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And it also opposes the legitimate cooperation the United
States gives to the democratic government which is the
result of a popular election, while supporting the guer-
rrillas who enjoy the benefits of the Soviet interven-
tion through Cuba and Nicaragua.

That is why as long as the Mexican influen-
ce prevails, the Contadora Group will not be able to
offer a constructive solution to the armed conflict of
Central America.

During the first meeting at the Island of
Contadora, the Foreign Relation Ministers of Mexico, Pa-
nama, Colombia, and Venezuela declared that they were
adopting as their own the peace plan for Nicaragua and
El Salvador proposed by the then President of Mexico,
José López Portillo.

It is peculiar that the thesis of President
López Portillo was first presented by Mexico to the Ge-
neral Assembly of the Organization of American States
(OAS) in November of 1981 in St. Lucie. On that occa-
sion, Mexico wanted the backing for the Sandinista re-
gime, plus a declaration against the elections which
were to be held in El Salvador, asking that it be re-
placed by negotiations with the guerrillas so that they
would come in and form part of the government. The

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LC

Mexican position was totally defeated. It received only the little prestigious support of the two Marxist-like dictatorships in the Caribbean: the one of Sandinista Nicaragua, and the other of the Grenada of Bishop.

It is not easy to explain how, after the Mexican defeat at the O.A.S. in November of 1981, the Foreign Relations Minister of Mexico later on managed to convince his colleagues from Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela, gathered at Contadora, to endorse the López Portillo's plan, when the same Ministers of those three countries had voted against the Mexican thesis during the meeting at St. Lucie.

What is indeed easy to explain is why Mexico has adopted those theses of clear cut support of the Marxist-Leninist guerrillas and, by the way, why it has become such a severe critic of the friendship and cooperation that the government of President Monge has been able to develop with the government of President Reagan.

Rich in history, resources, and the arts, Mexico is a country very different to all the other countries of Latin America. In the "Philanthropic Ogre", Octavio Paz declares that Mexico, like the God of the Christians, is three in one: There is an Aztec Mexico,

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LQ

there is a Spanish Mexico, and there is a Modern Mexi-
co. But at the same time, they all are a very peculiar
whole.

This peculiarity is reflected in its poli-
tical system, which escapes all traditional definitions.
Mexico is not a democracy in the classical sense of the
word because, in reality, only the official party, the
PRI (Institutional Party of the Revolution) has access
to power. The elections are just a formality. The Pre-
sident of the Republic of Mexico, who has more power by
himself than any known absolute emperor, has a limited
tenure of six years. Once the term is over, he melts
away to give his place to the new Prince, who comes in
with a new team. But if Mexico is not a democratic
country, neither it is a totalitarian one such as those
of the Southern half of the Continent; in Mexico, the mi-
litary castes do not predominate, neither is its system
a transitory one, so that the conditions necessary for
the security may be established in order that political
freedom may be exercised. Neither is Mexico, much less,
a Marxist-Leninist state.

Although the official policy of the PRI is
verbally socializing and anti-capitalist, there exists
in Mexico a very backward capitalistic system. Poverty
affects without hope hundreds of thousand of farm work-

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(LC)

ers and millions of marginal persons in the large cities, while the well-to-do are wealthy in a bigger proportion than in any other Latin American country.

In spite of its socio-economic contrasts and its political peculiarities, Mexico asserts itself each day more frequently on the international stage. Its new oil riches and the fact of being the one Latin American nation with the largest economic and demographic impact, plus the stability of its peculiar system of government, have given Mexico an ever growing influence in our Americas, and in special, in the Caribbean area.

For that reason, the fact that Mexico openly displays its sympathy towards the Sandinistas of Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran and Guatemalan guerrillas, has a tremendous importance for those who want to conceal the Soviet penetration. Because, according to them, Mexico's support proves that in those countries there is not a Communist threat, but rather the struggle of some nationalistic revolutionaries who are trying to liberate their countries from the military tyrannies which are maintained with the support of Yankee imperialism. In other words, because Mexico supports them now, the Marxist-Leninist movements of Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatema-

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[c]

la are being presented like the sincere Mexican revolu-
lutionaries of 1910, who have developed since then a
great nation, whose system has not created any adverse
consequences neither for Mexico nor for the rest of
the Western Hemisphere.

However, it is not difficult to prove that
the Nicaraguan, Salvadoran, and Guatemalan revolutions
have been misled and seized by the international Marxist-
Leninist elements, and subjected to the Soviet tutelage,
through Cuba. Neither it is difficult to prove that the
fact that Mexico supports a revolution, does not mean it
is a nationalistic one, patterned after the Mexican revo-
lution.

Mexico may be charged with having supported
the Cuban revolution, which is the least nationalistic of
all, the most totalitarian, and the most alienated of all
the revolutions that have taken place in the Americas.
The Cuban government is, without any doubt, one of the
most despotic in its domestic policies, and one of the
most aggressive servants of the Soviet imperialism in its
foreign dealings.

Mexico's strange position, decidedly capita-
listic as far as its domestic policies are concerned,
pro-Cuban and pro-Sandinista in its foreign relations,

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[LJ]

seems to be that by assuming the defense of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in other countries of the Caribbean, they will prevent their bringing to Mexico the same pro-Soviet revolutionary process which Mexico helps promote in other countries of the region.

Besides, by assisting the positions of the enemies of the United States, they satisfy the Mexican ego, humiliated by territorial loses suffered in the past at the hands of the Colossus neighbor of the North, and because that neighbor now shows a prodigious economic development with social justice within a framework of freedoms that they, the Mexican themselves, have not been able to start achieving.

San Jose, Costa Rica

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THE O.A.S. AND THE NICARAGUAN CIVIL WAR

By

Gonzalo J. Facio

(Published by DIARIO LAS AMERICAS, June 19, 1983)

- o -

The Nicaraguan civil war of 1978-79 reached a point where it became a threat for the peace of the Americas. That is why the XVII Meeting of Foreign Relation Ministers of all the member nations of the O.A.S. was convened in Washington. After lengthy debates, on June 23, 1979, a historic resolution opposing the Nicaraguan dictatorship was adopted, which among other things, declared:

Considering

That the people of Nicaragua is currently suffering the horror of a ferocious armed conflict which is causing innumerable miseries and loss of life, and has driven the country to serious political, social and economic uphevals.

That the inhuman behavior of the dictatorial regime which the country endures...is the fundamental cause of the dramatic situation confronted by the Nicaraguan people.

That the spirit of solidarity which inspires the

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[d]

hemispheric relations makes unavoidable the obligation of
the American nations to utilize all the resources at their
disposal in order to bring an end to the spilling of blood
and avoid the prolongation of this conflict which continues
to disturb the peace of the Continent.

It Declares

...That the solution of the problem should be ins-
pired on the following bases:

1. The immediate and definite replacement of the
Somoza regime.

2. The establishment in Nicaraguan territory of
a democratic government, whose composition includes the main
groups opposing the dictatorship... and which reflects the
free will of the people of Nicaragua.

3. The guarantee for the respect of the human
rights of all Nicaraguans, without any exception.

4. The holding of free elections within the short-
est possible time, leading to the establishment of an authen-
tically democratic government which insures the peace, liberty,
and justice for all.

It Resolves:

1. To request from the member nations of the O.A.S.

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[L.C.]

to carry out such an undertaking within their capabilities,
that may lead to a peaceful and permanent solution of the
Nicaraguan problem based on the mentioned bases...

2. ...

3. To maintain open the current session of the XVII Consultation Meeting of Foreign Relation Ministers for as long as the crisis is unresolved.

This historic resolution has now a significant impact because Nicaragua continues to suffer the horrors of a dictatorship which do not have any respect for the human rights, and because the Nicaraguan people is, once again, "engaged in a bloody armed conflict that is creating a terrible political, social, and economic upheaval in the entire country."

In the 1978-79 period, the existence of a bloody civil war in Nicaragua, which was the result of a true popular revolt against the dictatorship that violated all human rights, justified the session of the XVII Consultation Meeting which produced the Resolution commented herein.

Using the same arguments we can affirm that in 1983 the existence of a bloody civil war in Nicaragua, which is the result of a legitimate popular uprising against a dictatorship that violates all human rights, and which, besides,

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[L]

is subjected to the expansionist interests of an extracon-
tinental superpower, justifies that the XVII Consultation
Meeting once again examine the grave problem and urge its
members to solve it on the same bases as those expressed in
their resolution of June 23, 1979.

About that time I held openly that the resolution
of the XVII Consultation Meeting, in spite of its historic
importance, suffered a grave flaw: to have ignored the possi-
bilities of a really effective participation of the O.A.S. in
order to insure that the measures comprising its declaration
were properly complied with.

The measure that the Consultation Meeting avoided
was the creation of a Latin American Peace Force which would
collaborate with the government replacing the dictatorship, in
the efforts to pacify the country, to create a National Armed
Forces subjected to the civil authorities, and to prepare the
country to hold free elections, so that the Nicaraguans could
give themselves a government truly representative of the popu-
lar will. In other words, the O.A.S. avoided taking the great
step that it took in 1964 in the Dominican Republic, when the
Inter-American Peace Force collaborated with the Provisional
Government in order to establish the democratic regime that
Dominicans enjoy today.

Because a Latin American Peace Force was not sent
to Nicaragua, the resolution of June 23 was truncated. The

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(LC)

Somoza regime was overthrown; but the most important thing was not done. Instead of having replaced the dynastyc dictatorship of Somoza with a democratic government, representative and pluralistic, those who controlled the revolutionary military power replaced the Somoza dictatorship with a despotic, totalitarian regime in which the armed forces belong to the political party of the rulers, controlling the civil authorities, with foreign policies, from the first moment, placed under the service of Cuba, and by its intervention, serving the Soviet Union as well.

I have no illusions that at this time, and without a previous preparatory process, it would be possible for the XVII Consultation Meeting to act again under the principles set forth in June of 1979, to examine the Nicaraguan situation of 1983.

That is the task that the Contadora Group should have undertaken, if they had objectively analyzed the cause of the armed conflict taking place in Nicaragua and which threatens the rest of Central America.

Now that any effective pacification activity has been discarded in regard to the Contadora Group, it is necessary to find which American governments are capable to initiate, within the O.A.S., the process which should culminate in a new Resolution of the XVII Consultation Meeting. A resolution that based on the one of June 23, 1979, grants this

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time the necessary assistance to the unfortunate Nicaraguan
people so that they may give themselves the representative,
democratic, and pluralistic government they desire so much.

San Jose, June 8, 1983

(Translated by Max C. Batista, M.A.)

( 6 )

Joan Frawley
127 W. 79th St. #8G
New York, N.Y. 10024

August 23, 1983

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 1100
55 E. 52nd St.
New York, N.Y. 10055

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Please find enclosed a memorandum on the content and quality
of Voice of America broadcasts, and short interviews with
Nicaraguans that reflect some reactions to the present
government.

Sheila and I both enjoyed meeting with you last week.
If I can be of any further service, please let me know.
I would like to add here that I included names of Nicaraguans
you might want to meet with that are attached to the
interviews. Members of the commission, however, must be very
cautious about not compromising dissidents, particularly in
conversations with government officials, interpreters, or
on the telephone.

MEMORANDUM

To: Dr. Henry Kissinger
Chairman, Bipartisan Commission on
Central America

From: Joan Frawley
Contributing Editor, the National
Catholic Register

Re: Content of Voice of America Broadcasts
in Central America

During my recent six-week trip to Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guatemala, I heard numerous complaints from Latin Americans about the quality and content of Voice of America broadcasts.

The complaints ranged from concern that the United States should be more aggressive about promoting its own principals and interests, to observations that its sports shows covered second-rate events.

The quality and content of the broadcasts in Nicaragua is of special importance because of the strict censorship imposed by the government. The people are thirsty for news from outside, and even though it is prohibited to listen to the broadcasts, they do so behind closed bedroom doors in their homes.

Another distinguishing characteristic of the broadcasts is that they are rarely coordinated with U.S. efforts in the region. When the U.S. carrier was parked off of Nicaragua's coast at the end of July, Radio Havanna broadcast Castro deriding U.S. imperialism. At the same time, Voice of America was interviewing an American business entrepreneur.

For Nicaraguans, factual reports describing conditions in their own country and in neighboring countries, would be of real value. For Central Americans, in general, explanation of U.S. foreign policy and its motivating democratic principals are needed. The majority of the people in the region, even many of the middle class, are ignorant about political ideologies and systems. Stations like Radio Sandino, Havanna, and the Salvadoran guerrilla station, Radio Venceremos, seek to fill this vacuum. The U.S. must supply an effective counterforce to Marxist ideology as it continues to provide military aid in the region.

Maria Christina Maglione, dean of the philosophy department,
at the Jesuit-run University of Central America, Managua.

--People have a kind of fear, they cannot explain why things
are going this way. They only know they have to do what is
required because it is dangerous not to.

--People are uncertain if conditions are any better elsewhere.

--My fellow professors came and told me they didn't want to
join the vigilancia, but they needed to work to support their
families. I told the Sandinistas, "I am glad people don't
want to go because you have only the hunger and fear of
people, not their minds." Of course, some people said I don't
have a survival instinct. But I think one of the ways of
protecting human rights is to work to show people how to
be free.

Nicaraguan industrialist in Grenada

--The only way to survive is to stay away from politics.

--People must live two different lives, or they aren't going
to survive.

--We feel we have been selected to give the impression to the
outside world that private enterprise exists.

Long-time American resident in Managua

--I visited Honduras and went to a supermarket and saw the
shelves filled with food just like the states, and it's only
one country away from Nicaragua. I've been conditioned to
accept the problems here as being the problems of Central
America.

Barrio resident, Managua

--Nothing has changed. We were poor before, we are poor now.

--Politicians make promises, but they don't follow through.

Barrio Resident, Managua

--Now we have education, but it is only political indoctrination.

--I don't get confused about the system here, because if you are really Catholic, you can still believe and know the truth.

Barrio Resident, Managua

--Tomas Borge says children are the loved ones of the revolution. But I don't think so because I can't get enough milk for my children.

--I would be liar to say there had been improvements in my life. But I have waited for 45 years under Somoza, so four years are like four days. I will be waiting.

Barrio resident, Managua

--Our life is better now. If you are willing to work to improve your community, they will give you support. We have fixed the streets here and the electricity and water. The only problem we have is the food shortages.

--We don't worry about press censorship, because we really don't have time to read the newspaper. Besides, the censorship is probably necessary right now with the war.

[L]

Xavier Zavalas--magazine editor and member of the permanent human rights commission.

--The educated population here is being confronted with a serious process of political change after a long period of political inactivity. That inactivity had a consequence: very few people knew or could plan political alternatives or could place themselves in one ideology. Even people who were seriously reforming themselves as Christians, never thought about learning Church doctrine in relation to social and economic life.

Middle-class father, Managua

--Theoretically, I am going to leave immediately when I lose control over my children's education. I don't have the right to subject them to this ideology. What worries me is how I will know when it is time to go before it is too late.

Catholic Bishop

--I remember I said to Daniel Ortega, "It smells like communism. If it is, I'm going to fight against it, especially atheism."

Maryknoll Missioner--Cuidad Sandino, Managua

--At least nuns and priests aren't getting killed here.

--The government allows masses in its buildings on feast days. When I taught public school in the Los Angeles school system, we could only sing 'Frosty the Snowman' during Christmas.

--We didn't know anything about politics, but the system just didn't work under Somoza,

American Missionary nun--Rosita

I said after the revolution. 'Okay, I'm going to work for socialism if that's what the Sandinistas want.' Then I saw what it did to the people.

Housewife and leader in the charismatic movement, Managua
--Our country is very poor. I am glad that the Sandinistas
are working to improve education and health for the poor.
I went to the state supermarket for the poor and found every-
thing I needed at a reasonable rate. I am glad they are
putting the poor first. But I cannot accept the Sandinistas
because of what they are doing to the Church, to the faith.

Roberto Cardenal-- editorial editor, La Prensa

--Why don't people see the truth now? They don't have good
information. They don't have ideology. There was just relief
that Somoza was overthrown. They had no philosophical principals
that would help them realize the deviations from democratic ideals.

