Evansonia, Illinois.
P. O. Box 1022.
Beat Friend Products, Inc.,
President,
Mr. Bernard W. Beck,

Personal Assistant
Suzanne S. McFarlane

Sincerely,

May, all of Georgetown -- thank you.
Acquaintances has been raised. Tyler, the Klaaringer --
Thanks to the Dog-Cone-Bag, the civic con-
much less the living room ring!

Farbeit for Tyler to ever find the foodpath.
Dear Mr. Beck:

May 27, 1976

Best Friend Products, Inc.

P.O. Box 1022 • Evanston, Illinois 60201
(312) 475-4300

May 7, 1976

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I noticed in the attached news photo that Mrs. Kissinger appears to be walking your pet without benefit of a product to remove waste should Tyler foul the footpath.

President Ford has rendered an administration position on this issue—that being that others should not be required to clean up after someone else's pet.

With this in mind, I have taken the liberty to enclose a package of our new product, the Dog-Gone Bag, for your or your wife's use should the need arise.

You might also appreciate an added benefit. Since our product is designed to be deposited in your garbage can after use, those investigative reporters can discover for themselves your high sense of civic responsibility.

BWP/jk
Enclosure

creators of the **Dog-Gone Bag**

Bozell & Jacobs International, Inc., One Dag Hammarskjold Plaza, New York, New York 10017

August 12, 1976

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Sir:

We want you to have, as a gift in this Bicentennial year, the enclosed copy of "What's Right With America--1976", a unique book which our firm is distributing to government officials, clients, business friends and employees throughout the United States.

Because we're in the advertising business, we hate to see good products get bad advertising. America is a great product. But its public image hasn't fared as well in recent years as many believe it should.

We think it's time to emphasize what's right with our country. That's why we encouraged Dwight Bohmbach, creative director in the Phoenix office of Bozell & Jacobs International, to write "What's Right With America--1976".

This book details information about our country with strong emphasis on the positives to weigh against the negatives we've been exposed to over the past few years.

We hope that you, an official of our government, will find this book thought-provoking and stimulating. We hope, also, that this unique book is providing added insights to those who read it as they reflect on our nation during this Bicentennial year. If you care to share your reflections, I'll be interested in hearing what you think.

Best regards.

Yours sincerely,

Charles D. Peebler, Jr.
President and Chairman of the Board

Bozell & Jacobs, Inc. Chicago Minneapolis New York Newark Trenton Omaha Racine
Bozell & Jacobs/Pacific Los Angeles Phoenix San Francisco
Glenn, Bozell & Jacobs, Inc. Atlanta Dallas/Fort Worth Houston Oklahoma City
Freeman, Milne, Bozell & Jacobs, Ltd. Hamilton Montreal Toronto Worldwide Advertising and Marketing London

CLAIBORNE PELL
RHODE ISLAND

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 15, 1973

Dear Henry:

Thank you so much for your thoughtfulness
in sending me the autographed picture.

With every good wish.

The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

CLAIBORNE PELL
*RHODE ISLAND*

PELL, Senator

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

April 8, 1974

Dear Henry:

My congratulations to you on your
marriage which makes all your friends happy
for and with you.

Knowing your concern with super
powers, we thought you and your bride might
like to come to a mini-power evening - a
dinner we are giving on April 23rd for Crown
Prince and Princess Hans Adam of Liechtenstein.

The contrast might divert you and
we would much enjoy seeing you. It is at
8 o'clock and not dress.

With warmest best wishes and
continued happiness for you both, I am

The Honorable
Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

NEW YORK TIMES

FRIDAY, August 9th,

1974

# Detente and the Future

[L.C.]

By Claiborne Pell

WASHINGTON—Given a choice between détente with the Soviet Union or a return to the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontations of the frigid cold-war period, most Americans, I suspect, would choose a realistic easing of tensions between the supporters.

And, as a matter of fact, the progress toward détente initiated by Richard M. Nixon and vigorously executed by Secretary of State Kissinger has had until recently very broad support among the American people. Now, however, détente is in trouble.

The efforts to reach mutually beneficial agreements with the Russians on arms control and trade are under attack from all sides within the United States.

Conservatives criticize détente because of their profound disapproval of Communism and their equally profound distrust of the long-range intentions of the Soviet Union.

Liberals, while not opposing détente, insist on a coupling of agreements on arms controls or trade with liberalization of Soviet society.

Our military leadership and their supporters in industry and the Congress oppose détente because they believe that only overwhelming military

superiority—and damn the cost—can provide security for our country.

The national leadership of much of organized labor is cool to détente, reflecting a traditional anti-Communist stance in foreign affairs as well as a union membership with heavy stakes in defense-oriented industry.

And the American Jewish leadership's view of détente is strongly shaded by its concern over the persecution of Soviet Jews and the role of the Soviet Union in the Middle East.

Each of these segments of our society has some measure of legitimacy for its concern. However, in combination, these segments form a very formidable alliance encompassing a major part of the most articulate and influential opinion-forming groups in the nation. And there is a very real possibility that, in combination, this alliance could turn our country from the path of détente.

I consider myself a liberal with moderate fiscal views, a supporter of labor, an admirer of Israel and the contribution to our national weal of our American Jewish community, and one who values basic human rights.

But I also have a long view of history, and I believe it would be disastrous if we were turned from the present opportunities for détente.

History does not stand still, but moves in currents and directions. And

if the movement toward détente is halted, history will take a new direction, probably toward confrontation and conflict.

