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Much as I would like to claim that it was the brilliance of our diplomacy that brought this about, I must say that our diplomacy, I like to think, helped, but it was also the Chinese self interest.

The Chinese faced with the growth of this Soviet power on their frontier like to show that they are not without resources of their own.

And, therefore, because of the internal Communist rivalries and because of the greater flexibility on our part, there are now possibilities of dealing with the Chinese that did not exist two years ago.

In the wake of the Cambodian incursions, the Chinese have called off a meeting which was scheduled at that time. But they couldn't do any less. We expect these talks to resume in the not too distant future. I am not giving you inside information. It is just the logic of events seems to indicate that sometime in the next six months one would expect that contact will be resumed. And, again, in fairness, one has to say this: The Chinese talk a tough game, but they have not actually undertaken military measures beyond their borders since 1962, and they have not challenged the United States militarily since the Korean War.

Part of this may be due to the fact that they have ripped their whole country apart in the cultural revolution.

People may not recognize -- it isn't generally recognized -- the extent to which China dislocated itself in the middle 60's. Mao, actually, I think analytically correctly, decided that the curse of a Communist state is bureaucratization. I think he is right, and that there is no way of dealing with this bureaucracy developing vested interests, and that, too, is true. That has happened in every Communist country within the system.

So what he did is conceive the mad idea of smashing the entire bureaucracy of a totalitarian state running a planned economy. In a country of 800 million people, you have to assume that bureaucracy included anywhere from 30 to 50 million of the population. He unleashed the Red Guards; he legitimized the student protest which we have; he organized as a governmental phenomenon against all the established institutions.

The result was, of course, that every established institution created its own Red Guard, so no one knew any more who was for whom. They were all fighting in the name of Mao. Total chaos developed. The bureaucratic structure was smashed entirely. The only reliable instrument left of control, or the only reliable instrument to which you could give an order and be sure it arrived at the place was the army, which is, incidentally, one reason why the army is not likely to engage in foreign adventures for the next few years, because it is needed within the country.

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So once the cultural revolution was ended, as it
has now been ended for a year and a half, they have had
a fantastic problem of pulling their country together
again, reconstituting a bureaucracy, getting some
regularity into their procedures, and then ten years from
now, they will face again exactly the same problem with
which Mao attempted to deal.

One final point: Many people say, "After Mao dies
maybe the Russians and Chinese will get together again."
This is not impossible for a short period of time, but if
you are sitting in the Kremlin, you have to say to
yourself, "If Mao is possible once, he's possible again."
And you see 800 million Chinese developing nuclear weapons
on your doorstep with this growth and this developing of
missiles that will be able to reach Moscow long before
they can reach Washington, with disputes with Moscow.
We don't really have any conflicts with China.

We don't have anything that they want, except a
capitalist system, which they would like to overthrow.

But there are no national disputes.

I think that this nightmare of the Chinese is going
to weigh on Russian policy for a long time, even after
Mao's death, even if his successors pursue a somewhat more
conciliatory policy towards the Soviet Union.

Ω Dr. Kissinger, you made some very interesting
points about Vietnamization and pointed out that 25 years Hanoi
has been bent on solidifying its position in Vietnam, that
they have been intransigent at the peace conference, that
we are in a sense weakening our position there by pulling
troops out and turning the power over to South Vietnam,
which at best, could not be as strong as we both were together.

I wonder if you could tell us what is the backup
position in the light of these facets to our Vietnamization
policy? Is it possible that it will not succeed? If it
does not succeed, do we turn around and go back in or is
it possible that we don't really care and that it is sort
of a cover up for a phased withdrawal?

DR. KISSINGER: If it doesn't succeed, not even
Arizona State will take me. (Laughter).

First of all, I have to point out in the rear of
the room is the White House press pool. I have to
stop speaking frankly now. Not that I don't like them,
I just don't trust them.

I must have used one of my elliptical sentences with
German construction and the verb at the end when you drew
the conclusion that I said our present policies weaken
our position in Vietnam by strengthening the South
Vietnamese and removing American forces.

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MR. KLEIN: Let me interrupt you for a second. I mentioned Ron Ziegler at the start of the meeting. I think most of you know him. But he has now joined us from classes at the Kansas State University, where he was there in charge of being stoned. (Laughter).

Seriously, the President had a very successful meeting there. Ron will be with us at the later reception. I am sure a lot of you will want to take the opportunity to meet him.

Let's go right back to your questions.

Q James Hoge, Chicago Sun-Times.

Dr. Kissinger, on the other side of those 800 million Chinese sits Japan. We have successfully renegotiated a security treaty with them. Still, they must be aware of the change in the strategic balance between us and the Soviet Union. They might well read more into the Nixon Doctrine than we intended for them to do. They might well see the need for their own strength in military resources as part of their foreign policy growing in Asia.

With this in light, what is your prognosis for Japan and for our relations with it and what are some of the pitfalls we have to watch out for?

DR. KISSINGER: Actually, your question stated the issue extremely well. Japan's GNP with 100 million people is larger than that of China's with 800 million people. The industrial capacity of Japan has grown enormously. It has the fastest rate of growth of any industrial country. They have managed to establish a substantial degree of economic influence in many parts of Asia.

It has been our policy to recognize that Japan is to be a principal and maybe the principal country to determine the future of East Asia over the next decade or two.

Therefore, in our negotiations with the Japanese on Okinawa, which was really the major negotiation we conducted last year rather than the security treaty, we had to weigh the continuation of all of our rights on our bases under some legal arrangement as against our long-term relationship with Japan.

We decided that you can't operate a base in a foreign country just because you have a piece of paper that says you have the legal right to do it. That has been the history of the whole post-war period.

Therefore, we made a very generous settlement with Japan on the Okinawa issue, because we wanted to establish a relationship of partnership with Japan. I think this was on the whole very successful.

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On the other hand, you have correctly pointed out the dangers that we face. They may misread the Nixon Doctrine, not as a way of remaining committed to Asia, but as a way of getting out of Asia, if not of the world.

They may watch what happens in Vietnam, and judge the degree of our capacity to influence events in Asia, whatever we may have intended to do. They have the option of either throwing in their lot by working with China, or by going on an independent course backed up by us. They undoubtedly have to look at the security balance as I have described it earlier.

With respect to the security situation, that obtains, of course, primarily in our relationship with the Soviet Union, and what that says is that U. S. strategic power is no longer exactly the same deterrent as it was before vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and, therefore, local power is more important.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union has no means of attacking Japan directly, except across the sea. And, therefore, the Soviet Union is not able to physically establish a fait accompli in Japan except through an operation of such a massive scale which would, of course, have a much higher probability of generating a general war.

China, on the other hand, which has a capability of encroaching on Japanese geographical interests, is for the foreseeable future still deterred by American strategic power, because Chinese nuclear strength is still pitiful compared to that of the United States.

So the strategic balance has not yet affected Japanese considerations. But we have to be extremely careful that the Japanese do not misread what we are doing as a retreat from Asia, that they do not get the idea that either we are tooweak to protect our allies or too divided at home to use our strength.

If they do, we might see again one of these sudden shifts of Japanese policy since it is one of the aspects of Japan that they believe, and I think believe correctly, that their culture is so particular to them that they can adapt to many conditions and still preserve their natural essence. This is what they have done through a long and, on the whole, very successful history.

But Japan, in many respects, is the key, and is one of the countries which we watch with the greatest care.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you.

Before you get to the next question, I might introduce one other man who just stepped into the room --Don Rumsfeld, former Congressman and Assistant to the President with Cabinet rank. He also runs the OEO sometimes.

We are getting close to the time so we will keep both questions and answers short, and we will do well.

Q Harry Boyd, Cedar Rapids Gazette.

To what extent is the Russian interest in controlling European oil supplies a factor in this Middle East situation, and would a standoff settlement over there tend to advance that interest?

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DR. KISSINGER: I think Joe ought to comment on that, too.

Of course, Japan gets 85 percent of its oil from the Middle East, and specifically from the Persian Gulf. Europe, I think, gets 90 percent of its oil from the Middle East.

So if the Middle East fell under Communist control, directly or indirectly, this would mean that those countries would be subject, or could be subjected, to an enormous degree of blackmail, assuming the Communists could keep control of their clients in the Middle East.

