CHADWICK/FILE = 65/Version B/5/29/80

The National News Council
One Lincoln Plaza
New York, New York 10023

Dear Council Members:

This complaint is submitted on behalf of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger pursuant to the By-Laws and Rules of Procedure of the National News Council. It charges that Dan Rather, Don Hewitt and CBS News compromised rudimentary standards of fair and accurate reporting in presenting a "60 Minutes" program entitled, "The Kissinger-Shah Connection?" which was broadcast over the CBS television network at 7 p.m. EST on May 4, 1980.†1/4 26/2 This program was devoted to charging "a link between Henry Kissinger, the Shah of Iran and the price you're now paying for gasoline,"†2/4 and was based on the theory that Dr. Kissinger knowingly encouraged, welcomed or acquiesced in the quadrupling of world oil prices in

1/ Mr. Rather is a co-host of CBS' "60 Minutes"; Mr. Hewitt is producer.

2/ Page 2 of the official transcript of the program, attached as Exhibit A.

26/2

December 1973 to subsidize the Shah's arms purchases.

The program "60 Minutes" prides itself on its
hard-hitting, fast-paced investigative journalism.
Obviously CBS News enjoys the First Amendment right
to express a point of view and to challenge public
figures. But the broadcast of May 4, 1980 went far
beyond the bounds of fairness, accuracy, opinion and
news judgment. The program's thesis was founded on
numerous crucial errors of fact, and CBS proceeded to
broadcast it in the face of detailed evidence provided
by Dr. Kissinger that its central factual assertions
were false.

26/3

CBS News not only ignored the information which
Dr. Kissinger had brought to CBS' attention well before
the airing; it refused to interview independent
witnesses. It knowingly took facts, documents and
interviews out of context and distorted them by deceptive
editing (two of the five persons interviewed have already
protested to CBS to dissociate from its more egregious
accusations). Indeed, Mr. Rather acknowledged that
the program was hostile to Dr. Kissinger and used this
fact in an open attempt to blackmail him into appearing.

26/4

I. REVIEW BY THE NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL

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Dr. Kissinger does not make these charges or
invoke the jurisdiction of this Council lightly. He
is no novice in the field of broadcast journalism.
He is fully aware of the central importance of editorial
discretion, reportorial selection, and vigorous pursuit
of the truth by television journalists. Never before
has he sought the aid of the Council, though this is
not the first time he has felt the sharp side of
television news criticism. In this instance, however,
he is constrained to do so because this is an
extraordinary case. The "60 Minutes" program of May
4, 1980, not only defamed him; its misrepresentations
of fact and reduction of a complex issue to a vicious
personal attack were a disservice to the viewing public.
Its sloppiness of research and bias of presentation
constituted an irresponsible and reckless disregard
for truth.

26/5

Dr. Kissinger first apprised Mr. Rather of
serious factual errors on the program on Thursday, April
17, 1980, eleven days before the program was tentatively
scheduled to be aired. Dr. Kissinger substantiated
his objections in subsequent conversations with Messrs.
Rather and Hewitt and in a detailed May 1, 1980 letter
to Mr. Rather (Exhibit B). In each communication Dr.

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Kissinger explained the facts, suggested independent
experts for Mr. Rather to consult, and offered to produce
documents that would disprove the program's allegations.
The program, aired on May 4, did not take into account
any of the information provided by Dr. Kissinger. Dr.
Kissinger then sent a complaint to Mr. William Leonard,
president of CBS News, on May 6, 1980 (Exhibit C), which
Mr. Leonard rejected on May 9 (Exhibit D). Dr. Kissinger
then amplified his complaint by a letter of May 12
(Exhibit E), to which Mr. Leonard responded on May 16
that the broadcast was accurate and CBS stood by its
story (Exhibit F). Dr. Kissinger wrote a final letter
addressing Mr. Leonard's points on May 29 (Exhibit G).
To our knowledge CBS News remains of the view that it
did no wrong and owes neither Dr. Kissinger nor its
viewers any correction.

26/7

CBS has aired no balancing or corrective
information, although since the broadcast it has had
ample evidence from Dr. Kissinger and from others that
the program's allegations were false and absurd.
Moreover, two of CBS' own witnesses have written to
protest the way their statements were used on the
program. The program simplistically put forth the
proposition that the present energy crisis is the result

26/8

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of the secret misdeeds of two former officials seven
years before, indeed to a large extent the responsibility
of Dr. Kissinger alone. This is no service to the truth,
to broadcast journalism, or to the country.

Dr. Kissinger is obliged to register an objection
in the strongest terms.

## II. THE FALSE CHARGE OF COLLUSION

In response to Dr. Kissinger's complaints that
"60 Minutes" falsely charged him with colluding with
the Shah to prompt or to maintain the oil price increase
of December 1973, Mr. Leonard now denies entirely that
"60 Minutes" ever made such a charge. He now says that
the program was meant only to suggest an awareness of
a "commonality of interests rather than collusion."

See Leonard's second letter, May 16, Exhibit F.13/4 Mr. Leonard's current position is disingenuous. The program did not simply imply a similarity of world view on the part of Dr. Kissinger and the Shah; it promised its viewers a look at a "Kissinger-Shah Connection." The program indeed had no other point except to charge that Dr. Kissinger shared in the responsibility for OPEC's

3/ Dr. Kissinger's complete response to this letter
appears as Exhibit G.

26/9

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1973 decisions to raise oil prices, in ways amounting
to either explicit or tacit collusion with the Shah
at Iran.

The charge of deliberate collusive action on
Dr. Kissinger's part is not only implied by the title
of the program (regardless of the disingenuous question
mark), but is underscored from the very outset by Mr.
Rather's opening series of innuendos of dark doings:
"Under Kissinger's direction there was virtually no
public debate when the Shah ordered $5.7 billion worth
of military hardware from this country between October
1976 and September 1977." Tr. 1. (In fact, of course,
Dr. Kissinger was not Secretary of State for most of
this period; most of the orders mentioned were approved
in the Carter Administration; and all sales were put
before the Congress as the law required.)

26/10

Mr. Rather continued with a miscellaneous
collection of accusations -- none of which was even
remotely true -- by such "authorities" as the current
Iranian President, to imply a continuing special personal
affinity for the Shah that is even partly responsible
for the present hostage crisis. Mr. Rather cited no
evidence whatever and, instead of reporting Dr.
Kissinger's publicly available denials, mentioned only

26/11

that the prior accusations remained "as of this date
unproven." Tr. 2. He then advanced his answer to the
puzzle of why the Shah received such "preferential
treatment": "People in a position to know pointed us
toward a link between Henry Kissinger, the Shah of Iran
and the price you're now paying for gasoline." Tr.
2. This is the thesis of the program.