--Liberation theologians say that the economic or political
structures are responsible for sin. But the Church has always
said that the structures are not responsible for man's abase-
ment, but his interior. They also want to create divisions
in the Church that now exist in society. In this case, they
label the bishops exploiters like the rich.

Young American-educated charismatic, Managua

--I believed in the Sandinistas for one and a half years.
I worked in agricultural reform as a representative of the Sandinistas.
I realized in March 1980 what the Sandinistas were trying
to do. They attacked the Church by spoiling the Bishop of
Chontales' projects. I saw them recruiting people to fight
in El Salvador. Though I wasn't a Christian then, I didn't
like the attacks on the Church.

[c]

Roberto Campbell, Anglican pastor, Bluefields

--Even after the Spanish took over the East Coast, we were
left alone for a long time. The governments come and the
governments go, and we just go on forever. Now, the Sandin-
ista revolution has upset that pattern. In the past, we
would hear about the coups a year later. This time, it's a
total process all over the country. Some sit back and say
it's just another coup. But I think it's different. We
will never be the same.

Bishop John Wilson--Moravian Church Bluefields

--If people were to tell the truth, they would say they want to
be left alone. But to think of the good old days of the
past, would be like cutting off the revolution and it would
end in bloodshed. We must cooperate.

Thomas Kelly, head of the municipal junta, Bluefields

--The child is only four years old, just learning to walk.

But America doesn't want to give him a chance to walk.

Whatever happens, Nicaragua is not the same as before,
the people have learned to question.

Juan Garcia Lopez--director of a credit union cooperative
aided by FUNDE, Massaya.

--I used to earn more money as a shoemaker, but my reputation
and relationship with people is better now that I am in
charge of 500 people.

--We are so efficient, that the local junta uses us, not the
state stores to distribute rations to its stores.

[c]

Dr. Emelio Álvarez Montalvan -- opthamologist and advisor to the
Conservative Party, Managua

--We have a school for the youth of our party. They study
all the "competitors" - imperialism, Marxism etc.

Political formation in Nicaragua has been very poor. The
people knew very little about politics, but now the country
is very active politically and the people are experiencing
the impact of political thought. Sandinista programs directed
at the country's youth cover all ages and aspects of life here.
Their political impact is amazing.

--The Sandinistas' approach is very totalitarian. They don't
accept people who have no political opinion. This approach
is too exaggerated. We must be free to be interested or
not in politics.

--Truth, it is very difficult to read the message here. The
culture of Latin America has not been properly studied by
foreigners. U.S. government officials here knew a lot about
cars and things, but they didn't know about culture.

--The people suffered a lot under the Spanish. To survive
they developed a mechanism of survival. 25,000 Indians
accepted baptism to save their lives. So they also went to
Somoza's political rallies in big numbers. Even on the day
before he left, the plaza was crowded with Somocistas. Now
the same people, trying to survive the violence, fill the
plaza for somebody else. The people have been under another's
power throughout their history.

--To change a culture, a country must demonstrate that it has
something to offer. The Indians accepted the Spanish culture
because of the advances it offered. But the Soviet and Cuba

[L]

Carlos Humbres - Independent union leader CTN

--What does a democratic process mean? I'm 33 years old and I've never been able to vote.

--The unions understand Nicaragua needs a democratic process, free elections, the independence of law from the government. We don't want to live through decrees. We want the popular vote as it is done in democratic countries.

Private microbiologist, Managua

--Maybe we were careless during the Somoza regime. Now we have to use the Sandinistas' schemes to fight their campaign against us. We work part-time in clinics for the poor.

Antonio Lacayo, general manager of GRACSA, a cooking oil factory recently placed under government control

--If you are inside the situation like myself, it is necessary to take risks to help clarify the situation. But you reach a point when you have to leave the country. Alot of Nicaraguans don't want to reach that point. We don't want to accept the same fate as Cuba.

--There are two sides of the coin on the question of government confiscations. It's fine to nationalize businesses, but on the other side, you have to be responsible for production. If you don't, you're dead. The government is dead, they thought the coin only had one face.

Ernesto Salazar -- spokesman for Cattleman's Association

--Why should I move away? All I know is cattle ranching. I don't want handouts from my friends.

DIEGO ARRIA

August 5, 1983

AUG 16 1983

On behalf of President Perez and myself, I would like to thank you very much for your invitation to have lunch with your and Harry Schlaudeman, for whom we also have the highest regard as a friend and a diplomat.

I am leaving for Mustique (St. Vincent) tomorrow morning. My telephone number there is (1/809) 458-4621, and I can also be reached through my office in New York at 308-1720.

The Honorable
Dr. Henry Kissinger
New York, New York

DIEGO ARRIA

President Perez and I are in permanent contact, so that I will be able to reach him at your convenience. May I say that we were as usual encouraged by your perception and opinions about this very unfortunate region of our continent.

Enjoy South Hampton, and I look forward to seeing you again in September.

Un abrazo

DIEGO

I would suggest you talk to Jose' Francisco Peña Gomez. MAYA OF SOUTH DOMING. I think he can be very helpful with the NICARAGUANS and CUBENS. — HE IS A very close friend of mine.—

HENRY A. KISSINGER

August 30, 1983

Dear Dick:

Thank you for your good wishes on my
appointment. The challenging task before
us these next few months will certainly
entail focusing on the refugee issue in
Central America, the importance of which
we well recognize.

I know you have been in touch with Tom
Korologos and Harry Shlaudeman on this
matter, and I trust we will work something
out.

I am sorry that I missed you in June and
do hope we are able to get together soon.

Mr. W. R. Smyser
Deputy High Commissioner
for Refugees
UNHCR
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10
Switzerland

SUITE 1021 • 1800 K STREET, N. W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 • (202) 872-0300

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

MEMORANDUM

TO: H. Kissinger ✓

FROM: William Perry ✉

SUBJECT: Central American Commission

AUG 30 1983

This memo is written in conformity with my understanding of arrangements by which the CSIS Latin America Program might provide on-going input for consideration by your National Bi-partisan Commission on Central America. It is the product of contacts and discussions made during a recent visit to Brazil.

One of the principal tasks of the Commission will undoubtedly be to identify means by which United States policy can provide meaningful long term economic assistance to the countries of the region. As the history of the CBI demonstrates, direct aid and foreign investment will quickly encounter limits imposed by our economic situation and the nature of our political system. We should strive, therefore, to identify *quid pro quo* areas that might provide economic benefits both to the U.S. and the Latin American nations.

One such area that deserves consideration is sugar cane-derived alcohol fuels. The present situation is that the U.S. uses little in the way of gasahol and that our local producers of alcohol (mostly from corn) have succeeded in placing tariffs on the product which effectively preclude Latin American imports. But what if the United States were to allow a 10% alcohol mix into our national gasoline supply -- creating a gasahol blend that would not adversely affect automobile performance and, in fact, might enhance it?

The result would be to create a huge market for alcohol that could be allocated, as necessary, among local producers and the nations of Central America, the Caribbean and South America. From the standpoint of the U.S. this would be a boon to local agriculture and serve to reduce our dependence on foreign petroleum suppliers. For the Latin Americans, it would create vastly enhanced export opportunities over the long term for a labor intensive industry. The effect would be to greatly assist the

1800 K Street Northwest. Suite 400 • Washington DC 20006 • Telephone 202/887-0200
Cable Address: CENSTRAT TWX: 7108229583

-2-

(c)

economies of Latin America at this critical juncture, and enhance
Hemispheric cooperation -- while at the same time requiring no
real sacrifices for the U.S. and, indeed, producing some tangible
benefits.

The details of this matter are too complex to enter into
a memo of this length. But I do have substantial background
material on this matter and a conference on the topic should be
held at CSIS within the next couple of months. Someone from the
Commission might wish to attend and/or talk with Jaime Rotstein,
who is the author and principal protagonist of this line of
thinking in Brazil.

cc. C. Ebinger
M. Falcoff
G. Fauriol
R. Hunter
W. Taylor

AJDE - MEMOIRE

Francis X. Gannon, (Ph.D)

June 7, 1983

* Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Latin America, Congressman Michael Barnes, D., MD. (per attached) has recommended creating a broad development program for Central America. This seem a very positive move in the right direction and could help shape U.S. thinking about its Tsthmian policies. Moreover, it parallels many statements by OAS Secretary General Alejandro Orfila, who has sought to reflect the views of Latin America generally. However, the basic questions for a proposal like this include:

* Should such a program consist of the development approaches that have dominated the U.S. foreign aid program since the Alliance for Progress was initiated: These approaches revolve around long-range planning, loans rather than grants, downplaying of technical assistance etc.; or,

* Should a major venture like Mr. Barnes' proposal go back to the approaches used in U.S. foreign aid efforts prior to the Alliance for Progress, namely, the Servicio or Service Unit Strategy. This was modelled on the highly successful extension program of U.S. land-grant universities, e.g. University of Maryland, and had a very strong impact on the development efforts of the larger (and some smaller) countries in the Hemisphere between 1942 and 1961; and, (Stratified by Nelson Rockefeller - & IEMR), and

- 2 -

o If the Service Unit strategy is adopted again, should it not be
under a multilateral OAS arrangement, rather than bilateral (U.S. and
host country) approaches, as in the earlier venture?

The attached article from Worldview (January, 1982) describes the
<u>Service Unit</u> strategy and indicates why its revival may provide an
alternative way to deal with Central America's development traumas at
present.

NB: While the <u>Caribbean Basin Initiative</u> of President Reagan is both necessary and sound, unless it is applied differently in the English-speaking islands of the Caribbean than in Central America, its results may vary from what is desired. There are two reasons for this:

1) In Central America labor unions and workers are not incorporated into the national decision-making process, except on the Honduran North Coast.

2) In the English-speaking Caribbean, on the other hand, unions form the backbone both for political and economic life.

In consequence, the CBI has to respond effectively to two quite
different situations in both sub-regions.

1645A

THE SUN, Monday, June 6, 1983

Barnes urges Latin economic aid program

BARNES, from Al

economies they wish to participate in are crum-
bling.

Though Mr. Barnes's laconic style has been de-
scribed as monochromatic, his rhetoric on Central
America occasionally has been colorful and blunt:

"I say to the people in the administration who think they're so tough: Let's do some of the tough things that need to be done to achieve our interests. Send a real development program to the Hill, and invest the same political capital in it that you invest in securing support for the war in El Salvador and we can pass it. It will be tough, but you're tough guys, so let's do it."

Instead, however, it appears that the adminis-
tration's inclination is to increase the toughness
quotient: Last month, it announced the reassign-
ment of Thomas O. Enders, its director of Latin
American affairs for the last two years.

Asked for his assessment of the move, Mr. Barnes said, "I hope this doesn't mean we're going back to where we were two years ago when we very simplistic."

"I'm not sure what it means. The popular perception is that it means they feel we need to get tougher. I think it comes at a very unfortunate time. Both Enders and Hinton [U.S. Ambassador Dean R. Hinton, who also has been replaced] have become extremely knowledgeable about Salvador and Central America. Their approach has become increasingly sophisticated."

Mr. Barnes does not reject the need for military
action in the region. And he said the amount of
military and economic aid provided by any admin-
istration in Washington will always be a relative
matter. But he said he prefers former President
Jimmy Carter's emphasis on human rights — un-
der which, he said, the United States had a far bet-
ter relationship with Latin America than it has
today. Yet, Mr. Barnes said he remains hopeful of
change.

During a recent seminar on Central America

"The administration's starting point is a myth: that the crisis in Central America is principally, if not wholly, externally caused — that is, Communist inspired."

—Representative
Michael D. Barnes

held in Washington by the Coalition for a Degro-
cratic Majority, Mr. Barnes said, he thought he
heard something like an endorsement of his plan.

To an audience including Mr. Duarte, U.N. Am-
bassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick said the administra-
tion backs an increased economic development
initiative as long as it remains paired with military
assistance.

Later, a spokesperson for the ambassador said
that no significant policy thrust should be inferred
based on her remarks, which the spokesperson
characterized as "rhetorical."

Nevertheless, Mr. Barnes saw hope for his view-
point.

"Two or three years ago, I was the only one in town talking about it. Now you have the U.N. ambassador and Senator [Henry M.] Jackson urging it."

Mr. Barnes calls his own plan for El Salvador
"the 1 percent solution".

"The Reagan administration proposes to spend $1.65 trillion on defense over the next five years. If we took 1 percent of that — $16.5 billion — and put it into economic development in Central America and the Caribbean . . . our security problems in the

region would disappear."

Mr. Barnes insists this idea has a chance of suc-
cess — despite Mr. Reagan's usual insistence on
avoiding cuts in his defense budget for any reason.

"It's a twofold problem," Mr. Barnes said. "You have to create the economic and political infra-structure for infusions of assistance to have any long-term effect.

"I don't suggest that simply by feeding people — dealing with immediate aspects of poverty — you are going to bring political stability. But if you begin a program of long-term economic development that creates a middle class and gives people a stake in the society, I do think you'll see greater political stability."

Mr. Barnes said he is not a knee-jerk critic of
the president:

"I was one of the president's whips trying to pass the Caribbean Basin bill [a $350 million aid package for Caribbean and Central American countries]. I think it's a very good program. It just doesn't go far enough."

His approach is precisely right, according to
William Doherty, an official of the American Insti-
tute for Free Labor Development.

"He has demonstrated that he is on top of the issue, fully informed. He's very balanced. You couldn't call him an ideologue," he said.

But Larry Birns, a spokesman for the Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, a Washington-based associa-
tion promoting trade union labor reforms, suggests
that Mr. Barnes's actions and the tone of his leader-
ship are shaped by his own political view of him-
self.

"Barnes does not want to be a congressional out-
sider. He seems to feel that unless he operates with-
in the more progressive establishment, he'll be
marginalized. He wants to be a leader, so he stays
in the mainstream.

"Yet, one is always prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt because he has been a leader for a more enlightened policy — but it hasn't been enough."

[L]

Not a Marshall Plan but a modest proposal

# Toward Caribbean Self-Help

BY FRANCIS X. GANNON

World attention now rivets on a troubled Central America — from Guatemala to Costa Rica — and on surrounding island states of the larger Caribbean basin. In many international forums the question is asked: Can an international assistance effort, with financial, technical, and market components, be mounted to assist the hemispheric subregion in achieving a more stable, secure, and peaceful ground for economic growth and general development? The subject is not a new one by any means. In fact, since 1945 it has found its way again and again onto the Hemisphere's geopolitical and economic agenda.

Skeptics argue the futility of any effort to transfer resources from the wealthier to the poorer countries, maintaining that "official transfers cannot significantly promote development," since they have too many adverse consequences on recipient nations, including encouragement of "imprudent financial policies." The skeptics make a good case, especially when arguing against proponents of resource transfers who focus exclusively on the matter of financing or who overlook the fact that development is a process of long-range change rather than a series of "quick-fix" objectives.

To some degree, though, this skepticism about the value of a new package is also shared by the hemispheric subregion itself, particularly when billed as a "Marshall Plan for the Caribbean." In some circles the term "Marshall Plan" denotes a resurgence of the same cold war spirit that infused the earlier venture. No matter that this U.S.-initiated program succeeded beyond the hopes of either the United States or the European nations involved in assisting European reconstruction and in helping to open up new channels for democracy. Still, apart from the limited technical assistance offered under Point IV, neither this broad postwar effort nor subsequent U.S. aid activities — with the significant exception of the Alliance for Progress — had substantial impact on the fortunes of either Latin America or the Caribbean. The Western Hemisphere has had an impressive growth pattern over

the past three decades, but more than 90 per cent was generated from within the region rather than from without.

As for potential donor countries for the Caribbean in the Americas — such nations as the U.S., Canada, Mexico, and Venezuela — their current tendency is toward forming what some term a "multilateral conceptual framework" within which to assist the troubled area, while in practice most assistance activities would be carried out on a bilateral basis. Given the economic policies at work in the U.S. at present, its tendency is to come down hard on improving the area's supply-side — that is, seeking ways to create a new competitive productive capacity in the recipient countries — in the belief that this allows diverse societies to take greater advantage of their human and financial resources.

