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community which would be essentially a federal government. In the absence
of a more embracing political structure, a clash of interests is
inevitable.

This is illustrated by two United States policies: (a) the sharp
attack on the national nuclear forces of Britain and France, and (b) the
various schemes to achieve central command and control over the nuclear
weapons of the Alliance within the present framework of NATO.

With respect to national nuclear forces, Great Britain since 1951
and France since 1958 have been engaged in a program to develop nuclear
capabilities under their own control. In 1954, an amendment to the
McMahon Act made possible United States nuclear assistance to Great
Britain. The provisions of the amended McMahon Act have never been extended
to France. This discrimination has been a constant source of irritation in
Franco-American relations--and would have been regardless of which government
was in power in France.

United States policy, which had been tolerant of the nuclear
programs of its allies, grew increasingly hostile from 1961 onward. The
French nuclear program was described as irrelevant and harmful to the
Alliance. The same criticisms, if more muted, were applied to the British
nuclear program. The tension inherent in an attack on major defense
programs of two close allies exacerbated the debate about other aspects of
NATO strategic doctrine--particularly the role of conventional weapons.

United States opposition to the British and French nuclear programs
was supported by the following major arguments: There was no strategic
need for national nuclear forces, since all significant targets were already

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covered by United States strategic forces. National nuclear forces were divisive because their very existence implied distrust of the United States. They were wasteful and would divert resources from the conventional build-up which should be the primary NATO effort. They would promote nuclear proliferation. Just as France imitated the example of Britain, the argument ran, so Germany would follow the lead of France. Italy and other European countries would then follow. Finally, it was argued, national nuclear forces would make impossible the flexible response which was the key to United States strategy. National nuclear forces were too small and too vulnerable to concentrate on military targets. But if they attacked population centers, the enemy in rage and frustration would retaliate against the civilian population of the United States.

Regardless of the merits of these arguments, they were certain to lead to a bitter, divisive debate. A full-scale theoretical onslaught on major programs of close allies impelled their governments to elaborate a doctrine to justify them which, by the terms of reference of the debate, could not help but stress differences in perspective with the United States. The political impact of United States views thus went far beyond the technical arguments in which they were couched. To ask a government to confess the bankruptcy of a policy which it has pursued at heavy expense for over a decade is to undermine its domestic position and to evoke reactions of hostility. We might ask ourselves how an American administration would respond if an allied government publicly and repeatedly insisted that one of our major programs was "divisive," "dangerous" and "useless."

The involvement of United States strategic doctrine in the domestic disputes of close allies produced a curious reversal of electoral positions.

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Groups heretofore not noted for their interest in defense programs began to use American arguments against governments which had, until then, been most responsible for close NATO ties. Some of those supporting United States views on nuclear control had in the past had neutralist leanings. They did not find it difficult to reconcile themselves to America's assumption of almost exclusive responsibility for their defense. Those taking the defense problem seriously were driven to one of two conclusions: Either they urged the United States to give up some of its freedom of action and move in the direction of a real sharing of sovereignty; or else they came increasingly to demand some degree of autonomy in the nuclear field.

Moreover, United States arguments involved a difference in perspective with our allies even on purely military grounds. Our European critics have identified the doctrine of flexible response with the concept, enunciated by Secretary McNamara at Ann Arbor in 1962, of counterforce operations designed to disarm the enemy. Many of them consider this concept unrealistic and even those who agree with the general notion of flexible response give it a different content than at least the early versions of Pentagon doctrine.

To be appeared in condition of war in the United States densely populated Europe, the distinction between military and civilian "disarming" targets seems more ephemeral. While not objecting to a ^ strategy as one possible option, our European nuclear allies see no compelling reasons to subordinate all considerations to what may well be a very remote contingency.

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This is all the more true because United States pronouncements are postulating a scenario for general nuclear war that seems somewhat remote. In his presentations to the Armed Services Committee in 1963 and in 1964, Secretary McNamara described only *one* contingency for general nuclear war: a full-scale Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and (perhaps) Europe concentrating on military targets. The United States would then respond by attacking Soviet residual forces and other targets.

But it is not clear what could possibly tempt even a rash Soviet planner into such a course or why the Soviets would then attack American missile sites. If they did attack, As long as the present numerical imbalance between Soviet and American strategic forces remains, there is no

22

In fact, in his testimony before the Armed Services Committees in January 1964, Secretary McNamara has usually associated the defense of Europe with *tactical*, not *strategic*, nuclear weapons should the conventional forces prove inadequate. Thus, in his report to the Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Years 1965-69, Defense Program and Defense Budget (January 27, 1964), Secretary McNamara said:

> . . . a large-scale Soviet attack on Western Europe . . . would be extremely dangerous to our own security, and would compel us to respond immediately with whatever force was needed to halt the onslaught, even with tactical nuclear weapons, if necessary. *[Emphasis added]*/

