26

relationship beyond the international consensus reflected at the UN?

Much of European debate implies that the answer is "very little." That answer spells the slow disintegration of an allied relationship and of a world order with the Atlantic partnership as its centerpiece. The relationship, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character - that is, the United States and Europe should be prepared to do things for each other beyond the immediate concepts of interest.

A deepening of the dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic is imperative. The ultimate challenge for US foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. The challenge for Europe is whether it views Atlantic relations as a partnership or as part

27

of an international system of multipolarity very similar to pre-World
War I Europe in which major power centers engage in shifting
coalitions to maximize their advantage from case to case. That
system broke down in the early twentieth century; its modern version
is not likely to be more successful.

No article can deal with the entire gamut of American foreign
policy. I have confined myself to some of the structural issues. Their
deepest challenge was perhaps best summed up by the philosopher
Immanuel Kant over two hundred years ago. In his essay, "Perpetual
Peace", he wrote that the world was destined for perpetual peace. It
would come about either by human foresight or by a series of
escalatory catastrophes that leave no other choice.

That is the ultimate challenge the newly elected President will
have to face.

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ARTICLE

As these lines are being written, the election process is still
in full swing, but we will

In a few days, the election process that has mesmerized America
for three months will be over. The focus groups, the pollsters, the
spinners on talk shows combining eagerness to please with congenital
like a mirage in the desert
insecurity, will vanish until another election cycle calls them forth
again.

What will remain are the challenges that generated all the
brouhaha over the privilege of dealing with them.

[And] these are formidable. No president has ever faced [an
agenda] of comparable scope. Never before has it been necessary to
reconstruct an international system on a global basis; to conduct a war
without front lines and geographic definition; to develop principles to

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replace those of the Westphalian order, which went up in the smoke of
the World Trade Center.

The [challenge perhaps] most [analogous] to that [facing] the
(next] president is that inherited by President Truman when the end of
the Second World War in 1945 left a vacuum in Central Europe and the
Soviet Union emerged as a threat to the global equilibrium. But
Truman's task was largely centered on the Atlantic [sphere]. The
Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. [Today's]
principal threats are abstract and mobile; they have generated attacks
from Bali to Singapore, to Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis,
and New York. In the 1940s, the solution was straightforward, albeit
quite difficult: to construct a defensive line in the center of Europe
and an economic program to close the gap between expectation and
reality, which constituted the greatest threat to domestic stability.

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The challenge [to] the [next] president will be to achieve a
domestic and international consensus regarding the nature of the
threat and the means to deal with it. Truman could take the
legitimacy of the international system for granted; the newly elected
president will have to lead an international effort to define and then
maintain it.

As [he] embarks on this task, all those concerned with the future
of the country should find ways to cooperate. The controversies of the
campaign testified to the vitality of our democracy. The time has
come to give expression to what unites rather than divides us. As
these lines are being written, the electoral outcome is still some days
away. I supported President Bush during the campaign and hope for
his success. But whatever the results, the US must not remain in
campaign mode. The rest of the world must see that on the

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fundamentals, America [is giving] itself a chance to implement a
common ________ until it can be tested in another electoral cycle.

It is to this effort that this article seeks to make a contribution.

Every international system reflects the ability to deal with two
sets of challenges: security and legitimacy. Both are unprecedented
in the present period.

The security challenge arises from two sources: the gravest
from acts until recently considered the task of internal police forces
rather than international policy; or it grows out of a scientific evolution
enabling countries to pose threats to survival as a result of
developments entirely _within_ a state's territory.

Both threats make to some extent irrelevant the prevailing
concept of international elections. The legal basis of the existing
international system was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in

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1648. Seeking to avoid a repetition of the Thirty Years' War during which [nearly] 30 percent of the population of Central Europe was killed in a conflict at least formally over religious belief, the rulers based the new system on the principle of sovereignty, which postulated noninterference across national borders. Hence threats to the international order were defined as the movement of military units across established borders. At the same time, weapons were relatively small, requiring mobilization before war, and technology moved sufficiently slowly, allowing at least the theoretical opportunity for countermeasures.

September 11 marked the end of that period. Threats, it taught, could be organized by private groups and did not require mobilization. These private groups would operate from the territory of sovereign states, but their motives transcended the purposes of the host

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countries. These objectives were not under the control of the host
state and not subject to negotiation since they arose at the overthrow
of the political and social structures of the societies against which the
terror was directed.

