FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

CARE OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OR

1908 G ST., N.W., WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

TELEPHONE: NATIONAL 8-4104

January 28, 1957

My dear Mr. Kissinger:

We would like to reprint Part V- the conclusion of your most interesting article, "Reflections on American Diplomacy", which appeared in the October 1956 issue of *Foreign Affairs*. Unfortunately, lack of space prevents our using the entire article.

We have re-titled this excerpt, "The Problem of Leadership." Will you please let us know whether you concur in the new title and if we have your permission to use the material?

Thank you for your consideration in this matter.

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Foreign Affairs
58 East 68th Street
New York, N.Y.

Rockefeller Brothers Fund

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York 20, New York

Nelson A. Rockefeller
President

Henry A. Kissinger
Director of Special Studies
22 West 55th Street
New York 19, New York

April 4, 1957

Dear Henry:

I must write you at least a brief note on your lead article in the current issue of *Foreign Affairs*; for this is not only a brilliantly original analysis, but one which takes all of us a lot closer to a coherent strategic concept.

You have in great part said what some of us, with less time and a good deal less perception, have been trying to say; and you have certainly provided a beacon light for the members of Subpanel II.

Not the least impressive proposal in your article concerns the realignment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I should like very much to pursue the implications of this with you, as it relates directly to one of the basic problems facing Subpanel II which has not been faced seriously as yet.

CONTROLS, INSPECTION AND LIMITED WAR

By Henry A. Kissinger

The remarkable aspect of the nuclear age is the separation it
has brought between strategy and diplomacy. The goal of strategy
is thought to be victory in war, that of diplomacy peace and each is
thought to begin where the other ends.

The result has been a penchant for absolute solutions. In
strategy, its manifestation has been our theory of deterrence which
identifies deterrence with the threat of maximum destruction, In diplomacy,
its symptom has been the quest for total peace of which our approach to
disarmament negotiations is the most notable example. During the same
month that Great Britain pressed the implications of our own strategic
doctrine to their most rigorous conclusion and staked its security on
the threat of national suicide, the major powers negotiated about disarma-
ment as if the perils of the nuclear age could be avoided at one fell swoop
by a diplomatic instrument.

It is not that the elimination of the danger of war by reducing the
level of armaments and the danger of surprise attack is not a desirable
goal; it is rather that it addresses itself to the most intractable and
the most unusual problem: intractable because disarmament negotiations
as heretofore conceived force the major powers to stake their survival

-2-

on the observance of agreements in an international order in which the breach of agreements has become commonplace and unreal because surprise attack while it carries with it the most severe penalties is in fact the least likely threat. From Korea, to Indo-China, to the Middle East the real security problem has proved to be the Communist strategy of ambiguity designed to multiply the hesitations and doubts of its opponents and graduating its challenges to a point well below that which is likely to provoke a final show-down.

Instead of bridging the gap between strategy and diplomacy the current emphasis of disarmament negotiations therefore reinforces it. By leaving no middle ground between total war and total peace both our strategic doctrine and our approach to disarmament prevent the attainment of a less diametrically but perhaps more realizable objective: the establishment of a frame-work, both military and diplomatic, which would cause war, if it does come, to take less absolute forms and which might spare humanity, if not nuclear conflict, at least the worst horrors of it.

The possibility of war does not even have to assume bad faith on the part of the major protagonists. The revolution taking place in so many parts of the globe will provide its own impetus; it will create its own tensions not necessarily sought by any of the major Powers.

-3-

The conflict over the Suez Canal was hardly foreseen by the Western Powers and perhaps not even by the Soviet Union. And the Hungarian revolution came as a rude shock to the Kremlin. Both upheavals resulted in military action which with the prevailing strategic doctrines might easily have spread to become all-out. And similar Soviet moves in East Germany or Poland would be fraught with even more serious danger.

The absence of any generally understood limits to war undermines the psychological framework of resistance to Soviet moves. Where war is considered tantamount to national suicide, surrender may appear the lesser of two evils. A gap is thus opened between the quest for total peace and the military doctrine of total war within which the Soviet leadership can operate with relative impunity. Both strategy and diplomacy should therefore seek to pose less absolute alternatives: the farmer by developing a doctrine for limited war, the latter by using disarmament negotiations to obtain an understanding of it by other powers.

Kissinger - 4.

II

The gap between strategy and diplomacy cannot be bridged by dis-
armament negotiations as heretofore conceived. For the always difficult
task of disarmament negotiations is made virtually impossible by the in-
stability and complexity of weapons technology, which has made it difficult
to agree either on reduction of forces or on control over the development
of new weapons.

A reduction of forces is difficult to negotiate because it seeks to
compare incommensurables: what, for example, is the relation between the
Soviet ability to overrun Eurasia and American air and sea power? If the
United States weakened its Strategic Air Command it would be years before
it could be reconstituted. If the Soviets should reduce their ground forces
the strategic impact would be much less and they could be reassembled in
a matter of weeks. Even a substantial reduction of Soviet forces would
not eliminate the availability of large reserves of trained and rapidly
mobilizable manpower.

Even should a scale of comparison of different weapons systems be
negotiable among Powers which have been unable to agree on much less
complicated issues, it would still not remove the real security problems:
the rapid rate of change of modern technology. Disarmament plans of the
past were based on the assumption of a relatively stable weapons technology.
Once the proposed reduction of forces was implemented, strategic relationship

[Y]

Kissinger - 5.

would remain constant. But under present conditions the real armaments race is in the laboratories. No reduction of forces, however scrupulously carried out, could protect the Powers against a technological breakthrough. Even were strategic striking forces kept at fixed levels and rigidly controlled, an advance in air-defense sufficient to contain the opposing retaliatory force would upset the strategic balance completely.

The rate of technological change, in fact, has outstripped the pace of diplomatic negotiations. Because stockpiles have usually accumulated before negotiators could agree on the nature of their problem, efforts to control the development of new weapons have proved futile. Since each scientific advance opens the way to innumerable others, it is next to impossible to define a meaningful point at which to "cut off" weapons developments. At the beginning of the atomic age, a strict inspection system might have succeeded in stopping the elaboration of nuclear weapons. By 1952, it might still have been possible to "control" the development of thermonuclear weapons, albeit with great difficulty. For the hydrogen bomb developed so naturally out of research and production of nuclear weapons that a foolproof inspection system would have been infinitely complicated. In any case, by 1957, the production of thermonuclear devices had so far outstripped any possible control machinery that the emphasis of disarmament negotiations turned from eliminating stockpiles of thermonuclear weapons to methods of restraining their use.

Kissinger - 6.

Moreover, once a weapon is developed, the next stage is to elaborate its applications until ever wider realms of strategy become dependent on it. A nation may be willing to forego the offensive use of nuclear weapons, but it will be most reluctant to give up its defensive applications, as in anti-aircraft or anti-missile weapons. But in advanced stages of elaboration, weapons often find a dual purpose: the launching site for anti-aircraft missiles can be used as well for attacking ground targets; a nuclear weapon launched from a plane against enemy bombers will be equally useful against supply centers. In short, weapons can be kept from being added to stockpiles only at their inception when their implications are least understood. By the time their potential is realized, the possibility of preventing their addition to existing arsenals by means of inspection or control will have disappeared. Thus if missiles are to be controlled, it will have to be within the next two years before they go into mass production.

### III

The difficulty of developing meaningful control machinery to end the production and development of new weapons has caused most disarmament negotiations since 1955 to concern themselves with means to prevent surprise attack. It is argued that since one of the causes for present tensions is the insecurity produced by the fear of imminent catastrophe, an inspection system which reduced the danger of surprise attack would

an inspection system which reduced the danger of an umbrella attack would
 PENETRATION
 tensions is the insecurity produced by the fear of imminent catastrophe,
 umbrella attack. It is argued that since one of the causes for present
 the production and development of new weapons has caused most dissemination
 the difficulty of developing meaningful control machinery to end

III

be within the next two years before they do into mass production.

have disabilled. Thus it misiles are to be controlled, it will have to
ing their addition to existing arsenals by means of inspection or control will
understood. By the time their potential is realized, the possibility of prevent-
added to stockpiles only at their inception when their implications are least
nauseous against supply centers. In short, weapons can be kept from being
nuclear weapon launched from a plane against enemy bombers will be equally
anti-aircraft missiles can be used as well for attacking around targets; a
of elasporation, weapons often find a dual purpose: the launching site for
cations, as in anti-aircraft or anti-missile weapons. But in advanced stages
nuclear weapons, but it will be most relevant to give up its defensive abili-
pendent on it. A nation may be willing to forego the offensive use of
elasporate its applications until ever wider resums of strategy become de-

Klaasberg - c.

