4319 Fessenden St., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20016

9 December 1968

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Office of the President-Elect
Hotel Pierre
5th Avenue & 61st St.
New York, N. Y.

My dear Henry,

The enclosed official description of Colonel Haig's qualifications and achievements is good and correct but, of course, it does not tell you anything, since such bureaucratic resumes can never depict the man.

I have observed Haig over very many years. He is, above all, a man of exceptional strength of character, who happens to be also very intelligent and endowed with an innate grasp of politico-psychological intangibles.

Haig came to my attention about 8 years ago, when he was a young lieutenant colonel in the International Plans and Policy Division of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (G-3). Since he was writing the Army comments on all JCS papers pertaining to Western Europe, I thought it desirable to give him my private advice regarding European reality. I noticed immediately that such advice was unnecessary. By knowledge as well as by instinct Haig understood everything on his own. We very soon worked together -- although that was by no means my official mission -- in order to thwart certain unrealistic JCS gimmick-concepts. The lieutenant colonel (and this really means something in a hierarchical world) stood his ground with absolutely extraordinary courage and presented his counter-arguments tirelessly in writing and in informal conversations with his superiors. Because of his unaggressive, quiet manners he was, surprisingly enough, able to do so without arousing anybody's antagonism. The latter feat is perhaps even more remarkable than his independence in thought and action.

Due to his unusual qualities Haig was pulled out of the International Plans and Policy Division and attached to lawyer Califano, then the hard-driving General Counsel of the Army who was very close to Vance and clearly destined for a rather spectacular career in government. Although Haig knew nothing at all about Cuba, he was supposed to serve Califano exclusively on Cuban affairs, which Califano handled, not in

his capacity of General Counsel, but as an ad hoc trouble shooter for
the Secretary of Defense. Califano, of course, had never heard of Haig
before, and I remember telling him that he was getting one of the very
best officers in the Army and that, for God's sake, he should not use
so gifted a man only for Cuban matters.

Actually Califano discovered the extreme overall-usefulness of
Haig very soon. Rising steadily through the Pentagon hierarchy, he
kept the lieutenant colonel with him, although for the latter it was a
tough rather than a friendly assignment. In the end Haig sat in McNamara's
inner office and very often was the only military person to accompany the
Secretary to White House and NSC meetings. In this position, peculiarly
tempting for a young officer, Haig retained his utter integrity to an
extent which even aroused the admiration of McNamara himself, whose
general capability for admiring others is decidedly underdeveloped. When
Haig left OSD to attend the Army War College, he received McNamara's
photo with an inscription expressing the Secretary's respect and admi-
ration in astonishingly strong terms. Califano explained to me that
McNamara had remarked, while signing the photo, "This is one of only
two Army officers who dare to contradict me to my face." Again Haig had
succeeded in making his points fearlessly and yet, at the same time,
gaining the respect and trust of a most difficult, near-dictatorial man.

Individuals of Haig's characteristics have become very rare. Our
mass age is not conducive to producing the type. In your fearsomely
responsible new position you will be a lonely man and you need at least
a very few on whose unshakeable human reliability, integrity, and profound
understanding you can rely. I have known you for some time and I am con-
vinced that you will be more than well served by this man.

At this moment everybody is trying to obtain something from you,
because you have risen so high. My interest in Haig is not a personal
one. In fact, he and I are not close friends but merely respect each other.
He addresses me most formally as "Dr. Kraemer" and I call him "Colonel Haig."

The country, however, is in a very difficult and dangerous situa-
tion, and it is necessary that the few talents we have get into positions
where they can be objectively most useful, and where they can be loyal and
effective helpers of men like yourself on whose performance so very much
depends.

As ever,

Kraemer

2

CAREER RESUME OF

COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., 050790, ARMOR

Colonel Alexander M. Haig, Jr., 050790, Armor, was born on 2 December 1924 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He is married and has three children. He entered on active duty as a Second Lieutenant on 3 June 1947.

Colonel Haig graduated from the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York in 1947 and received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Military Science. He also received a Master of Arts Degree in International Relations from Georgetown University, Washington, D. C., in 1962.

In his early assignments from 1947 to 1949, Colonel Haig attended the normal Basic Officer Courses and served as a Platoon Leader and Regimental Staff Officer. He served as Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff, General Headquarters, Far East Command (Japan) from June 1949 to September 1950. In September 1950, he was assigned as Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, X Corps, Far East Command (Korea). He remained in this position until June 1951, at which time, he returned to Fort Knox, Kentucky and served in additional troop and staff positions until September 1952.

