The enclosed report on Eastern Europe follows approximately the pattern suggested by the mimeographed guidance outline. The first part is a factual resume of some of the major political, social and economic aspects of the situation. It is designed to provide the basic background information and some few historical highlights of the countries concerned. Thirteen comparative tables are appended to it. This part is purely informational and is presented in the form of an abstract.

The analytical part of the report is divided into three sections: the first deals with the contemporary dynamics of the general situation in Eastern Europe, especially as it pertains to the international situation; the second is a critical evaluation of American policies with respect to the area; the third offers some general policy recommendations. As requested, the main emphasis is put on the first two. No country by country survey is attempted as the stress of the report is on broad trends and general implications. The author reserves the right to such use of this material as he sees fit.

Z. K. Brzezinski

# I. BASIC FACTS

## Albania

Population: 1,400,000 (1957).
Area: 10,629 square miles (approximately the size of Vermont).
Communist Party Membership: 43,000 (1954).
Capital: Tirana - 60,000.
Approximately 40,000 native-born in the U.S. (1950 census).

## Political Outline.

Albania was traditionally ruled by beys. It became a republic in 1925 under the Orthodox Bishop Fan Noli. The latter was overthrown in 1927. In 1928 Zog I proclaimed king. Albania remained a monarchy until 1946. Italian influence grew steadily from 1926, initially by means of loans. Italian invasion takes place April 7, 1939. Albania severs relations with the United States in June, 1939. Since that date it has not been recognized by the United States. Albanian World War II deaths amounted to 28,000.

Between 1925 and 1939 there existed no political parties in Albania. The Albanian Communist Party was founded November 8, 1941, its name being subsequently changed to Albanian Workers Party. It is the only party recognized by the 1950 Constitution. Albania was formally proclaimed a people's republic on January 11, 1946. Haxhi Lleshi is President of the Presidium of the People's Assembly; Enver Hoxha is First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Albanian Workers Party.

Albania's ground forces amounted to 45,000 men in 1954. No known Soviet troops are present. Albania's traditional territorial ambitions are Kosovo (Yugoslavia) and Chameria (Greece).

Bulgaria

Population: 7,629,254 (1957).

Area: 42,796 square miles (approximately the size of Ohio).

Communist Party Membership: approximately 400,000.

Capital: Sofia - 500,000.

Approximately 10,900 native-born in the U.S. (1950 census).

## Political Outline.

Monarchy under Boris III from 1918-1943; under Simeon II, 1943-1946. Alexander Stamboliiski, a populist, premier 1919-1923. After Stamboliiski's assassination, Aleksandur Tsankov rules until 1934. He is overthrown May 19, 1934, by a military revolution under Velchev and Boris III becomes undisputed ruler. The powerful anar-chist organization IMRO (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organiza-tion) with its seat in Bulgaria, is liquidated.

During World War II Bulgaria joined the Three-Power Pact, March 1, 1941, and the Anti-Comintern Pact, November 25, 1941. Bulgaria declares war on the United States on December 15, 1941, the latter reciprocating June 5, 1942. USSR declares war September 5, 1944, on eve of expected Bulgarian capitulation to the West. Bul-garia's World War II deaths amounted to 30,000. The armistice was signed October 28, 1944.

The Bulgarian Communist Party was formed in March, 1919, as the Bulgarian Workers Party. It was banned in 1924. In 1927 it reorganized, assuming the title Independent Workers Party. In 1939 all parties were banned, yet the Communist party stayed on as an underground organization. On September 9, 1944, the Party became dominant, changing its name to Bulgarian Communist Party in 1948. The Independents and the Agrarians are the only other parties per-mitted by the present regime.

Bulgaria became a "People's Democracy" following the October 27, 1946, elections and the promulgation of the Constitution on December 4, 1947. It entered into formal alliance with the USSR on March 18, 1948. Recognized by the United States October 1, 1947. After the suspension of diplomatic relations in 1950, they were resumed in 1959.

Georgi Damyanov is President of the Presidium of the National Assembly; Vulko Chervenkov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party.

