MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs

Newsweek Group

Mel Elfin (Washington-Bureau Chief)

Ox Elliot (Editor-in-Chief)

Lester Bernstein (Managing Editor)

Bob Christopher (Executive Editor)

Ed Klein (Foreign Editor)

Ed Kasner (National Affairs Editor)

Kermit Lansner (Editor)

Henry Trewhitt (State Correspondent)

Henry Hubbard (White House Correspondent)

John Scali

Les Janka (Notetaker)

TIME AND DATE:
8:00 p.m. - 11:15 p.m. -- Tuesday,
November 9, 1971

PLACE:
Home of Mel Elfin: 2804 29th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

After a brief period of light banter over cocktails, Dr. Kissinger was asked a question concerning his knowledge of the status of Lin Piao. Dr. Kissinger: I have only seen press stories about Lin Piao but it is my feeling that Lin Piao is clearly out of the picture and possibly dead. The circumstances surrounding the plane crash in Mongolia are admittedly strange but I do not know for sure if Lin was on the airplane. The next question dealt with Dr. Kissinger's confidence in a press backgrounder before his second trip to Peking; if Dr. Kissinger was so sure that Mao was alive, was he equally certain then about Lin? Dr. Kissinger: I was much less certain about Lin but I felt that there was clearly a convulsion in China and that Lin was at the center of it. Did Dr. Kissinger know at that time anything about the plane that was shot down? Dr. Kissinger: I was always certain that there was something strange about it since there are only six such jet planes in the PRC and that they rarely fly at night. There was also the matter of the standdown of the Chinese airforce. The

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kind of plane shot down is normally reserved only for VIP travel. **Question:** Was the entire issue of internal domestic troubles avoided in Dr. Kissinger's conversations in Peking? **Dr. Kissinger:** Yes, that is essentially correct.

**Question:** Did you get any sense of direction of this internal convulsion in Peking? **Dr. Kissinger:** There was no discussion of the troubles, but it was quite clear that the Chou group had opposition, that the course they had launched on in July (the President's trip), had created strong opposition.

You must imagine the shock of the sudden shift of relations, relations with the Chief Imperialist. Chou and his group had a massive job of explaining to do to the Cadre and party officials throughout the government. **Question:**

You mean there was a need for a great amount of education of the Chinese public? **Dr. Kissinger:** You must realize that Chinese newspapers carry

only the official line and that the Western press watches only the Chinese newspapers. The real political education done in China is done through small groups, in Cadre meetings, and in small Army groups. We sometimes get intelligence reports on the instructions to these Cadre groups at the Provincial level. This is how we know what we do about what is really happening in China. **Question:** Are you somehow equating the Nixon trip with the convulsion in China? **Dr. Kissinger:** Well, they were certainly related.

**Question:** Do you see any equivalent U. S. domestic convulsion from the right wing? **Dr. Kissinger:** Not much. In response to the point that only Richard Nixon could have pulled off this kind of trip, Dr. Kissinger responded: That is right. It couldn't have been done by a Democrat or even a Nelson Rockefeller. It would have created a massive uproar and therefore the trip and the entire China initiative is a real credit to Richard Nixon.

**Question:** Will we see a photograph showing the lineup of the new Chinese leadership before the trip to Peking occurs? **Dr. Kissinger:** I'm sure we will see such a lineup by the time we go there, but I must point out that I have no inside information, only my impressions from everything I read. I would be totally astonished if Lin should suddenly emerge during our visits.

**Question:** Who are the other officials who are rising to the top? **Dr. Kissinger:** Well, there are several, but Yeh Chien-ying has emerged as the top military man in recent weeks.

**Question:** In the course of your conversations did you have a feeling that Chou could make decisions on his own? **Dr. Kissinger:** Almost all the decisions were made on his own. Certainly all of the operational questions, but there were occasional checks on policy issues with Mao. And I must point out that Chou gave evidence that he genuinely did check, since he would introduce new items which would have not normally have occurred if his

