DR. KISSINGER: Well, I am certain that the question of the measures that were taken to protect the security of the office, which, after all, had the most sensitive information in the Government, will be discussed at the Senate hearing and on that occasion I will answer questions with respect to that.

Any government has to strike a balance between the requirements of national security and the requirements of individual freedom, and that balance should be carefully drawn, and one should hope that one could justify individual decisions on the ground of their necessity.

In those activities of which I was aware, which were conducted by processes that were considered legal at that time, according to legal processes, I will be prepared to account fully to the appropriate committees of the Senate.

Now, your other question on the impact of Watergate on foreign policy. The foreign countries have to assess what sort of a country they are dealing with, how steady it can be in the carrying out of its commitments, and the degree of authority possessed by its leaders.

To the extent that these are affected, there is a long-term effect on foreign policy.

Our intention will be, as I have stated prior to this appointment, to emphasize those aspects of foreign policy on which most Americans agree to carry out a foreign policy that has the widest possible support on a bipartisan basis, and since I am confident that that can be achieved, I believe that the effect of Watergate on the conduct of foreign policy can be minimized.

Murrey?

Q Dr. Kissinger, a related question: You have publicly expressed concern that the consensus in the United States on the formulation of foreign policy has been eroding. You also have expressed concern about an orgy of recrimination setting in. Have we not been experiencing some considerable recrimination with the President, himself, attacking Congress over his policy in Indochina?

DR. KISSINGER: That last question about the orgy of recrimination, or the comment about "orgy of recrimination", I was asked very early in the Watergate affair at the end of April, whether it might have an effect on foreign policy.

At the time, one's knowledge of it was confined essentially to the break-in of Democratic campaign headquarters.

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At that time, I said that, if an orgy of recrimination set in, it might have an effect on foreign policy. Now, there is no question if the divisions in a country grow too deep, then the conduct of foreign policy will be affected, and people will have to decide whether the issues on which they are being divided are worth it.

On this, I am not taking a position. I am just stating the facts analytically.

Now, it is true that the consensus on which foreign policy was conducted in the late 1940s, and through the 1950s and 1960s, is eroding in part because the conditions in the world have changed so enormously. In the late 1940s and in the 1950s, foreign policy was essentially designed to prevent what was considered a monolithic Communism from militarily overrunning the world. Today, we are conducting a foreign policy in which, at one and the same time, we are engaged in detente with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and on the other hand, we are trying to strengthen the traditional friendships with Europe and Japan.

On the one hand, we are stressing the need for adequate defense budgets and on the other, we are conducting negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms. This requires a complexity of thought and a sophistication on the part of the American public that was not called for in the 1940s and 1950s.

We have had the legacy of a war that bitterly divided Americans and that has to be healed. And therefore, one of the prime objectives of the Administration will have to be to create a consensus in which the American people and the American Congress can understand and will support the necessity of carrying on adequate defense programs and disarmament negotiations, friendship, strengthened friendship with traditional allies and nevertheless, a policy of reconciliation with former enemies and in that sense, we have to create a new consensus which can give a new impetus and a new excitement to our foreign policy for the next decade or two.

Q Dr. Kissinger, a question on the Middle East. For the past four years, you have maintained a low profile in this particular area. Do you plan to continue that, or will you become a more public figure in pursuing settlement of the Middle East situation?

DR. KISSINGER: The President has repeatedly stated that the Middle East is an important area, and perhaps the most dangerous area, and I will pursue, under the President's direction, those policies which are considered necessary and in the past, that has sometimes meant a less than restrained profile.

Q Dr. Kissinger, may I follow on to that? How do you plan to put to rest the apprehensions that

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have been expressed by some Arab leaders about your
family heritage and how that might affect our policy in
the Middle East?

DR. KISSINGER: I am asked to conduct the foreign
policy of the United States, and I will conduct the
foreign policy of the United States regardless of
religious and national heritage.

There is no other country in the world in which
a man of my background could be even considered for an
office such as the one for which I have been nominated,
and that imposes on me a very grave responsibility which I
will pursue in the national interest.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how close, or how close do
you think you were to a settlement in Cambodia, a negotiated
settlement at the time the Congress imposed a deadline on
bombing?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think I want to speculate on
that on this occasion. What I hope to achieve in the
relations with Chairman Fulbright and other members of his
committee is an ability by which we can lay out our general
strategy with respect to key areas so that when individual
decisions come up for Congressional vote, they will know
what this overall design is rather than be confronted with
a series of individual pressures.

Q Dr. Kissinger, why did the President cancel
plans for a trip to Latin America?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is why did the President
cancel plans for a trip to Latin America. Because he
has been preoccupied with domestic matters.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if I may, sir, a couple of
very quick questions. Is the United States willing to
allow Prince Sihanouk to return to power and what is it
the U.S. wants that Sihanouk does not find acceptable?

The other question is, how much of a factor in
U.S. foreign policy has grain sales become and is it being
used to revive the ailing American dollar and, if so,
how long will this go on?

DR. KISSINGER: Can I answer it yes or no? (Laughter)

The first question I am sure will be discussed at
the Senate hearings and is a rather delicate subject which
will lead, we expect at some point, to some negotiations
and therefore, I don't think I should comment on it.

With respect to the grain sales, I think it is
important to understand that there are major areas of
American foreign policy -- or let me rather put it, of the
American position in the world in which approach and
realities are fundamentally changing. For example, for the

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entire post-war period and the entire first term of this
Administration, it was considered axiomatic that the
United States could never sell too much grain.

The entire farm policy, and the entire foreign
policy as it was expressed in -- as it related to agri-
cultural policy proceeded from the assumption that with our
huge surpluses and our huge productivity, we should stand for
free markets. For our almost entire post-war history we
have considered ourselves more or less self-sufficient in
raw materials.

Now we find a greater dependence on foreign
sources of energy. We find that for the first time,
because of a combination of factors, there is a shortage of
American food for export and this has profound consequences
for the conduct of our foreign policy when free access to
foreign markets had been one of the cardinal tenets of our
policy previously.

So what we have to change first is our traditional
approach and we have started prior to this appointment,
already, a study on an interdepartmental basis in this
government to examine how, over the next five to ten years, the
world needs and American productivity could be brought
into some relationship.

And I mention those two examples as one of the
two big problems that the United States faces in adjusting
its perception of the world to the new conditions and,
therefore, I cannot yet answer you what exactly the policy
will be until we have completed those studies.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did you get any indications from
the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about
how quickly they would act on your nomination and what the
outcome would be?

DR. KISSINGER: I did not think it was appropriate
for me to raise the question of my confirmation. I did call
all the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and
told them about the philosophy that would animate my conduct
of the Office of Secretary of State if they confirmed me. I
did not raise the issue of a schedule nor did I ask them how
they would vote, and I might add that I do not intend to do
this.

Q Dr. Kissinger, when does the President plan to
go to Europe and what are the prospects now for some kind of
statement of principles while he is there?

DR. KISSINGER: The decision as to the timing will
be made after the meeting of the European foreign ministers
which is taking place in September and on that occasion we can
also answer what will emerge, but we would expect that when
the President goes to Europe it will be for a significant
substantive result and not simply on a grand tour.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, when your change has been consummated, will the national security staff remain in and around the White House or will it be shifted with you to the State Department?

