and because of that, half of Vietnam fell to the Communists. If the United States does the same thing now, the other half of Vietnam will go." In 1954, France abandoned the quisling regime it had established, and half of Vietnam fell to what the U.S. government had ruefully conceded, years before, was the nationalist movement of Vietnam. General Thieu and his colleagues, most of whom fought with the French against the nationalist movement of Vietnam, quite naturally fear that their future is dim if they are abandoned by the imperial power that replaced France.

Washington, however, has now served notice that it intends to continue to impose the "political tendency" and "leading personalities" of the GVN on the people of South Vietnam. Given the historical circumstances and the context of the agreements it is evident that for the U.S. to "impose its rule of the GVN can mean nothing other than to recognize, supply, and directly support this regime, instituted and maintained in power by U.S. military might, as the sole legitimate government of (South) Vietnam. If words have any meaning, the military and police forces of the U.S.-imposed regime are mercenary forces-assembled, trained, supplied and paid by the U.S. These forces could not have existed in the past, nor could they now, without U.S. direction and massive support, just as the Saigon regime itself has always been entirely dependent on the imperial power that created it and kept it alive.

[A QUESTION OF SOVEREIGNTY]

The central issue of the war since the early 1960s has been the question of sovereignty in the South. The U.S. government is announcing that, in violation of the Agreements it has just signed, it will continue to impose the regime it created on the people of the South. In obvious defiance of the facts, Thieu asserts that the Agreements identify his government as the "lone legal government" in the South. Washington agrees.

The announced intentions of the U.S. government become still more significant as we look further into what is implied by recognition of the GVN, "its constitutional structure and leadership intact and unchanged." Consider first its constitutional structure. Article I of the GVN Constitution, which is unremendable, states that "Viet-Nam is a territorially indivisible, unified and independent republic"; the GVN "represent[s] the people of Viet-Nam," North and South. This might be dismissed as bluster, but not so Article V, which proclaims: "The Republic of Viet-Nam opposes communism in every form. Every activity designed to propagandize or carry out communism is prohibited" (Congressional Record, June 6, 1967, S7733). This Article provides the "legal basis" for the Phoenix program and for the various laws of the past years that outlaw not only communism but also "pro-communist neutralism." For example, "All plots and actions under the false name of peace and neutrality according to a Communist policy ..." including "diffusion, circulation, distribution, sale, display ..." in any form of material "aimed at spreading Communist policies, slogans and instructions," and so on. Nixon and Kissinger must be aware off this when they announce that they will continue to recognize and support the GVN,

under its existing constitutional structure, as "the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam," in Nixon's phrase.

Consider now the leadership which remains "intact and unchanged," with full U.S. backing. Its intentions are no secret. "According to the semi-official newspaper *Tin Song* South Vietnamese President Thieu has issued shoot-to-kill orders to his troops and police that would take effect with the announcement of a cease-fire. The report said the orders cover Communist demonstrators, rioters, and sympathizers; deserters; anyone who raises the Viet Cong flag or takes part in Communist propaganda campaigns" (Henry S. Hayward, *Christian Science Monitor*, Jan. 23). Thieu has "reminded the commanders" that "police and armed forces are "authorized to shoot on the spot people who incite riots and 'applaud the communists,'" to "'arrest summarily anyone who distributed Communist propaganda" or who "urged others to move to Communist-controlled areas." Furthermore, "anybody engaging in political activities as 'neutralist or pro-Communists,' or distributing currency to the Communists, are subject to arrest." These tactics, according to *Tin Song*, "Will remain in effect in Government-controlled areas after a cease-fire goes into effect," under "the authorities and powers granted by the Constitution and laws" of the GVN (*NY Times*, Jan. 23). "Saigon troops and police have been ordered to restrain the refugees-forcibly if necessary" if they attempt "to return to their homes after a cease-fire is declared." According to articles planted by the GVN in the press, "half a dozen actions considered 'pro-Communist' are also punishable by death" (Peter Osnos, Thomas Lippman, *Washington Post*, Jan. 23). "Saigon radio said troops and police had orders to shoot on sight anyone tearing down flags and banners or creating disturbances for the Communists" (Reuters, Jan. 24).

