CHAPTER 4 (1974)

Page

3. HK to Haig, 1/4/74, talks about pitfalls in Middle East; asks about "our frame of mind" re RN and notes "I left San Clemente very dispressed. I am beginning to wonder how long this is manageable."

5. HK assures RN that the press is affirming that the President is in full control of foreign policy.

8. RN tells HK in response to critics "just stand there and say that's a damn lie. How are you feeling?" (RN asks that often) 1/22/74

10. HK/RN on oil embargo. 1/23/74 RN: "How's your confidence? You're not getting discouraged?"

16. HK/RN on oil embargo. 1/28/74 RN: "...I say except for Henry Kissinger we wouldn't even have a chance to have the embargo lifted...Thank God you had the guts to stand up and do the right thing..."

19. RN/HK, 1/29/74 RN: "I want to make it clear we support the disengagement and support the additional steps for permanent peace..." (re a planned RN speech)

23. RN/HK, 2/5/73, on various. RN: "Take care of youself."

29. RN/HK during period of Washington energy conference, 2/13/73. RN: "You have done a great job Henry and I know it has been pain and suffering and all the rest." RN wants to "isolate" the French. (30) Further RN/HK on energy conference, pp 32 ff.

38. HK briefs RN on status of pressures to get embargo lifted, 2/18/73. RN: "My only interest is the embargo. That's the only thing the country is interested in. They don't give a damn what happens to Syria." (p 39)

47-48. HK/VP Ford discuss misunderstanding over announcement of lifting of the oil embargo. 3/14/73. Ford is completely understanding: "Don't worry about those little things. I understand what the damn press does."

51. HK tells Scowcroft to tell RN (3/15/73) that his press conference performance was "absolutely spectacular."

## Chapter 4

52 Ticker reports oil embargo lifted, 3/18/74.

53 Later in day RN/HK talk again. HK: "The major thing we need now is the disengagement." RN: "This is the one thing we're going to do though, Henry...there is going to be a permanent settlement...(no) illusions...the Israelis think that they can just dig in and this is it."

57 ff RN/HK talk about a possible Presidential Mid East trip.

66 RN feels he still has strong support for his foreign policy. 4/16/74

68 RN/HK discuss various (including China and MFN), 4/26/74. RN tells HK to stress in his press conference that "Peace...it is no giveaway, it is no donor thing or anything like that. It isn't something to get us involved, it is a way to keep out of war in the ME..."

72 RN to HK after ME shuttle: "I just called to see if you got a good night's sleep." 6/2/74

76 RN to HK complains about all the questions of HK about wire-tapping; "It's disgusting." Defends program. 6/6/74.

77 HK/Ronald Reagan chat, 6/7/74.

81 RN asks HK, "how are you feeling?" 6/8/74

84 ff Some telcons on wire-tapping. I agree with PWR to ignore issue.

90 RN to HK on Cyprus, 7/17/74: "Whatever you decide, it's alright with me." Made same point next day (p 92)

94 In talk about Cyprus, RN mentions "the libs and all that sort of thing." 7/19/74 They talk about Cyprus again that day, with RN noting the "damn symbolism in the UN..." 97 Further talk on Cyprus on June 20 -- now an overlay to RN's final days. (100) See also talk on Cyprus, p. 101.

103 In final days, Haig/HK talk about Israeli arms request and getting RN decision. 8/3/74 RN told HK that day "I think we should keep a tight string on them but if you think this is right, OK." (104)

Chapter 4

105 Gracious chat by Ford with HK, 8/5/74.

106 Inserted for mood in final days: Rita Hauser speculation that "Jerry won't pick" NAR as VP as "he's too big and powerful." Asked if he will stay on, HK: "I don't think anyone knows what sort of President Ford would make, including Ford." (107) HK also notes that "some awful mistakes were made by the President but he doesn't deserve this." 8/6/74

109 Haig calls to ask that HK come to the Oval Office immediately. 7/7/74

110 More on mood. Rita Hauser speculation on Mel Laird. 7/7/74.

112 HK/Scowcroft on plans for RN speech that day announcing resignation. 8/8/74

113 Ford/HK talk about Ford's meeting with Nixon and what RN confided about HK being the only one in the Cabinet in the know. Ford: "I really want you to stay and stand with me in these difficulty times...I wanted to get that in now so there is no doubt about it." (Ford has a similar statement in his memoir). (114) 8/8/74
(130-b)

115 HK tells Brent he wants to call RN (no record). 8/8/74

116ff Nixon memoir recount of one of his last hurrahs - his Mideast trip. Praised HK talents (116); recalled HK Salzburg press conference (118); notes his phlebitis problem (which will almost kill him in the fall - for use in a later chapter; Ford visited him in hospital).

126 RN departing by helicopter on August 9 (photo).

127 RN's farewell speech shortly before, at the White House.

130 Ford memoir account of his critical meeting in which RN said he would resign and his recall (130-b) of his words to HK about staying on (8/8/74)
a-d

131 Ford is sworn in (photo), August 9.

132 HK tells Hugh Sidey of the "human tragedy" of RN.

Chapter 4

134 RN talks to HK to ask "my last request of you old man." 8/9/74

135 Arthur Burns is sad about RN's family. HK says "I spent three hours with him Wednesday night and it just about tore me up." 8/10/74

137 HK briefs Ford on Cyprus. The new President sounds as if he has grasped the situation immediately but also makes clear to HK that "I would rely on your good judgment." (138)

138-a Ford memoir of meeting Rabin on September 10, 1974. He also discusses Gromyko visit ten days later and Soviet pitch for Geneva. But Ford writes "Kissinger and I decided that we could accomplish more unilaterally by working with Israel and each of its Arab neighbors." (This address point made on last page of chapter 4)

139 Aitken account of Nixon on a comprehensive peace settlement.

140 Ford on Nixon's pardon - September 8, 1974 (there are many accounts, including Ford's, of the outcry over this).

143 Ford memoir on taking HK's advice on plunging into foreign policy beginning with his first day in office when Ford met with innumerable foreign representatives.

146
ff Excerpts from the new book *Nixon Off the Record*
by his research aide of the last few years of his
life, Monica Crowley. It does sound authentic;
she claims RN did not know she was taking notes.
I am not recomending using any of this but I will
give you the cites:

146 RN on Ford (and Kay Graham); also 147

147 On Carter

148 On Bush

149 On Clinton and Bush

150 On Clinton (and Hillary); Ford and his economic summit; Warren Christopher, Tony Lake, Les Aspin.

151 Note comments re HK 1969 NSC staff.

152 On Bush again; also RN hopes that 1973 would have been the year of a Mideast peace.

153 On Clinton and the aid to Russia issue

154 On Clinton, Hillary; also Bosnia

8/15/96-#5

# Chapter 4

## The Nixon Legacy: Calming Middle East Storms

### The Boiling Cauldron

In the part of our world where the mirage is a natural phenomenon, nothing is ever as it appears. When Nixon left office, no Arab nation had as yet recognized the state of Israel, nor had any Arab leader agreed to negotiate directly with an Israeli leader on political issues (except for King Hussein, who had done so surreptitiously). The furthest [the Arabs] had gone was to permit technical military discussions regarding ceasefires and, even then, only under third-party sponsorship--usually of the United States, occasionally of the

TELCON

The President/Secy Kissinger

12:45 p.m., January 3, 1973

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. Everybody tells me you did a fine job at your press conference.

K: Well, I laid into them.

P: Good.

K: Actually, they asked our sort of question. What about this story that you're conducting an independent foreign policy? So this gave me a chance to say how often we meet, how you give me directions before I go, how I am in touch every evening, how I am on top of it in touch with Scowcroft whom you see regularly and Haig. And I said, but moreover I don't like the idea of a government of independent fiefdoms wasn't run by feudal barrons. The President is in charge of foreign policy. That's the way the constitution provides it; that's the way it is; that's the way it will always be as long as I'm in the Department and the President is in the White House.

P: That's good, Henry.

K: You know, that was --

P: Great!

K: Then they said: How can the President conduct foreign policy when he's being impeached? I said: Well, you've got one thing wrong. He's isn't being impeached. And they said: Well, as long as there's a threat of impeachment. I said: You read the President's annual Foreign Policy Report. He has designed a strategy; he is pursuing it. He is pursuing it for the sake of the peace of the world and he is in no way influenced by any of the domestic considerations which you imply and he will do what is right and only what is right.

P: That's very good.

K: And I also indicated at great length that you were spending a lot of time on the energy problem and I said you were going to approach various heads of government next week. We're spelling out these proposals and that gave me a chance to give them your approach to it, which is more than we could have done -- We couldn't release the letter so we would have had to have had Ziegler just say it.

P: Sure, much better for you.

2

The President/Secy Kissinger

K: No, much better for you.

P: Much better for you to say it though.

K: It gives a much better ride to the story.

P: Of course.

K: So I thought it was a pretty good press --

P: Oh, everybody thought so, yeah. Ron and Al both called me and said they thought it was great.

K: Al told you about that letter I had from the Saudis --

P: Yeah.

K: A fellow called McMullin going around there saying that on behalf of Ford that you're going to be impeached in two months.

P: That's a curious thing. Have you ever met him?

K: I don't even know who he is. Do you know who he is?

P: No, never heard of him.

K: Probably one of these goddamn oil executives.

P: No, but we know most of those. Hummm. But we'll run it down.

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1973

3:35 pm

K: How are you? I wanted to check one thing to get your personal judgement. I have had a very good talk with Dayan. They have basically bought our concept. It is a tremendous advance. Really incredible. But there are enough wrinkles in it for them so it is hard to handle through diplomatic channels. If I talk to Sadat I could get the ..... accomplished. But I know what our leader would think if I was to go out there. I would just go to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

H: Yeah.

K: I can have our Ambassadors present it to him, but the explanations would have to be so complex.

H: What are you telling me?

K: If I do it I should do it next week. some time if you are that eager to get it settled.

H: Sure. Would you go to Cairo?

K: If we present this in Geneva and let the Russians hack at it we may get a stalemate..

H: Is Dayan speaking for her?

K: yes. This thing is now for the first time within manageable range but still not acceptable to the Egyptians. The Egyptians want them to withdraw to the Mitla Pass... the Egyptians want... two kilometers at the Suez Canal. They are willing to give them two battalions. They have given up the idea of tanks east of the Canal.. if they are willing to have... but if every concession becomes the result of a cable.. do you see what I mean?

