DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By A2 NARA Date 6/9/09

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/General Haig

10:15 a.m. 7/14/73

H: I don't think this thing played very big and I think it is because you handled it the way you did and it is best not to have it impinge on the Press Office--to formal a way.

K: I don't think we should do anymore, don't you?

H: That's what I think. We can avoid it, you know--could say--

K: They should say they don't comment on speculative reports and that Kissinger seems to have covered it.

H: Yep, that's exactly--that -- I wanted to add that. Kissinger has covered this--we're not going to add anymore to the speculative reports.

K: I think--I haven't seen--it isn't in the Post, I haven't seen it in the Times--haven't looked at that-

H: I haven't seen it anywhere--(to George--have you seen it anywhere) It's down in the left-hand corner--small tittle story in the Post.

K: Yeh.

H: So, that is good, we had a lot of people trying to call everybody last night, I think it's played well. Ron talked to Saffire--

K: To Saffire?

H: Yeh, Reston was calling last night trying to get everybody and no one talked to him, he apparently went away for the weekend but Ron is taking care of it with Saffire to cool it up there.

K: Oh good.

H: So I think we are all right.

K: Good, I am glad.

H: Our friend probably had a bowel stricture out there in Honolulu.

K: On the way? Is he going to make it?

H: He will make it--I mean the press guy called Ron last night.

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Adm. Moorer
(Secure Phone)

7/14/73 10:30 a.m.

AM: I have here and wondered if you received from Swank what the results of last meeting was with Lon Nol.

HK: No.

AM: I talked with Weyand who says the meeting went very well with InTam there and he announced his request to be released from the council ---and had a very frank discussion on how important it is to stay together and demonstrate political solidarity. That InTam is still, in Weyand's view the one who is causing difficulty lining up manpower-- he won't carry out the conscription. Lon Nol tried to get him to do it. Swank played the idea of Lon Nol leaving in very low key because he thought Lon Nol ____________. Lon Nol did say when things eased up he would go when the situation was a little clearer. Lon Nol sounded very practical except for the idea of accepting the Koreans. There was no discussion of South Vietnamese assistance during this discussion. Now on the military situation, they talked about it and it is confused. There is very little fighting going on by either side--both sides are exhausted. Neither is doing good fighting.

HK: Well you know if it were not for the bombing cutoff we would be in good shape.

AM: I talked to Vogt and his people about laying on maximum amount of ammo. They are doing everything they can and will bring in more ammo if possible. In this same vein, discounting anything that happens in Cambodia, the rice situation in Southeast Asia is very critical. There may be a little from Thailand. The only good possibility of rice appears to be in Chian. So there will be a rice shortage in Cambodia by September. And you ought to think about it.

HK: How can we think about it?

AM: Well maybe the Chinese could help. There is a small amount we could get from Philippines and maybe some from Japan and Thailand will give some. The US crop doesn't come until the fall and I am sending you a paper on this. On South Vietnam, Weyand visited all four regions and in Military 1, Troung reports that they are in the best shape ever and clear of VietCong and North Vietnamese.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-04

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12758
By C.D. KARA Date 6-8-64

Finally, the NVN are about where they have always been.
Weyand judged from Troung that things are going well.
In Military Region 2, there is the problem you are aware of and
they are trying to correct that. In 3, Minh is trying to open 1-A
and is not doing--is doing about as an effective job as he did
at 13.

HK: He must be the most incompetent man operating any where in the world.

AM: In 4, the situation is good. Nghai says he will keep the Mekong opnn. Not sure about giving ________ support in the Mekong. In any event there is good control in 4. The overall supply situation, Weyand says, has no surprises. There should be some tubes for the 105's.

HK: We don't mind improving quality of what they need.

AM: He knows that and he will be prepared to speak to that as will the J-4 people from ________.

HK: Maybe we can have Weyand at one of our WSAG meetings when he gets back.

AM: Last night I had a meeting with Martin. He briefed our embassy people on the supply situation and then Martin ________ wanted to stay in Hawaii for two days (?) and I told Weyand to go to Hawaii and work on this all day tomorrow, because if Martin gets out there with the bureaucracy, he won't get anything done. This way he can think on this problem alone.

HK: The South Vietnamese should know that we want them to succeed and that we will help them to the maximum possible.

AM: That was his message (Weyand). It is my judgment that it is better to talk to the people in Hawaii to get correction action.

HK: All right.

AM: And then I will follow up on these other things, and when he gets back we could have him at a WSAG.

HK: Good. I will see you next week on that other problem.

AM: That's right. 5: o'clock Monday evening.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By: NARA Date 6/9/09

10:45 a.m., July 14, 1973

Dean Fisher/HAK

DF: Dean Fisher, how are you?

HAK: I'm fine.

DF: Anything to this CBS report that you are going to be named Secretary of State by the end of the summer?

HAK: Well, why should I move to a lower lposition?

DF: I don't know.

HAK: That was a joke -- off the record.

DF: I understand.

HAK: Look, I can tell you only what I've told everybody and that is the President has not discussed anything like that with me. In that case, I consider it unlikely that he'd discuss it with anyone else and therefore, I would have to assume the sources are inaccurate.

DF: Fair enough.

HAK: But, you know, if it were to ahppen, it certainly is going to post-date this event today. The right answer is that he has not discussed it with me, and, therefore, I would question whether there could be any reliable sources.

DF: Right. Are you planning to go out to California with him in August?

HAK: Yes, of course. It's still 60 miles from Beverly Hills, isn't it?

DF: I believe so.

HAK: That's where I'll be.

DF: I'll look forward to seeing you there if I don't see before then. Thanks a lot. Bye

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By NARA Date 5/9/01

July 14, 1973

10:45 a.m.

Hank Treuitt/HAK

HT: How should we treat this thing? There are two of them. One of them is the Rather report that the President has said he intends to make you Secretary of State in September, and then there is one apparently out of the State Department which says Rogers has told friends he is thinking of quitting in the fall; and that if he does the President fully intends to name you.

HAK Well, you know the White House policy is never to comment on hearsay and what is that briefing?

HT Well...

HAK No, I was joking. How should you treat it? I can only tell you what I know which is that the President has never discussed it with me. Therefore, I don't know who the reliable sources could be. And knowing the President he is not in the habit of saying that sort of thing to many people.

HT The word from the State Department has more of the sound of a 70 trial balloon, but I can't even understand why a trial balloon would be necessary at this stage.

HAK Look, if the President were contemplating....my own plans were to leave originally.

HT I know.

HAK If the President wants to launch a trial balloon, he sure as hell wouldn't launch it out of the State Department. What came out of the State Department is certainly not authorized by the White House. And that you can take as absolutely axiomatic. They ought to know why the President needed a trial balloon.

HT He's right.

HAK[ Secondly, we would certainly surely not float it out of the State Department if he did want a trial balloon.

HT Let me be absolutely for a second. What if the President was a bit worried that you might be getting ready to leave earlier than he wanted you to.

HAK Absolutely not. I don't play games like that. Would this be a way of reassuring me?

2

HT Well, in effect, yes.

HAK Absolutely not. Absolutely not, inconceivable. First of all, I consider this Watergate situation a national emergency so he's in no danger of my leaving now. He is under no pressure from me whatsoever and taking our relationship he would not do it this way. Absolutely out of the question.

HT Let me ask you something...

HAK If I want to leave he will be the first to know. I won't be mumbling around here and if he hears if from third hand and he communicates from me with third hand, that is not possible. All of this is not to be quoted.

HT Of course not. Well, there is the final, final thing and I don't know whether you can answer it or not, but would you, and this would not be for use I assume, but would you take it if it developed that way?

HAK It would really depend on the circumstances at the time. It is a hypothetical question. Six months ago I would have said no.

HT Well, I think the thing to do with it is to use is just use it as one of those minor Washington mysteries that are floating around.

HAK That's right. The thing I would discard completely is that the President is doing this and wanted to placate me in some way. That is total nonsence because if he wanted to do that all he had to do is tell me directly if I needed placating. Secondly, I don't need placating.

HT I think we'll just treat it as floater then.

HAK And, thirdly, he just wouldn't do it to the State Department with Rogers out of town.

HT Rather has been wrong before.

HAK Now that is the State Department's side of it. Now on the Rather's story, I would have to know the source to see if there is an even 10 percent credibility to it. I told Rather what I am telling you that the President has not discussed this with me and that's all I Know.

HT Well, we will just let it float as one of those Washington rumors
and not try to resolve.it.

HAK The only reason I give these qualifications is if it would or were
to happen when the timeframe mentioned that State doesn't change
the what I'm telling you today is true.

