Draft Resolution of Ratification

(a) Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of the protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic subject to the declarations of subsection (b) and the conditions of subsection (c).

(b) DECLARATIONS.--The advice and consent of the Senate to ratification of the protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is subject to the following declarations:

(1) Reaffirmation that Membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Remains a Vital National Security Interest of the United States of America.--The Senate declares that--

(A) For nearly fifty years NATO has served as the preeminent organization to defend the territory of nations in the North Atlantic area against all external threats.

(B) Through common action in NATO, the established democracies of North America and Europe persevered and prevailed in the task of ensuring the survival of democratic government in Europe throughout the Cold War.

(C) The responsibility and financial burden of defending the democracies of Europe and North America can be more evenly shared through an alliance in which specific obligations and force goals are met by its members.

(D) The security and prosperity of the United States of America is enhanced immeasurably by NATO's collective deterrent against all forms of aggression that threaten the combined territory of alliance members.

(2) Strategic Rationale for NATO Enlargement.--The Senate finds that--

(A) Notwithstanding the collapse of most non-democratic governments in Central and Eastern Europe, the United States and its NATO allies face enduring threats to their stability and territorial integrity including--

i) the potential for the resurgence of a hegemonic power in or around Europe;

ii) conflict stemming from ethnic and religious enmity or the actions of undemocratic leaders; and

iii) the proliferation of technologies associated with nuclear, chemical, biological weapons as well as ballistic and cruise missile systems.

(B) The invasion or destabilization of Poland, Hungary or the Czech Republic would threaten the stability of Europe, jeopardize vital United States national security interests, and, in the event of war, lead to the inevitable engagement of U.S. forces.

(C) Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are possessed of established democratic governments and, having demonstrated a willingness to meet all requirements necessary to contribute to the territorial defense of the alliance, are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

(D) Extending NATO membership to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, with

all rights and obligations arising under the North Atlantic Treaty, will deter
aggression, consolidate democracy, and advance the interests of the United States and
its NATO allies.

(3) **Supremacy of the North Atlantic Council.**--The Senate understands that--

(A) The North Atlantic Council is the supreme decision-making body in NATO. The decisions of the North Atlantic Council shall not be subject to the review, challenge or veto by any NATO affiliated forum, including the Permanent Joint Council, the Partnership for Peace, or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, or by any non-member state participating in any such forum.

(B) In no instance shall the North Atlantic Council require the consent of the United Nations, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, or any other international organization in order to take any action pursuant to the Washington Treaty, including the deployment, operation and stationing of forces.

(C) It is the sense of the Senate that the Permanent Representatives of member states serving on the North Atlantic Council shall undertake direct responsibility for matters relating to the basic policies of the alliance including development of the strategic concept and negotiations that affect the relationship between members of the alliance and non-members participating in fora such as the Permanent Joint Council.

(4) **Full Membership for New NATO Members.**--

(A) IN GENERAL.--The Senate understands that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, in becoming NATO members, shall be subject to all of the same requirements, and shall be entitled to all of the same protections, that are afforded all other NATO members.

(B) POLITICAL COMMITMENTS.--The Senate endorses the political commitments made by NATO to the Russian Federation on May 27, 1997 (The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation), which are not legally binding and may not be construed as affecting or interfering in any way with future decisions taken by the NATO Alliance to preserve the security of its members.

(5) **The Importance of Intra-NATO Unity and Dispute Resolution.**--

(A) The Senate finds that--

(i) for nearly fifty years the commitment to collective defense in NATO and the functions of the North Atlantic Council have facilitated the peaceful resolution of disputes between member states in Europe for nearly fifty years; and

(ii) in order to retain the cohesion that allowed NATO to provide for the collective defense of its members, it is essential for NATO members to resolve all disputes in the same manner that has successfully prevented hostilities between members over the past half century.

(B) Report on Mechanisms to Intra-NATO Disputes.--Prior to the deposit of any of the United States instruments of ratification of the protocols, the President shall

2

submit a report to the Senate on the need for any changes to the current procedures within the North Atlantic Council, or any new formal mechanisms for dispute resolution, that are essential to maintain the ability of current and future NATO members to act, in a unified manner, to provide for the collective defense of the alliance.

(C) It is the sense of the Senate that--

(i) the central purpose of NATO should be to provide for the collective defense of its members;

(ii) the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe should be the primary organization for the discussion and resolution of political disputes between European members, Canada and the United States; and

(iii) the European Union should be the primary organization for the economic integration of all qualified European countries into an undivided Europe.

(D) Policy--The policy of the United States shall be--

(i) to utilize fully the institutions of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe to reach political solutions for disputes in Europe; and

(ii) to encourage the European Union to facilitate actively the expansion of its membership to stabilize the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

(6) Future Consideration of Candidates for Membership in NATO.--

(A) In General.--The Senate finds that Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that the members of the alliance, by unanimous agreement, may invite the accession into the North Atlantic Treaty of any other European State in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

(B) The Senate finds that--

i) other than Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the United States has not consented to the invitation of any other nation to join NATO; and

ii) in advance of any future invitation, the United States has signaled its commitment to facilitate the qualification for NATO membership of other European States that may be in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

(C) The Senate declares that no action or agreement other than a consensus decision by the full membership of the alliance, approved by the national procedures of each member of the alliance, including the requirements of Article 2, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution of the United States (regarding the Advice and Consent of the United States Senate) shall constitute a defense guarantee pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(c) CONDITIONS.--The advice and consent of the Senate to the ratification of the protocols of accession to the North Atlantic Treaty for Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic is subject to the following conditions, which shall be binding upon the President:

3

(1) The Strategic Concept of NATO --

(A) THE FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE OF TERRITORIAL DEFENSE -- The Senate declares that --

(i) in order for NATO to serve the security interests of the United States, the core purpose of the Alliance must continue to be the collective, territorial defense of all Alliance members. Accordingly, NATO's force structure should be dictated by the requirements of deterring and countering a significant military threat to NATO members in Europe or North America, as provided for in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty;

(ii) notwithstanding the core function described in this section, NATO should engage in joint military exercises and promote force interoperability to preserve its capability, when necessary, to take action pursuant to Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, subject to the approval of all Alliance members, in order to respond to specific threats to the security of members, whether in Europe or North America;

(iii) the development of a rapid deployment capability can enhance the ability of NATO members to respond effectively to aggression outside of the North Atlantic area, but must not occur at the expense of the basic force structure essential for guaranteeing the territorial defense of the Alliance.

(B) PLANNING AND TARGET FORCE GOALS -- NATO force planning and target force goals shall continue to be based, first and foremost, upon the responsibility of Alliance members to prepare for and maintain the collective defense of the territory of all Alliance members, as required pursuant to Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

(C) REPORT -- Within 90 days of enactment of this Resolution, the President shall submit to the Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services of the Senate and the Committees on International Relations and National Security of the House of Representatives a report on any proposed revisions of NATO's Strategic Concept that are under consideration by the United States government within NATO. The report shall be submitted in both classified and unclassified form, and shall include --

(i) an analysis of all potential threats to the territory of the Alliance, including consideration of the possibility of a reconstituted conventional threat to Europe posed by the Russian Federation;

(ii) a detailed account of all negotiations regarding the revision of NATO's Strategic Concept;

(iii) the progress of all Alliance members, on a country by country basis, towards meeting current force goals;

(iv) a timetable for implementation of target force goals by all Alliance members under any revised Strategic Concept;

(v) a description of the system architecture for the deployment of a regional, NATO missile defense with a timetable for development and an estimate of costs.

(vi) a detailed explanation of the manner in which specific revisions to the Strategic Concept serve United States national security interests and affect

4

U.S. military requirements both within and outside the North Atlantic area.

(D) DEFINITION --For the purposes of this resolution, the term "Strategic Concept" means any document agreed to by the North Atlantic Council that would serve a purpose similar to that of the Document agreed by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on 7th-8th November, 1991.

(2) **Cost, Benefits, Burdensharing and Military Implications of an Expanded NATO.**--
Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that the inclusion of additional members in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not have the effect of increasing the percentage share of the United States of America in the common budget of NATO, that the United States has made no commitment to subsidize the national expenses necessary for new NATO members to meet their NATO commitments, and that the inclusion of additional members in the alliance does not come at the expense of meeting or funding the military requirements of the United States of America outside the North Atlantic Area.

(3) **The NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council.**--Prior to the deposit of the United States instrument of ratification, the President shall certify to the Senate that--

(A) **IN GENERAL.**--the Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council do not provide the Russian Federation any role in decisions the alliance takes on internal matters, the way NATO organizes itself, conducts its business, or plans, prepares for and conducts those missions which affect only its members, such as collective defense, as stated under Article 5.

(B) **NATO DECISION-MAKING.**--the Russian Federation will not play a part in the North Atlantic Council or NATO decision-making and it will never have a veto over NATO policy.

(C) **NATURE OF DISCUSSIONS IN THE PERMANENT JOINT COUNCIL.**--in discussions under the auspices of the Permanent Joint Council--

i) the Permanent Joint Council will not be a forum in which NATO's basic strategy, doctrine and readiness are negotiated with Russia, nor will NATO use the Permanent Joint Council as a substitute for formal arms control negotiations such as the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty;

ii) any discussion with Russia of NATO doctrine will be for explanatory, not decision-making purposes;

iii) such explanations will not extend to a level of detail that could in any way compromise the effectiveness of NATO's military forces. Such explanations will be offered after NATO has first set its policies on issues affecting internal matters. NATO will not discuss these issues with Russia prior to making decisions within the North Atlantic Council; and

iv) the Permanent Joint Council will never be used to make decisions on NATO doctrine, strategy or readiness.