H: I understand.

K: I don't want to present it to him because he will go into orbit.

- 2 -

4

H: I think we ought to do what will get this thing settled.

K: I got him good publicity yesterday.

H: Excellent, excellent. That problem is manageable.

K: I am not so eager to take another trip out there....if this is the last Israeli position..

H: That's right.

K: I would go to Cairo and Tel Aviv and I may hop to Damascus to keep them quiet -- but essentially it will be Cairo and Tel Aviv for three or four days... My worry is we put it into Geneva and the Egyptians will ______ and I may have to get to break a deadlock.

H: That's a traditional problem, but the basic problem is if you go there and get caught up in a vice...I would hate to think, if you should go and get caught in a stalemate, I mean you are included in it.

K: He would like it and then he could get rid of me.
How is our frame of mind?

H: Fine, much better than yesterday.

K: I left San Clemente very depressed. I am beginning to wonder how long this is manageable.

H: It is...in the Los Angeles Times.

K: That part is manageable. I think we have it won. What may not be is our...

H: No, that is manageable...the question is that this thing will rise or fall on what is accomplished. I think if there is opposition and it is real and now and not a situation where you are rendered inoperative then we ought to take it.

K: Let us analyze the plan and find out if the Israelis mean this is their final position because then there will be a deadlock...I may be able to bring about a meeting with Dayan and their top man but let me think about it. You think you can manage it if I find it desirable to go.

H: We can manage whatever is necessary.

K: OK, fine.

END

5

TELECON

President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1974

8:12 PM

N: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President. I just wanted to bring you up to date on the meeting with Dayan. We spoke about Israel ____. We're 75% of the way at last. We made very good progress. Have ____ to the depth of the zone. I haven't talked to the Israelis. The Israelis are willing to be at the West end and the Egyptians want them at the East end. That's a difficulty that ____. We're now talking about the same plan with just different numbers.

N: Good, Henry. That's very good.

K: I think we have a chance now of making some progress. I'll report to you after the meeting tomorrow.

N: You're meeting with him again?

K: Yes. So we know what's happening, when and where.

N: That's fine, Henry, just fine.

K: Every paper including the Star has a headline that you're in full control of Foreign policy.

N: Eventually, they have to write it.

K: We never could get it printed.

N: Why do you think they're printing it now. It's a curious thing, isn't it.

K: The Washington Post has a separate story on the first page, with a big headline "Kissinger says Nixon in full charge". The New York Times had a big print of it's story on the subject.

N: The main thing is that it's all working. __________.

K: I think we can handle that.

N: I followed that one in those reports.

K: We think you should have it.

N: I know. I wouldn't do it, but you with it. You will let me know. I'm just thinking of you. It's still in the dry season. They hung on this long.

K: We can already begin to ____ if they got to the middle of May they could make it.

N: The make slow progress here. The energy ____.

K: We can get some other equipment in there and...

N: Part 2 of the energy thing played well. A lot of people are asking, "What is the President planning".

K: I think we would make your proposal thing next week on the energy action group. We want those letters out so we can release them.

N: You got out just in time. It's going to rain here for the next few days.

K: I'll call you tomorrow to report to you.

N: You're feeling all right?

K: I feel fine, Mr. President. Those four days did me a world of good.

N: Now if we can find time to get you back out here. ____ Don't let them corrupt you again.

K: I'm going to a Chinese Restaurant with Nancy and let them corrupt me.

END

1

TELECON

January 21, 1974

3:15 PM

K: Mr. President.

N: Henry. I heard you found a nice reception from your staff when you got back. They were applauding.

K: I'm having a staff meeting in a few minutes. I'll be talking to them then. But I don't expect enthusiasm from my staff.

P: Deep down they have respect.

K: They know it's a big thing.

N: The reason we were having a NSC meeting is I think it's a good to pull all those people together. I don't know what subject you want. Just make it an hour, Wednesday at 3:00.

K: That's fine Mr. President. I'll make a note to you tomorrow as to the _____. Maybe we can just have a review on the Middle East.

N: Or SALT.

K: Maybe SALT. Let's have SALT, Mr. President.

N: Middle East, they're just rehashing things. You can get running on that in the meantime. Get ready to get back on your time clock and just remember you've done a hell of a job. Keep fighting.

K: I am. No question about it, Mr. President.

END

TELECON

January 22, 1974

N: Henry.

K: Mr. President.

N: I see you gave the Arabs hell today.

K: I didn't give them hell really. ________ after it broke up they'll lift the embargo. They said maybe he'll do it at the end of February, maybe after 60 days. ________ we just have to show them our teeth. We'll get it off, Mr. President. We have an intelligence report from Saudi Arabia to which we replied in such a way we may get you to announce it at the State of the Union address. It is very important that you announce it. Really should be done now. I said, you tell King that we want to do something. This is the time to do it, at the State of the Union address.

N: Why can't you get along with all the other preparations today. Your press conference went well.

K: They raised that God-damn spying incident again. Now they're accusing me of perjury.

N: Just part of the game. Just stand there and say that's a damn lie. How are you feeling?

K: I feel fine, Mr. President. I feel very well.

N: Let me tell you, we're going to find the way ________.

K: I can't agree more.

N: Don't you agree.

K: Yes. I don't think you should be in the position of constantly defending yourself.

N: Fight them all out.

K: I think that's essential.

N: Right, Henry.

END

TELCORN

The President/Sec. Kissinger

Wed, January 23, 1974, 3:05 p.m.

K: Mr. President.

N: Anything new on the embargo front?

K: No, and I have been waiting for some word from Jidda and I cannot figure it out. We sent our Ambassador in there and I think we should send a letter to Sadat to point out to him that they had better not play around.

N: I don't know whether Sadat can do it. Should we send it to Faisal?

K: We have sent strong representation to Faisal. Our Ambassador had an appointment to see him. After we have heard from him, I think you might consider sending a letter.

N: All right. A letter to him and to Sadat. Maybe he cannot deliver.

K: If he cannot deliver, Mr. President, then we should make them pay for it. They will just drive us crazy if that happens. It has always been understood that the embargo would be lifted when disengagement took place. If that does not happen they will jack up the price until it becomes impossible. I don't think it will get to that point.

N: Maybe it is the usual bureaucratic elements, etc.

K: They have to bring along Libya and Iraq and that may be the big obstacle.

N: We have no contacts with either of those?

K: Not that would do any good.

N: Yep. O.K. Whatever you think. We will do.

K: Right, Mr. President.

N: Fine, Henry.

END

TELECON

The President/Secretary Kissinger

January 23, 1974, 7:00 p.m.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: Hi, Henry.

K: Mr. President, I just wanted to let you know that I have had a long cable from Saudi Arabia. I think there's still another part coming. If you write a letter tomorrow that, then, over the week-end we can work out so that you can announce it in your State of the Union address.

N: Letter to whom?

K: To Faisal.

N: Good. Good. This is the greatest thing we could possibly do. Apart from the damn embargo, it wouldn't amount to anything anymore.

K: All you have to do is give him reassurance.

N: Why don't you prepare a letter and bring it over tomorrow. I'll add a few scribbled notes.

K: We'll send it over tomorrow, Mr. President.

N: That's good news. How's your confidence? You're not getting discouraged?

K: Not at all. I thought you were in very good form this morning.

N: Well. I thought that our friend... Which meeting were you at?

K: I was at both.

N: I thought that Simon was a wipe-out.

K: A disaster.

N: I felt I had to say a few things. Didn't you?

K: You saved him.

- 2 -

N: At the Cabinet meeting -- just running the GD thing. They're all so weak. What they need is leadership. What was your feeling?

K: Exactly. As you said, they're very weak. You certainly got it across to them.

N: It isn't my nature, as you know, to talk strongly and toughly like that. Maybe I ought to do a little more.

K: I think, Mr. President, if you continue to give the leadership, that that is all the people want.

N: We shall see. In any event, we'll continue to give the leadership. But that's good news. When will you have the letter ready? The meeting - it's NSC - is at 3:00 tomorrow.

K: I'll have it by then, sir.

N: One thing I do want to discuss there -- raised by the Southerners -- re the Reserves. The Regular Army and all that bunch. Moorer and the bunch want to cut them off. I want to save them because that's good politics. So take that line. You know what I mean.

K: Absolutely. That is my conviction anyhow.

N: Frankly, the Reserves saved Israel.

K: They've saved us in every crisis we've had.

N: Moorer and the Admirals are only interested in how many stars they've got. And kick the Guard. You know what I mean. All of our friends in Congress don't want us to do this. That should be for the Southerners ______ is why is it that, frankly, why is it that the National Security people - they didn't mention you by name - they mentioned Schlesinger - why is it you're fighting this battle simply to put the name into the ______ thing and to slash the Reserve program. I think they're wrong.

K: I'm fully behind you, Mr. President.

N: Let's hit it tomorrow. O.K.?

K: Right, Mr. President.

N: O.K. Thanks. That's good news.

END

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
The President

1/28/74; 11:23 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. Anything new today?

K: Yes, Mr. President. I was just going to call you. We have had word from Sadat that the oil embargo will be lifted in a way that you can announce it in your State of the Union Address. And we have had word from Jidda which is a little less -- can I have those cables, which is a little less precise but still precise enough to enable you to make a statement in which Faisal says he doesn't want his name mentioned but you can say you have been in touch with senior Arab leaders who are now in the process of engaging in the lifting of the embargo and let's see, let me get what he . . . You can say that you have been in direct contact with important Arab leaders who have called an urgent meeting of the Arabs to arrange the lifting of the oil boycott and that you have every reason to believe that this action will be taken in the very near future. That is a direct quote from Faisal that you are authorized to say.

P: That's a little bit . . .

K: No, we can jazz it up a little bit more.

P: Maybe jazz it up a bit.

K: It is a clear statement that the embargo will be lifted and. . . .

P: I think the way you might ______ of it Henry, would be in terms of saying that I have been in touch with leaders -- Arab leaders -- and I can tell the Congress that I have every reason to believe, that I have . . .

K: That you have been assured.

P: That I have received assurances that the embargo will in the very near future be lifted.

K: After certain legal formalities.

P: After certain formalities will in the very near future be lifted.