The Central American nations themselves, with some encouragement from the Latin America Economic System (SELA) and various U.N. agencies, have set a minimal target of $15 billion in external transfers of funds. Postwar experience with development, though, has demonstrated the importance of first establishing concrete and realistic goals. A further question to be asked is whether the Caribbean basin's problem is simply a lack of money or one of ideas concerning the uses to which money should be put.

At the risk of oversimplifying, it may be useful to look at the Caribbean basin not merely in terms of its postwar experience with development questions but also with regard to present conditions and prospects. The picture is something like this:

* The smaller island states of the Caribbean basin, especially the newer ones, must now establish new institutions that enable development to be broadened, stimulated, or turned into different and more productive channels. According to most studies, the English-speaking Caribbean is an area marked by high literacy and a strongly humanistic culture, but its scientific and technical capacity, as well as indigenous entrepreneurial skills and opportunities, remains limited.

* In much of Central America, however, the current challenge remains one of reconstructing development capacities. The real question here, of course, is whether present domestic political diffi-

Francis X. Gannon is Advisor to the Secretary General of the Organization of American States. The views expressed here are his own.

19

LC

culties in various isthmian states will constrain this
process and for how long.

* For the entire basin the critical issue is whether the various states will achieve significant market access in the United States, Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, and Argentina for its products.

* The advanced economies of the Hemisphere have severe restraints on official and resource transfers. Thus the prospects — both current and foreseeable — for increasing substantially the volume of external financing for the Caribbean should not be exaggerated. This suggests that most of the development effort will have to be generated from within the Caribbean basin itself, supplemented perhaps by some broader financial support from Japan, the Middle East, and certain countries of Europe. It also implies the need for intensive efforts at creating conditions that are more conducive to attracting private foreign investment on terms compatible with the host country's self-interest.

One difficulty with transferring resources from wealthier to poorer societies, at least where the U.S. is concerned, has been the often conflicting and contradictory nature of the various doctrines offered to justify such transfers. Each new U.S. administration is forced by the pressure of political events to reinvent the wheel of economic assistance. As a result, some really difficult questions — e.g., Which contributes more to national development, multilateral or bilateral forms of aid; in specific circumstances, which is more appropriate, financial or technical cooperation? — have been scarcely looked at. As Robert Packenham pointed out a decade ago in *Liberal America and the Third World*, "despite hundreds of books and articles that have been written about aid, the corpus of serious literature dealing with aid's impact on development remains small." The famous Pearson Report of the late 1960s devoted only four of its four hundred pages to this critical matter and the same lack is noted in the recent report of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, known familiarly as the Brandt Report.

If there is to be a new international aid venture to assist Central America and the Caribbean, it is necessary to address the question of how aid — especially in the form of technical assistance — contributes to development. Quite clearly there is little time, little in the way of resources, and perhaps no inclination to make this assessment in any systematic way. Yet we have had enough experience with both multilateral and bilateral assistance programs to stake out alternative courses of action.

## A Viable Path

It has been argued convincingly that of all the major forms of international technical assistance rendered to Latin America the *servicio* (service organization) was among the more successful. This concept, developed under the autonomous Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) founded in 1942, was first put into operation under an agreement with Ecuador in the same year and then in other countries,

with particular expansion between 1950 and 1961. The *servicio* was modeled on the land-grant college system developed in the United States after the Civil War, whose strength lay in combining research and training activities in a cooperative federal, state, and local network. In the case of agriculture, for instance, extension agents reached out to local farmers.

As developed by the IIAA, a *servicio* became the joint venture of the United States and a host Latin American country. Initially, these service units for technical cooperation operated outside the formal U.S. governmental structure, and each *servicio* — whether for health, education, agriculture, industry, etc. — had two co-directors, one from the U.S. and one from the host nation (the latter was usually the head of the ministry to which the technical service unit was attached).

The *servicio* units were not given inordinate funding by the United States, yet they succeeded in training and equipping participating governments to develop their capacity for managing technical programs. As reflected in the determination of provincial, state, and municipal governments in the Hemisphere to participate in these programs in specific fields, they were regarded generally in Latin America as a sound application of Point IV of the Truman Doctrine for foreign economic assistance.

> "Each U.S. administration reinvents the wheel of economic assistance"

Naturally there were both positive and negative features of the original service unit instruments. A 1953 evaluation by the U.S. Public Health Service of ten years' experience with health *servicios* in Latin America praised them for rendering great service to specific areas that had lacked health facilities while it faulted them for paying insufficient attention to promoting "sound administrative methods and safeguards within the structure of the host government." A decade later, however, these initial defects had been corrected for the most part and the *servicios* in health, sanitation, transportation, agriculture, and so forth were widely recognized as making a critical contribution to hemispheric development.

Perhaps the key to the success of the original bilateral *servicio* was its decentralized nature. All projects were determined locally by the IAA representative (who was also co-director of the local servicio corporation) and the local ministry to which

the unit was attached. This automatically gave
higher prominence and visibility to the host coun-
try than to the U.S. No doubt it accounted for the
strong desire of state, provincial, and municipal
governing bodies to set up cooperating *servicio* cor-
porations for fields in which they had particular in-
terest.

Starting in the late 1950s, the *servicio* gradually
was abolished as an instrument of U.S. cooperative
policy. What took its place, as witness the Alliance
for Progress and subsequent developments, was the
notion that foreign aid programs ought to consist
primarily of loans rather than grants, to be linked to
five-year plans in recipient countries, and to have
specific, targeted objectives — including the pro-
motion of democratic forms of governance.

Today, of course, the original bilateral *servicio*
concept would not be welcomed in Central America
or in the Caribbean states, immediately conjuring
up an image of the old paternalism. Moreover, re-
gional governments, even in smaller countries, feel
they now have the capacity to organize and manage
efficiently a growing number of projects. Smaller
states in the region may, of course, lack specific
technical and human resource capacities to under-
take projects involving fusion or solar power, for
example. But even here, bilateral international
technical assistance, as distinct from financial help,
might have more drawbacks than are readily antic-
ipated.

THE PROPOSAL

Given these assumptions, *is* there a way to assist
the Caribbean basin through limited technical as-
sistance programs that are tied in with broad inter-
national financial, investment, and marketing
efforts? It seems worth pursuing a suggestion that
has been made for the creation of a *multilateral*
rather than a bilateral *servicio* arrangement under
the aegis of a new and specialized institute of the
Organization of American States (OAS). This would
be designed specifically to support an international
technical assistance program (as distinct from the
financial or marketing arrangements agreed upon)
for the larger Caribbean basin. Governments or in-
stitutions participating in this assistance effort
would agree, insofar as is reasonable, to channel pro-
grams of a technical assistance nature through and
with *servicio*-type agencies to be established in the
cooperating countries.

The operating mode of the institute and its *servicio* units in the Central American isthmus — where reconstruction of development capacities is the next task — might well differ from that of the island republics of the Caribbean basin — where particularly the newer states may require external help to formulate projects. The institute's life would be limited to perhaps ten or fifteen years and snuffed out automatically at that date.

How should such an OAS "Caribbean Basin Insti-
tute" be administered? Perhaps the current execu-
tive directors of the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB) from OAS member states plus Canada,

each of whom represents several countries, would
also serve as the board of directors of the proposed
institute. Or a board could be selected jointly by the
OAS and the IDB, thence to operate under the OAS.
Such a link between the OAS and the IDB would

Decentralization was the key
to the original *servicio's*
success

have two practical results: There would be no need
to select and underwrite another group of distin-
guished representatives from OAS member states,
and this would help bridge the enormous gap be-
tween the financing programs of the IDB and the
technical work of the OAS, at least for the Carib-
bean basin area. This tie should also result in greater
cooperation between existing OAS councils and
agencies, perhaps leading to administrative integra-
tion of all OAS technical programs.

A feature of any multilateral *servicio* ought to be
its stress on involvement by voluntary nonprofit or-
ganizations. As Alvin Toffler points out in *Future
Shock*, since 1963 the most rapid growth in the in-
ternational community has been registered in pri-
vate sector efforts. At various points in the 1970s,
for instance, funds for Latin America and the Car-
ibbean from the U.S. voluntary sector surpassed
those of even the Agency for International Devel-
opment. Cooperation among nonprofit organiza-
tions can be stepped up within the framework of the
proposed OAS institute. Perhaps the *servicio* units
in various OAS countries would choose to empha-
size private enterprise initiatives to create jobs, giv-
ing such activities priority status.

It must be said that however useful such a new
multilateral technical assistance program might be,
it can make only a limited and circumscribed con-
tribution to the subregion's future well-being. In-
creased bilateral assistance — largely financial but
also technical — greater access to the advanced
market economies, and, above all, achievement of
internal political and social stability by the coun-
tries themselves remain the more central elements
to a solution of the problems in this vital area. This
proposal, then, is hardly a panacea. But in helping to
improve the potential for growth in the subregion,
it could be of strategic value for enhancing the area's
development prospects. More than anything else its
success depends upon the sensitivity and spirit of
accommodation with which it is examined and
acted upon. ■WV

21

# Joseph D. Keenan Biography

Monsignor George Higgins
Chairman

## MEMBERS

Al Chesser
President Emeritus
United Transportation Union, AFL-CIO

Thomas G. Corcoran, Esq.
Attorney at Law

John DeCoulciel
President
Bakery, Confectionery & Tobacco
Workers International Union,
AFL-CIO

Thomas R. Donahue
Secretary-Treasurer
AFL-CIO

David J. Fitzmaurice
President
International Union of Electrical
Workers, AFL-CIO

Dr. Francis X. Gannon
Advisor to the Secretary General
Organization of American States

Thomas W. Gleason
President
International Longshoremen's
Association, AFL-CIO

Dr. Theodore Hesburgh
President
University of Notre Dame

Lane Kirkland
President
AFL-CIO

William Kenyha
President
United Brotherhood of Carpenters
and Joiners, AFL-CIO

Ralph A. Leigge
Secretary
International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, AFL-CIO

Dan V. Maroney, Jr.
President
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO

John Miller
Acting President
National Planning Association

Frederick O'Neal
President
Associated Actors & Artistes of
America, AFL-CIO

Alex Radin
Executive Director
American Public Power Association

S. Frank Raftery
President
International Brotherhood of
Painters, AFL-CIO

Bayard Rustin
Chairman of the Board
A. Philip Randolph Institute

Ray Scheesling
General Secretary-Treasurer
International Brotherhood of
Teamsters

J. C. Turner
General President
International Union of Operating
Engineers, AFL-CIO

Richard Walsh
President Emeritus
International Alliance of
Theatrical Stage Employees,
AFL-CIO

Martin J. Ward
President
United Association, AFL-CIO

Glenn E. Watts
President
Communications Workers of
America, AFL-CIO

William W. Wimpslinger
President
International Association of
Machinists, AFL-CIO

Jerry Wurt
President
American Federation of State,
County & Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO

To: Friends of Joseph D. Keenan

From: Mgr. George Higgins, Chairman
Committee on the Joseph D. Keenan Biography

Re: Preparation of a Biography on the Life and Labor
and Public Career of Joe Keenan, Retired Inter-
national Secretary, International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers.

The name - Joe Keenan - is relatively unknown to the American public. Yet to his friends, admirers and associates, whether in government, industry or labor, he is one of the unsung heroes of the U. S. labor movement. Indeed, there is a genuine folk-hero quality about his life and career that is synonymous with consistent integrity, great personal probity, utmost loyalty to the cause of labor and to its friends, unabashed but discerning patriotism, a rare understanding of the relationship that should exist between industry, labor and government in a free society.

The elements of Mr. Keenan's career are well-known:

* **Labor:** Recording Secretary, Local #134, IBEW, Chicago (1930's); Secretary, Chicago Federation of Labor (1935-1949); Secretary, Building Trades Department, AFL (1951-1954); International Secretary, IBEW, (1954-1974); Vice President, AFL-CIO (1954-1976).

* **Politics:** Delegate to Democratic National Conventions, (1940 thru 1960); Founding Director, Labor's League for Political Education (1947-1950); adviser to Presidents Truman, Kennedy and Johnson and to Senators Humphrey, Jackson and McGovern, etc; labor adviser, Democratic National Committee.

* **Government:** Assistant to Sidney Hillman (Office of Production Management) and subsequently, Vice Chairman, War Production Board, World War II; Assistant Director, Defense Mobilization Authority, Korean War; adviser to subsequent defense and civil-defense agencies.

* **Voluntary Service:** Founded and/or served on many boards of directors for voluntary church and private organizations working for the public good (1950-1980).

* **Overseas:** Labor adviser, with rank of general, to General Lucius D. Clay, Germany (1945-1947); service with other international labor efforts relating to the ILO, Latin America, etc. (1950-1980).

Prepared by: W. Averell HARRIMAN

- 2 -

[c]

For his service to this nation and to its communities Joseph Keenan
has been honored with many civic, religious, labor and other awards,
including the Medal of Freedom and the Medal of Merit, the latter
the highest awards to civilians by the government of the United
States.

Despite the vast service he rendered to labor and to this country,
Mr. Keenan's varied roles and contributions are relatively unknown.
Never one to seek the limelight, Mr. Keenan, as he frequently said,
"just did my job" - and, one should add, consistently refused to
write reports or memoranda on his many and, at times, Herculean
activities.

As indicated by this letterhead, some friends and admirers of Joe
Keenan have formed a committee whose purpose is to have a popular
but scholarly grounded biography written on his life and career.
We are supporting this project in many ways, including by setting
down on paper or tape our personal recollections of Joe Keenan
and his impact on our lives and on our time.

Because Mr. Keenan was such a pivotal labor figure of the past half
century, to capture his protean talents and experience on paper is
a most difficult task. He himself is taping recollections of key
turning points and activities in his career and research is well
underway to find the events, circumstances, programs and organizations
in which he was so closely involved. Interviews are being conducted
with individuals who knew Joe Keenan personally during all the various
stages of his life, including persons who have been friends of his
for as long as 70 years.

The research coordinator and writer for this Keenan biography is
Francis X. Gannon, a widely published writer on labor, politics
and international affairs. Mr. Gannon, who holds a Ph.D in politics
from The Catholic University of America, has worked in and out of
the U.S. labor movement for some 20 years, including work for the
Teamsters and Steelworkers unions and the American Institute for
Free Labor Development. He has also worked extensively in Europe
and in Latin America; served as an adviser and writer for various
public figures, including the late Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey. Like
Mr. Keenan, he has been involved with a variety of civil rights,
cultural and religious organizations. And he knows Mr. Keenan well,
having worked closely with him for four years at the Americans for
Energy Independence.

Assistant coordinator of the project is Patricia M. Gannon, who has
had extensive involvement in managing a variety of cultural, public
relations and religious programs dealing with both domestic and
international issues.

Oscar P. Landmann
Consul General a.h. da Colombia

SÃO PAULO-BRASIL, August 5, 1983
RUA FUNCHAL, 203-9º ANDAR
TELEX 1122 900 LAND BR
TELEFONE: 815-6 111

Prof. Harry Kissinger
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Georgetown University
1800 K Street N.W.
Washington D.C. 2000

U.S.A.

Dear Prof. Kissinger:

Since our home town used to be, at least until 1933, Fuerth
in Bayern and your father was my first teacher from 1916 to
1920, I take the liberty to write to you. You might remember
the Landmann family, who lived in Fuerth for generations.

I would like to introduce myself:

I came to Latin America, specifically to São Paulo/Brazil,
47 years ago and have been working for American companies
all over Southamerica since that time.

My permanent address is São Paulo.

I am Honorary Consul General of Colombia since over 40 years.
and I was President and am still Honorary President of the
São Paulo Biennial Foundation, which is probably today, to-
gether with the Venice Biennale and the Dokumenta/Kassel, the
most important bi-annual Art event.

I have always been a friend of the U.S.A. and the U.S.A. Consuls
in São Paulo and I have also discussed the ideas I am submitting
with this letter with the actual Consul General of the U.S.A.
in São Paulo, Mr. John Leary.

