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and not try to kill individual hornets over a forty acre lot. He said he was
willing to risk the loss of half our Navy if there was a commensurate gain.

We discussed the question of capital ships. I told him our minds diverged on this subject. He admitted it, but, after I had made an argument in favor of capital ships, he refused to discuss it further, declaring that no matter whether I was right or he was right, it was impracticable to make an arrangement with Great Britain at this time looking to our securing some of her capital battleships after the war in consideration of our abandoning our ship-building program of capital ships in order to build submarine destroyers. He thought the only thing that could be binding on Great Britain would be a treaty, and a treaty must necessarily go to the Senate for confirmation. He did not believe this country was prepared for a treaty of that sort with Great Britain. Anything less than a treaty, he thought footless because the present Administration might change and the British Government might change, and what would a verbal agreement amount to under new administrations. I argued that an arrangement could be made which would meet the approval of our people. He, in turn, said if the British Government wanted to do this after the war, they would do it anyway, and if they did not want to do it, we had no means of making them short of a treaty.

I disagree entirely with this conclusion. He has not accepted their offer, therefore Great Britain will be in no way bound to give us her battleships in the event we need them. The truth of it is, they do not believe in capital battleships; therefore, he is not interested in working out a plan by which they might be secured. In this I think he is making a mistake. I cannot see how he can think otherwise than that they are necessary to the maintenance of the supremacy at sea. The fact that they are now bottled up

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in barbours seems to impress him greatly, although I pointed out that they
could come forth whenever they pleased by throwing a proper screen around them-
selves, and that they could destroy an enemy's fleet if inferior, and leave
themselves in command of the seas.

We talked a good deal about the Chief of Staff and the Naval Board, and
an infinite number of minor matters.

During the afternoon we were discussing Lincoln. We agreed that Washington would continue in history the greater man. I repeated what Sedgwick said when he lunched with me Saturday, i.e. that a Massachusetts historian had made the statement that Lincoln would never have been great by his deeds, but it was what he had written that had impressed the world and had given an in-otherwise sight into his mind that would never have been unfolded. The President did not agree with this. He thought Lincoln's deeds entitled him to greatness as well as what he wrote. He thought that his environment was, to a certain extent, limited and that by lack of wider education he did not have the outlook he might otherwise have had. Yet he thought his judgment would have been equal to any situation that might have confronted him.

September 10, 1917.

I called for the President at half past nine and motored with him and
Mrs. Wilson to the Essex County Club where I turned them over to Mona, Randolph
and Hugh and Mrs. Wallace. I returned home to do some necessary work.

The President and Mrs. Wilson lunched with us at half past one o'clock.
There was no one present besides ourselves excepting Mona and Randolph. After
lunch the President and I went to my study where we talked for an hour. The
main discussion was of peace terms and the collating of data necessary for in-
telligent dealing with the subject. I showed him Felix Frankfurter's brief
suggesting what he considered necessary information for dealing with a single

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country, and taking Germany as an example. The President thought as I did
that it was absurd to prepare such comprehensive data. He declared that if
anyone started such a metaphysical and historical discussion that he could easily
him
brush it aside and bring it down to the real business of peace making.

I called his attention to the necessity of not broaching this subject
when he took up with Lansing the matter of their differences. I thought he
should bring up the question of my directing the peace conference work imme-
diately, and leave the personal questions relating to Lansing until later. I
had two reasons for this. One was that it would give me more time to try and
straighten out Lansing through Frank Polk and Gordon, or through Lansing direct-
ly.

I told the President I was afraid he was making a mistake in contemplat-
ing a change, and I hoped he would first have a frank talk with Lansing and in-
sist upon his leaving statements to the press, either to his press representa-
tive or to Polk. The President agreed to do this, but thought it might cause
Lansing to tender his resignation. If this should happen, I thought it would
be better to have it come that way rather than to ask for it. I have in mind
getting Polk to prime Lansing and get him in a frame of mind to accept the
President's rebuke kindly.

I told the President that I trusted Polk's discretion thoroughly
and what I had in mind to do. I make it a rule never to keep anything back
from the President. He knows the whole story as far as I am concerned. In
this connection, I told him of Dudley's recent indiscretion in his talk with
Monsignor Dunn and the message sent to the Papal Delegate. In talking of
this, we agreed that Dudley was not himself or he would not have made such a
blunder. The President wondered if it would "involve us" in any way. I
thought not, and stated why.

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In discussing Dudley, he seemed to feel keenly the action he took on the suffrage question, and declared that Dudley was one of the last men he would have suspected of disloyalty to him. I excused Dudley by saying he was not himself-- an excuse which he seemed ready to accept.

I showed him President Eliot's proposal for a conference of the belligerents. He had not seen it. I am sometimes startled by the President's lack of information concerning current happenings. He looked over Eliot's statement casually, criticised it severely, and put it down remarking that it was "nothing better than the mewlings of an old man". He is mistaken in this, and if he had read it carefully he would not have had this opinion, although he would not have agreed with Eliot.

He said he was growing tired of Jusserand's excitable impertinence and wondered whether we could not have him recalled in a way not to hurt French sensibilities. What angered him was Jusserand's criticism of his reply to the Pope-- a criticism which came to him almost immediately after Jusserand made it.

Once or twice during the conversation I threw the President off his line of thought by interpolations, and he found it difficult to return to his subject. He smiled plaintively and said: "You see I am getting tired. This is the way it indicates itself". I noticed later, too, that he had forgotten that the Swiss Legation was representing the German Government at Washington. He had forgotten what government had taken over their interests. I am glad he is taking this rest"for faith, he needs it." No man has ever had deeper or graver responsibilities, and no one has met them with more patience, courage and wisdom.

When we went back on the veranda, we found a large gathering of newspaper men and photographers on the lawn, and one of the secret service men asked

permission for them to come and see the President. They asked no questions but he and I, at their request, were photographed together. The President, Mrs. Wilson and I motored the entire afternoon. I left them at their landing at six o'clock and returned home to attend to some pressing work. Mona, Ran and I dined with them on the Mayflower. The evening was entirely social and so was the ride.

We tried to keep him in as merry a mood as possible. He seemed to thoroughly enjoy his visit, and it was arranged that I should come to Washington either next week or the beginning of the week following for further discussion.

During lunch the President spoke of his nervousness when speaking in public. I had thought that he was entirely free from it, and yet he said if he had to walk across a crowded stage, with an audience in front of him, he always wondered whether he would drop before he reached the speakers stand.

While driving, he described himself as "a democrat like Jefferson, with aristocratic tastes". Intellectually, he said, he was entirely democratic, which in his opinion was unfortunate for the reason that his mind led him where his taste rebelled.

I sent today the following cable to Lord Robert Cecil:

"The President has been here with me for two days and I used this occasion to ask him concerning your inquiry regarding the Zionist Movement. In his opinion, the time is not opportune for any definite statement further perhaps than one of sympathy, provided it can be made without conveying any real commitment. Things are in such a state of flux at the moment that he does not consider it advisable to go further. I am glad Wiseman has proved so serviceable and has justified my confidence in him".

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September 11, 1917.

Captain Stedman Hands of the Air Service came to tell of the progress they are
making. He is enthusiastic over the new liberty motor. Bullitt and Colcord
also called and some others.

September 12, 1917.

Alfred Millard, son of my old college friend, took lunch with us. Archibald
Coolidge came by appointment in the afternoon to be looked over for a possible
assignment in the work proposed for the peace conference. I was very frank
with him and while I may use him in this way, I may think it better to use him
in the capacity I first considered.

telephone

I have had long talks with Gordon, Sir William Wiseman, who has just land-
ed, and David Miller. Miller says that Wiseman told him that my influence
with the British Government was paramount. That whatever I advised was followed
without question. Wiseman is to be in Magnolia tomorrow to report on his trip.
He has some more information concerning the German Charges in Argentine. He
was disappointed at the way the State Department handled the information given
them. This was done contrary to my advice. I counselled waiting until
Wiseman returned so as to have the proof and any additional data he might bring.

Yesterday I had nearly an hour's talk over the telephone with Frank Polk.
I went into every detail of the President's conversation with me concerning
Lansing, suggesting means by which his objection to the Secretary might be
overcome, and the situation composed. Lansing is not well and his memory is
not good, and I can understand the President's irritation. At the same time, I
doubt whether he could better himself by making a change. I should certainly
regret to see him go. He has been fine in many ways, and he is so lacking in
ability to take care of himself, that I have a sympathy for him. He has tried

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conscientiously to do his duty.

The New York Sun says today:

"Colonel House personally knows more about camouflage than all the Allied Governments will ever know." This has a certain humor and yet is not altogether pleasing. I wish they would rid themselves of the belief that I work so mysteriously. There is nothing mysterious about it, it is simply that I do not talk on every occasion which presents itself.

September 13, 1917.

We are busy getting ready to leave in the early morning. Sir William arrived this afternoon and is to go down with me to New York. I shall not pick up the thread of my diary until I reach New York on Monday of next week.

Frank Polk telephones that he has seen Lansing and delicately hinted at the trouble. He also informed Lansing what the President had in mind for me to do in gathering data for the peace conference.

Lansing, as usual, was generous and said he was delighted to undertake the task; that his only regret was that I was not constantly at his side. Polk told him I had said I would not accept a place on the peace commission. He also told him that I had asked whether he, Lansing, had any feeling on account of my activities in the State Department. Polk told him that he has assured me that he, Lansing, had not the slightest feeling upon the subject.

Wiseman has just arrived and I have had only a few minutes talk with him. He opened the conversation by saying: "you have no conception of the influence you have with the British Government. There are only three nations to be considered in this war, Prussia, Great Britain and the United States, and the strings are all being pulled at Magnolia."

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September 14, 1917.

Wiseman brought messages from nearly all the important British leaders, and letters from Lloyd George, Grey, Lord Robert Cecil and Sir Eric Drummond.

In the hurry of departure, I have not had time to go into matters in detail, but he is apparently much impressed with the potency of my influence in Great Britain. He assures me in various terms that it is paramount. Wiseman is to motor with me to Plymouth where we are to spend the night at Chiltern Hall, Sherman Whipple's country home.

I have had a delightful and profitable summer. I have never, I believe, done better work, and the visitors who have come to Magnolia indicate the importance of the conferences.

Louise has added more joy to the summer than anything else. The President was enthusiastic over her childish beauty and charm.

New York, September 16, '17.

Sir William and I had a most interesting conversation on our motor trip to Plymouth and from there to New London, where we took the train for New York.

His Government took my estimate of him and each in turn gave him their confidential views. He says his Government think we are peculiar to pick him out as the medium for our most confidential negotiations, but if we are satisfied, they are. The fact that we do this indicates the character of representatives the British have in the United States. Of course, Wiseman, even with his ability, would not be so essential if the British Foreign Office had used good judgment.

The most startling thing Sir William told was that Lloyd George invited him and Lord Reading down to his country place, Walton Heath, and told them in the strictest confidence what he had in mind to do. He had not even

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yet communicated this to the War Cabinet.

The war on the western front, in his opinion, bids fair to be a stalemate
despite the fact that the military leaders continue to assert they will even-
tually obtain a decision there. George said they first asked for more muni-
tions. When these were supplied, it was the weather that prevented, and then
it was the Russian collapse. He believes that another way out must be found
and he has in mind the smashing of Turkey, or the smashing of Austria through
the Italian front.

There is to be an Allied Conference in October or the first of November
and Lloyd George wishes the President to send a representative, preferably me--
to take part in it and to father the idea as to Turkey and Austria. He ex-
plained that he could not do this himself without risking his influence at
home and in the Allied countries, but the United States could do it with im-
punity. That if the proposal was made by us and insisted upon, that he, George,
would yield to our arguments and help force the other Allies into line.

Wiseman was instructed to bring this word to me, and Reading was in-
structed to take it to the President. No one else was to know of it. Reading
was also directed to ask the President to name me as the representative from
the United States, because "they trusted me and had no secrets from me". I
hope it can be arranged for someone else to go for I do not desire to work in
even a semi-official capacity.

I tried to impress Sir William with the idea that it was of more
importance to have Russia become a virile democracy than it was to beat Ger-
many to her knees. He is to send my views to his Government. He thought his
people were beginning to look upon Russia as a hopeless problem. It may be
that she is, but I am not yet willing to give her up.

I thought if conditions became worse in Russia, the conservative ele-

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ment would welcome German intervention in order to COME out of the situation.
The people generally would soon realize order, even if it were German order,
rather than what they seem to be drifting into. I outlined with considerable
detail what I thought could be done to help compose Russia. One thing which is
lacking is an agreement among the Allies as to policy.

Wiseman is to cable his Government that their present proposal to attack Germany from the south was what I suggested to them nearly two and a half years ago. Lloyd George told Wiseman that he thought it necessary for the German military oligarchy to have some symbol of defeat before it would be safe to undertake peace making. Here, again, I interposed to say, that after the Battle of the Marne they had this symbol of defeat, and that I tried to get the Entente to consent to open peace negotiations at that time.

Germany had counted up the men and economic power of the Entente and had felt that she would be beaten in a further trial of strength. She did not realize, as indeed the Allies did not realize themselves, that Germany was not overmatched, because the Allied strength was separated, largely disorganized, and could not be altogether coordinated. On the other hand, Germany had her 120 millions of people in a compact body and organized for war down to the last button. If we had been permitted to open negotiations at that time, we could have forced Germany to have done what we felt was necessary. If she had refused, the President would have been willing to throw the strength of the United States against her. The result of these negotiations would probably have meant peace, and they would probably have meant the overthrow of the present German Government, perhaps, the Dynasty itself.

History, I hope, will censure the Entente Governments for refusing to
listen to our proposal for peace at that propitious time.

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Wiseman said he met some people who thought Lloyd George is striving for
in England
a republic with himself as in the chief role. In Wiseman's and Milner's pres-
ence, a discussion was started concerning the powers of the President of the
United States, which they assumed was practically that of a dictator when our
country was at war. Milner said: "As a matter of fact you (meaning Lloyd George)
are practically Great Britain's dictator". Something was then said of the
King. Lloyd George replied: "He does not count. We cut off the head of one
king for interfering." Wiseman said if George had not been Prime Minister, he
would have resented this remark by leaving the room conference.

He says the English realize that the war has reduced itself to a contest
between Prussia, on the one hand, and Great Britain and the United States on
the other. We discussed the tragedy of having a reactionary Cabinet in
England at this period of the war. Curzon and Carson can hardly be matched
in that direction, while Bonar Law and Lloyd George are anything but progres-
sive at the moment. It is a pity that a man like Grey is not in supreme com-
mand. The entire British Government is honey-combed with reactionaries.

Sär William said the Government had decided to accept my advice given in
a recent cable. Following my suggestion, they had already sent Reading, and
are recalling Spring-Rice just as soon as they can find someone to take his
place. The post at Washington is considered the great prize at this time, and
there is keen opposition to Grey because of his relations with Asquith and the
too much of
old Government. They also consider Grey a pacifist. Still they will send
him if it can be brought about. Each faction desires its own particular man.
It may result in their keeping Lord Reading here.

Today I lunched with the President on board the Mayflower. We had
a talk before lunch. I told him of Wiseman's report and of Lloyd George's
desire that a representative from the United States be sent to the Inter-Allied

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Conference, and of his desire that I should come. I indicated a willingness
to go in the event the President wished me to do so. Mrs. Wilson, who was
present during that part of the conversation, hoped I would remain in the United
States because of the important work I was doing, and also because of the danger
of crossing.

The President thought he could not go much further toward meeting Lloyd
George's wishes than to express a feeling that something different should be
done in the conduct of the war than had been done, and to say that the American
people would not be willing to continue an indefinite trench warfare. He
thought it would be inadvisable to commit himself further, and to this I agreed.

The difficulty is, Lloyd George's methods and purposes are not always
of the highest. It is unfortunate not to have a government there composed of
such men as Grey, Balfour and Cecil. International dealing is easy when
such men are in command. It is not pleasant when one is unable to receive
statements of policy at their face value.

I left the Mayflower with the President at three o'clock, but came
directly home instead of going with him to the Pennsylvania Station. I saw
Wiseman in the late afternoon and we discussed plans for the immediate future.
We have the greatest difficulty in keeping the Ambassador, Reading and North-
cliffe on amicable terms.

September 17, 1917.

T. P. O'Connor was my most interesting visitor. He came to consult me
as to the advisability of asking the President to help his faction in Ireland.
I convinced him this was impossible.

Wiseman and I are amused at the compliments paid the State Department
and our Intelligence Bureau for the recent German exposé. Even the English
papers are praising us. Admiral Hall of the British Admiralty is responsible

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for what we have gotten as, indeed, he was for catching and decyphering the Zimmermann note. No one has done better work than Hall. Wiseman cabled him the President's appreciation, and also mine. Admiral Hall was especially desirous that we should know that he had caught and unravelled these German despatches.

September 18, 1917.

Roland S. Morris took lunch with us. We had an exhaustive talk about the Japanese and the Far Eastern question. I talked to him very much along the lines of my letter to the President last August. He had just seen Roosevelt and he tells me that Roosevelt's views and mine are almost identical. I shall write the President tomorrow or next day and ask him to see Morris before he sails next Tuesday. I am doing what I can to settle this Chinese-Japanese problem, for unless it is properly settled, the future will be full of difficulties and dangers.

R. W. Woolley was one of my callers. Lord Northcliffe came by appointment to bring Premier Holman of New South Wales. Holman remained only a few minutes, and then went away, but left a message to express the hope that the United States would be good enough to permit the Australian ships now being built on our ways, to go to their home ports when finished. Northcliffe says that Holman is one of the greatest English speaking orators. He impressed me favorably.

