HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

May 30, 1969

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Henry:

I'm writing to follow up our conversation last week and to respond to your inquiry if I could help you this summer on any of the foreign policy problems with which you are wrestling.

As I mentioned to you then, a satisfactory end to the Vietnamese War is clearly the top priority item on our foreign policy agenda, and I would very much like to make any contribution I could to achieving that goal. The aspect of this problem on which I could be of most help would be the nature of the political settlement in South Vietnam and the constitutional arrangements which might be worked out there. As you know, earlier this year I wrote a fairly lengthy paper on "Getting Ready for Political Competition in South Vietnam." More recently, I have been involved with Cy Vance, Roy Wehrle, Jim Grant, Chet Cooper, and Harry Boardman in attempting to sketch out a negotiating strategy on some of these issues. We now have under preparation for you a second paper analyzing constitutional and electoral arrangements which might be acceptable to both sides at Paris. We will have this paper in your hands before you leave for Midway.

In preparing this paper and in any other consideration of what type of constitutional and electoral arrangements we could accept in South Vietnam, we are always confronted with one great unanswered question. This concerns the political cohesiveness and organizational strength of the non-communist South Vietnamese and the extent to which alternate constitutional arrangements or US policies may foster or obstruct greater cohesion among them. As you have mentioned, we clearly wish to secure a political settlement which will maximize the probability that Saigon will not be dominated by the communists for at least three to five years.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger

Page Two

Electoral and constitutional arrangements for peaceful political competition and majority rule will go a long way toward meeting this objective. The other key element in the picture, however, is the extent to which the non-communist South Vietnamese are able to organize themselves politically and to work together effectively.

It seems likely, for instance, that the NLF will want to replace the existing presidential-type government with a parliamentary system. If the US could be reasonably sure of a reasonably high degree of cohesion among the non-communist South Vietnamese, we could be much more willing to agree to such a system than if the opposite were the case. A parliamentary system in which the NLF had 40% of the votes in parliament would be a viable and acceptable system, from our viewpoint, if the other 60% were organized into a stable working majority. Such a system would, on the other hand, be an invitation to disaster and a complete communist take-over within a few months if that non-communist 60% were divided into four or five squabbling parties and factions.

Our negotiating strategy on a whole range of constitutional and political issues thus requires us:

(a) to have as accurate as possible appraisal of the trends in South Vietnamese political development and the current and prospective cohesiveness and organizational strength of non-communist groups in South Vietnam; and

(b) to explore how, if at all, alternative negotiating strategies in Paris or US actions in South Vietnam may affect this political cohesiveness and organizational strength.

In the absence of a settlement, American disengagement from South Vietnam will depend, in large part, on the military effectiveness of ARVN and its ability to assume military functions now performed by US forces. With a settlement, the consequences of American disengagement from Vietnam will depend, in large part, on the political effectiveness of the non-communist South Vietnamese and their ability to compete politically with the NLF. We now have underway many studies of the problem of increasing ARVN military effectiveness and we have adopted many policies and programs designed to hasten this along. What seems essential now is a similar analysis of the future political effectiveness of the South Vietnamese vis-a-vis the NLF and what, if anything, we can do to increase that effectiveness.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
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Action on this front could have important pay-offs in terms of hastening an agreement in Paris and in postponing, perhaps indefinitely, NLF conquest of political power in Saigon. It may be that we are already doing a lot in this area, but from what I have been able to see, such is not the case. Assuming that the Paris negotiations are likely to go on for most of the rest of the year, it would seem most important that we know where we stand with respect to current and possible political development in South Vietnam.

What I would suggest, consequently, is an analysis and report on current trends and possible future developments in the political coherence and organizational strength of the non-communist South Vietnamese and what, if anything, the US can do at Paris or in Vietnam to enhance their political effectiveness. If this report is going to be useful, it would have to be done quickly and probably completed by mid-summer. It would, I think, involve a couple of weeks' work in Washington going over the appropriate cables and documents and also, I suspect, at least a brief (two weeks, perhaps) trip to South Vietnam to talk directly to knowledgeable Americans and South Vietnamese there and to get first-hand the smell of the current situation. As you will remember, I was out in Vietnam during most of the summer of 1967 doing a study for the State Department on the long-term political development and stability of that country. While clearly things have changed significantly in two years, I do have some familiarity with the ways of Vietnamese politics and some idea of the South Vietnamese and Americans who could be helpful on this issue.

