(✓)

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1 outcome there is. It is conceivable to me that if the United

2 Nations takes a firm stand and if this country is united in

3 its general direction, as I believe it will be and is that

4 then Saddam may do what Milosevic did after Kosovo to accept

5 some kind of an agreement that in fact undermines his rule

6 and, after a certain time, he will be removed. It is not very

7 likely, but it is not totally inconceivable.

8 It is more conceivable, though, that still not very probable that

9 some of the military people in Iraq will decide that they have

10 gone about as far as they can and to fight a suicidal war is

11 senseless and that we will find that Saddam is removed. In

12 that case, we have the problem of negotiating with a de facto

13 government, and then the question of coming up with an

14 inspection system that has real teeth would be very relevant,

15 but the need of governing itself in Iraq would be less.

16 From the point of view of post-war reconstruction, the

17 most complex situation is one in which there is military

18 action leading to the disintegration of all authority in Iraq.

19 and, the need to reestablish authority as was the case in the

20 occupation of Germany and, to some extent, of Japan.

21 would be an extraordinarily complicated case.

22 I am opposed to a prolonged occupation of a Muslim

23 country in the heart of the Muslim world by western nations

24 who proclaim the right to reeducate that country.

25 am I very difficult undertaking, and therefore I would

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.
1111 14th Street, N.W. Suite 400 1-800-FOR-DEPO Washington, DC 20005

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1 believe that ~~that should be~~ really turned over to some kind of ~~all new~~

2 international group ~~that can be formed~~ But in which we would have

3 a very major role. Therefore, it is very difficult to talk

4 ~~all~~ about this in the abstract.

5 Senator Feingold: Well, I appreciate that answer. And

6 if I could just comment, Mr. Chairman, and then turn it over.

7 We are talking about a scenario here where we have militarily

8 succeeded and whoever is taking over there, we still have the

9 problem of the weapons of mass destruction and securing those

10 weapons of mass destruction. I do not think that is the time

11 to start figuring out how we are going to secure those weapons

12 of mass destruction.

13 I agree with Senator Lugar, although I certainly do not

14 want to try to put words in his mouth, that there is a sense

15 here that we are not getting even the outlines or the general

16 concept of what would that entail. What would be the American

17 commitment? What kind of agreements do we have to get up

18 front from our allies about how to achieve the kinds of things

19 in that area that Senator Lugar has devoted so much of his

20 career to doing in other places?

21 So I think this is central, and I am worried that we are

22 talking about knocking out Saddam Hussein and then trying to

23 figure it out after the fact.

24 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 The Chairman: Senator Hagel.

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1 Senator Hagel: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

2 I add my welcome and thanks to both of you. We are
3 grateful for your appearance this morning and the benefit of
4 your expertise and insight and great experience. Thank you.

5 I would just add a comment to what the Senator from
6 Wisconsin and prior to the Senator from Wisconsin's comments,
7 the Senator from Indiana said, but more to the point, their
8 line of questioning. I think as you have sat through this for
9 about an hour-and-a-half, you both are getting a sense, at
10 least from some on this committee, where the thrust of this
11 is, this great question, this debate, this issue of whether we
12 should go to war and the questions that you both began with,
13 how, when. I think it is clear to state that no one has all
14 the answers, and I think it is also clear to state, going back
15 to referencing the Senator from Wisconsin's point, I do not
16 know if there is a Member of the Congress certainly that I am
17 aware of that does not take seriously the threat of Saddam
18 Hussein.

19 Now, that said, we differ a bit on how we deal with that.
20 But there are those who minimalize even such a debate and how
21 outrageous to even question things like the destabilization of
22 the Middle East. I mean, how foolish of you to ask such a
23 question. If we could just get rid of Saddam Hussein, then
24 all of our problems would go away. Everybody knows that. And
25 you heard some of that.

57

1 I want to go back to the destabilization issue in a

2 moment and would like very much to hear from each of you on a

3 particular question I will ask on that.

4 But before I do, Secretary Albright, you are the most

5 recent Secretary of State who has had to deal with this issue.

6 You were Secretary of State in the first 2 years after Saddam

7 Hussein kicked the UN inspectors out. What did your

8 administration learn that you could share with this committee

9 on how we should be dealing with Saddam Hussein and this issue

10 today, the debate that is going on today?

11 For example, did your administration ever closely examine

12 or pursue tightening those resolutions or forcing those

13 resolutions at the UN and looking seriously at a military

14 option, to go through maybe what President Bush is going

15 through now, realizing that you did not have the force of

16 September 11th? You did not have the mobilization of the

17 country, the world, the Congress behind you on that. But is

18 there anything that you can share with this committee with the

19 experience you had most recently that might give us some

20 assistance here as we grapple with this great debate of our

21 time?

22 Because I am one who believes that we are not talking

23 about just going to war with Iraq. You both have talked about

24 preemption, about doctrines, about the future, of what this

25 will do to balance of power and geopolitical strategic

58

1 interests, economic interests. We are talking about an awful
2 lot here. Your point, Madam Secretary, about overloading the
3 structure and the system, I generally happen to agree with
4 that.

5 But not to get off into that tangent, I would like to
6 stay on focus on asking you to answer the question and then I
7 would come back to a more particular question I have for each
8 of you. Thank you.

9 Secretary Albright: I, unfortunately, do have more
10 experience with this than most, and I think we have to keep in
11 mind the following, that we did try very hard to keep a
12 consensus in the United Nations. There began to be what we
13 called sanctions fatigue. As we know, certain of our friends
14 and allies had a different idea. But we, for a long time,
15 kept a completely unanimous Security Council to enforce the
16 resolutions, but ultimately it was very hard I think to keep
17 everybody in line.

18 We began to think about very much the kind of thing that
19 Secretary Powell came forward with at the beginning of the
20 administration, which were the smart sanctions which was
21 trying to limit and tighten the box on the regime and not to
22 punish the people because one of the things that was happening
23 was we were losing support because there was increasing -- I
24 would actually not have agreed with this -- propaganda,
25 basically that it was our fault that the people were

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1 suffering.

2 We also did consider a number of military options, and I

3 think we managed to do what was the right thing, which was to

4 keep constantly vigilance on the no-fly zones to make sure

5 that he stayed within that box, and were more and more robust

6 in that bombing not just when our pilots were illuminated, but

7 when we felt that there was danger from ground-to-air attacks.

8 So I think we really did bomb and do that job well, and they

9 are continuing to do it now.

10 I must say that while there were sometimes discussions

11 about a ground option, you point out very accurately the mood

12 is very different after 9/11, and I think that there was no

13 way to do that psychologically, much less do I think

14 physically given what we knew about the numbers that were

15 necessary to do that.

16 I stand down to no one in terms of my characterization of

17 Saddam Hussein in terms of being a danger and an evil. And I

18 think the question is what is the best way to handle it. I do

19 think that the continued bombing is the way to do it. And as

20 I suggested in my testimony, if we know or have suspicions

21 that some facility is actually in the process of doing

22 something with weapons of mass destruction, I think we have

23 the authority to just go and do the bombing. So I think that

24 we need to continue this robust keeping him in a box until we

25 are ready with all the plans that we need to have some other

60

1 aspect if it cannot be handled in some other way.

2 May I just make one other point? The inspection issue is
3 a dreadful one because what happened in the course of the
4 years, the original inspection regime became weaker and it did
5 work at the beginning. As I said, the inspectors managed to
6 get rid of more weapons of mass destruction than the war
7 itself. But ultimately there were changes in the modalities,
8 and I do think that the deal that Kofi Annan made in '98 was a
9 problem in terms of inspectors had to be accompanied by
10 diplomats and all that. But even that has not been enforced.
11 So we need to get back to an intrusive and overall inspection
12 regime, not the modalities that we have had in the past.

13 Senator Hagel: Mr. Chairman, may I ask if Secretary
14 Kissinger had any response to that, we would welcome his
15 response?

16 Secretary Kissinger: I think the conditions after
17 September 11th produced the current situation. I understand
18 why ~~before September 11th~~ it was ~~deemed~~ ~~judged~~ not to be desirable,
19 but ~~sooner or later, we~~ would have faced this problem. Sooner
20 or later, the problem of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
21 would have had to be faced, but I generally sympathize with
22 the answer that Madeleine has given.

23 Senator Hagel: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 The Chairman: Senator Wellstone.

25 Senator Wellstone: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, I

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1 have been listening and I have a bunch of questions prepared

2 by staff, but I am going to try to go with our discussion and

3 try to ask some questions based upon what is on my mind.

4 I think it was Senator Hagel who said that there is no

5 disagreement about Saddam Hussein. Nobody I know wants to

6 just put him in parentheses and say we will get back to

7 thinking about this in 3 to 5 years from now. I do not know

8 anybody who has taken that position at all.

9 A couple of observations and one question. Senator

10 Sarbanes asked Dr. Kissinger, is there a path to peace? Dr.

11 Kissinger said, I do not know but certainly we ought to play

12 it out. I want to emphasize that again. It seems to me that,

13 although Secretary of State Albright is correct that this has

14 not worked so far, it is simply not true that you cannot

15 design an international arms inspection regime that could work

16 and that insists on unfettered access and that gets whatever

17 weapons of mass destruction there are out. It seems to me we

18 would want to, first of all, pursue that with all vigor before

19 we talk about doing to war. It seems to me the military

20 option would be the last option.

21 My question is when I hear you all say what happens

22 afterward, we win militarily but then we are there -- and then

23 I have heard I think both of you say we do not want to be

24 doing this alone. That is for sure. Then I heard Secretary

25 Albright say I have got some real concerns about this war

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1 against terrorism and al Qaeda and I want to make sure this

2 does not undercut our efforts in South Asia and the Near East

3 where we need the assets on the ground and we need the
4 cooperation. And then I think about the Israeli/Palestinian

5 conflict.

6 It would seem to me that there would be a world of
7 difference in terms of both what our men and women face if we
8 have to go in, God forbid, in terms of what the reaction in
9 the Near East and South Asia and throughout the world would
10 be, much less who is going to do the occupying afterwards. It
11 would make a huge difference whether we did this with the
12 international community or we did it alone. Do you think
13 there are some major differences here in terms of all of the
14 consequences? Because the resolution calls for preemptive,
15 unilateral military action. That is what we are voting on.

16 Do you think there is a difference in terms of the
17 consequences on all three fronts between our doing it alone
18 versus if we have to? And I still believe that the arms
19 inspection regime ought to be given the first priority. That
20 if we have to, that we do it internationally would make a huge
21 difference or not?

22 Secretary Albright: Well, I happen to believe it makes a
23 huge difference to do it internationally, and the first Gulf
24 War was done internationally. That was a huge difference to
25 have that coalition, and the first President Bush worked that

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1 very well. I admire what was done, and there is great

2 continuity where we picked it up in '93 from there. So I do

3 think that it is very important to do it internationally. It

4 would make a huge difference.

5 If it is impossible and if we are given better

6 information than at least I believe we have on how rapidly

7 this has to be done, I think that we then owe it to our people

8 to take action. But all that is missing. Those are the

9 missing pieces.

10 And I must say that I think this is a remarkable

11 discussion. I think the fact that we are able to have these

12 kinds of discussions is what the American people need to hear

13 because this is going to be long-term and expensive. There

14 are a lot of priorities that we will have to set aside because

15 of this. I am very concerned not just about a unilateral

16 foreign policy but a unidimensional foreign policy. We will

17 suffer for that in the long run.

18 Senator Wellstone: Dr. Kissinger.

19 Secretary Kissinger: When we look back at the first Gulf

20 War, it is important to understand its structure. It is indeed

21 correct that the first President Bush achieved an

22 international consensus. It is also true that he moved some

23 400,000 American troops into the region before there was an

24 international consensus, and it was clear that we could not

25 march in and march out and that the implication of his conduct

64

1 was that, if we did not achieve ~~an~~ international consensus, we

2 would operate with those nations that would support us. I

3 believe that one reason ~~that~~ he received as much support as he

4 did was that ~~this~~ was ~~the~~ way by which other nations could

5 influence our actions and participate in it. So ~~that~~ in

6 principle, the difference is not so great in the methods of

7 the Bush family ~~in~~ the Gulf ~~with~~ which, I must say, I agree.

8 Secondly, in conducting these discussions, we have to

9 keep in mind that we seem to agree that ~~we~~ are talking about

10 timing ~~here~~ is We are not talking about the principle. One has

11 to take care ~~that~~ these discussions ~~of~~ what might happen ~~and~~

12 ~~of~~ the inspection system ~~is~~ not used for endless

13 procrastination. On the other hand, we have to be serious in

14 conducting them.

15 Senator Wellstone: Well, if I could say to me the two

16 issues that I feel like are staring me in the face -- and I

17 appreciate the answer of both of you -- are, one, as a matter

18 of public policy, are we not going to make it the first

19 priority to try to put into effect an arms inspection regime

20 that will work, unfettered access, and will insist that these

21 weapons of mass destruction are out? Is that the first

22 priority or not? I think some, frankly, do not think it is.

23 They have other priorities. And some think it is.

24 The second point I would make is it seems to me that we

25 are in an odd position right now because, on the one hand, we

65

1 are saying to the United Nations we want your support. On the
2 other hand, we are asked to vote on a resolution that gives
3 the United Nations the back of the hand and says regardless of
4 what you do, we are going in. And if we go in unilaterally, I
5 would just say to the Chairman again, I think that the
6 consequences throughout the Near East and South Asia, the
7 consequences in the world that we live in, and the
8 consequences for our men and women that are there in Iraq
9 could be very serious.

10 I think we need to pay very special attention to that,
11 the difference between unilateral, going alone, and having the
12 support of the international community. If it requires more
13 diplomatic heavy lifting, we ought to at least make every
14 effort to do that first. That would be my plea here today.

15 Secretary Kissinger: I think we one looks at the
taking place discussion in the Security Council, it is interesting that
16 none of the permanent members has threatened a veto, and they
17 know that, by abstaining, if that is what they are going to do,
18 they will make possible a resolution that will support our
19 action, Assuming we can achieve nine votes. Britain will
20 clearly be for us. And I am not sure that France will
21 abstain. But it is not necessary now to speculate about what
22 the or may not
do in a final vote.

23 individual countries may do in a final vote.
24 Secondly, as I pointed out before, I am convinced that if
25 military action is taken, we will not act alone, that there

66

1. will be significant countries supporting the United States.

2. So it is not in absolute terms, and one always has to keep

3. focus on what is the alternative? Therefore, we all seem to

4. agree that we cannot acquiesce in the growth of weapons of

5. mass destruction in Iraq. So we are talking about means for

6. dealing with that problem.

7. The Chairman: Senator Allen.

8. Senator Allen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you

9. both, our esteemed witnesses, today for your insights and comments.

11. I think I speak for everyone on this committee that no one cares to risk lives unnecessarily of the men and women in uniform. We do not want war. It is not in our interest.

14. However, when you think of the priorities and you say, gosh, there are a lot of different concerns and priorities, the top responsibility of the Federal Government is national security.

17. Unfortunately, we only have a theoretical unimpeded path to disarming Saddam Hussein.

19. I would say to Secretary Albright that we have had briefings and some of these briefings that we have had were of a highly classified nature and we cannot necessarily publicly state every bit of intelligence, very credible intelligence, about the capabilities that Saddam has as far as chemical, biological weapons and also the means of delivering those. One can be in a box and still deliver outside that box. Or

67

1 also the concerns that he may transfer some of that capability
2 to terrorists.

3 I know, Madam Secretary, you were Secretary of State in
4 1998, and I do not mean to get into legalistic matters. But
5 in 1998, the Senate passed S.Con.Res. 71 and read all the
6 whereases and the resolved clauses which in many ways this
7 resolution is a furtherance of it, in fact, entitled a
8 furtherance of this 1998 resolution. As Secretary of State,
9 did you support this resolution which urged the President to
10 take all necessary and appropriate actions to respond to the
11 threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its weapons of mass
12 destruction programs?

