Moscow Sees Midway
As ‘Birth of a Mouse’

MOSCOW, June 9 (NYT).—The Soviet Union reacted with scorn today to the allied decision to withdraw 25,000 U.S. troops from South Vietnam.

A commentary in Izvestia, the government newspaper, said the Midway Island conference between Presidents Nixon and Nguyen Van Thieu was like the "mountain laboring to give birth to a mouse."

"And so, again, in place of constructive steps is a hopeless propaganda stunt with the goal of raising a racket around an important contribution to peace, and instead of a search for a political decision there is a clumsy maneuver to camouflage the unwillingness of Washington to take the decision which the world is waiting for."

That political decision, Izvestia indicated, is acceptance of the ten-point program of the National Liberation Front, which Moscow has supported without reservation.

Earlier, Tass, the Soviet press agency, in a dispatch from Washington, said the essence of the joint communiqué could be expressed in a single sentence: "In its Vietnam policy the Republican administration is not abandoning the principles which became bankrupt a long time ago."

Tass said the reduction of the American force level from about 540,000 by 25,000 "is only a drop in the sea as compared to what still remains."

Y
K

HISKY

South Vietnamese paratroop camp near Tay Ninh, 60 miles northwest of Saigon near the Cambodian border. It was the fourth day of heavy fighting around the city, which threatens Communist infiltration routes leading toward Saigon.

Military spokesmen said the South Vietnamese defenders hurled back the assault, killing 37 Communists in two hours of fighting that included support from U.S. artillery and jet fighter-bombers.

The announcement that American troops had withdrawn from

No Reprisal
On Gibraltar

(Continued from Page 1)

people whose only wish is to do a useful job ought to be confined to the Spanish government."

As to tourism, Mr. Stewart maintained that the government cannot tell British subjects where they can go on holiday. He did hope, however, that reflective tourists would pass up Spain for Gibraltar.

Historical-minded observers compared the present situation with the great siege of管理体系, where the fortress's attacks

["4 Providence Evening Bulletin, Monday, June 2, 1969", "No More Books for Momma: Brown graduates, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Huseby and Bobby Jr.", "They Met as Freshmen,\nWed as Sophomores ...", "They met as freshmen, were married as sophomores, became parents as juniors, managed to get their names on the dean's list of honor students and were graduated today in Brown University's 271st commencement exarkens.", "Robert N. Huseby and the former Nan Lynn Hayes, both from New Jersey, have been married four months on campus for the last four years, and together they have produced 10 children and 48 minutes behind the winner. The two have been married 1965. By the end of their sophomore", "year, they had decided to get married. With parental help, they took an apartment at 24 Benefit St. and continued their studies, Mr. Huseby as a history major and his wife as an anthropology major.", "To keep up with academic requirements after Mrs. Huseby became pregnant, they enrolled in two of the same courses, so that Mr. Huseby could take notes and bring them home when his wife was unable to attend.", "When Mrs. Huseby was in the hospital to have Robert Jr. and immediately after the birth, Mr. Huseby attended not only his own classes, but all of his wife's as well. And in this last academic year, he still brought home notes from the two shared courses while Nan was busy keeping house and tending the baby.", "During her Pembroke College", "year, Mrs. Huseby was chairman of the formal dance, served as a tutor and was active in Brown Youth Guidance, a program that helps underprivileged children and adults.", "Mr. Huseby was in the same program and was a tutor, too. He ran on the track team, managed the varsity crew and was a member of the Meeklejohn Society, which surveys student opinion of courses.", "In addition, he worked part-time as a campus maintenance man.", "In the fall, Mr. Huseby expects to be in law school where, he is confident, his semantic loud will be considerably softer because his wife doesn't intend to become a lawyer.", "The young father is from Summit, N.J. and comes from Summit, N.J.", "Brown Graduates, Class of '69", "Gallant, A. M., of Boston, was in the class of '60. She received her M. Sc. in 1961. She is a member of the Phi Kappa Phi sorority. She is a member of the English club. She was a member of the debate team. She won the English departmental contest in the English department. She is a member of the

1407

1er JUILLET 1969

INFORMATIONS RELIGIEUSES ★ INFORMATIONS

# L'ANGOISSE DES JUIFS

par le R. P. Michel RIQUET

CE que fut dans le passé, ce que demeure dans le présent l'angoisse du juif, c'est ce que deux livres récents, parmi d'autres, nous aident à comprendre avec une lucide objectivité. Le premier (1) retrace l'histoire de vingt-trois siècles d'antisémitisme. Ce thème, évidemment, n'est pas nouveau. Les ouvrages de Léon Poliakov, notamment, nous fournissaient, déjà, une documentation exacte, sans partis pris sectaires. Ceux de Marcel Simon, Verus Israël, sur les relations entre juifs et chrétiens dans l'empire romain, de 135 à 425, et de Bernard Blumenkranz sur Juifs et chrétiens dans le monde occidental, de 430 à 1096, sont des modèles d'érudition savante et de finesse dans l'analyse des situations.

L'originalité du livre d'Edward H. Flannery, *L'Angoisse des juifs*, dont la maison Mame vient d'éditer la traduction française, c'est qu'il présente le point de vue d'un théologien catholique parfaitement informé de l'histoire. Il ne conteste pas les faits rapportés par les auteurs précédemment cités. Tout au plus fait-il, ici ou là, une mise au point réduisant tel ou tel événement à de plus justes proportions. Il ne veut pas céder à l'impérialisme du présent qui juge les siècles passés d'après nos propres standards démocratiques et libéraux d'aujourd'hui.

Cependant, on ne peut contester que nonobstant l'attitude généralement humaine et libérale adoptée et recommandée par la plupart des pontifiles romains, de Grégoire le Grand à Jean XXIII, le monde chrétien a fait subir un étrange et douloureux calvaire aux communautés juives d'Occident. Sans doute, l'atroce génocide ordonnée par Hitler s'inspirait d'un racisme aussi contraire au christianisme qu'au judaïsme. Cependant, l'enseignement du mé-

pris diffusé par une certaine catéchèse chrétienne, de saint Jean Chrysostome à Luther inclusivement, déposait dans le subconscient des masses de secrètes dispositions à la haine du juif. Des massacres de juifs qui jalonnèrent à travers l'Allemagne le passage des Croisés aux pogroms de Pologne et de Russie, à l'abeau du XXe siècle, en passant par les atrocités infligées aux juifs d'Espagne par ses rois catholiques, les faits démontrent que le roman de Schwartzbart, *Le Dernier des Justes*, n'est pas le fruit d'une imagination déillante mais le reflet d'une tragique réalité.

Sans vouloir innocenter les chrétiens, le Père Flannery s'applique à discerner les influences multiples qui, dans la diversité des époques et des situations, suscitaient les manifestations d'un antisémitisme dont les motivations ne furent ni toujours ni principalement religieuses mais plus souvent encore racistes. Nationalistes, économiques ou politiques. Plusieurs siècles avant le Christ, Rome comme Alexandrie, Babylone ou Suse ont connu les pogroms car, déjà, le monde méditerranéen et le Proche-Orient se trouvaient parlementes de colonies juives dont le particuliarisme ethnique et religieux provoquait dans les populations indigènes des réactions de méfiance, voire d'hostilité, parfois sanglantes. Ces réactions païennes se sont prolongées dans la chrétienté médiévale. Elles s'y sont même renforcées de prétextes théologiques fournissant à l'antisémitisme des chrétiens une fallacieuse justification. A ces errements, le Concile de Vatican II aura mis, on l'espère, un point final. Mais le racisme, le nationalisme, eux, ne sont point morts. Ils menacent encore.

La Russie du marxisme-lénisme intégral demeure, aujourd'hui, face aux juifs, aussi méfiante, inquisitoriale et persécu-

trice que le fut celle des tsars, tout comme l'Europe des lumières, des philosophes, du rationalisme et du positivisme, mais pour de tout autres raisons, prolongea l'atmosphère d'angoisse et d'insécurité dans laquelle eurent trop souvent à vivre les communautés juives d'Occident et, plus rarement, d'Orient.

Or, malgré des tracasseries et des humiliations sans nombre, malgré les pogroms, les massacres et le monstrueux génocide de six millions des siens, le peuple juif n'a cessé ni d'exister ni de garder, partout, son identité. Cette survivance d'Israël à travers tant d'épreuves atroces, son actuel regain de vitalité, la continuité de sa vie religieuse sans cesse renouvelée à la source originelle de la Bible commentée dans la tradition talmudique, quel prodige !

Pascal y découvrait, déjà, un signe indubitable de la présence de Dieu à notre histoire, le Dieu d'Abraham, d'Isaac et de Jacob, « non des philosophes et des savants ». Par là se révèle la dimension transcendante du drame d'Israël. Pour le chrétien, comme pour le juif, un mystérieux dessein de Dieu s'y trouve inclus.

Dans leur lucide objectivité, les Réflexions sur l'avenir d'Israël, de Saül Friedländer (2), nous rappellent opportunément que la traduction dont le livre d'Edward Flannery évoque les étapes historiques n'est pas encore terminée. Elle peut recommencer demain. Quel chrétien pourrait, alors, de-meurer silencieux et passif devant un nouveau massacre de ce qui survit des martyrs d'Auschwitz et des héros du ghetto de Varsovie ?

Michel RIQUET, s.j.

(1) Edward H. Flannery, *L'Angoisse des Juifs, vingt-trois siècles d'antisémitisme*, Paris, Mame, 1969, 318 pp.

(2) Saül Friedländer, Réflexions sur l'avenir d'Israël, Paris, Le Seuil, 1969, 187 pp.

Vietcong Woman Member Could
Break Peace Deadlock In Paris

By Vicente Villamin

2657 Maytubig, Malate, Manila, Philippines

MADAME NGUYEN Phi Bihn is the only woman whose voice is heard at the Paris peace conference on Vietnam. She is the foreign minister of the provisional revolutionary government in South Vietnam, which is the former National Liberation Front (the Vietcongs), pitted against the constitutional government of South Vietnam under President Nguyen Van Thieu. She is the representative of that body at the conference. She could break its deadlock and make it function as a real peace meeting.

By the photographs, she looks intelligent, determined, level-headed, attractive, youngish and kindly. With this imagined description, it is paradoxical to say that what she uttered so far at the conference were warlike words, unrealistic words, unkind words and irreconcilable words. They always ended with an urgent desire for America to depart from South Vietnam immediately and completely, leaving the impression that the Americans are to her the most unwelcome people on the face of the earth. But human beings can always change; they are not static.

Perhaps she talked that way because that was the way the representative of Hanoi, Ambassador Xuan Thuy, talked. If she had independently followed her natural instincts and her intellectual urge she would have talked as a woman, and a brainy and thoughtful one, and she could not have failed to inspire the spirit of peace that is the beginning of reconciliation. Without giving up what she thinks are right and just in her political ideologies and aspirations, she can help open doors to peace which are now closed without good reasons. It is still very much her privilege to do that. On this, she has a happy and hopeful rendezvous with mankind and destiny.

Madame Bihn must realize that at this time hers is the glorious opportunity that had been given to no woman in the world in this century to secure peace in a situation where it is so uncertain and distant. She must feel heroic and invulnerable to meet the monumental challenge to her intellectual independence, letting no difficulties to deter her from inevitable triumph. Wouldn't it be just the proudest thing for a woman-or a man-the world over to say that "it is a woman, the lovely Madame Bihn, who powerfully helped to settle the cruel Vietnam war that could have led to a thermonuclear World War III that could end the world with the total annihilation of all life"?

In happier days in South Vietnam, Madame Bihn must have met many Americans and liked them. Surely she heard of Americans in the fields of humanitarianism, philanthropy, generosity and general helpfulness all over the world. And certainly she must know that the Americans as human beings are not anywhere as bad as their temporary enemies so irresponsibly picture

them to be.

Relevant to this estimate of the American is what President Nixon said on May 14 last, as follows: "The United States has suffered over one million casualties in four wars in this century. Whatever faults we may have as a nation, we have asked nothing for ourselves in return for those sacrifices. We have been generous toward those whom we have fought, helping former foes as well as friends in the task of reconstruction. We are proud of this record, and we bring the same attitude to our search for a settlement in Vietnam."

