Ever since its formation NATO has suffered from the anomaly
that Europe which originated the concept of nationalism and
spawned the two wars of this century has been the ward of the
United States in defending itself against the Soviet Union.

Several hundred thousand American troops have been stationed in
Western Europe for a generation. The nuclear defense of Europe
has been almost exclusively an American responsibility. It has
never been natural that the defense of countries with such a rich
tradition and with combined resources superior to those of the
Soviet Union should be so largely in the hands of a country
thousands of miles away and with a national tradition of isolationism
alternating with missionary fervor. And this has been compounded
by the apocalyptic nature of nuclear weapons which raised the
question whether any nation -- no matter how closely allied --
would be prepared to risk national suicide for a remote ally.

This concern has dominated especially the last decade when the
growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal guaranteed that any general
war would risk mass civilian extermination.

4

in Europe seemed an additional reassurance, for America's legal commitments, Atlanticized Europeans reasoned that these weapons would have to be geared more precisely to their concerns and that the American NATO commander would be more sensitive to their way of looking at defense than his superiors across the ocean.

To this point of view was never unanimous. A significant portion of European opinion always argued that Europe should rely less on the United States and rather play a mediating role between East and West. Others, while agreeing to the concept of joint defense, were reluctant to base nuclear weapons -- especially long-range nuclear weapons -- on their soil. In the middle of a turbulent only when America sought to deploy the Fifties the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe -- identified with the then Polish foreign minister Edwardögained a fleeting popularity. It was overcome because of the determined objections of the United States but nostalgia for it has never completely abated. It is certain to be resurrected in the wake of the pending agreement.

The deployment of the medium-range American missiles in Europe in the early Eighties, unleashed once again the long dormant debate between European nuclear pacifists and Atlanticists. These missiles in the end could be deployed only in the face of riots

that shook the domestic tranquility of many countries. They are understood in the European community as the preliminary steps necessary for a final settlement, especially that of course, now about to be removed less than five years after their installation on the basis of arguments from America not radically changing their view, will argument analyze and show different from those used by the opponents of nuclear deployment

in the first place.

The American role in all these debates has been complex. It was the United States which originated the concept of massive nuclear retaliation which threatened all-out attack on the Soviet Union in case of war in Europe in the Fifties. It was abandoned in the Sixties in favor of the doctrine of flexible response which sought to take account of the inhibitions caused by the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and to gear the nuclear response to the level needed to stop the provocation. It took a long time to convince Europeans of the wisdom of this change, but the

defense-oriented Europeans interpreted it to require a substantial
American nuclear establishment on the Continent.

That point has always been hotly contested by some influential
circles within the United States. Nuclear pacifists have never
been comfortable with nuclear deployment in Europe. They were supported
> at least theoretically -- prepared in extremis to threaten a policy
of "assured destruction" devastating major parts of the Soviet
civilian population, but they strenuously rejected the notion
that this required any nuclear deployment in Europe. Indeed, they
> thought very small U.S. nuclear forces based in America or at sea
were enough for that purpose. Ironically they were joined in their
view on European deployments by many domestic opponents, including
many Reagan supporters -- who favored a more discriminating nuclear
strategy and hence much larger American strategic nuclear forces. I can see
> why these options are reasonable.
But a substantial part of the defense oriented Americans were in
fact nuclear hegemonists. They wanted the nuclear defense of
America entirely in American hands based in America or at sea.

7

[Y]

They denied that there could be any difference in perception between Europeans and Americans. They were deeply suspicious of a NATO commander perhaps too sensitive to what they consider uninformed or escapist European concerns. They agreed to a nuclear deployment on the Continent only with the greatest reluctance.

The American domestic debate is thus not without irony. The forthcoming agreement is not only justified on the ground that the United States can cover all targets relevant to the defense of Europe from its own territory and from the oceans but above all because for the first time it eliminates two categories of nuclear weapons altogether. But this makes sense only as a first step towards the elimination of all nuclear weapons which indeed is also frequently avowed. It is in fact the most persistently promoted defense program of the Reagan Administration. The

It explains as well the phenomena that so many American conservative journals usually opposed to arms control have been curiously silent on the forthcoming agreement.

8

Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is urged not only on military
grounds but as a means to eliminate nuclear war altogether.