26/12

Mr. Rather pursues the conspiratorial thesis
in the paragraph immediately following:

"This is where it began [presumably
the high oil prices]. October, 1969:
the Shah was in Washington for an
official visit with President Nixon
and his first real encounter with Henry
Kissinger. They talked privately for
one hour, it is believed, during which
the groundwork was laid for the Nixon
Administration's policy toward Iran
of continuing military and economic
aid to the Shah." Tr. 2.

Once again there is no evidence to support this
statement. As Dr. Kissinger notes in his May 29 letter
to Mr. Leonard, his:

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"schedule of appointments shows no
private meeting between the Shah and
me in October 1969. No record confirms
that any major decisions were taken
during the Shah's conversations with
Nixon in 1969. It appears to have
been a tour d'horizon. Nothing, in
short, 'began' on that visit." P.
3.

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Mr. Rather then posed a "theory" to Mr. William
Simon -- a "theory" which, of course, the program implied
over and over was correct:

"[T]hat Dr. Kissinger knew full well
what he was doing, that he wanted the
Iranians and the Shah to have weapons,
in order to get the weapons they had
to have the money, and the way they
got the money was to raise the oil
prices . . ." Tr. 5. (Emphasis
added.)

26/14

Thus, the import of the program is that
conscious, deliberate action on Dr. Kissinger's part,
in parallel with the Shah, accounted for devastating
oil price increases that have seriously disrupted the
world economy. In support of the "theory," the program
offered the following:

-- James Akins, former Ambassador to Iran who was fired by Dr. Kissinger for inadequate performance on the job, was seen agreeing with Mr. Rather that he had first cabled Kissinger in December 1973 -- on a date not specified -- to warn that the Shah would lead "OPEC into quadrupling the price of oil. He never got an answer." Tr. 3. Despite Akins' continued insistence, he says later, "we didn't try" to pressure the Shah to restrain oil prices. Tr. 7.

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-- Mr. Akins added his endorsement
of the "theory" posed to Mr. Simon:

still in some circles today, that
the State Department -- not
necessarily Henry Kissinger, but
the State Department -- was in
favor of high oil prices." Tr.
4.

Mr. Rather presented no evidence for an opposing
point of view, and indeed the witnesses presented, if
their statements are examined closely, provide no support
for his theory. In reality, there is no factual support
for "60 Minutes'" proposition that Henry Kissinger was
largely responsible for the quadrupling of oil prices
in December 1973 and for "the price you [Americans]
are now paying for gasoline." The proposition is but
a collection of factual errors.

26/18

A. Factors Affecting 1973 OPEC Price Increases

If the charge were not so monstrously against
the national interest, Dr. Kissinger might be flattered
by "60 Minutes'" suggestion that he had the power to
cause world oil prices to skyrocket. Anyone even
casually familiar with the realities of world supply
and demand, however, must recognize that the story's
thesis is a simpleminded, sensationalistic account that

26/19

5/ Mr. Simon's subsequent denial of having been in a
position to know about any possible Kissinger/Shah
conspiracy appears at Exhibit I.

meets no standard of serious journalism.

To begin with, the oil price increases of 1973 were the product of a confluence of social, political, military and economic factors which provided favorable conditions for the formation of an effective suppliers' cartel, including:

a. The end of American energy self-sufficiency.

b. The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973.

c. The Arab oil embargo against the United States and the overall Arab oil production cutbacks beginning in October 1973 -- which the Shah of Iran opposed.

d. Increased Arab solidarity and confidence in using oil as a political weapon.

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e. Fundamental changes in world oil consumption patterns.

f. The increase in energy demand resulting from the simultaneous surge in industrial growth in the United States, Europe and Japan in 1972 and 1973.

g. OPEC's knowledge of oil shortages which began to appear in major oil consuming countries by early 1973.

h. The increasing importance and vulnerability of the "independents" in crude oil production activities resulting in changing patterns of negotiations between the producing countries and the oil companies.

i. The short-run inelasticity of oil demand resulting in spot market oil sales in December 1973 at over $17 a barrel.

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j. The extremely high price of energy alternatives to oil.

k. Regulatory and other delays in the development of United States nuclear power.

l. Environmental and other restraints in the United States which deflected some energy demand away from coal to oil in 1970-73; delays in completing the Alaska pipeline, originally scheduled for completion in 1973; and the moratorium on off-shore oil drilling in the early 1970s.

Whatever the relative importance of each of these factors as an explanation of the 1973 oil price increase, none was mentioned or alluded to in "The Kissinger-Shah Connection?"

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Furthermore, the assertion that "the Shah led OPEC into quadrupling the price of oil" in December 1973 -- reported twice in the program (Tr. 3, 7) -- is itself a blatant error. The OPEC oil price was in fact nearly doubled first in October 1973, under Saudi leadership, and then doubled again in December 1973. The major causal factor in both increases was the disruption of the market caused by the Arab oil embargo and Saudi production cutbacks without which all OPEC prices could not have been sustained. The viewer was told none of this.

Dr. Kissinger's alleged responsibility for "the price you're now paying for gasoline" is a lie, even on the most elementary level. OPEC's oil price in May 1980 was approximately $30 a barrel; the December 1973 OPEC decision which is the center of controversy here pegged it at $11.65 a barrel. The price the American consumer was "now paying for gasoline" in May 1980 is nearly $1.40 a gallon; in January 1977 when Dr. Kissinger left office it was under 60¢ a gallon. From 1974 to 1978, partly due to cooperation between the United States and Iran, the price of oil was restrained to such a degree that in real terms it declined by 15% over that period. The price of oil then doubled again in 1979 -- after the Shah was overthrown. Today, Iran's price, without the Shah and without U.S. arms purchases has been raised to the highest of all OPEC countries. In short, the alleged "link between Henry Kissinger, the Shah of Iran, and the price you're now paying for gasoline" in May 1980 is a monstrous distortion.

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But it is not simply the absence of evidentiary support which condemns Mr. Rather and the program's thesis. More serious than his errors of history and logic were (1) his complete disregard of the substantial credible information brought to his attention disproving

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both the overall charge of collusion and its several
subsidiary allegations, and (2) his and Mr. Hewitt's
efforts to intimidate Dr. Kissinger to appear on the
program by threatening him with the prospect of this
public attack.

