resolve not to preside over a defeat in Vietnam?

An answer—with ominous implications—can be found in the strategy for the war previously articulated by the Strangeloves of the Nixon Administration, grouped around the President's chief foreign policy advisor, Henry A. Kissinger. In the light in which these men see the conflict, any “peace” moves look rather like the expectant lull before an even more terrible storm.

AS THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION assumed office in January 1969, an article by Kissinger appeared in the house organ of the foreign policy establishment. *Foreign Affairs*, reviewing the previous Kennedy-Johnson record in Vietnam. Kissinger argued that the Johnson military strategy had been fundamentally in error because it had not recognized that guerrilla war differs from traditional war in that “its key prize is not control of territory but control of the population.”

Washington's incorrect strategy of "opting for a military victory through attrition" led to "dual control" in the villages: the U.S. and Saigon forces could control the rural areas by day, but the NLF had control during the night (which is Kissinger's way of saying that the NLF had the support of the people, and Saigon did not).

"Hanoi's strength," wrote Kissinger, "is that it is fighting among its own people in familiar territory. . . . Not surprisingly, Hanoi has shown superior grasp of the local situation and a greater capacity to design military operations for political ends." But Hanoi's "superior planning can substitute for material resources only up to a point." In fact, "We are so powerful that Hanoi is simply unable to defeat us militarily." And, "Since it cannot force our withdrawal, it must negotiate about it." But, "Unfortunately, our military strength has no political corollary; we have been unable so far to create a political structure that could survive military opposition from Hanoi after we withdraw."

The failure to win in the political sphere, the recurring resort to technological solutions—this is the pattern of Washington's imperial war effort in Vietnam. First, military advisors were supplied; then "strategic hamlets" were constructed; then a full-scale invasion was mounted; and when that failed to win the countryside, Washington turned to a nightmare assault of terror and devastation, precipitating a massive exodus of the peasant population to the urban centers. Professor Samuel P. Huntington, a Harvard colleague of Kissinger and important policy advisor, called this flight from terror "forced urbanization," and in it he saw a neat solution to the impasse which Kissinger had described. Huntington noted (also in *Foreign Affairs*) that the proportion of the population under Saigon's (nominal) control had risen dramatically in the three years since the massive American commitment of men and arms in 1965. "This change, however, has been largely, if not exclusively, the result of the movement of the population into the cities rather than the extension of the Government's control into the countryside."

In this pattern of "forced urbanization," the U.S., according to Huntington, has begun to find the answer to people's war. "For ten years the Viet Cong has waged a rural revolution against the Central Government, with the good Maoist expectation that by winning the support of the rural population it could eventually isolate and overwhelm the cities."

This type of rural revolution, Huntington observed, had previously been immune to technological warfare. But the Vietnam experience has upstaged Mao: the U.S. is countering the Maoist-inspired rural revolution with the "American-sponsored urban revolution." "For if the 'direct application of mechanical and conventional power' takes place on such a massive scale as to produce a massive migration from countryside to city, the basic assumptions underlying the Maoist doctrine of revolution no longer operate."

The U.S. has transcended Mao, Huntington argues, because societies are susceptible to rural revolution only at certain stages in their development. Thanks to the "American-sponsored urban revolution," (sic) "History . . . may pass the Viet Cong by." The Viet Cong, according to Huntington, have been even less successful in winning support in the cities than has the government in the countryside. Consequently, "In an absent-minded way the United States in Vietnam may well have stumbled upon the answer to 'wars of national liberation.' The effective response lies neither in the quest for conventional military victory nor in the esoteric doctrines and gimmicks of counter-insurgency warfare. It is instead forced-draft urbanization and modernization which rapidly brings the country in question out of the phase in which a rural revolutionary movement can hope to generate sufficient strength to come to power."

AS LONG AS FORCED-DRAFT urbanization continues to drain the countryside, "time in South Vietnam is increasingly on the side of the Government. But in the short run, with half the population still in the countryside, the Viet Cong will remain a powerful force which cannot be dislodged from its constituency so long as the constituency continues to exist." The logic of Huntington's position, as Noam Chomsky has observed, is that "to crush people's war, we must eliminate the people."

This may be the logic, but the intention is slightly different. Although the "modernizing instruments of bombs and artillery" are clearly genocidal in intent and effect, Huntington is more concerned that the surviving population form a potential constituency for the urban-based government, or at least for urban non-Communist opposition parties. Huntington is also aware that the strategy could backfire if the NLF infrastructure were to remain intact or to be recreated in the cities—the U.S. would then have created a Trojan horse. But Huntington fails to acknowledge what Chomsky underscores: the goal of U.S. policy must be the destruction of organized social life in South Vietnam, particularly that of the NLF. This cultural genocide is necessary not only to destroy the NLF remnants in rural areas, but also if the U.S. is to prevent a fifth column in the urban areas. The "American-sponsored urban revolution" must leave the surviving population demoralized, disorganized, amenable to police-state domination on the one hand and political manipulation on the other (what Huntington's colleagues might call a "modern electorate").

