Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon
Secretary Roggrs
4/15/70 4:00 p.m.
page 2

K: I don't see how you do it. He raved about you for what it's worth.

R: That and 20 cents will get you a ride in a subway.

K: I was against it, but the President wanted to show some affirmative movement.

R: It will give me a chance to talk to Fulbright about something else.

K: The President is afraid the combination of the briefing of NATO and the snooping around of the press . . . While I have you on the phone, about the U.N. commission, I would be glad to work out a joint list with you. I have no views on it so it would be your list.

R: I don't want to bargain with Flemming. Some of these people are so old; there's no point in having them. Jack McCloskey, no point in having him. Edward Teller shouldn't be on.

K: No, he's bad.

R: We could do it in 5 minutes after the meeting.

K: Yes, and since it will be a joint list that should settle it. I don't have a suggestion.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KNV NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCONE
Zeigler/Kissinger

4:10 pm (?)

4/15/70

Z: Are you aware of what I said this morning re Soviet ______.

KN No.

Z: I said the President

K: Could I call you in 15 mins.?

Z: I have to brief. I said we have received a message from Kosygin and ______ from many countries both here and at NASA. This shows concern around the world. ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? (quoting too fast for notetaker to get). OK?

K: That's fine.

Z: I was asked if the President expressly intends to respond.

K: Yes.

Z: Personnaly?

K: To the Soviets.

Z: Thanking him. Would we release it? They will probably release theirs.

K: We haven't decided yet. We asked NASA to draft a reply.

Z: Is the tone fine?

K: It's fine.

Z: I would rather you didn't answer unless you have to.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Zeigler.

4:12 4/15/70

In a conversation with Ron Zeigler, Mr. Kissinger indicated that he was thinking of talking to the press after his congressional briefing tomorrow. However, he might put it off until Friday. Ron said that there was a great risk of leaks if he waited and he should do it right away. HAK said he would think about it and let Ron know.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCOM

Sen. Jackson/Kissinger

4:35 pm

4/15/70

J: I have a breakfast thing on tomorrow morning. Will there be a subsequent opportunity to be brought up to date?

K: I will have one of my people brief you.

J: These people are coming all the way from Spokane. How about a senior staff member -- Fosdick?

K: Send Dorothy (?) and I will have him/her (?) brought in with my people.

J: Do you know Perle?

K: Send him. He is less known. I will check on it because no one else has that. It's wiser just to have one.

J: I will let your office know. Just put down Richard Perle. You know him. Will you clear him at the SW gate?

K: Have him at my office at 8:15 and I will bring him up. I will have to talk to Harlow and if he has a <u>conniction</u> I will have to call you back.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON

Prof. Doty/Kissinger

5:05 pm

4/15/70

D: Just two or three things. With regard to a science type that you were talking about -- I have several suggestions -- the most attractive one is at the LinCOLN Laboratories. I wondered if that was far enough away to get the circulation vita

K: I don't know if it will be approved.

D: He sounds so good and I can get Ruina to send for his sheet. The larger issue is that in the event that ______ would retire on his 70th birthday this year and there was talk about replacement there and I suggest you take into account the person I would come up with -- Charlie Towne. He is at Berkley now.

K: That's a good idea.

D: That's meaningful to him. MIT was a mixed blessing for him. He would like to see that scene again with some confidence

K: That's an interesting idea.

D: I think he would be remarkable. I hasten to mention it now because the national academy --

K: The President is calling now and I have a meeting. Let me call you back around 7:00.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Phil Farley

4/15/70 6:30 p.m.

F: The full briefing schedule has accelerated.

K: Right.

F: Are you expecting me to participate?

K: Yes, we expect you to be present. President intended to do most of it himself. He may have me give a description of the work program. But you have been invited?

F: No.

K: God Damn. We want you there.

F: Are you trying to discourage Congressional briefings?

K: I hadn't thought of it one way or the other.

we

F: If there is a disposition to try to cut these off it might make a point about the desirability of cutting down or else take them as they come.

K: I think that's the present inclination, but I'll check.

F: I'll be there a little before 8:30.

