HENRY A. KISSINGER

April 30, 1997

Dear Mr. Aigner:

Please convey my great appreciation to President Johansson for his invitation to attend the European Cup championship match in Munich on May 28 as the guest of UEFA. There is nowhere I would rather be on that day but, unfortunately, some long-standing commitments here at home will keep me away. I am deeply touched by President Johansson's thoughtfulness, however, and hope to be able to see the game on television when it is shown here.

I am already making plans to attend the latter
matches of World Cup 1998 in France and am looking
forward to seeing you and President Johansson there,
if not before.

Mr. Gerhard Aigner
General Secretary
UEFA
Chemin de la Redoute 54
Case Postale
CH-1260 Nyon 2
Switzerland

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

28/04 '97 17:25 FAX 4122 994 44 88

UEFA NYON

001/003

The General Secretary

Chemin de la Redoute 54
Case postale
CH-1260 Nyon 2
Telephone ++41 22 994 44 44
Telefax ++41 22 994 44 88
Telex 419 706 UEF/CH

Union des associations
européennes de football

Sent in advance by Fax

Dr Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
NEW YORK, NY 10022

U.S.A.

APR 28 1997

Your reference

Your correspondence of

Our reference
A/urr/mp

Date
25.04.1997

Dear Dr Kissinger,

On behalf of the UEFA President, Mr Lennart Johansson, we have pleasure in inviting you
as his guest of honour to the

European Champion Clubs' Cup / UEFA Champions League Final 1996/97.

The match between Borussia Dortmund and Juventus FC will take place on 28th May 1997 at the Olympic Stadium in Munich (kick-off 20.30 hours). We would be happy to welcome you as our guest at the

Hotel Bayerischer Hof Tel: +49 89 2 12 00
Promenadeplatz 2-6 Fax: +49 89 2 12 09 06
D-80333 München

The costs of hotel accommodation (including meals) will be borne by UEFA.

An official luncheon, hosted by UEFA in honour of the two finalist teams and the host association, will take place on the day of the match, and we also cordially invite you to this luncheon. Your arrival in Munich may be planned for Tuesday, 27th May, and your departure for Thursday, 29th May 1997. May we ask you to confirm your travel arrangements to us by means of the enclosed form, not later than 9th May 1997. It goes without saying that UEFA will also provide transport to and from the airport.

E:\OFFICE\G:\ECO\LETTERS\m\2504.doc

[cc]

JACK HAUSMAN

105 MADISON AVENUE, SUITE 1200
NEW YORK, NY 10016

(212) 679-1990

685-8394 fax

JUL 10 1997

July 9, 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Frank Bennack, President and CEO of The Hearst Corporation, has sent an official letter of invitation to Mrs. Albright asking her to be our honoree for the coming year (copy enclosed).

To help us get the right answer, would you good enough to write
a personal note to Mrs. Albright?

I'm in the South of France, returning on July 14th.

I would appreciate your assist on this and so would Leonard
Goldenson. I'll call you when I get back.

All my best,

Jack Hausman

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

The Hearst Corporation

Frank A Bennack, Jr
President and
Chief Executive Officer

959 Eighth Avenue
New York NY 10019
Telephone 212 649 2120
Fax 212 265 0169

July 2, 1997

Mrs. Madeleine K. Albright
Secretary of State
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Secretary Albright:

I'm very privileged to have been asked to convey to you the unanimous decision of United Cerebral Palsy's 1997 Awards Dinner Committee to designate you as a recipient of UCP's Distinguished Service Award to be presented at the 43rd Annual Dinner in New York City on a date convenient to you. We hope to schedule this for January or February 1998 but will accommodate your schedule. I sincerely hope you can and will accept.

We recently honored President and Mrs. Clinton, The Princess of Wales, Generals Colin L. Powell and H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Margaret Thatcher, Henry A. Kissinger, Katharine A. Graham, and both President and Mrs. Reagan. Other past awardees selected from government, the entertainment industry and civic affairs have included: President Jimmy Carter, President Dwight D. Eisenhower, President Gerald Ford, Walter Annenberg, Governor & Mrs. Mario Cuomo, Alan C. Greenspan, Bob Hope, Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson, John W. Kluge, David Rockefeller, Governor & Mrs. Nelson D. Rockefeller, Walter V. Shipley and Paul A. Volcker.

Over the years, many thousands of children and adults have benefitted from services provided by UCP's centers in New York City. This annual dinner has netted millions of dollars to assist these efforts and to continue important and successful research for the benefit of those all over the world affected by this condition.

It is entirely fitting that we salute you for your great and distinguished accomplishments.

On behalf of the 1997 Awards Dinner Committee, may I express our hope that you will honor us by accepting this invitation, thus assuring United Cerebral Palsy of still another memorable evening. Your early acceptance would allow us to prepare and plan for a notable event involving civic leaders of the highest caliber.

We very much look forward to your positive response!

3-17-1997 3:12PM

FROM US AZERBAIJAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE 202 775 4100

United States - Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce

1825 Eye Street, N.W. Suite 400, Washington D.C.20006 • Tel:202-857-8069 • Fax:202-775-4188

COCHAIRMEN OF THE BOARD

T Don Stacy
Chairman & President,
Amoco Eurasia Petroleum Company
Reza Vaziri
President, R.V. Investment Group

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

Galib Mammad

SECRETARY

Leyla Rzakulleva
Johns Hopkins University

TREASURER

Nancy Tuomey
VP. Riggs Bank

COUNSEL

James Baker IV
Baker & Bott, I.L.P.

