TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Frank Sinatra

1:34 p.m. 4/16/73

HK: Frank--you don't want to see me because you think I am a warmonger.
Admit it. You've gone peacenik on me.

FS: Oh sure, some peacemaker. I don't know what the hell happened to me
--we went to the Carriage House--I woke up about 5:30 this morning
and was terribly sick to my stomach.

HK: I am sitting here with Nancy Maginnes eating lousy White HOuse food.

FS: Oh I am sorry Henry, I just thought I wouldn't be able to make it throug
lunch. I'm just lying around and taking it easy. I feel exhausted.

HK: Well we need you tomorrow.

FS: Oh, I'll be all right. I'm ever going to rehearsal this afternoon at 5:00

HK: No, no you did the right thing, but I want you to know I'll miss you.

FS: Well, I'll see you Henry. I might even peek in there before I go in
the East Room.

HK: Oh, I'll be at the performance. Are you coming to dinner?

FS: Yes, I'm going to dinner, but I'm coming to the WH this afternoon to
rehearse.

HK: Oh you are? I'm going to New York around 3:00

FS: Oh, all right, I'll see you tomorrow.

HK: Good.

FS: I'm sorry about lunch, Henry, I don't think I'd been good company.

HK: That you couldn't be--I mean you couldn't be bad company under any
conditions.

FS: Have a good trip and I'll see you tomorrow--make my apology to Nanc
will you.

HK: I will -- all the best.

DECLASSIFIED

Authoritg EO1295C
BY NARA Date 6/13/01

TELCONE
Dr. Kissinger/William Clements

4/16/73 1:56 p.m.

HK: Bill?

WC: Yes, hi, Henry.

HK: Well, I've noticed that Friedheim has done exactly what we've told him not to do.

WC: How's that.

HK: The U.S. is considering whether we will resume bombing in Laos. Now GD it does us no good to start that debate before Hanoi's even protesting. That gives our opponent an eight hour head start. I just am in despair over the way this Government is running and I'm getting ready to tell the President that some really major surgery is needed.

WC: My God, Dan Murphy left the room to go out there and call Jerry Friedheim.

HK: Well, I, to me these WSAG meetings are like a bunch of recalcitrant schoolboys.

WC: I agree with you.

HK: There is no enthusiasm. I mean when they don't want to do something, they lose us with proposals. We never get a proposal to do something. After all the ceasefire is being violated every day. It isn't our job in the White House to drive you all. And here this is in total violation of what we told him to do and I would like to know one rational reason why we have to trigger Congress. We could have had another day of freedom from Congressional screaming.

WC: Well, I'll just have to call him, Henry, and find out because I thought that was all taken care of.

HK: Yes, but what I want to make clear, Bill, is from now on, this stuff isn't free any more. I'm just going to drag department heads into the President and one of us is going to go. Because I'm just sick and tired of these performances at the WSAG and I'm sick and tired of my personally having to call every subordinate bloody officer in order to get Presidential orders carried out. That's what department heads are there for.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO12951

Dated: 6/12/94

-2-

WC: Well now, Henry, do you feel that in any way we're dragging our feet over here on trying to support what you're trying to do?

HK: I don't know who is dragging their feet, but there is never any, never two people who just snap to and do it. Now if, you were at this meeting, Bill. I know you are on our side.

WC: Damn right.

HK: I'm not yelling at you.

WC: I hope not.

HK: Just trying to give you ammunition.

WC: Alright.

HK: All I know, Bill, is--you know what I said at that meeting.

WC: I do.

HK: Anyone wants to challenge it, we can go together to the President. That's fair enough. But this is what the original proposal was. We said it shouldn't take place this way, and to go right ahead and do it anyway.

WC: I just don't understand it. And Henry, I will get right into this one. I'm sorry to be in the position of putting out these damn little old fires like this for you.

HK: I know it.

WC: It's a shame.

HK: If you want my frank opinion, I don't have Defense. But the only guy I feel I can call in Defense and get enthusiastic support is you.

WC: Well.

HK: Everybody else I call I have the sense that I am engaged in a battle with a bunch of fat lawyers who are trying to cut corners, and I don't have the sense, now, exempting Moorer.

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph E01255

By: XUARA DED: 01/14/94

*

-3-

WC: Excuse Tom on that because he is enthusiastic and he wants to do what you want him to.

HK: But here we are, the President is taking the heat. He's willing to do something. I've been on the phone yesterday afternoon for hours.

WC: I know that.

HK: Scowcroft was in the office all day. No one else is in any department and the next thing we know the thing runs out after less than 24 hours.

WC: I would have thought ...

HK: That wasn't your fault. I mean, there's nothing you could do, but don't you think if you were in charge of a department you'd be out there on top of your Ambassador to make sure this thing is going to run like clockwork?

WC: I damn sure would have and I didn't know until this morning when this came up that that Ambassador had in fact cleared every time targets had been in Laos. I did not know that.

HK: Well, it's the first time that the Ambassador, who's been on our back all the time for bombing constantly, is cancelling strikes. Now if he had said all I want is an 18-hour strike, we'd never have approved it.

WC: No, certainly not, you wouldn't. You wouldn't start it for that reason.

HK: I mean why should we throw away our prestige on stuff like that.

WC: That's right, you wouldn't have. It's a damn shame...

