S. H. Hoffmann
Seminar, Oct. 19, 1959

# THE FRENCH POLITICAL TRADITION

## 1. Purpose.

An attempt to answer the following questions: (a) What is it that gives to French political life its unchanging aspects? Emphasis will therefore be put on the more *permanent* features of French politics; a further session will be devoted to Professor Wahl's analysis of present factors of change.
(b) What is it, in these permanent characteristics, which makes French political life *unique* among Western political systems?

## 2. Method.

(a) The first task will be an attempt to *identify* the features of French politics in the period 1815-1958, which distinguish French political life from English and American politics. Hence:

(1) The need to denounce "false difference": some observers present as characteristically French features that can be found elsewhere

(2) The identification of distinctive features at the level of the political institutions (i.e. the level of cabinets, parliaments and parties)

(3) The identification of distinctive features at the level of the electorate. Among the characteristics which will be mentioned, the following ones appear of particular importance:

- the game aspect of French politics

- the persistence in the electorate of a deep divisions and of a feeling of alienation from political life.

(b) The second task will be an attempt to *explain* these distinctive features by turning to history and to the ideas of the various ideological and social groups of French society.

(1) The starting point will be a discussion of the French brand of "multipartism": an attempt to answer the question: why so many parties, and the question: why a system in which stable alliances of parties appear to be impossible, will show the need to look for an explanation into

(2) The fundamental ideological and social split created by the French Revolution, and

(3) The theory of the "balanced society." on which a kind of consensus existed for a very long period (roughly that of the Third

French Seminar

October 26, 1959

Nicholas Wohl

FOR INTERNAL USE ONLY BY MEMBERS OF THIS SEMINAR:
MATERIAL WILL NOT BE USED OR QUOTED BY OTHER AGENTS
OR INDIVIDUALS.

THE EMERGENCE OF NEW FRENCH POLITICS

I. Preliminary comments on how to explain the course of French politics.

A. Professor Hoffman's hypothesis of Game Periods vs. Dictatorial Periods: its neglect of intention in favor of stressing institutional results in a limited area of politics; its slight applicability to the major portion of contemporary French history.

B. An explanation of the hypothesis of the Administrative Tradition vs. the Representative Tradition.

C. The common ground between the two hypotheses: the problem of French politics, yesterday as well as today, is the absence of a form of mixed government such as exists in the United States and Britain, i.e. political institutions which satisfactorily balance the executive and the legislative, assuring to government both the possibility of effective action in solving problems, and the legitimacy for these actions that comes from popular participation. Mixed government, therefore, avoids both the extremes of immobilisme (Game Periods, the pure Representative Tradition) and dictatorship (Dictatorial periods, the pure Administrative Tradition).

II. The Problem Professor Hoffmann has described distinguishing "features of French politics in the period 1815-1958" that represent the obstacles to the development of stable, mixed government in France. The problem to be discussed in this succeeding paper concerns perceptible trends in contemporary France that appear to be removing these obstacles. A secondary problem to be discussed is the extent to which these trends are, in fact, proceeding, and the comparison of their effects in France with their effects in other countries.

III. The Development of the Problem

A. The obstacles to mixed government in France

1. The peculiar nature of French political ideas and opinions

2. The historical context in which parliamentary government emerged in France

2.

3. The particular impact of industrialization and the subsequent evolution of French society

B. The causes of recent changes in French politics tending to remove obstacles to mixed government

1. The "sleeper" factors: mounting popular dissatisfaction with parliamentary government, with its climax in the war, occupation, and Liberation periods. The result: approval, expectation of constitutional and political reform, and a subsequent disillusionment.