Northcliffe remained for nearly an hour telling how impossible Spring-Rice was and how fearful he was that the Ambassador would create trouble between our two countries. He said the Ambassador warned him against Hurley of the Shipping Board, declaring that he was an Irishman and to be careful. He also said the Duke of Devonshire had told him that the Ambassador had warned the Duke of Connaught that the United States had designs against Canada. Spring-Rice told someone in Washington the other day that the President felt he had

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been dragged into the war by England. I calmed Northcliffe by telling him
that as long as we had no secrets from one another, throuble could not be en-
gendered.

I should like to see some of the despatches Northcliffe is sending back
home about the Ambassador and vice versa.

Northcliffe expressed a belief that the United States as a whole was an-
tagonistic to England. I tried to contradict this. Much to my surprise he
said: "Your suggestion that the British Government should obtain the money
through the French Government for the payment of the Morgan loan indicates
this prejudice, and I so cabled my Government, asking them to be careful."
It took me some minutes to make him understand that the objection was made
wholly because of the loan being held by Morgan & Company, and the impossibil-
ity of McAdoo paying them with Government funds. I asked him to correct the
impression he had given.

He was amused with something Wiseman had told us. Bonar Law had pre-
pared some cables to send McAdoo on the financial question. They were pretty
stiff in tone, particularly since Great Britain was the borrower. Bonar Law
thought they were excellent messages to send. Sir William told him that just
such communications to America caused the Boston Tea Party, and that if he de-
sired another, to send them as written. Law saw the point and changed the
tone.

September 19, 1917.

Bernard Ridder called this morning to talk over his plans to get the
German-Americans back of the President's answer to the Pope.

Jameson, of the National Democratic Committee, came to go over
Party matters. W. R. Miller, our Consul General at Seoul, Korea, called to
be looked over as a possible instrument to use in securing data upon the Far

East for the peace conference. He was recommended by Roland Morris.

Carl Ackerman called to get an opinion as to whether he should go to South America to represent the Saturday Evening Post, or whether he should go to Europe. I advised Europe.

September 20, 1917.

Mr. Keely, of the Chicago Herald, called to interest me if possible in some settlement of the print paper problem. He believes if the Attorney General would not press the criminal suit against them, he could get them to consent to cut the price of paper to a point where it would mean a saving of millions of dollars to the newspapers. His idea, as I understand it, is that the Attorney General should merely postpone action, leaving the sword of Damocles hanging over their heads. He saw the Attorney General some three weeks ago, and while Gregory did not give him any assurance, he intimated that if the paper trust would give positive evidence of reformation, he might consider the matter. I advised Keely to see what he could do with the paper trust before taking the matter up again with the Attorney General. I thought the Attorney General had gone as far as he could.

There has been a great to-do in Washington over the failure of the British Embassy and the State Department to make an early engagement for Lord Reading to call on the President. The fault lies partly with the State Department and partly with Spring-Rice. Reading is furious and got Wiseman, who was in Washington yesterday, to ask my good offices. I telephoned Frank Polk and the matter was straighted out in short order, in fact, it was in process before I telephoned.

Some of the labor leaders have been after me today to use my good offices in behalf of Thos. J. Mooney, of San Francisco who is under death sentence.

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Mezes came in the morning to talk about the proposed organization for the peace conference. I asked him to be one of a group of three, which I shall have immediately around me to direct the work. My letter to the President will indicate my thought in the matter. I have in mind Walter Lippmann for another member.

The President's letter on this subject, and my letters to him and to Lansing are parts of the record. I feel that this work is most important, for its ramifications for good or evil may be widespread.

September 21, 1917.

Herbert Croly and Wiseman were visitors. Sir William brought me a framed photograph of King George which the King had asked him to present to me. He also brought me photographs of Lord Robert Cecil and Sir Eric Dummond which they had kindly sent.

He gave me several memoranda and cables which had come in. He said that most of Reading's and Northcliffe's cables of a confidential nature are sent through him. Neither of them care to trust the Embassy or Consulate with them. Northcliffe's are verbose and take one or two extra men to code, but Sir William feels it is worth while in order to retain all the threads in his hands.

September 22, 1917.

Today has been interesting. Wiseman brought a letter from Lord Reading telling him of his interview with the President, and expressing satisfaction with what the President had said. Reading gave me the credit of arranging the interview so promptly, which I did not deserve, and also for the cordial manner in which he was received, which, perhaps, I did deserve. He wishes to see me at once, and Sir William telephoned him if he would take the 12.30 today I would see him upon the arrival of his train. Northcliffe is also coming to

New York on that train. No one excepting Reading, Wiseman, the President and myself really know what Reading's mission to this country is.

Walter Lippman was with me for an hour. He was pleased at the tentative choice of him to help in the peace conference work. I outlined the plan and he was a sympathetic listener.

General H. P. Davison of the Red Cross and Mr. Hutchins of the National Bank of Commerce, who is recently from Russia, spent an hour telling of conditions there, and what was being done to better them. Hutchins believes that Ambassador Francis has taken unto himself a German spy-- a woman by the name of Madame de Cram. He told of what Thompson of the Red Cross and others were trying to do by way of helping Kerensky meet German propaganda. He asked me to see the financially Swedish Commissioner Launbaum (?), whom he considers the most important man in Sweden. I am to let him know whether I think it advisable to see him.

Justice Brandeis telephoned from Washington asking for an appointment tomorrow. And this reminds me that Brandeis is carrying on a correspondence by cable with the English Jews on the subject of the Zionist Movement. All these cables come through Wiseman, though Brandeis does not know it. He believes they come through Willert of the London Times.

I have not covered half the happenings or conversations of the past week or ten days, for it has been impossible to find time to do so. Enough has happened to fill a book.

Paderewski asked for an appointment to pick up the threads of Polish problems. They are seeking to establish a provisional government in Poland which they desire this country to recognize. Paderewski is so extravagant in his gratitude and praise of me that I am always embarrassed. If he were less naive and childlike I would be suspicious of him. He speaks of me as having been sent by

God to deliver Poland, and he sees my hand, so he says, everywhere and always
helping Poland. He attributes the British conversion to the Polish cause to me.
There is some truth in this last, and more in the credit he gives me for what the
President has said in behalf of Poland. But his imagination takes its wildest
flight, when he claims that I am the only man since Napoleon the First who has un-
derstood the importance of a reconstructed Poland to the peace of Europe. His
statements leave me dumb with confusion.

Lord Reading followed Paderewski. Strangely enough, the larger part
of his time was taken up by a discussion of his troubles with Sir Cecil Spring-
Rice and proposed remedies. He told of his interview with the President, which
amounted to nothing further than the statement (such as Wiseman made to me) from
the Prime Minister, and handing the President certain papers, duplicates of which
I have. Reading feels he is in a precarious situation with Spring-Rice working
against him at every turn, and in a perfectly unbalanced way. We agreed it was
best for him to ask his Government to recall Spring-Rice, giving as the reason
Lord Reading's presence here and the consequent possibility of a vacation for
the Ambassador, and also the desire of the Government to confer upon him certain
honors because of the United States entrance into the war on the side of the Al-
lies.

I spoke to Reading of the narrow escape the Allies had in keeping back their
true condition from us. We went in barely in time to save them. This, I thought,
was because they had not trusted us. I recalled to him that I urged them a year
when
and a half ago to let us know their condition became serious. He also recalled
that I had tried to get them to allow us to intervene for peace, promising to side
with the Allies in the event Germany would not consent to reasonable terms. Read-
ing condoned their action, or lack of action, by saying that they had been totally
misinformed as to conditions here. That while I had told them the truth, every-

one else was giving a distorted view, particularly as to the President's mind, and they feared to act. This comes again to Spring-Rice's door, for he has been the backbone of misinformation. Page has been an able second. Both of them took their views from enemies of the President and I think became unconscious enemies of their two countries.

Reading is to write a dispatch to his Government on the question of re-
calling Spring-Rice, and is to submit it to me for approval. We agreed that he,
Reading, is to remain here as long as it was possible for him to do so consistent
with his position as Lord Chief Justice, and that then they should send Grey,
Cecil or Asquith, preferably in the order named. Asquith, he thought, would be
an admirable selection were it not for Mrs. Asquith, good woman as she is. There
was danger that her caustic tongue would set Washington by the ears before she
had been there a month. Cecil, he considered the best of the Tories, even
through he was a narrow churchman.

September 23, 1917.

I made arrangement to go to Garrisons today to see Louise and although
I have had Baruch, Justice Brandeis and others try to break in, I determined
they must wait on this visit. Baruch I agreed to see provided he came at 8.30
in the morning and motored with me as far up the road as he desired. He went
to Tarrytown and beyond. He is a curious mixture of patriotism and egotism. He
wishes to serve, and is willing to serve under any condition, but his admiration
for Baruch and his methods are wonderful to contemplate. He is a Trustee of
City College and I told him of my plans for Mezes. He thought there would be
no difficulty in getting him an extended leave of absence, but, curiously enough,
he offered his own services in connection with the work we contemplate, and re-
commended himself as being perhaps the most suitable person living to give a
comprehensive view of world trade.

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I have known Judge Robert S. Lovett for years and have always considered him a man without ambition and without pride of position. Baruch tells me Lovett refused to serve on the Purchasing Board under him, Baruch, or anyone else. In other words, if he were not to be chairman, there must be no chairman, and that is the condition at present. It hampers the work, but it came to a question of either doing it in that way or of losing the Judge's services.

I took lunch at Garrison with Mrs. Edgar Auchincloss, and spent the morning with baby Louise. I told her that the bunch of daisies she gave Mrs. Wilson on Sunday at Magnolia were still fresh on Sunday the 16th when I lunched with the Wilsons on the Mayflower, and Mrs. Wilson wore them on her trip to Washington.

I returned to New York by six o'clock in order to keep an engagement with Justice Brandeis and Rabbi Wise. They came to talk of the Zionist Movement. They had received a cable from Weitzman of London outlining in two paragraphs the views of the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister, which they, the F. O. and P. M., were endeavoring to get the War Council to accept. The views outlined were practically identical with the suggestion I cabled Cecil after discussing the matter with the President at Magnolia. I dictated a cable for them to send Weitzman. Copies of both of these documents are attached.

I cautioned against pressing the President for any public statement. I suggested they bring the French, Italian and Russian Governments to the attitude of Great Britain and the United States as was possible and then leave the matter there. I confessed that the President was willing to go further than I thought advisable, and that I had warned him against a more definite statement than the one I cabled to Cecil.

When this discussion was over, Rabbi Wise left, but Brandeis and I took up the question of appointments on the Interstate Commerce Commission;

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our future relations with South America and several other matters. Brandeis thinks Germany will try to penetrate South America with her civilization, and that we should meet it at every point and try to off-set it. He thought if Germany was successful, sometime in the dim future, another conflict would occur and perhaps on this Continent.

September 24, 1917.

Herman Bernstein, who is just back from Russia, was the most interesting caller. He was rather optimistic. Being a Russian by birth himself, he was able to get information ordinarily denied Americans.

Baruch called again to finish the story of his activities on the War Purchasing Board. I desired information as to large ordnance for both the Army and Navy, but could not pin him down further than that the Spring would find us short, and we would not for almost a year from now have our output what it should be. Rifles and machine guns he thought would be ready in quantities by spring. He is disappointed that he was not made sole director of purchases, for he continues to harp on the inefficiency of Judge Lovett and Brookings.

September 25, 1917.

The President's letter and my reply are attached. I am glad he approves of Mezes. I shall now begin actively to organize our bureau for gathering information for the peace conference.

Samuel Strauss of "The Villager" came to ask certain leading questions regarding policies and conditions.

Mezes called to talk about the organization of the peace conference work. Captain Arthur Little came to report on his work in the Army. Colcord, Wiseman Kohlsaat and a number of others called. Kohlsaat came to thank me for having

helped him in the consolidation of his Western Newspaper Union organization. He
is to furnish plate to 14000 newspapers and states the organization is entirely
at my command. He is to return in a day or two to outline a policy of pro-
cedure.

T. W. Gregory and Major General Edwards came in on the 6.10 from Boston.
I met their train and brought them to the apartment. I saw Edwards first. He
expressed deep appreciation for what I had done for him at Washington. However,
he desires to be raised in number, claiming that by priority he should be a long
way up. He hopes General Scott's retirement will give him this opportunity.
If he does not talk himself to death before he reaches France, I expect credita-
ble things of him. He sails tomorrow on the New York.

Gregory took dinner with us and we went to the Knickerbocker Theater to
see George Arliss in "Hamilton". The performance was mediocre, both as to
the play and the acting.

Gregory wants Gordon to accept the Federal Judgeship for the South-
ern District of New York. He wishes to take one of the District Judges and
put him on the Circuit Bench and give Gordon the vacancy. He says he would be
the youngest judge in the United States. He asked me not to interfere which I
declined to promise. As a matter of fact, I have no intention of giving my
consent. It is a great compliment and Gordon has ample qualifications; young
as he is, for the position.

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September 26, 1917.

R. W. Woolley, Wiseman, Keeley of the Chicago Herald, and Max Eastman, the
socialist, were among the day's callers.

Woolley thinks McAdoo is making a mistake in taking Vanderlip into the
Treasury. As he terms it, "he is playing with fire". We talked principally
of the Interstate Commerce Commission appointments and the great work to be
done there.

war

Wiseman and I outlined what we thought should be the policy of the
Allies=duringxkhaxmaxx He has written it in the form of a letter which is
attached.

Max Eastman came to talk about his paper, "The Masses". It is now ex-
cluded from the mails by the Postmaster General. He claims action has been
taken without giving him a chance to explain, or without pointing out spec-
ifically what is objected to. He expressed a willingness to make the paper
unobjectionable, if he could be advised how to do so. He is to write a let-
ter stating this willingness, and I am to take it directly to the President.

The President has seen Roland Morris as I asked, although previously
he had declined to do so. See Morris' letter of yesterday. The President
is also having an investigation made of the Thos. J. Mooney case in San Francis-
co as I advised. I often fail to note such matters as I have so little time.

September 27, 1917.

Paderewski, Kohlsaat, Ramely, Frederic C. Howe and Sir William Wiseman were
the most interesting callers.

Paderewski had some information regarding the Polish case which he
thought I should know. He is thoroughly anti-Russian as, indeed, he is anti-
German and anti-Austrian. He distrusts all of them and with reason.

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Kohlsaat outlined the policy of his Western Newspaper Union. He again
offered the use of this service in any way I desired. He seems more appre-
ciative of advice and friendship than most.

Dr. Edward Rumely was concerning about our agricultural production.
He began an explanation of farming until I stopped him by saying I had done
nothing all my life except farm; that I had come from a line of farmers running
back three or four hundred years. I believe I am one of the few who have
made farming profitable without living on the land.

He asked what the Evening Mail could do to help in the war. I outlined
various fields of endeavor, emphasizing the desirability of getting into Ger-
many the real facts of our purposes, the loyalty of German-Americans, and
their disapproval of the German autocracy.

Colcord's article concerning my activities in directing preparation
for the peace conference came out in splashing headlines in the Public Ledger
today. Most of the other papers have articles in a more or less modified
form. It looks as if I might get off lightly as far as publicity is con-
cerned, and I believe it was wise to make the announcement in this way.

The President's letter of today is a part of the diary. I have been
in constant touch with Washington by telephone, particularly in regard to Ger-
man and Swedish intrigue.

September 28, 1917.

The publication of my being asked to direct this country's prepar-
ations for the peace conference is causing much annoyance. Reporters are at
my elbow at every turn, and letters are beginning to come in from all sides
giving advice and offering services.

I had an interesting talk with Abram Elkus. He told of von
Kuehlman, German Foreign Secretary, whom he knew quite well at Constantino-

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ple where they were both ambassadors. Kuehlman, according to Elkus, has a
suave and pleasant manner, but inside is really a Prussian. Kuehlman knows
Americans better than most Germans, and appreciates the weight this country can
throw against the Central Powers.

September 29, 1917.

This has been one of the busiest days of the Autumn. Reporters have been
many, the Russian Ambassador, Wiseman and a dozen or more others. Victor Ber-
ger, the Milwaukee socialist, was an interesting caller. His paper is under
the ban and he desires it released. He appears to be the better type of Amer-
ican socialist.

The Russian Ambassador remained an hour. His troubles are many. He
wishes the President to call an Allied Conference in order that Russia may be
helped in some way, about which he is rather vague. He complains that Great
Britain and France are not sympathetic with the Provisional Government, and won-
dered if we could not bring influence to bear upon them and make them express
sympathy for Russian effort toward democracy. He voiced a sincere desire for
peace to come soon, and thought we should attempt to segregate Bulgaria and Tur-
key from the Central Powers. He was quite willing, as all Russians seem to be
now, to leave Turkey intact. He considers this a better solution than the one
the Allies have had in mind, that is, to divide Turkey amongst themselves, piece
by
piece.
I am insympathy with this view.

Wiseman and I conferred for an hour and a half. I told him of
Vance McCormick's visit this morning, in which McCormick had discussed the ac-
tivities of the Embargo Board. My letter to the President about this is at-
tached. Wiseman is to cable his government asking for their views on the
proposed embargo.

Glenn Frank called with his Editor in Chief, Mr. Patterson, to

again offer the service of the Western Newspaper Union. He desired an outline
of our proposed activities in the gathering of peace data, which he will publish
in the fourteen thousand newspapers represented by his association.

