Speech Henry Kissinger - Davos Symposium 1980

Mr Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I notice that in the recounting of my qualities, which Mr Heath put forward with characteristic British understatement, he omitted the humility for which I am so famous. Of course, it is somewhat difficult for somebody with potential schizophrenia to speak here and see this fellow on his left. But I want to express my great appreciation about what Ted Heath has said. We have been friends for twenty years and fought sometimes together and sometimes separately about the future of our societies.

I had the privilege of working with Ted Heath when he was Prime Minister. The German statesman Bismarck once said (I paraphrase from memory) that the art of statesmanship is to listen carefully until one can perhaps discern the footsteps of history and follow for a brief period in their train. I am convinced that history will show that Ted Heath understood and heard the footsteps of history.

He realized that Europe needed unity and identity to make its contribution to our contemporary period. In office, he did not always share my own estimate of my infallibility, which made him not always the easiest partner to be with, but he performed the most important role of an ally, a friend and a partner, to recall us to our duties, to advance his view of our future and, as Winston Churchill said, he was not always wrong.

coexistence can be made more tolerable and, in time,
less dangerous and perhaps even constructive. The
desire for peace must not be permitted to turn into a
form of blackmail, but the willingness and necessity
to resist expansion must not seek confrontation for its
own sake.

One of the difficulties of Western policy has been the
oscillation between euphoria and panic: the reluctance
to accept the fact that we must be both strong and
determined on the one side and prepared to negotiate on
the other; the difficulty of relating negotiations to
concrete objectives and the unwillingness to face the
strategic necessities of containing Soviet agressivness.
And as we go into this new period of danger, it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that, if we succeed in what must now
be done, we will again confront a period of negotiation
- that is indeed the purpose, and we must prepare ourselves
for it now.

Now let me discuss the international situation as I see
it. I will mention briefly a number of structural,
dynamic changes independent of specific actions and then
I will address the specific events that have led to the
current situation, independent of the actions of any
state.

We are living in a world which has seen a major redistrib-
ution of power. Several times, first at the end of World
War II when Europe lost its traditional pre-eminence,
then in the decades afterwards, there developed new
standards of power including Europe, so that the world
became transformed first into a bipolar system and then into

4.

a somewhat multipolar system. But it is a curious system because, for the first time in history economic, political and military power are not identical. For the first time in history, it is possible for a country to be militarily strong and economically <u>stagnant</u>, like the Soviet Union. It is also possible for a country to be economically very strong and yet be militarily insignificant. Some countries play a major political role for a variety of reasons, without being either militarily or economically strong. So the incommensurability of the various elements of power gives a complexity to contemporary international relations that is unique.

The second is that, for the first time in history, foreign policy is truly global. Until the end of World War II, the various continents pursued their policies in isolation from each other. One could not really compare China and Europe in the 17th century because, to all practical purposes, they did not interact.

That condition has changed, and it is compounded by the loss of economic autarky of the various regions. Then, for the first time in history, there are many problems that affect all of humanity: environmental concerns, proliferation of <u>dangers of nuclear weapons</u>, <u>FOR EXAMPLE</u>, there is, again for the first time, a discovery of agricultural incompetence in many parts of the world that cannot feed themselves any longer, either because they do not have** the margins of their resources - of which the reverse side is the near monopoly position of small numbers of countries of scarce raw materials.

** the technology or because the population has pressed at

5.

And there is a dilution of confidence in classic economic models, a challenge to the capitalist system. But also, a demoralization of the socialist systems which nowhere have produced the satisfaction of the human personality. All of these changes are global and would make ours a period of turmoil - even apart from any specific challenge that we face. But we do face a specific challenge, and I would now like to talk about my assessment of what we are confronting at this moment in the Soviet Union.

We face, in the Soviet Union, a strange amalgam of ideology, bureaucratic stagnation and economic stagnation coupled with enormous ability in one limited field - the accumulation of military power.