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checking was only a ploy. Perhaps two, maybe three times, I could
specifically point to when he did such things. I must say that Chou is a
very tough negotiator, but not tricky. There is a minimum of bargaining,
he is a very principled man. **Question:** Did you do any advance reading on
Chou? **Dr. Kissinger:** You must realize that this was an entirely, gen-
uinely new experience. It would compare almost to an adolescent type of
new experience. **Question:** Did anything that you read before going have
any relevance to what you in fact found there? **Dr. Kissinger:** I had no
preconceptions when I went except that I thought the Chinese might be like
the Russians, the only Communists I had met and dealt with before that
time. But I was totally wrong, wrong in many intangible ways. Russians
give you the impression that they can only dominate by power and that they
only talk the Marxist jargon and slogans, that they don't really mean them.
For example, if you drop a nickel, the Russians would kick you when you
stooped to pick it up and thereby lose a thousand dollars in good will to
take a nickel from you. The Chinese are much more elegant, much more
subtle; nothing is said by inadvertence, yet this is not contrived like the
Japanese would make it. For example, I was most struck by their
punctuality and their precision. The great art of the Chinese is that you
never feel the pressure of the precision scheduling. They move with
enormous subtlety and yet everything occurs exactly on time. I have the
impression that the Chinese act from the belief that they will prevail
through their moral superiority. They come from a culture where they
have no doubts about the rightness about their position or their cause.

**Question:** Do you think they feel inferior, shouldn't they from their background, their long years of subjugation and their industrial weakness? Dr.

**Kissinger:** They don't feel those doubts in any way.

**Question:** What impression do you have of Huang Hua, their new representative at the UN? **Dr. Kissinger:** He is very able and there is no question that he is Chou's man. **Question:** Did you find that many of them spoke English? Did Chou speak English with you? **Dr. Kissinger:** Chou can speak some English and he occasionally used an English sentence with me and he usually greeted me in English. I am confident he understands everything said in English. Returning to the earlier question, I want to point out that unlike the Russians, the Chinese are very elegant and just don't pull little stunts or attempt tricks. **Question:** You've said before that you had a feeling of a sense of history during the trip. Do you think the Chinese shared this sense of history? **Dr. Kissinger:** They went to enormous lengths to show how interested they are in the President's trip. But don't mistake me, they could make our trip very tough although it is inconceivable that they would try to embarrass President Nixon. The trip will definitely be a pleasant one.

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They will raise all of the tough issues and everything will be discussed. We could put on a show just for the press, we could pretend great friendship for public consumption, but we can't pretend that we can just solve twenty-five years of major differences in one trip. We could, however, agree on many minor things just to give an impression of great agreement; but really more important is the question: can two great nations of totally different backgrounds and philosophies work out parallel international approaches? Very much depends upon the long-term philosophical evolution of the relations between these powers.

**Question:** What do you think motivates the Chinese? What motivates the United States, is it just our election? **Dr. Kissinger:** We started our planning very early on, in fact I would say the very first weeks of February 1969. We started to signal them early. We wanted to give them propositions they didn't have to accept or reject. For example, we lifted certain trade restrictions which they could note but didn't have to act on or respond to. At the first we had tremendous difficulty finding an intermediary which both sides could trust. There were a number of false starts, but once we got started, conversations moved very rapidly. We did start communicating, actually communicating not just signalling, at a very early point. I was impressed that their communications were marked by being very graceful and polite, much more so than the usual diplomatic communications. In response to the question about Chinese motives, I would note, of course, there was the trauma of the cultural revolution which has now led to a conscious decision to open up to the rest of the world; and of course one has to realize that LBJ couldn't have responded because then it was in the middle of the cultural revolution. JFK could not have responded for reasons of domestic opposition. Perhaps Eisenhower might have done so but then it was just too early. Korea was too recent. I also think the Brezhnev doctrine and the Czech invasion also gave them an impetus to establish broader contacts in the world. At an early point we received through intelligence sources a copy of a Chinese report on international relations. I was flabbergasted by it. It was so perceptive for people I didn't think capable of having a view of the world like that before 1969. I was impressed with their assessment of our relative positions in the world and I realized from it that the U.S. policy trends would not bring us conflict with China. In fact we had parallel interests. **Question:** Let me ask again about Richard Nixon's motives. Going back as far as the fall of 1967 and before the campaign, I had the feeling that Nixon had in mind concept of pulling off some sort of international "judo trick" to straighten out the world and an attempt to turn China to his purposes with the Soviet Union. **Dr. Kissinger:** When I first met him, and you must remember that was **after** the election,

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he then had the idea of opening up to the People's Republic of China. I didn't get the impression that he had any sort of master gimmick in mind. He was thinking more of the long-run historical sense of bringing them into play. The President clearly had in mind that the Russians should not be the only representative of Communism with which we would deal. You must also see the Romanian visit as a way station on our trip to China. In fact, I recall during that trip Bob Haldeman said to me "I bet he is in China by 1972." I must say I didn't quite share that feeling at the time.