HONORARY ADVISORS

James Baker III
Zbigniew Erzezinski
Dick Cheney
Henry Kissinger
John Sununu

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Amb. Richard Armitage
President, Armitage Associates
Farhad Azima
Chairman & CEO, ALG
Henry Blair
Editor, Azerbaijan International
Nader Falimi
President, Alfucum
John Gore
Head of External Affairs, BP Group
Marty Miller
VP, Unocal Corporation
K. Terry Koonce
President, Exxon Ventures(CIS), Inc.
Farrokh Nakhjavani
Araz Golden Gate Inc.
John Thrash
CEO, Natural Gas Storage Corporation
of North America
Bill White
Chairman, Frontier Resources
former Deputy Secretary of Energy

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Ilham Aliyev
VP, SOCAR
George Helland
VP, Dresser Industriess
Congressman Greg Laughlin
Richard H. Matzke
President, Chevron Overseas Petroleum
Hafiz Pashayev
Ambassador of Azerbaijan
Richard N. Perle
AEL, former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Suhri Sayarl
Executive Director,
Institute of Turkish Studies
Suleyman Tadlyev
President, Chamber of Commerce & Ind.
Neslihan Tombul
VP, Bank of New York
Don R. Voelte
VP, Mobil Oil Corporation
Congressman Charlie Wilson

March 17, 1997

Dr. Henry Kissinger
President
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

MAR 17 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

In reference to your plans to visit Azerbaijan this summer, I am pleased to inform that Unocal Corporation is willing to provide a company aircraft to facilitate your travel to Baku.

Mr. Marty Miller, Vice President of Unocal Corporation has kindly agreed to accompany you on that trip. Unocal is a founding member of the U.S. - Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce (USACC). Mr. Miller is also serving on the USACC's Board of Directors.

I would request your good offices to contact Ms. Francie Phelps at Unocal's Washington offices to make necessary travel arrangements. Ms. Phelps can be reached at (202) 639-0070. Unocal has requested that we communicate the exact travel dates to them as soon as possible, so that they could reserve the aircraft and make other arrangements.

Please note that this organization will do its best to facilitate your upcoming trip to Baku. Furthermore, we are truly privileged to have you as an Honorary Advisor at the Chamber and look forward to continuing the best of relationship.

cc: Ambassador Hafiz Pashayev
Mr. Marty Miller
Ms. Francie Phelps

02/20/97 WED 15:18 FAX 4853253910

PRESIDENTS OFFICE

002

The University of Oklahoma

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

February 25, 1997

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Esquire
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10022

FEB 27 1997

Dear Henry:

I really appreciate your acceptance of membership on the Board of our International Program Center at the University of Oklahoma. The Board now contains some excellent members including many of your friends like Larry Eagleburger and others. We are anxious to have a major conference on the future architecture of American foreign policy and our failure thus far to develop a clear model for the post cold war world. The conference would coincide with the first meeting of our board. I also hope to have all former CIA directors at the conference to have a side discussion on the future of U.S. Intelligence.

As I mentioned several months ago, I'd really like to get you to be the keynote speaker to start the entire conference and set the major themes. That would best occur at dinner on campus with about 600 conference participants and outstanding students and faculty from the university and civic leaders. We would be happy to provide first class airfare or private jet transportation. We hope that you might bring Nancy with you and all expenses would be provided for her as well. Maybe we could even entice Kay Graham to come out for the occasion. We would be glad to pay an honorarium as you would deem appropriate. I candidly hope that you would consider our means which are small and our purposes which are lofty in determining what is required. We would like for you and Nancy to stay with us at the recently restored old president's home at the edge of the campus. Hugh Jacobson did a good job on the project and it has very good guest suites which are completely private with sitting and working areas. Hopefully the visit could be relaxing and enjoyable for you.

I am holding the entire university schedule for the fall in abeyance until I find out from you if you can come. The conference will be the major event next fall and your presence and intellectual contribution would be of great importance to its success.

660 Parrington Oval, Room 110, Norman, Oklahoma 73019-0390 (405) 325-3916, FAX (405) 325-7805

The University of Oklahoma

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS CENTER

August 25, 1997

AUG 29 1997

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It is with pride and gratitude that I welcome you as a member of the Board of Visitors of the International Programs Center of The University of Oklahoma. We are proud that a person of your experience and prestige is willing to serve on the Board to provide counsel and direction for the University's commitment and endeavors to "internationalize" its curriculum, degrees, activities and outreach. We are grateful for your willingness to take time from your other activities and work to contemplate our efforts and to attend and participate in our meetings.

The International Programs Center has compiled this briefing book for your perusal prior to the Board's inaugural meeting on September 14, 1997, at the University. As the table of contents indicates, information is included about the following:

1. Agenda and Conference Program

2. The International Programs Center

3. The University of Oklahoma

4. The State of Oklahoma and the City of Norman

5. The Board of Visitors

President David L. Boren, the International Programs Center staff, a growing significant number of faculty and students, and I are committed to reforming this University into an institution of higher learning that will truly prepare students to live and work successfully in the 21st century. In this process, we expect the University to serve as a pace-setter in a "revolution" in higher education that we believe is essential to our citizens' and nation's future leadership and competitiveness in world affairs.

While your advice and support are vital to the accomplishment of our mission, we will ever be conscious of the preciousness of your time. The Board will meet annually. From time to time, President Boren or I may call upon you individually for counsel in areas where we know you possess special knowledge, expertise or personal contacts, both within the United States and abroad. We will periodically provide you with information about the University and the International Programs Center's activities and progress.

Again, we are honored and thankful that you have agreed to serve on the Board of Visitors. My staff and I look forward to working with you.

339 West Boyd Street, Room 400, Norman, Oklahoma 73019-5144 PHONE: (405) 325-1396 FAX: (405) 325-7454

[L]

AUG 26 1997

University of Oklahoma
President and Mrs. David L. Boren
Request the pleasure of your company at the
International Programs Center Conference
"Preparing America's Foreign Policy for the 21st Century"

Featuring a Keynote Address by
Former U.S. Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger

September 15 & 16
and
Pre-conference Round Table: September 12
The University of Oklahoma
Norman, Oklahoma

Business Attire

The favor of your reply by September 8 is appreciated.
Seating is limited - reservations by date of reply.
Please see enclosure for program and reply card.
Complimentary Parking - Union Parking Garage

For additional information or for accommodations on the
basis of disability, please call Public Affairs at (405) 325-1543.

