TODAY SHOW, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 28, 1977

(Brokaw introduction, reviewing highlights of Nixon visit in 1972 and turmoil in China since. "We continue our discussion with Mr. Winston Lord, former director of Policy Planning, etc., who made nine trips to China and sat in on all the meetings of the two Presidents, Nixon and Ford. Mr. Lord is now in Colorado, where he is working on a book about his experiences.")

BROKAW: Mr. Lord, are we expecting too much from the Shanghai Agreement, do you think now, five years later? After all, it was just a statement of an agreement to disagree, in effect, between leaders who are now gone, five years ago.

LORD: First of all, at the outset, Tom, let me correct something you said. I'm not writing a book about my experiences, before everyone gets excited.

No, I don't think we're expecting too much. I think, the fact that people are still talking about the Shanghai Communique is remarkable in itself. Most communiques are forgotten within weeks. It was basic national interest for both China and the United States that brought us together, not particularly personalities, although the personalities were important. So I think the principles that were laid down there and the interests that brought us together will continue in the future.

B: Was it tough to find mutually acceptable language when you were writing the agreement five years ago? After all, it had been 23 years since there had been any relations at all between the two countries. It was the first time a President had visited. Ver sensitive issues that existed then have kind of faded

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in our memory now.

L: Well, it was top in the sense of we had not communicated with one another for 23 years. In fact, it's interesting to think of the setting. We hadn't talked to each other for over 20 years. There were great differences in social systems and some international issues. The Chinese have had a history of dealing either with other countries as superior -- Middle Kingdom to barbarians -- or more recently they had been humiliated by the West and Japan in the 19th and 20th century. We, in turn, had had a lover-hate relationship with China. We either saw it like Pearl Buck, or Marco Polo, or like Fu Manchu, and the Red Guards. And so there was a need to sort of set a course after this great isolation after to many years.

I think, we were successful in a sense that international realities brought us together, both sides bargained hard, but we decided not to have the traditional communique where you sort of pretend we agreed on everything and had generalities and paper over differences. We felt that after 20 years of isolation and some hostility, this would not look credible to the world or to our peoples, so we clearly set out our differences at the beginning of this communique, then outlined the principles we could agree upon, and then laid out concrete programs of trade and exchanges where we would try to develop our relations.

B: Are you disappointed, however, in that there has not been more progress toward normalization in the five years that have passed? We are talking, of course, about the Taiwan question remaining central.

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L: Well, most people are fascinated with the Taiwan question. It is extremely important, of course, a matter of great principle to China, and we should make progress on that. But it's really the international dimension that _is_ important to both sides. And I think we have made considerable progress, both on the bilateral plane and internationally. We have liaison offices in each other's capitals, great communication, trade and exchanges, and most importantly, we have had very detailed conversations on international issues and reeonforce each other diplomatically around the world, even though we disagree on other issues. So I think there has been good progress; I think there is room for considerably more progress.

B: What would we achieve by having diplomatic relations now that we would not have in our current relationship?

L: Well, the most important think in our relationship with China is really how we look as on international power. Do we look responsible? Are we vigilant? Are we promoting peace and stability in the world? And this is more important than any particular formal relationship. But having said that, normalization _is_ important. I think we have to continue to make progress, and this could solidify our relationship. But if we do not look like a responsible world power, formal diplomatic relations in and of themselves won't achieve a great deal. So I think we have to move on both fronts.

B: Would you, of you were in the State Department now, would you be advising Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to let the domestic political situation in China settle down a little bit before going back in and trying to resume the relationship?

L: I am a little reluctant having just been out of Government a month to advise the new Administration.

B: But that does make it more difficult, doesn't it, the turmoil that exists there now?

L: Well, I think we have had our domestic problems the last few years which are settling down, and they have had theirs, and I think there will be a good basis for good talks, and I think they'd probably want to explore at a high level fairly soon future relations.

(Program interrupted for station break, advertising a move on Big Foot, the Mysterious Monster, and yoghurt; five minutes of local news and then internation news.)

(Brokaw returned to introduce a film segment on Taiwan, its life and politics and then a "panel of experts" including Win Lord, Stanley Karnow, and Robert Oxman, a modern China historian.)

B to L: Do you think it is now time to refine, in a sense, the Shanghai document as it pertains to Taiwan, to try to achieve some definition of how Taiwan would become part of China in the United States and the Peking government?

L: Well, I think the Shanghai Communique give the basic framework that's necessary to complete the normalization process, so I don't see any need to change that specifically. We still have to work out the particular modalities of how you would effect it. So I think further exploration is certainly needed; further progress

(L)

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that is needed. I think it will be within the basic positions
se out in that document.

B: When the Shanghai Agreement was signed between the United
States and Peking, was it the intention of the United States to,
in effect, what some of the critics have called, sacrifice Taiwan
to China? Was it the understanding of the State Department that
Taiwan would be "folded in" with the People's Republic of China
totally without any United States presence at all?

L: Those are pejorative words. What we said particularly in the
Shanghai Communique, and purposefully, was that we believe this
question should be solved by the Chinese themselves on both sides
of the Straits. It was for them to decide this, and that we would
not challenge the proposition held both by those on Taiwan and in
Peking that there is one China; we do not challenge that proposition.
We thought this is a question for the Chinese to resolve and not
for us to resolve.