Roy Howard, President of the United Press, and Negley Cochran of the
Toledo Bee called to present several matters they have in hand. Howard has
seen the President and is in a good humor with the Administration. He still
clings to his idea that Lansing should go. I am sorry the President was indis-
creet enough to partially agree with him, and to indicate that he would go if
he, the President, knew how to better the situation.

In speaking of the peace conference, I told Howard of my suggestion
to the President
of more than a year ago kaxxhexRrassidankx that he should go in person. Howard
thought it an admirable suggestion.

Wiseman read me a 2000 word confidential despatch from Lord Reading
to the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour. It was a fairly good analysis of the
situation. There some inaccuracies. Wiseman and I agreed on what he should
send to supplement it in order that they might have a better view.

September 30, 1917.

Yesterday I wanted to go to the country to see Louise, but conditions
were such as to make it impossible. I devoted myself largely to correspon-
dence and necessary reading.

Walter Lippman and Walcott Pitkin came in the afternoon. Lippmann has
spoken to Secretary Baker, who has released him from the War Department, and
he will start work with me at the end of the week.

The Lord Chief Justice came to dinner. We had Mr. and Mrs. Adrian
Iselin and Mrs. van Renssler to meet him. Immediately after we had finished,
Reading and I went to my study and were in conference until half past ten o'clock.
We went over the international situation in detail. I have confidence in

Reading, as he seems to have in me, and it is not difficult to open our minds to one another. I cannot go into what was said, for our talk covered the entire range of the war.

I told him of my conversation with Vance McCormick, and of the extreme danger in the situation. He appreciated this and said he was wholly in the dark, since Spring-Rice and the Embassy staff seemed determined to confine his activities to finance. He intends to send a message to the Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour tomorrow, practically demanding that they bring Spring-Rice home, or relieve him, Reading, of further duty.

I had the advantage in the discussion because I knew the contents of the long cable he had sent his Government, therefore, I was able to answer some of the things I knew he had in his mind, but which he did not express. In his conversation he covered much of the contents of his despatch, leaving out parts which he doubtless thought might offend. He does not know that I do not mind criticism when it is made homestly and without malice.

October 1, 1917.

It has been an exhausting day. The telephone, both local and long distance, has been a great nuisance. Hugh Wallace called at half past ten, and when I had finished with him David Lawrence came to get some data for a character sketch which he thinks to write of me in the Saturday Evening Post.

Then Sir William came for a half hour to give me a cable from Balfour stating that the Committee of the Edinbrough University were anxious to invite the President to become Lord Rector for the approaching year. I thought it would be unwise for the President to accept, and we composed an answer to Balfour giving our reasons why we thought it inadvisable. Both cables are attached.

Sir William and I discussed Northcliffe's indiscretions. He has writ-

ten an article for Current Opinion which will get him in serious trouble should
the President chance to see it. He undertakes to outline this country's views
and to give reasons why we are in the war. He is unfortunate enough to use
one of the President's expressions in a negative way, that is, the President
said "we are in the war to make democracy safe". Northcliffe says, "we are
not in the war to make democracy safe, but for self preservation". Wiseman
thinks Northcliffe did not write the article himself, but it is done so badly
he will doubtless get full credit for it.

Sidney and David Harrell took lunch with us. I have asked the State
Department to send Harrell as special agent to Spain to look out for our in-
terests in matters appertaining to the embargo, and I wished to advise him
about his duties there. With Sidney, it was to outline the organization for
the collecting of peace data.

Peter Brady Brady, labor leader, M. Gillat, of the French High Commis-
sion, and Paul Warburg were other callers.

Brady tried to interest me in the municipal campaign, but failed.
Gillat desired to make an engagement for André Tardieu. Paul Warburg discuss-
ed the financial situation. I gave him the thought I have already given to
other German-Americans as to the folly of Germany trying to make peace under
her present form of government. I told Warburg, if that if I were Germany's
best friend, I would advise her against it. Warburg replied, "You are her
best friend."" He congratulated me upon my new undertaking and was good
enough to say there was no one else so well fitted to do it.

I motored with the Lord Chief Justice for an hour and a half in the
Park. We fell to talking about the political situation in England, and he
told the inside story of affairs there. It made clear some things which I
had been unable to understand. It was interesting and will be of value. We
discussed Northcliffe's indiscretions. He thinks when he, himself, goes home

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in November Northcliffe will also go and remain.

October 3, 1917.

I often weary of my diary, and at times when it should be of greatest interest. It never gives a true picture of the day. So much is done that can not be recorded and so much work is accomplished by telephone of which there is no record.

Lord Reading was the most important visitor of the day. We used the motor again in order to get the fresh air and talk at the same time. In this way we are undisturbed. Our talk largely concerned current matters at issue between our two governments. I find Reading a calm, clear-headed statesman with more of the political than the judicial mind. These talks with him have been of much value to me, because I have become saturated with the British official point of view. Every phase of their governmental action comes up at one time or another as it relates not alone to this country, but to France, Russia, Japan and their colonies.

We decided that it was essential to be more attentive to France. They French are highly sensitive and the fact that they speak a different language and have different views of government and civilization, make them suspicious of the growing goodwill between Great Britain and the United States. I spoke of the feeling that is prevalent in France, Italy and some of the smaller neutrals, that after all it makes but little difference who dominates the world-- whether it be Anglo Saxon or Teuton. It does make a difference of course and intelligent people recognize it, but it is questionable whether the ordinary man in the street does.

Norman Angell was another visitor. He talked of the new work I have in hand, of the war and of its aftermath.

We dined with S. R. Bertron at Delmonico's and went to see "Maytime"

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My mail has been enormous, but I have turned that part of it relating to the gathering of peace data over to Sidney. I have also refused to see nine tenths of the people who have called. I have received several cables about current happenings which are parts of the diary.

October 3, 1917.

The press has broken loose again over my appointment to gather data for the peace conference. The pro-German part of it are trying to make it appear that it has something to do with an early peace. The editorial about me in the American, complimentary as it was, purposely gave that slant. The New York Evening Sun had an especially malicious article, stating that Lansing knew nothing of my appointment until I announced it myself.

In talking about this to Lord Reading and Tardieu, both having read it, I remarked that the article was true with the exception that Lansing had suggested to the President that I was the proper person to do the work, and that the announcement was given out from Washington and not by me.

as usual,

The Lord Chief Justice and I drove for an hour and a half in the Park. We definitely decided it would be best to let Spring-Rice remain here until he, Reading, returned to England and could place the situation before his Government in person. He has notified London that he will return around the middle of November, and has told them that the impressions he received before coming over as to the inefficiency of the Embassy, have been more than realized. He did not go into further detail.

We discussed Spring-Rice's successor. Reading eliminated Lord Derby who had been thought of. We then took up the question of Grey and concluded it must be either Grey or Lord Robert Cecil. Reading has rather a quaint and vocabulary and phraseology which I find attractive. He remarked that it was a curious situation here with Wiseman and myself really directing British pol-

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icy in the United States. He said the British Government were accepting
Wiseman's advice, knowing that I was advising him.

André Tardieu followed Reading and remained for nearly an hour, an
unusually long time for me to give anyone these busy days. His troubles were
mostly about shipping facilities. He mentioned that General Pershing had been
ill advised in seeing so much of Joffre and so little of Petain. I excused
Pershing by saying he was nothing of a politician and probably could not sense
a situation of that kind. I shall see what can be done about it when I go to
Washington.

John C. Ferguson, Adviser of the Chinese Foreign Office, followed Tar-
dieu. He has lived in China for the past thirty years and must understand
the situation there better than anyone with whom I have been in touch, but I
did not try to get an opinion from him as to the Chinese or China's condition
for I knew it would be colored and not his real opinion. He is an able man
and impressed me much. He knows his way about among governments. The pur-
pose of his visit is evidently to off-set Ishii's. After he presented his
view of what our Government should do regarding China, he asked what I thought
of it. I declined to commit myself further than to say that I was interested
in what he had to tell me, but that I was not familiar enough with Far Eastern
questions to wish to express an opinion.

October 4, 1917.

Governor Beekman of Rhode Island was my first caller this morning.
He asked advice about going to France to be with the New England troops on
Thanksgiving Day.

Kohlsaat followed Raskuann Beeckman. He asked permission for one of
his correspondents to come over from Washington to write a short sketch of me
for his innumerable country papers.

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Frederick Prince, of Boston, arrived before Kohlsaat and Beeckman left.
He has a cable from Franklin Bouillon, who is now a member of the Ministry,
asking him to urge me to come to France at once. This cable is attached to
the record.

Some interesting correspondence came to me today from Brougham of the
Public Ledger, which included his letter to the President and the President's
reply. Several cables have come in, one about the wool situation in answer
to an inquiry I made of the British Government concerning that commodity.

Richard H. Dana was an afternoon caller to talk over Civil Service matters.
General Henry P. Davison, Ryan and Wadsworth of the Red Cross were with me for
an hour discussing the advisability of sending supplies to Roumania, and also
concerning the publicity matter I have had up regarding Russia. Davison de-
clared the problem was clearly up to the President and me, that he had exhaust-
ed every other means, including the Secretaries of State and War. The ques-
tion at issue is whether this Government intends to back Roumania to the extent
of giving her sufficient financial aid to enable her to continue as a "going con-
cern". If this is to be the policy, the Red Cross will furnish the medical
supplies and food demanded, otherwise, not.

Carl Ackerman discussed an article he is writing for the Saturday Evening Post, and his proposed trip abroad. Lorimer of the Evening Post has consented for him to go to Switzerland as I advised rather than to South America.

Soldatenkov was with me a half hour explaining in poor English some
conversations his Government has had with Bulgarian representatives regarding
separate peace. I asked him to give me a memorandum in writing which he has
promised to do. The Russians are eager for peace.

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October 5, 1917.

Gordon Abbott called first. He talked of our financial condition and advised a somewhat different policy than that adopted by the Federal Reserve Board. He remarked in speaking of the Federal Reserve Bank Act that "it should bear your name for certainly you did more to mold it into intelligent shape than anyone". I thought the best service I had given toward making that measure a success was its direction during the presidential campaign and immediately afterward. I was largely instrumental in making it the principal measure of reform upon the democratic program, and I steered it carefully in order that it might not be wrecked before it reached the "open sea."

Edward B. Clarke, Washington correspondent of the Kohlsaat publications came for a short talk.

I visited Muller-Ury's studio to see his new portrait of the President which he considers his masterpiece. He has done the work well. The face is somewhat sterner and more powerful than in reality, but the likeness is good and the pose indicates the importance of the occasion portrayed. As a matter of fact, I heard the speech, saw the surroundings, and I am obliged to confess that it was not as dramatic as the artist pictures it.

Jesse H. Jones of Texas called to discuss Red Cross matters, of which he is now a part. Henry Bruere followed to tell of Mexico and of conditions there and what his organization was trying to do in order to better them. He said he was told that I would not discuss Mexico with him. My reply was that I knew his views were in sympathy with my own, since we were both trying to help Mexico help herself, and I was willing to talk from that viewpoint. I gave it as my belief that if Mexico did not show more sympathy for the Allies' cause, of which we are now a part, that her difficulties would be many when the war was over. It was a situation in which she could not play safe except

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by playing with us. If Germany won, Mexico's relation to us would be the same
as if the Allies won. We were the nation to be reckoned with, not the European
powers, and her administrators were short-sighted in not seeing this and seizing
the present opportunity which would never come again.

Mezes and Lippmann came for a long conference concerning the gathering
of peace data and war facts.

The most important part of the day came when Sir William Wiseman brought
me some cables concerning a German peace offer from Spain. That cable, the
reply which I suggested for the President to make to it, the cable referring
to the Interallied Conference and my letter to the President are all parts of
the record.

We went to the theater as the guests of Mrs. Borden Harriman. The other
guests were T. P. O'Connor and Soldatenkov. We went to see "Polly with a Past".
O'Connor talked to me as constantly as he could about the Irish question and
other matters which he has come to this country to further.

October 6, 1917.

I had a meeting with Mezes, Lippmann, Croly and Shotwell of Columbia
in order to discuss the scope of our organization for the gathering of peace
data.

There are some developments which I hope may come out of this war. One
is a higher standard of international honor. I would also like to see a new
spirit of service spring up, a service which would have for its purpose, the
help and uplifting of the less fortunate of mankind. Those who are endowed
with health, intelligence and ability to make a success, should consider it a
pleasure and privilege to carry along with them, as a part of life's load, one
or more less fortunate. I do not mean by this that people should become in-
digent, or that we should create a helpless class, but each of us has within

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our orbit some less fortunate than ourselves, the bed-ridden, the diseased, the mentally deficient, and those who desire to work but can find none to do. These are the ones whose burdens we should help carry. If we did this the reward would come in the feeling of duty fulfilled.

October 7, 1917.

Yesterday we motored to Mount Kisco to be with Mr. and Mrs. Robert Brewster overnight. They have a delightful home. This morning we left there and motored to Mararoneck to lunch with Frederick Penfield. The other guests were Mr. and Mrs. Abram Elkus and Mr. Bagby, the musical director. I had a talk with Elkus about the possibility of making separate peace with Turkey, and how it could be done. He is eager to undertake it, but since Morganthau's failure, I am skeptical about it and so, I am sure, will be the President. Elkus, however, is more discreet than Morganthau and would not fall into pitfalls.

Sir William Wiseman came for a conference soon after I reached home. While he was with me I received the following telegram from the President.

"Referring to your letter of the fifth, message suggested satisfactory. Also proposed chairmanship".

My letter to the President, Wiseman's reply to his Government, and the several other cables which came from the British Government to me or for my information are important parts of the record.

Gifford Pinchot came to tell of his troubles as one of Hoover's assistants. He and Lassiter of Texas have the livestock department. Pinchot believes that Hoover is on the verge of a nervous breakdown and is not directing the work as it should be. He insists upon retaining all the authority and by doing so, the cause suffers. I have promised to look into the matter and see if anything can be done.

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October 8, 1917.

John M. Bowers was the first caller and apropos of a Federal judgeship in a
Indiania. The British Ambassador followed. He was in one of his flighty
moods. Spies are in the Navy Department, in the War Department and elsewhere.
I could not get him off the subject and was relieved when he only remained a
half hour.

Von Weigand followed Spring-Rice to give his ideas as to how informa-
tion regarding the President's purposes could be gotten into Germany in order
to reach liberal opinion there. I asked him to submit his views in writing.

Lippman and Mezes came to talk further about the organization. In
the afternoon Samuel Gompers was my most interesting visitor. I had sent for
concerning labor
him in order to obtain his views on labor and what data could be gotten for
the peace conference.

Professor William E. Rappard, Swiss Commissioner, was with me for a few
minutes to add to the memorandum which he gave me the other day to be presented
to the President.

My letter to the President is a part of the record.

October 9, 1917.

The President's letter to me is attached. I am leaving with little
Louise on the 11.08 for Washington. I shall stop with the President for a
day or two and then, perhaps, with Janet for another day.

October 13, 1917.

I returned from Washington this morning. Gordon came over with me.
I have had three or four strenuous days. The White House motor met us
and I took Gordon and Louise to their home before going to the White House.

The President was over at the offices, having just finished a Cabinet
meeting, and having some engagements which detained him. I sat in Mrs.

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Wilson's room with her, going over the happenings since we last met in New York.
The President came in just before dinner and we had no talk until after we had
eaten and gone to his study. He opened the conversation at once by saying that
he was not willing that anyone should go abroad to represent him excepting me.
"No one in America," and he whimsically added, "or in Europe either, knows my
mind and I am not willing to trust them to attempt to interpret it". This was
apropos of Lloyd George's request that someone should be sent to represent the
United States at the next War Council.

The President knows that both the English and French desire me to come.
The French have gone so far as to ask for me formally. The British have done so
informally. Some of my recent letters will indicate that I thought it best
that someone other than myself should go at this time, because the Central Pow-
ers might think it peace propaganda rather than a war measure, my name being so
inseparably connected with peace. I suggested Baker or McAdoo, but the Pres-
ident would have none of them. We discussed the matter in detail, and the
questions of strategy on each of the fronts. We spoke of the Italian campaign
and the campaign in Asia Minor, and the partition or non-partition of Turkey.

The President suggested the making of another speech in which to say
that our people must not be deceived by Germany's apparent willingness to give
up Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine, for it would leave her impregnable in both Aus-
tria and Turkey and her dream of Mittle-Europa would be realized. He thought
it important that our people should understand that the evacuation of both
Belgium and France were a part of the Allies' program, and not so important a
part as to restrict German power for evil in the future.

He thought he should say that Turkey should become effaced, and that the
disposition of it should be left to the peace conference. Without advising
that I thought it advisable to make such a speech now, I added that if it was

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made, it should be stated that Turkey must not be partitioned among the bel-
ligerents, but must become autonomous in its several parts according to racial
lines. He accepted this addenda.

The President was surprised when I told him that the present Government
in Russia did not desire the internationalization of the Dardanelles because
they were afraid they would have to maintain a large fleet in the Black Sea,
and they preferred the Black Sea to remain a Russian sea as at present. He
thought this might be met by some form of guarantee, a suggestion, indeed, I
have already made to the Russian Ambassador and other Russians with whom I
have talked.

I told the President that Burleson desired to be a peace commissioner,
in fact, everybody I knew desired to be one. The President replied, "do you
think the American people would sustain me in being the only representative
from the United States at the conference?" I did not know, and thought it
was something to be considered later. There will of necessity be committees
at the peace conference and there must be at least three commissioners in order
to have representation on these committees, if for nothing else. Then, too,
the other nations will have more than one and may stultify ourselves. I
put this idea of being sole representative at the peace conference in the Pres-
ident's mind some two years ago, but conditions then were quite different from
those that confront us now. Then we were not in the war, and he would have
gone over in quite a different capacity.