I fully realize that you will have other things on your mind before Midway and that, indeed, what happens there may have direct implications for the nature and relevance of this proposal. I won't, consequently, attempt to contact you about it before you return from the far Pacific. But I will give you a ring then.

With all the best,

As always,

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

July 1, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Dean Moor
SUBJECT: Comment on Attached Memorandum

Some advice on negotiating strategy in Vietnam has been sent you by Messrs. Harry Boardman, Chester Cooper, Samuel Huntington, and Roy Wehrle (Tab A). They propose a joint working group made up of allied and Communist representatives at Paris with the mission of working out elements of a political settlement.

The group is intended to leap over the problem of a coalition government. The authors feel that the NLF might give up its demands for a coalition if the GVN indicated a willingness to establish a joint group to make "early and serious" progress on constitutional and election changes. The memorandum contains some sound judgments on the enemy's political objectives in any agreed effort to alter the constitution or arrange elections.

I do not share the authors' views about the receptivity of the Communists to a proposal for a joint group. They seem determined to hold out against any substantive participation by the GVN, as a government, in the peace settlement. If such a proposal were made by the GVN, it might have merit as part of Thieu's peace plan. Thieu would probably not object to a joint commission, particularly if the membership were limited only to the GVN and the NLF/PRG.

Other than as a useful propaganda gimmick, however, the proposal seems to me to have little merit at this point. If the Communists change their tune, it might be useful at a later date.

If you discuss the proposal with the authors, you might tell them you agree with their judgment that it is "most uncertain" whether such a joint working group could be established at this point. However, you will keep it in mind as a possible model for an allied proposal of this sort, if the proper opportunity arises.

Private and Confidential

# I. A Bridge from Negotiations to Political Competition

Our previous paper delineated practical arrangements for the division of political control and power in SVN and for a political process that would supplant the military conflict there. In that paper we:

- presumed that each side would, or conceivably could, agree that the potential gain from political competition was more promising than the calculable benefits being achieved by military means;

- proposed short-term arrangements by which it is hoped that each side could be persuaded to agree to certain trade-offs which would confirm communist control in the country-side while minimizing their role in the national government and in urban centers, where a GVN would dominate;

- assumed, but did not discuss, the necessity for a bridge between the Paris negotiations and the beginning of the active process of political competition.

As a means for resolving the constitutional, legal, and practical barriers to a political process in SVN which embraces both sides and, explicitly, permits active participation by the communists, we make the following suggestion for a joint working group or groups, a possible scenario for its conception and development, and an estimate of some of the elements that might comprise the NLF position on constitutional and election issues. Our analysis of the likely NLF

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position leads us to believe that the procedural obstacles to agree-
ment will be at least as troublesome as substantive differences over
constitutional and electoral issues. The joint working group is one
possible way of getting around these procedural obstacles.

## II. The Concept and Establishment of a Joint Working Group

The NLF's Ten-Point statement of May 8 proposes an interim
coalition government, a new constitution, and a new general election.
To obtain the political solution which is a stated objective of the
US, the constitution must be changed so that the NLF may play an
overt role in the political processes in SVN. On the other hand, we
recognize that an interim coalition government could be troublesome,
because it is likely to be unstable and possibly unworkable. Also,
we know that the GVN will go to great lengths to oppose the idea of
one, with consequent strains on US-GVN relations. We do not feel,
however, that the US should rule out a coalition government, although
it would seem desirable to find an alternative, if possible.

We suggest a joint working group as a means for devising
changes in the constitution and electoral laws while affording a pos-
sible way to leap-frog an interim coalition government. That this
could be done is, of course, most uncertain. But confronted with
early and serious progress on constitutional and electoral changes the
NLF might be willing to drop its demand for an interim coalition.

A joint working group could be established as a subcommittee
of the Paris negotiations group. The working group could be comprised
of only NLF-GVN representatives or expanded to include representatives

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of the other two parties. It would carry on its own negotiations
on constitutional and election changes while the Paris negotiators
continued to work on other questions (such as cease-fire, troop with-
drawal, international supervision).

At an appropriate time (probably following private discussion between US and NVN representatives) the Paris negotiators would agree that representatives be appointed to this joint working group. They would be asked to report back to the four negotiating principals after a specified period of time (90-120 days) with agreed-upon constitutional changes and election arrangements. (Note: If the changes agreed upon by the joint working group are to be legitimate under the present constitution, they would need to be approved by the National Assembly. If the changes cannot be worked out within the framework of the present constitution, a constitutional referendum might be necessary.)

