems and similar situations. NASA looks after space-program tracking stations in Spain and Australia.

Nobody knows how many permanent or ad hoc inter-agency committees exist in Washington at any given time to deal with all the aspects of foreign relations in which this country is engaged. It is likewise impossible to determine which groups are really needed and which are simply the bureaucrat's delight. Each of the principal departments and agencies involved in foreign affairs has a multitude of in-house committees, study groups, and task forces. The State Department, as a matter of policy, cranks up special task forces for special crises. So does the Pentagon.

I have referred several times to the importance of the intelligence community in serving up raw material for policy decisions. Obviously, knowledge and information are the most powerful weapons a government possesses in determining its foreign policy. The most brilliant diplomat or negotiator may be working in a vacuum if he ignores special conditions in the country of his adversary. The intentions of an actual or potential enemy are as important as his military capability. Military deployments or missile-site construction in foreign countries are vital in planning national security policies. Technological weapons-systems breakthroughs abroad must be known and understood in terms of a country's own armament programs or disarmament negotiating postures. Political alliances or splits involving foreign countries need to be considered in determining one's own policies. There is no end to the functions of intelligence and the curiosity of consumers of intelligence can never be fully satisfied. Situations arise around

110

the world when, wisely or not, clandes-
tine operations are ordered.

No modern state, particularly one as
important as the United States, can even
attempt to conduct foreign policy with-
out the product of intelligence. In
Washington, therefore, the intelligence
community is one of the most weighty,
and thus controversial, elements of the
policy establishment.

Intelligence, by definition, works
under the cover of secrecy. But the best
Congressional estimates are that almost
150,000 persons—not including local
agents and informers abroad—are en-
gaged full time in the production of in-
telligence at an approximate cost of $6
billion annually.

On paper, the intelligence community
operates as a coherent apparatus known
as the United States Intelligence Board.
It is headed by the Director of Central
Intelligence, who also serves as CIA
Director, and it includes the CIA, the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelli-
gence agencies of the three military serv-
ices, the National Security Agency, the
State Department's Intelligence Bureau,
and the FBI.

Ideally, the community should pro-
duce agreed intelligence estimates on
every subject under the sun. Such studies
are known as National Intelligence Esti-
mates (NIE) and, when required by
urgent developments, as Special National
Intelligence Estimates (SNIE). But noth-
ing is ideal in Washington and the vari-
ous agencies often disagree with one
another. A NIE—as well as the daily
secret reports prepared by the Central
Intelligence Directorate—carries annota-
tions showing these disagreements. As I
said earlier, it is the NSC at the White
House that in the end resolves these
differences, not infrequently an exercise
in instinct or even prejudice.

The head and coordinator of this
enormous machine now is Ambassador
Colby, an old CIA hand who ran pacifi-
cation programs in Vietnam before early
this year becoming deputy to Dr. Schles-
inger during the latter's brief tenure.
Schlesinger had been originally appointed
to the intelligence job because when he
served as director of the budget bureau
he drafted a plan to reorganize the in-
telligence community. It became the
basis for Nixon's executive order issued
in November 1971, ordering the stream-
lining of the whole operation. When
Nixon and Kissinger decided late in 1972
that Helms, a career intelligence officer,
no longer fitted the new White House
style, it was Schlesinger who was picked
for the job. One theory is that Helms,
who was exiled to Iran as ambassador,
failed to put the reorganization plan into
execution. But White House insiders say
that Helms lost direct access to Nixon
about a year ago and, in the words of a
colleague, "He had less and less to say at
NSC or WASAG meetings." Schlesin-
ger, on the other hand, was known to
have met with the President on numerous

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office under Air Force Major-General Lew Allen and of the Intelligence Resource Advisory Committee under Army Major-General Daniel O. Graham. Both are career military intelligence officers and the two groups are concerned with the workings of the whole intelligence community,

Schlesinger's decision to bring Allen and Graham to the CIA from the Pentagon led to suspicions that the agency is being "politicized," infiltrated by the military and, in effect, abandoning some of its responsibilities in favor of the rival Defense Intelligence Agency. A recent article by General Graham in *Army magazine* urging military intelligence to be more serious and less self-serving in its estimates led to speculation that *all* military estimating would henceforth be turned over to the Pentagon. Schlesinger is not believed to see it this way.