**Question:** In setting up the President's trip did you get any feeling who was the instigator or invitee, who was the dominant person in these negotiations? (Dr. Kissinger did not answer this question.) **Question:** Well, can we trust Chou? Isn't his life sort of a series of flip flops from hard line to soft line? **Dr. Kissinger:** Well, I wouldn't be surprised if Chou should ever turn on us. But if so it wouldn't be capricious, it would be for very strong reasons. He would not do so for trivial reasons. We must realize that the Chinese don't wish us well. They believe they represent a superior moral force. They don't accept peace as an abstract world objective. They are guided by a superior perception of history. The Chinese have never had the doubts about their legitimacy as the Russians had to have stemming from Lenin's lack of popular base in the Russian revolution. The Chinese just won't do tawdry little things. They won't bargain over little things. I would give you the example of our negotiations with them over the technical arrangements of the President's trip. Whereas most of the party wanted to come in with their optimum demands and count on bargaining downward on the numbers and details, I took the position that we should present our minimum demands, our minimum numbers and explain them fully as the best method of presenting the massive intrusion we were confronting them with on a Presidential trip. My experiences with the Chinese indicated that the best way to deal with them would be to present in extremely careful detail our minimum numbers for their study. Thereby treating them honorably and attaining our ends that way. (Dr. Kissinger refused to go into details of the technical arrangements for the trip, but he said he was satisfied we would get the best the Chinese could offer within their limitations. He noted parenthetically the Chinese were astonished by our requirements.)

**Question:** Do you feel you now have a grasp of all the major issues related to our relations with China? **Dr. Kissinger:** We are engaged with a formidable people who offer us a great opportunity if we do it well but they can also give us a tremendous menace if instead we convince them we are just a bunch of unprincipled clowns and if we can't control our own bureaucracy

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and other "domestic contradictions." **Question:** Is there any analogy in Marshall's mission to China? **Dr. Kissinger:** The Marshall mission worked out badly due to misconceptions of who the Chinese Communists were, what the Chinese Nationalists could do, and what the U.S. role in China was. History reveals the Chinese as formidable men, men who have been through the Long <u>War</u> and the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. I admit that our new China initiative has many inherent dangers. One, it could radicalize Japan. Two, we could legitimize the Chinese and that they will then try to run us out of Asia. He noted, however, we must realize that we have no <u>basic</u> conflicts with the Chinese. We have no trade wars, for example. If we mismanage this trip and give the Chinese the impression that we are only trying to turn the trip to our own domestic advantage, they will act upon their own ideology and present us with very serious ramifications. The Chinese were more ideological but less doctrinaire than the Russians.

**Question:** How well-informed did you find the Chinese about the United States? **Dr. Kissinger:** Spectacularly well informed on personalities at the top levels but they did not seem to know much about how Congress works — about the role of Congress, in the U.S. political system. They were very well-informed on the Administration and on President Nixon's words and his positions, but for example, they knew nothing about Fulbright or the role he plays in our foreign policy. **Question:** From such interviews as Reston's one is very impressed of Chou's grasp of the world issues, but what seems out of key is his obsession on Japanese militarism. Can you comment? **Dr. Kissinger:** His concerns are real enough. He realizes that Japan is getting to the point where it can get out of control. I think the Japanese can be viewed as a tribal society without a world view and one which has difficulty in relating to the rest of the world's realities. Therefore, they are capable of tremendous adaptations for survival, such as their adaptation to the American victory over them and the subsequent Japanese accommodation to the U.S., but I am reluctant to draw any conclusions about Japan's future role in Asia.

**Question:** Turning to a new subject, what did the Senate Foreign Aid vote mean to you? **Dr. Kissinger:** The action was utterly irresponsible. One might attack the aid program on a variety of reasons but to smash the whole thing two weeks before the authorization runs out is unimaginable. The action was a result of an unusual coalition of liberals and isolationists.

