Even when they admit that conflict is sharp and the opponent stubborn, Westerners may foresee improvement, even agreement.

"These are rather laborious subjects which perhaps cost us a number of words which is out of proportion to their importance," Sir Michael notes at one occasion when his American colleague is somber. "But," he adds, "I would conclude by saying that I think that with further patience we should certainly be able to reach acceptable understandings on them." (DNT 245, p. 21, Provisional text.) He thus hints at future concessions, a theme which Easterners do not use.

"I am glad to note, "the same Westerner declares at another occasion, "that on a material point we are now in agreement. Of course I must note, at the same time, that we are not yet in agreement on the whole complex of the question (under discussion). Never mind. One step forward may lead to another, and I do not at all despair that we shall reach such an agreement." (DNT 254, p. 31)Provisional text.

In contrast to Western squishiness in the matter, the imputation of insincerity to the opponent is routine for the East.

"Let us, "Tsarpakin proposes, characterically, when addressing the West early in the negotiation," strip the question away (under discussion) of the trappings with which you attempt to conceal its true character and camouflage the real nature of the problem " (DNT 20, p. 12). "Everyone knows, " he affirms, " that when people try to make out that underground nuclear explosions do not contaminate either air, water or the environment, it is a deliberate deception, a lie" (DNT 129, p. 17) "If I believe," he announces, "that the United Kingdom representative's failure to understand what we have said is artificial and not genuine" (DNT 17, p. 19) "In defending his position, Mr. Wadsworth makes lavish use of technical arguments," the Easterner observes. "In fact, however, the technical arguments he uses are only a screen." When the

"This," declares Tsarapkin to the West, "makes the problem completely clear and, try as you may to obscure it, you must bear in mind that. . ." (DNT 16, p.17). "But here," he notes, "perhaps consciously, perhaps unconsciously - - I do not know, perhaps it would be better if it were unsonsciously - but it is more likely to be consciously, the United States representative is confusing two questions. . ." (DNT 56, p. 24). "At the last meeting, as on a number of previous occasions," he recalls, "Mr. Stelle asserted with an air of seriousness..." (DNT 268, p. 32 Provisional text).

Protesting against Eastern manners the West also protests its own goodness.

"I would ask him to study the proposals which we have just abled," says Ormsby-Gore to Tsarapkin. "Their sole purpose is to indicate that we have no sinister purpose..." (DNT 5, p.14). "It is with the utmost sincerity that I say this," declares Wadsworth (DNT 9, p. 14).

As it does in the face of Eastern denials of its sincerity, the West protests against the impugning of its motives.

"I came to Geneva," declares Wadsworth early in the negotiation, "fully convinced that the Soviet delegation would come here in good faith to negotiate, and I must say that it gives me quite a shock to find this continued misunderstanding of motives and impugnment of motives" (DNT 3, p.17). Almost two 1 years later, both his a surprise and his indignation still seem fresh: "But, Mr. Tsarapkin, you are now doing something which I deeply regret, particularly in view of our excellent associations during approximately the

"We consider," says Wadsworth in words never heard from Tsarapkin, "That the arguments used by the Soviet Union . . . have convinced the United States delegation of the rightness of the Soviet view (opposed to the one held to by the United States) in this particular regard. . ." (DNT 19, p. 14). When a divergence has arisen between him and Tsarapkin about what Pres. Eisenhower has said at a certain occasion, the Westerner finally declares: "I find that my impressions was wrong, and I therefore concede that my impression was wrong" - - to which his Eastern opponent reacts by applying the principle of pursuit: "Then, please accept our amendment" (DNT 44, p.35). "Yesterday," Wadsworth recalls, "the Soviet delegation presented us with certain suggested amendments. . . to the draft article VIII... which he had submitted to the Conference. . . As the United States delegation studied the suggestions which had been made by the Soviet delegation we came to the conclusion that indeed there was, throughout this article, some ambiguity. . . We are happy, therefore, that the suggested Soviet amendments have called these ambiguities to our attention" (DNT 79, p.5). "My delegation," declares Sir Michael Wright, "considers that the Soviet delegation is making a valid point. . ." (DNT 165, p.9). "I see a certain force in your remarks on this point," Popper admits to Tsarapkin (DNT 202, p. 23).

Obeying the principle of pursuit, Easterners are apt--more than Westerners--to react to a concession by pressing the opponent for more; a trait which the West proceeds to name only when the negotiation has entered a critical phase. Then Dean observes, "As usual, when we meet the Soviet proposals. . . the Soviet Union apparently demands still more and ever more" (DNT 290, p.6, Provisional text), while Ormsby-Gore notes, "When we make concessions, the Soviet representative simply asks for more" (DNT 304, p. 5 Provisional text).

The Western concession, the Easterner will then declare is in any case much overdue.