Shortly after the peace scare of late October, government-backed groups in Danang began distributing leaflets which "called on South Vietnamese to 'extermine the Communists' before, during and after a cease-fire" (AP, Oct. 31). Thieu's closest advisor, Hoang Due Nha, stated in an interview that with Thieu in power, communists "are afraid of an Indonesian-style coup even in a coalition. They are afraid we would cut their throats" (Laurence Stern, *Washington Post*, Nov. 30). Nha is referring to the massacre of hundreds of thousands after the military takeover in the fall of 1965. The Thieu regime proudly boasts that the CIA-directed Phoenix program has been assassinating civilians at the rate of better than 1000 a month (*Vietnam 1967-71: Toward Peace and Prosperity*, Ministry of Information, Saigon, 1971, p. 52). After an abortive anti-Sihanouk coup in 1959, the Saigon government diplomatic representative in Phnom Penh told British reporter Michael Field: "You must understand that we in Saigon are desperate men. We are a government of desperadoes." It is all the more true today.

The Paris Agreements state that the "two South Vietnamese parties," namely, the GVN and the PRG, will "Achieve national reconciliation and concord, end hatred and enmity, prohibit all acts of reprisal and discrimination ..." and will ensure "democratic liberties" including freedom of speech, press, meet-

RAMPARTS 27

Ramparts
April 1973

ing, organization, political activities, movement and residence, and so on (Chapter IV, Article 11). Article 2 of the Protocols on the Cease Fire states that "All regular and irregular armed forces and the armed police of the parties in South Vietnam shall observe the prohibition of the following acts: ... Armed attacks against any person, either military or civilian, by any means whatsoever ... [and] All acts endangering lives or public or private property."

In short, the U.S. supports as the sole legitimate government a regime which is informing the world that it has not the slightest intention of observing the Agreements it has just signed. Its constitutional structure, which remains intact with full U.S. backing, is inconsistent with fundamental provisions of the Agreements and serves as the "legal basis" for subverting them. The announced intentions of this regime also clearly reveal its own analysis of the degree of its popular support.

All of this recalls the behavior of the Diem regime in the mid-1950s. The 1954 Geneva Accords, which Diem publicly denounced by Jan. 1955; guaranteed democratic liberties and prohibited reprisals or discrimination (Article 14c). Diem instituted "pacification" programs which the correspondent for the London Times and Economist, David Hotham, described in these terms: "They consist of killing, or arresting without either evidence or trial, large numbers of persons suspected of being Viet-Minh or 'rebels'." The Diem army conducted "massive expeditions" to peaceful Communist regions, arresting tens of thousands and killing "hundreds, perhaps thousands of peasants," destroying "whole villages ... by artillery" in operations that were "kept secret from the American public" (Joseph Buttinger). Diem's forces were trained, equipped and advised by the U.S. His secret police "was largely the brain-child of a highly respected, senior U.S. Foreign Service professional," General Edward Lansdale, highest-ranking CIA man in South Vietnam, reported secretly in 1961, adding: "I cannot truly sympathize with Americans who help promote a fascistic state and then get angry when it doesn't act like a democracy." These methods were temporarily successful in crushing the Viet Minh and others in the South, in direct and immediate violation of the Geneva Accords, although the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group warned in July 1957, "the Viet Cong guerrillas and propagandists, however, are still waging a grim battle for survival" and still attempting to form groups "seeking to spread the theory of 'Peace and Co-existence,'" along with other similar crimes against the state.

As in the 1950s, the U.S. commitment to the Thieu regime signifies an intention to violate the central provisions of the Agreements that have just been signed. It is easy to conjure up some unpleasant "scenarios." Suppose that refugees attempt to return to their homes or that PRG supporters or neutralists of the wrong type try to make use of the freedoms theoretically granted them by the Agreements; the GVN proceeds with its announced intention of preventing this by force, shooting to kill if necessary; there is resistance to government terror; Nixon appears on TV to announce that the U.S. will not tolerate such communist violence and lawlessness—the bombers are now on their way; the liberal press denounces both the "communist atrocities" and the "retaliatory bombing." Whether or not

something of the sort takes place, it is clear that Nixon and Kissinger have laid the basis for it in their response to the Paris Agreements.

