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APPENDIX II: DOCUMENTS OF U.S. POLICY ON ARMS CONTROL

[Hereunder are provided texts of some of the principal official statements of the Administration regarding general problems of disarmament. There is no single official document which covers the subject. It has been thought logical to confine these texts to 1958-59, inasmuch as new weapons techniques and changing political factors rapidly date the majority of approaches to this subject].

A. Text of U.S. State Department Statement on Arms Policy, March 15, 1958:

The United States seeks early resumption of disarmament talks. To this end, the United States suggests privately to the Soviet representative at the United Nations early this month certain procedures designed to lead to an early resumption of disarmament talks and at the same time maintain the continuing responsibility of the United Nations.

Yesterday's statement by the U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister distorts the United States position and casts doubt that the Soviet Union wants serious discussions on the disarmament question or that it is really seeking a relaxation of tension. Our doubts were confirmed by the fact that the U.S.S.R. made public its statement before Ambassador Arkady Sobolev, Soviet representative to the United Nations, conveyed his government's position officially to Ambassadors Lodge and Wadsworth yesterday.

Specifically, the United States proposed to the U.S.S.R., after consultation with a number of other United Nation members, that a meeting of the enlarged Disarmament Commission be held pursuant to the resolution adopted overwhelmingly by the General Assembly last year. Despite the fact that the Soviets have indicated an intention to boycott such a meeting, we believe the Disarmament Commission should meet in the light of the action of the General Assembly.

The United States also informed the U.S.S.R. that if it was found that owing to Soviet nonparticipation the Disarmament Commission could not usefully pursue serious discussions, the Security Council should hold a purely procedural meeting in order to provide a proper link between the United Nations and any subsequent disarmament discussions.

Under the Charter, the Security Council has an important responsibility to bring about the regulation of armaments. The purpose of Council consideration would be to give this body opportunity to take procedural action designed to lead to an early resumption of disarmament discussions through other channels. Rather than creating obstacles in the way of future disarmament discussions, this procedure would ease the way to and enhance the possibility of meaningful talks.

The U.S.S.R.'s reiteration of its unwillingness to participate in the Disarmament Commission constitutes a continued flouting of the resolution adopted overwhelmingly by the General Assembly. In opposing Security Council consideration of disarmament even on a procedural basis, the U.S.S.R. seems to be implying that it no longer recognizes the responsibility of the Council to deal with disarmament. The United States is not prepared to disregard the United Nations in its efforts to resume disarmament talks.

The U.S.S.R. purports to favor a heads-of-government meeting to consider urgent international problems, including disarmament. We are prepared to participate in a high-level meeting, provided prior preparations indicate that it would result in reaching agreements. The United States seeks meaningful agreements which will,

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in fact, resolve issues, reduce tensions and respond to the hopes of mankind. The recent Soviet statement in the field of disarmament is hardly calculated to achieve these ends. Nevertheless, the United States will continue to take every feasible step to bring about a resumption of serious disarmament negotiations.

B. U.S. State Department Statement on the Soviet Announcement of the Unilateral Suspension of Nuclear Testing, March 31, 1958:

The Soviet statement about nuclear testing will, of course, be studied in detail. But some general observations can be made at once.

The Soviet statement comes on the heels of an intensive series of secret Soviet tests. They should arouse world opinion to the need to deal in an orderly and dependable way with the testing and related aspects of the disarmament problem.

Soviet official propaganda incessantly seeks to create abroad the image of a peace-loving Soviet Government. But that same Government openly defies the United Nations with respect to both the substance and the procedure of disarmament.

The Charter of the United Nations gives that organization broad authority with reference to principles of disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

In the exercise of that authority the United Nations General Assembly has, by an overwhelming vote, approved the comprehensive first-stage disarmament proposal and called on the nations concerned to begin at once technical studies as to how these proposals might be carried out.

The studies include the studies needed for a supervised suspension of nuclear testing. The United States stands ready instantly to respond to that resolution. But the Soviet Union refuses to comply.

The same General Assembly reconstituted and enlarged its Disarmament Commission. The United States wants that commission to carry out its mandate. But the Soviet Union boycotts the commission.

The Charter makes the Security Council responsible for formulating plans for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armament. The United States has recently proposed to the Soviet Union that this responsibility be discharged. But the Soviet Union refuses to cooperate.