U.S. COMMITTEE TO EXPAND NATO

1150 17TH STREET, N.W., SUITE 1250, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036

TELEPHONE: (202) 862-5830 • FAX: (202) 862-5874

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Jenne K. Britell

Sheila P. Burke

Landon Butler

Julie Finley

David J. Gribbin

Stephen J. Hadley

Bruce P. Jackson

Sally A. Painter

Paige E. Reffe

Peter W. Rodman

James H. Rowe

Paula Stern

Gregory F. Treverton

Robert B. Zoellick

September 22, 1997

SEP 25 1997

MEMORANDUM TO USCEN SENIOR ADVISORS

FROM: Bruce Jackson

SUBJECT: *Roll Call* ad

Attached is a copy of the advertisement that the U.S. Committee to Expand NATO placed in *Roll Call* today. This is the first in a series we are scheduling for over the next several months. Our goal is to make the case for an enlarged NATO before the Senate recess in November, in the hope that the Senate will schedule a vote on ratification early next year.

The momentum for successful Senate ratification is clearly building. This is occurring thanks to the work of the board, the generosity of the Committee's benefactors, and the overwhelming support from our distinguished senior advisors.

THE UNITED STATES - INDONESIA SOCIETY

2000 L Street Northwest ■ Suite 200 ■ Washington, DC ■ 20036 ■ Telephone 202.416.1611 ■ Facsimile 202.416.1813

March 26, 1997

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

MAR 27 1997

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I enjoyed the opportunity to talk with you last night at Consul General Isnaedi's dinner and enclose a copy of the book which I mentioned. Commissioned by the U.S.-Indonesia Society, the book covers this important bilateral relationship from Indonesia's declaration of independence in 1945 until 1996. I hope you will take a few minutes to skim through it.

You may find of particular interest the first chapter which discusses our awakening to the importance of Indonesia and eventual pressure on the Dutch to grant it independence and Chapter 9 (page 202) on the events of 1965 to which you referred last night. Your visit to Jakarta together with President Ford is mentioned on pages 285-6. The official documents have not been released. I hope the author got it right.

You referred last night also to Indonesia's constructive foreign policy, and I am taking the liberty of enclosing a paper on that subject which I did for the Council on Foreign Relations. You may find it of interest. There is no doubt in my mind that Indonesia has been one of the most cooperative and helpful developing countries.

Our discussion of the Mayaguez brought back many memories. I very much appreciate your constructive response to my fairly strong cable from Bangkok. It all worked out all right once I was able to convey our regrets but was a fairly close call at the time. Prime Minister Kukrit Pramote, who played the part of Prime Minister in the movie *The Ugly American* and then got the part in real life, told Joe Alsop, who visited Bangkok as the crisis was winding down, that Thailand would have had no alternative but to expell me in response to our failure to follow usual notification procedures except that I was well known and trusted in Bangkok and the Thai believed

HONORARY CO-CHAIRS,
BOARD OF ADVISORS
Sumitro Djojohadikusumo
George P. Shultz

CO-CHAIRS,
BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Emil Salim
Paul Wolfowitz

TRUSTEES
Aburizal Bakrie
George C. Benson
John E. Bryson
Alfred C. DeCrane, Jr.
Bianti Djiwandono
Hashim Djojohadikusumo
Hasnan Habib
Roy M. Huffington
Helen I. Jessup
Ann R. Kinney
Edward Masters
Nafsiah Mboi
James R. Moffett
James Riady
Mohammad Sadli
Emil Salim
Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo
Paul Wolfowitz

OFFICERS
PRESIDENT
Edward Masters
SECRETARY
Helen I. Jessup
TREASURER
George C. Benson

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. is a nonprofit and nonpartisan organization devoted to improved understanding of international affairs through the free exchange of ideas. The Council does not take any position on questions of foreign policy and has no affiliation with, and receives no funding from, the United States government.

All statements of fact and expressions of opinion contained in Council monographs are the sole responsibility of the author.

THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTHEAST ASIAN ISSUES SERIES

As part of its comprehensive analysis of American foreign policy in Asia, the Council's Asia Studies Program will be devoting substantial resources and energy to Southeast Asian elements in the policy equation. The Contemporary Southeast Asian Issues Series for 1996 examines current political, economic and social developments in Southeast Asia with a view towards reassessing the U.S. role and interests. Monthly seminars and roundtable discussions will focus on individual countries as well as the ASEAN community.

If you are interested in participating in the Contemporary Southeast Asian Issues Series, please return the fax response sheet on the last page of this Working Paper.

For more information about the Contemporary Southeast Asian Issues Series or additional copies of this Working Paper, please write the Asia Studies Program, Council on Foreign Relations, 58 East 68th Street, New York, NY 10021, or contact the Asia Studies Program via facsimile at (212) 535-0527 or email: nyao@email.cfr.org

Copyright © 1995 Council on Foreign Relations®, Inc.

The constitution of the Republic of Indonesia requires the government to "contribute to implementing a world order based on independence, abiding peace and social justice." This is to be accomplished through the "independent and active" foreign policy enunciated in 1948 by its first Vice President and then Prime Minister Mohammad Hatta. Indonesia's two presidents have interpreted this mandate differently, but each in his own way has played a prominent international role and has had a significant impact on the international system.

Sukarno, president of the republic from its inception until 1967, was flamboyant, confrontational and controversial. His foreign policy, grounded in the four-year revolutionary struggle against Dutch colonial rule, reflected all of these traits. Searching for friends abroad, Sukarno hosted the 1955 Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung and was a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961.