## [LIQUIDATION OF PRISONERS IN SOUTH VIETNAM]

Virtually the sole "progress" achieved by Kissinger between October and January is that the "question of the return of Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam" is left unresolved in the Agreements, whereas the 9-Point plan of October indicated that they were to be released (Point 3). The Protocol on prisoners now states that "All Vietnamese civilian personnel captured and detained in South Vietnam shall be treated humanely at all times, and in accordance with international practice. They shall be protected against all violence to life and person..." There have been numerous reports of torture and murder in the prisons (see Holmes Brown and Don Luce, *Hostages of War*, 1973, for a recent summary). On December 29, 1972, two Frenchmen who had been imprisoned in Saigon for over two years were released. They reported beatings, torture and assassinations, with names and dates, adding that "all of this is under the control of American advisors who, we are convinced, are aware of everything that happens in the Vietnamese prisons" (Le Monde, Jan. 4, 1973). They also report that a few days before their release, "there were massive deportations to the Poulo Condor Prison camp," the scene of numerous reported atrocities in the past. They speculate that their sudden release may have been motivated by concern that they might witness what they expect will now take place: "a liquidation operation which might begin in the prisons." Amnesty International has since cited "evidence that selective elimination of opposition members had begun" in the prisons, and reports that "267 political prisoners were sent from Chi Hoa national prison in Saigon to the notorious prison on Con Son Island, home of the 'tiger cage' detention cells," adding that "300 prisoners travelling on a boat from Con Son to the mainland are reported to have been killed" (*NY Times*, Jan. 27, 1973). That U.S. officials are aware of what goes on in the prisons that are maintained with U.S. aid is hardly in doubt. The chief of the Public Safety Division in Saigon, Frank E. Walton, who publicly described Con Son as "like a Boy Scout Recreational Camp," signed a report on October 1, 1963 which stated that:

> In Con Son II, some of the hardcore communists keep preaching the "party" line, so these "Reds" are sent to the Tiger Cages in Con Son I where they are isolated from all others for months at a time. This confinement may also include rice without salt and water—the United States prisons' equivalent of bread and water. It may include immobilization—the prisoner is bolted to the floor, handcuffed to a bar or rod, or legions with the chain through an eyebolt, or around a bar or rod." (Brown and Luce).

A significant element of U.S. "aid" to the people of South Vietnam.

*(Continued on page 55)*

28 RAMPARTS

PHOTOGRAPHY BY TIM PAGE

Ramparts
July 1973

the GVN as the sole legitimate government in South Vietnam is not only without support in the texts, but is in plain violation of their provisions. The original and always primary source of external interference in the internal affairs of South Vietnam has been the United States, and apparently this will continue to be the case. One might dismiss Kissinger's evasions as merely a childish display, were it not for the fact that they may represent official policy. Furthermore, the mass media seem to be taken in, and continue to present Kissinger's conclusions as though they had something to do with the facts.

Exactly the same charade was enacted in October. On October 26, Kissinger conceded that the Radio Hanoi broadcast of the 9-Point program gave "on the whole a very fair account." He then offered the following paraphrase: "As was pointed out by Radio Hanoi, the existing authorities with respect to both internal and external politics would remain in office." Although there is a studied ambiguity, the natural interpretation of his statement, made still more clear by the context, is that the GVN ("the existing authori-

ties") will remain "in office" as the government of the South, and will deal somehow with the other "party," whose status remains mysterious. But this is not what "was pointed out by Radio Hanoi," which stated, rather, that "the two present administrations in South Vietnam will remain in existence with their respective domestic and external functions," going on to identify them as the GVN and PRG.

On the issue which Kissinger now correctly identifies as what the war has been "all about," he was offering a "paraphrase" which was sharply at variance with the broadcast that he conceded was accurate. Having rejected the central principle in the 9-Point program, he then went on to say that "peace is at hand." The reason for the deception was, quite obvious at the time. On the eve of the election, Nixon was not willing to reject publicly an agreement which offered public return of the POWs and a ceasefire. He preferred to delay any response to the DRV initiative until after the election, when he would have more leverage. The mass media, with characteristic docility, chose to believe that peace was at hand and to overlook the fact that Kissinger was clearly rejecting the central provision of the 9-Point plan. Now apologists lamely argue that Kissinger's statement that "peace is at hand" was a "signal" to the DRV that U.S. intentions were serious. A telephone call would have achieved the same result, without any mysterious "signals," had this been the intention.

In mid-December Kissinger announced that negotiations had broken down, blaming DRV intransigence and overlooking the fact that the DRV was publicly calling for signing of the 9-Point agreement. Typically, the mass media repeated this nonsense, and depicted poor Kissinger as caught between two irrational adversaries, Hanoi and Saigon. The terror bombing of urban centers in North Vietnam ensuited. Though severe damage was caused, the tactic failed. The U.S. Air Force suffered substantial losses, and there were clear signs of resistance among B-52 pilots. Furthermore, there was an unanticipated and threatening international reaction. Nixon and Kissinger then formally accepted an agreement which is virtually identical to the 9-

Points of October. But they continue to misrepresent the central terms of this Agreement in exactly the way they misrepresented the October plan, though more blatantly. The press remains obedient and silent.

