II-8

of hostilities and will confront the NLF with a
difficult choice. If the NLF attempts to isolate
the areas under its control from these developments,
it is likely to be confronted by population drainage
and an increasing gap between the economic and social
well-being of its areas and those areas integrated
into the national economy. The experience of ef-
forts to maintain comparable autonomous enclaves
more or less independent of central government
control, such as the communist controlled "red
republics" in Colombia or the Kingdom of Rwenzori
in Uganda, suggests that in the absence of outside
support the long-term viability of such areas is
dim. If, on the other hand, the NLF permits exten-
sive contacts to develop between its areas and the
cities, the social and economic grievances in large
part responsible for its appeal will be undermined
by economic development and the opportunities for
entrepreneurship opened up by the integration of
these areas into the national economy.

E. <u>Acceptability of Local Control to NLF</u>

The NLF undoubtedly wants a substantial share in national
power as well as local control of large areas. When it comes
to concessions, however, it is in the interest of the US and

II-9

the GVN to trade off local control for national power, to
concede a few more villages or districts to the NLF in order
to keep control of more Saigon ministries. If this is the
preferable line for the GVN, is there any chance that the
NLF can be persuaded to accept such trade-offs except at
outrageously high prices?

Several reasons exist why local control should be an
acceptable if not a desirable alternative to the NLF.

First. Local control of substantial, even if discon-
nected, rural areas does provide the NLF with its minimum
prerequisites: a reasonably secure base which guarantees
its survival and maintains its options for future political
or military struggle. Assured power in selected rural areas
would provide the NLF a degree of security which it would lose
if it bargained away such control in order to obtain a more
dramatic but also less secure foothold in Saigon.

Second. Agreement on local control would reflect existing
realities. In Korea the armistice eventually simply legitimated
the front between the two armies. In Vietnam, as everyone
points out, there is no front. There are, however, reasonably
clear distinctions between areas which are under GVN control,
under NLF control, and disputed. A settlement which has any
hope of lasting must be based on those realities. The ultimate
rationale for local control is simply that each side continue

II-10

to exercise through political means the authority which it
has so far been able to win and maintain through military
means.

Third. Recent actions by the NLF suggest that they
may well be placing themselves in a position to bargain for
and to accept arrangements for local control. The Alliance
which they announced with such fanfare a year ago has been
quietly back-tracked while increasing emphasis has been put
on the Liberation Committees supposedly elected in various
provinces and districts. The Alliance was the type of urban-
based group which might play a critical role in a national
coalition government. The unveiling and promotion of the
Liberation Committees, on the other hand, are efforts designed
to establish the authority and legitimacy of the NLF govern-
mental structures in local areas. Such committees have
purportedly been elected in some 1,000 villages and 10
provinces. Obviously the GVN cannot accept the legitimacy
of all these bodies, but the rush with which the NLF has
gone about creating them suggests that it will be prepared
to negotiate over the functional scope and territorial extent
of their powers.

III-1

III. POLITICAL COMPETITION: ARENAS AND INFLUENCES

A. Arenas of Competition

In almost every society both the extent and the intensity
of competition vary significantly from one part of the society
to another. They reflect electoral structure and social
structure. The larger the electoral districts, for instance,
the more competitive the elections. The greater the pre-
dominance of social (horizontal) cleavages over territorial
cleavages, the larger the number of districts with high
levels of competition.

In terms of political competitiveness it seems reasonable
to divide South Vietnam into five areas, three of which will
have continuing low levels of competition (particularly
between NLF and nonNLF groups), one which will have continuing
intense competition not polarized along NLF-nonNLF lines, and
one which will have intense temporary competition polarized
along NLF-nonNLF lines.

The three areas which are likely to have continuing low
levels of competition are:

(1) NLF-controlled rural areas, described above in Section

II. In these areas the probability of candidates and agents of nonNLF groups effectively challenging NLF control will be very slight. NonNLF political activists will at best take the risks and confront

III-2

the fate of civil rights workers in rural Mississippi -- before police power and judicial authority of the Federal Government was extended to these areas.

(2) **Communal-controlled rural areas.** In predominantly Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Catholic, and perhaps Montagnard villages and districts, it seems unlikely that the NLF will initially be able to make significant appeals. It is possible, however, that: (a) rival cliques and factions among the communal groups may compete vigorously with each other; and (b) the NLF may well try to capitalize on the splits within such groups by negotiating alliances with some factions.

(3) **District and provincial towns.** These are the outposts in the countryside of the GVN administrative-military-police apparat. They are likely to be the centers of conservatism in Vietnamese politics, and it seems probable that they will for a substantial period of time remain under the effective control of the local-powers-that-be. Some degree of electoral competition may be allowed for appearances' sake, but in the final analysis the desires of the governmental bureaucracy are likely to prevail.

III-3

(lc)

Low levels of political competition are normally associated with low levels of urbanization. Rural areas are more likely to be one-party areas. Urban centers mean greater social heterogeneity, exposure to more diversified viewpoints, higher levels of literacy and education, and more intense and complex communications patterns. All these tend to lend to greater political consciousness, political activism, and political competition. Thus it seems likely that the *metropolitan centers* of Vietnam (by which I mean primarily Saigon-Gia Dinh, Danang, Hue) will have a highly competitive politics. The large number of active groups and individuals combined with the indeterminate but clearly not dominant strength of the NLF will probably preclude NLF-nonNLF polarization unless the NLF is able to monopolize opposition to the government in those cities.

Finally, there are the *contested rural areas* in which neither the GVN nor the NLF has been able to establish effective control through military means. If political methods of war substantially replace military methods in these areas, the competition will still be intense and it is likely to be all the more so because a tremendous premium exists for the side which *first* gets an effective political organization functioning in the area. In terms of the stakes involved, these are the areas where the greatest concentration of effort should be made to develop nonNLF political strength.

III-4

B. <u>Factors Affecting Outcomes of Competition</u>

The results of the political competition are a function
of three things.

(1) <u>The rules of the game.</u> The most important rules concern the electoral structure, which can have decisive impact on who gets into what office. In addition, the extent to which informal rules exist modifying or cancelling the formal rules is also crucial. Of particular significance in Vietnam will be the extent to which violence and corruption play a role in the electoral process.

(2) <u>The players of the game.</u> The individuals and groups which compete for office can change significantly from one contest to another. The most important difference in any new elections in Vietnam will be participation by the NLF. But other new actors are also likely to appear on the scene.

(3) <u>The resources of the players.</u> Among these, the most important are:

(a) money

(b) organization

(c) political skill

(d) candidate popularity

(e) issue appeals (i.e., ability to develop

III-5

or to exploit issues which arouse favorable
popular response).

The US wields a decisive influence in Vietnamese
politics by shaping the environment in which the political
process takes place and particularly by creating expectations
as to its own future role in that environment. The factors
listed above which more directly affect the outcomes of
political competition, however, are in general not so easily
influenced by the US and the influence which the US can
wield varies significantly among them.

(1) The US can play a major role in shaping the rules of the game through its negotiations with Hanoi and the NLF and through advice to the GVN.

(2) The US could, if it seemed desirable, influence the identity of the players in the game by encouraging or discouraging some individuals (e.g., Generals Minh or Thi) or groups (e.g., the CVT) to participate in politics. Perhaps the key policy issue here is the attitude which the US should assume toward active ARVN participation in (overt or covert) the electoral process. The US could also provide inducements and coercions to foster alliances or mergers among political actors.

(3) The US can give money and material support to can-

III-6

didates and groups. This can be done either through
covert means or openly through the distribution of
economic assistance and "perk barrel" projects.
The US might also be able to impart some specialized
organizational and political skills to some Vietnamese
leaders, although it is highly dubious whether there
is much US politicians or bureaucrats can tell Viet-
namese politicians on how to win in Vietnamese poli-
tics. In general, the US is severely limited in
what it can do to influence the resources which the
players bring to the competition. These resources
are largely within the control of the Vietnamese.
Even the resource (positive or negative) which
might be thought to be most directly under US con-
trol, i.e., identification of a candidate or group
with the US, is not always easily manipulated!

There thus would seem to be some reason for the US to
concentrate its attention on the rules of the game and the
number and names of the players. The next section of this
paper will, consequently, focus on the electoral system and
the following section on the probable and possible participants
in the two most highly competitive arenas: the contested rural
areas and the metropolitan centers.

IV-1

IV. FIXING THE RULES OF THE GAME:
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

A. Electoral Laws Make a Difference

The electoral system of a polity is compatible with
the interests of the dominant groups in that polity. It
is also, however, an independent factor in its own right.
Different types of electoral systems can produce markedly
different types of results. In parliamentary elections,
for instance, rarely does a single party get a majority
of the vote. In 27 out of 117 elections in twenty dif-
ferent countries, for instance, the electoral laws
produced artificial majorities in the parliament which
had not been created by the voters. In almost two-thirds
of the cases where a single party got a majority in the
legislature, the result was produced by the electoral laws
not the electorate.* Electoral laws can be designed to
exacerbate certain types of conflict and to minimize other
types: the Lebanese system, for instance, is beautifully
rigged to virtually eliminate religious rivalry from
elections. Changes in electoral laws can produce changes
in government. In Guyana a shift in the electoral laws
was responsible for the defeat of Jagan's People Party.

That electoral laws make a difference is not unappreciated

*See Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (Yale Press, 1967), pp. 74-75.

IV-2

in Vietnam. In 1967 the Constituent Assembly deputies consciously rejected proposals for a run-off presidential election in order to enhance the probability of the military candidate winning with a plurality of the vote. Similarly, the Senate electoral system was designed to benefit and did benefit well organized minority groups, most notably the Catholics who with perhaps ten percent of the population and twelve percent of the senatorial candidates landed 43% of the senators.

In terms of the criteria of equity and democracy, some electoral systems clearly leave much to be desired. Among many varieties of electoral laws, however, it is virtually impossible to choose in terms of these general criteria. Good cases in terms of equity and democracy can, for instance, be made in favor of both plurality voting and proportional representation. Consequently, within the broad range of reasonably equitable and democratic systems, choices have to be made in terms of the consequences of the system: Which groups will it help? Whom will it hurt?