26/25

B. The_False_Charges_by_Mr._Akins

The base upon which the Kissinger-Shah connection
was built was former Ambassador Akins' repeated charge
that Dr. Kissinger ignored his warning (given to Mr.
Akins by Saudi officials) of an impending price increase
in December 1973. Prior to the program Mr. Rather was
informed, and was offered documents to prove, that the
allegations that Dr. Kissinger did not respond to Mr.
Akins' warning was simply not true. Mr. Rather ignored
the evidence.

Mr. Rather maintained that "Akins first cabled
the Saudi warning to the State Department in December,
'73, before the Shah led OPEC into quadrupling the price
of oil." Tr. 3. The first oil price increase, however --
a fact not mentioned in the program -- was the near-
doubling of prices by OPEC on October 17, 1973. This
was led_by_Saudi_Arabia, not Iran. That increase
occurred in connection with the October War between

26/26

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the Arabs and Israel, and was taken in concert with
a full Arab oil embargo against the United States and
a progressive monthly curtailment of overall Arab oil
production sustained principally by Saudi Arabia. Iran
did not join in the embargo and even increased its oil
production, which partially compensated for the Arab
oil curtailment. The Shah indeed aided the United States
diplomatically in seeking the lifting of the Arab
embargo.

26/27

The Akins "warning" referred to came on December
21, 1973, a day before a scheduled OPEC meeting in
Tehran. Within two days OPEC announced another doubling
of oil prices (over the October 17 prices) to be
effective January 1, 1974 (a date wrongly cited by Mr.
Rather as when the OPEC meeting took place). And, as
already noted, only when taken together do the October
and December price increases -- each roughly a doubling
of prices -- equal a "quadrupling" of prices. Mr.
Rather's repeated claim that "the Shah led OPEC into
quadrupling the price of oil" (Tr. 3, 7) is, of course,
a tendentious misstatement.

26/28

The key accusation on the program, however,
is Mr. Rather's flat assertion that, as to Mr. Akins'
December warning, "He never got an answer," and "never"

received "an explanation." Tr. 3. He got "No response."

Tr. 4. The accusation is reinforced by George Ball's purported denial that Dr. Kissinger had ever tried to "use his influence with the Shah to keep the prices down." Tr. 6. These assertions, of course, are the heart of the program's thesis that Dr. Kissinger consciously welcomed, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the oil price increases. The episode occupies more than two full pages of the transcript. It is flatly wrong.

26/29

Dr. Kissinger advised Mr. Rather before the program was aired -- and offered documents to prove the point -- that he in fact responded immediately and forcefully to OPEC's anticipated December price increase, and protested vigorously afterwards. Within hours of receiving Mr. Akins' December 21 warning, and a slightly earlier warning from Ambassador Richard Helms in Tehran, Dr. Kissinger's

"associates in the Department of State drafted a statement to all OPEC countries protesting any price increase; this was coupled with an appeal to all industrial countries asking them to join our protest.

26/30

"I approved these instructions within eight hours of their dispatch from Washington to Geneva. They were delivered in the relevant capitals--

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including Teheran--on December 22,
in other words within 24 hours of
receiving the warnings from Helms and
Akins." May 1, 1980 letter to Mr.
Rather, Exh. B, pp. 2-3.

Although Mr. Rather had this letter well before
the broadcast, not one mention of it was made, and not
one sentence of it was quoted. The program failed to
tell viewers that a formal demarche was made in Tehran
protesting the projected price increase. The demarche
in Tehran was coupled with formal protests in all OPEC
capitals. (The viewer, of course, was never told that
all OPEC decisions are made unanimously.) And this
protest in form was coupled with a demarche to all OECD
nations urging a concerted protest on the part of all
the industrialized countries of the free world. All
this was done within 24 hours of the warnings received.
CBS News cannot responsibly persist in the belief that
its charge that Dr. Kissinger made "no response" is
accurate.

26/31

Also contrary to the allegations of the program,
and to Mr. Leonard's May 16 reply, Dr. Kissinger
continued to respond vigorously and unequivocally
following the OPEC oil price rise of December. He
described his actions in his letter to Mr. Rather before
the program was aired, citing dates and messages and

26/32

from them give clear evidence of his persistent position
that the oil price increases were excessive and that
the oil-consuming nations, developed and developing,
had to take vigorous action together to counter the
increases. The speeches not only illuminate Dr.
Kissinger's views and intention but also enumerate the
policies and actions he took over a four-year period
that constitute a sustained and vigorous "response"
to the oil crisis, making a mockery of the program's
charge to the contrary:

"The energy crisis has three
dimensions; first, the oil embargo;
second, the shortage of supply;
and finally, the quantum increase
in prices. . . . The most immediate
and critical problem concerns
price. . . . At present prices
the less developed nations will
face a current account deficit
of $25-$30 billion in 1974, of
which more than $10 billion is
caused by the increase in oil
prices. This deficit is three
times the total flow of the entire
world in recent years. Neither
the developing nations nor
traditional aid donors can finance
such a sum. Even the attempt
would destroy two decades of hard
won progress, leaving in its wake
a legacy of political tension,
social turmoil, and human despair."†‡/¥

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26/36

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‡/ Address by Secretary of State Kissinger before the Washington Energy Conference at Washington, D.C. on February 11, 1974.

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CBS News was told of these speeches on May 1 but
apparently made no effort to examine them or the evidence
contained in them.

26/41

In addition to speaking out aggressively on
the issues of the oil price explosion, Dr. Kissinger
took the personal initiative to organize common action
among all the oil-consuming nations to reduce their
vulnerability to OPEC price moves, to share the common
burden of the increases already imposed, and to restore
market conditions to force the price down. Thus, Dr.
Kissinger within the month had taken the lead in
arranging the Washington Energy Conference of the major
consuming nations. The Conference met in February 1974
under Dr. Kissinger's chairmanship, and resulted within
months in the creation of the International Energy Agency
(IEA), still the sole oil consumer organization in
existence. The Agency, even standing alone, would have
been a dramatic statement against the OPEC price
increases. Dr. Kissinger's preprogram letter informed
Mr. Rather of this as well:

26/42

"I spent the month of January
[1974] organizing the Washington Energy

[Footnote continued]

the Ministerial Council of the IEA Governing Board,
May 27, 1975; Department of State Press Release No.

Conference which met February 11.
Out of it emerged the International
Energy Agency--a grouping of consumer
nations to deal with OPEC." Id. at
4.