Of course I was very pleased to hear that you have been
appointed Chairman of the National Mission for Central America.
Knowing of the feelings of many people in Latin America, I am
of the opinion that they certainly will not be in favor of help
given to the former Samoza people. I do believe, however, if
the right man could be found, who would also have the backing
of the Socialist countries or Socialist governments like Spain,
France etc., it could be worthwhile to back such a man.

The only person I could think of for such a purpose is EDEN
PASTORE (Comandante Zero). He certainly has the following of
a large part of his countrymen in Nicaragua. He is certainly
progressive minded, liberal and definitely anti-totalitarian.

AUG 12 1983

-2-

[L]

-2- Prof.Henry Kissinger, Washington D.C.

August 5, 1983

I might not know enough about this man and there might be
reasons which could make my idea senseless, however, if
there are no specific reasons against Pastore, why not help
the man in every way, including with military aid, mainly
for the reason to build up your own 'Castro' against Russia's
Castro in Cuba?

If this man would get control in Nicaragua, the civil war
in El Salvador would probably end automatically and if the
U.S.A. could count on their own strong man in Central America,
in the future the whole picture could change in favor of the
Western World.

As mentioned before, I am writing to you as a friend of the
U.S.A. and also because I believe in what I am saying and
last not least as a former Fuerther!

If my idea is worthless, please forget about it.

In any case please accept my best regards,

OPL/IS

AUG 8 1983

accion international/ aitec

August 2, 1983

The Honorable Henry G. Cisneros
Mayor of San Antonio
P. O. Box 9066
San Antonio, TX 78204

Dear Mayor Cisneros:

I want to congratulate you on your recent appointment to the Presidential Commission on Central America. The charge of this Commission is most difficult and its recommendations will be critical to the future stability of the region. Because of your background and personal knowledge of Latin America, your role on the Commission is particularly significant and I applaud you for accepting this challenge.

As you are aware, ACCION International/AITEC has been intimately involved in grassroots socio-economic development programs for over twenty years throughout Latin America including Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica in Central America. Unique, perhaps, is the fact that much of this development work has been financially supported by the multinational and local business communities. ACCION, then, has often found itself in the unique position of serving as a bridge of understanding and support between the business community and the local "grupos de base."

It is our hope that the Presidential Commission will bring a fresh and innovative perspective to the socio-economic development of the region and to the role of the United States. Such a perspective must recognize first and foremost that the long-term security of the region will directly depend on a dramatic improvement of the quality and standard of living among the poor majority. This challenge should be the Commission's primary focus; to be seen within the context of each country and not solely within the traditional context of superpower confrontation. In addition, this perspective should respect the national sovereignty of all Central American nations; without this mutual respect any relationship between the United States and these countries will be less productive.

**Board of Directors**

Honorary Chairman

Donald M. Kendall

Honorary Director

Jacob K. Javits

Chairman

John C. Duncan

Vice Chairman

Beren Friele

Vice Chairman

Hans Neumann

President

Robert C. Helander

Treasurer

Crocker Nevin

Secretary

Charles W. Muller

John E. Avery, Jr.

Patricia M. Cloherty

Paulo Ayres Filho

Henry R. Geyelin

Eugene Gonzalez

Terry M. Holcombe

Walter Hunnewell

Russell E. Marks, Jr.

Thomas P. McDermott

Kathrine Ockenden

Roderick O'Connor

Frederick D. Seeley

Daniel A. Sharp

Roger D. Stone

Peter B. Trinkle

Ralph A. Weller

**International**

Advisory Council

Armando Arauz

Edmundo Penna Barbosa da Silva

John Beck

John R. Camp

Roberto de Oliveira Campos

Jaime Carvajal

James R. Greene

David Garza Laguera

Valerie T. McComie

William E. Moffett

Tomás A. Pastoriza

10-C Mount Auburn Street, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138 Phone (617) 492-4930 Cable: ACCIONUSA, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

L|C

Letter to The Honorable Henry G. Cisneros

August 2, 1983

Page 2

May I respectfully recommend that in its deliberations the Commission consider some additional specific ideas, briefly outlined below:

1. Keep development and humanitarian assistance programs separate, legislatively and administratively, from those within military and security objectives, including Economic Support Funds.

2. Direct US development assistance programs towards:

a. local economic and food self-sufficiency,

b. land use efficiency,

c. access to credit, managerial and technical assistance for the small farmer and urban microbusiness,

d. diversification of the local industrial/manufacturing base,

e. import substitution, and

f. more direct involvement of the poor and popular organizations in national planning and decision-making.

3. Recognize that long-term US foreign policy objectives will best be served by de-emphasizing bilateral government agreements and by promoting more direct mechanisms for reaching the poor populations. A fine example of this approach is the Inter-American Foundation which uses tax payer funds to directly support community-based development efforts in Latin America.

4. Strengthen private development efforts carried out by US private volunteer agencies and foundations, local private agencies and "grupos de base."

5. Foster a dialogue and broader understanding among the US public at large of the importance of Third World Development and its relationship to the United States.

If during the course of its work, the Commission will be receiving direct testimony, we would be pleased to present these ideas in greater detail and/or assist in any manner. I wish you and the other members of the Commission well in this endeavor.

Sincerely,

WWB:vjm

cc: Dr. Henry Kissinger, Chairman, Commission on Central America
Mr. John C. Duncan, Chairman, ACCION International/AITEC

August 19, 1983

To: Gerry Sutton

From: Chris

Subj: Recommendation from President Carter

President Carter's office called with the following recommendation as a way to "converse with Christian missionaries in Central America." Apparently, when Dr. Kissinger and President Carter spoke by phone Carter raised this issue and this is a follow up:

A. **Southern Baptist Convention.** The relevant agency in the Convention is the Foreign Mission Board. Mr. R. Keith Parks is President of the Foreign Mission Board. Within that organization is the Central American Mission. Head of that is Mr. Don Kannerdiener and his assistant's name is Trudy English. Mr. Kannerdiener can be reached at: 804-353-0151.
Their mailing address is: P.O. Box 6767
Richmond, Virginia

B. **United Methodis Conference:**

The relevant agency is The General Board of Global Ministries.

The division within the agency is The World Division.

The phone number is: 212-870-3600
The mailing address is: 475 Riverside Drive
New York, New York 10115

Carter's office did not have a specific contact

I told Dr. Kissinger about this and he said that Amb. Shlaudeman should try to see someone from these institutions.

The
Economist

Registered office
25 ST JAMES'S STREET
LONDON SW1A 1HG

Telephone: 01-839 7000
Telex: 24344

FROM THE EDITOR

Dr Henry A Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street NW
Washington DC 20006
USA

August 11, 1983

Dear Henry,

I hope to arrive in New York by late afternoon on Thursday October 20th, and, if you can put up with me that long, stay through the evening of Saturday October 22nd (I would take the morning flight to London on Sunday October 23rd).

I have to speak at a Citibank function on the Friday evening.

It is hard from this distance and in this much ignorance to respond to your postscript injunction to expand on what I had in mind about a useful report. I would list my three concerns as follows:

1) The United States has to take part in the politics of the hemisphere - central America and Latin America itself; however, if solutions cannot be found quickly enough, there is a real danger that the attentions of the United States will be preempted by preoccupations to its south, thereby weakening the attention it should be giving to the geopolitical and regional balances elsewhere.

2) There is a danger that the proponents of American intervention in central and south America will rely too exclusively on balance of power arguments. These arguments should be made firmly, but not to the exclusion of others. Otherwise the diseased asymmetry which undermined American efforts in south-east Asia - "cold" geopoliticians arguing against "warm-hearted" students of south-east Asian society - will destroy support for the administration over El Salvador and Nicaragua as well.

AUG 15 1983

...2..

ARCHDIOCESE OF CHICAGO

POST OFFICE BOX 1979

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 60690

Office of the Vicar General

July 26, 1983

The Honorable Charles H. Percy
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Percy:

Thank you for returning my phone call this morning. I called you because I know you are sensitive to and appreciate many values in the make-up of peoples of other cultures than our own. I have seen this in things I have heard you express when not dealing directly with this theme.

Moreover, since you are head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, you are just the one to deal with the matter which I wish to discuss with you here.

I am much disturbed by the report that the President is being urged to double the number of military personnel presently in Central America as technicians and advisors, and that we have a fleet steaming toward both the Gulf and the Pacific coasts of Central America.

The report disturbs me, because I feel, as do many other Americans, that, despite the good intentions of our military and diplomatic people at this moment, these intentions may change, especially under stress. I fear that the military sometimes make decisions which may possibly be good military strategy, but are neither diplomatic nor humane, much less Christian. I do not wish to run down our military men, but we must admit that not all people are suited for every kind of work. (For example, I as a Catholic bishop, and because of my own personality, would be the world's worst bill collector; I just could not squeeze money from people who are in financial straits.) We are all afraid that these two circumstances (presence of more military personnel ashore, and two fleets offshore) will on purpose or accidentally lead to some incident which will get us embroiled in a Viet Nam type of war. If this should occur, I feel I would be obliged to advocate conscientious objection on moral grounds.

Looking at the situation from the Latin American point of view, it is equally grave. I speak now from a background of 20 years of experience of living in Peru. I have lived with the genteel, cultured people of the capital city, Lima, and with the Indians and Mestizos in the high Sierra (12,575 ft. altitude) one hundred miles from the ancient Inca capital, Cuzco. I have spent time also in Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, and I have stopped off in many other South and Central American countries.

[L.C.]

July 26, 1983

Page 2

I studied Spanish as my post-graduate major. I taught Spanish, French, and Latin in the seminary before going to South America. I mention this so you will understand that my knowledge of the Spanish language, with all its intricacies and nuances, is thorough. I understand and speak it as well as I do English. Living with the charming Latin Americans in all the aspects of their lives - joys, sorrows, problems, sicknesses, political and social upheavals, etc., one gets to know the heart and soul of the people. Most Latin Americans would like to love us Americans, but very often we are completely insensitive to others. Many times I have been ashamed of my fellow Americans who have behaved in foreign countries as though they were superior to their hosts merely because the U.S. is territorially larger, militarily more powerful, economically wealthier, and more advanced in material progress. Such an attitude is of course very offensive, and adequately proves to the Latins that such people are much more ignorant and uncultured. Nevertheless they would like to love us.

At this point in this letter I have just heard President Reagan's T.V. talk to the nation. He looked tense and worried. He sounded like he himself did not believe what he was saying. Many of the journalists posed questions about the "maneuvers" and "advisory personnel." His answers rung very hollow.

If this whole situation remains unclear in the mind of the President and in the mind of the very perceptive and intelligent people who questioned him, how will it seem to the Latin Americans - those who would like to love us, and those of a reddish tint who like to hate us?

If we have to keep repeating that this is not gunboat diplomacy, although it looks and sounds like it, what perception will the uninformed Latin have? He has to trust his eyes and ears, and he will be further convinced by communist agitators.

I do not wish to blame or criticize the President, but merely to point out his lack of sensitivity (and diplomacy) when he tried to justify the presence of two fleets and thousands of combat-ready troops just outside the 12-mile limit on both coasts of Central America. "Wouldn't it be a show of weakness," he asked, "if we were to draw away from the two coasts?" This is equivalent to saying that we are using Central America as our chessboard to show Russia that we are strong. We have no care for what the Nicaraguans, Hondureños, Salvadorans, and other Latins think about our actions. Can't we understand that this attitude in itself is an insult to all the Latin Americans?

Why can't we ask friendly, intelligent, well-informed Latin Americans to help us? We have never had an infallible or divine president or diplomat. It is not humiliating to seek guidance and information from people from a country smaller than the U.S. Such intelligent procedure would win their friendship and respect.

I do not pretend to know a very large number of people in many countries, but I do know some. These men all have great affection for the U.S. I list some of them:

LC

July 26, 1983

Page 3

Cardinal Eugenio Salas of Rio de Janeiro

Cardinal Juan Landázuri Ricketts, Lima, Perú

Cardinal Alfonso López Trujillo, Medellín, Colombia

Bishop Arturo Szymanski, Tampico, Mexico

Ambassador Javier Pérez del Cuellar, Secretary General,
United Nations

President Fernando Belaunde Terry, Lima, Perú

Ambassador Antonio Lulli, Lima, Perú (and Washington, D.C.)

Ambassador Miguel Bakula, Lima, Perú

Dr. Emilio Castañon Pasquel, Lima, Perú (Economist)

Commander Jorge del Rio Roldan, Lima, Perú (Retired Navy
Officer, Businessman)

All of these men are very well educated, cultured, well-travelled, well-read, well-informed on world affairs, and of superior intelligence.

I would add to this list several U.S. citizens:

Ambassador (retired) J. Wesley Jones, Flat Rock, North Carolina,
former U.S. Ambassador to Perú

Bishop Richard Ham, Minneapolis, bishop and missionary in
Guatemala 25 years

Bishop Nicolas d'Antonio, New Orleans, bishop and missionary
in Honduras 20 years

Bishop John McNabb, Chulucanas, Peru, bishop in Perú 19 years

These 14 men can give priceless, accurate information, insights, and guidance to our President, State Department, and diplomats. They have no financial or political interests, and are reliable and truthful. It is important that we learn from people who thoroughly understand the language spoken to and around them, from people who feel with and for and like the Central and South Americans.

I hope it is not too late. We have repeatedly stepped on the toes of those who want to be our friends, and we still display an arrogant disdain for them, whether we are conscious of this or not.

The Latin is a thinker, a born philosopher. He is deeply spiritual, although he may or may not be religious. He is capable of, and generally practices, great human kindness and profound love towards others. Spiritual values are more highly regarded by him than material values. He is a loyal, true, lasting friend. Why offend him by rattling sabres, or by trying to tell him how to run his own house?

Someone has calculated that with the money we so scandalously wasted in Viet Nam (not to mention the human lives) we could have built a home for every person in both North and South Viet Nam, using materials from the U.S.A. and paying U.S. wages for construction.

I do not know how many hundreds of millions of dollars these "maneuvers" are costing you and me. I do know that one practice launching of a guided missile costs hundreds of thousands of dollars. The life of that missile, as the life of every bullet and bomb that we provide is only seconds. The same amount of money would provide thousands of homes that will endure beyond the life of any person now alive. The people in these Caribbean countries are dirt poor. Why can't we respect the dignity of these potential friends and put them in houses

July 26, 1983

instead of graves? Nobody will shoot a friend who builds him a house; no one
can hate the man who puts a roof over his head.

Our Latin American brothers need our understanding, our respect, our
genuine love. The same dollars that buy rifles, cannons, bombs, and tanks
will buy lumber, tile, water and sewer pipes, sinks, tubs, toilets, and
screens. If we would give these things, it would merely be paying the wages
of the thousands who were exploited by our fellow Americans in the mines and
on the plantations.

We have never tried this kind of diplomacy before. We have always carried
the biggest stick, flown the biggest plane, sailed the biggest ship, exploded
the biggest bomb, and waved the biggest dollar in the face of others.

Why not use a little common sense, seek a little advice, show a little
kindness? Although it would not be our primary motive, we would put a lot of
our own people to work in a good way. And we would be making a lot of reparation
for the past sins of our nation. Not only our neighbors to the South, but our
God above us would love us for this.

I beg you, Senator, to use your persuasive powers to convince our Government
people of this. Any help I can offer (besides my feeble prayers) is herewith
unconditionally extended. God bless you.

NWH/t1

CENTRAL AMERICA:

A Framework for Policy Analysis

by: Francis X. Gannon *

(Ideas related to those expressed in this essay were set forth by the author in previous articles: Caribbean Aid and Ambition, Worldview, January, 1982; Globalism vs. Regionalism: The U.S. and the OAS, Orbis (Foreign Policy Research Institute) Spring 1982; and, The Current Hemispheric Agenda in Trade, Investment and U.S. Public Policy in Latin America, Occasional Papers, 1983, American Enterprise Institute.

This current paper attempts to set a framework for thinking about Central America, especially from a U.S. perspective. Its point of departure is Henry L. Stimson's thesis about isthmian realities and within this context a critique is made of various contemporary views and judgments about Central America, the OAS and U.S. policy. No panaceas on these matters are set forth.)