Following attendance at the Armored Officer Advanced Class at Fort Knox, Colonel Haig was assigned to the United States Military Academy where he served as a Tactics Instructor and Tactical Officer until June 1955. His next assignment was as a Tactical Officer at the Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland, where he remained for one year.

Colonel Haig was assigned to Europe from August 1956 to June 1959. During this tour he served as a Tank Battalion S3 and later as a Logistics Staff Officer at Headquarters, United States Army Europe.

Upon graduating from the Command and Staff Course at the Naval War College in June 1960, Colonel Haig attended Georgetown University, receiving his MA in 1962. He was then assigned to the International and Policy Planning Division, Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Washington, D. C. In July 1963, he became Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. Colonel Haig remained in this position until January 1964 when he was appointed as Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Cuban Affairs. In April 1964, Colonel Haig became Military Assistant to the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense. He remained in this key position until June 1965 when he became a student at the Army War College.

Following graduation from the Army War College in 1966, Colonel Haig was assigned to Vietnam. In combat with the 1st Infantry Division from July 1966 until May 1967, he served successively in the positions of Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Battalion Commander, and finally Brigade Commander. In July 1967, Colonel Haig returned to the United States and was assigned to the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York. At West Point he has served successively to date as Commanding Officer, 3d Regiment, United States Corps of Cadets and as Deputy Commandant, United States Corps of Cadets.

During his distinguished career, Colonel Haig has participated in six military campaigns in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. He has been awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the Silver Star with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Merit with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Distinguished Flying Cross with two Oak Leaf Clusters, the Bronze Star Medal with one Oak Leaf Cluster, the Air Medal with 23 Oak Leaf Clusters, the Purple Heart, and the Combat Infantry Badge.

PREVIOUS DUTIES: (Con't)

Platoon Leader, Troop F, 8th Cavalry,
Far East Command 8/48 - 8/48
Platoon Leader, Headquarters Troop,
1st Cavalry, Far East Command 8/48 - 12/48
Athletics and Recreation Officer,
Service Troop, 8th Cavalry, Far
East Command 12/48 - 4/49
Athletics and Recreation Officer,
Headquarters and Headquarters Company,
8th Cavalry, Far East Command 4/49 - 4/49
Administrative Assistant, Office of the
Chief of Staff, Headquarters, Far East
Command 6/49 - 9/50
Aide-de-Camp, Headquarters, X Corps,
Far East Command 9/50 - 6/51
Aide-de-Camp, Headquarters, Far East
Command 6/51 - 8/51
Company Commander, Headquarters,
and Service Company, 131st Tank Battalion,
Ft Knox, Kentucky 8/51 - 11/51
Company Commander, Company B, 131st Tank
Battalion, Ft Knox, Kentucky 11/51 - 6/52
Training Inspector, G3 Section, Ft Knox,
Kentucky 6/52 - 9/52
Student Officer, The Armor School, Ft Knox,
Kentucky 9/52 - 6/53
Tactics Instructor, Combined Arms Detachment,
1802d Special Regiment, West Point, New York 6/53 - 9/53
Tactical Officer, U.S. Corps of Cadets, U.S.
Military Academy, West Point, New York 9/53 - 6/55
Company Officer, Midshipman Company, U.S. Naval
Academy, Annapolis, Maryland 6/55 - 8/56
Battalion S-3, Headquarters and Service Company,
899th Tank Battalion, US Army Europe 8/56 - 12/57
Logistics Staff Officer, Installations Branch,
G-4 Division, Headquarters, US Army Europe 12/57 - 6/59
Student Officer, Naval War College, Newport,
Rhode Island 8/59 - 6/60
Member, Staff and Faculty, Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island 6/60 - 8/60
Student Officer, Georgetown University,
Washington, D. C 9/60 - 2/62

PREVIOUS DUTIES: (Con't)