Then the question is do the Soviets have to prevent a settlement in the Middle East in order to further their objective. Or can they have realistic hopes for that objective even in the face of a settlement? They can argue that there are great risks if the war erupts again, because if their clients continue to be humiliated or hard pressed, or if they cannot deliver their territories back to them, there may be a degree of disillusionment with Soviet protection.

They run the risk of an increasing radicalization of the Middle East so that the Maoist groups take over.

Finally, they may conclude that even if there is a settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, some of the latent tendencies in the Arab world may still give them an opportunity to further their objectives.

I agree with Secretary Sisco that a calculation of their self interests is quite consistent with an Arab-Israeli peace even if you throw in the objective of eventually controlling the oil supplies.

But what we can't assess properly is to what extent their ideological fear of the Chinese, to what extent possible divisions in their leadership group make it tough for them to break the mold of any existing policy and, therefore, force them to keep going whatever is going and, therefore, prevent a settlement.

Q. Bob Fransen, WTCN, Minneapolis.

What steps are being taken as of today to get the Arabs and Israelis to the bargaining table and what happens if they don't get through before the cease fire runs out?

MR. SISCO: First of all, through diplomatic channels, we are talking both to Moscow and Cairo because the principal focus has to be on rectification or correction of the situation.

That has resulted from the violations of the cease fire as I have described a bit earlier.

This is going to be a continuing effort, because in this proposal originally there was not a direct link between the cease fire and the actual beginning of talks. But the way the thing has evolved, of course, particularly when the question of confidence has been raised by the Israelis in a very specific and a very concrete sort of way, our own judgment is that it is going

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to be very necessary to restore the cease fire standstill before
any talks can really begin even though in the formal, technical
and legal sense there wasn't this kind of linkage.

Q Dr. Kissinger, aren't we in fact, when we withdraw
from the Southeast Asia, giving up our influence there? We
certainly can't depend on the South Vietnamese or the Cambodian
or the Thai armies there. What kind of an umbrella are we going
to maintain? What kind of bases to protect those governments?

DR. KISSINGER: We still have some bases in Thailand. I think there is no organic reason why South Vietnam, with a population of 19 million, Cambodia with a population of about 7 million, and Thailand with a population of about 35 million should not be able to defend themselves against the North Vietnamese.

Q They are not doing it now.

DR. KISSINGER: In fact, one of the curious results, or
not curious, but one of the interesting results of the Cambodian
operation is that the South Vietnamese Army has been defeating
the North Vietnamese whenever they fought conventional battles.

So if we can reduce the guerrilla activity within South
Vietnam, continue to reduce it on the rate it has been reduced
in the last two years, and if we can force the North Vietnamese
into a situation where they become an invading army, there
is some prospect now that the South Vietnamese can handle them
in a conventional war.

Therefore, I could not accept your proposition that our
withdrawal would leave them defenseless against the North
Vietnamese.

What has made the North Vietnamese strategy so potent in
the past is they have been able to combine conventional operations
with the guerrilla. So when the defense is concentrated on the
guerrillas, the conventional forces emerge. When they concentrate
on the conventional main forces, the guerrillas come to the
surface.

The Cambodian operations have forced these main forces
into Cambodia, or they are in Cambodia now. They have been badly
decimated. The South Vietnamese have gained a tremendous
confidence by fighting successfully in these operations, and
actually one of the big changes that has occurred in the last
year has been the growing ability of the South Vietnamese to
handle the North Vietnamese.

It is the guerrilla war that is the problem.

END

(AT 4:44 PM CDT)

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
6:00 P.M., EDT, SATURDAY,
SEPTEMBER 26, 1970

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

2:43 P.M. EDT

FRIDAY

SEPTEMBER 25, 1970

MR. ZIEGLER: This BACKGROUNDER is available for
those of you, and those organizations, who will be going
on the President's up-coming trip to Europe and the
Mediterranean.

Dr. Kissinger will discuss this with you and
also take your questions.

The groundrules are as they have been in the
past: Administration officials; no direct quotations.

Q Ron, are you going to run this off and give
us copies?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will run it off and make it
available to those of you who will be going on the trip.

Q How soon will it be?

MR. ZIEGLER: It takes about six hours.

Q I wondered if you had an embargo on time?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am sorry. Thank you.

I should tell you that the words from Dr. Kissinger
will be embargoed until 6:00 p.m., Eastern Daylight Time,
Saturday; in other words, for Sunday papers.

Thank you very much.

Q You say you are going to make it available,
do you mean you are going to give us copies to take away
or just look at?

MR. ZIEGLER: I haven't decided that yet.

Q Can we get anything from Dr. Kissinger in
connection with his trip for today's release?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. Anything that Dr. Kissinger
covers in regards to his trip can be for immediate release.

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Q Will that be on the record?

MR. ZIEGLER: It will be on the same basis, and then
I will follow up after that.

DR. KISSINGER: You will get the text as soon as
we put the verbs into it. (Laughter.)

I don't have a prepared statement or an unprepared
statement. I will just take your questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us what the
President hopes to accomplish by speaking to Tito? Will
this be a go-between, perhaps, in our relations with the
Russians or what?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think we need a go-between
to conduct our relations with the Russians.

Let me make a general observation about the trip
and then on the extended conversations that the President
intends to have with President Tito on this.

The trip was really planned before the recent events
underlying the urgency of the situation in the Mediterranean,
and its intention was to symbolize the American commitment
and interest in the Mediterranean, to talk to countries with
a major stake in the area about their view of what would
be most conducive to stability and peace in that area, and
to explore both bilateral and multilateral relationships
in the Mediterranean region.

Obviously, recent events have underlined even more
the importance not only of overcoming the immediate crisis,
but to bring about a situation in which these crises are
less likely and in which a more permanent stability can be
achieved. This applies to the Middle East.

Of course, Yugoslavia, like most of the countries
in the Mediterranean, really looks in separate directions
at once: they look towards Europe, they look towards the
Middle East; they look East, North, West and South in a
way that few other nations of the world do.

President Tito and Yugoslavia—we recognize of course
that they are a Socialist country, and it is obvious that they
have prized their non-aligned status over the
years, and this is exactly consonant with our view of
what their role should be.

Therefore, the visit to Yugoslavia, as far as
we are concerned, is obviously not directed against any one.
We recognize also that President Tito is in an unusual
position of understanding the dynamics of the Communist
countries and of having the confidence of many or most
of the countries in the Middle East and, finally, of having
a problem which is very similar to that of many of the
countries in the region; namely, how to preserve the
independence and integrity of his country in a world of very
complex international rivalry.

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For all of these reasons, we believe that an
exchange of views between the two Presidents is going to
be very significant and very useful to us, and I think it
will be helpful to President Tito in his diplomacy to
understand our thinking about the international situation.

But the focus of the conversation is not going
to be primarily U.S.-Soviet relationships. We are not looking
to President Tito to broker our relationships with the
Soviet Union. I think our relationship and our channels
to the Soviet leaders are good enough that we can do that
bilaterally.

But we do believe that understanding of other
Socialist countries and of the world scene is going to be very
useful in helping us form our own judgments about the situations
which I have described.

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Q Henry, on a slightly different subject, the United Press is saying today that informed sources in Moscow were talking about the Soviet-American presence in the Middle East if the United Nations cannot supply -- I don't know how far you want me to go with the story -- that there is no United Nations force that can be brought in to guarantee the borders of the countries in the Middle East.

They say further, that they have proposed -- this is a story, a booklet put out by Novosti News today -- proposing that there be a demilitarized zone and U.N. troops on both sides of the line.

But they also say that Soviet officials have talked to American diplomats, and UPI quotes informed sources as saying this, that if that United Nations proposal doesn't work, that the scheme we have heard before, Soviet-American troops might be a possibility in the Middle East.

DR. KISSINGER: You remember that at a previous backgrounder, an unidentified spokesman who did not have an accent raised this as a possibility.

I don't want to go into specific schemes for policing any possible Mid East settlement. We have, of course, always stated that demilitarized zones should be part of an ultimate settlement, recognizing that Israel is very reluctant to permit any demilitarization on its side of the border.

So, we have not endorsed that particular proposition, but we have believed that the demilitarization of border areas, of areas contiguous to the borders, particularly the areas that were evacuated by Israeli troops, would be a useful component of the settlement.