K: Right.

P: This means there will be no rationing. Work out some language like that, if you would, Henry.

13

1/28/74; 11:23 a.m.

-2-

to

K: Right, Mr. President. We have/add a paragraph or so on the Middle East which has to go with it.

P: Oh, I see.

K: If that fits into the scheme of your speech.

P: Well, we are going to say something on the Middle East but I think what you mean. You mean about developments and what we are pumping to do or...

K: That's right. It's basically *innocuous* but it is sacramental language.

P: Uh-huh.

K: You know 242 and...

P: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, we could even more it. We could put that paragraph in another section if we didn't want to put it right there. But we will.

K: That's where the Arabs would want it.

P: Yeah. We could just type the darn thing up in the briefest possible form, you know, and the most -- you know -- striking form.

K: Right. You will have it this afternoon, Mr. President.

P: That's plenty of time. plenty soon. Or tomorrow morning.

K: You will have it late this afternoon.

P: Fine, Henry, you have plenty of time to get something in. But as I said, what we say about 242 and the rest, make it brief.

K: Oh, very brief. The less the better from my point of view.

P: I know. But we have to say it because their...

K: And it's...

P: Right.

1/28/74; 11:23 a.m.

-3-

P: Anything else on your front?

K: No, otherwise things are . . .

P: You went up to New York over the weekend?

K: That's right I went up Saturday afternoon.

P: Was it restful?

K: It was very pleasant.

P: You didn't have to do a lot of work?

K: I saw Waldheim . . .

P: Oh!

K: The choice between seeing him up there or having him come down here and I thought he would be easier to get rid of up there.

P: [Laughter] Down here you would have to have him for dinner.

K: That's right.

P: Very good. Very good.

K: I don't know whether Haig had a chance to mention it to you -- the Russians wanted me to meet them in Geneva about the Middle East -- Gromyko did, and I have no interest in that. I proposed if he wanted to come here.

P: Then we'll see him's coming here.

K: A week from today.

P: Sure. Fine.

K: I think you should see him.

P: Sure. By all means. By all means. Yes. He'll be coming here from Cuba.

K: That's right, which I think is a nice ticket . . .

15

1/28/74; 11:23 a.m.

-4-

P: Yeah. Sure. Yeah, I told them that's fine.

K: And the only other person I know . . .

P: The King of Jordan, yes, I'll see him.

K: Okay.

P: But this time I don't think I should give him a dinner, you know.

K: I'll be glad to give him the dinner.

P: Only because of the fact that I haven't given Mrs. Meir a dinner. You know what I mean? This time I should just see him and somebody else could give him the dinner.

K: I could easily give him the dinner.

P: Or let Ford give him the dinner.

K: That's even better. Let Ford give him the dinner.

P: Let Ford give the dinner.

K: I think that's excellent.

P: But I will be glad to see him, Henry. Good work.

K: Good, Mr. President.

P: And the King of Italy -- I mean the President of Italy a little later, if you don't mind.

K: No, no, no, that's in March sometime.

P: Yeah, Yeah. Let's hold that off.

K: Absolutely. Oh, no, that's in March.

P: All right, fine.

K: Right, Mr. President. I will have this worked out.

TELECON

January 28, 1974, 7:10 p.m.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: Henry, how are you. I was wondering if you got that
document up yet.

K: I sent it up a couple of hours ago. It may be caught
in the system, Mr. President. It's just one paragraph, but
all the information in it is requested by the Saudis.

N: What we want to do is to get the damned embargo lifted,
and we want to say the things that will not be put out --
you know the point -- to make it appear like a helluva
foreign policy achievement of this Administration. If you
hadn't worked out the Israeli-Egyptian thing, we wouldn't
be here.

K: That's absolutely true. I don't mean

N: When they start that crap, I say except for Henry
Kissinger we wouldn't even have a chance to have the embargo
lifted.

K: It wasn't that. It was what we did for four years.

N: You're good to say that.

K: No, but it's true.

N: Thank God you had the guts to stand up and do the right
thing. If I can announce it in a subtle way -- what do you
think I should say?

K: You should read what I gave you, but you certainly can
add a paragraph of your own. Incidentally, in foreign policy,
it's the credibility.

N: But the main thing I should say is that as a result of
the conversations we have had in the last 48 hours, etc., etc.,
that the embargo will be lifted.

K: That you can say.

N: Secondly, I will say, as a result, I can now announce
with full confidence to the American people there will be
no rationing.

-2-

17

K: That you can also say.

N: That will be the good news of this speech -- just that --
that's all we need.

K: What you cannot say is about production restriction will
also be lifted -- but the public won't understand that, so
there's no point.

N: You and I know it took four years to do it. Where
are you now?

K: I'm in my office.

N: My God -- it's so late.

K: It's only 7 o'clock.

N: No, it's longer than that.

K: No, it's 7:15.

N: State Department or White House?

K: State Department. I was in the White House in the
morning. What I usually do is spend the mornings at the
White House and the afternoons at the State Department.

N: We've taken care of all your needs now? Let's see.
We've taken care of Gromyko. We've taken care of the Italian -
in March. Nobody else you have to worry about at the moment?

K: No, Mr. President.

N: Thank God. I was just thinking -- when I talked to my
old friend Bill, I'd have to go into great ______, but with
you we all know what the game is -- **you do what's necessary.**
No more.

K: Exactly, Mr. President.

N: These are necessary.

K: These are necessary.

N: Fine. I'll do them. Incidentally, if dinners are
necessary, I'll do them, but I prefer for you to have them.

K: I don't think that's necessary.

N: Also -- have Ford do them. Ford could do Hussein for us. Basically, Gromyko doesn't need - he doesn't expect a dinner.

K: I'm going to have dinner with Gromyko at the Soviet Embassy.

N: With Gromyko, I see him. He never expects dinner. For all the others, use Ford -- he loves to do it. He has the place for it.

K: I think it's an excellent idea. I'll check on that document.

N: Don't bother to check on it.

K: Right, Mr. President.

END

TELCORN

The President/Secretary Kissinger
January 29, 1974

1:25 p.m.

N: How did you get along up there.

K: Very well.

N: Foreign Relations Committee.

K: Right.

N: I was talking to Brent Scowcroft -- you are back at the State Department?

K: That's right.

N: Because of the length of the thing, I have to boil down the section on the embargo. He is working on it but I would appreciate your help. I'll make all the points but I want to cut it as much as I can.

K: Right. I have it in front of me, Mr. President.

N: I don't have it in front of me. It is over with Price. I'll make any commitments that we need. But I don't want to put too much there. It is not only the length of it but the rhythm of the section. I move from that to the (part) on energy. If I have too many words it will destroy the thing.

K: I am looking through it. There are a few key phrases that have to stay in, like "this is only the first step" -- "the agreement on disengagement"...

N: On the disengagement -- we are talking about two different subjects. I know they are interlocking.

K: I see about three sentences...

N: What I am getting at is -- the embargo is what I am talking about. I know the disengagement is locked to it but without the disengagement you could not have the embargo lifted. But I want to make it clear we support the disengagement and support the disengagement and support the additonal steps for permanent peace. Boil it down as much as you can, will you, please.

K: Absolutely.

N: Send it to me and I will take another look at it.

K: I will get it to you by 3:00.

The President

January 29

N: Good. Is everything else all right?

K: It went beautifully.

N: (Not clear)

K: You run the risk -- this is what the Saudi Arabians authorized. Kuwait may start climbing the wall but then we just have to crack them but Saudi Arabia authorized it. The text we have given you has been cleared in fact suggested by Saudi Arabia and has...

N: In the speech...

K: And has been approved by Sadat. It would be a hell of a risk for them if they disavowed you.

N: O.K. Fine. Thank you Henry.

K: I would take the chance.

END.

TELECON

January 30, 1974, 10:03 p.m.

K: Mr. President, this was a great and courageous speech.

N: Well, it's nice of you to call. I looked at you a couple of times, and I gave Dobrynin a couple of looks, too.

K: I think it was very moving, Mr. President.

N: I thought it was necessary to add that little - the five minutes at the end. Otherwise they would have said I ignored the damned thing.

K: It was good that you did not include it in the formal text. In the formal text you laid out an agenda.

N: If I had ignored it completely, they would have said you were afraid to.

K: I wondered about how it would be handled.

N: Not in the formal speech at all, you know.

K: It was tremendous and moving.

N: We hope it helps, Henry. I coppered down that Arab part. The coercion bit bothers me, but Al said you thought it was important. It's a shot across the bow. We gotta let them know we don't have to have them.

K: You'll get more credit for having said it. Everyone understood what you were saying.

N: You notice how I did the Soviet part. I rewrote it. That military part - I struck it all out ______ strength for the sake of strength.

K: That came out extremely well. It was very, very powerful. I think you got out of the energy thing what you need. We got a message from the Saudis this morning in which they asked us to tone down what you said ______ stuck to the original.

N: I understand. This way we get two bites at the apple. Well, Henry, keep the faith.

K: No question about it.

END

TELECON

February 5, 1974, 5:35 p.m.

K: Hello.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: Henry, anything new today?

K: Well, we still have that hassle with the Saudis.

N: You don't think I should intervene by writing another letter to the fellow?

K: We're thinking of that. We're drafting a letter. He has himself locked in concrete.

N: He's really locked in concrete. Until Syria has disengagement, there'll be no lifting of the embargo.

K: It will take months. It took three months with the Egyptians. In January when you wrote him, he couldn't understand your urgency about when he would lift the embargo. We got the Egyptian disengagement the day after. He said he would lift it the next day. We even were worried that it might be premature for your State of the Union address. Then he comes with a new condition. In November he said absolutely no assurance that if we do the Syrian thing they will do it. We are there on a roller-coaster. We have their solemn assurance in writing that they would lift the embargo. This is not our imagination.

N: Yes, I know.

K: Remember, in December, Prince ______ sent me a letter saying they would lift it. ______ conference table because of the issue of the POW's. Now that's going to take us two weeks to break.

N: I think I ought to send a letter ______ my solemn commitments on this.

K: I doubt, Mr. President, we should continue running around under these conditions.

