- 6 -

[Y]

Indochina

Let me start with our most tragic and immediate
problem.

I can add nothing to the President's request for
military and humanitarian assistance for the anguished
people of South Vietnam. I support this appeal and have
testified at length to that effect before Congressional
committees over the past several days.

The time will come when it will be clear that no
President could do less than to ask aid for those whom
we encouraged to defend their independence and at whose
side we fought for over a decade. And when that day
comes Americans will be glad that they had a President

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applied to our dealings with other nations.

Statesmen must act, even when premises cannot be
proved; they must decide, even when intangibles will
determine the outcome. Yet predictions are impossible
to prove; consequences avoided are never evident.

Skepticism and suspicion thus become a way of life and
infect the atmosphere of executive-legislative debate;
reasoned arguments are over whelmed by a series of
confrontations on peripheral issues.

American faces as well the problem of its new
generation. The gulf between their historical experience
and ours is enormous. They have been traumatized by
Vietnam as we were by Munich. Their nightmare is
foreign commitment as ours was abdication from

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'20's and '30's. We took our power for granted,
attributed our successes to virtue and blamed our
failures on the evil of others. We disparaged means.
In our foreign involvement we have oscillated between
exuberance and exhaustion, between crusading and
retreats into self-doubt.

Following the Second World War a broad spectrum
of civic leaders, professional groups, educators,
businessmen, clergy, the media, Congressional and
national leaders of both parties -- led American public
opinion to a new internationalist consensus. Taught by them and

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is prolonged by American involvement, that injustice
is perpetuated by American inaction, that defense
spending is wasteful at best and produces conflict at
worst, that American intelligence activities are immoral,
that the necessary confidentiality of diplomacy is a
plot to deceive the public, that flexibility is cynical
and amoral -- and that tranquillity is somehow to be
brought about by an abstract purity of motive for which
history offers no example.

This has a profound -- and inevitable -- impact
on the national mood, In the nation with the highest
standard of living and one of the richest cultures in the
world, in the nation that is certainly the most secure in

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the responsibility ⌜whether we like it or not⌝ to
strive for a safer and better world. And there is a great
reservoir of confidence around the globe in this country's
values and strength.

## Where Do We Go From Here?

So, let us learn the right lessons from today's
trials.

We no longer have the margin of safety. Our
aberrations are no longer free of consequence. In the
era of American predominance, America's preferences
held great sway. We could overwhelm our problems with
our resources. We had little need to resort to the
style of nations conducting foreign policy with limited

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At the same time, diplomacy must be permitted
a degree of confidentiality, or most serious exchange
with other governments is destroyed. To focus the
national debate on so-called secret agreements which
*and whose alleged subject matter has been* ~~prohibited~~ *by laws for too many years* no party has ever sought to implement *is to indulge* what Mencken called the "national appetite for bogus revelation." It goes without saying that a commitment involving national action must be known to the Congress or it is meaningless.

One lesson we must surely learn from Vietnam
is that new commitments of our nation's honor and
prestige must be carefully weighed. As Walter Lippman
observed, "for foreign relations, as in all other
relations, a policy has been formed only when commitments

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responded to our repeated requests that they at least

~~print and~~ protest North Vietnam's flagrant violations of these agreements. Such silence can only undermine any meaningful standards of international responsibility.

At home, a great responsibility rests upon all of
us in Washington.

Comity between the executive and legislative
branches is the only possible basis for national action.

The decade-long struggle in this country over executive
dominance in foreign affairs is over. The recognition
that the Congress is a coequal branch of government is
the dominant fact of national politics today. The Executive
~~recognizes~~ accepts that the Congress must have both the sense
and the reality of participation; foreign policy must be

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a shared enterprise. The question is whether the Congress
will go beyond the setting of guidelines to the conduct of
tactics; whether it will deprive the Executive of discretion
and authority in the conduct of diplomacy while at the
same time remaining institutionally incapable of
formulating or carrying out a clear national policy of

its own. At this moment in our history there is a grave
national imperative for a spirit of cooperation and
humility between the two branches of our government.

The effective performance of our constitutional system
has always rested on the restrained exercise of the
powers and rights conferred by it.

