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In dealing with the other nations in the
world, we have to take this fact into consideration

The third new element, which is not necessarily new but
is different in the world, is that there is much greater
interdependence in the world today than ever before, and
that is going to accelerate in the years ahead.

For example, a person who is unemployed in
Indiana, may very well be very much concerned about the
balance of payments, about monetary matters, because
they affect his employment.

A narcotics addict, a youngster in New York
City that is hooked on heroin may -- that addiction may
result from opium that's grown in Turkey and processed
in some other country, such as France, and smuggled into
the United States.

The world is much more interdependent in many
ways: ... in commerce, in transportation and communications,
and that is going to greatly accelerate, as I say.

For example, some of the major problems in the
world today involve pollution; hijacking of aircraft;
kidnapping of political personalities for political purposes,
-- kidnapping of public officials; ... the law of the sea, --
resources in the deep sea, transportation of the oceans, (who
controls not only the surface of the ocean but the seabeds.)

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So we are much more interdependent in the world.
And this, it seems to me, is going to require very
active diplomacy, not only bilaterally, but in multilateral
organizations such as the United Nations. And I mention
the United Nations because it has had serious problems,
and serious problems recently. But the United States
strongly supports the United Nations. It's going to do
everything it can to make it succeed in the years to come.
One of the ways to support the United Nations is to
face up to the deficiencies that exist and see what we
can do to correct them.

So the foreign policy of this nation
is based on a recognition that we must deal with the world
as it is today, and that is the basis for President
Nixon's foreign policy.

Let me say that I don't suppose there is any time
in the history of this country when the foreign policy
of our country is more comprehensive in nature than it
is today; when the President of the United States
himself, has involved himself to the extent that he has in

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seeking ways to bring about peace in the world and in
creating initiatives which are, as young people say,
"bold and imaginative." The fact is, they are
initiatives of great importance to the future of this
country and the world generally.

The world in the last few years has become a
much more peaceful place to live in. We have attempted
to reduce our commitments abroad in terms of our physical
presence without in any way weakening our treaty
commitments. And as a result of that policy, the United
States has greatly reduced its military presence abroad.

We have roughly 500,000 less military men
agroad than we had three years ago.

The Defense establishment has been reduced in size
by about 1,400,000. That includes about 300,000
civilians. So our total Defense establishment is
considerably reduced in size, and yet we have not
conducted our foreign policy in a way that has destabilized
other areas of the world.

We have taken very strong measures to assure --
a great deal of intensive effort -- to assure our allies
that we are not going to change our position, as far as

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our treaty commitments are concerned, And I'm speaking
about treaty commitments with 44 nations in the world,
and particularly nations in Asia, that have resulted
from a bipartisan foreign policy over these years.

The war in Viet-Nam, as you know, has been
reduced in size and scope; and in terms of American
involvement, greatly reduced. The amount of money
that we are spending there has gone from about $22 billion
a year to about $8 billion a year. You are all
familiar with the reduction of our armed forces
there. And you are all familiar with the very
strenuous, intensive efforts that the
President has made to bring about
a negotiated peace; And I'll be glad to answer questions
about that, if you would like.

Now, the Middle East, as a result of initiatives
by the United States, has had in effect a cease-fire for
about 19 months, and we hope that will continue.
We have done everything we can, as a nation, to involve
ourselves in the diplomatic process to continue that
cease-fire in effect.

Fortunately, the war in Africa, which was raging

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when we took office, is ended, and our relations with
Nigeria are good.

So the world is a more peaceful place to live in.
And we are going to do all we can to end the war in
Viet-Nam honorably -- not only for our American forces, but
for the good of the area itself.

We're going to continue to press for a sensible
peace in the Middle East which is fair to all concerned, and
we will play our role either through the United Nations
or individually, if that would be helpful.

And furthermore, we are going to attempt to
lay a foundation for peace which will be lasting --
not just to deal with these problems which are of such
importance at the moment, but to establish a foundation
which will provide for peace for a generation.

And I don't think that the idea of a generation
of peace, which has been announced and proposed
as a goal by the President, is unrealistic. I think
it's quite possible we could live the rest of this
century without a major war.

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The President's initiative in going to Peking
is such a dramatic step, It has been applauded throughout
the world, and by most Americans. The decision by the
President thereafter to go to the Soviet Union is a
very important constructive step. We have recently met,
as you know, with the leaders of many of the European
nations, and will meet with others in the future, to make
it clear that these efforts on the part of this Adminis-
tration to bring about peace in the world are not going
to be at the expense of our friends and allies.

So, Ladies and Gentlemen, just in conclusion
of these preliminary remarks, let me say that I feel
that this country can be proud of the foreign policy
that we have had. I think it can be proud of the role
that the United States is playing in the world. I think
it has been successful. Of course there are areas where
we wish we could have made greater progress, but on the
whole, I think the foreign policy of this nation has
been quite successful. We are going to do everything we
can to make it even more successful in the future. And
I think one of the things I would like to have you consider
as you listen to the discussions here in this conference

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is what has happened in terms of human needs as a result
of a successful foreign policy, because there are two
considerations in foreign policy. One is peace, which
is of greatest importance and, two, how does it affect
the average American? Does it mean anything to him, or
is it sort of a game that nations play? And the answer
is that it means a great deal to the average American
to have a successful foreign policy.

I was interested in looking at the budget figures
and comparing the amount of money that was being spent
for defense purposes three years ago with the amount
apportioned to human needs in this country. And
it is interesting that the proportion of the budget which
was directed to defense needs was 45 percent when we took
office and 32 percent of the budget was directed to human
needs in this country. Today, in the budget that President
Nixon is submitting, those figures are just reversed, so
that now we are spending 45 percent -- or proposing in the
budget to spend 45 percent -- for human needs, and 32 percent
for defense needs.

Now, we have done this at a time that is not
destabilizing. I don't believe that our defense posture

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is weekend, but I think it is a result of a successful
foreign policy. And I would hope that in the years to
come this nation can continue to take the lead in
the search for peace, continue to take the lead in playing
a responsible role in the world. We must do that, do it
realistically, and in a way that is fashioned to meet our
domestic needs as well as our international responsibilities;
but nonetheless to play a responsible role in the world,
not for the purpose necessarily of gaining influence,
although influence follows from a successful foreign policy,
but because it means so much to the American people to
have a peaceful world, a secure world, and a world where
we get the benefits from our expenditures directly,
not spend the money for military purposes.

Now, obviously we have to continue to have a
very strong national defense, because it is not possible
to have a successful foreign policy without a successful
defense establishment; without a strong, capable defense
establishment. And we must never get in the position
where the United States is second best in the military
field. We must maintain that strength if we are to
pursue a successful foreign policy. And we are going to

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do that.

On the other hand, we don't want to let the rest of the world feel that we are going to carry the whole burden, and as other nations become stronger -- economically stronger, industrially stronger -- we expect them to do their fair share. And that is why the new economic policy of the President was proposed -- one of the reasons -- and we think it has been successful. And certainly the combination of the efforts by the President to achieve a more peaceful world and the success of his new economic policy, I believe, suggests that the foreign policy of this nation in the years ahead will continue to be strong and successful.

I might conclude by saying that over the years the foreign policy of this nation fortunately has been supported by both parties. And I was particularly pleased to see Senator Mansfield, the leader of the majority party in the Senate, support the President's proposal the night before last. He said it was a long step forward and he hoped it would become a basis for successful negotiations leading to the end of this long and horrible war.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me again thank you very

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much for being here. I appreciate your attendance. I
hope that you enjoy this conference. And now I will
answer any questions you may have.