"Forced urbanization" provides the necessary foundation for the effort to secure control of the population. The next (and present) stage of the process, when the refugees are herded into the cities, is outlined in a semi-secret paper by Huntington entitled "Getting Ready for Political Competition in South Vietnam." This paper outlines a strategy which

RAMPARTS 27

has strong resemblance to the actual emergence of peace forces in Saigon in recent months. Huntington's study was undertaken for the Asia Society and AID's Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group for delivery in March 1969, two months after Nixon took office.

The core of the Huntington strategy is to reach agreement on a political structure that would grant the NLF relative autonomy in rural areas presently under their control, while maintaining the Saigon regime as the national government; in effect this would mean no South Vietnamese government troops; no reversal of NLF land reform; NLF control of local taxes; and NLF military units as the local self-defense corps. In return the NLF would be expected to accept the formal authority of the Saigon government, guarantee free movement and security for all civilians and civil officials of the Saigon government, guarantee free movement and security of goods and commerce, and accept the functioning within the district of civilian ministries of the Saigon government. The greater context of social forces would then provide the key to ultimate victory.

In "modernizing" countries like South Vietnam, Huntington argues, the city is increasingly dominant over the countryside. If the NLF can be convinced to accept confinement to rural areas at the start of the political competition, then economic and political forces will be set in motion which will undermine the political strength of the NLF.

To begin with, the image of the NLF (and PRG), he argues, would be undermined as a competing national government, and the NLF would be reduced to the status of a "communal group," like the religious sects of the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai. More important, forces would be set in motion which would lead to the integration of the NLF areas into a U.S.-dominated Saigon political economy. For if the NLF attempted to isolate the rural areas it controlled from the rest of the country (and particularly the cities), it would face severe problems of communication, organization and transportation. On the other hand, if the NLF were to allow free circulation of goods and services within the developing urban-dominated capitalist market, and if the capitalist market and entrepreneur enticements were to penetrate the economic relations of the NLF area (peasants wanting to sell the rice on the open market in order to buy consumer goods, for example), then the socialist revolution and cohesive political base of the NLF would be undermined and the NLF areas would be effectively integrated into the Saigon political economy.

BESIDES THE LONG-RANGE destruction of the NLF the U.S. can also manipulate the structure of political competition. The U.S., according to Professor Huntington, can play a major role in shaping the rules of the game. It can also influence the identity of the players. In professional terms: "Perhaps the policy here is the attitude which the U.S. should assume toward active ARVN [Saigon troops] participation—overt or covert—in the electoral process." Or, if the pluralistic political path is deemed more opportune, "the U.S. could provide inducements and coercions to foster alliances or mergers among political actors. . . . [It] can give money and material support to candidates and groups. This can be done either through covert means or openly through the distribution of

Saigon

Photos by Orville Schell/Pacific News

Photos by Ed Rasen

Craterization

economic assistance and 'pork barrel' projects," and through
influencing or controlling the media. There are problems
of designing the system, however, that must be very care-
fully considered. For example, "Single-member [electoral]
districts produce less proportional results than multi-member
districts. They greatly over-represent the strongest party. If
we can be sure that party is not the NLF, the system is fine.
But how can we be sure?"

But before this "settlement" could succeed, the professor observed with true scholarly insight, a crucial problem had to be solved. "One of the few generalizations about politics in modernizing countries which is almost universally true is that the metropolitan centers are the principal source of opposition to the government." Thus, if "open political competition" is allowed, it will inevitably lead to the emergence of strong anti-government (and anti-American, in this case) groups in the cities. "This urban opposition proclivity," Huntington warns, "offers great opportunities to the NLF to move in and establish itself as the dominant opposition group . . . . From the U.S. viewpoint the most important goal is to insure the existence of a strong non-Communist opposition to the GVN [South Vietnamese government]. The worst situation in the cities would be for the NLF to dominate the opposition there." Huntington proceeds to discuss some of the possible groups and leaders who could coalesce opposition elements around them, and, presumably with "overt or covert" U.S. support, could "prevent the NLF from monopolizing the opposition and thereby attracting to itself all those groups and individuals with real or imagined grievances."

Huntington suggested specifically that the U.S. back the
Buddhists, and either Thich Tri Quang, General Thi, or ...
General Minh.

Given this strategy for winning a "political settlement,"
it is hardly surprising that while the Nixon Administration
has made a "space" for the emergence of the non-Communist
political forces in the urban areas in recent months, it is con-
tinuing the military aspect of the Vietnamization-urbaniza-
tion strategy: the isolation of the guerrillas not only from the
rural population but from supplies and reinforcements from
North Vietnam. Although the Cambodian invasion was part-
ly to shore up the Lon Nol regime against imminent col-

lapse at the hands of the Cambodian peasants and their
Vietnamese allies, we can accept Nixon's word that he was
trying to get at the alleged "sanctuaries," however ineptly.
Nixon and Kissinger probably calculate that if they can iso-
late the guerrillas from outside aid they can threaten them
with eventual extinction if they refuse to negotiate. From
this perspective, the recent massive B-52 raids on Southern
Laos—the so-called Ho Chi Minh Trail—may lead to fur-
ther escalation as Nixon tries to sever the supply lines to the
North.

