ELC

شام شجرة الدر

الزموالك - الدعوة

مصر

3.

Whenever I asked him to talk to the press about his efforts, he replied: "You are the boss and our job is to help you". Once there was a press conference which I couldn't attend, and I asked him to deputize for me. He went to the Conference. Then I met him and found him rather agitated. He said: "I can't deal with these people. They do not want to hear about the hunger of Third World. They are only interested to know if there will be a Fund in which the U.S.A. will participate." He added that someone with my past political experience can deal with them. John recognized the delicate nature of the subject so as not to jeopardize my efforts with the OPEC countries.

John was always honest to himself, honest to his dealings with others. I could write a lot on John Hannah but I am sure that what I have outlined here will bring out the outstanding qualities of John Hannah the man, and his professional capabilities.

SAYED MAREI

9 SHAGARET EL DORR STREET

ZAMALEK - CAIRO

EGYPT

ABBREVIATED VITAE OF RICHARD O. NIEHOFF

**Date of Birth:** September 25, 1907

**Marital Status:** Married, Helen M. Niehoff

**Education:**

George Williams College, BAS, 1929

University of Chicago, Ph.B., 1933

University of Chicago, MA, 1934

- Fellow in the Department of Education

- Passed preliminary exams for Ph.D. at the University of Chicago

Additional graduate work at the University of Tennessee

**Experience:**

Tennessee Valley Authority, 1935-42;

- Director of Professional Training

Office of Price Administration, 1942-43;

- Director of Training

National Housing Agency, 1943-46;

- Director of Administrative Relations, Training, Personnel, Policy and Organization

Atomic Energy Commission, 1946-50;

- Special Assistant to the General Manager and Deputy Director of Public and Technical Information

Tennessee Valley Authority, 1950-56;

- Assistant to the Director of Personnel (Personnel Policy);

- Assistant to the General Manager (Educational Relations)

United Nations, 1956-60, Co-Director of UN-Egyptian Institute of Public Administration;

- 1958-60, Director of the Ethiopian Imperial Institute of Public Administration

Michigan State University, 1960 -

- Chief Advisor of Pakistan Project, Rawalpindi, Pakistan

- Professor of Education

- Coordinator of the Pakistan Project and Assistant Dean of International Programs in the College of Education, 1960-1965;

- Assistant Dean of International Programs, Office of the Dean of International Programs 1965 - 1973

- Professor of Education and Advisor on Program Development, Office of the Dean of International Studies and Programs, 1973 - 1976

- Professor Emeritus, 1976 -

NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, INC.

TELEPHONE
(03)270-0251
TELEFAX
(03)246-0750

(JAPAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL)
ESTABLISHED 1876
9-5. OHTEMACHI 1-CHOME, CHIYODA-KU, TOKYO

CABLE ADDRESS
NIHONKEIZAI TOKYO
TELEX:J22308.

April 14, 1987

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for Strategy and
International Studies
Georgetown University
1800K Street, N.W., Suite 400
Washington, DC 20006
U. S. A.

APR 22 1987

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The Nihon Keizai Shimbun's Advertising Department and NEC's Advertising Division have cooperated since 1979 in the placement of periodic NEC Salon dialogue ads in the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*. Up until now twenty dialogues have appeared. We would like to thank you for your cooperation which has made this achievement possible.

NEC's Advertising Division recently approached us with a plan to gather together fifteen of the more memorable NEC Salon dialogues as they appeared in the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* into a book. Finally, we complied the book since we felt that the dialogues were superb, hoping that this step would also gain your understanding and support. I believe that NEC has sent you a complementary copy of this volume separately.

I can assure you that these volumes are not for sale. Five hundred will be distributed as gifts to the readers of the *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* and 9,500 will be used by NEC employees for staff development purposes.

I close wishing for your health and success.

Sincerely,

OCT 5 1987

Soka Univ. Takiyama Hokuryo,
1-236 Tangi cho, Hachioji, Tokyo,
Japan.

Sept 21, 1987

Dr. and Mrs. H. A. kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street. N. W.
Washington. D. C. 20006
202-872-0300

Dear Dr. Henry A. Kissinger;

I was very delighted and proud to learn that you have
become a member of Soka University and have recieved
an honorary degree.

Your speech, on September 12th, was a valuable and
memorable one not only to me and Soka University stud-
ents but also all the young Japanese generation.

In the speech, I was most impressed by the sentence, "we
do not want a world in which the gentle can be exploi-
ted by the ruthless." This is the very true cry and
wish from everyone's heart.

This thought must be put at the center of the
politics. However, it seems that our Government often
leave that behind somewhere.

I hope you and our founder Mr. Daisaku Ikeda's publish-
ed book will be read by young generation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE
WASHINGTON

MAR - 4 1987

February 23, 1986

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
HAK Consulting Company
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 520
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Henry:

Recently I made two presentations which I thought you might find of interest. The first one, a statement which I delivered before the Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee in Washington, D. C., on December 4, 1986, reviews the developments over the past several months in the nuclear and space talks; and the second one, a speech which I presented before the World Affairs Council in Boston, Massachusetts, on January 14, 1987, reviews the nuclear and space arms control negotiations with the Soviets as they have developed over the last year and a half.

Encls.:

Current Policy Nos. 906 and 910

[LC]

Paul H. Nitze

Current
Policy
No. 910

# The Nuclear and Space Negotiations: Translating Promise to Progress

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, before the World Affairs Council, Boston, Massachusetts, January 14, 1987.

I propose this evening to discuss the bilateral nuclear and space arms control negotiations with the Soviets as they have developed over the last year and a half.

In November 1983, the Soviets walked out of the Geneva INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] negotiations. The following month they refused to set a date for the START [strategic arms reduction talks] negotiations to resume after the Christmas recess. By the summer of 1984, they had come to the conclusion that that had been a mistake; formal negotiations began again in March 1985. The negotiations since then have been tricky; have been at various levels; have, at times, appeared to make substantive progress; and have run into various difficulties. The talks are continuing; Ambassador Kampelman [Head of the U.S. Delegation on Arms Control Negotiations and U.S Negotiator on Defense and Space Arms] and his teams are resuming their negotiations with their Soviet counterparts in Geneva tomorrow morning. So far, we have not been able to bring the Soviets to closure—to a signed and sealed agreement satisfactory to both sides in any of the three negotiating areas of INF, START, or defense and space—either on a broad package of agreements or on a specific area.

