A NEW NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP

A half-century ago Winston Churchill, in his book _The World Crisis_, observed that in happier times it was the custom for statesmen to "rejoice in that protecting Providence which had preserved us through so many dangers and brought us at last into a secure and prosperous age". But "little did they know", Churchill wrote, "that the worst perils had still to be encountered, and the greatest triumphs had yet to be won."

The same may be said of our age. We are at the end of three decades of a foreign policy which on the whole brought peace and prosperity to the world and which was conducted by Administrations of both our major parties. Inevitably, there were failures, but they were dwarfed by the long-term accomplishments.

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Now we are entering a new era. Old international patterns
are crumbling; old slogans are uninstructive; old solutions are
unavailing. The world has become interdependent in economics,
in communications, in human aspirations. No one nation, no
one part of the world can prosper or be secure in isolation.

[For America, involvement in world affairs is no longer
an act of choice but the expression of a reality. When weapons
span continents in minutes, our security is bound up with world
security. When our factories and farms and our financial strength
are so closely linked with other countries and peoples, our
prosperity is tied to world prosperity. The first truly world
crisis is that which we face now. It requires the first truly
global solutions.]

The world stands uneasily poised between unprecedented

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chaos and the opportunity for unparalleled creativity. The
next few years will determine whether interdependence will
foster common progress or common disaster. Our generation
has the opportunity to shape a new cooperative international
system; if we fail to act with vision we will condemn ourselves
to mounting domestic and international crises.

Had we a choice, America would not have selected this
moment to be so challenged. We have endured enough in the
past decade to have earned a respite: assassinations, racial
and generational turbulence, a divisive war, the fall of one
President and the resignation of another.

Nor are the other great democracies better prepared.
Adjusting to a loss of power and influence, assailed by
recession and inflation, they too feel their domestic burdens
weighing down their capacity to act boldly.

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But no nation can choose the timing of its fate. The
tides of history take no account of the fatigue of the helmsman.
Posterity will reward, not the difficulty of the challenge, only
the adequacy of the response.

For the United States, the present situation is laced
with irony. A decade of upheaval has taught us the
limitations of our power. Experience and maturity have
dispelled any illusion that we could shape events as we pleased.

[ Long after other nations, we have acquired a sense of tragedy. ]

Yet our people and our institutions have emerged from our
trials with a resilience that is the envy of other nations, who
know -- even when we forget -- that America's strength is
unique and American leadership indispensable. In the face of
all vicissitudes, our nation continues to be the standardbearer

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of political freedom, economic and social progress, and
humanitarian concern -- as it has for 200 years.

Thirty years ago America, after centuries of isolation,
found within itself unimagined capacities of statesmanship
and creativity. Men of both parties and many persuasions --
like Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg and Marshall,
Acheson and Dulles, -- built a national consensus for
responsible American leadership in the world.

[ Their work helped fashion the economic recovery of Europe and Japan and stabilized the postwar world in a period of international tension. These were the indispensable foundations on which, in recent years, we have been able to regularize relations with our adversaries and chart new dimensions of cooperation with our allies. ]

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To Marshall our energies for the challenge of interdependence requires a return to fundamentals. It was a confident - perhaps even brash - America that launched its postwar labors. [ It was an America essentially united on ultimate goals that took on the task of restoring order from the chaos of war. ] Three decades of global exertions and the war in Vietnam have gravely weakened this sense of common purpose. We have no more urgent task than to rediscover it. Only in this way can we give effect to the root reality of our age which President Ford described in his State of the Union address. "At no time in our peacetime history has the state of the nation depended more heavily on the state of the world. And seldom, if ever, has the state of the world depended more heavily on the state of our nation. "

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Let me turn, then, to an examination of the issues
before us in international affairs; our traditional agenda
of peace and war, the new issues of interdependence and the
need for a partnership between the Executive and Legislative
branches of our government.

## The Traditional Agenda of Peace and War

The traditional issues of peace and war addressed by
the post-war generation will require our continuing effort,
for we live in a world of political turmoil and proliferating
nuclear technology.

Our foreign policy is built upon the bedrock of solidarity
with our allies. Geography, history, economic ties, shared
heritage and common political values bind us closely together.
The stability of the postwar world -- and our recent progress

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in improving our relations with our adversaries -- have crucially depended on the strength and constancy of our alliances. Today, in a new era of challenge and opportunity, we naturally turn first to our friends to seek cooperative solutions to new global issues such as energy. [ This is why we have sought to strengthen our ties with our Atlantic partners and Japan and have begun a new dialogue in the Western Hemisphere. ]

The second major traditional effort of our foreign policy has been to fashion more stable relations with our adversaries.

