-3-

more dangerous than the one before. And the current crisis
is particularly dangerous, for it threatens the price
and supply of oil, that most precious commodity, and
thereby threatens the economic health of all the
industrialized democracies.

We can see three dangers in the present conflict:

First of all, whoever wins the Iran-Iraq war, the
principal beneficiary will be the Soviet Union. Iraq
is a Soviet client and has been for over 20 years.
Since 1972 there has been a formal treaty relationship,
and Soviet arms have turned Iraq into a substantial
military power that is now bidding for dominance of
the Persian Gulf. It was this trend that caused the pro-
Western government in Iran to seek American arms in 1972,
and while it was in power it was a counterweight to Iraq.
Now, after the collapse of that friendly government in Iran
and the foolish excesses of the Iranian revolution, Iraq
is filling the vacuum of power. The West's nightmare for
the last ten years is about to come true: A radical anti-
Western state is on the verge of becoming the predominant
power in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, as the fighting
broke out, a top Iraqi official rushed to Moscow where
he was demonstratively received by a top ranking Secretary
of the Soviet Party Central Committee.

The second danger is the impact of this conflict on
our friends, the moderates states in the Middle East.

-4-

Their reaction is predictable when they observe two trends; and second, that Iraq now threatens to emerge as the dominant military power in the Gulf. They will not turn to us, as the Carter Administration naively believes. Even Iran may have no choice but to adjust to strategic realities, and either seek Moscow's protection or face disintegration.

The third danger lies in this further, and monumentally serious, demonstration of American impotence and irrelevance.

The President has proclaimed our neutrality, and I am prepared to support this position and not to second-guess his tactical decisions. But he needs to explain his policies to the American people.

-- The President insists on our right of free passage through the Straits of Hormuz, where 100 tankers pass each day. But what is our policy for guaranteeing it? What will we do if ~~Iraqi~~ or Iranian forces close the Straits?

-- And while we may be neutral, we clearly have vital interests in the area, as the President himself has proclaimed. What steps are we taking to coordinate our policies with our allies, who are even more vulnerable to disruption ~~of~~ to the oil lifeline? After all, 40 percent of the world's oil supplies pass through the Gulf. This is an area where 8 million barrels a day of Saudi Arabian oil are shipped. Iraq supplies 500,000 barrels of oil every day to France, 400,000 to Brazil, and 200,000 to Japan, to say nothing of the supplies to Europe from other Gulf states.

-5-

Where is the fire break beyond which the radical assault on the moderate states and our friends will be resisted? If we cannot answer this question, the radicalization of the whole area will be inevitable.

And even if this particular crisis passes, we still face the more fundamental problem of the Carter Administration's failed approach to international affairs:

- The President did not respond in 1977, when the Cuban and Soviets first intervened in Ethiopia.

- The President did not respond, in 1978, when the Communists first overthrew the legitimate government of Afghanistan.

- The President did not respond in 1979, when he accepted a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba that he two weeks earlier had declared "unacceptable," and when our policies accelerated the process by which Iran turned from a key ally into a cauldron of anti-Americanism.

- and he did not develop an effective policy last Christmas, when the Red Army march into Afghanistan.

It is this pattern of vacillation and inaction that produces the threat to world peace. We cannot continue to abdicate our international responsibilities without paying an enormous price.

## The Requirement of Peace

What needs to be done to maintain world peace?

Peace depends on restoring the four fundamental pillars of an effective foreign policy.

First, we must restore the strategic military balance, in both intercontinental and conventional

weaponry. We cannot permit every major measure of military
power to turn against us without incurring drastic
political losses in a world in turmoil. For it is
American weakness that provokes crises, not American
strength.

Second, we must regain the confidence of our allies
and restore the regional balances of power. Where will
we draw the line in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf?
We must build a firebreak against the advance of radicalism
and Communism in this vital area. If we fail to support
and reassure our friends there, then the entire area will
turn viciously against us and against our allies.

The third requirement for peace is to restore, in
Washington, an understanding of what is happening in the
world. We must have a strategy for coping with our future,
instead of the zigzagging and piecemeal decisions that
are the hallmark of the Carter Administration. We simply
cannot improvise our way through every crisis and confronta-
tion, allowing contradictory policies to run simultaneously
because the President can't make a decision. Our long-term
defense policy cannot succeed with a President who declared
in 1976 and 1977 that the defense budget needed to be
cut by $7 billion, and then raised it by $5 billion two
years later. This is political manipulation, and not a
national strategy.

On the basis of these principles,
and only on this basis, must we turn to the question of

-7-

(4)

negotiating with the Soviet Union. But it is not possible to
concentrate only on measures of controlling arms. The
threat to the peace in the recent period has been the
continuing Soviet geopolitical assault on the world balance
of power. The Soviet Union must therefore be made to
negotiate about that, together with the control of arms.

The Administration's misunderstanding of this
reality is shown by the President's recent news conference
in which, before Secretary Muskie had even met with Foreign
Minister Gromyko, the President already announced the
outcome; and the outcome is another arms control negotiation,
without any reference to the foreign policy context.

* * *

All Americans are united in the yearning for peace.
This is not a partisan dispute. What is in dispute, however,
is whether the vacillations of this Administration are not
inviting crises and contributing to the danger of conflict.
That is the issue the American people must face as we enter
a decade of new dangers.

THE WORLD CRISIS AND WORLD PEACE

Maintaining world peace is a central
typically
issue in this election. President Carter has/gone so far
as to claim that only he can preserve the peace. But he fails
to understand the real issue/ It is not the individual decisions
of any President that *guarantee* peace; every President, including
Mr. Carter, will try to behave as prudently as possible.

The danger of war, or crisis, rarely results from some
single deliberate decision to press a button./it comes from
statesmen losing control over events. It comes from allowing
events to drift out of control to the point where we are
faced with only the horrendous choice between resorting to
military action (always a last resort), or else acquiescing
in some major development that is disastrous to our interests.
Allowing that situation to develop in the first place means
that our policy has *already* failed. Success in foreign
policy means never letting things develop to that point.

A President who does not know how to wield America's
influence to head off dangerous developments, to shape events
at an early stage according to *our* purposes, only exacerbates
crises. It is the hallmark of impotence, and impotence
means that we will drift into further crisis. The resulting
chaos only leads to disaster. The ability of a statesman
to remain in control of events is the true test of his
stewardship. Mr. Carter has failed this test. This is the
real issue of peace, and today if we survey the Carter record
we see that there is no peace.

