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Finally, our industrial potential will be less significant
in a nuclear war. Since nuclear weapons provide greater de-
structiveness per unit cost than conventional explosives, reliance
on them enables weaker nations to redress the balance much more
easily than they could with conventional forces. And nuclear
weapons place a premium on surprise attack and sudden thrusts
to which the defender is much more vulnerable than the attacker.
To rely on a nuclear strategy, it is urged, would thus be adopting
a course of conduct which rewards the qualities in which potential
aggressors excel.

A conventional strategy according to its advocates would
have these advantages: (1) It would provide the best chance to
limit any conflict that might break out. (2) It would use our
industrial potential to best advantage. Since the destructive
power of individual conventional weapons is relatively low,
victory can be achieved only through a substantial production
effort which puts a premium on our special skills. At the
same time, the relatively slow space of military operations - at
least compared to nuclear war - and the need to build up supplies
before each new advance give the maximum opportunity for
attempting a political settlement. (3) Conventional defense pro-
vides the best means of preventing the occupation of threatened
countries. The concept of a flankless line which advocates of a
nuclear strategy wish to abandon is likely to be considered by
threatened countries as the best guarantee of their safety.
Liberation will always be a less attractive prospect than

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protection; (4) If nuclear weapons were used, after all, the onus
of initiating such a war would be shifted to the Communist states.

One of the difficulties in resolving these arguments is that
the moral fervor of the debaters sometimes obscures the nature of
the issues and often causes them to claim too much; those who
think that to forego nuclear weapons is an offense against Progress
have as their counterpart those who are passionately convinced
that even to consider modalities of nuclear warfare is to insult
morality. As a result, arguments that closer examination would
reveal at least as imprecise and sometimes as erroneous have been
elevated into dogma.

For example, it is often said that a nuclear war cannot be
limited because neither side would accept defeat without resorting
to ever larger weapons. Now there are many good reasons for con-
cern about the possibility of limiting nuclear war. But the
argument that neither side will be prepared to accept a set-back
implies that it is somehow worse to be defeated in nuclear than
in conventional war. In reality it seems much more likely that
the decision whether a war is expanded depends more on the value
attached to the objective than to the weapons used to attain it.
It is not clear why a country should be more willing to acquiesce
in a conventional than in a nuclear defeat. Whatever the
technical difficulties of limiting nuclear war, the political
argument that it makes defeat unacceptable does not bear scrutiny.

On the other side of the debate a nuclear strategy is often
justified by the spectrum of available weapons. The smallest

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nuclear weapons, it is said, are less destructive than the most powerful conventional devices. There is therefore no technical reason to recoil before nuclear warfare and every reason to use our most "advanced" technology. However, the effort to base a nuclear strategy on the discrimination of nuclear weapons surely goes too far. The chief motive for using them is, after all, their greater destructive power and their lower weight per explosive equivalent. Nuclear weapons no more destructive than conventional ones would probably not be worth the increased risk of "escalation" inherent in an unfamiliar mode of warfare.

The frustration in the debate all too often is caused by the fact that both the proponents and the opponents of a nuclear strategy are right; their disagreements arise from the perspective from which they consider the issue. Looking at the problem from the point of view of deterrence, the advocates of a nuclear strategy argue that nuclear weapons are the most effective sanction against the outbreak of a war. Considering the actual conduct of a war, the opponents of a nuclear strategy are above all concerned with reducing the impact of military operations and increasing their predictability. The destructiveness of individual weapons and the uncertainties of an unfamiliar mode of warfare which are correctly adduced as contributing to deterrence can, with equal justification, be cited as working against effective limitation. Much of the debate therefore turns on the question of what should be stressed: deterrence or the strategy for fighting the war. Obviously an overemphasis on destructiveness

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may paralyze the will. But an overconcern with developing a tolerable strategy for the conduct of war may also reduce the risks of aggression so much that it will be encouraged. While the deterrent threat must be credible, the quest for credibility must not lower the penalties to a point where they are no longer unacceptable. The history of war since the Middle Ages demonstrates the difficulty of achieving deterrence with unconventional weapons alone. A course of action that increases the opponent's uncertainties about the nature of the conflict will generally discourage aggression. If war should break out, however, through accident or miscalculation, it may make limitation extremely difficult.