There can be no peaceful international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union -- the two nations with the power to destroy mankind.

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The moral antagonism between our two systems cannot be ignored; it is at the heart of the problem. Nevertheless, we have succeeded in reducing tensions and in beginning to lay the basis for a more cooperative future. The agreements limiting strategic arms, the Berlin agreement, the significant easing of tensions across the heart of Europe, the growing network of cooperative bilateral relations with the Soviet Union -- these mark an undeniable improvement over the situation just a few years ago.

[ The recent Vladivostok accord envisages another agreement placing a long-term ceiling on the principal strategic weapons of both sides. For the first time in the nuclear age, the strategic planning of each side will take place in the context of stable and therefore more reassuring assumptions about the programs of the other side instead of being driven by fear or self-fulfilling

projections. The stage will be set for negotiations aimed at

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projections. The stage will be set for negotiations aimed at reducing the strategic arsenals of both sides. We shall turn to that task as soon as we have transformed the Vladivostok principles into a completed agreement.

The course of improving U.S.-Soviet relations will not always be easy, as the recent Soviet rejection of our trade legislation has demonstrated. It must, nevertheless, be pursued with conviction despite disappointments and obstacles. In the nuclear age there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence.

Just as we have recognized that a stable international environment demands a more productive relationship with the Soviet Union, so we have learned that there can be no real assurance of a peaceful world so long as one-quarter of the world's people are excluded from the family of nations. We have,

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therefore, ended a generation of estrangement and confrontation
with the People's Republic of China and sought to develop a new
relationship in keeping with the principles of the Shanghai
Communique. Progress in our bilateral relations has opened
useful channels of communication and reduced regional and
global tensions. Our new and growing relationship with the
People's Republic of China is now an accepted and enduring
feature of the world scene.

A third traditional element of our foreign policy has been
the effort to resolve conflicts without war. In a world of
150 nations, many chronic disputes and tensions continue to
spawn human suffering and dangers to peace. It has always
been America's policy to offer our help to promote peaceful
settlement, and to separate local disputes from big-power

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rivalry. In the Middle East, in Cyprus, in Indo-China, in South Asia, on urgent multilateral issues such as nuclear proliferation, the United States stands ready to serve the cause of peace.

## The New Agenda of Interdependence

Progress in dealing with our traditional agenda is no longer enough. A new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The problems of energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas, now rank with the questions of military security, ideology and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda.

With hindsight, there is little difficulty in identifying the moments in history when humanity broke from old ways and moved in a new direction. But for those living through

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such times it is usually difficult to see events as more than
a series of unrelated crises. [ How often has man been able
to perceive the ultimate significance of events occuring during
his lifetime? ] How many times has he been able to summon the
will to shape, rather than submit, to destiny?

The nuclear age permanently changed America's
conviction that our security was assured behind two broad
oceans. Now the crises of energy and food foreshadow an
equally dramatic recognition that the very basis of America's
strength -- its economic vitality -- is inextricably tied to
the world's economic well being.

Urgent issues illustrate the reality of interdependence:

-- The industrial nations built a generation of prosperity
on imported fuel at sustainable prices. Now we confront a

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cartel that can manipulate the supply and price of oil almost
at will, threatening jobs, output and stability.

-- We and a few other countries have achieved immense productivity in agriculture. Now we see the survival and well-being of much of humanity threatened because world food production has not kept pace with population growth.

-- For thirty years we and the industrial countries achieved steady economic growth. Now the economies of all industrialized countries are simultaneously afflicted by inflation and recession, and no nation can solve the problem [red] alone.

Yet the interdependence that earlier fostered our prosperity and now threatens our decline can usher in a new period of progress if we perceive our common interest

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and act boldly to serve it. [It requires a new level of political wisdom, a new standard of responsibility, and a new vigor of diplomacy.]

Clearly, the energy crisis is the most pressing issue on the new agenda. In the American view, a permanent solution is possible based on the following principles:

**The first imperative is solidarity among the major consumers.** Alone, no consuming country, except possibly the United States, can defend itself against an oil embargo or a withdrawal of oil money. Alone, no country except perhaps the United States can invest enough to develop new energy sources for self-sufficiency. But if the United States acted alone, it would doom the other industrialized nations to economic stagnation and political weakness; this

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would soon undermine our own economic well-being. Only by
collective action can the consuming countries free their
economies from excessive dependence on imported oil and
their political life from a sense of impotence.

We have made important progress since the Washington
Energy Conference met less than a year ago. Last November,
the United States and 15 other countries signed an unprecedented
agreement to assist each other in the event of a new oil
emergency. That agreement commits each nation to build
an emergency stock of oil; in case of a new embargo, each
will cut its consumption by the same percentage, and available oil
will be shared. Thus, selective pressure would be blunted and
an embargo against one would be an embargo against all.