The ideology places great stress on the objective correlation of forces. One can argue forever whether the present Soviet leaders still hold the pristine version of Leninism, and almost certainly they do not, but they do believe that they understand Western trends better than the West. And therefore, the worst approach in negotiations with Soviet Union is the psychiatric approach, the attempt to understand them, the sentimental tendency to think that good personal relations are a guarantee for good inter-state relations. They tend to treat our negotiators the ways psychiatrists treat their patients. No matter what you say to them, they think they understand us better than we understand ourselves.

And if the correlation of forces tilt, in their judgement, in their direction, we live in a period of great danger. And this is exactly what has happened in the last decade in the military field. Indeed, the fact that the economic performance of the Soviet Union is so poor compounds our danger, because it creates a temptation to use the military advantage, while it still exists, and it also creates another temptation: the dilemma of modernization, the overallWin.

gras overrunning.

6.

The Soviet Union faces the dilemma than one cannot run a modern economy by central planning, but it is not clear that you can run the Soviet system <u>without</u> central planning. Before they address this issue, they may want to achieve security in the external environment; so that we may find a paradoxical combination of the modernizers and the bureaucrats - the bureaucrats, because when you have rigid structures, the one that commands large resources, like the military, its own communications net and its own transportation system, plays a very important role.<sup>perเลข</sup>

determin

Nobody can deny the Soviet Union has should deny the Soviet Union, legitimate security concerns. Up to now, the problem has been that the Soviet Union is in danger of adopting a definition of security that can be satisfied only by the neutralization of everybody else. We cannot accept a definition of security for the Soviet Union which make everybody else absolutely insecure. Nobody has the right to march with a hundred thousand men into a neighbouring state that has consistently pursued a policy parallel to that of the Soviet Union, and in which no Western state ever attempted to assert a significant political influence just to fulfil some theoretical concepts of security.

Nor is this an isolated act. Since 1975, at least, we
have seen a pincer movement <u>with</u> Soviet proxy forces
coming up through Africa from Angola, Ethiopia, into
South Yemen, threatening the oil-producing regions on
which the industrial democracies depend from one direction,
and we see another pincer movement in the coup in
Afghanistan in April 1978 developing from the other

7.

direction, and now completed with the occupation of
Afghanistan. We have seen networks of terrorist
organizations, not directly controlled from Moscow,
but financed and trained in part from Moscow, undermining
the stability of many countries.

Nobody can avoid the responsibility for a rockslide when
he throws a rock down a hillside, just because the
rock that finally killed somebody is not the rock which
he threw. We have had Cuban soldiers in Africa and a
Soviet brigade in Cuba. So that Afghanistan is a
combination of these events. And for this reason, I want
to state that even though I have not been noted in the
United States for unalloyed admiration for every aspect of
the foreign policy of our Administration, I believe that
their fundamental decisions to make clear that expansionism
now must stop is correct. And those who worry about
whether America is going too far or whether this or that
move was tactically wise should ask themselves what
would they think if the United States had taken the
opposite course and had minimized what happened in
Afghanistan, and had accepted it, as we erroneously did
in Ethiopia and elsewhere.

So I believe, regardless of whether one agrees with
every tactical move or not, that the fundamental issue
now is to have this basic policy direction succeed.
And those who are worried should make their contribution
in giving content to what will be an enormously difficult
task, which I would be amazed if we in America had
thought through, where we need the wisdom of many of
our friends and where, as Ted Heath has said, a
European view of the situation could now be of great
importance to us all.

8.

What are the necessities that we face? The West has
neglected for too long its military strength. The Soviet
Union, since 1962, has increase its defence budget by
5%, in real terms, every year for nearly 20 years. I do
not need to tell a group of this composition what
compound interest at the rate of 5% a year will yield
over such an extended period. For a variety of reasons
that are not worth now debating, the United States has
not equalled these expenditures, and Europe has done
even less - not to speak of Japan.