When the most conservative postwar U.S. Administration
endemically nuclear weapons + using demilitarization with arguments
adopts the arguments of the Committee for Nuclear Disarmament,
nearly indistinguishable from Pacific
the essence of the political debate within the Atlantic Alliance
is altered, probably irrevocably. In Europe the Atlanticists who
have supported American proposals for over a generation are at
best confused. They have accepted as an article of faith that
American nuclear weapons were needed to counterbalance Soviet
conventional superiority and that an American deployment on the
Continent was an essential component of that strategy. They
now find themselves accused of footdragging because they do not
adopt readily enough the arguments of their opponents that this American
mines on the continent well
deployment was unnecessary in the first place [an argument
supported by much of the rhetoric of a conservative American
administration]. They experienced the shock of the near agreement
at Reykjavik where the superpowers were on the verge of agreeing
to scrap all missiles (including those of our allies) on the road

15

European allies are likely to move heaven and earth to prevent actual

But Attley de議 needs to agree to a plan to offer German unification. But the slogan that the fate of the Germans under Communist rule should be eased is gaining momentum. This, in turn, could give the Communists a growing veto over further pro-Western moves by the Federal Republic paying any political price for actual unification.

Many Europeans recognize this danger. An eminent European leader said to me shortly after Reykjavik had inaugurated the current phase of American policy: "The [medium range] missiles were a corset that tied Germany to the West. You are now destroying that corset and we will have to pay the price for it."

Why then were the Europeans not more vocal about their concerns?

It is my impression that the leaders of the nations in Europe possessing nuclear weapons were shocked by Reykjavik into the belief that President Reagan would not leave office without giving up some nuclear weapons. And they preferred him to give up American weapons stationed in Germany than French and British

19

enough time to it at a summit and because we consider it right and proper to take action against those who would mislead and mislead the public.

The need for assurance falls heaviest on the strongest nation of the Alliance and still its principal leader. Those Europeans most prepared to rely on America have been the principal victims of the increasingly frequent changes in American foreign and military policy. In every decade since the Fifties major programs to which European leaders have committed themselves at American urging have been unilaterally abandoned. In the Sixties, the missiles painfully installed in Turkey and Italy were withdrawn and it has recently become apparent that the United States was prepared to do so formally to settle the Cuban missile crisis. (This is, anyway, how it appeared to many Europeans). In the Seventies, we dropped the neutron bomb; in the Eighties, the medium range missiles that were in fact a reaction to the neutron bomb fiasco. Another more ambiguous example of American tendency to change its views was the abandonment of the Skybolt airlaunched missile on which the British air force had relied. Each of these reversals -- whatever

20

its theoretical and technical merit -- caused military damage among
European leaders who had staked the ir own position on it.

In this sense the anti-nuclear detour of the Administration
will, over time, gravely weaken all of America's traditional supporters
in Europe. They may or may not agree with particular American
analysis. But I know no European statesman in office who does not
believe that in the end the defense of Europe depends on nuclear
weapons.

If policy is not to degenerate into public relations, A
principal duty of statesmanship is to define attainable
objectives. And the elimination of nuclear weapons is not
one of these. So many nuclear weapons have been produced and
the territory of the superpowers (especially of the Soviet Union)
is so vast that it would be impossible to account for all of them.
No arms agreement would eliminate the knowledge in the minds of
men. Any superpower agreement would have to take into account
open as well as secret programs in Third countries. Even the
most sweeping agreement could only reduce to a number that would

21

offset what experts believe the Soviets -- and rogue countries
-- could hide in vast territories. This would return the dis-
cussion more or less to where it is today: what is the minimum
number of nuclear weapons compatible with security? In short, it

keep a warning on the situation more sentimental than the one

cannot be in the American interest to stigmatize the weapons on

which the defense of the West has been and for the foreseeable

must be based and will be

future is being

This makes it all the more essential for the Atlantic Alliance
to develop a strategic doctrine that has a chance of being carried
out. Systems analysts speak blithely of a purely conventional
defense of Europe. The practical impact can only be to demoralize
NATO. I have argued for thirty years that the threshold at which
nuclear weapons have to be used should be raised as high as possible.

But bilateral talks with the Soviets which in the mind of Europeans
affect the nuclear balance is the worst way to bring this about. A

few realities must be faced: Will the United States, will not

and no

will substantially

Will any Western nation increase its defense budget? Is not the

in the opposite direction.

-- Indicated the trend is

22

opposite happening everywhere? And will these trends not be accelerated by the euphoria with which the pending agreement is being greeted? In fact, it is probable that the Atlantic Alliance will sooner or later be faced with a Soviet proposal on the Reykjavik model: a seemingly advantageous numerical scheme -- say the withdrawal of two Soviet divisions for an American one -- which has the practical consequence of putting a ceiling on the remaining forces and thus freezing the Soviet advantage in conventional strength at an even more dangerous level.

The relationship between nuclear and conventional forces will soon be placed on the diplomatic agenda either by the Soviets, or by some Europeans -- especially the Federal Republic of Germany -- or by the United States in the wake of the pending INF agreement. It is not probable that some of the leaders of the Federal Republic will not seek to escape the dilemma that the nuclear missiles remaining on German soil have a range that can kill only Germans East but in the majority West of Germans. A harbinger is German reluctance to proceed with the modernization of the short-range missile which has never been

controversial before. If the Germans do not propose the elimination
of this category of weapons, the Soviets almost surely will.

