World Politics

Vol. XXI, No. 4, July 1969

pp. 655-691

Review Article

WESTERN CONCEPTS AND CHINA'S
HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

By TANG TSOU*

Robert J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*. New York, Random House, 1968, 178 pp. $1.95.

Lucian Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics: A Psychocultural Study of the Authority Crisis in Political Development*. Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1968, 255 pp. $2.90.

James R. Townsend, *Political Participation in Communist China*. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1967, 233 pp. $5.50.

THE massive effort in the United States to develop the study of the Chinese Communist regime and movement began in the wake of the postwar upsurge in the development of the social sciences, particularly in the field of comparative politics. Inevitably, it has come under the controlling influence of the exciting intellectual ferment in these disciplines. With the publication of Chalmers Johnson's *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* (1962) and Franz Schurmann's *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (1966), the study of contemporary China can be said to have begun its drive to maturity. In contrast to the purely historical studies of Chinese politics prior to that time, Johnson develops his carefully researched account of the Chinese Communist movement from 1937 to 1945 within the context of a general analysis of mass nationalism, explicitly applying Karl W. Deutsch's notions of communication and social mobilization. Schurmann produces a masterly synthesis and analysis through an integration of empirical findings with theories and concepts that were formulated by nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century social theorists but that have been further developed by contemporary social scientists such as Reinhard Bendix, Talcott Parsons, Marion J. Levy, Jr., Amitai Etzioni, and Robert K. Merton. Rather than concerning himself exclusively with Chinese politics, Johnson arrives at his conclusions by an

* The author wishes to acknowledge the research grant from the Joint Committee on Contemporary China of the Social Science Research Council for the academic year 1968-69. He has also received support from the Center for International Studies, Social Science Divisional Research Committee, the Committee on Far Eastern Studies, and the Center for the Comparative Study of Political Development, University of Chicago.

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explicit comparison of two similar cases of national communism. Similarly, Schurmann discusses the departure of Chinese theory and practice from their Soviet prototypes, thus explicitly and implicitly contrasting the two systems. In his analysis of the process of revolutionary change in China, Schurmann starts with a notion of traditional China in which "the trinity of ethos, status group, and modal personality was represented by Confucianism, the gentry, the *pater familia* (*chiachang*)" (p. 7). Dissatisfied with explanations of contemporary events that simply find parallels and analogies in the many diverse aspects of China's long tradition, he reports his impression of how "little Chinese" the political system appears to be (p. xvi). These two books mark a sharp break with the tradition of Sinological studies and with their almost exclusively historical and humanistic emphasis. They have avoided the mechanical emulation of Soviet studies. They have also gone beyond the application of the model of totalitarianism, which has been found too static, formal, and value-laden to be conducive to comparative studies of the deeper sociopolitical processes at work in both Communist and non-Communist systems. They represent an important step toward building contemporary Chinese studies on the paradigms found in the social sciences.

Professor James R. Townsend's *Political Participation in Communist China* applies the general pattern of analysis established by Schurmann and Johnson to a careful examination of one aspect of the Chinese political system. Professor Lucian Pye, one of the pioneers in postwar studies of comparative politics, "returns to China" with an interpretation of the "spirit of Chinese politics," stressing the continuity of the Chinese political culture and the crisis of authority developed under the changed circumstances of twentieth-century China. Although he focuses his attention on the psychocultural dimension, his work, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, is based on the same general approach as that of Schurmann and Johnson. Dr. Robert Lifton's book, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, marks a new departure in so far as his use of theories and concepts is concerned.

The new types of approach represented in these three studies raise general methodological questions for scholars in the Chinese field. First: whether, how, and to what extent can concepts and theories originating in the democratic West be applied to the entirely different political system of China with its totally different cultural setting? Second: how ought the problems of tradition and modernity, continuity and change, to be handled in the very special case of China with

POLITICS

ases of national communism. Simi-
ture of Chinese theory and practice
explicitly and implicitly contrasting
the process of revolutionary change in
tion of traditional China in which
and modal personality was repre-
ly, the *pater familia* (chiachang)"
s of contemporary events that sim-
me many diverse aspects of China's
ession of how "little Chinese" the
). These two books mark a sharp
cal studies and with their almost
emphasis. They have avoided the
lies. They have also gone beyond
itarianism, which has been found
to be conducive to comparative
processes at work in both Commu-
They represent an important step
Chinese studies on the paradigms

*Political Participation in Communist*
of analysis established by Schur-
kamination of one aspect of the
Lucian Pye, one of the pioneers in
tics, "returns to China" with an
se politics," stressing the continu-
and the crisis of authority devel-
aces of twentieth-century China.
the psychocultural dimension, his
, is based on the same general
Johnson. Dr. Robert Lifton's book,
*Life-tung and the Chinese Cultural*
in so far as his use of theories and

ented in these three studies raise
or scholars in the Chinese field.
extent can concepts and theories
be applied to the entirely different
otally different cultural setting?
tradition and modernity, continu-
very special case of China with

CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

657

its long, unbroken tradition and its complex problems of modern-
ization? Third: to what extent can psychological interpretations add
to structural-functional analysis? In so far as these problems are
raised by the works of Townsend, Pye, and Lifton, they will be dis-
cussed in the following pages.

I

Scholars studying another society must of necessity employ concepts, generalizations, and theories developed or generally accepted in their own society, even if they must begin by understanding the goals, values, viewpoints, and ideologies of actors in the other society as these are understood by the actors themselves. Two types of concepts, generalizations, and theories can be distinguished in this context; each of these two types creates its own distinct problems and dilemmas when applied to a society, such as China, with an entirely different political system and cultural background. The first type consists of concepts, generalizations, and theories believed to be universally valid. David Easton's input-output model of the political system, Karl W. Deutsch's cybernetic model of political communications and control, the controversial notion of the ruling elite, and the neo-Freudian theory of personality development underlying Lucian Pye's study are cases in point. As is generally recognized and indeed intended by the theorists themselves, these concepts and models provide useful frameworks for area studies in that they direct our attention to data of theoretical interest, serve as the theoretical underpinning for empirical and historical studies, and establish a common language for area studies and the social sciences. When applied to the study of a specific political system, the limitations of these concepts and models do not come from the logical suppositions alleged by Giovanni Sartori that such concepts are not "defined by an opposite" and that "only the concepts defined by an opposite have an empirical applicability, for a concept without contrary has no descriptive denotation and hence cannot be tested on empirical grounds."¹ Rather, these limitations stem from the simple fact that in so far as these universal concepts and models are valid, their application to area studies merely confirms their validity but does not enable us to derive specific hypotheses on the differences between various political systems. The application of social-science concepts and theories of this type represents nothing more than a prelude to our study of a particular system in our comparative enterprise. For

¹ Giovanni Sartori, "Functionalism in a Comparative Perspective," Chapter XVIII of a manuscript to be published, pp. 148 and 150.

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our task is precisely to show how the distinctive configurations of structures, patterns of behavior, and combinations of symbols are evolved from the common nature of man to confront universal problems of human existence as they arise at different times and places. This task has been most successfully and systematically accomplished in Lifton's book.

The confrontation between supposedly universal concepts and area studies is not without theoretical interest in other aspects. In some cases, it reveals that the allegedly universal concepts are actually culture-bound. In other cases, area studies may show that a concept that falls short of universal applicability may nevertheless find empirical support in specific cases. For example, Professor Robert Dahl has convincingly shown that the ruling-elite hypothesis has not been strictly tested in so far as it is used in the study of the United States or local American communities. But it is quite reasonable to suggest that imperial China during normal times can pass his tests for the existence of "the weaker system of elite rule,"² and that in all cases but one of unsuccessful peasant attempts to overthrow the throne since the establishment of the Han dynasty,³ the centralized empire passes his tests for the "more stringent case" in which "a small group dominates over another that is opposed to it." During the Hundred Flower episode of Spring, 1957, Communist China provided a clear-cut example of disagreement between the ruling elite and the non-elite. In the land reform program, the Three-anti and Five-anti campaigns, the socialization of industry and commerce, the establishment of agricultural cooperatives, the Anti-Rightist movement of 1957-58, and even the initial months of communization, both the population in general and the various groups specifically affected by these "mass movements" fell in with ready compliance with the elite when the "word" was authoritatively passed down. It is not without good reasons that almost all writings on Communist China are based explicitly or implicitly on the ruling-elite model. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suggest that one of the reasons the members of the New Left in the United States are so fascinated by Communist China and Mao's attack on the "establishment" is that China corresponds closely to the ruling-elite model with which they analyze all political systems.

The second type of concepts, generalizations, and theories that have

² Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," *American Political Science Review*, LII (June 1958), p. 467.

³ C. P. FitzGerald, *Revolution in China* (New York 1952), pp. 12-16. FitzGerald explains this one exception in terms of an alliance between scholars and peasants to drive out the Mongol rulers.

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the distinctive configurations of
and combinations of symbols are
of man to confront universal prob-
lish enterprise at different times and places.
and systematically accomplished

possession of universal concepts and area
interest in other aspects. In some
universal concepts are actually cul-
bles may show that a concept that
may nevertheless find empirical
law. Professor Robert Dahl has con-
the hypothesis has not been strictly
study of the United States or local
elite reasonable to suggest that im-
can pass his tests for the existence
of" and that in all cases but one of
arthrow the throne since the estab-
centralized empire passes his tests
which "a small group dominates
During the Hundred Flower epi-
nina provided a clear-cut example
elite and the non-elite. In the land
Five-anti campaigns, the socializa-
establishment of agricultural co-
ment of 1957-58, and even the initial
e population in general and the
by these "mass movements" fell
ite when the "word" was authori-
zout good reasons that almost all
based explicitly or implicitly on
not too far-fetched to suggest that
the New Left in the United States
and Mao's atttack on the "estab-
closely to the ruling-elite model
all systems.

ralizations, and theories that have

*ing Elite Model,* *American Political Science*

(New York 1952), pp. 12-16. FitzGerald
Alliance between scholars and peasants to

been applied to Chinese studies can be divided into two subtypes. One
consists of those concepts, generalizations, and theories that have been
either developed in the study of Western democracies or shaped by
the influence of the democratic currents of thought. Townsend's key
concept of political participation belongs to this category. So do such
notions as integration, interest articulation, and interest aggregation.
The other subtype consists of concepts, generalizations, and theories
specifically developed in the study of political systems that stand at
the opposite pole of the Western democracies or are quite different
from them. The theory of totalitarianism is particularly relevant here.
But Robert Tucker's notion of a nationalist mass-movement regime,
Edward Shils's "modernizing oligarchy," and the generally used
notion of "transitional society" Pye helps to formulate also fall under
this rubric.