The problem of American policy is how to strike the best possible balance between deterrence and the strategy for fighting a war.

It is to this problem that we must now turn.

## B. A Direction for U.S. Strategy.

Some years ago this author advocated a nuclear strategy.² It seemed then that the most effective deterrent to any substantial Communist aggression was the knowledge that the United States would employ nuclear weapons from the very outset. A nuclear strategy appeared to offer the best prospect of offsetting Communist manpower and of using our superior industrial capacity to best advantage.

The need for forces capable of fighting limited nuclear war still exists. However, several developments have caused a shift in the view about the relative emphasis to be given conventional

2. See the author's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, New York, Harpers, 1957, p. 174 ff.

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force as against nuclear forces. These are: (1) The disagreement within our military establishment and within the alliance about the nature of limited nuclear war. (2) The growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile and the increased significance of long-range missiles. (3) The impact of arms control negotiations. The first of these considerations raises doubts whether we would know how to limit nuclear war. The second alters the strategic significance of nuclear war. The third influences the frame work in which any strategy will have to be conducted and determines the political cost. They will be discussed in turn.

While it is feasible to design a theoretical model for limited nuclear war, the fact remains that fifteen years after the beginning of the nuclear age, it would be next to impossible to obtain a coherent description of what is understood by us from our military establishment. The Airforce thinks of it as control over a defined airspace. The Army considers it vital to destroy what it considers tactical targets, including centers of communications. The Navy is primarily concerned with eliminating port installations. Since disputes about targets are usually settled by addition — by permitting each service to destroy what it considers essential to its mission — a limited nuclear war fought in this manner becomes indistinguishable from all-out war. At least it would diminish our assurance and subtlety in an operation in which everything would depend on the ability to remain in control of events.

The disagreements between our services are repeated in relations with our allies. Few of our allies possess nuclear

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weapons. Those that do, have emphasized the retaliatory and not the tactical aspect of nuclear warfare. Public opinion in most allied countries has been mobilized by a variety of sources against nuclear weapons. And these attitudes are reinforced by current trends in arms control negotiations. In these circumstances, it will become increasingly difficult to concert a strategic and tactical doctrine accepted by the alliance and maintained with conviction in the face of Soviet pressure. This raises the doubt whether the West will possess either the knowledge or the daring to impose limitations. If it relies entirely on a nuclear strategy, its vulnerability to nuclear blackmail both prior and during hostilities would be considerable.

All of this compounds the inherent difficulties of limiting nuclear war. Any limitations of war are of course, to some extent arbitrary. In a conflict among major powers, both sides, by definition, possess more resources than they commit. (But this makes it all the more important that the limitations which are attempted are reasonably familiar. Even with the best intentions on both sides, nuclear war will be more difficult to limit than a conventional one. Since no country has experience with the tactical use of nuclear weapons, the possibility of miscalculation is considerable. The temptation to use the same target system as for conventional war and thereby produce vast casualties will be overwhelming. The pace of operations may outstrip the possibilities of negotiation. Both sides would be operating in the dark with no precedents to guide them and a necessarily inadequate understanding

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of the purposes of the opponent, if not their own. The dividing line between conventional and nuclear weapons is more familiar and therefore easier to maintain — assuming the will to do so — than any distinction within the spectrum of nuclear weapons. This uncertainty may increase deterrence. It will also magnify the risks of conflict should deterrence fail.

These considerations are reinforced by the strategic changes wrought by the advent of the age of nuclear plenty and of the long-range missile. When nuclear material was relatively scarce, it was possible to believe that tactical nuclear weapons might give the West an advantage in limited war. Since a "low-yield" nuclear weapon is essentially an inefficient large one, the Soviet Union, under conditions of nuclear scarcity, would have had to make a choice: it could not simultaneously push the development of its retaliatory force and equip its ground forces for nuclear war. Whatever alternative was chosen would produce a weakness in some category. Since the logical decision was to give priority to the retaliatory force, tactical nuclear weapons could be used to offset Soviet conventional preponderance.

