["2", "PUBLISHED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES, NEW YORK, N.Y.", "DISTRIBUTED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES, NEW YORK, N.Y.", "U.S. Is Facing New Strains With Soviet and Taiwan", "CARTIER IS WHEN\nYOU'RE LOOKING\nFOR A WHIMSICAL\nWATERING CAND", "Our sterling, hand-made watering can is a diminutive 3/8-inch, high, but permethenately feisty. But vermilion it is and dampens a dry marin with considerable style. Water your bonal or dwarf petunia. Put cigarettes in it.", "Salt spread on a steak with it. Put cream in. Dispense maple syrup. Or..., but let your imagination soar. And what hostesses wouldn't find this small charmer an ultimate stable gift? In silver, $25. In vermillion, $35. See it in the Silver Salon on the second floor. Place your order by Mail. Or Phone Plaza 3-0111.", "Cartier", "Fifth Avenue & 52nd St., N.Y., N.Y. 10022/ Palm Beach/Chicago", "Summer Shopping Hours: 10 AM to 5:30 PM Mon. through Fri.", "• Dresses\n• Costumes\n• Suits\n• Cocktail and evening dress\nlong and short\n• Raincoats\n• Including a selection\nin women's sizes", "Summer clearance\nof designer and\nbetter apparel", "3 to 5pm\n\nSummer clearance\nof designer and\nbetter apparel\n\n3 to 5pm\n\nDresses\nCostumes\nSuits\nCocktail and evening dress\nlong and short\nRaincoats\nIncluding a selection\nin women's sizes\n\nFifth Avenue & 39th Street\nSelections at all Lord & Taylor stores", "Continued From Page 1, Col. 7\n\nTo Moscow— to familiarize the Russians with its policy views.", "The time being, Administration officials merely cited Mr. Nixon's words last Thursday that his move toward Peking \"is not directed against any other nation,\" that \"we're clear friendly relations with all nations,\" and that \"any nation can be our friend without being any other nation's friend.\"", "In writing Mr. Rogers's report to the Senate and weeks ahead to international consultations on the subject of and implications of the Administration's new attitude toward Peking, a ranking State Department official said today that \"we are confident that all countries will be bound to at least a psychological impact.\" The report, which was released in Paris. But the United States official expressed no confidence in the report, and the report would change dramatically the future of Taiwan and the political situation in the coming weeks. The Administration has not yet announced its official position.", "Source: AP Photo", "Mr. Kissinger is beingreeted at Peking airport. Chinese officials are from, left, a protocol aide; an interpreter; Yeh Chin-ying, vice chairman of the Military Affairs Commission; Hung Huang, Ambassador to Canada; Chang Wen-chin, specialist in U.S. studies.", "Peking Press Devotes 7 Lines\nTo Disclosure of Nixon's Visit", "Continued From Page 1, Col. 8", "The key points of the Vietnam War are now being discussed. The American press has already had time for a review of the new relations between the President and the People's Republic of China. The American diplo-", "matic initiative, coming on top of the September 1971 Peking statement that Mr. Kissinger has said, \"We are very confident that the President will support the building of a strong, durable world order, would be able to carry out any difficult foreign policy, and we are confident that the United States will be a strong, durable force in the world.\"", "The President's trip to May 1, 1972, was a form of letting it all out. The American press has said that the President's trip to Peking, while American combatants are expected to meet with President Tru-", "pension trip May 1, 1972, was a form of letting it all out. The American press has said that the President's trip to Peking, while American combatants are expected to meet with President Tru-", "They say the Chinese want what is theirs—meaning China want what is theirs—meaning China want what is theirs.", "They say the Chinese want what is theirs—meaning China want what is theirs—meaning China want what is theirs.", "Unless one gets to the top, one has to know.", "Unless one gets to the top, one has to know. Unless one gets to the top, one has to know what the American diplo-", "matic initiative, coming on top of the September 1971 Peking statement that Mr. Kissinger has said, \"We are very confident that the President will support the building of a strong, durable world order, would be able to carry out any difficult foreign policy, and we are confident that the United States will be a strong, durable force in the world.\"", "The President's trip to May 1, 1972, was a form of letting it all out. The American press has said that the President's trip to Peking, while American combatants are expected to meet with President Tru-", "pension trip May 1, 1972, was a form of letting it all out. The American press has said that the President's trip to Peking, while American combatants are expected to meet with President Tru-", "Taiwan Firmly Opposes\nAny Talks With Peking", "By JAN STEWART", "TAIPEI, Taiwan, July 17—Premier Chou En-lai, spoke of a time when policy shifts into a position of consensus, to improve under Peking's pressure, the people of the people on Taiwan would improve under Peking's pressure.", "The President's visit to Taiwan, which has come a long way from the time when President Chou En-lai, the then prime minister, was in power, has been well-looked after. But the bitter memories of defeat 22 years ago remain in the minds of Nationalist leaders of those like the 84-year-old President Chou En-lai and President Chou En-lai's family. The old and generational pressures, the pressure of national interests, are the ones that will not be sur- prised. \"How can we expect to be surprised by the President's visit to Taiwan,\" the President asked.", "\"If we want to be surprised by the President's visit to Taiwan, we don't see any time when there is a position of Nationalist leadership in the country. Influential members of the ruling Nationalist party are now in power, and they are very interested in the subject of consideration.", "The President's visit to Taiwan, which has come a long way from the time when President Chou En-lai, the then prime minister, was in power, has been well-looked after. But the bitter memories of defeat 22 years ago remain in the minds of Nationalist leaders of those like the 84-year-old President Chou En-lai and President Chou En-lai's family. The old and generational pressures, the pressure of national interests, are the ones that will not be sur- prised. \"How can we expect to be surprised by the President's visit to Taiwan,\" the President asked.", "\"If we want to be surprised by the President's visit to Taiwan, we don't see any time when there is a position of Nationalist leadership in the country. Influential members of the ruling Nationalist party are now in power, and they are very interested in the subject of consideration.", "The President's visit to Taiwan, which has come a long way from the time when President Chou En-lai, the then prime minister, was in power, has been well-looked after. But the bitter memories of defeat 22 years ago remain in the minds of Nationalist leaders of those like the 84-year-old President Chou En-lai and President Chou En-lai's family. The old and generational pressures, the pressure of national interests, are the ones that will not be sur- prised. \"How can we expect to be surprised by the President's visit to Taiwan,\" the President asked.", "\"If we want to be surprised by the President's visit to Taiwan, we don't see any time when there is a position of Nationalist leadership in the country. Influential members of the ruling Nationalist party are now in power, and they are very interested in the subject of consideration.", "The President's visit to Taiwan, which has come a long way from the time when President Chou En-lai, the then prime minister, was in power, has been well-looked after. But the bitter memories of defeat 22 years ago remain in the minds of Nationalist leaders of those like the 84-year-old President Chou En-lai and President Chou En-lai's family. The old and generational pressures, the pressure of national interests, are the ones that will not be sur- prised. \"How can we expect to be surprised by the President's visit to Taiwan,\" the President asked.", "### Some Young People Change", "Other young people for the President's visit to Taiwan might abandon their interest in the President's visit to Taiwan, might become more interested in the President's visit to Taiwan, might lose their interest in the President's visit to Taiwan

