Statement By
Sol M. Linowitz
before
President's Commission on Central America
September 1, 1983

I am very pleased to have been invited to meet with your Commission in order to talk about some of the critical problems we face in Central America. Let me say at the outset that I believe the only way to understand the problems of Central America and what lies behind them is to view them against the backdrop of United States-Latin American relations over the years. For I submit to you that it will not be possible to deal effectively and thoughtfully with the challenges we confront in Central America today unless we have some sense of what has gone before in our Hemispheric relationships.

Unhappily, Latin America is an area of the world which has been largely overlooked, ignored or disregarded in the United States. James Reston once said that Americans will do anything for Latin America except read about it, and I am afraid that he is all too accurate. No responsible American leader since the days of President Monroe has dared to tell the American people that we can neglect or ignore Latin America, yet we have consistently relegated Latin America to the backwash of history - focusing on it only in moments of crisis. Over the years we have tended to take Latin America for granted or to use the region to score points and teach lessons rather than to build constructive relationships.

Ask most Americans about Latin America and you get a glazed look. Few can name as many as ten of the twenty-two countries in Latin America. To too many Americans, Latin America is still a kind of homogeneous glob inhabited by sombreroed Latinos lurching from siesta to fiesta. Few know the immense differences - cultural, physical, political, sociological - that separate the countries and permit you to change five centuries by crossing a border. Relatively few recognize that Latin America consists of individual nations at critical points in their history determined to fulfill their destiny in their own way.

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Now we have suddenly rediscovered Latin America and its
significance to the United States. The strife in Central America;
the aftermath of the war in the South Atlantic; the financial
upheavals in Mexico, Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina and elsewhere;
the dramatic flow of migrants from Mexico, Haiti, Cuba and other
countries - reveal all too clearly that what happens in Latin
America deeply affects the security, welfare, culture and politics
of the United States. And by the same token, what happens in the
United States has a great impact on Latin America.

Because of my own concern about these problems and my own
involvement in Latin American relations over the years, some months
ago I talked to a number of men and women both in the United States
and in Latin America - people of different parties from different
professional perspectives and different generations - about the
need to come together in order to exchange ideas on how we might
approach the problems in inter-American relations today.

I was struck by how much had changed in Hemispheric relationships
since the 1970's when I had served as Chairman of the Commission
on United States-Latin American relations.

In the mid-1970's we thought that revising the Panama Canal
Treaty was the most urgent issue in United States-Latin American
relations. Today that problem is largely behind us.

In the mid-1970's because of Latin America's dynamic growth
and prospects, we viewed Latin America's economic future with
great optimism. Today we know all too well that Latin America is
a region which faces a severe economic downturn and an acute crisis
of overwhelming debts and high unemployment.

In the mid-1970's, territorial conflicts were not regarded as
particularly significant. Today these questions are hard to avoid,
and they in turn raise other issues such as the arms races,
peacekeeping capabilities and the like.

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In the mid-1970's, we were disturbed by what we called a "plague" of repression" sweeping the Americas. Today we are aware of deep stirrings for a return to democracy in many countries, and the struggle in many nations to achieve progress toward a fuller respect for human rights.

In the 1970's, we paid little attention to Central America which we regarded as a relatively tranquil corner of the Hemisphere. Today we know all too well that we did not have enough understanding to anticipate the fierce struggles now being waged in that region.

And in the 1970's, while we were aware that the so-called "special relationship" in the Hemisphere was declining, we could not have imagined that the United States and major Latin American countries would actually line up on opposite sides of a war.

All these developments made unmistakably clear that there had been drastic changes in inter-American relations in a relatively few years, and what was needed was a new look, free of preconceptions and prejudices.

Dr. Galo Plaza, former President of Ecuador and former Secretary General of the Organization of American States, joined me in convening a group of distinguished opinion leaders from all over the Hemisphere in order to examine the issues in an Inter-American Dialogue. Twenty-four leaders from 15 countries of Latin America, one Canadian and 23 from the United States responded to our invitation. Our group included two former Latin American Presidents, four former Foreign Ministers, six former Finance Ministers, and such distinguished North Americans - Republicans and Democrats alike - as David Rockefeller; General David Jones; Father Theodore Hesburgh; Cyrus Vance; Edmund Muskie; Elliot Richardson; Robert McNamara; Ralph Davidson, Chairman of Time, Inc.; Frank Shakespeare, Chairman of the Heritage Foundation; and Mayor Henry Cisneros, a member of this Commission.