Bulgaria's ground forces amounted to 250,000 men in 1944. Soviet troops departed on December 14, 1947. Traditional territorial ambitions are an outlet to the Aegean, incorporation of parts of Macedonia, belonging to Yugoslavia and Greece, as well as the southern Dobruja.

## Economic Outline.

Nationalization of banks and Italian owned enterprises began December 15, 1944. All industry was nationalized by the end of 1946.

A land reform bill was passed March 12, 1946, making the maximum allotment 50 acres (75 acres in the Dobruja). Collectivization began in December 1948.

## Social Outline.

**Ethnic Origin:** Mongol-Slav

**Religion:**
* Bulgarian Orthodox 90%
* Moslem 7%
* Roman Catholic, Protestant 3%

There exist no diplomatic relations with the United States. The SED (Socialist Unity Party), combining the Communist and the Socialist parties, was formed April 21 and 22, 1946. The German Communist party was formed December 30, 1918. Besides the dominating SED, other parties now in existence are the Christian Democrats, the Liberal Democrats, National Democrats, and the Democratic Farmers.

Wilhelm Pieck is President of the Republic; Otto Grotewohl is Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Walter Ulbricht is First Secretary of the Central Committee of the SED. The GDR has ground forces amounting to about 125,000-150,000 men.

## Economic Outline.

15 per cent of the East German population is engaged in agriculture.

Nationalization was undertaken under statutes of February 1947 and August 1948.

Land Reform legislation was passed in September 1945 under the slogan "Junker land in Peasant Hand", allowing maximum holdings of 250 acres.

The collectivization drive began in the middle of 1952. It was halted after the uprising in June 1953. Subsequently it was resumed at a slower rate. The principle of voluntarism is still adhered to.

## Social Outline.

**Ethnic Origin:** Celtic, Germanic, Roman, Norse, Slavic.

**Religion:**
* Protestant 80%
* Roman Catholic 15%

[LC]

9

**Minorities:** Serbs - 70,000.

**Education:** The educational system was sovietized July 27, 1945. The following are figures for 1957:

<table><thead><tr><td></td><td>Number of Schools</td><td>Number of Students</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Primary</td><td>8,332</td><td>1,613,167</td></tr><tr><td>Secondary</td><td>1,150</td><td>73,495*</td></tr><tr><td>Higher Learning</td><td>46</td><td>94,587</td></tr></tbody></table>

*Ninth and Tenth grades only

* * *

## Hungary

**Population:** 9,800,000 (1957)

**Area:** 35,911 square miles (approximately the size of Indiana).

**Communist Party Membership:** 450,000

**Capital:** Budapest - 1,185,000

About 268,022 native-born are living in the U.S. (1950 census).

## Political Outline.

On October 16, 1918, Hungary dissolves Austro-Hungarian Union (in existence since 1876). Hungarian Communist Party formed November 18, 1918. In 1919 Bela Kun forms a communist government. Rumania intervenes. After an allied ultimatum, Kun flees Hungary on August 1, 1919. Rumanians take Budapest and hold it until November 14, 1919, when Admiral Horthy enters. Horthy, a nominee of the Premier Bethlen, is elected regent March 1, 1920. Hungary becomes a kingdom without a king in 1921, with Bethlen the supreme power until 1931. After his retirement in 1931, Karolyi and then Gömbös, Daranyi and Imredy are premiers in turn, all right-wing conservatives. In 1938, the fascist Arrow Cross Party is formed. Under two Vienna Awards of November 1938 and August 1940, Hungary takes over portions of Slovakia and Ruthenia.

Hungary declares war on United States December 13, 1941, the United States reciprocating on June 5, 1942. During World War II Hungary lost 320,000 people. Hungary is occupied by the Germans on October 15, 1944, Horthy being deported to Germany. After World War II, the Hungarian Government is recognized by the United States on September 28, 1945. It is not recognized at the present time.

Having become a republic on January 31, 1946, Hungary came under full Communist rule by June, 1947. A formal alliance with the USSR was signed on February 18, 1948. Hungary is still occupied by Soviet troops. In 1954 its own ground forces numbered about 200,000 men. Janos Kadar is First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party, the only official party.

