Part II -- Main Edition -- 11 August 1977

FEATURES COLUMNISTS

THE DEFENSE
MONITOR

CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D.C.

Volume VI, Number 5

July 1977 (11 AUGUST)

SALT: A Race Against
The Arms Race

*Monitor in Brief*

* The Carter administration appears to be committed to a substantial reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles through agreement with the Soviets, but time and patience are needed to slow the spiraling arms race.

* SALT II negotiations may produce a draft treaty limiting nuclear bombers and missiles at levels slightly below those agreed to in 1974 by President Ford and President Brezhnev. Its most significant result could be the slowing of new nuclear weapons developments in both the United States and the Soviet Union.

* The Soviets fear the prospect of American military advantage through cruise missiles in large numbers, especially those launched from Europe or from ships at sea. U.S. negotiators are disturbed by Soviet MIRVed ICBMs.

* American-Soviet differences in types and numbers of nuclear arms, political systems, and negotiating styles make quick arms control agreement less important than confidence-building measures. Unilateral restraint and prudence against military overreaction on both sides are necessary if any agreement is to work or be replaced by a better one.

* Neither country has nuclear superiority nor is likely to obtain it by adding new weapons. But even modest arms control agreements can dampen misplaced notions of strategic advantage, and refocus attention on mutual avoidance of nuclear war.

President Carter's reputation as a "fast learner" has been put to the test in the past few months. He has been working hard to achieve a new Strategic Arms Limitation agreement to replace the five-year Interim Agreement expiring in October. In negotiating with the Soviets and trying to satisfy critics at home, the President and his advisors have encountered a wall of knotty problems, some perhaps beyond immediate solution.

The administration's first lesson is that it will be more difficult to negotiate a new SALT treaty and get Senate approval than previously thought. The process will be more lengthy because the U.S. seeks meaningful arms reductions — the very opposite of the higher than actual limits accepted at Vladivostok.

## Purposes of SALT — Why Arms Control?

A long-term objective of SALT is gradual reduction in the numbers of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems, down to a few hundred and possibly to zero. Short of that goal nuclear weapons in numbers that could destroy all life on this planet will continue to be with us. Because there is no defense against nuclear missiles, avoidance of nuclear war is vital to U.S. and Soviet survival. It is imperative for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to retain

confidence in their retaliatory capacities. The best prospect for reducing the chances that nuclear weapons will ever be used is to insure that neither country has any incentive in a crisis to strike first with nuclear weapons. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union must understand that regardless of which nation initiates the attack, both nations will be destroyed. Arms limitation agreements can help create both military and political conditions for the avoidance of such destruction.

Existing arms control agreements have produced limitations on only one new weapon — the ABM — but this helped each side retain confidence in mutual deterrence. However, both countries have continued to develop new offensive weapons in a vain effort to build forces which could achieve "victory" in a nuclear war. New U.S. weapons programs have been stimulated by apprehensions over the potential silo-busting abilities of improved accuracy Soviet MIRVed missiles. U.S. programs include new and more powerful nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery systems, such as the Mark 12A warhead (for Minuteman III missiles), the mobile ICBM, longer range MIRVed submarine launched missiles, and cruise missiles. These "improvements" on both sides make new arms

(See SALT, Pg 2-F)

1-F

SALT ... CONTINUED

limitation agreements crucial if the nuclear arms competi-
tion is to be slowed. Without such agreements, no amount of
weapons will provide safety and in fact might well destroy
what little there is.

Vladivostok Was No Help

The 1974 Vladivostok accords set ceilings of 2400 strategic delivery vehicles, including ICBMs, SLBMs and long-range bombers, and permitted no more than 1320 MIRVed missiles to either side. These limits were to have been incorporated into a treaty running from October 1977 to December 31, 1985. The agreement failed to limit qualitative improvements in weapons, more important now than numbers of strategic arms, and for that reason was widely criticized. The Vladivostok ceilings were also so high that they served mainly to legitimize existing arms programs rather than to slow or stop them. The 1974 MIRV ceiling was and *still is higher than either the U.S. or the Soviet stock of such warheads.* President Ford actually argued that the U.S. has an "obligation" to build up to the Vladivostok ceilings, and by implication, so did the Soviets.

Disagreement over U.S. cruise missiles, the Soviet "Backfire" bomber and new large Soviet ICBMs delayed a final treaty incorporating the Vladivostok accords. The U.S. presidential primaries also interfered; President Ford, unwilling to sign an agreement and risk criticism from the right wing of his own party and the Pentagon, virtually suspended negotiations for several months.

After a thorough review of the growing nuclear arsenals in the U.S. and U.S.S.R., and their SALT implications, the Carter administration apparently sided with the critics of the Vladivostok accords. It took an entirely new approach aimed at substantial *reductions* as well as restraints on *qualitative* improvements in strategic nuclear delivery systems. Carter's "comprehensive proposal,"* as it came to be called, was generally a forward-looking and lawable effort, though it was seriously flawed in many respects — not least in the way it was presented to the U.S.S.R.

The Soviets, deeply conservative in military matters, and angry about Carter administration human rights activities, summarily rejected the comprehensive proposal. They have insisted both sides were committed to an agreement along the lines agreed to at Vladivostok in 1974. A compromise combining elements of both the Vladivostok accords and some of the ideas contained in the U.S. comprehensive proposal seems to have been worked out in general terms, but some issues remain unresolved.

While lower-level U.S. and Soviet officials are meeting regularly to work out a variety of technical details, high-level meetings needed to resolve the outstanding political problems will not take place until September. The Carter administration, sensitive to charges that it is too eager to reach an agreement, and charges that it is too willing to make concessions, is not committed to an October deadline. As a result, a new agreement may not be completed until early 1978.

FIVE PROBLEMS IN SALT — AND THEN SOME

One thing is clear. The new treaty will contain a commitment by both sides to continue the SALT negotiating process into the mid-1980's. SALT negotiations in many ways are as important as the signing of agreements, but why is progress so slow, and why are real arms limitations so scarce and talk so plentiful? The explanations can be found in the hard problems and disagreements that plague the SALT process.

Problem 1: Cruise Missiles

The U.S. long-range cruise missile, a potent new preci-
sion weapon now in the test phase, is a major obstacle to a
new agreement. In air, sea and land-launched versions with
ranges of several hundred to several thousand miles, these
nuclear offensive missiles could become operational with
U.S. forces by 1980 or sooner. However, it appears that un-
less mutually acceptable limitations on cruise missiles are
negotiated, no SALT agreement of any kind will be possi-
ble.

The U.S. proposed range limitation of 2500 km. (1553 miles) is not a severe one: it is actually greater than the range of early U.S. Polaris missiles and greater than the performance of U.S. air-launched cruise missiles now in development. But the Soviets are especially worried about *ground-launched* cruise missiles based in Europe and by the prospect of submarine-launched cruise missiles. Their concerns are well founded. Land and sea-launched cruise missiles would be extremely hard to detect. Large numbers of highly accurate U.S. cruise missiles would be able to strike many Soviet targets with little warning.

The Soviets have insisted the U.S. retreated from com-
mitments on cruise missile limitations made at Vladivostok.
The Vladivostok accords include "air-to-surface missiles"
in the agreed-aggregate ceiling of 2400 delivery vehicles and
the Soviets argue cruise missiles launched from aircraft are
included by the phrase "air-to-surface missiles."

No, say U.S. officials, the reference to air-to-surface mis-

siles refers to "ballistic" missiles only and since no mention
was made of cruise missiles there is no limit on them.
However, President Carter has said the U.S. would accept
limits on land and sea-launched missiles, but not air-
launched. He has proposed a three-year limit on deployment
and testing of land and sea launched cruise missiles — tied
to agreement on deep cuts in U.S. and U.S.S.R. nuclear
forces to be negotiated in a future agreement.

The cruise missile could reestablish the kind of U.S.
numerical superiority in nuclear delivery systems enjoyed in
the 1950's and 1960's, though U.S. superiority could be
temporary at best. The Soviets would eventually develop
comparable cruise missiles and the race would be on again.
NATO allies are also pressing for long-range cruise missiles
to be based in West Germany and elsewhere in Europe.
These are seen as bolstering the alliance's deterrent capacity.

Though the Soviets are many years behind the U.S. in
cruise missile guidance and propulsion technology, they will
eventually improve. Were the Soviets to acquire large
numbers of long-range cruise missiles with the kind of preci-
sion guidance now in U.S. hands, the U.S. might be forced
to greatly expand its defensive efforts, though such efforts
would not protect against other kinds of Soviet delivery
systems. The U.S. does not now have an air defense system
capable of coping with significant numbers of cruise mis-
siles. To develop and build such a system would cost billions
of dollars. In the end we might be worse off than we are
now.

Cruise Missile Verification Problems

Cruise missiles present unique and potentially
troublesome verification problems. The problems
associated with cruise missiles derive both from their own
characteristics and from different launch modes.

The range and kind of warhead carried by cruise missiles

(See SALT, Pg 3-F)

*See p. 8 for a summary of the Carter comprehensive proposal and its impact.

2-F

SALT ... CONTINUED

cannot be determined from their outward appearance. Furthermore, long-range (1000-2000 miles) nuclear-armed cruise missiles intended for targets in the Soviet Union would be difficult to distinguish from their shorter-range (200-400 miles) tactical cousins intended for use against enemy ships and battlefield military targets. Sea-based cruise missiles, launched from submarines or from surface ships, might not be visible externally. There is also no relationship between the number of torpedo tubes on a ship or submarine and the number of cruise missiles carried aboard. Unlike submarine ballistic missile launch tubes, cruise missiles can be loaded and reloaded from inside the vessel; which ships carried them and how many were on board could not be verified by external observation.

Ground-launched cruise missiles could easily be hidden and verification of numbers and location would be impossible. Numbers might be verifiable provided there were no effort at concealment, but range performance would be difficult to verify by available means.

Air-launched cruise missiles would be limited by the number of available aircraft and while not entirely foolproof, the number of missiles carried by each aircraft could be determined with reasonable accuracy. But range and type of warhead would be hard to verify.

It is possible to make too much of the difficulties in verifying cruise missile limitations. In the short run (until the mid-1980's), these are essentially Soviet problems, and the Soviets have not expressed concern over the problem of verifying limits on U.S. cruise missiles. Since the Soviets do not now have long-range cruise missiles (ranges of more than 300 or 400 miles), none with the kind of precision guidance capabilities of U.S. cruise missiles, we have several years to resolve these troublesome technical issues.

## Problem 2: New Soviet Weapons — Backfire and MIRV ICBMs

Two new Soviet weapon systems particularly concern American officials and cause disagreement with the Soviet Union. One is the new Soviet bomber code-named Backfire. The Soviets have about seventy Backfire bombers in operation with their long-range aviation forces. While there has been disagreement among U.S. intelligence agencies over the capabilities of Backfire the U.S. has insisted that it is a strategic aircraft capable of attacking the U.S. CIA has estimated its unrefueled range at 3500 nautical miles. The Defense Intelligence Agency believes by aerial refueling the Backfire could fly two-way missions against targets anywhere in the U.S. Without refueling, Backfire could reach U.S. targets on one-way missions from Arctic bases, landing in friendly or neutral territory.

The Soviets say Backfire is a medium bomber with an unrefueled range (presumably they mean radius) of 2200 km. (1375 miles) and, therefore, incapable of reaching U.S. territory. They insist it is intended for naval missions and for use in Europe and Asia.

Resolution of this issue may be less difficult than it now appears. The Soviets have hinted that they might be able to accept deployment limitations. They have suggested also the possibility of limits on refueling aircraft or elimination of the aerial refueling capability of the Backfire altogether. Production limits may also be possible.

More serious to Americans are Soviet heavy, MIRV ICBMs. President Carter said on May 30: "The main thing they have that concerns us is the increasing reliance on very large missiles with multiple warheads." The Soviets are currently deploying 3 new ICBMs with MIRV warheads, the SS-17, 18, and 19. As the accuracy and numbers of these missiles improve — particularly the large SS-18 — they

## Why Nuclear Parity is Hard to Define

Sources: U.S. Department of Defense and Congressional Research Service

## Rough Equality in U.S. Eyes — Unequal Security in Soviet Minds

hold out the prospect of attacking and destroying U.S. fixed silo ICBMs. If the ability to destroy hardened point targets is extended into a credible capability to destroy all or most U.S. ICBMs in their silos, the Soviets might be tempted to strike first in a crisis in an attempt to destroy the 1054 U.S. land-based missiles before they are launched.

It will be several years before the Soviets have sufficient numbers of missiles with sufficient accuracy to even contemplate such an attack. Even then they would face immense and possibly insurmountable technical difficulties. Nevertheless the possibility of future ICBM vulnerability must be faced.

Two approaches to heading off the dangers of ICBM vulnerability are available: one military, one political. Most, though not all, of the military solutions involve substituting one or another weapon for fixed land-based ICBMs, since defensive missiles (ABM) are ruled out by treaty. Mobile land-based ICBMs are one alternative. One justification for the development of the MX ICBM is that it will be movable (if not fully mobile), and thus any attacker seeking to destroy it would face substantial problems in pinpointing its location. A second military alternative is to expand our sea-based missile force and eventually eliminate fixed, land-based ICBMs. Both of these alternatives would be costly and could eventually fall victim to still more advanced military counters.

By any measure, arms control agreements are the safest way of averting the future problem of ICBM vulnerability. Such agreements, if effective, will do two important things: 1) reduce the military incentives for a preemptive attack, and 2) deny to both sides the capability to mount one. Additionally, a web of political, economic, and cultural ties between the Soviets and the West should inhibit other incentives for such an attack, and build confidence on both sides that conflicts can be resolved.

The U.S. comprehensive proposal, rejected by the Soviets in April, sought to limit the very missiles that are the major

(See SALT, Pg 4-F)

3-F

SALT ... CONTINUED

source of U.S. concern, the increasingly accurate, MIRVed
SS-18 as well as the total MIRV ICBMs on each side. It
also sought to limit ICBM flight tests and thus prevent
either side from developing confidence in its ability to
launch a successful first strike. If U.S. officials are
successful in negotiating these limits and in limiting those
qualitative improvements in existing ICBMs that enhance
their ability to strike other ICBM silos, the risk of ICBM
vulnerability will be substantially reduced. Even if un-
successful in negotiating all these limitations in SALT II,
there is still a good chance they can be attained in SALT
III.

Problem 3: Differing Force Structures

Designing satisfactory SALT agreements is particularly
difficult because the strategic nuclear forces of the U.S. and
the Soviet Union are different. Since they are not the same
it is very hard to determine what constitutes equality, or
what comprises an equitable agreement. Furthermore, both
sides have different views on the meaning of equality and
hence on what is equitable.

Problem 4: Negotiation Problems
of Democratic Societies

Disagreement over goals and how best to achieve them
exists *within* the U.S. as well as *between* the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. Such disagreement is a constant problem for
U.S. negotiators who can never be sure the position they are
currently taking will not change tomorrow.

The American negotiating team in SALT speaks for the U.S., but elsewhere the U.S. hardly ever speaks with one voice. There are as many U.S. voices on SALT as there are viewpoints, and there are at least as many viewpoints as there are agencies in the U.S. government concerned with the issues. The cacophony of views led one observer to propose, only half in jest, a strategic *word limitation agreement*.

American politics produces much maneuvering and
negotiating among a variety of people and agencies within
the U.S. government. The participants in this elaborate
chess game include the President, the White House staff, the
Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, key Congressional figures and committees,
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the CIA and
other parts of the intelligence community.

Any treaty finally negotiated must be approved by the
Senate and supported by the public. Special weight will be
given to the views of the U.S. military, even if it is more con-
cerned with preserving weapons programs than with arms
control. Negotiators cannot avoid taking such views into ac-
count in designing U.S. positions and strategies, particular-
ly when Senate approval will be needed for any new treaty.

Problem 5: Verification

Monitoring compliance with the terms of an agreement
seems to concern the U.S. more than the Soviets. The
reasons are the general openness of American military
developments, as opposed to the extensive secrecy that sur-
rounds Soviet military programs. Designed to detect
violations, if they occur, verification procedures insure that
neither side can secretly gain a significant advantage.
Assurances of verification are important to win public and
Congressional support in the U.S. No less important is the
role of verification to build confidence in the arms agree-
ment process itself.

The development of "national technical means" of
verification — satellite surveillance, radar, and other in-
telligence gathering techniques — have played a crucial role

in making arms control agreements possible. Agreements
have been written specifically to limit those things that are
observable and verifiable — missile silos, submarines and
bombers — rather than their nuclear weapons. Though im-
portant in themselves, these weapons are too hard to count
without on-site inspection, and for practical purposes their
numbers are indirectly limited by verifiable restrictions on
launchers.

Two sets of circumstances have raised questions about the
adequacy of national technical means for verification of
future agreements — allegations of Soviet violations and the
development of new delivery systems whose characteristics
make them harder to verify. The latter has led at least one
high U.S. official involved in the SALT talks to suggest that
on-site inspection of one sort or another might become
necessary.

Verifying MIRV, Cruise and Mobile Missiles

Agreement on verification procedures for numbers of
MIRV launchers, limited under the Vladivostok accord to
1320, already has been a source of difficulty in translating
that agreement in principle into a treaty. The strategic
cruise missile poses some unique problems for verification.
Finally, mobile ICBMs present still another set of new
verification problems.

While satellite surveillance and other means used to
monitor Soviet military activity are capable of great in-
telligence feats, they cannot see inside a missile to determine
whether or not it is equipped with MIRV. However, tests of
MIRV missiles can be and are observed. Furthermore,
Soviet MIRV missiles are distinguishable from their non-
MIRV missiles in a number of respects; silos and support
equipment for instance, are different and can be identified.
The problem of distinguishing MIRV and non-MIRV
variants of the same missile in all likelihood will be resolved
by a simple counting rule: once a missile is tested with
MIRV all missiles of that type will be assumed to be
MIRVed.

