Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

9:20 am 3/5/70

By KHLW

NARA, Dato 5/12/04

R: I want to call the President's attention when you call him and say Kosygin took part in the ceremony on the signing of the NPT and made a speech. He didn't say very much.

K: I have the text here and it's going into him in 5 mins. What he plans to say now, I will send it over. Something like you recommended about bi-partisan and foreign ambassadors and this is a major step forward.

R: He should make some statement vis-a-vis Kosygin because Kosygin said it was an idea of our ability to cooperate. Kosygin also sent his regards through Amb. Beam and expressed his regards on his help on this treaty to the President.

K: We will add two or three sentences in reciprocity. After the foreign policy and bi-partisan part. Here's what he plans to say: "The treaty is an international step forward and we hope to build a more secure world? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? we appreciate all our guests ? ? ? ? ? and I am confident that it will ? ? ? an historical event."

R: Take into account that Kosygin said something.

By: KCL NARA, Dato. S/12/04

Telcon
March 5;10:35 a.m.
Amb. Freeman

F: You asked me to call.

K: It is only about that document which is going through a series of nitpicking exercises so that everyone can say he got is word in. In order to prevent you from getting a check list as to who does what to whom I am not giving you a preliminary draft. But by 1:00 or 2:00 --

Freeman: I can either collect it or have it collected immediately and I have warned No. Ten they should expect something.

K: They should certainly have it -- you will have it by 2:00 and we will call you as soon as we have it.

ms

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

*

By: KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Yoshida

10:40 am

3/5/70

Y: I have the following message to you from my friend. Our envoy is on his way back to Washington and he has with him our counter proposal. I myself met with this man before his departure and made every effort for a solution to this problem. My friend suggested to this friend Yoshino to get in touch with you to have a confidential exchange of views. My friend did not say anything about this channel. We believe you know Yoshino personally.

K: He was a student of mine.

Y: My friend's suggestion derives from his confidence in you and his belief that something fruitful will come out of this. He knows you are not an expert. He hopes this meeting will take place in confidence before he meets with Trezise and the others on your side. Yoshino is supposed to get in touch with you on his arrival shortly.

K: I can't see him before Monday evening. I am going to Fla. this weekend. Maybe we could fly him there.

Y: Perhaps you could suggest that to him. The counter proposal, according to my friend, will at first glance probably appear unacceptable (to your government) but from the Japanese internal point of view and the mounting pressures it must take that form to start with. The main point from your point of view will be the injury business. My friend will ask you not to take it at first value as you see it because we are entirely flexible and in due course Yoshino will accept your new counter proposal on possible injury rather than actual injury. What we really need is the (extent?) of the injury in your country in the future. We would like to have from you ______ instructions on the export if we stick to the word voluntary. My friend, knowing you are in a great hurry, hopes that you will be a little bit patient in the beginning of the new negotiations because of the above. My friend is concerned about industry at home but also because of the political opposition both in his party and opponents in the Diet. Every day he is attacked. Therefore, my friend would greatly appreciate your ______ in the cause of our successful negotiations. My friend personally maintains his resolution for the solution of the problem and has spoken out in the Diet in the context of wider U.S.-Japanese relations. The forthcoming visit to Japan of Kendall is a further opportunity to talk the matter over. He and his colleagues are available to talk to Kendall and hopes he will take the opportunity.

K: I appreciate this very much and I will of course see Mr. Yoshino as soon as I get back or maybe I will fly him to Fla. I will do my best to act in the spirit of your proposal as indicated by your friend. Give him my high regards.

Y: I will. If there are any messages, please get in touch again.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon

Joseph Alsop

3/5/70 10:55 a.m.

A: You're in a terrible mess?

K: Yes, that is true. When I don't call you back, I hope you're
a good enough friend to understand.

A: I do, but I will be heartbroken if I don't see you before I leave.

K: I was going to suggest some late hour today. We could
have a bite if you could stand the horrible food.

A: I have a dinner tonight, but I could see you before it. Could we make it 6:45?

K: Yes, that will be fine.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

WELCON

Marshall Green/Kissinger

12:10 pm

3/5/70

K: Your letters are OK.

G: Fine. Are the telegrams ok?

K: Yes.