HT I think probably B had a certain logic going for him and he
may have gotten this out of the State Department who does have..

HAK In my view the State Department would not be the first to know this.

HT Well if we ask the other side of it that Rogers might want to get
out this fall.

HAK Well that's conceivable to me then. But again I have no basis
whatever. He's never mentioned it to me. I mean Rogers hasn't
mentioned to me that he is leaving.

HT Okay, I think we can let it float that way then. Thank you much.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E 0.12958

By AB NARA Dae 6/9/09

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger - Secy. Rush

July 14, 1973

12:04 p.m.

K: How are you? The President read something in the Washington Post that made him so irate that he almost had a relapse.

R: What is that?

K: On page 9. "A high State Department official, challenged by a West German legislator to explain just what the United States had gotten out of the two summits with the Russians, had this to say at a conference held in Washington recently. 'I can cite a number of particular areas...some specific benefits...(before the summit) we couldn't agree on the amount of rent--how many rubles--we should pay for trade offices and apartment space. We reached agreement on this at the summit.'" Now we will be glad to give talking points, but if such people at the State Department want to take statements..

R: Yes, I agree, it was an outrage.

K: Well, it shouldn't be hard to find out who these people were.

R: Yes, you're right.

K: But, it is impossible that our people don't give a proper defense --- and it made the President furious. Will yoy give me an answer to this by Monday?

R: Yes I will, Henry. I'll look into it and will have an answer to you on Monday. Have a good weekend, Henry.

K: Thank you, and you too, Ken.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By NARA Date 6/9/69

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/69

July 14, 1973, 12:15 p.m.

Herb Schlosser/HAK

HS How are you? I picked up the morning's TIMES, and without saying anything I just hopes that happens, and I thought I'd just call you because...

HAK Aren't you nice. But it's not happening yet.

HS So you can't say anything.

HAK It's one of these mysteries that can get floated around here. But it is, in any event, premature.

HS I realize that, but I think it would be the right thing, particularly in view of all of the circumstances that would be right so I hope it will happen.

HAK All my friends must want me to go broke.

HS Have you gotten calls this morning as a result of this?

HAK I get a lot of newsmen who are calling.

HS It couldn't happen better.

HAK Well, you're nice to say that.

HS

HAK That's the one shining area, without you I don't know how it would be. Now you're leaving soon for abroad?

HAK Well, not for three weeks.

HS You're not going to be about in New York or at anytime next week, are you? I'm leaving for about two or three weeks to go west.

HAK No, I won't be in New York next week.

HS Okay, I thought we might get together some evening for dinner...

HAK No, I'd love to do it but I don't think I'll be up in New York before I leave. Will both of you be in the West Coast?

HS Well, we'll be going to Wyoming and then we'll be out there for a week and I'm just going to sit at my beach house for two weeks and do nothing. We're going to some summer resort in Wyoming owned by Doris Stacy. When we fix up our Fire Island house which will be next summer, you're going to come out here.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.012958
By: NARA Date 6/9/04

A6

TELCONE
President/Mr. Kissinger

7/14/73 1:05 p.m.

HK: Hello, Mr. President.

RN: Hi, Henry, how are you.

HK: Okay, you sound better today.

RN: Yeh, I think so, I think so. Coming along.

HK: Al probably told you already you had a letter from Brezhnev and the
entire Politburo--

RN: No, he didn't get into that Henry. Very nice.

HK: Came in yesterday from Brezhnev saying on behalf of himself and
all his colleagues he wishes you the speediest recovery and that they
are all thinking of you. And Mrs. Chandi sent a message this morning.

RN: Isn't that nice. Well

HK: The Ambassador was in--then Pompidou sent a message and the Indian
Ambassador yesterday gave a press conference in which they asked him
what is the effect of Watergate on American foreign policy and he said
Watergate is a domestic affair--it has no impact on foreign policy and
it's a good thing because this is the best foreign policy that American
has ever conducted.

RN: (laughs) Well that just drives them up a wall doesn't it.

HK: And that's from the Ambassador. That we had allegedly, irretrievably
alienated---

RN: I know, isn't that something. Well they got--these people, Henry
they're problems,--they tell me Dick Moore did very well before the
committee--

HK: Yeh, Dick Moore did well and--there is a good article by William White
today about Mitchell--don't know whether you have seen it.

RN: I heard that it was good.

HK: Very good, he said he was a man among pygmies--

RN: That's a good thing--I remember you had the same reaction.

DECLASSIFIED
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Telcon

Page 2

HK: Exactly.

RN: Actually, look Ervin and his bunch now have become and are now becoming so violently partisan and actually been violently partisan that gives--when I do it, I can hit them harder and I will and I'm not going to lay back and take this, the second point is this silly letter of his suggesting that we meet--of course, coming to the hospital was only coincidental, but that drives them right up the wall because they know very well I can't meet them for a week

HK: Not all of next week, I would hope. I would hope for the meeting.

RN: Of course not.

HK: I mean I hope there would be a quick recovery but

RN: Couldn't possibly meet them before Friday.

HK: I frankly think you should'nt come back before Friday night.

RN: I don't intend to certainly before Thursday night but we can't tell us know there could be complications but I'm going to stay here because the problem with this thing apparently is which I can sense today would be the turning factor would be sharply reduced but what sets in afterwards because of the--apparently it was very acute, more acute than I had realized on Wednesday and Thursday night. There is a very heavy fatigue factor which sets in, you are just very, very week.

HK: They have an article today in one of the papers saying that medical doctors--some doctors analysis that it reduces the work capability by 70% of patients because of the fatigue factor.

RN: I can see it, I have no reading--I just haven't got interest in it, so I'm just doing the minimum--lying, laying around which is hard to do but--as a matter of fact it may be a blessing in a way just to get the mind turned off for the week, I haven't had my mind turned off for a week for years, so may as well do it

HK: You have been under this unbelievable turtuous pressure for the last few months and every since you have come into office you have taken the position you don't take vacations so you've always been on. Now this isn't a vacation but it forces you to rest and I really think we can get around so much momentum in August and September that when these hearings resume, it will be in a totally different climate.

RN: Well the hell with them--the hearings do go on and we'll go on doing

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By A6 NARA Date 6/9/09

our job, let the country take the choice; in the meantime too, I'm delighted that it is one good thing is that our friends in the liberal community hit the Post and Time and Newsweek that the--at least we gave them some happiness by getting sick. They haven't been happy for months.

HK: No, Mr. President. I don't think they want you sick because first of all--

RN: I don't care what they want.

HK: No, no, I think Mr. President that in a way even from strictly our point of view, by being sick you gain public sympathy and they don't want that, but secondly I don't think they want you sick, I think they want you politically destroyed which is a different thing

RN: Well we shall see, we shall see, it doesn't matter. Anyway we'll handle them, we'll handle them and continue to go forward with our jobs and you can see that that type of message should get out, the ones you just mentioned like Brezhnev, Pompidou, the big ones-- you could tell Ron not --he has said we have received messages from foreign heads of state, but I think Brezhnev and Politburo and so forth although maybe if you start putting them out they say why haven't you had one from Chinese--don't do it then.

HK: We should mention them by name.

RN: I wouldn't mention them by name, that's right. right. You'll get something from the Chinese eventually.

HK: I think we should wait a few days and put them all out.

RN: Right, fight. Good, thanks for calling.

HK: I hope you feel better.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O.12958

Authority

By A4 NARA Dae 6/9/09

TELCOM

President/Mr. Kissinger

1:20 p.m. 7/14/73

RN: Hello, I was wondering if Magnuson had been acting up anymore?

HK: No, (laughing) he's under control now. Or at any rate, I haven't had any reports on him.

RN: Yeh, well, it's too bad he had to go over there before--on the other hand after their seeing him, they'll be glad to see him.

HK: No, no it's an asset. It's an asset because it shows to them that what policy we are pursuing is not just--is not universally ______ because even those who are talking as if they are supporting rapproachment with China do it very often for the wrong reasons.

RN: Hm huh.

HK: So I think that in the long term, he is an asset. He was a disaster for us on Cambodia but then whatever he said on Cambodia he threw in by what he said on Taiwan.

RN: Yeh. Well the next question is--we still don't know about the announcement of your trip, that's still--

HK: No, we haven't got that yet and frankly Mr. President if we have no assurance of what they will do in Cambodia then I do not think I should go before the 15th of August because otherwise--
it

RN: In other words, let's blow before you go.

HK: Let it go well down the drain before I go, because otherwise they'll say we went to Peking failed and then blame the Administration for it. And I think I should put if off maybe even till early September.