Kissinger - 7.

also remove some of the urgency from international relationships. This
was the reasoning behind President Eisenhower's proposal at the Geneva
summit conference to exchange military blueprints with the Soviet Union
and to permit aerial reconnaissance of each other's territories. The princi-
ple that inspection may prevent surprise attack has been accepted in the
Soviet counterproposal for stationing ground observers at strategic points
in the territory of the other nation and in the recent offer to open part of
Soviet territory to aerial inspection.

It cannot be denied that the danger of surprise attack contributes to
the tensions of the nuclear age even if it does not cause them. It is less
clear, however, that uncertainty about the opponents's intentions would be
significantly reduced by aerial inspection; or that the inspection schemes,
if implemented, would add a great deal to existing warning methods and
intelligence information. Because a strategic striking force cannot afford
to be caught on the ground, it must be prepared to attack from its training
bases at a moment's notice. If properly prepared, it should require no
noticeable mobilization to launch its blow. An enemy should not be able to
tell whether a given flight is a training mission or a surprise attack until
his early warning line is crossed.

To be sure, the Soviet Long Range Air Force has not yet reached
this stage of readiness. Because it probably does not possess a capability

Kissinger - 8.

for aerial refueling, it would have to transfer its planes to advance bases on the Kola or Chukotski peninsulas before it could attack. A system of inspection would inform us of this move and it might therefore increase our warning time. Nevertheless, the gain would be only a relative one, because any substantial movement of the Soviet Long Range Air Force to advance bases could hardly escape high altitude detection or general intelligence surveillance even in the absence of inspection. And the next family of Soviet planes will be able to launch an attack on the United States from training bases.

Because of the greater range of our planes and the nature of our base system, the Soviet Union would gain very little either from ground inspection or from aerial surveillance. It knows the location of most of our air bases and, since it will presumably strike the first blow in an all-out war, it is assured of maximum warning in any case. It can be argued, of course, that the U.S.S.R. may not evaluate the danger of a United States surprise attack so low and that it would therefore gain added security from an inspection system. But unless most planes are grounded all the time and both sides are certain that no substantial installations are hidden, there is no guarantee that planes on so-called training flights will not be used for surprise attack. Even filing flight plans in advance will not eliminate this danger. Given the speed of modern planes, by the time inspectors realize that a violation

the speed of modern planes, by the time in advance realize that a violation
even filing flight plans in advance will not eliminate this danger. Given
that planes on so-called training flights will not be used for air袭 attack.
are certain that no sup potential installations are hidden, there is no sus
system. But unless most planes are grounded all the time and both sides
so low and that it would therefore gain added security from an inspection
so low and that it would therefore gain added security from an inspection
the U.S.A.R. may not evaluate the danger of a United States air袭 attack
assumed of maximum warning in any case. It can be assumed, of course, that
and, since it will presumably strike the that blow in an all-out war, it is
or from aerial surveillance. It knows the location of most of our air planes
system, the Soviet Union would gain very little either from ground inspection
Because of the greater range of our planes and the nature of our plane
training planes.

Soviet planes will be able to launch an attack on the United States from
surveillance even in the absence of inspection. And the next family of
planes could hardly escape high altitude detection at general intelligence
any sup potential movement of the Soviet Long Range Air Force to advance
warning time. Nevertheless, the planes would be only a relative one, because
inspection would inform us of this move and it might therefore increase our
on the Kole or Chukotak peninsulas before it could attack. A system of
for aerial refueling, it would have to transfer its planes to advance planes

Klassiger - 8.

[x]

[Y]

Kissinger - 9.

of a flight plan has occurred and can communicate this information to their home government, the planes will probably have reached the opposing early warning lines in any case. Moreover, if flight plans are cleverly arranged - and every incentive would seem to exist for doing this - it will be very difficult to discover whether a given flight is a move to advance bases or a prelude to an all-out attack.

Inspection could, of course, be coupled with the grounding of all planes, except perhaps a very small number insufficient to inflict a catastrophic blow. Such a course would be highly dangerous, however. It would be difficult to maintain the readiness or the morale of the retaliatory force without constant training. Since our strategy is more dependent on its strategic striking forces than that of the Soviet Union, the grounding of all planes will work to the advantage of the other side. Even should we develop a capability for limited war equal to that of the Soviet Union, the grounding of our strategic air force would stand to benefit our opponent. It would tell him the precise deployment of our retaliatory force and enable him to concentrate his attack and his defenses against it. To be sure, we would have the same information about the Soviet Long Range Air Force. But it would be much less useful to us. Since we concede the first blow, information about the deployment of the Soviet Long Range Air Force will not help a great deal; the Soviet bomber force presumably will have left its bases by the time we become aware that an attack is imminent.

[Y]

Kissinger - 10.

The maximum warning achievable by even a perfect inspection
system is the interval between the time planes leave their bases and when
they would have been detected by existing warning systems. With the
present family of airplanes this would amount to perhaps three hours for
the state which is being attacked. The aggressor would gain no additional
warning time from an inspection system because he would, in any case,
alert his defenses before mounting his blow. To be sure, three hours is
not negligible. But since the victim of aggression cannot be certain what
the apparent violation of inspection means he may have difficulty utilizing
the additional warning effectively. He will be tempted to delay his counter-
blow until the aggressor crosses the early warning line, which is precisely
the situation today.

Moreover, as the speed of planes increases, the warning time
afforded by even a perfect inspection system, correctly interpreted, will
be progressively reduced. In the age of the Intercontinental Ballistic
Missile - in less than ten years - the maximum warning time possible,
assuming perfect communication between the inspector and the home govern-
ment, would be thirty minutes: the period of time the missile would be in
transit. In the age of the missile and the supersonic bomber, even a
foolproof inspection system will tell the Powers only what they already know:
that the opponent possesses the capability of launching a devastating
attack at a moment's notice and with a minimum of warning.

that the opponent passes the capability of launching a devastating
tocopherol inspection system will tell the Powers only what they already know:

*In the age of the missile and the aerobatic bomber*, even a
*mistle* - in less than ten years - the maximum warning time possible,
*be progressively reduced*. In the age of the intercontinental ballistic
*afforded by even a perfect inspection system*, correctly interpreted, will
*Moreover*, as the speed of planes increases, the warning time
*the situation today*.

blow until the agorassor crosses the early warning line, which is precisely
the additional violation of inspection means he may have difficulty utilizing
not negligible. But since the victim of aggression cannot be certain what
*start his defenses before mounting his blow*. To be sure, three hours is
warning time from an inspection system because he would, in any case,
the state which is being attacked. The agorassor would gain no additional
breast family of planes this would amount to perhaps three hours for
they would have been detected by existing warning systems. With the
system is the interval between the time planes leave their bases and when
The maximum warning achievable by even a perfect inspection

Kleisinger - 10.

4

Kissinger - 11.

The extreme readiness of the forces-in-being also reduces the use of aerial reconnaissance. Since flying time from the interior of the U.S.S.R. to our early warning line is about three hours with the present family of airplanes, each base of the Soviet Long Range Air Force would have to be photographed at least every three hours. If the reconnaissance occurred at longer intervals, the Early Warning Line would provide a better indication of a surprise attack because an attack launched immediately after an aerial inspection would reach the Early Warning Line before the next reconnaissance sortie discovered that the opposing force had left its base. As the speed of planes increases, the frequency of reconnaissance missions would also have to be increased so that in practice reconnaissance planes would probably have to hover over enemy airfields almost constantly. And in the missile age aerial reconnaissance would be fortunate if it could discover launching sites; it would not be able to warn of impending attack.

It is therefore difficult to imagine that present vigilance could be reduced or that insecurity would be removed by an inspection system now in prospect. The machinery required would be so formidable and the benefits relatively so trivial or uncertain that an inspection system may actually have pernicious consequences. It may give a misleading impression of security and therefore tempt us into relaxing our preparedness. More likely, however, it would induce both sides to place their striking forces

Kissingor - 12.

into an even greater state of readiness in order to compensate for the loss
of secrecy by a demonstration of power.

Indeed, unless designed with extraordinary care, a system of
inspection may well make a tense situation more difficult. The value of
inspection depends not only on the collection but also on the interpretation
of the facts. But the information produced by inspection systems is
inevitably fragmentary and is likely to be most difficult to obtain when it
is most needed: when international tensions are at their height. On the
other hand, the only meaningful reaction to a seeming violation is to launch
an immediate retaliatory attack because protests could not begin to be
effective before enemy planes had reached their target. The knowledge
that all-out war is the sanction for seeming violations may well add to
the tenseness of international relations. Instead of reducing the danger of
thermonuclear conflict, an inspection system may make an all-out war
based on a misunderstanding of the apparent intentions more likely. From
the point of view of preventing an all-out war, ignorance may be preferable
to partial knowledge. Disarmament negotiations, as heretofore conceived,
may therefore cause war - if it does come - to take the most absolute
form. In their quest for total solutions they may prevent the achievement
of intermediary goals which are attainable.