In the meantime, the Soviet nuclear stockpile has multiplied. A nuclear strategy will now have to be conducted against an equally well-equipped opponent. In these circumstances, numbers became again important. Because of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, the casualty rate among combat units is likely to be high. The side which has available more replacements therefore stands to gain the upper hand. The notion that nuclear weapons

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can substitute for numerical inferiority has lost a great deal of
its validity.

The development of missiles has accentuated the strategic
problems of limited nuclear war. As long as delivery systems were
composed of airplanes air domination over the battle area on the
model of our experience in the Korean war was conceivable. And
tactical skill in handling the weapons *within* the combat zone
might lead to victory on the nuclear battlefield. However, as
missile forces grow on both sides, as even airplanes are equipped
with medium range missiles, this possibility steadily diminishes.
For one thing, it seems unnecessary to introduce major nuclear
forces into the combat zone since nuclear weapons can be delivered
accurately at considerable distances. More importantly, the only
way of achieving what used to be considered air superiority is to
destroy most of the opponent's medium and intermediate range
missiles. Such an operation is difficult to reconcile with an
attempt to limit hostilities. If, however, the areas where these
missiles are located become sanctuaries, it would appear that a
stalemate is the almost inevitable outcome of limited nuclear war.

Of course, such a result must not be minimized. An aggressor
certain that his attack would be checked would presumably be
deterred. The difficulty is the devastation of the combat zone,
which would be the price of a stalemate. In some situations, it
may be to the Communist advantage to settle for the *status quo*
*ante* in a war that obliterates the disputed area. If a Soviet
attack on Western Germany should lead to the desolation of the

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Federal Republic, the Soviet Union would score a major gain even if it offered at some point to withdraw to its starting point. The devastation of Germany could be a means to convince all other threatened areas of the futility of resistance. An "unsuccessful" attack of this nature might insure the success of all future Soviet blackmail.

Finally, it would be idle to discount the impact on strategy of the pattern of arms control negotiations. At each conference, nuclear weapons have been placed into a separate category and stigmatized as weapons of mass destruction without any distinction as to the type or device. The goal of eventual nuclear disarmament has been avowed by all states. A moratorium on nuclear testing has been in existence for two years and it is probable that a formal agreement will be signed. Future negotiations will almost inevitably reinforce this trend. The consequence will be that the inhibitions against using the weapons around which the West has built its whole military policy will multiply. Whatever the other consequences of a nuclear test ban, it will reinforce the already strong reluctance to the use of nuclear weapons in limited war. The concern that to resort to them would end all progress in the field of arms control may well outweigh all other concerns.

These factors will create an extremely precarious situation if the free world continues to rely primarily on a nuclear strategy. The more the pressures against any use of nuclear weapons build up, the greater will be the gap between our deterrent policy and our

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military capability and our psychological readiness -- a gap which must tempt aggression. The years ahead must therefore see a substantial strengthening of the conventional forces of the free world. If strong enough to halt Soviet conventional attacks -- as in many areas such as Europe they could be -- conventional forces would shift the onus and risk of initiating nuclear war to the other side. Even where they cannot resist every scale of attack, they would force the aggressor into military operations which left no doubt about his ultimate aim. They would thereby make ultimate recourse to nuclear weapons politically and psychologically simpler, while affording an opportunity for a settlement before this step is taken.

Many of the assumptions regarding the impossibility of conventional defense and of "hordes" of Communist manpower are either fallacious or exaggerated. In total available manpower the free world still is superior and its industrial potential exceeds that of the Communist bloc by a factor of three. There is no reason except lack of will why Western Europe and the United States cannot create local forces capable of arresting almost any scale of Soviet aggression. It has been truly remarked that but for the development of nuclear weapons, the defense would long since have achieved ascendancy over the offense. Even in World War II, the attacker generally required a superiority of three to one. And with improvements in conventional weapons technology -- far

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simpler than many of those already accomplished in other fields --
this ratio could be increased further still.

