Dr. Henry A. Kissinger's Lecture for The Norwegian Atlantic Committee in Memory of Johan Jörgen Holst in The Nobel Institute, Oslo, Friday 13 January 1995.

Members of the Holst Family, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Ladies and Gentlemen.

Johan Holst was a friend of mine. We first met when he was a student at Harvard. I have had many students but very few of them became personal friends. In any event, I had the privilege of observing what Johan Jörgen Holst did as a researcher, as Defense Minister, and as Foreign Minister. Though best known for this last achievement, I have valued him as much for his attention to the permanent problems of the democracies as for his concern with the preservation and extention of peace, together with his human politics - of humility, simplicity, and dedication. And it is symbolic that a country so far geographically from the conflicts of the Middle East should have made such a major contribution to the settlement of conflict there and to the beginning of a reconciliation between the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples.

When I was Secretary of State it was a requirement of our foreign policy to promise to Israel that we would not talk to the PLO; and of course, any idea that the Israelis would talk to the PLO was considered impossible. Yet here in Oslo the Palestinian and the Israeli leaders met and made a very strange agreement, strange in the sense that, when I first viewed it from the perspective of a technical diplomat, I could think of innumerable things that were wrong with it.

Nevertheless, the essence of that agreement was that it did not pretend it could solve the suspicions, tensions, and injustices of several generations in a single stroke. The strength of the agreement was the fact that it requires of the Israelis and the Palestinians to work together almost every day for years to come, which will give it specific content in individual situations. In many ways it reflects the necessities of the situation, and it is a tribute to Norway - and a tribute to Johan Jörgen Holst - that such an agreement could have been made.

In fact, I believe it was due to the fact that neither Holst nor Norway were trying to prove anything by achieving such an agreement. Unlike other would-be mediators, Johan and his country did not try to prove a general theory about the specific contribution which Norway could make. Rather, they seized on the fact that their sole interest was the advancement of peace. Throughout, the dignity and the humility with which Norway and its Foreign Minister presented their seminal contribution represents one of the most impressive diplomatic performances I have seen. For this, both his country and Johan Holst will be long remembered.

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It is therefore truly a privilege for me to have been asked to speak here and to pay tribute to my friend, at an institute in the name of which I was myself once honored - though I never had the opportunity to visit it because, at the time, emotions were running too high to permit an undisturbed visit to Oslo. So this is a very meaningful occasion. And the topic about which I have been asked to speak is one that Johan and I talked about for twenty years, together with many other Norwegian friends. As the Prime Minister pointed out, I was also a good friend of Foreign Minister Frydenlund. So it can not be an accident that, having known so many Foreign Ministers and so many former students, it should be representatives from this relatively small country with whom I have formed personal relationships in addition to the necessary professional ones.

My subject today is the Atlantic Relationship after the Cold War. We are in an unusual situation in that the problems we have now were created by our successes, not by failure. The needs of adaptation being talked about result from the fact that the Atlantic Alliance achieved almost everything it set out to do forty years earlier. If one compares the statements of purpose being made when the Atlantic Alliance was formed with what in fact transpired, there is a degree of close correspondence for which I know of no other historical precedent, and surely not in such a short period of time.

One result is that every country dealing with the new situation is facing a historically unprecedented challenge. The United States has become for the first time in its history one nation among many, still the most powerful but no longer the only dominant nation. We now neither can control all events nor can we withdraw from them. In Europe the unification of Germany has overthrown many of the premises of the post-Cold War period which had assumed that the unification of Germany would come in a very distant future, if ever. And Russia lives within borders which it has not known since Peter the Great. Between the Europe of NATO and the post-Soviet Russia lie many countries, historic European states, that function in a kind of a vacuum with no institutional connections to either side, or at least with insufficient institutional ties.

So let me talk about each of these areas in turn. For the sake of the emotional stability of our distinguished American ambassador here, let me emphasize that I speak as an individual and not on behalf of the Administration, although my views and the views of the Administration are not very different except on some tactical details. And in any event, with all the electoral changes you read about in the United States, they concern almost exclusively domestic problems. Foreign policy has not been a major issue in the recent campaign, and there are many of us in both parties who will make every effort to keep foreign policy from becoming a political issue in order to guarantee continuity to both friends and

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adversaries.

