Draft 3

# PACEM IN TERRIS

## The Nature of the National Dialogue

This conference comes at a most opportune time. Seldom in our history has there been a more urgent need to define our national interests and shape a foreign policy that expresses the will of the American people.

For we are poised at a moment of both hope and uncertainty. Many international objectives of the 1950s and 1960s have been largely realized; there is a more peaceful world in which our friends are revitalized and our relations with adversaries greatly improved. Yet our very achievements have brought to the fore other problems which had been obscured by more pressing demands; now we are inquiring about the purposes of peace, and the nature of stability, and the justice of societies with whom we are dealing. And at the same time a whole new set of challenges is emerging.

Thus there is a full agenda for the national dialogue that this convocation seeks to encourage.

There have been hopeful beginnings in recent years. We have to decide -- together -- how we carry these processes forward and where they should take us.

There are familiar problems where assumptions have changed, and a fresh approach is required. We have to decide -- together -- how to tailor traditional policies to new realities.

There are unprecedented issues calling for global cooperation.
We have to decide -- together -- how to move ahead in uncharted territory.

But our discussions will prove fruitless unless the issues are properly
defined. If we hope to find meaningful answers, we must first of all ask the
right questions. What are our national interests? What are our priorities
in a relative world? What can we reasonably expect to achieve and in what
timeperiods. What are the realistic alternatives?

Failure to address these questions could turn our dialogue simply
into competing catalogues of the desirable rather than informed comparisons
of the possible. If we do not bring realistic perspectives and inner
consistency to our exchanges, they will degenerate into a kaleidoscope of
tactical skirmishes.

Some recent developments point up the dilemmas and ambiguities
in our debate.

-- A foreign policy considered overly moralistic some years
ago is now judged overly pragmatic.

-- Where there was criticism in 1969 over linking trade progress
to changes in other countries' foreign policies, there is now
criticism for not linking trade progress to changes in other
countries' domestic structures.

-- Drawing down our overseas presence inevitably dilutes our
capacity to influence the domestic structures of other countries.

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[N]

- Detente cannot be pursued if both the inducements for progress and the penalties for reversal are legislated away.

- The objective of maintaining a responsible international role is inconsistent with nationalistic positions in such areas as trade and monetary negotiations.

- Disapproval of American interventionism in recent years has now been superseded by disapproval of non-interventionism.

## The Competing Elements of Foreign Policy

In this environment we must begin by recalling that foreign policy involves the attempt to affect the actions of other nations. There can be no definitive winners or losers in this process, for absolute security for one nation would mean absolute insecurity for others. Progress will always be measured in partial steps and in the relative satisfaction of alternative goals. There will always be a tension between our values, which are inevitably cast in absolute terms, and our efforts to promote them, which inevitably involves compromise.

In other words our foreign policy expresses both our ideals and our strengths. In defining our interests we must always be guided by our sense of justice. But we cannot simply affirm our goals. Their practical pursuit involves military power and economic strength and the domestic support required to sustain our performance. A nation's security means little if

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it forfeits its purposes, but a nation's ideals become academic if its very survival is mortgaged. Its power is expressed in pragmatic, neutral terms while its moral force takes more visionary, absolutist forms.

Clearly, America cannot follow one approach to the exclusion of ~~the other~~. An excessively pragmatic policy would be empty of vision and humanity. It would lack both roots and heart. There would be no criteria for other nations to assess our performance and no standards to which the American people could rally. If we mean nothing to ourselves, we can mean nothing to others.

An excessively moralistic policy, on the other hand, would be quixotic and dangerous. It would suggest an American monopoly on ~~and create temptation for us to act without thought, hardly a self-evident proposition.~~ It would hamstring essential truth, efforts at negotiation and compromise. We would continually forego good results because we were holding out for the best results. And we would be led into perilous adventures.