HK: Now on top of that, now your spokesman is getting us into the soup of the Congressmen for nothing.

WC: GD, I don't understand him saying that.

HK: But I think Friedheim must be told now that anyone who can't carry out White House orders ought to look for another job.

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/ Sec. Richardson

2:03 4/16/73

HK: Hello, Elliot?

ER: Hello, Henry. Bill
I've just been filled in by Tom and / on the meeting this morning--
they are chewing over where we go from here.

HK: Well there are two problems, one is the meeting and the other is
Jerry Friedheim. And it's just getting impossible to do serious
business this way. I mean there is nothing to be gained--I'm deluged
--not I have 8 phone calls stacked up from press guys. We are now
in the middle of a Laos bombing debate when we are not even bombing.
CINPAC will have to confirm it within the next hour when they do
their briefing and for nothing. We are in the middle of a debate 24
hours before it was necessary and in direct violation in what both
Scowcroft and I conveyed as Presidential wishes. That's one aspect.
The other one is these WSAG meetings are getting intolerable. It's
like a reform school. I sit there giving the President's views and
the whole goddamn bureaucracy --they're shooting at it. We get 10
memos on why we can't fly off Libya. We don't get one on what we
can do on Cambodia. And I'm just going to force a showdown in front
of the President and let him see whether he wants to run the govern-
ment that why if it keeps up this way.

ER: I'm not sure I understand.

HK: This doesn't necessarily affect Defense in every category, but the
Friedheim thing is unnecessary and this constant--

ER: That's too bad. I haven't seen the transcript of what he said yet

HK: He said we are considering bombing.
So the next thing that will be asked at CINPAC is "have you bombed"?
Which he'll have to say "yes".

ER: It's too bad all right. I think it's a consequence of handing him a note
in the middle of the briefing.

HK: But the note specifically said not to say that.

ER: Yeh, I haven't --

HK: We discussed it at WSAG and he was told yesterday by Scowcroft not
to do that.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized E01295C

BY XA RA Date 6/12/73

Page 2

ER: Well I haven't had a chance to talk to him yet.

HK: The President's strategy may look irrational, but it isn't. One can make a good case for the fact that that his opponents are going to produce the most irrational situation. The President feels that the only chance we have got is not to let the other guys calibrate the price that they have to pay at each stage. What one sees over the edge, he's going to do something out of proportion, and he socked him into stopping it. That's his strategy, now it may be wrong, but the record would prove that it hasn't been in the past.

ER: I think that's right. Well, we have been thinking about what and I agree it was a mistake for Friedheim to get into this at this point, but the question is now, how rapidly can we follow up and on what grounds do we put it on and what kind of foundation if any does it have and that involves--

HK: Well we have to get Souvanna's okay.

ER: We certainly have to be sure he doesn't say we did it against his protest or something. Because he could pull the rug on it. We've also been thinking about what could we do by way of pegging a sharp reaction to the violation inherent in the turn and expansion of the SAM missile site defenses at Caison. Which give the earlier history even its in itself, a substantial justification for reaction.

HK: The North Vietnamese have given us a very insolent reply to a very conciliatory message by us. Now it is not that we are made, but it's just they should have the feeling that when they get hit--that --that there are brutal reactions.

ER: Let me ask you Henry--you told me that there had been that reply, but I don't have at this point any sense of--did we have specific violations?

HK: We've been citing specific violations every time we received them--they just flatly denied that they are bringing in any armaments and they are charging us with bringing armaments in illegally. They don't admit that they have brought in one gun. And now they have said we have no right to express a view at all since we are out.

Page. 3

ER: Let me run over the summary I just tried to articulate.

HK: No, we don't have to continue this week in Laos, Eliott, we can wait for a better opportunity. We had originally no intention of doing anything this week in Laos.

ER: We could stand for the moment on the assistance requested by Souvanna at Tav Yen (sp). What I'd like to do is --let me just review for you where we were when you called. I was trying to restate the summarized situation in these terms. So far as the justification for some action is concerned, we have three present situation and one potential one. The 3 present situations are (1) requested help for the RLG at Tav Yang. (2) the continuing violations of Article 20 inherent in the use of Laotian/Cambodian territory for the introductic of men and materiel into South Vietnam. (3) is the violation of South Vietnamese territory itself that is involved in the reintroduction of SAM missiles and the expansion in the number of SAM sites at Ka San (4) is the potential we might have if Schlesinger is right and there is significant offensive launched in the vicinity of Quang Tri. Now the problem at the moment it seems to me is we haven't really thought of just what we are doing. The problem with a combination of reaction t help Souvanna at Vieng and striking the trails in Laos is that it won't be very plausible that --to include in the trail targets--

HK: Plausible to whom?
The average American doesn't know where anything is in relation to
anything else in Laos.

ER: No, but --I just saying it is an inherent problem in this --what we are doing is to help Souvanna or whether what we are doing is to react against the persistent violation of--

HK: Well we have one other problem, Eliott is that insolent North Vietnam message.

ER: Yeh, if the message is a message designed directed to the response to our calling their attention to persistent violations, then the relevance of the message is that we have reacted because --

HK: But these fellows of Hanoi--

ER: They don't understand any other language.