MANUSCRIPTS AND ARCHIVES

YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

CLASSIFIED ITEM(S) REMOVED

The following item(s) have been removed from the collection because they
contain security classified information:

**Collection:** Henry A. Kissinger Papers, Part III

**Box Number:** 210

**Folder Number:** 1

Item(s) and Security Classification:

TELECON - The President/Secretary Kissinger, February 6, 1974, 7:46 p.m. 2pp

MANUSCRIPTS AND ARCHIVES

YALE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

CLASSIFIED ITEM(S) REMOVED

Collection: Henry A. Kissinger Papers, Part III

Box Number: 210

Folder Number: 1

TELCON - Secretary Kissinger - The President, February 12, 1974 3pp

shocked but intrigued by the extent to which such revelations might damage the candidate. "What effect will they have on the voters?" he asked.

"If they are true—" I began to reply.

"They are, without question. He established it early on with the media. I would say this: 'Let's not discuss personal lives. There are plenty of issues that concern us in this country; let us focus on those.' If he cannot avoid it, all he has to say is 'My wife and I have had some problems.' I don't know if the media will be satisfied with that. He is a Democrat, though, so they will be more inclined to protect him. What do you think?"

When I replied that it could be a serious liability, he answered, "It wasn't for JFK. No one knew because those who did protected him and in some cases pimped for him. I just don't know if a moral majority still exists out there where this even matters anymore. But in any case, the Democrats are defusing it now because they believe he's their best hope. The Republicans should bring it up later, when he's the front-runner or nominee, and force a Gary Hart-type withdrawal. But who knows? That type of scandal may be a nothing thing these days."

He shook his head in disbelief and turned his criticism to Bush. "The White House is in total disarray because it still believes it has a communications problem and if it could just put together a slick photo op, he'll be back to seventy percent approval. The problem is deeper; it's something that Lee Atwater [the former and late chairman of the Republican National Committee] could sense. I knew him. He was a tough southern son of a bitch, and we needed him. Bush will miss him this election. He just doesn't have it without Atwater. Frankly, he's a poor campaigner. I really did it for him when I appointed him to the UN; remember, he lost twice for the Senate. He was pretty bad on the Watergate crap, but I guess he had no choice. He was in a hell of a position." Nixon refocused on Bush's immediate problem. "Look, now he is running for reelection. His opposition is weak. His people are not serving him well. People are anesthetized by bad news, and Bush is so closely related to it. Buchanan will cut it close in New Hampshire. Clinton is a

pretty boy who doesn't quite have it together. He's a fluffer and an opportunist, and I don't think he has much of a chance. This race is Bush's to lose."

On January 22, Nixon began discussing a Nixon Library-sponsored foreign policy conference to be held in Washington in March. The purpose of the conference was to influence the administration's policies toward Russia, Asia, and Europe through debate and discussion. Nixon was scheduled to give a major address, and Bush was invited to deliver the keynote address at a black-tie dinner later the same day. When Nixon discovered that the library had invited Bush directly, he grew frantic. "By issuing the invitation to Bush himself, they have put him in a hell of a position. I understand if he doesn't want to come for political reasons, but he shouldn't have to turn it down himself. I've been there; it's a horrible position. Who else could we get? [Secretary of State James] Baker? No way. We've got Kissinger coming; he can cover the secretaries of state. [Defense Secretary Richard] Cheney? He's a possibility. But I am not expecting Bush. He has kept away, and I don't think he is going to start paying attention to us now." Then he revealed his intention to force Bush to pay attention, saying, "But it will be hard to ignore us come March." His very public criticism of Bush on U.S. policy toward Russia had begun to take shape. Bush was to learn that he ignored Nixon at his own peril.

Nixon's distress with Bush led him to seek out others who would confirm or challenge his concerns about him. Hugh Sidey, presidential observer for *Time* magazine, received an invitation to lunch on January 23 and arrived at the office early. Nixon, not wanting to be seen by Sidey before the appointed hour, grabbed his coat and hid in the mailroom until Sidey was safely ensconced in Nixon's office. As I sat with Sidey, Nixon hurried out unseen and went home to prepare for the discussion.

As he waited, Sidey talked with me about each of the presidents he had covered, from Eisenhower to Bush, whom he knew very well. "Bush, like Kennedy, is basically an elitist who finds it difficult to connect with the average person. It didn't really matter with Kennedy, but Bush will find it harder. And you

Crowley - cont'd

60

61

84

much, but some." The philosophical and generational distinction among the candidates would become even more meaningful in debate, as they stood, shoulder to shoulder, answering the same questions and appealing to the same audience.

As expected, Perot reentered the race on October 1, prompting Nixon to remark, "Can you believe this guy? He's such an egomaniac. A debate with him will be a goddamned circus. The rise of Perot happened because the other two are so bad. Clinton stands for the wrong things, and no one knows what Bush stands for. Perot is just a demagogue—right message on deficit, wrong messenger." Perot's last-minute third-party candidacy would cause anxiety for everyone but Perot. He knew that he could not win the election, but he could certainly deny it to Bush. The possibility that Clinton could win by default was a prospect that all three candidates now faced.

"As you know," Nixon said on October 2, "I'm strong on law and order, but I don't go for these kooky ideas on abortion and isolationism. Buchanan whipped everyone into a frenzy over the anti-abortion and 'America first' crap. The Phyllis Schlaflys and the Buchanans are, frankly, frightening. Bush has attached himself—sort of—to the nut-head social types and may lose the election as a result.

"Even talking about the economy doesn't help." He handed me several newspapers, including *The New York Times*. "Here. The latest unemployment numbers are not bad: down point one percent. It's a wash for Bush. The media will kill it, but imagine what they would have done if it had gone *up!*"

He grew quieter and more reflective. "Clinton should not be president. He's damaged merchandise. He's got the McGovern crowd as advisers. Assuming he wins, we'll have Warren Christopher as secretary of state, which will be very bad. My God, Henry [Kissinger] will climb the walls! And he'll put others in there—the [former secretary of state Cyrus] Vance—[George] McGovern type, which is what Clinton *really* is, not the [former secretary of state Zbigniew] Brzezinski—[Senator Henry] Jackson type. We will see the end of the Reagan-Bush era and, really, the era I began in '68. So we'll have Clinton

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Crowley cont'd

and his New Covenant, and he'll build an ark for his covenant, and we won't hear from them at all. He believed the wrong things. But he is good out there on the stump. He's positive and optimistic. I saw him yesterday at a pig roast, or some damn thing, and while he's not a good man, he's a great campaigner.

"I suppose my greatest concern is that at our moment of victory in the cold war we could do so much better. This campaign has been disappointing in that regard. The party will Goldwaterize. The extremists will take over. It's so destructive, and we'll have to wait until the year 2000 for a comeback. Bush has a credibility gap, which even though the other two have it as well, he will not be able to overcome.

"We could have a situation—and you can write this down—in which Clinton could have a popular-vote landslide and a close or narrow electoral-vote victory."

In early October, someone sent Nixon a copy of Bob Woodward's October 4, 1992, *Washington Post* article on "Origins of the Tax Pledge," which detailed the sources and ramifications of Bush's 1988 "no new taxes" pledge. Nixon threw it at my feet. "Woodward! As if I would read anything by him. The point is that Bush showed no leadership on the economy then and little leadership since. I don't need that asshole to tell me that!" he exclaimed. "Put it in your file if you want, but please keep it away from me."

The latest scandal involving Clinton, a charge that he was in Moscow in 1969 as a guest of the KGB, which allegedly cultivated him to oppose the war in Vietnam more aggressively, swirled on October 8. The story disappeared before it could become real news, and Nixon was disappointed. "Well, it may not even matter anymore. The cold war stuff is yesterday's news, I'm afraid. The number-one issue is the economy. No one gives a horse's ass about anything else. If Bush loses, he will have erased the '72 victory, because that was a referendum on Vietnam. A Clinton victory will reverse that by saying that it was OK to have actively opposed the war."

I asked how he would have run the campaign differently. "At the outset," he replied, "I would have leveled with the American

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ers. But the double standard accepts their extremism as being idealistic and motivated but condemns the extremism of the right as being fascist or worse!"

The Silent Majority brought the country together, but as president, Nixon also had the benefit of the great issues of Vietnam and communism with which to do ideological battle. The three current generations have had completely different experiences: Nixon's and Bush's knew war and generally respected service and country; Clinton's knew war and generally distrusted America; and the youngest—my own—has not known war as profoundly and responds primarily to selfish motivation. Crossing the generational divides was easier for Clinton than for Bush. Bush talked to the younger generations; Clinton talked with them.

Nixon recognized the seminal importance of Clinton's presidency, though he did not approve of it. "Clinton has opened up the office to all those who otherwise would have been disqualified, as late as '88 with Gary Hart. Most in the media, though, are just like him. They are sympathetic with him on Vietnam; they experimented with drugs and casual sex. The most deadly sin is pride, intellectual pride, and this whole bunch is guilty of that and of losing the ability to distinguish between right and wrong. The late '60s destroyed that ability for many forever."

Nixon saw Clinton's election as an attempt to glamorize that era of false ideals, false courage, and false prophets, when action was compelled by principles based not on morality but on amorality. The higher interest that most like Clinton sought was actually no higher than their own.

Clinton's influence and agenda were tested once again, on the fourth Tuesday in November, with the special Senate race in Georgia between Democrat Wyche Fowler and Republican Paul Coverdell. Both theFACTS: Democrats had campaigned breathlessly for Fowler, but at the end of the night the race was still too close to call.

Early the next morning, Nixon phoned me with the results.
"Well, we did it in Georgia. Our man won, and even though he's

kind of a turkey, he's still a Republican body. Dole will be happy. The *Times* gave it front-page play, but the *Post* tried it on page eighteen, although when Clinton campaigned for Fowler, it was front-page news. It's beyond belief. BothFACTS: Democrats were in there for Fowler, and so was Jimmy Carter, and he still lost. I'm sure *Hillary* is annoyed. She doesn't want to be associated with a loser. She probably threw a shoe at him." He laughed before changing the subject.

"I see that Clinton is having an economic summit. Ha! Ford did that, and it was a disaster. Remember the WIN buttons? 'Whip Inflation Now!' That lasted two days. Oh, boy, is he misguided. You can't run the presidency by think tank."