Equally important, we have moved dramatically toward

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financial solidarity. Only last week, the major consuming
nations agreed to create a solidarity fund of $25 billion --
less than two months after it was first proposed by the United
States. Through the creation of this fund, the industrial
nations have gained significant protection against shifts,
withdrawals, or cutoffs of funds from the petrodollar earners.
The industrial countries will now be able to offset financial
shifts of oil producer funds by loans to each other from the
$25 billion mutual insurance fund. The United States considers
this rapid and decisive decision for the creation of the solidarity
fund to be of the greatest political and economic significance.

The second imperative is a major reduction in consumer
dependence on imported oil.

The safety nets of sharing and financial guarantees are

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important for the short term. But our long-term security
requires a determined and concerted effort to reduce energy
consumption -- on the highways and in our homes, in the
very style of our lives. Equally important will be a speed-up
in the development of alternative energy sources, such as
nuclear power, coal, oil shale, the oil of the outer continental
shelf, Alaska, the North Sea, and elsewhere.

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Cooperative action among the consumer nations will reinforce our own efforts in this country. The International Energy Agency, created last year, and other countries acting in parallel with it, such as France, are responding to the crisis with substantial conservation programs of their own. And the United States will shortly propose to the IEA a large-scale collective program to develop alternative energy sources through price and other incentives to investors and through joint research and development.

[ ] Such policies will be costly and complex; some will be unpleasant and politically unpopular. But we face a choice: Either we act now, and decisively, to ensure national self-sufficiency in energy by 1985, or we remain prey to economic disruption and to an increasing loss of

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control over our future.

This, bluntly, is the meaning of President Ford's
energy program which he laid before the Congress in his
State of the Union message.

The third imperative is an eventual dialogue between
consumers and producers.

Ultimately the energy problem must be solved through
cooperation between consumers and producers. The United
States, as a matter of evident necessity, seeks such a
dialogue in a spirit of good will and of conciliation. But just
as the producers are free to concert and discuss among
themselves, so too are the consumers.

A principal purpose of consumer cooperation will be
to prepare substantive positions for a producer dialogue to

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ensure that it will be fruitful.] The consumer nations
should neither petition nor threaten. They should be pre-
pared to discuss the whole range of issues of interdependence:
assured supplies, a fair return to the producers of a depleting
resource, security of investment, the relationship between
oil and the state of the world economy. [Over the long term,
producers and consumers, developed and developing nations,
all depend on the same global economic system for the
realization of their aspirations. It is this system which is
now in jeopardy and therefore the well-being of all nations
is threatened. We must -- together -- and in a cooperative
spirit -- restore the vitality of the world economy in the
interests of all mankind.]

Though we are far from having overcome the energy
crisis, the outlines of a solution are discernible. The right

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course is clear, progress is being made, and success is
well within our capacity. Indeed the energy crisis which
accelerated the economic difficulties of the industrial
democracies can become the vehicle by which they reclaim
control over their future and shape a more cooperative world.

At a time when the industrial world calls for a sense
of global responsibility from the producers of raw materials,
it has an obligation to demonstrate a similar sense of respon-
sibility with respect to its own surplus commodities.

Nowhere is this more urgent than in the case of food.
A handful of countries, led by the United States, produce
most of the world's surplus food. Meanwhile in other parts
of the globe, hundreds of millions do not eat enough for

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decent and productive lives. In many areas, up to 50%
of the children die before the age of five, millions of them
from malnutrition. And according to present projections
the world's food deficit could rise from the current 25 million
tons to 85 million tons by 1985.

The current situation, and the even more foreboding
future, is inconsistent with international stability, disruptive
of cooperative global relationships and totally repugnant
to our moral values.

For these reasons the United States called for the
World Food Conference which met in Rome last November.
It was clear to us -- as we emphasized at the Conference --
that no one nation could possibly produce enough to make up
the world's food deficit and that a comprehensive international
effort was required on six fronts:

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- to expand food production in exporting countries
and to coordinate their agricultural policies so that their
capacity is used fully and well;

- to expand massively food production in the develop-
ing countries;

- to develop better means of food distribution and
financing;

- to improve not just the quantity but also the quality
of food which the poorest and most vulnerable groups receive;

- to ensure against emergencies through an inter-
national system of global food reserves;

- to augment the food aid of the U.S. and other surplus
countries until food production in developing countries increases.

In the next two months the United States will make

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further proposals to implement this program and we will
substantially increase our own food assistance.