Cooperation must be a two-way street. Just as the
Executive has an obligation to reexamine and then to

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explain its policies, so the Congress should reconsider
the actions which have paralyzed our policies in the
Eastern Mediterranean, weakened our hand in relations
with the USSR, and inhibited our dialogue in this
Hemisphere. Foreign policy must have continuity.

If it becomes partisan, paralysis results, Problems
are passed on to the future under progressively worse
conditions. In such an atmosphere, our elections become
an element of international instability.

When other countries look to the United States, they
see one nation. When they look to Washington they see
one government. They judge us as a unit -- not as a
series of unrelated or uncoordinated institutions. If we
cannot agree amongst ourselves, there is little hope

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will lead to more positive relationships
and ultimately a true global community.

-- We must ensure that the vast reaches of
the oceans and space become areas of
cooperation rather than conflict. We can
then leave to future generations vast
economic and technological resources to
enrich life on this earth.

Our nation is uniquely endowed to play a creative and
decisive role in the new order which is taking form around us.

In an era of turbulence, uncertainty and conflict, the world

still looks to us for a protecting hand, a mediating influence,

a path to follow. It sees in us, most of all, a tradition and

- 5 -

Every day reports are coming in from our embassies all over the world, relaying anguished questions from our friends abroad. What do events in Indochina, and elsewhere signify for the America's competence -- constancy -- credibility -- coherence? How will Americans react at a time of travail? What are the implications for America's policies?

It is fashionable to maintain that pointing to serious consequences makes for a self-fulfilling prophecy; that if we would only keep silent, there would be no problem. To say that those who predict consequences are responsible for them shuts off rational debate -- and in our present situation will make the consequences inevitable. Such an attitude ignores the elementary fact that other nations judge us by our actions, not our rhetoric. It implies that we can manufacture credibility. It suggests that we can

CYJ

-11-

means to make here at home. And we have the raw materials for continued progress -- if we exhibit purpose and resolve.

It should not be forgotten that the central thrust of our foreign policy has been to adjust our conceptions, our methods, and our commitments to the conditions of a new era -- including an American already fatigued by Indochina.

We were convinced that a continuing, strong American role was indispensable to global stability and progress. But we knew as well that this required tailoring our role to new realities abroad and a new mood at home.

The postwar order of international relations ended with the last decade. No sudden upheaval marked the passage of that era, but the cumulative change by the end of the 1960's was profound: both in the condition of two coalitions headed by Moscow and Washington and vising the world and the attitude of the American people.

For Americans in the third world, in its place was a much more fluid and complex world—with many centers of power, more subtle dangers, and fresh openings. An alliance in Western Europe and Japan were stronger and more self-confident; our alliances needed to move from American predominance towards partnership,

- 16 -

confidence between the public and the government and
between the Executive and the Legislative government.

We must fact the ~~fact that our deepest problem is~~
~~Some of our deepest problems effect~~
a crisis of confidence -- the causes of which are

deep-seated. Some afflict democracies everywhere;
some are unique to America's tradition and recent
history.

We face the problem of modern government, besieged
by social, economic, and political challenges that cut
across national boundaries and lie at the margin of
governments' ability to control. The process by which
~~consumed~~ are consummated by the political leaders reach office too often does not~~
prepare them for the scope of the challenges with
which they must grapple. Management of bureaucracy consumes their energies and turns issues of public policy into issues of institutional bargaining. Instant

- 19 -

achievement in foreign affairs, They find little meaning or

incentive for loyalty in an impersonal, technological, bureau-

cratized, materialistic society. To satisfy their frustration,

the need for nonelasm + opinion is offered by an

intellectual leader.

powerful factor for the demoralization of any society.

This has been compounded by the decline, if not the

demoralization of what has been called "the Establishment."

Following the Second World War, a broad spectrum of
civic leaders, professional groups, educators, businessmen,
clergy, the media, Congressional and national leaders of
both parties -- led American public opinion in a new inter-
nationalist consensus. Taught by the very experience of the
Second World War, the nation understood that we best secured
our domestic tranquility by enlightened participation, indeed
leadership, in world affairs. Assistance to friends and allies

- 21 -

These themes strike a responsive chord in a disillusioned public. And they are all the more persuasive at a time of serious unemployment and inflation at home. But they are indiscriminate and they are dangerously irrelevant in a period of evident and complex dangers abroad.