13 Secretary Albright: First of all, we did want them to
14 end everything in terms of their weapons of mass destruction.
15 But the terms of that resolution were somewhat different.
16 They were more narrow in terms of the scope for the President.
17 My reading of it here is that it was to bring Iraq into
18 compliance with its international obligations.

19 I think part of the problem with the current resolution
20 -- and again, I do not think it is up to me as a private
21 citizen to even begin to think about how you draft that last
22 paragraph, but I think what is troubling to me as a private
23 citizen is it sounds very much like a carte blanche to do
24 things within the entire region. I think that is one of the
25 questions and how much impact and activity the Congress wants

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1 to have in this.

2 I worked for Senator Muskie, so I understand the role of
3 Congress in foreign policy, and I respected it as Secretary of
4 State. I think here, as Senator Lugar suggested, part of the
5 difference in this resolution is that it needs to have more of
6 a reporting role in some way. So that is the difference.

7 The resolution that we had in '98 was more limited, and I
8 did support it.

9 Senator Allen: I would say, Mr. Chairman, that you made
10 some comments having to do with almost a sense of the Senate
11 which make, I think, a great deal of sense logistically and
12 diplomatically in that we would encourage more allies to be
13 with us. I do think the Bush administration -- we will hear
14 from the Secretary of State this afternoon -- is making
15 efforts in the United Nations and also, obviously, with our
16 NATO allies and others who are not NATO members, other
17 countries in the Middle East, which I think is very important.
18 Logistically in the unfortunate event that military action is
19 needed, you want allies, if nothing else, for some of the
20 bases for the tactical air strikes. And then obviously in
21 making sure any conflagration stays in Iraq and we do not end
22 up having Saddam, as he has done in the past, try to get
23 Israel into this and make this into religious wars.

24 I would say, Mr. Chairman, that those sort of
25 constructive additions to whereas clauses in here would make

69

1 sense, but I would ask Secretary Albright. Since the

2 statement back in 1998 urging the President to take all

3 necessary and appropriate actions, which is pretty broad, to

4 respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its

5 weapons of mass destruction programs, have you seen anything,

6 Madam Secretary, in the subsequent 4 years to lead you to

7 believe he has not gotten stronger in his stockpiles and

8 capabilities, whether in delivery systems or in the bio or the

9 chemical weapons programs?

10 Secretary Albright: Again, I think it is very hard to

11 tell. I have had a briefing also, and I think that he has

12 probably gotten weaker in terms of some of the conventional

13 aspects that he has. And we do not know enough about what has

14 happened in the others, but it is of concern. I in no way am

15 underestimating the concern that we should have, and we were

16 concerned and continue to be concerned. I think the question

17 is whether an all-out invasion of some kind is the right

18 approach to take at this time.

19 I also believe, Senator, that one of the strengths that

20 we have had in all of this is a continuity and in many ways

21 bipartisanship as far as the policy towards Iraq is concerned.

22 We were handed Saddam Hussein in 1993 with a set of

23 resolutions that we worked very hard to get international

24 support for. I hope very much that we continue to see this in

25 a bipartisan way. The way this question is asked is a little

70

1 bit as to what we did and when, and I just think that we have
2 all been on this really difficult road of trying to deal with
3 what I call Migraine Hussein. I mean, he has really been
4 there throughout, and I think we are looking for the best
5 methods to make sure that he stays in a box that does not
6 explode and make the Middle East more complicated than it
7 already is.

8 Senator Allen: Madam Secretary, I just wanted to see if
9 there is consistency of thought and so forth since 1998.

10 I would ask Secretary Kissinger. You mentioned if not
11 now, why not now. It reminds me of Ronald Reagan's statement
12 about if not now, when. If not the United States, then who is
13 going to disarm Saddam Hussein for his clear violations. We
14 do need to have our allies.

15 Do you feel that if the United Nations does not act, that
16 we still should act with as many allies as possible in the
17 event the military action is necessary?

18 Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I do because if we do not, we
19 will face a worse problem a year or 2 or 3 from now.

20 Senator Allen: Thank you. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

21 Senator Sarbanes: Mr. Chairman, could I ask Senator
22 Allen, when he quoted whatever it was he quoted to Secretary
23 Albright, what was he quoting from?

24 Senator Allen: I was quoting from S.Con.Resolution 71,
25 which was a resolution passed in 1998 condemning Iraq's threat

71

1 to international peace and security. This was the second

2 resolved point.

3 Senator Sarbanes: Did that pass?

4 Senator Allen: I asked the Secretary if she supported it

5 and she said she did.

6 Secretary Albright: If I might ask. I was thinking we

7 were talking about what happened August 14th, 1998, which

8 became public law.

9 Senator Sarbanes: That is not this resolution. This
10 resolution did not pass, and the resolution that passed on
11 August 14th and the public law that passed on October 31 were
12 both more narrowly drawn. The public law on October 31 said
13 at the end: nothing in this act shall be construed to
14 authorize or otherwise speak to the issue of United States
15 armed forces except as provided in section 4(a)(2) in carrying
16 out this act. And 4(a)(2) talked about draw-down of military
17 defense articles for the Iraqi opposition.

18 And the other one, Public Law 105-235 at the end said
19 that the President is urged to take appropriate action in
20 accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the
21 United States, which of course includes, amongst other things,
22 the War Powers Act, and that was very carefully worked out in
23 the Congress.

24 And my understanding -- and if I am wrong, I certainly
25 want to be corrected -- is that the resolution from which the

72

1 Senator is quoting in fact was not passed by the Congress.

2 Senator Allen: I would say, Mr. Chairman, to my good

3 friend from Maryland I wanted to ask what her position was on

4 this resolution. This resolution, I would say to my friend

5 from Maryland, Senator Sarbanes, was sponsored by the

6 following Senators who are still here and it had bipartisan

7 support: Mr. Daschle, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Dodd, Kerry, Moynihan,

8 Byrd, Wyden, Hollings, and Akaka, as well as others on our

9 side of the aisle.

10 Senator Sarbanes: It did not have Senator Biden or me

11 cosponsoring it or a number of others. In fact, it did not

12 have Senator Lugar. I am looking at this thing. When the

13 thing was finally worked out, there was much more narrow and

14 careful language. That is the only point I am making.

15 And I do not know why the Secretary -- I mean, I am

16 laying this out because I think the Secretary was put in the

17 position of, in effect -- the premise that was given to her

18 was that this was passed by the Congress, presumably

19 acquiesced in by the administration. The language you quoted

20 was not passed by the Congress. I have the language that was

21 passed by the Congress. In both instances, the relevant

22 paragraphs are far more narrow and pointed than what you

23 quoted to the Secretary, which was an open-ended thing. The

24 fact that some people went on it when it was introduced --

25 that was not the end product.

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1 Senator Allen: Nevertheless, I would say, Mr. Chairman,
2 that it was the sentiments of those bipartisan leaders in it.

3 I think we can all stipulate that matters in Iraq have not
4 gotten less dire since 1998 when this concern was actually
5 addressed by the Senate and with Secretary Albright as
6 Secretary of State.

7 Senator Sarbanes: Oh, I am not addressing that issue.
8 Maybe it is getting more dire, maybe it is not. I am just
9 addressing the issue that you put a question to the Secretary,
10 the premise of which was that that language had been adopted
11 by the Congress, and that is not the case.

12 Secretary Albright: Senator Sarbanes, I appreciate very
13 much the clarification because the language that I have here
14 that I was responding to was out of Public Law 105-235 that
15 does, in fact, have the final paragraph from which I quoted in
16 responding to your question.

17 Senator Sarbanes: It says any action should be in
18 accordance with the Constitution and relevant laws of the
19 United States. Is that correct?

20 Secretary Albright: Right, and to bring Iraq into
21 compliance with its international obligations, not the broad
22 language that is in the resolution that has been proposed by
23 the administration that, as I said, gives carte blanche to the
24 administration to do what it wants in the Middle East. I
25 disagree with that, and I hope very much that that will, in

(N)

74

1 the course of this, be redrafted.

2 But to the point, Senator Allen, I think that we have
3 all, over the years, tried to figure out how to deal with the
4 horror of Saddam Hussein and the mood in the country is
5 different at different times. I am very proud of what we
6 tried to do to keep him in his box.

7 Senator Allen: Well, as we develop this resolution and
8 fine tune it, if it needs fine tuning, the draft resolution --
9 and any legislative branch is naturally going to change
10 something. That is just the nature of a legislative branch of
11 the government. But it does say the President is
12 authorized to use the means he determines to be appropriate,
13 including to enforce the United Nations Security Council
14 resolutions that are referenced above in the whereas clauses.

15 But I do think that the Chairman does have some good
16 ideas that I would like to work with him on insofar as the
17 encouragement of having allies join with us.

18 The Chairman: I do not want to take up Senator Boxer's
19 time. She has been so patient.

20 But I was involved in that negotiation. I will not
21 characterize anybody else. I will speak for myself. The
22 reason why I felt comfortable in voting for the amended
23 resolution was the addition of the paragraphs that said the
24 government of Iraq is in material and unacceptable breach of
25 international obligations. Therefore, the President is urged

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75

1 to take appropriate action in accordance with the Constitution
2 and relevant laws of the United States.

3 The other one that we talked about, Public Law 105-338 on
4 October 31st, added the section which I may be mistaken but I
5 think I was in the room and helped draft, which was section 8,
6 rule of construction, which says, nothing in this act shall be
7 construed to authorize or otherwise speak to the issue of
8 United States armed forces except as provided in section
9 4(a)(2) in carrying out this act. And that was giving aid and
10 assistance.

11 Senator Sarbanes: To the opposition.

12 The Chairman: To the opposition.

13 Again, this is not a matter of argument. At least I am
14 not trying. Hopefully we can do what we have always done with
15 these resolutions, whether they have been sent up -- this was
16 not sent up by the administration -- but resolutions sent up
17 by the administration, going all the way back to the Gulf War
18 or as recently as 9/11. And that is, when we have got cooler
19 heads, we sit down. We have worked through it.

20 Administrations have cooperated. We have ended up with
21 something we could all live with that gave the President the
22 necessary authority needed to meet the limited objective he
23 stated. Hopefully that process is still underway and we will
24 be able to do that. I am anxious to work with the Senator to
25 incorporate, to the degree he agrees with Senator Lugar or me

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1 or anyone else, additional language.

2 But let me yield and apologize to the Senator from

3 California and blame the Senator from Maryland.

4 [Laughter.]

5 Senator Boxer: I think the Senator from Maryland is
6 right, these points are important. I cannot thank both of you
7 enough, because you have helped me cement my views, and I want
8 to tell you why. During yesterday's hearing with
9 Mr. McFarlane and Ambassador Holbrooke I spoke about how I
10 voted for force twice recently, once against Milosevic in your
11 day, Madam Secretary, and once after 9/11 under the current
12 administration, and I also spoke about my belief, very strong
13 belief in my whole life that the use of force should be a last
14 resort, and that I believe every President has an obligation
15 to lay out a path for peace before taking us to war.

16 In my view, I have not seen this President do that yet,
17 and in the view of my constituents, thousands of whom are
18 calling me -- it is unbelievable, every 2 days, we get 1,000
19 calls or e-mails They are saying they feel the President is
20 itching to go to war, and to put in a nicer way, a phrase that
21 Secretary Albright used, not pertaining to the President in
22 her opinion, but she said some in the administration have an
23 irrational exuberance for war, and I think that does speak for
24 a lot of my constituents.

25 Well, I want to thank you in particular, Secretary

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1 Albright, because you did for me something that I have not

2 heard yet before today from someone at your level. You have

3 laid out a path for peace, and I believe your statement was a

4 breath of fresh air in the drumbeat of war.

5 I also would say to Dr. Kissinger, for one brief, shining

6 moment in answer to Senator Sarbanes, I think you laid out a

7 path for peace, a little bit more skeptically than Secretary

8 Albright, but nonetheless, it was there, and I can tell you

9 that I take pleasure in small victories as this debate moves

10 forward. For the first time, I have seen experts lay out a

11 path to avoid bloodshed, and I understand it is not an easy

12 path. I understand it might not work. I understand it will

13 take a strong, intrusive, unfettered inspection regime,

14 followed by dismantlement of anything found.

15 I personally demand that Iraq live up to the U.N.

16 resolutions, particularly regarding inspection and

17 dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction. They agreed to

18 it. They must live up to it, and the world must ensure that,

19 not just our Nation, because if it is just our Nation, I am

20 very worried, as the Senator from the largest State in the

21 Nation, about the risks and the cost borne by our people. The

22 world must step up to the plate, and I think the world will if

23 we do this right.

24 Yesterday, Senator Danny Inouye took to the floor. Danny

25 Inouye is a war hero. He has more medals than, I do not know,

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1 probably anyone that I know.

2 The Chairman: Including the Medal of Honor.

3 Senator Boxer: Including the Medal of Honor, and I want
to tell you what he said. He said, there are those who plan
4 war and there are those who fight war, and as we sit here
5 talking about post war regime in Iraq, as we sit and plan for
6 that, I want us to think for a moment the path we are taking
7 if we do not follow the path for peace that I heard outlined
8 here today, and I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman,
9 at this time to introduce into the record an article in
10 today's USAToday.

12 It is entitled, In Iraq's Arsenal, Nature's Deadliest
13 Poison. Botulinum toxin might be the most diabolical of
14 Saddam's terror tools, but the U.S. is far from ready to
15 protect its troops. I would like to put that in the record.

16 The Chairman: Without objection.

17 [The information referred to follows:]

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

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1 Senator Boxer: I think sometimes we are not paying
2 enough attention to this, at least in my opinion.

3 I want to say that I listened to Condoleezza Rice with
4 great interest, and I spoke to the Chairman about this, and
5 maybe I could get his attention on what Condoleezza Rice said
6 today about the presence of Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Madeleine
7 Albright, Secretary Albright, you referred to this, and to me
8 it was very interesting.

9 It seems a whole new line is developing here as a
10 rationale, and since she raised the question, which we have
11 been briefed on but none of us really raised it, I want to say
12 today what I believe to be the case. I believe there may be
13 some Al Qaeda there. I also believe, in my opinion, from what
14 I know, there is more Al Qaeda in Pakistan. There is more Al
15 Qaeda in Africa, and there is more Al Qaeda in the United
16 States of America itself, in this Nation, and so those of my
17 colleagues who bring up not taking our eye off the ball in the
18 war against terrorism, and to you, Madam Secretary, for
19 mentioning that, I think that is very important.

20 To me, the issue in Iraq is simple. Weapons of mass
21 destruction have got to be inspected. We have got to find
22 them if they are there. We have got to get them dismantled.
23 But all these other issues, I think, added now are very
24 interesting, and go to some of the cynicism that I hear among
25 my constituents, and I want to put that point out there.

(Y)

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1 I have a question, believe it or not, that deals with the
2 Carnegie Foundation. The Carnegie Endowment for International
3 Peace released a study called, quote, Iraq, a new approach,
4 unquote, which advocates a policy of U.N.-sanctioned, coerced
5 inspections. This plan envisions that an armed inspection
6 implementation force would be added to support international
7 inspectors. I wonder if either of you have read this report,
8 or have a feeling about it, because as I search for a path to
9 peace, it is through the inspection regime, but I want to make
10 sure it is a strong inspection regime, and I think that the
11 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace may have come up
12 with some idea that we can seize on and develop and I wonder
13 if you, Secretary Albright, and then Secretary Kissinger,
14 could respond.

15 Ms. Albright: Secretary Boxer, I think that -- I have
16 not read the report. I have read about it, and I do find it
17 an interesting concept, because part of the issue is how to
18 try to get intrusive inspections that actually have some teeth
19 to them, and while I think there probably are some technical
20 difficulties to it, I think it is certainly worth exploring.

