- 2

View of Negotiations as Commercial transactions

Meet Soviets half-way

"Negotiable" proposals

Fall-back position

"New" New " ideas--June 27 position

Compromise in between

Technique is not substitute for purpose

Have dwelt so long on American psychology for two reasons:

(1) Many of the American actions in the post-war period XXXXXXXX are incomprehensible without it

(2) because many of our European friends have sensed our ambivalence. They have therefore been most XXXXXXXX concerned to commit us to their defense. They have therefore XXXXXXXX paid less attention whether the methods of this defense were strategically sound. They have resisted change because they feared we might withdraw. And they have sometimes sought to combine the advantage of every course of action: of American protection and a minimum of participation; of the American shield with a minimum contribution of their own. Will return to this problem.

The first problem that of the American notion of peace and war has produced much of the oscillation in American post-war policy.

We are often accused of excessive distrust of the Russians.

The fact is that we have been almost pathetically eager to believe in their good intentions.

Read quotes, Also quotes re Hitler;

Steel strike; Automobiles

Time and again we have been disappointed.

- 3

Reason: Communist belief in the importance of "objective" factors.

U.S. good will either hypocrisy or opportunity

Khrushchev quotes.

Difference Laos--Korea--Test ban

Often said Communists convinced war is suicidal and no longer interested in
expansion

See how they treat their own oppositionists

Do not believe they have to make this choice

Disarray and confusion of the West cause them to believe that they can
win without war.

the
This is the only reason for concern with defense.

We in the West can always have peace by surrendering.

The problem arises when we want both peace and freedom; both security
and the preservation of our values and our dignity.

Freedom and defense

This is the context within which I want to talk about the strategic problem.

Not possible to have simple answers.

Let me begin by stating the security problem of the West:

(1) Soviet Union can threaten all adjoining countries from its own territory--alliances are not necessary for its security.

(2) No threatened country is capable of resisting alone.

(3) Soviet Union can threaten each ally separately by menacing each ally individually--offering different risks and special immunities.

(4) Allies must threaten a monolithic Soviet Union

This inequality can be mastered only if the West becomes increasingly
a unit. Policies of petty nationalist advantage will prove equally disastrous
to everybody -- the big and the small. Unity is required for freedom.

- 4

With this as a background--let me turn to the strategic problem.

Apologize for being somewhat technical--perhaps abstruse.

## II Problem of Strategy

Problem of defense in nuclear age is complicated by four factors:

(1) The destructiveness of weapons;

(2) The *kapability* rapidity with which they can be delivered;

(3) The rapid change of technology;

(4) The novelty of the problem.

Factors one and two are reasonably familiar.

When X weapons XXX can destroy whole cities and when they are in transit between continents for less than thirty minutes strategy takes on a new connotation.

From the technical point of view it creates a great premium on surprise

From the political point of view it produces an enormous consciousness
of risks

From the moral point of view it often leads to various versions of pacifism and in any case results in increasing reluctance to resort to war

Psychological problem:

Deterrence must be Western policy because of conviction and values of
its people.

Deterrence is tested negatively by things which do *not* happen

Very hard to prove why some event has *not* occurred.

Problem of Defensive

Can always argue Communists had no intention of attacking.

Also this creates another obstacle: In face of rapidly changing technology even best strategy can become obsolete. -- Yet all evidence points to its success.

- 5

Finally, novelty of problem makes much traditional knowledge irrelevant.

Problem that much military expertise is outdated.

Serious disputes within each country and within each government
*and* within our alliance.

Psychological problem of how our military posture is interpreted.

Deterrence can operate only if opponent understands the risks and be-
lieves the threat-- a condition which alters with changes in technology.

But also requires that he does not construe policy as prelude to
attack--otherwise preemptive war.

There have been four distinct strategic periods since World War II:

(1) United States monopoly on weapons as well as means of delivery--ended
around 1951.

(2) United States practical monopoly on means of delivery--ended around 1956.

(3) United States superiority provided we get in first blow in response to
Soviet aggression--now ending.

