# THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN KENYA*

by

Carl G. Rosberg, Jr.
African Research and Studies Program
Boston University

September, 1956

The Colony and Protectorate of Kenya(1) in the post-war period has been the scene of political and social ferment of which the Mau Mau rebellion was only one and the best advertised manifestation. The Mau Mau rebellion failed, but the larger process of social change is still taking place. It is natural to ask oneself what the outcome of this process is likely to be and what type of political system may eventually emerge; but if we are to catch even a small glimpse of the political future of Kenya, an analysis of the current of power relationships becomes essential.

Almost every explanation of Kenya's political problems advanced so far has been based on two key propositions: first, that the small and fairly homogeneous European population numbering about 46,500, together with the heterogenous Asian and

* The author wishes to acknowledge his appreciation to the Ford Foundation for a research grant which enabled him to study political problems in Kenya during the year 1954-1955. The opinions and conclusions are those of the author and are not necessarily those of the Ford Foundation.

1. On July 23, 1920, with the publication of the Kenya (Annexation) Order in Council, 1920, the territories formerly included in the East Africa Protectorate were annexed to the British Crown and became the Colony of Kenya, with the exception of a ten mile strip of coastline which remained part of the Dominion of His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar. The latter territory was called the Protectorate of Kenya. For all practical purposes the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya are governed as one.

- 2 -

African sectors, accounting for approximately 136,600 and 5,729,000 persons respectively, (2) form one common social system; and secondly, either explicitly or implicitly, that this system may be roughly described as a pyramid in which the dominant Europeans are to be found near the apex, the Asian in the middle with some Africans present, and the large mass of the Africans forming the broad base. An analytical scheme of this sort emphasizes the relation between economic function and race, and the result is a tendency to explain political conflicts as manifestations of a class struggle. However useful such a scheme may be in showing the relation between political tension and racial discrimination, it tends to relegate to a secondary position, and thus to obscure, the fundamental struggle for political power which has always been going on in Kenya.

In analyzing the various forces reflected in the struggle for political control of Kenya, it must always be kept in mind that the balance of power and authority still rests with Great Britain. For in the last resort it is the metropolitan government which can provide the armed forces to put down rebellions and maintain security, as in the case of the Mau Mau outbreak. It is the metropolitan government that can make available most of the enormous public capital required for economic development.

2. It should be noted that the term "Asian" is generally synonymous with Indians in Kenya, whether they be Muslims or non-Muslims. Arabs are also one of the racial or ethnic components of the population, but they have played no really effective role in power relationships. The population figures quoted in the text are the de facto civil population estimates for 1954, East Africa High Commission, *Quarterly Economic and Statistical Bulletin* No. 27 (March, 1955). The Arab population is approximately 30,000 and the overwhelming majority live on the coast.

- 3 -

But here we are fundamentally concerned with the power relation-
ships between the three main racial groups within Kenya around
which British policy has evolved. "Power" in this context
should be understood as that complex of influences that is
exercised both formally and informally in Kenya, and informally
in the United Kingdom. A racial group may exercise power by
sharing in the formal processes of government; but it may also
wield effective control over other groups by extra-constitutional
means, i.e. through activities which take place outside the
formal processes of government. Both qualitatively and quantita-
tively there are gross disparities between Europeans, Africans
and Asians in the command of these influences which are the pro-
perties of political power in Kenya.

The Colony and Protectorate of Kenya gained representative
government in 1948, when a system of an unofficial majority was
introduced in the Legislative Council. Nevertheless, the method
of communal representation formalized in the Constitution of 1927
continued to be the mode of representation for the racial components
of the population. Europeans, Asians and Arabs each had their
own separate electoral rolls, while African representatives were
nominated by the governor. Parity of representation existed in
the Council between Europeans and non-Europeans. In 1952, after
a long controversy regarding Government proposals to increase
African and Asian representation, European parity was maintained
by increasing their membership in the Legislative Council from 11
to 14, that of the Africans from 4 to 6, and that of the Asians
from 5 to 6 representatives, with two of the Asian seats reserved