Q Mr. Secretary, I notice the adjective "successful" repeatedly used in your remarks, and I hope you won't mind my asking whether or not you would want to apply that without qualification to developments in South Asia in recent weeks and months; and perhaps looking more to the future, how we perhaps can ameliorate the effects of some of those developments?

A Well, I think the reason I used the word "successful" is because I am speaking about the overall success of foreign policy. And as I have said here in the Department at times, it is the only way to look at it, because if you look at it on a day-to-day basis, it always is a total failure. [Laughter.]

I have told the story that some have heard here
that I will repeat if you don't mind. I am briefed
every morning about what is happening all over the world,
and the news is always bad, and we are blamed for the bad
news no matter whether we had anything to do with it or
not, or whether we could have prevented it from happening.

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On this particular morning, my briefing officer said, "Mr. Secretary, all the news is bad," and he recounted what had happened during the night, and it was all bad. And I said, "Is there any news anywhere in the world that is good?" And he said, "No, sir." [Laughter.] "No good news." But he said, "You will be pleased to know there is some bad news that we are not to blame for." I said, "What is that?" He said, "The Aswan Dam is leaking." [Laughter.]

Well, you never know, of course, in foreign affairs whether everything you do is right or not, and I wouldn't suggest that that is the case. We have made mistakes the way other administrations have made mistakes, and we will continue to make mistakes. But I think the overall success of our foreign policy is pretty well acknowledged.

Now, in terms of South Asia, I have read a good deal of criticism of our policy, and I can realize that when it is over with and when India was successful, that it can be argued that we might have done it some different way, that maybe we should have anticipated that India

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would win and therefore not done anything, not taken any
action. And that is a perfectly acceptable proposition.
We took the action that we took because we believed it
was the right thing to do. And without recounting the
whole history of the controversy, let me merely say that
we felt that the initial problems were caused by Pakistan.
And obviously India was under tremendous pressure as a
result of the refugees. And it was a situation that
couldn't last forever because India couldn't be expected
to accept that many refugees and care for them and so
forth.

On the other hand, we thought in the United
States that more time should be used to see if we could
bring about a successful conclusion by diplomatic means,
and we were making every effort that we could in that
regard.

It didn't work out. We felt that India moved
too soon, and so expressed that view in the United Nations.

Now, I want to say, too, that in the United
Nations, we had 104 nations that supported us. As I
recall, there were only 11 nations against us, which is
quite unusual. [Laughter.] And I think it suggests that

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the policy that we followed did have the support of other nations in the world, at least in that regard.

We are going to try to have realistic relations with the countries in the area. We still, of course, have diplomatic relations with India. Our Ambassador, the former Senator Keating, is here now, and our Ambassador to Pakistan is here now. And I would not say that it was unsuccessful. Nonetheless, I understand why people are critical of some of the things that happened.

I don't believe that anything has happened there that can't be remedied, and we are going to do what we can to improve our relations with the countries in the area depending on events in the area.

Q Mr. Secretary, to what extent have our efforts at a detente with the Soviets been damaged by violence towards Soviet diplomats and those promoting cultural relationships with the Soviets by an ethnic group?

A Do you want to ask me that question again?

Q Yes, sir. To what extent have our efforts at a detente and the President's trip -- proposed trip --

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to the Soviet Union been damaged by events such as those
yesterday where violence has been visited on those who are
promoting cultural relations with the Soviets and
violence against Soviet diplomats in this country?

A Well, it is a little hard to measure it
quantitatively, but it is a very serious matter indeed.
We can't think of anything that is more likely to cause
problems in our relations with other countries than to have
irresponsible personal attacks on the diplomats of
those countries. We think it is totally reprehensible,
counterproductive, and can be harmful.

Now, I have had many discussions with representatives
of the Soviet Union on this matter. They are greatly
concerned, as you might expect, about the developments.
I can remember one occasion when the Ambassador came in
and recounted the shooting in New York into an
apartment house where there were two or three children.
Now, all decent people, I think, abhor that kind of
conduct. Also I think it should be noted
that the Soviet Union has permitted a good deal more
emigration this year, which is a favorable development;
not as much as we would like, but certainly much better

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than it has been in the past. So, to be more direct
in answer to your question, we think it is reprehensible
conduct. It is harmful to our national interests, and
has no place in the United States.

Q Mr. Secretary, some politicians have said
that the President's recent statement on Vietnam with
the eight-point peace proposal was realistic, and the
Communists initially seem to have rejected it. Do you see
a possibility of them reconsidering, and if they don't,
what is the next program for the United States in Vietnam?

A The President made the speech that he made
the other night in order to give the American people the
full facts so that the American people would understand
that we have made every possible effort to bring about
a peaceful settlement of the war by negotiations.

I was convinced myself that the reason the
North Vietnamese had failed to respond to the President's
latest proposal that was made in October, and the reason
that they made attacks on our proposals in the public
session, when they knew that we had made these proposals
they were criticizing before, in the private session -- in
other words, they were using the private session on the

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one hand, criticizing us in public, and the purpose
was to attempt to divide the American people from its
Government. And they, I am sure, have a feeling that
maybe they can do that. They were reasonably successful
some years ago in that attempt, and because they were not
successful militarily, and because the South Vietnamese
have been successful, our program has been successful,
one of the last remaining hopes they had was to divide
the American people from its Government.

So we felt that we should disclose what we had
done, our willingness to consider other proposals, to make
our proposal public, which Ambassador Porter did today
in Paris -- I have just talked to him -- and to indicate
a flexibility which we indicate. And I think we have
been able to convince the American people that we have
done everything that reasonable men could do to bring
about a negotiated settlement.

Now, when you analyze where we stand, you can
analyze it this way: The North Vietnamese insist that the
Government of South Viet-Nam be removed and a government
of their choosing--Communist government--take over. Our
position, is we are prepared to have any government in

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South Viet-Nam that the people in South Viet-Nam want.
And we are prepared to work out any reasonable machinery
to determine what the people of South Viet-Nam want.

Now, the North Vietnamese keep talking about
self-determination, but they mean by"self-determination"
that they should determine who should represent the
South Vietnamese people. And they think they should
represent the South Vietnamese people, and they want
to put a Communist government in. That we can't accept.

On the other hand, the United States and the
Government of South Viet-Nam have agreed that we should
take every possible step to have an election, which is
the only method that we know of that can determine what
the people want, and we are perfectly flexible about how
that election is to be conducted.

Now, we have offered to have a total with-
d withdrawal of our forces from South Viet-Nam before that
election takes place. We are prepared to have a commission,
an electoral commission, control the election, and included
in that commission will be a fair representation of the
Viet Cong, NLF. We are prepared to have it supervised
by an international group to be sure that it is fair,
and to use any other devices that the other side wants to

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be sure that it represents the will of the people.

The present Government has agreed to resign before
the election and to be bound by the election. It has agreed
to have everyone in the country eligible to vote.

Now that is the area of difference. And the United
States cannot retreat from that matter of principle.

On the other hand, we are completely flexible
about how that election is to be conducted, or how we
could determine who the people of South Viet-Nam want
to represent them. And I don't know how anyone could
suggest that that isn't completely fair.

