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CAUTION: This material is strictly embargoed. Its use is authorized only by subscribers of the HENRY KISSINGER column. With the exception of these paid subscribers, its contents must not under any circumstances be quoted, excerpted, summarized, paraphrased or in any way published, in whole or in part. Precautions should be taken to prevent the disclosure of the contents of this material to third parties prior to publication.

HENRY KISSINGER--INTERVIEW

For release Wednesday, November 21, 1990

(c) 1990, Los Angeles Times Syndicate

(NOTE TO EDITOR: This column is for release Wednesday, November 21, because of topicality.)

The Kissinger interview was conducted in New York by Gaetano Scardocchia, special correspondent for La Stampa.

QUESTION: May I try to summarize your attitude on the Gulf crisis in a few words? Without the capitulation of Saddam Hussein, the real choice is not between peace and war but between a war now and a war in the future, a war more destabilizing and catastrophic.

ANSWER: I wouldn't put it in terms of capitulation of Iraq, but I would say that any settlement must keep in mind not only the immediate issue but the balance of power in the Gulf after the United States leaves. And if Iraq remains in a militarily predominant position, then indeed there will be a war later, either between Arabs or between Arabs and Israel, or both.

Q: With the decision to almost double the military force in the Gulf, President Bush wanted to scare Saddam Hussein by saying we mean business, but the first effect has been a more scared American public opinion. Domestic support is weakening.

A: The basic problem has been from the beginning to relate strength to time. At the very beginning we were relatively weak, but we had lots of time. As we build up our strength, we also lose support, because time goes by; one of the big decisions to be made is to pick the optimum mode in which strength and available time combine to produce the best negotiating positions, or, if that fails, the best military positions. And I am not sure that all of our military people understand the psychological element.

Q: Why did the President suddenly make a decision of such an increase in forces?

A: I can only speak as an outsider. My impression is that our military leadership, analyzing the issue in strictly military terms, has stated the force requirements that we have now seen publicly. They generate the force requirements by taking the worst case scenario, and so they treat the Iraqi army as if it were the German army at the height of its power, and they want to allow for everything that could conceivably go wrong.

Yet I can see what tempts a military commander into that direction, because if anything goes wrong, as it often does in war, they want to have the greatest degree of reassurance. The decision the President has to make is how much weight to give to the political, psychological, diplomatic factors to avoid being driven by purely technical considerations.

Q: The choices seem to be only to capitulation by Hussein or

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war. Is there a third option?

A: The only effective diplomatic way out is one that changes the situation. We have to summarize what Saddam Hussein has done. He didn't just occupy Kuwait. He is changing the character of the whole country, expelling people, looting the entire infrastructure, moving in new people, so that with every passing month he is creating a fait accompli which makes the whole diplomatic effort partly irrelevant. On top of it, he has undertaken an absolutely unprecedented use of hostages in taking thousands of them and keeping them near military targets. Now if a man who has shown such ruthlessness emerges from this crisis with a strong military position, then we have lost, and we ought to be honest about this. Every diplomatic proposal that I have seen so far is in fact a defeat for the United Nations position; they would give him something and penalize him not at all. Every prominent outside visitor is a psychological success for him. Every time a leading outside figure calls for diplomacy without asking anything of Iraq, it is a success for Iraq.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, from your words I arrived at the conclusion that war is inevitable there.

A: No. Defeat is also possible. A diplomatic solution is also possible. If I had to predict what will happen, I would say there is a good chance of an unsatisfactory diplomatic solution in a face-saving way.

Q: It seems to me that President Bush has not prepared this country enough for a war.

A: Within the government there are different opinions, and those who are opposed to the military option always ask for more time for diplomacy, and those who favor the military option ask for time to build up forces, and the combination means the time for decision never arrives. And since the President has not been obliged to make the decision, he cannot very well prepare the American public for something that his advisers tell him doesn't have to be decided yet.

Q: But it will come in January because there are certain deadlines, the weather, the spring ...

A: Unless people know that a deadline of a sort comes in January, there will be a peace proposal from somewhere, which I expect ... maybe from Saddam Hussein, maybe from the Soviets. I firmly expect a diplomatic phase.

Q: What will happen when the U.S. proposes to the Security Council a resolution authorizing the use of military force in the Gulf?

A: Well, I would be astonished if we could get a resolution without any qualifications. There will be a debate. There will be two kinds of proposals: first, qualifications of the kind of force that can be used -- some sort of limitations. Second, there will almost certainly be a proposal that before one decides, there should be a peace mission.

I don't think there'll be a clean resolution (authorizing force).

Q: Were you disappointed by the Europeans? Did you see any change in their behavior that can anticipate a stronger and more politically united Europe?