The principal elements of the electoral system subject to manipulation are:

(1) qualifications for voting;

(2) qualifications for office;

(3) offices to be elected;

(4) criteria for winning, i.e., the electoral formula (majority, plurality, proportional representation);

IV-3

(5) number of electoral districts;

(6) number of seats in districts (district magnitude);

(7) equality in size of districts;

(8) boundaries of districts (gerrymandering);

(9) salience of parties and candidates in electoral choices;

(10) timing and frequency of elections.

The discussion in this analysis of the Vietnamese electoral system will focus primarily on the electoral formulae, district magnitude, district boundaries, and the timing of elections.

## B. The Vietnamese Constitution Permits Great Flexibility in the Electoral System

The 1967 national elections were carried out under a system prescribed in part by the Constitution and in part by electoral laws passed by the Constituent Assembly. In terms of constitutional provisions, however, the system has great flexibility, and a number of changes could be made in the 1967 system without amending the Constitution. This flexibility could play a most important role in negotiations with the NLF by making it possible to accommodate reasonable demands on their part within the existing constitution and thereby eliminating or weakening one argument which they could make for completely junking the present constitution. The changes possible could both

IV-4

encourage NLF participation and reduce the probability
of NLF victory.

In a country which has gone through as many coups
and constitutions as Vietnam has in recent years, pre-
sumably much is to be said for attempting to build the
legitimacy of the existing system by adapting it to
changing circumstances.

Electors and Candidates

Article 4 of the Constitution declares that "The
Republic of Viet-Nam opposes Communism in any form" and
that "Every activity designed to publicize or carry out
Communism is prohibited." If applied strictly, they
would have to be changed before overt communists could
overtly operate politically. But these phrases also
presumably can be interpreted to mean almost anything
the government wants them to mean, and if an agreement
were made for VC and NLF participation in the political
system they could easily be ignored."

The Constitution nowhere explicitly prohibits
communists or NLF members from either voting or running
for office. The 1967 senatorial election law, however,
excludes from candidacy "those who have directly or
indirectly worked for communism and pro-communist neutralism
or worked in the interests of communism." (The presidential
and lower house laws, I assume, have similar provisions.)
Presumably these provisions would have to be repealed to

IV-5

open the doors for NLF participation in the system.

The Lower House

The Constitution provides for the election of 100 to
200 representatives for four years by "universal suffrage, direct
and secret ballot." It also says that "Candidates run as
individuals from separate constituencies no larger than provinces."
In fact, in 1967, 137 representatives were elected on a plurality
basis from in effect 69 different electoral districts, 21 from single
member districts, 16 from single-member ethnic districts, and the
remaining 100 from two-to-six-seat districts. (See Table IV-1).

With respect to Lower House elections, it would be
possible, without constitutional amendment:

(1) to add up to 63 new representatives, an obvious means
of providing for NLF representation;

(2) to alter the present mixed-constituency system so as
to have purely single member districts or purely
multi-member districts (provided no district is
larger than a province);

(3) to modify the current plurality formula or to replace
it with a majority vote system (with or without run-off
elections) or with proportional representation, (provided
party slates were not used).

IV-6

Table IV-1. Lower House Constituencies, 1967 Election

<table><thead><tr><th>Number of Seats per District</th><th>Number of Districts</th><th>Number of Representatives</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>6</td><td>3</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>2</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>6</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>6</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>15</td><td>30</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>21</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>1-Ethnic Minority</td><td>16</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>69</td><td>137</td></tr></tbody></table>

Apparently it would not be possible, without constitutional amendment, to have a new election for the 137 seats filled in 1967 before 1971.

## The Upper House

Less flexibility exists in the senatorial electoral system. Unlike representatives, senators must be elected by plurality and must be elected on a list system. The Senate is also at its constitutional limit of 60 seats. One-half of the current membership will, however, come up for reelection in 1970. At that time, voters would, presumably, elect three ten-man slates of senators. If the NLF participated in such an election, it would seem highly probable that it could elect at least one slate. The electoral system which in 1967 favored the Catholics could in 1970 favor the NLF.

IV-7

The Executive

The Constitution simply provides that the President
and Vice President are elected on one list for a four-
year term "by the entire nation by direct and secret bal-
lot." The 1967 election was run on a straight plurality
basis. It would be possible by law, however, to provide
for a run-off election or for the Australian majority-
vote system. The next regular presidential election would
be in September 1971. Under the Constitution, it would,
however, be possible to have a new presidential election
before that date if the President resigned his office before
November 1, 1970 or if both President and Vice President
resigned between November 1, 1970 and the regularly scheduled
election in September 1971. In these cases, indeed, the
Constitution requires that a new election be held within
three months after the Presidency becomes vacant. The
Constitution also provides that this election will be
for "a new term of office." Since the Presidential term
is defined as four years, this early election would not
be simply to fill out the unexpired term, until November 1,
1971, but would be for a new four year term dating from
that election.

These provisions would make it possible, within the
framework of the Constitution, to agree with the NLF to
have new presidential elections at almost any time, provided
(and it may be a big proviso!) that Thieu and Ky can be

IV-8

persuaded to resign.

## Provincial and Local Elections

The Constitution provides for the popular election of village, provincial, and municipal councils and of province chiefs and mayors. Provincial and municipal councils were last elected in May 1964, and they should have been elected again in May 1968, but they were not. Village councils were elected in April 1967 and are due to come up again in mid-1969. The Constitution provided that province chiefs could be appointed during the first presidential term. Consequently, if the Constitution is adhered to, province chief elections presumably should take place no later than 1972 and would have to occur earlier if the Presidential term ended earlier.

The timing and structure of both provincial and local elections could easily be adapted within the Constitution to whatever arrangements seemed desirable to provide for the participation of the NLF. In this connection, it should be noted that the NLF claims to have elected Liberation Committees for 10 of the 44 GVN provinces and for 1,000 to 1,200 villages. As of August 1967 GVN village councils had been elected in some 1,037 villages.

IV-9

C. Voting is Highly Fragmented in Vietnam but Changes in District Magnitude Can Significantly Affect the Degree of Fragmentation

The 1967 voting was highly fragmented. Eleven tickets contested the Presidency; the winning slate received 34.8% of the total vote. Forty-eight slates (of ten candidates each) contested the six slate-places in the Senate. The slate which came in first got only 20.1% of the total vote; the sixth slate, which also was elected, received 11.4% of the vote. The vote for the other forty-two slates varied from that percentage down to 5.7% of the vote. In the Lower House elections, 1,172 candidates ran for 137 seats, an overall ratio of eight contestants for each seat. Roughly 30% of the successful candidates for non-ethnic seats were elected with less than 15% of the vote, 60% were elected with less than 20% of the vote, and almost 80% were elected with less than 25% of the vote. While there were significant variations in the extent of fragmentation, the overall pattern was certainly characterized by highly personalized candidacies and the absence of broad-based electoral coalitions. (See Table IV-2.) The average senate slate was elected with 13.1% of the vote; the average lower house winner by 20.5% of the vote. Almost no elected national official in Vietnam -- except those holding ethnic seats in the Lower House -- won as many as 35% of the votes in his contest.

IV-10

(u)

Table IV-2. Votes of Representatives
by City and Corps

<table><thead><tr><th>% of Vote in District</th><th> Saigon - Gia Dinh</th><th>Other Municipalities</th><th>I</th><th>II</th><th>III</th><th>IV</th><th>Total Minus Ethnic</th><th>Ethnic</th><th>Total</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0-15</td><td>24</td><td></td><td></td><td>4</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>35</td><td>0</td><td>35</td></tr><tr><td>15-20</td><td>2</td><td>2</td><td></td><td>10</td><td>7</td><td>16</td><td>37</td><td>1</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>20-25</td><td></td><td>2</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>7</td><td>24</td><td>0</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>25-35</td><td></td><td>1</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>13</td><td>2</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>35-50</td><td></td><td>1</td><td>3</td><td>1</td><td></td><td>4</td><td>9</td><td>6</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>over 50</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>1</td><td></td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>7</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>26</td><td></td><td>6</td><td>15</td><td>23</td><td>17</td><td>34</td><td>121</td><td>16</td><td>137</td></tr></tbody></table>

A fragmented system like this, it has been suggested, would open the way for the NLF as a highly cohesive, well-organized, sizeable minority (averaging perhaps 20 to 30% of the vote nationally) to win a highly disproportionate share of the seats in the legislature and conceivably even to elect a President. The existing electoral system, which benefits the relatively cohesive and well-organized Catholic and military minorities, could be turned against them by the perhaps somewhat better organized and larger minority represented by the NLF. The frequency of multi-seat districts also enhances the desirability of disciplined, bullet voting, at which presumably the NLF would also excel.

What are the causes of this fragmentation and to what extent is it the product of the electoral system?

The underlying causes lie in the nature of Vietnamese

IV-11

society and culture: the high degree of personalistic individualism, the dominance of particularistic family loyalties, and the relative absence of trust in social behavior. In addition, the political leaders and groupings which figure in GVN politics have, by and large, failed to develop effective electoral organizations reaching down to the grass roots. Politics, consequently, as in many societies at low levels of political modernization--witness 18th century England and America--tends to reflect personality, family, and clique. It is basically a politics of factionalism.

Significant variations in vote fragmentation do, nonetheless, occur in Vietnam. These variations can be explained by differences in the cohesion of social groups and in the magnitude of electoral districts.

### (1) Socio-political cohesion and vote fragmentation

The number of candidates contesting any given seat is largely independent of the electoral structure, which has an equal impact throughout the country. The candidate/seat ratio may hence be taken as a rough index of group cohesion versus social fragmentation. If an extremely large number of candidates run for office in a particular district, the level of socio-political cohesion in the district is presumably low. If a small number of candidates run, the level of socio-political cohesion is high: at least some non-structural factors were operating to reduce the number of aspiring office holders. As the data in Table IV-3 suggest, the level of social cohesion in a district (as measured by the candidate/seat ratio) is strongly associated with vote fragmentation.