RN: I agree, I agree. That's right.

HK: That is also a good shot across the bow for the Chinese.

RN: Yeh, because frankly if it goes Cambodia goes--we've got to really nail these people on the other side for it.

HK: And that's why I don't think we should ______ it by my going there. Unless the Chinese guarantee us a good outcome.

RN: That's right. That's probably what they are sweating over it--

HK: Exactly that's their problem.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By NARA Dated 5/9/09

July 14, 1973, 1:30 p.m.

John Sherman/HAK

JS: Dr. Kissinger.

HAK I'm on the way out.

JS: You're on the way out of what?

HAK: Out of my office to go take a swim.

JS: I thought you were on your way out of the White House. to look over the office in Foggy Bottom.

HAK: Why should I take a demotion?

JS: To go over and look it over.

HAK I said, why should I take a demotion?

JS: That's a definite quote.

HAK: Yes, off the record.

JS: Look, has anything changed since our <u>NEW</u> conversation?

HAK No.

JS: That's exactly what you said.

HAK: What did I say at lunch?

JS: You said that the President has not discussed it with you.

HAK That is right.

JS: You also said that there has been no indication whatsoever that of Rogers' leaving.

HAK: Well, look, all I can tell you is what I know. The President has not discussed this with me. I have my doubts whether Arthur could have a reliable source but I cannot speak about Rogers' sources. Rogers has not discussed his leaving with me, certainly and not in my knowledge with anyone else.

DECLASSIFIED

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By AB NARA Date 6/9/09

JS: I've heard nothing about it. In other words, it still stands?

HAK: It is where it was when I talked to you, and the only way I'm leaving a little hole is in case the President may have something in his mind that I'm not aware of.

JS: Well, is that possible that he would be thinking of this without discussing it with you?

HAK: It is not at this as of today, July whatever it is, 14th. It is not alive; it's not an enterprise that I have any awareness of.

JS: But that the fact is..

HAK: Whether there is a longer range plan like this, I cannot tell you.

JS: Because I gather there is a New York Time story in the late edition saying that Rogers' friends have been saying that he would like to leave in September which, of course, indirectly supports.

HAK: I saw that in the Star.

JS: We ran it today, right.

HAK: But, you know, I really. If you called me yesterday... the only new thing that I know is the damn Rogers story. Otherwise, the situation is exactly when we discussed it.

JS: You have no idea wherre Rathers' story is coming from?

HAK: No. And I don't know who Rogers' friends are either. I mean who's putting ojt that story.

JS: Well, I have a fairly good idea who that is and that's why I doubt it too. I mean I don't doubt that he's planning on leaving, it but I doubt that he says that specifically, but I don't know. You see, my problem frankly, Henry, is that Dave saying to me should I run a story tomorrow on this and I'm rather loft to do it if there is no substance to the thing. I can't see giving xx credibility to a Dan Rather - you know Dan Rather is not the most credible person in town in the past when it comes...

HAK: Well, you know, I respect Dan Rather but I wouldn't make it.. I wouldn't go with a big story tomorrow.

JS: Just one other thing, I know you're on way out, what about Cambodia and this Sihanouk business. How do you look at that?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By NARA Date 6/9/09

HAK: Off the record. After the Congressional votes, things have certainly not moved the way I thought they would. But you can interpret the Sihanouk thing as either having him get into a negotiation or meaning and your guess is as good as mine.

JS: Why haven't they moved after the vote as you expected.

HAK: I just don't want to go into that.

JS: You mean diplomatically or the situation.

HAK: No diplomatically.

js: For the better or worse?

HAK: Well, for the worse.

JS: With the Chinese?

HAK: But it isn't clear yet. I just wanted .... just judgment.

JS: What are current plans in terms of Peking? More toward the middle of the month?

HAK: Yes.

JS: After the bombing halt?

HAK: We're really still talking about it.

JS: Okay, have a good swim.

TELCOM

Sec. Schlesinger/Kissinger

7/15/73 = 12:25 p.m.

K: Hello.

S: Henry, how are you?

K: All right.

S: Henry, I'm meeting with our friend Laver on Tuesday as you well know.
Now I believe I can work out with the Chairmen and all a system that
insulates the Defense component of the balance of payments from the
rest of the balance of payments and get that monkey off our backs.

K: That would be masterful.

S: It would be masterful but it requires separating the Defense issue from all the other trade and monetary issues and I think that George and others would prefer to keep them linked as part of the piece of bargaining.

K: Well, how would you separate them?

S: The way I would separate them would be to compute very precisely
what the balance of payments affects/our overseas defense commitments
and then each year, since the other countries are (washed) with dollars -
which is their chief complaint and the fact that the US dollar is now
undervalued allegedly, and they can't sell their goods in competition
with it, that as long as they are a wash in dollars, each year they set
aside say a billion and a half dollars which they invest in a non-negotiable,
non-transferable, non-marketable US Treasury security lasting for
say 30 years. This takes the liquid dollar flow resulting from our
overseas presence out of the money markets and since they are awash
in dollars I believe they would be willing to do this. It's just like a
longterm investment in the United States.

K: What does Shultz want?

S: Well George wants to use this as an opportunity to push a little more
US goods on the Germans.

K: Oh, bullshit.

S: In any event I would like to feel this out with the Germans.

K: I think you should.

By: NARA Date 6/9/69
DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
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S: And see if I can sell that package to them, if I can you see, then the arguments on the Hill that this is draining our country dry, etc. because of the balance of payments leak simply go away and I think we're running in the clear there.

K: Well, I would support that.

S: OK. Good.

K: Now wait a minute, Jim, I've got two other things. One is I read the cable from Weyand in which he told Lon Nol we would not be able to airdrop military supplies

S: That's wrong. We can airdrop them.

K: That may be so, but he told

S: Let's get that corrected.

K: But it's really one other of this endless series of semi-sabotages that happen there.

S: Henry, I can't believe it's sabotage. There's just too much stupidity around the world or ignorance I should say.

K: But it always happens to coincide with the goddam chiefs and what they want for budgetary reasons.

S: What the Chiefs want - and Tom Moorer wants to go on providing supplies to these people and Tom has a commitment to this and I think the other Chiefs too. I think that that just is an error. It's an unfortunate and mistimed error, but let's

K: All right, can we correct it?

S: We will get it corrected.

K: OK, secondly, when you talk to Laver, I'll do it too when I talk to him, and incidentally I don't mind if you want to have a man there when I talk to Laver I'd be delighted.

S: Fine.

K: It's up to you.

S: Good.

DECLASSIFIED
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K: Otherwise we'll send you a memcon.

S: Good.

K: But if you could do something about their belief that this nuclear agreement may undermine flexible response.

S: No, I think I've got that half solved already and I'll get it solved the rest of it on Tuesday.

K: Because really we have to hit them on the proposition that it has nothing to do with the conduct of war.

S: No, that's exactly right. I've got that half solved already, Henry.

K: And that in fact by linking conventional and nuclear war dangers in the same articles it gives for the first time an international legal justification for it or a connection to it. If you could do that, that would be very helpful.

S: No, I think we'll get that problem solved.

K: And if you also - I will do it - but if you could on your side, one point I will make to him is that we want the Year of Europe, not to bug out of Europe, not to blackmail them on economics but to create an emotional basis here for the continuation of the policies and to continue and to give us public support to fight the battles of troops and so forth that we know we'll have to fight.

S: Very good.

K: So that it's in their interest to let us have a success in it because we don't want anything.

S: Couldn't agree more and we're selling that line.

K: If you can do that those are the two things.

S: OK.

K: Thank you, Jim.

S: OK. Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
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By NARA Dje 5/9/09

TELCOM

Dep. Sec. Rush/Kissinger

9:35 a.m. - 7/16/73

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: Yes, Ken.

R: I found that our friend Walter Stoessel is the person who said that.

K: It's unbelievable.

R: This was at a conference of Dave Abshire's out at that Georgetown Center, you know.

K: What explanation does he have?

R: I haven't talked to him. What I want to do is get the full text of the thing. See what was said. I notice in her articles she says "I can cite a number of particular areas ... some specific benefits ..." and so forth. And from then on we couldn't agree on the amount of rent and so forth.

K: That's absurd.

R: Absolutely absurd. I just can't understand it.

K: You know Ken, we could have - I guarantee you if you or I had been in front of that group they just couldn't have taken things out of context because the whole thrust would have been positive.