I think it is premature to talk now about who should furnish the units for such a force. The primary requirement should be that they should be from countries which give the parties concerned a sense of security, rather than a sense of insecurity and that they should be there in a manner that does not permit a repetition of the 1967 experience that, at the moment they were most needed, they evaporated.

I think with these general principles in mind we would be prepared to engage in a discussion of the concept. The composition of the force is really a detail further down the road and that I shouldn't speculate on it today.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you tell us a little bit about your trip to Paris? Does it indicate that you see some hope in the Viet Cong or that there has been some movement that has not met the eye.

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DR. KISSINGER: As some of you know, I have been accused of being excessively optimistic about negotiations all along. I have had occasion to point out here in these meetings before, that I believe that we will not have an excessive advance warning if a break should ever come. I have never predicted that there would be a break at any particular moment.

All I have said is that one should not conclude from the fact of the stalemate that it will be inevitably permanent.

I still believe this. As Vietnamization is making progress, we here believe that the chances of negotiation are enhanced. Now that Ambassador Bruce has been there for a month, for more than a month, now that the chief North Vietnamese negotiator has returned to Paris and attended several sessions, it is time for us to assess the trend, the trend of events.

As you know, the President is expecting to meet with Ambassador Bruce and Ambassador Habib in Ireland. I must caution you not to expect any dramatic announcements from that meeting, because it is intended to be a review of the situation as it exists at that moment in order to help decisions which the President may wish to make over the next weeks and months.

My trip is really taking advantage of the opportunity of going to Europe anyway, of stopping by in Paris and exchanging ideas with our delegates. When they come to see the President, then I will have had a somewhat better feel and have had an opportunity to talk to them at greater length than the more formal setting permits.

Do not read any great significance into this. I had intended to do this, if the occasion permitted it, for a long time. And it is not related to Madame Binh's proposal.

Q If the Jordanian situation had gotten worse, would the trip possibly have been called off?

DR. KISSINGER: That is a very speculative question. If full fighting had erupted in the Middle East, we would certainly have had to take this into account in our plan.

I think that there is a chance that it would have been called off, yes.

Q Henry, would you discuss Madame Binh's proposal with us in some detail, give us your preliminary reactions to it.

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentleman, if I could make a suggestion here. I think we would be better served if we proceeded at the outset of the briefing on subjects to do with the trip and then at the end of that, we can go for a few minutes to general questions, such as yours, Bob.

Q This seems to me it is the only substantive part of the trip.

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MR. ZIEGLER: Let's proceed on that basis.

DR. KISSINGER: Can I answer his question?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. (Laughter).

DR. KISSINGER: I wish I didn't have to, actually.
(Laughter).

Q What was it? We have forgotten it now.

DR. KISSINGER: The question was whether I would comment on Madame Binh's proposal.

The eight points of Madame Binh, in many important respects, repeat the ten points with which we are familiar. Some categories are more specific.

We are studying them with great care, because the other side has a tendency that when they want to say something, to do it in rather subtle shifts of phrases, rather than in dramatic shifts of positions. So, we are studying the proposals with great care. We will hope that over the next few weeks, we will receive further clarification.

On first reading, if I wanted to score debating points, I would have to say on first reading, there is no very great difference between the eight points and the ten points, but we are looking at it carefully for new answers to see whether they might indicate a shift of emphasis. And you can be certain that we will be exploring those. But I want to repeat, my trip is not connected with the eight points, nor are we planning any dramatic overture as a result of my trip to Paris.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what contribution can President Nixon make to peace in the Middle East by going to the Mediterranean and the Sixth Fleet?

DR. KISSINGER: The peace in the Mediterranean depends on a number of factors, some of which are outside of our direct control. There is, of course, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the solution of that conflict depends importantly on the contribution the two parties are prepared to make, and the sacrifices both sides will be prepared to make in the eventual settlement.

There are at least two important respects in which the United States role in the Mediterranean is very important: The first is that the growing Soviet Naval forces in the Mediterranean and the changes in the political situation that have occurred at the southern rim of the Mediterranean have created in the mind of our allies a rather substantial concern about the southern flank of NATO. This is not directly related now to the Middle East, but has to do with the general situation in the Mediterranean, and you are all familiar with the general concern that exists all over the world, including in Europe, that the Nixon Doctrine might mean a withdrawal by the United States into isolationism.

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We have repeatedly asserted that the Nixon Doctrine
is not a return to isolationism, but is rather a means
by which we will remain committed to the rest of the world,
and particularly, to our allies under the conditions
that now exist.

Therefore, this objective of making clear
that we have significant relationships in the Mediterranean is
served by our visit there, first symbolically by our
presence there, and secondly, substantively by the conver-
sations we expect to have with the leaders of Italy, of
Yugoslavia and of Spain. Then as you know, of course,
the Secretary of Defense is going on to Greece and Turkey
so that the NATO context is going to be discussed.

Secondly, as far as the Middle East is concerned,
there are, as I pointed out, many elements to a possible
settlement, the most important of which I have already
alluded to, namely, the relationship that the two principal
parties establish among each other.

But other elements are the confidence in the
American willingness or ability to safeguard those elements
of a settlement that we have agreed to safeguard, or
take an interest in. And in this sense again, a visit
to the area and the meeting which we intend to have with
our Mediterranean Ambassadors, as well as to the leaders
of this area, will give us, first, a sense of the components
of the settlement that the principal people there want,
and secondly, it will give us an opportunity to make clear
what we will do to contribute to a settlement in the area.
And in this manner, I think, this would be one of the
building blocks for our long-term Middle East policy.

Q Henry, will the President express his
concern that the other NATO powers do not at least
publicly appear to be as interested in protecting the
peace in the Middle East as we do in connection with the
Nixon Doctrine and all of its points?

DR. KISSINGER: The President certainly intends to
state his view of the importance of the Middle East in
the countries which he visits. It is not his style to
chide people or tell them what they ought to do, but he
will certainly explain our view.

Q But is the premise of my question correct,
that their role has been something less than adequate?

DR. KISSINGER: I wouldn't want to use a negative
adjective on it. I would say their role has been somewhat
less active than ours in the recent crisis.

Q Where will the meeting between the President
and the "leaders of the area" be?

DR. KISSINGER: The itinerary has been made
available, hasn't it, Ron? We will meet with the leaders
in their capitals. We will meet with the U.S. Ambassadors from
the Mediterranean countries in Naples.

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Q The European countries only?

DR. KISSINGER: No.

MR. ZIEGLER: You have the complete itinerary. When Henry refers to the leaders, he is referring to those leaders of the countries where we are going.

Q We don't have the list of nations yet whose Ambassadors will be there.

DR. KISSINGER: I think it is all the countries bordering the Mediterranean, the Eastern Mediterranean, and it does not include our Ambassador to Yugoslavia because we are going to be in Yugoslavia; it does not include our Ambassador to Spain, because we will be there.

I will have an opportunity to see Ambassador Watson in Paris, so he will not be there. But our Ambassadors or our Charges in all the Arab countries bordering the Mediterranean will be there, and of course our Ambassador to Israel will be there.

The best thing to do is give you an exact list.

MR. ZIEGLER: We will give you that list at 4 o'clock.

Q. Henry, I think it would be of value to some of us if you could describe how the Administration views Greece, Italy and Spain as Mediterranean powers? Why are they important to the Mediterranean? What do they do?

DR. KISSINGER: For one thing, they are located in the Mediterranean. (Laughter.)

It would be hard not to call them Mediterranean powers.

Secondly, in terms of the Southern flank of NATO, the NATO Southern Headquarters is in Naples.

We have just concluded a new base agreement with Spain. It is therefore important to us for that and other reasons.

Greece, geographically, is also important in the NATO context, and also in relationship to the Middle East.

So these are countries that think of themselves as principal Mediterranean countries who take a profound interest in the changes that have occurred on the Southern shores and with which, on a bilateral basis, we have often had discussions on the situation in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East.

For example, the UAR Foreign Minister only recently visited Spain, and Spain has had a long relationship to the Arab countries. Of course, Yugoslavia's views on this matter are well known. Italy has shown a profound interest.

So both from the point of view of the security of Europe as well as from the point of view of the political evolution of the Mediterranean area, these are key countries.

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Q. Should we view arms shipment to Greece part of the Southern strategy, so to speak?

DR. KISSINGER: The renewal of arms shipments to Greece this week was based on the important contributions that Greece makes to the Southern flank of NATO.