IV-13

Vote fragmentation is least among the ethnic minority constituencies. (See Table IV-4.) The average vote for the winning candidate in these districts was a very respectable 53.7%. The candidate/seat ratios varied from 2.0 to 5.5, with the data suggesting high levels of socio-political cohesion among the Southern Montagnards, Chams, and Cambodians, and a slightly lower but still high level among the Northern Montagnard refugees. The effects of communal groups is perhaps also visible in Tay Ninh, An Giang, and Chau Doc provinces whose candidate/seat ratios of 5.7, 6.2, and 4.7 were also distinctly below the national average. These low ratios did not, however, translate into winning vote percentages significantly higher than the national averages.

Vote fragmentation and candidate/seat ratios in I Corps also suggest significantly higher levels of socio-political cohesion there than elsewhere in the country. These undoubtedly reflect the strength of the Revolutionary Dai Viets, VNQDD, and Buddhist movements in those provinces.

Vote fragmentation in the urban areas was very high. Thirteen of the fifteen winners in Saigon won with less than 15% of the vote, and the other two got less than 20%. None of the eleven winners in Gia Dinh got more than 15% of the vote. Four of the six representatives from the other municipalities won with less than 25% of the vote. The average winning percentage in the six municipalities plus Gia Dinh was 12.8%; the average for the non-ethnic seats in the rest of the country was 23.3%.

IV-14

High urban vote fragmentation reflected high candidate/seat ratios, which, in turn, suggest low levels of social-political cohesion in the cities. The candidate/seat ratio of 14.6 in Saigon-Gia Dinh was completely out of line with those in the rest of the country. In part this was undoubtedly due to the twin facts that: (a) most candidates are urban residents; and (b) campaigning in a city is less difficult--and less risky--than campaigning in the countryside. It also, however, undoubtedly reflects the greater heterogeneity of the urban population.

Vote fragmentation thus varies inversely with the strength of communal groups and parties and directly with the level of urbanization.

## (2) District magnitude and vote fragmentation

Despite these relationships between social factors and vote fragmentation, an even more powerful explanation of differences in vote fragmentation for lower house elections exists in the structure of the electoral system. The decisive factor would appear to be simply the number of seats in a district, i.e., district magnitude. The average winning percentage in six-man districts was 11.4%, only a little more than one-third that (30.8%) in one-man non-ethnic districts. The fairly direct correlation between district size and vote fragmentation is clearly visible in Table IV-5.

IV-15

Table IV-5 District Magnitude and Vote Fragmentation

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Number of<br>Seats In<br>District</th><th colspan="2">All Districts</th><th colspan="2">Urban Districts</th></tr><tr><th>Number of<br>Districts</th><th>Average<br>of Winners</th><th>Number of<br>Districts</th><th>Average<br>of Winners</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>6</td><td>3</td><td>11.4%</td><td>2</td><td>8.5%</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>2</td><td>10.3</td><td>2</td><td>10.3</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>6</td><td>20.8</td><td>1</td><td>11.0</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>6</td><td>20.8</td><td>0</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>15</td><td>22.3</td><td>1</td><td>21.5</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>21</td><td>30.8</td><td>4</td><td>26.5</td></tr><tr><td>1-Ethnic<br>Minority</td><td>16</td><td>53.7</td><td>0</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>69</td><td>20.5</td><td>10</td><td>12.8</td></tr></tbody></table>

District magnitude also explains in large part the apparent differences in urban and rural vote fragmentation. Four of the five largest districts are urban districts. Vote fragmentation within urban areas also varied directly with district magnitude. Urbanization clearly has some positive effect on fragmentation, but it is secondary to the impact of district magnitude.

The strong association between district magnitude and vote fragmentation found in Vietnam is apparently a fairly common phenomenon, also prevalent in electoral systems with much higher levels of political cohesion and organization. In his study of 117 elections in primarily Western democratic systems, Rae found that the fractionalization of both elective and parliamentary party systems varied directly

IV-16

with district magnitude: "high magnitudes are associated
with great fractionalization, and vice versa." The
relationship was, however, also found to be curvilinear,
with the fractionalization increasing at a decreasing
rate as magnitude increased.*

The effects of district magnitude on fragmentation
in Vietnam can also be seen by comparing upper house, lower
house, and presidential voting. The president was elected,
in effect, in a one-seat district, and hence we should
expect his winning percentage to correspond closely to that
of the winners in the single-seat lower house contests.
This does, in fact, turn out to be the case: the presiden-
tial winner got 34.8%; the average lower house single seat
winner got 30.8%. Similarly, we should expect the average
winning percentage for the senate slates (elected in
effect in a six-seat district) to correspond closely to
the average winning percentage in the six-seat lower house
districts. Again this turns out to be the case: the six-
seat house winners average 11.4% of the vote; the winning
senate slates averaged 13.1% of the vote.

It thus seems reasonable to predict that given the
social structure and current level of political cohesion
in South Vietnam, a candidate can win a single-seat plurality
election by getting roughly one-third of the total vote.
As the district magnitude increases, a candidate can expect

*Rae, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-121.

IV-17

to win with a decreasing percentage of the vote, about 12% of
the vote being necessary in a six-member district. Thus in the
three-slate senatorial election scheduled for next year, one
would predict that a slate would have to receive 21% or 22% of the
total vote to win.

D. A Shift in the Vietnamese Electoral System to a Multi-Member Run-Off Majority System Would Reduce the Probability of the NLF Receiving Disproportionate Representation in the National Assembly

The most significant factor in reducing vote fragmenta-
tion will be NLF participation in the electoral system. Cohesion
does tend to generate cohesion. The prospect of a well-organized,
sizeable minority attempting to win electoral victories will
undoubtedly promote intense efforts at electoral cooperation
among non-communist politicians at both the local and national
levels. The participation of the NLF could well be the critical
factor which would move the Vietnamese system from the politics
of factionalism to that of polarization and expansion.* If the
NLF participation in the system does not have this effect, on
the other hand, the existing electoral system is likely to lead
to the NLF receiving highly disproportionate representation in
the national assembly.

* See my *Political Order in Changing Societies* (Yale, 1968), pp. 412-420.

IV-18

It would be desirable to safeguard against this eventuality
by altering the existing electoral system. The principal alterna-
tives available are outlined in Table IV-6. The current system
is a plurality mixed (single and multi-member) district system.
The principal alternatives are: (a) proportional representation;
(b) a single-member district plurality system; or (c) a run-off
majority system.

Table IV-6. TYPES OF ELECTORAL SYSTEMS

<table><thead><tr><th>District<br>Magnitude</th><th>Majority<br>Run-off</th><th>Australian</th><th>Electoral Formulae<br>Plurality</th><th>Proportional<br>Representation</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Single<br>Member</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Mixed</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Multi-<br>Member</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

Proportional Representation

A proportional representation system maximizes proportionality of legislative seats to popular votes. It would insure that if the NLF got 20% to 30% of the total vote, it would not get more than that in legislative seats. It would not, however, offer inducements for non-communist groups to coalesce in the electoral process; coalescence if it took place at all would take place in the legislature. There would also be some question over the constitutionality of PR for lower house elections. The present Constitution

IV-19

provides that candidates for the lower house must "run as individuals".
This would, presumably, preclude the most simple and common forms
of PR, all of which require candidates to run as members of party
slates and require voters to vote for a slate rather than an individual.

Single-Member District Plurality System

The earlier analysis relating district magnitude to vote
fragmentation suggests that an effective antidote to excessive
fragmentation would be a straight single-member district plurality
system. Those western democracies which have such electoral systems
almost invariably have two party political systems. The winning
percentage consequently is normally 50% or more. As we have noticed,
in the 1967 Vietnamese elections, the winning percentage in single-
member contests averaged about 33%. The difference between these
two figures is, in some degree, a measure of the organizational
underdevelopment of Vietnamese politics.

The universal use of single-member districts in Vietnam
would tend to produce greater cohesion and to raise the winning
percentage. The NLF would attempt to add to its hard-core vote what-
ever allies it thought necessary to produce the winning margin,
while the leading non-NLF group or political figure would similarly
attempt to enhance his appeal to win a plurality. Single-member
districts produce fewer parties and benefit the stronger ones. The
NLF undoubtedly would be one of the beneficiaries of such a system.
The extent to which other groups benefitted from it would be
directly proportional to the extent that the introduction of the

IV-20

system induced them to form broader-based electoral coalitions.

A single member plurality system is more likely than any other to lead to something like the Japanese "one and a half party system", with a majority non-NLF coalition opposing a minority NLF grouping.

A single-member district system would also tend to reduce the scope and intensity of political competition. In many provinces GVN-groups could be sure of at least carrying the district with the provincial capital while NLF and communal groups might be equally sure of carrying one or more of the rural districts. Each group would be likely to have a certain number of safe seats which would enhance its sense of security with the system.

Single-member districts, on the other hand, do pose some problems.

(1) In multi-member districts the boundaries are not so important. In single-member districts boundary drawing (gerrymandering) can easily decide the election long before it is held. Some of the electoral competition is transformed into legislative competition. Who draws the boundaries becomes of crucial importance.

(2) Single-member districts produce less proportional results than multi-member districts. They greatly overrepresent the strongest party. If we can be sure that party is not the NLF, the system is fine. But can we be sure?

(3) Single-member districts give each contestant an incentive to promote divisive candidates to take votes away from his principal opponents. The NLF is better able to do this than other groups. In

IV-21

a district where both the NLF and Cao Dai are strong, for instance,
the NLF is more likely to be able to get two or three "fake" Cao
Dai to enter the race than the Cao Dai will be able to get dissident
NLFers to play its game.

(4) Single-member districts are more vulnerable to shifts in population than multi-member districts. In Vietnam such a system could in a few years produce a number of rotten boroughs from which the population had moved but whose boundaries it would be very difficult to alter.

Majority Vote Systems
---

Majority vote systems are seldom used because of the
complex mechanisms required to produce majorities. To get a majority
the voter almost inevitably has to vote twice, either in the same
election (the Australian majority system) or in two successive
elections (the run-off system). Under the Australian system the
voter indicates first, second, third choices, etc., among the
candidates for the seat or seats. If no one gets a majority of
first place votes, the votes of the lowest candidate are redistributed
according to their second choices. This process continues until
the requisite number of candidates receive majorities. The useful-
ness of such a system in Vietnam would depend upon voters who cast
first-place votes for one non-NLF candidate casting their second-
place vote for another non-NLF candidate. It would seem likely,
however, that this is just precisely what the average Vietnamese
voter would not do. He is, instead, likely to feel that he has an

IV-22

interest in keeping a foot in both camps and hence is likely to cast his second choice if not his first for the NLF.

