[L]

FREEDOM HOUSE

WILLKIE MEMORIAL BUILDING

20 WEST 40 STREET, NEW YORK 18, N. Y.

LONGACRE 5-3344

## Board of Trustees

JAMES J. WADSWORTH*
Chairman

HARRY D. GIDEONSE*
President

LEO CHERNE*
Chairman,
Exec. Committee

RALPH J. BUNCHE
HARRY J. CARMAN*
GEORGE B. FORD
Honorary Chairmen

REX STOUT*
Treasurer

MRS. HENRY GALE*
Assistant Treasurer

GEORGE FIELD*
Executive Secretary

Herbert Agar
Norman Cousins
Christopher Emmet
Arthur J. Goldsmith
Nathaniel L. Goldstein
Helen Hayes
Henry W. Hobson
Paul G. Hoffman
Mrs. Andrew Jackson
Jacob K. Javits
J. M. Kaplan
Maxwell A. Kriendler
John V. Lindsay
Goodhue Livingston, Jr.
Francis Pickens Miller
Edgar Ansel Mowrer
Dwayne Orton*
Mrs. Bonaro Overstreet
John G. Palfrey
James A. Pike
Rudolph Rathaus
Whitelaw Reid
Elizabeth M. Riley
Francis E. Rivers*
Mrs. Kermit Roosevelt
Elmo Roper
Whitney North Seymour
George N. Shuster
Mrs. Caroline K. Simon
Nathaniel Singer
Spyros P. Skouras
J. Waties Waring
William L. White
Roy Wilkins
Chester S. Williams

*Executive Committee

August 10, 1961

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

This year Freedom House commemorates its Twentieth Anniversary. Each anniversary during the month of October has been marked by the presentation of the Freedom Award to a leader of the Free World who has made an outstanding contribution to the cause we serve.

The serious world situation, with West Berlin symbolizing the crisis we face, has prompted Freedom House to expand its customary anniversary program. We are sponsoring a Freedom Assembly in New York City for two days, Friday and Saturday, October 6th and 7th. The sessions will be held just ten days before the forthcoming Twenty-Second Party Congress meeting in Moscow.

We will open the Freedom Assembly at a public luncheon in the Hotel Commodore on Friday with a keynote address and the presentation of the 1961 Freedom Award.

Following the luncheon, the Friday afternoon session will be devoted to the presentation of five papers discussing the various aspects of "Priorities and Strategy" outlined in the enclosed agenda. During the whole of the next day, Saturday, (including luncheon at the Overseas Press Club), the five papers will be subjected to criticism, analysis, amplification and a summary of the areas of substantial agreement. It is our hope that the proceedings will be instructive and influential in shaping public opinion. We anticipate that the discussions will be published as a paperback book.

Because of the potential public appeal of this program and the opportunity it affords to counter the Soviet propaganda drive at a crucial time, many responsible citizens' organizations have been invited to associate themselves with us as co-sponsors.

FREEDOM HOUSE

20TH ANNIVERSARY 1941-1961/ 20 WEST 40TH STREET. NEW YORK 18. N.Y.
LONGACRE 5-3344

September 8, 1961

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

We were glad to learn from Leo Cherne that you plan to attend the sessions of the Freedom Assembly to be held in commemoration of the Twentieth Anniversary of Freedom House on Friday and Saturday, October 6th and 7th.

We are now in the process of shaping our final program which includes the presentation of five target papers to coincide with the five subdivisions outlined in the enclosed agenda. This involves the preparation of an introductory talk not to exceed 20 minutes as an opening for the informal discussion to follow for each of the five topics.

The Friday afternoon session at 3:00 p.m. in an adjoining ballroom of the Hotel Commodore, following the keynote luncheon, will be devoted to the ideological and political phases of "Priorities and Strategy." It is the hope of our Planning Committee, which includes Leo Cherne, Dr. Harry D. Gideonse, Edgar Ansel Mowrer and others, that you will agree to present the paper on the political phase, preferably in the form of a prepared text.

You will be interested to know that in addition to those listed on the agenda who have accepted our invitation we have since added the names of Senator Thomas J. Dodd, A. A. Berle, Jr., Howland H. Sargeant, and Stacy May, along with Whitney North Seymour and other principal members of our Board. James J. Wadsworth will preside during the Friday sessions.

If there is any additional information you require, please let me hear from you.

Thank you for accepting our invitation.

GF/gd

Encl.

Board of Trustees

JAMES J. WADSWORTH*
Chairman

HARRY D. GIDEONSE*
President

REX STOUT*
Treasurer

*Executive Committee

September 11, 1961

Mr. George Field, Executive Secretary
Freedom House
20 West 40th Street
New York 18, New York

Dear Mr. Field:

Thank you for your cordial letter
of September 8th. I look forward to attending
the Freedom Assembly, though I am afraid I can
only promise to attend as much of the Friday,
October 6th session as I can. I will be unable
to stay for the Saturday meetings.

One other detail: I never speak from
a prepared text, but from notes. In addition,
I would like to edit any record that is made of
my talk if there is a view toward publication.
I hope you can accept these conditions, and look
forward to hearing from you.

P.S. I have since talked with Leo Cherne about
this, and I hope you understand that I may
have to cancel out at the last moment.

FREEDOM HOUSE

20TH ANNIVERSARY 1941-1961/ 20 WEST 40TH STREET. NEW YORK 18, N.Y.
LONGACRE 5-3344

September 11, 1961

Board of Trustees

JAMES J. WADSWORTH*
Chairman

HARRY D. GIDEONSE*
President

REX STOUT*
Treasurer

*Executive Committee

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Leo Cherne informed us that we may list your name for the introductory talk in connection with the discussion of the political section of the enclosed agenda.

This part of our program is scheduled for the afternoon session on Friday, October 6th, in the Windsor Terrace of the Hotel Commodore starting at 3:00 p.m. Prior to that, we will hold our luncheon in the Windsor Ballroom starting at 12:30 p.m. for the presentation of our annual Freedom Award. We are inviting each of the discussion leaders to be our guests at the dais at this luncheon if they are free to attend. Please let us know whether we may reserve a place for you at the dais.*

As you requested, I am enclosing a brief description of the purpose and activities of Freedom House in our brochure, "This Is Freedom House."