The tragedy is that most of the segments now joining in the alliance against détente do not want to see such a change in the direction of history. Each wants only to attach a condition to détente, apparently without realizing that the cumulative weight of the conditions could sink the ship.

The result would be what very few of the critics of détente want: an escalation of the arms race, a tightening of repression within the Soviet Union, a resurgence of the basic Soviet anti-Semitism, and an end to all voluntary emigration from the Soviet Union.

I am under no illusions as to any sun and light behind the Iron Curtain.

But at least people there are alive and leading reasonably normal lives. It is not the bleak scorched area it could be in a World War III.

It is so easy to forget the improvements of the last ten years. Prominent opponents of Soviet policies are now exiled instead of being killed or jailed.

It is understandable that the American Jewish community is concerned about the ill-treatment of many Jews who wish to emigrate, particularly in light of the Soviet history of pogroms

and anti-Semitism. But the Russians have in fact responded to world pressure and some 30,000 Jews are being permitted to leave Russia each year. The extent to which the Russians have responded can be seen in the fact that Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union represents 85 per cent of all persons permitted to emigrate, while Jews contitute less than one per cent of the population.

Finally, I think we should remember that Nikita S. Khrushchev was removed from power primarily because his advocacy of détente with the West was opposed by Soviet conservatives and the Soviet military. Now Leonid I. Brezhnev has staked his political life on détente. If he, too, falls because of his advocacy, it will be many a decade before another Soviet leader will risk his reputation, his prestige and his power in pursuit of better relations with the West.

In seeking détente, the United States should use whatever bargaining levers it has to assure our military security and to press for recognition of the human values and liberties we treasure. But we must be careful that we do not overload the circuits and instead of bringing light to the world, plunge it toward darkness.

Claiborne Pell, Democrat, is junior Senator from Rhode Island.

MORNING

EVENING

SUNDAY

THE

SUN

THE A.S. ABELL COMPANY, PUBLISHER
BALTIMORE, MD., 21203

WASHINGTON BUREAU
1214 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
14TH AND F STREETS, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20004

September 13, 1975

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I want to thank you for the time and consideration you gave to the idea of my working for you as press secretary.

As I mentioned to Bob McCloskey in our meeting yesterday, I have decided not to continue in my present job in any event, and shall be exploring other opportunities over the next few months.

If circumstances at your end should change, and you feel that I might be of help to you in some way--perhaps in some capacity other than principal press secretary--I hope you would give me an opportunity to consider such a possibility.

I very much support your ideas for an American role in world affairs, and hope they prevail over competing ideas of either isolationism or abstract moralism.

My thanks again, and Anne joins me in wishing you the very best regards.

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
2201 C Street, NW,
Washington, D.C.

PERCY 9-23

NIGHT LD

CHICAGO (UPI) -- SEN. CHARLES PERCY, R-ILL., SAID MONDAY THE UNITED STATES SHOULD MAKE AN UNRELENTING DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO SHOW THE ARAB OIL-PRODUCING NATIONS THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON THIS COUNTRY FOR PROTECTION AGAINST COMMUNISM.

"I SUGGEST THAT THE U.S. MAY HAVE MUCH MORE LEVERAGE THAN WE HAVE ELECTED TO USE WITH THE MOST IMPORTANT OIL-PRODUCING NATIONS," PERCY SAID.

"THEY ARE PROFOUNDLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE THREAT OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM, AN IDEOLOGY ENTIRELY ALIEN TO THEIR PROFOUNDLY RELIGIOUS, ISLAMIC TRADITION.

"THEY MUST THEREFORE RELY IN MANY WAYS ON THE U.S. FOR AN ENDURING SANCTUARY FROM THE LARGER FORCES SURROUNDING THEM," HE SAID.

PERCY SAID THE FORD ADMINISTRATION "SHOULD LAUNCH AN INTENSIVE UNRELENTING DIPLOMATIC EFFORT TO CONCERT THE INTERESTS OF THE WESTERN OIL-DEPENDENT NATIONS.

"THE OIL-EXPORTING NATIONS MUST BE BROUGHT TO THE REALIZATION THAT THE SECURITY AND FUTURE OF THEIR WORLD DEPENDS ON THE PROSPERITY AND STABILITY OF OURS," HE SAID.

PERCY SAID THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO APPLY MORE LEVERAGE ON THE ARAB NATIONS BECAUSE MANY COUNTRIES "ARE FACING EXTRAORDINARY HARDSHIP AS A RESULT OF ARAB OIL POLICY. THE WORLD CANNOT TOLERATE OIL BLACKMAIL."

PERCY MADE THE REMARKS IN A SPEECH TO THE EXECUTIVES CLUB OF CHICAGO. HE ALSO DETAILED HIS PREVIOUSLY STATED OPPOSITION TO PRESIDENT FORD'S PARDON OF FORMER PRESIDENT NIXON.

"IT WAS A MISTAKE BECAUSE IT WAS PREMATURE, BECAUSE IT SEEMINGLY REPUDIATED A SWORN PLEDGE TO CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, BECAUSE IT THWARTED JUST ICE AND BECAUSE IT SUPERSEDED THE RULE OF LAW," PERCY SAID.

"AND IT WAS A MISTAKE BECAUSE IT REINFORCES THE CYNICISM OF MILLIONS OF AMERICANS."

PERCY SAID, HOWEVER, HE BELIEVES FORD'S STATEMENT THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR COMMITMENT TO PARDON AND "NO DEAL" INVOLVED.

"I THINK HE SIMPLY MADE AN HONEST MISTAKE IN JUDGMENT," PERCY SAID.

