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# I. THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS REPORT

The Report that follows is the result of a group effort by Subpanel II of the Special Studies Project of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Although all the members of our Panel have not subscribed to all statements herein, the Report reflects our broad general agreement.

Our Panel has been concerned with International Security Objectives and Strategy and the problems and opportunities in this field which may face the United States during the next ten to fifteen years. Recognizing the imponderables in our task, it has still been possible to make our report fairly specific. We wish it could be more so, for most of the tough problems will always be specific as they become critical. But to have tried to make our conclusions sharper would have required going into detail uncomfortably beyond the extent to which we can trust the durability of our judgments since so much of the raw material for our consideration will be shaped by history which has yet to happen.

It is our judgment that all is not well with present U.S. security policies and operations. The overall U.S. strategic concept is lagging behind foreseeable developments in technology and in the world political situation. Defense organization in many major ways is only remotely related to obvious and critically important strategic mission areas. The U.S. military system of budgets and appropriations is painfully out of gear with the radically accelerating tempo of military developments.

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Our Panel, having acquired considerable knowledge through our individual experiences in security affairs, eschewed a strong temptation to try to use this Report to catalyze in the Congress and the Executive an thorough-going overhaul of policies and practices because, from our experiences, we realize how great the gap can be between what is desirable for tomorrow and what is feasible to change now.

Our report points to flaws where we believe they exist, where we judge them to be significant, and where we are convinced they can be corrected now. We hope that our suggestions will be found practicable and not merely interesting theories.

And may it be clear that our criticism deals with systems, not with individuals. We know how very much competence and dedication is found among the government officials and military officers concerned with the national security. Indeed, we are sure that even our most adverse comments will find support among many responsible officials of government who know what needs doing and are trying to accomplish it.

## Determinants of American Security

It will come as no surprise that the explorations of our Subpanel have not been held to strictly military matters. For military power is not developed, much less does it come into play, in isolation from the other major realities of the times. And we are living through a period of swift and far-reaching changes.

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Since 1914 we have witnessed two global wars of tremendous violence, one Russian revolution, two Chinese revolutions, the drastic decline of the French and British imperial systems. Hundreds of millions of human beings, formerly subjects of colonial empires, are now joining in new or would-be nations. They are thrusting impatiently towards political independence, often without adequate institutions or preparation, and they are demanding rapid economic development, often without capital resources or training.

We hope the United States, richest and most powerful of twentieth century nations, will be determined to preserve the integrity and vitality of its own free society. And we hope it has realized that its own general welfare is inseparable from free society elsewhere, and therefore is determined to help provide for a common world defense and to help promote a common world welfare. But these great objectives are challenged by another super state with different intentions.

The relentless ambitions of Soviet Communism are well known. It seeks to expand its own power. It works to prevent new nations from achieving genuine freedom and it plans to capture them if possible. It strives to degrade the influence of Western Europe. And it is determined to isolate the United States.

Moreover, the Russo-Chinese threat is subtle despite the brutal face it often presents. The end objectives of communism have from the start been made abundantly clear by its principal prophets, but its strategists and

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tacticians, in pursuing aggrandizement, are masters of ambiguity in the use of
their power.

In addition to these political challenges, science and technology are
in process of spectacular proliferation. They are carrying military technology
along in their flood and they are sweeping into the past the tradition of a fort-
ress America invulnerable behind her oceans. There are no oceans, neither of
water nor of air, to modern military delivery systems with the nuclear warheads.
The time is very close, if not already here, when the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
will be capable of destroying each other with great suddenness by large-scale
atomic attack. Similar, if lesser capabilities are likely in due course to be in
the hands of Britain and other countries.

The Problem of American Security

Such are the elements that go to make up the turbulent surroundings in
which the United States must build its structure of security for the years ahead,
deprived of much of the protection it historically enjoyed. Precisely because
U.S. physical security in the traditional sense is not likely ever to be regained,
it is supremely important that we find a way to protect ourselves from, and
gradually abate the forces opposed to, our system.

Beyond any question, our country can create and maintain all of the
elements of military power necessary to survive. And our Panel does not take
survival only as a negative aim, a protection from geographical or physical

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extinction. By survival, we mean the preservation and strengthening of our
system of moral values and convictions. But in neither sense need we fear
for our survival. The practical questions turn rather on our willingness to main-
tain the required forces, the accuracy of the concept by which they are designed,
and the wisdom and timeliness of their use when needed.

The equilibrium of the atomic age may be uneasy; we are in danger and
will continue to be. But so is our opponent, and he has reasons at least as
good as our own for making sure that the balance does not tip into all-out war.
We are threatened, of course. But more accurately we are confronted with a
challenge: can we construct a strategy capable of coping with the new world?

Towards a Rational Military Program

As the cost of weapons systems grows, as the lead-times from drawing
board to field operations lengthens, as the technological choices open to scien-
tists and military men multiply into the thousands, the question of how the
U.S. is to maintain the necessary military strength becomes increasingly
urgent. Our Panel is convinced that our total resources are adequate and that,
given leadership and an understanding of the facts, the American people will
sustain whatever level of military effort is necessary. The question therefore
centers not so much upon U.S. resources as upon the spirit and skill with
which we will organize and develop and apply our strengths.

Underlying all the technical complexities is a practical question: what
general level of military strength should the United States strive to achieve

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and maintain? A clear answer is especially difficult because military technology is advancing so swiftly; yet a practical decision must be found if the United States is to avoid irrational levels of military expenditure. In later chapters of this report, we shall attempt to answer the question in terms of dollar expenditures and composition of forces. 10 - 15 years

But here, considering the nature of our overall problem, one conclusion is inescapable: despite all the attention paid to security matters in the U.S. during recent years, we still stand in paramount need of a clear national recognition that force at certain times and for certain purposes, can make a positive contribution to the survival and growth of a nation. Only force in being can enable us to forbid an enemy the option of choosing all-out war, or limited war, for that matter. Only force in being will permit us to exercise the principal leadership which has been thrust upon us. Only the contemplation of our force in being, willing and able to deter him, will render an enemy unwilling to seek to further contract the areas of freedom in the world.

We are thus faced with two military problems which are closely inter-twined, yet contain fundamental differences. We must be able to prevent general war and we must be able to cope with limited war. This means the United States must have force capable of two differing tasks. We must have strategic forces capable of destroying a far off target system, in the Soviet Union or elsewhere. And at the same time, operating under this all-important

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strategic umbrella, we must have **tactical** forces able to contribute effectively to the defeat of the ever-shifting threat of limited aggressions against vulnerable areas of the non-Communist world.

Neither task, strategic or tactical, is cheap, although the cost can vary widely according to the skill with which we assess the continuing threat and design our means for reducing it. Neither task is simple. And both tasks require a stern and abiding resolve.

The first task, deterring general war, is in a way the easier because it is more straightforward. Our country was brought into being and expanded in influence by men of action and spirit who simply yet grandly assumed that what needs doing gets done, and then proceeded to do it. We have not flinched because a job was tough or dangerous.

But therein lies a major source of our troubles today. For Americans are unaccustomed to using military power with subtlety and discrimination for limited purposes in ambiguous situations. Indeed, we rather repulse the idea. Among our current problems which range from hydrogen bombs and crumbling empires to slavery in a third of the world and manifestations of revolution in another third, the most fundamental of our difficulties is how to cope with the unclear on a heroic scale. We must discover how we can adapt our essential national dynamism to a new challenge: to the most powerful and responsible nation in the world, survival must be a never-ending series of international counter-adjustments and counterbalances.

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Concern for our national survival and growth would be a selfish national policy if our country had no other major objectives. But thoughtful free men everywhere well know, as do Americans, that the future of their freedom depends on the survival of freedom here.

We are criticized, and sometimes justly, for the ways in which we do our duty, but the unforgivable dereliction would be to leave it undone. This is the truth that cannot be wished away, the fact that sets the magnitude of our concomitant risks and responsibilities.

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## II. DEVELOPING POWER TRENDS

The next 10-15 years are certain to see economic, technological, psychological and political changes that will significantly influence the military position of the United States and its allies. A number of these closely related trends are foreseeable and major trends in all these fields will be influenced by the explosive rate of technological change. Four areas appear to be of particular significance.

**One:** The U.S.S.R. and Communist China will continue to gain in overall economic, industrial and technological strength as compared to the U. S. The present economic superiority of the West will become less significant. The U.S.S.R. will catch up with the U. S. in many major fields of military technology. In certain areas assigned high priority by the Kremlin, the Soviets will be able to surpass us. Meantime, the Communist Bloc will continue to maintain large military forces deployed against the non-Communist world and will challenge that world with ambiguous uses of their power.

Some of the consequences of these developments will be discussed in later chapters on Alliances and NATO.

**Two:** The concept of "scarcity" in nuclear weapons will disappear from the calculations of the U. S., the U.S.S.R.,

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and to a lesser extent Britain. In spite of disarmament dis-
cussions, the U.S., the U.S.S.R. -- and Britain -- now
seem likely to continue to increase the number and variety
of their atomic weapons. On a more limited scale, other
countries will then begin to have their own atomic arms
capacity. And there will be increasing worldwide aware-
ness and apprehension of the power of nuclear weapon and
the consequences of any general war.

Chapters on Disarmament and on Civil Defense will consider some of the impli-
cations of these trends.

**<u>Three:</u>** It is reasonable to anticipate that in the years
ahead <u>technological development will leave the offense</u>
<u>in the more favorable position relative to the defense.</u>

Both will improve. But predicted new offensive weapons
-- such as the intercontinental ballistic missiles -- sudden
in action, massively destructive, relatively invulnerable
either before launching or in flight, will greatly aggravate
the problems of defense and greatly raise its costs.

It might be added in parenthesis here that the next 10-15 years is un-
likely to bring a technical breakthrough comparable with the last 10-15 years.
With nuclear weapons today yielding explosive power more than capable of

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destroying the largest possible targets and with ballistic missiles now able to
span half the world in an hour, even a doubling of destructive capacity or
speed would not be of great strategic significance or likely to end the present
strategic standoff.

But techniques to locate a submarine more accurately at usefully greater
distances, or to make possible communications with our arctic warning line
under all atmospheric conditions, or to improve the accuracy of a long range
missile, or to add twenty percent to the altitude and range of a strategic
bomber; these are the sort of important scientific weapons the U. S. can hope
for, if a better, more intimate understanding can be achieved between science
and strategy.

This area will be examined in the chapter on Weapons.

Four: Weapons technology will become increasingly complex
and will present the United States with a corresponding in-
crease in the difficulty of choosing the most effective combi-
nation of weapons. There will be continued increase in the
cost of developing, manufacturing and maintaining them.

Later chapters on Missions, the Budget and the Department of Defense will
take up this related set of problems.

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U.S.S.R. Military Capabilities

The U. S. has in the past suffered from a tendency to underestimate military technology in the U.S.S.R. At first we took their production of large numbers of copies of our B-29 as flattery of our concept and our technology. Their first jet fighters, also produced in large numbers were explained as having been made possible by their receipt of the design of a semi-obsolescent British engine. But then the Soviets proceeded in short order to prove not only that we had no monopoly on the atomic bomb but also that our gift of understanding the security implications of science and technology was not unique, especially as applied to air power.

Today Soviet science is at least the equal of our own in most military applications. Employing a system of effective priorities, Soviet skill in weapons engineering is adequate to achieve modern armaments. The total Soviet technological capability is growing larger, enabling the assignment of high priority to an ever-increasing number of projects. The U.S.S.R. has several times in recent years demonstrated a striking ability to surpass U.S. performance in the matter of telescoping lead times from the idea steps to weapons-in-being. Ten years ago the possibility of this advantage passing from the U. S. to the Soviet Union would have been ridiculed, yet it is happening, and the main reason is a simple one. The Kremlin's decisions on the new weapons to be produced are made with firmness and then the projects decided upon are adequately and consistently supported.

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In contrast, the U. S. system permits a large amount of vacillation, and introduces numerous controls from outside the responsible operating organizations. Our failing is of course mainly attributable to organizational weaknesses in the Defense Department and the defense budgets. In appropriate places later in this Report our Panel makes recommendations which can lead to real improvements in this very important area where our national strength is enormous, and needs only to be allowed to operate with force and decisiveness.

Preponderance in army forces permits the U.S.S.R. to handle any likely threat on the ground -- from Western Europe or China, from the satellites, or in maintaining political control inside the Soviet Union.