Forty-three years ago, this writer wrote an article in the SATURDAY EVENING POST (Nov. 20, 1926), then the magazine of the largest circulation in America, concluding it with these words: "The policy pursued by America in the Philippines is a sharp departure from the colonial policies followed by European nations. Its cornerstone was the welfare of the Filipinos. Even the well-being of American citizens in the Philippines is subordinated to this. Certainly, the unfurling of the American flag over the Philippines has been a blessing to the people in a thousand ways. The Filipinos are the better for it, America is the better for it, the world is the better for it." Today, at strong 78, I say the same with gratitude to the end of my life.

There are numerous matters, especially in the economic and social fields, that Madame Bihn could consider that would bring about the welfare of the Vietcongs and their followers in a regime of peace. She could talk about them everywhere and she will find sympathetic response from the Americans. In that way she will start a new line of thoughts away from war. Instead of the repetitious and now meaningless statements that are heard every week at the peace conference at the old Hotel Majestic, let there be new ideas presented that have bearing on the people's welfare, without compromising the nation's dignity, freedom and independence. As a woman, let Madame Bihn lead in this new, even extramural, phase of the peace conference. Mankind would be unanimous in wishing her success. She could bring peace, cooperation and reconciliation. Bless her soul. ●

(Reprint from EXAMINER, The Asia Newsweekly, September 13, 1969: 67 Dr. Alejos St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, Philippines.)

# US Leaves Troop Withdrawal
## Peace Plan Hanging In The Air

By Vicente Villamin

HANOI'S ONLY condition for peace is the total and unconditional withdrawal of American troops from South Vietnam.

America's reply is President Nixon's plan of May 14 for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from that country, including, of course, those from America (550,000) and Hanoi (150,000).

Hanoi's counter-reply is that she has no troops there to withdraw. Therefore, America can withdraw her troops alone.

America knows Hanoi has troops there. So President Nixon said: "If North Vietnam (Hanoi) wants to insist that it has no forces in South Vietnam, we will no longer debate the point-provided that it's forces cease to be there, and that we have reliable assurances that they will not return."

Hanoi has ignored that statement. President Ho Chi Minh again asserted that the only way for peace to come is for America to go from South Vietnam.

Three months have elapsed and America has not answered that assertion. Meantime, the Paris peace conference has gone on in verbal hostility—and worse.

Thus the Nixon troops withdrawal peace plan is left hanging in the air. What could America do to bring it down in the negotiating table? This is an answer. It is to ask Hanoi what she would do if America complies with her wish and withdraws the American troops from South Vietnam without her doing the same.

This is a fair and relevant question. If Hanoi fails to reply, it will imply that she accepts that she has troops there and that as soon as America leaves, Hanoi might invent an excuse to continue the war against Saigon.

But she could reply that she would maintain peace with Saigon, which means she would not continue the fighting. If America is satisfied with that reply, that might be considered as a "reliable assurance" that "they (the Hanoi troops) will not return" to South Vietnam.

If, however, she insists on America's unilateral withdrawal without assuring her or doing anything on her part, then something else has to be done to bring her down to reality and sobriety. She cannot be a bull all the time in the China shop.

What could be done, for instance? Convince the Vietcongs to stop fighting by emigrating from South to North Vietnam at the expense of the Allies, especially America. Besides, if America can't do it directly, let third persons talk economics and related matters with

Hanoi to find out what she has back of her wild words.

Also let third persons talk to the American people why America cannot honorably and practicably leave Vietnam without a peace understanding. These third persons should be private individuals and not officials of foreign governments.

While exchanges between America and Hanoi are going on and before deciding to leave unilaterally, of course America will do everything to prepare Saigon to fight the war alone, if necessary. This will help Hanoi to decide to end the fighting. She will acknowledge Saigon's strength and determination to fight a total war in North Vietnam and only in her territory.

Again, to emphasize, it is timely, logical and material for America to ask Hanoi what she would do in South Vietnam if she leaves it as she asks for. If she does not ask that question, she will be deliberately leaving the troops withdrawal peace question without a definite conclusion, when one is possible.

It is also timely for Saigon herself to be heard on this particular matter. Without any "ifs" nor "whens," she should declare emphatically that she is ready to fight Hanoi alone to the bitter end and at the same time ready to grasp Hanoi's hand of friendship any time. They are all Vietnamese of one blood, culture and history, after all.

If Saigon assumes that attitude, world opinion would be overwhelming with her. Even Communist China and Russia would be embarrassed to continue supporting Hanoi. If the fighting continues notwithstanding, the responsibility would be shifted entirely to Hanoi.

Let America revive the troops withdrawal peace plan, while the Vietcong emigration from South to North Vietnam is being considered. These two subjects contain prolific seeds for understanding and peace. It is again and again made clear that to deal with the Communists the other side must have the patience of Job, the wisdom of Plato, the devotion of St. Francis of Assisi, and the humanity of Abraham Lincoln. ●

CRITICISM: *Books and the Arts*

## Power Play

POWER WITHOUT GLORY: A STUDY IN
ECUMENICAL POLITICS. By Ian Hender-
son. John Knox, $4.95.

♦ THIS American edition of the late Prof. Ian Henderson's controversial study of unity proposals and policies between the Church of Scotland and the Church of England is dedicated "to the good Christians in every denomination who do not care greatly whether the Church is One Church or not." It is a dedication indicative of Henderson's quarrel with an ecumenical movement that he feels is bent on effecting unity at the expense of truth—an ecclesiastical unity achieved by and for power which is often cloaked in "Christian love" or "the will of God." Henderson regards this kind of ecumenical activity as "political" and unchristian.

Henderson believes that the Notting-
ham Declaration of 1964 made it clear
that "the supporters of the ecumenical
movement had high hopes of extermi-
nating at a relatively early date all the
churches of my country [Scotland] with
the exception of one of which I would
be conscientiously unable to be a mem-
ber." In his opinion the leaders of this
ecumenical enterprise are like possessive
parents who disguise their desire for
power under the form of love. And the
chief culprit is a weaselly ecumenical
"language" which is framed to conceal
rather than to describe events — a lan-
guage saturated with doublethink and
double-talk.

In Britain publication of the book
has created a mild sensation. Coming
from a distinguished professor of theol-
ogy at Glasgow University — one pos-
sessed of personal gifts and scholarly
ability — it "astonished" the proponents
of church unity, made the Anglicans
"seethe" and, according to the *Scottish
Daily Mail*, caused "the staunch Presby-
terians [to] chuckle with reluctant ad-
miration."

Henderson exposes the hidden power
drive of some ecumenical motivation;
he questions the desirability, the possi-
bility and the biblical basis for one
ordered church; and he fears that the
union proposals concerning the Church
of Scotland and the Church of England
may result in an "ecclesiastical power
game with Anglicans in a massive take-
over."

Henderson has been accused of "passionate overstatement" and of making "wild assertions" which will do more

harm than good. Indeed, much of his
book describes the old feud between the
English crown and the Scottish nobles,
between British imperialism and Scot-
tish nationalism. One spicy chapter even
deals with the place of the moderator of
the Church of Scotland in the corona-
tion ceremonies of the present queen.
Nontheological factors galore make
quite a political game of the historical
church relations between the Scots and
the English. A lot of soiled household
linen is displayed in this polemic.

But time alone will tell whether this
volume is the passionate plea of a Scot-
tish nationalist who fears an imperialist
in every glen, or whether Henderson's
tract represents the voice of a prophet.
However, his diagnosis could help to
bring more stringent honesty into the
ecumenical movement and to bring
about a more genuine unity among
Christians — one more in harmony with
the mind of Christ than with the han-
kering for a union whose end is ecclesi-
astical conformity or secular power.

E. G. HOMRIGHAUSEN.

## Compassionate Realist

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: THREE ES-
AYS. By Henry A. Kissinger. Norton,
$3.95; paperback, $1.25.

♦ WRITTEN before he became Presi-
dent Nixon's chief foreign policy ad-
viser, this slender volume reveals Henry
A. Kissinger as a compassionate realist
in the best tradition of Reinhold Nie-
buhr. In his lucid analysis of major
issues he rejects cynical romanticism on
the one side and mechanistic scientism
on the other — two viruses that have
made serious inroads on the liberal-
intellectual community in the past dec-
ade. Kissinger is neither arrogant about
nor apologetic for American power. In-
structed by a classic view of man and
history, he insists that the twin goals of
foreign policy are national security and
international stability. Because of our
great power we have a major role in
peacekeeping, but it is not our duty to
make over the external world or even
small patches of it (including South
Vietnam) in our own image.

Occasionally the author gently
chastises notions he regards as naive and
romantic. He seriously questions the
"dominant American view" that politi-
cal viability in the emerging states of
Asia and Africa "will follow more or less
automatically upon economic progress."

## Books

He warns against expecting a dramatic
improvement in Soviet relations with
the West, noting that each of the five
periods of *détente* "since the Bolshevik
seizure of power" has "ended abruptly
with a new period of intransigence."
Nevertheless, he is a strong advocate of
strategic arms talks with Moscow and
other arms control efforts whose primary
objective is "to enhance the security of
all parties," not to lower taxes or release
resources for other good programs,
domestic or foreign.

In our approach to Europe, Dr. Kissinger criticizes legalism and a "tendency to multiply formal arrangements" and urges an American attitude of quiet understanding. The function of NATO, he says, is defense against and not *détente* with the Soviet Union.

In these days of confused, strident
and cynical "advice" on the uses of
American power it is reassuring, at least
to this reader, that the approach of the
President's most influential foreign
policy adviser is realistic without being
cynical, humane without being senti-
mental, and pragmatic without being
flabby.
ERNEST W. LEFEVER.

## New Frontier

UNFINISHED MAN AND THE IMAGINATION:
TOWARD AN ONTOLOGY AND A RHET-
ORIC OF REVELATION. By Ray L. Hart.
Herder & Herder, $9.50.

♦ REVELATION is a theologem which
modern theology can neither do with
nor do without. While there is some
general agreement that it refers neither
to a religious experience nor to doc-
trinal propositions but rather to the
self-disclosure of God, neither confes-
sional theology nor any of the various
efforts toward neonatural theology have
been able to give any referential or
denotative resonance to the word. Hart's book is a giant step in that direction.

The context is the hermeneutical
problem — the problem of understand-
ing. In some sense we must already
know what it is we want to understand
when we attempt to move from not-
understanding to understanding. The
"in some sense" here is critical. In what
sense? Hart develops the image of the
"hermeneutical spiral." Understanding
is always the circular process of move-
ment from not-understanding to under-

September 3, 1969 1139

Christian Century

standing and back again. But the movement is not viciously circular. In the process layers of meaning accrue; thus the spiral.

The process of understanding is also a movement between immediate perception and reflective contemplation — between confession and criticism. Hart suggests that revelation is operative throughout a wide spectrum of the “scale of mental acts.” This expanded understanding of revelation provides a much more fertile background for the problem of the relation between divine causality and human causality in the process of understanding.

Revelation makes sense, Hart argues, only if one abandons both traditional theism (man is the measure of all things) and traditional theism (man is totally determined by God). Neither adequately articulates the unfinished character of human being. We are not yet human nor do we yet know what it means to be human. When

the call to become human is heard, one stands in the revealed presence of God. This call, however, does not ignore the sediments of the past that shape our present. The occasionalism of both theological and nontheological revolutionary thought ignores the complicated but critical relation between “continuous ingredience” (the constant in “human nature”) and “discontinuous ingression” (the impact of the new).

Hart's book is largely programmatic. Its strength lies in its grasp of the fact that the basic problem is not the revival of Christianity but the revitalization of our own humanity. That revitalization depends, Hart believes, on the development of "a phenomenology of the symbolic tradition" and "systematic theological symbolics" with reference both to the history of religions and to the theology of culture.

*Unfinished Man and the Imagination* is not a casual book; Hart's style taxes

the reader's conception, memory, intuition and patience. It is, however, a major theological work — one which exposes the predilections that make present theological options unviable and establishes the first corner posts for a whole new theological frontier.

JOSEPH DABNEY BETTIS.

## This Week

**THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH.** By John L. McKenzie, S.J. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, $6.95. Aug. 28.

This comprehensive and stimulating examination of today's Roman Catholic Church and how it got that way also asks crucial questions about that church's future. Recommended reading for ecumenists of whatever affiliation.