If U.S., China can
agree on 2 things...

*(Continued from Page 1)*

ment of his projected trip has left hanging.

Also left hanging is what the United States is going to do about the admission of the People's Republic into the United Nations.

The consensus among U.N. diplomats polled by the Associated Press since announcement of the Nixon trip, as after the now-famous tour of China by a United States ping-pong team last spring, is that these developments are likely to bring Peking into the world organization this fall.

Last fall, the United States managed to put this off by getting the Assembly to adopt 66 to 52 (with seven abstentions) a resolution declaring that the China representation issue posed an "important question." As a result, a two-thirds majority was required for passage of a subsequent resolution by pro-Peking members to admit the Chinese Communists to the Chinese Nationalists. It got, instead, a bare majority with 51 members voting for it, 49 against, and 25 abstaining.

## U.S. Could Remain Mute

There is some feeling among U.S. diplomats that the best course for the United States this fall would be to submit the two-thirds resolution as before, and gracefully accept defeat if that is in the cards. This would be in accord with Mr. Nixon's brief statement Thursday night, oft-repeated as he has moved toward improving relations with Peking, that it "will not be at the expense of old friends."

The United States, of course, could stand mute and offer no resolution, although, as one top State Department official put it: "The trouble is that when the United States does nothing, that is an affirmative great power action."

It could push a plan advocated by a presidential commission, headed by Henry Cabot Lodge, favoring United Nations seats for East and West Germany, North and South Vietnam and North and South Korea, as well as the two Chinas, on the contention that U.N. membership is "a duty and not a privilege."

Neither the Republic of China nor the Peking regime accepts that, both considering Taiwan a "province of China." And South Korea would go up in smoke if North Korea were equated with it. As of now, it claims it has been recognized by the U.N., although not with membership, as the sole legitimate regime on the Korean peninsula, and it cherishes the protection of a United Nations command, now headed by an American general, who among other things, has command control of the Republic of Korea's own military as well as American and other military units protecting the country.

Washington, in close consultation with a Japan in a similar predicament, has been laboring over the problem for months, government spokesmen claiming even as of Friday that no decision has been made, although at San Clemente a White House spokesman said the State Department would announce a revised U.S. policy on the U.N. problem in the very near future.

## Nationalists Are Angry

Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's regime, shaken by the series of moves Mr. Nixon has made in the past two years to liberalize trade and travel contacts with Peking, by the ping-pong diplomacy of last spring and now by the prospect of an American President going to Peking, has erupted into some non-diplomatic language. Ambassador James C. H. Shen, delivering Friday his government's pro-test of the planned trip, called it "a shabby deal."

That is being echoed in the United States by remnants of what used to be the powerful China Lobby and by a few in the Congress, including the Republican congressmen from Mr. Nixon's own congressional district in California.

Hanoi may not like that, but China might pay the price of a small Asian friend to gain a big one in the United States as it feuds with a mighty Soviet Union over ideological and territorial problems and wonders whether it will be allowed to build up its own arsenal of nuclear tipped missiles or, instead, attract a preemptive strike by a hostile member of the Communist fraternity.

not, but he has been seeing children in his psychiatric practice, Dr. Kanner has never lost the enthusiasm and interest that I am certain he possessed when he saw his first patient. Each case (and Dr. Kanner does not look at his patients as "cases," so this is a poor choice of a word that I have made) is new and different, and engages his full attention and sympathies.

I would like to end my letter by quoting something that Dr. Kanner has so often emphasized at our school's staff meetings. "Never forget the importance of the human tranquilizer. Medical tranquilizers are sometimes necessary too, but the value of the human one cannot be overemphasized."

Thanks to Dr. Leo Kanner for the humanitarianism that continues to distinguish him in his profession of child psychiatrist.

(Miss) Courtney Fry.

Baltimore.

