We must resist aggressive actions and irresponsible behavior.

But we must not seek confrontations lightly. Our policy is to reduce both the dangers of conflict as well as make progress towards a more peaceful, cooperative world.

We must be mature enough to recognize that to be stable a relationship must provide advantages to both sides. Moscow will benefit from certain measures just as we will from others. The balance cannot be struck on each issue every day, but only over the whole range of relations and over a period of time. The most constructive international relationships are those in which both parties perceive an element of gain.

Let me apply these principles to the conduct of US policy.

# I. The Course of Soviet-American Relations

In the first two decades of the post-war period US-Soviet relations were characterized by many fits and starts. For example, some encouraging developments followed the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. But at the end of the decade the invasion of Czechoslovakia brought progress to a halt and threw a deepening shadow over East-West relations. The Nixon Administration took office at a moment when US-Soviet relations were stalled out by suspicion and uncertainty.

-5-

It was tempting, by reflex, to infer that antagonism was the central feature of the relationship and that US policy had to be geared to this grim reality even while the Vietnam agony raised questions about our people's readiness to sustain a policy of confrontation. Others recommended a basic change of policy: The Administration was barraged with demands to hold an immediate summit to establish a better atmosphere, to launch the SALT talks, and to end the decades-old trade discrimination against the Soviet Union which was widely criticized as anachronistic, futile, and counterproductive.

These two approaches reflected the discussion that dominated most of the postwar period, and revealed deep-seated American reactions to the very process of international relations.

For many Americans, tensions and enmity in international relations are anomalies. Thus their cause is attributed either to deliberate malice or to misunderstanding. Malice is to be combatted by force, or at least isolation, while misunderstanding is to be removed by the strenuous exercise of good will.

Communist states on the other hand, regard tensions as inevitable by-products of a struggle between opposing social systems.

-6-

For Americans, relations between states are perceived as either friendship or hostility, either to be embraced or renounced in absolute terms. For the Soviet Union, foreign policy is conducted in a grey area heavily influenced by the Soviet conception of the balance of forces. Its diplomacy is therefore never free of tactical pressures and never conceived independently from the prevailing military balance. For Moscow, East-West contacts and negotiations are in part designed to promote Soviet influence abroad especially in Western Europe and to gain formal acceptance of those elements of the status quo most agreeable to Moscow.

But the issue is not whether peace and stability serves some Soviet purposes, but whether it serves our own. Indeed, to the extent that our attention focusses largely on Soviet intentions we create a latent vulnerability. If detente can be justified only by a basic change in Soviet motivation, the temptation becomes overwhelming to base US-Soviet relations not on realistic appraisal but on tenuous hopes: a change in Soviet tone is taken as a sign of a basic change of philosophy. Atmosphere becomes confused with substance. Policy oscillates wildly between extremes of antagonism and of hope.

-7-

Neither extreme is realistic, and both are dangerous.

The naive view ignores that we and the Soviets are bound to compete for the foreseeable future. The antagonistic view ignores that we are <u>condemned</u> to coexist. Detente seeks an environment in which competitors can regulate and restrain their differences and ultimately move from competition to cooperation. As President Kennedy pointed out in June 1963:

> "For in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet."

## A. <u>American Goals</u>

America's aspiration for the kind of political environment which we now call detente is not new.

The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union is not made in the name of any one administration, or one party, or for any one period of time. It expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for <u>a relaxation of tensions</u>, and their expectation that any responsible government will strive for peace. No aspect of our policies, domestic or foreign, enjoys more consistent bipartisan support. No aspect is more in the interest of mankind.

In the postwar period repeated efforts were made to improve our relationship with Moscow. The spirits of Geneva,

-8-

Camp David and Glassboro were brief evanescent moments in a quarter century marked generally by tensions and by sporadic confrontation. What is new in the current period of relaxation of tensions is its duration, the scope of the relationship which has evolved and the continuity of consultation which it has produced.

This is due to many factors including a basic change on the international environment. By the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies the time was propitious for a major attempt to improve U.S.-Soviet relations -- whatever administration was in office in the United States. Various contradictory tendencies contested for preeminence in Soviet policy; several events could tip the scales either towards increased aggressiveness or towards conciliation.

-- The fragmentation in the Communist world in the 1960s challenged the leading position of the USSR and its claim to be the sole arbiter of orthodoxy. The USSR could have reacted by adopting a more aggressive attitude toward the capitalist world in order to reassert its militant vigilance; instead the changing situation and U.S. policy seems to have encouraged Soviet leaders to cooperate in at least a temporary lowering of tension with the West.

-9-

The prospect of achieving a strategic position of near military parity with the US could have tempted Moscow to conduct an even more strenuous effort for expansion; in fact it sought to stabilize at least some aspects of the military competition through negotiated restraints and tempered the militancy of some of its actions and

The very real economic problems of the USSR and Eastern Europe could have reinforced autarkic policies and the tendency to create a closed system, economic warfare abroad; in actuality the Soviet Union and its allies came closer to seeking the reality of an interdependent world economy.

Finally, when faced with the hopes of its own people for greater well-being, the Soviet government could have continued to stimulate the suspicions of the Cold War to further isolate Soviet society, enhance a closed society; in fact it chose to seek to meet them - however inadequately and gradually - by pursuing a policy of relaxation of tensions.

For the United States the choice was clear: to provide as many incentives as possible for those courses of action by the Soviet Union most likely to produce peace and individual well-being and to develop a relationship less subject to the swings between illusionary optimism and narrow antagonism that had characterized most of the postwar period. Thus

-10-

we sought to explore every avenue towards an honorable and
just accommodation while remaining determined not to settle
for mere atmospherics. We have relied on a balance of mutual
interests rather than Soviet intentions, when challenged in a
crisis situation we have always responded firmly. When Soviet
policy became more conciliatory we sought to turn what may
have started as a tactical maneuver into a durable new pattern
of conduct.

Our approach proceeds from the conviction that in moving
forward across a wide spectrum of negotiations, progress in
one area adds momentum to progress in other areas. If we
succeed, then no agreement would stand alone as an isolated
accomplishment vulnerable to the next crisis. The interrelationship
- the so-called linkage concept, it/ between issues was a reality because of the range of problems
and areas in which the interests of the United States and the
Soviet Union impinge on each other. We looked for progress
in a series of agreements settling specific issues and we sought
to relate these to a new standard of international conduct
appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age. Our aim is
that the Soviet Union by acquiring a stake in this spectrum of
relationships we will feel more ensigns of what it
negotiations will see that its interests would be best served by
loss by a union of states, indeed that it will develop a self-interested
encouraging the entire process to go forward.

In short, we are attempting through the policy of detente
to create vested and permanent interest in mutual
restraint. We have engaged ourselves in a process which

--ll-

at any one time is by definition incomplete but whose very incompleteness imparts the urgency for persevering.

## B. The Global Necessities

The importance of detente transcends U.S.-Soviet relations; it must be viewed also in its global context and in its implications for the broad design of American foreign policy.

In the 1940s this nation engaged in a great debate about the role it would play in the postwar world. We forged a bipartisan consensus on which our policies were built for over two decades. By the end of the 1960s the international environment which molded that consensus had been transformed. What in the Fifties seemed a solid bloc of adversaries had fragmented into competing centers of power and doctrine; old allies had gained new strength and self-assurance; scores of new nations had emerged and formed blocs of their own; and all nations were being swept up in a technology that was compressing the planet and deepening our mutual dependence.

Then, as now, it was clear that the patterns formed in the immediate postwar period were in fundamental flux, and that a new international system was emerging. America's help in this new international relationship, historic opportunity was to shape this new international relationship.

-13-

severely tested. The Middle East war demonstrated dramatically the integral relationship between economics and politics. Clearly the international economic agenda must be addressed, whatever the state of our relations with the USSR. But the task would be infinitely more complex if we proceeded in a cold war environment.

International economic problems cut across political dividing lines. All nations, regardless of ideology, face the problems of energy and economic growth, feeding burgeoning populations, regulating the use of the oceans, and preserving the environment.

At a minimum easing international tensions allows the West to devote more intellectual and material resources to these problems, of growth and the quality of life. Eventually it may create prospects for broader collaboration on these issues, especially between East and West. It is significant that some global cooperation in science & technology issues -- such as energy and the protection of the environment -- have already reached the US-Soviet agenda.

- 14 -

In short mankind may be menaced as much by international economic and political chaos as by the danger of war. Avoiding either hazard demands a cooperative world structure for which improved East-West relations are essential.

### C. The Public Dimension

For any policy to be effective, it must be sustained by the American people over the longer term. After two decades of global burdens, Cold War tensions, agonizing conflict abroad and turmoil at home, we can no longer take for granted the American people's willingness to support a major American role in the world, unless it believes that its government is exploring all reasonable avenues toward peace.

We know that we cannot always avoid some frictions with the Soviet Union. But by balancing the harsher aspects of the relationship with cooperative efforts and a clear vision of a more peaceful world, we will be better able to rally public support for the necessary firmness in a crisis. And if we should be faced against our wishes with a period of renewed Soviet aggression, the American people will be better prepared to make the necessary sacrifice knowing that all other paths have been seriously explored. If confrontation should once again be our fate, it must be clear that we had no other alternative.

*********************

- 15 -

## II. The Evolution of Detente - the Balance of Risks and Incentives

The course of detente has not been smooth or even. As late as 1969 Soviet-American relations were ambiguous and uncertain. To be sure negotiations were initiated on, for example, Berlin and SALT. But the tendency towards confrontation seemed dominant.

We were challenged by Soviet conduct in the Middle East ceasefire of August 1970, during the Syrian invasion of Jordan in September 1970, on the question of a possible Soviet submarine base in Cuba, in actions around Berlin, and during the Indo-Pakistani war. Soviet policy seemed directed toward creating detente in bilateral relations with our allies in Western Europe, while challenging the US.

We demonstrated then, and stand ready to do so again, that America will not yield to pressure or the threat of force. We made clear then -- as we do today -- that detente cannot be pursued selectively in one area or towards one group of countries only. For us Detente, like peace, is indivisible.

Finally, a breakthrough was made in 1971 on several fronts -- in the Berlin settlement, in the SALT talks, in other arms control negotiations -- that led to what is now considered the process of detente. It consists of these elements: the elaboration of principles; political discussions to solve outstanding issues and to reach cooperative agreements, economic relations; and arms control negotiations especially concerning strategic arms.