There has been a reluctance to face the geopolitical facts
of life, which are: that a statesman has the choice of
acting early in the evolution of certain events; at that
time, his knowledge will be very limited and he has to
trust his judgement; or he can wait, until he knows for
certain what it happening. Then he must pay a fearful
price. In 1936, it would have been easy for the democracies
to resist Hitler physically, but psychologically it was
hard. Five years later, they all knew what the danger was.
They paid for their psychological uncertainty with
twenty million lives. In 1975, when Cuban troupes first
showed up in Angola, it was a qualitative change in the
international situation. Some of us wanted to resist.
We were prevented by our domestic structure from doing
so. It would have been easy then - it is more difficult
now.

9.

It is better now than it will be three years from now.

So, there is no way around the necessity of building up
the overall military capacity of the United States, and
of its allies. And indeed, I think we will find that, if
we think through the problem, even the budget now
submitted will not make up for the neglect of the past
and that we will have to make even more sacrifices.
Secondly, we must create not only an overall strength
but a demonstrable local strength to resist in those
areas that we have defined as vital.

Some months ago, I gave a speech in Brussels, which is
often quoted to the effect that I have said the United
States is no longer committed to the defence of Europe.
Of course, since German is my native language, I some
times express myself in a complexity not easily followed
by all my listeners. What I meant to say was, and what
I want to insist now is, we must not act as if the fortunate
circumstance of an atomic monopoly permits us never to
adapt our strategy to the new circumstances. I said then,
and I repeat now, that an attack on demographic targets,
whose chief end is the destruction of populations, is
demoralizing for all decision-makers, either European
or American, who have no other choice. I repeat, however,
that this does not have to be our strategy, that the
defence of Europe and America must be linked, including
in the nuclear field, and that we then jointly must address
the question of other areas which are now subject of
debate.

There is no way we will be able to implement any guarantees of any area without some visible presence of American forces and, preferably, of Western forces. Even if it is theoretically possible to move forces rapidly, it will not necessarily be credible to our opponents or to the countries concerned. Secondly, in defending an area, we have to understand in the name of what we are defending it, and that has two components. One, what we tell our own people and, secondly, what the people we are protecting are telling their people.

We have suffered, in my view, from a rather simplified conception of human rights. We do not defend other countries as an award for good behaviour. We are defending them because we discover a vital security interest of free peoples. But equally, we must have some concept of change, since history is not going to stop. What is the reform that can reasonably be asked? How can we support governments without challenging their fundamental structures and, therefore, making their defence meaningless to them - and yet have in mind some concept of adaptation to modernity. That, too, is the question we must answer. And in areas like the Persian Gulf, we must, over time, respond in some fashion to the political concerns that these nations have and to which they give high priority, even if it is not a central issue in East-West relations, such as the Arab-Israeli problem.

With respect to Pakistan, we must ask similar questions. Pakistan faces three types of potential dangers: hot pursuit from the Soviet Union, a Soviet attack or another India-Pakistan war, or a combination of all three.

13.

I do not think China survived with the longest uninterrupted history of self-government by being in other countries too, in its own rivalries with third powers.

I do not believe we should conduct our relations with China on the basis of the fluctuations of our relations with the Soviet Union. We should have a steady policy that looks to a long-time future and does not attempt to add to the annoyance factor in Moscow when something particular happens which we do not like, because, beyond the question of the modernization of China, which I feel strongly we must support, we will also have the question of what our attitude is towards the territorial integrity of China, should it become the subject of Soviet pressure. That is an infinitely more important question than what arms are sold, and at what rate, and by whom.

And as our commitments around the Soviet periphery multiply, the absence of statements about our intentions in particular areas becomes more noticeable. I am putting this forward as an issue that has to be discussed and thought about when we design a global strategy, that Ted Heath mentioned. And even though it is not my special subject, I believe that recent events have given us a new opportunity towards the nonaligned, that have seen that communist advances led by Moscow are irreversible and may create an incentive and a justification for the Red Army - since the Soviet system operates under the peculiarity that the Red Army seems to be used only against Soviet allies. So that it becomes very dangerous to enter the Soviet orbit in any form. I think that the issue raised by Ted Heath of how the resources of the North can be related to the needs of the South can perhaps, once again, be addressed in a new environment, free of the self-righteousness of some of the previous dialogue.