Sukarno divided the world into two irreconcilable groups: New Emerging Forces (NEFOS), composed of Third World and communist states, and Old Established Forces (OLDEFOS), the United States and its allies and associates. His strident campaign against what he termed the forces of colonialism, neocolonialism and imperialism (NEKOLIM) led to a sharp break with the West and an all but formal alliance with the Asian communist powers.

Sukarno's military confrontation against Malaysia alarmed his neighbors, and his withdrawal from the United Nations -- the only state ever to resign from that world body -- in

[lc]

order to form a rival, more militant organization disturbed all but his most avid international supporters. Sukarno's admonition to the United States to "go to hell" with its economic aid signalled an end to any possibility of effective working relations between Jakarta and Washington. These dramatic moves plus the steady stream of communist and Third World visitors fed Sukarno's oversized ego and were used to distract his people from their rapidly deteriorating economic plight.

Suharto, Indonesia's second and current president, took control as acting president in 1967 and full president the following year. Adopting a low-key, pragmatic approach, Suharto replaced confrontation with accommodation. He ended military action against Malaysia, broke his predecessor's alliance with the Asian communists and took Indonesia back into the United Nations.

Suharto's main objectives were domestic: to establish peace and tranquility after the trauma of the abortive 1965 communist coup attempt and, for the first time in the nation's history, to start the process of rational economic development. He did, however, have two immediate foreign policy requirements. First, he needed to rebuild the nation's relations with its neighbors; toward this goal, Indonesia was a prime mover in 1967 in forming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Secondly, achieving economic development and reducing poverty required good relations with the West, and he moved quickly to rebuild Indonesia's relations with the United States and other Western powers. Relations with the communist nations were deliberately slipped to the back burner and those with other developing states were neglected for a number of years while Suharto and his talented economic team concentrated on getting the

2

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domestic house in order.

With a firm political base and 20 years of solid economic progress, President Suharto turned his attention in the late 1980s to international affairs. As head of the NAM, he has been instrumental in reinvigorating that moribund organization and turning it from futile political confrontation with the Western industrialized nations to a course of constructive dialogue on economic issues. He has emerged as a major force within the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), and with strong support from President Clinton he pushed through a commitment to open trade in the Asia Pacific region at the November 1994 APEC leaders' meeting at Bogor, Indonesia. Once again Indonesia has become a major international force.

The foreign policies of both Sukarno and Suharto reflect the nation's history, size, geographical location and economic and military strength. This is true of all nations. But in Indonesia's case there are added factors determining the foreign policy agenda; among these are the nation's ethnic diversity (over 300 distinct groups), its archipelagic composition (over 17,000 islands), its bitter four-year fight for independence and its early political turbulence.

Both presidents share a strong belief in the nation's national destiny and its national resilience. Each in his own way used regionalism and multilateral organizations in carrying out his foreign policy objectives. Each, Sukarno much more quickly, played a prominent role in world affairs, and each had virtually unchallenged control over the foreign policy agenda.

3

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Emergence of Suharto the Statesman

As noted earlier, foreign policy took a seat far in the rear during the first two decades of Suharto's New Order government. Indonesian expert Donald Emmerson says that Indonesia was internationally "invisible" in the 1970s; Michael Vatikiotis, author of a detailed study of the nation's foreign policy, referred to the 1970s and 1980s as a time of "diplomatic dormancy."

Observers date the beginning of a more assertive Suharto foreign policy anywhere from 1980 to the end of the Cold War a decade later. Rizal Sukma, writing in the *Jakarta Post* on December 13, 1994, put the turning point in 1985 when Indonesia sponsored a ceremony commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of the Bandung Afro-Asian Conference. This seems as good a starting point as any, but of course Suharto's emergence as a world leader was a process rather than a single event. This process was accelerated by his successful participation in the 1989 non-aligned heads of government meeting in Belgrade, his first attendance at such a gathering since 1970, and by the end of the Cold War which made possible -- even necessary -- greater flexibility in foreign affairs. Indonesia's higher international profile was also fed by growing domestic pressures for a more "free and active" role commensurate with the nation's size and economic importance.

Indonesia's emerging international leadership rests on four pillars: ASEAN, the Non-Aligned Movement, APEC and the United Nations.

4

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ASEAN: A Declining Force?

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has been the primary base for Indonesia's foreign policy for a quarter century. Formed for the basic purpose of containing Indonesia and rehabilitating it after the debacle of confrontation against Malaysia, ASEAN consists at present of Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei and the Philippines. Vietnam is scheduled to be accepted as a member in mid-1995 largely at Indonesia's urging.

Initially viewed as an organization for economic cooperation, ASEAN quickly came up
against the hard reality that its members economies are more competitive then complementary and
that most of its markets are outside the ASEAN region. As a result, it has made more progress
in the political and security fields, most notably the 1991 settlement of the fighting in Cambodia
in which Indonesia, acting on behalf of ASEAN, succeeded in working out a political solution.
As further evidence of its international commitment, Indonesia contributed 2,000 troops, by far
the largest contingent, to the UN peacekeeping force in Cambodia.

In 1992 in an effort to strengthen ASEAN's negligible economic progress the members announced formation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) with the goal of reducing intra-ASEAN tariffs on manufactured goods to a range of zero to five percent within 15 years. The timetable was shortened the following year to 10 years, and the target date may be advanced to the year 2000 at the 1995 ASEAN summit meeting. Acceleration of the schedule has become necessary to stay comfortably ahead of the APEC timetable for a more open trading system.

Despite these efforts, AFTA has made only limited progress. Indonesia and to a lesser

5

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extent Thailand and the Philippines have been unenthusiastic about the idea because of the nature of their economies. Also, the private sectors in the ASEAN countries are not exploiting the opportunities created and are not pressing for further liberalization. A survey is underway in early 1995 to determine whether there is real interest on the part of private traders. If not, AFTA is likely to wither and be subsumed by the much larger move for free trade within the APEC area.