**CAPTIVE TO THE WORD.** By A. Skevington Wood. Eerdmans, $4.50. Aug. 28.

This careful analysis of the Scriptures' influence on Martin Luther also deals with the Reformer's attitude toward the issues of authority, inspiration and interpretation.

**CATHOLIC THEORIES OF BIBLICAL INSPIRATION**
**SINCE 1810.** By James T. Burtchaell. Cambridge University Press, $9.50. Aug. 29. After tracing the development of the 19th century controversy over the question of biblical inspiration and inerrancy, Fr. Burtchaell concludes that much of recent theorizing by Catholics on the subject of inspiration is only a hesitant rehash of ideas that were more boldly advanced a century ago. Scholarly and thorough.

**POLITICS, PERSONALITY, AND SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY.** Edited by Arnold A. Rogow. University of Chicago Press, $11.00. Aug. 29.

A collection of essays that analyze, criticize and celebrate the callithumpian career of Harold D. Lasswell, who inspired a generation of political scientists with the idea that psychiatric studies have a bearing on their subject. Morris Janowitz, Leo Rosten and Daniel Lerner are among the contributors.

**SUPERGROW.** By Benjamin DeMott. Dutton, $5.95. Aug. 29.

Many of these DeMott essays have appeared elsewhere, and we were impressed at how many of them we recalled at second glance — a tribute to this irreverent and always up-to-the-minute teacher, critic and novelist. The book's subtitle, "Essays and Reports on Imagination in America," is particularly appropriate; in the final analysis imagination is what DeMott is all about.

**THE PREACHING OF JOHN HENRY NEWMAN.**
Edited by W. D. White. Fortress, $2.45. Sept. 1.

In this latest volume in the "Preacher's Paperback Library" White provides an extensive introduction to some of Newman's classic, serene sermons. Intellect, imagination and elegance are to be found here in abundance.

**AGONY AT EASTER.** By Thomas M. Coffey. Macmillan, $6.95. Sept. 1.

Ireland's Easter 1916 uprising that marked "the beginning of the first successful revolution in 20th century Europe" seems to be undergoing re-enactment these days — a fact which gives this fascinating account of that "Easter agony" a poignant timeliness.

**No God But God.** By Del Byron Schneider. Augsburg, $2.95. Sept. 2.

A basic introduction to the "big three" of the Eastern religions — Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. The book's emphasis is not on doctrines and observances but on how the faiths function in the lives of their adherents. Paperback.

## Modern Jewish Thinkers

**JEWISH PHILOSOPHY IN MODERN TIMES.**
By Nathan Rotenstreich. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, $6.50.

**LEO BAECK: TEACHER OF THERESIENSTADT.** By Albert H. Friedlander. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, $8.95.

THOUGH philosophy has never been central to the Jewish religion, it has made its impact — particularly in Moslem Spain in the Middle Ages and in Germany during the 19th and 20th centuries. In eight chapters Nathan Rotenstreich examines the teachings of the principal figures in modern Jewish thought (from Moses Mendelssohn to the present) in their relationship to the world of philosophy. Not an easy book to read, *Jewish Philosophy in Modern Times* has apparently been translated into English by another hand.

One of the greatest luminaries of the intellectual world described in Rotenstreich's book is Leo Baeck — rabbi, thinker, leader. Baeck's life span (1873-1956) takes us back to the world of Wilhelm Dilthey, Adolf Harnack and Herman Cohen, and then to the nazi assault on European civilization. In 1905 the young rabbi proved himself in a polemic with Harnack, which resulted in his best known work, *The Essence of Judaism*. In 1933 and later the acknowledged thinker showed remarkable talent as a man of affairs when he led his community in its endeavor to withstand a nazi attack. Even in the Theresienstadt concentration camp he continued to teach and to write, and in the post-war years he shone as the great light of liberal Judaism.

In Leo Baeck: Teacher of Theresienstadt, Albert Friedlander has produced a model account of the Jewish thinker's life and teaching. His research is comprehensive — published material being supplemented by private correspondence and personal interviews; his style is sympathetic; and while he writes as a warm admirer, Friedlander presents scrupulous criticisms of Baeck's actions and of the limitations of his teaching. One lays down such a book with sad reflections on the gap that has been left in the intellectual continuity of Judaism through the destruction of the milieu from which Baeck emerged.

S. D. TEMKIN.

1140 *the christian CENTURY*

*"ABM Will Make A Less Dangerous World"*

# ABM IS A SHIELD, NOT A SWORD

by Ernest W. Lefever

(On a number of occasions, TEMPO has stated the case against the proposed anti-ballistic missile system, now up for decision in Congress. In the following article, Dr. Ernest W. Lefever, senior fellow on the Foreign Policy Studies staff of the Brookings Institution, states the case for ABM. Dr. Lefever, an ordained minister, once spent three years (1952-1954) as associate director of the National Council of Churches' Department of International Affairs. He is also currently professor of international politics at American University. Among his books are, Ethics and U.S. Foreign Policy and Arms and Arms Control.)

In our dangerous world where nuclear war is possible, though not probable, any human citizen wants his government to pursue policies designed to prevent a nuclear holocaust. Concerned and informed persons differ in their assessment of the external threat faced by the United States and of the means to counter the threat as they see it.

Will President Nixon's proposed Safeguard ABM system make nuclear war more or less likely than alternative ways of dealing with the strategic threat of the mid-1970s?

To deal with this fundamental political and moral question, one must define the dangers we face. The President and most strategic experts believe we will confront a new and serious nuclear threat within five years if present trends in the United States and the Soviet Union continue. In the past decade Soviet spending for strategic nuclear weapons has increased about 70 percent, while ours has declined about 50 percent. For several years Russia has been spending substantially more on its strategic forces than we have on ours.

By the mid-1970s Russia's massive SS-9 intercontinental missiles will be sufficiently accurate to virtually wipe out our land-based Minuteman missiles in their reinforced concrete silos in one devastating blow-unless we develop an active defense for them before that time. This widely accepted judgment is a statement of Russian military capability, not a statement of Russian political intentions. We have no way of knowing what Soviet leaders intend to do with their mighty military capability. But we do know from history that political leaders sometimes are prepared to use the maximum military power they have to achieve their objectives.

To put it another way, the strategic stability that now prevails between U.S. and Soviet forces, and which thus far has prevented nuclear war, is now being seriously challenged by the dramatic upsurge of Soviet missile might. The situation is further complicated by the capacity of both sides to develop multiple warheads on one missile-MIRVs, multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, though neither we nor they have completed a testing program.

## Doctrine of Mutual Deterrence

The major strategic problem is to prevent a first nuclear attack from either side. If we succeed in this prime objective there will never be a deliberate nuclear exchange. This is where the doctrine of mutual deterrence comes in. Each side must have the capacity to deter a first strike by the other. The essence of this capacity is a second-strike force sufficient to deliver an unacceptable blow to the homeland of the other-thus deterring any rational and responsible government from launching an attack in the first place.

There are two principal ways of maintaining a creditable deterrent force. One is to deploy more offensive missiles than the adversary can destroy. The other is to deploy a smaller number of offensive weapons, but better protected.

It is this second alternative that Safeguard is designed to make possible. Since hardening will not provide adequate protection for Minuteman in the mid-seventies, an active defense is required. As such an active system, Safeguard will maintain an effective deterrent without a significant increase in U.S. offensive weapons.

Safeguard is an anti-ballistic missile system designed to destroy attacking missiles before they reach their targets and without detonating the nuclear warhead of the attack missile. Its long-range Spartan missile intercepts the attack missile 200 to 400 miles above the earth. The smaller Sprint destroys warheads missed by Spartan within 40 miles of the target. No one claims perfection for this complex system which involves radar and computers, but the majority of the best

Tempo, August 15, 1969

A Twice-Monthly Publication of the
National Council of Churches

ABM Is A Shield - 2

informed scientists believe it would be about 80 percent efficient.

In my professional contacts with scientists and engineers in and out of Government, I have had many opportunities to discuss the feasibility of Safeguard. I am convinced it will work, a conviction based primarily on my respect for the views of experts who have a good record of being right in the past.

## Five Reasons

I reject as immoral and dangerous the position of those Safeguard opponents, and there are many, that a substantial increase of U.S. missile capacity is the best way to counter the new Soviet threat of the 1970s. There are five reasons why President Nixon's Safeguard system is preferable to the alternative of deploying additional offensive weapons, all of which have significant moral and political implications.

**First:** Safeguard will more effectively protect our deterrent than the multiplication of new offensive weapons. It is better to protect the weapons we have than to build and deploy additional offensive weapons which, if matched by the other side, will also need protection.

**Second:** Safeguard is not as provocative to the Soviet Union as the multiplication of offensive weapons. A shield is less menacing than a sword. Recognizing this, the Russians have deployed ABM weapons at some 60 sites and have repeatedly asserted the desirability of defensive weapons. We have deployed no ABM weapons. The fact that Moscow has made no official protests against our ABM plans suggests that the Soviet leaders accept the mutual need for a limited ABM system, at least against the common threat from Red China.

There is no evidence that Congressional support for Safeguard will delay strategic arms limitation talks with Moscow nor adversely affect their outcome. On the contrary, if we entered the talks just as the President's request was rejected by the Congress, we would start off from a position of weakness that the Soviets would be tempted to exploit.

**Third:** Safeguard would have a stabilizing effect on strategic arms expenditures on both sides, while a new round of offensive weapons could launch a strategic arms race. The mutually provocative character of offensive missiles has been demonstrated in the past. After declining 50 percent in the past ten years, U.S. strategic expenditures have leveled off substantially below current Soviet strategic spending. It is important to note that U.S. strategic expenditures (including research, development, hardware, maintenance, and manpower) constitute about 15 percent of the defense budget, the remaining 85 percent going for general purpose forces.

**Fourth:** Safeguard is less expensive than a significant increase in offensive weapons. The requested ABM appropriation for 1970 is $893 million, which is less than 1/90 of the defense budget and less than 1/1000 of the GNP. The total cost of the projected ABM program from 1968 (the year Congress authorized it) through its completion in 1976 is estimated at $10.2 billion, or about eight percent U.S. strategic expenditures, less than two percent of each defense budget, and about one-fifth of one percent of the GNP. By any measure this is a tiny fraction of our total resources, and in any event, defense "savings" are not transferrable to any other slot in the Federal budget.

**Fifth:** Perhaps most significant of all, Safeguard increases the military, diplomatic, and moral options of the President in and serious confrontation with a nuclear adversary or in the event of a nuclear accident. If a nuclear event should occur now, the President has two choices—he can choose to do nothing militarily or he can unleash nuclear retaliation against Russian cities. This is a terrible choice. While we all hope that no President will ever be faced with a deliberate nuclear attack or even a nuclear accident, what humane and rational man would deny him a third option in that fateful moment—of a third option were available?

## A New Button for Nixon

Safeguard provides that third option between capitulation and retaliation. If a nuclear event occurs after we have a deployed ABM system, the President will not be limited to doing nothing and pushing a button that may kill millions of Russians. He will have an ABM button, a damage-limiting option, which may save millions of American lives without killing a single Russian. Who would deny the President this chance to save millions of lives, to reflect, to plan? Furthermore, Safeguard strengthens mutual deterrence and thus reduces the probability of a nuclear attack in the first place.

Our world is becoming more dangerous and uncertain because of China's growing nuclear might. By 1975 Peking will be able to launch a nuclear attack against the United States. Both Communist giants have serious internal stresses, and a leadership crisis at the top could erupt at any time. In the ensuing power struggle there could be a breakdown of restraint and a nuclear event, by design, miscalculation, or accident, could take place. If the United States were the target, we want to be in a position to limit damage to ourselves and to avoid a full-scale nuclear exchange. Only an ABM system can make this possible. Offensive missiles can retaliate and cause damage, but they cannot prevent and limit damage. Safeguard can prevent and limit damage, but it cannot cause it. Safeguard is a shield, not a sword. ■

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

TUESDAY, AUGUST 5, 1969

Cut Funds Not Easily Transferred

Many opponents of President Nixon's
Safeguard ABM proposal in and out of Con-
gress argue that expenditures for this pur-
pose, like other defense spending, takes
away money from desperately needed do-
mestic programs. While it is obviously true
that the government cannot spend the same
funds twice, it is incorrect to assume that
"savings" derived from cutting former de-
fense programs or refraining from undertak-
ing new ones are transferable to other areas
of the federal budget.