The significance of these maneuvers becomes still more clear if we recall a little history. In 1962 the NLF announced its official program, which has not materially changed until this day. It proposed that South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia form a neutral zone, and that "South Vietnam will follow an independent, sovereign foreign policy with internal democratic freedoms and no external interference. Negotiations between the leaders of the "two zones" temporarily separated at Geneva in 1954 would lead to "step-by-step reunification," taking into account the different character of the two zones and observing the principle of "equality" and "nonannexation of one zone by the other." The U.S. government has been fighting for ten years to prevent the realization of this program, which it has now, in essence, formally accepted at Paris, while continuing to reject it in the Washington version of these Agreements.

It is quite obvious why the U.S. could not consider the NLF Program of 1962. Internal freedom in South Vietnam would have led to a political role for the NLF—in fact, a dominant role, if one accepts the assessment of high officials in the U.S. mission in Saigon in 1962 that about half the population supported the NLF (could George Washington have claimed as much?), while virtually no one supported the GVN. The U.S. government expert on the NLF, Douglas Pike, who gives the same estimate of NLF support in 1962, notes that "in September 1963 the NLF asked the United Nations for help in establishing a coalition government in South Vietnam until the one established in Laos by the Geneva Agreements of 1962. "The NLF in mid-1964 put forth feelers for a proposal for what appeared to be an authentic coalition government" (Pike, War, Peace and the Viet Cong, p. 6; Viet Cong, pp. 359 ff. Substantial evidence that the NLF looked to the Laos settlement as a model, along the lines of their 1962

> Of all the articles and books that have been published on apartheid in South Africa, none makes the true situation so grimly real for the outsider as Carlson's story of his 20-year attempt to win some measure of justice for black South Africans. His descriptions of what life is like for the defenseless 'Jantu' are unparalleled.
> 
> —Publishers Weekly

> With the skill and discipline of the professional and the sensitivity of an artist he conveys the full stark terror of repression ... his lesson is imperative to our survival.
> 
> —RAMSEY CLARK

> A fascinating book by one of the world's most distinguished, compassionate, and courageous lawyers. It should be read by everyone who wants to understand the nature of our constitutional liberties.
> 
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56 RAMPARTS

JOYCE HABER

Kissinger Loses His Peace Talk Pallor

On Sunday, Mickey and Paul Ziffren threw one of their very best parties (and that is best, I assure you) for Henry Kissinger. The President's foreign affairs adviser is tanned and in top condition after his recent vacation in Acapulco. His date was strawberry-haired Samantha Eggar, looking pretty but frail and pale—as if she, not Henry, had been spending this decade in conference rooms.

Henry was clearly pleased to be back in his own New Hollywood playground: He answered host Ziffren's gracious toast by saying that "no other group has been more loyal to me through national crises" than those in California, the land of the Western White House. Henry was also quick as Clint Eastwood's trigger, as always, at conversation.

A classic example occurred some time ago. Paul said to me, jokingly: "Joyce, do you realize this is the first time a German ever *ended* a war?" When I told Kissinger Paul's remark, he laughed and riposted: "Maybe that's why it's still not over."

Another guest, MGA's Lew Wasserman, commended guest Danny Kaye's brilliant handling of the American

Film Institute dinner honoring John Ford the night before (Peter Bogdanovich, by the by, who compiled the Ford film clips, asked that his name be removed from the credits of the CBS telecast since his work has been "truncated and recut for TV" not by the network, but by AFI). Kaye (who was with his Sylvia), replied to Wasserman's toast, and to laughter, that movie making "is a profession I'm proud of and everyone should be proud of, despite the fact that occasionally we screw it up."

Henry Kissinger

Evening Escalates Socially

So the evening escalated, as the Ziffrens tend to escalate socially. Mickey mixes people better than James Bond that now-famous, fictional perfect martini. Also present were bright and versatile Sen. Alan Cranston, State Atty. Gen. and Mrs. Evelle Younger (he will run for governor in the fall), U.S. District Judge Matt Byrne with Washington's Carol Welch, Fox's Dennis Stanfills, the Frederick Brissons (Roz wearing a stunning high-necked sheath of red, white and blue), Lance Brisson, Paramount's Robert Evans, again with The Rookies' Kate Jackson, Robert Wagners (Natalie beautiful in her new short page-boy hairdo by Neil Sloane), Billy Wilders, Norton Simons (Jennifer Jones, of course), Dick Crennas, Greg Pecks (Veronique in a beautiful new long hairdo by Veronique), ABC's Barry Diller (who had to rush off to catch a midnight plane for New York ABC's fall scheduling meetings), KNBC's Tom Brokaws (for once, because it was Sunday, Tom didn't have to rush off to do his newscast), Alan Livingstons (Nancy Olsen), David Janssen with Dani Greco and the Kirk Douglases. (Ann has a sense of humor, too: I wrote a column some

time ago saying that Kissinger was such a social lion one Mrs. X—that was Ann—had asked me not to mention her party, so as not to offend those who weren't invited. She called me the day the column appeared, and suggested: "Next time you give a party for Henry, call yourself Mrs. Z." I may.)

