May 25, 1962

M. le General P.-M. Gallois
8, rue Rembrandt
Paris VIII, France

Dear Pierre:

I have the pleasure of introducing Dr. F. G. A. Kraemer, the gentleman about whom I wrote you on May 24th.

Kind regards and many thanks for seeing
him.

182 THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON

our country. But whether at the close of such a war we should
be as free as we are now, God knows. In fine, if war takes place,
republicanism has everything to fear; if peace, be assured that
your forebodings and my alarms will prove vain, and that the
spirit of our citizens, now rising as rapidly as it was then running
crazy, and rising with a strength and majesty which show the
loveliness of freedom, will make this government in practice what
it is in principle, a model for the protection of man in a state of
freedom and order.

To Thaddeus Kosciusko, Philadelphia, February 21, 1799.

## II. PEACEABLE COERCION ¹

### 1. Justice by Negotiation

He also believed that commercial regulations could be used so
as to induce other nations, for their own advantage, to deal
justly with the United States, thus avoiding the need of aveng-
ing injuries by resort to war. A notable example of this policy
was the Embargo adopted during Jefferson's presidency. Opin-
ions are divided as to the efficacy of that experiment, some
believing that, like war itself, it was "as much a punishment
to the punisher as to the sufferer."

As to myself, I love peace, and I am anxious that we should give the world still another useful lesson by showing to them other modes of punishing injuries than by war, which is as much a punishment to the punisher as to the sufferer. I love, therefore... [the] proposition of cutting off all communications with the nation which has conducted itself so atrociously. This, you will say, may bring on war. If it does, we will meet it like men, but it may not bring on war and then the experiment will have been a happy one.

To Tench Coxe, Monticello, May 1, 1794.

War is not the best engine for us to resort to. Nature has given us one in our commerce which, if properly managed, will

THE GREAT FAMILY OF MANKIND

183

be a better instrument for obliging the interested nations of Europe to treat us with justice.

To Thomas Pinckney, Philadelphia, May 29, 1797.

The English are still our enemies. The spirit existing there and rising in America has a very lowering aspect. To what events it may give birth, I cannot foresee. We are young and can survive them, but their rotten machine must crush under the trial. The animosities of sovereigns are temporary and may be allayed, but those which seize the whole body of a people, and of a people, too, who dictate their own measures, produce calamities of long duration. I shall not wonder to see the scenes of ancient Rome and Carthage renewed in our day, and if not pursued to the same issue, it may be because the republic of modern powers will not permit the extinction of any one of its members. Peace and friendship with all mankind is our wisest policy, and I wish we may be permitted to pursue it. But the temper and folly of our enemies may not leave this in our choice.

To Charles W. F. Dumas, Paris, May 6, 1786.

Calculation has convinced me that circumstances may arise, and probably will arise, wherein all the resources of taxation will be necessary for the safety of the State. For though I am decidedly of opinion we should take no part in European quarrels but cultivate peace and commerce with all, yet who can avoid seeing the source of war in the tyranny of those nations who deprive us of the natural right of trading with our neighbors? The produce of the United States will soon exceed the European demand; what is to be done with the surplus, when there shall be one? It will be employed, without question, to open by force a market for itself with those placed on the same continent with us, and who wish nothing better. Other causes, too, are obvious, which may involve us in war, and war requires every resource of taxation and credit. The power of making war often prevents it and in our case would give efficacy to our desire of peace. If the new government wears the front which I hope it will, I see no impossibility in the availing ourselves of the wars of others to

184 THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON

open the other parts of America to our commerce as the price of
our neutrality.

To George Washington, Paris, December 4, 1788.

Never was so much false arithmetic employed on any subject
as that which has been employed to persuade nations that it is
their interest to go to war. Were the money which it has cost
to gain at the close of a long war a little town, or a little territory,
the right to cut wood here or to catch fish there, expended in
improving what they already possess, in making roads, opening
rivers, building ports, improving the arts, and finding employment
for their idle poor, it would render them much stronger, much
wealthier and happier. This I hope will be our wisdom. And,
perhaps, to remove as much as possible the occasions of making
war, it might be better for us to abandon the ocean altogether,
that being the element whereon we shall be principally exposed
to jostle with other nations; to leave to others to bring what we
shall want and to carry what we can spare. This would make us
invulnerable to Europe by offering none of our property to their
prize and would turn all our citizens to the cultivation of the
earth, and, I repeat it again, cultivators of the earth are the most
virtuous and independent citizens. It might be time enough to
seek employment for them at sea when the land no longer offers
it. But the actual habits of our countrymen attach them to com-
merce. They will exercise it for themselves. Wars then must
sometimes be our lot, and all the wise can do will be to avoid
that half of them which would be produced by our own follies
and our own acts of injustice, and to make for the other half the
best preparations we can.

Notes on Virginia, Query XXII.