(D) **Dependence on Russian Military Equipment.**--It is the sense of the Senate that, in

5

Address by Senator Jesse Helms
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
U.S. Capitol Historical Society Dinner Honoring
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Thursday, March 26, 1998

I am deeply grateful, of course, Mr. Brown, for your kind introduction, and for
hosting tonight's dinner honoring the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On
behalf of all the members of the Committee, past and present, I thank you.

And, Dr. Kissinger, its always good to see you, and I am grateful to you for your
kind remarks. Your presence here tonight honors all of us on the Committee --
especially in light of all that we have put you through over the years!

I think it is important to mention at the outset that I am not the first North
Carolinian to have had the privilege of serving as Chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations. The first was Nathaniel Macon, a Revolutionary War veteran,
and native of Warrenton, North Carolina, who served as chairman between 1825
and 1829.

Now, as Dr. Kissinger well knows, I have occasionally been referred to as "Senator
No." And I'm proud of that title. But when it comes to saying "No," I'm not in
the same ballpark with Senator Macon, who was a fierce opponent of any and all
measures to expand the power of the new federal government.

In fact, it is a historical fact that during his entire 37 year tenure in Congress, no
ten other members combined cast as many "no" votes as did Nathaniel Macon
cast alone.

Dr. Kissinger, I'd like to contemplate your appearing before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee when Senator Macon was Chairman.

Seriously, the fact is, saying "no" is a part of the job of being Foreign Relations
Committee chairman. As much as some might wish it to be otherwise, this
Committee was never meant to be a rubber stamp for Administration policies.
That's what tripartite government is all about.

A recent article from *Foreign Affairs* magazine lamented the Foreign Relations Committee's role in foreign policy. The author wrote (and I quote):

> "It would not occur to [the Senator] that he must sacrifice his liberty of action because he has become Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations. He has always spoken his mind on all subjects, and he continues to speak it. If he does not like French policy... or British policy... he says so loudly and publicly. He feels perfectly free to indulge in running comment on the acts of foreign powers... and on any and all negotiations, however delicate, at any time while they are in progress.... [He] is determined to make the Senate a major partner in diplomatic affairs... He exercises the power of protest and veto... [and] the ensuing troubles of the executive do not break his heart.... As a matter of fact, he regards it as his high duty to watch the executive with the utmost suspicion."

That essay was not written about the *current* Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (though I would plead *nolo contendere* if it had been).

It was written in January, 1926 by Walter Lippmann, about Chairman William Borah of Idaho, who succeeded Henry Cabot Lodge as chairman in 1925. While I don't subscribe to *all* of Senator Borah's views -- I sure do like his style.

Chairman Borah was not alone in provoking the ire of the foreign policy elites. Consider this missive, launched against his predecessor, Chairman Lodge, by *The New York Times* editorial page on July 19, 1919:

> "The light of truth and knowledge will penetrate the shadows of the crypt in which the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate holds its sessions only over the prostrate form of Henry Cabot Lodge, Chairman of that Committee. The legions of light, multitudinous, bold, and powerful, have by their approach startled the hosts of night in their encampment within that chamber. They storm the entrance, but there stands Lodge... unconquerable and opaque at the door of the Committee room."

So if anyone tells you that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began rankling the folks up at the *New York Times* and the *Council on Foreign Relations* only when I took the helm, he or she needs to bone up on American history. Angering the striped-pants crowd may not be a time honored tradition of Foreign Relations Committee Chairmen, but a lot of us have given the striped-pants crowd dispersia.

[L]

In any event, the editorial writer at the *New York Times* who wrote that passage was, not surprisingly, frustrated with Chairman Lodge because of his opposition to the League of Nations. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has always been a source of frustration for utopian idealists in a rush to remake the world, and I fervently hope that it will never fail to be.

I believe our Founding Fathers intended for the Committee to be a burr under the saddle. The Senate is slow to action by design -- a brake on impulsive instincts. And the Foreign Relations Committee was, I believe, intended to be the Senate's brake on foreign policy.

The Foreign Relations Committee's role is contemplative; Our job is to say to presidents and secretaries of state -- when they come demanding quick action on "urgent" treaties and legislation -- "Slow down, let's think on this a little." We hold hearings, we listen to witnesses with differing points of view. Then, sometimes, our job is to work with an Administration to improve their proposals. And sometimes, the Committee's job is to say "No."

This, needless to say, has been frustrating to generations of American presidents. Woodrow Wilson, for example, loathed the United States Senate. He was a man in a hurry, with grand visions of a new world order, and the Senate stood in his way -- thank goodness!

There is a story that, as a young 22-year-old senior at Princeton University, Wilson wrote a dissertation called "Congressional Government," in which he took the Founding Fathers to task for their lack of wisdom in establishing a Constitutional separation of powers, and heaped scorn on the Senate's power over treaties and appointments. Young Wilson advocated, instead, the adoption of a cabinet system based on the British parliamentary model -- in effect, a legislative rubber stamp.

The young Mr. Wilson then sent his dissertation around to see if he could publish it and make a name for himself. And eventually it caught the eye of a 29-year-old tutor at Harvard, who thought it was well argued. He published it in a journal he edited, *International Affairs*, and that started off Woodrow Wilson's career.

The young Harvard tutor was none other than Henry Cabot Lodge. And some years later, when Wilson was President, and Lodge was Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Chairman Lodge gave President Wilson a lesson in "Congressional Government."

Now, President Wilson probably could have achieved ratification of the League of Nations, if he had not approached the Senate with such disdain. Lodge proposed 14 conditions, most of which would not raise an eyebrow today. He demanded language to ensure:

* that the U.S. be the judge of its own internal affairs;

* that the U.S. retain the right to withdraw from the League;

* that the League not restrict any individual rights of U.S. citizens;

* that the U.S. assume no obligation to deploy forces through the League without the approval of Congress;

* that Congress approve all U.S. officials appointed to the League; and

* that Congress control all appropriations of U.S. funds for the League.

Not controversial stuff.

But President Wilson refused even to consider Chairman Lodge's proposed reservations, howling: "Never! Never! I'll never consent to adopt any policy with which that impossible man is so prominently identified!" Wilson lost the final vote 38 to 53.

The lesson for Presidents ever since has been that they rarely win when they refuse to work with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. By contrast, when Presidents have attempted to work with the Committee in partnership, rather than confrontation, they have seen many successes.

Compare the fight over the League of Nations, with the Senate's current consideration of NATO expansion. The expansion of the Atlantic Alliance is perhaps the most important foreign policy matter to be debated by the Senate since the end of the Cold War. Yet, while the debate over NATO expansion has been spirited, it has not been confrontational. Why?

Early on, in the process, the Committee raised a number of reservations to the Administration's approach. Dr. Kissinger came and testified about his concern that, by giving Russia a voice in NATO decision-making, we were letting the fox into the henhouse. And so the Committee drafted conditions in the Resolution of Ratification that built "fire walls" in the NATO-Russia relationship. And, over the next nine months, Senator Biden and I worked with the Secretary of State to address a number of other concerns.

The result: The Senate is on the verge of not only approving NATO expansion, but ensuring that NATO expansion is done the right way. Had the Administration dug in its heels, and expected the Committee to rubber-stamp the expansion protocols, I can assure you we would not be on the verge of approving NATO expansion today.

So I must conclude by saying that I disagree with President Wilson -- the Founding Fathers showed great wisdom when they established the separation of powers doctrine. Because in so doing, they ensured a voice for the American people in their nation's foreign policy -- a check on the elites, many of whom would prefer to run our nation's foreign relations unencumbered by the wishes or concerns of the American people.

In short, the Founding Fathers knew what President Wilson did not -- that there is great wisdom in the American heartland. They trusted that wisdom.

And so for each and every one of us here tonight who serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the many distinguished senators who preceded us, let us never forget what a privilege the American people have granted us by allowing us to be their voice in the great debates over the national security of our great nation. And let us recognize that tonight's dinner is really not a tribute to us, nor to this Committee; Rather, it is a tribute to the American people.

##

AMANPURI

Fax:076-324200

20 Jan '98

16:56

P. 02/02

Dear Clifford:

Nancy and I are sorry that we cannot celebrate your birth-
day with you, but we could not let the occasion go by without
expressing our congratulations and warmest wishes.

What began many years ago as a professional relationship
has become one of friendship. In a business where an amateur
had best be wary, you educated and guided us. We appreciate
not only your knowledge of art but your innate sense of beauty.
We *treasure* your integrity and adherence to principle, two rare
qualities, and we are constantly delighted by your thoughtful-
ness and charm. But above all, we *cherish* your friendship, which
has become part of our lives.

With the appreciation and good wishes of two of your
greatest admirers,

[You might want to substitute another word for one of the
"treasure"s -- cherish, esteem, prize, value -- particularly
the one relating to friendship.]

Nancy: Do you want to wait to sign it yourself and FedEx it to London, or would you rather send it as soon as you approve it, signed "Henry and Nancy" and, under that, "Dictated from Thailand"?

TOTAL P. 02

HENRY A. KISSINGER

May 14, 1998

Dear Mr. Johnson:

I am writing to nominate Skitch Henderson - Founder, Music Director and Conductor of the New York Pops - for a 1998 Kennedy Center Honors Award.

