Copy No. 4

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

May 30, 1963

Lunch with Eugene Gerstenmaier, President of the German Bundestag - May 18, 1963, at his home.

Gerstenmaier received me in a green hunting uniform which made him look slightly ridiculous. The reason was that he had to open a hunting lodge later in the afternoon.

Though Gerstenmaier, whom I had never met before, talked volubly, even incessantly, it is not easy to recall now what points he was trying to make. He was clearly attempting to demonstrate that he was a potential Chancellor who would have the courage to face difficult problems which had been swept under the rug during the Adenauer era. The overwhelming impression was however of a sincere, well-meaning man, not very strong and likely to confuse an intellectually abstractive proposition with an effective policy.

He considered the Adenauer era a period of intellectual stultification. None of the major issues confronting Germany had been faced. The issue of unification which would become the great unsolved problem for Germany had been left dormant to plague future generations. Whenever he had proposed a new initiative he had been slapped down by the Chancellor with the argument that he was under-mining the Western alliance. Did I think the U.S. would object to German initiatives? I said that I would not speak for the United States. As for me, I considered abstract discussions about the desirability of initiatives beside the point. The only thing worth discussing was the concrete proposals an initiative would involve.

Gerstenmaier then mentioned disengagement, the Rapschi plan and some kind of special regimen for Eastern Germany as possible process to be paid for reunification. I stated my views about the military aspects of disengagement. Gerstenmaier replied that he had been most impressed by Kennen's lectures in 1956.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL.

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However, the time had probably passed when these ideas could be realized. His major hope now was in improving German relations with Eastern Europe. He welcomed the establishment of the trade mission in Warsaw. He hoped that as time went on it would be possible to elaborate a distinction between the East German regime and the governments of Eastern Europe. He also favored a more flexible attitude towards the U.S.S.R. The visit of Beitz (Krupp's general manager) with Krushchev was a hopeful sign.

Turning to domestic politics, Gerstenmaier said he thought Schroeder had been too clever in not contesting the party leadership. If the CDU won the next election or held its own, Erhard would be the Chancellor for seven years assuming his health held out. If Erhard made a mess of things--as was quite possible-- the CDU would lose and the next Chancellor would be a Socialist. In any event, Schroeder was not likely to be Chancellor before 1970 and a lot could happen before then. Given the fact that there was no opposition the large negative vote against Erhard at the party caucus (about a third of the vote) was significant. A lot would depend on Adensuer. If he continued his sniping, Erhard might well be finished by 1965. But then the CDU would almost certainly lose the election.

One result of Adensuer's dominance is the unpredictability of German political life. No one knows what the German generation which grew up after the war really wants. Gerstenmaier considered it significant that at the universities study groups dealing with problems of German unification had increased in the past years. Most German political leaders were tacticians--terribly cautious and afraid of upsetting things. Gerstenmaier was afraid of the growing materialism in Germany. He did not know what the German army would do if put to the test. He had his doubts about the willingness to use German troops on the approaches to Berlin. He did not even know whether West Germany would fight if attacked--particularly if the Soviets built up the pressure gradually.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

In an otherwise very conciliatory conversation Gerstenmaier sharply criticized German politicians for standing in line at the White House to receive the Presidential blessing. This showed a lack of character and loss of identity. What did it mean if every year German politicians praised the "improvement" in U.S.-German relations when the year before they had extolled them for never being better?

Gerstenmaier also criticized the refusal of the three Western occupying powers to permit the Bundestag to meet in Berlin. This was a unilateral concession to the Soviets which eroded Berlin's ties to the Federal Republic.

Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Lunch with Eugene Gurstenmaier, President of the German Bundestag - May 18, 1963, at his home

Gurstenmaier received me in a green hunting uniform which made him look slightly ridiculous. The reason was that he had to open a hunting lodge later in the afternoon.

Though Gurstenmaier, whom I had never met before, talked volubly, even incessantly, it is not easy to recall now what points he was trying to make. He was clearly trying to demonstrate that he was a potential Chancellor who would have the courage to face difficult problems which had been swept under the rug during the Adenauer era. The overwhelming impression was however of a sincere, well-meaning man, not very strong and likely to confuse an intellectually attractive proposition with an effective policy.

He considered the Adenauer era a period of intellectual stultification. None of the major issues confronting Germany had been faced. The issue of unification, which would become the great unsolved problem had been left dormant to plague future generations. Whenever he had tried a new initiative he was slapped down by the Chancellor with the argument that he was undermining the Western alliance. Did I think the U.S. would object to German initiatives? I said that I could not speak for the United States. As for me, I considered abstract discussions about the desirability of initiatives beside the point. The only thing worth discussing was the concrete proposals an initiative would involve.

Gurstenmaier then mentioned disengagement, the Rapacki plan and some kind of a special regimen for Eastern Germany as possible prices to be paid for reunification. I stated my views about the military aspects of disengagement. Gurstenmaier replied that he had been most impressed by Kennan's lectures in 1956. However, the time had probably passed when these ideas could be realized. His major hope now was in improving German relations with Eastern Europe. He welcomed the establishment of the trade missions in Warsaw. He hoped that as

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Turning to domestic politics, Gurstenmaier said he thought Schroeder
had been too clever in not contesting the party leadership. If the CDU won
the next election or held its own, Erhard would be the Chancellor for seven years
assuming his health held out. If Erhard made a mess of things-as was quite
possible - the CDU would lose and the next Chancellor would be a Socialist.
In any event, Schroeder was not likely to be Chancellor before 1970 and a lot
could happen before then. Given the fact that there was no opposition the large
negative vote against Erhard at the party convention was significant. A lot
would depend on Adenauer. If he continued his sniping, Erhard might well be
finished by 1965. But then the CDU would almost certainly lose the election.

Adenauer's dominance is the unpredictability of German
political life. No one knows what the German generation which grew up after
the war really wants.

Gurstenmaier considered it significant that at the
universities study groups dealing with European problems had increased in the past
years. Most German political leaders were tacticians - terribly cautious and
afraid of upsetting things. Gurstenmaier was afraid of the growing
materialism in Germany. He did not know what the German army would do if put
to the test. He had his doubts about the willingness to use German troops on the
approaches to Berlin. He did not seem to know whether West Germany
would figure it attached - particularly if the Sonderbild would up the game
slightly.

In an otherwise very conciliatory conversation (Gurstenmaier sharply
criticized German politicians for standing in line at the White House to receive
the Presidential blessing. This showed a lack of character and loss of identity.
What did it mean if every year German politicians praised the "improvement" in the