August 31, 1956

To: Mr. Poplai

Subject: Chapter III: Soviet Communism and International Communism

Dear Mr. Poplai:

I appreciate very much the opportunity to read your draft of Chapter III. It has been such lovely weather in the country that I have been slow in getting to it, and I hope that this delay has not inconvenienced your work. I shall be back at the Council on September 5 and hope to have an opportunity to have some long talks with you before you leave for Delhi.

Your chapter is impressive through its comprehensive scope and its sympathetic statement of the two basic positions, as well as of many of the nuances. Certainly, it is extremely fair. Even as it stands, it represents a major contribution to a closer understanding --not so much between our two groups at the conference of last June, for I feel we understood and appreciated each other's point of view very well--but for wider segments of public opinion in both our countries. I have only two major questions, concerning structure, and then a number of minor points of emphasis or interpretation. The major points, concerning structure, will depend on large measure on the general structure of the volume and therefore any comments from me, especially dictated at a distance, can only be highly tentative.

1. At present the chapter consists of a section setting forth the U.S. point of view (very well), a section setting forth the basic Indian view on the same problems and events, and a section summarizing many of the points made in the discussion at the conference. Depending on the manner in which the other chapters are to be organized, there might be some economy of space in interweaving the American and Indian points of view on the same topics, rather than keeping them in separate large sections. Similarly, since our conference in itself will not be of much interest to readers, it might be better to take the basic points from the discussions at the conference and to weave those into the chapter as a whole. This is a difficult task, but I feel that the end result would be both somewhat economical of space and even more effective in bringing together the differences of interpretation. I present this suggestion rather diffidently, however, and primarily for consideration by the joint authors.

2. One method of restructuring the chapter would be to set out an outline of basic topics and then to bring together the various Indian and American views under each topic (several American and several Indian views might then appear, rather than a single Indian or a single American view). Among such topics might be: basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism, including the leadership of the proletariat, one-party rule, subordination of the individual to the dictatorship, thought-control, economic and social programs; foreign policy of the Soviet Union and

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its relations with the Communist parties in various countries;
"coexistence" under Soviet and democratic concepts; inevitability or
avoidability of an armed showdown; Soviet policies in Europe, 1945-1949
and Western countermeasures; the Communist landslide in China and di-
vergent reactions by American and Indian opinion; origins of the Korean
war; role of Communist China and Soviet Russia in the Korean war;
status of Formosa; force and outcome of the conflict in Indochina;
colonialism and anti-colonialism; programs of economic development
assistance; views of the proper functions of the United Nations; pro-
spects for strategic stalemates; disarmament proposals; and so forth.
Under each of these and numerous other topics, it might be possible
briefly to present a certain range of both Indian and American views,
rather than "a single" view for each of our peoples. At the same time,
a topical survey of this kind would, I think, tend to show how many
basic values and hopes are shared by Indians and Americans, even when
there is disagreement over the practical steps needed to achieve them.
It is this forward-looking approach which I feel is most important,
rather than limiting our survey too much to a review of past agreements
and disagreements.

3. Here are a few specific suggestions, for your consideration:

p.2) In the origin of the intervention of July 1918 the desire to re-
establish an eastern front and to assist the Czechoslovak was im-
portant; the responsible leaders who authorized the intervention did
not regard this as a commitment to overthrow the new regime; the
Soviet government has recognized at various times that the American
intervention in the Far East prevented the territorial dismemberment
of Russia by Japan. Once the intervention was over a large body of
American opinion was generally sympathetic to the internal aims of
the Soviet regime and American firms, even prior to recognition, pro-
vided large-scale cooperation in Soviet industrialization.

p.3) UNRRA also provided aid for Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union (Ukraine and Belorussia), but it left the United States to bear the direct burden of aid to Western Europe, Germany and Japan (UNRRA gave some aid belatedly to Italy). This lopsided direction of UNRRA aid was an even more important reason why the U.S. was unwilling to continue to work through it.

p.4) In Poland several non-Communist parties were allowed to take part in the election of January 1947, but their participation in the election was subjected to intensive police terror and the votes were counted by a Communist-dominated government, in definite violation of the Yalta agreements. The U.S. felt that the war had been fought in part to secure democratic self-determination for the peoples of Europe and could not ignore the fate of the one hundred million people of East Central Europe. After the costly sacrifices to secure victory it was a bitter thing to discover that the Soviet Union was insisting on imposing its own totalitarian control on these peoples, with which millions of Americans are related by blood and descent.

[LC]

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p.4) In Iran the Soviet government failed to secure the oil concession but it did actually establish a Communist dictatorship in Azerbaijan.

p.4) In Greece the guerrillas were supported from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania with strong Soviet approval, even though the guerrillas were mostly Greek.

p.6) The Soviet Union emerged from the war with a weakened economy; it achieved the pre-1941 level of production in 1947. Its economy would have been even weaker had it not been for U.S. lendlease deliveries during the war, approximately $475 million worth of post-hostilities deliveries, and approximately $450 million worth of UNRRA aid.

p.6, bot) From 1946 and especially from 1950, the Soviet economy was producing far larger quantities of conventional armaments than the U.S. The maintenance of very large Soviet forces (their size is still a secret today) made it possible for them, after 1946, to advance to the Atlantic coast without any real opposition until 1950.

p.7) The U.S. plan for atomic power would have removed the atomic factor from strategic calculations; Americans feel that this was a very generous offer of a "self-denying ordinance" and therefore was as much to Soviet as American advantage.

p.8, line 6) Perhaps "strong prospect" rather than "every likelihood."

