ture of the American political system, took great comfort from the secret correspondence, and chose to treat it as an integral part of the Paris Accords. (Ironically, Nixon was sending secret letters to Hanoi at exactly the same time, offering vast amounts of economic assistance after the cease-fire. It is odd that Hung and Schecter make no mention of the president's other bit of secret epistolary diplomacy.)

BY THIS TIME Thieu had come to regard Kissinger with great distrust. (After the Christmas bombing, he allegedly told his National Security Council: "If Kissinger had the power to bomb the Independence Palace to force me to sign the agreement, he would not hesitate to do so.") But in characteristic Asian fashion Thieu believed that if he could communicate directly with Nixon, instead of through his adviser, the president would take a tougher stand against Hanoi. This was wishful thinking; there was no evidence for Thieu's confidence in a direct relationship with Nixon, except for the advice of a few American conservatives who disliked Kissinger. Still, Thieu's faith sustained him, and led to several dramatic confrontations with Kissinger—all of which, of course, Thieu lost. Kissinger, for his part, came to regret some of the things he had done or said to Thieu. Indeed, he came close to an apology in a remarkable and previously unpublished letter he sent to Thieu in 1980 after Thieu attacked him in an interview:

My book praises you repeatedly for your courage and decency and acknowledges, in essence, that you were right... I agree with you that the cease-fire terms were harsh. Our tragic dilemma in 1972 was that we had reached the limit of our domestic possibilities... If it had been President Nixon's and my intention to betray you, we could have done it in 1969. You and I had many disagreements, but only over tactics. In view of the outcome, your anger is understandable. However, it would be a pity if those who long advocated our abandonment of South Vietnam were now able to use your bitterness as another weapon against those who tried to save South Vietnam... I do not expect to convince you. I can at least try to assure you of my continuing regret and respect.

Thieu did not reply to Kissinger's letter.

Thieu's situation was quite desperate, although significant American officials, especially Ambassador Graham Martin, continually delivered reports to Washington that were wildly overoptimistic.

You deserve a factual look at...

# Judea and Samaria
(the "West Bank")

## Whom does it belong to?
Is it "occupied territory"?

Many even otherwise well-informed people believe that the turmoil in the Middle East is due to the Israeli "occupation" of Judea and Samaria, also known as the "West Bank"—a territory less than half the size of Los Angeles County.

## What are the facts?

* Jews have been living in all parts of "Palestine" since Biblical times. After World War I, Britain was in control of Palestine. Earlier, in 1917, it had issued the Balfour Declaration. It called for the establishment in Palestine of a "national home for the Jewish people", with the understanding that the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish community needed to be respected.

* Until Jewish immigration into "Palestine" began in earnest early in this century, the country was sparsely populated and underdeveloped (Mark Twain describes the desolation well in his book *Innocents Abroad*.) Its civilization was that of the Middle Ages. When the Jews came into the country, they created commercial, agricultural, and industrial opportunities which acted as a magnet to the Arabs, most of them nomadic.

* In 1920, the League of Nations made Britain the mandatory power in Palestine, effective in 1922. The Mandate, in line with the Balfour Declaration, provided for the establishment of a Jewish national home in all or any part of Palestine. The British, in violation of the Balfour Declaration and of the Mandate, divided the country in two parts. They granted the area east of the Jordan River to the Hashemite tribes, thus excluding it from Jewish settlement. They limited the Jewish National Home to the 23% remaining west of the Jordan River. That entire area is about half the size of San Bernardino County in California. Transjordan was given independence by Britain in 1946.

* Israel declared its independence in April of 1948, on the same day as Britain relinquished its Mandate, and after the Arabs had rejected a partition plan proposed by the United Nations, which Israel had accepted.

* In its War of Independence, against overwhelming odds, the newly-formed Israel Defense Forces in what must be considered almost a Biblical miracle, were able to defeat five combined Arab armies. Transjordan, however, succeeded in pushing westward across the Jordan River and in occupying Judea and Samaria. They were the occupiers, and they stayed in that occupation until they attacked Israel in 1967 and were defeated in the Six-Day War. During its 19 years of occupation, Transjordan, now renamed "Jordan", systematically removed all Jews from the territory. Jewish holy places were profaned and destroyed.

* Israel has administered Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank") since 1967. Approximately 60,000 Israelis have settled there. The Arab population in the area enjoys local autonomy, civil liberties, free access to higher education, and the highest standard of living of any Arab population anywhere in the countries neighboring on Israel.

* A homeland for Arab Palestinians? Of course, they deserve one. They have such a country. It's Jordan. Jordan (77% of the British Mandate) is Arab Palestine, just as Israel is Jewish Palestine. Never in history has there been an Arab state in Judea and Samaria, and there certainly was never any mention of it during the 19 years of Transjordanian occupation. King Hussein himself has said: "The truth is that Jordan is Palestine and Palestine is Jordan."

In the almost 20 years of its administration, Israel has refrained from re-annexing its old provinces of Judea and Samaria (the "West Bank"). In the Camp David Accords, Israel committed itself to autonomy for the Arab inhabitants of the area and to the determination of a permanent political status. Israel has invited representatives of Jordan and of the Arab inhabitants of Judea-Samaria to participate in autonomy talks. But, under pressure and threats of the PLO and Arab rejections, they have so far refused to participate in any negotiations. Peace, and the ultimate resolution of the problem of the "West Bank" can only come about by negotiations. Israel has been ready for such negotiations for almost 20 years.

This ad has been published and paid for by

Committee for Accuracy in Middle East Reporting in America

P.O. Box 590381 ■ San Francisco, CA 94159-0381

CAMERA is a tax-deductible, non-profit educational organization, headquartered in Washington, DC. Its purpose is to combat media inaccuracies, through public education and publicity. Your tax-deductible contributions are welcome. They enable us to pursue these goals and to publish these messages. Our overhead is minimal. Almost all of our revenue pays for our educational work and for these messages. Please make your check payable to CAMERA and mail to the above address.

MARCH 9, 1987 35

But with the withdrawal of American and Korean troops, the overall manpower and firepower of the non-Communist forces was declining, while Hanoi's was increasing. In 1973, the congressionally mandated cutoff of all American military activities in all of Indochina—accepted by Nixon after it was proposed by the House minority leader, Gerald Ford—would ultimately doom Saigon, as Alexander Haig had warned Nixon in an unsuccessful last-minute attempt to convince him to limit the restriction to Cambodia and Laos. And Watergate eliminated the last, slim chance that Washington would have the political will or the popular support to return to Indochina.

WHY, IN THE FACE of all these events, did Thieu not understand the real limits of the American commitment? Why did Thieu not make a more realistic appraisal of his situation and proceed from there? The answer lies partly in the prodigious efforts of Nixon and Kissinger—as well as the American ambassadors in Saigon, Ellsworth Bunker and Graham Martin—to convince the South Vietnamese not to give up. In their complex balancing act, every American step toward withdrawal was to be matched by another symbol of our commitment. Every concession to Hanoi was to be matched by another secret letter pledging American retaliation if Hanoi violated the agreements. For example, the cease-fire agreement was to be preceded by the Christmas bombing of Hanoi.

Still more fundamentally, Thieu had no real choice. He had to believe those letters. He had to believe that a private bond and personal commitment existed between him and the American president, that we would still come to his aid in a crunch. Not understanding—not wanting to understand, perhaps—the domestic pressures that were inexorably shaping Nixon's foreign policy, Thieu had to convince himself that Hanoi, not Saigon, was the sole object of American deception. Yet Nixon and Kissinger, those famous skeptics about deals made with Communists, could scarcely have believed that the agreement being forced upon Thieu stood a chance. Far more likely, they hoped for enough time between the Paris Accords and a North Vietnamese takeover of Saigon—the famous "decent interval"—to put into place their grand design for a global strategic balance involving both the Soviet Union and China. That design, unveiled with dramatic and successful trips to Pe-

king and Moscow, in February and May of 1972 respectively, had elements of genuine brilliance in it, and they were not going to let the mess in Southeast Asia thwart it.

Hung and Schecter write with great sympathy for Thieu. But they weaken their case by accepting his analysis of the battlefield situation in 1975. They contend that the war was being won, that "had the United States kept the promises made in writing to Thieu to convince him to sign the Paris Accords, the Republic of Vietnam could have survived." This is, to put it mildly, a highly debatable proposition. Combined with the authors' charge of American "betrayal," it makes *The Palace File* almost unique among books on Vietnam: it attacks Nixon, Ford, and Kissinger from the right, holding them, rather than Congress or the anti-war movement, most responsible for the calamity.

But Hung and Schecter's material, while fascinating, does not adequately support such a conclusion. Continued American military involvement would certainly have delayed Saigon's collapse; it had for many years. But it would not have brought a South Vietnamese victory. No matter how much we bombed the North or propped up the South, the ruthless leaders in Hanoi (who have subsequently fought both China and the Cambodian Khmer Rouge) would have

continued fighting as they had since 1945, at whatever cost, in order to outlast their foes by at least one day. Moreover, Thieu's government was inept and corrupt, and itself infiltrated by Communists. The importance of these unpleasant truths about America's ally is diminished throughout *The Palace File*. I must assume that it is Hung who insisted on such a sanguine and sanitized view of the Thieu government, of its actions and its motives. Hung's uniquely Vietnamese point of view gives *The Palace File* some of its power, though he consistently exaggerates his own role; in any event, his is a view that few outsiders would share.

It is a troubling story, this tale of the dying relationship between America and its Vietnamese ally, a story about which nobody—neither hawk nor dove—should feel proud, or even at ease. For the United States, disengagement from Vietnam became a necessity. But was it also necessary to treat our allies in this shabby manner in order to disengage?

RICHARD HOLBROOKE

Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 1977 to 1981, served in Vietnam as a member of the Foreign Service from 1963 to 1966 and was a delegate to the Paris Peace Talks in 1968-69.

## A NOVEL OF HER OWN

### Foe
by J. M. Coetzee

(Viking, 157 pp., $15.95)

At the beginning of J. M. Coetzee's haunting if maddening fictive meditation, a castaway woman swims to an island inhabited by a master and his slave. She introduces herself as Susan Barton, "a woman alone." She might be Shakespeare's Miranda presenting herself to her abstracted father and his foul-mouthed slave Caliban; she might even be Eve greeting God and Adam in Eden, a figurative island in a waste of a world. Coetzee's island trinity is animated in its association with earlier geneses. But somewhat less than a third of the way through, the island recedes into a story

begging for an author: the three are rescued, and Susan begins her search for a teller who can uncover the meaning of her year of torpor and tedium. Most of Foe is engaged with Susan's doomed quest.

Coetzee's allegory encourages us to think about God, but his triangle of a woman caught between male master and slave and trying to penetrate the silence of both is not, like that of the Old Testament, the genesis of our moral imperatives; nor is his island a healing anodyne to civilization like that of Shakespeare's *Tempest*. Coetzee's island is the genesis of

36 THE NEW REPUBLIC

HENRY A. KISSINGER

March 16, 1987

Dear Ms. Shemeley:

By the time you receive this letter, my office will have called to inform you that unfortunately I will be returning from overseas on March 28. Therefore, I will not be able to meet with representatives of your group at the hour you suggest. However, if you can delay your rally by 24 hours, I would be happy to meet with two representatives from your group at 11:30 on Sunday morning, March 29, for a brief discussion.