To be sure, in other areas the problem is more complicated.
In the so-called 'grey areas' of the Middle East and South-East
Asia, the Communist bloc can concentrate its manpower and material
against countries weaker and less closely allied than those of the
North Atlantic Community. On the other hand, these are also the
areas where the political penalties for aggression would be
greatest. An attack on an emergent country would antagonize all
the other uncommitted nations and it would lead to an increased
mobilization of Western resources. Moreover, difficulties of
terrain and communications place a ceiling on the number of troops
an aggressor could utilize effectively even there. The inability
to protect every area locally is no excuse for failing to secure
those where it is possible.

At a minimum, the conventional capability of the free world
should be of a size so that a nuclear defense becomes the *last*
and not the *only* recourse. The best situation is where the con-
ventional forces of the free world can be overcome *only* by
nuclear weapons. Such forces would remove many opportunities for
Soviet blackmail. They would increase the flexibility of our
diplomacy. They would enable us to negotiate with confidence
about controlling nuclear weapons.

## C. Some Consequences

While a substantial build-up of conventional forces and a
greater reliance on a conventional strategy is essential, it is

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equally vital not to press the conclusions too far. For one thing conventional forces should not be considered a substitute for a limited nuclear war capability but a complement to it. It would be suicidal to rely entirely on conventional arms against an opponent equipped with nuclear weapons. Such a development would probably provide the precise incentive an aggressor needs to employ nuclear weapons and to sweep all before him. A conventional war can be kept within limits only if nuclear war seems more unattractive.

In their attempt to prove their case many of the proponents of a conventional strategy have thought it necessary so to deride any reliance on nuclear weapons or to paint so awful a picture of atomic war that they may defeat their own object. For against an opponent known to consider nuclear war as the worst evil, nuclear blackmail is an almost foolproof strategy. Conventional forces will be of no avail, if an aggressor is convinced that he can probably force surrender by threatening to use nuclear weapons. A greater emphasis on conventional defense presupposes that the aggressor cannot promise himself an advantage either from the threat or the actuality of nuclear war. However much conventional war may be preferred to the use of nuclear weapons, limited nuclear war is preferable to all-out war.

If, despite our best efforts in the conventional field, nuclear weapons are actually used against us, we would seem to have three choices: to resort to all-out war; to accept defeat; or to seek to conduct limited nuclear war. If we are unwilling to accept defeat — and to do so under such circumstances would make

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us forever subject to nuclear blackmail -- our choice resolves
itself into all-out war or limited nuclear war. All-out war will
become increasingly senseless as the nuclear age develops. Hence
both considerations of psychology and strategy suggest that only
an adequate capability for limited nuclear war can keep a con-
ventional conflict conventional. If inability to fight such a conflict
could be met by a deterrence to act above the capability of the time,
we should be forced to conclude that it was irrelevant to forces irrelevant.

Assuming that we are willing to make the effort to maintain
both nuclear and conventional forces and to place greater reliance
on a conventional strategy, how is this decision to be made
manifest? Many thoughtful people have proposed that the free
world renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. We should, it
is urged, resist Communist aggression by conventional forces and
resort to nuclear weapons only to resist nuclear attack.

Yet this neat separation between conventional and nuclear
aggression hides great complexities. It cannot even be considered
as long as the disparity in conventional strength between the free
world and the Communist states is so vast. For then the only
deterrent to the utilization of the Communist local superiority
would be the fear that we do not know our own mind, that con-
fronted with a defeat by conventional weapons we would employ our
nuclear arsenal after all. In present circumstances, renunciation
of the first use of nuclear weapons would weaken deterrence and,
if we decide to resist after all, it will have had the para-
doxical consequence of making nuclear war more rather than less
likely.

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After the free world has built up conventional forces to some-
thing approaching parity with the Communist bloc the renunciation
of the first use of nuclear weapons would be less risky militarily --
though it must be recognized that this effort will take years and
that parity around a perimeter of twenty thousand miles defended
by a host of sovereign nations is almost certainly a will of the
whisp. But serious psychological problems would remain. A re-
nunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons could be interpreted
as meaning that we would accept a defeat with conventional
weapons rather than employ nuclear arms. In that case local ad-
ventures with conventional forces may be encouraged unless we are
preponderantly strong everywhere around the Communist periphery,
a condition impossible to fulfil. If the renunciation is taken
as a symptom of overwhelming inhibitions against any use of
nuclear weapons, it may tempt nuclear blackmail. And these risks
would be incurred for a gesture which in itself is essentially
meaningless. Regardless of what we may say or even believe, we
cannot guarantee that under stress we will not defend ourselves
with all means at our disposal.