The Soviet ship building program has long concentrated on submarines. A fleet of over 400 is already in operation. This number is greatly in excess of the German submarine force which constituted a mortal threat to Allied surface shipping during the early years of World War II. There is no doubt about the capability of the U.S.S.R. to develop atomic power plants for ships, and the Kremlin must see large advantages in nuclear propulsion, especially for submarines. Nor is there any reason why their submarines should not be fitted to launch the short and medium-range missiles.

They now produce aircraft superior in some important respects to our own, and they have demonstrated rather impressive electronic techniques, for example in countering our radio broadcasts to the people behind the Iron Curtain. Their new rocket weapons are obviously far beyond the German technology captured in 1945, and apparently not behind our own.

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For at least 10 years the Soviet weapon development program has given
high priority to guided missiles. A ballistic missile capable of reaching all of
Western Europe, Japan and Taiwan from Russian or Chinese bases should be
ready within three years, at the most. Intercontinental ranges will not be much
longer in coming into being.

Soviet air defense is based on a good radar detection and tracking sys-
tem, supported by a large number of all-weather interceptor aircraft, and in-
creasing proportion of which is supersonic. Ground-to-air missiles are appar-
ently the major element of important local air defense areas.

The Kremlin places high priority on the development of long-range atom
striking power. The U.S.S.R. now possesses a considerable nuclear and
thermonuclear capability against the U. S. as well as against the more vulner-
able lands of our allies in Europe and Asia. Within a few years Soviet attacks
of great severity will be possible against all major targets in the non-Commu-
nist world. From what is known of Soviet capability now, it is inferior to that
of the U. S. -- at least for the present -- but is already enormous in compar-
ison with any level of destruction we have heretofore contemplated enduring.
And it is being urgently built larger.

It is essential that the U. S. continue for the foreseeable future to
maintain an air offensive capability decisively superior to any defense the
enemy could put up against it. This involves many factors, from number and

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ranges of planes or missiles to types of warheads and supporting base structures. But from all evidence now at hand, this is a feasible task although its cost can vary widely, depending on the wit and skill with which we go about it.

## U. S. Military Advantages and Vulnerabilities

Comparing the U. S. with the U.S.S.R., our country now has three principal military advantages.

We have a superior long-range bomber force and a more advantageously positioned forward base system.

We have superior and more flexible naval power.

We have more atomic weapons, and a greater variety of them.

However, some aspects of these advantages must be qualified, and parts of them may be all too temporary. The long-range bomber capability is not a static asset. It is always in competition with improving defenses -- for example, in the never ending chess game of electronic countermeasures. And long-range guided missiles are fast coming up, both as a rival to manned bombers and as a means for defense against them.

Some U. S. forward air bases are politically vulnerable because of the instability or undependability of the country in which they have been placed. All our forward air bases are physically vulnerable to surprise attack. The system as a whole is deficient in intermediate bases and dispersal

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facilities while the readiness of present bomber forces is considerably handi-capped by a number of personnel deficiencies, in large part due to fiscal economies.

Neither will the assumed advantage of our supericrity at sea be main-tained by wishing it so. To be sure, the aircraft carrier is relatively free of the political uncertainties affecting forward air bases in foreign territories, and it also enjoys a degree of mobility for escaping attack. More generally, it is clear that surface ships, combatant and transport alike, have important offensive roles in limited war for a long time to come. And, in defending the United States against missile-launching submarines, the carriers and other surface vessels can greatly assist our shore-based defensive air forces. Surface ships are also invaluable in extending the continental air warning system in the sea approaches, and carrier-based aircraft would be of consider-able assistance in repelling an actual attack.

But the aircraft carrier, around which our naval power is now largely built, is limited in its capability for sustained heavy action by the availability of refueling facilities, particularly for its aircraft complement. The value of its freedom from the political uncertainties of foreign bases is therefore a matter of degree, and not absolute. So also is the value of its mobility for escaping attack, a large surface ship being detectable by airborne equipment over great distances and highly susceptible to destruction by atomic weapons.

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The field is one in which it is infinitely preferable for history to find
that we tried too hard rather than for us to run the risk of underestimating the
magnitude of the vital task.

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### III. WEAPONS

The dependence of modern military power on science and technology is much too widely recognized to need explaining here. However, one aspect of the relationship is so crucial to U. S. security it deserves special mention. While it is not the custom of great nations to stake their survival in war solely on an assumed advantage in military technology, the converse is today even more compellingly true: that is, unless it possessed an overwhelming superiority in both strategic offense and defense; and this can be attained only through superior scientific application. Yet the continuing exploding revolution in military weapons makes very, very touch our job of achieving and maintaining superiority, even in a limited number of carefully selected most critically important endeavors.

It is impossible for us to hope, and it would be suicidal for us to attempt, to maintain superiority in all fields. Instead, adequate defense is a three way proposition:

1) properly planned and utilized scientific research and development of

2) precisely calculated and wisely selected weapons systems to be used for

3) the missions, defensive or offensive which our military strategists have determined will provide for our military security.

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This Chapter on Weapons and the following sections on Missions and on the Defense Organization consider this central problem of Tactics and Strategy.

## The Attainment of Weapons Superiority

Americans have come to recognize that our general technological superiority by no means guarantees military superiority in particular, critical places. Unfortunately, we have not yet admitted that the race can be painfully close even in specifically selected fields. More importantly, we have not yet fully recognized that if our selection itself is faulty in locating the vital points, we may be hopelessly outclassed. Yet such would seem to be the inescapable truth.

It is superficial now to demand that we have a Navy second to none, an Army that yields to no one in the ways we choose to fight, or an Air Force the Kremlin dares not challenge. That is bluster and not defense. We must designate the critical missions of defense far more precisely than can be done by measuring them in terms of land, sea and air forces.

Neither is it more than part of the crucial right answer to promote reduction of armaments, although disarmament alone can, in the end, bring reasonable security to the world at reasonable cost. Of course we must continue to advocate civilized controls over the weapons that could destroy civilization. However, the effectiveness of our advocacy will, as always, depend on the strength of the position from which we speak.

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Meanwhile we must to solve quite severe practical problems if we are
to maintain that position. These problems involve highly professional
analyses of the wars we may have to fight, and technically sophisticated
choices of weapon systems conforming to the requirements of those possible
wars. And however cool and canny we may prove to be, our job of achieving
and maintaining superiority, even in a limited number or carefully selected
endeavors, is going to be very difficult.

The Course of Technology

The discoveries of science and the developments of technology have
throughout history been converted by the military, in due course, into new
elements of military power. In peacetime, the conversion process including
the necessary readjustments in military philosophy, strategy and tactics, is
traditionally rather slow and often resisted by the military but it is accelerated
in wartime. This was particularly true in World War II. Scientific research
was translated so rapidly into weapons, military equipment and new patterns
of military operations that both tactics and strategy changed radically in
half a decade.

Trucks and tanks were developed which were able to swim as well as
to operate on land; rocket weapons and electronic fuses became commonplace;
new equipment and techniques of air support for surface forces were introduced.
These technical advances in land, sea and air transportation considerably
lessened the earlier difficulty of achieving necessary concentration of military

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force at great distances from the home base and across amphibious defenses.

Radar, which at the time of Pearl Harbor was a rudimentary and untrusted device for the detection of aircraft in flight, had become a primary component of all major weapons systems by 1945. Powerful new strategic air offensive capabilities came from aircraft, with strikingly improved flight performance and navigation and bombing systems. And uranium, in 1941 a scientific curiosity, by 1945 had made possible a weapon to stagger the imagination.

Towards the close of World War II, further developments in the propulsion of air vehicles opened yet another era of warfare, the atomic age of high-speed jet aircraft and very high performance guided missiles in which we now find ourselves.

And the curve of military technology continues to rise.

## Warheads and Delivery Systems

On the static and crowded battlefield of World War I, chemical warfare was employed with remarkable effectiveness. Chemical weapons were not used in any general way in World War II, partly because out of humanitarian considerations but more practically because the dispersal and rapid movement of military forces resulted in rather few remunerative targets for such area weapons. Not even the Axis dictators facing defeat could see a military advantage in their use potentially decisive enough to justify the risk of massive retaliation on their own civilian populations.

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Chemical warfare agents have been greatly refined in effectiveness since 1918. Biological agents have been added to the possibilities. And, more recently, radiological materials have become available. Even if they were not used on a broad scale, beyond any doubt some of them could cause great damage in war, for example in sabotage and morale weapons.

Nor can there be any doubt that in case of all-out war the inhibitions against their use would be vastly reduced. Whatever may have been the objectives of the elaborate fantasy of Communist charges of germ warfare in Korea, one result was to ease the psychological problem of future use of chemical or bacteriological weapons by the Communists, if they so choose.

In the field of atomic weapons, the crude U. S. bomb of 1945 has been outmoded by a broad range of highly sophisticated weapons. With the addition of hydrogen, energy releases have risen from the original 20,000 tons of TNT, explosive power, equivalent to many million tons. The original bomb, which required a large aircraft and crew for its transport and delivery, has been reduced in size and weight and simplified in use to the point where it can, for example, be employed effectively in anti-aircraft rockets.

As capacity for the production of fissionable materials increases and these explosives become available in very large quantities, it becomes possible to contemplate their overwhelmingly widespread use in war. Developments in atomic-weapons technology promise to lower the general hazard of radioactivity resulting from the use of the weapons to a level consistent with the military principle that the major purpose of weapons is

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victory in battle, not the indiscriminate destruction of the world's population,
including our own.

The technology of air weapons, air transport and communications has
gone far in reducing the traditional military difficulties of distance and
dispersion. If vigorously exploited, this technology can largely eliminate the
problem; the United States need no longer concede so general a military
advantage to Russia or China in communist aggressions around the perimeter
of the consolidated land mass of the Soviet Bloc.

Aircraft can be built to cruise at several times the speed of sound,
and to attack with discrimination from altitudes of a dozen miles and more.
They can carry air-launched missiles so the planes themselves need not pass
directly over heavily defended target areas. New high energy fuels can give
them all the range and performance they require; in due course nuclear
power can remove the problem of range entirely, and make it possible for both
offensive and defensive aircraft to be continuously and conveniently on
station in flight.

Earth satellites vehicles can meet a need for uninterrupted overall
reconnaissance. Offensive and defensive missiles of all pertinent ranges,
and aircraft that need no runways or large airdrome facilities, will enable
universal dispersal of weapons and greatly reduce the vulnerability of
military forces to surprise attack. Improvements in reliability and operability
of weapons and equipment will add greatly to their instantaneous readiness.

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Developments in submarines, especially as nuclear propulsion comes of age, will insure use of the sea where surface ships could not hope to survive -- an important capability despite all foreseeable developments in air vehicles.

Powerful light-weight weapons and properly designed air transport in adequate amount will make possible quick and discrete application of military power, in the air and on the surface, at any chosen place in the world.

None of these are dreams of the far distant future; even the most remote among them is attainable within the next 10-15 years by nations willing to work for it.

And the capabilities of the resulting weapons systems will be ever more disrespectful of organizational boundaries drawn between the mission responsibilities of armies, navies, and air forces -- if indeed any such respect remains in significant degree even now.

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## IV. MISSIONS

In addition to radically new types of weapons systems, one other major force, also disrespectful of organizational boundaries, operates to fix the valid military missions of the U. S. defense establishment: the types of wars communist aggression may present to us.

The second world war brought to an end the era in which it was meaningful to think of military operations at sea or on land as strategically distinct one from the other, or to think of either as separable from the air battle. Since then, as the range and destructiveness of weapons has inexorably increased, the familiar yardsticks of land and sea power have become progressively less useful for measuring the military problems of the United States. And thus far in the new era in which air power overrides but does not supplant the older power forms, the new definitions and slogans of war have been less than altogether helpful to general understanding of U. S. requirements for military forces.

The U. S. has come to talk of big and little wars, of total and limited war, of general and local war, of atomic and non-atomic war, of peripheral war, of brush-fire war, some are defined interchangeably and all vary widely depending on who uses them. Thus an annoying problem of definitions has added considerably to the difficulties of discussing security. This becomes important because the U. S. system arrives at decisions through debate, and in recent years there has been a rather fundamental lack of

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clarity on the subject of military security.

There are four categories of military conflicts with which the communists
may challenge us:

1) All-out War

2) Limited War

3) War of Alliance

4) Obscure War

## The All-Out War

It is of paramount importance in developing any reasonably concept of what sorts of wars may eventuate to recognize that strategic power is no less essential to the control of small wars than it is to the deterrence of all-out war. The strategic deterrent force by no means protects all of our security interests but it is vital to the preservation of our ability to protect them by other means. It is our insurance against the supreme blackmail.