- 16 -

A. The Elaboration of Principles

Cooperative relations, in our view, must be more than a series
of isolated agreements. They must reflect an acceptance of mutual
obligations, and of the need for accommodation and restraint.

Setting forth principles of behavior in formal documents is
hardly a guarantee that they will be observed. But they can provide
reference points against which to judge actions and set goals.

The first of these documents is the Statement of Principles
signed in Moscow in 1972. It affirms: (1) the necessity of avoiding
confrontation; (2) the imperative of mutual restraint; (3) the
rejection of attempts to gain advantages at each other's expense;
(4) the renunciation of claims of special influence in the world;
and (5) the willingness, on this new basis, to coexist peacefully
and build a firm long-term relationship.

Reflecting these principles, an agreement for the Prevention
of Nuclear War was signed in 1973. It states that the objective
of the policies of the US and the USSR is to remove the danger of
nuclear conflict and of the use of nuclear weapons. But it
emphasizes that this objective presupposes the renunciation of
any war or threat of war not only by the two nuclear superpowers
against each other, but also against allies or third countries. In

- 17 -

short the principle of restraint is not confined to relations between
the US and the USSR, it is implicitly extended to include all
countries.

These principles were neither an American concession nor an
on
the contrary we had affirmed them for two decades, nor were they
legal contract; rather they were an aspiration and a yardstick by
which we would assess Soviet behavior. We were not intending
to "rely" on Soviet compliance with every principle; we did seek
to elaborate standards of conduct which the Soviet Union could
violate only to its cost. And if over the long term, the more durable
relationship took hold, these basic principles would give it
definition, structure and hope.

B. Political Dialogue and Cooperative Agreements

One of the characteristics of the current phase of US-Soviet
relations is regular consultation between the leaders either
face-to-face or through diplomatic channels. This permits the
defusing of crisis situations as well as the elaboration of co-
operative projects.

The dangerous aspect of crises is that either side might
feel driven to act or to react on the basis of incomplete or con-
fusing information. Although our consultation has reached a level of
candor and frequency without precedent, we know that consultation
by itself does not guarantee that policies will be compatible. It

- 18 -

does provide a mechanism to resolve differences before they escalate to the point of public confrontation and commit the prestige of both sides. This channel between the highest leaders has proved its worth in many crises. It has continued without interruption under President Ford.

However, political crisis management is not an end in itself. The more fundamental goal is the elaboration of a bilateral relationship which in time will prevent crises from arising.

In the past, it was difficult to speak of a US-Soviet bilateral relationship in any normal sense of the phrase. Trade was negligible. Contacts between various institutions and between the peoples of the two countries were at best sporadic. There were no cooperative efforts in science and technology. Cultural exchange was modest. As a result there was no penalty for aggressive behavior, other than confrontation, but was there much tangible inducement towards cooperation. The current policy seeks to use the common interests the US and the Soviet Union share as major industrial countries to provide incentives for restraint. By joining efforts in such fields as medical research or environmental protection we and the Soviets can benefit not only our two peoples but all of mankind.

Since 1972 we have concluded agreements on a common
effort against cancer, on research to protect the environment,
on studying the use of the ocean's resources, on using atomic
energy for peaceful purposes, on studying methods for conserving
energy, on examining construction techniques for regions subject
to earthquakes, on devising new transportation methods. Other
bilateral areas for cooperation include an agreement on preventing
incidents at sea, an agreement to exchange information and
research methods in agriculture, and the training of astronauts
for the rendezvous and docking mission planned for our spacecrafts
in 1975.

Each project must of course be judged by the concrete
benefits that result. But in their sum they also constitute a
commitment to work together across a broad spectrum of the
institutions of both countries. The areas for dialogue and
active collaboration between our two governments has been vastly
expanded, thus creating growing commitment on both sides to
a constructive relationship.

C. The Economic Component

During the period of the Cold War economic contact
between ourselves and the USSR was virtually non-existent.

-20-

Even then many argued that improved economic relations might mitigate international tensions; in fact there were Congressional resolutions to that effect. But recurrent crises prevented any sustained progress. Thus the wheat sales of 1963, following the test ban treaty, remained an isolated transaction.

The period of confrontation should have left little doubt however that economic boycott would not transform the Soviet system or impose upon it a conciliatory foreign policy. The USSR was quite prepared to maintain heavy military outlays and to concentrate on capital growth by using the resources of the Communist world alone. Moreover it proved impossible to mount an airtight boycott in practice, since over time, most if not all the other major industrial countries became involved in trade with the East.

The question then became how trade and economic contact -- in which the Soviet Union is obviously interested -- could serve the purposes of peace. On the one hand, economic relations can not be separated from the political context. Clearly, we cannot be asked to reward hostile conduct with economic benefits even if in the process we deny ourselves some commercially profitable opportunities. On the other hand, when political relations begin to normalize it would be wrong not to normalize should not be normally be well economic relations to keep pace with the overall process.

-21-

As political relations have improved on a broad basis, economic issues have been dealt with on a comparably broad front. A series of interlocking economic agreements with the USSR were negotiated, side by side with the political progress already noted. The 25-year-old lend-lease debt was settled; the reciprocal extension of most favored nation treatment was negotiated, together with safeguards against the possible disruption of our markets and a series of practical arrangements to facilitate the conduct of business with the USSR by American firms; our government credit facilities were made available for trade with the USSR; a maritime agreement regulated the carriage of goods. These were all primarily regulatory agreements conferring no immediate benefits on the Soviet Union but serving as blueprints for an expanded economic relationship if the political improvement continued.

This approach commanded widespread approval. It was considered a natural outgrowth of political progress. At no time were issues regarding Soviet domestic political practices raised. Not until after 1972 were the Soviet domestic order invoked as a reason for arresting or reversing the progress so painstakingly achieved.

-- For the Soviet Union, it casts doubt on our reliability as a negotiating partner;

- 23 -

-- The technology that flows to the USSR may have a few indirect uses for military production. But with our continuing restrictions on strategic exports, we can maintain adequate controls -- and we intend to do so. Moreover, the same technology has been and will remain increasingly available to the USSR from other non-Communist sources. Boycott denies us a means of influence and possible commercial gain; it does not deprive the USSR of technology.

-- The actual and potential flow of credits from the US represents a tiny fraction of capital available to the USSR domestically and elsewhere, including Western Europe and Japan. But it does allow us to exercise some influence through our ability to control the scope of the trade relationships.

-- Over time, trade and investment provide a means for blunting the autarchic tendencies of the Soviet system, stimulating a gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and fostering a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to political relations.

Ultimately the trading relationship must stand or fall on the basis of the advantages it provides both sides. The prospect of continued growth will act as an inducement for further improvement of relations and the danger of losing it as a deterrent to intransigence.

D. <u>The Strategic Relationship</u>

Perhaps the single most important component of our policy toward the Soviet Union is the effort to limit strategic weapons competition. It derives from a clear recognition that we cannot expect to relax international tensions or achieve a more stable international system, if the two strongest nuclear powers are conducting an unrestrained strategic arms race.

The strategic competition in which we are involved is non-f initial and involves
is historically unique:

-- Each side has the capacity to destroy mankind.

-- Failure to maintain at least equality could jeopardize
not only our freedom but <u>very</u> our <u>very</u> survival.

-- The lead time for technological innovation is so long, yet the pace of change <u>is</u> so relentless that the arms race and strategic policy itself are in danger of being driven by technological necessity.

-- When nuclear arsenals reach levels involving thousands of launchers and over ten thousand warheads, and when the characteristics of the weapons of the two sides are <u>very</u> different, it becomes difficult to specify what combination of numbers of strategic weapons and performance capabilities would give one side a militarily and politically useful superiority. At a minimum clear changes in the strategic balance can be <u>achieved</u> only by efforts so enormous and by increments so large that the <u>very</u>

- 25 -

attempt would be
quest for them is

highly destabilizing.

-- The prospect of a decisive military advantage, even if theoretically possible, is politically intolerable; neither side will passively permit a massive shift in the nuclear balance. In this sense each side helps to shape the military establishment of the other. The probable outcome of each succeeding round of competition is the restoration of a strategic equilibrium, but at increasingly higher force levels.

If forces
we are dominant

an arms race,
superficial

If necessary, the United States will sustain this competition. Indeed, it is likely that the United States would emerge from such a new era of competition with an advantage over the Soviet Union in most significant categories of strategic arms. But the political or military benefit which would flow from such a situation remaining elusive, however. The enormous destructive-ness of weapons, and the uncertainties regarding their effects in the absence of operational experience combine to make their use increasingly incredible. Military advantage grows ever more difficult to calculate.

The Soviet Union must realize that the overall relationship with the United States will be less stable if the strategic balance is sustained through unrestrained competitive programs.

Sustaining the buildup requires escalations by both sides that in

Indeed

- 26 -

time may prove incompatible with restrained international conduct. The very process of the strategic arms race has a high potential for feeding parallel attitudes on the other side. The effort then becomes self-confirming.

The cost and political instability of a race which is doomed to stalemate can be born by the American people only when it is clear that every effort has been made to prevent it. This is why every President since Eisenhower has pursued negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms while maintaining the military programs essential to strategic balance.

There are more subtle strategic reasons for our interest in SALT. Our supreme strategic purpose is the prevention of nuclear conflict, through maintenance of sufficient political and strategic power. Judgments as to what constitutes "sufficiency" have been contentious. Our judgments have changed with our experience in deploying these weapons and as the Soviets began first deploying and then expanding its own nuclear forces. When in the late 1960's it became apparent that the Soviet Union, for practical purposes, had achieved a kind of rough parity with the United States in nuclear forces, we adopted the posture of sufficiency.

We determined that stability required strategic forces

- 27 -

invulnerable to attack, thus removing the incentive on either
side to strike first. Reality reinforced doctrine. As techno-
logy it became apparent that neither side could realistically
expect to develop a credible disarming capability against the
other except by efforts so large as to represent a major
threat to political stability.

A corollary for our strategic planning was the decision
that in the unlikely event of nuclear attack, the President
should have a wide range of options in deciding at what level
and against what targets to respond. We designed our
strategic forces with a substantial measure of flexibility,
so that the United States response need not include an attack
on the aggressor's cities -- thus inviting the destruction of
our own -- but could instead hit targets other than major-
population centers. Translating this capability of our strategic
forces into a coherent system of planning became a novel, as
yet uncompleted, task of great complexity. (In our view it en-
hances the certainty of retaliation and that makes an attack
less likely. Above all, it preserves the capability for human
decision even in the ultimate crisis.