Staff Officer, Intelligence and Policy Planning
Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff
for Operations, Washington, D. C. 2/62 - 7/63
Military Assistant to the Secretary of the Army,
Washington, D. C. 7/63 - 2/64
Military Assistant, Office of Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense (Cuban Affairs),
Washington, D. C. 2/64 - 5/65
Military Assistant to the Special Assistant to
the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Washington, D. C. 5/65 - 6/65
Student Officer, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania 8/65 - 6/66
G-3, 1st Infantry Division, Viet Nam 7/66 - 10/66
Battalion Commander, 1st Battalion, 26th Infantry,
1st Infantry Division, Viet Nam 10/66 - 4/67
Brigade Commander, 2d Brigade, 1st Infantry Division,
Viet Nam 4/67 - 5/67
Commanding Officer, 3d Regiment, US Corps of Cadets,
US Military Academy, West Point, New York 7/67 - 6/68
Deputy Commandant, US Corps of Cadets,
US Military Academy, West Point, New York 6/68 - Present

EXTRACTS FROM EFFICIENCY REPORTS ON COLONEL ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., USA, 050790

Position: Commander of 3d Regiment,
U. S. Military Academy

Date: June 1968

Evaluator: Colonel A. J. Hughes,
Deputy Commandant,
West Point

"An affable, well mannered officer... Polished and erudite, he is an outstanding organizer; is adept at handling a great amount of detail smoothly... is a perspicacious and analytical thinker who works hard, plans ahead, and gets results... He is long on good sound common sense. Possesses an outstanding knowledge of military and world affairs and he speaks and writes well... an extremely capable Colonel who is definitely General officer material for he has the qualifications, the drive, and the ability. He will stand out at or near the top of the list in any competition... of resolute character and high morals and he is a fine husband and father. Recommended for key positions, staff or command, at the very highest echelons in the Army and the Defense Establishment..."

Evaluator: Brigadier General Bernard W. Rodgers
Commandant of Cadets, West Point

"I have served with Colonel Haig in previous assignments, to include combat as well as staff assignments at the highest level. In all types of assignments, Colonel Haig performs in a manner which is truly outstanding and better than any other officer I have known."

Position: Battalion Commander,
1st Infantry Division, Vietnam

Date: March 1967

Evaluator: Colonel William B. Caldwell III,
Brigade Commander

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is the most outstanding Infantry Battalion Commander I have seen in combat in Vietnam. He is articulate, intelligent, courageous, and is possessed of high personal and professional standards dedicated to the accomplishment of his mission... For his actions against two Viet Cong Regiments during Operation Junction City, 31 March thru April 1967, Lieutenant Colonel Haig was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross... Because of his outstanding performance of duty, he was selected on the field of battle to be a Brigade Commander when the former Brigade Commander was wounded. Lieutenant Colonel Haig is General officer material and should be given positions of great responsibility."

Evaluator: Major General J. H. Hay
Commanding General

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is without doubt one of the finest combat leaders the United States Army has produced during this war. He possesses all the qualities that such a leader should have; namely, great professional knowledge, initiative, perserverence, aggressiveness, and the ability to elicit from subordinates maximum effort in their performance of duty... He is erudite, articulate, imaginative, and refuses to accept any form of mediocrity. Lieutenant Colonel Haig has the capability and potential to rise to positions of great authority and responsibility in the military establishment..."

Position: Battalion Commander
1st Infantry Division, Viet Name

Date: February 1967

Evaluator: Colonel Sidney B. Berry Jr.,
Brigade Commander

"Colonel Haig possesses to an unusual degree the intellectual, personal, and professional qualities which make him equally effective as a high level staff officer or as a battlefield commander... He is capable of serving in positions of highest responsibility and is a potential three or four-star general."

Evaluator: Major General W. E. DePuy
Commanding General

"He has already demonstrated beyond any doubt that he is a masterful tactician, a cool and courageous combat leader, and I now regard him as the best battalion commander in the division... I expect lieutenant colonel Haig to rise high in the ranks of general officers. I strongly recommend that he be considered for selection to brigadier just as soon as possible and well ahead of his contemporaries."

Position: G-3, 1st Infantry Division, Vietnam

Date: November 1966

Evaluator: Major General W. E. DePuy,
Commanding General

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is one of those officers who should one day wear four stars. As the G-3 of this division, he was the primary moving force in planning and in operations. He is brilliant, extremely courageous, a 24 hour-a-day worker and a man of complete integrity and high moral character... Colonel Haig has all the tickets to go all the way and the Army should be very careful to manage his future assignments and to accelerate his promotion so that the Army and our country can enjoy the benefits of what this officer has to offer."