Our people are decided in the opinion that it is necessary for
us to take a share in the occupation of the ocean, and their estab-
lished habits induce them to require that the sea be kept open
to them, and that that line of policy be pursued which will render
the use of that element to them as great as possible. I think it a
duty in those entrusted with the administration of their affairs

THE GREAT FAMILY OF MANKIND

185

to conform themselves to the decided choice of their constituents,
and that, therefore, we should, in every instance, preserve an
equality of right to them in the transportation of commodities,
in the right of fishing, and in the other uses of the sea.

But what will be the consequence? Frequent wars without a
doubt... The justest dispositions possible in ourselves will not
secure us against it. It would be necessary that all other nations
were just also. Justice, indeed, on our part will save us from
those wars which would have been produced by a contrary dis-
position. But how can we prevent those produced by the wrongs
of other nations? By putting ourselves in a condition to punish
them. Weakness provokes insult and injury, while a condition
to punish often prevents them. This reasoning leads to the neces-
sity of some naval force, that being the only weapon by which
we can reach an enemy. I think it to our interest to punish the
first insult, because an insult unpunished is the parent of many
others.

To John Jay, Paris, August 23, 1785.

My hope of preserving peace for our country is not founded
in the Quaker principles of nonresistance under every wrong, but
in the belief that a just and friendly conduct on our part will
procure justice and friendship from others.

To the Earl of Buchan, Washington, July 10, 1803.

## 2. Justice Maintained by International Naval Force

While minister to France, Jefferson urged the establishment of
an international naval force to protect commerce from the
Mediterranean pirates, to whom the principal commercial
powers of Europe were paying tribute. The project fell
through. The United States was not willing to undertake the
burden of furnishing its share of the naval force (one frigate);
and England (according to Lafayette) preferred the continu-
ance of unsafe conditions as a deterrent to the commercial
ventures of rival nations.

186 THE POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON

There is little prospect of accommodation between the Alger-
ines and the Portuguese and Neapolitans. A very valuable
capture, too, lately made by them on the Empress of Russia, bids
fair to draw her on them. The probability is, therefore, that
these three nations will be at war with them, and the probability
is that, could we furnish a couple of frigates, a convention might
be formed with those powers, establishing a perpetual cruise on
the coast of Algiers which would bring them to reason. Such a
convention, being left open to all powers willing to come into it,
should have for its object a general peace to be guaranteed to
each by the whole. Were only two or three to begin a confederacy
of this kind, I think every power in Europe would soon fall into
it, except France, England, and perhaps Spain and Holland. Of
these, there is only England who would give any real aid to the
Algerines. Morocco, you perceive, will be at peace with us. Were
the honor and advantage of establishing such a confederacy out
of the question, yet the necessity that the United States should
have some marine force, and the happiness of this as the osten-
sible cause for beginning it, would decide on its propriety. It will
be said there is no money in the treasury. There never will be
money in the treasury till the confederacy shows its teeth. The
States must see the rod; perhaps it must be felt by some one of
them. I am persuaded all of them would rejoice to see every one
obliged to furnish its contributions. It is not the difficulty of
furnishing them which beggars the treasury, but the fear that
others will not furnish as much. Every rational citizen must wish
to see an effective instrument of coercion and should fear to see
it on any other element than the water. A naval force can never
endanger our liberties, nor occasion bloodshed; a land force would
do both. It is not in the choice of the States whether they will
pay money to cover their trade against the Algerines. If they
obtain a peace by negotiation, they must pay a great sum of
money for it; if they do nothing, they must pay a great sum of
money in the form of insurance; and, in either way, as great a
one as in the way of force and probably less effectual.

To James Monroe, Paris, August 11, 1786.

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187

### III. ONE CODE OF MORALITY FOR MEN AND NATIONS

Jefferson vigorously rejected the view that only individuals are bound by the moral code, and that nations are free to act in accordance with self-interest without any restraints.

To say, ... that gratitude is never to enter into the motives of national conduct is to revive a principle which has been buried for centuries with its kindred principles of the lawfulness of assassination, poison, perjury, etc. All of these were legitimate principles in the dark ages, which intervened between ancient and modern civilization, but exploded and held in just horror in the eighteenth century. I know but one code of morality for men, whether acting singly or collectively.² He who says I will be a rogue when I act in company with a hundred others, but an honest man when I act alone, will be believed in the former assertion but not in the latter. I would say with the poet, *hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto.*³ If the morality of one man produces a just line of conduct in him acting individually, why should not the morality of one hundred men produce a just line of conduct in them acting together? But I indulge myself in these reflections, because my own feelings run me into them; with you they were always acknowledged. Let us hope that our new government will take some other occasions to show that they mean to proscribe no virtue from the canons of their conduct with other nations.

To James Madison, Paris, August 28, 1789.

I have but one system of ethics for men and for nations—to be grateful, to be faithful to all engagements under all circumstances, to be open and generous, promoting in the long run even the interests of both, and I am sure it promotes their happiness.

To the Duchesse d'Anville, New York, April 2, 1790.