The run-off system does not pose the same problem. For here the second choices are made more by the politician than by the voter. Presumably non-communist candidates who lost out in the first election would normally tend to throw their support to the remaining non-NLF candidate in the run-off election. So long as the NLF is a 20% to 30% minority, it is clearly in the interests of the anti-NLF groups to polarize the election into a choice between the NLF and the most non-NLF candidate. This is precisely what the runoff system, unlike the Australian majority system, does.

A run-off majority system could be applied to either single-member or multi-member districts. Given some of the problems involved with one-seat districts, it might be well to continue with a predominantly multi-seat district system but adding the requirement that a candidate receive a majority of the votes in the initial election in order to win. If one or more seats were not filled by majority vote in the initial election a run-off election would be held. The number of candidates in the run-off would be twice the number of seats to be filled; they would be those who received the largest pluralities in the initial election; and they would be elected by plurality in the run-off election. Thus, if there were 15 candidates contesting three seats in the initial election, and only one candidate got a majority of the votes cast, the four candidates with the largest pluralities would contest the two remaining seats in the run-off.

IV-23

The principal disadvantage of a run-off system is the inconvenience and expense (to government, candidates and voters) of running two elections to secure the results of one. On the other hand, the system does have many real benefits. It would not produce the same strong tendencies towards an enduring two-party system that a single-seat plurality system would, but it would also involve fewer risks to either side. It should lead to a greater proportionality between popular votes and legislative seats than a single-member plurality system. It could, in addition, be easily introduced by legislative action without changing the existing constitution. Moreover, the same run-off majority system could also be applied to the presidential election. The introduction of such a system would seem to be a natural next step in Vietnamese political development.

V-1

# THE PLAYERS AND HOW WE CAN HELP THEM

## A. Coalitions of National Players: Parties and Party Systems

The principal players in national politics in the immediate postwar period will presumably include:

1. the NLF

2. the GVN military-administrative apparat

3. Buddhists

4. Catholics and northern refugees

5. Hoa Hao and Cao Dai

6. Ethnic minorities (Chinese, Montagnard, Khmer)

7. labor (CVT)

8. Urban intelligentsia

9. Old line parties (Dai Viet, Tan Dai Viet, VNQDD).

The cleavages and coalitions which exist among these players will shape the South Vietnamese party system. The key issue, of course, is the extent to which the participation by the NLF in national political competition engenders greater cooperation among non-communist groups. This cooperation could take a variety of forms. At the lowest level of political organization, this coalescence could simply involve highly temporary alliances among essentially narrow-based and personalistic cliques, thus preserving past patterns of factional politics. It is quite likely, however, that the combination of widespread political participation plus the threat of the NLF plus wartime experiences in electioneering and organization-building will bring postwar Vietnam out of the politics

V-2

(w)

of factionalism and into the development of more long-lived and
substantial political organizations.

In the past, collective political actors have been largely
either functional groups (like the military or labor) or communal
groups (like the Catholics or Montagnards). These groups will
obviously continue to play major roles in Vietnamese politics,
but they are likely to be either supplemented by or transformed
into more distinctly political organizations with functions
directly related to the input side of the political system. The
creation of such organizations is the heart of political develop-
ment, and postwar Vietnam appears to be ready for this "political
take-off." There are, indeed, few countries in the world which
have achieved the levels of modernization characteristic of South
Vietnam (in terms of urbanization, literacy, education) which
have not developed political party systems much more highly
structured than that which has existed in South Vietnam. Some sort
of real political party system, significantly different from the
old patterns, seems likely to be one of the major innovations on
the postwar Vietnamese political scene.

Any one or combination of four types of party systems --
two, dominant, one-and-a-half, multi -- might emerge in postwar
Vietnam. A two-party system, of course, carries the endorsement
of the present Constitution. Paradoxically, however, the proba-
bility of such a system developing in postwar Vietnam depends upon
the political skill and strength of the NLF leaders. The key
characteristic of such a system is that each of the two major
parties has a reasonable chance of electing a president and con-
trolling the national assembly. Presumably the NLF and the GVN

V-3

military-administrative apparat would be the cores of the opposing parties and the extent to which they competed equally would depend upon the extent to which the leaders of the two parties were able to make effective alliances with other groups. The most likely two-party system in South Vietnam would look something like this:

(1) <u>Two Party System</u>

<table><thead><tr><th>Party A</th><th>Ambivalent</th><th>Party B</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>GVN apparat</td><td>Chinese</td><td>NLF</td></tr><tr><td>Catholics</td><td>Montagnards</td><td>Buddhists</td></tr><tr><td>Northern refugees</td><td></td><td>Urban intelligentsia</td></tr><tr><td>Hoa Hao</td><td></td><td>Cao Dai?</td></tr><tr><td>CVT</td><td></td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

A <u>dominant party system</u>, such as in India, seems much less likely to emerge in South Vietnam. The key characteristic of such a system is one reasonably well organized party usually occupying the political center with fragmented opposition to both the left and right. The fragmentation of the opposition imposes much lower demands on the dominant party. If the opposition is fragmented, the party need not even be a majority party in order to be a dominant party. (The Congress Party in India has, indeed, never won a majority of the votes in a national election.)

In Vietnam, however, the majority is fragmented while one extremist minority is well organized. The most likely dominant party system to emerge might be one in which the NLF was the core of the dominant party and was opposed by fragmented religious, nationalist, and ethnic minorities. This, in short, would be the system which

V-4

would emerge if no further cohesion developed among non-communist
groups. Such a system would in all likelihood be a highly
unstable one, serving simply as a stepping stone to the
imposition of a full-scale communist dominated party dictatorship.

(2a) <u>Left Dominant Party System</u>

<table>
  <thead>
    <tr>
      <th>Dominant party</th>
      <th colspan="4">Splinter parties</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>NLF</td>
      <td>Hoa Hao-</td>
      <td>Dai Viets</td>
      <td>GVN Apparat</td>
      <td>CVT</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Buddhists</td>
      <td>Cao Dai</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Urban intelligentsia</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Chinese</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Montagnards</td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

An alternative type of dominant party system might result
from the coalescence of a number of moderate and neutralist groups
into a broad-gauged centrist coalition governing the country against
fragmented opposition from both the left and right. Such a system
might look like this:

(2b) <u>Center Dominant Party System</u>

<table>
  <thead>
    <tr>
      <th>Right splinter parties</th>
      <th>Dominant party</th>
      <th>Left Splinter party</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>GVN apparat</td>
      <td>Buddhists</td>
      <td>NLF</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Dai Viets</td>
      <td>Urban intelligentsia</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>Cao Dai</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>Hoa Hao</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>CVT</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

Again, this system seems unlikely to be a very stable one. The
principal problem is the absence from the dominant party coalition
of the three groups -- Catholics, GVN apparat, NLF -- which have
demonstrated any decent level of organizational skill and adminis-
trative effectiveness. It seems likely that a centrist dominant
party of this sort would be fairly quickly torn apart by personal
rivalries and doctrinal conflicts among its participants. It would,

V-5

in all likelihood, be supplanted by a left dominant system in which
the NLF played the decisive role.

A third type of dominant party system might emerge as a
result of an effective coalescence of GVN and Catholic groups,
much like that which might occur in a two-party system, but with the
opposition to this coalition remaining fragmented.

(2c) Right Dominant Party System

<table><tr><td>Dominant party</td><td>Splinter parties</td></tr><tr><td>GVN apparat</td><td>Buddhists</td></tr><tr><td>Catholics and<br/>northern refugees</td><td>VNQDD Urban intelligentsia</td></tr><tr><td>Hoà Hao</td><td>NLF</td></tr><tr><td>CVT</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Montagnards</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Chinese</td><td></td></tr></table>

The likelihood of this type of system emerging seems rather slim,
since the principal stimulus to coalescence among anti-communist
groups will be the threat of a communist take-over. If the NLF is
so weak as to be only a splinter party, this coalescence becomes
highly improbable.

If, however, the NLF is strong enough to be considerably more
than a splinter but considerably less than a majority, a _one-and-a-
half_ party system becomes a real possibility. This system has two
major parties, but differs from the two-party system in that one
party is quite clearly the majority party while the opposition is
clearly the minority and is faced with the prospect of life as the
permanent opposition. Japan is the most notable current example of
a one-and-a-half party system. In some periods of history the US
has approximated such a system nationally (what Lubell has called
a "sun" and "moon" party system). The emergence of such a system

V-6

in South Vietnam depends upon the non-communist groups achieving
a high level of coalescence in the face of only a medium level
threat from the NLF. Over time such a system could conceivably
evolve into a two-party system if the NLF-dominated coalition
was able to broaden its appeal and win the support of other groups.
The experience of the Japanese Socialists -- not to mention that
of the much more moderate SPD in Germany -- suggests that this is
not an easy transition to accomplish.

(3) <u>One-and-a-Half Party System</u>

<table>
  <thead>
    <tr>
      <th>Majority party</th>
      <th>Minority party</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>GVN apparat</td>
      <td>NLF</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Catholics</td>
      <td>Urban intelligentsia</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Northern refugees</td>
      <td>Some Buddhists</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Hoa Hao</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Cao Dai</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Montagnards</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Old line parties</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>CVT</td>
      <td></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

The difficulties involved in achieving a high level of non-communist coalescence in the face of moderate NLF strength suggest that a <u>multi-party system</u> is a more likely alternative than a one-and-a-half party system.

