JAN 17 1969

Shadan Hojin Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan

Chiyoda Bldg Annex

No. 14, Marunouchi, 2-chome,
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo
Tel. 211-3161

CABLES: PRESSCLUB TOKYO

東京都千代田区丸ノ内
二丁目一四番地千代田ビニ别館
社団法人 日本外国特派員協会
電話二一一三一六二

January 14, 1969

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Center for International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I hope you will forgive my tardiness in sending you my very best regards for the new year, and more particularly, for your new appointment. Considering the way we discussed such matters in August, I hope that things measure up to the expectations which have come to surround your appointment.

Enclosed is an article you may have already seen. It points directly to these expectations that people, both here and in the U.S., have. I have wanted to tell you that every comment on which this article was based was made to me *before* your appointment, and in almost every case, on the initiative of the other party. Normally, I do not mention the fortunate circumstances that led me to meet you, and later to study under you, and thus I felt it all the more remarkable that people here would volunteer such striking comments about you. The article does not name specific people, largely because I did not think a general newspaper article need concern itself with specific names. But I assume you can imagine some of the people whom I have met here. In any case, I believe you have accomplished something almost unique in the field of Japanese feelings toward Americans, and I'm sending you this piece for what it's worth.

I also hope you won't mind if I write a few paragraphs of my own thoughts about U.S.-Japanese relations.

A profound nationalism and sense of superiority exists in this country, but it is still held in check by a variety of legacies, including guilt. Yet this nationalism and this sense of superiority fires all Japanese foreign policy, and particularly Japanese attitudes toward the U.S. Correspondingly, there is no anti-Americanism *per se*, even among the most radical elements of the student movement. The U.S. is the target of protests and latent protests simply by coincidence—because it happens to represent the outsiders who "imposed" themselves upon Japan and who are still doing so.

-2-

Since the beginning of the "progressive" period of American diplomacy, i.e., since Ambassador Reischauer arrived, U.S. policy toward Japan has represented a compromise between two schools.

One school, led by the usual military people but also including some old State Department hands from Occupation days, believes that Japan is a country whose resources rightfully should be used by the United States and denied to other important powers. This school also believes that Japan's politics can be nudged along by the United States, and that Japan's political leaders actually want the U.S. to nudge them along (so they can blame their own policies on this nudging). Somewhat contradictorily, this same school also believes—at the same time—that Japan's relationship to the U.S. is highly tenuous, and so a bird in the hand is worth whatever the Japanese have in store for the bush, which won't be much. In military terms, this translates into the idea that free use of Okinawa today and tomorrow is worth a lot, since the day after tomorrow, if the Japanese have their way, the U.S. won't have any use of Okinawa at all. This school advocates a "might-as-well-get-it-while-we-can" approach.

The second school, represented by Reischauer, his young-turk disciples in the State Department, and a few military men who have some special expertise or experience in dealing with post-1955 Japan, believes that the U.S. should <u>exercise</u> de-escalate its ties with Japan and give Japan more rope. This school believes that in objective terms (such as the "balance sheet" Philip Quigg proposed in his <u>Foreign Affairs</u> article), Japan and the U.S. have convergent interests, and that to preserve these convergent interests in the face of an understandable rise in Japanese nationalism, the U.S. ought to take steps to remove Occupation-period legacies such as Okinawa, and do this quickly. Translated into concrete policies, this school opposed the Navy's desire to have nuclear submarines make rest-and-recreation visits to Japan; it favors giving Japan administrative rights over Okinawa, without American storage of nuclear weapons there and with American forces there subject to use with prior consultations with Japan.

This second school, which is more knowledgeable about Japanese internal politics than the first, recognizes the fundamental reason why the leftwing opposition continues to get as much mileage as it does—namely, the leftwing has the current monopoly on Japanese nationalism. The governing conservatives, by always appearing to compromise with the U.S., forfeits the right to pure nationalism to the leftwing, and lately, to the Komeito. Even when the conservatives do push the U.S.—on Okinawa, for example—the opposition gets credit for <u>pushing</u> having pushed the conservatives into doing so. In short, the second school wants to accomodate what it considers are antiquated and improper U.S. interests with what it considers are highly worthwhile future U.S. interests—namely a close "partnership," as they sometimes phrase it.

-3-

The main difficulty with the ideas of the second school is that they assume Japan will also see these same convergent interests. To be sure, there is an internationalist group in Japan, made up of the Tokyo University crowd (Finance Ministry, Trade Ministry, trading firms, English-speaking businessmen, and many conservative politicians), who do believe that Japan's long-term interests lie in cooperating with the other advanced, and as they sometimes put it, "civilized" countries of the west. But this position is hard to sustain—much as the concept of "building-bridges" to Eastern Europe is a policy that one never shouts from the housetops in the U.S. For against this internationalist trend is an East Asia trend—a group that believes Japan should stop coddling up to foreigners and stake out a dominant and sustainably independent position in East Asia. This group includes rural politicians; non-English speakers; gutsy, emotional romantics who like a lot of destiny; and the pro-China lobby in the conservative party. And these divisions between internationalist and East Asia cut across party lines. Furthermore, instinctively the Japanese do not believe there exists anywhere in any facet of life a relationship of equals, let alone a "partnership" as that word is defined in the U.S. There are instead superior/subordinate relationships of cooperation, and there are winning or losing relationships of confrontation. This explains why the left must take a confrontation picture toward the U.S.; since it abhors the subordinate position, it has no where else to turn but to confrontation, however futile that may seem (the more futile the better).

What does all this mean? It means, first, that school number one would only accelerate a break in U.S.-Japanese relations, and make the break all the worse when it comes. It also means that school number two is letting its hopes and dreams (particularly Mr. Reischauer's personal dreams about Japan) get in the way of its analysis. Even the type of hands-off policy you recommend in the Brookings paper would have rough sledding—in the sense that even such <u>unrestrained</u> restraint as you suggest will probably not be enough to preserve U.S.-Japanese relations in their present form or close to it. Specifically, even if Mr. Nixon adopted your Brookings paper word-for-word, i.e., if he stopped talking about "burden sharing," if he actually sought to permit Japan to become an independent power center in East Asia, even then, Japan would cooperate with the U.S. on political matters only in the same fractious way it does now, if that much. Of course, the Japanese government will remain with the U.S. through the 1970 crisis, because that is the easiest way to ride out the crisis; and, to be sure, the U.S. government cannot switch policies in mid-stream and back out of the security arrangement on its initiative. But once the psychological barrier of 1970 passes, Japan will then turn rapidly to rearmament and to foreign policies distinctive from the U.S. In some ways, Japan's policy will resemble Diefenbaker's miserable "Canadianism," i.e., differ from the U.S. no matter what the merits of the case.

-4-

What I think this long description suggests is an argument for de-escalating U.S. relations with Japan—but with a different goal in mind from Mr. Reischauer's goal. Instead of seeking an unattainable "partnership," the U.S. should allow Japan to become the dominant power in East Asia, and assume (or risk) that the Japanese will at least have learned one thing from their war: They lost, and they shouldn't take on the U.S. again. If the U.S. gets out of Japan's way, and gives them no issues on which to oppose the U.S. directly, then the risk is small. If, on the other hand, the U.S. stays in Japan's way, the likelihood of convergent interests is small, and the likelihood of enmity rises accordingly.