DR. KISSINGER: I plan to maintain an office in the White House and to spend some of my time in the White House on interdepartmental matters and on being available to the President. I would expect that some of my associates would join me in the State Department to ease the cultural shock, and I also would expect that some of the best people in the State Department would move to the White House in order to see the interdepartmental operation from a White House perspective but we would keep the NSC structure in place for the interdepartmental business and for the Presidential business. We would hope to give even more vitality to the operation of the State Department and I can only reiterate that if what has been done can be built on and if it is to last, it must engage the commitment of the professionals who will have to carry it on over a period of time and this will be one of my principal purposes at the State Department.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you played a major role in reopening the door to China. What can you tell us about reopening the door to Cuba?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I think this is a matter that we will have to study and there have not been any major developments in that respect.

Q Technical question. Do you prefer to be called Mr. Secretary or Dr. Secretary?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't stand on protocol. If you will just call me Excellency, it will be okay.

(Laughter)

THE PRESS: Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger.

END

(AT 11:50 A.M. PDT)

FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY

September 7, 1973

STATEMENT BY
HENRY A. KISSINGER
BEFORE
THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

SEPTEMBER 7, 1973

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee;

After talking to the Chairman and most members of the Committee, I have the impression that your purposes would best be served if we moved quickly to your questions. Therefore, I shall confine my opening remarks to a statement outlining the attitude I propose to bring to the Office of Secretary of State if the Committee and Senate should confirm my nomination. I take this approach, moreover, because the close and cooperative relationship that we shall seek between the Executive and the Legislative branches in foreign affairs depends ultimately on the spirit with which it is implemented.

My first thought is of the past and the great Americans who have held the office to which the President has nominated me. I derive both inspiration and a sense of gravity from that impressive roster, whether at the dawn of this nation's history -- Jefferson, Marshall, Madison, Monroe, Adams, Clay -- or just since World War II -- Byrnes, Marshall, Acheson, Dulles, Herter, Rusk, Rogers. These men, however different their styles and personalities, epitomized one fundamental reality: that the foreign policy of the United States transcends parties and Administrations. It expresses our ideals, our purposes and our hopes for the world. It must fulfill the best in America.

If confirmed, I shall always be conscious that I hold in trust the legacy of some of our greatest and noblest men.

Let me pay tribute to my predecessor who performed his duties with such dignity and decency for four and a half years. Secretary Rogers headed the Department of State during one of the most difficult periods in our history, when we had to adjust policies to new realities amid major domestic contention. His calm judgment and his humanity helped steer us through this passage and win the respect even of those who disagreed with Administration policies. The President and I will continue to look to him for counsel and support.

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Mr. Chairman, we have come to experience in recent years that peace at home and peace abroad are closely related. How well we perform in foreign policy depends importantly on how purposeful we are at home. America has passed through a decade of domestic turbulence which has deepened divisions and even shaken our national self-confidence in some measure. At the same time, profound changes have occurred in the world around us, a generation after World War II. Our era is marked by both the anxieties of a transitional period and the opportunities of fresh creation.

These challenges, though they appear as practical issues, cannot be solved in technical terms; they closely reflect our view of ourselves. They require a sense of identity and purpose as much as a sense of policy. Throughout our history we have thought of what we did as growing out of deeper moral values. America was not true to itself unless it had a meaning beyond itself. In this spiritual sense, America was never isolationist.

This must remain our attitude.

This is why our international policies must enlist the contributions of our best people regardless of political persuasion. Our task is to define -- together -- the contours of a new world, and to shape America's contribution to it. Our foreign policy cannot be effective if it reflects only the sporadic and esoteric initiatives of a small group of specialists. It must rest on a broad national base and reflect a shared community of values.

With good will on all sides, I deeply believe we can reach this goal. There is no dispute about many of the fundamental objectives of national policy. We are at a crucial point of transition in the international order, with major changes in the global structure promising a more peaceful world:

- Successful post-war policies have helped our friends to new strength and responsibilities. We shall work constructively and openly with our partners in Europe and Japan to give new impetus to associations based on shared purposes and ideals. We shall always remember that the vitality of our friendships is the necessary condition for the lowering of tensions with our opponents.

- We have developed fresh relationships with adversaries that can ease us away from confrontation toward cooperation. Tensions have been reduced in many areas. For the first

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time since the end of World War II, all great nations have
become full participants in the international system. There
is the hope that the arms race can be arrested and the burden
of armaments reduced.

-- Our most anguishing and divisive problem, the Vietnam war, is behind us. We achieved a negotiated settlement last January. The Congress has since expressed its view on how to terminate our military participation in the last area of conflict -- Cambodia. As you gentlemen know, the Administration differs with that view. But it will not attempt to circumvent it.

-- We face unprecedented issues which transcend borders and ideologies and beckon global cooperation. Many traditional assumptions need adjustment. We have viewed ourselves as blessed with unlimited agricultural surpluses; today we must contemplate scarcity in relation to world needs. We have assumed self-sufficiency in energy; now we face increasing needs for external supply at least for an interim period. Environmental problems used to be considered national issues, if they were considered at all; now many must be met internationally if they are going to be met at all. We need to explore new conceptual frontiers to reflect the new reality produced by both technology and human aspirations: that our planet has become a truly global society.

This Administration will continue to adapt America's role to these new conditions. But we cannot take for granted what has been begun. We cannot let irretrievable opportunities slip from our grasp. Just as we have benefitted from the efforts of our predecessors, so must we build for our successors. What matters to other countries -- and to the world -- is not so much the work of one Administration as the steadiness of America. So the nation is challenged to render our purposes durable and our performance reliable. This we achieved during most of a generation after the Second World War. We need to continue to do so.

This will require mutual effort and mutual understanding. We will do our part. The President has charged me with helping him to shape a foreign policy that can endure because it is carried in the hearts as well as the minds of Americans.

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The first necessity is a broader-based participation within the Executive Branch. During the last four years, there were many delicate initiatives that required a high degree of secrecy and concentration of effort. Crucial foundations were laid. Now we need to build on these foundations a more permanent structure that we can pass on to succeeding Administrations. Durability in foreign policy is achieved in the final analysis through the deep and continuing involvement of the dedicated professionals of the State Department and Foreign Service, who will manage our foreign affairs long after this Administration has ended. Thus one of my principal responsibilities as Secretary of State will be to infuse the Department of State with a sense of participation, intellectual excitement and mission.

As you know, the President has asked me to retain my position as Assistant to the President if I am confirmed as Secretary of State. I believe this will benefit the coherence and effectiveness of our foreign policy. The Secretary of State will be clearly the principal foreign policy advisor to the President. The locus of authority and the chain of authority will be unambiguous. Bureaucratic friction will be minimized. As the President said in announcing my appointment, the unity of position will underline the traditional principal role of the Department of State in the policy-making process.

There must be, as well, a closer relationship between the Executive and Legislative branches. It is the President's objective to make policy more accessible to the scrutiny and the views of the Congress. This is the fundamental answer to the question of executive privilege. As you gentlemen know, over an extended period of time when I was fully covered by this principle, I met regularly with the members of this Committee, both individually and as a group, and most frequently with the Chairman. I did so partly because I valued this association on personal grounds, but also because of my conviction that this nation faced no more urgent requirement than to promote mutual respect where a consensus was unattainable.