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Our studies and deliberations went on for a period of six months, and during that time, we consulted extensively with high officials in a number of countries. In the United States, for example, we met with Secretary of State Shultz, Vice President Bush, Assistant Secretary of State Enders and others. Working together in the Dialogue, we had a chance to look beyond today's headlines and to think hard and carefully about the kind of tomorrow we wanted in the Americas, and how to help achieve it.

The opening words of our Report were these: "The Western Hemisphere today faces challenges more serious than any since World War II, or perhaps even the Great Depression". And we undertook to examine some of the most important economic, political, social and security problems confronting the Americas.

We started with the grave economic and financial crisis in Latin America today - a crisis which, in my judgment, is no less serious and threatening to the security and stability of the Americas than the wars being fought in Central America.

To put it briefly, the debt crisis in Latin America which has plunged Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Chile and Costa Rica, among others, into deep trouble is also a serious problem for the United States; and our entire closely interlinked financial system is under challenge. To address these problems, we suggested measures to deal with the immediate liquidity crisis and also offered recommendations for resuming the sustained economic growth and development which will be required for a longer term solution. Let me just mention some of the specific recommendations on which we focused attention in our Report.

The strengthening of the International Monetary Fund; the expansion of the role of the multi-lateral development banks; extension of the maturities of existing debt in various Latin American countries; an increase in flows of private, direct investment; resistance to protectionist sentiment both in the Hemisphere and worldwide; the stabilization of commodity export earnings; and the speedy approval of the Administration's Caribbean Basin Initiative.

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[4]

I suggest that all of these are relevant to your own charge
as a Commission to review the economic problems affecting Central
America and to develop recommendations for long-term economic
policies in the region. In this connection, we have heard much
recently about a possible Marshall Plan for Central America.

The term is appealing, but I submit that it is very important
to be clear as to exactly what it means and what it does not mean.

The simple fact is that the problems of Central America and
of Latin America are not like those of Europe a generation ago
when we evolved the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe.
There is too little to reconstruct, recover or rebuild in Central
America. Too much must start from the ground up; and the ground
itself must first be cleared of jungle, a trail cut through the
mountain, civilization itself introduced before new farms can be
laid out and made productive. Factories must be built along with
homes, hospitals and schools. Disease must be stamped out; people
must be trained; institutions must be built, attitudes and policies
must change; and a whole new tradition and way of life must be
established. The fact is that the solutions for Europe are not
the solutions for Latin America. What can be borrowed from the
Marshall Plan is the overriding objective - a multi-lateral
undertaking not directed against any country or ideology, but
against poverty, chaos and distress. This is essentially the goal
set forth in the OAS Charter which enunciates our joint objectives
in the Americas in these words: "A united effort to insure social
justice in the Hemisphere and dynamic and balanced economic
development for their peoples, as conditions essential for peace
and security".

In short, our main economic job in Central America must be a
constructive one, a job of building, a job of hope, one that does
not put its faith in the force of arms but in the force of mutual
cooperation. An economic plan which is based on this understanding
could hold real promise for the future.

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[4J]

In viewing that future, we must recognize that Latin America is today at a political crossroads. During the last several years, much of Latin America has moved toward more open and representative policies, and the bases are being laid for a renewal of democracy in much of the Western Hemisphere.

If these democratic openings are to take hold, governments and political movements must enlist the participation of the great majority of Latin Americans by responding to their desire for improved conditions of life. Latin American countries have made substantial gains in recent years in such areas as health and education. But World Bank estimates still show that 1/2 of Latin America's rural population and 1/4 of its city dwellers remain in "absolute poverty". At least another 1/3 of the region's population is poor by contemporary standards.

The persistent poverty of 2/3 of the people of Latin America is the major cause of the Hemisphere's social unrest. Poverty, inequality and injustice lead to political protest and polarization. Polarization, in turn, frequently leads to repression, followed by cycles of violent opposition, widespread violations of human rights, and greater social injustice. To break this cycle, to increase the opportunities for human fulfillment, and to build more stable societies, sustained commitments to alleviate poverty will have to be made throughout the Americas.