My views are considered radical, impolite, and unsubstantiated by present evidence. Such criticism is valid—for there is no present hard evidence; there is only hunch. It is worth noting that most criticisms of this extreme argument come from people whose optimism the argument is attacking. Also, the embassy tends to take a legalistic view of essentially emotional politics. For example, the embassy is fond of saying that there is no legal connection between Okinawa and the Security Treaty, or that the present treaty was not "imposed" on Japan like the one in 1952, but negotiated in 1960 freely by both countries (and some argue, convincingly, that the 1952 treaty wasn't imposed either). But however right these objections may be, the Japanese are unaware of them or ignoring them. Ambassador Johnson, who is aware of the dangers of smothering allies and who does not need to be reminded about the possibility of a resurgent Japan, is more careful about these things. But even he mentioned the other day that the Japanese are schizophrenic toward the U.S.—they are impatient with being subservient, but they still ask him to tell them what the U.S. expects them to do, he says. He laughs this off as evidence of continued Japanese adolescence. But it is no such thing; it is really just more frustration that, when it eventually comes out, will come out all the harder if the U.S. continues to let Japan use the U.S. as a crutch. Also, the American section of the Foreign Ministry is truly pro-American, but they are the only ones in Japan who are; they are also the people the U.S. diplomats deal with most frequently.

I hope this letter hasn't been too long. More than that, Anne joins me in hoping very much that you will find things manageable and rewarding in the deepest sense in Washington.

Again, our very best regards for the new year,

Japan Likes Choice Of Kissinger

By Thomas Pepper

[Sun Staff Correspondent]

Tokyo, Dec. 3 — The appointment yesterday of Henry A. Kissinger as special assistant to the president for national security affairs is unexpectedly good news here.

Mr. Kissinger, a 45-year-old political science professor at Harvard, commands an almost unprecedented degree of respect from Japanese intellectuals of all camps.

His views on military strategy are considered among the most provocative in the world, and his approach to American-Japenses relations is considered refreshingly detached from the usual American pleas for constructive co-operation.

No Ax To Grind

Furthermore, because of his frankness in private discussions with Japanese, Mr. Kissinger is personally trusted as someone without an ax to grind.

The appointment comes after a month of hand-wringing speculation about President-elect Nixon's future Asian policies.

Whether in government, business, or intellectual circles, Japanese have not known what to make of Mr. Nixon. His general policy statements—both before and during the election campaign—have been too broad to indicate a definite trend.

For example, on Okinawa, Mr. Nixon has been quoted as saying that the island should be returned to Japan, but that the Japanese ought to make a greater contribution to regional

security. Since many Japanese define regional security in ways quite different from the United States, this hint that more Japanese military co-operation will be sought, in exchange for Okinawa's return, has been worrisome.

Worse yet, some Japanese have expressed fear that Mr. Nixon's advisers would be uninformed about Japan, and thus unlikely to appreciate what are considered special political problems in this country.

Mr. Kissinger's appointment will ease these fears. Although his contacts with the official bureaucracy are not that broad, his relationships to the younger intellectuals in their 30's and 40's are warm and numerous.

Intellectuals' Role

These same intellectuals are coming more and more to advise the Japanese government on policy matters. As in the U.S., they set up research institutes, hold conferences, and take part in newspaper and television debates.

For example, Mr. Kissinger had been scheduled to travel to Kyoto in January as participant in one such conference—a semi-official U.S.-Japan meeting on Okinawa and Asia.

Among Japanese professors and journalists who follow international politics as a full-time job, Mr. Kissinger is considered one of the few Americans who argue that the U.S. tends to smother its allies. Mr. Kissinger's book, "The Troubled Partnership," makes this point about

NATO, but Japanese consider it equally applicable to this country.

Appreciation Felt

In this same book, Mr. Kissinger appeals for American understanding of—if not agreement with—French President Charles de Gaulle's policy of an independent nuclear force. Since Gaullist foreign policy has a definite, if still subsurface, appeal in Japan, Mr. Kissinger's appreciation of the causes of French nationalism is taken here to signify a similar appreciation for contemporary Japanese nationalism.

Also, Mr. Kissinger has made his professional mark as a military thinker in the broadest sense, and his work has concerned Japan only incidentally. He is not among those American academics who specialize in Japanese studies as a separate field.

Members of the latter group, many Japanese intellectuals say, have careers that depend on continued cultivation of Japanese friends and continued influence among important Japanese. Thus, some of these Americans are criticized for being manipulative and patronizing in their dealings with Japanese.

By contrast, these same intellectuals say, Mr. Kissinger exhibits none of this behavior, and is respected accordingly. As one high-ranking bureaucrat put it recently, with reference to the Americans who specialize on Japan, "I don't like to be treated like porcelain China."

N.Y. STUDENTS
DEMONSTRATE

High School Groups Protest
Make-Up Time 2d Day

New York, Dec. 3 (P)—Public high school students demonstrated by the hundreds today in a second day of organized protest against make-up time resulting from the recent teachers' strike.

In Queens, a group surged onto the subway platform of an elevated line and tied up service for 45 minutes by pulling an emergency cord on a waiting train, and climbing onto the tracks. Aboard a Times Square shuttle train, others sang and demonstrated but no damage was reported.

A fire in a clothes closet disrupted classes for 5,000 students at George Washington High School in upper Manhattan. Damage was minor.

Outside Maher's Home

About 450 youths gathered at Washington Square in Greenwich Village. Several hundred others marched outside Gracie Mansion, Maher John V. Lindsay's home; he was vacationing in the West Indies.

Another disorder broke out at James Madison High School in Brooklyn when about 500 youths broke school windows and hurled bricks and empty bottles at police. Two youths were arrested, and several policemen reported suffering minor injuries.

About an hour later, near James Madison, six youths de-

window and ran off with articles of apparel.

The student unrest failed to spark the vandalism that marked yesterday's demonstrations, when predominantly Negro groups assaulted teachers, hurled rocks and bottles at police and smashed windows in schools and damaged subway trains.

The student demonstrations followed announcement that the city's 900 public schools would open 45 minutes early each day, so their 1,100,000 pupils could make up for 35 school days lost during the strike of the 55,000-member United Federation of Teachers (AFL-CIO).

Students Hear Carmichael

New York, Dec. 3 (P) — Stokely Carmichael gave a lecture on "revolutionary violence" today to a group of students, including about 300 high school students who have been staging turbulent protests during the current schools crisis in New York.

Mr. Carmichael, a former

All kids stay free
at the
Hotel McAlpin
(Formerly Sheraton-Atlantic)
in New York City

head of the Student Non-Violent Co-ordinating Committee, is now prime minister of the Black Panters.

About 100 persons, mostly Negroes, heard Mr. Carmichael speak at the City University of

Give Her Her
A MANO SWARTZ FOR
BUY NOW AND
80th CH
FUR

MORNING

EVENING

SUNDAY

THE

SUN

THE A.S. ABELL COMPANY, PUBLISHER
BALTIMORE, MD. 21203

June 2, 1971

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger,
National Security Council,
The White House,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Henry:

Anne and I hope that you are well, and that, in the end, the pace is really not quite as bad as it is described.

We are back in the states on home leave for about six months. We're living in Columbia, Md., mainly because I'm to work partly in Baltimore and partly in our Washington bureau.

We're scheduled to return to Tokyo in the fall for another two-year tour with The Sun.

I know that your schedule is always full, but if--at your convenience--you do have time for a chat, it would of course be wonderful to have the chance to talk with you again, particularly about Japan.

Enclosed are some pieces I wrote after a month-long trip through Southeast Asia.

In the meantime, our continued good wishes, and warmest personal regards.