HK: They are very crude. All they understand is brutality or deviousness

ER: I understand. But what I am saying is that we have to make up our
mind why we are doing what we are doing and it is one thing to say
that we're doing it because Souvanna asked us to do it and quite anothe

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12955
Date 6/13/69
By: XIA

*

Page 4

because they have persisted in flagrant violation of the agreement,
notwithstanding our constructive conciliatory, etc., etc.

HK: We are doing it to give them a shock. And give them a sense that we are just on the verge of going out of control and that they might be next.

ER: That may be the reasoning in the sense that that may be the message we want them to get, but we need some communicable rationale which in turn can affect what kind of foundation we lay for it. If we are helping Souvanna, then the only foundation we need is Souvanna's okay. If we are also alternatively using the rationale that they engaged in a serious violation and so on, then that could affect whether we--what other steps we take--

HK: Hold on a second [end of tape] [beging second tape]
That would be a little drastic--we are sending a message to Godley
which Porter and Sullivan are now drafting and we'll try to get a reply-
I think we should try to have a WSAG meeting--we have unfortunately
Andreotti coming tomorrow--could we have one at 8:30 in the morning?
I'll schedule it for 8:80 because we can't order anything before tomorrow
morning anyhow.

ER: Okay, in the meanwhile on the Friedheim bit--should we tell CINPAC to shut up or to confirm that--

HK: I don't see how he can fail to confirm it.

ER: I think that's probably right, especially since we have an intercept
from ____ 88th DRV regiment reporting the strike--866th DRV
regiment in Laos has already reported the strike to whomever they
report to.

HK: But we were hoping to gain 12 hours.

HK:

ER: I understand. / They wouldn't start screaming until 10:00 tonight and could save ourselves a day excitement here.

ER: I know--it's too bad, but I think the problem really is in what we use as the reason for further action, against trail targets and whether or not we include the Khe Sanh targets--

HK: Or whether we use that Route 7 tangatax

ER: As Thomas pointed out, we deny ourselves a lot of the best--

Khe Sanh

HK: I know but if you go into Kx Sanh you might just as well hit all over South Vietnam.

*

Page 5

ER: Yeh, you could hit in that vicinity. The thing again is that you have to change the explanation. We can hit Khe Sang itself on either grounds. (1) its a violation (2) you can't fulfill Souvanna's request with respect to the trail.

HK: But we won't get a Souvanna request--we'll get a Souvanna acquiescence. We have to wait now until we get an answer from Souvanna--

ER: You see what I am saying.

HK: We don't want to be caught, if we do something, between those who say nothing and those who say everything. Because the end result will still be nothing.

ER: I understand. I am saying though that it is important to be clear about what our rationale is both because it is going to be the public posture we stand on and also because it can affect what associated steps we take.

HK: That's right. We have get in North Vietnamese violations of Article 20 --that is our rationale. The mere request for assistance of Souvanna isn't enough.

ER: I think you are right. But we have also laid a foundation already on Khe Sang and the fact that they evidently felt guilty enough about it, so when you couple their earlier acts in moving those missiles, in response to our protest with their present insolence and disregard of most recent conciliatory efforts to achieve agreement and then if you could combine this with some follow up by way of a white paper addressed to the signatories of the subsequent Paris conference you know we might be able to get this on an international offenses.

HK: Yeh.

ER: The point to me it seems to some extent the rationale drives the steps we take including the selection of targets--and including what we say--

HK: No, first we have--

ER: and finally concluding what if any international diplomatic political move we make--

HK: I think we should first decide our strategy--we'll find the rationale afterwards. I mean I agree the rationale will affect it--but the rationale we have to stand on is violation of the agreement. Specifically Art. 20 Article 7 and Article 15.

Page 6

ER: This is about where I was--and we are at a point where I ought to give it a little more consecutive thought--this caught up with me over the weekend and I talked to Haig on Friday morning--Henry optimally to you, it would be good to be able to do some pretty violent combination of things which are rapidly followed by the disclosure of the extnet to which they have been obdurate in, insulting, etc., and including our--like the--box who kicks his opponent in the groin and then -- falls to the canvas clutch his gut and hollering foul--

HK: Every time you--you publish a white paper and you will be in an endless debate with every peacenik, liberal journalist in the country.

ER: That may not be a necessary or desirable ingredient, but it does seem to me though that we ought to be able to think of a way of combining a violent action and a way of hollering to the empire that it is their fault.

HK: Okay, well let me run a little counter to also the fact that we are now talking to the Russians and the Chinese. We also want to do something violent enough so that the Russians and Chinese have a handle to talk to them.

ER: I don't think it runs counter Henry, because if we did want to holler to the empire--in this case the signatories of the Paris March Agreement or February--we would need to have done some work on the Chinese or the Russians or else--

HK: I have to run off because I am going off to New York--

ER: Okay, we'll continue to chew it over so as to be as well prepared as we can for tomorrow's meeting.

HK: Good, excellent, bye.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EO12557
 By: A MRA DEC 01 1994

TELECON

Ambassador Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

2:30 p.m., April 16, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: ...Now we have to come back with an answer.

S: How did you know they'd done that?

K: Well, it's on the radio -- Hanoi radio. And they've announced that they've sent it to all the

S: God, that's going to generate into a

K: Yeh, but what basis do we have for doing any military thing in the face of this when they're charging us with violations.

S: I suppose we have to cuff one on their violations. OK, for circulation to all the members.