- 4 -

for Muslims. Arab representation remained at two. Official representation was increased to reduce the disparity between the Government's position and the unofficial majority. (3) The present Lyttleton Constitution, introduced in 1954, altered the formal political structure of Kenya by the introduction of a Council of Ministers as the principal instrument of government, even though final authority and responsibility within the territory still rests with the Governor, who in turn is responsible to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Council of Ministers consists of fourteen members, six of them unofficial. The latter are drawn from the membership of the Legislative Council. Three are elected Europeans, two are elected Asians and one is a nominated African representative. (4) The establishment of a Council of Ministers has resulted in an awkward situation for its unofficial members, who are supposed to act as spokesmen

3. Royal Instructions 29 March, 1934; amended by Additional Instructions 20 June 1935, 26 May 1938, 4 January 1939, 27 April 1948, November 1951.

4. *Proposals by the Secretary of State for the Colonies for a Reconstruction of the Government of Kenya, March 9, 1954.* Provision was also made for not more than five and not less than three Under Secretaries, of whom one would be an Arab and two would be Africans. The Constitution was to be regarded as experimental until the next General Election (September, 1956). If at this election the electorate (European and Asian) return members who are willing to serve as Members of the Government, there will be no further change in the proportions of members of the Legislative Council or the Council of Ministers, either as between the main racial groups or as between Officials and Unofficials, before 1960. The British Government also agreed not to initiate any changes in the communal basis of the franchise until 1960. But, if this Constitution proves unworkable, i.e. if members are elected who refuse to accept posts in Government, the Imperial power may revert to the Constitution of 1952 and take other constitutional action that may be necessary.

- 5 -

for the sections of the population which they represent. For
while they may oppose a particular bill at meetings of the Council
of Ministers, they must officially side with any decisions taken
by this body on the floor of the Legislative Council.

Local government institutions of Kenya have also reflected
the racial composition of the population and the differential in
the exercise of formal and informal influence by the various
racial groups. In the Municipal Council of Nairobi and in the
governing bodies of some urban areas the racial factor has been
most significant. African district councils - in the main
reflecting African rural life - vary with regard to power and are
not always meaningful institutions. In European settled areas,
county councils based broadly on England local government practice
are being developed. These are overwhelmingly European bodies
and appear reluctant to accept any influential non-European
participation. Local government bodies, however, have been of
secondary importance in the struggle for power in Kenya, for the
locus of power and authority is in the central government.

## The Dominant Role of the European

Within Kenya the group that wields the greatest power is
that of the European colonists, despite the fact that they are
outnumbered by approximately 170 to 1. (5) Their political power

5. British Colonial Civil Servants are included in the demographic estimates of the European population. Since some of these Civil Servants retire in Kenya and some of the local European population are now members of the Civil Service, no clear delineation can be made between the permanent and non-permanent sectors of the European population. It is crudely estimated, however, that the permanent European sector is about 35,000.

- 6 -

is derived chiefly from their economic superiority over Asians and Africans and from their close cultural links with Great Britain. These two considerations - economic power and English cultural ties - account in large measure for the dominant position of the white settlers.

The economic superiority of the European settler is due fundamentally to the greater technical skill and education with which he is endowed, as well as to the sizeable capital at his disposal. Technical skill means that, unlike the Asian or the African, the European settler is able to organize production in accordance with modern scientific methods. The large amount of capital at his disposal means that he is able to achieve economies of scale, as, for example, through the formation of huge co-operative societies which serve to market Kenya's products in foreign countries and obtain supplies from abroad. In short, technical skill and capital are the factors which make the European economically far more efficient and productive than either the Asian or the African.

These assets have enabled the European to enjoy on the whole a much higher standard of living than the other two groups. Incomes and wages reflect this significant differential between races. The average white wage is about double that of the Indian, and several times higher than that of the African. What is more important to us here, however, is that these assets have also enabled the European to achieve a position of dominance in the internal affairs of Kenya. The center of Kenya's agricultural development has been in upland country, an area in which ninety

- 7 -

per cent of the population lives, and the European has succeeded
in reserving about one-third of this valuable agricultural land
exclusively for his ownership and use. In addition, the European
controls the largest proportion of commerce, mining and industry.