THE HUNTINGTON-KISSINGER strategy is a last-ditch
attempt to insure an American victory in Vietnam.
But like all previous attempts to manipulate and con-
trol the Vietnamese people, it has little chance of
success. The student movement, for example, may already
have gone much further to the left than is tolerable to the
U.S. Recently in Saigon the students have been openly mak-
ing demands for unconditional, immediate withdrawal of all
U.S. forces. The students have begun to attack the Amer-
icanization of Vietnam—hitting directly at Huntington's
hopes for creating a consumer-oriented, petit bourgeois
mentality among the urban population. The cultural revo-
lution by the Vietnamese students, as well as their political
demands, seems to have the support of the general popula-
tion in the urban areas, forcing caution upon Thieu and Ky
in attempting to repress the movement. And the students'
politics have moved to the left and are now in harmony
with the NLF. The student leaders who were imprisoned
and tortured in the summer, then released under public
pressure, have apparently actually joined the Front.

In South Vietnam the U.S. attempt to destroy the cadre
infrastructure of the NLF with "Operation Phoenix"—
aimed at assassinating 20,000 NLF cadres per year—has
apparently failed. Meanwhile, the New York Times re-
ported on October 19 that a CIA study had provided evi-
dence that at least 30,000 NLF agents had infiltrated the
South Vietnamese government "in an apparatus which has
been virtually impossible to destroy." (Duong Dinh Thao of
the PRG told Wilfred Burchett that the actual figure of agents
is "many times greater.")

The million-man South Vietnamese Army, which the U.S.

30 RAMPARTS

Photo by Orville Schell/Pacific News

was to have "built up" in the last two years, is the most unstable and dangerous force in South Vietnam, according to Vietnam observer Francis Fitzgerald: "Led by a corrupt and demoralized officer corps and dependent on foreign support, it behaves no better than an undisciplined group of mercenaries, terrorizing the population it is meant to protect." Moreover, Thieu has had to work to narrow, rather than broaden, the base of his government "in order to achieve what many Americans assumed he already had: some control over his own army." A coalition government could well lead to an army coup and even a "revolt of the Central Vietnamese divisions against those in Saigon," Fitzgerald argues.

In Laos the U.S. has been "urbanizing" the country with the most murderous air attacks in history (500 to 1000 planes per day), creating 800,000 refugees out of a population of less than three million. But the strategy in Laos has failed, and already most of Cambodia is a "Communist sanctuary." (According to a Saigon military source, the North Vietnamese and NLF have even reoccupied their sanctuaries along the Cambodia-Vietnam border. *Le Monde*, 17 October) The Cambodian National United Front is building a solid revolutionary army and political organization, dominated by the Communist Khmer Rouge, according to Sihanouk (*Le Monde*, 28 September) and in control of at least half of the population and country. Sihanouk also said that Phnom Penh will be the last place to be liberated because it would give Nixon the excuse to escalate the war in Cambodia. (*Le Monde*, 4 November 1970)

NIXON IS RESPONDING to the Cambodian "threat" by increasing aid to Lon Nol, by continuing to send in Saigon troops, by supplying Lon Nol with CIA-trained mercenaries of Cambodian ethnic stock recruited in South Vietnam and Thailand, and by authorizing tactical and strategic bombing support for the beleaguered Cambodian army. Recently the Administration admitted that U.S. advisors are training and fighting with the Cambodian army, and Nixon is pushing for vastly increased U.S. aid to Lon Nol.

But the bombing raids have only slowed down the traffic on the trail in the past. There has been talk of a South Vietnamese and possibly U.S. invasion of Southern Laos (*Le Monde*, 21 October). Such an invasion, however, would be vastly more difficult than the invasion of Cambodia because the terrain is extraordinarily mountainous (nearly impossible for a mechanized army) and because the North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao are extremely well entrenched and fortified against such an attack. And as Nixon pulls out American ground troops, such an operation obviously becomes riskier as the rear areas in South Vietnam are vulnerable to attacks.

An ominous alternative would be for Nixon to resort to the ultimate technological solution to the collapse of the 25-year effort to win over the people of Vietnam to the American order: nuclear attack. He could, for example, use a tactical nuclear weapon on the Trail to isolate the NLF permanently with a radioactive barrier. Such an escalation would be consistent with the Vietnamization-urbanization strategy. Recently there have been a number of indications that this is in fact an alternative increasingly likely to be tried as the U.S. political foothold in Vietnam becomes smaller and smaller and its military options fewer and fewer.

Henry A. Kissinger

A recent article in the New York Times may be a "trial balloon" to test reactions and to prepare the way for public acceptance of tactical nuclear weapons. C. L. Sulzberger, chief correspondent for the Times, wrote on November 15—a week before the raids on North Vietnam—that "Limited commitments to conventional defense are seen as increasingly outmoded and yet total warfare is a dreadful absurdity. . . . Consequently, the search focuses on a third solution—between impossible nuclear disaster and unsuccessful conventional warfare. The answer may well lie in the field of truly tactical atomic weapons."