In my new capacity, I shall be prepared to testify formally on all my activities. In other words, I shall testify with respect to all matters traditionally covered by Secretaries of State and on my duties as Assistant to the President concerning interdepartmental issues. I will not claim executive privilege in either capacity except for the one area customarily invoked by Cabinet officers, that is, direct communications with the President or the actual deliberations of the National Security Council.

We will, of course, need to determine together which subjects should be treated in public and which in executive session.

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In short, as a result of my combined position, the Committee should receive substantially more information than it has in the past. We will have acted positively on one of your most central concerns.

This process of greater cooperation will not be confined to formal testimony. If confirmed, I will propose to meet immediately with the Chairman and the ranking member to work out procedures for enabling the Committee to share more fully in the design of our foreign policy.

I will follow a similar approach with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the leaders of both branches of Congress as well as with other Congressional groupings of proper jurisdiction.

This prompts the question, what do we mean by bipartisanship? We do not ask for rubber stamping and we cannot expect unanimity. Serious people obviously will continue to have differences. Where profound disagreements exist, it would be self-defeating to paper them over with empty formulae. We in turn cannot give up basic principles, nor can we promise to act only when there is bipartisan agreement, though this will be our preference. But we shall work to shape a broad consensus on our national goals and to confine differences to tactical issues. When our views differ, we shall strive not to press the debate to a point that tears the overall fabric of the national consensus. We will seek to maintain a climate of mutual trust so that arguments can center on methods, not motives. We hope that this restraint will be mutual. In this manner, our foreign policy debate can avoid the extremes of civil war and sterile accord for its own sake.

If our foreign policy is to be truly national, we must deepen our partnership with the American people. This means an open articulation of our philosophy, our purposes, and our actions. We have sought to do this in the President's Annual Reports to the Congress on foreign policy. Equally, we must listen to the hopes and aspirations of our fellow countrymen. I plan, therefore, on a regular basis, to elicit the views of America's opinion leaders and to share our perspectives freely.

Mr. Chairman, I have sketched an agenda for seeking a more durable peace abroad and a cooperative climate at home. Both objectives point to the urgent need for reconciliation. Americans have recently endured the turmoil of assassinations and riots, racial and generational confrontations, and a bitter, costly war. Just as we were emerging from that conflict, we were plunged into still another ordeal.

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These traumatic events have cast lengthening shadows on our traditional optimism and self-esteem. A loss of confidence in our own country would inevitably be mirrored in our international relations. Where once we ran the risk of thinking we were too good for the world, we might now swing to believing we are not good enough. Where once a soaring optimism tempted us to dare too much, a shrinking spirit could lead us to attempt too little. Such an attitude -- and the foreign policy it would produce -- would deal a savage blow to global stability.

But I am hopeful about our prospects. America is resilient. The dynamism of this country is irrepressible. Whatever our divisions, we can rally to the prospects of building a world at peace and responsive to humane aspirations. In so doing, we can replenish our reservoir of faith.

This is our common challenge:

- To distinguish the fundamental from the ephemeral.

- To seek out what unites us, without stifling the healthy debate that is the lifeblood of democracy.

- To promote the positive trends that are the achievements not just of this Administration but also of those who came before.

- To shape new initiatives that will serve not just the next forty months but also the decades to follow.

A few years before he died, one of our most distinguished Secretaries of State, Dean Acheson, entitled his memoirs "Present at the Creation." He chose that title because he was one of the leading participants in the creation of the post-war international system. The challenge before our country now is whether our generation has the vision -- as Dean Acheson's did more than two decades ago -- to turn into dynamic reality the hopeful beginnings we have made toward a more durable peace and a more benevolent planet.

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen of the Committee, I am confident that working together we can speed the day when all of us will be able to say that we were "present at the creation" of a new era of peace, justice and humanity.

Thank you.

# # # #

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

SEPTEMBER 22, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF REMARKS BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT
AND
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

AT THE SWEARING-IN CEREMONY OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER AS SECRETARY OF STATE

THE EAST ROOM

AT 11:05 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Ladies and gentlemen, we welcome you today to this ceremony in which Dr. Henry A. Kissinger will be sworn in as Secretary of State.

The Chief Justice of the United States will now administer the oath of office.

(The Chief Justice of the United States administered the oath of office.)

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Chief Justice, Mr. Secretary of State, Members of the Cabinet, Members of the House and the Senate, and all of our other distinguished guests:

I know all of you will want to hear from the new Secretary of State speaking for the first time in that capacity and my remarks therefore will be brief before presenting him to you.

First, I am aware of the fact that during the process of his hearings that you have learned much about him that perhaps you had not known before, but certainly during the process of his hearings you learned **that** here is a man who has the poise, the strength, the character to serve in this great position, and that he can handle himself under considerable fire. As a matter of fact, Dr. Kissinger used to come in my office during the days of the hearings. He had not been through such an experience before, and I said, "You are going to go through it for a long time, do you still want the job?" But I kept reassuring him and I told him the vote would be very, very good, and it was.

And I am sure he must have felt like Winston Churchill, who once wrote that the most exhilarating thing in life is to be shot at without result. (Laughter)

Now, much has been written about Dr. Kissinger's background and the significance of his appointment. All of you know, and members of the press are aware of the fact that I like to refer to things which happen to be first in this Administration. I suppose that is the right of every President.

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But in Dr. Kissinger's case, we are very proud -- it is very significant in these days when we must think of America as part of a whole world community, very significant -- that for the first time in our long history, a naturalized citizen is the Secretary of State of the United States.

It is also significant to note that this is the first Secretary of State, who, before assuming that office, had traveled on official business both to Peking and to Moscow. I was trying to think of something else that had not been written, and nothing occurred to me until yesterday, when very late in the day, I thought I had better get a haircut before appearing on television again, and so my barber, who is also Dr. Kissinger's barber, said he had been looking at some pictures of Secretaries of State, and he says, "I bet I know something about this man that you don't know."

I said, "I am sure you do. What is it?"

He said, "He is the first Secretary of State since World War II who doesn't part his hair."

So I began to think back and I said, "Secretary Acheson, yes, that is right, he parted his hair; Secretary Dulles parted his hair; Secretary Rogers parted his hair."

But then my barber, who is a very wise man and seldom wrong, I said, "But what about Secretary Rusk?" (Laughter) And he said, "Well, Mr. President, he didn't have much hair, but what he had, he parted." (Laughter)

That little story about the parting of hair has no relevance to the functions of Secretary of State. I would say on a serious vein simply that Dr. Kissinger assumes this office at a watershed time in American foreign policy, at a time when America is at peace for the first time in 12 years, at a time when we recognize that the only thing more difficult than getting peace is keeping it, at a time, therefore, when building the structure of peace is so important.

And he also recognizes another fundamental fact. There is a tendency these days to personalize every activity in, particularly, foreign policy: the exciting secret trips of Dr. Kissinger to Peking, to Moscow, to Paris; what a President does, what a Secretary of State does, what his advisors do.