Our strategic offensive-defensive force cannot be precisely measured. The calculations of strategy can never be mathematically exact; but our offensive capability must be terrible, and so assessed in the Kremlin. And we cannot forego, in advance, its use in any particular situation where it can present a realistic threat to our enemies or where it is needed to contribute to the securing of our interests by the prevention or control of war.

We maintain this frightful force to help discipline the events which might require its use; we believe that by all odds we should succeed in our purpose; in any event we see no worthy alternative. But we announce

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by its maintenance the possibility that we may be forced to use it in the
interest of our survival, in the war that may justly be called the ultimate war
of the civilization we enjoy.

And difficult as it may be for a democracy which abhors the thought
of massively destructive and fundamentally senseless war, our necessary
physical capability to fight must be coupled with a declared and recognized
willingness to do so if need be. The United States has an overriding
obligation to make sure that no enemy is left with the slightest uncertainty
on this point. He must be certain that swift and terrible retaliation would
follow if we became convinced that our survival was immediately and
directly at stake. This is the sine qua non of strategic deterrence, the
moral complement without which the existence of our great offensive power
would cease to prohibit, and could actually tempt, all-out attack on us.

A strategic deterrent force is completely successful only if it deters
and is never used. It is precisely because the United States does not wish
to see it used, yet wish it to be of maximum value not only in deterring major
war but also in controlling minor war, that our offensive-defensive capability
must be a terrible force in fact and in the Kremlin's view.

For the same reason, the U. S. could ill-afford to forego, in advance,
the use of its power in any particular situation where it could present a
realistic threat to communist aggression and therefore would contribute to
the securing of our interests without war.

If the strategic deterrent fails to the extent that the big war with the

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Soviet Union is upon us, then of course all effort must go to saving the United States, employing our defensive strength to the maximum of the utility, and striking as quickly and effectively as we can at Soviet offensive power.

If the need is less, then the application would be scaled down accordingly.

An all-out war might be a general war; or it might overleap all intermediate geography and nations, at least in its decisive phase, and be waged only on or over the territories of the U. S. and the USSR. The capabilities of U. S. and allied forces at sea and overseas, might play a large role - or one of less significance depending on the circumstances and the violence of the initial attack.

The all-out war would be the ultimate war, the war of survival. It is not the most likely war; in fact, we must be able to keep it very unlikely. But because it would be the war of final peril, it denies us any luxury of wishful thinking. It demands weapons and forces in being that can deter all-out war by being demonstrably able to wage one. The hard core of U. S. deterrent forces must be designed clearly for the task, secure against neutralization from any source, continuously alert, armed with weapons that cannot be destroyed by surprise attack and are decisively superior to any defenses the enemy can present.

This requirement cannot be satisfactorily met by adding together the various forces an Army and a Navy and an Air Force can contribute; the mission itself, the creation and maintenance of a sufficiently powerful deterrent strategic force in being, must determine the weapons systems and

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the weapons research and development. What Service develops or maintains
the weapons is a secondary decision.

This does not describe the present determination of missions in the
U. S. Department of Defense.

The Limited War

At the other end of the spectrum of possible wars is the limited war,
geographically limited by the decision of the principal protagonists or by
logistics and terrain, "brush-fire" perhaps in its intensity; distinguished
primarily by the decision of the major opponents that the particular battle is
not to become an immediate test of their own survival.

The force requirements of the limited war are in some important respects
quite different from the requirements for all-out war, although big-war forces
can always contribute to the conduct of limited military operations, and
big-war capabilities are essential to keeping small wars from developing into
larger ones.

(Thus the small war depends on big-war forces partly for their use but
as much or more for the restraint they exercise through their meaningful
non-use.)

By definition, the small war is reasonably distant from the power centers
of the USSR and the U. S. It requires flexibility and mobility of forces,
especially in the case of the U. S. By the same definition, the small war,
being limited in scale, affords sanctuaries outside the immediate battle area,

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for logistical and operational support bases capable of accepting efficient long-range air transport and surface shipping.

The limited war requires forces designed and available for quick, limited action in relatively minor conflicts in any part of the globe where U. S. interests are seriously at stake. The needed ground elements are best described in terms of the classical Marine Corps concept but brought up-to-date in weapons, equipment, and strategic and tactical air lift.

The combat air element is a more complex problem because of the tremendous effect technology has, or can have, in this field. Both land-based and carrier-based aircraft have an important and continuing role but much needs to be done to reduce the vulnerability of the operation by improving short or vertical take-off capabilities. Reconnaissance and communications equipment needs great improvement. Missiles for launching from the ground, from aircraft, and from surface ships and submarines are needed; and the entire present cacaphony among U. S. Army, Navy and Air Force concepts on the role of missiles requires deep re-study.

In the end, with skillful capitalization of technology, there can be no question of our ability to create and maintain the agile yet powerful forces needed to quench limited wars. And such a capability, together with a known determination to use it when necessary, is essential to our security. But again, the present structure of the U. S. Department of Defense, where the final strategy board is made up of the Service Chief of the Army, Navy

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and Air Force, is far from the most efficient organization to do the best planning
to insure the success of small war missions.

The War of Major Alliances

It is also possible to conceive of a war involving one of our major
alliances which would greatly exceed any definition of limited war but which
would stop short of the objective of total victory.

As in the case of all-out war, the war of alliances is not a likely one,
but it cannot be eliminated from our calculations. It supplies one reason for
the stationing of substantial U. S. forces overseas -- but it is not necessarily
among the major reasons which relate more directly to motivating the growth
of allied strength and extending the range of present U. S. weapons of
strategic airpower. Stated another way, the bulk of our overseas forces now
have more to do with the general maintenance of peace than with the waging
of war.

Because their main mission is deterrence of big wars, our principal
forces in Europe and the Far East can be considered only partly available
for dispatch to other (and minor) theaters. Neither are their organization,
training and equipment now adapted to "brush-fire" war, even if adequate air
transport were available, which it is not.

Because our principal overseas air and naval bases are exposed, the
role of overseas forces in all-out war, however important it might be in the
opening phase, would be severely limited thereafter to such employment as

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might prove useful in re-establishing order on the ground and mopping up after
a war that had been brought to an end by other means.

However, substantial alleviation of these deficiencies is possible and
would seem mandatory in any logical and determined effort to bring economy
and effectiveness to our total defense establishment.

The capabilities of our army, navy, and tactical air forces for small
wars can be markedly improved by proper refitting, organizing and training.
Most important is the development of a strategic and tactical air lift capacity
appropriate to our world-wide responsibilities.

Also, the capabilities of all overseas forces for participating in a
larger war, including all-out war, can be brought to a much higher level
with new aircraft and missiles realistically designed for survival in a major
air attack. This would reduce the need for large, vulnerable land bases and
aircraft carriers, and would afford much increased flexibility in defensive and
offensive operations.

## The Obscure War

Finally, there is the war that is made to be no war at all. It appears
frequently in the guise of an internal revolution, largely political in nature.
Such wars go on continuously and break into the open when the local situation
demands or permits. Greece has furnished an example of one sort of the
obscure war, Viet Nam was another, the Middle East has provided more than
one, each quite different.

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In general, U. S. military involvement properly takes the form of support to local elements whose interests accord with our own. Much of our Mutual Defense Assistance programs are thus aimed at stabilizing local situations so that these obscure wars -- ostensibly revolutions -- are more difficult for the communists to foment or to win. Much of our support to the United Nations as an element of force for keeping the peace derives from our belief that an informed and favorable world opinion can raise the morale and strength of conviction of harassed indigenous political elements which prefer independence to foreign domination.

The military requirements imposed on the United States by conflicts in this area are of a different order from those of open warfare envisioning joint action of U. S. and local forces. The weapons needed are those suited to the maintenance of order; the object is not the defeat of the military might of Communist China or the Soviet Union.

Again, the demands of this obscure war mission do not sensibly center in decisions by Army, Navy and Air Force Service Chiefs.

## Major Weapons in Minor Wars

This foregoing analysis has deliberately not distinguished between atomic and non-atomic war as two different kinds of war. From now on any war fought by nations with atomic weapons can be considered as an atomic war because the use of atomic weapons will always be a possibility; in any war necessity will demand the use of whatever weapons will best achieve

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the national aims. And a government planning an aggression would greatly be in a much stronger position if it could be sure atomic weapons would not be used against its aggression. And what aggressor, even if he is successful without atomic weapons, would not be pleased to be protected from them in his success?

Put in terms of U. S. security policy, when the use of atomic weapons, potential or actual, seems the best way to deter or to control war, then such use must be in our war plans.

The communists seek to persuade the rest of the world that any use of atomic weapons by or to help an intended victim would be the equivalent of declaration for widespread and all-out use. The exact opposite is more nearly the truth.

It is not difficult to visualize a limited war which would require us to be willing to choose to use atomic weapons. The only way to avert limited war is to keep the risk level sufficiently high so an aggressor is convinced he cannot gain from such a conflict. Therefore in deciding upon the military means most likely to stifle a small war -- the means that an aggressor respects and which raise the risk factor in his risk-gain equation -- it behooves us to make clear that we will use whatever weapons and level of force that seems most efficient for the purpose. For example, the President of the United States made this point explicit to the Chinese Communists when they appeared willing to precipitate a small war in the Formosa Straits, perhaps the Chinese had had other reasons for holding back in that particular

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area, but Peiping's spirit of adventure was dampened by the ominous possibilities indicated by the President's statement.

In any case, until there can be a really impressive and reliable reduction in communist armaments, it is simply not practical for the U. S. to contemplate the maintenance of a military establishment that would be at all times capable without the use of atomic weapons, of fighting either large or small wars. The force requirements would be enormously increased, the cost would be staggering, and we would still face the prospect of weapons of mass destruction in enemy lands.

A limited capability for limited war, not directly involving the use of atomic weapons, will always exist as a bonus from the maintenance of atomic forces, but the essential value of the deterrent will rest in the atomic capability.

## Organization and Security Concept

The examination of each type of possible war which can challenge U. S. military security in the next 10 - 15 years leads back again to a familiar point. Neither the weapon systems available to us, nor the wars we might have to fight, nor, much less, the military mission responsibilities these two sets of considerations impose upon us, are confined by organizational boundaries now existing between the Army, Navy and Air Force.

All important possible wars closely involve all three services. All important new weapons profoundly affect all three.

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For the worthiest of reasons, each service finds in each significant
new technology not merely a chance for self-aggrandizement but a duty to
identify itself and its role in the national security with the sweep of scientific
progress. The object in each case is to have the best possible army, navy,
or air force. Furthermore, it is inherent in the philosophy and training
of each service that it should see in the enemy threat predominantly those
elements which its particular professional role seems best adapted to counter.

The U. S. army, navy, and air force respectively considers that
the Soviet threat requires a very powerful U. S. army, navy, or air force --
within a balanced framework of forces, to be sure.

But each organization naturally judges the proper balance to be the one
that maximizes its own organizational role and permits it to develop the new
weapons that will most effectively exploit that role.

As a consequence, the joint efforts of the three services toward the
development of overall security concepts, and of strategic plans for the
maximum military contribution to the overall national security, are con-
sistently governed less by the competition of ideas than by organizational
competition for dominant roles.

This situation should be sharply reversed. The broad military
missions -- of offense and defense, for small and large wars -- should
clearly predominate over and discipline the roles of the individual services
therein.

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## V. DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

Because of the tremendous significance of the affairs which center in or flow through the U. S. Department of Defense, all studies of the national security must concern themselves in some way with the organization and methods of the Pentagon. And the judgments upon it are often severe, for the conduct of the business of defense is obviously inefficient.

It is therefore appropriate to emphasize that many of the widely publicized deficiencies of the Department of Defense are beyond its ability to correct alone. Some of the most important tools for improvement are in the hands of other departments and agencies of the Executive like the Bureau of the Budget. Still other Executive Departments, such as State, have compelling voices in shaping military policy. Under the Constitution, the powers of the Congress take sharp and personal form in the powerful committees of both houses. The Comptroller General, the Civil Service Commission, the Treasury, and many other agencies of government have strong influence. So do party politics, major news media, and public opinion generally.

All of this is inherent in our democratic system, and the checks and balances, when not abused, are proper parts of the system. But such abuses do occur, and the Department of Defense is entitled to note that not all of the sins attributed to it are solely its own.

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## Defense Department Deficiencies

The deficiencies in defense organization are so numerous and so easily discerned that it is virtually impossible for any commentary on the subject to fail to suggest a number of specific corrections which, while they may not be complete solutions, at least could not be entirely wrong. This Report is no exception to custom; such a commentary has been prepared and is attached as an appendix. Its location is not to be taken to indicate that the specifics in it are less important than numerous others covered more fully in the body of the Report. They are indeed very important. For example, the excessive organization layering of the Department of Defense not only stultifies positive decisions but also spreads the available talented people mortally thin.