I would like to take this opportunity to correct three misapprehensions in your letter. The most important is your apparent belief that there was no negotiating with respect to prisoners in Laos. No issue preoccupied us more than the release of prisoners, as the wives with whom I met on a monthly basis led by Mrs. Stockdale will confirm to you. Under the agreement, Vietnam was responsible for the return of all prisoners in Indochina. If any prisoners were kept behind, it was through a violation of the agreement by Hanoi, not through an omission in the agreement. I think this is crucial to your own case. Secondly, obviously the Nixon Administration couldn't raise the issue until it had received lists of prisoners after the agreement was signed. After that, we raised the issue of discrepancies on a number of occasions to be met with a denial that any prisoners were left. Thirdly, as you know, I have been out of government for over ten years. Three administrations under two Presidents have had the responsibility to raise the issue since then. You must know that I have no official standing. It would therefore seem to me much more appropriate to

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

National Forget-Me-Not Assoc.

For P.O.W.-M.I.A.'S Inc.

MARY N. BEAULIEU
New England

Regional Director
798 Graham Road

South Windsor, CT 06074
(203) 644-3665

KATHY SHEMELEY
CT State Chairman
22 Revere Road

New Milford, CT 06776
(203) 355-2567

March 10, 1987

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Henderson Road
Kent, CT 06757

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As part of our continuing effort to increase public awareness of the "highest national priority", which will result in increased pressure to secure the release of our live POWs, the Connecticut Chapter of the National Forget-Me-Not Association for POW/MIA's will conduct a rally on Henderson Road, Kent, just outside your gate, on Saturday, March 28th at 11:00 A.M. We have selected this date because fourteen years ago the last group of the 591 POWs left Hanoi bound for freedom and their families. Your residence has been selected because of your role in the Paris Peace Agreement.

We believe, based upon the overwhelming evidence, that live POWs still wait in Southeast Asia for Homecoming II. Since you never negotiated for the release of our POWs from Laos, we call upon you to return to the negotiating table to complete your unfinished business which will then secure the immediate release of our remaining live prisoners of war.

We would like you to meet with us or with a designated number of representatives from our organization at the rally. At that time, a statement from our chapter will be read, as well as a roll call of our missing men from Connecticut, a moment of silence, and music.

We hope to see you on the 28th.

cc: Mrs. Maureen Brady, Kent First Selectman
Mr. Tanner, Warren First Selectman
Connecticut State Police

A Non-profit, Non-political, Volunteer Group, Dedicated Toward a Full Accounting of P.O.W.'s and M.I.A.'s

## II

### A Visit to Hanoi

ONE of the first tasks before us in 1973 was to consolidate the Vietnam peace agreement that had been signed in Paris on January 27. This was the objective that took me on one of the most unusual diplomatic trips of my career: my first visit to Hanoi. In the capital of our ferocious antagonists who had brought war to Indonesia and upheaval to America, I intended to discuss with the North Vietnamese leaders the strict observance of the Paris Agreement that I had negotiated with Le Duc Tho and on that basis the possibility of a more positive relationship between our two countries.

#### The Paris Agreement

THE Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam had become possible when after ten years of bitter war and four years of negotiating stalemate, North Vietnam accepted what it had heretofore adamantly rejected: the continued existence of the Saigon government. The Agreement called for an immediate cease-fire in place throughout Vietnam; for the withdrawal of all remaining American troops (about 27,000); and for the release of prisoners of war throughout Indonesia. Hanoi's infiltration of troops and matériel into South Vietnam was prohibited. International supervisory machinery was to police the cease-fire and regulate the entry of replacement equipment through designated checkpoints. Another provision restored the seventeenth parallel as the Provisional Military Demarcation Line between North and South Vietnam, prohibited all military movement across it, and permitted civilian movement only by agreement between the Vietnamese parties. Hanoi further agreed to withdraw its forces from Laos and Cambodia and not to use these countries' territory for military action against South Vietnam. The political settlement in South Vietnam was left to future negotiations between the Vietnamese parties.

The United States had made a determined effort to end the war in Laos and Cambodia as well as in Vietnam. North Vietnam had consistently refused, on the excuse that such matters were within the jurisdiction

Years of Upheaval

in some close Oxford. Nancy our plans were with us.

I did out my intention of affairs as to the hopeful future Communists." All our mental catastrophe

relief that on inauguration, I saw the Old Executive Vietnam excluded. By section I was to be reconciled:

with us. And as for us at home, a monopoly of moral insight. the United States government which should help other with healing America.

path; paths are the — so uncharacterist that in the end we would

["10", "Years of Upheaval", "tion of the peoples of Laos and Cambodia. This solicitude for the sovereignty of North Vietnam's neighbors would have been touching had it not been so unprecedented; it seemed to apply only to the withdrawal of Hanoi's forces, not to their introduction, since tens of thousands of North Vietnamese troops had been systematically violating the peace and sovereignty of Laos and Cambodia for two decades and were, of course, still there.", "In the end, Le Duc Tho agreed to arrange a cease-fire in Laos. After \"consultations\" with the Communist forces in Laos (the Pathet Lao, who were in fact totally subordinate to Hanoi), Le Duc Tho pledged in October 1972 that Hanoi would bring about a cease-fire in Laos within thirty days of the cease-fire in Vietnam. By early January Le Duc Tho shortened the interval to fifteen days.", "On Cambodia, he flatly refused to be specific, claiming — truthfully, as it turned out — that Hanoi had less influence over its Cambodian Communist ally, the Khmer Rouge. In our talks from September 1972 through January of 1973, Le Duc Tho assured me again and again that when the war was settled in Vietnam, there was \"no reason\" for the war to continue in Cambodia.¹ But Hanoi would make no formal commitment other than a private understanding that it would \"contribute actively\" to restoring peace in Cambodia after the Vietnam war was settled. After we pressed in vain for months, Nixon reluctantly concluded that we could obtain more only by continuing the war in Vietnam. It was obvious we had no support at home for holding up an otherwise acceptable Vietnam agreement because of Cambodia, where Congress had sought for several years to reduce our involvement and our aid to the absolute minimum. If we did not proceed, Congress was certain to cut off all funds for Cambodia and Vietnam. Moreover, in the view of our Embassy in Phnom Penh as well as of our military experts, the Cambodian Communists would not be able to prevail without North Vietnamese combat support, which in turn was precluded by the terms of the Paris Agreement.", "We sought to protect our position by two further steps. First, we persuaded the Cambodian President, Lon Nol, to call once again (for at least the fifth time in three years) for a cease-fire in Cambodia and to declare a unilateral cessation of offensive military operations. Second, before initialing the Paris Agreement, I handed Le Duc Tho a statement to the effect that", "if, pending a settlement in Cambodia, offensive military activities are undertaken there which would jeopardize the existing situation, such operations would be contrary to the spirit of Article 20 (b) of the Agreement and to the assumptions on which the Agreement is based.", "In plain English, this meant that if the Khmer Rouge rejected Lon Nol's proclamation of a cease-fire the United States would continue military", "A Visit to Hanoi", "support for the中国人民's抗美援朝运动, 也即抗美援朝的中国共产党人所进行的抗美援朝的人民战争。", "The Paris accord specified that the United States and the People's Republic of China, as the two leading forces in the抗美援朝中国人民志愿军的总司令部, 以及北平人民政府和南京国民政府, 于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 开始撤退中国人民志愿军。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也下令停止一切外交活动。但是, 中国国务院和南京国民政府并没有遵守自己的命令, 而是继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。在 negotiations期间, 中国国务院和南京国民政府提出 several demands, 之一是要求中国人民志愿军停止一切军事行动, 包括撤退中国人民志愿军。中国人民志愿军总司令部拒绝了这些 demands, 并于1973年1月1日零时起在抗美援朝的中国人民志愿军总司令部的命令下, 继续进行军事行动。同时, 中国国务院和南京国民政府也继续与北平人民政府和南京国民政府进行 negotiations。

A Visit to Hanoi

11

support for the Cambodian government. Le Duc Tho indicated that he understood.

The Paris accords with all their ambiguities reflected the balance of forces in Vietnam in the wake of the climactic battles of 1972. As with any peace settlement, it depended on the maintenance of that balance of forces. We had no illusions about Hanoi's long-range goal of subjugating all of Indochina. In the final phase of the negotiations in November and December 1972, I repeatedly warned Nixon to that effect.² But I was also persuaded that our people would not sustain the prolongation of the war for a period of time that would make a military difference. In August 1972 President Nguyen Van Thieu of South Vietnam had expressed to me his estimate that if the war continued, by December 1973 North Vietnam would be weaker than it was in March 1972 — a marginal improvement over where we were. And all our political experts were convinced that the newly elected Congress would cut off funds for the war, starting in January 1973, using as a first target the Administration's request for supplementary appropriations to finance the cost of resisting Hanoi's spring offensive of 1972.

We were, in short, not just getting out under the cynical cover of a "decent interval" before the final collapse. We hoped for a decent settlement. The Agreement's risks were etched painfully in the minds of all the negotiators on our side. But we had achieved far better terms than most had thought possible. By 1972 our critics had reached the conclusion that Hanoi would never settle for anything less than the overthrow of our ally, the Thieu government in Saigon. This we had successfully resisted. A non-Communist South Vietnam had been given the chance to survive. With the proper mixture of rewards and punishments for Hanoi, we thought we had a reasonable chance to maintain the uneasy equilibrium in Indochina; certainly a better chance with an agreement than by continuing an inconclusive war in the face of mounting hostility at home and the near-certainty of a Congressional cutoff of funds.

I shall deal in Chapter VIII with whether it was realistic to expect that we could assemble the proper mix of rewards and punishments. We thought so and we had reason for our belief. For present purposes it is enough to stress that our intention was to make the Paris Agreement work. This was my attitude when I left Washington on February 7, 1973, on an eleven-day Asian journey that was to take me to the capital of our recent enemy, North Vietnam, as well as to those of two old friends, Thailand and Laos, and of a new friend, the People's Republic of China.

My feelings as I prepared for the trip to Hanoi had none of the exultation at a patiently prepared breakthrough that had marked my secret trip to China. Nor was there the inherent drama of superpower diplomacy that had characterized my first trip to Moscow. Lacking, too, was

Richard Nixon, 1973

Jan. 23 [12]

agreed to, all the conditions that I laid down then have been met:

A cease-fire, internationally supervised, will begin at 7 p.m., this Saturday, January 27, Washington time.

Within 60 days from this Saturday, all Americans held prisoners of war throughout Indochina will be released. There will be the fullest possible accounting for all of those who are missing in action.

During the same 60-day period, all American forces will be withdrawn from South Vietnam.

The people of South Vietnam have been guaranteed the right to determine their own future, without outside interference.

By joint agreement, the full text of the agreement and the protocols to carry it out will be issued tomorrow.

Throughout these negotiations we have been in the closest consultation with President Thieu and other representatives of the Republic of Vietnam. This settlement meets the goals and has the full support of President Thieu and the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, as well as that of our other allies who are affected.

The United States will continue to recognize the Government of the Republic of Vietnam as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam.

We shall continue to aid South Vietnam within the terms of the agreement, and we shall support efforts by the people of South Vietnam to settle their problems peacefully among themselves.

We must recognize that ending the war is only the first step toward building the peace. All parties must now see to it that this is a peace that lasts, and also a peace that healing—and a peace that not only ends the war in Southeast Asia but con-

tributes to the prospects of peace in the whole world.

This will mean that the terms of the agreement must be scrupulously adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement requires of us, and we shall expect the other parties to do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect other interested nations to help insure that the agreement is carried out and peace is maintained.