* Dr. Gannon is Adviser (Consulting) to the Secretary General, Organization of American States. The views expressed are personal not official

[L]

STAYING THE COURSE

Twenty years ago Harlan Cleveland, then a senior figure in the Kennedy administration, remarked that the central weakness undermining U.S. foreign assistance policies was an unyielding national determination to establish 20-year development programs on the basis of 5-year planning, two-year people and one-year appropriations. House Majority Leader Jim Wright (D. Tex.) has now added a contemporary version of this thesis when he observed that "even countries that do not doubt our motives question our staying power. While our generosity is unlimited, so is our impatience."

As Central America moves towards becoming a dominant focus on the nation's foreign policy agenda such insights serve as a caveat to any and all seeking an instant solution to the protracted agonies of the neighboring isthmian countries: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica. That is why the Bipartisan National Commission on Central America of President Ronald Reagan becomes particularly appropriate. Its Congressional sponsors, Senators Mathias and Jackson and Representative Kemp and Barnes, accepted--in the words of Senator Henry M. Jackson, that "U.S. policy must have a 30-to-50-year aim: Effective help in building democracies, increased economic opportunity and greater respect for human rights."

Consistent with Cleveland's insight, though, whether the American public would stay the course behind any policy for this length of time is invariably problematical. At present polls show the

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area has a mere 8 percent public recognition factor on key issues
affecting U.S. policy. And conflicting voices would routinely have the
United States throw up its hands in despair at its neighbours, a viewpoint
evidenced several months ago by the Post's headline over an article by
the Smithsonian's influential expert Dr. Abraham Lowenthal. In effect
this suggested that the United States should let the Latin Americans
"stew in their own revolutions."

This aetherial perspective is shared equally by many liberals and conservatives alike. Lowenthal stated his argument, for instance, nearly a decade ago in *Foreign Affairs*, insisting that "the first step toward an improved Latin American policy would be to realize that for most purposes we probably should not have a distinct Latin American policy at all."
And in a de facto way Henry Kissinger's gargantuan memoirs indicate that on entering public office he operated from almost identical premises so that when the overthrow of Allende occurred in Chile, the Nixon administration was not only caught without a policy but hardly krew where that country was.

Still, the fact that a bipartisan consensus is forming around the
concept of a national commission indicates that such overtly negative
viewpoints could become passé, especially if the idea of a long-range
commitment (not only by the United States but eventually of all OAS
member states, one trusts) of resources and talent for Central American
development remains intact. Lurching from crisis to crisis, in any
event, the standard post-war pattern for U.S. policy towards the isthmus,

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is hardly a serious way to help the Central American countries respond to
the political and development problems they face now and during
foreseeable decades to come.

CENTRAL AMERICA: EUROPE, 1948?

Already, some experts and diplomats denigrate the pivotal concept
which has given rise to the commission proposal: the thought that since
the Marshall Plan helped restore Europe, an updated version could help
Central America. Critics charge constantly that Central America is not
post-war Europe where reconstruction was possible, perhaps even
inevitable, given the historic evolution of the societies involved.
Contemporary isthmian countries on the other hand, are starting nearly
from ground zero in their attempts at development. So the reasoning goes.

No doubt there is logic in this position: post-war Europe and
contemporary Central America differ substantially, noticeably so in that
Europe had long been an industrial, highly technical area. Yet prior to
the currency reform in Germany in 1948, its economic prospects three
years after the inglorious end of the once-vaunted 1,000-year Third
Reich, still seemed and were desperate. France, on the other hand, was
mired in political chaos, the U.S. was disarming in an alarming manner,
and bread lines were still forming in Britain. Millions of refugees,
moreover, were treated as social outcasts. And at the other extreme the
armies of the Soviet Union remained fully intact. In other words, no
great hope existed that Europe would not enter a new age of barbarism

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similar to the period 15 centuries earlier after the sack of Rome. Some statesmen concluded as much.

Within this framework the bipartisan consensus for the Marshall Plan took hold and led to effective results. The question is: Can measures of equal daring, if less magnitude, have comparable results to assist Central America ride out its storms? The answer, tentatively, appears to be affirmative.

Isthmian countries have invariably been seen as the hemispheric backwaters by their neighbors, north and south. Until recently, few South Americans paid attention to them as reflected in the scanting comment of Argentina's 19th century Horace Mann--President Domingo Sarmiento that someone had mistakenly decided to create sovereign nations of mud villages. On its part the United States has generally, as Charles Evan Hughes said in Havanna in 1928, desired to see "peace on its borders." Until FDR's "Good Neighbor" policy accepted the principle of non-intervention, however, its tendency was to establish this peace by landing marines, a process that proved futile and, in the case of the 43-year Somoza continuation, eventually self-defeating.

## POST-WAR ISTHMIAN ADVANCES

For most of its history Central America has been economically weak and poor, with debt servitude binding most people to the land. Even now over 75% of its earnings from exports come from four products: coffee,

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cotton, bananas and meat. Families are split in the farming season as in Guatemala alone a half million people move from the highlands to the lowlands in search of work. In 1952, one report noted, Honduras had only 25 miles of paved road, with the situation not excessively dissimilar elsewhere as the isthmian countries, despite extensive inter-marriage and inter-change among their leadership groups, were essentially isolated from each other.

After 1945, though, substantial economic and social changes gradually occurred everywhere, except along Nicaragua's Atlantic coast and among Guatemala's large indigenous populations. Farm to market roads began to blanket the region, electricity spread in cities and towns and while housing and potable water conditions remain deplorable, regional banking and financial networks, as Honduran economist Mario Rietti demonstrated in various studies, sprang up. Governments proved capable of providing modern public services and during the 1960's, especially in Nicaragua and in El Salvador, a dynamic, if limited, technical and industrial community emerged. In the rural areas, agricultural and dairy cooperatives and community water systems were formed.

In some critical respects social conditions remain outrageous, however. Except for Costa Rica life expectancy at birth in the isthmian countries averages 6 to 15 years lower than in the developed world. In 1968 one study indicated that 38% of Hondurans were living below a poverty line of $75 a year, with the situation not much better now. And 75% to 80% of the isthmian population lives in impoverished or harsh

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circumstances in rural areas or towns, although in some areas, e.g. the
north coast of Honduras, conditions are superior to elsewhere.

After the mid-1950's a principal cause for the turnaround in isthmian
economic prospects was the Central American Common Market and integration
movement. Previously, the area's countries traded not with each other
but with nations outside the region, especially the United States.
Between 1960 and 1963, however, intra-regional trade under the stimulus
of the Common Market, abruptly shot upwards from 3.5 percent of the
region's trade to over 27 percent. Manufacture commodity exports rose so
fast that by 1968 two-thirds of intra-regional exports were manufactured
goods.

POST 1970: REGIONAL DOWNTURN

Several barriers blunted these advances after 1970, though. The
brief but violent struggle between El Salvador and Honduras was not
finally resolved by a peace treaty until 1980 after OAS Secretary General
Alejandro Orfila, provided impetus by serving as a moderator to get the
parties together. Under the Somoza rule, Nicaragua exerted a constant
drag on the integration process, as the Somoza family was generally
charged in other countries with refusing to support any ventures from
which it didn't profit personally.

As for the U.S. response, the State Department blindly missed a major
opportunity two decades ago to demonstrate that it was sensitive to the

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tides of history. Its ambassadors in Central America, with exceptions
like the ex-mayor of El Paso, Ramón Telles in Costa Rica, were unable to
provide any leadership and their hands were tied by Washington's
bureaucratic inertia.

President John Kennedy, himself, was almost a victim of this
blindness when he was invited to attend a summit meeting of isthmian
heads-of-state in San José in March, 1963. This was the first visit by a
U.S. President to Central America. But at a meeting in San Salvador the
American ambassadors voted against his attending an opening ceremonial
mass (On St. Joseph's Day--a holy day for Catholics to boot') on the
grounds of separation of church and state.

The White House, fortunately, reversed this decision and as the
American President entered the Cathedral of San José the organist boomed
out those familiar religious hymns--Yankee Doodle Dandy and My Wild Irish
Rose' So negative and filled with tunnel-vision were the State
Department's attitudes that its representatives in Guatemala even refused
to speak to their own USAID officials setting up the Regional AID Office
for Central America (ROCAP) when they rode the same elevator in the Cruz
Azul Building. One ambassador, in fact, cabled Washington urging removal
of an AID consultant on grounds that he was stepping into politically
sensitive fields. The consultant's error? He was working to strengthen
democratic trade unions and the cooperative movement.

This is not to imply that U.S. foreign assistance to the region
between 1960 and today was not formidable and heavy. For the opposite is

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true. But this has been primarily bilateral with each country and it
does not compensate for the previous failure to support the regional
integration process fully, a failure whose effects are now self-evident.

Within the past decade, isthmian development momentum slowed down sharply. This was a consequence to many factors, including the 1973 oil crisis, sharp contraction of international trade, enormous increases in international debt, severe inflation, and the internal political upheavals in Nicaragua and El Salvador. From 1980 onward regional growth rates, moreover, have remained dead in the water. Despite the breakdown in regional integration institutions, however, the intra-regional trade potential continues high with isthmian countries importing and exporting $ one billion to each other in 1978/79.

Experts periodically identify some key policies which Central America could follow to revitalize its growth patterns. These include establishing investment incentives to maximize job creation, reforming institutions to increase domestic savings, improving export development strategies, expanding foreign investment and revitalizing the common market. Most proposals advanced fail to deal, however, with the issue of foreign technical assistance which would probably determine whether realistic action on the suggested policies is a plausible option. Since the onset of the Alliance for Progress previous modes of international cooperation, which stressed technical assistance, have given way almost exclusively to financial and lending approaches. But in the volatile political isthmian arena now these latter are clearly inadequate.

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RIDING POLITICAL WHIRLWINDS

Political volatility has invariably seemed synonymous with Central America. At times after its rupture from Spain in 1821 the area appeared the nadir of political instability, with its bewildering "machete" violence, military reversals, coups and counter-coups. Looking at the period between 1870 and 1941, Guatemalan historian Mario Rodríguez commented that "instability was a constant factor in the Central American scene, much to the annoyance of foreigners. Crass opportunism reigned everywhere. States developed an increasing awareness of the regional balance of power complex, and unionism distracted the attention of the best minds, encouraging the historic pattern of intervention in each others' affairs."

Within this not so long ago framework it is perhaps understandable why the forecasts, hopes and judgments of observers on isthmian realities often seem obtuse. Few observers of Central America are immune from having reality intrude on their theories.

Communist-aided revolts occurred, for instance, in El Salvador in 1932 and Guatemala in the post-war years, with the failure of the former attributed by Marxist critics to the "leftist deviation" and "putchist" approach of this movement. Augusto César Sandino, the guerrilla who fought the United States in Nicaragua during the 1930's and whose name is synonymous with current government in Managua, was in turn accused in 1935 in _The Communist International_ of having capitulated and gone "over to the side of the counter-revolutionary government of Sacasa."

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(L)

To provide another illustration of this tendency to miscontrue
isthmian reality, the experience of Nicaragua's current foreign minister
offers a caveat. Two year before he entered the Sandinista government,
Miguel D'Escoto, then an active Maryknoll priest, wrote in Guardians of
the Dynasty that "when all has been said it is important to emphasize
that the blame for the Somoza dynasty cannot be totally placed on the
United States, the Nicaraguan rich, or even tha National Guard ... the
National Guard presently has a historic role to play in the liberation of
Nicaragua and without help that country will inevitably continue under
Somoza's heel."

This may have been effective revolutionary rhetoric in 1976 but with
the continuing turmoil in Central America, in retrospect, these and
similar insights have little relevance. With the "contras" on the march
in Nicaragua at present, including, apparently, former Guardia members,
it seems useful to recall these previous feelings towards the national
guard. Even though many of the Guardia had been corrupted, especially by
financial blandishment from General Somoza after the devastating
earthquake of 1972, there were many, as D'Escoto stressed, who remained
both incorrupted and patriotic. In their ranks, as among other groups in
Nicaragua, nationalism was fierce primarily as a consequence to
resentment of U.S. marine landings in the earlier decades of the century.

Elsewhere in the isthmus leadership groups in Guatemala and El
Salvador tended traditionally to look to the United States or Western
Europe as their home territory. Consequently, nationalism did not always

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have the force here that it had in Nicaragua: In that nation, on the contrary, nationalism, chiefly as a consequence to U.S. military intervention in the first three decades of this century has always being pervasive. One reason for the longevity of the Somoza rule was its capacity to manipulate appeals to this tradition. In other words it was not just its own dependence on the United States, and the forceful pressures of its rule that kept it so long in power. The force of nationalism in Nicaragua can only be compared to that found in Mexico or Cuba and it has little parallel in Central America. In consequence, nationalism--as distinct from Marxist-Leninism--still remains a force to be reckoned with and all sides involved in the Nicaraguan struggles only neglect this at peril to their own success and survival.

DEMOCRACY VS. AUTHORITARIANISM

Beyond the problem of misinterpreting isthmian realities, in any event, stands that of the ways to promote civic peace in Central America. Looking at this from one perspective, Jeanne Kirkpatrick, shortly before becoming U.N. ambassador, argued that the problem of Central America and especially El Salvador could best be seen through the philosophical prism of Thomas Hobbes. To a limited but important extent both Hobbes and Kirkpatrick were right: societies cannot thrive on constant civil disorder. Life must be protected, property secured and virtue cultivated for civil order and progress to prevail.

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This point was addressed persuasively in John U. Nef's classical treatise on "The Cultural Foundations of Industrial Civilization." As Nef noted, historically, "has not war been less a cause for industrialism ... (than its shadow and nemesis.) The exceptional prosperity which lasted in Great Britain for several decades preceding the civil war is explained partly by the fact that for some eighty years, from about 1560 to 1640, England and Scotland were at peace within themselves, while there was no prolonged fighting by English forces at sea or on the Continent." The two modern periods of greatest world growth---1894 to 1914 and 1958 to 1971---serve to confirm the thesis that civic peace not violence induces economic progress.

This argument goes against the grain of many contemporary theorists like Jean-Paul Sartre, Franz Fanon and Regis Debray (currently advisor to Prime Minister Mitterand) who have mindlessly proclaimed that relentless violence is essential to social progress. In Hannah Arendt's response, rather, no genuinely human society has ever been built on an unremitting shedding of human blood.

However, neither the Hobbes' nor the Kirkpatrick's routinely accept that democratic solutions are essentially an answer to civil war and anarchy. As Dr. Kirkpatrick noted at the 1980 public policy week of the American Enterprise Institute, for Hobbes, "autocracy is the solution he foresees. It is hardly an ideal one, surely one not acceptable under our human rights program, but wholly in keeping with the priorities stated by that most eloquent of El Salvador's democratic leaders, Napoleón Duarte.

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[L]

'I think it is not important who is in or out. The most important thing is how can we solve the basis of our problems--the violence. Whoever has the capacity to do this should have the power.'"

Transition to democratic forms of governance is never easy and often gruesome, especially in situations where violence is endemic and promoted heavily from without particular societies, as is self-evidently the case now along the isthmus. El Salvador's disorder may be unique in contemporary Hemispheric history in the intensity and widespread nature of its existing civil strife. In that sense, therefore, sui generis solutions are also essential and Hobbesian formulas or political prospects may have continuing relevance or still be in the historical cards. One cannot discount the use of force to counter force in situations as those in Central America where Clausewitz and his concept of war as an extension of diplomacy by other means appears to have more immediate relevance than Marxian ideology.

Democracy in variant forms, however, is not, as this Kirkpatrick assumption seems to infer, inherently antithetical to Central America's future.

The recent experience of a number of traditionally authoritarian countries underscores this point, including that of Ecuador, the Dominican Republic and even in Central America, Honduras. Relative social peace is currently present in these countries, a situation not always so before under more authoritarian forms of rule which, contrary

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[L.C.]

to any Hobbesian premises or imputations, did not always allow civic virtue to be cultivated.

