Nixon warns
Russia over
arms race

PRESIDENT NIXON bluntly threatened Russian leaders yesterday with a new arms race if they do not show restraint in their nuclear missile build-up.

The President, in his 95,000-word foreign policy report to Congress, also warned the world not to expect too much of his trip to China next week. "The trip to Peking is not an end in itself but the launching of a process," he declared, adding that it was an attempt to open communications with China after two decades of separation and hostility.

## Crucial turning point

Mr Nixon said he looked to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) for agreements to scale down the arms race and to set the foundations for further steps to ease tension.

But he said: "We are approaching a crucial turning point in our strategic arms programmes. If the Soviet Union continues to expand strategic forces, compensating American programmes will be mandatory.

"The preferable alternative would be a combination of mutual restraint and an agreement in SALT. But under no circumstances will I permit the further erosion of the strategic balance with the Soviet Union."

Mr Nixon told Russia that its actions in the coming months would demonstrate whether it was genuinely interested in improved relations and lessened world tensions.

He agreed that the Berlin agreement and other steps taken in the past year could mean the beginning of a new relationship.

But he said that "there were ... other developments in 1971 which make it unclear whether

we are now witnessing a permanent change in Soviet policy or only a passing phase concerned more with tactics than with a fundamental commitment to a more stable international system."

Serious questions, he said, were raised by Soviet weapons development, its arms shipments to Egypt in the Middle East, its military and diplomatic support of India in the recent war with Pakistan, and what he termed "the expansionist implications of the Soviet naval activities" throughout the world.

## "Watershed" year

The President called 1971 the "watershed year," in which America had made a dramatic opening to China and the beginning of a new relationship with the Russians, as well as the laying of a foundation for healthier relations with Japan and its European allies.

He described Soviet actions in South Asia and the Middle East, as well as in the field of nuclear disarmament, as developments with dangerous implications.

Mr Nixon confirmed unofficial reports that the Russians had supplied Egypt with 80 surface-to-air missile installations, several squadrons of combat aircraft with their pilots, 5,000 missile crew members and technicians, and about 11,000 other advisers since 1970.

He said the Russians had also sent in SA-6 surface-to-air missiles, the Foxbat and other advanced MiG aircraft, and TU-16 bombers equipped with long-range air-to-surface missiles.

The President said his biggest disappointment had been the failure of his efforts to persuade Hanoi to end the Vietnam war through a negotiated settlement. He said that America would never meet North Vietnam's demand for the elimination of the Saigon Government headed by President Nguyen Van Thieu.

On Western Europe and NATO, the President said American policy was to maintain and improve its military forces on the Continent and not reduce them except through reciprocal reductions negotiated with the Warsaw Pact nations, Reuter.

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 10, 1972

135, FLEET STREET, LONDON, E.C.4.

TEL: 01-353 4242. TELEX: 22874/5/6.

CLASSIFIED ADVERTISEMENTS: 01-583 3939.

OUR AMERICAN ALLY

EVER SINCE President Nixon started talking about his desire to present a "low profile" in international affairs, his allies have been apprehensive and uneasy. Could this mean that he was about to follow the example set by Lt Pinkerton, U.S.N., that he was about to shuffle off his responsibilities and leave us, like Madam Butterfly, holding the baby? No one who has studied his third "State of the World" report to Congress could suspect this of him any more. He fully recognises America's international obligations. He is also obviously alert to various dangers which he might perhaps have overlooked in the search for a détente with Russia and China.

In particular he recognises the need for a powerful American conventional presence in Europe. This need is not less than it was but greater, in view alike of Russia's growing military power and of the "ambiguous and contradictory trends" in her foreign policy. There will be, it is clear, no unilateral cuts in America's forces in Europe, as have been so irresponsibly demanded by Senator MANSFIELD and others. The possibility of reciprocal reductions, to be negotiated with the Warsaw Pact countries, is indeed not ruled out. But here too, Mr NIXON shows himself fully aware of the dangers. As he points out, a straight reduction on an equal percentage basis would be most damaging to Nato, since Russia, unlike America, is in Europe, always ready to strike.

Reassuring as Mr NIXON's words may be, Western Europe should not become complacent. Presidents less resolute and cautious, less loyal and trustworthy than he, are, alas, quite possible. He gave details of what his European allies are doing to defend themselves. This may not be adequate, even if America continues to do her stuff. Gen. Sir WALTER WALKER, retiring Nato commander in Oslo, has warned us. We should never rest easy till we can look after ourselves.

NIXON TO
SEEK ARMS
PACT

By STEPHEN BARBER
in Washington

PRESIDENT NIXON said yesterday that his talks with China's leaders later this month will represent "a necessary and a giant step towards the creation of a stable structure of world peace."

He expressed optimism that his next summit, with the Kremlin leaders in May, would mark the beginning of a new relationship with Russia, but he referred to "ambiguous and contradictory trends" in Russian policy and their "dangerous implications."

Although Mr Nixon appeared confident that at least an initial agreement on nuclear arms limitation would be achieved at his Moscow talks, he emphasised that the unabated build-up of Russian military power was his one deep concern.

He was going to Moscow, he said, in his foreign policy report to Congress to test Russia's willingness to break with the traditional patterns of Soviet-American relations.

Military expansion

Throughout the report he asserted that Russia continued to pursue expansionist military policies in the Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, as well as in the Indian sub-continent, while overtaking America in the deployment of nuclear weapons.

He said the Russians had so sharply expanded their arms supplies to India as to cause concern about their objectives. Tanks, guns, missiles, submarines and ships worth £300 million had been delivered to India in six years.

During the week of Dec. 6, the United States received "convincing evidence" that India was seriously contemplating seizing Pakistan-held Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan's military forces in the West.