MR. BUNDY'S SPEECH IN COPENHAGEN BEFORE THE ATA

SEPTEMBER 27, 1962

Your preoccupation in this meeting, as I understand it, is with the
Common Market and its relation to NATO and the Atlantic Community. I have
listened with great interest to parts of the discussions so far, and I have had a
chance also to read other contributions. I am sure from what I have heard and
read that you have correctly selected the topic of greatest immediate
importance. The generally positive position of the United States Government
on this issue has been clear for a long time. It is equally clear that the main
present processes of negotiation are best conducted without noisy kibitzing
from official Americans. So it seems best to me, today, not to direct my
remarks to this question, as such, but rather to attempt some more general
comments on the processes by which we may hope for the growth of what
President Kennedy has called an Atlantic Partnership.

My purpose is to offer thoughts about what we may accomplish in the
future, but I ask the historian's license to state my case mainly in terms of
propositions from our past and from two parts of that past in particular. I
believe that there are very large negative lessons for us in the record of the
years between 1925 and 1940, and very large affirmative lessons in the
record of the years between 1947 and the present. We all know the gloomy
record of Atlantic diplomacy between Locarno and the Fall of France, and it
is not my aim here to recapitulate it. The greatest of our failures, of course,
was in the failure to develop common policies and purposes of sufficient
coherence to prevent -- and later to deal with -- the rise of Adolf Hitler. In
this failure there is blame enough for all of us; I do not know of a country now
in the Atlantic Alliance whose people and leaders I should wish to represent
today in a claim before history of total innocence. Each of us is able to write
and speak with particular zest perhaps, of the shortcomings of others -- but
this is hardly a profitable exercise. Let me instead suggest a series of more
general comments.

In the first place one must put the dangers of neutrality or appeasement as means of dealing with a determinedly expansionist power. This is a point which needs no laboring in this audience. But it is not always the simple points which are the least important. This one deserves continuous and straight forward repetition.

Second, and more subtly, we can think discern in the history of the
years from 1925 to 1939 an astonishing tendency to miss the real issues
through a preoccupation with rivalries that became wholly pointless when the
real themes of history were unfolded.

What do we care now for the contest between the franc and the pound
which so engrossed able and determined men on both sides? At the onset of
the 30's, what we remember now is only that this contest was a part of the
shortsighted and self-destructive approach to money which deepened the great
depression and helped Hitler to power.

What do we now remember of the revulsion against war and its
propaganda which led Americans to suppose that the Allies, not the U-Boat,
had been the real cause of our entry into the first war -- so that our contribu-
tion to the keeping of Atlantic peace in the 1930's was a series of solemn
legislative acts against commitment, -- acts of neutrality. What matters to-
day is that those acts, in the early years of Hitler's weakness, served to
give him assurance that America saw the enemy more in alliance than in
aggression.

And we forget, behind the general failures named appeasement, how
often in the 1930's it was a narrow suspicion of the wrong people that became
the immediate cause -- or excuse -- for inaction. The Italians mistrusting
the French, the French mistrusting the British, the British mistrusting the
Czechs, Italians mistrusting everyone until in a final irony he was the last to
try trusting Hitler. This detailed record of the follies of nations which tried
to act alone, carries a deeper lesson than simply the warning against
appeasement. And that lesson is that already in the 1930's no foreign nation
could serve itself well if it tried to serve itself alone. The aggressions of
Hitler and Mussolini proved it for everyone else, and their failures proved it
for their own still unhappier countries.

A third lesson from the 1930's is that governments without courage
can be expected at critical moments to take wrong decisions which they will
defend on grounds of domestic political necessity. Perhaps the sorriest of
these demonstrations is to be found in the history of the war debts from start
to finish -- but other examples are available in such numbers that the choice
is one of taste. Over and over again, when the need was urgent and the
right course clear, men in authority held back their diplomatic hands lest
they lose their political heads.

It is not for any office holder to assert that this course is always
wrong. Diplomats who ignore domestic political realities are deeply un-
professional. But it remains fair to remark of the 1930's that they record an
immensely long list of follies committed in short-sighted subservience to
supposed opinion -- and a correspondingly short list of men who preferred
retirement to timidity.

In this assertion I do not mean to leave public opinion itself exempt
from criticism. This is no place for an excursion into the endless fascinations

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of the relation between opinion and leadership; my argument does not require any assumption that the fault was all with statesmen. Opinion too was at fault - and in a variety of ways - and it may well be that in the widest of prospective later students may find that which was needed to permit avoidance of all the errors I have cited was precisely the terrible process of retribution and instruction which we call the Second World War. But we cannot afford additional instruction today.

Finally, in this set of gloomy flashbacks, let me recall what we may call the error of the empty commitment. The greatest of failures was the League and the earliest of blows to that institution was struck by the United States. But there is in addition a long and melancholy set of ties that did not bind and words that did not work: the Kellogg Briand Pact was always empty, and the French tie to Czechoslovakia broke only when it was needed, but there remains a family resemblance among them. Both represented efforts to exorcize by words a problem which could only be dealt with by will and by works. Promises - to oneself or to others - cannot prevent danger unless they mean to meet it. I hope you will feel, as I do, that it is time to move to more cheerful themes - to the set of lessons of a very different sort which may be drawn from our common experience in the years since we set about the great business of Atlantic reconstruction and reordering, since 1947. And let me urge it upon you, sweepingly that the record shows us to have made much progress in avoiding all four of the major failures I have just charged to an earlier time.