No member of the House or Senate is ever
confronted with a clear option to authorize
$10 million for education or defense, high-
ways or space. Each program, domestic or
foreign, is presented on its own merits, not
as an alternative for other unrelated pro-
grams. The Congressman, keeping in mind
his own priorities and responsive to his con-
stituents, votes for the measure as present-
ed, against it, or seeks a modification. He
never presents an amendment calling for a
transfer of $10 million to an unrelated pro-
gram.

Even in the complex budget-making proc-
ess, each program must pass muster on its
own merits, and no program is arbitrarily
cut to beef up an unrelated program.

In the past when we have cut back de-
fense expenditures, we have usually cut taxes
by approximately the same amount and the
"savings" went into houses, cars, refrigera-
tors and TV sets in the private sector. There
is little evidence that a reduction in military
spending has ever resulted in a comparable
upsurge in domestic federal spending, espe-
cially in the controversial area of social
welfare.

In fact, there is some evidence that social
welfare programs advanced more rapidly
during periods of relatively high military ex-
penditures. A case in point is Vietnam. Dur-
ing America's "most unpopular war," domes-
tic welfare expenditures increased twice as
fast as the rising defense budget. From
1964-70 federal welfare programs increased
by about 120 per cent while defense spend-
ing, including Vietnam, increased only 55
per cent.

Concerned citizens seeking tax support for
domestic programs need not wait for the
war to end in Vietnam or for an arms limita-
tion agreement with Moscow. Fortunately,
our $900 billion Gross National Product ena-
bles us to do what we need to do at home
and abroad without sacrificing a portion of

one good program for another one. Ob-
viously, wasteful and other unnecessary
spending should be rigorously eliminated
from defense, poverty, highway and all other
Government programs.

With defense, including Vietnam, cur-
rently taking 8.7 per cent of the GNP, we
have an interest in reducing military expend-
itures if this can be done without endanger-
ing national security. We also have an obli-
gation to spend the other 91.3 per cent of
the GNP wisely, especially that portion we
have assigned to the federal government.

It is important to note that, of our total
defense budget, strategic expenditures (in-
cluding research, development, hardware,
maintenance and manpower) consume less
than 20 per cent. General purpose expenses
take the remaining 80 per cent. Cutbacks
are more likely in the latter category.

In the past decade, Soviet strategic expend-
itures have increased about 70 per cent,
while ours have decreased about 50 per cent,
leveling off at a substantially lower amount
than current Russian spending.

The total ABM program from 1968
through its completion in 1976 is estimated
to cost $10.2 billion, a figure that would not
significantly affect the present level of our
strategic expenditures. It would amount to
less than 2 per cent of the defense budget
(at its present level) and about one-fifth of
1 per cent of the GNP.

The specific issue before the Congress
now concerns a requested appropriation for
fiscal 1970 of $893 million—less than 1/90 of
the defense budget and less than 1/1000 of
the GNP. Of this amount, $401 million is for
research, development, testing and evalua-
tion, which virtually no one opposes.

The decision on Safeguard should be
made on the basis of its contribution to na-
tional security and international stability,
not on its cost—only 2 per cent of the de-
fense budget.

Citizens seeking to promote needed do-
mestic programs should use to the hilt the
multiple facilities of our remarkably respon-
sive political system—mobilizing public
opinion and electing Congressmen who will
vote the necessary tax increases to finance
such programs. This is the rational and dem-
ocratic way to do what needs to be done.

ERNEST W. LEFEVER,
The Brookings Institution.

Washington.

KISSINGER, HENRY A./Newspapers

THE KANSAS CITY STAR

1729 GRAND AVE.
KANSAS CITY, MISSOURI

September 29, 1969

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
The White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

This special section of The Star
is another in our series of Background for
Better Understanding, dealing with the
importance of Red China today. I thought
you might be interested in glancing
through it, and would, of course, welcome
your comments.

In addition to including this in
our regular Sunday paper, we have sent
some 45,000 copies to the schools without
charge, for classroom use.

WWB:gig

RECEIVED
OCT1 4 1969
CENTRAL FILES

Page 4 F

Bad@round for Better Understanding—Red China Today
September 28, 1969

(Continued From Preceding Page.)

tant of all "gut-issues" as it affects those who actually live in China—that of war and soldiers. No bandits have roamed the country for 20 years except for a few remnants in the Southwest early in 1949, and perhaps a form of lawlessness approaching banditry. In a few parts of China during the Cultural revolution Chinese soldiers have not been killed abroad since the end of the Korean war in 1953 (during which the PLA possibly suffered 100,000 casualties) except for a small number in border fighting with India or with the Soviet Union.

## Veil on Issues

Yet China is usually discussed in much more abstract terms than I have used so far. The gut-issues may be important to the Chinese who live in China, but political and social scientists outside China have more significant questions to ask. Is China's foreign policy isolationist—or subversive? Have the leaders in Peking worked out a valid development process? What is the state of China's social fabric? How does the political process function? And so on.

Let us simply observe two basic and simple rules before proceeding to discuss the larger issues, however. (1) Never forget that the natural functions—eating, sleeping, working and living—are what occupy the minds of the Chinese, just like us, most of the time. (2) Try to identify and disregard our own Western pre-conceptions whenever discussing abstractions about Chinese politics or society. (It is easiest said so done.)

To realize that the Chinese are human beings is not to discount the crucial involvement of an overt and articulate ideology in their everyday life. Before 1949 some Western liberals and progressives, anxious to overcome prejudice against the Chinese Communists whom they saw—probably correctly—as the only hope for China and alternative to the moribund Kuomintang, used to describe Mao and his colleagues as "agrarian reformers." Mao himself never con-caled his Marxist-Leninist aims, however.

After 1949, Western public opinion generally swung to the other extreme—"Of course they are Communists. Just like the rest of the bunch in Russia, Poland, East Germany and so on. Like all the others, the Chinese must be under the thumbs of Moscow." Peking, said Dean Rusk in May 1951, did not "pass the first test" of a government of China—it was simply "not Chinese." A year before, Secretary of State Acheson had already concluded that "the Communist victory in China has armed Russian imperialism with a new and most insidious weapon of penetration."

The Sino-Soviet split has shown how wrong we were about Moscow's supposed "domination" of Fe-king; even more recently the Cultural revolution has begun to show us how wrong it was to regard Chinese communism as just another brand of Marxism-Leninism. Admittedly we are faced with an enormous task of comprehension; not only must we come to grips with a political and social system which is alien to those of the Western democracies, but we must then go on to distinguish between the orthodox and nonorthodox versions of it.

## Two 'Lines' Struggle

In China both versions have coexisted side by side—until the Cultural revolution, when in effect they parted company. This is what is meant essentially by "the struggle between two lines," or between "socialism" and "revisionism," or between "Mao" and "Liu."

Liu Shao-chi, China's former head of state, and once regarded as Mao's successor—who had been re-viled and vilified as a "revisionist" during the Cultural revolution—symbolizes the more "orthodox" approach to the task of building a socialist society. An expert in the art of the possible, Liu has always specialized in tricky jobs which involve manipulation

and compromise. Before 1949 he worked chiefly in the so-called "white," non-Communist, urban areas—sometimes under clandestine conditions. During his years in the "red" areas he was chiefly known for his work in building up a strong, disciplined Communist party.

After 1949 he was probably most vocal of all the leadership in advocating alliance with the Soviet Union, especially as a source of aid and a model for economic development. He also played a prominent part in cajoling China's "national bourgeoisie"—the capitalists who stayed behind—to co-operate with the new government. He also championed the policy of giving top priority to industrialization, of concentrating China's resources upon selected prime areas of economic growth, and of adopting a gradual approach to social reform. In areas where there was local resistance (such as those inhabited by backward non-Chinese minority races).

Perhaps this picture—which is partly based upon recent anti-Liu accusations—is overdrawn and rather unfair. Scholars disagree on how far the positions of Liu and Mao really differed, and if so how far back in time the differences extended. But both leaders serve to illustrate the two different approaches even if the differences between them were partly functional.

## The Next In Line

SUCCESSOR TO MAO is Lin-Piao, (right), defense minister, who accompanies the 75-year-old Communist Chinese leader at a parade review. Lin was named Mao's successor by Red China's ninth Communist party congress —(Wirephoto).

Lin was the man who got things done; as Mao himself later explained, Liu was "in the frontline," and as such he had to take a more pragmatic approach. Mao, who seems to have withdrawn into the background to some extent soon after 1949, was the imagination thinker who would emerge ever so often with some brilliant new sweeping policy.

In 1955, Mao called for an ultra-rapid speeding up of the formation of agricultural co-operatives; in 1957 he inspired the "Hundred Flowers" movement in which China's intellectuals were encouraged—albeit only for a few months—to speak out and criticize the party. In 1958, it was Mao who championed the Great Leap Forward in which the countryside was revolutionized and the People's communes were established. It is also Mao who, in the last decade, seems to have taken the lead in promoting and guiding Peking's bitter controversy with the Soviet Union. And most recently, it was Mao who in the autumn of 1965 left Peking for the company of a small band of ideological sympathizers in Shanghai, and launched the Great Proletarian Cultural revolution, the most radical innovation (at least in intention) of them all.

Perhaps this picture of Mao as the inspired idealist is also slightly overdrawn; but again he typifies

# RED CHINA AT A GLANCE

**LAND:** China covers 3.7 million square miles of which 11 per cent is cultivated, 78 per cent desert, waste (an estimated 3 per cent could be reclaimed) or urban; 8 per cent forested, 2 to 3 per cent inland water.

**PEOPLE:** Population is estimated about 750 million. According to ethnic division 94 per cent are Han Chinese, 6 per cent minorities including Chuang, Uighur, Hui, Yi, Tibetan, Mongol, Pu-lu and Korean. Officially religions are prohibited but religious elements of Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, ancestor worship are still practiced. About 3 per cent of the population is Muslim, 1 per cent Christian.

**GOVERNMENT:** Communist. Capital city is Peking. There are 21 provinces, two centrally-governed municipalities and five autonomous regions. The Chinese Communist party is the only effective party. Mao Tse-tung, as chairman of the Central committee, is the power with Lin Piao, vice-chairman, as heir. The Central committee of 279 full and alternate members is elected by a party congress which is supposed to convene every five years. The recently-concluded ninth party congress was long overdue since the eighth congress was held in 1956. Party membership is estimated at 18 million.

**ECONOMY:** Gross national product estimated at 70 billion dollars or less than $100 per capita. Grain exports since 1960 have averaged six million tons—about 5 per cent of total consumption. During the Cultural revolution farmers tended to hold on to food needed in cities when periods of political uncertainty arose. The output of crude steel is about 10 million tons annually; coal about 220 million metric tons, oil 8 million metric tons, grain 182 million metric tons, electric power 36 billion kilowatt hours. Railroad mileage is about 21,000 miles.

Page 12 F
Background for Better Understanding
—Red China Today
September 30, 1969

THE
LONG
MARCH

A TREK of more than 6,000 miles by the Communists began in October, 1934, when Chiang Kai-shek's offensive drove them from their chief base in Southern Kiangsi, Attacked and bombed by the Nationalists, caught in the cold and snow of the mountains, only 40,000 of the 300,000 persons who left Kiangsi arrived in the dusty plains of Northern Shensi a year later. There, at Yenan, the Communists established a new base and went on to win all of China. These water colors romanticizing the epic journey were painted in Red China and sold in Hong Kong through Communist outlets.

How Mao Won China

'Nationalists Threw It Away'

By Robert Pearman

(National-World Editor of The Star)

When was the course of history set in China? At what point, at what milepost, did the Communist victory become inevitable? When did it become impossible for Chiang Kai-shek to win China's civil war even with massive direct American military intervention?

These questions are calculated to aggravate dormant political prejudices and bring out emotions buried in the aftermath of Mao's victory. These questions can be answered quickly and certainly with controversial argument, but objectively with far less assurance.

IF YOU ACCEPT the Communist view, believe in the principle of dialectical materialism—that the pread of communism is as the growth of a tree—then the forces were set in motion with the organization in 1921 of the Communist party of China.

BUT THE forces go back even further in history in the exploitation of the masses, the privation of the peasantry, the power of the warlords—conditions that gave the party root and growth.