The European has thus achieved a position of economic prepon-
derance which he wishes to maintain at all costs. The color bar
which is so striking a feature of Kenya's social structure serves
this purpose. The color bar has been used to prevent African
settlement in the White Highlands and to restrict African produc-
tion of certain cash crops until recent years. It has been
employed to restrict Asian competition in all major spheres of
economic activity and, with the same end in view, in the higher
grades of the Civil Service.

The cultural heritage of the European has given him a distinct
advantage in the pursuit of power within Kenya's formal
structure of authority, based as it is on British traditions,
values and techniques. The ability to organize political action
which is effective in the constitutional structure, easy access to
and influence over positions of authority both locally and in Great
Britain, the facilities to publicize and communicate the settlers'
point of view, the appeal to "kith and kin" in the Mother Country
and an intimate knowledge of the rules of the political system,
have all contributed immensely to the achievement of European power.

Considering themselves as the political and social elite, and
as the heirs presumptive to authority in Kenya, it has been European
aggressiveness and their attempts to control all situations that

- 8 -

has marked the history of racial politics of the territory. (6)

Precedents and myths, in part rooted in political victories, have fostered a European belief that complete political control as an ultimate goal was feasible. As an educated elite group reared in British political tradition, they have considered it their "natural right" to demand the transplanting of institutions of responsible parliamentary government. Without regard to the ethnic and cultural features of Kenya and pressures for a more sensitized consideration of African rights, they have pointed to the political development of the white dominions and to the granting of self-government to Southern Rhodesia in 1923 in support of their claims.

The constitutional and political development of Kenya, from a protectorate to the present multi-racial government, is largely a result of European drive for power which in the pre-war period strove to enlarge its influence and since then has been seeking to consolidate its position. In this struggle the European has achieved some outstanding successes. He has succeeded in institutionalizing his role of political dominance in the representative system through the adoption of communal representation in 1923.

6. British Policy in Kenya Colony (New York, 1937), by Marjorie Ruth Dilley, is a comprehensive and well documented study covering the period 1900 to 1935. See Elspeth Huxley, *White Man's Country*, 2 Vols., (London, 1935), for a study of white settlement from the viewpoint of the white colonists. See also W.K. Hancock, *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, Vol.1, pp.209-237, for a study of the Indian question. Compare M.F. Hill, *The Dual Policy in Kenya* (Nairobi, 1944); S. and K. Aaronovith, *Crisis in Kenya* (London, 1947), an analysis of the Kenya situation from a left wing point of view; W. McGregor Ross, *Kenya From Within - A Short Political History* (London, 1927) and Norman M. Keys, *Kenya* (London, 1924) are both critical of white colonists and Government policy. See also Huxley and Perham, *Race and Politics* (London, 1956), a controversy between the authors on various aspects of the Kenya situation.

- 9 -

His formal influence within the parliamentary system has been
expanded and secured to date from non-European encroachment. In
addition to the three European elected members in the present
Council of Ministers, there have been since 1946 one or more
European settlers as nominated officials holding executive govern-
ment portfolios. Many other illustrations could be given, such
as the reservation of the White Highlands. Lord Hailey has
written that in certain periods, European settler "interests have
exercised an influence on policy hardly less than that which they
might have attained under a fully developed form of responsible
government." (7)

Nevertheless, fulfilment of the European's ambitions has
been thwarted by a combination of factors beyond his control.
Among these factors have been the ability of Asians in the early
days of white settlement to appeal to the Imperial power as
citizens of the British Empire; in more recent years, rising
African dissent and their rejection of presumptive control; and
finally, the increasing reluctance of the Imperial power to relin-
quish its moral trusteeship, responsibility and authority. The
last mentioned factor is particularly significant. It shows that
no clearly defined community of interests has existed between
the Imperial power and the European settler group.

7. Lord Hailey, *An African Survey* (London, 1938), p.383. See also *Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa* (Cmd. 3234) (1929), p.89.