In view of the tremendous involvement of the
United States in the Indochina war, forgetting, putting
aside whether it was wise or not wise in the beginning,
but considering the total investment that we have made--
45,000 Americans killed, over 300,000 Americans wounded,
the longest and most agonizing war we have ever experienced--
we can't at this stage, when our program is successful
(and if you go to Viet-Nam, you can see it, how successful
it is) we can't at this stage just say, "All right, we
will take part in throwing the present Government out

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and letting the Communists put their leaders in and
we'll just get out." That is impossible. We would
lose our standing throughout the world. We have defense
commitments with Korea and Japan and the Philippines,
and other countries--Thailand. If we did that, our
credibility, our standing in the world would go to zero.

So, we are fully prepared to work out any kind
of a sensible solution to this problem. We have agreed
to total withdrawal of our forces from South Viet-Nam,
and I think the conclusion that has been reached by the
American people -- and certainly by the international
community--is that we have done everything we can to
bring about a negotiated peace.

I might say that I have just looked this morning
at the cables we have had from around the world, and
the world reaction is extremely favorable to the proposals
that the President has made.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you feel that an eventual
settlement may be delayed because we are in a Presidential
election year?

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A I don't think it is possible to predict that. I think that a natural question that arises is, is the fact that we made this disclosure about these private meetings, is that going to speed up or delay the possibilities of a negotiated settlement? My own view is that if there is any inclination at all on the part of the other side to negotiate a settlement -- and I think that is in doubt -- but if there is any inclination at all to work out a negotiated settlement -- (and it is possible that they will come to that conclusion if they think they can't achieve their full objectives; they may feel they will have a better shot at achieving their objectives by a negotiated settlement) then the statement by the President the other night, which was so effective, and I think will have the effect of unifying the American people, may convince them that they can't divide the American people. And if they are convinced of that, I think they will be more inclined to work out a negotiated settlement.

I am somewhat encouraged by the fact that they have not rejected our proposal in Paris this morning. There has been a good deal of invective about it, but it

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hasn't been rejected.

And secondly, they have been asking a few questions about what we mean, and how could they be sure that the electoral process would be fair? Now, that is a good sign. That is exactly what negotiations are supposed to do, supposed to provide an opportunity for each side to ask the other, "What do you mean?" and, "How can we be sure?" and so forth -- "Let's work it out."

Now, if they should get in that frame of mind, so that they want to actually negotiate, that would be fine. It is possible that we could work out a settlement. It is a perfectly natural question for them to say, "Well, how can we be sure that the election will be fair?" Now, it seems to me we have to say, "Well, what do you want to do to provide fairness? If you are prepared to have an election, what should we do to provide fairness?" We understand the difficulties, but by providing for an election commission who will have complete authority over the elections, and an international supervisory body, consisting of other nations, and a total withdrawal of American forces prior to the election, and a resignation by the present government, we certainly have laid down some principles that provide a

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basis for fair elections.

Q I was interested in your figures from the budget three years ago, that you said 45 percent went for defense and 32 percent went for domestic affairs, and the reversal, yes, human needs. You mentioned the reversal of today's budget. Do you anticipate the same types of changes in the near future, along the same lines?

A Well, I think we are going to probably move forward in this direction, but probably not to the same extent, for the reasons that I have mentioned. But it is interesting, if you look at the budget -- most people don't -- if you look at the budget, you see that we are spending a great deal more for things like drug control, the environment, child care, and food stamps, and many things that relate to human needs. And we have a lot of long-term programs which will be very important in the future.

If our foreign policy is successful and there is a way to reduce tensions in the world, then I would hope that we can gradually reduce our defense expenditure and increase our expenditures for human beings.

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Q Mr. Secretary, it seems that the issue of American air power in Thailand and the waters off Viet-Nam, and our relationships with Cambodia and with Laos, were conspicuous by their absence in the President's remarks. Are these negotiable elements in this present situation, or for some future negotiating area?

A Well, as far as Cambodia and Laos are concerned, they are included, because we have indicated that we would like to have an Indochina conference and an Indo-china settlement. So there again, it is up to those on the other side as to how you negotiate a settlement. We would like to have a cease-fire in all of Indochina and a nonalignment position for the countries in Indochina, and a permanent peace.

Now, in the case of Thailand, of course, it is different. We have a defense treaty with Thailand, the SEATO treaty, and Thailand is not involved in the war as Cambodia and Laos are. So we would expect that we would, at least for the short run, continue to have some Americans in Thailand. But that doesn't affect the settlement in Indochina, involving Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam.

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Q What about the air bases in Thailand?

A Well, obviously if you are going to have a settlement, it requires a cease-fire, and a cease-fire will certainly include any use of Thai bases. In other words, the proposal contemplates the end of the war, a cease-fire, so we certainly wouldn't use any of our bases for that purpose.

Q Mr. Secretary, what about the Russian ships now that are going into the Indian Ocean; and we are sending in warships, at least aircraft carriers?

A Well, the Soviet Union has embarked on a policy of enlarging their Navy and having greater naval presence throughout the world, and their presence in the Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, is a part of the implementation of that policy. We are quite conscious of the policy. We are going to continue to watch what they do in this connection. As you see from this year's budget, the President is very conscious of the need to strengthen our own Navy. We are going to do that. We have asked for considerably more money for defense purposes in this area for next year.

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Q There appears to be a tacit assumption that the results of any elections in South Viet-Nam would be favorable to the United States. What is your own assessment concerning the results of a free election were it held today, and what would be the response of America were that election to choose a Communist government, given the tremendous cost of that war?

A Yes. Well, that is a good question. The United States is completely, fully, prepared to accept the results of an election, whatever they are. And no one can predict elections with any complete certainty, even in this country, as you ladies and gentlemen know.

But you have asked for my own judgment on that.

I think that the people of South Viet-Nam want to retain their independence and sovereignty. And I think it is interesting that there has been a failure to recognize that they have been fighting this war too, they have had a lot more men in the war than we have. They are carrying almost the whole combat responsibility now. I have been there on two occasions, and I have no doubt that they support an independent, free South Viet-Nam.

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Now, I think it is very difficult to predict
the outcome of the election in terms of personalities;
but certainly the present Government has provided
stability and a good deal of economic viability over
these years, and it has introduced a land reform program
that is quite sweeping in nature. So my guess would be,
and I think it is a very sound guess, that the people in
South Viet-Nam would support a free system. I think they
are opposed to a Communist takeover of their country.

I think I'd better go to some of the gentlemen
in the back of the room here.

Q Mr. Secretary, regarding the recent
India-Pakistan conflict, has not the Department of State
proved ineffective in its desire to be heard and heeded
on the basis of its previous diplomatic experience with
India and Pakistan? And in addition to this, it just seems
to me that the Nixon political motives of foreign policy
has undermined the work of the State Department, and
specifically, the humanitarian assistance given by AID
to India. Could you comment?

A I am sorry I couldn't hear the first part
of your question, but I heard enough of the last part to

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comment. [Laughter]

No. The idea somehow that the State Department
and President Nixon are working at cross purposes is just
not correct at all.

Obviously, in any government this size there
are different points of view from time to time. But the
position of the State Department is fully presented to the
President, not only on paper, but I do it personally.
And there is no division on that score.

No, I think that the aid that we have given to
India and Pakistan has been of great importance, and it
has helped them become more self-sufficient. In the case
of India particularly, the agricultural programs have been
very successful.

No, I don't think all of that is lost. And, as
I said before, I don't apologize for our policy at all.
I think the policy that we followed and that was supported
by 104 nations of the United Nations is one that we don't
have to be defensive about.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I am correct, I have
quoted you approximately as saying as it would be not so
bad in recognition of the world as it is today -- maybe I

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am a little off -- something about that.