## The Political Dimensions of Arms Control

Three or four years ago, I discussed the then ongoing INF negotiations with my friend, Marshall Shulman.¹ He said that the NATO so-called two-track decision of 1979—that the United States should be requested to deploy Pershing IIs and ground-based cruise missiles in certain NATO countries and that the United States should concurrently negotiate with the Soviets for the reduction or elimination of all such LRINF [longer range INF] missiles on both sides—was a political decision. He said the Soviets were, at that time, playing on European political opposition to the U.S. deployments. The problem being political, it could be solved politically. All that was required was a political decision to do so, and that should be a simple matter.

I objected. My point was that arms control decisions are not merely political; they are politico-military decisions. Political issues are generally not simple; they are complex. Military issues are also generally not simple; they can also be complex. Politico-military decisions combine many of the complexities of both.

Among the complexities of the political arms control issues is that they concern, in part, the long-term political interests of the parties involved. In part,

they concern the more immediate public opinion, propaganda, and psychological interests of the parties. These short-term interests do not necessarily converge with the long-term interests.

In 1959, when I was not in the government, my friend, Fred Eaton, was appointed head of the U.S. delegation to the Ten Nation Conference on Disarmament being held in Geneva under the aegis of the United Nations. He asked me to serve as an adviser to his delegation. The Soviet side had come up with a vague proposal for “general and complete disarmament.” They were making tremendous propaganda hay worldwide with that slogan. We were getting nowhere in finding out how they proposed to accomplish “general and complete disarmament” in a way that protected the interests of both sides at each stage. They insisted that we agree in principle to the ultimate objective before they would discuss details. But we could not agree to the principle without having some ideas as to the “how.”

We finally addressed the problem by coming up with a proposal that, while visionary, was also realistic in recognizing the need for a concrete sequence of steps that would preserve stability as nuclear weapons were reduced. It was “phased total disarmament.” We then began outlining in some detail the various phases involved. Public opinion reversed almost overnight. The propaganda gains the Soviets had been making eroded; they finally walked out of the negotiations; apparently they were more interested in the propaganda value of

¹Former director, W. Averell Harriman Institute for Advanced Study of the Soviet Union, Columbia University.

[LC]

the negotiations than in taking the
required steps to realize the objective
of disarmament. Since that time, the
situation has changed somewhat for
the better, but the public opinion,
psychological part of the equation con-
tinues to be important.

## Developments in the Current Negotiations

After the Soviets decided, in the summer of 1984, that they had made a mistake in walking out of the INF negotiations in November 1983, it was still not easy to get negotiations underway again on a serious basis. The Soviets took the position that they would be doing us a favor by returning to the negotiating table and should, therefore, be rewarded. The President and Secretary of State Shultz didn't agree. Finally, however, it was settled that Mr. Shultz should meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in January 1985. They met and agreed on a communique, largely because each side could interpret its language to mean what they wanted it to mean. In any case, the Shultz-Gromyko meeting led to the beginning of the Geneva NST [nuclear and space talks] negotiations in three fora: one negotiating group for START, one for INF, and one for defense and space, all three teams on each side being part of one umbrella delegation. Max Kampelman heads the U.S. team.

## The Geneva Summit

President Reagan first proposed the idea of a summit meeting in March 1985 when he invited the new General Secretary of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, to Washington at the earliest possible time. Over 4 months passed, however, before the two sides agreed to a November meeting in Geneva. Much work—between the delegations in Geneva; between the foreign ministers in meetings in Vienna, Moscow, and Washington; and through normal diplomatic channels—preceded that summit meeting. The summit meeting itself had significant media exposure and had a large impact on public opinion. While no breakthrough occurred on arms control in terms of concrete progress, the meeting established the basis for further progress and committed both sides to an indepth dialogue on the full range of U.S.-Soviet relations. A communique was agreed upon which contained language the Soviets wanted from the preceding January's communique and language we wanted saying the sides would accelerate negotiations on 50% START reductions

and on an interim INF agreement. The
President and Mr. Gorbachev also
agreed that there would be two addi-
tional summits, one in the United States
in 1986 and one in the U.S.S.R. in 1987.

By early 1986, it became evident
that the road to a summit meeting in the
United States would be difficult. There
was criticism in Moscow that Mr.
Reagan had gained public opinion points
on Gorbachev at the 1985 summit. Con-
sequently, Mr. Gorbachev did not wish to
meet with the President in the United
States unless he was assured in advance
of an outcome acceptable to Moscow.
During the winter and spring following
the summit, the Soviets presented some
new proposals in Geneva but did so in
such a public manner that it seemed as if
the proposals were intended to maximize
the propaganda effect rather than to
contribute to substantive progress. We
also presented new proposals. Although
there was some movement by both sides,
we had not moved much closer to
closure.

## The Experts' Meetings

In June, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister for U.S. and Canadian Affairs, came to Washington. He talked to Secretary Shultz, to Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Roz Ridgway, and to me. We agreed to try an additional mode of dialogue for the purpose of exploring possible breakthroughs in each of the three negotiating areas. Four "experts" from our side would meet with four "experts" from the Soviet side, first in Moscow, then in Washington. Not more than one on each side was to be from the Geneva negotiating teams.

We informed the Soviets that I
would head the U.S. team and that the
other three members would be Max
Kampelman, the chief U.S. negotiator in
Geneva; Assistant Secretary of Defense
[for International Security Policy]
Richard Perle; and Col. Bob Linhard,
Special Assistant to the President on the
NSC staff. The Soviets then informed us
that their team would be headed by
Viktor Karpov, the head of their Geneva
delegation, assisted by General Detinov
and Ambassador Obhukov, also members
of their Geneva team, and General
Chervov, head of the Arms Control
Directorate of the U.S.S.R. General
Staff. This lineup was contrary to the
understanding we had had with
Bessmertnykh. We, therefore, added
Ron Lehman, head of our START team;
Mike Glitman, head of our INF team;
and Ed Rowny, Special Adviser to the
President and the Secretary of State
on Arms Control Matters, to our group.

The "expert" negotiations, first in
Moscow in August and then in early
September in Washington, were
vigorous and pointed. We made some
progress in both sessions but were still
far from closure. In the earlier
negotiating rounds in Geneva, the
Soviets wanted to achieve agreements in
principle on broad objectives and ambig-
uously defined numbers. In the experts'
meetings, they switched their approach,
wishing to address what they called
"practical measures"—measures which
could be negotiated to a point where
they could assure Gorbachev that
these measures could be brought to
closure at a summit. While they did
move somewhat toward the U.S. position
on several issues, they continued to push
for what would have been very much a
one-sided outcome.