The Soviet Government declines to deal with the subject of armaments in any of the several ways prescribed by the United Nations Charter.

It prefers elusive formulations of its own.

It is elemental that free nations which want to remain free will not, and should not, forego their indispensable collective capacity to deter and defend against aggression merely in reliance on a Soviet statement of intentions for which there is no system of verification, which can be evaded in secrecy and altered at will.

The United States again calls on the Soviet Union to deal with the vital problem of disarmament in an orderly way, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to which the signature of the Soviet Union is affixed. That Charter constitutes a solemn agreement. If it is nullified by the Soviet Union, why should the world place confidence in new Soviet engagements?

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C. U.S. Draft Resolution on Arctic Inspection Before the Security Council,
April 29, 1958:

The Security Council,

Considering further the item of the U.S.S.R. of 18 April, 1958,

Noting the development, particularly in the Soviet Union and the United
States of America, of growing capability of massive surprise attack,

Believing that the establishment of measures to allay fears of such massive
surprise attack would help reduce tensions and would contribute to the increase
of confidence among states,

Noting the statements of certain members of the Council regarding the par-
ticular significance of the Arctic area,

Recommends that there be promptly established the northern zone of interna-
tional inspection against surprise attack, comprising the area north of the Arctic
Circle with certain exceptions and additions, that was considered by the United
Nations Disarmament Subcommittee of Canada, France, the U.S.S.R., the United King-
dom and the United States during August 1957;

Calls upon the five states mentioned, together with Denmark and Norway, and
any other states having territory north of the Arctic Circle which desire to have
such territory included in the zone of international inspection, at once to desig-
nate representatives to participate in immediate discussions with a view to agree-
ing on the technical arrangements required;

Decides to keep this matter on its agenda for such further consideration as
may be required.

D. Text of U.S. Note on the "Rapacki Plan," May 3, 1958:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Rapacki's note of Feb. 14, 1958, enclosing a memorandum elaborating on the Polish Government's proposals concerning the establishment of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe.

Recognizing that the initiative of the Polish Government stems from a de-
sire to contribute to the attainment of a stable and durable peace, my Government
has given these proposals serious and careful consideration. On the basis of
this study it has concluded that they are too limited in scope to reduce the dan-
ger of nuclear war or provide a dependable basis for the security of Europe. They
neither deal with the essential question of the continued production of nuclear
weapons by the present nuclear powers nor take into account the fact that present
scientific techniques are not adequate to detect existing nuclear weapons. The
proposed plan does not affect the central sources of power capable of launching a
nuclear attack, and thus its effectiveness would be dependent on the good inten-
tions of countries outside the area. The proposals overlook the central problems
of European security because they provide no method for balanced and equitable
limitation of military capabilities and would perpetuate the basic cause of ten-
sion in Europe by accepting the continuation of the division of Germany.

An agreement limited to the exclusion of nuclear weapons from the territory
indicated by your Government without other types of limitation would, even if it
were capable of being inspected, endanger the security of Western European coun-
tries in view of the large and widely deployed military forces of the Soviet Union.

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Unless equipped with nuclear weapons, Western forces in Germany would find themselves under present circumstances at a great disadvantage to the numerically greater mass of Soviet troops stationed within easy distance of Western Europe which are, as the Soviet leaders make clear, being equipped with the most modern and destructive weapons, including missiles of all kinds.

The consideration outlined above has caused the United States, in association with other Western powers, to propose that nations stop producing materials for nuclear weapons, cease testing such weapons and begin to reduce present stockpiles. The United States has further proposed broader areas of inspection against surprise attack, including an area in Europe, roughly from the United Kingdom to the Ural Mountains. We remain willing to do this.

You will recall, moreover, that the Western nations offered at the London disarmament negotiations to discuss a more limited zone in Europe. With regard to missiles, you will recall that over a year and a half ago the United States proposed that we begin to study the inspection and control needed to assure the exclusive peaceful use of outer space now threatened by the development of such devices as intercontinental and intermediate range ballistic missiles.

The United States, in association with other Western powers, has also proposed that a comprehensive and effective European security arrangement be established in conjunction with the reunification of Germany. The proposed arrangements would provide for limitations on both forces and armaments, measures for the prevention of surprise attack in the area, and assurances of reaction in the event of aggression...