**Question:** Do you think the action was a calculated one? **Dr. Kissinger:** I don't think so. **Question:** How hard did the Administration really push for the reforms indicated in the Peterson report? **Dr. Kissinger:** I would say that the Peterson's proposals were not pushed strongly enough by the

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**Administration.** **Question:** Shouldn't the President now come out and say something to support the foreign aid bill? **Dr. Kissinger:** President Nixon shouldn't have to clash with the Senate over the issue of foreign aid. For example, the Mansfield Amendment and the Cooper/Church Amendment have been up four different times and their attaching them to the aid bill is just another form of harassment. Once it is voted down, it shouldn't have to be brought up again and again. Also at a time when the Administration is trying to put a lot of things into place in foreign policy, it amazes me the Senate would peevishly kick out all the props through its action on the foreign aid bill. **Question:** Let me ask a more fundamental question. Would you describe the foreign aid action as a crude reflection of the national mood? A mood which might affect the way you and the President pursue your policies? **Dr. Kissinger:** I frankly don't know what the public mood is, but any Administration would have to pursue a major foreign policy effort.

**Question:** Let's turn to the Russian trip. Do you see it in any way as a play-off to the China trip? What will be accomplished by the Moscow trip? **Dr. Kissinger:** When you look at the Sino-Soviet American triangulation, there is a great temptation to play off all parties and get negotiating leverage. We think this would be a grave mistake. First, the rivalry of the Chinese and the Soviet Union was not created by the United States. Any U.S. attempt to interfere would be self-defeating. Secondly, their major quarrel is one we can't really exploit. It is based (1) upon ideology, in which we are not competent to interfere and (2) on a border dispute which would be insane for us to get into. The only way we can manage the relationship with all parties is by substantial honesty with both China and the Soviet Union. **Question:** What do we really expect to gain in Moscow? **Dr. Kissinger:** The relationships are really quite different. In Peking we are starting on a evolutionary process and a small variance now can lead to a big divergence later on in the course of our bilateral relations and in China's role in the world. In Russia, where our relations are well-established, much more would be needed to bring about a fundamental change in our relations, but we do have a number of outstanding political and technical issues between us. SALT will be settled either in Moscow or probably before. There is the European Security Conference, there is the Middle East, there is a whole number of items on a different order than those we have with Peking. The China trip, you must realize is more concerned with fundamental directions. **Question:** Well how precise is the Peking agenda? **Dr. Kissinger:** It is not at all limited in scope, but it is fairly well defined now. But let me go back to the Russian question for a minute. With the Russians we don't have the range of choice at this later stage in our relationship that we do at this earlier stage with the Chinese. I am somewhat concerned by the fact that the Soviets would

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not be spending so much for weapons if they didn't think they couldn't someday be able to translate that military power into political advantage. As you know, they have not gone for the second-strike capability as we have. The Soviets are continuing to build up massively and we must act to turn this off in the next two years. Therefore, SALT is of critical importance. I am not sure how the Soviets view detente with the United States. Whether detente should come through defeating the United States or through negotiating for world peace. Our part therefore is to try in Moscow to get a long enough period of detente to let momentum and pressures build up for maintaining the peace. The big danger now is demoralizing our friends. This is the big danger that we haven't started yet to solve or even focus upon.

**Question:** Does the established thinking within the government support your efforts? Does the rest of the government concur with what you are doing? **Dr. Kissinger:** You have to recognize that large bureaucracies don't think in large, integrated philosophical terms. Therefore, we do not see any real opposition to our overall plans and of course they may support our various actions for reasons other than our own. For example, trade is seen as good in the abstract, communication is good, etc. Therefore, the President has to piece together a consensus on how to get support from the bureaucracy which is needed. In fact, such support is essential.

**Question:** Is China the result of a Nixon-Kissinger initiative or did it build up externally over time? **Dr. Kissinger:** The initiative was essentially the President's. It would be wrong to see a conflict developing between the President and the bureaucracy. First, you have to realize that there is always some natural tension due to the vested interests of any established large organization. I spend a large percentage of my time worrying about how to line up a bureaucratic consensus but this is inevitable in any organizational system.