## Reykjavik

These efforts were underway when the
Daniloff² affair occurred. During the
course of that affair and during his visit
to Washington to meet with Secretary
Shultz, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevard-
nadze delivered a letter from Gorbachev
to the President suggesting that a
meeting outside either the United States
or the U.S.S.R. could serve to review in
an informal and private session the
agenda for Gorbachev's trip to the
United States. The President was
favorably inclined to such a meeting but
replied that nothing could be done until
Daniloff was released. Shortly after that
happened, the meeting at Reykjavik was
arranged.

Shortly before the Reykjavik
meeting, we anticipated that Gorbachev
planned to make important new pro-
posals at Reykjavik coupled with
demands certainly unacceptable to the
United States. We also learned that he
was planning an extensive propaganda
campaign to exploit the anticipated
failure of the meeting at Reykjavik.
When we arrived at Reykjavik, we saw
much evidence supporting that view of
Gorbachev's agenda. Many members of
the Soviet delegation appeared to be
propaganda, media, or public relations
experts. They had organized a never-
ending series of press conferences which
began even before the talks had started.

²Nicholas Daniloff, Moscow correspondent for *U.S.News & World Report*, was arrested in the U.S.S.R., allegedly for espionage activities, shortly after the arrest of a Soviet UN employee in New York. Daniloff was released September 29, 1986, as a result of U.S. diplomatic efforts.

2

[LC]

Gorbachev appeared to be approaching the Reykjavik meeting hoping to create a no-lose situation for himself. Either the President would agree to his one-sided proposals, or his people would be in a good position to place the blame for failure on the President.

The Reykjavik talks had been scheduled to consist of three sessions: Saturday morning, Saturday afternoon, and Sunday morning. The talks were to be held at Hofdi House, a handsome house on the bay. The participants were to be restricted to the President, Secretary Shultz, an interpreter, and a notetaker on our side and a similar team, including Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, on their side. Our whole delegation was scheduled to leave Sunday afternoon.

At the Saturday morning session, Mr. Gorbachev presented a package of new proposals, including some significant moves in our direction, but also including demands quite unacceptable to the United States. The morning session was devoted largely to a discussion of the Gorbachev proposals.

During the afternoon, the President presented the U.S. position in a logical and forceful way. Toward the end of the afternoon, Gorbachev and the President agreed that their experts would meet at 8:00 p.m. to continue to work on the issues that they had discussed. One group of experts would work on the bilateral and human rights issues; the other group would work on the major nuclear arms control issues—i.e., START, INF, defense and space, and nuclear testing.

After the Saturday afternoon session, the President and Secretary Shultz briefed the rest of us. At that time, it was decided that Roz Ridgway would head our bilateral and human rights team and I would head our arms control team. I was joined by more or less the same group who had been with me during the experts' meetings in Moscow and Washington, plus a senior representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We were not given much in the way of specific instructions. The general idea was that these teams would attempt to achieve agreement on as much common ground as they could, leaving the unresolved issues for subsequent negotiations by foreign ministers.

When we arrived at Hofdi House at 8:00 p.m., we were met by the Soviet team. It was headed by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces. He was assisted by Ambassador Karpov; Yevgeniy Velikhov, their principal scientist; Valentin Falin, one of their most able political operatives, now editor of a

Moscow newspaper and formerly their expert on Soviet political operation in Germany; and Georgiy Arbatov, head of the U.S.A. and Canada Institute and also a well-known political operator.

I found Akhromeyev to be tough, intelligent, forceful, and practical. It took us little time to agree on how we would address our work; we promptly got down to substance. On the various START issues, we found ourselves pretty well stymied. He wanted 50% reductions from present levels of strategic arms, category by category, on each side. Their levels are, in general, far higher than ours, except for heavy bombers. Equal reductions would result in different levels of missiles after reductions that would exaggerate current force asymmetries and, therefore, favor the Soviet side. I insisted upon aggregate ceilings and sublimits which would be equal for both sides after the reductions. Neither of us agreed to the other's approach. We, therefore, moved on to the INF issues, where we made better progress.

The INF issues the United States set out to resolve included agreement on a ceiling on the number of each side's LRINF missile warheads that could be deployed within range of European targets, a ceiling on LRINF warheads in Asia and the United States, the duration of such an agreement, the principles that would govern the verification of adherence to the agreement, and the treatment of shorter range INF missiles, called SRINF. Akhromeyev appeared not to be authorized to negotiate on a ceiling in Asia. We also were unable fully to resolve the SRINF issue, which is of significant concern to our European partners, particularly the Germans. On the other INF issues, we appeared to have come to agreement.

We moved on to the defense and space issues. They presented their arguments for limiting SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] research to that which could be conducted within the walls of a laboratory. This proposal would involve limitations beyond those of the 1972 ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty. I presented in full detail our view as to what the ABM Treaty permits and does not permit, particularly as to "field testing," the only aspect of research which is observable and, therefore, verifiable. They insisted upon a 10- to 15-year period during which both sides would agree to abide strictly by the ABM Treaty and not to withdraw from it. This proposal cannot form the basis for agreement as long as the Soviets attempt to redefine on their terms what is permitted under the ABM Treaty and unless we have a common understanding

of what is meant by the term "non-withdrawal." We asked whether they were prepared to correct their current violations of the treaty, specifically the Krasnoyarsk early warning radar. They were not. In the event one side violates a treaty, international law permits the other side to take various proportionate responses. It was not clear whether we were being asked to forgo such rights, including our explicit right to withdraw from the treaty in the event that our supreme national interests were jeopardized or in the event of material breach of the treaty. Nor was it clear what the sides would be permitted to do after the 10- or 15-year period.

I suggested to Marshal Akhromeyev that we report to our higher authorities that there were three issues in the defense and space area which subsequent negotiations at the foreign minister level would have to resolve: one was what activities the ABM Treaty was to permit during the time period; second, what activities would be permitted after the time period; and third, how long that time period would be. Marshall Akhromeyev refused my suggestion. He thought we should merely report lack of agreement on defense and space.

We then turned to nuclear testing. This had already been discussed at higher levels with some progress. We presented a paragraph which we thought correctly summarized the resulting positions of the sides. The two sides would promptly enter into negotiations on nuclear testing. The first matter to work out would be improved verification measures to permit ratification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Thereafter, the sides would negotiate on a step-by-step approach to the eventual elimination of nuclear testing in parallel with the elimination of nuclear weapons.