K: Right.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
U. Alexis Johnson
4/15/70 7:45 p.m.

K: I'm trying to see in this package whether it had any basis in a Presidential decision and I can't find it. Is there something wrong with me? I'm not saying he's against it, but this is a rather heavy artillery list. There are as many 155s as in three American divisions.

J: I haven't been going into the details on this.

K: If the President had had a change to pass on something like this and this were a 40 percent increase I would clear it on my own. But here we're giving three divisions of artillery. An American division has eighteen 155s and we are giving 60. That's a pretty significant number. I would like to put it to the President, but I'm sure I can't get his decision tonight.

J: Let's drop trying to get it out tonight.

K: I'm trying to be responsive.

J: No, I had not gone into the details on this. I was leaving it to NEA and ISA to work it out together.

K: It would be a major political move for the President. It may make sense and may be the right thing to do and I have no reason to suppose he would disapprove it. The Secretary asked for approval of F-104s and we approved that. But at the same time there was some talk of going easy on artillery.

J: I haven't done my own homework.

K: 155s are the major item in there.

J: That's right. If you wanted to do

K: If you wanted to cut them out and consider them separate, the anti-aircraft we've talked about something like that before.

J: Yes.

K: It's quite a package. If we take out the 8" howitzers and the 155 howitzers, which I understand are the same, the rest I'd be prepared to do on my own. There are 24 8" howitzers and 20 155 mm. howitzers and 20 of another kind. Altogether that's 64 pieces

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Telecon

U. Alexis Johnson

4/15/70 7:45 p.m. page 2

of artillery. I would like to take some advice on the 150 howitzer.

J: They are much smaller. More a field type of thing. I have
been trying to get NEA and Defense together on the thing. If we take
out the heavy howitzers and the 155s . . .

K: That would be a more manageable problem for me. I won't
be able to get the President to handle it tonight.

J: I understand that. If we take out the 64 . . .

K: Let me reserve judgment on the 105 howitzers. I'd like
to ask what that is. But the others I understand the trucks.

J: Yes. If we take out the 105s and . . .

K: If you take out the artillery and leave the anti-aircraft,
trucks, mortars and radar you can consider it cleared now.

J: Okay. I'll talk to Roger Davies on this and if they think
it is useful to go ahead with the rest of it then we will. If not, we
will hold up on this whole thing.

K: If you take out all the howitzers I don't have to think at all.
It would still give them mortars and radar. That's not an inconse-
quential package.

J: No, not at all. If they don't think it's worth it to go ahead
with that then we'll hold the whole thing over.

K: Okay, let me know which way it comes out.

J: Okay, I'll call Roger Davies and call you back.

By: KHLW

NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Prof. Yoshida
4/15/70; 9:20 p.m.

Y: My friend has asked me to assure you that it is his never changed intention to honor his commitment and to go through with the negotiations. He appreciates the embarrassing position of your friend and expresses his personal regret for the delay in reaching a mutual agreement. As you described it to me the other day, my friend realizes this is indeed an unfortunate thing for both of us. At the final stage he will exercise his political power to get this done. He knows that he will have to pay a heavy political price.

K: How will we get to the final stage?

Y: I have made it clear to my friend that our counterproposal must be based on your three conditions. He understood that. He has already told that to the two top aides as his own idea -- nothing to do with our channel. But he is not an expert on the subject. Apparently he has some confusion and difficulty in getting this translated into a concrete counterproposal. In light of the difficult situation here, just between us, when I come to see you next week around the 24th, I wonder if you could prepare a few options accommodating your three points so that I could give them to my friend so that he will be able to formulate his own counterproposals based on one of your ideas and then we could put it to you.

K: I understand.

Y: You are not an expert, but sometimes I feel that an outsider can see things much better and put them in the proper perspective. I would like you to give me some options, if you can.

K: Right, I will do that. One other possibility -- I talked to my friend this afternoon and he was picking up the suggestion of your friend that it be done through private negotiations secretly. If you want to send somebo here, he would let me take a personal interest in the matter to get the thing settled.

Y: I see, with you?