As this long and very difficult war ends, I would like to address a few special words to each of those who have been parties in the conflict.

First, to the people and Government of South Vietnam: By your courage, by your sacrifice, you have won the precious right to determine your own future, and you have developed the strength to defend that right. We look forward to working with you in the future—friends in peace as we have been allies in war.

To the leaders of North Vietnam: As we have ended the war through negotiations, let us now build a peace of reconciliation. For our part, we are prepared to make a major effort to help achieve that goal. But just as reciprocity was needed to end the war, so too will it be needed to build and strengthen the peace.

To the other major powers that have been involved even indirectly: Now is the time for mutual restraint so that the peace we have achieved can last.

And finally, to all of you who are listening, the American people: Your steadfastness in supporting our insistence on peace with honor has made peace with honor possible. I know that you would not have wanted that peace jeopardized. With our secret negotiations at the sensitive stage they were in during this recent period, for me to have discussed publicly

19

[12] Jan. 23

Public Papers of the Presidents

our efforts to secure peace would not only have violated our understanding with North Vietnam, it would have seriously harmed and possibly destroyed the chances for peace. Therefore, I know that you now can understand why, during these past several weeks, I have not made any public statements about those efforts.

The important thing was not to talk about peace, but to get peace—and to get the right kind of peace. This we have done.

Now that we have achieved an honorable agreement, let us be proud that America did not settle for a peace that would have betrayed our allies, that would have abandoned our prisoners of war, or that would have ended the war for us but would have continued the war for the 50 million people of Indochina. Let us be proud of the 2½ million young Americans who served in Vietnam, who served with honor and distinction in one of the most selfless enterprises in the history of nations. And let us be proud of those who sacrificed, who gave their lives so that the people of South Vietnam might live in freedom and so that the world might live in peace.

In particular, I would like to say a word to some of the bravest people I have ever met—the wives, the children, the families of our prisoners of war and the missing in action. When others called on us to settle on any terms, you had the courage to stand for the right kind of peace so that those who died and those who suffered would not have died and suffered in vain, and so that where this generation knew war, the next generation would know peace. Nothing means more to me at this moment than the fact

that your long vigil is coming to an end.

Just yesterday, a great American, who once occupied this office, died. In his life, President Johnson endured the vilification of those who sought to portray him as a man of war. But there was nothing he cared about more deeply than achieving a lasting peace in the world.

I remember the last time I talked with him. It was just the day after New Year's. He spoke then of his concern with bringing peace, with making it the right kind of peace, and I was grateful that he once again expressed his support for my efforts to gain such a peace. No one would have welcomed this peace more than he.

And I know he would join me in asking—for those who died and for those who live—let us consecrate this moment by resolving together to make the peace we have achieved a peace that will last.

Thank you and good evening.

NOTE: The President spoke at 10:01 p.m. in the Oval Office at the White House. His address was broadcast live on nationwide radio and television. An advance text of the President's address was released on the same day.

Before delivering the address, the President met separately with members of the Cabinet and 6 members of the bipartisan leadership of the Congress.

On January 24, 1973, the President met with the expanded bipartisan leadership of the Congress to discuss the agreement. On the same day, the White House released the following related material: the texts of the agreement and protocols to the agreement; the transcript of a news briefing on the agreement by Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and fact sheets on the basic elements of the agreement, the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and the Four-Party Joint Military Commission. The texts of the agreement and protocols and Dr. Kissinger's news briefing are printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 9, pp. 45-74).

20

13 Message to the Congress
Plan 1
the President

On January 5, 1973, program to strengthen the branch of the military branch of the armed forces, this program proved the service that the President's hands of the cies, this program believe these services gently necessary for cooperation of them with all of them during the coming years.

The first part of the program was newed drive to strengthen the military and the military branch of the government. The second part of the program pointed three Counsellors to the President, one of them being the President of the United States. These three Counsellors and the other two Assistants to the President, one of them being the Vice President, and the other two Assistants to the President, were to act as the White House representatives on matters of human rescues and community development. They were to act as the White House representatives on matters of economic and social development, and as the White House representatives on matters of civilian affairs, economic affairs, and the administration of the government.

The third part of the program was sharp reduction in Executive Office building, reorientation of original mission and policy formation, and the elimination of original mission and policy execution in the Executive Office building. No longer be en-rolling or managing or which can be en-

Text of the Agreement To Be Signed in Paris on
January 27, 1973. Released January 24, 1973

To be signed at the International
Conference Center, Paris,
Saturday morning, Paris time,
January 27, 1973:

AGREEMENT ON ENDING THE WAR AND
RESTORING PEACE IN VIETNAM

The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on
Vietnam,

With a view to ending the war and restoring peace in
Vietnam on the basis of respect for the Vietnamese peo-
ple's fundamental national rights and the South Viet-
namese people's right to self-determination, and to con-
tributing to the consolidation of peace in Asia and the
world,

Have agreed on the following provisions and undertake
to respect and to implement them:

CHAPTER I

THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S FUNDAMENTAL
NATIONAL RIGHTS

Article 1

The United States and all other countries respect the
independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity

¹ For Dr. Kissinger's explanation of the signing of two versions of the agreement, see page 68 of this issue.

of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva Agree-
ments on Vietnam.

CHAPTER II

CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES—WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS

Article 2

A cease-fire shall be observed throughout South Viet-
nam as of 24:00 hours G.M.T., on January 27, 1973.

At the same hour, the United States will stop all its mili-
tary activities against the territory of the Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam by ground, air and naval forces,
wherever they may be based, and end the mining of the
territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The United States will
remove, permanently deactivate or destroy all the mines in
the territorial waters, ports, harbors, and waterways of
North Vietnam as soon as this Agreement goes into effect.

The complete cessation of hostilities mentioned in this
Article shall be durable and without limit of time.

Article 3

The parties undertake to maintain the cease-fire and
to ensure a lasting and stable peace.

As soon as the cease-fire goes into effect:

(a) The United States forces and those of the other foreign countries allied with the United States and the Republic of Vietnam shall remain in-place pending the implementation of the plan of troop withdrawal. The Four-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 16 shall determine the modalities.

Volume 9—Number 4

46

PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: RICHARD NIXON, 1973

(b) The armed forces of the two South Vietnamese parties shall remain in-place. The Two-Party Joint Military Commission described in Article 17 shall determine the areas controlled by each party and the modalities of stationing.

(c) The regular forces of all services and arms and the irregular forces of the parties in South Vietnam shall stop all offensive activities against each other and shall strictly abide by the following stipulations:

- All acts of force on the ground, in the air, and on the sea shall be prohibited;

- All hostile acts, terrorism and reprisals by both sides will be banned.

Article 4

The United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam.

Article 5

Within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement, there will be a total withdrawal from South Vietnam of troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel and military personnel associated with the pacification program, armaments, munitions, and war material of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a). Advisers from the above-mentioned countries to all paramilitary organizations and the police force will also be withdrawn within the same period of time.

Article 6

The dismantlement of all military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) shall be completed within sixty days of the signing of this Agreement.

Article 7

From the enforcement of the cease-fire to the formation of the government provided for in Articles 9(b) and 14 of this Agreement, the two South Vietnamese parties shall not accept the introduction of troops, military advisers, and military personnel including technical military personnel, armaments, munitions, and war material into South Vietnam.

The two South Vietnamese parties shall be permitted to make periodic replacement of armaments, munitions and war material which have been destroyed, damaged, worn out or used up after the cease-fire, on the basis of piece-for-piece, of the same characteristics and properties, under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission of the two South Vietnamese parties and of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

# CHAPTER III

## THE RETURN OF CAPTURED MILITARY PERSONNEL AND FOREIGN CIVILIANS, AND CAPTURED AND DETAINED VIETNAMESE CIVILIAN PERSONNEL

### Article 8

(a) The return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties shall be carried out simultaneously with and completed not later than the same day as the troop withdrawal mentioned in Article 5. The parties shall exchange complete lists of the above-mentioned captured military personnel and foreign civilians on the day of the signing of this Agreement.

(b) The parties shall help each other to get information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action, to determine the location and take care of the graves of the dead so as to facilitate the exhumation and repatriation of the remains, and to take any such other measures as may be required to get information about those still considered missing in action.

(c) The question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two South Vietnamese parties on the basis of the principles of Article 21(b) of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam of July 20, 1954. The two South Vietnamese parties will do so in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, with a view to ending hatred and enmity, in order to ease suffering and to reunite families. The two South Vietnamese parties will do their utmost to resolve this question within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect.

# CHAPTER IV

## THE EXERCISE OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE PEOPLE'S RIGHT. TO SELF-DETERMINATION

### Article 9

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam undertake to respect the following principles for the exercise of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination:

(a) The South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination is sacred, inalienable, and shall be respected by all countries.

(b) The South Vietnamese people shall decide themselves the political future of South Vietnam through genuinely free and democratic general elections under international supervision.

(c) Foreign countries shall not impose any political tendency or personality on the South Vietnamese people.

Volume 9—Number 4

47

Article 10

The two South Vietnamese parties undertake to respect the cease-fire and maintain peace in South Vietnam, settle all matters of contention through negotiations, and avoid all armed conflict.

Article 11

Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties will:

- achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination against individuals or organizations that have collaborated with one side or the other;

- ensure the democratic liberties of the people: personal freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of meeting, freedom of organization, freedom of political activities, freedom of belief, freedom of movement, freedom of residence, freedom of work, right to property ownership, and right to free enterprise.

Article 12

(a) Immediately after the cease-fire, the two South Vietnamese parties shall hold consultations in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, mutual respect, and mutual non-elimination to set up a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. The Council shall operate on the principle of unanimity. After the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord has assumed its functions, the two South Vietnamese parties will consult about the formation of councils at lower levels. The two South Vietnamese parties shall sign an agreement on the internal matters of South Vietnam as soon as possible and do their utmost to accomplish this within ninety days after the cease-fire comes into effect, in keeping with the South Vietnamese people's aspirations for peace, independence and democracy.

(b) The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord shall have the task of promoting the two South Vietnamese parties' implementation of this Agreement, achievement of national reconciliation and concord and assurance of democratic liberties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will organize the free and democratic general elections provided for in Article 9(b) and decide the procedures and modalities of these general elections. The institutions for which the general elections are to be held will be agreed upon through consultations between the two South Vietnamese parties. The National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord will also decide the procedures and modalities of such local elections as the two South Vietnamese parties agree upon.

Article 13

The question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties in a spirit of national reconciliation and concord, equality and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation. Among the questions to be discussed by the two South Vietnamese parties are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The two South Vietnamese parties will accomplish this as soon as possible.

Article 14

South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and independence. It will be prepared to establish relations with all countries irrespective of their political and social systems on the basis of mutual respect for independence and sovereignty and accept economic and technical aid from any country with no political conditions attached. The acceptance of military aid by South Vietnam in the future shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b).

## CHAPTER V

### THE REUNIFICATION OF VIETNAM AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH VIETNAM

Article 15

The reunification of Vietnam shall be carried out step by step through peaceful means on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam, without coercion or annexation by either party, and without foreign interference. The time for reunification will be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam.

Pending reunification:

(a) The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary, as provided for in paragraph 6 of the Final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference.

(b) North and South Vietnam shall respect the Demilitarized Zone on either side of the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(c) North and South Vietnam shall promptly start negotiations with a view to reestablishing normal relations in various fields. Among the questions to be negotiated are the modalities of civilian movement across the Provisional Military Demarcation Line.