(4) Period when both retaliatory forces began to approach each other--
Period now beginning. Neither side can win by striking first. Neither side
can lose by waiting. Mutual invulnerability.

This is period now beginning.

The condition of mutual invulnerability long since approaching brings
about a basic change in strategic relationships.

First, let us understand what is meant by invulnerability and by win.

Invulnerability regardless of scale of blow can inflict unacceptable losses
in aggressor

Win means to reduce losses to acceptable levels.

This has nothing to do with damage that can be inflicted.

-6

A country can be in an absolute sense stronger than ever and also more
vulnerable.

Strength in the abstract does not suffice for deterrence. Not fully
understood.

During first three periods of atomic age the West possessed a strategic
preponderance in the equation of all-out war.

Certain restraint was placed on Communist actions because of fear of triggering
Strategic Air Command.

In 1954 despite crushing victory at Dienbienphu, Communists settled for peace
terms in Indo-China not justified by local situation because they were reluctant to face a show-down.

In 1961, despite most solemn warnings they pressed local attacks because the threat of all-out war had lost a great deal of its credibility.

It is not a question of what the United States is prepared to do as what
the Communists believe we are willing to risk. For purposes of deterrence
latter is ~~minax~~ decisive.

The Soviet leaders may simply not believe the threat of all-out nuclear
war particularly if they are skillful in presenting each challenge as a limited,
local one.

Equivalence -- Khrushchev speech
if
And/they do not believe it, deterrence will fail regardless of what we then
ultimately do--all the less so as such a strategy can not protect the threatened
country.

The problem is even more acute diplomatically and psychologically.

As the retaliatory forces grow more invulnerable all-out war becomes essentially an irrational act.

- 7

In any crisis the West would therefore have to maneuver deliberately to
demonstrate its capacity for irrationality i.e. it will not ask whether
Berlin or Trondheim is "worth" the terms of millions of casualties of an
all-out war.

Yet in every crisis tendency of the West both because of public opinion
and requirements of alliance policy is to insist that it is "calm" "calculating"
"rational"; in short it acts in a manner least calculated to support deterrent
posture.

A gap has opened up between policy of deterrence and strategy the West
is prepared to implement-- a gap which encourages Soviet pressure and which
demoralized the West.

For purposes of deterrence we emphasize the most fearful threats.

For purposes of diplomacy strive for tolerable strategy. Result is
either pacifism or multiplication of national nuclear arsenals.

Three goals of U.S. strategy

(a) Invulnerable retaliatory force

(b) Improved control

(c) More emphasis on local defense

None of these goals improve our offensive capacity
<u>All</u> designed to enhance defense.

This ambivalence comes to expression in NATO. Allies have been torn
between conflicting motives. Make sure of American umbrella but also banish
war if it comes from their territories.

U.S. and British troops on the Continent conceived less in terms of an
integrated strategy than as hostages--to make certain SAC would be triggered.

Ambivalence first became manifest at the time of Sputnick.:

- 8

"The Gaither report" wrote the New Statesman and Nation, "has revealed that irrespective of any effort s which American may now make, the Soviet preponderance in advanced weapons has reached such a point that until 1961 American national survival will depend on Russian 'benevolence.'"

House of Commons

Hitherto I have always thought that the principle of the alliance was that it gave greater protection to ourselves. On this occasion with these rockets we are clearly inviting the risk of attack in some way and are giving one-sided protection to the United States.

However, if we were in fact vulnerable and if IRBM's were means to remedy that vulnerability European allies should have had positive interest to acquire them. Instead some public statements seemed to suggest that allies were above all concerned with banishing conflict from their territories.

No security for any ally without secure U.S.

Ambivalence has led to two x trends in NATO:

(a) Independent nuclear forces to make US dispensable

(b) Minimum effort-even a form of neutralism-- the implied protection of a US guarantee.

British left and General de Gaulle two sides of the same coin.

NATO strategy stands in danger of becoming like French system of alliances before World War II: a military doctrine incapable of supporting the policy of the Alliance in time of peace and potentially disastrous in time of war.

This is behind effort of US. to realize goal of NC -70.