But the material is placed in an appendix because specific organizations suggestions lead directly into a wide variety of detailed improvements on which the arguments fall outside the main stream of the Report as a whole, which is directed toward the basic concepts and stragegies of security.

However, two points of defense organization do emerge as so critical as to merit consideration in any serious discussion of concept and strategy.

### THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS NOT ORGANIZED TO FIGHT A WAR

In the event of sudden, large-scale hostilities, it could serve only by abdicating from its principal controls. It is organized along industrial

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lines, to manage a vast business enterprise. Its controls are mainly fiscal in nature, and greatly detailed. It suffers acutely from a weakness of all large organizations: to elevate to a major objective the avoidance of risk.

Of course the nation's largest business must be conducted in a business-like manner, but the clutter of its present administrative procedures all too frequently produces very unbusiness-like results. In any case, the purpose of a Defense Department, is to deter wars but to be ready to fight them if necessary. And it is not difficult to conceive of an organizational structure and philosophy aimed more directly at military readiness than what the U. S. now has.

So it is relevant to question whether the present Department of Defense is fundamentally the sort of top military command structure the country needs. It is democratic, it follows the traditions in which we have gained pre-eminence among nations. It is diligently administered by devoted citizens who accept frustration as the price of public service. But the question remains: is it what we need in this period when peace is separated from possible devastation by one enemy decision and a few minutes of time, a period in which great risks may be involved over many years solely to deter such a decision.

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THE ORGANIZED CAPABILITIES OF THE ARMED SERVICES
ARE CRUCIALLY OUT OF ACCORD WITH BOTH THE
WEAPONS AND THE THREATS OF TODAY.

In the preceding sections on Weapons and on Missions, it has been
noted that the power and range of modern weapons easily overleap the
traditional preserves of the army, navy, and air force and that each service
is bent on assisting the process along. Either the air force or the navy is
now capable in one blow of obliterating beach defenses which only a dozen
years ago occupied large, well-equipped field armies for months of pre-
paration and extended periods of hard fighting. Either the navy or the army
can now accomplish a large part of the once unique mission of land-based
tactical air forces. In turn, the capabilities of tactical air, both land and
sea based, now reach deep into the territory of strategic air. With modern
weapons and air support, the Marine Corps has the capabilities of a very
powerful army.

This is not all bad, for flexibility of force is an important asset;
but the growth has been haphazard, to say the least.

The weapons that cause all of this power to exist are developed, as
science makes them possible, on the initiative of the strongly motivated
individual services. The standard justification for their cost is that a new
capability in question advantages the service in question, as indeed it
usually does. The more spectacular the new weapon, the stronger is the
motivation for its attainment and the less the regard for its particular place

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in an accurately pre-designed and agreed-upon overall scheme of weapons.

The restraints of the Department of Defense, the enforcement of which supply its main motivation, tend generally to be overwhelmed by the powerful drives of the services, which enjoy the great strength of having positive missions in life, not just disciplinary functions.

On occasion, the Department of Defense sees fit to stop a major weapon program because it constitutes outrageous poaching by one service in the preserve of another. Such action usually leaves the sincere proponents of the lost cause convinced that the decision and its waste resulted from political and budgetary pressures: if the losing service was working outside of its operational role, why had the decision been so long and expensively delayed; if the judgment was technical, where was the new proof, short of final testing?

More generally, the controls of the Department of Defense have seemed to the proponents of all causes in all services to be applied rather indiscreetly across the board to all projects, thereby accomplishing mainly only a slow-down among the worthy and unworthy alike, the resort of authority which is convinced that total expenditures must be reduced but which is unable to say where. And meanwhile even the person most determined to hold total expenditures in check must admit that particular mission areas are under-financed.

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## Organizational Motivation

So the Department of Defense is accused -- and not entirely without justice -- both of too little discipline and of too much, both of excessive economy and of waste. It is the contention of this Report that real cures are not likely to be found through the application simply of more and stronger business and financial management. In fact, in two most important respects, these have an effect opposite from that intended. First, the tighter the controls of top defense management -- which cannot know the details of its vast enterprise, the less is the ability and inclination of responsible and knowledgeable operating officials down the line to exercise good management when that need is discounted or invisible on high. Second, the tighter the budget prospects, the stronger is the competition among services for identification with the weapons most likely to attract the larger appropriations. This goes along with slighter attention to ostensible service boundaries, and slighter attention also to the less spectacular missions but still important missions of minor war.

## An Organizational Answer

One real organizational answer, while it cannot quickly be put into full force, is obvious and inevitable.

Foremost among all requirements for defense reorganization is to provide a positive strategic mission to the top command echelon of our defense establishment, now represented by the organizations of the Secretary

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of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The missions there now are management discipline and adjudication of disputes. There are negative prospects for the future in contrast to the thrusting, separate drives of the services, each anxious to maximize its own contribution to the country's security, and its own role therein. The objective should be to replace this with a system of influence and control that, so to speak, brings in the coach's function of building the effective power of the whole team rather than the present referee's power to bench the unruly members.

There will be many components in any program toward this goal, but two deserve attention here. One is in the realm of strategy, the other has to do with technology.

## Concept and Strategy

Security concept must emanate from the top of the organization. However much conceptual inspiration may derive from the services, it cannot be a patchwork compromise of their organizing and individual concepts. This applies equally strongly to the broad strategies evolved to fulfill concept, to the military missions which give body to the strategies, and to the assignment of roles therein to the several services.

In all of this, it is most important that the professional competence of our officer corps be used to the maximum, while guaranteeing reasonable personal security to the officer who, in following his conscience, may depart from the current "party line" of his service.

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Since 1945 there have been many urgent recommendations to promote this end. A single chief of staff and staff for the armed forces. A single uniform for all, a military staff or/and a board of senior strategic advisors for the Secretary of Defense. Divorce of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from their separate service responsibilities. Replacement of the present Joint Chiefs by a new set representing not the three services but major mission areas involving combined forces of strategic offense-defense, "tactical" forces for lesser wars, and the maintenance of overseas lines of communications.

Among other suggestions, perhaps the most provocative that might also be practical is to add to the present Joint Chiefs two or three senior mission area commanders, for example, Chiefs of Strategic offensive-defensive and tactical forces.

At least such a move would accomplish the inclusion in top councils, on a par with the chiefs of services, of senior officers directly responsible for the operation of elements of all services. The advantages in coordinating current operations might be slight, but powerful voices representing missions rather than services would be introduced at the level where new strategy is devised, where new weapon developments are decided upon, and where the future contributions of individual services are, or can be, powerfully conditioned.

In any case, whatever may be done to improve the methods for utilizing our best military minds in the shaping of defense affairs, it is no less necessary that the organizational philosophy provide for the closest

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possible relationship between strategy and the business management of defense Successive Secretaries of Defense have run a gamut of opinion regarding that relationship, ranging from apparent belief that one of the two must consistently control to the idea that the two are generally separable. Of course they are of one fabric. Military administrative policy -- domestic as well as foreign -- is part of our strategy, and our strategy has the deepest influence on the entire life of the nation. The organization of the Department of Defense must provide for the balanced contribution of both strategy and business management. And the goal of the entire organization, Secretaries and Chiefs, civilian and military, must be forward: It cannot flourish on discipline as its primary purpose in life.

## A Purpose Through Technology

If the high command of the Department of Defense is to play a dominant and progressive part in the development of security concepts and strategy it must first predominate in the policies meaningfully and beneficently affecting military technology. And it must do so at the crucial early formative stages of developments, not just after ships are on the ways or missiles successfully in flight, and not after enormous expenditures of time and money have gone to waste because of tardiness in straightening out formal service prerogatives.

Fortunately, the necessary position of prestige in this area is not too difficult to attain, provided a straight-forward decision to do so is taken and ample evidence is given that this decision is deeply based in the

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philosophy that significant military technology is to be stimulated, not merely
governed.

At the top level of the Department, an ability second to none is
required to keep technology and strategy under penetrating review and to assure
to the absolute best of our intelligence and perception, that three urgent
demands of U. S. military security be met.

<u>one</u>: we must overlook no good bets in science and
technology for important new military capabilities, for
the guidance of present strategies, and for making possible
advantageous new strategies.

<u>two</u>: we must select and emphasize new developments
that contribute most to meeting our most paramount
military needs, in accordance with the military missions
we must be able to perform.

<u>three</u>: we must conduct desired competitive weapon
developments as competitions in technology only,
and we must cease to use them as determinants, in
default of strategic decision, for the assignment of
operational roles among the services.

When such intentions are made clear, the necessary numbers of
qualified people can be forthcoming to assist in the difficult and highly
sophisticated technical choices and to exercise competent technical super-

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vision over their subsequent development.

One rich source of such people will be the services themselves.

Their voluntary respect will grow for the technical authority of the high command in science and technology. And their need will diminish for layering their technical officers and civilians throughout all echelons of command. The bulk of these officers are mainly engaged in defending their weapons developments as a means of affirming the operational responsibilities of their service.

The recent increased support of the Weapons Systems Evaluation
Group of the Department of Defense, and the end of a needless organizational
dichotomy between responsibilities called "Development" and "Engineering"
at the Assistant Secretarial level, are good, though modest steps in the
direction urged here.

The full right answer goes much farther than is apparently yet con-
templated in the Pentagon.

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VI. ALLIANCES AND THE ROLE OF FORCE

The system of alliances which the United States has erected involves the disbursements of billions of dollars, the distribution of immense stores of American military equipment, and the dispersal of American soldiers to stations and bases all around the globe. The U. S. has now entered into military agreements with sovereign states involving a wide range of different types of commitments and partners from the sweeping multilateral defense agreements of the InterAmerican Treaty of Reciprocal Association through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the South East Asian Treaty Organization, the Anzac Pact and the Baghdad Pact down to all the kinds of bilateral agreements we have made with single nations.

As integral a part of the U. S. alliance system as these treaties and mutual security pacts are the attendant agreements authorizing our overseas base complex and providing for military assistance to our allies. The U. S. maintains abroad a variety of bases ranging from the immense deterrent bases of the U. S. Strategic Air Command to various tactical installations like naval bases, logistical facilities, and staging areas for ground forces and tactical air forces. And during the past eleven years, the U. S. has expended over $40,000,000,000 to strengthen and maintain the military forces of our allies.

Earlier in this Report, and in the allied reports of the Panels on

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International Political Objectives and International Economic Objectives, the U. S. has been represented as carrying a triple responsibility: to defend itself and its vital interests, to prevent further communist expansion and aggression, and to help erect a canopy of international security under which systems and moral values compatible with our own may flourish. If the U. S. were forced to carry this responsibility alone, it would impose an almost intolerable burden on our system. It is the purpose of the U. S. system of alliances and military aid and overseas bases to enhance the will and ability to resist of its allies throughout the non-communist world while simultaneously reinforcing U. S. military security against enemy attack.

Rationale of Alliance

Earlier chapters of this Report, have repeatedly emphasized the double challenge to U. S. military security posed by technological change: the strategic standoff and the augmented threat of local or limited war implicit in this nuclear stalemate.

Strategically, the U. S. alliance commitments and expenditures are invaluable to us in maintaining that favorable balance of power versus the Communist Bloc which is the best deterrent to a general war. The U. S. system of overseas bases provides advanced observation and warning posts, provides valuable dispersal areas for the SAC, brings U. S. striking forces that much nearer to military targets, and permits employment of medium-range bombers as well as easier refueling of long-range bombers based in the U. S.

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The wide dispersal of SAC units permitted by this base complex imposes a severe defense problem on Russia and China. Such bases will be an essential element of our effective striking power for at least the next decade and will continue to be of significant importance even with the advent of the intercontinental missile, and while tactical and logistical bases in the forward areas are vulnerable to surprise attack and would probably be quickly destroyed in a general war, they are valuable as an offensive threat which requires the enemy to disperse his defense forces more widely.

Another contribution of the overseas base complex is the invaluable means it provides for maintaining effective footholds in important strategic areas without incurring political liability. Air and naval bases in particular permit other peoples to visualize our power; the physical presence of a limited U. S. complement serves to reinforce our common purpose with the host country without the aggravation of a large force.

Just as overseas bases permit us to move the first line of defense -- or attack if need be -- farther out from the United States, so another aspect of alliance arrangements, the military assistance program, provides for the strengthening of allies so they may be able to bear more of the burden of mutual defense. With military aid programs, our allies are bringing into being more than 200 army divisions, naval strength of over 2,000 vessels, air forces of about 300 squadrons.