Clinton could, however, benefit by talking with Nixon. He had already spoken to Carter and Reagan, both of whom, according to Nixon, "he should see but not expect to learn much from." Clinton's failure thus far to call on Nixon distressed and disappointed him. "If he wants distance from me, fine," he said on November 28. "I won't have to pull my punches like I did with Bush. The press, of course, wants to cut him some slack to protect him, little Chelsea, and poor Hillary, who is such a weak little thing. *Please*. His contempt for the press should make them *want* to go after him, not protect him, goddamn it. If I go after him, I'll be sure that it is covered."

His concerns focused on the Clinton Cabinet beginning to take shape. According to Nixon, *Warren Christopher* was the weakest possible choice for secretary of state. "He doesn't know anything, and what he does know is wrong."

Anthony Lake, the choice for national security adviser, was "a liberal ideologue. Remember, Henry brought him in because he respected his intelligence but didn't appreciate his desertion on Vietnam. He was wiretapped by Kissinger, and he sued him! He's far to the left. He and Clinton are hooked on three things: the foreign service, the UN, and the Carter obsession with human rights. Disastrous!"

Les Aspin, the choice for secretary of defense, was "a good man. He has character; he's responsible and progressive, but he's from Wisconsin, with a deep tradition of isolationism going

Gowlby - cont'd

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Quayle arrived at the appointed hour, preceded by the bomb-sniffing dog of the Secret Service. Observing this ritual, Nixon joked, "If someone wanted to blow up either Quayle or me, they would have done it a long time ago!"

Quayle strode into the office wearing a broad smile and a look of great confidence. He addressed the staff with some witty conversation and appeared relaxed and relieved. He related to people well and was incredibly upbeat, considering that he had just lost the election. Nixon escorted him to his residence for lunch and called me after Quayle's departure.

"Well, Quayle was really annoyed that the military leaked that these latest [air] strikes against Iraq weren't so successful. The war turned out great, and they want to keep the aftermath looking great too, and unfortunately it isn't. I did tell him one thing that you might find interesting. I said, 'You can always forgive your enemies, but you can never forgive your friends.' That, of course, was a clear shot at Baker. I told him not to pan-der to the press; they are not for him. He said he took a hard line on hitting Iraq again, like I told Henry in '73 with regard to Israel—'Send all the planes needed to do the job. We'll be just as criticized for sending ten planes as one. Don't go half-assed.' He took a dim view of Somalia, and he wasn't being racist; he just thought it was a wedge to get the U.S. there and then to allow the UN to take it over."

"I told him he should build up his foreign policy credentials. He has them, but no one knows it. I told him to do foreign travel. Baker kept him out of China, Russia, and the Mideast. Now is his chance to go. He can then return and be an expert. I told him to limit himself to three boards; you don't make a lot of money, and they want him for other purposes. He says he's taking honoraria because he needs the income, but that's not the case. I told him to consider running for the Senate or for governor in Arizona. He said some were urging him to do it. I told him, 'Run.' He said he'll be accused of being a carpetbag-ger, but I said, 'No way. Reagan wasn't born in California. It's no big deal. Very few Arizonans were born there.' But he's a re-alist. He knows that he's too damaged to run in '96. He's got

guts and heart, but he's just not considered heavy enough for the top job.

"For his memoirs, he needs help—a straight shooter—some-one who is for him. He needs someone loyal. I don't know who would read it unless he makes it really controversial. I told him not to kiss the asses of the intellectuals. Take them on. They're not his friends anyway. And take on the media; make it contro-versial. The meeting, though, was good. He's a good man, and I came away with a higher impression of him."

Nixon was so impressed that he wrote a letter to Quayle four days later, offering new insight into his brief initial advice on memoirs. Nixon believed that although professional writers were supposedly objective, most, he told Quayle, were liberals or left-leaning independents. He recounted his experience with the National Security Council staff in 1969, when policy experts such as Morton Halperin, Roger Morris, and Anthony Lake who were appointed by Kissinger for their unbiased pro-fessionalism became some of the administration's severest crit-ics. He advised Quayle to find a collaborator who was not simply loyal to him personally but loyal also to his principles.

Quayle replied immediately: "It is very difficult for a liberal to understand and to have a feel for the conservative perspec-tive. You have first hand experience with people who claim to be loyal but who turned out to be disloyal. . . . I admire your wisdom and I will continue to seek your counsel in the months and years ahead."

Nixon was fond of saying that his "advice is worth what it costs," but many in the Bush administration, including the pres-ident and vice president, sought out Nixon's counsel after the election. As one who had spent years in the political wilderness and later in exile, Nixon was in a unique position to advise those out of office on either how to get back in or how to use their time constructively. The advised usually acted upon his counsel, to their benefit and to Nixon's; his position as the wise sage of the Republican Party was now uncontested.

The Democrats embarked on a multistate bus tour en route to Washington for the inauguration. It was billed as a trip to ex-

Gowley - cont'd

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["were evident, and I insisted that Mrs. Nixon and I stand up. I didn't think about risking my life. I just did it to show those goddamned protesters that this president was not going to be pushed around.", "\"Thinking back on it, it is unfair that someone like Clinton should become president tomorrow. Two things about him bother me the most: the draft evasion and the drug use. [Former *Time* editor in chief Henry] Grunwald asked me today about moral decay in America, and I attributed it to the lack of family, church, and decent, safe schools. The 1960s permis-siveness—which Clinton played in and now represents—shot this decay upward. The drug problem is a legacy of the Kennedy and Johnson eras. They called the '50s the dull gen-eration, but I *never* made a speech as vice president on drugs; I didn't have to.", "\"Anyway, Eisenhower asked [in 1953], 'What are you and Pat doing this summer? You should go on a trip.' This is how history is made by incidental events. A man named Holland, I believe, asked me to go to New Zealand, and Eisenhower ap-proved it. A trip that was supposed to be a few weeks lasted sixty-nine days. We covered Asia, except for China, of course, and much of it was still colonial. We went on to Iran, where the young shah [Mohammed Reza Pahlevi] was married to Saroya, whom he later divorced when she didn't bear him a son. They stayed with us and danced into the night. We stayed in a beau-tiful place, which we really appreciated, especially after staying in some of the places we did, with no air-conditioning and mos-quito nets—oh, boy! That was rough going. Mrs. Nixon was such a trouper.", "\"You know,\" he added parenthetically, \"after thinking back on that trip, it occurs to me that Bush's foreign policy creden-tials are overbuilt. He was good at the UN, but that wasn't worth a tinker's damn. And he drove his bike around Beijing as ambassador and did some good things there, but that was about it. I really *earned* the respect I got abroad. Well, anyway...", "\"So we won in 1968, and the first term was fine, and we went on to win in '72 by the biggest landslide—bigger than", "Reagan's in '84, and he won on the social issues. I didn't have that so much as we had the good guys—us—was the bad guys—the drug culture. We were going to do so much in the second term: visit all fifty states and concentrate totally on the Middle East. I think back to '73; it was so full of promise. We were getting the war wrapped up, although we couldn't put that in the inaugural speech. Oh! What we could have done. We wanted to accelerate everything, especially the Middle East, where I had great leverage. I told Henry to make '73 the year of the Middle East because we had to do it in a non-election year. He wanted it to be the year of Europe, but I rejected that.", "\"We were going to go full tilt on the domestic side; we wanted to change the whole establishment, and they knew I had the power to do it, and it scared the hell out of them. I was going to build a new Republican Party and a new majority. We were going to work on attracting more of the Jewish vote; they do better under Republicans than Democrats anyway. And blacks, who needed to be lifted up and given some hope. I was going to break down elitism in the universities, in the news, in the party. People love to see a president paying attention to them. Yes, a new majority..." he said, his voice trailing off.", "\"And we were going to move the southern Democrats to us. They were ready to go, and with Connally at the top we could have done it. Domestically, we had one hell of a good agenda: drug and welfare-reform programs. And on education, I knew we didn't need more money, but we did need to improve quality. The [National Education Association] was never for me. But we started the [Environmental Protection Agency] and the cancer initiative.", "\"Nineteen seventy-three was a great time. We had a week before the news of the cover-up business came to me, and then the Watergate bullshit came along. Imagine—that silliness! Well, there was the cover-up, but we were protecting our people, which everyone does. One of the biggest mistakes related to Watergate—and I know I've said this to you before—was letting", "Gowley cont'd", "148", "149", "52"]

They turned in his chair and said quietly, “Well, enough about that. At about two-thirty, I got a call from Clinton, and we spoke for about twenty minutes. He came for straight advice—no bullshit. I sensed he was really panicked about what to do on the Russian thing. I told him that I thought what he’s done so far has been outstanding and that he must meet Yeltsin carrying a significant aid program. I reiterated that it’s a risk to support Yeltsin, but if he goes down without U.S. support, it will be far worse. He must see Yeltsin alone—no secretaries of whatever or other assholes along. If I had waited for the bureaucracy, we never would have had the China initiative. He gave me the four policy options on Russia he has, two of which are ludicrous. And you can’t do anything at the ministerial level. I sent him a fax on this, which I think is pretty good. I told him that he must deliver a real program, and he must stand up for Yeltsin unequivocally. He must enlist the G-7 at the presidential level to make the package big enough. He should meet Yeltsin in Vladivostok and then go to Tokyo and stroke the Japanese. They should be doing more for Russia.”

There was a long pause. “He asked if I thought he should talk to Kissinger. I couldn’t tell him not to, and although Henry is brilliant, that’s just what he wants.” The prospect of Kissinger’s preempting Nixon’s special relationship with Clinton vexed him. “So I told him to talk to Scowcroft first. Anyway, he’s probably seeking advice from others, so I gave him a bit of additional advice. I told him that when he talks to others, he must tell them what he is going to do and then ask for their advice, because if you ask first, then do something else, they’ll be upset. Clinton likes to talk to everyone, but when you do, your thinking gets watered down. But how do you like that?”

Nixon tried to contain his joy. Despite his insistence that flattery not pollute the relationship, he was flattered by Clinton's attention. And although he prided himself upon his ability to remain unaffected by it, he submitted to it, if only momentarily. The mutual adulation reached new heights on March 30, when Nixon received an inscribed photograph of Clinton with a request for one from Nixon, and Nixon returned the favor

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with a humorous note commending Clinton's courage and vision to aid “China.”