Two weeks before Sulzberger's advocacy of a "third solution," the Times ran an article on atomic land mines recently developed for NATO whose uses seem rather more appropriate for severing North from South Vietnam: "The atomic land mines could block a mountain pass against attacking forces by contaminating the areas with nuclear fallout and by caving in earth and rocks from the heights . . . in sparsely populated areas with relatively few avenues of invasion, atomic land mines could be an effective weapon." (October 28, 1970)

That the United States is now on the brink of using nuclear weapons in Vietnam is no more an occasion for wonder than that it has already crossed the threshold of systematic war crimes as defined by its own Nuremberg Tribunal. Imperial war tends by nature to become genocidal war because it lacks the popular base and raison d'être of more conventional conflicts. Powerless to win support among the Vietnamese and unable to garner the necessary troops from their own increasingly disaffected people, the captains of the American empire must inevitably resort to ever more powerful technologies of destruction to stave off equally inevitable defeat. Nuclear catastrophe thus appears as the limiting case in Washington's desperate effort to escape the consequences of its conflict as a global empire whose base is crumbling with a world revolution whose time has come.

Wide World Photos

RAMPARTS 31

0-19 (Rev. 11-3-69)

VIP

# The Actress And the Adviser

By Maxine Cheshire

At a Hollywood dinner party which she attended months ago with Frank Sinatra, actress Jill St. John was Henry Kissinger's dinner partner.

The red-haired film star, whose press agents have always claimed she has a 145 I.Q., intrigued the professional and hawkish White House foreign affairs adviser, even though she is dovish enough to have worked for Sen. Eugene McCarthy two years ago.

After the party, given by Kirk and Anne Douglas, Miss St. John did not see much of Kissinger until about a month ago.

She has made at least two trips to Washington since early May, dining with him at the Sans Souci and the Jockey Club and lunching at Le Provençal.

In his company, she has been meeting administration notables, including Secretary of State William Rogers.

When Kissinger accompanied President Nixon to San Clemente on Memorial Day weekend, he took Miss St. John to Hollywood gossip columnist Joyce Haber's for cocktails and then to Chasen's restaurant for dinner.

Like actor George Hamilton, the actress is finding that being seen with a Washington VIP can be very good publicity.

Her press agent, Richard Gully, couldn't be happier.

"She hasn't had a part in six months," he said frankly in a long-distance conversation last week. "She hasn't worked except for making a $35,000 television commercial for somebody who makes sunglasses."

Gully, who also works as society editor of the Hollywood Citizen-News, claims that Kissinger has invited Miss St. John to attend the World Cup soccer matches in Mexico City with him when he travels there later this month with an official party.

Kissinger says this is not true. He has little experience, he confesses, with Hollywood press agentry.

Miss St. John's name came up in federal court in New York yesterday.

At the trial of Nathan Voloshen and Martin Sweig on charges of using House Speaker John W. McCormack's office as a base for influence peddling, the judge read a list of 82 names of individuals and corporations expected to figure in trial testimony involving Sweig. Miss St. John's name was among them.

Miss St. John was in New York yesterday and is expected to return there again in November for a hearing in another federal court case in which she is also involved.

Miss St. John, Voloshen and seven other stockholders in the Parvin-Dorhmann Co. are under fire from the Securities and Exchange Commission. The SEC complaint alleges that an "insiders" group of stockholders including Voloshen and Miss St. John used false financial statements and other illegal tactics to gain control of Parvin-Dohrmann and inflate the price of its stock.

The court has been asked to force Miss St. John and her co-defendants to "disgorge" profits which amount to several million dollars.

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Examiner (Washington)

Date 6/18/70

LETTER

TO L. I. BREZHNEV, CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE
CPSU, A. N. KOSYGIN, USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
AND TO THE N. V. PODGORNY, PRESIDIO OF THE
USSR SUPREME SOVIET

Deeply Esteemed Comrades

We address ourselves to you on a matter of great im-
portance. Our country has achieved very much in the de-
velopment of production, in the realm of education and
culture, in the cardinal improvement of the living condi-
tions of the workers and in the formation of new socialist
relations between people. These achievements have world-
wide historical importance. They have exerted the deepest
influence on events throughout the world and have laid
a solid foundation for further successes in the cause of
communism.

But there are patently also serious difficulties and short-
comings.

In this letter a point of view is considered and developed
which in abbreviated form can be formulated in the fol-
lowing theses:

1. At the present time there is an imperative necessity for carrying out a series of measures directed towards the further democratization of public life in the country. This necessity emerges from the existence of a close link between problems of technico-economic progress and scientific methods of management with questions of information, publicity and competition. This necessity emerges also from other internal and external political problems.

2. Democratization must facilitate the preservation and strengthening of the Soviet socialist system, the socialist economic structure, our social and cultural achievements, and socialist ideology.

109

3. Democratization carried out under the direction of the CPSU in cooperation with all layers of society must preserve and strengthen the leading role of the party in the economic, political and cultural life of society.

4. Democratization must be gradual in order to avoid possible complications and disruptions. At the same time it must be deep, must be carried out consistently and on the basis of a carefully worked out program. Without deep rooted democratization our society will not be able to solve the problems lying before it, will not be able to develop normally.

There is a basis to suppose that the point of view expressed in these theses is shared to a greater or lesser extent by a considerable section of the Soviet intelligentsia and the advanced section of the working class. This point of view finds its reflection in the views of student and working youth and in numerous discussions in a narrow circle.