G: The Secretary called to say he is anxious for the press release. He is going to Key Biscayne but he would like to see it.

K: It's being typed but you can tell him that every suggestion you made has been taken except on the Paris negotiations which is being re-written. You will have it by 2:30 or 3:00. If you have comments back by 7:00, the President can work on the plane.

G: Will the letters be released? It's not customary except after a certain period of time.

K: We thought we wouldn't release them.

G: Fine. Are you giving the press backgrounder?

K: I haven't seen too many volunteers for this.

G: You carry out the role of the villain so

K: villanously. It's a role I don't like but it's a Presidential statement.

G: We will then be calling in the Soviets and tell them tomorrow to come in tomorrow. The Secretary will do it. Underline the gravity. I had a call from Pat on Fulbright's staff for a transcript but I couldn't tell him that.

K: The Secretary thought the first volume.

G: Yes.

K: Could you send that?

G: Now? After the speech we will send it over with a blue line on it.

K: We thought this would help with that.

G: It will.

*

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Sisco/Kissinger

12:35 pm

3/5/70

K: I am going to be taking up the Middle East package with the President in Key Biscayne but I have doubts about the statement. I would like to see if I could get an alternative statement. Then I will present both. This statement will drive the Israelis up the wall and a good chance of producing a conflict. Precisely

S: What you are saying surprises me.

K: The first paragraph, 'The President has concluded that the ? ? ? ? ? ?' Why take it on? What I thought the President had in mind -- I will show him this too -- but I thought he said we had this request and we are analyzing it but we are convinced that Israel and everyone else is best assured by restraint. Therefore we are holding off our decision for a period in order for other countries to show restraint and avoid an arms race.

S: The trap is -- say the Russians are restrained and dribble things in. Then you have the President hooked publicly while in order to put in arms at another date you have to show that they didn't have restraint.

K: ? ? ? ? ? ? how could it be impaired if it's not in that way? In 6 mos. if there are no arms shipments on the Israeli side, we are not in a position to supply them either.

S: I think that sentence has to be doctored from that point of view.

K: If we do make a positive decision later, we can do it without giving them a veto.

S: Look at the next paragraph.

K: It does it to some extent.

S: The key sentence we have to look at but your problem -- if you don't make this point there are only two ways you can justify postponing the decision. The agreement won't cause ? ? ? in the U. S.

K: In the MX/WX U. S. we are taking a beating.

S: If you say the President has made proposals to the Soviet Union and others and they give us the back of the hand, it will not hold weight. There are only two things to say: 1) looked at this and Israel doesn't need any now; and 2) we can supply them if the need arises. Then the people are convinced that we have done the right thing. You don't want to put it in such a way that your requirement the other side to pump arms into the Arabs. Another possibility to broaden the rational for this decision. The rational was to say we were watching at closely.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELOCN

Sisco/Kissinger

12:35 pm 3/5/70

-2-

S (cont.): We could say our decision will be made in line light of the military and political situation in the area. Then if Cairo and the Russians want to ignore them, we can't avoid it.

K: Could you do that in a memo and get it to me by the end of the day?

S: In a revision of this text.

K: Either stick with this and give him another or amend this one.

S: Let's amend this and put the emphasis on the restraint point that you have indicated.

*

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Stans
2:05 pm, 3-5-70

By: KHL

NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

K: Maury, I have heard from my kabuki players. They have Yoshino on the way back to Washington. He has with him their counter proposal. Sato met with his man and made every effort to come to a solution, and suggested to him that he get in touch with me to have a confidential exchange of views. He said he knows I am not an expert but hopes this meeting will take place in confidence. He said the counter proposal, according to my friend, will at first glance probably appear unacceptable, but from the Japanese internal point of view and the mounting pressures it must take that form to start with. My friend said the main thing from your point of view will be the injury business. He said his friend will ask that we not take it at first face value as we see it because they are entirely flexible and in due course his friend will accept our new counter proposal on possible injury rather than actual injury. He said what they really need is plausible entry into our country in the future. He said we would like to have instructions from you if we stick to the word voluntary. He said his friend hopes you will be patient because this is a new procedure.

S: Let's see what Yoshino has to say and try to parcel it out.

K: I just wanted to tell you where it stands.

S: You will let us know where it stands when you meet with him.