The renewal and expansion of democratic procedures offer the best hope of progress toward greater social justice. But democratization is by its nature a national process for which individuals and institutions within each country must be responsible. Democracy is not a set of formal mechanisms and procedures that can be sent abroad. It is a process, a set of commitments rooted in the history and architecture of a nation, a process that can be nurtured and encouraged but not transplanted or imposed. While outside countries can and should encourage the growth of democratic institutions, it is doubtful than any government - perhaps least of all that of the most powerful country in the Hemisphere - can in a direct way undertake to build democratic political institutions in other countries.

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Accordingly, the recommendations in our Report for advancing
democracy in the Hemisphere were quite modest.

First, we oppose any activities - covert or overt - by
government and other institutions which undermine the political
autonomy or integrity of any country. We believe that the
principle of non-intervention is vital for safeguarding democratization.

Second, we believe that foreign governments, international
organizations and private institutions can contribute importantly
but indirectly to democratization through support of equitable
economic and social development.

Third, we believe that governments can help create a climate
favorable to democracy through the tone and quality of their
diplomatic relations. We hope that democratic countries in the
Americas will maintain warmer and more supportive relations with
other democracies. But we would counsel against breaking diplomatic
relations with authoritarian governments, since this tends to
rally nationalist support for a regime and to reinforce rigidity.

On the issue of human rights, clearly the protection and
advancement of human rights is primarily the domestic responsibility
of the national government. But is also a legitimate international
concern. And this should be reflected in the foreign policies of
the governments and in the programs of international organizations.
For carefully considered multi-lateral action to protect fundamental
human rights is not intervention, but an international obligation.
Direct unilateral intervention of any government in the domestic
affairs of others, even on behalf of human rights, can have unfortunate
consequences. But silence and inaction in the face of clear abuses
are inexcusable. For these can threaten both the security and the
stability of the Hemisphere.

In focusing on the issue of security, we agreed on two important
points: First, that the basic roots of insecurity - and the basic
problems of security - in the Hemisphere are primarily economic,
social and political, not military. Second, that sources of insecurity

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are mainly internal to each nation, and external influences are
secondary.

It was also our firm conviction that even when there is a
military dimension to conflict as in Central America, the solutions
ultimately lie in economic and social development and political
dialogue and not in weapons or military advisors. Even when
external support for insurrection clearly is present, as in El
Salvador, the underlying problems remain domestic.

There are significant differences in the way security is
conceived and defined in the United States as against the way it
is understood in Latin America. When Latin Americans think of
security, most of them tend to think of the internal challenges of
national unity, of border issues with neighboring states, and, in
some cases, of the possibility of intervention by the United States.

In the United States, the focus on security is external, global and strategic. Because of its worldwide interest and role, the United States generally seeks to assure political stability by supporting the status quo under sharp internal or regional challenge. Many Latin Americans, on the other hand, feel that profound change in the region is inevitable and that an emphasis on immediate stability is, therefore, misguided.

These differences are reconcilable. For both North Americans
and Latin Americans stress self-determination and non-intervention
as norms. Both favor keeping Latin America and the Caribbean out
of the East-West conflict to the greatest extent possible. Both
understand that social and economic progress is vital for achieving
political stability and protecting national and international
security.

Our approach toward the Central American conflict was based
on two major premises. First, that most citizens and governments
throughout the Hemisphere oppose an expansion of Soviet and Cuban

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military presence in the Americas. Second, that the United States
could do much to foster a climate of security in the region by
making unequivocally clear its commitment to respect national
sovereignty.

Accordingly, we strongly endorsed the initiative taken by
Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela in the Contadora Declaration,
offering their good offices in seeking peaceful solutions to Central
America's problems. We urged the United States to declare its
full support for the Contadora group's efforts and its readiness
to participate in the discussions as might be deemed appropriate.

Such an American commitment must make unmistakably clear by
word and deed that this regional approach is central to our planning
for the resolution of the conflicts - and not just peripheral to
it; and that we stand resolutely with the Contadora countries as
partners in this common effort. I am afraid that such a commitment
is still lacking.

We also made a further recommendation, suggesting that it
might be worth exploring the possibility that the United States-
Soviet understandings of 1962, 1970 and 1979 with respect to Cuba
might provide a basis for a wider accord that could enhance the
collective security of the entire region. We proposed that this
could be explored informally and quietly with both the Soviet
Union and Cuba in order to determine the possibility of arriving
at understandings.