Aside from these strategic considerations, if -- as we have hypothesized in this Report -- the nuclear stalemate is likely to result in more limited

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or local wars, then alliances take on added dimension as an instrument of military security. For in a limited war -- which by definition involves internal sanctuaries from which to support limited military operation -- overseas bases would be of great tactical importance. Given the swiftness with which a local attack could be launched against, for example, southern Vietnam, an effective response might wholly depend on availability of ready forces, say in the Philippines. Consider the usefulness of the presence on the spot of complements of U. S. forces and pre-stocked staging bases, the complimentary strength of the ready military forces of our allies -- planned and provided for by our treaties, trained and equipped by our military aid programs. Such factors not only can determine victory or defeat in limited war, they can deter such wars.

Besides their value to the United States alliances can be of equally significant help to our allies. Alliance arrangements can provide local forces to deter or check limited aggression. They can warn potential aggressors of our willingness to defend specific areas. They can make clear our political solidarity with friends and neighbors. They can strengthen local will to resist because they guarantee a threatened country would not stand alone. And above and beyond these military considerations, a sound and strategic system of alliances can provide a protective canopy for the continuation and extension of the democratic ideas and values we share with our allies.

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Pressures on Our Alliance System

But the above exploration of alliance values does not imply that all
is well with the present system of U. S. alliances. As will be demonstrated by
the rest of this chapter and the following chapter on NATO, U. S. alliance
arrangements are lagging dangerously behind changed strategic needs in the
nuclear age.

Three sets of forces weaken U. S. alliances: the rising threat of
nuclear weapons, the rising cost of all weapons, and the rising ambiguity
in the communist tactic of aggression.

An evaluation of U. S. alliances must recognize the growing attractive-
ness of the doctrine of neutrality to many of our allies. Acutely aware of
their military vulnerability, weakened by domestic pressures and precarious
economies, they are becoming increasingly reluctant to support the use of
force. In Europe and in Asia, the Communist bloc is steadily improving its
military capabilities, including nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
Against the threat of such nuclear attack, our allies -- with the exception
of Great Britain -- have no defense except that provided by our treaty
obligations. The capability of their forces to deter or to check local aggressions
is decreasing at the very time when the importance of such local deterrents
is becoming so important.

Any alliance embracing a large number of nations over a considerable
territory tends to dilute the effective capacity of its strong members,
especially in the face of a challenge that does not present a clear and present

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danger to the entire alliance. The growing awareness among people and leaders of the non-communist world of the damages and casualties certain to result from even the smallest tactical atomic weapons has weakened the will to resist among many of our allies, in and out of NATO, who see war, _any war_, as their greatest possible danger.

There is a correlative force which also makes our allies reluctant to develop the necessary capabilities to render aggression unattractive to the Communist Bloc. The growing cost and complexity of modern weapons systems needed for effective defense imposes exorbitantly heavy burdens on the frail economies of many of our allies as well as requiring manpower skills and industrial facilities our allies often do not have.

Take for instance the predicament this poses even for a willing and staunchly anti-communist nation like the Republic of Korea where an army of 600,000 men has been raised, supported by modest air and naval units.

A significant reduction in these forces appears politically impossible and militarily undesirable, but the ROK economy cannot support such armed forces which require about some $400,000,000 a year merely to feed and pay the troops and to maintain their fifteen-year-old equipment in usable condition.

Urgently needed modernization programs would lead to still higher maintenance costs, yet without some modernization program within the next few years, the combat effectiveness of the ROK forces will inevitably deteriorate. And the limits of ROK capability to operate and maintain modern weapons systems presents another difficulty.

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Aggression, Twentieth Century Style

Aggravating the other pressures on our alliance arrangements is the outmoded concept of aggression which underlies them. This definition, essentially restricted to the crossing of frontiers by armed regular troops, renders it next to impossible to prepare adequate counters against a whole range of communist aggressive techniques of subversion, from civil war or economic strangulation to slow takeovers of power by communist-guided and communist-armed fifth columns.

As a result the communist bloc has learned that under the sanction of the strategic standoff, if it keeps its challenges sufficiently ambiguous and well below the level which the free world considers warrants all-out war, we and our allies are unlikely to take major action. Neither Korea, nor Indochina, nor Suez seemed worth an all-out war nor did our alliances seem to fit the issues actually in dispute: in the Far East, our European allies did not consider the issues important enough to run the risk of a major war on our behalf; in the Middle East, we did consider the issues to justify us risking major war on behalf of the British and French. Confronted by an ambiguous threat, even a group of nations whose interests are very similar will find it exceedingly difficult to achieve an effective concerted response, particularly if this response could lead to mass suicide.

Nor can the United Nations provide the deterrent to the new style aggression. Certainly in the UN lies the world's best hope of eventually controlling the aggressive ambitions of national powers. But we cannot

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afford to depend on the UN and the UN cannot afford to have us depend on it
for actions which it does not have the power to take nor to enforce. The
United Nations is already playing an invaluable role; but whatever its
political economic and social contributions -- and they are immense -- as it
is now constituted or as it is likely to be reconstituted, the United Nations
cannot function as the world's police force.

The UN can and should remain a world forum, an indispensable neutral
ground for the expression of opinion and for the exchange of views between
parties in dispute. And the United Nations, like the League of Nations before
it, may be effective against minor aggressive powers. But, there is little
evidence so far that it can deal with the major security threat to free world
countries: an aggression, large or small, nuclear or subversive, backed
by the U.S.S.R. or China.

Moreover, the Communist veto in the Security Council, and the ability
of one-third-plus-one of the members to defeat any action proposed by a
preponderant majority of the General Assembly, indicates that we may expect
severe limitations upon UN support for any counter-action to aggression that
the U.S. might be forced to take. True, the Middle Eastern crisis gave rise
to a UN Emergency Force, but under the ground-rules the UN forces could
remain on a given piece of territory only at the pleasure of the sovereign
thereof -- who, in every foreseeable case, would be a party to the dispute.

The U. S. under its obligations to the U. N. Charter has a moral
responsibility to place questions involving aggression before the U. N.

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However, if the world organization should fail to take action or act in time, for its own safety, the United States must then feel free to take the countermeasures required by its own interests. And unfortunately, the U. S. can not be certain that every action it may be forced to take to preserve the values of its own system and the UN Charter will be an action which will command the necessary unanimity in the General Assembly, let alone be an action which will escape the veto of the U.S.S.R. in the Security Council.

Recommendations on the Military Aspect of Alliance

This does not imply the U. S. should take such steps alone. In countering any type of aggression, the United States should strive to act in concert with already-functioning allies for already-agreed upon common purposes. But today, the new necessities of military strategy, as expressed in our alliance arrangements, are neither well defined nor widely accepted.

Therefore, our Panel would focus its suggestions and recommendations in one general area:

We are convinced that the United States must make a concerted effort with its allies to achieve a clear and effective combined strategy.

Such efforts should aim at the development and acceptance of integrated strategic concepts designed to cope with various types of threats ranging from strategic nuclear attack to armed insurrection by Communist-dominated elements.

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With the exception of the NATO alliance, our present mutual security arrangements do not reflect a common strategic concept. The U. S. has never chosen among three alternative positions on its alliance arrangements whether one, are they obligations of military assistance, declared U. S. intentions to go to war if an ally is attacked; or are they collective security arrangements, to strengthening allies so that the overall power of the alliance will deter the Communists from aggressive moves; or are they pacts whose existence legitimizes our intervention when necessary on the territories of our allies. And with the U. S. tending to regard any war as a nuclear war, it is not surprising that most of our allies want to limit their alliance commitments to us.

The lack of U. S. clear and precise strategic doctrine is reflected in weaknesses, indecisions and contradictions at every level of our security arrangements. It has led to endless difficulties in formulating and implementing U.S. base agreements and military aid programs. There have been disagreements among the Services and there has been understandable military reluctance to make specific force commitments when there was no definition of the function those forces would perform.

At the same time, the U. S. has found it difficult to obtain the agreement of its allies as to the objectives which they mutually support and the role of their respective armed forces in the attainment of such objectives. For example, the majority of our allies have neither political nor military commitments to provide forces for use outside their own territories in the event

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of attack upon the U.S., nor for use in any aggression involving treaty partners
but not themselves.

On the military side, at present the forces of our allies are organized,
equipped and trained primarily for non-atomic war. To some extent this is
unavoidable, since many countries must reach a materially higher level of
technical competence before they can maintain the increasingly complex
weapons of modern warfare. In addition, these weapons, which are just
beginning to be available in quantity to U. S. forces, are exceedingly costly
and their large-scale supply would require both increased U. S. financial
assistance and the expansion of U. S. production facilities. As the U. S.
comes more and more to rely upon nuclear weapons for the prosecution of
even relatively small military operations, allied forces can become less and
less capable of making meaningful military contributions to the success of
such operations.

Therefore, through its military assistance programs, the U. S. must
help develop allied forces capable of operating in concert with U. S. forces
in various types of military operations. This does not mean we should equip
all allied elements along the lines of comparable U. S. units. To the
maximum degree possible both the types and levels of equipment provided
allied forces should be tailored to the missions which they are expected to
perform. And we should not set standards for our allies based on our own levels
of technology; in Southeast Asia for example, we might well substitute
mules for trucks, and in areas like the Middle East, we should help our allies

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develop lightly armed mobile combat units capable of maintaining internal
security and of making at least initial resistance to external aggression, pending
the arrival of allied forces.

Even providing measures such as those outlined above are successfully
implemented, the cost of military aid programs will necessarily be large.

The U. S. will have to provide -- either directly or indirectly -- much of the
military resources our allies need or else see the political reliability of these
countries decline along with their military strength. In effect, the United
States is faced with a task of re-equipping and re-strengthening allied forces
at least comparable in magnitude to that which it faced in 1950 and at a time
when both rapidly changing technology and decreasing popular support for
military programs combine to make the task even more costly.

Next, if the communists do attempt to expand through subversion and
indirect aggression and peripheral wars the U. S. may find neither its present
strategy nor its system of alliances is sufficient. Given the strategic
standoff which presents the communists with a new opportunity to advance by
indirect means, our Panel feels there is an urgent need to broaden the way
in which we and our allies think about "aggression" in order to establish a
concept more in consonance with the reality of limited war.

Unless the U. S. and its allies can achieve a more embracing concept
and can make this generally acceptable to the community of nations, we will be
in danger of suffering serious reverses by default, largely because we will have
succeeded in paralyzing our policy by an insistent clinging to outmoded

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notions of aggression.

In certain cases counter-measures to subversion may more appropriately
take the form of political, economic, or covert operations, designed to oust
the aggressor and restore a favorable situation. However, we cannot refuse
to use force if this appears to be the only way to prevent a successful
aggression. If the U. S. regards the dissent of others as an effective veto
against any unilateral action on our part, paralysis may follow, to the detriment
of the whole alliance.

It is impossible in advance to draw up a list of the countries which
might be threatened. Nor is it possible, in writing treaties with our allies,
to define explicitly what types of aggression would justify what responses.
In the period ahead, it may be as difficult to define aggression as it will be
to resist it. But to prevent successful aggression it is quite likely the United
States will have to assume responsibility for major portions of the free world
perimeter and widely deploy small U. S. forces throughout the world, instantly
available for movement to threatened areas near their overseas bases. It is
necessary for the U.S., ahead of such eventualities, to arrange our alliances
and prepare our allies -- as well as world opinion -- for such eventualities,
making clear in advance what are our intentions and motivations.

Conclusion

In today's circumstances, because of the political and military
difficulties of intervening against "legitimate" governments or of assisting

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in the suppression of guerrilla and para-military forces, the U. S. will also have to take a number of parallel but non-military preventive measures to strengthen friendly countries against possible communist takeover. Most of these measures -- economic aid, technical assistance to improve government administration, and popular education, cooperation in the development of informational agencies and programs, etc. -- do not fall within the military sphere; nevertheless, an alert, well-trained, and democratically-oriented people are the most powerful deterrent to communist aggression. This is one occasion when an ounce of prevention may literally be worth a pound of cure.

None of these actions we have recommended will be easy or cheap and many of them will be <u>perplexing</u>. In summoning up the will to make the necessary difficult or onerous arrangements in advance, we must remain aware that the hardest decisions will be those required in situations involving a conflict of ethical or moral values each of which seems in itself desirable. For example, in the case of a Syria or an Egypt, the adoption of constructive policies by the United States may be frustrated by our respect for the right of national sovereignty; yet simultaneously we may be well aware that a Communist takeover in their country could have fateful consequences for the whole Middle East -- and for Western Europe with which our own physical security is intimately bound up.