However, food aid is essentially an emergency measure.

There is no chance of meeting an 85 million ton deficit

without the rapid application of technology and capital to the

expansion of food production where it is most needed, in the

developing world. Other surplus producers, the industrialized

nations and the oil producers must join in this enterprise.

Energy and food are only two of the most urgent issues.

At stake is a restructuring of the world economy -- in

commodities, trade, monetary relations and investment.

Politically, if we succeed, it means the shaping of a new

international order. For the industrial democracies, it

involves regaining their economic health and the sense that

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their future is in their own hands; for the producing and
developing nations it holds the promise of a stable long-
term economic relationship that can ensure mutual progress
for the remainder of the century.

## Need for National Unity

The agenda of war and peace, fuel and food places a
great responsibility upon America. The urgency of our
challenges, the magnitude of the effort required, and the
impact which our actions will have on our entire society
-- all require an exceptional degree of public understanding
and the effective participation and support of Congress.

Our foreign policy has been most effective when it
reflected broad non-partisan support. Close collaboration
between the Executive and Legislative branches ensured

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the success of the historic postwar American initiatives and
sustained our foreign policy for two decades thereafter. More
recently, during the harrowing time of Watergate, the spirit
of responsible bipartisanship insulated our foreign policy
from the trauma of domestic institutional crisis. For this,
the nation owes the Congress a profound debt of gratitude.

A spirit of non-partisan cooperation is even more
essential today. The bitterness that has marked so much of
our national dialogue for over a decade no longer has reason
or place. Public debate once again must find its ultimate
limit in a general recognition that we are engaged in a
common enterprise.

To appeal for renewed nonpartisan cooperation in
foreign policy reflects not a preference but a national

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necessity. Foreign nations must deal with our government
as an entity, not as a complex of divided institutions. They
must be able to count on our maintaining both our national
will and our specific undertakings. If they misjudge either,
they may be tempted into irresponsibility or grow reluctant
to link their destiny to ours. If our divisions lead to a
failure of policy, it is the country which will suffer, not one
group or one party or one Administration. If our cooperation
promotes success it is the nation which will benefit.

In his first address to Congress President Ford pledged
his Administration to the principles of communication,
conciliation, compromise and cooperation. In that spirit,
and on behalf of the President, I invite the Congress to a
new national partnership in the conduct of our foreign policy.

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Together with new conceptions of foreign policy, we must
define new principles of Executive-Legislative relations
-- principles which reconcile the unmistakable claims of
Congressional supervision and the urgent requirements of
purposeful American world leadership.

The Administration will make every effort to meet
Congressional concerns. We will dedicate ourselves to
strengthening the mutual sense of trust with the Congress.
We do not ask for a blank check. We take seriously the
view that over the past decade there often has been a break-
down of communication between the Executive and Legislative
branches. We have made major efforts to consult the Congress
and to keep it informed. As Secretary of State, confirmed by
the Senate, I have considered this a principal responsibility

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of my office. [ Therefore, in less than 16 months in office I have testified 37 times before Congressional committees and have consulted even more frequently with individual members and groups.]

Nevertheless, we recognize that a new partnership requires a willingness to explore new approaches. Specifically, the Administration will strive to evoke the advice and consent of the Congress in its broadest sense. We know that Congressional support presupposes that both Houses are kept informed of the Administration's premises and purposes as well as of the facts on which its decisions are based. In the process, the Administration will seek the views of as many members of Congress concerned with a particular issue as possible. In short, the Administration will strongly support the effort of the Congress to meet its

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Constitutional obligations with wisdom and imagination.

Beyond the general requirement of advice and consent, the role of legislation and appropriations in defining the basic directions of policy is traditional. The Administration may disagree with a particular decision; we may argue vigorously for a different course, as we have, for example, concerning the necessity of adequate aid to support the self-defense of allies in Indochina. But we welcome the indispensable contribution of Congress to the general direction of national policy.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that the legislative process -- deliberation, debate and statutory law -- is much less well-suited to the detailed supervision of the day-to-day conduct of diplomacy. Legal prescriptions, by their very nature, lose sight of the sense of nuance and the

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feeling for the interrelationship of issues on which foreign
policy success or failure so often depends. This is why the conduct
of negotiations has always been preeminently an executive
responsibility, though the national commitments which a
completed agreement entails must necessarily have legislative
and public support.

The growing tendency of the Congress to legislate in
detail the day-to-day, or week-to-week, conduct of our
foreign affairs raises grave issues. American policy --
given the wide range of our interests and responsibilities
-- must be a coherent and purposeful whole. The way we
act in our relations with one country almost inevitably
affects our relationship with others. To single out individual
countries for special legislative attention has unintended but
inevitable consequences and risks unravelling the entire

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fabric of our foreign policy.