K: That's right and answering theirs. Can we have it tomorrow morning?

S: (Laughs) I'll try, I'm going up on the Hill this afternoon with two of these damn Wilson appointments, but I'll get some people working on it right now.

K: OK. And we have something here which we'll send over to you which is just a compilation of intelligence reports so we will -- and I'm going to have a WSAG meeting at 8:30 tomorrow morning.

S: 8:30?

K: Yeh.

S: OK. Have you seen my message to Godley?

K: Yes, Scowcroft will call you with - I'd like some changes in it.

S: Could he call Eliot because I literally am taking off for the Hill right now.

K: We're never going to get an answer.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01295F
By: XARA Date: 6/14/74

2

S: Well, Eliot can make the changes in it.

K: I don't trust - Eliot, Ted Eliot?

S: Ted Eliot, yeh. Well then we have to redraft it and send it over.

K: Well, then we have to redraft it and send it over.

S: I'm sorry but this is another branch of the White House which is sending me up on the Hill.

K: For what?

S: Oh, they got this goddamn interview program going on in which we're supposed to talk to all these people who are taking a sounding on our foreign policy. And I spend about half of my time up there. I'll be finished by tomorrow I guess. OK.

K: OK, thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

Author: E01295C

Date: 6/12/01

By: NARA

TELCOM

Dr. Kissinger/Dr. William Kintner

4/16/73 3:30 p.m.

WK: Hi, Henry how are you?

HK: All right, how are you?

WK: Oh pretty good, I was sitting here talking about this with Al Haig and John Lehman and I think that you've really ______ me in such a way that there is not much I can do except go along with it. Nothing I look forward to with any great ______, but I gather there is a possibility of making it work and I have a lot of research and talking and thinking to do, but before we finally get down to cases, I'd like to have a chance with you and a few others to develop concrete--

HK: No question. Well what we would like to do is to send over to the State Department this afternoon a presidential directive getting you appointed and I think we have to show the determination to take some drastic action and I am delighted you are doing it. I think you are--you are the President's personal choice and whatever backing we can give you--

WK: I'll need a hell of a lot of backing, because personally on the outside it's a pretty messy situation.

HK: It's a messy situation and you have a mission that determines to maintain a low profile.

WK: When will I have a chance to see you?

HK: I'm going off to New York--really not effectively before Thursday, or Friday would be even better.

WK: I have to --can we make it Thursday because I have to get back -- I'm going to get down here all week with this conference Dick ______ is working up ______ Hutchins--you know about that one.

HK: We'll make it Thursday.

WK: Let's make it Thursday for sure.

HK: Good. Call Dick Campbell and he'll work it out.

WK: Take care.

HK: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED

DELEGATION
BY: MARA DAE: 04/17/04

TELCORN
Dr. Kissinger/John Andrews

4/17/73 9:30 a.m.

JA: ...You got my wife mixed up with someone else again.

HK: I know, I know. That's the greatest credit I've been giving
you.

JA: OK.

HK: Although I like your wife.

JA: You liked my wife even better than Bonnie, really, I have
to tell you.

HK: No, I like your wife. I've met her at Camp David.

JA: That's right.

HK: Listen, I've got two questions. One, how long does it take to
read a double-spaced page. I'm doing a speech on Atlantic
affairs, which I hope will be somewhat important.

JA: We figure 120 to 130 words a minute for the President and
there's about twice that on a double-spaced page, so it's about
two minutes to a page.

HK: Two minutes to a page. OK. So I've got to cut it substantially.
I've got about 40 minutes and I need 20. Second, would you be
willing to work on that when we get an acceptable draft?

JA: I'd be delighted. When is the event?

HK: A week from today, but I would like to have a rough draft by
Thursday so I can give it to the British or discuss it with the
British.

JA: Who's doing the drafting right now?

HK: Peter Rodman and Bill Hyland.

JA: OK. Well, I'll be glad to plug in with them at any time.

HK: They'll have something that you can look at tomorrow morning.

JA: Fine.

TELCONE

Gaylord Shaw/Kissinger

12:53 p.m. - 4/17/73

K: Hello.

S: Hi,

K: How are you?

S: Fine, Doctor, how are you today?

K: Fine. I enjoyed the dinner the other day.

S: I did too, I'm so glad you could be with us.

K: I thought about that question you asked me about that song and while it's true that I like it, it's really not very appropriate.

S: OK.

K: You know it really would compound the megalomaniac impression I make anyway.

S: (Laughs) I don't think it would but I will

K: You know how it will look and I know the intention will be not bad but

S: OK, what's your second favorite song then?

K: Oh god, I'll let you pick it out. I'm not that musical. You pick anything appropriate other than the German National Anthem.

S: (Laughs) OK. I'll come up with one. I'll pass word along and make sure that it doesn't come up then.

K: I'd appreciate this and it's extremely thoughtful.

S: OK. Fine. Thank you so much.

DECLASSIFIED

DEW12950

D: 12 MARA Dae 01/17/91

Telcon

Kirk Douglas

April 17, 1973; 3:05 p.m.

D: Henry.

K: Hello, Kirk. How are you?

D: Good. How are you?

K: OK.

D: Last night I was a Rabbi and officiated at the - at a Seder service.

K: (laughs) I'll bet that was eloquent.