The discussion leaders for the agenda topics are: A. A. Berle, Jr., Col. William R. Kintner, Leo Cherne, and George V. Allen. You will also find enclosed a partial listing of those who are participating in the Freedom Assembly program.

It is our understanding that you are not prepared to write a text in advance but will speak extemporaneously for about ten minutes in introducing the political discussion.

Thank you for accepting our invitation and we will look forward to having you with us.

GF/gd
Encls.

FREEDOM HOUSE

LONGACRE 5-3344

[il]

September 13, 1961

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I appreciate receiving your letter of September 11th and have noted the conditions you have set with regard to your participation in the Freedom Assembly.

We will have a full transcript of the discussion which will subsequently serve as the basis for a printed report. The form it will take will, of course, depend upon the contents.

As you requested, we will submit the transcript of your own remarks to you for editing.

If you are available to join us for the luncheon starting at 12:30 p.m., I would like to reserve a place for you at the dais. As for the afternoon session, it is planned to get underway at 3:00 p.m. and we should be out by 5:30 p.m. I regret that you will be unable to stay for the Saturday meetings and have made note of that fact.

Thank you for accepting our invitation and I look forward to our meeting with you.

GF/gd

Board of Trustees

JAMES J. WADSWORTH*
Chairman

HARRY D. GIDEONSE*
President

REX STOUT*
Treasurer

*Executive Committee

September 15, 1961

Mr. George Field
Executive Secretary
Freedom House
20 West 40th Street
New York 19, New York

Dear Mr. Field:

Thank you for your various letters.
This is just to let you know that I would be de-
lighted to sit at the dais on Friday, October 6th
for lunch before the afternoon program.

FREEDOM HOUSE

20TH ANNIVERSARY 1941-1961/ 20 WEST 40TH STREET. NEW YORK 18, N.Y.
LONG ACRE. 5-3344

Board of Trustees

JAMES J. WADSWORTH*
Chairman

HARRY D. GIDEONSE*
President

RALPH J. BUNCHE

HARRY J. CARMAN*

REX STOUT*
Treasurer

*Executive Committee

September 22, 1961

For the Attention of: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

We have asked Mr. Gerald Steibel, our research consultant, to prepare a brief digest of available information on the questions outlined in our agenda. This digest will consist of selected quotations of various points of view, which are not meant to indicate any special bias on our part. This compilation will be mailed to you in a few days.

If you have not already done so, please indicate as definitely as you can which sessions (or all of them) you will attend, beginning with luncheon at 12:15 p.m. in the Windsor Ballroom of the Hotel Commodore on Friday, October 6th; continuing in the Windsor Terrace at 3:00 p.m.; reconvening at 10:00 a.m. Saturday in the eighth floor Auditorium of Freedom House; proceeding to a luncheon session in the dining room of the Overseas Press Club at 12:30 p.m.; and remaining there for the closing afternoon session. Please make special note of the locations for the Saturday sessions as they are not indicated in our program brochure. A member of our Committee will be on hand to direct you to a reserved place at each of the sessions.

We must also accommodate others who are attending as observers, delegates from co-sponsoring organizations, and the press. Confusion will be avoided if we obtain information about your plans in advance.

Thank you.

GF/gd

P.S.

-- We find we have been previously informed that you plan to attend only the luncheon on Friday, Oct. 6th, and the afternoon session on that date. Unless we hear from you to the contrary, we will assume that this is still your intention. We have reserved a place for you at the dais for the Friday luncheon, as discussed previously. Please come at 12:00 noon to the guest of honor room, the Windsor Court to the right of the Ballroom in the Hotel Commodore. Also, we are prepared to defray the expenses incidental to your attending the Freedom Assembly and will appreciate hearing from you about this matter after your return to Cambridge. We are enclosing a luncheon ticket for Friday, but none is needed for Saturday.

WESTERN UNION
TELEGRAM

W. P. MARSHALL, PRESIDENT

SF-1201 (4-60)

The filing time shown in the date line on domestic telegrams is LOCAL TIME at point of origin. Time of receipt is LOCAL TIME at point of destination

637P EDT SEP 27 61 BB353

SYB547 SY ZGA142 ZGZ1 ZGZ1 NL PD AR ZG NEW YORK NY 27

DR HENRY A KISSINGER

6 DIVINITY AVE CAMBRIDGE MASS

YOU ARE INVITED TO A PRIVATE DINNER WITH BERLIN MAYOR WILLY BRANDT, ARRANGED BY THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF AMERICA FOR ABOUT 40 BUSINESS AND COMMUNITY LEADERS, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 6, 6:30 PM UNION LEAGUE CLUB, BUSINESS SUIT. MAYOR BRANDT LOOKS FORWARD TO MEETING WITH YOU FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF A RELAXED, FRANK, OFF-THE-RECORD EXCHANGE OF VIEWS. PLEASE WIRE ME 589 FIFTH AVENUE OR PHONE PLAZA 5-8900

LEO CHERNE

40 6 6:30 589 5-8900

FREEDOM ASSEMBLY AGENDA

Commemorating the 20th Anniversary of Freedom House

Friday and Saturday, October 6-7, 1961

Opening Session: Friday 12:30 P.M. at the Hotel Commodore

Luncheon: Freedom Award Presentation and Keynote Address

Friday Afternoon Session: 3:00 P.M., Open to Luncheon Guests

Saturday Sessions: Admission limited to invited participants, representatives of co-sponsoring organizations and the press.

THEME: HOW FREE MEN CAN PREVAIL

## Priorities and strategy:

### 1. Ideological

We are told that "ideology" has lost its wallop on both sides of the Iron Curtain: how much weight does an ideological offensive really carry today?

What significance should be attached to the recent Soviet Party Draft Program?

Can our concept of freedom be projected to all areas of the world or is it uncommunicable to some areas because of cultural, technological and sociological differences?

What "ideology" is identified with the United States and which of its elements should be emphasized?