The Soviet SS-16 and the proposed U.S. MX missiles are
not dependent on fixed silos but rather could move around
the countryside on mobile launch vehicles, or they might be
emplaced in one of several different kinds of multiple launch
point facilities that combine limited mobility and conceal-
ment. The Soviet weapon is close to attaining operational
operational status. The U.S. MX on the other hand, is not
expected to be operational until the mid-1980's.

Mobile missiles can be seen and counted with confidence.
Concealment added to mobility would present virtually in-
surmountable verification problems. An arrangement such
as the U.S. buried trench proposal for the MX, along which
the missile could move to several widely separated firing
points, would present serious verification problems despite

(See SALT, Pg 5-F)

A World Without
Nuclear Weapons

The world is still engaged in a massive armaments
race designed to insure continuing equivalent strength
among potential adversaries. We pledge perseverance
and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world's ar-
maments to those necessary for each nation's own
domestic safety. We will move this year a step toward
our ultimate goal — the elimination of all nuclear
weapons from the earth.

Jimmy Carter

Inaugural Address

January 20, 1977

4-F

Big Stakes in SALT

Small Cuts in Delivery Vehicles -
Large Cuts in Number of Nuclear Weapons

1. Projections based on Department of Defense and Congressional Research Service data.

2. Assumes ceilings of 2200 Delivery Vehicles and 1200 MIRV.

SALT ... CONTINUED

assertions to the contrary by U.S. weapons specialists. Furthermore, it is doubtful that the U.S. could have confidence in its ability to verify the number of missiles involved in a similar trench in the Soviet Union. If not, it is hard to imagine the Senate accepting a treaty in which concealment and deception were permitted. A ban on mobile ICBMs may be the only approach possible.

Charges of Soviet Violations

Of the several violations of the ABM treaty and Interim
Agreement charged against the Soviets, only one appears to
have been unambiguous: their failure to dismantle older
ICBM launchers on schedule as new ballistic missile sub-
marines were launched, as required. The issue was raised by
the U.S. in the Standing Consultative Commission and the
Soviets rectified their error. In some cases, alleged Soviet
violations were inconsistent only with unilateral American
understandings to which the Soviets have never agreed, or
they were the result of insufficiently precise treaty language.
The experience suggests the importance of greater care and
precision in drafting future SALT agreements.

A SALT Position for the U.S.

The strategic arms limitation process is one part of a
broad effort to decrease the likelihood of nuclear war and to
defuse U.S.-Soviet hostility by building, a web of
relationships and interrelationships between the Soviet
Union and the West in a wide range of fields, including
trade, science, medicine, industrial technology, sports, and

culture. The shorthand term for this effort is detente. Total
breakdown of SALT could damage relations in areas where
the political costs would be great. Failure could also lead to
increased counterforce weapons programs. The economic
costs would not be substantial. Secretary of Defense Harold
Brown has said failure to negotiate an agreement would
require this country to spend $1-2 Billion more per year over
currently planned levels — only about two percent of the
U.S. military budget.

In the final analysis any worthwhile SALT agreement
must reduce the likelihood of nuclear war and it must be
evaluated on its own merits. A desirable agreement should:

1. Control and eventually reduce numbers of strategic nuclear weapons possessed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union;

2. Slow the pace of technological improvements and the introduction of new weapons;

3. Reduce both incentives and capabilities for a first-strike by either side;

4. Contain reasonable incentives to insure compliance by both sides; and

5. Be explicitly clear in its terms and not leave ambiguities open to unilateral interpretation.

The nuclear momentum would be slowed by banning all
nuclear weapon testing, banning modifications of existing
ICBMs; limits on numbers of missile flight tests also would
prevent either side from developing confidence in its ability
to carry out a successful first strike. Quantitative limits on
ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers should be lower than current
arsenals.

(See SALT, Pg 6-F)

5-F

1985 WITHOUT SALT

U.S., FORCES

<table><thead><tr><th>Delivery System</th><th>number</th><th>MIRV</th><th>number of weapons</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Titan II</td><td>54</td><td></td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>Minuteman III</td><td>650</td><td>650</td><td>1950</td></tr><tr><td>Minuteman II *</td><td>350</td><td></td><td>350</td></tr><tr><td>MX</td><td>100</td><td>100</td><td>1000</td></tr><tr><td>Poseidon (31 submarines)</td><td>496</td><td>496</td><td>4960</td></tr><tr><td>Trident (10 submarines)</td><td>240</td><td>240</td><td>1920</td></tr><tr><td>B-52 (with ALCM and SRAM)</td><td>265</td><td></td><td>3180</td></tr><tr><td>Air Launched Cruise Missile Carriers</td><td>100</td><td></td><td>1200</td></tr><tr><td>TOTALS</td><td>2205</td><td>1436</td><td>14614</td></tr></tbody></table>

U.S.S.R. FORCES

<table><tbody><tr><td>SS-18 ICBM</td><td>400</td><td>400</td><td>3200</td></tr><tr><td>SS-17 ICBM</td><td>600</td><td>600</td><td>2400</td></tr><tr><td>SS-19 ICBM</td><td>600</td><td>600</td><td>3600</td></tr><tr><td>SS-16 ICBM</td><td>100</td><td></td><td>100</td></tr><tr><td>SS-N-6 SLBM</td><td>544</td><td></td><td>544</td></tr><tr><td>SS-N-8 SLBM</td><td>412</td><td></td><td>412</td></tr><tr><td>SS-N-18</td><td>64</td><td>64</td><td>192</td></tr><tr><td>TOTALS</td><td>2720</td><td>1664</td><td>10448</td></tr></tbody></table>

1985 WITH SALT

Limits of 2200 Delivery Vehicles, 1200 MIRV.

U.S. FORCES

<table><thead><tr><th>number</th><th>MIRV</th><th>number of weapons</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>54</td><td></td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>550</td><td>550</td><td>1650</td></tr><tr><td>450</td><td></td><td>450</td></tr><tr><td>0</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>400</td><td>400</td><td>4000</td></tr><tr><td>240</td><td>240</td><td>1920</td></tr><tr><td>265</td><td></td><td>3180</td></tr><tr><td>0</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>1965</td><td>1190</td><td>10154</td></tr></tbody></table>

U.S.S.R. FORCES

<table><tbody><tr><td>308</td><td>308</td><td>2464</td></tr><tr><td>340</td><td>340</td><td>1360</td></tr><tr><td>550</td><td>550</td><td>3300</td></tr><tr><td>60</td><td></td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>464</td><td></td><td>464</td></tr><tr><td>476</td><td></td><td>476</td></tr><tr><td>0</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>2198</td><td>1198</td><td>8124</td></tr></tbody></table>

SALT ... CONTINUED

What Kind of Agreement is Possible?

A comprehensive arms reduction agreement is probably not possible in 1977. But will a more limited agreement be worthwhile? Will it make us more secure or would the U.S. be better off with no agreement?

Such judgments are impossible without an agreement to evaluate, and we do not yet have one. We only have a few bits and pieces of information on the prospective thrust of a new agreement. It appears it will follow the general outlines of the Vladivostok accords, possibly with a reduction in the ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles of about 10 percent, or down to 2160 from 2400. The U.S. is also seeking reduction in the MIRV ceiling of 1320 by a comparable amount, or down to 1188. The Soviets so far have resisted changes in both ceilings and the outcome is uncertain, but modest reductions are still possible.

The new treaty would run from October 1977 to 1985 with an agreement in principle on the elements of a follow-on treaty to begin in 1985. That treaty — SALT III — would contain much more extensive cuts and limitations. The U.S. wants included in the list of principles for SALT III most of the provisions of the March comprehensive proposal, including "drastic substantial reductions" in present ceilings, a ban on modifications of existing missiles and a limit on missile flight tests. Whether the Soviets will accept any or all of these goals remains to be seen.

A three-year protocol would be appended to the treaty to deal with difficult issues such as cruise missiles, the Backfire bomber mobile missiles and Soviet SS-18 missiles. The U.S. would agree to withhold deployment of land and sea-launched cruise missiles for the period of the protocol, and to limit tests of such missiles to 600 km. In return, the Soviets would accept deployment and/or production limits on Backfire bombers, and a limit on replacement of older SS-9 missiles with newer MIRVed SS-18s.

Air-launched cruise missiles carried by bombers would be permitted but would be limited to a range of 2500 km. The Soviets have further proposed that bombers equipped with cruise missiles be regarded as MIRV vehicles and be counted toward the MIRV ceiling of 1320 delivery vehicles. The U.S. opposes this and the recent decision to cancel the B-1 bomber in favor of B-52's equipped with cruise missiles

can be expected to stiffen U.S. resistance to limits on air launched cruise missiles other than the 2500 km. range limit.

No Big Results This Year

A new arms limitation agreement along expected lines will have little impact on U.S. strategic forces and weapons programs for 2 or 3 years; its major impact would come after 1980. It would force some difficult but necessary choices among weapons systems planned for the 1980-1985 period, and could make it impossible to procure some new weapons in the numbers envisaged by the Pentagon.

At present, U.S. nuclear forces are below the Vladivostok ceilings and the probable SALT II limits of 2160 strategic delivery vehicles and 1188-1320 MIRV delivery vehicles. New U.S. weapons systems will not begin entering the inventory in significant numbers until about 1980. The first Trident submarine, for example, is not scheduled for completion until late 1979 and probably will not be ready until 1980.

Long-range cruise missiles — both air- and sea-launched — are not scheduled to attain initial operational capability until at least 1980, and the land-based version perhaps not until 1981.

MIRV Ceiling Would Force Tough Choices

The limits on U.S. strategic weapon programs would come during the 1980-1985 period.

As the U.S. currently has 1046 MIRV missiles, it would be able to add only 274 MIRV delivery vehicles before reaching the Vladivostok limit of 1320 MIRV. If the Vladivostok ceiling is reduced by 10% to 1188 the U.S. would be able to add only 142 MIRV. Under the 1320 ceiling the Navy could build only 11 Tridents and under the lower 1188 ceiling it could build only 6 Tridents, though it currently has plans to build at least sixteen.

Retirement of older Polaris boats would not ease the situation since they are not MIRV equipped. The retirement of later-model Poseidon boats, which do have MIRV missiles, is not scheduled to begin until the late 1980's.

Limits on cruise missiles will delay deployment of at least

(See SALT, Pg 7-F)

6-F

SALT ... CONTINUED

the sea- and ground-launched versions of these new weapons and could lead to permanent limits later. If bombers carrying air-launched cruise missiles are counted within the MIRV launcher ceiling, as urged by the Soviets, the MIRV crunch would be even more severe for the U.S. If only 10 Tridents are built, only 34 bombers could be equipped with cruise missiles unless some land-based ICBMs or Poseidon SLBMs are retired. If the Air Force opts for a larger force of cruise missile bombers, fewer Tridents could be built. If the current MIRV ceiling is lowered by 10 percent, bombers with cruise missiles might not be included but only 5 Tridents would use up the margin.

Less clear is the impact of these limits on the MX ICBM, currently under development. In any case, the MX will not be ready for deployment until about 1985. The prospect of substantial reductions after 1985 could severely constrain Air Force plans for the MX. However, failure to negotiate a treaty would probably result in a speed-up in the MX development program and earlier deployment.

Immediate Impact on Soviet Forces

The impact of a new treaty on Soviet forces would be

WASHINGTON POST - 11 AUGUST 1977

For the Record

* Lefteris Papadopoulos, a leader of the rightist Greek Cypriot Eora-B underground movement, was sentenced in Nicosia to life imprisonment for taking part in the coup that overthrew President Makarios in July 1974.

* A combined force of Malaysian and Thai troops claimed to have dislodged Communist guerrillas from strongholds in southern Thailand.

greater in the short-run than on U.S. forces. The Soviets would be required to reduce delivery vehicles immediately. With over 2500 strategic delivery vehicles at present the Soviets would have to cut back by 340. They would most likely do this by retiring a combination of older ICBMs, old bombers, and perhaps some older missile submarines. It could also limit their SLBM building program. A sue-limit on SS-18 missiles, if included in an agreement, would put a significant limit on one of three major MIRV missile building programs. However, with some 200-300 MIRV missiles now deployed they are still well below a MIRV ceiling of 1320, or even a lower one.

The U.S. Comprehensive Proposal
It Asked for Restraints on Both Sides

Restrictions

1. Limit Strategic Launchers to 1800-2000

2. Limit MIRV Launchers to 1100-1200.

3. Limit MIRV ICBMs to 550.

4. Limit Modern Large Ballistic Missile Launchers to 150, (such as Soviet SS-9/18)

5. Ban Development and Deployment of new ICBMs.

6. Ban Mobile ICBMs.

7. Limit ICBM and SLBM Flight Tests to six per year of each.

8. Ban Modifications on existing ICBMs.

9. Limit Deployment of Backfire bomber.

10. Ban Cruise Missiles with ranges of more than 2500 km. Only long-range bombers could carry cruise missiles with ranges of 600 to 2500 km.

Impact on: U.S.

Cut 62-262 launchers.¹

Could add 54-154 MIRV launchers.²

No change

No effect on U.S.

Would not deploy MX ICBM.

Would not deploy mobile ICBMs.

Slow Trident I missile program, eliminate Trident II Program. Reduce confidence in ability to launch successful 1st strike.

Stop construction of MK 12A warheads, and other ICBM modifications.

No effect.

Cruise missiles up to 2500 km. range could be deployed in unlimited numbers.

U.S.S.R.

Cut 540-740 launchers.¹

Could add 900-100 MIRV launchers.²

Could add 350 MIRV ICBMs.¹ Force Soviets to push MIRV SLBM program.

Would not deploy about 150 heavy ICBMs.¹

Stop deployment of new ICBMs.

Prevent deployment of SS-16.

Slow MIRV SLBM programs, slow operational silo test firings, slow MIRV development. Reduce confidence in ability to launch successful 1st strike.

Stop changes in existing missiles.

Prevent deployment of Backfire in certain parts of U.S.S.R.

No immediate effect as Soviets do not have long-range cruise missiles.

NOTES:

¹Assumes 2062 U.S. and 2540 Soviet launchers.

²Assumes Soviets now have approximately 200 MIRV ICBMs. U.S. has 1046 MIRV missiles.

³Assumes approximately 50 SS-18 currently in place.

Tomorrow's Concerns

What may be achieved in SALT this year would begin the process of controlling the growth of nuclear arsenals though with a small step. It would offer reasonable prospect of more and larger cuts in years to come. The worth of that small first step must be judged in the context of those more

substantial future reductions. It is worth remembering that it has taken the U.S. and the Soviets more than 30 years to develop and build the numbers of weapons they now possess. We would all be happier (and safer) if reductions could be accomplished faster than that, but it clearly will be an undertaking of many years. Progress without patience is not in our nuclear future.

CONCLUSIONS

* A desirable SALT agreement should slow the introduction of new weapons, reduce incentives and capabilities for starting a nuclear war, contain reasonable incentives to insure compliance by both sides and be explicitly clear and not leave ambiguities open to unilateral interpretation.

* American and Soviet confidence in the arms control process needs to be reinforced if the danger of nuclear war is to be reduced. An agreement that reduces Vladivostok ceilings by ten per cent and imposes some qualitative limits on new weapons, while less than ideal, is far better than no agreement at all. Such a SALT agreement could reduce the growth of U.S. and Soviet arsenals and prevent as many as 7,000 new nuclear weapons from being added to U.S. and Soviet forces by 1985.

7-F

# CURRENT NEWS
## SPECIAL EDITION

THIS PUBLICATION IS PREPARED BY THE AIR FORCE AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO BRING TO THE ATTENTION OF KEY DOD PERSONNEL NEWS ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THEM IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITIES. IT IS NOT INTENDED TO SUBSTITUTE FOR NEWSPAPERS. PERIODICALS AND BROADCASTS AS A MEANS OF KEEPING INFORMED ABOUT THE NATURE, MEANING AND IMPACT OF NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL NEWS DEVELOPMENTS. USE OF THESE ARTICLES HERE. OF COURSE. DOES NOT REFLECT OFFICIAL ENDORSEMENT. FURTHER REPRODUCTION FOR PRIVATE USE OR GAIN IS SUBJECT TO THE ORIGINAL COPYRIGHT RESTRICTIONS.

25 AUGUST 1977

No. 238

International
Security

SUMMER 1977

Page 24

PROGRAM FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Across the
Nuclear Divide—
Strategic Studies,
Past and Present

Colin S. Gray

A combination of accident and design has produced a transnational strategic studies community which has only the most casual acquaintance with strategic thought and action prior to 1945. In this article it is argued both that the continuities in international politics and strategy, pre- and post-1945, are far more important than are the discontinuities, and that therefore the disciplined study of pre-nuclear ideas and events could and should much improve our understanding of the structure of current and anticipated security problems. The identity of the political players changes, as do the characteristics of particular weapons, but such policy problem categories as the utility of force for the support of foreign policy, alliance management, the conduct of an arms race, the prosecution of limited war, arms control negotiations, and the accommodation of new weapon technologies, all have long pre-nuclear histories. Nuclear-age strategic theory has suffered severely from shallowness of its empirical base.

Relatively few strategists today deny, in principle, the salience of pre-1945 thought and practice. But, historical consciousness of more than a very cosmetic variety continues to be the rare exception in contemporary strategic and arms control analysis. It is, of course, somewhat contrary to the American "style" which continues overwhelmingly to be pragmatic and optimistic in character, to suggest that the practice of bad old "power politics" may be traced back as far as human literary and archaeological records extend—the past and the present essentially are one in terms of statecraft. An historical memory that stops at a postulated great divide in 1945 encourages aspirations for "new eras" and the like. Since the past provides the only evidence upon which theories may be constructed, the time is long overdue for strategists and arms controllers (if these be separate categories) to seek out the relevant past in a systematic fashion for the purposes of policy-science today. (This is not to deny the value of historical enquiry pursued for its own sake; the trouble tends to be that historical research for its own sake requires a massive effort of translation before its findings are organized in ways at all useful for those facing contemporary policy problems.)

Colin Gray is a member of the professional staff at Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, New York.