K: Yes -- of course, I would have to take practical advice. It would not be a bad time to do this before May 2 for one technical reason -- one of the men with whom you were so concerned, counterpart of your Mr. M______ -- will be away and therefore it will be somewhat easier for us to be flexible.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC W

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Telecon
Kissinger/Yoshida

4/15/70; 9:20 p.m.

- 2 -

Y: Certainly, get things settled before May 2.

K: But it doesn't have to be -- it is just a suggestion.

Y: I would like to talk to my friend.

K: In any case, I will prepare some possible variations. I understand your problem.

Y: This is the only way from our side that we can get things done. I would greatly appreciate your personal intervention.

K: I will take a personal interest in it.

Y: In the meantime, I would like to talk to my friend again over the telephone. If my friend can find someone to send to you in the absolute quiet then I would certainly let you know.

K: I understand the problem.

Y: This has to be quiet. This is rather difficult for us to send someone who knows something about the subject and who could settle the matter.

K: We have the same problem.

Y: In any case would you please do that for me.

K: When are you coming?

Y: I will come on the 23rd or 24th.

K: I will be here on the 24th so I could see you on the afternoon of the 24th Or maybe the morning of the 25th.

Y: That's excellent. Could I see you on the evening of the 24th and if necessary on the 25th, too.

K: Right.

Y: Then I don't have to change my itinerary.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KH V NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: When you say evening, you mean 6:00?

Y: That's right. As soon as I get in I will get in touch with you. Will you set up an appointment tentatively for 6:00 on the 24th -- and if necessary anytime on the 25th at your convenience. In the meantime I will talk to my friend about your suggestion and I will get in touch with you again.

K: Fine.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Stans

4/15/70 9: 45 p.m.

K: I just talked to my Japanese friend again and the President this afternoon. The President wanted me to get from you what you consider the minimum reasonable position. It should be consistent with our commitment but with the utmost flexibility.

S: I think the best place to find flexibility is in the base period. We could go to 1969 base period; that would give them considerable increase. We could even allow a step-up in 70. If we start tampering with the mechanics you lose control.

K: My contact is coming over next week for some other reason. Sato would like 4 or 5 variations of our plan which would have the same result. He could put it forward as his idea to his associates.

S: You don't suspect any kind of trap.

K: Well, this is not an official thing. I'd just put it on a plain piece of paper and just deny it. He says his problem is his associates know he doesn't know about the problem. When he gets to technicalities they suspect collusion. This seems plausible to me.

S: Me too. We'll get to work on it.

K: Don Kendall certainly seemed subdues when he left.

S: Yes, I was grateful for your support for Flanigans.

By KCLW

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

TELECON
President/Kissinger
4-15-70 9:50 p.m.

K: Mr. President

P: With regard to the briefing tomorrow, one thing we must instruct people to see they won't follow instructions. Gore and Case will be there so everything will leak. He (Gore) shouldn't be invited. Case is worse.

K: We didn't handle it. It was handled by the Congressional office.

I would tell them that it is very important that this not leak; that we give an honest briefing but if it isn't handled well there will be a propaganda battle with the Soviets.

P: What can they say?

K: It would help our negotiations. They are glad(?) it is comprehensive and covers every category of weapons -- includes both MIRV and ABM for negotiations.

P: We will try that. We will take our chances.

K: As long as you have said it.

P: You can tell Dobrynin we can't control our Senators.

K: Dobrynin is back in the Soviet Union. I will call Dobrynin's replacement tomorrow.

P: We have to do that under the law.

K: I talked to our Japanese contact just now. He is coming next week. Stans is working on three or four alternatives. Sato has his own bureaucracy. We have to give him some flexibility and a deadlock.

P: What?

K: A deadlock so he can break it. Sent someone to pick up the Kennedy proposal.

P: I think the best thing is for him to settle it with you.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC U

NARA, Date 5/12/04

President/Kissinger

4-15-70 9:50 p.m.

- 2 -

K: It is the end of their Diet Session May 20 and then they can do it by Executive Order(?).

P: Mills has a bill in.

K: I am pushing and he is calling me tomorrow. I would like to settle it by May 1. That's when Maury comes back. Their proposal to us is that I give this guy next week three or four schemes so he can put it to his bureaucracy as his own idea.