As I said, the United States faces a philosophically unique
situation. Among the great powers, no other nation can say that
its history began on a specific date or that it was populated
entirely, or almost entirely, by immigrants. Moreover, America has
never had a powerful neighbour or really felt threatened, until
very recently. Therefore foreign policy has always had a different
character in the United States than anywhere else. There has been
in the United States, precisely because most of the population came
from the middle class, a view that America had about it a
missionary quality, indeed a duty. The way to seek peace was not
by the methods of European diplomacy but by transforming the whole
world and making that world democratic. This has led to great
achievements but it has also led recently to some tragedies, as
when we tried to export democracy to South-East Asia under
conditions for which there was no historical preparation and in
which the strategic necessities were quite different from the ones
we knew from Europe. NATO too was for America a fulfilment of its
democratic tradition and a validation of the American experience
in World War II, when it organized overwhelming force against a
recognized evil.

Broadly speaking, the Cold War with its two-power world
coincided with the American genius for large-scale mobilization of
resources and capacity for overwhelming dedication to big causes.
Without sounding nationalistic, I cannot think of any other major
country that would, as the United States did at the end of World
War II, dedicate itself to the spread of its technology around the
world thus creating economic competitors to itself; to building up
defeated enemies; and to convincing itself that this was its
contribution to peace. I think these were major achievements. But
now we live in a different world. There are no clear-cut enemies,
no central ideological conflict. It is not possible, as it was
throughout the Cold War, to develop a general concept and to apply
it uniformly all over the world. We will henceforth be obliged to
recognize special circumstances and to calculate rewards and
penalties the way nations in less favourable environments than ours
have always had to do. Now this will require a big emotional
adjustment in the United States.

I have written a book on the importance of the study of the
national interest. In Europe one would not have to spend three
minutes on such a proposition. In America it produces intense
debate. But even once you have said, we now need to have a national
interest, you still have to define what you mean by the phrase. At
this moment America is preoccupied with domestic affairs. But
inevitably, for the rest this century a foreign policy debate will
start - not so much between the parties, but within each party -
as to what the American national interest really is. At the end
of it, I expect some definition to emerge just as "containment" had
in the Forties and which will likewise guide American policy for

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another fifty years.

One of the questions America must answer for itself is why we should have close relations with Europe. For it is no longer a self-evident proposition. It is as well a key challenge for America because, when I look around the world, I see huge transformations occurring in its every reach. We are seeing in Latin America, an area which has been consigned to permanent progress, another one of those crises which, though it may be perfectly conceivable from the perspective of overall development, also illustrates just how complex, unpredictable, and in some ways utterly different, these societies still are from the advanced economies. And in Russia we see nearly every day evidence of the turmoil associated with moving from totalitarianism toward a set of relationships associated with democracy and the free market.

Everybody is talking about the economic recovery of Asia. But the fact is that this economic recovery is being conducted by nations with national orientations and attitudes towards foreign policy similar to that of Europe in the 19th century. The nations of Asia do not think of themselves as a community in the same sense as the Europeans do. The nations of Asia look at their relationship with each other in terms of competition and rivalry. Japan, China, Asian Russia, Korea, South-East Asia, and India deal with each other more according to the maxims of 19th century Cabinet-diplomacy than they do by the maxims of the European Union, among whose members war and military competition have literally become inconceivable.

And then there are changes in the Muslim world, where the rise of fundamentalism is causing complicated challenges from North Africa to Central Asia. Given all of this, if Europe tries to act alone it will be driven back to its traditional national rivalries and will end up in a position that is perhaps similar to that of Greece after the rise of the Roman Empire. And if America tries to act alone, it will find that even the richest and the most powerful countries are unable to deal with problems of such complexity in isolation. For any of us in America who have been in high office - and I know all the former Secretaries of State and Presidents - there is no question that, despite all the disagreements existing across the Atlantic, we have found it easier and more natural to deal jointly with Europe than with any other region in the world. That does not mean that disagreements cannot occur but, for America, this relationship remains crucial. And for Europe it is equally crucial, probably because Europe by itself will not be able to sustain a national policy. In all likelihood, that policy will become fragmented again and, on some of the key European issues, an American role is absolutely essential.

The Europe of the Cold War was based on two premises: that the American role was essential to the defense of Europe; and, secondly, that the European Union - or rather the European

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Community at that time - was crucial to providing a home for a divided Germany, which it was assumed would remain divided for an indefinite period of time. Within that context, America had the military leadership, France played a major role politically, and Germany played a major role economically but without trying to assert a politically dominant role. The unification of Germany has changed these equations. The defence of Europe against the Soviet Union is no longer as central. A unified Germany has no reason to subordinate its political leadership to another country over a protracted period of time. Therefore the internal relationships of Europe as well as the trans-Atlantic relationships require new definitions. The internal relationships of Europe are a matter for the Europeans to decide, and I will not talk about these today. The trans-Atlantic relationship has to be rethought.

