20

that despite this wealth, for half the population real wages had been declining since
1950.⁸ This social stratification and poor wealth distribution contributed to a Communist
party that was one of the strongest in the west,⁹ and all parties "are well aware that it is
controlled by Moscow."¹⁰ The Socialist party could claim a thirty-seven year history
with impressive results both in and out of government, as the Chilean social-welfare
system—and concomitant debt—indicates. Consciously copying the European model,
Chile's socialists began, in the 30's, to form into 'Popular Fronts', the first of which, the
"*Frente Popular*," brought President Pedro Aguirre Cerdo (himself a low-key socialist) to
power in 1938. This party, a mix of communists and socialists, was one of the most loyal
to Moscow in the entire world.¹¹ Indeed, the decision to form this front was taken at the
7th Congress of the International Communist Movement, held in Moscow in 1935.¹²
Suffice to say that Chile had a strong political strain of Socialism/Communism pre-dating
US interest in the domestic politics of the state.

This movement of leftist parties Chile ran in opposition to the long established
political culture. On the right were, at a various times, the Conservative and Liberal
parties (who would run together initially in 1958 under the banner of 'Democratic Front')
and the National Party and in the centre was the Radical Party (which, in 1962, also
joined the Democratic Front) a collection of various socialists held together by a shared

⁸ NIE 94-63, "The Chilean Situation and Prospects," 3 October 1963. [JFK FRUS, Vol. XII Microfiche supplement, Doc 45.]

⁹ Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende* (Ithaca, 1989), p. 3.

¹⁰ Memorandum, INR, "Salvador Allende, Chilean Presidential Candidate", 24 April 1964. [DDRS]

¹¹ James D. Theberge, *The Soviet Presence in Latin America* (New York, 1974), p. 51. See also testimony of Ambassador Korry, "The United States and Chile During the Allende Years", Hearings Before the House Sub-Committee of Foreign Affairs, July 1 1971, p. 11.

¹²Eusebio Mujal-León, *The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship* (Boston, 1989), p. 124-125. See also Biehl and Fernandez, "The Political Pre-requisites for a Chilean Way," p. 316.

21

anti-clericalism, and divided on the subject of cooperating with the Marxist left. ¹³ All of these orthodox parties were historically very important in Chilean politics but saw some measure of their support drawn away to the Communist/Marxist 'popular fronts' that emerged after 1938. ¹⁴ Likewise drawing away support for the centre-right parties was the relatively new and left-leaning Christian Democratic Party (PDC), whose membership tended to support land reform, state influence in the economy, and the cause of "Christian communitarianism." ¹⁵ Prior to 1964 the Christian Democrats had not been involved in any government. Their chosen leader was Eduardo Frei Montalva, a charismatic, frugal and hardworking Senator from a patrician family.

Despite all these active parties, INR was quick to note that no more than 15% of the Chilean electorate was a member of a political party. A large majority of the non-committed were 'a floating mass of lower-class voters' who supported the candidate offering the greatest promise of improving their lot. ¹⁶ This was, potentially, ripe for harvest by a keen popular front.

## Allende and the 1950's Elections

The election of 1958 was the second one in which Allende, now a senator, competed—in 1952 he was the candidate for a fringe Socialist party, where he received 5.5% of the vote. The poor showing of the Socialists in the 1952 Presidential race left the US apparently unimpressed by the threat of Communism in Chile, but this was to change

¹³ Julio Faúndez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile* (New Haven, CT, 1988), pp. 31, 160-161.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Sigmund, p. 17.

22

in 1958. As head of the *Popular Action Front* (FRAP) Allende was one of four
candidates but notably represented all the Marxist/Socialist parties, previously fractured;
his principal opponents were Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, of the conservative *Democratic
Front*, and Eduardo Frei Montalva of the PDC.¹⁷ Allende lost to Frei by only 3.3%—
fewer than 32,000 votes—and the Chilean Congress confirmed Alessandri as president in
the required run-off vote.¹⁸ For the first time—due to changing demographics and
electoral laws—the bulk of the Chilean working poor had exerted their electoral clout,
and the US paid attention.

The reaction was determined, if not yet panicked, within the US government.
Noting the narrowness of the conservative victory over the Socialist front party, US
Ambassador Walter Howe noted in a despatch to Washington that things were likely to
get worse, not better. "We must recognise", the ambassador wrote, "that the political
pendulum has swung as far to the right in Chile as it is likely to go, and that the return
swing is likely to be evidenced in... the presidential election of 1964." More than just a
call for increased support for the conservatives, Howe was urging the US government to
get ahead of the swing back and support "the non-communist parties of the Chilean
centre and left."¹⁹ This was an interesting policy option that was to become the chosen
course for the subsequent Democratic administrations of Kennedy and Johnson, and
stands apart from the assumption that the US would always support the conservatives as

¹⁶ Memorandum, INR to ARA, "Pressures for Change Dominate Chilean Presidential Campaign", 1 May 1964. [DDRS]

¹⁷ Faúndez, p. 109.

¹⁸ Falcoff, *Modern Chile*, p. 14. According to the Chilean constitution, if in an election no individual secures a majority, the two leading candidates are put to a combined session of congress for a run-off vote. Long standing tradition—but neither the letter nor spirit of the law—dictated that the candidate with the most votes be selected.

¹⁹ Despatch, Ambassador Walter Howe to State Department, 8 January 1960 [FRUS 58-60, Vol. V Microfiche Supplement, CI-27]

23

the main opposition to socialists. President Alessandri of Chile, while visiting
Eisenhower in February of 1960, reiterated the suggestion of a broad-based anti-
Communist approach in Chile, noting that the Communists had a sophisticated
propaganda machine that attacked the US regularly to the detriment of all the non-
communist parties. President Alessandri "urged that... the US conduct a vigorous
campaign of counter-propaganda."²⁰ Eisenhower, while previously keen to overthrow
several lesser nations, seems to have thought such low-threshold pro-capitalist
propaganda was inappropriate for Chile, and "said jokingly he assumed that president
Alessandri was not suggesting that the US buy a newspaper in Santiago and turn it into an
official US propaganda organ."²¹ While this was the precise course of action the US
would eventually take with the *El Mercurio* in 1970, it was evidently unacceptable at the
time, and president Alessandri "laughed, and said that of course was not his intention".²²
We must take his assurances at face value.

The Alliance for Progress

While John F. Kennedy beat out Richard M. Nixon to win the 1960 election by
only a thin margin, his rhetoric on taking office showed the determination of a strong
mandate. Latin America played an important part of his inaugural address, an address
otherwise famous for the 'ask not what your country can do for you' statement. In a
paragraph addressed to 'our sister republics south of our border,' Kennedy read,

²⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, President Alessandri with President Eisenhower, 29 February 1960 [FRUS 58-60, Vol. V Microfiche Supplement, CI-30]

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

24

we offer a special pledge—to convert our good words into good deeds—in a new alliance for progress—to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbours know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.²³

Like any 'speech from the throne' Kennedy's words are densely packed with significance and indications of future policies. The last three lines of this paragraph are familiar to any student of politics since 1823, for it is an unmistakable reiteration of the Monroe Doctrine, updated with a veiled threat against communism, those 'aggressors' who might try to 'subvert' the cause of freedom in the Americas. But whereas such a statement could have as easily come from the Eisenhower Whitehouse, the first part of the paragraph most certainly would not have, for it states an understanding of, and sympathy for, those segments of society left behind by the course of statist capitalism (or pure kleptocracy) in the region. The idea led to the creation, in March of 1961, of the eponymous Alliance for Progress, an organisation destined to be one of the greatest US aid efforts ever conducted after the Marshall Plan. William D. Rogers, a Washington lawyer and later an Assistant Secretary of State under Nixon, served as Deputy U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress from 1961 until 1965. In a recent interview he noted "there were a lot of people who were enthusiastic about it at the time, regarding it as an enlightened chapter in American foreign policy towards Latin America, which was to move beyond old Cold War antipathies and to move towards positive development of the hemisphere."²⁴ Despite the rhetoric of 'moving beyond Cold War antipathies', Rogers said the programme was "admittedly [designed] to counter the lure coming out of

²³ John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address" in *Inaugural Addresses of the presidents of the United States: from George Washington to George W. Bush* (2nd Ed.), US Congress, Senate, USGPO, 1989,

25

Havana." Nevertheless, Rogers believes that Kennedy was wise and statesmanlike enough to realise that "for the US to project that image [of positive development aid] was the best kind of antidote for the appeal of Fidel and Ché."²⁵

Chile was to feature in the new Alliance for Progress, for at the time democracy was a rare system in Latin America. Particularly after the coup in Brazil, Rogers noted, democracies you could count on one hand: Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and that was it.... in Latin America democracy was very much embattled at that time, so Chile was one of the few places where we felt that the concept of the Alliance for Progress had a chance of being realised in the near term. We ran a lot of programs in Chile for that very purpose, demonstratively.²⁶

The 1964 Chilean presidential election existed in this context for the United States. To set a non-communist model of success for Latin America required a shining example of democratic success. With the number of democracies in South America so sharply limited, if the Marxist-Communist front under a *Fidelista* like Allende won the election in Chile, there would be precious few chances for the President's Alliance to work its magic. Conversely, the Alliance might give the impetus required for the victory of the pro-democratic party. The 1964 Presidential election in Chile suddenly became a *very important* matter, being both a subject of, and requirement for, the success of the Alliance for Progress.

That Chile was increasingly important is reflected by the production, in October of 1963, of the first ever National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Chile. Obviously concerned with the potential negative outcome of the election, American policy makers had initiated the study to better inform the determination of a coordinated US response,

²⁴ Interview, Rogers.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

26

both overt and covert, to this threat of communism spreading out of isolated Cuba. The NIE echoed what many in the administration had said over the previous six years, indicating the 1958 election results "raised apprehension that the 1964 presidential election might bring to power a government under strong communist influence, if not control."²⁷ This was taken seriously in government, and responding to the NIE, a group of State Department officers agreed that "we need to take the Allende campaign seriously."²⁸

The modern conception of Salvador Allende paints him as a pleasant and jovial 'Champaign Socialist' along European lines, more democrat that despot. Was the reaction to him in the early 1960's a false one, viewed through the eyes of desperately and unreasonably anti-Communist Americans, made worse by Monroe Doctrine fears? Or was there something more to Allende's stance that spooked the Americans into action?

## Who's Afraid of Salvador Allende?

Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens was a recurring character in Chile's political dramas from the 1930's onwards.²⁹ From a wealthy family, Allende had entered politics while still in medical school and had helped found the Chilean Socialist party in 1933, the year he graduated.³⁰ Elected as a federal deputy in 1937, Allende became Secretary-General of the Socialist Party in 1943, and by 1951 he was president of the Chilean

²⁷ NIE 94-63, "The Chilean Situation and Prospects," 3 October 1963.

²⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Belcher, Thompson, Richardson and Carlisle, "Chile", 14 November 1963. [JFK FRUS Vol. XII Supplement, Doc 46.]

²⁹ In Spanish speaking countries, two last names are officially used. However the latter name, called the matronymic, is not used in addressing an individual.

³⁰ Barry Goldwater, "On Covert Actions in Chile 1963-1973: A response to the Church Committee Report" in *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, 1986, p. 86.

27

Medical Society and vice-president of the Chilean Senate.³¹ Revolutionary Cuba would emerge as his party's main model and Allende cultivated a close friendship with Castro. Allende was important in the forming of the Cuban-sponsored Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO), which was to serve as the political body behind Che Guevera's 1967 Bolivian adventure.³² Indeed, Allende's daughter Beatriz would later marry the Cuban diplomat (and spy) Luiz Fernandez Ona, a former Guevaraista and intimate of Castro.³³ In the merger of the Socialists and Communists each entity remained intact, but there was enough cohesion in the party to retain Allende as the presidential candidate over the course of three consecutive elections.

Previous to the 1958 election, however, few in the US government would have ever heard the name Allende, and those who had would not have been unduly worried by it. Allende was just another socialist politician in another Latin American country. In the run-up to the 1964 election, however, Allende finally appeared as a bright icon on the US government's anti-communist radar screen. This is not to say that perceptions of Allende were entirely conditioned by anti-communist obsession, nor was it entirely hysterical in tone. Tasked in 1963, as part of the NIE procedure, to give a sketch of Allende, the US country-team in Santiago wrote:

> Allende is a chameleonic person... Personally he is vain, quick tempered, easily offended, socially as well as politically ambitious, able turn on or off at will a considerable social charm. He is sensitive to charges he would be dominated by Communists or that he would institute anti-democratic measures. Nevertheless were he to achieve power we think he could be led by events into being harsh and ruthless with his opponents but more likely use exile than prison or pardon. It is probable that he thinks in terms of a Marxist regime similar to Castro's Cuba in its free-wheeling, relatively

³¹ Memorandum, INR, "Salvador Allende, Chilean Presidential Candidate", 24 April 1964. [DDRS]

³² Barry Goldwater, "On Covert Actions in Chile 1963-1973: A response to the Church Committee Report", p. 87.

³³ Nathaniel Davis, p. 91.

28

independent line but more sophisticated, cultured, without emotional
excesses of "tropical" country such as Cuba.³⁴

Allende himself (who in the CIA's view "does not possess unusual intelligence") was clothed in the rhetoric of Marxism, but nonetheless wore a democrat's cloak. Despite his periodic statements (often to American press representatives) that he was not a Communist, as well as the wide-spread belief among Chileans, including many in opposition, that he was basically a democratic socialist as opposed to communist, the CIA believed the "record shows he has collaborated with Communists for more than 15 years with no apparent difficulty" and was likely fully in league with Communist Party leader Luis Corvalan.³⁵ INR added that Allende "has turned increasingly to the Communists as an instrument of victory and has risked becoming their tool."³⁶ Indeed, Allende may have believed himself to be a new breed of *Chilean Marxist-Socialist*, and he would become agitated when accused of wanting to do away with Chilean democratic institutions, saying that he will actually *save* democracy by the introduction of *People's Government*: "The new social order will require new institutions...we shall draft a new Constitution using the present Charter as a springboard."³⁷ But if one was unsure about the precise meaning of this last sentence, Allende provided a more concise explanation in his party platform: "the objective is total, scientific Marxist socialism."³⁸ Allende may have been a new-model Marxist, but in using such language he confirmed, to any but the most sophisticated political philosophers amongst American officials, that he was indeed a Marxist first and foremost.

³⁴ Cable, Embassy Santiago to Department of State, "Assessment Socialist-Communist Candidate Salvador Allende", 22 April, 1964. [LBJ FRUS, 251]

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Memorandum, INR, "Salvador Allende, Chilean Presidential Candidate", 24 April, 1964. [DDRS]

29

But 'Allende the threat' was not taken for granted by US officials. Many in the State Department and other parts of the government put significant thought into the question. One particularly noteworthy discussion of the matter came from the US Embassy First Secretary Robert Hurwitch, who produced a lengthy and thoughtful letter on the topic addressed directly to the NSA, McGeorge Bundy. While suggesting that the Soviets would be likely, but not certain, to take advantage of a communist Chile to expand their presence in America, Hurwitch was much clearer about the overall impact of an Allende victory:

"Dear Mac:

I have had very much in mind your request for another opinion as to whether an Allende victory would be seriously detrimental to US national security interests.... As a practical matter, whatever our assessment of the significance of an Allende victory, we may find our manoeuvrability the day after the election severely circumscribed. (I have often thought that the real tragedy for us of Castro's having embraced the Marxist, rather than our, world lay in the limitations now placed upon the flexibility of US policy toward situations which superficially resemble that of Cuba.) Another "Castro" in the Hemisphere, particularly one who achieved power through the democratic process in a country where we have invested the highest rate of per capita assistance, would be awfully tough to handle from both the international and domestic standpoints. This would clearly be a case where one and one totalled much more than two and the consequences throughout the Hemisphere of a second Castro would be serious."³⁹

That the issue of Chile was tied to the issue of Cuba is inescapable—as Hurwitch regretfully notes—but the discussion here is much less hysterical than some suppose. Regardless, Hurwitch ultimately suggest quite simply that "An Allende victory would

³⁷ Airgram A-756, AMEmbassy to State, 10 April 1964. [NARA, RG 59, Stack 250, Box 2025, Pol 2-1 Joint Weekas Chile]

³⁸ Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution* (New York, 1971) p. 118.