**Question:** How does Chou stay so well informed? In his interviews he always comes across as extremely sophisticated. **Dr. Kissinger:** I just don't understand it. I don't know how he has the time especially when you realize that he is in charge of domestic policy, foreign policy and the affairs of the party too. In all aspects of their work, their technical preparation is just superb. You never have any foul ups like you have in Eastern Europe and they are terribly meticulous in everything they do. All of our party was tremendously impressed with the Chinese quick grasp of the new and often immense problems we threw at them. I was also very impressed with Chou personally. For example, during a long philosophical discussion of foreign aid he questionned a dollar figure from President Nixon's July 7 speech in Kansas City. I just can't comprehend how he keeps

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up with so much. **Question:** How about Mao? **Dr. Kissinger:** Mao is very much in evidence. I talked to Couve (de Murville) recently and he said that Mao is still very active and very alert. **Question:** How good is the Chinese intelligence? **Dr. Kissinger:** Very good in detail on top level matters, but almost non-existent below that. **Question:** What would be the impact of the Peking trip on the Soviet Union? Wasn't Nixon very Soviet-oriented at the beginning. I can't believe that Nixon isn't going to China to balance off the Soviets. **Dr. Kissinger:** I can't say what he may have thought before the election but in our very first meeting (which was after he was elected) he wanted to do something with China. **Question:** What are the realistic limits of an agreement from the Peking trip? What can be accomplished? **Dr. Kissinger:** You can be sure that I am not looking forward to the post-trip briefing on China. The Chinese will not do anything to make them lose their ideological purity, but I think there will be full and frank discussions on world events which however can't be expressed in any agreement or be revealed in any post-trip briefing. **Question:** Hasn't China lost something already? **Dr. Kissinger:** I really don't know. **Question:** What experts do you consult on China matters? Who do you check out your impressions on China with? **Dr. Kissinger:** Al Jenkins, the State Department official who went with me to Peking on the last trip, is very good. Also I see several professors such as Alan Whiting, Doak Barnett, etc. I check my impressions with them and discuss matters in general. However, I found the professors were much more concerned with tactics and the short-run matters such as the UN issue than I had ever expected.

**Question:** What do you think would have happened if Taiwan had been kept in the UN? **Dr. Kissinger:** I am sure Peking would not have come to the UN. **Question:** Did you raise the Taiwan question in Peking? **Dr. Kissinger:** It was discussed but it just wasn't that big an issue with them. It was obvious that the President's trip just wouldn't be affected by the UN issue -- it made no difference to them. I am absolutely convinced that getting into the UN was not that essential a concern for the Chinese. It is total balderdash to say that the second trip was timed to conflict with the UN. In fact it was the United States that set the actual date and the Chinese just accepted it. In fact that is why it would have been hard for us to change the date once we realized that the trip might conflict with the UN vote. **Question:** If President Nixon was peculiarly able to pull of the Peking trip because of his anti-communist credentials, won't these hardline credentials in fact handicap him when he gets to Peking? **Dr. Kissinger:** I have always thought that the Communists preferred to deal with conservatives than with liberals. The fact that President Nixon is an anti-communist will not bother the Chinese, but if they get the idea that the President is any kind of a trickster we will be in deep trouble. We must be very meticulous in our dealings with

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them. A great deal depends upon their assessment of our actions now for
the future impact on the course of our relations.

**Question:** At what point do they become pragmatic and stop believing in the saying of Chairman Mao? **Dr. Kissinger:** I don't really know, but the Chinese do have a great sense of humor. My knowledge of China is very new but I could speculate that there are great parallels between Mao and Confucius, that is translating moral rectitude into action. I met with John Stewart Service for a short time while we were in Peking last month and Mr. Service had told me about his travels to the rural areas where he saw a type of correction center. I was impressed with the fact that the people in the correction center seemed to be sincerely desirous of correcting their ways. Unlike the Russians who are always bragging about the perfection of themselves and their society, the Chinese are always pointing to the need for improvement both in themselves and their society. **Question:** Do they discuss the cultural revolution? **Dr. Kissinger:** It is obvious that was a very traumatic experience which started out from the right instincts and after some long, terrible troubles produced satisfactory results. But the while thing was obviously a very painful episode for the Chinese.

**Question:** How well did our own intelligence establishment serve you in preparation for the two trips? **Dr. Kissinger:** Not at all for the first trip since it was very closely held. In fact, Helms was told only about a week in advance -- and only then on the chance that some of his people might inadvertently discover something about the trip. Therefore, I had to get what ever information I could through devious means. Now we get some very good CIA analytical products on China. They do first-class work, very subtle and sophisticated. In fact I get better material from CIA than I do from my academic contacts. **Question:** Why such secrecy on the first trip? Why was it kept from our allies and our bureaucracy? **Dr. Kissinger:** Let me take up the allies first. We would have had to talk to both the Japanese and the Taiwanese. There was no way to talk to the Japanese on a confidential basis. They have a terrible problem with leaks. In fact they have a worse problem with their press than we do with our own. We just could not take this enormous risk. As for the bureaucracy, it was also the fear of leaks and also the likelihood of generating some opposition. But that was not a real problem. If we had exposed it here before and it had leaked, we would have wound up negotiating with the *New York Times* rather than with Peking. But equally important, we didn't know what would come out of the trip and we didn't want to create expectations which we weren't sure could be filled or not. **Question:** But what about Yahya Kahn. Didn't he know? Was there actually a pay-off to him as rumored concerning our policy toward Pakistan? **Dr. Kissinger:** The Paks were extremely helpful