This latter was noticeably the case, moreover, in the last stages of Somozan Nicaragua and its 43-year continual rule. After General Tacho Somoza's anti-constitutionalist ploys in 1968--in which he broke his pledge to stay only one term in office, not only did the Conservative opposition turn against him but so did many of the leading supporters of his brother, Luis (president between 1958 and 1962), notably Ramiro Sacasa Guerrera and other members of Luis' cabinet.

These 'liberales' initially supported him with the provision that he would take only one constitutional term in office and while foreign critics are unaware of the importance of this principle in Nicaraguan history, it has invariably been a key inspiring ideal for Nicaraguan democrats since the latter part of the 19th century. The eventual and tragic denouement of Tachito's failure to keep his promise was a genuine and widespread popular revolution that included all major segments of society: labor, industry, academics, the church and the then small-scale Sandinista grouping. That the outcome was not what many observers hoped for was of course, due to internal as to external factors which finally sidelined and destroyed many of the original forces who made the revolution.

Authoritarianism and autocracy, then, are not necessary outcomes to any given political situation in Central America, even if the current

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Nicaraguan or other historical outcomes demonstrate otherwise. Nor are
these even an essential prelude to social peace. What can be said,
though, is as the new bipartisan congressional resolution openly assumes,
that social order in the long run is difficult if not impossible to
achieve, if people do not believe they have a stake in their own
governance and in shaping their own destinies.

Both Costa Rica and Honduras illustrate this point, with the former's
30,000 small coffee growers long serving as a political backbone to
sustain its democracy; and, the latter's independent and autonomous trade
unions on its north coast and its agrarian reform of 1970 giving its
political system a flexibility and openness lacking elsewhere along the
isthmus.

Herculian efforts will be required, of course, to promote civic
order of a tolerably democratic nature throughout this region. However,
there seems little reason why promotion of this objective this should be
considered as solely or even primarily the responsibility if the United
States. Other OAS states have a considerable stake on what happens in
Central America. Because some of these now lack democratic governance,
should not lead to the assumption that all even most do not favor
democracy. Most, in fact, do, even if this too frequently turns out to
be more as an ideal than as a reality. Writers as diverse as Gioberto
Freyre in New World in The Tropics and Octavio Paz in the Labyrinth of
Solitude have insisted that the modern guises of 'Oriental Despotism' are
quite antithetical to the feelings, beliefs and sentiments of most

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governments and peoples in this hemisphere. Convinced that they can
outwit or control the (red) devil, even in his contemporary political
trappings, Latin Americans, of course, do persist in supping with him
with a long spoon. Sometimes foolish perhaps, but naive they are not.

NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

There are several ways to dramatize the nature of the challenge now
confronting U.S. foreign policy and the inter-American system in Central
America. In its May, 1983 "Background Paper: Central America", the
Reagan administration stressed the deep-rooted relationship of this
challenge to the strategy long espoused by Cuba's Fidel Castro under the
rigid tutelage of the Soviet KBG and military. This strategy includes
"unification of the extreme left, establishment of a 'broad coalition'"
both to gain control over domestic insurrections along the isthmus and
international support, and "provision of Soviet bloc ... military support
as an incentive for extreme left unity."

No matter what one says about the administration's viewpoint one
conclusion is evident: Its position, unlike those of some domestic
antagonists, is clear and consistent. This is not the case, for
instance, with many Democratic liberals who apparently found trenchant
such obtuse reasoning as John Kenneth Galbraith's riposte at the ADA's
1983 convention: Central America "is a dagger aimed at the heart of
Hollywood."

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[L]

One-liners are not necessarily a germane basis on which to build a foreign policy stance. Liberal Democrats, still reeling under the aftermath to the Vietnam debacle have, like many other Americans, difficulty in reflecting upon national security elements of an issue except in the most extreme cases such as those which involve raising the noise levels of the East-West struggle or assuring the survival of Israel.

In 1927, though, Henry L. Stimson, later FDR's Secretary of War, set forth some basic presuppositions about U.S. security interest in the Caribbean basin and in the Central America isthmus:

"There are certain geographical considerations which impose upon us a very special interest as to how certain of these nations fulfill their responsibilities which go with sovereignty and independence. I refer to those Central American nations whose territory lies adjacent to and in a naval sense commands the sea routes from our Eastern to our Western states via the Caribbean Sea and the Panama Canal.

"This situation does not arise out of the Monroe Doctrine but from certain broad principles of self-defense which govern the policy of the United States, as well as of all other nations which are in any way dependent upon the sea. These principles underlie the Monroe Doctrine, although they were not created by it. They bear a very much closer and more tangible relation to what I may call, for lack of a better name, our isthmian policy than they do to the Monroe Doctrine itself."

- 18 -

Some historians contend that the Monroe Doctrine, moreover, became a multilateral, regional principle when the OAS states accepted the collective self-defense and security principles of the Rio Treaty in 1947. On that score the recent view expressed by the _Conservative Caucus, Inc._ that President Reagan should "declare your intention to fully reassess the premise of the Monroe Doctrine that the U.S. Western Hemisphere" would need to be argued. Not only the U.S. but most OAS members support non intervention in the Americas, a point underscored by their overwhelming support for Argentina against Great Britain during the Malvinas dispute in 1982.

Robert Dallek's 1980 prize-winning treatise on the foreign policy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt points to an essential corollary to Stimson's basic perspective, moreover. Following FDR's acceptance of the non-intervention principle at Montevideo in 1936, the United States was henceforth committed to balancing within its security interests an adherence to this principle. This ideal was formalized into legal terms for the Americas region as a whole when the OAS Charter was adopted in 1948. According to Professor Dallek, Mr. Roosevelt came to accept this concept as a consequence to his service in the First World War when, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he realized the then futility of U.S. military intervention in Central America and the Caribbean as a lasting solution to the area's problems.

A balancing of U.S. security interests and non-intervention, of course, remains implicit throughout any discussion about U.S. foreign

- 18 -

- 19 -

policy towards Central America and the Caribbean. When push comes to
shove every U.S. President knows that if he permitted adherence to
non-intervention to mask a direct attack on U.S. national security, the
public furor could well result in domestic upheaval if not in his
impeachment. That is why Galbreathian sallies are irrelevant to much of
the present national debate over Central America and why outcries from
the Conservative Caucus now about the dangers which would be posed to
vital U.S. security interests by Soviet-controlled air bases and sea
lines in the greater Caribbean basin are essentially consistent with
Henry Stimson's argument of 1927.

While John F. Kennedy rightly stands next to FDR in the pantheon of
U.S. heroes in Latin America for his dedication to democracy, social
justice and friendly relations, he correctly described the razor-edged
dilemma facing every U.S. Chief Executive, where national security is
involved, especially in this protracted period of East-West struggle. In
April 1961 President Kennedy said bluntly:

"Let the record show that our restraint is not inexhaustible. Should
it ever appear that the inter-American doctrine of non-interference
merely conceals or excuses a policy of non-action--if the nations of this
hemisphere should fail to meet their commitments against outside
communist penetration--then I want it clearly understood that this
Government will not hesitate to meet its primary obligations, which are
to the security of our nation."

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[L]

Addressing Congress and the nation on April 27, 1982 President Reagan sought to re-focus national attention on the strategic importance of Central America, bordering as it does on the Caribbean--our lifeline to the outside world. Two thirds of all our foreign trade and petroleum pass through the Panama Canal and the Caribbean... in a European crisis, at least half over supplies for NATO would go through these areas by sea." One way the Soviet Union could exert a stranglehold over U.S. support for Israel in a mid-East crisis, some experts suggest, is by creating havoc in these nearby sea lines and air spaces, thereby holding hostage Israel's security.

As was to be expected, hardly had the president left the rostrum when his viewpoint was assailed. Writing in The Washington Post, former OAS Secretary General, Galo Plazo, stated that "as he outlined plans to meet the immediate emergency, it was disappointing that he did not also present a long-term program for economic development of the area as a prerequisite for solving the problems of Central America." The former president of Ecuador added that the report of a 1982/83 commission, the Inter-American Dialogue, which he had chaired with Ambassador Sol Linowitz, had "explored hemispheric problems in four different areas: economic and financial issues; social and political issues; security and peace-keeping issues, and, the task for inter-American institutions."

In his speech to the U.S. Congress President Reagan did, of course, focus almost exclusively on the short-term political and military aspects of the problems confronting Central America. Strangely enough, however,

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[c]

and somewhat at odds with Galo Plaza's thesis, so did the February 1982
report of the Smithsonian-sponsored Inter-American Dialogue. The experts
and statements convened together did recommend a series of measures for
Central America, including dialogue between the hostile parties, support
for the so called Contadora peace-making initiatives undertaken by
Colombia, Venezuela, Mexico and Panama, a widening of the U.S.-Soviet
accords with respect to Cuba so as to extend them "to Central America and
the Caribbean." But nowhere in the report is there any long-term program
for economic development of the Central America area (as distinct from
proposals for Latin America as a whole).

In general, of course, the Plaza-Linowitz analysis dealt effectively
with raging development issues in the hemisphere. Still, when assessing
proposals to resolve the Central American crisis, clarity seems, above
all, an essential pre-requisite to policy action. Two points might be
added, moreover, concerning both the Contadora efforts and the concept of
widening "U.S.-Soviet accords" to affect Central America.

Even if support for the Contadora initiatives becomes widespread, a
process also backed by the Reagan Administration's new super-ambassador
for Central America, former Senator Richard Stone, the door is still open
to assess their long-range impact on the regional system.

The problem is not directly the peace-making thrust by the Contadora
group as this can only be praised; rather, it is the potential involved
in the resolution at the United Nations which gave an official U.N.

blessing to the Contadora measures. Now that a precedent has been set
for U.N. involvement in Central America, this, as a Latin American
diplomat pointed out to The Washington Post, "makes it easier to use the
(U.N.) Security Council for the next round."

Some U.S. experts would appear to go along with this possibility. At
Meridian House seminar in Washington in 1982, Riordan Roett of Johns
Hopkins, for instance, argued that "it may be in Latin America's interest
to rely on global organizations when trying to control U.S. behavior in
this hemisphere."

This position, of course, begs a huge question--namely, if the United
Nations were to inject itself into such disputes as those wracking
Central America would this be injecting into the hemispheric dialogue the
entire body of shop-worn issues that have increasingly tended to paralyze
the world body? So far in the post-war period, these have been kept out
of the inter-American system and the OAS, precisely because the United
Nations has generally not intruded into regional waters except during the
1982 Malvinas dispute when both a regional and an extracontinental power
were involved. (A partial U.N. entrance was attempted in 1965.)

As for widening the "U.S.-Soviet accords" to include Central America
the question is whether this is a species of wishful thinking, despite
approbation of the concept by the Woodrow Wilson center's Dialogue Group.
Writing in the Summer 1983 issue of the *Wilson Quarterly* on
"Vietnam as Past", Richard K. Betts infers as much. From experience

- 23 -

[d]

elsewhere, Betts points to the difficulties normally involved in getting the Soviets to spur along its client regimes. Fifteen years ago Richard Nixon, like Lyndon B. Johnson, sought to have the U.S.S.R. push Vietnam towards genuine negotiations but, as Betts says, "his hopes (like those of LBJ) of enlisting Moscow's aid to sway Hanoi did not materialize."

History indicates one conclusion: Marxists have not given excessive evidence anywhere that they are moved by good will and by friendly gestures but, however, regrettably so, only as overwhelming force, whether political or moral, is brought against them.

## AN OAS ROLE?

With regard to Central America the OAS is frequently faulted for staying aloof from the struggle from two extremes: those who want it to do little and those who ask for it to do too much. On one side Senator Christopher Dodd, was quoted by The New York Times as saying that "given the historical pattern of OAS timidity, I don't think you will find them effective at all" (in the negotiations for El Salvador's future). Marvin Stone, editor of the *U.S. News & World Report* reinforced this perception when he wrote that the OAS "has proven worthless in this situation toothless and timid."

Such criticism, while having certain merit and widely accepted, somehow grossly misinterpret the reality that is the OAS. In effect, it makes it a third party, an entity distinct from the member governments

- 24 -

[L.C]

which belong to it. In 1954 its first Secretary General Alberto Lleras Camargo, however, pointed out that the Organization is nothing more than the will of its members. This still remains true and, in other words, the OAS can only act as its sovereign members agree to do so.

That is why informed Latin America journalists like the AP's Ary Moleon or UPI's Adolfo Merino, who follow its work assiduously, point out that the OAS has been basically used since its founding in 1948 in two capacities: (1) as a Hemispheric "steam valve" to allow its members to vent their frustration and anger while searching elsewhere for practical and lower-level solutions for a threatening dispute; and 2) as a "volunteer fire department" which has come together on at least 50 occasions (some analysts pinpoint 200 occasions) to put out or dampen-down peace-threatening fires in the Hemisphere. Looked at in this more limited light, the OAS' successes, contrary to the views of Senator Dodd or Marvin Stone would seem to outweigh any self-evident limitations.

On the other extreme the OAS is also regularly faulted for not determining ways to solve all of the region's outstanding geopolitical disputes. These, as the 1982 Malvinas violence demonstrates, can still chaotically disrupt peace in the Americas and, indeed, around the globe. In its June 1982 study on *Governance in the Western Hemisphere*, a study group of the Aspen Institute saw this problem and recommended "that in the next General Assembly of the OAS, member government agree to press for the resolution of all extant border disputes over the next five years, and to recommend specific procedures to do so."

- 25 -

On face value setting a timetable for resolving outstanding disputes, e.g. the future of Belize or the Beagle Channel, seems a laudable proposition. In November, 1982, at Meridian House, however, a premier international lawyer, Mexico's representative to the OAS, Rafael de la Colina, noted that such a rigid five-year goal "seems impractical, well-intentioned but unrealistic."

The dean of Mexico's diplomatic corps added that the Aspen Group's further recommendation that the OAS provide technical assistance in delimiting boundaries could be acted upon as the OAS already "has the means to provide this assistance. However, its ability to be of real service in this area will not depend "on general calls to action" but on whether or not there is the consent of the parties involved in each specific dispute."

Commenting on the thesis that the OAS Permanent Council should "monitor all disputes and potential breaches of the peace in the Americas," Ambassador de la Colina consigned that idea to a university shelf, noting "that such an ambitious mandate would raise more problems than it would solve, awakening many dormant disputes and overburdening the already-taxed OAS system."

Virtue stands in the middle, said Horace, and perhaps even for the OAS this is true. For those who wish to improve the OAS's role in assuring peace, development and democratic norms in the hemisphere, a backward glance at the way that its member states have used it seems

- 26 -

essential. This may be particularly helpful for those determined to
plunge the OAS willy-nilly into the Central American cauldron.

In mid-1982 in a speech to the Foreign Policy Association in New
York, the current OAS Secretary General, Alejandro Orfila, pointed to
various paths taken by the Organization's members to respond to critical
regional issues at specific points in history. As Ambassador Orfila
stated:

"At an early moment in OAS history, 1947, the Inter-American Peace
Commission was formed to fill a regional vacuum in dispute
settlement. It carried out this task forcefully until the OAS
Charter reform of 1967.

In 1958, following a decade of Latin American misgivings about U.S.
economic policies, the region moved on to new paths of economic
cooperation. This occurred when the Inter-American Development Bank
(which was first proposed in 1889) was created within the OAS forum.

In the early 1960's turmoil in the Caribbean helped regional nations
launch the ambitious response of the Alliance for Progress.

Following the regional tensions created by actions in the Dominican
Republic in 1965, a Meeting of Presidents was held at Punta del Este
in 1967. This opened the doors to over a decade of sustained
cooperation in education, technology, science and culture.

In the 1970's concern about abuses of human rights led to
ratification of the American Convention of Human Rights. This
reversed a decade of inaction on this important instrument."

The Charter of the OAS is broad and detailed. In a theoretical sense
the Organization can be all things to all men and women in the Americas.
Provided the member governments determine a specific course of action
together, anything is possible. When this consensus is lacking, the OAS
cannot act.

One important occasion when this mutual will was impressively evident
was during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. In the words of

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[LJ]

Senator Robert F. Kennedy in McCalls in 1968, "it was the vote of the Organization of American States that gave a legal basis for the quarantine. ...it had a major psychological and practical effect on the Russians and changed our position from that of outlaws acting in violation of international law into a country acting in accordance with twenty allies legally protecting their position."