R: The whole thrust would have been very positive. I think that's one of our major accomplishments. I just don't understand it at all. I don't understand Walter. I'm going to talk to him and see just what it is all about, but this thing just baffles because Walter is quite well you know Walter, he's quite pro-President, pro-sympathetic and I think Walter thought the summit was a great success. So this thing must be out of context. I just can't understand it but I do have it without question that he's the one who did it.

K: Will you talk to him?

R: Yes, I will.

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K: Ken, now as long as I've got you on the phone, there is a COCOM vote coming up on the sale of British afterburner (?) technology to China. Now I know we've got to oppose it, but I want to do it in the lowest key way possible.

R: Right, OK.

K: For complicated reasons which I don't want to discuss on the telephone.

R: I understand. Well, good. These things always get bitter as you know. The British think that we are really sons-of-bitches on this COCOM anyway. I ran into some tough times when I was over at Defense on that. So they'll play it up, I'm afraid, but we will oppose it as low key as we can.

K: Right.

R: OK, Henry.

K: So if you can do that I'd appreciate it very much and we'll tell Defense the same thing.

R: OK, good.

K: Thank you.

R: Fine, Henry. Bye.

TelCon

Murray Gard (TIME)/Mr. Kissinger

10:28 am, July 16, 1973

K: Hello.

G: How are you?

K: Okay.

G: Good.

K: I tried to get Jerry, and I couldn't get him, so I wanted to talk to you about this article you have on the European attitude towards the United States in this week's TIME.

G: Yeah.

K: You know, I really think when you do a thing like this and when you allegedly say the American view encounter, the Americans say the following. And then you come up with the three weakest arguments you can find. Considering that you people are in my office five times a week when you want something, why couldn't you check with our office?

G: We do not check with Henry.

K: Who?

G: You, on this story.

K: With me.

G: Yeah. Did anyone talk to you last week?

K: No.

G: Oh dear.

K: No one checked with me or my office.

G: Yeah, yeah.

K: And I mean God Almighty, we--you want to find out, the visit with Scheel wasn't hastily improvised to answer European fears. The visit was part of the series that was originated six weeks ago to

DECLASSIFIED
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push forward the Year of Europe, and it has been set for two or three weeks.

G: Um hum, uh hum.

K: We saw Jobert. It's not our fault that this was never covered. He came all the way out to San Clemente. We had the NATO council in San Clemente. And we are spending more time on solidifying our relations with Europe than with any other single topic.

G: Yeah.

K: And I think the honest answer is, the honest problem is the problem in Europe. And most of the garbage you are listing is an example of the European malaise. You know, I know Watergate is a nightmare, I know everyone wants to knock down everything that's ever been done, but I don't know why the United States must always p____ on itself.

G: Yeah. Well, it seems to a great extent does reflect the attitude in Europe, and mainly quotes our people over in Europe.

K: Yeah, but first of all I think if you talk to Heath or Hume they wouldn't say this in Britain. But if it does reflect the attitude in Europe, the question is that not the problem, isn't that a problem. What have we done. I can assure you that nothing was added to the Summit after April 1st that hadn't already been decided by April 1st. This garbage that Watergate made us make concessions, what concessions. What concrete concessions were made? Where did the European interest suffer? Where did anybody's interest suffer? It's become a damned ______. If it hadn't been for Watergate everybody would be praising this to the skies.

G: Yeah, well what the piece reports Henry is what was being said around Helsinki, in that respect. Wasn't that the point--

K: Well I can't criticize you quoting Europeans, but as long as you pretend to say that the American answer is--there is a hell of a lot better American answer than the one you gave. And a lot of what you print from Europe is so uncritical and so sore headed, and is in itself a symptom of the problems of people who will not make a defense effort but scream about any effort to negotiate reductions of-- now you take this argument about <u>dropping the word "balance"</u> our of mutual force reduction, you know who dropped it first--Brandt-- in his communique with Brezhnev. Now we could do no less than he did. Now secondly, we have not changed our proposal that we put

3

before NATO in one iota. The nature of the reduction isn't going
to be determined by whether you have an adjective in there, it's
going to be determined by the substance of the position.

G: Sure, sure. Well that does--

K: we've been trying for 9 months to get the Europeans to
discuss with us the content of a force reduction. For 9 months
they've been dancing around with legalistic arguments on like
whether the word "balance" ought to be in there.

G: Yeah. Well the piece rather directly tries to catalog the discussion
around Europe and --

K: Murray, you've got to defend the piece, there's no sense arguing it.

G: I'm not trying to argue it. That was preface to what I wanted to say.
I certainly think that we owe it to ourselves and secondarily to check
with you which we didn't do. Jerry was out of the country, and

K: I figure what really my basic problem is and maybe we ought to have
a lunch with the editors sometime. I really think it is a basic
problem. There's such a malaise in this country now, that we are
in danger of destroying the good things that either have been done
or can be done, and moreover than can only be done in the next
three years, given the cast of characters in the world. And we
all ought to think of what is needed to salvage what can be salvaged.

G: Yeah. Well why don't we arrange that lunch.

K: I would like it.

G: And fairly soon. Would you like to do it down there.

K: It's easier for me down here.

G: Let me get that arranged.

K: But I'd be delighted to meet with Hedley and you and Henry, and
I think really it is an important time to do it, even if nothing but
hard news comes out of it.

G: All right, very good. I'll do that, and I appreciate your call.

K: Good, and there are no hard feelings, on my side, just want you to know

G: Right, okay. Bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

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TelCon
Bryce Harlow/Mr. Kissinger

11:47 am, July 16, 1973

K: Hello.

H: Henry?

K: Yes., Bryce. I have some people here now, I wanted to talk to you about that question you asked so tactlessly at the staff meeting this morning.

H: Sorry, but I just figured these people are going to get pressed.

K: No, no, no, it was a good question. I was joking. Are you going to be in your office for an hour or so.

H: Well, I'm going over to the V. Pres. at the moment, and then I'll be back here.

K: Will you call me when you get back.

H: Yeah.

K: Good. Thank you.

H: Right.

[Later on the I.O.]

K: Hello.

H: I'm back.

K: Look, I still have these people with me. Can I come over in about 15 minutes.

H: Sure.

K: Good.

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TelCon

Hugh Sidey/Mr. Kissinger

12:55 pm, July 16, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Yes sir. Well listen, my question was about the Europe-- I was just curious--

K: No, no, you probably will go in the first half of November.

S: I see.

K: And I really think that despite all the mumblings that it will be successful.

S: Yeah, yeah.

K: But I talked to Murray briefly but I'd like you to think about this. I agree with much of what you have in your column this week which was mostly concerned with the domestic side. But I think that we have an overwhelming National problem now in this sense, that whatever horrors may have been committed, there are also some good things that have to be saved.

S: Um hum.

K: And in my area the opportunity for doing, you know building a more or less stable peace exist in the next four years, and we can't have a moratorium for four years, and I've been wondering whether we shouldn't have a meeting with some of your senior editors to discuss what the national need is now.

S: Kind of a national purpose here redefined.

K: And also what everybody's responsibility is. I'm not asking you to pull punches or anything like this but just how we can avoid this sense of malaise which you've described today. It becomes really totally paralytic.

S: Um hum. Well I agree, I was struck last week when I just called around, just you know.

K: I don't know whether you think that's a useful thing to discuss.

S: I do. Henry, one of the great tragedies I have felt all the way along has been the disintegration of this much maligned establishment because at least they came together and they sponsored things like the Rockefeller report, the national purpose series at Luce-Rand,

you know, and there was a constant ferment--our own corporation,
I've talked to Hedley, why don't we do something, you know, why
don't we go out and get these poeple. Listen Henry, you know--

K: If you wanted to arrange that, I would--

S: Well, I would be delighted but I would like to go a little farther.
Could you talk on the record for a column this week on that; that
I could write, if you're concerned which we can quote.

K: Let me think about that. I might be willing to do that.

S: You can say, look, you know we--

K: In fact, I probably will be willing to do that. Let me think
about it this afternoon.

S: Think about it and give me a call, because I--again you could
approve the whole thing, and I don't want to embarras anybody;
put it in Nixon's name or whatever you know, in which you say
these things, because I think it's damned important.

K: Okay. I'll talk to you later this week, later today.

S: Okay, fine.

K: Thank you, Hugh.

S: Very good. Bye bye.

K: Bye.

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AB

TelCon

John Osborne/Mr. Kissinger

2:45 pm, July 16, 1973

K: Hello.

O: John Osborne, thanks for calling. Doctor, the State Dept business--as you know, I haven't written about this since we discussed this a couple of months ago, but with the Dan Rather broadcast and all the follow up, I guess I will be at least mentioning it this week. Can I take it very seriously now.