While Akhromeyev did not appear to disagree with the substance of the paragraph that we had submitted, he did forcefully disagree with the first sentence. He wanted part of the last sentence on the elimination of nuclear testing brought into the first sentence. He wanted the first sentence to say the sides will promptly enter into negotiations on the elimination of nuclear testing. The political thrust of the paragraph would have been reversed, with the emphasis placed only on the long-term end goal and not on the process, even if the sustance of the sentences following the first had remained unchanged. I wasn't about to agree to a purely political ploy of this kind.

3

[LC]

We then went back to the START issues. After further extended discussion, we were making no progress. By this time, it was 2:00 a.m. Suddenly, Marshal Akhromeyev rose to his feet and said he was leaving; he would be back at 3:00 a.m.

I went back to the hotel. I woke up Secretary Shultz and described to him where we were. He advised me to go back and try to make such progress as was possible and sensible.

When we resumed, Akhromeyev promptly got to the point. He was now authorized to agree on what had been the major point of disagreement between us on START, that being my insistence on ceilings after reductions which would be equal between the sides. He was now willing to accept an equal ceiling on the aggregate level of ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] launchers plus heavy bombers of 1,600, and an aggregate ceiling of 6,000 on the number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads plus an appropriate number for the weapons on heavy bombers. We had included in our proposed aggregate of 6,000 the number of long-range cruise missiles on heavy bombers, but nothing for the gravity bombs and SRAMs [short-range attack missiles] such bombers might carry. Our rationale was that it is not proposed by either side that the tremendous Soviet air defense capabilities be limited. Gravity bombs and SRAMs are needed to penetrate those defenses and, therefore, should not be counted in an aggregate of strategic weapons. In an important breakthrough, Marshal Akhromeyev and I finally agreed that each heavy bomber carrying gravity bombs and SRAMs would be counted as one weapon in the 6,000-weapons aggregate.

We then moved on to another issue, one of particular interest to the Soviet side—a limitation on the number of sea-based, long-range cruise missiles. The problem of verifying the range and number of such cruise missiles is extremely difficult. After almost an hour's discussion of the issue, we came up with a sentence to which both of us could agree.

We then got locked into a discussion of sublimits within the aggregate ceiling on the number of weapons. I proposed agreement on three specific sublimits which we thought were necessary to assure that the reductions would be stabilizing and not retain current destabilizing force asymmetries. Marshal Akhromeyev would not agree to our proposal; he proposed instead a single

sublimit representing a reduction of 50% in their heavy missiles but permitting none on our side. This approach, however, was insufficient to assure that the reductions would be stabilizing. I proposed that a sentence be included in the paragraphs we were drafting, assuring that either side, in subsequent negotiations, could raise such sublimits as it thought necessary to assure stability between the forces remaining after the agreed reductions. Akhromeyev would not agree to put that language into the paragraph but assured me that, of course, either side could raise such sublimits as it wished in the subsequent negotiations. I said that I was prepared to rely on his personal assurance.

By that time, it was 6:15 a.m. We both had to report to our superiors in time for them to prepare for the Sunday morning meeting, scheduled to begin at 10:00 a.m. At that Sunday morning meeting, the principal forward movement came when General Secretary Gorbachev proposed a ceiling of 100 on Soviet LRINF warheads in Soviet Asia, to be matched by an equal ceiling on U.S. LRINF warheads in the United States. That seemed to lay the basis for resolving the key INF issues, except for the short-range systems. Despite the seriousness of the SRINF problem, particularly to the Germans, at least 80% of the INF problems facing us 36 hours earlier seemed to have been overcome. It was also agreed at that morning meeting that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, accompanied by their advisers, meet at 2:00 p.m. to sort out the remaining problems so as to facilitate the 3:00 p.m. final session between the chiefs of state.

At the outset of the 2:00 session, Secretary Shultz proposed that we first clear up some of the easier remaining issues. Shevardnadze said that would be useless; there was one crucial issue to be decided. Could the President agree to a time period of 10 years of strict adherence to, and nonwithdrawal from, the ABM Treaty? If he could, then agreement on all the other issues would be possible. If not, nothing could be agreed.

After some discussion, Shultz said that he wished to explore an idea that he had not yet discussed with the President, that was related to, but different from, the U.S. proposal in July. The sides had already agreed in principle to a 5-year period of 50% reductions in strategic offensive systems. Shultz's idea was that if the U.S.S.R. would agree to a second 5-year period of reductions, after the

first 5-year reductions had been implemented, in which all remaining offensive ballistic missiles would be eliminated, then that could constitute a 10-year reduction program. Having already argued that both sides should strictly abide by the terms of the ABM Treaty, the President might further agree that both sides would not withdraw from the ABM Treaty and would continue to abide strictly by its terms while such a program was being executed. Shevardnadze thought that might be of interest to Gorbachev.

We then went up to the room where the President was waiting. The Secretary's idea was presented to him, to Mr. Regan [White House Chief of Staff], and to the others present. Everyone thought it would be worth pursuing. A precise paragraph was worked out and typed. The President and Secretary Shultz went down to the main conference room with this language to meet Gorbachev and Shevardnadze.

They returned in about an hour with the news that Gorbachev had presented an alternative proposal calling for the elimination of all remaining offensive strategic systems in the second 5 years, rather than all remaining offensive ballistic missiles. This would leave the Soviets with a preponderant position in shorter range nuclear systems which, with their conventional forces, would give them potential dominance over the Eurasian landmass. We could not accept such an outcome. A revised paragraph was worked out, not too different in its central provision from our original paragraph.

The President and Secretary Shultz then rejoined Gorbachev and Shevardnadze. There was extensive further discussion, but no specific agreement. During the course of this discussion, it became clear that there was not one issue, but two, on which Gorbachev was adamant. He also insisted that the SDI program be restricted to that which could be conducted within laboratories. There is no such provision in the ABM Treaty. Gorbachev was asking for what amounted to an amendment to the ABM Treaty adverse to U.S. interests. Indeed, he intended to impose constraints on our SDI program far more severe than those imposed by the ABM Treaty. Such additional constraints would kill the SDI program. The President could not accept this.