2. The effects of advanced industrialization and economic prosperity on French political ideas, opinions, and behavior.

C. Some of these changes in French politics

1. A more pragmatic outlook on the goals of politics

2. New attitudes toward the role of government in society

3. The declining popularity of traditional doctrines and parties

4. New standards of political behavior and popular participation

5. The rise of a new "rational" nationalism

6. The weakening of the Communist party's grip on the working class

7. The promotion of new social groups to political leadership

IV. Conclusions

A. Reality and permanence of these trends

B. Remaining obstacles to mixed government under the Fifth Republic

C. The gamut of directions French political evolution can take

D. The relevance of the French experience to politics in both industrialized and under-developed countries.

French Seminar
Jesse R. Pitts

October 5, 1959

French Values and their Implementation by Social Classes

before World War II

In the first session of the Seminar on France, Mr. Pitts gave a vivid description of certain elements in French character and culture, in his original and provocative interpretive scheme which he calls "the aristocratic value-system". He postulated at the outset that he defined "values" as relatively constant limiting factors which determined the learning capacity and possibilities of social change in a society. He said further that he was trying to isolate French values from values which are shared with other societies.

I. The Value-System of the French Aristocracy - precisely:

1. The following set of attitudes and values are described by Pitts as "aristocratic" in the sense that they constitute the summit of French values, embody the ideals sought for, and are to a very great extent initiated by all the lower classes. As a corollary, to whatever degree people are in this top category they have a strong paternalistic and protective attitude toward lower groups dependent on them. This is seen as an extension of the attitude of the landed feudal class toward their inferiors.

2. The central feature of this value-system is the concept of *proress*. Prowess is the cult of the exceptional feat, its style, form, perfection--regardless of social utility, practical consequences or economic value. It is a way of satisfying the ideal of the self, and is suggested by the phrases *l'art de vivre*, *bon goût*, *beau geste*. It puts the self in the center of the value system, as opposed to social *nores*, organizational patterns etc. This

2.

is the root-explanation of what is called "French Individualism."

3. When this is combined and balanced with the emphasis on the durability of the family and the ancestor-cult it provides a countervailing stability to the expression of the individual—the explanation of "Frenchnesse". It enables the individual to indulge in <u>plaisir</u> and the arts of life <u>without endaneggering</u> the social structure and security of the group. It permits a large degree of personal irresponsibility without risk to the group. Mr. Pitts used the analogy of adultery (indulgence and satisfaction of needs) and marriage (continuity and conformity necessary to group security.) He also uses the phrase "delinquent community" to suggest the idea of a system which permits license by isolating the aspects of life in which the self is indulged from the aspects of rigid conformity.

4. Two factors of great importance in France are <u>education</u> and <u>money</u> which create the possibility of achievement of the highest goals by persons who may have started low in the social and economic scale—the peasant's son who becomes <u>académicien</u>, e.g.

5. Mr. Pitts considers that there are several important consequences of this "open" quality, a sort of <u>carrière ouverte aux talents</u>;

A. A "theoretical egalitarianism" or universality of "aristocratic" values since the highest goals are not restricted to a closed caste;

B. Central importance for the <u>aesthetic</u> aspects of life, with <u>consumption-oriented</u> goals. (This is shown by the emphasis on quality of clothes, food, craftsmanship of all sorts.) Mr. Pitts considers this a primary fact of the French aristocratic ideal as opposed to the German (military) or the British ideals;

C. The very "openness" creates a fierce <u>competition</u> and <u>insecurity</u> in those at the top, since they are forever threatened by others.

3.

6. <u>Fields of Progress</u> illustrating this value-system discussed by Pitts included:

A. "The arts of living," food, clothes, style of living, <u>bon gout</u>, patronage of fine arts, the expression of the self through possessions.

B. L'Amour (importance of its isolation from marriage)

C. <u>Politesse - savoir claire</u>

D. <u>Religion</u>. In this connection Pitts emphasized the role of the Church as a career for the aristocracy, and the sanctions of Catholicism for the indulgence of the self as long as the social framework was preserved, as in the death-bed absolution for any sin, the non-pragmatic, fatalistic philosophy of Roman Catholicism and the importance of the aesthetic-consumption factors in the ritual.