First, we have abandoned neutrality and appeasement, in the face of the Soviet threat, which in its gravity and in long range importance has required the structure of political and military commitment that we call NATO. This is not so remarkable a change for some of our nations as it is for others - but here in Copenhagen I may perhaps fittingly note how deep and significant the decision has been for countries as different - and as much alike too - as Denmark and the United States. Indeed for us Americans it is this single, simple fact of commitment to the Atlantic Alliance that is repeatedly decisive in the whole range of our relations to Europe. We are in, and in to stay.

Second, we have all of us succeeded, over and over again, in putting the larger common interest ahead of small national rivalries. One thinks here of such notable and farsighted acts as that of France in the Saar - and indeed of the wider process of reconciliation which has marked the behavior of many countries toward Germany. One thinks also - as Mr. Stikker so generously said on Tuesday - of the Marshall Plan, and in return I may say that in America we understand also what an important - and unprecedented - trust the old and proud people of Europe have shown in us by their acceptance of special American leadership in the military affairs of NATO. We believe that the tradition of Eisenhower, Gruenther, Ridgway, and Norstad has been

- 3 -

a notable one -- and we expect it to continue in distinguished fashion under General Lemnitzer. But we do recognize that it takes maturity to accept as well as to offer this kind of leadership.

But perhaps the most striking example of choosing the wide as against the narrow interest is to be found in the policy followed with such determination, for so long, by the German Federal Republic under Chancellor Adenauer. Not many years ago one could find in German politics many deeply different tendencies. There were some who hoped that answers might be found in some form of neutralism: others appeared to lean toward a renewed nationalism in which German and only German aspirations would govern policy. But in the event what has prevailed is a policy of determined devotion to freedom, determined and ever more intimate integration both in Europe and in the Atlantic Alliance, and determined reconciliation among all the Western Europeans who shared, on either side, in the catastrophe of Nazism. Never giving up the deep concern which all of us feel for all the Europeans -- Germans, Poles, Czechs, and others, whose true destiny is to rejoin us in the tradition of civility and the purpose of freedom, the Chancellor has never wavered in his knowledge that progress toward these hopes can be made on no other basis than that of unity and mutual commitment as among ourselves. This has seemed to us in America, for fifteen years, to be a wise, brave, and farsighted policy, and it has had our steady support.

Third, and still in contrast with the time before the Second War -- we have repeatedly seen since 1947, that political courage does exist -- and is not always punished -- in our affairs. I have just spoken of the special leadership shown in the Federal Republic. Other notable cases are to be found in many countries, in the processes which have led to the construction of the new institutions of Europe. Now that the Common Market is a great success, we tend to forget that brave men had to press for it against wide and varied opposition. And courage of a high and tempered variety has been shown too in the extraordinary successes of transmutation under which so many colonial holdings have been wisely set free. The diplomats and political leaders who have accepted and defended their part in these events will not be badly treated by history. Indeed their wisdom is already apparent as the new and post-colonial Europe moves forward like a swimmer who has dropped a heavy weight.

Finally, in this catalogue of happy changes we may set the fact that we now have treaties and commitments whose reality is attested in a thousand ways. Again this needs no proof to you, as friends of NATO -- so let me simply cite as an immediate example the case of the United States. We have not merely signed Article 5; we have not merely joined in mutual defense arrangements for arms and equipment of constantly more modern types; we have not merely committed our prestige and our purpose by a series of

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appointments of our leading soldiers to the NATO Command in Paris: We have emplaced in Europe weapons -- of all sorts -- in a strength which far outweighs the total explosive power employed by both sides in both wars, and we have sealed the whole by the presence in Europe -- essentially in forward development, and above all in Germany -- of four hundred thousand men. Insofar as American strength can defend it, free Europe is as safe as any state in the American Union. This American strength will remain as long as it is wanted in Europe and as long as the Alliance continues to grow on the basis of shared trust and shared effort. To think otherwise would be to mistake the 1960's for the 1930's.

There are other lessons, beyond these of direct contrast, to be drawn from our experiences of the last fifteen years. There is our new skill in creating international institutions -- squaring the circle of traditional political theory by showing that in societies which wish it so high responsibilities can be shared without destroying the Nation.

There is our success in growing a new generation of professional servants of the West -- men whose loyalty to their own countries remains undoubted, while at the same time they see the military -- or the monetary -- or the trading problems of the whole of our community as one. These new expert professionals are not always right. Political leadership is properly needful and decisive in the community as a whole, just as it is in each individual state. Still there is a special meaning to these new classes of men who work as colleagues in the professions that underpin the community -- it is and should continue to be a sort of strength to us. And I will not labor on other points, because your presence shows that you believe it: the new Atlantic Community has been extraordinarily dependent throughout its life on the support, the understanding, and the leadership of private citizens.