Moreover, on February 3, 1975, as disclosed
in one of the speeches to which Mr. Rather was referred,
Dr. Kissinger had proposed a floor price for alternate
supplies of oil to prevent any reduction of OPEC prices
from wrecking new sources of energy and thus destroying
the market again -- a proposal which would have made
no sense had he not sought to bring down OPEC prices.

26/43

In short, the allegation that Dr. Kissinger
made no response to oppose OPEC's rapid price rises
was totally spurious. Mr. Rather and others at CBS
News knew -- or had reason to know -- that the
allegations were completely false.

C. Other Significant Distortions

Interviews and documents were taken out of
context, resulting in additional distortions in the
program. For example, it is striking that two of the
critical witnesses presented on the program have since
written to CBS News dissociating themselves from the

26/44

[Footnote continued]

298.

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more egregious accusations broadcast on the program
and objecting to the deceptive editing which created
the impression that they were blaming Dr. Kissinger
for the December price rise.

Toward the end of the program, Mr. Rather asked
Mr. Simon whether Dr. Kissinger "blew" an important
decision, and Mr. Simon responded that "perhaps Henry
did blow it." Tr. 6. Exactly what Mr. Simon was
referring to is never made clear, since this particular
bit of dialog is taken out of its Rather-Simon context.
It is, instead, inserted between strips of conversation
with Mr. Ball and a Rather soliloquy which focus on
the alleged oil-arms "link." The clear implication
was that Mr. Simon had concluded that Dr. Kissinger,
the alleged architect of the "link," had made a serious
mistake by tolerating the oil price rise to facilitate
the arming of Iran.

26/45

However, Mr. Simon has made clear that he neither
said nor believed anything of the sort. His comment
was taken out of context. In a May 9 letter to Mr.
Rather, he wrote that "the difference in opinion I
discussed in the interview concerned how best to lower
oil prices" and "Ialt no time was I referring to the
charge regarding an arms-oil pricing deal . . . ."

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Exhibit I (emphasis added). Nonetheless, Mr. Rather
seized upon Mr. Simon's remark to support the "oil-arms"
allegation, and used it twice -- not only in the segment
just described but also in the opening portion of the
program. See Tr. 1.

26/46

Similarly, Mr. Rather had asked Mr. Ball whether
he had "ever seen any evidence that Dr. Kissinger did
try to use his influence with the Shah to keep [oil]
prices down," and Mr. Ball responded with a simple "no."
Tr. 6.†11/‡ Apart from the misleading nature of the
question itself (which suggests that Mr. Ball's
unawareness of contrary evidence proves that the charge
is true), the exchange presents a seriously misleading
picture of Mr. Ball's views.

26/48

11/ Earlier in the program, Mr. Rather implied that Mr. Ball had reviewed all relevant government memoranda -- including secret materials -- bearing on the points at issue. Tr. 2. This would not have been very likely and Mr. Ball never said as much. Indeed, in his subsequent letter to Mr. Rather, he denied it. Mr. Rather never made clear that Mr. Ball's insight into the documentary record of 1973 occurred during the very few days he was called in as White House adviser in December of 1978, five years after the 1973 price increase. He was busy on his task of deciding what contemporary policy should be in connection with the fall of the Shah. Mr. Ball worked for about two weeks. He was not embarked on an inquiry into the historic record. Finally, his failure to find 1973 evidence hardly proves the negative. Mr. Rather ignored all this.

26/47

As Mr. Ball wrote in a letter to Mr. Rather, "I was looking at the time [late 1978, five years after the price increases] for events that may have led to the [Iranian] revolution and oil prices were not within the purview of my inquiry." Exhibit H (emphasis added). Mr. Ball added that he has "no information as to what, if anything, the [Nixon] Administration did to deter the Shah from promoting an oil [price] increase." Id. It is thus clear that Mr. Ball was not looking for evidence of 1973 efforts by Dr. Kissinger to dissuade the Shah from raising oil prices during his short 1978 peek at the record. But Mr. Rather's use of the Ball film clip was designed to lead viewers to precisely the opposite conclusion, i.e., that Mr. Ball had searched for such evidence and found none.

26/49

Finally, Mr. Rather read from an alleged cable from a former Iranian ambassador to the Shah sent in March 1973, nine months *before* the OPEC decision in December, at a time when OPEC was making no decisions to alter the low oil prices. Immediately following this, Khomeini's current UN ambassador -- without any pretense of personal knowledge whatever -- speculated on the link between oil prices and arms purchases.

26/50

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In short, the program strung together quotations
referring to three different periods. This not only
distorted the views of two of the program's interviewees
but was allowed to stand as "evidence" of the alleged
"link" or "connection" when in fact none existed.

D. Blackmail Tactics: The "Invitation"

To Appear---------------------------------

CBS News in its correspondence with Dr. Kissinger
has made much of the fact that it invited him to appear
in his own defense and postponed the broadcast by a
week to enable him to do so. Unfortunately CBS' conduct
was far less noble than it claims. The necessity to
postpone the broadcast arose solely from the fact that
CBS approached Dr. Kissinger only at the last minute,
after it had prepared the program in accordance with
its own tendentious thesis and obviously without any
interest in having the benefit of Dr. Kissinger's point
of view, or that of independent experts, during its
preparation. The conclusion is unavoidable that CBS
sought Dr. Kissinger's appearance more to hype the
visibility of the program than for balance of
presentation. Indeed, the pattern of CBS' behavior
shows clearly that it tried to use the admitted one-
sidedness of the program as a weapon to blackmail Dr.

26/51

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Kissinger into appearing. This was highly unprofessional conduct.

The sequence of events is detailed in the letters and statement of Dr. Kissinger [and Nancy Kissinger?], attached as Exhibits B, C, E, G and __. It is summarized here.

Wednesday, April 16

The contacts began on April 16, 1980, eleven days before the program was scheduled to be aired (April 27). Mr. Rather called Dr. Kissinger and told him for the first time that "60 Minutes" was to do a program on his relationship to the Shah and the role that relationship played in the 1973-74 world oil price increases. He outlined to Dr. Kissinger the charges that James Akins was prepared to make. (Mr. Akins, a former ambassador to Iran, had been fired by Dr. Kissinger for inadequate performance of official responsibilities. It was, of course, no secret that Mr. Akins had great personal animus toward Dr.