About 27 years ago, about at this date, the Yalta Conference was held in the southern Soviet Union. As a result of this Yalta Conference, and as the result of the war events that developed at that time, nine nations representing over one hundred million people lost their rights of self-determination. And I feel, and many of us may feel that way, that in recognizing this situation maybe it would be a great harm done to these democratic nations that existed before World War II, including the Baltic States and other countries down south. I would like to ask you the question, what is planned to help these countries, and what are the plans to establish a just peace? I underline, a just peace, in Eastern Europe.

A Well, in the first part of your question, I think it would take too long to discuss. I think you asked Mr. Hillenbrand some of these questions earlier, and I am sure you will have an opportunity to talk to him about it further.

In so far as Europe itself is concerned, we hope that

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the discussions that are now under way of a bi-lateral
character will continue, looking toward a possible
European security conference. And if that should come
about -- and we hope it will -- we can discuss a lot of
problems involving the future of Europe, reduction of tensions,
contacts between Eastern Europe and Western Europe, and so
forth. And I would hope that if this conference is held,
that it will result in some reductions of tensions.

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P-1

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been reports
in the British press recently that the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations has been making cordial initiatives
towards North Viet-Nam, as well as towards Burma, Laos,
Cambodia and South Viet-Nam, in an attempt to reach regional
security, to avoid a Russia-Chinese conflict from centering
in their region, erupting in their area. Could you comment
on the activities of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations and what potential you see in them for permanent
stability in the area?

A Well, we have not, of course, taken part
in that, because if we took part in it it would become
suspect; people would think that this was a puppet
organization of some kind.

These initiatives that have been taken by the
Asian nations are on their own. We have indicated our strong
support for the idea of regional groupings. We think
it is a development in the right direction.

Now, whether it will help provide stability in
the area or not, I think has to be divided into two parts,
the short-run and the long-run. In the short-run, it

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probably won't be too significant in that respect, although
it will provide a forum for letting those nations publicly
express their combined views. On the other hand, I think it
can be very useful in the longer run, and I think it is the
kind of development that we should encourage in the United
States.

Q Mr. Secretary, these conferences are valuable
to us, too, and we missed you last year. I guess you were
keeping such a low profile that we didn't even see you at
all. But about ten years ago, at the first one of these -- yes,
I think we missed one last year -- President Kennedy described
as his distant golden shore, and as the most important thing
done in this century, compared it to the Magna Carta --
the Treaty of Rome, and worked around to saying that the
root of history will be money. And he was saying that against
a background of the Berlin crisis and the Cold War and the
Cuban crisis. And in the view of today's world trade, he
spoke of eventually markets in trillions. How does that
look ten years down the road?

A Well, I think that his general comments
were sound. And, as you know, we have been encouraged by the
enlargement of the Community this year. Now, it will present

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some immediate problems for the United States, particularly
in the trade field. That is one of the reasons we are
negotiating with them now on trade matters, and it is one
of the reasons we announced the President's economic
policy, which has resulted in the realignment of exchange
rates.

So I think that there will be a stronger, more
integrated Europe in the future, as a result of this enlarge-
ment. And I think that enlargement will include not only
economic and monetary matters, but just by the force of events
will develop greater political unity. So we think
it is a good development in the political sense. It
will provide some short-range problems for us in the trade
field, but we think they are manageable. In the long-run,
we think the competition will be a good thing for both the
Community and for the United States.

Q Mr. Secretary, over the years there has been a
great deal of feeling in this country that the U.S. has
subordinated its foreign policy to the wishes of the UN.
Has this been changing, or what is your comment on that?

A Well, I don't think it was ever true. But

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PR 423

if it were true, it is changing. (Laughter)

Q Mr. Secretary, if the North Vietnamese refuse to accept a negotiated settlement, what are the alternatives facing the Administration, and how will we go about pursuing them?

A If the other side is not interested in negotiating a settlement, then it is quite apparent that it is impossible to negotiate a settlement. And if that is the case, we will proceed with a Vietnamization program which has succeeded rather well. And the President pointed that out in his statement the other night. So we will proceed along that path. We will have, as you know, American forces down to 69,000 by May, and we will reduce them further; the President will make an announcement prior to that time.

But we would hope that our premise is wrong. We would hope it is possible the other side will realize that they cannot succeed to achieve their total objective, which is a takeover of South Viet-Nam by the Communists, and will attempt to work out some negotiated settlement.

Let me say in this connection that the President's

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PR-33

proposal contains several new elements which are worthy of
consideration. I think sometimes because there has been so
much said about this matter of Viet-Nam that we lose sight
of whether this is the same proposal or not.

First, we have indicated a readiness to set a fixed
date for total withdrawal of all U.S. and allied forces
from South Viet-Nam. Six months from the date of the
agreement in principle, we will withdraw all U.S. and
allied forces from South Viet-Nam.

Second, our withdrawals would be unilateral in a
settlement of military issues alone, if they prefer that.

Third, a new presidential election in South Viet-Nam
within six months of an agreement.

Fourth, an independent election body, including the
NLF, would completely organize and run this election, starting
on the date of the agreement, and for the entire six months
period until the election. President Thieu and the Vice-
President would resign one month before the election, and a
caretaker government would take over, except for the
election responsibilities, and those election responsibilities
would be conducted by the independent election body that I
have just referred to. All U.S. and allied forces would be

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PR 23

out of South Viet-Nam before the election.

The United States is willing to accept limitations
on military and economic assistance to South Viet-Nam
if North Viet-Nam will accept limitations on aid from its
allies.

South Viet-Nam has indicated that it is willing to
adopt the non-alignment provisions of the 1954 Geneva Accords.

Finally, the United States is prepared to undertake
a massive reconstruction program in Indochina of several
billion dollars, in which North Viet-Nam could share.

Now, these are very far-reaching proposals, which
show that we have gone the extra mile, which show that
President Nixon has done everything that we can to work
out a settlement that is fair to both North Viet-Nam
and South Viet-Nam.

We would very much hope that they will consider
seriously thinking about a negotiated settlement.

One more question.

Q Mr. Secretary, turning to another part of the
world, recent pronouncements indicate that our role as a
mediator in the Middle East has been rejected by Egypt.
Just what do you see as our role in the future, sir, there?

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A Well, having been in this job now for three years, I don't take anything at face value. (Laughter) So I think I think it is possible that we can play a role. We have had communications with all concerned. And we here again would like to see negotiations started.

Now, the United States is not interested in taking part in the negotiating process just to take part in it. And if Ambassador Jarring's negotiations can start again, we would welcome that. In fact, he was here in my office the day before yesterday, and I talked to him about that.

So all we are saying is that we got involved because both Israel and Egypt asked us to. And we are prepared to continue to play a role if both sides want us to. If they don't, of course, we have no interest in it.

My own view is that we will continue to play a very important part in the diplomatic process, and I think there is a possibility that our role can be very useful, as it has been in the past.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon at 12:00 noon the session was adjourned.)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

FEBRUARY 3, 1972

NO. 31

SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY 3, 1972

Following is the transcript of Secretary of State
William P. Rogers' News Conference, which is authorized
for direct quotation:

SECRETARY ROGERS: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

I thought that I would talk to you this morning
briefly about the meeting that I had with the Foreign
Minister of the Republic of Ireland this morning and the
British Ambassador yesterday afternoon. Both these requests
were made by the Governments concerned, to see me. Naturally,
we were very interested in talking both to the British
Ambassador and to the Foreign Minister of Ireland.