JAMES KILLINGBECK, CHIEF, CURRENT NEWS BRANCH, OX 78765

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3

race experience of the 1930s, it would be that the half-hearted conduct of a race against a wholehearted adversary is a prescription for disaster.⁵ The arms race in the 1930s, in and of itself, was no danger to peace. Indeed, had the race been conducted energetically and, above all, intelligently, by Britain and France, quite the reverse would have been the case. History can never instruct policymakers as to what should be done, but a disciplined, policy science-filtered history should diminish the ease with which officials may seek intellectual comfort from simple and misleading isolated analogies.

If it is correct, or at least highly plausible, to suggest that international politics really is a continuum of historical experience, then it follows that pre-nuclear statecraft and strategy is no less the subject of the contemporary strategist, a priori, than are MIRVs and cruise missiles. Without in any way endeavoring to play down the importance of the quantum jump in the lethality-to-weight of projectile ratio achieved with nuclear weapons, many of the features of the post-1945 world which tend to be associated with the revolution in weaponry have, in fact, only a tenuous or partial connection with that revolution. For example, the extreme disfavor with which the general public in all NATO countries views the prospect of large-scale organized violence is a continuation of a secular trend that would seem to have been born in the mud of Flanders. Nuclear weapons have strengthened a healthy public distaste for inter-state combat, but such distaste was no less prominent a feature of the inter-war years (of the 1920s in particular).⁶ It may well be correct to claim that "revolutionary" states⁷ are prevented, by the prospect of nuclear use, from prosecuting their ambitions to the point of major war. However, while granting the probable sobering effect of intimations of suicide, ambitions may still be forwarded by means of the threat of force on a very large scale, as well as by the actual employment of force on a small scale

(implying a readiness to escalate and a willingness to accept high risks). It is a fact that the strategic studies community has produced, and continued to produce, a literature that tends to ignore pre-1945 thought and experience.

There is some danger that two threads of contention will be confused. First, one may argue that the geometry of world power has so altered in the second half of the twentieth century—over the first half and over all previous periods—that all major political, economic and strategic problems are distinctive to this current period. History may be fun, but it can have no policy relevance (however defined). Second, one may assert that a nuclear age must differ from all previous ages, because of the revolution in military affairs wrought by nuclear physics. If the Manhattan Project (and its Soviet equivalent) had failed, what would have been the character of post-war international politics?

## The Superpowers and War

In summary form, one may suggest that, first, the Soviet Union and the United States would have been superpowers, contending over the control of the Eurasian "rimland."⁸ Second, the pre-eminence of the superpowers would have meant that the United States would have been an essential "balancer" in the power scales relating to Europe. Third, the new geography of power, with the intercontinental distances dividing the principal adversaries, would have ensured the development and procurement of long-range successors to the B-29 (e.g., the B-36 and so on)⁹—the exponentially rising unit costs of which would have spurred the development of "unconventional" weapons (e.g., nerve gas). Fourth, although the inhibitions to general war would have been somewhat lower than was the case with nuclear arsenals, it is easy to exaggerate the probable propensity of both the United States and the Soviet Union to run very high risks of war in a nuclear weapon-less world.

The United States is not a superpower because it is a nuclear power of the first rank, but rather is it a nuclear power of the first rank because it is a superpower. The first detailed exposition of the superpower thesis was offered by William T. R. Fox in 1944, while the Manhattan Project was still top secret.¹⁰ Atomic weap-

5. Donald C. Watt, *Too Serious a Business: European Armed Forces and the Approach to the Second World War* (London: Temple Smith, 1975), chapter 4; Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars* (London: Temple Smith, 1972), chapters 5-6; and Richard D. Challener, *The French Theory of the Nation in Arms, 1866-1939* (New York: Russell and Russell, 1965), chapter 6. A usefully detailed study of German rearmament problems is Edward L. Homze, *Arming the Luftwaffe: The Reich Air Ministry and the German Aircraft Industry, 1919-1939* (Lincoln, Neb.: University of Nebraska Press, 1976).

6. See Watt, *Too Serious a Business*, pp. 31-33. But, it should not be forgotten that in the so-called Peace Ballot of Autumn 1934, ten million people in Great Britain favored the imposition of economic sanctions against an aggressor so labeled by the League of Nations, while six million were willing to endorse military sanctions. This was hardly evidence of a country in the grip of pacifist sentiment.

7. Henry Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), chapter 10.

8. See Colin S. Gray, *Geopolitics and East-West Relations*, HI-2577-P (Croton-on-Hudson, New York: Hudson Institute, January 1977).

9. The B-36 was, of course, developed prior to the success of the Manhattan Project (in part as a hedge against the possibility of failure or undue lead-time slippage with the B-29, and also with a view to transoceanic power projection should Great Britain be defeated).

10. *The Super Powers* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944).

SPECIAL EDITION--25 AUGUST 1977

4

ons, and a temporary monopoly of those weapons, happened to coincide with the widespread public recognition of America's superpower status. Lest the above arguments seem unbalanced, it is appropriate for a brief outline to be offered of the principal differences wrought in international politics by nuclear weapons.

First, no nuclear or nonnuclear power would dare to press a military campaign against a nuclear power to the attempted end of total victory. Second, no nuclear or nonnuclear power would dare to press a military campaign against a close ally of a nuclear power to the end of total victory-unless the strategic forces of that power were neutralized by the counterdeterrent of the "aggressor." Third, because of the prospective costs of nuclear war, political and military action that could be held to impinge upon the interests (not even the "vital interests") of a nuclear power would be conducted far more cautiously than would be the case in a nuclear weapon-less world. The threshold of the *casus belli* has risen markedly. Indeed, with respect to the relations between nuclear weapon states, the very notion of the *casus belli* has lost nearly all meaning. Nuclear-weapon states do not go to war with each other: they might slide fearfully into combat via limited strikes for diplomatic purposes, but they could not afford the traditional unlimited implication of *going to war*.

The possibility of nuclear war, regardless of identifiable shifts in the strategic balance, the retuning of strategic doctrines, and the evolution of the arsenals, clearly strengthened greatly whatever may have been the predispositions to caution in foreign policy that were traceable to other causes. However, it would be a mistake to believe that statesmen prior to 1945, innocent of nuclear doomsday expectations, rushed like Gadarene swine down "crisis slides" into war.¹¹ Even before 1945, it was commonplace to observe that while victory was preferable to defeat, war tended not to pay. Short-war illusions were present in 1914, but it is well to remember that by 1914 the European political system had already endured a decade of acute international crises, none of which were permitted to slide into general war. The Anglo-French honoring of their guarantee to Poland in 1939 may seem almost trivial by comparison with the kind of immediacy of threat that would be needed to invoke similar action in the 1970s, but the Allied entry into war in 1939 was belated (in terms of a candidate *casus belli*) and fearful. It should be true that no leader could today expect to profit from major military aggression involving interests declared plausibly by a nuclear weapon state to be vital to its security, but Hitler, and certainly the German people,

did not rush joyously and unthinkingly into World War II. Hitler's calculations were in error, but calculations there undoubtedly were. The attack upon Poland was not intended to herald general war.

### Some Uses of History

The relevance of pre-nuclear thought and of commentaries upon pre-nuclear experience depend upon the character of the strategic studies in question. The closer the strategic analyst finds himself to military operations, the less relevant is he likely to find thought and experience that is distant in time. The realm of military tactics is likely to prove of policy-scientific interest only insofar as there should be lessons to be learned from the combat outcomes of asymmetries in tactical ideas, and in the realm of the timely assimilation (or lack thereof) of new weapons. There is general educational value in studying the military sociology of new technology. A systematic historical study of the claims for, and realities of, the tactical performance of new weapons should promote a prudent skepticism towards extreme opinions but the limited utility of historical study must also be recognized.

For example, an analyst seeking to make sense of PGMs for NATO's defense posture might ask what value history had for him. History-conscious strategic analysts could tell him that every weapon, or class of weapon, tends to catalyze counter-weapons; that with few exceptions, new "wonder" weapons achieve their most effective performance when employed in combination with other weapons; and that pre-war prognoses of weapon effectiveness tend to be in error. The closest historical analogue to "the PGM (claimed) revolution" was the introduction of the machine gun. Each was/is intended to prevent the tactical movement of the reigning "queen of the battlefield": infantry for the machine gun and tanks for the PGM.¹² Doctrinal argument and a wealth of supporting

11. "Crisis slide" is a concept developed in Coral Bell, *The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 14-15.

12. On the possible scale of the change in warfare implied in PGM development, see John T. Burke, "Smart Weapons: A Coming Revolution in Tactics," *Army*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (February 1973), pp. 14-20; Edward B. Atkeson, "Is the Soviet Army Obsolete?," *Army*, Vol. XXIV, No. 5 (May 1974), pp. 10-16; and James F. Digby, "Precision-Guided Weapons," *Adelphi Paper*, No. 118 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1975). The appropriateness of the analogy with the machine gun may be appreciated in a judgment by William McElwee: "It was the lavish provision of machine guns to their infantry regiments which was to give the Germans their nearly decisive tactical superiority in 1914." *The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), p. 303. Even McElwee is misleading: German infantry was not lavishly provided with machine guns compared with British infantry--the Germans simply employed the weapons more intelligently.

## The Superpowers and War

8. See Colin S. Gray, *Geopolitics and East-West Relations, HI-2577-P* (Croton-on-Hudson, New York: Hudson Institute, January 1977).

3

4

First, no nuclear or nonnuclear power would dare to press a military campaign against a nuclear power to the attempted end of total victory. Second, no nuclear or nonnuclear power would dare to press a military campaign against a close ally of a nuclear power to the end of total victory—unless the strategic forces of that power were neutralized by the counterdeterrent of the "aggressor." Third, because of the prospective costs of nuclear war, political and military action that could be held to impinge upon the interests (not even the "vital interests") of a nuclear power would be conducted far more cautiously than would be the case in a nuclear weapon-less world. The threshold of the *casus belli* has risen markedly. Indeed, with respect to the relations between nuclear weapon states, the very notion of the *casus belli* has lost nearly all meaning. Nuclear-weapon states do not go to war with each other: they might slide fearfully into combat via limited strikes for diplomatic purposes, but they could not afford the traditional unlimited implication of *going to war*.

The possibility of nuclear war, regardless of identifiable shifts in the strategic balance, the retuning of strategic doctrines, and the evolution of the arsenals, clearly strengthened greatly whatever may have been the predispositions to caution in foreign policy that were traceable to other causes. However, it would be a mistake to believe that statesmen prior to 1945, innocent of nuclear doomsday expectations, rushed like Gadarene swine down "crisis slides" into war.¹¹ Even before 1945, it was commonplace to observe that while victory was preterable to defeat, war tended not to pay. Short-war illusions were present in 1914, but it is well to remember that by 1914 the European political system had already endured a decade of acute international crises, none of which were permitted to slide into general war. The Anglo-French honoring of their guarantee to Poland in 1939 may seem almost trivial by comparison with the kind of immediacy of threat that would be needed to invoke similar action in the 1970s, but the Allied entry into war in 1939 was belated (in terms of a candidate *casus belli*) and fearful. It should be true that no leader could today expect to profit from major military aggression involving interests declared plausibly by a nuclear weapon state to be vital to its security, but Hitler, and certainly the German people,

## Some Uses of History

The relevance of pre-nuclear thought and of commentaries upon pre-nuclear experience depend upon the character of the strategic studies in question. The closer the strategic analyst finds himself to military operations, the less relevant is he likely to find thought and experience that is distant in time. The realm of military tactics is likely to prove of policy-scientific interest only insofar as there should be lessons to be learned from the combat outcomes of asymmetries in tactical ideas, and in the realm of the timely assimilation (or lack thereof) of new weapons. There is general educational value in studying the military sociology of new technology. A systematic historical study of the claims for, and realities of, the tactical performance of new weapons should promote a prudent skepticism towards extreme opinions, but the limited utility of historical study must also be recognized.

11. "Crisis slide" is a concept developed in Coral Bell. *The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 14-15.

12. On the possible scale of the change in warfare implied in PGM development, see John T. Burke, "Smart Weapons: A Coming Revolution in Tactics," *Army*, Vol. XXIII, No. 2 (February 1973), pp. 14-20; Edward B. Atkeson, "Is the Soviet Army Obsolete?," *Army*, Vol. XXIV, No. 5 (May 1974), pp. 10-16; and James F. Digby, "Precision-Guided Weapons," *Adelphi Paper*, No. 118 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Summer 1973). The appropriateness of the analogy with the machine gun may be appreciated in a judgment by William McElwee: "It was the lavish provision of machine guns to their infantry regiments which was to give the Germans their nearly decisive tactical superiority in 1914." *The Art of War: Waterloo to Mons* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), p. 304. Even McElwee is misleading: German infantry was not lavishly provided with machine guns compared with British infantry--the Germans simply employed the weapons more intelligently.

7

sible outer limits of military action it is far too early to say. Certainly there is a
difference in impact between a newspaper account of a search and clear operation
and a dramatic movie clip in living color of a few incidents from that operation.
It is widely accepted that television coverage of largely American military be-
havior in Vietnam did (for good or ill) promote infirmity of purpose on the home
front,²³ but it seems likely that the distaste for unwanted collateral damage that
the American public felt by the end of the 1960s may be confused with a rather
greater distaste for a war that was being lost. One cannot help wondering what
television coverage of the Somme and Verdun would have done for morale
on the home front in World War I, War is hell, but for so long as societies will
pursue such ends as national independence and more-than-minimal definitions
of security, and for so long as the details of some national ends are in competition
between societies, then for so long must the means be accepted also.²⁴ Rephrased,
the stability of the present international political system rests, in part, upon the
threat of organized force. Nuclear weapons have undoubtedly helped dissuade
super and great powers from prosecuting their interests to the point of war between
each other, but the general character of international politics has remained re-
markably undisturbed by the new technology.

The Pre-Nuclear Heritage

The immediate pre-nuclear origins of nuclear age strategic studies may easily be
identified in the operational research industry that flourished in World War II in
Britain and the United States (but which had distinguished roots in Britain in
World War I),²⁵ in the realist vein of international relations scholarship, and in
the ranks of military theorists and commentators. Although military and even
strategic studies have an ancient and distinguished lineage, it is still true to say
that the several perceived discontinuities imposed by the technological changes
that began with the first atomic bombs, have resulted in the growth of a stra-

tegic studies community that is sociologically very distinct indeed from its func-
tional parallels in the past. This point may best be appreciated by means of a sim-
ple illustration. In the 1970s when a national military college in the United
States or Britain wishes to hear an authoritative exposition of the political, eco-
nomic and military implications of new tactical nuclear weapon technologies, it
tends to invite a civilian to deliver the address—even a civilian who has had no
direct military experience whatever. Regardless of what the largely military
audience may think concerning the practicability of the civilian's views on
nuclear-capable artillery, or whatever, still—in historical perspective—it is a
major development that a civilian should be believed to have the most appropri-
ate credentials for an exposition on such a subject. Prior to 1945 many civilians
were opinionated, sometimes—no doubt—sensibly opinionated, on military
subjects, but they were not invited to instruct the military profession on how
its new weapons could be used most effectively.

The contemporary strategic (and arms control) analyst who finds his pale re-
flection in the separate activities of the pre-nuclear international relations schol-
ar of a realist stripe, the operational analyst and the military commentator, tends
to make only the most superficial use of pre-nuclear thought and experience. Pre-
nuclear history offers a dual challenge and opportunity to the strategist in the
1970s. First, a vast library of contemporary and near-contemporary literature
on the military and diplomatic experience of the day or the recent past awaits
perusal. A tiny fragment of this enormous corpus of writing appears in the read-
ing lists and footnotes of nuclear-age scholars. Most strategists have at least
heard of Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Saxe, Guibert, Clausewitz, Jomini, Bloch, Mahan,
Foch, Douhet, Liddell-Hart and Fuller: to cite a typical honor-roll of distinguished
precursors of contemporary endeavor.

Second, the strategist today may seek to transcend the limitations, real or imag-
ined, of the pre-nuclear "classics" of military and diplomatic thought and history,
and attempt to approach the data in a more direct fashion. Contemporary litera-
ture is always, of necessity, rich in evidence that it provides concerning existing
arguments and is, equally of necessity, bounded by the authors' appreciation
of the needs and capacities of the target audiences for their writings, and by the
limits of the historical experience available as candidate data for the works in
question. Few writers, over the entire length of recorded history, have been suffi-
ciently bold or arrogant as consciously to attempt to draft books of timeless value
which penetrate to the very heart of the business of the conduct of war or of
statecraft. Practically every work written in the field, or even on the margins, of
strategic studies that is more than a few years old, including nuclear age literature,

23. It is quite possible that the connection between public lack of enthusiasm for the war and daily television coverage is no more substantial than the assertion that it "stands to reason." Brodie, *War and Politics*, p. 290. A powerful charge of systematic bias against a major television network in the United States is presented and argued in Ernest W. Lefever, *T.V. and National Defense: An Analysis of CBS News, 1972-1973* (Boston, VA: Institute for American Strategy Press, 1974).

24. I have developed this argument in "Foreign Policy—There Is No Choice," *Foreign Policy*, No. 24 (Fall 1976), pp. 114-127.

25. For example, see F.W. Lanchester, *Aircraft in Warfare: The Dawn of the Fourth Arm* (London: Constable, 1916).

requires a considerable effort of translation before the reader is able to extract contemporary relevance from its pages. If one is seeking literary monuments of timeless politico-strategic wisdom one must look to Sun Tzu, Thucydides and, to a lesser degree, to Clausewitz—not to the works on deterrance, limited war and arms control written during the "Golden Age" of 1955-1965.