³⁹ Letter, "First Secretary of the Embassy in Chile (Hurwitch) to McGeorge Bundy", 19 June 1964. [FRUS 259]

30

constitute a defeat for US policy...."⁴⁰ The practical examples of such a defeat were quickly identified: "If Allende wins and stays in power, we are in trouble" wrote Gordon Chase of the State Department, for would "probably nationalize the copper mines, which in turn, might end the aid program because of the Hickenlooper amendment; this, in turn, could lead Chile to ask the Bloc for economic aid."⁴¹ For the US government in the 1960's all Communist roads led to Moscow.

Even without reference to the Kremlin, the mere mention of the word 'Cuba' would have caused blood to boil, hackles to rise, and numerous alarms to sound in a Whitehouse still occupied—for just a few more days—by the brothers Kennedy. It is likely that the CIA station in Santiago had a good idea of Allende's connections with foreign and domestic communist parties, and with the Soviet Union itself.⁴² While it is unclear what precisely the CIA knew about Allende in 1963, new work by Professor Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin shows that by this time Allende was indeed firmly in the Soviet camp. First contact by the Soviets with Allende was made by a KGB 'Line PR' officer from Buenos Aires, Svyatoslav Fyodorovich Kuznetsov (LEONID) in 1953. Salvador Allende was issued the appropriate codename "LEADER" by the KGB, though he was not officially recruited as an agent. Systematic contact between Allende and the KGB was established in 1961 when relations were restored and the KGB set up a residency in new trade mission. To the KGB Allende had 'stated his willingness to co-

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Memorandum, Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, "Chiefs of Mission Conference-Brazil and Chile", 19 March, 1964 [LBJ, NSF, Country File, Latin America, Vol. I, 11/63-6/64] The Hickenlooper Amendment stated that the US had to end all financial aid to any nation that expropriated US property without compensation or due legal process.

⁴² That the CIA was operating within the FRAP constituent parties is clear by the security deletions in CIA documents about these parties. Detailed information about party strategies or personalities is followed by such deletions, likely obscuring the source within these organizations. See XXXX.

31

operate on a confidential basis and provide any necessary assistance, since he considered
himself a friend of the Soviet Union. He willingly shared political information...."⁴³

Like their American counterparts, the KGB carefully analysed the man with
whom they placed a good degree of hope. Perhaps a comment on the judgement of both
services, the similarities between the KGB and CIA assessment of Salvador Allende are
perfectly eerie. The KGB noted, from contacts in Communist Party, that Allende's
"characteristic traits were arrogance, vanity, desire for glorification and a longing to be in
the spotlight at any price. He was easily influenced by stronger and more determined
personalities." Making a distinction that would have been lost on most Americans, they
also thought him to be "dangerously Maoist", and to have very bourgeois connections
with freemasonry. He was further noted, making reference to not-so-secret information,
to be something of a womaniser (ladies man?).⁴⁴ That Allende was being supported by
international communist elements was clear even outside the CIA, for Presidential
candidate Eduardo Frei reported to the US Ambassador that "large quantities of funds
[around $1 Million] for the Allende campaign had recently come in from Canada and that
more were expected in the near future. [Political Attaché] Scott Fox had told him that he
had not been able to track down the report but that the presumption was that the money
had originated in Cuba". Work in Soviet archives by Chilean-based researcher Olga
Ulianova does indeed show Soviet aid to Chilean Communist party (PCCh) at a baseline
of $50,000/annum in 1960 to 1969 with spikes of up to $400,000.⁴⁵ Eventually, the sums
of money passed to the PCCh were the highest in Latin America after Cuba.⁴⁶ Even

⁴³ Andrew, Mitrokhin, Vol. 2, p. 8.

⁴⁴ Andrew, Mitrokhin, Vol. 2, p. 8-9

⁴⁵ Ulianova, p. 89.

⁴⁶ Leonov, p. 39.

32

without this knowledge many commented that Allende was spending money at a rate far
fasted then he could possible be raising domestically.⁴⁷

The rise of Allende and the strength of the Chilean communist party helped
prompt the Soviet Union out of its normal aversion to operations in the American sphere
of influence. After the sudden and unanticipated success in Cuba, the USSR no longer
looked at Latin America as merely part of the American sphere, but rather as an
independent zone: previously 'out of bounds,' Latin America now appeared as an
enormous political arena which, if exploited properly, offered an opportunity to hurt the
Americans. For the first time, a Latin American branch was formed in the KGB and
Foreign Ministry, the former being given to the new KGB officer Nikolai Leonov, who's
memoirs offer substantial comments on Chile. The strategic vision was less direct than
many might perhaps think. Leonov introduces the concept that the USSR was not
interested in Chile because it would derive any necessary strategic or tactical benefit, but
because *the US did*. The USSR itself gained no particular advantage out of winning *aside
from winning*.⁴⁸ That such a victory might be achieved in the most capitalist of Latin
American countries was a tangible plus. Reporting from the Embassy in 1964 described
the chain of events resulting from a Communist government in Chile, and the impact they
would have on the United States:

> Negative economic impact will be very great immediately and probably
> over short-term as well. Allende would probably try to expand activities
> and efforts of existing GOC institutions which directly involved in
> economy in effort compensate for lacks and lags in private sector. He will
> undoubtedly seek help from bloc and "unaligned" countries but
> conceivably might make unreasonable request of USG (e.g. low interest
> loan pay for expropriation copper companies and utilities) expecting turn

⁴⁷ Telegram, Embassy Santiago to Sec State & Embassy Ottawa, "Allende's Funding", 5 May 1964. [LBJ, NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 1, Cables 1/64-8/64, doc 32]

⁴⁸ Nikolai Leonov, *Likholetye*, (publisher info) pp. 37-40.

33

down which he could use as ostensible justification Chilean public for
turning [to] bloc. In general economic deterioration after Allende victory
would tend stimulate and be used justify extreme internal measures toward
full statist economic power as well as shift to excessive Chilean
dependence Communist bloc aid and trade. ⁴⁹

American statements to the effect that having Chile 'go communist' would be a
blow to their prestige first and foremost shows a basic understanding of the great-power
stakes shared by their Soviet counterparts. "In essence," said National Security Advisor
McGeorge Bundy to President Johnson, "the problem we face is that a very popular and
attractive candidate, named Allende, who has thrown in his lot with the Communists, has
more than a fighting chance to win"⁵⁰ That the US had to do something to avert this was
quite simply assumed.

Initiation of the 1964 Operation

By the northern autumn of 1963, the US government had essentially decided to actively prevent the election of Allende in Chile. In overt terms this had begun with the inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961, largely through the Alliance for Progress, with the idea of assisting the Christian Democrats first mooted in March 1962 by Ambassador Cole and the then Special Assistant to the President, Richard Goodwin. At this time the '5412 Special Group' (a semi-official cabinet-level body tasked to review and approve covert action proposals) approved a programme of 'non attributable' assistance to Eduardo Frei's Christian Democrats in April 1962 and again on 30 August 1963, with concurrent approval from States' Latin American Policy Committee in

⁴⁹ Cable, Embassy Santiago to Department of State, "Assessment Socialist-Communist Candidate Salvador Allende", 22 April, 1964. [LBJ FRUS, 251]

⁵⁰ Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64. Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IV [LBJ FRUS 252]

34

January and June 1963. There was also, in 1963, a subsidy of an unknown amount to the Democratic Front (under the leadership of Radical Party boss Julio Durán Neumann), the coalition party of the right-leaning Conservative and Liberal Parties and the centre-left Radicals, a one-time payment not connected to any well thought-out policy, though specifically requested by a member of the party to make up their $500,000 campaign shortfall.⁵¹

These payments, one senses from the tone of CIA discussions regarding them, were not part of a coordinated strategy, but rather stop-gap payments based on the recommendations of the Embassy country-team. With the Assassination of Kennedy in November of 1963, there was a pause in the measures to implement such a high-level, coherent plan to be executed by the Agency. Despite the sad delay in proceedings, the transition to President Johnson was relatively seamless and had little impact on the developing proceedings in Chile—except in the attitudes behind the support to Chile. By mid-December of 1963, the West Wing had absorbed the new administration and the new staff got on with the business at hand.⁵² McGeorge Bundy seems to have put Chile back on the agenda, writing to President Johnson on the 24th of January with the suggestion that the Special Group, the informal committee which considered covert actions, “might, at an early date, give consideration to the interests of the United States in the Chilean election which occurs in December 1964.”⁵³ No one familiar with Latin American affairs, noted Bundy, “has any doubt as to the importance of the outcome of this election,

⁵¹ Memorandum, C/WHD (J.C. King) to DCI McCone, Political Action Program in Chile, 3 January, 1964. [LBJ FRUS 245]

⁵² LBJ Briefings, Ch. 3.

⁵³ Memorandum, Amb Dungan to McGeorge Bundy, untitled, 18 January, 1964. [LBJ FRUS 246]

35

not only in Chile but throughout the hemisphere" and it should therefore be dealt with
promptly.⁵⁴ Nothing further, however, was briefed to the President.⁵⁵

The major problem faced by the US government in early 1964 was precisely who they were going to support to prevent an Allende victory. While the Maxist-Socialist left parties were united under the banner of the Popular Action Front or FRAP, the centre and right-of-centre both represented viable alternatives to a communist government and were running separately: the Democratic Front (FD) and the Christian Democrats (PDC). The decision on which one to support was evidently the cause of much hand-wringing. The CIA's initial support to the PDC was aimed at getting them into a broad-based non-communist coalition with the Radicals, previously Chile's largest single political party— and may have had prompting from President Kennedy directly, as former US Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry stated in an interview in Santiago in 1999: "It started probably in early '63 after President Kennedy met directly with [PDC Chairman Eduardo] Frei in the White House. It was a secret meeting. I believe it was in the [Northern] Spring of '63... In that period."⁵⁶ But with Kennedy gone this pro-PDC desire waned, exacerbated by the inability to tell Eduardo Frei that he was being supported by the US at all. The last reason for PDC funding had been to make the party unwittingly act as a third, or splitter, party, drawing votes away from elements of soft-socialist/pro-clerical supporters of the FRAP in a way that the FD could not. Asked to make a choice on which they should support, the CIA was firmly behind supporting just the FD despite Kennedy's pro-liberal and pro-Catholic sentiments, with the reasoning that the Christian Democratic Party would be less favourable and responsive to United States Government

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

36

policies than the Democratic Front, and that they were likely to try to "establish relations
with Iron Curtain countries... [and] will endeavour to increase its trade with the Soviet
Bloc and will not follow the United States lead in foreign policy with the same
willingness as the present government."⁵⁷ The underlying reasoning of the CIA was
echoed by the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (ARA)
Thomas Mann, who suggested support should only go to the FD because Durán, being
more pliable—from the American viewpoint—in economic matters than Frei, might be
more ready to reinvest money into Chile. Also, Durán's relatively left-leaning tendencies
"might draw further votes away from Allende." But some small measure of "support to
the [PDC] should be continued because they too offer strong competition to Allende."⁵⁸
Despite the Kennedy's drive for some kind of 'progressive development aid' in Latin
America to back the Alliance, the Agency and State were aiming at the US-default of
supporting the right-wing, the 'alliance for progress' instead relapsing to a 'mandate for
stability.' In February the CIA's Chief of Western Hemisphere Division (C/WHD) J.C.
King submitted his recommendation to the Special Group to obtain approval for election
support of the Democratic Front and a subsequent cutback in the subsidy to the Christian
Democratic Party. Luckily for the PDC, however, the Special Group did not meet on 5
March, as planned, and failed to discuss Chile at its next meeting a week later.⁵⁹ As
would be repeated in 1970, the Special Group dithered over the decision on which they
should support. Before that decision could be made, however, local politics would force

⁵⁶ *Estudios Públicos*, 72 (primavera 1998). "El Embajador Edward M. Korry en el CEP".

⁵⁷ Memorandum, C/WHD (J.C. King) to DCI McCone, Political Action Program in Chile, 3 January, 1964.
[LBJ FRUS 245]

⁵⁸ Memorandum for the Record, Chief and Deputy Chief, WHD with Assistant Secretary Mann, "Record of Conversation", 28 February 1964. [LBJ FRUS 247]

⁵⁹ Ibid. See also NARA Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, Meetings.

37

the American hand to a more progressive policy with long-lasting effects on US-Chilean
interaction.

Chile, it was often noted by foreign political observers, seemed to be in a nearly
constant election campaign. Between presidential, congressional, municipal, and by-
elections there was always some sort of campaigning underway. In March 1964, as it
happened, there was to be a by-election in the riding of Curicó, and Ralph W.
Richardson, the State Department official in charge of Chilean affairs noted that it would
serve as a major indicator of the relative strength of the parties into the presidential race.
Pride, it is said, cometh before the fall, and straight into this cavernous aphorism walked
Durán, who stated explicitly that the by-election would stand as a 'plebiscite' on the
ruling party, the Democratic Front, as well as his leadership of it.⁶⁰ The FRAP candidate
in the election, however, was the son of a late and lamented Socialist deputy with great
clout in Curicó, and he played the familial link to his immense advantage. On 15 March,
the FRAP candidate won the Curicó by-election with 39.5 percent of the vote; the next
day, Durán resigned as the DF presidential candidate (though not from the Presidential
race itself). As the Democratic Front was a fragile coalition, the loss of Durán was
mortal, and the party dissolved within a short time. This was a high Richter-scale event
in the normally predictable Chilean political scene, and reaction in the US was high
enough to prompt the CIA's Desmond FitzGerald to write in a memorandum that "the
most important thing is to keep people from panicking" as a result of the by-election loss
to FRAP.⁶¹

⁶⁰Memorandum, Richardson to Mann, "Curico By-Election", 6 March 1964. [NARA, RG 84, Santiago Embassy Files: FRC 69 A 6507, 1964, POL 14 Elections (Presidential) 1964.]

⁶¹ Memorandum, Carter to Hughes, "ARA-CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965", 26 March 1964. [LBJ FRUS 248]

38

While many in the US government were vexed by the FRAP victory, some at the State Department (generally of the pro-JFK persuasion) saw the silver lining. One of these was Ralph Richardson of the Chilean desk. Realising the difficulty in running two horses against a very strong FRAP, Richardson believed that the best bet lay with a single, reformist candidate. The socialist parties had never taken more than 40% in any election in Chile, so if the centre and rightist parties could be induced to support the PDC candidate, Frei, as the main non-Marxist candidate, then the election had a much better chance of being won. While noting that the race was far from theirs, Richardson commented on the positive impact Curicó had on the decision-making process: "I still cannot repress a feeling of satisfaction in seeing how quickly and cleanly our 'decision' to swing behind Frei was made for us. I really had wondered before Durán's disaster whether we were going to get any definite decision from the front office on which group we should help."⁶² Unable to force the executive to make a decision on who should be supported—as would happen again in the 1970 election—the Americans nonetheless had a candidate thrust upon them.