This year Skitch is celebrating his 80th birthday and the 15th anniversary of the New York Pops. Age has not slowed this ebullient musician nor diminished the enjoyment he brings to concert-goers of all ages and walks of life. A serious musician who has never taken himself seriously, Skitch is equally at home in Carnegie Hall before a black-tie audience as he is conducting the Pops on a summer night in Central Park with the audience sitting on the grass. A Pops concert, wherever it is, rarely ends without the fans on their feet, cheering and applauding.

An important facet of the New York Pops is its youth programs, whereby literally thousands of young people who might otherwise never attend a concert of classical music have an opportunity to hear and enjoy good music. There are always free tickets for school children at afternoon performances.

I am enclosing a copy of the commemorative journal from Skitch's birthday benefit concert. It explains far better than I can why Skitch is beloved by so many and why I believe he deserves to be honored for his contributions to music and music education.

Mr. Jim Johnson
Chairman
The Kennedy Center Honors
The John F. Kennedy Center
for the Performing Arts
Washington, DC 20566-0001

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

1

Rio de Janeiro, August 13th, 1998

To
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
Twenty-Sixth Floor
NEW YORK, NY 10022

AUG 2 1 1998

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Was a pleasure see you again during the World Cup. As I told you in the Hotel Bristol in Paris, the first time we saw us, was during the trip London-Stockholm together with Pelé and Beckenbauer.

In Stockholm, invited by you and Pelé, I assisted the meeting of the USA Soccer Federation, before the FIFA Congress.

At that time and during 20 years, I was PUMA director in Spain and Latinamerica. After this I met you several times always during the World Cups in Mexico, Italy and United States.

Well, last January visiting Beckenbauer in Munich and Kitzbühl, I met also my friends Hans Nowak and Ursula Grösser. Both are today married. Hans and Uschi were my colleagues at Puma. And Uschi, was together with me and you and the trip London-Stockholm.

Invited by them, I was one night in the Hotel at Glonn - Bayern-. When I saw a picture of a little boy!

I asked Uschi and she told me that the boy at the picture is Henry Kissinger. Uschi bought that picture near from

Henry Kissinger, Uschi bought that picture near from
I asked Uschi and she told me that the boy at the picture is
Bayern-. When I saw a picture of a little boy!

Invited by them, I was one night in the Hotel at Glomm -
you and the trip London-Stockholm.

colleagues at Puma. And Uschi, was together with me and
Grösser. Both are today married. Hans and Uschi were my
Kitzbühl. I met also my friends Hans Nowak and Ursula
Well. Last January visiting Beckenbauer in Munich and
Staats.

always during the World Cups in Mexico. Italy and United
Spain and Latinamericas. After this I met you several times
At that time and during 20 years, I was PUMA director in
Congress.

meeting of the USA Soccer Federation, before the FIFA
in Stockholm, invited by you and Belé. I assisted the
Belé and Beckenbauer.

us, was during the trip London-Stockholm together with
told you in the Hotel Bristol in Paris, the first time we saw
Was a pleasure see you again during the World Cup. As I

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

NEW YORK, NY 10022
Twenty-Sixth Floor
320 Park Avenue
Dr. Henry V. Kissinger
to

2

Fürth, were she was working and living after leaving Puma.
I think was Grossgründlach from an old lady, who said was
friend of your family.

Some days before the World Cup, I received from the
actual Miss. Nowak the copy of the picture, which now I
am sending to you.

Just in case you want to write Miss. Ursula Grösser or Mr.
Hans Nowak I give you the adress:

Herrn Hans Nowak/ Ursula Griasch
Am Schmiedberg 16a, 85625 GLONN- Deuschtland-
Tel. 40-08093-2375.

Or you can phone Mr. Nowak, at Bayern München-
089/699 31-642. Herr Nowak, was an old football player
of Bayern, Schalke 04 and Germany. He is in charge of the
marketing of Bayern München.

Was nice to see you again. I am sending you a picture we
are together with Pelé, if possible to dedicate to me and
send to me at my adress in Rio de Janeiro.

As you propably remeber I am a journalist and am also
writing a little story about.

Kind regards,

Hans Henningsen

My adress is Rua Anchieta 16, apto. 1004- Leme- CEP
22.010.070 - Rio de Janeiro- RJ - Brasil-

22.010.070 - Rio de Janeiro - R1 - Brasil-

My address is Rua Anchieta 16, apto. 1004- Peme- CEP

Hans Henningsen

Kind regards,
writing a little story about.

As you probably remember I am a journalist and am also
send to me at my address in Rio de Janeiro.

Are together with Belé, it possible to dedicate to me and
Was nice to see you again. I am sending you a picture we
marketing of Bayern München.

of Bayern Schalke 04 and Germany. He is in charge of the
089/66 31-642. Herr Nowak, was an old football player
Or you can phone Mr. Nowak, at Bayern München-
Tel. 40-08093-2375.

Am Schmiedberg 16a, 82622 GÖNN- Denachtsland-
Herrn Hans Nowak/ Uranla Grässch
Hans Nowak I give you the address:

Just in case you want to write Miss. Uranla Grösser or Mr.
am sending to you.

actual Miss. Nowak the copy of the picture, which now I
some days before the World Cup, I received from the
friend of your family.

I think was Großgründisch from an old lady, who said was
Fürth, were she was working and living after leaving Puma.

30/04 '98 THU 17:41 FAX +49 228 3392002

AMB-OFFICE

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BONN

APR 30 1998

THE AMBASSADOR

April 29, 1998

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue
26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I would like to ask a personal favor of you on behalf of my chauffeur, Heinz Herchen, who will be retiring on May 29, 1998, after 42 years of service with the American Embassy in Bonn. Heinz served as driver for the Deputy Chief of Mission until 1976, when he was promoted to Ambassador's chauffeur. Prior to government regulations prohibiting this, he drove visiting Secretaries of State. Heinz still beams with pride when he speaks of driving you during one of your visits to Germany.

One of Heinz's prized possessions is an album with photos and farewell letters from the DCMs, Ambassadors and VIPs he has driven. To commemorate Heinz's retirement, we are preparing an updated album, with letters of congratulations from those he has served, as well as letters from you, Secretary Albright and President Clinton.

I would be very grateful if you would agree to provide a letter (and perhaps also a photo) to Heinz congratulating him on his retirement. He has been an outstanding employee throughout his career and truly is an institution at Embassy Bonn. I am trying to put together a fitting tribute to Heinz on his retirement and I hope you will join me in honoring him. Please mail any contribution to my Staff Assistant, Katherine Brucker at: American Embassy - Bonn, PSC 117 - Box 215, APO AE 09080. We would like to collect everything by May 22nd. Thank you in advance.

30/04 '98 THU 17:40 FAX +49 228 3392002

AMB-OFFICE

001

UNCLASSIFIED FAX COVER SHEET

U.S. EMBASSY, BONN
Germany

FAX No. (INT'L) 49-228-339-2002

FAX No. (FRG) 0228-339-2002

LOCAL DATE / TIME SENT: 17/25, 30 APRIL 1998

TO: DR. HENRY KISSINGER

ORGANIZATION: KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

PHONE NUMBER: (212) 759-7519

FAX NUMBER: 212-759-0042

FROM: AMBASSADOR JOHN KORNBLUM

PHONE NUMBER: 49-228-339-2330

NUMBER OF FOLLOWING PAGES: 1

SUBJECT: Letter regarding retirement of long-term employee.

COMMENTS: ORIGINAL TO FOLLOW BY POST.

THE AMBASSADOR

April 29, 1998

MAY 14 1998

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

HAK:

Ed Feulner encloses a copy of a memo on the
legal status of the ABM Treaty (finding that
it is a new treaty and therefore must be
approved by the Senate before ratification.

A joint letter to that effect has been sent
to Sen. Lott. Feulner offers you the oppor-
tunity to add your name when it is updated,
if you wish. (I assume you do not.)

Just file ____ Will list name ✓

Tuford

ssm

The
Heritage Foundation

A tax-exempt public policy research institute

July 24, 1998

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

JUL 27 1998

Dear Henry:

Enclosed is a legal memorandum drafted by the law firm of Hunton & Williams for The Heritage Foundation concerning the legal status of the ABM Treaty. Accompanying the memorandum is a letter to Senator Trent Lott endorsing its findings, signed by 56 public policy leaders. The memorandum makes a convincing case that under the international law doctrine of impossibility of performance the ABM Treaty ended when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Further, the memorandum explains why the agreement signed by Secretary of State Albright last September to establish succession under the ABM Treaty is, in fact, a new treaty, which must be approved by two-thirds of the Senate before it may be ratified.

I invite you to review both the memorandum and the letter to Senator Lott. If on the basis of your review of both the memorandum and the letter you wish to add your name to the letter, please fax your name and title as you would like them to appear on the letter. Our fax number is 202/544-0961.

Please note that The Heritage Foundation delivered the letter to Senator Lott on July 20. However, we will periodically release the updated letter, with additional endorser names. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact us at 202/546-4400. Thank you for your prospective support on this vital issue.

Sincerely,

Edwin J. Feulner, Ph.D.
President

Officers

Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., President

Phillip N. Truluck, Executive Vice President

John Von Kannon, Vice President & Treasurer

Herbert B. Berkowitz, Vice President

Robert G. Blatz, Vice President

Stuart M. Butler, Vice President

Michael G. Franc, Vice President

Lewis F. Gayner, Vice President

Kim R. Holmes, Vice President

Bernard Lomas, Counselor

Adam Meyerson, Vice President

Robert E. Russell, Jr., Counselor

Board of Trustees

David R. Brown, M.D., Chairman

Thomas L. Rhodes

Richard M. Scaife, Vice Chairman

Thomas A. Roe

J. Frederic Rench, Secretary

Hon. Frank Shakespeare

Holland H. Coors

Hon. William E. Simon

Midge Decter

Hon. Jay Van Andel

Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.