"We could not ignore the fact that when we repeatedly asked India and its supporters for clear assurances to the contrary, we did not receive them." This was the basis for a third appeal to the Security Council which was vetoed by Russia.

Arms race Warning—P.4.
Editorial comment—P.16

Return
of a great
power's
confidence

In his latest Foreign Policy Report, President Nixon sees 1971 as the watershed year. Judging from the direction and tone of the report, 1972 might well be remembered as the year when the United States regained its self-confidence as a great power in the world arena.

The first of these annual reports, known in Washington as the State of the World Message, was published two years ago when Mr Nixon, ably supported by Dr Henry Kissinger, his national security adviser, began to reexamine a national security policy established during the Cold War. The talk of a Nixon Doctrine frightened some people, who assumed an imminent American return to isolationism, but this year's report proves beyond any doubt that this is not the case.

The original objective remains unchanged. President Nixon, as did his predecessors, is trying to foster peaceful conditions in the world in order that the United States, and by inference other countries, may flourish.

The changes are in method. They have been dictated by many factors, above all by the ending of the bipolar postwar world and by the passing of America's indisputable superiority in strategic weapons.

Impatience

No less indisputable has been

the impatience of most Americans with the burdens of Pax Americana. Vietnam appeared to prove it a ghastly failure, but national confidence is now returning with the realization that an alternative policy is not beyond the wit or bank accounts of Americans.

President Nixon sees 1971 as a watershed because of the opening to China, the beginning of new relations with the Soviet Union, Europe and Japan, and the creation of a new environment for the world's monetary and trade activities.

He might be claiming a bit too much. The last Administration surely deserves some credit for better Soviet-American relations, but the report disproves the cynical theory that the Peking and Moscow visits were only election campaign gimmicks.

Anyone who has read the three reports can only be impressed by the progression of what Mr Nixon describes as the philosophical conception. Shrewd politician as he is, he has not been unaware of the political profit to be expected from the Peking and Moscow visits, but world security is not being cynically misused.

The tribes who for so long have served under American standards on the imperial glacis can be reassured, but much is still expected of them. One of the new factors President Nixon sees in this changing world is the regained vigour and self-assurance of Europe and Japan.

They are expected to share a greater portion of the burden of world leadership. There should be few complaints from those, and that includes most of us, who at times found American leadership too overpowering, but it will need a national self-confidence no less than that expressed by President Nixon in his report today.

Louis Heren
Foreign Editor

THE TIMES THURSDAY FEBRUARY 10 1972

PRESIDENT NIXON'S POLICY

President Nixon's report to Congress yesterday stands out immediately as one of the most weighty, most serious, and best argued statements of American foreign policy to be made since the end of the Second World War. In manner it is sober, factual, clear, without any obvious tremolo passages or over-contrived rhetoric. In substance it goes into American deeds, hopes, and difficulties in almost every part of the earth and above the earth. The main thread, appearing in several parts of the immensely long report, is provided by the sustained comments on the Soviet-American rivalry and on the search for a new relationship.

It may seem odd that in a report published only a week before the President leaves for Peking, China should take so little a part and Soviet Russia so great. But that balance is logical. In Peking Mr Nixon will be picking up old and almost forgotten links again; he will be beginning a new process, unsure of what he will find, with little to guide him. In Moscow, when he goes in May, he will be pursuing negotiations that the two countries have been busy with for years. Whereas China has mainly been on the sidelines since 1949, the American-Soviet rivalry has been at the very centre of the world, overshadowing it, throughout that time. Mr Nixon puts the predicament well:

> Since the nuclear age began, both the world's fears of Armageddon and its hopes for a stable peace have rested on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. For most of that period, the policies of both countries have been directed more to the fearful possibility than to the larger hope.

How to swing the direction more to the larger hope? Mr Nixon records many of the agreements that have been made in recent years—a heartening list—before coming to his reading of Soviet policy today. He is very far from the roll-back-communism school. Like others, he is puzzled by what he calls the ambiguity in Soviet intentions. More precisely, he does not know—any more than anyone else—which way Moscow will be turned by developments and events both within the communist camp itself and outside.

For example, will the tensions between Russia and China and within eastern Europe make Moscow more militant or more ready to seek easier relations with the United States and its Nato allies? So far Moscow seems to be pursuing the second course. Mr Nixon puts a less familiar and more interesting question. Will the spread of Moscow's influence and resources in the Middle East and South Asia be increasingly dangerous; or, "hopefully", will it give Moscow a new interest in regional stability and encourage it to use its influence in the cause of restraint? If the latter, "the USSR and the United States could act on parallel courses". But it is certainly too early to count on such a prospect.

Yet a third example of uncertainty is whether—at a time when Russia can produce both massive arms and (increasingly) consumer goods—the people's evident desire for still more consumer benefits will itself encourage more normal relations with the industrialised West? Or will suspicions remain?

These are all fair and proper questions for President Nixon to raise, even as Soviet military strength grows and its sphere of action abroad expands. The President is doing his very best to be fair. A fuller picture, of course, would have to bring in the suspicions and doubts on the Soviet side. Russians do not forget, as the West is apt to do, the chain of American bases near the Soviet frontiers. Nor are they convinced that America is really determined to withdraw from its once enormous commitment in Vietnam. Looking further back, they are always ready for endless bitter argument over responsibility for the cold war.

One of the strengths of Mr Nixon's survey is that it does not go too far back on the past, and at every point he indicates that the United States Administration are ready to take the more favourable view of Soviet policy if Moscow gives them half a chance. He says this even while heavily stressing elsewhere in his report the anxieties raised by Russia's arms build-up, by her attitude in the Indian-

Pakistan crisis, and her expansion in the Middle East.