All of this has produced the complex problem of executive-legislative relations in a new period. In every country, the modern state seems frustratingly remote from the human beings whose lives it affects; in every country, it is challenged by legislators who themselves find it difficult to affect policy except piecemeal or negatively. Accommodation of special groups -- the essence of problem-solving on domestic issues -- robs foreign policy of consistency and focus, which are the essence of national action abroad. Issues become difficult for technical

- 22 -

that becomes nearly unmemorable legislative oversight to encompass, as they become either more

sometimes in almost broad or more technical -- precisely as they become more

perpetuating 2/0 importance. Governments must make decisions before all issues. facts are clear, or else they abdicate control over events. Yet predictions are impossible to prove; consequences avoided are never evident. Skepticism and suspicion thus have a field-day and when they become endemic in executive-legislative relations, reasoned debate is replaced by a series of confrontations on peripheral issues.

These problems are the malaise of all democratic societies. In America, it has its own dimension.

We cannot afford domestic disarray, perhaps tolerable in other societies, because of the global consequences that

inevitably flow from our national policy. For Americans, the adjustment to a more complex world is inevitably difficult.

- 23 -

We are a people accustomed to triumph, to unlimited horizons.

Our earlier experience taught us that exertions had a terminal point, that striving was rewarded. We had a soaring idealism, a faith in law-- rarely tempered by the experience of tragedy or knowledge of the contingent quality of human ends. We took our power for granted and attributed our successes to virtue

We disparaged means. Thus in our foreign involvement we have oscillated between exuberance and exhaustion, between crusading and retreats into self-doubt.

We are a self-centered nation. In periods of success, we project ourselves. In periods of difficulty, we attack ourselves.

Let us remember that America's commitment to involvement in the world has always been problematical. The roots of isolationism, nourished by geography and history, go deep in

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the American tradition. The reluctance to be involved in
foreign conflicts, the deep-seated aversion to "power politics"
and balances of power, the notion that weapons are themselves
the causes of conflict, the conception that humanitarian
assistance and participation in the economic order are an
adequate substitute for political engagement -- all these were
familiar characteristics of the American isolationsim of the
'20's and '30's.

*funp23*

And so America today is a paradox. In the nation with
the highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures in
the world, in the nation that is perhaps the most secure in the
world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the ideals
of civil liberty and pluralist democracy -- we find a deep and
*especially in the late 1960s and* chronic self-doubt. There is a danger of forgetting the lessons
*painfully learned at great cost in our own lifetime.*

*particularly at the beginning of their lives.*

- 25 -

The result is a nation at the height of its powers that
needs to recover its faith in itself.

Will the American people now support a responsible and
active American foreign policy? They can and they will -- if
their leaders, in government and outside of government, give
them a sense that they have something to be proud of and some-
thing important to accomplish.

There is a great reservoir of faith around the world in
this country's values and strength. Equally, there is a great
reservoir of confidence within America in the contribution this
country can and must make to a better world.

This Administration dedicates itself to working in partner-
ship with Congress in a new spirit of commitment to international
affairs in our nation.

given the state of our economy and the trauma of the past decade, I find it encouraging that two-thirds of the Americans interviewed by Lou Harris in December thought it would be better for the future of their country if we took an active role in world affairs, rather than withdrawing. Even as other nations may be closely watching our constancy in foreign affairs, I suspect they marvel at the resiliency of our people and our institutions.

- 26 -

Where Do We Go From Here?

So let us learn the right lessons from our present situation.

We no longer have the margin of safety we once had, for
disarray or abdication or short-sightedness in the conduct of
*are no longer free of consequence.*
foreign policy. In the era of American predominance,

America's simple preferences held great sway. We could over-
whelm our problems with our resources. We had less need to
resort to the traditional style of nations conducting foreign policy
with more modest means -- subtlety, maneuver, patience,

*Today we need a very high premium on public understanding and public
flexibility. Now we must have these qualities -- but in a democracy,
they place a very high premium on public understanding and public
confidence.*

*In the era of our predominance, our constancy was not in
question; now it is.* We are still the largest single factor in

- 27 -

international affairs -- but we are one nation among many.

The weight of our influence now depends crucially on our
perseverance, our creativity, and our perceived reliability.

We can no longer afford isolationism in the guise of moralism
~~either in~~ overinvolvement in the affairs of others or in
abject renunciation of our great responsibilities.

We will have to work harder to earn trust and confidence
and we shall.