Barb Van Andel-Gaby

Jerry Hume

Preston A. Wells

Hon. J. William Middendorf, II

Honorary Trustees

Joseph Coors

William H. G. FitzGerald

Kathryn Davis, Ph.D.

Hon. Henry H. Fowler

Hon. Jack Eckerd

Nancy B. Krieble

214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E. • Washington, D.C. 20002-4999 • (202) 546-4400 • http://www.heritage.org

July 20, 1998

The Honorable Trent Lott
Majority Leader
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Lott:

The Clinton Administration continues to leave the American people totally defenseless against long-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. In fact, the deeply flawed proliferation, trade, and export policies of the Clinton Administration, especially regarding China, are actually increasing the missile threat to the United States.

The chief obstacle to defending the American people from ballistic missiles is the 1972 ABM Treaty. But an authoritative legal memorandum just published by The Heritage Foundation shows that the ABM Treaty ceased to exist as a binding "contract" when the Soviet Union, our former treaty partner, collapsed in 1991. This position is based upon a well-documented analysis of the relevant international law doctrines and constitutional law, and has been reviewed and approved by many of our nation's top legal scholars.

The Clinton Administration continues to observe this dead treaty as a matter of policy. And in order to solve the legal problem of having no successor to the lapsed ABM Treaty, the Clinton Administration signed an agreement last September in New York that would create a new ABM treaty with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. The New York agreement is not a mere technical agreement or minor adjustment to the old ABM Treaty. It is a major new international treaty, with new limits and obligations. It would revive the old 1972 ABM Treaty, expand it from a bilateral to a multi-lateral treaty, and impose limits on theater missile defenses that were not included in the original ABM Treaty.

The Clinton Administration is now quietly implementing the New York ABM agreement without the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate. This is not only a serious blow to America's national security, it is also a violation of Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, and of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961.

We believe that this illegal implementation of the 1997 New York agreement on ABM succession and on theater missile defenses should be stopped. We also believe that the President should submit this new ABM treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent.

Martin Anderson
Keith and Jan Hurlbut Fellow
The Hoover Institution

Dr. Larry Ann
President
The Claremont Institute

L. Brent Bozell, III
Conservative Victory Committee

Allan C. Carlson
President
The Howard Center for Family,
Religion and Society

Ted Galen Carpenter
Vice President
Defense and Foreign Policy Studies,
Cato Institute

Linda Chavez
President
Center for Equal Opportunity

Angelo M. Codevilla
Professor of International Relations
Boston University

Ambassador Henry F. Cooper
Chairman
High Frontier

T. Kenneth Cribb, Jr.
Former Counselor to the
U.S. Attorney General

The Honorable Paula Dobriansky
Vice President
Council on Foreign Relations

Elaine Donnelly
President
Center for Military Readiness

Michael Farris, Jr.
Chairman
Madison Project

Dr. Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.
President
The Heritage Foundation

Frank J. Gaffney
Director
Center for Security Policy

Robert Hawkins, Jr.
President and CEO
Institute for Contemporary Studies

Charlton Heston
President
National Rifle Association

David Horowitz
President
Center for the Study of Popular Culture

Robert Kagan
Senior Associate
Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace

David Keene
Chairman
American Conservative Union

Karen Kerrigan
President
Small Business Survival Committee

Dr. Jeane J. Kirkpatrick
Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
Leavey Professor of Government,
Georgetown University, and Former U.S.
Representative to the United Nations

Sven F. Kraemer
Former Director of Arms Control
National Security Council

Dr. Richard Land
President
Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission

Ambassador James R. Lilley
Director
Institute for Global Chinese Affairs

Dr. Herbert I. London
J. M. Olin Professor of Humanities
New York University

Capt. Eugene McDaniel, USN (Ret.)
President
American Defense Institute

The Honorable Edwin Meese, III
Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow in
Public Policy
The Heritage Foundation

******************* -COMM.JOURNAL- ******************* DATE AUG-24-1998 ***** TIME 15:25 *** P.01

MODE = MEMORY TRANSMISSION

START=AUG-24 15:25

END=AUG-24 15:25

FILE NO. = 044

NO.      COM      ABBR/NTWK      STATION NAME/
                                        TELEPHONE NO.

001      OK       <02>           KENT FAX

                                        PAGES      PRG.NO.      PROGRAM NAME

                                        002/002

-KISSINGER ASSOC.

- ****** -

- **********

HAK:

There was a call, followed up by a fax, from Rob Robinson, Editor-
in-Chief of "Signal" magazine (the magazine of the Armed Services
Communications and Electronics Association). He was amazed to see
that you were one of the signers on the Heritage Foundation's
open letter to Sen. Trent Lott. The letter gives the legal opinion
that the ABM Treaty that you put in place ceased to exist with the
collapse of the USSR. Therefore, the agreement signed by Secy.
Albright last September is a new treaty and cannot be ratified
without a two-thirds vote of the Senate.

He was surprised that you would join your name to "that bunch of
extreme right-wingers", and wanted to know if you truly support
that position, or just didn't read it carefully.

He sent the article he has written for the next issue of the maga-
zine. If it is NOT correct, he said he would not run the piece.

DEADLINE IS NOON TOMORROW

ssm

Aug-24-90 12:11 Signal Advertising

703 222 8/62

Henry Says Treaty Dead

Nobel prize laureate and architect of the 1972 Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the former Soviet Union, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, believes the agreement is legally dead. For decades, the treaty set up mutual assured destruction with the Soviet Union and the United States, each prepared to launch nuclear-armed ballistic missiles if the other side fired first. Under the treaty, neither side could develop an effective defense against these missiles.

The Secretary of State from 1973 to 1977 and assistant to the president for national security affairs from 1969 to 1975, Kissinger joined dozens of others in adding his name to a Heritage Foundation letter criticizing the Clinton Administration's attempt to implement a new ABM agreement without U.S. Senate ratification.

Kissinger agreed that the new ABM Clinton White House agreement with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine is not a technical agreement or a minor adjustment to the old ABM Treaty. It is a major new international treaty, with new limits and obligations, and as such constitutionally requires the Senate's advice and consent.

At a time when the United States faces an increasing ballistic missile threat, Kissinger believes an ABM Treaty is the chief obstacle to defending the nation against ballistic missiles. The letter he signed with the other officials is addressed to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott.

International Security Studies

Yale University
P.O. Box 208206
New Haven, CT 06520-8206

Campus Address:
Luce Hall
34 Hillhouse Avenue
Telephone: 203-432-6246
Fax: 203-432-6250

NOV 18 1998

16 November 1998

Dear Henry,

You and your mother were in the thoughts of all of us at the Boulders in New Preston this past weekend. I lost my mother, also in her 90's, just one year ago, and I know that no matter how long and wonderful a life she had, it's tough to go through.

Loyally,

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

October 16, 1998

Dear Mr. Hoeppner:

Dr. Kissinger was happy to sign the enclosed copy of
Mr. Valeriani's book, *Travels with Henry*, for you.

I hope you enjoy it.

Mr. Chuck Hoeppner
6385 Indian Head Highway
Indian Head, MD 20640

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919

17 Hendrickson.pp* 3/25/98 3:55 PM Page 1

# All the President's Acumen

## The Paradox of Nixon's Foreign Policy

David C. Hendrickson

*A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Presidency.* BY WILLIAM BUNDY. New York: Hill and Wang, 1998, 672 pp. $35.00.

Uniquely among postwar presidents, Richard M. Nixon continues to be the object of hard and unforgiving feelings among historians of American foreign policy. Though all presidents have at times been treated harshly, none evokes the special animus reserved for Nixon. Scholars who regard the American involvement in Vietnam as a blunder of monumental proportions—and there are few writing today who do not—frequently treat the president who escalated the war, Lyndon B. Johnson, with real empathy, the scorn once reserved for LBJ having been displaced by a sense of the tragic compulsion that led a man with essentially decent political instincts to doom. The president who extracted the United States from that war, by contrast, is still hated. Since Nixon was a great hater himself, as he ruefully acknowledged in his touching farewell speech, there is perhaps a measure of cosmic jus-

tice in this state of affairs—with Divine Providence ensuring strict reciprocity in this as in all other matters. Whatever the reason, or reasons, the fact remains. Nixon is judged harshly; even his successes are often seen as proceeding from an essentially rotten heart.

William Bundy's exacting, intelligent, and formidable history of Nixon's record in foreign policy demonstrates that the hard judgments about the former president are by no means confined to the radical critics who drove first him to distraction and ultimately to ruin. The author is no radical, but a pillar of the liberal foreign policy establishment. In the 1950s he joined the CIA, then served in the 1960s at the assistant secretary level in the Departments of Defense (for international security affairs) and State (for East Asian and Pacific affairs). He was editor of *Foreign Affairs* from 1972 to 1984. He is broadly sympathetic to the essential features of post-World War II American foreign policy and even to many central features of Nixon's foreign policy. At the same time, he has written a biting and often savage indictment of Nixon and his

DAVID C. HENDRICKSON is Professor of Political Science at Colorado College.

[1]

17 Hendrickson.pp* 3/25/98 3:20 PM Page 2

David C. Hendrickson

national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger. Under Bundy's microscopic examination, scarcely any feature of that record emerges unscathed. Time has not withered, nor custom staled, what is clearly a considerable animosity toward both men.