DUPLICATE TO B WIRE POINTS

UPI 09-23 08:49 PED

February 7, 1975

To: Ambassador Simcha Dinitz

From: Senator Charles H. Percy

Subject: Our Meeting of February 6, 1975

What follows is a brief summary of my reactions to the major
points you raised during our meeting of February 6, 1975:

1) We are in complete accord on the desirability of keeping the step-by-step negotiating process moving forward. We agree as well that this is not an appropriate moment to return to Geneva.

2) Concerning my public statement that Israel cannot expect a "blank check" from Congress, I intended to convey that Israel's requests for assistance will be subjected to far greater Congressional scrutiny than in the past, and that it is extremely unlikely that Israel will get any more from Congress than what the Administration asks for. There is no question in my mind that Israel is going to find Congress tougher than in the past, primarily because of our own economic problems.

3) Concerning my public statement that Israel has missed negotiating opportunities in the past, I can only repeat that this is the clear impression I gained in both Jordan and Israel. I do understand that there were numerous contacts with the Jordanians, but I cannot help but believe that steps could have been taken which would have preempted Rabat. I would add that people in your own government told me that they would have been better off to have made some sort of

-2-

agreement with Hussein while he still could negotiate on the
Palestinian question.

4) Concerning my statements that Israel might be well advised to negotiate with the P.L.O., we may simply have to agree to disagree. As I said publicly in Beirut (see the clipping I gave you) and have said publicly since I returned to the United States, the Palestinians cannot expect their desires to be dealt with until they publicly acknowledge Israel's right to exist. In addition, I told the Palestinians that they cannot expect a homeland of their own until they and their Arab supporters have given adequate assurances that such a new state will not pose a military threat to Israel's existence. Nonetheless, I see no hope of a lasting peace in the region until the Palestinian question is resolved, and I do not see how it can even begin to be resolved unless Israel is willing to at least talk to the chosen leadership of the Palestinian liberationists. I have never suggested that Israel (or anyone else) should extend diplomatic recognition to the P.L.O., but I do hope that Israel will consider dealing with the P.L.O. at some meaningful level. I fully understand Israel's reluctance to deal with an acknowledged terrorist, but unhappily we cannot select our adversaries.

5) Concerning the question of the occupied lands, I do not believe we are in disagreement at all. What I have said publicly is that an ultimate settlement will probably have to include a return to "essentially" the 1967 borders. I have used the word "essentially" because I recognize that certain adjustments of those '67 borders will

-3-

[LC]

have to be made in order to make them less vulnerable and less tempting
to Arab aggression.

6) Concerning the question of an Israeli pre-emptive strike, I was gratified to receive your reassurances that no such strike will be made. However, I do realize that in Israel, just as in the Arab world and in the U.S., there are hawks who would welcome a first strike. By publicly warning that U.S. support for Israel would be sharply diminished in the event of a pre-emptive strike, I was both stating my own strong conviction and hoping to strengthen the hand of your government and especially your Prime Minister.

CHARLES H. PERCY
ILLINOIS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 6, 1975

PERSONAL

Dear Henry:

I very much appreciate your thoughtful letter regarding
my memorandum on China.

My Executive Assistant, Scott Cohen, was invited to the
Chinese Embassy a few weeks ago for a very pleasant
evening. When one of his hosts said to him, "When are
you coming to China?", he indicated that he would be
going only if I went, and that I have been trying, first
through the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu years ago,
then through the Pakistanis, and then by direct contact
to obtain an indication that a visa would be issued to me.

Scott Cohen was surprised with the reply: "The question
of a visa for Senator Percy depends on Henry Kissinger."

Henry, you know the interest that Loraine and I have in
China and Loraine particularly in Chinese studies and art.
She has concentrated especially on Tibet and we have been
in every area bordering Tibet, including Bhutan, Sikkim
and Ladakh. I understand, of course, that our itinerary
in China would be dependent upon the Chinese and their
plans for us, but we would like to emphasize our deep
interest in going to Tibet. This would not be a political
trip but a cultural study trip for the family, hopefully in-
cluding Sharon and Jay Rockefeller, and our college-age
son and daughter, Mark and Gail.

We are all, in a sense, students of China, its history and
culture. This August, during the Senate recess, would be

CHARLES H. PERGY
ILLINOIS

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 28, 1976

(Dictated 10-25-76)

Dear Henry:

As we go into the final few days of the campaign, I wish to reiterate to you that our foreign policy is the single strongest aspect of the Republican Administration. I defend it, support it, and am eternally grateful to you for the creativity, brilliance and tenacity that you have brought into our foreign policy; a credit to you, to the Republican Administration and to the nation.

I have only been concerned about Southern Africa; not from the standpoint of the thrust of your efforts there, as they are and have been magnificent, but whether or not it might not have been overly ambitious to take on Rhodesia first (though admittedly, the highest priority and most immediate problem). Rather, it might have been better to put our prestige on the line in Namibia, which seemed a somewhat easier solution and might have gotten momentum under way in order to build confidence in our leadership in the area. Namibia simply seemed to me to be more susceptible to solution within the foreseeable future.

These are my private views, however, expressed to you, and naturally throughout the course of the campaign I have steadfastly supported your decision to reach for the brass ring in Southern Africa.

I look forward to sitting down with you for a leisurely discussion sometime after November 15th when I return to Washington, all with the thought in mind of seeing

The Hon. Henry Kissinger

October 28, 1976

Page Two

what I can do to further your objectives and goals,
regardless of the outcome of the election. We both
have a long lifetime ahead of us, hopefully, and I
do want you to know that whatever you will be doing,
I want you to count on me for moral support and help.