E. Excerpts from Schedule for Western Agenda Proposals handed to Foreign Minister Gromyko by the British Ambassador on behalf of the Western Powers, May 28, 1958:

1. Measures to control production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons and to reduce existing military stocks of such materials:

As for the nuclear problem, the heart of the matter is not the mere testing, but the weapons themselves. The Western powers seek a dependable ending to the accumulation of nuclear weapons and a dependable beginning of the steady reduction of existing weapons stockpiles. Since there is no known reliable means for detecting the weapons already made, the most effective and feasible way to work toward the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons is to halt production of fissionable materials for making them and to begin reducing weapons stockpiles by equitable transfers to peaceful uses. The Western Powers are prepared to discuss these measures and the ratios of materials to be transferred from existing weapons stocks to peaceful uses with a view to arriving at equitable proportions for such transfers by the states concerned.

2. Suspension of nuclear tests:

If there is agreement to put an end to the production of new fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, the way lies open to an immediate solution of the problem of nuclear testing. So long as unrestricted manufacture of nuclear weapons continues, and new means are being developed for delivering nuclear weapons rapidly and surely, the suspension of nuclear testing does not constitute disarmament. It is relevant to underline the fact that the existence of nuclear stocks, which are constantly growing, constitutes a much more serious danger than nuclear tests. Thus, the Western Powers propose not only the suspension of nuclear tests but the stopping of production of new fissionable ma-

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terials for weapons purposes and the progressive conversion of stocks of these materials to peaceful uses. Testing could be stopped indefinitely if the necessary inspection system is installed and the production of fissionable materials for weapons is also effectively ended. Both would be carried out under effective measures of international control.

### 3. The reduction and limitation of conventional arms and manpower:

An agreement on initial verifiable reductions of armed forces and their stocks of arms could ease the way toward settlement of problems which create international friction. In their turn, such settlements could set the stage for further reductions. This is a sound approach for developing confidence in relation between the countries. On the other hand, unverified and uncontrolled unilateral measures can well be merely shifts in deployment or temporary reductions. They do not inspire confidence.

With these considerations in mind, the Western Governments propose that the Soviet Union join them in agreeing on an initial limitation of their armed forces; and on placing in storage depots, within their own territories, and under the supervision of an international control organization, specific quantities of designated types of armaments. They will be prepared also to negotiate on a further limitation of their armed forces and armaments provided that compliance with commitments above has been verified to mutual satisfaction, that there has been progress toward the solution of political issues, and that other essential states have accepted equitable levels for their armed forces and armaments.

### 4. Measures to guard against surprise attack:

Until general controlled disarmament becomes a reality, the surest way toward the development of confidence lies in lifting fears of surprise attack. Growing capabilities of surprise attack on a massive scale underscore the importance of a prompt beginning on measures to deal with this problem. The Western Powers want to meet it on the broadest scale possible. The Governments of the US, UK and France express their readiness to enter into discussion of this subject both from the standpoint of technical considerations of ways and means of achieving this end in the most practical way and from the standpoint of initial areas to be included in the progressive installation of such a system. In this connection the Three Governments reaffirm their willingness as expressed in the United Nations Disarmament Subcommittee on August 29, 1957, to consider the installation of a system of air and ground inspection as a safeguard against surprise attack on a comprehensive scale embracing all of the US, USSR, Canada, and with the consent of the countries involved, the greater part of Europe as well. If this proposal is not acceptable to the USSR, the Three Governments are also prepared to consider the establishment in the first instance of smaller zones in the Arctic and European regions, provided that the latter also included a significant part of the territory of the Soviet Union. As the US indicated at Geneva in 1955, if agreement is reached on the installation of measures of air and ground inspection on the comprehensive scale outlines above, negotiations could be undertaken promptly both with other sovereign states involved and with the Soviet Union for the appropriate extension of such inspection, on a reciprocal, equitable basis and subject to the consent of any governments concerned, to bases outside of national territory.

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F. Text of U.S. Government Statement on Detection of Nuclear Tests, January 5, 1959

Since the Geneva conference of experts last summer, United States seismologists on behalf of the Government have continued to study all available data on the problem of detecting and identifying underground explosions, including new data obtained from the underground tests conducted in Nevada this past October. These studies and new data indicate that it is more difficult to identify underground explosions than had previously been believed.