D: It really was interesting. This morning I read an interesting article where Dr. Kissinger told from a speech he gave at the Federal City Club.

K: Oh, yeah. Where was that?

D: In the Los Angeles Times, which I thought was excellent.

K: Really?

D: Was this part of it or the entire speech? No, it's excerpted.

K: That was the end of it. The rest of it was sort of a parody on intelligence reports.

D: Oh, cause I thought...I don't see how it could be an excerpt because it seems to follow so completely.

K: No, it had two parts. The first part was sort of funny, or an attempt to be funny.

D: Yeah.

K: And the second part was this. I didn't know they printed it. Where was it, on the editorial?

D: Excellent. Yeah, on the Los Angeles Times. I'll send it to you.

K: No, I've got the Times here.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized FO1295R

D: XARA Dts: 6/17/73

-2-

D: Just opposite on the -- in the editorial section, you know, on the other side.

K: Right. You're coming here this weekend?

D: Yes. I'm coming with Eric and I tell you why I called because I hope we'll have a chance to see you. You know Monday is Ann's birthday and I was thinking of having a little dinner party, just a small group, in Washington before we go back to New York, and I'm trying to get -- Bobby's gonna, because I'm going to meet Bobby in New York. He's going to go on Wednesday.

K: Who's Bobby?

D: Bobby Evans.

K: Oh, yeah.

D: You remember him.

K: Oh, yeah, he's trying to sign me for a...

D: (laughs) And he's got something he's going to try to get out of. And I want to sort of surprise Ann with just a little dinner with just about 10 people.

K: Well I am in New York actually on Monday to speak at the Associated Press but I could conceivably get back for dinner.

D: Well, I don't want to inconvenience you, but Ann would be so thrilled if you could, but why don't we do this - we'll play it by ear. I will go ahead probably ask Joe and Tom, something simple, you know. I don't want a big...

K: Well, look you are friends of mine.

D: Sure, it's friends that understand if you are tied up you can't make it. If you can it's wonderful, you know?

K: You sound like my former mother in law used to say - I said something hurts you, she said only on the right side, don't bother, it only comes out in emotional stress. (laughter) Don't be so goddamed understanding, I can't stand it. No, you are nice.

D: Well, look, what I was going to say was the least you could do, Henry, was to be there.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized E012954

BY: NARA DECE 09/17/94

--3-

K: That's my friend. Look, I'll do my damnedest.

D: All right.

K: And the later the better for me. But are you going to leave that night?

D: Oh, no, I thought we'd leave the next day.

K: Good, so you could have it at a regular dinner hour. You wouldn't have to do it at 6:30.

D: No, since I've conducted this Seder I think we have to eat as the sun is setting. (laughter) You know what I mean, somehow at sundown...Oh, I even had Ann light the candles. Look you may see a different Annie Kirk that night. If you see an inspired look on her face, you understand, it's this new emotional religious experience.

K: Well, you've been playing these religious fanatics at various times. And I will become an Old Testament prophet.

D: But it was nice, it was nice.

K: No, that's the same as my parents. Well look, unless something totally unforeseen happens I'll make it my business to get back.

D: That would be wonderful.

K: And if, you know, I'll have to stay in New York I know until about 5:30 or so. But you know I have my own plane, so if I get on the plane around 6:00.

D: Wait a minute. I have another thought. This might be more convenient. We are coming back to New York Tuesday morning. Suppose I told Bobby we'll go to New York Monday afternoon and we'll have dinner in New York.

K: Well, that's a possibility. I'd have to leave around 10:30. But that's all right. We could eat around 8:00.

D: That might be more...

K: Well, I'll make it either place. We can do it in Washington; I'll be back.

D: All right, then, let's plan on that and see what happens.

-4-

K: Yes, let's plan for Washington.

D: OK.

K: And I'll see you Saturday night, anyway, I understand.

D: What's cooking Saturday night? Is that a...

K: Oh, Tony is...

D: Tony's giving a...

K: Tony's planning to take you to see A Midsummer Night's Dream which Nancy Maginnes has vetoed. So now she's going to be down here so I'm going to look for something else. (laughter) You don't have any voice in this.

D: No. So far it sounds terrible (laughs).

K: Is there anything you would like to do so we can veto that?

D: Not at all. I am amenable to anything.

K: Would you like us to get a few people together? Would that be more fun for you? Seriously?

D: I really don't care, Henry. Whatever - you know me, I'm as flexible... whatever. I'm not going to help you with those decisions, Henry, because I have all these religious decisions. I've got letters to Rabbis to write and all these things. How can I -- I mean I'm making these decisions about what to do on Saturday night in Washington.

K: OK, just don't have a beard when you get there.

D: No, not quite so soon.

K: OK.

D: But in any event, we look forward to seeing you.

K: Terrific.

D: No matter what, we see you Saturday, and then we can finalize what would be the best way to arrange something which I would love to do to sort of make an obstacle to ____.

K: And whatever it is, I'll be there.

D: OK. I look forward to it. Goodbye.

DECLASSIFIED

Author: EO1295L
Date: 6/13/01
By: MIRA DOD

TelCon

Amb. Porter/Mr. Kissinger

4:10 pm, April 17, 1973

K: Hello.

P: Yes, Henry.