This strategic doctrine is based on the perception that
the time had passed when either great nuclear power would

permit the other to gain any significant or appreciable advantage
on strategic arms.
SALT became one means by which we and
the Soviet Union could enhance stability by setting mutual con-
straints on our respective forces and by gradually reaching an
understanding on the doctrinal considerations that underlie
the deployment of nuclear weapons. It can become one means
by which the two sides could reduce the suspicions and fears
which fuel strategic competition. In short, we intended that
SALT, might establish an alternative to the arms race.

Our specific objectives have been:

(1) to break the momentum of ever increasing levels of armaments;

(2) to control qualitative improvements of weapons systems;

(3) to moderate the pace of new deployments; and

(4) ultimately, to achieve reductions in force levels.

The SALT agreements already signed represent in terms
of the scope and character of the weapons programs a major
contribution to strategic stability and a significant first step
toward a longer term and possibly broader agreement.

When the first agreements in 1972 were signed, the
strategic situation was as follows:

- 29 -

the Soviet Union was engaged in a dynamic program had closed the numerical gap in ballistic missiles; they were deploying three types of ICBMs, at a rate of over 200 annually, and launching about 8 submarines annually with 16 ballistic missiles each.

the United States had ended its numerical build up in the late 1960s at a level of 1054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs. We were pursuing technological improvements, particularly

-30-

in MIRVs for the Poseidon and Minuteman missiles. Our
replacement systems were intended for the late 1970s
and early 1980s;

-- by most reasonable measures of strategic power,
we held an important advantage, which still exists.
But it was also clear that over time the Soviet Union would
be able, first, to exceed our numerical levels by a
considerable margin, and then develop the same technologies
we had already mastered.

Our aim, therefore, was to make a breakthrough
which by halting the momentum of Soviet programs would
contribute to a less volatile strategic environment. These
goals were achieved in the five year Interim Agreement
which limited anti-ballistic missile defenses and froze
the level of ballistic missile forces on both sides, offsetting the
Soviet represented the essential first step towards a less
volatile strategic environment!
By limiting anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's) to
very low levels of deployment, the United States and the
Soviet Union removed a potential source of instability;
for one side to build an extensive defense of its cities
against missile attack would inevitably be interpreted by
the other as a step toward a first-strike capability. Before
seeking a disarming capability a potential aggressor would
want to protect his population centers from incoming
nuclear weapons.

- 31 -

With the five-year SALT interim agreement freezing the numbers of offensive strategic missile launchers, represents the essential first step toward longer-term limits on these and other offensive weapons. Some have alleged that the interim agreement, which expires in October, 1977, penalizes the United States by permitting the Soviet Union to deploy more strategic missile launchers, both land-based and sea-based. Such a view is misleading.

When the agreement was signed in May 1972, the Soviet Union already possessed more land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) than the United States and, given the pace of its submarine construction program, over the next few years it could have built virtually twice as many nuclear submarines, with ballistic missiles.

The interim agreement effectively dealt with these prospects; it halted a dynamic Soviet ICBM program at the then existing level; it put a ceiling on the heaviest Soviet ICBM's, the weapons that most concern us; and it set an upper limit on the Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program.

No American program was abandoned or curtailed because of this agreement. We remained free to deploy

- 32 -

multiple warheads, and no restraints were placed on bombers - a weapons system in which we have a large advantage. Indeed, the US lead in missile warheads may be somewhat greater at the end of this agreement than at the time of its signature.

The SALT I agreements were the first deliberate attempt by the nuclear superpowers to bring about strategic stability through negotiation. This ~~in itself is conducive~~ *new process*
to further restraint. For example, in the first round of SALT negotiations in 1970-72 both sides bitterly contested the number of ABM sites permitted by the agreement; two years later both sides gave up the right to build more than one site. In sum, we believed when we signed these agreements - and we believe now - that ~~by virtue of these~~ *they last implied* agreements the danger of nuclear war has been reduced, ~~that both sides have acquired~~ *last*~~ some greater interest in restraint, and that the basis ~~has been created for the~~ *last* present effort to reach a broader agreement.

The goal of the current negotiations is an agreement for a ten year period. *For the last two years we had* aimed at extending the Interim Agreement, with adjustments *aimed at dealing with* in the numbers and a new provision tackling the problem

- 33 -

of MIRVs. We found, however, that our negotiation over a two- or three-year extension tended to be overwhelmed by on-going programs of both sides that were due to be deployed just after, or at the end of the period. This distorted the negotiation, and indeed devalued its significance. Therefore we shifted to the ten-year approach, ~~in the interest of a better agreement.~~ The period is long enough to cover all current and planned forces but not so long as to invite hedges that would defeat the purpose of an arms control agreement. In fact it invites a slowing down of planned deployments. ~~A period of this length will allow us to set realistic ceilings that represent more than a temporary plateau from which to launch a new cycle in the arms race, ~~thus making future reductions become a realistic objective.~~

~~will respect the ceilings on strategic forces,~~ The central problem of course remains numerical ceilings. We have defined our goal as essential equivalence in strategic capabilities. What constitutes equivalence involved subjective judgment. Because US and Soviet forces are different from each other - in number and size of weapons, in technological refinement, in performance characteristics - they are difficult to compare.

~~We shall have to compare heavy bombers in which the United States is ahead of heavy missiles which the~~

- 34 -

the USSR has emphasized. We shall have to decide whether
to insist on equivalence in every category or whether to
permit trade-offs in which an advantage in one category
compensates for a disadvantage in another. This is not
~~the~~ does not remain static.
a static equation, We shall have to relate present advantages
to potential development, existing disparities to future
trends. This is a difficult process but we are confident
that it can be solved.

Numerical balance is no longer enough.
In order to achieve the stability that we deem
essential, it will be necessary not only to limit numbers
of strategic weapons but to restrain the increasing destructive
potential of these weapons. Thus, our second task is to
limit the scope of technological change in such areas as
missile throw weight, multiple reentry vehicles and missile
accuracy. We are dealing not only with disparate levels
of forces but with disparate capabilities, of which MIRV
technology is a conspicuous example. The rate of increase
of warheads is surging far ahead of the increase in delivery
of vehicles. This is only the United States considering
a limitation of MIRV's must be an essential
component of the next phase of the SALT negotiations.

If we fail, the rate of technology will outstrip the need
to design effective
capacity for limitations; constantly proliferating warheads
of increasing accuracy will overwhelm fixed launchers.

(Y)

S

- 35 -

The third area for negotiations is the pace of deployments of new or more modern systems. Neither in its current position without change, side will remain unchanged for another decade. The Soviets are already embarked on testing and initial deployment of a third generation of ICBMs and on a third modification of submarine launched missiles -- though the rate of deployment so far has been far short of the maximum pace of the late sixties.

For our part we are planning to introduce the Trident system, and to replace the B-52 force with the B-1; we also have the capability of improving our Minuteman ICBM system, adding to the level of MIRV missiles, and, if we choose, of deploying mobile systems, land based or airborne. Thus, the task of the negotiators is to see whether the two sides can agree to slow the pace of deployment so that modernization is less likely to threaten the overall balance or trigger an excessive reaction by the opponent.

Finally, a ten year program gives us a better chance to negotiate reductions. Reductions have occasionally been proposed as an alternative to ceilings; they are often seen as more desirable; or at least, seen as less desirable; or easier to negotiate. In fact, it is a more complicated problem. Reductions in launchers, for example,

- 36 -

if not accompanied by restrictions on the numbers of
warheads will only magnify the vulnerability of the remaining
force. The fewer the aim points the simpler it would be
to calculate an attack. At the same time reductions will
have to proceed from some base line and must therefore
be preceded by ceilings - if only of an interim nature.
But a ten year program should permit the negotiations of
stable ceilings and hence the start of a process of reductions.

Detente is admittedly far from a modern equivalent
to the kind of stable peace that characterized most of the
19th century. But it is, a long step away from the bitter
and aggressive spirit that has characterized so much of
the post-war period. When linked to such broad and
unprecedented projects as SALT, detente takes on added
meaning and opens prospects of a more stable peace. SALT
agreements should be seen as steps in a process leading
to progressively greater stability. It is in that light that
SALT and related projects will be judged by history.

### III. An Assessment of Detente

Where has the process of detente taken us so far? What
are the principles that must continue to guide our course?

The course of improving relations with another nuclear
superpower basing itself on a profoundly different philosophy is bound

-39-

to be uneven. Soviet purposes and ours will inevitably clash in many
places around the world. The challenge is to contain these differences
below the threshold of confrontation. The issue is not whether differences
can be removed, but whether competition can be restrained and cooperation
broadened.

In this sense major progress has been made:

-- Berlin's perennial potential as Europe's flashpoint
has been substantially reduced through the Quadripartite
agreement. Needless to say, the U.S. considers strict
adherence to the agreement a major test of detente.

-- We and our allies are launched on negotiations with
the Warsaw Pact and other countries in the European
on security and cooperation
Conference designed to foster East-West dialogue and
cooperation.

-- At the same time NATO and the Warsaw Pact are negotiating
the reduction of opposing forces in Central Europe.

-- The honorable termination of America's direct military
involvement in Indochina and the substantial lowering
of regional conflict was due to many factors. But
this progress would have been much more difficult -
if not impossible - in an era of Soviet and Chinese hostility
toward the United States.

-40-

-- Recent diplomatic progress in the Middle East could have been complicated by Soviet adventurism. Instead it was eased by Soviet acquiescence. To be sure, the Arab attack on Israel left October war was made possible by Soviet arms. But it is also true that the belief by some Arab countries that the UN deliveries was too slow, the USSR was sacrificing their interests to detente has contributed to Soviet difficulties in the Middle East.

-- America's principal alliances have proved their durability in a new era. They have undergone a series of strains brought about by inevitable adjustments to new conditions. Instead, But detente has also helped to place our alliance ties on a more enduring basis by removing the fear that friendship with the United States involved the risk of unnecessary confrontation with the USSR.

-- Many incipient crises with the East have been contained or settled without ever reaching the point of public disagreement.