P: The Kendall thing is out of the question.

K: I told him we couldn't do what he suggested. His is a complete cave in.

P: With what he suggested you would have a quota bill down here in about a month

K: Not even face-saving.

P: One year moratorium. . . hell. Both Case and Gore are crazy.

K: I will just give him four options. I won't single out the one you picked. It will show them we have been very serious. Then you can say why you picked out the two you did. The Arms Control Agency recommended No. 2 and you went a step beyond them.

P: I won't tell that Defense recommended No. 1.

K: Defense recommended 1 or 4. You recommended 3 or 4. Alternatives . . on-sight inspection and ban MIRVs or reduce land based missile force but keep MIRV.

P: You might say the radar thing.

K: Your memorandum on Bell. . . probably just the scientists raising hell.

P: My view is we can get the contract to someone else.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

President/Kissinger

4-15-70 9:50 p.m.

- 3 -

K: I agree. Nothing was discovered last year they didn't know before. All our experiments indicate it is working. I have had these tests looked at. There is no major problem on test results.

P: Sheer camouflage. People will say it won't work. They are against it because they don't want the U.S. too strong. If it doesn't work, . . . our friends in the Soviet Union are building them like crazy.

K: We know what we have to do against the Soviets.

P: Phase 2 . . we can't afford to lose ABM.

K: Radar

P: We will build radars. Discuss it with Mel so we will be in a position to move. Go for R&D and radar.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Telecon
Professor Doty
4/15/70 10:00 p.m.

Doty and Kissinger talked about the riots in Cambridge that were going on tonight, started at 7:00 this evening. I will transcribe the conversation, which was quite lengthy tomorrow. Only at the very end of the conversation did Mr. Kissinger and Prof. Doty discuss anything on which any action was to be taken:

K: We'll get together next Wednesday or Thursday, and you'll send me the curriculum on this fellow?

D: Yes. There are other possibilities, but this seemed the best.

K: What's his name?

D: Joel Aruskin (?).

K: I couldn't be so lucky as to get an Anglo-Saxon.

D: I'll look into that. There's also a fellow in ACDA(?); his last name is Ifft.

K: That has the advantage that ACDA might pay for him. If anything important happens at Harvard will you let me know?

D: Okay, I will. And in your spare time, think about the Charlie Town situation, will you?

K: Yes. I think that is a good suggestion. I will raise it tomorrow.

[There was no mention during the course of the conversation of what the Charlie Town situation or the suggestion regarding it is.]

By KLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Y
4/15/70 10:50 p.m.

Y: I just spoke with my friend about your position and your suggestion to quietly send his man to you in order to settle the matter before May second. My friend feels it is very difficult to find a trusted and qualified person to send and make arrangements. Also, one of his aides, Aichi, is now overseas on a trip and won't be back for several days. He therefore regretfully declines your suggestion. He would like your personal intervention and assistance still along the lines I suggested to you.

K: Some of our people think it's a trick. But I will use my intervention.

Y: I am very honest and my friend means it.

K: I believe you and I will ask him act on that basis. I believe you because I know you will think we have to work together.

Y: I would like you to trust me. I am very honest with you.

K: I am sure of that.

Y: My friend thinks it is very difficult to find a qualified person to settle the matter.

K: I understand.

Y: When I see you Friday, April 24 in the evening, I should like you to give me as many options as you can. Please put yourself in the position of my friend and make these options as easy as you can, not for himself. My friend will act . . .

K: My people do not know very much about our contact. XXXX I don't know how much I can offer you but I will do my best.

Y: Even my friend's closest aides have no knowledge. Just between myself and my friend. His closest aide has no exact knowledge of the existence of this. My friend has the same problem. What he really wants is not the detail but the outline of . . .

K: I have asked my people to prepare various options.

Y: Yes, please.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Y

4/15/70 10:50 p.m.
page 2

Y: That's right. Within that framework, if there's any room...

K: I will take a look at it. I am not too optimistic, but I will take a look at it.

Y: I will see you next week. I will be away from home from the morning of Saturday, the 18th.