This would then create the demilitarized zone in the center of
the Continent that the Alliance has resisted for over a generation.
And the arguments against it have not improved with age. If an
ally -- especially a major one -- seeks to escape the nuclear danger
by denuclearization, it thereby seeks to shift the entire nuclear
risk to the most distant ally, the United States. But why should
America run the risk of nuclear devastation if the most immediately
threatened countries refuse to do so. Moreover, the denuclearization
of Central Europe would surely be coupled with some declaration
that the West not use nuclear weapons just as many eminent Americans
have already urged. But the no first use of nuclear weapons means
in practice an announcement that the West would rather be defeated
with conventional weapons than use nuclear weapons. And once the
readiness to accept defeat is acknowledged, how is it possible to
make credible the use of any nuclear weapons even after the Soviets
employ them. To do so would imply that NATO resists the method of

defeat, not the fact of it. Denuclearization of central Europe
would be the beginning of the neutralization of Europe. This fear is
surely behind Prime Minister Thatcher's warning that the process of
removing nuclear weapons must stop until chemical weapons and
conventional forces are dealt with.

The Atlantic Alliance thus urgently needs reconsideration of
military strategy as well as of foreseeable arms control challenges.
The process of negotiating major agreements and then selling the
result -- almost obsessively -- must enhance the European sense of
impotence.

Now that the major nuclear response to Soviet aggression
against NATO has been moved to the seas or to America, a method
must be found to meet European unease about our long-term commitment
by placing some of the weapons for that purpose more immediately under
NATO control than is the case today. The American strategic weapons
"assigned" to NATO are now assigned in name only. They can be used
by NATO only if the President releases them in an emergency; no
specific submarines are assigned to that purpose; they will be

25

designated as the occasion arises. But as the former NATO commander Bernard Rogers has pointed out, this means that the release of these weapons is then tantamount to general nuclear war. There will be no way for the Soviets to distinguish NATO assigned forces from the overall force. Nor would a President release these weapons on the basis that such a distinction could be maintained. Some concrete measures that give the NATO commander a greater and continuing role in the weapons earmarked for European defense is essential.

But the most serious challenge ahead to American policy is the wisdom with which it will deal with foreseeable trends in Europe. Efforts of greater European self-reliance are now inevitable. Europeans -- depending on whether they are neutralists or Atlanticists -- see either an opportunity or a necessity to reduce American tutelage. This is not in itself a bad thing unless Europeans veer towards abdication or Americans towards isolationism. A greater assumption by Europe of responsibility for its own defense can in the long run strengthen Atlantic ties. America in

26

the long run has nothing to fear from an emergence of a
European sense of identity. There is no foreseeable situation
in which Europe will not be better off with American support than
without it.

After Reykjavik and INF it is foreseeable that both Britain
and France will spur their nuclear build-up and surely give it
priority over conventional forces. American resistance to these
trends can only weaken the Alliance. Moreover the United States
should not stand in the way of coordinating the British and French
nuclear forces. I consider that in fact an important first step
towards a greater European role in the common defense.

It is also likely that in the wake of the INF agreement Europe
will make efforts to increase a specifically European conception of
security and a European identity in this field. That too will be
in the long run Western interest. Dependence breeds irresponsibility;
France has pursued a highly responsible foreign policy not despite
but because it has taken seriously the problem of national defense.
If America can live with the German market which involves no penalty

27

for competing with America, it should be able to welcome a
European identity in defense where all incentives make for
cooperation.

I do not deny that I would have preferred a different
approach to nuclear arms control in Europe than the one taken in
the pending INF agreement. But it cannot now be undone. And if
America faces its new realities, it may yet usher in a long overdue
revitalization of Atlantic relationships.

September 28, 1987

NEWSWEEK ARTICLE

The pending U.S.-Soviet agreement on eliminating medium-range and shorter-range weapons will no doubt evoke an intense debate when it is submitted to the Senate for ratification. But in important respects that debate will be beside the point. For one thing, critics -- to whom I belong -- must keep in mind that the United States cannot keep making agreements that the Senate fails to ratify without undermining American credibility. More important, the most important impact of the pending agreement has in my view already occurred. The way the negotiations have evolved and the concerns they have generated will mark a watershed for the Atlantic Alliance. The internal relationships in the Alliance can never be the same again, whatever the Senate's ultimate decision.

Some of the problems of NATO which have been swept under the rug for decades can no longer be evaded. The divisions within each country and among the allies on proper strategy can no longer be papered over.