Kissinger - 13.

IV

One such attainable goal is to mitigate the horrors of war. One of the most important tasks of disarmament negotiations should therefore be to establish a common understanding of the possibilities and mutual advantages of limiting warfare. There has been a shrinking away from this effort, as if the admission that war may occur could itself be a factor in bringing it one, or perhaps because of lack of clarity about the possibilities of war limitation in the nuclear age.

A program to mitigate the horrors of war would help overcome the impasse in which we find ourselves paralyzed by the implications of our deterrent strategy. It would have the advantage of focussing thinking on things to accomplish rather than those which should not be done. It would relate disarmament to strategy and thus help to bridge the gap between force and diplomacy. It would overcome a situation in which the Soviet leaders can conduct atomic blackmail in the guise of disarmament negotiations and transform conferences into a fertile ground for paralyzing the will to resist by evoking the most fearful consequences of such a course.

Above all, a program to mitigate the horrors of war could be used to clarify insofar as diplomacy is able, the intentions of the opposing sides and thereby prevent the catastrophe of an all-out war caused by miscalculation. Even a unilateral declaration of what we understand by limited war

Kissinger - 14.

would accomplish a great deal because it would provide a strong incentive to the Soviet Union to adopt a similar interpretation. Finally, given the likelihood that any war which involves the two major blocs will be nuclear even if it should not be all-out, it will be imperative to establish in advance the psychological and political framework of such a conflict. Under present conditions, the sudden introduction of nuclear weapons in a war might have devastating effects on world opinion or it might unleash an all-out war.

It has been argued that the deliberate ambiguity of our present position, which refuses to define what we understand by limited war, or under what circumstances we might fight it, is in itself a deterrent because the enemy can never be certain that military action on his part may not unleash all-out war. But if we wish to pose the maximum deterrent, an explicit declaration of massive retaliation would seem by far more advantageous. The purpose of our ambiguity is to combine the advantage of two incompatible courses: to pose the threat of all-out war for purposes of deterrence, but to keep open the possibility of a less catastrophic strategy should deterrence fail. Ambiguity, however, may have precisely the contrary effect; it may give rise to the notion that we do not intend to resist at all and thus encourage aggression. Or it may cause an aggressor to interpret resistance which we intend to localize as a prelude to an all-out war.

Instead of strengthening the deterrent and giving scope for a non-catastrophic strategy, the deliberate ambiguity of our position may weaken the deterrent and bring on the most catastrophic kind of war.

Kissinger - 15.

Moreover, a diplomatic program designed to convey our understanding of the nature of limited war may be important because it is not certain that the Soviet leaders have fully analyzed all the options of the nuclear period. Marshall Zhukov and other Soviet leaders have denied the possibility of limited nuclear war both at the Twentieth Party Congress and afterwards. If this represents their real conviction and not simply a form of psychological warfare, an energetic diplomacy addressed to the problem of war limitation might stimulate some second thoughts on the part of the Soviet general staff. In these terms one diplomacy may have to substitute for lack of imagination on the part of Soviet leadership.

Before we can convey our notion of war-limitation to the other side, however, we have to admit its possibility to ourselves and we have to be clear in our own mind about its nature. At present no such clarity exists either among our military or among our political leaders. Our services are operating on the basis of partially overlapping, partly inconsistent doctrines, some of which deny the possibility of limited war while others define it so variously that even from a strictly military point of view we can hardly be said to be able to conduct limited war either physically or conceptually.

- 16 -

If our military staffs could become clear about a doctrine of limited war, we could then use disarmament negotiations to seek some acceptance of it by the other side. It would not be necessary that such a concept be embodied in an international treaty or even that the Soviets formally adhere to it. There should be no illusions, in fact, about the ease with which the Soviets might be induced to forego the advantages of atomic blackmail. The primary purpose of such a program would be to convey our intentions to the Soviet bloc and to encourage it likewise to consider a limitation of war in its own self-interest.

Limited war should not be conceived as a cheaper substitute for massive retaliation. On the contrary, with a doctrine of limited war, many of the long cherished notions of strategy will have to be modified or abandoned. One of the cardinal principles of air strategy is that wars can be won only by dominating the air space completely. But any attempt to deprive an enemy of his retaliatory force would inevitably bring on all-out war, because a major Power without a retaliatory force is at the mercy of its opponent. Even control of the air over the combat zone will be difficult to achieve. As the range of planes increases, the doctrine of complete air superiority would require deep penetrations of enemy territory. But a deep penetration may unleash a retaliatory blow. An enemy, observing a flight of planes on his radar screen, cannot know whether they intend to attack a "tactical" or "strategic" target and in the face of the risk of having his retaliatory force caught on the ground, he

may launch his counterblow. And within ten years when missiles take
over much of the tactical support, air superiority over a combat zone
will be meaningless. For launching sites, especially of medium range
missiles, can be so dispersed that they will be hard to locate and even
more difficult to destroy.

Thus the minimum condition for limiting war will be the immunity
of the enemy's retaliatory forces. In any war between major nuclear
Powers sanctuary areas immune to attack will be almost essential.

Against this background, it is possible to visualize a diplomatic
program designed to bring about a tacit, if not a formal, understanding of
the frame-work of limited war.

The details of such a program would require detailed technical
study. Some tentative ideas will nevertheless be advanced. Even if
on closer examination some of these proposals appear not to be feasible
they may indicate a general direction, mostly of serious attention."

Without damage to our interest we might announce that while
Soviet aggression will be resisted with nuclear weapons, we would
make every effort to limit their effect and to space the civilian popula-
tion as much as possible. To this end, we could propose that both
sides list the bases of their strategic airforce. These bases would be
immune from attack if located more than a certain distance from the
combat zone (say 500 miles) and if they admitted inspectors. Equally

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all cities the same distance from the combat zone would be immune.
Within that zone cities could purchase immunity by being declared
open and admitting inspectors. An open city would be one which did
not contain, within a radius of 30 miles from the center, any installa-
tions that could be used against military forces. The term military
installation should be literally defined and not extended to industrial
plants. Although the inspectors might be provided by neutral nations,
it would be preferable if they were experts of the opposing side because
their reports would then have a much higher credibility. The inspectors
would have their own communication system and would operate even
during hostilities.

The elimination of area targets will place an upper limit on the
size of weapons it will be profitable to employ. While it will be im-
possible to control effectively the explosive power of various weapons
there is one self-policing dividing line: that between weapons producing
significant fall-out effects and those which do not. The former are de-
vices above 500 kilotons explosive power exploded close to the ground,
the latter are weapons of a smaller size or higher yield weapons exploded
in the air or so-called "clean" bombs, a new development which eliminates
fall-out even in high-yield weapons. We could therefore announce that
we would not resort to the fall-out effects of nuclear weapons. Any
explosive equivalent
weapon above 500 kilotons exploded close to the ground would be a

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clean bomb -- unless the opponent violated this understanding.

Such a program would have several advantages over disarmament schemes designed only to prevent surprise attack. The objection to inspection as a bar to all-out war is not that it will not work but that even if effective the information it produces does not address itself to the real security problem. Given the high state of readiness of strategic striking forces and their increasing speed, even a perfect inspection system will not add significantly to the existing warning time. Moreover, in all-out war, the aggressor, having already staked his national existence, will lose every incentive to make the inspection system as soon as he decides on a surprise attack. In limited war, on the other hand, the aggressor can be assumed to remain anxious to avoid a thermonuclear holocaust; this indeed is why the war remains limited. He would therefore be eager to continue to observe limitations - at least as long as the other side possesses a sufficient retaliatory force to make all-out war seem unattractive. And both protagonists will presumably be eager, not reluctant to overlook occasional violations.

An additional advantage of the plan is that the inspectors could serve as points of political contact. Thus the mechanics of arms limitation would also improve the opportunity for a rapid settlement should the contenders desire it. And by relating disarmament negotiations to military strategy it would force the opposing staffs to consider

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options other than the stark alternative of total peace (which may mean
total surrender) or total war.

It may be objected that the program outlined here would in effect neutralize cities and seriously interfere with military operations. From the military standpoint, however, it would seem to make little difference whether a city is neutralized by the presence of inspection teams or through the explosion of megaton weapons. As for impairing military operations, the handicap would be the same for both sides. The military will have to accept the fact that short of a thermonuclear holocaust, purely military decisions are no longer possible and that they must adapt their tactics to the new technology.

