FEBRUARY 1, 1974

REMARKS OF HENRY A. KISSINGER
TO ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AND WIVES

THE EAST ROOM

DR. KISSINGER: Mrs. Nixon, ladies and
gentlemen:

After this introduction, I feel as I did
once on a trip to China when I was sitting on the
beach in Hawaii, minding my own business, when a
young lady came up to me and said, "I understand
you are a fascinating man - fascinate me." (Laughter)

I noticed that Ken got off this rostrum very
quickly after introducing me, and he has good reason
to, because after a few months in the Middle East, I
kiss any man in sight. (Laughter)

Let me talk to you for a few minutes about
the basic design of the President's foreign policy,
and particularly where we expect to go during the
next year.

It is fashionable at this moment, in the
condition of the country as it is, for the press to
get the impression that any particular event is the
result of the effort of one particular performance,
but the real story of the foreign policy is that it
reflects the design that the President told me the
very first time I met him, when I was still a professor
at Harvard, when he insisted that what he wanted to bring
about was a foreign policy that was not geared to crisis;
when he said that what he wanted to be remembered for
was exactly what he said in his State of the Union Address,
to bring about a structure of peace which would leave the
world better than the way he found it.

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The events, for example, that occurred in the Middle East in the last four months, were not produced by negotiation; they were produced by decisions in 1969 and 1970, that were not widely reported in the press because they did not lend themselves to very dramatic announcements -- decisions as to the strategy to be pursued when the Soviet Union seemed the dominant country in the Arab world and when the President decided that we first had to bring about a condition in which it was clear that no settlement could be achieved against the United States, but once the various countries had decided that it had to be achieved with the United States, that then we should move quickly and decisively to bring about a solution along the lines that we are now attempting.

And therefore, when you think about our foreign policy, or when you talk about it, you shouldn't deal with it in terms of individual dramatic events, but in terms of an overall design that began in 1969 and that will not be fully completed by 1976, but whose basic structure will be outlined by 1976.

In the Middle East, if you compare the situation at the end of October when the United States was confronted with a unified, hostile Arab world, with the coalition of Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, all concentrating on demands that only the United States could fulfill but which they were in a great position to enunciate, you can see that we faced the danger of isolation or of being maneuvered into a position where the Soviet Union could simply by escalating demands, gain more and more influence in the Arab world, and where our friends in Europe and Japan were caught on the one side between their desire to curry the favor of the oil producing nations and on the other side, by that very act, encouraging the pressure which they were in no position to resist.

Now as a result of decisions which were made by the President in October and carried out in November, we managed to approach all the nations in the Middle East with one basic theme, without going into all the details of the negotiations, which was this:

Others can issue proclamations, or you can arms from other countries, but only the United States can deliver what it promises.

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Our theme throughout was, we will promise nothing that we cannot deliver and we will deliver everything we can promise, and as a result, the United States emerged during these three months, as the country trusted by everybody, to which all parties turned for a solution and as the country without which the beginning of a settlement would have been impossible.

And it is also well to keep in mind when we are obsessed by our domestic affairs, that abroad the United States still represents the hope of mankind and that abroad in every crisis, and especially this one, it was the United States that provided the moral impetus to a solution.

Now as we look ahead, what do we foresee for 1974. The major thrust of our foreign policy will be to continue the design that was outlined by the President in 1969. First to overcome the hostility that had divided the world, to be conscious of the fact that in the nuclear age we are facing demands on foreign policy different from any that any previous generation has confronted.

When the leaders of the major countries know that decisions involve the lives of hundreds of millions in a very brief period of time, we are in a qualitatively different era of international relations, and while it has now become fashionable to criticize detente, by the very people who criticized us for four years for not doing enough, and where suddenly now people demand that we transform the domestic structures of other countries, the policy of the Administration will continue to be what we set out to do, to bring about a different code of international conduct, first among the super powers, because they can destory humanity. And when the President goes to Moscow in June, we will continue the efforts started in the first Administration that culminated in the SALT agreement in May 1972, to make another major step forward on the limitation of strategic arms.