7. Finally, Mr. Pitts expounded the idea that the nation, <u>la patrie</u>, had taken over many of the functions of the crown, with the result that people with this set of values die bravely and willingly for a "cause", but are reluctant to serve responsibly in routine service to the state. Connected with this is an attitude of filial dependence on and expectation of "being taken care of" by the state, as formerly they were by the crown.

* * *

Mr. Pitts spent the major portion of the time setting forth the above scheme, dealing with the value-systems of other classes much less fully. This is partly to be explained by his notion that all other classes adapt and imitate the "aristocratic" values. Although the pecantry appears in his chart, he did not discuss it at all, nor did he deal with distinctions among the various levels of the bourgeoisie, though he referred to the fact that there are such levels.

14.

## II. The Bourgeois System of Values

The principal features discussed were as follows:

1. The importance of *property* with the emphasis on ownership, continuity, security for the family. Pitts sees the "family firm" as the bourgeois equivalent of the feudal castle, with primary emphasis on accgrandizement of the fief rather than on expansion, profit, creation of new goods, etc.

2. "Militant paternalism" toward employees by the owner class, corresponding to the medieval "nobless oblige" of the aristocratic viewpoint.

3. The importance of *thrift* and *hard work*, — *on n'est pas en vie pour s'amuser*. This is regarded as an "aesthetic exercise", or instance of prowess in contrast to the utility-geared, *quid pro quo* of Anglo-Saxon Puritan ideas about the value of work.

*

*

*

## III. The Technocrats—St. Simoniensis.

Mr. Pitts believes that the French have "taned" and interpreted the rationalist-scientific approach to life so as to make it into another form of aesthetic prowess. In this connection he emphasized:

1. The aesthetic satisfaction of French engineers in "crands travaux", sometimes regardless of practical utility.

2. The absorption in details of technique and routine of the "crands corps", the civil service and the Army, to the point where the method often obstructs the supposed object of the enterprise. (This would be the explanation of what is often called by others French "red tape" and bureaucracy.)

3. He suggested—without elaboration—the extension of this point of view to social and political fields in the present era, especially by what he called the "New Right", with its emphasis on "reinforced state apparatus on engineering lines". He implied that the men interested in the various Greater Europe movements (e.g. Monnet) represent this tendency.

5.

#### IV. The "Romantic" Proletariat

Mr. Pitts sees the French proletariat as adapting, in their own terms, the concept of prowess, in such a way that the Revolution of which they dream is a "millenium which never comes", the present a "purgatory" in which the important matter is the intensity and purity of one's devotion to the ideal, rather than organization or action in realistic social and economic terms.
He illustrated this by reference to the Sunday Grand Soirs at which the faithful participate with great fervor as high-sounding speeches are made, go home feeling purified and exalted, and on Monday morning go deliberately to work for the bourgeois-capitalist employer.

Two important consequences of this in his eyes are:

1. a less effective Labor movement in France than in other advanced capitalistic nations, such as Britain or Germany;

2. The paradox that the revolutionary movement in France has actually served as a stabilizing factor preserving the status quo. He thinks therefore that the bourgeoisie ironically owes an enormous debt to the proletariat for the persistence of the bourgeois way of life.

#### V. Critical Reaction and Discussion

Members of the Seminar were all stimulated and interested in Mr. Pitts' thesis, with its many vivid insights and entertaining examples, while feeling skeptical of its over-schematization, lack of historical context, or "time-lessness", and omissions of some major considerations, together with oversimplification of others. Some specific points raised in the discussion were:

1. Questioning of Pitts pre-suppositions, a) that values don't change, b) that there are "French" values. (Saxe) Pitts replied that he considers that values change much less and more slowly than other things.

6.