It is on the arms build-up that Mr Nixon is entirely unequivocal. It is on this he gives his clearest and gravest warning. It is the strongest single theme in his report. He gives accounts of Soviet increases in strength in arms conventional and nuclear. He gives details of naval expansion, and of the great military supplies sent to Egypt. After listing the Russian developments in nuclear weapons of various formidable kinds, his verdict is the more convincing for being phrased in measured words:

> The Soviet Union is continuing to create strategic capabilities beyond a level which by any reasonable standard already seem sufficient...

> We cannot know the intentions of the Soviet leadership but we must assume that this trend reflects a calculated policy within the framework of an overall strategic rationale...

> If the Soviet Union continues to expand strategic forces, compensating United States programmes will be mandatory.

Some men might have been tempted to end there. Mr Nixon's warning certainly remains as strong as it can be: nothing elsewhere in the survey weakens it. But equally firm is his expressed belief that the Russians are unlikely to be planning to use their nuclear forces "in an all-out manner". And no less firm is his intention to go on negotiating. He sets out all that he hopes to talk about in Moscow and describes how he sees the strategic arms talks (Salt) progressing both before and after his visit.

On their side the Russians have been presented with a policy document of major perspectives. Their propaganda services have lately been particularly busy in attacking American acts and supposed plans. They have been given something more solid in return, something that should occupy several Politburo meetings. They will produce their criticisms and their counter-arguments. But they can hardly deny one evident truth, "We have the opportunity to usher in a new era in international relations. If we can do so, the transformation of Soviet-American relations can become one of the most significant achievements of our time."

WALL STREET JOURNAL 14 FEBRUARY 1972

An Unmistakable State of the World

Much of the commentary on President Nixon's state of the world message has centered on its impact on domestic politics, but it's hard to say whose state of mind this reflects, the President's or the commentators'. We'll agree that this 236-page document will have more political impact than, say, the Washington, D.C. telephone directory, though it will not be nearly as well read.

Presidential messages that catalog aspirations, achievements and disappointments naturally have a political side, though their prose is of negligible political value compared to the realities they speak to. Even from the political standpoint of those interested in the substance of public affairs, the more important question remains, what of the realities?

Here, those commentators friendly to the President and those suspicious of him have, for the most part, succumbed to the same temptation: how easy to browse through the world, either crediting the President with supposed signs of progress (he's going to Peking; the monetary crisis is settled) or chastising him for purported global failings (picking the "loser" in the India-Pakistan war; failing to end the arms race; not getting out of Vietnam).

But there is a larger picture of the state of the world, one Mr. Nixon has been trying to tell us about with dogged consistency. That is, at this moment in time, the world is within grasp of a stalemate of the superpowers, a balance of power that can be fixed in place if only Washington, Peking, and Moscow consciously decide to do so simultaneously.

An emerging military comparability has been a key to this evolving condition in the world. But other coincident factors have been important as

well: the tensions between Russian and Chinese Communism; the current absence on the world scene of Hitler-like or Stalin-like megalomaniacs; a diminution of arrogance in the global outlook of the United States; recognition by each of the powers of limits on their ability to influence the third world.

Mr. Nixon did not arrange this opportunity. But his role was important, for he perceived that it was due to come if only he could keep the United States from steering away from it. His maneuvers in every area of foreign affairs for three years have been directed toward this end. And while any or all may have involved miscalculations, errors in judgment, it is at least easier to comprehend his conduct of foreign policy from this perspective.

Hence, his "tilting" toward Pakistan, not to appease Peking, but to remind the Soviet Union that the opportunity for a superpower stalemate would vanish if it chose to press the expansion of its hegemony.

Hence, his willingness to infuriate Japan if that's what it would take to arrange the Peking visit in secrecy. And his willingness to bully Western Europe into acting to avert international financial chaos, for that too would have exploded the opportunity the superpowers have been converging on.

Hence, the culmination of his Vietnam policy, which holds out to Peking and Moscow the chance to confirm the stalemate in Indochina, with the three superpowers agreeing to leave the war to the Vietnamese.

Hence, his seeming endless patience with the SALT talks and his measured restraint of the Pentagon, even as the Soviets try to stretch to their advantage the concept of nuclear comparability.

The opportunity he's been preparing for rapidly approaches, symbolized by the summit in Peking and Moscow.

It's arguable whether specific Nixon moves helped or delayed bringing the world to this point, but it's clear that the sum total of his policies have somehow succeeded in getting us this far. If the moment is lost, it might not soon come again.

For one thing, Richard Nixon might not be President for much longer; it's uncertain what a successor would or could manage in this balance-of-power maneuvering. This applies, perhaps more so, to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai have few active years left; there's no telling whether their successors will be able to compose the divergent views that strain Peking on whether to accept stalemate or embark on new ideological adventures. There are these strains, too, in Moscow, and from month to month it's hard to tell whether Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin recognize the importance of the coming opportunity.

Whatever part Mr. Nixon's skill or luck has played, the state of the world is unmistakably before us; the conditions have ripened for a reasonable balance of power that could preserve some measure of peace. It's now really up to Peking and Moscow to decide whether they're prepared to accept this kind of world.

WALL STREET JOURNAL

14 FEBRUARY 1972

VIETNAM AIR STRIKES by the U.S. continued heavy; American troops went on alert.

A sixth day of bombing brought total strikes in the period to 500 as the U.S. Command ignored a 96-hour Tet cease-fire declared by the Vietcong. The allies announced a 24-hour moratorium of their own to begin today. The alert was described as "in anticipation of a possible increase in enemy activity." The Cambodian command, meanwhile, reported fighting near the Angkor Wat and Angkor Thom temples occupied by the enemy since 1970. And U.S. ambassador Ellsworth Bunker returned to Saigon after meetings in Washington and Paris.