Now, they recounted the events, as they saw them,
which have occurred in recent days and told me the attitudes
of their Governments, and asked that we would deal with them
in a friendly way.

In the case of Great Britain I was given a message
from the Foreign Secretary setting forth the position of his
Government. And the Foreign Minister of Ireland this
morning presented the facts as he saw them and pointed out
some of the dangers that he thinks lie in the future.

For further information contact:

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Now, for our part I expressed the following points.

First, I expressed the deep concern that President Nixon has concerning the recent tragic events in Northern Ireland. We have very friendly relations with both Governments, the British Government and the Irish Government. President Nixon has visited both countries in the recent past. And I expressed in the very best way I could the deep concern that we have concerning these tragic events.

I told the Foreign Minister of Ireland that we were not in a position to intervene in the area. He said he understood that and was making no such request. I also explained to him that we were not in a position to condemn any party's past judgments concerning recent events. I pointed out that the animosities and hatreds that existed in that area have existed for centuries and I felt sure it would be both inappropriate and counter-productive for the United States to attempt to intervene in any way in the area.

On the other hand, I did express to him the views of President Nixon, which are that if we can play a useful role, and the parties concerned feel it is possible for us to play a useful role, then we would naturally consider it. Personally, I have serious reservations about whether there is a useful role we could play. And I asked both the British

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and the Irish representatives whether they thought there was
such a role we could play. They did not have any particular
request at this time, but they said they appreciated very much
the offer and that they would keep it in mind, and if there
was a useful role they thought we could play, they would
be back in touch with us.

I think the conversations were very useful. I think
it is a tragic thing that these events have occurred. And
if there is anything that the United States could do that would
be helpful, we would consider it. But I am sure that any
intervention on our part would be inappropriate and counter-
productive.

Q Mr. Secretary, some of the news this morning
is coming from Paris also, where negotiators from the other
side have declared the October 11 proposal not acceptable and
put forward a point calling for immediate resignation of President
Thieu. Also Senator Muskie has portrayed the plan as an
attempt to win at the conference table what could not be done
on the battlefield. Could you comment on both these?

SECRETARY ROGERS: Well, I think that the positions
that were taken by the North Vietnamese this morning in Paris
were by and large a repetition of what they have said before,
although in some instances they could be considered clarification

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[re.] PR 31

of previous points.

I think it is noteworthy that they have not rejected the proposals made by President Nixon. And there is some possibility, it seems to me, in view of the tremendously favorable response which we have received from all over the world on President Nixon's proposals, that the other side may feel that it would be the best course to follow to enter into meaningful negotiations.

Now, you have asked me about Senator Muskie's speech yesterday. I want to say that I was dismayed by the speech. I think it will be very harmful to the prospects for successful negotiations to end this war. This is particularly true because Senator Muskie's initial response was that he welcomed the President's proposals, that he felt they contained elements that were substantial and represented views that he and others who thought the way he did had been urging us to present for some time. So, as I say, I am not only disappointed, but dismayed.

We had hoped that as a result of the initiatives which the President has taken recently, particularly the disclosures of the patient negotiations which we have undertaken over a thirty-month period, the favorable response that we have received from many of the critics of the President,

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that we would have united support in this country; because
if the enemy feels that it can divide the American people, then
the prospects for peace are dim indeed in terms of a negotiated
settlement.

As a result of the policies that the President has
pursued, the American involvement in a combat role is very
minimal now. We are trying to work out a settlement through
the negotiating process which will provide peace in the area, not
only as far as the United States is concerned, but peace in
the area that is fair to everyone. We have even offered to
provide very massive relief and rehabilitation amounts. And
I think that the American people and people generally throughout
the world -- and this applies to Communist countries as well
in some instances -- feel that the President of the United States
has gone as far as he possibly could. And I think that the
statement by the Senator, that he made initially, was a responsible
statement, and I am sorry that he didn't stick to that.

I might say, by way of further comment on this, that
I think the position that Senator Mansfield has taken is
a very responsible position; it is constructive, and it can
be very helpful to our national interests.

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Q Mr. Secretary, Le Duc Tho apparently will be in Peking about the same time that President Nixon is there. In fact, I think he is arriving one day before. Do you see an opportunity perhaps for resumption of direct negotiations on Viet-Nam between either the President, Dr. Kissinger or yourself and Le Duc Tho?

SECRETARY ROGERS: Well, I wouldn't want to comment on the specific question you ask. But I will make this comment: that we are prepared to negotiate on the basis of the proposals that the President has made in any forum that holds out promise for success. We also have indicated that we are flexible on these proposals, and that if the other side is interested in negotiating we would like to talk about the proposals because we think it represents a way out of this tragic war that would be fair to all concerned.

So, yes, we are prepared to negotiate in public or in restricted sessions or any other way that would seem to be productive.

Q Mr. Secretary, does the United States Government feel that it would be helpful if the British troops were withdrawn from Northern Ireland?

A Well, we are not going to make any comment about any particular element of that problem.

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PR 31

That problem, it seems to us, has to be solved
fundamentally and basically by the people in the area.
It's a problem that has existed for so long, and we would
hope that this recent escalation would quiet down. We
would hope that some kind of discussions might take place
that would lead to a sensible solution.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the same subject, a two-part question.

A One at a time please.

Q All right.

Since neither the British Ambassador nor the
Foreign Minister of Ireland gave any indication that they
believed there was anything the United States could do at
this stage, to help, did they indicate to you why they felt
it necessary to come and talk to you about this problem?

A Well, I think that in both instances it
was felt that we are a very friendly Government that has
particularly close relations with both Ireland and with
Britain, and that a discussion might be useful.

Each wanted to present their point of view
and, I suppose they may have felt --maybe Ireland
felt that we could take some action, but no such request

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PR 31

was made.

Q The other part of that question, if I may:

Is there any reason to believe that if we were
to play some role that we would play, we would be able to
maintain a greater degree of neutrality than we did,
for example, in the case of India and Pakistan?

A I haven't given any thought to that question. [Laughter.]

Q Mr. Secretary, as you know, there has been considerable official speculation in regard to an offensive in South Viet-Nam. What effect would such an offensive have on the prospect of further peace talks?

A Well, I think that the prospect for an offensive -- prospects for an offensive, are there. I think that is quite likely.

All the indications are that the enemy is building
up for a major offensive, particularly in the Central
Highlands, and probably in Military Region One.
And it may be a country-wide offensive, including sapper
attacks and so forth; and we would think that this was
likely sometime during the next month and maybe in the
next couple of weeks.

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PR 31

Now, the purpose would be to have a spectacular, to get a lot of attention focused on successes on the part of the North Vietnamese, with the thought that they could divide the American people, that they could take advantage of the accelerated withdrawals of Americans from South Viet-Nam and particularly, in view of the President's trip to Peking, to make it difficult for us for obvious reasons.

Now we don't think this offensive will succeed, but we recognize that the battle will have to be carried on by the South Vietnamese to a large extent, and I think this is one of the reasons, particularly, why we are concerned about anything that divides the American people at this critical stage, when President Nixon is making every possible effort to bring about peace by way of negotiation.

Q Mr. Secretary, Senator Kennedy --

This is on Ireland again.

Senator Kennedy proposed that the United States supply something like the role Cyrus Vance played during the Cyprus episode. What would you think of that as a possible role for the United States to play?