“The China reference was pretty funny, I think. I’ll get a kick out of it,” he said, stoking the relationship with that much-maligned flattery. “By the way, I thought you’d be interested to know that I received a nice note from [communications director George] Stephanopoulos, thanking me and asking me to let him know when he’s doing something wrong. I suppose everyone in that administration sees the benefits of kissing up to me!” He laughed. “As long as Clinton doesn’t renege on the Russian-aid thing, he’ll be OK with me.”

The following day, Clinton delivered a speech focused almost solely on the issue of aid to Russia. Nixon was satisfied that much of what he told Clinton survived in the speech.

When I told him that CBS News gave relatively favorable coverage to the speech but then followed it with a poll showing that most Americans did not support Russian aid, he spewed contempt: “Goddamn loaded poll. Look, Clinton really stepped up to this issue, which is more than we can say for Bush. The only negative is that he is stopping in Portland, Oregon, on his way to the summit to talk about logging or the spotted owl or some damn thing. I think he feels that he has to offset the foreign policy with something domestic.”

Nixon, once again, took it upon himself to refocus the nation's attention on foreign policy. When we returned from Russia in late February, he decided to make another journey to the Far East. The Russian situation was urgent and deserved priority, but relations with China, Japan, and Korea were languishing dangerously. Nixon's mission was to tend to the crucial economic and political relationships with the thriving Pacific Rim in the hope that the administration would again follow his cue.

During the April 3 flight to Anchorage, he remarked to me that he had received a call from Clinton's national security adviser, Tony Lake, who wanted him to carry some messages to Beijing. Nixon put on his eyeglasses and removed from his briefcase a yellow legal pad on which he had made notes of the

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conversation. "I told him that I appreciated their gutsy call on
Russia and he said that it couldn't have been done if I hadn't
taken the lead. He brought up some things he wanted me to dis-
cuss with the Chinese—primarily on human rights—so that
they can go after those who oppose MFN [most-favored-nation
trading status]. Also on Russia, he said that the top-level G-7
meeting was still a live idea." He put the legal pad back in the
briefcase and took the glasses off. "I don't like—or was not im-
pressed by—what he did on Vietnam or to Kissinger, but I've
got to get along with these people, and he was very helpful."

The Clinton-Yeltsin summit took place while we were in An-
chorage, and Nixon wanted constant updates on the tone of the
meeting and on how Clinton handled Yeltsin. My positive as-
sessments reassured him. "If Clinton continues to step up to this
and follows through, Yeltsin just might survive. And Clinton
will have a triumph of historic proportions." The trip consumed
his energy and prevented any further serious examination
of Clinton's activities. Now that he was satisfied that his rela-
tionship with the president was sound, he resumed his private
criticism.

"When I met with [Governor Pete] Wilson during my stop-
over in California," he said to me back in the office on April 24,
"we decided that Clinton tries too hard to please everybody and
ends up pleasing nobody or very few."

Nixon had stayed in California for several days on our way
back to tend to some functions at his library and to speak with
Wilson. He returned with fresh insights about the president and
first lady. "He does what's expedient. Hillary is the true believer.
The whole bunch of them are just learning on the job; it's a ter-
rible way to run the White House. But of course people will say,
'Who is Richard Nixon to criticize?'"

His voice dropped. "You know, last night I had insomnia, so
I turned on one of those late-night comics. He said something to
the effect that Clinton had his first one hundred days and his
first one hundred lies and that we should bring back Richard
Nixon—he was an honest man! You see what I mean? This is
what we are up against. The audience didn't really laugh, but it

178

just reinforces what's out there. Clinton's话 come, and we will get the arrows."

Despite the positive relationship he had built with Clinton, he
still resented Clinton's ability to thrive despite transgressions
that would have severely damaged another president. The press,
he felt, protected Clinton as it had protected Kennedy, and Clin-
ton himself was masterful at dodging the political bullets.
Nixon at once admired him and scorned him. The next phone
call from the White House illustrated these dueling opinions.

"You will be pleased to know that I got another call from
Clinton today," he told me on April 26 with thinly veiled satis-
faction. "He thanked me again for taking the lead on aid to
Russia, and he was delighted with the [Russian] election results,
although he agreed with me that the media have been disgusting
by downplaying Yeltsin's victory. Naturally, I'm not for Clinton,
but I will side with him when the media pack comes after him.
Anyway, I told him—again—that it was a gutsy call on aid but
the right one, and he said he'd just talked to Yeltsin; Clinton
said [Yeltsin] was pleased with the aid program, but he was hav-
ing difficulty getting the goddamned bureaucracy to carry it
out. And these are his own people! But they have a socialist
mentality and move like snails. I told him that I completely un-
derstood. Look, if we had relied on the bureaucracy, we never
would have gone forward with ninety percent of what we ac-
complished with regard to China, Russia, Europe, and the Mid-
dle East.

"Well—the main reason he called was to ask what I thought
about Bosnia. It's obvious that he's leaning toward lifting the em-
bargo and using limited air strikes against the Serbs. I told him
that I agreed, but whatever he decided I'd support. He's on the
right track with this since we have got to have a balance of force
on the ground before a peace agreement is even an option, but I
didn't want to push it in case he goes with something else. To re-
inforce this point, I told him that you can only negotiate at the
table what you win on the battlefield. And I said that if the Serbs
aren't stopped, they may go after other parts of Yugoslavia. He
made a good point. He said, 'Yes, or in other parts of the world.'

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5

4

He is sitting toward action and thought that Britain and France would stand along. I also told him that he cannot win the war there, but he can provide a correlation of forces that may bring some sense to their heads.

"He listened, but who knows what we will hear tomorrow? He's very susceptible to pressure from the press. And it burns me up to see that Tony Lewis—who went through a male change of life over our bombing in Vietnam—is for our involvement in Bosnia. With a Democratic president, I guess military intervention is OK." He smirked.

"Oh, I also told Clinton that Yeltsin should attract private investment like China has, and he said he wanted to talk to me about China at a later time, so that's in the mix."

"Clinton is very clever," I said.

"He sure is, but what exactly do you mean?" he asked.

"Well, by mentioning China at the end of the conversation, he leaves you tantalized, waiting for the next call—and prepared once it comes."

Nixon shook his head in agreement. "Of course. The guy knows how the game is played."

Clinton's one hundredth day in office came and went on April 29 with little fanfare. Nixon groused over a *Washington Post* poll showing Clinton's approval climbing to 59 percent and dismissed it. Despite his action in behalf of the struggling reform process in Russia, Clinton had done little to convince Nixon that he belonged in the job. Clinton's agenda overflowed with promises made that would inevitably unravel unkept. On May 1, Nixon commented on the trap Clinton had set for himself.

"The guy is all over the place," he said. "Health, education, welfare reform, God knows what else. What he has put out there is enough to fill a two-term president's agenda, never mind the first three months! The problem is that he has no steel. He's totally unfocused. I'm surprised that Hillary doesn't have more control over disciplining him. Where he's sloppy and undisciplined, she's strong and decisive. Where are *our* women?" He waved a hand in the air. "She's just good. But looking back on

150

these first months, I think that the decisive step—what will reflect well on him—is that he bit the bullet on Russia.

"Assuming," I said, "that he follows up and gets the Congress to pass the program."

"True," he replied, "but even so, at least he did it." He paused. "And I hope he has a better appreciation for the gutwrenching decisions presidents have to make, like the kind he protested against when I was in there. I doubt he'll do anything on Bosnia. The libs in his party are after him to do something, but I don't think he will."

"You know, in a few days, on May 8, we will celebrate the anniversary of the second hardest decision I had to make, the first, of course, being the resignation. It was the bombing of Haiphong [in 1972]. We were worried about the Russians. It was an extremely difficult decision. No one—except for Connally, really—was with me. Richardson was ready to resign. Kissinger was waffling. I don't think Clinton has it in him to make the tough call."

"I remember so well when [CIA director Allen] Dulles came to see me during the Cuban missile crisis. I put all of this in *Six Crises*. He told me he told Kennedy 'not to let it fail.' My God, you've got to go all the way or [do] nothing. Clinton must not go halfway on Bosnia. All of this Hamlet-like deliberating over Bosnia makes him look weak. We've got to get our allies, the Congress, and the people to go along. Instead of *telling* them what we are going to do, he's looking for their permission! This isn't leadership! He doesn't scare anybody, and neither does Christopher. Hillary inspires fear. You've got to put fear in these people or scare them with silence—just don't say anything and leave it uncertain. But I find his vacillation on this frankly shocking."

His disappointment in Clinton began to escalate; what originated with low expectations reached heights of frustration and anger. His advice was being watered down. His experience was being drawn upon but not used. The lessons of his presidency were being wasted. Clinton weighed and reweighed his options without issuing firm decisions. Indecisiveness in a candidate

181

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to run. According to Nixon, none of the possible candidates—including Kemp, Cheney, Weld, Gramm, and William Bennett—could challenge Dole successfully, but he would need their support in 1996.

Nixon focused Dole's attention on two particular potential threats: California governor Pete Wilson and the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell. Wilson had strong foreign and domestic policy credentials, Nixon wrote, and Powell was a wild card. Both could make significant runs for the nomination. Nixon advised Dole to maintain open and constructive relationships with both, but particularly with Powell since he had the power to change the dynamics of the race by joining either party.

The vice presidential nomination should go to a “heavyweight,” and Nixon suggested [South Carolina Governor Carroll] Campbell, [Wisconsin governor Tommy] Thompson, and [Lamar] Alexander. They were progressive and serious Republicans who would lend additional gravitas to the ticket.

On the religious right, Nixon advised Dole to maintain a good relationship with its members but to avoid allowing them to dictate his policies or his campaign. Since they needed Dole more than Dole needed them, Dole could resist advocating their more extreme positions and avoid giving them power over his own agenda.

On media coverage, Nixon reassured Dole that he did not suffer from overexposure and that in order to compete with Clinton for air time, Dole had to lead forcefully and get coverage wherever possible.

On Perot, he instructed Dole to withhold criticism about him until after the 1994 elections, since Perot could still influence the outcomes of several House and Senate races. After the elections, however, Dole should actively and aggressively campaign against any Perot candidacy.

Nixon turned his attention to policy, where he advised Dole to be “conservative” on the economic issues but “compassionate” on issues such as welfare and health care reform, without appearing to go along with Clinton’s views on these issues.