School: US Army War College
(student)

Date: June 1966

Evaluator: Major General Eugene A. Salet,
Commandant

"A highly intelligent, well-informed officer who freely, cheerfully and enthusiastically participated in all curricular and noncurricular activities of this installation. Quiet in manner, he displays an excellent sense of humor and a very pleasant personality... In all respects he exhibited superior leadership qualities. He demonstrated complete objectivity when considering matters of national significance, and is considered fully qualified for assignment to joint, combined, unified, allied, or OSD staffs... His poise, persuasiveness, and professional maturity mark him clearly as one of the outstanding members of his class. During the academic year, he and his family have made an outstanding contribution to this military community. He assisted in the Boy Scout Program and the Catholic Youth Program. He organized and conducted a Horse Show; and he actively participated in adult athletic programs. His wife served as a Gray Lady and was active in many programs sponsored by the Officers' Wives Club... He is general officer material."

Position: The Military Assistant to The Special Assistant Date: April 1965
to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense

Evaluator: Mr. Joseph A. Califano, Jr.,
The Special Assistant to the
Secretary and Deputy Secretary
of Defense

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is the most outstanding officer of his rank. I have ever worked with. In a post which I consider one of the most difficult and demanding in the Department of Defense, he has worked day and night, under extreme pressure with total dedication, in duties which cover the full spectrum of the Department of Defense... His duties as military point of contact between the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the President required him to deal with a large number of important Government figures. This he did with great tact and competence. I have counted on him to handle White House correspondence of personal interest to the President, to pass on most of the cases himself, and to select those few which needed my personal attention. He was personally selected by the Secretary of Defense to develop and prepare briefings which the Secretary gave to the highest officials of the Executive and Legislative branches of the government. The President personally commented on the excellent work on important matters performed with the White House staff... Lieutenant Colonel Haig is the most outstanding Lieutenant Colonel of any service whom I have ever known."

Evaluator: The Honorable Cyrus R. Vance,
Deputy Secretary of Defense

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig has performed his important mission in a manner that could be expected of very few officers. He is one of the most outstanding military men with whom it has ever been my privilege to be associated. The depth of his professional background in political and military affairs, the total nature of his integrity and dedication and the sensitivity of his judgement have made him an invaluable assistant. He is a tremendous asset to the Army and to the country."

Position: Staff Officer, Politico-Military Branch, International Policy Division; Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations

Date: August 1963

Evaluator: Major General C. E. Hutchen, Jr.
Director of Strategic Plans and Studies

"Lieutenant Colonel Haig is outstanding. He has poise, an incisive intellect, a fine sense of humor, and a remarkable ability to look ahead. He is polished, sociable and obviously physically fit... he demonstrated an unusual grasp of both international affairs and staff procedures... Demonstrated mature judgement and finesse. A man of high standards, he took a great interest in his family and his community. A pillar of strength in plans - a topnotch team player, an accomplished planner -- this officer should be specially marked for positions of great responsibility..."

13 June 1969

TO: Dr. Kissinger

FROM: Kraemer

SUBJ: View of the Future

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

A

As you know, I happen to read more classified and unclassified strategic material than most other human beings can afford to peruse under modern bureaucratic and social pressures.

The over-all picture emerging from these daily readings, and from conversations with people of remarkably varied backgrounds is profoundly reassuring. Fully aware of the fact that your own power is infinitely more limited than naive amateurs believe, I submit to you, nevertheless, for what use you want to make of it, the following observations.

B

1. Regardless of any details of US actions and declarations regarding Vietnam, the conviction is worldwide that we, the United States, simply "want out." This global impression may be quite wrong, but it is in itself a factor of ominous importance.

2. We--not only the United States but the entire "Western" world--have evinced only minimum reactions regarding the invasion of Czechoslovakia, the capture of the Pueblo, the shooting down of the EC-121, the shelling of our fishing boats by Peru, the unfriendliness of other Latin American nations in connection with the Rockefeller trip, and countless other breaches of the peace or encroachments on our own interests and those of our Allies. In each of these cases it may have been statesman-like and prudent not to retaliate by anything but words. In sum total, however, the image of the United States as a paper tiger is coming dangerously close to being universally accepted.