Faced with disintegration of the Soviet Union, the problem of managing relations with a more assertive China and doubts about the willingness of the United States to continue its traditional role in the area, ASEAN at its 1992 meeting agreed to set up the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to consider security matters. The following year ARF's horizons were extended by inviting a broad group of East Asian and Pacific states to join the dialogue. Indonesia, formerly strongly opposed to ASEAN's involvement in security relationships and to security ties with powers outside the region, fully supported these decisions.

The first meeting of the expanded Regional Forum in July 1994 brought together 18 nations to join in what were called "structured consultations" on security issues in the Asia Pacific region: the six ASEAN states; seven "dialogue partners" (United States, Canada, Japan, European Community, Australia, New Zealand and the UN Development Program); three "ASEAN observers" (Papua New Guinea, Vietnam and Laos); and two "consultative countries" (Russia and China). Speaking in New York a few months later, Indonesia's Foreign Minister Alatas said consultations among the 18 nations center on "how to develop greater transparency, better understanding and common perceptions on the evolving security constellation in the Asia Pacific."

6

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China has agreed to participate in the ASEAN Regional Forum, but there are indications that Beijing wants to limit the impact of any single multilateral security tie. Speaking on July 24, 1993, PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said that China prefers "regional security dialogues of various forms, at different levels and through various channels."

Nonetheless, ARF engages both China and the United States formally in a security dialogue with other concerned states. The ASEAN Regional Forum is an encouraging start, but the question over the longer term is whether this arrangement will suffice or whether the East Asian and Pacific nations will at some point take the further step of forming a more structured body.

A broader issue is Indonesia's future relationship with ASEAN. For a quarter of a century Indonesia has limited itself largely to working within the ASEAN framework. It has now moved into the wider APEC and, in fact, global arenas, and ASEAN will probably not play the central position in its foreign policy formulation that it has in the past. Jakarta is likely, however, to continue to maintain close ASEAN ties since ASEAN gives additional clout to Indonesia's role within APEC, and the ARF, operating under ASEAN's auspices, is currently the only regional security forum.

## NAM: An Awakening Giant?

In its search for an international forum beyond ASEAN, Indonesia resumed active

7

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participation in the 111-nation Non-Aligned Movement in the late 1980s after largely ignoring it for 20 years. Elected to a three-year term as chairman in 1992, Indonesia has turned the organization from futile political rhetoric to constructive economic engagement. President Suharto, speaking at the tenth NAM summit in Jakarta in 1992, exhorted the members to concentrate on creating a new economic order based on closer South-South cooperation and a constructive North-South dialogue.

Indonesian Ambassador-at-Large Nana Sutresna, in a speech reprinted in the February 3, 1995 *Jakarta Post*, noted that the former adversarial approach had not worked and that the NAM should "dynamically adapt" to new realities by "not acrimoniously dwelling on grievances but...instead seeking a constructive dialogue and offering to engage the developed world in cooperation in all fields." Lacking bureaucratic constraints, University of Indonesia Professor Juwono Sudarsono said in an op-ed article that Indonesia believes the South "cannot continue finding external alibies for its own shortcomings and demand concessions from the North."

As NAM chairman, Suharto has focused NAM's energies on four development fields: food security, population control, debt management and sustainable development, and he has set up mechanisms to share Indonesia's experiences in these fields with other developing countries. A Special Executive Assistant to Suharto, seven senior Indonesian economists and four roving ambassadors fan out over the developing world to drive home the need for action, not words, and to share Indonesia's technical expertise.

Emil Salim, former Minister for Population and Environmental Affairs and now one of the seven economists appointed by Suharto to work with other developing countries, noted in a report

8

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on "South-South Cooperation on Debt and Development" prepared in August 1994 that there are two "important catalysts for South-South cooperation." Under the first of these, the Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries scheme, Indonesia has programs with 84 developing countries financed through the national budget or tripartite or multipartite arrangements. Additional programs have been organized under the Action Program for Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries which is being coordinated with the Caracas Action Program of the Group of 77.

Salim noted also that President Suharto, in his capacity as NAM chairman, "has established in Indonesia a group of high level representatives to provide advice and assistance to debt affected countries that may wish to acquire it." Indonesia hosted a ministerial meeting of non-aligned countries on debt and development in Jakarta in August 1994 to exchange ideas. Indonesia also held a demographic conference in Bali to explore possibilities for bilateral cooperation and sharing of information in the family planning field.

The Non-Aligned Movement is an anachronism since there is no one now to be nonaligned against. But this movement, by whatever name, gives Indonesia an excellent forum to enhance its international role, to strengthen its ties to developing nations and to provide technical advice and cooperation on economic development. From the standpoint of the United States, it should not be forgotten that this advice comes from a nation which has made dramatic progress through close association with the West and with reliance on a free market economy.

9

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APEC: The Switch to Free Trade

The third base for Indonesia's more active foreign involvement is the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum which was organized in 1989 as an "informal inter-governmental process" to promote economic cooperation in the Asia Pacific region. Suhadi Mangkusuwondo, writing in the fourth quarter 1994 issue of *Indonesia Quarterly*, reported that Indonesia and most other ASEAN members joined APEC "reluctantly" and only under considerable pressure from Australia, host to the inaugural session. Concerned that ASEAN's role would be diluted and that APEC would be dominated by the major powers, especially the United States and Japan, Indonesia and its ASEAN colleagues insisted on three conditions: that APEC would not become an economic bloc, that the different levels of economic development of the members would be taken into account and that any trade arrangements under APEC would be GATT consistent.

Indonesia's interest in APEC accelerated as ASEAN failed to move ahead with economic integration and as concern grew that NAFTA might take the European Community course and become a less open market. The opportunity to use another vehicle to tie the United States more firmly to the area and the benefits of an annual U.S. presidential visit to the region probably also contributed to Jakarta's change of heart.