This is becoming much more complex because where in 1972 we were concerned primarily with quantity, in 1974, we have to be concerned with technological change and with quality, but we are confident we can make another big advance on the road towards control of armaments, an advance that has

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been made possible by the steadiness in maintaining our defense
posture in the face of constant and severe criticism.

The other big breakthrough in mitigating hostility
was, of course, the establishment of relations with the
People's Republic of China. It is the essence of successful
policy that they come to be taken for granted, and today no
one questions any more that we have good relations with
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and that
is why it is easy to attack detente policies because one
doesn't have to run many risks on behalf of this toughness.

And our relations with the People's Republic of
China has steadily improved. We have made major advances
again during the last year, and we expect to continue to
proceed on this course towards normalization of relations,
increase of trade, increase of scientific exchange,
a course which has brought about an extremely moderate
Chinese foreign policy which has enabled us to pursue
our objectives in Japan and many other parts of Asia
without significance pressure from or opposition from
the Chinese.

With respect to Europe, we offered last year what
we called "The Year of Europe," something which we offered
at the end of April 1973, and therefore the argument you
sometimes see in the press that the year of Europe has failed
is premature. We have until the end of April 1974 to bring
it to completion. (Laughter) And we have every confidence
that we will bring it to completion by the end of April, 1974.

We will work out, together with our European allies --
indeed, we have practically completed -- a set of declaration
of principles which should guide the actions of the Atlantic
community in the decades ahead, and we hope that the President
will be able to travel to Europe in April to sign these
declarations with the heads of governments of our principal
allies.

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We are engaged in the same effort with Japan and we expect to complete a similar exercise with Japan during this year, and while no definite plans have been made, we do think this would be an appropriate occasion for the President to conclude this agreement with Japan if his schedule permits him, as has been planned, to visit Japan this year.

In the Middle East I have pointed out to you that we have made a first step towards peace. The next step, following the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement will have to be a Syrian-Israeli disengagement, and if this succeeds, involving for the first time one of the radical Arab states, in a negotiation with Israel, the chances of bringing about a territorial settlement, at least with Egypt, would be very good. I think you will see a dramatic improvement in our relations with Egypt and depending on the Syrian-Israeli negotiations, in our relations with Syria and other Arab countries as well.

One of the major changes in recent months has been the improvement in the American position with respect to the Arab countries, an improvement that has been achieved without sacrifice of our traditional friendship with Israel.

Those are the major events that we can now foresee for the year 1974. We foresee 1974 to be a year of peace, a year of strengthening the design on which the President has been working ever since coming into office, a design which is not merely an amelioration of a previous situation, but one which hopefully will bring about an entirely new era in international relations so that at the end of this Administration one can say with some confidence that the world that has been left for our children is a more secure and a more peaceful one than the one that the President found when he entered office.

Now I will be glad to answer questions for a few minutes.

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Q Mr. Secretary, you did touch upon the Panama Canal. Is there anything you can say about the on-going negotiations in that area?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. We have completed with Panama a declaration of principals which will guide these negotiations and in fact, I am going to Panama next Thursday to sign that declaration with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama.

And indeed, this gives me an occasion to point out that we have made major progress in the last year with respect to Latin America. We made a proposal to the Latin Americans for a new dialogue as a result of which the Foreign Ministers of all Latin American countries met in Bogota, and submitted a list of ideas for this dialogue to us and delivered it here in Washington. This led to a Foreign Ministers Conference which will meet in Mexico City from February 20 to February 23, which we are confident, on the basis of the exchanges we have already had, will lead to a dramatic improvement in relationships in the Western Hemisphere.

Q Mr. Secretary, since I can't get the gentleman on my left to answer this question for me could you share with us when the embargo is going to be lifted?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was going to say put a television camera in front of him and he won't -- (Laughter)

We can't give you an exact date when the embargo will be lifted, but as the President pointed out in the State of the Union Address, the governments of the oil producing countries have called an urgent meeting in order to discuss lifting the embargo.

Let me point out, incidentally, that this language which the President read, was drafted for the President by the heads of government of friendly Mideastern countries. It was not something that was invented here in the White House to give dramatic effect to the State of the Union Address. Therefore, since it was given to us by the heads of government of friendly Mideastern countries,