(pp. 56-7)

And a little further on, when discussing General Purpose Forces, Secretary McNamara said:

(1) The forces envisioned in NATO plans for the end of 1966 . . . could hold an initial Soviet attack on the central front using non-nuclear means alone;

(2) Until these requirements are met, the defense of Europe against an all-out Soviet attack, even if such an attack were limited to non-nuclear means, would require the use of *tactical* nuclear weapons on our part. *[Emphasis added]* (p. 58)

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conceivable gain for the Soviets in launching a blow against the United
States strategic forces. Even if every Soviet missile destroyed an
American delivery vehicle, the Soviets would have disarmed themselves
and would find themselves confronted with a large American force
unrestrained by any Soviet threat.

In short, a counterforce "disarming" strategy cannot be an
optimum strategy for both sides. Soviet military theorists have
consistently denied the possibility of the kind of war described by
Pentagon officials. This would not be decisive were it not in accord
with the realities of the strategic equation; for a war confined to
military targets, even if it were technically feasible, cannot be in the
interest of the weaker side. As the United States reduced the Soviet
retaliatory force, the sensible strategy for the Soviets would be to begin
attacking American cities, perhaps "controlling" their response by
destroying some smaller towns first.

another way of saying that

This is a flexible response should not be confused with counterforce
strategy. The Soviets may well have an incentive to "control" their
response, but not necessarily to direct their blow against military
targets. This situation is likely to multiply pressures for European
nuclear forces or for a more effective voice in ours. As has been
frequently pointed out by Pentagon spokesmen, the Soviet delivery vehicles
aimed at Europe far exceed in number those deployed against the United
States. It has also been emphasized that even a "controlled" nuclear war
would produce far greater casualties in Europe than in the United States,
perhaps exceeding even the tens of millions estimated for North America.
In these conditions, it is understandable that some Europeans have come

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to the conclusion that Europe must have control of its own means of retaliation in order to discourage the Soviets from using Europe as a hostage in the Soviet version of "flexible response."

In order to meet these concerns, the Kennedy Administration in 1961-62 offered a number of schemes which sought to combine assurances about the availability of American weapons with undiluted American control. These proposals had great technical merit. However, the basic issue raised by the American insistence on unitary control of strategy was not technical but political: A centralized military strategy was possible only if the United States was prepared to yield at least some of the freedom of action that it was asking its allies to give up. The issue of nuclear control emphasized that NATO required a mechanism for managing political crises even more than a military staff for planning a war.

This is illustrated by the initial United States proposals for nuclear control which concentrated on such gestures as "earmarking" and "assignment" of nuclear weapons to NATO. Thus, in May 1961 President Kennedy formally offered to "commit to the NATO command five--and subsequently still more--Polaris . . . submarines. . . subject to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use." This pledge was declared fulfilled by Secretary McNamara at the Athens ministerial meeting when he announced that

23
John F. Kennedy, Address to the Canadian Parliament, May 17, 1961, DOSB, Vol. XLIV, No. 1145 (June 5, 1961), p. 841.

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five Polaris submarines had already been "committed" to NATO with more
24
to come. In his report to the House Armed Services Committee of
January 1963, Secretary McNamara announced that the United States had
"earmarked a fully operational Polaris force to the NATO command."25

These measures were largely symbolic. Since they did little more
than paper over the real conflicts involved, they served only to make
the disputes more acute. For one thing, there was a serious question about
precisely what is implied by the term "assignment." All forces in NATO
are under national command in peacetime. NATO headquarters are planning
outfits that control the forces "assigned" to them only during specified
maneuvers or in war. Each ally retains the right to go to war according
to its own constitutional processes. The right to withdraw forces is
inherent, and "assignment" does not significantly restrict the independent
disposition of NATO forces. This has been demonstrated by the United
States withdrawal of forces from Germany for action in Lebanon, by the
French withdrawal of its fleet from NATO, by the use of NATO-assigned
forces by both Greece and Turkey during the Cyprus crisis and by the
withdrawal of British forces from Germany for use in Malaysia. Thus, the

24
*New York Times*, May 6, 1962. No more submarines have, in fact,
been assigned.

25
*Hearings on Military Posture, Committee on Armed Services, House (88th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 298.*

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assignment of American and British strategic units to NATO does not
significantly restrict the ability to use these forces for national
purposes (or, what is more relevant, to refrain from using them). The
escape clauses in the Nassau Agreement with respect to use in national
emergencies which were so severely criticized gave Britain no additional
rights; if Britain were to abandon these clauses, as the Labor Party has
proposed, this would not significantly restrict its ability to use its
nuclear forces in the inconceivable case that it would be prepared to go
to nuclear war in the event that the United States should propose to go
without the United States.