26/53

Kissinger.)†12/‡

26/53

12/ It also was no secret that Mr. Akins was hardly an unbiased observer for another reason. His charges, which suggest the beneficence of Saudi Arabia during the OPEC price increases of 1973, were made with obvious self-interest. In this regard he has been called the

Dr. Kissinger immediately informed Mr. Rather that documents exist which prove clearly that Akins' charges are untrue. Mr. Rather promised to review the documents -- a promise he soon was to break. Dr. Kissinger also gave Mr. Rather the names of several experts and government officials with independent knowledge of the oil price question. They could confirm the true state of affairs if only Mr. Rather would ask.

Thursday, April 24

Nothing was heard from Mr. Rather for eight days. Then on the evening of April 24, Mr. Rather and Dr. Kissinger talked again. Mr. Rather had been "too busy" to consult any experts. He insinuated that any documents Dr. Kissinger might produce could have been created to cover the tracks of the Kissinger/Shah conspiracy. Mr. Rather had not looked at the documents during the eight days and would not look at them now unless William Leonard, President of CBS News, approved delaying the program from April 27 to May 4. Mr. Rather expected that Mr. Leonard would not delay the program merely to gather facts; he probably would approve a

26/55

[Footnote continued]

Ambassador from Saudi Arabia by three reputable journals. See Economist, April 25, 1975; Washington Post, March 14, 1976 and Forbes, April 15, 1976.

26/54

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delay only if Dr. Kissinger agreed to appear to defend himself. Thus, within 72 hours of the program's scheduled airing, Dr. Kissinger was first "invited" to defend himself. Dr. Kissinger needed until Monday, April 28, to make a decision: some of the people he needed to talk with could not be reached before then.

26/56

Friday, April 25

April 25 is the day the unsuccessful Iranian rescue mission was announced. Dr. Kissinger was in constant demand from the news media and others concerning that important event. Despite the circumstances, pressure mounted from the "60 Minutes" staff.

Mr. Rather called Dr. Kissinger at 11:30 a.m. He had correctly guessed Mr. Leonard's position, he said. The program could be delayed from Sunday, April 27 to May 4 only if Dr. Kissinger agreed personally to rebut Akins' charges. Mr. Rather would not look at documents or consult other witnesses. Promotional imperatives for the show required a prompt decision. Dr. Kissinger requested more time.

26/57

At 12:30 p.m. Don Hewitt, producer of "60 Minutes," called to urge Dr. Kissinger to defend himself: the charges were serious; they should not go undefended,

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he argued. Dr. Kissinger protested that it was unfair
that he be forced to personally rebut patently untrue
statements without even one disinterested person
providing an accurate factual background. Mr. Hewitt
retorted that if Dr. Kissinger could not decide by 3:00
p.m., no rebuttal would be presented. The charges would
be aired, errors and all.

26/58

At 1:30 p.m. Mr. Rather called again. He wanted
to see Dr. Kissinger in a private, "off the record"
meeting. Dr. Kissinger could see him at 3:30, and Mr.
Rather agreed to extend Mr. Hewitt's 3:00 deadline.

Mr. Rather appeared at Dr. Kissinger's apartment
at 3:30 p.m. as planned. Dr. and Mrs. Kissinger were
present. Mr. Rather said that the program made
"extremely damaging" allegations against Dr. Kissinger
that should not go unanswered. To avoid serious injury
to Dr. Kissinger's reputation, Dr. Kissinger had to
rebut the charges. There was no time to put on any
disinterested expert. The only way Mr. Rather could
help save Dr. Kissinger's reputation would be to film
Dr. Kissinger for the program. Dr. Kissinger would
have to decide by 5:00 p.m.

26/59

At 4:45 p.m. Mike Wallace, Mr. Rather's colleague

- 32 -

on "60 Minutes," called Nancy Kissinger to urge her to influence Dr. Kissinger to appear. As a "friend," Mike Wallace assured her that a refusal to appear would seriously jeopardize her husband's reputation.

By 5:00 Dr. Kissinger decided he had no choice. He would go on. Once again he pleaded with Mr. Rather to contact an oil price expert who could also appear, and gave him several names.

Saturday, April 26

During the evening of April 26, a number of Dr. Kissinger's friends called him to say that Mr. Hewitt was bragging that he and Mr. Rather had forced Dr. Kissinger to defend his relationship with the Shah. Their conversations with Mr. Hewitt led them to believe strongly that Dr. Kissinger should not appear on the program in a defendant's role. They urged Dr. Kissinger to request that a disinterested expert describe the background and mechanics of the oil price increases. Only in that manner would the story avoid irrational personality issues and ad hominem attacks.

26/60

Dr. Kissinger was also advised that evening, by his agent, that NBC's approval should be sought to avoid a possible contract breach. (Dr. Kissinger is

- 33 -

26/61

under a general television contract with NBC.)

Sunday, April 27

Dr. Kissinger called Mr. Hewitt on Sunday, April 27, to tell him he needed written permission from NBC. He requested once again that an expert on the pricing of oil, such as Allan Greenspan, former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors, be brought on the program. Mr. Hewitt immediately rejected the suggestion. It became even clearer that the program was not seeking balance; it was seeking publicity.

A few minutes later Mr. Rather called Dr. Kissinger: Kissinger had better not double-cross him.

Mr. Rather still had not consulted any of the experts mentioned by Dr. Kissinger. He had, however, consulted James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Energy. Mr. Schlesinger informed Mr. Rather that the idea of a Kissinger-Shah conspiracy to raise oil prices to finance arms purchases was absurd. Mr. Schlesinger, however, to remain friends with Mr. Akins, declined to appear on the show.

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Monday, April 28

On Monday, April 28 Dr. Kissinger instructed

- 34 -

his agent to obtain NBC's written permission to appear
on "60 Minutes." Mr. Hewitt called the agent several
times during the day, accusing Dr. Kissinger of hiding
behind the NBC agreement. Mr. Hewitt claimed he had
taken the initiative to talk with NBC's executives and
had cleared the appearance himself. He reiterated that
no one but Dr. Kissinger would be on the program to
rebut the conspiracy charges.

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Dr. Kissinger also became aware of the following
"Periscope" item from Newsweek magazine:

"Henry Kissinger's scheduled appearance on '60 Minutes' this Sunday represents a change of heart. Broadcasting sources say that the former Secretary of State at first refused to appear because he was outraged by the content of the program. . . . Kissinger finally agreed to defend himself in an interview with Dan Rather after learning that the segment includes criticisms of him by ex-Treasury Secretary William Simon and other Nixon Administration colleagues. . . ." Newsweek, May 5, 1980, at 23.