K: Bill, you are redrafting that note--I understand Sullivan is out of town.

P: The note to the Vietnamese?

K: Yeah.

P: Well, he didn't go out of town before he started to work on it.

K: Well, I just want to make sure we are getting a draft the first thing in the morning.

P: Oh, we'll get you a draft one way of another. I'll check on the progress right away.

K: And it should be very tough.

P: You want it to be tough.

K: And the President wants to add to it a charge that they have not given us an adequate accounting for the missing in action.

P: Okay.

K: Including a word about nine indicators where we even have pictures and gave them files which they've never responded to.

P: They have files on about nine cases of that kind?

K: Well I don't know how many, but there were quite a few.

P: All right.

K: And we want to put our charges in first and only then rebut theirs.

P: Put our charges first.

K: Right.

P: Okay, all right, anything else.

K: No.

P: I'll take care of it right away. K: Thank you.

Telecon

Mr. Kissinger
Senator "Scoop" Jackson

4/17/73; 4:53 p.m.

J: Henry, Scoop.

K: Scoop, how are you?

J: Fine, fine.

K: How is my favorite incorruptable Senator ?

J: (Laughter) Not incorruptable, incorrigible!

K: Incorrigible always.

J: Incorruptable.

K: Uncharmable.

J: (Laughter) Are you going to be at this thing tomorrow?

K: Yeah, and Scoop, I was wondering whether you would like to come in at 8:00 so that I could review with you what is going to be discussed in the second half of it.

J: Well, I will try to get down a little early. I am going down to North
Caroline tonight and maybe I can get in there about ten after. I've got to pack
and go home. I am going to Seattle tomorrow and I am in a real jam.

K: Right. Well come in so that I can talk to you.

J: I'll come in to your office.

K: And I wanted you to know you're the only person with whom we're going to talk in advance so we're not setting you up for any discussion, you know.

J: Yeh, I understand. All right.

K: But I'd like to give you a little feeling about some exchanges we've had with
the Soviets.

J: All right.

K: That at least you should be aware of.

J: Where is the meeting? Is the meeting going to be in the President's office or is it going to be over in. . the White House.

DECLASSIFIED
Authorship EO 12951
Date 6/17/73
BY XARA

2

K: It's going to be in the Cabinet Room first, but I think he may take some of you into his office. And he isn't going to ask you to do anything right on the spot.

J: No, no, well I'll listen.

K: But uh...

J: I've just taken a firm position on this and I see no reason to...

K: Well, what we would like to do is tell you some information which you don't have and then we know you're going to make up your own mind.

J: Right.

K: But I just thought it might help you if you had twenty minutes.

J: I want to give you a copy of LeCours (sp?) piece. We had him up today. He was damn good on the terminology that we've been kicking around for so much, you know, from detente to peaceful coexistence. He's damn good.

K: Outstanding.

J: He's a first-rate scholar.

K: Absolutely.

J: I'll bring a copy for you tomorrow.

K: Come as close to 8 as you can. Will you have had breakfast or should I have

J: No, I'll have had breakfast. I'll have a cup of tea with you.

K: Good. Excellent. Look forward to seeing you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz
E012954
Date: 9/1/64
BY: NARA

TELCONE (Secure Phone)

Moorer/Kissinger

5:50 p.m. - 4/17/73

K: Hello.

M: Henry.

K: Yes, Tom.

M: I've got those two actions pretty well chaped up now. I know you wanted to see them tonight but any time tomorrow that you'd like me to I'll come over and explain them to you.

K: Good, tomorrow afternoon.

M: Anytime you say.

K: Why don't we say 2:30. Is that convenient or would you rather do it later?

M: I would rather do it later - say 4 o'clock or 5. I have a JCS meeting at that time.

K: Let's do it at 5.

M: Good, I will be there.

K: Good, that would be helpful. You have one that slopped over the DMZ.

M: Yes.

K: We won't need them before tomorrow. I think we will wait for the next provocation. I'll see you tomorrow afternoon.

M: OK, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
Original EO 1295C
Date 04/13/73
By: MARA

Tel Con

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:20 pm, April 17, 1973

K: Anatol!

D: Yes. Hello Henry.

K: I'm sending over a paper to you of some ideas on economic things.

D: Right now?

K: Yes.

D: It's very good because really it's better for him, Brezhnev, it would
like to have a more clear picture.

K: It's not very precise but at least it may give you some ideas.

D: Some ideas, all right.

K: I'll send it right over.

D: Okay.

K: Now, on this draft, I just an running out of ideas. If you prefer to
say assert a maximum effort?

D: They will do everything necessary, maybe?

K: Well "everthing necessary'is then a total commitment.

D: I think it is not really, it's a preventative development, of situation
capable, incidentally commitment on such a very nature, did you not,
laughingly. So he propose everything to do, or as second but I think
it is a very clumsy English, he gave a second but I didn't really propose
it to you. Second, I translate from Russian, in English I don't like plenty
but--they will add: "so as to prevent" or they add in such a way as
to prevent-- is it better for you.

K: No.

D: He gave me two possibilities. First, everything or all.

K: Can I call you around 11:00 tonight?

D: You let me answer--my impression they are going to have a meeting

10/10/73
By: N.A.Y.G.
DECLASSIFIED
 authority
 25 Nov 73
W.

of Central Committee and Brezhnev will have some answers, that is
my impression.