The President was tired and retired early in order to have a mas-
sage. Mrs. Wilson and I talked for a half hour and we too retired by ten
o'clock.

On Wednesday the 10th, I went to the State Department and was with
Lansing, Polk, Phillips, Gordon and others until lunch time. The President

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and I had no conversations at lunch or dinner, but after dinner we went into executive session until ten o'clock. We threshed out the question of my going abroad to represent the United States at the Allied War Council. We discussed whether we should have a representative on the Embargo Board. He strongly objected until I read him a memorandum from Sir William Wiseman which is attached to the record. Wiseman has pointed out the danger of transferring the center of gravity from this country to Europe. He believes this is inevitable if I go abroad to remain as long as the President has in mind, and take with me military, Naval, and economic staff.

This shook the President because he has no intention of loosening his hold on the situation.

We took up many other matters I had in mind to discuss with him, but all of comparatively minor importance. We discussed his successor, and whether or not he might come from the Cabinet, and whether McAdoo or Baker had the better chance.

On Thursday, the 11th, I had another busy day at the State Department. I also saw Jusserand, Reading, Wiseman, the Attorney General, the Postmaster General, and heaven knows who else.

Practically all the information which the British Foreign Office receives that is of value come to me either directly or through Wiseman or Reading for me. Many of these cables are attached to the record, others I destroy.

I had a long talk with Lansing regarding the organization for the peace conference. He is eager to be in it and I want him to help and will endeavor to arrange it that way. In speaking to the President, however, he told me distinctly that he preferred everything to go to him rather than to the State Department, and he would refer to the State Department what he thought necessary. Later I got him to agree, since I am going to Europe, for Mezes to keep in

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touch with Lansing, but the President added, "and also with me": I shall arrange this and shall endeavor to give Lansing a larger and larger part. He is fond of detail work and can relieve me of much of that. His ideas are good along certain lines, especially as to technique, for which I have no liking.

On Friday the 12th, it was arranged for Lord Reading and Sir William Wiseman to come to the White House at twelve o'clock for a conference with the President and with me. Wiseman and I concluded afterward that it would be best for him not to come because it might hurt the sensibilities of Reading and Sir Cecil Spring-Rice as well, therefore the President authorized me to eliminate Wiseman.

Sir William was disturbed at my decision to go to Europe, particularly, if my stay was to be a long one. He thought my influence abroad would be lessened because it would be impossible not to get tangled up with the jealousies and ambitions of the Allies. He thought I would be pulled this way and that, and it would be impossible to satisfy any of them. He also thought Lloyd George was making a distinct effort to use me to further his plans. George is afraid to antagonize the military and naval authorities by proposing a new objective in Russia, a field other than the Western Front, and wants to use me for his own purposes.

Reading came at noon and remained for an hour. The interview was uninteresting, as far as I was concerned, because I had talked the subjects out with both, and Reading knew what the President intended to propose, and the President knew what Reading expected. Reading seemed pleased with the President's reception. I walked to the door with him and he asked me to meet him at five o'clock at the British Embassy for a further conference.

At this conference, I definitely decided that I would attend the Allied War Council. Reading was pleased and offered me his house in London. He

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also offered to cable his Government asking them to send the Mauretania or
Olympic to Halifax to take me over. I have made it clear to both the
British and French Governments that I wish to go in the simplest way possible.
There must be no banquets, no receptions, but merely conferences to transact
business as speedily as possible.

At our conference Tuesday night, the President authorized me to see both
Baker and Daniels and tell them of our plans and ask them to suggest suitable
military and naval officers to accompany me. The President thought General
Bliss, Chief of Staff, would be the proper man to represent the Army, to which
Baker later readily acquiesced. Baker sent for Bliss while I was at the War
Department, and the three of us had some talk upon the subject. When I visited
the Navy Department, Daniels suggested Admiral Benson, but I asked him not to
make a definite decision until later. Daniels also sent for Benson without
telling him the purpose but merely indicating that he desired us to know one
another.

After returning to the White House I told the President I had de-
finitely decided it was best for me to go and that we had better make plans
accordingly. He was pleased and said he felt confident that I would keep
free from entanglements and antagonisms. I expressed confidence that my
mission would bring him further prestige rather than lessen that which he al-
ready has.

It was agreed that I should come to Washington again before sailing.

I am gratified at the way the American Press has received the announce-
ment of the President's request that I undertake the preparation of our case
for the peace conference. Of the hundreds of editorial comment which have
come in, it is only here and there an unfriendly note is struck. Republican

and democratic press are alike complimentary. Another pleasing feature is
that the radical press view it with unfeigned approval. So indeed, do the
German-American press. Some of the best comment has been in the Staats Zei-
tung and other German publications. Vierick's "New America", the old "Father-
land" has one of the most complimentary articles written. They compare me with
Root, whom they designate as the leading republican statesman. The comparison
is more to my credit than to his, which I am sorry to see, for it is unfair to
him.

October 14, 1917.

We went out to the Piping Rock Club for lunch. It has been a quiet day, and I have finished up correspondence and odds and ends. My letter to the President, enclosing some cables, is a part of the diary. Minister Pleasant A. Stovall called yesterday to report on Switzerland from whence he has just come. He had little of interest or value to tell.

October 15, 1917.

My letters to the President, his memorandum to me enclosing a cable from
Page, my letter to Mr. Balfour and the several cables which have come to me
through Wiseman are attached.

Benjamin Strong Jr. was my most interesting caller in the afternoon.
He told of financial conditions and discussed the flotation of the present
Liberty Loan, and loans which are to follow.

I have not had a free moment from breakfast to bedtime. We went
to the theater with Mrs. Marshall. The other guests were her daughter, Mrs.
Marshall Field, Worthington Whitehouse and Craig Wadsworth.

October 16, 1917.

Rabbi Wise called to show a cablegram he had received from Weitzman
of London. He was surprised to know that I had already seen it and had sent

a cable giving the President's approval. This was done according to the
President's letter upon this subject which came this morning. I was careful
to tell Wise that no publicity must be made of the President's cooperation in
this matter with the Entente Governments, because I did not wish it to appear
that he was having any understanding with them upon such subjects. The purpose
of the Zionists I thought might be reached by having the Entente publish their
position upon the question, and then have a number of leading Jews ask the Pres-
ident if he concurred, and let his views be known in this way.

Jeff Mclemore, Congressman at large from Texas, came from Washington
to see me regarding matters touching upon prohibition. I asked him to submit
his views in writing.

Charles Foster Peabody, William de Leftwich Dodge, the artist, Gifford
Pinchot, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, Sir William Wiseman and Lanier Winslow all ar-
rived at practically the same time. I had to group some of them and got rid
of all of them as soon as practicable. None of them wanted anything of impor-
tance.

Pinchot is still at logger-heads with Hoover and I can see a break im-
minent there. The Ambassador talked of my visit abroad. He says his Gov-
ernment desires that I shall be their guest. My letter to the President and
his to me are parts of the diary. So also is Balfour's cable to me.

October 17, 1917.

I telephoned Nicholas Murray Butler today and asked about Professor
Shotwell as a suitable man to use in our peace data work. Butler gave him an
excellent recommendation and thought we could not do better. I shall therefore
take him on. I knew in advance what Butler would say, and I intended to use
Shotwell, but I thought it would please Butler and make for pleasant relations

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to ask for an opinion, and to allow him to tell Shotwell he had been selected.

The British Ambassador called again this morning apropos of nothing. I
had much difficulty in steering him away from dangerous subjects, but succeeded
in having a pleasant half hour with him.

J. Allen Baker of London followed Sir Cecil. The last time I saw Baker
was in the early part of March just before he sailed for England. He took a
memorandum of my conversation and predictions as to the United States entering
the war, and the manner in which we would conduct it when once in. He said
when he reached London, he told Lloyd George, Balfour and others of this con-
versation and they could scarcely believe it. Balfour asked Baker to give him
a written memorandum of what I said, and he sent it to the other members of the
Cabinet. Baker said it was the first intimation they had of our intentions
and of the manner in which we would make war.

Lippmann came to present a memorandum outlining plans for the peace
data organization. He said there was great dissatisfaction here because of
Burleson's action in the suppression of free speech. I asked him to write a
letter embracing what he had told me and I have sent it to the President. Co-
pies of this letter and of my own to the President are attached.

An interesting letter comes from Walter Page, parts of which I sent the
President yesterday.

Mr. Hemphill of the Guaranty Trust Company came to talk of the financial
situation and to ask advice concerning certain features of it. The subject was
one in which I am well versed and I suggested a program which, if followed, will
probably be effective.

Hamilton Holt followed Hemphill. He wished to offer his services as
having a
chairman of a committee which has a fund of $2,000,000, which a church organ-
ization has set aside to be used for propaganda purposes to help bring about

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a just a just settlement for permanent peace. Holt has been made chairman of a committee to suggest a plan of expenditure and wished my advice as to this. He was willing for me to work out the plans myself, which I declined to do. He offered me any part of the fund for clerical help, or to be used in other ways. This, too, I declined after thanking him warmly. He expressed gratification that the President had placed the American case in my hands, and hoped I would head the commission at the peace congress. I explained why I did not care to do so.

We went to dinner and theater as the guests of George Gordon Moore. Mrs. Borden Harriman was the only other guest. We saw "The Tiger Rose". Moore has an ambitious plan for building a causeway across the North Sea in order to shut in the German submarines.

I have been discussing with Wiseman and with Washington the details of our proposed trip to Europe. The British would have offered us the Olympic or Mauretania but the one is laid up for repairs, and the other enroute for the other side. They offered another ship in lieu of these two, but since the President has taken the matter into his own hands, the Navy is arranging for a battle ship and proper convoy.

Wiseman and I discussed the Swedish mail seizure and I have advised the British to release it. He wished to send the advice as coming directly from me, but I declined to let him do this. They are making a mistake in pushing Sweden too far.

The President's letter to me regarding the embargo, in which he encloses a despatch from Page, and my letter to him, are parts of the record. I asked Wiseman to send his Government a strongly worded cable asking for their definite opinion so as not to leave us in doubt.

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It is to be hoped that the people of all nations will some day notice that
those in authority who are largely responsible for wars and those who fan public
opinion to white heat, are seldom hurt. Where among the crowned heads of
Europe do we find a fatality? Where among Gabinets and members of parliaments
has the war caused a death? Where among the great editorial writers, politi-
cians and public orators has one suffered death on the field of battle? I
sometimes wonder whether I am right in advocating protection of non-combatants.
Is it not possible, if an entire population suffered, wars would not be made so
readily, and if made, would not peace come sooner? What a helpless plight
humanity is in with everyone groping to find a way out and everyone equally
helpless.

October 18, 1917.

Professor Archibald Coolidge and Mezes were my first callers. We
have taken Coolidge into our organization and put him to work. We have also
taken on Shotwell.

My two most interesting callers were Lord Reading and Lord Northcliffe.
Reading is restless at being left here while I am in Europe. I think he be-
lieves there will be no way for him to get decisions, should an impasse occur.
When I am here, he feels that a way out is always at hand, and I think he is
nervous over the thought of my leaving. He does not wish his mission to be a
failure. The truth is, in getting the President to send me to the Allied War
Council, he has accomplished the main purpose of his visit. He desires to re-
turn to England with me, but we will not come to a final decision upon this un-
til I reach Washington next week. He spoke of Northcliffe's trouble with his
staff. They feel that he does none of the actual work as he is too busy going
from place to place. It is Canada today, Detroit tomorrow, and somewhere else
the next day.

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Reading said they wished to pin Northcliffe down to Washington, knowing he would prefer going home permanently than to be in any one place.

Strangely enough, after Reading left, Northcliffe came in. He spoke of "what a charming and capable man Reading is". I wondered whether he felt this or whether he did it for a purpose. He knows the people I like and see most of, and he has never yet failed to say a word in their praise. Outside of Spring-Rice, he had few caustic criticisms to make of anyone. He, too, wants to return on the same ship with me, and if it can be arranged, I shall ask both Reading and Northcliffe to go.

Our conversation was of no value to the record. He talked munitions and of the things he discussed the last time he was here. He repeats himself. Reading said in leaving, "I will now turn you over to Northcliffe in order that he may tell you the things he told you the last time you met". I wish to say however, that I like Northcliffe the more I see of him. He does what he promises and he rings true. I am constantly wondering how well we analyze him. There must be more to him than his critics see, for how could he have made the success he has. I must confess he is a puzzle to me.

Herman Bernstein followed Northcliffe. I introduced them and they had a few minutes conversation together. Bernstein came to seek advice on two points. James Gordon Bennett has cabled him to return to Russia. He was wondering whether he could not do better work here for the time being. He showed me a cable from Russia asking him to explain the Berkman case. He desired a statement to send back to Russia, and advice as how best to get it.

October 19, 1917.

his

Governor Beeckman was my first caller. He came to express thanks for my getting him well started on his mission to Europe, and for the interview he had the other day with the President.

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to me
The French Ambassador called unexpectedly to convey an invitation from the
British, French and Italian Governments to attend the War Council in Paris.
He said I would be the only representative in the Council who was not a high
official; that the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of all the Allied Na-
tions would be present with the exception of Russia, which now has no stable
government.

I am glad I am going alone, for I can do better work when the responsi-
bility is entirely on my shoulders. Jusserand promised to cable his Government
requesting that no official or private entertainments be given, at least, until
the conference ended.

The next subject of importance on his mind was the Brazilian ships
which the French Government had thought to purchase, and which our Government
is now holding up. I promised to doxxkxxXx see what could be done in the
direction of the French Government's desires.

Sir Charles Gordon followed Jusserand. His trouble had to do with
munitions. He complained of the lack of coordination in Washington, and the
lack of any central authority outside of the President who, in the nature of
things, could not act in every instance.

S. R. Bertron brought a delegation from the United States Chamber of
Commerce to talk about the changes which should be made in purchasing by our
Government and the Allies. It is an old story, and I have had it threshed out
many times. They are probably correct, and is one of the things that might
have been remedied if the President had permitted a better organization for war.

Dr. Blumenthal, an Alsatian, bored me for a half hour. He spoke such
poor English that I did not trouble to listen to what he had to say.

October 20, 1917.

Prof. William E. Dodd of the University of Chicago came for a special

conference as my letters and telegrams will indicate. We discussed the feasibility of connecting him with the peace data organization; although I do not know how he can be fitted in.

Gordon Moore came with his plans for building a concrete causeway from England to Denmark in order to check submarines.

André Tardieu called with M. Gillat to talk over pending matters and to thank me for having helped them accelerate their shipping program. They read me a cable from their Minister of Finance urging that I come to France. This cable is attached.

I went to dinner and theater with Willard V. King and William A. Tucker to see "Lombardi & Co. Ltd."

October 21, 1917.

The Russian Ambassador called at 9.30. He came to say that it was essential for the War Council which is to meet in Paris to recognize Russia's political as well as her war needs. He believes it would strengthen the present government and perhaps enable it to maintain itself. It is evident that the Russians feel they are in bad repute with the other Allies, as indeed they are.

We motored to Riverdale to take lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Cleveland H. Dodge. Dodge and I discussed the Bulgarian and Turkish situations with which he is familiar, since he is one of the patrons of Roberts College and has a married daughter there, and a son in Beirut.

Wiseman has been with me once or twice during the day. We have been planning for our trip abroad, and I have sent cables through him to the British Government and have received some in return.

Walter Lippmann called to discuss the peace data organization.

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The White House, Washington.

October 22, 1917.

I came to Washington today on the 11.08. Mezes and David Miller accompanied me. I wanted them to come in order to introduce them to the heads of the Departments in order that they might secure data needed for the peace settlement.

Janet and Gordon met us. I took Janet home in the White House motor, remaining a few minutes to see Louise. I then came to the White House. I had no conversation with the President as it was too near dinner time, and after dinner we went to see "Good Gracious Annabelle" at Belasco's.

October 23, 1917.

The President and I decided this morning that it would be well for me to take over representatives of the Army, Navy, Munitions, Food, Finances, Shipping and Embargo. When he first asked me to go on this trip he wished me to go alone. I had some difficulty in persuading him that I could not possibly confer with the heads of the Allied Governments on matters of policy and in addition confer with the headquafters of the Armies and navies of the Allied powers, War, Navy, Treasury, Shipping, Munitions, Food and Embargo Departments of those governments.

It took me the better part of the day seeing them and explaining the purposes of the trip. Admiral Benson has arranged for the transportation. We are to have two cruisers and a destroyer, and we are to be met at the danger zone with four other destroyers. Benson is determined that we shall get across safely if possible, and I have much confidence that he will succeed, since he is to be with us.

Lanier Winslow, who has been in Germany four years, says the safest way for me to go would be to advertise it throughout Germany, and to let them know the ship I was sailing on, illuminating it etc. He thinks I am the last person in the world the Germans wish to destroy, because I am "their best bet" for a

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fair settlement".

I shall not go into details of this busy day. It has been one of hurried conferences, now with the President, and again, with Lansing, Polk and many others.

October 24, 1917.

The President and I had a long talk last night alone. We went over the situation carefully. He again expressed pleasure that I was to represent him, and declared once more that he would not be willing for anyone else to do so.

In the course of the conversation, I expressed the opinion that if such a war as this could be justified at all, its justification would be largely because it had given him a commanding opportunity for unselfish service. The great figures in history, like Alexander, Caesar and Napoleon, had used their power for personal and national aggrandizement, but in the present instance, it should be his purpose to use it for the general good of mankind.