Bundy, it is true, treats with much generosity the Kissinger of the dark years of 1973-74, after he had become secretary of state, when the political mood was one of the utmost bitterness and serious crises pressed on all fronts. He praises Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy after the 1973 Yom Kippur War as masterful, echoing his complimentary treatment of the handling of the Jordanian crisis in 1970. He also clearly admires Kissinger's rear-guard action against the hard-liners, centered on Senator Henry Jackson (D-Wash.), who were indicting Kissinger for appeasement on arms control and the emigration of Soviet Jews. But what praise there is for the overall record is meted out sparingly, appearing as little oases of commendation amid a desert of condemnation. Bundy's larger judgment emphasizes that Nixon and Kissinger continually deceived the American public and Congress; out of these deceptions flowed the major mistakes in policy (the "tangled web") in which they were subsequently entrapped. Watergate, though emblematic of Nixon's deceit, was not the primary cause of the collapse of the administration's policy from 1973 to 1975. The real reason was that its vaunted "structure of peace" had been "oversold, timed and framed too much for domestic political effect." The administration is alleged, in effect, to have kept three sets of figures: one to mislead the public, another to mislead the Congress, and the

third to mislead itself.

THE INDICTMENT

Among the many allegations brought against the administration are that Nixon "personally organized in 1968 a covert operation to persuade Nguyen Van Thieu to defer joining in the peace talks—the very act that may have tipped the [1968 U.S.] election result in Nixon's favor"; that Nixon never challenged Thieu's choice of commanders in South Vietnam, which might have made a real difference, because of the debt so incurred; that the Cambodian incursion of 1970 was counterproductive to the larger policy of Vietnamization and disastrous for Cambodia, part of a series of missteps that place the responsibility for the mass killing that befell that country after the 1975 Khmer Rouge victory squarely on Nixon and his advisers; and that in the period leading up to the Paris peace accords of January 1973 the administration treated the North Vietnamese with bad faith and brutality and the South Vietnamese with contemptuous disregard, while deceiving the American public with Nixon's secret and unconstitutional pledge to Thieu to resume bombing in the event of a major North Vietnamese violation of the peace accords.

The traits that distinguished the administration's approach to Indochina, Bundy argues, were also on display in its policies toward Chile, Iran, and the Asian subcontinent. Though Bundy absolves the administration of direct responsibility for the coup against Salvador Allende in 1973, he castigates the covert and violent measures against the Chilean regime approved in 1970, casts strong doubt on Kissinger's assertion that they

[2]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS · Volume 77 No. 3

17 Hendrickson.pp* 3/25/98 3:20 PM Page 3

All the President's Acumen

were countermanded, and insists that
even in 1973 the administration might be
fairly indicted for indirect responsibility
because it so clearly welcomed the action
by the Chilean military. Policy toward
Iran, which in effect gave the shah carte
blanche for military purchases from the
U.S. arsenal, prepared the ground for the
harsh anti-Americanism of the Iranian
Revolution, while the dispatch of a car-
rier task force to the Indian Ocean in
1971, in the midst of the war between
India and Pakistan, probably played a key
role in India's decision to acquire nuclear
weapons. Throughout that crisis, Bundy
concludes, Nixon and Kissinger "lurched
to highly doubtful conclusions on the
basis of fragmentary evidence, little un-
derstood the decisive regional elements,
and misjudged the conduct of both the
Soviet Union and China at key junc-
tures," leading to a policy "replete with
error, misjudgment, emotionalism, and
unnecessary risk taking."

Whereas policy in all these areas had
grave consequences, the administration's
policy toward the Soviet Union was often
simply inept. In the Strategic Arms Lim-
itation Talks (SALT), Bundy holds,
Kissinger was continually sloppy. His
blunders included a cynical political ma-
never that feigned a willingness to ne-
gotiate limits on multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) tech-
nology, an unwillingness to explore with
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin the bases
of a mutual framework for controlling
nuclear arms, and an unaccountable fail-
ure to link offensive and defensive limita-
tions until early February 1971. Détente,
Bundy believes, was for Nixon little more
than a ploy intended to secure his reelec-
tion in 1972, but a policy for which the

administration nevertheless had expecta-
tions that were doomed to be disap-
pointed (for neither Russia nor China
provided any real help in extracting the
United States from Vietnam).

The real success of détente was the
European version, emphasizing human
rights, rather than the American, cen-
tered on geopolitics. Indeed, the Nixon
administration never grasped the impor-
tance of Willy Brandt's policy, often bit-
terly criticized it, and misunderstood the
part played in Soviet policy by concern
about the future of Germany (even
though, Bundy notes with a gasp of dis-
belief, Kissinger absurdly took credit for
the achievements of the European dé-
tente in his eulogy of Nixon).

The opening to China was brilliant
theater, and Bundy even allows that the
understanding that Kissinger reached
with Zhou Enlai over Japan, reflecting
Chinese acceptance of the U.S.-Japan al-
liance, was of great importance. But it
was a big blunder to have informed Japan
at the last moment, profoundly embar-
rassing its government and destroying
the trust that had been built up for a gen-
eration. Given the sheer inevitability of
such a normalization, as well as the lim-
ited benefits obtained thereby, the open-
ing was not quite the virtuoso perfor-
mance alleged by the administration's
defenders; besides, Kissinger found the
answer to all the really difficult problems,
like Taiwan, in State Department mem-
oranda of the 1950s.

The heroes of this book are the un-
sung bureaucrats who were continually
slighted and cut out of the policy process
by the White House but who, Bundy ar-
gues, often gave more prescient assess-
ments and better policy advice. Thus

FOREIGN AFFAIRS · May/June 1998

[3]

17 Hendrickson.pp* 3/25/98 3:20 PM Page 4

David C. Hendrickson

Marshall Green, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, expertly forecast the folly of invading Cambodia—and was punished for being right. Gerald Smith, chief SALT negotiator, was cut out of the action before and during the final stages of the negotiation over offensive nuclear forces, with predictably negative results. The State Department's Berlin experts were not the “sterile theologians” of Kissinger's description but professionals with a far better grasp of the European situation than either Nixon or Kissinger. Bundy also lavishes high praise on the economic diplomacy of the administration, particularly the patient method of consultation with Congress and allied governments employed by George Shultz after he became secretary of the treasury in 1972, pointedly contrasting it with the deceptive end runs made by Kissinger.

## A PHILOSOPHICAL DEEPENING

The power of this indictment, and the skill with which Bundy marshals his evidence, cannot be gainsaid. It is nevertheless flawed. For all the emphasis on Nixon and Kissinger's deceit, there is much that this book leaves hidden: the polished foreign policy reports prepared under Kissinger's direction hardly merit a mention, much less a fair exposition. Yet the words of the administration were important. Nixon and Kissinger introduced to the dialogue over the nation's foreign policy a new sophistication that did represent what Kissinger called a philosophical deepening. Their outlook accepted much of the previous liberal critique of universalism, yet cast the new approach in the classic idiom of European statecraft. America, they contended, could

neither withdraw from nor dominate the world; instead, it would have to accept its necessary role as a stabilizing factor in the maintenance of a balance of power, without which there could be neither peace nor justice. The Nixon administration's policy, it might be argued, often sounded better than it was, but a careful historian should recall the words and give them their due.

Bundy's desire to cast the two men into perdition leads him frequently to overstatement. It is misleading, for example, to leave the impression that the Nixon administration was positively hostile to Brandt's Ostpolitik. Giving vent to suspicions in private is not the same thing as opposing in public. Privately, both men did indeed worry that Germany would get too far ahead of its allies and be tempted to cut a separate deal with the Soviet Union. Their considered policy, nevertheless, was not to derail but to guide Ostpolitik by embedding it "in a wider framework than German nationalism," as Kissinger noted in his memoirs.

Nor is it fair to chide the administration for failing to move "out of the mold of the Cold War." Such an enterprise, like the tango, is best not undertaken unilaterally. When the American presidency suddenly weakened in 1973 and 1974, the Soviet Union proved a most coy and unwilling partner (as was seen in its continuing military buildup and its growing adventurism in Africa and the Middle East). Bundy is right to stress that Europe's mid-1970s détente with the Soviet Union represented an important structural change, for contact with the free societies of the West did in the end introduce a fatal contagion into the communist system. But that détente, culmi-

[4]

17 Hendrickson.pp* 3/25/98 3:20 PM Page 5

All the President's Acumen

nating in the 1975 Helsinki accords, was
largely brought about in conjunction
with rather than in opposition to the
United States and would not have been
as successful as it was without the corre-
sponding U.S. insistence that a balance
of military power was also indispensable.

Bundy's account of Kissinger's oversights, failures, and sloppiness in negotiations over nuclear weapons is also tendentious. As Kissinger himself has conceded, the methods employed in the Nixon administration—the “weird” administrative style of the White House, the studied isolation of the foreign affairs bureaucracy—are not “desirable in the abstract; certainly, they should not be regularly pursued.” Bundy does show that certain mistakes followed directly from that style, but he does not show that those mistakes were really all that consequential. The Nixon administration's policy must stand or fall on the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty, whose lasting significance was the acceptance of mutual vulnerability, yet Bundy says little about the importance of that agreement. Conceding, as he does, that it would have been almost impossible for any administration to stop the momentum toward MIRVs and precision guidance in the late 1960s or early 1970s, which so complicated arms control efforts over the next two decades, the indictment of Kissinger must center on certain marginal features of the numbers game related to strategic nuclear weapons. Later in the book, Bundy all but acknowledges that the numbers game was essentially meaningless.