B: What would the United States gain by "losing Taiwan", in
effect, apart from diplomatic relations with China? Couldn't
we possibly lose strategic toe-hold in that very critical part
of the world, if there is a new sense of detente between the Soviet
Union and China?

L: Well, I... I am not sure I understand your question.

T: My question is, Mr. Lord, if we were to give up Taiwan, in
effect-- the military presence of the United States in that part
of the world -- and given the new regime that exists now in China,
and the attempt to achieve some kind of detente with that regime

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on the part of the Soviet Union, can we sacrifice in effect our
presence in Taiwan as easily as we could have five years ago when
there was a different set of relationships between China and the
Soviet Union?

L: Well, the relations between Peking and Moscow are essentially
the same as they were five years ago; I see no change in that right
now. Essentially, we are not talking about "sacrificing" Taiwan;
again, it's up to Taiwan and Peking to work out their future
relationship. We do have a concern for the future of our friends.
in Taiwan who have been loyal and whom we have worked with for many
years. But I think objective facts indicate that that
situation probably over time will be done in a peaceful way.
I would certainly hope so.

B(to KARNOW): You share that optimism?

K: There is a key issue here, and that's the issue for domestic
American opinion, and that relates to another question which I
think is essential for the whole Taiwan issue, and that is, can
the Chines, that is, the Communist Chinese, give the United
States some assurance, either a pact assurance of a loose
assurance, that they will not use force to liberate Taiwan, to take
over Taiwan. And that, it seems to me, is the crux of the issue
and it is the subject that has been debated for the last five
years, and in my estimation one of the reasons why on bilateral
relations between the United States and Peking we've really gone
nowhere since the Shanghai Communique. Except for a small way...
(inaudible)

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Now what we are looking for, what we should be looking for, is
some sort of formula that satisfies Peking, which considers Taiwan
to be an internal matter, and at the same time satisfies
Congress and the American public that we are not, to use your work,
"sacrificing" Taiwan. And maybe it will have to be done with
mirrors; maybe it will have to be done by the Chinese self defense.
But that's the main issued, I would say, because we have the defense
treaty with Taiwan. We have the question of credibility; we can't
walk away from it; there are 16 million people on Taiwan, and so
forth. Therefore, in the years ahead, or the months ahead, that's
the issue that I think that people ought to be grappling with.

B: This Taiwan constituency remains very strong in the United
States, in domestic way, doesn't it?

OXMAN: Yes, I couldn't agree more with what Stan has said...
and reflect that it was five years ago today that the Shanghai
Communique was signed. There was a kind of euphoric reaction
to it, and for about two years thereafter. I think we saw
excitement that a lot of people felt about this kind of "new
relationship" between the United States and China. And there
were several reflections of this. One was certainly in terms of
trade; we had no trade with China. That hit a peak of almost
$1 billion in 1974. We had no cultural exchanges with China,
and in 1975 some 10,000 Americans have been to China and about a
thousand Chinese have come to this country. Over the last couple
of years it seems to have slowed down. The Ford visit of late
1975 had nothing of the excitement of the first Nixon visit. And

as we came into the election of 1976, the issue of China policy
was no longer a key factor. Right now, we seem to existing
sort of semi-stalemated situation, although both sides have
given some indication that they want to proceed with the
relationship. President Carter has endorsed the Shanghai
Communique. Vance has met with the head of the Chinese liaison
office. The Chinese have indicated that they want to negotiate
the question of Taiwan. And yet all of this at this point is up
in the air.

B: Mr. Lord, in a column yesterday I speaking of a meeting between Secretary of State Vance and the head of the China Mission here, I am sure that you are aware that Joe Kraft raised the possibility that there was a secret pledge on the part of President Nixon to Chairman Mao that the U.S. would in a period of, say, five years or so, withdraw from Taiwan. Was there such an agreement between the U.S. and Chairman Mao?

L: There is no secret deal. It is very clearly set out in the Shanghai communique that we would normalize, assuming that we could work out the modalities. So there is no mystery about this. I would like to comment about what my colleagues have been saying, though, about progress. I would agree in the last couple of years the momentum has slowed down in our bilateral relationship. But I think firm foundations are there, I think it's a mistake to say we have made no progress since Nixon's trip, when we have a liaison office here and all the other developments that we have talked about. And we always felt that it would be a long-term process based on the mutual interest of both sides. And I think a very good framework has been laid, and further progress can be made. So I think they put too pessimistic a tone on where we stand in our relations with Peking.

B: But where do we go from here? Would the next step be without diplomatic relations, without settling the Taiwan question, would an appropriate next step be to provide China with some military technology, hardware, or with the technology itself?

L: I repeat what I said earlier. The single most important thing in our relations with China is how we look as a world power; how are our relations with Europe and Japan? Do we have influence in the Middle East and Africa; Do we have a strong defense; Are we vigilant. This is the most important element. If this is the case, then our relations will go better, and normalization will reenforce it. If we don't look like a responsible world power, then all the issues that we are talking about, become secondary.

With regards to military assistance, I think we have to take account of the impact of that on Japan, on Taiwan, on the Soviet Union, but we are interested in China's independence and stability, but military assistance is a very delicate subject.