Nixon could have been advising himself with his next remarks to Dole. He told him to ground his message in the experiences of his modest background, to champion the “underdog,” to remind voters that he is neither wealthy nor part of the Eastern elite, but that he comes from the “heartland” where he will always derive his personal and political strength.

He advised Dole to be pro-NAFTA, pro-reform in Russia, supportive of Yeltsin and patient with the Chinese, responsibly supportive of Israel and the restructuring of NATO, and tolerant of but not dependent on the United Nations. Dole should remain an idealist without allowing that idealism to overrun crucial American interests.

On choosing a campaign team, Nixon told Dole to accept everyone's support but to limit his circle of closest advisers to those who would be qualified to serve in his administration should he be elected. There was, Nixon wrote, no room in a presidential campaign or in an administration for lightweights. Nixon cited members of his own administration in support of this argument: Kissinger, Haig, Scowcroft, Schlesinger in foreign policy; Arthur Burns, Moynihan, Herb Stein, Paul McCracken in domestic policy; Ray Price, Bill Safire, Dave Gergen, Pat Buchanan in speechwriting; and Tom Korologos in congressional relations. All were—and remain—heavyweights, Nixon wrote, and Dole should follow the same example.

Nixon turned to Dole's “personal factors,” including his age and how it might affect his candidacy. Nixon told him that his age would not be a liability after four years of Clinton and his administration of “baby boomers.” He reminded Dole that many of the world's most preeminent statesmen, including de Gaulle, Adenauer, Yoshida, and Chou En-lai, remained brilliant, sharp, and effective well into their seventies. Dole should not disregard the age issue but embrace it as a way of pointing to Clinton's inexperience.

He whetted Dole's appetite with some prescient predictions. If the economy did not improve significantly by November 1994, he said, the Republicans would gain at least five seats in the Senate and twenty-five in the House. And if the economy re-

Crowley could

198

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52

mainly a serious issue, Nixon foresaw the possibility that Re-
publicans might win the House.

Although he did not predict the results of the 1996 election,
he told Dole that the race was winnable, even if the economy
improved. Clinton could be beaten, but he should be defeated
with his own record. He instructed Dole to attack Clinton's
policies and not him personally. Any criticism leveled at Clinton
should be directed toward his woeful inexperience and inability
to attract centrist voters because of his close ties to the ex-
tremely liberal left wing of the Democratic Party.

Nixon wished him good luck and, in a parting note of per-
sonal camaraderie, he appealed to Dole to "stay young."

Nixon's memorandum to Dole accomplished several objec-
tives. It offered Dole sound advice on how to win the nomina-
tion in 1996. It solidified Nixon's position as Dole's chief,
though shadow, adviser. It guaranteed Nixon tremendous influ-
ence in a Dole White House. And it reassured Nixon that he
was still a player in the presidential game. Advising Dole, some-
one so similar to Nixon generationally and philosophically, was
the next best thing to Nixon's running for the office himself.

With Dole counseled on how to wrest the office from Clinton,
Nixon turned his attention back to the president. On September
2, Gergen called to see whether Nixon would attend a White
House ceremony with the other former presidents to honor the
signing of the peace agreement between Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization. Nixon, completely opposed to such
"dog-and-pony shows," refused to attend. He believed that his
support of the agreement precluded any obligation to be there.
"Gergen must know that I wouldn't go to one of those events
where they trot out the former presidents like some sideshow,
whether it's for NAFTA or the Middle East thing. If Clinton
wants to call me on it, fine, but I will not go," he said, agitated.

"Carter deserves to be there. I do too, of course; we saved the
place during the Yom Kippur War. The peace thing wasn't Rea-
gan's bag. Bush should be there because the Gulf War was sig-
nificant. But if this agreement is going to stand, we need to pour
money in right away. The Israelis make twelve thousand dollars

200

a year and the Arabs in the territories make one tenth of that.
They need to even it out, or they are going to have aferrous
problems. But I've made my support for this agreement clear,
and I will not attend the ceremony. I've done enough of them as
president."

He called me Sunday morning, September 5, ecstatic that *The New York Times* had run an article arguing that neither Clinton nor Christopher had any real influence over the agreement between PLO chairman Yasir Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. "I love it!" Nixon exclaimed. "Look, with the end of the cold war, it was inevitable that they'd come together with or without Washington. I told Rabin he was the only one who could do it because of his military background; people trusted him not to give away the store. It was genius. And here is Clinton claiming a huge victory for American foreign policy." He paused. "Well, I suppose he's got to claim something. He's got a full fall, full of messes: NAFTA will be a battle, and health care is going to be disastrous even with Hillary in charge. It's just too complicated to try to socialize it the way they want to. Those who want to keep the good benefits they have with their companies that go further than the minimum the government is going to offer will have to pay taxes on it. And I love it. We are going see a big rude awakening!"

Nixon declined invitations to the ceremony on September 13,
1993, that formalized the peace agreement and, later, to the
NAFTA-ratification ceremony. His rationale was that he had
advised the parties privately and made his positions public, so
his presence would be nothing more than window dressing for
the incumbent president.

Nixon watched the historic handshake between Rabin and
Arafat on television, then remarked to me how relieved he was
not to have been there. "I can't tell you how glad I am that nei-
ther Reagan nor I was there. It was like a three-ring circus. And
I don't know how Bush could sit there and watch Clinton go
through all of this, grinning up there like a Cheshire cat. And by
the way, Kissinger showed up after telling me he wasn't going to
go! And [former secretary of state George] Shultz did the same

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57

versely deemed to outshine even her husband's. Through sheer force of will, she intended to get some semblance of health reform passed. When Mrs. Clinton and her commission studying health-care reform finished their work, they passed their recommendations to Clinton, who then gave a speech on September 22 in support of a complete overhaul of the health-care system. Nixon watched the speech and called me immediately afterward with an enthusiastic reaction.

"It was a hell of a speech," Nixon said. "He's just damn good out there. He was full of passion and conviction. He moved people. He used the TelePrompTer, but he did it as well as Reagan. He wove in the anecdotes, and he was able to hold people's attention for fifty-three minutes. Some people have a problem giving credit to our opponents—not me. And when our people are jerks, I say so! He brought the goddamned house down."

"I was surprised to see that he mentioned my health program." He paused. "Did you know that that was the first time a president ever mentioned me? Ford, Reagan, and Bush never did. It took a lot for him and drove the critics crazy because now they'll have to pay attention, particularly the press. But he did it. He said we had a plan, and had we survived, it would have been better than this one."

"You know, I've always been a liberal on health issues because I lost two brothers to TB and an aunt to cancer. And during my years in Congress, I helped put together a modest plan, and it didn't go anywhere. Eisenhower didn't want to do anything, and we didn't survive. But Clinton acknowledged my efforts. Remember when I was at the White House and saw Hillary, and she said to him, 'Richard,' then she corrected herself and said, 'President Nixon had the best plan?'" He laughed. "Isn't that something? Maybe she put it in his speech; she's so shrewd. The liberals will go, 'President Nixon had a plan?'!" He chuckled again."

"Well! Look at that Cabinet. Aren't they an awful-looking group? My God! [Health and Human Services Secretary Donna] Shalala and [Attorney General Janet] Reno? They are so far to the left that I don't know what they are. And Hillary!"

She's so steeley. She even claps in a controlled way. She's a true-believing liberal."

"But I do give credit to Clinton for taking on foreign policy at the end and standing up for the Russians. Look, the Europeans fell in line after Clinton supported Yeltsin yesterday. See what a little leadership can do? If he had a Kissinger or a Brzezinski, he might be better. But Christopher is just weak. Clinton communicates so well; if he could just get it together. In any event, the health plan the way it is will never pass, but at least he—or I should say she—gave it a shot."

"The problem with the plan is the problem with most solutions Clinton's advisers advance," I said. "It's all pure theory, which doesn't translate well into real practice."

"Agreed," he said. "But something needs to be done. He's right on that. He thinks it should be a government solution. I don't. In any case, I don't think that the health issue is going to be big enough to make a real impact in '94."

As Nixon expected, the first lady began an aggressive campaign to sell her program to the Congress and the people in order to force an impact on 1994 and beyond. Health-care reform was one of the principal promises made by the Democrats during the campaign and the one for which they would be remembered. In an attempt to offer equal health-care opportunities for all Americans, the administration sought to institute price controls and compulsory conscription of every doctor and every patient in a government-controlled, government-directed, government-regulated system. A vast new bureaucracy would have to be created to run the industry, reducing efficiency and quality of care for all in the name of access for all. Centralizing health care was less about health than it was about government power. Mrs. Clinton set out to persuade the country that this liberal prescription was the correct one.

On September 28, she went to Capitol Hill to testify about the details of the administration's plan. She defended the plan as the fairest, most comprehensive approach to reforming the system, in which everyone would have access to quality health care regardless of economic status or other extenuating conditions.

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Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Marquis Childs
9/9/74; 11:47 a.m.

K: Marq!

C: Hello, Mr. Secretary!

K: I figured if I let you wait three days that proves . . .

C: Right. Well, I was just -- I think things are working out. You haven't met Rabin yet, have you.

K: No, I haven't.

C: I don't know whether you saw the piece that I did or not but . . .

K: A few weeks ago or . . .

C: No, ten days ago. I did a piece about -- well, inspired by you, on the fact that . . .

K: Yeah, I did see it.

C: . . . that they didn't want to negotiate.

K: Yeah. I saw it and I agree with you.

C: That's really -- it's a really bad situation, isn't it?

K: No, nono, what they can't get into their head now -- I speak to you as a friend now . . .

C: Sure.

K: They would like to construct it as a contest between them and me. The only way they are going to survive is on the course that I have been XIXX urging.

C: Yes. Compromise the negotiations.

K: They are going to be bled to death shortly -- slowly.

C: Of course, that is what is happening now.

K: And you know Europe. You believe that the Europeans are going to hold still for another Arab-Israeli war in which their own energy situation would collapse?

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C: Of course not, They would lose all their . . . . wouldn't they.

K: That's right.

C: Yeah. I especially wanted to ask you how you think that Cyprus thing --
is it really going to evolve in something hopeful.

K: I think with patience we can steer it in the direction of communal talks
blessed by Greece and Turkey and with our very active participation.

C: Yeah. Do you think Karamanlis has a very strong position today?

