OUR NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY MUST BE BASED ON A CONCEPTION
OF ENDURING NATIONAL GOALS AND PERMANENT RESPONSIBILITIES,
NOT ON THE ACCIDENTS OF PERSONALITY OR CHANGE FOR THE SAKE
OF [CHANGE] NOVELTY WITH THE ADVENT OF EACH NEW PRESIDENTIAL
ADMINISTRATION. THE FUTURE WELLBEING AND SECURITY OF
THIS COUNTRY CAN NEVER BE A PARTISAN ISSUE. THEY AFFECT
EVERY AMERICAN, AND, GIVEN OUR CENTRAL ROLE, EVERY HUMAN
BEING CONCERNED WITH THE PRESERVATION AND STRENGTHENING
OF THE CAUSE OF FREEDOM.

OUR SUBSTANTIAL STAKE IN THE PANAMA CANAL IS A CASE IN
POINT. THE UNITED STATES HAS A VITAL INTEREST IN THE FREE,
NEUTRAL, AND EFFICIENT OPERATION OF THE CANAL. THIS
INTEREST CANNOT BE COMPROMISED; WE CANNOT FORESEE THE DAY
WHEN IT WILL BE INCONSEQUENTIAL.

UP TO NOW THIS INTEREST HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED WITH
THE PRECISE TREATY RELATIONSHIP WE ESTABLISHED IN 1903
UNDER VASTLY DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES. BUT FOUR SUCCESSIVE

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PRESIDENTS AND THEIR SECRETARIES OF STATE, REPRESENTING BOTH POLITICAL PARTIES, HAVE BEEN PERSUADED OVER A PERIOD OF THIRTEEN YEARS THAT A NEW TREATY RELATIONSHIP WITH PANAMA IS MORE LIKELY TO SERVE THE LONG-TERM SECURITY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES; ABOVE ALL THAT IT WOULD BEST ASSURE WHAT IS THE ESSENCE OF OUR INTEREST: THE EFFICIENCY, NEUTRALITY, ACCESSIBILITY, AND SECURITY OF THE CANAL. ALL FOUR PRESIDENTS CAME TO THE VIEW THAT THE TREATY OF 1903 NO LONGER ADEQUATELY ASSURES THAT INTEREST. THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS INCLUDE PROVISIONS WHICH ARE NO LONGER ESSENTIAL AND WHICH COULD OVER TIME ACTUALLY MAKE PROTECTION OF OUR VITAL INTERESTS MORE DIFFICULT BY FORCING US INTO ACTIONS INCREASINGLY IN CONFLICT WITH OUR TRADITIONAL ALLIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

IT IS MY CONVICTION THAT THE TWO TREATIES RECENTLY NEGOTIATED WITH PANAMA DO INDEED PROTECT OUR LONG-TERM INTEREST IN THE CANAL MORE EFFECTIVELY AND UNDER CONDITIONS

MORE IN KEEPING WITH PRESENT-DAY REALITIES THAN IS POSSIBLE
UNDER THE 1903 TREATY.

WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT HOWEVER WE IN THE UNITED STATES
MAY VIEW THAT TREATY, THE REST OF THE WORLD AND ESPECIALLY
THE NATIONS OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE DO NOT REGARD IT
AS AN EQUITABLE AND FREELY NEGOTIATED AGREEMENT. [ IT WAS
REACHED IN AMBIGUOUS CIRCUMSTANCES AND NO PANAMANIAN EVER
SIGNED IT. SOME EVEN QUESTION ITS LEGALITY. ] TO INSIST
ON THESE ARRANGEMENTS WOULD MEAN THAT OVER TIME WE WOULD
BE COMPELLED TO FALL BACK ON THE USE OF FORCE AS THE
ULTIMATE BASIS FOR OUR PRESENCE. THIS WE SHOULD BE
PREPARED TO DO WHEN OUR VITAL INTERESTS CAN BE DEFENDED
IN NO OTHER WAY. BUT THIS IS NOT THE CASE HERE BECAUSE
THE TREATIES GIVE US A CLEAR, AND ON BALANCE A BETTER,
ALTERNATIVE.

UNDER THE TERMS OF THE NEW PANAMA CANAL TREATY, NOTHING
OF REAL SIGNIFICANCE TO US IN THE EXISTING ARRANGEMENT FOR

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MANAGEMENT AND DEFENSE OF THE CANAL WILL CHANGE DURING THE REMAINDER OF THIS CENTURY. THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO CONTROL OPERATION OF THE CANAL; UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE FOR DEFENSE OF THE CANAL FROM WITHIN PANAMANIAN TERRITORY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE NEW TREATY ARRANGEMENT ESTABLISHES A COOPERATIVE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH PANAMA WHICH WILL ENHANCE OUR ABILITY TO ENSURE THE CANAL'S SECURITY AND EFFICIENT OPERATION, PROVIDE FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION, AND INCREASE PANAMA'S STAKE IN THE LONG-TERM SECURE AND NEUTRAL OPERATION OF THE CANAL.