I suggested that the time had come when he might make a statement which would be as important as the announcement he made at Mobile regarding the acquisition of territory by force. Then he laid down the principle that no nation should acquire territory without the consent of the governed. Now he should lay down the doctrine that nations should be equally unselfish regarding commerce. There should be complete freedom of commerce upon the seas, no preferential tariffs or transportation rates upon land, making the staple products and raw materials of the world accessible to all.

The President's eyes glistened and he rose to the argument sympathetically. He asked what I thought of his putting it in his message to Congress this coming December. He argued at some length as to his right to address Congress upon such matters, claiming the Constitution really required him to do so.

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when necessary. I appr concurred heartily. I thought he was in such a com-
manding position that he could put through anything that was right and that
other governments of the world were in such a precarious plight that they would
not dare oppose him. In my opinion, it all came down to a question as to
whether he was right and whether what he proposed was actually for the good of
all mankind and not merely for a portion of it. To all of this he cordially
agreed.

There were two other things to which I called his attention, which I thought
should be brought out in the same speech. I thought he should express the idea,
an idea which I have so often brought out in the diary recently, i.e. the worst
that could happen to Germany herself would be a peace made by her present govern-
ment; that the only peace that could benefit Germany would be a peace made by
a representative government.

I suggested he put in the message a threat that if Germany refused to
liberalize her government and continued a menace to the world, the democracies
would defend themselves by waging an economic war against her until the German
menace had been broken.

The President seemed to approve both suggestions, and, I take it, they
will appear sometime soon.

I shall not go into the many other matters we discussed, for my time is
limited. We outlined a "letter of marque" for me to use with the Governments
of Great Britain, France and Italy. Neither of us knew how it should be ad-
dressed, whether to the sovereigns or prime ministers. It was decided to con-
sult the State Department today which I have done. Lansing thinks, since the
invitation came to participate in the War Council through the French Ambassador,
Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, that the acceptance should go through the same
channel. Therefore, the President wrote a letter to the Secretary of State

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asking him to inform the French Ambassador that he was pleased to accept the invitation of the Allied Governments to participate in the War Council and that he had commissioned me to represent him. We decided that I should also keep the letter he wrote last night addressed to the Prime Ministers, even though that was not the proper procedure. A copy of this letter is attached, as also is one he has written to our Ambassadors at London, Paris and Rome.

We worked over these letters last night, he taking down in short hand the first text, and afterward re-writing them on his typewriter. This morning he wanted to write a letter and address it to the Kings of Great Britain and Italy and the President of the French Republic instead of the one he had written the Prime Ministers. I urged him not to bother to do so, declaring that I did not believe it would be necessary for me to show any credentials whatsoever. He then suggested that I have a document making it clear that those accompanying me were under my direction. I thought this too unnecessary. I did not believe there would be any difficulty anywhere. I felt that my relations with those going with me were of such a character that they would readily work under my direction, and yield to any suggestion I might make regarding their activities while abroad.

Sargent continues to paint the portrait of the President. We like it fairly well and are wondering whether he can be induced to make a copy. Mrs. Wilson is especially anxious that this be done. I am afraid, however, that Sargent will be obdurate for he has practtstically given up portrait painting and this canvas is the first for many years. It is to go to Dublin. Sargent gave a blank canvass to the Red Cross and it sold for $50,000.00.

The friendship and affection shown me by the President and Mrs. Wilson touches me deeply. There is no subject too intimate to be discussed before me; there is nothing that can be thought of for my comfort or pleasure that

is not urged upon me. In bidding me goodbye, the President again told how
deeply appreciative he was of my willingness to represent him at the coming
Conference.

After lunch, I went to Janet's and she, Louise and I drove for an hour.
They left me at the station where Mezes, Miller and I took the Congressional
Limited for New York.

New York,
October 25, 1917.

Today has been quiet as far as visitors and telephone calls, as few know of
my return from Washington, but it has been crowded with preparations for our
departure.

October 26, 1917.

Today, as was yesterday, has been filled with preparations to leave. I
made my will and had Attorney General Gregory and Sidney Mezes and Sir William
Wiseman witness it.

Gregory and Mezes took lunch with me. Mezes tells me that poor drunken,
drug-soaked McCombs is making trouble because he, Mezes, is serving with me in
the collection of data for the peace conference. McCombs threatens to resign
as Trustee of the City College of the City of New York and bring suit as a tax
payer if the College continues to pay Mezes while he is performing this public
service. All the other Trustees are against him, and are trying to bring him
to reason, but his insane jealousy of me makes it difficult. The fact that
Williams College has given Harry Garfield, and other colleges have given their
men to the country for service at this critical time in our history and continues
to pay their salaries, means nothing to McCombs. Any university in the United
States would be glad to lend its head for such work, and while McCombs knows

this, he seeks this opportunity to make trouble.

October 27, 1917.

Mona and Randolph came over from Boston today to be with us until tomorrow afternoon. There has been a hurry and scurry to get things ready, and I have seen as few visitors as possible.

Sir William Wiseman sailed at noon. He expects to reach London several days in advance of us in order to make arrangements for our coming.

October 28, 1917.

Baruch came from Washington today in order to try and settle the McCombs-Mezes controversy. He claims to have done it in short order. He says McCombs made a complete back-down, and now believes it would be a good thing for the College and they should pay Mezes' salary. Mezes has written a short letter which I have approved and it will go to the Board of Trustees tomorrow or next day.

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VISIT TO EUROPE AS HEAD OF AMERICAN WAR MISSION, 1917

October 29, 1917.

Our private car was ready for us at the Pennsylvania Station last
night by ten o'clock. Bainbridge Colby and Nelson Perkins were already on
board. We were picked up at four o'clock in the morning by the special train
from Washington which is to take our party to Halifax.

The personnel of the party now consists, (besides ourselves) of General
Bliss, Chief of Staff of the U. S. A. and his Aide, Admiral Benson, Chief of
the Naval Board and his aides, Oscar Crosby, Assistant Secretary of the Treas-
ury, and his counsel, Paul Cravath, Vance McCormick, Chairman of the Embargo
Board, Bainbridge Colby of the Shipping Board, Dr. Alonzo Taylor of the Food
Administration Board, Nelson Perkins of the War Industries Board, secretaries,
stenographers etc. etc. I brought Gordon and Miss Denton to act as my secre-
taries, and Mr. Cross as stenographer. Hugh Frazier of the Paris Embassy
will meet me in London to act as diplomatic secretary, and Sir William Wiseman
will act as liaison officer between the British Government and myself.

No one was allowed to leave the train enroute to Halifax. General
Bliss tells me that his wife has not the remotest idea where he is going. He
merely told her that he was to be absent sometime on a trip which it was nec-
essary for the moment to keep secret. He did not know himself from what port
he was to embark, in fact, no one knows this excepting Admiral Benson and myself.

October 30, 1917.

We reached Halifax this morning at about half past nine after a pleasant
journey. I feel rested already. The Cruiser Saint Louis was at the dock and
we all boarded her first, and then Admiral Benson, General Bliss, Vance McCor-
mick and our party took a launch to the Cruiser Huntington. Loulie and I

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have the Admirals quarters which are commodious and comfortable. We have a
private dining room, bath etc. The rest of the party remained on the Saint
Louis. I was glad of this arrangement for I do not want to be disturbed on
the way over further than to have conferences with General Bliss and Admiral
Benson. It is with them that my chief discussion lies.

ON BOARD BATTLESHIP HUNTINGTON.

November 3, 1917.

Up to date we have had a remarkable voyage. We have proceeded along slowly at the request of the British Admiralty as they do not desire us to cross the 30th meridian until after Sunday, November 4th at midnight. This is on account of the moonlight. Even then, there will be more or less moonlight, but less rather than more.

The Officers Mess gave us a dinner last night in the Ward Room.
There were thirty-two at the table. Commander Cage and Surgeon Kress did the
honors. It was a pleasant evening and we greatly enjoyed it.

The discussion on shipboard is almost entirely of submarines, their methods
of working, the way they are to be met, and every possible detail of that sub-
ject. One is reminded of the time when people took ship in earlier days and
did nothing but discuss pirates and the possibility of being attacked, robbed
and sunk by them. History is repeating itself. In those days of ruthless
piracy it was necessary to walk the plank, and the vessel and everyone on
board was destroyed. Today is the same. Some commanders allow the passengers
to escape, others compel them into open boats and shell them until all are de-
royed. It shows how little German civilization has progressed in the cen-
turies. In fact, has she progressed since the Stone Age when might was the
only code to regulate the conduct of people. It is humiliating to think that

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our western civilization should have developed such an unruly member. We are
on a level with the lower animals where the larger destroy the smaller and the
big fish eat the little.

There are constant drills on board and everything is being done to meet
attack, either by raiders or submarines. We sighted a ship this morning in
the dim distance, and later a whale spouted not far to the port, and there was
instant readiness with the guns. We carry four eight inch guns, fourteen six
inch, and eighteen three inch guns, besides innumerable torpedo tubes and depth
bombs. The Saint Louis is almost as heavily armed.

Our order of sailing is that we preceed the St Louis and the destroyer,
Balch, is a little forward of us on the port side. Tomorrow we expect to
pick up another destroyer and when we reach the real danger zone, five or six
more destroyers will pick us up and take us in. We will then proceed at full
speed.

I have had several talks with General Bliss and Admiral Benson preparato-
ry to our conferences in London and Paris.

November 4, 1917.

We have had an interesting day. The Admiral had an oil collier to meet
us in mid-ocean in order to re-fuel the destroyers. In addition to the
Balch, the Downs was also instructed to meet us at this point. The process of
fueling two destroyers in a high sea was both interesting and hazadous. It
took the better part of the day, and it was not until 3.30 that we continued
our course at nearly full speed. The decks have been cleared for action, the
sitting room in the rear of our private dining room is now filled with gunners,
crews of fourteen each, to operate the two stern guns on this deck. There is
a constant going in and out, both during the day and night, and unless one is
a good sleeper, as I am, it would be impossible to get much rest.

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November 5, 1917.

The British Admiralty and Admiral Sims insisted that we should not cross the 30th meridian until midnight last night. This morning we are going at top speed. The difference in the motion of the vessel is very considerable.

November 6, 1917.

We are covering a zig-zag course, which was also directed by the British Naval Staff. We met this morning at 8.30 four more destroyers. We now have a fleet of eight warships and are going at top speed, zig-zagging every ten to twenty minutes. We zigzag about fifty degrees. Under orders of the Navy Department at Washington, everyone is compelled to wear while on a battleship and in the submarine zone, a life belt both night and day. This does not add to comfort. As far as our party is concerned, it is merely a matter of form, for in case of necessity we would discard the jackets we are wearing for a more complete suit which we brought with us.

November 7, 1917.

Last night was the most anxious one for the Captain and the crew, as today is the most anxious day. We are all struck by the paucity of vessels. Outside of a sailing ship which, strangely enough, was going out under full sail, the only other craft we have seen today was a tremp steamer, hugging the coast.

When we were in the most dangerous part of the zone, it looked as if the St. Louis would not be able to continue the pace we had set, and the Huntington had to come to a complete stop and turn back in order to find what the trouble was with the St. Louis, since the signals were not satisfactory. However, she soon righted herself, steering gear and we continued on our way.

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November 8, 1917.

Before we reached Plymouth, a British destroyer came out to pilot us in. A hydroplane also came in order to see that our way was clear, and perhaps to add an additional touch of welcome.

We docked last night at 6.30 o'clock. There was a special train waiting to take us to London, and Admirals Jellicoe and Sims, General Colwell, Sir William Wiseman, Irwin Laughlin (of our Embassy) and Sir Ian Malcolm, representing the Foreign Office were on the quay to meet us. We took dinner on the train, and at twelve o'clock arrived at Paddington Station.

Mr. Balfour, Ambassador Page and others were at the station to welcome us. Mr. Balfour led the way with me to the first automobile and Page followed with Loulie. My immediate party drove to Chesterfield House, now the residence of the Duke and Duchess of Roxburghe, which has been placed at our disposal by the British Government. It is needless to tell of Chesterfield House since it is known to be one of the most beautiful houses in London. Of all the large town places I have seen here, it appeals to me most, especially the library. I have wondered since seeing this lovely house why more of our Americans have not sought to copy it.

My day started with a visit from the Ambassador. Then came Admiral Hall of the Intelligence Department. I complimented Hall upon the excellent work he has done, and my letter to him of some weeks ago tells what I think, of it. He is one of the driving forces of the war.

Geoffrey, Editor of the London Times, followed Hall. He desires to write a leader for his paper and wished me to give direction to its scope and tone which I was glad to do.

I went to No. 4 Carlton Gardens to lunch with Mr. Balfour. The only other guest was Sir Eric Drummond. Mr. Balfour had asked me last night

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whether I wished to lunch alone with him, or whether I would mind having Drummond. We made a survey of the entire field during and after luncheon. We spoke with the utmost candor, criticizing at times both Governments, and giving praise where we thought it due. Mr. Balfour expressed great pleasure at our coming at this time, and declared it meant much, not alone to Great Britain, but to the Entente cause, on account of the debacle in both Russia and Italy.

He greeted me with something akin to affection, and has made me feel that I have the confidence of his Government as much as I have of our own.

I left Mr. Balfour to return to Chesterfield House in order to meet the French Minister of Marine, now in London, who had expressed a desire to call. I think I succeeded in heartening him by saying that if France, Great Britain and the United States stood firmly together, success was unquestioned, and all that was needed was the fortitude to endure until victory came. While I have kept every note of boasting out of my conversation, at the same time, I have made them conscious of the strong arm we possess and of how determined we are to use it for the common good.

I saw some thirty to thirty-five newspaper men at six o'clock this afternoon. They represented practically the entire world, excepting the Central Powers. I gave them a written statement which is a part of the record, and in addition, I invited them to ask any questions they desired, expressing a willingness to respond if possible. Most of the questions were of such a nature that it was easy for me to say that the British Government was better informed upon that particular subject than I, and I referred them to that source of information.

One correspondent asked if the American people were not critical of the way the Allies had conducted the war. I replied that I could not speak, and never undertook to speak, for the people generally, but that the President

had no such feeling.

A South African correspondent was desirous of knowing my opinion of General Smuts. It was a pleasure to tell of the admiration every well informed American has for him. When they broke up to go, many of them lingered to have an individual word, which I gladly gave.

Loulie, Gordon and I went to an informal dinner at the Embassy. Page wanted to give a dinner to the entire Mission, which I vetoed. I asked him to let me come and dine with them quietly, and then give two or three formal dinners to the Mission, inviting such people as would facilitate their work while in London. He agreed to do this. Page has done everything that could be desired, so far, and has shown a disposition to play the part one might properly expect. I asked him today to make appointments for the Mission, excepting myself, with the British officials of opposite numbers.

I shall do everything possible not to offend his dignity, and I trust we may get away without there being any hurt feelings. I am sure Page is a popular Ambassador, and he runs the Embassy without friction though without much cohesion. He has an exaggerated idea of what the Embassy is doing and of the value of his assistants. If I am any judge of men, he has a mediocre staff. He makes a good speech, and is in his element since we entered the war against Germany. He showed me the portrait which, at my suggestion, his friends had Laszlo paint of him. It seems to me as good a portrait as Laszlo has done, and it is very lifelike.

November 9, 1917.

There have been many callers today. Among them were Mr. Asquith, the Harcourts, Sir Arthur Lee, Mrs. Whitelaw Reid, the Consul General and Mrs. Skinner, Lady and Admiral Jellico. I did not see any of them. In addition to these, there have been a number of telephone calls and requests for ap-

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declined.
pointments, all of which I have ixxiixxii I have made out a list of those whom
I consider it necessary for me to see and I am asking them to come at such
times as is most convenient. It is war now and it is essential that I confine
myself to the necessities of the situation.

In speaking to Balfour of this he said he did not know whether it was my
place or the place of the Cabinet Ministers to call first, because he knew and
paid so little attention to questions of etiquette, but he had the impression
that they should call upon me, and he advised that it be arranged that way. I
told him I was indifferent about it further than that it would be more conven-
ient to have them come to me because my time was so limited, and there was so
much important work to do.

My first caller was Sir Eric Drummond. We threshed out the question of
British representation at Washington. He repeated what Mr. Balfour had already
told me, that they were ready to recall Sir Cecil Spring-Rice and had offered
the post to Lord Grey of Fallodon who had declined, although they still have
hopes of I may be able to persuade him to accept.

Drummond showed me a confidential despatch which Mr. Balfour has been
sending British agents throughout the Empire. It had reference to the adjust-
ment of differences, should any arise, between American and British commercial
interests. Tomorrow or next day I shall write a letter to the President en-
closing him a copy of this note which I asked Drummond to embody in a letter to
me. He showed me the latest despatches received concerning the Italian and
Russian situations.

We have been offered every facility in the prosecution of our tasks.
I had the entire Mission to lunch today at Chesterfield House. In addition, I
asked Ambassador Page and Admiral Sims. After lunch we had a group sk picture
taken on the front steps of the house.

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It was necessary for me to excuse myself in order to receive M. Klotz, French Minister of Finance, who happens to be in London and who desired to confer with me. He is disturbed over the Russian and Italian news, as indeed almost everyone is. I tried to encourage him in every way possible. When he was leaving, we passed the compliments of the day in the usual effusive Latin he fashion, and expressed a keen desire to welcome us on French soil, as indeed, did the Minister of Marine yesterday.

Frazier tells me the French are making the Americans and British pay for everything in France, and that the courtesies we are being shown here by the British will not be extended by the French. He laughingly said he had been told that the French were charging the British ground rent for the trenches they occupy.