For over nine decades the OAS has played frequently an informal but certainly a singular role in promoting hemispheric peace and development. Much of its work is and will remain unsung, precisely because its member states try to keep matters that way. "Corridor diplomacy," rather than public posturing, is often the method preferred by the OAS countries and their ambassadors to carry out their agreed-upon responsibilities.

What is the OAS main role, then, despite all its warts and imperfections? Several answers have been suggested. Walt N. Rostow, for instance, noted in Caracas in 1982 that "in keeping extra-continental military power out of the Hemisphere, the OAS avoided making Latin America the kind of bear-pit that Africa, the Middle East and Asia have become." The editors of a Colombian magazine, _Consigna_, echoed in 1982 that it "is the only thing that separates us from total fragmentation and perhaps war."

Those conclusions may be somewhat overdrawn. At present, moreover, Latin America is increasingly involved in multiple ways in the broader

- 28 -

international arena. In consequence its commitments to the OAS do not
appear as strong or extensive as in previous periods of the
Organization's history. Nonetheless, most OAS members are, above all,
realists and they know from experience that the Organization's existence
precludes, in John W. Ford's term the "balkanization of the Hemisphere,"
while it also serves to keep the United States more willing to listen to
and act with its neighbors than to plunge ahead precipitously on its own.

It is misleading, of course, to presume that the United States will
always and in every way act in unison with its neighbors through the
OAS. President Kennedy's 1962 statement should stand as a warning that
no U.S. President can act against the core of U.S. national security
interests, even if its regional friends and fellow OAS members are in
total disagreement with the administration's perception of regional
reality. The support of the Reagan administration for Great Britain in
the Malvinas crisis in 1982 indicates the way that U.S. presidents look,
however haphazardly so, at the world.

In a similar vein President Lyndon B. Johnson's commitment of U.S.
troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965, an action in which various OAS
states joined, was considered an overpowering show of U.S. force in
defense of its security concerns. In turn, ever since then grave
Hemispheric doubts have been expressed as to whether the OAS could
survive other similar misadventures. What is frequently scanted by the
critics, of course, is the democracy which emerged on the island, perhaps
mainly as a direct consequence to OAS post-crisis initiatives which
smoothed out a potential debacle.

- 29 -

[L.C.]

In assessing relative responsibilities of different outside powers for what goes on in Central America it is essential, as Mark Falcoff has argued in the _Washington Quarterly_, not to "focus strictly on the formal-legal structure of international relations and utterly ignore the flesh-and-blood realities of geopolitics and international stratification". Moreover, U.S. national interests simply cannot be treated on a 'plane of equality' with the 'aspiration', or 'fantasies' for adventurism of any other country in the Hemisphere. Or even outside of it. This is a basic point largely ignored in the ongoing national and global debate over the U.S. role in Central America and there is little sense in dwelling on U.S. historical mistakes and failures, whose dimensions are all too obvious, when considering its current responsibilities to its own national interests.

## DEVELOPMENT VS. LIBERATION

P.T.Bauer has listed some apparently destructive consequences of aid as including the damaging of economic performance, the diversion of energies from economics to politics and the encouraging of the "delusion" that progress is impossible without resort to economic effort. The contrast to these sudden effects of aid on traditional societies is the gradual and tentative impact of Western commerce.

While Bauer's critique is a useful corrective to many of the strange and erroneous claims made an aid's behalf, it is nonetheless marred by

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(LC)

two features: a constant setting-up and putting down of straw men and a neglect of the political rationale for aid on the side of the donor nations.

For their own reasons radical theorists on Latin American affairs tend to concur with assessment of this kind, however. For them, both Western aid and commerce lead to the unwarranted dependence of the 'periphery' nations or the 'center' or 'metropole' societies.

Neo-Marxists and others ground this dependence, on alleged and, at times, real, modern forms of economic imperialism. In consequence, no matter what form of bipartisan national consensus emerges through a _National Commission on Central America_, the weight of academia may well be thrown into the political scales against extending U.S. commitments and resources to the region as it now stands. Doubtlessly a critical charge raised may be that the United States is seeking to extend its imperialistic designs by newer economic means. It is in other words, siding with outmoded development approaches against the newer and more dynamic fever of "liberation", which is now riding the upward curve of history. Thus will run arguments against any new U.S. commitments.

On face value such premises will continue to be accepted in many Latin American intellectual and political circles. Earlier in this century the rapid and overwhelming increase in the national product and general well-being of the United States was attributed by various hemispheric thinkers and politicians to an inherent national penchant that gave nationalistic values precedence over spiritual and cultural

- 31 -

ones. From this ethnocentric stance Uruguay's Rodó in *Ariel*, Nicaragua's Rubén Darío in poems such as his *Ode to Roosevelt* struck a highly responsive public chord as they assailed the 'Yanqui's' grasping ethos of materialism. These themes have been repeated endlessly in hemispheric literary and political discourse for most of this century.

During the past 15 years or so another version of Latin American
difference from the United States and other advanced industrial societies
is reflected in the emergence of the theory of socioeconomic dependence.
At first set forth in works by Celso Furtado, Helio Jaguiribe, Fernando
Enrique Cardoso, Enzo Faleto and André Gunnar Frank, at present this is
among the more widely-accepted theories of the regional relationship
found as well among U.S. academic experts concerned with hemispheric
affairs. Its persuasive nature appears also in its influence on the
theology of liberation in Latin America.

Enrique Dussel points out in "A History of the Church in Latin
America" that this form of theological reflection implies that "the
cultural and theological awakening of Latin America as oppressed and
dependent forces us to rethink our situation in the light of faith as a
mean of escaping the apparent dead-end with its perpetual
underdevelopment." Theological speculation in the "center" countries
about development or about such virtues as religious hope have, according
to the liberationist scant relevance to the "periphery" nations where
revolution, even of a subversively violent form, may be essential to
overthowing both oppression and dependence, whether foreign or domestic.

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[L]

That not only current economic and political thinking in Latin America but even theological speculation is oriented against the formation of a U.S.-sponsored or initiated long-range commitment of hemispheric nations to assuring a relatively democratic future for Central America should in no way militate against establishing this commitment. Despite any polemical or ideological stance Latin Americans are generally realists. Most sense that a weak, unstable and insecure isthmus portends prolonged instability and insecurity for the surrounding Caribbean basin countries, including, Venezuela, Colombia and Mexico. The difference between this perception and that of many Americans above the Rio Grande is it implies that chronic violence and economic backwardness must be confronted primarily through developmental rather than through military instruments. To be effective, of course, any broad-guaged U.S. or OAS commitment to Central America must somehow devise a strategy which blends, no matter how unharmoniously, these two viewpoints.

There are several plausible responses to this argument which would be advanced by those advocating that the United States should merely stand aloof from Central America and let its revolution play out their ends. On the one hand, the United States as the world's oldest democracy, has generally, despite the failures it routinely acknowledges in the long-run, sought to live consistent with its own basic ideals by promoting democracy elsewhere. To extend a helping hand to Central America in this time of upheaval is hardly inconsistent with U.S. national purposes or its moral outlook. It is not, intrinsically thereby

- 33 -

determining to keep isthmian countries in a state of exaggerated
dependence on U.S. largesse but merely trying to uphold the hemisphere's
democratic ethos.

As for rhetoric about aid being a form of economic imperialism this
and related economic arguments about economic stakes in a desperately
poor area alike Central America is too frequently grounded in ideology
than in economic reasoning. As. W.J. Mommsen stressed in his *Theories of
Imperialism* expansionist opportunities are not necessary "to the
preservation of capitalism. Indeed, the difficulties of the modern world
are partly due to the fact that this is not so. The reluctance of
private capital to invest in third world countries is no less notorious
than the disinclination of industrialists to consider the economic
advantages of the periphery when choosing a site for an industrial
plant." That the U.S. may broaden its support for Central American
development under any bipartisan formally new assistance policy does not
necessarily mean or imply that its primary aim is therefore to maintain
an economic stranglehold on isthmian development.

At a deeper theoretical level the thesis of the dependency theory
advocates might be controverted or constrained, at least in important
ways by pressing them to examine the problem of scientific and
technological dependence not merely from an economic or a Marxist
perspective but from the viewpoint of the influence of epistemology on
history. It is evident that the West did surpass much of the world in
its use of science and technology and in this regard Latin America, like
most of the rest of the planet, has lagged behind.

- 34 -

However, as Stanley L. Jaki ponted out in the Gifford Lectures in
Edinburgh in 1975 and 1976, Joseph Needham's *Science and Civilization in
China* provides evidence for the deeper and broader dimensions of these
problems of dependence affecting non-Western countries. According to
Jaki, Needham, "in spite of his avowed Marxism, gave prominent place
among causes that prevented the escape of science from its blind alley in
ancient China to a theological cause, namely, the early vanishing among
the Chinese of a belief in a rational lawgiver or creator of the world.
Lacking that belief, the Chinese could not bring themselves to believe
that man was able to trace out at least some laws of the physical
universe."

Professor Jaki himself insists that the failure of science in all
great ancient cultures is not wholly accounted for by "the philosophy and
theology of eternal return" .... yet the philosophy, and theology in
question seem to be the only factors common to all those cultures. That
factor is as much a major cultural pattern as the failure of science is
in all of them a monumental fact. That it received so little attention
in an age of avid research into far less significant cultural patterns is
hardly an accident ... with the rejection of philosophical theology one
is left with socioeconomic, geopolitical and psychological types of
explanation. They all appear puny in the gigantic presence of the
failure of science in all great ancient cultures." While it may be
implausible to presume that the dependency theorists are prepared to look
into the history for epistemological reasoning as a source of the
difficulties confronting most of mankind in the application of modern

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[c]

science, that their existing explanations of dependency may not be as profound as they assume should give pause to their critique of any new U.S. foreign assistance commitments.

## A VIABLE PATH

As and when a national consensus is forged about shaping new assistance policies for Central America, it should be underscored that a serious difficulty with transferring resources from wealthier to poorer societies, at least where the U.S. is concerned, has been the often conflicting and contradictory nature of the various doctrines offered to justify such transfers. Each new U.S. administration is forced by the pressure of political events to reinvent the wheel of economic assistance. As a result, some really difficult questions--e.g., which contributes more to national development, multilateral or bilateral forms of aid; in specific circumstances, which is more appropriate, financial or technical cooperation?--have been scarcely looked at. As Robert Packenham pointed out a decade ago in *Liberal America* and *The Third World*, "despite hundreds of books and articles that have been written about aid, the corpus of serious literature dealing with aid's impact on development remains small." The *Pearson Report* of the late 1960's devoted only four of its four hundred pages to this critical matter and the same lack is noted in the various reports of the Independent Commission on International Development Issues, known familiarly as the *Brandt Report*.

- 36 -

[L]

If there is to be a new international aid venture to assist Central America, it is necessary to address the question of how aid--especially in the form of technical assistance--contributes to development. Quite clearly there is little time, little in the way of resources, and perhaps no inclination to make this assessment in any systematic way. Yet we have had enough experience with both multilateral and bilateral assistance programs to stake out alternative courses of action.

It has been argued convincingly that of all the major forms of international technical assistance rendered to Latin America the *servicio (service organization)* was among the more successful. This concept, generated under the autonomous Institute for Inter-American Affairs (IIAA) founded in 1942, was first put into operation under an agreement with Ecuador in the same year and then in other countries, with particular expansion between 1950 and 1961. The servicio was modeled on the land-grant college system developed in the United States after the Civil War, whose strength lay in combining research and training activities in a cooperative federal, state, and local network. In the case of agriculture, for instance, extension agents reached out to local farmers.

As developed by the IIAA, a servicio became the joint venture of the United States and a host Latin American country. Initially, these service units for technical cooperation operated outside the formal U.S. governmental structure, and each servicio--whether for health, education,

- 37 -

agriculture, industry, etc.--had two co-directors, one from the U.S. and
one from the host nation (the latter was usually the head of the ministry
to which the technical service unit was attached).

The servicio units were not given inordinate funding by the United
States, yet they succeeded in training and equipping participating
governments to develop their capacity for managing technical programs.
As reflected in the determination of provincial, state, and municipal
governments in the hemisphere to participate in these programs in
specific fields, they were regarded generally in Latin America as a sound
application of Point IV of the Truman Doctrine for foreign economic
assistance.

Naturally there were both positive and negative features of the
original service unit instruments. A 1953 evaluation by the U.S. Public
Health Service of ten years' experience with health servicios in Latin
America praised them for rendering great service to specific areas that
had lacked health facilities while it faulted them for paying
insufficient attention to promoting "sound administrative methods and
safeguards within the structure of the host government." A decade later,
however, these initial defects had been corrected for the most part and
the servicios in health, sanitation, transportation, agriculture, and so
forth were widely recognized as making a critical contribution to
hemispheric development.

Perhaps the key to the success of the original bilateral servicio was
its decentralized nature. All projects were determined locally by the

- 38 -

IIAA representative (who was also co-director of the local servicio
corporation) and the local ministry to which the unit was attached. This
automatically gave higher prominence and visibility to the host country
than to the U.S. No doubt it accounted for the strong desire of state,
provincial, and municipal governing bodies to set up cooperating servicio
corporations for fields in which they had particular interest.

Starting in the late 1950's, the servicio gradually was abolished as
an intrument of U.S. cooperative policy. What took its place, as witness
the Alliance for Progress and subsequent development, was the notion that
foreign aid programs ought to consist primarily of loans rather than
grants, to be linked to five-year plans in recipient countries, and to
have specific, targeted objectives—including the promotion of democratic
forms of governance. Theoretically, one foundation for this approach,
was the 1957. Proposal: A Key to Foreign Economic Policy, the handiwork
of MIT's Walt W. Rostow and Max Millikan.

Today, of course, the original bilateral servicio concept might not
be welcomed in Central America, immediately conjuring up an image of the
old paternalism. Moreover, regional governments, even in smaller
countries, feel they no have the capacity to organize and manage
efficiently a growing number of projects. Smaller states in the region
may, of course, lack specific technical and human resource capacities to
undertake projects involving fusion or energy solar power, for example.
But even here, bilateral international technical assistance, as distinct
from financial help, might have more drawbacks than are readily
anticipated.

- 39 -

[LC]

Given these assumptions, is there a way to assist Central America basin through limited technical assistance programs that are tied in with broad international financial, investment, and marketing efforts? It seems worth pursuing a suggestion that has been made for the creation of a multilateral rather than a bilateral servicio arrangement under the aegis of a new and specialized institute of the Organization of American States (OAS). This would be designed specifically to support an international technical assistance program for Central America (as distinct from the financial or marketing arrangements agreed upon) for the larger Caribbean basin. Governments or institutions participating in this assistance effort would agree, insofar as is reasonable, to channel programs of a technical assistance nature through and with servicio-type agencies to be established in the cooperating countries.

The operating mode of the institute and its servicio units in the Central American isthmus--where reconstruction of development capacities is the next task--might well differ from that of most island republics of the Caribbean basin. The institute's life would be limited to perhaps ten or fifteen years and snuffed out automatically at that date.

How should such an OAS *Central American Institute* be administered? Perhaps the current executive directors of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) from OAS member states plus Canada, each of whom represents several countries, would also serve as the board of directors of the proposed institute. Or a board could be selected jointly by the OAS and

* THE PROPOSAL (Initially this proposal was advanced by the writer for the entire Caribbean Basin in Worldview, January, 1982. and is repeated almost verbatim here)

- 40 -

[c]

the IDB, thence to operate under the OAS. Such a link between the OAS and the IDB would have two practical results: There would be no need to select and underwrite another group of distinguished representatives from OAS member states, and this would help bridge the enormous gap between the financing programs of the IDB and the technical work of the OAS, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, at least for Central America. This tie should also result in greater cooperation between existing OAS councils and agencies, perhaps leading to administrative integration of all OAS technical programs.