Some of Hungary's traditional territorial ambitions are the pre-Trianon (1919) frontiers, Slovakia, Transylvania, Croatia and Slovenia.

## Economic Outline.

About 55 per cent of Hungary's population is engaged in industry, 24 percent in agriculture.

Coal mines, power plants and the three biggest steel works were nationalized on June 25, 1946. Banks were nationalized in January 1948. Firms with more than 10 employees or those under foreign ownership were nationalized on December 28, 1949. Private homes were nationalized on February 19, 1952.

Land reform legislation was initiated on March 17, 1945, permitting minimum holdings of 250 acres.

16

Yugoslavia

Population: 17,800,000 (1957).
Area: 98,674 square miles (approximately the combined area of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania).
Communist Party Membership: 635,984 (1956).
Capital: Belgrade - 470,000.

Political Outline.

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was officially pro-
claimed on December 1, 1918. In 1929 its name was changed to Yugo-
slavia. It underwent a turbulent history between 1918 and the Axis
invasion of April 6, 1941, having 39 different cabinets. From 1927
until 1941, the Peasant-Democratic Coalition offered the most
democratic ideas. On January 6, 1929, King Alexander declared a
royal dictatorship, essentially anti-Croat in character. Alexander
is assassinated in Marseilles on October 9, 1934, together with the
French Foreign Minister Barthou. He is succeeded by his cousin, Paul,
regent.

During World War II, in which about 1,000,000 Yugoslavs lost their lives, three wars were fought on Yugoslav soil: a patriotic war against the Axis; and ethnic and religions wars between Serbs and Croats; a war between the Partisans of Tito and the Cetniks of the Monarchist General Mihajlovic. In June 1944 the Tito-Subasic Agreement determined Tito's authority in Yugoslavia. A Federal People's Republic was proclaimed in November 1945, a Communist constitution adopted on January 21, 1946. In the fall of 1948, Yugoslavia was evicted from the Cominform.

The Yugoslav Communist Party, presently known as the League
of Communists, was formed in 1920. Besides the League, the only other

17

organization permitted is the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia (People's Front). Yugoslavia's President is Josip Broz Tito; its four vice-presidents are: Edvard Kardelj, Aleksandar Rankovic, Rodoljub Colakovic and Mijalko Todorovic.

## Economic Outline.

Yugoslavia's urban population consists of 18 per cent, its agricultural population 66.5% of the total population.

In the last phases of World War II, Yugoslav industry was placed under the state's management on the basis of a decree of November 24, 1944, providing for the confiscation of property of ex-enemies, collaborationists and war profiteers. On December 5, 1946, a detailed nationalization law transferred to the state all undertakings of forty-two specified branches of industries of national importance. In April 1948 nationalization was extended to all enterprises of "local interest".

The Land Reform Law of August 23, 1945, limited individual peasant holdings to about 62-87 acres. Holdings involving the leasing of land or hired labor were limited to 112 acres. The remainder of the land was distributed according to the second Land Reform Law of 1946 to the "socialist sector", consisting of Peasant Working Cooperatives, General Agricultural Cooperatives and State Farms.

A further agrarian reform in 1953 limited private holdings to 25 acres.

## Social Outline.

**Ethnic:** Slavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins)

**Religion:**
* Orthodox: 41.4%
* Roman Catholic: 31.8%
* Protestant: 0.9%
* Moslem: 12.3%

rejected the Soviet claim to leadership and maintained that relations
between communist states must be based on the principles of equality
and noninterference in the domestic affairs of one Communist party
by another. The Polish Communist party, led by Gomulka, disputed
the Soviet claim to leadership in order to protect the measure of
autonomy that it had won in October, 1956.