Multi-party systems normally have four or five major parties and are produced by the existence of a number of lines of cleavage of about equal salience to politics. Thus, in France of the Third and Fourth Republics, the principal cleavages between secular and Catholic, republican and anti-republican, leftist and conservative produced a system of five or six major parties, each representing a unique combination of views on all three issues and each capable of aligning itself with a different combination of parties on any one issue. The cleavages in Vietnam would include: communist and

V-7

neutralist vs. anti-communist; Buddhist vs. religious minorities;
urban vs. rural; southerners vs. Annamites and northerners; ethnic
minorities vs. ethnic Vietnamese. In Vietnam such a party system
might take the following form:

(4) A multi-party system

GVN apparat Hoa Hao Buddhists Dai Viets NLF
Catholics Cao Dai Urban intelligentsia Annamites
Montagnards CVT

The elections of 1967 and the shifting coalitions in the national
assembly suggest that this type of party system may well already exist
in embryo. In a parliamentary system, the formation of a government
depends upon a sufficient number of these groups coalescing
together to form a parliamentary majority. Where the government is
not responsible to parliament, as in South Vietnam, this impetus to
the formation of even a temporary majority coalition is lacking.
Coalition incentives are also largely absent from the existing
electoral system, although some could be furnished by provisions
for run-off elections, as suggested above in Section IV.

Any guess as to the probability of a particular type of
party system emerging in South Vietnam depends in some measure on
the assumptions made with respect to:

(a) NLF political strength, including its ability to win allies; and

(b) the degree of coalescence which will take place among
non-communist groups.

Alternative combinations of high, medium, and low non-communist coalescence could produce the following outcomes in terms of party

V-8

systems.

Table V-1. NLF STRENGTH, NON-COMMUNIST COALESCENCE, AND POSSIBLE PARTY SYSTEMS

<table><thead><tr><th>Non-Communist Coalescence</th><th>High</th><th>NLF Strength Medium</th><th>Low</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>High</td><td>a. Two</td><td>d. 1 1/2</td><td>g. x</td></tr><tr><td>Medium</td><td>b. x</td><td>e. Multi</td><td>h. Dom-Right</td></tr><tr><td>Low</td><td>c. Dom-Left</td><td>f. Dom-Cent.</td><td>i. None</td></tr></tbody></table>

Three of the nine spaces are not accounted for by our six systems.

Box g embodies an inherently highly improbable situation, which can be ignored for all practical purposes. Under Box i conditions, no new organized party system is likely to emerge, and the existing pre-party pattern of politics would continue with the NLF joining in the old game but not changing the game. The Box b situation is also relatively improbable. If NLF strength is very high, non-communist groups are likely to choose one or another polar alternative as far as coalescence is concerned. Either they combine together (Box a) to defeat the NLF in a party-to-party battle (like Italy 1948 or Chile 1965) or they break ranks and attempt to make the best deal they can by joining with the NLF in a dominant left coalition (Box c).

Anyone can make their own predictions as to party system outcomes based on their own assumptions about NLF strength and non-communist coalescence. For my part, I conclude this analysis with what seems to me to be a reasonable summary of the relative desirability of these systems from the viewpoint of the US and the relative probability of their actually occurring.

V-9

Table V-2. POSSIBLE POSTWAR PARTY SYSTEMS

<table><thead><tr><td>Rank</td><td>Desirability</td><td>Probability</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>1 1/2</td><td>Multi</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>Dom-Right</td><td>Two</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>Multi</td><td>1 1/2</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>Two</td><td>Dom-Left</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>Dom-Center</td><td>Dom-Center</td></tr><tr><td>6</td><td>Dom-Left</td><td>Dom-Right</td></tr></tbody></table>

All of which would seem to indicate that the US should push for a one-and-a-half system but that it should be prepared to settle for a multi-party system.

## B. Arenas of Local Competition

While greater coalescence on the national level is clearly desirable, it will only really bear fruit if the groups involved have themselves deep roots in local political organization. The NLF is, in itself, not a very broad or diverse grouping; its strength derives from the extent to which it can mobilize effective organization at the local level. A broad-gauged coalition of nationalist groups -- Catholics, labor, Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, etc. -- would not necessarily be an effective counterbalance to the NLF unless its elements also were well organized for political competition at the local level.

The level of political competition is likely to be low in the hard-core VC areas, the rural areas dominated by religious or ethnic communal groups, and the provincial and district towns dominated by the GVN administrative-military bureaucracy. Competition is

V-10

likely to be intense in those rural areas in which the fighting
was the hardest and in the metropolitan centers of Saigon, Danang,
and Hue. It is in these areas, consequently, that the US should
concentrate its efforts to help its friends and to defeat its enemies.
The evolution of competition in these two areas, however, is likely
to differ significantly. In the contested rural areas, competition
is likely to be intense for a brief period and then to decrease
rapidly as one group or another established control over each
locality. In the cities, competition is likely to intensify
indefinitely as the cities become the principal sources of opposition
to the government.

C. <u>The Contested Rural Areas: Monopolizing Control</u>

The principal characteristic of these areas is the absence
of effective political and social organization beyond the hamlet
level. This vacuum has been responsible for the heavy fighting,
for the intensive GVN pacification efforts, and for the intensive
VC counter efforts. These military and political struggles, in
turn, tend to perpetuate the organizational vacuum by discrediting
traditional authorities, enhancing distrust, dividing villages and
families against each other.

The end of the shooting will lead to intensive efforts by
both sides to fill the organizational vacuum through political means.
The importance of these initial efforts is all the greater because
rural localities generally are not conducive to prolonged political
competition. The relative homogeneity of the population and the

V-11

shortage of organizational skills tend to lead to a situation in which one group becomes dominant and other groups disappear or become distinctly subordinate. In a short time either the NLF or one non-communist group will establish itself as the dominant group in that area (which may mean a village, a district, or perhaps even a province). The basic organizing group in a rural area may be a political party, a church, or a labor union. It is a mistake, however, to assume that most rural areas, even in a society with as highly mobilized a rural population as South Vietnam, can support a large number of different organizations. Hence the US and/or the GVN ought to promote one particular non-communist rural organization in any given rural area. In some areas it may be the Hoa Hao; in others the Tenant Farmers Union; in others the VNQDD; in still others a cooperative group. The choice obviously depends upon which group already has the strongest roots in the area. The key point, however, is not to disperse effort and support among two or more non-communist groups in any one rural area.

The other key principle is the need for prompt action. Longer range measures designed to link village and city, such as extension of the market economy, are undoubtedly desirable, but they are not substitutes for getting in first when the shooting stops. Similarly, the current Village Development Program which is being rapidly and apparently effectively implemented also furnishes a foundation for successful competition with the NLF. The decentralization of functions, the subordination of RD cadres to village authorities, the establishment of a Joint Fund arrangement for direct

V-12

US support of village activities, the proliferation of village committees and subcommittees to promote communal development, the assumption by the village of major responsibilities in land reform -- all these tend to make the village government itself a more effective counterweight to the NLF and its Liberation Committees. On the other hand, they also make village government a more important target for political competition. Developing an effective village government is a necessary precondition to successful competition with the NLF but it is not sufficient. Social forces and political groups must still be organized to win and to maintain control over that local government.

In many contested rural areas the strongest local group will be a religious or ethnic minority. This group may encompass only a minority of the people in a village, but in most cases it will undoubtedly be better to encourage and to build upon this group, local minority as it is, than to attempt to promote organization of a majority which has never been organized before. The basic principle will be to capitalize on existing building blocs. In some areas these blocs may be unique to the area. They will, nonetheless, provide more effective resistance to NLF efforts at takeover than would a national communal group (e.g., Catholics or Hoa Hao) which did not have the same existing strength in the area. More often, the key to establishing control in the area will be a national communal group. The GVN consequently should give high priority to developing cooperative relationships with these groups, and the US should support such efforts politically and perhaps with material resources. Clearly one key to local control will be the local Popular Forces and militia; the more effectively these forces

V-13

are organized and related to the local communal group, the easier it will be to resist NLF take-over. In addition, in the immediate cease-fire period, the countryside is likely to be overrun with roving bandits and marauders. The group which is able to furnish reasonably effective security against these dangers will have a strong claim to the allegiance of the average peasant. One important step to improved relations between the GVN, on the one hand, and the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai, Khmers, and Montagnards, on the other, would be for the GVN to bring representatives of these groups into high positions in the national administration. A more extensive sharing of national power with these groups is likely to be the only realistic alternative to an extensive sharing of power with the NLF.

Another critical group in terms of bridging the gap between countryside and city consists of what may be termed, after Belden Paulson, "the small intellectuals." These include small businessmen, traders, local clergy, the more prosperous resident farmers, and, above all, the school teachers. They are the people who normally furnish the non-administrative linkage between the world of the peasant and the world of the metropolis. They have some education, but typically have not completed the university and, most importantly, their social functions require them to live continuingly in the rural areas. The past weakness of this particular class has been one of the major contributing factors to the political problems of Vietnam. Many of those people who might have assumed these roles in Vietnamese society were recruited into the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong.

The small intellectuals differ from both traditional village leadership and from the local agents of the national bureaucracy.

V-14

Compared to the former, the small intellectuals are more likely to be committed to modern and egalitarian values and to rest their status on achievement rather than ascription. In comparison with the national bureaucrats, the small intellectuals are more likely to have roots in the local community.

Effective competition with the NLF will be helped by an increase in the number of small intellectuals in the countryside and an increase in the political activity and leadership roles assumed by such individuals. As in many other modernizing countries, the key person in this process may be the local school teacher. It would be highly desirable to insure that the school teachers being trained and dispatched to the rural areas receive a good training in politics as well as in education. As Everet Bungardner reports in his memo of 6 January 1969, many Vietnamese "do not fear anyone who could win an election because of their belief that only nationalists would be recognized by the village intellectual and teacher groups at the voting level. These people in turn determine who would win the election."

## D. Metropolitan Centers: Monopolizing Opposition

While competition in rural areas normally leads to one group winning effective control, competition in the cities tends to be a continuing process. One of the few generalizations about politics in modernizing countries which is almost universally true is that the metropolitan centers are the principal source of opposition to the government. In democratic countries the ruling party seldom carries the capital city in an electoral contest. In non-democratic countries intellectuals, students, military groups, sometimes labor

V-15

organizations, are all alert in the capital ready to pounce upon
the government. This has been as true in Vietnam as anywhere
else. The opposition to Diem was centered in Saigon and, to a
lesser degree, in Hue. In 1967 Thieu-Ky failed to get both a
plurality and 30% of the total vote in seven provinces and munici-
palities. Three of these were Saigon, Danang, and Hue.

A prolonged period of open political competition will inevitably
lead to the emergence of strong anti-government groups in the
cities. This urban opposition proclivity offers great opportunities
to the NLF to move in and establish itself as the dominant opposi-
tion group. While the key question in the contested rural areas
concerns who will monopolize control, the key question in the
cities concerns who, if anyone, will monopolize the opposition.