In Paris, an international antiwar assembly backed Communist proposals for ending the Vietnamese war, called Nixon's peace plan "hypocritical and fallacious."

CHICAGO TRIBUNE 12 FEBRUARY 1972 (14)

The Chinas and the Viet Nams

In his foreign policy message Wednesday, President Nixon enunciated a policy toward the two Chinas which seems both sensible and practical—a rare combination these days. He said that it was up to the two Chinas to settle their own relationship; that this would do much to reduce tension in Asia, and that in the meanwhile the United States will stand by its military commitments to Taiwan.

This policy is fair and sensible because it puts the fate of the Chinese people in their own hands—or at least in the hands of their own governments—while preserving the integrity of Taiwan, which is just about the only country in the developing world where our foreign aid can be considered a success and which we already let down disgracefully in the United Nations.

It is practical because a military confrontation between Mainland China and Taiwan is unlikely, in the foreseeable future, and our commitment is therefore likely to be easy to carry out. Except for the offshore islands such as Quemoy and Matsu, where any conflict would be limited both in extent and in military significance, the Communists have neither the power nor, we suspect, the desire to launch an invasion of Nationalist property. Chiang Kai-shek has a large and powerful army which would have the added advantage of being on the defensive on an easily defensible island. Peking has little in the way of air power and less in the way of a navy. Its vast army would be of little use, even if it could be spared from the Russian frontier.

So there is little chance of a crisis as long as Chiang, who is in his eighties, and Mao, who is almost there, are alive. And it is hard to predict what will happen when they leave the scene, since

both run virtual dictatorships. The chances are that whatever happens will happen slowly enough so that we can adjust our policy as needed.

The obvious question is whether the same convenient formula might not apply also in Viet Nam, where the principles involved are much the same: an aggressive Communist portion which calls itself democratic but is nothing of the sort and which is dedicated to regaining control over the non-Communist portion; and a non-Communist portion which, despite Chiang's occasional oratory, is more interested in preserving its own relative freedom than in conquering the Communist portion. By both word and precedent, we are committed to protect the free portions from a forceful takeover by the Communists.

The big difference is that in Viet Nam there is no China Sea to separate the two sides. There is only a demilitarized zone which can easily be violated and in any event can be bypassed thru Laos. North Viet Nam has sent troops and supplies into the South almost at will, and no doubt intends to step up this activity as soon as American troops are withdrawn.

So while it's easy to say in principle that the two Viet Nams, like the two Chinas, should reconcile their own differences in a civilized manner, the question in practice is what will happen if they don't. In China, nothing is likely to happen; in Viet Nam, all hell may break loose. This is why Mr. Nixon is rightly eager to have an international guarantee for any Viet Nam settlement. And it is why, lacking any such guarantee, it is going to be harder for the United States to detach itself from Viet Nam's schizophrenic problems than from China's.

NEW YORK NEWS 13 FEBRUARY 1972 (14)

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER

In his latest State of the World message, President Richard M. Nixon spelled out in alarming detail the dimensions of Soviet Russia's breakneck program to achieve superiority in strategic weaponry.

The USSR's continuing development of newer, bigger and better arms, said Mr. Nixon raises "serious questions" about the Kremlin's intentions.

Inasmuch as no one has a tap on the twisted noodles of the Red tyrants, the only safe course for the U.S. is to deal in the realities of Soviet capabilities.

On the evidence at hand, the USSR is driving full tilt to a position where it could launch a preemptive first strike—a knockout of America's nuclear deterrent.

All past experience drives home the point that once the czars of communism have—or think they have— the upper hand, they would not hesitate to use their power to devastate the free world or blackmail it into submission.

Even with Russian might growing ominously, Mr. Nixon has so far proposed only modest measures to end this country's self-imposed standstill on strategic arms improvement.

The Chief Executive's mild response is dictated in part by the fact that the anti-military clique already is howling for the slaughter of his defense budget.

Soft words and halfway measures will not soothe this band of doves, self-deluders and appeasers. Nor is it likely that the President's recital of Soviet arms expansion will remove the blinders from their eyes.

It is time Mr. Nixon laid the cards on the table for the American people, making no bones about the perils they face or the steps needed to meet the menace.

We can't go on playing Russian roulette with the nation's security.

President Nixon

WASHINGTON POST

13 FEB 1972 (14)

THE ECONOMIST FEBRUARY 12, 1972

43

THE WORLD

American Survey

When Kissinger breached the Chinese wall

The thoughts of Chairman
Nixon before his travels

Washington, DC

President Nixon's third annual report on foreign policy went to Congress this week as the preparations for his visit to Peking were nearing their final stage: he flies to Hawaii, the first of two overnight stops on the way, next Thursday. As he now explains in the report, he made a start on his approach to Peking within two weeks of his inauguration in 1969:

> I ordered that efforts be undertaken to communicate our new attitude through private channels, and to seek contact with the People's Republic of China.

While he was feeling around for reliable intermediaries and trying out channels of communication, he was also engaged in his series of limited improvements and relaxations in the American official attitude to communist China. By the autumn of 1970 messages began to come back from Peking; last spring the pace of the limited gestures of relaxation accelerated; and in July Dr Kissinger found himself sitting in a chair

opposition to Chou En-Lai.

The narrative does show awareness of the fact that the elements of secrecy and surprise in the way that this was done left several friendly governments disconcerted or annoyed. But, says the President, "there were over-riding reasons for keeping Dr Kissinger's July visit secret." These, substantially, were the fears that inflated expectations might lead to disillusionment and that both governments might have been forced "to take public positions which could only have frozen discussion before they began." He says nothing to confirm the suspicion that he actually enjoys surprising people, but also little to rebut it.