The trend toward applying the first subtype of concepts, generaliza-
tions, and theories to Chinese studies has been, in a sense, a reaction
against the mechanical use of the theory of totalitarianism and the
mistaken treatment of Chinese communism as a replica of Stalinism.
It has also been fostered by a shift of the attention of the analysts of
the Western political systems from normative theories of democracy
to practice and actual behavior. Accompanying this shift is an increas-
ing awareness of the possibility that a totalitarian system may not be
so monolithic and its control not so effective as they initially appear
to be. Taken together, these two considerations have given rise to the
thought that in drawing so sharp a contrast as we did, we may simply
have been juxtaposing democratic rationalizations to totalitarian pre-
tensions. There is also the feeling, encouraged by the quest for univer-
sally valid concepts and theories, that common processes and similar
responses to similar problems must underlie all political systems. One
example of the extreme and untenable forms in which this trend of
thought can find expression is the theory of the convergence of Amer-
ican and Soviet societies, a theory that Zbigniew Brzezinski and Sam-
uel P. Huntington rightly and systematically criticize.⁴

The application of the first subtype of concepts, generalizations,
and theories has given rise to a serious though not insoluble methodo-
logical problem. As most forcefully stated by Sartori, the issue is
whether a concept, with very specific empirical referents and definable
meaning when applied in one kind of political system, can be applied
in another kind of system (in the case of China, an opposite type)
without creating utter miscomprehension or becoming meaningless.

⁴ Political Power: U.S.A.-U.S.S.R. (New York 1967).

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According to Sartori, a concept at this level of abstraction is defined or at least delimited by its opposite. Examples of such polar categorizations are expression versus repression, electioneering versus mobilization, participation-voluntarization versus manipulation-conformity, and integration versus homogeneity.⁶ The warning that Sartori's abstract remarks hold for scholars in the field of China is that the first set of polar concepts—i.e., "expression," "electioneering," "participation-voluntarization," and "integration"—cannot be applied to the study of Communist China, for which only the second set of concepts is appropriate.

Townsend's careful study of political participation in Communist China reflects some of the difficulties involved in what Sartori calls "conceptual stretching" in the horizontal direction to cover heterogeneous referents. But at the same time it provides a concrete example of how the application of the concept of "participation" can be handled intelligently and meaningfully. By implication it also suggests a solution to the methodological problem posed by Sartori. The difficulties find expression in the need felt by Townsend to begin his book by affirming at once the "dominant place" of the Western experience in any discussion of political participation and by underlining sharply the differences between the Chinese Communist and the Western democratic "styles of political participation" (pp. 2-3). Townsend states these contrasts in terms of "execution of Party policies" versus the exertion of "popular influence on political decisions"; "direct contact between cadres and masses" versus reliance on "representative institutions"; cultivation of popular support for a "supreme, unified national interest as defined solely by the Communist Party" versus "the recognition of a national interest as a fluid combination of diverse interests that may legitimately compete"; emphasis on "the quality and morality of political leaders" versus the exaltation of "legal and institutionalized popular control"; and, finally, the denial of "limits to the extension of demands for political activity" versus the insistence on the limits imposed by the "inviolability of private life" on public obligation. This formidable list of contrasts raises the question whether the Chinese style of political participation is "participation" in the strict sense of the term or if it can be more accurately characterized in terms of a combination of mobilization, manipulation, and repression. In his discussion of the 1953-54 basic-level elections in Communist China, Townsend concludes that "in the eyes of the CCP, the elective

⁶ Sartori.

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this level of abstraction is defined
Examples of such polar categoriza-
tion, electioneering versus mobiliza-
versus manipulation-conformity,
⁵ The warning that Sartori's ab-
the field of China is that the first
tion,” “electioneering,” “participa-
tion”—cannot be applied to the
only the second set of concepts

tical participation in Communist
es involved in what Sartori calls
horizontal direction to cover hetero-
me it provides a concrete example
pt of “participation” can be han-
By implication it also suggests a
olem posed by Sartori. The diffi-
lt by Townsend to begin his book
place” of the Western experience
ation and by underlining sharply
the Communist and the Western
 participation” (pp. 2-3). Townsend
ecution of Party policies” versus
a political decisions”; “direct con-
us reliance on “representative in-
port for a “supreme, unified na-
tive Communist Party” versus “the
fluid combination of diverse in-\”; emphasis on “the quality and
the exaltation of “legal and insti-
nally, the denial of “limits to the
ctivity” versus the insistence on
ity of private life” on public ob-
trasts raises the question whether
pation is “participation” in the
more accurately characterized in
on, manipulation, and repression.
ic-level elections in Communist
the eyes of the CCP, the elective

function is a relatively minor aspect of popular participation in an
election campaign." In contrast, several other functions emerged as
major aspects of the election campaign. These were the raising of
mass political consciousness, increasing production, strengthening
unity, educating the masses and the cadres, and securing demographic
and political information (pp. 134-35).

Townsend defines political participation as “all those activities
through which the individual consciously becomes involved in at-
tempts to give a particular direction to the conduct of public affairs”
(p. 4, italics added). Interpreted strictly, this definition describes more
accurately the democratic than the usual Chinese Communist practice.
It does not adequately cover a situation in which the Party plays an
exclusive role in defining a supreme, unified national interest and
making policy decisions, and in which the task of the masses is pri-
marily the implementation of policies.

Yet in his general discussion and by his detailed description of par-
ticipation in Communist China, Townsend does suggest by implica-
tion a solution to the methodological problem posed by Sartori. On
the one hand, in justifying the use of the concept of participation, he
points out that “the extensive use of propaganda to mobilize the popu-
lation, the manipulation of political organizations by their elites, the
inability of citizens to exert effective influence on decision-makers, and
the lack of significant electoral choice—all characteristic features of
Chinese political life—are by no means absent in democratic politics”
(p. 6). On the other hand, in discussing the CCP’s assumption that
both Party leadership and mass voluntarism can be preserved, he notes
that “Party leadership of the liberated areas [during the Yenan period]
was real enough, but it rested on the foundation of a broad popular
consensus that virtually eliminated the need for coercive measures
against the population of these areas” (p. 84). In analyzing the Party’s
ability to enlist mass support during the period of political construc-
tion, he emphasizes that “Party policies, at least in their stated objec-
tives, were consistent with majority interests” and that “the obvious
presence of CCP control makes it easy to underestimate the attraction
of participation in the early mass movements” (p. 90). In discussing
the aftermath of the collapse of the Great Leap and the commune
system due to the peasantry’s passive resistance and slowdown, he ac-
cepts John W. Lewis’s view that village kinship and friendship ties
were still prerequisites for successful leadership in the production team
(p. 172). He concludes that “the action to which we are referring is
voluntary in the sense that the consequences of inaction, in most cases,

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are not so severe as to compel action unless there is also present some
degree of willingness to act" (p. 193). All this suggests that the inter-
ests, voluntary actions, and particularistic ties of the masses have
sometimes been factors in accounting for the CCP's success in mobiliza-
tion, manipulation, and control, and at other times obstacles to be
overcome.

The methodological implication of these discussions by Townsend
is that while we must take fully into account the basic differences be-
tween voluntary participation in a democratic system and mobiliza-
tion-manipulation in a totalitarian system, we can nevertheless consider
these dichotomous concepts as referring to a similar function in the
two political systems—i.e., the structuring of the relationship between
the individual and the political authority. For lack of a better term,
we can call this function "political involvement." Political involve-
ment in this sense can be conceived in any political system as a com-
bination or mix between participation and mobilization-manipulation.
In so far as this dimension of political life is concerned, the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian system can be understood as
a difference in the pattern in which voluntary participation combines
with mobilization-manipulation. The different total patterns in which
the various dimensions are combined will differentiate one type of
political system from another. Similarly, the "uniqueness" of any par-
ticular case will be sought in the specific combination of factors that
is different from the combination in other cases belonging to the same
type.⁶ This way of conceptualizing our problems has the advantage
of bringing our abstract notions closer to political practices in a polity,
and of directing our attention to the complex realities in any type of
political system. It will also facilitate our perception of the quantitative
and qualitative changes of a specific dimension of political life and the
direction of these changes. One of the great merits of Townsend's study
is its detailed and careful analysis of the changing pattern of political
involvement in China, from noninvolvement or nonparticipation in
traditional China to the different combinations of voluntary participa-
tion and mobilization-manipulation in different periods of the history
of Chinese communism, with the element of voluntary participation
declining in importance since the Yenan years until the element of
mobilization-manipulation reached its height during the Great Leap.⁷

⁶ Sidney Verba, "Some Dilemmas in Comparative Research," *World Politics*, xx (October 1967), 114.

⁷ The more fundamental and more difficult problem of integration versus uniformity can be dealt with in the same fashion. In all political systems, the processes of both integration and "homogenization" are at work. In the democratic West, integration

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unless there is also present some
). All this suggests that the inter-
laristic ties of the masses have
for the CCP's success in mobiliza-
d at other times obstacles to be

of these discussions by Townsend
to account the basic differences be-
democratic system and mobiliza-
tem, we can nevertheless consider
ring to a similar function in the
uring of the relationship between
ority. For lack of a better term,
involvement.” Political involve-
in any political system as a com-
mon and mobilization-manipulation.
All life is concerned, the difference
ian system can be understood as
voluntary participation combines
different total patterns in which
d will differentiate one type of
fly, the “uniqueness” of any par-
cific combination of factors that
other cases belonging to the same
our problems has the advantage
to political practices in a polity,
complex realities in any type of
ur perception of the quantitative
mension of political life and the
great merits of Townsend's study
the changing pattern of political
olvement or nonparticipation in
binations of voluntary participa-
t different periods of the history
ment of voluntary participation
nan years until the element of
height during the Great Leap.⁴

roblem of integration versus uniformity
political systems, the processes of both
. In the democratic West, integration

At times, the application of concepts, generalizations, and theories
developed in the West to the study of the type of system to which
Communist China belongs is not entirely without its difficulties. Pye's
discussion of one of the reasons for Peking's failure to achieve rapid
economic and social development is a case in point. Agreeing with the
view expressed by many scholars in the West, Pye asserts that "totali-
tarianism is uniquely a product of the modern industrial world," or
more specifically, of its capacity for building large-scale and highly
disciplined forms of human organizations (p. 235). According to
him, the Chinese are fighting the reality of history "in their effort to
utilize the modern system of totalitarian rule when so much of their
society is still essentially pre-industrial." It is not easy to reconcile this
conclusion with Pye's own perceptive psychocultural analysis of the
capacity of the Chinese for organization-building. Furthermore, he
cites the failure of the Great Leap as a proof of his point. Yet, one can
reasonably argue that the failure of the Great Leap was due not to
a lack of the capacity for building large-scale and highly disciplined
forms of human organization, but rather to an ideologically inspired
miscomprehension of socioeconomic reality, as he himself points out
in his discussion of the commune system (pp. 199, 211, 231). The
Party's management of the retreat from the Great Leap and its success
in preventing the economic disaster from developing into political
chaos were a reflection of its organizational strength. We can at least
suggest that between 1949 and 1957 Chinese totalitarianism was prob-
ably just as effective as the Russian variety and the Chinese system
more totalitarian than Italian fascism,⁸ to cite two nations that stood
at a much higher level of industrialization than China. We can also
venture the hypothesis that the bureaucratic tradition of the Chinese
empire and the twenty years of guerrilla warfare could be an alterna-
tive source for the capacity to create the large-scale and highly dis-
ciplined forms of human organization on which a modern totalitarian
system depends. Similar factors may account for the relative success
of North Vietnamese totalitarianism when compared with the political
instability of many regimes in the underdeveloped world.

of the various functional groups is achieved partly by the general acceptance of certain
basic principles of "right" and "wrong" and the "rules of the game" guiding the
struggle for power and material resources: in other words, uniformity at this highest
level combined with diversity at other levels. In few other political systems are the
leaders more determined to establish uniformity in all spheres of life than in Maoist
China. Yet even Mao and the Maoists must seek the integration (in their own termi-
nology, *chieh-ho*) of the different groups.