Similarly, following the crisis of 1956, some of the parties,
particularly the Yugoslav but also the Polish, seized on the oft-used
communist slogan of coexistence in order to protect themselves against
Soviet interference. The formula of coexistence suggested implicitly
that relations between communist states were relations between enti-
ties which, though bound by special ties of friendship and indeed
by common ideological purposes, were sovereign, independent and funda-
mentally separate. These interpretations were sharply rejected by
the other parties in favor of the concept of "proletarian inter-
nationalism." This concept implicitly suggests that state entities
are not the important consideration in inter-communist relations,
but that there is a supra-national class bond which binds the various
ruling Communist parties together. Proletarian internationalism
was thus a formula designed to penetrate the "legalistic" walls of
national frontiers, and to reestablish a common purpose and ties
between party organizations. As on the question of Soviet leader-
ship, the Polish Communist party by late 1957 was forced to abandon
its position and to subscribe to the more binding ideological for-
mulation.

In spite of such conflicts, it seems that an important element
in the Polish relationship to the communist bloc is still the continuing

40

communist leaders to adjust their doctrine to the specific require-
ments of their situation, and to suggest that the range of the par-
ticular must be widened at the expense of the universal within the
communist ideology. Even while not tantamount to a direct challenge
to the international unity of the camp, such application nonetheless
introduces a particular perspective which in the long run is inimical
to the unity of the orbit. If Gomulka's views were to become wide-
spread within the camp and if they were accepted by all communist
leaders, much of the unity of the camp would be fractured.

Gomulka's continuing insistence on his domestic autonomy
thus reflects underlying tension in the international communist
camp. To this day, even though Gomulka has acknowledged the pri-
macy of the principle of communist unity, even though he has reluc-
tantly accepted the principle of Soviet leadership, and even though
he has condemned Yugoslav insistence on their independence, Poland
remains a potential challenge to the unity of the communist camp.
The fact that Poland enjoys a measure of relative autonomy means that
the so-called construction of socialism proceeds in Poland on lines
somewhat more palatable to the masses who are tired of Stalinist
oppression and desire a greater measure of individual rights and
individual freedom. In Poland there is still a measure of free
speech, contact with the West has expanded, and fear of the secret
police has decreased. These are considerations which mark the Polish
road to socialism as something rather different from that applied
and pursued elsewhere.

41

However, insofar as the existing Polish government is concerned, ideology is an important restraining element which prevents the translation of Polish insistence on domestic autonomy into actual striving for national independence. Even though the Polish nation itself expects and hopes for national independence, and even though Polish nationalism creates pressures in that direction, the existing communist regime is committed to certain propositions making it necessary to maintain close liaison with the rest of the communist camp. Accepting unity and rejecting Titoism, Gomulka, his quarrels with other communist regimes notwithstanding, does not desire a dissolution of the communist camp. He has always insisted on a relationship which would permit the communist regimes to enjoy a measure of domestic autonomy, but which would at the same time maintain external unity against the dangers which he apparently believes exist: imperialism and capitalism. Gomulka, subscribing to the notion that socialism and eventually communism will spread throughout the world, cannot engage in actions which, in his own judgment, would be beneficial to the interests of the enemies of communism.

Looking into the future, one should not expect striking assertions of domestic autonomy on the part of Gomulka. There are important restraints in the way. In addition to the ideological, there is the geographic factor. The geographical position of Poland, its political isolation in the orbit, as well as the economic dependence of the new Polish industries on raw materials from the rest of the communist camp, narrowly restrict the range of independent activity of any Polish government. Even anti-communist Poles are inclined to feel

that Soviet support for the Oder-Neisse frontier necessitates close
Polish-Soviet ties, in the name of Polish national (not communist)
self-interest. Fear of Germany, magnified by Poland's geographic
isolation, necessarily makes Poland dependent on Russia. On this
an increasing number of Poles agree, seeing no alternative to their
dilemma.

Another factor limiting Gomulka's freedom of action, in addition to the ideological and geographic, is the weakness of the Communist party that he leads. As long as that party seemed to be protecting Poland from Soviet interference, as appeared to be the case for a short time after October 1956, Gomulka could count on popular support. But at the same time, that very popular support constrained him in his efforts to build "socialism" in Poland, Gradually but steadily it became evident that Communist rule without efforts to communize society would mean the sapping of the party's sense of purpose and eventually would pave the way to the dissipation of its rule. Even at the cost of popular support, communization had to be resumed. That in turn meant greater dependence on outside support, with further loss of domestic support. National communism under such conditions of weakness was necessarily out of the question.