If you subscribe to the timetable of the Kuomintang, Chiang's Nationalists who fought and lost on the mainland, and then found refuge on Taiwan, then the timing coincides directly with the efforts of the United States to bring peace between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists.

In the Nationalists' eyes, their military and political failure is directly tied

to blind blundering of American efforts at mediation and the three men—Gen. Joe Stillwell, Patrick Hurley and Gen. George Marshall—who went to China with confidence and resolve and came home critical, bitter and ac- knowledging defeat.

There is a third view held by American officials involved at the time—to wit, Dean Acheson, secretary of State, and President Truman. The view is that there was probably nothing at all that could have been done to alter the outcome—not because of the inexorable rise of communism, but rather because of the fantastic ability the Kuomintang possessed to destroy itself.

... the Nationalist government could not impose its dominance on the Communists without the military intervention of the United States (if it could even with it) due to the ineptitude of the Kuomintang," the former secretary will say in a forthcoming book "Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department," to be published by W. W. Norton & Co.

"That the policy adopted is now seen to have been doomed carries no implication that any other would not have been equally doomed. Hindsight does not carry comfort, like a St. Bernard to an exhausted traveler," Acheson writes.

FINALLY THERE IS the son of an old North China industrial family, who as a newsman saw the war in both its active and quiescent stages from the beginning until he had to flee to Hong Kong.

To him the death knell of the Kuomintang on the mainland was sewn

in 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek became the center of the anti-Communist movement, Chiang turned on the leftists in Shanghai and drove forever the irreconcilable wedge between the Communists and the Nationalists. Prior to 1927, the two parties had worked together (even if in an often uneasy marriage of convenience) since after the downfall of the Manchus in 1911 and the proclamation of the Republic by Sun Yat-sen.

In 1926, a year after the death of Sun Yat-sen, his best general, Chiang Kai-shek, aided in the organization of his army by the famous Bolshevik general, Vassily Blucher, forcefully and successfully pursued a campaign to unify all China.

Chiang drove north through Honan and Wuhan and in March, 1927, Nationalist troops entered Nanking.

The leftists of the Kuomintang began looting, robbing and killing foreigners and former landlords. The uneasy partnership within the Kuomintang grew even more uneasy.

Labor unions in Shanghai, at the best of the left wing, organized a general strike and disarmed police. On April 12, shortly after his army arrived in Shanghai, Chiang instituted a bloody purge against the Communists and leftist elements within the Kuomintang.

The schism was final.

"... now feeling himself strong enough to do without them, he (Chiang) abruptly broke off the Communist connection," writes Lionel Max Chassin in "The Communist Conquest of China," published by Harvard university. "By his order the Communists

were excluded from all the higher posts in the Kuomintang... in all cities where the Communists had begun to form autonomous groups, they were disarmed.

"Hesitating to unleash civil war, Chen Tu-hsi, at this time the head of the Chinese Communist party, submitted. He was replaced by such extremists as Lt-san, who declared China to be in a state of permanent revolution and tried, without success, to foment mass uprising in the large cities.

"Meanwhile, as Chiang moved north and made himself master of Peking, a certain number of Communist leaders who had escaped the repression re-sorted to guerrilla warfare in the mountainous regions, where regular troops could be easily resisted. This was the case with two leaders who were to become famous—Chu Teh and Mao Tse-tung."

BY 1930, THE Communists had become a sizable force and their "Seviet" regions covered large areas of Kiangsi, Fukien, Hainan and Hubei.

Between 1930 and 1933 Chiang launched five campaigns against the Communists and in October, 1934, drove them from their chief base in Southern Kiangsi. That was the beginning of the Long March, more than 6,000 miles through mountains and deserts, through Kwangtung, through Kwangsi; through Yunnan and Szechwan.

Chassin estimates that 200,000 men, women and children left Kiangsi, and that no more than 40,000 reached the dusty plains of North Shensi.

But by now there were two wars going on in China.

The American involvement in Vietnam vividly illustrates one important facet of the differences between China and Russia.

A STUDY BY a subcommittee of the House foreign affairs committee points out that by standing firm in Vietnam, the United States confirms the Soviet contention in the Communist world that America is a power to be reckoned with.

However, the study continued, if the United States withdraws from Vietnam, this would tend to support the Chinese argument that their revolutionary activities represent only a small risk of escalating into a larger conflict. The immediate impact on the Russians within the Communist community would be a loss of prestige and influence.

The Chinese say that their most recent differences with the Russians began with the meeting of the 20th party congress in 1969.

Before that time it was the ideological cement of communism which held the two nations together. Now the cement has become a solvent which has started to dissolve the bonds.

At the party congress, Premier Khrushchev advanced three theoretical premises which outraged the Chinese: Peaceful coexistence, the non-invasibility of war and the peaceful transition to socialism.

THEN THERE WERE several other irritants. One was that the Chinese accused the Russians of backing out of an agreement to help them develop nuclear weapons.

American officials say that although the Russians helped the Chinese in the early stages of nuclear development with some basic information and a missile test range, they refused to tell the Chinese how to put a nuclear bomb together.

Communist China had been depending on Russia for military, economic and diplomatic assistance and now it was becoming evident to Moscow that it would be folly to arm a potential enemy with full nuclear capability.

Another source of friction was Khrushchev's visit to the United States in 1959, a clear indication to Peking that the Russians were playing footsie with the capitalists and that their common policies were diverging.

After his visit to the United States, Khrushchev stopped off in Peking in an effort to reassure the Chinese but his mission was a failure. Mao even refused to shake hands with Khrushchev at the airport.

IN 1966 THE RUSSIANS attempted the strategy of putting pressure on the Chinese by withdrawing all their military and economic aid and pulling out all their technicians. Factories which the Russians were building for China were left half-finished.

At that time China was in a desperate economic plight and the Russians thought that Mao would come around to their way of thinking, but he arrogantly held his ground.

The propaganda blasts continued with increasing bitterness, with the Chinese charging the Russians were practicing "phony communism."

The already deepening rift was worsened in the Cuban missile crisis. The Chinese seized on the Soviet conciliation to the United States and charged them with "capitulationism" within the world Communist movement.

Then in 1965 Premier Kosgin of Russia went to Hanoi and later to Peking for a talk with Mao. But the Chinese leader was adamant. It was at this time that the Russians began to send more aid to the North Vietnamese in order to save face with other Communist countries leaning toward China.

ANOTHER ILLUSTRATION of the growing split

between the two countries and one epitomizing the clash of national interests was the refusal of the Soviet Union to back Red China in its border skirmish with India.

Moscow has been committed to keep India neutral and away from the West and if the Soviets had backed Red China they would have damaged their interests and image in India.

Finally, the question arises on what the United States should do in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Should we try to exploit the differences or simply stay on the side lines.

The feeling of many officials in Washington is that the United States should stay out of it and that it is not in our national interests for an armed conflict to develop.

The American position in the rivalry is likened to a situation where a man goes into a dark basement where there is both gunpowder and gold. If he lights a candle to try and find the gold, he faces the risk of igniting the gunpowder.

THE HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS committee has recommended that this must recognize the limitations on its ability to profit from the quarrel.

"Obviously, Western actions have influenced the course of the dispute and will continue to do so," the report said.

"The United States must, however, base its policies on American interests and not on any assumptions with respect to the effect that can be achieved on the Chinese Peking relations."

One of the keenest students of Russia, George Kennan, former ambassador to Russia and Yugoslavia, has said that the conflict contains lessons which have profound implications from the standpoint of American policy.

However, Kennan believes that the conflict "is not a happy one. It is not our quarrel and we should not associate ourselves with either side of it."

WHEN HE WAS SECRETARY of State, Dean Rusk warned that the two totalitarian powers are capable of changing directions almost without prior notice. He recalled, for example, that Stalin made his deal with Hitler just before World War II.

But Rusk also said it was his belief that there is a "real problem" within the Communist world and that there is a "real rivalry" that extends not only to ideological questions but to state relationships in a vast complex of differences.

"The big question is whether the Soviet-Chinese conflict will escalate into an all-out war with nuclear weapons, or whether the current tensions will be eased when Mao Tse-tung relinquishes his power.

The feeling in well-informed quarters here is that a full-scale war is unlikely because it would not be in the national interests of either side. It also is pointed out that both Moscow and Peking operate as rational governments, assessing the hard consequences of their actions and not emotional reactions.

Western Western diplomats have learned that it is almost impossible to determine what the Russians will do. The experts did not think the Soviets would invade Czechoslovakia—but they did. So, the speculation here goes, if the Soviets decided to strike at one Communist country, why not at another?

One informed school of thought here believes it is possible that the two countries will not be enemies forever and that when Mao goes, Peking will adopt a more pragmatic regime and shift its tactical approaches toward Moscow with the objective of avoiding an armed holocaust. But it also is asserted that the bitter ideological contest will continue.

## FACE TO FACE ON THE BORDER

"This pack of Soviet hoodlum troops of a so-called "socialist country" intruded on the Chinese side of the Wusuli river and struck wildly at Chinese fishermen with big clubs; killing and wounding three of them"—(Translated from "The New Czars Anti-China Atrocities.")

Background for: Better Understanding—Red China Today
September 28, 1969

Page 19 F

## Film Hits 'New Czars'

In a crowded theater in Hong Kong, you can see the Peking propaganda film "The Anti-Chinese Crimes of the New Czars." In Peking, it is said, one million persons saw the film in the first five days.

On the screen before your eyes are murky pictures of Nikita Khrushchev and President Eisenhower, Nikita Khrushchev and President Kennedy, Nika Khrushchev and President Nixon—"proof," on celluloid, that the "new Czars" are plotting with the rulers of America.

Then the dark shadow of capitalism passes over Russia and there were the "New Cossacks" Russian mounted police beating up Chinese demonstrators on Red Square.

And we are told:

The Soviet revisionist renegades have many dirty ways of nibbling at Chinese territory.

For untold generations Chinese fishermen have been fishing on the Wusuli river. Yet during every fishing season since the revisionist renegades seized power in the Soviet Union, they have disrupted fishing and threatened the lives of Chinese fishermen with gunboats, fireboats, landing launches, automatic barges and speedboats with armed troops. As Mao Tse-tung thought spread throughout the world and China's Great Proletarian Cultural revolution was winning great victory, this piracy became more frequent and open. More and more, Soviet gunboats crossed over the navigation channel to the Chinese side. Wearing steel helmets and lifejackets, Soviet seamen tried to stop our fishermen from casting nets.

When some of the officers asked one of the fishermen, his name, the prompt reply was, "My name is 'Down with Soviet revisionism!'"

Standing fearlessly in front of the Soviet revisionists, the two Chinese fishermen shouted in their faces, "Long live our great leader Chairman Mao!" They sang the quotation songs, "All reactionaries are paper tigers!" and "Be resolute, fear no sacrifice and surmount every difficulty to win victory." The Soviet troops were licked and finally had to return our fishermen to Chinese territory.

## List 488 'Breaches'

By Bernard Gwertzman

(© 1969, New York Times News Service)

Moscow—The Soviet Union has charged Communist China with 488 deliberate violations of the Soviet frontier between June and mid-August.

A lengthy statement issued by Tass, the official press agency, said 2,500 Chinese had participated in these "premeditated violations." The Soviet assertions were backed up by what Tass described as documentary evidence seized by Soviet frontier guards when they were "driving away Chinese provocateurs from Soviet territory."

The Tass statement appeared to be the Soviet response to an official Chinese foreign ministry protest of August 19, which claimed the Russians had instituted 429 border violations in June and July.

Investia, the government newspaper, published the Tass report together with two photographs of some of the alleged material. This was the first major Soviet statement on China since a long Pravda editorial warning that war with China would inevitably involve nuclear weapons.

The only apparently new major incident noted by the report took place on July 20 when Chinese authorities "staged an armed attack on the Soviet island of Kirkinsky on the Ussuri river" in the Far East.

Among the documents seized on Goldinsky island, Tass said, were reports of strategy meetings and personal diaries.

Tass said that a man named Liu said "We have studied the military tactics of Chairman Mao and have drawn up the plan of action, but we must foresee a case when the actions develop not according to our plan."

Tass said the soldiers used in the fighting were recent Red Guards but that not all were enthusiastic Maoists.

One diary, according to Tass, had an entry that said life and work on the island preparing for the attack "are very tense."