-2-

-- There is no peace in Africa, where 30,000 Cuban troops and Soviet-bloc advisers are trying to suppress a popular rebellion in Angola, and where 20,000 Cuban troops and Soviet-bloc advisers are in Ethiopia threatening Somalia.

-- There is no peace in Cambodia, where the North Vietnese continue their invasion and occupation, with the support of the Soviet Union.

-- There is no peace in Afghanistan, where 100,000 Soviet troops are vainly trying to subjugate the Afghan freedom fight.

-- And now there is no peace in the Persian Gulf, in what is possibly the most vital area of the world to the security and survival of the West, where Iraq and Iran, two countries hostile to us, have started a war in which we lose whichever side wins.

The harsh fact is that over the past three years, international crises have multiplied. Each crisis is more dangerous than the one before. And the current crisis is particularly dangerous for it threatens the economic health of the Western world-- and the price and supply of oil, that most precious commodity.

First of all, whoever wins the Iran-Iraq war, the principal ben beneficiary will be the Soviet Union. Iraq is a Soviet client and has been for over 20 years. Since 1972 there has been a formal treaty relationship, and Soviet arms have turned Iraq into a substantial military power that is now bidding for dominance of the Persian Gulf. It was this trend

-3-

that caused the Shah to seek American arms in 1972, and while he
was in power he was a counterweight to Iraq. Now, after the
collapse of a friendly government in Iran and the foolish excesses
of the Iranian revolution, Iraq is filling the vacuum of power.
The West's nightmare for the last ten years is about to come
true: A Soviet ally is on the verge of becoming the predominant
power in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, as the fighting broke out,
a top Iraqi official rushed to Moscow where he was demonstratively
received by a top ranking Secretary of the Soviet Party
Central Committee.

The second danger is the impact of this conflict on
the moderate states--the impact on Jordan and Saudi Arabia
that borders on Iraq, or on Israel and Egypt or even our
European allies. The reaction is predictable when the
moderates observe two trends; first, that every international
conflict in the last three years has been settled decisively
by Soviet arms, by Soviet clients, with the support of
Soviet friendship treaties; second, that Iraq now threatens
to emerge as the dominant military power in the Gulf. They
will not turn to us, as the Carter Administration naively believes.
Even Iran may have no choice but to adjust to strategic
realities, and either seek Moscow's protection or face
disintegration.

-4-

The President says we will not use force to keep open the Straits of Hormuz, where 100 tankers pass each day. But then he insists on the right of free passage through the Straits. What is our policy? What will we do if the Iraqi or Iranian forces close the Straits?

And while we may be neutral, we clearly have vital interests in the area, as the President himself has proclaimed. What steps are we taking to coordinate our policies with our allies? After all, 40 percent of the world's oil supplies pass through the Gulf. This is an area where 8 million barrels a day of Saudi Arabian oil are shipping Iraq supplies 500,000 barrels of oil every day to France, 400,000 to Brazil, and 200,000 to Japan, to say nothing of the supplies to Europe from other Gulf states. The total shutdown of the Gulf will be a world crisis of shattering dimensions.

In other words, how does the President intend to gain control over this dangerous crisis? As I said at the outset, this is the test of statesmanship.

And even if this particular crisis passes, we still face the more fundamental problem of the Carter Administration's failed approach to world peace, that has led to yet another American humiliation and defeat:

- The President failed in 1977, when the Cubans and Soviets first intervened in Ethiopia.

- The President failed in 1978, when the Communists overthrew the legitimate government of Afghanistan and we made no response.

- The President failed in 1979, when he accepted a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba, and when he looked on helplessly when

-5-

Iran turned from a key ally into a cauldron of anti-Americanism.
-- And he failed last Christmas, when the Red Army marched into
Afghanistan.

This pattern cannot continue. We cannot continue to
abdicate our international responsibilities without paying
an unacceptably high price. Each crisis will only become
worse and more threatening. The Soviet Union will become the
dominant power on almost every continent.

The Requirement of Peace

Second, we must restore the regional balances of power.
Where will we draw the line in the Indian Ocean and the Persian
Gulf? We must build a firebreak against the advance of radicalism
and anti-Americanism in this vital area. If we fail to support
and reassure our friends and allies, then the entire area will
turn viciously against us and against our allies.

The third requirement, therefore, is to restore the
psychological balance by halting the constant erosion of
American prestige and influence abroad, and ending the growing
crisis of confidence in our leadership. This Administration

-6-

has accomplished the unprecedented feat of alienating _both_ the Soviet Union _and_ our NATO allies. Our allies now have less confidence in American leaders than at any time since the end of the Second World War. In both the Iranian and Afghan crises, the US could not gain the support of its allies because they actually believe our erratic policies were a threat to peace. And now Andrei Gromyko spends one hour before the United Nations General Assembly accusing _us_ of endangering world peace.

The fourth and final requirement for peace is to restore, in Washington, an understanding of what is happening in the world. We must have a strategy for coping with our future, instead of the zigzagging and piecemeal decisions that are the hallmark of the Carter Administration. We simply cannot improvise our way through every crisis and confrontation, allowing contradictory policies to run simultaneously because the President can't make a decision. Our long-term defense policy cannot succeed with a President who declared in 1976 and 1977 that the defense budget needed to be cut by $7 billion, and then raised it by $5 billion two years later. This is political manipulation, and not a national strategy.

On the basis of these principles, and only on this basis, can we then turn to the question of negotiating with the Soviet Union. And when we do, the agenda must include the aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union, not just in Afghanistan, but worldwide. The President has already announced the outcome of the meetings between Secretary Muskie and Foreign Minister

Gromyko. Apparently a new round of European arms control
talks is to begin. Thus, Mr. Carter repeats the same mistake:
ignoring Soviet behavior and putting the whole burden of
East-West relations on arms control negotiating. I have
indicated my support for effective arms control. But how
can we proceed with business as usual, nine months
after the invasion of Afghanistan, or while a Soviet client
destroys the peace of the Persian Gulf? We cannot allow
the Soviet leaders to use arms control talks as a safety valve,
as a cover for global aggression. Nor can arms control survive
such a period of international tension.

