[Y]

CHURCHILL

V. S. Speech Nov. 30, 1950

215 "I hope that at the right and best time, esp. after matters are stabilized in the Far East, a conference will arise which will not merely be like those of which we have had too many in the past, of two sides arguing against each other in the glare of publicity, but that the decisive conversations will take place in confidence, in privacy and even in secrecy, and will be conducted at the highest levels. It is what I asked for at Edinburgh six months ago."

"...I am in favor of efforts to reach a settlement with Sov. Russia as soon as a suitable opportunity presents itself, and of making those efforts while the immense and measureless superiority of the U. S. A bomb organisation offsets the Soviet predominance in every other military respect and gives us the means to talk together in a friendly and dignified manner and, at least as equals."

CHURCHILL

Effort against Great Britain

V.S. Jan. 15, 1951

"World Cause Will be Decided in Europe" Speech before H. of C. Nov. 30, 1950.
pp. 213 - 216.

214 "In 1948, I hoped that we might come to terms with them before they gained the secret of the A bomb. Now I hope that we may come to terms with them before they have so large a stockpile of these fearful agencies, in addition to vast superiority in other weapons, as to be able to terrorize the free world."

"All that can be said is that it certainly does not seem to be in the Russian interest to begin a major struggle now."

"The great Duke of Marlborough quoted a saying in his day: 'Interest never lies'; and there is no doubt that trying to put oneself in the position of the other party to see how things look to him is one way, and perhaps the best way, of being able to feel and peer dimly into the unknowable future."

"I am in favor of efforts to reach a settlement with Soviet Russia as soon as a suitable opportunity presents itself, and of making those efforts while the immense and measureless superiority of the U. S. A bomb org. offsets the Sov. predominance in every other military respect and gives us the means to talk together in a friendly and dignified manner and, at least as equals."

CHURCHILL

V. S. Dec. 15, 1951

Speech before H. of C. Nov. 6, 1951 pp. 130-134

133

"Our great hope in foreign affairs is to bring about an abatement of what is called the 'old war' by negotiation at the highest level from strength and not from weakness."

"At Edinburgh, in Feb. 1950, I appealed for a conf. between the heads of States and I and my righ hon. Friend the F. Secr. who have acted in the closest, spontaneous accord in all these matters, still hold to the idea of a supreme effort to bridge the gulf between the two worlds, so that each can live its life, if not in firendship, at least without the fear, the hatreds, and the frightful waste of the cold war."

"I must, however, today utter a word of caution. The realities which confront us are numerous, adverse and stubborn. We must be careful not to swing on a wave of emotion from despondency to over-confidence; but even if the differences between West and East are, for the time being intractable, the creation of a new atmosphere and climate of thought, and of a revived relationship and sense of human comradeship, would, I believe, be an enormous gain to all nations."

CHURCHILL

V. S. Feb. 1, 1952

Address to joint session of Congress. Jan. 17, 1952. pp. 231-234.

"The sooner strong enough forces can be assembled in Eur. under united command the more effective will be the deterrents against a third world war. The sooner, also, will our sense of security and the fact of our security be seen to reside in valiant, resolute and well-armed men, rather than in the awful secrets which science has wrested from nature.

"These are at present, it must be recognized--these secrets--supreme deterrents against a third world war and the most effective guarantee of victory in it. If I may say this, members of the Congress, be careful above all things, therefore, not to let go of the A weapon until you are sure and more than sure that other means of preserving peace are in your hands.

"It is my belief that by accumulating deterrents of all kinds against aggression, we shall in fact ward off the fearful catastrophe...

"It may be that presently a new mood will reign behind the Iron Curtain. If so, it will be easy for them to show it. But the democracies must be on their guard against being deceived by a false dawn."

No mention of meeting with the Soviets.

[Y]

233

[Y]

CHURCHILL

H. of C. Feb 9, 1953

Answer to written question whether he will try to arrange
a meeting with Stalin after his U.S. visit.

"...I am, of course, always ready to consider any proposals which would effectively reduce international tension, but the attitude of the Soviet Gove't in regard to those issues which are outstanding between us does not encourage me to think that a meeting of the kind suggested would in present circumstances lead to this result."