[Y]

15.

and not suffer from what has been the pain of so much of
the Atlantic debate - which is: when the United States
negotiates with the Soviets, some accuse it of condominium;
and when it resists the Soviets, it is accused of needless
intransigence. Let us use this time, now, to develop a
global strategy on a joint basis, with a division of
labour where that is appropriate.

And now let me get back to the Soviets. In this phase, we
must bring to a halt the Soviet geopolitical offences
that have been under way at least since 1975. That must
be stopped, even in the Soviet interest. The American
people is a vital people. We will not be defeated without
noticing it and, when we notice it, we will resist. The
biggest danger of all is a series of reciprocal miscalcula-
tions. So we must stop the policy of pressure of proxy
forces, of encouragement of terrorism; but we must also
show a way out, we must also give the Soviet Union an
opportunity to define itself a real coexistence.

The last period of what has been called detente was
characterized by Western euphoria and, to some extent,
nonperformance of what we said we would do. It was also
characterized by massive Soviet rearmament and a
massive Soviet assault on the equilibrium. In 1972 and
1973, the Administrations in which I served signed some
principles of coexistence with the Soviet Union - not
because we believed for one moment that a legal document
will restrain the Soviet Union, but because we wanted
to create a yardstick by which to measure compliance with
norms of international behaviour.

16.

What we now need, in this period when we are building up
strength and creating walls to expansionism, is to talk
to ourselves first as to what we understand by peaceful
coexistence. I do not believe that Salt II is worth
reviving. It only has three more years to run and weapons
decisions take longer than three years. I believe that
the next time we talk about arms control, we should
negotiate on a ten- or fifteen-year basis, including
the European weapons - ~~to~~ do ~~as~~ without sentimentality
and without illusion. We should define for ourselves a
genuine code of conduct. And in such a negotiation, we must
of course take seriously legitimate Soviet security concerns.
But we cannot define those, or let them define them, as the
right to move the Red Army into any territory whose
government displeases them.

So this is the agenda before us, in which there is a
need for Western strength and determination - but also
a Western sense of justice and realistic conciliation.
What it needed, now, cannot be done half-heartedly or
hesitantly, because that will multiply our dangers. But we
must do it carefully & thoughtfully. But we ought to remember that we have multiples of the
gross national product of the Soviet Union, multiples of
the population, the more vital economic and political
systems; so that, whatever shortcomings exist on matters
of will and leadership, and are not inherent in the
situation, I would tell you that, at this moment of
danger, I am actually more optimistic then I have been
in many years.

[Y]

17.

The American people have overcome the trauma of Vietnam, the American government reflects the aspiration of our people. Even though I am of the opposition party, I want you all to understand that on the fundamental course, there is now for the first time in many years a united America. So when I raise these questions, we are in a position, for the first time in many years, to give meaningful answers. But we cannot do it alone, either physically or intellectually. I do not believe we have thought everything through, nor could we have, after so dramatic a change. But these problems can be thought and they must be thought and thought must create the apposite of what we are through. And so we live in a moment of danger, which is also one of hope where we can shape our own future and where, if we listen carefully, we might be able to hear the footsteps of history.

2.

I am speaking to you today in an atmosphere quite different from the one in which I accepted your invitation. At that time, I thought that I would deliver a more or less standard speech about the major elements of international relations. But we find ourselves now in a period of tension, of some confusion: one is asked whether we are facing now a new period of cold war, an end of detente - perhaps the prospect of a new world, not cold. I would, therefore, like to analyse the nature of the contemporary situation as I see it, offer some suggestions and ask some questions to which answers must be found.

First, I do not like the distinction of the post-war period into a period of cold war and into a period of detente. The cold war was not so terrible and detente was not so exalted. In the cold war, we had a certain amount of ideological hostility and a number of Berlin crises. In the detente period, we had a number of summit meetings and Soviet rearmament and expansionism. So we should not treat international relations as if there had been a clearly defined period in which we lived with a consciousness of harmony. Indeed, the tendency to deal with East-West relations as if they were relations among individuals, the tendency to attempt to solve the problem of war and peace psychiatrically, as it were, by creating an atmosphere without substance, is in itself a problem of contemporary policy.