⁸ It is immaterial here whether or not we regard Fascist Italy as a totalitarian system.

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In sum, the application to Chinese Communist studies of concepts, generalizations, and theories developed in the West has enable us to see the theoretical and general significance of seemingly unique and superficially trivial facts about China. When skillfully done, it can also lead us to understand the distinctiveness of Chinese politics. Yet in undertaking this task, we must be constantly aware of the methodological problems created by the application of the various kinds of concepts, generalizations, and theories to a sociopolitical system like China's, which is so different from those in the West and which has emerged out of an entirely different and extraordinarily complex political tradition.

The application to area studies of concepts, generalizations, and theories developed on the basis of Western experience marks the beginning of the drive to maturity of non-Western studies. Full maturity can be attained only when scholars specializing in area studies can fashion new concepts, generalizations, and theories of universal or general applicability on the basis of the integration between their Western intellectual tools and their knowledge of non-Western nations. Lifton's book is the first in the field of Chinese studies that points toward this direction. Partly from his research on the survivors of Hiroshima and partly on the basis of his broad intellectual concern with "man's struggle for various forms of renewal and transcendence," he has evolved a series of concepts around what he calls "modes of symbolic immortality" and has begun to apply them to different epochs and to a general view of the historical process (p. xiii). The Cultural Revolution in China, staged by an ageing tragic hero intensely concerned with the possible death of his revolution, provides Lifton with an extreme case in which "man's continuing need for an assurance of eternal survival for his self" coincides with a revolutionary romantic's struggle for revolutionary immortality. The result is the most fascinating book ever written on Communist China, portraying "the Chinese experience as both distinctive and part of the general flow of human events." Dissatisfied with the usual practice of seeing the Chinese revolution in terms of the French and Russian revolutions, Lifton urges us to use "the Chinese situation as a paradigm for revolution in general" and to reexamine the French and Soviet experiences in relation to the theme of revolutionary immortality (pp. xvi-xvii). His ultimate concern is the development of a general view of the historical process and the search for "new conceptual connections between individual and collective patterns" (p. xv). Generalizing from Lifton's suggestions and from his interest in extreme historical

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ese Communist studies of concepts, loped in the West has enable us to minificance of seemingly unique and la. When skillfully done, it can also liveness of Chinese politics. Yet in constantly aware of the methodologi- ion of the various kinds of concepts, sociopolitical system like China's, the West and which has emerged traordinarily complex political tra-

of concepts, generalizations, and Western experience marks the be- of non-Western studies. Full matu- cholars specializing in area studies izations, and theories of universal is of the integration between their ir knowledge of non-Western na- the field of Chinese studies that from his research on the survivors basis of his broad intellectual con- jurious forms of renewal and tran- of concepts around what he calls and has begun to apply them to ew of the historical process (p. xiii). , staged by an ageing tragic hero le death of his revolution, provides ich "man's continuing need for an is self" coincides with a revolution- itionary immortality. The result is ten on Communist China, portray- distinctive and part of the general el with the usual practice of seeing the French and Russian revolutions, e situation as a paradigm for revo- lune the French and Soviet experi- evolutionary immortality (pp. xvi- development of a general view of h for "new conceptual connections patterns" (p. xv). Generalizing in his interest in extreme historical

conditions, we may venture the thought that precisely because of China's long history and large size, the nature of her confrontation with the West, the extent of the disintegration of her society, her pro- tracted period of revolutionary struggle, the sharp contrast between the early success and recent failure of the CCP, and the unexpected and novel attempts made by Mao to realize his revolutionary vision, the seemingly unique characteristics of Chinese politics throw into bold relief certain universal political problems and reveal some general dilemmas of the human condition in a magnified and easily recog- nizable form. If so, scholars like Lifton may develop from their study of China new views of the historical process and new conceptions of the political system, thus reciprocating the contributions made by social-science theory.

II

The extraordinary degree of continuity in the traditional order in China, followed by an apparently new and distinct sociopolitical sys- tem, has posed a formidable challenge to scholars. The problem of tradition and modernity in political development, and of continuity and change in history, cannot be ignored. It is faced directly and squarely in Townsend's study of one aspect of the Peking regime, Lifton's treatment of two related themes, and Pye's sweeping inter- pretation of the whole political system and the political culture of China, past and present. These works provide us with examples of the inviting opportunity afforded by China for the investigation of this problem, and also reveal some hidden pitfalls in such an enter- prise. The opportunity can be most fully realized when a scholar has selected a significant and well-defined problem on which there exists a wealth of historical material and adequate monographic works on the premodern period. G. William Skinner's impressive and ingenious study of the persisting influence of the premodern peasant marketing system on the units of agricultural collectivization under the Commu- nists, and David S. Nivison's discussion of the relationship between the Communist practice of ideological remolding and earlier, pre- Western Chinese thought, are cases in point. So is Townsend's exam- ination of political participation in traditional, transitional, and Com- munist China, although in his case the problem studied is much less complex. Whereas Skinner and Nivison uncover the strong links be- tween the past and the present, Townsend finds a sharp break in the pattern of political participation. He has successfully shown us the way in which the noninvolvement on the part of the masses in national

666

WORLD POLITICS

politics in imperial China has been replaced by the extension of the
central government's authority down to the lowest levels of society,
by the regime's demands for positive popular commitment to its goal
and program, and by the active mobilization of the masses in the ex-
ecution of its policies.

Yet underlying "this most striking difference between the political
system of Communist China and that of imperial China" (p. 213) are
a number of continuities with the past on a deeper level. Townsend
implicitly recognizes these continuities in his discussion of the moral
leadership of the Communist elite, and the limitation of popular in-
volvement to the execution of policies made exclusively by the elite.
Pye explicitly states and analyzes them. In so doing, he has defined some
of the traits shared by the traditional and Communist Chinese political
systems with a freshness and relevance to theory not found in many
other works. In contrast to many scholars, however, Pye concludes
that in most cases these features have become serious handicaps to
China's modernization and have contributed to the failure of the
CCP. He observes that to a very large extent the Chinese polity, tra-
ditional or Communist, is "a self-contained system very little influenced
by citizen or nongovernmental elites" (p. 13). As a corollary, the
Chinese believe without question that the needs of the public can be
met by the actions of officials who pose as sympathetic and understand-
ing, rather than by a system of political representation through which
the interests of the various groups are expressed and influence official
policies (p. 22). The result is that Chinese politics is "so peculiarly
insensitive to changes in the social and economic environment" (p. 14).
The Chinese have always attached "sovereign importance to the value
of politics." This emphasis on the primacy of politics has inhibited
the development of autonomous systems of human relationships and
specialization. The Chinese have shown extraordinary concern for
the efficacy of moral persuasion and the importance of self-cultivation.
This has led to "a planned effort to establish the cult of the leader"
(p. 31). The "almost compulsive need for ideologies" suggests that
"for the Chinese a basic function of ideologies has been to make it
possible for them to avoid a direct confrontation with the realities of
their politics" (p. 31). The Chinese have suffered "little confusion
over the reality of their identity," and have never lost their "identifi-
cation with historical greatness" (pp. 50, 51). Yet, according to Pye,
"it is remarkable how few specific features of their civilization the
Chinese self-consciously value or feel that they must fight to maintain";

[c]

POLITICS

CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

667

n replaced by the extension of the
own to the lowest levels of society,
ve popular commitment to its goal
obilization of the masses in the ex-

ing difference between the political
that of imperial China" (p. 213) are
past on a deeper level. Townsend
ities in his discussion of the moral
, and the limitation of popular in-
icies made exclusively by the elite.
em. In so doing, he has defined some
al and Communist Chinese political
ance to theory not found in many
scholars, however, Pye concludes
have become serious handicaps to
contributed to the failure of the
arge extent the Chinese polity, tra-
ntained system very little influenced
ites" (p. 13). As a corollary, the
hat the needs of the public can be
pose as sympathetic and understand-
itical representation through which
are expressed and influence official
Chinese politics is "so peculiarly
nd economic environment" (p. 14).
"sovereign importance to the value
primacy of politics has inhibited
systems of human relationships and
shown extraordinary concern for
the importance of self-cultivation.
to establish the cult of the leader"
need for ideologies" suggests that
of ideologies has been to make it
confrontation with the realities of
ese have suffered "little confusion
and have never lost their "identifi-
op. 50, 51). Yet, according to Pye,
c features of their civilization the
that they must fight to maintain";

indeed, their "sense of identity is . . . derived less from the content of culture . . . and more from the fact of race" (pp. 54-55).

These and other statements made by Pye on the continuities be-
tween past and present force us to realize how difficult it is to general-
ize about China's long political tradition. While some of the general-
izations, such as the statement about the effect of the emphasis on the
centrality of politics on the development of autonomous human rela-
tionships, undoubtedly command our agreement, others seem to fit
one period of Chinese history with more exactitude than they do other
periods. Students of the Chinese Communist movement might ask
whether, during the period of the civil war and Sino-Japanese War,
a basic function of the evolving doctrine of Mao was not in fact to
enable the Chinese Communists to confront the realities of their poli-
tics directly and successfully. Those historians who consider cultural-
ism rather than nationalism, not to say racism, as a prominent feature
of Chinese civilization would probably doubt whether this feature can
disappear so completely as to justify Pye's attribution of the source of
Chinese identity to the fact of race. Some would point to the unique
system of language, the notion of reciprocity, the popular tradition of
thrift and industry, and indeed some of the continuities in the political
culture described by Pye himself as the specific elements of Chinese
culture that serve as a source of identity. Other historians, mentally
reviewing the history of the Three Kingdoms, the Southern and North-
ern Dynasties, the Five Dynasties, the warlord era, and the Kuomintang-
CCP civil war, as well as the measures taken by the founders of the
Han, Ming, and Ch'ing dynasties to consolidate their rule, would not
find it easy to accept Pye's statement that "when one considers what
was at stake and the rewards of expanding power, what is striking about
Chinese history is how little competition there was [for the throne
during the interregnum] and how easily new authorities become en-
during imperial dynasties" (p. 87). Still others who study the careers
of outstanding emperors and capable ministers would question whether
"there has been a direct and firm correlation between the degree of
authority and the degree of inactivity" (pp. 130-31).