### 2. Political

How do we resolve conflicts between commitments to our European allies and our hopes for enlisting the so-called "uncommitted" peoples?

What are the possibilities for long-term, viable and sustained support from new nations: in Africa? in Southeast Asia? in Latin America? Which groups should we appeal to: intellectuals, industrial managers, peasants, youth, etc.?

What are our commitments to the captive countries of Eastern Europe? Should we hold out the hope of liberation or accept the status quo?

What are we willing to accept under the banner of "neutralism" and what should we reject?

How far can we go in our reliance upon the United Nations?

### 3. Military

What armed might do we need to be militarily "credible"? Should our strength provide a posture to contain or to win?

How important are our overseas bases: should we give them up when they generate adverse public opinion, or should we hold fast?

What are the relative merits of conventional weapons and nuclear weapons?

How can we use our potential military strength to compel political decisions favorable to us?

How can the search for inspected and controlled disarmament fit into our military planning?

Freedom Assembly Agenda

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## 4. Economic

Should there be any conditions attached to economic aid: 'its proper application so that all the people benefit; military self-help; political loyalty to ourselves as a *guid pro quo*, etc.? How much of our strategy should be based upon "no-strings" aid?

To what degree must free nations coordinate their economic programs to prevent gradual capitulation to Communist economic warfare?

Do we "aid and trade" with Communist nations, and if so, what is the effect on our political and ideological posture? To what extent should our "aid and trade" program be planned as a form of economic warfare against the Communist world?

What part should private enterprise play: what are its obligations, opportunities and problems?

## 5. Psychological

What kind of propaganda, information or other communications program do we need? What should our messages say? Who should decide what we say?

How should we coordinate our propaganda efforts with those of our allies?

What are the conflicts between serving "truth" and "national interest"?

What do we expect from cultural exchanges, particularly with Communist nations?

What should be our reaction to the psychological impact of Soviet exploits in outer space?

Just how confident are we that the future can be determined by free men?

How can the initiative in psychological warfare be seized and maintained?

* * *

Partial List of Participants in the Freedom Assembly:

Hon. George V. Allen, Former Ambassador and Director of the USIA

Dr. Z. K. Brzezinski, Russian Institute, Columbia University

Leo Cherne, Executive Director, Research Institute of America

Roscoe Drummond, Columnist, New York Herald-Tribune

Dr. Harry D. Gideonse, President of Brooklyn College and Freedom House

Hon. Paul G. Hoffman, Managing Director, United Nations Special Fund

William R. Kintner, Foreign Policy Research Ctr., Univ. of Pennsylvania

Hon. George McGhee, Director of Planning Staff, Department of State

Dr. Philip E. Mosely, Director of Studies, Council on Foreign Relations

Edgar Ansel Mowrer, author and columnist on foreign affairs

Hon. Robert D. Murphy, Former Ambassador and Undersecretary of State

Dr. Dwayne Orton, Editor and Educational Consultant, IBM

Mrs. Bonaro Overstreet, co-author "What We Must Know About Communism"

Hon. James J. Wadsworth, Former U.S. Ambassador to the U. N.

Introduction

The following pages provide a sampling of opinion on the major issues under discussion by the Freedom Assembly. The selections are not exhaustive, as to either the list of issues or the depth of difference.

Ideology

Some voices say ideology has little power, some that it is at the core
of the current struggle. Closely related is the issue of how broad the American
appeal should be, whether it should be addressed to all or to selected areas.

For the West, ideology, which was once the road to action, has
become a dead end.

Daniel Bell, <u>The End of Ideology</u>.

In addition to the consolidation of Khrushchev's personal power,
strenuous efforts have been undertaken to revitalize political
indoctrination both within the Party and within society at large
in order to counteract the gradual erosion of ideological com-
mitment.

Zbigniew Brzezinski in
*The New Leader*, June 27, 1961

We have been told that it is we, not the Russians, who are the
most "revolutionary" nation on earth. Nothing is farther from
the truth. It is the absence of the experience of social revolu-
tion which is at the heart of the whole American dilemma...
in a whole series of specific ways it enters into our difficulty
of communication with the rest of the world.

Louis Hartz, <u>The Liberal</u>
<u>Tradition in America</u>

A new world is in the making. We know that the Communist
powers will do everything they can to shape it to their will.
Whether they can be prevented from doing so depends in large
part upon the United States... This is an age of change, of
liberation, of promise and of hope. If America has no aims
that go beyond maintaining the <u>status quo</u>, it will fall short of
fulfilling its full promise...

Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Study by Council on
Foreign Relations, Nov. 25, 1959.

If the rest of the world cannot see in us all that we should like
them to see, the main reason is because we cannot see it in
ourselves, no matter how often or how hard we stare in the
mirror. The mirror cannot create; it can only reflect, and
what is not there will not be reflected. In the domestic realm
we have unfinished social and economic business of grave
importance on our hands... One way to strengthen our foreign
policy is to get on with that business.

A. Whitney Griswold, in
*Foreign Affairs*, October, 1960

-2-

Our need is to be selective in the targets of our foreign policy. In a world of ferment and change, the effort to contain and resist the outward thrust of Communist imperialism wherever and whenever it appears places an impossible burden on our government. Too great a dissipation of our energies and resources is bound to bring a harvest of failure and frustration.

Dr. Grayson Kirk, to American Association of University Women, June 22, 1961

What these voices are saying is that the United States should not hesitate to commit its strength to the active defense of its policies anywhere outside the Communist empire. This is dangerous doctrine; nothing would please Communist leaders more than to draw the United States into costly commitments of its resources to peripheral struggles in which the principal Communist powers themselves are not directly involved.

Senator J. W. Fulbright, in U.S. Senate, June 29, 1961

## Neutralism

The ideological problem is intimately tied to the political. What we as a nation think of the "neutrals" is still almost totally unresolved, and how to act toward them involved in considerable dispute.

I do not believe that we ourselves should be unduly concerned about what might be called the genuine neutralism because if a new nation is internally vigorous, viable, strong, progressive, its orientation in foreign policy is not so important as its health and strength, its orientation as a neutral... I do not believe we ought to ask commitments of a sort that would make it difficult for them to lead their own peoples in development, or difficult for them to draw together in regional associations of their own, as the opportunity might arise, or difficult for them to take their proper place in such an organization as the UN.