In the nuclear age actions speak louder than words. We
should make immediate and energetic efforts to build up the free
world's conventional forces. We could then announce that we would
employ nuclear weapons only as a last resort and even then in a
manner to minimize damage. To the extent that the Communists are
unable to defeat the conventional forces of the free world without
resorting to nuclear weapons, the practical effect will be to

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renounce the first use of nuclear weapons. Even where this is
not the case, strengthened conventional forces would pose an

increased risk for the aggressor and provide additional opportunities to
settle the realization of additional conventional forces in place for
attestation before we take the decision to use nuclear weapons.

The inability to defend every area with conventional forces
should not be used as an excuse for failing to build up our
strength. The free world must not become a victim of asserting
that if it cannot do everything, it will not do anything.

The relation between conventional and nuclear forces is complex,
more crucial than declarations, we must reassess if actions are more crucial than declarations.

a notion which has become prevalent in our military establishments,

that of dual-purpose forces capable of fighting both nuclear
and conventional war. This concept has merit as regards the Navy
and the Airforce. But it is fallacious with respect to ground
operations, and it may well nullify the effort to place greater
reliance on conventional forces. To be sure, troops can be
trained to use both nuclear and conventional weapons. They
should be aware of elementary forms of protection against nuclear
attack. But once committed to combat, the units actually engaged
in military operations must opt for one mode of warfare or another.

For one thing it is militarily probably impossible to shift from
conventional to nuclear war at the opponent's initiative. The
side using nuclear weapons first can disperse while the side
relying on conventional weapons must remain concentrated in order
to have the necessary firepower. The units of the side conceding
the first nuclear blow will almost certainly be destroyed, should
the war turn nuclear. We must be aware of this before we enter

or any other unit not in constant contact with the opponent
and the face subject to may continue, contact from close range.

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the conflict.

The chief pro-

testion is to have available within striking distance other units
so must be analytical nuclear weapons of this kind as a
capable of conducting nuclear operations. For this reason alone,
a conventional strategy will require considerably larger military
budgets. This is a price worth paying, but we must admit to
ourselves that it will be neither cheap nor easy.

If nuclear weapons become an integral part of the equipment
of every unit, it will be next to impossible to keep a war con-
ventional regardless of the intentions of both sides. While the
intentions of the two sides in this doctrine that nuclear weapons will be used only as a last resort
is proper for the national leadership, it becomes meaningless
when the interpretation of it becomes more and more decentralized.
A regimental or even a divisional commander should not be the
judge of what constitutes a last recourse. For lacking the over-
all picture he will always be tempted to utilize all available
weapons. When hard-pressed, it would require superhuman discipline
not to use arms which he believes may solve his difficulties. And
the further down a unit in the chain of command, the less can its
experience be taken as a guide to the general situation. Regiments
or divisions have been destroyed even in the midst of an over-all
victory.

While a great deal of attention has been given to the
diffusion of nuclear weapons to new countries, the diffusion down-
ward of nuclear weapons within our military establishment is also
a cause for concern. The more focus of control, the greater is
the possibility of the use of these weapons -- not so much by the

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action of the "mad" major of the horror stories of accidental war
as by the best judgement of a hard-pressed officer in the confusion
of combat. An action which would bespeak our increased emphasis
on conventional weapons more convincingly than any abstract
declaration would be to create nuclear and conventional commands
for purposes of combat. The units could be trained interchangeably.
But once committed, the conventional forces would not have nuclear
weapons at their direct disposal. Deterrence as well as the con-
duct of nuclear war would be in the hands of separate commands
whose weapons would be made available to the conventional forces
only on the basis of an explicit decision at the highest level.

It is obvious, then, that the relationship between a con-
ventionall and a nuclear strategy is subtle, and complex. Simple
answers are almost surely misleading. The course we adopt will
determine the future direction of both our strategy as well as
our diplomacy.