I have come a long way through two contrasting chapters of the past toward my few comments on the future. Fortunately most of what I want to say I have managed to say along the way and I can summarize it in one or two sentences.

We must avoid false hopes of isolation; we must rise above petty national rivalries; we must see to it that our commitments are real and strong; we must -- people and leaders alike -- have the courage of our convictions. We must go on, step by practical step, with the construction of a partnership in which the United States -- and other countries too -- will be closely bound to the emerging Europe in a series of constantly growing ways.

But in closing I would like to offer one or two more direct comments on our pending business. First, I would like to associate myself -- word for word and letter for letter -- with the extraordinarily clear and well-framed

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statement of Secretary General Stikker on the problem of Berlin. I have just come from Berlin -- I have had a chance to see for myself the overwhelming contrast between the energetic, genuinely high-spirited life of West Berlin and the inhuman ugliness of the Wall. West Berlin is bound to us all by a thousand ties of feeling, of commitment, of trade, of travel, and above all of example. We must and shall keep it as it is until the day when good sense may outweigh creed in the Soviet Union -- until the day when Soviet policy may come to reflect what all honest and well-informed Russians themselves understand: the fact that the real anomaly in that part of Europe is not the great human triumph of West Berlin but the sordid inhumanity of the Wall, and of East Berlin, and of the whole dirty failure in the Eastern Zone of Germany.

This may be a winter of renewed Soviet threats to Berlin: we in the Atlantic Community are clear and firm and ever more ready -- and we could not have a better cause. I have only one other point.

Our defenses today are clear and strong -- and we mean to keep them that way for tomorrow too. As technology develops, constant effort is necessary, and it is wrong to suppose that we can rest comfortably forever merely because our strength today is overwhelming. Moreover, the problem of defense in the nuclear age is as much psychological as military. We in the United States have tried to set forth our concept of effective nuclear defense on the strategic scale -- both in the private councils of the Alliance and in major statements like those of the President at Ottawa and the Secretary of Defense in Ann Arbor. We share the view of Mr. Stikker that the nuclear defense of our community is essentially indivisible. We believe also that the special responsibility which has fallen to us in the United States is one which we shall continue to be able to discharge; our commitment is clear, our purpose firm, our ability evident, and our forward planning firm. We believe, finally, that small separate national deterrents are not likely to be valuable and that, therefore, we should not as a matter of policy, give our support and assistance to them.

But no one should suppose from all this that we are blind either to the common military needs of NATO or to the special political and psychological forces which may most understandably press on our friends in Europe. No one should suppose that we are unwilling to share in this grim responsibility whenever the responsibility is truly shared. It would also be wrong to suppose that the reluctance which we feel with respect to individual, ineffective, and unintegrated forces would be extended automatically to a European force, genuinely unified and multilateral, and effectively integrated with our own necessarily predominant strength in the whole nuclear defense of the Alliance. Any possible arrangements for assistance and cooperation in such an enterprise would, of course, require full consultation and approval

by all appropriate agencies of our Government. Moreover, we ourselves
cannot usurp from the new Europe the responsibility for deciding in its own
way the level of effort and of investment which it wishes to make in these great
matters. Nor do we wish to press for a European answer when in our own
honest judgment the instrument of NATO itself may serve as well or better.

Here, as elsewhere, we run the risk of seeming to interfere
whether we speak or keep silent. Moreover, we would strongly endorse the
opinion others have expressed in this meeting, that these matters need time
for careful thought and study -- time which our present strength and present
forward planning permits us.

But it does seem right at least to say this: if it should turn out that a
genuinely multilateral European deterrent, integrated with ours in NATO, is
what is needed and wanted, it will not be a veto from the Administration in the
United States which stands in the way.

The North Atlantic Nations have many duties beyond those I have
discussed. In particular, I would have liked to stress with you the concern
which we feel in the United States for the further development of effective and
coordinated efforts to improve our help to -- and our trade with the less
industrialized countries. Let me simply assure you in closing that this
omission -- and others -- are not a signal of our level in interest in
Washington -- but only a frail mark of my respect for the patience with which
you have heard me speak for so long. It is now time to stop, and I will
simply repeat, in closing, the deep appreciation of the Government for which
I speak -- to your organization as a whole, to you as delegates, to your
officers -- and in particular to our Danish hosts -- for all that all of you are
doing in the cause -- the common cause -- of safety, freedom, and progress.

March 15, 1963

Dr. Fritz Kraemer
4319 Fessenden Street N.W.
Washington, D.C.

My venerated Kraemer:

I thought you might like to see a
copy of Max Ascoli's reply to Bundy.
Could you please return it, since it
is my only copy?

Many thanks and warm regards.

Hilft eine europäische Atommacht weiter?