Thus, the policy-maker must be concerned with the best that can be achieved, not just the best that can be imagined. He must reckon with the penalties for failure as well as the benefits of success. He foregoes certain courses not because they are undesirable, but because their risks outweigh their gains. What is possible does not always coincide with what is "right." We must settle for the gradual, much as we might prefer the immediate. We compromise with others, and this means to some extent compromising with ourselves.

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[Y]

The perspective of the critic is inevitably different. While the executive is engaged daily with the complexities of policy and the grayness of decisions, the observer tends to focus on more far-reaching objectives. He can compare the best outcome with the inevitable imperfections of any chosen course. His role, therefore, is indispensable for challenging assumptions and advocating alternatives. But it must be played with realism, a sense of the obtainable as well as the ideal.

It is in these terms that we must consider the specific issues of foreign policy.

## Detente with the Soviet Union

This Administration is profoundly concerned by the current campaign to make changes in Soviet society a precondition for better relations.

Until very recently the definition of detente was not an issue. We were so engaged in trying to shift international tides away from confrontation toward negotiation that the only measurement that counted was peaceful international conduct. But now progress has been made -- and taken for granted by some -- and eloquent appeals prompt us to consider the internal as well as international behavior of other countries.

Let us address this issue in its complexity, not as a debate between those who are concerned about human rights and those who are insensitive.

First, the very term "most favored nation" is misleading in its implication of preferential treatment. In reality it denotes the normal conditions of trade with other countries. We seek merely to put the

Soviet Union and other communist nations on the equal basis they enjoyed
up until 1951. In any event, the actual growth in trade is not apt to be large in
the near term. This theme is largely symbolic

Second, tying the extension of most-favored nation trade treatment
to emigration policies would not just undermine our relations with the
Soviet Union. It would also set back our efforts with the People's Republic
of China and many other countries.

Third, this Administration has never maintained that progress in
trade should be unconditional. In 1969, we emphasized that political advance
must precede economic advance. In fact, this policy was attacked by some
on the grounds that trade growth was an end in itself, and indeed would
promote detente. Now, after there has been substantial progress in
relaxing international tensions, many of these same observers insist on
linking trade with domestic policy. The real question, therefore, is not
whether there should be some conditions for increased trade but rather what
one government can reasonably ask of another.

Fourth, the issue is not strictly economic. It must be seen in the
context of continued negotiations and reciprocal benefits to which the
Soviet Union has contributed its share. The condition that Moscow modify its
domestic policy was never really raised in this country while we were
negotiating; now it is inserted after both sides have carefully shaped an
overall mosaic. Our willingness to normalize trading relationships is an

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inextricable part of our entire bilateral relationship. We must weigh not just the merits of the particular problem, but the consequences in terms of our whole foreign policy.

Finally, there has been concrete progress on the very subjects of emigration and human rights. We have been, and will continue, raising these matters in our private exchanges and appropriate international forums. We are working in ways that can prove effective rather than forcing formal confrontation; significant results have already been obtained through quiet methods.

This issue impinges not just on our relations with one nation, but also on our posture toward many nations whose internal structures we find incompatible with our own. The conditions impend on one country could inhere expanding relations with others and as the People's Republic of China, we can never simply acquiesce in the suppression of human liberties.

We must take our stand for humane principles and do all we reasonably can to promote justice. But there are limits to what we can attempt short of forfeiting movement toward a more peaceful world. Legitimate human concerns must contend with some critical questions. What is our capability to change the domestic structure of other nations? Would a slow-down of detente or a relapse into tension prompt greater liberty? What are the implications and obligations of getting directly involved? What would our reaction be to attempts by other nations to change our society? Are we prepared for the social union will challenge the domestic structure of aUNITED STATES?

For half a century we have objected to international communism's efforts to interfere in the domestic systems of states around the world. For a generation of Cold War we sought to ease the risks of conflict

[Y]

produced by competing ideologies. At the precise moment of emerging
detente is our foreign policy to come full circle? Are we now prepared
to propose that America lead its own crusade? Are we to make peace
conditional on our prescriptions for domestic structures?

Our primary criterion must remain the foreign policy of other countries, just as we insist that this be the one they apply to us.