Suharto's senior advisors apparently convinced him that free trade was the wave of the future, that it was going to happen in any event and that it would be to Indonesia's advantage to get in early and help shape its direction. This helps explain Indonesia's dramatic shift from one of Asia's more reluctant supporters of free trade to one of its prime exponents. It was, in fact,

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the personal commitment of President Suharto, with strong backing from President Clinton, that pushed the Bogor Declaration through to a unanimous but, in some cases, unenthusiastic vote at the November 1994 APEC leaders' meeting. This resolution committed APEC to open markets for industrialized nations in the region by 2010 and by 2020 for the developing countries.

While there is no evidence that Indonesia's support for the Bogor timetable has weakened, two issues could create problems in the future. First, some Indonesians are concerned whether Japan, which will chair the 1995 APEC leaders' meeting at Osaka, will carry forward, as it was asked at the Bogor meeting, with an "action agenda" to meet the 2010 and 2020 deadlines. They cite Japan's domestic political problems, which could slow the process, and that nation's reluctance to open its own markets.

Secondly, Indonesia is concerned that other nations are pressing the first point of the Bogor Declaration, trade liberalization, and slighting the other two, trade and investment facilitation and development cooperation. Indonesia's leaders believe that progress on points two and three is essential to underpin movement toward free trade. They would also like to see progress on issues such as an investment code, a legal code, human resource development and environmental considerations.

Although Indonesia is no longer in the APEC chair, it will have considerable influence on implementation of the Bogor declaration. It remains committed to the goals set at Bogor and believes that, with continued close U.S.-Indonesian cooperation (which they expect), movement can continue on two paths: "concerted unilateral liberalization" in which each member will decide on the products to include and move toward the Bogor deadlines on its own schedule in

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accordance with the APEC process. The second track involves multilateral cooperation within the World Trade Organization, which Indonesia supports. Indonesians speculate that by the year 2000, the WTO may decide on further steps necessary to advance the general trade liberalization process and that this may facilitate the APEC program.

ASEAN will be crucial to APEC's success, and while Indonesia has significant influence within that organization, there are doubters such as Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad who continues to push his East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) which excludes the United States. Indonesia wants the United States firmly anchored within any regional trading organization and does not want another organization to compete with APEC. As a result, Indonesians oppose EAEC's having a formal structure and have been instrumental in quietly burying it by appending EAEC to APEC. As one knowledgeable Indonesian put it, "At the annual APEC meetings, the EAEC countries can have lunch together or something."

## The United Nations: Indonesia's Fourth Pillar

Finally, Indonesia is paying increasing attention to the United Nations as a forum through which to exert influence. Elected to the Security Council for the 1995-97 term, Indonesia has announced according to a year-end report prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that it will work to "maintain the prestige of the Security Council by limiting the use of force to the last resort," by avoiding use of the veto and by getting the Council to work more closely with the

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General Assembly and the Secretary General.

The Ministry's report notes that "the process of reforming and restructuring the United Nations should go beyond procedures and practices to include important aspects such as...the genuine participation of all members in decision making. In this respect, the General Assembly must play a central role." Indonesia believes also that enlargement of the Security Council is essential to reflect conditions as they are today, not those of 50 years ago. The Foreign Ministry report takes the position that "while the principle of geographical representation is important, it should not be the only criterium...Other criteria are of equal importance, such as political, economic and demographic importance and a nation's record in contributing to peace, security and economic development at the regional as well as the global level."

This seems a clear bid by Indonesia for a permanent seat on the Security Council. The introduction of criteria in addition to geographical considerations may be designed to nip in the bud arguments that Asia would be over-represented if Japan, perhaps India and Indonesia were added to the Council.

## A New Strategic Equilibrium

The end of the Cold War has in Indonesia's view created a situation which is more complex and less predictable than that existing before 1990. This requires a more imaginative and flexible foreign policy approach. Less is heard in Jakarta today about a "quadrilateral

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equilibrium" since Russia is not now a player in Southeast Asia and, while a remilitarized Japan
might someday pose a threat, that threat seems far in the future. The security problem today, as
Indonesia sees it, is to balance the United States, which it sees as the principal outside source of
support, and China, whose future course is uncertain and potentially threatening.

In his April 1994 address to the Asia Society, Foreign Minister Alatas stressed the
essential need for continued U.S. involvement in the region. We "have always found it self-
evident," he noted, "that the active and constructive presence of the United States in the Asia-
Pacific region, including military, should remain as an essential requisite to forge a new strategic
equilibrium..."

Although Indonesia has long publicly rejected foreign military bases in Asia, it was
concerned about closure of U.S. bases in the Philippines and U.S. plans for further military
withdrawals from the region. They had previously found the U.S. "over-the-horizon" military
presence comforting. Ambassador-at-Large Hasnan Habib, writing in the *Indonesian Quarterly*
(first quarter of 1994), warned that the ensuing vacuum might be filled by "the remaining big
powers, including Japan, China and the increasingly assertive India." Indonesia has agreed to
service U.S. Navy ships at its Surabaya ship repair facility, and further agreements to cooperate
in the military field are likely. Indonesia also warmly welcomed the recent U.S. decision to stop
further military withdrawals from the area.

With their strong commitment to national resilience and economic development, Indonesia
is concerned also that the United States, increasingly preoccupied by domestic issues and financial
stringency, may be unwilling to bear the adjustment costs for East Asia's industrialization. It

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wants to tie the United States firmly to the regional security system, which at present means the ASEAN Regional Forum, and to the region's economic development through APEC. This, it is hoped, will reduce the danger of U.S. military and economic retrenchment and that NAFTA, under U.S. leadership, might become a less open market.