- 10 -

The Weak Power Position of the Asian

Asian political power has been declining in the post-war period in relation to that of the European and the African. The system of communal representation has critically limited the Asian's influence in the decision-making process of central and local government. Asian membership in councils of government has never been more than half that of the European settler, and is now hardly larger than that of the African. The two ministerial posts assigned to Asians in the Council of Ministers do not cover significant fields, all the important posts having been assigned to Europeans. Abolition of the India Office has deprived the Asian of a valuable ally for any attempt to influence the British Government. Any appeals to the India of today would only confirm European and perhaps African anxiety over their divided territorial loyalties. What informal influence the Asian exerts in challenging European dominance has been essentially based on the doctrine of equal political and social opportunity for all. Refusing to acquiesce to a subordinate status, Asians have employed techniques of political boycott, and in the post-war years have attempted to achieve African political alliances. Neither of these approaches have proven fruitful.

At a minimum, Asians seek to retain their formal influence within the parliamentary system in relation to other races. Aside from a potential displacement of their formal influence by emerging African power, limited social solidarity has acted to restrict their political role. Opposition to European dominance and the implications of its racial theory provokes some lingering solidarity,

- 11 -

but racial isolation and the social and religious conflicts that
this isolation helps to promote have reduced the possibility of
substantial and sustained political action. There are intense
economic frictions and clashes, but social classes are only
meaningful within a religious framework. Religion, then is pre-
dominant as a basis for organization, and the various political
associations demonstrate its dynamics. Diverseness associated
with these disparate religious affiliations in large measure
accounts for Asian inability to exert a united political front in
opposition to European power, although such has been the aim of
many Asian leaders, including those of the Kenya Indian Congress
and its predecessor, which have striven to maximize Asian political
strength. However, the Asian's marginal social position in a
white dominated Kenya has resulted in the availability of few
positions of prestige. Competition among Asian leaders has thus
been keen, and the non-Hindu religious minorities have used their
religious groups in support of their political aspirations. Both
the Sikhs and Muslims have sought separate representation in the
Colony's parliamentary system, and the Muslims succeeded in 1952. (8)
It may thus be appreciated that European racial policies have for
the most part fostered more dissension amongst the Asians than
unity. The European settler has not hesitated to exploit these
divisions further by favoring Muslim minorities against the Hindu
majority.

8. "The Report of the Committee on Indian Electoral Represen-
tation," *Colony and Protectorate of Kenya, Legislative Council
Debates*, 13, 14, 18 December 1951, col. 1024-1028, 1075-1094.

- 12 -

Changing Political Role of the African

Although the Imperial power declared African interests to
be paramount in 1923, (9) this declaration did not affect the power
structure of Kenya. Indeed, in retrospect this declaration appears
to be more in the nature of a moral principle of trusteeship than a
basis for practical politics. A goal of racial partnership in the
parliamentary system has now replaced the earlier doctrine. Not
until the post-war period was the African able to affect power
relationships, and even today he is able to do so more by virtue
of his potential than his actual strength. Until 1944, he had no
direct participation in the central government's legislative or
executive institutions. His political participation was limited
to African district councils, which served as local agencies of
the central government though with restricted powers. Through
incipient political and social associations he achieved a degree
of informal influence by making known his needs and disabilities
to those British civil servants, missionaries and elements in
England who recognized the African's lack of power to protect his
own interests. However, at that time it was European power in
the first place, and Asian demands for equality of status in the
second, that constituted the main factors which the metropolitan
government had to consider in the conduct of government in Kenya.

The post-war period has witnessed both legal and non-legal
African political action to gain substantial formal influence in
the parliamentary system. Demands have been made for direct

9. Indians in Kenya: Memorandum (Cmd. 1922) (1923).

- 13 -

representation in municipal councils, for an increase of powers
for district councils and for the direct election of African
representatives to the Legislative Council. Before being pro-
scribed in April, 1953, the Kenya African Union was demanding
African parity of unofficial representation in the Legislative
Council and a common electoral roll for all races. (10) These
demands have only been fulfilled in part. The present six African
representatives in the Legislative Council are nominated by the
governor after informal district council elections. Although
they have been allowed latitude in their criticism of Government,
their formal influence over the exercise of public policy has
been minor. One of their number is a member of the Council of
Ministers and holds the portfolio of community development -
essentially an African matter. Proposals are being considered
to increase African participation in both legislative and executive
institutions, but any increase will be offset by the maintenance
of European parity. (11) The Lyttleton constitutional agreement
of 1954 morally binds the metropolitan government until 1960 not
to alter the constitution without the consent of all races. It
made provision, however, for an eventual African franchise. This
was acted upon and in March 1957, by means of a qualified multi-