But Dr. Kissinger knows, as I know, and as everybody in this audience knows, that successes in any area, and particularly in foreign policy, do not come simply from the activities of one person. It requires a dedicated team of people, men and women working together and, in now having achieved peace, in keeping the peace and building the structure of peace, he has the function and, I am sure, will meet that responsibility of getting the cooperation of the people in the State Department and the other agencies of government, so that working together and working with the Congress of the United States, we will not miss that historic opportunity to build a lasting peace for America and the world. This is certainly his charge. It is one that he welcomes and it is one for which he is superbly qualified.

Ladies and gentlemen, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. President, the Chief Justice,
distinguished guests:

Nearly five years ago, shortly after the President had
been elected, he invited me to call on him at the Hotel
Pierre in New York. I had never met the President at the
time, and he described to me, in a conversation which
eventually led to my appointment as his Assistant for
National Security, what he hoped to achieve in his Presidency.

He told me that no goal could be more noble than to bring
mankind closer to its eternal hope for a lasting peace. He
said that we should not be hampered by any preconceptions,
that we should not avoid any new departures and that we should
enlist the ablest people in the departments and in the
country to help in this enterprise.

In the five years that have passed since then, we have
gone through many turbulent times, but the objective has never
wavered, and the major progress has been made in easing many
of the tensions that existed in the world when the President
assumed office.

A few weeks ago in San Clemente, the President spoke
to me again about his hopes for his second term, and asked
me to assume this position, and he again stressed to me that
the only objectives that are worth achieving in foreign policy
are those that transcend Administrations and go beyond parties,
and he spoke to me then about the structure of peace.

When we speak of a structure of peace, we mean a world
which does not just ease tensions, but overcomes them; a
world not based on strength, but on justice; a relationship
among nations based on cooperation and not an equilibrium of
forces alone. That kind of a world is the task, as the
President has pointed out, of all Americans, and it is the
reason why the President has charged me here with achieving
it in the closest cooperation with the Congress and with the
great departments of the Government.

Mr. President, you referred to my background, and it
is true, there is no country in the world were it is conceivable
that a man of my origin could be standing here next to the
President of the United States. And if my origin can contribute
anything to the formulation of our policy, it is that at an
early age I have seen what can happen to a society that is
based on hatred and strength and distrust, and that I experienced
then what America means to other people, its hope and its
idealism, and therefore, in achieving a structure of peace
under your leadership, Mr. President, we will strive not just
for a pragmatic solution to this or that difficulty, but to
recognize that America has never been true to itself unless
it meant something beyond itself.

And as we work for a world at peace with justice, compassion
and humanity, we know that America, in fulfilling man's deepest
aspirations, fulfills what is best within it.

Thank you very much.

END

(AT 11:19 A.M. EDT.)

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PRESS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 24, 1973

No. 343

CORRECTED COPY
AS DELIVERED
TEXT

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE 28TH UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY
SEPTEMBER 24, 1973

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I come before you today -- confirmed in office but two days ago -- as probably the world's most junior Foreign Minister. That President Nixon should ask me as my first official act to speak here for the United States reaffirms the importance that my country attaches to the values and ideals of the United Nations.

It would be idle to deny that the American people, like many others, have sometimes been disappointed because this Organization has not been more successful in translating the hopes for universal peace of its architECTS into concrete accomplishments.

But despite our disappointments, my country remains committed to the goal of a world community. We will continue to work in this Parliament of Man to make it a reality.

Two centuries ago, the philosopher Kant predicted that perpetual peace would come eventually -- either as the creation of man's moral aspirations or as the consequence of physical necessity. What seemed utopian then looms as tomorrow's reality; soon there will be no alternative. Our only choice is whether the world envisaged in the Charter will come about as the result of our vision or of a catastrophe invited by our short-sightedness.

The United States has made its choice. My country seeks true peace, not simply an armistice. We strive for a world in which the rule of law governs and fundamental human rights are the birthright of all. Beyond the bilateral diplomacy, the pragmatic agreements and dramatic steps of recent years, we envisage a comprehensive, institutionalized peace -- a peace which this Organization is uniquely situated to foster and to anchor in the hearts of men.

This will be the spirit of American foreign policy.

This attitude will guide our work in this Organization.

We start from a bedrock of solid progress. Many of the crises that haunted past General Assemblies have been put behind us. Agreement has been

For further information contact:

PR #343

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reached on Berlin; there is a ceasefire in the Middle East; the Viet-Nam war has been ended. The rigid confrontation that has dominated international life and weakened this Organization for a quarter of a century has been softened.

The United States and the Soviet Union have perceived a commonality of interest in avoiding nuclear holocaust and in establishing a broad web of constructive relationships. Talks on strategic arms limitation have already produced historic accords aimed at slowing the arms race and ensuring strategic stability; we have, today, resumed negotiations on this subject. The positive results we hope for will enhance the security of all mankind.

Two decades of estrangement between the United States and the People's Republic of China have given way to constructive dialogue and productive exchanges. President Nixon has met with the leaders of that nation; we have agreed to an historic communique that honestly sets forth both our differences and our common principles; and we have each opened a Liaison Office in the capital of the other.

Many other countries have seized the initiative and contributed -- in substance and spirit -- to the relaxation of tensions. The nations of Europe and North America are engaged in a conference to further security and cooperation. The two German states have taken their place in this Assembly. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have begun to move toward a welcome reconciliation. North and South Korea are at last engaged in a dialogue which we hope will lead to a new era of peace and security.

Yet these achievements, solid as they are, have only made less precarious the dangers and divisions inherited from the post-war era. We have ended many of the confrontations of the Cold War; yet, even in this room, the vocabulary of suspicion persists. Relaxation of tensions is justified by some as merely a tactical interlude before renewed struggle. Others suspect the emergence of a two-power condominium. And as tension between the two original blocs has eased, a third grouping increasingly assumes the characteristics of a bloc of its own -- the alignment of the non-aligned.

So the world is uneasily suspended between old slogans and new realities, between a view of peace as but a pause in an unending struggle and a vision of peace as a promise of global cooperation.

In 1946 James Byrnes, the first Secretary of State to address this Assembly, spoke of how the United Nations could help break down habits of thinking in national isolation and move toward "universal understanding and tolerance among all peoples."

The United States will never be satisfied with a world of uneasy truces, of offsetting blocs, of accommodations of convenience. We know that power can enforce a resigned passivity, but only a sense of justice can enlist consensus. We strive for a peace whose stability rests not merely on a balance of forces, but on shared aspirations. We are convinced that a structure which ignores humane values will prove cold and empty and unfulfilling to most of mankind.

The United States deeply believes

-- that justice cannot be confined by national frontiers;

-- that truth is universal, and not the peculiar possession of a single people or group or ideology;

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-- that compassion and humanity must ennoble all our endeavors.

In this spirit we ask the Assembly to move with us from detente to cooperation, from coexistence to community.

Our journey must begin with the world as it is and with the issues now before us. The United States will spare no effort to ease tensions further and to move toward greater stability.

-- We shall continue, in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique, our search for a new relationship with the People's Republic of China.

-- We shall work to promote positive trends elsewhere in Asia. The uncertain peace in Indochina must be strengthened; the world community cannot afford, or permit, a relapse into war in that region.

-- We shall continue to pursue vigorously the building of constructive relations with the Soviet Union.

-- We shall strive to promote conciliation in Europe. In the negotiations beginning next month we shall seek a reduction of the military forces that have faced each other for so long across that divided continent.