Even now the President is most reluctant to say what results he expects from his long journey. He will discuss primarily "bilateral questions"; still, either side can raise any subject that it wishes; even so, Mr Nixon will not negotiate on behalf of third parties or settle anything at the expense of

friends. That is all, except that the visit is a necessary step in a long process of moving "from antagonism to communication to understanding."

Relations with the Soviet Union, by contrast, are not in so rudimentary a state that a mere improvement in atmospherics, as Mr Nixon puts it, or in communications is of any particular interest. He envisages a more organised agenda for his talks in Moscow in May. He seems confident that a partial agreement in the strategic arms limitation talks is not far off. Perhaps it will still need discussion when he goes to Moscow, or perhaps it will be completed before then; if the latter, he can use the Moscow visit to prepare the second stage of the Salt talks. There are some other bilateral questions, including trade—"a variety of fields in which United States-Soviet co-operation would benefit both." The common involvement in European security has to be discussed, but the report throws in a reassurance to the western European allies: no agreements will be made in this area without them.

Mr Nixon also wants to discuss the Middle East, one of his confessed disappointments so far. Not only are some substantial American interests threatened by the failure to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict, but there is also danger of recurring tension there between Russia and the United States.

President Nixon puts the blame on the Russians and once again he reproaches the Soviet government for using the Arab-Israeli conflict "to perpetuate and expand its own military position in Egypt." In general, however, though he has the familiar word of caution about "the continuing buildup of Soviet military power," he is relatively mellow about American-Soviet relationships. He lists a series of improvements since the tense period of 1970 and is in a guarded way hopeful that the competition of the two superpowers "need not be translated into hostility or crisis."

The difficulty of a document of this kind is that on the one hand it sets out to propound a general view or, as

44

AMERICAN SURVEY

it is called in the White House nowadays, a "philosophy" of American foreign policy: but, on the other, it has to be made to serve immediate tactical ends. The general view is required to show the American public what its government is after, to help foreign governments understand American actions and because the domestic debate on foreign policy needs a "framework."

Yet it would be asking too much to expect the Administration to refrain from using this document to send signals to foreign powers and, like its predecessors, the report is replete with such signals. Mr Nixon, since he wants to be re-elected this year and since for that and other reasons he wants to be thought of as a success, would also like his foreign policy achievements to look good in this, the year of fruition of his first term.

Perhaps that is why the Soviet Union, at the end of a little lecture on the error of military expansionism, gets an unexpected word of commendation for having "in the end" played a restraining role in the Indo-Pakistani war. Turning to the passage on South Asia one finds a claim that in early December the United States "received convincing evidence that India was seriously contemplating the seizure of Pakistan-held portions of Kashmir and the destruction of Pakistan's military forces in the west." What it amounts to is that, while the United States did not succeed in saving East Bengal from being over-run, it did stop the Indians from attacking, and perhaps overrunning, West Pakistan: and it is for restraining India, on American urging, that the Russians get their word of commendation. A touch of self-justification has perhaps to be expected here and there.

It goes almost without saying that self-justification is not absent from President Nixon's explanation of another area of disappointment, in Indochina. Here he anticipated the report by disclosing on January 25th the prolonged secret negotiations conducted by Dr Kissinger and the American peace offer as it stood then. The act of disclosure itself suggested that the secret negotiations were at an end. Mr Nixon's formal position is now that his offer is still open and that "the choice is up to Hanoi." But nothing in the report, or in the broadcast in which he explained the report to the public on Wednesday, suggests that he still seriously entertains the hope of a negotiated ceasefire before November's presidential election.

Plainly this presents him with a problem of public relations. After all in 1968 he asked the voters to trust him to bring about a negotiated peace. After three years in power he has still not managed it and plainly does not think that it is imminent. How to explain this, beyond the statement that unfortunately the communists would not accept his terms? There is an obvious temptation to blame political sabotage by the Democrats and the past 10 days have seen Mr Nixon struggling not very successfully with this temptation.

After he had disclosed the secret negotiations and his peace offer, Senator Muskie, the leading Democratic contender for the Presidency, took a characteristically long pause for breath and then, on February 2nd, dismissed Mr Nixon's plan as hopeless. Next day the Secretary of State came down heavily on Mr Muskie in a televised press conference, calling his speech very harmful to the prospects of successful negotiations to end the war. This week one of Mr Nixon's chief assistants, Mr H. R. Haldeman, took the matter further in another interview on television. Without naming any names, Mr Haldeman said that the Democratic critics of Mr Nixon's peace plan "are consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States." When the interviewer, taken aback, asked him to say that again, he said it again. Severely limited as is the definition of treason in the American Constitution, it does include giving "aid and comfort" to the enemies of the United States. Mr Haldeman was accusing Senator Muskie, Senator McGovern and the other critics of treason and he was manifestly doing it deliberately. The critics resented it.

President Nixon never said it himself. He went out of his way, in his broadcast about the foreign policy report on Wednesday, to assert the value of free debate and criticism. He added that he did not "question the patriotism or the sincerity of those who disagree with my policies to bring peace." However, Mr Nixon went on, he did hope that any presidential candidate would take care that "nothing he says might give the enemy an incentive to prolong the war until after the election." There may well have been an element of seriousness in this remark. Still, it outlines not only a theme for use against critics of his foreign policy but also a possibly useful explanation for hopes unfulfilled, in a presidential election contest that has started already.