This type of conflict reflects, unfortunately, the essence of the ambiguity with which Communism is likely to present its challenges: the threat is sheathed in circumstances selected to create on our part a moral or

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VII. THE SPECIAL PROBLEM OF NATO

Since preserving Western Europe from Communist control is a primary
U. S. security objective superior to all other security objectives except the
defense of our homeland, none of our military alliances is as important as the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the supporting military forces which
give it expression.

In order to appreciate the importance of NATO we need only to con-
template our situation if Western Europe were in hostile hands or lay divided
and helpless before Soviet aggression: The Communist Bloc would have an
industrial potential equal to our own; they would be in an almost unassailable
strategic position, able to straddle the world's main communications lines
and flank the weak and divided Middle East from both north and east, able to
manipulate the manpower, factories and cultural prestige of Europe, to dominate
Africa and infiltrate South America.

It is not hard to visualize the loss of Western Europe as prelude to a
beleaguered United States retiring to what it would hope would remain Fortress
America, but a fortress to which the surrounding Communist World could forbid
trade or raw supplies. The conversion of this not too difficult flight of
imagination into a dollar and cents estimate of subsequent U. S. security
budgets should have a restraining effect on those who view with alarm the
current security costs of the NATO alliance.

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The Weaknesses of NATO

The factors and elements which make the NATO area essential to U. S. security also create difficulties and complications. Like the newly awakening peoples and newly developing states of the Afro-Asian complex, the older western civilization is also affected by the revolutionary changes going on in the world. The change of international climate since the first Geneva Conference has tended to dissolve the sense of urgency upon which NATO was founded and to revive a number of rivalries and irritations between NATO members. The dispute over Cyprus burst into the open without serious regard by Britain or Greece or Turkey for the consequences to NATO; France has withdrawn most of her fourteen European divisions to Algeria and reserves the lack of political support she has received from her NATO allies in her Algerian policies; and in Central Europe, the Germans are offered the choice of unification on Soviet terms or continued membership in NATO and no unification.

The failure of the Anglo-French adventure in Suez, including the U.S. condemnation of the action, has not strengthened NATO ties while the recent British White Paper on Defense, which was surely hastened by the debacle at Suez, announced sharp reductions of British forces in Germany, plus the replacement of the home fighter defense command with a guided missile system, and armed forces reductions by 1962 from 690,000 to 375,000.

The Soviet development of air-atomic capability has created progressive

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contradictions between the organization of NATO forces and the strategy to which the U.S. strategic air forces in Europe -- SACEUR -- are committed. We have about five infantry divisions in Germany and the British about four, but SACEUR has proclaimed a nuclear strategy of defense which implicitly rule out either local defense or the effective use of non-atomic forces. Nevertheless, the United States is still pressing the Germans and other NATO members to contribute non-atomic ground forces, and NATO maintains a supply system based on the assumption of conventional warfare and therefore highly vulnerable to nuclear weapons.

In addition to these strictly military weaknesses of NATO, and the allied economic and political troubles of Europe there is a sentiment towards neutralism in many NATO countries. Many factors contribute to their psychological retreat from nuclear reality: their relative weakness as compared to the two supra-states, the frictions and antagonisms inherent in any alliance system, and of course most of all the fear which the awareness of nuclear weapons has brought. This is a double fear. Not only do Europeans recoil from the damage and destruction certain to result from the use of even a few of the smallest tactical atomic weapons they are also afraid that the existence of the strategic stand off will make the U.S. unwilling to commit its strategic air

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forces in case of overt communist aggression because the United States would
fear the increasing retaliatory capability of the U.S.S.R. to bring nuclear
catastrophe directly to the American mainland.

The Strengths of NATO

For these and other reasons, psychological and economic and social,
the future viability of NATO cannot be taken for granted. But this is by no
means the whole story. The United States must also evaluate NATO's future
in terms of the contribution it can make to the security and welfare of other
NATO nations and the U.S. The communists' determined drive to weaken and
destroy NATO shows how high an evaluation the Kremlin places on NATO's
potential.

Earlier sections of this chapter have considered some of the strengths
and contributions that free world alliances make to their members in a period
of formidable and unrelenting Communist expansion: mutual security and pro-
tection, overseas bases, the greater deterrence to Communist aggression which
comes from U.S. nuclear capabilities stationed close to Russo-Chinese borders,
etc. These advantages and strengths are also characteristic of the NATO
alliance.

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And we have had recent demonstrations of the determined strength of will of NATO members when subjected to Soviet atomic blackmail. Within recent months, Turkey, Norway, West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Britain, Greece, and Iceland have had definite threats from the Kremlin of Soviet retaliation for their participation in NATO. These warnings have had no effect. Even the smallest and weakest nations of Europe, knowing they are an integral part of the NATO whole, have been able to ignore the communist blackmail.

It is significant that this has occurred at a time when we have been hearing so many gloomy prophecies about NATO, and as for the Soviet estimate of the future of NATO, these recent threats from the Kremlin bear witness that the communists regard NATO as considerably more than a paper tiger.

## NATO Strategy

The fundamental strategy of NATO is made up of two components: a shield of local tactical forces and a sword of nuclear retaliatory force. The shield — or trip wire — component of NATO has a double purpose: it maintains sufficient tactical forces in Western Europe to contain local aggression or the threats of aggression, and its presence notifies the communists that a major aggression which these forces could not cope with, would trigger the second component of NATO strategy, the sword of strategic air forces carrying nuclear weapons.

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But NATO strategy needs considerable implementation. For many reasons, ranging from economic and political interests of the United States to the development of greater self-confidence and responsibility in Europe, NATO's additional military strength should come principally from European contributions. But Europe cannot be prodded into providing large numbers of conventional forces when the U.S. and Britain are turning away from such forces to concentrate on air-atomic power; considering our proclaimed nuclear defense for the NATO area, the continued maintenance of standard infantry forces and propeller-driven aircraft must seem to Europeans an exercise in futility.

To the U.S., the central problem of NATO is now to provide, within Europe and controlled by Europeans, a military capability that will substantially reduce Europe's dependence on U.S. strategic airpower. This is necessary both to restore the declining power position of Europe vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. and to bolster the European sense of hope and of participation, basic ingredients of the will to resist. Any greater structure of military cooperation the U.S. can erect with NATO nations contributes doubly to the strength of the alliance: it lessens the burden on us, and it interweaves Europeans more closely into the NATO fabric.

Our Panel has two suggestions on how the United States can significantly contribute to the revitalization of NATO.

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NATO Recommendations

One serious and unnecessary weakness of U.S. military research and development has been our failure to utilize effectively the rich store of scientific talent in other countries, especially in Western Europe.

Much of the difficulty relates to U.S. rules on secrecy of information.

Actually, such a situation can work against our own security interests and can place the U.S. in the absurd position of withholding from NATO information and developments which Soviet science already possesses.

Certainly a revision of our security policies and procedures to permit more reasonable exchange of the latest technical information between U.S. research agencies and those of our NATO allies is urgently needed.

This should be followed by U.S. official encouragement and support for a unified military research and development effort in Western Europe designed to concentrate the available European talent on problems of NATO defense.

Excluding Europe from technical knowledge possessed by the U.S. limits European industry to the production of obsolescent weapons. It thus precludes a full European contribution to NATO and imposes a disproportionate burden on the United States in both research and manufacture.

By thus depriving Europe of a fully meaningful participation in the developing defense effort, it threatens European self-confidence and morale. A unified research effort would strengthen the Europeans' sense of responsibility for their own defense and lead to a more significant defense effort in Europe.

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Therefore the United States should place the NATO nations in a
position to exercise more influence over their own defense by providing them
with a variety of tactical atomic weapons including intermediate-range
missiles.

This recommendation would of course require changes in the U.S.
Atomic Energy Act which now prohibits turning over atomic weapons to
foreign countries. We believe Congress will be willing to enact these
changes when it realizes that the possession of atomic weapons will
give Western Europe power and incentive to withstand atomic blackmail
and would lessen the present sense of impotence of a Europe trapped between
the atomic collosi.

In this connection, it is important the U.S. understand the
unavoidable time lag between a national decision on this matter and the
attainment of operational nuclear forces manned by Europeans. At a con-
servative estimate, it will take five or six years from legislation to delivery
of atomic weapons; thus NATO nations cannot be equipped with significant
numbers of atomic capable weapons before 1963-65.

In the meantime, NATO's defensive strength must continue to
depend on the deterrent power of U.S. strategic airpower, on substantial
U.S. military forces, plus whatever larger European military forces can
be found for NATO.

Any risks the U.S. would run by atomic sharing with its NATO partners

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must be weighed against the risks of standing still. In the longer run, NATO bonds might become loosened. Possessing atomic strength of their own with which to resist Communist pressure, European nations may tend to reduce the reliance on allies, including the United States; this would not necessarily work against our interests for keeping the NATO area out of Soviet hands in the primary U.S. objective in Europe and we have long sought for a situation in which the area could stand on its own feet. In the longer run, a stronger and more self-reliant Western Europe, continuing along its present path toward greater economic unity, could become a great and equal partner in the future evolution of free society.

There is a major political and psychological problem intimately related to any future arms policy for NATO: Europe's realization that the explosion of a few hundred tactical atomic weapons in that populous and highly compact area could destroy European civilization. Superficially this would seem to conflict with our recommendation that NATO be equipped with atomic weapons. Actually there is no conflict of choices involved.

First, it is evident that Europe cannot now be defended, even against a Soviet attack with massed conventional forces, with the forces NATO powers seem willing to raise. Therefore, nuclear weapons would have to be used and great destruction would result. Second, nuclear weapons placed in the hands of the Europeans would significantly reduce NATO dependence on U.S. strategic air power and thus reaffirm that NATO

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deterrent which Europeans fear is being weakened by the U.S.S.R. capacity
to strike heavy blows against the U.S. Third, given this new power
situation, it would be in U.S. interests to limit and localize any European
conflict; and for similar reasons, the U.S.S.R. would also rush to avoid
general war as a result of any conflict in Western Europe.

In addition to urging the U.S. promptly to create a maximum deterrent to war by providing the Europeans with nuclear capability, our Panel has another broad recommendation. While making clear to all concerned, including the Soviets, that the defense of NATO is based firmly on the abundant use of atomic weapons against large-scale attack, the U.S. must work with Europeans to devise an alternate strategy to automatic all-out counter-attack.

Such a strategy would definitely require respectable ground forces
and support units -- prepared to fight either atomic or non-atomic war --
to be stationed in Berlin and other forward areas to discourage or deal
firmly with minor border incursions or any other local disturbances fomented
by the Soviet or their satellites. Of course any system of graduated
responses would function only if the U.S. is willing and prepared, if
need be, to join our NATO allies in limited war in Europe.

We believe that the means of reconciling Europe's need for maximum
deterrence and combat effectiveness with the European fear of nuclear
devastation can be provided by such a system of graduated responses.

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And to the extent we can achieve it, the United States will have revitalized
the NATO alliance by giving new hope and a sense of meaningful participa-
tion to our European partners.

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VIII. DISARMAMENT

No subject has taken a more attractive appeal to peoples and govern-
ments than international disarmament. And we in the United States have
cherished the hope that through disarmament negotiations we might lay down
the burden of astronomical military budgets and walk out of the valley of the
shadow of nuclear destruction.

Our Penal fully recognizes the great boon a reasonable regulation of
armaments would bring to a strife-torn world and it fully recognizes the
popularity that will accrue to whatever nation takes the lead in lessening
armament burdens and the attendant fears. We are also convinced that a
measure of disarmament is sufficiently desired by the U.S.S.R. so that
reductions in Soviet forces can result from any negotiations. But we cannot
regard the Kremlin's intent in any such negotiations as more than tactical,
aimed at speeding and exploiting the response of the non-communist world
to military reductions the communists intended to make anyway. We accept
as fact that the U.S. is correct and wise in pushing this particular course
of events, while earnestly hoping that the fears reflected in our opinion
will continue to receive the deep consideration we believe they deserve.

It might be well to say frankly that our Panel is quite wary about
disarmament arrangements. Most regretfully, after examining the existant
possibilities for meaningful disarmament agreements, we are forced to conclude

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that such a solution to our military problems is not only unlikely but could
result in a situation more dangerous than the present high-armaments high-
tension period.

The Real Problem in Disarmament

Ever since World War II, the United States has sought for disarmament agreements. We have been motivated by a desire to decrease the resources devoted to military purposes, the feeling that armaments alone do not offer security, and the wish to test Soviet willingness to negotiate. But while spurred on by knowledge of the disastrous consequences of large-scale use of nuclear weapons, we have been made cautious by the realization that, under present circumstances, the illusion of security would be worse than the reality of peril.