From the US viewpoint the most important goal is to insure
the existence of a strong non-communist opposition to the GVN.
The worst situation in the cities would be for the NLF to dominate
the opposition there. The end of the fighting will see a number of
groups, including the NLF, emerge on the surface of urban politics.
While undoubtedly war-weariness will translate itself into
politics-weariness too, the postwar urban scene should also present
ample opportunity for messianic leaders and mass movements. Con-
ceivably the Buddhists could reemerge as a dominant group. Quite
possibly a movement like the Soka Gakkai could get established in
Vietnam, a development whose probability is increased by the
prominent role which Japanese interests may play in the postwar
reconstruction. Any developments like these ought to be viewed
favorably from the US-GVN viewpoint. It might also be in the

V-16.

interest of the US and GVN to encourage Generals Thi or Minh or Trich Tri Quang to take the lead in organizing the urban opposition to the government. Such an organization would at least occupy the field and prevent the NLF from monopolizing the opposition and thereby attracting to itself all those groups and individuals with real or imagined grievances.

## E. Techniques of political appeal

The NLF may well be the best organized political group in South Vietnam. To counter the NLF top priority has to be given to developing non-communist dominant organizations in the contested rural areas. Organization, however, is not all of politics, and at least three other political resources can be used effectively by pro-GVN groups.

### (1) Populist leaders

Non-communist politics in Vietnam is fragmented and personalistic. Loyalties are to individuals rather than to organizations. Clique and faction play preeminent roles. Studies of political development suggest that this pattern of politics is often followed by the emergence on the political scene of charismatic popular leaders. Personalistic politics, in a sense, is transferred from the cabinet to the street. Certainly one of the most striking lacuna in recent Vietnamese politics has been the failure of any single political leader (except Diem) to develop widespread mass popularity. In part, of course, this reflects the restricted and authoritarian character of the politics of the Diem and immediate

V-17

post-Diem periods. The political obstacles to the emergence of charismatic mass leadership have now been removed, however, and the end of the war will generate conditions of flux, uncertainty, and quite possibly unemployment favorable to the emergence of such leadership.

It is highly probable that the NLF has one or more leaders who could meet this need. It is conceivable that Thieu and/or Ky could also meet it. In both the NLF and ARVN, however, the emphasis is on organizational rather than popular leadership. It has only been slowly and reluctantly that Theiu has learned to play the demagogue, although Ky clearly was temperamentally more inclined in this direction. In any event, it seems likely that some mass political leaders will emerge who have been closely associated with neither the NLF or the GVN. Tzu was in a small way a taste of the future. Such individuals can play a highly functional role in developing a mass appeal which would rival and perhaps undercut that of the communists. In South American terms, Vietnam would seem to be ripe for a Peron or a Rojas Pinilla.

## (2) Mass media

Closely related to the emergence of populistic leadership is the role of the mass media. The expansion of the media offers another important counterweight to the NLF, particularly in the cities. It would seem very much in the interest of the US to give media development a high priority now and in the immediate postwar period. Subsidies to newspapers, investments in radio and TV installations, and distribution of radio and TV sets should all have significant positive benefits for the government. While experts

V-18

differ on the political impact of the media, the old view that
tended to discount its importance has now been superceded by new
evidence that it can play a major role particularly where other
sources of information and viewpoint are weak or conflicting.

(3) Constituent service

Much can also be done to strengthen existing non-
communist political activists by furnishing them with the oppor-
tunity to do good -- or to appear to do good -- to their constituents.
It would seem to be particularly important to furnish these
opportunities to those assemblymen and senators who potentially
confront formidable NLF opposition. Opportunities were apparently
missed to involve congressmen in the introduction of IR-8. It
would indeed be tragic if similar opportunities were again missed
with the land reform program. Assemblymen and senators perhaps can
also play some role in the distribution of war surplus material and
installations. Another opportunity will be in the promotion and
implementation of bonuses and other benefits for former servicemen --
who will comprise, after all, a significant portion of the male
population. In terms of winning support, the way in which benefits
are provided to people is just as important -- and perhaps more
important -- than the extent to which they are provided.

First Draft

124/68

# Getting Ready for Political Competition in South Vietnam

Samuel P. Huntington

## Summary

### I. A Strategy for Political Competition

The US needs to develop a strategy for political competition in Vietnam to supplement its military and diplomatic strategies and to be closely geared to those strategies. The US will have a significant although less important role to play in political competition than it has in military and diplomatic conflicts. A political strategy, unlike the military and diplomatic strategies, has a double goal: to persuade the enemy to compete politically and then to beat him at that competition.

### II. National Power and Local Control: Incentives to Play the Game

The NLF will want an extensive share of national power and full local control of the areas it dominates. It is in the interest of the US and GVN to trade local control for national power. The NLF can be permitted to have a substantial degree of autonomous control of substantial rural areas without serious damage to US-GVN interests.

### III. Political Competition: Arenas and Influences

Low levels of political competition are likely in NLF-controlled rural areas, communal-controlled rural areas, and the district and provincial towns. Political competition in the metropolitan centers will be continuing and intense but not polarized. Competition in the contested rural areas will be intense, polarized, but temporary, as one group or another will establish predominance quickly. Hence US efforts to develop political organizations should be concentrated in those areas.

The three crucial elements in a political competition are: (a) the rules of the game; (b) the number and identity of the players; and (c) the resources which they have at their disposal. The US can influence these in descending order.

### IV. Fixing the Rules of the Game: The Electoral System

Electoral laws significantly affect the outcomes of political competition. The Vietnamese constitution permits considerable flexibility

in setting up an electoral system. Voting in Vietnam has been highly fragmented, and under the existing electoral system the NLF would have serious advantages. Vote fragmentation has been associated with: (a) low levels of group cohesion; (b) high levels of urbanization; and (c) high district magnitudes. Reducing district magnitude should reduce the fragmentation. A single-seat plurality system would accomplish this goal, but also would reduce proportionality and pose electoral risks to both GVN and NLF. A run-off majority system with multi-member districts would offer the best mix of pay-offs in terms of proportionality, cohesion, and minimizing NLF opportunities to manipulate the system.

## V. The Players and How We Can Help Them

### To Follow

I-1

First Draft

1/24/69

GETTING READY FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION

IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Samuel P. Huntington

I. A STRATEGY FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION

For three years from 1965 to 1968 the conflict in
Vietnam was waged almost entirely at the military level
and the principal efforts of the United States were devoted
to developing and carrying out a military strategy which
would provide minimal security against invasion and sub-
version. In April 1968 a second, diplomatic, front was
added to the competition, and it became necessary for the
US to devise and to apply a negotiating strategy for the
Paris talks with Hanoi. At some point during the coming
year, it appears likely that the conflict will be extended
to a third, political, level as the GVN and the groups
associated with it engage in open political competition
with the VC and NLF.

The purpose of this paper is to identify, in a very
preliminary way,* some of the problems involved in such

*This paper is based on brief talks with perhaps a dozen Washington officials and casual reference to a few documents. It clearly is only the beginning of a consideration of a subject which deserves much closer attention than it has thus far received.

I-2

competition and the factors affecting its outcome and to
suggest the outlines of a strategy for the US to follow
and for the US to urge upon the GVN.

Three points affecting this discussion should be
made clear at the outset.

**First.** While the US has played the overwhelmingly
dominant role in shaping allied strategy on the military
and diplomatic levels, it will play a much less important
role in shaping strategy on the political level. Ideally,
it might well be desirable for the US to play no role
whatsoever in the political competition, but to leave the
determination of the rules of the game and the playing of
the game to be worked out by the GVN and the VC-NLF, with
the US confining itself to negotiating with Hanoi the
arrangements to end the military conflict. Such a situation
would have many attractions, not the least being avoidance
by the US of deeper involvement in the subtleties and
complexities of Vietnamese politics.

Yet it is extremely dubious whether the US can, in
fact, duck the issue so neatly. It is also highly debatable
whether it should even try. Much of our grief in Vietnam
has come as a result of our *not* becoming deeply enough
involved in Vietnamese politics during the late 1950s and
again during the two years immediately after the fall of
Diem. Both times we consciously refrained from taking action

I-3

to shape the course of Vietnamese political development.
The results in one case were the increasing alienation of
the government from its people and in the other almost two
years of coups and chaos.

Since early 1966, on the other hand, we have played an
active role in attempting to develop a viable political
system in South Vietnam. The accomplishments have been
substantial. These accomplishments plus the American stake
in the political future of Vietnam plus the sacrifices and
costs which we have incurred in the effort over the past
three years to influence that future - all dictate against
our simply washing our hands of the problem and limiting
ourselves to the military and diplomatic sides of the
conflict. On the other hand, it is clear that the South
Vietnamese role in shaping the political competition and
in engaging in that competition will be much more important
than it has been in the military and diplomatic struggles.

Second. At the present time the struggle is going
on simultaneously on the diplomatic and military fronts.
This imposes a need to coordinate negotiating strategy and
military strategy. It is possible that the military and
diplomatic struggles will end before the political competi-
tion in South Vietnam really gets underway. It is also
possible and even likely that the political competition
will go on simultaneously with negotiations at the diplo-
matic level. Some more overt forms of political competi-
tion are already getting underway long before the achievement

I-4

of a military cease-fire. Undoubtedly all three forms of competition will continue to overlap in the coming months. But also, undoubtedly, political competition will tend to become more important and the military and diplomatic struggles less important.

**Third.** The problem of formulating a strategy for political competition is more complex than those involved in formulating military or diplomatic strategies. In the latter, the goal is simply to win as much as possible from the opponent in the struggles on the battlefield **and** at the negotiating table. In devising a political strategy, however, the first requirement is get the opponent to agree to play the game, that is, to work out an agreement on the rules, and then, secondly, to beat him at the game which he has agreed to play. This is obviously a subtle and tricky business requiring a complex balance of inducements and guarantees for both sides.