-------U.S. can't be only country charged with Western defense -------

Limited Strategic War

Guerilla action

- 9

Senseless for deterrence
bad for threatened country
impossible for US

NATO must have increased capacity for local defense. Must create maximum number of stages between doing nothing and doing everything, between surrender and what may prove to be a devastating conflict.

Minimum goal must be to push up the point at which there is no choice but general war as high as possible and to enforce pause to permit aggressor to become aware of increasing dangers.

Ideal situation would be where Soviets can gain their ends only by general war and are deterred from this course by our retaliatory power.

NATO should not continue a strategy simply as a means to commit us to the defense of Europe. We are committed. But this should not preclude determinations of strategy most in the interests of everybody.

### III Local Defense: Conventional or Nuclear?

Argument is made that local defense weakens deterrent.

Answer: Must weigh loss of destructiveness against increased plausibility of threat.

Will it lead to American psychological withdrawal?

Answer: No. U.S. committed to defense of Europe.

Is local defense force threatening to Russia.

(a) We don't need basis for attack

(b) Local defense

Is there such a thing as limited war? All conflicts since World War II have been limited.

To be sure both sides possess physical capability to expand the war.

- 10

What keeps war limited is the condition of mutual invulnerability described earlier. If the Communists wanted a general war they would launch an all-out attack and not alert our retaliatory force by local attacks.

Process of tacit agreement as to limits.

Experience of Korea. Quemoy and Matsu.

Problem of conventional or nuclear war. These facts must be kept in mind.

(L) USSR has nuclear weapons in quantity.

(2) Decision no longer entirely up to us.

(3) Can escape it only by surrendering if nuclear weapons are used--thus set up ideal conditions for nuclear blackmail.

(4) Even then cannot accept defeat by conventional forces.

This must be clear: It is possible to have a nuclear defense with very few conventional weapons.

It is not possible to rely <u>exclusively</u> on conventional weapons--Even if we decide on a conventional weapons. Even if we decide on a conventional defense must have nuclear weapons to make it meaningful.

What of relative balance?

Advantages of conventional weapons;

(1) more familiar--easier to limit--therefore also riskier

(2) Easier to establish front-line to prevent occupation

(3) Moarl onus

(4) Industrial Potential

Argument for Nuclear Weapons

(1) increased uncertainty

(2) dispersal

(3) other course too expensive

The issue then turns on the sacrifices the Alliance is prepared to make to give itself the greatest options.

- 11

It would be highly desirable to strengthen conventional forces backed up by
tactical nuclear weapons. Would welcome it. If we continue to have minimum
defense budget greater. Relative emphasis will have to be placed on nuclear
weapons.

And in any case must be available to keep conventional war conventional.

This is special problem for countries either not put part of the alliance
or in any exposed position or which do not have American units.

What happens in one of two contingencies:

(a) If conventional forces are overwhelmed

(b) If nuclear weapons are used against them.

Should the countries concerned then surrender:

Requires doctrine. Used locally--for minimum damage.

If Communists are determined to win that rather destroy country than
stalemate then no defense policy may work.

Problem of custody

Problem of targeting

Problem of political control

Four problems meet with respect to nuclear weapons:

(1) Proper strategic doctrine--are they used against cities or on something like front line

(2) Possession

(3) Availability

(4) Control

Possession is crudest and least effective form of control.

Common command structures and plans.

This is a delicate issue now before NATO and must be common decision.

OSLO--MAY 5, 1961

NATO Strategy and United States Foreign Policy

I. The international Situation

Peace is not at issue

All Americans wanted nothing so much in the post-war world as to be left
alone

Emerged from World War II with the conviction that only a villain or deranged
person would disturb the "normal" pattern of internation/relations.

The world was essentially beneficent--Aggression was unambiguous. Danger was overwhelming.

We could rely on other nations to enter the fry long before we were me-
naced.

US experience in World War I and World War II

Entered late; Germany would have won.

US attitude towards balance of power.

Inherently wicked--contributing cause of international tension.

Churchill recounts Ambassador Davis' mission to Britain at the end
of World War II

Biographies of American generals with respect to Balkans

Above all difficult for Americans to understand implacable hostility
and nature of revolutionary.