One of the most serious problems in the functioning of the intelligence community has been the divergent views between the CIA and the DIA on such things as the Soviet nuclear potential and the North Vietnamese military capabilities.

In his article General Graham made the point that the DIA lost credibility in the last ten years because its estimates of enemy threats were "self-serving, budget-oriented and generally inflated," which was another way of saying that the worse the DIA could make the threat look, the more money it could extract from Congress for men and weapons. He also wrote that "with regard to Vietnam, it became painfully obvious that 'worst-case' assessments of enemy capabilities by Washington (military) estimators gave the erroneous impression that the more casualties we inflicted on the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese, the stronger they got."

The CIA, as General Graham implied, was less sanguine and therefore more accurate. Although he noted that "we military professions have been in danger of losing our shirts to civilian agencies" in accurate estimates, the irony in recent years was that the White House seemed more prone to accept the Pentagon than the more scientific and thoughtful CIA analysis. Presumably, the support of the Secretary of Defense, then Melvin Laird, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the gloomy DIA estimates helped to tilt the balance against the CIA. A senior intelligence officer I know had been complaining for years that the White House pays no attention to the professional intelligence product. But his mood has brightened perceptibly since Schlesinger took over as director of Central Intelligence and men like General Graham began to urge seriousness among military intelligence people.

An important intelligence support function is provided by the State Department's Intelligence and Research Bureau. Headed by Ray S. Cline, a one-time CIA Deputy Director, the 335 State

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the new economic policy: Phase One
controls at home, surcharges on imports,
and the end of gold convertibility in in-
ternational dealings. The new policy
represented the belated recognition that
the dollar was overvalued, that the US
suffered brutal balance-of-payments defi-
cits, and that new trading arrangements
were required with Western Europe and
Japan. The State Department was called
in to soothe the ruffled feelings of our
friends and allies whom Nixon, as usual,
surprised by his actions. But it was Con-
nally who rode herd on chaotic nego-
tiations with the Europeans and the
Japanese to force them to revalue their
currencies. The idea was that the dollar's
malady should be cured through the up-
ward revaluation of other currencies so
that the US would not have to change
the parity of the dollar in relation to
gold. It was a matter of national pride to
Nixon that the dollar should remain in-
tact, but the others evidently had other
perceptions.

In December, Nixon took Connally,
Rogers, and Kissinger to the Azores for
a meeting with President Pompidou to
settle the festering dollar problem. Con-
nally failed to budge the French-Rogers
was not involved in the financial talks-
and, strangely, it took Kissinger to work
out a formula for the dollar devaluation
in exchange for a French commitment
to a new round of trade talks. Suddenly,
the devaluation was portrayed as a vic-
tory. The whole package was sanctified
in the Smithsonian Agreement in Wash-
ington two weeks later. As far as Nixon
was concerned, all was well again in in-
ternational economics.

But there were terrible gaps in the
situation. There had been no trade legis-
lation in the United States since 1962,
when Congress authorized the Kennedy
Round for tariff cutting, and, therefore,
the Administration had no authority to
negotiate new arrangements. Washing-
ton politics and the tug-of-war between
free-traders and the increasingly power-
ful protectionists prevented the drafting
of new legislation. All during 1972, new
pressures were mounting against the dol-
lar, but this was the year when the Presi-
dential attentions were focussed on the
trips to China and the Soviet Union and
the Vietnam conflict.

Having been shunted over to be Com-
merce Secretary, Peterson proceeded to
concentrate on monumental trade deals
with the Soviet Union. So, again, no-
body was seriously minding the store in
the wider area of foreign economic
policy. Connally, preparing to resign,
was losing interest in monetary problems.
The State Department had neither the
courage nor the desire to move into the
vacuum of economic policy making—
even if it had been permitted to do so.
Nixon and Rogers didn't bother to re-
place the Deputy Under Secretary for
Economic Affairs—who had resigned—
for nearly a year.
(continued)

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In the new year—1973—it was confusion once more. Again, Washington was caught napping as dollar speculators mounted a new assault. George P. Shultz was the new Treasury Secretary, with immense powers in both domestic and foreign economies: It was his lot to devalue the dollar for a second time. Invitably, the Administration said this was a new triumph of Nixon economics.