The Geneva conference of experts last summer concluded that, although it is not possible to identify an underground explosion by seismic means alone, it is possible to identify a large fraction of seismic events as natural earthquakes when the direction of the first motion of the seismic signal is observed at several appropriately located stations. This procedure reduces the number of seismic events which would be unidentified and could, therefore, be suspected of being underground tests.

Analysis of all available seismic data on underground tests, including the data new since last summer, has shown that this method of distinguishing earthquakes from explosions is less effective than had been estimated by the Geneva conference of experts. These analyses and new data also indicate that the seismic signals produced by explosions are smaller than had been anticipated and that there are consequently about twice as many natural earthquakes equivalent to an underground explosion of a given yield as had been estimated by the Geneva conference of experts.

These two factors mean that there will be a substantial increase in the number of earthquakes that cannot be distinguished from nuclear explosions by seismic means alone. For example, the total number of unidentified seismic events with energy equivalents larger than five kilotons may be increased ten times or more over the number previously estimated for the system recommended by the Geneva conference of experts.

The effect of this new analysis and data on the capabilities of the system recommended by the Geneva conference of experts, as well as modifications of that system which could restore its originally estimated capability against underground tests, are at present under study by United States scientists.

The Department of State advises us that the results of this continuing analysis have been communicated to the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics delegations at the present Geneva conference on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, and that the United States delegation will be prepared to discuss this information with experts of the other delegations. This will assure that all the parties at the present Geneva conference have available the best scientific information and analysis in their consideration of the problem of detecting and identifying underground tests.

G. U.S. Reply to Soviet Note Charging Sabotage of Geneva Talks, January 24, 1959:

The statement of the Soviet Government released in Moscow on Jan. 22 about the negotiations in Geneva for the discontinuance of tests of nuclear weapons claims that the United States and the United Kingdom "are obviously looking for excuses to torpedo the current Geneva talks." This is not so. The fact that the Soviet Union has chosen this moment, when the negotiations are under way at Geneva on central issues of effective controls, to make such unfounded charges, raises questions as to their intentions.

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The basic facts concerning these important negotiations must be clarified.

The key issues have been clearly revealed in the negotiations which have been under way since Oct. 31. These issues relate to the problem of establishing effective control, for without effective control no agreement can be reached or would be meaningful. The Geneva experts' report of last summer described only the technical features of a control system and did not decide the important political and administrative arrangements which are now under negotiation. Whether the control system is effective or ineffective will depend upon the nature of these arrangements.

These are the major issues:

1. Will the Soviet Union be able to veto and obstruct every action of the control commission, as it now demands, or will it be possible for the control organization to act without this obstacle? The United States believes that any control system which could be frustrated in its day-to-day operations by the veto power in the hands of a single party would be worse than useless.

2. Will the control posts be manned by an international staff or, as the Soviet [sic] demands, by nationals of the government on whose territory the control posts are located, with only one or two outside "observers"? The Soviet position would amount to self-inspection and, as such, cannot be the basis for an agreement in which all parties can have confidence.

3. Will international inspection groups be organized and ready to move quickly to the site of an event which could be suspected of being an explosion? Or will sending of such a group be subject to weeks of debate and a veto? The Soviet approach would entangle this key provision in miles of red tape.

If these and similar key questions can be solved in a way that will insure that the control system is effective, the matter of how long the agreement will last need not be a matter of concern. Indeed, on Jan. 19, the United States and the United Kingdom showed clearly their readiness to reach a lasting agreement when they dropped the requirement that any discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests must depend on explicit progress on major disarmament measures. The United States is prepared to conclude an agreement for the indefinite discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests subject only to the satisfactory working of the control system. This certainly is not an unreasonable demand. It is a principle repeatedly endorsed by overwhelming majorities in the United Nations.

The Soviet statement attempts to cast doubts on the motivation of the United States in submitting to the Geneva conference data which resulted from the underground nuclear tests which were held last fall. These data did not invalidate the system agreed upon at Geneva last summer. They did show, however, that it is more difficult than had been believed to distinguish between earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions. Consequently, the system agreed at Geneva, if unadjusted, would result in a burdensome number of on-site inspections, which would be the principal remaining tool to identify possible underground nuclear explosions.