"We have not decided yet," he says much later, "exactly what should
be placed in the heavens from the standpoint of high-altitude and outer
space control. We should like to discuss this with our colleagues," (DNT 171, p.13)

"We on the Western side," declares a Canadian representative (Wilgress) at
the conference surprise attack, "cannot go beyond illustrative papers and
gett down to the practical detailed study of the technical subject of this
Conference until, and I must stress this, the experts on the other side
of the tabke join us in carrying out these studies" (SA 24, pp. 4-5).

"Our plan does not attempt to set out the details," announces Ormsby-Gore at
the conference on disarmament in 1960, "We look forward to wrking this out
with all our colleagues around this table" (TN 2, p.13)

When Tsarapkin criticizes a passage in an announcement issued by the
would
White House, Wadsworth starts his reply thus: "I/begin my answer to the
Soviet representative by telling him frankly that I myself would not have
drafted this particular paragraph in exactly that way." For "the wording
of the fourth paragraph of the presidential announcement can be regarded as
some what vague." Still, the Western claims that his superior committed
a mistake of form rather than an error of substance, "although" there is the
regrettable matter in question, "I am convinced that..." Still, "I would say
again that I am sorry it (the President's announcement) is drafted in a
slightly vague way (DNT 203, p. 7)" what might have been viewed as a slip
is this repeated.

A lack of definite positions, Westerners may claim, increases the
chances of negotiation succeeding; for precision induces inflexibility.

The two appear fused, or confused, when Sir Michael Wright recalls
"our experience at this table"!" When any of our three delegations has felt
obliged to take up a hard and fast position in advance on a particular matter
before, ; . . our subsequent negotiations have not always become easier."
Hence the Western preference for regarding matters as "open for further
discussions and. . .negotiation between us. . .rather than trying to define
unilaterally in advance exactly what the right answer may be." Therefore
"I would ask my Soviet colleague not to consider that in saying this we are
trying to be vague in the sense of being unhelpful. On the contrary, we are
trying to be helpful by showing ourselves flexible (DNT 194, pp 33-34, Prov.
text.)

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When the West ceases to insist that the duration of the <u>preliminary</u> pro-
jected treaty banning nuclear tests be made conditional on progress in dis-
armament, Tsarapkin comments" "We note with satisfaction that the United States
and the United Kingdom have judged it expedient, albeit at a fairly late
stage in our negotiations, to remove on £ of the strange conditions which
has been laid down in the United States and United Kingdom proposal regarding
the duration of the treaty. . . "(DNT 37, p. 10).

When the West raises the n umber of host country nationals it is
willing to admit at a control post from about four to about ten, Tsarapkin
merely remarks that "at least we are seeing some movement in our negotiation..."
(DNT 113, p. 12).

Also the concession proffered is but small.

"While this <u>consit</u>utes a certain step forward," Tsarapkin declares
It at the same occasion about the Western concession, "it is a long way from
being a possible ground of agreement between us." All he can think of
a t that juncture is "to remind the United States and United Kingdom
representatives again of their very great indebtedness in regard to a
decisive question--I ¤ refer ß to our proposal relating to inspection quotes.
I hope you are ready to give us your answer today on that question as well"
(Loc. Cit., p. 15). It is only at the next meeting that the Easterner does
admit in unusual fashion, "a considerable rapprochement of our positions"
(DNT 114, p. 5).

In any case, the West offered its concession under duress; for there
is no other reason for any concession by any opponent.

When the West abandons its effort to make a test ban conditional on
progress in disarmament, Tsarapkin comments: "It must be observed that, in

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removing this condition. . . the United States has first and foremost eliminated one of the weaknesses of its own position, one which had been very severely criticized throughout the world. In removing this weakness, the Western powers have. . . eased their own position" (DNT 37, p. 11). "The Western representatives said here yesterday" the Easterner recalls at the next meeting, "that they had made a great concession to the Soviet Union. But this is not a concession to the Soviet Union it is merely the necessity to show some common sense, to reckon with the demands of public opinion. . . The fact that the United States withdrew one of its proposals, the obstructionist purpose of which was obvious to everybody, is attributable mainly to its desire to escape the incessant criticism to which it has been subjected from every quarter of the world" (DNT 38, p. 34).

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two years (during which Tsarapkin has frequently been doing the same thing) I
beg you to refrain from impugning the motives of my country. I beg you to
understand that we mean what we say. I beg you to inform your Government
that we sincerely wish to see a test-ban treaty concluded on terms which are
acceptable to all three of us." (DNT 232, pp 19-20).

In the late spring of 1961 Dean may still adopt a tone which
is essentially Wadsworth's of the late fall of 1958: "Throughout our negoti-
ations. . . the USSR. . . has frequently assailed the motives of the United
Kingdom and of the United States. The Soviet argument is. . . that if the
United States wants some effective control measure to accompany the United
States pledge of a test ban, which measured the Soviet Union opposes, this
supposedly creates a new obstacle and thus shows that the United States is . . .
against concluding a nuclear test ban treaty and therefore wants to resume
nuclear tests. . . . I submit that my Government is as aware of the importance
and utility of a test ban as is the Soviet Government, and indeed is much more
realistic about trying to work it out" (DNT 310, pp. 7-10, Provisional text).