Von Günther Gillessen

Der Bundeskanzler hat in dem Brief an Erhard behauptet, die britische Regierung wolle vor den nächsten Unterhauswahlen keine Verhandlungen mehr über einen Beitritt zur EWG führen. Das Foreign Office hat sofort erwidert, daß die britische Regierung auch vor den Wahlen an dem Beitrittswunsch festhalte, daß aber eine neue Initiative von den Sechs gemeinsam kommen müsse. Auffällig war, daß der Sprecher des Foreign Office vom Beitritt zu den europäischen Gemeinschaften, im Plural, sprach. Es geht nicht nur um Wirtschaft und Zölle. Das Ganze der auswärtigen Beziehungen ist gemeint; und in welchen Bahnen sich der Anschluß vollziehen könnte, bleibt offen.

Das festzuhalten ist um so wichtiger, als es kein Zauberwort gibt, das die ins Schloß geworfene Tür zur EWG wunderbar öffnen könnte. Gelingt es aber nicht, den Kern des Sechser-Europas den anderen europäischen Mächten zu öffnen, so ist schon jetzt zu sehen, daß dieses Sechser-Europa an Kraft verlieren und einer Lähmung anheimfallen kann, die nicht nur den Ausgesperrten, sondern auch den Einbezogenen schadet.

wenig supranationale Elemente enthält und deshalb dem gaullistischen Frankreich wie auch den Briten zumutbar erscheint. Es sind im wesentlichen zwei Organe: Ein politischer Rat, in dem die sechs EWG-Mächte, England, Irland, Dänemark und Norwegen sitzen, soll etwa zweimal jährlich tagen und die allgemeinen Fragen behandeln. Beschlüsse sollen dagegen von einem öfters zusammentretenden Exekutivausschuß gefaßt werden, der, ähnlich dem Sicherheitsrat der UN, aus ständigen Mitgliedern (Frankreich, England, Deutschland und Italien) und zwei nichtständigen Mitgliedern (die die sechs kleinen Mächte reihum aus ihrem Kreis wählen) besteht, wobei jede der vier größeren Mächte oder die beiden Vertreter der sechs kleinen zusammen ein Vetorecht haben sollten. Gladwyn weiß, daß de Gaulle seine „Force de frappe" keinesfalls einer Institution unterstellen würde, die supranational konstruiert wäre. Die beiden Organe wären vor allem zur Konsultation da, wobei zu hoffen ist, daß die gemeinsame Planung über die nukleare Abschreckung auch die allgemeinen Außenpolitischen Ansichten der europäischen Mächte harmonisieren würde. Im Nato-Rat könnten sie dann weiter mit den Amerikanern geklärt werden.

Gegen diesen Plan werden sich manche Einwände erheben, zum Beispiel, daß eine europäische Atomstreitmacht die amerikanische Abschreckung nicht wesentlich verstärken, daß der geringe militärische Nutzen mit zuviel Geld bezahlt und daß der amerikanische Kongreß sich weigern werde, das MacMahon-Gesetz (über den Schutz der Atomgeheimnisse) zugunsten Europas abzustandern. Doch richten sich diese Einwände genauso gegen Kennedys multilaterale Atommacht der Nato. In beiden Fällen kommt es aber gar nicht auf militärische Erfate an, sondern auf Mittel des politischen Ausgleichs. Dabei verspricht die europäische Form den größeren Gewinn: In der Nato macht de Gaulle bei der multilateralen Atommacht bestimmt nicht mit, in Europa aber vielleicht.

Die Verwaltung der FWG muß nicht in jedem Falle das nächste Ziel sein, vor ausgesetzt, daß die Sechs der FWG und die Sieben der Efta inzwischen alles vermerden, was die handelspolitische Kluft verbreitern könnte. Die bisherigen Fortschritte des Zusammenschlusses wurden abweichend auf verschiedenen Wegen erreicht. Es ist denkbar, daß Gespräche über die Verteidigungspolitik weiterführen können, was man mit dem Gemeinsamen Markt steckenblieb. Einen neuen Ansatzpunkt in der Verteidigungspolitik zu suchen, empfiehlt sich besonders deshalb, weil de Gaulle seinen Widerspruch gegen Englands Beitritt vonehnmlich mit Macmillans Atompolitik auf der Bahama-Konferenz begründete. Dort habe sich England allantisch verhalten und gezeigt, daß es für Europa „noch nicht reißend sei. Ob de Gaulle mit dieser Begründung sein hauptsächliches Motiv aufgedeckt hat, ist umstritten. Und ob eine atlantische Gesinnung für die Europäer etwas Falsches sei, ist es ebenso. Doch so viel ist gewiß, daß die nuklearen Abschreckungswaffen im europäischen Rahmen dem General de Gaulle so wichtig sind, daß es sich lohnt, darüber nachzudenken, ob gewisse Zugeständnisse an seine atomare Politik ihn zum Nachgeben gegenüber Englands Beitrittswunsch beweisen können. Sehr wahrscheinlich ist das nicht. Aber es ist auch nicht ausgeschlossen.