Other criticisms assert that a program for limiting war assumes
a degree of human rationality for which history offers no warranty.
But history offers no example for the extraordinary destructiveness of
modern weapons either. A program that seeks to establish some
principles of war limitation in advance of hostilities would seem in
any case to make fewer demands on rationality than one which attempted
to improvise the rules of war in the confusion of battle.

Still others argue that any attempt to convey our understanding
of limited war to our opponent would tell him the price to be paid for
aggression and therefore weaken the deterrent. But the notion that de-
terrence is achieved only by the threat of maximum destruction deserves

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close scrutiny. It is an understandable outgrowth of our desire to enjoy
our existence without interference from the outside world. As a result,
aggression has, for us, always had the quality of an immoral art under-
taken for its own sake and we have come to think of resistance to it
more in terms of punishment than in terms of balancing risks.

But the usual case of aggression has a specific objective. It
is not necessary to threaten destruction of the home base of the
enemy to inhibit it; it is sufficient to prevent the aggressor from attain-
ing his goal. An aggressor would seem to have no motive for an attack
if he cannot calculate with a reasonable chance of success.

The United States should therefore shift the emphasis of dis-
armament negotiations from the technically almost impossible problem
of preventing surprise attack to an effort to mitigate the horror of war.

We would lose nothing even if we announced a program of war
limitation unilaterally. If the Soviet Union begins a war by an all-out
surprise attack, nothing will have been lost by elaborating a doctrine
of limited war; we would react by using every weapon in our arsenal.
If it begins hostilities on a limited scale, a limited war could be fought
according to rules established well in advance. And the inspection
system sketched here would serve a threefold purpose - as a warning
against surprise attack, as an instrument for keeping the war limited,
and as a device to maintain contact with the opponent so that a political

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settlement is made possible at any point in the military operations.

The limitation of war described here is impossible, however, without a strategic doctrine adapted to the nuclear weapons. It presupposes an ability to use force with discrimination and to establish political goals in which the question of national survival is not involved in every issue. It also requires a public opinion which has been educated in the realities of the nuclear age. A program of war limitation, in short, cannot be used as a cheaper means for imposing unconditional surrender. Limited war and the diplomacy appropriate to it reflects the recognition that in the nuclear age the possibility of total solutions exists no longer.

By Henry A. Kissinger

It is remarkable to what an extent the nuclear age has produced a penchant for absolute solutions. It is as if the very enormity of the new technology has made it impossible to conceive of intermediate objectives. [ The quest for absolutes obscures the attainable remedies; in focussing energies on the desirable it inhibits a consideration of the possible. And it overlooks that no policy can combine the advantages of every course of action. ]

In strategy the manifestation of this tendency is our theory of deterrence. Because we have identified deterrence with the threat of maximum destructive-ness, we have relied on the threat of all-out war as the chief counter to Soviet aggression. But the more absolute have been the alternatives posed by our strategic doctrine, the more reluctant we have been to react to it. A policy of deterrence cannot rest on merely posing the maximum threat; it must also consider the strategy we are prepared to implement should deterrence fail. [ The quest for absolute power may merely serve to paralyze the will. By emphasizing the physical aspect of deterrence we have neglected the psychological component. ] By our concern with the most absolute limit of deterrence we have committed

Kissinger - 5.

was implemented, strategic relationship would remain constant. But under present conditions the real armaments race is in the laboratories. No reduction of forces, however scrupulously carried out, could protect the Powers against a technological breakthrough. Even were strategic striking forces kept at fixed levels and rigidly controlled, an advance in air-defense sufficient to contain the opposing retaliatory force would upset the strategic balance completely.

The rate of technological change, in fact, has outstripped the pace of diplomatic negotiations. Because stockpiles have usually accumulated before negotiations could agree on the nature of their problem, efforts to control the development of new weapons have proved futile. Since each scientific advance opens the way to innumerable others, it is next to impossible to define a meaning ful point at which to "cut off" weapons developments. At the beginning of the atomic age, a strict inspection system might have succeeded in stopping the elaboration of nuclear weapons. By 1952, it might still have been possible to "control" the development of thermonuclear weapons, albeit with great difficulty.

For the hydrogen bomb developed so naturally out of research and production of nuclear weapons that a foolproof inspection system would have been infinitely complicated. In any case, by 1957, the production of thermonuclear devices had so far outstripped any possible control machinery that the emphasis of disarma-

Kissinger - 6.

The difficulty of developing meaningful control machinery to end the production and development of new weapons has caused most disarmament negotiations since 1955 to concern themselves with means to prevent surprise attack. It is argued that one of the causes for present tensions, it is argued, is the insecurity produced

Kissinger - 8.

it probably does not possess a capability for aerial refueling, it would have
to transfer its planes to advance bases on the Kola or Chukotski peninsulas be-
fore it could attack. A system of inspection would inform us of this move and
it might therefore increase our warning time. Nevertheless, the gain would be
only a relative one, because any substantial movement of the Soviet Long Range
Air Force to advance bases could hardly escape high altitude detection or gen-
eral intelligence surveillance even in the absence of inspection. And the next
family of Soviet planes will be able to launch an attack on the United States
from training bases.

Because of the greater range of our planes and the nature of our base sys-
tem, the Soviet Union would gain very little either from ground inspection or
from aerial surveillance. They know the location of most of our air bases and,
since they will presumably strike the first blow in an all-out war, they are as-
sured of maximum warning in any case. It can be argued, of course, that the
U.S.S.R. may not evaluate the danger of a United States surprise attack so low
and that it would therefore gain added security from an inspection system. But
unless most planes are grounded all the time and both sides are certain that no
substantial installations are hidden, there is no guarantee that planes in so-
called training flights will not be used for surprise attack. Even filing flight

Kissinger - 9.

plans in advance will not eliminate this danger. Given the speed of modern planes, by the time inspectors realize a violation of a flight plan has occurred and can communicate this information to their home government, the planes will probably have reached the opposing early warning lines in any case. Moreover, if flight plans are cleverly arranged - and every incentive would seem to exist for doing this - it will be very difficult to discover whether a given flight is a move to advance bases or a prelude to an all-out attack.

Even this inspection could, of course, be coupled with the grounding of all planes, except perhaps a very small number insufficient to inflict a catastrophic blow. Such a course would be highly dangerous, however. It would be difficult to maintain the readiness or the morale of the retaliatory force without constant training. Since our strategy is more dependent on its strategic striking forces than that of the Soviet Union, the grounding of all planes will work to the advantage of the other side. Even should we develop a capability for limited war equal to that of the Soviet Union, the grounding of our strategic air force would stand to benefit our opponent. It would tell him the precise deployment of our retaliatory force and enable him to concentrate his attack and his defenses against it. To be sure, we would have the same information about the Soviet Long Range Air Force. But it would be much less useful to us. Since we

Kissinger - 10.

concede the first blow, information about the deployment of the Soviet Long Range Air Force will not help a great deal: it would presumably have left its bases by the time we become aware that an attack is imminent.

The maximum warning achievable by even a perfect inspection system is the interval between the time when planes leave their bases and when they would have been detected by existing warning systems. With the present family of airplanes this would amount to perhaps three hours for the state which is being attacked. The aggressor would gain an additional warning time from an inspection system because he would, in any case, alert his defenses before mounting his blow. To be sure, three hours is not negligible. But since the victim of aggression cannot be certain what the apparent violation of inspection means he may have difficulty utilizing the additional warning effectively. He will be tempted to delay his counterblow until the aggressor crosses the early warning line, which is precisely the situation today.

Moreover, as the speed of planes increases, the warning time afforded by even a perfect inspection system, correctly interpreted, will be progressively reduced. In the age of the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile - in less than ten years - the maximum warning time possible, assuming perfect communication between the inspector and the home government, would be thirty minutes, a period of

Kissinger - 11.

of time the missile would be in transit. In the age of the missile and the supersonie bomber, even a foolproof inspection system will tell the Powers only what they already know: that the opponent possesses the capability of launching a devastating attack at a moment's notice and with a minimum of warning.

The extreme readiness of the forces-in-being also reduces the use of aerial reconnaissance. Since flying time from the interior of the U.S.S.R. to our ear-
ly warning line is about five hours with the present family of airplanes, each
base of the Soviet Long Range Air Force would have to be photographed at least
every four hours. If the reconnaissance occurred at longer intervals, the Early
Warning Line would provide a better indication of a surprise attack because an
attack launched immediately after an aerial inspection would reach the Early
Warning Line before the next reconnaissance sortie discovered that the opposing
force had left its base. As the speed of planes increases, the frequency of re-
connaissance missions would also have to be increased so that in practice re-
connaissance planes would probably have to hover over enemy airfields almost con-
stantly. And in the missile age aerial reconnaissance would be fortunate if it
could discover launching sites; it would not be able to warn of impending attack.