While it is often assumed that the US had been behind the PDC from JFK's inauguration onwards, the record shows it not to be so. Kennedy's Democrats—liberal and Catholic, like Frei—did have an affinity to this analogous Latin-American party, but sympathy had not been enough to swing a notably conservative administration into actually supporting them: the Alliance for Progress was to be run on political terms dictated from Washington, and those terms demanded a pliable, conservative government. This was especially so after Kennedy's death when the more pragmatic LBJ

⁶² Letter, Ralph W. Richardson to Jova, 3 April 1964. [NARA, RG 84, Santiago Embassy Files: FRC 69 A 6507, 1964, POL 14 Elections (Presidential) 1964 (1)]

39

took office, leaving his even less Kennedy-inspired staff to run the show. It is only from
the relatively late date of 15 March, less than six months before the election, when the US
government—because they had no choice—truly committed to supporting Eduardo Frei
and his left-leaning, progressive Christian Democrats. Some still thought the loss of
Durán was catastrophic, and the embassy regretfully noted that “not without certain
aptness has it been jested that the choice between Frei and Allende is between chaos and
disaster.”⁶³ But despite this occasional lack of conviction about their now-chosen man,
whatever the US lost in time they made up with enthusiasm, and within a matter of days
the situation changed dramatically: the proscription against ‘witting’ (or overt) contact
with the PDC was partially broken, and at the party’s request incredible sums of money
were being sent from the US. With no other choice to avert a Marxist government, the
PDC suddenly became the Great Hope.

The CIA Swings Into Action

With focus thrust upon them, and determination accidentally imbued to the
Whitehouse, the CIA acted with appropriate decisiveness in Chile. Within a short time
the implications of the Curicó defeat had been absorbed and processed by the Agency
with the help of the State Department and the Santiago Embassy. On 1 April, two weeks
after the defeat, a comprehensive and lengthy memorandum was submitted to the Special
Group outlining the full plan for initial support to the PDC. The preamble to the
memorandum is significant, outlining the significantly different political scene in Chile
after Curicó, and the way the PDC was now approaching American involvement. Central

⁶³ Airgram A-45, Embassy to Dept State, "Semi-Annual Politico-Economic Assessment - Chile", 16 July 64. [NARA: RG 59, Stack 250, Box 2025, Pol 2-1 Joint Weekas Chile]

40

to this significance is that it tells us that at the end of March a member of Frei's campaign
team visited the embassy (whether this is the political section or the CIA is not said) to
present their campaign budget to the Americans. First they presented their current
budget of US $100,000 per month, which they claimed to be meeting only with difficulty
and which they did not think was sufficient anyway. Next, they presented their desired
budget of over $300,000 per month. This, they said, is what needs to be spent in order to
beat Allende. And to maintain this budget, the Chileans boldly suggested that the U.S.
Government make up the difference "which amounts to one million dollars for the period
from now to election time."⁶⁴ The Embassy and the CIA station reviewed the budgets,
felt they did not seem unreasonable, and subsequently recommended that the Chilean's
request for one million dollars be granted as soon as possible.⁶⁵ Money to the Christian
Democrats, though, was not the end of the proposed US program of covert support in
Chile. "As a result of the [political] situation outlined above," the memorandum
continued, "it becomes necessary to take all possible action to assist Frei in his
campaign." A whole battery of tactics were proposed, which one can summarise as:

(1) Preventing the Radical Party from formally endorsing Allende; "In the event the Radical Party declares for Allende, financial assistance will have to be provided to individual Radical leaders or groups capable of bringing Radical voters into the Frei camp."

(2) Influencing the Conservative and Liberal parties to support Frei in a manner that would not damage his image as a reform candidate. (to be achieved by bribes);

(3) Complementing the subsidy directly to the PDC, influence on Frei to reach a private agreement with the Radicals for their support in exchange for post-election patronage;

(4) Preventing the declaration of a third candidate (the most likely was Jorgé Prat, a conservative from a powerful political family) by bribery and "pressure" to avert the splitting of the non-Marxist vote; and

⁶⁴ Memorandum, CIA to Special Group, "Support for the Chilean Presidential Election of 4 September 1964", 1 April 1964. [FRUS 250]

⁶⁵ Ibid.

41

(5) Financial assistance to ancillary organizations, such as youth and student groups, peasant organizations, slum dwellers' associations, labour unions, and women's clubs, to bring their votes to Frei.

(6) Initiating "specialized propaganda operations, some of which will be black, to denigrate Allende."⁶⁶

All together, this seems a fairly reasonable set of options, perhaps even standard political wrangling, whose only sinister terms are the vaguely described 'pressure' to be applied to keep other candidates from challenging Frei's dominance of the centre and right. Nor was it illegal under either Chilean or US law. It is, nonetheless, serious political interference with the electoral process in a democratic state. To the Americans, however, it was merely a gentle inoculation of prevent the far worse anti-democratic disease of Marxism, for this was contagious disease: there were serious consequences "if this major Latin American nation should become the first country in the hemisphere to freely choose an avowed Marxist as its elected president."⁶⁷ A further option listed at the end of the memo underlines the gravity with which the CIA and the Special Group viewed the situation. Realising that the first six options might not swing the required votes, the CIA should be prepared, in the latter stages of the campaign, "to buy some votes outright if required."⁶⁸

Despite the PDC's open and direct approach for campaign funding, there was still disagreement as to whether this funding should be provided to them in an overt fashion.

While it is not yet stated explicitly, it was clear to all that the revelation of wholesale US funding to the PDC would be a disaster with massive political gains for Allende and the FRAP. Yet, with the whole point of the campaign being to "obtain some essential

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Presidential Election in Chile", 1 May, 1964. [LBJ FRUS Doc 253]

⁶⁸ LBJ FRUS 250

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leverage" over the PDC during their erstwhile Presidency, the CIA suggested that the money be passed in a manner which might "infer U.S. Government origin of the funds yet permit us plausible denial if necessary" by explicitly attributing the funds to US non-official sources.⁶⁹ The Embassy's political staff, however, believed that the important matter was merely for Frei to win, that the benefit of leverage over the PDC was dramatically outweighed by the risk of a leak from some nationalist in the PDC which would compromise the entire operation. The PDC, though, was just that little too left-wing for the Special Group to feel comfortable with them not under some American influence. Accordingly, the Special Group authorised $750,000 (of the requested $1 million) in immediate funding to go to the PDC, in the semi-covert fashion outlined by the CIA. This decision was made, however, with the understanding that it did not "reflect the Embassy's position." The difference was not too great, however, and it seems that the CIA was able to accommodate the slightly sceptical ambassador Cole. The following day the paper was approved, with new C/WHD Desmond FitzGerald announcing in an attached memo that a solution to the slight difference of opinion between Ambassador Cole and the Santiago CIA station had been reached: attribution of U.S. support would be inferred *but there should be no evidence or proof*.⁷⁰ This was, FitzGerald apparently assured them, something the CIA could do. Whether it would actually be effective at deflecting realisation of American funding would remain to be seen.

After the Church Committee investigations of 1975, the manner in which covert actions were approved changed dramatically. Within a day of approval by the successor to the Special Group, the president would have to issue a 'finding' authorising the

⁶⁹ Ibid.

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operation as necessary for the national security of the United States and then pass it to the congressional select committees on intelligence. This was not the case in 1964, a time when the covert-action decision-making infrastructure was still blissfully clear of bureaucratic hurdles or legal checks, especially those later emplaced by congress. While the President may have been partially cognisant of the ongoing procedures on Chile (he did not choose to read the still-classified 'intelligence checklist' [latterly known as 'the President's Daily Brief'] from the DCI, as would later become customary, so this is not certain<sup>71</sup>) the first evidence of him being informed about the actual programme and the associated funding decision came on or about 13 May 1964. At this time, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy forwarded to Johnson a memorandum written by Assistant Secretary of State for ARA Thomas Mann to Secretary of State Dean Rusk which outlined the entire US programme of action in Chile, both covert and overt. To this memorandum Bundy appended a short note for the President, which highlighted the salient points as he perceived them, indicating

> We have a coordinated Government-wide program of action to strengthen [Allende's] opponent and support actions in Chile which will work to the advantage of those now in power. It is a highly fluid situation and one in which there may have to be further action as we get into the summer. I have been very much encouraged by the determination and unity which all Departments of the Government are showing on this one, and we will be watching it very closely, but I do think you ought to know about it yourself.<sup>72</sup>

The latter point—full cooperation of all the departments—is important, for it is possible that the success of this programme hinged upon it, as would be proved in later US efforts

<sup>70</sup> Memorandum, Minutes of Special Group Meeting of 2 April, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, 9 April 1964. [NARA]

<sup>71</sup> Johnson briefings.

<sup>72</sup> Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64. Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IV [LBJ FRUS Doc 253]

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in Chile. It is notable, however, that this entire programme of covert actions (and tens of millions in overt funding) was occurring possibly *without the knowledge or permission of the President*. Certainly, the system of security management in the NSC as established by the National Security Act of 1948 was designed to allow swift responses by empowered staff acting within the conceptual framework previously given by the President. The Chief Executive is, after all, a fairly busy individual. Initially, one might be shocked that such a delicate and seemingly important task, with so much money being funnelled to a friendly democracy (an act, Loch Johnson notes, more serious than operations in a repressive regime), without some small measure of control by the President—but there is an explanation. Johnson, by April of 1964, had only been acting as President for four months and before that he was kept—at the request of JFK—almost totally in the dark about covert actions.⁷³ He had met on one occasion with DCI Allen Dulles in July 1960 while a vice-presidential candidate, but neither Dulles nor his successor, John McCone, had made much effort to keeping Johnson informed during the intervening years.⁷⁴ Compared with the concerns of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Cuba, and especially Vietnam, Chile was a relatively secondary matter, so the fact that LBJ had not been 'read-in' to the matter until April, when real action was being planned, seems much more plausible. Nonetheless, by this time Johnson had long stopped reading the Agency's *intelligence checklist*, preferring to let the agency or the NSC take care of matters. Accordingly, one can detect very little Presidential input into the matter both before and after this initial briefing.⁷⁵ The operation was, essentially, still operating under the control of a dead president. But what JFK had started was impressive, and it

⁷³ LBJ Briefs, Ch. 3

⁷⁴ Ibid.

45

becomes clear in the rest of this memo to Johnson. In addition to the CIA's covert
actions, the memorandum outlines the entire sweep of US overt operations:

2) Providing AID loans in CY 64 amounting to approximately $70 million...

5) Organizing a political action and propaganda campaign through CIA contacts in coordination with or parallel to Frei's campaign. This includes voter registration drives, propaganda, person-to-person campaigning... and arrangements to provide some Italian Christian Democratic organizers to Frei as advisers...

7) [Attempt]... to encourage their rising awareness of the subversion which would take place under an Allende government.

8) Continuing USIA placement in Chile of un-attributed material, giving special care to low-keyed efforts which do not expose U.S. Government involvement.

9) Encouraging, through covert ties and private U.S. organizations, effective anti-Allende efforts by Chilean organizations including the Roman Catholic Church, trade union groups, and other influential bodies, such as the anti-clerical Masons.⁷⁶

This was, indeed, a 'full court press', with all aspects of the US government directed to prevent the election of Allende. Indeed, some observers were so impressed by the anti-Allende efforts of other US government agencies that they assumed that they were CIA fronts. Popular Chilean author Eduardo Labarca, in his book *Chile Invadido*, states quite firmly that the United States Information Service (USIS) was a CIA front organisation, though in its own records the CIA states that this was not the case.⁷⁷ William Broe wrote to the DDP, in explanation of his own activities, that "the material disseminated [by us] does not duplicate USIA efforts, which in Chile are centred mainly in propaganda areas other than radio."⁷⁸ While Labarca may have been correct in noting that the USIA was spreading pro-American propaganda (as well as bad movies, if on can judge from their film repertoire #286 'Danza Hacia la Libertad' [Dancing towards Freedom] about two

⁷⁵ LBJ Briefs, Ch. 7.

⁷⁶ LBJ FRUS 253.

⁷⁷ Find.

46

Hungarian ballerinas who bravely flee to West Berlin.), it was noted by the CIA that the "USIA effort does not concentrate on disseminating a significant amount of anti-Communist material."⁷⁹ While Labarca spots some fairly unlikely patterns to support his theory—he argues, for example that any editorial from Santiago daily *El Mercurio* that finished with the letters O, W, or S was a plant from the CIA—he is not incorrect to have spotted the American hand behind the large pro-Frei propaganda drive in Chile, including (though his letter pattern is nonsense) editorials in major conservative papers such as *El Mercurio*.⁸⁰ The Americans, however, felt that the operation and all its millions were still entirely *sub rosa*, with ARA assistant-secretary Mann telling his superior that they "are attempting to insure that extraordinary caution is observed in this action campaign to conceal official U.S. government interest, and we have rejected several ideas which have seemed to entail undue risks or excessive American involvement."⁸¹

## Corporate Funding

Though the Americans perhaps had an inflated sense of their own security, they did at least take it seriously. Perhaps the most frequent charge levelled against the US in Latin America is that they were subservient or reactive to corporate interest at the expense of sound policy. This certainly applies to Chile, where the large US investments in the copper mining industry, and in telecoms and infrastructure, were in the order of billions of US dollars. In Chile in 1964, however, the desire to work directly with or for the corporate sector was viewed as being too predictable and too likely to be

⁷⁸ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval and Renewal", 12 March 1968.

⁷⁹ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval and Renewal", 12 March 1968

⁸⁰ Eduardo Labarca, *Chile Invadido* (Santiago, 1968), pp. 307-317.

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compromised for there was a "lack of assurance on security before, during, and after the election" from interested corporations.⁸² Part of this stemmed from admonishments directly from Frei. On more than one occasion when speaking to US Embassy officials, Frei emphatically stated that any linking of him to the US Government or—especially—to the U.S. private sector financial assistance would be "fatal."⁸³ Simply, to have his reformist and 'communitarian' party linked with foreign capital in such a highly nationalist country as Chile would be a political kiss of death—a fact he made explicitly clear to Joseph Jova, the Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affairs.

Concerns about the political ramifications in Chile of a revelation about corporate funding (made manifest in the ITT scandal of 1972) were not the only concern on the minds of US politicians. While the common conception about US foreign policy is that it is totally amoral, especially when in pursuit of anti-Communist goals, in 1964 the State Department seems to have had great ethical concerns about corporate involvement as well. In a cable to his superiors at Foggy Bottom, Jova wrote:

> The concept of American commercial firms passing financial aid surreptitiously to the U.S. government raised so many questions of ethics, financial and interrelationships that Mr. McCone said he felt the matter should be discussed in the [Special] Group. A lengthy exchange of views ensued, but the conclusion was that the legal aspects were too labyrinthine and the questions of tax benefits, conflicts of interest and corporation behavior were too murky to make any clear determinations.⁸⁴

The security risks and questionable morality of acting as an agent, in effect, of U.S. capital led to the agreement that the CIA would refuse any offers of assistance from any US corporation invested in Chile: there was a "decision *not* to become a partner with

⁸¹ Memorandum, Mann to Rusk, "Presidential Election in Chile", 1 May, 1964. [FRUS 253] (or Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64).