(d) North and South Vietnam shall not join any military alliance or military bloc and shall not allow foreign powers to maintain military bases, troops, military advisers, and military personnel on their respective territories, as stipulated in the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Vietnam.

Volume 9—Number 4

48

## CHAPTER VI

### THE JOINT MILITARY COMMISSIONS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION, THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

#### Article 16

(a) The Parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall immediately designate representatives to form a Four-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

- The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam;

- Article 3(a), regarding the cease-fire by U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries referred to in that Article;

- Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam;

- Article 5, regarding the withdrawal from South Vietnam of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a);

- Article 6, regarding the dismantlement of military bases in South Vietnam of the United States and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a);

- Article 8(a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties;

- Article 8(b), regarding the mutual assistance of the parties in getting information about those military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties missing in action.

(b) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity. Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) The Four-Party Joint Military Commission shall begin operating immediately after the signing of this Agreement and end its activities in sixty days, after the completion of the withdrawal of U.S. troops and those of the other foreign countries mentioned in Article 3(a) and the completion of the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

(d) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, the working procedure, means of activity, and expenditures of the Four-Party Joint Military Commission.

#### Article 17

(a) The two South Vietnamese parties shall immediately designate representatives to form a Two-Party Joint Military Commission with the task of ensuring joint action by the two South Vietnamese parties in implementing the following provisions of this Agreement:

- The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

- Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;

- Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

- Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this article;

- Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

- Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

(b) Disagreements shall be referred to the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

(c) After the signing of this Agreement, the Two-Party Joint Military Commission shall agree immediately on the measures and organization aimed at enforcing the cease-fire and preserving peace in South Vietnam.

#### Article 18

(a) After the signing of this Agreement, an International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be established immediately.

(b) Until the International Conference provided for in Article 19 makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the four parties on matters concerning the control and supervision of the implementation of the following provisions of this Agreement:

- Article 3(c) regarding the cease-fire between all the parties in South Vietnam;

- Article 8(a), regarding the return of captured military personnel and foreign civilians of the parties.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The four parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The parties will facilitate their operation.

(c) Until the International Conference makes definitive arrangements, the International Commission of Control and Supervision will report to the two South Vietnamese parties on matters concerning the control and

Volume 9—Number 4

49

supervision of the implementation of the following pro-
visions of this Agreement:

—The first paragraph of Article 2, regarding the enforcement of the cease-fire throughout South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

—Article 3(b), regarding the cease-fire between the two South Vietnamese parties;

—Article 3(c), regarding the cease-fire between all parties in South Vietnam, when the Four-Party Joint Military Commission has ended its activities;

—Article 7, regarding the prohibition of the introduction of troops into South Vietnam and all other provisions of this Article;

—Article 8(c), regarding the question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam;

—Article 9(b), regarding the free and democratic general elections in South Vietnam;

—Article 13, regarding the reduction of the military effectives of the two South Vietnamese parties and the demobilization of the troops being reduced.

The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall form control teams for carrying out its tasks. The two South Vietnamese parties shall agree immediately on the location and operation of these teams. The two South Vietnamese parties will facilitate their operation.

(d) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall be composed of representatives of four countries: Canada, Hungary, Indonesia and Poland. The chairmanship of this Commission will rotate among the members for specific periods to be determined by the Commission.

(e) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall carry out its tasks in accordance with the principle of respect for the sovereignty of South Vietnam.

(f) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall operate in accordance with the principle of consultations and unanimity.

(g) The International Commission of Control and Supervision shall begin operating when a cease-fire comes into force in Vietnam. As regards the provisions in Article 18(b) concerning the four parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities when the Commission's tasks of control and supervision regarding these provisions have been fulfilled. As regards the provisions in Article 18(c) concerning the two South Vietnamese parties, the International Commission of Control and Supervision shall end its activities on the request of the government formed after the general elections in South Vietnam provided for in Article 9(b).

(h) The four parties shall agree immediately on the organization, means of activity, and expenditures of the International Commission of Control and Supervision.

The relationship between the International Commission and the International Conference will be agreed upon by the International Commission and the International Conference.

## Article 19

The parties agree on the convening of an International Conference within thirty days of the signing of this Agreement to acknowledge the signed agreements; to guarantee the ending of the war, the maintenance of peace in Vietnam, the respect of the Vietnamese people's fundamental national rights, and the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination; and to contribute to and guarantee peace in Indochina.

The United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, on behalf of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam, will propose to the following parties that they participate in this International Conference: the People's Republic of China, the Republic of France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the four countries of the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and the Secretary General of the United Nations, together with the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam.

# CHAPTER VII

## REGARDING CAMBODIA AND LAOS

### Article 20

(a) The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam shall strictly respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Cambodia and the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, which recognized the Cambodian and the Lao peoples' fundamental national rights, i.e., the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of these countries. The parties shall respect the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos.

The parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam undertake to refrain from using the territory of Cambodia and the territory of Laos to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another and of other countries.

(b) Foreign countries shall put an end to all military activities in Cambodia and Laos, totally withdraw from and refrain from reintroducing into these two countries troops, military advisers and military personnel, armaments, munitions and war material.

(c) The internal affairs of Cambodia and Laos shall be settled by the people of each of these countries without foreign interference.

(d) The problems existing between the Indochinese countries shall be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of respect for each other's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

Volume 9—Number 4

50

# CHAPTER VIII

## THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

### Article 21

The United States anticipates that this Agreement will usher in an era of reconciliation with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam as with all the peoples of Indochina. In pursuance of its traditional policy, the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to post-war reconstruction of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and throughout Indochina.

### Article 22

The ending of the war, the restoration of peace in Vietnam, and the strict implementation of this Agreement will create conditions for establishing a new, equal and mutually beneficial relationship between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on the basis of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. At the same time this will ensure stable peace in Vietnam and contribute to the preservation of lasting peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia.

# CHAPTER IX

## OTHER PROVISIONS

### Article 23

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature by plenipotentiary representatives of the parties participating in the Paris Conference on Vietnam. All the parties concerned shall strictly implement this Agreement and its Protocols.

Done in Paris this twenty-seventh day of January, One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy-Three, in Vietnamese and English. The Vietnamese and English texts are official and equally authentic.

[Separate Numbered Page]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
WILLIAM P. ROGERS
Secretary of State

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM:
TRAN VAN LAM
Minister for Foreign Affairs

[Separate Numbered Page]

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
VIETNAM:
NGUYEN DUY TRINH
Minister for Foreign Affairs

FOR THE PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH VIETNAM:
NGUYEN THI BINH
Minister for Foreign Affairs

Volume 9-1

June 11, 1986

MEMO FOR HAK

FROM: Rosemary

SUBJECT: Vietnam Statements - Letter to Reverend

You indicated you wanted to send a letter to the following gentlemen regarding the Vietnam peace agreement. I understand you met him at Weber State College:

Reverend Richard Lawson
Community Presbyterian Church
304 South 2nd Street
Brigham City, Utah 84302

Attached for your review is a checklist of major public statements from the time of the announcement of the Paris peace agreement to the fall of Saigon (plus Mayaguez).

These highlight (a) the nature and extent of North Vietnamese violations from the very beginning; (b) the US defense of the agreement and insistence on compliance but our inability to enforce it militarily; (c) Congressional restrictions which eroded the implementation of the agreement by virtue of their limiting the US capability to fulfill, including as a 'moral' obligation, our military and economic aid obligations to the South Vietnamese and to Cambodia.

The checklist is only for you - to mark off those items you wish to send. The full text of each item is also attached in chronological order.

[ ] CV - include only items marked and I will dictate a cover note.

[ ] RN: What I really wanted was:

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL. WEDNESDAY.

TLOOK

Treaty

if properly developed, the con-
nal GLCM would be capable of
ing an echeloned Soviet attack by
hitting bridges, massed armor
communications outposts.
er eliminating the potential for
weapons in which the U.S. ex-
poses the world safe or less safe
question that won't appear in an
on poll.

The Soviets, it's said, have ac-
ded "intrusive" verification proce-
dure on the doors of a factory in Vot-
that produces both intermedi-
ange SS-20 and intercontinental
missiles; their mission will be to
re that the factory produces only
les that can reach the U.S.
over the treaty's 13-year inspec-
regime one of the American ob-
ers raises an objection, the U.S.
the Soviets will talk about that in
othing called the Standing Nu-
 Commission. This succeeds the
ding Consultative Commission,
we talked about (and never
did anything about) Soviet viola-
tions of the two SALT treaties. Nei-
commission can compel either
y to cease an activity; they are
ms for discussion.

The U.S. Senate already has made
own contribution to the arms-con-
process this year. It spent most of
session debating two matters.
so, whether the binding version of
ABM treaty was the "broad" in-
proportion negotiated with the Rus-
s or the "restrictive" version sold
the Senate. Debate Topic Two,
ich held up the defense authoriza-
n bill, was an amendment requiring
administration to adhere to the
ms of the SALT II treaty, which
Senate refused to ratify in 1979.

The hoopla surrounding the signing
this latest treaty conceals a hard
tet: The entire Washington commu-
ity, from one end of Pennsylvania
venue to the other, of late has suf-
fered a fundamental loss of serious-
ness about the direction and purpose
Western security. We suspect that
any in Washington, Democrats and
Republicans, know this to be so. Will
ay of them soon begin redefining an
agenda that forces the West to work
its defense, instead of mostly talk-
ing about it?

Arms control, we fear, has become
the heavy-metal music of Western for-

Nobel Peace Prize:
Tragic Memories,
New Nominations

By ROBERT L. BARTLEY

WSS

PARIS—"When I keep getting asked
questions I think I have already answered,
I am reminded of previous experiences
with other Vietnamese in this hall 15 years
ago," Henry Kissinger, exasperated by
charges of betrayal, told a young Vietna-
mese questioner. "As for the Nobel Prize, I
donated what I received to children of
American servicemen killed in Vietnam."

The former secretary of state had returned, bravely enough, to the International Conference Center on Avenue Kleber, where he and Le Duc Tho negotiated their Agreement on the Cessation of War and Restoration of Peace in Vietnam. Last week, French, American and Vietnamese anti-communists rented the same hall to advance a budding reassessment of what went wrong. This week, the joint prize to Secretary Kissinger and Le Duc Tho, who turned down his half, has a special pertinence: It's perfectly obvious that another joint Nobel Peace Prize is being won in Washington by President Reagan and Chairman Gorbachev.

The bitter tone of the dozens of Vietna-
mese refugees came as no surprise to Mr.
Kissinger, who admitted to "many hesita-
tions" about appearing. He had come pre-
cisely to tell them, "If we had wanted to
abandon South Vietnam there were a lot
less painful ways to do it."

"I believe it was not a glorious agreement, but it was one that could have been maintained." While the settlement did not require the North Vietnamese to remove their units from the south, it did prohibit reinforcing those units through Laos or Cambodia. "We who signed the agreement thought that South Vietnam could handle whatever forces stayed in the country, and if forces from outside the country intervened we were determined to resist."

The Nixon administration had "no illus-
sions" about whether the North Vietna-
mese would comply, and indeed they vio-
lated the infiltration ban from the first
day. By April 1973, Kissinger said, the
administration had developed an "inten-
tion" to resume bombing North Vietnam,
and stepped up its rhetoric on the viola-
tions accordingly. But by the time bombing
was to resume it was "the week John Dean
went to the prosecutor." Watergate, and
Mr. Nixon's resignation, sealed Vietnam's
fate. "If President Nixon had stayed in of-
fice with unimpaired power there would
have been no offensive in 1975."