"We eat only fish. There are no vegetables. Sometimes I feel dizzy. All is quiet now. But the hostilities may start any time. I think it would be good if a war should break out now. I would rather die in a battle than work to exhaustion every day."

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Was wird aus der westlichen Allianz?

Econ-Verlag GmbH., Düsseldorf—Wien 1965, 312 S., Ln. DM 24,80.

Kissinger, einer der Berater Kennedys, hat schon in früheren
Analysen zu einem tieferen Erfassen der politischen Pro-
bleme beigetragen. Seine klare und verständliche Darstellung
der schwierigen politischen Fragen zeugt von einer genauen
Kenntnis der einzelnen Strömungen im politischen Bereich.

In dem hier vorgelegten Buch geht der Verfasser von zwei
Grundfragen jedes Staates aus, die auch für die Atlantische
Allianz gelten. „Welches Maß an Einheit wollen wir wirklich
haben" und „Wieviel Pluralismus können wir uns leisten?",
das sind die Fragen, die in den nächsten Jahren beantwortet
werden müssen, wenn das westliche Bündnis nicht zu einem
Schattendasein verurteilt werden soll. In diesem Zusammen-
hang wird auch das wirtschaftliche Wiedererstarken Europas
und die Rückgewinnung eines europäischen Selbstbewußt-
seins gesehen. Zwar ist dieses Selbstbewußtsein Europas
immer noch schwach und leicht zu erschüttern; aber es ist
doch als Faktor der Politik von Amerika zu berücksichtigen.

Ein Zeichen für das wiedererwachte Selbstbewußtsein Euro-
pas ist die Haltung de Gaulles und seine Ansichten zur Inte-
gration auf militärischem und wirtschaftlichem Gebiet. Aller-
dings sieht der Verfasser in de Gaulle nicht den Störenfried
der Harmonie zwischen den Interessen Amerikas und Euro-
pas. Er glaubt, daß diese Auseinandersetzung zwischen den
Kontinenten in der Struktur des Bündnisses begründet liegt.
So sei auch die britische Haltung im Grunde nicht so ver-
schieden von den französischen Absichten.

Kissinger befürchtet, daß die USA allzusehr auf ihrer Vor-
machtstellung beharren und zu wenig bereit sind, den euro-
päischen Nato-Partnern eine gleichberechtigte Stellung ein-
zuräumen.

Schließlich schildert der Verfasser eingehend, wie die Zukunft
der westlichen Allianz gestaltet werden sollte. Dabei nimmt
er zur Kontrolle der Atomwaffen, zur Deutschlandfrage, zu
dem Ost-West-Problem und zur europäischen Einigung Stel-
lung. Wenn auch manche Vorschläge, so z. B. zur Lösung der
deutschen Frage, etwas theoretisch erscheinen, so bleibt dem
Verfasser doch nicht mehr als Argumente, Gedanken und
Vorschläge vorzutragen. Es bleibt zu hoffen, daß die sach-
kundige Analyse die Politiker zum Handeln, nicht zuletzt auf
dem Gebiet der Wiedervereinigung Deutschlands, treibt.

-a-

Ein interessantes Buch des Amerikaners Henry A. Kissinger

Henry A. Kissinger, seinerzeit auch Berater des US-Präsidenten Kennedy, analysiert in seinem neuesten Buch (in deutsch erschienen im Econ-Verlag Düsseldorf) mit ziemlichem Freimut die entscheidenden und ständig kritischer werdenden Fragen, vor denen die westliche Allianz heute steht und in Zukunft stehen wird. Dabei stellt er Forderungen auf, die nach seiner Meinung erfüllt werden müssen, um in politischer, militärischer und wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht den Bestand der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft zu sichern.

In seinem Vorwort teilt Kissinger mit, daß sein Buch, dem Vorlesungen vor dem XXX. amerikanischen „Verband für auswärtige Beziehungen" zugrunde liegen, nicht unbedingt den Beifall aller Fachleute in den USA finden wird. Das macht aber diese Darlegungen nicht uninteressanter, denn Kissinger ist nach Kenntnissen und sachlichen Erfahrungen Experte auf diesem Feld.

„Nichts ist gefährlicher", schreibt er unter Anspielung auf de Gaulle, „als die neuerdings moderne Theorie, daß alle Probleme der westlichen Allianz nur von einem einzigen Manne ausgelöst werden und daß man nur zu warten braucht, bis dieser Mann von der Bildfläche verschwindet."

Von dieser Erkenntnis ausgehend weist Kis-

singer nach, daß die Spannungen innerhalb der westlichen Allianz vor allen Dingen eine Folge der grundlegenden Wandlung in der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Stellung Europas sind und daß sie auch auf das Wesen der modernen Waffentechnik zurückgeführt werden müssen. Deshalb hängt nach seiner Meinung die Zukunft der NATO von der Bereitschaft der USA ab, ihre bisherige Vormachtstellung gegenüber den NATO-Ländern in eine gleichberechtigte Partnerschaft umzuwandeln.

Wenn die USA nach wie vor darauf bestehen, sich Entscheidungs- und Handlungsfreiheit weiter vorzubehalten, sie gleichzeitig aber den Verbündeten zu verweigern, werde entweder die NATO auseinanderfallen oder der politische Wille dieser Allianz zerstört werden.

Kissinger behandelt in seinem Buch auch eingehend die Zukunft. Er zählt dabei auf, was zur Verteidigung Westeuropas nötig ist. Dabei nimmt er zur Kontrolle der Atomwaffen, zur Deutschlandfrage, zum Ost-West-Problem und schließlich auch zur europäischen Einigung Stellung. Ohne Anspruch auf das letztgültige Wort und allumfassende Kenntnisse dieser Probleme zu erheben, gilt dieses Buch doch als eine der grundlegenden und richtungweisenden Analysen des politischen und militärischen Kräfteverhältnisses unserer Zeit.

kt

argus
Seit 1887

Ausschnitt aus

Fränkisches Volksblatt, Würzburg

vom

19. Dez. 1966

# Umdenken das Gebot der Stunde

Zu einem Buch Henry Kissingers über die westliche Allianz

Als Konrad Adenauer wegen seiner Parteitags-Bemerkung, die Sowjetunion sei eingetreten in den Kreis der friedliebenden Mächte, heftig angegriffen wurde, berief er sich unter anderem auf das Buch des amerikanischen Polit-Professors Henry A. Kissinger „Was wird aus der westlichen Allianz?“ (Titel der amerikanischen Originalausgabe: The troubled partnership, die ge-trübte Partnerschaft). Adenauer führte weiter aus, er habe sagen wollen, daß zur Stunde auch die Sowjets kein Interesse an kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen haben könnten und daß man diese Zeit nutzen möge, das westliche Bündnis der unumgänglichen Überprüfung zu unterziehen.

Genau das ist das Thema Kissingers (sein Buch erscheint im Econ-Verlag Düsseldorf). Kissinger, Berater amerikanischer Präsidenten und eigenständiger Beurteiler des auf US-Vorherrschaft abgestellten NATO-Paktes, spricht sich für eine Verteilung der Verteidigungslasten und Entscheidungsge-

walten auf zwei Schultern aus. Er weist mit zwingender Logik nach, daß echte Partnerschaft nicht auf Bevormundung gegründet sein darf. Er warnt davor, daß die Starrheit amerikanischen Hegemoniedenkens entweder die NATO oder den politischen Waffen der europäischen Partner zerbrechen könnte.

Seine im Vorjahr niedergeschriebenen Gedanken haben sich inzwischen zweifach bestätigt: Die Politik de Gaulles zeigt, daß das derzeitige Bündnis in seinen Organisationsformen nicht mehr ausreicht. Und das Vordringen der Rechtsradikalen in Deutschland läßt sich wesentlich aus der von Kissinger kritisierten politischen Entmündigung der Bündnispartner Amerikas erklären. Man sollte Kissingers Buch den leichtfertigen Kritikern de Gaulles, Adenauers, Strauß' und Guttenbergs zur Pflichtlektüre machen. Das 312 Seiten starke Werk kostet in Leinen 24,80 DM.

Pressebüro F.P. Schwakenberg, Bonn

Ausg.
Int. Buchges.
1968

"WAS WIRD AUS DER WESTLICHEN ALLIANZ?", v. Henry A. Kissinger (DM 24,80) - Hier wird eingehend geschildert, wie die Zukunft der westlichen Allianz aussehen sollte. Der Autor zählt auf, was zur Verteidigung Europas nötig ist. Dabei nimmt er zur Kontrolle der Atomwaffen, zur Deutschlandfrage, zum Ost-West-Problem und nicht zuletzt auch zur Frage der politischen Einigung Europas Stellung. Dieses Buch muß als eine der grundlegendsten und richtungsweisensten Analysen des politischen und militärischen Kräfteverhältnisses unserer Zeit gelten.

ausgegeben
woesung
qse

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

4248

NOV 17 1969

Dear General Klein:

Thank you for sending along the article
from the *National-Zeitung*. I can't say
that it surprises or disturbs me. I see
that you will be in town on November 15.
Unfortunately, that happens to be a bad
day on my schedule, but I do hope that it
will be possible to get together for a talk
on another occasion when you are here.

General Julius Klein
One East Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois

Retyped:nm:11/4/69

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

November 3, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. KISSINGER

FROM: Helmut Sonnenfeldt
SUBJECT: Julius Klein

I don't know whether you want to bother with
Julius Klein at all (incoming at Tab B). I
have drafted a letter (Tab A) putting him
off.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.

["Seite 9 / Nr. 41 / 18. Oktober 1969", "USA", "# HENRY KISSINGER-ein Freund Deutschlands?", "VON DR. AUSTIN J. APP", "EHRENPRÄSIDENT DER VEREINIGUNG AMERIKANISCHER BÜRGER DEUTSCHER ABSTAMMUNG", "Von allen Ernenneten Präsident Nixons wurde der Henry Kissinger von der Konservativen und den Republicanen mit Goldwater mit der größten Zurückhaltung von und den Liberellen aller Schattierungen mit der größten Befriedigung aufgenommen. Kissinger, dessen Macht und Einfluss dauernd steigen, bekommt dem Präsidenten auch die größte Unterstützung durch die Presse. Angesichts seiner großen Macht und manch auffe verließen ist, ihn für einen Freund Deutschlands zu halten - ist es sicher interes- sant, seine tatsächliche Einstellung gegenüber Deutschland zu kennen. Kissinger selber ist zu sehr Diplomat, sein Haltung zu enthüllen.", "KISSINGER", "Rogers, der an der Ernennung zum Nationaler Berater in Angelegenheiten der Nationaler Sicherheit weist von vorherin darauf hin, daß er damals - und damals - den Präsidenten über die Veröffentlichungen über den zweiten Mann in der Außenpolitik zu verlangen, die der Außenminister auch der erste Kriegsminister des Präsidenten in außenpolitischen Dingen zu verlangen, die er als den zweiten Mann in der Außenpolitik in erster Linie die Initiative zur Verwaltung der Bundesrepublik zu leisten und die Verwaltung der Bundesrepublik zu leisten. Er weist sich auf die deut- abstammung und die Verwaltung des Bundes- und der Bundesministeriums, die sich in der zweiten Amtsperiode als头 of Statekongress und als头 of Statekongress in der zweiten Amtsperiode als头 of Statekongress und als头 of State

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

November 17, 1969

Dear Mac:

Many thanks for sending me the copy of your
article in Sunday's _New York Times Magazine_.

Like its cousin in _Foreign Affairs_, it was
helpful in a large sense and also was of value
to me as I continue to define my own thinking
on the subject. I am sure that everyone reading
the article will appreciate the clarity with
which you treat this abstruse subject.

I am grateful for your taking the trouble to send
me an advance copy and hope that we can get
together again soon.

The Honorable McGeorge Bundy
320 East 43rd Street
New York, New York 10017

HAK:TL:lds:11/17/69

RECEIVED
NOV 1 9 1969
COMING FILES

# How to Wind Down
The Nuclear Arms Race

By McGEORGE BUNDY

IN Helsinki tomorrow the United States and the Soviet Union begin their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Proposed by the Johnson Administration as early as 1967, and agreed to in principle by Moscow in the middle of 1968, they have been delayed repeatedly, and indeed excessively, by both sides. Their opening is a major moment in the 25-year history of man's effort to survive in the company of nuclear weapons.