21 If I might also say, I know this is not an easy subject
22 to bring up, but I do not think it would hurt if we considered
23 the fact that Saddam Hussein is a war criminal, and the War
24 Crimes Tribunal made a big difference when we were dealing
25 with Milosevic, and I think this is something we might also

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1 think about.

2 Senator Boxer: Actually, that was my next question. My

3 time has run out, but I will put it in the record and hope

4 that you can respond to it. I would greatly appreciate it.

5 The Chairman: Madam Secretary, I proposed that 5 months

6 ago. He should be declared a war criminal.

7 Senator Boxer: Can we hear from Dr. Kissinger?

8 Dr. Kissinger: I do not agree with the statements that

9 have been heard around here about the irrational exuberance of
10 the administration towards war. The administration is facing a
11 the problem on which we all agree: the existence of weapons of
12 mass destruction. They are facing the problem that if we
13 SE WEAPONS WILL ONLY BE ACQUISITED IN THAT NOW, THEY WILL CONTINUE TO GROW. WE WILL
14 face the same problem a year or 2 or 3 from now. AND

15 The President went to the United Nations and put the case
16 to the United Nations, and therefore started the process.
17 which I am confident he will let run to a reasonable
18 conclusion. We have all agreed here that we are talking about
19 months and not years, so the difference in regard to all of
20 this is relatively small.

21 Now, with respect to that inspection system, I have
22 talked to General Boyd, who was one of the drafters, and I
23 have read the report, and I put a sentence in my statement
24 about a stand-by force and a stand-by authority when I
25 discussed the general requirement for inspection, so I think

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1 it is a useful idea, and if an inspection system were to be

2 worked out, that would be a possible element in it.

3 The only warning I would issue is not to use inspection

4 as a means of avoiding the problem and facing the same issue

5 2, 3, 4 years from now. We should (in good faith) see what can

6 be worked out. I cannot make a big contribution because I do

7 not know enough about it, and I think the administration will

8 do this because, in fact, they will have to answer the

9 question of the inspection system as it goes through the

10 process, but then we will have to face the issue within a

11 limited period of time or action, if that does not prove

12 feasible.

13 Senator Boxer: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 The Chairman: I apologize to the Senator from Rhode

15 Island for this additional intervention, and it will just take

16 a second, but I want to make sure the record is straight. My

17 understanding was, the comment was made earlier on that some

18 within the administration were engaged in irrational

19 exuberance about war. I do not think that was said of the

20 President.

21 The second point is --

22 Senator Boxer: I said that, Mr. Chairman.

23 The Chairman: I know. I just want to make sure what we

24 are talking about here, because we are trying to all -- and

25 the witnesses are incredibly helpful to this degree. We are

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1 trying to work something out here. We are trying to get this
2 cooperatively. We are not looking for disagreement. We are
3 looking for agreement to deal with what we all agree is a bad
guy and a bad situation, meaning Saddam.

5 Part of the reason why I think we are in this dilemma is
6 that as recently as today in the press -- and I can tell you
7 from my personal experience there is still real disagreement
8 within this administration about how to proceed. Now, I know
9 the Secretary of State is going to tell us there is not much,
10 but there is. There has been at least up until today, and so
11 part of our problem relates to whether or not we pick up the
12 paper and read a statement made by, say, Mr. Wolfowitz, as
13 opposed to a statement made by the Secretary of State.
14 Sometimes they are way apart.

15 The President is working his way through, deciding who he
16 agrees with on each of the things, but guaranteed there is a
fundamental difference being presented to the President on
18 these issues.

19 And the second point is, the Senator from Indiana and I
20 had an opportunity to meet with the Russian foreign minister,
21 Mr. Ivanov. We asked about amendments to a new resolution in
22 the Security Council. His initial response to us was, there
23 was no need for one.

24 As we pursued this along the lines of Dr. Kissinger's
25 comments and Secretary Albright's comments, we said the

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1 inspection regime as played out prior to them being removed

2 was not good enough. The point Dr. Kissinger made, we could

3 not interview potential defectors and/or collaborators because

4 Kofi had come along and said, you are allowed to have an

5 Iranian military person standing in the room. That is

6 unacceptable.

7 We also discussed the possibility of the need for a

8 military force to accompany the inspectors, and to that, and I

9 am anxious to hear what the Secretary of State has to say, the

10 foreign minister said he was open to that The Russians were

11 open to that. So I would not be so quick -- and I know

12 neither of the witnesses are suggesting it. I would not be so

13 quick to suggest that Secretary Powell may not be able to pull

14 off something very positive here to get us down this road we

15 all say we want to go down.

16 So I just want to make those two points as it relates to

17 how it is beginning to move, and hopefully, God Willing, and

18 my grandpop used to say, and the crick not rising, we could

19 end up at the end of the day with the same kind of resolution

20 agreement we had as we work through the 1998 resolution with

21 sufficient safeguards built into it.

22 But at any rate -- and Senator, you and the Senator from

23 Florida can take more time than anybody has had on this

24 questioning to ask your questions, because you have been so

25 patient.

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1 Senator Chafee: Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I know we all share the same goals and had a good discussion about that, but one of the areas that does concern me is the international relations that have been, the dynamics that have been created by this initiative and, of course, the elections in Germany are, I guess, on the front burner as to how that became an issue in that country.

8 But one -- and you read the comments from the various international leaders from around the country, whether it is China, Japan, Kuwait, even our friends in Canada, they are all expressing concerns about this, but particularly one of the quotes was from President Mubarak, who is maybe one of the deans in the Arab world, has been there since the early eighties as the leader of his country, and he said just several weeks ago, if you strike Iraq, not one Arab leader will be able to control the angry outburst of the masses.

17 And maybe we should not argue, just for the sake of discussion, about whether he is right or wrong, but supposing he is right, then what happens, and from your experience, maybe you could take us down that path. What countries are most susceptible in the region to the angry outburst of the masses?

23 Jordan, certainly King Abdullah has expressed concerns, and where do we go? Then do we go into Jordan and help him out? Do we go into Saudi Arabia or Egypt to help him out?

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1 Maybe you could go down that path a little bit, if he is

2 right, just for the sake of argument.

3 Ms. Albright: First of all, could I just say I

4 appreciate Chairman Biden straightening out the business about

5 exuberance, because I did not say it about the President or

6 the whole administration, but I do think, as I said earlier,

7 that there are those who had an agenda even before this

8 started, so that concerns me.

9 I think Secretary Kissinger is right when he says that if
10 we go in and do this ultimately there will be some that have
11 said they would have nothing to do with us that will have
12 something to do with us, so I do not dispute that.

13 On the other hand, I do think that we have had many
14 signals from various Arab leaders in the region who are very
15 concerned about what the sparks of this might initiate, and
16 King Abdullah has made that very clear. I think the Saudis,
17 one of the reasons that they have backed off a lot of this is
18 that they are concerned about what happens on their street,
19 and that we do have to be concerned about how, that we find
20 ourselves in the rather peculiar position, if I can put it
21 this way, that we might be opposed to those who disagree with
22 their Governments, but are not necessarily extremists about
23 how this is carried out.

24 So I think again, as people consider what the effect of
25 this will be, we need to hear more from those who have up-to-

87

1 date intelligence as to what the effect of all of this will be

2 in those countries, because there is little doubt in my mind

3 that there will be outpourings of sentiment against what we

4 have done.

5 Dr. Kissinger: I am assuming we will not act unless we

6 believe it is in the overwhelming interest of national and

7 international security. If that is our judgment, it is indeed

8 the judgment of the administration, then it cannot be deterred

9 by the threats of outbursts in the streets, because that will

10 happen and it surely become that will then be a permanent source of blackmail.

11 I also believe that the countries you mentioned have

12 shown a pretty good capacity to control their streets, but we

13 cannot be driven in the fundamental judgment of what is

14 necessary for international order by the fear of

15 demonstrations.

16 The growth of these stockpiles is a serious problem and it

17 must be dealt with. It is addressed to be dealt with through

18 the processes which are now being conducted, but I do not

19 think that the demonstrations are going to be a disastrous

20 element.

21 I also think that the German election was not caused by

22 our policy. There were many elements within German politics

23 that produced this reaction, and it will almost certainly be

24 dealt with, will be resolved in the weeks to come in a

25 cooperative spirit.

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1 Senator Sarbanes: Would the Senator yield on that very

2 point for just a minute?

3 Senator Chafee: Certainly.

4 Senator Sarbanes: I am interested to hear Dr. Kissinger
5 say that, because on January 13 you wrote -- and I would only
6 make this point because earlier in this discussion you said we
7 should not engage in speculation about individual countries,
8 and I wanted to just quote what you said then. Talking about
9 building up this movement against Hussein you said, Britain
10 will not easily abandon the pivotal role, based upon its
11 special relationship with the United States, that it has
12 earned for itself in the evolution of the crisis, nor will
13 Germany move into active opposition to the United States,
14 especially in an election year, end of sentence.

15 Dr. Kissinger: I think All of us who have been concerned
16 with German-American relations were surprised by the fact that
17 an anti-American appeal could evoke such feelings.

18 Senator Sarbanes: But it does underscore, I think, the
19 warning you gave today about the danger of speculating about
20 individual countries.

21 Dr. Kissinger: That is right. I had not understood the
22 degree to which this feeling had evolved, but I think that
23 feeling has deeper causes than reactions to the immediate
24 tactics in this situation.

25 Senator Sarbanes: I thank the Senator.

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1 Senator Chafee: Thank you. I will just follow up a
2 little bit.

3 At a hearing we had earlier this month, I asked one of
4 the witnesses about spontaneous combustion that has happened,
5 and specifically I mentioned Iran, and how we were caught so
6 flat-footed. It just seemed to happen overnight. We did not
7 even get our embassy evacuated, obviously.

8 He responded, the witness responded by saying yes, as a
9 matter of fact, one of the leading scholars in the area wrote
10 a book, Iran Under the Pahlavis, by Professor Lenkowski, if I
11 have pronounced it right, and saying it is the most stable
12 regime in the region -- his book was not a best-seller -- so
13 we have to be aware of that, and when President Mubarak is
14 making these type of statements, no Arab leader will be able
15 to control the outbursts -- let me get it right, the angry
16 outbursts of the masses, I think we have to listen, and if we
17 are going down this road, go down it.

18 And I guess I will ask one more time, if Jordan is, the
19 Arab leader cannot control the outburst of the masses, or
20 Egypt, for the sake of argument, then what do we do?

21 Ms. Albright: Could I, Senator -- I think that -- I hate
22 to, I really do hate to disagree with Henry on this. I think
23 that as we look at what the causes of terrorism are -- I
24 remember, Chairman Biden asked me when I testified sometime
25 ago whether poverty was the cause of terrorism, and I remember

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90

1 saying, we do not know that.

2 We do know that there are people who are looking for

3 reasons to be opposed to us that are part of societies that

4 are dysfunctional, or where there is a great gap between the

5 rich and the poor, or people have no way of knowing what their

6 future will be, that they are out there as potential recruits

7 for terrorism and therefore, if the streets explode, it is not

8 just a matter of controlling them by the monarch or the ruler.

9 It may be impossible, and it may, in fact, create an

10 environment that hurts us in the overall fight against

11 terrorism, and that is my concern.

12 Senator Chafee: I would agree with that.

13 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

14 Dr. Kissinger: One has to go back to the fundamental

15 issue, there are stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction

16 in Iraq, in violation of the U.N. resolution, we are engaged

17 in a diplomatic process to attempt to deal with him. Can we

18 be the first of all, does Mubarak really mean this, and

19 secondly, even if he means it, can we then in the end be

20 deterred from doing what we should do, and leave these weapons

21 undisturbed, and will that not create a worse problem with the

22 streets as time goes on? This is the question that needs to

23 be addressed.

24 Senator Chafee: I know my time is up, but I guess I did

25 not get an answer to the question, what does happen, just for

91

1 the sake of argument? Do we preemptively go into Jordan if

2 there is someone there, but I do not want to take any time.

3 Dr. Kissinger: The word preemptively is being thrown

4 around too loosely in the debate. It has always been

5 understood that if there is a fundamental threat to ~~the~~ national security, ~~us~~ one reserves the option for military

6 action. There have been occasions in the past ~~as~~ when the

7 Jordanian Government was threatened that the United States

8 was willing to give it very substantial support.

9

10 I do not know ~~Nobody would recommend moving American~~ troops into Egypt or Jordan on the basis of riots in the streets. This will have to be dealt with when the issue~~ of preemption, but by an assessment of the national security and international security as it is perceived at that moment. ~~and~~

11 troops into Egypt or Jordan on the basis of riots in the streets. This will have to be dealt with when the issue

12 streets. This will have to be dealt with when the issue

13 ~~arises~~, in a way that is not determined by an abstract theory

14 of preemption, but by an assessment of the national security

15 and international security as it is perceived at that moment.

16 Senator Chafee: Thank you very much.

17 The Chairman: Senator Nelson.

18 Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am intrigued

19 by the declaration of this preemption doctrine. As I read the

20 Constitution, the President in his role as Commander in Chief

21 can act preemptively for the protection of the interest of the

22 United States, so what is different in this declaration of

23 preemption, and if it is an emphasis on it, is there a

24 weakening of the actual constitutional rights of the Commander

25 in Chief?

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Dr. Kissinger: This is a question you should address to administration witnesses. I was traveling. I have only read it on the Internet. I have not had the document in my hand yet, I read it on the Internet but I have read it, I have expressed my general view in my statement and elsewhere I do not believe it is in the American interest to proclaim a universal theory of preemption that any nation can use to protect itself against its definition of a threat.

I believe also that, it would be wise -- I also believe given that the kind of terrorism that now exists, that to deal with it would be that is incompatible with some of the notions of sovereignty, I have as they had evolved in the 17th, 18th, and 19th century, that it would be that have, for govern the rules among nations, so that there is an element of preemption inherent in the nature of the terrorist threat and in the nature of the modern reference.

Therefore think it would be useful to initiate a general international discussion, or Security Council discussion of what principles of preemption could be universally applied so that not every major nation could attack every nation around its periphery, but I have no resolution to this problem, but I think this is as I recall when the statement as I read it, preemption is listed as an absolutely last resort in that document, and primarily aimed at terror, but one really ought to ask the people who drafted it. My view on preemption is the one that I have

93

1 stated.

2 Senator Nelson: Madam Secretary.

3 Ms. Albright: Well, I think that it becomes a very kind
4 of shadowy area in terms of what the right of self-defense is
5 versus the preemption, and I think you raise a very important
6 point, that perhaps it does undermine the whole concept of
7 self-defense if, in fact, you begin now to see it as a new
8 doctrine, and that is what has concerned me, is that all of a
9 sudden -- you know, everybody has been looking for a term for
10 the post cold war era and whether deterrence still works, and
11 these are very important discussions, but I do not think they
12 should be superimposed on what we are trying to deal with now,
13 because it is so unclear, and I agree with Secretary Kissinger
14 that it would be worth having a national as well as an
15 international discussion of this, not in any kind of an overly
16 rapid or hysterical way.

17 Dr. Kissinger: I think In retrospect, though, I did not
18 argue that at the time. It would have been appropriate to
19 take preemptive action against bin Laden in Afghanistan, and
20 as these terrorist cells exist, it cannot be precluded, but
21 what it means in an international system as both a concept and as
22 something that can be more or less universally accepted so
23 that it does not become arbitrary, that is something that we
24 are at the beginning of the problem, not at the solution of
25 it.

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1 Senator Nelson: Mr. Chairman, I have come away from this
2 discussion and others we have had both in this committee and
3 our other committee, the Armed Services Committee, thinking
4 that the draft resolution that was sent to us clearly needs to
5 be changed, that Ambassador Holbrooke had four suggestions of
6 change yesterday that I think were excellent, and I am just
7 curious as to our two witnesses here.