Raising these questions does not imply that Pye's statements are
necessarily wrong. But it does suggest that in view of the long history of
China and our still inadequate knowledge, generalizations of the type
advanced by Pye are not easy to confirm or refute at this time. The
difficulties are further compounded by the fact that some of these
generalizations are based on an explicit or implicit comparison of the
history of China with that of the West—another formidable task. An

[LC]

668

WORLD POLITICS

interpretation of Chinese politics based on such generalizations must be held most tentatively. Indeed, Pye himself urges us to read his book in this spirit when he characterizes his study as "an interpretive and highly speculative essay," and when he warns us that examples and incidents from Chinese history and contemporary Chinese behavior can be "only illustrative of our hypotheses" and should not be taken as "real proof" (p. ix). Within that self-imposed context, this briskly written book by an outstanding political scientist has raised many issues concerning our understanding of China that must be reexamined. In this reexamination, we should be wise to use the research strategy followed by Skinner, Nivison, and Townsend.

Like many other scholars, Professor Pye has detected many discontinuities between traditional political order and contemporary political systems. Again, he finds that these discontinuities are related to some of the worst features of modern politics in China, which he characterizes in highly opprobrious terms. The traditional scholar-official class has been replaced, to quote Pye, by "half-educated rulers and strong-armed bullies" (p. 36). The "dispossessed Westernized intellectuals," who are juxtaposed to the "rooted and unalienated politicians," "have at best only taken over the role that in traditional politics was filled by eunuchs," and "the potency of Chinese intellectuals has been limited almost entirely to the harping, negativistic role of the purveyor of scandals." Few would disagree with Pye's contrast between the role of the traditional scholar and the role of the modern intellectual, or with his description of the displacement of the traditional respect for scholars by the rankest form of anti-intellectualism. But many would wonder whether the phrase "half-educated rulers and strong-armed bullies" describes much more than one facet of the complex of individuals and traits that characterize contemporary Chinese leadership; whether the role of modern Chinese intellectuals is significantly analogous to that of eunuchs (who in some cases exercised tremendous political influence and in other cases were nonentities); and whether or not such men as Hu Shih, Li Ta-chao, Ting Wen-chiang, Feng Yu-lan, and Fei-Hsiao-tung were mere purveyors of scandal.

The complex pattern of continuities and discontinuities between past and present raises the methodological problem of how it can best be characterized and analyzed. The problem finds expression in the following statement by Pye: "The linkage between contemporary Communist practices and historical politics is found less in grand traditions or explicit philosophies of government than in the vulgar but popular traditions of day-to-day Chinese life. Thus when we speak of the per-

[L]

POLITICS

CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

669

based on such generalizations must
himself urges us to read his book
his study as "an interpretive and
he warns us that examples and
contemporary Chinese behavior
sotheses" and should not be taken
self-imposed context, this brisk-
political scientist has raised many
ing of China that must be reex-
should be wise to use the research
on, and Townsend.

or Pye has detected many discon-
trol order and contemporary political
discontinuities are related to some
politics in China, which he charac-
ters. The traditional scholar-official
Pye, by "half-educated rulers and
dispossessed Westernized intellec-
tualized and unalienated politicians,"
able that in traditional politics was
ry of Chinese intellectuals has been
ing, negativistic role of the purveyor
ith Pye's contrast between the role
ole of the modern intellectual, or
ment of the traditional respect for
 intellectualism. But many would
ducated rulers and strong-armed
one facet of the complex of indi-
contemporary Chinese leadership;
intellectuals is significantly analo-
gic cases exercised tremendous politi-
nonentities); and whether or not
Ting Wen-chiang, Feng Yu-lan,
veyors of scandal.

es and discontinuities between past
al problem of how it can best be
oblem finds expression in the fol-
kage between contemporary Com-
es is found less in grand traditions
nt than in the vulgar but popular
Thus when we speak of the per-

sistence of elements of traditional Chinese culture in both Communist
and Nationalist politics we are thinking not of the vestiges of Con-
fucianism but of the spirit in which the Chinese have approached
power and the necessity of government" (p. 39). These two statements,
together with his discussion of continuity and change in China, actually
point to a very complicated set of ideas. To use some basic categories to
express these ideas, we should like to suggest the following formula-
tions. While the nature of the political system in China taken as a whole
has basically changed, certain parts of the tradition, particularly those
"popular" elements that occupied a secondary place in the traditional
society, have not only persisted but have been elevated to a central posi-
tion, thus engendering different implications, entailing different conse-
quences, and making the new system different from the old. While the
traditional and the contemporary political systems in China, as well as
some of their components, are structurally similar, they are basically
different in content. While the goals of the traditional and Communist
political systems are poles apart, the methods of the modern Chinese
to achieve their goals have been conditioned by the political tradition.
While the values espoused by the Chinese Communists are totally
modern, the style of leadership is traditional. While the explicit orienta-
tions are new, the implicit support for them may be traditional. Finally,
while the social institutions have been eroded, the attitudes that have
been cultivated by them may persist.⁹ It is in the analysis of the per-
sisting Chinese attitude toward authority under entirely new condi-
tions that Professor Pye intends to make his most important and origi-
nal contribution to our understanding of contemporary China. To this
subject we now turn.

III

The major theme of Professor Pye's book is the existence of a pro-
found "authority crisis" in twentieth-century China. This authority
crisis has arisen because the attitude toward authority has remained
constant whereas the systems of authority have been disrupted. This
attitude toward authority has persisted because the earliest socialization
process has not changed and the young have still been taught "abid-
ing sentiments and concepts about authority," in spite of the progressive
disruption of the traditional family (pp. 6, 107-08). In this persisting
socialization process, the personality of the Chinese is shaped by "the

⁹ For a more detailed discussion of these ideas, see Tang Tsou, "Revolution, Re-integration, and Crisis in China," in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou, eds., *China's Heritage and the Communist Political System* (Chicago 1968), 288-91.

[L]

CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

671

three most striking characteristics of the Chinese family: the para-
mount value of filial piety, the absolute denial of the legitimacy of all
forms of aggression, and the vision of a rigidly defined order of role
relationships" (p. 91). Parents exert tremendous social pressures and
sanctions (particularly through the use of shame) on the child to in-
still in him strict self-discipline and self-control (pp. 77, 89, 91, 94). The
childhood experience of dependency on the parent creates in adults
a tendency to expect a great deal from political authority in solving
their problems, in giving them a sense of security, and in providing
them with a stable social order. Authority is supposed to be "absolute,
harsh, and even ruthless"; yet it is also seen as being "subtle, wise, and
the source of morality." "It is to be feared and distrusted, yet to be
revered and relied upon" (p. 86). When the realities of authority both
in his home and in the larger society meet his expectations, the Chinese
accepts authority readily, and powerful psychological mechanisms are
at work to repress and suppress aggressive impulses "to an extreme de-
gree" (p. 126). These repressed aggressive impulses formerly found
sublimation in the cultural achievements of traditional China and in
compulsive, ritualized, and routinized action (pp. xvii, 103, 135).

The authority crisis developed when both parental and political
authority were shown to be weak and no longer able to meet the high
expectations of the individual. Because of the lingering tradition of
filial piety, however, the Chinese, instead of openly revolting against
his parents, struck out aggressively at other forms of authority (p. 111).
The weakening of the mechanism for controlling aggression that ac-
companies the authority crisis sets the stage for "aggression to become
explicitly mobilized in politics" (p. 111). This mobilization of aggres-
sion in politics took place in company with the exaltation of hate and
hostility as "positive virtues of the political activist" (p. 65). Once this
authority crisis had developed, "the problem of controlling aggression
complicated the process of establishing new forms of authority." On the
one hand, "the release of repressed aggression through more popular
forms has complicated the task of arriving at concepts of authority
appropriate for more modern politics." On the other hand, "the attempt
merely to impose modern versions of traditional forms of authority in-
volves the stifling of powerful emotions released by the overt expression
of long-repressed aggression" (p. 32).

Professor Pye's delineation of the authority crisis in China, as sum-
marized above, represents one way of handling psychocultural analysis.
Pye has given us a plausible explanation of the distinctive Chinese
approach to politics through the application to the data of a universal

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[L]

CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

673

theory about culture and personality. But there is one logical difficulty at a point crucial to the understanding of contemporary Chinese politics that Professor Pye has not fully clarified for us. On the one hand, he assumes that there is a dominant pattern of early socialization practice in the Chinese family and a cultural pattern of attitude toward authority. He further assumes that these two patterns determine or largely condition the political behavior of the Chinese and thus their political programs and their preferred political system. On the other hand, in his central hypothesis and throughout his book he underscores the conflict between two political tendencies in contemporary China. To repeat, one stems from "the release of repressed aggression through more popular forms," and the opposing one finds expression in "the attempt merely to impose modern versions of traditional forms of authority." There is little doubt that Professor Pye's characterization of these two conflicting political attitudes is largely correct. On the macro-societal level, the first tendency may be said to have manifested itself in the various revolutionary movements and the second may be said to have been symbolized by the endeavor of those in power to maintain the *status quo* at any particular moment, i.e., "modern versions of traditional forms of authority." Within a revolutionary movement, e.g., the Kuomintang before 1927 and the CCP up to 1949, these two tendencies existed side by side. The aggressive impulses were released against the *status quo* while "a modern version of traditional forms of authority" was developed within the movement. Even within the personality of a single individual, these two conflicting tendencies may coexist, with the first exerting a strong influence on his behavior at a particular time and the other having a stronger impact under different circumstances. Professor Pye interprets the clash between Mao and the Party apparatus under Liu Shao-ch'i in terms of "two different approaches to the authority crisis in the political culture," with the "romantic, aggressive, irreconcilable spirit of Maoism" pitted against "the regularized orderliness and bureaucratized relations" symbolized by Liu (pp. 234, 242).

If one way to understand the political changes and developments in contemporary China is to view them in terms of the conflict between these two types of persons or two types of attitudes, the central task of psychocultural studies is to undertake a thoroughgoing analysis of the personality development of the two types of persons and the psychogenesis of the two types of attitudes. Given his assumption of the existence of one dominant pattern of early socialization practices, it is incumbent upon Professor Pye to explain more fully and in more

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CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

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specific terms the distinct psychological mechanisms that produce these two very different types of men and tendencies from a single pattern of early socialization. How can we explain from the psychocultural viewpoint the very different approaches in recent years of men like Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, when their experiences with authority in the family were quite similar, as Pye himself notes? In a discussion of revolt against parental authority, Pye places side by side P'eng Teh-huai's conflict with his stepmother and Mao's clash with his father. Yet P'eng and Mao symbolize two opposite approaches toward China's problems at least since 1953. Thus, Professor Pye poses a significant problem that remains to be fully investigated.