The eve of the meeting is not a good time for second-guessing the first steps of the participants on either side. Their opening instructions are presumably settled, and they do not yet have anything to report on what "the other side" has said or left unsaid. Moreover, the scope of the talks has yet to be clearly defined; and even their location is not settled, beyond an agreement to begin at Helsinki. But it may be a good time for the rest of us to think a little about the stakes of SALT—and about what may be needed from us all if this long-delayed negotiation is to end in success. One possible prescription would be equal parts of endurance, determination, understanding and action.

## ENDURANCE

THE first thing we shall all need is patience. It is most unlikely that the meetings this week—or this month—will produce any important level of agreement on any of the questions before the two parties. Indeed it will be some gain over most previous meetings if the early weeks of the conference disclose no position on either side which is so clearly unacceptable, or even offensive, to the other that there is nothing left to discuss. The preliminary noises from the two capitals do suggest that we may have graduated from the time when each side was eager to take positions whose domestic popularity was matched by their irrelevance to the real world—"general and complete disarmament" for the Russians and "international control and super-

McGEORGE BUNDY was, from 1961 to 1966, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. He is the president of the Ford Foundation.

**Specter** . . . — Brezhnev and Nixon form alternating, escalating warheads in this drawing from Nebelspalter, Switzerland. The caption: "Anti-anti-anti-anti-anti-missile system"

The New York Times Magazine NOVEMBER 16, 1969

# What Happens When
The Police Strike

By GERALD CLARK

**BLACK TUESDAY IN MONTREAL**—On the morning of Oct. 7, the police of Canada's largest city met at Paul Sauvé Arena where, led by Sgt. Guy Marcil (above), president of the Policemen's Brotherhood, they voted to stay off the job. Throughout that day and night, the city was racked by robberies, riots and looting; two men were killed, 49 persons were wounded. Below, citizens strip a downtown shop.

MONTREAL.

ON the day Montreal became a city without policemen, Gilles Madore unsuspectingly left his home as usual at 9:30 A.M. to drive to work. Madore, a 32-year-old bank inspector, had been filling in for the past few months as manager of the City & District Savings Bank branch at the corner of St. Denis Street and St. Joseph Boulevard, almost entirely a French-speaking residential area with only a splash of English and Italian. It was a perfect October day—clear and crisp—and during the 15-minute drive Madore noted that the trees were at their peak of gold and crimson. He was listening to the car radio, but since it was an FM all-music station, he caught no bulletins. Madore, in fact, did not know the police had walked off the job until he arrived at the bank and a nervous teller greeted him with the news that the city was wide open to criminals. "Don't worry," Madore said reassuringly. "We're a small branch. Holdup men won't come here." Besides, this was a Tuesday, by experience the quietest day in the week for bank robberies.

Madore was not alone in his ignorance of the strike. Most Montrealers were only now beginning to hear of it, for there had been no forewarning, no build-up. The morning newscasts had carried, as a routine item, the report that police were to meet in the Paul Sauvé Arena at 9 A.M. to hear the results of an arbitration board's findings on wages and other issues that had remained unsettled for almost a year. But no one had anticipated a walk-out; it was illegal for policemen and firefighters to strike.

ABOUT the time Madore was learning of the development, another tall—and rather rugged—Montrealer, René St. Martin, was also receiving a sketchy fill-in. St. Martin, 25, was a patrolman, first class, assigned to cruisers. He had worked the 4 P.M.-to-midnight shift and, after a few hours' sleep, had now arrived at court as a witness in a stolen-car case. But, St. Martin discovered, no cases were being heard; few police witnesses had shown up. Shop stewards of the union, the Montreal Policemen's Brotherhood, had made the rounds of 25 station houses around 7:30 A.M.—and calls had gone out over police radio bands—to get men to leave their posts at once, to assemble in the arena even before the planned session. Men arriving for the 8 A.M. shift also were told that the arbitration board's decisions were so distasteful that everyone had better head for the meeting. Even members of the Sûreté, the detective branch, turned in their sidearms and took off.

To St. Martin it was a surprise—and shock—to realize that a full strike was under way. He got into his car and drove the 10 miles to the arena in the northeast end of the city. By now scores of blue-and-white police cruisers were double- and triple-parked, along with scores of motorcycles. St. Martin arrived at about 11 A.M. and, as it developed,

(Continued on Page 176)

GERALD CLARK is the editor of The Montreal Star.

"More than any diplomatic event since Hiroshima
was bombed, the talks starting in Helsinki
tomorrow offer a chance of major impact on the
largest issue before the human race—its
survival in a world of thermonuclear knowhow"

vision" for the Americans. A good first test of the prospects of SALT will be the degree to which the parties avoid doctrinaire and irrelevant virtue of this sort.

But even if both sides avoid the gamesmanship of other years, we shall need patience. This problem is hard, and the parties are not ready to deal with it. One reason for welcoming this meeting is that by its own existence and momentum it may be an encouragement to actions that have not yet been taken in the tight circle of final authority in either capital.

The most obvious difficulty is one common to nearly all efforts at arms control in this century: it is the very great complexity of any attempt to reach agreement on limits or reductions that are "fair" to both sides. It is questionable whether this way of looking at the strategic arms race really makes sense, but it seems certain that at least initially the question of balanced concession—of *quid pro quo*—will be a necessary part of the thinking of both delegations.

The balancing of one kind of strategic weapon against another is an extremely difficult business. In the simpler and less dangerous days of disarmament conferences between the world wars, the conferees used to get into painful entanglement over such matters as the relative value of light and heavy cruisers, and it is worth remembering that this particular struggle erupted with particular force between two nations which really had no need to see each other as adversaries: the United States and the United Kingdom. Moreover in that earlier time no one had much doubt as to just how many warships everybody had or what kind of guns and ammunition they carried. Today's conferees have weapons systems that are as secret and as varied as they are untried. The difference between a one-megaton American Minuteman and a 25-megaton Soviet SS-9—both of them land-based intercontinental missiles—is so great that there is a wide range of plausible arguments on their relative value.*

*A one-megaton warhead has an explosive force equivalent to a million tons of TNT, 50 times the power of the A-bomb dropped on Hiroshima.

What makes matters more difficult is that the Helsinki meetings come at a time when both powers are engaged in major additions to their strategic arsenals. Through the anonymous initiative of those in Washington who wish to emphasize the dangers in Soviet behavior, William Beecher of The New York Times has recently given us the best public account of what the Russians are up to. It is not cheering. Large-scale Soviet deployment of the SS-9 continues, and the Soviets continue to test a multiple-warhead weapon for it. Soviet land-based intercontinental missiles are now more numerous than our own, and their megatonnage is much greater. The White House and the Pentagon seem especially worried about the threat that the multiple-warhead SS-9 may pose to our whole Minuteman system, and there is also a prospect of a new Soviet bomber and a new Soviet medium-range missile.

On our side, meanwhile, the development and initial deployment of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) to protect our Minuteman sites has been approved (though only after the hardest single legislative effort yet made by the Nixon Administration). We are also engaged in advanced testing of the Multiple Independently targeted Reentry Vehicle (MIRV), a system in which a single missile can carry up to 10 warheads, each aimed independently at a separate target.

The current acceleration of the strategic arms race is not made less dangerous by the wary ways of thought which seem dominant in the two great governments today. President Johnson, whose conviction and energy first put life into SALT, has retired to Texas. The momentum of what he started, in combination with other growing forces, has brought us to Helsinki—but it remains a fact that the governments represented there are led by men who have so far put more emphasis on building national strength against threats from others than upon finding a common path away from a common danger. The two governments have agreed to hold these talks, but neither one has

yet placed much of a bet upon their value.

In this situation it seems unlikely that either side will have any very startling proposals to make as the talks begin—and indeed both seem happy to call them "preliminary." The American delegation, led by Gerard Smith, is serious, informed, energetic and full of personal commitment. (The Soviet delegation has not been named as I write.) But the power of decision in both delegations will be at the other end of the cables.

Nor is it likely that either Washington or Moscow is yet ready to register any major decision in quick response to any cabled recommendations. Unlike Washington, Moscow is capable of sustained secret decision-making, so we cannot exclude the possibility that the Kremlin is already clear about what it will propose and reject, in some terms other than those of worn-out propaganda. If so, it will be the greatest surprise in the world of arms control since Charles Evans Hughes electrified the Washington Naval Conference of 1921 by offering to scrap a whole navy of battleships built and building. It appears almost certain that the collective leadership in the Kremlin has done no more than authorize a fishing expedition. On previous form we cannot expect the fishing expedition to be short. The Kremlin requires its negotiators to drive hard bargains, and the American delegation can expect to be fully tested before Moscow will begin to make serious decisions.

Washington seems undecided. Certainly it is clear that it wants talks, and apparently—which is important—there is a clear decision that any and all forms of strategic limitation can and should be examined if the Russians are ready. But if the American menu is offered à la carte, its prices are probably not yet decided. Would we trade our ABM for theirs, as Secretary Rogers once suggested, or is the real trade-off between ABM and SS-9? We are probably ready to accept some sort of "freeze" (generally defined as a standstill on new starts of major detectable activities like missile sites or submarines or

(Continued on Page 152)

... Reality—A missile is lowered into a Polaris submarine. The Polaris alone, says Bundy, serves the purpose of all the U.S. strategic weapons together—it deters all comers.

NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE NOVEMBER 16, 1969

THE OLD AND THE NEW—

Premier Sato (right, talking with members of the Diet) was raised in the traditions of prewar Japan, but as a politician he belongs to the postwar generation. In seeking to lead his 100 million countrymen out of the still-lingering miasma of defeat, he faces two main challenges: in foreign affairs, the return of Okinawa (which he hopes to resolve during his visit with President Nixon this week); in domestic affairs, the growing violence of rebellious youth (above, Tokyo police confronting student rioters). Sato (left) performs a chore unique among heads of government: filling one of the hundreds of requests he receives for specimens of his calligraphy. This scroll, when completed, will read: "I wish to sit in the spring breeze."

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE

How to wind down the nuclear arms race

(Continued from Page 47)

systems tests of new weapons), but which weapons, exactly, would we include?

And what does our Government really think about the terms on which it would accept some sort of MIRV moratorium? We know that Mr. Agnew does not like Mr. Muskie's proposal for a short-term unilateral delay, but we do not know—and it is unlikely that Mr. Nixon has yet decided—just what the Administration could and would accept.

We may regret the absence of major decisions (and I shall return to this point), but it is hard to withhold some sympathy from leaders who prefer to watch and wait. Not only are these decisions technically complex, but they engage the strongest possible convictions of groups that are concerned not only with the strategic defense of the United States, but also with the relative and absolute importance of their own part in that defense. It may be true—I think it is—that the United States and the Soviet Union would both be much safer and saner if they would agree to a drastic reduction or elimination of some of the weapons systems they already have—let alone the ones they are building. But if there is anything dearer to any military service than the weapons systems it has, it is the one it wants next. Even if Mr. Nixon has a deeper and stronger personal commitment to the struggle for arms control than we have yet seen, it is hard to blame him, so early in his Administration, for denying to delegate Smith and his colleagues the commanding initiative that Mr. Harding allowed to delegate Hughes. Still, we must hope that our country will in time do better.

DETERMINATION

THE Sunday morning sentiment that patience is a virtue may be necessary, but it is hardly enough. The required complement to an emphasis on the difficulty and the necessary deliberation of the opening talks at Helsinki is a fierce insistence on their importance—and a determination by all of us that, if they fail, it must not be our fault. It is right to remind ourselves, now and regularly in the weeks ahead, just why these talks matter so much. The probability of delay and frustration is high enough that, if

belief in their importance should be weak, the talks might well peter out into emptiness, as so many arms talks have before.

The simple and sufficient reason for the importance of these talks is that, more than any diplomatic event since Hiroshima, they really do offer a chance of major impact on the largest single issue before the human race—its survival in a world of thermonuclear knowhow. Opinions differ as

Unseen Participant in the Talks (I)—The SS-9 missile on view in Moscow, 1968.

to how much we really keep this crucial question in our minds. I suspect few of us think about it as much as we should. But when we do think about it, the most important fact about it is not hard to state: these terrible weapons could end us all, and with all our troubles we do not want to be ended. It follows that any understanding which can make that result less likely has an overriding importance.

SALT can have this effect. It puts the right subject before the right parties at the right time.