K: Look, in my knowledge of it which is all I can talk about, nothing has changed since I last talked to you about it. It's the sort of thing which the President might be thinking of, but it is not anything that has ever come to a point of decision.

O: Uh huh. You were quoted in one of the pieces, and I guess in the CBS broadcast, Dan's broadcast, and I suppose he's never discussed it with you.

K: That's right.

O: That remains so true.

K: That remains true.

O: Background for ;my use. What sort of a level has these discussions been going on at.

K: What I don't know is--look you've been around long enough to know that this is not a thought that in this present situation he could not have considered.

O: Yes.

K: And, the trouble I have, and have had ever since Friday, I've just seen a State Dept dispatch from Tokyo where a State Dept official is quoted as saying I was the source of these stories. Well, you know better than that.

O: Right.

K: I don't think there's a reporter in town who's ever heard me speculate in this direction.

O: No.

K: Then the question is who would be able to make a story that Dan Rather believes sufficiently to go with it. That I cannot judge.

O: Um hum. Well, to go back to my original question, how seriously to take the possibility, if it is a possibility at this point, you know. I guess that just has to be something for the individual reporters to--

K: I think the individual reporter has to judge in what direction a certain logic of events might drive the President.

O: Uh huh. It may, but

K: It is not something--I can tell you my own personal view is it is not a position which in itself I would have wanted. It is not a position that in itself I would even have considered accepting three months ago. Now in the present circumstances, it would depend on what the President, I mean this is all for your background, not for quotation, why the President would want it if indeed he wants it.

O: Um hum.

K: You know, what I find so astonishing is that in this town, the business of power is so all consuming, and status, why would anyone want it right now. What the hell difference does it make what title anyone has? Up to now I've been able to get the things done that needed to get done from my present position. So it would have to depend entirely on what the President had in mind, and my predeliction has not been to stay out the term, you know that.

O: Right.

K: And until the President talks to me, I think it would be highly inappropriate for me to make any abstract comment. It's not a position I'm seeking, that I can tell you now.

O: Well, that would be what I would have supposed, that you are not seeking it.

K: I am not seeking it, I have not asked for it directly or indirectly either from the President of from anyone who is in a position to discuss it with the President.

O: Did you read the Novak column this morning?

K: I read it, yes. I frankly--until this State Dept. blast out of Tokyo, I had assumed that this stuff had come from the State Dept.

O: Um hum. You are an intelligent guy, I assume Creech is with Rogers out there.

K: Yeah.

O: And he said this. It's news to me, I just got back from lunch and

K: I just saw a ticker that he's--that there's a State Dept source out there who claims that I am the source of it, but that he believes that I didn't discuss it with the President because I didn't have the guts to do that.

O: That sounds like a rather nasty remark.

K: And the reason I want the job is to get out from under the shadow of Watergate, you know, I don't want the job particularly.

O: Right. Subject two--I still assume you'll be off to China next month.

K: Yes, but I would like to--I want to separate the China trip from the implication that I'm going about Cambodia, because the China trip was planned long before Cambodia.

O: Uh huh. Does that mean that both--it has to mean I suppose, but the substance of the subjects you'll be taking up on the China trip don't necessarily have to with a turn on the Cambodian negotiation, is that right?

K: That is correct.

O: Uh huh. This could very well turn our parts--Cambodia negotiations still--you know you said publicly that it isn't framed.

K: Well I'm not really - my impression which however is not yet based on clear evidence is that it is not now moving as fast as I thought it would be and I, of course, think that cut-off date must have something to do with it. But that's not for quotation.

O: Right.

K: Or attribution, or even mention.

TelCon
Flanigan/Kissinger
2:55 pm, July 16, 1973

K: Hello.

F: Henry.

K: Pete, I'll say this for you, as head of the personnel search group in '68, it's better to sit in this country where you've managed to miss, you must have been hidden in ______ Island looking for the Jap in the caves.

F: Well, what brought that on in 1973?

K: Alex Butterfield has just gone on national television saying that the President had every office he owned bugged.

F: I heard that, but you know where Alex Butterfield came from.

K: I know.

F: An old room mate of Robert Haldeman.

K: That's right.

F: I take credit for you and for one or two others, having brought them into the government.

K: If I thought you were--but Haldeman's judgment--all these sons of bitches who were counting how many times you mention the President in a press conference.

F: It's unbelievable.

K: Are now volunteering information. There's no need to volunteer anything.

F: Unbelievable. I must say I thought Maurice Stans and John Mitchell at least stood up--

K: They were men.

F: Exactly.

K: Maurice Stans and Mitchell may have done wrong things, but they were at least true to themselves. But those bastards. Those guys when I gave a press conference would call me afterwards and say you mentioned the President only eight times, and in our judgment in a half an hour you should mention him 23 times.

2

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F: (Laugs) I know it. Well, Henry, it is a shame isn't it. But Alex--I would have thought an old military man/hew ould have had a different approach to life.

K: I have learned one thing. If you want to run an organization, hire an Irishman. They may not be bright but they are loyal.

F: (Laugs) Are you getting it through.

K: Well I'm for it.

F: Listen, Henry, you and I have temporarily won the battle on export controls, but I assure you it's a very shakey win. The problem of course is to what extent will people abroad take advantage of a period of no export controls to put in manmouth orders or will people think that manmouth orders are going to come in?

K: Yeah, what can we do?

F: Well, I think we can do two things that could be very helpful. According to Continental Grain who are, they say, the only agents to the USSR. The USSR has bought all of the feed grains and plans to buy this year, in fact has given us back a million tons. If we could take that back to Dobrynin and say is this true and can we repeat it. If we could connect that with a similar statement from the Chinese--they are said to of bought a substantial amount, and if they have bought what they intend to buy, the removal of those two threats to the market would be enormous. We could combine that with a statement that we are going to our traditional customers and working with them so that in this period of short supply, they buy for consumption, not for storage. Lobking towards meeting their storage needs next year when we expect an expanded crop. It seems to me if we could put together those statements, we could relieve the pressure on the futures market very substantially and --

K: Well, I can do it with the Russians certainly. And let me think on how to do it with the Chinese. We are having other problems right now.

F: All right. I will send you, within an hour, the statement from Continental. We can;t make that public of course. If Dobrynin would say yes--

K: Can it wait until Wednesday.

F: That's the day you see we'd like to announce it.

3

K: Okay, I'll talk to Dobrynin.

F: Can you talk to him today, and think about our Chinese friends. I think we might be able to put together a package here that might relieve the pressure on the market quite substantially.

K: Well, I don't think the Chinese will want to announce that they are not doing anymore.

F: If they won't, we can't say it. We can only say it about the Soviets, then we'll just limit it to that.

K: Let me see what I can do.

F: Good. I'll have this over to you shortly. I have another problem I'd like to talk to you about when you have a moment.

K: Good.

F: Will you give me a call. I need ten minutes at your leisure.

K: Actually I wasn't have, but I'll give you ten minutes.

F: Give me ten minutes then when you are not leasurely.

K: Good.

F: Thank you.

K: Bye.

TelCon
Richard Hottelet/Mr. Kissinger

3:00 pm, July 16, 1973

K: Hello.

H: Hello, Henry.

K: Dick, how are you.

H: Very well thank you, how are you.

K: Okay.

H: Look, I would like to come down to see you, to tour the horizon.
Is there any time in the near future that is convenient for you.
Are you going to be around.

K: Let me, in the next two weeks, find a breakfast or lunch.

H: Yeah.

K: Can I do that. I just don't have my calendar in front of me.
I'll get Dick Campbell to call you.

H: Okay. I'll tell you, the week after next would be a little better
for me than next week.

K: Okay, let's do it the week after next.

H: The week after next. I'll wait for you on call.

K: Good.

H: Very good.

K: Thank you, Dick.

H: Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/Murray Marder

7/16/73 3:50 p.m.

HK: What did you want to discuss with me so urgently?

MM: I wanted to come over and have a chat on foreign policy in general plans, activities, that kind of thing.

HK: What plans and activities?

MM: The thing we have discussed about institutionalizing the process and--

HK: Can it wait till tomorrow?

MM: Yes, it could wait till tomorrow surely--is there a time that you could--

HK: I'll try to get you in tomorrow.

MM: Henry, while I have you on the phone, may I ask you one other thing?