A reduction of forces is all the more difficult to negotiate because it seeks to compare incommensurables. How can one relate a cut in U.S. air power, which might take years to reconstitute, with a reduction in Soviet ground forces, which, given the structure of Soviet society, could be again mobilized in a matter of weeks? Or, to take another example, what weight does one give to trained reserves as against ready forces, to munitions stockpiles as against productive capacity, to tanks as against aircraft, etc.?

In general, each side will seek to deprive the other of the capability it fears most, while keeping its own most effective weapon as long as possible.
Thus Russia and China have attempted to expel our troops, and particularly our air bases from Eurasia while maintaining their own capabilities for

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offensive action, and we have sought to reduce the communist strength in ground forces while retaining our nuclear deterrent in case of a sudden onslaught.

Unfortunately, disarmament plans do not so far deal with the real security problem: the increasingly rapid rate of technological change. Scientific research and development can decide the armament race. And therefore no reduction in standing forces, however scrupulously carried out, can protect a nation against a technological breakthrough by its enemy. For instance, assume the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to keep their strategic striking forces at fixed levels, still if either party was subsequently able to advance its air defense systems sufficiently to contain the retaliatory force of its enemy, the strategic balance would be completely upset. Thus even a drastic reduction of forces would not be conclusive.

In addition to the technological problems, the structure of international relations will prevent military reductions from going beyond a certain point, for the U.S.S.R. is not likely to accept a disarmament proposal which impairs its position relative to weaker states, and nothing would induce the Soviets to accept a level of armaments which reduced their ability to control the satellites or to play a major role in contiguous areas like the Middle East. But forces sufficient to accomplish this task are also sufficient to imperil all the peripheral powers of Eurasia. And a reduction of forces which does not affect the Soviet position relative to weaker powers will not diminish the basic security problem of the non-Soviet world.

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The Wrong Approach: Prevention of Surprise Attack

It is precisely because the reduction of forces has proved so nearly impossible to negotiate and because its rewards would be so questionable even if achieved that the major emphasis of disarmament efforts has turned to the prevention of surprise attack and to the problems of inspection and control.

But every inspection scheme that has proved acceptable to the free world has proved objectionable to the U.S.S.R. This may be because the Soviet domestic apparatus might be difficult to maintain in the face of any control system which would reassure the West but in any case, negotiations on control and inspection have produced the same vicious circle as earlier efforts to bring about a reduction in armaments by other means. Were it possible to agree on inspection and control machinery, it would also be possible to settle the disputes which have created the existing tensions.

And, of course, the technological race is raising its own obstacles to any control plan. The rate of change of technology has so far outstripped the pace of diplomatic negotiations that control plans change their meaning while they are being debated.

For instance, the control scheme of the first U.S. disarmament proposal, the Baruch Plan, assumed that an international authority with powers of inspection, and in control of mining, processing and producing fissionable materials, would be able to eliminate nuclear weapons from the arsenals of

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the powers. Even when it was advanced, this scheme would not have been
foolproof because the normal "slippage" in the handling of fissionable materials
would enable a nation, without obviously violating of international agreements,
to increase this slippage and thus slowly to build up a nuclear stockpile of
its own.

Today, so many nuclear weapons, of so many different sizes, have
been produced and are so easy to conceal that even the most elaborate inspection
machinery could not account for all of them.

And so it is with each new technological discovery. In the very early
stages of development, a scrupulous control system may forestall the addition
to the arsenal of this particular weapon. However, once it has gone into
production the weapon becomes so sophisticated and the production of it
reaches such proportions that control machinery may magnify rather than reduce
the existing insecurity: to the fear of surprise attack it may add the fear
of violation of the agreement by the other side.

The difficulty of establishing effective machinery to control the develop-
ment of ever more destructive weapons has caused most disarmament negotia-
tions since 1955 to concern themselves with means to prevent surprise attack.
Since -- so the argument goes -- a prime cause of present tensions is
insecurity stemming from fear of imminent catastrophe, an inspection system
which reduced the danger of surprise attack would also remove some of the
urgency from international relationships. Certainly the danger of surprise
attack contributes to the tensions of the nuclear age, even if it does not

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cause them.

But an inspection scheme is yet to be proposed which could significantly reduce the element of surprise. This is because the high state of readiness required of strategic striking forces means that they need no noticeable mobilization to launch their blow. And, as the normal peacetime maneuvers of a strategic striking force come to approximate its behavior in case of emergency, an enemy will be unable to tell until his early warning line is crossed, whether a given flight is on a training mission or is launching a surprise attack.

Moreover, as the speed of planes increases, the warning time afforded by even a perfect inspection system will be progressively reduced. To be effective, even today, reconnaissance planes would probably have to hover over enemy air fields almost constantly. In the age of the Inter-continental Ballistic Missile -- which should be reached in less than 10 years -- the maximum warning time possible would be half an hour, the period of time the missile would be in transit. And this assumes complete intelligence of all missile installations plus perfect freedom of the inspector plus instant communication between him and his government.

Under such circumstances, even a foolproof inspection system can tell a power only what it already knows: that the opponent possesses the capability to launch a devastating attack on very short notice and with a minimum of warning. Thus, inspection systems are becoming increasingly less useful in giving direct warning of impending attack although they may

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have marginal values as indicators of political intent and as sources of military intelligence. Their usefulness will depend far less on giving specific notice of the departure of enemy aircraft or missiles than in affording trained operatives a chance to detect all of the intangibles of nervousness, tension and different patterns of activity which might betray a hostile intent.

Our Panel, much as it would like to be more optimistic, cannot see how present vigilance could be reduced, or insecurity be removed, by any inspection system now in prospect.

## The Right Approach; Limitations on War

The attempt to eliminate war through disarmament is the reverse of the attempt to prevent war through retaliatory power. Either of these methods is highly useful and desirable as long as it succeeds. But suppose it does not? In both cases, exclusive concern with the avoidance of war pose a fearful alternative: total war as the only alternative to total peace.

If a war comes, the result of the disarmament conclusions as heretofore concerned could force war into its absolute form. Thus, in spite of -- and even because of -- their quest for final solutions, disarmament plans can prevent the achievement of intermediate goals which are both attainable and desirable.

> Instead, the U. S. should shift the emphasis of disarmament negotiations to constructive proposals to mitigate the horrors of war.

Such a program would have the advantage of focusing thinking on things to accomplish rather than on those which should not be done. Above all,

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a program to mitigate the horrors of war could be used to clarify the intentions
of the opposing sides and thus help prevent the catastrophe of an all-out war
caused by miscalculation.

Even a unilateral declaration would accomplish a great deal because it would provide a strong incentive to the other side to consider the same ground rules. For instance, it is highly likely that even a limited war involving the major powers will include the use of nuclear weapons. Under present conditions, the sudden employment of nuclear weapons would have devastating effects on world opinion and might unnecessarily unleash an all-out war. It is therefore imperative to establish _in advance_ the psychological and political framework of such a conflict.

Such a course would also enable us to make a distinction between disarmament and communist ban-the-bomb propaganda. We would leave no doubt that aggression by the Communist Bloc would be resisted with nuclear weapons, but we would make clear to the rest of the world that we were making every effort to limit the effect of nuclear weapons and to protect civilian populations. Of course if a war began with an all-out surprise attack on us, we would react by using every weapon in our arsenal; but in the case of a local communist attack, we would fight a limited war according to rules we had established well in advance -- as long as the enemy observed the same rules.

It is not likely the Soviet Government would formally accept such a
proposal. The Soviet leaders have every interest in painting the consequences

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of any war in the most drastic terms; the belief of the non-Soviet world in the
inevitable horror of nuclear war is the prerequisite of Soviet atomic blackmail.

But whatever the utility of the pronouncements of impending doom for para-
lyzing resistance, the Soviet leaders would face a considerable dilemma if
we reiterated our position even in the face of a Soviet rejection. Whatever
their distrust, if a limited war came they would possess a powerful incentive
to fight it according to the rules we had laid down.

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IX. CIVIL DEFENSE

The invention of the nuclear bomb has for the first time in history, created a direct threat to the civilian population of the United States. At present there is no real civil defense program in the United States.

These two sentences pose one of the gravest problems in military security facing the U.S. for the USSR already has the capability of nuclear attack against any city in the U.S. and with the development in a few years of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying megaton size weapons, sudden and devastating attacks can be launched upon the chief population and industrial centers of the United States. There is no weapon or defense now foreseeable to counter such an attack.

Consider what would happen if a ten megaton bomb made a direct hit on an American city -- and the USSR has considerably larger bombs. There would be an inner blast area with a radius of three miles where there would be total destruction and a death rate of about 75%, and an outer blast area with a seven mile radius of heavy destruction and a mortality or serious injury rate between 50% and 75%. In addition there would be a fire circle seventeen miles in radius; at its outer limit, buildings would be burned and humans without shelter would be seriously injured. To all these damages would then have to be added, the later casualties, over an undertermined wider radius, from atomic fallout.

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Or to put the extent of the threat to civilians in another way: nuclear attacks on our fifty leading population centers would leave from 15,000,000 to 20,000,000 Americans dead and another 20,000,000 to 25,000,000 injured.

We hope such an attack will never come. But we cannot be certain. Yet the U.S. government and people regard civil defense with apathy. Neither the federal government nor any state government has even systematically assembled the data which would either prove or contradict whether real civil defense is possible in a nuclear war. By general consent it would seem this subject has been pushed under the rug.

In a future war, the freedom of action of the U.S. government may importantly depend upon the realization throughout the nation that there is a reasonable chance of personal and group survival if the crisis led to all-out war. Therefore, our subpanel is convinced the U.S. must immediately start to study and search out a serious integrated nation-wide civil defense program. Such a program would add to our military strength; it would support our diplomacy; and it would help our people to survive.

## Rationale for a Civil Defense Program

War is always a discouraging business and nuclear war so discouraging that it is natural for people to refuse to imagine themselves in the dismal vista of death and destruction which would follow an attack. But such an attitude would force the United States into one appeasement after another.

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each one bringing the threat of war closer and leaving the nation with fewer
allies and less strength with which to defend itself. This in turn would in-
crease the possibility an enemy would dare to launch an all out attack.

While recognizing that the main purpose of military planning is to avoid
general war, the possibility of it must be faced, and must be prepared for. A
people physically and psychologically unprepared for the possibility of an
attack may crumble beneath it; a well prepared people has a far better chance
of surviving as individuals and of maintaining their country as a national
entity. So the first step in civil defense program is to help make people aware
of their chance of physical survival in the war we hope will never come.
Again, specific facts are impossible to adduce now to support this argument.
The facts depend on what kind of civil defense steps are taken, how well
they have been carried out before an attack, when and what kind of an attack
is made with what kind of weapons, etc.

However, in the judgement of our Panel if there are adequate civil
defense preparations, at least one out of every Americans who would
otherwise die should be able to survive the catastrophe of a nuclear attack.

Such added margin of survival for the given individuals can mean the
difference between death and survival for a nation. And it could also mean
the difference between undergoing a nuclear attack and deterring one; for if
an enemy recognizes it cannot safely knock the U.S. out, it will not dare try.
Thus adequate civil defense becomes an important concomitant in the preser-
vation of the strategic standoff.

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Civil Defense Recommendations

Since so few studies have been made and so little data has been assembled about civil defense it is difficult to make detailed recommendations. We would present some general propositions and suggest some steps which should be taken immediately.

First, Americans are going to have to face up to one unpleasant limitation in any civilian defense program: _no program will provide protection for everyone._ This is a basic limitation which must not be allowed to paralyze our efforts. Total immunity from atomic attack, like total military security, is a chimera in our age.

Second, the magnitude of the actions involved, and the present public apathy towards civil defense measures, means that _any civil defense effort is going to have to be sparked by a massive program of public education and encouragement_, probably one inspired or instituted by the federal government.

Third, civil defense programs must be integrated with the construction programs needed for the normal development of our expanding population and economy. The more that normal economic incentives can be used to guide people and companies and communities toward civil defense, the better.

Four, there are three related threats against which a civil defense program should be directed. There are the direct effects of nuclear attack: damage from heat and explosion, etc. There are the indirect effects of nuclear attack: hunger, sickness, lack of housing, and above all fall-out. And there are the

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psychological problems: providing against panic and paralysis caused by lack of authoritative information before or during or after an attack.