It is time to answer Gromyko by restoring a strong and
firm American foreign policy, by once again becoming the
master of our own destiny, not the helpless, passive victim
of events. This is the test of a statesmen and it is the
true challenge of peace.

Maintaining world peace is a central issue in this election. President Carter has/gone so far as to claim that only he can preserve the peace. But he fails to understand the real issue/It is not the individual decisions of a President that guarantee peace; every President, including Mr. Carter, will try to behave as prudently as possible.

The danger of war, or crisis, rarely results from some
single deliberate decision to press a button, it comes from
statesmen losing control over events. It comes from allowing
events to drift out of control to the point where we are
faced with only the horrendous choice between resorting to
military action (always a last resort), or else acquiescing
in some major development that is disastrous to our interests.
Allowing that situation to develop in the first place means
that our policy has already failed. Success in foreign
policy means never letting things develop to that point.

A President who does not know how to wield America's
influence to head off dangerous developments, to shape events
at an early stage according to our purposes, invites crises and
them. This is the hallmark of impotence, and impotence in the Carter Administration. That is to threat to peace off the world. And for that, Pres. Carter means that we will drift into further crisis. The resulting must be some version of chaos only leads to disaster. The ability of a statesman to remain in control of events is the true test of his stewardship. Mr. Carter has failed this test. This is the extraordinary feat of having at one and the same time the worst relations with our allies, the worst relations with our adversaries, and the most serious threats in the developing world since the end of World War II.

-2-

50
advisers are deployed in an area from
and Soviet-bloc advisers are trying to suppress a popular
rebellion in Angola, and where 20,000 Cuban troops and Soviet-
in Africa and even menacing the Arabian Peninsula, an
bloc advisers are in Ethiopia threatening Somalia.
The Horn of Africa.

There is no peace in Cambodia, where the North Vietnamese continue their invasion and occupation, with the support of the Soviet Union, and threaten ally Thailand.

-- There is no peace in Afghanistan, where 100,000 Soviet troops are vainly trying to subjugate the Afghan freedom fighters.

The harsh fact is that over the past three years,
international crises have multiplied. Each crisis is more
dangerous than the one before. And the current crisis is
particularly dangerous, for it threatens the economic health of
the Western world--and the price and supply of oil, that most
precious commodity, and thereby, threatens the economic health of all
industrialized democracies.

The second danger is the impact of this conflict on our friends,
the moderate states--the impact on Jordan and Saudi Arabia
that borders on Iraq, or on Israel and Egypt or even our
European allies. Their reaction is predictable when they
moderate observe two trends; first, that every international
conflict in the last three years has been settled decisively
by Soviet arms, by Soviet clients, with the support of
Soviet friendship treaties; second, that Iraq now threatens
to emerge as the dominant military power in the Gulf. They
will not turn to us, as the Carter Administration naively believes.
Even Iran may have no choice but to adjust to strategic
realities, and either seek Moscow's protection or face
disintegration.

-4-

(4)

insists on our right of free passage through
The President says we will not use force to keep open
the Straits of Hormuz, where 100 tankers pass each day. But
then he insists on the right of free passage through the Straits.
for guaranteeing it?
What is our policy? What will we do if the Iraqi or Iranian
forces close the Straits?

-- And while we may be neutral, we clearly have vital interests
in the area, as the President himself has proclaimed. What
steps are we taking to coordinate our policies with our allies? Who are
even more vulnerable to disruption of the oil life-line?
After all, 40 percent of the world's oil supplies pass through
the Gulf. This is an area where 8 million barrels a day of
Saudi Arabian oil are shipping Iraq supplies 500,000 barrels
of oil every day to France, 400,000 to Brazil, and 200,000 to
Japan, to say nothing of the supplies to Europe from other Gulf
states. The total shutdown of the Gulf will be a world crisis
of shattering dimensions.

What is the firebreak beyond which the assault on the
canals will be inevitable.
In other words, how does the President intend to gain
moderate states and our friends will be resisted? If we
control over this dangerous crisis? As I said at the
cannot answer this question, the radicalization of the whole
outset, this is the test of statesmanship.
area will be inevitable.

And even if this particular crisis passes, we still
face the more fundamental problem of the Carter Administration's
international affairs:
failed approach to world peace, that has led to yet another
American humiliation and defeat:

-- The President failed in 1977, when the Cubans and Soviets
first intervened in Ethiopia.

The President failed in 1978, when the Communists overthrew
the legitimate government of Afghanistan, and we made no response.

The President failed in 1979, when he accepted a Soviet
that he two weeks earlier had declared "unacceptable," and when our policies
combat brigade in Cuba, and when he looked on helplessly when

-5-

(4)

Iran turned from a key ally into a cauldron of anti-Americanism. He did not gain a clear view on effective policy. And he failed last Christmas, when the Red Army marched into Afghanistan.

## The Requirement of Peace

-7-

negotiating with the Soviet Union. Is not possible to
concentrate only on measures to control arms. The
Threat to the peace in the recent period has been the
continuing Soviet geopolitical assault on the world balance
of power. The Soviet Union must therefore be made to
negotiate about that, togethier with the control of arms.

The Administration's misunderstanding of this
reality is shown by the President's recent news conference
in which, before Secretary Muski had even met with Foreign
Minister Gromyko, the President already announced the
outcome; and the outcome is another arms control negotiation,
without any reference to the foreign policy context.

* * *

[Y]

Maintaining world peace is a central
typically
issue in this election. President Carter has/gone so far
as to claim that only he can preserve the peace. But he fails
to understand the real issue/ It is not the individual decisions
lead to
of any President that guarantee peace, every President, including
Mr. Carter, will try to behave as prudently as possible.

The danger of war, or crisis, rarely results from some
single deliberate decision to press a button. It comes from
statesmen losing control over events. It comes from allowing
events to drift out of control to the point where we are
faced with only the horrendous choice between resorting to
military action (always a last resort), or else acquiescing
in some major development that is disastrous to our interests.
Allowing that situation to develop in the first place means
that our policy has already failed. Success in foreign
policy means never letting things develop to that point.