It is therefore difficult to imagine that present vigilance could be re-
duced or that insecurity would be removed by any inspection system now in pros-

Kissinger - 12.

pect. The machinery required would be so formidable and the benefits relatively
so trivial or uncertain that an inspection system may actually have pernicious
consequences. It may give a misleading impression of security and therefore
tempt us into relaxing our preparedness. More likely, however, it would induce
both sides to place their striking forces into an even greater state of readiness
in order to compensate for the loss of secrecy by a demonstration of power.

Indeed, unless designed with extraordinary care, a system of inspection may
well make a tense situation more difficult. The value of inspection depends
not only on the collection but also on the interpretation of facts. But the
information produced by inspection systems is inevitably fragmentary and is like-
ly to be most difficult to obtain when it is most needed, when international ten-
sions are at their height. On the other hand, the only meaningful reaction to
a seeming violation is to launch an immediate retaliatory attack because pro-
tests could not begin to be effective before enemy planes had reached their tar-
get. The knowledge that all-out war is the sanction for seeming violations may
well add to the tenseness of international relations. Instead of reducing the
danger of thermonuclear conflict, an inspection system may make an all-out war
based on a misunderstanding of the apparent intentions more likely. From the
point of view of preventing war (3), ignorance may be preferable to partial

Kissinger - 14.

important tasks of disarmament negotiations should therefore be to establish a common understanding of the possibilities and mutual advantages of limiting war-fare. There has been a shrinking away from this effort, as if the admission that war may occur could itself be a factor in bringing it on, or perhaps because of lack of clarity about the possibilities of war limitation in the nuclear age.

Above all, a program to mitigate the horrors of war could be used to clarify insofar as diplomacy is able, the intentions of the opposing sides and thereby prevent the catastrophe of an all-out war caused by miscalculation. Even a unilateral declaration of what we understand by limited war would accomplish a great deal because it would provide a strong incentive to the Soviet Union to

Kissinger - 14a.

adopt a similar interpretation. Finally, given the likelihood that any war
which involves the two major blocks will be nuclear even if it should not be
all-out, it will be imperative to establish in

Kissinger - 13.

[Y]

Kissinger - 20.

feudal period which were as much a test of will as a trial in strength.

Such a change in traditional notions of warfare will not be simple to bring about. On closer examination it may even prove technically impossible. But the discouraging aspect of so much of our thinking about strategy is its refusal to admit that the new technology requires a new order of tactics. Instead we tend to add nuclear weapons to existing strategy as merely a more efficient explosive. This will not only produce appalling casualties; it also may not be adequate to the challenges we will confront. Any progress in our manner of conducting war must therefore be preceded by a doctrinal revolution. We must recognize the new strategy conceptually before we can explore its technical feasibility. It is, to be sure, a difficult and perhaps an impossible task. But history will not excuse the inadequacy of the response by the vestures of the challenge.

Kissinger - 24.

continue to observe limitations - at least as long as the other side possesses a
sufficient retaliatory force to make all-out war seem unattractive. And both
protagonists will presumably be eager, not reluctant to overlook occasional vio-
lations.

An additional advantage of the plan is that the inspectors could serve as
points of political contact. Thus the mechanics of arms limitation would also
improve the opportunity for a rapid settlement should the contenders desire it.
And by relating disarmament negotiations to military strategy it would force the
opposing staffs to consider options other than the stark alternative of total
peace (which may mean total surrender) or total war.

It may be objected that the program outlined would in effect neutralize
cities and seriously interfere with military operations. From the military stand-
point, however, it would seem to make little difference whether a city is neutral-
ized by the presence of inspection teams or through the explosion of megaton
weapons. As for impairing military operations, the handicap would be the same
for both sides. The military will have to accept the fact that short of a ther-
monuclear holocaust, purely military decisions are no longer possible and that
they must adapt their tactics to the new technology.

Kissinger - 25.

human rationality for which history offers no warranty. But history offers no example for the extraordinary destructiveness of modern weapons either. A program that seeks to establish some principles of war limitation in advance of hostilities would seem to make fewer demands on rationality than one which attempted to improvise the rules of war in the confusion of battle.

Still others argue that any attempt to convey our understanding of limited war to our opponent would tell him the price to be paid for aggression and therefore weaken the deterrent. But the notion that deterrence is achieved only by the threat of maximum destruction deserves close scrutiny. It is an understandable outgrowth of our desire to enjoy our existence without interference from the outside world. As a result, aggression has, for us, always had the quality of an immoral art undertaken for its own sake and we have come to think of resistance to it more in terms of punishment than in terms of balancing risks.

But the usual case of aggression has a specific objective. It is not necessary to threaten destruction of the home base of the enemy to inhibit it; it is sufficient to prevent the aggressor from attaining his goal. An aggressor would seem to have no motive for an attack if he cannot calculate with a reasonable chance of success.

The United States should therefore shift the emphasis of disarmament nego-

[Y] Kissinger - 27.

a limited scale, a limited war could be fought according to rules established well in advance. And the inspection system sketched here would serve a threefold purpose - as a warning against surprise attack, as an instrument for keeping the war limited, and as a device to maintain contact with the opponent so that a political settlement is made possible at any point in the military operations.

The limitation of war described here is impossible, however, without a strategic doctrine adapted to the nuclear weapons. It presupposes an ability to use force with discrimination and to establish political goals in which the question of national survival is not involved in every issue. It also requires a public opinion which has been educated in the realities of the nuclear age. A program of war limitation, in short, cannot be used as a cheapener means of imposing unconditional surrender. The possibility of total solutions exists no longer. Limited war and the diplomacy appropriate to it is a means of escaping from the sterility of the quest for absolute peace, which paralyzes by the unreality of its hopes, and for absolute victory, which paralyzes by the vastness of its consequences.

["differences.", "robes, and for space-fighters, which paralyzes by the vastness of its con-\ntrol of the great force of space-fleetness, which paralyzes by the unreason-\nity of the great force of space-fleetness, which paralyzes by the unreason-\nity

UNITED STATES LEADERSHIP
AND THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES

by

Henry A. Kissinger

No event of the post-war period has presented a greater challenge to American foreign policy than the emergence of so many new states hitherto under colonial rule. Diplomacy previously confined to a relatively few states dominating vast areas suddenly has become world-wide in scope. The United Nations now contains eighty-one members, a substantial minority of which were colonies barely a decade ago. The newly independent states, for better or worse, have become a major force in contemporary international relations.

The importance of the newly independent nations cannot be doubted. It is clearly to our interest that we identify ourselves with their aspirations and that we seek to prevent an alignment of the white against the colored races. The consequences which flow from this proposition are much less obvious however. It is tempting to believe that we can develop one policy equally applicable to all newly independent states or that we will be able to disarm suspicion entirely by patience and goodwill.

- 2 -

But the problem is more complex. The difficulties faced by newly independent states are as different as the histories which produced them. And their suspicions reflect not only past injustice but the sense of insecurity produced by disintegrating values and the search for a new orientation. United States policy towards the newly independent nations must therefore begin with an awareness of the nature of the revolution through which they are living.

The revolution taking place in the newly independent states can only be narrowly understood as a revolution against colonialism. In an important sense, it is a continuation of a revolution started by the colonial powers and carried on under their aegis. Moreover, there is an important difference between areas in which colonialism ruled directly and those in which it governed indirectly.

The remarkable aspect of colonialism from its beginning was the imposition of rule by a very small group of Europeans over vast populations. This was due not so much to the military superiority of the West - in many respects it is greater today than it was in the nineteenth century - as to the fact that the European powers displaced an existing ruling group in a society where the vast majority of the population neither enjoyed nor expected direct participation in government. The structure of government

-3-

in what is now the uncommitted third of the world had been feudal for
centuries, and in their first appearance the Europeans appeared as a
new governing group substituting itself for the existing one according
to a pattern which had characterized these areas for many generations.
The domination of vast territories by small groups of Europeans was
possible precisely because they were not considered as "foreign".
The notion of their foreignness was introduced in the first instance not
by the governed but by their rulers.

For the Europeans were not content with displacing a feudal
upper class. They brought with them the twin doctrines of rational
administration and popular participation in government, which in time
had inevitably to prove inconsistent with their continued domination.
The rationalizing of administration led to the consolidation of many
areas into viable units for the first time in their history; Indonesia,
for example, was nothing but a geographic expression until the Dutch
found it more efficient to unite the islands of the Indies under a single
administration. At the same time the colonial powers trained a group of
indigenous leaders in European universities where they absorbed the
doctrines of the right to self-government, human dignity and economic
advancement which had been the rallying points for European revolutionary
movements throughout the nineteenth century.