"This is one man's version of the events, of course, though others at last week's conference shared the battlefield assessment. "If we look back at 1972, I think we will conclude that the war was won," said former CIA chief William Colby. The guerrilla force in the south had been destroyed, and the South Vietnamese turned back a major conventional invasion with the help of U.S. logistics and air power. Mr. Colby listed as the three errors of the war the abandonment of 1975, the Americanization

Soviets Let Off Hook

By ALAN L. KEYES

Neither the arms-control process, nor
the agreement President Reagan and So-
viet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed
yesterday do anything to address Ameri-
ca's most threatening strategic defi-
ciency—it's inability to mount a sustained,
effective campaign for its interests in key
regions of the developing world.

The U.S. is at an inherent strategic dis-
advantage, a fact the Soviets fully appreci-
ate. A major goal of their policy has al-
ways been to make arms-control and dis-
armament discussions the only serious
focus of U.S.-Soviet relations. They have
successfully resisted any linkage between
progress on arms control and progress in
the areas of Soviet behavior that pose the
greatest immediate strategic threat to
American interests.

The Soviet war against the Afghan peo-
ple continues, generating millions of refu-
gees and pressure on Pakistan, a key stra-
tegic partner of the U.S. Similarly, Soviet
backing sustains the Vietnamese occupa-
tion of Cambodia, which has created a pro-
longed refugee problem in neighboring
Thailand. Through their military supplies
and the presence of thousands of Cuban
troops in Angola, the Soviets maintain
their bid for predominant influence in
southern Africa. On the horn of Africa, a
Soviet client regime in Ethiopia not only
wages war against its own people, but pro-
vides support for rebel forces in southern
Sudan. In Central America, massive Soviet
assistance permits the Sandinista regime
to resist democracy at home and support
efforts to destabilize its neighbors, espe-
cially in El Salvador.

Nonconvertible Currency

While the two sides jockey for positions
in a war that may never be fought, the
U.S. remains exposed to gradual defeat in
the war that goes on every day. Because of
the resistance to linkage, Soviet persis-
tence in that war never becomes a central
focus of serious U.S.-Soviet negotiations.
The arms-control coinage that most inter-
ests the Soviets can never be cashed in for
reductions in offensive Soviet behavior in
the developing regions. The two sides
reach bargains in which the U.S. pays in
hard cash—that is, results that can be con-
verted into Soviet gains outside the arms-
control area. In return, the U.S. receives
nonconvertible currency—that is, results
that, at best, produce marginal advantages
strictly limited to the arms-control area.

America's greatest postwar achieve-
ment is the reconstruction of Western Eu-
rope on a democratic basis. It failed, how-
ever, in its efforts to prevent the establish-
ment of massively brutal, pro-Soviet tyrann-
ieans in other strategically significant re-
gions. While the defeat in Vietnam is the
principal symbol of that failure, its most
dangerous consequences are felt much
closer to home, in Central America.

The principal aim of Soviet policy in the
postwar era has been to compensate for or
overcome the effects of its strategic defeat
in Western Europe. The main strategic ne-
cessity facing the U.S. has been to reverse
the trend of failure in the other strategi-

rope they sought to neutralize
nuclear option needed to
NATO's inferior convention
They also sought to weaken
between Western Europe and
Soviet leaders who made the
decision had good reason to
would be no effective U.S.-N.
They hoped to exploit Ameri-
nam malaise to achieve a de-
logical and political advan-
tage just as they had seized upon
portant gains in Asia, south
Central America.

What the Brezhnev-era
gists did not anticipate was
a U.S. administration that h
competence and domestic p
to frustrate the political con-
strategy. The Reagan adm
cessfully managed the politi-
Pershing 2s and cruise mis
Soviet strategy suffered a
Instead of leaving Europe
attack without an automati-

sponse, the result left it
open to attack from Eur
automatic involvement of
range nuclear arsenal.

The situation was not
Soviets. At best, they hit
SS-20s into bargaining ch
extract concessions from
worst, there would be a re-
quo ante, leaving increa-
prehensions about the rel-
c's nuclear umbrella ar
with the politically pa
paying for expensive inc-
tional arms. It was a
volved little pain for the
it left intact their gains
world.

Since Lenin, Soviet le-
stood that the resource-
of the world are one key
rope. These areas prov
materials and future t
more important to Eur-
ica. Africa and Asia are
Europe of such mineral
and aluminum, as well a
raw materials including
edible oils, spices, sis-
Americans are critical
ergy supplies from the
Soviets could gain pres
in these regions, this wo
pean inclinations toward
countries in the Soviet
Soviet demonstrations
pacity in these areas c
age Western cohesion
In the '70s the Soviet

The Soviets
linkage between a
trol and the are
viet behavior th
 greatest immedi-
gic threat to U.S.

n attacking in sequenced, helons from Eastern Europe inside the Soviet Union. Siles are extremely accu- mulate large payloads powerful conventional war-

eign policy—a seemingly addictive pursuit of otherwise normal people. There seems to be a difference, though, at least so far. After a heavy-metal concert, the audience goes back to the real world.

## An Echo

first time in history, the "arms control" was replaced by "arms reduction"—in this complete elimination of all of U.S. and Soviet nuclear Ronald Reagan, on signing treaty yesterday. An international agreement

since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons from the arsenal of nations.—Richard Nixon, in his official message on the Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Biological and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction, 1972.

## Constitution vs. Tort Crisis

of neglect by judicial returned parts of the Constitution. Now original-intent have rediscovered an ossified in a potentially enormous tort law. For the first time, it has challenged punitive in the ground that they viollenth Amendment rule that bail shall not be required, live fines imposed."

Life & Casualty Co. rely a policyholder because and that his surgical amputee required by a degenerative sport by an insured accidental Mississippi jury said the action to blame, and ordered the fine $20,000 under the policy 1.6 million in punitive dam- company objects that the award violates the excessive use. The Supreme Court arguments last week.

Anglo-American common law traditionally denied punishes except in certain nar- row of gross fraud. But the zeal for bating-fee lawyers has ed punitive damages into fuel of the litigation explo- AND study found that by average "bad-faith" award geles was more than $3 million that more than a third of de- found to have breached contract to pay punitive damages.

pocket insurance companies referred targets. As in this case, the insurers demand that firms pay based on a benefit. This litigation is described in detail by Wil- noff, a California lawyer, in *On: Payment Refused.* In

plained that the huge awards "punish the insurance companies for refusing to honor their policies."

Former Justice Department lawyers Ted Olson and Larry Simms developed the argument based on the Constitution's excessive fines clause. They cited the Magna Carta as the source of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against court fines as a form of punishment. King John agreed to limit amercements, or fines. "A free-man shall not be amerced for a slight offence, except in accordance with the degree of the offence; and for a grave offence he shall be amerced in accordance with the gravity of the offence, yet saving always his contentment," the clause says. The language is archaic, but the Eighth Amendment and modern jurisprudence endorse its principle of proportionality.

The brief says punitive damages are "vague, elusive and retroactively applied." There is no relationship between compensatory and punitive damages or between the defendant's alleged wrongdoing and the fine. The damages are a due-process violation because they "reward plaintiffs indiscriminately" and impose crushing financial burdens for the most whimsical of reasons." The brief also made the separation of powers argument that even if the insurer had committed a fraud, private punishment via the courts is inappropriate because the state legislature has established criminal penalties. The top fine is $1,000, well below $1.6 million.

The abuses by Naderite tort lawyers have so far confounded the legal system's ability to correct itself. This case is a sign that the Constitution itself is a tool against gross abuses, and a source of wisdom on the nature of justice that we literally cannot afford

of the war from 1964-1968, and the over-throw of Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963, which left the choice of defeat or Americanization.

Col. Harry Summers, the Army's historian of the war, cited the 1962 Laos agreement, which secured the North Vietnamese infiltration routes, and the failure to mobilize U.S. public opinion. During the final invasion, he added, he was evacuated to the carrier Coral Sea, to hear pilots tell of North Vietnamese convoys 100 miles long. "What those pilots could have done."

But in 1975, no bombs stopped North Vietnamese tanks. In Paris last week, Vietnamese expatriates agonized over the subsequent results: the boat people, one of whom appeared to give the invocation; political executions, 65,000, or maybe 100,000, not counting deaths from neglect or malnutrition; re-education camps and block committees; the sale of slave laborers to build Soviet and Eastern European pipelines; in Cambodia, the conscription of 120,000 to 140,000 people a year to work in remote wilderness to construct a 500-mile Berlin Wall on the Thai border. In short, the usual results of revolutions promoted by the political system and ideology Mr. Gorbachev represents as he is being toasted in Washington this week.

With that purpose so obviously failed, Mr. Kissinger admitted one error in calculation. "I suffered from the illusion that this would unify the American people; that the peace movement would be gratified that we had reached settlement and that the others would be gratified that we had maintained honor.

"It did not occur to me that the people who opposed the war would have an interest in proving peace could not be maintained," he continued. But after settlement was reached and U.S. prisoners returned, Congress cut aid to South Vietnam from $2 billion a year to $750 million at a time of soaring oil prices, legislated against any U.S. military activity, and by the time South Vietnamese resistance collapsed, was discussing a "terminal grant." Public opposition of the war did not diminish; instead, critics pressed to prove that nothing good could come of the effort.

Mr. Kissinger was defended by David Horowitz, during the war an editor of Ramparts magazine and now organizing a project named Second Thoughts. "I would just like to say to the Vietnamese here that it's Americans like me you have to blame if you want to blame somebody. Dr. Kissinger was your friend."

Watching the summit festivities unfold in Washington this week, a visitor to Avenue Kleber wonders whether President Reagan is making the same mistake, not in his assessment of the Communists but in his assessment of the Americans. No doubt Mr. Reagan's administration believes that arms-control agreements will repair his tarnished standing with the public and smooth his relations with Congress. But for ratification of his new treaty he is putting himself in the hands of opponents who have ravaged his appointees, held his arms buildup hostage to a tax increase and taken every opportunity to diminish the powers of his office. After the summit celebrations fade, the returning visitor suspects, Mr. Reagan will learn what their price will be.

the role of China in the other cally significant regions of the world.

When the Vietnam debacle dem- onstrates America's governing elite, the Soviet a chance to consolidate their military in Europe. With their loss of SS-20s against targets in Wes-

## Jaime

By ANTHONY SPAETH

Filipinos are fond of martyrs' history and in their art. Jose Rizal, a national hero, was shot by the Spanish 1896. Politician Benigno Aquino hailed a martyr in 1983 when he dered by one of Ferdinand Mar-diers. A beautician, killed in a accident shortly before Corazon Aquino threw Mr. Marcos, was insta- claimed the first martyr of the tion." (The giddy implication there would be many more.) Often, one gets the uncomfortable that Filipinos would prefer Mrs. Aquino as their living president, as a martyr that wish hasn't come true.

To my mind, the 1986 Philippine government gained its first genuine may-day, when a disgraced former minister blew his brains out in his office. I doubt if many Filipinos with me; surely the death of Jimmy pin, if filmed, would lack the glory necessary to draw a crowd. For who needs a martyr- ing revolution?