8 One was to delete the clause that would seemingly give
9 carte blanche to go into the whole area, and nail it down just
10 as a resolution as to Iraq, another one was to make reference
11 to a U.N. Security Council resolution, a third would be the
12 executive branch reporting clause to the Congress, and a
13 fourth was a statement, a clause as to the post conflict Iraq,
14 and what would be our responsibilities there.

15 Are we moving in the right direction with such changes to
16 the resolution?

17 Ms. Albright: Well, I do not think that as a private
18 citizen it is absolutely right to give you suggestions on
19 this, but my problem with the resolution that came here is its
20 broadness, and you all have in previous ways worked out a
21 resolution that makes clearer what the co-responsibility of
22 the executive and legislative branch is in this, and as
23 somebody that was in an administration that we always have had
24 discussions about the war powers, I do think that it is up to
25 you all to figure out how to refine this, and it is essential,

95

1 frankly, but I am not sure it is appropriate for me to make

2 suggestions.

3 Senator Nelson: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Dr. Kissinger: I have not studied the resolution enough

5 to make suggestions. As a general proposition, I think the

6 President should be given authority of a nature that makes

7 clear that the Congress understands the relationship of the

8 Iraq issue to other issues in the area, and does not just deal

9 with it or look at it in Iraq terms, and that the President is

10 given adequate flexibility to deal with this as to reporting

11 requirements.

12 Senator Sarbanes: I am not clear on that answer. Is it

13 your view the President should be authorized to take military

14 action with respect to issues in the region, and not just with

15 respect to Iraq?

16 Dr. Kissinger: I am now most concerned about the issue

17 of Iraq. I think the resolution should clearly indicate the

18 relationship of the Iraqi issue to others, though I really have

19 not studied it enough to make drafting suggestions.

20 The Chairman: Senator Brownback.

21 Senator Brownback: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you

22 both very much for being here, and for lasting through this.

23 A couple of quick things. I want to apologize for not

24 being here during a portion of it. There were other hearings

25 I had to be at.

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1 A point that I would like to make is, at least for this
2 Member, if we need to narrow the resolution or add
3 restrictions or reporting requirements to that, I would be
4 open to any of that being done as long as at the end of the
5 day it allows the President the use of force, including
6 military force against Iraq if the administration decides it
7 is necessary to move on forward.

8 So working the wording on this to make it clear that it
9 is not expansive, it cannot be used in other places, I think
10 that is good, and if we can do that and get a large, positive
11 vote for it, because I think that is an important statement to
12 make, that it be a large vote in the Senate for moving forward
13 on this, I think it would be a very positive statement to do.

14 Secretary Kissinger, I wanted to ask you, in looking
15 through your statement about a post Saddam Iraq and the impact
16 on terrorism if we do move forward against Iraq -- and I
17 apologize if this question has been asked in another forum or
18 not while I was not here, but I see a problem if we do not
19 move forward -- and you articulate that some people will ask
20 why now, and you would ask, why not now in your original
21 statement. I can see a lot of difficulty if we move forward,
22 but I see a lot of difficulty if we do not move forward, and I
23 think there is a substantial positive scenario if we do move
24 forward on Iraq, not on the basis of a preemption doctrine,
25 but on the basis of what he has failed to do with U.N.

97

1 resolutions, that we could have a substantial positive impact

2 on the Iraqi people and the war on terrorism if this is done

3 right, and with the right reasoning in place.

4 Dr. Kissinger: That is my view.

5 Senator Brownback: I would like you to articulate, how

6 do you see this impacting the whole region and its war on

7 terrorism if we do move forward with this war on Iraq?

8 Dr. Kissinger: There are many causes for which groups join

9 terrorism, and Madeleine has indicated some of them. I would

10 focus on the toleration by governments of terrorist groups

11 because they are afraid of the consequences of not tolerating

12 them and, secondly, by the perception that in the end the

13 United States and its friends are too weak to defend their

14 fundamental interests.

15 So for all these reasons, I believe that a

16 demonstration that the United States will insist on carrying

17 out the obligations that a country has undertaken in

18 particularly this region, and especially with respect to

19 weapons of mass destruction, will have a positive impact on

20 the war against terrorism.

21 I do not accept the proposition, as I have said, that

22 there is a distinction between the war on terrorism and this

23 the problem. I believe the two are closely related. The war

24 against terrorism must be pursued energetically, and we think

25 our credibility with respect to it will be enhanced if we act

98

1 as I have indicated and, more importantly, as the
2 administration has indicated on the Iraq issue.

3 Senator Brownback: Previously I have worked a lot with
4 the Iraqi National Congress, the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998
5 that Secretary Albright, you worked on its implementation, and
6 with Senator Kerrey of Nebraska, Bob Kerrey, the former
7 Senator. Both of us concluded -- and this is somewhat wishful
8 thinking, but I do not think so, that Iraq will move to
democracy and will be, we would hope and think, clearly very
10 possible in the near future, a strong democracy. It has
11 resources underneath it. It has an educated population. It
12 is not without its difficulties and divisions within the
country, north and south and in the middle, but that this
14 could be a very strong force for democracy once Saddam is
15 removed in that region.

16 Secretary Albright, you would have dealt with that a lot
17 as Secretary, and probably had a lot of chance to think about
18 that recently as well.

19 Ms. Albright: Well, I think it would be much wished, and
20 clearly the population of Iraq is a little bit different in
terms of its modernity and education from some of the other
22 places, but the question that I think we have, and we raised,
23 was, what is the plan to get from here to there, that it will
24 not be simple, that there is not only the potential of
democracy, but also the potential of internecine fighting

99

1 before we get there, and what I have wanted to hear a little

2 bit more from the administration, what is the plan from

3 getting here to there?

4 I am chairman of the board of the National Democratic

5 Institute, that has been working very hard at looking at

6 different ways that democracy might be possible in the Middle

7 East. We have programs in Yemen and Bahrain, and I am not one

8 of those people who believes that it is impossible to have

9 democracy in the Middle East, but I think that we have to get

10 there in a systematic way, and understand how we get there,

11 and I must say that while I have a great deal of respect for

12 those people who try to work with the Iraqi National Congress,

13 it is not a group that I think is quite -- has shown so far

14 that it has the continuity and the cooperation within it to be

15 ready to have democracy.

16 I have talked to the Kurdish leaders. They would so much

17 like to hear us talking about not regime change but a freeing

18 of Iraq, and I think we should be thinking about that, but I

19 think it is a long way between here and there, and that is why

20 we need to see a little bit more how we get there, and what

21 the role of the United States in that will be.

22 Dr. Kissinger: I would say that the choices with respect

23 to the weapons of mass destruction are relatively limited.

24 Our choices after a military operation require us to bring

25 about substantial improvement in conditions in Iraq I

1 would consider it unlikely that one could move ~~to democracy~~ *there to* 100

2 full democracy in a very brief time ~~but~~ I think it is

3 essential to move to ~~its~~ accountability of the Government

4 institutions towards some type of constitutional system, and

5 ~~to a~~ substantial improvement in the lives of the population

6 ~~but~~ We cannot do that ~~alone~~ and it will require an international

7 effort.

8 Senator Brownback: I would certainly agree with that. I

9 just -- I think there is a potential to do something

10 extraordinarily positive for a lot of people and

11 extraordinarily positive for our security here, not without

12 huge risks, substantial risks, but the risks of waiting I have

13 concluded are greater than those of acting now.

14 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 The Chairman: You have been very patient. With your
16 permission, I would like to let Senator Sarbanes -- he says he
17 has another question, and I know you missed your shuttles, two
18 of them here.

19 Senator Sarbanes: Mr. Chairman, I am looking at a
20 dispatch from a Virginia paper reporting on a meeting at the
21 University of Virginia on Tuesday at the Miller Center, at
22 which General Scowcroft and Secretary Eagleburger spoke. They
23 had a crowd of, it says here of over 900 people, and the
24 director of the center says, I do not know of a larger
25 gathering, or an event of this kind in the city in a long

101

1 time.

2 At that event, General Scowcroft said, America cannot

3 fight a global war on terrorism without the active assistance

4 of other nations, and must consider what the consequences of

5 actions taken in Iraq might be for that international

6 cooperation. Saddam is a terrible, evil man, he said, but he

7 is not a problem for us because of terrorism. If we

8 antagonize the world, it could cripple world support for the

9 war on terrorism. We cannot win the war on terrorism without

10 international support.

11 And, of course, earlier, a little over a month ago,

12 General Scowcroft had an article in the Wall Street Journal in

13 which he said, amongst other things, an attack on Iraq now

14 would seriously jeopardize our counterterrorist campaign.

15 Now, Secretary Kissinger, you have argued here this

16 morning just to the contrary. You think an attack on Iraq

17 would help the counterterrorism campaign, but General

18 Scowcroft is very strong on this point. I mean, he argues it

19 with considerable force, so what is your take on this,

20 Secretary Albright?

21 Ms. Albright: Well, I agree with what General Scowcroft

22 has said. That has kind of been my point, is that basically

23 the war on terrorism I think we have been told by the

24 President is our top priority, and I do think that in many

25 ways, either because assets are removed, or because we cannot

102

1 get the kind of cooperation we need from the rest of the
2 international community for pursuing the terrorists, that this
3 in some ways is an additional task that we do not need right
4 now.

5 But I think, Senator, the problem that we are all having
6 in this is that there is nothing that is written in stone in
7 this, that there are answers that are not out there, and we
8 are all, I think, trying to seek them, and my personal opinion
9 is that, as you pointed out earlier, we have not finished in
10 Afghanistan. In fact, far from it.

11 Senator Sarbanes: We may not have finished elsewhere. I
12 was struck by Secretary Kissinger's statement here, and I just
13 alluded to it before, and I want to come back to it. At the
14 bottom of page 1 of your statement, bases for terrorists have
15 been established in several countries, and I am now quoting,
16 usually in areas where the Governments can plausibly deny
17 control, are actually not in control, such as in Yemen,
18 Somalia, or perhaps Indonesia and Iran, close quote.

19 Now, should we not be focused on that specific problem at
20 this time, if these terrorists have established these bases,
21 this infrastructure, a la what they had in Afghanistan,
22 although presumably not as fully developed, should not the
23 immediate focus of our attention be to figure out how to
24 destroy that infrastructure?

25 Dr. Kissinger: General Scowcroft is a long-time

103

1 associate of mine, and friend, for whom I have very high

2 regard. We just have a serious difference of opinion on that

3 subject. I do not believe that the war against these bases is

4 competitive with the need to destroy the weapons of mass

5 destruction in Iraq and T. Indeed, I believe that T. = success,

6 either diplomatic or military, in destroying these weapons of

7 mass destruction will enhance our ability to conduct another

8 war. Scowcroft has a different opinion.

9 Senator Sarbanes: What do you think we should do about
10 these four countries here?

11 Dr. Kissinger: Well, one would have to deal with them,
12 and I dO NOT think there is a general rule. Somalia has no
13 at least.

13 Government, really, no effective Government, and T. thus
14 therefore the

15 question is, what are these places actually doing? Yemen has
16 a Government, but not in every region of the country. With

16 respect to bases from which terrorist attacks are being

17 planned against the United States, or might be planned
18 making them.

18 we cannot exclude, ultimately, the use of military action.

19 Now, obviously, a country like Indonesia is of a
20 that

20 magnitude where this is not something that should be done

21 under
22 except in the most extreme provocation, A, which does not exist

22 right now. It is not even clear whether there are bases, as

23 some people claim, on these islands, so one would have to go
24 this country by country, and depending on the nature of the

24 each
25 threat.

each

104

1 The Chairman: Not that you ever need me to defend you,

2 Dr. Kissinger, but as I listened to Senator Sarbanes and your

3 response, am I missing something, or is there -- it seems to

4 me that your underlying premise is that if and when the

5 President takes action, he is not going to be antagonizing the

6 rest of the world, that he is going to have a sufficient

7 portion of the rest of the world with him. Is that -- I mean,

8 because I think everybody agrees --

9 Dr. Kissinger: That is my underlying premise.

10 The Chairman: Again, though there is a disagreement, one

11 of the things that I find the most difficult as I try to go

12 through this --

13 Dr. Kissinger: It depends upon how you define the rest

14 of the world, but as a general principle, if you take all the

15 major countries and all the other countries, I do not

16 believe --

17 Senator Sarbanes: What is your analysis if it is done

18 unilaterally?

19 The Chairman: In other words --

20 Senator Sarbanes: What is your analysis if it is done

21 unilaterally, American military action unilaterally?

22 Dr. Kissinger: I do not believe it will happen.

23 Senator Sarbanes: But we have to reason this through, do

24 we not?

25 Dr. Kissinger: But I am convinced that --

105

1 Senator Sarbanes: Would you condition the President's
2 ability to act on the premise that it not be unilateral?

3 Dr. Kissinger: I think we pay a higher price if we act
4 unilaterally, but I would have enough confidence in the
5 President, if he does act, that I think that I would assume
6 that it will have been necessary.

7 Senator Sarbanes: Well, the rhetoric that has been used
8 it seems is moving us increasingly to the position where we do
9 not have options. If they do not act, then we say, aha, he
10 did not act. He said he was going to act, unilaterally or
11 not, and he did not do it.

12 The Chairman: Well, if I can, you have been here 3 hours
13 You have been incredible. I just want to conclude by,
14 a) thanking you, but b), also pointing out what I think is a
15 fair statement, I hope is a fair statement, and that is that,
16 as it relates to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as policymakers writ
17 large, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
18 Defense, they are never going to have more than 75 percent of
19 the facts they need to know to be certain.

20 There is no place we reach the point where there is
21 certainty, so where we peel off among us is the degree to
22 which it seems to me -- it is not observation, but the degree
23 to which we think certain things are going to fall into place.
24 I happen to agree with Dr. Kissinger on this point. I cannot
25 fathom the President going alone. I just cannot fathom the

106

1 President going alone.

2 If I am wrong about that -- and I am going to end up

3 having to take a chance here when I vote. If I am wrong about

4 that, I have made a tragic mistake, because he would be making

5 a tragic mistake if he went alone, but that comes down to a

6 little bit of faith here. I mean, it comes down to the point

7 where, at least for me, what I do not know I have to look at,

8 and based on my personal conversations, public conversations,

9 I have to take a chance. We all do at some point. We are not

10 going to get all the facts here.

11 One point I would make, though, and I publicly urge the

12 President, he made a very compelling case to the United

13 Nations as to why Iraq has violated the United Nations

14 standards. That is a different case than the case to the

15 American people of what he is asking the American people to be

16 prepared to do.

17 I will end where I began this hearing. I am absolutely

18 convinced that no matter how well-formulated a foreign policy,

19 it cannot be sustained without the informed consent of the

20 American people, and at this moment we do not have that

21 informed consent.

22 You go home -- and I will just read from today's paper,

23 the Washington Times. It says, an increasing number of

24 Republican lawmakers are saying that President Bush has not

25 made a convincing case of using force against Iraq, although

107

1 they expect the Congress to overwhelmingly approve a

2 resolution authorizing military force.

3 Representative Michael N. Castle of Delaware, a very

4 good, personal friend, said the same thing I have been saying

5 at home, and what I have been hearing at home. He said that

6 the administration lobbying job on Capitol Hill has been so

7 dismal that the best arguments by far thus far have been made

8 by Tony Blair. He goes on to say, there is almost no

9 discussion with the administration, said Mr. Castle, a member

10 of the House Intelligence Committee.

11 I do not know if we are all glued to the Sunday talk

12 shows, but we are not. Most of us have questions. Members of

13 Congress are not getting the information. Quote, no

14 Republican mentioned the public disagreements among the

15 Democrats. I am looking for more information, said

16 Representative Ray La Hood of Illinois, a Republican member of

17 the Intelligence Committee. You go on and on.