-- We shall give new vigor to our policy of partnership in the Western Hemisphere.

-- We shall honor our pledge to promote self-determination, economic development, and human dignity across the continent of Africa.

-- We shall press on with strategic arms limitation talks. We consider them crucial for security and stability in this period.

-- We shall search for solutions to the worldwide problem of conventional weapons, which drain our resources and fuel the fires of local conflict.

In these efforts, the United States will be guided by fundamental principles:

-- We have no desire for domination. We will oppose -- as we have consistently opposed throughout this century -- any nation that chooses this path. We have not been asked to participate in a condominium; we would reject such an appeal if it were made.

-- We will never abandon our allies or our friends. The strengthening of our traditional ties is the essential foundation for the development of new relationships with old adversaries.

-- We will work for peace through the United Nations as well as through bilateral relationships.

We recognize our special obligation, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, to assist in the search for just solutions in those parts of the world now torn by strife such as the Middle East. While we cannot substitute for the efforts of those most directly involved, we are prepared to use our influence to generate a spirit of accommodation and to encourage the parties toward practical progress.

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But progress on the traditional agenda is not enough. The more we succeed in solving political problems the more other and perhaps deeper challenges emerge. As the world grows more stable we must confront the question of the ends of detente. As the threat of war recedes the problem of the quality of life takes on more urgent significance.

We are in fact, members of a community drawn by modern science, technology, and new forms of communication into a proximity for which we are still politically unprepared. Technology daily outstrips the ability of our institutions to cope with its fruits. Our political imagination must catch up with our scientific vision. This is at the same time the greatest challenge and the greatest opportunity of this Organization:

The pollution of the skies, the seas and the land is a global problem.

The increased consumption of cereals and protein has reduced world food reserves to dangerously low levels.

The demand for energy is outrunning supply, and the need for technological innovation is urgent.

The growth of the world's economy is inhibited by restrictive trading blocs and an insufficiently flexible international monetary system.

The exploitation of the resources of the ocean beds which is essential for the needs of burgeoning populations requires global cooperation lest it degenerate into global contention.

Challenges of this magnitude cannot be solved by a world fragmented into self-contained nation states or rigid blocs.

I do not intend, today, to cover the whole agenda of international cooperation. Rather, I shall speak briefly of some illustrative areas of common action. I pledge the readiness of the United States to solve these problems cooperatively and to submit proposals aimed at their resolution.

## 1. A world community requires the curbing of conflict.

The United Nations, in its 28-year history, has not always been idle in this sphere. In Indonesia, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, the Congo, and in Cyprus, it has shown its ability for effective fact-finding, mediation and peacekeeping missions. This central aspect of the United Nations' work must be strengthened. On a small planet, so bound together by technology and so interdependent economically, we can no longer afford the constant eruption of conflict and the danger of its spread.

Yet, in recent years, we have found ourselves locked in fruitless debates about the inauguration of peacekeeping operations and over the degree of control the Security Council would exercise over peacekeeping machinery -- an impasse which ensured only that permanent peacekeeping machinery would not come into being. Each peacekeeping unit we have formed to cope with an emergency has been an improvisation growing out of argument and controversy.

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We should delay no longer. The time has come to agree on peacekeeping guidelines so that this Organization can act swiftly, confidently and effectively in future crises. To break the deadlock, the United States is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. If all countries concerned approach this problem with a desire to achieve a cooperative solution, the United Nations can achieve a major step forward during this session.

2. A world community must have the widest possible membership.

The exclusion of any qualified state denies representation not only to governments, but to peoples. Membership in this body should be a step toward reconciliation, not a source of conflict. The time has come for North and South Korea to be offered their rightful places here, without prejudice to a future evolution toward unification.

In this spirit also, we support the permanent membership of Japan in the Security Council.

3. A world community must assure that all its people are fed.

The growing threat to the world's food supply deserves the urgent attention of this Assembly. Since 1969, global consumption of cereals has risen more rapidly than production; stocks are at the lowest levels in years. We now face the prospect that -- even with bumper crops -- the world may not rebuild its seriously depleted reserves in this decade.

No one country can cope with this problem. The United States therefore proposes:

-- That a World Food Conference be organized under United Nations auspices in 1974 to discuss ways to maintain adequate food supplies, and to harness the efforts of all nations to meet the hunger and malnutrition resulting from natural disasters.

-- That nations in a position to do so offer technical assistance in the conservation of food. The United States is ready to join with others in providing such assistance.

4. A world community cannot remain divided between the permanently rich and the permanently poor.

Let us therefore resolve that this Assembly, this year, initiate a search -- drawing on the world's best minds -- for new and imaginative solutions to the problems of development. Our search must be candid and realistic, but it must also be free of peremptory demands, antagonistic propositions, ideological confrontation, or propagandistic rhetoric -- or we will surely fail.

The United States is prepared to join in this new search, providing freely of the experience gained over two decades. We have learned not to exaggerate our capacity to transform nations -- but we have also learned much about what progress is possible.

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We will participate without preconditions, with a conciliatory attitude and a cooperative commitment. We ask only that others adopt the same approach.

In this spirit the United States is willing to examine seriously the proposal by the distinguished President of Mexico for a Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States. Such a document will make a significant and historic contribution if it reflects the true aspirations of all nations; if it is turned into an indictment of one group of countries by another it will accomplish nothing. To command general support -- and to be implemented -- the proposed rights and duties must be defined equitably and take into account the concerns of industrialized as well as of developing countries. The United States stands ready to define its responsibilities in a humane and cooperative spirit.

5. Finally, a world community must harness science and technology for the benefit of all.

We must begin to match our remarkable technological skills with our equally remarkable technological needs. We must find the means for the cooperative and judicious development of our energy resources. We must responsibly confront the problems of population growth, which are fast pushing humanity towards the limits of what our Earth can sustain. We must embark on a new scientific revolution to increase agricultural productivity in all lands. No field of human endeavor is so dependent upon an open world for its advancement, no field is so in need of international cooperation to cope with its potential dangers.

Mr. President, fellow delegates:

Are we prepared to accept the imperatives of a global society and
infuse our labors with a new vision? Or, shall we content ourselves with
a temporary pause in the turmoil that has wracked our century? Shall we
proceed with onesided demands and sterile confrontations? Or, shall we
proceed in a spirit of compromise produced by a sense of common destiny?
We must move from hesitant cooperation born of necessity to genuine
collective effort based on common purpose.

It is a choice no country can make alone. We can repeat old slogans or strive for new hope. We can fill the record of our proceedings with acrimony or we can dedicate ourselves to dealing with man's deepest needs. The ideal of a world community may be decried as unrealistic -- but great constructions have always been ideals before they can become realities. Let us dedicate ourselves to this noblest of all possible goals and achieve at last what has so long eluded us: true understanding and tolerance among mankind.

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[L.C.]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 27, 1973

No. 349

#1

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
SEPTEMBER 26, 1973

Ladies and gentlemen, I wanted to give you a brief account of what I have been doing here, and then answer yours questions, hopefully relating primarily to my activities in New York.

You know my schedule, so there is no point in repeating that. My activities consisted of the speech to the General Assembly, meetings with various Foreign Ministers, and meetings with my staff in preparation for entering the State Department on Thursday, where I still haven't been.