Speaking of honors, Mark Spitz received—get ready—the second annual Life Saver of the Year Award on Monday. No, not from the Red Cross. From the makers of Life Savers candy and chewing gum. "An array of Olympic and swimming dignitaries (were) expected to attend—it says here.

Best-selling authoress Jackie Susann, who was scheduled to arrive this weekend, was taken to Doctor's Hospital in New York with double pneumonia. I saw Jackie and Irving Mansfield, her husband, recently, and she seemed fine, but complained of weariness. She'd been working up to deadline on her new novel, just published last week, "Once Is Not Enough." Even without Jackie's personal promotion, "Enough" is already No. 1 on the N.Y. Post's (local) best seller list; No. 8 on The Times list, and No. 3 in Hollywood, according to Pickwick Bookshops. Jackie, get well soon... Susan Hayward has also been ailing, seriously. She's in a Los Angeles hospital... And Burt Reynolds, who had intestinal surgery—for a strangulated hernia—at Century City Hospital on Saturday, is recuperating nicely.

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ZZ

RNR142

NIGHTLEAD NIXON :

BY RALPH HARRIS

SAN CLEMENTE, CALIF., APRIL 6, REUTER - PRESIDENT
NIXON ANNOUNCED TODAY MAJOR CHANGES IN HIS NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL THAT WERE WIDELY REGARDED AS STRENGTHENING
THE HAND OF DR. HENRY KISSINGER IN CONTROLLING EUROPEAN
AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY.

NIXON STRENGTHENED THE COUNCIL STAFF BY APPOINTING FOUR NEW DEPUTIES TO DR. KISSINGER, HIS FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISER, WHOSE DOMINANT ROLE IN THE VIETNAM PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WAS REGARDED AS A DOWNGRADING OF PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMATS AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT.

HE ALSO NAMED HELMUT SONNENFELDT, A TOP WHITE HOUSE
ADVISER AND AN EXPERT ON THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE,
AS TREASURY UNDERSECRETARY WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR EAST-
WEST TRADE RELATIONS, AND FOREIGN SECURITY AND ECONOMIC
POLICY.

THE PRESIDENTS MOOD WAS VIEWED BY OBSERVERS AT THE
WESTERN WHITE HOUSE HERE AS A STRENGTHENING OF DR. KISS-\INGER'S HAND AS THE UNITED STATES BEGAN ITS "YEAR OF
EUROPE" THE UNITED STATES IS MOVING TOWARD DIFFICULT
TRADE NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET AND
OTHER TRADING PARTNERS.

;; MORE GS/EP 1754

ZZ

RNR143

NIGHTLEAD NIXON 2 SAN CLEMENTE :

PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SECRETARY RONALD ZIEGLEP WAS ASKED
IF THE CHANGES WERE A FURTHER SIGN THAT DR. KISSINGER AND
HIS NATIONAL SECURITY STAFF--WIDELY KNOWN AS THE "REAL
STATE DEPARTMENT"-- WAS BECOMING EVEN MORE DOMINANT OVER
THE STATE DEPARTMENT, HEADED BY SECRETARY OF STATE WILLIAM
ROGERS.

ZIEGLER REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT THINK SO AND SAID
THAT THE PRESIDENTS ACTIONS WERE A CASE OF "INSTITUTION-
ALIZING" THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL.

OBSERVERS STRESSED ZIEGLERS CHOICE OF WORDS,
SAYING THAT DR. KISSINGER NOW HAD A PERMANENT STRUCTURE
UNDER HIM, RESEMBLING THE STATE DEPARTMENT ORGANIZATION
WHERE ROGERS IS SUPPORTED BY A NUMBER OF UNDER-SECRETARIES AND
DEPUTY SECRETARIES.

NAMED AS DR. KISSINGERS PRINCIPAL DEPUTY WAS MR. NIXONS
MILITARY AIDE, BRIG. GEN. BRENT SCOWSCROFT, WHO
Succeeded GEN. ALEXANDER HAIG. GEN. HAIG WAS DEEPLY
INVOLVED IN THE VIETNAM PEACE NEGOTIATIONS AND IS NOW DEPUTY
ARMY CHIEF OF STAFF.

LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF DEFENCE, WAS CHOSEN AS ANOTHER DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO
THE PRESIDENT AND TO DR. KISSINGER.

;; MORE RH/GS/BR 1758