There is no doubt that Professor Pye adds an important dimension to our understanding of Chinese politics. But our assessment of the validity and extent of the utility of his psychocultural interpretation varies with our agreement or disagreement with his judgments on the objective situation confronting the Chinese in the twentieth century. It also varies with the availability of alternative interpretations that are perhaps less profound but easier to accept. Professor Pye observes that "the emotional content of the Chinese sense of revolution was singular in that it dealt upon the need for a strong and more complete authority" (p. 10). Yet the need for a strong and more complete authority in China was seen by many Americans who had been brought up under very different early socialization practices. In 1915, Frank J. Goodnow, the eminent political scientist who was an adviser to President Yuan Shih-k'ai, published an article on the desirability of China's return to monarchy. In the 1940's, American officials advocated the development of "a strong, united, and democratic China." Indeed, this recognition of the need for strong and more complete authority is not unique to the Chinese but is rather common among outside observers and native politicians in many states in the underdeveloped world. Granted this, Professor Pye's contribution lies in his analysis of the irrational sources of an attitude that can also be explained on rational grounds. This type of analysis is helpful in so far as it enables us to understand the emotional basis underlying and reinforcing a realistic judgment. It is indispensable only in cases where we can clearly show that the subjective need for strong authority has pushed the Chinese to entertain unrealistic expectations from political authority, or that an obsession with maintaining effective political control militates against full recognition of the need for functional specialization, professional autonomy, and individual creativity and spontaneity. We must

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CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

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grant that in analyzing some of these problems, Pye has made a signal contribution.

Similarly, Professor Pye correctly underscores the high level of emotionalism and hostility in the political culture of twentieth-century China. But he goes on to observe that this degree of emotionalism and hostility "was out of proportion to the intensity of the political issues involved" (p. 112). It is, of course, difficult to measure accurately either the degree of emotionalism and hostility or the intensity of the political issues, and to determine precisely at what point the former is out of proportion to the latter. But it is not unreasonable to suggest that the Chinese in the twentieth century have been confronted, during a relatively brief span of time, with many of the most serious political issues that the peoples in the West resolved one at a time over a period of centuries. Furthermore, this concentration of hate has found more forceful expression in the words than in the actions of the Chinese. As Professor Pye notes, even on the verbal level it has not been developed into "an exaltation of violence" for its own sake or as a moral virtue (p. 68). Nor has it completely obliterated "the spirit of accommodation" (p. 34). These phenomena require more emphasis and a more adequate explanation than that supplied in Professor Pye's work if we are to have a more balanced view of the Chinese political culture.

Another phenomenon requiring further explanation is this: the concentration of hate has moved to a higher level over the course of the last fifty years, culminating in the words and actions of the adolescent and young Red Guards. This increase in the concentration of hate cannot be completely explained by the displacement of the revolt against parental authority onto political targets, because the concentration of hate and the intensity of parental control have not moved in the same direction over time. There is no doubt that the concept of filial piety has progressively lost its potency. It is also probably true that the control of the parents over the child has decreased. Although the early socialization practice may have remained fundamentally the same, as Professor Pye asserts, one reasonable assumption is that the parent's realization of the weakening of the concept of filial piety, together with his decreased control over the child, has offset, at least to some extent, the failure of the parent to meet the high expectation of the child and thus has moderated or allayed the impulse to revolt against parental authority. We might also wonder whether childhood socialization has continued to be dominated by the theme of filial piety since the Communists came to power in 1949. There are indications that the peer group has become a more and more significant factor in the

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CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

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child's early environment.¹⁰ At the same time, the political authority
in Communist China can no longer be considered by adolescents and
youths to be weak. Yet it is precisely the Red Guards who embody the
concentration of hate in twentieth-century Chinese politics since the
Boxer Rebellion. It would seem that in so far as the Red Guard gen-
eration is concerned, the "authority crisis" and the accompanying con-
centration of hate cannot be adequately explained by the juxtaposition
of persisting early socialization practices and the weakening of political
authority. One possible explanation can be inferred from Professor
Pye's book: the political culture of hate was created by the generation
born at the turn of the century, and the leaders of the older generations
can easily manipulate the hostility of the adolescents and youths who
have been socialized in the new political culture. This explanation
gives precedence to later political socialization over early socialization
practices. As Robert Lifton suggests, "the initial anger associated with
the Cultural Revolution was part of a command performance." But this
is hardly a sufficient explanation. Lifton goes on to point out that there
emerged hatreds of a more unfocused nature among both the Maoists
and the anti-Maoists, young and old. It is the hostility of people who
were suffocating under excessive personal control, psychological ma-
nipulation, and demands for moral purity and ideologically inspired
action (p. 130).¹¹ Lifton's explanation is based more upon our knowl-
edge of the relationship between the individual and political authority
in Communist China than upon the less thoroughly explored area of
early socialization practice since the turn of the century.

In the sphere of foreign relations, the dominant emotions of the
Chinese have been correctly characterized by Professor Pye as a sense
of having been humiliated by other nations and a resultant hostility
toward them. Quite convincingly, Professor Pye finds the dynamic
origins of the sentiments about humiliation and its relationship to anger
to lie in the frequent and widespread use of shame by the parent in
disciplining the child (p. 95). Yet he seems to have dismissed too com-
pletely and too readily the objective basis and the clearly understandable
reasons for this sense of national humiliation and hostility. He char-
acterizes as "political mythology" the Chinese belief that they "have
invariably suffered unjustly at the hands of all nations" (p. 72). Even
in the form stated by him, this belief is not as far from the truth as he

¹⁰ Remarks by Ezra Vogel, at the National Seminar on Communist China, held at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on May 5 and 6, 1967.

¹¹ Lifton has explored these problems methodically in his *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York 1961).

[L]

CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

681

believes, although in international relations justice or injustice is ad-
mittedly not always on one side. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to
say that no other independent nation in modern times has been con-
fronted, so frequently and for such extended periods, with crises in
its foreign relations as has China since 1839.

Professor Pye goes on to suggest that the Chinese derive "satisfaction
from the injustices that their nation has suffered in modern times" and
that they are "wallowing in self-righteous humiliation in politics." This
"moral masochism of the Chinese" in the political sphere is then traced
to the "narcissistic satisfactions" gained by the child through suffering
and humiliation (pp. 72-75). If the Chinese really derive unconscious
satisfaction from a sense of suffering humiliation and injustice at the
hands of other nations, how can we account for the tremendous efforts
and sacrifices made by both the Nationalist and the Communist regimes
in trying to improve the international status of China—efforts ranging
from the war against the Japanese to the development of nuclear
weapons? To this reviewer, what needs equally to be underscored and
answered is why the intense sense of national humiliation and hostility
toward other nations had not led to irrational acts of aggression and
violence toward other nations on a large scale. Perhaps the powerful
psychological mechanisms for controlling aggression are still operative,
when national survival is at stake. Perhaps the Chinese have sublimated
their hostility in their ideological pronouncements, or have displaced
it first from one country to another and then to their erstwhile com-
rades in violent inner-Party struggle. We may wonder how long these
mechanisms will continue to deter the Chinese from taking that one
disastrous aggressive step that will trigger a large-scale conflict in the
Far East, unless the Chinese can have a proper status in the interna-
tional community.

Here and there in his book Professor Pye has made a series of explicit
and implicit assessments of the success and failure of the Chinese in
different periods in their attempts to modernize their country and in
their resolution of the authority crisis. Looking at the pre-Communist
period in the light of our new knowledge of the violence, confusion,
and ineffectualness characteristic of developing societies, he sees "sig-
nificant advances" in China even during the last years of the Ch'ing
dynasty and the period of warlord rule, although "the Chinese have
been blind to their own positive achievements" (pp. 2-4, 62). These
significant advances were made despite the profound authority crisis
that, according to his central hypothesis, must have reached its height
during the warlord period. Rather casually, Professor Pye tells us

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CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

683

that "Chinese communism during the 1950's appeared to be achieving a monolithic order that could have meant the resolution of all Chinese problems of authority," a conclusion also logically deducible from his central theme (p. 234). But so little is said about the achievements of the Peking regime and so strong is his emphasis on the obstacles placed by the spirit of Chinese politics on modernization and political stability since 1949, that the period of relative success in the 1950's is almost completely buried. As for current developments, Professor Pye rightly tells us that the Chinese authority crisis was "revived" by the problems posed by the commune movement, and that the trend in the 1950's toward "routinized handling of public problems seems to have produced an inexorable split within the party" (pp. 189, 234). No one will disagree that "the profound upheavals of 1966 and 1967 will inevitably weaken the authority of communism" (p. 235). But the violence, chaos, intrigues, and flagrant breaches of standards of fair play and simple principles of decency ought not obscure the fact that fundamental political issues are at stake, as we shall see. Provided that the Cultural Revolution and the eventual death of Mao will resolve in compromise rather than civil war, the achievements of the Peking regime taken as a whole will remain very impressive when compared with those of the warlord period or of the twenty-year rule of the Kuomintang on the mainland. If Professor Pye's analysis of the nature of the authority crisis is correct, a stable political system could be rebuilt along the general pattern of the 1950's. But history is irreversible. It is likely that, for better or for worse, China after the Cultural Revolution will not be the same.

Notwithstanding the questions, qualifications, and caveats raised in the preceding pages, there is no doubt that Professor Pye has produced a significant and original book on Communist China as well as the most controversial yet to appear. He is one of the very few scholars who foresaw the coming of a political crisis before it erupted. His book is consistently provocative and never bland, and Pye's analyses are invariably penetrating if also controversy-inspiring. He provides us with interesting explanations for the extreme vacillations in Chinese politics between monolithic order and intense political conflict, the inability of the Chinese to manage disagreement and competition without a dramatic rise in tension, Chinese anxieties about disorder and unpredictability, the Chinese search for ritualized behavior, the belief in the potency of willpower, the spontaneous tendency toward organization-building, the considerable contentment of the average organization man despite the lack of upward mobility, and

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CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

685

the Communist success in tapping the Chinese potential for action. For a long period, and particularly since the 1930's, American scholars and observers have tended to see the Chinese and their culture in the best possible light and have perhaps drawn an over-idealized picture of China, however critical their views toward specific governments, individuals, and policies might be. Professor Pye has now applied neo-Freudian psychoanalytic theory to diagnose the ills of an erstwhile friend and present enemy, and has not shrunk from stressing the most unpalatable aspects of Chinese life. Hence the originality and the controversial nature of his book. The issues raised by him cannot be easily solved, for his sweeping hypotheses are difficult to prove or disprove. Moreover, to borrow a sentence from Pye himself but to use it in a different context, "we do not have a solid theoretical basis for determining the appropriate techniques with which to evaluate the sets of hypotheses" (p. viii).