K: Yes. He needs a certain amount of anti-Americanism to pull the
____ to the left.

C: Yeah.

K: You know it isn't true -- this thing -- what could we have done short of
intervening militarily?

C: We couldn't, of course not.

K: And is it really in our interest to take the position that whenever two
countries have a quarrel I must rush out there and try to settle it.

C: Of course not, I never thought so.

K: And indeed if I did it wouldn't have worked at that point.

C: It would have brought Russia in too.

K: Exactly.

C: I thought That Ford handled Dobrynin awfully well. Didn't he?

K: Oh, yes.

C: The other day at that crab feast.

K: Yes.

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-3-

C: I feel bad about the abruptness of this [pardon] but then maybe that's the way to clear the air, I don't know.

K: Well, Marq, it is not a decision in which I was intimately involved.

C: I am sure you were not.

K: Nevertheless if you ask yourself this: If he were going to pardon him at all he couldn't wait until the trial of the others had started because that would prejudice the trial. He couldn't wait until an indictment had been handed out against Nixon because then he would have interfered with Nixon's trial. So the only realistic choice he had either now or about a year and a half from now after a conviction of Nixon but XXXXX before he served his sentence.

C: Yes, yes.

K: Now, would -- what purpose would it have served?

C: Oh, I suppose not. My own feeling was that if he had only waited a bit further. For the judicial process to begin.

K: If the other trial hadn't been scheduled, that is what he would have been tempted to do.

C: Yes. Yes. Well, have you heard anything new about Chou En-lai.

K: I think he is very ill.

C: Very ill. Isn't that f tragic. I hope you get out there when you can still see him.

K: Yeah. I would like to.

C: He is a great man.

K: I couldn't agree more.

C: Do you think the is a chance -- you will have to wait for a bit before going to India?

K: Well, I can't really get out there until beginning of December and I have talked to the Chinese about it. This is not to be published.

C: No.

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K: They did not want me to go there as their first. I offered to go first before anyone else.

C: Yes.

K: But that they weren't so eager for.

C: What are you going to have David doing? I am puzzled by that, Mr. Secretary.

K: I may get him to handle the Greece-Turkey negotiations.

C: Really?
Yeah.

K: But don't write that.

C: No. There's not time to write that, is there?

K: Humm?

C: It would be good. It's not time to write it though, is there?

K: No, no. No, really, no. But I'll let you know in enough time so that you can write it first.

C: Will you do it?

K: Yeah.

C: Fine. The flowers were beautiful that Jane received and she was deeply touched. She's feeling much better now and she's home.

K: Good.

C: I love it. But she really loved them. You were so thoughtful.

K: Well, you've been a marvelous friend.

C: Well, I appreciate that friendship more than I can tell you.

K: See you soon.

C: Bye.

34

It Sure Looks Different from the Inside

the pardon behind now as an issue and it will begin to fade out."
I was a bad forecaster.

During Ford's presidency, he saw Nixon in person only once. It was a dramatic meeting in a California hospital, at which I was one of the few witnesses.

In late October 1974, Nixon was operated on in Long Beach, California, to remove blood clots caused by phlebitis in his leg. He went into shock and nearly died. Shortly afterward, Ford flew to California and other western states to campaign for Republican candidates in the 1974 congressional elections. The day before the trip I had this exchange at my briefing:

Q.: Is there any chance now that the president will call on Mr. Nixon?

NESSEN: There are no plans for the president to visit the former president.

Q.: In view of the pardon and in view of statements which come from that rostrum about mercy relating to other Nixon officials and in view of the fact that the man is acknowledged to be very sick, how can the fact that Mr. Ford is going to California and not seeing Mr. Nixon be acknowledged as anything but a snub?

White House reporters taking up for Nixon? Consistency is not required.

Ford phoned Pat Nixon from his hotel room in Los Angeles. I was in the next room and didn't mean to eavesdrop, but the president always speaks very loudly on the phone.

"Hello, Pat? This is Jerry Ford. How is the president?"

There was a long pause while Mrs. Nixon described her husband's condition.

"I don't want to push it," Ford said, "but would it help if I came down there?"

There was another pause. Ford told me later Mrs. Nixon had replied, "I can't think of anything that would do him more good."

"Well, I have a tight schedule," Ford concluded, "but I will get my schedulers to look at it and we will decide in the morning."

A military helicopter was put on standby at a base near Ford's hotel, ready to fly him to Nixon's bedside. The next morning, after Nixon's doctor told Dr. Lukash, the White House physician, that

a visit from Ford would be a good boost for the former president's morale, the decision was made to go.

Ziegler phoned me in Los Angeles to arrange the press coverage of Ford's visit to the hospital. I had not talked to him since I'd proclaimed, "I'm a Ron, but not a Ziegler." Picking up the phone I didn't know what his attitude would be. He seemed friendly, if subdued, and cooperative.

I accompanied Ford on the chopper flight to the hospital and on the elevator ride to the seventh floor, where Nixon was being treated. No reporters were allowed inside the hospital, so I promised to make notes and give the press a description of what happened during the visit.

Nixon's room was at the far end of a row of intensive-care units. Ford hugged, in turn, Mrs. Nixon, Julie and Tricia, who greeted him in the seventh-floor corridor, and then put his arms around all three and hugged them together. Instead of going into Nixon's room immediately, Ford went with the three women into an unoccupied room.

Then Ziegler appeared, looking thin, haggard and tense. He explained that the door to Nixon's room had somehow become locked from the inside. There was no way to open it from the outside. Nixon was in the room all alone, hooked up to tubes and machines, too sick to get out of bed to unlock the door.

Ford couldn't get in. And if Nixon suffered a medical emergency, there would be no way for the doctors to get in either.

A workman was summoned to cut open the lock with a hacksaw.

Once Ford was in Nixon's room, Ziegler motioned me to follow him to the end of the corridor to look in from about ten feet away. Nixon was squirming in bed, trying to find a comfortable position. He looked drawn, his hair tousled and grayer than I remembered, his voice husky. Over the bed, electronic monitoring equipment blinked and flashed.

At one point, Ford asked him whether he'd had a good night.

"None of the nights are good," Nixon croaked.

Hordes of reporters waited outside the hospital to question Ford about the visit with Nixon. Before going out to face them, the president met with Ziegler and me in an empty hospital room to discuss what to say to the press. Ziegler urged Ford not to say that Nixon looked better than he'd expected. I wondered whether that was part of some strategy to support the contention that Nixon was too ill to testify in the Watergate trials.

At a news conference in the hospital driveway, Ford finessed

Haunted by Nixon

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36

*It Sure Looks Different from the Inside*

the question by telling reporters, "Obviously, he's a very, very sick man, but I think he's coming along very, very well. . . . The [former] president was very alert. He was interested, but it was very obvious to me that he had been very, very ill. But he showed a great deal of strength."

In giving reporters my promised detailed description of the visit, at Ziegler's urging I did not disclose that the door to Nixon's room had to be cut open. To account for the time spent waiting for the lock to be sawed off, I reported that Ford was with Nixon for eight minutes. Actually they were together only about four minutes. It was a relatively minor matter, but for the first time I had broken my promise never knowingly to mislead the White House press corps. Ironically, my first lie was to cover up for Nixon.

Before Ford's western trip I had recommended that the president not visit Nixon. I argued that such a highly publicized event would raise new suspicions about the Ford-Nixon relationship. And, I contended, such a vivid reminder of the scandals in a Republican White House just three days before the congressional elections would hurt GOP candidates. Aboard *Air Force One* leaving California after the Nixon visit, I again raised with Ford my concern about possible political damage.

"If compassion and mercy are not compatible with politics, then something is the matter with politics," he replied.

Ford had not been a close friend of Nixon's before Watergate. Theirs had been mostly a political relationship. After becoming president, Ford maintained only occasional, correct telephone contact with his predecessor, aside from the hospital visit, because Nixon had violated Ford's simple, old-fashioned sense of ethics. Ford trusts people until they prove untrustworthy. Then he drops them. Ford never forgave Nixon for lying to him about Watergate.

To me, Ford's choice of words in referring to Nixon was a strong indication of his attitude toward the former president. Ford used first names and nicknames in talking about the other presidents he had known—"Harry Truman," "Ike," "Jack Kennedy," "Lyndon." But when he spoke of Nixon it was always just "Nixon," no first name, no title.

The Republicans were clobbered in the elections of November 5, 1974, losing forty-eight House seats, six Senate seats and six governorships.

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*Haunted by Nixon*

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"Maybe people were expressing their feelings about the Watergate era," I told my briefing the next day, in a massive understatement.

Yet there was almost a party atmosphere as the president watched the returns on TV with Mrs. Ford and a few friends and staff members. Because, after all, the outcome was no surprise.

Four TV sets were set up in the Oval Office, one tuned to each network for the election returns, and the other to an independent station that was showing a musical movie. At one point Mrs. Ford did a little dance in imitation of an actress in the musical.

"Here, here, now. None of that in the Oval Office," the president chided her good-naturedly, distracted for a moment from the dismal returns. "It's not allowed."

That night I was the master of ceremonies at a mock retirement ceremony for Dean Burch, the wry, wise, rumpled White House political adviser who was going back to private life.

"We are holding this ceremony because today's election was the crowning achievement of your political career," I joked Burch, "although some would argue that nineteen sixty-four was the crowning achievement." Burch had been Barry Goldwater's campaign manager in the 1964 presidential debacle.

With the president and Mrs. Ford joining the spoofing tribute in a conference room across the hall from the Oval Office, I presented Burch with a white football helmet decorated with stick-on presidential seals "for playing politics."

There were some laughs and some drinks, the president's dog, Liberty, romped around, bearded White House photographer David Kennerly took pictures and showed off his airline stewardess date, and there was no visible gloom. The president, having seen enough of the bad election news, went to bed at 1:30 A.M.

The next morning I jokingly asked him, "If we had a party like that when we lost, what's going to happen when we win?"

"We." That's the term I found myself using to refer, collectively, to the Republican president, the Republican party and the recently apolitical me. Less than three months before, I had told the president and the world that I was no Republican. I had turned down invitations to speak at Republican gatherings because, I told my secretary, I wanted to keep my "political virginity."

But as Ford began his heavy campaigning for Republican candidates in the 1974 elections and clashed with the Democratic Congress, I found myself more and more acting as the president's

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