Much as we deplore injustice in other societies, we cannot gear our policy to their transformation. The first concern is the prevention of a war that could erase all societies.

## Our Troops in Europe

The need to relate particular issues to our overall view of the world is underlined by the current debate over our force levels in Europe.

Some Americans understandably question why it is necessary, in an increasingly peaceful and prosperous Europe, to maintain and pay for 300,000 troops. But we must also consider the consequences and costs of unilateral withdrawal in the face of increased Soviet capabilities. Both questions require that we relate our troop presence to our overall foreign policy objectives. First, what is the nature of our national security interest? Second, what kind of a defense is needed to meet this national interest? Third, how should we proceed to allocate the defense burden more equitably?

As both opponents and proponents of unilateral reductions agree that American security is inseparable from that of our European allies, the

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Draft 56 [Y]

# PACEM IN TERRIS

I come before this conference with a mission unusual for a Secretary of State in the second term of an Administration. The customary practice is to defend a specific policy or to advocate a particular course. But my purpose tonight is more fundamental: to urge that we define the parameters of our national dialogue.

No task before the American people is more urgent than a discussion of our purposes and our direction in foreign policy. No assembly is better suited for this task.

The need is impressed on us by the dramatic changes in international affairs that recent years have brought:

- For most of the postwar period America operated against the background of vast and predominant resources. Now we are in the position, long familiar to less favored nations, of applying more limited means to carefully defined ends. We can no longer overwhelm our problems; we must master them with understanding.

- Throughout a generation our continual preoccupation was to keep the Cold War from degenerating into a

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hot war. Today, when the danger of global
conflict has receded, we face fresh questions
about the nature of security and the criteria for
detente.

-- For two decades our alliances seemed as
constant as the threats to our security. Now
when our allies have gained strength and self-
confidence, new issues emerge concerning the
balance in our partnerships and their relation-
ship to our adversaries.

-- As crises have lessened, we have to consider
the nature of a more permanent international
order. Questions once obscured by more pressing
demands now demand our attention: What are our
ultimate purposes? To what end stability? What
do we mean by justice?

These themes suggest that we are in a time of fundamental
transition. It is the nature of such periods that they seem
to those who live through them as a series of haphazard
events. So before we can discuss solutions we must define
the nature of our problems. And we must understand what can

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reasonably be asked of foreign policy and, equally important,
at what pace it can be achieved.

Failure to address these questions could turn our
dialogue simply into competing catalogues of the desirable
rather than informed comparisons of the possible. Our
exchanges would degenerate into a kaleidoscope of tactical
skirmishes.

Some recent developments point up the dilemmas and
ambiguities in our current debate. There have been major
shifts in perspectives:

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And many hold positions with inherent contradictions:

- Detente cannot be pursued if both the inducements for progress and the penalties for confrontation are legislated away.

- The objective of maintaining a responsible international role is inconsistent with national-istic positions in trade and monetary negotiations.

Any discussion must begin with the understanding that foreign policy involves the attempts to affect the actions of sovereign countries within fixed time periods. Sovereignty, which has been defined as a will uncontrolled by others, gives foreign policy its contingent and ever incomplete character. The fixed time periods produce a sense of urgency.

Thus relations among states can be settled only by negotiation or by power, by compromise or by impositon.

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Which of these methods prevails depends on many factors--
the values, the strengths and the domestic structures of
the countries involved. A nation's values define what is
just; its strength determines what is possible; its domestic
structure decides what international decisions can in fact
be implemented and sustained.

So for every nation foreign policy reflects the
tension between two imperatives: how to define its interests,
purposes and values, and how to relate them to the interests,
purposes and values of other countries. Foreign policy is
explained domestically in terms of justice. But what is
defined as justice at home becomes the subject of negotiation
abroad. It is thus no accident that so many nations, including our own, view the international arena as a forum where
justice is thwarted by the clever practice of foreigners.