Relations between the West and the Soviet Union must be based on two fundamental principles. The first is: we must be strong enough and determined enough to resist expansionism, whatever forms it takes. Second, possessing as we do weapons of untold destructiveness, we are also doomed to coexistence, and we must seek means by which this

3.

One of the difficulties of Western policy has been the oscillation between euphoria and panic: the reluctance to accept the fact that we must be both strong and determined on the one side and prepared to negotiate on the other; the difficulty of relating negotiations to concrete objectives and the unwillingness to face the strategic necessities of containing Soviet aggressiveness. And as we go into this new period of danger, it is important to keep in mind that, if we succeed in what must now be done, we will again confront a period of negotiation - that is indeed the purpose, and we must prepare ourselves for it now.

We are living in a world which has seen a major redistribution of power. Several times, first at the end of World War II when Europe lost its traditional pre-eminence, then in the decades afterwards, there developed new standards of power including Europe, so that the world became transformed first into a bipolar system and then into

4.

a somewhat multipolar system. But it is a curious system because, for the first time in history economic, political and military power are not identical. For the first time in history, it is possible for a country to be militarily strong and economically <u>stagnated</u>, like the Soviet Union. It is also possible for a country to be economically very strong and yet be militarily insignificant, <u>SOCH AS MOST OPEC COUNTRIES</u>, Some countries play a major political role for a variety of reasons, without being either militarily or economically strong. So the incommensurability of the various elements of power gives a complexity to contemporary international relations that is unique.

That condition has changed, and it is compounded by the loss of economic autarky of the various regions. Then, for the first time in history, there are many problems that affect all of humanity: environmental concerns, proliferation of <u>FOR EXAMPLE</u> nuclear weapons. There is, again for the first time, a discovery of agricultural incompetence in many parts of the world that cannot feed themselves any longer, either because they do not have** the margins of their resources - of which the reverse side is the near monopoly position of small numbers of countries of scarce raw materials.

5.

And there is a dilution of confidence in classic economic models, a challenge to the capitalist system. But also a demoralization of the socialist systems which nowhere have produced the satisfaction of the human personality. All of these changes are global and would make ours a period of turmoil - even apart from any specific challenge that we face. But we do face a specific challenge, and I would now like to talk about my assessment of what we are confronting at this moment in the Soviet Union.

And if the correlation of forces tilt, in their judgement, in their direction, we live in a period of great danger. And this is exactly what has happened in the last decade in the military field. Indeed, the fact that the economic performance of the Soviet Union is so poor compounds our danger, because it creates a temptation to use the military advantage, while it still exists, and it also creates another temptation. THE DILEMMAS OF MODERNIZATION GROW OVERWHELMING.

6.

The Soviet Union faces the dilemma than one cannot run
a modern economy by central planning, but it is not
clear that you can run the Soviet system <u>without</u> central
planning. Before they address this issue, they may want
to achieve security in the external environment; so that
we may find a paradoxical combination of the modernizers
and the bureaucrats - the bureaucrats, because when you
have rigid structures, the one that commands large
resources, like the military, its own communications net
and its own transportation system, plays a very important, <u>PERHAPS</u>
role.

Nobody can deny the Soviet Union nor should deny the Soviet
Union its legitimate security concerns. Up to now, the
problem has been that the Soviet Union is in danger of
adopting a definition of security that can be satisfied
only by the neutralization of everybody else. We cannot
accept a definition of security for the Soviet Union which
make everybody else absolutely insecure. Nobody has the
right to march with a hundred thousand men into a
neighbouring state that has consistently pursued a policy
parallel to that of the Soviet Union, and in which no
Western state ever attempted to assert a significant
political influence just to fulfil some theoretical
concepts of security.