Recent statements by Fidel Castro appear to encourage such
an approach and suggest that we should indeed, in the President's
words, give Castro "the benefit of the doubt" and ask our Contadora
friends to explore the seriousness of his own proposal along this
line.

Any such understandings would necessarily have to be contingent
- and revocable if any party failed to adhere to its pledges.
Appropriate procedures would of course have to be established to
monitor continued adherence. This would be exceedingly difficult,
but should not be impossible to achieve.

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Of course, we cannot be sure that such discussions would succeed. But we are sure that the perils and costs of allowing the Central American conflicts to grow are grave and raise the specter of wider conflicts. And the dangers are growing - for time is not on the side of peace. Accordingly, we firmly believe - all of us from North and South America and covering a wide spectrum of views and experience - that negotiations should and must be tried - on all levels.

In both El Salvador and Nicaragua, negotiations should be pursued with the help of the Contadora countries to arrange for free internationally supervised elections on the basis of security guarantees for all parties and participants. And in the region as a whole, a major effort should be undertaken in conjunction with our Latin American friends to find a way to settle the conflicts.

All of this suggests some of the basic principles which I believe should guide us in dealing with the Central American situation today.

First, we must recognize that the problems of Central America are regional ones, affecting all of the countries in the area and not just the United States. Accordingly, we cannot and must not undertake unilaterally to deal with the issue as if it were ours alone to solve.

Second, as a regional issue it is a problem which must and can be dealt with only on a regional and cooperative basis. The Contadora countries have taken leadership in exploring avenues for peaceful negotiation of the conflicts and we should make unequivocally clear our full commitment to their efforts.

Third, we must understand that the basic problem of Central America today is essentially a political problem with a military dimension rather than - as our present policy seems to suggest - a military problem with a political dimension. Accordingly, we must recognize that a military response in Central America will not achieve a solution.

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[M]

Fourth, we must be clear about what we seek to achieve in Central America and consistent in our words and actions moving toward that objective. We cannot, for example, assert that we are committed to regional cooperation and, at the same time, pursue our own course without regard to the views of our friends and allies. We cannot maintain that we are committed to self-determination and freedom of choice for the people of Central America, yet assume we can undertake to prescribe what that choice must be.

In short, the United States of America must stand for the peaceful resolution of the conflicts through negotiation, making unmistakably clear our commitment to non-intervention and self-determination as fundamental principles.

I believe that Central America is less a test of our resolve to stand up to the Soviet Union than of our capacity for farsighted leadership and cooperation within our hemisphere - whether we can conduct ourselves with requisite vision, restraint, flexibility and self-confidence, not just as a great power - but as a great democracy.

It may be significant that all who participated in our Report agreed that the security of the Americas had probably been *advanced* more in recent years by the *Panama Canal Treaties* than by any other single development.

For the Treaties did much to enhance the spirit of cooperation between the two halves of America; and they reinforced the stakes held in common by allowing Latin Americans to take responsibility commensurate with their stakes.

That was the essence of the approach in our Report - not to deny differences in interest and perspective between the United States and Latin America, but to emphasize the important interests we share, and the importance of mutual respect for vital concerns. For as the Mexican patriot *Benito Juárez* once said: "Respect for the rights of others is peace".

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Today we are at a moment of crisis in Central America and in the Hemisphere at large. When conditions of crisis are faced imaginatively, opportunities for progress exist. Such opportunities do exist - especially for the United States. The question is how we will respond to them.

Many years ago, President Theodore Roosevelt described those opportunities in some words singularly applicable to our role in Latin America today - and to your role as members of this Commission.

"The United States does not have the option as to whether it will or will not play a great part. It must play a great part. The only question is whether it will play that part well or badly".

August 31, 1983

STATEMENT OF THOMAS CLIFTON MANN

I.

1. United States policy of opposition to attempts by states hostile to our form of government to impose their systems on independent American states is as valid today as it ever was. The basis of that policy was that such attempts to gain footholds in this hemisphere would constitute a threat to the security of the United States.

2. This policy was first announced by Monroe in 1823 when certain European states were rumored to be considering the reimposition of monarchical systems on American republics. It was followed by Franklin Roosevelt in 1940-1941 when Nazi Fifth Columns were operating in American states with the purpose of diminishing the will of those states to resist Nazi aggressions. It was followed by John Kennedy during the October, 1962 missile crisis. It was followed by Johnson during the 1955 Dominican crisis.