Paradoxically, the President and the Congress share
the same immediate objectives on most issues that
have recently become sources of dispute. Too often,
differences as to tactics have defeated the very purposes that
both branches meant to serve because the legislative sanctions
were too public or too drastic or too undiscriminating. Our
inability to implement the trade agreement with the Soviet
Union is a case in point; another is the impact of restrictions
on aid to Turkey on our efforts both to advance the Cyprus
peace negotiations and to safeguard our wider security
interests in the Eastern Mediterranean; yet another is the
damage to our Western Hemisphere relations, specifically
in Ecuador and Venezuela, caused by an amendment designed

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to withhold special tariff preferences from OPEC countries.

In fairness it must be pointed out that Congressmen and Senators must represent the particular views of their constituencies. All reflect an electorate impatient with foreign turmoil and insistent that international responsibilities be shared more equitably. In a period of domestic recession, the case for foreign aid becomes increasingly difficult to make. And yet the reality of interdependence links our destiny ever more closely with the rest of the world.

It is therefore understandable that one of the issues on which the Congress and the Executive Branch have recently divided is the degree to which foreign aid cut-offs -- military or economic -- can be used to bring about changes in the policies of other nations. Whether foreign aid should be used

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as an instrument of pressure depends on the way foreign
aid is conceived. The Administration is convinced that
foreign aid to be viable must serve American national
interests above all, including the broad interest we
have in a stable world. If an important American interest
is served by the aid relationship, it is a wise investment;
if not, our resources are being squandered, even if we have
no specific grievances against the recipient. For moral and
practical reasons, we must recognize that a challenge to the
recipient's sovereignty tends to generate reactions that far
transcend the merit of most of the issues in dispute. Instead
of influencing conduct in ways we desire, cutting aid is likely
to harden positions. The very leverage we need is almost

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always lost. Our bilateral political relationship is impaired,
usually for no commensurable benefit. And other friends and
allies begin to question whether we understand our own national
interest and whether we can be a reliable, longer-term partner.

[ These issues have little to do with the age-old tension
between morality and expediency. Foreign policy, by its
nature, must combine a desire to achieve the ideal with a
recognition of what is practical. [ The fact of sovereignty
implies compromise and each compromise involves an element
of pragmatism. On the other hand, a purely expedient policy
will lack all roots and become the prisoner of events.] The
difficult choices are not between principle and expediency,
but between two objectives both of which are good or between
courses of action both of which are difficult or dangerous.

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To achieve a fruitful balance is the central dilemma of
foreign policy.

The effort to strengthen Executive-Legislative bonds
is complicated by the new character of the Congress. New
principles of participation and organization are taking hold.
The number of Congressmen and Senators concerned with
foreign policy issues has expanded beyond the traditional
committees. Traditional procedures -- focused as they
are on the Congressional leadership and the committees
-- may no longer prove adequate to the desires of an
increasingly individualistic membership.

[As the range of consultation expands, the problem of confidentiality increases. Confidentiality in negotiations facilitates compromise; it must not be considered by the Congress as a cloak of deception; it must not be used by

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the Executive to avoid its responsibilities to the Congress.

Some of these problems are inherent in the system of checks and balances by which we have thrived. The separation of powers produces a healthy and potentially creative tension between the Executive and Legislative branches of government. Partnership should not seek to make either branch a rubber stamp for the other. But if old patterns of Executive-Legislative relations are in flux, now is the time for both branches to concert to fashion new principles and practices of collaboration. The Administration stands ready to join with the Congress in devising procedures appropriate to the need for a truly national and long-range foreign policy. We would welcome Congressional suggestions through whatever device the Congress may choose, and we will

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respond in the same spirit.

In the meantime, the Administration will strive to
achieve a national consensus through close consultation,
the non-partisan conduct of foreign policy and restraint
in the exercise of Executive authority.

The problem of achieving a new national partnership
is difficult. I am confident that working together the
Executive and the Congress will solve it and thereby
enhance the vitality of our democratic institutions and the
purposefulness of our foreign policy.

## CONCLUSION

In 1947 when another moment of crisis summoned us
to consensus and creation, a member of the Senate recalled
Lincoln's words to the Congress: "The dogmas of the quiet

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past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion
is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the
occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew,
and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then
we shall save our country."

We have learned more than once that this century
demands much of America. And now we are challenged once
again, "to think anew and act anew" so that we may help
ourselves and the world find the way to a time of hope.
Let us resolve to move forward together transforming
challenge into opportunity and opportunity into achievement.