The grand design that Nixon and
Kissinger put forth in the first term—
symbolized by “triangular diplomacy”

and “the new structure of peace”—had
more coherence and integrity than
Bundy is willing to allow. Their moves to
open an era of negotiation with both
communist powers and to de-emphasize
the ideological warfare of the preceding
generation gave American diplomacy
considerable flexibility and resilience,
constituting valuable warnings against
the overreaching of the previous epoch
and important insurance against the
prospect of the unilateral abdication that
then beckoned.

Linkage, it is true, introduced through
the back door the fixation on ideological
considerations that had been banished at
the front, and Bundy's criticism of the
Chilean episode—a discreditable in-
stance of this strange displacement—is
just. Still, the overall framework then es-
tablished was a sound one, which is why
American diplomacy kept returning to it
over the next 20 years. The strategy of
offering to the Soviet Union both in-
ducements and restraints did not consti-
tute a miracle cure for superpower com-
petition (what could?), but it still seems
in retrospect a more sensible formula
than that offered by the Congress of that
era. That formula, increasingly, seemed
reducible to denying the administration
both carrots and sticks in its approach to
the communist world, yielding a diplo-
macy that was not made for peace and a
military posture that was not prepared
for war.

"Peace with honor" also, of course,
ended ignominiously, and doubtless the
Nixon administration must take much of
the blame. But blame also falls on Con-
gress, which irresponsibly cut the South
Vietnamese off from the supplies of am-
munition and fuel that were desperately

[5]

17 Hendrickson.pp* 3/25/98 3:20 PM Page 6

David C. Hendrickson

needed in 1974 and 1975. The assessment of responsibility in Cambodia is also, I think, much more difficult than Bundy allows. The alternative scenario that he suggests might have unfolded had the United States respected the Cambodian sanctuary (a North Vietnamese rather than Khmer Rouge takeover of Cambodia) seems quite implausible. Even if right, isn't it a classic case of wisdom after the event? Many critics of the Cambodian incursion in 1970 stressed the illegality of the measure; those whom Bundy cites approvingly (like Green) stressed that it would prove counterproductive to the larger policy of Vietnamization. None predicted that it (or later missteps) would give rise to a chain of consequences that would end with a genocidal regime in power in Phnom Penh in 1975. Americans should certainly reflect deeply and sorrowfully on the nature of the responsibility their country bears for that catastrophe, even if the consequences were unintended and the responsibility was partial. Still, those who advised that we should wash our hands of the entire business and let events take their course are really in no position to hurl down thunderbolts at those who counseled resistance to a communist takeover.

"The test of a first-rate intelligence," in F. Scott Fitzgerald's oft-quoted words, "is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and still retain the ability to function." Certainly such an ability is useful in coming to terms with Nixon and Kissinger. They are truly a study in contradiction. Not for nothing has "Nixonian" passed into the language as an adjective designating low methods and deceptive tactics. There is impressive evidence that Kissinger, too,

acted in ways that well earned the distrust and enmity of former colleagues and associates. But the dark side is not the whole truth about either man. Nixon may have been, as Bundy alleges, a "true believer,' fervent, intolerant, sure of his own positions," but he could also be a very shrewd observer of the political world. Kissinger, as *The Haldeman Daries* made clear, may have acted in an extraordinarily petty fashion on some occasions, but he also displayed elements of true greatness as a statesman. It is a strange irony indeed that Kissinger, who may be found on occasion both well below and well above the mean of virtuous conduct—alternately resembling, as it were, both the beast and the god of Aristotle's description—should be most identified with, and have given us such profound explications of, the philosophy of equilibrium in international relations.®

[6] FOREIGN AFFAIRS · *Volume 77 No. 3*

HAK:

Holbrooke's editor at Random House has asked whether your blurb can be reversed to read "Whether one agrees with him on Bosnia or not, Dick Holbrooke's book is must reading." (It had been "... must reading on Bosnia.")

Fine ✓ per HAK 4/2

ssm

Tafoed Joy 4/3

30 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA

NEW YORK, N.Y. 10112

March 27, 1998

ROOM 5600

(212) 649-5600

Dear Dick:

It was fun seeing something of you during the recent meetings, first of the American Academy of Berlin and subsequently at Trilateral. I felt that both events went off extremely well; and, of course, it was especially good fun to have been back in Berlin with many old friends, such as yourself.

I think your idea of establishing an American Academy in Berlin comparable to the one in Rome which has been so successful for so many years was excellent. The timing right after the removal of the Wall and the departure of American troops from Berlin could not have been more appropriate.

Understandably, your financial requirements for a project of this size and importance are substantial; and I am delighted that you have already been successful in raising roughly half of the funds you need for its launching. Unfortunately, very heavy commitments I have made to a number of organizations with which I have had a very long association, such as the Rockefeller University, the Museum of Modern Art and Harvard's Latin American Center, make it impossible for me to contribute significantly to the Academy.

Nevertheless, as an indication of my admiration for you and in recognition of the fine contribution I believe the Academy will make to German-American relations, I am happy to send to the Academy my check for $10,000. It carries with it my best wishes for your ongoing success.

With best regards,

The Honorable Richard C. Holbrooke
Vice Chairman
Credit Suisse/First Boston
11 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10010-3629

ID:+493031107418

Henry Kissinger

I held a speech in a room that had a big dome like this and one result was that nobody at one end of the room could hear what was said at the other. That was a dinner for the French Foreign Minister in Washington and the next day the Washington Post said it was a fascinating dinner; Henry Kissinger declared war on France and the French Foreign Minister thanked him for his brilliant thoughtful speech and nobody could hear what the other one was saying. I must also point out that when I was invited to come here I was told that I should extend a few greetings and now this has been upgraded to remarks to a group that has heard all kinds of speeches today. And to another group that will hear all kinds of speeches tomorrow, so I will be merciful. And give not one of my standards assured speeches, so don't get too, too relaxed about it.

But let me first of all say the fact that there is an American Academy is due to one man, Richard Holbrook. His diplomacy is based on the principle that it is more painful to get rid of him than to do what he wants. So I would urge all the people that will be approached by him over the next weeks and months: Give him gratefully. It is too nerve-wracking to have a grown man crying at your door all the time. But it really is a tribute to his inspiration, to his dedication and my only contribution has been that I did something that, people in this room will know, I never do, I absolutely refuse to raise money for anybody. But it was more painful to get rid of Holbrook, so I have supported his efforts and also because this means personally a lot to me.

Now I may have caused a number of misconceptions. American intellectuals when they write about me create the impression that in my youth in Germany I red Bismarck by candlelight. And so they always speak of my Prussian proclivities and I cannot really explain to them, that my father refused to cross the Main river. Yesterday when I arrived, some journalists asked me what it means to me to be in my old capital seeing it so revitalized. I was a little tactless and said: My old capital was Munich. Then this evening another journalist asked me whether I feel more

ID: +493031107418

German or more American. And I, my education, my upbringing were basically in America and I feel American, but the Germany I remember best, the Germany that shaped me and the Germany that shaped my attachment to Germany is not the Germany where I was brought up, but the Germany I saw from the end of the war on. And in this room there are many friends and comrades of that particular struggle.

I was in Berlin in January 1946. At that time nobody would have believed that you could clear away the rubble in 50 years. And the idea that you could ever have a building like this in Berlin would have been considered a sign of madness. Or the idea that a unified Germany would emerge as a central factor in European and world politics would have been a dream. I have always admired the courage and moral strength it took to start again in Germany after the debacle of the war. And in those days to go from one Landkreis to the other, to communicate from one Landkreis to the other was an adventure. I am getting told now that I always thought that people of my current age were different when I was a child. I thought they were put in the world as 70 year olds and they'd remain that way and I would always repeat 20.

I have known every German chancellor and most of the political leaders of Germany since the end of the war. And I think the ties that have been built between America and the United States are due to the dedication, to the democratic spirit and to the act of faith that their efforts represented.

When I was a young professor I once called on President Truman and I asked him what it was that he had done, of which he was most proud. And he said: "Of what I'm most proud is that we totally defeated all enemies. And then we brought them back to the community of nations as equals and created a community of democratic nations." And then he said perhaps a little chauvinistically: "I'd like to think that only Americans could have done that." And actually there is something to that. That it took a people of a certain naivety to believe that this was possible. But it couldn't have worked if, as I said this afternoon in introducing Chancellor

14-APR-98 16:17 FROM: USIS BERLIN

ID: +493031107418

Kohl, if the Germany of the forties had not had the faith to prefer division to an uncertain return to national politics. And the decision of the German leaders to say that they would rather be divided with the West than to enter again the complex national policy of a country with more borders than any other, more neighbors than any other. Without that it could not have happened.