K: Yes.

mlh

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

2:20 pm 3/5/70

K: Latest report from kabuki land. Yoshino is on his way back. Sato wants to make sure Yoshino talks to me first. This suggestion is from Sato because of his confidence in me -- and I've never met him! He know I'm not an expert but hopes the meeting will be in confidence before Yoshino meets with Trezise and the others. At first gland it will appear unacceptable (Etc., taken from the Yoshida telcon). He also mentions Kendall.

J: Kendall is very impatient from the industry side. They don't want to talk to him.

K: I will leave Kendall out of it. In the future they don't want actual injury but potential future injury.

J: This fits in with my word. He is coming back and will not have the counter proposal and will have instructions on Monday.

K: That's so he can see me.

J: Go ahead and see him.

K: I can't give anything away -- I don't know anything!

J: I have no worry.

K: I will keep you posted.

J: You will be seeing him tomorrow?

K: I'll be in Key Biscayne.

J: When do you go?

K: Tonight.

J: He will presumably call your office when he comes in. I can find out when he is getting back and then we can go from there. I will let your office know.

(J called back to say Yoshino is arriving 9:00 Friday morning.)

By KHL NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
3/5/70 a.m.

R: There was just one other thing I forgot to mention. That story in the New York Times is not correct. I said we had no present plans, and if more were developing we would discuss them with Congress. They tried to press me. I said a President has a right to think about what he wants to think about.

K: I read what you had said as being consistent with what Laird had said and what we are going to say.

R: As a matter of fact, I think it went quite well.

K: You must have established an extraordinary relationship with the committee.

R: Some time next week maybe we should have some of them over.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger/(Jonathon Moore)
6:40 pm 3/9/70

R: We have some doubts about putting out the names because we are not sure of the number. Your staff took over responsibility earlier. We want to be sure.

K: What do you mean?

R: We wanted you to take out the names of those killed in combat.

K: I will take responsibility.

R: You don't agree?

K: What do we do now?

R: We're not sure of the numbers and names and we're not sure who are sheepdip or not.

K: The President made the decision today. I wasn't here. You don't think we should put out the names?

R: I don't think we should dribble them out. They will want to know how many and who in 68. They will not care who the Administration was. We should do it only with an accurate list.

K: The President was trying to get the names for '69 because he was told he couldn't get them for the whole period.

R: When did he call? No one here has been contacted. When he does he want the list made public? Grant and Lord said they would take over the responsibility of getting the accuracy of names. We should get the names for Laos.

K: We have 3 times -- it came back from the Dept and that line was not taken out.

R: Your staff said they wanted that in and they would take over the accuracy. Mel said he recommended it too.

K: Mel suggested only prairie fire. I am to blame because I should have known it couldn't be true. You are absolutely right.

R: You should give thought to whether we can -- If we are going to put out a list, we will have to put out the whole list. We got the word from Haig that we would put out the civilians and Defense would put out the list of military. There's only one military. We want to be sure we have them all.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

*

Rogers/Kissinger

6:40 pm

3/9/70

-2-

K: Who would have them? The Embassy?

R: yes

K: Can you go to the Embassy? What documentation do you have that you questioned the figures?

R: Our first written comment was that you should not say there were no combat deaths and your man said they would take over the responsibility of accuracy.

K: I don't have documents in front of me.

R: We will send over

K: It's fine. It's my fault. Let's not argue.

R: I don't want you to think it's not correct.

K: We put out a statement and it was our responsibility to check the figures.

R: The sources about deaths are 1 from AID, 1 from CIA, 1 from a telephone conversation from Mar. 9. I think we should check these figures. When will the President make his statement?

K: Zeigler released it at 6:00.

R: What did he say?

K: He said we will release the names.

R: He said we?

K: I don't know who said what, I just returned.

R: Maybe I should talk to him. When? Tonight?

K: Tomorrow would be time enough. Haig gave me a list, saying it was from State.

R: It was the best we could do with the time. It's from Jonathan Moore. Marshall made the first recommendation.