## Vienna and Beyond

Secretary Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze met again in November in Vienna in connection with a CSCE [Conference on

4

[LC]

Security and Cooperation in Europe] meeting. We had set up a special session for the two foreign ministers at which they could meet to confirm and build on the common ground that had been developed at the Reykjavik meeting and to identify and narrow the remaining differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. Neither this meeting nor the following night session of their advisers resulted in progress. The Soviets seemed more interested in attempting to make propaganda points by misstating what had happened at Reykjavik than in advancing the negotiations. They reiterated their newly hardened position that links any agreement on START systems or on INF systems to acceptance of their space defense demands.

During the upcoming round that begins tomorrow morning in Geneva, the U.S. negotiators will call upon the Soviet Union to address in specific terms the key issues remaining in all three negotiating fora. In INF, we will continue to insist on adequate verification measures, to insist that the proposed limits remain in effect until superseded by an agreement providing for further reductions, and to assert our right to a level of SRINF missile deployments equal to that of the Soviet Union. Finally, the United States will continue to insist that progress in INF be delinked from progress in the other negotiations.

In START, we will insist that the Soviets return to their earlier acceptance of the concept of sublimits on particularly destabilizing systems. We have proposed in Geneva specific sublimits of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads. These numbers represent substantial movement in the direction of the Soviet position. As in the case of INF, we oppose the linkage between agreement on these reductions and progress in other areas. We must also work on identifying adequate verification measures. This latter point is critical in view of recent Soviet deployment of land-mobile ICBMs. Because of the serious verification problem they pose, the U.S. START proposal calls for a ban on mobile missiles. The

United States has called upon the Soviets, as the first nation to deploy such systems, to address our verification concerns in the context of limiting these missiles in a START agreement. Thus far, they have not done so. The significant deployment of land-mobile missiles in the Soviet Union presents the United States with a new reality that may require us to take parallel steps to assure the survivability of a significant portion of our own strategic retaliatory forces.

In the defense and space negotiations, we will continue to focus on the U.S. negotiating agenda by:

* Elaborating on the potential role of effective defenses in providing a more stable offense/defense relationship;

* Engaging the Soviets in a dialogue on a jointly managed transition toward a more defense-based deterrence posture, should defenses prove feasible; and

* Reversing the erosion of the ABM Treaty and bringing the Soviets into compliance with it.

The Soviet goal, on the other hand, is to place enough restrictions on the SDI program so as to disrupt its progress. They have attempted to do this by amending the treaty with proposed restrictions on research, development, and testing in excess of those imposed by the treaty.

We call upon the Soviet Union to withdraw their proposal to restrict SDI to the laboratory and to show their seriousness by making their approach consistent with the existing provisions of the ABM Treaty. The United States has explained to the Soviets its view with regard to permitted and prohibited activities under the ABM Treaty in connection with agreement on a regime of permitted research, development, and testing during a possible 10-year period of offensive reductions and strict adherence to and nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty. However, we see no reason to accept changes in the understanding of key terms and definitions associated with the ABM Treaty which would alter that which has already been negotiated and agreed.

This review of the status of the negotiations indicates that the greatest potential for further concrete progress is concentrated in those areas of common ground involving reductions in the first 5-year period: reductions in START to the 1,600/6,000 ceilings and in INF to the 0/100 ceilings. Our defense and space proposal that all remaining ballistic missiles be eliminated in the second 5 years remains on the table subject to the same conditions we stated at Reykjavik.

In the immediate future, the United States will continue to attempt to consolidate the areas of common ground and to clarify areas of disagreement with a view to resolving or narrowing remaining differences. Our strategy, based on an understanding of the political and military dimensions of the issues at hand, is focused on achieving the long-term benefits that would be shared by both sides in the aftermath of deep, stabilizing reductions in the scope of the nuclear threat. Earlier this week, in connection with the appointment of First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov as the new chief Soviet negotiator in Geneva, the Soviets stated that they view the next round of negotiations with utmost seriousness. We hope that Mr. Gorbachev will translate his words into an emphasis, similar to our own, on concluding an agreement consistent with our mutual interests, rather than continuing to focus on transitory, short-term propaganda advantages.

With such an emphasis, we can move forward with the Soviets toward a comprehensive, stabilizing agreement on a future arms control regime providing for permitted defensive research and testing, strategic and intermediate-range offensive reductions, and a jointly managed transition to greater reliance on strategic defenses, if and when SDI research demonstrates their feasibility, survivability, and cost-effectiveness at the margin. ■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • February 1987
Editor: Cynthia Saboe • This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source is appreciated.

5

Paul H. Nitze

Current
Policy
No. 906

Developments in NST
Issues After Reykjavik

Following is a statement by Ambassador
Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the
President and the Secretary of State on
Arms Control Matters, before the Defense
Policy Panel of the House Armed Services
Committee, Washington, D.C., Decem-
ber 4, 1986.

This morning, I will review briefly the developments over the past several months in the nuclear and space talks (NST). I will describe separately the developments in each of the three negotiating areas of INF, START, and defense and space, with reference to the status of each area prior to the Reykjavik meeting and its evolution during the Reykjavik and Vienna meetings. My statement will conclude with a brief description of where I think we should go from here.

The progress to date is significant. We have expanded the potential area of common agreement between our negotiating position and that of the Soviets. Yet, we still face a long, difficult task ahead. Much hard work remains, and important obstacles must be overcome in order to conclude arms reduction treaties that are in our national interest and that can be implemented. We must both nail down the details of the agreements that we have achieved in principle—for example, reductions in longer range INF missiles—and address issues that are only now maturing to a point where a serious dialogue is possible—for example, what strategic defense development and testing activities are permitted and prohibited by the ABM Treaty and the conditions under which the sides would agree not to

exercise, for a period of time, their
existing right to withdraw from that
treaty on 6 months' notice.

During the coming months, the
Soviet Union will take a full account of
the state of U.S. executive-legislative
branch relations, especially as it relates
to arms control. The ability of the
United States to negotiate worthwhile
arms control agreements will continue to
depend upon close cooperation, coordi-
nation, and consultation between the
Administration and the Congress. This
relationship should be based upon
realistic expectations and assessments of
the progress achieved and the remaining
obstacles at each future step in the
negotiations. We must reduce the degree
to which different perceptions or views
between the executive and legislative
branches regarding the negotiations are
taken by the Soviets as an opportunity
to hold out for concessions or to create
friction and delay.