AFTER THE YEAR 2000, WHEN MANAGEMENT OF THE CANAL PASSES TO PANAMA, ARTICLE IV OF THE TREATY CONCERNING THE PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND OPERATION OF THE PANAMA CANAL WILL BECOME CONTROLLING. THE NEUTRALITY TREATY NOT ONLY ESTABLISHES THE LEGAL OBLIGATION OF BOTH PANAMA AND THE UNITED STATES TO MAINTAIN A PERMANENTLY NEUTRAL CANAL; IT ALSO DEFINES

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NEUTRALITY CLEARLY IN TERMS OF CONCRETE STANDARDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE CANAL WHICH BOTH PARTIES ARE PLEDGED TO MAINTAIN. ARTICLE IV MAKES THE UNITED STATES A GUARANTOR OF THAT PERMANENT NEUTRALITY. IT THUS GIVES THE UNITED STATES THE CONTINUING RIGHT, UNILATERALLY IF NECESSARY, TO DEFEND THE CANAL AND ITS OPERATION AGAINST THREATS TO THE NEUTRALITY OF THE CANAL -- AND THUS, THE ABILITY TO DEFEND THE CANAL FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. AND THIS SAME REGIME OF NEUTRALITY, AND OUR RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO UNDERWRITE IT, WILL APPLY AS WELL TO ANY OTHER INTERNATIONAL WATERWAY THAT MIGHT BE BUILT IN PANAMA IN THE FUTURE.

FURTHERMORE, UNDER ARTICLE V OF THE NEUTRALITY TREATY, PANAMA WOULD RELINQUISH THE RIGHT TO INVITE OR ACCEPT FOREIGN MILITARY FORCES OR FOREIGN MILITARY INSTALLATIONS ANYWHERE IN THE REPUBLIC. THIS WOULD BAR PANAMA FROM ENGAGING IN AN ALLIANCE WITH ANY OTHER POWER IN A WAY WHICH INVOLVED THE PRESENCE OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ON ITS SOIL. BY THE SAME

["TOKEN, PANAMA'S BREACH OF THAT COMMITMENT WOULD ENTITLE\nAND OBLIGE THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION\nTO INSURE THE CANAL'S NEUTRALITY.", "WE WOULD NOT, IN SHORT, HAVE A GENERAL RIGHT OF\n\"INTERVENTION\" IN PANAMA'S INTERNAL AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS.\nNOT WOULD WE WANT SUCH A RIGHT. BUT WE HAVE UNDER THE\nNEW TREATIES THE RIGHT AND OBLIGATION TO TAKE SUCH ACTION\nAS IS REQUIRED TO INSURE THAT THE CANAL REMAIN PERMANENTLY\nNEUTRAL -- FREE OF THE THREAT OF FOREIGN MILITARY PRESENCE\nAND FOREVER OPEN TO THE OCEAN-BORNE COMMERCE OF THE WORLD\nON A NON-DISCRIMINATORY BASIS.", "THE NEW TREATIES WILL ESTABLISH A FAR STRONGER LEGAL\nUNDERPINNING AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR THE PROTECTION\nOF OUR INTERESTS IN THE CANAL WHILE RETAINING ALL THE\nESSENTIALS OF ASSURING THE CANAL'S SECURITY. THEIR RATIFI-\NCATION IS THUS AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADVANCE FUNDAMENTAL AMERICAN\nFOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS. THEIR REJECTION, ON THE OTHER\nHAND, WOULD BE READ BY THE NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE AS A"]

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DEMONSTRATION THAT THIS NATION STANDS ON FORCE AS THE
FINAL ARBITER EVEN WHEN A CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVE IS
AVAILABLE. [ SUCH A COURSE WOULD BE UNNECESSARILY COSTLY
TO MANY OTHER OF OUR INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY TO THE
SOLIDARITY AND ALLIANCE OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NATIONS
THAT HAS BEEN CENTRAL TO OUR FOREIGN POLICY FOR GENERATIONS.

AND I AM CONVINCED THAT WE SHALL NOT AGAIN BE GIVEN THE
OPPORTUNITY TO SAFEGUARD AND ADVANCE OUR INTERESTS ON
TERMS AS FAVORABLE AS THOSE WHICH HAVE JUST BEEN NEGOTIATED.

THE MOMENT WHEN WE ARE CLEARLY STRONG ENOUGH TO DEFEND OUR
RIGHTS IN THE CANAL AND WHILE THE CANAL IS FREE OF IMMEDIATE
THREAT AND MENACE PROVIDES THE BEST OPPORTUNITY TO PREEMPT
A POTENTIAL CRISIS AND TO SECURE THE FUTURE OF THE CANAL
ON MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TERMS.

