November 1, 1954

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy

PRELIMINARY OUTLINE OF STUDY

by Carroll L. Wilson

1. The destructive capabilities.

a) The effects of an H. Bomb on a large city - on structures, on people.
(For planning purposes what assumption is FCDA using as to areas of
total, partial and minor destruction, casualties, effects of fire,
blast and radiation, distant fall-out, etc. This information might
well be sufficient to establish the dimensions of the disaster to a
single city - and perhaps to downwind areas.)

b) Estimate of the mass effect of simultaneous nuclear bomb attack on critical target areas of the U.S.A., Western Europe and U.S.S.R.
in terms of -

1. Dead and injured

2. Property damage

3. Capacity of the undamaged remainder areas to hospitalize, house, feed, support, etc., the refugees.

4. Cost and time to restore destroyed areas to a productive role in the economy.

5. Political morale, etc., effects - fear in other cities of similar attacks, effects upon functioning of the remainder of the economy.

6. Effects of destruction of national capitals and a substantial part of their inhabitants upon machinery of government.

7. Degree and duration of national paralysis which might be expected to follow - capacity of the nation to deal with anything except internal problems in the wake of such attack. Resilience of the political-economic system to such a blow.

c) Delivery of bombs.

1. State of existing delivery means and systems - speed, range, target identification, etc., for U.S. and U.S.S.R.

2. Probable character of such delivery means in five years.

3. Plans for Soviet attack on U.S. targets must rely on launching from Soviet territory. Importance of advance bases now and in five years. Will U.S. trend toward Soviet strategy with less dependence on bases outside N. America?

d) The Defenses.

1. State of existing warning of attack and defenses to intercept, divert and exact a toll from attack by present nuclear bomb carrying aircraft in Western Europe, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.

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2. Estimate of effectiveness of optimum defenses now contemplated against

-present carriers

-future carriers under development

3. What about civil defense

-sheltering, mass evacuation?

-problems in both target areas and fall-out areas?

-degree of feasible protection?

e) Can massive retaliation be avoided?

1. Dispersal of SACS

2. Vulnerability of bases and firing sites for guided missiles.

3. Does U.S. believe it could mount a massive counter-attack even if U.S.S.R. attacked first with top priority against our means of counter attack?

4. Is it fair to assume the U.S.S.R. could do the same?

2. Does the possibility of virtual mutual annihilation produce nuclear stalemate?

a) Is an assumption of effective if not numerical equality of nuclear weapon strength and means of delivery and defense of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. a sound basis for planning?

1. Reliability of our estimates of Soviet strength.

2. Comparative rate of technological progress in weapons, delivery and defense.

b) What are the realities of the capacity of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to initiate nuclear warfare?

-politically - domestic

-politically - allies and UN

c) Clues from Soviet statements and actions re their estimate of the useability of nuclear weapons as instruments of national power.

1. Soviet statements re H and A bombs, positions taken in UN, role in dealings with neighbors and neutral nations.

2. Evidences of reliance upon conventional military means vs. nuclear weapons.

3. Evaluation of tools of Soviet strategy between military and non-military means.

d) The question of rationality at the "trigger."

1. Would counter-annihilation have deterred Hitler?

2. What about the Soviet leaders? The U.S.A.?

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3. Implications for war and the military establishment.

a) Are the following premises among those on which U.S. policy is based?

1. That the principal -- indeed the overwhelming threat to the security of the U.S. is the U.S.S.R. and its ally Communist China.

2. That the basic aims and plans of the U.S.S.R. are world domination with the U.S.A. as the foremost and most formidable obstacle to the achievement of these aims.

3. That there is no prospect of enduring peaceful coexistence of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.

4. That the military strength of the U.S.S.R. in conventional arms will continue to exceed by a wide margin that of the U.S. and its present allies.

5. That the preservation of Western Europe from being overrun and consumed by the U.S.S.R. is an essential shield for our protection.

6. That advance bases on allied territory are essential to our capacity to strike the U.S.S.R. by air attack with nuclear weapons (at this point of technical development).

7. That the further extension of Soviet power must be contained and if possible the limits of its present extension reduced.

8. That there have been no important changes in the strategy on tactics of the U.S.S.R. since Stalin's death.

b) Are the following the principal elements of U.S. strategy based on these premises?

1. That the threat of massive attack by U.S. on U.S.S.R. with nuclear weapons will deter the U.S.S.R. from further expansion.

2. That the principal means by which the Soviet power is to be contained is by military force.

3. That the U.S. is prepared to use nuclear weapons on the U.S.S.R. in response to some degree or act of aggression by the U.S.S.R.

4. That such use is an integral part of allied strategy as well as that of U.S.

5. That the U.S. and its allies are prepared to initiate World War III by a massive attack on the U.S.S.R. with nuclear weapons.

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6. That the U.S. is prepared to take this step with or without the consent of its allies.

7. That diplomatic, economic and other non-military measures of meeting the Soviet menace are of relatively minor importance as compared with military measures.

8. That this strategy is a well-tailored counterpoise to the probable Soviet strategy during the next five years.

c) Churchill at the close of the last session of parliament May 1954 said:

> "But I had not held my mind closed to the tremendous changes that have taken place in the whole strategic position in the world which make the thoughts which were well founded and will knit together a year ago, utterly obsolete and which have changed the opinion of every competent soldier that I have been able to meet. How utterly out of proportion to the Suez Canal and the position which we held in Egypt are the appalling developments and the appalling spectacle which imagination raises before us. Merely to imagine in outline the first few weeks of a war under conditions about which we did not know when the session commenced and about which we had had not been told...."

This statement implies that a profound reappraisal of the strategy of Britain in view of the facts of H Bomb warfare is to be undertaken. If such facts make utterly obsolete the thoughts of a year ago in re the strategic position of the U.K., what about the U.S.?

d) Wars of limited objective vs. wars of undonditional surrender or total destruction.

1. Korea

2. Indo-China

3. Differences, if any, between such wars in Asia and wars in Europe or the Middle East.

e) Tactical use of nuclear weapons - value they might have had in Korea or Indo-China - lessons from recent maneuvers in Europe.

1. Probabilities that tactical use of nuclear weapons will lead to full-scale strategic use against cities.

2. Assessment of the risk of unleashing global war and mutual annihilation against the value of nuclear weapons in military actions.

f) Do the new weapons create a revolution in warfare that displaces old concepts or does the stalemate re-establish the validity and importance of the old concepts? Does this mean that the type of warfare of Korea and Indo-China (guerilla vs. push-button) is the probable pattern of the future? Is this type of warfare inherently based on men being

cheap and machinery being dear? Is the U.S. military establishment postulated on the opposite concept?

g) What meaning does this have in relation to our commitments vs. our capacity and public support to fulfill them in Korea - Indo-China type struggles?

4. Implications for alliances.

a) Do the new weapons make allies less important because -

1. Need to act quickly and hence alone.

2. Stalemate makes the U.S. more secure against disturbance.

3. Our principal military power instrument to support allies is unusable.

4. We must greatly reduce our commitments of strength because our main source of military strength is neutralized.

5. We cannot risk aiding our allies in conventional military arms nor can they risk receiving our aid because of the possibility of loosening nuclear destruction.

6. Bases become less needed for delivery of attack on the U.S.S.R. on account of improved long-range delivery systems operating from North America.

b) Or do these weapons make allies just as important as they were in the pre-atomic era because -

1. The neutralization of nuclear weapons re-establishes the conditions and means of power counterpoise which existed before.

2. The real battle is for the minds of men in the period of the "Revolution of Rising Expectations" - hence for trade and general world public relations we must vigorously compete with the U.S.S.R. for allies throughout the world.

c) What about the forces pulling allies away from us because of vulnerability of allies to attack; neutralism as affected by these weapons and U.S. policy regarding their role and use.

5. Implications for non-military aspects of foreign policy.

a) Does a nuclear stalemate mean that the U.S.S.R. is likely to put special emphasis on its other foreign policy means? Are there clues to Soviet strategy which support or deny this thesis?

b) What modifications in the premises of U.S. foreign policy and the strategy for fulfillment should be made? - what about trade, aid,

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

November 1, 1954

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

PRELIMINARY OUTLINE OF STUDY

by Carroll L. Wilson

a) The effects of an H. Bomb on a large city - on structures, on people. (For planning purposes what assumption is FCDA using as to areas of total, partial and minor destruction, casualties, effects of fire, blast and radiation, distant fall-out, etc. This information might well be sufficient to establish the dimensions of the disaster to a single city - and perhaps to downwind areas).

in terms of -

1. Dead and injured

2. Property damage

c) Delivery of bombs.

1. State of existing delivery means and systems - speed, range, target identification, etc. for U.S. and U.S.S.R.

3. Plans for Soviet attack on U. S. targets must rely on launching from Soviet territory. Importance of advance bases now and in five years. Will U.S. trend toward Soviet strategy with less dependence on bases outside N. America?

d) The Defenses.

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2. Estimate of effectiveness of optimum defenses now contemplated against
   -present carriers
   -future carriers now under development

3 What about civil defense
   -sheltering, mass evacuation?
   -problems in both target areas and fall-out areas?
   -degree of feasible protection?

1. Dispersal of SACS

4 Is it fair to assume the U.S.S.R. could do the same?

-politically - domestic

-politically - allies and UN

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c) Churchill at the close of the last session of Parliament May 1954 said:

> "But I had not held my mind closed to the tremendous changes that have taken place in the whole strategic position in the world which make the thoughts which were well founded and well knit together a year ago, utterly obsolete and which have changed the opinion of every competent soldier that I have been able to meet. How utterly out of proportion to the Suez Canal and the position which we held in Egypt are the appalling developments and the appalling spectacle which imagination raises before us. Merely to imagine in outline the first few weeks of a war under conditions about which we did not know when the session commenced and about which we had not been told...."

d) Wars of limited objective vs. wars of unconditional surrender or total destruction.

1. Korea

2. Indo-China

e) Tactical use of nuclear weapons - value they might have had in Korea on Indo-China - lessons from recent maneuvers in Europe.

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5. We cannot risk aiding our allies in conventional military arms nor can they risk receiving our aid because of the possibility of loosing nuclear destruction.

b) What modifications in the premises of U.S. foreign policy and the strategy for fulfillment should be made? - What about trade, aid, technical assistance, etc.

The first meeting of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on Monday, November 8, at 5:30 PM.
Present were: Gordon Dean, Chairman; Carroll L. Wilson, Research Director;
Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur; Hamilton Fish Armstrong; Hanson W. Baldwin;
Lloyd V. Berkner; George S. Franklin, Jr; N.E. Halaby; Caryl P. Haskins;
William Henderson; Mervin J. Kelly; David E. Lilienthal; Maj. Gen. James
McCormack, Jr; Frank C. Nash; Paul H. Nitze; Charles P. Noyes II; Frank
Pace, Jr; James A. Perkins; I.I. Rabi; Oscar M. Ruebhausen; Henry deWolf
Smyth; and Shields Warren.

The Chairman pointed out that the following men have also promised
to attend future meetings of the group: Frank Altschul; Robert R. Bowie;
Joseph E. Johnson; Don K. Price; David Rockefeller; Walter Bedell Smith;
and Arnold Wolfers.

Mr. Wilson explained the background of the project and of the outline
(which was distributed to the group members). He pointed out that those
who helped to set up the group had chosen, from among many possible starting
points, the one contained in Sections IA and B of the outline -- namely,
the effect of one nuclear weapon on an American city, this effect multi-
plied to give the result of a Soviet strike against 25 major target centers,
and a comparison of the net consequences of such a strategic blow delivered
against the United States with those of a similar strike against the USSR.

Mr. Dean explained that the group has, as yet, no definitely fixed
goal, which he took to be a healthy sign, but that as the meetings progress
a reasonable goal may well emerge, possibly to prepare the way for a written
report. He agreed with Mr. Wilson that a logical starting point for dis-
cussion would be an analysis of weapons effects on large urban centers and,
for that reason, had requested Dr. Warren to lead off with a consideration
of the radiological and blast damage which might result from a nuclear
attack.

Dr. Shields Warren: Society as Organization and Organism

Dr. Warren prefaced his remarks with an analogy to the starfish, a
simple organism, which has the ability to regenerate a severed tentacle or
even, if each piece contains a bit of the central part, to grow whole new
starfish from five divided arms. Such regeneration, of course, is possible
only in relatively uncomplicated organisms -- not, for instance, in the
human brain which cannot repair injuries to its component cells. Society,
to carry out the analogy, is a highly complex and specialized "organism"
and cannot in all cases regenerate destroyed parts. Furthermore, the effects
of a local injury may be transmitted along the "nervous system" to all parts
of the social animal. Thus, the destruction of New York City would be
accompanied by physical and psychological shocks throughout the country.

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Several group members pressed Dr. Warren for details on fall-out composition and he replied that it is made up of fission products which have condensed, plus coarse contaminated particles of earth and buildings, over 75 microns in size, which are sucked up into the blast and then deposited downwind. While smaller atomic particles are likely to travel considerable distances in the upper air strata, they pose little immediate problem. The larger particles, on the other hand, are deposited almost at once and continue to fall-out for several hours. These larger particles are created only when the fire-ball touches ground, not in under-water or air bursts. Dr. Kelly pointed out, however, that it is only logical to assume that the enemy will be sufficiently well-informed and accurate as to cause the bomb to burst at the most lethal height. Dr. Warren agreed to this and suggested that, in any event, the fire-ball of a fusion weapon is so large as to make it all but impossible to miss hitting the ground. Although wind determines the direction of fall-out, in most of the target areas the destruction-range of a fusion bomb is so great that the suburban areas will suffer more from direct effects than from fall-out. Dr. Haskins added that fall-out is aggravated in cities where brick is a common building material because the silicon in the brick and the lime in the mortar become part of the hot material.

## Fall-out and Civil Defense Problems

Mr. Dean wondered about the extent to which fall-out affects the civil defense picture and Dr. Warren thought that the FCDA has not yet taken to heart the lessons of last spring's Pacific tests. Fall-out may destroy the usefulness of planned evacuation areas; only further study of the problem will tell whether the better plan would be to evacuate or to try and provide individual shelter areas within the target center. Mass shelter, he insisted, is quite out of the question. Dr. Berkner also noted that evacuation plans are postulated on a dispersion of the population rather evenly over the target area so as to relieve high density concentrations and reduce the statistical probability of casualties. Mr. Noyes observed that there is a good bit of difference, in all these considerations, between one hour of warning and warning (through, possibly, increased world tensions) over a relatively long period of time.

Dr. Rabi felt strongly that shelters ought not be eliminated as a means of reducing casualties significantly and Dr. Warren stressed that he had meant mass shelters were out of the question; small shelters, he agreed, are important. Mr. Armstrong raised the further question of FCDA intentions vis-à-vis the closing of major highways in the event of attack. Mr. Wilson said he feels the Administration has modified its position from the stay-and-take-it philosophy of fission bomb days to the one-hour-warning-and-evacuate-the-downtown-area philosophy of fusion bombing, but that apparently this thinking has not been revised in light of more recent disclosures about fall-out.

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He thought it possible that an uneducated general population might be better adapted to the business of primitive survival than an alert and sophisticated one. Dr. Haskins suggested that the responsiveness of the two governments to their peoples is very directly related to any relative advantages of a "blackmail" attempt -- that is, the threat of using nuclear force against civilian populations. Mr. Wilson noted that the group will discuss the whole problem of comparative morale later in the year; Mr. Dean added, however, that such a discussion is hamstrung by a general unwillingness to discuss dispassionately the consequences of "preventive war." Most people either support or attack the notion, largely on emotional grounds, and no one is willing to talk about it in terms of occupation problems, mopping-up operations, etc. Mr. Halaby brought the group back to the proposition that, before effects can be considered, world conditions which might lead to an attack by either side must be discussed. The general feeling of the group, as it adjourned for dinner, was that the second half of the meeting should concern itself more with the political preconditions of nuclear war.