Acronyms

ABM Treaty—Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

ALCM-air-launched cruise missile

GLCM—ground-launched cruise missile

ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile

INF—intermediate-range nuclear forces

LRINF—longer range INF

NST—nuclear and space talks

RV—reentry vehicle

SDI—Strategic Defense Initiative

SLCM—sea-launched cruise missile

SN DV—strategic nuclear delivery vehicle

SRAM—short-range attack missile

SRINF—shorter range INF

START—strategic arms reduction talks

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Our long-term policy goal with respect to
longer range INF missiles is to eliminate
this entire class of U.S. and Soviet
weapons on a worldwide basis. Because
the Soviets were unwilling to go that far
at that time, the United States agreed at
the 1985 Geneva summit to focus efforts
on an interim agreement to reduce these
missiles.

The United States set forth, at that time, a number of guidelines for such an approach. We required that both the United States and Soviet Union have equal rights and limits and that those limits be global in scope, owing to the range, mobility, and transportability of LRINF systems. We stated that we would not negotiate commitments regarding the independent strategic nuclear deterrents of third countries and that no compensation be afforded because of such third-country systems. We ruled out reductions in dual-capable systems, to prevent degradation of NATO's conventional capabilities. Last, we required that any agreement be verifiable.

**Pre-Reykjavik.** As a result of the experts' meetings in Moscow and Washington last summer and the September meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the United States achieved several of these objectives. The sides agreed on an end goal of eliminating the entire class of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles. The sides agreed that, as an interim step, they would be prepared to limit the total number of warheads on LRINF missiles

[LC]

deployed in Europe to an equal level
above zero. Both sides were also
prepared to agree to equal global limits
on the number of LRINF missile war-
heads. Discussion during this period
focused on five issues: the specific
numbers for numerical limits, Asian
deployments, deployment mix, shorter
range INF, and the duration of the
agreement.

The Soviet Union proposed reduc-
tions to a level of 100 warheads in
Europe but offered only a freeze on
SS-20s deployed in Asia; that would
have left a global residual of more than
600 SS-20 warheads. The United States
suggested in the experts' meetings that
the limit be set at 200 warheads for each
side worldwide, with no more than 100
warheads in Europe.

The United States reiterated that LRINF warheads deployed in Asia should be reduced proportionately and concurrently with those in Europe but that a reduction to equal levels in Europe and Asia could also be acceptable if the specific level was agreeable to the United States. Although the Soviets refused to agree to any reductions of SS-20s in Asia, or even to specify existing levels, they stated that they would "limit" the number of LRINF warheads deployed in Asia.

The Soviets proposed that the LRINF missile mix after reductions in Europe include only GLCMs on the U.S. side and SS-20 ballistic missiles on the Soviet side. The United States said that the mix between U.S. GLCMs and Pershing II ballistic missiles could be discussed further, but that Pershing II missiles must constitute a part of the U.S. force.

The sides agreed on the need for
constraints on SRINF missiles. The
United States insisted that this issue be
resolved concurrently with the establish-
ment of ceilings on LRINF missiles. The
Soviets argued that the SRINF issue
could be resolved after agreement on
LRINF reductions.

The United States insisted that an
interim agreement on INF should
remain in effect until superseded by a
later agreement providing for further
reductions—and should not be a "temp-
orary" measure of short duration as
the Soviets suggested.

Reykjavik. The Reykjavik meeting created considerable movement in the substantive areas of INF, although there was no closure on the major areas of concern. The President and General Secretary agreed to eliminate U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe. Worldwide deployments would be limited to 100 warheads on each side,

with Soviet missiles deployed in the
Asian U.S.S.R. and U.S. deployments
limited to U.S. territory.

With regard to SRINF missiles, the
Soviets proposed to freeze SRINF
deployments at the current level and to
address their reduction in a subsequent
negotiation. The United States agreed to
a ceiling at the present Soviet level on
Soviet SRINF and to the proposal for
follow-on negotiations on SRINF missile
reductions but demanded a right to equal
SRINF missile deployments.

Movement on verification also
occurred in Reykjavik. Although the
discussion was not detailed, there was
Soviet agreement to the U.S. proposal
that an effective verification package
must include a comprehensive exchange
of data before and after reductions,
onsite inspection of the elimination of
weapons, and effective onsite monitoring
of the remaining INF systems and
associated facilities.

Since the Reykjavik meeting, the
Soviets have attempted to relink prog-
ress in INF to progress in the defense
and space negotiations, reversing their
position of last spring. The United
States rejects this linkage and will con-
tinue to work for a separate agreement.

START

The U.S. goal in the START talks is to achieve deep and verifiable reductions to equal levels properly structured so as to enhance stability. Consequently, our negotiating position draws a distinction between more and less destabilizing systems—for example, between heavy ICBMs and other ballistic missiles and between ballistic missiles and air-breathing missiles.

Our START position contains
several key elements:

* A reduction in the total number of ballistic missile warheads;

* Within this ceiling, sublimits on ICBM RVs; and

* A corresponding reduction in overall ballistic missile throw-weight.

Pre-Reykjavik. At the 1985 Geneva summit, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed in principle to 50% reductions in strategic offensive systems. Each side had significantly different approaches to structuring such reductions. The United States called for limits of 1,250-1,450 ballistic missiles, with 4,500 ballistic missile warheads, 3,000 ICBM warheads, a 50% reduction in throw-weight below Soviet levels, and 1,500 ALCMs on, at most, 350 heavy bombers. The Soviet proposal for 50% reductions applied cuts to these strategic systems but included, as well, U.S. LRINF

in Europe and all U.S. dual-capable air-
craft in Europe and Asia and on aircraft
carriers, wherever located, while exclud-
ing equivalent Soviet systems from cuts
on their side. The Soviets accepted the
concept of sublimits, proposing that
there be a warhead limit of 60% on any
one leg of the triad.

In June 1986, the Soviets offered a
new proposal involving reductions of less
than 50%. During the experts' meetings,
first in Moscow and subsequently in
Washington, we explored such an
approach while not changing our com-
mitment to the principle of 50% reduc-
tions. After the experts' meetings, the
United States decided it could accept the
Soviet SNDV aggregate level of 1,600.
We increased to 7,500 the number of
ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs that we
were willing to accept and proposed the
following sublimits: 5,500 ballistic
missile RVs, 3,300 ICBM RVs, and 1,650
RVs on allowed ICBMs except for fixed,
light, or medium ICBMs with six or
fewer warheads. The Soviets retained
their 8,000 limit on "nuclear charges,"
including gravity bombs and SRAMs,
and proposed a limit between 6,400 and
6,800 on ballistic missile RVs.