Dean Rusk before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jan. 12, 1961

The United States seeks not to impose its hegemony upon others, but to help others remain independent and safe from foreign domination.

-3-

The policy of the United States should not be one of doctrinaire condemnation of the authoritarian trend in Southeast Asia, but one that would explore all means by which these regimes could indeed be a short but constructive phase of transition... Strong governments are eminently suited to implant in a new country the rule of law. The United States should miss no opportunity to encourage firm observance of the rule of law. This is a strong ideological antidote to Communist totalitarianism in countries which are not yet capable of making full-blown democracy work.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study by Conlon Associates, Ltd., No. 5, Nov. 1, 1959

In our attitude toward the unfamiliar methods by which the less-developed countries, with their different historical and cultural backgrounds, will strive to create economic institutions, we *must avoid applying our traditional standards of political, economical or ethical responsibility*.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study, Nov. 11, 1959

As in the case of India, so in some of the other postcolonial states, excessive support of the Western position would be likely in the long run to benefit the Communists... A considerable measure of tension in their relations with the West is highly desirable in order for them to appear as the stanchest champions of national interest in the competition with the Communists. In such a situation, full of contradictions, it is difficult to see what useful purpose would be served by closer American involvement.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study, 1960

On many issues we can work closely with the new nations... But some situations are conceivable where we may have a duty to act without the support of the new nations, and perhaps even against the opposition of some of them... As for the uncommitted, we must make it clear to them that they cannot eat their cake and have it too: they cannot ask us to respect their neutrality unless they respect our commitment.

Henry A. Kissinger in *The Reporter*, Nov. 24, 1960.

The United States must judge whether the neutrality of each one of them (the unaligned states) is sincere. It has no right to expect more from them than independence of mind on the issues of the day; it will find it increasingly hard to accept what consistently seems to be less.

Hamilton Fish Armstrong, in *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1961

-4-

We must stop believing that our primary objective must be to humor the public opinion of neutral or uncommitted nations rather than to defend our strategic interests, cooperate closely with our allies, and to advance our position of strength.

Sen. Goldwater, in New York
*Times Magazine*, Sept. 17, 1961,
p. 102.

## Military

Military force and its role in our foreign policy also remain to be decided upon. Opinion is divided over how we can achieve a credibility in Communist eyes which will deter them militarily, without, however, precipitating the catastrophe we are trying to avoid.

We Americans naturally abhor resort to fear as an instrument of policy. We have left to our opponents the regular and in some areas the effective use of that commodity. When our opponents speak of peaceful coexistence it is customary for them to tack onto the statement a reminder to the world of their military power and the availability to them of powerful rocketry. Our abstention from the use of fear as an instrument of national policy is not always appreciated in the world and in fact I am not certain that we are always given credit for our sincerely peaceful desires. Many abroad are beginning to say that we Americans are simply fearful of provoking the Communist camp.

Robert Murphy, at Boston College,
June 12, 1961

We must never allow ourselves to arrive at what I would describe as a disaster point - a point where the Soviets could devastate our country without risk of effective retaliation. We are not at the disaster point now, and by increasing our effort on sound programs, which have been developed over the years, we can protect our future.

General Twining, in Baldwin,
The Great Arms Race, pp. 13-14.

We do not have the will to use that one power with which we can stop him (Khrushchev). In short, we have the nuclear capability but not the nuclear credibility.

Margaret Chase Smith, in the
Senate, Sept. 21, 1961

-5-

First... The military... may tend to continue to maintain overseas bases after their present priority has descended to a relatively low level of necessity. Here the balance between military desirability and political liability must be constantly reexamined. Withdrawal should be given the earliest possible consideration so that the greatest possible political capital can be made of it...

As a matter of policy, our security program should require an annual review of the overseas bases and a defense of their continued necessity by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As our long-range missiles based in the United States and at sea achieve reliability, the need for overseas bases for bombers and missiles tends to disappear. Likewise, when we have limited war forces properly trained and equipped for rapid strategic movement, the purely military need for overseas garrisons at present strengths will also diminish. Our policy on this subject should be clearly and openly stated, and the withdrawal of forces should be undertaken voluntarily well in advance of the development of local pressures.

Maxwell D. Taylor in
*Foreign Affairs*, January, 1961

The emphasis in our military development must be upon achieving a deterrent strategic force... Our retaliatory capabilities have to be sufficiently impressive that even under circumstances of extreme duress, the initiation of all-out war will not appear to the Russians to be a "conservative policy."

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study, Feb. 14, 1960,
p. 57

Arms control does not necessarily mean disarmament. What it may be able to do is to seek cooperation between the Russians and the Western powers to stabilize deterrence, to reduce the possibility of war through misunderstanding, to reduce the spread of weapons to other powers, and to reduce the danger of war being set off by a third party... arms control ought to be viewed as part of our military and national security policy, and not as an alternative to military policy.

To be unwilling to accept the uncertain risks of nuclear warfare is not weakness, but requires the courage not to fear being thought cowardly.

David Riesman, letter to
*New York Times*, April 3, 1960.

-6-

Those of us who have faith in the new America can welcome competitive coexistence with Communist states. In those states the cry for liberty will mount as soon as national security is attained. Communism is a war economy, and can be maintained only so long as there is danger of war.

Hence I have hoped that our policy toward Russia would aim at lessening her fear of us, and our fear of her...I should like it (the U.S. government) to turn its back upon Metternich, to make it clear to the peoples of the world that it will not kill them wholesale to persuade them to adopt our ways.

Will Durant, letter to New York

Times, May 7, 1961

## Foreign Aid

Deep opinion conflicts have arisen over the criteria by which overseas economic help is to be dispensed, to whom it ought to go, and what, if anything, we should require in return.

The preservation and strengthening of the free institutions of underdeveloped countries, and the defense of the free world, require a substantial increase in the amount of foreign aid, to be equitably shared by the major free nations.