The weapons that we are sending to Greece under their policy are not useful particularly for civil control. They are almost exclusively useful for defense against aggression. They are items of heavy equipment. And for that reason it seemed to us that in the present situation in the Mediterranean, and as we pointed out in the public statement accompanying it, whatever the views about some of the domestic policies, this was a measure taken into the common interest.

Q. If you wanted to dramatize American concern about the Middle East, it seems to me a trip to Israel might have been appropriate for the President; and, secondly, could you assess the affect of the Jordan crisis in the last week on the overall situation there?

DR. KISSINGER: Whenever we take a trip, we have to explain why we did not visit particular countries. I think the President's visit to the Sixth Fleet makes clear that we are concerned also with the Eastern Mediterranean; and, secondly, the events of the past week have made clear what our general concern is.

Also, we would not visit Israel alone. We would visit, if such a trip were taken, also some Arab capitals and this would have made the itinerary too complex at the present moment. (Laughter.)

As for the question that you asked, what is the impact of recent events on the possibilities of the future evolution in the Middle East? If nothing happens that has not already happened, in other words, if there is no new foreign intervention or no new upheaval, then we think that the long-term prospects for the peace initiative have probably improved and for the following reasons: The structure of a peace in the Middle East, as I have pointed out before, will require on the part of Israel the giving up of some physical possessions -- we should be careful about individual words these days -- but some of the physical conquests in return for intangibles, like enhanced legitimacy in Arab eyes, promises of future performance, and similar matters.

For this to be effective, there have to be a number of components: One, there has to be confidence in the willingness of the other parties to perform on their commitment. Secondly, there has to be confidence in the ability of the other states in the area to perform on their undertakings. Thirdly, there has to be a confidence in whatever assurances the United States gives in order to safeguard the settlement.

A number of events in the Jordan situation crystallized possible doubts about many of these components. It crystalized, in conjunction with the violations of the standstill agreement, doubts about the willingness to perform on promises. To the extent that the authority of the

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King of Jordan was undermined, it crystalized doubts about the ability of the King of Jordan to perform or of any government to perform. And, of course, if the King of Jordan had been overthrown and a radical government had taken over, this would have then created doubts on the willingness to perform on the promises.

Finally, if all of this had happened, this increasing radicalization of the situation, without any outside action, it would have raised doubts about the American ability or willingness to safeguard any settlement that might be, or contribute to the safeguarding of any settlement that might be achieved.

The events of the last two weeks should have contributed in a number of ways. One, if a moderate government can maintain itself in Jordan that has already committed itself to the peace negotiations, and if it establishes a greater degree of control in its territory than it has had up to now, it will be better able to live up to whatever commitments it may make.

So that from that point of view, the atmosphere has somewhat improved.

Secondly, the actions that have been taken by the United States over recent weeks indicate that we at least have the ability to carry out whatever promises we may choose to make in order to safeguard such a settlement.

Finally, we can hope, and there is no proof of this yet, that all the parties in the area could have learned from the recent crisis that the continuation of the status quo can bring about totally unforeseeable events and trigger a set of actions that could get out of control unless by political means they managed to stabilize events now. So that the motive of all parties to bring about a settlement might have been strengthened.

So, I repeat, we are not out of the woods in the present crisis. There is still a possibility of outside intervention. There is still a possibility of other developments. I am saying that if nothing happens other than what has already happened, then the long-term prospects have improved.

Q What would be the agenda of the conversations in Rome? Is the President going to talk just about the recent situation or about other problems like the European Security Treaty of the Soviets? Number two, what does the President think of this demonstration staged by the Communist Party?

DR. KISSINGER: First, we don't generally announce an agenda in advance. These discussions are always fairly loose. We recognize that Italy is not only a Mediterranean country but also a part of Western Europe and we would expect and would be prepared to discuss issues not confined to the Mediterranean.

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As far as the demonstrations that the Communist Party in Italy has made, we have enough troubles worrying about our own demonstrations and we will leave it to the Italian Government to worry about theirs.

Q In view of your assessments you gave of the impact of the Jordanian situation, in that context, could you assess for us the Soviet tactics during the past week or ten days?

DR. KISSINGER: We have stated our view about the violations of the standstill that had occurred earlier and that could not have contributed to quieting the situation.

In the immediate crisis, I think it is fair to say that the Soviet Union was in the early stages relatively passive and began to become active only when the situation threatened to get out of control.

What we would welcome is a Soviet contribution before the situation threatens to get out of control rather than to let things reach such a dangerous point.

Q Could you elaborate a little on what you mean by getting active only when they began to get out of control?

DR. KISSINGER: The thing is, that we have to base our policy on what happens, not on what is said. What happened was that Syrian tanks crossed the Jordanian frontier about four or five days after the Jordanian internal conflict broke out. The Syrian army is trained and advised by Soviet technicians. We are not saying that the Soviet Union had anything to do with this. But we also cannot conclude that the Soviet Union restrained it.

All we can say is, the fact of the matter is that the Syrian army crossed the border in force. When this triggered the series of other events, then we had some indications that the cooler heads urged the Syrians perhaps not to press matters to a point of explosion.

We would have preferred if Syrian tanks had never crossed into Jordan, obviously, because if one attempts to calibrate these actions so precisely it gets very dangerous.

But whoever contributed to the Syrian retreat -- I don't want to speculate as to what made the Syrians withdraw.

Q Henry, I would like to follow that up. To what extent -- combining that with the missile violations, the general build-up in the Mediterranean by the Soviets and this announcement today that possibly they are building a submarine base in Cuba -- are we fearful generally at this time of Russian military activity increasing around the globe and, if so, is the President's trip at all related to these Russian actions?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the President's trip was basically planned before these actions occurred. It was planned after the cease fire and these violations began to be obvious, but before they became acute.

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The reasons for the Presidential trip I have
essentially indicated.

As for the events that you have mentioned, they
are, of course, matters which we have to look at with
concern.

With respect to the Soviet naval activity in the
Caribbean, we are, of course, watching the development
of Soviet naval activity and of possible construction
there. We are watching it very closely. The Soviet Union can
be under no doubt that we would view the establishment
of a strategic base in the Caribbean with the utmost
seriousness.

I would like perhaps to call attention to a press
conference statement that President Kennedy made on
November 20, 1962, in which he said the following:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons are
removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the
future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if
Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist
purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean."

The operative part, of course, is here: "If all
offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of
the Hemisphere in the future."

This, of course, remains the policy of this
Government.

Q Does that imply that a submarine with
missiles aboard would be carrying offensive weapons and
therefore ---

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go any further
than what I have said. And I have related it to the
reports to which my attention was called about the possible
construction of a naval base. All I want to point out is
that we are watching it and we want to see for what type of
weapons it would be suitable, and similar matters.

I have stated our general view with respect to
it while the activity is now in an early state.

Q Do I understand that there is some doubt
that this base could accommodate Polaris Submarines?

DR. KISSINGER: I will go no further than what I
have said. Obviously, a Polaris type submarine is
an offensive weapon.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you agree with the thesis
that now the Russians are achieving parity in the military
force with the United States around the world and also
in the Mediterranean, that this will lead to peace?

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DR. KISSINGER: We have trouble enough worrying about our side of the military equation. Our concern, our belief, our policy is to maintain a military establishment on the basis of the doctrine of sufficiency, and we believe that in the field of strategic weapons this is adequate to achieve the security and foreign policy objectives of the United States.

We do hope and we have made it clear to the Soviet Union in many exchanges, and we have done so in the SALT negotiations, we do hope that the two superpowers recognize their special responsibility for maintaining the peace, and also the need to recognize that both sides must be willing to subordinate possible tactical advantages for the benefit of the greater interest of humanity in peace.

This is why some of the events to which the preceding question alluded require us to study Soviet actions with particular concern.

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Q Do you expect any substantive announcements after the talks with the various leaders any place along the President's trip?

DR. KISSINGER: Our practice is not to have communiqués at the end of the talks. We sometimes depart from that. But the difficulty is that an inordinate amount of time is then spent on drafting communiqués and generally, the President prefers to concentrate on the substance of the talks, rather than on the drafting of communiqués.

Q But you did have some announcements, I think, about cultural exchanges.