Golden trade

Washington, DC

Changing the gold content of the dollar from one thirty-fifth to one thirty-eighth of an ounce is a more elaborate operation than might appear at first sight. Not only does Congress hold authority over the par value of the dollar under the Bretton Woods Agreements Act of 1946, but it was also Congress that authorised the various subscriptions and quotas of the United States in a group of international organisations ranging from the International Monetary Fund to the Asian Development Bank. As the par value goes down, those holdings have to go up in dollar terms and authority is needed for that.

In addition, while the Administration had determined to get the Par Value Modification Act to Congress by Wednesday, the last day before the recess for Lincoln's Birthday, it had also promised itself to sweeten the draught with announcements of trade concessions from abroad. Some concessions were indeed extracted from the European community in favour of American wheat and citrus fruit; but the French did not like it and there were difficulties about putting the agreement into final form.

Mr Connally, the Secretary of the Treasury, therefore had to content himself with assuring Congress that agreements had in fact been reached with the community, subject to approval by its council of ministers, without being able to submit the agreements themselves. With Japan he did better and he was able to submit a whole list of industrial products on which Japan

"LET'S CALL IT TRIMMIN'. I HATE TH' WORD 'DEVALUATION."

Financial Times (cont'd)

# U.S. foreign policy 'turning point'

BY PAUL LEWIS, U.S. EDITOR

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9.

AMERICAN foreign policy is now at a turning point marked by the emergence of a new and more balanced relationship between Washington and its allies and a more constructive one with its traditional enemies.

Along with the rundown in the Vietnam involvement, this has opened the door to "a generation of peace" based on a wider, though more complex, international consensus that would place a new premium on compromise and moderation in diplomacy.

This is the essence of President Nixon's third foreign policy message to the Congress, which was released here to-day. It is essentially a political document of greater interest than its two predecessors because it sets out to demonstrate the success of the Administration's policies in this election year.

For the past three years, the report says, the Nixon Administration has been working quietly to recast America's foreign policy to the realities of the present day world. It has sought to end the period of cold war confrontation between the western alliance and the Communist nations by seeking a more cooperative relationship with Moscow and bringing China into the world system.

## Most proud

At the same time, however, the growing economic strength and political self-confidence of Europe and Japan has shifted the centre of gravity in the Western Alliance away from the U.S. In recognising this, the Administration has sought to refashion its traditional ties in a more equitable way that takes account both of America's reduced weight in world affairs and of its partners' ambitions to play a more prominent and distinctive role.

It is in the field of East-West relations that President Nixon is clearly most proud of the contribution he has made to this remodelling of American foreign policy over the last three years. However wide the differences with China may still be, he holds out his visit to Peking as an historic gesture ending 25 years

of "implacable hostility with the creation of a stable peace."

Although somewhat less dramatic, the President believes that his forthcoming trip to Moscow will be no less important than the Peking visit as a breakthrough in American relations with the Communist world. He cites a number of signs that the Russians may now be looking for a more peaceful relationship with the West—the Berlin agreement, the treaty banning ocean floor weapons etc.—and is optimistic that this year will see a first agreement in the SALT talks that could lay the foundations for further disarmament measures in both the nuclear and conventional fields.

The report suggests that the Soviet Union's achievement of approximate nuclear parity with the U.S., has contributed to the progress of the SALT discussions by giving both countries a common interest in freezing defence expenditures.

Nevertheless, it acknowledges that one price of this development has been the emergence of the USSR as a world power in the conventional sense, with a large fleet and a new interest in influence and prestige. It warns that only time can show whether this tendency will disrupt its new-found concern for world stability.

Where Europe is concerned, the report suggests that the transformation in American attitudes reflects the success of earlier policies.

The post-war recovery of these countries and Japan has equipped them to play a more prominent role in their own defence and forced the U.S. to pay closer regard to its own economic interests. That this change could strain their relations quite seriously was made plain by the August 15 crisis: but President Nixon argues that the Smithsonian agreement and his parallel round of summit talks has averted the danger and laid the foundations for a more equal and more viable Atlantic partnership.

In separate chapters on the alliance and the international economic order, the President contends that the old trading system had begun seriously to undermine the political unity of the western world by creating

recurrent monetary crises which strained America's relationship with its allies.

The prospect of enlargement of the Common Market—which the U.S. had always supported—threatened to compound these difficulties still further and made imperative from every point of view “not a patchwork adjustment, but a more fundamental change in the manner in which the non-Communist world economy is managed.”

## Less rigid

The report goes on to argue that the “drastic unilateral measures of August 15” were taken in order to stimulate just such a multilateral settlement of the problem.

"We did not, in the period that followed, resort to bilateral agreements. We sought instead a new international agreement which all would participate in decreasing."

The first stage came in the Smithsonian settlement, but President Nixon goes on to underline that this must be followed up by the creation of a more balanced monetary system and a more equitable trading environment.

On monetary reform, the report calls for a less rigid system in which the burden of exchange rate adjustment would fall more evenly on both surplus and deficit countries alike. It suggests that the Special Drawing Right scheme offers an "invaluable" means of diminishing the role of gold and avoiding "the excessive reliance on reserve currencies that had become characteristic of the system." As regards trade, the President calls for "a broad international assault" on the remaining barriers and warns that protectionist or "neCommercialist" policies by any group of countries would "deal a severe blow to the international co-operation which underlies the strength and prosperity of all nations."

The report argues that the distribution caused in America's political relations with Europe by the August 15 programme and the unexpected announcement of the President's visit to Peking, was ironed out during the summit meetings in December and

early January. But it acknowledges that the more fundamental shift in the balance of Atlantic power that has also occurred has brought "an end to American tutelage and an end to the era of automatic unity."

The challenge now is to establish "a new practice in Atlantic unity—finding common ground in a consensus of independent policies instead of in deference to American prescriptions."