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PR 31

A Well, I don't want to comment on any particular role, except to say that no role that we would offer to play would be productive in any sense unless it was done with the approval of the parties concerned. We couldn't even play the role unless we were asked to. No such request has been made.

I think this is a situation that has to be solved by the people in the area, and I don't think that we should do anything to suggest that the United States can solve this problem. It's unrealistic, and suggestions that if we "acted vigorously in a diplomatic way" that we could solve it are outrageous.

Q Mr. Secretary, in view of your comments about Senator Muskie's criticism, what would be your hope concerning all the public pronouncements of all the candidates this year?

A Well, every candidate, of course, has to accept the responsibility of being a candidate, and I think I would point to the position that President Nixon took in 1968 and how he dealt with the matter there. He pointed out that he was going to proceed with great care in all his public pronouncements, because he

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PR 31

recognized that the President of the United States and the negotiators in Paris represented all of the people of the United States, and that he was not going to make any comments that undercut the prospects for negotiations.

Now obviously, every candidate has to decide how he is going to conduct himself. I think this particular speech, coming at this time, was most inappropriate and harmful to our national interest.

Q Mr. Secretary, if I may change the subject:

Would you tell us where, when, and under what circumstances you are planning to approach the Egyptians on the Suez issue?

A We are naturally pleased that the Israeli Government announced its willingness to engage in what we refer to as "close proximity talks." And for those of you who have not followed the subject too closely, let me say that we think close proximity talks, or something analogous to that, is essential if progress is to be made.

One of the problems in these negotiations has been there has been no active exchange of ideas,

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PR 31

and in order to work out these complex problems, there have
to be active exchanges of ideas. I have used the
parallel with the SALT Talks and the Talks on Berlin:
if we had not had very active exchanges of ideas over a
period of time, exchanges of views, each side attempting
to help the other find solutions for its problems,
we never could have worked out an agreement on Berlin,
and we wouldn't have made the progress that we have made
on the SALT Talks.

So we are encouraged by this willingness on the
part of Israel to engage in these talks.

As you remember, we were willing to play a role
in such talks because both Egypt and Israel indicated
they would like to have us. Clearly, such talks would
not be productive unless both Israel and Egypt were
prepared to have us play that role.

Now, you have asked (with that long background):
"How do we intend to convey that information, and where
do we stand with the Egyptian Government?"

We haven't decided yet. We'll decide it in
due course, and we'll present it in the appropriate way.

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PR 31

At the present time, President Sadat, as you know, is
in Moscow. We also realize that he has a difficult domestic
problem. As you know, he has had opposition groups from
universities and so forth demonstrating recently.

So we will indicate at the appropriate time and in
the appropriate way our willingness to play this role.
When that will be, I would not want to disclose.
We hope we can do it in a way that will keep the door
open, that he will not close the door to negotiations.

Let me say too, that we also strongly support
the Jarring Mission, and if there is a way of getting
those negotiations under way, we, of course, would favor
that. There is no reason why the two could not be
conducted at the same time, if that seemed desirable.

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PR 31

Q Mr. Secretary, part of Senator Muskie's attack was the inclusion of the cease-fire as one of the conditions that Hanoi would have to accept in a withdrawal of U.S. troops, and I'm wondering -- the Administration has stressed its flexibility on this. How flexible are you in fact? Would the U.S. be prepared to postpone the cease-fire until after all U.S. forces are withdrawn and all POW's released?

A Well, I'm glad you asked this question because there is a lot of misunderstanding on it. And let me see if I can either clarify it or add to it. We have indicated on several occasions to the North Vietnamese that we were prepared to discuss with them and negotiate about a military solution alone. By that we meant without any regard to the political questions; a military solution involving a total withdrawal of troops and release of prisoners of war. And in the case of May 31 we included the proposal of a cease-fire.

Now, we made that proposal on May 31. What was the response of the other side? The other side said, "We are not interested in any such proposal. We will not consider a military agreement unless it contains the political elements that we insist on. So we reject the concept. We won't discuss it with you."

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PR 31

Then on several other occasions in public sessions they have repeated the same thing: they will not discuss a military solution in the absence of an overall political solution.

And then, if you need further verification, the *New York Times* sent a series of questions to the North Vietnamese, and they responded to the same effect: they will not consider a military solution dealing with prisoners of war and a total withdrawal of our troops in the absence of a political solution. So this is really beating a dead horse, and I think most of the people in politics know it is. The reason that is not a possibility is because the enemy rejects it.

Secondly, the enemy has made it clear that all they are willing to accept is an overthrow of the Government, not just President Thieu, but an overthrow of the Government and a requirement that the Communists take over all of Viet-Nam. Now, that is what the United States cannot accept. We're prepared to accept a solution which will permit the people of South Viet-Nam to determine their own future. And we have said to the other side, "The only way we know to determine what people want is to ask them. If you have got

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PR 31

a better way, tell us." And we have said, "We are quite
flexible about how we do it. We recognize the difficulty
of an election." And we have had over the last two or
three years requests of "Why didn't we arrange to have Thieu
leave office?" Well, he is willing to do it. The Senator said,
"How can you expect the election to be fair while the police
power is with the Government of South Viet-Nam?" I think
that is a perfectly fair question. The answer to it is
that the control of the election would be taken over by an
election commission, including the Viet Cong, and it would
be supervised by an international supervisory body consisting
of other nations. And we are willing to consider any other
safeguards that would provide for a fair election.

But instead of asking the other side what it is
prepared to do when we make a forthcoming proposal that is
acclaimed throughout the world, our own people attack it.
That is why it is difficult to deal with, and that is why
the North Vietnamese realize that if they can divide us then
we have no hope of a peace by negotiation. So, we hope that
they will not be misled. I think the American people support
President Nixon. I think they feel that he has done
everything that a President could do to get us out of this

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PR 31

war that was started before we got here. And I think every
man who is running for public office should ask himself --
and I am speaking particularly about Presidential candidates --
should ask himself every time he makes a statement whether it
serves the national interest or not, and particularly, if he
could wait a little while, closer to election, so that at
least we would have the opportunity to see if the other side
would be interested in negotiating. I am dismayed because
what has happened is we have a rejection, here in our
country, by a prominent political official, before the enemy
has rejected our proposals. The enemy indicates some interest
in the proposals. And we have diplomatic conversations with
others that indicate they think the President's
proposal might be a way out, it might lead to successful
negotiations. There is no assurance of that, of course, but
there is that hope.

Q Mr. Secretary, are we flexible on the
composition of the caretaker government and on the length
of time that President Thieu would resign prior to the
election?

A Yes, we are. And I think those are considerations
that if the other side was interested in negotiating in good

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PR 31

faith, they could raise. I think they are perfectly
logical, sensible considerations that we would have to
think about. We are flexible on those.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that the question
about police power was a fair one. How in the President's
peace plan would you get around the problem that not only
the police power but the army, the administration, the
provinces, the secret police, etc., etc., would remain in
the hands of a pro-American South Vietnamese Government?

A Well, you would have to figure out first how
the election was going to be conducted. And then you would
have the electoral commission given whatever authority it
felt necessary to insure that the election was fair. And
we recognize that's a problem. We say it is not an insoluble
problem. You can set up an electoral commission with
sufficient authority and with international supervision
that would provide, we think, reasonable guarantees that
the election would be fair.

But let me say, in all candor, you know the reason
that they are not interested in the electoral process is they

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PR 31

know the people of South Viet-Nam don't want a Communist government. That's the simple answer to it. Americans act as if, if there was a free election, that the people of South Viet-Nam would vote for a Communist government. That isn't true. No one really believes that. The Communists aren't interested in the electoral process probably. But we say, "How else can you determine what the people want?"

