RICHARD NIXON

November 5, 1985

26 FEDERAL PLAZA
NEW YORK CITY

In my conversation with Deng, we covered a wide range of domestic and foreign policy issues. I shall try to cover in this letter those subjects he might raise with you and on which you might want to make points with him.

You can assume that he will be very tough on Taiwan. I made the point that the President had shown great courage and statesmanship in changing his views on Taiwan but that there was no way that he could at this time go further than he had gone and accede to the P.R.C.'s request via Margaret Thatcher that he mediate the issue. I emphasized that there was still a strong pro-Taiwan sentiment in the Congress, as evidenced by the Winston Lord confirmation hearings, and that the President had too much on his plate politically to tackle this issue at this time. I assured him that the Administration would not provide military assistance to Taiwan which would increase their offensive capability and that it would not discourage any efforts to reach a rapprochement. I deliberately tried to cut the conversation on this matter short so that we could get on to other issues. He was obviously not satisfied but he at least was left with no illusions that the President might be persuaded to play a mediator's role.

We had a long discussion of the strategic balance in the world. I noted that since my first visit in 1972, the Soviet threat as far as the P.R.C. was concerned was far greater today. The Soviets had moved from a position of nuclear parity in 1972 to nuclear superiority in the most powerful and accurate nuclear weapons -- land-based strategic and intermediate missiles. I also pointed out that the encirclement which the P.R.C. was concerned about in 1972 was far more dangerous today with the Soviets and their allies in Afghanistan, Vietnam, and

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Cambodia. I also made the point that the Soviets were now moving into a dominant position in North Korea. He tried to down play the significance of the Soviet planes in North Korea but was obviously sensitive on this score. I would urge that you indicate that your intelligence indicates a Soviet determination to replace the P.R.C. as the major supporting power for North Korea and that this, thereby, increases the encirclement danger.

I also made the point that while we understood why the P.R.C. would want to reduce tensions with the Soviet Union, public statements to the effect that the Chinese considered the U.S. and the Soviet Union to be equal obstacles to peace gave ammunition to the hawks who opposed President Reagan's decision to provide technology for the P.R.C. and would jeopardize any further transfers in this regard which the Chinese very much want. I told him that I had personally supported the technology transfer and would continue to do so but that while I trusted the Chinese leadership, there were strong and powerful forces in the Congress and the media who did not and who would seize upon the evidences of Sino-Soviet rapprochement to block such transfers in the future.

This got his attention. He insisted that the P.R.C.'s new independent line served the cause of peace. He made the point that getting the Soviet Union to move on the "three obstacles" -- Cambodia, Afghanistan, and their forces on the northern border -- would serve not only the interests of China but the cause of peace. But like Hu Yaobang, to whom I made the same points, he reacted almost violently to the suggestion that if the P.R.C. received technology there is a possibility they might make it available to the Soviet Union in the future. It was the only time during the two hours that he became very agitated and raised his voice saying, "Never, never, never." Of course this is what he had to say and it could have been an act, but you could well build on the point that I made because I think it does pose a real problem for technology transfers in the future. Their cozying up to the Soviets and particularly their equating of the U.S. and the Soviet Union as potentially aggressive powers could cause serious problems in the event that technology transfers are considered.

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It was obvious that I had hit a raw nerve, because he went to considerable length then to point out that in spite of the public statements, he wanted to make it very clear that the P.R.C. had far more differences with the Soviet Union that it had with the United States. On the other hand he made the point that because China was a very weak country militarily and would continue to be for a long time, "We don't want to tie ourselves to one chariot." I responded by saying that I recognized his concern and that what we should do was to develop a close strategic relationship privately between our military and intelligence agencies but to keep a low profile on that relationship publicly. He responded enthusiastically to that suggestion, observing that it was "a very good idea" and that he would welcome such cooperative contacts. I believe that this gives you a very good opening to follow up on my suggestion that you should make it clear that you are not sharing the views that he and you expressed with anybody else except the President and that consequently you are going to be very candid with him and you would hope that he would follow the same course with you.

He was more guarded than Hu Yaobang and Zhao in his evaluation of Gorbachev. But he did state categorically, "We have seen no change in his policies yet in relation to us." He said that they will continue to explore economic, cultural and other ties but until there was movement on the three obstacles, there could not be a real rapprochement. However, I sensed that if Gorbachev was smart enough to move on even one of the obstacles, we might expect a significant change on this front. In any event, you may want to explore the matter with him further.

On SDI, I noted that he had come out flatly against it and then gave him my own rationale which, incidentally, may not be exactly the same as yours. I pointed out first that the Soviet Union was spending twice as much on missile defense as we were. As far as a foolproof population defense was concerned, I pointed out that most of the experts do not believe it would be possible until the next century but that a system that would defend enough missile sites to deny the Soviets a first strike capability could become operational in the next

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ten years. I emphasized strongly that the major threat to peace in the world was the Soviet SS-18 first strike capability which provided a dangerous probability of their being able to use nuclear blackmail against the United States and our friends. I made the point that 40 MX missiles were not enough of an incentive to get the Soviets to reduce that threat and that in dealing with the Russians I had found that you can't get something from them unless you have something to give to them. He emphatically said, "I agree." I made the additional point that any program that makes the United States more secure, makes our friends more secure and, particularly where Japan was concerned, makes the credibility of our deterrent absolutely indispensable. I didn't have to paint any pictures for him to realize that if the U.S. nuclear deterrent lost credibility, the Japanese would have no option but to develop their own nuclear defense capability. He responded, in my view somewhat lamely, by saying that he didn't believe absolute parity was possible and that superiority is now irrelevant. He came down hard on the point that a nuclear arms race risks war and would hurt everyone. I got his attention somewhat when I observed that the P.R.C.'s opposition to SDI helps the Soviet Union by encouraging them to stonewall the President at Geneva. I won't go into further detail of our rather long conversation on this subject except to point out a rather curious conversation I had with Henry. He said that Han Xu had suggested that he talk to me about my conversation with Deng on SDI prior to the time that he sees Deng later this month. I also made my usual point, and yours as well, that it wasn't the existence of nuclear weapons but the failure to resolve political differences which lead to their use which brings war. His interview in *Time Magazine* last week would seem to reflect that point of view.

It was interesting to note how he had changed since the two times I talked to him in 1979 and the other occasion in 1982. He bluntly said that the P.R.C. had changed its policy of forming a line against the Soviet Union running from Japan, through China, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Europe. While Mao had said that war was inevitable, the situation has now changed and that he no longer believed that was the case. The Soviet Union has encountered great "problems" and the United States has recovered from