## U.S. Policy Alternatives

Mr. Dean suggested three working assumptions, on the basis of which U.S. policy might be projected: (1) the possibility of a definite break in the Dew Line giving two hours notice of attack; (2) the possibility that an increase in world tensions might indicate an attack in the very near future; or (3) the possibility of an attack in about six months, which is probably the present situation and one that will continue on into the indefinite future. Dr. Rabi felt that the capacity of this country to retaliate controls its actions under any one of these alternative situations. Mr. Dean acknowledged that relative U.S.-U.S.S.R. strength is very important and suggested that each of his three assumptions be tested with time coordinates -- today, one year from now, and ten years from now.

Mr. Baldwin agreed that the evening's discussion was all based on the unexamined assumption that the U.S.S.R. can "use our nuclear weapons against us" and that possibly the U.S.S.R. is not now as strong as we are; but he maintained that we must be prepared to face the maximum eventuality. General McCormack very strongly agreed that our policy must always be proof against the fiercest known weapons; he went on to point out that at the present time the U.S.S.R. is probably in position to launch a major strike against the U.S., using B-29 type planes with one-way suicide crews. Dr. Kelly concurred that, in the absence of exact information, the group must assume that the enemy will reach maximum potential, at least eventually. General McCormack added that the men "really running things" are constantly reshaping policy in light of every smallest detail.

Mr. Dean, in order to peg the discussion of Soviet capabilities onto something tangible, reviewed the certainties in the situation. First, the Soviets apparently know a good bit about the U.S. nuclear program. Second, they have atomic bombs. Third, they have at least one-way planes in quantity.

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Mr. Dean felt that one must assume that a tactical atomic weapon will be effective in a given situation and then pose the question: can the U.S. forbear using it? Mr. Pace reiterated his previous point that the use of such devices may have greater political disadvantages than military advantages.

Dr. Berkner felt that stalemate, in any definition, is a myth; either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. will be willing to use atomic devices to achieve "vital" goals. Mr. Noyes suggested that it is vital, after all, that a nation not commit suicide in order to achieve a goal.

## Mr. Halaby's Five Point Program

Mr. Halaby remarked that nearly all the members of the group have either "made" or "used" atomic devices and he called for a more political approach to the problem. He then stated five basic U.S. foreign policy requirements, with the emphasis on political rather than military factors:

(1) Prevent a nuclear war.

(2) Win a nuclear war if it occurs.

(3) Stop local aggression at the locality.

(4) Stop local aggression at its source.

(5) Preserve the solidarity of the free world.

Mr. Dean agreed with the first of these five points but balked at the second; he felt that the U.S. is not prepared, at this moment, to win a nuclear war.

Mr. Nitze thought that Mr. Halaby's points were well-taken but he would go one step further and make the primary goal the preservation of the United States and the continuance of a "salutary" world environment, thus placing the avoidance of war second. Even if war were to destroy the world as we know it today, still the U.S. must win that war decisively. Furthermore, he would expect most policy planners to agree that, in the final analysis, the preservation of the U.S. is the overriding goal, not the fate of our allies.

The atomic bomb has perhaps acted as a war-deterrent so far, Mr. Lilienthal suggested, but although it has avoided total war it has certainly not prevented Soviet aggression.

Mr. Nitze amplified his previous statement by saying that political success depends upon the military situation. Mr. Pace agreed, adding that to deter war a country must have the capacity to win that war and must make that clear to the potential enemy. Mr. Dean concurred but remarked that this country has not always made its intentions clear to the enemy nor has it always been prepared mentally to face the consequences of its actions. We know what we want to do with regard to war, Mr. Dean went on, but perhaps the people are not yet ready to assess the alternatives publicly.

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Mr. Halaby wondered if there is really any such thing any more as a "little" war. Mr. Dean thought that it is indeed becoming less likely; if a situation were to arise in which a little war could be terminated by the use of atomic weapons, this country would surely choose to do so. General McCormack wanted to stress two further points: first, that in those areas where a definite picket line has been established, this country is becoming better and better prepared to resist aggression. And second: in considering possible political pressure by our allies against using nuclear weapons, the courage of our allies and their willingness to go along on extremely unpleasant decisions should never be underestimated.

Mr. Dean closed the meeting with a suggestion that it would be appropriate, at the next group session, to have a statesman discuss the foreign policy aspects of nuclear weapons and set the whole weapons picture in that perspective.

Kelsey Marechal
Rapporteur

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The Chairman pointed out that the following men have also promised
to attend future meetings of the group: Frank Altschul; Robert R. Bowie;
Joseph E. Johnson; Don K. Price; David Rockefeller, Walter Bedell Smith;
and Arnold Wolfers.

********

********

Mr. Wilson explained the background of the project and of the out-
line (which was distributed to the group members). He pointed out that
those who helped to set up the group had chosen, from among many possible
starting points, the one contained in Sections IA. and B of the outline --
namely, the effect of one nuclear weapon on an American city, this effect
multiplied to give the result of a Soviet strike against 25 major target
centers, and a comparison of the net consequences of such a strategic blow
delivered against the United States with those of a similar strike against
the USSR.

Mr. Dean explained that the group has, as yet, no definitely fixed
goal, which he took to be a healthy sign, but that as the meetings progress
a reasonable goal may well emerge, possibly to prepare the way for a written
report. He agreed with Mr. Wilson that a logical starting point for dis-
cussion would be an analysis of weapons effects on large urban centers and,
for that reason, had requested Dr. Warren to lead off with a consideration
of the radiological and blast damages which might result from a nuclear
attack.

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It is impossible, to be sure, to predict human behavior under such extreme conditions; but nearly all eyewitnesses to the Nagasaki raid in 1945 (including competent observers from all professions) have described a state of protracted shock which seized them after the attack. Dr. Warren guessed that an experience of such magnitude might well preclude even a trained person from responding with organization and efficiency for some time afterward. It was seven days before rescue operations began in Nagasaki.

The cities of the United States, Dr. Warren went on to say, are built socially and physically in such a way that they may carry the seeds of their own destruction, either through the uncontrolled acts of their citizens or through the combustible nature of their buildings. With regard to the possibility of fire after an atomic attack, it is necessary to remember that the most flammable structures are generally located at the outer edges of the city, which would not only spread the area of destruction but also might encircle the city with a ring of fire -- or, quite literally, a "ring of fear" -- thus inducing further panic in the survivors.

Dr. Warren felt that the FCDA estimate of 30 per cent mortality within the B-zone of heavy damage (seven mile radius) might be a bit conservative. In purely technical terms, however, mortality from an attack represents only the actual number killed. That is, while fire might consume most of the bodies and the rest could be bulldozed under, the problem of injured survivors affects many more persons than the actual number of injured. For example, under normal conditions, a hospital requires five persons to care for one patient. In Nagasaki, under the most primitive medical conditions and totally lacking in formal organization, it has been estimated that each survivor required two persons to care for him -- one to scavenge for food, the other to prepare it and minister to the patient. Using the most optimistic estimate, therefore, after an attack the entire surviving population of the affected area would either be injured or engaged in caring for the injured. The psychological effect on survivors would also be increased by the enormous difficulties of identification of casualties, thus placing persons under severe tension regarding the fate of their families. Dr. Warren recalled that after the Cocoanut Grove fire in Boston which resulted in only 700 casualties in a city of millions, and even though the organization of society was in no way affected, it required three days to identify the victims.

## Special Problems in a Petroleum-Based Economy

Dr. Warren felt that Mr. Wilson had brought out clearly in his paper and outline that, despite great differences among the various cities of the United States, there are compensating factors in each case which allow them to be handled similarly. Thus, while the A-zone (three mile radius) of New York is more densely populated than most other cities, it includes large areas of park, river, and marshland which, in Chicago or Los Angeles, are inhabited. Dr. Warren also felt that the outline treats adequately certain of the secondary effects of an attack -- such as disruption of the electrical

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supply and poisoning of the water supply -- but that it neglects various
more long-range problems. For example, in terms of motive power our econ-
omy is petroleum-based, not only for general transportation but also for
productive farming; draft animals have very largely disappeared in this
country as an available energy-source. Dr. Warren said he has been advised
that, even were an intensive breeding program begun now and barring all
unforeseen accidents, it would take from 10 to 12 years to produce enough
horses to permit families stripped of power equipment to become self-supporting
even in the most fertile parts of the country.

Post-Attack Medication Problems

Our capacity to deal with medical problems after an attack, Dr. Warren pointed out, is severely limited by the fact that most of our hospitals, supplies, and personnel are themselves within the target areas and, thus, subject to serious damage. Fortunately, if ironically, some of the newer Veterans Administration hospitals and state institutions have been subject to such strong local political pressures that they are to all intents "dispersed" from the major target areas. In the event of attack, subsequent medical aid would probably be limited to essential amputations, simply treated lacerations, and easily set bones -- little more than crude first aid. While we might expect to fare better with some preparation, more than six weeks after the Hiroshima attack the only available dressings were old newspapers, and the majority of wounds went undressed.

The FCDA has, of course, attempted to stockpile whole blood and
plasma, but the value of such supplies would be greatly diminished by the
lack of personnel trained in their proper use. There are in this country
approximately 100,000 MD's and, adding trained nurses and veterinarians,
we have about 160,000 persons trained in medical practice -- a number which
is marginal even under peacetime conditions. Considering the concentration
of these trained persons in the target areas and bearing in mind that eight
nurses working under favorable conditions can administer only 10,000 infusions
a month, it is apparent that infusions for casualties measured in the
millions would be out of the question. The stockpiling of medical supplies
beyond a certain level, then, has only domestic propaganda value.

The medical picture is further complicated by the almost certain
disappearance of hygienic conditions of life, leaving the population of
survivors open to a whole range of epidemic diseases such as might be
caused by the destruction of water purification machinery, quick exhaustion
of chlorine supplies, breakdown of sanitary disposal systems, and putre-
faction of normally refrigerated foods.

It is clear, however, Dr. Warren said, that some sort of disaster
planning is necessary, if only for morale purposes. Japanese doctors
evidently were completely demoralized in 1945 by the seeming hopelessness
of the situation and their complete ignorance of the nature of the illnesses
they were trying to treat. As far as the general population is concerned,

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there is a need for informing prospective evacuees well ahead of time of the exact location of their destination in safe territory. British experience during World War II indicates that panic can be very largely avoided if individuals understand clearly that at a certain specific place they will find shelter, food, clothing, and minimal first aid supplies. The absence of such pre-knowledge might very well lead to greater casualties through panic than would have resulted had everyone sought shelter in the A-zone, as well as making the task of directing a mass exodus more complicated.

## Fall-Out Hazards

By way of summary, Dr. Warren said he felt that the picture presented in Mr. Wilson's outline and paper is substantially accurate, if a bit optimistic on the number of casualties. Also, it does not place adequate emphasis on such secondary killers as thirst, fire, and starvation. While there are certain to be psychological repurcussions throughout the country, we might generally expect Americans to pull through well. The London blitz indicated that cataclysmic events have a way of focusing popular energies and actually reducing psychotic casualties below normal peacetime levels. One further problem, and an extremely crucial one Dr. Warren pointed out, is that of "fall-out", which may affect persons 100 miles or more from the blast center.

Not only does the fall-out problem greatly enlarge the area of necessary evacuation, but it may also reduce the effective energy of a society over the long run by reducing, from 10 to 20 years, the life expectancy of those who are only briefly exposed and not visibly harmed. Mr. Dean interposed the comment that although one usually thinks of the areas of damage and evacuation as circles, fall-out seems to change this concept. Dr. Warren agreed that the fall-out possibility forces evacuation of a much larger areas, in the shape of an ellipse, depending on such variables as wind direction and velocity. Since a sub-lethal exposure may, as laboratory experiments with animals indicate, shorten the life-span of those exposed, it is necessary to think in terms of protecting much larger groups of people. Given the prevailing southwest wind in Washington, for example, not only the District of Columbia would have to be evacuated but also a strip of land to the northeast involving several million additional persons.

Dr. Warren estimated that the population of a hundred-mile ellipse would, if not evacuated, suffer from fall-out, both in terms of immediate deaths (i.e., within four weeks) and of shortened life-span. General McCormack felt that this appraisal was accurate. Mr. Wilson pointed out that fall-out tends also to immobilize an area for an extended period by making all horizontal surfaces "hot", thus hampering rescue operations and restricting civilians to their homes or shelters. Mr. Dean wondered, however, if the isotopes are not short-lived. Dr. Warren said that they follow the standard rate of deterioration, T⁻¹, which means that depending on the distance from ground zero, it would take days or even weeks to clear the fall-out area.

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5.

Several group members pressed Dr. Warren for details on fall-out composition and he replied that it is made up of fission products which have condensed, plus coarse contaminated particles of earth and buildings, over 75 microns in size, which are sucked up into the blast and then deposited downwind. While smaller atomic particles are likely to travel considerable distances in the upper air strata, they pose little immediate problem. The larger particles, on the other hand, are deposited almost at once and continue to fall-out for several hours. These larger particles are created only when the fire-ball touches the ground, not in under-water or air bursts. Dr. Kelly pointed out, however, that it is only logical to assume that the enemy will be sufficiently well-informed and accurate as to cause the bomb to burst at the most lethal height. Dr. Warren agreed to this and suggested that, in any event, the fire-ball of a fusion weapon is so large as to make it all but impossible to miss hitting the ground. Although wind determines the direction of fall-out, in most of the target areas the destruction-range of a fusion bomb is so great that the suburban areas will suffer more from direct effects than from fall-out. Dr. Haskins added that fall-out is aggravated in cities where brick is a common building material because the silicon in the brick and the lime in the mortar become part of the hot material.

## Fall-Out and Civil Defense Problems

Mr. Dean wondered about the extent to which fall-out affects the civil defense picture and Dr. Warren thought that the FCDA has not yet taken to heart the lessons of last spring's Pacific tests. Fall-out may destroy the usefulness of planned evacuation areas; only further study of the problem will tell whether the better plan would be to evacuate or to try and provide individual shelter areas within the target center. Mass shelter, he insisted, is quite out of the question. Dr. Berkner also noted that evacuation plans are postulated on a dispersion of the population rather evenly over the target area so as to relieve high density concentrations and reduce the statistical probability of casualties. Mr. Noyes observed that there is a good bit of difference, in all these considerations, between one hour or warning and warning (through, possibly, increased world tensions) over a relatively long period of time.

Dr. Rabi felt strongly that shelters ought not be eliminated as a means of reducing casualties significantly and Dr. Warren stressed that he had meant mass shelters were out of the question; small shelters, he agreed, are important. Mr. Armstrong raised the further question of FCDA intentions vis-a-vis the closing of major highways in the event of attack. Mr. Wilson said he feels the Administration has modified its position from the stay-and-take-it philosophy of fission bomb days to the one-hour-warning-and-evacuate-the-downtown-area philosophy of fusion bombing, but that apparently this thinking has not been revised in light of more recent disclosures about fall-out.

6.

In order to pinpoint the problem further, Mr. Noyes asked whether or not a five minute exposure to fall-out would prove fatal. Dr. Warren could not give an exact answer but he did say that a person cannot simply walk out of the fall-out area. From this, and from Mr. Baldwin's observation that a 12-minute exposure within one hour of attack near the center of the fall-out area is likely to be lethal, Mr. Noyes concluded that it is impossible to consider clearing the fall-out area *after* the explosion. Dr. Warren outlined some additional problems in monitoring vagrant clouds of fall-out material-- clouds which may be deadly for several hours -- and recalled that much of the monitoring apparatus, too, would itself be destroyed in the blast.