## The Challenge of China

China, which occupied a central position in Sukarno's foreign policy, became Indonesia's prime threat under Suharto's New Order. A strong supporter of the now defunct Indonesian Communist Party, China is believed by many Indonesians to have actively backed the party in its abortive 1965 coup attempt which resulted in the murder of Indonesia's top army leaders. In 1967, at Indonesia's initiative, relations were "frozen." By freezing relations rather than formally breaking them and by failing to take the final step of recognizing Taiwan, Indonesia clearly signalled that at some point active relations would be resumed. That process took 23 years.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and concern about U.S. intentions toward the region, pressures grew within Indonesia to resume formal diplomatic ties with China (informal trade relationships had begun in 1985). Indonesia's business community brought strong pressure to normalize relations, and its political leaders came to the conclusion that only by recognizing China could Jakarta enhance its claims to regional leadership, bring about a solution to the Cambodian problem and improve its chances for leading the Non-Aligned Movement.

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China, for its part, went a long way to meet Indonesia's terms for normalization. Chinese Premier Li Peng visited Jakarta in August 1990, Beijing abandoned its previous vow of continued assistance to remnants of the Indonesian Communist Party and its signed a memorandum of understanding that neither government recognized dual nationality for its citizens. The last-named agreement was particularly important for Indonesia given its longstanding concern for China's influence over Indonesia's economically powerful Chinese minority. More recently Indonesia has moved to tie China into a growing web of relationships as, for example, a January 1995 pact to cooperate in development of legal systems and law enforcement.

Opinions differ in Jakarta over the extent to which China is or will become a threat to Indonesia's security. The Indonesian military and some civilians argue that Beijing has not abandoned its ambitions to dominate Southeast Asia. Others feel that domestic imperatives and the interlocking web of relationships established with China, not the least of which are commercial, greatly reduce the threat. Both groups agree, however, that Indonesia must approach its relationship with China with great care.

Those who argue that the threat continues point to China's military build-up, including reports that it is about to acquire Russian submarines, by Beijing's more aggressive moves to reinforce its claims to offshore islands and by its more assertive diplomatic posture toward Indonesia.

Passage of a law by China asserting sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and the Spratlys in the South China Sea plus reinforcement of its presence in the Spratlys have caused serious concern in Jakarta over the danger of a clash among the disputants and the

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possibility of a significant projection southward of Chinese power. Chinese maps showing claims coming dangerously close to Indonesia's gas-rich Natuna Island, for which Exxon is leading a $40 billion development project, have brought the dispute even closer to home. As part of its more active international diplomacy, Indonesia has sponsored a series of "workshops" on conflicting claims in the South China Sea, but there has been no real progress toward defusing the issue.

Two diplomatic issues have also heightened concern in Jakarta. In February 1994 Beijing formally protested against the "private visit" to Indonesia by Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui which included a call on President Suharto and a visit to the state-owned aircraft factory in Bandung. The Chinese protest accused Indonesia of violating the 1990 agreement to resume diplomatic relations.

More seriously, in April 1994 the PRC Foreign Minister officially expressed concern over the fact that an Indonesian of Chinese descent was killed, others were injured and Chinese-owned shops were destroyed in the northern Indonesian city of Medan when a labor dispute took a violent turn. Reflecting Indonesia's resentment over this renewed indication that China regards itself as protector of the overseas Chinese, the Indonesian Minister of Justice publicly suggested that China should "mind its own internal affairs."

So far, Indonesia's skeptics about China are in the majority. Beijing's recent actions confirm longstanding Indonesian fears of China and its relationship to the local Chinese community. While continuing efforts to strengthen diplomatic and commercial ties and to fold China into regional bodies such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, Indonesia is likely to remain concerned about China's intentions now and perhaps even more so in the years ahead as the

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transition to new leadership in both countries unfolds.¹

## Conclusions

Indonesia has come full circle -- from deep involvement in the Non-Aligned Movement and international affairs in general under Sukarno to a similar situation under Suharto. But the similarity ends there. Suharto's involvement is constructive and nonconfrontational, and it rests on a solid political and economic base. His approach is to bind friends and potential adversaries in interlocking networks for dialogue and consensus-building.

Particularly striking are two basic policy shifts in the past several years. Formerly a strong opponent of international military relationships, Indonesia now supports the ASEAN Regional Forum, which commits 18 Asia Pacific nations to discuss security issues. It has opened its Surabaya ship repair facility to U.S. Navy vessels and is probably willing over time to move toward more structured security arrangements in the region.

Formerly a highly protectionist state, Indonesia has done a 180-degree turn in this area as well. Suharto told the Parliament in his annual state address on August 16, 1994 that "with conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations the world enters a new chapter, namely free trade."

He was the driving force, together with President Clinton, in moving APEC to a specific timetable

¹For an excellent discussion of the Indonesian-Chinese bilateral relationship, see Rizal Sukma, "Recent Developments in Sino-Indonesian Relations: An Indonesian View" in *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 16, No. 1, June 1994.

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for free trade at the November 1994 Bogor meeting.

These dramatic shifts reflect Suharto's greater confidence in playing on the international stage, the fact that his domestic agenda is firmly set and probably his desire in the remainder of his term as President to make his mark on the world scene. But the changes are also driven by two external factors. Indonesia believes that, with the end of the Cold War, the United States can no longer be counted on to ensure the security of Southeast Asia. There is thus a need for new approaches to ensure national security. In addition, the formation of powerful economic groups in Europe and North America poses problems for developing nations such as Indonesia. The European market is already tightening, and there is concern that NAFTA might follow this course, particularly if international economic conditions worsen.

A key question is whether these fundamental shifts in Indonesia's foreign policy will survive the transition to new leadership, whenever and however that occurs. The odds are that it will, although Indonesia's next president is likely to lack the personal power and authority of Suharto and will undoubtedly have differences of style.

The new foreign policy approach is rapidly becoming institutionalized. The Indonesian people, especially the younger generation, strongly support the nation's higher international profile. It was, in fact, in part public pressure which encouraged Suharto to move toward a more active international role and end the earlier semi-isolationism. And Indonesia itself is becoming entangled in the web of overlapping associations which it has fostered to bind others to a moderate course. These factors will constrain a new leader from foreign policy adventurism and help ensure continued moderate engagement.