Nothing in the American scene prepares for men who prefer victory to peace
and who reject the present for the sake of the future.

Nothing prepares Americans for a world where truth is so relative--
where the problem of justice is solved simply by definition.

where the problem of race is solved simply by definition.

Nothing precedes Americans for a world where truth is so relative—and who reject the present for the sake to the future.

Nothing in the American scene precedes for men who broiler victory to base
and nature of revolutionarily.

Appears all difficult for Americans a to understand imprecise postivity
Biographies of American generals with respect to Germans
of World War II

Churchill reconstitutes Ambassador Davis's mission to Britain at the end
inherently wicked—contributing cause of international tension.

U2 attitude towards balance of power.

Entered late: Germany would have won.

U2 experience in World War I and World War II
naced.

We could rely on other nations to enter the war long before we were me-
overwhelming.

The world was essentially penitent—Agreement was nonsignificant. Danger was
behind would diatump the "normal" pattern of international relations.

Emerged from World War II with the conviction that only a villain or degenerate
alone

VII Americans wanted nothing so much in the post-war world as to be left
peace is not at ease

I. The international situation

0210—MAY 2, 1945

- 1

Meet Soviets half-way

"Negotiable" proposals

Fall-back position

"New " ideas--June 27 position

Compromise in between

(1) Many of the American actions in the post-war period XXXXXXXXXXX are incomprehensible without it

(2) because many of our European friends have sensed our ambivalence. They have therefore been most XXXXXXX Concerned to commit us to their defense. They have therefore XXXXX paid less attention whether the methods of this defense were strategically sound. They have resisted change because they feared we might withdraw. And they have sometimes sought to combine the advantage of every course of action: of American protection and a minimum of participation; of the American shield with a minimum contribution of their own. Will return to this problem.

The fact is that we have been almost pathetically eager to believe in their good x intentions.

Steel strike; Automobiles

Steel strike; Automotives

Read quotes, Vila quotes re Hitler;

their good & intentions.

The fact is that we have been almost systematically eager to believe in
We are often accused of excessive automatism of the Krausena.

Much of the oscillation in American boat-war policy.

The first problem that of the American notion of peace and war has возник
ed. Will return to this problem.

of participation; of the American shield with a minimum contribution at their
vantage of every course of action: of American protection and a minimum
tested we might withdraw. And they have sometimes sought to complicate the ap-
dause were strategically sound. They have resisted change because they
have therefore been mostxxx. Concerned to commit us to their defense.

(2) because much of our European friends have sensed our impatience. They
comprehensible without it.

(1) Much of the American actions in the boat-war period xxxxxx are in-
使用的 malt so long on American psychiatry for two reasons:

Technique is not an attribute for坏bees

Combustion in between
New " ideas" June 27 position

Full-puck position
"Meatpie" probebejs
Meet Soviets half-way

- 3 -

- 3

Khrushchev quotes.

Often said communists convinced war is suicidal and no longer interested in
expansion

the
This is *only* reason for concern with defense.

The problem arises when we want both peace *and* freeedom; both security
*and* the preservation of our values *and* our dignity.

Freedom *and* defense

(3) Soviet Union can threaten each ally separately by menacing each ally in-
dividually--offering different risks and special immunities.

to everybody — the pig and the smell. Unity is required for freedom.

This inequality can be watered down if the West becomes increasingly
a unit. Policies of betty nationalist advantage will prove equally disastrous

(4) Villes must threaten a monolithic Soviet Union

dissipally—offering different risks and specialist immunities.

(3) Soviet Union can threaten each ally separately by messaging each ally in-

alliances are not necessarily for its security.

(1) Soviet Union can threaten all surrounding countries from its own territory—
Let us begin by stating the security problem of the West:

Freedom and defense

and the preservation of our air defense and our integrity.

The problem arises when we want both peace and maximum freedom; both security
We in the West can always have peace by surrendering.

This is the reason for concern with defense.
the

win without war.