-- A series of bilateral cooperative relations have changed the nature of the US-Soviet relationship in a positive direction. With political ramifications going beyond their technical significance, these arrangements will have an impact.

-- We have achieved unprecedented agreements in arms limitation and measures to avoid accidental war, as well as war by miscalculation.

-41-

-- New possibilities have emerged for positive US-Soviet cooperation on issues in which the globe is interdependent -- science and technology, environment, energy.

These accomplishments do not guarantee peace. But they have served to break down the rigidities of the past and offer unprecedented hope for a better era. Despite fluctuations a trend exists; the character of international politics has been markedly changed.

It is too early to judge conclusively whether this change should be ascribed to tactical motives: On a sense, however, the issue is immaterial. For whether the change is temporary and tactical, or lasting and basic, our task is essentially the same: to guide it by the purpose of a secure peace and man's yearning for a better life. A tactical change becomes a lasting transformation, sufficiently prolonged.

But the very success of the process can be jeopardized by being taken for granted. As the Cold War recedes in memory, a relaxation of tensions can come to seem so natural that it seems safe to levy progressively greater demands which may tax its tolerances. The temptation will grow to combine detente with increasing pressure on the Soviet Union. Such an attitude would be disastrous. We would not accept it from us, Moscow. However, it will not accept it from us. We will finally wind up with the cold war, which we thought had been overcome.

-42-

To be sure, the process of detente raises serious issues, but we must detent me deal with these in terms of the principles which underlie our policy.

First, if detente is to endure, both sides must benefit.

There is no question that the Soviet Union obtains benefits from detente. On what other grounds would the tough minded members of the Politburo sustain it? But the essential point surely must be that detente also serves American and world interests as well. If these coincide with some Soviet interests, this will only strengthen the durability of the process.

On the global scale, in terms of the conventional measures of power, influence and position, our interests have not suffered. After all, we certainly propose to do many things in the world where the influence of power, influence and position, our interests have not suffered. Indeed as I have indicated, there are areas in the world where the influence and the respect we enjoy are greater than was the case for many years.

-43-

It is also true that Soviet influence and presence are felt in
many places around the world. But this is a
reality that would exist without detente. The record shows that
detente does not deny us the opportunity to counteract and
and to offset it.
sometimes even to reduce it.

Our relations with the USSR have only just begun to
proliferate across the broad range of activities in which our
societies engage. Of course, there are instances
where the Soviet Union has obtained some particular advantage.
But we seek in each agreement or project to provide for benefits
that are mutual -- in any event we attempt to make sure that
there are trade-offs among the various programs that are implemented.
Many of the projects now underway are in their infancy; we have
many safeguards against unequal benefits -- in our laws, in the
agreements themselves and in plain common sense. We must
also recognize that in a hostile environment programs inherently
beneficial to both sides will be pursued in terms of unilateral
advantage. The more the compatibility of certaininte rests
is acknowledged, the more cooperative programs can be made to
serve larger purposes. Americans surely are the last who need
fear hard bargaining or lack confidence in competition.

-44-

Second, building a new relationship with the Soviet Union does not entail any devaluation of traditional Alliance relations.

~~Our allies themselves seek, as a common objective, an easing of international tensions.~~ Our approach to relations with the USSR has always been, and will continue to be, rooted in the belief that the cohesion of our alliances, and particularly of the Atlantic Alliance, is a precondition for establishing a more constructive relationship with the USSR.

Crucial, indeed unique, as may be our concern with Soviet power, we do not delude ourselves that we should deal with it alone. When we speak of Europe and Japan as representing centers of power and influence in the last third of our century, we describe not merely an observable fact but an indispensable element in the equilibrium needed to keep the world at peace. The cooperation and partnership between us transcend formal agreements, ~~which merely reflect values and traditions not soon,~~

~~if ever, to be shared with our adversaries.~~

Inevitably, a greater sense of drama accompanies our dealings with the Soviet Union because the central issues of war and peace cannot be other than dramatic. It was precisely the concern that Alliance relations not be taken for granted that led to the American initiative in April of 1973 to regenerate our traditional

-45-

associations. We sought political acts of will, to transcend
~~but~~ ~~and~~ either routine or the highly technical issues at hand, in order to
~~our underlying goals~~ reassert and thus enhance our fundamental bonds. Much has been
accomplished. The complications attendant to adapting U.S. -
~~their~~ European relations should not be confused with our basic character.
~~that is not affected~~ We were tested in difficult conditions not related to our central
purposes. Today relations with Europe and Japan are strong and
improving. We have made progress in developing common positions
~~on security, detente and energy.~~ We have demonstrated that not-
~~only is there no contradiction between vigorous, organic alliance
relations and a more positive relationship with adversaries, but
~~that they are mutually reinforcing.~~ Indeed

Third, the emergence of more normal relations with the
***Soviet Union*** must not undermine our resolve to maintain our
***national defense.***

While some deny that any progress has been made in achieving
~~a more stable relationship with the Soviet Union, others believe~~
~~that the goal has already been reached and that political stability
~~will be self-enforcing. The tendency in democratic societies to
relax as dangers seem to recede is real; there is an inclination
to view the maintenance of strength as incompatible with relaxation of
tensions, rather than its precondition. But this is primarily a
question of leadership. ~~We shall attempt to be透明~~ And this Administration will not be lulled
~~in the issue of national defense.~~ With the real danger facing
~~the Administration, America, this Administration
~~will not be misled-or mislead-on issues of
~~national defense.

-46-

NOTICE: The same time we do not accept the propositions set forth in the above notice, we maintain our defense society that needs artificial crises to do what is needed for survival will soon find itself in mortal danger.

We need a consensus that is mature enough to avoid unwarranted swings in mood and expectation; a consensus which understands that detente, let alone peace, cannot be taken for granted; a consensus which also recognizes that the incentives for peace and deterrents to war depend on adequate military power.

Fourth, we must know what can and cannot be achieved in changing human conditions in the East.

The question of dealing with Communist governments has troubled the American people and the Congress since 1917. There has always been a fear that by working with a government whose internal policies differ so sharply with our own, we are in some manner condoning these policies or encouraging their continuation. Some agree that until there is a genuine "liberalization" or signs of serious progress in this direction, all elements of conciliation in Soviet policy must be regarded as temporary and tactical. In that view, demands for internal changes must be the condition for the pursuit of a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.

One view is as follows: we shall insist on responsible international behavior by the Soviet Union. This is the primary

-48-

Both as a government and as a people we have made the attitude of the American people clear on countless occasions, in ways that have produced effective results. I believe that both the Executive and the Congress, each playing their proper role, have been effective. With respect to the specific issue of emigration:

-- The education exit tax of 1971 is no longer being collected. This government has been assured that it will not be reapplied.

-- Hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government have been given increased attention, and there have been remedies in many well-known instances.

-- The volume of Jewish emigration has increased from a trickle to tens of thousands.

-- And we are now moving toward an understanding that should significantly diminish the obstacles to emigration and ease the hardship of prospective emigrants.

Thus, we have accomplished much. But we cannot demand that the Soviet Union, in effect, suddenly reverse five decades of Soviet, and centuries of Russian history. Such an attempt would be futile and at the same time it would hazard all that has already been achieved. Changes in Soviet society have already occurred, and more will come. But they are most likely to

-49-

develop through an evolution that can go forward best in an
environment of decreasing international tensions.

## Agenda for the Future

Detente is a process, not a fixed condition which is bound to continue for as long into the future as one can see. It is obvious that the main concern between the superpowers must be to reduce the sources of potential conflict. This requires several interrelated areas of mutual effort.

- The military competition in all its aspects must be subject to increasingly firm restraints by both sides.

- Political competition, especially in moments of crisis, must be guided by the principles of restraint set forth in the documents described earlier. Crises there will be but there is a special requirement on the United States and the Soviet Union simply because of the cataclysmic military power that we wield and represent. Exploitation of crisis situations for unilateral gain can no longer be an accepted feature of superpower conduct. There is, on the contrary, a special superpower responsibility to encourage peaceful settlement of disputes.

- This restraint in crises must be augmented by co-operation in removing the causes of crises. The

-50-

old notion that political advantage can be derived
~~from keeping crises below the boiling point~~ is an
~~anachronism.~~ There have been too many instances,
notably in the Middle East, which demonstrate that
policies of unilateral advantage through efforts to
~~manipulate tensions~~ sooner or later run out of con-
trol and lead to the brink of war, if not beyond.

As far as the United States are concerned, there is no
~~ possibility for positive cooperation, in an ameliorative or supportive capacity, to
encourage negotiation and peaceful settlements. ~~

-- The process of negotiations and consultation must be continuous and intense. But no "superpower agreement" between the nuclear enemies can be durable over the heads of other nations until we make it clear who have a stake in the outcome. We cannot impose peace; we can, however, see that our own actions and conduct are conducive to peace.

Only in the coming months must be:

we shall strike a deal

STL

-- completion of the negotiations for comprehensive and ~~complete~~ equitable limitations on strategic arms beyond the expiration date of the present agreement in 1977, at least until 1985;

STL

-- completion of the multilateral negotiations on mutual ~~complete~~

-51-

force reductions in Central Europe, so that security
enhanced all
will be equally strengthened for the countries of Europe;
conclude

-- the Conference of European security and cooperation in
a manner that promotes both security and human aspira-
tions;
continue

-- continuation of the efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries without depriving those countries of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy;
complete

-- ratification of the recently negotiated treaty banning
underground nuclear testing by the US and USSR above
a certain threshold;
byeen

-- beginning of negotiations on the recently agreed effort
to overcome the possible dangers of environmental
modification techniques for military purposes;
resolve

-- resolution of the long-standing attempts to cope with
the dangers of chemical weaponry.

Beyond the formal agreements, we must never forget that
the process of detente depends ultimately on habits and modes
of conduct that extend the letters of agreements to the spirit of
relations as a whole. Even if each of the negotiations now in
progress or envisaged were to succeed, the level of diversity
of arms remaining will be so great that there would be no
guarantee against their use if other interests came into conflict.