K: I may be taking my children to Camp David that weekend. But I may have you brought up by helicopter or car.

Y: I can be reached in Washington at the Washington Hilton Hotel.

K: Yes, but you will call us.

Y: Yes. I am paying a brief necessary visit to Paris and London I will leave Paris on the 18th.

K: I will not call you after Saturday.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KML NARA, Dato

TELCON

Secy. Hickel/Kissinger

afternoon 4/15/70

H: I had a talk with the Charge' at the Soviet Embassy. I just got through meeting with him re my trip to Russia through Alaska. I would like to talk to you about this.

K: As the President told Volpe, our problem isn't the merit of the trip but other things we are doing.

H: I understood we should get your advice.

K: You should get our go ahead before you do it. I have no objection to your talking about it in principle but don't tell them the date you have agreed to.

H: I told them roughly the first of June.

K: You'll have to do something about that. That would be premature from a point of view.

H: I would like to talk to you.

K: Our problem is that we have a complicated game to play and we want to give them that as a reward and not as a down payment.

H: I know Volpe is talking about it.

K: You have priority over Volpe. If anyone goes, you can go.

H: The problem I have is different but I will do what you have me do. Our political problem is to open up Siberia to Alaskan airlines. They will start the 6th of June and after that wouldn't be important to me. After that it's after the fact. They will have flights right off the Sea of Japan. Six of the flights are full out. If they take in just anyone then all my work for years is down the drain.

K: Our interest is not the merit.

H: If I wasn't a Cabinet officer then I could go?

K: Definitely. You cannot convince the Russians that we would go just for Alaska or reasons of Interior. They would see it as a try for detente.

H: I have an impossible thing.

K: They will take you anytime.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Hickel/Kissinger

afternoon

4/15/70

H: They will but I am trying to win a battle on my home base.

K: I will raise this with the President and call you in a few days. You had better ask him to hold off for a week.

H: I will call him again and ask him to hold it for a week. I misread your memo.

K: It probably wasn't clear. Hold it for a week.

H: If there's anything else I could report to you.

K: No, I understand. Wait a week.

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
11:25 am 4/16/70

R: This is a minor matter but I am curious. I don't understand Defense. The President gave instructions that there would be no comments on future reductions. Melik has prepared a speech. It was on the front Page of the Post this morning. Don't they ready their instructions? He made the speech at Ft. Riley, Kansas.

K: He said it in a background last week before the instructions. I told Alex that State had been great on these things. We haven't had a leak in 6 months from there.

R: I keep telling my people and then they see this.

K: He will see this. You are right that there is no change in the instruction to take the credit for it when he knows there was military objection to it. He should let the President take the credit. I hadn't seen it or I would have raised hell this morning.

R: It's on the front page of the Post.

K: It won't help your negotiations.

R: Even if Mel hadn't seen the instructions, his people did.

K: The President said it orally.

R: I think the leaks on reductions, Cambodia, etc., are coming from Defense.

K: I think that's true.

R: Or maybe from over there.

K: I told Alex you were being very meticulous.

R: We are. There is some I suppose --

K: That can't be helped. Thank you, Bill.

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telcon
Dir Helms

4/16/70; 1:15 pm

K: I don't know whether the President has had a chance to talk to you yet.

H: I just hung up. Just talked to him.

K: He wants to get together with you and Cushman this afternoon at 3:30 in the EOB.

H: Cushman and I will be there.

K: Come to my office and we will go over together.

ms

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

2:37 pm

4/16/70

L: That went well this morning.

K: I thought so too.

L: I have a feature over there.

K: We didn't have any comments.

L: We have to start hitting a little bit or we will get <u>RE</u> clobbered in the Hou

K: The President did (?). There was one point about <u>RE</u> one missile compar to the other. Haig called Barroodi about it.

L: I have gone out to thefield for -- you saw the recent intelligence reports SAM sites. Wehave no sites in the area you are interested in.

K: The SAM site he wants to hit are in the previous area and Rt. 101.

L: There are none there now and none in an active status. I went to McV an asked them to get any intelligence on any they could find. There are no sites now. They are in movement.

K: Let's wait.