3. On only two occasions has the US failed to follow this policy. One was in 1961 when a division of opinion amongst the leaders of our Democratic party caused a paralysis in the White House decision-making process. The result was the Bay of Pigs fiasco, the consolidation of Marxists-Leninists in power in Cuba, and the formation of military ties between Cuba and the USSR. The other was the support of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries in Nicaragua and El Salvador with the result that Marxists-Leninists were able to gain control of a second American state (Nicaragua) and to launch a class war against the Salvadoran middle class - against all those who owned property which produced goods or services or employed labor.

4. These two failures to follow traditional US policy created the conditions which presumably made it necessary for these hearings to be conducted.

II.

1. During the two decades 1945-1965 other American states essentially declared that the activities of revolutionary groups, particularly guerrillas and terrorists, which were in the service of a Communist state, constituted intervention and aggression; and that an act of aggression against one American state would be considered an act of aggression against all American states.

2. During the same period, a majority of American states

2.

often recognized that collective action by the OAS did not impair
any state's individual right of self-defense which is inherent in
sovereignty. Thus the right of the US to defend itself against
an act of aggression does not depend upon affirmative action
by any international body.

3. Nor does the US have to wait until its own territory is attacked by a hostile power. In the words of Elihu Root every state has a right to protect itself "by preventing a condition of affairs in which it will be too late to protect itself." In the words of Franklin Roosevelt, it would be suicide to wait until the enemy is in our front yard. "Anyone with an atlas and a reasonable knowledge of modern war, knows that it would be stupid to wait until a probable enemy has gained a foothold from which to attack. Old-fashioned common sense calls for the use of a strategy which will prevent such an enemy from gaining a foothold in the first place."

III.

1. The USSR represents a threat to the security of the US because its leaders have consistently affirmed that their country has a mission to promote class wars for the purpose of gradually creating a one-world socialist state and, in the process, destroy the governments and political, economic and social systems of all states which are not Marxist-Leninist in character. This sense of mission has become, for those leaders, a kind of secular religion.

2. There is no cogent evidence that Soviet leaders have abandoned Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist ideology, strategy or tactics. On the contrary, the evidence that Soviet leaders are pursuing their goal with undiminished zeal is overwhelming.

3. All rational Americans prefer peace to the horrors of war, particularly those who have lived through wartime periods and have learned that even victory has its price. But it takes two to keep the peace - the aggressor and the victim. Targets of aggressor states who are strong and able to defend themselves have a much better chance of surviving than those who are weak or who have lost their will to defend themselves.

4. More particularly, those who lived through the long, dark months following Pearl Harbor when the US lost control of the sea and air in the Caribbean do not need to be convinced of the importance of the area to our survival. Those who did not

3.

would do well to read accurate historical accounts of the ships
and lives lost in those dark days when the US was trying to keep
open sea lanes vital to the US and other American states.

5. During the Second World War, we learned, or should have learned, that the power that controls the seas adjacent to our coasts, and the skies above them, controls access to many of our ports, the Panama Canal, and to our ability to buy materials in the hemisphere which are in short supply here at home and essential to our ability to mobilize our military strength.

IV.

1. Not being privy to such plans that may exist for re-
sisting Communist penetration in Central America, no opinion
is expressed concerning any plan that may exist on a contingency
or other basis.

2. Subject to conditions described later, the following
general opinions are, however, expressed:

3. In respect of El Salvador, we should (a) try to persuade all anti-communist factions to unite under leadership chosen by themselves; (b) refrain from additional interventions in the domestic affairs of that country; (c) lend the Salvadoran government the military and economic assistance it wants and needs to defeat and expel Communist guerrillas and terrorists; (d) if the Salvadorans are unable to accomplish this end, land US armed forces in strength to assist them; (e) try to persuade the Salvadoran government that it should hold elections as soon as feasible after order has been restored; (f) ask that government to permit foreigners to observe whether the elections are free and without coercion; (g) leave the fate of the so-called "reforms" imposed by Washington to the decisions of the elected representatives of the Salvadoran people.

4. In respect of Nicaragua, the US should support counter-revolutionary groups which seek to restore the sovereignty and independence of that state until (a) positive steps are taken to hold free elections and (b) the government of that state demonstrates that it is longer supporting guerrillas in neighboring states, including El Salvador.

5. In a Marxist-Leninist society such as Nicaragua, in order
to eliminate the fear of reprisals it would be necessary for the