This is particularly evident with respect to arms control
negotiations. There, the present state of our military establish-
ment places us at a severe disadvantage. Given the disparity in
local power, such measures as a percentage reduction of forces or
a troop freeze may be a means of perpetuating an inequality which
will be an increasing source of danger as all-out war becomes
more and more senseless. The same effect will be produced by
concentrating on nuclear disarmament without addressing ourselves
to the gap in conventional forces. We can escape this vicious
circle only if we realize that the price of flexibility is

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sacrifice and effort. If our military establishment continues to be built around nuclear weapons and if we refuse to make the sacrifices involved in greater reliance on conventional weapons, the current emphasis of arms control negotiations must be shifted. In such circumstances it will not be wise to lump all nuclear weapons into a separate category of special horror. Rather we should then elaborate as many distinctions between various types of uses and explosive power as possible in order to mitigate the consequences of any war that may break out. On the other hand, if we really believe in the need for a greater emphasis on conventional weapons, we must be prepared to accept the paradox that the best road to nuclear arms control may be conventional rearmament.

This is the measure of the task ahead: Simultaneously with building up our capability for limited war and our conventional forces, we will be embarked on arms control negotiations of crucial import. Our leadership must convince public opinion that we have to increase our military expenditures even while making earnest efforts to negotiate on arms control. The danger of slighting one or the other effort is enormous.

Yet history will not excuse our failure because the task is complex. The divorce between diplomacy and strategy, the oscillation between a mechanical conciliatoriness or an extreme of belligerence will produce paralysis. If we want limited war forces we will get them only by a major effort. If we are serious about disarmament, we must restore the balance of our military establishment. To continue to combine incompatible policies must lead to disaster.

[Y]

## IV

### CONCLUSION

It sounds hopelessly abstract to advocate an expanded
United States military effort (in the present state of America,...)

Against the background of our present force-levels and those
of our allies, ~~any~~ analysis of the nature of limited war,
its problems, and its requirements must remain a theoretical
exercise. The dispute between the advocates of an all-out and
a limited war strategy is unreal in a situation where the free
world's forces are grossly inadequate for limited war and are
growing dangerously vulnerable even for all-out war. The debate
about the relative merits of a nuclear or a conventional strategy
will remain beside the point as long as our forces are totally
insufficient for either.

With fourteen divisions, some of them understrength and most
of them less well-equipped than their Soviet counterparts, we are
in no position to fight a limited war against a first class
opponent. Our tactical airpower is the lowest priority item

IV-2

in the Air Force. The Marine Corps is at the very bottom of its
statutory requirements. Our airlift is inadequate. These short-
comings are not the fault of the services--though the inadequate or-
ganization of the Defense Department does not help matters. The
basic difficulty is that at recent budgetary levels every mission
has been neglected. Adjustment within the present budgetary ceilings
can do no more than ameliorate our growing weakness somewhat. We
have to admit to ourselves that we cannot finance our necessities
by eliminating Pentagon "waste." The times are too serious for
such evasions. To be sure, waste should be eliminated. But the basic
requirement is a dedication to a major national effort.

One of the symptoms of our difficulties is the self-delusion
to which we have become subject. We maintain that we have never been
stronger. We invoke the experience of Lebanon as a proof of the
efficiency of our limited war forces. We argue that there is no
limited war problem, for every war in which the U.S.S.R. and China
are involved is general by definition and because our limited war

IV-3

capability is adequate to deal with any other opponent. It
is indeed misleading to insist that our total strength has never
been greater. Our task is no to compare present capabilities
against those of a generation or even a decade ago. Military
power is always measured relative to that of any possible opponent.
Only self-delusion can make us doubt that we are falling behind.

To avoid this problem by defining every war with the Soviet
Union or Communist China as all-out is to deal with a national
crisis through verbal legerdemain. According to this definition
even our present limited war forces are excessive, for they are
clearly larger than what is required for police actions like Lebanon.
Unfortunately, the dilemmas described in this chapter cannot be
solved so easily. No more urgent task confronts the free world
than to separate itself from nostalgia for the period of its in-
vulnerability, and to face the stark realities of a revolutionary
period.