18 Now, that does not mean the case is not there. That does

19 not mean the case is not there. I have the advantage or

20 disadvantage of having access to, on a regular basis, the

21 Secretary of State, the President because of this job, but I

22 really think it is very important, very important that the

23 case be made in more detail, and not confuse having made the

24 case of a violation of U.N. resolutions as being synonymous

25 with having made the case to the American people that we may

108

1 be asking them -- not only, as my friend from Kansas says,

2 taking a chance here, we have to be prepared. Are we

3 prepared?

4 For example, we had testimony in our second set of

5 hearings from a retired executive director, Colonel Scott

6 Feil, F-e-i-l, whose job was after-conflict resolution

7 questions and what we do. He says, the requirements are

8 providing a core security for the largest city, about 10

9 million in population, in the largest State, which is about 40

10 percent of the population, and humanitarian efforts, securing

11 WMD and associated facilities, patrolling the Iranian border

12 areas, the Kurdish areas, protecting the Shat-el-Arab oil

13 fields, monitoring the region from the Tigris to the

14 Euphrates, and Syrian border -- the Tigris and the Euphrates

15 contain the bulk of the population -- and then conducting the

16 integrated disarmament and demobilization process is

17 coordinated with the integrated efforts.

18 He goes on to say, the total cost of this force, once

19 again based on U.S. equivalence -- there is wide variation in

20 the country -- could range up to $16 billion and a force of

21 75,000 to operate within Iraq.

22 Now, it may not be 75,000, but I will conclude by saying,

23 in my last meeting with the President, along with 10 other,

24 quote, congressional leaders, the President turned to me in

25 the presence of everyone, as he asked other people, and he

109

1 said, Mr. Chairman, what do you think, and I said,

2 Mr. President, I will be with you as long as you make a clear

3 case to the American people, including telling them we are

4 going to have to be there for a while, we are going to have to

5 put American forces on the ground there for a while, and it

6 could cost a lot of money. His response was, I will do that.

7 That has not been done yet.

8 Senator Brownback: Mr. Chairman, you are very thorough.

9 Would you mind if I make just a quick comment on this regard,
10 because I think you have got quite a valid point. I mentioned

11 to other people the calls into my office, many are running

12 against this, even though polling numbers say they are for it.

13 What the President did at the U.N. was, he spoke at the
14 U.N., and I did not hear new information come forward, but he

15 recited, here is the case. I think we should have the

16 President up to a joint session of the Congress and have him

17 say, here is the case, and here is what we will do, because

18 what the U.N. did, and what the President took advantage of

19 there was to say, okay, you want me to go to the U.N., I will

20 go to the U.N. Here is my case, and when you put it all

21 together, it stacks up that Saddam has made a great case

22 against himself. He is the one who has made the case.

23 I think if the President will come up to a joint session

24 of Congress, address the Congress and the American people

25 similarly, here is the case, and that you will cumulatively

(N)

110

1 see, in the private briefings we have, and the public hearings

2 we have had, an extraordinary condemnation, but it does need

3 to be laid out collectively to the American public, because

4 you are right, no policy of ours, if it is to engage a war

5 effort in this country, can be sustained without the sustained

6 support of the American people, and I think that would be an

7 important thing for the President to do and for us to engage.

8 The Chairman: I am making that point, and I appreciate

9 the witnesses sticking around for our intramural discussion

10 here, but I am making an additional point, an additional point

11 not merely what the threat is, which is critically important,

12 but what we are going to ask of the American people to meet

13 the threat. I think they are prepared, but we have to tell

14 them.

15 What I worry about after being here 30 years, I do not

16 want to go through a process where we engage, we succeed on

17 the military front, we lose some or many American forces in

18 the process, but we will succeed and then find 18 months from

19 now we do not have the same people who called for going to war

20 refusing in the budget price to say, I am going to vote for an

21 extra $30 billion for Iraq this year, instead of -- which will

22 have to be made, instead of a tax cut, or prescription drugs,

23 or for whatever it is, because those are the choices we are

24 going to have to make.

25 And I watched in Afghanistan, Mr. and Mrs. Secretary, I

111

1 asked, I sat with the President for literally hours, over

2 3 hours on this. The President said, we need a mini Marshall

3 Plan. The President said, we need to have forces there to

4 provide security. The President said, this was along term

5 obligation. The President said, we are in the there for the

6 long haul. We cannot get the House and we cannot get some of

7 our colleagues to vote the money we need there.

8 Now, I do not want to be around when my son, who just got

9 back from Kosovo, or his friends are sitting in the middle of

10 Baghdad and the United States Senate says, well, wait a

11 minute, you did not tell me that we had to vote for an extra

12 10, 20, 30, $40 billion to finish this job. I want everybody

13 on the line.

14 My father, who died 2 weeks ago, used to say, I like to

15 know who is in charge so I know who to hold responsible, and I

16 am prepared to do it, but I do not want to be part of -- I do

17 not want to be part of an outfit that votes to send us to war,

18 or give the President that authority, and then leave him

19 hanging, or be unsure he is willing to come back to us and

20 say, pay the price.

21 I promise you if we go, forget your permanent tax cut.

22 There is not enough money. If we go, forget the idea that we

23 are going to have a massive new health care program. Now,

24 that, I am prepared to make those choices, but let us not kid

25 the American people, because I am not in for a guns and butter

(N)

112

1 routine here. I am not going down that route again.

2 I first met the distinguished Secretary of State when I

3 first got here as a 29-year-old kid, and our first meeting was

4 on the Vietnam War. I am not going to go there again. We

5 have to tell the American people what the likely price is,

6 even though we do not know for certain. It may be a lot less.

7 We will have the present Secretary of State at 2:30. I

8 thank my colleagues. This has been incredibly helpful, and

9 you have been here for over 3 hours. We owe you.

10 [Whereupon, at 1:35 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

17

1 STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY

2 OF STATE, CEO, KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC., NEW YORK, NEW YORK

3 Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, Like Madeleine, I would like to express my pleasure
at being here the recollections I have of many meetings in
this room and the different chairmen and of the issues that deeply
affect our country.

8 Madeleine and I have been friends for decades and we have
discussed these problems between us when we were in office,
when one of us was in office and when both of us were out of
office. And we share, as she pointed out, the experience of
having had the great good luck of being safe from
totalitarianism by finding refuge in this country. That then
also
creates a very special sense of obligation and concern for the
role that America plays in the world.

16 ~~The~~ Senate and the Congress have been asked to
express themselves on what action the United States should
take to deal with the threat posed by illegal stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and their potential
growth.

21 President Bush has reaffirmed America's commitment to a
22 cooperative world order by asking the United Nations to
23 rectify Iraq's defiance of a large number of United Nations
24 resolutions mandating the destruction of these stockpiles, as
25 well as Iraq's flagrant breach of its pledge to do so as a

18

1 condition for the suspension of the Gulf War in 1991. But If

2 the world community, by fudging its response, opts for the ~~an even~~

3 risk of a greater threat in the future, the issue will ~~become~~

4 whether America and a coalition of the like-minded can ~~Should~~

5 acquiesce in stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in

6 Iraq.

7 I do not believe that the issue of America acting alone

8 will arise. Whatever happens, the ~~United States~~ will have a

9 significant number of countries ~~that~~ will support, ~~and~~ maybe a

10 larger number ~~that~~ will welcome an American action. I think

11 that Secretary Albright ~~already~~ and I agree that the authority for

12 such action ~~exists~~ whether or not the UN passes a ~~resolution~~

13 ~~(in the~~) ~~previous~~ resolutions.

14 But there is a question as to the when and the how. I

15 would like to stress, ~~first~~ the integral connection between the

16 Iraqi stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction and the

17 terrorist threat. I do not believe it is possible to separate

18 these two issues ~~and~~ deal with them in sequence. For ~~How we deal~~

19 with Iraq will affect the ability to deal with the terrorist

20 threat.

21 On September 11th, 2001, the world entered a new period.

22 in which private, non-state organizations undertook to ~~had already~~

23 threaten national and international security by stealth

24 attacks. Highly disciplined operatives were scattered around

25 the globe, some on the soil of America's closest allies and

17

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. KISSINGER, FORMER SECRETARY
OF STATE, CEO, KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, INC., NEW YORK, NEW YORK

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Chairman and members of the
committee, Like Madeleine, I would like to express my pleasure
at being here the recollections I have of many meetings in
this room and the different chairmen and issues that deeply
affect our country.

Madeleine and I have been friends for decades and we have
discussed these problems between us when we were in office,
when one of us was in office and when both of us were out of
office. And we share as she pointed out, the experience of
having had the great good luck of being safe from
totalitarianism by finding refuge in this country. That then
also
created a very special sense of obligation and concern for the
role that America plays in the world.

The Senate and the Congress have been asked to
express themselves on what action the United States should
take to deal with the threat posed by illegal stockpiles of
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and their potential
growth.

President Bush has reaffirmed America's commitment to a
cooperative world order by asking the United Nations to
rectify Iraq's defiance of a large number of United Nations
resolutions mandating the destruction of these stockpiles, as
well as Iraq's flagrant breach of its pledge to do so as a

19

some even within America itself. Having no territory to

defend, these terrorists are not subject to the deterrent

threats from the Cold War. Having as their aim the destruction

of social cohesion, they are not interested in the

conciliating procedures and compromises of traditional

diplomacy.

Modern technology in the service of terror gives no

warning to its perpetrators are capable of inflicting

catastrophic damage and vanishing with the act of commission.

So the relationship of international politics to the

traditional notions of sovereignty is inherent in the nature

of the challenge, therefore, to the accumulation of

weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Moreover, violation of UN

resolutions cannot be separated from the war against

terrorism.

In the Cold War world, there was a degree of

assessment of risk between the nuclear sides. But when many

different states threaten each other for incongruent purposes and when

they acquire weapons of mass destruction, who is to do the

deterring and in the face of what provocation? And this is

especially true when what has to be deterred is not simply the

use of weapons of mass destruction, but the threat of them.

In the discussion that is going on today, one hears a

great deal about the possible danger of American and allied

action in provoking the use of the existing stockpiles of

20

1 weapons of mass destruction against Saudi Arabia, Israel, or

2 other targets. But if that is a danger today, how much more

3 will it be some years from now? This illustrates the

4 complexity of the challenge rather than the obstacle to

5 dealing with it now.

6 Therefore, when the question is asked, why now, I would

7 like to ask the question, why not now? What is the reason for

8 not dealing with it?

9 Global terrorism cannot flourish ~~except~~ without the support

10 of states that either sympathize with this or acquiesce in its

11 actions. To the extent that these countries observe the

12 flouting of United Nations resolutions, the weakening of

13 international norms, and the defiance of America, they feel

14 less restrained in acquiescing to or ignoring terrorist

15 activities. For the nations of the world to accept the presence

16 existence of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction

17 in the region where the new form of terrorism has originated

18 is to undermine restraint with respect not only to the weapons

19 proliferation but to the psychological impulse towards

20 terrorism altogether.

21 In short, the continuation of illegal proliferation, the

22 global dangers which it involves, the rejection or

23 impossibility of establishing a viable inspection system, and

24 the growth of terrorism require action preferably by the

25 international community but as an ultimate resort to America

20

3 ~~of a danger~~ What is this illustrates the

5 dealing with it now.

8 not dealing with it?

10 of states that either sympathize with ~~us~~ or acquiesce in its

14 less restrained in acquiescing ~~to~~ or ignoring terrorist

15 activities. For ~~the~~ nations of the world to accept the ~~presence~~

16 ~~existence~~ of growing stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction

17 ~~Very~~ ~~this~~ in the region where ~~the~~ new form of terrorism has originated

18 is to undermine restraint with respect ~~not only~~ to the weapons

19 proliferation, ~~but to~~ the psychological impulse towards

20 terrorism altogether.

21 In short, the continuation of illegal proliferation ~~and~~ the

22 ~~global dangers which~~ that involves, the rejection or

23 ~~~infeasibility of establishing a viable inspection system, and

24 ~~however subtle~~ the growth of terrorism require action ~~preferably by the~~

25 international community, ~~but as an ultimate resort to~~ America

21

1 together with those countries that have been prepared to support

2 it.

3 It is argued and has been argued by my friend that

4 dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq weakens the

5 war against terrorism. It is not clear to me what measures

6 that are required in the war against terrorism would be either

7 interrupted or weakened by the actions that might be imposed on

8 us if it is not possible to do away with the stockpiles of

9 weapons of mass destruction in Iraq by other means.

10 One can make the opposite argument that by showing our

11 determination to prevent such threats, we will strengthen the

12 war against terrorism.

13 At any rate, my basic point is that the two issues are so

14 closely related that they cannot be separated, and that the

15 attempt to separate them will make it difficult to achieve

16 both. The war against terrorism will take many years.

17 Dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq cannot wait

18 for many years. So one can only argue about how many months one

19 can defer action.

20 At the same time, while reserving the option to act in

21 concert with only the nations it can convince, I strongly

22 support the United States' appeal to cooperative action by the

23 world community. As the most powerful nation in the world,

24 the United States has a special unilateral capacity and

25 indeed, obligation to lead in implementing its convictions.

22

1. But it also has a special obligation to justify its actions by principles that transcend the assertion of preponderant power.

2. It cannot be either in the American national interest or the world's interest to develop principles that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own definition of threats to its security.

7. The case for enforcement of established resolutions is from POSSE POSSESSED the special danger represented by Iraq in the past by its violations of the United Nations resolutions. This does not require a universal principle. Indeed, I would favor a discussion led by the United States of those principles of preemption that are compatible with the operation of an international system separate from the case of Iraq which does not require such a debate.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17. Secondly, if military action against Iraq is unavoidable, it becomes most issues important to address the question of reconstruction and the future of the region.

18. Iraq is a country of strategic importance to the equilibrium of the region, and it is composed of a combination of at least three and maybe several more ethnic groups. A federal system to enable these groups to live together without domination and oppression is surely desirable, but how this can be achieved, with what degree of American involvement, is a matter that requires serious thought.

25. And I believe, as that when military action proves

21

1 together with those countries that have prepared to support

2 it.

6 that are required in the war against terrorism would be either
7 interrupted or weakened by the actions that may be imposed on

17 Dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq cannot wait
18 for many years. So one can argue about how many months one

19 can defer action.

20 At the same time, while reserving the option to act in
21 concert with only those nations it can convince me strongly to
22 support the United States' appeal to cooperative action by the
23 world community. As the most powerful nation in the world,
24 the United States has a special unilateral capacity and so on
25 indeed, obligation to lead in implementing its convictions.

23

1 necessary, ~~that however many nations may~~ hesitate to support encounter

2 it explicitly, we will find a larger degree of support in

3 inviting them into a program of postwar reconstruction which I

4 believe is in the interest of the region and in the interest

5 of the world.

6 See Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, Congress

7 has an opportunity to vindicate a system of international

8 order. I urge you to give the President the authority to

9 enforce the appropriate UN resolutions, together with the
world community, if at all possible, in concert with like-

11 minded nations if necessary. Thank you.

12 [The prepared statement of Secretary Kissinger follows:]

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

24

1 The Chairman: Thank you very much.

2 With the permission of Senator Helms, we will go 7-

3 minutes rounds. Does that make sense?

4 Senator Helms: Yes, sir. That would be fine.

5 The Chairman: Let me again thank you both.

6 There are a number of questions, as you can tell by the

7 attendance here. I would like to focus on just one aspect,

8 and I apologize for being parochial in the sense of

9 articulating my view.