K: Where did he make a recommendation? I will take the responsibility but when did you make

["Reproduced from the open files\nof the Nixon Presidential\nMaterials Staff", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "*", "By: KH V NAIA, Date: 5/12/04", "Rogers/Kissinger/Moore", "6:40 pm 3/9/70", "-3-", "M: Are you talking about the statement on recommendations in the President's statement?", "K: I have the lined-out drafts and that's not here.", "M: It's in the first draft. I talked to Winston Lord and said I saw it was in. He said it was deliberately left in. So on the second draft we made a different statement.", "R: You talked about checking", "M: Before the point we just discussed was the point of new statistics. We had gone to Godley over the weekend and asked for a comprehensive list. He gave us a list and then 24 hours later revised it slightly. When we found out the WH staff was working independently and with the departments, feverishly, I talked over there and when the figures didn't agree, I talked over there. Your people said they had done the research on this and would take full responsibility for the figures.", "K: That's true.", "M: I got word last night that the WH wanted casualty statistics. That was new. The people on my desk were working with the staff had the figures. We didn't know until 2:45 today what they were for.", "K: That was at the request from the President -- he called no less than three times.", "M: S/S sent over the list at 3:30. We were told then that there was to be a release tonight.", "K: If anyone had told me there was any doubt I would not have used it.", "R: Our point was that it was an unnecessary position to take because we were afraid that there would be disputes, as there were, on combat deaths.", "K: We got recommendations for many of the changes, but not for that one.", "R: You will see.", "K: "? ? ???? ? ? ? ground troops in Laos in the past.", "They avoided that implication.", "R: They didn't do away with the implication. Time enough --? ? ? ? ? ? ?"]

*

By: KHL

NARA, Dato S/13/04

Rogers/Kissinger/Moore

6:40 pm

3/9/70

-4-

K: Fine. I get the point. I'm not going to argue. It's not worth my while.
What we need to discuss is where we go from here.

M: On the list of casualties we did not go out to the field -- there was no time.
What we need is to go to the field and make sure we are working with accurate
data and names.

R: How can we justify giving the names in '69 and not in '68?

K: I'm not wild on this idea but it has been decided and announced. That's the
problem but the President has had it announced.

R: We will have the best figures we have and get them out first thing in the
morning.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
7:10 p.m., 3-9-70

L: Henry, how was your trip? How was the briefing?

K: It was a very good briefing.

L: I just got a call from Rogers who said I had not recommended removal of the sentence from the statement.

K: As I told Rogers, I am responsible for it. And no one should go flapping around about it. I am taking the full responsibility. On your lined out copy you had deleted the sentence.

L: I deleted it four times.

K: We then called Pursley or someone over there and got the impression that it was deleted because of PRAIRIE FIRE. We therefore released this statement to take account of PRAIRIE FIRE. It is my responsibility. I should have seen if the statement were correct.

L: My concern is the other people we put in Air Force that were killed. They have showed up in casualty figures but did not show up the way they should.

K: It was my fault. You certainly made it clear how you stood. I am going to call the President and tell him it is my fault and I will send you a copy of the telcon.

L: Don't do that at all. I am only talking to you because I did not want you to think I caused you this problem.

K: You did not cause me any problem. There is no question that you had asked that it be out. I am going to call the President.

mlh

By: KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON

Rogers/Kissinger
7:10 pm 3/9/70

R: I looked at the press statement and we will have to take a chance. He said we would do it tonight. We will have to take a chance. In the meantime, we will send out a telegram and make sure

K: I have looked over the drafts and on one they didx didn't say anything at all on ground personnel and on the other they said there were ground personnel and didn't change the figures.

R: I raised the question on what was combat casualties. I also raised the figure. They said your staff had taken over the responsibility. I didn't know there was a military man killed.

K: Do you think I did? If JCS cannot give the figure, I don't know who can. We checked with JCS and DOD and they just said some people came in from Thailand from time to time.

R: I will have them say on paper what they say happened.

K: It may not be true. I have no record.

R: I believe Marshall Green and Jonathan Moore.

K: And I believe X Winston Lord.

R: We will see. On this one, if we say no one was killed in combat -- we raised the question. I don't want you saying we didn't get the information to you.

K: It isn't in my record.

R: We have photocopies too and we will get it down on paper and let you take a look at it.

K: OK

*

By: KLC NARA, Dalo: 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Marshall Green
3/9/70; 7:35 p.m.