Now, they have begun to show some interest. They have been asking a few questions recently about how could they be sure an election was fair, and so forth. If they want to discuss that, we are prepared to discuss it, and we are flexible about it. We realize the difficulties.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you involve the International Control Commission in the electoral commission?

A Well, we haven't -- as I say, we are quite flexible about how it's to be done.

Q Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you could now give us an assessment of how the SALT talks are progressing, since they have recessed, and whether you are hopeful that there may be a first agreement by the time President Nixon goes to Moscow.

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[ic]

PR 31

A The talks have progressed reasonably well, and, as you say, they are in recess now. We still have hopes that these talks will result in an agreement at a reasonably early date. I would not want to make any prediction about exactly when that would occur. But we still are confident and certainly hopeful that these talks will result in an agreement.

Q Mr. Secretary, you have expressed confidence that South Viet-Nam can handle whatever offensive the North Vietnamese may throw at them in the coming weeks. What is the situation in Cambodia and Laos, and are they part of your consideration?

A Yes, they are. And I suppose that if an offensive takes place it could very well include Laos and Cambodia, particularly Laos. As you know, there have been some difficult times in Laos recently. At the moment things seem to be better in Laos. In Cambodia we are encouraged by recent developments, and we think that if this offensive takes place the South Vietnamese will be able to handle it. It's possible though that there will be some dramatic developments which will be adverse, which will get a lot of attention, and that is something we have to think about.

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PR 31

But, as the President said in his address the other night --
and I think this should not be forgotten -- if the
enemy attempts to take advantage of us as we are withdrawing
our troops at an accelerated rate, he will take whatever action
is necessary to protect those troops.

Q Sir, in that connection, is there any truth
to the reports that Cambodia and the North Vietnamese may
be negotiating for use of some of their property as
sanctuary in the northeastern border?

A We have heard some reports that the North Vietnamese
have suggested that, but there are no negotiations under way.

Q Mr. Secretary, to pursue your criticisms of
Senator Muskie, et al, to pursue that to the logical
ultimate would be saying that Viet-Nam should be removed
as an election year issue in this country. Is that realistic,
or is that fair do you think?

A That isn't what I said.

Q Well, is that not the logical ultimate of what
you are saying?

A No. I said that I thought every candidate had
to ask himself before he took a stand on Viet-Nam whether
it served the national interest. Now, obviously, in

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[LC]

PR 31

a political year candidates have a right to express their views, and I would not suggest that there should be any moratorium on it. I think how you do it and when you do it and what you say has to be a matter each candidate should decide for himself.

I do say that if a candidate suggests what amounts to total defeat, that sort of discourages the incentive of the other side to negotiate a settlement between now and election.

Q Are you implying that that's what Senator Muskie was saying in his speech?

A No. I wasn't sure what he said. There were a lot of unanswered questions. I wasn't sure whether he was talking about cutting off economic aid completely; I wasn't sure whether he was talking about cutting off military aid completely. In fact, I really wasn't sure -- I would be interested to see what he says about that, exactly what he proposes to do. Because if we accept the Communist proposition, which they are advocating, which is that there should be: total withdrawal of all American and allied forces; and there should be total withdrawal of all military equipment; and total stoppage of any economic aid or military assistance in

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the future--then that means total defeat for South Viet-Nam.
It means a complete takeover by the Communists. And it means
that all of the efforts that we have made in all these years
will have gone for naught.

I think we have a
responsible role to play in the area. And I think that
the President's address the other night presented the outer
limits to which we should go. Anything beyond that, it
seems to me, any acceptance now to allow a total takeover of
South Viet-Nam by the Communists would be a total defeat for
the United States. It would be a very black day in our
history.

Thank you very much.

[The briefing terminated at 1:05 p.m.]

THE CONGRESS

Secretary Urges Senate Support for 1973 Security Assistance, Narcotics Control, and South Asian Relief Funding Requests

*Statement by Secretary Rogers¹*

I am here today to seek this committee's support for the President's fiscal 1973 funding requests for security assistance, the international narcotics control program, and South Asian relief.

Mr. Chairman, for fiscal 1973 I am asking your support for the authorization of $780 million for grant military assistance, $527 million in foreign military sales credits, and $844 million for security supporting assistance.

This requirement was developed within the executive branch and approved by the President prior to final congressional action on the administration's fiscal 1972 request. Our fiscal 1973 request does not compensate for the reduced sums authorized and appropriated by the Congress for the current fiscal year. As the President has stated, the funds appropriated for security assistance were inadequate for the purposes which we are seeking to achieve. Many important country programs have had to be cut back drastically. These reductions have impaired the effectiveness of the Nixon doctrine. Assistant Secretary Marshall Green, during his recent trip to East Asia, found that the leaders of many countries now question not the President's desire to provide adequate assistance in support of their legitimate self-defense needs, but whether this assistance will in fact be forthcoming.

The funds we seek will help to build local defense capabilities. In placing greater reliance on local forces, this approach will mean a correspondingly less potential need for direct U.S. military involvement. And it will bring the time closer when even our security assistance can be reduced.

—The progress of the Vietnamization program, despite the renewal of North Vietnamese aggression, has permitted us to withdraw virtually all of our ground combat troops.

—Our assistance to Cambodia has helped the Khmer Government develop and support a light infantry force which has resisted the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong invasion and has diverted and complicated North Vietnamese efforts against South Viet-Nam.

—We have 20,000 fewer troops in Korea than we had 2 years ago, and the Koreans themselves have assumed primary responsibility for the defense of the entire demilitarized zone.

—Our security assistance has helped to maintain the delicate military balance in the Middle East. And although the arms balance may not be a guarantee of peace, it is a deterrent to war.

—Our assistance to Greece and Turkey has been an important ingredient in our close cooperation with both countries in the security field and has enhanced their ability to perform their assigned roles in NATO's military defense planning.

¹ Submitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Apr. 17 (press release 91).

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Department of State Bulletin

While many of the nations we seek to assist still require our material support, the nature of our relationship is changing. Our friends and allies now are determining their own security requirements, are doing more of their own military planning, are assigning priorities in terms of economic and military resources, and are developing plans for their own defense self-sufficiency. They know and we have told them that our basic objective, consistent with our security interests and obligations, is to get out of the grant military assistance business as soon as we can.

Let me turn to our specific fiscal 1973 request.

## Security Assistance for Viet-Nam

For Viet-Nam, we are requesting $585 million in security supporting assistance earmarked mainly for economic stabilization and war relief activities and for expanded economic development. A significant part of this request is for requirements that previously were met by expenditures from the Department of Defense budget.

Mr. Chairman, as the committee knows, South Vietnamese forces are now engaged in the courageous battle to defend their country. The North Vietnamese, while cynically calling for meetings at the conference table, prepared and launched a massive invasion of South Viet-Nam. All but one of their 13 combat divisions are currently operating outside of North Vietnamese territory, and nearly all of these are engaged in attacks against South Viet-Nam.

In Military Region I, in the north of the country, the North Vietnamese have invaded directly across the demilitarized zone using heavy tanks, artillery, and massed antiair-craft weapons of the most sophisticated types.

In Military Region II, in the Central Highlands, two more divisions of North Vietnamese troops, attacking from Laotian territory, are pressing hard against the defenders of two provincial capitals.