The United States delegation in Geneva presented these data to the Soviet Union and to the United Kingdom in good faith. In so doing we proposed that they be studied carefully by our respective scientists, who would consider how we might overcome the difficulties disclosed by these new data. Our scientists are urgently studying this problem. We expect to be able to transmit their preliminary conclusions to the Soviet scientists in the near future. We believe

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that these new scientific facts cannot be ignored in the course of the present negotiations, and to have withheld them would have been an act of bad faith.

Success in the negotiations in Geneva is squarely up to the Soviet Union. If the Soviet Union is willing to agree to a control organization that can operate effectively, it will be possible to achieve agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing.

The United States sincerely seeks such an agreement, convinced that it would be of paramount importance as a first step toward substantial disarma-
ment and toward easing international tensions. For this reason we will perse-
vere in our efforts to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion.
The world is entitled to similar efforts on the part of the Soviet Union.

H. Excerpt from Speech by Secretary Herter Before the U.N., September 17, 1959:

Perhaps the greatest contribution that could be made to peaceful change would be for the powers to move from reliance on unlimited arms competition to reliance on safeguarded agreements as a means of preserving national security.

During the past year there have been both promising and disappointing developments with respect to our efforts in this field, which are of such critical importance to the future of all mankind.

The United States took the initiative in proposing a technical conference on measures to guard against surprise attack. While the problems are understood more clearly as a result, we regret that little progress was made.

The United States and United Kingdom continued the negotiations begun a year ago with the U.S.S.R. for an agreement on the discontinuance of nuclear weapons testing. There is some progress to report. The Three Powers have agreed on a number of details which would have to be a part of a full accord, and technical agreement has been recently reached on the means of detecting and identifying nuclear explosives at high altitudes and in outer space.

However, there are still three central issues on which agreement has not been achieved. They all relate to effective inspection, which remains the key to agreement.

First, there is the problem of staffing control posts-- "the listening posts" that would be established to register data which might indicate an unauthorized nuclear explosion.

The Soviet Union has insisted that a major portion of the personnel at each control post must be from the host country, a form of "self-inspection" which we cannot accept.

The United States and the United Kingdom have proposed that all technical and supervisory positions at each post be staffed on the basis of one-third U.S. or U.K. specialists, one-third Soviet specialists, and one-third specialists from countries other than these three. This would allow for reasonable host-country representation. It would be a genuinely international staffing pattern in which all countries could have confidence. Finally, it would provide a role for other members of the United Nations who have a deep interest in assuring a successfully operating system.

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The second key control issue is the matter of on-site inspections required to identify suspected underground explosions.

While the United States does not object to placing a limit on these inspections, we believe that the number should be based on a scientific judgment, not on political arguments.

To assist in making this judgment we have submitted scientific data bearing on the complex problem of detecting underground explosions and determining whether they are nuclear explosions or earthquakes. We remain convinced that this information should be considered, although the Soviet Union has thus far refused to do so.

The third key issue in the negotiations is the veto.

The Soviet Union wants the veto in one form or another. The United States firmly believes that any control system which could be frustrated in its day-to-day operations by the veto power would be worse than useless. It would create the illusion and not the reality of control.

These are the principal issues. It is clear that the points at issue are real. They cannot be ignored.

We hope that these three issues can be resolved and that an agreement can be achieved for a comprehensive test ban. We will pursue this approach with vigor, but there is another approach if the Soviets are not willing to agree to the necessary means of verification.

On April 13 of this year President Eisenhower offered to Chairman Khrushchev to enter immediately into an agreement to ban tests within the atmosphere and under water, if the Soviet Union remained unwilling to accept effective safeguards for a complete discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests.

This would be only a first step toward the ultimate objective of a total ban. However, it would represent a very good start. It would also ease concern over levels of radioactivity. This offer still stands.

In the meantime, President Eisenhower recently announced that the 1-year unilateral ban on tests which the United States voluntarily undertook last October would be continued to the end of the year. Our hope is that, if we allow a reasonable extension of time for the negotiations to proceed, significant progress can be made.