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This conclusion might be called into question if the transition to new leadership resulted
in violence and severe internal disruption, as was the case with the only political transition to date.
The odds are strong, however, that the major stakeholders -- the military, the business
community, the growing urban and rural middle class, political groups -- will in the Indonesian
tradition reach consensus on a new leader. These stakeholders are all basically conservative.
They are much more likely to support maintenance of law and order than to risk having the
decision on a new leader made in the streets. If the new leader is acceptable to these key groups,
the people can be expected to accept him as well.

Implications for the United States

The United States and Indonesia during 1994 moved from a position of serious tension over issues of human rights and a general failure of communication to a successful partnership within the APEC framework. But it remains to be seen whether this cooperative relationship will continue.

The fundamental challenge for the United States will be to advance our positions on human
rights and other difficult issues in ways which are effective, that is, which take full account of
local culture and sensitivities. We will also need to pay more attention to the style of our
diplomacy -- to listen more and lecture less -- and find ways to convince Indonesia and other
friends in the area that we will continue to play a constructive role politically, economically and

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in security affairs. This will not be easy given financial and political problems in Washington and domestic pressures from influential single interest groups.

For Indonesia, the problem will be to manage its new role as a spokesman for the Third World in ways which show awareness of the basic attitudes of and problems faced by the industrialized nations. Indonesia will need also to tackle more directly the problem of East Timor, which poisons the atmosphere for so much else in its relations with other nations. This could involve steps to involve Timorese more directly and broadly in the governing process, reducing the role of the military and moving more aggressively to create jobs for the growing group of educated Timorese.

Four specific areas in the bilateral relationship will require special attention. First, ratification in November 1994 of the Law of the Sea agreement adds an additional three million square kilometers of territorial waters to Indonesia and jurisdiction over another three million square kilometers of an economic exclusion zone. Indonesia, a strong advocate of the archipelago concept since 1957, is in the process of designating three or more north-south sea lanes for international shipping. U.S. defense officials are concerned by the possible impact on the free movement and activities of naval vessels, and commercial shippers are watching closely in light of the fact that Indonesia has on several prior occasions unilaterally closed sea lanes through key choke points. Working out the way in which the agreement is implemented will require careful coordination.

Secondly, restructuring the United Nations and the international economic system will not be easy. Indonesia can be expected to press the cause of the South against what are seen as vested

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economic and political interests of the North. It will work also to enlarge the UN Security Council, limit the veto and enhance the role of the General Assembly. All of these will test the new relationship and require attention to the style as well as the substance of the bilateral diplomacy.

Thirdly, trade issues remain potential trouble spots. Formation of the WTO has removed the textile trade and some other possible irritants from the bilateral relationship, but Indonesia's handling of intellectual property rights remains cause for serious concern. American sources estimate that, excluding pharmaceuticals, U.S. business loses upwards of $200 million annually due to inadequate Indonesian procedures to protect foreign property rights or failure to enforce existing regulations.

Finally, the sensitive area of human rights will need far more deft handling than in the recent past. Threats of sanctions and punitive actions by the United States are blunt weapons which must be employed carefully if at all. Our economic competitors do not use these tactics, and our ability to impose our will on others is considerably more limited than we seem to realize.

Change when it comes to Indonesia -- and the process is already underway -- can really only come from within Indonesia. A growing middle class, estimated at 16 to 20 million people, the return of thousands of students studying abroad (there are 15,000 in the United States today), and widespread use of the fax machine, satellite dishes and e-mail are more effective tools than public pressures or threats from abroad. We can help on the margins, but our intervention will be most effective, and the strain on our bilateral relations will be contained, if it is done out of the public spotlight and to the greatest extent possible through nongovernmental or multilateral

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organizations.

The third and fourth most populous nations in the world have embarked on a new relationship -- one which within recent months has produced good results. Both sides will need to nurture this relationship as we tackle difficult and in some cases emotional issues in the months and years ahead. If they do, the new ties between Washington and Jakarta will prove to be mutually beneficial and we will find that Indonesia is a good partner in moving toward the elusive new world order.

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## About the Author

**Edward Masters** is President of the United States-Indonesia Society. Previously Mr. Masters was Adjunct Professor of Asian Studies at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Senior Vice President for International Affairs at the Natomas Company, and President and Chief Executive Officer of the National Planning Association. During a distinguished career in the Foreign Service, Mr. Masters served as United States Ambassador to Indonesia and Bangladesh and Deputy Chief of Mission in Thailand. Mr. Masters received his B.A. from George Washington University and his M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Doug Stangman of U.S. News and World Report has called. He is doing a story on Aldrich Ames book to be released on Monday, *Confessions of a Spy*, in which there is a reference to you, on which he would like to give you an opportunity to comment.

The reference is to a cable which was allegedly sent back to the Kremlin by Dobrynin when he was in DC, reporting about a cable received by a Russian CIA agent in which you expressed your anger about Carter's election and appointment of Vance as Sec. of State. You called them "amateurs", thus undermining Vance's ability to handle arms control issues. You apparently were explaining to Dobrynin "how to deal with Carter and Vance".

Apparently there was a CIA investigation to see if there was any validity to this story, but ultimately no action was taken, and the investigation was closed. There is still a file on the investigation, but the cable has not been found.

The question is, first of all, if there in fact was a cable, or if this was just a fabrication on the part of Dobrynin or the KGB, and secondly if what was allegedly stated by you in the cable is true. This same story was referenced to in a recent book called *Widows*, written by widows of CIA agents, and in a column by Admiral Zumwalt, in which your name was not explicitly mentioned, but the story regarding "a high-level diplomat" seems to be the same one. Stangman of U.S News states that it does not seem like you have ever had an opportunity to deny or comment on these allegations, and he simply wants to give you that chance before they run the story. He needs your comment by 6:00pm, if you have a comment at all.

Douglas Stangman (202/955-2322)