Warmest personal regards,

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Secretary
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Thomas Perdue
101 Barbaree Way
Tiburon, CA. 94920

September 27, 1976

PERSONAL

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
State Department Building
Washington, D. C. 20015

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I must preface this letter with a personal note. My eldest brother Howard was a student of Nancy's in her History 101 Class at Berkeley back in 1966. This fact has always made my observations of your work as rather special. In addition, I have studied your book *American Foreign Policy* while a student at Feather River College in Quincy, California. Since then I have made a real effort to understand the magnitude of responsibility in being a Secretary of State.

While I would never want the job, I have to congratulate
you for you are to be congratulated for what you have ac-
complished in Rhodesia. You have probably done more for
civil rights in this country than any other man since
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and I can only hope that the
minorities within this country have enough sense to recognize
this.

Many of your accomplishments have been amazing, and I believe
our nation has been restored to International respect due in
large measure to your efforts.

Howard sends his hellos to Nancy and remembers their discussions
of Albert Camus fondly.

WTP/sp

Minister Shimon Peres

Jerusalem, 20 May 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Your remark about our "love for hills" (or shall we say, better, our respect for them) is not entirely unprecedented, as it is not entirely unreasonable.

It all goes back to an aggression that the king of Syria, Ben-hadad, started against Israel. He sent messengers to "A-hab king of Israel" who "said unto him: Thy silver and thy gold is mine; thy wives also and thy children, even the goodliest, are mine." "And the king of Israel answered and said, My lord, O king, according to thy saying, I am thine, and all that I have." (1 Kings 20, 3-4).

Ben-hadad was sure of his victory. But the king of Israel recovered from the initial worry and warned his adversary in a ringing phrase: "Tell him, Let not him that girdeth on his harness boast himself as he that putteth it off." (1 Kings 20, 11).

And then we come to the hills: "And the servants of the king of Syria said unto him, Their gods are gods of the hills; therefore they were stronger than we, but let us fight against them in the plain, and surely we shall be stronger than they." (1 Kings 20,23).

The war started. "And the children of Israel pitched before them like two little flocks of kids; but the Syrians filled the country." "And there came a man of God, and spake unto the king

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
U. S. A.

of Israel, and said, Thus saith the Lord, Because the Syrians have
said, The Lord is God of the hills, but he is not God of the
valleys, therefore will I deliver all this great multitude unto
thine hand, and you shall know that I am the Lord." (1 Kings 20,27-28).

Israel won the war, and the Syrians were ready for
a "separation of forces."

Ben-hadad suggested to A-hab: "The cities which my
father took from thy father, I will restore; and thou shall make streets
for thee in Damascus, as my father made in Samaria. Then said
A-hab, I will send thee away with this covenant. So he made
a covenant with him, and sent him away." (1 Kings 20, 34).

All that took place in the 10th century B.C.E.;
and the negotiators used horses!

Best of luck, and many happy returns!

Minister Shimon Peres

Jerusalem, 20 May 1974

Dear Mr. Secretary,

THE NEW
REPUBLIC

Martin Peretz
Chairman, Editorial Board

April 30, 1975

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
The Department of State
Washington D.C.

Dear Henry:

This is with reference to our discussion about a
meeting of Jewish business figures whom I would
like to bring together to meet with you to hear
your views on the current Middle-Eastern situation.
You should know that they have a fundamental commit-
ment to Israel but are both independent and open-
minded - which is also to say realistic. This is
true even for those who have positions in established
Jewish organizations. I believe it would be useful
for the ongoing conversation that this meeting take
place: to clear the air, as some of us have tried to
do on this issue in a nearly hysterical atmosphere.

Will you have one of your aides call me about how
the matter should proceed if the idea still has the
merit in your eyes which it had some five weeks ago?
Attached is a partial and tentative list of proposed
 invitees.

With personal warm wishes,

Martin Peretz

Enc.

MP:cc

1244 Nineteenth Street, NW • Washington, D.C. 20036 • (202) 331-7494

Edgar Bronfman, Chairman,
Seagram's Distillers

Martin Stone, Chairman,
Monogram Industries

Ted Ashley, Chairman,
Warner Brothers

Laurence Tisch, Chairman,
The Loews Corporation

Arnold Hiatt, President,
The Stride-Rite Corporation

Isidore Becker, President,
Schenley

Herman Marinoff, President,
Renfield Importers

Maurice Levinson, President,
Allied Food

Jerry Hoffberger, President,
National Brewing Company

George Weissman, President,
Philip Morris

David Kreeger, Former Chairman,
Government Employees Insurance Corp.

James A. Meyer, President,
Goodyear Rubber

Frank Lautenberg, President, Automatic
Data Processing; General Chairman, U.J.A.

Arthur Krim, Chairman,
United Artists

Bernard Rapaport, President,
American Income Life Insurance Company

THE NEW REPUBLIC
A Journal of Politics and the Arts, Vol. 172, No. 15,
Issue 3144, April 12, 1975 Note: Issue numbers 3129 (Dec. 28) and 3130 & 131 (Jan. 4 &
11 combined) have been misnumbered. Published weekly (except the issues of January 4, July 12,
August 9, August 23) and distributed by The New Republic, 1244 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036. Phone 331-7494. Single copy, 50¢; Yearly subscriptions, $17;
foreign, $20; students, $10. Send all remittances and correspondence about subscriptions,
undelivered copies and changes of address to Subscription Department, The New Republic, 381 West Center
Street, Marion, Ohio 43302. Copyright 1975 by The New Republic, Inc. Item g. Second class postage paid at
Washington, DC and additional mailing offices. Indexed in Reader's Guide.