Answer to question of why he was in favor of it during election and no longer now: "I think we must understand the general position as it moves. We in this country would feel very severe domestic preoccupations making it difficult to have conversations with heads of Govert's if, for instance so many of our best doctors were being charged with poisoning so many of our best politicians."

"I think there was a better moment two years' ago and more than two years' ago than is presented now for such conversations."

CHURCHILL

H. of C. speech May 11, 1953.

II

three of our difficulties would be an important gain to every peace-loving country. For instance, peace in Korea, the conclusion of an Austrian Treaty--these might lead to an easement in our relations for the next few years, which might in itself open new prospects to the security and prosperity of all nations and every continent.

"Therefore, I think it would be a mistake to try to map things out too much in detail and expect that the grave, fundamental issues which divide the Communist and non-Communist parts of the world could be settled at a stroke by a single comprehensive agreement. Piece-meal solutions of individual problems should not be disdained or improvidently put aside. It certainly would do no harm if, for a while, each side looked about for things to do which would be agreeable instead of being disagreeable to each other."

"Above all, it would be a pity if the natural desire to reach a general settlement of I. policy were to impede any spontaneous and healthy evolution which may be taking place inside Russia. I have regarded some of the internal manifestations and the apparent change of mood as far more important and significant than what has happened outside. I am anxious that nothing in the presentation of f. p. by the NATO powers should, as it were, supersede or take the emphasis out of what may be a profound movement of Russian feeling."

[y]

525

CHURCHILL

H. of C. Speech May 11, 1953

III

"We all desire that the Russian people should take the high place in world affairs which is their due without feeling anxiety about their own security. I do not believe that the immense problem of reconciling the security of Russia with the freedom and safety of Western Eur. is insoluble. Indeed, if the U. S. org. had the authority and character for which its creators hoped, it would be said already.

"The Locarno Treaty of 1925 has been in my mind. It was based upon the simple provision that if Germany attacked France we should stand with the French, and if France attacked Germany we should stand with the Germans.

"The scene today, its scale and its factors, is widely different, and yet I have a feeling that the master thought which animated Locarno might well play its part between Germ. and Russia in the minds of those whose prime ambition it is to consolidate the peace of Eur. as the key to the peace of mankind. Russia has a right to feel assured that as far as arrangements can run the terrible events of the Hitler invation will never be reapeated, and that Poland will remain a friendly Power and a buffer, though not, I trust, a puppet State.

"I must make it plain that, in spite of all the uncertainties and confusion in which world affairs are plunged, I believe that a conf. on the highest level should take place between the Leading Powers without long delay. This conf. should not be overhung by a ponderous or rigid agenda, or led into mazes and jungles of technical details...It should meet with a measures of informality and a still greater measure of privacy and seclusion. It might be well that no hard-fought or

525

CHURCHILL

H. of C. Speech

May 11, 1953

"agreements would be reached, but there might be a general feeling among those gathered together that they might do something better than tear the human race in including themselves, into bits.

"At the worst the participants in the meeting would have established more intimate contacts. At the best we might have a generation of peace.

"Whatever differences of opinion may be between friends and allies about particular problems or the general scale of values and sense of proportion which we should adopt, there is one fact which stands out overwhelmingly in its simplicity and force. This would be the most fatal moment for the free nations to relax their comradeship and preparations. To fail to maintain our defense efforts up to the limit of our strength would be to paralyze every beneficial tendency towards peace both in Europe and in Asia. For us to become divided ourselves because of divergencies of opinion on local interests or to slacken our combined efforts would be to end for ever such new hope as we have broken upon mankind and lead instead to their general ruin and enslavement. Unity, vigilance and fidelity are the only foundations upon which hope can live."

[Y]

IV

526

CHURCHILL

V. S. Nov. 1, 1953

Margate Speech Oct 10, 1953 pp. 36-40

"I ask for very little. I hold out no glittering or exciting hopes about
Russia. I thought that firendly, informal, personal talks between the leading
figures in the countries mainly involved might do good and could not easily do
much harm, and that one good thing might lead to another....Her Majesty's Gov't
still believe we should persevere in seeking such a meeting between the heads
of government."