There is a difference between claiming that pre-nuclear theorizing on the subject of military strategy was a very "sparsely populated" field,²⁶ and asserting that pre-nuclear military and diplomatic experience is not worthy of serious study. Three interlocking and highly dubious propositions would seem to command quite undue respect throughout the strategic studies community. First, it is held that pre-nuclear experience is irrelevant by definition to contemporary problems, though light anecdotal use of pre-nuclear practices may usefully be made in order to demonstrate the historical depth of the writer. Second, pre-nuclear strategic theory was intellectually unimpressive (an opinion, by and large, of a "received" character). However, even had pre-nuclear theory been a monument to prescient scholarship, it should still be deemed close to irrelevant because it was drafted for a pre-nuclear age. Third, pre-nuclear military experience should be seen as a catalogue of intellectual (and hence military) failure.

However, by any pragmatic standard we have to concede that the system [by which new technologies were appreciated, absorbed and used by the military—prior to 1945] worked very badly. The tactical and strategic lessons presented by the experience of successive wars had to be learned over and over again, always at great cost in lives and resources and often at the cost of defeat.²⁷

Brodie is correct, but—thirty years after Hiroshima—one wonders quite how the world has changed. In the 1960s and very early 1970s the United States, on the frontier of "scientific strategy," succeeded in Vietnam in fighting the wrong war in the wrong way. The fact that pre-nuclear history tends, overall, to illustrate lack of strategic foresight, should encourage contemporary strategists to analyse those past errors lest they be repeated. In our *hubris*, do we imagine that the contemporary equivalent of the folly of massed cavalry charges against steady infantry could not occur?²⁸ Israeli practice in the opening days of the October

War of 1973 demonstrated that old strategic sins continue to be committed in the newest of ways.²⁹ As a general rule, the case for studying manifest human failure is quite as strong as is the case for studying success.

Practically all pre-nuclear strategic writing is environment-specific and exclusive. Theorists of, and commentators upon, land power, sea power and air power abounded, but theorists of strategy writ large were distinguished by their scarcity. This generality of environmental specialization was both a faithful testament to the unique characteristics of war on land, sea and, later, in the air; but also it reflected the fact that commentary upon military affairs tended to be the exclusive preserve of those very closely connected with the military profession. Contemporary scholars interested in the advisory connection between civilian policy scientists and government, with regard to the prerequisites for success or the uses to which outside expertise may be put, for examples, could do a great deal worse than to add Spenser Wilkinson to their list of case studies. However, this writer cannot recall having seen a single mention of Wilkinson in the policy-relevant strategic studies literature of the nuclear age.³⁰

The essential unity of strategic problems, denying any inherent self-contained validity to land, naval or air strategy, was of course recognized in practice in the combined operations of World War II. In the West, World War II has inspired a military-historical literature that is vast, yet which betrays implicitly the belief that its subject matter is that of a world which has vanished nearly in its entirety. One discerns almost a romantic attachment to an honest old fashioned and "real" war: a war in which military power could be applied decisively. The "war game"-type of enthusiasm with which the Battle of the Bulge or the armored horror of the Kursk Salient is replayed in print, on film or on boards, emerged with respect to the October War of 1973. Here was a "real" war, with tanks and aircraft and front lines. While the appreciation of discontinuity has tended to persuade civilian strategic analysts to write off World War II as a potential source of instructive data, military practice, East and West, has shown and continues to show some remarkable continuities with pre- and actual World War II behavior. The Russians have returned to the "deep penetration" ideas pioneered by Marshal Tukhachevsky between 1928 and 1937 and have acquired a posture to match, while the United States, following a brief flirtation with the "pentomic division" in the middle of the late 1950s, has reverted to its old World War II form of divisional organization. Whatever the longevity of World War

26. Bernard Brodie, "The Scientific Strategists" in Robert Gilpin and Christopher Wright, eds., *Scientists and National Policy-Making* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 241. Brodie does not advocate a benign neglect of pre-nuclear theory and practice—quite the contrary. See *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 19-20.

27. Brodie, "The Scientific Strategists," p. 242.

28. Despite its overwritten features, there is a value in Charles Fair, *From the Jaws of Victory* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972, first publ. 1971).

29. Israeli armor was committed piecemeal and naked of infantry or artillery support.

30. A useful, brief appraisal is Luvaas, *The Education of an Army*, chapter 8.

∞

II forms may be in American military practice (and it can be argued that they are not the forms which ought to be perpetuated), World War II enjoys no status at all as a supporting referent in Western strategic studies.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki pre-empted what might have been a flood (or even a flow) of works seeking to incorporate the lessons of the war into the general theory of the conduct of war, or into specific prognoses for future doctrine and tactical forms. The events of August 6 and 8, 1945 have been interpreted by most strategic commentators as opening an unbridgeable gulf between the present and the past. It is interesting to note that military analysts in the Soviet Union have both accepted that there has been a "military-technical revolution" of a thorough-going kind and have not ceased to maintain that, properly appraised, the history of the Great Patriotic War has an enduring military meaning.³¹ The obsessive (if not retrogressive) focus upon World War II and its lessons which permeates Soviet military literature may be explained away in terms of the searing effect of that war upon Soviet perspectives. However, those Western analysts most closely acquainted with Soviet military thought and practice seem to be agreed that contemporary and "modern" Soviet analysts and soldiers do genuinely perceive a very substantial continuity in military problems, and hence, in appropriate solutions.

Western analysts have a very mundane and eminently practical reason for studying the Great Patriotic War. Precisely, that war speaks volumes to "the Soviet way" in the conduct of war. Societies wage war not merely as their level of technological prowess dictates, but also—if not more importantly—as their very natures dictate. New technology is grafted onto old styles of behavior and old modes of thought. NATO strategists attempting to devise an effective counter to the avalanche of armor that could be moved westwards, would do well to study how Soviet tank armies were handled in World War II and to take note of the criticisms that Soviet analysts have made of the ways in which the *Welhracht* handled its *panzer* armies. Western analysts might not approve, on professional grounds, of the particular meld of new technology and tactics with a traditional Soviet (and Russian) war-waging style, but they would be foolish in the extreme if they neglected to take that apparent meld seriously.

The pre-nuclear heritage for the nuclear-age student of strategy is rich and varied, both as raw and unfiltered events and, though to a much lesser degree, as reflected in the literature. The substantial neglect of this heritage may well

not prove to have been a tragedy for the conduct of public policy, since even the best of all possible scholarly communities cannot guarantee political wisdom. But, this neglect does constitute a gratuitous impoverishment of the contribution of strategic studies as a policy science. A failure to attempt to bridge the nuclear divide was understandable for a period after 1945 (for perhaps a decade). One could hardly seek to relate the present to the past if there were massive uncertainties concerning the character of the contemporary strategic and political world. But, once a resilient and apparently workable theoretical framework had been devised for the accommodation of the new technologies and the new geopolitics of superpower preponderance, scholars of strategy should, without taking a full sabbatical from contemporary problems, have stood back to consider the novelty or other characteristics of the problems that they were addressing. If those problems had been found not to be substantially unique, then it might have been deduced that past eras could tell some cautionary and instructive tales.

## Evidence for Theory

It is easy to be misunderstood. All that is being claimed here is that a disciplined, even scientific—by James Rosenau's minimal definition³²—study of pre-nuclear strategic phenomena should result in a cluster of strategic theories in which we could place higher confidence than is the case today. This is no mere declaration of faith: many of the errors committed in arms race management and in the conduct of arms control negotiations over the past decade should have been identified as probable errors at the time, had the officials concerned been operating on the basis of premises more substantial than those derived from intuition and deductive theory. Although this argument is couched in terms of the lessons to be learned from pre-nuclear experience, a study by Alexander George and Richard Smoke demonstrates that a disciplined examination of the empirical evidence of the nuclear age can yield the rudiments of an inductive strategic theory that is more promising for the education of decisionmakers than are the deductive, often intuitive and even aphoristic, propositions that tend at present to move a government down particular paths of policy action.³³

In terms of policy relevance, the disciplined long view which a scientific bridg-

31. See John Erickson, *The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin's War with Germany, Vol. 1* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1975), p. viii.

32. James Rosenau, "Moral Fervor, Systematic Analysis and Scientific Consciousness in Foreign Policy Research," in Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 31.

33. Alexander George and Richard Smoke, *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974).

9

10

ing of the nuclear divide should help to provide, will open to the policymaker a far wider range of experience than post-1945-focused study alone can offer. Also, this long view should help protect the policymaker from the purveyors of plausible but flawed deductive theories. For example, in and of itself, the new self-consciousness as to the systemic consequences of American arms race actions detectable in the thought of Robert McNamara was a positive development. Unfortunately, the strategic studies community had little to say to McNamara concerning the dynamics of the nuclear arms race that was worthy of his attention. Lack of inductive theory did not dissuade strategists from filling the theoretical vacuum. The American arms control community, with Robert McNamara as its most distinguished disciple, responded to the policy need by espousing and propagating (and lecturing to any Soviet citizen who would listen) a doctrine on arms race dynamics that has since been found to be incorrect in most important respects.³⁴ This, it must be said, occurred not at the dawn of the nuclear age; but more than twenty years after the first brief flurry of systematic speculation on the meaning of the new weapons had been disseminated. Proceeding in what has been termed an engineering mode, strategists had somehow neglected to consider the fundamental nature of the security enterprises to which their countries were committed. In the second half of the 1960s arms race theory ceased to be an esoteric sub-subbranch of strategic studies, of interest practically to nobody. Instead, it began to be milked for guidance on concrete problems of defense and arms control policy. The knowledge road could not bear the traffic that began to pass, so evidence was hurriedly, though disingenuously, tailored to fit certain propositions concerning arms race dynamics which accorded with the predictions of the analysts and policymakers.³⁵ The result was not disaster, but it was policy based on false assumptions. Good arms control intentions could not substitute for lack of evidence.

## Explaining the Past

The pre-nuclear heritage of military thought is introduced to aspiring strategists,

to a surprising degree, via the pages of one book: namely, *Makers of Modern Strategy*, edited by Edward Mead Earle in 1941. In most respects excellent, in a few shallow and even bizarre,³⁶ Earle's book has tended to serve as "the book" which enables the busy contemporary strategist to feel that he has the military thought of four and a half centuries at his finger tips. As a first book to read on military thought from the 1490s to 1941 Earle is no doubt, taken overall, superb. Unfortunately, Earle is almost too good. Given the policy orientation and the ahistorical training of very many strategists, Earle's is a book which tends to be regarded as being functionally definitive (that is to say, it seems to be good enough for the minimal historical needs of its readers). When Earle's contributors canter from Machiavelli to Hitler, why take time to read Machiavelli, Saxe, Clausewitz, Foch and the rest? By an accident and even an irony of history, *Makers of Modern Strategy* has served to reinforce the widespread opinion among nuclear-age strategists that atomic fission wrote *finis* to the relevance of (nearly) all previous military thought and experience. Appearing on the threshold of the nuclear age, *Makers of Modern Strategy* often is approached as a critical celebration of a defining era. For reasons that might be worth exploring, no revised or successor volume has sought to present "military (strategic) thought from Machiavelli to Schlesinger." Edward Mead Earle intended that his book should demonstrate some not inconsiderable themes of continuity over four hundred and fifty years, even though he recognized explicitly in his Introduction that it was increasingly difficult to talk of *military strategy*.³⁷ Nonetheless, this work, terminating with an appraisal by the editor of the politico-military skills and ambitions of Hitler, serves to reinforce the popular opinion that works on military or strategic thought are either pre- or post-Hiroshima in focus.

It is true that some useful "linkage" work has been performed, particularly by George Quester, by Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, and by Barry Steiner,³⁸ but in general the "rich lode of empirical material for the expansion and refine-

34. Fairly pure statements of the doctrine are George Rathjens: "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," *Scientific American*, Vol. 220, No. 4 (April 1969), pp. 15-25; and *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970s* (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969). Critical texts include Albert Wohlstetter, *Legends of the Strategic Arms Race*, USSI Report 75-1 (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1975); and Colin S. Gray *The Soviet-American Arms Race* (Lexington: Mass.: Lexington Books, 1976).

35. One is reminded of Brodie's comment on Foch, an earlier propagandist: "The historical knowledge he possessed was always at the command of his convictions . . . ." *Strategy in the Missile Age*, p. 41.

36. Overall, this book merits its enduring high reputation. However, the contributions on Liddell-Hart (Chapter 15), on "Japanese Naval Strategy" (Chapter 19), and on "Hitler: The Nazi Concept of War" (Epilogue), are notably weak.

37. "Introduction," p. XI.

38. George H. Quester, *Deterrence before Hiroshima: The Airpower Background of Modern Strategy* (New York: John Wiley, 1966); Robert E. Osgood and Robert W. Tucker, *Force, Order, and Justice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967); Barry Steiner, *Arms Races, Diplomacy, and Recurring Behavior: Lessons from Two Cases*, Sage Professional Paper in International Studies, Vol. 2, No. 02-013 (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973). A recent work of considerable value whose authors tend to eschew deliberate and direct identification of pre- and post-1945 linkage, is Klaus Knorr, ed., *Historical Dimensions of National Security Problems* (Lawrence, Ka: The University Press of Kansas, 1976).

11

ment of contemporary concepts," as George and Smoke describe the diplomatic and military history of the past two centuries,⁴⁹ has yet to be mined in earnest. For a contemporary strategist to delve into the Anglo-German naval race (let alone into twelfth-century arms control arrangements) is still widely regarded as a harmless, though potentially diverting, eccentricity.

Apart from the classics of military thought which should be read for their timeless qualities, the contemporary strategist in search of his pre-nuclear heritage will have to perform most of the spadework himself.⁴⁰ In much the same way that officials and politicians profess to find most academic writings interesting but only of marginal relevance to their needs, so the strategist in quest of policy scientific knowledge is almost certain to find the works of military and diplomatic historians interesting, even enlightening, but nowhere near fully responsive to his theoretical needs. The military historian, whether formed in the vintage mold of the campaign analyst, or whether conceived in the more modern image of the scholar of the relations between military institutions and society, is unlikely to be equipped adequately in order to function as a perceptive policy scientist. "Progress" in strategic studies, if such a possibility is to be admitted, seems likely to be impeded by the gulf of methods, approaches and concerns that divides historians from social scientists. The man best qualified to examine the tactical innovations and strategic consequences of new civilian and military technologies in the American Civil War, is unlikely to be a man willing to step beyond "his period" to co-operate in the amassing of a cumulative knowledge concerning the introduction of new devices and methods in different periods. Unfortunately, but of necessity, the contemporary strategist with but a cursory knowledge of pre-nuclear military history braves all the perils that beset the rank amateur when he ventures into the 1930s (or the 1830s).

*Strategy in the Missile Age*

It is possible that despite the presence of clear statements expressing a contrary intention, the most widely-praised book on contemporary strategy, Bernard Brodie's *Strategy in the Missile Age*, may have served to discourage scholarly journeys "in quest of the wisdom of the past on the subject of war."⁴¹ Strategists

daunted by the dimensions of Edward Mead Earle, could obtain a far quicker "fix" on their pre-nuclear heritage from the first four chapters of Brodie's work. Those chapters are witty, brilliant and economical. They are also very contentious. For example:

> As one goes in quest of the wisdom of the past on the subject of war, one notices first of all how small is the number of general treatises on strategy even over the space of centuries. There have been many great soldiers in the past, and military historians have favored us with thousands of volumes recounting the exploits of outstanding military leaders, as well as of many of them not so outstanding. But this richness of writings in military history does not prepare us for the poverty in theoretical writings on the strategy of war. Indeed the few theorists have enjoyed an exceptional scarcity value.⁴²

The context of the above quotation is an argument to the effect that the military profession, certainly prior to 1945, has been far more interested in tactics than it has in strategy. This is rather like saying that officials are far more interested in concrete proposals for action than in conceptual frameworks. Both are hardy perennial truths that stem from the very nature of the responsibilities of the men in question. The principal frailty in Brodie's argument is that it requires a baseline for assessment. If there was a "poverty in theoretical writing" (and it is by no means self-evident that this was the case—although this author agrees with Brodie), is that a poverty in quantity, in quality or in both? If the judgment rests upon the appreciation that, say, wars from the time of Napoleon to Hitler were ill-conducted with reference to political purpose—what is the relevant standard of comparison? Ill-conduct by comparison with Korea (or Vietnam—which occurred after the date of publication)? Whether or not the wealth (in quantity at least) of contemporary strategic theorizing will produce a well-conducted World War III, it is, fortunately, too soon to say. The quality of contemporary theory may be reflected in the protracted absence of a direct clash of arms between the superpowers, but there is no way of being certain that this is the case.⁴³

It is true that the scale of effort of strategic theorizing from the middle 1950s onwards was unprecedented. However, it is also true that this rapid growth in-

39. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy*, p. 14.

40. For example, see Edward N. Luttwak. *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire: From the First Century A.D. to the Third* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1976).

41. *Strategy in the Missile Age*, p. 28.

42. *Strategy in the Missile Age*, p. 28.

43. It is not implied here that Brodie has been uncritical towards the schema devised by his strategic colleagues since 1945. Indeed, as Michael Howard claims, he "has remained aloof from all the fashionable fads of civilian strategic analysis;" in "Two serious a matter: politicians and the Pentagon," *The Times Literary Supplement*, September 6, 1974, p. 946 (a review of Brodie's War and Politics).

dustry was the product of very special circumstances (including the rapid develop-
ment of succeeding generations of weapons which were clearly beyond the special
professional competence of the military to accommodate conceptually; and the
rapid development of ancillary academic disciplines). To confront Brodie's argu-
ment directly, it is useful to pose two questions. First, are there more first class
minds studying the interface between war and politics today than was the case,
say, in 1900? Second, if the answer is in the affirmative, is the numerical discrep-
ancy reflective not of pre-nuclear "poverty," but rather of the scale and complex-
ity of contemporary problems? As we observed earlier, the strategic studies com-
munity today is very large by comparison with times past, but the number of
theoretical innovators is very small indeed (between five and ten perhaps—
though their identity would be disputed according to personal preference). Given
the compression of comprehension time imposed upon theory-builders by the
pace of technological innovation, it is quite plausible to argue that the scale of
strategic theoretical activity prior to 1945, allowing for the peaks and troughs
of inventiveness that characterize all streams of intellectual endeavor, was neither
inappropriate to the pace of military developments, nor—historical contexts re-
called—was it on a scale greatly disproportionate to that conducted today.