- 52 -

In compiling catalogues of the desirable, we must take care not to jeopardize what is attainable. We must consider what alternative policies are available, and what their consequences would be. And, the implications of alternatives must be examined, not just in terms of a single issue, but *in terms of how they might affect the entire range of Soviet-American relations and the prospects for world peace.*

We must assess not only individual challenges to detente, but also their cumulative impact:

* If we justify each agreement with Moscow only when we can show unilateral gain;

* If we strive for an elusive strategic "superiority";

* If we systematically block benefits to the Soviet Union;

* If we try to transform the Soviet system by pressure;

* If, in short, we look for final results before we agree to any results,

We would be reviving doctrines of liberation and massive retaliation of the 1950s, at a time when Soviet physical power and influence on the world are greater than a quarter century ago when those policies were devised and failed. The futility of such a course is as certain as its danger.

- 53 -

Let there be no question, however, that Soviet actions
could destroy detente, as well.

If the Soviet Union uses detente to strengthen its military
capacity in all fields;

If in crises it acts to sharpen tension;

If it does not contribute to progress towards stability;

If it seeks to undermine our alliances;

If it is deaf to worldwide needs of the least developed then
emerging issues of interdependence conflicts
it in turn tempts a return to the tensions and confrontations we
have made such efforts to overcome. The policy of confrontation
has worked for neither of the superpowers.

We have insisted toward the Soviet Union that we cannot
have the atmosphere of detente without the substance. It is
equally clear that the substance of detente will disappear in an
atmosphere of hostility.

We have profound differences with the Soviet Union -- in
our values, our methods, our vision of the future. But it is
these very differences which compel any responsible adminis-
tration to make a major effort to create a more constructive
relationship.

We are challenged.

STATEMENT
by
SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER
BEFORE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

I. The Challenge

Since the dawn of the nuclear age the world's fears
of holocaust and its hopes for a stable peace have turned
on the relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union.

Throughout history men have sought peace but suffered
war; all too often deliberate decisions or miscalculations
have brought violence and destruction to a world yearning
for tranquility. Tragic as the consequences of violence
may have been in the past, the issue of peace and war
takes on unprecedented urgency when, for the first time
in history, two nations have the capacity to destroy
mankind. In the nuclear age, as President Eisenhower
pointed out two decades ago, "there is no longer any
alternative to peace".

The destructiveness of modern weapons defines the
necessity of the task; the deep differences in philosophy and
interests between the United States and the Soviet Union point
up the scope and difficulty. These differences do not
spring from misunderstanding, or personalities, or transitory
factors:

-- They are rooted in history, and in the way the two
countries have developed.

-2-

-- They are nourished by conflicting values and opposing ideologies.

-- They are expressed in *sometimes* diverging national interests that produce political and military competition.

-- They are influenced by allies and friends whose association we value and whose interests we will not sacrifice.

Paradox confuses our perception of the problem of peaceful coexistence: if peace is pursued to the exclusion of any other goal, other values will be compromised and perhaps lost; but if unconstrained rivalry leads to nuclear conflict, these values, along with everything else, will be destroyed in the resulting holocaust. The struggle for peace is a moral duty that confronts each of the nuclear powers quite impartially. However competitive they may be at some levels of their relationship, both must base their policies on the premise that neither can expect to impose its will on the other without running an intolerable risk. The challenge of our time is to reconcile the reality of competition with the imperative of coexistence.

There can be no peaceful international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There will be no international stability

-4-

We must maintain a strong national defense while recognizing that in the nuclear age the relationship between military strength and politically usable power is more complex than historically.

Where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny is concerned we are not neutral. But other imperatives impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is consciousness of the necessity of peace - not moral callousness. We have an obligation to recognize that the preservation of human life and human society are moral values too.

We must be mature enough to recognize that to be a stable/relationship must provide advantages to both sides and that the most constructive international relationships are those in which both parties perceive an element of gain. Moscow will benefit from certain measures just as we will from others. The balance cannot be struck on each issue every day, but only over the whole range of relations and over a period of time.

## The Course of Soviet-American Relations

During those different days, some were tempted, by reflex, to conclude that antagonism was the central feature of the relationship and that US policy -- even while the Vietnam agony raised questions about our people's readiness to sustain a policy of confrontation -- had to be geared to this grim reality. Others recommended a basic change of policy: There was a barrage of demands to hold an immediate summit to establish a better atmosphere, to launch the SALT talks, and to end the decades-old trade discrimination against the Soviet Union which was widely criticized as anachronistic, futile, and counterproductive.

These two approaches reflected the two poles of the debate: that dominated most of the postwar period; they also revealed deep-seated differences between the American and the Soviet reactions to the process of international relations.

For many Americans, tensions and enmity in international relations are anomalies, the cause of which is attributed either to deliberate malice or a misunderstanding. Malice is to be combatted by force, or at least isolation; misunderstanding is to be removed by the strenuous exercise of good will. Communist states on the other hand, regard tensions as inevitable by-products of a struggle between opposing social systems.

Most Americans perceive relations between states as friendly or hostile, both defined in nearly absolute

-7-

terms. The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is conducted
in a grey area heavily influenced by the Soviet conception of
the balance of forces. Thus, Soviet diplomacy is never free
of tactical pressures or ~~tactical~~ adjustments, and it is never
determined in isolation from the prevailing military balance.
For Moscow, East-West contacts and negotiations are in part
designed to promote Soviet influence abroad especially in
Western Europe and to gain formal acceptance of those
elements of the status quo most agreeable to Moscow.

The issue, however, is not whether peace and stability
serve some Soviet purposes, but whether they serve our own.
Indeed, to the extent that our attention focuses largely on
Soviet intentions we create a latent vulnerability. If detente
can be justified only by a basic change in Soviet motivation,
the temptation becomes overwhelming to base US-Soviet
relations not on realistic appraisal but on tenuous hopes:
a change in Soviet tone is taken as a sign of a basic change
of philosophy. Atmosphere becomes confused with substance.
Policy oscillates between poles of suspicion and euphoria.

-8-
ignores that we have some ~~congruent~~ interests and that we
are compelled to coexist. Detente seeks an environment in
which competitors can regulate and restrain their differences
and ultimately move from competition to cooperation.

A. American Goals

America's aspiration for the kind of political environment
we now call detente is not new.

The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship
with the Soviet Union is not made in the name of any one
administration, or one party, or for any one period of time.
It expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the
American people for an easing of international tensions, and
their expectation that any responsible government will strive
for peace. No aspect of our policies, domestic or foreign,
enjoys more consistent bipartisan support. No aspect is more
in the interest of mankind.

In the postwar period repeated efforts were made to
improve our relationship with Moscow. The spirits of Geneva,
Camp David and Glassboro were evanescent moments in a
quarter century otherwise marked by tensions and by sporadic
confrontation. What is new in the current period of relaxation

-9-

A number of factors have produced this change in the
international environment. By the end of the sixties and the
beginning of the seventies the time was propitious -- no matter
which administration was in office in the United States -- for a
major attempt to improve US-Soviet relations. Contradictory
tendencies contested for preeminence in Soviet policy; events
could have tipped the scales towards either increased aggressiveness or towards conciliation.

-- The fragmentation in the Communist world in the
1960s challenged the leading position of the USSR and its
claim to be the arbiter of orthodoxy. The USSR could have
reacted by adopting a more aggressive attitude toward the
capitalist world in order to reassert its militant vigilance;
instead the changing situation and US policy seem to have
encouraged Soviet leaders to cooperate in at least a temporary
lowering of tension with the West.

-- The prospect of achieving a military position of near
parity with the US in strategic forces could have tempted Moscow
to use its expanding military capability to strive more determinedly

-10-

for expansion; in fact it tempered the militancy of some of its
actions and sought to stabilize at least some aspects of the
military competition through negotiations.

-- The very real economic problems of the USSR and Eastern Europe could have reinforced autarkic policies and the tendency to create a closed system; in actuality the Soviet Union and its allies came closer to acknowledging the reality of an interdependent world economy.

-- Finally, when faced with the hopes of its own people for greater well-being, the Soviet government could have continued to stimulate the suspicions of the Cold War to further isolate Soviet society, in fact it chose - however, calm its public reaction, inadequately and slowly - to seek to meet such sentiment by joining in a relaxation of tensions.

For the United States the choice was clear: to provide
as many incentives as possible for those actions by the
Soviet Union most likely to produce peace and individual
well-being and to develop a relationship less subject to the
swings between illusionary optimism and narrow antagonism
that had characterized most of the postwar period. We could
capitalize on the tentative beginnings made in the sixties of the
compelling new conditions of the 1970's.

-11-

We sought to explore every avenue towards an honorable and
just accommodation while remaining determined not to settle
for mere atmospherics. We relied on a balance of
mutual interests rather than Soviet intentions. When
challenged - such as in the Middle East, the Caribbean or
Berlin - we have always responded firmly. And when Soviet
policy moved towards conciliation we sought to turn what may
have started as a tactical maneuver into a durable pattern
of conduct.

Our approach proceeds from the conviction that in moving
forward across a wide spectrum of negotiations, progress in
one area adds momentum to progress in other areas. If we
succeed, then no agreement stands alone as an isolated
accomplishment vulnerable to the next crisis. We did not
invent the interrelationship between issues, the so-called
linkage concept, it was a reality because of the range of
problems and areas in which the interests of the United
States and the Soviet Union impinge on each other. We have
looked for progress in a series of agreements settling
specific political issues and we have sought to relate these
to a new standard of international conduct appropriate
to the dangers of the nuclear age. Our aim is that the
Soviet Union by acquiring a stake in this network of

-12-

relationships with the West will feel more conscious of
what is lost by a return to confrontation; indeed, that it
will develop a self-interest in encouraging the entire
process to go forward.

## B. The Global Necessities

In the late 1940s this nation engaged in a great debate
about the role it would play in the postwar world. We
forged a bipartisan consensus on which our policies were
built for more than two decades. By the end of the 1960s the
international environment which molded that consensus had
been transformed. What in the fifties had seemed a solid
bloc of adversaries had fragmented into competing centers
of power and doctrine; old allies had gained new strength
and self-assurance; scores of new nations had emerged and
formed blocs of their own; and all nations were being swept
up in a technology that was compressing the planet and
deepening our mutual dependence.

Then, as now, it was clear that the international
structure formed in the immediate postwar period was in
fundamental flux, and that a new international system was
emerging. America's historic opportunity was to help
shape a new set of international relationships -- more
pluralistic, less dominated by military power, less

-13-

susceptible to confrontation, more open to genuine cooperation among the free and diverse elements of the globe. This new, more positive international environment ~~would~~ be possible only if all the major powers - and especially the world's strongest nuclear powers - anchored their policies in the principles of moderation and restraint. They no longer have the power to dominate; they do have the capacity to thwart. They ~~would~~ can't not build the new international structure alone; they ~~would~~ an' make its realization impossible by their rivalry. ~~A new international order~~ requires more stable and cooperative US-Soviet relations.