But Jaime Ongpin-Jimmy to one of the brightest hopes of the government. He was brilliant, field-dicated, and groomed for the duties of finance minister at Harvard and executive suite. Jimmy was the first, with a bullet in his brain, the rious revolution he believed in.

Of course, Mrs. Aquino re-power. But she's proved herself the problems she faces. She hasn't revolutionary change to her country. She could have and which it needs, nila, it is often debated whether brought "good government"-al to merely better or more popular.

The Filipinos have missed the opportunity for change by mistaking Marcos's ouster for a revolution when they should have been and by shrugging away the small failures-matters of more military, of yawning inefficiency threaten to discredit, if not to Aquino administration.

None of these were Jimmy flaws. I knew Jimmy for five years; they were professionally friendly to personally close. I quoted him as one of the boldest critics of the administration. I covered him with Mrs. Aquino's finance minister, the second day of her president.

The story of his public career printed often: the anti-Marcos man catapulted into the revolution; the squabbles between Mrs. Aquino's closest aide and

September 29, 1983

FOR HAK

FROM: RN

Attached are

Tab 1 US proposal of May 31, 1971. It was printed in full in the footnotes to Chaper 23 of White House Years. See page 1018 for chapter reference.

Tab 2 Vietnamese Nine-Point proposal of June 26, 1971. Not printed in full in WHY but summarized in the Chapter 23 text, p. 1023.

Tab 3 Mme. Binh's Seven-Point proposal, July 1, 1971. (See p. 1024 of WHY)

Tab 1 at back, US proposal of October 11, 1971 - printed in full in notes to chapter 23 of WHY. (See p. 1040 of WHY)

Tab 4 Nixon's speech of January 25, 1972 revealing all of the foregoing and making public text of US proposal.

1488

Chapter Notes

3. The State Department acknowledged on June 22 that its original announcement of the embargo on April 15 did not mention the fact that earlier transactions would not necessarily be affected by it. See *The New York Times*, June 23, 1971.

4. Dobrynin also gave the gestation period as a year. Jha told Rogers it was two years, and Foreign Minister Singh gave this figure publicly. After Nixon's July 15 China announcement, Singh had told the Indian Parliament cryptically that India had been considering countermeasures to a possible Sino-American rapprochement 'for some time' (see Chapter XIX).

5. Sydney H. Schanberg, "India Sets Range for Retaliations in East Pakistan." *New York Times*, Nov. 29, 1971.

6. The Article read: "The Government of Pakistan is determined to resist aggression. In case of aggression against Pakistan, the Government of the United States of America, in accordance with the Constitution of the United States of America, will take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may be mutually agreed upon and as is envisaged in the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East, in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request."

7. Assurances were given by the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, including a letter from President John F. Kennedy to Pakistani President Mohammed Ayub Khan on Jan. 26, 1962; an aide-mémoire presented by the US Ambassador on Nov. 5, 1962; a public statement by the State Department on Nov. 17, 1962; and an oral promise by President Lyndon Johnson to Ayub Khan on Dec. 15, 1965.

8. See the Anderson column in the *Washington Post*, Dec. 21, 1971, and the minutes of the Dec. 8 WSAG meeting published in the *New York Times*, Jan. 15, 1972.

9. The *Washington Post* of Dec. 8, 1971, reported on my background briefing with a column headlined, "White House Softens Pro-Pakistan Stance." Senator Barry Goldwater was so carried away by my briefing that he inserted it in *toto* into the *Congressional Record* without informing us. *Congressional Record* (daily ed.), Dec. 9, 1971, p. S21012.

10. Milton Viorst, "War Odious, but Not Always Evil," *Washington Star*, Dec. 11, 1971.

11. See the *New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1972; *Washington Post*, Jan. 6, 1972.

## XXII
### CRISIS IN THE ALLIANCE

1. Raymond Aron, *The Imperial Republic: The United States and the World 1945-1973* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1974), pp. 293-295.

## XXIII
### VIETNAM 1970-71: FORCING HANOI'S HAND

1. *Washington Post* editorials, Aug. 28 and Sept. 1, 1970.

2. See the *New York Times*, June 16, 1969; *The New York Times Magazine*, Sept. 21, 1969.

3. See, e.g., *New York Times* editorials, Aug. 5, Aug. 21, Aug. 24, Oct. 15, 1969.

4. They included Henry Jackson, who drafted the letter, Hugh Scott, Mike Mansfield, Barry Goldwater, Jacob Javits, Warren Magnuson, Bob Doyle, Alan Bible, Thomas J. McIntyre, Winston Prouty, Birch Bayh, Charles Percy, Milton Young, and Ted Stevens.

5. "Peace Plan Gets Wide Praise from Hill Leaders and Media," *Washington Post*, Oct. 9, 1970.

6. "Peace Initiative Backed By The Press," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, Oct. 11, 1970.

7. Proposed, for example by Morton Halperin and Leslie Gelb in the *Washington Post*, Oct. 11, 1970, and by Halperin again in the *New York Times*, Nov. 7, 1970.

8. Benjamin F. Schemmer, *The Raid* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), pp. 243-244.

9. A handy schedule of a dozen separate planned antiwar rallies and campaigns was published in the *Washington Daily News*: see Judy Luce, "Demonstration Timetable Here," March 31, 1971, p. 3.

10. Address to the Nation, April 7, 1971; see also news conferences of Feb. 17 and March 4, 1971.

11. The May 31 proposal as I read it to Xuan Thuy was as follows: U.S.
First, we are prepared to set a terminal date for the withdrawal of all our forces from South Vietnam. We would, as I have indicated earlier, arrange for roughly the same timetable for the withdrawal of other Allied forces.

Second, the Vietnamese and the other peoples of Indochina should discuss among themselves the manner in which all other outside forces would withdraw from the countries of Indochina.

### Chapter Notes

Third, the time when the forces and the forces and the drawl will be withdrawn will be later than the statement is to be released.

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on the day a

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the agreed t

— The re
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12. Walters handed

I. The Un
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drawal will

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 withdrawn t
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months aft

— The re
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2. The re
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US proposal

See page 1018 of with years

Notes

Chapter Notes

1489

Third, there should be a ceasefire in place throughout Indochina, to become effective at the time when U.S. withdrawals based on the final agreed timetable begin.

Fourth, as part of the ceasefire, there should be no further infiltration of outside forces into the countries of Indochina.

Fifth, there should be international supervision of the ceasefire and its provisions.

Sixth, both sides should renew their pledge to respect the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords, to respect the neutrality, territorial integrity, and independence of Laos and Cambodia. This could be formalized at an international conference.

Seventh, I want to reiterate our proposal for the immediate release of all prisoners of war and innocent civilians held by both sides throughout Indochina. We believe this issue should be settled immediately on a humanitarian basis. If this is not done, the men must be released as an integral part of the settlement we are proposing in our final offer. We would expect:

- Your side would present a complete list of all prisoners held throughout Indochina on the day an agreement is reached.

- The release of the prisoners would begin on the same day as our withdrawals under the agreed timetable.

- The release of prisoners would be completed at least two months before the completion of our final withdrawals.

We are prepared to talk concretely and to make rapid progress. We have framed this offer to respond to your proposals. We expect that you will deal with our final proposals in a constructive spirit.

12. Walters handed over the text of our new eight points:

U.S.

1. The United States agrees to the total withdrawal from South Vietnam of all U.S. forces and other foreign forces allied with the government of South Vietnam. This withdrawal will be carried out in the following manner:

- All American and allied forces, except for a small number of personnel needed for technical advice, logistics, and observance of the ceasefire mentioned in point 6, will be withdrawn by July 1, 1972, provided that this statement of principles is signed by December 1, 1971. The terminal date for these withdrawals will in no event be later than seven months after this statement of principles is signed.

- The remaining personnel, in turn, will be progressively withdrawn beginning one month before the Presidential election mentioned in point 3 and simultaneously with the resignations of the incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam also provided for in point 3. These withdrawals will be completed by the date of the Presidential election.

2. The release of all military men and innocent civilians captured throughout Indochina will be carried out in parallel with the troop withdrawals mentioned in point 1. Both sides will present a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day this statement of principles is signed. The release will begin on the same day as the troop withdrawals and will be completed by July 1, 1972, provided this statement is signed by December 1, 1971. The completion of this release will in no event be later than seven months after this statement is signed.

3. The following principles will govern the political future of South Vietnam:

The political future of South Vietnam will be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

There will be a free and democratic Presidential election in South Vietnam within six months of the signature of the final agreement based on the principles in this statement. This election will be organized and run by an independent body representing all political forces in South Vietnam which will assume its responsibilities on the date of the final agreement. This body will, among other responsibilities, determine the qualification of candidates. All political forces in South Vietnam can participate in the election and present candidates. There will be international supervision of this election.

One month before the Presidential election takes place, the incumbent President and Vice President of South Vietnam will resign. A caretaker Administration, headed by the Chairman of the Senate, will assume administrative responsibilities except for those pertaining to the election, which will remain with the independent election body.

The United States, for its part, declares that it:

- will support no candidate and will remain completely neutral in the South Vietnamese election.

The White House has made it clear to the Government of North Vietnam that it does not wish to engage in military action in their part of the country. The Government of North Vietnam has not yet given its response to the call for help from the United States. It has said that it will give its reply when it has received an offer of help from the United States.

on

1490

Chapter Notes

Chapter

— will abide by the outcome of this election and any other political processes shaped by the South Vietnamese people themselves.

— is prepared to define its military and economic assistance relationship with any government that exists in South Vietnam.

Both sides agree that:

— South Vietnam, together with the other countries of Indochina, should adopt a foreign policy of neutrality.

— Reunification of Vietnam should be decided on the basis of discussions and agreements between North and South Vietnam without constraint and annexation from either party, and without foreign interference.

4. Both sides will respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. There will be no foreign intervention in the Indochinese countries and the Indochinese peoples will be left to settle by themselves their own affairs.

5. The problems existing among the Indochinese countries will be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs. Among the problems that will be settled is the implementation of the principle that all armed forces of the countries of Indochina must remain within their national frontiers.

6. There will be a general ceasefire throughout Indochina, to begin when the final agreement is signed. As part of the ceasefire, there will be no further infiltration of outside forces into any of the countries of Indochina.

7. There will be international supervision of the military aspects of this agreement including the ceasefire and its provisions, the release of prisoners of war and innocent civilians and the withdrawal of outside forces from Indochina.

8. There will be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples, the neutrality of all the countries in Indochina, and lasting peace in this region.

Both sides express their willingness to participate in an international conference for this and other appropriate purposes.

13. McGovern quoted in *Washington Post*, Jan. 4, 1972.

14. Muskie and Humphrey quoted in *Newsweek*, Feb. 7, 1972.

## XXIV
NIXON'S TRIP TO CHINA

1. *RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 560-564.

2. Ross Terrill, *Flowers on an Iron Tree: Five Cities of China* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1975), p. 171.

3. The complete text of the Shanghai Communiqué is as follows:

### JOINT COMMUNIQUE

February 28, 1972
Shanghai, People's Republic
of China

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agri-

NORTH VIETNAMESE NINE-POINT PROPOSAL

June 26, 1971

1. The withdrawal of the totality of U.S. forces and those of foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam and other Indochinese countries should be completed within 1971.

2. The release of all military men and civilians captured in the war should be carried out in parallel and completed at the same time as the troop withdrawals mentioned in Point 1.

3. In South Vietnam the U.S. should stop supporting Thieu/Ky/Khiem so that there may be set up in Saigon a new Administration standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy. The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam will enter into talks with that Administration to settle the internal affairs of South Vietnam and to achieve national reunification.