This is a particularly the case in a period of
ideological conflict when the values of states become at least
partially incompatible. For then the challenge of peace
confronts nations in a particularly acute form: the attempt
to impose absolute justice by one side will be seen as
absolute injustice by the other; the quest for absolute

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security for some turns into absolute insecurity for the remainder. In such periods the pursuit of peace must begin with the pragmatic concept of coexistence.

Thus policy-making involves a balance between what is desirable and what is possible. Progress will always be measured in partial steps and in the relative satisfaction of alternative goals. There will be a constant tension between our values, which are inevitably cast in maximum terms, and our efforts to promote them, which inevitably involve compromise.

We must, of course, avoid the extremes. An excessively pragmatic policy is empty of vision and humanity. It lacks both roots and heart. It has no criteria for other nations to assess our performance and no standards to which the American people could rally. If we mean nothing to ourselves, we can mean nothing to others.

An excessively moralistic policy, on the other hand, would be quixotic and dangerous. It would suggest an American monopoly on truth, and create temptations for crusaders to implement them. It would hamstring essential efforts at negotiation and compromise. We would continually

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forego good results because we were holding out for the best results. And we could be led into perilous adventures.

Thus, the policy-maker must be concerned with the best that can be achieved, not just the best that can be imagined. He must reckon with the penalties for failure as well as the benefits of success. He foregoes certain courses not because they would be undesirable if successful, but because their potential risks outweigh their potential gains. What is possible does not always coincide with what is "right." We must settle for the gradual, much as we might prefer the immediate. We compromise with others, and this means to some extent compromising with ourselves.

If this is not understood, debate turns sterile. Critics will then insist on absolute aims, contrasting the best outcome with the inevitable imperfections of any chosen path. They will seek to combine the advantages of conflicting courses of action. They will fail to weigh the hazards of failure. For dialogue to be creative, it must take into account the real nature of foreign policy.

There must be an understanding, as well, of the crucial importance of timing. Opportunities cannot be hoarded; once past, they are lost irretrievably. Improvements in the

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international climate are always vulnerable; they must be
nurtured if they are to thrive. We cannot pull up young
shoots periodically to see whether the roots are still
there or whether there is some marginally better location
for them.

We now are at a period of both great opportunity and tenuous beginnings. Moderate leaders in Europe and Japan are prepared to consider a new definition of allied relationships. The Soviet Union has started to practice foreign policy as interstate relationships rather than international civil war. The People's Republic of China has emerged from two decades of isolation. The developing countries cannot wait for the solutions of their problems.

We are at one of those fragile moments where man seems truly able to determine his fate. The question before America is whether we will focus on what is essential or whether we will be sidetracked by the bitterness of domestic acrimony.

No area of policy demonstrates more urgently the need for calm debate than our policy toward the Soviet Union. For the issues involved provide a classic example of the clash of values and the choices we must make among priorities. And what is now at stake is not a particular item of legislation but the nature of the whole relationship.

This Administration has never had any illusions about the Soviet system. We have always insisted that advancement in certain areas, such as trade, must follow movement toward

more stable political relations. While recognizing the imperative of coexistence in the nuclear age, we have maintained a strong and flexible defense posture. We have therefore based progress in our relations on concrete achievements and the willingness of both sides to observe peaceful rules of international conduct.

To a considerable extent we have succeeded. The Soviet Union and the United States have concluded an historic accord to limit strategic arms. We have reached a series of agreements in other fields designed to put our relationship on a broadly constructive basis. Of the crises we inherited, the problem of Berlin has been resolved by negotiation; there is a cease-fire in the Middle East; and there is a settlement for most of Indo-China.

This is a promising foundation. But now we face an intense debate as to whether we should make changes in Soviet society a precondition for further progress.

Until very recently the definition of detente was not an issue. We were so convinced of the paramount necessity of shifting international tides away from confrontation toward negotiation that the emphasis on peaceful international conduct was uncontested. But now progress has been made -- and taken for granted by some -- and eloquent appeals prompt us to consider the internal as well as international behavior of other countries.