2. Should this set of values and attitudes—certainly an aspect of French culture—be attributed to the aristocracy or is it correctly described as "aristocratic"? (Duroselles, Hoffman, Bowie and generally.) This raised a whole series of sub-questions about chronology—(was this system really dominant after 1914?) and semantics. In reply to various related points, Mr. Pitts said that he was a) not concerned with origins, was b) not referring to what is usually meant by the "aristocracy" in modern France, i.e., since 1789. (It is possible that if he used the word elite certain objections would be removed.)

3. The alleged "universality" of "aristocratic" values, and the "open" nature of the top class was generally challenged by the members of the seminar—this is partly as a result of objections to the Pitts use of "aristocracy" in a special, non-historical sense. No clear answer to these objections.

4. Challenge to the Pitts use of St. Simoniens in his thesis.

M. Duroselles suggested that it is stretching and distorting the historical facts and the role of St. Simoniens and confusing several different eras of social thought in France. No clear answer.

5. Social mobility in France. Mr. Hoffman and Kindelberger both said they thought there was a great deal of social mobility in France and also in French social thinking, which is also more complex than Pitts theses allows. Pitts agreed on the first point and re-emphasized the "universality" of the value-system as his way of including and indeed, emphasizing it.

6. The importance of consumption-goals. Hoffman questioned whether this is actually a cause or is not rather an effect of the exclusion of the aristocracy,--in the historical sense--from a realistic part in what is essentially a bourgeois society?

7.

7. The Proletariat. Mss. Wahl and Stoessel objected to the interpretation of the French working class as set forth by Pitts, which oversimplifies a minor "romantic" element and overlooks the real sense of "alienation" from bourgeois society felt by the workers. Various other members of the Seminar joined in a general dissatisfaction with the treatment of the proletariat as well as the omission of the peasantry. (Rodrigues)

Partly due to the lateness of the hour, none of these questions were really met by Mr. Pitts. He did show an awareness of recent modifications in French social thinking, and repeated that this was his analysis as of 1933.

It is hoped by the members of the Seminar that he will be able to return later in the year to discuss what he feels has changed in the post-war period.

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY

NOTICE OF SEMINAR

Seminar on France

The first meeting of the spring series of the Seminar on France will take place at 6 Divinity Avenue on February 15 from 4:00 to 6:00 p.m. Stanley Hoffmann will speak on "The Breakdown of the Third Republic"; first of two parts: "Dissenters and Enemies--the On襲ught from the Outside."

NOTE: Please bring schedules so that a permanent time of meeting may be arranged.

Nancy L. Roelker
February 15, 1960

SEMINAR ON FRANCE

At the analytical session of November 27, 1959, there was agreement among the members that France had passed from "state A" to "state B" in Mr. Hoffmann's phrase--during the period between the 1930's and the late 1950's. It was further agreed that the 1930's seemed to be a critical period in terms of the "breaking of the crust" of "state A", and that the papers and the discussion of the spring term should address themselves to analyzing the years 1934-44 in terms of what elements of "state B" could be discovered and what the forces were which brought it into existence so that eventually a pattern emerged (though not clearly till the '50's) which was discernibly different from the earlier pattern.

It might facilitate our attempt to work out an analytical framework, if we bare the following questions in mind.

I. What are the dominant features of "state A" which were present and identifiable in sufficient degree to account for the general pattern we are calling "state A" in whatever field is being considered? (economic organization, class structure, political attitudes, etc.)

II. What is the latest date, or approximate date, at which we consider "state A" was still generally persistent?

III. What forces or factors can we identify as operating either to undermine or invalidate "state A"? (This includes a. forces external to France and b. internal forces which were seen at the time as "deviations from the normal" of "state A".)

As a corollary, can we determine to any extent how such new forces were explained at the time, when they did not seem to fit with the expected "normal" pattern and were not yet sufficiently crystallized or recognized to be accepted as a new (and different) pattern, as we now see to be the case, i.e. "state B"?

IV. What can we identify as the principal features of "state B" as it seems to be emerging in the late '50's ?

V. To what degree can we pin-point the "origins" of "state B" in terms of "shocks", impacts of other forces mentioned in question III.