L: We ought to have something in the next few hours.

K: He is determined to do it.

L: The next thing -- I understand it's tied up with Saigon. Nothing's going on in Saigon.

K: He has been reading the casualty reports.

L: We had one bad one yesterday -- a heliocopter landed on a booby trap th let off their ammunition that they were carrying. But that's all there's been this week.

K: He wants his general posture that if they challenge him he must hit back or there will be erosion of ______.

L: I think the best response will be areas that are built up in Cambodia.

K: Other than what you are already doing.

By KHLW

NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger
2:37 pm 4/16/70

-2-

L: We had one 25 minutes ago against a build up in Laos. 17 sorties in there.

K: Let me have the intelligence report on that this afternoon. He doesn't want any ? ? ?

L: I can't go on that.

K: You can always go to him.

L: ? ? ? ? You are just inviting them across the DMZ.

K: If the SAM sites are there, go for them. If they are not there, find what you have.

L: What does he want, the Bartholomy pass?

K: No, south of there.

L: McGuia (?) pass. I have asked for intelligence on that and should be hearing soon. W Should I tell him there are no sites.

K: I will tell him.

L: Make sure he understands we believe that the lack of SAM activity and movement suggests that new re-allignment is under way but we don't know where that will be. We are watching it. But in Saigon we have lost no one a the VN only 3.

K: I will tell him.

L: Three shells are nothing.

K: We will wait for your intelligence.

L: I will get it right away. I have a cable here from State to call people out of Cambodia again. We are causing trouble.

K: You are doing fine.

L: I will not sign it for awhile. I think we should keep up the posture like in Laos.

K: He will be very pleased on that.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
5:40 pm 4/16/70

R: Mel sent me a copy of his speech. Have you seen it?

K: It's not very literate.

R: Not that. I think it causes a hell of a lot of trouble. It's not in the spirit of this morning. Secondly, it's easy to constuate as an effort on our part to shuttle the SALT talks. Third, it will drive the Russians up the wall.

K: The President wanted him to give the balance. But he hasn't seen this speech.

R: That's what I thought. It will raise hell.

K: It doesn't hurt us if it's forthcoming.

R: If he feels he must do it, it shouldn't relate to SALT. He should say this is what I propose but obviously if SALT works, we will have to change it. B he ties it on to SALT.

K: That's a strong point. He should do it on a ? ? ? ? . But it shouldn't be directed at SALT.

R: He can state the facts but not draw the conclusion. He starts out by saying he wants to put the facts on the table but he says we haven't done anything.

K: I said he should put in MIRV to put the sense of balance. I made that to his <u>XMGGK</u> assistant.

R: I see no reason to challenge them. You can challenge them with the facts. He says SALT will give us a chance to see what the Russians are up to. That's what they accuse us of.

K: I will have it made a speech on military balance and take out the SALT.

R: Even that seems like bad timing. It could be to Congress. I guess he is stopped because he hasn't another speech.

K: That's right.

R: I think the President should say if he wants to give a speech.

K: We did well today.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLW NARA, Dalo 5/13/04

Rogers/Kissinger
5:40 pm 416/70

-2-

R: That's what I mean. If we could keep them in the frame of mind they were in this morning that would be great.

K: I will mention it to the President and I will get that done on the SALT part of it.

R: I don't think the President should have to approve it but Heshould think about the timing and see if it will help ABM or hurt on ABM fight. Those Senators were impressed.

K: Mansfield and Cooper praised the President.

R: I wonder if this will destroy the good work we did today. Mel has opportunities to testify.

K: Does he have another speech?

R: They can get him another one.

K: I mentioned to the President about that troop withdrawal thing and he agrees and knows you played the game.

R: It makes no difference to me but it scoops him on his speech. I'm not bugging Mel but

K: I will do what I can.

R: If he makes it, he shouldn't let on the President even knew about it.

K: That's essential and the absolute minimum.

By KCLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
6:15 pm 4/16/70

R: I think I must have gotten a garbled report -- and 8:30 briefing tonight?

K: No, tomorrow morning.

R: I could just imagine the President seeing those guys at 8:30 tonight.