DR. KISSINGER: We had an announcement out of Romania. There was, I believe, a consular convention and a cultural agreement that were ready for signature, and which fortuitously, it wasn't planned that way, could be announced on the occasion of the President's visit.

So, we do not exclude announcements in all circumstances, but I think I am safe in saying that you should not expect world-shaking announcements out of any of the visits. This is not the purpose.

The purpose of the visit is more long range. It is to contribute to everybody's understanding of the elements of peace in the Mediterranean; to enable the President to meet the new leaders of Italy, and Great Britain, and to meet, of course, with our European negotiators to reassess the situation. But I can assure you there will be no announcement coming out of that meeting either.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you indicated, in speaking about Jordan, that the recent events in Jordan "prove that we at least have the ability to carry out our promises."

Could you be a bit more specific as to what promises you were referring to?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not referring to any particular promises we may have made with Jordan. I am referring to the fact that the projection of American power into the Mediterranean should have made clear that we are in a position to contribute to the safeguarding of the peace, if that should become necessary, and if that should be part of the settlement.

We are not, at this moment, necessarily committed to any particular course along that line. And to the extent that our promises are a weight in the scales, I think our performance enhanced them, our performance in the last two weeks.

Q Is the stop in London really much more than a courtesy stop?

DR. KISSINGER: No. It is a working visit. We expect to have about four hours of conversations, and we expect it to be a working visit.

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Q Aside from watching the Cuban coast, have we had any representations to the Soviet Union concerning this or trying to find out what they are up to?

DR. KISSINGER: No. We are watching the situation carefully. And I will say no more about it at this moment. When we have something specific to announce or to say, we will do so. But we are not at this moment doing it. We are keeping it under careful observation.

Q Henry, what did we do in the last two weeks in order to show people where we will carry out our -- we would be able to carry out ---

DR. KISSINGER: What did we do?

Q Yes.

DR. KISSINGER: I think over the last two weeks, both in relation to the hostages and to the general situation, I don't want to list all the measures that were taken, but there has been a rather clear demonstration of what the United States could do and also a demonstration that the United States does not look with indifference at aggression in the area.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how will the Mid East figure in the President's talks with Marshall Tito, and will the President be asking Tito, in any way, to use his influence with Nasser to help solve the Mid East problem?

DR. KISSINGER: It would be difficult to have a conversation with President Tito in light of his wide ranging experience among the non-aligned countries without getting his full views on the situation and of their views and his own views on the Middle East.

We are not going to any of the countries for the purpose of asking them to do anything specific related to the tactical situation that now obtains.

Q Isn't this really an effort to sort of regain our balance after the stalling of the peace initiative and after the Jordanian crisis?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the visit was planned before the peace initiative had, what you called, stalled, and long before there was a Jordanian crisis. Let me say incidentally a word about the so-called stalling of the peace initiative.

Under the best of circumstances, you would have to expect that a conflict that had lasted for so long and engaged feelings so deep, would not be settled in one smooth operation. You would expect that it move from its present situation to an ultimate solution, if it should move in that direction, through a series of deadlocks.

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So, it is safe to predict that there will be
other periods, when the peace initiative is revived,
in which there will be temporary interruptions.

We have to guard against oscillating between
euphoria and depression in this. But the intention of the
trip has nothing to do with reviving the peace initiative.

Q Ron, Dr. Kissinger's remarks about Cuba and
the submarines is for immediate release?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will cover that at the end.

Q Do you expect to see Vice President Ky while
you are in Paris?

DR. KISSINGER: I will probably pay a courtesy
call on Vice President Ky. It hasn't been definitely settled
yet, and I will be guided by the recommendations of Ambassador
Bruce. But I would think that it is very likely.

Q Will you offer him any advice on his travel
plans? (Laughter).

Q It is a serious question. Will you offer him
any advice on his trip to the United States?

DR. KISSINGER: I have been known to offer
advice with little urging. If I should be asked, I would
certainly express my opinion.

Q Which is?

DR. KISSINGER: I never give a checklist,
because maybe my advice isn't taken and I don't want to undermine
my position. (Laughter).

Q Would it be the same as Mr. Agnew's?

Q Doctor, with the possible establishment of
Soviet submarines in Cuba, isn't this a bad time to be taking
a foreign trip?

DR. KISSINGER: Let's be careful about what has been
said. We are watching the events in Cuba. We are not at
this moment in a position to say exactly what they mean. We
will continue to observe them and at the right moment, we
will take the action that seems indicated. We are in excellent
communication. Nothing very rapid and dramatic is likely
to occur, and we are going to be in very close touch with
the situation.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you say that the trip was planned
after the cease fire, but before the cease fire violations
became acute. Could you elaborate on that a little bit, about
what effect the cease fire had on your plans, and what
the early reports, as you seem to indicate, of the violations
have on the plans for the trip?

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DR. KISSINGER: The basic purpose of the trip was, as I have indicated, to consult with the countries that were most concerned about the evolution of the situation in the Mediterranean. This is independent of the particular tactics of one specific initiative. We wanted their view of what a peace in the area would look like. This was what we discussed internally throughout the summer within the Administration.

It happened to coincide with the early period of optimism in the cease fire, but it was really quite independent of that, just as it is, to some extent, not directly related to the later violations.

I would like to call your attention to the point I intended to make, which was that the purpose of this trip has to do more with the long-term position of the United States in the area and the long-term prospects of peace in the Middle East than with the immediate tactics.

Q Has the Soviet Union's performance in the Middle East situation, at the beginning of the case fire violations, caused you to reassess your concept of their long-term strategy there, and also your concept of whatever the timetable might be?

DR. KISSINGER: As I have pointed out, we have made clear in many statements, and above all, in our performance in the SALT talks and in other ways to the Soviet Union, that we are prepared to have the real solutions to the outstanding problems on the basis of full recognition of Soviet interest and concern, and of course, the same for us.

The problem that in a way both countries face in such a situation is that it is always easier to continue to do what you have been doing than to change your basic orientation.

Obviously, what the countries have been doing, what especially the Soviet Union has been doing in most of the post-war period, is to pursue the Cold War. The question is, can these habits be given up, and can the leaders of both sides -- and I recognize that this is a mutual obligation-- can the leaders of both sides recognize that for the sake of a long-term peace they cannot press every seeming opportunity for a tactical advantage?

It is from this point of view that one has to look at some of the developments that have been mentioned here, 'it is why we are watching them with such great care.

It is one thing if there is a misunderstanding. It is another thing if it is part of a general policy line that only adapts to modern conditions the essential philosophy of the Cold War. This is what we have to form a judgment about.

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This would be a great opportunity missed if SALT
and other things were jeopardized by some of the methods that
were more appropriate to the 40's and 50's.

Q Dr. Kissinger, along that line, if U.S.
involvement in foreign affairs has been lagging recently,
and if the Soviets ---

DR. KISSINGER: You don't expect me to admit that.

Q If the Soviets have turned out to be merely
more sophisticated, rather than more friendly, how much
have events of last week, our actions and motions of last
week, and this trip next week, served to balance them?

Just let the premises go. That is all right. We
will understand.

DR. KISSINGER: I was just going to say after what
the Attorney General said about me you wouldn't expect me
to admit the premises. (Laughter).

You can observe the relationship of close trust
and support that exists on the White House staff. At Harvard,
it took me ten years to develop a relationship of total
hostility to my environment. (Laughter). I want you to know
that here I have done it in 18 months. (Laughter).

I would regret, we would all regret it, if you
would look at events on any particular period as if we were
engaged in sort of a game where one month the Soviets
score a few points and then we have got to score a few points
to rectify the balance, and that obliges them a chance
to score a few more points against us.

This is a way of looking at foreign policy. But
if this is the way it is going to be conducted, the outcome
is going to be very serious, because we are both too strong
to defeat the other. We can both score points against the
other. But none of them is going to be decisive.

If a sequence of events of that type starts, the
consequences, sooner or later, are going to be serious. So,
we would like very much to avoid having to look at matters
in this light, and we are not looking at this trip as a means
of scoring particular points, or at the events of the last two
weeks as a way of scoring off the Soviet Union or anyone else.

We thought what was done in the last two weeks was
essential in order to preserve the peace in the Middle East.
Look at what some of the consequences could have been. If
a radical government had taken over through foreign intervention
in Jordan, then the whole evolution in the Middle East would
have been in a more radical direction. The peace initiative
would have been down the drain. The possibility of a new Middle
East war would have been enhanced enormously, and therefore,
the danger of great power involvement would have been enhanced
enormously.