NATO is the only organic link between Europe and the United States. It is the only institution in which America is required to deal with Europe on a regular basis. But since the collapse of the Soviet Union, there has been a temptation to try to use NATO as a bridge for relations with Russia, for which in my view a military alliance is not ideally suited.

Now let me say a few words about Russia. The history of Russia is an important part of the history of Europe. But the history of Europe does not exhaust the history of Russia. Russia is out of scale as far as the European countries are concerned. St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, and Vladivostok is closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow. There is no nation in Europe of such dimensions. Russia includes Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. Historically, Russian foreign policy has been equally of a scale unique unto itself. Now it is true that Russia has been invaded twice (or, if you include the Crimean War, three times) from Europe. It is also true that, if you look at history since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has fought more wars than any other country and against more of its neighbours, in the process acquiring more and more territory. And it did not acquire this territory by plebicite.

Thus Russia is presently living within borders unprecedented since the early 18th century. Yet many in the West think that the spread of democracy and market economics in Russia will automatically produce a peaceful world. For that was the essence of the Wilsonian dream. Indeed, an American scholar wrote a text only three or four years ago called The End of History in which he professed that the spread of market economics and democracy had caused foreign policy to come to an end and that all history would henceforth consist of domestic economics. That sort of attitude tempted all the Western nations to identify foreign policy with the (still current) preoccupation with Russian domestic politics. It has moreover led, first to the view that Gorbachev was essential for peace and, subsequently, to the view that Yeltsin is essential for peace, together with a temptation to try to identify groups in Russia that we ought to back and encourage.

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I believe this to be a grave mistake. The internal evolution of Russia is a Russian problem. We can encourage reform by economic assistance where that assistance genuinely brings about change. But we can not identify personally with Russian leaders or approach that country's historic evolution on the basis of our domestic preferences primarily. What we need to do is to identify the foreign policy problems that Russia creates as well as the foreign policy opportunities which cooperation with Russia can provide.

Historically, Russia has had a curious attitude towards foreign policy: in those issues beyond the reach of the Russian armies, or beyond the capabilities of the Russian armies, Russia conducted typically European policies in its international affairs. In other issues - Central Asia, the Far East, the Balkans - that is, areas where there was no balance of power - were the responsibility of the so-called Asiatic Department. There Russia refused to submit its policies to European or international conferences and acted unilaterally, just as we have been witnessing lately in Chechenya. This was true even in the post-World War II period when the Soviet Union would not discuss Eastern Europe as an international problem but simply occupied it, thus creating an altogether new geopolitical reality.

From the Russian point of view, one can argue that the tragedies of Russia were caused by overextension. Having so many foreign peoples under its rule imposed on Russia the requirement of maintaining an army much larger than any required by other European states. But, thereby, Russia also frightened its neighbours. And a seemingly endless expansionism ensued that had no specific goal other than eliminating vacuums.

I would therefore argue that there are two necessities in foreign policy: first, to discourage Russian military activities beyond its borders. A country of the vastness that I have described, larger than the United States and with huge resources, should not feel claustrophobic in the vast region between St. Petersburg and Vladivostok. Secondly, Russia must be given an honest opportunity to participate - as an equal - in the resolution of international problems. These seem to me the primary requirements of foreign policy, nor do they bring with them the necessity of dealing with Russia's internal problems as if they were our own or those of the world community.

Now what does all this signify for Eastern Europe? I believe that the most dangerous situation there would be to permit a vacuum to arise between the Eastern border of Germany and the Western border of Russia, threatening as it does stability in both directions. For it would oblige Germany over a period of time to try to take care of its security east of the Oder by its own national means. (One can not expect Germany to sit by and wait until a threat emerges fifty miles or so from its borders.) Such

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a vacuum would also tempt Russia to try to recreate Finnish conditions among its former satellites. And I say this as somebody who greatly admires Finland's heroic capacity for achieving independence.

Nevertheless, the temptation will be there for Russia to seek to influence the domestic situations of its neighbours. Therefore I believe that the countries of that region should be encouraged and permitted to join the European Union. I also think that the key countries should be invited or permitted to join NATO as soon as possible. I realize that many people out there would say that this will make things difficult but I would argue that a vacuum will make things even more difficult. Now I know this to be an issue that is being studied, and I know there is a standard phrase to the effect that the issue is not whether, but when. To this, my response is that it is not a problem for study but a problem that requires some decisions. Statesmen should not ask rhetorical questions; they should answer them. And these questions we can answer as soon as we want to. Hence every effort should be made, first, to reassure ourselves against, however absurd it may seem, the danger of a military invasion over land. Indeed, one could accept a German arrangement whereby no foreign troops are moved beyond the pre-unification dividing line in Europe.