Sir George McDonough, Director of Military Intelligence, was an interesting caller. He is a canny Scot, and I did not get much from him. I learned afterward that it was because he feared Lloyd George might possible "scrub his head" if he told things which George desired to tell himself.

Lord Milner followed McDonough. Strangely enough, we found ourselves in agreement upon nearly all the subjects discussed. This is not unusual, for I have found that I can generally steer conversations away from contentious subjects. We might have talked a week upon certain things and never agreed upon one, but on the other hand, he remained for an hour and a half and we found ourselves in perfect accord upon all matters discussed.

Milner is able enough and judicious enough to see where this war is leading Europe, and he has a keen desire, as I have, to bring it to an end in some way that will not make the sacrifices futile. I gave him a detailed account of my activities in behalf of peace from the Spring of 1914 to date. I desired him to have the picture as I have seen it so we may work for like purposes.

While Milner was with me, Balfour telephoned and asked if he, Milner, would not come to the Foreign Office. Wiseman was with Balfour at the time and came up hastily to get Milner. It seems that Wiseman had been giving Balfour a "wigging" about not having an Agenda before we arrived, and he decided to get to work and make one. He thought the suggestion had come from me and that I was dissatisfied at the condition I found here. Balfour asked if I would consent to a postponement of the Paris Inter-Allied Conference from Friday of next week until Thursday of the week following. That is, from November 16th until November 22nd.

Henry Roberts came to dinner and took us to the theater. I did not remain more than a half hour and returned home to get at our work which is almost overwhelming, although I have in my entourage, Sir William Wiseman and his Secretary, Miss Denton, Gordon Auchincloss and his secretary, Hugh Frazier of the Paris Embassy and Hugh Millard, of the American Navy, whom I asked Admiral Sims to detail to me for code work.

I am in constant touch with each member of the Mission, and I have requested them to send memoranda of what they are doing each day. I have also asked that I be given copies of cables they are sending and receiving from their several departments in Washington.

November 10, 1917.

I have an invitation from the President of France to lunch with him next Monday. I have sent regrets because I shall not be there at that time.

The Lord Stamfordham telephoned today saying the King had returned and would like to see me on Sunday at any hour after eleven that would suit my convenience, and that he would like Loulie and me to lunch with them any day next week that was convenient to us. I named eleven o'clock Sunday as the time I would like to have him receive me, and Monday as the day for the lunch.

W. H. Buckler of the Embassy was my first caller. I told him quite frank-
ly that at the moment it was impossible for me to use him because of the atti-
tude Page has taken regarding him. Buckler with fine feeling understood per-
fectly and hoped I would do nothing to cause embarrassment.

I have had many invitation to lunch and dine, all of which have been
declined excepting those which included necessary conferences.

Bainbridge Colby followed Buckler to discuss the advisability of command-
deering all neutral shipping in the world. It is a startling project and I
declined to give a definite opinion, until I had looked further into it. My
first thought is that Great Britain and the United States should not set a
precedent that might some day return to haunt us. I will not be a party to
any action akin to what Germany has done in the violation of Belgium.

Before Colby left, Lord Robert Cecil was announced, and I asked Colby
to remain and discuss that question with us. Much to my surprise, Cecil
agreed with Colby, the argument of both being that it would work to the ad-
vantage of the neutrals. This may be true, nevertheless, it is a pretext upon
which such high-handed action by powerful nations is always done. Lord Robert
and I conferred after Colby left, taking up the embargo question, the shipping
question and many other subjects in which our countries have a common interest.
I like Cecil very much.

I lunched with Bonar Law at 11 Downing Street. There was no one pres-
ent other than ourselves excepting his daughter. Law is depressed and broken.
Both of his sons have been killed and he cannot restrain his emotion in speak-
ing of them. Nothing that can happen in the future can compensate him for their
loss. The lunch was very simple, as indeed it should be. It consisted of
roast beef, potatoes and cauliflower and afterward apple tart and coffee.
He is practicing economy of food which public men preach but seldom follow.

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After lunch we discussed the possibility of terminating the war and the war's aftermath. I told him of the President's purpose to address Congress on the subject of economic freedom, and to threaten Germany with an economic war in the event she refused to be a party to a just and lasting peace. He expressed unqualified approval.

I went from Downing Street to the Embassy to see Page for a few minutes. It was my first call at the Chancellery and merely perfunctory. I had to hurry back to Chesterfield House to meet A. G. Gardiner of the Daily News. I like Gardiner and Gardiner's sort, and we had a pleasant half hour together before Sir Edward Carson arrived. With Gardiner I did most of the talking, telling him of the President's purposes and of his proposed message to Congress. Gardiner expressed his conviction that the President was the hope of the world. He feels much as I do, and expressed himself as I did in almost the last letter I wrote the President before leaving New York.

Carson is a man with whose views I have little sympathy, and yet we talked for nearly an hour without disagreement because, knowing his mind, I avoided controversial subjects. I got little of value from him. I do not believe he is now in close touch with the situation.

Philip Kerr, of the Round Table, and now acting as Secretary to the Prime Minister, displaced Carson. Kerr's entire time was taken up in discussing the possibility of resurrecting Russia on the one hand, and Italy on the other, and giving Germany a knock-out blow in the spring. I did not find his talk of much importance as he seemed thoroughly impractical.

Mr. Balfour and Lady Essex dined with us. After dinner Mr. Balfour and I retired to the library and conferred for more than an hour. At his request, I gave a detailed view of the situation at Washington, especially as it referred to Sir Cecil Spring-Rice. He was emphatic that the Ambassador

must come home and soon. He said he had just seen the King and had told
him that their only hope of inducing Lord Grey to accept the place was by my
persuasion.

We talked of the proposed Supreme War Council which Great Britain, France
and Italy have agreed to form. It is to consist of the Prime Minister and
a military member from each country as adviser, and Mr. Balfour followed up
the argument Drummond made yesterday upon the same subject concerning the ad-
visability of the United States have representation in it. After analysing
the question for some time, we thought it would not be necessary for the
United States to be constantly represented on the civil end, but that we
permanent
should keep a military representative on it. I suggested General Blies
as a suitable member.

There was some discussion as to my permanently sitting as the civil
member, but in conferring with Balfour, Drummond and Wiseman upon the subject,
we came to the conclusion that I was more needed in Washington than here.

Carson said this, at a recent Cabinet meeting, he had been inhospita-
ble enough to object to my coming over because he thought it far more nec-
essary for me to be at the President's elbow than to be in Europe.

Wiseman joined the discussion Balfour and I were having. I told Mr.
Balfour of the help Sir William was to all of us, and to what degree he had
my confidence. I had no secrets from him, and he had access to my papers
with about as much freedom as any of my secretaries. Balfour seemed touched
with this evidence of confidence and in return offered me the freedom of the
Foreign Office, stating I might have any papers they had no matter of how
confidential a nature. It reminded me somewhat of my little Irish terrier
Bobs. When I treated him particularly well he would dig up his most precious
bone and lay it at my feet. It was the best he could do. I appreciate

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Balfour's motives just as much as if it were necessary to avail myself of
his offer. As a matter of fact, I get everything the Foreign Office has from
Sir William and others.

The Foreign Office has detailed Sir William to me during my stay in
Europe, and he and Lady Wiseman are staying with us at Chesterfield House.

November 11, 1917.

Last night Balfour asked whether I cared to have the King receive or
entertain the Mission. I replied that I should prefer his not doing so, but
I was sure the Mission would be disappointed if they did not meet the King
therefore we would be glad to accept his hospitality for lunch.

Balfour has invited the Mission to dine with him to meet the Prime Min-
ister and several of the Cabinet. Inadvertently, his secretary sent me an
invitation for which Balfour apologized because he thought I feel embarrassed
to decline. It so happened that I had declined before his explanation was
made.

I walked with Wiseman to Buckingham Palace this morning at eleven o'clock
to keep my engagement with the King. There was a large crowd at the gates
watching the changing of the guards. I was with the King for nearly an
hour. During this time Wiseman was with Stamfordham and other members of
the Household. The King and I covered the ground quite thoroughly. He
was exceedingly cordial. We talked of the naval situation, the army, mu-
nitions, airplanes, and the question of my sitting in the new Supreme War
Council. He took up, as Balfour told me he would, the question of recall-
ing Spring-Rice and sending Lord Grey. He said Balfour had told him that
the one chance of getting Grey lay with me, and he wished to tell me that I
might say to Grey that he, the King, thought it his duty to accept the post,
and that he would personally appreciate it if he would go. He said I

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might use his name in any way I thought necessary to bring about acceptance.

I gave the King messages from the President, (which the President would have been surprised to have heard), and he, in turn, was equally responsive. We always have pleasant visits together, and he seems to have as genuine a likeing for me as I have grown to have for him. In speaking of the President, he referred to his autocratic power, stating he was the greatest autocrat in the world. He touched, with a tinge of bitterness, upon the assumption of autocratic powers by some of his Prime Ministers. He plainly referred to Lloyd George, and I could see there was considerable feeling lurking under the surface. He spoke of Grey and Asquith in the highest terms, but was guarded in what he said of his present Prime Minister.

I told him, as I have before, of the permanency of his position and of the passing power of the President and Prime Minister. They were here today, but gone tomorrow, while he was always to be found in the same place.

Loulie and I lunched today with Admiral and Lady Jellico. Admiral Benson was also present. The conversation was general, but as we were leaving Jellico said he would like to see me for a confidential talk before I left London. It was agreed that it had best take place toward the end of my stay, and his secretary is to ring me up Sunday or Monday for me to make an engagement. Jellico evidently has something on his mind. I promised to call at the Admiralty some day to see the "holy of holies" where his confidential maps and information are kept.

What an opportunity Jellico missed at the Battle of Jutland! He easily might have become the greatest sea captain of all time if he had been willing to take a gamblers chance. In my opinion he should not have hesitated to do this, for chances were many in his favor, and a complete defeat of the German fleet would have had a far-reaching effect. Benson and every

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naval authority with whom I have talked, believe he could have destroyed the
German fleet at that battle. If he had done so, his name would have ranked
with that of Nelson, and perhaps he would have been placed on even a higher
pedestal.

I called at Claridaes today for the first time to see Benson and
Bliss. I wished to confer with them about several matters, and I desired
to ask Bliss if he would care to have me suggest his name to the President
for the Supreme War Council which is being formed. He took the matter under
consideration before giving an answer.

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November 12, 1917.I

I walked to the Embassy this morning to see Page in order to ask his advice concerning a matter of several matters, about which I thought he would like to be consulted. I also saw Irwin Laughlin for a few moments.

Massingham of The Nation was my first caller at Chesterfield House. He thanked me cordially for having used my good offices in getting the ban lifted from his publication. I do not know where he got his information but he knew of my endeavors. Massingham gave me some information of the situation here which I consider valuable. I was sorry not to have a longer time with him, but it was necessary for him to make way for General, Sir William Robertson.

Robertson is a plain, forceful soldier without polish but without subtlety and seems to know his job. I was prepared to hear him criticise the proposed Supreme War Council of which he is not to be a member. General Robertson, who is to be the military member, is not on rapport with either Robertson or Haig. Robertson talked to me in confidence, asking me not to repeat what he said. I asked if he had considered how dangerous it was to go much further in Asia Minor. I feared a disaster might happen to the British there similar to that which came to the Italians on the Piave. He assured me they had no intention of pushing beyond the safety line. He said the Turks had become rather assertive and it was necessary to give them a dressing down. When that was done, nothing further, at the moment, was contemplated. I found him against dividing the Allied forces into the several expeditions this, that or the other one thought advisable. He wishes to concentrate on the Western Front, and he believes in the British having control of their own forces without regard to France, for they might have to stand alone against the enemy. The British seem to have the pre-war British prejudice against

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the French.

Sidney Brooks came for a half hour. He believes Lloyd George and Northcliffe will have a row and, as he expressed it, "many wigs will fall upon the green". He said he was present when George asked Northcliffe to go to the United States and was surprised when Northcliffe consented. Later, he said, he was with Lloyd George when a third friend asked why Northcliffe was sent to America and whether it was not because he was becoming troublesome. George admitted that this was his reason. When everyone asks me, from the King down, about Northcliffe's career in the United States, I have to tell them he has been surprisingly modest; that he has taken advice and altogether has done well.

Loulie and I lunched with the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. Prince Albert and the Princess Mary were the only others present. We sat at a small table in a corner room overlooking Green Park and the Mall. It was as informal and as friendly as if it had been a family party. The lunch itself was simple, consisting of a course of fish, chops and two vegetables, some stewed fruit and the inevitable cheese and coffee. No wine was served. The King apologised for this and said with some feeling that he had been "tricked into promising not to touch spiritous liquors during the period of the war" a promise he had faithfully kept. He blamed Lloyd George for getting him into this and said no one else in the Kingdom observed it. I think it was so far as he knew.

The Princess Mary is a sweet, modest girl. I have never seen her or lovelier coloring. After lunch we watched an airplane from the windows and sat around laughing and talking until time for us to go. I was charmed with their simplicity and cordiality.

I called on the French Ambassador as a matter of courtesy. We discussed my proposed trip to Paris and he invited me in behalf of his Government to be the guest of the French Republic. I accepted for myself, but declined

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for the Mission in general. Paul Cambon is a high type of the old fashioned diplomat, cultured and courteous. He is, I think, out of date in these rough and tumble times, and is not fitted to deal with a man like Lloyd George.

I returned to Chesterfield House in order to receive Lord Curzon, who had expressed a wish to call. I found he knew nothing of importance, not even what was going on in his own Governmental circles, although he is supposed to be a member of the War Board.

Viscount Grey of Fallodon did me the honor of coming down from North-umberland to see me. He dined with us tonight. After dinner we had a long and interesting conference. As I have said before, the King had asked me to try to persuade him to accept the Ambassadorship to the United States. Balfour also asked me to persuade him and when I commenced to talk to Grey about the matter, he said "I realize I am to have my hardest tussle now. I have refused to accept the offer, but you have put it in a way that I find difficult to evade."

My main argument with him was that if he would come to Washington, the President, he and I could formulate peace plans. The three of us thought alike and I was glad to believe, unselfishly. Together we could formulate a peace program which would be of benefit to the entire world and, therefore, of benefit to both Great Britain and the United States. Grey replied that he did not possess the confidence of the present Government, and if he undertook to formulate a peace program with us, it would not meet the views of the Government, and he did not believe it fair to put his own views forth in such a conference when he knew they did not coincide with those of the Government he was supposed to represent.

I found, too, that he did not desire to accept an ambassadorship or to perform ambassadorial functions. If he comes at all, he prefers to come as a special ambassador like Reading or Balfour, precisely the thing we do not want

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since it makes for friction. It means a multiplicity of those in authority, and confusion, and it is that we are trying to rid ourselves of which

Grey and I reviewed the war from its beginning. He recalled our many conversations, and he was pleased when I brought to his mind what he had said about the sanctity of treaties, almost a year in advance of Germany's violation of Belgium. The occasion of his remarks was the RANUANU PANAMA tolls controversy, a controversy which the President settled to the lasting glory of honest diplomacy. He recalled, too, my predictions as to the war after my visit to Germany in the Spring of 1914. We had a delightful evening.

November 13, 1917.

The most interesting happening of the day was my dinner with Lloyd George at No. 10 Downing Street. Immediately upon his return from the Continent he went to see the King; and he then wrote me an autograph note inviting me to dine with him alone.

There was no one present, not even members of the family. I was amused to see him drink both champagne and cognac. The King told me that he thought Lloyd George refused to touch liquor himself, but served it to his guests. George evidently does not refuse to help himself when the occasion presents itself. He laughingly told me that he went to the Palace upon his return from Italy to make a report to the King about the situation there, but he left without saying more than a word or two upon that subject, as the King talked to him steadily about "Colonel House's visit who has cheered me more than anything that has occurred for a long while, etc. etc."" He said he could not get the King off the subject, and at last it became amusing and he left.

Baron Moncheur, the Belgian Minister, was received by the King on Monday and he, too, told me that the King was full of "Colonel House". I am

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glad for I did my best to cheer and please him and it seems I accomplished my purpose.

But to go back to the Prime Minister and more serious matters, George wished to explain his attitude regarding the Supreme War Council and to convince me that the United States should sit in. I had already made up my mind what was best to do, and I gave my reasons for thinking it would not be wise for us to have a representative who, at all times, would sit in with the Allied Prime Ministers and Ministers for Foreign Affairs. I promised to recommend that General Bliss, or some other military personage, should sit with the military branch of it. George was satisfied with this, but he wished me to sent to his making a statement in the House of Commons tomorrow that we approved the idea and would send a representative. I declined emphatically to permit this until it had been submitted to Washington.

He said that Rupert Petain and Cadorna thoroughly approve the plan. He also said that Petain does not approve of future offensives on the Western Front. If George has his way, and if he represents Petain correctly, there will be no further offensives in France, but they will wait until the United States can throw her strength on the Allied side, or until Russia can recover sufficiently to make a drive on the Eastern Front. I suggested if we definitely decided upon that policy, it might be well to make a public statement. The Germans would not receive it with enthusiasm; the thought that the Allies on the Western Front proposed sitting still and holding the line until the end of 1918 or the beginning of 1919, when the United States could bring her full power against them. George concurred in this view, but we left it for further discussion.