- 4 -

The result was two sets of paradoxes: in its revolutionary aspect colonialism represents one of the greatest conversions of history. Almost without exception the leaders of the newly independent states are opposing their former masters in terms of values they have learned from them.

Their challenge to the West is not in terms of a different set of beliefs.

On the contrary, in the struggle for independence they were demanding that the West live up to its own principles. As the ideals of the British, French and American revolutions became diffused, partly through the very spread of colonialism, the seeds were sown for the destruction of colonialism itself. The more successful the teachings of the colonial powers, the more untenable their positions became. Thus the greater the participation of the indigenous population in their own government the more insistent grew their demands for independence, as is demonstrated by the difference between the British and the Portuguese colonies. What is taking place in the areas once under direct colonial rule is the second stage of the revolution started by the colonial powers. It is an attempt by the leaders of the newly independent states to spread among the masses of their people the values which they themselves acquired from the colonial power and which furnished the original impetus of the revolution.

This leads to the second paradox of the uncommitted third of the world: that the situation of areas which had been under direct colonial rule is more advantageous than that of countries where the colonial powers

- 5 -

[N]

exercised their influence only indirectly. The territories governed directly, such as India, benefited through administrative consolidation and the overthrow of the old feudal order by an outside force. The countries controlled indirectly, such as most of those in the Middle East, suffered the demoralizing influence of foreign rule without a corresponding gain in the training of leadership groups or of administrative cohesion. On the contrary, while in areas governed directly boundaries were drawn with an eye to what constituted a viable unit, in other territories they were often drawn to ensure that the countries would not be viable. Thus the only reason for the existence of what came to be known as Transjordan was its need of a British subsidy over an indefinite period of time. For the most part, boundaries in the Middle East reflected neither a common history nor an economic or administrative necessity. They were drawn to guarantee weakness and rivalry.

In the areas once ruled indirectly, several revolutions are therefore going on concurrently: there is, to begin with, the revolt by a small Western-educated elite often against feudal rule. There is the quest for administrative, political and economic cohesiveness which in areas of direct rule is also the legacy of colonialism. There is, finally, the attempt to raise the level of economic welfare and of education of the masses. The revolutionary urgency is much greater and the problems

- 6 -

more nearly insoluble in areas which had been governed indirectly than in the countries which had been under direct rule, because in the latter many of these upheavals were accomplished by the fiat of the colonial power and over a long period of time. Therefore, while a legalistic concept of sovereignty and aggression may be a stabilizing element in Southeast Asia, it invites explosions in areas like the Middle East because it works counter to the consolidation of inherently volatile and economically unviable unity.

These paradoxes make the quest for popularity such a treacherous course with respect to the newly independent states. For, while the leadership groups have been trained in Western universities and have on the whole accepted Western thinking, this very fact may limit the degree to which they can identify themselves with the Western powers politically. It is not so much that these leaders would be suspected by their countrymen of collaboration with the former colonial rulers; the motivation is more complex and more subtle. To sustain the dedication and the suffering of the rebellion against the colonial powers, they had to elaborate a distinction between themselves and their rulers which they derived from a claim to superior morality or at least superior spirituality. But, when the battle was won and independence finally achieved, many leaders of newly independent countries have had to realize, at least

-7-

subconsciously, that they were inwardly a good deal closer to their
former rulers than to their own countrymen. It may be too much to say
that they resent the West for having taught them patterns of thinking
which make them strangers to their own people. It is clear that they
require anti-colonialism as a means of achieving a sense of personal
identity. Precisely because they are inwardly so close to the West,
many of the leaders of the newly independent states cannot afford to
align themselves with it politically. If they must think in the categories
of their former colonial masters, they can at least refuse too close
political association.

In these terms, neutralism and anti-colonialism are not so much
a policy as a spiritual necessity. The constant reiteration of non-
alignment may be the means by which the leaders of newly independent
nations reassure themselves; they can be certain of their independence
only by acting it out every day and on every issue. This explains why the
most strident advocates of neutrality are often the very people who in
dress, bearing, and manner of thinking are closest to the West - indeed
who often have spent very little of their lives in their own countries.
Individuals with firm roots in their own tradition, on the other hand,
such as the Burmese leadership, for example, feel less compulsive about
proclaiming their independence daily and seem more prepared to act
jointly with the Western powers when their interests coincide.

-8-

Therefore, too, the extent of anti-colonialism reflects less past suffering, than the difficulty of achieving a national consciousness. For, contrary to the nations of Western Europe from which they drew their ideal of nationhood, many of the newly independent states are based neither on a common language nor on a common culture. Their only common experience is the former colonial rule. Their leaders require anti-colonialism to achieve not only a sense of personal but also of national identity. The collection of islands called Indonesia is meaningful only in terms of history of Dutch rule; its frontiers follow precisely the frontiers of empire and so does its national consciousness.

Because West New Guinea was part of the Dutch East Indies, Indonesia claims West New Guinea, which is inhabited by people as different from the Polynesian stock of Indonesia as the Dutch themselves. It does not covet Malaya, although racially and linguistically it is much closer, because no common experience connects it to Malaya. Conversely, Malaya has no desire to join its cultural brethren in Indonesia, but will become a state within the boundaries of former British colonial rule. Therefore, finally, it is futile to seek to substitute a concept of Soviet colonialism for the current concept identified with the West. The leaders of the uncommitted nations may condemn such Soviet actions as the repression of the Hungarian revolt. They may dislike Soviet control of the satellite orbit. But they will not be prepared to consider it as the

-9-

same phenomenon which causes their own frustrations. Until they develop
a stronger sense of personal identity and until their nations can develop
purposes not drawn from the struggle for independence, they will require
anti-colonialism, and it must have an anti-Western connotation. For
beyond anti-colonialism lies psychological chaos.

In the uncommitted areas, popularity is an unattainable goal.
To seek to gear our policy to an inquiry into what people desire may
merely force the newly independent states to dissociate themselves from
us in order to demonstrate their independence. It would not be the
least paradox of the contemporary situation if we drove the newly inde-
pendent states toward the Soviet bloc by a too ardent embrace. On
the other hand, we should be able to utilize the combination of spiritual
kinship and political nonalignment for acts of leadership. For, whatever
their protestations, the leaders of almost every newly independent state,
particularly in areas which had been under direct colonial rule, are
spiritual heirs of the West at least to some extent. The very fact that
India considered it a great achievement to obtain Soviet acquiescence to
its five principles of coexistence indicates that its assessment of the
real threat to peace is not so very different from ours. For no attempt was
made to ask for the agreement of the former colonial powers or of the
United States, so often depicted in Asian folklore as imperialist and eager

- 10 -

to restore colonial rule. It was obviously self-evident to India that
relations between it and the United States were so firmly based on the
principle of peaceful coexistence that no explicit reiteration was
necessary.

If then, we are prepared to exercise leadership, we may be able
to induce many of the newly independent nations to travel in a direction
to which they incline, if always a few steps behind us. They will not
surrender their nonalignment, but they may be willing to act in the
pursuance of common interests provided we are prepared to chart the
road and provided we tolerate a measure of dissociation. In the uncommitted
nations popularity may be less important than respect.

In a situation in which old forms and values are in dramatic
and often violent flux, independent and sometimes unilateral United
States action may paradoxically be the best means of achieving a common
purpose. For what else is leadership except the willingness to stand
alone? The price of our power and greater domestic stability is leader-
ship. The failure to exercise it will not result in a consensus of humanity;
it will lead to the creation of a vacuum.

THE REPORTER

136 EAST 57th STREET
NEW YORK 22, N. Y.
Murray Hill 8-4033

April 30, 1957

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As I told you on the phone yesterday, Ascoli was just as enthusiastic as I about your article and we are very pleased to accept it for publication in the issue which will reach the newsstands on June 6.

I really don't think it requires much further work. For what it's worth, here are my suggestions:

1) A very condensed version of the first three pages in order to provide a framework of reference for the arguments that follow -- and to underscore the dangers of the absolutism which now characterizes both our diplomatic and military posture. This, I think, could be done in a couple of paragraphs (I have indicated in pencil a few suggested cuts and you will doubtless see others).

2) The main point of the article would then follow -- i.e. page 4 through page 13. With minor cuts and clarifications this section could stand very much in its present form.

3) Beginning from the bottom of page 13 straight through to the end, but omitting the three and a half pages which were included in your Foreign Affairs article (I have marked this section in red pencil). If I am not mistaken it seems to me that you can jump from the top paragraph on page 17 through to the bottom paragraph on page 20 without any transition at all. The major problem it seems to us from page 21 on is one of condensation and simplification. There is, I feel, a certain amount of looseness in this section plus some repetition of ideas which have already been adequately stated in the first part of the article. This last section, it seems to us, too, has a further weakness but one easily taken care of. As Ascoli put it, there is a certain amount of whistling in the dark in this section -- as indeed is almost always the case where a writer is putting forward new ideas and attempting to break new ground. In our opinion, however, it would be wise to recognize this aspect quite openly by some flat and simple statement in the text, perhaps at the bottom of page 20 just before you put forward your detailed proposals.