Aufmerksame Prüfung scheint uns besonders der Vorschlag zu verdienen, den Lord Gladwyn, bis vor zwei Jahren englischer Botschafter in Paris und jetzt in England einer der Vorkämpfer für den Beitritt, dieser Tage gemacht hat. An Stelle einer multilateralen Atommacht der Nato wünscht er eine europäische Atommacht, nicht als „dritte Kraft", aber doch als rein europäisches Gemeinschaftswerk in der Nato. Gladwyn ist kein Anhänger einer Politik nationaler Status-Symbole, die man häufig hinter der Forderung nach einem zweiten, einem europäischen Abschreckungszentrum vermuten könnte. Aber er sieht, daß de Gaulle von dem Gedanken an die Atommaffen beherrscht ist, und er fragt sich, wie man diesen Ehrgeiz vor den europäischen Wagen spannen kann. Gladwyns Vorschlag hat den großen Vorteil, daß er dort beginnt, wo man neu anfangen muß: bei de Gaulle.

Für die Verwaltung einer europäischen Abschreckungsmacht hat Gladwyn einen lokeren politischen Apparat entworfen, der

Mancher könnte such fragen, ob England nach der Bahama-Absperrung noch Herr seiner Entschlüsse sei. Dem ist entgegenzuhalten, daß in Nassau kein Vertrag, nicht einmal ein Abkommen geschlossen wurde. Es liegt nur ein Kommuniqué vor, ein Programm, für dessen Ausführung auf allen Seiten noch wichtige Voraussetzungen fehlen. Es ist keineswegs sicher, ob die Kritik den Plan Kennedys nicht schon erledigt hat — obwohl die Regierungen ihn noch erörtern. Wenn einige Anzeichen nicht trügen, wäre Macmillan sogar heilfroh, wenn ihm jemand aus dem Bahama-Projekt wieder heraushülfe. England könnte seine Atommaffen noch umdisponieren. Ob dies de Gaulle von Englands europäischer „Reife" überzeugen wird, läßt sich nur durch einen Versuch feststellen.

Schließlich könnte argumentiert werden, dies sei nicht die Zeit, um mit der Produktion von „Plänen" die europäische und atlantische Krise zu überwinden. Man müsse die Zeit arbeiten lassen. Doch niemand hat bisher einen brauchbaren Ausweg vorschlagen können; und nicht einmal in der Natur reift die Zeit allein die Früchte. Immer muß eine Energie am Werk sein. Von allein wird de Gaulle sein Veto nicht aufheben. Man könnte ihm in den Verteidigungsfragen jenen Teil seiner Wünsche zu erfüllen suchen, der sich mit Europas Rolle als Freund und Partner Amerikas verträgt, und ihn dafür zu gewinnen, die europäische Politik ein Stück ihrem Ziele näherzubringen.

Henry A. Klausinger

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards.

Great deal to me as always.
The weekend with you meant a
tingling.

Your clairvoyance is not confined to political
you wrote me in 1928. It demonstrated that
previously, I came across a very long letter
find some letters I had written to you.
In going through the files to
find your address.

Newspaper before I leave? I do not have
written to Sedgley and will write to Albert
Could you tell me how that I have
my泛学术派?

My泛学术派派头:

Washington, D.C.
4210 Keeneen Street, N.W.
Mr. Fritz Kraemer

August 29, 1929

WILLIAM H. BAUMER

1701 PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, N.W.
WASHINGTON 6, D. C.

September 30, 1963

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Department of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

In years past I have met you on occasion at the Council of Foreign Relations of which I am a non-resident member, having moved to Washington, D. C. within the past year. My Army Reserve assignment was changed to a local unit where I renewed old friendships with fine people like Fritz Kraemer and Paul Lineberger.

Recently Fritz was retired--as you can imagine, against his wishes--and I felt that a testimonial dinner was in order. The attached letter to General Wheeler gives the particulars.

Recalling that you are an old and valued friend of Fritz, it seemed appropriate that you should be invited to make the principal address at his farewell dinner. We would be most honored if you could be present, and I know Fritz Kraemer would be in tears.

If there is some way that you could juggle your schedule to be in Washington the evening of Wednesday, October 16, it would make the evening perfect for Fritz and all of us.

When I telephoned today to invite you, I found that you would not be available until next Monday, October 6. Could you please call me collect as soon as possible to let me know your decision. My number is: Area code 202, 298-6200.

Enclosure

WHB:rm

10/16/63

I would like to take this opportunity to pay an entirely
inadequate tribute to a great human being. No one has had
as great an influence on my life as Fritz Kraemer. I have
never known another man of such strength of character and
wisdom. A world of clever little calculations, where
tactical skill masquerades for intelligence needs from time
to time to be recalled fundamentals. Fritz Kraemer's
dedication and devotion, his willingness to do the difficult
are a challenge to all of us to continue to struggle for
the values which we hold dear.

Straight cable to

Mr. William H. Baumer (Brigadier General)
1701 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

10/16/63

Straight cable to

Madeleine J. Kraemer

in Washington D.C.

Now a student at Woodrow Wilson Public High School in her senior year. She is not an A student, but during her last 4 years of high school she has had a good B average and has been in the upper 1/4, or upper 1/5 of her class. Since her junior year she has been in English Honors and this year she is also in an Honors class in History and Government. Like her parents she is good in the humanistic fields and made A in English regular, and B in Honors English, and in her 2 years of Latin and 2 years of German she always had an A. She is less good in the fields of math (C and B), and natural science (C in biology and chemistry), but she had an A in freshman science and earned a 2nd prize in a citywide science exhibit with a thorough work on "Our Solar System".