10. "Kenya African Union Statement, 27 October 1952," reproduced in *Opportunity in Kenya*, Fabian Publications Ltd., Research Series No. 162, Appendix I. See *The Times*, 5 March 1951. See also Letter to Editor, *The Times*, 11 June 1952, by Mr. Mbiju Koinange, Delegate in Great Britain of the Kenya African Union.

11. A recent proposal by a group of European Elected Members of the Legislative Council suggests the increase of five European members, two Africans, two Asians and one Arab.

- 14 -

vote scheme enfranchising an estimated 50 per cent of the adult
non-Kikuyu African population, direct African elections for their
legislative representatives will occur. Only Kikuyu of sworn
loyalty will be eligible for the vote. (12) This electoral roll
is the outstanding African political achievement of the post-war
period. It will provide a constitutional vehicle for political
education and action, and will give meaning and sanction to the
views of African representatives. By further racially compart-
mentalizing political action in Kenya it will no doubt add
greater racial rigidity to political behavior, and will thus more
sharply define the struggle for power.

The weakness of the African is reflected not only in his
limited share in the formal processes of government, but also in
the small informal influence which he exerts in the social order.
Lacking technical skill, education and capital, African involvement
in the market economy is at a subordinate level. The poverty of
the reserves, together with the low African wage scale, further
contribute to his economic insecurity and act to limit mobility to
only a few. (13) Socially, he has only a peripheral position in
a social order whose norms, standards and values are European.
Social interaction is essentially limited to economic and cere-
monial necessities. Since he is not assimilated into European

12. *East Africa and Rhodesia, Vol. 32, No. 1631* (January 12, 1956); *No. 1632* (January 19, 1956). This limited qualitative franchise based on education, experience, public service and character provides than an elector may earn up to three votes.

13. See the *East Africa Royal Commission 1953-1955 Report* (Cmd. 9475) (1955) for a study of the problems of African economic and social development.

- 15 -

society, he does not have access to roles and positions of
informal influence. Racial restrictions further limit his
access to positions of prestige and wealth. Nevertheless, he
must compete for power in a political system which is alien to his
cultural background, with an inadequate command of the techniques
and facilities of that system. This weak power position is
further conditioned by an insufficient development of social and
political solidarity among Africans.

Despite these weaknesses, incipient African nationalism is
a potential source of African power and the greatest threat to
European dominance. To date its development has been inhibited
by the fact that there was only a small number of educated men
and few of these sought to function as a national elite. Though
African leadership strove for inter-tribal representation in the
political movements and influences in all areas, this leadership
was unable to overcome its essentially tribal identification.
Such political organizations as developed were primarily Kikuyu
in orientation and appeal; the slogans, symbols and values
selected for use and emphasis derived essentially from Kikuyu
values and hence had little effectiveness in the non-Kikuyu areas.
Historically, the impact of Western civilization on African life in
Kenya was greater and had more profound effect among the Kikuyu
than among the other tribes. (14) Quite naturally, therefore, most

14. See Margery Perham, "The Struggle Against Mau Mau," *The Times*, 23 April 1953; "The Kikuyu suffered most because their region pivoted upon Nairobi and was almost surrounded by European settlement while they became the purveyors of labour." Compare Negley Farson, *Last Chance in Africa* (London, 1951), pp. 107-112, for a report of the Kiambu reserve; Patrick Monkhouse, "The Mau Mau in Kenya," *The Manchester Guardian*, 12 November 1952, 17 November 1952, 18 November 1952, 20 November 1952, 24 November 1952. See also L.S.B. Leakey, *Mau Mau and the Kikuyu* (London, 1953), pp. 57-86, for the impact of European penetration.