However, we consider it appropriate to set forth this point of view in written form to facilitate wide and open consideration of important problems. We are endeavoring to reach a positive and constructive approach acceptable to the party-state leadership of the country, refraining from the explanation of certain misunderstandings and groundless dangers.*)

In the course of the past decade menacing signs of breakdown and stagnation have been discovered in the economy of our country, and the roots of these difficulties

*) Since January 1970 a letter to L. I. Brezhnev was widely circulated in Moscow signed by the name of "Sakharov" or "Academician Sakharov." This "letter" in many variations was published subsequently in the foreign press. In No. 1 of the anti-Soviet emigrant journal Posev for 1970 an article was published under the pretentious title "The Truth About Contemporary Times" over the signature of R. Medvedev. This very article, full of provocative fabrications, was subsequently broadcast in the Russian language by Radio Liberty (FRG). We declare that we are not the authors of the aforementioned letter and article. These documents attributed to us are flagrant falsifications and are evidently distributed with provocative aims. (Signed Medvedev and Sakharov.)

[c]

110

originate from an earlier period and bear a very deeply
rooted character. The growth rate of the national income
is steadily dropping. There is a widening gap between the
actual introduction of new production capacities and those
required for normal development.

There are patently many cases of errors in the deter-
mination of technical and economic policy in industry and
agriculture and impermissible red tape in the solution of
the unpostponable problems. Defects in the system of
planning, accounting and incentives often lead to a con-
tradiction of local and departmental interests with public
and state interests. As a result, reserves of development of
production are neither properly developed nor used, and
technical progress is sharply retarded.

By virtue of these same reasons the natural wealth of
the country is frequently destroyed without control and
without punishment: forests are being cut down, water re-
servoirs polluted, valuable farming lands flooded, soil is
becoming eroded and saline, and so forth.

It is common knowledge that there is a chronically grave
situation in agriculture, especially in cattle breeding. Real
income of the population in recent years has hardly risen
at all. Nutrition, medical service and everyday services are
improving very slowly and geographically unequally.

The number of goods in short supply is increasing. There
are obvious signs of inflation. Especially alarming for the
future of our country is the slowdown in the development
of education. In fact our over-all expenditures on educa-
tion of all types are less than in the USA and are increas-
ing at a slower rate.

Alcoholism is increasingly socially and socially addic-
tion is beginning to make itself felt. In many regions of
the country crime is rising steadily, including among teen-
agers and youth. In the work of scientific and scientific-
technological organizations, bureaucracy, narrow depart-
mentalism, a formal attitude to the job and lack of initia-
tive are growing.

111

A decisive factor in the comparison of economic systems is labor productivity and here the situation is worst of all. Productivity of labor with us, as before, remains many times lower than in the developed capitalist countries and its rate of increase has slowed down sharply. This situation is especially noticeable when it is compared with the situation in leading capitalist countries, and especially in the USA.

In introducing into the economy of the country elements of state regulation and planning these countries have rid themselves of the destructive crises which earlier tore capitalist economies apart. The widespread introduction into the economy of automation and computer technology assures a rapid growth of the productivity of labor which in turn promotes the piecemeal surmounting of some of the social difficulties and contradictions (as for example ways of establishing unemployment benefits, the shortening of the working day, etc.).

Comparing our economy with the economy of the United States we see that our economy lags not only in quantitative but also — which is saddest of all — in qualitative respects.

The newer and more revolutionary an aspect of an economy is, the greater is the gap between the United States and ourselves. We surpass America in the mining of coal but we lag behind in oil drilling, lag very much behind in gas drilling and in the production of electric power, hopelessly lag behind in chemistry and infinitely lag behind in computer technology. The latter is particularly essential because the introduction of computers in the national economy is of crucial importance for fundamentally changing the whole look of the system of production and of the whole culture. This phenomenon has deservedly been called the second industrial revolution. Incidentally, the capacity of our inventory of computer machines is hundreds of times less than in the United States and as for the use of computers in the economy here the gap is so wide

112

that it is impossible to measure it. We simple live in an-
other epoch.

It is no better in the field of scientific and engineering
discoveries. And no increase in our role is in sight. More
likely the contrary. At the end of the 1950's our country
was the first to launch a sputnik and send a man into
space. At the end of the 1960's we lost our lead and the
first men to land on the moon were American.

This fact is just one of many that shows the growing dif-
ference in the extent of scientific and technical work in
our country and the developed countries of the west. In
the 1920's and 1930's the capitalist world was hit by crises
and depressions. At that time by employing the enthu-
siasm of the nation engendered by the revolution we were
creating industry at an unbelievable pace.

At that time our motto was to catch up with America
and overtake it. And we had really been doing this for
several decades. Then the situation changed. The second
industrial revolution began and now at the beginning of
the 1970's we can see that not only have we not caught
up with America but that we are lagging behind it more
and more.

What is the matter? Why was it that our country not
only failed to take the initiative in the second industrial
revolution, but that we also were unable to keep pace with
the most developed capitalist countries? Is it possible that
the socialist structure provides fewer possibilities than the
capitalist system for the development of productive forces
and that in the economic competition between capitalism
and socialism the former is maintaining the upper hand?

