(267)

about
from the British Ambassador, which I in turn, wished to consult with him abscissa
and also to discuss how far it would be advisable at this time to bring pressure
upon the Allies to meet the willingness of Germany to start peace parleys.

There were no outside visitors at dinner excepting Dr. Grayson and myself.
Afterward we went to the study and discussed the best means of action.

In the meantime, I had wired Phillips from New York to make an engagement with
the British Ambassador at his home at nine o'clock. The President suggested that
I telephone Phillips to find if this had been done. I did so, and found that
Spring-Rice had a dinner engagement and desired to meet me at 10.15 but I did
not wish to keep the President up so late since he would want to hear the result
of the interview. Therefore, I asked Phillips to please communicate with the
Ambassador again and ask him to come at 9.45, and it was arranged that way.

The President and I went into every phase of the situation, and it was
decided that I should ask Spring-Rice to send another despatch to Sir Edward Grey
and have him feel out the Allies as to Bernstorff's proposal.

In the meantime, we discussed the Trades Commission, the row with the Senate
over the confirmation of appointments and other matters of current, though not
permanent interest.

When I met Spring-Rice he said he had received another cablegram from Sir
Edward Grey, and while he was personally agreeable to the suggestion made, he had
not yet taken it up with his own Cabinet, much less with the Allies. He felt
there would be difficulties with France and Russia, and great difficulty in ef-
fecting a plan by which a permanent settlement might be brought about. Sir Cecil
wanted to go into a discussion of what such a settlement would entail. It seemed
to me footless to undertake such a discussion at this time, for it would probably
cover a period of weeks, if not months, even after the powers had begun parleys.
I told him it was not my idea that they should stop fighting even after conversa-
tions began, and that an armistice need not be brought about until at least a

(268)

tentative understanding as to what would constitute a permanent settlement was
well within sight.

He thought France would probably desire the French part of Lorraine, and
he thought Russia would like Constantinople. He wondered if Germany would accede
to the former request. I thought that was something to be threshed out later, and
that the conversations should begin upon the broad lines of an evacuation and in-
demnity for Belgium, and an arrangement for a permanent settlement of European
difficulties, including a reduction of armaments.

I was surprised to hear him say that the indemnity to Belgium could be arrang-
ed, for all the powers might be willing to share the damages done that brave lit-
tle nation. I was also surprised to hear him say that he saw signs of what he
called " a general funk among the European nations, and he thought perhaps most
of them feared revolutions". He suggested that I say to Bernstorff that Germany
was in possession of a large part of Belgium and a portion of France, therefore
it would be to her advantage and to the disadvantage of the Allies to begin par-
leys now. In my opinion it would be a mistake to concede that Germany had any
advantages whatsoever, and it seemed to me the proper attitude to assume was one
of absolute confidence in the ultimate defeat of Germany.

He could not understand why Germany would consent to peace parleys now
when they seemingly were so successful, and he did not believe the German milita-
ry party or the German people as a whole, would permit such conversations being
brought to satisfactory conclusions. That was also my opinion, as far as those
two elements were concerned, but I thought the Kaiser, the Chancellor, the Foreign
Secretary, and their entourage knew that the war was already a failure and did not
dare take the risk involved, provided they could get out of it whole now. He
thought if the Kaiser should seriously propose peace at this time, he would pro-
bably be assassinated and the Crown Prince become Emperor.

I admitted to Sir Cecil that it was a difficult and dangerous thing to

(269)

handle, but I felt it must be handled sometime by somebody, and we might just as
well begin to face the difficulties and undertake a solution. Sir Cecil said he
would cable Sir Edward Grey tonight and tell him of our conversation and ask him
to feel out the Allies, and let us know as soon as possible whether it was advisa-
ble for me to come to London.

I asked him to explain that we had no disposition to force the issue, but
in
it would be advisable to let the Germans have the advantage of having expressed
a willingness to begin parleys upon such terms, and then have the Allies refuse.

Sir Cecil thought he would have something definite for me within a week.
Returning to the White House, I found the President anxiously awaiting me. After
telling what had passed, we discussed what was best to do regarding Bernstorff, and
we came to the conclusion that it would be well to leave him alone until I had
heard something direct from the Allies, and then we could put the question square-
ly up to Bernstorff by telling him I was ready to go to London, but he must not
let me go, only to find Germany repudiating what he had said.