II-1

## II. NATIONAL POWER AND LOCAL CONTROL:
### INCENTIVES TO PLAY THE GAME

#### A. Local Control as an Inducement to Political Competition

The NLF's principal incentive to engage in political competition is the beating it is getting in the military competition. If, however, political competition offered at best only an equal chance of losing, it could well conclude that the best course was to continue the military fight in which it would retain greater freedom of action to adjust its tactics and level of operations to its own convenience. An NLF shift to political competition, in short, requires not only increasing costs from the military contest but also some chance of benefits from the political contest. At a minimum, it seems likely that the NLF will agree to participate in political competition only if the structure of that competition:

(1) insures its continued survival as an organization;

(2) offers a reasonable probability of its being able to achieve national power either through political competition or by later reopening a military struggle on more favorable terms.

These minimum aims could be achieved by a negotiated agreement for NLF participation in a coalition government (presumably headed by a neutralist but including some elements

II-2

now in the GVN) and/or by recognition of NLF authority in
those areas of the countryside in which they exercise de
facto control. The NLF would probably be prepared to
sacrifice some elements of local control in order to achieve
a greater share in national power. It would appear to be
clearly in the interest of the US and the GVN, however, to
make substantial concessions in terms of NLF local control
in order to minimize concessions of national power to the
NLF. These concessions could cover:

(a) the degree of autonomy and authority conferred
on NLF local structures; and

(b) the extent of the territory in which such NLF
authority was recognized.

At both these levels there is ample room for substantial
inducements to the NLF without serious injury to the interests
of the US and GVN.

B. Possible Arrangements for Local Control

The arrangements for local control could take a wide
variety of forms, and there is little reason to try to
anticipate in detail all the points which might come up in
prolonged and detailed negotiations. On its part, however,
the GVN could be ready to concede for the areas concerned
any or all of the following:

II-3

(1) recognition of the NLF Liberation Committee structure
as the only legitimate government of the area;

(2) confirmation of the authority of the existing of-
ficials of the Liberation Committee as local officials
of the GVN;

(3) a guarantee that no subsequent appointments of GVN officials within the local government will be made without the approval of the local authorities (a concession comparable to those which the GVN has in the past made to the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao);

(4) acceptance of the VC-NLF guerrilla-militia units
as the Popular Force-Self Defense units of the dis-
trict (as has also been done with Hoa Hao and other
communal units);

(5) a guarantee that no regular ARVN units will enter
the district except with the approval of the local
government (again a commitment somewhat like those
made to the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao in some provinces);

(6) recognition of local control over taxes and the uses
of tax revenues (a procedure already operative within
GVN-controlled rural areas);

(7) recognition by the GVN of the legality of previous
NLF-Liberation Committee decrees on land tenure and

II-4

other local issues;

(8) provision by the GVN (and ultimately, presumably, the US) of material assistance for reconstruction in the district;

(9) immediate representation of the district in the lower house of the National Assembly by election of a representative to one of the 63 "unfilled" seats.

In return for these substantial concessions to local control, the NLF should agree to at least the following:

(1) acceptance of the formal authority of the GVN as the national government;

(2) a guarantee of free movement and security in and out of and within the designated districts for all civilians, including local population, international peace-keeping observers (if such should be created), and civil officials of the Saigon government;

(3) a guarantee of the free movement and security of goods and commerce in and out of and within the district;

(4) acceptance of the functioning within the district of (potentially selected) civilian ministries of the Saigon government such as agriculture, health,

II-5

and education.

C. Extent of Area to be Subject to NLF Local Control

The areas to be conceded to NLF local control would undoubtedly have to be defined in terms of villages and districts, although in some cases, particularly in the Delta, hamlets within a village might have to be divided between NLF and non-NLF control. The specific definition of the areas would clearly be the result of prolonged negotiation. In preparation for this possibility, it would seem highly desirable that negotiating positions be developed identifying which villages and districts could be most reasonably conceded to the NLF, which might be conceded, if necessary, and which should definitely not be allowed to become subject to NLF rule. Such an inventory would have to be based on the most recent and accurate results of the HES and other sources of information.

D. Advantages for US-GVN of Local Control

If NLF local control can be negotiated as a substitute for substantial NLF participation in the national government, the advantages for the US-GVN are considerable.

(1) It prevents the NLF from gaining through negotiation what they have not been able to win through military means, i.e., an open foothold in the cities. If, on the other hand, the NLF did get control of a

II-6

substantial number of Saigon ministries, it would be in a position to give substantial help to its former underground urban organization in developing political appeal and strength in the cities. If the future of Vietnam lies in its cities, it is worthwhile from the US and GVN viewpoint to pay a significant price to minimize the NLF presence in the cities.

(2) Local control undermines the image of the NLF as an equal of the Saigon government and instead reduces it to the level, in the eyes of Vietnamese, of a communal group like the Hoa Hao or Montagnards. Vietnamese traditionally tend to think of the government as an entity more or less endowed with the "mandate of heaven" and existing above conflicting social and political groups. The NLF is laying claim to that mandate. No matter how much territory or how many people the NLF may control locally, if it allows its claim to be an equal to the government to be undermined, it will suffer a severe setback.

(3) In contrast to shared national authority, local control will tend to enhance the importance of political competition at the provincial and local level and to reduce its significance at the national

II-7

level. Fragmentation and disunity among noncommunist
groups are likely to be greater at the national
level than in any particular locality and the un-
desirable consequences of that disunity are also
much greater there. The NLF is, after all, the
most powerful purely political national organization:
at the national level of competition, its organiza-
tion in areas which it does not control would be
weighed in the balance along with its strength in
the areas it does dominate.

(4) The underlying problem in Vietnam has been to bridge the gap between the countryside and the cities. The VC-NLF propose to do this by bringing a mixed urban-rural leadership group to power by mobilizing support in the countryside. Constrained by urban leadership divorced from the countryside, neither the Diem nor post-Diem GVN has been able to bridge this gap.

The US, however, has been bridging the gap through
two means: (a) inducing substantial migration of
people from the countryside to the cities; and
(b) promoting economic development in rural areas
and marketing and transportation links between
them and the cities. In one form or another these
developments will undoubtedly continue after the end

II-8

II-9

First, Local control of substantial, even if disconnected, rural areas does provide the NLF with its minimum prerequisites: a reasonably secure base which guarantees its survival and maintains its options for future political or military struggle. Assured power in selected rural areas would provide the NLF a degree of security which it would lose if it bargained away such control in order to obtain a more dramatic but also less secure foothold in Saigon.

II-10

III-1

A. Arenas of Competition

III-2

III-3

Low levels of political competition are normally associated with low levels of urbanization. Rural areas are more likely to be one-party areas. Urban centers mean greater social heterogeneity, exposure to more diversified viewpoints, higher levels of literacy and education, and more intense and complex communications patterns. All these tend to lead to greater political consciousness, political activism, and political competition. Thus it seems likely that the metropolitan centers of Vietnam (by which I mean primarily Saigon-Gia Dinh, Danang, Hue) will have a highly competitive politics. The large number of active groups and individuals combined with the indeterminate but clearly not dominant strength of the NLF will probably preclude NLF-nonNLF polarization.

III-4

(a) money

(b) organization

(c) political skill

(d) candidate popularity

III-5

III-6

didates and groups. This can be done either through
covert means or openly through the distribution of
economic assistance and "pork barrel" projects.

IV-1

IV-2

(3) offices to be elected;

IV-3

The 1967 national elections were carried out under a system prescribed in part by the Constitution and in part by electoral laws passed by the Constituent Assembly. In terms of constitutional provisions; however, the system has great flexibility, and a number of changes could be made in the 1967 system without amending the Constitution. This flexibility could play a most important role in negotiations with the NLF by making it possible to accommodate reasonable demands on their part within the existing constitution and thereby eliminating or weakening one argument which they could make for completely junking the present constitution. The changes possible could both

IV-4

## Electors and Candidates

IV-5

The Lower House

(3) to modify the current plurality formula or to replace
it with a majority vote system (with or without run-off
elections) or with proportional representation.

IV-6

## The Upper House

IV-7

The Executive

The Constitution simply provides that the President and Vice President are elected on one list for a four-year term "by the entire nation by direct and secret ballot." The 1967 election was run on a straight plurality basis. It would be possible by law, however, to provide for a run-off election or for the Australian majority-vote system. The next regular presidential election would be in September 1971. Under the Constitution, it would, however, be possible to have a new presidential election before that date if the President resigned his office before November 1, 1970 or if both President and Vice President resigned between November 1, 1970 and the regularly scheduled election in September 1971. In these cases, indeed, the Constitution requires that a new election be held within three months after the Presidency becomes vacant. The Constitution also provides that this election will be for "a new term of office." Since the Presidential term is defined as four years, this early election would not be simply to fill out the unexpired term, until November 1, 1971, but would be for a new four year term dating from that election.

IV-8

persuaded to resign.

IV-9

IV-10

<table><thead><tr><th>% of Vote in District</th><th> Saigon - Gia Dinh</th><th>Other Municipalities</th><th>I</th><th>II</th><th>III</th><th>IV</th><th>Total Minus Ethnic</th><th>Ethnic</th><th>Total</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>0-15</td><td>24</td><td></td><td></td><td>4</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>35</td><td>0</td><td>35</td></tr><tr><td>15-20</td><td>2</td><td>2</td><td></td><td>10</td><td>7</td><td>16</td><td>37</td><td>1</td><td>38</td></tr><tr><td>20-25</td><td></td><td>2</td><td>8</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>7</td><td>24</td><td>0</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>25-35</td><td></td><td>1</td><td>4</td><td>3</td><td>3</td><td>2</td><td>13</td><td>2</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>35-50</td><td></td><td>1</td><td>3</td><td>1</td><td></td><td>4</td><td>9</td><td>6</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>over 50</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>1</td><td></td><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>7</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>26</td><td></td><td>6</td><td>15</td><td>23</td><td>17</td><td>34</td><td>121</td><td>137</td></tr></tbody></table>

IV-11

IV-13

IV-14

High urban vote fragmentation reflected high candidate/seat ratios, which, in turn, suggest low levels of socio-political cohesion in the cities. The candidate/seat ratio of 14.6 in Saigon-Gia Dinh was completely out of line with those in the rest of the country. In part this was undoubtedly due to the twin facts that: (a) most candidates are urban residents; and (b) campaigning in a city is less difficult--and less risky--than campaigning in the countryside. It also, however, undoubtedly reflects the greater heterogeneity of the urban population.