These are the principal developments regarding a possible agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

But the question of disarmament is much broader than suspension of nuclear testing. What we earnestly seek is the general limitation and control of armaments and armed forces. The degree to which we succeed may determine man's future. There would be growing danger in an indefinite continuation of the arms race. We must use all of our imagination and ingenuity to devise a way of controlling this race, to prevent it from exploding into nuclear conflict.

In an effort to renew disarmament negotiations, the United States and the United Kingdom and France have agreed with the Soviet Union, with which they share a major responsibility for reaching a solution on this problem, to resume discussions on disarmament early next year. These four powers have invited a small group of other states to join them.

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APPENDIX III: AN EVALUATION OF THE HUMPHREY DISARMAMENT SUBCOMMITTEE

[ The following is a verbatim reproduction of the article, "The Humphrey Subcommittee: Was It Worthwhile?" by Jerome H. Spingarn, Washington attorney and nationally known expert on disarmament matters, which appeared in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, XIII, June 1957, pp. 224-227.]

The Subcommittee on Disarmament of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Hubert Humphrey (D., Minn.) has had an important impact on government decisions for two reasons: it has performed a "watchdog" function which resulted in a considerably more serious approach to arms control within the executive branch than might otherwise have been the case, and it has implanted an understanding and knowledge of the subject among a small group of senators who serve on the three Senate committees concerned with the problem.

I

Disarmament has been a lofty and abstract sentiment which produced some extremely popular oratory for chief executives. But presidential addresses on the subject were subjected to very little critical analysis in the press and to none at all in the Congress, and were never taken seriously by foreign policy experts and informed commentators. Peace groups and church organizations applauded them warmly, and there the matter stood.

What the Humphrey Subcommittee accomplished, in the two years since it was created, was to snatch the subject down from the clouds, and to bring the Congress, the press, and the public, face to face with the technological environment that surrounds the problem of arms reduction and control in the year 1957.

In addition, the very existence of congressional surveillance frequently serves to produce more energetic executive action. It has a potential power to expose, to embarrass, to goad, and sometimes to reward, to assist, and to run interference. It is hard to speculate on how great an effect of this sort was exercised by the Humphrey Subcommittee. While Senator Humphrey is often hard-hitting and frequently partisan, the record indicates that he approached this subject with humility, non-partisanship, and a determination not to break the crockery. He was determined from the outset to issue all committee reports unanimously, and opined that disarmament had not begun to reach the point where it could form the subject of partisan senatorial debate.

But, according to close observers, the very acquisition of this new jurisdiction by Senator Humphrey was always a source of considerable irritation to Presidential Assistant Harold Stassen. This was a tragedy, because in the opi-

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nion of those closest to him, Stassen approached his job with zeal and intelligence, and could undoubtedly have accomplished more if he had had better working relationships in the Congress, or if he had availed himself of Humphrey's willingness to assist him. Nevertheless, the Committee did serve to generate new executive approaches and to inspire action on the part of the Stassen office.

While it is hard to ascribe a cause and effect relationship, it is generally understood that the sentiment recurrently expressed at hearings by Subcommittee members, in favor of a limited testing zone for aerial inspection, had a great deal to do with Governor Stassen's interest in the creation of such a zone, an idea which is far from dead even though it has received rebuffs from other departments of government.

Recently, in an article in *The New Republic*, Senator Humphrey called attention to the fact that the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee had, since its inception several years ago, conducted its discussions on a catch-ase-catch-can basis, without a formal agenda, and suggested that an agenda might serve to aid negotiations in the future. Shortly thereafter, when the meetings opened in March 1957, a seven-point agenda was adopted by the Subcommittee at the instance of Governor Stassen. Observers agreed that this was a valuable improvement in procedures.

The interest of Adlai Stevenson in a ban on nuclear tests has been traced to the testimony before the Subcommittee by Atomic Energy Commissioner Thomas E. Murray. Stevenson's first speech on the subject was made very shortly after Murray's testimony, and followed Murray's reasoning closely.

In spite of the rather blank response which Stevenson's ideas drew from the electorate, his position has made a considerable impression on several Democrats in Congress. Humphrey asked about radiation hazards at several hearings, and provided a forum for a good deal of discussion of the problem. Indeed, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy is now exploring the problem in considerable detail, largely as a result of Humphrey's initiative, which included a public letter suggesting the urgency of a thorough investigation.