⁸² Airgram, Deputy Chief of Mission (Jova) to ARA (Mann), "76320", 5 May 1964. [Frus 254].

⁸³ FRUS 254.

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business interests in covert political action but at the same time [the US would] assure
[the corporations] that the U.S. was making every effort, on a priority basis, to prevent
the election of Allende."<sup>85</sup> Nonetheless, the US-owned corporations in Chile, including
the multi-national firm International Telephone and Telegraph (IT&T or ITT) did have
resources or expertise that the CIA was often keen to use, and names such as that of
Harold S. Geneen, CEO of ITT, appear in the context of such non-intelligence matters as
how to move 3,500 metric tonnes of beef to Chile to prevent a price spike.<sup>86</sup> Of course,
private firms operating in Chile were not forbidden from making political contributions,
and many sought to do so (apparently, sometimes in the form of on-the-hoof beef). In
August of 1964 a request arrived at the embassy in Santiago from a private business
woman, named Carroll Walters, of Pfizer, asking how to contribute money to the Frei
campaign, as "most other American business firms are now making direct contributions
to campaign both through local offices and...through a business committee in NY."<sup>87</sup>
The official line was set, however, and when the embassy sought guidance on what to tell
her to do they received the formula reply:

> Inform Walters that [State] Dept...[discourages] private contributions since we feared charges of US involvement in the campaign as a result possible indiscretion. This is consistent with our long-standing policy to advise US citizens against interference or participation in the internal political affairs of any foreign country.

<sup>84</sup> FRUS 254.

<sup>85</sup> Memorandum for the Record, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group", 12 May 1964. [FRUS 257]

<sup>86</sup> Telcon, DCI McCone and Under Secretary of State George Ball, 11:45AM, 7 May, 1964. [FRUS 256]

<sup>87</sup> TELEGRAM, Embtel 264, Santiago Emb to Sec State, "Frei Campaign Officials", 15 Aug 1964. [NARA RG 59, Stack 250, Box 2026, Pol 5 & 12 Political Affairs and Relations/Political Parties]

49

Despite a sincere corporate interest to help the PDC with either money or expertise, US corporations were deflected from doing at the combined request of Frei and the US Government.

## Playing Politics

Funding was not the sole course of action pursued by the US government in Chile, and a large part of the CIA's mission was to directly influence the decisions of certain political parties. It is clear that, to this end, the CIA was involved in the internal affairs of some parties. A memorandum from the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division to the Deputy Director for Plans in March of 1968 discusses the renewal of funding for certain [unnamed] projects. It notes that in one of these projects, the Agency was providing funding to moderate elements within the Radical Party since 1963.⁸⁸ Though "we have worked with the same kind of collaborators within the party, the nature of our objectives, scope of involvement, and tactical use of such collaborators" changed along with the evolution in Chilean politics. When funding had started, the Radicals were part of the centre-right coalition in Congress which had supported Alessandri. This basis of support had evaporated, however, when the Radical Julio Durán was defeated in a by-election.

With Frei now established as the choice candidate for the US to support, and CIA support drifted away from the increasingly left-wing Radicals. The Radicals, however, were not entirely abandoned by the CIA, however, for they noted that Julio Durán had recently avoided an attempt within his party (which the CIA had initially hoped would beat Allende) to endorse Allende directly! With this action the CIA—who had never come to the same opinion twice about the Radicals or Durán—realised that there was still utility

50

in supporting Durán, and they were happy to note that their funding had been
"instrumental" in maintaining the Radical candidate in that particular struggle.⁸⁹ All
along, CIA and Country-Team political assessments were unsure whether Durán and the
Radicals stole votes from the PDC or the FRAP, but with the attempt of the Radical party
to align with the FRAP, this became a secondary concern to keeping them from
supporting the FRAP directly. With the help of Frei, the PDC was thus enlisted to push
money to Durán in order to keep him both in the race and friendly to Frei, for in the case
of a slim electoral majority and a run-off contest between Frei and Allende, the hope
would be for friendly Radical party congressmen voting for Frei as President. While they
could keep Durán in the race for President, however, they could not guarantee the post-
election support of the Radical party, nor could they guarantee the prevention of another
Radical Party move to support Allende, for "Due to ambassadorial restrictions against
supporting Radicals, our equities in that party [are] quite diminished."⁹⁰ For the mean
time, at least, this was not a major problem.

## More Money

If the CIA could not influence every aspect of the Chilean political system, the
US government as a whole could at least throw a lot of money at the one party they could
sway. On 14 May, 1964, the Special Group considered a proposal to increase the funds
available for covert use in the Chilean election, noting the CIA's opinion that "recent
political developments and additional information" indicated that an additional
$1,250,000 was needed for the program to defeat Allende. Almost all of these funds

⁸⁸ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Renewal of Project", 20 March 1968.

⁸⁹ Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, 14 May, 1964.

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were to go to Frei, allowing his party to "campaign at its full potential."⁹¹ According to the minutes of the Special Group meeting where this was approved, "the principle of financial flexibility," lay behind the new payment, for "if, as the campaign develops, one segment [of the operation] needs additional support and another less, authority exists to shift the subsidy in the needed direction." Here we know LBJ had at least a cursory awareness of the ongoing proposal, for MacGeorge Bundy informed the participants that "higher authority was aware of the seriousness of this election."⁹²

Yet more money was to follow. The 303 Committee, successor as of 2 June, to the Special Group, considered on 23 July a proposal to provide "supplementary support for the Chilean presidential elections." In a 21 July memorandum to the 303 Committee the Central Intelligence Agency reported that an additional $500,000 was needed for the program to defeat Allende, as it would permit Frei to "maintain the pace and rhythm of his campaign effort" and allow the CIA to meet any "last minute contingencies." The 303 Committee's obvious question on why yet more money was required in addition to the US $2 million already spent (an enormous sum even in a US election, several people noted) was met with an apology from the CIA: Frei had miscalculated his finances, they said, an error "attributable to the PDC's inexperience in organizing a campaign of this magnitude."⁹³ Apparently placated, NSC staffer Peter Jessup recommended approval of the suggestion to Bundy on 23 July, repeating the mantra: "We can't afford to lose this one, so I don't think there should be any economy shaving in this instance. We assume

⁹⁰ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Renewal of Project", 20 March 1968.

⁹¹ FRUS Doc. 262 (Editorial)

⁹² Memorandum for the Record, "Minutes of Special Group Meeting of 13 May", 14 May, 1964 [NARA: National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Chile thru 1969]

⁹³ Memorandum for the Record, "Minutes of 303 Committee Meeting 21 July", 21 July 1964. [NARA: National Security Council, 303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Chile thru 1969]

52

the Commies are pouring in dough; we have no proofs. They must assume we are pouring
in dough; they have no proofs. Let's pour it on and in."⁹⁴ The funding was approved.
There was also the case of an unnamed Chilean man who, apparently on the basis of
conversations with various Americans, assumed that he had a tacit commitment for
financial support from the US. Although no formal commitment had been made to him,
nor any deals signed (for the CIA, of course, was careful about Chileans not detecting
their hidden hand), the 303 Committee felt he "had made measurable contributions to the
Frei campaign through his 'front' organisation and that some allocation of funds should
be made to defray his deficit of $395,000."⁹⁵ This was an enormous sum of money for an
individual, especially in Chile in 1964. Indeed, ARA's Ambassador Thompson
commented disapprovingly that it "seems a great deal", but he did not enter any caveat to
the disbursement.⁹⁶ This incident indicates the seriousness with which the USG viewed
the elections but also, more importantly, how freely their money was injected into Chile.

Progress

If so much money was being thrown around in Chile, was it actually achieving the
aim? Did it look as if Frei would actually beat Allende. By and large, the Santiago CIA
station thought so: "In the Embassy's opinion almost every evidence and observation
suggest that Senator Eduardo FREI should win the most votes in the national election on
September 4, 1964... [despite] FRAP charges that he is the candidate of the Church, the

⁹⁴ FRUS Doc. 246. Editorial.

⁹⁵ FRUS Doc. 267. Editorial.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

53

Right and the United States....”⁹⁷ The implication that there support—which they knew was secret—might be aiding the FRAP was impossible, and they concentrated instead on their scientific polling—a function introduced to the non-Communist Chilean political scene by the US Embassy Country Team, and which they shared with Frei.⁹⁸ The US Embassy also met with local business leaders, who “all agreed with me that Frei likely winner. General feeling serious violence unlikely and GOC well prepared to maintain order.”⁹⁹ There was, however, a note of fear from the Embassy and the CIA in particular. The latter felt that all the money they were passing to the PDC was doing nothing to ameliorate the fact that the PDC was ~~simple~~ less well organised than the FRAP, and it “is now convincingly evident that the communists have indeed been working hard for many years pointing toward this election. They have made notable inroads among the campesinos...” and other segments of the electorate that the PDC simply could not reach.¹⁰⁰ While people were generally confident of a PDC win, there was “a certain tension is felt in middle and upper class circles as shown by such things as the greatly increased issuance of visitor’s visas, plane and ship bookings and **capital flight**.”¹⁰¹ Not totally dismissing the unscientific political prognostication of the locals, the CIA—haunted by the concept of an Allende win and another Cuba on their watch—made inquiries amongst the Chilean army on what they might do in the event of an Allende victory. The answer to this question was a resounding ‘nothing.’ Simply, the Chilean military was conditioned by a long tradition of ‘non-deliberation’, remaining outside of

⁹⁷ Airgram, US Amb Santiago (Cole) to State Dept, "The Presidential Campaign with Two weeks to go", 21 Aug 1964. [NARA: NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 1, Cables 1/64-8/64]

⁹⁸ Interview, Devine.

⁹⁹ Telegram, US Amb Santiago (Cole) to Sec State, "Met Today", 27 Aug 1964. [NARA: NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 1, Cables 1/64-8/64]

¹⁰⁰ Airgram, US Amb Santiago (Cole) to State Dept, "The Presidential Campaign with Two weeks to go", 21 Aug 1964. [NARA: NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 1, Cables 1/64-8/64]

54

politics, liable only to act if a party, any party, attempted to subvert the Chilean constitution. "If Allende should impatiently attempt to override Congress," the CIA Station wrote to Washington, "the military would almost certainly intervene to preserve constitutional order. If he should too abruptly seek to impose his personal control on the military establishment, there might also be a reaction. Otherwise, the military and the Carabineros [the Chilean national police] would be likely to support the duly elected regime." Despite military intervention in the government briefly in 1924, there simply was no great likelihood of any extra-constitutional action: "Military intervention in politics can happen in Chile, though not without strong provocation."¹⁰² Furthermore, this was no run-of-the-mill tin pot South American republic, and the warning was made to the White House that "we should not confuse the Chile of 1964 with the Guatemala of 1954 unless we are prepared to physically occupy the country."¹⁰³ Luckily, this course of action did not seem too likely, as the polls were coming out in favour of Frei. An August 1964 sampling of the important areas of Santiago and Valparaiso shows Frei ahead by 20.2% over Allende in these cities:

<table><tr><td>Frei</td><td>54.4%</td></tr><tr><td>Allende</td><td>34.2%</td></tr><tr><td>Duran</td><td>36.9%</td></tr><tr><td>Undecided</td><td>34.5%</td></tr></table>

*104*

¹⁰¹ Ibid. Original Italics

¹⁰² NIE, "The Chilean Situation and Prospects", 3 October 1963.

¹⁰³ Memorandum, McGeorge Bundy/Lawrence O'Brien/John Reilly to Senator H.H. Humphrey, "The Present Political Situation in Chile, 16 June 1964. [LBJ: EX CO 4 Chad, Republic of, BOX 21]

¹⁰⁴ Memorandum, CIA to State/NSC, "Chilean Election Forecast", 1 September 1964. [FRUS 268]

55

The Station, however, was keen to stress that these were rough polling numbers, hard to translate into a prediction of the actual election outcome, and that the 'important point' was that Frei looked like he was in for a simple majority and a solid mandate. Such a majority, they noted hopefully,

> would mean that the election would not have to be thrown to congress and therefore that the uncertainties surrounding that process, including the possibility of rioting, would be eliminated. Furthermore, with a clear majority Frei would not have to make any political deals with other parties. Forced to predict, however, we would give the following: Frei-53 percent; Allende-41 percent; Duran-6 percent.¹⁰⁵

This was wonderful news for the White House. Nonetheless, as 4 September of 1964 approached there was, no doubt, a few white knuckles both in Washington and Santiago.

## Election Day

Come the election day of 4 September, the various parts of the Johnson administration involved in the Chilean operations closely monitored the official voting count in Chile. The Department of State received hourly updates from the Embassy in Santiago, which in turn were forwarded to the White House.¹⁰⁶ Although the initial returns echoed the polls and put Frei into the lead quite early on, the final result was surprisingly decisive. With only slightly more than a tenth of the electorate not voting, Eduardo Frei and his PDC received 56% of the vote; Salvador Allende Gossens and the FRAP 39%; Julio Durán Neumann, centre of such hand-wringing and worry in the Santiago Station, finished third with just 9% of the vote—very close indeed to the CIA's polling numbers. President Johnson addressed the importance of the Chilean election at

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

56

a news conference on 5 September. The election, he said, served as a reminder of the
strength of democratic institutions throughout Latin America; it was a victory for
democracy as well as a defeat for "those who are hostile to freedom" (read:
communism).¹⁰⁷ The Embassy staff were slightly more prosaic, commenting in a cable
several days after the poll that "Midnight Wednesday mercifully brought to an end an
election campaign which has been going on for longer than Embassy officers care to
remember."¹⁰⁸

## Effectiveness & Results

The CIA was not shy about the share of the credit due them for the stunning win, the first clear majority government in a Chilean election in 22 years, as DCI John McCone pointed out to the 303 Committee. The CIA was one of the "indispensable ingredients of Frei's success."¹⁰⁹ Frei, personally, also praised the Embassy for its role during the campaign, noting their "discretion and cooperation" throughout his campaign.¹¹⁰ The Station likely agreed wholeheartedly, and they indicated to the 303 Committee their belief that Frei's chances of winning the election "would have been considerably more tenuous, and it is doubtful if his campaign would have progressed as well as it did without this covert U.S. Government support."¹¹¹ The Ambassador agreed, and the day after the election Ambassador Charles Cole reported that the combined effort of U.S.

¹⁰⁶ Memorandum, Chase to Bundy, "Chilean Polling", 4 September 1964. [LBJ: NSF, Country File, Latin America Vol. II, 6/64-12/64] See also telegrams 366-371, Santiago to Washington, 4 September 1964. [NARA: RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE]

¹⁰⁷ FRUS Doc. 269 Editorial.

¹⁰⁸ Airgram A-187, Santiago to State, Joint Weeka No. 36, 3 September 1964. [NARA: RG 59, Stack 250, Box 2025, Pol 2-1 Joint Weekas Chile]

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Telegram #383, Santiago to State, 8 September 1964. [NARA: RG 59, Central Files 1964-1966, POL 14 Chile]

¹¹¹ Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Chile, 1964-1967. [FRUS 269]

57

agencies "contributed significantly to the very satisfactory Frei victory on September
4."¹¹² Feeling, apparently, in remarkably generous mood, McCone remarked that the
voters "themselves... deserved some commendation."¹¹³ It was, all around, a great day
for being in the CIA. And it was probably a good day for Chile, too.