RECEIVED
NOV 1 1971
CENTRAL FILES

MORNING

EVENING

SUNDAY

THE

SUN

THE A.S. ABELL COMPANY. PUBLISHER

BALTIMORE, MD. 21203

Comeback In Asia—II

Pacific Lands Ambivalent
Toward Ties With Japan

By THOMAS PEPPER

Sun Staff Correspondent

Singapore—Here and else-
where in “Pacific Asia,” the re-
action to closer economic and
political relations with Japan is
decidedly mixed.

The Japanese are not particu-
lary popular. At the same time,
they are not so unpopular as to
find their activities systemati-
cally restricted.

None of the 10 countries with
growing Japanese trade and in-
vestment is ready to toss this
aside simply because it is Japa-
nese. They need it too much.

If they do limit imports or
investments from Japan, they
do so as part of belt-tightening
policy against imports in gen-
eral, or as part of an underlying
caution against too much for-
eign investment of any sort.

Admire Japan

Asian intellectuals—and some
men in the street—admire Ja-
pan for its ability to grow rich
and still preserve its own cul-
ture, minimizing Western influ-
ences on social and personal be-
havior. South Koreans, for ex-
ample, whatever their political
feelings against their former
colonial ruler, are busy copying
Japanese production, marketing
and personnel practices.

According to Koenan-
grat, an Indonesian anthropo-
gist, his countrymen are ambi-
valent about Japan.

He recalls being impressed
with the early Japanese military
victories over the Dutch colonial
government. "We Indonesians
learned in this way," he said in
a lecture in Tokyo, "that four"
white masters and the white
men in general were not by na-
ture superior."

"Quite Often Aggravant"

But, he added, referring to the
Japanese military police, "we
soon learned, however, the other
side of the reality, namely that
acting as masters and superiors,
the Japanese were even more
authoritarian, tyrannical and
quite often arrogant."

Nowadays, wartime images of
Japan have given way to im-
pressions of the Japanese as
hard-driving businessmen, re-
لتlessly single-minded.

"They're nice before they've
signed a deal," an Indonesian
businessman says, "but once
agreement is reached, they su-
denly become very tough. The
contrast is too great."

In an interview, Tunku Abdul
Rahman, former prime minister
of Malaysia, described the Japa-
nese as people who are "always
seeking their own short-term in-
terests, and they'll drop you
whenever it suits them."

Various Asian businessmen
complain that the Japanese dis-
play no hesitation in dropping
local sales agents at the first
sign of a business slowdown, or
in negotiating for a proposed
joint venture with five potential
partners simultaneously, rather
than one at a time.

Japanese who live in "Pacific
Asia," even those who speak
English or the local language,
generally work and live in en-
claves.

Japanese tourists also travel
in groups, led by a representa-
tive with flag and whistle, and
they rarely mix with local peo-
ple. "Japanese are clamorous,"
says a diplomat in Singapore,
"gregarious among themselves,
but insensitive to outsiders."

Deficient In Languages

A legendary deficiency in for-
ign languages is one reason.
Different social customs are an-
other. Japanese are repelled by
the idea of vigorous, face-to-face
debates such as found in Malay-
sia or Singapore.

Although Japanese occasionally
will high marks for their
knowledge, of Asian customs—
gift-giving, for example—their
lack of intellectual and cultural
talk with the rest of "Pacific
Asia" has hurt.

Most of the elite in Asia were
educated partly in Europe or the
U.S., acknowledges a Japanese
diplomat, "and they don't read
Kawabata or the Asahi."

A Thing Of Past

"We're both Asians, but we
don't speak the same language,
and we don't think the same
way," says Renoo Suvarnits,
secretary general of the Thai
National Economic Develop-
ment board.

On the political side, some of-
officials say Japan's "low posture
diplomacy" is already thing of
the past.

Indonesians charge the Japa-
nese with "bullying" in a fishing
rights dispute, and Malaysians
say that Japan used economic
threats to try to get Malaysia to
drop her claim over waters in
the Strait of Malacca.

"They're thumping the table
now, where 10 years ago they
would never have done so," ac-
cording to a senior Singapore
bureaucrat.

"The Japanese haven't
learned how to handle people.
When the Chinese finally do play
the game of international poli-
tics in a civilized way," he says,
"they'll run rings around the
Japanese."

"The top ambassadors from
Southeast Asia will be sent to
Peking, the No. 2 men to
Tokyo," he predicts.

Diplomats Disparaged

Others describe Japanese dip-
ломats as nothing more than
public relations men for the
trading firms, and in any case,
il-informed, cautious, and, ac-
cording to some Americans, na-
ive.

Unquestionably, some of these
critical comments about Japan
reflect simply another brand of
cultural elitism, the counterpart
to Japanese feelings of superior-
ity toward Asians poorer than
them. "Individually, we Viet-
namese are smarter than the
Japanese and Koreans, though
they have more discipline," say
Nguyen Ngoc Linh, a business-
man and sometime promoter of
South Vietnamese-Japanese re-
lations.

Also, the Japanese are a
handy whipping boy for politi-
cians. In Bangkok where 5,000
to 6,000 Japanese are more dis-
tinctly visible than in other cit-
ies in "Pacific Asia," the whole
question of Japanese trade and
investment is a domestic politi-
cal football.

Domination Foreseen

Bunchana Athakor, minister
of economic affairs, warns that
unless present economic pat-
terns change—forward more re-
strictions on imports and capital
from Japan—the Japanese will
come to “dominate” Thailand

politically. This means, Mr.
Bunchana says, "They can exer-
cise influence in asking us to
do something, and in getting some-
thing from us against our will."

Pote Sarasain, minister of na-
tional development and leader
of the group that welcomes
more Japanese investment in
Thailand, argues that this in-
vestment is mutually beneficial,
and controllable. It creates jobs,
raises incomes, boosts exports,
spreads technical knowledge
and, in the end, he and his sup-
porters say, it helps protect
Thailand against her most im-
mediate threat—a Communist-
directed insurgency.

Controls Expected

Besides, one brain-truster con-
tends, as long as Japan has no
significant military power, it is

no threat to Thailand, and if
Japan becomes a military power,
Thailand could do nothing
about it anyway. "That would
be the busines of the U.S., the
Soviet Union, and China, and
they would be concerned for
their own reasons," he says.

Some countries have tried
quietly to restrict Japanese eco-
nomic influence. The Philippine
Senate has spent 10 years delay-
ing ratification of a commercial
treaty with Japan.

Although his government puts
in periodic, formal pleas for
passage, President Ferdinand
Marcos acknowledged in an in-
terview that the delay gives the
Philippines additional safe-
guards against too much Japa-
nese investment.

Besides Mr. Bunchana, who
has made a specialty out of
faulting the Japanese, Mr. Ab-
dul Rahman, Lee Kwan Yew,
Singapore's prime minister, and
Adam Malik, Indonesia's foreign
minister, all have criticized Jap-
ananse aid, and have suggested
more generous alternatives.

To some extent, Japan has
responed positively to such criti-
cisms and sensitivities, but she
also has noticed—particularly in
the Thai case—that she has be-
come a natural target for politi-
cians and journalists. The mood
in Tokyo now is to take people
like Mr. Bunchana less seriously
than when he first raised a
storm early last year.

Varied Responses

And why not? Most countries
in "Pacific Asia" have no real
policy for coping with Japan's
expanded economic and political
interests in the region. Some
have actively encouraged this
expansion, all are trying to get
what they can from it and, if
any governments are seriously
worried about excessive Japa-
nese influence, for the present
they are just hoping for the best.

In part, officials are too busy
with internal problems. In part,
they hope—or expect—that the
U.S. will retain air and naval
bases in the area indefinitely.