Report of President Eisenhower's Commission on National Goals, pp. 16-17

It would be useful to amend the Trade Agreements Act so that the President was authorized in his discretion to suspend the provisions requiring trade discrimination against the Soviet bloc. With these powers in hand, the President could aggressively try to develop reasonable trade relations with the bloc.

Raymond Vernon, in *Foreign Affairs*, April 1961

But let me point out that on the present basis any increased volume of Communist trade will add in direct ratio to their power to disrupt and dominate world trade by Trojan horse tactics.

Governor Rockefeller, Oct. 8, 1959

As I have said before, while we believe that our assistance should be without strings which offend or impair the freedom

-7-

of others, we have every right to expect that the underdeveloped nations will themselves adopt realistic objectives for us to support. Self-help must be our principal 'string' and an insistent one.

Secretary Rusk before the Senate Appropriations Committee on August 21, 1961

A condition of our providing aid must be that the countries will also help themselves. There is definitely a 'string' tied to our aid, but it is not a political string. In cooperation with each recipient government we shall seek to identify those self-help measures which are indispensable to make a national development program effective.

Henry R. Labouisse, Director of International Cooperation Administration, in State Dept. Bulletin, Aug. 21, 1961

If their (underdeveloped nations) economic development programs are unsound, we must not be 'blackmailed' into providing lavish aid for fear they will otherwise go to the Communists.

Senator J. W. Fulbright in *Foreign Affairs*, Oct. 1961

If the Sino-Soviet bloc is waging economic warfare against the West, it is a tragic folly for the West to try to do 'peaceful business' with the Soviets.

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study, by Foreign Policy Research Institute, Oct. 15, 1959

It is myopic... to sound alarms on the one hand about the Communists' economic offensive and on the other hand to exchange, for Communist toys, cars, musical instruments, furs and vodka, capital goods which will help to relieve the Communists' planning bottlenecks.

Ibid.

American aid should be furnished only to friendly, anti-Communist nations that are willing to join with us in the struggle for freedom.

Sen. Goldwater, *The Conscience of a Conservative*, p. 123.

-8-

## Cultural Exchange

Whether cultural exchanges help us or the Communists more is one more question on which there is little consensus.

Cultural exchanges between nations are of major importance as a continuing means of winning and keeping friends when political quarrels threaten relations between nations... Even when differences are as great as exist today between Washington and Moscow, I believe cultural exchanges between the US and Russia are profitable.

George V. Allen, former Director of the US Information Agency in a speech before the Overseas Press Club, New York on Sept. 23, 1958

There is every reason to fear that, in line with the policy of not offending Khrushchev, the coming months will witness an expansion of tourism and of cultural and political exchanges without a serious fight by the United States for reciprocity...

Thomas J. Dodd, in *Orbis*, Winter 1959

The exchange program, in Soviet eyes, is simply another operation in Communist political warfare... The exchange program is a Communist confidence game. Let us not be taken in by it. Let us remember that American confidence in the Soviet government is the very last thing we want.

Sen. Goldwater, *The Conscience of a Conservative*, pp. 108-9.

## Captive Nations and Liberation

American policy toward the captive nations and the issue of their liberation has been torn between the continuing moral commitment to freedom and the practical difficulties in undoing the Communist successes there.

Finally, while our attention is centered on the development of the non-Communist world, we must never forget our hopes for the ultimate freedom and welfare of the Eastern European people. In order to be prepared to help re-establishing historic ties of friendship, I am asking the Congress for increased discretion to use economic tools in this area whenever this is found to be clearly in the national interest.

President Kennedy, speech to the Congress, January 30, 1961

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Our goal for the captive nations is emancipation -- emancipation achieved not by external force, but primarily by the appeal of freedom to the minds of men everywhere. Our weapons are not military, but ideological, psychological, political, economic, and diplomatic.

Malcolm Richard Wilkey, assistant
Attorney General, speech in
Philadelphia on July 21, 1960

Without in any way detracting from the deterrent value of the
nuclear weapons and the intercontinental missiles, it is safe
to assert that the most effective deterrent against a Soviet in-
vasion of the west of Europe is no other than the state of public
opinion in that part of the continent which the Soviet Union al-
ready occupies.

Salvador de Madariaga in
Current, April, 1961.

We should encourage the captive peoples to revolt against their
Communist rulers. This policy must be pursued with caution
and prudence, as well as courage.

Barry Goldwater, in National
Review, March 25, 1961

The West, if it is to derive profit from the internal contradic-
tions which continue to rend the Soviet domain, must be pre-
pared to intervene actively in the affairs of Eastern Europe.

Frank R. Barnett in Orbis,
Winter, 1959

We recognize the Soviet Union's historical concern about their
security in Central and Eastern Europe, after a series of
ravaging invasions. And we believe arrangements can be
worked out which will help to meet those concerns, and make
it possible for both security and freedom to exist in this
troubled area.

President Kennedy, Speech
to Nation, July 25, 1961

Liberation was a lure for the Polish, Czech and Hungarian
vote...irresponsible, fraudulent and demonstrably self-
defeating.

Chester Bowles, Dec. 20,
1959 *NYT Magazine*

-10-

## United Nations

The effectiveness of the United Nations and the question of how far the United States should commit itself to the U. N. are problems of continuing debate.

There may be occasions when the United Nations can be utilized to provide a broad base to policies that further Western interests. But when submission of a matter to the United Nations will predictably muddy the waters and obstruct the pursuit of American policy, then we must, as we did in the case of Berlin, quietly insist on settling the problem elsewhere.

Senate Foreign Relations
Committee Study by Council
on Foreign Relations, 1959

The United Nations can be, and should be, a cornerstone
of United States foreign policy.

J. F. Dulles, *War or Peace*,
p. 41

Our involvement in the UN may be leading to an unconstitutional surrender of American sovereignty.

Sen. Goldwater, *The Conscience of a Conservative*, pp. 116-7.

We would be better advised to seek feasible means of building a cohesive community of free nations. This objective should be pursued as far as possible within the United Nations. In large measure, however, it must be pressed outside of the U. N., through instrumentalities that reflect a limited but real community of common interests.