As a result, the years 1958 and 1959 saw a gradual but marked
improvement in Polish-Soviet relations. Gomulka's domestic policies
of suppressing the revisionist intellectuals and of reasserting the
role of the party, seemed to vindicate Khrushchev's "confidence"
in him, and presumably were gratifying the Soviet leader's self-esteem.

At the same time, the marked hostility displayed by the other com-
munist leaders towards Warsaw and even, it seems, by Peiping, help
to create the feeling in Warsaw that within the communist camp Khrush-
chev was the only leader with whom the Poles could bargain. The
mounting domestic economic difficulties in Poland forced Gomulka in
October-November, 1959, to engage in an important political reshuffle,
bringing back to posts of responsibility some party leaders associa-
ted formerly with policies of "a strong hand." This too served fur-
ther to reassure the other communist leaderships that the period of
crisis in Poland was gradually coming to an end and that the Polish
regime could be relied on to remain loyal and steadfast in maintain-
ing outward communist unity.

It would be a mistake, however, to expect Poland to return
to the pre-October 1956 position of a totally subject satellite.
In some important areas of Polish life, such as collectivization and
Church-State relations, as well as in terms of general Polish-Soviet
relations, a marked difference with the past is still maintained.
Poland in effect enjoys an intermediary position between a satellite
and an ally. The regime remains dependent on Soviet support, even
while striving to make communism more palatable to the great masses
of anti-Communist Poles. At the same time, many Poles realize that
their economic development and their frontiers remain dependent
primarily on Soviet support and would not risk a total rupture.
Most Poles seem to feel that such a rupture would not only bring
about a repetition of the Hungarian tragedy, but could have the
effect of leaving Poland at the mercy of Germany whose interests

would presumably find support among the Western powers. Thus, the uneasy balance between unfulfilled nationalist aspirations of the Polish people, the efforts of the Communist party to water down the rigid Stalinism to fit the Polish conditions, and the national interests of Poland given its geographical and economic context, are likely to maintain in the foreseeable future the curious Polish political compromise known as Gomulkaism.

An issue of a somewhat different dimension is raised by Yugoslavia. It is sometimes forgotten that in its domestic policies, Yugoslavia originally was more Stalinist than Stalin. In the years 1945-47, the communist leadership of Yugoslavia was openly contempestuous of the efforts of other communists in Eastern Europe to constrictue the "people's democracy" as a new form of state, not yet an open "dictatorship of the proletariat." The other communist leaders in Eastern Europe were then inclined to feel, and apparently so did Moscow, that communist aims would be furthered by a policy of circumspection, of alliance between the various classes and adjustment to the existing situation, rather than by a policy of radical communist evolution. In fact, it can be argued that the communist policy in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1947, was a prototype for some of the policies recently adopted by the communist world with regard to the post-colonial and underdeveloped nations. There was a concerted effort to avoid any identification with class violence, with communization and with collectivization. The emphasis was rather on social and economic reconstruction, and on communist cooperation with noncommunist political parties. This policy, applied

remained basically sympathetic to the Soviet bloc in the sense that they remain convinced that the communist camp is "objectively" marching in step with history despite temporary Stalinist aberrations. They continue to believe that in the long run it will be the socialist and communist mode of socio-economic organization that will replace the capitalistic mode. For this reason, the Yugoslavs welcomed the de-Stalinization campaign in the Soviet Union, and were inclined to interpret it as a radical break with the past, effected by a group of progressive Soviet leaders representing the wave of the future. Applying their Marxist perspectives to the Soviet scene, they interpreted Soviet internal developments as involving a clash between contradictory forces, those of the new opposed to those of the old, Khrushchev symbolizing the future and Molotov the past. To them, these political personalities were the superstructure to basic underlying conflict in the Soviet Union.