In Military Region III, not far from Saigon,

the North Vietnamese, again using heavy and sophisticated offensive equipment, have invaded from Cambodian soil.

These attacks have dropped the pretense that this war is in any sense a "popular up-rising" and have exposed it as a naked aggression of the most flagrant type.

The South Vietnamese have risen to the challenge; they have demonstrated their determination to resist aggression. They deserve, now more than ever, our steadfast help and encouragement.

## Other Security Assistance Requests

Our proposed $50 million program for Laos will be primarily for economic stabilization and refugee relief and resettlement operations.

The bulk of the $225 million requested for military assistance for Cambodia will continue to finance required ammunition, light combat equipment, and much-needed training. Another $75 million in supporting assistance will help meet the needs of a war-disrupted economy and help to replace some of the resources denied the Cambodian people by NVA/VC [North Vietnamese Army/Viet Cong] military operations.

The largest single grant military assistance request, $235 million, is to continue to support the Republic of Korea's 5-year modernization program. Given adequate funds we expect the program to be completed in 1975. We then expect Korea to meet the bulk of its defense needs through the foreign military sales program.

In the Middle East, in the absence of a peace settlement, we must continue to provide assistance to Israel and friendly Arab countries. This assistance contributes to the military stability which is an essential condition for progress toward an Arab-Israeli peace.

The armed forces of Greece and Turkey need further modernization to enhance the effectiveness of their contributions to NATO's strength. Neither country is yet able to dispense with our assistance. However, Greece's rapid economic strides have made it possible

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for us increasingly to substitute credit for grants. With Turkey's economy considerably strengthened, we believe it possible that Turkey will be able over a period of time to make a transition from grant military assistance to credits.

## Transition From Grant Assistance to Sales

We are proposing two amendments directly aimed at accelerating the transition of countries from grant military assistance to sales.

The first amendment which we are proposing extends the repayment period for foreign military sales credits from 10 years to 20. This will allow the sale of military equipment on a more favorable basis and thereby relieve the balance of payments pressures which recipients experience. But more importantly, longer repayment periods will allow us to accelerate our program for moving countries from grant military assistance programs (MAP) to sales programs. The transfer of a country from grant assistance to sales of military equipment encourages the recipient countries to review priorities and make the hard decisions between military and other requirements within their own budgets.

Second, we are requesting that the Congress increase the ceiling on military grant materiel and sales programs to Latin America from $100 million to $150 million. Latin American nations, with World War II and Korean War vintage equipment, wish to modernize their inventories. If U.S. equipment is not available, Latin American countries will go elsewhere; in recent years they have spent some $800 million for European arms. Recent Latin American military expenditures average only about 2 percent of gross national product. We want to be responsive to reasonable requests for force modernization, and we believe that important political and economic advantages will result from an increase in the regional ceiling.

Finally, we are proposing the repeal of section 514 of the Foreign Assistance Act. This section imposes a requirement that is

contrary to the basic purpose of grant MAP programs, cuts across our desire to encourage recipients to assume a greater share of their defense responsibilities, and inhibits their movement from grant programs to credit programs.

With the help of Congress, we have taken an important step to improve the management of our security assistance programs. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1971 authorized a new position, an Under Secretary of State for Coordinating Security Assistance Programs. The President has just nominated Curtis W. Tarr for this important position. Under his guidance I am confident that we can improve the integration of our security assistance.

## International Drug Control Efforts

Mr. Chairman, I now turn to the international aspects of the drug abuse problem, which has caused an inordinate amount of human suffering and social dislocation in the United States. To combat it, the President has organized an all-out effort, of which the international narcotics control program, for which we are requesting $42.5 million for fiscal 1973, is an essential element. This program is supervised by the President's Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, of which I am Chairman. It complements the domestic programs undertaken by Dr. [Jerome H.] Jaffe's Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention and by Myles Ambrose's Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement. Nothing less than a comprehensive and coordinated attack on all fronts will be sufficient to overcome this critical problem.

We knew at the outset of our planning that many nations did not regard the drug abuse problem as seriously as we did. The first part of our program involved intense diplomatic efforts to persuade other governments of the need for cooperative action and to mobilize their support. Our top narcotics officials and the President himself have joined with the Department of State in this effort. Our diplomatic posts in over 50 na-

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tions which are important producing areas, refining sites, or transiting routes have prepared narcotics control action plans. These plans will be the basis for bilateral negotiations with each country; our goal is to begin implementing all the plans within 6 months. In nations where bilateral joint efforts are already underway—for example, France, Laos, Mexico, Thailand, and Turkey—we have received excellent cooperation. We will need your support to expand our effort.

I should also like to call your attention to the increasing role of the United Nations in the international drug control effort. With broadened financial support the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control is becoming increasingly active in organizing control programs in critical areas. The recent conference to amend the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs was a singular example of international cooperation on the narcotics issue, adopting by a vote of 71-0 (with 12 abstentions) a reinforcing protocol already signed subject to ratification by 41 nations. Moreover, more than 20 nations are at various stages of ratifying, and three countries have ratified, the Convention on Psycho-tropic Substances now under consideration by your committee.

I know that the Congress fully shares our interest in controlling the flow of illicit narcotics, and I deeply appreciate your constructive efforts to support and improve the program. Our preliminary indications are that the international and domestic efforts are beginning to have an impact and with your help we expect by the end of the year to have registered even more significant progress.

## South Asian Relief and Reconstruction

Mr. Chairman, our final authorization request is for $100 million as the contribution to the international effort in South Asia. The Government of Bangladesh is facing enormous problems of relief and reconstruction. For fiscal 1972, the Congress appropriated $200 million for South Asian relief. We have already committed over $71 million of that amount for priority nonfood items, and we

have also made available nearly $73 million under P.L. 480 to meet immediate requirements. We are urgently considering additional assistance to Bangladesh as part of the coordinated effort directed by the United Nations.

The World Bank is completing an assessment of requirements in the area. Hence, it is still too early to determine accurately overall needs, and our $100 million request reflects only a preliminary assessment of future requirements.

Mr. Chairman, the proposals for which I am asking your support are premised upon a view of the world as it is today, not upon what it was in the past. Our role has changed dramatically, but it is still significant and we must continue to discharge our responsibilities. I urge your committee's support for these authorization requests.

## Congressional Documents
### Relating to Foreign Policy

#### 92d Congress, 2d Session

* Importation of Pre-Columbian Sculpture and Murals. Report to accompany H.R. 9463. H. Rept. 92-824. February 7, 1972. 5 pp.

* China and the United States: Today and Yesterday. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on China today and the course of Sino-U.S. relations over the past few decades. February 7-8, 1972. 115 pp. [Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations.]

* War Powers. Report, together with additional views of Senator Fulbright and individual views of Senator John Sherman Cooper, to accompany S. 2956. S. Rept. 92-606. February 9, 1972. 33 pp.

* Seabed Arms Control Treaty. Report, with individual views, to accompany Ex. H, 92d Cong., first sess. S. Ex. Rept. 92-18. February 10, 1972. 7 pp.

* Partial Revision of the Radio Regulations (Geneva, 1959). Message from the President of the United States transmitting a partial revision of the Radio Regulations (1959) relating to space telecommunications, with a final protocol, dated at Geneva July 17, 1971. S. Ex. E. February 16, 1972. 314 pp.

* Relating to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany S. 860. H. Rept. 92-852. February 24, 1972. 19 pp.

* Regulation of International Air Fares. Report to accompany H.R. 11416. H. Rept. 92-854. February 24, 1972. 16 pp.

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