Mr. Dean suggested that the evacuation problem imposed by fall-out will vary greatly from city to city. New York, for instance, is impossible to evacuate quickly because of its high population density and relatively inadequate arterial roads. Los Angeles, on the other hand, has a reasonable chance of imposing rigid traffic controls and moving most of its inhabitants out into the San Fernando Valley. Unfortunately, Mr. Dean added, the Valley is in the direction of prevailing winds, thus constituting a probable fall-out area. Whatever these problems may be, though, they seem to be largely local. Dr. Warren agreed with this analysis; it is the responsibility of the FCDA to state clearly the dangers of fall-out and then leave the actual planning of remedial action to local authorities.

Mr. Dean wondered whether Dr. Warren had read Mr. Baldwin's piece on the dangers of fall-out (published in the *New York Times* of November 8) and whether he agreed with Mr. Baldwin's analysis. Dr. Warren said that he had and, in all essentials, did agree. *(Editors Note: Mr. Baldwin, in his article, explains the origin and effect of fall-out particles in language very similar to that used by Dr. Warren. It makes the further point that those tiny fission particles which enter the upper atmosphere or circulate about the earth for long periods may, in the case of a considerable number of explosions, cause a change in the orderly life processes of the planet and affect life-span and growth in some unforeseen ways. While this fear should not be elevated into a hypothesis, it is being given currency by many scientists and by Mr. Churchill. Mr. Baldwin concludes that this fear hardly justifies the suspension of nuclear research but very definitely constitutes a fit subject for further study by our "best brains".)*

## Soviet vs. American Capacity to Rebound from Attack

Mr. Wilson suggested that since the effects of a large scale attack have been rather thoroughly canvassed, perhaps Dr. Warren could give the group his estimate of the comparative recuperative powers of the United States and the USSR. Dr. Warren said that he is no expert on such problems but that, for one thing, the latter might make a swifter recovery because the vast land area combined with low population density decreases fall-out danger and because there are enormously more draft animals in the USSR than in the US, thus making Soviet agriculture far less dependent on gasoline. Dr. Rabi, however, pointed out that since much of the USSR's effective agricultural land is near urban centers, the animals would be directly irradiated and

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7.

also subject to fall-out. Furthermore, animals are hardly likely to take
protective measures after exposure. Mr. Baldwin added that cattle is likely,
too, to eat irradiated fodder (which might even be passed on to human con-
sumers of animal flesh). Dr. Warren granted these points but maintained that
the controlling factor is dispersal of the stock.

Dr. Haskins inquired about direct damage to crops and Mr. Noyes asked
about the effects on water supplies. Dr. Warren answered that if a country
can survive without the first year's crop (after an attack) it can probably
get by. In some areas of the USSR, to reinforce this point, stockpiles of
one-year supplies of various grains have been amassed. As far as water
supply is concerned, aside from the likelihood that distribution would be
interrupted, the supply would not be contaminated for longer than three or
four days, owing to the relatively low uptake of fissionable materials by
water.

Mr. Halaby asked Dr. Warren to elaborate on his theory that a petroleum-
based economy would be eliminated, or severely crippled, after an attack. In
response, Dr. Warren said it must be assumed, if hostilities continue beyond
the initial attack stage, that it will mean an end to organized society; by
virtue of its great economic diversity and complexity, moreover, this country
is ill-prepared to survive under primitive conditions. Mr. Halaby wondered
whether the crisis would be caused by few skilled operators of gas-run
machinery or simply by a lack of fuel. Mr. Wilson observed that with 20 to
25 major cities knocked out, not only would refining and distribution facil-
ities be destroyed but also those companies that make seamless pipe and other
vital "building blocks" needed to rebuild the industry would be gone. To
this physical problem would be added, Mr. Dean noted, the high casualties
and absenteeism among skilled workers. Mr. Nitze wondered if stockpiling
would obviate these problems but Dr. Warren felt that the example of Japan
and its post-1945 recovery must be measured against the vast quantities of
American aid given in the first year, to say nothing of the much more inten-
sive farming practices of the Japanese. Gen. McCormack added that trans-
portation and distribution of goods are much more difficult problems than
that of storage. Mr. Nitze conceded the truth of these statements but pointed
out that railroads were again running through Nagasaki within three days
after the atomic explosion.

## Major Policy Dilemmas and Major Alternatives

Mr. Baldwin felt that the discussion to this point showed clearly
two major dilemmas of the nuclear weapons problem. First, the situation
seems to be so black that defeatism is likely, as also a fatal disregard for
civil defense measures. Second, it seems terribly important to establish
the relative vulnerability of the two countries before postulating a major
conflict between the US and the USSR. Mr. Nitze observed that a distinction
must also be made between a surprise attack and the luxury of an advanced
warning, of days or even weeks. For instance, what would be the proper policy
to follow in a one month period of grace before war -- what of a pre-crisis
evacuation of major population centers? Mr. Noyes wondered whether this

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8.

country would go along politically with the restrictive policies involved in an orderly mass evacuation. Mr. Ruebhausen pointed out that there is clearly a spectrum of possibilities, running all the way from an attack without warning to a long-range "tip-off". Mr. Nitze agreed that there is a wide range of possibilities; there is even the chance that in response to Soviet pressure -- as, for example, an attack on a NATO ally -- the US might choose to use the atomic bomb tactically, in which case there would be considerable warning of the likelihood of Russian retaliation against the continental United States.

While early warning might make evacuation feasible, thus saving many lives, Mr. Wilson reminded the group that the damage to the economic structure of the country would remain unchanged, warning or no. Mr. Nitze felt that it is of the essence to examine all ideas of evacuation and dispersion because if for any reason, perhaps a political one, the US cannot achieve dispersion while the USSR can, then of course there will be no such thing as an "atomic stalemate".

Commenting on Mr. Wilson's point, Dr. Berkner said that although the physical plant might be destroyed, if skilled workers in sufficient numbers are safe, then the economy can be rebuilt. Dr. Warren concurred and cited the cases of Japanese steel mills which were "destroyed" by bombing but were back in operation within 48 hours, while subsequent raids on workers' living quarters effectively halted the entire production process.

Mr. Dean raised the further question of the economic effects of a one-week suspension of work in major target areas after evacuation. Mr. Nitze felt that the risks of not evacuating are entirely incommensurate with the loss of but a week in total economic output but that, naturally, such action would require great discipline and careful planning. Mr. Dean recalled that last week the Governor of California tried to get the oil refineries in the Los Angeles area to shut down for two days, with no success, but he granted that the two cases are not precisely parallel. The problem is further complicated by the possibility that several evacuations might have to be made in response to "false alarms". According to the Mr. Nitze, the US Air Force has found that, in the Ruhr during the heavy bombing of World War II, the production loss amounted to about two per cent; there is, of course, a world of difference between this situation and a two or three week evacuation of all major US cities. Mr. Wilson and Dr. Berkner both pointed out that such an obvious move as a mass evacuation would serve as a clear tip-off of intention to attack and might provoke early retaliation thus defeating its major purpose.

## Delivery Potential

Dr. Smyth felt that the group should first consider the question: can the USSR deliver on US targets quantity of nuclear weapons necessary to cause mass destruction? Mr. Wilson, on the other hand, thought that it is more logical to consider the consequences of such a potential attack, temporarily ignoring delivery capabilities. Mr. Dean agreed and pointed out that the topic of the second meeting will be an estimation of Soviet potential. Nevertheless, Mr. Armstrong felt that it is vital to consider the differing reactions of a totalitarian and democratic government to the strain imposed

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9.

by a nuclear blow. He thought it possible that an uneducated general popu-
lation might be better adapted to the business of primitive survival than an
alert and sophisticated one. Dr. Haskins suggested that the responsiveness
of the two governments to their peoples is very directly related to any
relative advantages of a "blackmail" attempt -- that is, the threat of using
nuclear force against civilian populations. Mr. Wilson noted that the group
will discuss the whole problem of comparative morale later in the year; Mr.
Dean added, however, that such a discussion is hamstrung by a general unwillingness
to discuss dispassionately the consequences of "preventive war".
Most people either support or attack the notion, largely on emotional grounds,
and no one is willing to talk about it in terms of occupation problems,
mopping-up operations, etc. Mr. Halaby brought the group back to the proposition
that, before effects can be considered, world conditions which might
lead to an attack by either side must be discussed. The general feeling of
the group, as it adjourned for dinner, was that the second half of the meeting
should concern itself more with the political preconditions of nuclear war.

US Policy Alternatives.

Mr. Dean suggested three working assumptions, on the basis of which
US policy might be projected: (1) the possibility of a definite break in the
Dew Line giving two hours notice of attack; (2) the possibility that an increase
in world tensions might indicate an attack in the very near future; or (3) the
possibility of an attack in about six months, which is probably the present
situation and one that will continue on into the indefinite future. Dr. Rabi
felt that the capacity of this country to retaliate controls its actions
under any one of these alternative situations. Mr. Dean acknowledged that
relative US-USSR strength is very important and suggested that each of his
three assumptions be tested with time coordinates -- today, one year from
now, and ten years from now.

Mr. Baldwin agreed that the evening's discussion was all based on the
unexamined assumption that the USSR can "use our nuclear weapons against us"
and that possibly the USSR is not now as strong as we are; but he maintained
that we must be prepared to face the maximum eventuality. Gen. McCormack
very strongly agreed that our policy must always be proof against the fiercest
known weapons; he went on to point out that at the present time the USSR is
probably in position to launch a major strike against the US, using B-29
type planes with one-way suicide crews. Dr. Kelly concurred that, in the
absence of exact information, the group must assume that the enemy will reach
maximum potential, at least eventually. Gen. McCormack added that the men
"really running things" are constantly reshaping policy in light of every
smallest detail.

Mr. Dean, in order to peg the discussion of Soviet capabilities onto
something tangible, reviewed the certainties in the situation. First, the
Soviets apparently know a good bit about the US nuclear program. Second, they
have atomic bombs. Third, they have at least one-way planes in quantity.

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10.

Fourth, the fact that they have exploded several bombs indicates that they have several reactors producing plutonium--a process that is continuous -- and thus it is safe to assume that they have a sufficient stockpile to destroy 20 prime targets in this country. To this Dr. Kelly added one further fact; The Russians were able to make off with enough scientists from the Nazi guided missile program so that we must assume they are well along in the development of ballistic weapons against which, for all practical purposes, there is no defense.

Mr. Baldwin then raised the question of Soviet defensive measures. Mr. Wilson speculated that since this country held an atomic monopoly from 1945 to 1949, fear of the US must have spurred considerably the Soviet defense program. Mr. Dean reported that a man "in a position to know" had told him about the ability of the USSR to absorb an atomic blow. In economic terms, Eastern and Western Russia are virtually independent. That is, there are manufacturing and assembling facilities organized vertically in both sectors so that, for example, a MIG fighter can be produced in either one. As far as food is concerned, many areas of the country have already amassed, at the cost of inadequate supplies at the present time, a one year grain supply. Concerning civilian morale, the best guess is that the average Russian is convinced of the truth of the three-fold official propaganda claim that (1) there will be war; (2) the US will start it; and (3) the USSR will win it.

Dr. Kelly felt, on the other hand, that the Soviet defense task is more difficult than our because of geographical disadvantages; given the same level of technology, his guess would be that the US could do a better job of defending itself. Also, the US has managed to ring the USSR with air bases. Mr. Armstrong asked if Dr. Kelly meant to include Europe within our defense perimeter and Dr. Kelly answered that he meant only that this continent would be easier to defend. Of course, the defense of Western Europe is another problem altogether. The US, on balance, has greater flexibility for effective retaliation, in Dr. Kelly's view.

## The Possibility of Stalemate

Mr. Pace reintroduced the time-factor as an aspect of planning by stating that such a discussion as this must assume that there is presently a stalemate but that the long-range trend is favorable to Russia since (1) they have the advantage of the initiative in light of our reluctance to begin a war and (2) our cities are relatively more vulnerable. In order to determine the exact advantage of the initiative, Dr. Berkner wondered whether a sneak attack could immobilize either potential foe. Mr. Dean thought it could, in the case of a Soviet attack on the US, and he used the words "wiped-out". Mr. Baldwin and Dr. Kelly demurred, however. Mr. Dean cited recent FCDA figures based on 20 bombs of 50 kilotons each (only two-and-one-half times the power of the Hiroshima bomb and small in terms of present weapons developments); the FCDA mortality estimate is from 10 to 70 per cent for the cities involved (the effect of which, as Dr. Warren pointed out earlier, might be greater than is at first evident).

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11.

Dr. Smyth felt that an attack of this sort would not, however, destroy the power to retali ate; Mr. Dean suggested that "immobilize" would be the better term since most of our energies would be devoted to the merest survival efforts. Mr. Nash thought that the US could absorb such a blow and still have the capacity to retaliato. Actually, Mr. Dean observed, it is only for purposes of discussing weapons effects that we assume the first Soviet strike to be aimed against urban targets; it is more likely that the first blow would fall on SAC command centers and air bases throughout the world.

Mr. Pace epitomized atomic stalemate, then, as continuing until such time as the USSR can destroy our SAC, disperse its own targets completely, or defend itself adequately, since as long as the US retains atomic leadership there will be no war. He suggested that this stalemate might continue for five years, fifty years, or even indefinitely. Dr. Kelly said he is willing to go along with the five year estimate.

Mr. Nitze questioned the existence of a stalemate by asking if it were not the case that, in response to Soviet attacks on Western Europe, the US would use atomic devices. Mr. Pace agreed that surely the preponderance of power lies in the nuclear field, for not only a surprise attack but also any form of aggression would be an invitation to use the atom bomb. When Dr. Rabi suggested that all weapons are in fact based on the ultimate power of atomic devices, Mr. Pace concurred, stating that this is particularly the case when a "picket line" has been drawn, across which the enemy may not step without grave risk. Gen. McCormack felt that such a line must necessarily be drawn. Mr. Baldwin cautioned that if a line is established and violated, then the US is committed to retaliatory action which in turn invites Soviet strategic bombing, at least of Western Europe. If this is the case, Mr. Dean asked whether the upshot is not that the US is forestalled from using any atomic device; Mr. Baldwin thought that it is, by the political pressure of its allies. He went on to redefine atomic stalemate as "the unwillingness to use the atom but not the unwillingness to use force".

## Use of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

Mr. Pace felt, further, than the atom might be only an extension of tactical weapons in a limited war. He cautioned, however, that the advantages of tactical atomic weapons must be weighed against the political liability of alienating world opinion. Mr. Nitze added that there would seem, therefore, to be another alternative, that of the use of tactical atomic devices in a limited war while the strategic stalemate continues. In answer to Mr. Perkins' question, Gen. McCormack said that the line between conventional and nuclear armaments grows dimmer with passing time; no country, that is to say, can begin a limited war without being prepared to accept the risks of total war.

Mr. Baldwin asserted that this country must retain its ability to fight with conventional weapons; but, as Dr. Kelly added, the time will approach when conventional weapons are atomic weapons. Mr. Pace disagreed, since atomic devices have different degrees of effectiveness under different

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12.

conditions of terrain. Mr. Dean felt that one must assume that a tactical
atomic weapon will be effective in a given situation and then pose the question:
can the US forbear using it? Mr. Pace reiterated his previous point that the
use of such devices may have greater political disadvantages than military
advantages.

Dr. Berkner felt that stalemate, in any definition, is a myth; either
the US or the USSR will be willing to use atomic devices to achieve "vital"
goals. Mr. Noyes suggested that it is vital, after all, that a nation not
commit suicide in order to achieve a goal.

Mr. Halaby remarked that nearly all the members of the group have
either "made" or "used" atomic devices and he called for a more political
approach to the problem. He then stated five basic US foreign policy require-
ments, with the emphasis on political rather than military factors:

(1) Prevent a nuclear war

Mr. Dean agreed with the first of these five points but balked at
the second; he felt that the US is not prepared, at this moment, to win a
nuclear war.

Mr. Nitze thought that Mr. Halaby's points were well-taken but he
would go one step further and make the primary goal the preservation of the
United States and the continuance of a "salutary" world environment, thus
placing the avoidance of war second. Even if war were to destroy the world
as we know it today, still the US _must win that war decisively_. Furthermore,
he would expect most policy planners to agree that, in the final analysis,
the preservation of the US is the overriding goal, not the fate of our allies.

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13.

Mr. Halaby wondered if there is really any such thing any more as a
"little" war. Mr. Dean thought that it is indeed becoming less likely; if
a situation were to arise in which a little war could be terminated by the
use of atomic weapons, this country would surely choose to do so. Gen.
McCormack wanted to stress two further points: first, that in those areas
where a definite picket line has been established, this country is becoming
better and better prepared to resist aggression. And second: in considering
possible political pressure by our allies against using nuclear weapons,
the courage of our allies and their willingness to go along on extremely
unpleasant decisions should never be underestimated.

Kelsey Marechal
Rapporteur

A little war is a war in which nuclear weapons are not used vs. civilian population. In a limited war weapons used to deter total attack. Requires change in tactical patterns - defense in depth etc. If used vs cities - unless cities become战略attac

uncivilized

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The second meeting of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on Wednesday, December 15, 1954,
at 5:30 p.m. Present were: Gordon Dean, Chairman; Carroll L. Wilson;
Research Director; Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; Robert Amory;
Hamilton Fish Armstrong; Hanson W. Baldwin; Lloyd V. Berkner; Ferdinand
Eberstadt; Merle Fainsod; Thomas K. Finletter; George S. Franklin, Jr;
Edmund A. Gullion; N.E. Halaby; Caryl P. Haskins; William Henderson; Joseph
E. Johnson; Mervin J. Kelly; David E. Lilienthal; Maj. Gen. James McCormack,
Jr; Frank C. Nash; Paul Nitze; Charles P. Noyes, II; Frank Pace, Jr.; I. I.
Rabi; David Redding; Oscar M. Ruebhausen; David Rockefeller; Henry Roberts;
Henry deWolf Smyth; Shields Warren; and Arnold Wolfers.

Mr. Wilson opened the discussion by commenting that the digest of
the previous meeting seemed to him to make one point quite patent, that
an attack upon the continental United States, regardless of the exact
techniques used by the enemy, would have the effect of diverting nearly
the total energies of the people of this country to matters of the merest
personal survival. General McCormack agreed with this interpretation of
the gist of the first meeting, but suggested that the cumulative effect of
the report is too ominous. Particularly, he felt that the report tends to
glide over the vulnerability of the Soviet Union to retaliation, one of the
few bright spots in an otherwise dark picture. Mr. Dean answered that it
is just that subject -- the comparative vulnerability of the United States
and Russia to nuclear attack -- that Mr. Amory would review for them.

## Comparative Vulnerability

Mr. Amory prefaced his remarks with the warning that he is not an
expert in the delivery capabilities of weapons, but that assuming that an
attack were made upon either country, certain effects might be postulated
on the descriptions of the national economies he wished to give.

Essentially, the Soviet Union has the second largest industrial
economy in the world, running on the average about one half the size of that
of the United States. Such an estimate is of course only an approximate
one, for there is considerable variation in relative size from element to
element. For instance, while the USSR produces a little over one half as
much steel per year as this country, it makes almost the same number of
machine tools. On the other hand, it produces only one fourth as much
electric power.

In terms of geographical dispersion, certain types of production are
concentrated in European Russia, while others are more evenly spread.
Referring to a map of the USSR depicting the distribution of various
industrial operations according to geographic areas, Mr. Amory noted for
instance that finished steel products are manufactured in all but three
regions, and consumer goods are well distributed among all the regions.
In comparison with the United States, Soviet military end products are
more highly dispersed. For example, the MIG 17 is fabricated in seven
plants running at about thirty per cent of capacity, whereas in this country
if the Los Angeles area were immobilized, production would almost vanish
on the F-100 series fighter. The same general rule of dispersion applies
also to tanks, artillery, and most other military end products.

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2

Deductive information about stockpiling suggests that the Soviets have nearly reached their goal of amassing and safely storing goods in all major economic fields. In terms of dollar values, US stockpiles are greater than the Soviet supplies, but measured against the only relevant yardstick, each country's annual needs, Russian stocks represent a far greater percentage of yearly necessities. While the US has on hand only ten per cent of a year's production of aluminium, the USSR has 100 per cent; this is only one example of the result of a long-range accumulative process designed to give to the Soviet controlled economy a certain resilience. Actually this Soviet "squirrel" system predates the era of strategic bombing, stemming rather from the necessity of providing an economic cushion against famine, pestilence, or bureaucratic bungling.

The two countries display differing patterns of urban concentration. For example, the twenty largest cities in the United States include in their urban areas nineteen per cent of the nation's urban population, whereas the same number of Soviet cities house only nine per cent of that country's city dwellers. On the basis of the top 100 cities, the percentages of population are US, thirty; USSR, nineteen. However, the differential changes with increasing number, and at the point of 280 oil cities the entire Russian urban population has been accounted for.

It is difficult to calculate the effect of strategic attack upon civilian populations, but regarding the USSR there are at least two extant theories. It is held by some observers that the Soviet economic and governmental systems are so highly centralized that the destruction of Moscow would result in the collapse of subordinate regions and cities. A more likely theory holds that the regional commissions have both the authority and the administrative machinery to take over semi-autonomous control. With respect to this problem of post-attack civilian control, Mr. Amory said that the USSR seems not to be substantially more vulnerable than this country.

However, with regard to the ability of an individual to exist under primitive post-bomb conditions, he suggested that the Russian civilian is prepared better than his American counterpart, even considering the more extreme climactic conditions of the Soviet Union: to support this observation he cited the continual German surprise at the stamina of the Russian citizen in the face of privation during World War II.

Mr. Amory concluded with the important point that even though the Soviet Union has an economy but one half the size of the United States, both countries are so large that they might be called "absolutely vulnerable." In other words, if in say five years the two nations were to unload upon each other their existing weapons stocks, they would both be reduced to the level of fourth or fifth rate world powers.

Mr. Amory's presentation had brought to mind many questions, and Mr. Wilson led off with an inquiry about food stockpiles. Mr. Amory explained that both grain and prepared foods are stored in quantity, by regions. General McCormack suggested however that perhaps the estimates of US stocks in all commodities would not be so low if normal surpluses and wholesale inventories were included in the total. Mr. Amory pointed

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3

out that these goods in storage and in all channels of the economic machine
were already being included as part of the American stockpile, and that the
Soviet Union still had a larger margin of most materials. For instance,
at any moment of time the United States has about a three months supply of
natural gas (measured from well to distribution point), whereas the USSR
had under comparable conditions nearly six months supply.

Regarding military production, Mr. Baldwin suggested that American
plants, like Soviet plants, are producing at a fraction of total output,
and are thus subject to almost instant production expansion. Mr. Amory
explained that with regard to fighter planes for instance, certain types tend
to be concentrated in factories producing at high volume to fulfill the
requirements of rush orders on new models, and that frequently an improved
version of a military item replaces its precurser before production can be
leveled off on the first model. The USSR has tended to standardize models
more, making it easier to meet their needs by means of an even production
at greatly less then capacity.

Regarding transportation differences between the two countries, in
answer to a question by Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Amory noted that since there is
virtually no trucking outside the major Russian cities, the USSR is largely
dependent upon inland water routes — always subject to the vagaries of
the Russian winter, and upon railroad lines vastly more extended than our
own. The great problem of transportation, however, has been a leading
factor in the development of the now considerable regional autonomy dis-
played by the USSR.

Mr. Halaby wondered if it were not true that during the Second World
War the percentage of total economy devoted to arms production in the
Soviet Union was higher than in this country, and Mr. Amory agreed that the
USSR had been able to suppress civilian goods production more easily and
thus had devoted about sixty per cent of its economy to war goods, while
the US percentage had been forty. He went on to explain that currently in
both countries about fourteen per cent of the Gross National Product is
military production, but that allowance must be made for the narrower line
between civilian and military goods in the USSR, and also for the greater
ease with which that country can contract consumer demand. This apparent
advantage is counteracted by the higher productivity of American agriculture,
for while this country regularly feeds itself from the food produced by
only eight per cent of the population, in the USSR a full forty per cent
of the population is engaged in agriculture, and this force is probably
not subject to much reduction. Furthermore, the much greater proportion
of the US GNP devoted to consumer goods, services, and luxury items provides
a considerably greater margin for compression into a fully mobilized
economy.

Mr. Dean suggested that food and medical supplies are the most impor-
tant immediate needs after an attack, and inquired about Soviet preparations
along these lines, as well as their civilian defense structure. Mr. Amory
replied that antibiotics seem to be in adequate supply. As for CD, the
structure is indeed extensive, but has had very little practice in operation.
Certain regulations pertaining to bomb shelters have been added to building
codes, but these seem to be of a minimal variety, proof against only con-
ventional weapons.

[L.C.]

4

Mr. Amory pointed out the slightly different concepts of supply to the armed forces of the two countries in Western Europe. The Russians seem to have equipped their armies in Germany with a six month supply of materiel beyond the transhipment points, where the Russian broad gauge railroads meet the European narrow gauge, whereas the NATO forces have only a seven day supply of ammunition, the expectation being that supplies can be brought freely through the European coastal ports.

Mr. Dean recalled that a major point made by Dr. Warren in the previous meeting had been that the United States is a petroleum based economy and as such is subject to paralysis in the event of disruption of supplies or distribution facilities. He raised the question of the degree of concentration of Soviet refineries as applied to this same problem. Mr. Amory stated that a high degree of concentration does exist within the Soviet petroleum economy, for the two largest refineries there produce 42 per cent of petrol products, whereas in this country such a percentage is produced jointly by the first fifteen refineries. In response to Dr. Rabi's question, Mr. Amory said that the electrical supply system of the USSR has examples both of over-concentration and, in the Urals for instance, well integrated grid systems less vulnerable to disruption.

On the subject of civilian attitudes in the USSR, Mr. Dean identified Mr. Amory as the source he had quoted in the previous meeting as describing the attitudes of Soviet citizens thus: There will be a major war, the United States will start it; and Russia will win it. Mr. Amory corroborated this statement, explaining that this information had been received from interrogation of many Japanese recently returned from Siberia. At the very least he felt that the average Russian civilian is convinced that "... we mean them no good." The Soviet people seem to be aware that a major war would be terribly destructive, but their morale seems to be in such a state as to preclude any sudden turn against their government such as plagued Germany at the end of the last war.

The dependence of successful propaganda upon actual fact was illustrated by Mr. Amory as follows: At the start of the Korean war the Soviet civilian population demonstrated skepticism toward the charges that the South Koreans had initiated the hostilities. However, the American crossing of the Yalu gave strength to the Russian propaganda claim, and reaffirmed the belief of the citizenry in the justice of their North Korean campaign.

Mr. Halaby wondered how aware the average Soviet citizen might be of the American military potential, and whether or not discussion is officially suppressed. Mr. Amory answered that until one and one half years ago the subject had indeed been suppressed, but that since that time a certain amount of civilian education with regard to America's nuclear power has taken place, only in terms of the twenty kiloton bomb, however.

General McCormack called attention to one of the crucial problems which will be discussed in future meetings. He pointed out that much of the previous discussion is linked to the evaluation of the strength of the Soviet political control mechanism, noting that there is an apparent disparity between the peoples' view of Soviet vulnerability to attack and the actual conditions which exist. If in the course of a war the people were

[L.C.]

5

suddenly to become aware of this discrepancy it might have important con-
sequences. Mr. Armstrong agreed that the psychological vulnerability of
both peoples is an important point, and Mr. Dean added that he personally
tended to be pessimistic about American ability to mobilize for survival,
considering the fact that this country never has had such an experience.

A Portrait of the Weapons

Mr. Dean explained that he felt it essential that everyone in the
study group be thinking in the same terms when discussing problems relating
to nuclear weapons, and he therefore asked Mr. Kelly to outline the A B C
of these weapons and of the defenses against them.

Taking the type of Atomic Bomb used on Hiroshima as a starting point,
Mr. Kelly explained that present A bombs are twenty-five times more power-
ful. Since the original bomb has a "bang" equivalent to 20 kilotons of
conventional explosive, the present weapons are on the order of 500 KT.
However this increased energy release has been accomplished with equivalent
increases in efficiency, so that present weapons use approximately the same
amounts of ingredients as the prototypes. Intermediate sizes have also
been developed as well as weapons of less than 20 KT; while the efficiency
of energy release is not as high for the smaller bombs, their development
greatly improves the flexibility of the weapon since deliverability by
air or other means is obviously related to size and weight of the mssssile.

Delivery equipment has progressed from the original vehicle, the B 29
through the B 50, B 36, and B 47 to the B 52, which is soon to become
available. The trend of course has been to develop faster and higher
flight, and all the delivery planes now in use can be considered intercon-
tinental if refueling is used. Since the limitations of both speed and
altitude on pilots are greater than on machines, development is concen-
trating upon two basic types of intercontinental guided missiles. The first
type, a plane of "super characteristics" is like a manned aircraft, except
that it can fly higher and faster. The second type, Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles, is further in the future; defense against the IBM is
of another order of magnitude." At this stage it is an open question as
to which country will perfect these latter two weapons' carriers first.
The USSR has some advantage in that they were able to employ certain German
scientists already expert in the field, and they perhaps have given more
attention to this area of research.

Suffice it to say that with present equipment the US can get over
any target in the Soviet Union by means of refueling planes launched from
bases in Africa, America, or Europe. Furthermore, carriers can accommodate
planes of "certain sizes" which are capable of delivering nuclear weapons,
and submarines can be used to launch guided missiles with nuclear warheads
The military worth of the African and European SAC bases is hard to evaluate,
but they certainly have a value as rocket launching sites and staging areas
for aircraft.

[LC]

7

Dr. Rabi suggested that the idea of a strong defensive perimeter might come to be another Maginot Line concept, but Mr. Kelly said that he felt that if defense expenditures are kept within an appropriate percentage of the military budget the entire defensive system becomes a functioning part of the various deterrences against war. He conceded, however, that the jump from an atomic weapon of 500 kiloton size to a nuclear weapon of 10 megaton size is such a broad leap that many military men may not have acclimated their thinking to the new conditions as yet.

Mr. Finletter agreed that it is useful to assume for purposes of discussion that there will be a war, but he warned against losing sight of the fact that the prevention of a war is still the basic aim of this country's foreign policy. He also commented that were Russia to perfect the IBM first, it would be unfortunate but by no means fatal. While such a development would enhance Soviet chances of damaging the US, it would not alter the capacity of the US to destroy Russia with more conventional delivery media.

Concerning American bases abroad Mr. Finletter noted that there are great political advantages to be had from the presence of US installations among the NATO countries, but that the exact military worth of these bases is open to question. Personally, he felt that the overseas base structure is not now of great value. He felt that the Air Force, especially from a budgetary point of view, has failed to understand the base requirements. Indeed, the base program of the Truman administration, which he believed had been five billion dollars short of the actual need, has never been completed. There is a need for an intermediate line of SAC bases between the present front and rear echelons to allow for greater dispersal of men and equipment. He stated that SAC bases are presently inadequately defended, but that the military men thinking in terms of direct attack see them as well defended. He pointed out that the dangers from sabotage are as great as those from direct attack, and went on to recall one of the bitter lessons about the need for high dispersal that had been taught by the tornado which decommissioned some 85 per cent of the B 36 fleet in one blow. It is, however, entirely possible to defend SAC, although this is not being done adequately at this time; in the last analysis the problem is budgetary.

Concerning the figure of 80 per cent probable kills by defensive forces, Mr. Lilienthal remarked that during the initial phases of a war the defense system would be quite green, and therefore perhaps not too effective. He wondered also if the figure had been computed by assuming that the enemy would be using materials and skills comparable to ours. As for warning against attack, he felt that more than warning is required.

Finally, Mr. Lilienthal suggested that it would be wise to relinquish the distinction between strategic and tactical weapons. There is, he felt little likelihood that any future war can be kept a "local war".

Beginning the second half of the session, Mr. Kelly elaborated upon a few of the points that he had made earlier about which other members seemed to have some questions. While he felt that his estimate of 80 per cent effective defenses is fairly accurate, still it can be only an approximation.

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8

Actually, he had introduced the 80 per cent figure to induce the group to discuss the damage potential of the 20 per cent of raiders who might get through defenses. In arriving at his estimate, however, he had taken into account the fact that the defenders would be untried in battle, but, with time, the amount of semi-automatic paraphenalia is being increased. There has been an overall improvement in the efficiency of these devices, and of course in the time which has elapsed since Mr. Finletter left office there have been many improvements in techniques. Nevertheless, in spite of this improvement there is little chance of going beyond the four-fifths kill ratio even with the use of atomic anti-aircraft weapons. While a greater depth of defense would be desirable, the present budget limits the defensive efforts to a warning line, fighters to pick up the filterers, and Nikes at the points of attack. Naturally, if the money spent on defense cuts into other military spending, say if it exceeds about fifteen per cent of the military budget, then the danger is present of a nascent Maginot philosophy.

Mr. Dean mentioned that while an air-to-air missile with an atomic warhead is a technical possibility, it raises considerable problems about the geographic location of the points of interception. Mr. Kelly agreed that atomic missiles increased the problems of interception to some extent, but pointed out that not only does the increased radius of destruction greatly improve the odds for a kill, even in the event of a relatively inaccurate intercept, but that one missile of 20 KT size can break up an entire formation. Of course if the interceptor is to escape, the bang must be smaller, perhaps two or three KT, but the 20 KT weapon can be launched from earth. General McCormack added that the economic advantages seem to belong to the atomic weapons.

Mr. Dean noted that the DEW line is not an interceptor line, but rather a warning line designed to alert the ADC and to warn civilian populations. He wondered whether or not the political feelings of other countries have limited in any way our efforts to push out the defense perimeter. For instance, could the warning line be extended across the sea to Norway? Mr. Kelly replied that such a move is technically feasible, but that the cost might be prohibitive. He did feel, though, that perhaps the military minds have not been directed enough toward defense problems.

Mr. Berkner suggested that the cost of an adequate defense and warning system has been exaggerated. For instance, original estimates of the cost of an Arctic warning system had been as high at $150 billion, but the DEW line cost (estimated from the cost of three stations) will be $250 million, plus or minus $50 million.

Mr. Berkner continued that several observations have been made about the unfortunate limitation of the mid-Canada line to warning functions only. He felt that it is imperative that the first interception point be pushed up to the mid-Canada line, particularly in anticipation of the use of atomic missiles against air formations. While a 20KT bomb will affect plane kills within a cubic mile of air, such action for obvious reasons can take place only over wastelands or oceans. He felt certain that if the problem were presented clearly to Canadian officials, they would recognize the efficacy of pushing the line farther north; any enemy raiders turned back at the US border would have as remaining targets of opportunity only the major urban conglomerations of Canada.

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9

On the subject of the IBM Mr. Berkner cited the unclassified works of Newton (an early NATO mathematician), from which he had determined that to travel intercontinental distances a ballistic missile would have to go about 4000 mph, rising to 600 miles, and attaining a speed of about mach 20. Now a weapon of such characteristics would indeed be formidable, but on the other hand no real attempt has been made as yet to prepare a defense against it. Mr. Kelly rejoined that while there is often a time lag between an offensive development and the corresponding defense, it will be a number of years before the IBM is in operation, and during that time several good minds are going to be at work on a solution to the defense problem. Here again the amount of money available sets a limit on research. Furthermore, if the balance between the allocations for offense and defense is going to be out, it is better that the error be in favor of the offensive expenditures.

Dr. Rabi requested an explanation for the fact that once the Air Force had 70 wings, considered adequate on the basis of the power of atomic weapons of that time, but that now that the size of the bang has gone up by a factor of 1000 the number of wings has doubled. Mr. Finletter explained that first of all the 70 wings in 1947 were not only SAC planes, but the sum of all Air Force planes. Of course, at that time the US still had a monopoly on atomic weapons; there is no relation between a US-Soviet atomic equipped air wing ratio of 70 to zero in 1947 and 143 to current Russian potential in 1954. Also there are certain non-rational factors at work in obtaining the funds for the Air Force. Mr. Dean added that the 1947 force did not of course include either carrier-based or jet-powered bombers.

Concerning the Canadian situation, Mr. Baldwin expressed the belief that if the argument for an advanced interceptor line were to be presented in the way outlined by Mr. Berkner, the obvious advantages to the Canadians would cause them to cooperate with American wishes.

He also noted that besides the high cost of the warning systems, an inherent difficulty is the heavy manpower drain upon the armed forces at a time of decreasing size. For instance, the Navy this year has switched roughly ten thousand men from other duties to the radar ships and planes.

Mr. Kelly emphasized that no matter how much money might be spent on defense, if there is a war this country must expect to submit to at least some successful strategic raids. He reminded the group that his estimate of 80 per cent kills was under ideal conditions, and using atomic anti-aircraft weapons, Mr. Baldwin raised the question of whether or not any relative security through defensive measures might not prove to be short lived if the enemy develops the IBM within a few years. Mr. Kelly reiterated that defensive forces must be supplemented by the deterrent forces of a strong offensive power. Mr. Berkner added that regardless of the future of ballistics weapons, this country must still maintain the ultimate in defenses against conventional delivery systems.

[Lc]

10

## Defense of Europe and Overseas Bases

When Mr. Dean wondered if the European bases of SAC are not obsolete, Mr. Finletter remarked that they still are useful, but will become less so as time passes. Mr. Baldwin pointed out that in an enemy attack the overseas SAC bases would have to be hit first, yet the relative vulnerability of these bases is partially offset by the political effect of not withdrawing them. Mr. Pace noted that of course the NATO allies are valuable for more reasons than as air base sites. Mr. Dean agreed, but felt that the SAC bases make certain parts of Europe prime targets. He agreed with Mr. Baldwin that today every country is vulnerable to attack, particularly as SAC bases are spread out.

The expanse of SAC bases is not the only factor in determining the number and placement of bases, Mr. Dean felt. There are various political angles too. Mr. Finletter, however, remarked that he thought that the cost of bases has been exaggerated, and Mr. Amory followed though with a typical instance in which $290 million worth of planes may be housed on an installation costing $40 million; the expenditure of another $40 million would halve the vulnerability of these planes to enemy action. Mr. Dean noted the way in which nuclear weapons increase the vulnerability of planes and installations, and Mr. Finletter mentioned the relative ease of sabotage.

Mr. Wilson inquired as to how the European defense setup compares with that of this country, and Mr. Kelly replied that except for the possibility of being given low target priority by the Russian strategists, the chances of Europe to avoid destruction are slim. The US is far ahead of the other NATO countries in warning and defense paraphenalia. Since the main Soviet blows would tend to be at SAC bases, the enemy would not be likely to waste bombs on lesser targets in Europe. Mr. Pace maintained that the best protection for Europe is the strength of the United States.

If we must assume that at least 20 per cent of a Soviet attack would get through, said Mr. Dean, does this not raise considerable question about the idea of a nuclear stalemate? Mr. Berkner tended not to think so, since the US has 170 cities of over fifty thousand persons, and adding the various military bases, there are between 150 and 200 prime targets in this country. If the Russians lose 80 per cent of their attackers, it would require an enormous force for them to knock out this country, and this fact is a strong deterrent regardless of their ability to defend themselves. Mr. Kelly felt it appropriate to cite the lack of experience on the part of Russian fliers in navigating intercontinental distances. Furthermore, he felt that a good guess is that given the same offensive potential the US could deliver more bombs on target. However, he felt that he could not overemphasize the unpleasant fact that a residue of 20 per cent enemy bombs on target here, coupled with the latest nuclear developments, gives a dismal outlook indeed.

## Some Political Aspects of the Warning System

That any violation of the warning line by an unaccounted for plane raises certain problems was pointed out by Mr. Halaby. If the US detects an enemy aircraft over its area of protection then the decision must be made whether or not to intercept the visitor, commence "massive retaliation",

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11

mobilize the cililian defense apparatus, or merely send a diplomatic note of protest. Dr. Rabi submitted that the answer to the first of these posers had already been given by the Russians: Shoot down any planes that come near the borders. Mr. Dean agreed that this was an important point to raise, and wondered if the DEW messages go to civil as well as military commands. Mr. Amory noted that complications might arise from the fact that the FCDA acts in an advisory capacity only, and that the states retain discretionary power regarding possible alerts. To put the question in more concrete terms, Mr. Kelly asked if a trip of the DEW line would result in the evacuation of New York City, for instance. Mr. Halaby said that he raised the question because he thought it merited further study, but that he could conceive of a number of different sorts of crossings in various places and quantities with different intents: each of the possible cases might require alternative solutions. For instance, there is always the chance that an enemy plane might "spoof" the warning line just to feel out or to harass the defenses of this country. However, Dr. Rabi questioned that the Soviet high command would dare to spoof if they felt that such an action might precipitate massive retaliation. General McCormack added that this country had better make certain that the Kremlin understood that the reaction to a spoof might be deadly, else such a policy could backfire. While the General conceded that, as Mr. Kelly suggested, some mechanical error might overcome the system and report a flock of Canadian geese as planes, still he felt that the decisions to be made at the time of an indicated attack did not require as much courage as, for instance, the American decision to enter the Korean war.

Mr. Berkner pointed out that the problem becomes less academic in actual practice. Naturally the detection of a single plane, ten planes, or one hundred would require a separate reaction in each case. Also, as Mr. Baldwin noted, the SAC has many hours of flight before reaching target areas, during which final policy can be established according to progressing events.

## The Cost of Defense

In reply to a question by Mr. Dean, Mr. Kelly estimated that the cost of a defense program designed to achieve the optimum rate of 80 per cent kills would be a yearly minimum of five to six billion dollars. The DEW line alone will cost $250 million. He admitted that there are technical problems to be solved, but assured the group that these problems are all soluble. Dr. Rabi declared, by way of showing how certain problems can be solved under pressure, that while atom weapons might turn out to be impractical in air defense because of the required distance that an interceptor stands off from the blast, as a last resort fighters could always ram formations of bombers in a suicide defense.

General McCormack commented that the cost of the proposed warning line over the oceans would be much higher than the sections already completed over land. He submitted that the dimensions of the problem of keeping ahead of the Soviet Union offensively are larger than might be expected, owing to the extensive Soviet perimeter, developments toward an IBM, overseas bases,

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12

and high altitude planes. All of these were going to be more expensive than anticipated. Mr. Altschul suggested that the group might address itself to the vital field of leading public opinion into supporting increased defense expenditures.

## Defending the Defenders

Mr. Franklin remarked that one of the principal keys to the problems we are discussing in this series of meetings is whether, in fact, this country's Strategic Air Command would be able to preserve its power of retaliation in spite of a surprise initial blow by the Soviet Union. He noted that Mr. Finletter had said that SAC bases could be made effectively defensible against attack, even though they are not at the present time. Mr. Franklin wondered whether the other members of the group agreed with this opinion and also what should be done to make the defenses of these bases effective. Should they be placed underground, or what? Dr. Rabi suggested that one answer to the problem of base protection lies in the fact that under the current hardbitten plan of rotation there is nearly always a sizeable fraction of the SAC forces in the air *en route* to a new base, and that this air-borne fraction pacts a terrific punch by itself.

Mr. Dean felt that in terms of deterrence, defensive and offensive forces are inseparable. He added that the problem of surreptitious delivery of nuclear weapons could indeed sabotage much of the offensive ability. Mr. Nitze countered that since about thirty targets in the USSR contain about one half the population, SAC need retain potency sufficient to reach thirty targets only. But Mr. Berkner maintained that these thirty targets would be the most densely defended, so the kill ratio might be high.

General McCormack agreed that at any rate defense is needed to make offense possible. Mr. Halaby wished to stress the importance of good Civilian Defense and warning systems.

Mr. Wilson proposed that the group consider the extent to which conventional and nuclear weapons are entwined, and Mr. Finletter suggested in this connection that a meeting be devoted to the question of a "little war". Mr. Nitze concluded the second meeting with a preview of the subject upon which Mr. Dean had asked him to prepare a few remarks of orientation for the next session, January 12th, at the usual hour. He said that he will discuss the ramifications of Item II in the outline -- the alleged atomic stalemate, and the implications of nuclear weapons for foreign alliances.

Kelsey Marechal
Rapporteur

Personal

CONFIDENTIAL

Not for publication

STUDY GROUP REPORTS

NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Chairman: Gordon Dean
Research Director: Carroll L. Wilson
Rapporteur: Kelsey Marechal

Second Meeting
December 15, 1954

Digest of Discussion

(This Digest has not been edited by the participants)

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21

## Comparative Vulnerability

2

[Y]

3

4

[Y]

The dependence of successful propaganda upon actual fact was illustrated by Mr. Amory as follows: At the start of the Korean war the Soviet civilian population demonstrated skepticism toward the charges that the South Koreans had initiated the hostilities. However, the American crossing of the Kala gave strength to the Russian propaganda claim, and reaffirmed the belief of the citizenry in the justice of their North Korean campaign.

5

A Portrait of the Weapons

Taking the type of Atomic Bomb used on Hiroshima as a starting point,
Mr. Kelly explained that present A bombs are twenty-five times more power-
ful. Since the original bomb has a "bang" equivalent to 20 kilotons of
conventional explosive, the present weapons are on the order of 500 KT.
However this increased energy release has been accomplished with equivalent
increases in efficiency, so that present weapons use approximately the same
amounts of ingredients as the prototypes. Intermediate sizes have also
been developed as well as weapons of less than 20 KT; while the efficiency
of energy release is not as high for the smaller bombs, their development
greatly improves the flexibility of the weapon since deliverability by
air or other means is obviously related to size and weight of the msssse.

Delivery equipment has progressed from the original vehicle, the B 29
through the B 50, B 36, and B 47 to the B 52, which is soon to become
available. The trend of course has been to develop faster and higher
flight, and all the delivery planes now in use can be considered intercon-
tinental if refueling is used. Since the limitations of both speed and
altitude on pilots are greater than on machines, development is concen-
trating upon two basic types of intercontinental guided missiles. The first
type, a plane of "super characteristics" is like a manned aircraft, except
that it can fly higher and faster. The second type, Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles, is further in the future; defense against the IBM is
of "another order of magnitude." At this stage it is an open question as
to which country will perfect these latter two weapons' carriers first.
The USSR has some advantage in that they were able to employ certain German
scientists already expert in the field, and they perhaps have given more
attention to this area of research.

6

[Y]

Since 1950 the military has turned its attention to the tactical use of atomic devices, and increased professional awareness and action have resulted in the development of possible uses of these devices across the entire range of tactical weapons. Indications are now that as the defense need grows, but budgets tend to contract, atomic and nuclear weapons will increase in importance through their greater relative efficiency. In fact, it can be maintained that if the United States in the future were to be involved in a "little war" it could not avoid using nuclear weapons.

## The Art of Self-Defense

Of defense against these weapons Mr. Kelly said that there "is none." In the event of an all-out enemy attack this country would be hit hard. However it may be possible within five years to build a defense capable of screening out 80 per cent of attacking planes. The outer ring of the defense perimeter, the Delayed Early Warning line along the Arctic Circle was commenced in December 1952. Mr. Kelly cited some of the technical difficulties which had confronted the Lincoln Project group at the time — the need to redesign detection gear for semi-automatic operation since the climate and difficult supply lines limited the number of human monitors available, coupled with the necessity of assuring solid communications in the face of regional electromagnetic interference with conventional radio systems. These and other problems were solved, however, and the communications system has been operating satisfactorily for more than a year. Recently the decision was reached to extend the DEW line detection system across the Arctic Circle, and this system is expected to be in good operation by 1957. This radar net, built and financed by the US will be manned by either American or Canadian personnel, depending upon decisions still to be made. The DEW line is only a detection facility and cannot be used for identification. Naturally this means that the USSR can make feints across the line, but there are solutions to this problem.

The second line is being established near the base of Hudson's Bay. This Mid-Canada line, like the Arctic line, is for detection only. Mr. Kelly felt that it would be preferable to have this second line also the first fighting line.

The third ring of defense consists of the Air Force line along the Canadian border and down both coasts, augmented by picket ships, ocean towers, and four engined radar planes over the oceans. These facilities include more complete radar for detecting, tracking, and vectoring aircraft, and all in all are an extremely sophisticated system. While currently manually operated, this line is scheduled to be replaced by a semi-automatic system, with planes and eventually missiles cued in directly.

Final defense is point defense at principal targets, where present installations of highly developed antiaircraft, which are actually deficient in range by present standards, are rapidly being supplanted by Nike type missile defenses. Mr. Kelly summed up the defense picture thus: In five years, assuming that technical advances forseen now can be brought off without slip, and given adequate funds to do a proper job, under average conditions of attack, the ADC should be able to destroy from 75 to 80 per cent of any attacking force.

[x]

8

9

[Y]

202A defense AA — 1 cubie
mi² yar²
11

mobilize the cililian defense apparatus, or merely send a diplomatic note of protest. Dr. Rabi submitted that the answer to the first of these posers had already been given the by Russians: Shoot down any planes that come near the borders. Mr. Dean agreed that this was an important point to raise, and wondered if the DEW messages go to civil as well as military commands. Mr. Amory noted that complications might arise from the fact that the FCDA acts in an advisory capacity only, and that the states retain discretionary power regarding possible alerts. To put the question in more concrete terms, Mr. Kelly asked if a trip of the DEW line would result in the evacuation of New York City, for instance. Mr. Halaby said that he raised the question because he thought it merited further study, but that he could conceive of a number of different sorts of crossings in various places and quantities with different intents: each of the possible cases might require alternative solutions. For instance, there is always the chance that an enemy plane might "spoof" the warning line just to feel out or to harass the defenses of this country. However, Dr. Rabi questioned that the Soviet high command would dare to spoof if they felt that such an action might precipitate massive retaliation. General McCormack added that this country had better make certain that the Kremlin understood that the reaction to a spoof might be deadly, else such a policy could backfire. While the General conceded that, as Mr. Kelly suggested, some mechanical error might overcome the system and report a flock of Canadian geese as planes, still he felt that the decisions to be made at the time of an indicated attack did not require as much courage as, for instance, the American decision to enter the Korean war.

Mr. Berkner pointed out that the problem becomes less academic in actual practice. Naturally the determination of a single plane, ten planes, or one hundred would require a separate reaction in each case. Also, as Mr. Baldwin noted, the SAC has many hours of flight before reaching target areas, during which final policy can be established according to progressing events.

## The Cost of Defense

[Y]

12

## Defending the Defenders

Mr. Dean felt that in terms of deterrence, *defensive and offensive forces are inseparable*. He added that the problem of surreptitious delivery of nuclear weapons could indeed sabotage much of the offensive ability. Mr. Nitze countered that since about thirty targets in the USSR contain about one half the population, SAC need retain potency sufficient to reach thirty targets only. But Mr. Berkner maintained that these thirty targets would be the most densely defended, so the kill ratio might be high.

Kelsey Marechal
Rapporteur

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

# Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy

## Background Paper: Outline Parts 1 a and b

by Carroll L. Wilson

An appraisal of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons seems an
appropriate starting point for this study. We need to imagine the first
few days or weeks of an all-out war with nuclear weapons. As we try to
assess the impact of nuclear weapons on U.S. target areas - urban, indus-
trial centers - we should have in mind the principal features of such centers.
A partial catalogue includes the following:

1. Great specialization in the skills of people, trans-
portation means, factories, materials supply and
distribution systems, professional activities and
institutions - schools, hospitals, and in the sub-
divisions of Federal, state and local government.

2. The use of very large and increasing amounts of fuel energy through machinery - principally electrical and internal combustion - upon which the whole urban-industrialized area is completely dependent. Means of transportation of people and things, communication, production of goods and rendering services are almost entirely dependent upon large uninterrupted supplies of energy for the machines. The energy source - machine - is a central feature of the economy.

3. Highly organized group activity - great elaboration of interlocking management forms to combine such variety of specialties with specialized machinery into mechanisms for the production of goods and services on such a scale that the shares of the fruits of such goods and services among the specialized individuals are many times greater than the share of the generalized individual in a farming-subsistence economy.

4. Concentration in such centers of the most highly developed skilled workers and professional people and the leaders of national industrial and professional life. Most of the leading hospitals, medical schools, many of the universities, most of the banks and credit institutions, most of the exchanges and merchants who form innumerable essential links in the complex structure of the urban-industrialized, free-enterprise economy are located in the Critical Target areas. The places are essential components in the "Nervous System" of our economy. Here is where intelligence is digested, decisions made, actions set in motion, etc.

5. Another important feature is the susceptibility of these centers to dislocation both from physical causes and from psychological causes. New York City is probably the extreme

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example among these target centers. A dock strike, an elevator operator's strike, stoppage of ground or subway transportation, or even failure of street traffic signals can materially slow down the economic machine which is New York. More important still is the confidence of the individual in the machine and the system.- that it will serve and not destroy him. In the depression of '29 the physical plant for production and distribution did not shrink, our people were no less skilled than before but industrial production fell more than 40%, millions were unemployed and the system was in shaky condition. Without the lifeblood of Confidence - Credit the American urban industrial complex doesn't work.

6. These centers are the source of the "building blocks" for rebuilding or expanding our means of production, transportation, communication and housing. From these centers come the building materials and machinery from which new but specialized urban-industrial centers, such as aircraft factories, were built in World War II. These centers are also our links to other nations - they include the ports through which most of our commerce flows - they have the docks, the warehouses, the railroad yards, harbors, etc., which constitute a necessary bridge for the import and export of men and materials. They constitute a large part of our "fixed capital" and stand on our books at some hundreds of billions of dollars worth of materials, time, energy and intelligence.

There are many other features of these centers which may deserve description but for our immediate purpose these may be sufficient. Our immediate purpose is to assess the impact of an attempted knockout blow by the USSR against our Critical Target Areas. Subject to later re-examination it is suggested that we use the planning assumptions of the FCDA as our starting point. Briefly they are summarized as follows:

1. The Soviet Union has the capability of striking any target within the U.S. with nuclear weapons, including thermonuclear types delivered by air and detonated above ground during normal working hours. Targets will be our centers of industry and population.

2. Initial attack will include sufficient nuclear weapons to hit all of our critical target areas; to be followed by other less heavy attacks; that a large proportion of all weapons carried will be delivered on the targets.

3. Bomb size will range from a few thousand to millions of tons of TNT equivalent. Any city attacked, with very few exceptions, can be substantially destroyed by one bomb. Atomic bombs of today may be assumed to be as much as 25 times as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb, i.e. 500,000 tons.

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4. The principal city in each of the 92 Critical Target Areas could be struck by at least one bomb. The daytime centers of population will be the aiming points within the city.

5. Any city attacked will need outside support to meet the emergency.

6. A warning time of one hour in most areas is expected but cannot be assured.

7. Evacuation of people from downtown areas in cities is to commence upon the first warning. It is expected that such people might have moved on an average two miles away from their offices by the time the attack became imminent.

This is the general doctrine for 1955. In effect this says the Soviet Union can drop any size bomb anywhere at any time and by implication we can do the same to the Soviet Union.

Let us first consider the effects of an H bomb on New York. If we use for thermonuclear weapons a 3-mile radius of total destruction, a 7-mile radius of heavy damage and a 10-mile radius of light damage, we can see why even the largest city would be essentially destroyed by one of these weapons. In order to be quantitative we should take a numerical example.

Assume an "Ivy Mike" thermonuclear weapon exploding above 5th Avenue and 42nd Street during working daytime. The 3-mile radius of total destruction would include all of Manhattan Island south of 96th Street, parts of Jersey City and all of the cities on the west shore of the Hudson up to Hudson Heights and in Queens it would include Long Island City, Hunter's Point and Williamsburg. According to FCDA tables, with warning, the mortality within the area of total destruction (A Damage) will be about 75%. The daytime working as well as the resident population in this zone of A-damage is at least 4 million. This would produce 3 million deaths and most of the survivors would be severely injured.

The radius of the B-zone of heavy damage is 7 miles. This circle runs just north of the George Washington Bridge, includes about a third of the Bronx, runs to the east of Flushing Bay, includes perhaps half of Queens and Brooklyn and all of Jersey City. Heavy damage is defined as major structural damage that would result in the collapse of buildings. With warning, FCDA tables indicate about 30% mortality in this area. The population of this region might exceed normal to the extent that persons evacuating the Manhattan area had moved into this zone. Estimated population about 3 million. Mortality at 30% would be 900,000. Surviving casualties would probably number at least 600,000.

The proportions of the disaster to a single city become fairly clear. New York is probably more vulnerable than any other city owing to the extreme density of population. On the other hand, there are large unpopulated areas in the circles we have considered - Central Park, the rivers and Upper Bay, the Jersey Meadows - which would be solid built-up areas in Los Angeles, Dallas, Columbus, etc.

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the nation's medical resources in doctors, nurses, hospitals and medical schools; the communication facilities in the form of telephone exchanges, radio and TV station; the port facilities and most of the employees and facilities comprising the machinery of the federal government.

It would be conservative to assume for our key cities within the 25 Critical Target Areas that 25% of the population are uninjured, 25% are killed and the other 50% are injured. With a total population of about 36 million, this would mean 9 million killed and 18 million injured. These cities would cease to exist as productive units of the economy and would require succor from all of the remaining parts of the country. The central plant and most of the personnel of the Federal Government would be destroyed.

The effect upon those who survived may be imagined. The city as the target for destruction would probably be shunned by as much of the population as could find refuge in the country. A few follow-up attacks on cities escaping the first attack would be likely to dislocate much of the remainder of the economy. The problems of mere survival of the survivors would become of paramount importance - the prevention of disease, the distribution of food and medicines, the maintenance of law and order.

The scale of destruction of life and property and the degree of immobilization of the remainder of the nation preoccupied with its own survival in the face of further attacks as well as rendering assistance to the survivors and refugees from these 25 cities and their environs is hard to imagine. But it is clear that many of the factors which make the U.S. a world power and a formidable power would have been destroyed. Rebuilding these sinews of strength would absorb the energies of the survivors for years. The physical, political or economic pattern of what might be rebuilt would be very difficult to predict. That it would resemble our cities and systems of today seems unlikely.

This brief inspection has been limited to the U.S.A. The effects upon the principal target cities of Western Europe would be comparable. The much higher density of total population would give these nations less resilience than the U.S.

The effects upon Russian cities should not be markedly different and the mass-effect upon the Russian system could well be as great as upon ours. Perhaps their critical targets are more dispersed - they are certainly less mechanized. But even today there is an almost oriental degree of crowding in most Russian cities - hence high population densities. Their economy is less urban-industrialized than ours. Their industrial war-making potential would presumably be as thoroughly destroyed as ours. The destruction of those parts located in the satellite nations would present awkward decisions for us to make. Their bureaucratic system might have greater capacity thanours to cope with widespread destruction. Their experiences in World War II may make them better prepared to deal with such major disasters.

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In this review no consideration has been given to the effects of down-wind fall-out immobilizing large adjacent areas, sabotage by agents, the use of chemical or biological warfare or psychological warfare to stir up confusion, hysteria, etc. but these are matters which this group should consider - especially fall-out. To what degree they would amplify the effects of the attack may be deferred for the moment. The overwhelming impact of an attack without these additional measures seems sufficient to consider as a beginning.

Before proceeding to an appraisal of the defenses against attack - present and prospective - we should consider the area of our agreement as to the effect of a massive nuclear bomb attack upon our cities and upon those of the USSR. How would it change the status of the U.S. and the USSR as World Powers? What would be the probable duration of such changed status? Are there significant differences in the vulnerability of the U.S. and USSR? Are there significant differences in their recuperative capacities? Would longer warning and an enormous shelter plan reduce greatly the impact as described? Would a government sponsored and enforced dispersal plan which dismembered our large cities reduce greatly the impact as described? What is the probability that such a plan, if effective, could be carried out in the U.S.?

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

by Carroll L. Wilson

An appraisal of the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons seems an
appropriate starting point for this study. We need to imagine the first few days
or weeks of an all-out war with nuclear weapons. As we try to assess the impact
of nuclear weapons on U. S. target areas - urban, industrial centers - we should
have in mind the principal features of such centers. A partial catalogue includes
the following:

1. Great specialization in the skills of people, transportation means, factories, materials supply and distribution systems, professional activities and institutions - schools, hospitals, and in the subdivisions of Federal, state and local government.

5. Another important feature is the susceptibility of these centers to dislocation both from physical causes and from psychological causes. New York City is probably the extreme example among these target centers. A dock strike, an elevator operator's strike, stoppage of ground or subway transportation, or even failure of

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street traffic signals can materially slow down the economic machine which is New York. More important still is the confidence of the individual in the machine and the system-- that it will serve and not destroy him. In the depression of '29 the physical plant for production and distribution did not shrink, our people were no less skilled than before but industrial production fell more than 40 per cent, millions were unemployed and the system was in shaky condition. Without the lifeblood of Confidence - Credit - the American urban industrial complex doesn't work.

6. These centers are the source of the "building blocks" for rebuilding or expanding our means of production, transportation, communication and housing. From these centers come the building materials and machinery from which new but specialized urban-industrial centers, such as aircraft factories, were built in World War II. These centers are also our links to other nations - they include the ports through which most of our commerce flows - they have the docks, the warehouses, the railroad yards, harbors, etc. which constitute a necessary bridge for the import and export of men and materials. They constitute a large part of our "fixed capital" and stand on our books at some hundreds of billions of dollars worth of materials, time, energy and intelligence.

There are many other features of these centers which may deserve description but for our immediate purpose these may be sufficient. Our immediate purpose is to assess the impact of an attempted knockout blow by the U.S. against our Critical Target Areas. Subject to later re-examination it is suggested that we use the planning assumptions of the FCDA as our starting point. Briefly they are summarized as follows:

1. The Soviet Union has the capability of striking any target within the U.S. with nuclear weapons, including thermo-nuclear types delivered by air and detonated above ground during normal working hours. Targets will be our centers of industry and population.

3. Bomb size will range from a few thousand to millions of tons of TNT equivalent. Any city attacked, with very few exceptions, can be substantially destroyed by one bomb. Atomic bombs of today may be assumed to be as much as 25 times as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb, i.e., 500,000 tons.

4. The principal city in each of the 92 Critical Target Areas could be struck by at least one bomb. The day-time centers of population will be the aiming points within the city.

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Assume an "Ivy Mike" thermonuclear weapon exploiding above Fifth Avenue and 42nd Street during working daytime. The 3-mile radius of total destruction would include all of Manhattan Island south of 96th Street, parts of Jersey City and all of the cities on the west shore of the Hudson up to Hudson Heights and in Queens it would include Long Island City, Hunter's Point and Williamsburg. According to FCDA tables, with warning, the mortality within the area of total destruction (A-Damage) will be about 75 per cent. The daytime working as well as the resident population in this zone of A-damage is at least 4 million. This would produce 3 million deaths and most of the survivors would be severely injured.

The radius of the B-zone of heavy damage is 7 miles. This circle runs just north of the George Washington Bridge, includes about a third of the Bronx, runs to the east of Flushing Bay, includes perhaps half of Queens and Brooklyn and all of Jersey City. Heavy damage is defined as major structural damage that would result in the collapse of buildings. With warning, FCDA tables indicate about 30 per cent mortality in this area. The population of this region might exceed normal to the extent that persons evacuating the Manhattan area had moved into this zone. Estimated population about 3 million. Mortality at 30 per cent would be 900,000. Surviving casualties would probably number at least 600,000.

Let us then imagine that World War III is started by a massive Soviet attack on U.S. Targets which is met by a massive counter-attack by the U.S. on Soviet Targets. The FCDA has identified 92 Critical Target Areas with a total population of 68 million. For the Soviet Union to place 92 aircraft on target at the ranges of these targets from their bases may not be an exceptionally difficult undertaking. But there is bound to be some diversion, confusion or interception so let us assume that only 25 of the Critical Target Areas are hit in the first attack, but that these 25 are the largest and most easily identified targets and that each is struck by at least one bomb of appropriate yield. The principal cities within the Critical Target Areas which have been chosen for our study here are the following:

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problems of mere survival of the survivors would become of paramount importance, the prevention of disease, the distribution of food and medicines, the maintenance of law and order.

The effects upon Russian cities should not be markedly different and the mass-effect upon the Russian system could well be as great as upon ours. Perhaps their critical targets are more dispersed - they are certainly less mechanized. But even today there is an almost oriental degree of crowding in most Russian cities - hence high population densities. Their economy is less urban-industrialized than ours. Their industrial war-making potential would presumably be as thoroughly destroyed as ours. The destruction of these parts located in the satellite nations would present awkward decisions for us to make. Their bureaucratic system might have greater capacity than ours to cope with widespread destruction. Their experiences in World War II may make them better prepared to deal with such major disasters.

In this review no consideration has been given to the effects of down-wind fall-out immobilizing large adjacent areas, sabotage by agents, the use of chemical or biological warfare or psychological warfare to stir up confusion, hysteria, etc., but these are matters which this group should consider - especially fall-out. To what degree they would amplify the effects of the attack may be deferred for the moment. The overwhelming impact of an attack without these additional measures seems sufficient to consider as a beginning.

Before proceeding to an appraisal of the defenses against attack - present and prospective - we should consider the area of our agreement as to the effect of a massive nuclear bomb attack upon our cities and upon those of the U.S.S.R. How would it change the status of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as World Powers? What would be the probable duration of such changed status? Are there significant differences in the vulnerability of the U.S. and U.S.S.R.? Are there significant differences in their recuperative capacities? Would longer warning and an enormous shelter plan reduce greatly the impact as described? Would a government sponsored and enforced dispersal plan which dismembered our large cities reduce greatly the impact as described? What is the probability that such a plan, if effective, could be carried out in the U.S.?

Study Group on
<u>Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy</u>

Corrections to Digest of Second Meeting: December 15, 1954

(1) Mr. Nitze writes: "On page 12 of the record of our December 15 discussion, I am quoted as saying 30 targets in the U.S.S.R. contain half the population and that S.A.C. needs a potency to reach only these targets. The point I was attempting to make was quite different.

"I was trying to make the general point of decreasing marginal vulnerability to increasing numbers of bombs on target. To make this point I referred to the fact that half of the U.S. urban population and economic potential is concentrated in the first thirty targets. After the first 200 targets our marginal vulnerability per bomb falls off very rapidly.

"I was suggesting that a roughly comparable situation might exist in the U.S.S.R., that the deterrent effect of being able to deliver 100 or 200 weapons on target might be most of the deterrent effect possible, and that it is conceivable that expenditures which would have the effect of increasing our capacity to deliver bombs on U.S.S.R. targets from 200 to 300 (for instance) might be better spent on defense if by such a switch we could reduce our own vulnerability from 30 to 20."

(2) Page 7, paragraphs 4 and 5. The remarks attributed to Mr. Lilienthal were made by Mr. Finletter.

December 29, 1954

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Draft Notes on Part I of Study Outline

1. Destructive Capabilities

(a) Effects of an H Bomb on One Large City - Would destroy all facilities within a radius of 3 miles from ground zero and produce 75% mortality among people there; severly damage a belt from 3 to 7 miles out with 30% mortality; would immobilize down-wind elliptical area of several thousand square miles by radioactive fall-out with severe casualties from radiation in fall-out area.

(b) Mass Effect of Simultaneous Attack on X Cities.

1. In U.S.A. - Even if X were only 20-25 critical centers, the full energies of the nation would be absorbed for weeks or months in the care of the injured, continued survival (food, medicines, fuel, etc.) and in re-establishment of at least the basic essential services and activities. As a productive "arsenal of democracy" capable of turning out and delivering to a European front the machines and personnel for conventional warfare the USA would not be very formidable for some time.

2. In USSR - Much the same can be said about the effects of a mass nuclear attack on Soviet cities. They may be moderately less vulnerable because of more integrated dispersed armament factories, larger stockpiles of food, fuel, supplies, etc., and because of more recent experience in coping with

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the effects of invasion and the consequent dislocation of the
country. But 25 well-placed nuclear weapons of appropriate
yield would affect the USSR in more or less the same way they
would affect the USA or the key points in Western Europe.

(c) **Delivery of Bombs** - For the next few years delivery means will be high-speed manned bombers. During an interim period they may be robot aircraft. Ultimately the delivery means will be intercontinental ballistic missiles. Weapons in any case will be nuclear bombs of various types. USA is probably well ahead of the USSR in aircraft. The relative positions in IBM's is less certain.

(d) Defenses

1 - At Present

A - **For USA** - Poor for Critical Target Areas. Late and uncertain warning and identification.

B - **For USSR** - Probably not very effective - perimeter is too great, identification probably easier.

C - **For Western Europe** - Very poor, warning time insufficient, close-in defenses too late.

2 - <u>Optimum Foreseeable Defenses</u>

A - **For USA** - Against aircraft could be as good at 70-80% toll of attackers with perhaps 2-3 hours warning of major cities.

B - **For USSR** - Could be as good in principle but their many-sided exposure makes the problem more difficult.

C - **For Western Europe** - cannot visualize any very effective warning or defense system for Western European key tarkets.

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## Against IBM

Since the first long-range BM's the V-2's were used against the UK in 1945 no effective defense against such missiles after launching has been developed or can now be visualized.

### (3) - What About Civil Defense

We have not visualized a Civil Defense Program (Protection of structures and their inhabitants against the effects of nuclear weapons) which would substantially mitigate the effects of a large-scale nuclear attack. A problem already bordering on the impossible in the face of megaton H bombs is made vastly more difficult by Fall-out. A redistribution of population and essential functions sufficient to allow a country to continue to operate as a production arsenal of democracy following a massive nuclear attack is not believed practical.

(e) Can Massive Retaliation be Avoided - US SAC has vulnerable points perhaps most particularly through subversion of native personnel employed in large numbers at overseas bases. But an important part of SAC is based in North America, is operational at all times and is sufficiently scattered and protected so that at the present time the USSR would have to expect severe retaliation from SAC if they were to strike first and concentrate on SAC as a target. However, the plans for defense of SAC are not now such that SAC will continue to be adequately defended in view of the expected increase in Soviet offensive power. Though an adequate defense of U.S. industry against the foreseeable increase in Soviet offensive power does not seem possible, an adequate

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defense of SAC is possible and must be undertaken, so that our capacity
to retaliate against a Soviet nuclear attack will be maintained. It is
probable that the Soviet Union also will be able to maintain a capacity
to retaliate against a U.S. attack, although their SAC is smaller and
slower than ours and less experienced in intercontinental flying. With
the future advent of IBM's the prospect that any attacker would face
massive retaliation is likely to increase rather than diminish.

Carroll L. Wilson

[Y]

The third meeting of the Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy was held at the Harold Pratt House on Wednesday, January 12, 1955, at 5:30 p.m. Present were: Paul Nitze, Discussion Leader; Gordon Dean, Chairman; Carroll L. Wilson, Research Secretary; Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; Hamilton Fish Armstrong; Hanson W. Baldwin; William Diebold, Jr; Thomas K. Finletter; George S. Franklin, Jr.; N.E. Halaby; Joseph E. Johnson; Maj. Gen. James McCormack, Jr.; Charles P. Noyes, 2nd.; Frank Pace, Jr; James A. Perkins; Don K. Price; I.I. Rabi; Henry L. Roberts; David Rockefeller; Oscar M. Ruebhausen; and Arnold Wolfers.

The opening portion of the meeting was devoted to a review of the draft notes on Part I of the Study Outline prepared by Mr. Wilson after the first two meetings. (This draft is attached hereto.) There were several suggestions made pertaining to the exact language of the draft and Mr. Wilson expects to consult with Mr. Dean and circulate a revised outline shortly. A number of observations were made, however, which seem to be of more general interest to the members of the group, and these are recorded rather briefly below before the main portion of the digest of Mr. Nitze's prepared remarks.

## Findings of Fact

Mr. Finletter suggested that the area of blast destruction mentioned might be an underestimate, and that according to his understanding the blast damage from a 20 MT bomb was "destructive" with a 10 mile radius and heat damage was destructive within a 20 mile radius. He noted Mr. Dean's caution that as far as maximum size of bang is concerned, the only thing that can be said is that an H-bomb of "X" size has been developed, but felt that at least the paper should contain the caution that the present size does not represent the maximum bang foreseeable.

Mr. Baldwin felt that the term "full energies" was an overstatement as used to describe the portion of US effort that would be absorbed by the business of survival after an attack. He noted that the fact that the civilian population might be reduced to disorganized status would not preclude effective retaliatory action by SAC.

A number of persons objected to the term "arsenal of democracy," (2b-1) on the grounds that not only does the nature of nuclear war demand that the materials of attack be already in hand, but that the term itself is left over from World War II, and carries an implication of American neutrality.

Mr. Baldwin stated that sections 1 a, b, and c give the erroneous impression that the Soviet Union is less vulnerable to nuclear attack than this country, while he felt the contrary to be true.

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Mr. Halaby suggested that the role of the FCDA in reducing fatalities is not covered adequately. Some estimates indicate that with proper warning and defensive action the population of Washington, D.C. for instance, could be evacuated so as to reduce deaths from 900,000 to only 3,000. If this is true, the CD factor is important.

There was some discussion of the SAC base structure. General McCormack admitted that the base complex is vulnerable to attack and to subversion, but that rotation of planes and various other devices are helping to decrease this vulnerability. Mr. Finletter felt that the SAC bases structure needs to be expanded. He also thought that some mention should be made of TAC.

Mr. Dean felt that while a comparison of vulnerabilities of the US and the USSR, as noted in the last sections of the outline, is valuable, there is some danger in thinking of the two countries as comparable in a linear sense. After all, no attack is ever perfect, and furthermore, the Russians have a certain advantage in that they may choose the time of a surprise attack since the US is restrained by many factors from initiating nuclear war except under special circumstances.

## Stalemate: Feasibility of Either Side Commencing Nuclear War

Mr. Dean noted that the first two meetings had emphasized the many aspects of weapons effects and performance, and that Mr. Nitze had prepared a few comments which would serve to shift the discussion from hardware to politics. Mr. Nitze commenced by noting that he had been asked to address himself to the problems under sections 2b, and 4a and b of the preliminary outline, i.e., the feasibility of either the U.S. or the USSR initiating a nuclear war, and the implications of new weapons for systems of alliances. He felt that these two problems are so closely entwined as to be almost inseparable, but for the purpose of organizing his talk he proposed to discuss section 2b first.

As Commander-In Chief the President clearly has the technical capacity to initiate nuclear war. If he were to give the order, surely this order would be carried out by SAC. Congress has specifically stated through the AEC Act that the President shall decide whether or not to make weapons available to the military, and even if Congress were to pass an act forbidding the executive to make use of nuclear weapons -- and if such an act were to be held Constitutional -- there is doubt that it would be possible to deny to the President the effective power to initiate nuclear war under all conceivable circumstances. Perhaps subsidiary commanders could involve the country in a nuclear war in the absence of a responsible governmental decision. Naturally, Congress could declare war, but such declaration is likely only upon advice or demand of the President. Such being the case, it seems adequate for the purposes of the study group to concentrate upon the types of issues which are likely to be considered by the President and his advisors before he can make a decision or a recommendation involving the initiation of nuclear war.

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These issues may be grouped under six general headings;

1. The nature of the affront.

2. The type of war involved.

3. The effectiveness of taking the initiative in preventing retaliation.

4. The amount of damage likely to be absorbed domestically.

5. The likely further evolution of the war.

6. The existence of non-nuclear alternatives.

The important problem of gaining popular domestic support for a decision to initiate nuclear war is closely tied to the nature of the affront against this country, and is concerned with such intangibles as national prestige and honor. Perhaps the matter can be visualized best as a spectrum of situations running from the dark end of the band -- all-out attack with conventional weapons by the USSR, with success of the venture certain, through many shades of gray -- to the light end of the band: -- a forseeable worsening of the general power between us and our enemies. There can be little doubt that a decision to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of an attack at the dark end of the band would receive public support, and it is probable that there will continue to be some point beyond which this country cannot be pushed without initiating nuclear warfare. The other end of the spectrum is less clear, however, although both recent administrations have had to deal with decisions of that order. For instance, the Truman administration faced the problem of nascent Russian nuclear development, and this implied power shift was exacerbated by the Korean war and by Chinese intervention, by pressures in Europe and Asia, etc. So far it has not been politically feasible to commence a nuclear war as long as the provocation remains at the light end of the spectrum, and with the constant increase in Soviet nuclear potential the point at which this country will contemplate nuclear retaliation is moving closer to the dark end of the band.

Naturally the most difficult questions to answer are in the middle of the band, for instance, a blockade of Berlin and subsequent local ground engagements in which it seemed likely that the US would suffer defeat and humiliation if nuclear weapons were forewarned, or an attack upon Formosa beyond the power of the Seventh Fleet to control. Many of such possible interactions contain the danger that once the countries become committed to a course of action, the events will flow almost automatically toward nuclear war, just as the complex actions of separate states ended at Pearl Harbor.

The second group of issues, the type of war involved, also runs on a spectrum from all-out nuclear war to the limited use of tactical atomic devises. This band is composed of three subsidiary bands: The band of weapons size, from say a few KT to maximum bang; the band of target choice, from military to civilian; and the band of geographical location, from isolated tactical use to blanket target coverage.

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This second area of choice includes an important dilemma, for, if the decision is in favor of attack toward the lighter end of the range, then the enemy is left with the prerogative of responding with maximum strength; on the other hand, immediate use of full potential may bring domestic and foreign political and moral repercussions. It seems then that action in terms of the middle band of this spectrum of attack is the most likely alternative, with nuclear strikes limited to the Russian SAC and other retaliatory military forces. This country is limited somewhat in its choice of geographic areaswhere the bomb might be effective, since many areas such as Asia are not under full coverage of the American base structure. Furthermore, if the US decided to limit the use of nuclear weapons to some battle area in China, for instance, it seems unlikely that the Soviet Union would refrain from either direct retaliation or at least the indirect provision of weapons to the Chinese. While some persons hold a contrary view, Mr. Nitze felt personally that unless an American strike in China or some other isolated area were of such force as to "scare the Russians stiff," then the net result of such a limited use of nuclear weapons would be the provocation of Soviet attack.

Further differences of opinion surround the set of issues having to do with the effectiveness of an initial strike in crippling the Soviet power to retali ate. Some observers feel that the first US blow could eliminate the Soviet SAC as a coordinated group, and that the resulting disorganized thrusts against this country could be almost completely rebuffed by the ADC. Naturally these estimates deal with conventional carriers, not ballistic weapons. Others maintain, however, that American intelligence sources are not good enough to locate all the bases of Russian striking potential, thus making it impossible to prevent retaliation even with a strong initial attack. Obviously this is one point at which more information is necessary before a determination can be made whether the advantages of initial action make for a situation of instability, or whether the lack of advantages of surprise attack tends toward a situation of relative stalemate.

A fourth band of issues for the President to consider is the probable amount of damage which would have to be absorbed by this country in the event of attack. The major part of the American urban population and economic potential is concentrated in 100 target areas, and over half of this total is found in 30 of the largest; only two or three of these areas would require bombs of over 500 KT for "substantial destruction." Taking Mr. Kelly's estimated rate of kills (80 per cent), and applying this figure to estimates of present Soviet atomic stockpiles, it becomes apparent that more than enough bombs are available to the enemy to enable it to destroy one half of this country's potential power.

The fifth consideration concerns the possible future course of a nuclear war. If, as Clausewitz postulated, war tends to degenerate toward maximum violence, the initial limiting of the scope of attack in terms of size, target systems, or geographical area may only give an added advantage to the enemy who is at liberty to disregard such self-imposed limits. There is the additional problem of determining a conclusion to any war after all available targets and bombs have been mated. How is the winner determined?

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Mr. Dean interposed that the group did not have sufficient information about the ability of the US to cripple Soviet power, and that since such information is not only hard to evaluate but also highly classified the group had better discuss the problem in terms of the reasonable alternatives. Mr. Wolfers noted that there is a great deal of danger in the rational discussion of such a vital problem because of the secrecy involved, and Mr. Nitze added that the values involved are so great that they make all possible decisions "loaded". Mr. Wolfers suggested that perhaps the group had better work on the assumption that the enemy is fairly intelligent, and that such being the case he for one could not conceive of any nuclear strike being so well prepared and executed that it would destroy the retaliatory power of a major country. He stressed the danger in the obverse conclusion, and wondered if this country could afford to gamble on one guess.

The value schemes of this country have changes in recent years, Mr. Rabi suggested, and he felt that the words "honor" and "prestige" as used by Mr. Nitze have meanings today which they had not had before in history. Mr. Altschul called attention to the fact that this country might be limited in its actions by moral considerations.

## Effect of These Issues Upon America's Allies

Mr. Nitze began the second half of the meeting with a discussion of the ways in which the allies of this country might be affected by the same considerations he had outlined above. He noted first that certain American allies tend to be more belligerent with respect to the enemy than this country itself, and he listed Korea, Formosa and Turkey as examples. Furthermore, most of this country's allies feel themselves to be more openly exposed to Russian attack than America is, although, recalling the damage that this country might have to absorb with even the maximum number of defense kills, it is difficult to agree that any country is more vulnerable than America. If London can be destroyed by three bombs, but at the same time the Russians are capable of delivering at least thirty bombs over targets in this country, then one can hardly say that England is more vulnerable than the US. (For a more complete discussion of this problem of the "marginal utility" of additional bombs, see Mr. Nitze's correction to the 2nd. digest.)

Mr. Rabi countered that not only is this country's warning system superior to that of any ally, but that our 80 per cent kill ratio should have a demoralizing effect upon enemy pilots. Mr. Nitze noted, however, that at least 50 per cent of the Kamakazi pilots had found targets during the last war, and that also the attrition rate had been high for the US 8th Air Force without adversely affecting morale. Mr. Wolfers suggested that the whole question seems to boil down to one of the Russian priority system for European and American targets. Mr. Pace felt that there really is no problem -- the US is number one. The political situation in the US today is such that an attack upon Europe would be answered in kind from American bases, and the Russians know this. Mr. Perkins felt, that Mr. Nitze's point was well taken, and that this country and its allies

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are today equally and absolutely vulnerable. Mr. Nitze buttressed his point by noting that long before the five year date at which Mr. Kelly has said the kill ratio might attain 80 per cent, the Russians will be able to launch from one to ten thousand sorties with appropriate atomic or nuclear devices; even though these sorties might not be simultaneous, they could within a short space of time hit all the major targets in Europe and the US.

Mr. Nitze continued that besides the similarities of vulnerability between the US and its allies, there is at the top levels of decision a similarity of purpose. While Mr. Pace did not agree, and stated that the peoples of the various countries have differing understandings of the implications of nuclear warfare, Mr. Nitze contended that the courage of the allies should not be underestimated. Under the same set of circumstances which might force an American President to initiate nuclear war, he felt that the leaders and peoples of the US allies could be counted upon to concur.

Mr. Rabi wondered how US allies could be worse off if they proclaimed a policy of strict neutrality. For instance, France might try, and indeed very nearly has tried, to eschew any sort of complete alliance with the US for military purposes. Mr. Halaby pointed out, however, that France would lose not only its peace of conscience, but its colonies under a policy of neutrality, since the rest of the Western powers could hardly be expected to allow France to shift the power balance so unfavorably. But Mr. Rabi insisted that if certain of the weaker allies were to remove themselves from the defensive orbit for fear of Russian nuclear attack against US bases there, for military reasons they could still expect to remain under the protection of the US. Mr. Price posed the problem more concretely by postulating that if the USSR were to prepare to occupy Europe, these preparations would become evident to the NATO nations, and that France might well be caught between the alternatives of concurring in a nuclear attack or being occupied by Russian ground forces. Mr. Franklin noted that it would put our alliances under a great strain if the Soviet Union started an all out nuclear attack on the US and at the same time announced that it would grant immunity to our allies in return for their neutrality.

Mr. Wolfers suggested that there might be grave danger to Europe in a situation in which the US and Russia exchanged crippling blows, for Russia would then be in a relatively advantageous position in terms of renascent ground strength, and could eventually take over Europe. The best hope for Europe then is that there will be some sort of atomic stalemate, and that, even if the Russians march to the sea, the American forces will be able to liberate Europe by virtue of superior logistic supplies and tactical nuclear weapons. General McCormack noted that General Gruenther has stated publicly that tactical nuclear weapons are a part of the European defense structure, and that there have been no dissents from this proposal by Europeans.

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The USSR And Surprise Attack

The same chain of considerations applies to the Russian decision about initiating a nuclear war as to the American decision, Mr. Nitze said, except that the point of view differs. Furthermore, Malenkov is likely to have to consult with more persons than the President before pushing any buttons, and there is a great deal more likelihood that the order will be down in the Russian command chain.

Perhaps one major difference in the thinking processes of the two countries is that if the facts indicate that a surprise move will actually produce a significant advantage, then there is greater likelihood of the Russian carrying his thoughts to a strictly logical conclusion. Mr. Nitze continued that the Russians would seem to have a higher degree of control over the satellites than this country does over its allies, and that the Soviet political system lends itself more readily to full mobilization, or to compression of the civilian economy. He called attention to the important fact that if indeed the USSR can take necessary defensive and other measures which are not politically feasible in the US then there may be no such condition as an atomic stalemate.

Mr. Wilson noted that there might be some differences between the alternatives open to the two countries under item six of Mr. Nitze's set of issues. For instance, subversion and infiltration might very well pay off for the Russians, particularly if they were fully checkmated on the military front.

General McCormack suggested that perhaps the Soviet task is easier in that the USSR needs to prepare only for the sort of war that it contemplates starting, while the US must be ready to fight many sorts of wars. He added that delivery capability does not "keep" well, but needs to be constantly refurbished, thus adding to the US burden of preparedness for any eventuality.

The General wished to make the further point that the action of the US in supporting Western Europe through NATO mechanism is gradually building the European sense of responsibility for their own defense, and is heading toward an eventual position of strength from which the allies may be able to hold their own against a Russian land assault. Of course he wanted to stress that at present the NATO force is too weak to withstand a Russian onslaught without American strategic bombing aid, and that in the future the strength of NATO will always be linked to the free use of tactical nuclear weapons. In his opinion, the major present weaknesses in the Soviet potential for war are Malenkov's leadership system, and the satellite coersive alliances.

Mr. Wolfers suggested that even if it becomes apparent that Soviet potential is too great for the US to destroy in an initial attack, and this country therefore refrains from using nuclear weapons, there is no reason to believe that the Russians will seize upon the opportunity to get in the first crack. He suspected that there are several reasons why this might be so. First, the Russians have had vast experience in

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land maneuvers and seem to have faith in their conventional weapons. Second, the Soviet Union is in a very real sense a technocracy; ideologically it has evolved from a Marxist oriented bolshevick regime into an organization whose god is what it has built with its hands. If society and the machine are one and the same, the Russian leaders will not risk the destruction of their dams, factories, and buildings. General McCormack agreed with this interpretation of what Mr. Wolfers called the "dream of the backward area."

Mr. Noyes agreed with this point and suggested that the USSR might be more prone to take calculated risks throughout the world than to initiate a nuclear war. This likelihood places on American shoulders the responsibility for determining at what point Soviet conventional war or subversion will have to be countered with nuclear weapons. Mr. Wolfers insisted that the US can, if it chooses, meet conventional attack with conventional weapons; hence the emphasis upon massive retaliation has certain dangers. He wondered, however, if the US is prepared to wage conventional war. Mr. Noyes inquired if it is better to win with conventional arms than to win with nuclear arms.

Mr. Pace suggested that NATO would hardly admit the ground weakness implied by the resort to nuclear weapons unless the situation were hopeless otherwise. He stressed that Russia cannot be allowed to occupy Western Europe. Mr. Dean suggested that perhaps the nuclear and atomic weapons have been so thoroughly integrated into the NATO force that they are no longer separable.

Mr. Pace stated that the effects of nuclear attack can never be so grim that this country can allow Europe to fall, but Mr. Wolfers felt that if the nuclear exchange is one in which the US will emerge with a net loss, then the bomb can hardly be considered an advantage.

Mr. Johnson pointed to the "moral line" in terms of world political opinion, which the Soviet Union would try to get the US to step over first in the event of war. Mr. Altschul asked if there can be any doubt that if Europe were attacked the US would respond with a SAC blow aimed at Russia. Mr. Nitze answered tentatively, "Yes", but did not elaborate.

Mr. Pace stated that total destruction of the US does not follow as the certain result of the 20 per cent bombs on target, and felt that this country had to determine first just what might be an acceptable level of destruction. Also, as far as alternatives are concerned, the following questions must be answered: Can the US stop Soviet forces on the ground with conventional weapons? Can tactical weapons be separated from strategic weapons? Can tactical weapons alone preserve Europe? If the answer to either of the last two questions is "No", the US cannot afford to surrender its right to massive retaliation. Mr. Dean thought that this raised an important series of points, and suggested that for the next session the group might consider, say, three different situations as regards area, weapons, tactical or strategic use, etc. to see just how the answers work out.

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Implications of Nuclear Weapons for Systems of Alliances

Mr. Nitze returned to his presentation with the consideration of
point 4 in the preliminary outline. He asserted that the way in which the
three subsections of point 4 are phrased implies that allies are important
to this country only in so far as they are of value in a war. He wished
to take exception to this interpretation of the interrelations of nations.
If, as the Constitution requires, foreign policy is to be an instrumentation
of national policy, then it has as its primary goal the fostering and dev-
elopment of an international climate in which nations dedicated and orien-
ted as ours is oriented can survive and prosper. Military policy then
becomes in turn a support for our foreign policy, and while never being
entirely a secondary consideration, is certainly not a primary one. Inter-
preted in this way, the American position in Berlin, for example, is taken
not as an expedient in a hot war, or a necessity in a cold war, but rather
as an acceptance of responsibility of leadership in an alliance of freedom
loving men.

Naturally a traditional problem of coalitions has been the pro-
vision for orderly ways of making decisions requiring united action, (4a-1).
It should be noted that neither Mr. Truman nor President Eisenhower has
delegated in any way the right of decision about the uses of nuclear weapons.
However, the right of this country to use foreign bases or the right of
flyover is quite dependent upon the maintained good will and cooperation
of its allies. Mr. Rabi and several others expressed some surprise that
explicit provision has not been made regarding the right of the US to launch
strikes from overseas bases. The resulting discussion of the exact nature
of certain base leases soon grounded on the shoals of security. It was
pointed out, however, that even if a country refuses to let our planes take
off, it might well be subject to Soviet nuclear retaliation, since it
would be almost impossible for the Soviet Union to tell where the planes
attacking it came from.

Mr. Nitze summed up his views on this particular point by saying
that the isolationist argument that the President is limited in his decisions
by the allies is not valid. Furthermore, to the question posed in 4a-2 of
the outline, (Does atomic stalemate make allies less necessary) he gave
a negative answer. In the first place, it is yet to be proven that a stale-
mate does, or even can exist. Even if such a condition is possible -- if
the bases in Europe multiply the effectiveness of SAC by two or three times
as some observers feel they do -- then the power of the US to maintain a
stalemated condition diminishes as the bases are contracted. Soviet hege-
mony over the Eurasian land mass and South America is hardly apt to conduce to
stalemate.

Item 4a-3 raises the question whether our new weapons make
allies less important because "our principal military power instrument to
support allies is unusable," on the theory that its use might mean the
loss through retaliation of at least 30 major American cities. Mr. Nitze
pointed out that if this country had never developed nuclear power, it still
would have had the responsibility of protecting its allies, and that, if
the more efficient nuclear weapons are going to be ruled out for any reason,
the obligation remains to discover perhaps more expensive non-atomic ways
of maintaining the security of the country and its allies.

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Item 4a-4 asks whether "we must greatly reduce our commitments of strength because our main source of military strength is neutralized." Mr. Nitze pointed out that in a bi-polar world such as that of today, any reduction in commitments by one side is likely also to result in a reduction of the strength of that side, and a corresponding increase in the strength of the other camp. Thus if the nuclear weapon becomes neutralized (which Mr. Nitze was not prepared to concede) it behooves the US to seek out areas of replacement strength, of which an important one would be a **strengthening** of alliances.

The implication of item 4a-5 is that this country cannot risk aiding an ally because it cannot risk becoming involved in a nuclear war. Such a position is logically possible only if it is first agreed that world hegemony by the USSR is preferable to running any risk of nuclear war.

The argument advanced by 4a-6 is that long-range delivery systems operating from North America eliminate the need for overseas bases, and thus for allies. Without discussing the dubious point that a concentrated long-range delivery system is more effective than a mixed long and short-range system, Mr. Nitze felt that here again the unfortunate implication is that allies are war partners only. He had already expressed his views on the importance of preserving a world climate conducive to American growth. But even in terms of war partners, the value of allies extends beyond the need for bases. After all, destroying the enemy urban areas is not a conclusive stroke in war -- there must be some sort of follow through. Also, in terms of cost, the maintenance of a division is much lower for those of the allies than for an American division based overseas. Mr. Pace agreed with this last point, and added that the fighting effectiveness of allied armies must not be underestimated.

Mr. Halaby suggested that there may be some area between all-out nuclear war and a condition of stalemate. For instance, the US might use nuclear weapons against Communist China, but remain stalemated with the USSR. Mr. Nitze agreed that it is important to search for such middle ground. General McCormack noted that if the group followed Mr. Dean's suggestion it would discuss at the next session several possible permutations of the situation, of which at least one might be such a middle case. He wished to emphasize, however, that the actual decision making process involves a series of ponderables which cannot be wholly predigested. In other words, the group could serve a useful purpose by working through specific problems which might arise, but it cannot expect to predict the exact nature of all eventual decisions.

Kelsey Marechal
Rapporteur