A feature of any multilateral servicio ought to be its stress on involvement by voluntary nonprofit organizations. As Alvin Toffler pointed out in *Future Shock*, since 1963 the most rapid growth in the international community has been registered in private sector efforts. At various points in the 1970's, for instance, funds for Latin America and the Caribbean from the U.S. voluntary sector surpassed those of even the Agency for International Development. Cooperation among nonprofit organizations can be stepped up within the framework of the proposed OAS institute. Perhaps the servicio units in various OAS countries would choose to emphasize private enterprise initiatives to create jobs, giving such activities priority status.

It must be said that however useful such a new multilateral technical assistance program might be, it can make only a limited and circumscribed contribution to the subregion's future well-being. Increased bilateral assistance--largely financial but also technical--greater access to the

- 41 -

advanced market economies, and, above all, achievement of internal
political and social stability by the countries themselves remain the
more central elements to a solution of the problems in this vital area.
This proposal, then, is hardly a panacea. But in helping to improve the
potential for growth in the subregion, it could be of strategic value for
enhancing the area's development prospects. More than anything else its
success depends upon the sensitivity and spirit of accommodation with
which it is examined and acted upon.

Many voices suggest that Central America is too overwhelmed by
domestic violence and upheaval now to give serious attention to
development. Unless civic order is restored, the argument runs, economic
progress cannot be revived. Yet perhaps this judgment should be turned
on its head. It may be that a strategic way to move towards social
stability and civic order is for the inter-American family, with the
cooperation of the United States, to mount a multi-pronged and heavy
development program for the isthmus.

THE SHORT RUN

Creation of a National Commission on Central America could prove a
solid step in the right direction towards effectively re-directing U.S.
foreign policy towards these neighboring countries. Economic and
political factors, though, both of an international and a domestic
nature, may well preclude immediate practical results from the formation

- 42 -

of such a commission. In consequence, expectations about its prospects
for achieving any dramatic or overnight reversal in U.S. policy should be
restrained, if at all possible.

Central America's economic picture continues bleak. The initial
gains flowing from the progress of the Central American Common Market
peaked out in the early 1970's. Guatemala and El Salvador were able
temporarily to compensate for this slowdown when, following the frost
that blighted Brazilian coffee in 1975, their coffee exports rapidly
increased. Just as suddenly, however, by 1980 this economic bloom wore
off and with Brazil now re-entering the international coffee market,
export earnings in Central America, with the possible exception of
cotton, should remain sluggish. At present regional reserves are low,
terror and violence are hurting economic momentum, in several countries
and the International Monetary Fund's standby arrangements are being
drawn into play. Venezuela and Mexico, moreover, which were providing
special oil facility arrangements for the region have announced they are
restricting these. Despite their peace-keeping initiatives under the
Contadora Group neither country appears to be in a position now to assist
Central America confront its major challenge--that of revitalizing its
economy.

Within this context, what are the prospects for transforming U.S.
policy towards the isthmus. In the short run--that is, until past the
1984 U.S. elections, these hardly seen bright. Commenting on Aristotle,
Aquinas remarked that politics is the operable of contingent variables.

- 43 -

[L]

In other words, these is little or no certainty in predicting outcomes
from any political decision and the determining factors as to whether a
specific course will succeed depends on a wise choice being made.

Immediately prior to a U.S. presidential election year, however,
wisdom is often in short supply. The economic factor looms largest in
Central America's horizons at present. Experts familiar with the area
believe that an external infusion of some $600-700 million annually for
the next five years could help countries over their current economic
hump. Yet when the Reagan administration asked for $150 million in 1981
for El Salvador, Congress decided on $ 50 million and the gap between
anticipated economic needs and actual outlays has and will probably
continue in a similar vein through 1984. There are few voters from
Central America found among the American public so it is not to be
expected that either political party will be able to focus its attention
seriously on isthmian development questions until after the election.

This makes all the more imperative formation of and serious work
under any national commission. While political miracles cannot be
expected, the commission could serve to help generate sufficient
bipartisan support for U.S. long range initiatives. There are required
if the United States is to shape its Central American policy into
stronger, more durable and permanent commitments. Pending completion of
the commission's work and subsequent congressional action, interim and
Jerry-built responses may well have to suffice. This places a premium on
statesmanship and diplomacy.

- 44 -

Politically, of course, the domestic problem in most of Central America is to open up the political systems so that more democratic norms and forms became possible. This requires a greater sharing of power among contending groups. Some U.S. experts have, however, misconstrued this situation by contending that the main political problem in the area would be solved if the United States would simply announce beforehand that it is willing to co-exist with any or all Marxist-Leninist regimes that happen to come into power along the isthmus.

This, however, is not the principal political problem facing either Central America domestically or outside countries, including the United States. As the post-war experience of Europe, especially that of France and Italy demonstrates, coalition governments composed of forces of the right, center and left are quite plausible outcomes even for larger democratic societies. Yet a countervailing difficulty arises, as happened in Portugal in 1974 when small communist or Marxist-Leninist parties refuse to accept the rules of democracy, attempt to overwhelm all other contending forces in a society that make revolutions possible, and then seize the reins of power exclusively for themselves. In the case of Portugal, of course, European democratic groups, including the Socialist International, stepped heavily into the picture to preclude this from happening. Why European democratic parties have not followed a similar course of action for Central America remains a major mystery. Some critics argued that it is because they are more concerned with embarrassing the United States or at least distancing themselves from its policy interests than with genuinely helping isthmian societies surmount the traumas now wracking their communities.

- 45 -

[c]

Whatever the rightness or wrongness of such arguments, the fact is
that Central America's transition to more open societies could be spurred
forward by broader, cooperative efforts from democratic forces in Europe,
the United States and Latin America generally. The fundamental issue
politically is not for the United States to announce beforehand that it
can live with leftist regimes; it routinely does that in every part of
the world. On the contrary the basic political issues involved in
Central America are two-fold: can domestic situations emerge which
permit more people and more organized political groups to shape and
determine their own participation in the political process of all
isthmian countries rather than to be subjected either to rule imposed
violently by the extreme right or the extreme left; and, will the regimes
which come into being not be aggressively antagonistic and hostile to
their neighbors to the point where international peace in the region is
constantly being threatened. As in 1928 with Charles Evans Hughes in
Havana the primary interest of the United States remains that it simply
wants peace on its borders. Experience attests that failing to find this
it feels insecure, as do most of its hemispheric neighbors. Experience
also evidences, moreover, that when its basic security interests are
threatened its chief executives, as President Kennedy demonstrated in
October 1962, cannot afford not to take decisive action appropriate to
given circumstances, regardless of what even its closest allies think
should be done.

- 46 -

(c)

THE LONG RUN

For over nine decades the United States and Latin America have sought to relate their interests to each other through a formal regional relationship. Since the formation of the OAS in 1948, in particular, a primary focus of their mutual concern has been Central America. However, in recent years, even though it hand a hard in the ouster of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua in 1979, the organization has not generally played a front and center role in the preservation of peace and planning for hemispheric development, especially in the crisis that has gripped Central America since the mid-1970's.

Most informed observers on the regional relationship believe it must be modernized and updated to take into account transformed conditions. Perhaps leadership will be forthcoming at highest regional levels to set such a process in motion. One critical challenge which would provide the triggering point to initiate this modernizing process for regional institutions might well be courses of action recommended under a U.S. National Commission on Central America. Despite any nagative feelings towards the United States, one conclusion can be drawn from regional history: Latin America best pursues its own interests when the United States is actively engaged with it in seeking to achieve certain common objectives.

The future of Central America now apparently hangs in the balance. For a broader democratic outcome all OAS members, especially the United

- 47 -

[LC]

States, would have to cooperate with the isthmian societies to help them overcome their existing agonies. However, forging either a new U.S. policy for the area or revitalizing the regional relationship so that it will impact more directly on the promotion of isthmian democracy, will not be work for the short-winded or for the short-term. Long-term 30 to 50 year commitments are in store for those seeking to inspire either Latin America or the United States as they attempt to ride out the historical whirlwind along the isthmus that serves as their common geographical bridge. That is why the proposal for a bipartisan Commission on Central America is both essential and necessary. Provided its thinking is grounded in reality rather than in fantasy, its deliberations and recommendations could lead to concrete and secure results for the entire hemisphere and not merely for the tiny sub-region of Central America.

2705A/0718/04

The
Economist

FROM THE EDITOR

Dr Henry A Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K Street NW
Washington DC 20006
USA

July 27, 1983

Dear Henry,

I was riding out a force nine-eleven gale off the southern tip of the Peloponnese when your commission was announced - so forgive the delay in writing to you about it. From such a distance, I can only express happiness and relief that America's outstanding public servant during the 1970s should be in service again.

I can imagine that there is less happiness and relief on your part. To have to report on such a problem during an election year is a task more unappetising than I can imagine. But you will better the best that can be made of it.

My worry is that the attention of the United States may be pre-empted for years to come by preoccupations to its south, those in central America and in the continent of Latin America itself. My hope, however, is that you and your colleagues will help turn the tide of domestic debate by meeting the main arguments head on that are advanced against America's participation in the region. There are, of course, the questions of balance of geopolitical power. But it seems to me that even the arguments of local central American interest should support American participation, civil and military. My fear is that the proponents of American intervention will rely too exclusively on the geopolitical arguments, while the opponents are allowed to get away too easily with arguments of local regional politics that can be turned back even on their own merits.

That, anyway, is a distant view.

Might I be able to stay with you and Nancy in New York for a night or two around October 21st? It would be

.../...

AUG 02 1983

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July 21, 1983

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 520
1800 K St. NW
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

We need a fundamentally new plan to stop the erosion of the free world to Marxism. The plan must be based on such high ideals that it will have overwhelming support by all factions and political groups that cherish freedom.

We have an opportunity and a critical need to establish such a plan right now in Central America which could reverse the tide there and serve as a model for the future.

I propose that we negotiate a treaty with Third World countries such as El Salvador which would include the following:

1. The Third World countries would agree to adopt a constitution which provides:

- Basic human and economic freedoms and the establishment of a Republic form of government.

- Equal treatment for foreign and local capital.

2. We would make a military alliance which guarantees the protection of their constitutional government against internal and external threat.

3. We would insure capital investment in the country against loss due to treaty violations and establish a free-trade relationship.

A positive plan, such as the above, backed up by a U.S. which was strong economically and militarily could turn back the tide of Communist domination.

I urge you to seriously consider this plan. The old approaches have not worked and time is running out.

JUL 25 1983

JEC:se

cc: Senator Charles H. Percy
Senator Alan J. Dixon

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P.O. Box 3591
San Francisco, California 94119-3591
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Richard B. Madden
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

July 25, 1983

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Center for International
& Strategic Studies
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 1021
Washington, D. C. 20006

JUL 27 1983

Dear Henry:

Thank you so very much for the delightful luncheon at The Pacific-Union Club in honor of President Valery Giscard d'Estaing. It surely was one of the most interesting and enjoyable luncheons I have ever had the pleasure to attend. I also hope you had a good weekend at the Grove.

Relative to our luncheon discussion on your most challenging new assignment, just two thoughts. First, I completely agree with you that your group should focus initially on the political, economic and social issues involved in Latin America and general agreement may well be possible. Second, I believe your thought about not forcing a single proposal on implementation is absolutely correct. Minority opinions are far superior than too bland a set of proposals. Furthermore, as you suggested, there may be a most useful technique in developing two (not the State Department's three) proposals. This approach would permit a clustering of opinions and focus the debate along more classic lines, much as was possible a few years ago when there was more party discipline in the Congress.

All of us at the American Enterprise Institute look forward to seeing you in Vail with President Ford this summer.

One Maritime Plaza, San Francisco, CA 94111-3576

Council for Inter-American Security

**Chairman**

Lt. Gen. Gordon Sumner, Jr.*
(USA-Ret.)
Santa Fe, New Mexico

**President**

L. Francis Bouchey
Author, International Affairs
Consultant

**Secretary**

Hon. Larry D. Pratt
President, American Society
of Local Officials

**Treasurer**

Richard W. Powell
Public Accountant

**General Counsel**

Michael Connelly
Attorney at Law
Baton Rouge, Louisiana

**Directors**

Dr. Robert W. Searby
Deputy Undersecretary for
International Affairs
Department of Labor

Patrick J. Buchanan
Author, Syndicated Columnist,
Commentator

Michael Carricarte
Carricarte Corporation
Miami, Florida

Col. Samuel T. Dickens
U.S.A.F.-Ret.
Falls Church, Virginia

Hon. Daniel A. Manion
Indiana State Senator

Dr. Lewis A. Tambs*
U.S. Ambassador to Colombia
Professor of History
Arizona State University

F. Andy Messing
Treasurer, National Defense Council

Dr. Robert Emmet Moffit
Severna Park, Maryland

Roger Reed
Editor, West Watch

JUL 29 1983

July 25, 1983

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Georgetown University Center
for Strategic and International Studies
18th & K St. NW
Washington, DC 20036

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

I applaud the attention that the new Kissinger Commission is giving to the development of a long-range strategic plan concerning Central America.

However, it is important to stress at the outset that in order for such a plan to win truly bipartisan support, it must provide for military and political security as well as economic development. The formulation of a strategy aimed at the resolution of fundamental socio-eclectic problems over the long term must not be allowed to become a smokescreen that diverts attention from the immediate necessity of turning back the short term military threat posed by forces supported by an extra-continental power.

Furthermore, we cannot overlook the fact that the foundation of economic development is a socially responsible market economy, not state socialism. Our efforts in Central America must be aimed at the development of a healthy competitive free enterprise system that will continue to create more wealth in the future.

Clearly, pumping money into government treasuries alone is not enough. Aid should be channeled through the private sector, and we should encourage entrepreneurship by lowering trade barriers and providing investment incentives. At the same time, the wholesale nationalization of banking, and imposition of a state monopoly on the trade of certain commodities, and the confiscation of property without due compensation must be discouraged.

*[on leave while in government service]*

729 Eighth Street, SE, Suite 200 • Washington, DC 20003 • (202) 543-6622

[L.C.]

Formulation and implementation of a long term
development plan for the entire Caribbean region--which
includes, but is not limited to, Central America has to
be conceived as part of, not an alternative to, the
active U.S. commitment to deny an extra-continental
power, namely the U.S.S.R. and its Cuban surrogates
from establishing territorial power bases in the
Americas. Just as the Marshall Plan was able to suc-
ceed because it was under the military umbrella of what
subsequently became NATO, so too, any Caribbean/Central
American development initiative will have to be pro-
tected by a similar security commitment.

We at the Council for Inter-American Security have
for years urged the formulation of an integrated policy
approach to Latin America that properly addresses the
military, economic and social problems of the region.
I trust that you will propose the kind of measures that
we can support enthusiastically.

Yours truly,

L. Francis Bouchey
President

The Graduate School and University Center
of the City University of New York

Albert Schweitzer Chair in the Humanities
Graduate Center: 33 West 42 Street, New York, N.Y. 10036
212 790-4261

July 25, 1983

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 400
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Henry:

I am sure you are flooded with advice these days, and I have no wish to add to your burdens. But a couple of points do occur to me.

First, you must recognize that, seen from the outside, this Central American commission seems to be in a different class from the earlier Reagan commissions. The social security commission was set up to resolve a genuine perplexity. Its membership covered a wide range of views, from Alan Greenspan to Claude Pepper. The Scowcroft commission was set up less to resolve a genuine perplexity than to win acceptance for a projected course of action; but, since the action was still projected, the Scowcroft commission had a certain freedom of decision, though not nearly so much as the social security commission.

Your commission appears to be set up not to resolve a perplexity but to ratify policy already decided upon and already in place. This impression may not be an accurate representation of your charter. But it would appear to be verified every day by the administration's evident determination to commit the country to a military course long before the commission completes its work. It is verified too by the composition of the commission, which, so far as the public knows, contains no active critics of the administration's policy -- no moral equivalents of Claude Pepper.

My second point is that, since the commission does not offer much prospect of internal debate, you should make a systematic effort to expose the members to adversary testimony. If you make your judgments only on the basis of information provided by the government itself, no one will take you seriously. It would serve the interests not only of your recommendations but of the reputation of the commission to make sure its members listen to

JUL 27 1983