A President who does not know how to wield America's
influence to head off dangerous developments, to shape events
at an early stage according to our purposes, only exacerbates
*their* crises. It is the hallmark of impotence, and impotence
*means* that we will drift into further crisis. The resulting
*chaos* only leads to disaster. The ability of a statesman
to remain in control of events is the true test of his
stewardship. Mr. Carter has failed this test. This is the
real issue of peace, and today if we survey the Carter record
we see that there is no peace.

-2-

that caused the Shah to seek American arms in 1972, and while he
was in power he was a counterweight to Iraq. Now, after the
collapse of a friendly government in Iran and the foolish excesses
of the Iranian revolution, Iraq is filling the vacuum of power.
The West's nightmare for the last ten years is about to come
to an end.

**Medical and Western states**

-4-

(4)

And while we may be neutral, we clearly have vital interests in the area, as the President himself has proclaimed. What steps are we taking to coordinate our policies with our allies? After all, 40 percent of the world's oil supplies pass through the Gulf. This is an area where 8 million barrels a day of Saudi Arabian oil are shipping to Iraq supplies 500,000 barrels of oil every day to France, 400,000 to Brazil, and 200,000 to Japan, to say nothing of the supplies to Europe from other Gulf states. The total shutdown of the Gulf will be a world crisis of shattering dimensions.

In other words, how does the President intend to gain control over this dangerous crisis? -As I said at the outset, this is the test of statesmanship.

And even if this particular crisis passes, we still face the more fundamental problem of the Carter Administration's failed approach to world peace, that has led to yet another American humiliation and defeat.

-5-

## The Requirement of Peace

Second, we must restore the regional balances of power. Where will we draw the line in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf? We must build a firebreak against the advance of radicalism, ~~anti-Americanism~~ in this vital area. If we fail to support and reassure our friends and allies, then the entire area will turn viciously against us and against our allies.

-6-

has accomplished the unprecedented feat of alienating both
the Soviet Union and our NATO allies. Our allies now have
less confidence in American leaders than at any time since
the end of the Second World War. In both the Iranian and
Afghan crises, the US could not gain the support of its allies
because they actually believe our erratic policies were a
threat to peace. And now Andrei Gromyko spends one hour
before the United Nations General Assembly accusing us of
endangering world peace.

-7-

(4)

dpl @ sappiakats.

muselesta & I ab ki

Shan by O's negst pe

/shw Mew arsaa. / ukem

he tul mad y the fomga.

Maintaining world peace is a central
typically
issue in this election. President Carter has/gone so far
as to claim that only he can preserve the peace. But he fails
to understand the real issue/ It is not the individual decisions
of any President that guarantee peace; every President, including
Mr. Carter, will try to behave as prudently as possible.

A President who does not know how to wield America's
influence to head off dangerous developments, to shape events
at an early stage according to our purposes, only exacerbates
crisis. It is the hallmark of the world
means that we will drift into further crisis. The resulting
chaos only leads to disaster. The ability of a statesman
to remain in control of events is the true test of his
stewardship. Mr. Carter has failed this test. This is the
real issue of peace, and today if we survey the Carter record
we see that there is no peace.

-2-

(4)

The second danger is the impact of this conflict on the moderate states—the impact on Jordan and Saudi Arabia that borders on Iraq, or on Israel and Egypt or even our European allies. The reaction is predictable when the moderates observe two trends; first, that every international conflict in the last three years has been settled decisively by Soviet arms, by Soviet clients, with the support of Soviet friendship treaties; second, that Iraq now threatens to emerge as the dominant military power in the Gulf. They will not turn to us, as the Carter Administration naively believes. Even Iran may have no choice but to adjust to strategic realities, and either seek Moscow's protection or face disintegration.

-4-

-5-

Iran turned from a key ally into a cauldron of anti-Americanism. We not develop an effective policy last Christmas, when the Red Army marched into Afghanistan.

## The Requirement of Peace

-7-

ix

IRAN → Iraq Intelligence Briefing

The briefing is likely to be a general one, emphasizing the present military situation. The political questions are far more interesting than what did we know before hand and what did we do about it, if anything; and second what is the assessment of other countries as to the outcome; did we suffer a setback in the eyes of key countries in Europe, the Middle East and nearby areas? Are the Soviets percieved as the gainers?

It is worth remembering that in the period before the war, i.e. the month of August September, the Administration was sending messages to Iran, hinting at negotiations, and making semi-optimistic statements about the outcome. What was the working assumption about hostilities underlying these actions and statements?

Once the war began the critical question were the degree of Soviet involvement, in resupplying and or encouraging Iraq; this is particularly important in light of statements prasing the Soviets for restraint and the agreement to be reached about their nuclear weapons in Europe. Were the Soviets actively trying to end the fighting or merely going through the motions while their clients achieved their objectives?

Finally, there is the question of where we go from here: If it is fighting likely to erupt again, is Iran turning to Moscow, are we working against Khomenin, etc., It may be of particular importance to have an official estimate, in light of the volatile situation. Another round of fighting threats to oil supplies, etc., in late October obviously has an impact on the election campaign.

In sum, what did we know and what, and what do we think will happen know are the important questions.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

1. <u>Early Warning</u>

What degree of early warning was available to the US,
were collected; how were they interpreted
what specific indicators and what actions, if any were
taken?

-- Usually there is some indication if communications
intelligence or other technical intelligence, overhead
photography, of impending troop movements, or standdown
of aircraft, protective measures, etc.;

-- were any intelligence collections measures adopted in
the past several weeks in anticipation of actual fighting:
what specifically?

-- what do we know of political, military support or
encouragement of Iraq from the Soviet Union in the weeks
before the fighting began?

-- were any "Alert Memorandum" prepared before the fighting,
and if so, what was their content?

<u>Comment</u>: Obviously the outbreak of fighting in this region
should be of major importance for the US; yet, the <u>N.Y. Times</u>
indicated we were poorly prepared on all counts:

"The war between the Iran and Iraq exposed serious deficiencies in United States intelligence-gathering abilities in the strategically vital Persian Gulf region, according to senior aids in the Carter Administration and intelligence officials." (N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1980)

If, in fact, the US had some warning, the question arises
of what diplomatic action was taken to head off the fighting:
Were the Soviets approached? Were the Iranians warned?