So we have worked together now for over 50 years and what resulted from this was an Atlantic Community, it wasn't done by Germany alone, but Germany was the absolutely indispensable element in the European side of that construction. We created an Atlantic structure and then a European Community and now we live in a totally new world for both of us. For America foreign policy has usually been dealing with an overwhelming danger that could be described as absolutely evil. That doesn't exist. Our foreign policy has been to solve a problem and then to present it to a public that this problem is gone, now we go to another problem. For Germany in the post-war period that provided a nice framework. But now we don't have a clear cut enemy. Nor an ideological identifiable overwhelming challenge. Now we have to create structures and systems over an indefinite period of time. In which - when Germany does it as a united country - It has the high potential or some potential of raising old fears. So that now we have the need to create a new sense of the Atlantic Community - and to give the existing structures a new content. When our troops withdrew from Berlin, Berlin had been the symbol of standing up to the danger, Berlin in the 1960's really broke everybody's heart when the wall was built. So now the question was, can Berlin still fulfill this unifying role? And it was, I must say, Richard Holbrook's idea, which a few of us supported, to say: Let us put something of the deposed cold-war period here that organically ties our two countries together. And that was really this spirit that we try to represent. But it's only a symbol, an important symbol but still a symbol. What is really crucial is that our two countries and that Europe and America together remember that in the nature of the emergence of a new international system a whole host of problems keep arising. Modern politics and modern media and maybe modern education drive one to deal with them on a daily basis. And so to deal with the urgent and not often to get to the important. So in addition to what

6

1-APR-98 18:18 FROM: USIS BERLIN

ID:+493031107418

the American Academy does, what our two countries and beyond our two countries what Europe and America must do, is to identify the long-range problems and to see what our ultimate focus is.

So in this sense when people ask me what does Germany mean to me, it isn't that I was born here. That I was born here enables me to speak the language which Berlin has (what I even deny) given my franconian accent. But to speak the German language has enabled me to communicate. What ties me is what Germany has done for democracy, for freedom, for the Western community since the war in partnership with us and that is what we should not only preserve but do extend. To this the American Academy has tried to make a contribution. Thank you very much.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

June 19, 1998

Dear Dick:

I am delighted by the news of your appoint-
ment. I know of no one who could do a
better job in this enormously challenging
position, and I am proud of you. You have
my warmest congratulations and support.

I'd also like you to know how much I
appreciate your nice inscription in your
book. I was very touched by it.

The Honorable
Richard C. Holbrooke
Credit Suisse First Boston
11 Madison Avenue - 22nd floor
New York, NY 10010

FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1998

The Boston Globe

SEP 24 1998

# Why RFK shunned the inquiry into his brother's assassination
## Getting closer to the truth about the death of JFK

MAX HOLLAND

For the federal government, and all Americans, it has been a long, torturous road from the 6th floor of 411 Elm St. in Dallas to the second floor of 600 E St. in Washington. But now these two red brick buildings are irrevocably connected in history as the federal government writes the last chapter of its part in the tragedy which, 35 years ago, struck dumb an entire nation.

Four-eleven Elm Street is more commonly known by the name of its former tenant, the Texas School Book Depository Company. The nondescript building at 600 E St. has no such claim on the national consciousness, though over time the work of one tenant there will do as much or more to shape history – if reason ever prevails over our paranoia with respect to the assassination of President Kennedy.

For the past four years, five presidential appointees have labored almost anonymously, yet tirelessly, in Suite 208 to make public every significant artifact and document related to Nov. 22, 1963, and its aftermath. Within a matter of days the Assassination Records Review Board, as the appointees are collectively known, will publish its final report and shut down for good on Sept. 30.

Unlike every previous federal effort, however, the review board will not assert a single conclusion, in keeping with its mandate. It will report only what it managed to find. It's up to others to make sense out of the four-million-page collection, assembled at the cost of $8 million to the taxpayers.

While there are 10,000 stories in those documents, including many peripheral to the assassination, it is not premature to ask how, if at all, they affect our understanding of the emotional and political Grand Canyon that opened beneath our gaze in 1963.

Many of the documents have lain open for months already. Whether by accident or design, the review board has shed new light on the genuine Rosetta stone to that weekend in Dallas, namely, the response of Robert F. Kennedy to his brother's murder.

The version heretofore propagated was congenial to the Camelot meta-

phor, though independent of it. Roughly described, the preferred account has been that Robert Kennedy, attorney general at the time, was so profoundly devastated by the loss that he paid little heed to who was responsible for the assassination. "Jack's gone and nothing is going to bring him back" was RFK's refrain whenever he was intermittently pressed on his apparent uninterest in the Warren Commission's investigation.

The truth turns out to be considerably more complicated and interesting. Through the review board's efforts, you can piece together as never before the genuine, underlying reason for Robert Kennedy's uncharacteristic response. His pain was compounded by guilt. Because what occurred in Dallas was roughly what Robert Kennedy hoped and planned to have happen in Havana.

While a dozen documents retrieved and declassified help to build this case, the single most striking is an Oval Office memorandum of conversation dated Jan. 4, 1975, almost 12 years after Dallas. There are only three men in the room that Saturday morning as the discussion begins: Gerald Ford, president for a mere five months; Henry Kissinger, who held unprecedented power as Ford's secretary of state and national security adviser, and Brent Scowcroft, the note-taker (and later a national security adviser in his own right). The urgent, 9:40 a.m. meeting was called because the season of inquiry spawned by Watergate had not exhausted itself. But now the target was not a president but the sacrosanct Central Intelligence Agency, which was hanging in the fire after press reports of "massive" wrongdoing.

Kissinger is conveying to Ford the gist of his just-concluded breakfast conversation with former CIA Director Richard Helms, who had been summoned from Tehran to brief the White House about the alleged misdeeds. "What is happening," Kissinger

RANDY MACK BISHOP ILLUSTRATION

Beer

singer tells the president, "is worse than in the days of McCarthy. You will end up with a CIA that does only reporting, and not operations.

"Helms said all these stories are just the tip of the iceberg. If they come out, blood will flow. For example, Robert Kennedy personally managed the operation on the assassination of Castro."

The suggestion has already been made (this memo was opened in July) that the document does not really mean what it states in plain English, that it must be carefully put into context. Yet it is precisely the context that makes this document dispositive. Unless the White House could devise a mechanism, the CIA's days as an instrument of presidential power were numbered. But the president had to have all the facts to act effectively. It is inconceivable that Richard Helms told Henry Kissinger anything less than the full, hard truths as Helms knew them and as Kissinger needed to know them. As Allen Dulles once explained the need-to-know principle, "I would tell the president of the United States anything ... I am under his control. He is my boss."

This truth about Robert Kennedy's bottomless melancholy, which never fully lifted during the reminder of his life, has at least three implications. For one, it helps explain his uninterest in the Warren Commission. Months before that federal panel presented its conclusion - indeed, probably no later than Christmas 1963 - he had reached the unavoidable conclusion, relying on his own crack investigators: Oswald, though enamored of Castro, had acted alone and Jack Ruby was a self-appointed vigilante. None of RFK's bete noires - not Castro, Jimmy Hoffa or the Cosa Nostra - had anything to do with the Dallas murders. Consequently the Warren Commission was not going to tell him anything he did not already know.

Indeed, in some respects the

Warren Commission's investigation represented a threat, first to the Kennedy administration's image and then to RFK's own political viability. That is the only conceivable reason why Kennedy, when specifically asked by Earl Warren, did not share his knowledge of anti-Castro plotting with the Warren Commission. One is left with the bleak, sobering fact that Robert Kennedy and other high-ranking officials, no less than the CIA, realized that the national interest (as apart from the truth) would not be served by having the Warren Commission delve into and probably expose the plotting.

Rock-solid intelligence proved Castro had nothing to do with Oswald. Therefore, whatever the US government was trying to do was irrelevant to the issue of Oswald's culpability. The same need-to-know principle that compelled full disclosure in 1975 dictated in 1964 that the chief justice and Warren Commission staff be kept in the dark insofar as possible. And so they were.

Robert Kennedy's anguish and predicament turns out to be the metaphor for understanding the aftermath of the assassination. The entire, vast apparatus of the federal government had been put in motion to find out who had murdered a president. But once the facts pointed overwhelmingly in one and only one direction, the truth was portioned out to protect individuals and bureaucracies.

It's not the civic portrait (a government of laws, not men) depicted by high school textbooks. But it is the legacy left behind by the Assassination Records Review Board, and it ought to shift the entire axis of public understanding. Will Americans ever come to terms with this portrait of imperfection, and understand that for all the omissions, their government did not fail in its one supreme duty - which was to tell the people who had killed their president.

Max Holland, a research fellow with the Miller Center for Public Affairs at the University of Virginia, is completing a history of the Warren Commission for Houghton Mifflin.

President
Admiral J. L. Holloway III

Directors

The Honorable William L. Ball III
Vice Admiral Robert F. Dunn
Rear Admiral John D. H. Kane, Jr.
Ambassador J. William Middendorf II
Admiral William N. Small
Rear Admiral Elliott B. Strauss, Chairman
Mrs. J. S. Taylor

NAVAL HISTORICAL FOUNDATION

Building 57
Washington Navy Yard
901 M Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20374-0571
(202) 433-2005
Fax (202) 889-3565

Executive Director
Captain Kenneth L. Coskey

Vice Presidents

Captain Edward L. Beach
Captain Victor Delano, Treasurer
Vice Admiral J. H. Doyle, Jr.
Rear Admiral Frederick G. Fellows
Vice Admiral Charles H. Griffiths, Secretary
Vice Admiral William P. Lawrence
Vice Admiral William H. Rowden

0 3 OCT 1997

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Twenty-Sixth Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have recently been working with the Office of Naval History in recording my oral history and this experience has brought home to me how much my career as a senior naval officer was involved with the execution of the strategic policies and military decisions made by you as Secretary of State and National Security Advisor to the President: as commanding officer of the carrier ENTERPRISE in 1967-68, Commander Striking Force Sixth Fleet in 1976, Commander Seventh Fleet in 1971-73 and as VCNO and CNO from 1973 to 1978. You may recall that I was Acting Chairman of the JCS, in General George Browns absence, during the Mayaguez seizure and recovery, the evacuation of Lebanon, and the Tree Chopping Incident in the DMZ in 1976 during the National Republican Convention when we went to DEFCON 2 for three days.