All would welcome more
American and European invest-
ment, even though by volume,
U.S. investment far exceeds
Japanese investment.

Premature Threat

In part, officials feel that Ja-
pan will not be a military power
in the orthodox sense of the
word until at least 1980. Thus,
they treat the question of threat
from Japan as premature.

Besides, as Mr. Malik put it, if
Indonesia had to choose between
close relations with Japan and
close relations with China, she
would choose Japan—because,
he said, Japan does not meddle
in domestic politics.

MORNING

EVENING

SUNDAY

THE

SUN

BALTIMORE, MD. 21203

Comeback In Asia-III

Japan Plays Politics For Profit

By THOMAS PEPPER

Sun Staff Correspondent

Tokyo, March 15-Japan is slowly trying to establish a ring of "allies" around the eastern rim of China.

So far, the effort has been extraordinarily vague by American standards, or, as an Australian characterizes it, "very woo-ly."

Vagueness Is Necessary

Yet with good reason. Since anything more definite would heat up the opposition at home and abroad—and the opposition is mainly at home—the vagueness of the maneuver is one prerequisite to its success.

By reputation, Japanese are playing the game of Asian politics only for business.

From their paneled, air-conditioned offices in every Southeast Asian capital, banking and trading firm representatives are beating the bushes to cultivate particular politicians or bureaucrats, who in turn can sanction particular business deals.

In Thailand, for example, one much-discussed device is the appointment of an important ethnic Thai, usually a retired general, to the board of a Japanese subsidiary of joint venture. The idea is to offset the appointment of overseas Chinese as sales agents.

And Japan's economic strength, visible in terms of trade, aid and investment, is still the main tool the nation has to work with in its relations with other Asian countries.

"As long as Japan offers us soft loans, or will offer them in the future," concedes a leading Malaysian politician, "we just can't restrict the Japanese as much as we'd like to."

Goal As Growth

But such comments concern only Japan's obvious postwar goals—economic growth for the sake of autonomy, continued growth for the sake of firmer autonomy or, as some claim, continued growth for no purpose other than continued growth.

In Asia at least, these economic goals have now given way to a political goal—a search for countries, like Malaysia, that will defer to Japan's interests, even if they are only economic interests, just enough to give the Japanese a sense of confidence in their forthcoming dealings with China.

Japan's problem with China, at least in the eyes of her leading conservative politicians and Foreign Ministry planners, is basically psychological.

In their view if Japan is to survive as an independent country, she must—among other things—avoid the classical tributary relationship that the Chinese have always expected from their neighbors.

Yet China has the nuclear weapons, the entrance into a big power club, and the automatic political influence in Asia and the world.

Unless and until Japan also acquires nuclear weapons—a step that would change Japan's relationship with the United States and the Soviet Union—it must, according to its leading politicians and planners, make the most of its economic strength.

This is where the countries of "Pacific Asia" come into the picture.

If, as Japanese officials assume, the main security threat to countries such as Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia is an internal one, then a high rate of economic growth is as vital to their security as a good army or police force.

As it happens, Japan is now well equipped to help these countries generate a high growth rate. Japan can provide—and expects to provide—increasing amounts of trade, aid and investment in Southeast Asia nations and is pledged to triple foreign aid by 1975.

Helping Hand

Thus, where Japan's burrowing businessmen look upon trade and investment in Southeast Asia as simply a way to make money, its politicians and Foreign Ministry planners see it also as a political insurance policy.

As these countries accept an increasing degree of economic contact with Japan, the argument runs, their overall security interests will coincide with Japan's particular interest in obtaining political and psychological support against China.

But, emphatically, present plans call for no formal alliances, which, in Japanese eyes, would be unnecessarily hostile and, in any case, unsustainable domestically.

Rather, Japan prefers an informal arrangement based on implicitly shared interests—a group of countries that, as a Foreign Ministry planner once put it, "are neutral in Japan's direction."

Perpetuating Isolation

Meanwhile, with Eisaku Sato, the prime minister, at the helm

for the past six years, Japan has systematically tried to perpetuate China's isolation from the rest of Asia, and also to postpone the day when Japan itself has to begin negotiations leading to diplomatic relations.

For the moment, neither China nor Japan is prepared to establish formal ties without demanding concessions from the other. Each side is trying to out-maneuver the other. China is lobbying in Japanese domestic politics, stressing the revival of "militarism." Japan is lobbying abroad, stressing the threat of a strong China.

Japan has also helped lead the campaign to delay China's admission to the United Nations and in 1969, hinted that the U.N. charter should be revised to give Japan a permanent seat on the Security Council.

Vagueness Worded

Though the proposal was vagueness worded, its intent was clearly to prevent China from acquiring the only Asian seat among the permanent members.

Yet, from many different quarters within Japan, there is sharp disagreement with current China policy.

Leftist opposition parties, supported by most of the press, argue that the U.S., not China, is the main threat to Japan's security—since, according to the argument, U.S. bases in Japan will drag the country into war.

New Left Support

As a remedy, the left supports China's demands for an end to the defense treaty with the U.S., a separate Japanese-Chinese peace treaty (in which Japan would acknowledge war guilt), reprisals and Japanese acquisitions to the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland.

The business community is divided. The older leaders of Mr. Sato's generation support his go-slow policy. Others urge the government to establish diplomatic relations with China fairly soon, even on somewhat humiliating terms.

"Separate Taiwan"

This group contends that further delay will only harden Chinese hostility, and thereby endanger Japan for generations to come. Since this is also the group that took the initiative in setting up Japanese-Chinese trade—now running at more than $800 million a year—it views cannot be ignored.

Finally, in both the Foreign

Ministry and the Liberal-Democratic party, people disagree about the importance of a "separate Taiwan."

Some see great strategic value to keeping Taiwan out of mainland hands, no matter what kind of government rules the mainland (Communist or otherwise). This group also expects that a separate Taiwan—whether ruled by the Chinese nationalists or by Taiwanese—would inevitably be dependent upon, and friendly toward, Japan.

Others, however, stress the seriousness with which China views the unification question. They argue that any attempt to normalize relations with China, while trying to retain ties with nationalist China, will infuriate Peking and set off an irreversible cold war.

Short-Term Policy

Against all its critics—leftists, businessmen, and analysts within the ranks—the government staunchly maintains that its policy of delay is only a short-term policy—not necessarily hostile, and designed only as a defense mechanism.

By offering China the fruits of Japanese technology, and by limiting its search for Asian "allies" to a vague and almost formless endeavor, the government hopes to convince China to tolerate at least a "competitive co-existence."

And if relations remain cool, Japan is ready to blame China for making them that way.

"Whether China will interpret out intentions in hostile or indifferent terms remains to be seen," Kiichi Aichi, the foreign minister, wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in 1969.

Not Hopeful

But he did not seem particularly hopeful. "I privately think," he went on to say, "that the question of attaining a viable equilibrium in relations between nuclear-equipped Peking and ourselves will take at least another decade for a full answer."

At the very least, under present government policies, Japan is no longer confining herself only to economic goals.

"It seems safe to predict," Mr. Aichi wrote, "that the Communist Chinese will have to take more notice of Japan as our national influence, in keeping with our responses to new challenges, continues to rise."

The Washington Post

ASAHI BUILDING
6-7 GINZA 6-CHOME
CHUO-KU, TOKYO, JAPAN
TELEPHONE: 573-2838/9

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

NORTHEAST ASIA BUREAU

Feb. 19, 1973

Dear Henry:

Welcome to Japan!