- 16 -

of the political leaders in Kenya have been Kikuyu. Such leaders,
however, could neither penetrate easily nor work effectively
within the cultural setting of other Kenya tribes. Moreover,
since there were few political leaders from other tribal groups,
the facilities for linkages of a trans-tribal character among
leaders were practically non-existent. Furthermore, such move-
ments as developed were essentially negativistic in character,
without benefit of a positive drive for an African political
society or nation state. Debarred from meaningful participation
in the European dominated political order and given their political
immaturity, these movements tended to be secretive, conspiratorial
and insurrectionary in character.

The New Context of the Power Struggle

In this analysis emphasis has been put upon the conditions
which have inhibited the development of African political power.
In concluding, attention must be directed to some of the factors
and trends now prevailing or emerging in Kenya which may reshape
power relationships.

Of primary significance has been the strengthening of a
tendency endemic in Kenya's history towards the formation of a
trans-tribal elite. Important in this respect has been the emer-
gence of an educated elite among the Luo tribe, second in population
after the Kikuyu. (15) Today they hold positions of leadership in

15. The Kikuyu population numbered 1,026,341 in a tribal analysis completed in 1950, while the Luo numbered 757,043. Together Kikuyu and Luo constitute 34.9% of the African population of Kenya. Colonial Office, *Report on the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya for the Year 1954* (London, 1955), p.11.

- 17 -

the trade union movement and in the recently formed Nairobi
District African Congress. This leadership has been conscious
of the necessity for trans-tribal political cooperation and has
viewed African social and political development territorially and
not in a particular tribal structure. Government policy does
not permit the formation of territorial African political movements
at the moment, but the granting of the franchise to the African
will provide a basis and a constitutional framework for the
political mobilization of the African. By restricting the African
to a separate electoral roll it will tend to encourage political
thought and action along racial lines. It will therefore fail to
correct the fact that the whole of African political development
has been restricted to its own affairs and not to those matters
of territorial concern. Moreover, this franchise will provide
leaders with opportunities to use the African's demographic
strength as a political tool in the achievement of power.

While it would be premature to state that there now exists
more than an incipient, amorphous, political consciousness among
the African mass, it can be asserted that a trans-tribal elite is
in process of forming. Moreover, the acceleration of factors of
social change represented by economic development, educational
expansion, increased spatial mobility of the African population,
together with further weakening of African traditional societies
and sanctions, will release increasing numbers of individuals who
are more susceptible to mass mobilization by this emerging elite.
There appear to be at least two alternatives for fulfilling the
aspirations and ambitions of this elite. The first relates to
the willingness of the European group to allow the elite to attain

- 18 -

positions of prestige and substantially to share the formal
influences of the parliamentary system. The second alternative
is that of mobilizing the African mass with the end in view of
displacing the European from his present position of power. This
process might well be facilitated through the skillful exploitation
of existing social and economic inequalities. Furthermore, the
African elite could conceivably strengthen its position through
appeal to the ideology and principles of democratic government.

If the European accepts the first alternative of penetration
by the African elite into the power structure, there is a slight
possibility that he may succeed in detaching the African elite
from a potential nationalist movement. A form of inter-racial
oligarchy would have at least short term possibilities. But the
European will no doubt recognize that this may be but the first
step in a further expansion of African power. Clearly, neither
of these alternatives are attractive to the European settler,
who is disposed to resist African demands for a substantial share
in the formal influences of the parliamentary system. Under
these circumstances the African elite will be driven to exploit
the possibilities of African nationalism. It is significant that
while European leadership is now politically divided in Kenya,
this division does not center around basic goals or objectives,
but relates to tactics and means for securing European power.

Since the logic of the situation seems to compell a more
hardened European political response towards African political
aspirations, and while coincidentally the African elite is driven
to mobilize the African mass to advance his own political interests,

- 19 -

extremist ideologies are likely to gain wider appeal in the
future. Because of its weakness, the Asian group is unable to
play the role of a third force or balancing factor. It is,
therefore, quite likely that the future will see an increasing
polarization in the power struggle within Kenya. This is a
possibility which bodes ill for the development of a stable political
community, since in such a political atmosphere a liberal, moderate,
middle of the road point of view will find few supporters. The
problem facing the British Government is to find institutional
devices which will arrest the trends towards extremism and channel
the struggle for power and the conflict of interests into avenues
of peaceful change.