Leaving aside Europe and the Communist world, President Nixon admits that his policies have been less successful in many other areas of the globe.

The most prominent setback has been in Indo-China with the failure of his secret negotiations with Hanoi to produce a settlement that would leave the future of the South Vietnamese in their own hands. But he is also pleased with the outcome of the Indo-Pakistan war, reserved about the prospects for Africa and disturbed by South America's ambivalent attitudes towards the United States.

## Overstated

From the domestic political point of view as well as the international, the main comment to be made on this year's foreign policy report is that it overstates the achievements of the Nixon Administration so far. There is indeed encouragement in the field of disarmament, in improving relations with the Communist world and in refashioning the Atlantic alliance. But the main fruits of these labours have yet to be seen and are in fact not easy to predict.

The President himself is careful to enter a note of caution about his dealings with the Communists—although this detracts from his claim that 1971 was a "watershed" in American foreign relations. But he comes close to equating a call for monetary and trade reform with final agreement and he takes credit for resolving the problems that he himself created with the August 15 programme.

This is, in fact, an electoral document which shows that on foreign policy, as with the domestic economy, President Nixon is campaigning as much on promises as on concrete achievements.

LA STAMPA (Turin)

10 Feb. 1972

Il Messaggio al Congresso sullo stato del mondo

# Nixon parla di distensione globale
Fermo coi russi, conciliante con Mao

Ha tracciato le linee della sua politica estera: « Rapporti più creativi con gli avversari, alleanze più equilibrate con gli amici » - Il viaggio in Cina « una svolta storica », la visita in Urss « senza illusioni »
Vietnam: ora gli Usa aspettano iniziative da Hanoi - Medio Oriente: un accordo giungerà presto

(Dal nostro corrispondente)

New York, 9 febbraio.

A otto giorni dalla partenza per Pechino, e a tre mesi dalla visita a Mosca, il presidente Nixon ha presentato al Congresso il suo terzo « Messaggio annuale sullo stato del mondo ». E' questo un massiccio documento (94 mila parole, le dimensioni quasi di una guida telefonica) di politica estera, con il bilancio del 1971 e gli obiettivi del 1972. Il presidente ha voluto precederne la pubblicazione con un breve discorso alla radio alle 11,15 locali, le 17,15 in Italia, e una conferenza stampa del consigliere politico Kissinger.

Il documento è, nel suo campo, il più importante tra quelli preparati dal governo americano negli ultimi anni. Esso suggella il principio del low profile o della revisione della funzione degli Stati Uniti nel mondo, principio riasunto da Nixon con lo slogan « rapporti più creativi con gli avversari, alleanze più equilibrate con gli amici ». Indica anche le direttive nuove « per una generazione di pace ». bilancia di potenza con l'Unione Sovietica, distensione con la Cina, riforma delle strutture commerciali e monetarie dell'Occidente e del Giappone.

Se un particolare ha colpito il Congresso, è la differenza di tono usata dal presidente verso Pechino e Mosca. Verso Mosca, Nixon è stato molto fermo, al punto da denunciarne l'espansionsmo e metterne in dubbio la bontà delle intenzioni, anche se, ha concluso, « considero la mia visita senza illusioni, ma con qualche ragionevole aspettativa ». Verso Pechino, è stato conciliante: « Il mio viaggio — ha detto — rappresenta una svolta storica... Il vecchio scambio di sterili accuse può essere sostituito da un fattivo scambio di opinioni ». Un altro vitale particolare è il mutamento di tono sul Vietnam. Nixon evi-

Il presidente Nixon

dentemente non è disposto ad altre concessioni. « Ho fatto tutto ciò che si poteva fare con onore per porre fine alla guerra » ha dichiarato. « Le mie offerte di pace sono le più generose della storia militare... Hanoi deve ora distinguere tra ciò che è accordo e ciò che sarebbe resa ».

Conviene esaminare i punti principali del messaggio, alla luce dell'affermazione del presidente che « gli Stati Uniti hanno smesso di reagire semplicemente agli eventi, e oggi sanno dove vanno », e che « si accingono a smuovere la storia ». Il messaggio, ha precisato Kissinger, deve servire « come base ad un dibattito nazionale ». Il 1971 è stato un po' « lo spartiacque » degli Stati Uniti. Il mondo del futuro sarà non più bipolare, ma tripolare, e ben presto pentapolare, con

il Giappone e il Mercato comune accanto alle tre grandi.

Cina. La visita a Pechino, ha detto il presidente Nixon, « contribuirà forse ad evitare successive catastrofi ». « Essa non è fine a se stessa, ma segna l'inizio di un lungo dialogo... finalmente discutiamo, e discuteremo da pari a pari ». Ha aggiunto il presidente: « Tra l'America e la Cina rimarranno profonde differenze, ma verrà chiuso un triste capitolò... In futuro, i nostri due grandi popoli potranno collaborare tra di loro... Stiamo compiendo un gigantesco passo avanti verso la pace ». Egli ha sostenuto che la segretezza dei preparativi della visita era indispensabile.

Parlando di Pechino, Nixon ha voluto rassicurare sia il Giappone sia Formosa. « Il Giappone resterà il primo dei nostri alleati asiatici — ha affermato —. Non v'è contraddizione tra il nostro riavviciamento alla Cina ed il raforzamento dei legami con esso. Non intendiamo compromettere un quarto di secolo di strettissima collaborazione politica ed economica coi giapponesi ». Su Formosa ha detto: « Manterremo l'amicizia, i rapporti diplomatici e gli impegni diensivi che abbiamo con l'isola ».