Commenting on the matter almost forty years later, William D. Rogers gives a
more reasoned and rational tone to the reaction, which also puts into perspective the
supposed secrecy of the CIA's efforts:

> We saw [the election] in 64 as kind of an acid test. You know the old
domino effect: we were terrified. I still remember the sense of relief in the
Alliance that he won. He was our strong preference, so we put our money
where our mouth was. But there wasn't any secret about it, about where
our aid money was going. And I think it was applauded by most of the
liberal side of the spectrum here in Washington.¹¹⁴

Accordingly, they did everything they could both openly and clandestinely to ensure a
Frei victory, though Rogers also added "Oh, no that's wrong: it wasn't everything we
could; we could have done a hell of a lot more. We were pretty restrained in what we
really did. But there was no doubt in where we saw our interests lie."¹¹⁵ Nonetheless,
Rogers disagreed with the assessment that the CIA was a major factor in the Frei victory.
Instead, he believes a combination of Frei's charismatic personality, the collapse of the
Democratic Front after Curico, and the continued candidacy of a defeated Durán which
led to this notable majority. Indeed, this opinion was echoed by senior State Department
Official Ambassador John H. Crimmins, who indicated in an interview that this opinion

¹¹² Telegram, Ambassador to SecState, # 372, 5 September 1964. [NARA: RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 14 CHILE]

¹¹³ FRUS Doc. 269.

¹¹⁴ Interview, William D. Rogers

¹¹⁵ Interview, William D. Rogers

58

was also privately shared by Bob Hurwitch, the Embassy's First Secretary: "He believed" said Crimmins, "that the [US] efforts had had a very marginal effect.¹¹⁶

But it most certainly *had* had an effect. Regardless of whether they had actually assisted the Frei candidacy, the universal suspicion arose in Chile that Frei was the US's man. Eduardo Labarca remarks: "*Lo cierto es que en la época del gobierno del presidente Frei, Washington se ha valido preferentemente, en su labor corrupta y colonizadora, de personeros democratacristianos.*"¹¹⁷ Habeas Corpus or not, plausible deniability simply does not matter when everyone comes to believe that the supposedly unproved allegations are true. The US had effectively, and with consent, undermined the credibility of the Frei government and the PDC by aligning too closely with them. The final word on this can be given to Jorgé Alessandri, the recently ex-President of Chile who would stand again for the Presidency in 1970. Meeting a US official several weeks after the inauguration of Frei, the former President noted:

> Chile was [an] over-politicised nation accelerating its plunge towards chaos ruin and inevitable military intervention... [the] PDC [is the] incurably muddled inefficient cutting edge for eventual open Marxist takeover which only armed force could and should and would stop, however much he lamented blows to Chilean democratic tradition.

> Frei could not change stripes (he implied that he regarded Frei as a Chilean Kerensky) and therefore independents would oppose Frei to the end, running their own candidate in 1970 even if it assured victory of FRAP and put communists in GO[C] At least such eventuality would trigger army intervention.

> He held USG largely responsible, not only for its direct actions, but for support it gave to such subversive organisations as ECLA [Economic Commission for Latin America] and FAO, for the imminent Chilean crisis.

¹¹⁶ Interview, John. H. Crimmins.

¹¹⁷ Labarca, p. 24.

59

Intellectuals surrounding President Kennedy had meddled ruinously in Chile.¹¹⁸

Such a damning—and, as it turns out, shockingly accurate—appraisal of the results of the US’s involvement in Chile likely fell on deaf ears.

¹¹⁸ Cable, Santiago to SecState, “President Frei Insisted”, 21 Dec 1967. [LBJ: Country File Box 14, Chile Vol V, Memos, 8/67-11/68]

DATE 2/03/04

CORR. FILE Gustafson, Kristian

ACTION: Alan Stape Dennis

Jessee (Theresa) Stephanie

Don Amanda Suzanne

COMMENTS:

Went w/ Saunders to Bahamas in
pouch on 2/6.

SUBJ. FILE

CROSS REF. Chile

STAFF MEMO

DC OFFICE:
Christie / Jody / Tiffany

INFO COPY TO:

ROUTE CC COPY TO:

TO BE FILED

Supporting the Moderates

# The 1969 Congressional Election

Kristian C. Gustafson

After the 1964 presidential election, the next significant U.S. operation in Chile took place in mid-1968 through to 1969: the manipulation of the Chilean congressional election of March 2, 1969. American activities in Chile in this period were not a continuation of any previous effort the Americans had undertaken there, and can be viewed as something of a fresh start. While the US had, through the CIA, undertaken missions to influence the Presidential elections of 1964, and the subsequent congressional elections in 1965, no operation had been maintained with the aim of preventing the dominance of the communist party in subsequent elections. This despite the fact that the political climate in Chile had not altered, and the chances of a communist victory had increased due to notable changes in Chilean demographics and electoral law. Throughout 1968-1969 the goal of the United States in Chile remained stable if simple: keep the communists from power. The various agencies in the US government responsible for Chile, however, were not able to adapt their policies in Chile to the growing radicalism of Chilean politics, nor could they in their minds easily abandon their old political allegiances to the increasingly communist and anti-American PDC. The American operation to influence the 1969 election therefore reflect a period of ambiguity and misunderstanding of Chilean politics. The efforts surrounding the 1969 election were haphazard and they progressed without and clear executive direction—a fact perhaps compounded by the handover of the lame-duck Johnson Administration to the incoming team of Nixon and Kissinger. Drifting along without significant executive-level input, both Ambassador (a State Department functionary) and CIA HQ provided conflicting direction, with neither side having a clear image of what strategic foreign policy goal they were pursuing. Furthermore, at critical points the CIA's political analysis was crucially flawed, misreading the impact their measures would have on the Chilean political environment. Likewise, disagreement between the COS and the Ambassador highlighted the differing political predictions of the various American players. The ultimate result of the confused American action was to actually split the anti-Marxist vote and contribute to an electoral environment that actually *favoured* Marxists in the period following the election. The hallmarks of the operation are a meandering mission, confused chain-of-command and insufficient executive control.

If the benefits were so small, so undeterminable, why was the US government willing to risk an operation in the first place? Covert action is, in the greater scheme of things, a war undertaken without the knowledge of one of the participants. Likewise, one does not initiate a war without some tangible goal. Was this war worth waging for the Americans? Did it have a goal? Examination of the evidence shows that the effort to influence the 1969 congressional election in Chile was a waste of time and effort, a procrastinating half-effort that compounded future troubles for American operations in Chile.

41

The Genesis of the Operation

The genesis for the 1969 election operation apparently came from the Ambassador, Edward Korry. He had approached the CIA Station Chief, Henry Hecksher, in late 1967 or early 1968 and asked him to request 303-Committee permission to undertake a "limited covert election operation aimed at Congressional elections."¹ The political arena seemed fairly clear to the US Embassy team during this period. On the conservative right was Arturo Alessandri's National Party. In the centre was the governing PDC, surrogate Democrats in Latin America. On the far left, were the constituent parties in the FRAP and, wavering between them and the government, were the Radicals, formerly centrists like the PDC but now moving into the Communist-Socialist orbit. The congressional elections, the CIA team imagined, could be used to stiffen the resolve of the PDC to resist the UP, while at the same time promoting moderate centrists within the Radical party as well as any other leftist party that had more democratic tendencies.

In May of 1968 the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, William V. Broe, in a meeting with State Department representatives, formally made the suggestion that the USG should attempt to influence the Chilean congressional elections of 1969, and by extension the Presidential Election of 1970. That they had to make a proposal to start such a programme for this election is telling from the point of view that the Embassy in Santiago had not made an effort to sustain any covert mechanism to influence the Chilean political system in which they had such great interest. Generally, this was because of a reduction in the size and number of covert operations as the sixties drew to a close. This scale-back had to do with budgetary concerns, as well as the beginnings of more public scrutiny of the agency. "By the end of the decade, internal concern developed over the problem of exposure for large-scale operations...Gradually, senior Agency personnel began to recognise the cumulative effect of long term subsidies to and associations with political parties, media, and agents overseas—a large presence invited attention and was vulnerable to exposure."² This is not to say that the CIA had not maintained any assets in Chile—it is clear that they did—but that the level of commitment had waned significantly from their effort in 1964. Yet, in the case of Chile the reduction in commitment originated from more than just a concern of general risk, but also out of confusion about the general political situation. In the last presidential election the choice had been very clear cut for the Americans: There was only one non-Marxist party that had any hope of beating the Socialist-Communist FRAP, and that was the PDC. The decision to subsidise the PDC as heavily as they did was an easy choice to make for the Americans, as the PDC, and their champion, Eduardo Frei, were icons to the American Democratic party. After having cleared the major hurdle of the 1964 election, the PDC was left to its own devices under the trustworthy hands of President Frei. It was assumed, perhaps due to a mistaken mirroring of the permanence of political institutions in the US, that the PDC could be relied upon to remain a bulwark of the Democratic-style social reform that

1

² Leary, P. 81.

42

Kennedy and Johnson had favoured. Politics in Chile evolved much faster than the US, however, and the PDC of 1968 did not resemble the PDC of even four years previously.

The Embassy staff was persistent if anything, and it was decided that the PDC should be the focus of their plan regardless. An old soldiers' maxim asserts that 'no plan survives first contact with the enemy' and in this case the maxim held true. The PDC was, in any case, the only party to which the US could actually make an open approach. The PDC, however, did not have the same view of their relationship with the CIA as the latter did with them, and the CIA did not receive a favourable response. "STA overtures," wrote one CIA officer "have evoked no response suggesting PDC leadership's election planning encompasses [a] role on any terms STA would entertain."³ The reasons for this had, for some time, been clear to many within the Chilean political environment, including President Frei himself. In January of 1968 Ambassador Korry had spoken at length with Frei about the PDC's current drift to the left, and he noted "High personalities in the PDC had argued...that some kind of broad popular movement [in conjunction with the Communist Party] was needed in Chile to assure the execution of PDC goals."⁴ Essentially, the PDC had ceased to be the reliable pro-US machine it had been in the past. Indications came from recent manifestos issued by the party, which showed that the moderate reformist President Frei was in a struggle for control of his party mechanism with a group led by the FRAP-friendly Radomiro Tomic. Of all the Chilean politicians aside from Frei and Alessandri, the US government and CIA had the most information on Tomic. For two years he had been the Chilean Ambassador to the US, and so had become quite well known, politically and personally in Washington. The CIA understood that Tomic was the representative of the new, vigorous left wing of the PDC. They knew of his ambitions to lead a broad leftist front in the next election, and dismissed his chances of doing so, for Tomic was "not trusted—let alone liked—by the other leftist parties...he envisions himself as leader of."⁵ As far as the Chilean right was concerned—in this case represented by National Party founder Miguel Otero—the right believed that "Tomic was *very* close to what Allende was saying. Only a very slight difference....I would say that Tomic would have been completely anti-American."⁶ The CIA no doubt understood this fact, for they wrote that the rise of the Tomic wing within the PDC "casts into more striking relief fundamental incompatibility of [Station/USG] role in support of PDC and PDC's dedicated travel of *via no capitalista*."⁷

Yet, for some reason, the CIA could not move past the fact that the PDC was the only party that offered an alternative to a Communist-Socialist front in the coming elections. The CIA's conclusion, announced in a DI 'Special Report', was that "in the absence of a strong Christian Democratic showing in the 1969 congressional elections, Chile probably will stumble along until a new administration—possibly with communist support—takes over in 1970."⁸ In March of that year a Board of National Estimates Special

³ Cable, Santiago Station to DCI, "Foll Not to be Considered", 8 August 1968.

⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, Ambassador Korry with President Frei, "Aboard Presidential Aircraft on route to Concepción," 3 January 1968. (DDRS)

⁵ Special Report Weekly Review, "Chile: A New Opening to the Left?", 12 April 1968. (DDRS 15/7/03)

⁶ Interview, Miguel Otero, Santiago Chile, 12 May 2003.

⁷ Cable, Santiago Station to DCI, "Foll Not to be Considered", 8 August 1968. (DDRS 15/7/03)

⁸ Special Report Weekly Review, "Chile: A New Opening to the Left?", 12 April 1968. (DDRS 15/7/03)

43

Memorandum titled "Chilean Problems and Frei's Prospects" stated that Frei was a lame-
duck President who could not control his increasingly left-leaning party. In view of the
hostility to the PDC in the conservative-dominated Senate, "there appears to be little
chance that he could secure passage of additional reform measures his [left-wing]
opponents within the PDC are demanding." The estimate further stated, "this could result
in the Christian Democrats losing to the Communist-Socialist coalition in both the
congressional and presidential elections."⁹ While in retrospect we know the conclusion of
the prediction was correct, but what about its premise, the need for a strong PDC?

Aside from the PDC there existed two other non-Marxist parties that the CIA
would consider for support. The first and most interesting of these was the Radical Party,
which had been part of the right-wing Coalition that elected President Alessandri in the
1958 Presidential race, but had been defeated by the PDC juggernaut in 1964. Yet, where
the PDC had been left to its own devices, the CIA had maintained collaborators within
the party and had been providing financial support to 'moderate' elements within it since
1964.¹⁰ To no avail, apparently, for in 1965 "the balance of power within the Radical
Party shifted and the left wing came to dominate... no possibility remained in the near
future to recapture the party."¹¹ With perhaps little head to warnings of 'good money
after bad' in July of 1967 the 303 Committee approved a programme to spend an
unspecified amount of money "in an effort to discourage the movement of important
elements of the Radical party toward a working alliance with the Communist party and
Socialists."¹² This was a fool's errand as the party continued to move left and seek
alliance with the FRAP. Nonetheless, in the debate about what to do with the Radical
Party, the CIA decided to maintain 'minimal' support for the PR in order to retain some
influence within the party. This might be a useful tool for the CIA, as the PR was
entering into informal cooperation with the FRAP, so continued influence in the PR
might give the CIA either information on the plans of the FRAP, or might perhaps serve
to cause some sort of vote-stealing split in the PR later on.¹³ It is notable that this was the
only party to receive US funds through this period, and perhaps serves as something of a
foreshadow for CIA relations with the PDC through the congressional election to the
presidency.

The second and more obvious party that the CIA considered was the National
Party (PN), the right-of-centre party that had elected the popular and very conservative
President Alessandri in the 1958 election. As it approached the 1969 Congressional
election, it appeared that Jorge Alessandri would once again seek the leadership of this
party for the crucial Presidential election in 1970. The CIA noted that this party was
basing its election strategy "exclusively...upon his undeclared Presidential candidacy."¹⁴
Nonetheless, the PN draws curiously little comment from the CIA in this period. For

⁹ Board of National Estimates Special Memorandum, "Chilean Problems and Frei's Prospects", 4 March 1968.

¹⁰ Memorandum, CWH/D to DDP, "Request for Renewal of Project", 20 March 1968.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Memorandum to File, INR/DDC Records, "CIA Operations", 1 August 1968. (State)

¹³ DI Special Report/Weekly Review. "The Popular Front in Chile as a Communist Path to Power", 2 August 1968. (DDRS 15/7/03)

¹⁴ Cable, COS to 'Director', "Foll not to be Considered", 8 August 1968.

44

some reason, and despite the fact that the PN polled very high and was seen as controlling most of the not-inconsiderable right-of-centre vote, the CIA cables do not reflect consideration of this party as a universally suitable alternative to the PDC. Drawn by their concern over the left, the embassy seemed to be ignoring the right.