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Dr. Kissinger could only interpret this as a further
attempt to pressure him to appear, as a bid to hype
the program by virtue of his appearance, and as further
confirmation that the program itself was stacked against
him. In view of all these indications of the nature
of the program, and in view of CBS' continuing refusal

to interview any disinterested witness or to review
any pertinent documents, Dr. Kissinger withdrew from
the program. That evening, CBS News announced that
it intended to sue Dr. Kissinger for reneging -- another
publicity maneuver. CBS subsequently retracted this
threat.

26/65

Tuesday, April 29

By Tuesday, April 29, Dr. Kissinger and his
associates had reviewed additional documents at issue.
They found that, contrary to Mr. Akins' allegations,
only one cable had been received from Mr. Akins warning
of an OPEC price increase; it was dated December 21,
1973. Dr. Kissinger had acted on the warning within
24 hours. Dr. Kissinger informed Mr. Rather of this
by telephone that evening. Dr. Kissinger offered to
show the cable to Rather, along with other documents.
Mr. Rather, in an apparent change of heart, agreed to
review the documents at Dr. Kissinger's apartment at
10:30 a.m. the following day.

Wednesday, April 30

On Wednesday morning, Mr. Rather's secretary
called to inform Dr. Kissinger that Mr. Ratner would
not meet as agreed. He was unexpectedly called out

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- 36 -

of town. No new appointment was set. Dr. Kissinger began drafting a letter to outline the facts and to describe a few key documents for Mr. Rather.

Thursday, May 1

On the following day, May 1, Dr. Kissinger sent Mr. Rather a detailed letter by messenger. It reviewed the facts again, citing dates and messages and quoting from some of the supporting documents, all demonstrating the inaccuracy of Mr. Akins' charges. The letter, along with an affidavit of personal service, is attached to this complaint as Exhibit B.

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Sunday, May 4.

The "60 Minutes" program was aired on May 4. Dr. Kissinger's May 1 letter was not mentioned. Not one sentence from it was read. Not one fact from it was revealed. Dr. Kissinger, it was announced, refused to be interviewed. All Dr. Kissinger would say, Mr. Rather pretended, was that the story was "malicious, ridiculous and untrue," that Mr. Akins was "lying" and that Mr. Ball was "jealous." Tr. 7.

Dr. Kissinger, of course, had said much, much more. The brief "rebuttal" from Dr. Kissinger that

- 37 -

was broadcast did not meet any standard of journalistic
responsibility. Mr. Rather avoided all substantive
information provided to him and focused solely on an
hominem comments that did not reflect the basis of Dr.
Kissinger's denials. The point is, however, that Mr.
Rather's blackmail tactics, laid out above, provide
additional insight into the bias and distortion present
in "The Kissinger-Shah Connection?" and additional reason
for the Council to condemn the program.

26/68

E. Failure to Correct Errors and
Distributions------------------
Orions

The events which took place after "The Kissinger-Shah Connection?" was aired on May 4 also help to show the nature of "60 Minutes'" journalism in this instance.
In addition to Dr. Kissinger's letter of May 6 to Mr. Leonard protesting the bias of Messrs. Rather and Hewitt, and providing additional information, Exhibit C, they include the following:

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Monday, May 5

Professor M. A. Adelman, Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, an expert on the economics of oil who
was consulted by Mr. Rather earlier in the year, chided
Mr. Rather's presentation for, among other things, having

"suffered badly by its failure to research the international oil market . . ." He explained the instrumental role played by Saudi Arabia -- not by Iran -- in increasing oil prices in 1973, and the curious role that Mr. Akins had played as a Saudi apologist during that time. Exhibit --.

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Wednesday, May 7

Gerald Parsky, former Assistant Secretary for International Affairs of the U.S. Treasury Department and former Executive Assistant to the Federal Energy Administration, wrote Mr. Leonard to point out the absurdity of Akins' charges and to protest the unprofessional nature of Mr. Rather's "blatantly biased reporting." Mr. Parksy offered facts to prove that the

"statement, or even the suggestion, that Mr. Kissinger colluded with the Shah to drive up the price of oil in 1973 or thereafter is simply not true." See Exhibit --.

Thursday, May 8

George Ball, one of the guests around whom Rather built his conspiracy theory, wrote Mr. Rather complaining that his statement had been taken out of context:

26/71

"As you know, you did not ask me as to what effect, if any [the Shah's purchase of arms] may have had in persuading the Shah to press for higher oil prices at the beginning of 1974. Although that matter was addressed by others on the program, I had no occasion to express an opinion on it nor have I ever done so. During the interview the one question that in any way related to the matter was, as I recall, your query as to whether I had seen anything in the files made to dissuade the Shah from raising oil prices, and I replied in the negative. In fact, I was looking at the time for events that may have led to the revolution and oil prices were not within the purview of my inquiry. I have no information as to what, if anything, the Administration did to deter the Shah from promoting an oil increase." See Exhibit H.

26/72

Friday, May 9

William Simon, another guest whose comments were used to support Mr. Rather's conspiracy theory, also complained that he had never intended to lend support to "the alleged deal between Dr. Kissinger, President Nixon and the Shah." See Exhibit I. Mr. Simon continued:

"I'd like to set the record straight by making it very clear that the difference in opinion I discussed in the interview concerned how best to lower oil prices and the pressures required to be brought against the

26/73

Shah in order to do so, while still
maintaining Iran as an important ally.
At no time was I referring to the charge
regarding an arms-oil pricing deal
between the three. This deal -- if
indeed it ever existed -- would have
been struck a year before I took office
in Washington and thus was not something
with which I was associated nor had
any knowledge of in any way." Id.

On this same day, May 9, Mr. Leonard responded
to Dr. Kissinger, rejecting his complaint that the
program was neither fair nor truthful. In spite of
the Ball and Simon protests, Mr. Leonard concluded:
"CBS News stands by the broadcast."

26/74

Sunday, May 11

"60 Minutes" presented a selection of letters
it received. It did not present Mr. Ball's complaint.
It did not present Mr. Simon's complaint. It did not
present anything provided by Dr. Kissinger. The only
opposing viewpoint presented was a sentence from Mr.
Parsky's letter in which he said Saudi officials who
had mentioned Iranian pressure to increase oil prices
had not suggested that Kissinger had colluded with the
Shah. Even here "60 Minutes" ignored Mr. Parsky's
statements that no such conspiracy could have existed
and that Dr. Kissinger fought the OPEC price increases.
Instead, "60 Minutes" offered as the only correction

26/75

the fact that Saudi officials and not directly charged
Kissinger with conspiracy.