As for the experience of Lebanon, so widely hailed as a
demonstration of our limited war capability, it in reality exhibited

IV-4

its futility. In order to intervene in the Middle East, we
were forced to pull two divisions out of Germany and tie up
most of our strategic airlift. In other words, we weakened
the most sensitive area, Europe, at the precise moment when
international tensions were highest and the threat to it there-
fore potentially greatest. And we had to reduce the mobility
of our Strategic Air Command while it was most needed to perform
its deterrent function.

As worrisome as the imbalance of our military establishment
is, the inadequacy of our doctrine and the immobility of our
diplomacy. We not only lack the forces for limited war. There
is also no agreement about what forces we would need provided
we were willing to make the effort and what diplomacy might most
effectively convey our notion of limitation to an opponent. Our
three services operate on the basis of partially overlapping,
partially competing concepts. It is not necessary to decide which
view is correct. It is sufficient to point out that we are hardly
in a position to communicate what we understand by limitations as

IV-5

long as we do not know it ourselves. Our confusions will
make it more difficult to limit any war that does break out.
They will force us to improvise under the pressure of military
operations and they will complicate the already difficult task
of establishing limits. The price we may have to pay for our
confusion may be that an aggressor misunderstands our intentions
and that he launches a pre-emptive blow in response to what we
intended as limited resistance. The penalty for combining
a nuclear <u>disarmament</u> military establishment with a diplomacy striving
for nuclear disarmament may be that an aggressor underrates our
willingness to resist with the sole weapon we have available
and that deterrence fails.

The task of restoring cohesion and responsibility to our
policy is not eased by the tendency of too many to assign
any concern with questions of national security to an era of
the Cold War, which they believe is ending. Some fear that to
debate issues of preparedness may deflect attention from the urgency

IV-6=

of the quest for peace. Others insist that an obsession
with Communist military capabilities blinds us to our real
challenges in the field of economic competition and in the
development of our own society. Military expansion, they
claim, is contrary to the image of themselves of the Communist
leaders and the least likely form of the Soviet menace. The
obsession with military security is alleged to be at the root
of many of our difficulties. Many of the most virulent attacks
on the concept of limited war come from individuals who rebel
against the very notion of strategy, such as the advocates of
universal or even unilateral disarmament. Many give the impression,
and some make explicit, that they must deprive the American people
of all alternatives to peace save suicide, for otherwise we might
behave irresponsibly. And a few are prepared to admit that they
would prefer surrender to any form of resistance. Such evasions
if they become generally accepted--would doom us as a nation.

A responsible leader does not have the right to stake the

IV-7

survival of his society merely on the assessment that a
country which has subjugated tens of million of people in
a decade is not concerned with military expansion. Many of
the other arguments against an effort to build up our limited
war forces are based on a curious distrust of the American
people. They assume that we must either be motivated by

fear or euphoria, that we cannot be both strong and conciliatory.
It is sometimes claimed that if the American people is around unless it is deprived of all alternatives, then the impression is made that

If this is true no constructive policy of any kind will be
possible. A nation which cannot/be trusted will hardly be
able to deal with the much more difficult task of living in
dignity with impotence. Rather than deliberately paralyzing our
society by posing impossible alternatives, many of the proponents
of the above views would do better to address themselves to the
question of how we can become worthy of our responsibilities.

There is no doubt that the Western world is in deep trouble.
It has not been able to articulate either a philosophy or a program
adequate to our time. It has failed to identify itself with the
revolutionary period through which we are living. It has not had

IV-8

the vision or the willingness to carry through a sustained
*living a sense of direction to make it happen*.
program of world economic development.

But granting all these criticisms, the fact remains that
even in the military field we are inadequately prepared. We
are falling behind in the equation for all-out war. We have
insufficient strength for limited war. Our conventional forces
are constantly shrinking. The answer to our political problems
is not to be found in reducing our defenses--for even here more
effort and imagination are required--but in injecting a greater
sense of purpose into our over-all performance.

As a nation of specialists we like to believe that a problem
is either political _or_ economic _or_ military. The challenge we
face, however, is that contemporary problems involve a combination
of these factors. In this task, our choice is not between working
for the things in which we believe or attending to our necessities.
If we cannot do both, we will not be able to do either.