The threat to the social structure is compounded by the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the Westphalian
system, the balance of power could generally be upset primarily by
conquest. In the world of privatized terror and proliferating weapons
of mass destruction, threats to survival are inherent and can no longer
be dealt with after the event. Preemption is therefore [an essential
component of] the new international system. Inevitably this leads to a
clash between traditional concepts of order and new realities. The
nations used to the traditional pattern find it difficult to accept the new
necessities, and all nations will insist on some rules of conduct that do

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not leave the decision on preemption to the unilateral, unconstrained
determination of a single state. Nor can it be in America's interest to
encourage every nation to define preemption in purely national terms.
How to relate legitimacy to preemption is therefore a key challenge for
the emerging international order.

Iraq

No issue has been more frequently raised in the campaign
[nearing its] end than the American effort in Iraq, most of it focusing
on the decision to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. I supported
that [course], but the debate about it is no longer relevant to the task
[at hand]. The 9/11 Commission has wisely pointed out that terrorism
is a method, not a policy. The basic adversary is radical,
fundamentalist, militant Islam, aiming to overthrow both moderate

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Islamic societies and all others it perceives as standing in the way of restoring an Islamic caliphate. For that reason, many societies that questioned America's decision nevertheless have a stake in a successful outcome of the Iraqi crisis. If a radical government emerges in Baghdad because the United States is defeated or [tires] of solitary exertions, even more if Iraq falls into Taliban-fed chaos, the entire Islamic world will be in turmoil. Moderate governments will topple or fight for their existence; countries with substantial Islamic minorities, such as India, will [witness] a mounting violent challenge. Terrorism will spread across Europe. The challenges to America will multiply.

The international community therefore has a major stake in the outcome. The US acts as the custodian of global stability even while domestic obstacles prevent the admission of these realities in many

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countries - though it is not possible such a one-sided arrangement
[can continue] indefinitely or indeed much longer.

There is no shortcut around the necessary next steps: the
restoration of security, especially in areas that have become terrorist
sanctuaries, and the holding of elections. These tasks cannot wait for
an international consensus. And with respect to them, America has a
global responsibility.

Having experienced the challenges of creating local security
forces in Indochina, I would warn against approaching that enterprise
in too mechanical a spirit. In Vietnam, it took longer to make units
combat-ready than simply fulfilling the requirements of a training
manual. And many units that were prepared to risk their lives in
defense of their home regions were far less effective when used as a
strategic reserve to support an overall design - though, in the end, the

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South Vietnamese forces beat back an all-out North Vietnamese
invasion so long as they had American air support.

[Ultimately] the effectiveness of Iraqi forces will depend not only
on their military training but above all on the degree to which the
emerging Iraqi institutions gain domestic legitimacy. Units without
political allegiance risk degenerating into unstable mercenaries least
reliable when most needed.

But national elections are only the first and perhaps least
complicated step on the road to Iraqi self-government. Democracy in
the West evolved over centuries. It required first a church
independent of the state; then the Reformation, which imposed
pluralism on religion; the Enlightenment, which asserted the autonomy
of reason from both church and state; the Age of Discovery, which
broadened horizons; and finally capitalism, with its emphasis on

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competition and the market. None of these conditions exists in the
Islamic world. Instead there is a merging of religion and politics
inimical to pluralism. A genuine democratic government has emerged
only in Turkey and there only on the basis of imposition over 20 years
by an autocratic leader. This is not to say that individually Muslims
are incapable of operating democratic institutions, only that their
emergence faces great cultural obstacles and overcoming traditional
temptations. It also should cause us to be modest in expectations and
patient in the execution of political reform.

Special understanding is needed of the obstacles to democracy
in a multi-ethnic and multi-religion society such as Iraq. In the West,
democracy evolved in homogeneous societies. There was therefore no
institutional obstacle to the minority becoming a majority. Electoral
defeat is considered a temporary setback capable of being reversed.

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But in societies with distinct ethnic or political divisions, minority status turns into permanent discrimination, implying the threat of political extinction. In such conditions, political contests are over constitutional arrangements to protect the minority by means beyond the electoral process or civil war.

This is a particular issue in Iraq. The country is composed of three major groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, with the Shiites representing about 60 percent of the population and the other two groups about 20 percent. For 500 years, the Sunnis have dominated the other groups by military force and, during Saddam's rule, with extraordinary brutality. To them, the democratic process implies a radical change in status. The insurgency in the Sunni region is not only a national struggle; [it] is a means to restore political dominance. By the same token, the political process for the Kurds means little if it

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does not assure their autonomy while the Shiites support it to some
[degree] to reverse the historic pattern of Iraqi rule. The Shiites
tolerate the American presence - ambivalently - to achieve this goal.
But it remains to be seen to what extent they retain this posture as
the transfer of power progresses.