## The Plan Takes Shape

The plan to influence the election began to take shape in June of 1968, a timing based on the fact that the parties would not select their congressional candidates until the autumn of that year. "It was decided" stated the CIA in a brief to the NSC, "that because the 1969 election might hold the key for 1970, an operation should be undertaken to help elect moderate candidates of the PR, PDC, and PN where it is decided, on the basis of hard information, that our support could be decisive."¹⁵ The Ambassador's election team had a massive piece of work ahead of them; there would be upwards of 750 listed candidates for 180 congressional seats.¹⁶ Korry, himself a JFK appointee, was very clearly of the camp supporting the PDC, and his tactics reflected his trust that this party would continue in its reformist approach in a manner that would benefit US (or Democratic?) interests. In view of the increasing leftward drift of the party, however, he felt that something had to be done to 'encourage' the PDC to refrain from supporting the FRAP. Moreover, Korry perceived the general trend that politics in Chile were abandoning the centre entirely, moving towards extreme-left and ultra-conservative, leaving no room for the gentle reformist. His idea was apparently simple: the Ambassador and his chosen staff would canvass the field of candidates from all the non-Marxist parties and would hand-pick a number of these candidates who appeared sufficiently 'moderate' to suit the American (Democratic Party? State Department?) political interests. These candidates would be chosen with no consideration to their parent party, merely on their own political merits and a rough system of triage: the chosen ones would be those moderates most likely to benefit from US support. Despite the PDC's drift left, or the Radical Party's confirmed support of the FRAP, candidates from these parties stood a chance of being chosen for American support based on their own political views. The programme, however, was not entirely without guile. Support would continue for one potential splinter group from the Socialist Party, the Popular Socialist Union (USP) in the express hope of drawing votes away from its parent party, and with the general hope of sowing discord in this most important FRAP constituent party.¹⁷ While it does not receive a lot of attention, and cables and memos regarding the topic are heavily excises, the support for the USP was considered of primary importance to the election program. The logic being that the USP candidates would draw votes away from the PS, splitting the left-wing vote and paving the way for the win of a PDC or PN candidate.¹⁸ The Embassy staff believed the entire plan was sound and was timed to provide a good start on the project. "By early planning, a country team setup, and

¹⁵ Memorandum for the Record, Briefing of Viron Vaky by DDP, 6 August 1968.

¹⁶ Memorandum, CWH/D to DCI, "Progress Report: March 69 Chilean Congressional Election, 4 December 1968.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ December progress report...cited elsewhere.

45

personal direction from Ambassador Korry," wrote the COS, "significant results are
possible."¹⁹

Discussion on the embryonic plan began at a meeting between the CIA and the State Department on 24 May of 1968, and quickly seized on some of the tactical and political problems facing the CIA Country Team (CT) and the Embassy in the execution of the operation. As it appears, the CT was simply not positioned to provide all the information required by the Ambassador's team to choose the candidates. William Broe, Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, noted, "our biggest trouble at the moment was lack of information." Indeed, for the agency was considering appealing to "its European and Latin newspaper contacts for information about political temperatures in the Chilean hinterland; the sort if information on other words that our Embassy could not readily produce"²⁰ Moreover, the CIA did not have any ability to ensure that moderates were chosen by their parties as candidates in the first place; Santiago had already determined that this was impossible, for the system was too complex, and the Station "lacks sufficiently detailed intelligence to second-guess party decisions/deals" nor, they admitted, "does the STA have covert political muscle to impose its will."²¹ In addition to lack of information and covert leverage, however, the State Department official present, one Mr. Sayer, brought up a serious issue of command and control: who would be choosing the candidates, and by what criteria? Being informed that it was to be the Ambassador directing a team of CIA and Embassy staff, Sayer posited that the principal difficulty "would be to get the Ambassador to be specific enough to give us a fair idea of exactly what he wanted to do and how we would go about it."²² While it is clear that the State Department was not entirely convinced by the plan—nor by the "inadequate" quality of the CIA's staff-work—they gave the CIA and Ambassador the benefit of the doubt and gave State's endorsement for further planning by both agencies.²³ "The ARA agrees with the objectives of the proposal program" wrote State Department officer Covey T. Oliver, adding that he thought the CIA's tactics were sound and that "the survival and health of [these democratic, reformist] forces is desirable and congenial to our interests."²⁴ The programme was recommended to the Assistant Secretary of State with no reservations. Accordingly, the incomplete plan moved forward along the approval process and, with the basic support of all the agencies involved, was approved by the 303 Committee, with a budget of $350,000, on 12 July 1968,²⁵ stating that the support given to moderate candidates would be made "in an effort to brake the leftward drift toward a popular front which threatens to engulf" the PDC and President Frei.²⁶ Nonetheless, it was noted that "the 303 Committee would be just as satisfied if we were

¹⁹ Memorandum, William Broe to DDP, "Request Approval of Project", 13 August 1968.

²⁰ Memorandum, INR/DDC, "ARA/CIA Meeting 24 May 1964", 27 May 1968. (State)

²¹ Cable, Santiago Sta to DCI, "Foll Not to be Considered", 8 August 1968.

²² Memorandum, INR/DDC, "ARA/CIA Meeting 24 May 1964", 27 May 1968. (State)

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Memorandum, ARA-Covey T. Oliver to Ambassador Bohlen, "Chile: Assistance to Congressional Candidates", 5 July 1968. (State)

²⁵ Memorandum, CWH/D to Director, Office of Planning, Programming and Budgeting, "ref: Minutes of 303 Committee", 1 August 1968.

²⁶ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval of Project", excerpt of 303 Committee approval of 12 July 1968.

46

not involved in this election, even on a limited scale." This was hardly a ringing
endorsement of the plan, and a budget that perhaps reflected this enthusiasm.

The Plan In Execution:

Both the CIA and the State Department moved forward with the plan that had
been agreed upon, but it would not be long before they were not reading off the same
sheet of music. While the CIA had been relatively clear on what the tactics of the
operation would be, there was soon divergence between the 303 Committee and the CIA,
between the CIA and State Department, and within both departments, as to what was the
overall intent of the mission. As far as the State Department understood it, the object of
the proposal was to:

Promote the election in 1969 of the greatest possible number of moderate senators and deputies in order to maximise effective opposition to the popular front candidate in 1970 and to create a body of moderates who could act as a restraint on the policies of any popular front president, should one be elected.²⁷

This diverges by a few degrees from what the 303 Committee stated in its
approval note. Indeed, when briefed by William Broe in August of 1968, Viron P. Vaky,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, was told that the
operation would be undertaken, quite sensibly, "because the 1969 election might hold the
key for 1970."²⁸ The State Department, in its internal communications, added "The
rationale for this assistance, which is generally recognised as probably only the first
instalment, is that there is {Perhaps} at stake the survival in Latin America of the sort of
democratic reformism that President Frei represents."²⁹ This was closer, but again faintly
different, for while the 303 Committee talked about preventing the (short-term, tactical)
collapse of Frei's hold over his party, the State Department was here discussing the
(long-term, strategic) stability of Frei-style democratic reformism over all of Latin
America. While this would appear to be different only in style, enthusiasm and syntax of
expression, it is an important difference in that it shows the vastly different
understanding of both the scope of the operation and its overall intent. The cause is a
lack of a 'mission statement' sent from the executive level, telling everyone the object of
the operation. Some thought it was to be a precursor mission to the 1970 election, but as
things developed this would prove not to be the case. Regardless, as the plan moved into
execution the gap in understanding between all the organisations would grow greater still.

²⁷ Memorandum, ARA-Covey T. Oliver to Ambassador Bohlen, "Chile: Assistance to Congressional Candidates", 5 July 1968. (State)

²⁸ Memorandum for the Record, "Briefing of Mr. Viron Peter Vaky", 6 August 1968.

²⁹ Memorandum for the Record, INR/DDC, "CIA Operations", 1 August 1968. The word 'perhaps' is a marginal note. (State)

47

The 303 Committee, as stated when they approved the document, were not entirely interested in supporting an operation for the congressional elections, begging the question as to who was pushing the mission onwards. The answer, clearly, was Ambassador Korry. There can be doubts, however, that Korry really understood what was going, and this doubt was shared by the COS in Santiago. "I suppose one can feel fairly comfortable about Ambassador Korry's judgement and lack of experience in Latin America, even though he certainly cannot qualify as an expert on Latin American affairs", offered the COS. Moreover, because the selection mechanism was entirely in the ambassador's hands, any change in the Administration, and perhaps the introduction of a neophyte ambassador, might put the whole election mechanism into disarray.³⁰ An unanswered question might focus on the nature and strength of the Ambassador's political biases, and how they might affect his choice of candidates. More importantly, however, comes the question of overall focus. If the 303 Committee was disinterested, and the ambassador was pushing the mission, who was there to bring the two constituent departments, CIA and State, into concert on the intent and aim of the operation? The answer might be 'no one.'

A member of the election team sent the 303 Committee the first status report on the mission on the 3rd of September 1968. Very little was said, and the committee was told that "the lack of spic-and-span picture at this time is largely due to the fact that particular candidates are not selected until November, and the campaign gets under way only later in December."³¹ The first discouraging words to be uttered about the 1969 election programme, however, came only two weeks later. Though the full titles of the recipient and originator of the document are partially deleted, it appears that someone in the US wrote it to the Chief of Western Hemisphere division. A three-page long document, it argues at length that the entire operation lacks focus, is likely to produce negligible results, and is potentially embarrassing for the US. The author starts by admitting that though it was perhaps too late to do anything about the mission, stating he...

...should like to go on record as having serious reservations about the basic concepts underlying the proposal...By and large, the subsidies will go to individual candidates in the absence of any real indication of how they will use the funds, and without any control over the manner in which the funds are expended....the mere insertion of funds to individual candidates does not assure us of any positive results.³²

Furthermore, it did not appear that all the candidates selected for support would have needed support. Early estimates made of the PDC war chest indicated to the Station "that PDC's vigorous fund-raising drive yielding more than satisfactory results, (amounts as high as 2 million dollars have been mentioned). Come Nov 68, PDC campaign managers should be able launch (sic) campaign without overpowering financial worries."³³ If

³⁰ Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "I realize it is late", 17 September 1968.

³¹ Memorandum, to C/WHD for files, Extract of 303 Committee minutes, 3 September 1968.

³² Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "I realize it is late", 17 September 1968.

³³ Cable, Santiago Sta to DCI, "Foll Not to be Considered", 8 August 1968.

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money was not needed, then what was the point of giving the candidates money, and small sums of it at that?

On the other hand, it is clear that the National Party, as one example, was perennially short of money, and in 1969 "near bankruptcy" stated Miguel Otero.³⁴ One could argue that it was a waste of resources to give money to one organisation that was flush with funding, and which in any case was not sure to act in your interests while, at the same moment, restricting support of another organisation that was more likely to act in their interests and was short of money. Lastly, the writer of this cable did not like the way the operation was being run from a tactical standpoint, and thought it had a "more than normal flap potential." Simply, its mechanism of using priests as couriers "seems to raise more security problems than it solves"³⁵, for large numbers of these unknown quantities were required to sponsor the number of candidates to make it an effective operation, therefore inversely decreasing the security of the operation. Miguel Otero was sceptical of this funding mechanism as well, and said that there were individuals who bragged at the time that in working for the CIA, in either receiving money or moving it to candidates, they did not see the funds to an honest end; rather, "they pocketed it."³⁶ The drafter of the CIA cable may have had his suspicions, and was not enthusiastic about the operation, indeed much less enthusiastic than the lukewarm, perhaps disinterested 303 Committee. He wrote that: "In sum the proposed project appears simple, both in conception and execution. I would maintain that is deceptively simple and that it will come back to haunt us sooner or later."³⁷ This not-so resounding endorsement for the operation is wonderfully dramatic foreshadowing of subsequent operations in Chile.

This dissenting cable appears not to have had any effect on the progress of the operation, and as it proceeded the conflicts and contradictions brought up by the plan continued to flourish. In mid-October, the Chief of Western Hemisphere division was given a memorandum explaining a State Department's paper designed to brief the incoming Nixon administration about the problems relating to Chile. The CIA would have a chance to review this paper a few days later, on October 18th, and (the DDP? DCI?) wanted Western Hemisphere's views and consent on a few issues. First of all, they wished to agree with the State Department that the aim of the entire US policy towards Chile, both overt and covert, was "to keep both the Chilean Presidency and Congress free of Marxist control."³⁸ On the other hand, they disagreed on the aim of the Congressional election operation's intent, contradicting State's (and Western Hemisphere Chief William Broe's) apparent belief that this mission would effect the 1970 Presidential election. First disagreeing with the view that the Christian Democrats could somehow control both houses of the Chilean Congress after the 69 elections, the drafter of the memorandum posited that even "this would not substantially reduce the prospect of a FRAP victory in 1970 (40% FRAP/Radical vote vs. 60% remainder, which split.)".³⁹

³⁴ Interview.

³⁵ Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "I realize it is late", 17 September 1968. The indication that it was priests being used as couriers comes from the CEP interview with Ambassador Korry.

³⁶ Interview.

³⁷ Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "I realize it is late", 17 September 1968.

³⁸ Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "State Draft Policy Paper on Chile", 17 October 1968.

³⁹ Memorandum, From unknown to C/WHD, "State Draft Policy Paper on Chile", 17 October 1968.

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Calling into question the suitability of the PDC as the American's choice party in Chile, and the continued American support for them, the memorandum went on to argue that the overall party-outlook of the PDC in terms of the 1970 election was more important than the outcome of the congressional elections. "The point will be made that [the current] strategy runs counter to US objectives," and that this point needed to be made quite clear.⁴⁰ Nonetheless, the CIA was directed to still move money to the PDC, in hopes of fortifying that party's moderates, despite the fact that continued support for the Radical Party through the first years of the Frei presidency had not stopped that party from moving to a type of alliance with the FRAP. This left the National Party as the only non-Marxist party in the upcoming election, and Alessandri as the only non-Marxist candidate. So what did the 303 Committee make of all this? "On the negative side...his candidacy would split the democratic, anti-Marxist vote should be a three-way presidential race in 1970 as now seems possible."⁴¹ It was not the pro-FRAP PDC that would be the problem in the 1970 election, but the conservative PN, the only remaining party not to have some designs for an alliance with the FRAP. Old habit dies hard, and the US had been supporting the PDC for a long time.

In preparation for the visit of Ambassador Korry to Washington on November 20th, 1968, for consultations with the White House, as well as with the DCI and C/WHD, the latter sent a cable to Santiago outlining its briefing notes that it planned to go over with the Ambassador. It begins by pointing out that the 69-election operation was never designed to be more than a 'minor' covert part of a total overt US government diplomatic strategy aimed at preventing the rise of Marxist power in Chile. The posture would be to support moderates from all the non-Marxist parties "in absence of a clear-cut choice [of Presidential candidate] for 1970 which is the real test facing the US in Chile."⁴² Developments pointed out in the progress report in early August, however, brought this strategy into question, specifically the fact that the PDC was now under the control of Tomic to a degree that was indisputable and, furthermore, that the support to the Radical Party, which had been going on since 1967, was going to a party that had to be considered "as hostile [to US interests] and in pursuit of an alliance with the FRAP."⁴³ Conversely, Alessandri was now clearly the PN's candidate for the 1970 election, and was exerting influence on them. Western Hemisphere HQ then began to draw its conclusions. First, it said the "election program is now basically [PN]-oriented by virtue of both the preponderance of financial support we will provide...and the propaganda climate." More critically, however, the HQ's cable made one statement that seemed to suggest the unthinkable for Ambassador Korry, for it suggested "We are building what might eventually become a pro-Alessandri machine for 1970."⁴⁴ Worse, the cable did not suggest that this was a bad thing.