Now that you have bearded the high and mighty -- Mao, Chou, Pham Van Dong etc. -- how about taking a few minutes out to see me for yrs. truly and your old student, Mr. Thomas Pepper Esq.? We'd like very much to see you. Tomorrow morning sometime, maybe?

Tom and I are both from Atlanta, and old friends. Fact is, I started him off in the journalism business when he was just out of Harvard. Only recently did I discover that you were his mentor in the academic world.

I'm delighted with my new assignment here. Have done much traveling in these months since arriving here last fall -- four trips to Korea, a long trip to Saigon in October, most recently my trip to Clark Field to do the POW story -- but still manage time to learn about Japan.

Enclosing Thursday's Post with the Hanoi communique story, which I thought you might like to see.

PS My home number is 401-3169. Tom's number for both home and his Baltimore Sun office is 715-2876.

D..

CHARLES H. PERCY
ILLINOIS

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 22, 1971

Dear Henry:

Loraine and I, and Sharon, welcome you home and again express appreciation for your magnificence in coming to Chicago at such a personal sacrifice of time and energy.

I have scanned the papers carefully and am pleased to report that with 11,300,000 residents in Illinois, 52% of whom are women, not one of them has claimed to have had a date with you while you were in Chicago.

Now as for political exploitation . . . . . .

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
Executive Office of the President
Washington, D. C. 20500

A CNS Analysis

# Percy Doesn't See U.S. Picking Up Entire Tab

By LESTER BELL

Copley News Service

WASHINGTON — A figure of $7.5 billion for Indochina reconstruction that has some currency here won't be Uncle Sam's tab alone, says Sen. Charles H. Percy.

The Illinois Republican told Copley News Service in an interview that, at any rate, is how he chooses to interpreted a clouded issue that could become very sensitive in Congress.

The figure of $7.5 billion was mentioned by President Nixon a year ago.

The President in his Indochina Peace Plan of Jan. 25, 1972, also talked of aid, disclosing that private talks had been held with Hanoi on July 26, 1971.

Holding the private offer open, the President said, "we remain prepared to undertake a major reconstruction program throughout Indochina, including North Vietnam, to help all these people recover from the ravages of a generation of war."

Henry A. Kissinger, the President's National Security Adviser, has since said that the Paris Peace Agreement must be "well advanced" before the issue of reconstruction can be discussed. He has also labeled the $7.5 billion, for four countries spread over five years with perhaps $2.5 billion to North Vietnam, as no longer "current."

The question of reconstruction is uncertain to say the least, although administration sources apparently have been trying to make it clear that the President is not suggesting that Uncle Sam pick up the whole bill.

This is Percy's reading of the White House signals as well.

He was asked in the interview if the United States has a "moral obligation" to reconstruct Indochina.

"We have a moral obligation to try to achieve peace in the world." this is in our national interest. If we see that

by working in cooperation with other developed nations of the world we can help in the economic reconstruction of a war-devastated area and enable those people to stand on their own feet, then it's in our national interest to do this.

"Certainly if it would help preserve the peace and if it would be an inducement to our adversaries to observe strictly the spirit and letter of the cease-fire and work out a political settlement of the problem of Indochina, then I think this is again in our own national interest.

"But we have no responsibility to do anything other than what is best for our own national interest. I think it is time we begin looking to our own national interest and not just doing, as was characterized by high officials, 'the most unselfish thing any nation has ever undertaken,' this dreadful and tragic war in Southeast Asia."

Percy said he could see no need for American support of a "large-scale military program in South Vietnam." Except for replacement of equipment on a "one-for-one" basis, that is prohibited in the first place.

"But I would hope emphasis would be placed on the economic reconstruction of the area so that it, similar to other nations in Southeast Asia, could begin standing on its own two feet and rely less on American assistance.

"I think we've done enough. In fact, we've done more than enough for South Vietnam."

Reminded of suggestions that other nations should pick up part of President's Nixon's $7.5 billion figure, Percy was asked what if they don't want to.

"Then the program is going to be substantially lim-

ited," he said. "The pledge that the President made was that there would be a $7.5 billion reconstruction fund. I assume he's not talking about that coming from the United States.

"I assume that he's talking about that coming from the whole world, all the developed nations and certainly through the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and other such organizations as well as bilateral assistance from Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union. Certainly these countries should find it in their national interest, and if they do not find it in their interest, then proportionately the obligations we have would be substantially reduced."

Percy made it clear he does not believe the reconstruction burden would fall on the United States, although he has "found it generally interpreted here in Washington that it was our obligation."

He emphasized how cloudy the issue has become by saying he had, in a search for clarity, talked with Washington officials as well as five or six American Ambassadors on his Southeast Asian trip.

"They had no real inkling of what the President had in

mind," he said. "so I've publicly (in Asia) chosen to interpret his statement as meaning that this is a multinational affair. I've not been contradicted on those statements."

That the issue of rebuilding war-torn Indochina while the United States has neglected domestic priorities will be heated on Capitol Hill is sharply perceived by the President.

In his Jan. 31, surprise White House news conference he was asked for a dollar figure on Indochina rehabilitation.

"That," the President said. "is a matter that the members of Congress have raised with me ... I cannot give you that figure now, because it is a matter that has to be negotiated and it must be all part of one pattern. That figure, of course, will come out, but they must first be discussed with the bi-partisan leadership..."

Mr. Nixon said, the talk of the powers of the Presidency aside, that he is "keenly aware" that Congress has to "believe" and "support" a reconstruction program in North Vietnam as well as South Vietnam as "an investment in peace" if there is to be such a venture.

"And this is going to be one of the more difficult assignments I have had as President." Mr. Nixon said. "But I

think we can make it if the Congress sees what the stakes are."

2/14
All State Journal

# Percy Says China, Too, Can Rebuild N. Vietnam

By David L. Hopcraft

U. S. Sen. Charles H. Percy, said last night he opposes and believes Congress would also oppose a rebuilding of North Vietnam financed solely by the U. S. Treasury.

Percy, at a news conference before speaking at the Ripon Club dinner honoring Cuyahoga County Republican Cochairman Robert E. Hughes, said other nations of the world must assume a role in the rebuilding of North Vietnam.

"China, for example, supplied military aid to the North Vietnamese and certainly can supply economic aid," Percy said. Other sources of help would be the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Soviet Union and Japan, he said.

He said no American dollars should be spent on North Vietnam until every American prisoner of war is returned and the terms of the cease-fire are scrupulously adhered to.

Percy was also critical of President Nixon's freeze of funds for federal housing and federal housing subsidies.

Percy conceded that there have been irregularities and failures in the housing programs. However, he said, "You don't solve the problem by throwing the baby out with the bath."

Percy said he supported the President's intent to limit federal spending. Then he said: "I don't like to see any one program cut out completely as the President has done with the housing programs."

In a speech prepared for the dinner, Percy said Americans and the Republican party are challenged to "bring to the human side of our national equation the

THE PLAIN DEALER, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 15,

CLUB TALK — Cuyahoga County Republican Co-chairman Robert E. Hughes, left, talked with U.S. Sen. Charles H. Percy, R-Ill., before last night's Men of the Year dinner sponsored by the Ripon Club. Plain Dealer Photo (William A. Ashbolt)

same sense of concern that we have brought to our material progress."

Percy said every American has a right to confidence in the safety and reliability of the products he buys, confidence in his job satisfaction, his air, water and food, and confidence that his government and his technology will be used for his ultimate benefit.

"We must create a new spirit of genuine personal respect for each individual citizen," Percy said, adding that Republicans "have a unique opportunity to meet this challenge."