The January elections [in Iraq], therefore, are not the end of a
process but the beginning of an extended [contest among] the various
groups with the constant risk that [they] will resort to civil war or to a
national struggle against the US to obtain legitimacy, or both - indeed,
they [all] maintain militias as a last resort. It thus seems necessary to
supplement the national political process with a significant element of
federalism. This would give the various factions a democratic
expression that coincides with an operational democratic consensus; it

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might provide some guarantees for the concerns of the various groups
and a safety net if national reconciliation proves impossible.

The nature of the political evolution also suggests that it is
neither in America's interest nor that of the affected countries that it
be conducted together with other states. If the US insists on being the
sole interlocutor for the Iraqi government regarding its political
evolution....

Some degree of internationalization is desirable. This is not
because of an abstract concern with multilateralism. Rather it is the
only realistic course toward political stability. The survival of the
institutions emerging from the political process depends in the first
instance on security but ultimately to a significant extent on its
international acceptance. The United States would signal a
commitment to international cooperation by asking the United Nations

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to create a contact group to advise on Iraq's political evolution after
the January elections. Logical members would be countries [having]
experience with military Islam and much to lose by the radicalization
of Iraq, such as India, Turkey, Russia, Algeria, together with the
United States, Britain, and other nations to be agreed. In the context
of common approach to a political evolution, the issue of military
contribution by other nations, including NATO, can be raised.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Militant Islam is the most immediate challenge to international
order; nuclear proliferation is the most insidious threat to the survival
of civilization. In a world of multiple nuclear powers, the principles of
deterrence will erode for at least three reasons: it will not always be
clear who is seeking to deter whom; the calculus of deterrence may no

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longer be uniform – that is to say, the possibilities of miscalculation
multiply exponentially; nuclear materials may spread into the
possession of non-state actors, removing a direct target for
deterrence.

Dealing with nuclear proliferation requires a diplomacy that is
inherently preemptive; it is meaningful only before the process of
proliferation has become irreversible. But this also means that it is
difficult to demonstrate the extent of the danger and, above all, how
imminent it is. The diplomacy therefore concentrates on technical
issues while the underlying challenge is political. For the country
undertaking the journey toward proliferation, the motive is never
purely technical. For countries such as Iran and North Korea, the two
most imminent proliferators, the purpose is to become major
international players and to discourage attempts to influence their

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17

domestic policy - in other words, the exact opposite of the general
incentives put before them, which increases their dependence on
foreign help and obliges them to rely on the promises of countries
against which the process of proliferation is directed in the first place.

Inevitably there emerge disputes about the process of
negotiation obscuring the purpose of the anti-proliferation diplomacy.
The pressures and incentives that need to be assembled are of a
magnitude to command a multilateral approach involving the key
countries bordering Iran and North Korea. If the pressures involve the
threat or use of military force, the attitude of neighboring countries -
China with respect to North Korea, Russia with respect to India -
becomes especially crucial.

To achieve a successful nonproliferation policy, the next
administration will need to clarify these issues. The controversies

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about the appropriate forum detract from the main task, which should
be to decide on a precise program to be negotiated. In Europe, the
discussion about the method for dealing with Iran too often is
presented as a means to restrain American bellicosity instead of as an
elaboration of common purposes. And on North Korea, the dispute
concerns whether the United States should negotiate bilaterally with
Pyongyang.

It goes without saying that the nonproliferation issue cannot be
resolved diplomatically without the direct participation of the
interested parties, including the proliferating country. But [in the case
of] Iran, care must be taken lest proliferation assume a symbolic
character in an ongoing Atlantic controversy. And with respect to
North Korea, the insistence on US-North Korea bilateralism would
leave America as the sole enforcer of any agreement at the borders of

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19

China. And it would enable Pyongyang to use the agreement for
repeated bouts of blackmail on the pattern it followed after the
bilateral agreement of 1994.

The most urgent task for the United States is to clarify together
with other interested parties an answer to the following questions:

(a) How much time is left before the process of proliferation in
North Korea and India becomes irreversible? In other words, how
much time do we have to execute whatever policy is [reached]?

(b) If negotiations make progress, what precisely do we insist
on, and what concessions or assurances are we prepared to offer in
return?

If we cannot answer these questions, nonproliferation policy will
turn into a means to legitimize proliferation.

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If the process continues to drift, we will sooner or later need to
address the issue of how we would react in the face of a nuclear
explosion of undetermined origin either in this country or on friendly
territory. At what point will the risk become so great [that it elicits]
consideration of how to impose nonproliferation regimes together with
like-minded countries?