⁴⁰ Ibid (17 October).

⁴¹ Memorandum, CWH/D to DCI, "Progress Report: March 69 Chilean Congressional Election, 4 December 1968.

⁴² Cable, C/WHD to Santiago Sta, "In Preparation for Amb's Visit", 14 November 1968.

⁴³ Ibid. (14 Nov 1968)

⁴⁴ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Sta, "In Preparation for Amb's Visit", 14 November 1968.

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To this point, it appears that none of the major players involved in the election
operation—Ambassador, State Department, Santiago Station, CIA WHD, and the 303
Committee—really had a clear idea of what was the unifying aim of the mission. Was it
to prevent a communist dominated congress, or to prevent a communist President?
Would this be achieved by the support of moderates, even when those moderates
belonged to FRAP-associated parties? The Station's rebuttal to the last cable, however,
was not based on these questions but on questions of practicality. The Station did not
agree with HQ's logic, "particularly that our modest Ops machinery could either
influence or significantly benefit possible Alessandri candidacy in 1970." This, the
station argued, was because "both financially and in terms of number of persons involved
[the mission] continues [to] be minor part of total US govt package..."⁴⁵ Their operation
was simply too small for them to be considering the scope of their operation as including
the presidential election. The Station's outlook, by force of resources, was distinctly
short-view. As it filtered its way up the chain-of-command, however, the message
became a bit diluted. Perhaps, as it turned out, the 69 election would not directly effect
the outcome of the presidential election, as was stated in August 1968. Perhaps it had
been mentioned earlier that "the 1969 election might hold the key for 1970"⁴⁶ but really,
the DDP wrote to the DCO, "The program for 1969 was designed to be limited in scope
and flexible in political terms, thus leaving all options open for the 1970 election."⁴⁷ The
Election operation changed colour, if not shape, once again.

The confusion about what was going on in Chile could not have been helped by
the input from Ambassador Korry. It is unclear where Korry truly stood with regards to
his support of the PDC and its leading contender, the left-leaning Tomic. The
aforementioned Mr. Sayre of the State Department had commented in May of 1968 that
"he felt he detected in Korry's correspondence and attitude hostility to former
Ambassador Tomic" which would be alright in consideration of Tomic's left-wing
views.⁴⁸ The Station perceived the opposite, and mentioned later that year that "There is
a difference in outlook between the Ambassador/Embassy and the Station, the former
being inclined leftward towards the Christian Democrats and Tomic and the latter
inclined right-of-centre towards the nationals and Alessandri." (This disagreement, they
noted, did not impair the Station's "fine relationship with Ambassador Korry."⁴⁹) In the
same month, "The Ambassador...made it abundantly clear that he lines up with President
Frei and the Christian Democrats...he gave the impression that Tomic is out and that a
more moderate candidate...would rise as the party's candidate...the ambassador took
repeated swipes at Alessandri..."⁵⁰ This was despite the fact that the CIA had reported
that the most-likely presidential candidate for the PDC was Tomic, who had in August
ushered in a new directorate composed primarily of Tomic supporters, which had in

⁴⁵ Cable, Santiago Sta. to Director. "Station Agrees with HQS Briefing", 18 November 1968.

⁴⁶ Memorandum for the Record, "Briefing of Mr. Viron Peter Vaky", 6 August 1968.

⁴⁷ Memorandum, DDP to DCI, "Visit of Ambassador Edward M. Korry on 20 November 1968", 19 November, 1968.

⁴⁸ Memorandum, INR (William Trueheart) to Messrs. Hughes and Denney, ", 27 May 1968. (State)

⁴⁹ Memorandum, DDP to DCI, "Visit of Ambassador Edward M. Korry on 20 November 1968", 19 November, 1968.

⁵⁰ Memorandum for the Record, "Visit of Ambassador Edward M. Korry/ Working Lunch", 22 November 1968.

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October formally adopted Tomic's political strategy of an opening to the left.⁵¹ In light of his earlier comments, and this information, the note that "Ambassador Korry has been skilfully trying to perpetuate Communist distrust for Tomic by making it appear as though the US and Tomic have 'an understanding'"⁵² takes on a more conspiratorial tone. Ambassador Korry may not have been 'shooting straight' in all his dealings with the PDC and the CIA, and was perhaps ensuring the continued pre-eminence of JFK's favourite party before a more hostile Republican President Nixon took office. Korry's most recent remarks, in an interview with the Santiago-based think-tank Centro de Estudios Públicos, make his contemporary reports at the time all the more curious. There, in 1998, when asked why the PDC was supported after it had clearly gone to the left under Tomic, Korry responded with: "Why did we [support the PDC] at all? Because if we hadn't done it, the Democratic Congress would have been on my back in two seconds, as having reversed the Kennedy policy, taken it out...."⁵³ Was Korry pressured by some part of the Johnson administration to support Tomic and the PDC? There is no evidence for this, for the 303 Committee seemed untroubled by Chile, and even the State Department were unsure of supporting Tomic. While the contradictory information makes it unclear where Korry stood with regards to Tomic, it can be offered that the former was less than transparent in his dealings with this party. What can be stated with certainty is that these conflicting expressions, from the man who was responsible for the direction of the election effort, did not contribute to the mission in a positive manner.

## Selection of Candidates

Thus, it was with some conflict in aim between the main players in Chile that the election operation pushed on. While the operation had been inaugurated in July, there was little to report until the beginning December, when the parties had finalised their candidate lists (a complex matter under the *D'Hondt* electoral system). While it had been thought, originally, that upwards of 40 candidates would be selected for support, the realities of the Radical Party's communist tendencies, and concerns over some in the PDC, sharply limited the number of suitable candidates.⁵⁴ Thus, in the first week of December 1968, "in full recognition that the election program is a limited one which cannot in any significant way be expected to affect the prospects for 1970, that the Embassy/CIA election team approved ten candidates for support."⁵⁵ Within two weeks an additional five candidates had been added to the list. These fifteen candidates were from all three 'non-Marxist' parties, a list that still included the FRAP-allied Radicals, as well as the PDC and the conservative National Party. While the number of candidates from each party has not been released, it is firmly recorded that these fifteen candidates

⁵¹ Memorandum, C/WHD to DCI, "Progress Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 4 December 1968.

⁵² Memorandum, DDP to DCI, "Visit of Ambassador Edward M. Korry on 20 November 1968", 19 November, 1968.

⁵³ *Estudios Públicos*, 72 (primavera 1998). "El Embajador Edward M. Korry en el CEP", p. 19.

⁵⁴ Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC).

⁵⁵ Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Progress Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 5 December 1968. *Italics Added*. (NSC)

52

were moderates for whom additional covert support might make the difference between election and defeat.⁵⁶ Additional moneys were spent on propaganda to support the moderate candidates, and in support of the dissident USP in a vote-stealing endeavour—indeed, they would ultimately provide the splinter USP with up to one half of their campaign budget.⁵⁷ By December 26th, the election team had spent roughly one half of the approved total funding for the operation, or $175,000.⁵⁸ (This was, in an important foreshadow, the first briefing that Kissinger received on the topic of the US operation in Chile. It is also interesting to note that at this point, the DDP considered the election effort to be on the 'A-list' for having the highest "flap-potential" amongst all the CIA's covert operations at the time.⁵⁹) It would be unlikely if they found any more candidates than the fifteen (which were spread between the 150 Deputies and 30 of 50 Senate seats open for election) as the Station election team was having a hard time keeping grips on the political upheavals in Chile, and in the PDC specifically. The COS apologised that his reporting was "bereft of all insight" for "a significant section of the spectrum of events no longer registers on our [Deleted: 1 word) radar screen. To substitute speculation where facts are unobtainable strikes us as dangerous practice."⁶⁰ The Station's fifteen candidates, trimmed down to 12 by February,⁶¹ represented a small knot of moderate politicians within a much larger and very confusing political scene the Americans were grappling to understand. Through most of January and February 1969, there is little further traffic between Santiago Station and Langley: it is impossible to determine whether this is due to continued classification of these documents, or an actual lull in communications. Informed speculation might indicate a drop of communications volume after the candidates had been chosen and the campaigns begun, but this can only remain speculation.

## Propaganda Production:

Throughout the entire period of the political analysis and candidate evaluation the CIA was in fact carrying on an operation independent of the individual candidates, if united in general aim. This mission, directed at the production of propaganda for the Station, was also the only operation undertaken by the CIA in this period that had any continuity with previous CIA actions in Chile. While the CIA had ceased to support any party but the Radicals in the period after the 1964 PDC victory, they had carried on in the production of certain propaganda, albeit at a low level. Several cables and memorandum show the existence of propaganda efforts covering "anti-Communist...activities, mainly in the form of wall posters, leaflet campaigns and other similar street actions" dating back

⁵⁶ Memorandum, "Briefing Memorandum for Mr. [Deleted]", 17 December 1968.

⁵⁷ Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC)

⁵⁸ Memorandum, "Chile: March 1969 Congressional Election" (Hand written: "Memo to DCI to Brief Kissinger"), 26 December 1968.

⁵⁹ Memorandum, [Deleted] to C/WHD, "Covert Action Activities to be Covered...for Mr. Kissinger.", 19 December 1968.

⁶⁰ Dispatch, COS Santiago to C/WHD, "For Reasons Too Complex", 6 January 1969.

⁶¹ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Summary of Chilean Congressional Election Operation", 4 March 1969. The exact date that three of the candidates for support were dropped is not listed in the material.

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to the 1967 fiscal year and before.⁶² That this propaganda was considered important is made clear by developments through the 69-election mission: by the end of 1968, the CIA was noting that propaganda rather than selective support had become the primary thrust of the election operation.⁶³ The examination of this propaganda effort becomes interesting in light of the fact that it began as a separate effort, but was soon rolled into the programme of selective support. Of all its operations, the CIA holds its cards closest on those dealing with media and propaganda. For understandable reasons, the CIA does not want to have the reputation of being able to warp facts and sully the 'truth', nor does it want its particular methods and mechanisms known: there is a visibly higher degree of deletions from those CIA cables dealing with propaganda than those that deal with, say, political analysis of parties or their methods of supporting candidates. Evidently, the CIA considers well-placed propaganda to have a significant 'force multiplying' effect on its target audience. Accordingly, propaganda took a major role in the 69-election campaign that, as is noted, grew as the operation progressed. The propaganda mechanism developed for the 1968 fiscal year—which coincides with the beginning of the selective-support election mechanism—was a more sophisticated operation in organisation, production, and scope.

If propaganda became a very important aspect of the election operation, it did so in sharing the confusion in mission of the greater project. One can detect a slight confusion in direct intent of the mission, and several different explanations of it are given in cables. Overall, one cable says, the aim of the CIA's propaganda efforts was to promote moderate politics amongst "the leadership class and the opinion moulders."⁶⁴ Alternately, it was explained that the main thrust of the Station's "broad spectrum propaganda is plea to independent voter to exercise his vote...subsidiary function [is to] provide guidance to the uncommitted voter on how to choose among candidates the one best qualified to help steer Chile on course of moderation, eschewing summons to class warfare which in long run bound to lead to alteration of existing constitutional order."⁶⁵ Alternately, one could believe the cable that asserted "The propaganda woven into the daily radio news casts is designed to influence those vocal groups—public and private— which play a role in the political process of the country. Over the long run and aiming particularly at the Congressional election of 1969 and the Presidential election of 1970, the purpose is to [one line deleted]...to discourage an alliance of the democratic opposition to the Government with the FRAP."⁶⁶ One might take as the CIA's propaganda mission the statement of another cable, which believed that:

> By promoting an anti-communist climate, the objective is to curb growing radical tendencies among the Chilean populace and, more specifically, to create tensions between the Government and the Soviet Bloc representation in Chile...⁶⁷

⁶² Memorandum, Acting Chief, WH/[Deleted] to C/WHD, "Termination of Project", 23 April 1969.

⁶³ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Sta, "In preparation for Amb's Visit", 14 November 1968.

⁶⁴ Memorandum, CIA, "Propaganda Production", 12 March 1968.

⁶⁵ Cable, Santiago Sta to C/WHD, "Following Station Analysis", 11 Feb 1969.

⁶⁶ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval and Renewal", 12 Mar 1968.

⁶⁷ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval and Renewal", 12 March 1968.

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Lastly, one might take the mission to be as stated later on in the operation, in February
1969, which was a "plea to independent voter to exercise his vote and counteract present
state of lethargy (aggravated by distractions of summer vacation period) and repugnance
at Chile's party system as a whole."⁶⁸ The impact of this confusion may have been to
diffuse the effectiveness and focus of the messages that the CIA was trying to
disseminate, though some additional focus may have been given by the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in late August of 1968, thus providing a touchstone for materials aimed
at the doctrinaire, Moscow- and Havana-oriented Communist and Socialist parties.

If there was a slightly confused mission, however, this did not affect the crisp
functioning of the propaganda mechanism itself, as opposed to the message. In March of
1968, a full year before the election and months before the CIA's election mechanism
was brought into action, the Station in Santiago had established a 'propaganda workshop'
aimed at disseminating Station produced propaganda through all mass media
instruments.⁶⁹ This 'workshop', of unknown scale, was needed to meet the large amount
of propaganda demanded by the Station's media operations. The cost of the workshop is
also a guess. We know from other cables that a perhaps significant portion of the
$350,000 earmarked for the operation was going to 'media operations.'⁷⁰ We also know,
however, that none of this money was expended until sometime after mid-August,
meaning that the propaganda effort running until this time was operating on a much
smaller budget.⁷¹ Regardless, the propaganda machinery seems to have been very highly
developed. One memorandum reported that "Agency-prepared news-items and editorials
are inserted daily in the programs of [deleted: one word] radio networks. These comprise
some [deleted: one word] radio stations (of the 126 operating in Chile)" and that this
coverage reached the majority of the Chilean working class, who derived most of their
information from the radio.⁷² The Station also sponsored some programs directly, feeling
that these were sufficiently anti-Communist. In general, the propaganda attacked "the
nature of communism, PCCh attempts to subvert and/or divide other parties...and
implications of Czech invasion...", a very exploitable example of Communist aggression,
they believed. Furthermore, as with the selective-support actions, it was thought that the
"propaganda benefits moderates in PDC, PR, and PN without stressing support for any
one party." Yet, it was noted that "Propaganda must... be selective and sharp hitting
rather than massive because of limited amount of funds..."⁷³ The Station believed it was
handicapped by the election mechanism, which barred them from cooperation with any
political party, leaving them with an absence of "non-affiliated political mechanisms to
which propaganda can be attributed."⁷⁴ Some tailor-made propaganda, however, was
produced for the usage of the chosen candidates.⁷⁵

⁶⁸ Cable, Santiago Sta to C/WHD, "Following Station Analysis", 11 February 1969

⁶⁹ Memorandum, "Project [Deleted]", 12 March 1968.

⁷⁰ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval of Project," 13 August 1968.

⁷¹ Cable, Santiago COS to DDP, "As Required by the 303 Committee", 14 August, 1968.

⁷² Memorandum,

⁷³ Cable, Santiago COS to DDP, "Station Agrees with HQs Briefing", 18 November 1968.

⁷⁴ Cable, Santiago Sta to C/WHD, "Following Station Analysis", 11 February 1969

⁷⁵ Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC).