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We believe that our actions in the last two weeks
helped to preserve the peace in the Middle East. That was
our paramount objective. That was in a way saving everybody
there, maybe, from the consequences of their own actions and
therefore, was even in the interest of some of those who
violated some of the understandings. So this was not intended
to score off anyone. This was to contribute to the peace
and we would like to think, unless something unexpected happens,
that it has contributed to that end.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have time for two more questions.
Tom, and then we will take Bob over here.

Q Why was this time chosen for the trip?

DR. KISSINGER: We had chosen a time frame in terms
of available schedules of about three weeks in which it
was possible, between the middle of September and around
October 10, given the fact that many of the leaders
had other travel plans, and why it fell into this particular
week, I really can't tell you. I would like to say
that the brilliant NSC staff saw there was going to be a
Jordanian crisis last week and therefore, we couldn't go.
But that is not the case.

Why it happens in this week, in this particular
three week period, has technical reasons. Why it happened
in this particular three week period is due to the fact
that it seemed to us that when we first planned it, that by
that time, when we still thought that the negotiations might
go a little faster in the Middle East, that we would be
at a point where it was time to take counsel with a lot of
people, and the holidays were over. It was reasons of
this kind that led to the blocking out of, say, the
September 15th to the October 10th period.

Within that, it has essentially technical reasons.
There are essentially technical reasons for picking this time.

Q Will this trip and the previous foreign
trips the President has taken, Dr. Kissinger, sufficiently
prepare the groundwork for a meeting with Premier Kosygin
in New York?

DR. KISSINGER: I have to tell you that the press
seems to be better informed about Premier Kosygin's travel
plans than we are. We are not aware officially that he is
coming to New York. If he were to come to New York, the
question, of course, might then arise. But we are not
aware that he is coming to New York. Therefore, the purpose
is not to prepare for a visit by Premier Kosygin.

Q I wondered whether or not the President's
words on July 1 about a Middle peace settlement, which
asked that Israel withdraw to the defensible border, is the
new formulation of the government replacing Secretary
Rogers' formulation?

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DR. KISSINGER: No, you are not going to get me into that one.

Q May we use the remarks about the Soviet construction in Cuba immediately?

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger was so expansive today we have to break the briefing down. The part on his visit to Paris is for immediate release. His remarks relating to the breaking story today regarding the Caribbean and Cuba are for immediate release.

Q What about Moscow, and the peace force in the Middle East?

MR. ZIEGLER: You can quote just direct quotations on Dr. Kissinger's remarks regarding the Cuban situation, attributed to White House spokesmen.

Q Who would the spokesman be?

MR. ZIEGLER: White House spokesman said, just like you say Administration officials said and use quotes.

Bob, if you would prefer to say White House officials said, that is fine. Let's say White House officials said and then quotes.

Q Can we have that sentence back?

Q How about the Moscow story?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me finish here, please.

We will read what Dr. Kissinger read to you, and then we will have the sections of the transcript relating to the Cuban thing and relating to the trip available for you as soon as possible after you leave here.

Do you want to read that, Dr. Kissinger?

DR. KISSINGER: You mean the quote from President Kennedy?

Q And your comment on it.

DR. KISSINGER: My comment was extemporaneous. We will have it for you within an hour.

MR. ZIEGLER: We will have it in about 20 minutes.

Q How about the Moscow peace force story? The story out of Moscow. Dr. Kissinger commented on it.

MR. ZIEGLER: That also can be for immediate release.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 3:47 P.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
(Dr. Kissinger's Visit to Paris)

ATTRIBUTABLE TO WHITE HOUSE
OFFICIAL, DIRECT QUOTATIONS
ARE PERMITTED

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

3 P.M. EDT

SEPTEMBER 25, 1970

FRIDAY

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you tell us a little bit about your trip to Paris? Does it indicate that you see some hope in the Viet Cong proposal or that there had been some movement that has not met the eye.

I still believe this. As Vietnamization is making progress, we here believe that the chances of negotiation are enhanced. Now that Ambassador Bruce has been there for a month, for more than a month, now that the chief Hanoi negotiator has returned to Paris and attended several sessions, it is time for us to assess the trend, the trend of events.

As you know, the President is expecting to meet with Ambassador Bruce and Ambassador Habib in Ireland. I must caution you not to expect any dramatic announcements from that meeting, because it is intended to be a review of the situation as it exists at that moment in order to help positions which the President may wish to make over the next weeks and months.

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Q Which is?

END

(AT 3:10 P.M. EDT)

ATTRIBUTABLE TO WHITE HOUSE
OFFICIAL, DIRECT QUOTATIONS
PERMITTED

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

(Soviet Presence in Cuba)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

3:20 P.M. EDT

FRIDAY

SEPTEMBER 25, 1970

Q To what extent -- combining that with the missile violations, the general build-up in the Mediterranean by the Soviets and this announcement today that possibly they are building a submarine base in Cuba -- are we fearful generally at this time of Russian military activity increasing around the globe and, if so, is the President's trip at all related to these Russian actions?

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I have stated our general view with respect to it while the activity is now in an early stage.

###

Q Dr. Kissinger, with the possible establishment of Soviet submarine bases in Cuba, isn't this a bad time to be taking a foreign trip?

DR. KISSINGER: Let's be careful about what has been said. We are watching the events in Cuba. We are not at this moment in a position to say exactly what they mean. We will continue to observe them and at the right moment we will take the action that seems indicated. We are in excellent communication. Nothing very rapid and dramatic is likely to occur, and we are going to be in very close touch with the situation.

END

###

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

(U.S.-Soviet Peace Force)

ATTRIBUTED TO WHITE
HOUSE OFFICIAL, DIRECT
QUOTATIONS PERMITTED

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 3:30 P.M. EDT

SEPTEMBER 25, 1970

FRIDAY

Q Henry, on a slightly different subject, the United Press is saying today that informed sources in Moscow were talking about the Soviet-American presence in the Middle East if the United Nations cannot supply -- I don't know how far you want me to go with the story -- if there is no United Nations force that can be brought in to guarantee the borders of the countries in the Middle East.

But they also say that Soviet officials have talked
to American diplomats, and UPI quotes informed sources as
saying this, that if that United Nations proposal doesn't
work, that the scheme we have heard before, Soviet-American
troops, might be a possibility in the Middle East.

I think it is premature to talk now about who
should furnish the units for such a force. The primary
requirement should be that they should be from countries
which give the parties concerned a sense of security,
rather than a sense of insecurity, and that they should be
there in a manner that does not permit a repetition of the
1967 experience that, at the moment, they were most needed,
they evaporated.

I think with these general principles in mind
we would be prepared to engage in a discussion of the concept,
and the composition of the force is really a detail further
down the road and that I shouldn't speculate on it today.

END

(AT 3:32 P.M. EDT)

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

Saratoga
WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 7:10 P.M. LOCAL TIME

SEPTEMBER 29, 1970

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: As most of you know, there was some
difficulty in getting reports to you. What we will do on, I
think, eight pool reports, the last one relating to the
President's remarks this evening -- Henry, I won't walk out
there with your remarks if you won't do it with mine.

What we will do is post all of the pool reports
at the entrance to the press room. I am sure that the
people on the press staff are going to be in that process of
preparing those and posting them for you while Dr. Kissinger
is giving you a little BACKGROUND information. These pool
reports will relate to the President's activities today and
also this evening on his arrival.

As you know, the President has spent the day today
with the Sixth Fleet on board the Saratoga and the Springfield,
where he met with the commanders.

In today's meetings, he again reemphasized to the
commanders the intention to maintain the United States'
posture in the Mediterranean.

I pointed out to you yesterday he had made the
same point to the Italian Government where he reaffirmed the
United States policy to maintain our strength in the
Mediterranean and reaffirmed, of course, our commitment to
the NATO Alliance.

Dr. Kissinger will take your questions on
BACKGROUND. We have many here this evening who do not
attend regular White House briefings so I would like to
state the ground rules to those of you who may be from other
countries.

You can attribute what Dr. Kissinger says to
Administration officials, or White House officials. You
may not quote Dr. Kissinger directly. Therefore, anything
that Dr. Kissinger says in your story you should say
"White House officials feel," "White House officials
believe," or "White House officials said."