No genuine democracy can or should obtain total
unanimity. But we can strive for a consensus about our
national goals and chart a common course. If we act with
large spirit, history could record this as a time of great

1/21/75

Tenth Draft

CYJ

A NEW NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP
FOR AN ERA OF CHALLENGE

A half-century ago Winston Churchill observed that in happier times it was the custom for statesmen to "rejoice in that protecting Providence which had preserved us through so many dangers and brought us at last into a secure and prosperous age". But "little did they know", Churchill wrote, "that the worst perils had still to be encountered, and the greatest triumphs had yet to be won."

The same may be said of our age.
Our age is no exception. We are at the end of three decades of a foreign policy conducted by both of our major parties which we have every reason to consider a success.

Inevitably, failures there were, but they were dwarfed by the accomplishments.

But times change and foreign policy must keep pace with new

-4-

Nor are the other great democracies better prepared.
Adjusting to a loss of power and influence, assailed by
recession and inflation, they too feel their domestic burdens
weighing down their capacity to act boldly, in the face of the
current challenge.

But no nation can choose the timing of its fate; history
gives no award for the difficulty of the challenge, only to the
adequacy of the response. As Edward Gibbon said, "the winds
and the waves are always on the side of the ablest navigators."
But it is equally true that the necessities of navigation take no
account of the fatigue of the helmsman. He must steer through
the elements as he finds them."

For the United States, a decade of
troubles have taught Americans the limitations of our power.

-5-

Experience and maturity have dispelled any illusion that we could shape events in the image of our own history. Long after other nations, we have acquired a sense of tragedy. Yet at the same time, our people and our institutions have emerged from

their trials with a resilience that other nations, even the crisis of the emerging international system reminds us -- as the world has never forgotten -- that America's position is unique and American leadership indispensible. The world knows -- even if we sometimes forget -- how great our real strengths are. This is only in the face of all possibilities, our nation still carries the standards of political freedom, economic and social progress, and humanitarian concerns for 200 years. It has just begun.

So once again history -- against our will -- imposes upon us a responsibility.

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The essence of our current challenge is that we must continue our exertions on the agenda of the past generation and forge fresh creativity for the agenda that will dominate the remainder of this century.

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if ever, has the state of the world depended more heavily
on the state of our nation."

Let me address in turn our traditional agenda, the
new issues of interdependence and the need for national
partnership.

The issues of war and peace faced by the post-war
generation will continue to engage our efforts for as long
as we can see. We live in a world of continuing political
turmoil and proliferating nuclear technology. It remains
necessary to adapt our traditional alliances to new problems
and new conditions to build a reliable long-term basis for
relations with our old adversaries, and to seek to bring
peace in areas where chronic instability threatens global
security.

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multilateral diplomacy -- including the urgent problem of

nuclear proliferation -- the United States stands ready in

its own interest to serve the cause of peace and settlement.

THE NEW AGENDA OF INTERDEPENDENCE

Whatever our achievements in dealing with our
traditional agenda, the future of our country and of mankind

will be largely determined by our response to a new

challenge: the emergence of a new international order
based on the principle of interdependence. With hindsight,
there is little difficulty in identifying the moments in
history when humanity broke from old ways and moved in a
new direction -- the slow decline and then collapse of the
Roman Empire, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the
great industrial and political revolutions of the past two

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diplomatic agenda.

slanted

The nuclear age permanently corrected America's perception that our security was assured behind two broad oceans. Now the crises of energy and food foreshadow an equally revolutionary change -- for it is evident that the very basis of America's economic health and thus the very basis of its strength is inextricably tied to the world's economic well being.

-- The industrial nations built a generation of prosperity on imported fuel at sustainable prices. Now we confront a cartel that can manipulate the supply and price of oil almost at will, threatening jobs, output and stability.

- 18 -

-- We and a few other countries have achieved massive productivity in agriculture. Now we see the survival and well-being of much of humanity threatened because food production in the world as a whole has not been kept pace with population growth.

-- For twenty years we and the industrial countries achieved sustained and stable economic growth. Now the economies of all industrialized nations are afflicted by simultaneous inflation and recession.

Yet the interdependence that earlier existed between our prosperity and now threatens our decline can once again be our salvation if we can perceive our common interest and act boldly to serve it. It requires of us a new level of

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which first emphasized our dependence on oil and accelerated the economic difficulties of the industrial democracies can become the vehicle by which they reclaim control over their future and shape a more cooperative world.

Energy is but the first item on the agenda of interdependence. Nations must deal as well with the flow of resources both to and from the industrialized nations. The United States and other industrialized countries are calling for a sense of global responsibility from the producers of raw materials. We must in return demonstrate a similar sense of responsibility with respect to our surplus commodities.