## Discriminatory Policy

Sir: It is admirable in one sense that Mrs. Alan Wurtzburger, whose letter appeared in your paper, does not feel better about the discriminatory policy of the Maryland Club. But as long as so many leaders of our community condone it, they are saying that anti-Semitism is alive and well in Baltimore.

It has not been peculiarity or eccentricity that has killed Jews in Germany or treated them unjustly in Russia. The issues involved are certainly larger than the desires of a few to further business interests. Margaret McKean, Owings Mills.

## THE SUN

Printed Every Sunday By

S. ABBELL COMPANY

F. SCHMICK, JR., PRESIDENT

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scatned are jeopardized by the appeal of men like Jackson and Mills to the voters there. And he feels the other candidates off to his left could hurt him in later primaries by capitalizing on what happens in Florida.

The South—the New South—plays a key role in Muskie's essentially centrist nomination strategy. Primaries in Arkansas, Tennessee, West Virginia and North Carolina (plus Alabama, which doesn't count because of George Wallace's) follow that in Florida. To talk moderate good sense and win in Florida will strengthen Muskie's already firm standing in the primary and convention states.

That is his aim—not to appeal to the prejudices of the South, nor even to address himself to the South as such. He wants to talk there about national problems, to say outright and to imply by the breadth of his campaign approach that the South is now part of the nation, not a region to be dealt with separately. In doing so, he hopes to join with southern spokesmen for the present and future, rather than the past, men like Gons. Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, Robert Scott of North Carolina (who has already declared himself a Muskie-man), John West of South Carolina, Jimmy Carter of Georgia, and, particularly Reuben Askew and Senator Lawton Chiles of Florida.

His worry is that his challengers, having less to lose and in any event almost no hope of carrying Florida themselves, may try to whipsway him there. McGovern or Birch Bayh, can come in and state in the strongest terms their positions calculated to appeal to Democrats in other primary states where they have better prospects, for example Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Nebraska, Oregon and California. Then, in those states, they can taunt Muskie for hewing to the middle of the road (and trying to win) while they were boldly speaking out (and knowing they would lose).

It is a form of progress in politics that any leading candidate should be sweating these eight months in advance about what he will Say in Florida—in the South—as he seeks the presidency. And that kind of early agony is the price one pays for running so far ahead so long before the campaign begins.

NYSE tightens
membership rules

9A

Minneapolis Tribune

Fri., July 16, 1971

Company earnings

New York Times Service

New York, N.Y.

The New York Stock Exchange announced major revisions Thursday in the rules governing the financial structure of its member firms.

The changes, which had been in preparation since last fall, are "the most significant capital rule revisions ever made at one time," the Big Board said.

The exchange also took these steps:

* It tightened the criteria that corporations must meet to obtain a listing as well as the standards that they must maintain to keep their listing.

* It imposed a $5,000 fine on J.S. Love & Co., Inc.,

Medicor

Continued from page 7A

"We want them to pay those notes and not use that form of financing in Minnesota anymore," Driscoll said.

He added that the company also has been warned against any further use of a scheme in which it sold diamonds and diamond rings to the public. Medicor agreed to repurchase the gems, each valued at $1,000 or more, any time within three years from the date of sale and to pay 7-percent interest on the purchase price.

That offer was advertised nationally in May, but has since been discontinued.

Driscoll said that even if Medicor produces an ac-

for violations of the exchange's net capital rule.

Under the new rulings, brokerage firms will have to maintain a minimum of $1 in liquid assets for each $15 of indebtedness. The former net capital ratio was 20 to 1.

Those now having public accounts will have to maintain a minimum net capital of $100,000 — double the old minimum. New firms seeking to deal with the public must have a minimum of $200,000, up from the former level of $60,000.

In steps taken to increase what the exchange called "the quality and permanence" of capital, it prescribed that all capital contributed to member firms remain at the firm's disposal for at least a year. It also decreed that six months' notice be required by a contributor if he intends to withdraw. It noted that before interim guidelines imposed last fall, it was possible in some cases to withdraw capital on 90-day notice.

It likewise required that all subordinated lending or contributing of securities for capital be made through a secured demand note and collateral agreement and that all collateral be in fully paid securities. It took the step, it said, to eliminate fluctuations in the capital of brokerage firms as market values change.

The exchange also imposed a 100 percent deduction from new capital of any securities if, after 44 days, a broker is not in possession of securities it owes a customer.

Honeywell Inc.

Lower sales and earnings were reported Thursday by Honeywell Inc. for the second quarter and six months ended June 30.

Earnings for the second quarter were off 39 percent, from $14.9 million, or 86 cents a share, last year to $9.2 million, or 53 cents a share, this year. This year's second-quarter earnings included $900,000, or 5 cents per share, of extraordinary income from a tax-loss carry-forward.

Second-quarter revenues were $461.3 million, down 6 percent from the $489.1 million of the previous year.

Earnings for the six months were $16.1 million, or 93 cents per share, on revenues of $890.7 million. Last year the company earned $28.7 million, or $1.68 per share, on revenues of $950.4 million for the first half.

In reporting the lower sales and earnings figures, Honeywell also pointed to "areas of strength and modest signs of improvement that lead to a brighter outlook for the remainder of the year."

Computer business was good on a worldwide basis, said James H. Binger, board chairman, and the company's control systems did well in international markets.