Diarray and confusion of the West cause them to believe that they can
Do not believe they have to make this choice

See how they treat us own oppositionists

explanation

Often said communists convinced war is accidental and no longer interested in
difference races—Kores—Test pan

Kinnaphen quotes.

U.2. Good will either paperclip or opportunity

Reason: Communist fail in the importance of objective factors.

- 3 -

- 4

## II Problem of Strategy

(2) The *marginality* rapidity with which they can be delivered;

When x weapons xxx can destroy whole cities and when they are in transit between continents for less than thirty minutes strategy takes on a new connotation.

Psychological problem:

Very hard to prove why some event has *this* not occurred.

Problem of Defensive

its success.

Even past strategy can become obsolete. — Let all evidence points to
Vice this creates another obstacle: In face of rapidly changing technolo-
gies alike some communicate had no intention of attacking.

## Problem of Defensive

Very hard to prove with some event has *not* occurred.

Deterrence is tested negatively by things which do *not* happen
into people.

Deterrence must be Western policy because of conviction and absence of
benevolent problem.

war.

Tight and in such case results in increasing reluctance to resort to
from the moral point of view it often judges to various versions of be-
its risks.

From the political point of view it produces an enormous concomitance
from the technical point of view it creates a great premium on amorphous
notation.

between continents for less than thirty minutes strategy takes on a new con-
front x weapons mm can destroy whole cities and when they are in transit
Factors one and two are reasonably familiar.

(3) The rapid change of technology.

(2) The unaccountable rapidity with which they can be delivered!

(1) The destructiveness of weapons!

Problem of defense in nuclear age is complicated by tom factors:

## II Problems of Strategy

Vocabulary for dealing somewhat technical—terms spectrae.

With this as a background—let us turn to the strategic problem.

- 4 -

- 5

Serious disputes within each country and within each government
arise and within our alliance.

But also requires that he does not construed policy as prelude to
attack—otherwise preemptive war.

This is period now beginning.

This has nothing to do with damage that can be induced.

Win means to reduce it losses to acceptable levels.

in aggressor.

Influencerability regardless of scale of flow can inflict unacceptable losses
first, let us understand what is meant by influencerability and by win.
spont a rare change in strategic relationships.

The condition of mutual influencerability found since approaching prongs
This is period now beginning.

can lose by writing. Mutual influencerability.

(4) Period now beginning. Neither side can win by striking first. Neither side
period now beginning. Neither side can win by striking first. Neither side
soiet aggression—now ending.

(3) United States superiority provided we get in first place in response to
(2) United States practical monopoly on means of delivery—ended around 1926.
among 1921.

(1) United States monopoly on weapons as well as means of delivery—ended
There has been long distinct strategic period since World War II:
attack—otherwise preemptive war.

But also requires that he does not constrain policy so far to
lieve the threat— a condition which alters with changes in technology.
Deterrence can operate only if oblique understand the risks and pe-
behavioural problem of how our military doctrine is interpreted.

If and within our alliance.

Serious debts within each country and within each government
problem that much military expertise is outpaced.

Hibility, novelty of problem makes much traditional knowledge irrelevant.

- 2 -

It is not a question of what the United States is prepared to do as what
the Communists believe we are willing to risk. For purposes of deterrence
latter is obviously decisive.

Equality -- Khrushchev speech
if
And/they do not believe it, deterrence will fail regardless of what we then
ultimately do--all the less so as such a strategy can not protect the threatened
country.

As theretaliatory forces grow more invulnerable all-out war becomes es-
sentially an irrational act.

especially an irrational act.

As theretofore forces grew more insidious all-out war becomes es-
tablished. The problem is even more acute diplomatically and psychologically.

cantly.

ultimately do—all the less so as such a strategy can not protect the threatened
And they do not believe if deterrence will fail regardless of what we then
it

Equity — Khrushchev speech

local one.

The Soviet leaders must similarly not pelt the threat of all-out nuclear
war particularly if there are skills in presenting each challenge as a limited,
the Commissates believe we are willing to risk. For burdens of deterrence

It is not a question of what the United States is prepared to do as what
cause the threat of all-out war had lost a great deal of its credibility.