HK:

MM: I only heard x fragments of this testimony but I have to explain the diplomatic end of it--I don't know if you had heard the Butterfield testimony which now requires doing a thesis about the practic of diplomacy and so on and what I was asking, I'm trying to get some people at State to recall or actually get to me what the practic of training diplomats in security and so on and I would like to explain to the public particularly with this that it is the widely assumed practice in diplomacy when someone is visiting someone else's foreign office that everything is being recorded.

HK: That is true--
You know just for your guidance, I didn't happen to know about this
operation, but that is neither here nor there and no records were
circulated of it, but this is not to be used but it is widely assumed that
this is true. I always assume that when I travel everything I say
is being recorded--

MM: Well one of things we were going back to--

HK: I don't think that this was done as a diplomatic practice--Butterfield said it was done for historical reasons--that is what somebody told me.

MM: In either case

HK: We are not talking for quotation here, all right?

Page 2

MM: No. Unless there is something you wanted to say on the record.

HK: No I don't.

MM: You recall out in San Clemente and other places, the questions came up about the interpreter and wasn't the President at a disadvantage and so forth and frankly I always assumed that the conversations were being recorded in this country as in most other countries.

HK: That is the normal procedure yes. In most countries. I had always assumed that these things get recorded in every country.

MM: Actually I was a little surprised to have him say that when foreign visitors are at Camp David, it is turned off. I don't know why the hell it should be turned off--But was there ever any exchange of recording or anything of that kind--does anyone ever say to each other --you understand we are--

HK: Not to the best of my knowledge.

MM: Hm huh.

HK: But people have joked about it, you know. I talk about it in Russia that everything one says is recorded and they have never denied it.

MM: Yes, I remember that crack about what--looking up at the chandeliers --it is something that the public as a whole is totally unaware of-- unfamiliar with and I don't know what kind of a rebound if any that will come out of this--I imagine very well that there may be pious denouncements from some countries. ______, I think would love into an act--

HK: Who?

MM: The Uganda guy. There'll be guys popping off about it--

HK: I don't want to get into that. I think, okay-- Now while we are talking could you tell Unkar--or whatever his name is who wrote this column about --this article on an inside page of your newspaper that while David Young was technically paid by the NSC he was not an aid of the NSC when he asked for the psychological profile of Ellsburg--that we did not know a man thing of what he was doing.

MM: Right, I don't recall how he phrased that--

HK: He said an aide to the NSC asked for these things--that is technically

Page 3

perhaps true, but I just want it clearly understood that we did
not know about the existence of the plumbers, we did not know
that David Young was doing these things and it just so happened
that we paid him because--you know 3/4 's of my staff is paid by
other agencies and that doesn't make their department heads
responsible for their actions

MM: Right, okay, we'll pass that on.

HK: He didn't make a statement in any critical way, he just put it in for identification, so this is not said in criticism of the post, just--

MM: In referring back to the NSC staff

HK: That is right.

M: I understand your point. That it was not part of the--he was not operating in an NSC function--

HK: Just for your information

M: Hm huh. Good. Shall I wait to hear from you then on

HK: Yeh, you will hear from me by tomorrow morning.

MM: All right fine. Okay.

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TELCONE

Dan Rather/Kissinger

4:07 p.m. - 7/16/73

K: Hello.

R: Dr. Kissinger, it's Dan Rather.

K: Dan, could I ask you something which I know you are very reluctant to do. Could I ask you this question - That story which you launched on Friday night - let me tell you quite candidly, I'm being accused of having launched this myself.

R: Well, that is absolutely untrue. any

K: And I would just like to check this: Can by/plausible stretch the source
that gave it to you be called a friend of mine; I mean somebody who
would have an interest in promoting me?

R: On the contrary as a matter of fact.

K: OK. That's what I would have

R: You know for obvious reasons

K: No, no I don't want you to

R: Quite frankly it's only my respect for you that leads me to go that far.

K: Dan, I don't want you to tell me anymore. I would not have thought
that any friend of mine could have an interest in putting out a story
like that.

R: Mind you that I tried a number of your friends of yours and as I say
it was to the contrary.

K: All right.

R: And quite frankly that's one reason that I hastened to call you. I didn't
hasten to, I was afraid the story would leak to someone else and I
purposely waited until late in the day. But I did go to Ron about 4 o'clock
that afternoon when I first learned about it. And the reason was that
it had this smell about it that maybe that somebody was putting it out
to your detriment and I wanted to give it a chance of response, but no,
to the contrary I just have to stand on that answer.

K: That's all I need. I don't need anything more.

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A2

2

R: You know I'd be happy to buy billboard space to say that I suppose if it could be helpful. It just is not true that someone friendly to you was responsible for the start of it. And I must say that among those people that I thought you know might have talked to you about it or know something about it, to a man said that they had never heard you say anything to that effect.

K: No, I am certain no newsman in town can be found who has ever heard me say anything even implying this. OK, Dan. Many thanks.

R: You're quite welcome.

K: What I didn't know is whether a friend of mine might have done it out of an excess of enthusiasm.

R: No.

K: Although no friend of mine could have known anything like this if indeed there's any truth to it which I still have no reason to suppose.

R: Fine.

K: OK, thank you.

R: Thank you, bye.

By AB NARA Date 6/9/68

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Fred Brisson

7/16/73 4:30 p.m.

FB: How are you Henry.

HK: Freddy, how are you

FB: --- Secretary ---

HK: Not at all, I mean this --it is one of these campaigns that one of my
opponents are starting--this isn't done by friends of mine.

FB: Of course not. I don't think anyone believes Henry--I am here
in NY by the way I don't know if you know that, came in a couple
of days ago--wherever I am everybody seems to laugh about it
and says it ridiculous--

HK: I certainly have no interest in it--

FB: I sure hope someone will come out with a statement that will make
it clear that you are not and get on with the job because I don't
think it is fair to you or the country

HK: Right.

FB: Coming up by any chance Henry?

HK Not in thenext few days

FB: I talked to Bob and Charlie--who went into the hospital today

HK: Who?

FB: Charlie Evans

HK: Oh really, for what?

FB: Just for some tests--you know he has had that heart problem

HK: No, I didn't know that

FB: If you were coming up this week, I was going to suggest dinner on
Wednesdya--

HK: No, I can't do it on Wednesday--

FB: Are you coming back to the Coast in August?

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Page 2

FB: Middle?

HK: Yeh

FB: Hold yourself free for the 20th--we are having a little dinner that night. Some friends are coming from Europe

HK: I'll do my damnedest

FB: You're not coming up at all this week?

HK: No.

FB: All right, we'll be in touch--

HK: How long will you be in NY?

FB: Till Friday or Saturday

HK: Well I don't think I'll see you this time, but I'll see you on the Coast

FB: You'll be out about the end of the month?

HK: Middle of August

FB: We'll talk before then and if you can make the 20th, it'd be wonderful

HK: Good, bye.

FB: Bye, bye.

TELCORN

Lou Ciaffi . /Mr. Kissinger

5:17 p.m., July 16, 1973

C: Last week I cabled Sihanouk in Peking --

K: Yeah.

C: And reminded him that we had met in '64 and again when Jacqueline Kennedy was there and on several occasions and made the usual pitch and I got an answer this morning and he says he's accorded me an interview in China.

K: When.

C: He's not said. The cable -- wait a second, I'll read it to you in a second -- He says: [reads in French ?]

K: Um-humm. Good.

C: Now we've got a small problem because the President of ABC News, Elmer Lower, and the Chairman of the Board, Leonard Goldenson, are preparing themselves to go in and do a tour of China on Friday. And the company does not want me to apply officially for my visa until they're in. They are afraid of misunderstandings and so on.

K: Yeah. I think that's --

C: So I'll probably be applying in Paris -- I'll be going back to Paris this weekend and apply on Monday morning in Paris.

K: Well, why don't you check with Dick Campbell tomorrow and see whether we can get together for half an hour.

C: Very, very good.

K: Good, Lou.

C: Dick Campbell?

K: Dick Campbell.

C: Very good. I'll call him tomorrow morning then.

K: Good. Thank you.

wgh

TelCon

Dave Packard/Mr. Kissinger

521 P. M., July 16, 1973

K: Hello.

P: Dave Packard, Henry.

K: How are you Dave?

P: How are you.

K: Okay.

P: Getting along all right, sir.

K: Well, it's at least exciting I'll tell you that. Do you want to come back and join us.

P: Well I don't know. I think you're getting along very well.