4. The United States Government must bear full responsibility for the damages caused by the United States to the peace of the whole of Vietnam. The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam demand from the U.S. Government reparations for the damage caused by the U.S. in the two zones of Vietnam.

5. The U.S. should respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. It should stop its aggression and intervention in the Indochinese countries and let their people settle by themselves their own affairs.

6. The problems existing among the Indochinese countries should be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs. As far as it is concerned, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is prepared to join in resolving such problems.

7. All the parties should achieve a cease-fire after the signing of the agreements on the above mentioned problems.

8. There should be an international supervision.

9. There should be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples, the neutrality of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and lasting peace in this region.

The above points form an integrated whole and are closely related to one another.

V-65

HK was set to leave on his around-the-world trip on the evening of July 1, 1971. During the day, in Paris, Madame Nguyen Thi Binh presented a new seven-point peace plan which paralleled in its main provisions the nine-point proposal given to HK by Le Duc Tho in the secret meeting of June 26. This was in spite of HK's warnings and Le Duc Tho's apparent agreement that the proposals be kept secret. The PRG seven-point proposal was as follows:

PARIS, July 1 (Reuters)— Following is the text of the Vietcong's seven-point peace proposal presented at today's session of the Vietnam peace talks:

[1]

Regarding the deadline for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces.

The U.S. Government must put an end to its war of aggression in Vietnam, stop the policy of "Vietnamization" of the war, withdraw from South Vietnam all troops, military personnel, weapons, and war materials of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, and dismantle all U.S. bases in South Vietnam, without posing any condition whatsoever.

The U.S. Government must set a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

If the U.S. Government sets a terminal date for the withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1971 of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp, the parties will at the same time agree on the modalities:

A. Of the withdrawal in safety from South Vietnam of the totality of U.S. forces and those of the other foreign countries in the U.S. camp.

B. Of the release of the totality of military men of all parties and the civilians captured in the war (including American pilots captured in North Vietnam), so that they may all rapidly return to their homes.

These two operations will begin on the same date and will end on the same date.

A cease-fire will be observed between the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the United States and of the other foreign countries in the United States camp, as soon as the parties reach agreement on the withdrawal from South Vietnam

of the totality of United States forces and those of the other foreign countries in the United States camp.

[2]

Regarding the question of power in South Vietnam.

The United States Government must really respect the South Vietnam people's right to self-determination, put an end to its interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, cease backing the belligerent group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu, at present in office in Saigon, and stop all maneuvers, including tricks on elections, aimed at maintaining the puppet Nguyen Van Thieu.

The political, social and religious forces in South Vietnam aspiring to peace and national concord will use various means to form in Saigon a new administration favoring peace, independence, neutrality and democracy.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam will immediately enter into talks with that administration in order to settle the following questions:

A. To form a broad three-segment government of national concord that will assume its functions during the period between the restoration of peace and the holding of general elections and organize general elections in South Vietnam.

A cease-fire will be observed between the South Vietnam People's Liberation Armed Forces and the armed forces of the Saigon administration as soon as the government of national concord is formed.

B. To take concrete measures with the required guarantees so as to prohibit all acts of terror, reprisal and discrimination against persons having collaborated with one or the other party, to ensure every democratic liberty to the South Vietnam people, to release all persons jailed for political reasons, to dissolve all concentration camps and to liquidate all forms of constraint and coercion so as to permit the people to return to their

native places in complete freedom and to freely engage in their occupations.

C. To see that the people's conditions of living are stabilized and gradually improved, to create conditions allowing everyone to contribute his talents and efforts to heal the war wounds and rebuild the country.

D. To agree on measures to be taken to ensure the holding of genuinely free, democratic, and fair general elections in South Vietnam.

[3]

Regarding the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam.

The Vietnamese parties will together settle the question of Vietnamese armed forces in South Vietnam in a spirit of national concord, equality, and mutual respect, without foreign interference, in accordance with the postwar situation and with a view to making lighter the people's contributions.

[4]

Regarding the peaceful reunification of Vietnam and the relations between the North and South zones.

A. The reunification of Vietnam will be achieved step by step by peaceful means, on the basis of discussions and agreements between the two zones, without constraint and annexation from either party, without foreign interference.

Pending the reunification of the country, the North and the South zones will establish normal relations, guarantee free movement, free correspondence, free choice of residence, and maintain economic and cultural relations on the principle of mutual interests and mutual assistance.

All questions concerning the two zones will be settled by qualified representatives of the Vietnamese people in the two zones on the basis of negotiations, without foreign interference.

B. In keeping with the provisions of the 1954 Ge-

neva agreements on Vietnam, in the present temporary partition of the country into two zones, the North and the South zones of Vietnam will refrain from joining any military alliance with foreign countries, from allowing any foreign country to have military bases, troops, and military personnel on their soil, and from recognizing the protection of any country, of any military alliance or bloc.

[5]

Regarding the foreign policy of peace and neutrality of South Vietnam.

South Vietnam will pursue a foreign policy of peace and neutrality, establish relations with all countries regardless of their political and social regime, in accordance with the five principles of peaceful coexistence, maintain economic and cultural relations with all countries, accept the cooperation of foreign countries in the exportation of the resources of South Vietnam, accept from any country economic and technical aid without any political conditions attached, and participate in regional plans of economic cooperation.

On the basis of these principles, after the end of the war, South Vietnam and the United States will establish relations in the political, economic and cultural fields.

[6]

Regarding the damages caused by the United States to the Vietnamese peoples in the two zones.

The U.S. Government must bear full responsibility for the losses and the destructions it has caused to the Vietnamese people in the two zones.

[7]

Regarding the respect and the international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded.

The parties will find agreement on the forms of respect and international guarantee of the accords that will be concluded.

HAK:

3/19/87

If you haven't seen it, you will probably
find of interest the new review by Dick
Holbrooke of the Schecter book, *A Palace
File*.

I know you are leaving town, but I will be
sending you the Vietnam materials you want
for your next letter to Schecter.

Rosemary

To paraphrase
no significant
author's. With all
omissions, its
and its dimin-
it, its vulgariza-
f Hemingway's
is a travesty.

out getting blamed for the probable con-
sequences of our departure, they selected
a method that required some deception
of almost everyone.

To conservatives, they wished to appear tough—hence such actions as the Christmas bombing of 1972. To liberals, and to war-weary Americans in general, they wished to appear to be moving toward the end of America's involvement in Indochina—hence the gradual withdrawal of American troops, and Kissinger's "peace is at hand" statement in October 1972. Yet their slow, deliberate ambiguity in the negotiations was designed more for appearances than for purposes of policy. Kissinger in effect conceded this in his own memoirs: by July 1969 (when Nixon visited Saigon), he wrote, "We were clearly on the way out of Vietnam, by negotiations if possible, by unilateral withdrawal if necessary."

To effect that departure without vast international embarrassment, Nixon and Kissinger had to gain approval from the Thieu government for agreements that were, from Saigon's point of view, deeply worrisome, since they permitted North Vietnam to keep well over 100,000 regular military forces, in the South after the cease-fire. This was a major concession by Nixon, and it terrified Thieu. The reciprocal Communist concession, that Hanoi would no longer insist on the prior removal of the Thieu government, was hardly the major negotiating achievement that Nixon claimed it was, in the light of what Hanoi had already gained. Thus, to allay Thieu's fears, Nixon reassured Thieu in private letters with phrases and promises too strong for public consumption. If the North Vietnamese violated the Paris Accords, the president vowed, he would respond. "You have my absolute assurance," Nixon wrote after the 1972 elections, "that if Hanoi fails to abide by the terms of this agreement it is my intention to take swift and severe retaliatory action."

Such a commitment would have been repudiated by Congress, however, and by most of the American public. Thus the existence of the letters was a closely guarded secret. Not even Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who might have had to implement such an "assurance," knew of them, something that to this day he regards as astonishing and appalling. In fact, the letters had little standing as anything more than personal statements of Richard Nixon's. But Thieu, perhaps confused about the na-

PROMISES, PROMISES

The Palace File
by Nguyen Tien Hung and Jerrold L. Schecter

(Harper & Row, 542 pp., $22.95)

The literature on Vietnam, so scant in
the 1960s, when it was most needed, is
now swelling toward flood tide. Much of
what is being produced is either redundant or merely memoiristic; but one can
now add *The Palace File* to the relatively
short list of important books on this
grim and complicated subject. It is the
product of an occasionally awkward co-authorship between an economist who
served as a special assistant to President
Nguyen Van Thieu during the last years
of the Republic of Vietnam and the distinguished former diplomatic correspondent for *Time* magazine. Hung and
Schecter's book provides new and valuable information about the doomed alliance between Washington and Saigon.
Their contribution has been to cast light
upon that alliance from the South Vietnamese point of view. Their study leaves
unanswered some profound questions
about the American role in Vietnam, but
still it is fascinating, and an unusual way
of looking at one of the most dramatic
events in recent American history.

Just before the end came for the gov-
ernment of the Republic of Vietnam in
April 1975, President Thieu sent Hung to
Washington to plead for last-minute
help. To assist with his argument, Thieu
gave Hung photocopies of 31 secret let-
ters written by Presidents Nixon and
Ford to Thieu. These hitherto unpublished
letters form the connective tissue
of *The Palace File*. Interspersed with cross
references to previously published mem-
oirs and extensive interviews, Hung and
Schecter shift the focus away from our
usual obsession with the condition of the
Americans toward the ultimate victims of
the tragedy, the Vietnamese themselves.

This is the story the way Thieu and
Hung want it remembered. Predictably,
it differs sharply from the story presented by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in their memoirs. In essence, *The Palace File* advances two theses. First, that Washington's treatment of Saigon from 1969 to 1975 constitutes a "betrayal of an ally unrivaled in American history"; or, as Thieu himself put it, "It is so easy to be an enemy of the United States, but so difficult to be a friend." Second, that had the United States kept its word, South Vietnam would have survived.

In late April 1975 Hung made public
two or three of Nixon's letters to Thieu.
The full file, placed in the context of
other events between 1971 and 1975,
does make one sympathetic to at least
part of the authors' argument. Nixon's
and Ford's letters (presumably written in
large part by Kissinger) skillfully combined
threats and promises, with the intention
of pushing Thieu into accepting
a cease-fire agreement that he felt was
fatally flawed.

Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford have defended themselves in the past with various explanations and denials: that Wartergate prevented the United States from saving South Vietnam; that Hanoi broke the agreements; that liberals in Congress shackled the government with restrictive anti-war legislation; that they regret having treated Saigon so harshly; and so on. Each of these explanations falls short of fully satisfying, and of course they are somewhat contradictory. Still, I do not mean to make light of Nixon's and Kissinger's dilemma. Seeking a way to end America's involvement in Vietnam with-

34 THE NEW REPUBLIC

3/9/87

> My book praises you repeatedly for your courage and decency and acknowledges, in essence, that you were right... I agree with you that the cease-fire terms were harsh. Our tragic dilemma in 1972 was that we had reached the limit of our domestic possibilities... If it had been President Nixon's and my intention to betray you, we could have done it in 1969. You and I had many disagreements, but only over tactics. In view of the outcome, your anger is understandable. However, it would be a pity if those who long advocated our abandonment of South Vietnam were now able to use your bitterness as another weapon against those who tried to save South Vietnam... I do not expect to convince you. I can at least try to assure you of my continuing regret and respect.