However, he said, "these factors were more than offset by the impact on our control systems business of the softness of the U.S. economy, the continued reduction in aerospace and defense revenues as expected, and the relative-

10 A

Friday, July 16, 1971

Minneapolis

Tribune

Established 1867

Bower Hawthorne Editor
Wallace Allen Managing Editor
Leonard Inskip Editorial Editor

Volume CV Number 53

# The Nixon breakthrough on China

Far more than Harry Truman really “lost” China, Richard Nixon has “won” it. The President’s totally unexpected announcement last night of his forthcoming visit to Peking is not only a precedent in American foreign policy and a diplomatic coup. It is also the most decisive — spectacular is not an overstatement — move yet made toward the normalization of Washington-Peking relations that Mr. Nixon has been seeking since his first year in office.

This has been diplomatic escalation of the positive kind. Almost precisely two years ago the State Department announced an easing of travel and trade restrictions with mainland China. Further trade restraints were lifted later; an attempt to reopen ambassadorial talks in Warsaw was tried, but failed; finally, the visit to China last spring by the U.S. Ping-Pong team, followed by the welcome given to American journalists who had been no closer than Hong Kong since 1949, added momentum to the normalization effort.

But travel, trade and reporting pale in contrast to the meeting last week between Premier Chou En-lai and Henry Kissinger, the President's national security adviser. Mr. Nixon's disclosure of the event was astonishing first because no one outside of a few top officials knew Kissinger had made that detour from Pakistan. Second, Kissinger's reputation is based on his credentials as scholar and theoretician, not negotiator (which is why some had assumed he later avoided meeting the North Vietna-

mese and Viet Cong in Paris). Third is the result he brought home: the joint announcement by Chou En-lai and Mr. Nixon that the President will be visiting Peking before next May.

Even in the brief time that Mr. Nixon spoke on radio and television, he was able to focus his words on separate audiences. His introductory emphasis on the importance to peace of the People's Republic of China was, we believe, aimed primarily at Americans who remember Nixonian warnings a decade ago to avoid "giving respectability" to Peking. There was a world audience for the joint announcement. And in his final explanation, the President was clearly talking to Taipei on the one hand and Moscow on the other.

This policy is not at the expense of America's friends, he said, meaning Nationalist China. Nor, he added, is it against other nations. That was a reference to the Soviet Union, whose territorial and ideological disputes with China have made Russians understandably apprehensive about Chinese-American amity.

The agreement on a presidential visit crosses only one of the diplomatic hurdles. Still ahead are major questions of formal recognition, U.N. policy and, probably most important, Chinese participation in negotiations for the control of nuclear arms. Mr. Nixon is still a long way from having "won" China; but he has made, as the Chinese might say, a great leap forward.

THE PRESIDENCY
BY HUGH SIDEY

The secret of Lincoln's Sitting Room

They are not much as pictures, but they are
mounted now in an album in a corner of Henry
Kissinger's office—a touristy record of his 49
hours in Peking. From time to time, Kissinger
gets up to look at them and, oddly for him, falls
silent as he looks. The hours of euphoria and $40
wine have passed. The long, tough road to China
lies ahead. Neither President Nixon nor Kissinger,
the architect of this amazing turn in human affairs,
is yet sure what forces have been loosed.
That is why the President last week began a campaign
of caution. In the Cabinet Room early
Monday with the congressional leaders of both
parties, he talked of the need to restrain expectations.
Then he told the cabinet that now was a
time for politeness but also toughmindedness. His
White House staff learned from him that they
were all at a very important turning point in history,
facing a society that had been closed for 22
years. Secrecy would be necessary. Through the
week Nixon told others that the meeting between
himself and Chou was coming about because of
necessity—that the realities of power had forced
them together, and that each expected to gain
something from the encounter . . . but that success
was not assured.

It is standard cocktail fare in Washington these
nights to quote Nixon's diatribes of earlier years
against the "Communist conspiracy" as evidence
that a miraculous transformation has occurred in
him. That misses the point. He has always been
drawn to the Communist leaders and nations—in-

trigued, fascinated and ready to contend with
them, as if he were a quarterback trying to figure
out how to win the big game. Herb Klein, his
friend and press counselor for 25 years, has
among his family photos one of a thin, youthful
Congressman Nixon posing in front of a stone
wall in Greece in 1947. Nixon was there in connection
with an investigation of the threat from Communism.
Just behind him is crudely painted the
hammer and sickle. It was the first lesson in his 25-
year seminar on Communist governments.

His approach to this summit was a meticulously prepared presidential venture. Other men would have called in 20 aides to help. Not Nixon. He created a special world, walled away even from his own government. Only Kissinger was allowed in at first. Then Secretary of State William Rogers was admitted. Nixon worked in secrecy in the Victorian parlor in the southeast corner of the White House known as the Lincoln Sitting Room.

If political necessity is about to bring Chou
and Nixon together, another necessity wedged
the remarkable bond between Nixon and
Kissinger—two master planners, so different, yet
so alike—two men now curiously isolated from
their pasts. Nixon is estranged from his right-wing
constituency because he is going to Peking. He is
resented by liberals who must support the move
but can't stand the fact that their old adversary
brought it off. Kissinger has suffered emotional
excommunication from Harvard and the Cambridge
complex. His Peking success will not help
in the petty, jealous atmosphere that so infects
the Charles River.

At nights now, the two men are back in the Lin-
coln Sitting Room, ruminating, planning, writing,
sometimes just talking for hours. There is a
volume of more than 100 single-spaced pages con-
taining every word spoken by Kissinger, Chou
and the others. There is a separate 40-page, single-
spaced account of those 20 hours that details
every nuance and impression Kissinger gained,
from how Chou's complexion looks to how his
mind works.