Detente is all the more important because of what the creation of a new set of international relations demands of us with respect to other countries and areas. President Ford has assigned the highest priority to maintaining the vitality of our partnerships in Europe, Asia and Latin America. Our security ties with our allies are essential but we also believe that recognition of the interdependence of the contemporary world requires cooperation in many other fields. Our alliances are strained and weakened ~~if the~~ of each allied country ~~allied~~ United States is perceived by the public opinion as an obstacle to peace and if public debate

is polarized on the issue of whether friendship with

- 15 -

severely tested. The Middle East war demonstrated dramatically the integral relationship between economics and politics. Clearly whatever the state of our relations with the USSR the international economic agenda must be addressed. But the task would be infinitely more complex if we proceeded in a cold war environment.

At a minimum easing international tensions allows the West to devote more intellectual and material resources to these problems. Eventually it may create prospects for broader collaboration between East and West. It is significant that some of these global issues -- such as energy, cooperation in science and health, and the protection of the environment -- have already reached the US-Soviet agenda.

As security concerns reside, humane concerns come again to the fore. International organizations take on greater significance and responsibility, less obstructed by Cold War antagonisms. The climate of lessened tensions even opens

-16-

In the present period mankind may be menaced as much
by international economic and political chaos as by the danger
of war. Avoiding either hazard demands a cooperative world
structure for which improved East-West relations are essential.

### C. The Public Dimension

For any American policy to be effective, it must be
sustained by the American people over the longer term. After
two decades of global burdens, Cold War tensions, agonizing
conflict abroad and turmoil at home, we can no longer take for
granted the American people's willingness to support a major
American role in the world, unless it believes that its govern-
ment is exploring all reasonable avenues toward peace.

By balancing the harsher aspects of the relationship
with cooperative efforts and sustained by a clear vision of the
kind of peaceful world which we seek, we will be better able
to rally public support for the necessary firmness in crises.
Then we can do so without tearing the overall fabric of our
approach. And if against our wishes we should be faced with
a period of renewed Soviet aggression, the American people
will be better prepared to make the necessary sacrifice knowing
that all other paths have been explored. If confrontation should
once again be our fate, it must be clear that we had no other choice.

*********************

-17-

The course of detente has not been smooth or even. As late as 1969 Soviet-American relations were ambiguous and uncertain. To be sure negotiations on Berlin and SALT had begun. But the tendency towards confrontation appeared dominant.

We were challenged by Soviet conduct in the Middle East ceasefire of August 1970, during the Syrian invasion of Jordan in September 1970, on the question of a possible Soviet submarine base in Cuba, in actions around Berlin, and during the Indo-Pakistani war. Soviet policy seemed directed toward creating a detente in bilateral relations with our allies in Western Europe, while challenging the US.

We demonstrated then, and stand ready to do so again, that America will not yield to pressure or the threat of force. We made clear then -- as we do today -- that detente cannot be pursued selectively in one area or towards one group of countries only. For us detente is indivisible.

Finally, a breakthrough was made in 1971 on several fronts -- in the Berlin settlement, in the SALT talks, in other arms control negotiations -- that generated the process of detente. It consists of these elements: the elaboration of principles; political discussions to solve outstanding issues and to reach cooperative agreements; economic relations; and

-18-

Cooperative relations, in our view, must be more than a
series of isolated agreements. They must reflect an acceptance
of mutual obligations and of the need for accommodation and
restraint.

To set forth principles of behavior in formal documents is
hardly a guarantee that they will be observed. But they can be
reference points against which to judge actions and set goals.

The first of these documents is the Statement of Principles signed in Moscow in 1972. It affirms: (1) the necessity of avoiding confrontation; (2) the imperative of mutual restraint; (3) the rejection of attempts to exploit tensions to gain unilateral advantages; (4) the renunciation of claims of special influence in the world; and (5) the willingness, on this new basis, to coexist peacefully and build a firm long-term relationship.

An Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War was signed in 1973, reflecting these principles. It affirms that the objective of the policies of the US and the USSR is to remove the danger of nuclear conflict and to use nuclear weapons. But it emphasizes that this objective presupposes the renunciation of any war or threat of war not only by the two nuclear superpowers against each other, but also against allies or third countries. In

other words, the principle of restraint is not confined to
relations between the US and the USSR, it is implicitly extended
to include all countries.

These statements of principles were not an American con-
cession; indeed we had been affirming them unilaterally for two
decades. Nor were they a legal contract; rather they are an
aspiration and a yardstick by which we assess Soviet behavior.
We have never intended to "rely" on Soviet compliance with
every principle; we do seek to elaborate standards of conduct
which the Soviet Union could violate only to its cost. And if
over the long term, the more durable relationship takes hold,
the basic principles will give it definition, structure and hope.

B. <u>Political Dialogue and Cooperative Agreements</u>

One of the features of the current phase of US-Soviet
relations is the unprecedented consultation between the leaders
either face-to-face or through diplomatic channels. This has
permitted the defusing of crisis situations as well as the elabora-
tion of cooperative projects.

The danger of crises is that either side might feel driven
to act or to react on the basis of incomplete or confusing
information. Although our consultation has reached a level of
candor and frequency without precedent, we know that consultation
does not guarantee that policies are compatible. It does provide

a mechanism for the resolution of differences before they escalate to the point of public confrontation and commit the prestige of both sides. This channel between the leaders has proved its worth in many crises, but it has continued without interruption under President Ford.

But crisis management is not an end in itself. The more fundamental goal is the elaboration of a political relationship which in time will make crises less likely to arise.

In the past, it was difficult to speak of a US-Soviet bilateral relationship in any normal sense of the phrase. Trade was negligible. Contacts between various institutions and between the peoples of the two countries were at best sporadic. There were no cooperative efforts in science and technology. Cultural exchange was modest. As a result, no longer was there a tangible inducement toward cooperation and no penalty for aggressive behavior. Today our policy seeks to use the common interests the US and the Soviet Union share as modern advanced societies to provide incentives for restraint. By joining our efforts in such fields as medical research or environmental protection, we and the Soviets can benefit not only our two peoples but all mankind, in addition, we generate incentive for each other.

- 19 -

Since 1972 we have concluded agreements on a common
effort against cancer, on research to protect the environment,
on studying the use of the ocean's resources, on the use of
atomic energy for peaceful purposes, on studying methods for
conserving energy, on examining construction techniques for
regions subject to earthquakes, and on devising new transportation
methods. Other bilateral areas for cooperation include an
agreement on preventing incidents at sea, an agreement to
exchange information and research methods in agriculture,
and the training of astronauts for the rendezvous and docking
mission planned for our spacecrafts in 1975.

Each project must be judged by the concrete benefits that result. But in their sum -- in their exchange of information and people as well as in their establishment of joint mechanisms -- they also constitute a commitment to work together across a broad spectrum in both countries. The areas for dialogue and active collaboration have been vastly expanded, thus creating a growing commitment on both sides to a constructive relationship.

### C. The Economic Component

During the period of the Cold War economic contact between ourselves and the USSR was virtually non-existent. Even then many argued that improved economic relations might

- 20 -

several

The question then became how trade and economic contact
-- in which the Soviet Union is obviously interested -- could
serve the purposes of peace. On the one hand, economic
relations cannot be separated from the political context. Clearly,
we cannot be asked to reward hostile conduct with economic
benefits even if in the process we deny ourselves some
commercially profitable opportunities. On the other hand, when
political relations begin to normalize it is difficult to explain
why economic relations should not be *meaningful* as well.

-21-

We have approached the question of economic relations with deliberation and circumspection and as an act of policy not primarily of commercial opportunity. As political relations have improved on a broad basis, economic issues have been dealt with on a comparably broad front. A series of interlocking economic agreements with the USSR have been negotiated, side by side with the political progress already noted. The 25-year-old lend-lease debt was settled; the reciprocal extension of most favored nation treatment was negotiated, together with safeguards against the possible disruption of our markets and a series of practical arrangements to facilitate the conduct of business in the USSR by American firms; our government credit facilities were made available for trade with the USSR; a maritime agreement regulating the carriage of goods as has been signed and regulating the operation of the Black Sea fleet was made

This approach commanded widespread approval. It was considered a natural outgrowth of political progress. At no time were the issues of Soviet domestic political practices

-22-

raised. Not until *after* the 1972 agreements was the Soviet domestic order invoked as a reason for arresting or reversing the progress so painstakingly achieved, and *agreed*.

This sudden, *ex post facto* form of linkage raises serious questions:

-- The significance of trade, originally envisaged as only one ingredient of a complex and evolving relationship, is inflated out of all proportion;

-- The hoped-for results of policy become transformed into pre-conditions for any policy at all.

We recognize the depth and validity of the moral concerns expressed by those who oppose - or put conditions on - expanded trade with the USSR. But a sense of proportion must be maintained about the leverage our economic relations give us with the USSR:

-- Denial of economic relations cannot by itself achieve what it failed to do when it was part of a determined policy of political and military confrontation.

-- The economic bargaining ability of MFN is marginal. MFN grants no special privilege to the USSR; in fact it is a misnomer since we have such agreements with over

-23-

100 countries. To enact it would be to remove a
discriminatory hold-over of the days of the Cold War. To
continue to deny it is more a political than an economic
gesture, act

-- Trade benefits are not a one-way street; the laws of
mutual advantage operate or there will be no trade.

-- The technology that flows to the USSR as a result
of expanded US-Soviet trade may have a few indirect uses
for military production. But with our continuing restrictions
on strategic exports, we can maintain adequate controls --
and we intend to do so. Moreover, the same technology
has been available to the USSR and will be increasingly
so from other non-Communist sources. Boycott denies
us a means of influence and possible commercial gain;
it does not deprive the USSR of technology.

-- The actual ~~potential~~ flow of credits from the US
represents a tiny fraction of the capital available to the
USSR domestically and elsewhere, including Western
Europe and Japan. But it does allow us to exercise some
influence through our ability to control the scope of trade
relationships.

-24-

-- Over time, trade and investment may leaven the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system, invite gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political equation.