In keeping with this assessment, Belgrade was inclined to feel in 1956 and 1957 that it was the duty of Yugoslavia to support the "progressive" forces, that is, the so-called anti-Stalinists, in the struggle against Stalinism. For this reason, they went a long way to avoid any conflict with the new "anti-Stalinist" elements, and they were encouraged both by Khrushchev's willingness to subscribe formally to the principle that there are many paths to socialism and by his condemnations of Stalinism.

Consequently, when the Hungarian outbreak occurred, the Yugoslavs, after some hesitation, were willing to endorse the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution as a necessary measure designed

48

declare the recognition of both Soviet leadership and the principle of unity in the camp. He did not go to Moscow.

Only then did Tito finally reassess the situation within the communist bloc. In reacting against his past optimism, he moved in the direction of open ideological challenge. In March, 1958, the Yugoslavs issued a so-called draft program, a summary statement of their doctrinal position, to be approved at the Party Congress in April. The draft program systematized and made explicit many of the previously held Yugoslav positions, reassessing many of the sacred tenets of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Claiming that their statement was derived from the principles of Marxism and Leninism, and strongly implying that their judgments had universal relevance for all communist movements, the Yugoslavs explicitly abandoned the two-camp theory, which is at the core of the communist image of the world. In rejecting the notion of two irreconcilable world military blocs, they implied a certain degree of equivalence between them and naturally provoked cries of outrage from the communist citadels. Furthermore, the Yugoslavs suggested that the process of change throughout the world is an interrelated, organic continuum with the capitalist world undergoing evolutionary changes and gradually pointing in the direction of a greater degree of societal ownership. At the same time, they suggested that the communist world, despite Stalinist aberrations, was also evolving in the direction of greater diversity and freedom. The implication was that in the end the two will meet. They further outraged the dogmatic communist viewpoint by suggesting the possibility of building communism

without the dictatorship of the Communist party. Indeed, they
suggested that the construction of socialism is possible through a
democratic, socialist, parliamentary system, and that communist
dictatorship is a dispensable aspect of this process. They also
rejected the Leninist principles of proletarian dictatorship and
class struggle, sacred tenets in both Stalinist and post-Stalinist
communist thinking. They further declared that proletarian inter-
nationalism is a meaningless term utilized by the Soviet party to
maintain its hegemony over the other weaker Communist parties. Fi-
nally, they went on record as observing that Soviet leadership in the
camp can lead to aberrations limiting the independence of the several
communist states.

The Yugoslav statement was thus a clear-cut challenge to
the position maintained by the other Communist parties, above all
by the Soviet and the Chinese. It went far beyond the Polish
position, for it crystallized an explicit, systematic program to
which communist movements could refer, and on which they could base
their actions. Therefore, it is a major irritant in the communist
camp. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the Yugoslav position is
limited by the consideration that the espousal by a Communist
party of the Yugoslav stand would necessarily involve breaking from
the communist camp altogether. To be able to do so, a communist re-
gime would need an indigenous basis to maintain itself without So-
viet support, and presumably in spite of Soviet subversion. No
communist regime in Eastern Europe, save that of Yugoslavia, has
the capacity to do so.

59

quo while at the same time it satisfied United States demands (and conscience) through statements about "free elections" to be held in areas under Soviet control.

Nevertheless, even at this late stage, there are some indications that the USSR was uncertain about the extent of Western disengagement from Eastern European affairs and at first moved rather cautiously in consolidating its gains. Political opposition was allowed to operate, particularly in Poland and Hungary, and in the latter, free elections were even held in the fall of 1945. A democratic government was allowed to operate relatively freely in Czechoslovakia. In fact, the implication suggests itself that the USSR expected that its violations of Yalta and Potsdam might produce some energetic reaction from the other signatories. This caution, however, was short-lived. It soon became apparent to the USSR that United States policy with respect to Eastern Europe did not go beyond general formulas, and the years 1946-1948 witnessed a gradual, but steady, tightening of the screws of Soviet control.*