As this is written late in April, foreign economic policy is managed by the Treasury and the special White House council, this time headed by Flanigan. The President has finally presented the Congress with a trade bill, but it was anybody's guess whether it will be passed. Meanwhile, the country was running out of fuel, forcing the President to abolish oil import quotas, an idea that he ignored when a special Cabinet group recommended it in 1969. This meant another blow at the balance-of-payments position. We were back on the merry-go-round. An intellectual game played privately by Washington economists was to predict the next crisis in foreign economic policy and the degree to which the Administration would be surprised by it.

V

This, then, is the Washington foreign policy establishment and how it operates. Despite Kissinger's patient building-bloc approach to foreign policy, its successes are relative, perhaps because this is the kind of world we live in. The spectators have come and gone. Obviously they were great milestones in American diplomatic history, but there must be uncertainty over the follow-up. The Indochina war is clearly far from being over, which is not our fault, but the reality is that the US has not become disengaged. We still drop bombs there. We have helped China enter the world, which is fine but we cannot predict her future attitudes. We have entered into pacts with the Russians, which certainly was necessary, but only history will tell whether they achieved the fine balance sought by Nixon and Kissinger in their quest for the "Concert of Nations" and the "Generation of Peace." ☐

118

POOL REPORT

Reykjavik to Washington, June 1, 1973

En route shortly after take-off, Henry Kissinger talked to the press pool. He said:

--- As to the Nixon-Pompidou conference, "we achieved what we set out to do."

--- "The press had the wrong image" regarding the Reykjavik talks. The talks were not held to absolutely certain that they would go into the substance of issues, but we got a procedure established which is essentially what we recommended. The procedure involves bi-lateral talks between the U.S. and Western European nations and a deputy foreign ministers conference, possibly in July, "to pull all these things together."

--- There is some ambiguity that the French think this
the U.S. wanted to include economic issues, that it should be done on
an ad hoc basis and not in the NATO council. And President Pompidou
agreed.

ON BACKGROUND, Leonid Brezhnev wants to speak on television
during his U.S. visit June 18 to 26 --as Nixon did during his Soviet
Union visit in May, 1972. Details have not been worked out, but
plans for a half-hour Brezhnev TV address are in the works.

Nixon and Brezhnev will have to do "extensive talking."
SALT will be an important subject of their discussions.

About a week before Brezhnev's arrival, Kissinger will
 brief reporters on the upcoming visit and talks with Nixon.

Discussing the recent arrival of the head of the new
Chinese diplomatic mission in Washington, Kissinger Huang Chen,
Kissinger said that Huang is "an old friend." Huang, he disclosed,
was his "channel" to Peking following initial, secret trip to
China in July, 1971. Huang was then in Paris and Kissinger called
on him there four times while Kissinger was in Paris for Viet Nam
peace discussions with the North Vietnamese. (more)

2 -- Pool Report Reykjavik to Washington, June 1, 1973

----- Brezhnev will be accompanied to the U.S. by Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko.

Before Kissinger's conversation with the press pool, Secretary
of State William P. Rogers talked to the pool. Rogers said:

----- On the Nixon-Pompidou talks, Rogers said he thought "they
went very well and lived up to our expectations."

----- Today's plenary session "was a very good one this time."
He commented that sometimes these sessions are "only pleasantries...
but this time there was real participation." The general atmosphere
between Nixon and Pompidou was "very good." He observed that in the
past, exchanges between France and the United States have been marked
by ~~frankness~~ working well "little edges." He went on to say
that in Reykjavik "there was less controversy, less sharpness in
comments than in any meeting ~~with France~~ before... and I've had
a lot of them."

----- Asked if Watergate impaired the Nixon-Pompidou talks,
Rogers replied "not the slightest." He said Watergate never
was mentioned.

At Keflavik ~~air base,~~ air base, a crowd of about 2,000
--mainly Nixon wives and children of American navy and air force
base personnel -- were on hand when Nixon arrived to board his
plane. Small, waving groups of Icelanders dotted the route of the
presidential motorcade en route to the air base. Nixon waved back
from his limousine from time to time.

Nixon Ziegler mentioned on the drive to the airport that at
the concluding plenary session, Nixon and Pompidou "sat in warm,
mutual terms about the relationship between the two countries and
the success of the meeting."
(more)