K said he was searching his records and could not find any indication that anyone from Green's shop told us to take that sentence out. G said this was a matter that had been handled orally between Jonathan Moore and Winston Lord or Lindsay Grant. G said because of the conversation they felt the matter was being handled by the White House and that it was not to be their concern. G said that is why when they went back to their written comments they did not touch on that point. Also, G said they understood that Defense had an objection and felt they would handle it. K said he had their drafts -- the first one had no objection at all and the other one had a stylistic objection. G said that was a mistake and someone had neglected to draw a line through that. G said he just pulled the draft out and found that it was not drawn through. G said he has explained it to the Secretary and apologized. G said there is no proof that they had an objection that would be available to K.

G said he had a couple of things he wanted to discuss: he had a call from Chal Roberts who had asked whether there was any truth that Thanat had asked the Secretary for additional American assistance. G said he told Roberts that he was not aware of any such thing and that he would have to check on it. K said he didn't raise it with me. G said he didn't raise it with the Secretary either. K said all he asked for was moral assistance. G asked K if he told Chal Roberts that would it embarrass K. K said no.

G said we are putting out the six names tonight. G also said they were sending a wire to Vientiane.

Jonathan Moore got on the line and told K that he takes full responsibility for not crossing out that sentence. K said he should tell that to the Secretary. M said he did. M said with regard to any informal conversations he has with K's staff he also takes full responsibility -- none of it goes on them. K said we all know what is going on here -- it's not your fault and it's not our fault. K said M should not worry about it and that he has done well. K said it was put out in a hurry and a mistake was made.

*

By: KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/94

TELCOM

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

7:55 pm

3/9/70

S: I'm doing homework for our next meeting and it occured to me it would be helpful if you put out an agenda. There are somany papers that need attention.

K: What do you think should be in it?

S: What the question of the 3 options should be. The working level has no clarity.

K: We should discuss SAM upright problem, shouldn't we?

S: Yes, but the three options and look at the ______ again because the problem of whether they will take the land and the ~~XMX~~ ABM/MIRV relationship problem. Are you aware of that?

K: No.

S: It's very complicated. If we cover all that, it's a full afternoon's work

K: May I get back to you tomorrow?

S: Certainly -- if you could just designate what it should be.

*

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger

8:00 pm

3/9/70

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

H: Did you enjoy your holiday?

K: I was out on the wrong day.

H: They did a good job on it. The President was pleased with the way Al Haig moved in on it with Ron. I saw the morning briefing and Zeigler did a sensational job.

K: I have just been on the phone with the two cabinet members who said they were against it from the first.

H: That's not why you should take the blame.

K: I should have known it wasn't true. The President should never have made the statement and

H: It should have been made by State.

K: they never volunteered any information and gave us no warning. Laird gave one of his fudged statements and Rogers, as for the Nov. 3 statement, we didn't hear from. Nevertheless, I'm here to prevent that sort of thing.

H: We are OK now.

K: But when you know you could have done it. With thousands of Americans it could not be true. Technically it's true but when they are through, you can't tell it.

H: Are they still nitpicking? The Secretaries?

K: No but they are holding up for themselves. Rogers didn't want to put out the names tonight but he will.

H: He'd better. The President is so involved and he is cranking on this. They won't get very far. The real problem is that it's not known which he doesn't know. He thinks he has covered well.

K: He has. We had no choice -- he shouldn't have made that statement. It's too much a can of worms. We should have known there were too many skeletons in that closet. But they would have given the game away. We came out ok

H: Let's see how it rides in the next few weeks. Under the circumstances

K: We recovered as best we could.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Haldeman/Kissinger
8:00 pm 3/9/70

-2-

H: Ron and Al did a great job.

K: I think so too.

H: How was your journey?

K: It was useful for the SALT discussions. Did I call you?

H: No, I was just checking on you.

K: Is the President's mood OK?

H: He was never disturbed about this and got concerned about the specifics. He didn't have anything else to do today, so it gave him something to concentrate on. He was very pleased with the way it was pulled together and wasn't concerned when it started falling apaprt. You can never be sure they are giving you the truth.

K: That's what we should have been careful of. Can you let me see him in the morning? We have an Israeli problem.

H: Another one? OK, there should be time clear after his 8:30 meeting before his 10:00 appointment.