No, it is not so. The source of our difficulties is not the
socialist structure, but, on the contrary, it lies in those
peculiarities and conditions of our life which run contrary
to socialism and are hostile to it. The source of this is anti-
democratic traditions and norms of public life which ap-
peared during Stalin's period and have not been comple-
tely liquidated down to the present time. Non-economic

113

[Lc]

coercion, limitations on the exchange of information, re-
strictions of intellectual freedom and other displays of
anti-democratic distortions of socialism which took place
in Stalin's time are still generally considered to be the
costs of the industrial process.

It is considered that these did not seriously affect the
country's economy although they had extremely serious
consequences in the political and military fields and for
the plights of wide strata of the population and even of
nationalities. We are leaving aside the problem about the
extent that this conception was justified at the early stages
of the development of socialist economy — the reduced
rate of industrial development in the pre-war years testi-
fies, rather, to the contrary. There is no doubt that with
the beginning of the second industrial revolution these
phenomena have become a decisive economic factor, have
become a major obstacle for the development of the pro-
ductive forces of the country. Due to the increase in the
volume and complexity of economic systems the problems
of organization and management have advanced to the
forefront. These problems cannot be solved by one or se-
veral individuals who hold power and who "know every-
thing." They demand the creative participation of millions
of people on all levels of the economic system. They de-
mand a wide exchange of information and ideas and this
is the distinction of the present-day economy from the
economy, say, of the countries of the ancient east.

But in the process of exchange of information and ideas
in our country we are facing indeterminable difficulties.
Truthful information on our faults and negative pheno-
mena are kept secret on the basis that they may be "used
by hostile propaganda."

Exchange of information with foreign countries is re-
stricted because of fear of "penetration of hostile ideolo-
gy." Theoretical generalizations and practical proposals
which may seem to be too bold are suppressed immediate-

114

ly without any discussion under the influence of fear that they may "undermine the foundations."

One can really see actual distrust of those who think critically, creatively and actively. Under these conditions only those who in their words display staunchness for the cause of the party but in reality are distinguished by their narrow personal interest or passive performance, and not those who really possess high professional qualities and principles, can move upward. Restrictions in the freedom of information not only impede control over the leadership, nor merely frustrate the people's initiative, but also deprive the intermediate level supervisors of rights and information and they are transformed into passive performers and bureaucrats.

The top administrators receive excessively incomplete and doctored information and are also deprived of the possibility of fully using their available authority. The economic reform of 1965 is an extremely useful and important measure for the solution of important questions of our economic policy.

But we are convinced that in order to fulfill all its tasks economic measures alone appear to be insufficient. Moreover these economic measures cannot be taken without reforms in the sphere of administration, information and public disclosure. The same concerns such promising initiatives as setting up organizationally complex industrial associations with a high degree of independence in economic, financial and personnel fields. No matter which specific problem of the economy is taken up, the conclusion can be made that its satisfactory solution needs scientific solution of such general and fundamental problems of the socialist economy as the forms of feedback in the system of administration, price formation in the absence of a free market, general principles of planning, etc.

We are talking a lot now about the necessity of a scientific approach to the problems of organizations and administration. This is quite correct. Only a scientific ap-

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proach to these problems can help to overcome the diffi-
culties which have developed and exploit all those poten-
tialities in the direction of the economy and technical-
economic progress which the absence of capitalist ownership provides. But a scientific approach requires complete information, impartial thinking and freedom to create. Until these conditions are met (and not only for some individuals but for masses of people in general), the talk about scientific management will remain mere talk.

Our economy can be compared with traffic entering an intersection. While there were few cars, the traffic policeman could handle it quite easily and the traffic flowed normally. But the traffic constantly increases and a traffic jam develops. What can be done in this situation? The drivers can be fined or the policeman changed. But this will not save the situation. The only way out is to make the intersection wider. The obstacles that prevent the development of our economy can be found outside it, in the social and political field, and all the measures for eliminating these obstacles are condemned to ineffectiveness. The survivals of the Stalin period still produce negative effects on the economy and not only directly because of the impossibility of a scientific approach to the problems of administration and management but in no less degree indirectly through the general reduction of a creative potential of representatives in all the professions. But it is specifically creative labor which is becoming more and more important for the national economy under the conditions of the second industrial revolution.

In this connection one must also speak about the prob-
lems of the relationships between the state and the intel-
ligentsia. Freedom of information and creativity are neces-
sary for the intelligentsia due to the nature of its
activities, due to the nature of its social function. The
striving of the intelligentsia to increase this freedom is
legal and natural. The state however suppresses this aspi-
ration by introducing various restrictions, administrative

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pressure, dismissals and even the holding of trials. This brings about a rupture, mutual distrust and a deep mutual lack of understanding which makes it difficult for the state and the most active strata of the intelligentsia, i. e., the strata most valuable to the society, to cooperate fruitfully. In the conditions of the present-day industrial society, where the role of the intelligentsia is growing continuously, this rupture cannot but be termed suicidal.

The greater part of the intelligentsia and the youth realizes the necessity of cautious and gradual approaches to this problem but it cannot understand or justify actions of a purely anti-democratic nature. How can one really justify the imprisonment or the detention in camps and mental asylums of persons holding opposition views but whose opposition is still within legal bounds, within the sphere of ideas and convictions. In a number of cases we are not speaking of any sort of opposition but merely about the striving to have information, to have a fearless and unbiased discussion of social questions. It is impermissible to keep writers in prison for their work. One cannot understand or justify such preposterous and extremely harmful measures as the exclusion from the Writers' Union of the greatest and most popular Soviet writer who is deeply patriotic and humane in all his actions, or the shattering of the *Novy Mir* editorial board in which were united the most progressive forces of the Marxist-Leninist socialist school.