Contents

5-7 Comment
Who's to Blame?, Risky Business

8 The Underarm Menace: Not So Sure
—Joseph A. Page

9 Blackening Africa—Milton Viorst

10 Exchanging Dictators in Portugal
—Peter P. Wilonski

11 Pacific Pullback—Walter Pincus

14 Last Act in Vietnam—Stanley Karnow

16 Long-Shot Jimmy Carter—
Paul R. Wieck

20 Theater—Stanley Kauffmann

21 Books—Reviews by Bruce Cook,
Kenneth Burke, Victor Gold, Peter
J. Ognibene, Jonathan Groner.
Jonathan Yardley

28 Television—Roger Rosenblatt

31 Fine Print—Doris Grumbach

31 Poem—Peter Cooley

The Staff

Chairman, Editorial Board—Martin Peretz

Publisher—Robert J. Myers

Managing Editor—David Sanford

Executive Editor—Walter Pincus

Literary Editor—Doris Grumbach

Senior Editor—John Osborne

Foreign Editor—Stanley Karnow

Associate Editor—Eliot Marshall

Assistant to the Editors—Gwen Somers

Assistant to the Literary Editor—
Cherryl Holt

Contributing Editors:

Robert Brustein, Robert Coles,
Joseph Featherstone, Gerald W. Johnson,
Nathan Lewin, Peter J. Ognibene, John
Seelye, Melville J. Ulmer, Michael Walzer,
Paul R. Wieck

Films and Theater—Stanley Kauffmann

West Coast Editor—Peter Barnes

Production Manager—Mary Henninger

Assistant Production Manager—
Ellen Cochran Hicks

Circulation Manager—Elizabeth A. Scanlan

Business Manager—Pearl Wilmer Ramsey

Assistant Business Manager—
Constance Cole Twining

New Republic Feature Syndicate—
Leslie B. Seagrave

Advertising and Promotion—
Ilene Briggin Kahane

Receptionist—Ruby McGowan

Advertising Representative—

E. Laurence White
50 E. 42nd St., NYC 10017
(212) 986-6210

Who's to
Blame

"History is politics"—which is why the current public discussion about who is to blame for the collapse of Dr. Kissinger's Mideast mediation efforts is so intense and even bitter. It is easy to dismiss such talk as an aspect of propaganda war. But in this case at least, serious examination of the negotiating positions of Egypt and Israel reveals a good deal about their intentions and about the political constraints and incentives—foreign and domestic—under which the two governments operated.

In this country, unhappily, the proper and inevitable review of what went wrong in the negotiations has been diverted from a consideration of the merits of the proposals made by Cairo and Jerusalem to an appraisal of whether, given Israel's dependence on the United States, Israel served the broader needs of American foreign policy. This foreign policy—in Indochina, Portugal, the eastern Mediterranean, and as it pertains to energy and trade—is now, thanks in part to Congress, such a shambles that some might think Israel should have done virtually anything (and everything) to provide Washington with a symbolic success in its shuttle diplomacy. To be sure, that's not what the Secretary of State expected; but we are told now almost daily by columnists Evans and Novak, who seem to be acting as Gerald Ford's interlocutors in the matter, that the President believes Israel let him down. This may not be much of a basis on which to build policy, but there are precedents in our history for diplomacy following the dictates of pique. Petulence played a considerable role in the foreign policy of Ford's spiritual ancestor, Dwight Eisenhower, and particularly for his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, when the issue happened to be the Middle East.

Mr. Kissinger, however, certainly knows that no permanent American interest will be served by bullying Israel. He has lectured too much on our responsibilities to allies to allow his disappointments and whatever concrete differences he may have had with Israel during the recent talks to undermine our historical commitment to a democratic society whose safety should be the burden of conscience to civilization. The Secretary feels this possibly more than anyone else in the administration; but there will be great pressure, if not to sacrifice Israel, then to squeeze that nation so much that in the end it is sacrificed. Powerful business interests will see pressure on Israel as a

6

The New Republic

lure for the homeless Arab petrodollar. Others will welcome it as a way of disengaging the US from a problem that has come to seem chronic and contagious. Or they will want to punish Israel for frustrating a major American diplomatic initiative, on which more was at stake than the conflict between Israel and the Arabs.

No doubt President Sadat would have welcomed a second stage agreement in the Sinai if he had been able to win one wholly on his own terms. In that sense, it might be correct to say that he did not enter the talks hoping they would fail. But his own terms called for a series of major territorial and economic concessions from Israel—strategic mountain passes, considerable land and valuable oil wells—in exchange for vague and easily revocable assurances, not to Israel, but to the United States. He knew this would be wholly unacceptable to Israel, to any adversary in almost any conflict. But he hoped that the American need for a diplomatic achievement was so great that either the United States would succeed in imposing on the Rabin government a settlement that Rabin could not defend to his own people or, failing to do that, the United States would so reduce its support for Israel that in any future war the military advantage would be Egypt's.