Monday. May 12

Dr. Kissinger wrote to Mr. Leonard in greater
detail about Mr. Rather's tactics and his reporting.

See Exhibit E.

Wednesday. May 14

George P. Schultz, Secretary of the Treasury
at the time of the events in question, wrote CBS News
to complain of the distorted reporting and to set forth
facts demonstrating the captious character of Mr.

Rather's charges -- as Mr. Schultz understood the program --
"of a conspiracy between Henry Kissinger and the Shah
for the purpose of providing the Shah with money to
buy arms in the United States." See Exhibit --.

26/76

Thursday. May 15

Charles W. Robinson, Chairman, Energy Transition
Corporation and formerly Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs during the time at issue, wrote Mr.
Leonard to criticize the program's unfair attack against
Dr. Kissinger. He stated:

"One of my prime responsibilities was to develop and implement specific programs for dealing with the oil price challenge within the context of over-all policies laid down by the State Department. I participated in planning sessions and had full access to all documents relating to the oil price issue. I can state without reservation that Mr. Kissinger was engaged in a continuing effort to reduce oil prices and at no time did he suggest or imply that we should consider any other alternative." Exhibit ---.

26/77

Mr. Robinson then listed a variety of specific actions taken "which established Dr. Kissinger's role in holding down oil price increases."

Friday. May 16

Mr. Leonard of CBS News wrote to Dr. Kissinger, stating that there is no basis for Dr. Kissinger's complaint because "60 Minutes" never technically charged that Dr. Kissinger had colluded with the Shah to push up oil prices. The program merely presented a "theory" that Dr. Kissinger, perceiving the relationship between higher Iranian oil prices and Iran's ability to buy more arms, concluded that "an increase in oil prices might be helpful." Although he either encouraged the higher prices or refused to discourage them, he did not necessarily "collude" with the Shah. This disingenuous interpretation, as explained in full at

26/78

pp. __ of this complaint, does not square with a
reasonable review of the program script, is directly
contrary to the preprogram threats and warnings given
to Dr. Kissinger by Messrs. Rather and Hewitt, and it
is
26/79
directly contrary to the clear import of the program
as understood by a variety of dispassionate observers
and program guests. See letters from Messrs. Ball,
Parsky and Schultz at Exhibits __, __ and, __ and
commentaries by journalist William F. Buckley, Jr.,
Exhibit __.

CBS' tactic of intimidation persisted even in
Mr. Leonard's May 16 response to Dr. Kissinger. For
example, following his caution that he "do[es] not
believe that a protracted debate on the many points
raised by your letters would serve either your interest
or ours," Mr. Leonard warned:

"[B]ased on the oil revenues to Iran
before and after the 1973 OPEC
increases, there is a good case to
be made--one we did not make on the
air, but which we certainly could make
in the future--that there was indeed
a strong motivation for the Shah to
want increased oil prices to pay for
military hardware." Exhibit F at p.
6.

Dr. Kissinger replied to Mr. Leonard's May 16 letter
on May 29. Exhibit G.

Even had high executives of CBS News not learned
before airing "The Kissinger-Shah Connection?" that
the program contained extremely damaging errors,
mistatements and distortions, they soon learned that
it did. They chose publically to ignore the facts and
to persist in proclaiming the program's accuracy. By
doing so, they -- like Messrs. Rather and Hewitt who
knew of these facts before the program aired -- violated
common standards of decency and fair play for broadcast
journalism.

26/81

VI. NATIONAL NEWS COUNCIL STANDARDS
CONCERNING FAIR AND ACCURATE REPORTING

Messrs. Rather and Hewitt, and others at CBS
News, violated the most basic precepts of fair and
accurate reporting. The Council's previous decisions,
which have explored the networks' obligations for fair
and truthful reporting, make this clear. The Council
early decided that:

"While a great latitude must be accorded
to television producers in the case
of any given documentary, that it not
to say that there is not, or ought
not to be, a limit to the degree of
distortion and misrepresentation that
a producer can indulge in." Haydon
against NBC-TV (Complaint No. 47, April
8, 1975) reported in National News
Council, In the Public Interest (1975)

26/82

at 115.

In *Haydon* the Council concluded that a program comparing American Samoa with Western Samoa contained "a series of distortions and misrepresentations in production, writing and editing" that could not be "justified under the rubric of robust journalism." *Id.* at 116.

It is fundamental that one-sided reports are misleading to the public, which does not have ready access to the "other side of the story" and is thus prevented from reaching its own conclusions as to the issue at hand. In *Barrett against Parade Magazine* (Complaint No. 113, September 20, 1977), *In the Public Interest* (Vol. II 1979), at 177, the Council found that a magazine story strongly implying that a government scientist was fired because he opposed the swine flu program was "so one-sided as to have strayed beyond an acceptable range of editorial judgment."

26/83

Specifically, the article "neglected the other side of the controversy [i.e., that the government had valid reasons for firing the scientist], and the arguments advanced by the opponents of [the scientist] were ignored," with the end result that "an essential element of the story was clearly missing." *Id.*

26/84

- 46 -

Balance is particularly crucial where a news
organization has constructed an hypothesis concerning
a controversial issue and sought to support it with
a collection of facts. Unless the presentation is
balanced, "debatable issues [will be] handled in such
a way as to appear settled," and the public "cannot
appropriately assess and form their own opinions as
to that situation." Frank against Newhouse News Service
(Complaint No. 56, November 11, 1975), In the Public
Interest (Vol. II 1979), at 52, 54.

For example, in Pennsylvania Program for Women
and Girl Offenders, Inc. against the National Observer
(Complaint No. 66, September 17, 1975), In the Public
Interest (Vol. II 1979), at 40, a newspaper article
attempting to link the rise in female crime to the
women's rights movement was found to have "exceed[ed]
the range of [the proper exercise of] editorial
judgment." The Council specifically found that the
factual underpinnings for the article did not support
its thesis; moreover, the Council pointed out that:

26/85

"The difficulty for the reading public
with articles like this is that they
tend to stigmatize a legitimate movement
. . . by linking concurrent phenomena
without showing an actual or theoretical
linkage." Id. at 41.