K: It would be interesting.

R: Any late news on Apollo?

K: I had a briefing at 3:00 from Anders and the big problem will come tomorrow. They will power the systems tomorrow. They don't know how they will react after being cool for so long.

R: I had lunch with Michael Collins today. He thinks if they get into this corridor -- which is a little like hitting the edge of a piece of paper from 30 feet -- once you are in the corridor you are good about it.

K: That's what they tell us.

R: He thinks the oxygen and electricity are ok.

K: Yes, but since they have never flown in this configuration before and nev
made these adjustments before, there are questions. They don't think the
heat shield is bothered by the explosion. I thought it was like the governmen
after things are in bad shape then you still have to go 70,000 miles before yo
can turn around. Let me box leave you on that.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

8 06 pm

4/16/70

L: I wanted to check one or two things with you. First, on the SALT presentation, I understand we are not going to be able to look at the presentation for Monday.

K: Why?

L: I was talking with Gardner and the presentation isn't ready.

K: I don't know, I haven't looked at it. We are not doing it.

L: My understanding is that we are just going with C.

K: No!

L: They had a briefing ? ?

K: That's what State and ACDA are trying to peddle but I'm putting out a Presidential directive that even a child can understand. We are presenting:

L: They said that was only a public relations thing.

K: I'm getting up set about this.

L: That's what Gardner said.

K: Gardner is a first rate guy. This is the game some people are trying to play but we won't have it.

L: I thought the signals may have been changed and I was trying to find out what the deal was.

K: Gerry said do I have to present them together. I said that was physically impossible and he would have to present them one after the other. So he figured we were just going for C and he could fool around with D.

L: I may call him. I want this for ______ Gardner.

K: I heard this was said by Bill at the backstop meeting.

L: I'm having a little trouble on my speech. I have to take a little different line because I have to build support for my budget and ABM. I had so much trouble this week.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

8:06 pm

4/16/70

-2-

K (cont.): don't have a text in front of me. Could you do it only on arms balance and keep SALT out of it?

L: OK.

K: Then it's a great asset.

L: I should say I am for SALT.

K: Yest but don't say it's for the Soviet system (?).

L: I called Bill and he wanted 5 corrections and that was one of them.

K: Then it's an asset and not a liability.

L: You have to bring up somethings for national security.

K: The President says if he is pressed he will go on TV and do what you are doing. When the Secy. of Defense cannot speak of defense anymore, then we are in trouble. But just don't say SALT so it won't look like we ? ? ?

L: I will send you a new draft tomorrow without it.

K: On the hitting -- he says it must be fix before Monday.

L: I went to Abrams today and he says we have taken them out at Bartholomew McGuia (?).

K: The 3 sites reaching into Laos.

L: Right. I went back and said find three sites.

K: The 3 at the border that can reach into Laos.

L: You saw the report this morning.

K: I saw a map where one is located and two unlocated.

L: They have been moved. We are locating them tonight and we will be back to you tomorrow.

K: Then you can get them before Monday?

L: Yes. But we have to locate them and have something to you tomorrow.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

8:06 pm

4/16/70

-3-

K: That's all right. But He just reassured that it has to be done by Monday morning.

L: Does he want to do anything in Cambodia? An air strike and go deeper? That ok?

K: With B-52's? If it doesn't hit a population center, I think that would be all right.

L: I will organize that. We will have a report for you tomorrow morning and I will send you a new copy of the spech with those corrections made. The House Committee reported out our bill today on the ABM and kept everything intact. We will pass it in the House and then fight it in the Senate. I cannot get anybody to speak out for ABM this year. They are running like hell.

K: It's a disgrace.

L: We will do it but only by beating people over the head. I can't get anybody to do it.

K: Like who?

L: I take Bill's suggestions for my speeches but I can't get him to put in a paragraph for me in his. He says it isn't the time. I said we will be through with the voting soon and he feels it will ruin SALT.

K: It will ruin SALT if we don't.

L: We cannot take ABM on a supplemental. He wants to wait 90 days.

K: In 90 days there will be other reasons. You have been a good soldier.

L: We will give them hell.