Senator J. W. Fulbright, in
*Foreign Affairs*, October, 1961

## Propaganda

Whether the United States should "propagandize" or "inform," for what purposes and toward what ends; these are still open questions.

In informing others about ourselves, we must not try to remake them in our image or to persuade them to swap their way of life for ours.

US Advisory Commission on
Information - 14th report,
April 8, 1959

FREEDOM HOUSE

October 16, 1961

Board of Trustees

JAMES J. WADSWORTH*
Chairman

HARRY D. GIDEONSE*
President

REX STOUT*
Treasurer

*Executive Committee

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

In line with my promise to you, I asked our steno-typist to furnish us with a separate transcript of your opening remarks at the Freedom Assembly as well as what you had to say during the discussion on Friday afternoon, October 6th. Until we receive the full transcript, we cannot determine just how it will be used.

In the more controlled atmosphere of the Saturday sessions, we made considerable progress in following the agenda outlined for the Freedom Assembly and we are enthusiastic about the overall contribution which you and the other participants have made during the two days. We are therefore determined to publish a carefully-edited report of those proceedings.

In this connection, if you wish to suggest any changes in the enclosed transcript which should be taken into account when we get into the editing job, we will be glad to follow your advice.

Permit me to take this opportunity to express our appreciation for your valuable contribution.

Many thanks,

GF/gd

Encl.

16

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER: Mr. Ambassador, Ladies and Gentlemen: I have learned something very important this afternoon, which is never to appear on a program in which I follow Mr. Berle, and in which Brzezinski is in the audience and gets a chance to talk before I do. I once spoke on a program with General Taylor who was to follow me; and when I got through, he handed me a little note which said, "They have every point of view represented here from A to B." [Laughter]

The subject to which I would like to address myself really was very eloquently covered by Professor Brzezinski and, in part, by Mr. Berle. I, therefore, apologize if I duplicate some of the remarks that may have been made before.

There can't be much question that we are now at an extremely critical period in our relations with the rest of the world. Our national tendency is to discuss this crisis in terms of specific issues, in terms of the specific problems, as they arise. There has been here, and there is in our press, a great deal of discussion about what are the real Soviet intentions. Are the Soviets interested in world domination, or are they interested only in stabilization of their system, or God knows what other motives one can ascribe to them.

I would suggest to you that it is impossible for us to gear our policy to a psychoanalysis of Soviet intentions.

17

No one can be sure what the Soviets really want. All we can judge is what the likely consequences of their actions are. We cannot give up Berlin even if their intentions are relatively moderate. I read in a reputable journal the other day -- in fact, in the leading American newspaper -- that Munich was bad because Hitler was determined to have war. Munich was bad because the Western democracies were acting against their principles, and it would have been bad even if Hitler had not been determined to have war. I read in the same newspaper that appeasement equals total surrender. Are we now to suggest that partial surrender is an acceptable doctrine of foreign policy?

We cannot guarantee what Soviet intentions are going to be. I am not sure that the Soviets know exactly what their intentions are, in every situation. I do agree, however, completely with Professor Brzezinski that the Soviets do not think in the middle-class terms with which we are familiar. I spoke to somebody in Washington a few weeks before the Berlin sector boundary was closed. I said to him, "What is going to happen when they close off East Berlin?"

He said to me, "My dear fellow, it cannot possibly happen." One reason he gave me was a lot of the Soviet functionaries live in East Berlin but work in Potsdam. And in order to get from East Berlin to Potsdam, after West Berlin is

18

cut off, they would have to commute around West Berlin; and
they wouldn't expose themselves to a 2-1/2 hour commuting. This
is a kind of mentality which simply -- well, this was not a very
high-level person, I might say, and he was not influencing our
policy. But, nevertheless, it showed something about the thing.

I read the other day -- again, by a leading
columnist -- that after Mr. Kennedy made his speech, Khrushchev
got furious at America, and because he was so furious, the lines
of communication were interrupted for six weeks. Only now,
after the patient efforts of the Secretary of State, have these
lines of communication been re-established.

This indicates something about the notion of the
impact of personality on foreign policy. We believe that foreign
policy decisions are made because statesmen may be personally
angry at each other, or because they have established personal
good will among each other. The reason there is a relative
relaxation of tension now is precisely the reason Professor
Brzezinski mentioned -- because the Soviets in the interim have
created a situation within Germany in which there is a chance
that we may lose Western Germany while saving West Berlin; and
where they may wreck NATO and European integration, and there is
no point in jeopardizing that development by running major
risks. There have been a whole series of unilateral Soviet

19

actions in the interval. We could make no more foolish mis-
take than to pretend that now that Mr. Gromyko is behaving some-
what more civilly, this proves that the situation has been
ameliorated. The situation has deteriorated, and the objective
situation has deteriorated in the last six weeks. This is more
significant than the personal good will.

I remember when Mr. Khrushchev was over here, we
placed great stock on the good relationships that had been estab-
lished between him and President Eisenhower. Anyone with even
the slightest familiarity with Communist theory must know that
the one thing that no Communist leader can do is come home to the
Soviet Union and say, "I established good personal relations with
the American leadership. And because I have come to the con-
clusion they are nice and charming people, I will make certain
concessions." They would put him in a madhouse.

The essence of Communist theory, on which they
pride themselves, is the conviction that they understand us
better than we understand ourselves. Their attitude towards us
is that of an American psychiatrist toward his patient -- that
regardless of what we say, they understand what we intend very
well indeed.

I am not saying that they can never make con-
cessions. But the justification for their concessions, the

20

justification for the mutual compromise will never be, to them-
selves -- whatever they say to us -- good personal relations.
It will always be the fact that what seemed to them objective
social causes now require a tactical adjustment.

We have this difficulty in understanding that, to
some people in the world, economics isn't everything -- the
notion that economic progress is more important to some people
than power -- which leads us to the constant analysis that
Khrushchev is more interested in raising the standard of living
than in making other gains. This is another reflection of the
values of our society that may not be particularly correct.
One of the other gentlemen spoke before of the acquisition of
wealth in our society. This is true. But in other societies,
the struggle is in terms of power. I don't know whether it is
more pleasant to live in a society in which there is a quest for
power than in a society in which people have as one of their
motives a struggle for wealth.