The rough treatment meted out by Brodie to pre-nuclear military thinkers and practitioners probably has encouraged an already ahistorical community in its intuitive preference for ignoring pre-nuclear experience. As a naval historian and theorist of the first rank, Bernard Brodie was, of course, fully aware of both the continuities and the discontinuities in strategic problems and thought effected in part by the development of nuclear weapons. However, the overall impression left by the first four chapters of *Strategy in the Missile Age* is one of an era marked by strategic intellectual "poverty" and by military malpractice. The statements in a positive vein are swamped by the generally negative thrust of the argument. Brodie's book is important both because it is one of the few works addressed to contemporary problems that does look backwards in more than a passing fashion, and because his book is not just another work on strategy. It was a landmark text: a work summarizing and transcending the debates of a decade. Moreover, it remains, in the 1970s, the first book on the subject of strategy that newcomers are requested to read. Finally, even if Brodie were correct in his implicit claim that pre-nuclear strategic theory was but a pale and undernourished forerunner of contemporary theorizing, it does not follow (and, indeed, Brodie suggests to the contrary) that pre-nuclear military and diplomatic practice offers no substantial reward to the determined scholarly explorer.

Conclusion

A deeper and more systematic training of a new generation of strategists and arms controllers in relevant pre-nuclear history may be justified on a number of grounds. Such training should enable students better to distinguish the transient from the enduring; should facilitate their understanding of the structure of policy problems (with many more cases for study), and should help them to discern inappropriate historical analogies and illustrations when they are offered. However pragmatic their apparent approach to current problems, all strategists relate the particular to the general. Whether it be the proposed sale of F-18s to Iran or the fate of sea-launched cruise missiles in SALT, very particular issues are processed analytically by minds that contain general frameworks relating to foreign military sales, arms race, the character and objectives of the Soviet Union (in its relation to the conduct of arms control), and so forth. This article has not argued that public policy will be improved as a direct consequence of strategists and arms controllers delving into pre-nuclear thought and practice. All that is suggested is that the relevant data base for the construction of general hypotheses and premises would vastly be expanded were systematic attention to be paid to pre-nuclear phenomena. Among the virtues of historical inquiry is the fact that its findings compel officials and analysts to confront evidence that transcends the bounds of their life experience—although it is not to be denied that each generation will interpret history in ways consistent with its actual experience.

It is possible that the argument presented here is profoundly in error; that
really today's strategists and officials have no need of the policy-scientific study
of history. However, on prima facie grounds, that possibility looks more than a
little insubstantial. The case for the relevance of much of pre-nuclear strategic
thought and practice to the design of policy frameworks for the proper assessment
of contemporary policy problems is sufficiently robust, that the burden of proof
would seem to rest upon those who claim, explicitly or tacitly, that 1945 truly
marked a great divide in international political affairs.

This article was prepared under a grant from the Ford Foundation as part of a much larger work, Strategic Studies and Public Policy (forthcoming). I would like to thank my colleague at the Hudson Institute, Lewis Dunn, for his helpful comments.

12

Verifying
Moscow's
SALT pact
sincerity

By Guy Halverson
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Is the Soviet Union violating the 1972 strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) agreements and building offensive and defensive systems that go beyond the limits set by the accord?

That question is increasingly coming to
center stage here as the July 2 SALT II
conference in Geneva nears.

At issue, given Soviet rejection of on-site
inspection, is whether negotiators can find an
acceptable compromise allowing the Soviets
and the U.S. to monitor accurately nuclear
military developments by each superpower.

There is also the question of the impact of
the verification issue (if SALT violations can
be determined) — compounded by difficulties
over “classification” of such weapons as the
Soviet Backfire bomber and U.S. cruise
missiles — on detente.

Whatever, there is mounting concern in
Congress — and privately among some Penta-
gon officials — that the Ford administration
has not been candid about the nature and
extent of Soviet violations of the interim SALT
I agreement.

"There is considerable evidence that there
are large numbers of violations by the
Soviets," says one Pentagon official, speaking
off the record.

Alleged violations — none of them yet
officially confirmed by the Pentagon or State
Department — include jamming of U.S.
equipment used to monitor Soviet testing of
multi-warhead missiles (MIRVs); concealing
missile silos from overhead satellite surveil-
lance; development of a mobile anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) radar system; construction of
new silos — perhaps as many as 200 — above

★Please turn to Page 9

★ Verifying sincerity

Continued from Page 1

the levels set in the 1972 interim accord;
conversion of light to heavy missiles.

Press articles reporting such violations
include technical articles in the highly re-
spected Aviation Week and Space Technology,
The liberal New Republic, the July Reader's
Digest.

The Digest article, by Ford confidant and
former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird, is
considered particularly intriguing here, given
Mr. Laird's long-time working relationship
with President Ford.

A spokesman for the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency says the
"U.S. is satisfied that there are no Soviet
violations. We haven't accused them of viola-
tions, nor have they accused us." Indeed, the
commission established to monitor the 1972
agreements met last on the question of alleged
"ambiguities" in the accords from March 24
through May 6 at Geneva.

No further meetings are planned until later
in the year.

Still, some members of the Senate, in-
cluding Democratic Sen. Henry M. Jackson,
who heads up a Senate subcommittee on arms
control, remain skeptical. Though Secretary
of Defense James R. Schlesingr and CIA
Director William E. Colby met with the
subcommittee on the issue of Soviet violations
earlier this spring, Secretary Kissinger can-
celed an appearance and has not yet re-
sponded to subcommittee requests for a
rescheduling of that meeting.

"At first, the administration was saying that there were 'no violations' of the SALT I," says one Pentagon source, "now they are saying that 'ambiguities' are being 'clarified' and 'reduced.'"

Charles W. Yost

Dillydallying with diplomacy

Washington

A pamphlet issued by the U.S. State Depart-
ment last May entitled "U.S. Foreign Policy,
an Overview" contains the following state-
ment: "There must be an understanding of
the crucial importance of timing. Opportu-
nities cannot be hoarded; once past, they are
usually irretrievable."

This truism has unfortunately been illus-
trated time and time again in the foreign
policy of the United States, of some of its
friends and some of its adversaries, and of the
world community as a whole.

Strategic arms control is a good example. There is one case in which the U.S. and the Soviets did act in time, that is, SALT I strictly limiting antimissile defense systems. Had that action not been taken when it was, both countries would no doubt now be deploying numerous and hideously expensive installations of this kind across their landscapes, and multiplying their offensive missiles to penetrate these new defenses.

In most other respects both governments
have been neither so sensible nor so fore-
sighted. They have deployed land-based offen-
sive systems, they have deployed sea-based
offensive systems, they have installed MIRVs
on both of them, in each case in great numbers
and at vast expense. Only after the fact did
they get around to negotiating a ceiling in
these deployments. It will no doubt be many
years, and scores of billions of dollars, before
they finally reduce to modest levels what
might without too much difficulty have been
agreed and maintained if serious negotiations
had been started 15 years ago.

In another current example, both govern-
ments are gradually introducing naval deploy-
ments and installations into the hitherto
untroubled Indian Ocean. Both assert they are
doing so to match the other and would be
willing to stay out if the other would. Yet
nothing is done, despite the strong protests of
many of the littoral states. Very probably five
years from now both powers will, quite
unnecessarily, be maintaining imposing ar-
madas on these distant seas, thus adding one
more danger zone to the areas of competition
and confrontation between them.

In a quite different sort of case, it should
have been clear for over 10 years, ever since
the first Greek-Turkish disturbances in
Cyprus in 1964, that there would be an
explosion there if the Zurich agreements were
not modified to give greater protection to the
Turkish minority. United Nations peace-
keeping forces were sent in to hold the ring,
but inside the ring nothing constructive was
done.

Archbishop Makarios, relying on his large
majority, repeatedly refused concessions, as
he is still doing today. Disturbances continued
and the United States twice, to the great
indignation of the Turks, blocked Turkey's

intervention to protect its minority. No one
needed to have second sight to predict what
would eventually happen. Yet for 10 years the
United States, Great Britain, Greece, and
Turkey failed to act decisively to bring about a
settlement. The opportunity was lost, and now
Cyprus lies in ruins and NATO's southern
flank is gravely undermined.

The same thing may be happening once
again in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The oppor-
tunity to settle after the war in 1967 was
missed and the 1973 war occurred. Now the
bargaining and posturing over an interim
Sinai agreement are being carried to absurd
and dangerous lengths. While these maneu-
vers are prolonged, the momentum to exclude
Israel from the UN General Assembly builds
up steadily. If it is excluded, Israel and the
United States will react explosively and
peacemaking may be set back several years.

What is in fact needed to prevent Israeli
exclusion from the Assembly is not tough talk
but an agreement on Sinai this month, and a
decision next month to reconvene the Geneva
Conference very shortly.

Another example is Panama.

For several years the United States and
Panama have been, with difficulty but with
good will on both sides, renegotiating the
status of the Canal Zone. Panama passionately
believes — and the whole of Latin America is
solidly behind it — that the present status is an
anachronistic and humiliating hangover from
the days of gunboat diplomacy. The United
States executive branch agrees and is pre-
pared to make substantial modifications in the
old treaty.

Yet a certain number of members of the
United States Congress, apparently unaware
of what has happened in the world since 1945,
not only have announced their intention of
refusing to ratify the treaty but even of
withholding funds for the completion of the
negotiation. If these gentlemen are so reck-
less as to carry out these threats, they will
certainly provoke violence in the Canal Zone,
a disastrous deterioration in U.S.-Latin-Amer-
ican relations, and a very grave threat to
security of passage through the canal.

Finally, there might be mentioned the
fleeting opportunity which is now being lost
by all nations to preserve the oceans of the
world and their resources, not for narrow and
often prodigal national exploitation, but as a
common heritage for all mankind. Here
indeed it is undiscriminating "third-world"
solidarity, rallying behind the greediest
among them, which is working directly
contrary to the interests of four-fifths of the
third world itself.

The author of this article writes from a
background of 40 years as a United States
diplomat.

©1975 Charles W. Yost

CSM
8/7/85

The Monitor's View

Nuclear club: members only

How do the members of an elite and powerful club make everybody else happy not to join it?

This is a basic question posed to the countries already possessing nuclear weapons as Geneva talks begin in a renewed effort to prevent the potentially catastrophic spread of such weapons. How to deter the increasing number of countries developing a capability to "go nuclear" if they choose?

The answers lie in reducing the apparent advantages of belonging to the nuclear weapons club — and reducing the disadvantages of staying out of it.

Specific means to these ends are being discussed in the conference to review the 1970 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) which began in Geneva yesterday. Though public interest has not exactly been galvanized by the treaty with the jaw-breaking name, progress at the conference is vitally important if the lid is to be kept on what has so often been called the Pandora's box of nuclear proliferation.

The good news is that there is hope for such progress on the basis of new cooperative efforts by the United States and the Soviet Union. These are signaled by the joint release of policy reports on the subject by a panel of Americans and a panel of Russians under the auspices of the respective United Nations Associations of the two countries.

There are differences along with much fundamental agreement. Particularly significant is an increased Soviet disposition to talk "seriously" about pressing ahead with carrying out the terms of the NPT, according to Prof. Lincoln Bloomfield of the Center of International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a panel member who met with the Russians in Moscow in March.

India's explosion of a nuclear device appeared to be one spur to the Soviet concern about further nuclear spread. With Israel, Brazil, and South Korea among several other nations discussed as potential nuclear powers,

the whole world should share an urgency to answer that question of why any nonnuclear country should resist going nuclear.

The UN Association panel reports suggest various means of encouraging abstinence. For example:

* Internationally safeguarded help from the nuclear countries to the nonnuclear countries, including the use of peaceful nuclear explosions. This could remove pressure from countries to develop their own, perhaps less safe-guarded, efforts.

* Self-control by the nuclear countries in the development of weapons, while pursuing the NPT's provision for pushing toward a comprehensive test ban treaty. Salt II ought to be followed by a SALT III, suggests Professor Bloomfield, going beyond the limitation of strategic weapons to an actual cutting back on such weapons. Such steps could show the nuclear powers doing their part in reducing nuclear threat.

As the U.S. panel stated: "The most significant actions that the nuclear powers can take to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons will be major, prompt steps towards reducing their own nuclear capabilities. An international climate must be created in which the use of nuclear weapons in a military conflict is totally unacceptable and in which the political utility of possessing nuclear weapons steadily diminishes."

The steps are complicated, of course, so long as nuclear powers China and France remain outside the NPT. The review conference ought to work toward inducements to them to join in reducing arms. With all the danger of theft and misuse of spreading nuclear materials, the stricter safeguards recently proposed in a Vienna meeting of experts called by the International Atomic Energy Agency also need to be pursued.

The NPT review didn't make headlines yesterday. But its work is crucial to everybody's future.

SALT questions remain

This newspaper reacted enthusiastically to President Ford's arms agreement in Vladivostok. Any progress toward slowing the nuclear weapons race is welcome. But now that specific numbers have emerged, serious questions arise about the tentative accord — which does not restrain the arms buildup but permits it to go forward.

When even the arms disarmament community is skeptical, close scrutiny is merited. It may be better to have a "cap" on nuclear force levels than no cap at all. We think it is. But the cap is awfully big — and allows for a continuing race in qualitative improvements.

Under the accord, the United States will in effect replace existing systems as it planned to do anyway, going ahead with the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber. The Russians in turn will proceed with installation of their massive launchers and deployment of the multiple warheads called MIRVs. True, they will have to cut back on the total number of launchers, but this merely means phasing out obsolete models.

The inexplicable question — and one which did not emerge in the Ford press conference — is why the President agreed in Vladivostok to the ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed missiles on each side. The U.S. now has under 800 such missiles and the Russians are not yet deploying them. Why such a huge jump? Why was it not possible at least to freeze the number at the

existing American level?

Was this a yielding to the Pentagon, or to the Russians? If Moscow was especially eager for an agreement in order to save detente (and Leonid Brezhnev's political life), why did Washington not strike a better bargain?

Asked about the Soviet advantage in missile throwweight or size, Mr. Ford said the agreement would allow the American side to opt for larger missiles also. Does this imply a built-in restraint, some understanding with the Russians that if they chose to deploy MIRVs to the ceiling permitted, the U.S. would then start building larger launchers? Are there some subordinate agreements that provide hope for settling for lesser numbers than the proposed ceilings? How will Soviet deployment of MIRVs be verified?

These and other burning questions need clarification and public discussion. The impression at the moment is that in their haste for a show of progress on SALT and determination to keep detente going President Ford and his Secretary of State settled for much less than they reasonably needed to. Or, the Pentagon did not want an agreement that would interfere with its plans.

We recognize the importance of going on with the search for balance in the two nations' nuclear arsenals. But, unless the relevant questions are satisfactorily answered, it would not be surprising if Congress sent the administration back to work for a more acceptable framework.

Vladivostok's Gaps

One stark fact towers above all the other elements in the confusing debate over the nuclear arms agreement reached by President Ford and Mr. Brezhnev at Vladivostok.

The new accord would permit each side to build a "first-strike" force of new MIRV multiple-warhead missiles, a minor portion of which could threaten to destroy the bulk of the other's silo-based ICBM's, while the bulk of the attacker's force remained in reserve to deter retaliation. Neither side has such a capability now.

An effort to head off that capability on the Soviet side by a low MIRV missile ceiling—and, presumably, to negotiate a similar limitation of American MIRV forces—was the central thrust of the Nixon-Kissinger strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II) with Russian leaders in March and June. For reasons that are still unclear—and which the Congress urgently should probe—that approach was abandoned by President Ford at Vladivostok, if not before.

The Vladivostok agreement would permit the Soviet Union, starting next year, to replace with new, bigger, more accurate MIRV-tipped rockets virtually all the ICBM's it is permitted under the 1972 SALT I accords—1,320 of its 1,410 silo-based missiles. Before 1985, its present 1,410 warheads would go to an estimated 6,700. With their large size, this is more than three times the number of warheads needed for a "high-confidence" strike at the United States' 1,054 ICBM silos.

The United States, under the Vladivostok agreement, can replace all its first generation Minuteman III and Poseidon MIRV missiles—800 of a programed 1,030 already are deployed—with bigger, more accurate Minuteman IV and Trident I missiles. It plans, in addition, to add 288 larger Trident II missiles aboard 12 monster Trident submarines at a cost of almost $1.5-billion each. With this program—which would replace some 5,000 existing small MIRV warheads (too small for an effective counter-silo attack) with an estimated 11,000 bigger warheads—the Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly are confident that they could beat the Russians to a "first-strike" capability by two or three years.

A nuclear "Pearl Harbor" with its unforeseeable consequences would not be initiated lightly by either side, of course. But the existence of this capability on both sides during a future crisis—and the massive advantage it seems to offer for the side that shoots first—raise possibilities almost too horrendous to contemplate.

Crisis instability—the penultimate danger of the nuclear era, second only to the ultimate horror of an actual nuclear exchange—clearly has been brought closer by the failure at Vladivostok to limit MIRV missiles to low levels.

Secretary Kissinger argues that high vulnerability of silo-based ICBM's would be inevitable anyway by 1985, at the rate missile accuracy is increasing. But his persistent though belated efforts in Moscow last spring to limit MIRV missiles rather than missile accuracy—and his complaints about military resistance on both sides—suggest that he is now trying to make the best of a bad bargain. Without MIRV, an attacker must fire at least two missiles at every opposing silo for high confidence of success, thus disarming himself more than

the enemy. With MIRV, the attacker has the edge. One missile carrying six warheads could destroy three enemy ICBM's.

While arguing for retention of silo-based missiles, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger is talking of spending tens of billions of dollars to shift to greater reliance on new bombers and mobile missiles—on land and perhaps aboard aircraft, as well as at sea.

The Soviet Union will be unable to ignore this trend. If it deploys 1,320 of its new MIRV missiles in increasingly vulnerable silos, it will be under pressure well before 1985 to replace many of them with a second generation of mobile MIRV missiles both on land and at sea.