Nixon is the power broker, the man of un-
abashed gigantic hopes, willing to cocoon him-
self from old allies, to offend longtime friends, to
seek his objective with an iron determination.
Two years ago, when the President flew around
the world, he had an almost animal sense of things
to come. Crew-cut Bob Haldeman came up to
Kissinger as *Air Force One* soared over Asia and
chuckled that "the boss" seemed to have it in
mind he might be visiting Peking before another
year was out. Kissinger bet that Nixon would be
lucky to make it by the end of his second term.

But if Kissinger does not have as finely honed
an instinct for events as his boss, he is neverthe-
less the President's inexhaustible and indispensable
source of information about history, about
nations, about the men who run them. Before Kiss-
singer made his trip, Nixon would go to the Lin-
coln Sitting Room at night and digest the memos.
Maybe toward midnight he would call Kissinger,
and the President would then extract every shred
the professor possessed on the issue at hand. Kiss-
singer was the technician who could hold a prob-
lem up for inspection, examine it from every
angle, raise questions and offer alternatives. They
spent two hours together in the Lincoln Sitting
Room and another three hours in the Oval Of-
fice just tooling the opening statement that Kiss-
singer read to Chou. They composed ten possi-
ble communiqués which Chou and Nixon could
issue simultaneously.

They studied Chou at long range. Kissinger
sent to the CIA for the most complete and up-to-
date biography of the Chinese premier. Because
he feared secrecy might be broken if he explained
why he needed material on Chou, he asked at the
same time for rundowns on a lot of world lead-
ers for his "files."

Once, they thought their special world had been
betrayed. A small speculative item in the *New
York Times* listed Kissinger as a possible emis-
sary to Red China if relations were reestablished.
Kissinger's unknowing staff joked him about it.
He bluffed by joking that "one of my admirers"
in the State Department had drawn a circle show-
ing the farthest a person could be from Wash-
ington and consigned Kissinger to a likely spot
on its circumference.

By the time Kissinger was ready to leave for Pe-
king, he felt as if he were almost a part of Nix-
on's brain, so thoroughly had they examined each
other's minds. Kissinger flew off, and cables with
Nixon's last-minute thoughts kept following him.
Once in Peking, Kissinger was on his own—al-
most. At one session Kissinger, noting the con-
stant references to Mao's thoughts and words,
produced for his hosts the fat file of his own in-
structions with long, fresh marginalia handwrit-
ted by Nixon.

Kissinger found many similarities between the
Chinese premier and the President. Chou spoke
softly, like Nixon. He did not nitpick, a diplomatic
device that Nixon scorns too. Chou exp-
pounded his ideology with fervor, but it never
overwhelmed realism. Nixon does the same. Chou
did not have to use a note in 20 hours of con-
versation. That's the way Nixon talks. The man
in Peking and the man in Washington are infi-
nitely far apart on issues and goals, but in a cu-
rious way they will not meet as strangers.

Peking's View of

President Nixon's announcement that he would visit the People's Republic of China sometime before next May was one of the great diplomatic bombshells of recent years. For two decades, until the first signs of the thaw became visible early this year, virtually the only contact between the U.S. and mainland China had been the formal and endless exchanges of hostile polemics. The President's decision to undertake a personal mission to Peking opens an enormous door. Nixon is warning everyone not to expect too much (see The Presidency, page 6). Yet worldwide speculation is inevitable about the impact of the trip on the Vietnam war, the future of Taiwan, the 1972 U.S. elections, the admission of Communist China to the U.N. and the future of our relations with the Soviet Union.

The fact that Nixon would be welcome to visit China was first announced in *LIFE* last April 30 in an article by Edgar Snow. Snow reported then that Chairman Mao Tse-tung would be happy to talk with Nixon, "either as a tourist or as President." Mao explained that "the problems between China and the U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon."

Edgar Snow, author of *Red Star over China*, probably has more firsthand information than any American—except perhaps Nixon's foreign policy adviser, Henry Kissinger—on what the Chinese leaders think about the U.S. today. He has reported sympathetically on the Chinese Communists since the beginning of their movement, and his personal knowledge of Mao, Chou En-lai and other Communist chieftains dates back to 1936. During a six-month stay in China last year he was photographed at Mao's side during the October Day parade (page 22), the only American ever to be so singled out.

On the following pages, Snow reports on the Chinese view of the forthcoming visit: why they decided to invite President Nixon; what they think of Nixon and Kissinger; what their bargaining priorities will be. Snow also offers a personal insight into the man who will do most of the negotiating with the American visitors, China's durable and knowledgeable Premier Chou En-lai.

Aboard *Air Force One*, President Nixon confers with foreign policy adviser Henry Kissinger following Kissinger's secret trip to Peking. At right, the sunset view of the city Nixon will see before next May.

China will talk from a

Many are the answers and speculations offered to explain why President Nixon sought and accepted an invitation to Peking, but why were the Chinese responsive? Is it forgotten in Peking that Nixon built his early career on witch-hunting and climbed to the Senate and vice-presidency on the backs of "appeasers in the State Department" who sold China to Russia? Why should Mao Tse-tung, with a fierce domestic purge safely behind him, seeing America's Vietnam venture a sham-bles and believing its political and economic position to be in serious trouble abroad and at home, accept a belated olive branch? And if Nixon is not going to China just to eat shark fins, what may his hosts serve as side dishes—and what may they expect in return?

The question about Nixon has been partly answered for us by Chairman Mao in my earlier report. He told me that Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, should be welcomed simply because at present the problems between China and the U.S. would have to be solved with him. In the dialectical pattern of his thought Mao has often said that good can come out of bad and that bad people can be made good—by experience and right teaching. Yes, he said to me, he preferred men like Nixon to social democrats and revisionists, those who professed to be one thing but in power behaved quite otherwise.