-3-

## 2. The Course of the War?

What were the predictions on the course of the war:
specifically, did we estimate the destruction of oil
facilities in Iran and Iraq? Did we predict the probability
of Iraqi occupation of the oil regions of Iran: how did
we assess the Iranian performance? Did we anticipate the
loss of oil productions? How much has in fact been lost?

What has been the Soviet role during the war:

-- have there been any resupply to Iran of ammunition; weapons, etc.,

-- what has been the diplomatic relationship of Iraq and the USSR during the fighting;

-- what position did the Soviet take in the UN and in talks with the US; what assessment has been made about Soviet policy in the future; specifically about Soviet overtures to Iran, after the fighting is ended.

3. What have the various embassies, CIA stations, etc., in the area and in other key countries (Europe and Middle East especially) conclude about the conflict: is this a setback for the US, a gain for the USSR; how is our performance being rated in various quarters: weak, strong, etc. What popular opinion assessments have been made by CIA?

-- What is the Isreali view? Sadat's?

4. What is the assessment of the impact of the defeat on Iranian politics?

-- is Khomeini strengthened or weakened? what is the impact

-4-

(4)

on the various Iranian political factions?

-- does the US have any plans for operations inside Iran
or in other areas to effect the internal political situation;
if so, what are they and their purpose and chances of success?

4. What is the short and middle-term outlook:

-- will Iran resume the fighting? Iraq? What is likelihood
of blockade of straits? is it feasible w/ the skip as mines?

-- will both sides need supplies, and how much; is Soviet resupply beginning? <new military>

-- what is likely <ins>the future</ins> relationship between Iran and Soviet Union?
is a Soviet mediating role possible? what evidence is there
of this?

5. What is the impact <ins>on</ins> oil supplies and prices:

-- how much damage has been done to Iraq and Iran?

-- what will market trends be?

-- is the USSR likely to begin buying Iranian oil? Iraqi?

9/30/80

IRAN-IRAQ INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

The briefing is likely to be a general one, emphasizing the present military situation. The political questions are far more interesting than the technical details of what intelligence we have. For example, what did we know before-hand and what did we do about it, if anything; and second, what is the assessment of other countries as to the outcome; did we suffer a setback in the eyes of key countries in Europe, the Middle East and nearby areas? Are the Soviets perceived as the gainers?

It is worth remembering that in the period before the war, i.e., the month of September, the Administration was sending messages to Iran, hinting at negotiations, and making semi-optimistic statements. What was the working assumption about hostilities underlying these actions and statements?

Once the war began, a critical question was the degree of Soviet involvement in resupplying and or encouraging Iraq; this is particularly important in light of statements praising the Soviets for restraint and the Muskie-Gromyko agreement to begin negotiations about theater nuclear weapons in Europe. Were the Soviets actively trying to end the fighting or merely going through the motions while their clients achieved their objectives?

Finally, there is the question of where we go from here: is fighting likely to erupt again; is Iran turning to Moscow, are we working against Khomeini, etc. It may be of particular importance to have an official estimate, in light of the

volatile situation. Another round of fighting, threats to
oil supplies, etc., in later October obviously has an impact
on the election campaign.

In sum, what did we know and when, and what do we think
will happen now are the important questions.

More specific questions are attached.

-3-

[Y]

# IRAN-IRAQ WAR: INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING

## 1. Early Warning

What degree of early warning was available to the US, what specific indicators were collected; how were they interpreted, and what actions, if any were taken?

-- Usually there is some indication of communications intelligence or other technical intelligence, overhead photography, of impending troop movements, or standdown of aircraft, protective measures, etc.;

-- were any special intelligence collections measures adopted in the past several weeks in anticipation of actual fighting: what specifically?

-- what do we know of political, military support for, or encouragement of Iraq from the Soviet Union in the weeks before the fighting began?

-- were any "Alert Memoranda" prepared for the NSC before the fighting, if so, what was their conclusion?

**Comment:** Obviously the outbreak of fighting in this region should be of major importance for the US; yet, the *N.Y. Times* indicated we were poorly prepared on all counts:

> "The war between Iran and Iraq exposed serious deficiencies in United States intelligence-gathering abilities in the strategically vital Persian Gulf region, according to senior aides in the Carter Administration and intelligence officials." (N.Y. Times, Sept. 29, 1980)

-4-

## 2. The Course of the War?

What were the predictions on the course of the war: specifically, did we estimate the destruction of oil facilities in Iran and Iraq? Did we predict the probability of Iraqi occupation of the oil regions of Iran: how did we assess the Iranian performance? Did we anticipate the loss of oil production? How much has in fact been lost?

-- have there been any resupply to Iran of ammunition, weapons, etc.?

## 3. What have the various embassies, CIA stations, etc., in the area and in other key countries (Europe and Middle East especially) concluded about the conflict: is this a setback for the US, a gain for the USSR; how is our performance being rated in various quarters: weak, strong, etc. What assessments of popular opinion have been made

-5-

by ICA or CIA?

-- is Khomeini strengthened or weakened? What is the impact on various Iranian political factions?

-- what is the likelihood of the release of the hostages?

5. What is the short and middle-term outlook:

-- will Iran resume the fighting? Iraq? What is likelihood of blockade of Straits? is it feasible with ships or mines?

-- will both sides need new military supplies, and how much? is Soviet resupply beginning?

-- what is the likely future relationship between Iran and the Soviet Union? is a Soviet mediating role possible?

6. What is the impact on oil supplies and prices:

10/3

[y]

IRAN-IRAQ WAR: ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

1. What is the status of any exchanges or negotiations (direct or indirect) with Iran? (this is suggested by the second Muskie letter which reportedly reassured Iran of our neutrality.)

2. What is the status of U.S. exchanges with other Gulf and Middle East states, including Israel (in addition to Muskie's conversations with the Iraqi foreign minister)? What position is the US adopting in these various ex changes in New York at the UN or elsewhere? What have the individual countries had to report about the war, and what is their evaluation of the future? What is the assessment of President Zia? (According to the press reports, Muskie has ended a round of extensive meetings in New York with the various Islamic Muslim and Arab states, after which he announced that the chances of the conflict spreading had "diminished somewhat.")

3. What have Zia or Pakistani sources said about Gromyko's offer of "security guarantees" to Pakistan?

4. What is the essence of these exchanges about an allied contingency force to keep open the Gulf? (According to Secretary Muskie, these exchanges are continuing on a "technical level.")