K: I will send you that economic thing now.

D: Okay, but I definitely will until 11:00, that is no problem, it doesn't
matter.

K: Okay, I'll call you tonight.

D: Tonight, but of course I want to send it today.

K: Good.

D: We'll do whatever you say, we'll do "everything", if not--everything
you may imply, possible, everything.

K: How about exert the maximum effort?

D: I think you done gave better--we will do maximum to prevent--maximum
what? You couldn't say maximum, no!

K: No, that's like everything.

D: Yeah, maximum effort, this is not really as it stands here, it doesn't
really--no--

K: I don't know why he's wanting to change it, it's perfectly--

D: No, I don't have no idea really, when you maybe in Moscow you may
discuss with him, for me I think utmost---

K: Well, we could leave it open until the time when I'm in Moscow if worse
comes to worse.

D: Well, but he would like to have it now, because it will be a session of
their--he will probably make it a further plan so to speak, in this case

K: Okay, let me see what I can do.

D: He pressed me to get this one, tkey didn't have a question except for
this one, you can make it clear when you will be there and continue it,
but here he would like to have it--because in Russian as he translate it
--I translate it differently, but he translate it in a -- said it's rather weak.
Possibility, in Russian it does not sound really, I like rather well, but
to translate in Russian, you will say they will do everything to prevent--
but it's really everything necessary. But the utmost you translate in
English, but in Russian it's saying everything possible, so when it is
possible it's a question he doesn't like. He doesn't like the possible

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01205
By W.W. Parry Date 05/04/54

Tel Con
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:20 pm, April 17, 1973

K: Anatol!

D: Yes. Hello Henry.

D: Right now?

K: Yes.

D: It's very good because really it's better for him, Breshnev, it would
like to have a more clear picture.

D: Some ideas, all right.

K: I'll send it right over.

D: Okay.

K: Well "everthing necessary" is then a total commitment.

K: No.

JSS5533
DECE 9/16/73
By: NARAYANAN

2

K: Good.

D: I think you does gave better--we will do maximum to prevent--maximum what? You couldn't say maximum, no!

D: He pressed me to get this one, they didn't have a question except for this one, you can make it clear when you will be there and continue it, but here he would like to have it--because in Russian as he translate it --I translate it differently, but he translate it in a -- said it's rather weak. Possibility, in Russian it does not sound really, I like rather well, but to translate in Russian, you will say they will do everything to prevent-- but it's really everything necessary. But the utmost you translate in English, but in Russian it's saying everything possible, so when it is possible it's a question he doesn't like. He doesn't like the possible

DECLASSIFIED

JS551209

09/11/69

BY NARA DCC 09

TelCon
Hal Sonnenfeldt/Mr. Kissinger

6:35 pm, April 17, 1973

K: Hal

S: Yes.

K: That God damned Dobrynin is bugging me about that everything.

S: Do everything.

K: Yeah.

S: Have they discovered that the Russian is the same.

K: It's the same, so when you say do the utmost--

S: Yeah.

K: They want to get rid of the word possible. What if we say "do everything in their power".

S: It doesn't me.

K: Well, will it bother the Europeans.

S: No, no, I mean: do the utmost, do everything in their power--
it's a nuance, it's--

K: He wants to say do everything necessary.

S: That's even better. Everything in their power--we have a tre-
mendous amount of power, that if you take it literally, but
everything necessary--

K: Everything necessary to avoid confrontation.

S: Yeah, but that's your valued judgment, what we consider necessary.
That can be explained. And we would do that in any case.

K: You think we can accept that.

S: I think "do everything necessary to avoid confrontation" is better
than "do everything in their power".

K: Okay, thank you.

S: Okay.

2

K: Give it another half hour's thought and call me back.

S: Okay. I'm not sure of the text we are operating on now. But it's the same basic when we had this a couple of days ago.

K: Yeah, there's no change.

S: It's all over this one phrase then. Well the Russians could change their own translation. We could continue to say "we are utmost" and make the change to Russian. There are several ways of saying it in Russian.

K: Well--

S: Since we didn't say "do everything possible".

K: Accordingly, if they agree that they will do the utmost to prevent the development of situations favorable to what they will do everything necessary to prevent this development.

S: Do everything necessary--well let me scratch it out and look at it. But everything necessary sounds better than everything in their power.

K: It's more than "to the utmost"

S: I think it's about a toss-up. It becomes pretty hair splitting at this point--the difference between "do the utmost" and "all that is necessary".

K: Well "the utmost" is an subjective thing, everything necessary can be related to the situation.

S: Yes, so I'd say we were slightly better off with "everything necessary"

K: I think we are better off.

S: Especially compared to "everything in their power". It would be within our power to compel some other countries to take action, take certain actions.

K: How about "exert a maximum effort"?

S: That sounds as if we were straining to find a phrase.

K: Well, give it another half hour, will you?

S: Yeah.

K: Good.

TELCONE

President/Kissinger

7:15 approx. / 4/17/73

K: Hello.

P: Hi, Henry.

K: Sorry to disturb you.

P: That's all right.

K: There are two things: One is the Italian Ambassador has asked me, I'm sure you will do it anyway, if you could mention some connection between the Godsbury and

P: Yeh, I'm going to do that. I had that in mind.