"It would indeed be an act of unwisdom to weaken our efforts to build up a
western defense."

(Does not mention nuclear power)

[Y]

CHURCHILL

NYT June 29, 1954 - Interview by P. M. to Washington Press Club

"At any rate, I would like to make sure, to save the consciences of the democracies of the world, that no step or stage has been neglected in endeavoring to test the reality and the imminence of our danger. And, therefore, I am in favor of trying to find out where we are while at the same time exercising the strongest vigilance and making it clear... the unbreakable unity of the English-speaking world ...I do beg you to make sure that no stone is left unturned in this pe iod to give them (the Russian people) a chance to grasp the prospects of great material well-being which will be offered to all those millions.

Q. - Have you discussed with Pres. Eisenhower your proposal for "a meeting at the summit" with Premier Malenhov?

A. - ...I said a year and a half ago that I thought a meeting of the top leaders might be a great help. ...I still am of that opinion, But, of course, the time must be chosen. And the time must be rightly chosen as it makes a great difference to all the detailed negotiations which have to take place at a modern conference, makes a tremendous difference if there is behind it, as it were, the consenting minds of the heads of governments and states. ...I also said that the consequences of doing anything like that (meeting) if it didn't come off--might be to darken the scene might be very serious.

...I am not quite sure that nothing is more likely to bring about a modification of the rigorous Russian system of comm. than contacts between the Ru. people and the peoples of the W. world, and cultural contacts, and trade contacts ...

CHURCHILL

June 29, 1954

Interview before Wash. Press Club

..."I say that to go without good occasion, to hold such a meeting without good occasion, and at an ill-timed moment without some hope of producing a definite amelioration of the world situation, might be not to help matters but to worsen them, and not to ease tension, but to sharpen it."

Churchill

H. of C. April 5, 1954

Motion by Opposition to have the Gov't make an "immediate initiative to bring about a meeting between the Priem Minister and the heads of the Administrations of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R."

Motion accepted by Gov't, but it must be "Clearly understood that the word "immediate" does not commit us to action at an unsuitable time or lead only to courting a polite deadlock or even providing a refusal."

Wait until after Geneva conf.

"When in May last year I suggested a personal and to some extent informal meeting of this character, the situation was different from that which exists today. Stalin had just died, and Malenkov had newly assumed the leadership in Russia. I thought it would be a good thing if friendly, personal relations could be established between leaders and if we could form a clearer view of what was then called the "New Look". I am still in favor of that, but the topic has changed.

"A far more precise and definite objective is now before us, and there is also perhaps.. a new vehicle of procedure." (cooperation for the peaceful uses of atomic energy).

(Now wants to move from the specific to the general) "For instance, if Russia, the Br. Commonwealth and the U. S. were gathered round the table talking about the commercial application of a atomic energy and the diversion of some of their uranium stockpile, it would not seem odd if the question of the H bomb...cropped up and what I had hoped for, namely a talk on supreme issues between the Heads of States and Gov'ts concerned..."

CHURCHILL

V. S. Nov. 15, 1954

"Peace Through Strength" Blackpool speech (Conservative Party Conf) Oct 9, 1954

"The conventional military forces of which the NATO Powers dispose are of course much fewer than those of Russia and the Soviets have no need to fear their attack. In fact, there is no doubt that Sov. Russia could overrun the whole of Europe and make the life of the British Isles impossible, but for the fact that the U. S. possesses today that superiority in nuclear weapons which while it is maintained will be, I believe, a decisive deterrent against a Communist aggression."

"We...are going to adhere faithfully to them (the Brussels Treaty of 1948 and NATO) and do our utmost to promote the formation of the Eur. army with a strong contingent of Germans in it. We, like the Americans, shall maintain our forces in Eur. thus restoring the French balance of equality with our German associates."