With that, we will give you Dr. Kissinger and
he will take your questions.

I should add one thing for those of you who have
not seen the pool report. The President's schedule, as
he said before going into his residence, remains as

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previously announced. The only adjustment in the schedule, as you were told last night, was the fact that the firepower demonstration today with the Sixth Fleet was cancelled at the President's direction. But the rest of the maneuvers, as the poolers no doubt told you, proceeded as scheduled.

Q Does anybody know that Marshal Tito will be there for the whole time that the President will be there?

Q Would you repeat the question?

MR. ZIEGLER: The question is does anyone know that Marshal Tito will be there for the entire visit. I will let Dr. Kissinger discuss that with you and then I will take that question on the record with you if you would like.

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to your question, our understanding is that the Yugoslavs have requested that the schedule go forward just as it was planned. This would make it inevitable that Marshal Tito will be there during the whole visit.

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, we will go directly to your questions.

Q Henry, can you make any projections for any understanding of the new leadership in Egypt at this time?

DR. KISSINGER: May I make this suggestion: Let us have questions related to the trip first and then I will leave some time at the end for questions on other subjects.

Q Is the motorcade going on in Yugoslavia as scheduled?

DR. KISSINGER: Our understanding is that all events in Yugoslavia will go on as scheduled.

Q Did the President at any time consider going to the funeral himself?

DR. KISSINGER: I will repeat the questions. Did the President at any time consider going to the funeral himself?

As you know, we do not have diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic. Or this reason alone it wouldn't have been appropriate for the President to go to the funeral. Therefore, that possibility never was a real one.

Q What did the President discuss in his conference today, with the military commanders on the Springfield?

DR. KISSINGER: What did the President discuss with the military commanders on the Springfield, is that the question?

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Q Yes.

DR. KISSINGER: Right.

Let me say a word about the general objective of the President in the last two days and then fit the Springfield into it.

Many of you have heard me talk about the Nixon Doctrine at perhaps exorbitant length. But one of the problems that we have faced in connection with our foreign policy and with the transition from a period in which the United States carried the almost exclusive responsibility to one in which we are trying to share increasingly our responsibility with others, is the fear of many countries, particularly of many allies, that the United States might withdraw from its responsibilities altogether.

Whenever we have met Europeans over recent months, European leaders over recent months, this has been one of their principal concerns. It turned out to be one of the important concerns of Italian leaders when we saw them yesterday, one of whom pointed out to us that the first visit of the President here in February was very important but the one this week was really quite crucial in reassuring the Europeans, and particularly the countries of the Mediterranean, that the United States was not withdrawing into isolationism, but, rather, remained committed to its alliances.

I mention this because the President has reiterated wherever he has been that the United States did not intend to make any unilateral reductions of its forces; that we considered the problems of the Western Alliance a concern for all the countries.

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What we attempted to do this afternoon was to review with our commanders in the Mediterranean two problems: One, the problems posed for the southern flank of NATO by the developments in the Mediterranean over recent years and partly by the growth of the Soviet naval presence in the Mediterranean, and, secondly, to draw some lessons from the experiences of recent weeks, to review the experiences of recent weeks, and to see about the relationship between our strength in this area and the prospect for stability in this area.

We thought that this was particularly important, because, as I pointed out in the backgrounder I gave before we left, we are not only interested, obviously, in the aspect of how to protect the security of these countries, or help to protect the security, but how we can contribute to a more stable and more permanent peace, a problem which we want particularly to explore in our next stop when we visit Yugoslavia.

So, what we had this afternoon was a full review of the various capabilities in the Mediterranean, both as they affected NATO and as they affected other areas.

Q. Who will be the President's representative at Nasser's funeral and why was he chosen?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is who will be the chief representative of the United States at Nasser's funeral and why was he chosen.

Since the chief representative hasn't been named yet, I find it very difficult to answer why he was chosen. But we are going to have a distinguished group of senior Americans who will represent our desire for improved relations. The list will be announced either later in the evening or the first thing in the morning.

Q. Doctor, it seems at times that the relationship between the Nixon Doctrine as renunciated at Guam was not entirely clear in relationship to the President's statements concerning our role and our future role and our intentions in the Mediterranean.

Specifically, in his opening remarks with President Saragat, I believe he was talking along the lines that we intend to see to it that this will not become the place where future wars will begin. Can you talk about this statement in connection with the Nixon Doctrine?

DR. KISSINGER: This is great for my ego, but it is very dangerous. The question is that the relationship between the Nixon Doctrine and some of the pronouncements on this trip did not seem self-evident to the questioner, particularly the opening remarks to President Saragat where the President said, "We will see to it", or some words to that effect, "that peace in this area will be maintained."

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Let me say two things about it. First, we have
always brought out the fact that there can never be a
neat breakoff point between American foreign policy in
one place and another.

Secondly, it is clear that the Nixon Doctrine has
always envisaged a continuation of some significant
American presence in crucial areas of the world where
that American presence was necessary and was considered to
be in the American interest.

Both of these conditions obtain in the
Mediterranean. The objective of the Nixon Doctrine continues
to be one of the guidelines, or the guideline, of our foreign
policy. We intend to shift an increasing amount of
responsibility to our allies. We intend to cooperate with
them more fully than has been the case in the past, and we
do look to them to make their contribution.

But we also recognize that the threat in the
Mediterranean may have grown larger than anyone assumed
over, say, 10 years ago, and, therefore, we recognize that
some of the measures that are possible in other parts of the
world do not apply with equal force here. But the basic
objectives remain.

Q Can you tell us a little bit more about what
is going to happen tomorrow morning at the NATO meeting
and with the Ambassadors from the various countries, and
whether the agenda will be ---

DR. KISSINGER: I just got some additional
instructions. Excuse me.

Q -- and whether the agenda will be changed ---

DR. KISSINGER: You see, it is below Ron's dignity
to say what he knows. He is using me for that. Yes?

Q -- whether the meeting will be changed at all
because of Nasser's death, and what Nasser's death will
mean to the meeting.

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether I would
give some idea of what we would discuss, particularly at
the meeting of the NATO Ambassadors, and whether the
agenda was changed any as a result of Nasser's death.

As you know, tomorrow there are two meetings, one
with the NATO commanders and the other one with the
Mediterranean Ambassadors. The one with the NATO commanders
is really the counterpart of the meeting that took place
this afternoon on the Springfield.

On the Springfield, we discussed the American
effort in the Mediterranean, both as related to NATO and
as related to efforts with other countries.

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Tomorrow we will discuss those matters that are multilateral in their nature and it will, therefore, be an extension of the meeting this afternoon. This is with the NATO military people.

The Mediterranean Ambassadors' meeting was always intended to be a full review by the President and his Ambassadors of the political evolution in the Mediterranean area. What the prospects for peace are, what the American contribution to this can be, how we can improve relations for long term stability, our prospects for long term stability.

Obviously, we had not planned to discuss, when we drew up that agenda, we obviously had not foreseen a change in leadership in the United Arab Republic.

Equally obviously, it is impossible to discuss the problem I have just mentioned without discussing the judgment of the participants as to the impact of Nasser's death in the countries which they represent, or to which they are accredited, or the impact of Nasser's death on the prospects for peace in their area, relations between the United States and the countries of the Mediterranean.

So, obviously, while this has not been scheduled, while we will not be as fully prepared on that issue, as we hopefully are on other issues, it is unavoidable that that issue will come up, and it will loom large in our discussions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, during the recent events in the Middle East, who did the Sixth Fleet deter and how did it deter them?

DR. KISSINGER: Can I save that one to see if there are any more trip questions? Somebody pointed out it is a good question. I will answer it, but I wanted to see if I could get all trip questions together. I will get to it.

Q I have one trip question.

Earlier, in response to a question about the schedule in Yugoslavia, you said the Yugoslavians requested the schedule go forward as planned. Was that entirely their initiative or did we make some representations?

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DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether my use of the word "requested" indicated that it was all done at the Yugoslavian initiative. I am getting wise to you, gentlemen. You are not going to catch me with one word again.

Naturally, when we learned of Nasser's death, we, through our Ambassador, were in touch with the Yugoslavian Foreign Office and other officials to find out whether this indicated any change in their plans, and to give them an opportunity to express their views.