Nowhere is this more urgent than in the case of food. A handful of countries, led by the United States, produce most of the world's surplus food. Meanwhile in other parts of the globe, hundreds of millions do not eat enough for decent and productive lives. In many areas, 30% to 50% of the children die before

-38-

Legislature have ~~yet been able to resolve satisfactorily.~~

But

The legislative process -- the process of deliberation, debate and statutory law -- is not well-suited to the ~~detailed~~ supervision

of the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy. Legal

by their very nature, / prescriptions often lack the sense of nuance and the feeling

for the interrelationship of issues on which success or failure in foreign policy so often depend. / This is only The conduct of negotiations

has always been preeminently an executive responsibility,
though the national commitments which a completed agreement
entails must necessarily be backed by legislative or public
endorsement. American policy is, of necessity -- given the
wide range of our interests and commitments -- a complex
mosaic of interrelated parts. The way we act in our relations
with one country almost inevitably affects our relationship
with others, in the immediate area and perhaps beyond. To single

-40-

in point; the impact of restrictions on aid to Turkey in
our efforts to help the Cyprus peace negotiations and
in our wider security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean

is another,

It is essential that we find ways to reflect legitimate

Congressional concerns and disagreements with established
~~policy~~ without, at the same time, artificially and self-defeatingly
restricting the daily conduct of that policy. The issue is
not Congress' good faith or good intentions in the exercise
of its proper oversight responsibilities. It is, rather,
that legislative and budgetary instruments are often too
rigid and difficult to apply, and too cumbersome to change when
~~conditions dense,~~ the objective reality they were intended to affect itself changes.~~

A similar problem exists with respect to the
end of negotiations.

Equally, Congressional consent for the objectives, and for the results, of our negotiations with other nations is essential. But the process of reviewing developments at each stage -- particularly when the review is in the public domain -- risks encouraging a hardening of the positions of both sides, thereby often making it virtually impossible to arrive at a final agreement that would meet the essential needs of both sides. Confidentiality in diplomacy is a facilitation of compromise; it must not be seen or used as a cloak for deception.

Again, the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government need to examine the issue of how best to give meaning and content to the Senate's constitutional obligation to advise and consent in the ratification of treaties, and to

- 44 -

but on how we can best achieve our national purpose. Every
*by its nature,*
foreign policy must combine a concern for the ideal with
an attention to what is practical. The fact of sovereignty
implies compromise and each compromise involves an
element of expediency. On the other hand, a purely expedient
policy will lack all roots and become the prisoner of events.
Tension is inevitable between our values, which are inherently
absolute, and our efforts to realize them, which must involve
compromise and accommodation with others. The difficult
choices are not between principle and expediency, but
between two objectives both of which are good. To achieve
a fruitful balance between them is a central dilemma of
foreign policy.

These are all complex problems lacking simple
solutions. But answers must be found. There must be a way

- 48 -

the world who look to us for leadership in the struggle for
freedom and a better life.

## CONCLUSION

In 1947 when another moment of crisis summoned us
to consensus and creation, a member of the Senate recalled
Lincoln's words to the Congress, during our country's greatest
time of testing, "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate
to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with
difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case
is new, so we must think anew, and act anew. We must
disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country."

For more than a decade we have often been more
conscious of what divides than of what unites us. But this
time of travail has brought us a new, more mature national

- 6a -

them.

So we must return to fundamentals. It was a

its postwar labors. After some initial hesitation, it

was an America united on ultimate goals that took upon itself

the role of restoring order out of post-war chaos.

-8-

upon ~~urgently~~ to adapt our traditional alliances to new problems and new conditions; to build a reliable long-term basis for relations with our old adversaries, and to seek to bring peace in areas where chronic instability threatens global security.

Our foreign relations are built upon the bedrock of solidarity with our allies. Geography, history, economic ties, shared heritage and political values bind us together,形成 interdependence, our reality. Our nation's interests and purposes will continue to be most closely aligned with Western Europe, Canada, Japan, Latin America, and other alliance partners. The

-12-

For the same underlying reason, in recent years we also have ended a generation of estrangement and confrontation with the People's Republic of China. There cannot be a stable international environment without the constructive involvement of one-quarter of the world's people. Progress in our bilateral relations has opened channels of understanding and reduced regional and global tensions. Our new relationship with China is now an accepted and enduring feature of the world scene. We intend to persist in the months and years ahead in the steady development of more constructive ties in accordance with the Shanghai Communique. President Ford's visit to the People's

- 34 - (revised)

The Executive, too, has its obligations -- some of them deeply affecting the relationship of trust that should exist with the Legislative Branch. First, of course, is the advice and consent relationship between the Senate and the President. But beyond that is a broader obligation to keep both Houses informed of the Administration's intentions, the facts on which its policy decisions are based, and the range of considerations that have led the Executive to make a particular decision. Equally, the Executive has an obligation, if foreign policy is indeed to be a cooperative enterprise, to seek the views and advice of as many members of Congress as possible.