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and indeed that did in a small way affect the pressure we could put on them at the time. But our basic Pakistan policy actually reflected our convictions. As for the military shipments, we didn't know about the bit shipments in June since we had thought the March decision cut off the movement of all supplies, but even that was only about three to five million dollars in spare parts, with no strategic significance involved. It is my very personal opinion that if India was really interested in working for the autonomy of East Bengal they could go about it much differently and there would be no real problem to obtain that. But what India really wants is the destruction of West Pakistan via the traumatic collapse of East Bengal. If the Indians really only wanted help with the refugees and an evolution towards an autonomous East Pakistan, the United States would find itself two-thirds on the way to a solution. But India has defined a political solution in such a way that can only lead to destruction of West Pakistan. One of my doubts is that perhaps it might be entirely possible that India is using the arms supply issue as a prelude to an attack on West Pakistan as it grows weaker militarily. Question: What you do think of the Soviet-India treaty? Dr. Kissinger: I am not too worried except that it may give India too much confidence in the longer run despite the Soviet efforts to restrain India in the short run. India's asking Yahya to negotiate with Mujib is virtually asking him to commit suicide.

**Question:** What about Vietnam. What can you tell us. Where are we going?
**Dr. Kissinger:** We are on our way out either through negotiations or through our present efforts in Vietnamization. After all the anguish it would be in the nation's interest to end the Vietnam affair quietly and with some dignity. I really don't see that the current Senate debates and amendment efforts will really make any change in timing worth all the dissention and anguish that they have created. The real difference between the Administration and our critics is that our strategy has been to keep a margin of ambiguity as a negotiating tool. Whether that will work or not we are not sure at this point.
**Question:** What is the incentive for North Vietnam to negotiate if we are indeed on our way out? **Dr. Kissinger:** There are some other complicating factors. North Vietnam may be too weak to prevent a significant South Vietnamese buildup. The Cambodian operation set them back for quite a long time. We had thought perhaps eight months at first, but it turned out to be a much longer time. The Laos incursion had similar results. Also, the Peking and Moscow summits may work to prevent Hanoi from starting any new offensive. If Hanoi thinks that they cannot beat South Vietnam and therefore face another five years of struggle, they want to negotiate. Also, they may realize President Nixon won't have the election pressures after he is re-elected in 1972. **Question:** How effective (realistic) is your two-

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part formula for withdrawal only upon a POW release and the ability of South Vietnam to defend itself? **Dr. Kissinger:** We are still holding to this formula. **Question:** What about the moral question of assisting a continuing Asian war after the U.S. goes home? **Dr. Kissinger:** I would have to raise another moral question of not giving arms to those who want to defend themselves against aggressors armed by $3 billion of aid from their own allies. Is it moral to cut off such aid to people who want to defend themselves? **Question:** Do you see any difficulty of pursuing a coherent foreign policy in the future in view of the declining public support and from bureaucratic intractability? **Dr. Kissinger:** Both are problems and also another problem is the type of men who will be the national leaders in the future. Nixon is a very atypical leader in that he is a loner, and not at all like the typical American politician who rises from political processes. My view is that the time of heroic leaders in all Western bureaucratic societies is perhaps drawing to a close. As a historian I am very pessimistic about our ability to continue. **Question:** What do you think about the dangers of neo-isolationism? **Dr. Kissinger:** The problem is how to remain involved in the world and yet keep up with needed changes within our own country. Our leadership seems to have run out of ideas, in fact such organizations as the Council on Foreign Relations are almost moribund today.

The remaining of the evening's conversation was taken up by broader general philosophical discussion of the domestic mood, the problems of a isolationist foreign policy and the potential foreign policy of possible Democratic candidates. Dr. Kissinger observed that any Democratic candidate would eventually have to come close to what we are doing in foreign policy and that if any candidate was elected on an isolationist foreign policy, the disasters inherent in such a policy would become readily obvious.