By KL V

NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELECON
Fullbright/Kissinger

4-16-70 8:40 p.m.

K: How are you?

F: Fine, Henry. I thought you did a good job this morning.

K: I appreciate that.

F: Very good meeting.

K: We have worked hard on this. It is as important as anything we could be doing. Everyone says Vietnam takes most of our time, but the arguments on Vietnam are understood.

F: I think everybody was pleased. I don't know what the Joint Chiefs think about it.

K: Between you and me, not the majority of objections come from military quarters.

F: Very good briefing.

K: I am optimistic. Very complex. It took a year to understand it internally. Brezhnev was unusually forthcoming. No propaganda statements.

F: A newspaperman called . . Malik . . mentioned Geneva Conference. That's a new term. Maybe they have had a change of heart.

K: We have felt things might be breaking even in Vietnam. He made one of his enigmatic statements but I am sure it was cleared.

F: Gore, Cooper will be out of town this weekend. How does Tuesday suit you?

K: Another possibility is Wednesday. The President might go with the Vietnam speech Tuesday. Oh, you can't do it Wednesday. Let's keep it for Tuesday for about 5:00. Look forward to seeing you.

F: Good luck

K: You may not believe this but your encouragement means a lot.

F: I hope we have gotten things moving. By the way, very interesting testimony Lundiborg (?) had of the Bank of America. Today this man Sherman was very interesting . . from Chicago and Janeway. They

By KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Fullbright/Kissinger

4-16-70 8:40 p.m.

- 2 -

were saying inflation is undermining our economy. Gives you backing.

K: As I told you last time at your house we are trying to set up negotiations.

F: Testimony of this kind will neutralize all out Viet Cong ______. This comes from the business community. Unless I hear from you tomorrow I will start asking them.

K: See you.

By KHLW NARA, Dale 5/13/04

TELCON
Wheeler/Kissinger
8:40 pm 4/16/70

K: We have one of our usual problems. I just had a bite with the President and he wants it done Monday morning.

W: Thurs. night -- we ought to be able to do that.

K: We are being told there is nothing there.

W: I sent a message out tonight at the direction of the Secy. of Defense which asks Gen. Abrams for the installations of the things in question. We know where two of them are. There's another one floating. We will have that information tomorrow morning.

K: Will you keep after it for us? I hate to put you in that position. He wants it done and coming out the same as last time.

W: A little splashing around? We will have the reply tomorrow morning and we will keep after it.

K: If you could get that great strategist to a local (?) assignment, you would be doing a lot of good.

W: He is in my xerox hair too. I need to speak to my superior about that. ? ? ? ? Distribution of messages, etc.

K: It has come to my boss's attention too. Do you think we can get an execute tomorrow?

W: I think so. That's what I'm striving at. I asked Ab for 1300 Z -- 8:00 tomorrow morning.

K: I gave your boss until 10:00 tomorrow morning to come in with it.

W: We will push it.

K: We will miss you.

W: I am not sure I will miss you -- excluding some of you, including you.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHLU

NARA, Dato. S/13/04

TELECON

Kissinger/Potter (Baltimore Sun)

4-16-70 9:00 p.m.

Mr. Potter called to read and discuss the Malik statement with Mr. Kissinger. He said he was having Paul write the article but that he had done a lot of the work, particularly with State Department officials. After reading portions of the proposed article the conversation turned to a brief question and answer session.

P: Did you talk the matter over with the President?

K: We just talked about it.

P: How about Dobrynin?

K: Dobrynin has gone home for consultation. We have always had the feeling this thing was going to break.

P: What would you anticipate on another world conference -- another Geneva?

K: That was indicated in the Malik thing.

P: Has anyone opposed but North Vietnam?

K: It is inconceivable North Vietnam would oppose. The Soviet Union wouldn't say that without North Vietnamese (concurrence)...

P: How about China?

K: China might oppose.

I think the Cambodian thing showed they haven't been able to stampede us, in public or in Paris. Things are going better in South Vietnam.

P: I would imagine a widened war is more damaging to them than to us.

K: Shows what can happen.

P: The Russians might be moving toward . . .

K: I don't want to go into it.