Israel, in contrast, began the talks willing to make substantial geographical concessions—in fact just about what Egypt wanted—and tried during the process to elicit from Cairo political agreements that would justify giving up the two most important negotiating assets it holds in the Sinai. In the end Israel said it would give less territory for lesser political concessions, but Egypt wouldn't contemplate anything other than maximum geographic withdrawals. But, for a broad retreat from occupied lands, Israel wanted not just what has been derided as the meaningless legalistic or Talmudic formula of nonbelligerence. It sought a demilitarized buffer zone in the vacated areas, joint Egyptian-Israeli patrols and electronic surveillance units, a reduction of the economic boycott and propaganda barrage against Israel, direct passage for non-Israeli tourists from Cairo to Tel Aviv, telephone and postal relations—or at least some of these. Jerusalem's precondition for great military movement on its part was some political movement on Egypt's. Why were the Israelis so insistent on having this? Better: why were the Egyptians so insistent on rejecting this?

Egypt's refusal to give the agreement any political character whatever confirmed Israel's worst fears that the transaction Sadat wanted would be more conducive to the conduct of war than to the pursuit of peace. Indeed Egyptian foreign minister Fahmy admitted as much in an address to the Arab League Conference on March 24. "It is clear that what was being discussed was neither a partial solution nor a solution by stages. It is also clear that what was being discussed was neither a temporary nor a permanent political settlement. The

aim was a military movement on an agreement with military coloring."

Egypt's negotiating strategies, to say nothing of statements by government officials and quasi-official journalists, indicate that Cairo is not yet willing or able to renounce the war option. The volatile Arab political community, which includes Syria, Iraq, the PLO and Libya, "the rejection front" as it is called, is the greatest factor in pushing Egypt to hold out for the possible dismemberment of Israel through military action or concerted diplomatic activity, using the leverage of oil on Europe and Japan. The Russians also are lurking to play an inflammatory role. In this context, it is good that the United States maintains friendly relations with Egypt, and that it does not engage in frivolous recriminations against Cairo. America, through Dr. Kissinger, remains the most plausible broker among the contending parties, particularly in the polemical jungles of Geneva. At the same time, Americans should not fawn on the Egyptians. Sadat's announcement that he would reopen the Suez Canal on June 5, greeted as "statesmanlike," was accompanied by notice that he would ban from Suez cargoes bound for Israel. As part of the first disengagement agreement, in which Israel released Egypt's surrounded Third Army and withdrew from the African banks of Suez, Sadat pledged in writing to President Nixon (and Nixon communicated it to Mrs. Meir) to allow cargoes bound for Israel through the canal. It is difficult to see how *The Washington Post* and Ambassador Robert Anderson see a gesture violating this promise as a "responsible move." It is certainly not a move destined to build Israeli faith in the credibility of Egyptian commitments, or in American guarantees of these commitments.

For the US to pressure Israel is ill-conceived. Suspending arms deliveries to Israel as the Soviets are increasing their weapons supply to the Arabs will only encourage belligerence among Israeli's neighbors and tempt them yet again to war. Nor does hinting about Israeli intransigence, and inspiring in Jerusalem fear of abandonment, help sustain the deep trust Israel has had in America, trust that has allowed our country to play a critical and responsible role in its own interests and those of peace in the Middle East. Moreover, pressuring Israel is not warranted by dint of the fact that the Rabin government was willing from the outset to cede positions of tremendous strategic advantage to get another agreement, which would at best have been insubstantial. Even if the Egyptians had given in return whatever Israel wanted, decent people would still have held their breath for years.

There may still be room for an American initiative. Israel has made that evident, and Egypt is not anxious to merge its own concerns either with those of the extremist Arab *revanche* or the Soviets. An American initiative will only succeed if we make clear that Israel can't be pushed around simply because we have troubles everywhere else.

We know by now that even-handedness is a hoary goddess,
at least as applied to the Middle East. But in their article
"Kissinger and the Yom Kippur War," Edward N. Luttwak and Wal-
ter Laqueur lay claim to just such detachment about two conflict-
ing accounts of the politics and diplomacy that secured American
military aid to Israel last October. As with other attempts at
even-handedness, they too have produced a fractious and tenden-
tious version. Nor does their learned and disdainful allusion
to the 3rd century chronicle *Historia Augusta* dazzle as they
clearly wish it would. For they also have relied on factional
slander as their source and have not taken the trouble either
to check or (worse yet) to report what is hardly so obscure
knowledge in Washington - but which undermines the deliberate,
and yet careless, structure of recrimination which they have
erected.

Luttwak and Laqueur mislead their readers, I think, on two
points: the role of Henry Kissinger and that of the Israeli
Ambassador Simha Dinitz during the crisis. Since their only
other point seems to be to relieve the Pentagon of any responsi-
bility for such delays as there were in the shipment of supplies,
I am aware of the contextual seriousness of what I am saying.
Much of the case against Kissinger is based on speculations
about President Nixon's private attitudes towards Israel, the
Russians, the structure of power in his cabinet, and finally
towards the Secretary of State himself. It may suffice, then,
simply to raise some questions about the confident assumptions
behind this analysis. In any case, I am not, as they were not,
privy to anything like an absolutely reliable informant ( could
there be one?) on the inter- and intra- agency disputes which

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figure in the divergent Kalb and Szulc accounts. But as for Am-
bassador Dinitz and his embassy the situation is altogether differ-
ent. I know from my own experience and from that of others,
some deeply and some only peripherally involved, that the facts
are just not as Luttwak and Laqueur recount them.