The parties are right because to have fewer or more than these two would be wrong. The defining characteristic of the problem of strategic weapons is the inescapable interaction between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The behavior of third powers is important, but in a deeply subordinate way. The differ-

ence, in simple explosive force, between the nuclear strength of the two great powers and those of any other state is measured by multiples of 10 times 10—and it is probable that the difference in the numbers, range and sophistication of delivery vehicles is greater still. At the leading edge of the nuclear race, both in sophistication and in danger, there are only two states today.

But there are two, not one.

In nuclear matters the United States and the Soviet Union are stuck with one another. This point often escapes Americans who do not like what we are doing. They want us to stop—and for all sorts of reasons, each of which may seem strong and sensible when taken by itself. But they sometimes neglect the question of the comparative positions of the two states, which in political terms is inescapable. The comparison may in fact suggest a need and opportunity for American initiative (I believe that it does), but it cannot be neglected. The nuclear strength of the Soviet Union, when combined with its international record, leaves no case at all for simple, unilateral, nuclear disarmament by the United States. If there is to be a durable limit on the wild race in strategic weapons, each of the two great powers will have to help. The

governing political forces in both countries—and, in our case that means public opinion, in the end—will accept nothing less. So the two parties at Helsinki are the right ones.

The time is right, too. In one sense, any time is right for this topic; there has never been a moment, since long before the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo, when it was not critically important to be at work on these matters. Anytime in the future will be a good time, too; in the struggle for control of the atom there can be no time

when it is right to give up. But there is a special timeliness today.

There are four characteristics of the present situation which can give the diplomats reason to hope that they are meeting at a good moment:

1. Individual Americans and Russians have begun to learn how to talk with each other seriously on this hard topic. We all owe a great debt to the private citizens in this country who have worked hard to establish this dialogue with leading Russians. The most notable processes are those of the multinational Pugwash meetings and the bilateral exchanges between the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and reports from the most recent meetings of these groups in Russia do suggest that, in terms of mutual comprehension, we have come a long way in

recent years. There is a big difference between informal private exchanges and official negotiation, and between comprehension and argument. But the sober and responsible discourse which it now seems reasonable to expect will be very different from anything we have known before in disarmament negotiation—except for the single and sharply limited case of the atmospheric test ban agreement of 1963.

2. The general question of arms limitation has now engaged the attention and support of American public opinion as never before. It is true that there was general public approval of such American initiatives as the Baruch Plan for international control of atomic weapons, but such support was unrelated either to military budgets or to real choices of defense systems. In all previous arms control negotiations, a necessary principal concern of the American negotiators has been to avoid "concessions" that could not win support in the Congress. Countervailing pressure on behalf of specific forms of arms limitation has been comparatively weak. The summer's close debate on deployment of ABM's demonstrates how much the situation has changed. Comparable public concern in the past can be found only in the particular case of atmospheric contamination from nuclear testing, and it is worth remembering that an atmospheric test ban did emerge in the end. The American delegates in Helsinki will be exposed to the currents of public opinion in a manner quite at variance with the silence that surrounds the continuing discussion—of general disarmament questions—by 25 nations in Geneva.

To some specialists this new interest on the part of American opinion is not entirely welcome. Correctly noting that there is no comparable force working on Soviet negotiators, they fear a pressure for American concessions that might imperil the balance of deterrence. Such a possibility exists, at least in theory, but when we consider the very heavy weight of power and belief that works against arms control, it seems right to give a warm welcome to the new strength of public concern on the control side. It can help the negotiators at least as often as it hampers them—it gives to the President himself more freedom than it takes away.

3. The meeting at Helsinki is timely because the two governments have a pressing practical need for relief from

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vulnerability of both offensive and defensive land-based systems, weapons at sea are cheap and safe; they are also far from people and cities. So strong is this case, indeed, that one is forced to the suspicion that only the ancient devil of interservice rivalry has delayed its earlier recognition.

There are many uncertainties in this matter, and I repeat that in these closing suggestions I have intended more to indicate possibilities than to offer definite solutions. It may be that the case for ABM will not grow weaker, and land-based systems may also have some enduring virtue beyond the comfort which they provide for those to whom they give a mission. But at the very least it is right to ask these questions, and the process which opens now at Helsinki should help to force us all to think them through.

AS I read over what I have written, I sense a certain tension between the need for patience and the need for action. Partly this may be a tension also between concern for the problem itself, as I understand it, and sympathetic respect for the President's own unique position. Certainly those who have lived with the struggles of other Presidents must recognize that not one of them so far has fully grasped the nettle of nuclear parity; not one has wholly avoided words and actions that have helped to make the

present problem harder. No one who has shared in earlier compromises of nuclear politics can have any illusion that this subject is easy for Presidents.

Yet without Presidential leadership, nuclear arms control does not have a chance in this country. For the next three years at least we are all dependent on what Mr. Nixon decides. In this situation it seems reasonable to hope that in due course he will come to his own strong and clear conclusions. Meanwhile the rest of us have our own obligation to keep on trying to understand these things better. The talks in Helsinki, if they do nothing else, will remind both the citizen and the President that this great subject is THERE. The stakes are high, and from the President on down, we need to pay attention to the game.

The metaphor of a game is not a good one—but it does allow me one last comment. In any arms race the engine of escalation is powered by a deep, almost instinctive belief that a gain for one side is a loss for the other; so the analogy to a game seems to make sense—my plus is your minus; if I win a point, you lose it. But this terrible contest in superfluous strategic weapons is not that kind of game any more, if it ever was. It is a game that both sides lose by continuing—that both sides win by stopping. The statesman who acts first on this great truth has endless fame to win. ■

U.S. Leader at the Talks—Gerard Smith, chief of our delegation, in his State Department office. "In nuclear matters the U.S. and Russia are stuck with one another."

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# Vietnam General Says Saigon Is A Government Of Minority

By Vicente Villamin

GENERAL DUONG van Minh, "Big Minh," a retired Vietnamese military man of considerable distinction, says, according to a Saigon press dispatch of November 13, that, like the Vietcong, the Saigon government of President Thieu is supported only by a minority of the people. The Communist enemy says that "it represents nobody," and he proposes to abolish that government. General Minh wants it changed by holding a "referendum or congress to save the people." Their object is identical, though their motives are different. The former is hostile; the latter is patriotic.

The referendum or congress would lead to a new election for President. That election would violate the Saigon Constitution. According to its Article 52 (2), the next election for President will be in 1971. In the meantime, there can be no legal election.

Under Article 56 (1), an elected President can only cease to be such President before the expiration of his term of four years in cases of "death, resignation, impeachment, or serious or prolonged illness such that the incumbent can no longer carry out his duties." President Thieu today does not come under this provision.

The President can be removed from office under Article 85 if he is found guilty of "treason or other high crimes." That is effected by the Special Court which is "chaired by the Chairman of the Supreme Court and consists of five Representatives and five Senators." This provision does not now apply to President Thieu.

The timing of General Minh's proposal is particularly unfortunate. It will disturb, if carried out, the America-Saigon plan of American troops withdrawal to be replaced by South Vietnamese troops. This plan, agreed upon between Presidents Nixon and Thieu, will let America out of the war honorably in a reasonably short time and at the same time will lead to a general peace. While America has the so-called moratorium to deal with, Saigon will have the Minh referendum to worry about. The latter will be more serious because it is liable to produce an upheaval or worse.

It may be asked, how did General Minh know that there is only a minority supporting the Saigon government, when in the free and honest election of two years ago there was a big majority that elected it? He does not say that the majority had changed its opinion. He cannot say it because he does not have the means of finding it out. From all realities and appearances, there has been no change except for the better—more support for President Thieu from a united people, realizing the war problems and difficulties that their government has to face.

It is said that in South Vietnam there are some thirty or more political parties. They all want to be represented in the government to "broaden its base." Those that are not invited to the government usually make the hue and cry that the government is one of minority. As tacticians, politicians belong to one tribe all over the world.

In the absence of proved charges of incompetence, infidelity, graft and corruption, President Thieu stands before the world as a good, strong and successful Chief Executive. He does so today. The American government has great confidence in him. He maintains his nationalism, freedom and dignity intact. He is the South Vietnamese who can talk frankly to America and be readily believed and, above all, he can ask for America's assistance for his country, especially in the financial field, and obtain it. Plainly and patriotically, it is the duty of every South Vietnamese to support him and not harass him, especially in the midst of a war with a relentless and lawless enemy.

To this writer, a foreign sympathizer of South Vietnam in this war, it is obvious that General Minh's proposal for a referendum or congress to find out whether the people are with the government or not and presumably to elect a new President, is unconstitutional, unnecessary, unwise and dangerous.

It is under Article 12 (1) of the Constitution that General Minh advanced his proposal. The provision guarantees freedom of thought and expression provided it "does not harm... national security." The proposal necessarily involves the national security and is harmful to it. There is nothing to do but discard it for the sake of national solidarity and to uphold the Constitution. South Vietnam is a democracy and a democracy is always in trouble until it reaches its desired conclusions. Under President Thieu, she is reasonably safe, well, free and hopeful even in these days of war, hate and unreason. ●

(Reprint from EXAMINER, The Asia Newsweekly, December 6, 1969; 67 Dr. Alejos St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, Philippines.)

# America And Hanoi Should Have Anonymous Peace Negotiators

By Vicente Villamin

AFTER LONG efforts, there is yet no peace in Vietnam. Do the parties want peace? Yes. America and Hanoi want it, as they constantly say. Hanoi wants it, otherwise she would not have sent a big delegation to the peace conference in Paris. The late President Ho Chi Minh wanted it. He was the one who sent the delegation.

Why then is there no peace? It is largely due to procedure. In Paris, Hanoi is engaged, first and foremost, in propaganda. She takes positions to promote it even at the expense of understanding and peace itself. The other side has to defend itself. The result has been a continuous bickering and more misunderstanding.

In view of this situation, which has lasted for more than a year and thretened to go on indefinitely, another method of peace-making must be found. This method is to make the peace negotiation reserved and secret until the peace agreement is ready for public negotiation.

To this end, America and Hanoi should designate their own anonymous pre-peace negotiators. The two of them will meet anywhere at anytime in private and talk of the problems of peace and how they could be met. Of course, they will report to nobody except the heads of their respective governments. They must keep away from the press and other communication media. As complete a secrecy as is humanly possible must be maintained to avoid any complication.

The two men, if anybody can, will be able to talk frankly and fully with each other. They will know where they can agree or disagree or compromise. They will be constantly in touch with their superiors, who will receive their reports and direct them in the steps to take. In that way, they can reach tentative agreements without formally committing their governments. That will give them ample freedom for discussions.

A part-way step along this line was taken by President Nixon. In his speech of November 3, he mentioned that he asked a friend of the late President Ho Chi Minh to deliver a letter to him in which he urged peace. He said that his proposal was "flatly rejected" by President Ho in a letter he received from him on August 30, three days before his death.

President Ho's reply was not entirely hopeless. It contained this suggestive

words: "With good will on both sides, we might arrive at common efforts in view of finding a correct solution of the Vietnamese problem." Coming from him, those words are a source of hope for an understanding leading to peace.

Since President Ho still influences the thinking of Hanoi, it is not late even now for the anonymous pre-peace negotiator to follow it up if and when his counterpart is designated by Hanoi. That one statement alone of President Ho offers a wide field for negotiations that cannot help but produce at least some desired results. It showed clearly that the late President Ho was for peace and was willing to work for it with the American President. His successor would follow it.

The two anonymous pre-peace negotiators can talk on a wide range of subjects, such as postwar economic aid, future relations between the two Vietnams, and political, military and other relevant matters. The beauty of the whole thing is that they can indulge in unlimited give-and-take in their ideas without assuming any responsibility nor committing their governments, and then report to their superiors who will take on the responsibility at the proper time.

While the two anonymous pre-peace negotiators are exchanging their ideas, the Paris peace conference can go on to keep the semblance of discussing peace even in a warlike and impertinent manner. Then one fine day when everything is ready, a formal conference on a ministerial level can be called and approve the agreements reached in secret by the anonymous negotiators.

The present suggestion can be carried out only if both sides agree to it. If they have agreed on the Paris conference of numerous delegates, they should be able to agree on a two-man secret conference that will have an excellent chance to achieve peace which both sides want. Let us hope for the best. Let us have the majestic peace without victory—with neither winner nor loser.