In fuel, despite most solemn warnings they pressed local attacks ps-
tant to face a show-down.

terms in Indo-China not quantified by local situation because they were rejec-
tive in 1984 despite crushing victory at Dien Bien Phu, Communists settled for peace
Strategic Air Command.

Certain restraint was placed on Communist actions because of fear of triggering
prejudice in the education of all-out war.

During first three months of atomic age the West possessed a strategic
understanding.

A country can be in an indefinite sense stronger than ever and also more

14

- 7

A gap has opined up between policy of deterrence and strategy the West
is prepared to implement-- a gap which encourages Soviet pressure and which
demoralizes the West.

Three goals of U.S. strategy

(b) Improved control

U.S. and British troops on the Continent conceived less in terms of an
integrated strategy than as hostages—to make certain SAC would be triggered.

Vampirvience that became mmx manifest at the time of Schuickt: integrated strategy than as postages--to make certain SVC would be triggered. U.S. and British troops on the Continent conceived less in terms of an war if it comes from their territories.

The *vampirvience* comes to expression in NATO. Villages have been torn *VII* designed to enhance defense.

None of these goals improve any offensive capacity

(c) More emphasize on local defense

(p) Improved control

(a) Immoversle retentory force

Three goals of U.S. strategy

either pacifism or multiplication of national nuclei areas.

For hmbess of diplomacy strive for tolerable strategy. Meanst is for hmbess of deterrence no emphasize the meatfulful threats.

demoralize the West.

It is prepared to implement--- a gap which encompasses Soviet pressure and which
V gap has opened up between policy of deterrence and strategy the West
pressure.

"Strategic"; in short it acts in a manner least calculate to abdicate deterrent and requirements of alliance policy is to instat that it is "calm" "economizing". Yet in every strategy of the West both because of buglike inhibition

all-out war.

Berlin or Trogdheim is "worth" the terms of millions of cashities of an
demonstrate its capacity for irritability i.e. it will not say whether

In any case the West would therefore have to maneuver deliberately to

"The Gaither report" wrote the New Statesman and Nation, "has revealed that irrespective of any effort s which American may now make, the Soveit preponderance in advanced weapons has reached such a point that until 1961 American national survival will depend on Russian 'benevolence.'"

House of Commons

US guarantee.

British left and General de Baulle two sides of the same coin.

Limited Strategic War

Limited Strategic War.

----------U.S. can't be only country charged with Western defense ----------

This is behind effort of U.S. to realize goal of MC -30.

of the Alliance in time of peace and potentially diagrams in time of war.

before World War II: a military doctrine incapable of supporting the bulk

NATO strategy stands in danger of becoming like French albatross of alliances

U.S. guarantee.

(p) Minimum effort—each a form of neutraliam— the impeded protection of a
(a) Independent unclean forces to make U2 diabaseable

Vampiasfence has led to two trends in NATO:

No security for any ally without security U.S.

spoke still came tied with panicking conflict from their territories.

dquire them. Inated some public statements seemed to suggest that allies were
that unilaterality European allies should have had positive interest to ac-

giving one-aided protection to the United States.

rockets we are clearly inviting the risk of attack in some way and are
was that it gave greater protection to allies. On this occasion with these
Hitchcock I have always thought that the principle of the alliance

House of Commons

American national annihilation will be brought on Russian 'paveolence'."

bureaucracy in advanced weapons has reached an point that until 1961
that irrespective of any effort a which American may now make, the Soviet
"The Catcher Report" wrote the New Statesman and Nation, "was revealed

- 8

Guerilla action

- 9

(b) Local defense

- 10

(1) USSR has nuclear weapons in quantity.

(3) Can escape it only by surrendering if nuclear weapons are used--thus set up ideal condition. for nuclear blackmail.

It is not possible to rely exclusively on conventional weapons--Even if we decide on a conventional weapons. Even if we decide on a conventional defense must have nuclear weapons to make it meaningful.

What of relative balance?

(3) More effective

(4) Industrial Potential

Argument for Nuclear Weapons

(1) increased risk of uncertainty

(2) dispersal

itself the greatest options.