It has always been my view - as expressed in several of my published articles - that it was your wise and decisive leadership during those times that made your brand of "Civilian Control" the catalyst that produced the military successes we enjoyed in the Cold War.

It is with this association in mind that I ask you to endorse the enclosed photograph. In my advancing years, as I view national affairs, my principal solace is the recollection of one of the proudest events in our country's history - our victory in the Cold War. You were one of the main architects.

To: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
From: Judith Richards Hope

January 27, 1998

Page 1

Notes & Recollections of Banquet Hosted by Chairman Deng Xiaoping on November 10, 1989

Deng looks strong. Firm, dry cool hand and handshake. Good color. Clear thoughts. Clear articulation. A sense of history and of the vastness of China's role in it. Good sense of humor. Sharp mind.

It is an historic occasion in that our group of 14, half of whom are Chinese, are the last foreign visitors Deng will see except for old friends.

The round table is set with gold vermeil flatware and chopstick holders. Red silk floor length tablecloth. Gold chairs. The first course is sharks fin soup served in golden bowls.

The Foreign Minister is seated next to me; I am on his right. The luncheon for 14 with Chairman Deng occurs on the same day that the Berlin Wall begins to come down in Germany (although November 11th in Germany).

HAK: You have brought about historic reforms in your Country. I toast to continued Sino-American relations in the spirit of 1974. What is the significance of the changes? (in China, in the leadership)

DENG: I have met with Jiang already. He is a man of his own ideas and you'll get to know him. He is a real intellectual.

HAK: Will China go back or will it go forward in the spirit of your reform program?

DENG: I repeat with certainty that whoever wants to go back will collapse. Of the past decade we have ascended another stride. These achievements have not come easily.

HAK: Jiang seems to reflect the spirit of conversations I have had with the Chairman over the years. Some people in America and elsewhere argue that the June events will cause China to go backward.

DENG: It is right to strengthen the authority of the central government, but China will continue to develop opening, to develop rural areas and the economic zones, without let up.

HAK: Recalling China in 1979 as compared to 1989, it is an enormous achievement.

January 27, 1998

DENG: Nixon and HAK decided on restoring relations, when China was striving for socialism as well as capitalism. Now a basis exists for our cooperation, a socialist system with capitalist aspects. The days are gone when state-to-state relations are hindered by social systems. Between China and the U.S., we can find many common interests.

HAK: Common interests we might have for stability in the world. How can we express that?

DENG: We should propose the establishment of a new international political order, abiding by five principles of peaceful coexistence.

HAK: What is the Chairman's analysis of Soviet foreign policy at this point?

DENG: Even the Soviets themselves don't know. There is chaos in Soviet policy and it has not been completely sorted out and there has been no clear analysis. It is a contradiction: they relaxed their control suddenly over Eastern Europe, but they are intransigent over Kampuchea and Afghanistan. I also wonder whether they should completely negate their past position.

HAK: Gorbachev would like to push us out of Europe and Asia and then use his nuclear weapons to keep us in the Western Hemisphere. When Gorbachev starts with Japan he will create the same mess.

DENG: As I told Nixon, the U.S. must not gloat over the situation in Eastern Europe.

HAK: There is none, and, frankly we didn't originate it.

DENG: It is very easy for chaos to occur and it is hard to maintain tranquility in any country. Had the Chinese government not taken measures to quell the counter-revolution in Tiananmen Square, there would have been a civil war. An instability in China would cause instability in the world.

HAK: The U.S. government did not want the turmoil in China last May. They [the dissidents?] wanted to overthrow the government.

DENG: There are some people who want revolution in China. For example, listen to the VOA broadcasts into China.

January 27, 1998

HAK: When the Secretary of State and I went to the Middle East, the VOA would broadcast things undermining the negotiations. They take the view that they are independent.

DENG: Fang Lizhi takes the position that he was acting under the influence of the United States. I do not want to debate whether the United States got too deeply involved in these issues. We must avoid occurrences of similar incidents in the future.

HAK: It happened so fast that it was totally unexpected by our leading personalities. Bush's attitude is shown by the fact that he choose China as his first country to visit.

DENG: This is very clear and he first consulted with me as well.

HAK: The USSR, if it would leave its neighbors alone and retire to its 1991 borders, would be strongly supported by the United States. The US would be doing nothing to disturb them within those borders.

DENG: After WWII, a new pattern emerged on the world scene: 2 Germany's; 2 Korea's and border issues with Mongolia for China. But we will support the treaties signed in the past. Otherwise, there is turmoil in the world. Now that we have 1.5 million [miles?] of territory we will respect those treaties. Except for Taiwan, which must be returned to the motherland. There are two islands off Vietnam that we are entitled to and this must also be achieved.

HAK: In Taiwan we have a number of agreements between us so that the principle is settled.

DENG: When visiting the United States at the time of normalization, your Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act ~ so it seems this dispute has been going on endlessly. One of the norms for the new international order is no interference in each other's practical affairs and no commenting on the social system of any country. No country should take any action or recklessly talk about a social system. At the London Conference, 10 principles were developed, but they are not as good as the five principals I mentioned. Please do me a favor by bringing this idea back to the United States to RAND for their consideration [that is, the five principals, jointly initiated by Zhou Enlai and the Indian Prime Minister].

HAK: Afghanistan?

DENG: It is up to the one who tied the knot to untie it. The Soviet Union must take steps in both

January 27, 1998

Afghanistan and Kampuchea.

HAK: Cambodia?

DENG: Vietnam can stop assistance to Kampuchea.

HAK: I saw Prince Sihanouk yesterday. He talked for 45 minutes without interruption. He was very friendly to us and has great confidence in China.

DENG: On the question of Kampuchea, it can be solved easier than Afghanistan because there is a leader there acceptable to all [Norodom Sihanouk] China supports the government headed by Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

HAK: If so, would the Khamer Rouge stop fighting?

DENG: We will stop our assistance to the Khamer Rouge if they started fighting again.

HAK: I see no other solution though I dislike the Khamer Rouge. But you are not asking me to like them.

DENG: We have to distinguish between right and wrong and internal affairs and aggression. Because aggression is much more serious than “mistakes made by a country in its internal affairs.” The USSR has taken no concrete action on either Afghanistan or Kampuchea.

HAK: They have an unbroken record of never keeping an international promise. When they promise to withdraw, then we know for sure they are staying.

DENG: In war the Vietnamese turned against us. No such move can earn our respect.

HAK: Three weeks after the war ended, I visited Hanoi and saw a museum entirely directed against China. And I know what sacrifices you have made to support Vietnam.

[The meal ended, as usual, abruptly. There was discussion that this is probably the last event where Deng will be seen in public and certainly the last time he will have an official lunch or dinner for visiting dignitaries.]

From: Judith Richards Hope

January 27, 1998

Page 5

The lunch included sharks fin soup in golden bowls, sizzling beef, and bananas, melon and vanilla ice cream for dessert.]

ROBERT D. HORMATS

85 BROAD STREET
NEWYORK, NY 10004

June 1, 1998

JUN 0 3 1998

Dear Nancy and Henry,

Thanks so much for including me in a very lovely evening. Birthday parties are wonderful milestone events in one's life. You both have so many great friends who care so much about you and are so fiercely loyal to you. I count myself honored to be among them.

I am especially indebted to you, Henry. You have done so much to help me in my career. I shall always be grateful for that and for your friendship.

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

December 28, 1998

Dear Mr. Hormats:

Dr. Kissinger was happy to sign the enclosed copy of
*Diplomacy* for Liqun Jin.

I hope Mr. Liqun enjoys it.

Mr. Robert Hormats
Vice Chairman
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
85 Broad Street
New York, NY 10004

PRIME MINISTER
CANBERRA

21 DEC 1997

Dr Henry Kissinger
Adviser to the Board of Directors, American Express
26th floor
350 Park Avenue
New York NEW YORK
UNITED STATES 10022

JAN 20 1998

Dear Dr Kissinger

Thank you for your letter of 9 December 1997 raising your concerns about an
advertising campaign being conducted in Australia by Visa International. I
appreciate you bringing this matter to my attention and for providing me with
your views.

A senior adviser in my office has met, and keeps in contact with,
representatives of American Express to hear at first hand the concerns of the
corporation.

At this early stage, I can confirm that the Australian Tourist Commission,
which is a statutory authority charged with promoting Australia as a tourist
destination, has entered into an agreement with Visa International. In this
agreement, the Commission acknowledges that Visa may use the slogans
"Australia prefers Visa" and "Preferred card of Australia". The agreement is
explicit in noting that the Commission does not have the authority to grant or
endorse these claims and that responsibility for proving these commercial
claims rests with Visa.

The claims have been made by Visa on the basis of Visa's very substantial
share of the Australian market. Like any other instance of commercial free
speech in Australia, these claims can be contested under Australian law by any
party if there are grounds to believe that they are "false or misleading"
representations.

The agreement between the Australian Tourist Commission and Visa prohibits
any representation that Visa is the preferred card of the Commission or that the
Commission prefers Visa. Nevertheless, as there may be a perception of
government endorsement, I have sought advice on this matter.

The Commonwealth was pleased with the decision of American Express to locate its regional headquarters in Australia and provided some assistance towards the relocation. The Commonwealth looks forward to American Express having a major continuing presence in Australia.

I intend to write in due course to Mr Harvey Golub, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of American Express, to provide further information.

Thank you again for the benefit of your views on this matter.