Senator Humphrey also repeatedly asked why it would not be just as effective to set up an inspection system simultaneously with arms cuts, and helped the administration to realize that the insistence on setting up a full-blown inspection mechanism in working order before the beginning of any type of arms cuts, was becoming a King Charles' head.

Humphrey's persistence in asking about political settlements strengthened Stassen's hand in demanding authority to discuss certain political matters in

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Disarmament Commission meetings. Unfortunately, this was never granted, but the necessity for it is becoming increasingly recognized. The testimony of George Kennan made it clear that any broad-scale disarmament program was in itself a political settlement and, also, that some of the most feasible immediate approaches were very much involved with political matters.

Several senators developed considerable interest in the subject of disarmament during the Hearings. Senator John O. Pastore of Rhode Island was at first obviously unimpressed with the importance of the whole subject matter. As the Hearings went on, his attendance record improved and in recent months he had taken disarmament as the text for several speeches. Senator Symington has likewise proceeded from relative disinterest to a strong desire to explore the subject further. He has even expressed interest in maintaining permanent Senate surveillance of this subject.

## II

In many ways, the outstanding testimony before the Subcommittee was given by Secretary of State Dulles. Dulles obviously came to the Hearing without briefing himself too closely on the current position of his department. He had, however, in the years before becoming Secretary of State, given considerable thought to the problem of long-range peace plans and disarmament, and permitted himself to relax and think out loud. The young men from the State Department who accompanied him listened with open mouths, and a large number of transcripts were ordered immediately afterward by the Department for internal circulation, because he composed policy as he went along. The Hearing was a very cordial one, and it was interesting to note that the senators of the opposition party respected his honesty and did not attempt to take advantage of his candor.

In effect, Secretary Dulles made clear that any arms agreement would sooner or later have to include Commuinst China. Mr. Dulles also made it clear that political settlements must go hand in hand with arms reductions. With reference to Germany, for example, he said that a settlement "would not be practical without at least a partial settlement of the armament problem, notably in relation to Europe."

Mr. Dulles also, in response to questions from Senator Hickenlooper, indicated that the sound approach to disarmament should eventually involve the building up of a United Nations force which would be superior to any possible aggressor force. An ideal arrangement, he said, would be to have in some such

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body as the United Nations, a dependable force which would be greater than the force of any single member state; in other words, to extend to the society of nations the principle which is, broadly speaking, applied to maintain peace and order within a national society. However, he pointed out that that involved certain supernational aspects and also the question of renouncing the veto power and therefore regarded it as not a goal which can be practically attainable within any foreseeable period. For the immediate future, therefore, he pointed out that it is necessary to have collective forces which, when brought together, would be superior to the forces of an aggressor. The candor and imagination which the Secretary displayed at the Hearing has not, in the intervening sixteen months, however, produced appreciable change in the Department's positions.

In selecting highlights from the testimony of other witnesses for this necessarily brief report, emphasis will be placed upon those who made the strongest impression upon the Committee members, as revealed by their public or private remarks on subsequent occasions.

Some of the impact of Commissioner Thomas E. Murray's testimony has already been alluded to. A tally of newspaper reports of Committee Hearings indicated that Murray's testimony received wider press attention than that of any other witness. In subsequent Hearings, a large number of witnesses associated themselves with his suggestions that policies be adapted to set our nuclear weapons program "on a basis more in conformity with the realities of present-day international life."

Murray's argument can be summarized as follows: Wars in the future will be nuclear wars. This does not mean that they need be all-out nuclear wars. All-out nuclear war is no more acceptable than murder or suicide. It would be fatal to permit ourselves to drift into the habit of thinking about nuclear war only in all-out terms. A limited nuclear war is a possibility that our consciences can face and accept. In the different kinds of limited war that might confront us, certain types of nuclear weapons have a genuine military usefulness. It would therefore be wrong on our part to deprive ourselves of these weapons. Our stockpile should include only weapons that are useful in war. Moreover, it should include only weapons that we can legitimately use. It is time we stopped to take a hard look at this concept of "deterrence" and at the complementary concept, more recently added, the "balance of terror," which is too easily upset. It is at the mercy of miscalculation. Such a balance may even put a premium on moral cynicism. Rational armament should

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therefore include the making and stockpiling only of such weapons as are demonstrably useful for the purpose of actual warfare.