K: If you could give me 15 mins.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Dutch Foreign Minister Luns

3/10/70 9:35 a.m.

L: I saw Arch Duke Otto at luncheon in the Hague last week. I told him I read your article.

K: I'm going to send him a copy.

Ł: Good.

K: Are you in Washington?

L: No, I'm on my way to the West Indies, then to Beirut and Cairo. After I had a talk with Thant I've been very pessimistic. What seems important is that Israel indicates it will not insist on a procedure which would be humiliating to the Arabs. And make some statement indicating they will be willing to talk about everything. That's what Abba Eban thinks too, but he doesn't decide things there. I thought I would not decline the invitation because they know I'm on good terms with Israel. I would like to say to Nasser that if he finds an honorable way out his prestige with the Arab world will be increased because he will then not be dependent on foreign aid. Well, I will do my best.

K: I know you will. You will not be coming through Washington?

L: No. I'll be spending 3 days in Beirut, 3 days in Ahman, if that little city's still there, and Cairo.

K: Will you be at the Bilderberg Meeting?

Ł: Yes. Will you?

K: I will try to come. I look forward to seeing you there.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

9:40 am

3/10/70

S: Any report?

K: I expect to see him this morning.

S: I told Hal to be sure and read the cables ? ? ? ? ? ? concerned it will go the other way. One other thing -- if after you have looked at this and you feel there is an additional sweetener, the Israelis could be told privately that we were willing to commit ourselves to the principle of replacement.

K: A-16 (?) ?

S: You don't have to mention the number of planes. The President may be concerned about a negative reply. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? we don't need to say anything publicly but this helps on propaganda side. Nothing in the public statement ? ? ?. The original way is basically postponement but reassuring to the Israelis.

K: How about adding on some planes at the other end of the production line.

S: We could tell that to the Israelis and you would have to have the President tell Packard and Laird that "I want you to be sure that we plan to pluck these planes out.

K: You go along with both of these? If the President promised replacement and production?

S: That would take away the sting.

K: Would you recommend that?

S: That's what I recommended in my memo.

By KML NAHA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
U.A. Johnson/Kissinger

9:55 am

3/10/70

K: Our play is getting into focus. Yoshino has called and said he has to see me urgently and is coming in 10 mins.

J: He gave Trezise an Aide Memoire. It's not a counter proposal. It's the same proposal as before. It suggests meetings in Geneva. Says they might try something on selective controls. Consumption in some cases and tarrif ?? . If we could regulate tariff commission action to say we want to go it might be of some help (?). It's very discouraging.

K: I intend to be very tough. Every time they make me think something is going to happen and then nothing. Yoshino is a former student of mine and it will be nice to see him, but I'm going to be tough.

JX: He told Trezise that Sato said to see you. Sato thinks I have been too tough.

K: I am going to tell him I don't understand the problem but I know what I think the two principles talked about and this is what the President thinks was agreed on. There's a textile meeting on the 18th and if we don't agree before that, we will open the flood gates and we will see where it stops.

J: If you have anything more

K: If they have anything and they give us a face saving way out I will accept it. We have the best negotiator.

J: Good and we'll see what we see.

K: There's something subtle going on.

J: I don't know what it is.

K: Neither do I.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Charles Bartlett/Kissinger

10:00 am 3/10/70

K: I am able calling you on the basis of having read a portion of an article -- saying Rogers and State should have been informed that President was handling world report. The State Dept. was informed in writing on Oct. 27 that the President was making a report and they were told every two weeks what the progress was.

B: They didn't know it was so thorough.

K: They knew the outline and that there was a report and the topic headings and they knew every time a draft was finished what the length was. Technically they didn't know how long it would be but they knew every two days after how long it was.

B: That's the story they put out.

K: I don't want to get into an argument. If you want to see the chron -- talk to Elliott Richardson. At our weekly lunches he was kept informed. If you write these things you can't tell how long it will be. At first we aimed for 50 pages and every time a re-draft was finished, we called Ted Eliot and told him how long it was. It was longer than we had thought but since the outline was known and we kept to the outline, the length was unimportant.

B: They should have realized their effort was being eclipsed and there was no reason to go over it.