He said government can respond to the problems of an increasingly dehumanized society by opening its offices Tuesday through Saturday. Now citizens are forced to take time off from work to visit their government agencies, he said.

"Similarly, at a time when so many schools are overcrowded, and property taxes are skyrocking, it is illogical from both an educational and an economic standpoint to continue under-utilizing our school buildings," he said. "Staggered school days and a 12-month school year

would relieve pressures on pupils, teachers and taxpayers."

Percy said the citizen is the first link in the country's complex system of political and economic government.

"If citizens are concerned, say about the quality of air they breathe, they must respond by informing their elected representatives," he said.

"If the officeholders are responsive to their constituencies, they will pass laws to make it more expensive to pollute than not to pollute. And if the polluters are responsive, they will act in their economic interest to clean the air."

"The point is clear: If any link in the chain is broken, the problem will go unsolved and the pressures on the individual will intensify."

"So, I say to each of you: Ask yourselves what you can contribute, as individuals and groups, to the solution of this overriding problem."

Cleveland Plain Dealer

Commencement Address by Senator Charles H. Percy
Knox College
Galesburg, Illinois

June 2, 1973

I appreciate your invitation to return to Knox, although I am saddened on this occasion because of the recent passing of your distinguished president, Dr. Sharvy Umbeck. As the 13th chief executive of Knox, Dr. Umbeck deservedly achieved national renown. Perhaps the best assessment of his impact on your college during his 24-year tenure was offered by Dr. Hermann Muelder of your faculty, during the remarks he made at a memorial service for Dr. Umbeck. He said of Dr. Umbeck:

"No other President of Knox, certainly not in more than a hundred years, became so truly a national educational leader. That office in Old Main became one of the nerve centers connecting colleges and universities of this nation. There are numerous councils, associations, commissions, institutes, foundations, that could on this occasion testify to the important offices and services which he performed. But in such detailing we might lose our perception of his truly great academic statesmanship during that period in our history when the United States first made education a major federal responsibility ..."

"A synopsis of the broad accomplishments of a man so important as Dr. Umbeck is almost certain to sound like the profile of an institution."

-- 2 --

The evidences of Dr. Umbeck's leadership are all around us today, in the buildings, in the programs, and, most of all, in the people -- a faculty and student body of unsurpassed quality in your history.

It is the subject of leadership upon which I wish to focus my remarks today. The members of this graduating class have devoted four years to developing the skills and the mental discipline that will eventually bring many of you into leadership positions in business, the arts and sciences, government and the professions. In Washington, where I work, the office of the President is the embodiment of leadership for the entire nation. It is the position to which our country -- and often the world -- turns for guidance in times of crisis.

It is no overstatement to suggest that the Watergate scandal that envelops us today represents a crisis of unparalleled proportions. It has eroded the confidence of the people in their governmental system, diminished the image of politics as a profession and crippled the executive arm of the government.

There is only one antidote for this poisonous situation -- massive doses of the truth.

-- 3 --

[LC]

None of us is anxious to learn that our national ideals have been muddied and betrayed. But I believe we are strong enough to survive even the most chilling truths, and wise enough to learn from them. National pride and national unity will be hollow indeed if they are preserved only by shutting our eyes to the truth.

It would be best -- for the nation and for the future of this Administration -- if the leadership in the effort to get at the truth came from the top, from the White House, rather than being dragged out piecemeal by investigatory bodies or the press.

The President's 4,000-word statement of early last week is a step in that direction. It raises some new and profoundly disturbing questions, particularly those involving the use of national security as a justification for illegal government behavior. But it also appears to recognize the paramount need for full disclosure of the facts, and consequently it is welcome. I would strongly urge the President to supplement it with a further recounting of whatever additional knowledge he may possess of any aspect of Watergate.

Senator Barry Goldwater has forcefully suggested that unless the President leads the way on the Watergate matter, he will find it exceedingly difficult to provide meaningful leadership in other

-- 4 --

areas of national concern. I would certainly concur. For the
stark facts about the President's position with respect to Water-
gate would seem to be these: Either he was completely unaware of
activities being carried out in his name and ostensibly directed
by some of his closest subordinates, or else he knew about them
and at least did not express his disapproval.

Neither of these choices can be contemplated without dismay.
But if there is a logical alternative, it is the President's re-
sponsibility to make it known to us. We must know the whole truth
about Watergate and its allied abuses. Nothing less will do if,
we are to be successful in restoring confidence in our governmental
system and in purifying our political system.

If Vietnam -- and now Cambodia -- have taught us nothing else,
surely they have taught us that the price of national self-deception
is high. When we ignore reality, however harsh, we do so ultimately
at our own peril and expense.

But now, more than ever, we can ill afford to put our heads in
the sand. The way in which we resolve our present crisis will
define the depth of our commitment to ideals for which we often
congratulate ourselves.

The shattering events and disclosures of recent weeks have dis-
mayed all Americans, but they have been especially painful to those
of us who call the Republican Party our political home.

-- 5 --

[lc]

It is not pleasant to discuss them. But I think it is time
for both our party and our country to confront the unhappy truths
of the connecting offenses that we call Watergate.

The first realities we must face are the dimensions of the
Watergate crisis. Let us not deceive ourselves. This is not just
another Washington scandal, or "just politics." Watergate is not
a question of a White House aide accepting a vicuna coat or a deep
freeze. It is not even comparable to the scandals of the Grant
Administration a hundred years ago, or to Teapot Dome 50 years
ago, which resulted in a single Cabinet officer being sent to prison.

Rather, Watergate represents a pervasive, unprecedented pattern
of misconduct, impropriety and deceit throughout the highest reaches
of government.

Even before the coming criminal trials have opened, before the
Erving Committee has heard a dozen witnesses, we have learned enough
to know that Watergate is a national tragedy and a national disgrace.
The onrush of revelations has included the following items:

— The President's first Attorney General, who was also his
re-election campaign manager and one of his closest advisers, has
been indicted on criminal charges, including conspiracy to defraud
the United States and to obstruct justice.

— The President's first Commerce Secretary, who was also his
chief fund raiser in four campaigns, has been similarly indicted

-- 6 --

[LC]

on criminal charges. In the history of the Republic, only two other Cabinet officers have ever been indicted for a crime.

-- The President's second Attorney General, not sufficiently insulated from the Watergate revelations, felt compelled to resign.

-- The President's two closest White House aides have been forced to resign.

-- The President's White House Counsel, who supposedly conducted a presidential investigation of Watergate, has been forced to resign.

-- The President's hand-picked acting FBI director has admitted destroying evidence at the suggestion of the White House, and has resigned.

-- Last summer's break-in of Democratic National Committee headquarters was planned and partially executed by men associated with the White House and with the President's re-election committee.

-- White House personnel appear to have helped plan an elaborate espionage and sabotage campaign against Democratic presidential candidates during last year's primaries in order to influence their primary and convention selection processes.

-- The deputy director of the CIA has sworn that senior White House officials urged the Agency to assist in covering up the Watergate scandal over an eight-month period.

-- 7 --

-- All charges in the Pentagon papers trial have been dis-
missed because of unparalleled government misconduct, much of it
originating in the White House. The burglary of Daniel Ellsberg's
psychiatrist's office was engineered by White House personnel. A
former top Presidential assistant has admitted his failure to re-
port the crime.

-- At the request of the White House, high CIA officials pro-
vided technical assistance to the burglars, activity which seemingly
went beyond the Agency's statutory authority.