Nixon might be deceitful, he went on, but perhaps a little bit less so than some others. Nixon resorted to tough tactics but he also used some soft tactics. Yes, Nixon could just get on a plane and come. It would not matter whether the talks would be successful. If he were willing to come, the chairman would be willing to talk to him and it would be all right. It would be all right, whether or not they quarreled, or whether Nixon came as a tourist or as President. He believed they would not quarrel. But of course he would offer criticism of Nixon. The hosts would also make self-criticism and talk about their own mistakes and shortcomings—for instance, their production level was lower than that of the United States.

What has happened since January 1965 to change Mao's mind? At that time I asked the chairman if there was any message I might deliver to President Johnson, and his answer was *Pu-shi* (No!) and nothing more. Even so, Mao said then that one possible solution to the Vietnam conflict still was a new Geneva conference to end the fighting and guarantee Indochina's independence. That message reached the State Department, but the "option" was almost immediately closed out by Johnson's bombing of North Vietnam.

In an unprecedented gesture toward an American, Mao had author Snow at his side last year as he reviewed the October Day parade.

In that 1965 interview Mao had made it clear enough that he did not expect the Americans to desist until they had learned, the hard way, that they could not impose their political will on revolutionary Vietnam by military violence.

The Chinese believe that the lesson of Vietnam, and no mere change of Presidents, is what made it possible for Mao in 1970 to speak differently about Nixon. "Experience" had made Nixon relatively "good." Other major changes had also altered their view: antiwar resistance inside the United States; the formation of an alliance linking Hanoi, the VC and resistance forces in Cambodia and Laos, unilaterally backed by Peking. And there had been changes inside China itself,

position of strength

by EDGAR SNOW

COPYRIGHT © 1971 BY EDGAR SNOW, ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

including the sobering growth of nuclear missiles and delivery capacity.

Theoretically, the Chinese believe, Nixon had
various options along the way and did make use
of them as tactical threats for a time—as in Cam-
bodia and Laos. But the end was near. Once the
decision was taken to get out of Vietnam, clearly
a U.S. understanding with China became imper-
ative. The President had not only to safeguard
his rear against possible destruction by a China-
backed North Vietnam offensive, but also to cope
with domestic and world political repercussions
of withdrawal.

That was the general view in 1970 from the
Heavenly Peace Gate, but preparations continued

for the worst. (Bad can also come out of good.)

In the summer of 1969, the Nixon administra-
tion had publicly urged an easing of tensions with
China; later that year it had stopped the Taiwan
Straits patrols and the Chinese took note, of
course. The administration also proposed to re-
sume the suspended Warsaw talks at any mutu-
ally agreeable time or place. In January 1970 pre-
liminary Sino-American talks opened in Warsaw.
They were immediately suspended after the Cam-
bodian invasion. But Nixon went ahead, carried
out a stage-by-stage elimination of trade embar-
goes against China, and lifted travel bans between
the two countries. Early this spring a presiden-
tial commission advocated a U.N. seat for main-

At their secret meeting, Kissinger and Chou En-
lai sized each other up across a couch of cut velvet.
They used interpreters, though Chou speaks English.

land China, for the first time officially calling it
the People's Republic. Peking leaders remained
suspicious—especially of a double-cross play be-
tween Moscow and Washington.

By late autumn of 1970 several urgent and au-
thentically documented inquiries reaching China
had indicated that the President wished to know
whether he or his representative would be received
in Peking. An indirect answer was contained in
an interview given to me by Chou En-lai in No-
vember when he said that Sino-American con-
versations could be opened but only if the Amer-

CONTINUED

# ‘Kissinger knows the language of both worlds’

CONTINUED

icans demonstrated a "serious" desire to nego-
tiate. To the initiated, "serious" meant, first of
all, a realistic attempt to work out a program to
deal with the Taiwan problem. As Mao and Chou
see it, that was and is the key to all other Asian set-
tlements. Evidently sufficient assurances were
forthcoming. When Chou En-lai led my wife and
me to stand beside Chairman Mao's side last Oct-
tober, and to be photographed at the anniver-
sary parade, no American had ever been so no-
ticed. Nothing China's leaders do publicly is
without purpose. Discerning people realized that
something new was happening. Then came the
Ping Pong gesture. Chairman Mao had talked to
me in December, and after the Ping Pong gesture
I was able to report that he would welcome Mr.
Nixon or his personal representative to Peking.
A new horizon was already in sight.

My LIFE article was translated and widely cir-
culated in China among political and army lead-
ers. They could not, therefore, have been much
astonished by the recent Peking-Washington joint
announcement. Though China's press may carry
only a few lines, the whole subject today is un-
doubtedly being cautiously discussed and ex-
plained down to the commune level. Only one
thing may have surprised the Chinese: Mr. Kis-
singer's success in keeping his visit secret. Expe-
rience with American diplomats during World
War II had convinced Chinese leaders that Amer-
icans could not keep secrets.

The Chinese are, of course, well aware not only
of the international impact of Mr. Nixon's plans,
but also of the domestic effects and side benefits
to his present and future political career. Discuss-
ing Nixon's possible visit to China, the chairman
casually remarked that the presidential election
would be in 1972, would it not? Therefore, he
added, Mr. Nixon might send an envoy first, but
was not himself likely to come to Peking before
early 1972.