Now about my speech to the General Assembly, the intention was to convey the tone, philosophy, and the attitude of the Administration in its conduct of foreign policy for the remainder of this term.

We wanted to convey beyond the specific initiatives that might be proposed, that the task which is before us now is to consolidate what has been achieved, to construct something that can endure, both within our country -- because it has popular and Governmental support -- and above all, something that can endure internationally -- because it is seen to be in the common interest.

This attitude and general philosophy, we felt, was more important at this stage than a list of specific proposals -- although some were made -- because you are familiar with the main outlines of many of our policies.

So for the President's second term, our agenda is to try to create an international consensus to international order that is seen to be just by all or at least the greatest number. Something that embodies humane and progressive ideas.

In my conversations with the Foreign Ministers, I obviously had to deal primarily with the current agenda. On my trip this week, I saw a great many of our allies. I saw many of the Foreign Ministers from Europe. I saw, of course, the Foreign Minister of Japan. I spent some time with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and today with the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China.

I had a long and fruitful talk with the Foreign Minister of Brazil, to underline the great importance we attach to reinvigorating our relationships in that area. And I saw the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Korea.

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Let me say a word about the conversations with our European friends, and also the relation of Japan to that process.

There has been a great deal of speculation tied to a possible trip of the President to Europe. We still, of course, plan this trip, but its exact date will have to be determined by the pace of our preparation.

Much of the speculation has been in terms of an adversary relationship between us and the Europeans, and great difficulty in coming to an agreement.

I would like to correct this impression.

What we are confronting in the dialogue with the Europeans is the merging of several processes. There is the process of European integration. There is the process of the debate on security within NATO. And there is the redefinition of the Atlantic relationship, which covers all these areas.

As you know, on behalf of the President, I proposed a new Atlantic Declaration of Principles in a speech I gave in April.

There was some uncertainty in Europe on how and in what forum to respond; several months were spent in internal discussions within Europe -- whether the proper forum would be NATO, a series of bilateral negotiations with the Europeans, or a series of talks between the United States and the Common Market.

The result has been that after some months of going all these routes, European opinion crystalized; it was decided that those economic matters -- and political considerations relevant to economic matters -- relevant to Europe as an entity, should be discussed by the Nine, as a unit, with the United States. It was also decided that security issues -- and those political issues relevant to security matters -- should be discussed in the NATO Council.

And then, of course, bilateral channels have remained open throughout this process.

With respect to the declaration that the European Nine have developed, and that was presented to me yesterday on behalf of the Nine, by Foreign Minister Andersen of Denmark, let me say that the United States recognizes that this first attempt by Europe to speak with one voice on a political matter of trans-Atlantic relationships is an event of the greatest significance.

The United States in the post-war period has constantly supported the emergence of a European identity, and we therefore welcome the fact that Europe has now organized itself well enough so that it can speak to us with one voice. It may be that in historical retrospect, this meeting of the European Nine in Copenhagen will be seen as one of the decisive events of the post-war period.

At the same time, the United States, of course, reserves the right to its own opinion with respect to the outcome of these deliberations. They were not presented to the United States on a "take it or leave it" basis. They were presented to us in a spirit of partnership as the opening of a dialogue. Therefore, this Saturday the Political Directors of the Nine, and Assistant Secretary Stoessel, are going to meet for a discussion in which we will blend our ideas -- or attempt to blend our ideas -- with those of Europe in this declaration of economic and political principles.

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Secondly, as you know, there are discussions taking place right now in NATO dealing with the definition of future allied relationships; they concern security and the political aspects of security.

There is general agreement that these discussions will be energetically pursued within the context of the NATO Council. We expect to make a significant contribution to this. And so will other countries.

What I want to underline here is that we are not engaged in an adversary procedure. We are engaged in a process in which we intend to give traditional friendship new vitality.

The trip of the President is not an end in itself. The trip of the President will certainly take place in the near future, but our concern is to produce documents that will have some historic significance. We believe that we are now well on the way toward accomplishing what we set out to do earlier this year. The discussions have been useful and they will proceed in a constructive spirit.

It was, of course, inevitable in the conversations with Japan that its relationship to these various efforts would be a subject of conversation.

Since the Japanese Foreign Minister and Prime Minister are going to be visiting Europe in the next few weeks, it would not be appropriate for me to comment, except to say that in my speech of April 23 we outlined the American point of view. We believe that at some stage of this process, in some manner, it is important for Japan to participate.

The manner and the kind of declaration remains to be discussed. I think it will continue to be discussed between the Japanese and ourselves, and between the Japanese and the Europeans on the trip of senior Japanese officials through Europe.

I will make no comment about the conversations we had with the Representative of the People's Republic of China and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.

As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet the President on Friday in Washington, and after that he and I will have a lunch. Therefore, we are still in the middle of our discussions, which cover the entire agenda of US-Soviet relationships.

While I was here, I also met with the Representatives of African nations, and with the Representatives of Arab States, here at the UN.

These meetings were not intended as pronouncements of new policy, but as expressions of our profound concern.

We do not want to pretend to answers that have not yet been found. But we can pledge in both areas that we will make an effort at understanding and an attempt to find just solutions.

I think now it would be best if I took your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is not patently your talk with Andrei Gromyko, which you ruled out, but I would like to ask a question about his public speech in the Assembly, in which he demands that Western nations stop meddling in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union -- and I think something in connection principally with the emigration policy of the Soviet Union.

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The manner in which he spoke of it left us uncertain as to whether this really meant any lessening of the spirit of detente or whether it was simply a public gesture in a private game. Could you --

A. Ladies and gentlemen, during my confirmation hearings, I was asked extensively about this issue. It is also an issue about which I plan to make a formal statement sometime in the next month or six weeks. But for now, let me reiterate what I said then.

The United States, of course, has its own deeply held views about the human values at stake -- both in emigration policies and in internal policies.

The foreign policy question we face is:

First, the degree to which our foreign policy can directly affect others.

And secondly, the alternatives we in fact confront if our direct actions are ineffective.

There is a great tendency to assume that everything that has been achieved is now automatically permanent and can be drawn upon as if its capital were inexhaustible.

We have taken the position that we would not, as a Government, take a formal, public position, but we have also taken the position that insofar as we have influence in other ways, we would use it to the limit of our capabilities.

Now you are all familiar with the fact that the emigration tax is not being enforced. On an unofficial basis we have brought many hardship cases that were submitted to us by various organizations here to the attention of various officials. Many of those have been permitted to emigrate.

So the choice we have to make is between a public stance and the influence that our general relationship gives us.

We believe that we have been quite effective. But we should keep in mind that there is a point beyond which one cannot press a situation as it exists.

Q. Mr. Secretary, according to a sworn affidavit made public in Washington yesterday, your former National Security Aide, David Young, cited your name as authority in requesting the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg. Can you tell us whether you authorized Young to use your name in such a manner?

A. First, I do not know whether David Young used my name in such a manner, because all his affidavit said is, "This is the impression of the man making this affidavit."

And I want to add that I have to choose my words here carefully, because you know David Young is under indictment and I do not want to complicate his case.

In my confirmation hearings, both in public and in executive session, I stated my position very clearly. I did not know of any of the activities of David Young after he left my staff and joined Mr. Ehrlichman's staff, except for one project on declassification, which was publicly announced.