Curiously enough, he now has in mind some such warfare as the younger Pitt waged against Napoleon. George called attention to the fact that Pitt was look-

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ing
sland down upon us from the wall where his portrait hangs. George thought
the same condition faced us now as England faced in 1815. I combatted this
idea. He said if we could hold the seas, we could continue to fight in France
as long as she would fight, and if she quit, we could continue to hold our lines
on the Western Front. I pointed out the impossibility of this. He replied,
"Well we could wait until France recovered somewhat and ask her to join us again
when we could all continue the struggle". Here again, he had in mind the war
Great Britain waged against Napoleon. I insisted that France would never re-enter the war if she was once out.

His next proposal was that we get at Germany through Belgium. He declared the United States could take charge of Russia, put her railroads in good condition, manufacture guns and put her men back in the fight. This, mind you, after Russia was supposed to have been out of the war for a year or more like France. It is strange that so brilliant a man should talk such nonsense. Conditions are as different now from what they were in Napoleon's time as moonlight from sunlight. The only similarity is that Germany set out to conquer the world just as Napoleon did.

I told George, as I have told others here, that if we had sufficient
fortitude and did not permit the Russian and Italian disasters to blur our vis-
ion and depress our spirits, we could at least force Germany into a righteous
peace. The economic and naval power of Great Britain and the United States
make it impossible for Germany to win, provided we stand together and are reso-
lute.

George was good enough to recall some of the predictions I had made upon
former visits, many of them having come true. He deprecated the quarrel be-
tween himself and Asquith saying "if England had had a Colonel House, it could
never have happened", because you would have held each of us off at arms length

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and put each in his place" He said it could have been done, and should have been done, and he is sorry for the present status of affairs.

A little later in the evening he called in his secretary, Philip Kerr, and asked him to give me a copy of the Rapallo Agreement. He was surprised when I told him I had already seen it, the French Embassy having furnished me with the text almost immediately after it had been executed. George made a brilliant and convincing argument in favor of that pact. I opposed

I emphasized the lack of coordination existing at present and urged that something be done at once to bring it about. He agreed to this, and tomorrow some action will be taken by us both in that direction. I returned to Chesterfield House and wrote a despatch to the President, a copy of which is attached.

Early in the day I went to Claridaes to confer with the members of the Mission. I then returned to receive visitors. Scott of the Manchester Guardian was the first. I found he did not have any accurate knowledge of American newspapers. He gave me a hasty resume of political conditions here which was not of much value since I knew in advance what his point of view was.

Lord Northcliffe called before Scott left and it was arranged that they should not catch a glimpse of one another, since we feared it would be fatal. Northcliffe has arrived from the United States and came at once to see me. He is pessimistic as to conditions here and optimistic over conditions in America. He insists that we should read the riot act to this Government and force them into a better pace. Strangely enough, Reading, just as he did the last time I saw them both in New York, followed Northcliffe. I only saw him a moment, but I insisted that he help in every way possible to bring about a better coordination. Reading's influence with Lloyd George is greater perhaps than any other man's in England, and it is on this I am playing. Both Reading and Northcliffe are to scout around for a day or so and gather what news of im-

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portance that seems worth bringing to me.

Donald, of The Chronicle, followed. There again, I got nothing of
value. He asked me about Northcliffe's stay in the United States. Knowing
how much he dislikes Northcliffe I should have preferred not discussing him, but
since he put the question direct I told him that Northcliffe had done well and
had been both modest and responsive to advice.

Maxse, Editor of the Fortnightly Review came after Donald. He was much ex-
ercised over Lloyd George's Paris speech of yesterday and hoped I would take a
strong stand against his proposal for a Supreme War Council. If I had not been
at this sort of work for many years, it would probably throw my perspective out
of focus to have one person follow another in quick succession, each giving a to-
tally opposite view.

We lunched with the Asquiths. The other guests were the Marquis
of Lansdowne and Mr. and Mrs. Lever (the artiest). It is good for one's self
discipline to occasionally come in touch with Mrs. Asquith. She has perhaps
the most irritating personality in all the world. She did all the talking be-
cause I was afraid to express an opinion even about the weather. She very
d
candidly told me Mr. Asquith's views upon all pening questions. I was espe-
cially interested in what she told me he had said about George's new proposal
and of his Paris speech.

I had some conversation with Asquith after lunch, but since he dis-
claimed any information regarding governmental affairs, and since I was very
cautious in what I said to him, it was not an interesting discussion. We left
shortly after luncheon as I had promised to call on Mrs. John Astor on my way
to Chesterfield House.

General Smuts was my first afternoon caller. Nearly everyone I have met
has asked me to be certain to see Smuts. He has grown to be the lion of the

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hour. I was rather disappointed in him, although it is fair to say that my expectations were unusually high for it was not alone what I had heard of him, but I have been impressed by speeches and statements which I have read from time to time. He has just returned from Italy, but what he told me of conditions there was a mere repetition of what I already knew. He spoke enthusiastically of the plan for the new Supreme War Council. This was valuable for I have confidence in his opinion. He is one of the few men I have met in the Government who does not seem tired. He is alert, energetic and forceful. I shall hope to see more of him in the future for our views must be fairly in accord from what he has publicly said.

The French Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, came next. We had a long and interesting conversation. I called attention to the undesirability of making Alsace and Lorraine an ultimatum, telling him why in very much the same terms as I have used with others, and have written the President in my letter of the 11th which is a part of the record. He agreed that it was worse than useless to talk of territorial changes at present. He said, though, this was his personal view and he would not like to be quoted as being the spokesman of his Government.

Mr. Frazier has written a summary of our conversation and it is attached.

Lord Bryce came next. He desired to enlist my good offices, and get my opinion, regarding a plan which he and his colleagues have submitted to the British Government suggesting the appointment of a commission to formulate plans for machinery to ensure peace after the war. I was sorry to tell him that the President felt it was best not to have a cut and dried agreement, but was in favor of a flexible understanding so that those concerned could get together and formulate plans to meet any emergency. He admitted there was much to be said in favor of this. I asked him to submit his views in writing and I promised to discuss it with the President when I returned to Washington.

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Noel Buxton called but I was unable to see him as I had to hurry in order to meet the dinner engagement with Lloyd George about which I have already written.

November 14, 1917.

Again I wish to state that this diary in no way gives an adequate account of my daily activities. It is impossible for maxxaxgixxaxkmaxkxkmaxkxixx. Then, too, there is so much done by word of mouth, so many directions given, so many decisions taken of which there is no record. For instance, Northcliffe tells me over the telephone that the Prime Minister is trying to induce him to accept a post in the Cabinet. He declined, giving as his reason that he did not desire to join "so spineless a body" and he does not wish to place himself in a position where he cannot criticise. Northcliffe says that when Lloyd George returned, he called upon him and stated that he must see me immediately. Lloyd George replied that " a meeting has been arranged for tomorrow", whereupon Northcliffe told him to "sit down and write Colonel House at once with your own hand the most cordial note you know how to pen and ask him to dine with you alone tonight". This he says is a true account of what happened and the history of the dinner invitation. I mention this because such incidents are constantly happening of which I have no record and which slip my memory. It is common knowledge that Northcliffe treats Lloyd George as if he, the Prime Minister, was subordinate and speculation is rife as to when *kxix* the worm will turn.

Admiral Benson was my first caller. He says the Admiralty are making plans to take us safely across the Channel.

I went to Claridaes to see General Bliss to tell him that I considered it his duty to accept a place on the Supreme War Council, provided the President asked him. I told him I had cabled the President recommending his appointment. He asked whether I considered him competent to fill so important a place. He said if the President and I felt he was and wanted him to do it, he would be

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glad to accept. He hoped, however, that he would be continued as Chief of
Staff, believing that position would enable him to have more influence and do
better work in the Supreme War Council. I promised to use my best efforts in
this direction. I have come to like and admire both Bliss and Benson.

The Belgian Minister was an early caller to pay his respects and thank me
for the courtesies shown him when he was in the United States.

Lord French followed. He was exceedingly cordial and invited me
to ask him any questions I desired. What I wished to know was his opinion
of the proposed Supreme War Council. He was enthusiastic in his support of
it and hoped I would recommend a United States representative for it.

He told of his troubles with Asquith. He said, "I suppose you know that
while I was given a peerage, I was kicked out of command, and all because I did
not do the impossible". He spoke well of General Wilson and of the move to
make him a member of the Supreme War Council. He expressed the hope that I
would give it my endorsement. I promised to dine with him next week if I
remained here until that time, and he offered to let me name the guests. He
was one of the most cordial visitors I have had and, considering I know him so
slightly, it puzzles me somewhat.

Lady Robert Scott came to luncheon. I coust her among my best friends
in London. She is working in the Pension Bureau during the war, discontinuing
her sculpture work for the moment. She is one of the most patriotic women I
know. This is saying much, for the women of England have proven themselves
worthy of the best traditions of the race. Lady Essex told me the other
night that her daughter went to one of the hospitals in the early morning hours
on top of a bus, and scrubbed brass and did other menial work during the day,
returning home at night as she had gone.

My old friend Sir William Tyrrell was another caller. The British

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Government have given Tyrrell a task somewhat similar to the one I have undertaken for the United States, i.e. gathering of data and preparing a case for the peace conference. Tyrrell has not lost his perspective. He has the same logical outlook as before the war. I can understand how deeply such a man regrets the madness of the hour and of his impotence to stop it.

He said he remembered the warning I gave the British Government when I returned from Germany in the Spring of 1914. He threw up his hands and said, "Oh, if we could have realized conditions as fully as you did". He recalled every prophesy I had made, some of which I had forgotten, but which seemed burned into his memory because of the tragic aftermath.

It is needless to go into the exchange of our views as to what the peace conference should do, because we were entirely of one mind. He looks upon it as I do-- as a great opportunity which may be lost because of the grasping, selfish interests ever ready to use such occasions for their own and their country's aggrandizement.

He told me of von Kuhlman, whom he knows well. He was a much keener and deeper portrayal of Kuhlman than that given me by Elkus, who also knew him in Constantinople. I feel now as if I had a definite grip on von Kuhlman's mind and it may be helpful.

Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretary to the War Council, followed Tyrrell. Hankey has a wide knowledge of the inner workings of the war machinery. We threshed out at length various plans for coordination, and he was loath to leave when one of my secretaries announced Lord Lansdowne.

I found Lansdowne is a peculiarly pacific turn of mind. He condemned as thoroughly as I have done in these pages the folly and madness of some of the British leaders. He thought it was time for the British to realize that in the settlement they need not expect to get what he termed "twenty shillings to the pound". He believes that definite war aims should be set out-- aims

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that are moderate and that will appeal to moderate minds in all countries. He specifically set forth five or six things he thought necessary to be done and, strangely enough, conservative that he is, we scarcely disagreed at all. A more liberal sea policy, bordering on my plan for the freedom of the seas, which indeed, he was good enough to say he had obtained from me during my last visit here. He thought it would be necessary to give Germany an assurance as to our future economic policy which would not in any way restrict German trade. He was moderate in all his ideas and, if I have time, I shall see him again and try to use his influence to bring about a more rational sentiment.

Lansdowne is a great gentleman. He has what Grey and Balfour have and yet something more. Not in intellect, not in character, but in manner and that intangible, indefinable air which comes from man having for a background an ancient and distinguished lineage.

November 15, 1917.

Wiseman and I decided this morning to read the riot act to Mr. Lloyd George. He told someone yesterday that he did not believe he would go to the Paris Conference. Wiseman and I believe he will. I asked Wiseman to ring up Lord Northcliffe and tell him if Lloyd George did not go to the Conference I would not go myself and I would advise the French Government to call it off. I asked him to say to Northcliffe that if this were done, it would have a disastrous effect throughout the Allied countries and would exasperate Germany.

George, upon the impulse of the moment, has created the Supreme War Council and now he does not think it necessary to have the main conference. He is mistaken, and I shall insist upon it going through as scheduled, not indeed, for what it may do in its deliberations, but for its moral effect.

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When Sir William spoke to Northcliffe about it, he thoroughly agreed with my position and invited Wiseman to go with him to take lunch alone with the Prime Minister. Wiseman tells me that Northcliffe is willing to be guided by the President and me, having suddenly conceived a great respect for our opinion. We believe Northcliffe can be used to club Lloyd George into any plan we consider wise.

Northcliffe is to come at three o'clock and later in the day I shall write more in detail. It is planned to urge Lloyd George to help bring about better coordination in our working forces, and we have picked Lord Reading as the instrument to see that it is properly done. Lloyd George is to preside at a meeting to be held at No. 10 Downing Street. It is to take place in the same room in which the British Cabinet declared war against the United States under the administration of Lord North.

Later in the day, Wiseman telephoned from the Prime Minister's residence asking if it would be convenient to have Lloyd George come to Chesterfield House at once. Of course, I answered yes. He said the Prime Minister decided to call on me instead of asking me to come to him, his secretaries were struck dumb. It is the first time, so he says, that the Prime Minister has made such a call.

Before Lloyd George arrived, the Lord Chief Justice came apropos of nothing. It was evident to me, though, that Lloyd George had asked him to come. We talked a few minutes before the Prime Minister was announced. I told Reading that it was absolutely essential that the Paris Conference be held and why, and I thought he had made a mistake in announcing his plan for a Supreme War Council before the Conference was held. It should have been announced then, and if it had been, there would not have been the slightest criticism from any source, because everyone would have thought it had been decided upon

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by common agreement, and that the United States was largely responsible for it.

Reading agreed to this but excused George on account of the urgency of the situation in Italy, an excuse I did not accept because the Italian morale was stiffened not by that decision but by the announcement that Great Britain and France had decided to send troops to Italy to help hold that front.

I called Reading's attention to the importance of Lloyd George working cordially with me. If he did, I thought his Government could not be overthrown. In saying this I intended a covert threat which I think Reading caught. At this stage, the Prime Minister and Wiseman came in. George greeted Reading with enthusiasm, saying how delighted he was that he should have happened to be here at this time. He was just the man he wished to be present, for he had something very disagreeable to ask me. I marvelled that a man of George's ability should undertake to act so patent a farce.

He made a long speech urging me to consent to a postponement of the Interallied Conference. I listened quietly, for Reading had told me in advance of his coming what he would say, and I had told Reading that I would consent to postpone the Conference for a week but not longer. Reading and I had talked it out so all the arguments George gave were mere repetitions. Because of the Italian situation; because of the lack of a French Ministry, it would be futile to have a conference before these two situations composed themselves.

George wished to postpone it until a more distant date but I insisted upon naming the 29th of November, and this was finally agreed upon. He is to send for Balfour and have him communicate with the French Government and explain the reasons it will not be possible to hold the Conference on the 22nd. France is to be told that the situation in Italy is the cause of the postponement, and Italy will be told that it is because of conditions in France.

I now have both Reading and Northcliffe, Lloyd George's closest friends,

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working to force the Prime Minister to coordinate the work we have in hand.
Northcliffe delights in this. He is as eager as a hound on a trail. Today
he refused another offer from George to become a member of the Cabinet. He
wished Northcliffe to become Minister of the Air Service.

J. St Loe Strachey called this morning. He was much annoyed with Lloyd
George's Paris speech. He considers it wholly inexcusable. He is also against
the Supreme War Council. When he left he said that when I was here last, the
most memorable conversation that had ever taken place in his life occurred. I
had then told him that, in my opinion, Germany would make an immediate attack
on the Western Front, probably at Verdun, a fact which he said he communicated
to the Government, and which proved to be true soon after the prediction was
made. He believes he was the only recipient of this information, but as a
matter of fact, I had already told Grey and other members of the Government.

Strachey apologised for having criticised the President. In a polite way
I tried to make him feel thoroughly ashamed.

We lunched with the Duke of Connaught and the Princess Patricia at Clarence
House. There was no one else present except a Colonel whose name I did not
catch, (He is on Sir Douglas Haig's staff,) and a lady whose name I do not remem-
ber. It was a simple meal, even as that of the King and Queen. I like
the King, Queen and Princess Mary better than I do the Duke and Princess Pat.
It is perhaps because I know the King better, for the Duke was kindness and
cordiality itself.

After I returned to Chesterfield House, some newspaper men called,
among them Frederick Wile and George Lansbury, my old socialist friend. I
talked the latter clearly into the President's position regarding the war, and
I made him feel that things would finally come right. I told him something
of our negotiations with Germany and of how impossible it had been to make

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peace with the militarists of that country. When he left he said with some
emotion, "there are many of us who are praying for you."

Among my callers today was General Bliss. He is much disturbed over
the war situation as indeed is Admiral Benson whom I have also seen. My des-
patches to the President today is a part of the record.

November 16, 1917.

My letter to the President is a part of the diary.

At 12.20 the Ambassador and members of the Mission began to arrive and at a
quarter to one the King's carriages came to take us to the Palace. Page, Benson,
Bliss and I rode in the first carriage. The other followed. We were received
by the Lord Stamfordham and the King's Equerries and taken into the drawing room
and soon thereafter the King, Queen, Princess Mary and Prince Albert were announc-
ed. The King asked the Chamberlain to present me and after a few minutes conver-
sation we all proceeded to the dining room. The only other guests besides the
members of the Mission were the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour and the Members of
the Household.

I sat between the Queen and the Prime Minister, but my conversation was
mostly with the Queen and was all of a more or less intimate character. She
recalled with some amusement my prediction that Northcliffe would begin an at-
tack on the Ministry, and cited his letter in the morning press declining to ac-
cept a Cabinet position as evidence. She seemed to talk without hesitation
about matters of state or of personages, which would be embarrassing if repeated.

I laughingly recalled to the Queen a passage in Gerard's book relating to
the lunch which he and I took at Potsdam when the Kaiser referred to us as "two
black crows".