Logically it should be in the U.S.S.R.'s interest to slow the pace of MIRV deployment on both sides until it develops such mobile MIRV missiles. It clearly is in the joint Russian and American interest as well to lower the high ceilings of the Vladivostok agreement before they are reached rather than to seek to reduce them afterward.

A resolution introduced by Senators Kennedy, Mathias and Mondale calls upon the President to seek these improvements in the Vladivostok agreement and others while the detailed negotiations go forward next year to draft final SALT II accords. An effort to achieve such improvements is vital if the Vladivostok agreement is to bring arms control rather than the continued "mad momentum" of the arms race for another decade.

SALT Rhetoric

We'd like to offer a few more comments on the strategic arms agreement reached last week in Vladivostok, centering this time on the problem of rhetoric. The first thing to say is that this is not a trivial subject. Indeed, rhetoric may not be the window-dressing of SALT, but the core of it.

The second thing to say is that our own rhetoric, in last Monday's editorial "Whose Triumph?", was in one important respect misleading. In stressing the problem of missile throw weight, we did not mean to convey an impression that we were advocating a throw weight race with the Soviet Union, though some well-informed readers took it that way. The pact gives the Soviets a potential edge of something like 3-1 in missile throw weight, translatable into a similar edge in warhead numbers and destructive power. This disparity measures a huge Soviet threat that calls for some U.S. response, and while that response probably will include more throw weight, there is no magic in simply matching Soviet totals.

Throw weight is important not as a prescription for U.S. forces, but rather as a measure of the threat, as a measure of the kinds of asymmetries the Vladivostok agreement sanctions, as a measure of the kind of concessions that went into the agreement, and finally as a measure of the kind of rhetoric with which the negotiation process gets surrounded.

The rhetoric with which President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger are defending themselves on the throw weight issue, for example, suggests that the provisions of the pact do not sanction any throw weight asymmetry. The disparity results simply from the choice of U.S. defense planners, they say, and the pact allows the U.S. to close the gap if it chooses to do so.

Yet in fact the pact freezes the present disparity in the size of missile silos. Soviet silos are larger than ours, and the pact prohibits either side from building new silos or expanding present ones more than 15%. Unquestionably we can boost our throw weight substantially within present silos, but so can the Soviets. So far as we can discern, the assertion that we could close the gap rests on an assumption that they will stand still while we increase. To his credit, President Ford said essentially this in his last press conference. The assumption may be valid, since it certainly is

hard to see why the Soviets want their present throw weight, let alone a larger one. Yet the asymmetry in what the agreement allows remains, and the situation is far less evenhanded than the official rhetoric suggests.

Beyond that, the initial U.S. position that the two superpowers should be limited to equal throw weights was an entirely reasonable one. While no one number accurately compares two missile forces, if you

choose any single criterion it has to be throw weight. Our abandonment of that position, allowing the Soviets to count our small missiles as equivalent to their big ones, was close to the heart of the "breakthrough" that permitted agreement. This reality is entirely obscured by rhetoric that says the throw weight issue is a "phony" while it was a "concession" for the Soviets to drop their demand that they be given more intercontinental missiles because they feel threatened by China.

We suppose such rhetorical disproportion is inherent in the democratic political process, which asks the negotiator to strike a bargain abroad and then defend his handiwork against critics at home. It is all the more inevitable when, as in recent years, a succession of diplomatic "triumphs" seems the only way a President can prop up sagging domestic political support.

In defending his handiwork a negotiator need not be hypocritical. In this case he knows that the big-silo option he has given away is one we would be unlikely to use in an era when missile accuracy makes silos vulnerable and an ABM defense of them is for better or (in our opinion) worse outlawed by previous pacts. Yet the negotiator knows that the throw weight disparity measures a threat that will have to be offset by improvements in the U.S. strategic force—through improved accuracies, the new B-1 bomber, the Trident submarine, a cruise missile program. And he ought to worry lest negotiating momentum result in details that subtly foreclose these options, and even more that domestic support for them will be undermined by the rhetoric of SALT.

For in fact the fundamental rhetorical theme about stopping an arms race through a succession of agreements obscures the reality of what is happening to the strategic balance. On the U.S. side of the supposed "race," direct spending on strategic programs in real terms has been declining by an average of 8% a year for more than a decade.

In 1974 dollars it dropped from over $19 billion in 1961 to $6.8 billion in 1974. On the Soviet side spending is secret and in any event difficult to translate into U.S. equivalents, but it's impossible to look at their deployments without concluding that over the years in which our effort has fallen theirs has soared.

The Vladivostok agreement does nothing to arrest this trend. Arresting it would require a solid agreement centering on throw weight, but that probably cannot be realistically expected so long as the Soviets see a U.S. unwilling to spend its riches on defense. Willingness to support defense is not likely to be built by official rhetoric suggesting that an iffy agreement stops a disastrous "race," that the Soviets have made concessions while we have not, that negotiating deftness can somehow substitute for military preparedness.

# Pointing to SALT II agreement

## Framework laid— now for details

By Richard Burt
Special to
The Christian Science Monitor

London

Although only the bare outlines of a new agreement to control the latest nuclear weapons (SALT II) were revealed by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in Vladivostok, it is clear that he has succeeded in breaking the impasse that stood in the way of his much desired "conceptual breakthrough" in arms control.

But the agreement is not yet a hard and fast accord. It is instead a package of general principles that will form the framework for intense negotiations for the next several months by lower level Soviet and U.S. negotiators in Geneva.

Yet while the understanding only exists in outline form, analysts have already begun to point to the important points in the outline sketched for an eventual SALT II accord. Among them are:

* The new agreement will apparently cover only offensive strategic nuclear systems and will not affect the status of shorter-range systems. It has been a long-standing Soviet demand that U.S. aircraft based in Europe and capable of reaching the Soviet homeland with nuclear weapons should be included in the SALT II agreement. It seems that the U.S. has successfully resisted pressure to include these weapons in a new arms package.

* In formulating new ceilings for offensive weapons, the new agreement will incorporate "relevant" portions of the existing interim agreement on offensive weapons, which will remain in force until October, 1977. The new agreement will go into force at that date and will run until the end of 1985.

* The 1972 interim agreement limited the number of missile-submarine and land- and sea-base missiles each side could deploy. Under its terms, if the Soviet Union retired older land-based missiles, it could deploy 1,408 land-based missiles and 950 sea-based missiles. The United States was allowed 1,054 land-base and 656 sea-base missiles. It appears likely that these levels will be roughly maintained in the new agreement.

* While these numbers are not likely to be significantly changed, a new system of SALT accounting will be adopted, based on the "aggregate" number of delivery vehicles each side possesses — a figure that will include, for the first time, long-range bombers.

Thus unlike the 1972 agreement, the new accord will not limit separate categories of weapons, but will put a ceiling on the total number of strategic missiles and bombers that each side can deploy.

*Please turn to Page 6

Continued from Page 1

In 1977, the U.S. total will be roughly 2,150; the combined Soviet figure for Soviet missiles and bombers will be approximately 2,500.

Because the agreement, in the words of the communique released in Vladivostok, is to be "based on the principle of equality," it will probably be necessary to agree on an aggregate number for total weapons that lies between the projected 1,977 numbers for each side. This suggests, as Dr. Kissinger indicated to newsmen following the summit, that the Soviet Union's arsenal might undergo a reduction.

* While the aggregate plan for missile and bomber numbers appears complicated, an even more complex task will be devising a means of controlling the deployment of multiple warheads, or MIRVs, atop missiles. According to Dr. Kissinger, the SALT II agreement will not attempt to control the actual number of these warheads, but instead will limit the numbers of missiles on which they can be placed.

Again, the aggregate approach has been selected, allowing each side to put multiple warheads on the approved number of land- or sea-based missiles. At present, the U.S. is "MIRVing" both types of missiles, and by 1977 plans to deploy more than 1,200 missiles with multiple warheads.

The Soviet Union has tested MIRVs but has yet to begin operational deployment. If a ceiling of roughly 1,200 is agreed on for "MIRVed" missiles, the Soviets could then place them on a large proportion of their large-payload, land-based missiles. Many analysts believe this would constitute a grave threat to U.S. missile sites.

This concern has led to speculation that the Soviets have agreed to a lower ceiling for "MIRVed" missiles than that of the U.S.; or that the U.S. negotiators, if a common ceiling for MIRVs were adopted, might have agreed to phase out some already deployed MIRVs.

NOV 26 1974
CUM.

Ford adds
bombers to
SALT mix

U.S. concessions
yet to be measured

By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

While withholding definite com-
ment on the Ford-Brezhnev nuclear-
arms agreement until they see de-
tails, analysts here note that the
United States appears to have made
concession in two main areas:

* President Ford has agreed to include bombers among the launchers to be limited. In bombers the U.S. is far ahead of the Russians in quantity and quality. The U.S. has 550 long-range B-52 bombers and will soon start adding the new B-1's. The Russians have only 140 comparable aircraft.

* Mr. Ford also agreed to put a ceiling on the number of American MIRV (multiple, independently targeted) warheads of which the U.S. will soon have more than 10,000, whereas the Russians are still testing theirs. These multiple warheads are considered of importance not so much as weapons to be used against cities as against the enemy's missile launching sites.

Russian promise

In return, the Russians, so far as is
yet known, appear to have agreed to a
reduction in the total number of their
missile launchers. It is not known,
however, whether this reduction will
result in parity with the U.S.

Nor is it known how the reduction
has been calculated. Presumably,
more will be known on both counts
when President Ford reports to Con-
gress.

*Please turn to Page 6

NOV 23 1974

C.S.M.

★ Bombers added to SALT mix

Continued from Page 1

Bombers were excluded by the U.S.
from the 1972 SALT 1 agreement.
Included in 1972 were land-based and
submarine-based launchers only. The
Russians agreed to a limit of 1,618
intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) launchers — said to be the
number either deployed or under
construction at the time of the agree-
ment. Presumably, many of these
now have been completed.

On the American side, Washington
was to limit itself to its 1,054 launch-
ers, including 1,000 minutenen
launchers and 54 for the larger Titans.

In submarine-launched missiles
(SLBMs) the agreement provided
that the Russians could build up to 950
and the Americans up to 710, if they
dismantled one land-based missile
loader for every one they built
above their equipment then. It was
agreed that at that time the Russians
had 740 SLBMs, and the Americans
656.

Key observers here, including Sen.
Henry M. Jackson (D) of Washington,
are not commenting until they learn
more details, in particular the num-
ber of ICBMs to be retained on both
sides.

It is not known how the equivalents
between ICBMs and long-range
bombers has been calculated. Nor is

the linkage between the number of
Soviet launchers and the number of
American multiple warheads known."

At this writing, all that is known is
that there is a formula.

Senator Jackson said (through a
spokesman by telephone from Miami)
that he had received a telephone call
from the State Department an-
nouncing the "breakthrough," but did
not yet know enough about it to
interpret what had been accom-
plished.

The Senator has been a leader
among those who criticized the SALT
agreement of 1972 because it gave the
U.S. fewer launchers than it gave the
U.S.S.R. He did not regard the U.S.
advantages in MIRVs sufficient com-
pensation.

Dr. Kissinger argued in 1972 that
the U.S. was justified in accepting the
lower number of launchers for sev-
eral reasons including the following:
(1) the American superiority in mul-
tiple warheads; (2) the fact that
although Soviet missiles are on the
whole much heavier than the Amer-
ican ones, the U.S. has the much more
important advantage of great accu-
racy. Intermediate-range missiles
based under NATO and U.S. com-
mand in Europe were, like bombers,
excluded in 1972.

# The Vladivostok summit

By Vladislav Kozyakov

When Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford meet near Vladivostok, they will deal with complicated and, in some cases, most delicate issues concerning both bilateral Soviet-American relations and the situation in various parts of the globe. Despite the complexity of the matters to be discussed, there are grounds for hope that the forthcoming summit will be fruitful.

The foremost reason for optimism is that this summit is not starting out from square one. The previous summits laid the groundwork by the signing of basic agreements. Recorded in these agreements are the commitments of both countries to take all necessary concerted steps to strengthen universal peace and to base relations on the principles of equality, mutual advantage, and mutual consideration of each other's interests — the principles of peaceful coexistence.

This has led to some 40 treaties and agreements being concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States in recent years. But more importantly, wide prospects for furthering cooperation have been opened.

The outcome of Henry Kissinger's recent talks with Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko also inspire optimism. The talks, where agreement on the Vladivostok summit was reached, passed in a businesslike and friendly atmosphere. President Ford called them "very constructive."

Of course, the continued dialogue on measures to further limit strategic arms will take up a major part of the summit. There is now mutual understanding between the two countries that the interim agreement that expires in 1977 should be followed by a new long-term agreement concerning both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of arms control. The most essential term of a new agreement is that the contracting parties strictly observe the principle of equal security.

The first SALT agreements were achieved precisely because the two sides agreed to this principle, and it is absolutely necessary for SALT II. We only regret that this view is not shared by everyone in the U.S. In fact some senators and Pentagon leaders insist on unilateral military advantages for the U.S. This is not a realistic nor a sensible approach. It bears the imprint of obsolete concepts and views that have not withstood the test of time. Such an approach does

not reinforce U.S. security, but, on the contrary, undermines it. It leads to an intensified worldwide arms race and hence to even greater danger of a world nuclear war.

It is not the arms drive, which has been going on for decades, but the easing of tension and the Soviet-American agreements signed in the last few years that have succeeded in weakening the danger of a new war and in strengthening international security, including U.S. security.

The matter now is to promote the process of detente. As Mr. Brezhnev has pointed out time and time again, the U.S.S.R. is prepared to carry out the broadest concerted undertakings in limiting and consequently reducing armaments.

Proceeding from the fact that political detente should be followed by military detente, the Soviet Government has made numerous proposals on this issue. They include withdrawing Soviet and American naval vessels from the Mediterranean, banning all underground nuclear weapons tests, and prohibiting action to influence the environment for military purposes.

It is difficult to picture the development of Soviet-American relations without increased trade. Much has been done in recent years to establish mutually beneficial cooperation between our countries in trade. Agreements have been concluded, big contracts signed, and trade missions opened. Although the volume of trade has already multiplied several times, we cannot say that all the vast possibilities existing in this field are already being used.

The Soviet Union favors the establishment of large-scale, long-term economic ties with the U.S. as well as with other Western countries. If there is no progress here, then a great deal of that which was gained by both sides in 1972, 1973, and 1974 risks being weakened.

The Soviet Union is consistently working for the development and improvement of Soviet-American relations to be of a stable nature. The interests of the Soviet and American peoples, like those of all other peoples in the world, coincide in the safeguarding and strengthening of peace. This creates the widest prospects for the achievement of mutually acceptable agreements and cooperation.

Mr. Kozyakov is a correspondent for the Soviet press agency Novosti.

Clayton Fritchey

# A World Disarmament Conference

Iran wants the U.N. General Assembly, which opens in about six weeks, to establish a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Fair enough, but why only the Mideast? If the United Nations is going to take up nuclear problems again, why not do it across the board through the World Disarmament Conference that has been talked about so much but never implemented?

Since there appears to be little prospect in the near future of further inhibiting the development and spread of nuclear weapons through bilateral negotiations between Russia and the United States, there is little to be lost and perhaps much to be gained by turning to multilateral diplomacy for a change.

In a limited way, the United Nations has been trying to do this for the last 12 years, first through the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) and later through a successor group called Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). Little has been accomplished, one reason being the absence of such nuclear nations as China and France and such key European countries as West and East Germany.

Because of greatly changed condi-

tions, it is probable that most of these powers now would participate in a full-fledged World Disarmament Conference. Mrs. Alva Myrdal, who has long been the Swedish representative to both the ENDC and CCD, believes the Chinese might also come in if their views were given sympathetic consideration.

In any case, Mrs. Myrdal, whose experience qualifies her as one of the great veterans of the arms debate, thinks the proposed World Disarmament Conference (WDC) is now not only a practical possibility but "might come around in 1974."

In a remarkably candid and illuminating interview with Richard Hudson, editor of the scholarly World-Peace Report, Mrs. Myrdal says the conference "is indeed to be considered seriously because we need some kind of breakthrough. We can't just continue with the CCD, in which nobody really believes, on the one hand, and then have bilateral negotiations on the other."

The results of the strategic arms limitations talks (SALT) are, in Mrs. Myrdal's opinion, "either nonsenses or mere cosmetic devices." Speaking not only for herself but, as

she believes, for other delegations as well, Mrs. Myrdal says, "We are pessimistic about achieving any real disarmament because we must blame the two superpowers who all the time have gone on not only piling up more arms, but also improving the weapons they have."

As to China's doubts about a World Disarmament Conference, Mrs. Myrdal's answer is, "We should meet in order to consider the pledges called for by the Chinese of non-first use of nuclear weapons and never using them against nuclear-free countries."

That's what the WDC should be about in the first instance, the Swedish representative says. "And what," she asks, "of the Russians' offer when they say, 'We have already promised, you know, never to use force.' That's the kind of promise that is just rhetoric. It certainly is no pledge, as the Chinese want it to be."

If both bilateral and WDC multilateral efforts fail to control the arms race, there could be a revival of interest in the kind of unilateral approach that in the 1960s was known as GRIT, an acronym invented by Prof. Charles Osgood, signifying "graduated reciprocation in tension-reduction."

There are a number of appealing features to the GRIT approach. Prof. Robert Johansen, author of "The Politics of Arms Control," lists several:

(1) It does not depend on bargaining "with a suspicious rival over troublesome details."

(2) It cuts through the atmosphere of suspicion and communicates "a desire to exercise self-restraint, to extend a degree of trust to the opponent," and to carry out further acts if earlier ones are reciprocated.

(3) "It shifts the focus in efforts of the public and press from the usual practice of attacking the opponent's good faith to the more promising task of pressing one's own domestic political system to undertake initiatives for arms reductions."