p.9) Since the Soviet leaders had violated numerous compromises and agreements designed to facilitate "coexistence" after the war, American opinion was driven, reluctantly, to assume that only the creation of a political and military counterpoise to the Soviet-dominated empire would serve as an adequate warning to deter Moscow from new efforts to expand its control. The debate within American opinion was not a brief or simple one, for it has been contrary to our tradition to make extensive military preparations in peacetime or to have military conscription in peacetime, much less to maintain American forces overseas.

p.11) From 1945 on the Soviet government was demanding of Turkey "Joint control" of the Straits and the cession of approximately one fourth of the national territory, as well as the creation of a government "friendly" to the Soviet Union.

p.12) UNRRA had done very little for Western Europe. Also, it had not gotten beyond the stage of relief to that of rehabilitation.

p.14) Through bilateral agreements the Soviet Union had created its military bloc many months before Western Europe moved to create a protective bloc of its own. Line 11; the Molotov Plan was operative since 1945": this reference is obscure. In any case, the Soviet government was exploiting ruthlessly the resources and manpower of its satellites; whether there was a "plan" is uncertain.

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p.14) The Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia dealt the Final blow to hopes for some measure of mutual tolerance and peaceful coexistence. From February 1946 on the Soviet leaders had repeatedly stressed the division of the world into two antagonistic camps and their determination to do everything to secure the victory of their camp. In general, in these sections there seems to be more emphasis on U.S. responses than on Soviet actions, at least as far as assignment of space is concerned.

p.19) The parallel between the Karelian Isthmus and Azerbaidzhan is not clear to me; the Finnish territory was acquired by treaty, but the Soviet government was pledged to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of Iran, including Azerbaidzhan. I do not know when the Chinese Communists rejected "all programs to rehabilitate the Chinese economic strength" or whether they were ever consulted.

p.20) "Only in India the Communist action did not fit in the general pattern." This is not clear to me; I had understood that the Communists attempted wide-scale railroad and industrial sabotage and also tried to create guerrilla centers, at about the same time as they undertook guerrilla warfare in other Asian countries, 1949-50.

p.20) In addition to "military incompetence" and "corruption in civil administration" one might mention the long and exhausting war and Japanese occupation, the economic breakdown and runaway inflation, failure to cope with the agrarian problem.

p.21) Protection of territorial integrity and political independence of China were important U.S. policies. <u>Lines 3-5</u> are obscure.

p.21, <u>bot.</u>) At first there was a strong and influential movement to recognize the new government, but it was undercut by arbitrary Chinese Communist actions and by the Soviet insistence upon the immediate seating of Communist China in the U.N.

p.22) Was the Soviet boycott designed to turn the seating of Communist China into a political defeat for the U.S., rather than let it come about by the normal course of events? Or was it designed to prevent the seating of Communist China and thus to have a ready-made issue at hand and also to isolate Communist China?

p.23) The doctrine that the world had split into two camps was of Soviet origin, strongly reiterated from February 1946 on.

p.23, <u>middle</u>) "Many Republicans in the United States"; this is very obscure to me. In pages 23-25, some condensation may be necessary. In describing the Korean War period it would be worthwhile to point out those important occasions on which India voted with the U.N. majority, as these instances are not well known in the U.S.

p.26, <u>line 10 from bot.</u>) "against a supposedly Chinese island"; no action was taken against Formosa; the strategic status quo was to be upheld.

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p.27, top) It is not clear that either abandoning the Nationalist Chinese or even facilitating the conquest of Formosa by the Chinese Communists would in any way lessen the ambitions and demands of the new regime in China or would lead it to be more moderate elsewhere.

p.27) When numerous Chinese divisions entered the war in Korea, a new war began, from the American point of view.

p.27, middle) "Fighting the wrong war in the wrong place against the wrong enemy" refers to General Bradley's rejection of the proposal that the war which was being fought against Chinese forces in Korea should be extended to fighting the Chinese in China; it did not refer to fighting the Chinese in Korea, as I recall.

pp.27-30) Much of the chronological detail will have to be simplified, I should think, in order to make it fully clear.

p.28, bot.) It was not clear to American opinion why Communist China, in coming to the aid of the aggressor forces, was not also committing aggression. In general, pages 1-34 contain too much a chronology of events and not enough central analysis of the issues, so far as I can see.

p.35) In 1946 Browder was condemned and expelled from the CPUSA, and the CPUSA was reestablished as such.

p.36) For the first time Americans found their country greatly endangered in time of peace and this new realization of danger sharpened the feeling against people who seemed to have pledged their allegiance to an enemy power committed to destroying American democracy. After two victorious wars many Americans could not understand why the country was in greater danger than at any time in many decades and there was a real temptation to seek out domestic scapegoats instead of facing up to the changing international situation.

p.39) Some Americans linked Soviet expansionism to Czarist expansionism, but I do not; I think that there are basic differences between the two. Lines 6-7: I do not think that "international Communism stalks every land."

p.40) On the whole Americans do not attach much weight to the opinions of emigres, feeling that they have political axes of their own to grind.

p.41, top) There was also considerable sympathy for the new regime in Russia, among American opinion, for Czarist Russia was never regarded with any respect or sympathy, at least in its last decades.

p.43) U.S. made a substantial contribution through UNRRA to reconstruction in Belorussia and the Ukraine. It is not clear whether or why "in 1945 there was more fear of the United States in the Soviet Union than there was of the Soviet Union in the United States." Perhaps this means that the Soviet leaders were fearful that the United States would begin to resist the obviously expansionist ambitions displayed by the Kremlin.