In contrast to Professor Pye's comprehensive hypothesizing about wide-ranging aspects of Chinese personality and culture, and in contrast to his sweeping generalizations about Chinese history, Lifton confines himself to a single central theme and focuses his attention mainly on the Cultural Revolution. Whenever he refers to the Chinese past, he limits himself to those aspects of the tradition about which there is adequate knowledge and general agreement among scholars. He sees the Cultural Revolution as a "quest for revolutionary immortality." By this term he means "a shared sense of participating in permanent revolutionary fermentation, of transcending individual death by 'living on' indefinitely within this continuing revolution" (p. 7). From this point of view, he is able vividly to delineate the intense emotions surrounding the recent crisis, the deep fear of the death of the revolution, and the profound need to affirm a sense of immortality by assuring the endurance of the revolutionary works. Lifton is also able to locate the sources of Mao's political strength and the serious limitations in his approach to the problems of China. He tells us that "a key to the momentum of the Cultural Revolution is the merging of purity and power" that is "likely to dominate any collective quest for transcendence" (pp. 45, 46). Mao's strength derives from the fact that he has "achieved a status within the revolutionary lore as god-like in wisdom and virtue." Mao's identification with revolutionary purity and superior virtue is of utmost importance not only because "ultimate purity requires [and thus justifies] application of ultimate power," but also because "purity as such remains the source of that power—indeed

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CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

687

is ultimate power—because he who possesses it has conquered death” (p. 52).

This discussion of purity (defined as encompassing such factors as self-denial on behalf of a higher cause, the urge to eliminate evil, and ideological singlemindedness) paves the way to a further understanding of the inspirational character of “the thought of Mao,” which is extraordinarily simple and crude when viewed as a disembodied set of intellectual principles. “The thought of Mao,” Lifton writes, “becomes not so much an exact blueprint for the future as a ‘Way,’ a call to a particular mode of being on behalf of a transcendent purpose” (p. 70). During the Cultural Revolution, it “is elevated to an all-consuming prophecy: it nurtures men, predicts their future, and changes the world to accomplish its own prediction; it sets in motion spiritual forces against which nothing can stand” (p. 73). Lifton’s discussion of the cult of Mao is balanced by an appreciation of Mao’s extraordinary role in the Chinese revolution: “No twentieth-century life has come closer than his to the great myth of the hero—with its “road of trials,” or prolonged death encounter, and its mastery of that encounter in a way that enhances the life of one’s people. His message of mastery of death anxiety, reinforced by personal example, took on special relevance for a people living through a period in which such anxiety was continuously mobilized by extreme dislocation, violence, and loss” (p. 78).

Lifton sees Mao as a great man who is dissatisfied with his extraordinary accomplishments and who plunges into realms even he cannot conquer. In trying to do the impossible, he loses confidence in his claim to immortality and turns to despotism. This attempt to do the impossible is related to what Lifton calls psychism—the endeavor “to achieve control over one’s external environment through internal or psychological manipulation, through behavior determined by intrapsychic needs no longer in touch with the actualities of the world one seeks to influence” (p. 32). One form of this psychism particularly prominent during the Great Leap is “the exaggerated reliance upon will and psychic power to achieve technological goals” that leads to self-defeating policies (pp. xv-xvi). Mao fails to learn that “rather than the psychic state replacing technology, technology profoundly modifies the psychic state” (p. 110). The attempt to do the impossible is also related to Mao’s failure to realize that human nature, though highly flexible, does impose limits on how far men’s psychic state can be pushed and how long extreme psychic states can be maintained. One of these limits is “the need for a certain amount of harmony between

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CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

689

the evidence of the senses and socially shared images of self and world" (p. 137). As for the future, Lifton suggests that the psychological and technological limitations to the Maoist approach would be consistent with a pragmatic turn in China.

This brief summary with extensive quotation is intended to bring out the main points and the flavor of a book that, in my opinion, presents a most sophisticated and balanced analysis of Mao and the Cultural Revolution. Lifton is able to do this because he does not merely apply ready-made concepts and theories to China, but evolves his own ideas and generalizations on the basis of them and his knowledge of China. Though especially relevant to China and its recent crisis, these ideas and generalizations deal with the problems of men everywhere and in all times. With Lifton's book, Chinese studies have taken another step toward maturity.

Yet the complexity of the Cultural Revolution obliges us to seek alternative explanations to supplement Lifton's analysis—explanations that are more down-to-earth, lay more stress on the here-and-now, focus more attention on possible structural changes, and gives more prominence to the fact that Mao is groping for a Chinese way to socialism, industrialization, and modernization. One such alternative explanation might emphasize the immediate relevance of the Maoist vision to the contemporary problems of Chinese society, problems that may well reflect universal dilemmas of the human condition and fundamental issues confronting the sociopolitical order in a magnified and easily recognizable form. The Chinese political system prior to the Cultural Revolution can be understood as one of the purest forms in human experience of a type of association in which there is a clear-cut separation between the elite and the masses, a sharp division between domination and subjection. In this perspective, the Maoist vision as it revealed itself in its extreme form during the early phases of the Cultural Revolution can be considered a critique of this type of political organization and, in a certain sense, a critique of all bureaucratized organizations to the extent that they approach the Chinese type. It reflects an attempt to minimize the consequences arising from the division between domination and subjection or from the differential distribution of power. It entails an endeavor to blur the line between domination and subjection, to make the leaders less distinguishable from the led in status and privilege, and to create a new type of relationship between the two groups. It is to be realized by changing the pattern of participation of the dominated in the political process within every single organization, by redefining the role of those in positions of authority, by chang-

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[L]

CHINA'S HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE

691

ing their attitudes and values, and by instituting a system of mutual exchange of roles and mutual penetration among men of different statuses and occupations.

Beyond this, the ideal society in Mao's vision is one in which the absolute validity of its basic values and norms are beyond question, total commitment to societal goals is demanded from the individual, and all powers are employed in repeated efforts to realize his vision. In this totally mobilized society everyone is deeply concerned with public affairs. Every act must be relevant to politics. Every person must actively participate in the political system and processes. It is commonplace to say that Mao's vision has its roots in his experience in conducting guerrilla warfare, which requires total commitment and preoccupation with power to achieve a common objective. But in Mao's view, this vision also contains the proper corrective for an increasingly bureaucratized, modernizing society in which the gap between values and practices widens, idealistic pronouncements become empty rhetoric, commitments to societal goals are weak, and power is used to pursue narrowly defined interests. In the Cultural Revolution, the elevation of the cult of Mao's thought to a new height is meant to be, among other things, a reaffirmation of the societal values and goals. The repeated emphasis on "the three constantly read articles" is intended to bring about total commitment. Power is to be recaptured and used to implement his vision.

The course of the Cultural Revolution can then be interpreted from the structural-functional viewpoint as a process in which Mao's vision and his charisma, artificially refurbished and strengthened, have been employed as instruments to legitimize the revolution and destroy the "opposition" that entrenched itself in the bureaucratized party organization and apparatus. In the process, Mao has immeasurably widened the gap between himself and all other men, whom he tries to make as equal to one another as the circumstances permit. The Maoist vision is impossible to realize. But at least for a brief period, it will bring about changes worthy of examination in the direction of a higher degree of political participation and economic equality, even if the former is merely a wider sharing of the high political risks and the latter nothing more than equality in poverty.¹²

¹² For a fuller discussion of these ideas, see Tang Tsou, "The Cultural Revolution and the Chinese Political System," *China Quarterly*, No. 38 (April-June 1968).

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[L]

F. C. IKLE

August 24, 1969

Here is the promised paper -- a brief effort on a big subject! The treatment, of course, is still uneven. (In view of our other work on Mid East and Vietnam, these two areas may have received better coverage than other "fourth areas.")

Col. Haig arranged a tentative appointment with you next Thursday, 11:00 A.M., for Paul Hammond and R. Levien re your information flow/computer system. I might come along; thus you could then convey to me follow-up needs, if any, on the Sino-Soviet problem.

Fred

[C]

# U.S. OPTIONS IN SINO-SOVIET FIGHTING

## I. Difficulties Specific to this Problem

Conflicting objectives; unpredictability of many contingencies.

## II. U.S.-Soviet Relations vs. U.S.-Chinese Relations Overall

The possibility of preserving good American-Soviet relations vs. the desirability of permitting an improvement in American-Chinese relations.

## III. Alternate Courses of Action Toward the Fighting

### A. Attempt to prevent:

1. Escalation

Deterrence, costs and risks

2. Sino-Soviet rapprochement

Policy toward nuclear excision; toward occupation of territory.

### B. Non-involvement

## IV. Policies Toward Fourth Areas

### A. Vietnam

Supply effects; resumption of bombing; blockade; troop reductions.

### B. Japan

Okinawa; Security Pact; U.S. guarantees; nuclear arms for Japan; trade.

### C. Korea

The U.S. divisions in South Korea.

### D. Middle East

Limited impact.

At the beginning of Soviet preoccupation; during protracted Sino-Soviet fighting; anticipated return of large Soviet presence.

[c]

-2-

# I. DIFFICULTIES SPECIFIC TO THIS PROBLEM

Setting up a plan for consideration of U.S. policy options for the event of Sino-Soviet warfare is impeded by many major uncertainties. Events might occur suddenly that would necessitate a quick U.S. reaction in an entirely unfamiliar situation, and conflicts between objectives may be numerous and sharp.

## A. CONFLICTING OBJECTIVES

* avert the use of nuclear weapons;

* deter a large-scale war that would drag in other nations and/or require an increased U.S. defense budget.

* avoid a Sino-Soviet rapprochement and realliance;

* avoid cost-efficient Soviet domination of China;

* promote some weakening of the Soviet Union and/or of China, if the human and other costs are acceptable;

* try to take advantage of the new situation for improving our relations with China;

* maintain the subjective and objective security of our allies and friends;

* seize an opportunity for hastening the end of the war in Vietnam;

* ease tensions in other conflict areas, if possible;

* avoid risking our own security and prestige in unsuccessful initiatives.

Some of the more obvious conflicts include the possibility that the desire for favorable Soviet action in Vietnam would lead us to accept otherwise undesirable Soviet gains in a Sino-Soviet fight; the possibility that the high value of deterring major Soviet military initiatives by moderate means would conflict with the high cost of discrediting ourselves should such an effort fail; the possible conflict between a short-term interest in preventing accretion of Soviet power now and a long-term interest in inhibiting the growth of Chinese power over the next generation.

[Lc]

-3-

## B. UNPREDICTABLE CONTINGENCIES

Within the planning-time we shall not certainly know whether the level of Sino-Soviet fighting will remain what it has been in recent months (say, at the level of the Damansky affray) or will rise, and at what tempo; whether Soviet intentions include deep penetration of Chinese territory, and if so for a short, long, or indefinite term; whether a quick nonnuclear strike at Chinese nuclear installations is to take place; whether the use of nuclear weapons (against the Chinese nuclear installations and delivery vehicles, at the level of tactical nuclear, or counterforce or countervalue) is resolved upon; whether Peking will make overtures toward the U.S. or show themselves at least ready for closer contact; whether the Chinese Communist government will undergo significant changes of ruling elite; whether there will be a rapprochement between Peking and Taiwan or conversely an attempt by Chinese Nationalist forces to attack in Fukien; and whether in fourth areas (e.g., Middle East) there will be crises whose timing or scope is stimulated by Sino-Soviet preoccupations or felt dangers from the Sino-Soviet conflict.