-- In the midst of the government's prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg,
the President met with the presiding judge in the trial, and had a
subordinate offer him the directorship of the FBI.

-- A former White House official, using White House facilities, has admitted forging State Department documents in an attempt to defame a former president.

-- The former acting FBI director says that he warned the Presi-
dent last summer that top White House officials might be interfering
with the Watergate investigation, a warning which the President has
acknowledged receiving.

This is only a partial list, some say only the tip of the ice-
berg. But it tells us enough to know that we are not dealing here
with "corruption as usual." It tells us that we are confronted with
the darkest scandal in American political history.

-- 8 --

At first, last summer, most of us simply ignored the impli-
cations of the early Watergate disclosures. The White House
strenuously denied the few initial indications that Watergate was
something more than an isolated, unauthorized incident. We be-
lieved these denials, perhaps partly because we so much wanted
to believe them. By last fall, however, I had become sufficiently
concerned to call for the appointment of an independent, "blue-ribbon"
commission to investigate Watergate.

Then, this spring, as the evidence of high-level wrongdoing began
to mount, we told ourselves that the President had been ill-served
by some of his top appointees and closest advisers -- men whose
zeal and loyalty to the President apparently outweighed their judge-
ment.

But now we know that it is much, much more than an isolated in-
cident motivated by misplaced zeal. What has been happening behind
the closed doors of the White House goes beyond "zeal," beyond
"well-intentioned people falling into shady tactics," beyond "im-
proper actions."

What has been revealed to us in recent weeks is that certain high
officials have repeatedly demonstrated a contemptuous disregard for
the law, for simple decency, and for the trust of the American people.

From within the White House itself, there has been a concerted

-- 9 --

assault on the most basic assumptions of democratic government.
When it suited their purposes, some of the President's top appointees
and advisers have felt free to bypass our judicial and electoral
processes. They have made a mockery of the words "liberty and
justice for all," and too often they have ignored the Constitution
they swore to defend. Throughout it all, certain White House spokes-
men have lied and misled us so often that now we are incredulous
only when they tell the truth.

A great many of the President's personal appointees have misused
the powers of his office, usually in his behalf. Acting in his name
and with his authority, they have abused and deeply compromised not
only the Presidency itself, but the Justice Department, the State
Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the inde-
pendent judiciary.

They have betrayed their fellow members of this administration --
men like William Rogers, Henry Kissinger, Melvin Laird, George
Shultz and many others, who have labored long and hard in the best
tradition of public service.

They have betrayed all those Americans who in 1968 and 1972
voted for Richard Nixon because he convincingly promised them vigilant
adherence to a rule of law.

-- 10 --

They have betrayed the millions of loyal Republicans to whom "integrity in government" is a cherished goal -- Republicans who three times gave Richard Nixon their highest honor, and who gave his administration their faith and their untiring support.

They have betrayed our trust, our ideals and our heritage.

So it is not enough for the President simply to accept "responsibility" in the broadest, most imprecise sense of that word. It is not enough to lament the fact that crimes were committed in the name of a noble goal -- protecting national security. As a number of American public opinion polls indicate, the President has not yet erased the confusion in the minds of most Americans as to how such widespread, serious misconduct -- often on the part of his immediate subordinates -- could have escaped his attention for most of a year. The nation can not turn away from such grotesque perversion of power until we understand how it could have happened, and, specifically, how it could have happened so close to the President of the United States. Until we do understand these things, we shall have little assurance that we can prevent future Watergates.

In 1968, Mr. Nixon promised an administration "open in its communications with the people." Now, more than ever, it is time to redeem that pledge. The President owes it to his country, his party and himself to continue to provide detailed explanations not

-- 11 --

only of what went wrong, and why, but how he could have remained
oblivious to that which apparently was known to so many of the
men closest to him.

There are many disturbing questions which only he can answer
and which, until they are answered, will leave the White House and
his entire administration under a darkening cloud of suspicion.
He should be doing everything in his power to expedite full dis-
closure of every facet of Watergate. If each kernel of truth must
be torn away from those who are hiding it, the effort to redeem
our national honor could take years. And, in the meantime, it will
be increasingly difficult to prevent paralysis from overcoming the
government.

The Nixon administration has been badly scarred by the Watergate
scandals, but Watergate need not immobilize it for the next three
and a half years. The President clearly has the competence, the
experience and the vision to accomplish much that is good, much
that men everywhere yearn for. As proof of this fact, it is only
necessary to remind ourselves of his bold and imaginative over-
tures to Russia and China, the SALT agreements, the withdrawal of
American ground forces from South Vietnam, the return of our POW's,
the settlement of the Berlin crisis, the peacemaking efforts in the
Middle East and the end of conscription in this country.

-- 12 --

The hour is late, but it is not too late for the President to regain the momentum he has lost and to fashion his place in history. He has recovered from adversity in the past, and he can do so again. But until he re-establishes the credibility and moral authority of his office, his capacity to lead, to persuade and to inspire will remain sharply impaired, both here and abroad.

The President can restore the faith of the American people in government, in his administration, and in himself -- but only by being completely candid with them. He can secure the nation's trust if only he now will trust the nation with the whole truth.

Watergate is a searing chapter in our history, revealing as it does the distressing fallibility of men in positions of trust. But as this grisly story has unfolded, it has brought with it some reassuring messages that we can usefully ponder today.

We have witnessed a demonstration of the fundamental strength of our institutions, which have shown their vigor and adaptability in the face of unprecedented attacks.

-- Our system of justice has proven itself flexible enough to resist efforts to subvert it. The principle that no individual is above the law has been tested and reaffirmed.

-- 13 --

-- The American press corps has responded to threats to its freedom with a performance that embellishes its proud history.

-- The flow of excessive power to the executive branch has been reversed and Congress is beginning to regain its rightful place as a co-equal member of our tripartite system of government.

In essence, Watergate has taught us that the arrogant misuse of power will not go unchecked in a democratic system as carefully structured as ours.

That is a heartening thought for each of you to carry with you as you leave Knox. Few other societies in history have been able to make such a claim.

#

#

#

#

jlj 11/11/70

Type of Request & Date

Name: Martin Peretz of Cambridge

Martin Peretz 11/13-14/70

(Last name and pending date)

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Request: HAK told him to call when he was in town. He doesn't have anything he wants to see HAK about but if HAK wants to gossip about Cambridge he will be available Friday afternoon and Saturday morning (11--13-14--70). He can be reached in Cambridge at 617/495-4267. In Washington he thinks he will be staying at the Hay Adams Hotel but Sen. McCarthy's office can reach him and take messages.

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer:

Date and Time: 01:3E

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

The Honorable Bryce Harlow

-3-

November 15, 1968

After the Nixon administration is in office, I strongly urge a very active coordinating and clearing-house type of role for either a White House unit or a unit within the Justice Department, in order to assure that conflict-of-interest problems are being handled effectively and with some degree of uniformity among the Departments and agencies.

## 2. Appointments to H.E.W.

Of course, the staffing of H.E.W. is crucial from President Nixon's viewpoint, since it will indicate to a large number of people what his basic attitudes will be in these areas. I think that Dick must work very hard to establish the image of warmth and sympathy for the problems of the disadvantaged and sophistication in the approach to solving these problems.

My first suggestion is that Dick offer the Secretaryship of H.E.W. a second time to John Gardner--a matter which I am sure you have all discussed. No one is more qualified, and I still do not understand all the circumstances of his resignation from the Johnson administration. He is a lifelong Republican. While it might strike some people as a grandstand play, the choice of Gardner would be a tremendously meaningful act to everyone in the fields of health, education and welfare. I frankly doubt that John would consider going back to H.E.W., but the President-elect would have won himself hundreds of thousands of "brownie points" from people whose sympathies are not entirely with him at the present time.