Above all, the key point I would like to make is
this. We hear today on the Berlin issue and on a number of
others, a great deal about the need for realism and the need to
adjust to facts which we are powerless to change. Nothing in
the world would ever have been changed if this notion of reality
were to be predominant. It reflects, again, the notions of a

21

society which is pretty satisfied with the *status quo*, and to
which any basic change is really reasonably uncomfortable; and
explains in its deepest sense why we can be both peaceful and
irrelevant to the new nations.

I would like to make a few comments about this.
To us, in a middle-class society in the United States, the re-
ality that is most significant, it is the reality we see around
us. To us, realism consists in adjustment. Our eminent people
are people who have known how to operate in an existing system.
The worst penalty they learn in their lives is transfer to
another department, if they don't do so well. It is an ameliorat-
ing society. To the Communists and, on another level, to many
people in new nations, the most significant reality is the
future. The most ephemeral reality is what they see around them-
selves. If you had asked, in 1913, who were these ridiculous
people in Geneva, translating German texts, going to congresses,
splitting hairs about abstruse points of Leninist doctrine,
any Western businessman would have said, "These are ridiculous
fanatics." Yet, three years later they changed history be-
cause they had a conviction; they had a sense of the future.
Their reality was not where they were, but where they were going
to go.

On this level -- not on the level of detailed

22

ideology -- I think the new nations are psychologically more in tune with the Communist world than they are with us. For this reason, we have enormous difficulty conveying what we stand for to other people. They don't want to hear tired, careful explanations why what they have just said doesn't absolutely correspond to the truth; because their notion of truth is different. If Castro had wanted stability, if Castro had wanted security, he would be a bank president in Havana, today. He comes from the social circles where this was his own choice. The kind of man that goes into the mountains, the kind of man who leads a revolution is not a pleasant, middle-class intellectual disputing abstruse or abstract points of political doctrine. And their propensity toward a form of dictatorship is due to the fact that very few revolutionaries make a revolution in order to bring into power a form of government which will make them dispensable. Most of them undergo the suffering which is inseparable from revolution in order to be able to exercise power.

I don't agree with those who say that the exclusive motivation of the new countries is to raise their standard of living. I think this is one of their preoccupations. I think they know they can do almost as much as the traffic can bear, regardless of consequences. The real problem in the new nations is what system of political legitimacy appears, what

23

notions of social justice they develop, what conception of the
future they will have. It is these reasons, these preoccupations
on our part that have made it so very hard to understand either
the revolution in the new country or the nature of the Communist
challenge.

I would like to make a few remarks also about the
new nations. There have been a few comments here that their
behavior at Belgrade has been sickening, and there has been much
chastising. I would like to come somewhat to their defense.
If anything has been sickening, it has been our behavior, not
theirs. We had no right to expect them to behave very much dif-
ferently from the way they did. We had no right to act as if
international relations were a debate in the Oxford Union, with
the uncommitted sitting in the referee's chair and awarding a
prize, after they had heard all arguments. It was against all
reason to expect that nations barely come into independence,
which, by our own account, had difficulty understanding what was
going on in their own countries -- that those nations could
suddenly play a global role and make judgments that were wise
on the whole range of international problems. It is our
sentimentality and our illusion that has projected them into a
role that they cannot fulfill, and that must wreck their domestic
stability if they try to fulfill it.

24

If anyone asks himself why the new nations behaved this way, he should just remember a short twenty years ago. Was it conceivable that the United States would have supported Great Britain in 1939? Did there exist any British policy that would have gotten us on the British side? Where would the world have been in 1939 if Great Britain had said that it would only fight against Nazism if the United States supported it? No abstract arguments could possibly have achieved American support for Great Britain in 1939 on the issues which were of most consequence to the world in that day. And no American policy can get the kind of support many people were expecting out of the Belgrade powers. They cannot, by the nature of their society, by the nature of their preoccupation, play a global role. They cannot substitute for our foreign policy. On many problems in the world, we as the major country in the West, also as the country that has the major responsibility -- and for good or ill -- it is up to us to enter the breach.

We have been criticized -- and Ambassador Wadsworth has had more experience with this than almost anybody else -- that we have not studied the disarmament problem carefully. Well, we have a statutory agency and over 100 full-time professionals. I don't believe there is a single one of the emergent nations that has one full-time person studying the

25

problem of disarmament, on a regular basis. I don't criticize them for that. They have other priorities. They have more important uses for their talent. It only means we cannot expect them to come up with a formula, and we cannot expect them to be the arbiters of all disputes, and that we cannot substitute them for us.

One of the questions that is listed here deals with the problem of our relations with our allies as against our relations with the uncommitted. I don't believe that these problems are antithetical. We have in the West a major responsibility to give a new vitality to what we mean by a free world. I don't agree with those who consider flexibility to reside in ingenuity in finding a negotiating formula. I do not believe that the problems we face are due to lack of cleverness in finding this or that gimmick to offer to the Soviets. I do not like the phrase that "we must make a reconnaissance of Soviet intentions."

The issue over Berlin, or Germany, or Eastern Europe is not, as I have said before, what Soviet intentions are. The problem is whether we can develop a concept of the future that can inform our actions, and whether we can insist on this when there is no crisis. There is some merit in the criticism that it takes a crisis to get us to the negotiating table.

26

There is this criticism because when things are quiet, we don't like to upset things by raising disputes.

Within the Western world then, the major problem we have is not to find a negotiating formula with the Communists, but whether we can develop a set of relationships within the Atlantic world, within the Western Hemisphere, which creates a sense of dynamism and a sense of hope, and a policy which is not dependent on Communist initiatives.

We cannot give up, even though our so-called realists among the columnists tell us to, the principles of freedom and self-determination. We cannot assert that our principles have validity only in those areas where they involve no risks. Why are we being asked so insistently to give up our values, if these values were not in themselves a major force in the world?