To evaluate the role of personality in history, it is impor-
tant to lay out clearly the historical questions that are to be
answered. Perhaps to magnify the culpability of those whom
Luttwak and Laqueur wish to blame for the time it took to mount
a full-scale American resupply operation for Israel, they once
each in the first two paragraphs propose to explain a delay of
eight days from Yom Kippur morning, Saturday, October 6. With
2500 Israeli dead, it may seem to be quibbling, however, to suggest
that even their somewhat disguised evidence would have us focus
not on a delay of over a week, but on a delay of perhaps half
that time. For it is tragically true that both Israeli and Am-
erican intelligence estimates underestimated the capacity of the
Egyptian and Syrian armies to inflict losses on Israel and to
sustain their offensive thrusts. In Israel, optimistic twists
were often put on grim news by seasoned military observers: the
tide in the first days was always about to turn or actually had
turned. We know from Israeli military sources that they suffered
significant casualties because of mistakes in evaluating the
extent of the Egyptian infantry's capability with anti-tank
missiles and of Israeli reverses. Indeed, it was not really until
Tuesday, or Monday night at the very earliest, that anyone appeared
to realize that this war was not going to be a casual replay of
1956 and 1967. An understanding of the time perspective is
important because what Israel ultimately pressed for and finally

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received by way of massive military support in a very short period
was simply unprecedented for the United States, though unhappily
not for the Soviet Union.

Lest anyone minimize the dimensions of Israel's demands -
and the success of her diplomacy on this count - it should be
understood, for example, that the air-to-air missiles that were
replaced constituted fully one third of America's reserves in that
category. Moreover, if one wants to appraise from the outside
both the magnitude of the obstacles faced by the Israeli am-
bassador in gaining needed help and the points of resistance
to that help, one should also know that tanks, planes, and rockets
were moved not simply from dead storage but from operational
bases with American officers scarcely anxious to see their commands
denuded. Does this count for nothing in appraising the Defense
Department's posture vis-a-vis Israel? If Luttwak and Laqueur,
for all of their pretence at logistical sophistication, seem
unaware of so elementary a factor in bureaucratic behavior as
pressure from reluctant underlings, their view of the American
political situation as it affected Israel's requirements is
even more shallow. This is critical because Ambassador Dinitz
showed himself to be a most deft navigator of its quite circuitous
and dangerous waters - and at a particularly tempestuous moment
in national affairs.

The authors will have no truck with such complexities: Dr.
Kissinger functioned, in their view, as "foreign-policy czar,"
virtually an unmoved mover, without buts, ifs, ands, or maybes.
Reminiscent of the conspiracy hypotheses of left journalism they
see the United States government as a single rational actor -
personified not in a vague class interest but in one very par-

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ticular person. Perhaps only to expand on Kissinger's imputed
infamy in delaying arms to Israel, Laqueur and Luttwak slyly
hint that he was also frustrating Nixon's stated wish that aid to
Israel be expedited. Given other requirements of their character-
ization of Kissinger as possessing near-plenary power, they are
reluctant to picture Nixon as exercising too much power himself.
But they do invoke him in his presidential grandeur as someone
who would not have brooked Pentagon opposition to speedy and
adequate aid to Israel. Then, would he brook State Department
foot-dragging? And conversely, if he had the capacity to exert
himself against either a recalcitrant State or Defense Department,
is it so inconceivable that he might - just might - have been a
restraint on a policy of immediate assistance to Israel, a constraint
in fact on Kissinger himself?

On the record, this would not be so surprising: in 1956, during
and after the Sinai campaign, Nixon had teamed up with Dulles
in pursuing a hard-line against Israel; he had sponsored and stood
by the Rogers plan which so compromised Israel's security; the
Watergate tapes amply prove his primitive enmity towards Jews;
and the Jewish constituency was one that _pace_ Rabbi Korf- was
not going to be helpful to him with his own survival problems.
Moreover, it was in his urgent interest that a aura of detente
with Russia not be disturbed by provocative friendship with
Israel. Detente was after all his one and only remaining credit.

Now, we do know that on October 10 the President did order
a resupply of equipment lost by Israel during the war. No one
has claimed, however, that this order was anything but vague as
to the details of priorities and timing. Someone so experienced
as Nixon must have known that an unspecific directive is an in-

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vitation to bureaucratic wrangling and evasions. And these occurred,
as every account agrees.

In less than three days, however, the President's order
was made quite concrete and specific, and the airlift went into
full swing. But if Kissinger was the undisputed authority Luttwak
and Laqueur say he was, does he not merit some credit for this?
At least for overcoming the traditional *Arabisant* bias in his
own Department which he had taken over just a short time before?
The authors are even willing to concede that some credit may be
warranted, though they insist that he timed the resupply, that
is, delayed it, to secure America's maximum leverage for the
ensuing diplomacy. But why did this leverage entail delay?
The Russians surely could have been counted upon to press for a
ceasefire as soon as Israel was close to a decisive military victory.
But the Israeli successes on Egyptian territory proper - not in
unpopulated Sinai - which Kissinger needed to establish his or
America's own fulcrum position required prompt military aid,
and not a delay at all. For given the emerging catastrophe,
delay in fact threatened what Kissinger could never have wanted: 1)
a situation with the Russians pivotally placed behind victorious
Arabs and 2) inevitable demands for a direct American intervention
on behalf of Israel.