The straight enumeration of relevant contingencies would rapidly reach unwieldy magnitude if interdependencies were taken into account.

* * * * *

We proceed to discuss a number of options that may be reasonably considered open to the United States, appraising their appropriateness to the objectives assumed. Some costs and benefits are suggested. The treatment is far from exhaustive; but the approach is intended to illustrate what might be done in a more systematic effort.

[C]

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## II. U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS VS. U.S.-CHINESE RELATIONS OVERALL

Should U.S. policy in major Sino-Soviet fighting attempt a long-term improvement in either U.S.-Soviet, or U.S.-Chinese relations, or both?

### Arguments for Protecting Relations with S.U.

(A) If Moscow were to move against Peking, it would do so, after having surmounted protracted intense aversion against such a course, because (a) it would be certain that, say, a decade from now China, if left to herself, would present an extreme danger to the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union over a wide expanse of Asia, (b) it would be convinced that the cost would be sharply reduced by early prevention, (c) it would be evident to Moscow that the U.S. interests affected were of a lower order than the S.U. interests concerned. Hence a U.S. attempt at obstructing a Soviet move against China, far from being intelligible to Moscow as a reaction to a resumption of a Soviet drive to expand, would appear as a reversion of the U.S. to a policy to impair the Soviet Union.

(B) The only country that could destroy the U.S. over the next ten years or so is the Soviet Union. Hence, strategic arms controls and other favorable relations with the Soviets should take precedence over improved relations with China--desirable as the latter might be.

**Note:** We might obtain preferred changes in Soviet policies on fourth areas (Vietnam, SALT, Berlin) in exchange for our abstaining from certain kinds of support of China (rather than in exchange for our giving support to the Soviets, for which their need is probably limited). However, supposing that the price of reducing or eliminating our support of China would be worth paying, it might be difficult to obtain the

[10]

-5-

concessions we would be asking for in return, as Moscow may assign less effect and likelihood than the USG to possible pro-Chinese actions by the U.S.

## Arguments for Permitting Improved Relations with China

We should avoid being hostile or even indifferent to China's plight: if the U.S. were to crown two decades of antagonism by sacrificing its aversion toward aggression to its hostility to China, chances for an improvement in Sino-American relationships in the foreseeable future would be sharply decreased.

## Is It Possible to Protect Good Relations with Both?

Before fighting escalates to Soviet nuclear attack or major Chinese defeat (such as loss of Sinkiang), we might be able to accomplish both purposes to some extent by non-involvement, which would satisfy the (likely) Soviet desire that the U.S. take no sides, and yet avoid overtly taking sides against China. At that stage there would still be enough overlap between what would gratify the Russians and what would not outrage the Chinese. However, when and if the fighting were to go against China, a U.S. policy of non-involvement would increasingly appear as favoring the Soviets.

-6-

### III. ALTERNATE COURSES OF ACTION TOWARD THE FIGHTING

This section examines, for each objective listed, U.S. policies that might serve the objective. Frequently it will be obvious that a certain policy option, if effective for a specific objective, nonetheless would have adverse consequences for other objectives. This aspect is not elaborated here. Further government planning efforts might evaluate the options in the light of all major U.S. objectives.

#### A (1). ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT ESCALATION

It is assumed here that the escalation which the U.S. wishes to deter is primarily that which would be carried out by the Soviet Union, and, above all, escalation by means of nuclear weapons. The two sets of options discussed below relate respectively to the immediate future and to a period after large-scale warfare has begun.

o Option 1: Notify the Soviet Union privately that the extensive deployment of Soviet forces in China threatens to set in motion a train of events that would jeopardize the entire existence of Soviet-American détente, and that, unless adequate credible assurance is received that the escalation will not occur, the U.S. will be obliged to consider reversing the development of the last fifteen years and adopting a military and political posture unfavorable to the Soviet Union.

o Argument for: The leadership in Moscow may be sufficiently divided for the balance to be altered by this factor.

o Argument against: It is true that the probability that the Soviet Union will embark upon major fighting with China may be small, as the Soviet leadership is extremely reluctant to adopt such a course. But for that very reason, the U.S. threat sketched above might be

-7-

[c]

considered in the Politburo as much too minor for
the gravity of the decision at hand (as would have
been the case with regard to the occupation of
Czechoslovakia); all the more as Moscow may discount
the chance that the U.S. would persist in its new
hard stance **after** a successful Soviet attack against
China (and the Soviets are not likely to undertake a
major move against China if predicting that they may
well get bogged down in it). If this U.S. course were
without significant impact, it would underline U.S.
lack of power, or of will to use it.

* Option 2 (more appropriate during a large-scale Sino-Soviet war than before): While not engaging our own forces, we would take actions designed to improve the military posture of one or the other belligerent (without necessarily changing our position towards the side against which we are thus leaning). Alternatively, we would threaten such a course so as to deter. As the Soviet Union would be unlikely to need such support from us, this policy mainly concerns China: (1) sharply reducing Peking's forecast (not easy, as the Chinese would want to rule out a "stratagem" of deception on our part) of an invasion by GRC and ourselves from the off-shore islands and Taiwan, so that Peking could use the forces now deployed for such a contingency against the Soviets; (2) putting funds and materiel (our own and that of Allies stimulated by us) at the CPR's disposal -- support which we would expect that government to accept, regardless of yesterday's bitterness. (At the same time, we could continue relations with the Soviets on other matters, such as SALT -- showing that our actions in both domains are directed toward the same end of world security.)

* Argument for: Moscow was hesitant to move against Peking even while its adversary was isolated; now that the CPR has found in us a semi-ally, it will renounce or desist.

[Lc]

-8-

* Argument against: (a) If Moscow decides upon a major move against China, it is probably also ready to pay a very high price for attaining success and thus unlikely to be deterred from escalating. (b) The emergence of what the Soviet leadership might view as a Sino-American coalition of some duration would enhance the worth to it of whatever reduction of China's power it aims at, and thus make it even more inclined to bear the increment of cost which our support of China imposes on them.

-9-

A (2). ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT SINO-SOVIET RAPPROCHEMENT

o **Option 1: Abstain from opposing the Soviet Union in any decision to eliminate China's nuclear capability.**

o **Arguments for:** In order to maximize the chances for long-term Sino-Soviet enmity we should not obstruct any move that leaves grievances unresolved. If the Soviet Union should destroy China's nuclear capability, the Chinese hostility to the Soviet Union might well continue for decades, tending to offset Soviet power in fourth areas.

o **Arguments against:** A China without nuclear capability might think it essential to make it up with the Soviet Union, instead of staying hostile to both SU and U.S. or seeking U.S. protection. Also, a successful Soviet nuclear attack might lead to political changes in China favorable to SU.

o **Option 2: Do not oppose the Soviet Union in any effort to dominate part of Chinese territory.**

o **Argument for:** As under Option 1.

o **Arguments against:** China might believe that (without Chinese victory in a new war) her best hope of recovering control of lost territory lies in good relations with the S.U. Second, a Soviet occupation might extend to so large a part of Chinese territory as to be vulnerable to the same objections as the U.S. would have toward Soviet domination of China as a whole. Third, Soviet domination in Sinkiang and especially Tibet might extend Soviet influence over India and jeopardize India's West-leaning non-alignment.

o **Option 3: Depending on the course of the Sino-Soviet fighting, give limited U.S. support to that side that is getting the worst of it.**

o **Argument for:** The continuation of the Sino-Soviet conflict is the clearest, most effective, and--below some threshold

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of nuclear involvement or very large-scale conventional war--
the safest way of ensuring against a Sino-Soviet rapprochement
that would threaten U.S. interests elsewhere. To enhance the
probability of a continuing conflict we should keep our declar-
atory position flexible enough to enable us, at low political
cost, to come to the support of the weaker side, e.g. by:

(i) support for appeals to a cease-fire in the UN or
elsewhere (which we could not expect to succeed);

(ii) pressure on GRC to stay well away from the main-
land conflict, even to the point of freeing CPR
forces in Fukien by withdrawing the bulk of GRC
troops from Quemoy and Matsu.

Thus -- on the assumption that the aggressor and the
stronger side are the same -- some of the actions that the
U.S. might take to deter escalation are also actions that
the U.S. might take to keep the conflict going.

[C]

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B. NON-INVOLVEMENT

Non-involvement means here that the USG refrains from trying to dampen,
mediate or otherwise affect the fighting and meticulously seeks to give an
appearance of impartiality. It would deplore the bloodshed, reiterate that
it does not seek to exploit the fight, and in the event of UN action ini-
tiated by other governments follow the UN majority.

o Arguments for: The effect of any U.S. attempt to influence the fighting is highly uncertain and might even be negative (see above arguments against possible U.S. actions). Once involved, U.S. might find it difficult to extricate itself. Even U.S. actions which are manifestly impartial might easily be of major advantage to one of the belligerents. Also, the belligerents might react differently to impartial suggestions and thus force the U.S. towards partiality.

* Arguments against: The U.S. would stand to lose in influence and prestige as a world-power if it simply abstained. U.S. abstention might embolden the Soviet Government to step up the fighting so as to defeat Mao's China completely (as a result of which the global power balance would become more polarized again with increased Soviet threat in Asia and Europe).

Whatever the merits of non-involvement as a means of preventing deterioration of U.S. relations with either combatant at relatively low levels of fighting, the higher the level of the fighting the more asymmetrically pro-Soviet the policy will appear to Peking. Moreover, even at lower levels, non-involvement might heighten Peking's tendency to see the U.S. as in collusion with the Soviet Union and thus tend to perpetuate China's hostility toward U.S.

For further arguments against non-involvement see arguments above (pp. 6-10) in favor of U.S. initiatives.

IV. POLICIES TOWARDS FOURTH AREAS

A. VIETNAM

Option (1): Resume, or threaten to resume, bombing in the North, while stepping up U.S. ground fighting.

o Argument for: Reduction in supplies from (especially) the SU increases the probability that bombing would degrade NVA performance in the South significantly; while at the same time the North Vietnamese air defense system could be rapidly depleted.

o Arguments against: Hanoi would predict that domestic opposition in the U.S. would prevent the new bombing campaign from being both high-level (much higher than in 1965/67) and protracted, thus permitting it to maintain the required level of fighting with existing stockpiles. Having successfully resisted the pressure of our first air campaign, Hanoi would be particularly loath to succumb to the next one, undertaken at a time when U.S. domestic resolve on Vietnam seems weakened.

Resumption of bombing in the North might be construed by CPR -- at a time when the Chinese are highly suspicious of Soviet-U.S. collusion -- as a signal of U.S. intention or readiness to attack China, and thus lead Peking to yield to and make up with Moscow. Conversely, both Hanoi and Peking might, separately and perhaps together, see U.S. escalation as complement of Russian attack on China, thereby increasing united in-transigence of both Asian nations against perceived white aggressions. Also, the bombing resumption would make it harder for U.S. to exploit Sino-Soviet fighting politically, should it wish to do so.