It is taken as axiomatic that any "answers" to such questions are tentative hypotheses, generalizations to which there will be a considerable number of exceptions, that the time-table of change will vary from field to field, and that there will be differences of opinion, especially with regard to cause and effect and what Mr. Hoffmann has called the "order of magnitude" of the changes, and that some will be thought to be more fundamental and "irreversible" than others.

Seminar on France

The meetings of the Spring Series of the Seminar on France
have been scheduled as follows:

Tuesday, February 23, 4-6 p.m.: Stanley Hoffmann, "Impact of New Movements during 1930's."

Monday, February 29, 4-6 p.m.: Nicholas Wahl, "Institu-
tional Political Changes in France, 1934-1944."

Tuesday, March 8; 4-6 p.m.: Charles Kindleberger, "Economic Collapse in the 1930's."

Tuesday, March 15, 4-6 p.m.: Nancy Roelker, "Reaction in Paris Press to Spanish Civil War."

Tuesday, March 22, 4-6 p.m.: Laurence Wylie, "Changes in Land Tenure, Role of Church."

Tuesday, March 29, 4-6 p.m.: Jesse Pitts, "Structural Framework for the Analysis of French Society."

Monday, April 11, 4-6 p.m.: Jo Saxe, "The Balance of Payments: A Post-War Problem."

Subsequent seminars will be announced.

March 15, 1960

Summary of a Seminar of France's Search for Security since 1945
by General Pierre Gallois

(Not for external quotation or distribution)

French National Strategy, 1949-1960

France's search for security in the period immediately following the Second World War was expressed in the desire to establish a deterrent to Soviet aggression largely in conventional forces and armaments. Funds for the development of such a force would be complemented by United States assistance.

By the time of the Lisbon Conference of 1952 it had become evident that the powers of Europe could not hope to match Soviet forces. The new strategy which was then proposed under the aegis of General Gruenther was that conventional forces must be supplemented by the nuclear power of the United States. The increased demand for a higher standard of living which was expressed in post-war Europe made it doubtful that any of these nations would accept the sacrifices necessary to raise their troops to a high level and to accept the "Spanish concept of 1808" in their plans for national strategy.

In the period between 1953 and 1957 there was a general acceptance of assuming this posture of deterrence which was accepted in the December 1954 Conference in the Palais de Chaillot. Only in 1956 in the interparliamentary conference were there some doubts expressed as to the dependence upon atomic weaponry of the United States as the main deterrent to Soviet attack.

By 1957, however, changes conditions made the prior policy obsolescent, Europe was vulnerable to the threat of military occupation and the American atomic monopoly was no longer fully applicable. Premier Khrushchev's threats in August of 1957 concerning missiles with atomic war-heads threatened a vul-

nerability to the United States which it had not sensed since 1812. The theory of massive retaliation appeared no longer valid in European eyes except as an act of desperate resistance when the life of a country should be threatened. They feared as well that the former threat would no longer appear valid in instances of limited aggression.

The technological developments of missiles within the period 1957-1958 posed new questions to French policy makers. The question was posed as to whether the United States could be counted upon to come to the aid of a NATO power if in so doing that country would subject itself to the possibilities of all-out attack. If the United States were to respond would she attack Soviet cities or attempt to destroy Soviet retaliatory and other missile capability? The continuing shift in technology has presented increased doubts as to American policy as have the views of such Americans as Albert Wohlstetter and George Kennan.

## The Present Challenge

An alternative policy for the nations in NATO would be to seek to attain a collective deterrent to replace the doctrine of massive retaliation which relied so greatly upon the United States. United States distribution of missiles in Europe with a system of double-control may produce an alternative, but doubt has been expressed in France as to whether this system is entirely dependable. Therefore in March 1956, Guy Mollet decided to go ahead with the development of an atomic weapon for France. Such an independent nuclear force provides an element to guarantee survival to small nations and adds a homeopathic force to deterrence. Such a threat can only be credible when a nation's very existence is threatened and there will remain other challenges to which threat of atomic retaliation will not seem credible. Possibly strengthened conventional forces, in combination with double control nuclear forces can provide an effective deterrent. The

3.