It is necessary to refer again to ideological problems. Democratization with its complete information and competition must bring back to our ideological life (to the social sciences, art, propaganda) its dynamism and creative nature, and liquidate the bureaucratic, ritualistic, dogmatic, officially hypocritical and inept style, which presently occupies such an important position.

The course to democratization would eliminate the rupture between the party and state apparatus and the intelligentsia. Mutual lack of understanding will turn into close

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cooperation. The course to democratization will engender
a surge of enthusiasm comparable to that of the twenties.
The best intellectual forces of the country will be mobilized
for the solution of social and economic problems.

Achieving democratization is not an easy process. Its
normal progress will be threatened by individualist and
anti-socialist forces on the one hand and on the other hand
by the advocates of "strong power," by fascist-type demagogues who may try to use the economic difficulties of the
country, the mutual lack of understanding and mistrust of
the intelligentsia and the party-government apparatus,
and the existence in certain strata of the society of narrow-minded and nationalistic feelings for their own advantage.

But we must realize that there is no other way out for
our country and that this difficult problem has to be solved. The realization of democratization at the initiative
and under the control of the highest authorities will allow
this process to proceed according to plan with monitoring
to assure that all the links of the party and state apparatus
successfully change to a new style of work distinguished
from the past dread of public disclosure by openness and
a more extensive discussion of all problems. There is no
doubt that the majority of apparatus workers — people
tried and tested in a modern and highly developed country
— are capable of changing to this style of work and will
very soon feel all its advantages. The sifting out of an insignificant number of incompetents will only benefit the
apparatus.

We propose the following approximate program of measures which can be implemented over a 4-5 year period.

1. A statement from the highest party and government authorities on the necessity of further democratization, on its rate and the methods of achieving it. Publication in the press of a number of articles discussing the problems of democratization.

2. Restricted distribution (through party and state or-

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gans, enterprises and organizations) of information on the state of the country and of theoretical works on public problems which for the present would not be made a subject of wide discussion. The gradual increase in availability of such materials up to the complete removal of restrictions.

3. Stopping the jamming of foreign broadcasts. Free sale of foreign books and periodicals. Admission of our country to the international copyright system. Gradual (over 3-4 years) expansion and facilitation of international tourism, in both directions, unrestricted facilitating of international correspondence and also other measures for the expansion of international contacts with the fastest development of these trends in respect to the COMECON countries.

4. The establishment of an institute for the study of public opinion. Initially restricted with subsequent complete publication of materials showing the attitude of the population to the most important problems of internal and external policy, and also publication of other sociological materials.

5. Amnesty for political prisoners. A decree on the compulsory publication of complete stenographic reports of trials of a political nature. Public control over the places of imprisonment and psychiatric institutions.

6. Implementation of a series of measures to facilitate improvement in the operation of courts and procurators' offices, their independence from the executive authority, local influences, prejudices and connections.

7. Abolition of the nationality designation in passports. A single system of passports for residents of urban and rural areas. Gradual abolition of passport registration, conducted in parallel with the levelling out of territorial dissimilarities in economic and cultural development.

8. Broad organization of complex industrial associations (firms) with a high degree of independence in problems of the production planning of technological processes, sales, supply, and in the problems of finances and personnel, and

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the expansion of these rights for smaller production units.
Scientific determination of the forms and extent of state
control subsequent to thorough research.

9. Reforms in the field of education. Greater allocations for primary and secondary schools, improvement in the economic situation of teachers, giving them greater independence and the right to experiment.

10. Passing a law on the press and information. Providing opportunities for the establishment of new press organs by public organizations and groups of citizens.

11. Improving the training of supervisory personnel wielding the art of management. Creating a system for industrial trainees. Improving the knowledgeability of supervisory personnel at all levels. Their rights to exercise initiative, independence, to experimentation and to the defense of their opinions and the testing of them in practice.

12. Gradual introduction into practice of the nomination of several candidates for a single post during elections to party and Soviet organs at all levels, including during direct elections.

13. Expanding the rights of Soviet organs. Expanding the rights and responsibilities of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

14. Restoring all the rights of nationalities forcibly resettled under Stalin. Restoring the national autonomy of the resettled nations. Gradual granting of the opportunity of settling in former homelands again (where it has not yet taken place).

Of course this plan must be regarded as approximate. It is also clear that it must be complemented by a plan for economic and social measures worked out by specialists. We emphasize that democratization in itself does not at all solve economic problems, it only creates the preconditions for the solution; but without creating the preconditions economic problems cannot be solved. Sometimes we hear our foreign friends comparing the Soviet Union to a powerful truck whose driver is accelerating as much as

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possible with one foot, and at the same time applying the brake with the other. The time has come to use the brake more sensibly.