10 I arrive at the same spot that you both do, which is that

11 it is not a question of if, it is a question of when and how

12 we deal with this problem of Saddam Hussein. I for one think

13 that the distinction made by Dr. Kissinger is a very important

14 one and implied by the comments of Secretary Albright, that we

15 need not yield to a newly and not fully articulated doctrine

16 of preemption to justify action against Saddam Hussein.

17 I am operating on the premise that I am likely to be

18 faced with voting for a resolution that I think is not a good

19 resolution, because I believe that the President will not go

20 alone. I believe there are other nations in the world,

21 whether it is a Kosovo model or a UN model, that we will not

22 be alone. And I am quite confident of that. But I do worry

23 about a resolution that sets a precedent for future

24 Presidents, Democrat and Republican, that they will be able to

25 turn, assuming I am here after November, and say, well, Biden,

31

1. doctrine of preemption. He based the case on the violations of a whole series of UN resolutions and agreements related to the Gulf War.

3.

4. The Chairman: I agree.

5. Secretary Kissinger: Therefore, the issue of preemption is inherent in the terrorist challenge because there are non-state actors operating from the territory of states in pursuit of objectives that go beyond national borders.

6.

7.

8.

9. This is not an issue, however, that needs to be settled theoretically now. In order to justify action against Iraq, it is sufficient to examine the behavior of Iraq and the system of its undertakings and of UN resolutions.

10.

11.

12.

13. Secondly, in order to establish a relationship between terrorism and violations of UN resolutions in Iraq, it is not necessary to demonstrate a specific connection between al Qaeda and Iraq. It is sufficient to point out that one of the motives of the terrorist groups is to convey their belief and support to the West and of the United States is flagging that they can assert their claims by demonstrating their right to use of power. And to the extent that a country is surrounded by nations that are acquiescing to or helping terrorism explicitly, it is getting away with a violation of the international system. Overall, that extent of the psychological support for terrorism will only grow.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19. They demonstrate their right to use of power. And to the extent that a country is surrounded by nations that are acquiescing to or helping terrorism explicitly, it is getting away with a violation of the international system. Overall, that extent of the psychological support for terrorism will only grow.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25. So the reason why I believe that the two issues cannot be

(4)

32

1. separated in that psychological and geopolitical connection

It is also because of

taking

2. and why I believe that action on the violation of the UN

and Peace

and Peace

3. resolutions is part of the war against terrorism,

Dorcas

4. independent of whether al Qaeda had connections in Baghdad, of

5. which I have no personal knowledge.

 media

6. I would also think that the newspapers tend to emphasize

7. whatever disagreements may exist at middle and lower-

a

8. levels. My impression -- and the Secretary of State will,

9. undoubtedly, express himself more convincingly on this than I

is

10. can -- that on the basic principles we are discussing here,

Indeed

11. the administration is united and that the basic principles

a

12. that we are discussing here are in the fundamental national

13. interest.

14. The Chairman: Thank you very much.

15. Senator Helms.

16. Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a give

17. and take between these two distinguished Americans. Do you

18. agree with Secretary Kissinger, Ma'am?

19. Secretary Albright: Well, I agree with part of what he

20. has said. I think that there certainly is the question, the

21. way he has redefined it, on preemption that makes sense to me,

22. that it is important to have a discussion about it, but not

23. apply it to this, and that there are, in fact, legitimate

24. resolutions that are already in place.

25. I have a disagreement, somewhat, not in the fact that

32

1. separated in that psychological and geopolitical connection because of it is also taking a part of the war against terrorism, and that is part of the violation of the UN Charter and Peace

2. and why I believe that action on the violation of the UN Charter and Peace is necessary for the solution of the problem of terrorism, which I have no personal knowledge.

3. resolutions is part of the war against terrorism, and that is not independent of whether al Qaeda has connections in Baghdad, of which I have no personal knowledge.

4. independent of whether al Qaeda has connections in Baghdad, of which I have no personal knowledge.

6. I would also think that the newspapers tend to emphasize whatever disagreements may exist at middle and lower levels. My impression is that the Secretary of State will, undoubtedly, express himself more convincingly on this than I can do that on the basic principles we are discussing here, and that we are discussing here are in the fundamental national interest.

7. whatever disagreements may exist at middle and lower levels. My impression is that the Secretary of State will, undoubtedly, express himself more convincingly on this than I can do that on the basic principles we are discussing here, and that we are discussing here are in the fundamental national interest.

8. levels. My impression is that the Secretary of State will, undoubtedly, express himself more convincingly on this than I can do that on the basic principles we are discussing here, and that we are discussing here are in the fundamental national interest.

9. I will not express himself more convincingly on this than I can do that on the basic principles we are discussing here, and that we are discussing here are in the fundamental national interest.

11. the administration is united and that the basic principles that we are discussing here are in the fundamental national interest.

12. that we are discussing here are in the fundamental national interest.

13. interest.

15. Senator Helms.

16. Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, I would like to have a give and take between these two distinguished Americans. Do you agree with Secretary Kissinger, Ma'am?

17. and take between these two distinguished Americans. Do you agree with Secretary Kissinger, Ma'am?

19. Secretary Albright: Well, I agree with part of what he has said. I think that there certainly is the question, the way he has redefined it, on preemption that makes sense to me, that it is important to have a discussion about it, but not apply it to this, and that there are, in fact, legitimate resolutions that are already in place.

20. has said. I think that there certainly is the question, the way he has redefined it, on preemption that makes sense to me, that it is important to have a discussion about it, but not apply it to this, and that there are, in fact, legitimate resolutions that are already in place.

21. that it is important to have a discussion about it, but not apply it to this, and that there are, in fact, legitimate resolutions that are already in place.

22. that it is important to have a discussion about it, but not apply it to this, and that there are, in fact, legitimate resolutions that are already in place.

23. apply it to this, and that there are, in fact, legitimate resolutions that are already in place.

31

2. ~~by Iraq~~ of a whole series of UN resolutions and agreements related to the Gulf War.

3. The Chairman: I agree.

4. Secretary Kissinger: Therefore, the issue of preemption is inherent in the terrorist challenge because you have non-state actors operating from the territory of states in pursuit of objectives that go beyond national borders.

5. ~~S_therefore, the issue of preemption is inherent in the terrorist challenge because you have non-state actors operating from the territory of states in pursuit of objectives that go beyond national borders.~~
6. ~~It is not an issue However, that needs to be settled theoretically now. In order to justify action against Iraq,~~
7. ~~it is sufficient to examine the behavior of Iraq and the~~
8. ~~violation of its undertakings and of UN resolutions.~~
9. Secondly, in order to establish a relationship between terrorism and violations of UN resolutions in Iraq, it is not necessary to prove a specific connection between al Qaeda and

10. ~~It is sufficient to point out that one of the motives of the terrorist groups is to convey their belief and that the will of the West and of the United States is flagging,~~
11. ~~that they can assert their claims by using ruthless demonstration of power. And~~
12. ~~to the extent that a country that is surrounded by nations that are acquiescing to or helping terrorism explicitly, it is getting away with a violation of the international system.~~
13. Secondly, in order to establish a relationship between terrorism and violations of UN resolutions in Iraq, it is not necessary to prove a specific connection between al Qaeda and
14. demonstrate that they believe that the will of the West and of the United States is flagging, that they can assert their claims by using ruthless demonstration of power. And to the extent that a country that is surrounded by nations that are acquiescing to or helping terrorism explicitly, it is getting away with a violation of the international system. Overall, that extent, the psychological support for terrorism will only grow.

15. So the reason why I believe that the two issues cannot be

34

1 that we cannot take a measured approach to what we are doing.

2 Secretary Kissinger: Could I make two points?

3 Senator Helms: Yes, sir.

4 Secretary Kissinger: The first ~~is~~ when one talks about ~~there~~ timing, when is a better time to deal with Iraq than at this moment~~ when the major nations of the Security Council are not ~~in open opposition to us and can be brought along?~~ But ~~Above all, the war against terrorism will take many years~~ and ~~the decision one has to make is whether ~~one waits~~ and permits the growth of stockpiles for many more years ~~and then addresses~~ the issue of Iraq under quite different international circumstances. ~~Secondly~~

13 The second point is when nations help us or help in the fight against terrorism, they are not helping us; they are helping themselves. Russia has a major interest in not permitting fundamentalism to become a dominant force in the Muslim world. And the war against terrorism must be conducted on the basis that the participants ~~in which~~ have a common interest ~~and which~~ are looked at as if it were a special challenge to the United States. Therefore, to the extent that other nations believe in the importance of a strong America, they will not stop cooperating with us on something that is so much in their own interest because we are enforcing UN resolutions.

25 And I do believe that we must go through a process that

33

1 what is going on in Iraq is terrorism and that it links to

2 terrorism generally, but that I am concerned about the timing

3 on this because, as Chairman Biden said, there are certain

4 aspects of the war against terrorism that require cooperation,

5 even among countries that we do not particularly agree with,

6 on intelligence, on tracking the money of al Qaeda and Osama

7 bin Laden, and on law enforcement when the people come into

8 their various territories. And I think this is not the time

9 to disrupt that.

10 I think one of the things -- actually Henry and I have

11 talked about this a lot -- we do talk to each other. And by

12 the way, may I say the only time that there was not

13 disagreement between the State Department and the White House

14 was when Henry Kissinger was both National Security Advisor

15 and Secretary of State.

16 [Laughter.]

17 Secretary Albright: Otherwise, it is hard wired.

18 But I think that there is this question about what is the

19 right timing on this. What you pointed out, Henry, is that

20 having unsheathed the sword here, if we in fact do not use it

21 immediately, do we lose credibility? I do not think so

22 because I hope very much that we would continue to be robust

23 in our fighting of terrorism in Afghanistan, where I pointed

24 out we have not finished, and also make clear what we believe

25 in. So I hope we are not in this position, having threatened,

35

1. already ~~and~~
2. generate and what coalitions we can create. And I am sure the
3. Secretary of State will talk about this ~~this~~ in the
afternoon.

4. Secretary Albright: I think that I do not believe, nor
5. did I say, that the war on terrorism would have to be
6. finished. First of all, I think it will not be finished for a
7. long time. It is unfortunately what we have to live with for
8. most of our lives and our children's lives. So there can be
9. no termination to our effort on it.

10. But I think that we are in a crucial phase as far as
11. finishing the job in Afghanistan. Just to use an image here,
12. I think that we do have Saddam in a box, a strategic box. We
13. do not know a lot about it, but I have a feeling that if we
14. blow up the box, that as the sparks fly out, they will have an
15. effect already on a region that is inflamed and we cannot
16. forget what is happening or not happening in the Middle East.

17. So I actually think we are probably not as far apart as
18. might seem. It is a matter of timing and our favorite
19. diplomatic word, "nuance," in terms of when we do things. I
20. agree with Henry that we cannot persuade other countries to
21. think that fighting the war on terrorism is only in our
22. benefit. It has to be in their benefit also, obviously.

23. But I think it is just unnecessary to do this this
24. moment, and what I am advocating is that we play out the UN
25. string with the support of Congress in the pocket of the

36

1 President and the Ambassador, and we will have a better chance
2 of getting support by the other countries if it is evident to
3 everybody that the Iraqis stiffed us. And that is where my
timing comes in.
4

5 Senator Helms: Do you have any further comment?

6 Secretary Kissinger: It really is a question of whether
7 we are talking about a few months or a few years. The
8 process, as it now seems to evolve, seems to me to require
9 some months of clarification and that seems to me also
10 perfectly consistent with what the administration is doing and
11 saying. So I do not think there is a fundamental difference,
12 if that is what we are talking about.

13 The Chairman: You are both talking about a few months,
14 are you not, as opposed to a few years?

15 Secretary Kissinger: Then there is no difference.

16 Senator Helms: What was your answer to his question?

17 The Chairman: I said you are both talking about a few
18 months, and your response was, yes, if that's the case, there
19 is no difference. Right? Is that correct?

20 Secretary Kissinger: I am talking of a few months.

21 The Chairman: And I understand, Madam Secretary, you are
talking months, not years.

23 Secretary Albright: Correct, but I think that we have to
run out the string.

25 The Chairman: No, I understand.

37

1 Secretary Albright: And may I just say this. The
2 inspectors have to get in. They have to have a chance to work
3 it, et cetera.

4 Secretary Kissinger: May I say something about that?

5 The Chairman: Sure.

6 Secretary Kissinger: I think ~~before~~ inspectors go in ~~or~~
7 as inspectors go in, we require for ourselves some definition
8 of what is considered an adequate inspection system.

9 The Chairman: Absolutely.

10 Secretary Kissinger: The previous inspection system was
11 ~~not~~ clearly unworkable. My understanding is that an inspection
12 its system needs to have some assurance that inspectors can talk
13 to potential informants without interference from local
14 authorities. I do not know how you bring this about, but
15 ~~Since we~~ those concerns need to be answered ~~because one know~~ that the
16 previous inspection system has not worked. One must not
17 permit the word "inspection" to be used as a subterfuge for ~~And ~~
18 ~~its~~ endless procrastination. ~~One must ~~a~~s ~~b~~e inspection ~~to a system~~
19 that gives ~~a~~ major assurance that we will not see a repetition
20 ~~have been going~~ of what we went ~~through for the last~~ 10 years.

21 Secretary Albright: You have given us unusual leeway,
22 and I do not want to take advantage of it. But I think the
23 timing also depends on whether we hear from the administration
24 what a day-after plan looks like. It is the getting the
25 inspectors in and going through that string, but I think it is

(Y)

38

1 irresponsible to go in without knowing a little bit more than

2 at least I know about what their plans are afterwards. So for

3 me the timing depends a lot on the information that comes out

4 on the UN string, and on what very detailed plans are -- not

5 on the military side, because that is not my job and never

6 was, but more on the process of not leaving a vacuum there.

7 The Chairman: Senator Sarbanes.

8 Senator Sarbanes: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

9 Secretary Kissinger, is it your position the war against
10 Iraq is necessary and inevitable?

11 Secretary Kissinger: My position is that military action
12 to enforce the UN resolutions is necessary if they cannot be
13 implemented any other way. And I think it is likely.

14 Senator Sarbanes: Therefore, should we move to military
15 action?

16 Secretary Kissinger: We should not move to military
17 action until we have run out the string on the diplomatic
18 process that is now underway.

19 Senator Sarbanes: Is there a peaceful path by which this
20 matter can be solved?

21 Secretary Kissinger: I have difficulty visualizing how
22 an inspection system can operate while Saddam Hussein is in
23 unimpaired power. ~~It would require ~~ Bill certainly ~~ to some ~~ enough ~~ to all or ~~ for the Possibility that ~~ somebody could produce an inspection system that can operate.~~ really

38

21 Secretary Kissinger: I have difficulty visualizing how
22 an inspection system can operate while Saddam Hussein is in
23 unimpaired power. ~~So it would require ~~I will certainly believe ~~some~~ enough ~~to allow~~
24 political changes in Iraq. But I would be open-minded to ~~for the possibility that~~ really
25 somebody could produce an inspection system that can operate.

37

5 The Chairman: Sure.

6 Secretary Kissinger: I think before inspectors go in or
7 as inspectors go in, we require for ourselves some definition
8 of what is considered an adequate inspection system.

9 The Chairman: Absolutely.

10 Secretary Kissinger: The previous inspection system was
11 clearly ~~unworkable.~~ My understanding is that an inspection
12 system needs to have some assurance that ~~inspectors can talk~~ its
13 to potential informants without interference from local
14 authorities. I do not know how you bring this about, but
15 ~~Since we~~ those concerns need to be answered because ~~one knows~~ that the
16 previous inspection system has not worked. One must not
17 permit the word "inspection" to be used as a subterfuge for ~~And since we~~ ~~and must be~~ ~~acted~~
18 endless procrastination. ~~One must ~~the~~ inspection~~ to a system
19 that gives ~~have been going~~ major assurance that we will not see a repetition
20 of what we went ~~through for the last 10 years.~~

39

1 I do not think the issue should be defined in terms of
2 who is, for war and who is against war.

3 Senator Sarbanes: Well, that is a pretty fundamental
4 question, is it not, whether we are going to go to war or not
5 or whether there is a peaceful path? I take it your position
6 is you do not think there is a peaceful path. You just sort
7 of dismissed the inspection path. So if we do that, what is
8 left? War.