The cost imposed by shifts in technology are such that it seems doubtful that any European nation can maintain a full arsenal and so must then rely upon the United States.

Strategy has evolved to such an extent that some form of cooperation is essential if an effective deterrent posture is to be maintained. Such cooperation can combine the best scientific progress and potential of all of the NATO nations to produce the most effective strategy of the means. Within such a scheme double control may well serve to inhibit Russian adventurism.

There will still remain great issues which the Western powers must attempt to solve in meeting the increased demand throughout the world for an improved standard of living. The extraordinary demands and needs of the underdeveloped nations must be met in terms which are meaningful and pertinent to their problems rather than our conception of them.

The consequent discussion centered largely around the means by which double control could be exercised and the form in which the threat of its use could be made credible. There seemed little agreement as to whether prior conditions for use could be specifically declared and doubt was also expressed as to whether communications and decisions could be coordinated quickly enough to make such a system effective. Greater doubt was expressed as to whether a NATO deterrent as such could be credible as it would demand an even higher degree of consultation and coordination.

SEMINAR ON FRANCE

March 28, 1960

Please note the following changes in the scheduling of the meetings of the Seminar on France

Friday, March 25, 4-6 p.m.: Laurence Wylie: "Changes in Land Tenure, Role of Church."

Friday, April 15, 4-6 p.m.: Michel Crozier, "The French Bureaucracy."

Friday, April 22, 4-6 p.m.: John W. Smith, "Poujadisme."

Friday, April 29, 4-6 p.m.: Jesse Pitts, "Structural Framework for the Analysis of French Society."

Friday, May 6, 4-6 p.m.: W. A. Adelman, "Monopoly in French Industry."

Friday, May 13, 4-6 p.m.: Jo W. Saxe, "The Balance of Payments: A Post-War Problem."

Friday, May 20, 4-6 p.m.: Martin Norr, "The French Tax System."

There will be no meeting on Friday, April 1, or on Friday, April 8.

MARCH 30, 1960

SEMINAR ON FRANCE

Please note once again the following changes in the
scheduling of the Seminar on France:

Friday, April 29, 4-6 p.m.: Jo W. Saxe, "The Balance of Payments: A Post-War Problem."

Friday, May 6, 4-6 p.m.: Jesse Pitts, "Structural Framework for the Analysis of French Society."

Friday, May 13, 4-6 p.m.: M. A. Adelman, "Monopoly in French Industry."

There will be no meetings on April 1 and April 8.

Seminar Notice

Bernard Brodie, author of the recent *Strategy in the Missile Age* and numerous books and articles on military affairs, will visit the Center on Monday and Tuesday, April 18th and 19th. He will conduct an informal seminar from 10-12 Monday morning.

THE FRENCH SEMINAR

Schedule for Fall, 1960

Meetings of the French Seminar will be held on Fridays
from 2-4 p.m. in the Seminar Room at the Center for Inter-
national Affairs.

Friday, September 30--Review of previous work--Mr. Saxe,
Critical comments--M. Aron.

Friday, October 7, Changes in French Education, 1936-1960,
William M. Johnston.

Friday, October 14, Education and Society in France, Jesse Pitts.

Friday, October 21, Higher Education in France, M. Aron.

Further meetings to be announced.

Copies of the proceedings of the Seminar for 1959-60 are
available at the Library at the Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue, Cambridge. (Miss Lynch, X 2123)

THE FRENCH SEMINAR

QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION - October 6, 1960

Changes in French Education and Social Changes
in France 1936 - 1960

William M. Johnston

1. Why choose the 1930's as a starting point?

## Educational Reform and Politics

2. Does the slow pace of educational reform since 1945 confirm the thesis that the IVth and Vth Republics have perpetuated the "classic" patterns of French politics?