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A: What confuses the issue is that the United States committed itself so completely and so quickly that the Europeans could take a free ride -- they didn't need to make a big commitment. If we had said we will match any force you put in but no more, then one would have seen whether there could be a greater European effort. But in the present circumstances with Europe being divided as it is, it was correct of President Bush to take the heavier load. However, it will not be possible as a permanent feature, and therefore as Europe organizes itself it must assume greater responsibilities for the Middle East. By the end of the decade, the roles will be reversed. Europe must take the principal role, and America must be in a supporting position.

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HENRY KISSINGER--INTERVIEW

WED.

21

For release Sunday, November 26, 1990

QUESTION: May I try to summarize your attitude on the Gulf crisis in a few words. Without the capitulation of Saddam Hussein the real choice is not between peace and war but between a war now and a war in the future, a war more destabilizing and catastrophic.

ANSWER: I wouldn't put it in terms of capitulation of Iraq but I would say that any settlement must keep in mind not only the immediate issue but the balance of power in the Gulf after the United States leaves. And if Iraq remains in a militarily predominant position, then indeed there will be a war later,

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Q. With the decision to almost double the military force in the Gulf President Bush wanted to scare Saddam Hussein by saying we mean business, but the first effect has been a more scared American public opinion. Domestic support is weakening.

K. The basic problem has been from the beginning to relate strength to time. At the very beginning we were relatively weak but we had lots of time. As we built up our strength, we also lose support, because time goes by; one of the big decisions to be made is to pick the optimum mode in which strength and available time combine to produce the best negotiating positions, or, if that fails, the best military positions. And I am not sure that all of our military people understand the psychological element.

Q. Why did the President suddenly make a decision of such an increase in forces?

K. I can only speak as an outsider. My impression is that our military leadership, analyzing the issue in strictly military terms, has stated the force requirements that we have now seen publicly. They generate the force requirements by taking the worst case scenario, and so they treat the Iraqi army as if it were the German army at the height of its power, and they want to allow for everything that could conceivably go wrong.

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Q. The choices seem to be only to capitulation by Hussein or war. Is there a third option?

K. The only effective diplomatic way out it is one that changes the situation. We have to summarize what Saddam Hussein has done. He didn't just occupy Kuwait. He is changing the character of the whole country, expelling people, looting the entire infrastructure, moving in new people, so that with every passing month he is creating a fait accompli which makes the whole diplomatic effort partly irrelevant. On top of it, he has undertaken an absolutely unprecedented use of hostages in taking thousands of them and keeping them near military targets. Now if a man who has shown such ruthlessness emerges from this crisis with a strong military position, then we have lost, and we ought to be honest about this. Every diplomatic proposal that I have seen so far is in fact a defeat for the United Nations position; they would give him something and penalize him not at all. Every prominent outside visitor is a psychological success for him. Every time a leading outside figure calls for diplomacy without asking anything of Iraq, it is a success for Iraq.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, from your words I arrived at the
conclusion that war is inevitable there.

K. No. Defeat is also possible. A diplomatic solution is

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also possible.

Q. It seems to me that President Bush has not prepared enough this country for a war. K. President Bush's principal experience has been in managing government rather than in managing public opinion. Secondly, I think that W. within the government there are different opinions, and those who are opposed to the military option always ask for more time for diplomacy, and those who favor the military option ask for time to build up forces, and the combination means the time for decision never arrives. And since the President has not been obliged to make the decision he cannot very well prepare the American public for something that his advisers tell him doesn't have to be decided yet.

Q. But it will come in January because there are certain deadlines, the weather, the spring ...

K. Unless people know that a deadline of a sort comes in January, there will be a peace proposal from somewhere, which I expect... Maybe from Saddam Hussein, maybe from the Soviets. I firmly expect a diplomatic phase.

Q. What will happen when the U.S. proposes to the Security Council a resolution authorizing the use of military force in the Gulf?

K. Well I would be astonished if we could get a resolution

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I don't think there'll be a clean resolution (authorizing force.)

Q. Were you disappointed by the Europeans? Did you see any change in their behavior that can anticipate a stronger and more politically united Europe?

K. I think What confuses the issue is that the United States committed itself so completely and so quickly that the Europeans could take a free ride -- they didn't need to make a big commitment. If we had said we will match any force you put in but no more, then one would have seen whether there could be a greater European effort. But I think in the present circumstances with Europe being divided as it is, it was correct of President Bush to take the heavier load. However it will not be possible as a permanent feature and therefore as Europe organizes itself it must assume greater responsibilities for the Middle East. By the end of the decade I think the roles will be reversed. Europe must take the principal role and America must be in a supporting position.

end it