RICHARD HOLBROOKE

A NOVEL OF HER OWN

Foe
by J. M. Coetzee

(Viking, 157 pp., $15.95)

Coetzee's allegory encourages us to think about God, but his triangle of a woman caught between male master and slave and trying to penetrate the silence of both is not, like that of the Old Testament, the genesis of our moral imperatives; nor is his island a healing anodyne to civilization like that of Shakespeare's Tempest. Coetzee's island is the genesis of

36 THE NEW REPUBLIC

Among the many public statements pledging US enforcement of
the Paris Agreement were the following:

President Nixon's Address to the Nation, January 23, 1973:

The terms of the agreement must be scrupulously
adhered to. We shall do everything the agreement
requires of us, and we shall expect the other parties to
do everything it requires of them. We shall also expect
other interested nations to help insure that the
agreement is carried out and peace is maintained.

Dr. Kissinger's Press Conference, January 24, 1973:

QUESTION: If a peace treaty is violated and if the ICC proves ineffective, will the United States ever again send troops into Vietnam?

KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on hypothetical situations that we don't expect to arise....

Deputy Assistant Secretary William Sullivan on NBC-TV's
Meet the Press, January 28, 1973:

QUESTION: There's also reports from Saigon today, Mr. Ambassador, that the United States has given official but private assurances to Saigon that we would intervene militarily again if Hanoi commits serious violations. Just what is our commitment? What would we do if a cease-fire breaks down?

SULLIVAN: I am not going to speculate on that, Mr. Rosenfeld. I think you have seen Dr. Kissinger's statement concerning the method in which the agreement has stipulated the requirements for carrying out this accord. There are no inhibitions upon us, but we are not going to discuss any hypothetical questions at this time about what the future prospects may bring.

Dr. Kissinger's Interview on CBS News with Marvin Kalb,
February 1, 1973:

KALB: Dr. Kissinger, I think what I was trying to get at is what happens- and I suppose this question must be asked. In the best of all possible worlds the cease-fire is going to hold. In the world that we live in it may not. President Thieu said in an interview tonight on CBS that he would never call upon American air power to go back. And Ambassador Sullivan said only last Sunday that there are no inhibitions- I believe were his words- on the use of this air power. Is that correct?

KISSINGER: That is legally correct.

KALB: Politically and diplomatically?

KISSINGER: We have the right to do this. The question is very difficult to answer in the abstract. It depends on the extent of the challenge, on the nature of the threat, on the circumstances in which it arises; and it would be extremely unwise for a responsible American official at this stage, when the peace is in

the process of being established, to give a checklist
about what the United States will or will not do in
every circumstance that is likely to arise.

For the future that we can foresee, the North
Vietnamese are not in a position to launch an
overwhelming attack on the South, even if they violate
the agreement. What happens after a year or two has to
be seen in the circumstances which then exist.

Most of the violations that one can now foresee
should be handled by the South Vietnamese.

KALB: So that for the next year or two, if I
understand you right, there would be no need for a
reinvolvement of American military power?

KISSINGER: Marvin, we did not end this war in order
to look for an excuse to reenter it, but it would be
irresponsible for us at this moment to give a precise
checklist to potential aggressors as to what they can or
cannot safely do.

President Nixon's News Conference, March 15, 1973:

I will only suggest this: that we have informed the
North Vietnamese of our concern about this infiltration and
of what we believe it to be, a violation of the cease-fire,
the cease-fire and the peace agreement. Our concern has also
been expressed to other interested parties. And I would only
suggest that based on my actions over the past four years,
that the North Vietnamese should not lightly disregard such
expressions of concern when they are made with regard to a
violation. That is all I will say about it.

Under Secretary for Political Affairs William Porter, speech
in Grand Rapids, March 21, 1973:

President Nixon has made clear our concern at North
Vietnamese infiltration of large amounts of equipment
into South Vietnam. If it continued, this infiltration
could lead to serious consequences. The North
Vietnamese should not lightly disregard our expressions
of concern.

President Nixon's Address to the Nation, March 29, 1973:

There are still some problem areas. The provisions
of the agreement requiring an accounting for all missing
in action in Indochina, the provisions with regard to
Laos and Cambodia, the provisions prohibiting
infiltration from North Vietnam into South Vietnam have
not been complied with. We have and will continue to
comply with the agreement. We shall insist that North
Vietnam comply with the agreement. And the leaders of
North Vietnam should have no doubt as to the
consequences if they fail to comply with the agreement.

Defense Secretary Richardson on NBC-TV's Meet the Press,
April 1, 1973:

RON NESSEN: Mr. Secretary, can you say that the

United States will never under any circumstances send military forces back to Indochina?

RICHARDSON: No, I cannot give any categorical assurance, Mr. Nessen. Obviously the future holds possible developments that are unforeseeable now. But certainly we very much hope that this will not be necessary.

NESSEN: And if I ask you the same question about, can you say whether the United States will never bomb again in North or South Vietnam, your answer would be the same?

RICHARDSON: Yes, but of course our hope and expectation is that the cease-fire agreements will be observed.

NESSEN: President Nixon has warned several times North Vietnam that it should have no doubt about the consequences if it violates the cease-fire. What does he mean, Mr. Nessen....

They have, I think, had some reason, looking back over the past, to know that the President has been willing to do what has been necessary in order to bring about a negotiated solution and to bring an end to the war.

Defense Secretary Richardson to the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 2, 1973:

QUESTION: There are reports out of South Vietnam today that President Thieu of South Vietnam says that the United States and the South Vietnamese Government have an agreement that if there is an offensive, that if the North Vietnamese do come in, that the United States will come back with its airplanes and with its air support? Do we have such a commitment?

RICHARDSON: This is a question simply of very possible contingencies. I wouldn't want to try to amplify on anything he said or to subtract from it....

We, of course, continue to adhere to the proposition that the cease-fire agreements not only have been signed but are in the interest of all the parties and our objective is to assure so far as is possible that they are carried out....

Our job is to reinforce the considerations that will, we trust, lead them to carry out the agreement....

If he [the President] had the constitutional power to carry on the war while winding it down, we think it's a natural extension of this to say that he has the constitutional power to take whatever incidental steps that are now required in order to assure that the cease-fire agreements are carried out.

US-GVN Communique (San Clemente), April 3, 1973:

Both Presidents, while acknowledging that progress was being made toward military and political settlements in South Vietnam, nevertheless viewed with great concern

3

infiltrations of men and weapons of the Agreement on
Ending the War, and considered that actions which would
threaten the basis of the agreement would call for
appropriately vigorous reactions. They expressed their
conviction that all the provisions of the Agreement,
including in particular those concerning military forces
and military supplies, must be faithfully implemented if
the cease-fire is to be preserved and the prospects for
a peaceful settlement are to be assured. President
Nixon stated with great and continuing concern....

Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson, interviewed by newsmen
prior to his appearance before the House Appropriations
Subcommittee on Defense, April 3, 1973:

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, under what conditions might we have to begin bombing in support of the South Vietnamese?

RICHARDSON: It would be one of those questions that it's impossible to answer in general terms. We can only see what develops, and hopefully, what will develop is the full and complete implementation of the cease-fire agreements.

QUESTION: But is it possible that we will have to bomb either North Vietnam or in support of the South Vietnam army again?

RICHARDSON: It's certainly something we cannot rule out at this time.

Dr. Kissinger's Press Conference, May 2, 1973:

QUESTION: You say if North Vietnam does not obey the call for an honorable cease-fire, it would risk revived confrontation with us. Could you spell out a little bit more clearly what you mean there [in the Foreign Policy Report]?

KISSINGER:...Now, on the confrontation, we have made clear that we mean to have the agreement observed. We are now engaged in an effort to discuss with the North Vietnamese what is required to bring about the strict implementation of the agreement. We have every intention and every incentive to make certain that our side of the agreement is maintained, and to use our influence wherever we can to bring about the strict implementation of the agreement.

But the United States cannot sign a solemn agreement and within weeks have major provisions violated without our making an attempt to indicate it. Now, the particular measures: Some of them are, of course, obvious and we would prefer, as we state in the report and as we have stated publicly many times, to move our relationship with the North Vietnamese toward normalization, and to start a process which would accelerate, such as other processes normally have.

So the general thrust of this paragraph is that the tension existing between us certainly cannot ease as

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rapidly as we want if the agreement is not observed.

President's Foreign Policy Report, May 3, 1973:

We hope that the contending factions will now prefer to pursue their objectives through peaceful means and political competition rather than through the brutal and costly methods of the past. This choice is up to them. We shall be vigilant concerning violations of the Agreement....

Hanoi has two basic choices. The first is to exploit the Vietnam Agreement and press its objectives in Indochina. In this case it would continue to infiltrate men and material into South Vietnam, keep its forces in Laos and Cambodia, and through pressures or outright attack renew its aggression against our friends. Such a course would endanger the hard won gains for peace in Indochina. It would risk revived confrontation with us.... The second course is for North Vietnam to pursue its objectives peacefully, allowing the historical trends of the region to assert themselves....

The Republic of Vietnam will find us a steady friend. We will continue to deal with its government as the legitimate representative of the South Vietnamese people, while supporting efforts by the South Vietnamese parties to achieve reconciliation and shape their political future. We will provide replacement military assistance within the terms of the Agreement. We expect our friends to observe the Agreement just as we will not tolerate violations by the North Vietnamese or its allies....

We have told Hanoi, privately and publicly, that we will not tolerate violations of the Agreement.

Dr. Kissinger's Press Conference, June 13, 1973:

**QUESTION:** Do you feel now that with the signing of the document you have more or less ended your work in the Indochina area or that you will still have a lot of difficulties, especially concerning Cambodia?

**KISSINGER:** The remaining issues in Indochina will still require significant diplomatic efforts, and we expect to continue them. Of course, we remain committed to the strict implementation of the agreement, and we will maintain our interest in it.

President Nixon's Message to the House of Representatives, June 27, 1973, opposing the Indochina bombing halt:

A total halt would virtually remove Communist incentive to negotiate and would thus seriously undercut ongoing diplomatic efforts to achieve a cease-fire in Cambodia. It would effectively reverse the momentum toward lasting peace in Indochina set in motion last January and renewed in the four-party communique signed in Paris on June 13....

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A Communist victory in Cambodia, in turn, would threaten the fragile balance of negotiated agreements, political alignments and military capabilities upon which the overall peace in Southeast Asia depends and on which my assessment of the acceptability of the Vietnam agreements was based.

Finally, and with even more serious global implications, the legislatively imposed acceptance of the United States to Communist violations of the Paris agreements and the conquest of Cambodia by Communist forces would call into question our national commitment not only to the Vietnam settlement but to many other settlements or agreements we have reached or seek to reach with other nations. A serious blow to America's international credibility would have been struck- a blow that would be felt far beyond Indochina.

Secretary Kissinger's Letter to Senator Kennedy, March 25, 1974:

As a signatory of the Paris Agreement, the United States committed itself to strengthening the conditions which made the cease-fire possible and to the goal of the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. With these commitments in mind, we continue to provide to the Republic of Vietnam the means necessary for its self-defense and for its economic viability....

We have...committed ourselves very substantially, both politically and morally.

Interview with Tran Van Lam, former South Vietnamese Foreign Minister, April 14, 1975, Saigon (Press Report):

Foreign Minister Lam stated that President Nixon promised to "react immediately and vigorously" to any large-scale North Vietnamese offensive. But, he added, "no secret agreement was signed."

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