Nor is this an isolated act. Since 1975, at least, we
have seen a pincer movement with Soviet proxy forces
coming up through Africa from Angola, Ethiopia, into
South Yemen, threatening the oil-producing regions on
which the industrial democracies depend from one direction,
and we see another pincer movement in the coup in
Afghanistan in April 1978 developing from the other

Nobody can avoid the responsibility for a rockslide when
he throws a rock down a hillside, just because the
rock that finally killed somebody is not the rock which
he threw. We have had Cuban soldiers in Africa and a
Soviet brigade in Cuba. So that Afghanistan is a
combination of these events. And for this reason, I want
to state that even though I have not been noted in the
United States unalloyed admiration for every aspect of
the foreign policy of our Administration, I believe that
their fundamental decisions to make clear that expansionism
now must stop is correct. And those who worry about
whether America is going too far or whether this or that
move was tactically wise should ask themselves what
would they think if the United States had taken the
opposite course and had minimized what happened in
Afghanistan, and had accepted it, as we erroneously did
in Ethiopia and elsewhere.

8.

Y

M

Three require particular attention, and I will raise questions in respect to them that we must all answer - not, necessarily, that I know the answer: the Persian Gulf, Pakistan and China. It is imperative that we harmonize our commitments and our capabilities. We cannot afford, and we must not accept, another American setback. Before we engage ourselves, we must know what we are doing; and once we have engaged ourselves, we must prevail, or the impact will be catastrophic.

We have to decide, when we get a guarantee to an area, first what precisely the area is we are guaranteeing. I am not saying we need to say all of this publicly, but we need to say it to ourselves. I hear, often, that ambiguity is a virtue - and it is, as long as the lower level of the responses encompassed in the ambiguity are unacceptable to the agressor. What is it we are defending, and what is it we are defending it against? Military attack by the Soviet Union? Proxy attack supported by the Soviet Union? Terrorist attack? Internal upheaval? AND HAVE WE PREPARED TO ACHIEVE THIS OBJECTIVE FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD, WHICH IS WHAT STRATEGY IS ALL ABOUT?

It is not necessary for me, now, to give an answer to these questions, except to say that we must answer them and that, to the extent that we leave gaps, we are simply shifting the context into a new area. In giving this answer, we must act decisively and we must keep in mind that the curse of democracies in the recent past, including the American democracy, has been the belief that if something is done half-heartedly, or somehow incompetently, one avoids domestic difficulties. There are no rewards for loosing with moderation. But we also must act with prudence so that we do not provoke what we are trying to prevent. And that raises very serious considerations.

[Y]

WE DECIDE TO DEFEND
SO BEFORE WE SPREAD OUR
COMMITMENTS LET US 11.
MAKE SURE WE ARE PREPARED
to EXTEND OUR CAPABILITIES.
WITH CAPABILITIES, THE TRANSPORT FOR THE ROAD
AND LET US NOT CONFUSE PLAN
FORCE WILL NOT DEPLOY
FIRST BEFORE
1984 AT THE
END OF THE YEAR.
LEADERS
WE ARE PROTECTING
OUR PEOPLE

[Y]

13.

I do not believe we should conduct our relations with China on the basis of the fluctuations of our relations with the Soviet Union. We should have a steady policy that looks to a long-time future and does not attempt to add to the annoyance factor in Moscow when something particular happens which we do not like ~~because~~, beyond the question of the ~~modernization~~ of China, which I feel strongly we must support, we will also have the question of what our attitude is towards the territorial integrity of China, should it become the subject of Soviet pressure. That is an infinitely more important question than what arms are sold, and at what rate, and by whom.

And as our commitments around the Soviet periphery multiply, the absence of statements about our intentions in particular areas becomes more noticeable. I am putting this forward as an issue that has to be discussed and thought about when we design a global strategy. ~~that Ted Heath mentioned.~~ And even though it is not my special subject, I believe that recent events have given us a new opportunity towards the nonaligned ~~they~~ have seen that communist advances led by Moscow are irreversible and may create an incentive and a justification for the Red Army - since the Soviet system operates under the peculiarity that the Red Army seems to be used only against Soviet allies. So that it becomes very dangerous to enter the Soviet orbit in any form. I think that the issue ~~raised by Ted Heath~~ of how the resources of the North can be related to the needs of the South can perhaps, once again, be addressed in a new environment, free of the self-righteousness of some of the previous dialogue.