She took the college boards in her junior year and scored;

English Aptitude 561 and 638
Math " 524 and German " 749

She hopes to do better this year.

As far as extra curricular activities are concerned, she has been in the Pepclub, the Archery club, the Latin club and is now in the Play-reading club and in the German club of which she is the president.

Her main extra curricular activities have however been in connection with the youth group of our Lutheran Church. She has been its Secretary, its Vice-President and is now its Christian Growth Chairman. She always sings in the Choir, has attended Christian Youth Leadership courses, been a delegate to National Conventions and is altogether very active and interested in this whole field. I feel that in this field she could make a definite contribution wherever she is.

She also was a Girl Scout for 6 years and has a good all around training. She likes sports and has usually had an A in Physical education, although she is not an athlet type.

She is a well balanced, intelligent, friendly and helpful person with a strong sense of values, and a sincere striving to do her best and to be able to contribute something to the society in which she lives. She hopes to go into the field of social work and want to study mainly sociology, psychology, religion and German.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

5 November 1963

Dear Henry:

Inclosed the Viereck book. The new part (pages 123 thru 158) should be of particular interest to you at this time. When Viereck heard that I was going to send you a copy he had just given me, he insisted on handing me another copy for you.

He has just been my house guest for three days, and I must say he is one of the very few with whom one can discuss the deeper problems of life and man. He is extraordinarily absent-minded in conversation, but understands "real reality" so well that one can only marvel at the perceptiveness of a man who seemingly lives in the clouds.

I would like you to know, by the way, that Major General Lansdale retired on 31 October 1963. He is now "unemployed." I feel that a man with his particular expertise re guerrilla warfare should somehow be used. He would make a very helpful advisor to some of our statesmen who have to deal with foreign affairs and strategy and yet cannot possibly be experts in the non-conventional warfare field.

This is only a short and rushed note.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

of California in Berkeley where he is studying for his M.B.
with each year. He is now a teaching assistant at the University
standard. He did well at both Harvard and Harvard improving
he was accepted through the grades were somewhat below normal
the admission to Harvard and then to Harvard. In both cases
left Germany, had some of the same problems. I strongly urged
Madeline's brother, who was born just before the father

not had a full opportunity to develop their capabilities.
who are of unusual sensitivity and ability have nevertheless
so it was. Kraemer. The result is that both of their children
exceptional Benson, he is also a very strong sensitivity and
them again after the war in Germany. While Dr. Kraemer is an
then separated from his family for nearly ten years, meeting
even though he had the PROMISE of a brilliant career. He was
Dr. Kraemer left Germany in the 1930's for political reasons
the Vichy and have stayed in close touch with the family since.
Street, M.W., Washington, D. C. I served with father in
the abovementioned name in Madeline Kraemer, 4219 Leesburg
The abovementioned name is Madeline Kraemer, 4219 Leesburg
per to apply and why I endorse per application most strongly.
so it was. I would therefore, like to explain why I gave up my
grades would be somewhat below the normal standard for admission
and hence per application most strongly. I would suggest that per
use abided for admission to Cornell College. I would like to
I gave just learned that the daughter of a friend of mine

per to apply and why I endorse per application most strongly.
I would, therefore, like to explain why I gave up my
grades would be somewhat below the normal standard for admission
and hence per application most strongly. I would suggest that per
use abided for admission to Cornell College. I would like to
I gave just learned that the daughter of a friend of mine

Dear Sir:

Ithaca, New York

Cornell College

Director of Admissions

December 13, 1943

Henry A. Klaeujer

Sincerely yours,

With kind regards.

was splendid.

I thought your inaugural address

you do not wish to do anything.
drop this copy in the wastebasket if
admirable that I know you, so simply
and I have not told your Director of
You may not wish to interleave here

Dear Jim:

Ithaca, New York
Cornell University
President
Mr. James A. Perkins

December 17, 1963

June 9, 1964

Mr. Fritz Kraemer
4319 Fessenden Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

My dear Kraemer:

I thought you might like to see a paragraph from
the LE MONDE correspondent in Washington who previously had
been correspondent in Bonn and who is also an alumnus of the
Seminar.

"I am looking forward with great interest to reading your Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen and with resignation the reaction it will find here. For, altogether, I am surprised to notice that, in a country where to discuss is a national sport--and almost a rite-- there is very little tendency for the real Aus-einander-Setzung. Everything ends up -- as everywhere -- in monologues with the only difference that, here, they are often monologues involving many. But I do not want to digress prematurely toward generalities. I am waiting for the Rostow book, also the Bowie pamphlet and several statements of the State Department to write up a piece on "the American diplomacy and its language" -- to try and analyze the Denkschema which comes out of the speeches and official literature on foreign policy. For, De Gaulle is not the only one with a style all his own."

With warm regards.