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THIS WEEK WITH DAVID BRINKLEY - December 2, 1990

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As a senator, is it your belief that, from a standing start--at the expiration of this time-out, as you call it--the president can initiate offensive action without getting the consent of Congress?

SENATOR DOLE: Oh, yes.

MR. WILL: He can?

SENATOR DOLE: Sure.

MR. DONALDSON: And is it your--

SENATOR DOLE: I don't think he intends that happen, unless there's some provocation between now--

MR. WILL: You're saying constitutionally he can, that that wouldn't violate the letter or spirit of the Constitution?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, we've done it in the past many times. We've only had about five declarations of war.

MR. WILL: Four hundred and thirty-thousand people from a standing start? That doesn't violate the letter or the spirit?

SENATOR DOLE: But I think between now and the 15th, unless there's some provocation on the other side, there will be no action at all.

MR. BRINKLEY: Sam, you've got a few seconds left.

MR. DONALDSON: But your recommendation--is Bob Dole recommending that, if after the 15th, there is no change in the situation, the president go ahead then and initiate military action?

SENATOR DOLE: No, no.

MR. DONALDSON: Or should we wait months to see if the sanctions work?

SENATOR DOLE: Listen, if we wait twelve months or eighteen months, as some have advocated, there won't be 10 percent of the American people supporting this effort, as important as it is.

My view is we continue to keep up the pressure; we try to get Congress involved; we let Saddam Hussein know we're serious about this; and we get the coalition to stick together. If everything else fails, you have to use force.

MR. BRINKLEY: Senator Dole, thank you; thanks very much for coming in.

SENATOR DOLE: Thank you.

NEWS TRANSCRIPTS, INC. - (202) 682-9050

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MR. BRINKLEY: Coming next, the U.S. secretary of defense, Dick Cheney--in a moment.

(Announcements)

MR. BRINKLEY: Mr. Secretary, thanks for coming.

SECRETARY CHENEY: Good morning.

MR. BRINKLEY: Glad to have you--you know everybody here.

SECRETARY CHENEY: I do indeed.

MR. BRINKLEY: I would like to ask you a question that I believe a great number of the American people are asking. What is there in Kuwait that is worth the spilling of American blood?

SECRETARY CHENEY: Well, I think, David, the point is the overall focus, of course, now is on Kuwait. But it's the long-term proposition that if Saddam Hussein is not stopped--it's the prospect of having a man who has acquired an enormous military force and used it twice to invade his neighbors, who's acquired weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, sit astride the world supply of energy--to be in a position, in effect, not only to have a choke hold on the world's economy, but also to convert all that wealth into even more military power and more military capability.

We're in a position now today, as part of an international coalition with the backing of the United Nations and some twenty-five other nations that have deployed forces to the Gulf, to see to it that he does not succeed--and that's what at stake in this instance.

MR. WILL: Congress, to whom you will speaking this week, heard last week testimony, including from former chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the embargo is working--twenty times more successful than other embargoes, some have said; and that, given twelve, perhaps eighteen months, it might work.

The vice president says waiting eighteen months would be a signal of weakness, and the coalition might not hold together. And the costs of acting militarily after waiting that long might be unacceptably high, if it doesn't work.

Where do you stand, on the basis of what evidence, about the success of the embargo today?

SECRETARY CHENEY: Well, we have to be precise about what we mean by success of the embargo. I would take success of the embargo as forcing his withdrawal from Kuwait, forcing the implementation of the U.N. resolutions--the release of all the hostages. I don't think anything short of that can be defined as success in this instance.

Now, whether or not the sanctions will produce that result, of course, is a subject of big debate. But I think it's doubtful that we can wait forever--some have suggested a year or two. And there are several propositions, I think, that have to be considered in that regard.

We talk about food, for example. It turns out that Iraq is, indeed, a major importer of food in the past; but that's not because they can't produce their own. That's because of incompetent economic policies. There are three occasions in the last twenty-five years when they've doubled their production

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of cereals, for example, within twelve months. That's clearly what they're doing again now; and they should be able to sustain themselves from an agricultural standpoint.

We know that the sanctions have some impact on his ability to get spare parts for his military machine. But right now, he's basically hunkered down, not using it. He's occupying Kuwait, but the op tempo isn't that high. So the expectation that the sanctions will definitely produce a result, it seems to me, is a risky one.

The other thing I'd add, George, is that there's a penalty to be paid by delay. This coalition that we put together that everything now rests upon wasn't there four months ago. It's taken an enormous amount of effort by the president and Jim Baker to assemble it. It includes the Iranians and the Syrians and the Saudis and the Egyptians, as well as other major powers--the Soviets. And being able to maintain and hold that together over that length of time, I think, is a risky proposition.

MR. WILL: Now, you're defining success clearly in terms of the stipulated, explicit U.N. agenda.

SECRETARY CHENEY: Right.

MR. WILL: The ambassador to the U.N. from Iraq said this morning and others have said there's a hidden--barely hidden anymore--U.S. agenda; and that has to do with reducing arsenal and, perhaps, the prestige of Saddam Hussein before we leave.

Given that there does seem to be an additional U.S. agenda, independent of the U.N. points--with regard particularly to nuclear weapons--the vice president has said it just yesterday, that it's unacceptable that he continue developing nuclear weapons--doesn't that radically reduce Hussein's incentive to get out of Kuwait, because we still have demands on him after he does that?

SECRETARY CHENEY: Well, I think the point would be that--assume for a moment that he complies, that he does withdraw from Kuwait--that we still are going to be faced with an Iraq that has enormous military capability and has demonstrated a desire to develop even more nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, et cetera; and that it would be important to fashion in the international community a set of sanctions that were targeted specifically on those technologies that he's trying to acquire to develop that capability. It would be foolish for us to do anything less.