It occurred to me that one way of condensing and clarifying your final section would be the familiar device of listing the proposals one, two, three, four giving yourself space under each to provide appropriate comment and clarification. In your present version it seems to me you have somewhat reversed the procedure; thus, on page 26 you get a tight summary of all your proposals into one paragraph, after dealing with them one by one in a rather leisurely and oblique fashion. Would it, perhaps, not be crisper and clearer to turn it around the other way as suggested above?

May 17, 1957

Dear Phil:

Enclosed is a copy of the article which I submitted
to The Reporter and which you might wish to compare with
whatever changes they might make. You have complete carte
blanche as far as I am concerned. Anything acceptable to you
is fine with me!

Many thanks and warm regards,

Mr. Philip Quigg
Council on Foreign Relations
58 East 68th Street
New York, New York

GENERAL ELECTRIC
COMPANY

DEFENSE ELECTRONICS DIVISION

TECHNICAL MILITARY PLANNING OPERATION

735 STATE STREET, SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA . . TELEPHONE WOODLAND 5-0551

May 1, 1957

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Associate, Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I read your article, "Strategy & Organization" (FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April 1957) with considerable interest and, because of its relevance, am enclosing a bit of writing in the same general area. Most of the pages appeared in AIR FORCE Magazine, April 1957, under the same title.

I have been concerned about this situation for some time, far more, perhaps, than my poor writing indicates. Consequently, I am very pleased to read your paper and hope it receives the attention it deserves.

NP:eh

# A LONG LOOK AT THE "NEW" LOOK

## INTRODUCTION

The problem of determining roles and missions and that of delineating Service responsibilities is a difficult one. Advancing technology and the constantly increasing scope of modern warfare accentuate and multiply the underlying difficulties but the problem is not new. These developments have immensely amplified the effects of divergent views and have therefore intensified the inter-Service competition. Arguments will continue in the future and we must expect the inter-Service controversies to grow even fiercer. This follows because of the more or less arbitrary nature of much of the adjudication. What is needed is a reexamination of the premises underpinning our military structure and the development of some kind of organizational philosophy which will provide a solid base and basis for specifying roles and missions and for delineating Service responsibilities. Until that time we must expect each new clarification of roles and missions to be foreordained sooner or later to follow its predecessors into oblivion. The following paragraphs refer to these questions and suggest some thoughts to this end.

## THE DANGER

It is fundamentally wrong and in this area dangerous to arbitrarily fix Service boundaries; for example as has been done by,

1. Specifying a limiting size and weight for Army liaison/observation-type aircraft.

2. Prohibiting Army development and control of close support combat aircraft; denying Army aviation the tactical airlift function, even in support of airborne operations.

3. Prohibiting Air Force development and control of antiaircraft guided missiles in the less than 100-mile range class; prohibiting Army work beyond this range.

4. Restricting Air Force efforts in the field of water-based combat aircraft.

5. Defining the IRBM and ICBM in terms of range; allowing the Air Force to develop and use either or both of these missiles; the Navy, only the IRBM; the Army, neither of the weapons.

The danger is that directives such as these are strong inhibitors; they prevent the Services from developing their maximum military capabilities.

This fundamental wrong is aggravated and obscured by the solution popular in some circles: unification. A single military uniform is to be worn by all -- though there are various views on whether this uniform is to be modelled after the light blue of the Air Force, Navy blue, or the Army's khaki. Presumably the inter-Service controversies would then diminish and perhaps even disappear.

[LC]

HOW DID WE GET HERE?

A long long time ago military actions and forces came to be classified on the basis of physical environment. There were land wars and those on the sea. The former, reflecting the intimacy of the relationships between men, weapons, and land, developed along peculiarly specialized lines and led to the enormous growth and power of modern armies. These are associated with the control or physical possession of land. Navies with their own special needs and capabilities developed; ships and fleets grew both powerful and complex. These were involved with struggles for control of sea lines of communication and for certain strategically located land areas which might assist in attaining these ends. Navies are therefore associated with struggles for command of the sea, encompassing, in the present day, both the air above and the depths below. The specialized characteristics of land and sea wars caused armies and navies to develop in quite different directions so that the lines of separation were sharp. As time passed however, these sharp lines became less so. Possibly due to the need in ship-to-ship boarding operations, possibly due to warfare at the land-water boundary, the need for certain land warfare at the land-water boundary, the need for certain land warfare capabilities led to the Navy's Marines -- a kind of pluralistic force with capabilities on both land and sea. At the same time, the increasing scale and scope of land warfare brought armies up against prairies and deserts, mountains, rivers and inland seas, necessitating on their part, the development of additional and diverse capabilities.

Although, as did Icarus, we too have serious temperature problems in flight, technological advances over the years have brought us a long way toward mastery of the earth's atmosphere. As a result of these advances and the military potentialities in this new and third physical environment, we now have a new and third military Service, the Air Force, with its claim to domination in the air and all its reaches. Today we have three Services, based respectively on sovereignty in the air, on the land, and on the sea. Extending this reasoning forward, we should expect the creation of still another great military Service upon the coming of age of spatial operations.

However, as the three Services grew and changed and spread, the heretofore relatively clean lines of separation between them became fuzzy. While the newest Service was established on the basis of uniqueness of environment, i.e., a new physical environment called for a new Service, the apparently close connection between physical environment and Service became much less apparent and therefore more controversial. In fact the inter-Service boundaries had become in many places virtually non-existent. As evidence of these changes we note that the Navy now has its own aviation and its own land forces; the Army, definite although still limited air capabilities; the Air Force, the beginnings of its own combat ground troops and even certain water-based capabilities.

But with all these developments we still cling to the environmental basis for determining Service boundaries -- long after the environmental influences have taken on many meanings and in places even approached a kind of homogeneous heterogeneity. As evidence of the overlapping interests and difficulties in reconciling missions with jurisdictional boundaries, today we observe the inter-Service

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rivalries and controversies -- like a cold-war alliance of sovereign nations, each proud and jealous of its hereditary sovereignty but where there is grave doubt whether any can survive for long without the others.

## THE MISSION SERVICE

I submit that the up-to-now accepted basic assumptions underlying the organization of our military establishment are no longer acceptable and that fundamental reorientation and reorganization are essential. I submit further that significant improvement in organizational structure and hence combat effectiveness can, and perhaps can only, be obtained by focusing on the military mission, i.e., the task or function to be performed.

The environmental basis for Service organization was useful because of the earlier parallel between environment and strategic or tactical operation and not because of any intrinsic significance in the environmental parameter used. The environmental criterion for separation approximately coincided with the functional parameter. But the heart of the matter was and is the mission, the function to be performed. Because it is fundamental, it is still valid and applicable today. An old military axiom refers to this idea and runs about as follows:

> Given a particular task or mission it is the prerogative and in fact the commander's responsibility to plan and organize his forces in the manner calculated to best perform that job. Within certain and very general overriding rules of his society, the commander should and must be free to choose the number and characteristics of the weapons which will most effectively and efficiently accomplish his mission. He must therefore have freedom to add or subtract from his command; riflemen, artillery, armor, and aircraft in the numbers, shapes and sizes which will maximize his ability to perform the assigned mission. Correspondingly too, the Navy and Air Force must not be hamstrung by rigid or obsolete rulings but must be permitted, perhaps forced, to organize on a functional basis. Given a set of missions, each service must be free to concentrate on how best to achieve its objectives.

Dim outlines of such an approach are visible in the organization and operations of our Marines. An analogous but more embryonic situation is evident in the Continental Air Defense Command. Although there is still adherence to tradition and hence assignment of ConAD responsibility to one service, the task or mission cuts across all service boundaries. Continental defense is a big job and is likely to grow even bigger. If so, why not organize a Continental Defense Service, one which is not Air Force, or Army, or Navy, but a Force so organized as to maximize the probability of successfully accomplishing this job? This defines the "Mission Service".

For example, too, we might organize a Strategic Warfare Service. Surely a reorganized "SAC", integrally containing within it certain naval forces, would be a more complete and therefore powerful strategic striking force. It seems very unwise to develop a strategic force exclusively Air Force and thus implicitly to deny that the Navy can make any useful contribution in this regard.