The final political settlement could either incorporate
the basic recommendations of the joint working group as part of the
settlement or could simply note agreement with those recommendations
and have the joint group's report attached as an official annex of
the Agreement. The final political settlement would also include
the firm scheduling of new national elections.

The work of such a group could be approached by each side
from its own frame of reference: the communists, to write a new
constitution and to establish a new basis for political competition
in SVN; the GVN, to amend existing political norms to include the
NLF; each to establish conditions most favorable to its ultimate aim
of controlling the government of the RVN.

### III. An Estimate of Probable NLF Objectives Concerning Constitutional and Electoral Structures

Our evaluation of these principal objectives are grouped in three categories: division of local and national power; national government structure; and electoral laws.

#### A. National and Local Powers

Our previous paper discussed at length the reality of power at local and national levels, the division of power which must be recognized by all parties to any negotiated settlement, and the potential and possible techniques for negotiated trade-offs at and between the local and national levels.

With respect to the issue of national and local power, we expect that the NLF would, at the least:

1. desire a weak central government, which would help confirm NLF authority and maximize their political strength in local areas. Certainly they would seek to minimize, generally, the role of the central government and, in particular, would want to neutralize the authority of the central army and police forces in their area;

2. require recognition of the NLF Liberation Committees in those local areas in which they have been established; in those areas where actual control is currently in question, they would seek, through negotiation and bargaining, recognition of their authority to the broadest possible extent.

(Comment: It is our evaluation that much of this the GVN would need to and could recognize, while they could bargain seriously for weak,

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or minimum, participation by the NLF in the central and urban govern-
ments.)

B. <u>Structure of Government at National Level</u>

We expect that the NLF will:

1. demand recognition of the NLF as a legal, legitimate political party, without precondition or constraints;

2. demand elimination of article 4 of the present constitution;

3. seek a parliamentary form of government and, as in the case of NVN, a unicameral legislature.

(Comment: We presume the NLF would prefer a president elected by the national assembly and that the GVN could bargain for a president elected by popular vote.)

C. <ins>Electoral Laws</ins>

We expect that the NLF will:

1. demand repeal of the current laws, certainly those which prohibit participation in the electoral process by the communists;

2. seek an electoral system that would provide for:

a. single-member districts;

b. plurality voting with no run-offs;

c. negotiated boundaries of the electoral districts; in effect a gerrymandering by which each side would be assured a major bloc of representatives in the national legislature.

3. insist that there be no international supervision of elec-
tions, but they might compromise on a joint Vietnamese
electoral supervision committee;

4. will seek elections as soon as possible, but only after US troop withdrawal. They might compromise so that elections could take place after a substantial process of withdrawal and with remaining US troops in base enclaves;

5. would wish, if there is to be a popular election of the president, that he be elected by plurality vote, and that a slate of multiple candidates be encouraged.

MEMORANDUM

To : The Honorable Elliot L. Richardson
The Under Secretary of State

Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

From : Harry Boardman, Chester Cooper, Samuel Huntington,
Roy Wehrle

In support of the suggestions concerning a joint working group on the
constitution and electoral structures, we submit the following
comments.

A basic (perhaps _the_ basic) American objective in Viet Nam is to
provide the Vietnamese an opportunity to choose freely their govern-
ment. Such a choice, at least in terms the Americans understand, is
expressed in a free election. This objective is consistent with our
traditions. It is also a modest one, especially compared to the costs
borne in the effort to achieve it.

We believe that it would be in our best interest to obtain a free
general election in Viet Nam as soon as possible and that the route
to such elections should be as direct as possible. This is a further

reason we believe it important to leap-frog an interim coalition
government which we feel would be weak and fragile, almost by
definition, and unable to hold South Viet Nam's unstable mixture
together for very long. Nor is it likely that it could tackle
some of the tough problems which will crowd in on it during its
tenure - a period that could be very extended if both sides felt under
no compulsion to reach agreement on constitutional and election arrange-
ments. If, in fact, we must accept an interim coalition, it should
have a definite, agreed-upon term, i.e., between the Paris agreement
and the time of elections. (In our proposal, this would have been
agreed upon and incorporated in the Paris agreement.)

Another important consideration with respect to the elections is that
the American people be convinced that they were in fact free and
democratic. If the Administration is to claim that the American
objectives in Viet Nam have been achieved, the claim must be credible.
This means some form of supervision in which we can have confidence.