☆ [Y]

837

CHURCHILL

H. of C. March 1, 1955

II

1092

"Our best protection lies, in successful deterrents operating from a foundation of sober, calm and tireless vigilance." "However a curious paradox has emerged. The broad effect of the latest developments is to spread almost indefinitely and at least to a vast extent the area of mortal danger. This should certainly increase the deterrent upon Sov. Russia by putting her enormous spaces and scattered pop. on an equality, or near equality, of vulnerability with our small, densely populated island and with W. Eur."

"It is conceivable that Sov. Russia, fearing a nuclear attack before she has caught up with the U. S. and created deterrents of her own...might attempt to bridge the gulf by a surprise attack with such nuclear weapons as she has already. Am. superiority in nucl. weapons, reinforced by Britain, must therefore be so organized as to make it clear that no such surprise attack would prevent immediate retaliation on a far larger scale. This is an essential of the deterrent policy... Thus they should be convinced that a surprise attack could not exclude immediate retaliation."

"The deterrents will grow continually in value. In the past an aggressor has been tempted by the hope of snatching an early advantage. In future, he may be deterred by the knowledge that the other side has the certain power to inflict swift, inescapable and crushing retaliation."

But wants to maintain the services. "We must together with our NATO allies maintain the defensive shield in Western Eur."

CHURCHILL

H. of C. March 14, 1955

I

Motion by Churchill: "That this house ....recognises that a high-level meeting with the Soviet Union should await the ratification of the London and Paris Agreements by all the countries concerned."

Refers to resolution of the House of 5th April 1954 which called for a three power conference. But a busy year has passed since then: waiting for the ratification of the EDC (London and Paris Agreements) Malenkov gone, "New look" Speech of May 11, 1953 - key speech in asking for top level meeting succeeded by another New Look Steps taken to bring about this meeting:

Washington Conf. July 1953

Tripartite notes sent to Sov. Union and rejoinders

Bermuda Conf. Dec. 1953

Berlin Conf. of Foreign Ministers, Jan. 1954

Geneva Conf. April 1954

Churchill visit to Wash. June 1954

Churchill telegram to Molotov, July 1954, asking how Sov. Union would feel about a top level conf.

Sov. note of July 24 proposed a formal conf. of Eur. States and U. S.

CHURCHILL

H. of C. March 14, 1955

III

"desire to bring about a top-level conf. of great Powers to expose us to the charge of having thrown doubt and disarray into the ranks of NATO."

"I must here, however, say very seriously to the House that it is a mistake to suppose that to bring about such a meeting...is an end in itself. It is only a means to an end. It is by no means certain that the end will be agreeable. To have a conference at an ill-chosen moment, or in unfavourable circumstances, would only raise false hopes and probably finish by leaving things worse than before."

"If this happened those concerned would have to bear the responsibility not only for a futile procedure but for using up in a wasteful manner what might be at the right moment an important shield against rash or violent action and have thus weakened the resources, both moral and practical, of peace-seeking peoples. It would be wrong and foolish, in timing our procedure, to run the risk of dividing the allies of the Free World. That would only make the danger greater and the potential defense, whether mental or physical, weaker."

[Y]

CHURCHILL

H. OF C. March 14, 1955

II

With regard to note by Molotov of July 24, Churchill said: "This seemed have obviously superseded for the time being the small informal meeting that I had suggested which might perhaps have been the prelude to a four-Power meeting at the top level."

"I do not mind telling the House that I had in mind to tell the Soviet that if they wanted to bring the U. S. along they would have to make some change in their general attitude, and I would have suggested that the signature of the Treaty with Austria and also their joining the proposal which was made about this time by the Pres. of the U. S. for the civil use of A power-- which they have done since--would be very good topics which might make it possible to make it a three Power conf. and evidently it would soon become a four-Power, and, very likely, a five-Power, conference." ..."The unexpected revival of his [Molotov] Berlin proposal at this juncture created a new situation since it would not have been possible to have a large formal international conference going on at the same time as the unofficial two-Power top-level meeting which I had suggested."

"The sooner we can get our united ratification settled, the sooner the top-level four-Power conf. may come." ..."We must on no account allow our earnest