3. World public opinion may, indeed, be mistaken and underestimate the deep, underlying strength and health of this country (which happens to be far greater than that of "overcivilized" Italy, France, Britain, West Germany, or Scandinavia) yet, this all-pervasive feeling that the United States--at least for some time to come--does not want to become actively

"involved" in any confrontation, constitutes an almost irrepressible temptation for any wild-eyed elements to use for action the broad leeway we appear willing to concede to them. It would be primitive to think here only of Moscow, which has its own troubles, or Peking, or Hanoi, or Havana, all of whom might push forward more aggressively in the belief that such pushing would not be "confronted." I am thinking just as much of elements which cannot be labeled Communist. Arabs and Israelis, for example --estimating that we would not really intervene in any new armed conflict between them--might, for that very reason, glide gradually into such a conflict. Indians and Pakistanis, not deterred by awe and fear of the United States might more easily try another round against each other. Latin American juntas of officers, or possibly some neo-Peronistas in Argentina, or just some excited groups on some non-Communist Caribbean island, might start a fire, believing that there is no one around to restrain them.

4. Time was, when a harsh letter of warning from a President of the United States actually prevented Turkey from landing forces on Cyprus and thereby starting a Turko-Greek war. One can entertain legitimate doubts as to whether or not that letter was tactful and "politic," but the point is that the Turks felt impelled to comply. You probably noticed the Dayan interview in the New York Times Magazine of June 8. When asked:

"Do you believe that Israel can allow itself to reject an American/Russian agreement, if this agreement provides for the complete evacuation of conquered territories?"

he calmly announced that such decision would be rejected by Israel. At another point of the interview he remarked:

"I don't say that we are so powerful that the Big Four, or even one of them, could not force us to retreat. They can. But not by procedures, such as embargo, or by refusing us certain things [Phantoms and Mirages], of course, if the Americans send their Marines, they can win, but I don't think that they will make us with-draw by [diplomatic and economic] pressure alone."

Dayan certainly is not the only one to grasp the difference between potential [military] power, the use of which is merely threatened, and actual power actually brought to bear. By now there has arisen among friend and foe a very sincere conviction that, for quite a while, we will not really bring our power to bear.

5. Thus, things will happen, actions will be committed, in various areas of the world which will make simmering conflicts explode into open fires.

- 2 -

With everybody convinced that we are no longer inclined to play the fire brigade and dowse the flames--except by low-key measures and well-tempered diplomatic action--the danger of their developing into huge conflagrations is most real and frightening. Being a large country, unavoidably tied by economic and political interests to affairs in all parts of the globe, we would, in the end, be sucked into the fray anyway, whether we want it or not. It would mean World War III, unwanted by Washington and Moscow alike, but ignited by irresponsible fanatics--Anarchists, Nationalists, or Communists--encouraged by our passivity to heat up seemingly "local" conflicts.

6. President Nixon--whose long unsuspected very high intelligence and uncanny instinctive grasp of realities I used to praise loudly when doing so was distinctly unpopular--has appointed Secretary Rogers because of the latter's special qualifications as a skilled negotiator. The Secretary of State, however, will be unable, regardless of his skills, to negotiate successfully with anyone, if even the least powerful of those he has to negotiate with, do not believe that behind him there is the will of the United States to use its actual strength and react forcefully when its interests, or quite generally: the interests of peace, are threatened.

7. If, in fact, we are not willing to confront others in the harsh ways which are used by many elements in this world, we must at least make a better pretense of such willingness. If we cannot bring ourselves to do so, we will, very soon, stand naked, not only before our enemies, but even before our Allies (who will not listen to us either, as long as they consider us "weak" or "unreliable").

8. I also have dire premonitions regarding the reaction that will occur within our own country. In the lower middle classes and among the workers, with whom highly placed people of rank rarely converse in depth, there is building up a distinctly ominous, if inarticulate, sense of frustration and untutored anger. It is particularly frightening that economic conditions in those aforementioned classes are remarkably satisfactory as a whole and that their rage and frustration are not specific but rather amorphous and ill-defined. The masses somehow feel unguided and insecure, and they might turn inexorably to some false prophets, to some self-proclaimed "strong" men. If we cannot satisfy the emotional--as opposed to mere economic--needs of the masses, others, the wrong ones, will fill the vacuum. I have always considered myself a rather conservative individual and am so considered by others, but I am certain that I, too, would be swept away as part of the "intellectual crowd" by the angry new "Leaders" of the "average" people.