Assuming John turned the job down, the effort must still be to get someone of his quality. I have not thought hard enough about who the best people are, but would be glad to participate in a selection search if you need help. Above all, it must not be a Ribicoff-type appointment.

Either as a possible appointee or an advisor, I would hope that you would ring in my immediate successor as Assistant Secretary of H.E.W., Elliot Richardson, who is now the Attorney General of Massachusetts. I recommended Elliot for the job to Marion Folsom and he performed superbly. I am writing Elliot today to elicit his ideas.

The Honorable Bryce Harlow

-5-

November 15, 1968

periods of two-years or less. This committee includes representatives of business, such as Leonard F. McCollum of Continental Oil, Donald Cook of American Electric Power, T. Roland Berner of Curtiss-Wright, former Secretary of Commerce Alexander Trowbridge and others. I am also a member of this committee. The draft report, I think, is a good one, and I think that the program should be adopted by a new administration.

I understand from Sandy Trowbridge that efforts are afoot to revamp the committee so as to change the aspects and make it more of a Nixon-developed program. This is fine, but the main thing is not to let the ball drop.

John Macy is one of the spearheads of this effort, as is Frank Wozencraft whom I mentioned above. I would suggest that, in due course, you discuss its status with John Macy.

## 5. Reconstruction and Economic Development Program for Vietnam.

I believe that one of the most useful things the new President could do in his inaugural address or State of the Union message would be to state in strong and fresh terms a theme enunciated by President Johnson in a speech at Johns Hopkins University nearly two years ago, namely, putting the United States behind a major reconstruction and economic development program for Southeast Asia (and, in particular, South Vietnam) as soon as the war can be brought to an end. This positive note would have the tremendous advantage of setting everybody's sights ahead of and above the present morass, and hopefully would serve to give impetus to the peace talks.

I would personally recommend that the President-elect follow up such a policy statement with the designation of a committee of both government and nongovernment personnel to work out a blueprint for a "Marshall Plan" for Southeast Asia. I suspect that a tremendous amount has been done in this direction already, but it has not been publicized--and perhaps for very good reasons. Hopefully, the reasons (if any) for relative silence as to post-war reconstruction planning can be overcome.

The Honorable Bryce Harlow

-6-

November 15, 1968

Since Johnson has (so far as I know) said virtually nothing about this subject since his Johns Hopkins speech, Nixon could pick up the ball without undue fear of being tagged as "me too." And even if people do remember the Johns Hopkins speech, they will nevertheless applaud Nixon for moving in this direction so promptly.

## 6. Governor John Chafee.

As a Harvard Law School contemporary and friend of John Chafee, and also a summer resident of Rhode Island, I was deeply chagrined over John's loss. As you may know, it followed the death of his daughter from an accident with her horse, which put a virtual stopper to John's campaigning. The whole thing is deeply tragic.

I hope that you will find a way to call John to New York in the near future, and would also find a high place for him in the administration. (For all I know, this has already been done.) It seems to me that he would be useful in a number of jobs, since he has a very broad experience—including (I believe) the Marine Corps. I think he would serve well in the Defense Department or the Department of Commerce.

* * *

I was greatly encouraged by the public statement emanating from the Nixon headquarters between the election and your designation to the effect that Dick's appointments would be on the basis of "excellence." I regard his first staff appointment as a clear manifestation of this standard. I hope and pray that you will continue, as an administration, to match this standard. Political debts can be paid in a million ways—but service to the people, and hence to Dick's own success and his place in history—can be achieved only by an uncompromising quest for quality.

5/16/70

Perkins, Rod

(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: Rod Perkins

Request:

Would like to see HAK next week.

JTH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: OBE

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information: Mr. Perkins' said he was friend of HAK. He's going out of town today and will be back Tuesday and will call then.

He will understand if HAK unable to see him. He expects to be at Mayflower.

Resolution:

RECEIVED
JUN 4 1970
CENTRAL FILES

## City Commission
Tuesday Nite Results

Adjustment came at an
as the time to stage public
the Imposing high judge's
bench seemed to complicate
the discomfort of the
Commissioners. City ad-
ministrative people, the
public and press in at-
tendence. The place was
warm due to poor air-
conditioning, high noise level
because of acoustic
deficiencies, lack of
microphones, dim lighting
and unusually un-
comfortable chairs. (Later
the audience was about
to be excited.)

The room's general oddity
with a high clerical over-
lap (the imposing high judge's
bench seemed to complicate
the discomfort of the
Commissioners. City ad-
ministrative people, the
public and press in at-
tendence. The place was
warm due to poor air-
conditioning, high noise level
because of acoustic
deficiencies, lack of
microphones, dim lighting
and unusually un-
comfortable chairs. (Later
the audience was about
to be excited.)

Nevertheless, many
agenda items were disposed
of with dispatch including:
Setting August 7th as the
date for holding a public
hearing on a rent control
law. Setting up August 21st

as the time to stage public
hearings. The City Charter
Commission Review Board
and discussion of the
recently completed
feasibility of the City's need
for a Civic Center. The ap-
plication for a variance
permitting the operation of a
retail bakery at 2000 East
Hallandale Boulevard was
set for a public hearing on
August 7th.

On the question of granting
variance in connection
with the construction of the
twin Avant Guarda apart-
ment structures South
Ocean Drive, the Com-
missioners agreed to an
August 7th Public Hearing.
The audience seemed
pleased to hear about the
withdrawal of a request to
amend earlier submitted
building plans on Parcel B
and B-1 on the Three Islands
acreage. This promised long
discussion was delayed to
the August 7th agenda.

Some regular attendants
at Commission meetings
were unhappy with the
City Attorney's recommenda-
tions for ordinance restric-
tions on truck deliveries to
commercial establishments.
After several weeks of
consideration of this and an

pollution abatement or
acceptance, the Commission
decided more discussion in
order and named July 24th
the plan to build a Southeast
traffic load on East
Hallandale Boulevard.

Other Commission action
included the official ac-
ceptance of the Mid-
dlebrooke reports on the re-
der Development of the
City's Northwest section. Also,
the Commission authorized the
City Manager to plan ahead
traffic with the selection of an
architect-engineer to make
another Northwest section
study covered by a $26,000
grant from a Washington
agency.

The organization of the
newly appointed Human
Relations Commission came
about last Thursday. The
first step in organization was
the election of Arthur Lezar
as the Chairmanship of the
Commission. The office
roster was completed by the
election of Harold Cobb to
serve as Vice-chairman and
Mrs. Ruth Kessler to be
Executive Secretary.

Because of the urgency of
getting started on its year's
program, the question of a
quorum was waived since
only six of the Commission's
twelve members were

present.

City Commissioner How-
erd Forman, on, being
recognized by the Chairman,
expressed his confidence
that "the new Human Rela-
tions Commission will prove
itself to be among the best in

the City's history." Noting
that some HRC projects
might call for special fund-
ing to be successful, Com-
missioner Forman promised
that money would be found to
underwrite the cost of
worthy projects.

Chairman Lezar cited the
need for a review of ways
and means of carrying on
the activities of the HRC. To
familiarize the seven new
members with the purposes
and scope of the responsibil-
ities of the Commission, the

Chairman designated the
next regular monthly meet-
ing of the group as a work-
shop session. At that time,
current activities will be re-
viewed and long-range plans
for continuing activities will
be discussed.