Going into the Reykjavik meeting,
several issues separated the United
States and Soviet Union.

First, the Soviets criticized the
United States for attempting to restruc-
ture Soviet forces with its proposed
sublimits. Our position was that such
sublimits are necessary to ensure
stability.

Second, the Soviets insisted that gravity bombs and SRAMs be included in the aggregate weapons limit. The United States proposed that they be limited only indirectly through the 350 heavy bomber sublimit, since these systems are less destabilizing and since air defenses against the bombers are unconstrained.

Third, the United States wanted to
ban mobile missiles unless the Soviets
could show us how our verification and
stability concerns could be met.

Fourth, the Soviets refused to con-
sider codification of the 50% throw-
weight reduction.

Fifth, there was inadequate prog-
ress on verification, especially of SLCMs
and mobiles.

Finally, the Soviets insisted on link-
ing START reductions to a 15-year com-
mitment of nonwithdrawal from the
ABM Treaty. The United States rejected
such a linkage.

Reykjavik. At Reykjavik, the United
States and the Soviet Union reached
agreement in principle to reduce, in

2

[L]

5 years, to 1,600 SNDVs and 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads, consisting of ballistic missile warheads, ALCMs, and heavy bombers armed with gravity bombs and SRAMs, such bombers to count as a single warhead. The Soviets refused to agree to U.S.-proposed sublimits on these systems and, in addition, dropped their own proposal for sublimits. The United States, however, reserved the right to raise the issue of sublimits in the future, and the Soviets acknowledged that right. The Soviets did agree that reductions would involve significant cuts in Soviet heavy missiles. In addition, both sides agreed to seek mutually acceptable limits on nuclear-armed SLCMs, separate from the SN DV and warhead aggregates. The Soviets insisted that their agreement to these reductions remain linked to a defense and space agreement.

## Defense and Space

**Pre-Reykjavik.** In defense and space, the Soviet Union sought to ban or disrupt the SDI program. They demanded a ban on research, development, testing, and deployment of what they call "space-strike arms." They linked agreement to such a ban to reductions in the START area.

In June, the Soviets proposed that neither side withdraw from the ABM Treaty for up to 15 years and that the ABM Treaty be "strengthened" by redefining the activities permitted and prohibited under the treaty. The net result would have been to prohibit much of the U.S. strategic defense research now permitted by the ABM Treaty and to make future deployment so distant as to discourage active work on SDI.

The United States made it clear that we are committed to the SDI research program and to continued adherence to the ABM Treaty. In his July letter to Gorbachev, President Reagan stated that, if both sides can agree on radical reductions in strategic offensive weapons, the United States would be prepared to sign an agreement with the Soviets providing the following:

**First,** both sides would agree to confine themselves, through 1991, to research, development, and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, to determine whether advanced systems of strategic defense are technically feasible.

**Second,** a new treaty would provide that if, after 1991, either side should decide to deploy such a system, that side would be obliged to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense and for eliminating offensive ballistic

missiles. This plan would be negotiated over a 2-year period.

**Third,** if the two sides cannot agree after 2 years of negotiation, either side would be free to deploy an advanced strategic defensive system after giving 6 months' notice to the other.

**Reykjavik.** At Reykjavik, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reached common ground on the relevant time period during which both sides would agree not to exercise their right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the purpose of deploying advanced strategic defenses. Gorbachev insisted on a period of 10 years. The President was prepared to agree to 10 years provided agreement could be achieved on three subjects, namely, the regime of control over defenses and the program of reductions in offensive ballistic missiles during those 10 years and what each side was to be allowed to do after the 10 years.

* On the issue of the regime of control over defenses, President Reagan proposed to Mr. Gorbachev that both sides strictly abide by the limitations of the ABM Treaty. Mr. Gorbachev insisted on what he called measures to "strengthen" the ABM Treaty but what, in fact, amounted to an attempt to amend it. Specifically, he proposed to restrict to the laboratory testing of all space elements or components of antiballistic missile defense.

* With regard to the program of offensive reductions, the United States proposed the elimination of all ballistic missiles remaining after 1991 during a second 5-year phase ending in 1996. The Soviets called for the elimination of all remaining strategic offensive weapons during that period.

* With regard to each side's rights after 10 years, the United States proposed that either side be free to deploy defenses unless the parties agree otherwise. The Soviets proposed to enter into a new negotiation after 10 years on all issues related to the ABM Treaty.

## Vienna and Beyond

We appear to have achieved substantial, yet incomplete progress at Reykjavik in our efforts to reach agreement on INF, START, and defense and space. The objective of Secretary Shultz's discussions in Vienna with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze was to confirm and build on the results of the Reykjavik meeting and to identify and narrow the remaining differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. This meeting did not result in progress. The Soviets seemed more interested in attempting to make propaganda points

by misstating what had happened at Reykjavik than in advancing the negotiations. The Soviets hardened their position by linking all the progress at Reykjavik to acceptance of their space defense demands.

Key issues remain in all three negotiating fora.

**In INF,** we continue to assert our right to an equal level of Soviet SRINF deployments, to insist on adequate verification measures, to insist that the proposed limits remain in effect until superseded by an agreement providing for further reductions, and to de-link final resolution of these issues from other negotiations.

**In START,** we need to achieve agreement to stabilizing sublimits within the agreed framework of reductions. We have proposed, in Geneva, sublimits of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, 3,300 ICBM warheads, and 1,650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads. These numbers represent a substantial movement in the direction of the Soviet position. We must also work on identifying adequate verification measures. We oppose the linkage between agreement on these reductions with progress in other areas.

**In defense and space,** we wish to continue to discuss with the Soviets our view of what is permitted by the ABM Treaty. They must understand, however, that we see no reason to create limits more stringent than those already incorporated in the treaty.

This review of the status of the negotiations indicates that the greatest potential for further concrete progress is concentrated in those areas of common ground involving reductions in the first 5-year period: reductions in START to the 1,600/6,000 ceilings and in INF to the 0/100 ceilings. Our proposal that all remaining ballistic missiles be eliminated in the second 5 years remains on the table, subject to the same conditions we stated at Reykjavik.

In the immediate future, the United States will continue to attempt to consolidate the areas of agreement and to clarify areas of disagreement, with a view to resolving or narrowing remaining differences.■

Published by the United States Department of State • Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication • Editorial Division • Washington, D.C. • January 1987
Editor: Cynthia Saboe • This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source is appreciated.