9. I am deeply afraid now, in other words, that cleverness and brilliant schemes, diplomatic finesse, and complex chess-board moves can no longer save us, externally or internally. We do not have to become "brutal and primitive." But there has to be a very intense effort on our part to be

- 3 -

13 June 1969

TO: Dr. Kissinger

FROM: Kraemer

SUBJ: View of the Future

A

B

"I don't say that we are so powerful that the Big Four, or even one of them, could not force us to retreat. They can. *But not by procedures, such as embargo, or by refusing us certain things [Phantoms and Mirages], of course, if the Americans send their Marines, they can win, but I don't think that they will make us withdraw by [diplomatic and economic] pressure alone."

Dayan certainly is not the only one to grasp the difference between potential [military] power, the use of which is merely threatened, and actual power actually brought to bear. By now there has arisen among friend and foe a very sincere conviction that, for quite a while, we will *not really* bring *our* power to bear.

- 2 -

- 3 -

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

EXECUTIVE

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

6 February 1970

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
The White House

Dear Henry:

You will agree, I believe, that I have never, regardless of what your power position was, asked you for any favors. Today I feel impelled to request of you two things which, of course, have nothing whatever to do with me personally, but which I feel ought to be done:

1. I beg you to look at the enclosed one-page (draft) memorandum, subject: "Wars of National Liberation." The memorandum was written by one of the most experienced Psychological and Special Operations experts in this building, Mr. Bjelajac. When still very young this Yugoslav aristocrat was Under Secretary of the Army of his native country. He later became an officer in the US Army (at present retired full Colonel of the US Army Reserve) and a Special Advisor in the Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations here in the building. He has been in the Pentagon almost as long as I, myself, and I have great respect for his deep understanding, as well as for his patriotism. If you find some merit, as I certainly do, in the concept proposed by him, you might give him 10 minutes on your incredibly crowded calendar, or at least let him talk briefly to General Haig.

2. This is a new, entirely different subject of less substantive importance. I would like, nevertheless, to have your help in the matter for purely human as well as for practical reasons.

Major General Sutton, for years Chief of the Army Reserve, formerly Battalion and later Regimental Commander in the 84th Infantry Division, handed me today the enclosed letter plus latest copy of the Army Reserve Magazine. The man is totally selfless

WHITE HOUSE

Washington, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State

The Secretary of Defense

The Administrator of the Agency for International Development

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director of the United States Information Agency

SUBJECT: "Wars of National Liberation"

1. The purpose of this directive is to insure that the United States effort to find an antidote to Communist "Wars of National Liberation" is given a priority in our national defense second only to our nuclear defenses. The emphasis, however, is to be on the development and use of high quality expertise rather than on large numbers of personnel and large quantities of resources.

2. In recognition that "Wars of National Liberation," which may undermine the security of lesser developed countries, are extraordinarily complex and require more than coordination; and to achieve the needed integration in such activities as internal security, nation building and psychological operations potential of the U. S. agencies operating overseas, I am establishing an Internal Security and Psychological Strategy Board (ISAPSB) under NSC. It will be the national focal point not only to achieve integration but also to give impetus to/and improve the operations in these important areas. Its chief will make periodic reports to me on overall progress and problems.

S..................

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

26 October 1971

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
National Security Council
West Wing
The White House

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Sorry to bother you about a matter which, however, concerns
you rather than me.

Several days ago I received a phone call from a Mr. Barnard
Collier telling me that he was going to write a piece on you in
Time Magazine. He stated that in his conversation with you, you
had mentioned my name as a source re your life and thinking. I
informed the pleasant sounding gentleman that as a civil servant
I was not in the habit of giving any interviews and that, in the past,
I had spoken to journalists about you only at your specific request,
and as a service to you.

In the end I informed Mr. B.C. that I would, after you return
from abroad, get in touch with you and ask, whether it was your
desire that I talk to him.

The decision is entirely up to you. I would, however, be
grateful, if you were to express your decision in writing, since
I have noted that--overburdened as you are--you cannot afterwards
remember what you did, or did not, state orally.

Since it is my endeavor to add nothing to the almost unbearable
weight you are bearing now, I will take your mere silence as an answer.
In other words, you do not have to write even a line to me re Mr.
Collier. If I don't get a note from you, I shall simply inform him
that I have not been specifically authorized by you to speak to him
about you.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

June 28, 1973

Dr. Kissinger,

Colonel Marshall has asked me to forward the enclosed
invitation to you to join in a birthday dinner for my father
on July 3.

Some friends of my father's got together quite recently and
spontaneously planned this dinner surprise even at this late
moment.