9 Secretary Kissinger: No, no. I think there is a
10 peaceful path.

11 Senator Sarbanes: Well, what is that peaceful path?

12 Secretary Kissinger: Theoretically, if the UN passes a
13 strong resolution and if an inspection system is devised that
14 meets the objectives of the UN resolution, it is theoretically
15 possible that they will agree to these and under those
16 conditions, I think that would be a peaceful solution. I think
17 it is unlikely that this will happen, but that is a judgment,
18 not a course of action, I think we should run out of the
19 diplomatic string.

20 Senator Sarbanes: Well, because you think it might work
21 or just as a matter of appearance?

22 Secretary Kissinger: Not as a matter of appearance. I
23 would like it to work. I think it is unlikely to work, but I
24 would be delighted if it worked.

25 Senator Sarbanes: You say in your statement that we have

40

1 to entertain a program of reconstruction for Iraq.

2 Secretary Kissinger: Are you talking to me?

3 Senator Sarbanes: Yes, and that is on page 5 of your

4 statement.

5 Secretary Kissinger: Right.

6 Senator Sarbanes: What do you think about the program of

7 reconstruction in Afghanistan?

8 Secretary Kissinger: Afghanistan is a notoriously

9 difficult country for foreigners to reconstruct or to deal

10 with. I strongly favor economic aid to Afghanistan.

11 Senator Sarbanes: Do you think we are paying adequate

12 attention to the question of reconstruction in Afghanistan?

13 You argue here in Iraq, we are going to go in, and then we are

14 going to do a major reconstruction program in order, in

15 effect, to deal with the aftermath. What about the

16 reconstruction program in Afghanistan? If we are going to

17 look at say, well, what kind of reconstruction program would

18 we do, how committed have we remained in Afghanistan in order

19 to reconstruction?

20 Secretary Kissinger: It depends on how you define

21 reconstruction.

22 First about Iraq. I believe reconstruction in Iraq

23 should be undertaken not just by the United States, but by an

24 international consortium, international community, and a group

25 of major interested countries.

40

3 Senator Sarbanes: Yes, and that is on page 5 of your statement.

5 Secretary Kissinger: Right.

6 Senator Sarbanes: What do you think about the program of reconstruction in Afghanistan?

8 Secretary Kissinger: Afghanistan is a notoriously difficult country for foreigners to reconstruct to deal with. I strongly favor economic aid to Afghanistan.

11 Senator Sarbanes: Do you think we are paying adequate attention to the question of reconstruction in Afghanistan?
12 You argue here in Iraq, we are going to go in, and then we are
13 going to do a major reconstruction program in order, in
14 effect, to deal with the aftermath. What about the
15 reconstruction program in Afghanistan? If we are going to
16 look at say, well, what kind of reconstruction program would
17 we do, how committed have we remained in Afghanistan in order
18 to reconstruction?
19

20 Secretary Kissinger: It depends on how you define reconstruction.

22 First about Iraq. I believe reconstruction in Iraq should be undertaken not just by the United States, but by an international consortium, international community, and a group of major interested countries.

39

12 Secretary Kissinger: Theoretically, if the UN passes a
13 strong resolution and if an inspection system is devised that
14 meets the objectives of the UN resolution, it is theoretically
15 possible that they will agree to those, and under those
16 conditions, I think that would be a peaceful solution. I think
17 it is unlikely that this will happen, but that is a judgment,
18 not a course of action, and we should run out of time for
19 diplomatic string.

41

I believe ~~something like~~ that should be done in Afghanistan, too, but Afghanistan has the additional difficulty that the country is run by a group of warlords whose subjugation is ~~a major military effort and in the past,~~ would require attempts to that have been produced in which the warlords, who normally fight each other, unite against the foreigner ~~who is trying to~~ seeking to curb their power. So I would be uneasy about a major military effort to pacify the whole country, ~~but anything that we can do~~ with a reasonable military effort and a significant economic effort, together with other nations, I would favor. But I do have a question in Afghanistan which would not arise to the same extent in Iraq.

Senator Sarbanes: Is the effort underway in Afghanistan for reconstruction up to the standard that you think it should be? Are we falling short, perhaps woefully short, in Afghanistan? There are some who think we are risking turning a success into a failure by not following up on the reconstruction.

Secretary Kissinger. The first thing one has to consider, Senator, is if on September 10th, 2001, somebody had said we are going to have an expeditionary force in Afghanistan, we are going to overthrow the Taliban, we are going to operate all over the Middle East, and we will do all this within 6 weeks, that would have been considered incredible. So considering that the magnitude of the

42

1. challenge ~~that we have faced and the unusual cast of thinking~~ Vis-a-vis S, I think we

2. that is required in terms of American tradition, I think we

3. have done well in Afghanistan. As things continue --

4. Senator Sarbanes: You think at this point that our
5. reconstruction effort is adequate and meets the standard? You

6. do not think we should be doing more?

7. Secretary Kissinger: I think we have done the best that
8. could be done under present circumstances. As time goes on,
9. we will probably want to strengthen the reconstruction effort.

10. Senator Sarbanes: Could I hear from Secretary Albright
11. on these points?

12. Secretary Albright: I disagree. I think that we have
done a halfway job in Afghanistan and we need to keep our
14. attention on it. I know that I certainly have met with some
15. Afghan officials, and they are grateful to us, but they
16. understand that there is a lot more to do and that there is
17. reconstitution there potentially of some al Qaeda groupings,
18. and Pakistan continues to be a haven for some of these issues.
19. So I think it is very hard. We have not finished the job and
20. this concerns me.

21. And I might say that I think we have to deal with
22. something very serious here. The issue of Afghanistan is as a
23. result of unintended consequences of previous foreign policy
decisions, and I think we have to be very careful about the
25. unintended consequences of whatever decision we make on Iraq.

42

1. challenge that we have faced and the unusual cast of thinking

12. Secretary Albright: I disagree. I think that we have
13. done a halfway job in Afghanistan and we need to keep our
14. attention on it. I know that I certainly have met with some
15. Afghan officials, and they are grateful to us, but they
16. understand that there is a lot more to do and that there is
17. reconstitution there potentially of some al Qaeda groupings,
18. and Pakistan continues to be a haven for some of these issues.
19. So I think it is very hard. We have not finished the job and
20. this concerns me.

21. And I might say that I think we have to deal with
22. something very serious here. The issue of Afghanistan is as a
23. result of unintended consequences of previous foreign policy
24. decisions, and I think we have to be very careful about the
25. unintended consequences of whatever decision we make on Iraq.

41

I believe ~~something like~~ that should be done in Afghanistan, too, but Afghanistan has the additional difficulty that the country is run by a group of warlords whose subjugation to a major military effort ~~and~~ in the past, attempts to ~~that have~~ no, have produced a situation in which the warlords, who normally fight each other, unite against the foreigner ~~who is trying~~ to curb their power. So I would be uneasy about a major military effort to pacify the whole country, ~~but~~ ~~whatever~~, ~~but anything that we can be~~ do with a reasonable military effort and a significant economic effort, together with other nations, I would favor. But I do have a question in Afghanistan which would not arise to the same extent in Iraq.

Secretary Kissinger. The first thing one has to consider, Senator, is if on September 10th, 2001, somebody had said ~~we are~~ that were going to have an expeditionary force in Afghanistan, ~~we are~~ going to overthrow the Taliban, ~~we are~~ going to operate all over the Middle East, and ~~we will do all~~ this within 6 weeks, that would have been considered incredible. So considering that the magnitude of the

48

1 the modeling of local elections, et cetera. We cannot do that

2 alone. So that is one of the reasons I think it is important

3 to have UN support because it does provide some kind of model.

4 That is a beginning.

5 But I was plagued always whenever I suggested using

6 force -- and I did -- with what is the exit strategy. As far

7 as I have heard, none. And I do think that the

8 administration, while there is no way they can give us all the

9 details on this -- I think that is impossible -- they do need

10 to give us a better blueprint for what is out there after the

11 day after.

12 Senator Lugar: Secretary Kissinger, do you have any idea

13 as to how the control situation might work with regard to the

14 nuclear weapons, how we would get to something that is

15 satisfying?

16 Secretary Kissinger: I think this is a question that

17 should be addressed to the Secretary of State.

18 At some point in this process, we have to make clear what

19 we would consider an adequate inspection system or, at least,

20 what we do not consider an adequate inspection system.

21 Otherwise, there will be no criteria on which to base our

22 actions. I have put down here some general ideas, but I have

23 not studied in detail what you would require.

24 At the same time, I want to warn against the danger of

25 using the imperfection of any solution that you can offer as

47

1 Secretary Albright: Well, first of all, I think that we

2 do have to recognize, while I agree with Henry that

3 Afghanistan is full of warlords and a real problem, Iraq is

4 not exactly a unified place. And everything that we have ever

5 heard is that it is a country that was created by outside

6 powers that put together at least three groups, the Kurds, the

7 Shiites, and the Sunnis. And that is the least of it. So the

8 integrity of the country is an issue.

9 I met previously many, many times with the Iraqi

10 opposition, and as somebody whose father was part of an exile

11 movement, I applaud those people, but I also know how

12 difficult it is. Everybody has a different view, and believe

13 me, the Czechoslovak exile movement had nothing in common with

14 the Iraqi one.

15 So I think that there are very many different kinds of

16 groupings. When I met with them, they all had a different

17 idea about what to do. And I think the first thing that has

18 to happen is to try to bring them together in some particular

19 way.

20 The reason that I also believe that it is essential to

21 get more international support is while it has not been

22 perfect, Bosnia and Kosovo have, in fact, provided a model of

23 what happens with you work with an international organization

24 in terms of getting a high representative and various

25 countries participating in not only the reconstruction, but

49

1 an argument for doing nothing. And where we are now, we are

2 faced with the choice ~~of~~ will there be ~~enforcement of the~~

3 UN resolutions or will these stockpiles continue to grow. I

4 think the danger of acquiescing is greater than some of the

5 concerns that have been raised, but I ~~also~~ do think we have to

6 answer this question.

7 Now, about a post-war Iraq and its political

8 organization that requires really a lot of thinking because

9 it is easy to say you have a democratic government. The

10 question is, how quickly can you create this and what are the

11 interim arrangements that have to be made. And one has to

12 keep in mind that there will be great temptations on the part

13 of Iran to wreck any political structure in order to shift the

14 balance of power in the region, and there will be other

15 neighboring claimants. So this is not a vacuum in which one

16 can operate politically with an unlimited time span. This is but

17 an issue that has to be dealt with.

18 Senator Lugar: Mr. Chairman, I would just add yesterday

19 one of our witnesses suggested, as Dr. Kissinger has, we may

20 not have the perfect solutions and that should not defeat

21 action. But the administration ought to report to the

22 Congress at least every 30 days on how it was going. In other

23 words, if you are still trying to perfect the solutions, that

24 one resolution to go to war ought not to suffice for the next

25 8 years, given all the ramifications that we are discussing

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1 that would follow.

2 Secretary Kissinger: Also the power of improving what

3 exists now is not too high. We do not have to achieve

4 perfection to have the people of Iraq live under better

5 conditions than they live now.

6 The Chairman: The interim solution will be a MacArthur

7 in Baghdad.

8 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent

9 that a letter relevant to what we are discussing right now
10 from the State Department be printed in the record.

11 The Chairman: Without objection, it will be placed in
12 the record.

13 [The information referred to follows:]

14 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

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1 that would follow.

7 in Baghdad.

12 the record.

14 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

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2 faced with the choice of will there be an enforcement of the

5 concerns that have been raised, but I also think we have to

6 answer this question.

8 organization that requires a lot of thinking because

10 question is how quickly can you create this and what are the

16 can operate politically with an unlimited time span, this is but

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1 that have to go down.

2 But we cannot assume that this is like liberating central

3 Europe after Hitler. This is a different situation, and so we

4 have to look at that very carefully.

5 Senator Feingold: Let me follow that. Then I want to

6 hear Dr. Kissinger's remarks. Can you say anything more

7 specifically about what kind of threat conditions our U.S.

8 soldiers might be facing for months on end and what we could

9 do to reduce the threat? I wonder if you would follow with

10 that, Secretary Albright.

11 Secretary Albright: I think, again, this is something we

12 do not know because it depends if it is the Republican Guard

13 or the people that have been very close to Saddam Hussein --

14 if we are in Baghdad with hand-to-hand fighting from block to

15 block, I think there would be a threat. And I think that the

16 number of forces that will have to stay there and should to

17 protect our own forces as a result of our own experiences in

18 this, we would have to assume that there would be a threat to

19 our military. Whether it exists or not, we cannot take the

20 chance of sending them in without assuming that there would

21 be.

22 Senator Feingold: Dr. Kissinger.

23 Secretary Kissinger: First, as to the political outcome

24 in Iraq, I do not pretend to be an expert on the Iraqi

25 conditions, but I think a lot will depend on what kind of

(H)

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6 and, after a certain interval, he will be removed. It is not very
7 likely, but it is not totally inconceivable.

8 It is more conceivable, but still not very probable that

24 who proclaim the right to reeducate that country. That seems

25 to be an very difficult undertaking and therefore I would

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6 and, after some interval, he will be removed. It is not very

12 that case we have the problem of negotiating with a de facto

19 and the need to reestablish authority as was the case in the

25 to me a very difficult undertaking and therefore I would

(Y)

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1 that have to go down.

10 that, Secretary Albright.

21 be.

25 conditions, I think a lot of it depends on what kind of

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1 suffering.

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16 Secretary Kissinger: I think the conditions after
17 September 11th produced the current situation. I understand
18 why before September 11th it was judged not to be desirable,
19 but sooner or later, we would have faced this problem. Sooner
20 or later the problem of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq
21 would have had to be faced, but I generally sympathize with
22 the answer that Madeleine has given.

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4 cooperation. And then I think about the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
5

21 difference or not?

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9 missing pieces.

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1 was that if we did not achieve an international consensus, we
2 would operate with those nations that would support us. I
3 believe that one reason that he received as much support as he
4 did was that this was one way by which other nations could
5 influence our actions and participate in it. So that in
6 principle, the difference is not so great in the methods of
7 the Bush family in the Gulf with which, I must say, I agree.

8 Secondly, in conducting these discussions, we have to
9 keep in mind that we seem to agree that we are talking about
10 timing here. We are not talking about the principle. One has
11 to take care that these discussions of what might happen and
12 of the inspection system is not used for endless
13 procrastination. On the other hand, we have to be serious in
14 conducting them.

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15 Secretary Kissinger: I think if one looks at the
16 discussion in the Security Council, it is interesting that
17 none of the permanent members has threatened a veto, and they
18 know that by abstaining, if that is what they are going to do,
19 they will make possible a resolution that will support our
20 action, assuming we can achieve nine votes. Britain will
21 clearly be for us. And I am not sure that France will
22 abstain. But it is not necessary now to speculate about what
23 individual countries may do in a final vote.

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1 will be significant countries supporting the United States.

2 So it is not in absolute terms, and one always has to keep

3 focus on what is the alternative. Therefore, we all seem to

4 agree that we cannot acquiesce in the growth of weapons of

5 mass destruction in Iraq. So we are talking about means for

6 dealing with that.

7 The Chairman: Senator Allen.

8 Senator Allen: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you

9 both, our esteemed witnesses, today for your insights and

10 comments.

11 I think I speak for everyone on this committee that no

12 one cares to risk lives unnecessarily of the men and women in

13 uniform. We do not want war. It is not in our interest.