Our Panel is convinced that any serious and effective civil defense program must include the following elements:

(1) <u>an attack-proof warning system</u> to give people a reasonable chance to reach their shelters in time

(2) <u>an attack-proof radio net</u> to provide people with information and instructions during and after an attack

(3) <u>a radiological monitoring system</u> to assess the danger of radioactivity and report to people in their shelters.

(4) <u>a program for the underground stockpiling of essential materials</u> like food, medical supplies, building materials and machine tools

(5) <u>a shelter program of large public shelters in urban areas and small family shelters in or near private dwellings.</u>

The large public shelters in urban areas, which would hold perhaps one thousand persons, would be essentially expansions or additions to building programs already being undertaken by private or public authorities. A good example might be underground industrial installations which in peacetime would be used for especially vital industries but would be provided with excess space where, in case of a direct hit in the locality, people could be crowded in for protection during the "firestorm" and fallout periods. Other examples are deep

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subway tunnels, underground passages between skyscrapers, expanded or additional sub-basement facilities, etc.

The federal government would not assume the primary responsibility for all the costs of such shelters but might well contribute to the initial planning and then furnish various supplementary funds. For example, in a deep subway tunnel, these funds would be used to construct emergency ventilating systems, an independent water supply, storage areas of food and medical supplies, etc. The most of urban shelters for the nation would of course depend upon the number and size of the cities involved. In large sections of the country like mountain areas, thinly populated flatlands, and remote lake regions public shelters would be impractical and unnecessary. Still the total cost would come to at least $______.

The second part of any adequate civil defense shelter program is the development of family-sized, inexpensive shelters located in or near homes. As home shelter program cannot provide adequate protection against a direct hit but it could provide reasonable protection, particularly against fall-out, at a relatively low cost. A home shelter might be adjacent to the basement of a house and might consist of a fibre glass shell some six feet underground; it would be equipped with heat, food, sleeping accommodations and a secondary exit. It might cost around $______ per person. And, as in the case of public shelters, there would be many remote areas of the country where home shelters would probably not be necessary.

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There is much that can be done immediately to begin these shelter programs. With the building industry experimenting in the field better and cheaper home shelters could be evolved. Public shelters could be incorporated in federal state and municipal buildings. Leading government officials, prominent community leaders, and famous Americans in sports and entertainment could spark a home shelter program by their own example. And, with appropriate Presidential leadership, home shelters could soon become standard equipment in all new construction.

## The Justification of a Civil Defense Program

The program we have outlined should be able to arouse public support on at least two grounds. It is a realistic program which offers a measurable degree of real protection and thus a reasonably good chance of personal and group survival. And it is a practical program which, although expensive, can be realized without a basic disruption of our present economic and social patterns.

There is no question that a serious civil defense program will cost a great deal. But this should be measured against, among other things, the increasing cost of active military defense measures designed to interrupt and destroy the enemy's attacking vehicle. Also, given the growing disadvantage of the defense vis-a-vis the offense, we face the possibility that measures of active defense will grow obsolete so rapidly the whole effort will become prohibitively expensive. Civil defense will not be subject to the same disadvantage.

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vantages for radio nets, radiological monitoring systems, stockpiling, and
shelters are essentially one-time expenses, usable for many years and
equally valid against manned bombers or guided missiles.

Nothing can be done until the highest officials of government begin
to take civil defense seriously. Because the essential components of a wise
civil defense program cannot be left to local initiative, new laws will be
needed to give more substantial authority for coordination to the federal govern-
ment.

It is also important to make sure the cost of civil defense shall not
be met by taking money away from the armed forces. We have no choice but
to consider it an additional item in the federal budget.

Our Panel, considering the most modest and slowest civil defense
program the U.S. dares undertake, cannot see any way of avoiding a cost of
somewhere around $_________ a year for the next ________ years.

To those who doubt the wisdom of embarking on such a serious civil
defense effort, we would put a question. Assuming the worst eventuality that
deterrents fail and there ensues a large-scale nuclear exchange, is there any
other type of conceivable preparedness that will assure the degree of human
survival and of organization necessary if we are to take subsequent action as
a nation?

If the answer to this question is no, then where lies the path for
responsible men?

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# X. A BUDGET FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

In earlier chapters of this Report, we have attempted to set forth the considerations and objectives of our future national security programs. However desirable these objectives may be, they cannot be realized unless the U.S. is able and willing to spend the money needed to implement them. So we turn now to Defense Department budgets about which our Panel has two convictions.

We believe that the U.S. is not now spending sufficient money on its military programs and that it will have to spend more in the future.

And we believe that unless changes are made in the way the military budget is presented to the Congress, it will be extremely difficult to secure the needed larger appropriations.

## Recommendations on the Budgetary Level

It is exceedingly difficult to forecast future U.S. military budgets. The interplay of many and unpredictable forces will determine the figures: national policies, public attitudes, military strategy, tactics in the Communist bloc, and most of all, the unpredictable consequences of yet-undiscovered progressions in technology. For example, a dependable estimate of the cost of 1967 defense measures against intercontinental ballistic missiles is today beyond the capability of the best experts in the United States.

Nonetheless, from data now available, we are convinced the U.S.

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must promptly begin to spend more money on the military programs essential
to its security. And we also foresee the necessity for considerably greater
expenditures in the next 10-15 years.

Three reasons have brought about the present critical state of affairs.
In the first place, when the Korean war ended, it was natural for the American
people to demand that military expenditures be drastically cut. But the cutting
process was not particularly scientific and its bad effects did not become
evident for some time. The momentum of the Air Force build-up continued until
unspent appropriations from 1952 and 1953 ran out. Where major procurement
is concerned the Army is still living off its pre-54 appropriations. The Navy's
programs, which had not risen so sharply during the Korean war, required less
readjustment.

The second reason for the present level of military budgeting was the
national decision to balance the federal budget even if it meant drastic cuts
in Defense Department funds. And the third cause for the present critical state
of affairs has been the technological revolution - with its inevitable conse-
uences of rising military costs.

As a result of these three forces, the Defense Department has been
pushed into many unwise curtailments of its military expenditures.

## The Rising Cost of National Security

To remedy the grave deficiencies in our military security programs will,
in our judgment, require budgetary increases of as much as $3,000,000,000 a

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year for the next several fiscal years and a total budget of somewhat over
$50,000,000,000 by 1962.

Applied to the 1958 Defense Department budget, this will mean an
increase of about 8%. In addition, the Civil Defense budget should be in-
creased from ______ to about $1,000,000,000 a year.

Looking beyond 1960, it seems to us inevitable that, barring agree-
ment on disarmament, the cost of any adequate military program will continue
to rise. We anticipate no levelling-off before about 1965. The U.S. must
face up to the prospect that three or four years from now the combined Defense
Department and Civil Defense budget may have to go as high as $50,000,000,000
a year. And another $4,000,000,000 will have to be added for the military pro-
grams of the Atomic Energy Commission and for military aid to our allies.
Together these would make a total military budget of around $54,000,000,000,
about 20% above present figures.

To discuss the budget solely in terms of dollars is misleading. The
U.S. national income furnishes a much better gauge to measure how much of
a burden a $54,000,000,000 military budget will be on the American people:
with the increases we have recommended, U.S. defense expenditures in 1962
will be no greater than about 12% of the Gross National Product of
$410,000,000,000 predicted for that year. This is the same percentage level
at which defense expenditures were running in 1952.

Another gauge for measuring defense expenditures is to compare them

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with those of Russia. It is estimated that the U.S.S.R. is spending some-
where between 12% and 15% of its GNP on military expenses. But figures
can be misleading if dollar versus ruble comparisons are used to measure
U.S. versus U.S.S.R. expenditures; in terms of pay and subsistence, an
American soldier receives two and a half times as much as his Russian counter-
part, and our aircraft technicians are paid five times as much as theirs. Thus,
even though Soviet total national income is less than ours, a given percen-
tage of Soviet GNP can buy more military strength.

Coming back to our own country, our Panel is convinced that increases
in the Federal budget of the order suggested above can be effected without
inflation, controls, or a greater tax burden on our people. This conclusion
is based on the findings of Subpanel IV that our GNP will rise sufficiently to
allow an annual addition of $5,000,000,000 to the federal budget, more than
enough to cover the increases we urge in security expenditures. Moreover,
this does not take into account savings from a retailoring of military roles
and missions to conform to the strategic concepts recommended elsewhere in
this Report or savings from improvements in the organization of the Defense
Department.

Therefore our Panel is convinced the U.S. economy will be able to
provide the added funds necessary to support an adequate national security
program.

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Recommendations for Budget Expenditures

Therefore, since it lies within the American capability to remedy the present dangerous military under-spending, we recommend the following additional expenditures in U.S. military programs.

One: Additional aircraft procurement should be authorized to maintain modernization of existing units well into the 1960's. This is the only way the U.S. can avoid a gap in ready forces between the latest types of manned aircraft and the operational stage of ballistic missiles. The questionable British decision to halt bomber procurement is a safe risk only if U.S. continues to maintain the large and ever-ready deterrent forces.

Two: The SAC bases, long out of phase with other elements in our military programs, should be made less vulnerable to surprise attack by dispersion and other protective measures such as underground fuel storage, revetments, etc.

Three: A start at least must be made to provide Federal funds for the construction of a deep-shelter program and related warning-and-communication equipment.

Four: All of the services should be allowed to put more effort into improving early warning and anti-missile defense systems and anti-submarine measures.

Five: To provide something more than the token mobile units presently in being, additional troop airlift should be authorized and the Army should be

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<u>permitted to speed up modernization</u> of its division structure.

Six: <u>Accelerated</u> rather than diminished <u>research and development</u>
<u>support should be provided</u> for such <u>key programs</u> as chemically-fueled as
nuclear-powered aircraft and for advanced reconnaissance systems.

<u>Recommendations on the Budgetary Process</u>

Contrary to popular conception, the budget of the Defense Department
is an essential part of the process of military policy formation rather than to
adjunct to it. For instance, the ceiling on army personnel is fixed by law but
the law does not require the upper limit be reached. And there is little legis-
lation that prescribes the equipment the Army should have. These are matters
decided when appropriations are being considered. They are settled first by
budget perused and adjustment within the Defense Department later reexamined
by the committees of the Congress which authorize and appropriate military
funds.

Furthermore, there is no place in the Congress except in the Appropri-
ations Committee where there is real opportunity to consider every aspect of
national defense at the same time. Consequently the defense _budget_ becomes
the main focus for the consideration of defense _policy_.

But before the Congress can act intelligently on the defense budget,
its Committees should be able to determine how much and what kinds of de-
fense would be bought by the money they are asked to appropriate. Present
methods of preparing and presenting the budget do not give the Congress or the

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President -- or the people for that matter -- a clear indication of what the requested funds will accomplish in terms of military missions or effective unit. The best the Congress can do under the present circumstances is to be hesitant about cutting the budget if it thinks the general world situation is grave and to cut drastically across-the-board when it feels external dangers are not as serious as they are represented to be.

Admittedly a budget which permits the Congress to appraise the effec-
tiveness of national defense is difficult to achieve. But a start can be made;
for instance, it should not be too difficult to restate the presentation of the
Air Force budget. Present categories like "aircraft and related procurement",
"procurement other than aircraft", "research and development", etc., make
the Air Force budget very difficult to translate into how much money is asked
for the support of forces in being, how much is designed to increase their
strength, how much for the SAC, how much for Air Defense, etc.

The present budget structures of the other Services would be harder
to break down along such mission lines, but similar improvements could be
usefully made in each area of the defense budget. Therefore we recommend
that a start should be made at once towards a system of defense budgeting
which will show appropriations requests in terms of meaningful programs.

Another question of budgetary processes closely related to the pre-
sentation of meaningful requests is the period of time covered by the military
budget. Under the existing ground rules, the fiscal personnel of the Services

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spend the first six months of every year preparing and justifying and revising
the budgetary requests of their departments to their own superiors, the Secretary of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget. The next six months are consumed in testifying before Congressional committees and otherwise defending
the Service budgets after they have been approved by the President.

If the budget-making-and-justifying process took place only once in
two years -- that is, once for each Congressional term it would make for more
concentration on efficient financial management and less preoccupation with
repetitive budgetary procedures. Such a change would in no way weaken Congressional control of appropriations. Therefore we recommend that *the present one-year budget cycle should be changed into a two-year cycle*.

But whatever the length of budget cycles, a satisfactory defense budget
will not be achievable until there is a reduction of valid criticism of the
organization of the Defense Department. Unless the American people can be
assured that good husbandry is being observed in the financial management of
the defense establishment, they will continue to be skeptical about giving it
the money it must have. We therefore consider the changes in the organization
of the Defense Department which we shall propose in the next chapter as an
unavoidable prerequisite to satisfactory military budgets.