K: They refused to let us see what they were doing. Our draft was finished on Friday and they saw it on Sat. morning and we never got theirs. I thought there's would deal with country programs and ours would be conceptual.

B: From their end I thought that was what happened but perhaps not. There seems to be a tightness with these people.

K: That's not true. My people deal with them and I talk to Rogers three times a day.

B: I wasn't being critical.

K: I wasn't complaining about being unfari. I feel in my job that everyone who deals with us should have a fair idea and we want everyone to know what is being done. We put out a memo -- In fact, we put out a memo in Feb. 1969. We only drafts until early Jan.

B: They are putting out the story to protect themselves.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Bartlett/Kissinger

10:00 am 3/10/70

-2-

K: What conceivable incentive -- this isn't a competition between the Secy. of State and the President.

B: You are going to have to be sensitive to the morale problem over there.

K: What can I do but keep them informed? One thing is that I deal only with the Secretary and Under Secy. so he doesn't think I am under cutting him. So I take the heat.

B: They blamed it on you because this is the way they feel.

K: They feel that but they don't know -- I have a phone call log which shows the chronology.

B: You are doing so much more than Mac did. It's real progress. It's a problem of moreal and Rogers has this on a personal basis.

K: It's a rough job to come into cold.

B: Stay with it.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
M. Green/Kissinger

11:30 am

3/10/70

G: Bill and I have a number of ideas about things. We are anxious to talk to you. We would be available Sat. morning -- I'm going to be away Thurs. and Friday. We are willing to

K: I understand. Tomorrow is no -- Sat. is the Gridiron dinner. I was going to be in NY. I'm anxious to see you.

G: I have to go to the Hill tomorrow morning and in the afternoon I have ______. The only time would be probably tomorrow evening.

K: I have a dinner.

G: Just a suggestion -- 5 or 6?

K: At six I have someone coming in.

G: How about Sunday?

K: Do you want to do it before the weekend? How about lunch next Tues.?
Do you want to come over here at one?

G: Fine.

Further conversation 11:35

K: I just wanted, for your own information, to tell you that I saw a rather amazing cable sent to Habib that transmitted an instruction verbatim that I sent over. In my limited acquaintance with the State Dept., this is a new procedure. It was a hand written note from the President. I just wanted you to know for your information.

G: Thank you.

I*

By: KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telcon
Secy Laird

3/10/70 - 12:00 Noon

L: I wanted to ask you a question about whether you knew and the President knew Admiral Bud Zumwalt, in charge of our Naval operations in Vietnam.

K: No.

L: He is the person I lean towards for CNO. He is down the rank a bit - a Vice Admiral.

K: I don't know the name but I don't think it's a bad idea to go down a few ranks.

L: The President thinks so. Zumwalt is in town. I wonder if you would mind talking to him.

K: I would like to.

L: He can brief you on Vietnamization of the Navy and you can size him up a little bit. I would like the President to meet him. He is in town just these two days.

K: I know today is impossible for the President. Let him see me today and I will ask the President about tomorrow. We could do it by telling him to talk to him for 10 minutes about the Naval situation.

L: This guy is a great guy. He is the best of all the Vice Admirals we have. There is no 4-Star Admiral I can recommend.

K: I can't think of one.

L: He is a young man, 52, which is young to go into this job, but he has been in the military for 25 years and has several assignments in Defense. At one time was Military Assistant to Paul Nitze when he was Secretary of the Navy. He was in charge of Policy Planning in ISA.

K: I can see him at 6:00 today.

L: I will set the appointment up.

By KHLU NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

K: This isn't for that particular job, but I liked that Deputy at SAC yesterday. He seemed like a particularly thoughtful man.

L: He is a Rear Admiral - a guy we are watching. And another guy is Wendell, a damn good Vice Admiral too. We have got some pretty good ones, but these jk 4-Star Admirals -- there just xxxxx isn't one around.

K: I couldn't see one you would be happy with.

L: I haven't said anything to this guy about it. I will have him there at 6:00.