It was now after eleven, and I insisted upon the President going to bed. On
the other hand, he insisted upon sitting with me until I had changed my clothes and
was ready to say goodbye. He again expressed gratitude and affection for the
trouble I had taken and the manner in which I am trying to serve.

I had Hoover wall up Wallace, who was waiting to see me to find the result
of my conference with the President. He, of course, wished to go to Germany, and
I was sorry to tell him the President disapproved of that part of the plan. He
was disappointed and thought it a mistake. I feel, however, that Bernstorff would
never give his consent to Wallace going in the way he had in mind. That is to
practically represent the German Government. Wallace thought the British Govern-
ment was not acting in good faith, and he was doubtful of the propriety of Berns-
torff going any further than he had already gone. It was after midnight when I
reached the station and nearly one when I went to bed.

(270)

New York,

December 24, 1914.

When I was in Washington yesterday I arranged a code with the President so we might speak freely in our letters of the different countries at war and of their Ambassadors. The code is included above. [See p. 266]

Harold Fowler, Walter Page's secretary, landed last night on the Lusitania. He brought a long letter from Page which explains itself and will be found herein. Chalmers Roberts also came in on the same boat, and both took lunch with us today. They had much to tell of the war.

This afternoon, I had a telephone call from the White House, to say that the Argentine Ambassador desired to confer with me. I asked Hoover to get him over the telephone, but the Ambassador speaks such broken English that I could not catch what he said further than that he had communication from his Government and would have to see me in person, since he could not tell it over the telephone. He has promised to write, and I agreed to see him in Washington next week.

W. H. Clark of Kansas City and New York, came to see me. He desired help in some way to get a large shipment of cotton through to Russia. He thought he might be able to handle as much as a half million bales and intimated that I might desire to be a part of the syndicate. I grow tired of telling such people that I cannot touch such matters as long as Woodrow Wilson is President. He said

Stanley Quinn called. He wished to thank me for the courtesy I had shown him, but I think what he really wanted was to talk to me about Beers, whom Gordon in the District Attorney's Office is now grilling in connection with some election contribution, and who is connected with the Santo Domingo scandal.

Quinn said he had asked Governor Glynn, a Democrat, if he knew anything about the case, and if he thought Quinn should be mixed up in it.

December 25, 1914.

We had a delightful Christmas. Janet was carried to the table for the first

(271)

time since Louise's birth, which added to the joy of the occasion.

I received a telegram from the President which made me happy and which is included in the diary with my answer.

Late in the afternoon I received an autograph letter from Da Gama, the Brazilian Ambassador, saying his Government accepted the proposals regarding a convention between the North and South American Republics. A copy of this and my reply are included in the diary, as well as my letter to the President informing him of developments. I feel, with Da Gama, that it is an epoch making negotiation.

December 26, 1914.

It has been an exceedingly busy day. Among others, I asked Frank Polk to come up in order that I might outline what I had done in Washington regarding the New York political situation.

December 27, 1914.

A letter came from Herr Zimmermann, German Under Secretary for State for Foreign Affairs. This gives me an opportunity to test the sincerity of Bernstorff's statement as to their being willing to start peace parleys upon a stated basis. I have written the President and will go down Tuesday to take the matter up with him, and to finally button up, as far as possible, the South American negotiations.

Hapgood gave a lunch at the Century which I attended, Medill McCormack of Chicago, and Rublee of New Hampshire being the other guests. We discussed the personnel of the Trades Commission and other matters.

December 28, 1914.

It has been rather a quiet day. I lunched with Life's staff at the Hotel Wolcott. Those present were Messrs. Mitchell, Martin, Masson, Metcalf, Miller and Jones.

I have a telegram from the President saying:

"Beg you will come here. Lots of room and lots of welcome."

(272)

I shall therefore go to the White House instead of to Dr. Grayson's as I had intended.

We dined with Mr. and Mrs. Montgomery Hare and went with them to the opera.
The other guests were James Barnes, who claims to be a great African and world-
wide traveller, and Riddle, formerly of our Embassies at Madrid and St Petersburg.

The White House,
Washington, D. C.
December 29, '14

I took the 12.08 train down as usual. Davies met me at Baltimore and we went over in detail the personnel of the Trades Commission. It is a difficult proposition to find the right men who will accept the position.