26/86

The same problem arose in Cohen et al. against
NBC News (Complaint No. 117, November 15, 1977), In
the Public Interest (Vol. II 1979), in which the Council
found that certain inaccuracies in an NBC documentary
on nuclear waste stemmed from NBC's having erroneously
suggested a cause-effect relationship between radiation
and various health problems. Dismissing NBC's reporting
as a "series of 'mights,'" the Council determined:

"Indeed the conclusion on both stories
[in the documentary] is nothing more
than that there might be a connection.
The use of this material would seem
to betoken scare tactics, beyond the
limits of sound journalism." Id. at
199 (emphasis in original).

26/87

More recently the Council has made clear that
television journalists have an obligation to verify
information utilized in a news documentary and to provide
the viewer with a contextual setting for the material.
In finding that NBC had failed to depict accurately
life in Marin County, California, the Council said:

"[I]t hardly seems to be 'quibbling, '
as Mr. Crystal [of NBC] suggests, to
point out that NBC used hearsay material
and guesswork from interviewees. It
had an obligation to check those
statistics and, at the very least,
to place them in perspective." Boxer
against NBC News (Complaint No. 150,
December 8, 1978), In the Public

26/88

Interest (Vol. II 1979) at 300, 306.

This concept of "perspective" or "context" is
critical, for the Council has recognized that news
reports can convey distorted impressions and thus lead
readers and viewers to unwarranted conclusions. For
example, in *Shell Oil Co. against NBC News*, reported
in *Columbia Journalism Review*, January/February 1980,
at 67, the Council held that a complaint was warranted
because an NBC report titled "Fly Now, Freeze Later"
left viewers with the impression that Shell had suddenly
made a business decision to emphasize the production
of jet fuel and thus deprive New Englanders of much-
needed heating oil. The Council found that the story
was misleading and that its conclusions were unsupported
by available record evidence. In a strong concurring
opinion, Messrs. Brady and Rusher concluded:

"The distortions regarding Shell's
actions in particular, and oil companies
in general, reflect a mindset that
translates into a biased and at times
deceitful presentation. Such a report
can only be termed irresponsible."
Id. at 74.

See also *Haves against UPI*, reported in *Columbia Journalism Review*, November/December 1979, at 104
(complaint found warranted "because the story was

26/89

26/90

sloppily prepared and inadequately edited, exaggerated
and misleading"); Stans against NEA, reported in Columbia
Journalism Review, September/October 1979, at 82 (even
a statement technically accurate in a narrow context
may be misleading in broader setting);
Holt against
CBS (Complaint No. 149, September 12, 1978), In the
Public Interest (Vol. II 1979), at 298 (juxtaposition
of elements in news report held misleading);
AEL=CIQ
Public Employee Dept. against Time. Inc. (Complaint
No. 144, June 27, 1978), In the Public Interest (Vol.
II 1979), at 279 (error of omission was "seriously
misleading").†13/‡

26/91

Thus, a journalist's discretion in determining

13/ The Federal Communications Commission has taken
an extremely strong position against deliberate slanting
of the news:

"Rigging or slanting the news is a
most heinous act against the public
interest--indeed, there is no act more
harmful to the public's ability to
handle its affairs. In all cases where
we may appropriately do so, we shall
act to protect the public interest
in this important respect."

**Columbia Broadcasting System ("Hunger in America")**, 20 F.C.C. 2d 143, 151 (1969).

Accord. Columbia Broadcasting System (Incidents of "Staging" by Its Employees of Television News Programs), 45 F.C.C.2d 119, 121-22 (1973), Columbia Broadcasting System ("The Selling of the Pentagon"), 30 F.C.C.2d 150, 153 (1971).

26/92

- 50 -

whether certain material is to be included or excluded
in the final product is hardly an absolute defense to
charges of distortion and slanting. As the Council
has said, selectivity "becomes open to challenge where
factual material becomes an issue." Janeway against
Esquire Magazine, report in Columbia Journalism Review,
September/October 1979, at 89. There, for example,
the Council noted several instances of "overreaching"
by the magazine that created a biased presentation,
including the misquoting of several individuals and
the use of their statements out of the context in which
they were made. Such "selection" of material obviously
goes well beyond the bounds of responsible journalism,
and the Council so held. See also Accuracy in Media
against Anderson (Complaint No. 46, February 4, 1975),
In the Public Interest, at 111; Frank against Newhouse
News Service, supra.

26/93

These Council decisions pronounce salutary
principles of self-regulation by the print and broadcast
industries. They establish a wise balance between
vigorous but fair reportage on the one hand, and
substantially inaccurate, irresponsible reportage on
the other. "The Kissinger-Shah Connection?" is of the
latter vintage. It was filled with factual errors and

26/94

- 51 -

tendentious distortions, as this Complaint has
demonstrated. As in *Haydon, supra*, these distortions
of fact cannot be "justified under the rubric of robust
journalism." CBS, like NBC in *Boxer, supra*, "had an
obligation to check [the facts] and, at the very least,
to place them in perspective." CBS failed utterly to
do this despite Dr. Kissinger's repeated offers to
produce illuminating documents, despite his repeated
suggestions to contact disinterested experts (many names
of whom he offered) and despite his preprogram discussion
and letter containing persuasive contrary evidence.

26/95

"60 Minutes," claimed by Mr. Leonard to be "the
most honored as well as the most popular public affairs
series in the history of television broadcasting"
(Exhibit D), has misled the American public on an issue
of great national importance. If CBS News' "journalistic
standards [were] of the highest" in the coverage of
this program, as also claimed by Mr. Leonard (id.),
then standards of truthful and fair reporting have lost
all rational meaning. The viewing public deserves
better:

"The nation depends on broadcasting,
and increasingly on television, fairly
to illumine the news . . . . For what
ultimately is at stake in this entire
matter is broadcasting's own reputation

26/96

for probity and reliability, and thus
its claim to public confidence."
*Columbia Broadcasting System ("The*
*Selling of the Pentagon"), 30 F.C.C.2d
150, 154 (1971).

IV. CONCLUSION

"The Kissinger-Shah Connection?" was a distorted, inaccurate, and misleading presentation of an important news event. In preparation of the program Messrs. Rather and Hewitt also engaged in unprofessional conduct by seeking to intimidate Dr. Kissinger into an interview to defend himself. Even after the facts of the distortions and the intimidation were made known to CBS News' President, Mr. William Leonard, CBS took no steps to correct the errors or to remedy the injustice. It is now up to the Council to judge CBS News for this behavior.

26/97

Respectfully submitted,

---------------------------

william D. Rogers

Bruce M. Chadwick

ARNOLD & PORTER
1229 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036