And how that might affect his response, it seems to me, is problematical. He has to know--and I think the world knows--that we are very concerned about that capability, and that we are prepared to try to find diplomatic ways to deal with it, if possible; but it has to dealt with.

MR. DONALDSON: I want to pursue the point of the diplomatic initiative. But, first, as our defense secretary, tell us what means that within the past 24 hours Saddam Hussein has tested two of his Scud missiles.

SECRETARY CHENEY: Well, he has just test-fired some Scud missiles this morning, or Scud variants--fired him within Iraq. That is to say, they were launched inside and landed inside Iraq in a test program. Last time he did this was last April.

It's, I think, proof again, if anybody needed any, that he does in fact have ballistic missiles and the capacity to use them.

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MR. BRINKLEY: What can a Scud missile do in a military situation? How can it be used?

SECRETARY CHENEY: Scud is--

MR. BRINKLEY: Carry poison gas?

SECRETARY CHENEY: It could conceivably carry chemical weapons. In the past, he's used them with conventional high explosives on them. They've got a range of approximately 360 to 400 miles, depending upon which variant he uses. They're not very accurate--accurate enough to hit a city, not accurate enough to hit a point target.

MR. DONALDSON: What is your analysis? This is the first time he's done this since he invaded Kuwait. He did it just after the Baker initiative was announced. Do you think that was all planned, or just the military carrying out routine tests of Scud missiles?

SECRETARY CHENEY: Don't have any way of knowing, Sam. We may, in a few more days, after we're able to analyze the evidence, the data, and focus on it a bit, be able to come to those conclusions; but we can't this morning.

MR. DONALDSON: Now, let me ask you about the Baker initiative. If Saddam Hussein does not back down and say, well, now that you're here in Baghdad, thank you, because I do want a face-saving way to withdraw from Kuwait, and I can now talk to you about it. And if, in fact, as the president says, Secretary Baker has not gone to change the president's very stiff, no-negotiating posture, why isn't it proper to see this as simply a diplomatic feint to help assuage concerns in the United States--and among our allies--before we go to war?

SECRETARY CHENEY: I think the way to interpret what the president is doing here is exactly what the president said. And that is to make it abundantly clear by communicating directly with the Iraqi government that the president is, as he said on many occasions, deadly serious--that the only acceptable outcome is the full implementation of the U.N. resolutions: the withdrawal from Kuwait; the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait; and the release of all hostages. Those, indeed, are not subjects we can compromise on. We're not going to let him keep part of the hostages, or keep part of Kuwait. That would be unacceptable.

MR. DONALDSON: So you really are saying to us that the White House feared that Saddam Hussein did not believe George Bush long distance; but that if a Bush emissary comes and says the same thing, he might believe him.

But the emissary is not empowered to negotiate, to change a jot or tittle of U.S. foreign policy, to suggest that maybe a deal down the line could be made?

SECRETARY CHENEY: On those basic fundamental conditions that the United Nations has endorsed and that are at the heart of U.S. objectives in the area, Jim will not be going to negotiate. We will be going specifically to make it clear that the president is deadly serious, in fact.

MR. DONALDSON: How do you make that clear? I mean, how does a man--

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SECRETARY CHENEY: I think Secretary--

MR. DONALDSON: --sitting across the table make it clear? By a fierce look in his eye? By pounding the table? I mean, how do you do it?

SECRETARY CHENEY: I have known Jim Baker for many years. I know him to be a man who is extremely persuasive. We've just seen him put together a tremendous diplomatic victory in the United Nations Security Council vote. And I'm confident that he can convey, in no uncertain terms, to Saddam Hussein the president's wishes and desires.

MR. WILL: But there's one thing he could convey that a lot of Americans are anxious about. And that is, he could say: no give whatever; you have to satisfy these conditions--after which perhaps there can be a general Middle Eastern settlement. You know, something that gives Hussein what he's obviously looking for, which is a way of linking whatever he does to pressure on Israel.

Is that unacceptable from America's point of view?

SECRETARY CHENEY: My own personal view is that Saddam Hussein doesn't really care about the Israeli issue so much. He simply is trying to use it as leverage within the overall context of his own goals and aspirations in the Middle East.

I wouldn't want to forecast what Jim will do beyond what I've said. He will convey a very firm message to Saddam Hussein directly from the president.

MR. WILL: With regard to the worry that some Americans have and some of the testifiers last week in Congress had that the size of the deployment itself was driving us toward a decision to go to war, can we assuage anxieties on that subject--particularly with regard to rotation? Will there be rotation of the troops which, therefore, would allow the deployment to continue longer than, say, February?

SECRETARY CHENEY: Well, we will continue the deployment as long as we have to continue the deployment. I think the department's prepared, obviously, and the military, to do whatever the president directs us to do.

For now, we have put the question of rotation policy on the shelf--primarily because to do anything else would involve pulling people out as we were putting more people in. We wouldn't be able to achieve the level we'd like to achieve.

There's no question but what we're deploying a very, very significant force for very clear purposes.

MR. BRINKLEY: Just a few seconds left.

MR. DONALDSON: Finally, Mr. Secretary, do you still believe that Gorbachev will fail and be removed as the Soviet leader because of his failure to deal with the economy?

SECRETARY CHENEY: Well, Sam, I am intrigued with Mr. Gorbachev's ability to survive. I think, all in all--let's hope he's successful. But I haven't seen any significant progress yet on

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economic reform.

MR. DONALDSON: So you stick by your prediction?

SECRETARY CHENEY: I came this morning, Sam, to talk about the Middle East.

MR. DONALDSON: Ah, there's a waffle, if I heard it.

MR. BRINKLEY: Well, on that note, Sam, our time is up. Mr. Secretary, thank you--thank you very much for coming. Pleased to have you.