I was amused at Page when we were on our way down to take the car-
riages asking General Bliss to discard his eyeglasses. He made the General

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nervous by telling how particular the King was that no one should wear glasses in his presence and particularly gold rimmed ones. He also spoke of cuff links having to be of the right pattern and said that since the Court had been in mourning he, Page, had worn a black and white tie.

After lunch, Lloyd George, the King, Queen and Royal Family had each of the Mission brought up to talk to them separately. This took from a half to three quarters of an hour. While Lloyd George and I stood apart telling jokes and laughing at his predicament with Northcliffe. I told him something of Northcliffe's visit and of how perturbed we were when we heard he was coming. He said, of course you know why I sent him. I gave him an account of the way we took him in hand and of how we had tried to steer him straight. George thought it was a remarkable achievement, but he said toward the end, "I notice before he left, Northcliffe was doing much more talking, and I expected every day to have to recall him". I asked if Northcliffe was to return to the United States. He replied, "I hope you will ask for him because I should like to send him. I would even be willing to take Roosevelt for awhile in exchange, although" he added quickly, "not permanently". He spoke of Roosevelt having "lectured" the British Government when he was here, telling them among other things, how to govern Egypt.

We had a good time and I am afraid the King and Queen, whom I know dislike George, wondered how I could be on such friendly terms with him.

I returned to Chesterfield House in order to see Northcliffe. Later, while I was talking with him, Sir Charles Gordon and Geoffrey Dawson, Editor of the Times, joined us. My talk with Northcliffe was along general lines. He spoke of the Government's lack of efficiency. He thought there were only two men in it of any value, George and Milner, but Dawson included Geddes and Carson, and so it goes. No two opinions alike. Northcliffe criticised Balfour's and Bonar Law's inefficiency and said they should be gotten rid of forthwith. He included

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Jellico in this group. He referred to Jellico as "the man who ran away from a sea fight".

Thomas, a labor leader, and Davis, one of his confreres, followed. Thomas seems to be an able fellow but illiterate. I am wondering whether he has purposely refused to better his grammar and accent. He may believe that it gives him a stronger hold upon the 400 000 members of the Labor League of which he is the head.

My old friend, Marten Bailey, came to walk with me and upon our return I saw and talked with some ten or twelve American newspaper correspondents. I talked to them nearly three quarters of an hour, telling them some things in confidence and others which they might publish.

We dined with the Lord Chief Justice and Lady Reading. The other guests were the Prime Minister and Mrs. George, Sir William and Lady Wiseman. After the ladies left the table, the Prime Minister, Reading, Sir William and I discussed the general situation. I desired to find what was in Lloyd George's mind regarding peace terms. I believe I succeeded. I find it will be useless to try to get either the French or British to designate terms. Great Britain cannot meet the new Russian terms of "no indemnities and no aggression" and neither can France. Great Britain at once would come in sharp conflict with her Colonies and they might cease fighting, and France would have to relinquish her dream of Alsace and Lorraine.

George does not believe the Allies can do much in 1918, therefore, he wishes the concentrated effort made in 1919. I asked if he thought Russia and Italy would be willing to go through until that time. He thought not, but he did not believe their defection would hurt the Allied cause any more than their lack of help at the present time. I asked if France could hold out until 1919 and expressed my own doubts. I determined not to push him

further for a statement of peace terms, but concluded to wait until I return
to Washington and advise the President to do it. We are not embarrassed by
any desire for territory or commercial gain, therefore, we are making in a better
position to outline peace terms than any of the belligerents.

Lloyd George evidenced a desire to come to the United States and I
think we can count upon his presence there in the near future. He wishes to
come, he says, to have a two or three hour talk with the President and return
immediately without seeing anyone else or without stopping longer than that time.
This is spectacular enough to appeal to his Celtic imagination, and the more he
thinks of it, the more he will want to do it.

We had a delightful dinner but broke up early since we were all tired.
I shall invite them to Chesterfield House for Tuesday night to have a further and
perhaps final talk.

One of the newspaper men gave me an article this afternoon which Clemenceau
wrote for his *l'Homme Enchaine* and asked whether I would like to have it cabled
to America. I asked him to do so. It is complimentary to the United States
and to me personally.

November 17, 1917.

The President's cable which came this morning is an important document of
the day and is attached. As I expected, he has accepted my recommendation re-
garding General Bliss and the Supreme War Council. He evidently wishes me to
help
sit on it in order to formulate a definite policy. I shall do this but with-
out extending my stay unless something unforeseen turns up between now and then.

I went to Claridge this morning and gave a little talk to the rest of
the Mission. While we were in the midst of our conference Page came in and upset
it by telling a lot of stories we had all heard before. General Bliss and I,
with his aide and Sir William Wiseman, motored to Brighton to pay a call of re-
spect and sympathy on Major General Tom Bridges who has just lost his leg. It

["was something of a rest for me because the two hours of motoring each way was a diversion, even though I talked to Wiseman on the way down and Bliss on the way back. We lunched at Brighton with Lady Essex, General and Mrs. Bridges, Robert Hitchens and some others.", "I made no engagements for the late afternoon excepting with Erwin Laughlin, Counsellor of our Embassy.", "Lloyd George had been after me several times to know our decision as to the Supreme War Council. If favorable, he desires to announce it in the House of Commons on Monday. He is ever ready to use anything for his own advantage.", "November 18, 1917.", "I was busy in the early part of the morning finishing up some work in-order to go to Cliveden for lunch. I wrote an address to be given out by the French Press this afternoon regarding the Paris Conference and the President's intentions concerning it, stating that I would represent the United States and would have General Bliss as my military adviser. This is a part of the record.", "I had a talk with Vance McCormick, having asked him to come over from regarding Claridge to discuss portions of the President's cable 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detail, and he told me every intimate thing connected with them. I was interested in what he had to say about the submarine situation. It happens they bagged four yesterday, perhaps two more. It is the biggest haul they have had in any one day since the war began. He explained how they were overcoming the menace. How many they had caught to date; how many submarines the Germans had; how many were in northern waters and how many in southern, and how many were in commission at one time.

The Prime Minister told me the other day that Geddes was anxious to go back to the work of military transportation which he left to come to the Admiralty. I asked Geddes his reason for this. He went into great detail as to why he thought it was more important for him to do that work than to be First Lord of the Admiralty. He evidently considers that the work of the First Sea Lord can be done by someone else, and that he is the only man who can do the other work as efficiently as it should be done.

Geddes expressed wonder at my knowledge of him and the work as it was the first time we had met. I explained that he was one of the many men I had carefully estimated and had pigeon-holed for future reference. We discussed the control of submarines by mine barrages, and I urged him to close the Straits of Dover and make a finality of that passage. He said he had it in mind. I am sure he has, for Benson had been insisting upon this being done ever since he has been here.

And this reminds me that someone told me the other day that the British thought Admiral Sims a first class man until Admiral Benson appeared upon the scene. The members of the Mission have made a favorable impression as far as I can learn, and have worked harmoniously. There has not been a discordant note struck, either in public or private. This is the one thing I have been insistent upon and anxious about. I hope the record will continue clear until

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we reach home.

Geddes promised to write me when the occasion required, Sir Eric Drummond followed Geddes. He brought the latest despatches from Russia and Roumania, Italy and elsewhere. They bring or send these despatches as they arrive.

The statement I gave out to the Press concerning the Supreme War Council was done for a purpose. I did not desire the Prime Minister to use the information in his own way in the speech he is to make in the House of Commons tomorrow. I was afraid he would distort and make more capital out of it than I cared to have him do. I do not wish those who oppose the idea of a Supreme War Council, and there are many, to think that the Prime Minister and I are "playing together", and that is what they would think if the statement had come from him first. I also took the precaution to have Lord Reading see the statement and telephone Lloyd George that he had seen and approved it.

I was careful in the statement not to specifically approve the Lloyd George plan, but I simply approved the general idea of unity of action and unity of control of resources. Before I consented to give out the statement, I had Reading telephone George and obtain a definite promise from him that there should be a meeting of the Supreme War Council held immediately after the general Interallied Conference in Paris. I did this to meet the President's insistence that I should attend at least one meeting. Lloyd George readily promised.

I had Wiseman go to The Times to see its Editor, Geoffrey Dawson, and write with him an article concerning the statement I have given out regarding the President's position as to the Supreme War Council. This article is a part of the record. It is easy to see why I wished it written and I need not go into explanation.

November 19, 1917.

The statement I gave out yesterday concerning the Supreme War Council and the President's desire for me to sit in the first meeting has created something-

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of a sensation. The leader in the London Times, which Wiseman and Dawson wrote, is excellent. The first few paragraphs are attached to the diary. I have had them cabled to the State Department for their information.

Charles R. Crane was my first caller this morning. I invited him to confer with Wiseman and some agents from Russia regarding that situation.

The Greek Prime Minister, Venizelos, followed. He came with the Greek Minister and his Military Attaché, Colonel Franzes. I had arranged for Crosby and Cravath to come to talk of the economic situation with Venizelos. When they came in I had gotten Venizelos to talking of the military situation and he was explaining what he thought the Allies should do. Crosby stupidly asked whether he had any assurance that the Allies would continue to hold Saloniki, stating that he had reasons for asking the question. Fortunately, Crosby was sitting near me, and in an undertone which I hope was not heard, I told him to be careful, Venizelos replied that if the Allies did not hold Saloniki that he might as well resign as Prime Minister, send for Constantine, and let the Germans take Greece.

I found Venizelos an able and interesting man. I was not disappointed in him in any way, although my expectations ran high. We promised to see something more of one another, if not here, then in Paris. He understands English about as I understand French, so he talked in Greek and had the Greek Minister interpret the conversation continuously for an hour.

General Eliss came upon the heels of Venizelos to discuss some departmental affairs. He is unable to give any satisfactory answersto the questions being put to him about the movement of our troopsuntil he knows what shipping is to be set aside for American military purposes.

We lunched with Lord and Lady Curzon. The other guests were, Lord Howe, Austen Chamberlain, Lord and Lady D'Abernon, the Duchess of Marlborough,

Lady Leslie, Geoffrey Dawson and Mrs. Churchill, a sister-in-law of the only Winston. The Curzons seemed pleased that we had come to them as it is the only purely social invitation I have accepted. Curzon said he had been much amused by the account the newspapers gave of my interview with them, particularly where they spoke of my "solidified silence" which was of course not at all true since I talked quite freely.

I called upon the Colonial Secretary, Walter Long. It was my first departmental call and I made it because of our old time friendship. He has had an accident which keeps him confined.

Pomeroy Burton was the first afternoon caller. Then came Brailsford, who was followed by Spender of the Westminster Gazette who, in turn, was succeeded by Hirst of the Statesman, and Lord Loreburn.

It was rather an afternoon with the Liberals. Our conversations were not important. I explained the President's position and mind upon pending questions. It is always a pleasure to confer with Loreburn, for our minds run nearly parallel.

Lord Morley has expressed a desire to see me, but I am afraid I shall not be able to see him during this visit. He was unable to come with Lord Loreburn this afternoon but hoped for an opportunity to see me Wednesday.

November 20, 1917.

This has been one of the most disturbing days I have had since I have been here. For some unaccountable reason, a wireless was published in the papers this morning as coming from Washington denying some parts of the statement I gave out Sunday. My cable to the President today and my letter to him of tomorrow will explain more in detail.

My immediate entourage were somewhat "rattled" for it was disturbing to have such an incident occur when so much of real importance was to be done. Page was the first caller. He knew brought the disclosures the British Gov-

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ernment have made concerning Bernstorff's cables to his Government and their re-
plies. These have never been published and probably never will be. Bernstorff
mentions me frequently throughout these messages, but only once in an unpleasant
way when he speaks of "having Colonel House under his control". I shall get co-
pies of these despatches when I return and read them at my leisure.

Sir Albert Stanley, Sir Joseph Maclay and Bainbridge Colby lunched with me to discuss the shipping situation. Lord Northcliffe came in the afternoon to discuss the Censorship which he declares to be stupid and useless. He says he pays no attention to it himself, and that the British Government dare not interfere. He is certainly an unruby member. Lloyd George wants him back in America because he wishes to get rid of him here. Northcliffe also insists upon going to the Inter-Allied Conference at Paris, and he handles himself just as if he were Dictator of England and, in a way, he is, for the Government are afraid of him.

My old friend, Sir Malcolm Morris came after Northcliffe, and then Austin
Harrison of the English Review. His trouble was the Irish *sí�úskíkan*. He gave
some information which was interesting.

The King asked me to come to the Palace between five and eight o'clock.
I went at seven, the only available hour I had. We talked for something over a
half hour. He was full of Northcliffe and his dictatorial assumptions. He
asked me to find out quietly, without using his name, whether the Prime Minister
intended to let Northcliffe go back to the United States. He also wanted to
know whether the Prime Minister would take General Sir William Robertson, Chief
of Staff, to Paris for the Inter-Allied Conference. I told him I was sure he
would, and I was also certain Northcliffe would return to America whether the
Prime Minister desired it or not. I promised to send the King word about these
matters by Sir William Wiseman, whom I declared to be one of the most efficient

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men of his age I had ever met. The King spoke of the pleasure he and the Queen
had in meeting Loulie on Monday.

The Prime Minister and Lord Chief Justice took dinner with us. We had
a long and intimate talk afterward. George and I did practically all the talking,
Reading, as usual, being the listener. I pinned George down to British war aims.
What Great Britain desires are the African Colonies, both East and West, an inde-
pendent Arabia, under the suzerainty of Great Britain. Palestine to be given to
the Zionists under British or, if desired by us, to be under American control. An
independent Armenia and the internationalization of the Straits.

I made no comments since he, Balfour and I are to have a conference to-
morrow upon the same subject. We discussed a length the possible military pro-
blems which would come before the Supreme War Council. I find he is willing to
take Robertson, Chief of Staff, to France for consultation. This will allay some
of the ill feeling in army circles.

We discussed the Russian situation at considerable length. I urged on
them Gordon's suggestion regarding Roumania which is that she should be made
the rallying point for Polish and Cossack troops that are willing to continue
fighting. He looked upon this with approval.

We talked of Northcliffe. He evidently is afraid of him and unfortunate-
ly, Northcliffe knows it. I told George and Reading that in my opinion it
was not altogether certain that Great Britain would not have done better without
allies. If she had fought Germany alone, she would have accomplished just what
she has now accomplished, that is, she would have held the seas, destroyed Ger-
man commerce, and taken all the German colonies. Since it would have been im-
possible to have fought on land, Germany would have been compelled to have faced
a battle at sea and her fleet, in all probability, would have been destroyed.
The cost to Great Britain of such a war would not have been one tenth the

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cost of the present war in which she has had to create and maintain an enormous
army, and has had to finance her allies. She could not have reached conclusions
with Germany, nor could Germany have reached conclusions with her, but she would have
come out of it much the better of the two. However, if this had happened,
the sympathy of the world might have been with Germany rather than with Great
Britain, because of the power Great Britain would have exercised upon the seas--
a power which each nation may have thought might someday be directed against them.
Since there would have been no land fighting, Germany would not have had an oppor-
tunity to display her brutal military methods.

Lloyd George expressed a wish that I should give this view to the French
whom he said thought they were fighting Great Britain's battles.

I got Lloyd George to promise to remain in Paris until after the In-
ter-Allied Conference adjourned and until the Supreme War Council had formu-
lated definite military plans for the coming year.

November 21, 1917.

The most interesting happening of my day was a visit to the Admiralty.
Jellico showed me his war maps, charts etc. etc. I saw every mine field and
he explained in detail why the Admiralty had done this, or had not done that. He
explained the strategy of the war on the seas. He showed me where the new mine
fields are being placed across the Straits of Dover. He also had a chart show-
ing the convoy system. Each flotilla is noted and its exact position known each
day. Jellico spoke highly of Benson, for whom I have a warm regard. It is
Benson who has insisted upon their making a further attempt to close the Straits
of Dover. I was given a memorandum outlining his views regarding these impor-
tant matters and I shall attach it to the diary.

Jellico endeavored to explain, without my questioning him, the matters
which have been uppermost in American minds as to the prosecution of a more
vigorous war. He convinced me that it was impossible to attack the submarine

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bases at present. He came down stairs to my motor to see me off, a courtesy which seemed to cause surprise at the Admiralty.

I went from the Admiralty to No. 10 Downing Street where the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour and I conferred for an hour and a half. At the Cabinet meeting today they discussed two questions which they could not decide because they desired my opinion first. One was regarding Roumania and Russia. There is a strong element in the Cabinet that wish to recognize Kaledin, leader of the Cossacks in Southern Russia by advising the Roumanians to cooperate with him. I advised against this, but Balfour pleaded earnestly for it. Lloyd George rather sided with me. The result was a compromise. I thought at most they could not go further than to advise Roumania to cooperate with whatever Allied fighting forces were nearest them. I strongly urged not mentioning names. This view was finally adopted. Balfour is to write a memorandum to be sent to the British Minister at Bucharest and is to give me a copy which I shall attach to the record.

The other question which had arisen in the Cabinet, and which all of them seemed to favor, was that Great Britain should publicly declare that East Africa must never again be under German rule. The idea here was that if such a statement was made, the natives would join the British against Germany. They now fear Germany may sometime govern them again. It is said that the Germans mistreated the natives and they hate them, but are afraid to take any action. The Cabinet thought that by making this statement, and by sending an expeditionary force of two divisions, they could settle the war in East Africa during the winter.

I also strongly advised against making this statement. I thought the moment inopportune and Great Britain would be placed in a false light. They asked if it would embarrass us in the United States. I thought it would. I counselled doing nothing at present but to leave the matter open for future discussion. The military importance of it was not sufficient, I thought, to overcome the moral question involved.