This may sound like unrealistic, starry-eyed idealism, but one of the toughest politicians of our time—the late Nikita Khrushchev—says in his secret memoirs that, even if a Soviet-American agreement on bilateral arms reduction were impossible, Russia should "go ahead and sharply reduce our own expenditures—unilaterally." Is Khrushchev's successor, Chairman Leonid Brezhnev, listening?

© 1974, Los Angeles Times

W.P.

JUL 24 1974

MEDIA
REACTION
REPORT

WORLDWIDE TREATMENT
OF CURRENT ISSUES

Windup of Kissinger Trip

No. 7

January 26, 1976

S'interroge
utilité
t-européen

Le Monde
Frankfurter Allgemeine
REEL TIEMPO
BRECHT

TÉLÉVENTÉ

YOMIURI SHIMBUN

E TIMES

HÀTCHI

E STANDARTE

Aftenposte

AUSTRALIA

EUROPE 1

Straits Times

TADO DE S. PA

216019
XATLAO DAILY

The
Economist

## Summary

Widespread foreign media comment in considerable volume divided in judging the results of Secretary Kissinger's Moscow discussions and generally saw the new U.S. agreement with Spain as strongly supporting King Juan Carlos' regime.

Assessments of the Secretary's talks with Soviet leaders stressed that detente was evidently still the mainstay of both nations' policy, but questioned whether limited progress toward a SALT accord balanced off what most considered a defeat for the U.S. on the Angola issue.

Nevertheless, some commentators judged the balance positive. London's *Financial Times*, for instance, said "Dr. Kissinger's visit... produced no concrete agreements, but did help to clarify some of the outstanding issues...." It added that "the delay should provide an opportunity for further debate...about whether a second (SALT) agreement is really desirable...."

Hankook Ilbo of Seoul thought it "significant that the talks...made some progress despite confrontation on Angola."

On the other hand, Milan's *Corriere della Sera* observed that while "this visit cannot be considered a failure because it has at least enabled the two superpowers to keep alive a dialogue," on the Angola question Dr. Kissinger "has suffered one of the burning humiliations of his life."

Media observers viewed the accord initialed by Dr. Kissinger in Madrid as help for the new regime in its program of gradual democratization and as a strong move by the U.S. to strengthen Western defenses by bringing Spain into closer association with the Atlantic Alliance.

Figaro of Paris said "Washington seems determined to make Spain one of the Mediterranean big powers at a time when Italy, Greece and Turkey are becoming less reliable."

Soviet media said the Moscow talks had contributed to "normalization and improvement" of U.S.-USSR relations but warned that "certain U.S. circles" were resisting that process. With regard to Angola, Soviet comment reiterated that "support for national liberation movements...is one of the most important principles of Soviet foreign policy."

FIGARO LA LIBRE BELGIUM

CORRIERE DELLA SERA

The Daily Telegraph

DAGENS 1

ПРАВДА

East Asia, p. 15

Communist Media, p. 19

WESTERN EUROPE
BRITAIN

"Moscow Trip Clarified Some Issues"

Comment in the British press on the weekend and today covered the state of U. S. - USSR relations in the wake of Secretary Kissinger's Moscow discussions, as well as his initialing of a new accord with Spain, generally taken as endorsement of the Madrid regime's program for gradual democratization and a move toward closer ties between Spain and the Atlantic Community.

London's independent *Financial Times* today ran an editorial judging that "Dr. Kissinger's visit to Moscow...produced no concrete agreements, but did help to clarify some of the outstanding issues between the two superpowers." It said "the decision to take more time over SALT is welcome for a number of reasons.

"For one thing, the SALT I agreement does not expire until well into 1977, so there is plenty of time in hand to go for a considered successor. For another, it should reduce the risk of a draft SALT II agreement becoming an issue in the U. S. election campaign. Above all, the delay should provide an opportunity for further debate, both in the U. S. itself and in the West in general, about whether a second agreement is really desirable and, if so, on what terms."

The paper noted that "the one area where the U.S. continues indisputably to hold the lead is in technology. Given the size and increasing capability of Soviet conventional forces and the apparent unwillingness or inability of the West to match them, the preservation of this lead becomes imperative." It added that deployment of the American cruise missile in Western Europe "could go a long way towards compensating for NATO's manpower deficiencies and reluctance to maintain defense budgets.

No. 7

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"In short, their potential development is probably the best single card in the American hand. Any limitation on even their strategic deployment ought to require considerable counter concessions: limitations on their conventional deployment should remain unthinkable until the Russians have shown by their behavior that they are seriously interested in arms control."

## "Cruise Missile Confuses the Arithmetic"

The liberal *Guardian* today carried defense correspondent David Fairhall's observation that "perhaps the best thing that can be said for the cruise missile's revival is that it increases the effectiveness of conventional armament and could in principle lower the threshold of nuclear warfare."

"But in the context of SALT, it is a disturbing development. It has deeply confused the crude, strategic arithmetic--an irrelevant fantasy at one level yet frighteningly real at another--on which progress, of a sort, has so far been pro-pounded."

## "Brezhnev, Ford Both Happier Without SALT Agreement"

On Saturday the paper ran an editorial observing that "detente in both its varieties--East-West and southern African--is being brought daily under greater threat by the fighting in Angola."

"Dr. Kissinger has left Moscow with what appear to be constructive Soviet proposals towards a longer-term agreement on strategic arms limitation but with no hint of a softening of Soviet support for the Popular Movement in its Angolan stampede. And even if after the South African withdrawal the Russians give no further support, the MPLA has more than enough equipment to carry on the fight. Thus it seems unlikely that a new SALT agreement will be settled for the time being. Mr. Brezhnev can manage without it at the Soviet Communist Party's 25th Congress next month, especially if he then has an Angola victory to his credit. President Ford, during his election campaign, will be happier

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without it for the same reason. It marks a big reverse in
East-West diplomacy that an agreement with the Russians
is once again something which a Western statesman would
prefer not to flaunt."

"Americans Get the Quid Without the Quo"

The independent *Times* of London said Saturday in an editorial that "on the face of it, the progress made at the Moscow talks seems to have been substantial" but added that "it also seems, however, that... while the Russians are proposing a quid pro quo arrangement over Backfire, the Americans would have to suffer the quid without the quo."

The paper said "the American Administration, in a presidential election year, is seeking praise, not opprobrium, and will want to take soundings of public opinion before making an irrevocable decision.... Judging that "the proposals put forward at Moscow have shown a mutual desire to make progress," the paper concluded:

"Champagne for congratulation is premature at this stage; but it is not yet needed for consolation either."

"Advantages to Both Brezhnev and Ford"

The sister Sunday Times ran an assessment by Washington correspondent Henry Brandon, who judged that Dr. Kissinger "probably did not achieve his maximum objective" in Moscow, not only because of "the Russians' reluctance to go far enough in their compromise proposals" but also "because Dr. Kissinger had been given little elbow room by President Ford, anxious to avoid a repetition of the criticism after the last agreement on the strategic arms limitation talks....

"Detente remains one of the basic assumptions of American foreign policy, but since the open Russian and Cuban intervention in Angola its meaning and benefits have become politically much more controversial. And this is one reason why President Ford does not feel under pressure to clinch a new SALT agreement now. Another is that it could be positively harmful while he is fighting Ronald Reagan in the election primaries. It would be of some advantage, though, in the final contest with the Democratic opponent.

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"The progress achieved in Moscow last week, therefore, seems to suit both sides. It allows Mr. Brezhnev at next month's Soviet Communist Party meeting to claim that his detente policy is on course, and it offers the same advantage to President Ford without creating a new heated controversy."

The paper also ran the judgment of correspondent Nicholas Carroll that "for America, the Angolan debacle is a disaster. It has highlighted the continuing tension between Dr. Kissinger...and Congress...."

"Dr. Kissinger's main worry is that the edifice of East-West detente may crumble to dust because of Angola, though he is trying hard to prevent it."

"Two Kinds of Pessimism in Washington"

The independent Sunday *Observer* carried Washington correspondent Mark Frankland's assertion that "the worrying thing about America now is that, while people like [former Deputy Defense Secretary and SALT delegation member Paul] Nitze are pessimistic over the threat of Russian hegemony, Mr. Kissinger and others in the Administration are consumed by another sort of pessimism--a pessimism about America."

"Mr. Kissinger's worry is that Congressional and public demands that he conduct a properly agreed on and supervised foreign policy make it impossible for him to threaten and cajole Russia to stick to detente rules. The liberals want to prevent him from trumping the Russians in Angola, the conservatives from coaxing them towards new arms agreements."

"With the Kissingers pessimistic about America's internal weaknesses and the Nitzes pessimistic about Russia's strengths, it is no wonder that the country is puzzled over what to do about detente. Detente, one of Kissinger's associates remarked the other day, is essentially about dealing with the emergence of Russia as a superpower. This requires from Washington self-confidence and a steady hand; but the double-headed pessimism one comes across in this city today is scarcely conducive to either."

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"Spain Buoyed Up by Fulsome U.S. Support..."

Reporting Secretary Kissinger's visit to Spain, *Financial Times* Madrid correspondent Roger Matthews said "the Spanish regime (is) buoyed up by fulsome American support for what Dr. Kissinger sees as 'its gradual liberalization program'.... The last-minute decision of Washington to upgrade (its) agreement (with Spain) to a treaty completed a highly satisfactory weekend" for Spain's foreign minister.

*The Times* of London said "the Government of Sr. Arias Navarro gained in popularity today as Spaniards became aware of an agreement to remove U.S. nuclear weapons from Spanish soil."

"...Fortified by Effusive U.S. Embrace"

The Madrid correspondent of London's conservative *Daily Telegraph* observed, "Fortified by America's effusive military and political embrace, King Juan Carlos and his Government go well girded into battle against a rightwing 'bunker' bent on obstructing Spain's reforming process."

"Washington's moral support for cautious evolution from dictatorship to democracy could well be the ace that the monarch's men will play."

## ITALY

"Kissinger Satisfaction on SALT, Defeat on Angola"

Center-left *Corriere della Sera* on Saturday carried a Moscow correspondent's report that "Kissinger left Moscow without reaching a concrete agreement with Brezhnev on SALT and in full disagreement on Angola."

"However, this visit cannot be considered a failure because it has at least enabled the two superpowers to keep alive a dialogue that has recently become more difficult... Kissinger expressed his satisfaction about SALT, but on the Angola crisis he has suffered one of the burning humiliations of his life..."

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"Since the U.S. Congress removed all of Kissinger's instru-
ments of pressure by refusal to aid the pro-Western forces
in Angola... he exposed himself to the almost inevitable ne-
gative answer from the Soviets...

"The Secretary was set up for the slaughter..."

"Bitter End of the Idea of Detente"

Yesterday's middle-of-the-road _Il Giornale_ of Milan similarly stated:

"The Secretary left the Soviet Union without even concluding an agreement in principle on SALT, and even worse, he failed to block or limit the Soviets in Angola... This marks the end of the wizard, of the flying Henry, first salesman of the strongest power in the world. It is also the bitter end of the idea of detente."

The paper remarked that Brezhnev "could have helped him" but in order to justify such an action would have had to be facing "a strong counterpart" instead of "a man who did not have the power to make decisions and lacked the cards with which to gamble."

Independent-conservative _Il Resto del Carlino_ of Bologna's Washington correspondent stated Saturday that in "failing to link SALT with Angola" the Secretary had left behind "a substantial part of his credibility."

Obligations of Ford and Brezhnev

In today's independent _Il Messaggero_ of Rome, New York correspondent Lucio Manisco remarked:

"Both Kissinger and Ford are convinced that Washington has limited time to intervene in a large number of international problems that include SALT, Angola and the Middle East before the date of the New Hampshire primaries on February 24... On the same day, the Soviet Party Congress opens in Moscow and Brezhnev will have to give an account of the detente policy which, in the absence of good prospects for SALT, would not be an asset to him."

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Rome Communist Paper Cites Pravda on "Positive Progress"

Communist L'Unita of Rome today ran a Moscow correspondent's report quoting Pravda as saying the Soviets saw "new and positive progress" in the talks "for a mutually acceptable solution of SALT."

"Franco Never Got So Much From the U.S."

Of the U. S. -Spanish treaty, Corriere della Sera, quoted above, observed yesterday that "Spain never obtained so much from the U. S. while Franco was alive." It saw the treaty as "political and moral support for the new Spanish regime."

"Senators Disagree on Relations With Spain"

Correspondent Manisco of Messaggero, cited above, asserted that "two-thirds of the Senate will have to approve the treaty, and more than one-third disagree with Kissinger because they are convinced that the identification of U. S. interests with those of the Spanish Bourbon will in the long run damage the relations of America with the new democratic Spain, and will create new difficulties for the European allies."

WEST GERMANY

"Still No Agreement on Basic Questions"

Papers in West Germany generally considered the Moscow trip to have produced only modest progress.

Washington correspondent Heinz Barth of right-center Die Welt of Bonn wrote today that "Kissinger's three-day talks in Moscow produced 'progress' on some points but they require further clarification. Thus it remains to be seen whether his hope for concluding SALT II by the end of 1976 will come true...

"There is still no U. S. -Soviet agreement on basic questions of strategic armament, although understanding on this matter was said to have been reached at Vladivostok more than a year ago.

"As Kissinger indicated to his NATO partners in Brussels, the new proposals...have yet to be discussed by disarmament experts. Kissinger will probably have to go to Moscow once more before SALT II can be cast into a treaty. Only if he succeeds will the oft-postponed Brezhnev visit to Washington take place, so that President Ford can include it in his election campaign.

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"As was the case in 1972, the Soviets again succeeded by means of delaying tactics in timing the decisive SALT round so that it will take place in the last months before the U.S. Presidential election..."

Barth said "one ray of light is the prompt conclusion of the U.S.-Spanish bases agreement.... The document signed by Kissinger in Madrid for the time amounts to a treaty which must be ratified by Congress.... It establishes the psychological prerequisites for Spain's drawing closer to NATO and EC."

"Progress But No Breakthrough"

Today's pro-Christian Democratic Bonner Rundschau judged that "Kissinger's discussions in Moscow produced progress but no breakthrough.... He did not achieve a breakthrough in Brussels or Madrid, either. Although he succeeded in strengthening bilateral ties between the U.S. and Spain, NATO continued to cold-shoulder Spain....

"As long as the West fails to take proper care of its security interests, there is no need for Moscow to steer its policy out of the gray area between tension and detente. In this respect, Kissinger's travel diplomacy does not change anything."

"Trip Sought More Than Technical Definitions"

Right-center Frankfurter Allgemeine on Saturday carried the view of its military writer, Adelbert Weinstein, that "as far as substance is concerned," the Secretary's "statements in Brussels did not go beyond what he said before leaving Moscow--that there has been some progress...

"That is not much, even in the eyes of unconditional supporters of the policy of detente. What does it amount to if the two big powers agree on defining what a heavy missile is? Of course, agreement on technical definitions of SALT data is a political success. However, Kissinger's visit to Moscow had aimed at something else.

"He wanted his discussion partners to confirm in practical politics what he considers the strategic vision of our nuclear century, that is, that detente between the nuclear powers must

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be indivisible. One cannot discuss arms limitation and
wage war by proxy all over the world. However, the
Soviets do not follow Kissinger's line of thinking. What
will his reaction be? In the words of an American news
magazine, 'Henry is down, down, down.'"

"U. S. -Spanish Treaty Anticipates Positive Change"

Today the paper said in an article that the U. S. -Spanish treaty "anticipates something that is not mentioned in the text, namely, positive change in the Spanish regime..."

It remarked that "by expelling U. S. nuclear submarines from Rota, Spain indicates that it does not want to top the list of Soviet nuclear targets..."

"Aid Rewards Going Slowly on Democratization"

Left-center Frankfurter Rundschau declared today that "U. S. financial aid amounts to a reward for Madrid's going slowly in democratizing the country. Kissinger seems to have no objections to going slowly in carrying out reforms.... However, going slowly is necessary for a man who believes Europe is being lost to the Marxists."

FRANCE

"Success in Madrid After Moscow Defeat"

French papers and television news editors played the windup of Dr. Kissinger's tour as a major international story. The first network of Government-guided TV remarked that King Juan Carlos had succeeded in obtaining from the U. S. almost immediately "what Franco couldn't get in 20 years...."

"Spain is drawing closer to NATO with U. S. support."

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Today's papers ran the story under these headlines:

"WASHINGTON-MADRID ACCORDS--SPAIN'S FIRST STEP TOWARD NATO"

(Le Figaro, page one)

"SPAIN IN AMERICAN ORBIT"

(Le Quotidien de Paris)

"KISSINGER: SUCCESS IN MADRID AFTER MOSCOW DEFEAT"

(L'Aurore)

"SPANISH-AMERICAN TREATY SIGNED BY KISSINGER SURRENDERS TWO BASES TO U.S. ARMED FORCES AND LINKS MADRID WITH NATO"

(Communist L'Humanite)

Middle-of-the-road Figaro carried the view of byliner Jacques Guilleme-Brulon that Dr. Kissinger's "trip to Europe was not, after all, useless; after the dis appointing stop in Moscow, the one in Madrid has proved to be singularly positive....

"Clearly, the U.S. wanted to demonstrate its intention to integrate Spain into NATO as soon as possible.... In fact, Washington seems determined to make Spain one of the Mediterranean big powers at a time when Italy, Greece and Turkey are becoming less reliable. In case of calamity, the U.S. wants to have two gigantic aircraft carriers in Europe, Great Britain and the Iberian peninsula.

"Such a policy...would be in no way contrary to that of France, which intends, within the framework of her Mediterranean plans, to establish preferential relations with Madrid. And it would not be in the least paradoxical if, as an indirect consequence of the new Spanish-American friendship, we should witness a readjustment, if not a frank improvement, in the already less strained relations between Paris and Washington."

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# "Slap in the Face Over Angola"

Independent-left *Le Monde* of Paris observed in an editorial, "It is a valid question: Was Mr. Kissinger well advised to go to Moscow? ... The still unconfirmed progress in the SALT discussion hardly offsets what can only be called the slap in the face over Angola...."