3

March 20, 1987

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Henry:

I read with interest your column of March 8 in The Washington Post. I found myself in complete agreement with your description of Soviet negotiating behavior. I differ, however, with several of your points regarding the current Nuclear and Space Talks and the US approach to those talks.

First, you note the problem of asymmetrical negotiating attitudes, resulting in the US offering a stream of compromises while the Soviets remain intransigent. While I agree that this problem has plagued us in the past, I do not believe it is unavoidable. In fact, this Administration has done a remarkable job of sticking to the basic principles of its original arms control positions, while responding with tactical flexibility when the Soviets have shown flexibility of their own. We are closing in on an INF agreement that is almost identical to our original proposal. Similarly, the agreed elements in the START group keep our ingoing principles intact. And in the Defense and Space group, despite Gorbachev's best efforts, we have resisted adding any new limits to the ABM Treaty. In fact, I find curious your assertion that SDI is a good illustration of our self-imposed handicaps; the claim is based not on anything that has happened to date but rather on your prediction that we will agree to crippling restrictions on SDI research permitted by the Treaty, despite our success in resisting such restrictions thus far. The President made his firmness abundantly clear at Reykjavik.

Second, you claim that no compromise is possible between the Soviet intention to kill SDI and the Administration commitment to maintain it. To my mind, this is too absolute a generalization. (It seems you also think so, since the 5-point proposal you offer at the end of your piece is based on just such a compromise.) Surely, no compromise is possible if the Soviets can accept no outcome other than the effective end of SDI, but I am not convinced that they would not settle for an outcome that provided predictability to the strategic defense area while permitting us to retain a robust research program. Many factors bear upon such a judgment, including the possibility of a dialogue along the lines some Soviet scientists have advanced aimed at identifying the technologies now understood to be based upon other physical principles and the potential ABM components of systems based upon such

[Lc]

- 2 -

technologies. Using such definitions, one can conceive of a
regime that would allow SDI to proceed at a rapid but
predictable pace. Incidentally, the testing of sensors (other
than ABM radars), which you claim would be to Soviet advantage,
is actually the one component of SDI which General Abrahamson's
people say is most crucial to the progress of our program.

Third, you misstate our proposal for limits on SDI; at no
time have we proposed a 10-year deployment moratorium followed
by a two-year period for negotiation. In his July 25 letter to
Gorbachev, the President proposed a 5-year period of
nonwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty followed by a two-year
negotiation. At Reykjavik, we proposed a 10-year nonwithdrawal
period, with each side having the right to deploy immediately
at the end of that period.

Fourth, I differ with your assessment of the zero option in
INF. As Senator Nunn said last week, it represents a good
asymmetrical reduction, with the Soviets eliminating over 1300
warheads and the US eliminating about 200. It does not
eliminate the American means of retaliating from Europe; we
would retain all of our nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe,
including F-111s with range greater than the Pershing II, our
short-range missiles and nuclear artillery, and the 400 SLBM
RVs we have dedicated to NATO. Given these remaining systems,
as well as our extensive conventional contribution to NATO's
defense, I believe talk of decoupling is unjustified.

Finally, let me turn to your 5-point proposal. I find that
much of what you recommend has already been done. You
recommend a statement of overall strategy; I enunciated such a
strategic concept in a speech to the Philadelphia World Affairs
Council in February 1985, just before the NST negotiations
began. This concept called for radical reductions in the power
of offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the
offense/defense relationship, over the next ten years, followed
by a period of transition to greater reliance on defenses,
should new defensive technologies prove feasible. You
recommend an offer to the Soviets to discuss quantitative
restraints on SDI deployment and testing geared to the level of
offensive forces; we have been trying for two years in Geneva
to engage the Soviets in a discussion of the nature of a
cooperative transition that would involve such restraints. You
recommend an offer to reduce strategic forces in a manner that
would limit the capacity for surprise attacks by either side;
it is exactly this goal that underlies our insistence that a
START agreement include strict sublimits on heavy ICBM RVs, on
ICBM RVs, and on strategic ballistic missile RVs. Because of
our determination to reduce the capacity for surprise attacks,
we have held to this position despite strenuous Soviet
resistance.

- 3 -

I disagree strongly with your proposal to commit now to SDI deployment. While the research program has made great progress, it has yet to determine if prospective defenses would be survivable. Certainly there is nothing to be gained by deploying defenses that could not survive an attack; in fact, such an action could be seriously destabilizing. We also do not know yet if defenses would be cost-effective at the margin. Deploying defenses that could be overcome more cheaply by proliferating offenses would serve only to encourage the Soviets to do just that, touching off a costly and destabilizing offense-defense arms race. Waiting to ensure that these feasibility criteria can be met is not a subterfuge for attacking SDI, it is a prudent step to ensure our programs serve the goal of enhancing stability. It is also the only step that can garner the support we need in the Congress to sustain necessary SDI funding. My extensive consultations on the Hill have indicated that a deployment decision now, or a threat to abrogate the ABM Treaty, would backfire to the significant detriment of the SDI program.

In conclusion, let me dissent as well from the general point made at the beginning of your piece that the Administration is pursuing the traditional agenda of the past two decades with only minor variations. Our arms control agenda is substantially different from that of the past. Where past agreements allowed substantial buildups in offensive arsenals, we are pursuing substantial and stabilizing reductions. We are insisting on much stricter verification measures. And we will accept no agreement that does not allow us aggressively to explore the possibility of shifting to a defense-based deterrence.

[lc]

[LC]

MAR 17 1987

The
Richard Nixon Presidential Archives
Foundation

MAURICE H. STANS
FINANCE CHAIRMAN
350 WEST COLORADO BOULEVARD
PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91105
(818) 795-0851

March 10, 1987

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue (26th Floor)
New York, N.Y. 10022

Dear Henry:

I am happy to tell you that the fund raising for the Nixon Library has reached the level of $24 million against our $25 million goal. We have decided to wait for a dinner or reception or similar event in Los Angeles or Orange County at the time of the ground breaking when we should be able to pick up any remaining balance of our target.

Your participation at the dinner in New York in January, 1986, turned out to be extremely helpful because we raised more than $1,250,000 from the persons who were present that night.

At that time you offered to participate in one more such event if it could fit into your calendar, and I am hoping that when we get around to fixing the date for the ground breaking, we can do it at a time that will fit into your calendar so that you can be present and participate. Talent such as yours must not be allowed to lie dormant too long.

With many thanks for all your help and with best wishes, I am,

MHS:me