Fortunately for Israel, its emissary saw more clearly -
or at least argued more forcefully - than anyone else this American
interest in a prompt and adequate resupply of Israel's depleted
strength so that her forces could repel the Egyptian and Syrian
armies to beyond the pre-1967 boundaries. Otherwise, what could
the Americans (and the Israelis) possibly offer the Arabs as
inducement to compromise after the next ceasefire? Dinitz was

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also shrewd enough to recognize both Kissinger's centrality in the administration and his limitations. His relationship with the Secretary had to be of singular importance: no other relevant person had comparable access to the President on foreign policy and no one else was likely ever to act as his surrogate on these matters. In this circumstance, he could cross Kissinger only in the greatest extremity. Given the inner chaos and fears of the Nixon administration, to have sought polemical confrontations might well have endangered Israel's immediate and overriding interests, created additional and irrational justification for the U.S. government to avoid the hard choices, measured but nonetheless forward strategy of pressure on the Secretary and through him on the President. I cite only a few instances about which Luttwak and Laqueur should have known; since they do not allude to any of these, we can charitably assume that they do not know of them. But then what credibility at all should we then give their account of the Ambassador functioning as anything remotely like an instrument of Kissinger's policy?

Dinitz returned from Israel on Sunday, the day after the war started. On Monday he met in a private home with Senators Church, Hart, McGee, Mondale, and Symington and perhaps two or three other public figures. On Tuesday, I myself spoke with one of the senators in attendance and he recounted to me the dire report which Dinitz had given. Extrapolating pessimistically from his reading of incomplete but not encouraging reports, Dinitz had argued that a military disaster was in the offing and that Israel's friends in Congress had best mobilize quickly. Anyone in touch with events in Washington during those days knows that this message was repeated in countless briefings and conversations and that

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these efforts resulted in a continuous outpouring of support for Israel's requirements ~~from~~ also from genuinely influential figures. Since there are ~~in~~ Washington several journalists whom Dinitz sees regularly, why didn't Luttwak and Laqueur check to see what message he was giving them?

The message, in any event, was not limited to simple exhortation. The embassy did not discourage, in the early days of the war, American politicians from saddling the administration with added moral responsibility for what was taking place because of its pressure, that is, Kissinger's pressure, against a first strike. (This was somewhat irresponsible, it now appears, since we now know that the Israeli cabinet had decided on its own not to attack preemptively.) The authors did not even consult *Near East Report*, the weekly journal of the registered Israel lobby to see what line was taken by Jerusalem's quasi-official spokesmen in America and to what views it gave especial prominence. They would have found nothing like the pliant temper they try to evoke.

Particularly illumining also is the argument urged by the Ambassador on Israel's liberal allies in Congress. He pointed out to them that they had a stick to wield over the Secretary, that the war in the Middle East was a test of his whole European policy and the reliability of the NATO alliance. If the permanent presence of American materiel on American bases on the Mediterranean and in central Europe would not be a factor in the defense of Israel, and if American support for the most dubious governments in the region would not facilitate aid to Israel at this critical juncture, then that policy and that alliance would have been proven worthless. This was a serious challenge to Kissinger and those who made it assumed responsibilities for their own behavior

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vis-a-vis that policy and that alliance in the future.

Nor is this an argument which would be made by a pliant and timid ambassador.

One of Dinitz's tasks was to stimulate support from pivotal figures in Congress on very concrete and politically vexing matters. These included, for example, the landing of American pilots in American transport planes in an active combat zone. He had also to persuade Senators who had opposed production of some weapons and aircraft that they now urge precisely these to be deployed to Israel. But Dinitz also had every reason to avoid such issues becoming matters of congressional debate. What mischief Fulbright might have fomented as he mustered McGovern, Aiken, Mansfield, form the Foreign Relations Committee alone to his side - to say nothing of the other "reliable" foes of Israel, or in the Senate, the spectre of "another Vietnam." It is difficult to understand how Luttwak and Laqueur can be so oblivious to the risks of an indiscriminate popular rally behind specific and technical needs. In any case, they do ignore the fact that by Tuesday there had already been introduced a sense of Congress resolution supporting Israel in general terms and subsequently endorsed by seventy senators and more than half of the House.

I am not, as one says, "soft" on Dr. Kissinger, though I believe he was rightly the critical focus of Israeli attention. And if, for whatever reason, he may have favored logistical nightmares like private charters and island hopping to transport arms to Israel, this only meant he required more attention and persuasion. Now it may well be true that he also wanted a low American profile in aid to Israel. But the Defense Depart-

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ment demanded it no less. On Wednesday and Thursday, October 10 and 11, for example, El Al aircraft were picking up supplies in Norfolk, Virginia, but they had their distinctive markings painted over at the insistence of the Pentagon. Given such squeamishness at the Pentagon, the Ambassador clearly had a rough job ahead of him with Secretary Schlesinger, who must already have been conscious of the oil pressure the Arabs would apply on American bases generally and to the not-so-small lingering American supply commitment in Indo-China. But it was difficult for Dinitz even to see the Defense Secretary. His Wednesday appointment was postponed to Thursday, and this one was in turn postponed to Friday. I know of one long-time senatorial friend of both Israel and the defense establishment who tried unsuccessfully to bring Schlesinger out of hiding while Israel was in permit. When the Secretary and the Ambassador finally met on Friday, Dinitz was told that the American government could send three transports every two days - and that when six planes had left, the arrangement would be reviewed. Luttwak and Laqueur, apparently do not know of this altogether inadequate Pentagon maneuver - although on the night it was made staff members of the Senate Armed Services Committee were already aware of it and were working with some of its members to have its provisions dramatically increased.

The Luttwak and Laqueur article demonstrates no recognition of the hazardous environment in which Dinitz operated and in which he produced for Israel more equipment than the United States had ever before authorized to be sent anywhere else at one time. An unpredictable, preoccupied, and besieged President sat in the White House; and Arab oil boycott of tremendous consequence was already in the offing; the country was in an isolationist