10/3

1. What is the status of any exchanges or negotiations (direct or indirect) with Iran (this is suggested in the second Muskie letter which supposedly reassured Iran of our neutrality)?

2. What is the status of U.S. exchanges with other Gulf and Middle East states, including Isreal (in addition to Muskie's conversations with the Iraqi foreign minister)? What position is the US adopting in these various changes in New York at the UN or elsewhere? What have the individual countries had to report about the war, and their evaluation of the future? What is the assessment of President Zia? (According to the press reports, Muskie has ended a round of extensive meetings in New York with the various Muslim and Arab states, after which he announced that the chances of the conflict spreading had "diminished somewhat.")

4. What is the essence of exchanges about an allied contingency force to keep open the Gulf? (According to Secretary Muskie, these exchanges are continuing on a "technical level.")

A-6

# Pakistan's Zia, Carter
Meet for Talks Today

By Louis Halasz

Time-Life News Service

UNITED NATIONS — When Pakistani President Mohammed Zia ul-Haq meets with President Carter and his aides today, questions are likely to be raised about Zia's solicitude displayed toward the Soviet Union during a U.N. speech Wednesday.

With Zia will be his foreign minister, Agha Shahi, and finance minister, Ghulam Ishaq Khan. The Pakistanis expect all the troublesome issues of the region, from the Iran-Iraq conflict through Afghanistan to the Cambodian problem to come up.

According to Pakistani sources, he again will complain about the inadequacy of the promised $200 million in military assistance, which at one time he called "peanuts."

In several instances Wednesday, Zia softened prepared comments about the Soviet Union. For example, in the prepared text he referred to "superpower rivalry" as being behind the "tragic conflict" in Afghanistan, but in delivery he changed that to "colonial legacy," a Third World code phrase for Western powers.

The cumulative effect of these changes was a more deferential treatment of the Soviet Union, and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie was asked in a press conference yesterday afternoon whether he saw "any connection" between the changes and Zia's pending Washington trip.

Without rejecting the idea of a connection, Muskie said, "We better try to make that determination after we have met President Zia and his representatives — he should be the best authority on that."

High-level Pakistani sources, queried in the United Nations, said the changes had been made after Agha Shahi's "very good meeting" with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko last week. As a result, Agha Shahi thought it was advisable to make the references to the Soviet Union "less brusque," these sources said.

In that meeting Gromyko was described as quite understanding about the Pakistani refusal to negotiate directly with the Kabul regime and offered "security assurances" to Islamabad, Pakistanis here said.

Muskie said chances of the Iran-Iraq conflict spreading seem to have

"diminished somewhat," which makes it less likely Western navies will intervene to assure oil shipments from the Persian Gulf.

He also denied Iranian allegations of collusion between Iraq and the United States in the 11-day-old war between the two Persian Gulf neighbors.

Muskie, ending nine days of high-level meetings with foreign government officials attending the U.N. General Assembly, said he hoped Islamic or U.N. initiatives would end the war quickly.

"The risks of escalation and the consequences of escalation obviously pose very difficult problems for all concerned," Muskie said.

"(But) at the present moment hostilities seem to have diminished somewhat," he added. "The broader risks seem to have diminished somewhat and I hope we can continue in that direction..."

Muskie said that there was "evidence of deliberate restraint" in Iran's approach to shipping through the vital Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passageway between the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea. At the outset of the war, Iran had declared portions of the gulf a "war zone."

"There have been no attempts by Iran to block ... or harass that shipping" moving through the gulf, except for one or two instances where an Iranian patrol boat has hailed a freighter "to determine the cargo and destination," Muskie said.

Among the contingency plans reportedly being considered by the United States is creation of an international naval task force to assure the movement of oil through the strait and to the West. Some 40 percent of the West's imported oil comes from the Persian Gulf region.

Asked if it was necessary to mount an international naval force to keep the straits open, Muskie replied:

"Discussions on a technical level and on a contingency basis are under way... With respect to the possibilities of such a contingency arising, they seem to have diminished in the last couple of days.

"There has been no interruption of shipping and ... indeed, some evidence of deliberate restraint with respect to that," he added. "So it may well be that the risks of that contingency arising have diminished."

This article is based in part on wire service reports.

1. What is the status of any exchanges of negotiations (direct or indirect) with Iran (this refers to the second Muskie letter which supposedly reassured Iran of our neutrality)?

2. What is the status of U.S. exchanges with other Gulf and Middle East states (in addition to Muskie conversation's with the Iraqi foreign minister)? What position is the US adopting in these various changes in New York at the UN or elsewhere? What have the individual countries had to report about the war, and the impact in the future: What is the assessment of President Zia? (according to the press reports Muskie has ended a round of extensive meetings in New York with the various Muslim and Arab states, after which he announced that the chances of the conflict spreading had "diminished somewhat.")

3. What has Zia said about Gromyko's offer of "security guarantees" to Pakistan.

4. What is the essence of exchanges about an allied contingency force to keep open the Gulf (according to Secretary Muskie these exchanges are continuing on a "technical level").

THE ISSUE OF ARMS CONTROL

The Carter Administration is once again resorting to the tactic of "overstatement" (as Jody Powell has acknowledged). This time they claim that the election will decide whether there will be a new "arms race" with the Soviet Union. According to the Administration, only the ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty, signed by Brezhnev in June last year, will avoid a new round of arms escalation.

This approach completely distorts the real arms control issues. The real issues are, under what political conditions should we consider arms control? and what is the most effective approach to negotiations?

From the very outset this Administration has pursued arms control with the Soviet Union on the wrong basis. It has treated any agreement as an end in itself, regardless of Soviet behavior. Consequently, the administration became a prisoner of its own mistaken philosophy, each time the Soviets launched an aggressive probe or assault on the international order, the Administration refused to question the compatibility of Soviet conduct and continuing the SALT negotiations.

Consider the record while SALT was being negotiated:

In Africa, there are 50,000 Cuban troops and Soviet-bloc advisers deployed in an arc from Angola to Ethiopia, threatening friendly countries in Africa, and even menacing the Arabian

-2-

Peninsula from the Horn of Africa. Since 1977 we have seen two invasions of Zaire from Communist-held territory; a Soviet military base in South Yemen; mushrooming Soviet arms depots in Libya, while Libya threatens Tunisia and sponsors radicalism everywhere; and we see friendly Morocco under pressure from Communist-armed guerrillas.