The issue then turns on the sacrifice the Vichy is prepared to make to give
(3) other means too expensive

(3) diabolical

(1) increased and uncertainty

Argument for Unclear Weapons

(4) Industrial potential

(3) nuclear

(2) easier to establish front-line to prevent encroachment

(1) more familiar—easier to limit—therefore same riskier
Advantages of conventional weapons?

What of relative value?

a conventional defense must have nuclear weapons to make it meaningful.
weapons—Eau it, we decide on a conventional weapons. Eau it, we decide on
It is not possible to rely exclusively on conventional weapons.

The same must be clear: It is possible to have a nuclear defense with either an
conventional weapons.

no ideal condition, for unclear plan will

(3) Can escape it only by surrendering it unclear weapons are needed—this set

(1) U2R has unclear weapons in quantity.

Problem of conventional or unclear war. These facts must be kept in mind.

Experience of Korea. Goucho and Matan.

Process of secret agreement as to limits.

earlier. If the Communists wanted a General war they would launch an all-out
What keeps us limited is the condition of mutual inanquerapidity described

- 10 -

- 11

This is special problem for countries either not part of the alliance
or in any exposed position or which do not have American units.

Problem of custody

Problem of targeting

Problem of political control

Four problems with respect to nuclear weapons:

(2) Possession

(3) Availability

(4) Control

(4) Control

(3) Availability

(2) Possession

(1) Proper strategic doctrine--are they used against cities or on something like trout line?

Problem of political control

Problem of targeting

Problem of strategy

Statecraft then no defense policy can work.

It Commutes are determined to win that rather dirty country then require doctrine. Used locally--for minimum damage.

Since the countries concerned then amuse themselves.

(p) It unclear weapons are used against them.

(a) It conventional forces are overwhelmed
What happens in one of two contingencies:

This is a special problem for countries either not too far apart or the alliance and in any case must be available to keep conventional war conventional.

Weapons.

Defense budget greater. Relative emphasis will have to be placed on unclear tactical unclear weapons. Would welcome it. It we continue to have minimum It would be highly desirable to strengthen conventional forces packed up in p

- 11 -

- 12

Will simply make these comments:

(1) No country can escape nuclear dilemmas by unilateral decision--this is simply means to shift risks and burdens to others.

(2) No country can make others disposable

(3) Hope the NATO Council meeting will lead to common decisions in the common interest.

## IV Disarmament

- Distrust

- Ban the bomb--often makes task harder.

- If Communists believe we'll disarm unilaterally no incentive for serious negotiations.

- Reduction of numbers not infallible remedy.

- Inspection problem -- no nuclear weapons

- Unilateral measures

- Accident

- Problem of Stabilization

- Understanding of strategy

- Balances at all stages

- Problem of alliance in disarmament

- Problem of Morality---Not so simple as cookbook

## V Atlantic Community--

- Man from Mars would doubtless have to be convinced US must win

- Separate Negotiations

- Policies of little advantage

- Be bold

**New Nations** --World Opinion
"Strengthen" the UN
Uncommitted such

(1) because common with domestic problems

(2) Opportunity to play international role

(3) Lack of knowledge of international affairs.

US should understand it

But should pose issue properly:

Can we win over uncommitted?

Gear all policy to their pace?

Demoralize us--Disarmament

Preportarous for them to criticize others for being committed

Tito--Nasser--Nehru overture to Latin America
Hold their pressure to Soviets

Can have their respect not popularity.

Mor important what they think of us 10 years from now than month by month.

Depends on our actions.

Conclusion: Can and should have economic assistance
Real creativity in Western actions.

Defends our actions.

month.

Not important what they think of us 10 years from now than month by
Can have their respect not popularity.

Hold their breather to Soviet

Tito—Nassau—Nehem: overtime to Latin America

Preportations for them to criticize others for being committed

Demolish us—Disarmament

Can we still policy to their face?

Can we win over uncommitted?

But should base issues properly?

U2 should understand it

Uncommitted and

"Strengthen" the UN

New Nations --World Opinion

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