*Vote fragmentation thus varies inversely with the strength of communal groups and parties and directly with the level of urbanization.*

IV-15

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Number of<br>Seats In<br>District</th><th colspan="2">All Districts</th><th colspan="2">Urban Districts</th></tr><tr><th>Number of<br>Districts</th><th>Average Vote<br>of Winners</th><th>Number of<br>Districts</th><th>Average Vote<br>of Winners</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>6</td><td>3</td><td>11.4%</td><td>2</td><td>8.5%</td></tr><tr><td>5</td><td>2</td><td>10.3</td><td>2</td><td>10.3</td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td>6</td><td>20.8</td><td>1</td><td>11.0</td></tr><tr><td>3</td><td>6</td><td>20.8</td><td>0</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td>2</td><td>15</td><td>22.3</td><td>1</td><td>21.5</td></tr><tr><td>1</td><td>21</td><td>30.8</td><td>4</td><td>26.5</td></tr><tr><td>1-Ethnic<br>Minority</td><td>16</td><td>53.7</td><td>0</td><td>-</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>69</td><td>20.5</td><td>10</td><td>12.8</td></tr></tbody></table>

IV-16

The effects of district magnitude on fragmentation
in Vietnam can also be seen by comparing upper house, lower
house, and presidential voting. The president was elected,
in effect, in a one-seat district, and hence we should
expect his winning percentage to correspond closely to that
of the winners in the single-seat lower house contests.
This does, in fact, turn out to be the case: the presidential
winner got 34.8%; the average lower house single seat
winner got 30.8%. Similarly, we should expect the average
winning percentage for the senate slates (elected in
effect in a six-seat district) to correspond closely to
the average winning percentage in the six-seat lower house
districts. Again this turns out to be the case: the six-seat
house winners average 11.4% of the vote; the winning
senate slates averaged 13.1% of the vote.

IV-17

IV-18

Proportional Representation

IV-19

## Single-Member District Plurality System

IV-20

IV-21

Majority Vote Systems

Majority vote systems are seldom used because of the
complex mechanisms required to produce majorities. To get a majority
the voter almost inevitably has to vote twice, either in the same
election (the Australian majority system) or in two successive
elections (the run-off system). Under the Australian system the
voter indicates first, second, third choices, etc., among the
candidates for the seat or seats. If no one gets a majority of
first place votes, the votes of the lowest candidate● are redistributed
according to their second choices. This process continues until
the requisite number of candidates receive majorities. The useful-
ness of such a system in Vietnam would depend upon voters who cast
first-place votes for one non-NLF candidate casting their second-
place vote for another non-NLF candidate. It would seem likely,
however, that this is just precisely what the average Vietnamese
voter would *not* do. He is, instead, likely to feel that he has an

IV-22

The run-off system does not pose the same problem. For here the second choices are made more by the politician than by the voter. Presumably non-communist candidates who lost out in the first election would normally tend to throw their support to the remaining non-NLF candidate in the run-off election. So long as the NLF is a 20% to 30% minority, it is clearly in the interests of the anti-NLF groups to polarize the election into a choice between the NLF and the most non-NLF candidate. This is precisely what the run-off system, unlike the Australian majority system, does.

IV-23

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON'S

"GETTING READY FOR POLITICAL COMPETITION IN SOUTH VIETNAM"

A. <u>Underlying Assumptions</u>

1. During coming year GVN will be engaging in open political competition with VC/NLF.

2. US should not wash its hands of the problem.

3. "One should get the opponent to agree to play the game" and then "beat him at the game which he has agreed to play."

4. An NLF shift to political competition is desirable and requires NLF have:

- "increasing cost from the military contest"

- "some chance of benefits from the political contest"

-- i. e. if political competition:

- "insures its continued survival as an organization"

- "offers a reasonable probability of its being able to achieve national power either through political competition or by later reopening a military struggle on more favorable terms."

-- these minimum aims could be achieved for NLF by:

- "NLF participation in a coalition government" and/or

- "by recognition of NLF authority in those areas of the country- side in which they exercise de-facto control."

5. "It would appear to be clearly in the interest of the US and the GVN. . . to make substantial concession in terms of NLF local control in order to minimize concessions of national power to the NLF."

- On questions of (1) degree of autonomy and authority conferred on NLF local structures and (2) extent of territory in which such NLF authority was recognized, "there is ample room for substantial inducements to the NLF without serious injury to the interests of the US and GVN."

1. "GVN could be ready to concede any or all of the following:"

- "recognition of the NLF Liberation Committee structure as the only legitimate government of the area."

-2-

- "confirmation of the authority of the existing officials of the Liberation Committee as local officials of the GVN."

- "a guarantee that no subsequent appointments of GVN officials within the local government will be made without the approval of the local authorities."

- "acceptance of the VC/NLF guerrilla-militia units as the Popular Force-Self Defense units in the district."

- "a guarantee that no regular ARVN units will enter the district except with the approval of the local government."

- "recognition of local control over taxes and the uses of tax revenues."

- "recognition by the GVN of the legality of previous NLF Liberation Committee decrees on land tenure and other local issues."

- "provision by the GVN (and US) of material assistance for reconstruction."

- "immediate representation of the district in the Lower House by election of a representative to one of the 63 'unfilled' seats."

2. "NLF should agree to at least the following:"

- "acceptance of the formal authority of the GVN as the national Government."

- "a guarantee of free movement and security in and out of and within the designated districts for all civilians, international observers and civilian GVN officials."

- a guarantee of free movement and security of goods and commerce.

- "acceptance of the functioning within the district of (potentially) selected civilian ministries of the GVN"(e. g. agriculture, education).

### C. Acceptability of NLF Local Control

1. Advantages for U.S./GVN:

- Prevents NLF from gaining open foothold in cities; "If the future of Vietnam lies in its cities, it is worthwhile from the US and GVN viewpoint to pay a significant price to minimize the NLF presence in the cities."

- "Local control undermines the image of the NLF as an equal of the Saigon government and instead reduces it to the level, in the eyes of the Vietnamese, of a communal group like the Hoa Hao or Montagnards." The NLF lay claim to the traditional "mandate of heaven." "No matter how much territory or how many people the NLF may control locally, if it allows its claim to be an equal to the government to be undermined, it will suffer a severe setback."

- "In contrast to shared national authority, local control will tend to

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enhance the importance of political competition at the provincial and local level and to reduce its significance at the national level."

- "The underlying problem in Vietnam has been to bridge the gap between the countryside and the cities." The US has been bridging the gap by inducing substantial migration to the cities and by promoting economic development in rural areas.

2. Acceptability of Local Control to the NLF

- (The US should "trade off local control for national power, to concede a few more villages or districts to the NLF in order to keep control of more Saigon ministries.")

- Provides NLF minimum objectives:

- "reasonably secure base which guarantees its survival and maintains its options for future political and military struggle."

- "reflects existing realities"

- Liberation Committees "purportedly been elected in some 1,000 villages and 10 provinces. Obviously the GVN cannot accept the legitimacy of all these bodies, but. . ."

3. Areas to be Conceded to NLF control

- defined as a result of prolonged negotiation in terms of villages and districts, sometimes hamlets within villages

- districts most readily conceded are identified by inventory based on "the most recent and accurate results of the HES and other sources of information."

D. Constitutional and Legal Changes

1. Article 4 of the GVN Constitution which declares that "the Republic of Vietnam opposes Communism in any form and that every activity designed to publicize or carry out Communism is prohibited." But these phrases can be interpreted to mean almost anything the government wants them to mean, and if an agreement were made for VC and NLF participation in the political system they could easily be ignored."

2. The Election Law of 1967 excludes candidacies of "those who have directly or indirectly worked for communism and pro-communist neutralism or worked in the interests of communism." -- "Presumably these provisions would have to be repealed."

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3. "The next regular Presidential election is scheduled for September 1971. Under the Constitution it would, however, be possible to have a new Presidential election before that date if the President resigned his office before November 1, 1970 or if both President and Vice President resigned between November 1, 1970 and the regularly scheduled election in September 1971." -- "These provisions would make it possible within the framework of the Constitution, to agree with the NLF to have new presidential elections at almost any time, provided (and it may be a big proviso!) that Thieu and Ky can be persuaded to resign."

4. A number of changes could be made in the 1967 election laws without amending the Constitution.

S.F.K.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
Frank C. Thomson Professor of Government

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138 (LC)

February 10, 1969

Mr. Joseph Mendenhall
Acting Assistant Administrator for Vietnam
Agency for International Development
Room 6313 NS
Washington, D. C. 20523

Dear Joe:

Here is the revised and expanded version of the
paper which Jim asked me to prepare on postwar political
competition in Vietnam. It embodies most of the com-
ments and suggestions given to me when I was in Wash-
ington ten days ago as well as a new final section on
parties, groups, and other players in the game.

Jim suggested that it might be desirable to schedule
a group discussion on this completed version of the
paper. If you think this appropriate, I would be de-
lighted to come down to Washington for it. I would very
much hope that it might be possible to include in the
discussion people from the Working Group and Langley as
well as from AID.

I await your suggestions for action.

With all the best,

AA/VN

FEB 12 7 45AM '69

Samuel P. Huntington

## Summary

The postwar Vietnamese party system will reflect the strength of the NLF and the degree of coalescence by non-communist groups. A one-and-a-half party system would be most desirable from the US viewpoint but a four or five party multi-party system seems most likely.

Local political competition will be intense in contested rural districts and the metropolitan centers. In the former competition will decrease rapidly as one group -- (communist or non-communist -- establishes effective control. Consequently, the US should give top priority to short-run projects to build non-communist organizations in these districts, with particular attention to the role of communal groups and small intellectuals.

In the metropolitan centers competition will continue to intensify over a number of years. The cities will be susceptible to mass movements and will be the center of opposition to the government. It is consequently crucially important to encourage non-communist opposition leaders and groups and to prevent the NLF from monopolizing the urban opposition to the government.

Among the political resources which the GVN and the US can employ to counter the organizational strength of the NLF are: (a) popular, charismatic candidates; (b) the mass media, and (c) opportunities for constituent service by existing assemblymen.