-- We have witnessed the North Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Cambodia, launched shortly after the signature of a treaty with the Soviet Union. Now our ally Thailand is threatened.

-- In Afghanistan, there was a communist coup in April 1978; and, of course, an invasion 15 months later.

-- And now a heavily armed Soviet war client is fighting in the Persian Gulf, in the area of the world that is possibly the most vital to the security and survival of the industrial democracies.

The harsh fact is that over the past four years, international crises have multiplied and each has been encouraged, or exploited by the Soviet Union.

But even after the invasion of Afghanistan, the Carter Administration vacillated. At first the President withdrew the SALT treaty and announced that the Soviet Union must "suffer the consequences". By July, Secretary Muskie admitted to the press that "the President is constantly pressing us to come up with ways to reconcile arms control with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan."

-3-

Then Secretary Muskie and Gromyko, a few weeks ago, agreed to start a new arms control negotiation on theater nuclear weapons, on October 13.

The beginning of these talks, 10 months after the Afghan invasion, can only be seen as a ratification of the Soviet action by the U.S. and its Western allies. Indeed, the Soviets will be in several negotiations with the West: in bilateral summits (with Schmidt and Gissard), in the Madrid conference on European security, with Secretary Muskie, and finally with the U.S. on theater nuclear weapons. The Soviets can only conclude that their brutal actions in Afghanistan have produced <u>more</u> negotiations and contacts.

In short, the President is creating another situation in which arms control is being used as a safety valve, while Soviet aggressive behavior continues.

The second issue is whether to conduct negotiations in order to rectify strategic imbalances or to pursue them in name of avoiding another "arms race." The fact is that the United States has fallen beyond in almost every major category of strategic military power. The current SALT treaty will not <u>significantly</u> affect these trends. We have reached a point where these trends can only be checked and reversed by a vigorous American defense effort.

Will this touch off an arms race? Let us examine the record of SALT I.

In 1969, against major opposition from the Democratic Congress, the United States approved funding for its own ABM system, five years after the Soviet Union had begun its

SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

The Carter Administration apparently plans to launch a new "peace initiative" in the last week of September, when Secretary Muskie meets Soveit Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in New York (possibly on September 25). As a result of this meeting, the President is likely to announce agreement to hold the first "preparatory talks" on the limitation of medium range nuclear missiles in Europe.

The President's willingness to resume negotiations with the Soviet Union, exactly nine months after the Afghan invasion, raises some serious questions about the conduct of American foreign policy under the Carter Administration.

## Background

The negotiations are an outgrowth of the increasing concern in NATO over the Soveit build-up of medium range missiles in the western USSR. The Soviet SS-20 missile is mobile and equipped with three separate warheads, being deployed at about 150 installations in Western Russia. This new missile has a range of 3-4000 miles which permits targetting against all of Western Europe. These missiles are in addition to more than 100 new Backfire bombers which are also deployed against Western Europe. Last December the NATO defense ministers emphasized the gap in long range theater nuclear capabilities was "steadily widening." Clearly a NATO and American counter effort was necessary: particularly since in an era of strategic parity

-2-

or worse, permitting an imbalance in European theater systems becomes especially dangerous.

Our allies insisted on American guarantees that we would be prepared to deploy new medium range missiles to close the gap. Thus, in early December 1979 NATO agreed to a program to replace 108 U.S. Pershing missiles -- a short range ballistic missile stationed in Germany with a new version of greater range and capability. In addition it was agreed that 464 medium range U.S. cruise missiles (still under development) would be deployed in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy and United Kingdom. None of these deployments would begin before 1983.

Actually carrying out this military program, however, was dependent on the political situation in Europe. First of all the Germans were afraid of being singled out as the only country where new American missile deployments will be made; they insisted that some other European member of the Alliance on the continent (i.e. not England) also agree to take the missiles. In Belgium and in the Netherlands, while there was an apprehension over the Soviet build up,

left-wing political forces would not support a new missile deployment without first negotiating with the Soviets. The upshot was that NATO and the US in agreeing to the new missile deployment also made an offer to negotiate on the reduction of long range theater nuclear weapons in Europe.

This produced a vicious circle. The Germans would not proceed with deployments without the Belgians and the Dutch;

-3-

the Belgians and Dutch would not proceed with deployments
without first trying negotiations. This permitted the Soviets
to operate against the weakest link in the chain.

At first the Soviets violently protested and attacked
the NATO decision, then they recognized the opportunity
created by the situation in Belgium and the Netherlands and
they softened their terms. Then, under the pressure of
his own election campaign, the West German Chancellor,
Helmut Schmidt--fearing that Belgium and Holland would refuse
the missiles--suggested that there might be a moratorium
on further deployments on both sides. This would leave NATO
with no new weapons whatsoever, while the Soviet build-up
would stop at about 150 separate missile installations--a very
dangerous approach. In any case, the Soviets rejected
this probably because they calculated that they could get a
simply
unilateral NATO missile moratorium/by agreeing to negotiate.
Accordingly, during Schmidt's trip to Moscow in late June the
Soviets told him they were ready to negotiate without pre-
conditions. Schmidt, in turn, urged the U.S. to accept and
the Administration in early July began studying the offer
"in a constructive spirit". On September 7, Secretary Muskie
said that the U.S. was prepared for "technical and preparatory"
talks, and to "go forward as early as possible."

## The Implications

The beginning of these negotiations raise four major
problems:

(1) The mere fact of negotiations creates a potentially
worse situation for NATO than the mutual moratorium proposed
by Schmidt; under the Schmidt plan at least the Soviets stopped;
but at present what is likely to happen is that the talks will
be dragged out and the Belgians and Dutch will refuse to
go ahead with deploying any missiles as long as there is some
hope of a negotiated agreement. The West will be caught in
a self-imposed, unilateral moratorium.

(2) Even if some arrangement is made to limit or reduce
Soviet missiles, it may produce a major problem in our China
policy; withdrawing missiles from the western USSR,
or even banning them from this area, is no particular
concession since the missiles are mobile. On the other hand,
if missile deployments are permitted in the Soviet Far East,
the Chinese will certainly object that we are giving the
U.S. Soviets a free hand against them. Some/discussion with China
is certainly in order.