14 However, when you think of the priorities and you say, gosh,

15 there are a lot of different concerns and priorities, the top

16 responsibility of the Federal Government is national security.

17 Unfortunately, we only have a theoretical unimpeded path to

18 disarming Saddam Hussein.

19 I would say to Secretary Albright that we have had

20 briefings and some of these briefings that we have had were of

21 a highly classified nature and we cannot necessarily publicly

22 state every bit of intelligence, very credible intelligence,

23 about the capabilities that Saddam has as far as chemical,

24 biological weapons and also the means of delivering those.

25 One can be in a box and still deliver outside that box. Or

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1 to have in this.

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sense, but I would ask Secretary Albright. Since the
statement back in 1998 urging the President to take all
necessary and appropriate actions, which is pretty broad, to
respond to the threat posed by Iraq's refusal to end its
weapons of mass destruction programs, have you seen anything,
Madam Secretary, in the subsequent 4 years to lead you to
believe he has not gotten stronger in his stockpiles and
capabilities, whether in delivery systems or in the bio or the
chemical weapons programs?

Secretary Albright: Again, I think it is very hard to
tell. I have had a briefing also, and I think that he has
probably gotten weaker in terms of some of the conventional
aspects that he has. And we do not know enough about what has
happened in the others, but it is of concern. I in no way am
underestimating the concern that we should have, and we were
concerned and continue to be concerned. I think the question
is whether an all-out invasion of some kind is the right
approach to take at this time.

I also believe, Senator, that one of the strengths that
we have had in all of this is a continuity and in many ways
bipartisanship as far as the policy towards Iraq is concerned.
We were handed Saddam Hussein in 1993 with a set of
resolutions that we worked very hard to get international
support for. I hope very much that we continue to see this in
a bipartisan way. The way this question is asked is a little

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2 resolved point.

5 and she said she did.

8 became public law.

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9 side of the aisle.

18 was that this was passed by the Congress, presumably.

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4 [Laughter.]

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5 I also would say to Dr. Kissinger, for one brief, shining
6 moment in answer to Senator Sarbanes, I think you laid ut a
7 path for peace, a little bit more skeptically than Secretary
8 Albright, but nonetheless, it was there, and I can tell you
9 that I take pleasure in small victories as this debate moves
10 forward. For the first time, I have seen experts lay out a
11 path to avoid bloodshed, and I understand it is not an easy
12 path. I understand it might not work. I understand it will
13 take a strong, intrusive, unfettered inspection regime,
14 followed by dismantlement of anything found.

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3 Senator Boxer: Including the Medal of Honor, and I want
to tell you what he said. He said, there are those who plan
war and there are those who fight war, and as we sit here
talking about post war regime in Iraq, as we sit and plan for
that, I want us to think for a moment the path we are taking
if we do not follow the path for peace that I heard outlined
here today, and I would ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman,
at this time to introduce into the record an article in
today's USA Today.

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19

20

21

22

23

24

25

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20 To me, the issue in Iraq is simple. Weapons of mass
destruction have got to be inspected. We have got to find
21 them if they are there. We have got to get them dismantled.
22 But all these other issues, I think, added now are very
23 interesting, and go to some of the cynicism that I hear among
24 my constituents, and I want to put that point out there.

[ic]

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I have a question, believe it or not, that deals with the
Carnegie Foundation. The Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace released a study called, quote, Iraq, a new approach,
unquote, which advocates a policy of U.N.-sanctioned, coerced
inspections. This plan envisions that an armed inspection
implementation force would be added to support international
inspectors. I wonder if either of you have read this report,
or have a feeling about it, because as I search for a path to
peace, it is through the inspection regime, but I want to make
sure it is a strong inspection regime, and I think that the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace may have come up
with some idea that we can seize on and develop and I wonder
if you, Secretary Albright, and then Secretary Kissinger,
could respond.

Ms. Albright: Secretary Boxer, I think that -- I have
not read the report. I have read about it, and I do find it
an interesting concept, because part of the issue is how to
try to get intrusive inspections that actually have some teeth
to them, and while I think there probably are some technical
difficulties to it, I think it is certainly worth exploring.

If I might also say, I know this is not an easy subject
to bring up, but I do not think it would hurt if we considered
the fact that Saddam Hussein is a war criminal, and the War
Crimes Tribunal made a big difference when we were dealing
with Milosevic, and I think this is something we might also

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1 think about.

11 the problem on which we all agree, the existence of weapons of

12 mass destruction. They are facing the problem that if we
13 acquiesce in that now, they will continue to grow. We will

15 The President went to the United Nations and put the case
16 to the United Nations, and therefore started the process,

18 conclusion. We have all agreed here we are talking about
19 months and not years, so the difference in regard to all of

20 this is relatively small.

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3 The only warning I would issue is not to use inspection
4 as a means of avoiding the problem and facing the same issue
5 2, 3, 4 years from now. We should in good faith see what can
6 be worked out. I cannot make a big contribution because I do
7 not know enough about it, and I think the administration will
8 do this because, in fact, they will have to answer the
9 question of the inspection system as it goes through the
10 process, but then we will have to face the issue within a
11 limited period of time of action if that does not prove
12 feasible.

21 The second point is --

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1 trying to work something out here. We are trying to get this
2 cooperatively. We are not looking for disagreement. We are
3 looking for agreement to deal with what we all agree is a bad
4 guy and a bad situation, meaning Saddam.

15 The President is working his way through, deciding who he
16 agrees with on each of the things, but guaranteed there is a
17 fundamental difference being presented to the President on
18 these issues.

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6 unacceptable.

25 patient.

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5 Dr. Kissinger: I am assuming we will not act unless we
6 believe it is in the overwhelming interest of national and
7 international security. If that is our judgment, if that is
8 the judgment of the administration, then it cannot be deterred
9 by threats of outbursts in the streets, because that will
10 happen. That will then be a permanent source of blackmail.

11 I also believe that the countries you mentioned have
12 shown a pretty good capacity to control their streets, but we
13 cannot be driven in the fundamental judgments of what is
14 necessary for international order by threats of
15 demonstrations.

16 The growth of these stockpiles is a serious problem and
17 must be dealt with. It hopefully can be dealt with through
18 the processes which are now being conducted, but I do not
19 think that the demonstrations are going to be a disastrous
20 element.

21 I also think that the German election was not caused by
22 our policy. There were many elements within German politics
23 that produced this reaction, and will almost certainly be
24 dealt with, will be resolved in the weeks to come in a
25 cooperative spirit.

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2 point for just a minute?

3 Senator Chafee: Certainly.

15 Dr. Kissinger: I think all of us who have been concerned
16 with German-American relations were surprised by the fact that
17 an anti-American appeal could evoke such feelings.

21 Dr. Kissinger: That is right. I had not understood the
22 degree to which this feeling had evolved, but I think that
23 feeling has deeper causes than reactions to the immediate
tactics on this situation.

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13 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 question, there are stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction

16 in Iraq, in violation of the U.N. resolution. We are engaged

18 be -- first of all, does Mubarak really mean this, and

19 secondly, even if he meant it, can we then in the end be

22 streets as time goes on? That is the question that needs to

23 be addressed.

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3 Dr. Kissinger: The word preemptively is being thrown
4 around too loosely in the debate. It has always been
5 understood that if there is a fundamental threat to the
6 national security, that one reserves the option for military
7 action. There have been occasions in the past, when the
8 Jordanian Government was threatened, that the United States
9 was willing to give it very substantial support.

10 I do not know -- nobody would recommend moving American
11 troops into Egypt or Jordan on the basis of riots in the
12 streets. This will have to be dealt with when the issue
13 arises, in a way that is not determined by an abstract theory
14 of preemption, but by an assessment of the national security
15 and international security as it is perceived at that moment.

[10]

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Dr. Kissinger: This is a question you should address to administration witnesses. I was traveling. I have only read it on the Internet. I have not had the document in my hand yet. I read it on the Internet, but I have read it. I have expressed my general view in my statement and elsewhere I do not believe it is in the American interest to proclaim a universal theory of preemption that any nation can use to protect itself against its definition of a threat.

I believe also that it would be wise -- I also believe that the kind of terrorism that now exists, that to deal with that is incompatible with some of the notions of sovereignty, as they had evolved in the 17th, 18th, and 19th Century, which govern the rules among nations, so that there is an element of preemption inherent in the nature of the terrorist threat and in the nature of the modern reference.

I therefore think it would be useful to initiate a general international discussion, or Security Council discussion of what principles of preemption could be universally applied so that not every major nation could attack every nation around its periphery, but I have not a resolution to this problem, but I think this is -- as I remember the statement as I read it, preemption is listed as an absolutely last resort in that document, and primarily aimed at terror, but one really ought to ask the people who drafted it. My view on preemption is the one that I have

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1 stated.

17 Dr. Kissinger: I think in retrospect, though, I did not
18 argue that at the time. It would have been appropriate to
19 take preemptive action against bin Laden in Afghanistan, and
20 as these terrorist cells exist, it cannot be precluded, but
21 what it means in an international system as both a concept and
22 something that can be more or less universally accepted so
23 that it does not become arbitrary, that is something that we
24 are at the beginning of the problem, not at the solution of
25 it.

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2 suggestions.

11 requirements.

15 respect to Iraq?

18 relationship of the Iraqi issue to others, but I really have

25 I had to be at.

[1c]

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1. A point that I would like to make is, at least for this
2. Member, if we need to narrow the resolution or add
3. restrictions or reporting requirements to that, I would be
4. open to any of that being done as long as at the end of the
5. day it allows the President the use of force, including
6. military force against Iraq if the administration decides it
7. is necessary to move on forward.

8. So working the wording on this to make it clear that it
9. is not expansive, it cannot be used in other places, I think
10. that is good, and if we can do that and get a large, positive
11. vote for it, because I think that is an important statement to
12. make, that it be a large vote in the Senate for moving forward
13. on this, I think it would be a very positive statement to do.

14. Secretary Kissinger, I wanted to ask you, in looking
15. through your statement about a post Saddam Iraq and the impact
16. on terrorism if we do move forward against Iraq -- and I
17. apologize if this question has been asked in another forum or
18. not while I was not here, but I see a problem if we do not
19. move forward -- and you articulate that some people will ask
20. why now, and you would ask, why not now in your original
21. statement. I can see a lot of difficulty if we move forward,
22. but I see a lot of difficulty if we do not move forward, and I
23. think there is a substantial positive scenario if we do move
24. forward on Iraq, not on the basis of a preemption doctrine,
25. but on the basis of what he has failed to do with U.N.

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8 Dr. Kissinger: There are many causes for why groups join

10 focus on the toleration by Governments of terrorist groups

14 fundamental interests.

15 So for all of these reasons, I believe that a
16 demonstration that the United States will insist on carrying

20 the war against terrorism.

23 problem. I believe the two are closely related. The war

24 against terrorism must be pursued energetically, and I think

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3 Senator Brownback: Previously I have worked a lot with
4 the Iraqi National Congress, the Iraq Liberation Act in 1998
5 that Secretary Albright, you worked on its implementation, and
6 with Senator Kerrey of Nebraska, Bob Kerrey, the former
7 Senator. Both of us concluded -- and this is somewhat wishful
8 thinking, but I do not think so, that Iraq will move to
9 democracy and will be, we would hope and think, clearly very
10 possible in the near future, a strong democracy. It has
11 resources underneath it. It has an educated population. It
12 is not without its difficulties and divisions within the
13 country, north and south and in the middle, but that this
14 could be a very strong force for democracy once Saddam is
15 removed in that region.

19 Ms. Albright: Well, I think it would be much wished, and
20 clearly the population of Iraq is a little bit different in
21 terms of its modernity and education from some of the other
22 places, but the question that I think we have, and we raised,
23 was, what is the plan to get from here to there, that it will
24 not be simple, that there is not only the potential of
25 democracy, but also the potential of internecine fighting

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3 getting here to there?

15 ready to have democracy.

25 about a substantial improvement in conditions in Iraq. I

[LC]

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1 would consider it unlikely that one could move to democracy,

2 full democracy in a very brief time, but I think it is

3 essential to move to its accountability of the Government

5 to a substantial improvement in the lives of the population,

6 but we cannot do that alone. This requires an international

7 effort.

14 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 of them here.

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1 time.

10 international support.

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5 destruction in Iraq and, indeed, I believe that a success,

11 Dr. Kissinger: Well, one would have to deal with them,
12 and I do not think there is a general rule. Somalia has no
13 Government, really, no effective Government, and therefore the
14 question is, what are these places actually doing? Yemen has
15 a Government, but not in every region of the country. With
16 respect to bases from which terrorist attacks are being
17 planned against the United States, or might be making plans,
18 we cannot exclude, ultimately, the use of military action.

19 Now, obviously, a country like Indonesia is of a
20 magnitude where this is not something that should be done
21 except in the most extreme provocation, which does not exist
22 right now. It is not even clear whether there are bases, as
23 some people claim, on these islands, so one would have to do
24 this country by country, and depending on the nature of the
25 threat.

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12 through this --

16 believe --

18 unilaterally?

24 we not?

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1. Senator Sarbanes: Would you condition the President's ability to act on the premise that it not be unilateral?

3. Dr. Kissinger: I think we pay a higher price if we act unilaterally, but I would have enough confidence in the President, if he does act, that I think that I would assume that it will have been necessary.

7. Senator Sarbanes: Well, the rhetoric that has been used it seems is moving us increasingly to the position where we do not have options. If they do not act, then we say, aha, he did not act. He said he was going to act, unilaterally or not, and he did not do it.

12. The Chairman: Well, if I can, you have been here 3 hours
13. You have been incredible. I just want to conclude by,
14. a) thanking you, but b), also pointing out what I think is a
15. fair statement, I hope is a fair statement, and that is that,
16. as it relates to Saddam Hussein in Iraq, as policymakers writ
17. large, the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
18. Defense, they are never going to have more than 75 percent of
19. the facts they need to know to be certain.

20. There is no place we reach the point where there is
21. certainty, so where we peel off among us is the degree to
22. which it seems to me -- it is not observation, but the degree
23. to which we think certain things are going to fall into place.
24. I happen to agree with Dr. Kissinger on this point. I cannot
25. fathom the President going alone. I just cannot fathom the

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1 President going alone.

16 prepared to do.

21 informed consent.

107

3 Representative Michael N. Castle of Delaware, a very
good, personal friend, said the same thing I have been saying
4 at home, and what I have been hearing at home. He said that
5 the administration lobbying job on Capitol Hill has been so
dismal that the best arguments by far thus far have been made
6 by Tony Blair. He goes on to say, there is almost no
8 discussion with the administration, said Mr. Castle, a member
9 of the House Intelligence Committee.

18 Now, that does not mean the case is not there. That does
19 not mean the case is not there. I have the advantage or
20 disadvantage of having access to, on a regular basis, the
21 Secretary of State, the President because of this job, but I
22 really think it is very important, very important that the
case be made in more detail, and not confuse having made the
23 case of a violation of U.N. resolutions as being synonymous
24 with having made the case to the American people that we may
25

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3 prepared?

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7 That has not been done yet.

9 Would you mind if I make just a quick comment on this regard, because I think you have got quite a valid point. I mentioned to other people the calls into my office, many are running against this, even though polling numbers say they are for it.

13 What the President did at the U.N. was, he spoke at the
14 U.N., and I did not hear new information come forward, but he
15 recited, here is the case. I think we should have the
16 President up to a joint session of the Congress and have him
17 say, here is the case, and here is what we will do, because
18 what the U.N. did, and what the President took advantage of
19 there was to say, okay, you want me to go to the U.N., I will
go to the U.N. Here is my case, and when you put it all
21 together, it stacks up that Saddam has made a great case
22 against himself. He is the one who has made the case.

(tc)

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on the line.

say, pay the price.

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