Murray suggested that an upper limit be set on the size of thermonuclear bombs to be placed in our stockpile, on the basis of moral principles and military usefulness. Tests of multimegaton thermonuclear weapons should be stopped, since the weapons we now have in hand are large enough. But tens of thousands of very small weapons are needed. Flexible strength requires the fuller development of the capability for limited military use of nuclear weapons for limited military objectives, according to the Commissioner.

The deeply religious tone of Commissioner Murray's testimony, and his emphasis on moral points won for it considerable attention among citizens' groups concerned with world peace.

Another witness whose testimony had considerable influence on the Committee was Warren Weaver, Vice-President of the Rockefeller Foundation and Chairman of the Committee on the Genetic Effects of Atomic Radiation of the National Academy of Sciences. Weaver's testimony challenged the complacency with which the report of the Academy has been interpreted by the administration. While he carefully eschewed sensationalism or alarmism, and did not quarrel with the precise language of the report, he made it abundantly clear that the net effect of continued explosions would necessarily be disadvantageous to the genetic structure of the human race. Probably the serious interest of Subcommittee members in proposals to end tests was greatly heightened by the Weaver testimony.

John C. Eliot, a former Director of the Office of Munitions Control of the Department of State, discussed techniques of munitions control developed under the Neutrality Act as possible guideposts in general armaments control. Although he conceded that the development of guided missiles and thermonuclear weapons has made the problem of control and reduction of armaments more difficult, he said that the government need not content itself with atomic stalemate. On the basis of his experience, he suggested that it would be fruitful to continue the search on political, military, and scientific fronts for some formula for eliminating or controlling weapons. He felt that our proposals for disarmament, while sound and sincere, were insufficiently broad to excite the imaginations of peoples and thereby to pressure the Soviets into a workable disarmament agreement with adequate inspection. He urged a U.N. study on the effect of arms traffic to the disturbed areas of the world. His testimony elicited sympathetic comment from Senator Humphrey and helped bring the inspection problem into focus.

The testimony of Dr. Albert G. Hill, Vice-President of the Institute for

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Defense Analysis and Director of Research Weapons Evaluation Group, was important because of his close association with the development of an early warning system for the United States government. Dr. Hill pointed out that aerial inspection alone would be insufficient as a warning against surprise attack. He felt that any effective inspection must consist of both aerial and ground components. However, he commented that any inspection arrangement with the Soviet Union would probably be to our advantage today. Further, he stated that the mere agreement upon such a system would improve possibilities for the beginning of phased disarmament.

The Committee members gave considerable thought to the testimony by one of their colleagues, Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont. Senator Flanders has long been a passionate advocate of disarmament. In 1953, he was co-author of a disarmament resolution which was unanimously passed by the Senate. He appeared before the Subcommittee accompanied by a Reserve Air Force officer with considerable credentials in both arms and arms control, Colonel Richard S. Leghorn, now of the Eastman Kodak Company. Flanders and Leghorn pointed out that we have already passed the point of no return on many types of arms inspection and control. They warned that we were approaching one of the most serious of these points with the forthcoming development of the intercontinental ballistic missile. They urged that the United States immediately propose an agreement with the Soviet Union which would effectively prevent the perfection of these missiles. This could be done, they said, by agreeing not to test the missiles. They stated that the missiles developed in the laboratory and on the drawing board would not be useful in warfare without the developmental improvements which would result from actual test firings. While there would be no way to detect laboratory work, it would be possible to detect test firings through properly emplaced radar posts.

The Flanders-Leghorn proposal was discussed by the Subcommittee in the course of appearances of many other witnesses. Many of them, including Dr. Albert Hill, agreed that radar could be effective in detecting these tests. However, one important political question, raised by Sen. Symington, remained unanswered: the question of how the nations of Western Europe, already threatened by lesser range missiles, would take to the urgent insistence of the U.S. that work be stopped on the one weapon which might effectively reach the U.S.

Benjamin V. Cohen, who served for many years as U.S. representative on the United Nations Disarmament Commission, pointed out that: "Drastic and general disarmament presents less difficulty in respect to policing and inspection than limited and partial disarmament... drastic and general disarmament coupled with

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