55

While significant paper was generated by this propaganda effort—sadly, the total number of articles placed is removed—a seemingly failed excision tells us the amount of money being spent on this propaganda effort. The sum is remarkably modest. From an initial funding approval in April of 1968,⁷⁶ an unknown increase was granted bringing the total to $16,780.⁷⁷ A parallel project, which supported “individual propaganda assets”⁷⁸ received an increase to bring its total funds to the lofty heights of $8,050.⁷⁹ (These were below the awareness of the 303-Committee, which by an unwritten rule only judged activities with budgets over $25,000.⁸⁰) While it is difficult to determine precisely, this project was most likely supporting an individual or individuals, most likely known freelance journalists or correspondents, who were placing propaganda onto a wire service for general usage. Numerous statements, describing the how and where the Station’s product was carried, back up this guess.⁸¹

A fairly clear picture emerges of the CIA's propaganda mechanism, though some conjecture is required. Desirous of producing a wide-scale propaganda campaign, the CIA established a 'workshop' that wrote articles and general editorial pieces for all three media (TV, print, radio). Simultaneously, the CIA maintained several correspondents, editors or free-lance journalists as its own media 'stringers' (these paid for by the two smaller operational funds). These media assets would then take the CIA media product (and, presumably, money) and place the pieces on a wire service for pick up by unwitting media outlets throughout Chile. Others would place it in editorial pages of papers and magazines as their own work, or place it over the airwaves via radio (and in TV, to a much lesser extent). Still again, articles could be seeded into foreign journals or news services controlled by the CIA, with the knowledge that CIA media assets could pick up these stories with full credibility. They could, the CIA notes proudly, even seed American propaganda through Communist press services, an operation technique that they thought added much credibility to their product.⁸² William Broe noted in a cable that since the CIA's propaganda product was 'salted' into material from other sources and carried as straight news rather than rightist propaganda, and "it does not usually draw any measurable or heated response."⁸³

CIA propaganda did make it on to the media in a widespread fashion, and we have CIA assurances that it was effective. Indeed, Miguel Otero's comments about the visibility of CIA propaganda show that it may have been fairly effective, if subtle. Otero noted "I didn't really see anti-Communist propaganda. That was made mostly through the TV, or the panels, or the radio, or people that were speaking in a forum or something like that. But that you would see on pamphlets or posters, against the communists...I

⁷⁶ Cable, Santiago COS to C/WHD, "Request Amendment", 31 May 1968.

⁷⁷ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Amendment to Station Santiago's Project", 29 May 1968.

⁷⁸ Memorandum, to C/WHD, "FY 1969 Renewal", 22 April 1968.

⁷⁹ Project Approval Notification, C/WHD Authority, 5 August 1968.

⁸⁰ Leary, p. 82.

⁸¹ Memorandum, William V. Broe to [Unknown], "Thematic and Effectiveness Data", 23 May 1968.

⁸² Memorandum, Unknown to Unknown, "Renewal of Project [deleted] (WH/Chile)", 3 March 1969.

⁸³ Memorandum, William Broe to [Unknown], "Thematic and Effectiveness Data", 23 May 1968.

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don't recall. There might have been, but I don't recall that it was important."⁸⁴ Overt, over-the-top anti-communist poster campaigns or pamphlets would have been clumsy and transparently American, as noted by Labarca's comments about the 'obviousness' of American propaganda in the 64 Presidential campaign. Television, print, and especially radio placement of articles critical of the communists would have been much more effective in the Chilean context of an advanced media environment—though this didn't stop the Americans from believing that they were better at producing their favourite "anti-Communist posters which darkly predict" the bleak results of a communist victory.⁸⁵ Regardless, close monitoring by the CIA team led them to congratulate themselves for a job well done, as their material was being "skilfully used, and the finished product compares favourably with material deriving from the international news services with which the items are frequently interwoven."⁸⁶ The Station was even able to produce in Washington "voluminous samples" of all the articles and broadcasts that it had originated.⁸⁷ As the cables note, however, the true impact of this propaganda campaign can never been determined: Chile had no established polling organisations, the CIA itself could not conduct scientific polling and, most importantly, they lacked information on public opinion outside of Santiago.⁸⁸ The subsequent un-answerable question is whether propaganda was the best use of the money granted the CIA for the congressional election mission.

## Election Results & Plans for 1970

On March 2, 1969, the Chilean electorate went to the polls and the result was, at least initially, pleasing to the CIA and those concerned in Washington. "According to initial reports" said a State Department memorandum, "the congressional election operation in Chile has been successfully executed." The report when on to state that ten of the twelve candidates supported had been elected, but most significantly the breakaway United Socialist Party, which the CIA had cleverly supported, polled 52,000 votes and had thus deprived the regular Socialist Party (PS) of about seven congressional seats, all of which were won by PDC or the PN, save one to the PR.⁸⁹ Clearly the operation had achieved its aims for, depending on one's methods of accounting, 17 seats had been denied to the Marxist parties. This was good news, many believed, and the congratulations were cabled from party to party. One cable comes from Ambassador Korry to the DCI, thanking him for the hard word of the CIA officers in Santiago. He congratulates the CIA, and comments that this small operation had an outstanding effect on the political climate in Chile. The ambassador wrote:

⁸⁴ Otero.

⁸⁵ Cable, Santiago Sta to C/WHD, "Following Station Analysis", 11 February 1969

⁸⁶ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval and Renewal", 12 March 1968.

⁸⁷ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Project Renewal for FY 1970", 20 February 1969.

⁸⁸ Memorandum, Unknown to Unknown, "Renewal of Project [deleted] (WH/Chile)", 3 March 1969.

⁸⁹ Memorandum for the Record, "The Chilean Congressional Election of 2 March 1969", 4 March 1969. (Marginal Ink Annotation: 'Acc@ #980643000012, Safe A-2, Drawer Box 19'). See also Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC)

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I would appreciate the 303 Committee being informed of my great appreciation for the excellent contributions to US goals in Chile by the first rate contribution of the COS and his colleagues...I am persuaded that we had a maximum impact in electoral terms for modest resources employed and that we benefited greatly from carefully selected multiplying-effect choices...⁹⁰

Not everyone believed that the operation should be celebrating its success. If the missions' stated aim had been to support a political climate of moderates for the 1970 election campaign, or to act as a 'break' on any popular front leader elected in 1970, then it was not as successful as some thought.⁹¹ A document submitted to the 303 Committee noted that the CIA thought their operation had been a limited one—it did not spend its entire $350,000 budget⁹²—which had achieved limited objectives, and could not be celebrated as a major victory over the forces of Marxism⁹³ In the post-election wrap-up, even Korry was shocked into admitting that “the Chilean Right, born by a resurgent wind of Alessandrism, rose...to a strong vote that cut deeply into the strength of President Frei’s Christian Democratic Party.” While the PDC was still the largest vote getter, Korry admitted, “the facts remain that is has suffered a grave defeat.”⁹⁴ The 303 Committee, in a rare burst of attention to Chile, produced a direr verdict on the operation. The minutes of the meeting record:

> In the total picture, however, it should be realised that Chile's political moderates suffered a clear setback in the 2 March 1969 elections. What happened was a movement toward political polarization with the conservative right and the Marxist left coming out the greatest beneficiaries. In the present political climate the Communist-Socialist front would stand perhaps an even chance of victory for the presidency.⁹⁵

This reality seems to have caught up with the Ambassador. Speaking to the CEP in Santiago in 1998, Korry had changed his opinion from his on-the-record celebration of the mission of the operation in a dramatic way. When asked to elaborate on the process and success of the election operation, Korry expresses doubt about the effectiveness of the operation overall:

> ...we did the minimal that would hurt and was targeted very specifically not at any one party, but to where possible a little amount of money would defeat a Unidad Popular candidate.

So it went to all sorts of candidates of all persuasions, not many of them, it had a so-so effect, we never will know whether it had any effect.

⁹⁰ Cable, Ambassador Korry to DCI, 7 March 1969.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC)

⁹³ Memorandum, Proposed Agenda, Meeting of the 303 Committee, 15 April 1969. (NSC)

⁹⁴ Cable, Santiago Station to Director, "The Chilean Right", 3 March 1969.

⁹⁵ Memorandum, NSC/303 Committee, "Final Report: March 1969 Chilean Congressional Election", 14 March 1969. (NSC)

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But some of the people we supported did get elected, some of the people we opposed did not get elected, and the total of that was minimal, because with a hundred, say a hundred and fifty thousand dollars to spread among twenty or thirty people, it can't be very much, not even in this country, and moreover not one candidate knew he got it. It was delivered by priests, I don't know who, by all sorts of people.⁹⁶

Eight months of CIA work, and close to a third of a million dollars spent, thus was productive to a degree that no one can measure with any degree of certainty. The congressional election operation mechanism, it turned out, would not be maintained. When the COS in Santiago requested a renewal of budget and permission to look for new contacts to effect the upcoming presidential election—itself now 8 months away—he was rebuffed. A cable from Langley stated: "While we appreciate the reasons to project operational thinking and planning beyond 2 March 1969, it is felt that it would be best to wait for the results and the post-election assessment before taking any action which might imply [Deletion: 1 word. 'USG'?] commitment to a [deletion: 1 word]-type undertaking in 1970." The COS was free to keep up his contacts, but had no funding for further operations until a new operation mandate was given.⁹⁷

## Too Little Too Late?

When taken together, the propaganda effort and the assistance provided to moderate candidates provide an interesting if confusing image. What, precisely, was the American goal in both of these operations? What was the overarching *intent*? And what end-state was envisaged? The trouble with the 1968 operation is that there was no unifying political control over the effort. While the mission was important enough for the CIA to give it 'A' listing for 'flap potential,' it was basically not considered to be an important mission from the point of view of the policy makers. This is not to say that they did not give it their proper intention. Quite to the contrary, they took bi-monthly reports on the mission. Yet, there is no evidence of direction being given to the CIA or the State Department (and so to the ambassador) about what the executive branch of government hoped to get for the $350,000 they were willing to expend. One might say that the goal was 'to keep the communists from power' but this does not fully qualify as a mission. While all parties implicitly understood that the ultimate goal was to keep the FRAP-candidate from winning the 1970 presidential election—numerous documents cite this as the reason for starting the 1969 election operation—at no point does any higher authority explain how the smaller operation will link with the bigger intent. Ultimately, we see that the operation cannot possibly help the process of the 1970 election; it is simply too small and too restricted. This left each organisation, primarily in this case the Ambassador and the CIA Country Team, to situate the mission as they felt best. In failing to provide direction the 303 Committee, which was apparently (and appropriately) more concerned with affairs in Vietnam, as well as the Soviet invasion of

⁹⁶ *Estudios Públicos*, 72 (primavera 1998). "El Embajador Edward M. Korry en el CEP", p. 19.

⁹⁷ Cable, C/WHD to COS Santiago, 19 February 1969.

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Czechoslovakia, dropped the ball.⁹⁸ The result was eight months wasted in supporting a party—the PDC—that the CIA thought was communist, while it could have been eight months spent supporting the pro-American PN under Alessandri, who in any case everyone but Ambassador Korry thought was the most likely candidate to win the upcoming presidential election. Had the executive promulgated a clear objective, a mission clearly attached to a greater US foreign policy goal, the mission would either have been fully resourced and more successful; or it would not have been carried out at all, for lack of any ability to alter circumstances.

Politics clearly effected the execution of the mission. The PDC had been a darling of JFK and the Democratic Party, and the current Democratic administration was loath to give up on its old stand-by of non-communist reform. This despite the fact that the PDC was coming closer and closed to the communist left, while the favourite but lame-duck President Frei was unable to influence his party. The State Department was still committed to its policy of propping-up the moderates, long after the moderates in Chile had gotten off the fence and chosen sides. No one, for some reason, was willing to support the only party that was actually pro-American, Jorge Alessandri. Meanwhile, the CIA, unable to push a coordinated agenda of what it wanted to do, and without a clear mandate or mission, was left by want of alternative running a small mission with a small aim, while bigger concerns were left unanswered. As Chilean historian Joaquin Fernandois has stated, "Korry insisted on very attentive observation (and intervention) in Chile, and the CIA assisted him discreetly, but the CIA still undertook operations that Korry believed were absurd. On the other hand, the State Department considered the threat minimal, and thought that Korry was living too much in the spirit of the 'Cold War.'"⁹⁹ This is perhaps too simple a view of things. Korry was clearly, at this point, not working in a Cold War paradigm. More accurately, he was working in the paradigm of US party politics. Throughout the whole mission he seemed reluctant to abandon the PDC, the Chilean avatar of the US Democrat Party that was his home. This loyalty continued after it was clear that the PDC was not the pro-US reformist organisation it had previously been. Korry actually favoured a pro-Marxist party, hardly the actions of a cold Warrior as commonly depicted. Indeed, there needs to be a clear reappraisal of Korry's actions throughout his tenure as ambassador in light of his unwavering support for the PDC.

One may judge the wisdom of this operation by different standards. First, one might argue that it was too little too late. Support to a dozen candidates, most of whom were successful, might be considered a great success if one could judge for certain that they would have failed without the support. But with a maximum outlay of $30,000 per candidate, and apparently rarely in cash, it is uncertain whether these funds really contributed to their success, especially to a party (the PDC) which already had a plentiful election coffer in the millions.¹⁰⁰ In retrospect, did these ten candidates make a difference? The other view one may take is that in their assistance to the congressional

⁹⁸ Fernandois, *Chile Y El Mundo 1970-1973*, p. 285.

¹⁰⁰ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Summary of Chilean Congressional Election Operation." 4 March 1969.

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election, the CIA were 'cutting off their nose to spite their face' in that they continued to focus on the PDC as the main alternative to the Communist-Socialist front, ignoring the fact that in the upcoming Presidential election the PDC candidate would most likely have been inimical to US interests had he won, but more importantly that the continued strength of the PDC stripped support not from the Communist-Socialist bloc, but from the only candidate likely to defeat that organisation: Alessandri and his Partido Nacional. Instead of supporting a Right versus Left campaign, the US actually funded a Centre versus Right fight.

The choice between these views is one that requires one to judge the prescience of the CIA and State Department, and their motives for support in the first place. In the NSC's final report on the topic there is a hint of realisation that what the CIA had actually achieved was minimal, and showed an awareness of the erosion of any moderate position in Chilean politics. This erosion is the critical misinterpretation of the political scene in Chile. The CIA clearly understood that the PDC had drifted left, and they knew that the party mechanism was in the hands of pro-Marxists. Likewise, they knew that the PN was the party most likely to defeat the FRAP in any upcoming election. So the short-term goal of electing moderates to the congress made sense, but not in the long-term where the PN was the only party that stood a chance of defeating the Marxists in a Presidential election. By favouring the middle ground, the US was stealing potential support from the one party able to achieve the longer-term goal of keeping a Marxist president from office. In view of the political climate and direction of the time, the better choice would have been to provide strong support to the most important party for the US in the long-term, and that was the PN. Old party loyalties, and an ambassador that could not bury his bias, prevented this from happening.

Timeline

<table><thead><tr><td>Date</td><td>Event</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>24 May 1968</td><td>First CIA / State Meeting about Congressional Election</td></tr><tr><td>12 July 1968</td><td>303 Approval of election program</td></tr><tr><td>3 September 1968</td><td>First progress report. No candidates selected</td></tr><tr><td>5 December 1968</td><td>First ten candidates selected</td></tr><tr><td>27 December 1968</td><td>Second progress report. Half of $350,000 budget expended</td></tr><tr><td>12 February 1969</td><td>Final slate of 12 candidates for support.</td></tr><tr><td>2 March 1969</td><td>Election. Ten of the selected candidates win their seats, a further 7 Socialist Party seats denied by splinter party.</td></tr></tbody></table>