Urss. Il presidente Nixon ha indicato nell'espansione dei rapporti economici e in un accordo parziale sulla limitazione delle armi strategiche i risultati più probabili del suo viaggio a Mosca il prossimo maggio. Dall'accordo militare, verrebbero esclusi momentaneamente gli armamenti atomici sottomarini, e i sistemi di missili antimissili. Nixon ha continuato: « Cercheremo anche di stabilire formule neoziali per le altre questioni sul tappeto, come la sicurezza europea, il Medio Oriente, il Sud Est asiatico ».

In questo quadro, il presidente ha ammonito i sovietici. « Per qualche tempo in futuro continueremo a trovarci davanti ad ambigue e contraddittorie tendenze nella politica estera di Mosca » ha detto.

Vietnam. Senza rivelarlo esplicitamente, il presidente Nixon ha fatto capire che attende ora una iniziativa di Hanoi, forse su mediazione cinese o anche russa. Egli ha persino attaccato il candidato democratico alla presidenza, Muskie, che non ha peÜR nominato, per il suo pacifismo. « Si dà al nemico un incentivio a prolungare la guerra fino a dopo le nostre elezioni » ha sostenuto. In In docina, il presidente non è parso cercare scharite immediate. Ha invece insistito sulla necessità di non creare un altro focolaio nel Bangla Desh. Nella conferenza stampa, Kissinger ha accennato alla possibilità che gli Stati Uniti riconoscano presto il nuovo Stato.

Ennio Caretto

« Il serait de courte vue, dit le Président, d'échanger des liens solides avec un allié capital contre une attestation de l'hostilité d'un adversaire déclaré. »

● Il n'est pas question de trahir « notre vieille amie de Taiwan », de renoncer, pas plus à nos relations diplomatiques avec le gouvernement de Taïpeh, qu'aux engagements de défense que nous avons contractés à son égard.

● Il n'est pas question de chercher à profiter de la tension sino-soviétique. Ce serait une erreur de créer entre les Etats-Unis et l'URSS de nouveaux motifs d'antagonisme qui compromettraient les chances de conclure entre les deux « super-puissances » des « accords de la plus haute importance ».

## U.R.S.S. : Vastes espoirs

Que M. Nixon escompte de l'opération publicitaire de son voyage historique en Chine de considérables dividendes de prestige, voilà qui ne fait aucun doute. Il devient encore plus évident pourtant à la lecture de ce « message sur l'état du monde », que c'est de Moscou qu'il entend rapporter les « succès » qui feront de lui un candidat imbattable à sa réélection.

Là aussi, M. Nixon se veut réaliste. Les Russes ne lui feront pas de cadeau; il le sait. L'U.R.S.S. est « une puissance militaire expansionniste ». Il faut l'arrêter tout de suite : en aucune circonstance, proclame le Président, je ne permettrai que notre équilibre stratégique avec l'U.R.S.S. continue à se détériorer ».

Est-ce possible ? M. Nixon en est certain parce que, estime-t-il, les dirigeants soviétiques ont une conscience de leurs intérêts qui les rend « raisonnables ».

Certes, ils sont responsables du fait qu'une solution n'ait pas encore été apportée à la crise du Proche-Orient. Cette absence de solution facilite leur pénétration en Méditerranée. Mais ils sont aussi partiellement responsables du respect d'un cessez-le-feu qui se prolonge maintenant depuis plus de dix-huit mois. On peut donc négocier utilement avec eux. Leur attitude dans l'accord sur Berlin et dans les conversations des S.A.L.T. l'a déjà prouvé. Le moment est donc venu de chercher à concrétiser des arrangements « plus importants encore ».

M. Nixon se déclare maintenant persuadé d'être en mesure de signer formellement, lors de son séjour en U.R.S.S., un premier accord sur la limitation des arme-

ments stratégiques. Mais il attend aussi de ces conversations avec les maîtres du Kremlin des « progrès significatifs » en ce qui concerne notamment les problèmes du Proche-Orient et de la sécurité européenne. Si ses espoirs ne sont pas déçus dans ces deux domaines, il est prêt à envisager une coopération économique bilingérale américano-soviétique « sur une vaste échelle ». Il voit grand. Il ose le dire. Son voyage à Moscou, proclame-t-il marquera « l'ouverture d'une ère nouvelle dans les relations internationales... qui pourrait constituer l'une des réalisations les plus significatives de notre temps ».

## EUROPE : La cohésion

Dès lors, tous les autres problèmes mondiaux évoqués par le Président des Etats-Unis dans le cadre de son « message » peuvent injustement apparaître comme secondaires. Il faut cependant en retenir, au chapitre consacré à l'Europe, un appel vibrant à la « cohésion de l'Occident », présentée comme la condition indispensable de la « détente avec l'Est », une cohésion que M. Nixon espère voir se manifester pleinement lors de la négociation d'une « véritable réforme complète du système monétaire international » qu'il s'engage formellement à entamer « dès cette année ».

Jacques Jacquet-Francillon.

## UN FONDS SPÉCIAL DES NATIONS UNIES POUR L'ENVIRONNEMENT ?

M. Nixon a proposé la création d'un fonds spécial des Nations Unies pour l'environnement d'un montant qui pourrait s'élever à 100 millions de dollars en cinq ans. Il a en outre demandé que diverses mesures soient prises : encourager les Etats américains, sous peine de perdre le bénéfice de l'aide fédérale, a choisir en fonction de la lutte contre la polution, des emplacements des autoroutes et des aéroports d'ici à 1975 ; décourager les constructions sur les rives des lacs, des rivières et des océans ; imposer une réglementation sur l'élimination des déchets toxiques ; considérer comme un délit fédéral de porter préjudice aux espèces animales en voie de disparition.