I did not know about the request for a profile. I never saw this profile. I never discussed this subject with David Young. And therefore, if my name was used, which I cannot confirm, it was used without authority.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what significance does your upcoming African trip have, specifically for black Americans who identify themselves very closely with Africa and its problems?

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A. My upcoming African trip was promised for the year 1974 -- it is not a trip that I will take in the very immediate future.

The significance is that, at the highest level in the State Department and in the Administration, we are going to take a new look at our African policy. We want to see what useful role the United States can play in a Continent which is undergoing very rapid change, and which has many problems, some of which I mentioned yesterday.

Q. You say there is a point beyond which the detente should not be pressed. I wonder if you could outline what you think might happen if the Congress revokes or blocks the Most Favored Nation status for the Soviet Union in the new trade bill.

A. I don't want to speculate about Soviet actions. I have stated previously that the Most Favored Nation clause was part of a general arrangement with the Soviet Union in negotiations extending over a period of many years. If now the Most Favored Nation clause is blocked, then the most serious question has to be raised about the degree to which other countries -- in this case the Soviet Union -- can rely on a complex negotiation and about the performance of the United States, over a period of time, of its commitment. There was no reason to suppose at the time that this Most Favored Nation issue was discussed with the Soviet Union, that the type of problem that is now blocking it could be the subject of conditions in Congress. It had never been so used in any previous case where Most Favored Nation status was requested for a Communist country. Therefore, it would certainly be a significant setback in the policy that we are pursuing.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there's been some talk about the convocation of a special conference on the Middle East. I was wondering whether the United States favors such a conference in the near future.

A. The United States position on the Middle East has been that we should avoid at this time any very dramatic moves until we have had an opportunity to discuss with the parties what the possibilities are and how far they are prepared to go in moving towards a just peace in the Middle East. I think the calling of a conference before one has determined the framework and has some understanding as to objectives would be putting the cart before the horse.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the other day in the General Assembly you said the United States is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Can you tell us more precisely what you meant by that "more central role"?

A. Well, as you know, the issue of peacekeeping has been deadlocked in these negotiations between the belief of some -- that has included us -- that the Secretary General should have very wide discretionary authority and the belief of others that the Security Council should control even the day-to-day operations of such a force.

Q. Mr. Secretary --

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A. Just a minute; I'm not finished yet -- or do you want to comment on my remarks?

Q. No!

(Laughter)

A. We are prepared now to take into account the view of those who want the Security Council to take a more active role -- although we cannot go all the way with them into the detailed day-to-day supervision. So, my speech was to signal to the other parties concerned -- permanent members of the Security Council, countries that have traditionally supplied forces, and other interested parties -- that if they are willing to meet us in a cooperative spirit, if they are willing to work for a force that can act expeditiously, they will make a major effort to meet their common concerns. We are prepared to give the Security Council a greater role -- but not such a role that it can hamstring day-to-day operations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some of your views on the prospect of the Korean question debate this year at the UN -- particularly if the question begins to fall into another long series of international delays? Then would you welcome any chance of a higher dialogue negotiation between the major nation countries -- namely, among the Security Council members -- to avoid confrontation at the UN of the problem?

A. Our view, with respect to all issues, is that there should be a great deal of private diplomacy -- that the United Nations can be most effective if no side pushes its view to an absolute and public extreme. Then standard positions harden and compromises become extremely difficult.

So, with respect to the Korean question, we believe that the South Korean Government, in its June 23rd proposal, has made some very constructive initiatives; it has advanced some very constructive initiatives. We believe they deserve the most serious consideration.

On our part, we would welcome quiet discussions -- among the permanent members, as well as among other interested parties -- and we hope that everyone concerned will use this debate as a means of con-ciliation rather than of confrontation.

Q. Mr. Secretary -- Dr. Kissinger, you said the President's speech would take place in the very near future, and you say --

A. The President's what?

Q. Excuse me -- the President's trip would take place in the very near future -- and it was hoped that it would produce documents of very major significance. Should we link the two at the same time?

A. No. Of course, a great deal depends on what you mean by "very near future." What I'm saying is we now have a process, and we have the outline of the ideas that can form the outcome of that process.

You should clearly line in your mind that the President's trip will have to result from progress in these talks. And, again, I want to

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stress: We're not looking for a publicity maneuver; we're not simply looking for a document that everyone can sign -- because that's relatively easy to achieve and we're within sight of achieving this already.

We have made a very serious proposal. It is based on our conviction that Atlantic relationships have basically changed in the last 25 years, partly as a result of the success of previous policies. We think that in order to give a new impetus to them -- in order in a period of detente to reaffirm the significance of friends -- we have to develop a new vision of the future.

This is not done in the American interest; it is done in the common interest. That is what we consider a "document of historic significance."

We believe that it is achievable; we believe that some progress has been made; that process will now continue. As I think Mr. McCloskey has already pointed out, I plan to be in England about October 15th to give a speech to the Pilgrims. On that occasion I plan to meet with several of my colleagues of the European Foreign Ministers. And we believe that we are now well under way, but we're not setting any artificial deadlines. The outcome of the deliberations will determine the timing of the President's trip.

Q. Dr. Kissinger --

A. Yes.

Q. -- If there is a delay in arriving at a consensus between the United States and Europe on shared goals, are you concerned at all that this will have an effect in slowing detente between the United States and the Soviet Union in the sense that the subjects of detente are basically the question of European Security and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, which are the matters being discussed between the United States and Europe?

A. We believe, as detente progresses, that the redefinition of relationships with our friends in both Europe and Asia become very important, because so much of the original relationship was based on the fear of military aggression, which presumably would be lessened by the progress of detente.

Now, whether you can reverse this and say that if these negotiations, slow down -- that, I think, is much more problematical. Therefore, I would rather phrase it positively: that it is the duty of statesmanship in this period to see to it that relations among friends keep pace with relationships among former adversaries. And it does not make any sense that we should make slower progress with our friends than we are making with our adversaries. We don't accept that proposition, and there's no reason for you to believe that that is what is going to happen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you envisage detente with Cuba as part of your definition of the policy force in Latin America?

A. Well, I've stated our view with respect to Cuba before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I think we will first have to discuss

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this question fully with our friends in Latin America before we can
address this question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the average American regards the efforts of Dr. Henry Kissinger as being a prime motivation for working towards a resolution of the Viet-Nam war. Now, as you become Secretary of State and you turn your attempts to an area of the world like the Middle East, the average American might think that you could go in again and bring about what other people have not been able to accomplish.

As you look toward that troubled spot as you looked toward Viet-Nam,
how do you see your role and could you bring about something like that?

A. Well, first, while I think it has been pointed out that humility
is not my most distinctive trait --

(Laughter)

-- I do think it is important that foreign policy in this phase not
be identified with one individual or with virtuoso performances.

When this Administration came into office, we faced a series of
emergency situations that had to be dealt with by emergency measures.
But if we are going to build truly, we have to construct a more permanent
peace through more regular procedures and in a less personalized way.

Now, with respect to the Middle East, it would be a great mistake
to assume that any one man can pull a rabbit out of the hat. The
difficulties in the Middle East occurred not because the parties don't
understand each other but, in some respects, because they understand
each other only too well.