LET ME TURN NOW TO SOME OF THE CONCERNS AND QUESTIONS
THAT HAVE BEEN RAISED WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW TREATIES.

FIRST, SOME HAVE ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF PANAMA
WERE TO ABROGATE THE TREATY. THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT

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THIS IS A POSSIBILITY. BUT IT MUST BE VIEWED AGAINST THE NEAR-CERTAINTY THAT THE 1903 TREATY WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED ANY LONGER EITHER BY PANAMA OR BY THE OTHER NATIONS OF THE HEMISPHERE. THE QUESTION THEREFORE IS WHICH ARRANGEMENT PUTS US IN THE BEST LEGAL, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY POSITION TO PROTECT OUR RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IF WE ARE FORCED TO DO SO BY THE UNILATERAL ACTION OF PANAMA. I BELIEVE THAT THE NEW TREATIES WILL SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE THE RISKS OF ABROGATION, AND WILL ALSO CREATE FAR BETTER CONDITIONS IN WHICH WE COULD DEFEND OUR RIGHTS IF ABROGATION SHOULD OCCUR.

BY ESTABLISHING A RELATIONSHIP OF SHARED RESPONSIBILITY AND BENEFIT, THE NEW TREATIES MAKE PANAMA A PARTNER IN A SUCCESSFUL CANAL ENTERPRISE. THEY INCREASE PANAMA'S STAKE IN SAFEGUARDING THE VITAL INTERESTS WE WISH TO ASSURE -- A FREE, OPEN, SAFE, AND WELL-RUN CANAL. THE NEW ARRANGEMENT ACCORDS WITH THE REALITY THAT CONSENT AND COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOR ARE THE ONLY BASES FOR SECURE OPERATION

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OF A CANAL WHICH IS LOCATED WITHIN PANAMANIAN TERRITORY AND EVEN NOW IS RUN BY A PREDOMINANTLY PANAMANIAN LABOR FORCE. BUT IF, DESPITE EVERYTHING, WE HAVE TO ACT TO DEFEND THE CANAL, WE WOULD BE IN A FAR STRONGER POSITION TO DO SO IN THE NAME OF A 1977 TREATY FREELY NEGOTIATED AND SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF THE HEADS OF GOVERNMENT OF MOST OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NATIONS THAN IN THE NAME OF AN AGREEMENT CONCLUDED SEVENTY FIVE YEARS AGO AND WHICH EVERY LATIN AMERICAN NATION IN EVERY RECENT MEETING OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES HAS REPEATEDLY URGED US TO REPLACE.

ONE OF THE STRONGEST ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF RATIFICATION IS IN FACT ITS IMPACT ON COOPERATIVE WESTERN HEMISPHERE RELATIONSHIPS. OUR DECISIONS ON THESE TREATIES WILL TESTIFY TO THEM WHETHER OR NOT WE ARE WILLING TO RESOLVE DISPUTES WITH THEM ON THE BASIS OF NEGOTIATION. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT RATIFICATION OF THE TREATIES WILL RESOLVE ALL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US AND OUR NEIGHBORS TO THE SOUTH. OUR CAPACITY

FOR COOPERATION, UNDERSTANDING AND IMAGINATION WILL BE
TESTED IN THIS HEMISPHERE LONG AFTER THE PANAMA ISSUE IS
RESOLVED AND FOR AS FAR INTO THE FUTURE AS ONE CAN SEE.
THERE WILL BE MANY WHO DO NOT WISH US WELL IN THE AREA
EVEN IF WE RATIFY THE TREATIES. BUT FAILURE TO RATIFY WILL
PROVIDE HOSTILE FORCES WITH A PERMANENT ISSUE OF INCALCULABLE
VALUE AROUND WHICH TO RALLY AND ENCOURAGE A VAST NEW TIDE
OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT AND MAKE IT POLITICALLY IMPOSSIBLE
FOR OUR FRIENDS TO RALLY TO OUR SIDE.

I FIND IT SIGNIFICANT THAT NO HEMISPHERE LEADER,
REGARDLESS OF WHAT HIS PRIVATE FEELINGS ON THIS ISSUE MIGHT
BE, FEELS ABLE PUBLICLY TO TAKE ANY POSITION OTHER THAN THAT
OF STRONGEST SUPPORT FOR THE MODERNIZATION OF THE 1903 TREATY.
THIS REFLECTS THE DEPTH OF PUBLIC SENTIMENT ON THE ISSUE.
~~NO GOVERNMENT AND NO PUBLIC OPINION IN ANY OF THE~~
COUNTRIES OF THIS HEMISPHERE WOULD BE WILLING