I realize that you almost certainly cannot join the group in
Washington on July 3, but perhaps it might be possible for
you to send a few words to a remarkable crusader.

I hope that you will be able to enjoy some happy hours in
the California sun with your children.

We are very hopeful here that the President's courageous
veto message on the Cambodia bombing halt may be meshed
with a comprehensive Administration plan to brief the mem-
bers of Congress on the issues, to get supportive and doubting
forces in line on the Hill and to address the American people
on the very serious implications for strategy and for conscience
of a unilateral and precipitous bombing halt. There is still
a considerable reservoir of Congressional support for achiev-
ing a workable peace, but this will require considerable plan-
ning and personal effort by the highest levels in Washington
in order to be sustained through the summer.

Sven Kraemer

TELEGRAM

KISSINGER, HENRY

The White House
Washington

FULL RATE
(STRAIGHT TELEGRAM) ☒

NIGHT LETTER ☐

San Clemente

July 3, 1973

Dear Kraemer,

I deeply regret that duties in San Clemente prevent me from
being present at the dinner in your honor. There is no man more
deserving of tribute from his friends and his country.

You have been over the past thirty years a true friend and teacher.
You have recognized the potential in others and given them encourage-
ment and sustenance along the way. Your integrity and selflessness have
inspired all those whose lives you touched. Those of us who have known
you are indeed fortunate.

Congratulations on sixty-five remarkable years, and every best
wish for the future.

Dr. Fritz G. A. Kraemer
c/o Donald S. Marshall
3414 Halcyon Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22305

RECEIVED
JUL 1 1 1973

CENTRAL FILES

APPROVED FOR DISPATCH

TELEGRAM

The White House

Washington

San Clemente

FULL RATE
(STRAIGHT TELEGRAM) ☑

DAY LETTER ☐

NIGHT LETTER ☐

July 3, 1973

Dear Fritz, Kraemer

Your wise counsel over the past four years has been invaluable to me. You have helped us find the right solutions to the most difficult challenges we have faced. At crucial moments I have been able to count on your intellectual independence and integrity, and your deep understanding of the international scene.

More than that, you have been over the past thirty years a true friend and teacher. You have recognized the potential in others and given them encouragement and sustenance along the way. This earth is full of selflessness, love and justice, but only rarely blessed with men of your selflessness and nobility. Those of us who have known you are indeed fortunate.

Dr. Fritz G. A. Kraemer
c/o Donald S. Marshall
3414 Halcyon Drive, Alexandria, Virginia 22305

APPROVED FOR DISPATCH

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

26 June 1973

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

On the 3rd of July 1973, Dr. Fritz G. A. Kraemer reaches age 65. A number of his close friends and colleagues wish to pay their respects, appreciation and tribute to Dr. Kraemer for his truly meaningful contributions to the Nation, to the Department of the Army -- and to themselves as individuals.

Taking into consideration Dr. Kraemer's dislike of formal affairs, we have arranged for an informal evening at the Fort McNair Officers Mess. Cocktails will commence at seven thirty, dinner at eight thirty. Although there will be no formal head table, there will be the presentation of a book of our expressions of appreciation. We will pay our tribute through the presentation of a Wilkinson-made commemorative fighting sword.

We very much hope that, as one of Dr. Kraemer's most valued long-time friends and colleagues, you will be able to participate in each of the activities. If it is impossible to spend the evening with the group, you may wish to contribute a letter expressing your sentiments suitable for inclusion in the Book of Sentiments and/or participate in funding the presentation sword. Attached is a blank note, enabling you to indicate which of these expressions you would like to participate in.

Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF ARMY
PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

VZCZCSCD165 Q#H078 REUP 006745 2890256
RATUZYUW RUEKJCS8049 2890256-UUUU--RUEADWD.

ZNR UUUUU
R 160256Z OCT 73
FM JCS
INFO RUENAAA/CNO WASH DC
RUEADWD/CSA WASH DC
RUEKAAA/ANMCC FORT RITCHIE MD
RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY

R 160050Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 231
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UNCLASS USUN 3956

E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS: PFOR, UN, ME

SUBJ: KISSINGER LUNCH FOR ARAB DELS. TO UNGA

IN CASE DEPT NOT ALREADY AWARE OF IT FOLLOWING APPEARED WITH SOME PROMINENCE IN OCT. 13 ISSUE OF JEUNE AFRIQUE UNDER TITLE "LET A JEW DO IT".