(Laughter)

And we cannot substitute ourselves for the parties concerned. Even
in Indochina -- as our critics have often pointed out -- it took four
years to bring about a settlement -- which, also, incidentally, was the
period of time that it took France to disengage in Algeria.

In the Middle East, we are prepared to use our influence to urge the
parties towards a spirit of compromise -- to encourage them in the
process of negotiation. But you cannot expect -- and no one should ask
us -- to produce all the formulas and all the will as a substitute for
that of the other parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Senate voted today to reduce U.S. forces
abroad 40 percent in the next two years. Is that a good idea, and how
will it affect the U.S. position and negotiating capability in the talks
on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and the limiting of strategic
weapons?

A. Well, as you know, the Administration strongly opposes this type
of resolution. It will be impossible to negotiate an agreement for the
reduction of forces when the United States unilaterally accomplishes what
the negotiations are supposed to bring about. It will be very difficult --

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if not impossible -- to convince our allies of the steadiness of American policy when the United States again unilaterally, before our discussions have well advanced, reduces its forces in Europe.

And I might point out that it is somewhat contradictory to be asked at one and the same time to conduct a foreign policy designed to bring about a transformation of the Soviet system and to cut one's forces for defense.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, you mention -- in your growing relationship with Europe, you mentioned your concern with the countries of Japan and in Asia. Canada is one of the largest -- if not the largest -- trading partners with the United States today. Where do we fit in with your plans for Europe?

A. Well, as you know -- shall I repeat the question? As you know, I met with your Foreign Minister, and this obviously was a subject of conversation.

Procedurally, Canada, -- as we are now envisioning the procedure -- there will be at least two declarations -- one between the United States and the Common Market, and another dealing with the United States and NATO.

Of course, Canada is part of NATO and will be a full participant in the discussions concerning NATO.

With respect to the U.S. association with the Common Market, Canada is technically not part of it. We will proceed in closest consultation with Canada with respect to this, and we are open-minded about an association that Canada may wish to make to such a declaration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now what are your relations with Nigeria?

A. Well, obviously, it was impossible to cover every country in the world in the speech. I tried to convey that we will deal with Africa with understanding and with concern. Nigeria is, of course, one of the most important countries in Africa. It was visited by the Secretary of State two years ago.

We understand that your President is visiting here, and we are hoping that he can also pay a call on us in Washington.

So we consider Nigeria a very important, potentially decisive country in Africa.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

* * * * * * * * *

[L]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 28, 1973

No. 354

REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEES

SEPTEMBER 28, 1973

AMBASSADOR PORTER: The distinguished public servant who has come here to meet you today, needs no introduction. He comes to State with unprecedented credentials for achievement in foreign affairs. Those achievements, as you know, have received world-wide acclaim and they have placed our country in the forefront of the effort to bring about a global peace.

We have truly acquired an extraordinary leader.

Without further ado, therefore, on behalf of the
22,000 of us here and around the world, I extend a warm
welcome to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.
(Applause.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Porter, Ladies and Gentlemen:

When it was suggested that I meet so large a group,
some of my colleagues advanced the argument that this
would make me feel at home. I've been puzzling about
this remark, and I have concluded that based on the news-
paper accounts of how I am supposed to have treated my
staff at the White House, that my new colleagues here
had thought that this was the closest thing to a Nuremberg
Party Rally that they could organize. (Laughter)

In convincing me of the wisdom of doing this, they
also pointed out that Secretary Dulles met a similar
group. They forgot to mention that this was the last
time anybody in the Department saw Secretary Dulles.
(Laughter.)

I wanted to talk to you briefly, about what I think
we can do together.

When I was appointed, I mentioned that there was a
need for the institutionalization of foreign policy, and
this is true in many respects:

First of all, the whole nature of our foreign policy
has changed. For the greater part of our history we really
did not participate on a day-to-day basis in foreign
affairs, and therefore, more emphasis was placed in our

[L.C]

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diplomacy on reporting than on policy making.

And when at the end of World War II we did conduct foreign policy on a global scale, the proportion between our resources and those of most of the rest of the world were so great, we could overwhelm every problem and we could always substitute resources for thought.

But now we are in a situation where we have to conduct foreign policy the way many other nations have had to conduct it throughout their history. We no longer have overwhelming margins of safety and we no longer have overwhelming margins of resources. Therefore, we have to be good, and we have to be thoughtful. I think this is the most important aspect of the institutionalization of foreign policy.

In the making of foreign policy, we have a number of tasks: We have reporting, analysis, policy-making and education. And I think it is safe to say that in the past, we may have been better at the reporting functions than at anything else.

When I met yesterday with my colleagues on the 7th Floor, I told them that it was essential, in the months and years ahead, that we ask ourselves not only where we are but where we want to go. In discussing the policy issues and in reporting events around the world, you help us on the 7th Floor, not only by reporting what is happening, but by telling us what it means.

A great deal of time in this building and in Washington is spent on clearing cables and in working out understandings between various groups concerned with policy. I would like to have the opportunity to work out these understandings on the 7th Floor, and not throughout this building. We are much better off being told clear choices -- to be told what the alternatives are, to be told what choices we confront. I have asked every Assistant Secretary, when making his recommendations to us, to tell us both his recommendations as well as the alternatives that have been rejected. We would much rather see a clear-cut statement of choices than a negotiated document from which we cannot tell what the real arguments were that went into it.

In other words, as we try to restore the Department of State to its principal role of advising the President and future administrations on the making of foreign policy, the way to achieve that preeminent position is not to debate in the abstract or to determine where in the bureaucratic hierarchy one should be placed, but to do the best work in town.

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And having worked with many of you, I know that
there is no reason in the world why this building and
this organization should not produce the best and most
thoughtful work in town. And indeed, if we are going
to have a long-term foreign policy, it must produce the
best work in town. And not just for this administration,
but for the administrations to come.

I have talked to some of the officers in the
Foreign Service Association, and I take their concerns
extremely seriously.

What we will try to do in addition to the normal
administrative concerns which you must have, however,
is to make sure that the ablest people get put into the
key positions as rapidly as possible.

And in writing your memoranda, you should consider
that successful foreign policy depends not only on
difficulties avoided but on opportunities seized.

I asked every bureau yesterday to let us have by
the end of next week a statement of all the problems
that they perceive over the next year, as well as a
statement of those things we ought to do -- even if they
are not problems. That is to say, we should know where
we want to go if we want to do the right thing.

And this gets me to my final point. In working
out policies at the various levels, at some point it is
inevitable that some compromises will have to be made.
But in thinking about policy it is not necessary to make
those compromises as the papers are being written. In
this current state of America and of America's relations
to the world, we have an unparalleled opportunity to help
bring about a peaceful international structure, a world
in which the major participants feel that they have had
a share in creating and which, therefore, they have an
interest in maintaining.

It is an opportunity that comes not often in a
century, and then through a combination of historical
events that cannot inevitably be repeated.

At this state in America's relations with the world
and in this stage of America's concern with itself, our
primary concern ought to be to ask ourselves what is
right, and not to worry about political pressure, about
bureaucratic expediency, or the short-term considerations.

I think with this attitude, and with your help, we
can do great things together with some joy and some
enthusiasm and some hope.

Thank you very much.

(Applause.)

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