While I speak of this act of construction, I don't believe that this is a problem in the immediate future. In the immediate future we might face quite a different situation. There is a movie which most Americans seem to like, though we don't always act on the basis of it, called "High Noon." It deals with a sheriff who knows that some gunmen are coming into town, and who is going around trying to enlist the support of the safe, sane citizens in his town. And there is no

27

question that if they all supported him, he would prevail. But,
as you all know, he could not get their support, and, finally,
he had to shoot it out by himself. When he had succeeded, he
dropped his shield and left town.

I would say in many ways we may be going into a
period where we will have to take the responsibility for actions
by ourselves. And the only difference between us and the
sheriff may have to be that we cannot drop our shield when it
is all over. And that such actions may again create within the
West what it so sorely lacks today -- a faith in the possibility
of great conceptions.

[The following remarks were made during the
discussion period):

DR. KISSINGER: My view is that the issues
raised by the Soviet pressure on Berlin are varied. If I may
say so, Senator Pell has run together a whole list of them, some
of which bear no necessary relation to each other. The issue
of the Oder-Neisse line seems, to me, independent of the issue of
the recognition of Eastern Germany. The issue of disengagement
is independent of the other two. In fact, I would argue it is
impossible to do all three of them simultaneously, whatever
judgment one makes of the merit of any one of these notions.

28

Secondly, I do not think that when a man holds a gun at your head, you prove flexibility by saying, "Instead of $100, I will only give you $80." This is not necessarily a sign of flexibility. It is a sign, maybe, of necessity. And one should be sure that one isn't deluding oneself about what one is doing.

If you ask me as an abstract problem, of course, I would prefer for us to make a proposition, to come up with our own proposals on Europe -- proposals that include our conception of what a just settlement is. In my view, this would include our insistence on the right of self-determination, coupled with very generous security guarantees to the Soviet Union. It seems to me it is a legitimate concern to be concerned with security; but they cannot drive their concern for security to the point of subjugating hundreds of millions of people. I would be very unhappy if we gave up the principle of self-determination for any settlement; and I would be very unhappy if we pushed realism to the extent of formal recognition, or _de facto_ recognition, of what amounts to Communist imperialism. I would be much more flexible, however, if the Soviet Union were willing to recognize this principle on the question of security guarantees. How this would work in detail, we really don't have enough time.

........

29

DR. KISSINGER: I am a very strong supporter of the notion of creating a structure for the Atlantic Community, as a whole. I believe that we can show our flexibility, imagination, and creativity best by transcending the problem of nationalism within the Western world and creating a structure there that, by its performance and by its cohesiveness, can then perhaps become a model for many other regions which also suffer the problem of nationalism.

I think it will be essential to tie Germany into something bigger than itself. The most disastrous course for the West would be to fall in with the Communist propaganda that tries to stigmatize Germany as a particular problem and to isolate it. This is bound to create chaos for everybody, and to bring on the very qualities that we should fear most.

I would, therefore, strongly favor Atlantic institutions, not only primarily in the military field, but in all areas. I would begin with non-political institutions simply because it will be a little easier to do this way, because of the institution with which Senator Pell is affiliated. [Laughter]

......

FREEDOM HOUSE

20TH ANNIVERSARY 1941-1961/ 20 WEST 40TH STREET. NEW YORK 18, N.Y.
LONG ACRE 5-3344

October 27, 1961

Board of Trustees

JAMES J. WADSWORTH*
Chairman

HARRY D. GIDEONSE*
President

REX STOUT*
Treasurer

*Executive Committee

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Within a week we will have a draft of the report based on the speeches and proceedings of the Freedom Assembly. The publication of this report will involve our excerpting from the transcript and reconstructing the sequence to make an intelligible presentation for those who were not present. In no case will we in any way mis-represent the speakers.

Shortly after the adjournment of our Freedom Assembly sessions, I mailed you the transcript of your remarks. If you feel you would like us to include your editorial judgment on your text so that we might work it into our report, please let me hear from you. It would be sufficient if you made your notations on the copy which was originally mailed to you. We will, of course, send you copies of the report of these proceedings as soon as they are off the press.

Again, thanks for your contribution to our program and for your continued interest.

GF/gd

October 31, 1961

Dear Mr. Field:

Thank you for your letter of October 27th. From
your letter it is clear to me that there has been some misunder-
standing about my editing and your publishing a text of my remarks
at the Freedom Assembly a few weeks ago.

When I agreed to speak, it was with the understanding
that I could not prepare a text before my talk and that I must see any
remarks before publication. Since I speak extemporaneously with the
aid of a few notes, I do not like to have my speeches published in
general, and allow this only when I have been able to edit them.
In addition, I thought I had made clear that my schedule was so
crowded that I might not be able to go over the transcript, and
should this be the case, that it could not be published. I therefore
cannot agree to have the text of my talk published. If you wish to
publish excerpts in your report, I must be able to see these before
they are printed.

I am sorry for any inconvenience, but I do feel
strongly about this, and would appreciate hearing from you.

FREEDOM HOUSE

November 2, 1961

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

In reply to your letter of October 31st, we will, of course, not publish the transcript we mailed to you in the form of a speech in our report of the Freedom Assembly. I am somewhat surprized by your rather severe restrictions on our use of this material, as there was no indication in our correspondence or conversations that this was to be an off-the-record conference.

We will send you whatever excerpts appear in our report so that you may have an opportunity to make any corrections or other changes you desire. As this part of the text will be relatively brief, it will not involve much of your time.

As for the inconvenience to us, I can assure you this is not a problem and I hope you will understand that it would be awkward to completely omit quotations from the introductory talk for the political section when all other texts and remarks are fully reported.

Incidentally, the all-day session on Saturday, which was limited to the participants only, was more tightly managed by the presiding officers and I believe we have a transcript which will offer valuable guidance when our report is issued.

Please accept our gratitude for your important contribution in the Friday afternoon session under the more difficult arrangement of an open discussion.

GF/gd

## Board of Trustees

JAMES J. WADSWORTH*
Chairman

HARRY D. GIDEONSE*
President

REX STOUT*
Treasurer

*Executive Committee