K: I've got the Chairman sitting here, he

P: Well, I wanted to just chat for a minute with you about this embargo we have for ______ with China. I've gone back here and looked this over very carefully, it's sort of complex matter. They have asked for 26 separate quotations involving a group of maybe a dozen different instruments, and I wanted to get a pretty good idea myself of what the situation is. In almost every case they are ordering things which include items that are on the COCOM list. This is because they are for high frequencies and the microwave terms about 12 ______ which just happens to be a number, or more advanced. And in most cases we have not obtained approval for the shipment of the same kind of equipment to Soviet Union on the Warsaw Pact countries. So I think where we are Henry is there's probably no way this thing can be approved through any COCOM channels and it just gets back to the basic proposition whether there's enough good will and good faith that you might want to do at for them--

K: If we don't do it, others will find out won't they, there's no way of keeping it secret.

P: No, there's no way of keeping it secret, I don't think so. Now, I think the COCOM controls are probably still overly restricted because all of this stuff is on the commercial market. And

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.0.12958

By AB NARA Date 6/9/69

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By: NARA Date 5/9/09

K: Our only problem is we want to do it. I have to figure out a way of doing it, that's really the problem.

P: Yeah.

K: Let me get back to you within the week.

P: Well, I was going to suggest this, I'm writing a letter and I'm sending it out to you today outlining it in a little more detail--

K: Oh, good.

P: and I'm going to be in Washington on the 24th. Would it be possible to stop in and--

K: By all means.

P: Do you know what your calendar is for the 24th.

K: When is the-- oh, that's a week from--that's when the Czar ? is here, can you do it on the 25th.

P: Well, I might stay over. I have to go to the dinner at the White House which was--

K: How about having breakfast on the 25th.

P: All right, yes, I could do that.

K: Eight o'clock.

P: Eight o'clock on the 25th.

K: In my office.

P: That would be very good. I can do that. It may not take too much time, but I think

K: I want to talk to you about a number of things.

P: We've got to--

K: Let's do it at a quarter to eight.

P: Quarter to eight. All right. We've got to come to a decision one way or the other.

K: I agree, and I'll have an answer for you by then.

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p.m., July 16, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: Okay. Are you the source of all these news stories about my move?

D: Of course I am. Who could be else? (laughter) I today read there was some stories going on more and more around this. When will you be finally decided?

K: I haven't decided yet.

D: You haven't. When you will decide it?

K: As I told you, by the middle of August.

D: Of August. Well, I think then that will stop the stories because why to provide too many stories on this.

K: Well, you think I have an interest in putting out these stories?

D: No, why should you? I think on the contrary really.

K: The opposite.

D: I think it's rather opposite.

K: On either contingency, I think these stories are not put out by my friends.

D: But why really is there such a sudden interest at this particular junction?

K: Because it is conceivable that people who are in danger of being moved might put it out in order to avoid its happening.

D: Yeah, it could be. (laughter) It could be true. One of the ways -- No, I think it's better, one way or another, to be clear.

K: Now, Anatol, I have a problem on which I would like a quick answer from you.

D: Yeah, what's the problem.

DECLASSIFIED

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p.m., July 16, 1973

2

K: When are you going to destroy the SS-9?

D: Again SS-9. I think you would be thinking about more modern things but you are just old-fashioned things you are just country. Why should you?

K: I know you've got some better ones coming along.

D: Why should you really on this old one? You rather raise by raising this question you convince our general they're really worthwhile to have and keep.

K: Well, the new ones aren't in yet. I'll talk about them when you have replaced the SS-9s with the 18s.

D: When the Foreign Minister tried to say -- it's maybe not that important -- they could look about, Henry, he just pressed on SS-9 so they're available and he is the man who knows. Not the Foreign Ministry -- I mean, the Russian Foreign Ministry. So we have nothing to say after this when they quote you, what could I add? Nothing. (laughter)

K: Anatol, here is the problem on which we need your cooperation.

D: Yeah, what's the problem?

K: We are going to announce Phase IV here.

D: Yes, on --

K: Probably on Wednesday night.

D: You mean on economics?

K: On economics. And there has been very strong support for export control on agricultural commodities.

D: Yes.

K: And I have violently opposed this on many grounds, including our relationship.

D: Yes.

K: Now we will be able to avoid making that announcement -- you know, making export controls but we are afraid that if we say there will be no export controls, there will be mass buying from foreign countries.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MWAGA 5/24/73

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p.m., July 16, 1973

3

D: Yeah. You mean on agriculture --

K: On agriculture. Which will drive up the price and then force us to put on controls anyway.

D: Yeah.

K: So what I was wondering is this: We have been told by the Continental Grain Company that you have completed your purchases for this year.

D: Yeah.

K: If this is true, would you permit us to say this on Wednesday or Thursday?

D: What exactly to say?

K: What we would say is that one reason we can afford not to have controls on exports is because we know that one of our principal purchasers, the Soviet Union, will not buy any additional agricultural products for this calendar year.

D: For calendar year beginning from --

K: 73.

D: Oh, for calendar year.

K: Yes. You see, this would also make it easier for us, Anatol, to finish that letter on which we've initialled.

D: Yeah.

K: Which otherwise will create a tremendous pressure on the market.

D: Um-humm. But as I understand so it will be -- I don't quite understand. Are you intend or are not intend on Wednesday to announce it?

K: We intend not to have export controls.

D: Not to have.

K: If we can say that there will be no additional purchases beyond those that have already been made.

D: Made -- Oh, yes, made for delivery, I mean.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
Date: 7-15-73
By: MW

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p.m., July 16, 1973

4

K: That's right. I mean, we'll deliver --

D: You mean only from us or in general you will say?

K: Well, we are asking you and we -- with other countries which don't have State trading it's harder to do it.

D: Yeah. But in what way it will help us? You will just --

K: It would help --

D: Yeah. You will just tell that we're not going to have agricultural control because you do not anticipate any major purchases, is this --

K: Any additional purchases from the Soviet Union.

D: Yeah.

K: Because in that case then you will avoid the speculation of everybody buying more in order to prevent controls.

D: Where they could buy really?

K: Where could they buy?

D: Yeah.

K: Here.

D: Oh, you mean -- by whom?

K: And drive up the price of grain.

D: No, no, I understand. But who/are afraid could buy it really? I mean, in what sense? You mean some companies, your American companies?

K: First, American companies might buy up.

D: Yes.

K: And second, foreign countries might buy up.

D: But why buy it in any case?

DEC0512 12:00 7/15/73 HOLE 252

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p.m., July 16, 1973

5

K: But if you bought, say 12 million last year --

D: I understand.

K: And you buy only 5 million this year --

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: Then we have at least 7 million more to play with.

D: But you do not anticipate that there will be other major buying from the other countries.

K: Well, we're going to try to get that under control too.

D: Yeah. Because he will have no --

K: No, no. We are going to make approaches to other countries appropriate to their conditions.

D: Yeah.

K: But the thing that is now most on people's consciences are Soviet purchases.

D: Yeah, I understand. But why you do not decide for this year control, for instance. If you are going to have a control, in what way it affects you?

K: Because if we have controls this year, it is going to create a major crisis with a number of other countries. Specifically, with several European and ______ with Japan.

D: Yeah, I understand but do you think it will be satisfied if on our only account there will be no trouble with other countries. Because in this case as I understood you we will be the only one who will be mentioned in the statements of yours, yes?

K: Well, yes but I don't know whether we will approach other countries too.

D: No, I understand. But this will be ... you not change; you're not going to --

K: But we are only asking --

Amb. Dobrynin

6:05 p.m., July 16, 1973

6

D: I am simply trying to --

K: But, Anatol, we are not asking you to stop anything you're already -- We're asking you for the facts. If it is true that you have already stopped --

D: Yeah.

K: If you've already bought what you're going to buy this year --

D: But for the next year, for instance?

K: Oh, in 74?

D: Yeah.

K: We're willing then to make that agreement which we've agreed to.

D: Yeah. So the agreement you initialled it stands from beginning of the calendar -- beginning from the first of January.

K: Yes, but this year you have already bought 5 million.

D: Yes, I understand. So the question is --

K: So the question is it would apply next year.

D: Yeah, for the next year. I have to check about it.

K: Would you check on it?

D: Yes, I will check. You will on Wednesday?

K: We want to announce it Wednesday night.

D: Wednesday, I don't know whether I could make it in this rather schedule -- Could you wait maybe one day more -- Thursday -- just to be sure. Maybe I will have tomorrow but I'm not so sure that they might make it.

K: Well, that gives you 48 hours.

D: (laughter) But our people are now relaxing [in the country ?] Well, I will try to do my best.

K: Well, if you can't give us an answer before Thursday --

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F-012058
By: N.W. Mains, 50-00340

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p.m., July 16, 1973

7

D: Huh?