2639
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10/16/04

ARTICLE

As those lines are being written, the election process is still
in full swing. But in a few days, the election process will have
~~that~~ has mesmerized America

for three months will be over. The focus groups, the pollsters, the
spinners on talk shows combining eagerness to please with congenital
insecurity, will vanish until another election cycle calls them forth
again.

P. 1

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Oct 17 04 10:26a

OCT-16-2004 11:05

KAI

212 759 0042

prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of long-range purposes.

The challenge for Europe is to resist the temptation of "distinctiveness" for its own sake. Criticism of US culture and policy has been a staple of European opponents of NATO for 50 years. What is unusual now is that governments in key countries are making no efforts to stem the tide, occasionally even stirring it up. A groundswell of public opinion is forming, increasingly defining a "European" ~~& German~~ foreign policy as distinctiveness from the United States.

To be sure, a vital relationship must leave room for disagreements; indeed, it will benefit from it. But if a special relationship is to survive and prosper, a sense of partnership must be restored.

OCT-16-2004 11:05

KAI

212 759 0042

Much of ~~German media~~ debate implies that the answer is "very little."

That answer spells the slow disintegration of an allied relationship and of a world order with the Atlantic partnership as its centerpiece. The relationship, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character – that is, the United States and ~~Germany~~ should be prepared to do things for each other beyond the immediate concepts of interest.

A deepening of the dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic is imperative. The ultimate challenge for US foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. It implies the need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy

p. 9

Oct 17 04 10:30a

["for a series of consultations focused on selling immediate policy\nwhile we are aware of our strategic preeminence. It implies the need\nbeen with the U.S. and the EU. The U.S. and the EU are two of the\ninternational order, other than the U.S., composed of many centers of power, even\nthe dominant power, and a sense of shared reasonability. It is to\nbe true that the U.S. and the EU are two of the most dominant powers, and\nthe conduct policy, so the Australian sublimates Coral Bell has written, as it\nis true that

2639 WORDS (partial count)

10/16/04

## ARTICLE

In a few days, the election process that has mesmerized America for three months will be over. The focus groups, the pollsters, the spinners on talk shows combining eagerness to please with congenital insecurity, will vanish until another election cycle calls them forth again.

2

The [challenge perhaps] most [analogous] to that [facing] the
 next] president is that inherited by President Truman when the end of
 the Second World War in 1945 left a vacuum in Central Europe and the
 Soviet Union emerged as a threat to the global equilibrium. But
 Truman's task was largely centered on the Atlantic [sphere]. The
 Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. [Today's]
 principal threats are abstract and mobile; they have generated attacks
 from Bali to Singapore, to Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis,
 and New York. In the 1940s, the solution was straightforward, albeit
 quite difficult: to construct a defensive line in the center of Europe
 and an economic program to close the gap between expectation and
 reality, which constituted the greatest threat to domestic stability.

3

4

The security challenge arises from two sources: the gravest
from acts until recently considered the task of internal police forces
rather than international policy; or it grows out of a scientific evolution
enabling countries to pose threats to survival as a result of
developments entirely *within* a state's territory.

5

6

7

CYJ

## Iraq

8

9

Lyd

countries – though it is not possible such a one-sided arrangement
[can continue] indefinitely or indeed much longer.

Having experienced the challenges of creating local security
forces in Indochina, I would warn against approaching that enterprise
in too mechanical a spirit. In Vietnam, it took longer to make units
combat-ready than simply fulfilling the requirements of a training
manual. And many units that were prepared to risk their lives in
defense of their home regions were far less effective when used as a
strategic reserve to support an overall design – though, in the end, the

10

11

12

13

14

The nature of the political evolution also suggests that it is
neither in America's interest nor that of the affected countries that it
be conducted together with other states. If the US insists on being the
sole interlocutor for the Iraqi government regarding its political
evolution. . . .

15

16

17

domestic policy – in other words, the exact opposite of the general incentives put before them, which increases their dependence on foreign help and obliges them to rely on the promises of countries against which the process of proliferation is directed in the first place.

Inevitably there emerge disputes about the process of negotiation obscuring the purpose of the anti-proliferation diplomacy. The pressures and incentives that need to be assembled are of a magnitude to command a multilateral approach involving the key countries bordering Iran and North Korea. If the pressures involve the threat or use of military force, the attitude of neighboring countries – China with respect to North Korea, Russia with respect to India – becomes especially crucial.

18

19

20

OCT-16-2004 11:05

KAI

212 759 0042

Much of ~~German media debate implies that the answer is "very little."~~

A deepening of the dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic is imperative. The ultimate challenge for US foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. ✓ It implies the need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy

2639 WORDS (partial count)

10/16/04

ARTICLE

10/17/04 09:17am P. 001

703 9414072

JODY WILLIAMS