W.S.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger
Under Secretary Johnson

3-10-70, 12:30 pm

K: I have just seen Yoshina. He started by handing me the Aide Memoire. I told him I did not understand it. I said that Trezise tells me it is unacceptable and anything he says is the word. I told you I would be the villain. Then he said how tough this was for Sato, how the textile industry won't cooperate and he said Commerce will not produce on the injury thing. Then he said they would settle for the threat of injury. He said if we could do something that looks selective, they would try to be cooperative on the injury part. I said, how many items? I said what would you say if I said 12 items? Yoshina said why don't you say about 18 items so that we can say we have talked you down. Then he said why don't you use your influence to produce names of companies on the injury part. I said we have a meeting coming up on our textile industry. And we will just get out of the way. I said I would call you to see if we could put together a comprehensive, selective list. I was thinking of your fallback list. I am wondering if this isn't the time for you to produce your list, adding a few items to it. Then, if you did that, I would say this is as far as the President will go. Just add a few items that they can knock off.

J: Yes, I think we have to.

K: He said they could be ready by the 18th.

J: I will get together with Maury and tell him.

K: Y said the wollens are very hard for them.

J: Yes, the market is going down on them. We will have to throw something in on them. If you will call Maury, I will get a piece of paper to you.

K: OK.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Danielle Hunebelle
3/10/70 12:50 p.m.

H: I haven't heard from you.

K: I tried to reach you Friday night, but your line didn't answer.

H: Maybe I was asleep; it was the first time I had a chance to
sleep in three weeks.

K: I called you at 1:00 your time in Paris. Are you going to send me a copy of the film?

H: It's really difficult but you will receive it in about two weeks.

K: Was it good?

H: You were great. You can't imagine the success of this film.
Didn't you hear anything about it?

K: No.

H: Did you receive my letter?

K: No.

H: I sent you a press review. You will receive it at your home
probably today.

K: Oh, you sent it to my home? Was it a success?

H: It was a great success. Now everybody knows you in France.
You were really great. It was a surprise to everybody. You have an
extraordinary presence on TV. Everybody found you so charming and
so warm.

K: You certainly had a tough week producing it.

H: It was hard work, but the success has been so great. I could
tell you a lot of small stories about the reaction of the man on the street.
Now everybody knows your name in France.

K: So I can't do anything incognito.

By: KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Danielle Hunebelle
3/10/70 12:50 p.m.
page 2

H: Please answer my letter when you receive it.

K: You can be sure. You have been a good friend.

H: I hope you have not forgotten me entirely.

K: Not at all; we will be good friends. I will be looking forward to seeing the film.

H: I am longing to return to the exciting Washington city.

K: That would be fun.

*

By KCL- NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Stans
3/10/70 2:15 p. m.

S: I read the Japanese aide memoire. This takes us back to last November. We haven't gained an inch.

K: Right. I had Yoshino in today. He came with a message from the Prime Minister saying they are eager to settle. He said if we could give on "comprehensive" they will be more understanding on injury. He also said you wouldn't give them enough figures on injury. I don't know about this; I'm just relating what he said.

S: We've given them everything. This isn't a negotiation; it's a frozen attitude. I don't think we should give anything else. I'd like to talk with you and Alex.

K: Should we give them the fall-back position? Give them 10 items (75 percent of the list). I will tell him if we don't have something by March 18 we'll trigger the Congressional thing on the textile business. I said we know the only way we can be of help on "comprehensive" is if we itemize them and come close to being comprehensive.

K: How many items would it be?

S: Ten or twelve.

K: He said ask for 18 or 20 and let us get you down to 10 or 12.

S: That's what we've done. This is not a negotiating document. It's really an insult. I'd like to meet with you and Alex, any day except tomorrow.

K W: We shouldn't give them a fall-back and say take it or leave it?

S: We should say we reject it completely. Be as tough as they are.

K: Okay. Let's try to meet on Thursday.

S: Okay, you let my office know what time.

K: Okay.

By: KML NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Hugh Sidey/Kissinger

11:07 am

3/11/70

S: I am doing a piece on Laos and I'm appalled by it, particularly the kinds of battles. It's a pretty empty thing.

K: I'm appalled because it involves our VN position. We are not ______ for a land war in Laos.

S: That's my feeling too.

K: It's a pretty cheap shot. Here's a negotiated settlement done on communist terms, if they won't keep that how will they keep their word in VN. It will effect negotiations in VN. They will not take Laos unless it's free. Do you want to come in?

S: Sure, anytime.

K: Come down at 11:30.