3. Have budgetary provisions for education grown sufficiently to permit the needed expansion of all kinds of schools? If not, what sectors of education are lagging?

4. Has technical education expanded enough to meet the demands of industry? To what extent does industry prefer to train its personnel from scratch? Will other Common Market countries forge ahead of France in training skilled manpower?

## The Role of Education in Forming French Value Systems

5. How much have active methods of teaching altered the patterns and attitudes of French political and social life? Has classroom emphasis on empathy and participation diminished the traditional distrust of authority? Or are the symptoms described in last year's Seminar Report (pp. 163-164) too deeply rooted to be affected by a mere change of teaching methods?

6. Have changes in the content and tenor of textbooks altered traditional attitudes toward foreign affairs and international co-operation?

7. What role do teachers play in determining France's image of the external world? How do teachers compare in this respect with other moulders of opinion, e.g. journalists, priests, lobbies, etc.?

8. What institutions compete with education to shape French value systems? Is education gaining or losing in comparison with the influence of family, peer groups, mass communications, and the Church?

9. To what extent has the democratizing of French society depended upon first democratizing secondary education?

* * *

If on these two continents, communism manages to impose its
laws, in a quarter of a century, we, the white man, defenders of
Christian Civilisation, devoted to individual and political liberty,
may find ourselves a tiny minority...

The Hon. Paul-Henri Spaak

The William J. Clayton Lectures
1960-1961

The Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University

Often for a real decision, as opposed to a legalistic decision, the
right people are pretty far down.

Sir Charles P. Snow

The Godkin Lectures (III)

December 1, 1960

French Seminaß

Discussion of the Vendée War by Laurence Wylie
Friday, December 9

The events that occurred in the village of Chanzeaux and in the Vendée region generally between 1789 and 1793 will be presented as a case study to clarify certain aspects of French behavior. The following points will be stressed for purposes of further discussion by the group:

1. The traditional breach between Eastern and Western France.

2. A basic source of conservative political strength in France.

3. The importance of historical perspective to an understanding of French behavior.

4. The process of myth formation and its political implications.

5. The importance of the study of microcosms to a broader understanding of political behavior.

An excerpt from Les Evenements Survenus En France de 1933 a 1945

Rapport de M. Charles Serre, Depute au Nom de la Commission d'Enquête
Parlementaire

Dans une étude recente l'état-major de l'armée s'exprimait ainsi:

"On assiste depuis quelques années à une évolution très sensible
de l'état d'esprit dans les unités nord-africaines."

Cette évolution est en relations étroites avec celle du monde musulman
tout entier.

Elle a déjà abouti à des résultats dont la gravité ne doit échapper à personne. C'est ainsi que, en pleine crise économique, on enregistre une diminution très nette des engagements (diminution de 3.000 contrats pour 1933 par rapport à 1932) et aussi une diminution des rengagements. Le soldat est plus frondar, moins dévoué a ses chefs. Il est plus sensible aux influences extérieures; il fraie avec le civil, ce qui n'existait pas jadis. Dernière les apparences de la discipline, son esprit tend à nous échapper.

Des faits graves se sont produits dans des unités stationnées en
France au cours de l'année dernière: meurtre d'un officier français par
un officier indigène, désertions, présence de militaires dans des
assemblées indigènes révolutionnaires, etc."

Les conséquences d'un tel état de choses pourraient être redoutables
dans le cas d'une guerre européenne ou d'une insurrection dans l'Afrique
du Nord. L'état-major de l'armée étudie les moyens d'y porter remede.
Mais il importe de le signaler dans toute sa gravité a un moment ou le
loyalisme des indigènes de l'Afrique du Nord devient sujet à caution et ou
il est question d'augmenter le nombre des unités nord-africaines à stationner
sur le territoire de la metropole et de donner de plus en plus d'importance
à leur role en couverture immédiate.