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A case can be made for a "Limited Warfare" Service, a powerful, highly mobile, self-contained striking force designed to cope with the great variety and global distribution of the so-called limited-type wars, the brush fires and the police actions. There is no escaping the conclusion, in this "time of tempest," that there is no substitute for physical force on the spot. The achievement of this mobility and self-sufficiency and power would appear most accomplishable by a service integrally containing within itself certain land, sea and air components interwoven into a unified whole. The mission of this service: by physical force on the spot, to stop small wars directly, or in less direct fashion to seek to do so by raising the price of an aggressor's probable gains to a level he is unwilling to pay.

I submit that time and technological advances have obsoleted the original bases for determining service boundaries and upon which bases assignments for the development of particular military capabilities are still adjudicated. The magnitude and technical complexity of modern warfare means that any jurisdictional lines drawn on the basis of environment per se instead of on the job to be done are a built-in handicap to militarily obtaining "the most for the least."

## MISSIONS AND APPROPRIATIONS

Given the nation's over-all objectives and taking out those best achieved by the Department of Defense, we obtain the military missions. It is these military missions which we must possess capabilities for performing and hence these missions must be focused upon in contrast to building up or down of the Army, Navy, or Air Force. They are of course related but the correct orientation and focus is vital. A service in itself is of significance only to the extent that it contributes to performing these missions.

The really critical problem in all this is the selection and assignment of military missions. But this has always been critical and no amount of juggling and heated discussion will make it less so by one iota. Just what are our national aims, what should the Department of Defense do to assist in the achievement of these aims, what portion of our national budget should be allocated to the Department of Defense, what subdivision of funds for each of the military services will maximize the Department of Defense's over-all capabilities? Once these basic decisions have been made, burdening a service with arbitrary rules and restrictions must be eliminated for it is incompatible with maximizing service capabilities.

Norman Precoda

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Lev V. Serdakovsky
801 Spencer St.
Monterey, Calif.

9 May 1957

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
c/o Foreign Affairs
New York, N.Y.

Dear Professor Kissinger:

I warmly endorse your opinion that the need for a
definite US strategic concept is very strong. On the other
hand it is obvious that no correct strategic decision can
be made until certain basic facts are fully remembered and
understood. The high level and competence shown in your
articles in the Foreign Affairs (October and April 1957)
is a matter of great appreciation especially for those working
in the field of grand strategy. However there are some de-
batable points and I take the liberty to discuss them object-
ively as possible. Permit me to quote from your articles:

1. (p.382) it seems to me that the main factor which inhibits the development of US strategic doctrine ( besides a) the problem of interrelations in the NSC and in the JCS and b) fiscal considerations) is psychological one, namely the lack of the will of the West to start a decisive counter offensive.
All other reasons such as technical, economic and organizational, seem to be of secondary importance. It is now a truism that Communist strength lies in their strong will to achieve their goals and in the fact that they know what they want. However it is also well known that when they do meet a determined opposition they retreat as was the case of Kars and Artvin, to which the USSR has incomparably more rights than, let's say, to Koenigsberg. Why the West, facing global Red threat, lacks this will is a very interesting but a separate problem having deep historical and psychological roots.

2. (p.382) "... The goal of war can no longer be military victory as we have known it. Rather it should be attainment

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of certain specific limited conditions which are fully
understood by the opponent ...." What does the word
"opponent" mean in the existing concrete strategic sit-
uation? The Soviet government or the Russian people, the
Communist regimes or the countries enslaved by them, the
Communist bloc or an Eurasian alliance? Limited conditions
could be offered and accepted in case of a "regular" tra-
ditional conflict between nations, if in place of the Com-
munistic USSR were, - using your brilliant definition, -
"the legitime state of Russia"( and of China, of Poland,
of Hungary, etc.), whose policies are directed and limited
by national interests and geopolitical boundaries. But
what kind of "specific limited conditions" could be under-
stood by an aggressive and dynamic ideological movement
whose aspirations and possibilities are global, and which
is international in character and almost invincible in
purely military sense?

3. The same remark can be made regarding the idea that 
"... the more moderate the objective the less violent the 
war is likely to be". Cmdr. Williams strongly advocated 
the same moderation and limitations in his "Great Debate" 
and to a certain extent Prof. Roberts arrived to the same 
conclusions in his last book. But speaking in realistic 
terms, what limited or moderate objective offers a final 
solution i.e. is able to meet in long run the world-wide 
and total Communist challenge? Such objectives would be 
proper in "little wars" (or in diplomatic moves trying to 
prevent or to localize them) if these wars are considered 
as local, tactical, - or according to Soviet terminology 
"operational" episodes of a global war, undeclared but 
going on, in which the main adversaries not yet officially 
participate. This approach seems to be the only realistic 
one because it is as adequate to the Soviet concept of 
peaceful coexistence ("peace is a fought by other means"). 
I think that your article Reflection of American diplomacy 
is one of the best sources for understanding of Communist 
conduct and should be recommended to all seminaries and 
courses dealing with the Soviet and strategic problems.

4. (p.388) The supposition that "... in any nuclear war
between major nuclear powers sanctionary area immune to
attack will be almost essential ..." perhaps is correct,

["attach will be almost essential ...\" perhaps he is correct, between major nuclear powers a sanctuary area immune to V. (338). The subposition that \"... in any uncertain war", "courses defining with the Soviet and arithmetic problems. And conduct should be recommended to all seminars and if one of the best sources for understanding of Communist I think that your article *Reflection of American diplomacy peaceful coexistence* (\"because it is a touch by other means\"). one because it is as adequate to the Soviet concept of participants. This approach seems to be the only realistic route on, in which the main advantage is not yet obviously \"operational\" (opposition of a global war, unclarified but as focal, tactical or according to Soviet terminology prevent or to forestall them) if these wars are considered proper in \"little wars\" (or in diplomatic moves trying to and total Communist challenge? Each objective would be solution i.e. is able to meet in four or more the world-wide terms, what limited or moderate objective offers a sufficient conclusion in die fast look). But speaking in realistic and to a certain extentrol. Roberts arrived to the same the same momentum and limitations in die \"Great Depression\" war is likely to be\". Curr. Williams strongly advocated \"... the more moderate the objective the less violent the war is likely to be\". Curr. Williams strongly advocated the same as follows: \"... the more moderate the objective the less violent the war

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but not so indisputable. The core of this problem is the
difference in psychology and in sense of responsibility
of the leaderships of two antagonistic world blocs. Be-
sides the motives common for both opponents, the Soviet
side could be inspired by the fanatical will to destroy
the enemy no matter by what price. Therefore the possi-
bility of sanctionary areas is rather a matter of strate-
gic calculations and extremeness than of predominant
determination of both opponents to observe the rules
of the game.

The case of Red sanctuary area in Manchuria in
1951-1953 serves as a proof that in a similar situation
a more aggressive and determined side gaines. It has
also stressed again military implications of the ideo-
logical character of conflict with Communists, when Red
sympathizers within the anti-Communist camp reveal secret
top level political-military decisions to the enemy
(Burgess and Mc Lean).

5. (p.42) I personally do not think that in the future (presuming that the current ideological Gordian knot will be successfully cut) the polarization of Powers in world will take place according to the traditional nation vs nation lines. It looks more probable that future regrouping of Powers will be determined rather by racial differences. In such a case the United States and "legitimate state of Russia" will find themselves in the same defensive bloc protecting common civilization against anti-Caucasian coalition of Asiatic or Asiatic-African peoples. It seems to me that this possibility concerning the post-Communist era should be added to the strategic considerations dealing with the present world situation. It must be remembered that short-sighted policy of Great Powers saved the Bolsheviks in both World Wars.

6. (p.55) It is very significant from the psychological
point of view that "... no one (in the West; L.S.) believed
when World War ended that the United States would assume
commitments on such world-wide scale". However, people
experienced in dealing with the Bolsheviks namely the Rus-
sians themselves on both sides of the German-Soviet front,
forsow the world-wide role of the United States long before

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the war ended. General Vlassov and his lieutenants naively expected that a Soviet-American clash will take place immediately after their common victory over Germany. Moreover, they hoped that the United States will use against the Communist regime in Russia Vlassov's anti-Soviet formations and millions of Soviet citizens who were caught by the end of hostilities in Germany.

The same belief in an inevitable Soviet-American conflict existed in the Red Army. It was based not on the wishful thinking, as in the Vlassov's case, but on the political indoctrination from the top.

A major of the Marshal Tolbushin's army while sitting in an American jeep frankly told to a surprised White emigre in 1944 in Yugoslavia, that the war against Germany, regardless of all the tremendous difficulties involved, was nothing in comparison " with the next one, against the Americans".

I expect with greatest interest the publication of your book. I am sure it is of great value for the understanding of the fateful strategic problems by the American public which indeed is of greatest importance. I am especially interested in your appraisal of the role of the element of time in the USA-USSR relations and of the containment concept which still overshadowes the US strategic thinking.