But assuming that "assignment" does imply a higher degree of
commitment, what precisely was its strategic significance? Did it mean
that there was a stronger obligation to use submarines "assigned" to
NATO than SAC in the defense of Europe? What was one to make of the
phrase in the communique after the NATO ministerial meeting in Athens
in May 1962 which stated that the United States and Great Britain had
given "firm assurances that their strategic forces will continue to
provide defense against threats to the alliance beyond the capability of
NATO-committed forces to deal with"? Did this mean that there were
two "thresholds" in NATO strategy: one between conventional and nuclear
war and another between the strategic forces assigned to NATO and the rest
of SAC? If so, this would mean either that the counterforce strategy on
which the Administration had staked so much would have to be abandoned or

26

Text of communique, New York Times, May 7, 1962.

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that the strategic forces under the control of SACEUR would have to be
vastly increased--at least to match the Soviet MRBM's stationed in
Eastern Europe. In other words, before determining the significance of a
rearrangement of the nuclear forces within NATO there has to be an agreed
strategic doctrine, which is now lacking.

It has been argued by some that the strategic forces earmarked
for NATO can fill precisely this need by encouraging joint Allied guidelines
for their use. To assess the significance of this view, it is important
to be clear about what commitment an agreement to joint guidelines actually
involves. Are these guidelines to be conceived as a kind of contingency
plan for the employment of nuclear weapons, provided the governments
concerned agree to implement these plans? Or are they to be considered as
a delegation of authority to use nuclear weapons in certain specified
contingencies without further reference to political authority?

If guidelines are to be interpreted in the former sense--as a
form of contingency war plan--they are a useful exercise in allied
consultation. But in that case it is not clear why a formal assignment to
NATO is necessary or how the NATO-committed Polaris forces are to be
distinguished from other strategic forces in the Alliance. Joint planning
could and should take place even with respect to forces not formally
assigned to the Alliance.

If, on the other hand, the guidelines are to be a form of delegation
of authority, serious problems would arise. During the American
Presidential campaign of 1964, it was suggested that the NATO nuclear

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problem could be solved by giving SACEUR authority to use battlefield weapons at his discretion. Aside from the difficulty of distinguishing between "tactical" and "strategic" weapons, this would represent an unprecedented abdication of Constitutional responsibilities. It is difficult to imagine any President agreeing to this step. And even if it were taken, it would probably compound the problem. The predelegation of authority would be confined to the most obvious and unambiguous cases. A guideline so conceived will omit more cases than it specifies and thus raise uncertainties precisely about the ambiguous cases that have caused the greatest worries.

To be sure, some of the arguments made by Europeans on behalf of their nuclear forces have hardly helped matters. The French have pressed their case with a Cartesian rationalism that sometimes threatens to turn valid arguments into parodies. It is one thing to argue the undeniable fact that in the age of nuclear plenty the old notions of nuclear protection must be modified and that a redistribution of responsibilities is required. It is quite another to insist that this ends all possibility of one country's coming to the assistance of another. The French national nuclear force has in fact some utility only as long as France can count on American support in case of a nuclear war. As long as France's retaliatory force is composed of airplanes it could be overwhelmed by a Soviet pre-emptive attack, if the Soviets could be certain that the United States would remain aloof. It is because the Soviets cannot be certain of this, that the force de frappe makes more sense than American commentators usually admit. The real argument for the existing national nuclear forces

[A]

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in Europe is thus the opposite of the one usually advanced: It adds another element of uncertainty to an aggressor's calculations about an _allied_ response; it does not provide the means for a purely _national_ defense.

But United States policy should not gear itself to the most extreme and one-sided arguments of its opponents. On strictly strategic grounds, the United States doctrine is probably more nearly correct than the alternative of its European critics; division of labor within an alliance conceived as a unit does promote the most efficient allocation of resources. What the United States has overlooked is that NATO is _not_ a single political unit, nor is it likely to be one in any foreseeable future. The blind spot of the United States has been its unwillingness to face the political implications of its strategic views: An Atlantic area strategically integrated, as we urge, presupposes a willingness by the United States to give up a larger measure of its own freedom of action than has until now been proposed. It will not prove possible much longer for the United States to demand that its allies give up what has, heretofore, been considered a chief attribute of sovereignty--the possibility of conducting an autonomous defense--while the United States jealously guards its complete freedom of decision. The blind spot of many of America's European critics has been their reluctance to confront the strategic consequences of their political views: That the present scale of their defense effort is inadequate for the strategic role envisaged by them.

Thus, even before De Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, a stalemate in the debate about strategy had occurred. Europeans had

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been reluctant to respond to American pressures for an increase in conventional forces. The United States proposals for sharing nuclear control had not met the real concerns of those Europeans asking either for a greater share in nuclear decisions or for greater autonomy with respect to them. In order to escape this impasse, the United States--starting early in 1963--began ever more urgently to press a scheme for a NATO nuclear force, the so-called Multilateral Force (MLF).