By 1970 China had passed through the ordeal
of a great purge, much time had been lost in do-
mestic construction, and many fences had to be
mended or newly built to end China's interna-
tional isolation. The period of internal tension
was largely over. Now, if there was a chance to re-
cover Taiwan—Mao’s last national goal of uni-
fication—and for China to be accepted as an equal
in recognition of her great size, achievements and
potential, why not look at it? Nothing in Mao’s
thought or teaching ever called for a war against
the U.S. or for a war of foreign conquest, and
nothing in Mao’s ideology places any faith in nu-
clear bombs. The burden of building bombs and
counterattack silos is very heavy indeed and like-
ly to become more so; China has more than once
called for their total abolition.

Very high among the reasons why Sino-Amer-
ican rapprochement interests China is to improve
her strategic position in dealing with Russia. With
America off the Asian continent, the danger of a

Soviet-American gang-up dispelled and a seat of
her own in the U.N., Peking's maneuvering pow-
er would obviously be enhanced.

Did Mr. Kissinger understand, then, that Chi-
na was ready to talk from a position of strength,
not weakness? China's leaders respect Kissinger.
They know him through their own intelligence
system and through his writing. Discussing him
with an old friend and close comrade-in-politics
of Premier Chou one evening in Peking, I was
struck by his frank delight at the prospect of cross-
ing verbal swords with such a worthy adversary.
"Kissinger?" he said. "There is a man who knows
the language of both worlds—his own and ours.
He is the first American we have seen in his po-
sition. With him it should be possible to talk."

The immediate issues examined at the meeting
between Chou and Kissinger—and the agenda
ahead—are very concrete and could scarcely have
been anything very new to either side. As the Chi-
nese see it, solutions would involve these turn-
point decisions for Nixon: (1) seating the Peo-
ple's Republic in the United Nations and the re-
turn of Taiwan to mainland sovereignty, (2) total
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and arrangements
for an international conference to guarantee In-
dochina's independence, and for a negotiated
Hanoi-Saigon settlement which would preserve
some shell of the American-made regime, at least
for a decent interval, and (3) the establishment
of formal Sino-American diplomatic relations.
On all these matters, some rough negotiable script
had to be brought back to Nixon to enable him
to accept Premier Chou's invitation.

China's formula for Taiwan has always been
negotiable whenever American leaders so wished.
As repeatedly defined, it requires two steps: first,
that the U.S. and China jointly declare their in-
tention to settle all disputes between them, in-
cluding the Taiwan dispute, by peaceful negoti-
ation. Second, that the U.S. recognize Taiwan as
an inalienable part of the Chinese People's Re-
public and agree to withdraw its armed forces
from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits. Specific
steps on how and when to withdraw would be
matters for subsequent discussion.*

China contends that the dispute with the U.S.
over Taiwan is an international question
whereas her interrupted civil war with
Chiang Kai-shek is a strictly internal question.
Once American agreement to withdraw from Tai-
wan is conceded in principle, many terms would
have to be defined. Peking is likely to be found
reasonable in both the procedures for the dissolu-
tion of the American position and in dealing with
Taiwan itself—perhaps even granting a degree of
autonomy to Chiang Kai-shek if he should wish
to remain governor there for his lifetime.

China will never publicly renounce what it con-
siders its ultimate sovereign right to recover Tai-
wan by force if necessary. However, there is now

CONTINUED

*The U.S. maintains three nuclear-capable air bases on Taiwan and 9,000 men.—ED.

In 1936, Edgar Snow photographed a bearded
Chou who, at 37, was commander of one of the
Red armies battling the forces of Chiang Kai-shek.

As premier, Chou is used to the protocol
that puts heads of state into odd hats. He
acquired this turban in Pakistan in 1956.

Striding past curious on-
lookers, Chou arrived for a
session of the Geneva Con-
ference on Vietnam in 1954.
His negotiating ability, ad-
mitted even by his enemies,
was a factor in China's be-
lated emergence as a world
power. Of China's cur-
rent leaders, Chou has trav-
eled the most and presum-
ably understands the most
about the outside world.

Chou will do the nitty-gritty work,
Mao will have the final say

CONTINUED

a likelihood that a non-military solution will be
worked out by the Nationalists and the Commu-
nist Chinese themselves. The opening of serious
Sino-American talks may have already provoked
renewed covert conversations between Taiwan
and Peking in a search for the possible terms of as-
similation. That is no doubt one of Nixon's hopes.
Mao Tse-tung has pointed out to me that peace-
ful assimilation of Taiwan is his aim—reminding
me of several cases in the Chinese civil war when
other provinces acceded without fighting.

Nixon has now declared his readiness to see
China seated in the U.N. But he also wishes to re-
tain a seat there for the Taiwan regime. China
will not enter the U.N. on that condition. Wheth-
er the U.N. members themselves seat Peking and
simply drop Taiwan, or whether Taiwan with-
draws its delegation in protest, the Chinese be-
lieve that Taiwan cannot long function in the
U.N. once a majority of its members cease to rec-
ognize it.

A settlement in Taiwan obviously cannot be separated, however, from a cease-fire agreement and withdrawal in Vietnam, nor can the latter await the former. Nothing less than total evacuation of all foreign forces from Vietnam will satisfy Peking's Hanoi allies, as indicated by protests already coming from Hanoi and warnings to Peking against Nixon's perfidy. Peking cannot permit Russia to exploit differences of this nature, and it has surely been made clear to Kissinger that no Geneva conference solution can be advanced by China that does not have the full support of Hanoi and the NLF.

Such are the regional issues that must be set-
tled before any across-the-board détente can be
reached in East Asia and the broader Pacific. To
define China's less immediate but parallel aspi-
rations on a global scale is beyond the scope of
this report, but that they include continued sup-
port for revolutionary struggle—"in the interest
of China and the whole world," to quote the new
party constitution—is obvious.