"Mr. Kissinger tried to behave as in the past, but never has he held so few trump cards."

The paper termed the progress on arms limitation "both promising and controversial--promising because a lowering of the ceiling set in Vladivostok avoids an anarchical proliferation of nuclear arms which would be even worse than the present situation, controversial because the power accumulated by the two superpowers is in any case sufficient to blow up the earth."

# "Brezhnev Could Afford to Dismiss Kissinger Empty-handed"

Center-right *Aurore* carried a byliner's reflections on the state of detente: "Hardly had Brezhnev got what he had sought for years, written recognition of the partition of Europe and the irrevocable stranglehold of Communism on seven or eight formerly free nations of our continent... than the Moscow press bluntly asserted that the 'ideological struggle' for the rest of the world would continue."

"Leaving Helsinki, Brezhnev had watched a Gerald Ford already paralyzed by the U. S. Presidential campaign and, even more, by the desuetism of Congress, which no longer knows how to say anything but 'no' to Executive requests...."

"In Angola, for the same reasons, there is the same abdication of American policy.... Thus Brezhnev could afford the luxury of dismissing Kissinger empty-handed, though the Secretary of State had raised his voice regarding Angola even before he left Washington. The attitude of the Congress doomed him to humiliation in Moscow...."

"The USSR is taking advantage of the total practical vacuum in Washington to wage a world-wide action."

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# "The Soviet 'Right' to Intervene Anywhere"

Independent France-Soir's foreign editor, Benoit Rayski, wrote today: "Who claims the right to intervene militarily all over the world? Certainly not the United States. For having landed Marines in Santo Domingo and in Vietnam... it was accused of the most infamous deeds and acquired severe complexes which have deprived it of the will to do it again.

"The USSR, on the other hand, does not cherish such complexes. It can afford to send--or have its allies send--arms, specialists, 'volunteers' wherever it pleases, without arousing much indignation.... These actions are called 'wars of liberation' and thus become just and justified, giving the Russian SAM missiles a revolutionary halo which American arms somehow lack....

"It would be better, of course, if both the U.S. and the USSR refrained from intervening anywhere in the world; but if one admits intervention as part of the game, then fairness requires that it be observed equally by all. Thus those who applauded the entry of Soviet tanks into Saigon should also reflect that the same Soviet tanks entered Prague."

## SPAIN

# "U.S. Wants Spain Closer to the Alliance"

Spanish papers yesterday, in contrast to Saturday's press, contained no criticism of the terms of the new U.S.-Spanish accord and generally agreed that it reflected new U.S. support for the regime.

Liberal independent Informaciones bannered "An Important Step for Bringing Spain into NATO and European Community." It carried an article by a Brussels correspondent quoting Secretary Kissinger.

A columnist for the paper said Dr. Kissinger "wants to make clear Washington's support for Juan Carlos and his proposal to pass from Francoism to democracy without serious rupture." The writer also argued that "American politicians do not make concessions just for pure philanthropy.... It benefits them to continue enjoying military bases on Spanish soil."

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Concluding that "the goal of Washington is to draw (Spain) closer to the Atlantic Alliance," the writer contrasted that position with "the Nine--except for Germany and France--who do not want to wager until in Madrid all the cards are face up."

## AUSTRIA

"Will Increase Ford, Kissinger Freedom of Action"

Independent *Die Presse* of Vienna today carried the view of a Moscow correspondent that "the progress just achieved will add to Ford's and Kissinger's freedom of action in foreign affairs."

Mass-circulation *Kurier* pointed out on its front page Saturday that through Secretary Kissinger in Brussels, "the U. S. has informed its European allies, even before the American President gets first-hand information," of the Moscow proceedings and that "this had never happened before in the 25-year history of the Western Alliance."

A correspondent in Madrid for independent *Die Presse* of Vienna wrote today, "Two reasons have made it easier for the U. S. to agree to the treaty and make major concessions. Washington wants to prevent the 'Portugalization' of Spain" and "wants to stress its solidarity with King Juan Carlos and the Madrid Government who have both promised to transform authoritarian Spain into a democratic country."

## SWITZERLAND

"Too Much Concern About U. S. -Soviet Bilateralism"

Prestigious *Neue Zuercher Zeitung* said yesterday that the Alliance partners showed in Brussels that they "are concerned about too much U. S. -Soviet bilateralism, to which they contributed by their lack of support for the American cause." The paper said this situation could be eased "if both America and Western Europe returned to the more realistic policies of detente and balance of forces..."

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EAST ASIA

JAPAN

"Hawk Factions Delay SALT Agreement"

Tokyo observers generally agreed that some progress had been achieved at the Moscow talks.

Publicly financed NHK television reported today that the U. S. hoped to complete study of "the new Russian proposal on SALT" by the middle of February in order to speed up the negotiations. It said that there was "a strong possibility" that an agreement on limiting strategic weapons would be reached this spring so that Mr. Brezhnev would be able to sign the agreement when he visited the U. S. in June.

The network maintained that "no progress was made on the problem of Soviet intervention in Angola" but said that "U. S. officials believe that the 10 per cent cut in the number of strategic weapons proposed by the Soviet side is a major result."

On Saturday the network held that "the hawk factions in both countries appear to be a factor in delaying an agreement on SALT because of their fear of unfavorable compromises."

Liberal Asahi today carried a Washington correspondent's report that "U. S. officials stated that the success or failure of the negotiations depends on whether the U. S. decides that the new Soviet Backfire bomber is a strategic weapon."

"Optimism in Washington"

Moderately conservative Sankei today ran a Kyodo news agency report from Washington that "there is an optimistic view that a SALT II agreement is possible this spring, although Mr. Kissinger was unable to draw any concession from the Soviet side on the Angola problem." The report cited U. S. newspapers as stating that the Secretary would visit the Soviet Union again in February so that the agreement could be finalized by the end of March.

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# "Delay Caused by Weapons Weakens Detente"

Yesterday's moderate Yomiuri regretted that "the deadlock over the Soviet Backfire bomber and the U. S. cruise missile resulted in failure to reach an agreement on the SALT II negotiations...."

"The delay caused by the secondary strategic weapons is dangerous because it weakens detente." The paper urged that "secondary problems" be "solved politically because detente must be put on a firm foundation.... The present situation gives the hawk factions on both sides an opportunity to raise their voices on Angola and other problems."

# "Accord Brings Spain Into Western World"

On the signing of the U. S. -Spanish agreement in Madrid, Asahi, quoted above, said yesterday that this action "will include Spain in the Western world as it opens the way for Spain to join NATO and the EC."

Independent moderate Mainichi said yesterday "the new agreement indicates that the U. S. has accepted most of the Spanish demands."

# "Reaction to Come From Europe and the Congress"

Yomiuri, cited above, carried its Washington correspondent's view that the U. S. -Spain treaty is part of the U. S. effort to rebuild the NATO defense structure in the Mediterranean area. Asserting that the new treaty is aimed at Spanish membership in NATO, the paper said, "Attention will focus on the reaction of Europe and the U. S. Congress."

# SOUTH KOREA

# "Smooth Negotiations Will Help Brezhnev and Ford"

Seoul's independent Hankook Ilbo said of the Kissinger trip, "It is . significant that the talks with the Soviet leaders made some progress despite confrontation in Angola." It continued:

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"If future U.S. -Soviet negotiations continue smoothly, it will help both Brezhnev and President Ford.... It will enable Brezhnev to make his Washington trip and help President Ford's Presidential election campaign.... We believe Brezhnev and Ford are promoting the SALT negotiations to obtain such political effects."

The paper said that Mr. Ford would "face criticism in the U.S. since Brezhnev did not concede anything to the U.S. on Angola, which is believed to be a test of U.S. -Soviet relations.... Moscow's hard-line policy toward Angola is a signal that the Soviet struggle for its philosophy and expansion of its influence will not be checked despite U.S. -Soviet detente."

## PHILIPPINES

### "U.S. -Spain Pact Not a Mutual Defense Treaty"

Manila television stations carried dispatches on the signing of the bases treaty. One station said the new pact was more of a "cooperation treaty" than a "mutual defense treaty."

## THAILAND

### Pro-Peking Papers Say Moscow Talks Failed

Three pro-Peking Chinese-language papers in Bangkok on Saturday declared the Kissinger mission to Moscow a failure.

Lien Ho Wan Pao stated, "The joint U.S. -Soviet communique says in effect no progress was made on SALT, and further negotiations are needed. Kissinger has not even achieved superficial success (on SALT), so how can any progress by expected on Angola? It seems that the Kissinger magic has not worked--his 'brilliant era' is ended."

Chung Hua Jit Pao maintained that since "Kissinger and Brezhnev said only that progress had been made, the current talks did not break the deadlock. In short, the Kissinger trip has failed."

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Hsin Fu Pao Wan Pao contended that "the basic contradictions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union--the two supreme powers--will never be settled because they are trying to suppress each other through the struggle for hegemony and development of strategic arms."

## SOUTH ASIA

### INDIA

#### "The Superpowers Adhere to Detente"

The independent *Times of India* of New Delhi, Bombay and Ahmedabad on Friday saw "a welcome development" in the progress of the discussions as demonstrating that "despite the recent controversies over Portugal and Angola, the two superpowers continue to adhere to... the policy of detente."

## AFRICA

### KENYA

#### "A Lesson for Those Who Expected an Angola Solution"

Nairobi's *Nation* yesterday called the Kissinger-Brezhnev talks "not only a great failure but a shameful disappointment in that they did not produce an Angola solution." It said Africans had hoped the Moscow visit would persuade the Soviets "to end Russian support for the MPLA," but that throughout the talks "Kissinger failed to persuade the Russians to abandon their dangerous adventure in Angola." It continued:

> "Those who expected the Moscow talks to come up with a solution to the Angola problem should learn a big lesson.

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"The lesson is: African problems should not be left to outside powers, however mighty they may be, to solve.... The Angolan problem can only be solved by Africans... so the sooner outsiders leave that war-torn territory alone, the better it will be for everyone's peace."

## LATIN AMERICA

### ARGENTINA

#### "Treaty Increases Spain's Share in Defense"

Yesterday's papers in Buenos Aires played the Spanish-U.S. agreement on front pages with wire photos of Secretary Kissinger, Juan Carlos and the Spanish Foreign Minister.

Nationalist Mayoria headlined yesterday that the accord "Increases Spain's Share in Defense of West."

#### "Kissinger Mission Buttresses Detente"

Business-oriented Cronista Comercial esteemed as "positive" the results of the visit to the Soviet Union and Europe, concluding that "Kissinger's mission and the Lebanese truce can become factors tending to buttress detente."

## COMMUNIST MEDIA

### SOVIET UNION

#### Reporting of Final Communique, U.S.-Spain Treaty

Pravda on Saturday front-paged Secretary Kissinger's visit and the text of the final communique, which noted that he had discussed "questions of mutual interest to the USSR and the USA" with General Secretary Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko. The paper's inside pages reported the Secretary's luncheon for Mr. Gromyko and the former's departure.

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Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) yesterday was the only paper to report the Secretary's visit to Spain and the signing of a new U. S. -Spanish bases agreement. The paper said "public pressure" in Spain had forced the U. S. to withdraw nuclear-armed submarines from the Rota naval base.

Pravda's "International Review" yesterday called the Kissinger-Brezhnev-Gromyko talks a "substantial factor for relaxing world tensions and strengthening peace." It also noted the U. S. budget call for a "substantial step-up in military spending."

## "Talks Were an Answer to the Skeptics"

Commentator Viktor Glazunov of Radio Moscow's North American Service on Saturday called the Kissinger talks "a center of world public opinion and a dominating topic in the press. He said this was understandable "since a reconstruction of international relations is now taking place on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence," in which Soviet-American relations have a "special place." But despite the turning of Soviet-American relations toward "normalization and improvement," he warned that "certain U. S. circles" were resisting this trend. He termed the talks "an answer to the skeptics" which "took place in a business-like and constructive atmosphere," characterized by a "useful exchange of opinions."

Glazunov saw both progress on issues which must be settled prior to complete implementation of the Vladivostok agreement and additional talks which will seek "mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining issues." He stressed that the "drawing up of joint measures to eliminate the threat of war and to end the arms race is the pivotal direction in Soviet-American relations.... The USSR and the USA have already concluded the first important agreements (in this respect), .... but further steps must be made in this direction. The Moscow talks have shown that both sides have the desire and intention to act in precisely this way."

## Kissinger Remarks in Brussels

TASS on Saturday reported that the Secretary said at his Brussels press conference that "he got the impression... that the Soviet leaders are willing to go ahead with the policy of relaxation of tension" and that the U. S. would "carefully study" the Soviet proposals on drafting a new SALT agreement. TASS also reported Dutch, Belgian and West German "optimism" at prospects for nuclear arms limitation.

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Charges Against U.S. on Angola

Soviet media appeared to be soft-pedaling references to Angola during the Secretary's visit, but on Saturday Radio Moscow's North American Service asserted that "365 Cuban counterrevolutionaries are being prepared to leave for South Angola... to fight on the side of the splitter grouping."

"Washington Politicians Have Lost Sense of Reality"

Later Saturday evening, a commentary on the same service strongly defended the Soviet Union's position on "support for national liberation movements" which it said "is one of the most important principles of Soviet foreign policy." The commentator, Igor Aleksandrov, declared: "Despite claims that the Soviet Union has no economic, no military, no other gains to make in Angola....

"Some political leaders in Washington... have lost all sense of reality, and it's impossible to agree with statements made by the Washington press that the Soviet Union is trying to undermine the position of the United States in Africa. It would be more accurate to say that Washington's political course on the Angola question is what undermines the position of the United States on the African continent.... Washington is on the side of two separatist organizations working closely with the South African intervention. It's clear that this position of Washington distresses the African people. So, what does the Soviet Union have to do with it?"

Aleksandrov argued that "if Washington would continue the revolutionary traditions of its war for independence, the U.S. would today have different positions and policies" in regard to Chile, Cuba and Africa. In Angola, he contended, "loyalty to the traditions of the American war for independence would have prompted Washington to come out decisively against the use of foreign mercenaries in the struggle against the liberation movement."

Citing British use of mercenary troops at Trenton and Princeton, Aleksandrov declared, "Today the Angolan patriots also have to fight a hard battle against the neocolonialist mercenaries. Many of the mercenaries were soldiers in the former colonial army of fascist Portugal. Now the CIA is secretly sending in mercenaries from the United States; despite attempts at secrecy these facts have come out to the public. Indeed, Washington's official rhetoric about loyalty to the traditions of the American war for independence has nothing in common with Washington's true policy."

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npr

National Public Radio

2025 M Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 / 202-785-5353

James P. Barrett
Director of Public Information

press release

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

February 3, 1976-6:30 p.m. ET

NPR REPORTS DETAILS TO SALT TALKS ON "ALL THINGS CONSIDERED"

Washington, D.C., February 3, 1976 -- The Ford administration is currently considering a Soviet SALT II proposal similar to one found unacceptable by the National Security Council the month, according to a report aired on National Public Radio's "All Things Considered." Sources near the negotiations say that the Soviet proposal closely resembles an option unanimously rejected by the NSC before Secretary of State Henry Kissinger went to Moscow for the latest round of SALT talks.

Under the Soviet plan, all U.S. long-range cruise missiles would be banned on submarines and surface ships. The Soviets would agree under the plan to lower the SALT I Vladivostock ceiling by about 100 strategic nuclear weapons, rather than the 200 or 300 which has been previously reported in the press.

[That ceiling--reached in Vladivostock in November of 1974--limits both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to 2,400 strategic nuclear weapons. Of that total, 1,320 can be weapons carrying multiple independently-targeted warheads (MIRVs).]

The Soviet plan places no limit on the number of Soviet backfire bombers--the long-range heavy bombers which have been a sticking point in the SALT negotiations--but the Russians would make a formal declaration that their range would not exceed 4,000 kilometers. Official U.S. estimates place the backfire range at approximately double that figure.

The Soviet proposal is very similar to an option rejected by the NSC, January 13th,

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Before Kissinger's trip. The option was one of four under consideration at the NSC meeting, which Kissinger attended.

Option 1 would have postponed any agreement on the U.S. strategic cruise missile and the Soviet backfire bomber.

Under Option 2, the Soviets would have been permitted to deploy a significant number of backfire bombers and the U.S. would have agreed to accept severe--but not crippling--limits on its strategic cruise missile.

Option 3 would have limited both the number of backfire bombers and cruise missile launch platforms.

Option 4, which was preferred, NPR sources report, by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would have placed a significant number of backfires under the Vladivostock limits, but permitted a small number of backfires (not more than 100) to be excluded from the ceiling.

At the January 13th meeting, the NSC agreed unanimously that Option 2 was unacceptable. Kissinger was supposed to offer first Option 4, then Option 3, and finally Option 1--postpone--if the Soviets rejected the other alternatives. However, from Moscow, Kissinger cabled that the Russians had rejected Options 4 and 3, and that he was ready to propose yet another alternative.

Basically that impromptu proposal was similar to Option 2 that the NSC had rejected previously: the Soviets would be permitted to deploy 275 backfires over five years. For the U.S., vehicles carrying strategic air launch cruise missiles would be counted against the Vladivostock ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed weapons. All long-range cruise missiles on U.S. submarines would have been banned. U.S. surface vessels carrying cruise missiles would have been limited to 25.

A NSC meeting was hastily convened to consider Kissinger's cable. As a result of the meeting, Kissinger was instructed not to commit the U.S. to any proposal.

The Russians ultimately rejected Kissinger's impromptu proposal. In turn, they

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offered the counter measure which the Ford administration is now considering.

The Verification Panel--a high-level government committee dealing with SALT and chaired by Henry Kissinger--is expected to meet Thursday to discuss the latest Soviet offer.

This report was filed by Judy Miller for National Public Radio and heard nationwide on "All Things Considered."

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For further information, contact: Michael Weiss 202-785-5357
Judy Miller 202-785-5400 (or 202-232-6051)