Dr. Grayson was at the station and we went immediately to the White House.
A number of the family who had lingered over the holidays were still there. The
President and I went into his study and had a conference for the half hour or more
before dinner.

We agreed upon a plan of action concerning the South American adventure,
and one in the European peace proposals. I arranged to meet Naon at 8.30 and
Spring-Rice at 9.15. This left me but little time after dinner, and I went al-
most immediately to the home of the Argentine Ambassador. He endeavored to trans-
late into understandable English the despatch which his Government had sent him
in answer to this Government's proposals. The translation follows:

"The Government receives with sympathy the proposition with the under-
standing that such a proposition tends to transform the one side character of
the Monroe Doctrine into a common policy of all the American countries."

The despatch also asked for more information upon the second article of
the Convention in regard to government ownership of munitions of war. Naon said
he had sent four pages of cable concerning the first proposal and had merely men-
tioned the second, and that was the reason they were calling for additional in-
formation.

(273)

I explained the reason for government ownership of munitions of war was to prevent manufacturers from inflaming popular sentiment and influencing governments to maintain excessive armaments. Also because if the governments own armament factories, the question of the shipment to belligerent nations of munitions of war would be settled.

Naon was very enthusiastic over the entire proposal and said "it will not only insure the re-election of your President, but it will be such a great accomplishment that there will be nothing he can ever do afterward that can approach it in importance".

He thought Chile would hesitate to come in because she had dreams of expansion. He had talked with the Chilean Ambassador since I was in Washington and had not received much encouragement. I told him that the United States would not favor the acquisition of territory by the other Republics, rather by war or otherwise, and that Chile might as well accept that condition in a formal convention. He replied that Argentine held the same view, and would not willingly permit territorial aggrandizement in South America.

I went from Naon to the home of Billy Phillips to meet the British Ambassador. I found him nervous and excited because of the premature publication, and a garbled account of the protest made by the President to the British Government concerning the holding up of neutral vessels. He did not mind the note, for he and I had already threshed that out and settled it long before it was sent. He had even received a reply from Sir Edward Grey indicating that the President's request would be granted. The note was merely a formal matter of routine after the real issue had been met, but what he objected to was the way in which it had been given publicity and the manner in which our press had treated it.

The President had talked with me about this before dinner, and had told me the leak had occurred in the State Department, though Mr. Bryan thought it had occurred through Tumulty. I asked the President if Tumulty knew any-

(274)

thing about it. He replied that the other day Tumulty had stated we were be-
ing criticised by the pro-Germans for not taking a firm stand against Great Bri-
tain regarding to these contraband seizures, and that he, the President, had then
told him of this note, but not mentioning its contents, therefore, Tumulty could
not have given it out.

I asked what newspaper man got it and he said, David Lawrence of the As-
sociated Press. That settled it in my mind that Tumulty had given it out, al-
though I did not express this view to the President for he is so averse to be-
lieving anything derogatory to Tumulty, and I did not wish to disturb him.

I tried to explain to Spring-Rice how badly the President felt. He accept-
that part, but blamed the State Department most unreservedly, and said it was
impossible to conduct diplomatic negotiations of a delicate nature through the
newspapers. He claimed that it was not the first time, and that he hesitated
to take up further matters with them, in fact he intended to absent himself from
the Department in future. He had no doubt we would all be pro-Germans within
six months, that the Germans were strong and had a thorough organization, and
they would finally break down any anti-German sentiment which now existed.

I discussed peace overtures with him, although I knew the time was
not opportune for such a subject, but I got nowhere. He began a tirade against
the Germans which included Bernstorff and the German official family generally.
He said maxime if we would guarantee a permanent settlement, they would begin ne-
gotiations at once, but they would not accept anything Germany might propose. He
talked so many different ways, in almost the same sentence, that I concluded he
was too upset for me to have any profitable discussion with him and I therefore
took my leave. He saw by my silence that I was not pleased with his conversa-
tion.

As a matter of fact, if I could properly get at Sir Edward Grey's ear I
would advise him to replace Spring-Rice with a man of more robust health and

(275)

a more equitable temperament. In the work I did last year to bring Great Britain and the United States closer together, it was largely through Sir William Tyrrell that it was made possible.

When I returned to the White House and reported the substance of my two interviews, the President was peased with the one and disappointed with the other. He said "we had better give Spring-Rice ten days or two weeks to simmer down", and in the meantime he would undertake to see that there was no further leakage in the State Department.