Secondly, Russia should be given every opportunity to participate on an equal basis in the resolution of international problems. If Russia in fact develops into a Western-style democracy and is, for the first time in its history, concerned above all with domestic development, then the NATO countries would surely be jubilant. There is no sense in an anti-Russian foreign policy. Quite the contrary. But the fundamental question, at least from an American point of view, is whether we can develop a new set of purposes among Europe -- Western and Central Europe -- and the United States. I do not believe it is possible to use NATO as an institution in which military representatives from all over the former Soviet Union show up in Brussels twice a year because Uzbekistan and Belgium are not likely to unite on any common program. But I do think the basic members of NATO have to decide what they mean by political cooperation, how they can exchange their views in a meaningful manner, and what their limits and attitudes are towards various countries.

Now it is true that NATO did not develop a common policy on Bosnia but, even more importantly, it never developed a common definition of what the Bosnian problem was. The basic issue in Bosnia was whether it was possible in an administrated unit that had never been a nation to make Serbs, Croats and Muslims live together in a unitary fashion when they had proven that they could not live together in a much larger Yugoslavia. If that question had been asked at the beginning, perhaps a common policy could have been developed that recognized the national and ethnic peculiarities of the country's minorities and a kind of *de facto*

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partition achieved - in which case the Muslim area would have been
much larger than it is likely to be under any of the current
proposals. Therefore, on so many of these issues Europe and the
United States need the kind of dialogue which has not been taking
place in recent years. On the other hand, when one looks at the
challenges around the world, I believe that Western democracies
still have a unique contribution to make to world peace.

Thus I come back to where I began. The reason Johan Jören
Holst was a friend over so many years was not only because we had
certain intellectual problems to discuss but because we had certain
commom values to achieve. We could always start the dialogue again
where it had ended. That used to be and still is in many respects
the essence of the Atlantic Alliance. But it can not continue with
new generations coming into office in every country. Especially in
America, where a change of leadership - not between parties but
between regions of the country - leads to the creation of new
constituencies. That is the challenge of the Atlantic relationship
as I see it. And it is symbolic that we should discuss it here, at
an institute dedicated to peace, and honour a man who contributed
so much to peace - a man whom many of us do not consider a
Norwegian but a citizen of all of our countries, and a citizen of
the Atlantic area.

Thank You.

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Johan Holst was a friend of mine. We first met when he was a student at Harvard. I have had many students but very few of them became personal friends. In any event, I had the privilege of observing what Johan Jörgen Holst did as a researcher, as Defense Minister, and as Foreign Minister. Though best known for this last achievement, I have valued him as much for his attention to the permanent problems of the democracies as for his concern with the preservation and extension of peace, together with his human politics - of humility, simplicity, and dedication. And it is symbolic that a country so far geographically from the conflicts of the Middle East should have made such a major contribution to the settlement of conflict there and to the beginning of a reconciliation between the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples.

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[Y]

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domestic problems. Foreign policy has not been a major issue in the
recent campaign, and there are many of us in both parties who will
make every effort to keep foreign policy from becoming a political
issue in order to guarantee continuity to both friends and
adversaries.

6

[Y]

7

I have written a book on the importance of the study of the
national interest. In Europe one would not have to spend three
minutes on such a proposition. In America it produces intense
debate. But even once you have said, we now need to have a national
interest, you still have to define what you mean by the phrase. At
this moment America is preoccupied with domestic affairs. But
inevitably, for the rest this century a foreign policy debate will
start - not so much between the parties, but within each party -
as to what the American national interest really is. At the end
of it, I expect some definition to emerge just as "containment" had
in the Forties and which will likewise guide American policy for
another fifty years.

8

[Y]

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as the Europeans do. The nations of Asia look at their relationship
with each other in terms of competition and rivalry. Japan, China,
Asian Russia, Korea, South-East Asia, and India deal with each
other more according to the maxims of 19th century Cabinet-
diplomacy than they do by the maxims of the European Union, among
whose members war and military competition have literally become
inconceivable.

10

[Y]

The Europe of the Cold War was based on two premises: that
the American role was essential to the defense of Europe; and,
secondly, that the European Union - or rather the European
Community at that time - was crucial to providing a home for a
divided Germany, which it was assumed would remain divided for an
indefinite period of time. Within that context, America had the
military leadership, France played a major role politically, and
Germany played a major role economically but without trying to
assert a politically dominant role. The unification of Germany has
changed these equations. The defence of Europe against the Soviet

11

[Y]

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