Let us be honest, the growing power of the Presidency over the course of the past two or three decades has led -- sometimes through design, sometimes through oversight -- to a serious diminution in the adequacy with which the Executive Branch has fulfilled this obligation. To be equally candid, this is a process that sometimes the Legislative Branch has often aided and abetted, because it is absolved from the responsibility for policies which might go awry or prove unpopular.

In any event, a series of Congresses have made it clear that they are no longer prepared to accept that approach.

- 34(Revised) -

This Administration recognizes the rightness of the complaint, and will do all it can to meet the just demands of the Congress for the information and judgments so necessary if it is to meet its Constitutional obligations with wisdom and imagination.

Thus, just as we must together devise new approaches to the new issues of foreign policy, so must we, together, agree upon these methods and procedures for the creation of a new and productive partnership between the Executive and the Congress.

The Administration is prepared to begin this search for a new partnership immediately, and commits itself to doing all it can to meet Congressional concerns more than half way.

As the range of national concerns has expanded, so, inevitably, has the range of Congressional interest. With this expansion have come problems which neither the Executive nor Legislature have yet been able to resolve satisfactorily. The legislative process is not well-suited to the supervision of the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy. Legal prescriptions often lack the sense of nuance and the feeling for the interrelationship of issues on which success or failure in foreign policy so often depend. American policy is, of necessity -- given the wide range of our interests and commitments -- a complex mosaic of interrelated parts. The way we act in our relations with one country almost inevitably affects our

Again, the Legislative and Executive Branches of Government need to examine the issue of how best to give meaning and content to the Senate's constitutional obligation to advise and consent in the ratification of treaties, and to Congressional participation in the development of lesser international compacts, such as Executive Agreements. This Administration will approach such an examination with an open mind and a constructive spirit.

Another issue on which the Congress and the Executive Branch find a growing breach is the question of aid -- both military and economic. I shall not, today, seek to defend in detail the concept of foreign assistance, but both branches of government should make their decisions upon the wisdom of a particular program in terms of whether it serves our national interests -- not those of some other nation. If our purposes are served, it is a wise investment; if

- 35b -

they are not, it is an unwise use of our resources. And once
having granted the assistance we should, with only the most
extreme reluctance, legislate its removal or reduction as a
means of influencing the conduct of the recipient. The result is
likely to be, instead, a hardening of the position we seek to change,
a lessening of our influence to change the conduct we oppose, and
a deterioration of our bilateral relationship, and a serious question
in the mind of other recipients whether we understand one
national interest or whether we can be relied upon over a period
of time.

And finally, both Congress and the Executive Branch must
recognize that our debates on substance should focus not on whether
morality or expediency governs our policy, but on how we can
best achieve the ~~realization of our principles~~. Every foreign
policy must combine a concern for the ideal with an attention to
what is practical. Tension is inevitable between our values,
which are inherently absolute, and our efforts to realize them,
which must involve compromise and accommodation with others.

The choice is not between principle and the lack of it, but between
two objectives both of which are good. To achieve a fruitful
balance between them is a central dilemma of foreign policy.

t p 38

The fact of sovereignty implies compulsion
and equal compulsion involves an element of expediency
On the other hand, a purely expedient policy will lack all naught

-40-

## CONCLUSION

In 1947 at another moment of crisis calling for consensus and creation, a member of the Senate recalled Lincoln's words to the Congress during our country's greatest time of testing over a century ago: "The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion.

For more than a decade our country has been dismayed by war and disheartened by constitutional crisis. We have often been more conscious of what divides than of what unites us. But this time of travail has brought us a new, more mature national strength. We have glimpsed the limits of power, but

-41-

we have also felt the strength of our resilience.

More than once have we learned that this century demands much of America. Now we are challenged once again, to help ourselves and the world find the way to a time of hope. It is the challenge of recapturing for our country the dynamism and probity we held at the time of the Marshall Plan... to recapture qualities which persuaded the greater part of mankind that this country was decisive for the well-being and the progress of the world.

If we do not assume global responsibility no other country can or will. Our economy, our military strength, our spirit of enterprise, and our moralité, our background of commercial and cultural experience and influence in the world sets us apart. Other major nations needs our leadership. We must turn to this work united in our resolve to recognize this and, once again, are looking to us for leadership.