We must stop the pretense that we can choose between
morality and pragmatism. America cannot be true to itself
unless it stands for humane values and unless it upholds the
dignity of the individual. But to stand for our values we must
be secure. The deepest problem of foreign policy to to strike

a balance between these requirements. In 1941 Churchill supported
the Soviet Union whose values he abhored and had fought all his

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achieved in the policy of detente.

At this moment, a great responsibility rests upon all
of us in Washington.

Comity between the executive and legislative branches
is the only possible basis for national action. In every country,
their cooperation is a complex problem. It is compounded in
this country by the separation of powers and by the weakening
of traditional patterns of authority within the Congress, occurring
at the same time as the weakening of the authority of the
executive branch.

Let there be no mistake about it: in this country, the
decade-long struggle over alleged executive dominance in
foreign affairs is over. It is last year's issue. The assertion
of Congressional authority is with us; it is the dominant fact

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of national politics today, -- unchallenged by the Executive Branch.

The question now is whether Congress will block the diplomacy of the Executive Branch while unable to formulate or carry out a clear national policy of its own, or whether both branches will, with some humility, recognize that a spirit of cooperation is a grave necessity for this nation at this moment in our history.

If guidance is needed in thisendeavor, let us attempt it.

The Executive Branch will do its part to consult and to work in partnership. But cooperation must be a two-way street.

Just as the Executive has an obligation to reexamine its policies, so the Congress should reconsider the actions which have produced our paralysis with respect to events in Portugal, our loss of influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and weakened our land in have set back our relations with the USSR. The problems we face are national problems, not those of one Administration. Foreign policy must have continuity; if it becomes partisan the very

It is vital that all Americans do so. For one of lesson from the drawn from recent the greatest casualties of Vietnam has been the events is to restore civility of our domestic discourse. Over the years of the Vietnam debate has yielded to emotion, sweeping far beyond the issues involved. Not only judgments but motives have been called into question. Not only policy but character has been attacked. What began as overwhelming national consensus progressively deteriorated into vicious, poisonous contention. And disturbing traces remain. As fateful events in Indochina once more dominate the news, dormant passions threaten once more to erupt.

This type of debate must be put behind us. Civil discourse is a two-way street: leaders in Government and others allied with them have at times abused their position and demonstrated excesses of conduct and words. The Administration, following the President's example, will do its best to prevent moderation. But equally foreign policy in a democracy cannot be conducted when leaders are continuously vilified, when of debate, silence prevails.

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When they measure our continuity, our will, our purpose, our
ability to follow through on what we promise, their index is
our performance and not our debates. The country cannot
afford partisan warfare at this moment in our history.

## The Coming Agenda

Ralph Waldo Emerson once said "No great man ever
complained of a want of opportunity." Neither does a great
nation.

Our resources are vast, our leadership essential, our
opportunities unprecedented and insistent:

— The United States provides the core of the great alliances — with the industrial democracies of the West, with Japan and the other nations of Asia, and with Latin America. These alliances are the anchor of our security, the foundation for détente, and the expression of shared values

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challenges.

An incipient world order is taking form around us. Our nation is uniquely endowed to play a creative and decisive role. But we and our friends must come to terms with ourselves.

We must understand our own interests and act purposefully.

If not, the field will lie open to others -- others not necessarily friendly to us. The result could be a reshaping of the world which takes little account of our values and our interests, and produces great dangers of war.

It is time for America to act without guilt and without self-doubt. It is time for America's leaders, in and out of government, to say what they are for, not what they are against. In the words of Longfellow, it is time to "look not mournfully into the past. Wisely improve the present. Go forth to meet the shadowy future without fear, and with a manly

- 38 -

heart."

In an era of turbulence, uncertainty and conflict, the world still looks to us for a protecting hand, a mediating influence, a path to follow. It sees in us, most of all, a tradition and a vision of hope. Just as America has symbolized for generations man's conquest over nature, so too has America -- with its banner of progress and freedom -- symbolized man's mastery over his own future.

For the better part of two centuries our forefathers, citizens of a small and relatively weak country, met adversity with intense courage and creativity. And in the course of their struggle they built the freest, richest and most powerful nation the world has ever known. As we, their heirs, take America into its third century, as we take up the agenda of the modern world, we are determined to recover the belief in ourselves that characterized the most creative periods in our history.