The point has been made that the Administration needs "four or five
years" of grace in Viet Nam. Unless the non-communist groups can
rally into a cohesive force this just may not be possible. By our
scenario, they might have as much as a year in which to increase their
political strength. This assumes that the Paris negotiations go on until
next spring - a tolerable time schedule if conspicuous progress is being
made, some American forces withdrawn and casualties substantially decreased -
and a period of some months elapses before elections are held. Even

if the Communists do well in the elections and, as a consequence,
have a role in the government, the Administration will be on high
ground if the American people are convinced that the election
represented a free choice by the Vietnamese. There is, finally,
reason to hope that the NLF once it has a stake in political power
in South Viet Nam, will, for reasons of its own, attempt to keep
its distance from Hanoi for as long as possible. In short, with
effort, skill and luck we just might have a political solution
that would work.

Private and Confidential

--presumed that each side would, or conceivably could,
agree that the potential gain from political competition
was more promising than the calculable benefits being
achieved by military means;

--proposed short-term arrangements by which it is hoped
that each side could be persuaded to agree to certain
trade-offs which would confirm communist control in
the country-side while minimizing their role in the
national government and in urban centers, where a GVN
would dominate;

--assumed, but did not discuss, the necessity for a bridge
between the Paris negotiations and the beginning of the
active process of political competition.

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II. <u>The Concept and Establishment of a Joint Working Group</u>

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We expect that the NLF will:

C. <ins>Electoral Laws</ins>

We expect that the NLF will:

a. single-member districts;

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 31, 1969

Dear Professor Huntington:

I am sorry about the mix up within our staff concerning the followup on your letter to Dr. Kissinger of July 9. As both Tony Lake and I have told you, Henry is extremely interested in having you pursue the lines of inquiry outlined in your letter. What I did not know until after I had talked with you on the telephone was that Henry intended to discuss the project personally with you on his return from the Presidential trip. As soon as that meeting has taken place, we can discuss specific consultant arrangements.

Again, I regret any inconvenience we may have caused you.

Professor Samuel P. Huntington
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

February 23, 1971

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Henry:

If their daddy has as sure an instinct on foreign policy as David and Elizabeth have on museums, the critics and enemies of the United States had better fold their tents and quitely steal away while they still have a chance. By all accounts, the Naval Museum was absolutely tops. The boys were ecstatic -- "the guns move" -- and even Nancy said she had a whale of a time. Also, Admiral Hooper couldn't have been nicer. I'm green with envy that I had to miss it this trip, but it will clearly have to get priority over Foggy Bottom and the Pentagon the next time I'm in Washington. Many, many thanks for arranging all this and for offering us all such a cordial reception at the White House.

I also greatly appreciate your interest in Foreign Policy (upper case, journalistic meaning) and your willingness to speak to Elliot about the article we have in mind on the common elements underlying the domestic and foreign policy of the Administration and the balance of priorities between foreign and domestic policy. I'm very much looking forward to hearing from you as to what his reaction is. Could you please tell him that I would be happy to discuss the idea with him, either directly or by correspondence? As I mentioned to you, it is easy for a journal like ours to secure good pieces from the critics of policy, but it is very difficult to get good pieces from people supporting current policy. As 1972 approaches, it would clearly be in the interest of the Administration to develop a carefully reasoned appeal to thoughtful and informed readers. Such an appeal could, I think, help it to win over certain otherwise normally Democratic elements of the academic and policy-oriented community.

As you suggested, I will also let you know before I get in touch

MAR 2 1971

Dear Sam:

I enjoyed seeing you when you were down and
am pleased that the children had a good time
at the Naval Museum.

I will speak with Elliot about the article we
discussed, and will tell him that you will
write to discuss the details of your proposal.
I certainly agree that it is difficult to obtain
thoughtful pieces supporting current policy
and hope you and Elliot will be able to work
something out.

Please let me know when you next plan to be
in Washington and we will try to get together.
Best to Nancy and the children.

Dr. Samuel P. Huntington
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

PRH:jlp:3/1/71

DRH:Jlb:3\1\11

Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
6 Divinity Avenue
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Dr. Samuel P. Huntington

Henry A. Kieinger

Warm regards,

Beat to Nancy and the children,
in Washington and we will try to get together.
Please let me know when you next plan to be

something out.
and hope you and Elliot will be able to work
thoughtful pieces supporting current policy
I certainly agree that it is difficult to obtain
write to discuss the details of your proposal,
discussed, and will tell him that you will
I will speak with Elliot about the article we

at the Naval Museum.
Sam pleased that the children had a good time
I enjoyed seeing you when you were down and

Dear Sam:

MAR 5 1971

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