Ultimately the trading relationship must stand or fall on the basis of the advantages it provides both sides. But the benefit accruing to the Soviet Union is the result of our deliberate choice that we want to encourage the Soviet Union to join the world community. If it rewards the Soviet Union for anything, it is only for conduct in the international area consistent with peace and moderation.

-26-

achieved only be efforts so enormous and by increments so
large that the very attempt would be highly destabilizing.

-- The prospect of a decisive military advantage, even if
theoretically possible, is politically intolerable; neither side
will passively permit a massive shift in the nuclear balance.
In this sense each side helps to shape the military establishment of the other. Therefore, the probably outcome of each
succeeding round of competition is the restoration of a
strategic equilibrium, but at increasingly higher levels of forces.

If we are driven to it, the United States will sustain
an arms race. Indeed, it is likely that the United States
would emerge from such a competition with an edge over the
Soviet Union in most significant categories of strategic arms.

But the political or military benefit which would flow from such
a situation would remain elusive. The enormous destructiveness
of weapons, ~~and~~ the uncertainties regarding their effects ~~and~~
the absence of operational experience combine to make them ~~increasingly incredible.~~
~~the use of nuclear weapons~~

The Soviet Union must realize that the overall relationship
with the United States will be less stable if strategic balance is
sought through unrestrained competitive programs. Sustaining
the buildup requires exhortations by both sides that in

-27-

time may prove incompatible with restrained international
conduct. The very fact of a strategic arms race has a
high potential for feeding attitudes of hostility and suspicion
on both sides, transforming the fears of those who demand more
weapons into self-fulfilling prophecies.

The cost and political instability of a race which is
doomed to stalemate can be born by the American people only
if it is clear that every effort has been made to prevent it.
This is why every President since Eisenhower has pursued
negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms while
maintaining the military programs essential to strategic balance.

There are more subtle strategic reasons for our
interest in SALT. Our supreme strategic purpose is the
prevention of nuclear conflict, through maintenance of
sufficient political and strategic power. Estimates of what
constitutes "sufficiency" have been contentious. Our
judgments have changed with our experience in deploying
these weapons and as the Soviets expanded their own nuclear
forces. When in the late 1960's it became apparent that
the Soviet Union, for practical purposes, had achieved a
kind of rough parity with the United States, we adopted the
strategic doctrine of sufficient current posture of sufficiency.

-28-

We determined that stability required strategic forces invulnerable to attack, thus removing the incentive on either side to strike first. Reality reinforced doctrine. As technology advanced, it became apparent that neither side could realistically expect to develop a credible disarming capability against the other except through efforts so gigantic as to represent a major threat to political stability.

One result of this doctrine was that our strategic planning was based on the assumption that in the unlikely event of nuclear attack, the President should have a wide range of options in deciding at what level and against what targets to respond. We designed our strategic forces with a substantial measure of flexibility, so that the United States response need not include an attack on the aggressor's cities -- thus inviting the destruction of our own -- but could instead hit other targets. Translating this capability into a coherent system of planning became a novel, as yet uncompleted, task of great complexity, but progress has been made. In our view, it enhances the certainty of retaliation and that makes an attack less likely. Above all, it preserves the capability for human decision even in the ultimate crisis.

-29-

Another, at first seemingly paradoxical result was
a growing commitment to negotiated agreements on strategic
arms. SALT became one means by which we and the
Soviet Union could enhance stability by setting mutual
constraints on our respective forces and by gradually
reaching an understanding in the doctrinal considerations
that underlie the deployment of nuclear weapons. Through
SALT the two sides can reduce the suspicions and fears
which fuel strategic competition. SALT, in the American
conception, is a means to achieve strategic stability by
methods other than the arms race.

(2) to control ~~qualitative improvements of weapons~~ systems;

The SALT agreements already signed represent a
major contribution to strategic stability and a significant

-30-

When the first agreements in 1972 were signed, the
future strategic picture was not bright:

-- the Soviet Union was engaged in a dynamic
program that had closed the numerical gap in ballistic
missiles; they were deploying three types of ICBMs, at a
rate of over 200 annually, and launching on the average
eight submarines a year with 16 ballistic missiles each.

-- the United States had ended its numerical build
up in the late 1960s at a level of 1054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs.
We were emphasizing technological improvements, particularly

-31-

-- by most reasonable measures of strategic power, we
held an important advantage, which still continues. But it
was also clear that if existing trends continued the Soviet
Union would first, exceed our numerical levels by a consider-
able margin, and then develop the same technologies we had
already mastered.

The five year Interim Agreement which limited anti-
ballistic missile defenses and froze the level of ballistic
missile forces on both sides represented the essential first
step towards a less volatile strategic environment.

-- By limiting anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's) to very
low levels of deployment, the United States and the Soviet
Union removed a potential source of instability; for one side
to build an extensive defense for its cities would inevitably
be interpreted by the other as a step toward a first-strike
capability. Before seeking a disarming capability a potential
aggressor would want to protect his population centers from
incoming nuclear weapons.

-- Some have alleged that the interim agreement, which

-32-

expires in October, 1977, penalizes the United States by permitting the Soviet Union to deploy more strategic missile launchers, both land-based and sea-based, than the United States. Such a view is misleading. When the agreement was signed in May 1972, the Soviet Union already possessed more land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) than the United States and, given the pace of its submarine construction program, over the next few years it could have built virtually twice as many nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

The interim agreement halted a dynamic Soviet ICBM program at the then existing level; it put a ceiling on the heaviest Soviet ICBM's, the weapons that most concern us; and it set an upper limit on the Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program. No American program was abandoned or curtailed. We remained free to deploy multiple warheads. No constraints were placed on bombers - a weapons system in which we have a large advantage. Indeed, the US lead in missile warheads may be somewhat greater at the end of this agreement than at the time of its signature.

The SALT I agreements were the first deliberate attempt by the nuclear superpowers to bring about strategic stability through negotiation. This very process is conducive

-33-

to further restraint. For example, in the first round of SALT negotiations in 1970-72 both sides bitterly contested the number of ABM sites permitted by the agreement; two years later both sides gave up the right to build more than one site. In sum, we believed when we signed these agreements - and we believe now - that they had reduced the danger of nuclear war, that both sides had acquired some greater interest in restraint, and that the basis had been created for the present effort to reach a broader agreement.

The goal of the current negotiations is an agreement for a ten year period. We had aimed at extending the Interim Agreement with adjustments in the numbers and a new provision aimed at dealing with the problem of MIRVs. We found, however, that our negotiation over a two- or three-year extension was constantly threatened with irrelevance by on-going programs of both sides that were due to be deployed at the end of or just after the period. This distorted the negotiation, and indeed devalued its significance. We shifted to the ten-year approach because the period is long enough to cover all current and planned forces but not so long as to invite hedges that would defeat the purpose of an arms control agreement. In fact it invites a slowing down of planned deployments, and a period of this length will allow us to set realistic ceilings that represent more than a temporary plateau from which to

launch a new cycle in the arms race, thus making future reductions
thus being a realistic objective.

With respect to ceilings on strategic forces, we have
defined our goal as essential equivalence in strategic capabilities.
What constitutes equivalence involves subjective judgment.
Because US and Soviet forces are different from each other - in
number and size of weapons, in technological refinement, in
performance characteristics - they are difficult to compare.

Yet in the negotiations we shall have to compare heavy
bombers in which the United States is ahead with heavy missiles
which the USSR has emphasized. We shall have to decide
whether to insist on equivalence in every category or whether
to permit trade-offs in which an advantage in one category
compensates for a disadvantage in another. The equation
does not remain static. We shall have to relate present
advantages to potential development, existing disparities to
future trends. This is a difficult process but we are confident
that it can be solved.

Numerical balance is no longer enough. To achieve
stability, it will be necessary to consider as well the impact
of technological change in such areas as missile throw weight,
multiple reentry vehicles and missile accuracy. The difficulty

-35-

is that we are dealing not only with disparate levels of forces
but with disparate capabilities, MIRV technology is a con-
spicuous example. The rate of increase of warheads is surg-
ing far ahead of the increase in delivery vehicles. This is
why the United States considers limitation of MIRVs an
essential component of the next phase of the SALT negotiations.
If we fail, the rate of technology will outstrip our capacity to
design effective limitations; constantly proliferating warheads
of increasing accuracy will overwhelm fixed launchers. An
arms race will be nearly inevitable.

The third area for negotiations is the pace of deploy-
ments of new or more modern systems. Neither side will
remain in its present position without change for another
decade. The Soviets are already embarked on testing and
initial deployment of a third generation of ICBMs and on a
third modification of submarine launched missiles -- though
the rate of deployment so far has been far short of the
maximum pace of the late sixties.

Four our part we are planning to introduce the Trident
system, and to replace the B-52 force with the B-1; we
also have the capability of improving our Minuteman ICBM

-36-

system, adding to the number as well as capability of MIRV missiles, and, if we choose, of deploying mobile systems, land based or airborne. Thus, ~~the task of the negotiators~~ is to see whether the two sides can agree to slow the pace of deployment so that modernization is less likely to threaten the overall balance or trigger an excessive reaction.

Finally, a ten year program gives us a chance to negotiate reductions. Reductions have occasionally been proposed as an alternative to ceilings; they are often seen as more desirable, or, at least, easier to negotiate. In fact, it is a far more complicated problem. Reductions in launchers, for example, if not accompanied by restrictions on the number of warheads will only magnify vulnerability. The fewer the aim points the simpler it would be to calculate an attack. At the same time reductions will have to proceed from some base line and must therefore be preceded by ~~ceilings~~ - if only of an interim nature. But a ten year program should permit the ~~negotiations of stable ceilings and hence the start of a process of reductions.~~

Detente is admittedly far from a modern equivalent to the kind of stable peace that characterized most of the 19th century. But it is a long step away from the bitter and aggressive spirit that has characterized so much of the post-war period. When linked to such broad and unprecedented

-37-

## III. An Assessment of Detente

Major progress has been made:

-- Berlin's potential as Europe's perennial flash point
has been substantially reduced through the Quadripartite agree-
ment of 1971. Needless to say, the U.S. considers strict
adherence to the agreement a major test of detente.

-- We and our allies are launched on negotiations with
the Warsaw Pact and other countries in the European Conference
on Security and Cooperation, designed to foster East-West
dialogue and cooperation.

-- At the same time NATO and the Warsaw Pact are
negotiating the reduction of their forces in Central Europe.