Option (2): Impose, or threaten to impose, a blockade on delivery of supplies to NVN by sea.

o Argument for: The reduction in deliveries overland, as a result of Sino-Soviet fighting, affords an opportunity, by imposing

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[L]

a sea blockade at the same time, to worsen NVN supply situation suddenly and hard.

* Arguments against: NVN reserves of supplies suffice for months at present levels of depletion. Blockade runs risks of diplomatic difficulty with third powers, possibly disproportionate exacerbation of Soviet-American relations, and legal objections.

### Options (1) and (2) could be combined.

### Option (3): Maintain present level of U.S. effort and present strategy.

* Arguments for: The likely effect of Sino-Soviet fighting is a reduction in Hanoi's supplies and morale. The thoroughly considered present U.S. strategy on Vietnam offered a prospect of favorable outcome even in the absence of that contingency. The new events should only increase our confidence but not make us alter the strategy.

* Arguments against: Without U.S. escalation (stepped up ground fighting plus bombing in North plus perhaps sea blockade), NVA will sustain required level of fighting using their reserves and counting on full-scale resumption of Soviet deliveries after brief curtailment. By simply maintaining present U.S. strategy and negotiating policy, the U.S. will miss a major new opportunity for terminating war in Vietnam.

### Option (4): Accelerated U.S. troop reductions.

* Arguments for: The apparent improvement in the local balance of forces between GVN and the enemy and the reduction in NVA supplies would make U.S. forces less needed and also permit us to make a better case for rapid Vietnamization. And the decreased likelihood of Chinese Communist expansion in Southeast Asia will make Vietnam less important, while, at

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the same time, the Sino-Soviet fight could lead to a new and
more dangerous world in which our hands must be freer for
crises and opportunities elsewhere.

*   Arguments against: GVN's morale and determination are labile, and (after a brief interval of unrealistically high hopes) U.S. curtailment in response to the Sino-Soviet fight might hurt GVN more than Hanoi's curtailed supplies would help GVN. Sino-Soviet fighting affords the U.S. an opportunity to pursue more vigorously the objective of obtaining a quick negotiated settlement of the war in Vietnam.

For Options (1) through (4).

Any of the above options, particularly the _threat_ of air strikes
and sea blockade, could be combined with _new inducements_ to
Hanoi in an attempt to obtain a negotiated settlement. (A
possible new inducement would be an offer for a cease-fire
combined with provisions for some local autonomy in VC-held
areas.)

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B. JAPAN

Okinawa.

o Option (1): Exploit heightened Japanese apprehension of danger from the mainland by (a) pressing for a delay in the reduction of the bases to "homeland status," (b) pressing for advance agreement of the Japanese to free deployment of U.S. forces in a number of anticipated contingencies (e.g., certain events in Korea).

o Option (2): Express our willingness to surrender promptly our special base rights, hoping for political advantage from the anti-"imperialistic" concession and liquidation of a World War II vestige which should leave the way open for a later Japanese request to return.

Security Pact.

o Option (1): Press the Japanese for agreement to a long-term renewal, broader field of applicability.

o Option (2): Keep flexibility of short-term renewal, and hope that the initiative for closer links will come from the Japanese side under the influence of the new Sino-Soviet situation.

Note: It may be worth considering whether a "unified" position should be developed which would select Option (1) on both Okinawa and the security pact, or Option (2) on both; it may be that the political cost of keeping up the pressure on both is not much greater than the cost of pressing on one only, or that the military risk of waiting for Japanese invitation on both is not much greater than that of waiting for Japanese invitation on one only.

Similar interdependencies may apply within the following set of issues as well:

[L]

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Japanese demand for higher U.S. guarantees.

o Option (1): Reject unconditionally.

o Option (2): Accept unconditionally.

o Option (3): Accept on terms, e.g., on condition that the Japanese accede to the U.S. position on other issues, such as nuclear arms for Japan.

o Nuclear Arms for Japan.

o Option (1): Press for Japanese adherence to NPT.

o Option (2): With or without (1) -- attempt to slow down or halt the trend by threatening withdrawal of the nuclear umbrella, insisting on joint nuclear arrangements, offering compensation for the retention of non-nuclear status through technological assistance.

o Option (3): Abstain from pressing.

o One should also consider the possibility of Soviet concessions to Japan on the contested northern islands.

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C. KOREA

o Option: Withdraw one or both of the United States divisions now commited in South Korea.

o Arguments for: North Korea depends largely on the Soviet Union for supplies of more advanced military equipment. Prolonged Sino-Soviet conflict, even if minor, will tend to create uncertainty in Pyongyang about the resource-base for its stance toward South Korea. The U.S. could envisage a Korean settlement in an environment temporarily favoring the non-Communist side. North Korean aggressiveness would be so curbed as a result of the curtailment of Soviet and Chinese support that the U.S. divisions could safely be withdrawn from South Korea; this would free some U.S. resources for other uses and might even contribute to a relaxation of North-South tension in Korea.

o Arguments against: Soviet preoccupation in China need not lessen the availability of Soviet supplies to North Korea. Her geographical position may induce the Soviet Union and China, far from neglecting North Korea, to increase competitively their military, economic, and diplomatic aid. The U.S. military presence serves also as some deterrent to possible South Korean offensives. If the U.S. attaches high importance to the terms on which a Korean settlement might take place, it would be imprudent to withdraw the U.S. divisions before the settlement is achieved.

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D. MIDDLE EAST

The impact of <u>Soviet involvement</u> in China may be important for local actors in the Middle East; the impact on U.S. options in that area does not seem great. It is useful to group them under three phases out of the many that could be assumed for events in the Sino-Soviet theater:

(a) The Russians have just become engaged on the Chinese front and their preoccupation looks as though it may last for some time.

(b) The Russians are locked into continuous, or protracted intermittent, hostilities with China.

(c) The Sino-Soviet war is about to come to an end with (here assumed) some outcome other than a Soviet defeat.

(Implications of Soviet use of nuclear weapons are not considered here but are treated in Section III above.)

First phase: the beginning of serious Soviet military preoccupation in China.

o Option 1: Press Egypt to indicate acceptance of a peace settlement with Israel under which Israel would withdraw from territory gained in the West in June 1967 and Egypt would agree to recognition and some demilitarization.

o Argument for: The Soviet Union may be expected to attenuate such involvement with peripheral clients as: (i) readiness to intervene in a renewed intensive war, (ii) deployments of Soviet naval/technical/ paratroop forces, (iii) new economic and military aid, (iv) timely performance of existing agreements. The prospective reduction of the Soviet threat may embolden Israel to seek still further gains (doing to Egypt what the Soviet Union might do to China) unless a secure settlement is reached soon: Israel's purpose in that event

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[L]

would be to discourage Egyptian *revanche* or to strengthen
Israel's defensive position as by controlling both banks
of the Suez Canal. Egypt stands in a greater danger than
other Arab states do of an Israeli exploitation of Soviet
preoccupation elsewhere.

* Argument against: Israel is content with the local *status quo* so far as possession of territory goes; Soviet pre-occupation in China would not increase Israeli disposition to go onto a new offensive, which is far more sensitive to other factors. Besides, Soviet supplies of surplus, obsolescent military equipment may be adequate to permit continued deliveries to Egypt for some time.

o Option 2: Press Jordan to make a separate settlement with Israel.

* Arguments: Most of the arguments advanced for and against under Option 1 apply here. In particular, Israeli hopes of a disintegration in the Arab camp may be raised by Soviet preoccupation in China, and may lead the Israelis to try to accelerate the process by splitting off the least implacable enemy, Jordan. To this end Israel may be disposed to offer more than before in the way of concessions on (e.g.) the West Bank and refugee issues; the combination of Israeli offers and U.S. pressure may be enough.

## Second phase: Protracted Sino-Soviet fighting

o Options 1 and 2 would still be available; the impact on (respectively) Egypt and Jordan would presumably be greater than in the first phase and might make the Egyptians or Jordanians somewhat more disposed than in the first phase to accept a settlement, or at least equally disposed to accept what now might be a more adverse settlement than they could have got in the first phase.

o Option 3: Seek openings by diplomatic and economic means for a re-assertion of U.S. influence in the radical Arab states.

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* **Argument for:** As Sino-Soviet fighting continues, Soviet influence and prestige in the Middle East will wane because (a) Soviet interest, aid, "presence" will visibly diminish, (b) radical Arab elites will be repelled by Soviet repression against a developing "socialist" state. Inter-Arab cohesion, dependent in good part on Soviet aid and encouragement, will come apart. The time will be ripe for the United States - especially if the United States is seen abroad as leaning toward China's side - to re-establish a moderating influence in Middle Eastern affairs.

* **Argument against:** Soviet arms deliveries may not stop (see under Option 1 above). Soviet success against China may well impress Arab states as even more compelling than it is distasteful.

**Third phase: Anticipated return of Soviet interest, resources, and influence.**

* **Option 4:** Press Israel to settle for peace with evacuation of the territories gained in June 1967 and offer a guarantee of support against further Arab incursion.

* **Argument for:** An impressive Soviet victory in China would dispose the Israelis to greater caution for fear of the expansiveness of Soviet intentions and their readiness to deploy large resources. Even a Soviet success of smaller dimensions than a triumph would tend to produce the same effect. That part of Arab strength which is derivative from Soviet support would appear to have increased. The U.S. would then need to exert its diplomatic influence more insistently in a pro-Arab direction in order to salvage the prospects of improving its relations with, and protecting its interests in, the newly emboldened Arab states. A quick return to the *status quo ante*

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[lc]

June 1967 would be the only way to avert an Arab war of revenge that might cripple or destroy Israel.

*   **Argument against:** This option (to be applied at the third phase assumed here) need not be considered till that time is about to arrive. Soviet victory in China may be accompanied by other events that offset its prestige- or compellence-effect in other arenas including the Middle East. Soviet interest in the Middle East may not revive to the level it reached in 1967-68. Pro-Chinese radical elements in some Arab states may pull their countries away from dependence on Soviet supplies of military goods and services. To translate Soviet strength into Egyptian/Syrian, etc., strength *versus* Israel is not an easy task, for endogenous factors would continue to weigh heavily in Arab-Israeli military confrontation.

GILBERT
RADIANCE BOND
75% COTTON

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[c]

E. GENERAL

Many fourth countries will react to enlarged Sino-Soviet fighting with alarmed appeals to the U.S. for increased protection and guarantees against a danger that will seem to have risen sharply. The use of nuclear weapons, in particular, even if "only" to take out Chinese nuclear capability, will tend not merely to dissuade non-nuclear powers from exposing themselves to a Chinese fate but also to seek shelter against Soviet political-military compellence. The more the USG is unable to satisfy this demand, the greater will be the disposition to seek an alternate security by a stance similar to Finland's.

In this context, reactions in India require special attention, in view of Indian hostility towards China and the possibility that the Soviets might cut off Tibet from Chinese military control.

Taiwan

[The possible relationships of Taiwan and the GRC to a Sino-Soviet war requires more attention than has been given in this draft.]