K: Well, you know --

D: No, no; I will try to do my best. So there is no only magic figure of Thursday really, I just was trying to get an extra day.

K: It would help us if we had it Wednesday afternoon.

D: Well, I will try to do it. So the question is check about whether really we have any plans but if you do have some plans to buy more, then we will know.

K: Well, then you can't say it.

D: Then we could tell you.

K: Then you tell me you have. . .

D: So what you are going to do then?

K: Then we will put on controls and keep you from buying them.

D: (laughter) . . . very nice . . .

K: No, I don't know what we will then do.

D: Yeah.

K: I really don't know.

D: I understand. It's rather for this particular thing, I understand it's rather delicate matter but in the spirit which we discuss, I think it's proper to ask.

K: Exactly. I mean, it's really an attempt to be helpful to you.

D: Well, in what way? I think it's rather [mutual/neutral].

K: Well, it's an attempt -- We think that if we have to put on controls, that then every year we will have to debate how much we can give you, how much we can give others.

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p.m., July 16, 1973

8

D: But if we will have this agreement with you on the basis of letter we initialled, so we have no trouble. We will just put you under your control this sum we agree we'll ask you to do and we will not ask any more. So I think it fits rather nicely. Before you were complaining -- well, not you exactly but you too to a certain extent but mostly it was Mr. Butz -- the trouble with us, the Soviets, is that we are, and that was and is true, that we never said what we are going to buy next year. So this time we ought to try to be on a playing side to make it clear how . . .

K: But you know it is rather difficult for us under conditions where many other countries are screaming to announce a long-term agreement with you.

D: So maybe you may announce it a little bit later by saying in a sense that now you will know how much -- It first of all shows that we are going to buy on a [ low ? ] class scale because this decision of 5 million really would make as I was told by Brezhnev in order to -- sometimes he will not need them at all but better to keep it, not to make it, in case when we really don't need it so we could just keep our storage and then to balance so to speak. So if this is an attempt to, first, to make it on a more --

K: No, no, I understand why you are doing this.

D: So it's not necessary really this year to have it but we decide to buy it each year on a rather limited level.

K: No, no. Anatol, I have learned one thing.

D: Yeah.

K: Maybe we can occasionally win 40% with you on political things. On agricultural things, we are lucky if we gain 10%.

D: Ut-ut-oh.

K: You have convinced me last year that in agricultural trading, you are geniuses.

D: (laughter) No, no, I did not discuss anything. But, Henry, really --

K: But whoever did the trade deal last year should get some sort of decoration.

D: Yes. Well, it's probably those who deal -- people who deal in foreign trade How it will affect -- Because Brezhnev will look about the agreement . . .

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p. m., July 16, 1973

9

K: Anatol, it will make it easier to announce the agreement.

D: By the end, as you mentioned --

K: By the end of July. Because then we don't have to answer the question: Why we make a long-term agreement with you when we are not -- when we are facing shortages.

D: I understand this point with you. Well, of course there are several aspects of this one. So I am sure that if you will say the same under the control system, there will be no objection from our side either. I'm sure about it. Because they will think now it's controlled, each government, and receive according to your purchases so we will have our share within limit of 5 million so it's controlled under 5 million.

K: But I would have thought, Anatol, you want to preserve the [free] market.

D: Well, we --

K: Consistent with your . . .

D: But my impression is that you're not so sure that it's a good one. (laughter) So you're trying to control it and already in the Phase IV, if I'm not mistaken, if I'm understand mathmatics, so if you go to the 4th, so why not to do it? But this particular in IV, you're concerned only with agriculture business or in general?

K: In general.

D: And this with agricultural will be one of the items?

K: Exactly.

D: Defending the position of the Administration that you're not going to have a control on this, yes?

K: We would prefer not to have a control on it.

D: This will be your explanation of the rightness of the position, yes?

K: Exactly.

D: Well, all right, I will check. Maybe by Wednesday, you say, yes, I will try to get this answer.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By: NARA Dje: 5/9/09

TELCON

Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Klessinger

6:05 p. m., July 16, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry, how are you?

K: I haven't decided yet.

K: The opposite.

K: Because it is conceivable that people who are in danger of being moved might put it out in order to avoid it happening.

D: Yeah, what's the problem.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
By A6 NARA Dated 5/9/09

Amb. Debrystin/Mr. Kieslinger

6:05 p. m., July 16, 1973

2

K: Anstol, here is the problem on which we need your cooperation.

D: Yeah, what's the problem?

D: Yes, on --

D: You mean on economics?

D: Yes.

D: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
By NARA Die 6/9/69

Amb. Debrynim/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p. m., July 16, 1973

3

D: Yeah.

D: Yeah.

D: What exactly to say?

K: 73.

D: Oh, for calendar year.

K: Yes. You see, this would also make it easier for us, Anatol, to finish that letter on which we've initiated.

D: Yeah.

D: Not to have.

By: NARA Date: 5/9/09

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p. m., July 16, 1973

4

D: Yeah. But in what way will it help us? You will just --

K: It would help --

D: Yeah.

K: Where could they buy?

D: Yeah.

K: Here.

D: Oh, you mean -- by whom?

D: Yes.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
By NARA Date 6/9/01

Amb. Dobrynin

6:05 p.m., July 16, 1973

6

D: I am simply trying to --

K: But, Anatol, we are not asking you to stop anything you're already -- We
asking you for the facts. If it is true that you have already stopped --

D: Yeah.

K: Oh, in 74?

D: Yeah.

K: Would you check on it?

D: Wednesday, I don't know whether I could make it in this rather schedule
Could you wait maybe one day more -- Thursday -- just to be sure-
Maybe I will have tomorrow but I'm not so sure that they might make it.

Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Klessinger

6:05 p. m., July 16, 1973

7

D: Muh?

K: Well, you know --

D: Then we could tell you.

D: Yeah.

K: I really don't know.

Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p. m., July 16, 1973

8

D: But if we will have this agreement with you on the basis of letter we initialled, so we have no trouble. We will just put you under your control this sum we agree we'll ask you to do and we will not ask any more. So I think it fits rather nicely. Before you were complaining -- well, not you exactly but you too to a certain extent but mostly it was Mr. Buzs -- the trouble with us, the Soviets, is that we are, and that was and is true, that we never said what we are going to buy next year. So this time we ought to try to be on a playing side to make it clear how ...

D: So maybe you may announce it a little bit later by saying in a sense that now you will know how much -- It first of all shows that we are going to buy on a [ low ? ] class scale because this decision of 5 millions really would make as I was told by Breshnev in order to -- sometimes he will not need them at all but better to keep it, not to make it, in case when we really don't need it so we could just keep our storage and then do balance so to speak. So if this is an attempt to, first, to make it on a more --

Yeah.

K: Maybe we can occasionally win 40% with you on political things On agricultural things, we are lucky if we gain 10%.

D: Ut-ut-oh.

D: Yes. Well, it's probably those who deal -- people who deal in foreign trade. How it will affect -- Because Breshnev will look about the agreement ...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 012958
By NARA Date 6/9/04
From

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:05 p. m., July 16, 1963

9

D: Well, we --

K: Consistent with your . . .

D: But my impression is that you're not so sure that it's a good one. (laughter) So you're trying to control it and already in the Phase IV, if I'm not mistaken, if I'm understand mathematics, so if you go to the 4th, so why not to do it? But this particular in IV, you're concerned only with agriculture business or in general?

K: In general.

K: Exactly.

K: Exactly.

By AB NARA Date 6/9/63

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By A6 NARA Date 6/9/09

TelCon

Sander Vanocer/Mr. Kissinger

6:45 pm, July 16, 1973

K: Hello.

V: Henry.

K: Sandy, how are you.

V: I'm all right. How are you?

K: Okay.

V: Listen, I would like to see you one more time before you go off to China.

K: About what?

V: Well, it's something that I want to do in connection with the conference. It would involve statements from Tanaka, Chou En-lai, Brezhnev, Endira Ghandi, and Wille Brandt.

K: As soon as the date is set, why don't you call me and we'll get together. We haven't set a date yet.

V: For what?

K: For my trip to China.

V: Oh, all right. That's what I was worried about, that you would be leaving imminently.

K: Oh, no, no, I won't leave until August under any circumstances.

V: Okay, because they won't do anything without checking back with you and I want to square it with you before we advance --

K: Who won't do anything, the Chinese? I wish I could get the Americans to behave this way. If I could get Washington organized the way Peking is, we'd be in good shape.

V: That'll never happen. All right. Listen, you haven't heard anything over the weekend I trust.

K: About what?

V: About the conference.