Speech at Soviet-Czech Friendship Meeting, July 12, 1958, Foreign Radio Broadcasts.

Why is it that the imperialist circles do not wish to hold talks and conclude agreements with us? They fear that agreements with us and with other countries of the socialist camp will undermine the very basis of imperialist propaganda.... And then the entire system of aggressive pacts created by the imperialists--all the NATO's SEATO's, Baghdad Pacts and so forth--will begin to crumble. The fable of the Communist danger is the main thread which holds together that system of military pacts.

Figuratively, it looks like a knitted article: Pull out one thread and the whole article will fall apart and become no more than a shapeless heap of threads.

Have Soviet values changed then, as Mr. Fulbright, Mr. Rusk and others have implied? The answer is found in the Soviet Party's own words in its memorandum to the Chinese Communists of July 14, 1963:

"We stand fully for the destruction of Imperialism and Capitalism. We not only believe in the inevitable destruction of Capitalism, but are doing everything for this to be accomplished by class struggle and as soon as possible."

In another document of September 21, 1963, the Soviet leaders defended their policy of peaceful coexistence as the most effective means to destroy the West and they have also avowed Soviet support for so-called "wars of national liberation."

In its most recent pronouncement (made on February 14th and published April 4th), the Soviet party stated:

"One of the most acute points of the polemics in the Communist movement is the way of carrying out the revolution . . . Realistically assessing the present situation, the fraternal parties allow for the transition from Capitalism to Socialism either by peaceful or non-peaceful means."

In other words the slogan of peaceful coexistence is largely a matter of tactics.

What makes these statements particularly ominous is that "peaceful coexistence" is claimed by Soviet leaders to represent Leninist tradition. This calls to mind an observation by George F. Kennan during the Soviet peace offensive of 1960.

"... people in Moscow are not likely to strengthen belief outside Russia in their attachment to liberal and tolerant principles of international life. . . by pleading that such attachment flows inevitably from the

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"They (the Communists) appear to have begun to realize that there is an irresolvable contradiction between the demands to promote world Communism by force and the needs of the Soviet state and people."

What evidence is there of this except a more conciliatory Soviet tone not different from that of other peace offensives in the Forties and Fifties? Mr. Khrushchev speaks today of "peaceful coexistence." But how does this differ from this statement made in 1959 two years before the Berlin Wall and three years before the installation of missiles in Cuba:

"Our desire for peace and peaceful coexistence is not conditioned by any time-saving or tactical considerations. . . . There is only one way to peace, one way out of the existing tension: peaceful coexistence."

I am bothered by the statement of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, who summed up the attitude of three years of the Democratic Administration with the comment: "The Communist world was seldom, if ever, the enemy." Is Communist hostility to be removed by striking a pose?

And I see no evidence for Senator Fulbright's conclusion that "we must distinguish between Communism as an ideology and the power and policy of the Soviet state." This is a distinction the Communist leaders have always rejected. It overlooks the most important aspect of contemporary international life: the struggle for the heart and the minds of men.

The test of our desire for peace should not be whether one interprets trends in the Communist world in a way that lifts the burden of difficult choices from our shoulders. On the contrary, we must be prepared to face the real nature of our challenge, and yet explore every honorable road to peace.

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nature of the social and political system prevailing
in the Soviet Union. It is possible to conceive that
the Soviet attitude in such questions may have changed;
it is not possible to accept the proposition that it did
not need to change in order to meet the requirement of
peaceful coexistence."

The past record of the Soviets with respect to peaceful coexistence
offers little reason for optimism. Peaceful coexistence was avowed by the
Soviet Union between 1924-39; between 1943-46; at the time of the Geneva
Summit Conference of 1955; and again at the time of Khrushchev's visit to the
United States in 1959.

On each occasion the period of relaxation was ended when an opportunity for expanding Communism presented itself. The period of tranquility after 1924 was followed by the annexation of Bessarabia, a third of Poland, the Baltic States and an attack on Finland. World War II led to the creation of the satellite orbit in Eastern Europe. The spirit of Geneva gave way to the penetration of the Middle East and a crisis over Berlin. And the spirit of Camp David was ended with another Berlin crisis and the establishment of a Communist military base in Cuba.

If the United States fails to grasp the nature of the philosophical
challenge to it, then we cannot summon either the political creativity or the
dedication to our own philosophy which are required to meet it.

QUOTES FROM THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE:

A. Senator Connally, May, 1943:

"Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of Communism, and the whole Western world will be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts."

B. Fortune supplement, "The United States in a New World," April, 1943.

"Russia will prefer the peace of Europe to its communization. The arguments in favor of this assumption are that Trotsky is dead and that Russia will be too weak for aggression in Europe, even ideological aggression, after the war. It is the essence of Stalinism to use communism as an instrument of Russian nationalist foreign policy; and as a nation Russia, though she has been gradually expanding for centuries, is not so much land-hungry as hungry for security on her borders. Given this security she is likely to fix her attention on the development of her enormous internal resources."