- 38 -

of regional conflict were made possible by many factors. But
this achievement would have been much more difficult - if not
impossible - in an era of Soviet and Chinese hostility toward
the United States.

-- Recent diplomatic progress in the Middle East could have been complicated by Soviet adventurism. To be sure, the Arabs attacked Israel last October with Soviet arms. But it is also true that the belief by some Arab countries that the pace of deliveries was too slow contributed to Soviet difficulties in the Middle East.

-- America's principal alliances have proved their durability in a new era. Many feared that detente would undermine them. Instead, detente has helped to place our alliance ties on a more enduring basis by removing the fear that friendship with the United States involved the risk of unnecessary confrontation with the USSR.

-- Many incipient crises with the Soviet Union have been contained or settled without ever reaching the point of public disagreement. The world has been freer of East-West tensions and conflict than in the Fifties and Sixties.

-- A series of bilateral cooperative relations have turned the US-Soviet relationship in a far more positive direction;

- 39 -

the political ramifications of these arrangements transcend significance.

-- We have achieved unprecedented agreements in arms limitation and measures to avoid accidental war.

-- New possibilities for positive US-Soviet cooperation have emerged on issues in which the globe is interdependent

These accomplishments do not guarantee peace. But they have served to lessen the rigidities of the past and offer hope for a better era. Despite fluctuations a trend has been established; the character of international politics have been markedly changed.

It is too early to judge conclusively whether this change should be ascribed to tactical considerations. But in a sense, that is immaterial. For whether the change is temporary and tactical, or lasting and basic, our task is essentially the same: to transform that change into a permanent, undivided,和平的, 合作的, 幸福的 life.

to guide it by the purpose of a secure peace and man
yearning for a better life. A tactical change sufficiently prolonged becomes a lasting transformation.

But the whole process can be jeopardized if it is taken for granted. As the Cold War recedes in memory, detente can come to seem so natural that it appears safe to levy

- 40 -

progressively greater demands on it. The temptation to
combine detente with increasing pressure on the Soviet
Union will grow. Such an attitude would be disastrous. We
would not accept it from Moscow; however, we will not accept it from
us. We will finally wind up again with the Cold War which will
end peace or any form of Luminescence. We thought had been overcome.

To be sure, the process of detente raises serious issues for many people. Let me deal with these in terms of the principles which underlie our policy.

There is no question that the Soviet Union obtains
benefits from detente. On what other grounds would the
tough-minded members of the Politburo sustain it? But
the essential point surely must be that detente serves American
and world interests as well. If these coincide with some Soviet interests, this will only strengthen the durability of the process.

On the global scale, in terms of the conventional measures
of power, influence and position, our interests have not suffered
-- they have generally prospered. In many areas of the world
the influence and the respect we enjoy are greater than was the
case for many years.

- 41 -

It is also true that Soviet influence and presence are felt in many parts of the world. But this is a reality that would exist without detente. The record shows that detente does not deny us the opportunity to react to it and to offset it.

Our bilateral relations with the USSR are beginning to proliferate across a broad range of activities in our societies. Many of the projects now underway are in their infancy; we have many safeguards against unequal benefits -- in our laws, in the agreements themselves and in plain common sense. Of course, there are instances where the Soviet Union has obtained some particular advantage. But we seek in each agreement or project to provide for benefits that are mutual. We attempt to make sure that there are trade-offs among the various programs that are implemented. Americans surely are the last who need fear hard bargaining or lack confidence in competition.

Our approach to relations with the USSR has always been, and will continue to be, rooted in the belief that the cohesion of our alliances, and particularly the Atlantic Alliance, is a

- 42 -

to
precondition for establishing a more constructive relationship
with the USSR.

Crucial, indeed unique, as may be our concern with
Soviet power, we do not delude ourselves that we should deal
with it alone. When we speak of Europe and Japan as repre-
senting centers of power and influence in the last third of
our century, we describe not merely an observable fact but
an indispensable element in the equilibrium needed to keep
the world at peace. The cooperation and partnership between
us transcend formal agreements; they reflect values and
traditions not soon, if ever, to be shared with our adversaries.

Inevitably, a greater sense of drama accompanies our
dealings with the Soviet Union because the central issues of
war and peace cannot be other than dramatic. It was precisely
a recognition of this fact and an
the concern that Alliance relations not be taken for granted
that led to the American initiative in April of 1973 to regenerate
our traditional

- 43 -

associations. We sought political acts of will which would
transcend the technical issues at hand, symbolize our
enduring goals and thus enhance our fundamental bonds.
Much has been accomplished. The complications attendant to
adapting US-European relations should not be confused with
their basic character. We were tested in difficult conditions
that do not affect our central purposes. Today relations
with Europe and Japan are strong and improving. We have
made progress in developing common positions on security,
detente and energy. The experience of the past year has
demonstrated that there is no contradiction between vigorous,
organic alliance relations and a more positive relationship
with adversaries; indeed they are mutually reinforcing.

Third, the emergence of more normal relations with the
Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to maintain our
national defense.

The tendency in democratic societies to relax as
dangers seem to recede into view; there is an inclination
to view the maintenance of strength as incompatible with
relaxation of tensions, rather than its precondition. But
this is primarily a question of leadership. We shall
attempt to be vigilant to the real dangers facing America.

- 44 -

This Administration will not be misled - or mislead - on issues of national defense. At the same time we do not accept the proposition that we need crises to sustain our defense. A society that needs artificial crises to do what is needed for survival will soon find itself in mortal danger.

The question of dealing with Communist governments has troubled the American people and the Congress since 1917. There has always been a fear that by working with a government whose internal policies differ so sharply with our own, we are in some manner condoning these policies or encouraging their continuation. Some argue that until there is a genuine "liberalization" or signs of serious progress in this direction, all elements of conciliation in Soviet policy must be regarded as temporary and tactical. In that view, demands for internal changes must be the precondition for the pursuit of a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.

Our view is different. We shall insist on responsible international behavior by the Soviet Union and use it as the primary index of our relationship. Beyond this we will use our influence to the maximum to alleviate suffering and to respond to humane appeals. We know what we stand for, and we shall leave no doubt of it.

- 45 -

But we do not feel that detente should be dependant upon a change in the Soviet domestic structure. Detente of itself is relevant to human liberty: it has helped generate pressures and demands for openness which we are now witnessing. If we press our concerns too far or too publicly we may provoke a return to practices which increase international tensions and fuel domestic repression. A renewal of the Cold War would hardly encourage the Soviet Union to change its emigration policies or adopt a more benevolent view towards dissent.

Both as a government and as a people we have made the attitude of the American people clear on countless occasions, in ways that have produced results. I believe that both the Executive and the Congress, each playing its proper role, have been effective. With respect to the specific issue of emigration:

-- Hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government have been given increased attention, and remedies have been forthcoming in many well-known instances.

- 46 -

We have accomplished much. But we cannot demand
that the Soviet Union, in effect, suddenly reverse five
decades of Soviet, and centuries of Russian history. Such
an attempt would be futile and at the same time hazard all
that has already been achieved. Changes in Soviet society
have already occurred, and more will come. But they are
most likely to develop through an evolution that can go
forward best in an environment of decreasing international
tensions.

A review of the Cold War will clearly
emphasize the Soviet Union's failure to live up to its宣
policies or adopt a more behaviorist
attitude towards other nations.

Detente is a process, not a permanent achievement.

The agenda is full and continuing. Obviously, the main concern
must be to reduce the sources of potential conflict. This
requires efforts in several interrelated areas:

-- The military competition in all its aspects must be subject to increasingly firm restraints by both sides.

- 47 -

-- Political competition, especially in moments of crisis, must be guided by the principles of restraint set forth in the documents described earlier. Crises there will be but ... in the United States and the Soviet Union have a special obligation deriving from the unimaginable military power that they wield and represent. Exploitation of crisis situations for unilateral gain is not acceptable.

-- Restraint in crises must be augmented by cooperation in removing the causes of crises. There have been too many instances, notably in the Middle East, which demonstrate that policies of unilateral advantage sooner or later run out of control and lead to the brink of war, if not beyond.

-- The process of negotiations and consultation must be continuous and intense. But no agreement between the nuclear superpowers can be durable if made over the heads of other nations which have a stake in the outcome. We should not seek to impose peace; we can, however, see that our own actions and conduct are conducive to peace.

- 48 -

In the coming months we shall strive:

-- to complete the negotiations for comprehensive and equitable limitations on strategic arms beyond the expiration date of the present agreement in 1977, at least until 1985;

-- to complete the multilateral negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe, so that security will be enhanced for all the countries of Europe;

-- to conclude the Conference of European security and cooperation in a manner that promotes both security and human aspirations;

-- to continue the efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries without depriving those countries of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy;

-- to complete ratification of the recently negotiated treaty banning underground nuclear testing by the US and USSR above a certain threshold;

-- to begin negotiations on the recently agreed effort to overcome the possible dangers of environmental modification techniques for military purposes;

-- to resolve the long-standing attempts to cope with the dangers of chemical weaponry.

- 49 -

We must never forget that beyond the formal agreements
the process of detente depends ultimately on habits and modes
beyond

This only the whole process needs
of relations as a whole. Even if each of the negotiations now in
the carefully negotiated

progress or envisaged were to succeed, the level and diversity
of remaining arms would be so great that there would be no

- 50 -

In cataloging the desirable, we must take care not to jeopardize what is attainable. We must consider what alternative policies are available, and what their consequences would be. And, the implications of alternatives must be examined, not just in terms of a single issue, but for how they might affect the entire range of Soviet-American relations and the prospects for world peace.

* If we strive for an elusive strategic "superiority;"

* If, in short, we look for final results before we agree to any results, then we would be reviving doctrines of liberation and massive retaliation of the 1950s. And we would do so at a time when Soviet physical power and influence on the world are greater than a quarter century ago when those policies were devised and failed. The futility of such a course is as certain as its danger.

- 51 -

If it is deaf to the needs of the least developed and
the emerging issues of interdependence, then it in turn tempts
a return to the tensions and conflicts we have made such
efforts to overcome. The policy of confrontation has worked
for neither of the superpowers.

We face an opportunity that was not possible 25 years,
or even a decade ago. If that opportunity is lost, its moment

- 52 -

will not quickly come again. Indeed, it may not come at all.

As President Kennedy pointed out: "For in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future, and we are all mortal."