There have been several contacts during the course of the day. The Yugoslavs indicated that they preferred to stick with the existing schedule. Therefore, since they were the hosts, and since, as I pointed out before we left, we are looking forward very much to the opportunity to exchange ideas with them, we gladly went along with their suggestion.

In many ways, the discussions are now perhaps even more important than they would have been otherwise. But it is not that they requested us to do something that we weren't very happy to do.

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Q When the President talked with Mr. Colombo and Mr. Saragat, was there any reference made to what we might expect from the Italians in the Middle East?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is when the President spoke with Mr. Saragat and Mr. Colombo was there any reference made to what we might expect from the Italians as far as the Middle East is concerned.

It is not the purpose of this Administration to go to allies with a list of requirements that we expect from them for execution. Obviously, Italy is a major Mediterranean country. Obviously, Italy has a profound concern about developments in the Mediterranean. We did exchange ideas about the role both countries can play in our common objective, in establishing peace in the Mediterranean.

We indicated our interest in Italy playing a significant role, and Italy gave us some of their ideas, the Italian leaders gave us some of their ideas, but we did not come with a shopping list of precise requests to be made of the Italian leaders.

Q Do you think that the potential worth of the President's trip has been decreased as a result of the uncertainties from Nasser's death?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether the potential worth of the President's trip has been decreased by the uncertainty produced by President Nasser's death.

No, I don't think so. I think that the problems that made the trip important when it was planned have become even more acute as a result of the events of recent weeks, including the events of Nasser's death. To be sure, Nasser's death changes some of the circumstances with which one will have to deal.

But the problem of how to bring peace to the Mediterranean area, how to prevent the problems of the Mediterranean area from engulfing the world, have become, if anything, more acute.

I can only repeat what I said last week, which is that the events of the last three weeks should have really taught everybody how fragile the present structure is and how accidental events can be that precipitate major crises.

So the underlying problem has become if anything, more emphasized. But I do not want to claim that we foresaw the particular event.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did the President discuss with the Italian leaders a possible understanding between Moscow and Washington about the balance of power in the Mediterranean?

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DR. KISSINGER: The question is did the President
discuss with the Italian leaders a possible understanding
between Moscow and Washington about the balance of power
in the Mediterranean.

No, the President did not discuss the topic in the
way it was put. On the other hand, any reasonable assessment
of the situation must recognize that if there is to be peace
in the Mediterranean, the two big nuclear powers have to exercise
restraint and have to have some understanding about what they
will not do, whether that is a formal written understanding
or a tacit understanding in which they observe certain rules
being less important.

Neither side can attempt to humiliate or impose on
the other one-sided solutions in this area. Therefore,
of course, any basic settlement in the Middle East and in
the Mediterranean must include some kind of an understanding
between the United States and the Soviet Union. But we will
not make bilateral understandings with the Soviet Union
on matters that are of vital concern with our allies without
full consultation with our allies.

Q Dr. Kissinger, it has been previously told that
 Marshal Tito was not our broker in the Middle East. Can
you give us any indication of what Nasser's death will have
on the discussions with Tito?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is since we have said that
 Marshal Tito is not our broker in the Middle East, what effect
will President Nasser's death have on the discussions with
President Tito.

As I pointed out to some of you in Washington, we have
to distinguish the day-to-day events, even events of very
great significance, from the underlying problems.

President Tito has thought a great deal and he has had
some considerable experience with the problem of relations of
the Arab world to other parts of the world, including both
the West and to the Communist countries. I believe that his
judgment, we all believe that his judgment, on these matters is of
very great importance.

Again, the circumstances to which it has to be applied
have changed in recent days, but the problem is still extremely
acute and, as you pointed out yourself, the circumstances are
even somewhat more uncertain because no one knows exactly
what will crystallize for the leadership in Egypt. But we
respect his judgment.

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In addition, Marshal Tito has carried out a policy of nonalignment in recent years, and we are going there in order to make clear and going there will certainly contribute to making clear, that one doesn't have to be an enemy of any country in order to be a friend of the United States which again can be a model of a possible evolution in the Middle East as well as other parts of the world.

Now I will venture an answer on whom we deterred in the Middle East and how.

As you know, the difficulty with deterrence is that it is proved negatively. It is proved by things which do not happen.

Those of you who are logicians will know that it is never possible to prove why something has not happened. Did it not happen because of what you did or because the other side never had any intention of doing what you are trying to prevent in the first place.

So to some extent any speculation of what you deterred has to be conjecture. I say this to qualify my answer.

Our problem in this recent crisis, was, on the one hand, to set a limit to the turmoil but, on the other hand, to do it in such a way that our own actions did not accelerate the process of disintegration, and that meant we had a fine line on which we could operate.

On the one hand we did not want to give the impression, which would have been untrue, that we were pretty determined to intervene which would have united many countries against us and which might have precipitated a Soviet action.

On the other hand, we did not want to give an impression of such total aloofness that some of the countries whose security is directly at stake in Jordan might have in despair undertaken a preventive action and thereby triggered another Middle Eastern war.

This was the line we tried to pursue.

Finally, we had to convince the Soviets that they had a stake in restraining their clients and an even greater stake in preventing a unilateral intervention.

Our moves were calculated to try to bring this about. We tried to demonstrate if things got beyond a certain point, if the disintegration of Jordan reached the acute point where American lives were at stake, we did have the capacity at least to protect American lives.

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Secondly, if the Soviets, with their presence
in the Middle East would intervene we had some capacity of
affecting and influencing their decision, and to convince
the Israelis that they did not have to risk everything
on one throw of the dice early in the game.

On the other hand, we wanted to make clear
that our primary concern was the intervention of outside
forces and not to get ourselves involved in the civil war
in Jordan with American ground or, indeed, with American
military forces.

This is why we moved to demonstrate a capacity
to intervene without actually staking ourselves on the
ground and why we tried to maintain this delicate balance
between the various contenders in the area.

One of the objectives this afternoon was to review,
in part in answer to your question.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, do you feel that a claim by any
high or responsible spokesman for the United States of
major or sole responsibility for bringing the recent
Middle Eastern crisis to the end for the time being, is
a helpful contribution?

Do you feel that any claim by a responsible spokesman
for the United States of sole or even major American responsi-
bility for bringing the Middle Eastern crisis to at
least a temporary halt ---

DR. KISSINGER: The question is whether I share
the view of a major spokesman, a responsible spokesman,
of the Administration?

Q No. Do you feel that it is a helpful contri-
bution to the understanding with the Soviet Union that
you were speaking about a while ago?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not absolutely sure that I know what you are getting at, but I would say that the United States made a significant contribution in bringing the recent crisis to a conclusion. I would also like to say that it is going to be part of our policy to try to prevent such crises from arising. We are not drawing the conclusion from this that we can repeat this effort every three weeks and base our foreign policy on the sort of measures that necessity imposed upon us.

We would like to justify our foreign policy by our
ability to prevent such crises, rather than by our ability
to manage them. But once that particular crisis was upon us,
I believe we did make a significant contribution in limiting
its extent, in preventing the outbreak of a Middle East war,
and in reducing the chances of a larger war. This we do believe.

Q What is the outlook for renewing diplomatic
relations with Egypt?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is what is the outlook
for renewing diplomatic relations with Egypt.

First, you have to remember that Egypt broke
diplomatic relations with us in 1967. We did not break diplo-
matic relations with it. As the President pointed out this
afternoon, or it may not have caught up with you yet, but
he spoke briefly when he arrived here with some reporters, he
pointed out that we would like to be on better terms with
the Arab nations, including, of course, the most populous,
which is to say Egypt and we have no objection in
principle. We are not the obstacle to diplomatic
relations and we are prepared to improve our relationships
with Egypt.

MR. ZIEGLER: We will take one more question.

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Q Would you analyze, so far as the United States
understands it, what the political situation now in Egypt
is and who may succeed, what forces are contending for the
leadership?

DR. KISSINGER: The death of Nasser was, I must say,
quite unexpected. Of course, when a leader has been
in office for this long and has dominated the political life
of his country so completely as President Nasser has, it is
very difficult to predict who will emerge as an alternative or as
a successor.

I think it is best if we do not engage in excessive
speculation about this problem. This will not become really
acute until after the funeral.

In any event, at this point, I wouldn't have anything
very useful to say on this subject, except that I think many
Egyptians will have the same perplexity that I have just
expressed.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

7:45 P.M. Local Time