Copy No. 4

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

June 3, 1963

Conversation with Franz-Josef Strauss - May 17, 1963

This was the first meeting with Strauss since his resignation. He seemed much less ebullient than formerly.

Strauss began by saying that he was the victim of the press which had a left-wing orientation and the cowardice of the Chancellor. If Adenauer had fought for him he would still be in office. What had happened to him would not only affect his own future but the future of any strong defense policy. Von Hassel would be much more careful in order to avoid concerted attacks which would follow any attempt to think through his own ideas. Strauss added that "certain quarters" in the United States, particularly in the Pentagon, had co-operated in the attack on him. He refused to elaborate or to specify.

Turning to NATO, Strauss said that he thought the NATO multilateral force was a fraud. I told him that I seemed to remember that he used to advocate it. He replied that he had been and still was in favor of land-based mobile missiles. Surface ships were ridiculous, too vulnerable, their missiles too inaccurate and their warheads too powerful. He said that most German officers at NATO shared his view. A recent presentation by an American admiral at NATO had been extremely unconvincing.

Moreover, Strauss continued, his objections had to be seen in terms of his assessment of over-all U.S. strategy. The primary purpose of U.S. strategy, according to Strauss, was three-fold: (a) to keep ultimate control of nuclear weapons, (b) to raise the threshhold at which nuclear weapons would have to be used, and (c) to keep open the possibility of a separate accommodation with the Soviets in which the European allies would be consulted but which they would not be permitted to veto.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

He had heard Dean Rusk say on three separate occasions that the United
States had no quarrel with the U.S.S.R. All its disputes concerned other
people. Such an attitude was untenable in the long run. The distinction be-
tween U.S. and European interests made by a U.S. Secretary of State was too
dangerous for Europe. It made war again an instrument of policy. It could
sacrifice European interests to an over-all accommodation. Thus Europe had to
develop its own nuclear weapons to regain some control over its destiny.

I said that I had been told that during the Berlin crisis he had opposed
all military countermeasures. How was it possible for him then to assume we
would be less determined than the Europeans. Strauss replied that his opposi-
tion had been to our military plans which were nonsense. They proved his
general point. The result would be a conventional defeat and perhaps the dis-
integration of NATO.

Strauss did not let himself be drawn into a closer definition of what
he meant by a European atomic force. With respect to German national nuclear
weapons he said that he saw no need for them as long as the NATO guarantee re-
mained adequate. If that changed, Germany would have to reconsider its posi-
tion. Even then he preferred a European to a national solution.

Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Strauss began by saying that he was the victim of a left-wing press and the cowardice of the Chancellor. What had happened to him would not only affect his own future but the future of any strong defense policy. Van Hassel would be much more careful in order to avoid the KENNEDY concerted attacks which would follow any attempt to think through his own ideas. Strauss added that "certain qualifications" in the United States, particularly in the Pentagon, had cooperated in the attack on him. He refused to elaborate or to specify.

Turning to NATO, Strauss said that he thought the NATO MX multilateral force was a fraud. I told him that I seemed to remember that he used to advocate it. He replied that he had been and still was in favor of land-based, mobile MX missiles. Surface ships were ridiculous, too vulnerable, their missiles too inaccurate and their warheads too powerful. He said that most German officers at NATO shared his view. A recent presentation by an American admiral at NATO had been extremely unconvincing.

He had heard Dean Rusk say on three separate occasions that the United States had no quarrel with the U.S.S.R. All its disputes concerned other people. Such an attitude was untenable in the long run. The distinction between U.S. and European interests made by a U.S. Secretary of State was too dangerous for

2

Europe. It made war again an instrument of policy. It could sacrifice European interests to an **ex**tra over-all accommodation. Thus Europe had to develop its own nuclear weapons to regain some control over its destiny.

I said that I had been told that during the Berlin crisis he had opposed all military countermeasures. How was it possible for him then to assume we would be less determined than the Europeans. Strauss replied that his opposition had been to our military plans which were nonsense. They proved his general point. The result would be a conventional defeat and perhaps the disintegration of NATO.

Strauss did not let himself be drawn into a closer definition of what he meant by this. (With respect to German national nuclear weapons he said that he saw no need for them as long as the NATO guarantee remained adequate. If that changed, Germany would have to reconsider its position. Even then he preferred a European solution.)