K: Right. The other thing concerns that the leader of the CDU from Germany who is in town and who says that if the leader of the pro-American party is not received by the President while the man who is pushing neutralism is coming over here, it would really undermine his position and I tend to agree with him. I know I'm bothering you with this at this time.

P: How long is he going to be here?

K: Through tomorrow, but he'll stay Thursday morning for a bit if necessary. He's got an appointment in New York but he can, I'm sure, change it.

P: Well, I'll see, I'll take a look Henry and see how it boks.

K: Twenty minutes would do it - as long as he gets his picture taken. The poor fellow's in a desperate situation. He won't survive anyway, but it'd be a slap at his party.

P: OK, get a hold of Steve Bull and tell him to work him in for 20 minutes.

K: Right, Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. President.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorit
DE 1295C
Date 04/17/73
By: NARA

TELCONE

Amb. Kosciusko-Morizet/Kissinger

7:40 p.m. - 4/17/73

K: Mr. Ambassador.

KM: Yes.

K: You have, of course, already served your purpose so I don't know why I should talk to you since I've had a long talk with Christina.

KM: She told me.

K: I called to tell you that the 31st and 1st would be fine for us. If there is a strong preference on your side for the 4th and 5th we can manage that too.

KM: Yes.

K: But we'd slightly prefer the 31st and 1st. And we will accept Iceland.

KM: OK, well, thank you very much. I come back tomorrow to Washington and maybe it will be possible to discuss one day or the other the whole thing.

K: OK. Godd, and tell Christina I'm very jealous.

KM: OK. So you call me back.

K: I don't have to - we prefer the 31st and 1st.

KM: Yes, yes, yes.

K: So I don't have to call you back.

KM: Oh yes, no, but to discuss the program you know.

K: Oh absolutely, yes. And you will let me know about Jobert's coming here.

KM: Yes, OK.

K: Thank you.

KM: Thank you very much.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12951
Date 6/17/73
By: KIRA

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:25 p.m. - 4/17/73

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: How are you?

K: OK.

D: Now I think could be . . . . . . . after a nice dinner.

K: Of course.

D: Was Frank Sinatra all right?

K: He was excellent - outstanding.

D: I like him very much, really.

K: Have you ever met him?

D: I met him on occasion once.

K: Oh yeh, you met him at a dinner I gave.

D: Yes, yes, and a dinner twice - the time at Para mount you know.

K: Anatol, on that thing we were discussing, I just haven't had a chance
for a full discussion with the President, but I think personally this:
If we leave that one phrase open - you know the phrase 'do their utmost
or everything possible' - and the other idea of Gromyko is to say
"act so as to".

D: His other idea is to say - yes, "act so as to prevent" or "in such a way
as to prevent"

K: Well, that too, is possible and I think we should say - you should tell Brezhnev that we will do our really best to work something out along these lines... either "act so as to" or "everything that is necessary" or something like that.

DECLASSIFIED

2

D: But couldn't I tell "everything necessary"? I really. . .

K: I just cannot make it firm tonight.

D: You couldn't yet?

K: No, but I can tell you that there is a very good chance that we will find some formula that - you know - "do the utmost" isn't bad in English.

D: That's my impression too.

K: No, no, I understand your point, but if you tell Gromyko that we will take it very seriously.

D: Could I just tell him as of now you are thinking of everything necessary and in this proposal of second " will act in such a way to prevent"

K: Yes, but I cannot make an absolutely firm commitment on it.

D: I understand. Could you make it tomorrow, then I will save what you are thinking for tomorrow.

K: Well, I will try but we have a lot of other things here right now.

D: I understand, but you would rather next week . . . . . .

K: When will it be next week?

D: I think the beginning of next week.

K: Yeh, why don't you give me till Thursday.

D: Thursday. It would be best tomorrow because on Thursday we usually have a . . . .

K: Yeh, well let me try to call you tomorrow on it.

D: Tomorrow.

K: Yes.

D: But really Henry, I have never pressed on you but please try to do it tomorrow.

K: OK. Fine. Good.

TELCEN

Debryin/Kiesinger

11:25 p.m. - 4/17/73

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: How are you?

K: OK.

K: Of course.

K: Have you ever met him?

K: Oh yeah, you met him at a dinner I gave.

D: Yes, yes, and a dinner twice - the time at Para mountain you know.

K: Anatol, on that thing we were discussing, I just haven't had a chance for a full discussion with the President, but I think personally this: If we leave that one phrase open - you know the phrase 'Do their utmost or everything possible' - and the other idea of Gromyko is to say "act so as to".

D: His other idea is to say - yes, "act so as to prevent" or "in such a way as to prevent".

K: Well, that too, is possible and I think we should say - you should tell Breshnev that we will do our really best to work something out along these lines... either "act so as to" or "everything that is necessary" or something like that.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized: EO 12950

Date: 6/17/73

By: NARA

DECLASSIFIED

Author(s) E012954

Date 12 Oct 1967

By: MARY DEC

D: You couldn't yet?

D: That's my impression too.

K: When will it be next week?

K: Yeah, why don't you give me till Thursday.

D: Thursday. It would be best tomorrow because on Thursday we usually have a . . . . .

K: Yeah, well let me try to call you tomorrow on it.

D: Tomorrow.

K: Yes.

K: OK. Fine. Good.