On his visit to Peking the President would be en-
tering a nation with which his country has no dip-
omatic relations and one in which the real chief
of state holds no executive office. Meet the party
chairman Nixon certainly would, but in all prob-
ability Chou would do most of the negotiating.

What sort of man will the President see in Chou En-lai? Chou is clearly one of the world's ablest negotiators. Handsome and exuding charisma, he is, now in his 73rd year, tireless. In August 1967, Chou negotiated his way out of his most perilous moment in the Cultural Revolution. Though idealized by youth, he was, for more than two days and nights, surrounded in his offices in the Great Hall by half a million ultra-leftist Red Guards. Their leaders—some later arrested as counter-revolutionaries—were seeking to seize the files of the Central Committee—and Chou himself. Mao and Lin Piao were both absent. By talking to small

groups, day and night, Chou gradually persuad-
ed the masses—so Chou called them in talking
to me—to disperse. It was only following that in-
cident that Lin Piao brought thousands of troops
into the capital, and the disarming and breakup
of the Red Guards began in earnest—with heavy
casualties.

Kissinger is said to have spent 20 of his 49 hours
in Peking talking to the premier. That is nothing
extraordinary. One of several interview-conver-
sations I had with him lasted from the dinner table
one evening until six the next morning. I was ex-
hausted, he seemingly as fresh as ever. "I must
let you get some sleep," I mumbled.

He threw back his head and laughed. "I've al-
ready had my sleep," he said. "Now I'm going
to work." His night's rest had been a catnap be-
fore dinner.

Chou told me that he had taken one vacation
—a week when he was ill—in ten years.

Carefully avoiding any thrust for personal
power, he has been a zestful worker in pur-
suit of national and revolutionary power
politics. Chou's affable manner masks viscera of
tough and supple alloys; he is a master of policy
implementation with an infinite capacity for de-
tail. His personal contacts are innumerable. He
combines an administrative efficiency hard to rec-
oncile with his ubiquity. His self-effacing dedi-
cation makes him Mao's indispensable alter ego.

Symbiosis is perhaps the best word to describe
their relationship. Very different in working style
and personality, Mao and Chou complement each
other as a tandem based on 37 years of trust and
interdependence. Chou was never a mandarin but
his grandfather was, and he confesses to a feudal
background, although he spent 20 years in peas-
ant surroundings as a guerrilla. Mao is a peasant-
born intellectual genius to whose intuitive and
experienced knowledge of the people Chou ha-
bitually defers.

Mao is an activist, a prime mover, an origi-
nator and master of strategy achieved by alter-
nating surprise, tension and easement. He dis-
trusts long periods of stability and is never sat-
isfied with the pace of change, but he is practical
and capable of great patience in achieving a goal
by stages.

Chou welcomes the detailed execution of a plan
—which bores Mao—and the more complex the
problem the better. Chou quickly cuts to the heart
of matters, drops the impractical, dissimulates
when necessary, and never gambles—without
four aces. Chou works best when the revolution-
ary pendulum has swung to a point of stability.
He is a builder, not a poet.

In talks I have had with China's two great men
it usually is Chou who meticulously answers the
main questions and Mao who listens, adds a few
words of caution or elucidation, and enlarges the
broad and dialectical view. Chou attends count-
less large banquets, apparently with relish. Mao

detests feasts and prefers small groups. Chou is an
epicure but eats frugally, Mao likes simple food
cooked in the hotly seasoned Hunan style. Both
men drink very little, and each is highly disci-
plined in his own style. In negotiating with Pres-
ident Nixon, Chou will probably do the nitty-grit-
ty work, in close collaboration with Mao behind
the scenes. But the final decisions will be Mao's.

Whatever the Chinese may think of Nixon's
motives, he has earned their appreciation by the
courtesy of coming to see them, thereby accord-
ing prestige to Mao Tse-tung and *amour-propre* to
the whole people. Vassal kings of the past brought
tributes to Peking, but never before the head of
the world's most powerful nation. The gesture in
itself may go far to assuage the rancor and resent-
ment accumulated during the past two decades.
There is some risk that the gesture could be mis-
interpreted to the Americans' disadvantage, but
more likely it will be accepted with full grace and
improve chances of mutual accommodation.

The millennium seems distant and the imme-
diate prospect is for the toughest kind of adjust-
ment and struggle. China must satisfy Korea and
Vietnam, and the U.S. cannot jettison Japan. The
danger is that Americans may imagine that the
Chinese are giving up Communism—and Mao's
world view—to become nice agrarian democrats.
A more realistic world is indeed in sight. But pop-
ular illusions that it will consist of a sweet mix of
ideologies, or an end to China's faith in revo-
lutionary means, could only serve to deepen the
abyss again when disillusionment occurs. A world
without change by revolutions—a world in which
China's closest friends would not be revolution-
ary states—is inconceivable to Peking. But a
world of relative peace between states is as nec-
essary to China as to America. To hope for more
is to court disenchantment.
■

A warning from
Taiwan: 'Nixon will
be disappointed'

In Taiwan, news of President Nixon's trip evoked anger and dismay. The reaction of Liu Yuan (right), an electronics worker in Taipei, was typical: "This is a bad business. The Red Chinese foreign policy is masked in smiles, but they plan to defeat the U.S. The more eager Nixon is to make friends with the Communists, the more he will be disappointed. The free world will lose confidence in him and our brethren on the mainland will lose hope." Since their expulsion from the mainland in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists, with U.S. support, have ruled Taiwan and claimed to be the only legal government of China.