He suggested that affairs of this nature would have to be conducted between himself, Mr. Bryan and Mr. Lansing alone, and not even a stenographer should be brought in. I disagreed with this, and thought there would be no danger in bringing in a private stenographer of either Mr. Bryan or Mr. Lansing, provided he would have the documents sent directly over to the White House proper, and not allow them to pass through the White House Office. I said this would be a protection to Tumulty because they could not accuse him then of telling something about which he knew nothing. He agreed to this method of procedure in the future.

We then discussed the best means of buttoning up the South American proposition, and it was agreed that he should see Senator Stone immediately upon his return, and we again discussed whether it would be advisable to bring the matter before the entire Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, or before the democratic members of it. He would not discuss anything of importance with Senator Alden Smith of Michigan for the reason that he immediately gave it to the press. That, in this instance, it was necessary to have the matter presented to the country properly when they first heard it, and not get a garbled or distorted account from a political opponent.

I told him Naon desired to know whether it was out purpose to make twenty-one different treaties or a single convention. I had replied that it was the

(276)

intention to make a single convention, which the President thought was right.
Naon suggested, I told him, that the A. B. C. Powers and ourselves should first
thresh out the terms to a satisfactory conclusion before bringing in the smaller
republics. This, too, the President agreed to.

December 30, 1914.

We had breakfast as usual at eight. The President and I talked a few min-
utes afterward and laid out the business that I should attend to. I made an en-
gagement with the Chilean Ambassador for eleven o'clock.

I found he had not heard from his Government. He gave a change of min-
istry as the reason and was sure he would receive a favorable reply. I could
not see how he could fail to do so. This was not really in accordance with
Naon's statement to me, but I found Naon wrong in the first estimate of the man-
ner in which Brazil and Chile would receive the proposals.

I saw Franklin Lane and discussed the Trades Commission appointments
with him and also some matters concerning political procedure. He said he had
proposed, and the President had agreed, to do away with the formal Cabinet meet-
ings on Fridays, and substitute in lieu thereof an informal Cabinet meeting at
the White House proper on Friday evenings, when political questions should be
discussed. This is in line with my endeavours of last week to coordinate
action between the President's immediate entourage and Congress.

Upon my departure I found J. P. Morgan waiting to see Lane.

I went from Lane to Gregory. We had a general talk about the New York sit-
uation, and he told me what he and Frank Polk had done the day before. From
there I went to see Hugh Wallace to find whether he had any further information
from Bernstorff. The German Ambassador has been away since I was last in Wash-
ington, and was still absent in the Adirondacks. Wallace still believes the
Germans "are open, candid, and trustworthy, and that the British act with much
duplicity toward me". I did not argue the matter with him.

(277)

At lunch the President and I had no opportunity to discuss matters, but just
after lunch, I told him of my morning adventures and what the Chilean Ambassa-
dor had to say. We spoke of the Trades Commission personnel for a few minutes,
and I gave him some data I had gathered from different sources.

I called up Phillips at the State Department and told him I was sorry Mr.
Bryan was out of town, because I desired to suggest to him that he sooth the
ruffled feelings of the British Ambassador. I asked Phillips to take part in
this laudable endeavor. I said my trip to Washington had been largely nullified
by the premature publication of the President's protest to the British Government
and I hoped they would get the Ambassador in a normal frame of mind before I
returned, for he blamed the State Department for the leak. Phillips said they
had found exactly where the leak was, that it was not in the State Department,
and indicated as nearly as he could over the telephone that it was Tumulty, a
fact which I already knew as well as I could know anything that had not happen-
ed under my own eyes.

I asked Davies to come with me to the train so we might again go over
matters relating to the Trades Commission, and compare notes since yesterday. I
advised him to also take the matter up with Tumulty, since I was unable to give
it as much attention as it deserved. I took the 4.03 for New York.

New York,
December 31, 1914.

I received the accompanying letter from Spring-Rice a few minutes ago. He is
evidently in a good humor again. I am exceedingly glad.

I had an interesting lunch with John R. Mott. Those things that inter-
ested me most I have mentioned in my letter to the President, a copy of which be-
longs to the diary. Mott wishes to meet certain Members of the Cabinet and
I have agreed to go to Washington Wednesday of next week to bring this about. He
is to see the President Wednesday evening of next week and I shall probably be
present then. Read and approved pages 1 to 277 exclusive