*Many Eastern Europeans, however, misjudging both U.S. intentions and U.S. capabilities, were encouraged into anti-Communist opposition by the Yalta and Potsdam declarations. This belief was not even dispelled by the rigid neutrality maintained by U.S. representatives in Eastern Europe, which contrasted sharply with the more active behavior of Soviet delegates. As a result, there was a strong belief in Eastern Europe that the Western powers would react strongly against Soviet failure to assure free elections. It is difficult to abstract the fate that befell many of these people, as a result of their actions, from the motivations which produced such actions. The announced U.S. policy, regrettably, seems to have been one of these motivations. Few Eastern Europeans, being accustomed to traditional diplomacy, would believe that U.S. formulas for Eastern Europe were not backed by some preconceived program of action.

also the final liquidation of political opposition behind the Iron
Curtain, violent purges, intensive economic and political integra-
tion with the USSR, and the build-up of a communist military bloc.
As a partial response, and in keeping with the principles of contain-
ment (although not necessarily with the advice of its original for-
mulator), West German remilitarization was begun, thereby giving the
USSR yet another opportunity, made more real by the East Europeans'
understandable fear of the Germans, to solidify its unchallenged
control.

The crisis in American-Soviet relations, reaching a peak
with the fighting (and casualties) in Korea, the great concern with
possibilities of domestic subversion in the United States, the
growing fear of a general war, and the mass realization that the
Soviet regime was no better than the Nazi had been, produced con-
siderable dissatisfaction with a policy which most Americans auto-
matically assumed to be a relatively passive one. The coincidence
of this accumulated feeling with national elections made U.S.-USSR
relations one of the key issues in the presidential contest. A
product of these factors was the new foreign policy formula for
Eastern Europe: "Liberation." Although never spelled out with any
precision, it had several apparent advantages over containment:
(1) it seemed to be an active policy to a people whose patience
was sorely tested; (2) it offered hope of earlier change in the sta-
tus quo than containment; (3) it was specifically oriented toward
Eastern Europe and made it the focal point of U.S.-USSR relations.

72

step towards a new partition. Considerations of national interest
in turn then create pressures for closer Polish-Soviet ties. Simi-
larly with Czechoslovakia in the case of the Sudetenland.

Given the fact that some of the European communist-ruled
states identify themselves with European culture and resent the
abyss dividing them from Western Europe and driving them further
into the Euro-Asian bloc, efforts to promote the closest all-
European links without directly challenging the power of the present
communist regimes and, even more important, the basically socialist
organization of their societies, might eventually have the effect
of loosening slowly the close ties binding these states to the Soviet
Union. The communist states in Eastern Europe should be continuously
invited to join in all-European undertakings of a social, economic
and political character, even if the communist regimes at first
reject such invitations. In all future planning for European de-
velopment ostentatious consideration should be given to the ad-
vantages that Eastern Europe would derive from such participation.
Efforts to promote intellectual and cultural exchanges between them
and Western European nations, through such devices as the extension
of Eurovision to Eastern Europe, gradual extension of free travel,
mutual abolition of visas, as well as through exchanges, should be
promoted to a far greater extent than has been the case heretofore.
The United States should take the lead in encouraging the Western
European nations to engage in such operations and could offer indirect
financial assistance. To the extent possible, the United States
should occasionally engage in demonstrative gestures of good will

separating Eastern Europe from the rest of Europe. Without making
an actual endorsement of the existing communist regimes (it is to
be noted that Moscow never gave an eternally binding stamp of appro-
val, for instance, to Nehru), it might be desirable to deal with
these communist regimes in such a way as to create societal pressures
whenever these regimes reject advantageous overtures which would
have been accepted if such states were truly sovereign.

It is to be recognized, therefore, that our policy towards
Eastern Europe must be shaped within the context of the general
pattern of American-Soviet relations and in reference to further
changes within both the communist orbit and the Soviet Union itself.
In the foreseeable future any sharp changes in East Europe designed
to lessen drastically the degree of Soviet control would only pro-
voke a sharp Soviet counter-reaction. The United States military
and political posture leaves us helpless in such a situation. A
dual policy of the kind recommended would have the advantage of
avoiding situations in which conflicting American and Soviet
interests are brought to a head, creating overriding pressures on
the Soviet Union to assert demonstratively its dominion in Eastern
Europe.