BEGIN QUOTE:

CONTRARY TO WHAT THE LONDON TIMES ASSERTED IN ITS SEPTEMBER 26 EDITION THERE IS NO "KISSINGER PLAN" TO RESOLVE THE ISRAELI-ARAB CRISIS. WE HAVE THAT CERTAINTY FROM SEVERAL ARAB AMBASSADORS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE LUNCH GIVEN SEPT. 25 BY THE NEW SECRETARY OF STATE IN HONOR OF 13 ARAB DELEGATION CHIEFS AT THE UN AS WELL AS THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE ARAB LEAGUE. KISSINGER SAID TO HIS GUESTS:

"YOUR PROBLEM WITH ISRAEL IS A SENSITIVITY PROBLEM. TO TRY TO LIMIT IT AT THE FIRST APPROACH TO A RIGID PLAN WOULD BE EQUIVALENT TO CONDEMNING IT TO FAILURE FROM THE BEGINNING. MY VIETNAMESE EXPERIENCE IS INSTRUCTIVE IN THIS REGARD. I THEREFORE PREFER TO DIRECT MY EFFORTS TO BEGIN WITH, TO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH WITH THE ULTIMATE AIM OF SATISFYING YOUR LEGITIMATE DEMANDS."

THESE ARE KISSINGER'S OWN WORDS WHICH ALL OF OUR INFORMANTS HAVE CONFIRMED TO US.

KISSINGER WENT SO FAR AS TO ADMIT TO HIS GUESTS THAT

HE WOULD NOT EVEN START WITH RESOLUTION 242 OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL "HICH HE FINDS "AMBIGUOUS" (A POINT OF VIEW ALSO SUPPORTED BY THE ISRAELIS AND WHICH CERTAIN ENLIGHTENED ARABS ARE PREPARED TO CONCEDE).

"STARTING FROM RESOLUTION 242", SAID KISSINGER TO HIS GUESTS, "IN EFFECT COMPLICATES THE PROBLEM MORE.

I ASK THIS OF YOU IN ONE WORD. GIVE ME YOUR CONFIDENCE, I NEED IT AND I WILL MAKE A STRONG EFFORT TO BRING GENERAL DAYAN AND HIS FRIENDS TO REASON."

REACTION OF THE ARABS--JUBILATION. REACTION OF THE ISRAELIS--THE VISE CLOSES AGAIN. ALL THE MORE SO SINCE THEY ARE NOT EVEN ABLE TO ACCUSE KISSINGER, A JEW WHO ESCAPED FROM HITLERIAN DARKNESS, OF SELLING OUT THE INTERESTS OF THE JEWS. END QUOTE.

SCALI
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16 Oct 73 09 03Z

TO: MG Foster
FROM: F.G.A. Kraemer

20 May 1974

20 May 1974

SUBJ: ME: Highest Praise for Sec. State Kissinger by Asad

Syrian President Asad is reliably reported to have made the following statements (16 May 74) to Muhsin, Chief of Saiqa (a Fedayeen group) and member of Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Executive Committee:

(1) Palestinian Commando operation in Israeli Town of Maalot would not prevent, or even seriously retard, Syrian/Israeli disengagement.

Nor would it affect Kissinger's efforts to bring about Israeli withdrawal from Golan Heights.

(2) Praise for "intelligence, integrity and diplomatic skills" of U.S. Sec. State. Having initially suspected Kissinger to be prejudiced in favor of Israel, and of unwillingness to apply pressure on Israeli Govt, he [Asad] now "impressed with Kissinger's ability to extract concessions from Israel." Egypt being far more active than U.S. in arguing for concessions to be made by Syria.

(3) Disengagement in Golan Heights would have no effect on Syria's continuing support for Palestinian Cause.

Specifically, he, [Asad] has "no objection to the Maalot operation and endorses idea of increasing Fedayeen activity in Israeli-occupied territory."

### Kraemer Comment:

The very last sentence above is particularly revealing. Maalot was not captured by Israel in one of the post-independence wars, but forms part of Israel proper. Asad's remark indicates that he, as a matter of course, considers what is now Israel, as simply being Arab territory being occupied by the Israelis.

In connection with his expressions of complete confidence in U.S. Sec. State, it shows Asad as expecting, somehow, to obtain the final goal of total liberation of all Arab soil with U.S. help or at least, acquiescence.

OVER: