-9-

Kirkland: There may be very little disagreement that our vital interests are not involved in Central America because our commitment and proposed commitment do not indicate it.

Vance: This is one of the puzzles I've seen. There seems to be an inconsistency in deciding what the problem really is.

Kirkland: Important interests may be bound up in our values and opportunities that exist for us to defend and promote our values. Do you think we ought to be prepared to get out if there is no opportunity for us to defend and promote our values.

Vance: Yes.

Kirkland: Do you think the FMLN is prepared to go to elections, or are we prepared to negotiate a provisional government?

Vance: Not necessarily a provisional government. We need arrangements for elections that would reassure the guerillas.

Kirkland: If they would agree to go to elections if there were a provisional government, would you accept it?

Vance: Yes.

Kirkland: Would you be prepared to support the Nicaraguan contras?

Vance: Yes, if it's done overtly.

Mathias: If the USSR and Cuba went to the extent of trying to replay the missile episode and put arms in Central America, what would be the opinion in Latin America and among Hispanics?

Vance: There would be an explosion if an attempt were made to introduce nuclear weapons. There would be a substantial problem but not an explosion with conventional arms.

Mathias: If there could be an agreement not to introduce arms into Central America, would that be useful to the U.S. even if it limits us?

Vance: Yes, if it could be monitored.

-10-

Domenici: Were there free elections in El Salvador to establish a basis for a government?

Vance: I think not. It was a strong indication of where feelings of the majority of the people lie, but not a free and fair election.

Domenici: We started down a beautiful track, so how come we don't have broader support for elections there?

Vance: You should know that better than I. You deal with the public every day.

Domenici: Do we abandon government leaders to guerrillas if they don't improve?

Vance: We may have to.

Domenici: This Commission offers a the opportunity to send a whole new set of signals to Central and South America. The Commission should stand for a serious pursuit of exploration of political settlement in the region. I am not a member of the Commission, just an observer.

Lord: Assume that to make elections genuinely accessible, the El Salvador Government agrees to international observers, security for the guerrillas, etc., and the guerrillas turn it down because they want negotiations for power sharing.

Vance: We must look very carefully, without fooling ourselves, to see if free and fair elections could result, and then support it.

Rogers: What are your reflections on U.S. policy and Central America and the transition that occurred in Nicaragua in the Somoza-Sandinista transfer. Did we push too hard or not enough?

Vance: I think we did not act rapidly enough. We would've had a better chance if we could've moved before polarization. This is why I feel so strongly about Mexico's refusal to help.

Barnes: El Salvador has the feeling that support will be continued despite continued excesses, which strengthen the left. The principal obstacle to serious land reform in the country is the army, not the guerrillas.

-11-

Vance: Excesses by the right do strengthen the left and make it harder to reach a solution.

Barnes: What would happen if in the next election, the "good guys" (i.e. Christian Democrats) won? Does that change international support for El Salvador even without the participation of the left in the election?

Vance: Yes, it does change the situation, but you can't predict if it will last.

Broomfield: I am confused by the emphasis on economic as opposed to military aid for a political solution. Economic aid already outweighs military aid by 3 to 1. Do you feel that just by increasing the economic support portion in El Salvador that the thing will turn in our favor?

Vance: No. It is a factor. It addresses the root causes. Whether it'll work or not, I don't know, but we ought to give it a try.

Kissinger: With respect to the Europeans, I'd like to point out that one often pays the price for failure even if one is following the constituency's wishes.

Vance: Correct. The only reason I mentioned the alliance is that we see it only from this hemisphere, but there is another dimension.

Kissinger: Political root causes require American intervention as well as military. These are 2 forms of intervention.

Vance: Let me go back to the two cases I mentioned previously. In Shaba, the Katangans were invading and proceeding rapidly to overrun town after town. The allies asked themselves two questions: 1. Can we end the invasion. 2. Can we follow with prompt political settlement between the Angolans and the Zaireans. The answer was yes, but we need regional stamp. We approached our friends for a peacekeeping force which we would supply. It never could've been done if we'd tried it alone, or if Westerners had dictated without regional approval. The same thing happened in Zimbabwe with the Front Line States. Westerners working with the region can come up with solutions that neither could come up with alone.

-12-

Kissinger: There are levels of intervention in both military and political intervention. Could you indicate some of these levels as you see it? We succeeded in Shaba because we got troops there that created a reality that had to be dealt with. Same in the Dominican Republic.

Vance: When you get down and negotiate, you may have to have a peacekeeping force that will be there during elections (e.g. a regional or a U.N. force.) to oversee and make sure elections are free and fair.

Kissinger: How about Nicaragua and Cuba? What should we ask of them if they accept the distinction between East-West and local problems, i.e. they agree to stop exporting revolution?

Vance: There is the Contadora suggestion: cessation of shipment of arms. It is well worth pursuing if a monitoring system could be set up. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that it could be set up.

Kissinger: Should we attempt to define for ourselves what we mean by democracy? How can we as Americans help to bring it about? We all support democracy, but we can't make any impact unless we translate it into action. What concrete things can we do?

Vance: (will submit answers in writing)

Silber: Elections in El Salvador may not have been the best, but Nicaragua has not even made the attempt. What is the role of perfection in politics? Do we deny support for the imperfect democracy in El Salvador?

Vance: I am not for cutting off aid, but for being serious about warning that aid will be cut off, and then at the end of the road we must be prepared to withdraw aid.

Walsh: Should we withhold aid if the wrong people win?

Vance: I would support either side if the elections were free and fair.

Strauss: You said weapons are being delivered in small quantities to El Salvador. But what if it were discovered that substantial quantities were being delivered. Would that change your view?

Vance: I find that hard to answer.

Notes on Meeting of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

PRESENTATION BY: Gerald R. Ford

DATE: September 1, 1983
TIME: 3:20 - 5:00
PLACE: Rm. 1105

SUMMARY:

President Ford suggested that the US has essentially three sets of policy options: The first two are the undesirable extremes of a complete pull-out or direct US military intervention. Between those extremes is the best approach: a coordinated, well-funded policy for action in the military, economic, political and diplomatic spheres. The basic principles of the policy should include efforts to promote: politically stable and democratic nations; prosperous economies with equitable sharing of wealth; respect for human rights; friendship and cooperation with the US; and the prevention of the establishment of toeholds by US adversaries.

President Ford emphasized that such a policy must be pursued on a sustained basis. In this regard, he recommended the possibility of multi-year congressional authorizations and a five-year program of about $1 billion per year in economic assistance and about $200 million per year in military aid. He also emphasized the importance to the success of the Commission of unanimity in its recommendations.

HAK: Welcome and thank you for agreeing to appear.

Ford: Appreciate the opportunity. Support the establishment of the Commission and believe it can play an important role as the US tries to deal with Central America. Thank the members for making the sacrifice of their time and energy.

No prepared statement, but make some observations and recommendations. Too few in the US remember their geography and the size of CA. Strictly from a geographic point of view, CA is important to the US. There are 15-20 million people.

See three policy options: First, is do nothing--the US pulls out. This would end all possibilities of US influence in the region for all time. It would increase the poverty, would diminish respect for human rights. US citizens who remained in the region would probably lose their lives, and all US investment would be lost. This option would also open the door to economic, military, and political activity by unfriendly or adversary nations. The result would be catastrophic.

The second option is direct, US military intervention. This is not desirable unless there is a direct threat to US security. But the President shouldn't rule it out; he must retain the broadest possible options, including this one because once we announce our decision never to intervene, it makes it easier for our adversaries to make decisions regarding their actions.

Between these two extreme options there is the best approach: a coordinated, well-funded policy for action in the military, economic, political and diplomatic spheres, a policy that will be pursued on a sustained basis.

This is primarily the responsibility of the Executive Branch, but the President, as we have learned from Vietnam, can't conduct a foreign policy without bipartisan support from Congress and support from the American people. The details of such a policy must be worked out by the various agencies of the Executive Branch--NCS, DOD, State--but must be implemented in coordination with Congress, which must approve the funds.

The policy can be basically uniform for the entire region, but with some variation for each country.

- 3 -

Basic principles for such a policy:

-- seek development of politically stable and
democratically governed nations;

-- seek development of viable, prosperous economies where
there is equitable sharing of the wealth and the resources;

-- foster respect for human life and human rights;

-- seek development of friendly and cooperative nations;

-- prevent establishment of a toehold by adversaries whose
interests are incompatible with our own.

Believe intervention is necessary because the results of
withdrawal are unacceptable. We must also ask what are the
risks of intervening without success.

The program will require large sums of money and must
include military assistance. Understand that for FY83 the
Administration asked $81 million in military aid for El
Salvador and for FY84 the request is $86 million, although
there is much disagreement with Congress over the FY84
amount. The amount should not vary drastically from year
to year. There must be enough money to keep training the
Salvadoran military as we have been doing. We are
beginning to see results. Continued training, whether in
the US or in Honduras is essential if we are to reduce the
possibility of direct US involvement.

Perhaps this Commission should recommend even higher sums
for military assistance.

Program must also include economic aid. Over a five-year
period, it is impossible to think any sum less than $5
billion will be effective. And an effective program can't
be predicated on White House/Congressional whims which vary
from year to year, but must be sustained. The annual
authorization and appropriations process is ridiculous. No
one in the field can run a program if he is uncertain of
the next appropriation.

My first year in Congress was 1949 when we authorized the
Marshall Plan, a 4-5 year program with the first year
costing about $7 billion. One major factor in the success
of that program was that all knew it would be carried out
on a sustained basis. A program for CA must have the same
reliability. A program of this type will have benefits for
the region and for the US.

HAK: Do you think the current proportion between military and economic aid, about 2/3 economic and 1/3 military, is about right?

- 4 -

Ford: Believe about $100 million per year is needed for military assistance to El Salvador, and probably about that same amount for all the other countries combined. If we take the $1 billion per year figure for the region's economic aid, that's a ratio of five to one. But it would be stupid to provide economic aid if there is no military stability.

HAK: Economic and social development has a much longer time frame than military activities. How should we handle the problem of the slow economic and social evolution of governments that require immediate military assistance?

Ford: There is a variety of governments in the area and we may have to at times support some governments that are not so desirable from our point of view, so long as our ultimate goal is to have these governments become more democratic. We can't abandon a country because we don't like its current government. By our involvement, we can be influential in which way the government evolves.

HAK: What is your view of making diplomatic approaches to our potential adversaries in the region: Nicaragua, Cuba, and the Soviet Union?

Ford: If there is a bona fide opportunity for negotiations with the possibility of beneficial results for the region, I would not preclude negotiations with Cuba. During my Administration, we explored some avenues for talks, but they closed off when we took a strong position on Angola, where Cuba, indeed, is still heavily involved.

Scammon: How do you think the Commission should consider the problem discussed by General Taylor in his op-ed piece this morning, i.e., the problem of an exploding population in CA? This is a particular problem in Mexico.

Ford: Read that the world's population has increased by an incredibly large number in the past year and one of the areas contributing most heavily to world population growth is Latin and Central America. The population explosion in this part of the world presents us with a unique situation, because we feel its impact in the number of illegal immigrants in our own country--a number which could increase given the economic crisis, in Mexico in particular, unless Congress quickly passes the Simpson-Mazzoli bill.

If the US were to withdraw from Central America, political victories by our adversaries would result in an even greater refugee flow to the US.

- 5 -

Silber: You have remarked that we need to remember our geography lessons. How do you respond to those who ask how we have been able to co-exist with Cuba for over twenty years if we now claim our security is threatened by a much smaller communist presence in Central America. And how can we do anything to combat that presence that does exist in CA if we have been unable to do anything about Cuba?

Ford: Although many Americans do not believe Cuba is a serious threat to the US, I believe that it is and the possibility of diversifying bases of Soviet activity by expanding into Central America is even more dangerous. It would afford the Soviets a greater military strike capability.

Silber: Can or should we do anything to reduce the threat that exists in Cuba?

Ford: I don't believe it is possible to do so by military intervention, but I do believe there is a possibility for negotiations that would lead to a solution.

Strauss: You have commented on the need for consistency in our policy. How in an era of one-term Presidents, with a Congress that lacks the controls that existed when you were in the leadership, can we maintain a consistent policy?

Ford: It won't be easy, but it can be done if this Commission submits unanimous recommendations which are then supported by the President. The policy will require a five-year authorization, followed up by yearly appropriations. Although we wouldn't get through the appropriations process each year the full amount authorized, we would be halfway there so far as the process goes.

Strauss: Can you build in flexibility through the Congressional process so that sums can move from the military to the economic assistance column and vice versa?

Ford: The White House and Congress could work together to come up with this type of solution. Congress can't be expected to pass on individual items coming up five years down the road, but can approve a general sum.

HAK: Is it possible to make monies interchangeable between economic and military aid?

Strauss: Yes, that's what I mean, this would give our aid program a fresh look.

Ford: I suggest you look at how the Marshall Plan was crafted. It was authorized for a time certain, as must be done with a CA program.

- 6 -

Strauss: We need to move our program out of the year to year political arena.

Walsh: If we could get authorizations for several years, this would also be an incentive for proper behavior on the part of the CA countries, who would know that there was a payoff. I would echo Scammon's concern about the population explosion, and I believe this issue is related to the role of the Catholic church in CA and how the Marxists use it to their own advantage. Satisfactory economic progress in CA has, indeed, in part, been thwarted by population growth, but when the US tries to push population control programs, we are up against the Marxists who say their system can take care of all the children people want to have, just what the church wants to hear. So we need to consider this issue in light of the Catholic church--a divided church in CA.

The Marxists also use to great advantage their involvement in medical assistance programs in CA. I have heard there are 22,000 CA's being trained as medical auxiliaries, 20,000 of whom are being trained in Cuba. How can we combat this kind of communist influence?

Ford: Our economic aid should include medical assistance programs, including training. Our people can do a better job in this area, but we need to get them out in the field. We can't make a difference working from behind desks in Washington.

Walsh: We do have programs in the English-speaking Caribbean.

Ford: We need to get out into the field in CA as well.

HAK: On this point, I would like to remind the Commissioners that when we submit our recommendations for a program we must be specific. We can't simply say we need social reforms and humanitarian assistance programs, terms which are subject to interpretation. We need a detailed, specific program which the President can put before the Congress if he is to get a five-year authorization.

Ford: The Marshall Plan wasn't successful because it had a push from the White House alone, but because of strong bipartisan support on the Hill. Also, its supporters formed broad-based citizens groups to lobby Congress for the plan. This kind of campaign will also be essential for a CA program.

- 7 -

HAK: The fact that six of our eight Congressional counsellors are here during a Congressional recess indicates the kind of strong interest we might expect from the Hill.

Broomfield: The real question is how to restore bipartisanship
to foreign policy. The general public now is anti-foreign
aid and it would be difficult to get a five-year
authorization.

Ford: But a detailed program properly presented can be
passed. It has been done before and can be done again.

Brady: You have been meeting with former Chiefs of State from
around the world. Did Central America come up in your
discussions?

Ford: The topic of the meetings was global economic problems
with an emphasis on the Pacific Basin, so formally the
subject did not arise. But we did talk privately about CA,
and most of the former leaders felt that the US should be
involved in the region, but were not anxious for their own
countries to play a role in CA.

Cisneros: You said you would not preclude negotiations with
Cuba and others have said they would talk with the Soviets
as a way of resolving the problems of CA. What kind of
approach can we make to Cuba or the Soviet Union to
encourage them to remove themselves from the region or to
change their involvement from military to economic/
humanitarian assistance?

Ford: Cuban involvement in the region is very different from
Soviet involvement. The Soviets are involved primarily to
show that they can be involved and that we can't push them
out, whether they are active directly, as in Cuba, or
indirectly, through Eastern Europeans and the Cubans, as in
Nicaragua. Cuba, in contrast, has 4,000 - 6,000 security
and civilian advisers in CA. To discourage this type of
involvement, I believe a show of force, such as that
President Reagan is now projecting, is justifiable. There
is some evidence that Cuba is responding by opening the
door to communications.

Cisneros: Do you think we need to use the carrot or the stick?

Ford: We need both.

- 8 -

Cisneros: You mentioned the possibility of having to support undesirable governments. How can we ensure sustained aid to these governments without losing our leverage to change their behavior? If we become committed to them because of our domestic political situation, they will believe we can't afford to let them collapse, regardless of how deplorable their behavior becomes.

Ford: This is a difficult point for any president. I'm sure we could find examples from over the years when we did, indeed, lose our leverage in that kind of situation. But I believe there are also examples when our aid gave us the necessary influence to push for change.

HAK: We need to ask whether such a device as a yearly certification is the best way to bring about change. Sometimes this process encourages claims of progress when there is none.

Cisneros: So you would recommend that we just keep trying?

Ford: Yes, but at the same time keeping in mind that dangling large sums of money will not, by itself, ensure changes in behavior.

Diaz-Alejandro: How would you evaluate the receptivity of Congress and the US public to a multilateral aid program, which might include contributions from Western European and other Latin countries. And how would Congress view a program that gave the recipient states some say in the allocation of aid? I understand that was part of the early role of the OECD and a similar situation might pertain with the CACM.

Ford: In my meeting with the former Chiefs of State, I saw no enthusiasm for any heavy European involvement, whether financial or military, and few of the Latin countries are in a position to help financially, although they could make "in kind" contributions which would be useful. As for giving the recipient states a role in distribution, I doubt whether Congress would buy that, although an outside organization such as the World Bank might take on this role.

Domenici: Do you, Dr. Diaz-Alejandro, mean actually allowing the recipients to make final decisions on allocations or giving them a say in the types of projects that are undertaken and where?

- 9 -

Diaz Alejandro: I refer to giving them a voice, such as was
done with the formation of the Group of Nine notables who
consulted on the formulation of projects under the Alliance
for Progress, an idea which, I understand, had its basis in
the Marshall Plan.

Ford: Naturally, the views of the countries involved must be
factored into any program.

Johnson: Mr. Broomfield has confirmed Congress's hostility to
foreign aid program. I believe this reflects lack of
support for foreign aid among the US public in general.
How would you combat this?

Ford: This is obviously a problem, but my area, the Middle
West, which was isolationist up through WWII, is now as
internationally minded as any area in the country. The
leadership of the country simply needs to devise a good
program and then to go out and educate the people about it.
After all, who would have believed during WWII that a few
short years later we would be spending huge sums of money
to rebuild Japan and Germany? Labor, business, media, and
government, all working together, can sell a good program.

Johnson: You mentioned the need for a medical component to our
assistance programs. What other specific areas demand our
attention?

Ford: The area of land reform, for example, where we have not
always been completely successful in carrying out our
programs. The new small farmers need credit and extension
services.

Kirkland: Would you include Panama in the program you have
outlined?

Ford: Panama is a different situation. I believe we already
have some financial obligations to Panama under the Canal
treaties.

Kirkland: Some European countries are already involved in
Central America. The Germans are active through their
various party foundations, and the Dutch and Scandinavians
also have programs. We (in the labor movement) try to
coordinate our assistance with theirs when possible. Do
you believe we should try to maximize the effectiveness of
USG programs through this type of coordination where
European aid programs exist?

- 10 -

Ford: Yes, this kind of coordination can make assistance programs more effective from an economic and a political perspective. I would also include Japan. Although I reiterate that the Europeans with whom I have talked believe the US should bear the major burden in CA.

Kirkland: Canada also has some programs in CA.

Bentsen: The population explosion is a major problem in CA, but there has been some change of attitude within those countries in the past few years, particularly in Mexico, which has made much progress in decreasing the birth rate. I would say, with respect to Dr. Silber's comments, that if I could be assured that there would be no Soviet missiles going into CA I might say that this would be sufficient to ensure there was no security threat there for the US.

But I can't say that because of Mexico. The domino theory is relevant; anyone who doubts it applies can look at three million dead Cambodians. We share a long border with Mexico and that country will be under tremendous social strain over the next three years as it deals with its economic problems. De la Madrid has done a great job, but there is still a long way to go. How would we handle the numbers of Mexicans who would come to the US because of political instability in their own country?

Ford: What you say also pertains to Panama. The same danger exists at both ends of the isthmus.

Kemp: I hear a consensus emerging here, and I am encouraged. I believe you can get bipartisan Congressional support for a well-conceived program. The CBI, which was recently passed, and the Alliance for Progress are both examples of that type of program which Congress did support. It might also be useful to consider linking the economic program with a broader political/security alliance, as the Marshall Plan was somewhat linked to NATO.

Ford: This Commission has the potential for developing that kind of program, but your work will come to naught unless you present unanimous decisions to the President. There can be no effective program if you all write minority reports.

Kemp: I would also mention that under the Marshall Plan, the UK got more direct assistance than Germany. Germany's application of market-oriented solutions contributed fundamentally to its economic success. The free-market orientation has also made the difference in Asia.

- 11 -

Broomfield: I do support the idea of a long-term program, but the problem of Congressional fragmentation is real.

Ford: We must assume a program can be sold on the Hill, and I believe it can be if it is a solid plan.

Strauss: We just had an example of bipartisanship at work with the IMF bill, which the Administration supported but which only passed because of Democratic support.

Barnes: The multilateral approach suggested by Dr. Diaz-Alejandro does indeed work. Right now, through their oil facility, Mexico and Venezuela contribute more to CA in dollar terms than do we.

I agree that a long-term aid bill can be passed and this group, which represents so many different sectors of society, can make it happen.

Lord: What do you see as our problems with Nicaragua and what changes would you demand before you would recommend a halt to our support for the contras?

Ford: The original program of the Sandinistas was a good one, but they haven't lived up to it. I don't like their one-party rule, their military ties to Cuba and the Soviet Union, or their attempts to destabilize their neighbors. So there is not much I can approve in Nicaragua, although I think it is impossible to predict what, if any, success the contras might have. I don't see the possibility of much change there in the short term.

Domenici: We need more than a long-term aid program, we need to explain to the US people why we support some of those governments in CA and in regard to El Salvador, we need to consult with the Catholic Church, which is still undecided about whether it approves the establishment of this Commission. The Church is very concerned because of the killing of the churchwomen.

One of our witnesses said he favored a negotiated political solution in ELSA because there is no way at all the military could achieve a victory that would guarantee stability. We need to explain our position if we do not share that point of view.

Scammon: It's easy to say you support a negotiated, political solution, but in fact in any negotiated solution, those who have the guns come out ahead. And there is the real possibility that the solution will fall apart. What then will happen to those who depended on us. Will they, like Masaryk, jump out of a window with a little push?

- 12 -

Kemp: What can we do to consult with the Catholic Church on these issues?

HAK: I have had good conversations with both Cardinal Cooke and Cardinal Baum, and the Papal Nuncio here also is very supportive of the Commission's work.

Domenici: I suggest we ask to appear as a witness the priest from the Conference of Bishops who drafted the Conference's last major policy report.

Walsh: Cardinal Cooke doesn't speak for all the Church. For example, he opposed the Nuclear Freeze letter.

Cisneros: I suggest we ask several Church representatives to meet with the Commission.

HAK: Yes, that will be done. Also, with regard to a political solution, those who favor that course must say exactly what they mean. That phrase lends itself to many interpretations. And any negotiated solution must be enforceable and verifiable. Agreements do not enforce themselves.

Mathias: The media need to be involved in any campaign to sell the public on a long-term program. Walter Lippmann said he was a prime salesman for the Marshall Plan.

Silber: I think we are being unrealistic in talking about a long-term program as being a five-year one. The serious problems of CA won't be solved in five years; we need a twenty-year plan.

Ford: I don't believe Congress will support anything longer than a five-year authorization, but there is always the possibility of renewal.

HAK: Mr. President, do you wish to say anything in conclusion?

Ford: Yes, I strongly believe that the US must be involved in CA and that we must have a sustained program of both military and economic aid. That is the task of this Commission.

HAK: Indeed, the members of this Commission, with their varying constituencies, have, in the final analysis, the responsibility for unifying the country on this issue.

#4873N

PRESENTATION BY: Ambassador Thomas Mann

DATE: August 31, 1983
TIME: 5:10 - 6:10
PLACE: Rm. 1105

SUMMARY:

Ambassador Mann discussed his support for a continuing US policy, with roots in the Monroe Doctrine, of opposition to any attempts by states hostile to our form of government to impose their systems on independent American states. Where there is the danger of the establishment of regimes with close military ties to the USSR, the US should, if necessary, intervene militarily. Overall, Amb. Mann argued, the US is greatly overextended militarily; we no longer have the will or the resources to meet so many commitments around the world and should consider withdrawing our troops from remote areas. He suggested a modus vivendi with the USSR whereby the US would stay out of areas of their vital interest if the USSR would stay out of ours. While supporting application of the Monroe Doctrine, Amb. Mann argued that the US should not intervene in the strictly internal affairs of other countries in the hemisphere.

[prepared statement follows notes]

NOTES:

**Mann:** I continue to believe in a US policy of opposition to any attempts by states hostile to our form of government to impose their systems on independent American states.

On two occasions, the US failed to follow this policy, with unfortunate results. The first was the Bay of Pigs, in which a division of opinion caused paralysis in the White House decision-making process. The second was Nicaragua, in which support of revolutionaries resulted in Marxist-Leninist control of a second American state.

I supported LBJ's 20,000-man intervention in the Dominican Republic. We finally got the OAS interested and elections were held; when the new government was installed, all troops were withdrawn.

I believe we are militarily overextended. In 1945 we were the most powerful nation in the world, but we have degenerated into complacency. Unlike the US, the USSR did not demobilize after the War. I question whether we have the capability of dealing with Soviet action in this hemisphere.

We should concentrate and build our strength instead of dissipating what little we have. It is not feasible for the US to intrude too much into areas adjacent to the USSR that it considers essential to its security.

**Kissinger:** Is it your conclusion that the US should intervene militarily where there is a danger of the establishment of a regime hostile to the US?

**Mann:** I have no trouble with democratic or socialist countries; the danger is in countries with close military ties to the USSR. Where there is that danger, if necessary, we should send in troops. We could, for example, turn Nicaragua back over to the Nicaraguan people with the only direction that they not establish communist military ties.

**Silber:** Are you suggesting military intervention in Cuba?

**Mann:** That would be too bloody. I would leave Cuba alone but insist that they stop exporting revolution.

Silber: You advocate building and concentrating our forces; how?

Mann: Bring home as many stationed abroad as is feasible (for example, from Korea, Lebanon, and perhaps even Germany). The US can't be the policeman of the world.

Walsh: At what point should we throw down the gauntlet, after having allowed breaches of the Monroe Doctrine in Cuba and now Nicaragua and Grenada?

Mann: I would move pretty much as President Reagan is doing; but I'd make it clear that we will not accept a second Cuba in this hemisphere. The timing of moves by the US is important: If we wait until hostile regimes have consolidated their power and are fully armed, then we are in a weak position. We should establish a modus vivendi with the USSR that says we will stay out of areas of your vital interest if you will stay out of ours.

Cisneros: What would we have to offer the USSR in exchange for a modus vivendi of their staying out of Central America?

Mann: Possibly pulling out of the eastern Mediterranean.

Diaz: How do you feel your recommendations would be received in Latin America states?

Mann: Well in some; very badly in others. I note that the social democrats meeting recently in Europe endorsed Latin American revolutionary movements.

Diaz: Do you see potential threats to the vital interests of the US in other parts of Latin America?

Mann: Argentina and Chile, for example, are too far away to threaten our vital interests.

Johnson: Is Central America, then, one of the areas where you think we should have a position of strength?

Mann: Yes; we should add to our strength there.

Kissinger: As I understand your position, American foreign policy should be based on a strict definition of our national interest and reflect the balance of power. From that, spheres of influence emerge. We should define our interest, insist on it where we can enforce it, and trade it away where we can't.

August 31, 1967

STATEMENT OF THOMAS CLIFTON MANN

I.

1. United States policy of opposition to attempts by states hostile to our form of government to impose their systems on independent American states is as valid today as it ever was. The basis of that policy was that such attempts to gain footholds in this hemisphere would constitute a threat to the security of the United States.

2. This policy was first announced by Monroe in 1823 when certain European states were rumored to be considering the reimposition of monarchical systems on American republics. It was followed by Franklin Roosevelt in 1940-1941 when Nazi Fifth Columns were operating in American states with the purpose of diminishing the will of those states to resist Nazi aggressions. It was followed by John Kennedy during the October, 1962 missile crisis. It was followed by Johnson during the 1955 Dominican crisis.

3. On only two occasions has the US failed to follow this policy. One was in 1961 when a division of opinion amongst the leaders of our Democratic party caused a paralysis in the White House decision-making process. The result was the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the consolidation of Marxists-Leninists in power in Cuba, and the formation of military ties between Cuba and the USSR. The other was the support of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in Nicaragua and El Salvador with the result that Marxists-Leninists were able to gain control of a second American state (Nicaragua) and to launch a class war against the Salvadoran middle class - against all those who owned property which produced goods or services or employed labor.

4. These two failures to follow traditional US policy created the conditions which presumably made it necessary for these hearings to be conducted.

II.

1. During the two decades 1945-1965 other American states essentially declared that the activities of revolutionary groups, particularly guerrillas and terrorists, which were in the service of a Communist state, constituted intervention and aggression; and that an act of aggression against one American state would be considered an act of aggression against all American states.

2. During the same period, a majority of American states

2.

often recognized that collective action by the OAS did not impair
any state's individual right of self-defense which is inherent in
sovereignty. Thus the right of the US to defend itself against
an act of aggression does not depend upon affirmative action
by any international body.

3. Nor does the US have to wait until its own territory is attacked by a hostile power. In the words of Elihu Root every state has a right to protect itself "by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself." In the words of Franklin Roosevelt, it would be suicide to wait until the enemy is in our front yard. "Anyone with an atlas and a reasonable knowledge of modern war, knows that it would be stupid to wait until a probable enemy has gained a foothold from which to attack. Old-fashioned common sense calls for the use of a strategy which will prevent such an enemy from gaining a foothold in the first place."

III.

1. The USSR represents a threat to the security of the US because its leaders have consistently affirmed that their country has a mission to promote class wars for the purpose of gradually creating a one-world socialist state and, in the process, destroy the governments and political, economic and social systems of all states which are not Marxist-Leninist in character. This sense of mission has become, for those leaders, a kind of secular religion.

2. There is no cogent evidence that Soviet leaders have abandoned Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology, strategy or tactics. On the contrary, the evidence that Soviet leaders are pursuing their goal with undiminished zeal is overwhelming.

3. All rational Americans prefer peace to the horrors of war, particularly those who have lived through wartime periods and have learned that even victory has its price. But it takes two to keep the peace - the aggressor and the victim. Targets of aggressor states who are strong and able to defend themselves have a much better chance of surviving than those who are weak or who have lost their will to defend themselves.

4. More particularly, those who lived through the long, dark months following Pearl Harbor when the US lost control of the sea and air in the Caribbean do not need to be convinced of the importance of the area to our survival. Those who did not

3.

would do well to read accurate historical accounts of the ships
and lives lost in those dark days when the US was trying to keep
open sea lanes vital to the US and other American states.

5. During the Second World War, we learned, or should have learned, that the power that controls the seas adjacent to our coasts, and the skies above them, controls access to many of our ports, the Panama Canal, and to our ability to buy materials in the hemisphere which are in short supply here at home and essential to our ability to mobilize our military strength.

IV.

1. Not being privy to such plans that may exist for re-
sisting Communist penetration in Central America, no opinion
is expressed concerning any plan that may exist on a contingency
or other basis.

2. Subject to conditions described later, the following
general opinions are, however, expressed:

3. In respect of El Salvador, we should (a) try to persuade all anti-communist factions to unite under leadership chosen by themselves; (b) refrain from additional interventions in the domestic affairs of that country; (c) lend the Salvadoran government the military and economic assistance it wants and needs to defeat and expel Communist guerrillas and terrorists; (d) if the Salvadorans are unable to accomplish this end, land US armed forces in strength to assist them; (e) try to persuade the Salvadoran government that it should hold elections as soon as feasible after order has been restored; (f) ask that government to permit foreigners to observe whether the elections are free and without coercion; (g) leave the fate of the so-called "reforms" imposed by Washington to the decisions of the elected representatives of the Salvadoran people.

4. In respect of Nicaragua, the US should support counter-revolutionary groups which seek to restore the sovereignty and independence of that state until (a) positive steps are taken to hold free elections and (b) the government of that state demonstrates that it is no longer supporting guerrillas in neighboring states, including El Salvador.

5. In a Marxist-Leninist society such as Nicaragua, in order
to eliminate the fear of reprisals it would be necessary for the

4.

following steps (or their equivalent) to be taken: (a) elections should be controlled by an international group or organization which is impartial in the sense it does not favor or oppose the candidate of any particular faction or party; (b) such group or organization should be supported by a military force, preferably international in character, capable of maintaining order and preventing coercion of any faction or individual; (c) the military power of the present government of Nicaragua would be neutralized during the electoral process in a manner to be agreed upon; (d) ballots would be secret; (e) foreign observers of the electoral process would be welcomed; (f) all Nicaraguan political parties and factions (including Marxists-Leninists using whatever name or names they wished) would be allowed to participate in the electoral process but popular fronts which include Marxists-Leninists would be prohibited; (g) political parties and factions, and the candidates of their choice, would be free to advocate, and the Nicaraguan people free to choose, whatever kind of political, economic or social system they wish but candidates would be required to pledge they would be nationalists and would not associate themselves in any way with the international Communist movement; (h) all Nicaraguan citizens, including civilians in the Nicaraguan bureaucracy, would have the right to vote - except members of the Nicaraguan police, military and militia which, being under discipline, may be expected to vote as directed.

6. As it has been demonstrated that promises of the present government of Nicaragua have little value, it would be necessary for that government to take positive steps adequate to convince a prudent person that elections will be held promptly under the conditions described (or their equivalent) - and to demonstrate that it has ceased to supply arms to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in neighboring states or to give them other kinds of assistance.

7. If the Nicaraguan government should refuse to hold elections in the near future, and if the counterrevolutionaries should fail to achieve their goals, then, depending upon circumstances, the government of the United States should give consideration to invading Nicaragua for the purpose of restoring that country to full independence and sovereignty, and on the pledge that United States troops would be withdrawn as soon as this is accomplished.

8. In respect of the governments of other Central American states, the US should lend them such military and economic assistance as they may request, and which we think they require, for the purpose of defending themselves against Communist aggression.

9. In my opinion, all of the measures proposed would be legally permitted under rules of traditional law because they

5.

would be taken in the legitimate exercise of the right which all
states have to defend themselves against aggressions. The basis
of this opinion are described in two draft chapters of a book
which I am writing copies of which will be made available to
Commission staff. One of the chapters deals with the noninter-
vention rule. And the other deals with the individual right of
self-defense.

V.

1. The suggestions made in the paragraphs of part IV of this statement rest on two assumptions: (a) The US currently has nuclear weapons capable of wrecking great destruction on the USSR if that state should launch a nuclear strike on the US itself with long-range missiles based in Russian territory; (b) the USSR does not have, and will not have, shorter range nuclear missiles which could be launched from land bases in this hemisphere. I do not know whether these assumptions are correct.

2. If they are incorrect, then the US is already in great peril and our ability to prevent additional Communist penetrations in this hemisphere ought to be considered in light of this fact. I would then wish to reconsider the suggestions made in the paragraphs of part IV.

3. If the two assumptions are correct, then it seems prudent to assume that Soviet military reaction to US defensive actions in this hemisphere, if any, would come in the form of the use of conventional weapons. In this case, geography would give the US an important advantage.

4. Whether or not these assumptions are correct, before additional measures are taken in this hemisphere by the US an effort should be made by the US to reach an agreement with the USSR that both powers will refrain from intruding into areas that threaten the security of the other. Particular actions the US could take are described in the paragraphs that follow.

5. Even in the unlikely event that it would be possible to reach such an agreement, it would mean a temporary truce rather than an abandonment by the USSR of its doctrines, strategies and goals of world domination.

MD

6.

VI.

1. At the end of the Second World War, the US was the most powerful state in the world both militarily and economically. This condition created what a perceptive English writer called "an illusion of omnipotence" - a belief there was literally nothing the US could not do. This misconception was gradually replaced by a feeling of complacency concerning our own security which is reminiscent of the popular mood preceding the months before Pearl Harbor.

2. It would be tedious to list the failures of our foreign policy even at the height of our power which were related to these popular attitudes. Illustrative of them are two misconceptions in a single year. At the Yalta Conference in 1945, an imperfect understanding by the US of Soviet doctrines, strategy and tactics led to the loss of the independence of a number of Eastern European states, and to an extension of Russian territory or control of territory that extended some six or seven hundred miles westward in Europe. In the same year, the same misconceptions led to the creation of the UN in the belief that the new world organization would usher in a long period of universal peace enforced by an international military force under the direction of the Security Council - a force which never came into being.

3. The failure of the UN to accomplish the primary purpose for which it was created was followed by a confident feeling on the part of Americans that the US should use its power to prevent aggressions which twice in a single generation had caused two world wars.

4. In the period 1947-1959, the US therefore entered into a number of defense treaties which were one-sided in the sense they committed the US to defend other states against aggression but did not contemplate that the other signatory states would help defend the US if it were attacked.

5. With minimal aid from other states, the US also defended states which were not signatory to the treaties mentioned and which were not demonstrably related to our own security. The wars in South Korea and South Vietnam are examples.

6. In addition, the US acquired military bases in far-away places, and attempted to act as world peacekeeper in places such as the Lebanon where violence was endemic and there was little or no prospect of a pacific settlement of the complex issues that separated warring factions and states.

7.

7. Meanwhile, the balance of military power gradually tilted in favor of the USSR. After 1945, the Soviet Union continued to give priority to the production of military equipment at the expense of consumer production; US industry was quickly reconverted to the production of consumer goods. The USSR maintained a large standing army by conscription and armed it with new conventional weapons of all kinds; the US demobilized its army and, having abandoned the draft, replaced it with a small volunteer army attracted by material rewards the quality of which has not been tested. The USSR enlarged and modernized its army and air force; the US neglected both. The USSR developed sophisticated nuclear weapons systems and space technology; the US neglected its nuclear weapons systems. The USSR launched an extensive and prolongued propaganda campaign designed to create fear in non-Communist countries and to weaken their will to resist Communist expansion and aggression; the US did little to counter this propaganda and, at times, appeared to promote it.

8. In relative terms, the US economy declined in strength. For many reasons which space does not permit to be listed here, the Soviet economy is inefficient and noncompetitive. But the total power which the Soviet government exercises over the minds and bodies of its people enables it to pursue its goals by reducing the living standards of the masses of its people to a subsistence level. By contrast, the American people have for decades been unwilling to exercise self-restraint in terms of living within their means. As a result of borrowing to cover budgetary deficits, the debt of the national government, and the percentage of the national budget required to service the debt, are now excessive and constantly growing. This is the greatest single internal threat to the viability of our economy in the future - a danger which our founding fathers, liberals and conservatives alike, warned against.

9. In sum, conditions in 1983 are not comparable to those which existed in 1945. The US is no longer a superpower able to act as the policeman of the world. Indeed, the US is today already overextended in both a military and economic sense. Conditions have changed. But foreign policies remain largely the same.

VII.

1. Consideration should be given to withdrawing from all of the defense treaties negotiated in the period 1947-1959, including NATO and the Rio Treaty. The basic purpose of those treaties was to defend states against Communist aggression. Some of the states which are signatory to those treaties are now members of the Third World which initially expressed its neutrality in what was apparently viewed not as a struggle for individual liberties and national independence but as a power struggle between the US and the USSR. Others have expressed their dissatisfaction with particular aspects of the defense treaties.

8.

Other governments have supported guerrillas in the service of a Communist state. In other signatory states there appears to be significant opposition to the introduction of US missiles which are designed to deter the use of Soviet missiles already in place. These and other changes suggest that the treaties in question have been overtaken by events. Why should the US seek to convince other states they should defend themselves in the way we think best?

2. At the same time, the US should consider offering new mutual defense arrangements with governments that desire them and who have something of defense value to offer (e.g., the will and ability to defend themselves against the aggressions of their neighbors, materials which are in short supply in the US, a strategic location which is defensible). Generally speaking, the purpose would be to shift policy away from defending the weak and helpless to building positions of strength.

3. Consideration should also be given to withdrawing as many US troops currently assigned abroad as feasible and returning them to help defend the homeland. For example, if Indochina is not deemed vital to the defense of the US why should US troops be posted in South Korea? Another example: If Russian troops have the ability to march to the English channel using only conventional weapons, should not our troops be withdrawn from West Germany? - and should not the West Germans themselves have the exclusive right to decide whether or not to use nuclear weapons to defend themselves?

4. Each time the USSR extends the area which it controls it collides with nationalism and increases the drain on the Russian economy. The ability of the Soviet Empire to expand is not infinite.

5. A reorientation of US defense policy along these lines could be used as the basis of an approach to the Soviet Union to discover whether or not they would be willing to refrain from intruding (either directly or through surrogate states) militarily into the Western hemisphere, which is vital to the security of the United States, in exchange for our undertaking to refrain from intruding militarily into territory currently controlled by the Soviet Union or intervening in the internal affairs of such Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, etc., which the USSR obviously considers vital to its security. Other possible concessions which might be considered would be to withdraw the US military presence from Greece and Turkey, including US bases in those two countries and any US -controlled missiles that we currently might have there or which we could introduce if those states so desired. Still another inducement could be to refrain from introducing US-controlled missiles into West Germany without prejudice to the right

9.

of the US to sell such missiles to that or other responsible
democracy - provided the USSR made it clear that such an agree-
ment was considered by it essential to its security. Presumably
France has its own weapons and would not desire US assistance.
No other Western European state can reasonably be considered a
threat to the security of the USSR; all of them, including
West Germany, are, in any case, independent, sovereign states
which is all that we desire in the Western Hemisphere.

6. Whether or not proposals along these general lines (with details to be determined) would be acceptable to the USSR is questionable. If they were accepted, we should not deceive ourselves that this would imply any change in Soviet doctrine, strategy or tactics; all we could hope for is to decrease the risk of dealing with the Central American and Caribbean problems (except Cuba which would only be expected to discontinue its support of subversion in the area). If it is rejected, the Soviet Union would be put at a propaganda disadvantage. Neither the US nor the USSR would lose a great deal by agreeing to refrain from conducting military operations in areas geographically adjacent to the other which would be folly in any case.

7. By agreeing to refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of other countries, neither side would agree to abandon support of its basic principles. In our case, it would simply mean returning to the policy which was followed for the first hundred years after our independence: we stand for individual freedom and national independence and sympathize with those struggling to achieve them but, in the words of John Quincy Adams, we *do not* go in search of monsters to destroy. We would not expect the USSR to cease to be Marxists-Leninists but only cease to commit interventions and aggressions in areas vital to our national security.

8. Consideration should be given to warning the USSR not to miscalculate the determination of the US to defend itself against aggressions in this hemisphere which threaten its security - or be misled by those Americans who appear to favor unilateral disarmament or believe that peace can be secured by being militarily and economically weak and indecisive.

VIII.

1. Only a brief comment need be made about the various claims that have been made concerning the economic and social problems of Latin America.

2. Every sovereign state has exclusive jurisdiction within its own territory. This means it has the right to choose its own government, its political, economic and social systems and policies and manage its own domestic and foreign affairs free of the coercion of other states. It follows automatically that, having the exclusive right to manage its own affairs, no state,

10.

including the United States, can escape primary responsibility
for the way it manages those affairs.

3. One of the malaises that affect some Latin American
economies at the present time is identical with our own -
mismanagement of our fiscal affairs with all the economic
ills that follow in the train of an individual or a government
living beyond its means and accumulating debts that it cannot
service. It is an exercise in futility for the United States or
any other country to attempt to pass the blame to some mysterious
force operating in the markets of the world, or to try to place
the blame on other states. In the words of the comic strip
character, Pogo, " I have met the enemy and he is us." It is
nonsense to claim that when the US, or US private banks, do not
lend money in the amounts other states may desire, they are
Shylocks demanding their pound of flesh; and, on the other hand,
when they lend large amounts to claim they are responsible for
the size of the debts accumulated. One cannot have it both ways.

4. Dean Acheson correctly observed that the United States
can, within the limits permitted by its resources, supply missing
components (principally foreign exchange) in a situation otherwise
favorable to rapid economic and social progress. But it cannot
create in another sovereign state the conditions that are essential
to rapid economic and social progress.

5. The countries, again including the United States, which
have the largest debts are not, generally speaking, the poorer
countries in the hemisphere. They are the richer ones. The way
they choose to distribute the national wealth is for them to
decide.

6. The United States is not responsible for the rate of
population growth in other states, or for graft and corruption
in official circles when it exists, or for any of the other
vices inherent in human nature. Nor can it force people in
other lands to practice the cardinal virtues; if it could it
would presumably begin at home.

7. No state in history has been as generous with its
neighbors as the United States or tried harder to be a good
neighbor. All of the international lending institutions were
formed at the initiative of the US. No American state has
trade policies which are more liberal; many have trade policies
which are protectionist. No other American state has tried
harder, or as long, to give technical assistance or financial
assistance on such favorable terms. No other state has made
greater efforts to stabilize the prices of raw materials at
a level fair to producer and consumer alike.

-2-

NOTES:

Dr. Kissinger Ambassador Linowitz needs little introduction. He is a personal friend and a man whose opinions on Latin American policy I value.

Amb. Linowitz Thank you for this opportunity to speak to the Commission. Let me say at the outset that I believe that the only way to understand the problems of Central America and what lies behind them is to view them against the backdrop of the United States-Latin American relations over the years. Unhappily, Latin America is an area of the world which has been largely overlooked, ignored or disregarded. James Reston once said that Americans will do anything for Latin America except read about it, and I am afraid that he is all too accurate. We have consistently relegated Latin America to the backwash of history-- focusing on it only in moments of crisis.

Ask most Americans about Latin America and you get a glazed look. Few can name as many as ten Latin American countries. Few know the immense differences that separate the countries. Now, we have suddenly rediscovered Latin America and its significance to the U.S. The strife in Central America, the aftermath of the Falklands war, the Mexican economic crisis, the dramatic flow of migrants reveal all too clearly that what happens in Latin America deeply affects the U.S.

Because of my own concern, I have talked to many about the need to come together in order to exchange ideas on how we might approach the problems. I was struck by how much had changed in Hemisphere relationships since the 1970s. In the mid-70s we thought that revising the Panama Canal Treaty was the most urgent issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. In the mid-70s, we viewed Latin America's economic future with great optimism. In the mid-70s, territorial conflicts were not regarded as particularly significant. In the mid-70s, we were disturbed by what we called a plague of

-3-

repression. Today we are aware of the deep
stirrings for a return to democracy. In the
1970s we paid little attention to Central
America; today a fierce struggle is being waged
in that region.

In the 1970s, while we were aware that the
so-called special relationship in the
Hemisphere was declining, we could not have
imagined that the US and the major Latin
American countries would actually line up on
opposite sides of a war.

Because of these changes, I spoke with Dr. Galo
Plaza, the former Secretary General of the OAS
and we convened an Inter-American Dialogue.
Twenty-four Latin American leaders and 23
American participate in the six month project.
Working together in the Dialogue, we had a
chance to look beyond today's headlines and to
think hard and carefully about the kind of
tomorrow that we wanted in the Americas, and
how to help achieve it.

The opening words of our Report were these:
"The Western Hemisphere today faces challenges
more serious than any since World War II, or
perhaps even the Great Depression.

We started with the grave economic crisis, a
crisis that in my judgement is no less serious
and threatening to the security and stability
of the Americas than the wars being fought in
Central America. To put it briefly, the debt
crisis in Latin America has plunged many
nations into trouble. To address these
problems, we suggested measures to deal with
the immediate liquidity crisis and also offered
recommendations for resuming sustained economic
growth. We recommended strengthening the IMF,
expanding the role of the multi-lateral
development banks, stretching maturities on
existing debts, an increase in the flow of
private direct investment, resistance to
protectionism, and the stabilization of
commodity and export earnings. Money used for
debt servicing is not available for development.

-4-

In recent weeks we have heard much about a
possible Marshall Plan for Central America.
The simple fact is that the problems in Central
America and of Latin America are not like those
of Europe a generation ago. There is too
little to reconstruct or rebuild in Central
America. What can be borrowed from the
Marshall Plan is the overriding objective - a
multi-lateral undertaking not directed against
any country or ideology, but against poverty,
chaos, and distress. This is essentially the
goal set forth in the OAS charter which
ennunciates our joint objectives for a "united
effort to insure social justice in the
Hemisphere and dynamic and balanced economic
development for their peoples."

We must recognize that Latin America is today
at a political crossroads. Many nations have
moved toward more open and representative
policies. If these democratic openings are to
take hold, governments and political movements
must enlist the participation of the great
majority of Latin Americans by responding to
their desire for improved conditions of life.
Latin American countries have made substantial
gains in recent years, but World Bank estimates
still show that 1/2 of Latin America's rural
population and 1/4 of its city dwellers remain
in absolute poverty. Two-thirds live in
conditions below acceptable standards.
Poverty, inequality and injustice lead to
political protest and polarization. We need a
sustained effort to alleviate poverty.

Democratization is by nature a national
process, not a formal mechanism. It is a
process, a set of commitments rooted in the
history and culture of a nation. It cannot be
imported. The U.S. cannot attempt to impose it.

Accordingly, the recommendations in our report
for advancing democracy in the hemisphere were
quite modest. We oppose any activity which
undermines the political autonomy or integrity
in any country. We believe that the principle
of non-intervention is vital for safeguarding
democratization. Foreign governments and
international organizations can contribute

-5-

importantly but indirectly to democratization
through support of equitable economic and
social development. We believe that
governments can help create a climate favorable
to democracy through the tone and quality of
their diplomatic relations.

Human rights is a legitimate international
concern. Carefully considered multi-lateral
action to protect fundamental human rights is
not intervention, but an international
obligation.

In focusing on the issue of security, there are
tow important points. First, the basic roots
of insecurity are economic, social and
political. Second, the sources of insecurity
are mainly internal to each nation, and
external influences are secondary. It was also
our firm conviction that even when there is a
military dimension to conflict as in Central
America, the solutions ultimately lie in
economic and social development and political
dialogue and not in weapons or military
advisors.

There are significant differences in the way
security is conceived. When Latin Americans
think of security, most of them tend to think
of the internal challenges of national unity,
border issues, and in some cases the
possibility of U.S. intervention. In the U.S.,
the focus on security is external, global, and
strategic. The U.S. seeks to assure political
stability by supporting the status quo. Many
Latin Americans feel that profound change in
the region is inevitable and that an emphasis
on immediate stability is, therefore, misguided.

Our approach toward the Central American
conflict was based on two major premises.
First, that most citizens and governments
throughout the Hemisphere oppose an expansion
of Soviet and Cuban military presence in the
Americas. Second, the U.S. could do much to
foster a climate of security in the region by
making unequivocally clear its commitment to
respect national sovereignty and respect for
non-intervention.

-6-

We strongly endorese the initiative taken by
the Contadora Group and urge the U.S. to take
declare its full support. Such an American
commitment must make unmistakably clear by word
and deed that this regional approach is central
to our planning for the resolution of the
conflicts.

We also make a further recommendation, that the
U.S. explore, informally and quietly, the
USSR-US understandings with respect to Cuba.
Recent statements by Castro appear to encourage
such an approach and suggest that we give
Castro the benefit of the doubt. We should ask
the Contadora countries to explore Castro's
seriousness. We must explore all options in
order to avoid a wider conflict.

In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, negotiations
should be pursued with the help of the
Contadora countries to arrange for free
internationally supervised elections on the
basis of security guarantees for all parties
and participants.

All of this suggest a few basic principles
which I believe should guide is in dealing with
Central America. First we must recognize that
the problems are regional and that they are not
just affecting the U.S. They are not ours
alone to solve. Second, they must be dealt
with on a regional basis. Third, the basic
problems are political with a military
dimension and a military response will not
settle them. Fourth, the US must be
consistent, it cannot be two-faced in its
approaches. And fifth, the US must stand for
the peaceful resolution of the conflicts,
making unmistakably clear our commitment to
non-intervention and self-determination as
fundamental principles.

I believe that Central America is less a test
of our resolve to stand up to the Soviet Union
than of our capacity for farsighted leadership
and cooperation within our hemisphere - whether
we can conduct ourselves with requisite vision,
restraint, flexibility and self-confidence, not
just as a great power - but as a great
democracy.

-7-

The Panama Canal Treaty advanced our security more in recent years than any other single development, for it enhanced the spirit of cooperation between two halves of the Americas.

Let me conclude with a quotation from Benito Juarez, who said that "Respect for the rights of others is peace. Many years ago, President Theodore Roosevelt described similar opportunities in words applicable to this Commission. "The United States does not have the option as to whether it will or will not play a great part. It must play a great part. The only question is whether it will play that part well or badly."

Dr. Kissinger
Let me begin the questions. Do you feel that the U.S. can take unilateral action in Central America. Should we not act without the Contadora countries?

Amb. Linowitz
We have interest in common. If we feel a security threat, they will also see it. We must talk with the Contadora Group; we must work in the OAS; all with a view to building a regional basis for solutions. We must strengthen our efforts for a solution that is consistent with the other countries of the region.

Dr. Kissinger
I agree that we need to build a regional and international consensus; but if that is not possible, how can we define and defend our vital interests?

Amb. Linowitz
If we move alone, then we may loose much.

Dr. Kissinger
At one point you said that the problems in Central America are political problems with a military dimension, not the other way around. How do we solve the political problem without military action.

Amb. Linowitz
I have long felt that we are giving opened ended aid in El Salvador. If we had proposed that a 100 million be spent with the stipulation that negotiations must begin, then I feel that bipartisan support would have developed. I feel that we should limit any

-8-

open ended commitment. Clearly in the case of
El Salvador it would have been better to have
worked for a negotiated settlement.

Dr. Kissinger Obviously there are different solutions for different countries. Yet, what are the basics for political solutions.

Amb. Linowitz Although this may sound somewhat trite I feel that the basis for political solutions rest with self determination and non-intervention, that is so long as a situation does not develop in one in which the countries become threats or tools of Cuba and the USSR. We need a clear objective in Nicaragua such as the achievement of free elections and the end to subversion.

Dr. Kissinger What do we do if there are no free elections in
Nicaragua?

Amb. Linowitz If Nicaragua refuses to hold free elections and continues to receive arms from Cuba, then we must give overt aid to Honduras.

Dr. Kissinger Then you feel that if the Sandinista government follow a policy of non-intervention and reduce the importation of arms, then a non-elected Sandinista government would be acceptable.

Amb. Linowitz I would not try to do more if it conflicts with the basic principles that I outlined above. Now we see the use of more and more force, but to what purpose?

Dr. Kissinger That is my question also.

Amb. Linowitz Our current policy seems to be one of applying more and more force. But what do we do if we overthrow the Sandinistas?

Dr. Kissinger What is your perception of the possibility of a political solution in El Salvador?

Amb. Linowitz I believe that the focus should be on elections. When one talks of power-sharing one confuses the issue. If one is talking about free elections then one is in reality talking about power-sharing.

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Dr. Kissinger
Let us assume that there are additional free
elections and the guerillas reject them. Can
we then step up our aid to El Salvador?

Amb. Linowitz
Aid should be one aspect of Contadora support.
We should work with them since that is better
than going it alone.

Dr. Kissinger
I have heard it said that Mexico has one state
public policy, but that secretly they share our
objectives. Am I right or wrong?

Amb. Linowitz
The Mexicans are genuinely concerned about our
policy. They fear that too often we shoot from
the hip or that we pay lip service to their
interests. What we need is more trust and
confidence.

Mr. Kirkland
Although you favor non-intervention, the
provision of aid with human rights strings is a
form of intervention. Is that acceptable or
not?

Amb. Linowitz
I believe that it is acceptable because it is
permissible for us to decide how we allocate
our aid.

Mr. Kirkland
Is it your recommendation that the Commission's
report have the support of the Latin American
countries and the Contadora group.

Amb. Linowitz
Yes. We have often heard it said that in the
OAS the Latins complain but they take no
action. Well in the case of the Contadora
group we have Latins taking action.

Mr. Kirkland
We have heard a number of views on the nature
of the oligarchy in El Salvador. Some have
said that there was an oligarchy of fourteen
families, but that it has been largely
dissolved. Others state that there was no
oligarchy at all. What is your view?

Amb. Linowitz
I hold neither view. There is an oligarchy
which has been partially dissolved, but it
still continues to play an important role.

-10-

Mr. Johnson There appears to be a need for increased private investment, yet this cannot be done without political stability. Is it realistic to expect that we can get increased investments without political stability?

Amb. Linowitz That is a valid point. What we need in these countries are partners with a stake in the future of their countries. One of the most successful operations in Latin America are those of Xerox. This is because of their careful selection of partners and their efforts to maximize local input. There are also other positive changes. For example in Mexico, the climate for foreign investment is much better now.

Dr. Diaz-Alejandro Let me ask a question about intervention. We did it in the Dominica Republic in 1965 and it seemed to work. Is there a positive side to intervention or is it simply a case of the law of large numbers, do it enough and it will probably work?

Amb. Linowitz In the Dominican Republic, we helped appreciably in establishing a democratic government, but we lost the respect of much of Latin America. We missed a good opportunity to consult with the OAS prior to our intervention, instead we sought their support after the fact.

Mr. Kirkland You say we lost respect. How?

Amb. Linowitz It made it impossible to work in the OAS, on virtually all issues it became a matter of the U.S. vs. the rest of the OAS.

Mr. Kirkland What then is the balance sheet on the Dominican Republic?

Amb. Linowitz Is it simple. Had we gone to the OAS, we would have its support and thus the best of both worlds.

Dr. Diaz-Alejandro We are well aware of the interest in free elections in Central America. Are these same principles applicable to other countries? To Chile for example?

-11-

Amb. Linowitz Yes, I believe that we should be responsive to issues that involve elections. But we must tailor our responses to the circumstances when we seek to restore democracy. I feel for example that we went too far in trying to aid Frei. We became sucked in internally; we were too involved. Our ambassador went so far as to discuss internal policy issues directly with Frei.

Mayor Cisneros Let me review a line of thinking on Nicaragua. There seems to be a general desire for elections. But equally there is a feeling that this will not be enough because of current Cuban and Soviet policies.

Amb. Linowitz We need to be concerned if Nicaragua threatens its neighbors. Especially if they continue to pursue their policy of a revolution without frontiers in spite of elections.

Mayor Cisneros If the militarized trend continues in Nicaragua and there are no elections, then your advice is for us to aid Honduras. Does this also include more aid to El Salvador since there were elections in El Salvador?

Amb. Linowitz Yes, if there is bipartisan support. We must follow a rational and sensible course.

Mayor Cisneros Your position then is that we should involve others in the free elections and the stopping of arms shipments. I also have a question on the elections in El Salvador in 1982. Were the elections free? I have heard some reports that people were killed at the local level and that were inhibitions on free elections as we know them.

Amb. Linowitz I have talked with both Ungo and Zamora. They see them as non-free elections, claiming that many were intimidated. They argue that you cannot have free elections until there are real security guarantees.

Mayor Cisneros On the other hand, 80% voted.

-12-

Dr. Kissinger
I remember many heart rending stories about
Vietnam. What we need to know is, what is the
defenition of free elections as seen by the
other side. What de we know about the
intentions of Ungo and Zamora?

Amb. Linowitz
I believe that we should not get into
discussion about the two sides. What we should
do is join with the Contadora Group in
discussions about the terms and conditions for
the elections.

Dr. Walsh
Dick Scammon was there. Why don't we ask him
about the elections?

Mr. Scammon
I was in El Salvador and in Vietnam. My
impression of the elections in El Salvador,
with exception of the fact that the left did
not participate, is that they were generally
fair. It should also be noted that the left
tried to block voter participation. I believe
the left's slogan was "vote today, die
tonight." Another threat was that the left
would cut off the finger of any individual who
had the ink stamp from the polling booth. When
asked about this on National Public Radio,
Zamora had no comment. Yes, the absence of the
left in arms presented a problem; as did the
intimidation of some Christian Democrats.

I have problems with the position which holds
because the left held out, then the system is
unfair. It questions the whole value of
elections and gives the left a veto.

The other problem encountered was one of
ineptitude and bungling, but these were the
errors of honest men, even if some doubts were
created by bungling and ineptitude. There were
observers from each of the parties at each
polling place. The count was supervised at
each point and then reported to party
headquarters. If anything the Salvadorans
voted too fast. One group of critics assumed
that it would take three minutes to vote. Yet,
the Salvadorans voted more rapidly.

-13-

We saw the lines. We know that 20% didn't vote and that another 10% of the ballots were blank, Yet within the limits of an underdeveloped society, this was a good beginning and fair along the lines of PRI elections in Mexico.

Mr. Kirkland We also sent organizers down. One problem that they observed was the narrow range of candidates as well as the weakness of Duarte and the divisions between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats, which resulted in some cleavage in the moderate center. One error, I feel, and this was a major of misjudgement was the failure of the moderates to develop more comprehensive slates. Form our perspective, the results could have been better. Duarte was the best man available.

Mayor Cisneros I continue to wonder if there was a fair representation of the different policy options. What was the impact of fear as a motivating factor in the elections?

Dr. Kissinger Then if I understand these points, we should work to define a criterion that we believe in and define them with the Contadora Group and then seek to put them into action.

Amb. Linowitz Yes.

Dr. Kissinger Then you favor free elections and not power sharing as a precondition for a settlement in El Salvador.

Dr. Walsh Our government has not fully embraced the Contadora process. Is there any hesitancy. Three of the five countries were major supporters of the Sandinistas. Mexico, despite all is a major FSLN supporter. Is there not reason for U.S. hesitancy?

Amb. Linowitz I believe that we have the worst of both worlds. We say that we stand behind the Contadora process, yet we do not really support it. The desire for a full consultative role with the Contadora group has not been demonstrated.

-14-

Dr. Walsh
We are all opposed to to intervention. But I want to know what is intervention. Is human rights certification a form of intervention? For example are we intervening when we cut off aid to Nicaragua until there are free elections or is intervention primarily a military action? Each witness seems to have his own definition.

Amb. Linowitz
Yes that is true. Each individual generally has a definition of intervention. It is also true that there are differing forms of intervention. I would go with a broad definition of intervention - intervention is a forceful assertion or imposition of our will on another country.

Dr. Walsh
Is forcing the pace of land reform a type of intervention?

Amb. Linowitz
Yes in a way. But I have no problems with this. At the OAS and other international organizations one can examine broad programs such as this and make legitimate recommendations.

Dr. Walsh
The record of multilateral approaches to diplomacy is somewhat uncertain. In such actions can we retain strings and still protect U.S. interests.

Amb. Linowitz
I believe that we should assess our own interest first. Unless we can properly preserve our interests then we should not join.

Dr. Silber
I would like to raise two points. The first is that you mention that poverty is endemic. There is a need for some form of equality. Yet we know that if there is 100% equality then there is a high probability that there will also be 100% poverty. Would such a solution really solve the human rights problems. Another area of concern is that of population. We all recognize that the population problem is crucial in the region; yet we also know that the Church opposes efforts to control population.

-15-

Another point that I would like to make
concerns non-intervention. One person says
that we cannot export democracy, but that one
can export totalitarianism. Many argue that we
should not break with totalitarian regimes. I
am proud that we broke with Somoza. But I feel
that many principles are so confused and we
seem to be saying that intervention against the
right is o.k., but that action against
totalitarian groups is intervention. In the
minds of many, intervention is anything that
interferes with Marxist-Leninist regimes.

Dr. Kissinger

Ambassador Linowtiz, I would appreciate any
additional reflections that you might have on
democracy and on specific measures that we can
take to achieve the goal of democracy in the
region. Thank you for your presentation.

-2-

that separate the countries and permit you to change five centuries
by crossing a border. Relatively few recognize that Latin America
consists of individual nations at critical points in their history
determined to fulfill their destiny in their own way.

Now we have suddenly rediscovered Latin America and its
significance to the United States. The strife in Central America;
the aftermath of the war in the South Atlantic; the financial
upheavals in Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina and elsewhere;
the dramatic flow of migrants from Mexico, Haiti, Cuba and other
countries - reveal all too clearly that what happens in Latin
America deeply affects the security, welfare, culture and politics
of the United States. And by the same token, what happens in the
United States has a great impact on Latin America.

Because of my own concern about these problems and my own
involvement in Latin American relations over the years, some months
ago I talked to a number of men and women both in the United States
and in Latin America - people of different parties from different
professional perspectives and different generations - about the
need to come together in order to exchange ideas on how we might
approach the problems in inter-American relations today.

I was struck by how much had changed in Hemispheric relation-
ships since the 1970's when I had served as Chairman of the Commission
on United States-Latin American relations.

In the mid-1970's we thought that revising the Panama Canal
Treaty was the most urgent issue in United States-Latin American
relations. Today that problem is largely behind us.

-3-

In the mid-1970's because of Latin America's dynamic growth and prospects, we viewed Latin America's economic future with great optimism. Today we know all too well that Latin America faces a severe economic downturn and an acute crisis of overwhelming debts and high unemployment.

In the mid-1970's, territorial conflicts were not regarded as particularly significant. Today these questions are hard to avoid, and they in turn raise other issues such as the arms races, peace-keeping capabilities and the like.

In the mid-1970's, we were disturbed by what we called a "plague of repression" sweeping the Americas. Today we are aware of deep stirrings for a return to democracy in many countries, and the struggle in many nations to achieve progress toward a fuller respect for human rights.

In the 1970's, we paid little attention to Central America which we regarded as a relatively tranquil corner of the Hemisphere. Today we know all too well that we did not have enough understanding to anticipate the fierce struggles now being waged in that region.

And in the 1970's, while we were aware that the so-called "special relationship" in the Hemisphere was declining, we could not have imagined that the United States and major Latin American countries would actually line up on opposite sides of a war.

All these developments made unmistakably clear that there had been drastic changes in inter-American relations in a relatively few years, and what was needed was a new look, free of preconceptions and prejudices.

-4-

Dr. Galo Plaza, former President of Ecuador and former Secretary General of the Organization of American States, joined me in convening a group of distinguished opinion leaders from all over the Hemisphere in order to examine the issues in an Inter-American Dialogue. Twenty-four leaders from 15 countries of Latin America, one Canadian and 23 from the United States responded to our invitation. Our group included two former Latin American Presidents, four former Foreign Ministers, six former Finance Ministers, and such distinguished North Americans - Republicans and Democrats alike - as David Rockefeller; General David Jones; Father Theodore Hesburgh; Cyrus Vance; Edmund Muskie; Elliot Richardson; Robert McNamara; Ralph Davidson, Chairman of Time, Inc.; Frank Shakespeare, Chairman of the Heritage Foundation; and Mayor Henry Cisneros, a member of this Commission.

Our studies and deliberations went on for a period of six months, and during that time we consulted extensively with high officials in a number of countries. In the United States, for example, we met with Secretary of State Shultz, Vice President Bush, Assistant Secretary of State Enders and others. Working together in the Dialogue, we had a chance to look beyond today's headlines and to think hard and carefully about the kind of tomorrow we wanted in the Americas, and how to help achieve it.

The opening words of our Report were these: "The Western Hemisphere today faces challenges more serious than any since World War II, or perhaps even the Great Depression". And we undertook to examine some of the most important economic, political, social and security problems confronting the Americas.

-5-

We started with the grave economic and financial crisis in Latin America today - a crisis which, in my judgment, is no less serious and threatening to the security and stability of the Americas than the wars being fought in Central America.

To put it briefly, the debt crisis in Latin America which has plunged Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and Costa Rica, among others, into deep trouble is also a serious problem for the United States; and our entire closely interlinked financial system is under challenge. To address these problems, we suggested measures to deal with the immediate liquidity crisis and also offered recommendations for resuming the sustained economic growth and development which will be required for a longer term solution. Let me just mention some of the specific recommendations on which we focused attention in our Report.

The strengthening of the International Monetary Fund; the expansion of the role of the multi-lateral development banks; extension of the maturities of existing debt in various Latin American countries; an increase in flows of private, direct investment; resistance to protectionist sentiment both in the Hemisphere and worldwide; the stabilization of commodity export earnings; and the speedy approval of the Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative.

I suggest that all of these are relevant to your own charge as a Commission to review the economic problems affecting Central America and to develop recommendations for long-term economic policies. Money used for debt servicing is not available for

-8-

direct way undertake to build democratic political institutions in
other countries.

Accordingly, the recommendations in our Report for advancing
democracy in the Hemisphere were quite modest.

First, we oppose any activities - covert or overt - by
government and other institutions which undermine the political
autonomy or integrity of any country. We believe that the
principle of non-intervention is vital for safeguarding
democratization.

Second, we believe that foreign governments, international
organizations and private institutions can contribute importantly
but indirectly to democratization through support of equitable
economic and social development.

Third, we believe that governments can help create a climate
favorable to democracy through the tone and quality of their
diplomatic relations. We hope that democratic countries in the
Americas will maintain warmer and more supportive relations with
other democracies. But we would counsel against breaking diplomatic
relations with authoritarian governments, since this tends to
rally nationalist support for a regime and to reinforce rigidity.

On the issue of human rights, clearly the protection and
advancement of human rights is primarily the domestic responsibility
of the national government. But it is also a legitimate international
concern. And this should be reflected in the foreign policies of
the governments and in the programs of international organizations.

-9-

For carefully considered multi-lateral action to protect fundamental human rights is not intervention, but an international obligation. Direct unilateral intervention of any government in the domestic affairs of others, even on behalf of human rights, can have unfortunate consequences. But silence and inaction in the face of clear abuses are inexcusable. For these can threaten both the security and the stability of the Hemisphere.

In focusing on the issue of security, we agreed on two important points: First, that the basic roots of insecurity - and the basic problems of security - in the Hemisphere are primarily economic, social and political, not military. Second, that sources of insecurity are mainly internal to each nation, and external influences are secondary.

It was also our firm conviction that even when there is a military dimension to conflict as in Central America, the solutions ultimately lie in economic and social development and political dialogue and not in weapons or military advisors. Even when external support for insurrection clearly is present, as in El Salvador, the underlying problems remain domestic.

There are significant differences in the way security is conceived and defined in the United States as against the way it is understood in Latin America. When Latin Americans think of security, most of them tend to think of the internal challenges of national unity, of border issues with neighboring states, and, in some cases, of the possibility of intervention by the United States.

-10-

In the United States, the focus on security is external, global and strategic. Because of its worldwide interest and role, the United States generally seeks to assure political stability by supporting the status quo under sharp internal or regional challenge. Many Latin Americans, on the other hand, feel that profound change in the region is inevitable and that an emphasis on immediate stability is, therefore, misguided.

These differences are reconcilable. For both North Americans and Latin Americans stress self-determination and non-intervention as norms. Both favor keeping Latin America and the Caribbean out of the East-West conflict to the greatest extent possible. Both understand that social and economic progress is vital for achieving political stability and protecting national and international security.

Our approach toward the Central American conflict was based on two major premises. First, that most citizens and governments throughout the Hemisphere oppose an expansion of Soviet and Cuban military presence in the Americas. Second, that the United States could do much to foster a climate of security in the region by making unequivocally clear its commitment to respect national sovereignty.

Accordingly, we strongly endorsed the initiative taken by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela in the Contadora Declaration, offering their good offices in seeking peaceful solutions to Central America's problems. We urged the United States to declare its full support for the Contadora group's efforts and its readiness to participate in the discussions as might be deemed appropriate.

-11-

Such an American commitment must make unmistakably clear by
word and deed that this regional approach is **central** to our planning
for the resolution of the conflicts - and not just peripheral to it;
and that we stand resolutely with the Contadora countries as
partners in this common effort. I am afraid that such a commitment
is still lacking.

We also made a further recommendation, suggesting that it might
be worth exploring the possibility that the United States-Soviet
understandings of 1962, 1970 and 1979 with respect to Cuba might
provide a basis for a wider accord that could enhance the
collective security of the entire region. We proposed that this
could be explored informally and quietly with both the Soviet Union
and Cuba in order to determine the possibility of arriving at
understandings.

Recent statements by Fidel Castro appear to encourage such an
approach and suggest that we should indeed, in the President's
words, give Castro "the benefit of the doubt" and ask our Contadora
friends to explore the seriousness of his own proposal along this line.

Of course, we cannot be sure that such discussions would succeed.
But we are sure that the perils and costs of allowing the Central
American conflicts to grow are grave and raise the specter of wider
conflicts. And the dangers are growing - for time is not on the side
of peace. Accordingly, we firmly believe - all of us from North and
South America and covering a wide spectrum of views and experience -
that negotiations should and must be tried - on all levels.

-12-

In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, negotiations should be pursued with the help of the Contadora countries to arrange for free internationally supervised elections on the basis of security guarantees for all parties and participants. And in the region as a whole, a major effort should be undertaken in conjunction with our Latin American friends to find a way to settle the conflicts.

All of this suggests a few basic principles which I believe should guide us in dealing with the Central American situation today.

First, we must recognize that the problems of Central America are primarily regional ones, affecting all of the countries in the area and not just the United States. Accordingly, we cannot and must not undertake unilaterally to deal with the issue as if it were ours alone to solve.

Second, as a regional issue it is a problem which must and can be dealt with only on a regional and cooperative basis. The Contadora countries have taken leadership in exploring avenues for peaceful negotiation of the conflicts and we should make unequivocally clear our full commitment to their efforts.

Third, we must understand that the basic problem of Central America today is essentially a political problem with a military dimension rather than - as our present policy seems to suggest - a military problem with a political dimension. Accordingly, we must recognize that a military response in Central America will not by itself achieve a solution.

-13-

Fourth, we must be clear about what we seek to achieve in Central America and consistent in our words and actions moving toward that objective. We cannot, for example, assert that we are committed to regional cooperation and, at the same time, pursue our own course without regard to the views of our friends and allies. We cannot maintain that we are committed to self-determination and freedom of choice for the people of Central America, yet assume we can undertake to prescribe what that choice must be.

In short, the United States of America must stand for the peaceful resolution of the conflicts through negotiation, making unmistakably clear our commitment to non-intervention and self-determination as fundamental principles.

It may be significant that all who participated in our Report agreed that the security of the Americas had probably been advanced more in recent years by the *Panama Canal Treaties* than by any other single development.

For the Treaties did much to enhance the spirit of cooperation between the two halves of America; and they reinforced the stakes held in common by allowing Latin Americans to take responsibility commensurate with their stakes.

-14-

That was the essence of the approach in our Report - not to deny differences in interest and perspective between the United States and Latin America, but to emphasize the important interests we share, and the importance of mutual respect for vital concerns. For as the Mexican patriot Benito Juárez once said: "Respect for the rights of others is peace".

Today we are at a moment of crisis in Central America and in the Hemisphere at large. When conditions of crisis are faced imaginatively, opportunities for progress exist. Such opportunities do exist - especially for the United States. The question is how we will respond to them.

Many years ago, President Theodore Roosevelt described those opportunities in some words singularly applicable to our role in Latin America today - and to your role as members of this Commission.

PRESENTATION BY: William Rogers

DATE: September 1, 1983
TIME: 11:20 - 12:35
PLACE: Rm. 1105

SUMMARY:

Secretary Rogers emphasized the importance of the population problem in Central America, noting that population during the period 1970 to 1981 increased faster than GNP. He affirmed the importance of the region for the US and outlined the key concepts he felt should guide US policy.

The key concepts included support for sovereignty, the right to self-determination, freedom and economic development. Secretary Rogers called for a new beginning in US policy toward Central America based on human rights and highlighted by some dramatic statement. He pointed out that the new beginning could only be pursued in an atmosphere of security. In that context he said that US policy must be based on a clear statement of a firm stand against the advance of hostile forces. He closed by emphasizing the importance for the Commission to reach a consensus in its recommendations.

NOTES:

Kissinger: First we want to express our appreciation and thanks to Secretary Rogers for being here and sharing his views with us.

Rogers: Thank you very much. It has been ten years since my involvement with the problems of Latin America, but many of the problems remain the same. The central fact for the region is the continuation of population growth. If it is not reduced, suffering and hardship in the area will continue. The World Bank has noted that, with the exception of Costa Rica, the rate of population growth in Central American nations for the period 1970-1981 did not fall and, in some cases, increased. At the same time, growth of GNP in these countries has been at a rate lower than that for population.

Under these circumstances, pressure is needed on these nations to reduce their population increases. But outside pressure alone will not be sufficient; there will be no significant results unless there are also political changes. The wisdom of reducing population growth can be seen in India and China. Singapore is also a success in this area.

US policy toward Latin America over the years has been characterized by fits and starts. Our attention has faltered when other subjects appeared more important. Central America deserves a place as a separate and regular item on the US policy agenda.

Is Central America important? Of course it is. Its proximity to the US and Mexico alone makes it important. Other factors are the security of the Panama Canal and the historical and cultural ties we have with the area. Any appreciation of strategy and geopolitics shows the importance of the region.

Our policy should consist of support for sovereignty and the right to self-determination. We should also be for freedom and economic development for the people of Central America. Self-determination is best expressed by a commitment to free and open elections. Freedom means freedom from domination by outside forces. These concepts, however, mean little for the very poor. That

is why we must also be concerned with economic and
health issues.

Human rights must be uppermost in our policy toward
Central America. The problem is to reconcile human
rights with strategic considerations. A lesson is to be
found in the response to the rise of Nazi Germany. The
attraction of isolationism had to give way to the
strategic necessity to defeat the Nazi threat.

Our historical relations with Latin America have not
been good. Often we have supported tyrannies for
strategic reasons. Now a new beginning is needed based
on human rights, which should be made explicit in some
dramatic statement. This emphasis, however, can only be
pursued in the context of a secure and stable
environment. The problem thus is also how to prevent
the advance of hostile forces.

As we observe the course of events in places such as
Cuba, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and Poland, we see that a
policy to prevent such an advance must be based on a
clear statement that "we do not permit it." Can we only
express the hope that our adversaries will not attempt
to advance? Must we merely await another event such as
the Cuban missile crisis? The answer is no. My view is
colored by my experiences working in the Eisenhower
administration, when we took a firm stance and the USSR
showed respect for it. The Kennedy approach,
particularly in the Cuban crisis, also showed the value
of a firm approach. We should realize that we gain
benefits with other nations too, such as China, our
European allies and Japan, when we take a strong stand.
Currently, in Central America, we see some of the
supporters of Nicaragua having doubts about their
support in the face of President Reagan's stand and
evidence concerning the nature of the Nicaraguan regime.

A leading element in our policy toward the region should
be the development of a plan for regional cooperation.
The Central American Common Market, before it was
interrupted by the Salvador-Honduras war, is an example
of the type of cooperation we should seek. It is vital
that we get other nations to play a role in cooperative
efforts.

We need to recognize the fundamental importance of
Mexico for Central America. Recent developments there
offer encouragement from our point of view.

It is doubtful that the OAS can play a useful role, but
we can at least try to involve it. The OAS, for
example, was not helpful in bringing the
Salvador-Honduras war to an end.

As I mentioned, other nations from outside the region must be encouraged to play a constructive role. Japan may be able to offer trade or financial aid. South Korea has an excellent record in development projects with their construction teams. The Europeans naturally should also be involved. The Caribbean Basin Initiative ought to be pushed to encourage both bilateral and multilateral development projects.

The central problem for the Commission is that its recommendations must be meaningful while not promising too much. If they reach too far, historic Latin American suspicion of the US will immediately surface in their reactions.

The Commission has the opportunity to focus attention on Latin America and its importance for US interests. I would hope for a strong consensus on the recommendations--a split within the Commission would be very harmful in the foreign policy area. I would cite the efforts of two unanimous decisions in which consensus was very important. One of these was the Supreme Court decision in Brown vs. Board of Education. The far-reaching effect of the decision on American society was due in part to the fact that the Court was not split. The important work of the Greenspan Commission (sic) also was advanced by consensus. If differences of opinion can be accomodated within a unified report, it will be a great contribution to our foreign policy. Thank you.

Kissinger: Thank you very much for that statement of views. I share your feeling that the work of the Commission can bring the country together on Central American policy.

Rogers: I think that a strong view by the Commission will help greatly. I repeat that consensus is vital in the recommendations.

Kissinger: What should be the criteria, Secretary Rogers, for viewing the degree of Soviet influence in the region? At what stage should we say there should be no further advance?

Rogers: What we must do is generally make clear our resolve. We should not attempt to set exact parameters on Soviet behavior. With a general firm stand, we will find that many problems will take care of themselves. Some of the current problems of the hemisphere stem from lack of clear US resolve. We took a stand in Cuba, but then gradually allowed the Soviets to establish their sphere there with troops, etc. If Nicaragua follows the Cuban example and we let it go, it would suggest that we have no policy for the area. The important thing is not to lie down, to show strength and have a clear policy.

Kissinger: If we draw a line, should we then be prepared to use force?

Rogers: We do not need to state that explicitly, but they should know that that is behind our stand.

Kissinger: The Commission will need to take a position on evaluating the Nicaraguan government. Is it already beyond the line? If so, can it be brought back? What would we have to do to change its course?

Rogers: I am not completely up to date on those developments, but it appears they are following the Cuban path. They have invited in Cubans, Russians and East Germans. Moderate elements that participated in the revolution are now out of the country, and I see little hope under the present leadership. If support for the Nicaraguans erodes--and the Mexicans may be changing--it may be possible to negotiate with them and change their attitudes. But I am not optimistic.

Kissinger: You spoke of human rights and also the possibility of cooperative efforts, such as the Common Market. What areas do you feel are specifically appropriate for Commission recommendations?

Rogers: None of these would be new recommendations. The investment outlook in the area is discouraging. There are possibilities of developing tourism if there is stability. Agricultural aid would also be useful. People should realize that we've already done a lot, we've really tried. The main problem is population and its distribution. El Salvador, for example, is quite small but has a large population relative to Honduras, a much larger country. That disparity was partially the cause of the war between the two nations.

Long-range policy will require developing regional cooperation. Unfortunately there is a poor historical record for such cooperation. We need to tailor our aid more than in the past. The South Korean example with their construction teams for specific projects is a good one.

Kissinger: Now we will give everyone a turn for questions.

Scammon: You've already answered my questions, which related to population.

Rogers: You know, I don't recall population questions in Latin America being mentioned at all as a policy problem when I was Secretary. There has been a change in this area. Some see the population question as related to religion, but I don't feel it is necessarily tangled up with religion. Perhaps it is related to the idea that larger families add to national strength.

Scammon: These are also agricultural societies, and large families are traditional in such areas for economic reasons, to work the land.

Silber: Do you believe we should attach specific conditions to our aid for Central American countries?

Rogers: No, at least not publicly. Any conditions should be set quietly. Private organizations have been successful in channeling aid for particular purposes.

Silber: What, in your view, should be the US relation to the Contadora process and the OAS?

Rogers: We should work with both. I think Contadora is the more important in practical terms. The OAS historically has been very contentious. In my experience, dealing with the OAS--as with the UN--was very discouraging. In both cases they have had high hopes, but there have been so many lost opportunities.

Strauss: I have no questions, but I want to note that earlier Ambassador Linowitz also also expressed his reservations about the OAS.

Walsh: Speaking of population control, we have had some success with child and maternity care clinics as a vehicle to begin population planning. Even some local Bishops have lent support by their presence at some clinics. But I want to question the internationalization of the Central American problem. I think this has contributed to some legitimization of the Sandinistas, and possibly also the Salvadoran guerrillas. Is it possible to encourage economic assistance from outside the region without also contributing to this greater political participation?

Rogers: Sure, it is possible. But I think the main problem is the difficulty of assurances for capital. No one wants to invest if they think they might lose everything.

Walsh: Concerning Nicaragua, we hear there are possibilities of negotiating with them, that they are on the road to elections in 1985. Might we be taken in by all this, as we were in the case of Cuba? The Nicaraguans might sign some agreement, but after all is quiet, begin intervening again, following the Cuban philosophy and model. Is Nicaragua already another Cuba, ready to intervene again after US attention to the region wanes?

Rogers: Yes, I think that is likely. It seems there is the possibility of dealing diplomatically with some of these problems, but that appears outmatched by the Nicaraguan acceptance of the Cuban model. Even the elections they have proposed, if they take place, are not likely to result in a yes-no choice on the leadership of the country.

Walsh: What are the chances of any success for the Contadora effort if some of the countries involved--particularly Mexico--continue to finance the Sandinistas? How will this affect our development efforts for the region if various countries will say we must also include Nicaragua in our efforts?

Rogers: We can't be tough with the Mexicans. We can make clear our policy, which I think they will recognize, and then they will make some adjustments in their actions. The present Mexican government has been much better in this respect than past governments. It may possibly be moving to less support for Nicaragua.

Cisneros: What sort of financial aid might the US provide Central America? What is the link of the Korean example to the types of things we might do?

Rogers: The Koreans have the ability to come in, complete their projects, and then pull out without leaving behind too much influence. They do not retain a harmful domestic involvement. The important thing for the US is to present a vision for the use of the aid, and make sure the Central Americans know that we are helping.

Cisneros: I want to expand a point about providing training as aid. Possibly we could set up training facilities, universities, in the Central American countries. That would solve the problem of bringing people to the US for training, and then seeing them stay here.

Rogers: We could expand facilities, such as universities, in other places. I believe Costa Rica is an example of something that has been done. We need to show some new imagination in foreign aid. Programs as they are now managed often have limited success because of the influence of special interests.

Walsh: We have tried to persuade AID to create scholarships for training in Costa Rica.

Kissinger: (speaking to Walsh) Perhaps a paper on this sort of thing could be done for the Commission. It could detail examples of what sort of things have already been done.

Cisneros: It seems that the Soviets have been very successful with their educational and training efforts. They are able to bring people to the USSR and then send them back when the course is finished. We should match that effort, and we can do it training people here. There is the possibility of losing facilities after we create them in other countries.

Rogers: It's true that the Russians have a large advantage in being able to ensure that those they train then go home. In the US they tend to stay. Part of the problem

is that, even though we go through a lot of procedures,
we just don't deport people.

Diaz-Alejandro: Secretary Rogers, you have noted the problem of US policy credibility. It seems that policy toward Latin America runs in cycles of apathy, crisis, programs, and then a lapse back to apathy. What would be the mechanisms to make the new commitment you have proposed more credible than efforts in the past? Would five-year Congressional authorizations for aid, for example, help establish credibility for programs?

Rogers: I believe that a unanimous report from the Commission will temporarily help in the area of credibility. But the perceptions of Latin Americans are not going to change overnight because there is too much history behind them. A major problem for the Commission is not to promise too much but at the same time to obtain quick evidence of progress and change.

Johnson: What do you believe have been the reasons for our neglect of Central America as though it were a stepchild?

Rogers: I'm not sure we have treated it quite as a stepchild. We have tried to help, but the problems are so difficult. Just about all of the aid we have provided has been eaten up by population growth. Some of our inattention has been due to our assuming friendly relations with the area, particularly as we relaxed in the aftermath of the Cuban crisis. Then it later became clear that the Cubans were just Soviet lackeys, and this continues in their support of the Nicaraguans. The US must recognize how important the area has become, and help itself by helping others in the region.

Johnson: I want to agree with your position that it is important that we reach a consensus. What danger do you see if the Commission is not able to form a consensus?

Rogers: If there is a real split in the Commission, I think it will cause real harm. The division will be cited by the communists and it will be seen very negatively throughout Latin America. I do want to emphasize that I'm not advocating the suppression of differing views, but differing views should be reflected within a strong overall consensus.

**Kirkland:** It is my view that the population control issue is the worst one from the standpoint of having only long-term marginal effects. It does not seem to be a lead issue for a substantive Commission recommendation. On the subject of infrastructure aid projects, I urge that workers not be imported. Instead we should work to strengthen vocational education for local workers. This would also help deal with the problem of maintenance after the project is completed.

**Rogers:** I agree with Mr. Kirkland.

**Domenici:** We have a problem if we are going to set up tests for the nature of the Salvadoran or Nicaraguan regimes. We should be careful before we make broad policy dependent on such tests. We must realize we are dealing with nations that have severe economic problems, and it would be difficult for our type of government to survive under those conditions. For that reason, perhaps the report of the Commission should not begin with recommendations for democratic elections and then go on from there.

**Rogers:** I agree with that. Our general objective should be free elections, but we should not operate with that as our first requirement. We can urge that these governments grant their people the maximum amount of freedom possible, and demand at least that they have broad popular support. It occurs to me that Singapore is a good example where broad support exists within at least democratic forms.

**Domenici:** I wonder if in these cases a period of time is necessary for the infrastructure and economic development to mature, and during this period an interim political structure is required.

**Kissinger:** Part of the difficulty is obtaining political change in these countries with a Spanish and Indian heritage and a feudal structure. We need to indicate we are aware of the problems of development.

**Domenici:** We in Congress also see the problem of getting domestic support for policy in El Salvador. In the end, it requires a commitment to democratic elections. Support for policy toward Nicaragua also has to be based on elections, but in the opposite manner, citing their lack of democracy. I hope that there will be room in the Commission's report for recommendations involving more people-to-people contact, perhaps using youth or medical volunteers.

**Rogers:** I think that is a very good point. A key role in communist successes has been their use of personal contact to dispense aid. I know it is not easy, but there is a lot more we can do.

Domenici: I also want to say that I agree with Lane Kirkland that it would be death for the Commission to take a position on population control. We can just agree with the indications that, as the level of economic development rises, rates of population increase will decline.

Barnes: What is your judgment of the current negotiating efforts of Senator Stone and the Contadora group? Can you analyze where they are leading? Do you believe we should support the Contadora effort?

Rogers: That is difficult to answer. They are both good efforts. Contadora in particular could be useful. The Mexican role there is the key, I can't emphasize that too much. I know little of Senator Stone's efforts. There can be no harm in talking, but the sides there seem very far apart.

Kissinger: On behalf of the Commission, I again want to thank Secretary Rogers for being here and giving us his useful presentation.

Notes for Meeting of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

PRESENTATION BY: Dean Rusk

DATE: September 1, 1983
TIME: 1:00 - 2:30
PLACE: Rm. 1105

SUMMARY:

Secretary Rusk emphasized the roles of international law and collective security in addressing the Central American situation. He urged an intense effort to engage Latin American nations and the instruments of the Inter-American system on behalf of hemispheric security. While military force should be a last resort, the US must never rule out the possibility that armed force will be used. Any action the US might take should be overt and should be taken in light of our international law obligations and the right of our collective-security partners to self-defense.

Secretary Rusk also urged a multilateral approach to aid for the region (to avoid accusations of US interference). He argued that the western hemisphere should have the highest priority for US aid and stressed that the aid should be directed at assisting countries of the region to mobilize their own resources for the benefit of their people. Finally, Secretary Rusk emphasized the importance of a non-partisan consensus emerging from the work of the Commission.

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HAK: Welcome and thank you for coming.

Rusk: I'm happy to be here. This Commission has a difficult task, but it is important that you develop a strong consensus for your recommendations.

I have not been briefed on the factual situation in CA, nor have I read the raw intelligence. Indeed, it appears there is much confusion about the facts of the situation throughout the country and in other world capitals. Perhaps one goal of this Commission can be to try to clarify the factual situation. The Administration does have a credibility problem on CA. It is similar to the credibility problem we had with the Cuban missile crisis until we revealed the photographs we had of the situation on the ground.

There was much discussion over whether it was wise to release those pictures and possibly jeoparadize our sources. But in the end releasing them made the difference. Perhaps the secrecy which surrounds so much of the information available on Central America works against the need to develop a public and international understanding of the situation.

At any rate, I have been told that Nicaragua and Cuba are infiltrating agents and arms into El Sa to support the insurgency there. If this is true, this conduct is prohibited by international law--the law which rules the behavior of the community of nations. This conduct is in violation of Article 2.4 of the UN Charter and of two UN declarations which amplify that article: the Declaration on the Principles of International Law Governing Friendly Relations Between States, passed by consensus in 1970, and the 1974 Declaration Against Aggression, also passed by consensus.

The Declaration on Friendly Relations prohibits one state from organizing, assisting, or participating in terrorist attacks on another state and further prohibits it from permitting groups to carry out these types of operations from its territory. The Declaration Against Aggression uses similar language to prohibit these same activities. Thus, the

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difference between direct and indirect aggression, a
subject of such debate before WWI, has been
eliminated. In this hemisphere, the OAS Charter and
the Rio Treaty further prohibit such activities.

Some believe international law is only a bunch of
vague, moral principles. But I believe WWII could
have been avoided and I came out of that experience
like many others, believing collective security is the
way to avoid WWIII. That principle is reflected in
the UN Charter and in various regional agreements.

Therefore, if Nicaragua and Cuba are, indeed,
infiltrating arms and agents into El Salvador, ElSa
has a right of self-defense, both individual and
collective self-defense, which means it has the right
to call on its allies to assist it. That right is not
diminished by the faults of a victim country's
political or economic systems. There are, after all,
only about 30 constitutional democracies in the world,
and it would be absurd to say that states which do not
conform to that model have no right of self-defense.

Further, under international law, Nicaragua has no
right to claim that its own territory is inviolable if
it is providing sanctuary therein to groups acting
against its neighbors.

These notions are but a beginning, but we must keep
them in mind. In the Western Hemisphere, the
obligation of collective security pertains to all
states, not only to the US. Unfortunately, the idea
of collective security has been eroding in recent
years. I believe this is true for the American people
because Americans have suffered 600,000 casualties
since WWII in the name of collective security. We
have carried the greatest burden in this regard. We
provided 80% of the non-Korean forces in Korea and 90%
of the non-Vietnamese forces in Vietnam.

But those who reject the idea of collective security
must ask what principle they would offer instead to
stop wars. We need to discuss alternatives if we are
to abandon the idea of collective security, and we
have not been having this discussion.

The US people no longer want to carry the burden
alone. I recall the Ninth Meeting of the Council of
Foreign Ministers of the OAS in 1964, called to
respond to Castro's attempts to land men and arms in

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Venezuela. In their Final Act, the Ministers imposed
on Cuba all sanctions possible under the Rio Treaty
except for the use of force. And they noted that if
Cuba persisted in its activities against a member
state, all the members preserve the right of
individual and collective self-defense, including the
right to use force.

The basis of the Final Act was that in this situation
the victim state is the most important player,
regardless of the size of its territory or its
population.

I believe the OAS has a role to play in the current
crisis in CA. I could, for example, envision an
on-going meeting of the Foreign Ministers, kept in
session until the situation is resolved. I note that
in the spring Costa Rica asked the OAS for assistance
in patrolling its border with Nicaragua. Regardless
of how the OAS decided to handle that particular
request for assistance, I was most disappointed with
the failure of the Council of Ministers to let it be
clearly known that the OAS would respond positively to
whatever requests CR might make to diffuse the border
situation.

Having said all this, I must add that I believe
military actions should be used only as a last
resort. George Marshall used to say that if a problem
was considered first as a military problem, it usually
turned into one. Nevertheless, we must never
unequivocally reject the possibility that military
force might be used. In the case of the negotiations
now taking place between the two sides in ElSalvador,
if the armed insurgents want merely assurances that will
allow them to participate in the process, that's one
thing. But if they want power to be divided up and
handed to them, that's quite another situation. Those
who have influence with them must persuade them from
this course of action.

In the 1960's we almost every year made a new approach
to Castro, asking whether he would be willing to
reintegrate his country into the hemispheric community
on the basis of fidelity to the OAS Charter and the
Rio Treaty. There was never any indication that he
was willing to do so, and I don't know if that
position might be different now.

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There is another aspect of the CA problem we must consider. In general the situation of the rural population in CA is miserable. The leadership in these countries has never devoted much attention to the needs of its own people. This must change and it will change, but we -- the US -- can't do it at the consumer level. We can provide supplemental assistance, but above all the countries of the region themselves must mobilize their own resources.

One of the ways we can help is by training the CA people in such areas as public health and agriculture. Other countries of the hemisphere can also make contributions. For example, it is little known that Mexico has long provided technical assistance through such organizations as the Children's Hospital and the Cardiology Institute in Mexico City. In this way, we can improve the CA people's capacity to deal with their own problems. But to this end we must also harness the leadership in the countries themselves.

This will not be an easy task. During my tenure we found there was anti-American sentiment not only on the Left, but also among the established interests who felt the Alliance for Progress called for more social reform than they wanted to see. It is also crucial that the economic resources designated for development be used for this purpose, and this can perhaps best be ensured through the multilateral institutions, which can require rather severe standards of performance as a condition for aid. If we attempted to impose the same conditions on a unilateral basis, we would be accused of interference.

To summarize, I believe the Western Hemisphere should have the highest priority for US aid. We must find a peaceful way to develop a many-faceted economic and social program which will use the CA countries' own resources to the maximum. And we should never rule out the possibility that armed force will be used if necessary to meet our objectives.

HAK:

You have said military action should not be excluded, but should be a last resort. Dr. Silber asked yesterday a question which I would paraphrase in this way. It appears that when a country's capacity for action is greatest, its knowledge is at a minimum, and vice versa. For example, we have heard people who

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know say they are convinced that Cuba is indeed a
projection of Soviet influence in this hemisphere, but
now that the knowledge is certain, the costs of doing
something about this situation are exorbitant. How
can a country be prepared to act when the costs are
still manageable, and in this light, what criteria
should we apply to action in Nicaragua?

Rusk: Since WWII there have been many instances of problems similar to that which we face today in Nicaragua and we didn't always respond with force. In the case of Azerbaijan, we took the issue to the Security Council and persuaded the Soviets to pull back in that manner. In the case of Greece, we supported the government with economic assistance. In the case of Berlin, we found a diplomatic solution to the blockade. So force isn't always necessary, although the possibility of its use must be kept in the background.

There have also been occasions when we tried to use
limited force. This is what we tried in Vietnam. The
use of limited force is a difficult option for the
people doing the fighting and the people at home.

Looking back, it appears that in general early action
is better than later action. For example, Hitler,
when he sent his troops into the Rhineland, ordered
them to withdraw if they encountered resistance from
the French. But the French did not act, and we all
know the result. In the case of CA, taking action
against Cuba will not solve the problems.

HAK: What about the need for action against Nicaragua?

Rusk: Any action we take should be overt and should be taken with respect to our international obligations and the right of El Salvador to self-defense. Covert actions never stay covert for very long, and they give the perception that somehow we should feel guilty about what we are doing.

HAK: Nicaragua exercises its war muscles not only directly but also through a propaganda campaign and by the tremendous military buildup in which it engages. How can we deal with this?

Rusk: I believe the Contadora Four should make Nicaragua aware of the danger of its actions, possibly by warning Nicaragua that it can never be sure what the US reaction might be.

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HAK: We have discussed the issue of democratization in CA and what role the US should play in the process. There are two problems in this regard. First, the process of democratization is slow, and military developments occur quickly. What can we do to speed up the process of democratization without causing chaos in those societies?

Rusk: Genuine economic and social change takes time. I wonder what the Salvadoran rebels say their bottom line for change is?

HAK: They want a dismantling of the police forces and the incorporation of the guerrilla armed forces into the military.

Rusk: Well, that's not negotiable. I remember that when Castro first came to power, he was rather warmly received, even here in Washington as an alternative to Batista. But he had already set his country on a course of communism, opposed to the US. We seem to have a double standard for dictatorships; somehow, we are better able to tolerate dictatorships of the left than of the right. Well, I am opposed to all dictatorships. Unfortunately, sometimes your choice is not a clear-cut one between democracy and dictatorship.

Kirkland Assuming the GRN is committed to the course of illegal international conduct and we cannot get a hemispheric consensus for action, what unilateral steps would you recommend we take? Should we continue support for the Contras?

Rusk: No significant action can be taken covertly. The Bay of Pigs proved that. But I can't accept that a hemispheric consensus is impossible. There were a half a dozen nations, for example, that contributed troops during the Dominican crisis. If we could not get a consensus, that would mean the end of the principle of collective security in our hemisphere. Collective security is the only way to stop WWIII--a war we must prevent, because we won't be able to start over as we have been able to after conventional wars.

Kirkland Given the Salvadoran right to self-defense, is it desirable or appropriate that our aid be conditioned on improvements in human rights and on internal reforms?

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Rusk: Certainly we should use our influence in these areas, but we must be careful how closely we make the linkage, because fundamental changes can't occur overnight. Of course, it is true that most CA countries have a pretty poor human rights record and I believe it appropriate that multilateral agencies pressure them into changes.

Diaz-A: You talked about the benefits of early action, but there is also a danger of acting too quickly. In the 1920's, for example, many people believed our security was threatened by the Mexican revolution and wanted to intervene. Fortunately, we did not. Some now believe our actions against Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954 were premature. Can this be happening in Nicaragua or can we still work out an agreement with the GRN that will be compatible with our interests?

Rusk: There is still time for an agreement if the Sandinistas are genuinely interested.

HAK: Mr. Secretary, what would be an acceptable agreement from your point of view?

Rusk: Nicaragua would have to agree not to engage in destabilizing activities against its neighbors. We can have normal relations with a state that has a different political or economic system. We have relations with these types of countries around the world, and I do not believe there are ideological barriers to good relations with Nicaragua.

Diaz-A: What lessons should we take from the Alliance for Progress?

Rusk: When we established the Inter-American Commission to screen applications for Alliance that money went a long way toward reducing tensions that might have been caused by the gringo's alone laying down the law.

I would note that over the years it appears our friends in LA want two things which we find hard to give them: our interest and our respect. That is why multilateral involvement is so important to future programs.

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Brady: Do you believe the CA problems are local, regional, or global?

Rusk: A combination of all. Obviously, there is Cuban involvement as an agent of the Soviet Union. But by definition the problems are basically local, although the solutions must be somewhat different because of external attempts to exploit them. But if we try to use force to change political and economic systems, I see a dismal future for the area.

Brady: What are the real possibilities for establishing true democracies in CA?

Rusk: There is a very short list of democracies in the Western Hemisphere. I yield to no one in my concern for basic human rights, including political rights. But it is unrealistic to say we won't do business with countries that have other systems.

Walsh: You urge hemispheric action, but it often appears that the US must show the most flexibility while the other countries aren't as willing to change to our point of view. For example, Mexico takes anti-US positions in Contadora and continues support for Nicaragua. How can we recommend solidarity with nations that take this type of position?

Rusk: In the case of Mexico, I remember that country was one of the first to offer support for our position during the Cuban missile crisis. They recognized that this went to their deepest international obligations.

HAK: But they also knew we would react with or without their support.

Rusk: Yes, but they didn't abstain as might have been expected. Mexico's public statements are often very different from its true posture.

Walsh: But in this case, they continue to support Nicaragua.

Rusk: I believe this is a major diplomatic problem which should be handled through diplomatic channels.

Walsh: It is difficult to recommend solidarity with the Contadora Four in the face of this kind of action.

HAK: We can point out that solidarity carries responsibilities on all sides.

Strauss We have been talking about a large economic aid program. But how do you provide effective economic assistance when a country is engulfed by civil war?

Rusk: When you talk about a large, long-term aid program, you highlight out the difference between official assistance and private sector help. The private sector can sustain attention and assistance in a way we cannot do with our yearly appropriations process and our tendency to push for short-term results to justify next year's money.

Strauss: If you could be assured of a long-term commitment, you would still have the problem of what to do in the case of civil war.

Rusk: In the long run, the only way to avoid civil war is by making fundamental socio-economic changes. We need to invest time in this effort.

Silber: Hindsight can often be useful as a teaching tool. Could you give us the benefit of your hindsight and tell us what mistakes you believe we have made in dealing with Cuba? There are also lessons to be learned from the Dominican crisis of 1965. What characterized the internal debate that led to that decision?

Rusk: There were two phases to the Dominican crisis. At first, we believed US and third-country nationals were in jeopardy because of the failure of the Dominican forces to provide security. So, at first our Marines went in in accordance with a contingency plan devised by President Kennedy for this type of emergency.

Once we were there, we were contacted by people who told us of the fighting in Santo Domingo and the real possibility that the result would be the emergence of either a rightest dictator like Trujillo or a leftist dictator like Castro. The OAS had established sanctions against both these dictators, so we consulted with some of our colleagues in that body and agreed to send a multilateral force to set up an interim government until elections could be held.

On the whole, the results were beneficial for the Dominicans and even for us, although we are still criticized for our actions.

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There is also a lesson from recent history that teaches us armed force is not always the solution. During the missile crisis, armed force was one of our options. But again we consulted and were convinced that the Hemisphere might never recover from the use of force in that situation. Nevertheless, the possibility that we would use force was always present.

Kemp: I'm a proponent of a program along the lines of the Alliance for Progress. How could that program have worked better for Central America? What elements of the Alliance should we build on?

Rusk: We had hoped that the Alliance would encourage these countries to take a more realistic look at world markets and at what types of products they could effectively export. This goes back to the idea that we must encourage the CA countries to use their own resources. Assistance under the Alliance was never more than 1% of a country's GNP. The question then is how we can encourage and train them to mobilize effectively the resources they have.

Kemp: Along those lines, could you put something on paper about how we can mobilize resources for development in the type of civil war situation Mr. Strauss mentioned?

Rusk: I would be glad to.

Domenici The Western Hemisphere seems to have forgotten the laws you mentioned. It appears the rest of the Hemisphere isn't interested in this legal argument.

Rusk: I know some are concerned. Venezuela must be, given its own experience with Castro and how collective security was used in that case.

Domenici It seems some countries act out of hatred for the US when it would be in their own interests to support us.

Rusk: In the past at critical times the nations of this hemisphere have worked together. We can again, although it may take a major effort. All should be concerned. Che was in Bolivia, for example. The threat is to all.

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HAK: Sometimes it isn't so much that they hate the US as that they fear that our actions are uncertain and our commitments unreliable. If we can project a policy of continuity, that will change some attitudes. I know this is true in Mexico.

Rusk: It would be a disaster if this policy became the object of partisan debate during the upcoming elections. I hope a way can be found of talking to the Presidential candidates to avoid partisan debate on this issue. It's been done before. A national consensus is crucial.

Bentsen: As you prepare the paper you mentioned, I hope you will think in terms of how practically and specifically large amounts of aid can make a difference. After all, the Marshall Plan experience is not totally relevant because the infrastructure situation is so different in CA today.

Rusk: That's a difficult problem, and I will comment on it.

Mathias: When you were Secretary of State the first hemispheric quotas on immigration were established. What are your views on the question of CA migration to the US?

Rusk: This is a serious problem and I don't believe the US can accept residual responsibility for the birth rates in other nations. We must help these countries to take care of their own people at home with their own resources. There has been a change of attitudes on this issue over the years. In the early 1960's, 80% of the countries opposed population control programs. By the end of that decade, 80% approved of them.

HAK: Thank you for coming. We will be consulting with you again. I particularly note your hope that this issue not become one for partisan debate. That, indeed, is one of the prime responsibilities of this Commission--to forge a national consensus.

4883N:bjr

09/19/83

Notes on the Meeting of the
National Bipartisan Commission on Central America

SUBJECT: Meeting with former government officials

BRIEFER/WITNESS: President Jimmy Carter

DATE: September 1, 1983
TIME: 2:30 - 4:15
PLACE: Rm. 1105

SUMMARY:

President Carter reviewed his administration's policy
toward Central American, focusing on the importance of the
Panama Canal Treaty. He called for the U.S. to support
moderate and democratic forces in Central America. He felt
that if continued subversion threatened these countries, then
overt military assistance was justifiable.

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NOTES:

**Dr. Kissinger**
I want to thank you for agreeing to speak to the Commission about the long term evolution of U.S. Central American policy. You were a pioneer in the development of our Latin American policy. It is significant that we are now able to hear your views. I will, therefore, turn the meeting over to you.

**President Carter**
It is good that you have heard from Dean Rusk. He is an important individual as well as a man from Georgia. I am not a Washington regular and this is the first time that I have been called upon to provide testimony as a witness before a commission.

I share with others the growing consensus that it is important to prevent a Communist takeover in El Salvador. It is also our goal to have a long range policy which is in accord with our ideals of human rights.

I must point out that during my Administration, the Panama Canal was viewed as the primary threat to the region. The conflict generated by the claims to sovereignty over the Canal had intensified. The National Guard and subversives sought to capitalize on growing anti-American feelings. Under the Johnson Administration, there were bloody clashes and a break in diplomatic relations as a result of the competing claims to the Canal. Several administrations had sought a fair resolution to the issue. Yet it was difficult. It took my Administration two years to implement the legislation necessary for the Treaty. Yet, this was an important milestone, since it dramatized the importance of the peaceful resolution of disputes. As a result, we worked closely with Torrijos in Nicaragua and El Salvador, in an effort to deal both with Somoza and the crisis in El Salvador. We knew that embryonic Marxist groups existed in Central America and that Cuba was likely to

-3-

support them. I considered Central America to be extremely important, not tangential. During my Administration, we consulted with all major Latin leaders, including the Sandinista junta. We also consulted, through channels, with Cuba.

We saw the problems as primarily regional, involving both a human rights dimension and a struggle for political power. We saw clearly in the last 1 1/2 to 2 years that there was a danger of Soviet-Cuban expansion. These problems were troubling.

This Commission will become better informed than I am on the current situation. I have relied primarily on information received from human rights groups, missionaries, businessmen, and some exiles. I have also received briefings from the National Security Agency.

Since 1980, the Government of Nicaragua has become more militarized. Its armed strength is 20 times greater than it was in 1980, and most of this assistance comes from Russia and Cuba. Nicaragua has alienated its neighbors, through abuse and insult. Internally, opposition to the Sandinistas is growing, although this opposition has been stigmatized by its identification with Somoza. There is also repeated propaganda actions and threats which threaten Honduras. Yet, unless there is some U.S. militaty action, I do not believe that the Sandinistas will be overthrown.

The Government of El Salvador is also relatively strong, but it has been hit by both the guerrillas and by the excesses the right and the military. Both factions conspire to prevent "free elections" in a form that is accepted abroad. I feel that a political settlement is possible and do not foresee, under present conditions, a victory by the left. I believe that it is important that we continue to foster reforms.

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Let me move to some specific points. In
Nicaragua, our goals are not clear and as a
result there is much confusion and doubt about
them in the U.S. The U.S. declares that it
will not use troops in Central America, yet it
maintains that there are vital security
threats. We have engaged in covert support for
the anti-Sandinistas and also engaged in
extensive land and sea maneuvers. Our goal
appears to be to replace the Sandinistas with a
friendlier government. Yet, Congress and the
public continue to limit the degree of
intervention. Our ultimate goals must be made
absolutely clear. We must also deal with the
prosect of the continued existence of the
Sandinistas. This should be pursued through
dialogue. Honduras which has an important
stake in these matters should be invited to
participate. Such discussions might also
include the Cubans and the Soviets.

Another thing that bothers me is that we appear
to be working at cross purposes with the
Contadora Group and the OAS. Allegations of
intervention create problems for both Panama
and Mexico. It is very difficult to deal with
such allegations of unilateral U.S.
intervention. These actions also weaken unity
with the Latin American countries. It
forecloses the opportunity for Latin American
leaders to play an important part in shaping a
regional settlement. As a result, we are
suspected, even by our friends.

The global aspects of the problem have been
excessively emphasized. No doubt Moscow and
Cuba aid the left. Yet to rely on an East-West
explanation tends to isolate those favoring
rapid change from moderating influences; it
radicalizes them and leaves them with only the
alternative of turning to Cuba and the USSR.
It weakens ties with the Venezuealans and also
with internal moderates. Our position should
be one of doing all that is possible to
strengthen the moderates. By exaggerating the
global nature of the problem, we insult the
poor through a demonstration that their
opinions do not really count.

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I feel that we are not doing enough with human rights. We are allowing the true totalitarians to use the banner of human rights in their activities in Central America.

The problems with which one must deal are complex and must be handled within the context of a complicated framework. Most of the solutions lie with the Latin Americans. You on the Commission will build a consensus, as long as the Commission can define the common purposes and goals that should underly this consensus. The Commission should explore the overt means to deal with security issues. You must also be prepared to deal with the social and economic issues that are elements of broader concern. You should consult, even if it is a detriment to our unique interests, with the Contadora Group, particularly with Mexico and Panama. We must also make it clear that we will not accept open subversion in the region by outside forces.

Dr. Kissinger
Mr. President, thank you for your optimism and for the view that a group, endowed with so many strong personalities, can come together and unite to formulate recommendations. It is becoming apparent that with respect to Nicaragua there are two views. While most share a consensus view that we should seek to avoid the export of revolution from Nicaragua, one group says that we must define a code of coexistence with the Sandinistas. The other view is that the continued existence of the Sandinistas is a threat to its neighbors and therefore a threat to us. Where do you stand with regard to these two views.

President
Carter
My preference is for a moderate solution in which the Nicaraguans would create a freely elected democratic government - if it is possible to create one. However, my belief, on the basis of the evidence that I have is that the Sandinista government will continue in existence and that no present array of forces will bring about their overthrow. The Sandinistas are heavily armed and tightly controlled. They could probably resist an assault by both Honduras and the contras.

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Where do we go then. One way is to seek to impose constraints on the shipment of arms and aid to other revolutions through mutual agreements. The second is to continue to push for the holding of democratic elections. I would negotiate with them. The Sandinistas do not want to be puppets subservient to Cuba; they gave their lives in the struggle against Somoza, not just to surrender to Castro. We should seek to join with Mexico and maybe Canada in order to address important issues with Nicaragua.

Personally I disapprove of the covert-overt war with Nicaragua. Military maneuvers are an overt way of sending a signal to the Sandinistas.

Dr. Kissinger What if there is no agreement on elections?

President Carter There must first be a general agreement on the issue of the export of arms.

Dr. Kissinger Into or out of Nicaragua?

President Carter Out of Nicaragua at first. There must means to monitor such activities.

Dr. Kissinger Please reflect on this. There is general agreement on the need for social, economic, and political programs for the region. But to do so without specific mechanisms is less useful. Could you put before us specific recommendations for action?

President Carter I must state briefly that I have no definitive program, and I may not be able to present one to you. One thought that I have on Nicaragua is that we should indicate that we do not seek the overthrow of the Sandinistas, but at the same time make it clear that we will engage in overt actions. In designing any larger program, we should do so in consultation with the OAS and other multilateral groups. If we do this, then we will have U.S. support. One could perhaps design a program, maybe a five year program. It is important to build hope and to gain support from other Latin American leaders.

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Dr. Silber

During your Administration important steps were made with regard to your emphasis on human rights, your efforts to limit repression, and on confronting non East-West issues. Thus your opposition to totalitarian regimes is clear. You also demonstrated that we should not be monolithic in our approach to Marxist-Leninist groups. The question I wish to ask involves our aid to the Sandinistas. One theory that has been put forward is that during the negotiations to oust Somoza you had an array of forces. In the north were the Ortegas and others with strong Cuban backing. From the south came Pastora with the support of the Venezuelans. At a crucial point, aid to Pastora was cut off. Were there options at the time that could have been pursued?

President
Carter

Let me state that I feel we should not be monolithic in our approach to revolutionary groups, not in our approach to clearly defined Marxist-Leninist groups.

Dr. Silber

Did you support Pastora?

President
Carter

I do not recall the specifics as to whom we supported or exactly who visited Washington after the triumph of the Sandinistas. During the conflict, we sought to work with the OAS. Somoza claimed that he had the support of 90% of the people. We suggested that he go before the people and hold a plebiscite. He opposed the idea of a free election. After the Sandinista victory, the OAS and the core nations tried to work with the Sandinistas to give them alternatives and to strengthen the moderates. The presumption was that the Sandinistas would fulfill their promises. But they failed and began exporting revolution. Also the Cubans and the Soviets see the Sandinistas as a prime revolutionary instrument.

Dr. Silber

What if the Sandinistas refuse to hold elections? I would point out that in El Salvador there have been elections, even if they were flawed. It is also doubtful that the elections would be free since they have created a system of Defense Committees that appear to be modeled in part on Cuban and East German

-8-

models, and to a degree remind one of the SS in
Germany. Also if the arms build up continues
and it is unlikely that this can be
controlled. Then at some point there may be a
need for intervention. Is there a point when
intervention is necessary?

President
Carter

This first presupposes failure without
an effort at negotiations. A second
presumption is that there are negotiations and
these fail. I would like to see both parties
negotiating in good faith, instead of being
predisposed to bad faith on the side of both
parties. Discussions could include arms and
free elections. If there are failures in
negotiations, I do not advocate the use of U.S.
troops to overthrow the Sandinistas.

Dr. Walsh

If I understood you correctly, we should
consider in our negotiation strategy the
possibility of bringing in the Cubans and the
Soviets?

President
Carter

Yes, if we are talking about arms shipments

Dr. Walsh

Don't you fear that this would legitimatize a
Soviet presence?

President
Carter

That cuts both ways. The Soviets will not admit
to arms shipments. But if we look at the
overall elements of a solution, we may have to
deal with such matters as human rights and
repression which may be handled in an
international forum and this could involve the
Soviets.

Dr. Walsh

How much weight should be given to the feelings
of neighboring countries, many of whom feel
that negotiations with Nicaragua are not to
their advantage? Many ask us not to act alone
in dealing with the Nicaraguans.

President
Carter

If Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica do not
want to negotiate with the Sandinistas, we
cannot make them, but we can influence them.
We must also be aware that many of the issues
that must be discussed involve joint frontier
and border issues.

-9-

Dr. Walsh
It is my understanding that the Contadora Group, in its last two meetings, has not been able to develop a common position.

President Carter.
Let me again state my preference for peaceful negotiations. In our discussions about the Panama Canal, we were prepared to handle the issue, but would not take the initiative alone. We sought to develop a consensus atmosphere which was important in generating pressure for a solution. When we act alone in Latin America, we look bad, even if we are right. We must show that we accept equality. Thus there must be room for plans that do not originate in Washington.

Mr. Brady
Since it appears that Nicaragua is exporting revolution, there is a need to deal with this in a direct way.

President Carter
The way to deal with it is through direct and overt action. As President, we used some covert actions, but if one is engaged in a highly publicized covert undertaking, then you have the worst of both worlds: the action is public and there is a sense of illegality. We should support the Government of El Salvador and also be prepared to engage in the direct use of advisers, more training and military maneuvers.

I would also make an observation about revolutions. If we describe all revolutions as Marxist-Leninist, then we rob the moderates of legitimacy and radicalize the process. This process radicalizes the revolution and provides the left with a tool often based upon real grievances. If we say that one is a Marxist because he is a revolutionary, then we leave no alternative but for him to turn to Havana.

We also need firm support for the protection of U.S. interests and open and comprehensive economic and social programs.

Mayor Cisneros
You spoke of a lack of clarity in our goals. If we seek democratization, we usually seek to fine tune it and are not always satisfied with the results. We also act on our own interest. Often we give lip service to the democracy

-10-

process, when in fact we really have other
outcomes in mind. Should we not also think of
other frameworks, such as non-intervention as a
principle along with democracy.

President
Carter

We, that is my family, sought in many ways to show our approval of democracy. I will say that my Administration gave credit when there were democratic improvements in countries such as Ecuador, Brazil, and Panama. I spoke with Torrijos after the signing of the Panama Canal Treaty and urged him to work for change in his country. We supported even faltering democracies. In Nicaragua we offered UN or OAS observes to monitor a turn toward democracy, but Somoza refused.

Mayor
Cisneros

If a process of negotiations plays out without success, then it is possible that we would have a consensus on providing arms to El Salvador and Honduras? What then should be the nature of our commitment? What should be our stance on human rights in Honduras and El Salvador.

President
Carter

To the extent that we raise the East-West nature of the conflict, we remove our leverage on the Government of El Salvador and our ability to deal with human rights. I tied aid to specific changes - elections, land reform, and an end to government sponsored murders. They agreed and we continued with military aid. We all ought to remember that El Salvador is not a basket case. For over twenty years, it experienced growth of approximately 5-6% per year. It was to a large degree self-sufficient. Now it has been set back 10 to 15 years. Yet, it is not a hopeless case. I feel that we can respond effectively and that we can build stability. The best way to ensure that there is no guerilla victory is to rob them of the source of their support and to end various atrocities.

We should not lose sight of our direct bilateral relations with Mexico and Panama. We should inform them and consult with them as we consider different policies. Many ill feelings could be avoided if the President informed them in advance of decisions that we intend to make.

-11-

Dr. Diaz-Alejandro
Following on this line of discussion, how optimistic are you about the possibilities of reforming but not destroying the armies of Central America? Is it possible to eliminate the death squads? What is the role for U.S. military aid?

President Carter
The best answer is that results are being obtained in El Salvador. I believe that the degree of repression has been moderated somewhat, partially because of the publicity, the reforms, and U.S. advisers. To make this statement with confidence I would need a detailed security briefing. I do feel, however, that the Government of El Salvador is relatively secure. It plans to hold elections in 1983 and is working to draw in some of the left.

Dr. Kissinger
There is always a problem with security briefings. One never really knows if apparent success is the work of the army or if the guerillas are simply preserving themselves.

President Carter
I know that the Administration is required by law to assess progress. I feel that such active monitoring is important.

Dr. Diaz-Alejandro
Do you feel that annual certification is useful?

President Carter
I know that we had a problem with compulsory annual human rights reports and that they can at times present problems.

Mr. Kirkland
Mr. President, I feel that the future in El Salvador is in the balance. Our view is that we will not be satisfied until there is justice in the case of the AIFLD murders. The killers have been identified and they are free. I do not like to be in a position where we must make such a case a touchstone for assistance. But we need justice to protect our people. But there is a bigger and deeper concern that I have, and I would waive my desire for revenge, if we could create for the future a judicial system with integrity and independence. I am still deeply concerned that the problem is not resolved. I am afraid that there is little more than a choice between totalitarianism and

-12-

authoritarianism and that we can often do
little more than mitigate situations. Must we
be forced to choose between two bad
alternatives or are we prepared to pull out?
May I ask your thoughts on this?

President
Carter

We predicated aid to El Salvador on specific
human rights improvements. Then we agreed to
specific aid undertakings. President Reagan
rejected this approach. He saw the threat as
so overwhelming, that assistance should not be
provisional. He and his Administration,
however have not abandoned human rights.
Abuses are there, but to publicly berate
leaders of other countries is also
counterproductive. I recall less publicized
actions that we took with regard to the
Philippine Aquino and the private pressures that
we placed both on Presidents Park and Marcos.
In reality there must be a balance and there
are rarely black and white cases.

Mr. Kirkland

On the other hand if we fail, it effects our
credibility. Should we get out?

President
Carter

It then becomes a matter of judgement and we
must decide what is best for the United States.

Mr. Kirkland

I have one final question. If we proposed a
comprehensive assistance program, a form of
Marshall plan, should we make an offer to
Nicaragua?

President
Carter

I would not do so without conditions. There
would need to be an arms limit and an end to
abuses in Nicaragua.

Senator
Mathias

I have no questions. But I do want to thank
for this interesting periscope into history.

President
Carter

I am proud of the Commission's purpose. There
are no clear cut answers. What is impressive
is the multiplicity of interests represented by
this Commission. It is very important that
this Commission help to create a long range
basis for our policy.

-13-

Mr. Barnes
I have no questions. I have been meaning for a long time to write you a letter. Although some say that I travel too much, I have talked with many leaders throughout Latin America and they all speak with respect for your Administration and your policies. For example, I met with President Belaunde in Peru. He stated that he would not be President if it had not been for U.S. pressure. Also Mrs. Carter and the publicity that she gave to the democratic opening in Ecuador helped to sustain that process.

President Carter
That is the type of letter that should be written and a speech made on the subject.

Mr. Kemp
Although I am a Republican, I think that your emphasis on human rights was very sincere and dedicated. You have also been very candid with us. I would add that I believe that the U.S. cannot stand the test of history if it does not support a broad policy that includes human rights. President Duarte for example is evidence of our continued interest in human rights.

President Carter
Thank you all for these compliments. Since I am no longer President, I do not have Air Force I waiting for me and I must leave to catch a plane.

CHAIRMAN
DR HENRY A. KISSINGER

COMMISSION MEMBERS
MR NICHOLAS F. BRADY
MAYOR HENRY G. CISNEROS
GOV WILLIAM P. CLEMENTS, JR.
DR CARLOS F. DIAZ-ALEJANDRO
MR WILSON S. JOHNSON
MR LANE KIRKLAND
MR RICHARD M. SCAMMON
DR JOHN SILBER
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART
AMB ROBERT S. STRAUSS
DR WILLIAM B. WALSH

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
AMB HARRY W. SHLAUDEMAN

THE NATIONAL BIPARTISAN COMMISSION
ON CENTRAL AMERICA

SESSION ON SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

September 7-8, 1983

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 7

10:00 - 10:50 - Overview

Edward Marasciulo, Executive Vice President,
Pan American Development Foundation (lead
consultant)

10:50 - 11:50 - Population

Dr. Loy Bilderback, California State University
at Fresno

11:50 - 12:50 - Education

Dr. Russell Davis, Littauer School, Harvard
University

1:00-2:00 Lunch Break in the State Department Cafeteria

2:00-3:00
Role of the Private Sector in Social
Development Policy

Ronald Scheman, Assistant Secretary for
Management, OAS

3:00 - 4:00 - Reflections on Aspects of U.S. Social Development Policy Toward Central America

Leveo Sanchez, Development Associates, Inc.

4:00 - 4:10 - BREAK

4:10 - 5:00 - The Peace Corps and Social Development

Ms. Loret M. Ruppe
Director, Peace Corps

SENIOR COUNSELLORS:
REP MICHAEL D. BARNES
SEN LLOYD BENTSEN
REP WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD
SEN PETE V. DOMENICI
SEN HENRY M. JACKSON
REP JACK F. KEMP
AMB JEANE KIRKPATRICK
MR WINSTON LORD
SEN CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS
MR WILLIAM D. ROGERS
REP JAMES C. WRIGHT

2201 C STREET NW, ROOM 1004, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520 TEL (202) 632-7804

SUBJECT: Social and Humanitarian Issues

BRIEFER/WITNESS: Edward Marisciulo, Lead Consultant

DATE: September 7, 1983
TIME: 9:30 - 11:00
PLACE: Rm. 1105

SUMMARY:

Mr. Marasciulo began with an historical overview on the failure of Central American unity and the memory left by William Walker. He noted that in the past 30 years, Central America has received over $12 billion in foreign aid without providing substantial improvements in the quality of life. The dominant factor negating advances in development has been the population explosion, along with widespread malnutrition. Mr. Marasciulo discussed the Central American diaspora, which has resulted from political instability, population imbalances, and natural disasters. Mr. Marasciulo also suggested that the real war is the war for social development and that the key to improvements rests less with the allocation of monetary resources and more with a will to develop and adapt to an environment of change.

Mr. Marasciulo urged adoption of strategies that overcome formal and bureaucratic restraints and provide for direct distribution of assistance. He referred to the possibility of reviving the *Servicio* concept--joint ventures by donors and recipients to engage in direct development work, generally in the infrastructure. During questioning, Mr. Marasciulo expanded on the need to approach the population issue in terms of jobs not contraception, the importance of small project funding by multilateral banks, and the need for greater use of Spanish-speaking and Hispanic Peace Corps volunteers.

-2-

NOTES:

Mr. Brady
Acting
Chairman

I am acting as chairman since Dr. Kissinger is attending Senator Jackson's funeral. I have a couple of announcements to make. The Commission will meet at 9 o'clock tomorrow to discuss the trip. The lunch at the Inter-American Development has been cancelled and will be rescheduled at a later date. Finally, I wish to introduce a resolution of condolence to the family of Senator Jackson.

The resolution was read and adopted by unanimous consent.

Amb. Shlaudeman

Announces that Msgr. Salcedo, a Colombian priest with extensive experience on teaching literacy to campesinos by radio will, make a presentation on Friday at 10:30.

Mr. Brady

Introduced the lead consultant Edward Mariscuilo and William Doherty

Mr. Marisciulo

I wish to begin with a historical perspective on Central America. The Commission should begin by looking at Central America as confederation or union of states that has been in existence since 1821. Yet, unlike the United States, independence did not lead to union. Cohesion failed to develop and there was a permanent secession among the different states. For example, Chiapas was claimed by Mexico and Chiriqui became part of Colombia. As a result, there was conflict and civil war within these small city states. Furthermore, there was no liberating action such as the Emancipation Proclamation in the United States. Some observers even tell us that a form of slavery still exists in Central America.

History tells us that conflict was the greatest in Nicaragua. There a freebooter by the name of William Walker ruled as chief of state for five years. Walker looms large in Nicaraguan history as the symbol of U.S. imperialism. Ironically, he is buried not more than a half mile from the camp where the U.S. military are training soldiers from El Salvador on Honduras' north coast.

-3-

In Central America, with the exception of Panama and Costa Rica, the level of social development is poor and the low quality of life has been a major contributing factor to an environment of political instability despite an excess of over $12 billion in bilateral, multilateral, and private external support over the past 30 years. The fact that there has not been any major success and that there are no easy solutions emphasizes the enormous dangers for those involved in trying to improve the situation -- an enourmous and difficult job for the Commission.

Historical factors aside, the dominating social factor today in the isthmus is the population explosion which has overwhelmed the capacity of both public and private entities to improve material living standards for more than 60% of the people. If present rates continue the population will reach 39 million by the year 2000 and double again by 2025. Programs of education, health, housing and community improvement have not been able to keep up with this rate of growth -- especially when about 50% of the work force is unemployed or underemployed. This is an excess of 4 to 5 million. Although the problems may be manageable, if current population trends continue they will not be so.

In 1950, there was widespread poverty in Central America. Mind you we are still talking about a largely feudal soceity. The middle class that developed in this essentially feudal-mercantilistic economy was dependent on agricultural exports to the U.S and Europe to earn the foreign exchange needed to purchase manufactured goods. Over the past thirty years, the economic base of the area has been broadened. This was begun in the 1940s with the formation of such groups as AID and ECLA. Other changes took place: rural to urban migration accelerated; capital formation, manufacturing and service industries were initiated; and the physical and institutional infrastructure to sustain development began to be put in place.

-4-

There were, however, setbacks. The 1969 border war between Honduras and El Salvador, often referred to as the first of the population wars, emphasized the problem as 4.7 million people or 580 per square mile from El Salvador tried to expand into Honduras with 3.8 million or 88 per square mile. Border problems in fact have defined much of the political history of the region. Honduras once had a president who spoke Dutch because of the 18 years that he had spent at the Hague seeking a settlement to the boundary dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua.

The results of this population situation in human terms are demonstrated by a 1982 report by the Economic Commission on Latin America entitled the "The Degree of Satisfaction of Basic Human Needs in Central America." It classified 63% of the 23 million inhabitants of the area as "poor." That is 14 million barely surviving. The inverse is that 7 million, almost the entire population of the area in 1950, who have achieved higher standards of living. This was in large part the result of programs such as the Alliance for Progress. Yet, these monumental development efforts have been negated by the cumulative effect of population increases.

Another limiting factor is the fact that 52% of the population in the region are classified by reliable nutritionist as malnourished. In practical terms, this means that the learning abilities of at least 50% of the children are seriously impaired because they have not had adequate nourishment during their developing years. Thus even if there are improvements, some may bot be able to develop. The Central American Nutrition Institute (INCAP), founded by the OAS and the UN in the 1950s, continues to play a role in improving the nutrition situation in the region.

The choices in dealing with these problems are difficult. There is the issue of scarce resources and the choice as to whether poverty or unemployment are both to be addressed simultaneously. An equally great concern is

-5-

whether the governments have the will or the
administrative and absorptive capacity to take
on the tremendous tasks involved. The recent
passage of the CBI will certainly have some
impact on job creation in the next five
years. For the moment, only Honduras and
Costa Rica will immediately benefit from the
CBI; others are not eligible because they do
not meet political or other requirements.

What is particularly disquieting is the call
that major investments in social
infrastructure, health, education, nutrition,
and the generation of labor intensive
industries for job creation all to be done
simultaneously and coupled with a growing
democratization processes, such as labor
unions development and serious political
unrest. Can it be done? Coupled with serious
capital flight and a wary private sector,
there is a need for careful thought. One must
focus on the priorities. Where do you make
your investments?

Central America is not a homogeneous region.
In Costa Rica and Panama, for example, the
social indicators are not so bad. They are
horrible for El Salvador and Guatemala. For
Honduras and Belize, there is some hope.
Nicaragua must be set apart as a special case.

These disparities provide perhaps our best key
to political solutions of social development
policies in the region. Today in El Salvador
and Guatemala there are gross disparities
between the landed richty and the landless
poor. Attempts in the last 30 years at labor
union organization, agrarian reform, and rural
leadership have met with violent opposition.
Honduras and Belize on the other hand have no
great disparities between the wealthy and the
poor. They have also come to grips with their
agrarian reform problem which is openly
debated. The labor union structure of
Honduras' northern coast is by far the most
significant force of democracy in Central
America. In other countries, one cannot
discuss agrarian reform, it is a political
taboo.

-6-

Like Mexico, Cuba and Bolivia -- Nicaragua's social reform is turing its society around in revolutionary fashion, but it has only a few of the requisites of social change. Certainly agrarian reform is at the core of its revolution. They have gained some sympathy because of this. The success of the Sandinistas with assistance from the Cubans in literacy, education and health delivery systems are controversial. There are some people who believe that there is a hope for pluralism. Certain private sector activities continue. The left-wing factions of the Sandinistas are convincing many Nicaraguans that to be poor is to be patriotic. Neither the government of El Salvador nor that of Guatemala has learned this. An important strike against them is the impression that the government does not care; that it does not wish to enter into a dialogue with the people. There is not the same feeling in Guatemala and El Salvador that the government is there to help.

It is perhaps no great revelation that there is a disaspora of sorts at play internally within Central America and from Central America to the United States and Mexico. We have seen in the past how Cuba exports people to relieve population and political pressures. Even though accurate and reliable figures are hard to come by newspaper reports provide information about 200,000 plus Central Americans (mainly Nicaraguans) now living in Costa Rica; significant numbers of Guatemalans in Southern Mexico; 20,000 Salvadorans in Belize; a half million Salvadorans in the United States. To emphasize the situation more dramatically, take newly independent Belize with a land area larger than El Salvador and only 145,000 inhabitants compared to El Salvador's 4.5 million. It has recently acquired a new refugee population which represents ten to fifteen percent of its current population in the last four years. These new Spanish speaking Belizeans are made up mainly of Salvadorans and Guatemalans.

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We must remember that accurate figures do not exist with regard to the diaspora. The diaspora is and will be a major problem in the future and must be considered in any assistance program. It should also be emphasized that these displacement are not all due to the current political turmoil. Several of the countries have been victims of natural disasters which aggravate already difficult housing and public service problems. The danger of recurring disasters in the future have both psychological and real financial costs.

We must also ask if existing government to government assistance is effective. Let me give one example of the types of problems encountered in discussing assistance programs. Institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank only reluctantly engage in studies of demography and social development. They exist primarily to fund economic development; not social development. Social development is often put to one side. It is therefore necessary to use bilateral assistance if one wishes to deal with social development. One of the main obstacles is the resistance of recepient countries to social development assistance.

It is time that we look at both new and old ideas about social development. One idea which dates back to the time of the initial Rockefeller studies on Latin America is that of *servicio*. The *servicio* concept sought to remove the government filter and the opportunity for corruption in developing assistance program. The *servicio* concept is better explained in the memorandum from Francis Gannon which is appended to the briefing materials that you have received. One such also be aware of the work of private voluntary organizations. A list provided by TAICH is also in your briefing materials. There is also a report from the Partners of the Americas. We should always be aware of the innovative work of these organizations which bypass government to government obstacles.

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I will conclude by saying that social reform is the real war. The development and management of social development and humanitarian programs is risky business. Wars and major conflicts continue to be fought over this issue of social reform between liberals and conservatives in the isthmus. Many individuals have fallen because of their support for social development. One striking example is the assassination of U.S. Ambassador John Gordon Mein in Guatemala as well as others such as Carlos Fuentes Mohr and Colom Argeta. Central America is a dangerous place if one is dealing with social development. We must ask ourselves how can one work without security. In reality no one can work under these circumstances.

I will conclude by saying that social and humanitarian development in Central America is not only a matter of dollars and cents, but also a matter of will by governments and local leaders -- both good will and bad will. If they do not want it to happen, it will not irregardless of AID or no AID.

Mr. Kirkland
I do not want to sound sectarian, but is it possible to get some idea about corporate conduct in Central America. As a kid, when I was working in the port of New Orleans, I heard stories about men who were latter day William Walkers, such as Lee Malone and Lee Christmas. While this era has passed, it may still have some relevance to the present.

Mr. Mariscuilo
There have been significant changes, although the process, at times, has been slow. The Arbenz period in Guatemala, the activities of United Fruit, and the virtual communications monopoly exercised by Tropical Radio on Swan Island are examples of the darker period in our commercial relations with Central America. This has now changed and the corporate organizations are better citizens.

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Mr. Kirkland
What is the attitude of the Mexicans to the consequences of the population explosion both in Mexico and in Central America? What has been that government's attitude to the problem. Does it seek to ship them to the U.S.?

Mr. Marisciulo
Most of the movement has been from Guatemala into Chiapas. Most are not moving to the U.S. One should also note that many in Central America fear Mexico as a kind of colossus to the North. One idea that has been around for a long time is the idea of some type of ferry linkage between Guatemala and the U.S. because of the high duties charged by the Mexicans on transhipments. Most of the immigrants into the U.S. are from Mexico's Central Plateau.

Mr. Johnson
You suggested that over $12 billion in development assistance has been given to Central America. It is appeared that much of this has filtered into the hands of officials. Even if we increase our assistance can we be sure that it will touch the lives of those who need it?

Mr. Marisciulo
Yes. It has touched the lives of those who need it. Yet, the time has come to question the overall value of government to government assistance. There must be some mechanism to limit government's role. One such means would be the revival of the *servicio* system. It is an old idea. A *servicio* is an institution with the authority to run a programs. It worked effectively, but ended with the Alliance for Progress.

Dr. Diaz-Alejandro
In these societies which are largely based on the legacy of Spanish authoritarianism, are they not unfertile ground for the democratic process? Is the Indian and Hispanic legacy an obstacle?

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Mr. Marisciulo I generally agree that it is. But let us remember that it is not all Hispanic. For example in Honduras, most of the merchant class is of Arab descent. In El Salvador, there are a large number of Sephardic Jews. Yet, the legacy of the Napoleonic Code and the Spanish rule important.

Dr. Diaz-Alejandro You have noted the desire for unity and economic integration in Central America. Why is Central American unity and integration important?

Mr. Marisciulo It is important economically. The states are really not viable alone. The Brusells meeting, is the first major consultative effort since the demise of CIOP. There is a need for consultation and coordination. There are important Central Americanista such as Carlos Castillo. In business most merchants favor integration.

Mayor Cisneros Who started the *servicio* concept?

Mr. Marisciulo It was an idea instituted by Nelson Rockefeller that began in the 1940s and lasted until the Alliance.

Mayor Cisneros In dealing with population growth one runs into a real problem. When one seeks to discuss population issues with Blacks and Hispanics, it seems to take on the dimensions of a cultural attack, some say it is even a form of genocide. How do we avoid such problems?

Mr. Marisciulo You need to look at it in terms of jobs - not IUDs or condums. The key is job creation, not population control.

Dr. Walsh Many of the witnesses before this Commission have pointed out that the core of the difficulties are social, economic and population problems. In our experience, that is with HOPE, we have had to use private