14.

But I would like to say two more things: one about Europe and the United States and the other about relations with the Soviets. Since I have come here to Europe, I have heard a great deal about the question of whether detente is divisible; whether European and American interests remain identical; whether we can still co-operate. Let me give a few answers.

First, of course, our interests are not identical in every single respect, nor is it necessary for Europe to stand at attention every time we develop a new policy. But our fundamental interests in the world economy and in our mutual security are as congruent as it is possible for sovereign nations to be. And for this reason, I do not believe that what is called "detente" is divisible. I do not believe that Europe, in a period of danger, can adopt the posture that it will assume the monopoly of conciliation, WHILE but America BEARS the monopoly of defence. In this sense, detente is not divisible.

Europe has a vital interest that the policy that we are now adopting succeed; but it also has a vital interest in contributing its ideas to the content of this policy MAKES SENSE. And I have raised enough questions here, and some of you, some European leaders, will with no doubt be able to think of many other questions that I haven't raised, in which Europe's contribution must be crucial. We need a common assessment of the situation. With a common assessment, we can have divisions of labour: there are many areas of the world where Europe is now playing, or can play in the future, a role that would be difficult for the United States. But it is vital that we do this on the basis of similar interpretations of what we are up against

15.

BANE

And now I let me get back to the Soviets. In this phase, we must bring to a halt the Soviet geopolitical offences that have been under way at least since 1975. That must be stopped, even in the Soviet interest. The American people is a vital people. We will not be defeated without noticing it and, when we notice it, we will resist. The biggest danger of all for a series of reciprocal miscalculations. So we must stop the policy of pressure, of proxy forces, of encouragement of terrorism; but we must also show a way out, we must also give the Soviet Union an opportunity to define its role in a real coexistence.

What we now need, in this period when we are building up
strength and creating walls to expansionism, is to talk
to ourselves first as to what we understand by peaceful
coexistence. I do not believe that Salt II is worth
reviving. It only has three more years to run and weapons
decisions take longer than three years. I believe that
the next time we talk about arms control, we should
negotiate on a ten- or fifteen-year basis, including
the European weapons ~~and so do I~~ without sentimentality
and without illusion. We should define for ourselves a
genuine code of conduct. And in such a negotiation, we must
of course take seriously legitimate Soviet security concerns.
But we cannot define those, or let them define them, as the
right to move the Red Army into any territory whose
government displeases them.

So this is the agenda before us, in which there is a
need for Western strength and determination - but also
a Western sense of justice and realistic conciliation.
What it needed, now, cannot be done half-heartedly or
hesitantly, because that will multiply our dangers. BUT IT MUST ALSO
BE DONE CAREFULLY & REFLECTIVELY.
But we ought to remember that we have multiples of the
gross national product of the Soviet Union, multiples of
the population, the more vital economic and political
systems; so that, whatever shortcomings exist on matters
of will and leadership, and are not inherent in the
situation, I would tell you that, at this moment of
danger, I am actually more optimistic then I have been
in many years.

[Y]

17.

The American people have overcome the trauma of Vietnam, the American government reflects the aspiration of our people. Even though I am of the opposition party, I want you all to understand that on the fundamental course, there is now for the first time in many years a united America. So when I raise these questions, we are in a position, for the first time in many years, to give meaningful answers. But we cannot do it alone, either physically or intellectually. I do not believe we have thought everything through, nor could we have, after so dramatic a change. But these problems can be thought AND THEY MOST BE THOUGHT THROUGH LEST WE CREATE THE OPPOSITE OF through. And so we live in a moment of danger, which is also one of hope where we can shape our own future and where, if we listen carefully, we might be able to hear the footsteps of history.