The plan we propose shows, in our view, that it is completely possible to outline a program of democratization which is acceptable to the party and the state and satisfies, as a first approximation, the urgent demands of the country's development. Naturally, wide discussion, profound scientific, sociological, economic, general political, pedagogic, and other research, as well as actual practice, will provide substantial corrections and additions. But it is important, as the mathematicians say, to prove the "theorem of the existence of a solution."

We must also consider the international consequences of democratization if it is adopted by our country. Nothing can so well serve our international authority and the strengthening of progressive communist forces in the entire world as further democratization, accompanied by an intensification of the technological and economic progress of the world's first socialist country.

Undoubtedly, possibilities for peaceful coexistence and international cooperation will increase, the forces of peace and social progress will be strengthened, the attractiveness of communist ideology will grow, and our international position will become more secure. It is particularly important that our moral and material positions as they relate to China be strengthened and (indirectly, by example and technical aid) that there be more opportunities to influence the situation in that country in the interests of the peoples of both countries.

A number of correct and necessary foreign policy actions by our government are not properly understood because the information provided to citizens on these matters is incomplete, and in the past there have been cases of obviously inaccurate and tendentious information, which contributes to the lack of confidence.

An example of this is the question of economic aid to

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underdeveloped countries. Fifty years ago the workers of war-ravaged Europe helped those who were dying of hunger in the Volga area. Soviet people are not more callous or egotistical. However, they must be sure that our resources are being spent on real aid, on the solution of serious problems, and not on the construction of grandiose stadiums and the purchase of American cars for local officials. The situation in the modern world, the opportunities and tasks facing our country demand wide participation in economic aid to the underdeveloped countries in cooperation with other countries. But for the correct public understanding of these issues it is not enough to give verbal assurances. It is necessary to prove and demonstrate, and this demands more extensive information, demands democratization.

Soviet foreign policy, in its basic features, is a policy of peace and cooperation. But the public's lack of information causes disquiet. In the past there occured certain negative manifestations in Soviet foreign policy, which had the character of excessive Messianic ambition, and which force one to the conclusion that it is not the imperialists alone who bear responsibility for international tension.

All negative phenomena in our foreign policy are closely connected to the problem of democratization and this connection has a two-sided character. Great disquiet is caused by the absence of democratic discussion of such questions as arms aid to a number of countries, including, for instance, Nigeria, where a bloody civil war was in progress whose causes and course are quite unfamiliar to the Soviet public. We are convinced that the resolution of the U. N. Security Council on the problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict is just and reasonable, although also not concrete enough in a number of important points. However, disquiet is caused by the question: Does our position not go substantially further than this document, is it not too one-sided? Is our position regarding the status of West Berlin realistic?

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Is it always realistic for us to strive to extend our influence in places far from our borders at a time of difficulties in Sino-Soviet relations and of serious difficulties in technical-economic development? Of course in certain cases such a "dynamic policy" is essential, but it must be harmonized not only with general principles, but also with the country's real capabilities.

We are convinced that the only realistic policy in an age of thermonuclear weapons is a course aimed at continued deeping of international cooperation, at determined attempts to find a line of possible convergence in scientific, technological, economic, cultural and ideological spheres, and at renunciation of weapons of mass destruction as a matter of principle. We take this opportunity to express our opinion about the usefulness of unilateral and joint declarations by nuclear powers about their renunciation in principle of the possibility of being the first to use weapons of mass destruction.

Democratization will facilitate a better public understanding of foreign policy and remove from it all its negative features. This in turn will lead to the disappearance of one of the main "trump cards" held by the opponents of democratization. Another of their "trump cards" — the well-known mutual lack of understanding existing between government and party circles and the intelligentsia — will disappear at the very first stages of democratization.

What awaits our country if a course towards democratization is not taken? Falling behind the capitalist countries in the process of the second industrial revolution and gradual transformation into a second-rate provincial power (history knows similar examples); growth of economic difficulties; deterioration of relations between the party-government apparatus and the intelligentsia; danger of frustrations on all sides; aggravation of national problems. For in the national republics the movement for democra-

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tization, arising from below, is inevitably taking on a nationalist character.

The prospect becomes particularly menacing if one takes into consideration the presence of the danger from the side of Chinese totalitarian nationalism (which on the historical level we regard as temporary, but very serious for the next few years). We can face this danger only by increasing or at least maintaining the existing technological and economic gap between our country and China, increasing the numbers of our friends in the world at large, and offering the Chinese people the alternative of cooperation and aid. This becomes obvious if one takes into consideration the numerical superiority of the potential enemy and his militant nationalism, as well as the great extent of our eastern frontiers and the sparse population of the eastern regions. Thus economic standstill, a slowing down of the rates of development in combination with an insufficiently realistic and sometimes too ambitious foreign policy on all continents may lead our country to catastrophic consequences.

Deeply Esteemed Comrades:

There is no other way out of the difficulties facing the country except a course towards democratization carried out by the CPSU in accordance with a carefully worked out program. A move to the right, that is, the victory of the tendency towards rigid bureaucratic administration or "tightening the screws," not only will not solve any problems, but on the contrary will aggravate those problems to the extreme and lead the country into a tragic blind alley. The tactic of passively waiting to see what turns up will lead, in the final analysis, to the same result.

At present we have a chance to take the right road and carry out the necessary reforms. In a few years, perhaps, it will be too late. This situation must be realized through-out the whole country.

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