(3) The beginning of talks, 10 months after the Afghan invasions can only be seen as a ratification/ the Soviet action by the U.S. and its Western allies. Indeed, the Soviets will several be in/negotiations with the West: in bilateral summits (with Schmidt and Gissard), in the Madrid conference on European security, with Secretary Muskie, and finally with the U.S. on theater nuclear weapons. They commonly conclude that their brutal actions in Afghanistan have produced more negotiations and contacts.

(4) In fact, the Carter Administration seems to be repeating
policy
all the/mistakes of policy of the past three years:

-5-

The issue has never been whether to talk to the Soviet Union about arms control, but under what political conditions. The President, however, puts the entire burden of Soviet-American relations on arms control: he did this in 1977-80 during the SALT negotiating and apparently intends to do so again. The immediate problem we have with the Soviets is not one of controlling arms, as important as this may be, but checking the constant Soviet assaults on international order. Since the communist intervention in Angola in 1975 the Soviet Union has employed proxy Cuban troops in Ethiopia in 1977, subversion and assassination in Yemen in 1978, and finally in 1979 the outright invasion of its non-aligned neighbor, Afghanistan. If this continues, then the danger of war grows accordingly, because sooner or later the United States must resist.

But once again the Carter administration has vacillated. At first the President withdrew the SALT treaty and announced that the Soviet Union must "suffer the consequences". By July, Secretary Muskie admitted to the press that "the President is constantly pressing us to come up with ways to reconcile arms control with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan." (Washington Post, July 17) And if the talks on theater nuclear weapons begin, they certainly will lead to another round in SALT.

In short the President is creating another situation in which arms control is being used as a safety valve, while Soviet aggressive behavior continues.

-6-

A Reagan Administration will support negotiated arms control: this is evident in Governor Reagan's speeches and the Republican party platform. But a Reagan Administration will oppose negotiations that are totally separated from considerations of Soviet international conduct:

- The first order of business with the Soviet Union is a clear cut understanding that Soviet troops and Cuban proxies will not be used in other countries. Without such an understanding there is no sense in arms control negotiations.

- Even if these conditions are met, a Reagan Administration will negotiate on the limitation and reduction of theater nuclear weapons _only_ within the context of NATO/military strategy and doctrines, and not at the expense of third countries.

- Accordingly, a Reagan Administration favors a pause in the negotiations, until a Western summit meeting can be arranged after the U.S. elections to work out a common objectives and strategy in conducting arms control and a common policy in countering Soviet aggression.

A Reagan Administration will offer this nation a long-range policy of strength, of purpose, of humanity and, above all, of hope.

This is why a Republican Administration is a necessity for peace.

## II

America must deal with four great tasks in building a peaceful world:

Our first priority must be to restore the military position of the United States. Unless we do so, our friends will be driven by their fears and our adversaries will be tempted by their ambitions.

A Republican Administration will never be ashamed of American power; it will recognize the responsibility our power confers on America as the buttress of freedom. In the 1930's, when the cause of freedom was in danger, America was waiting in the wings to come to Europe's rescue. In the 1980's there is no one waiting in the wings to come to _our_ rescue.

As we are determined to rebuild our strength, Our purpose is to use our strength to help banish the risk of war and to build a long-range strategy for the future which our people can understand and to which other nations can gear their actions.

Our second priority is to halt the Soviet geopolitical offensive.

-2-

It is true that the United States cannot be the world's policeman. But the security of the free world will not survive if the Soviet Union is given free rein to expand its power and influence by the use, or the threat of force around the world. There must be a program of effective resistance. Only on that basis can there be serious negotiation for a peace of justice. The fear of using our influence has the paradoxical result of magnifying our risks. It tempts ever growing challenges to test the limits of our tolerance.

Our third goal must be to rebuild our relations with our allies. Our allies include distinguished and experienced statesman, but the current Administration has quarreled with every ally. We sometimes act as if our *allies* are the main foreign policy problem in the world. No wonder that our relations with our friends are the worst they have been in 40 years.

Our alliances need to adjust to the realities of the new international economic structure; to the challenge of the energy crisis, and to their own (growing allied) strength and cohesion. They must know they can rely on our support because they understand the purpose of our policy. We must offer them an opportunity to express their view before we act. They must be made genuine partners in constructing a peaceful and just world.

Finally, we must support our many true friends in the developing world--moderates who are sympathetic

Our alliances need to adjust to the realities of the new *international* economic structure; the challenge of the energy crisis and the of new *growing allied* strength and cohesion. They must know they can rely on our support *because* they *must* understand the purpose of our policy. We must offer then an opportunity to express their view before we act. They must be made genuine partners in constructing a peaceful and just world.

-3-

to the West, believe in peaceful change, and despair
when we undercut them by currying favor with trendy
Marxist radicals who wish our destruction.

Nations have every right to be non-aligned; but
we have every right to support our friends. We have
to demonstrate, after too long an interval, that
association with us has benefits and opposition to us
has its penalties. We will not be blackmailed; we
will work with all those of good will, with that part
of mankind struggling to establish new nations, to
fulfill aspirations to progress and human dignity. For
a world will be truly at peace only if most of mankind
considers that it has helped to create it.

The world is in turmoil because America--the
leader of free peoples--has become a factor of confusion
and unpredictability.

--When allies are confused we lose our position
on leadership.

--When adversaries are confused we risk miscalculations
which can lead to war.

Only if friends and foes can count on our word will
America's word count. And only if America's word is
respected, only if we are once again a constant factor
in world affairs, will we regain our mastery over the
course of events. Only then can we talk with our adversaries
on an equal footing, negotiate on the basis of reciprocity
and push back the specter of nuclear war.

-4-

We have a duty to resist the forces that threaten
liberty. But we have an equal obligation to give our
people a positive message and mankind the promise of
a better, more humane future. We are not defined by
our fears, but by our goals. We will be judged not
by the stridency of our rhetoric but by the firmness
of our purposes.

This people which crossed an unexplored continent
will rally to the vision of a better world; it will
respond to the call for sacrifice so long as it is in
the service of high ideals.

We will confront if we must.

We will build where we can.

Ronald Reagan has warned us of our danger, and we
now turn to him to lead us through the storms ahead
to a more hopeful future.

(OPTIONAL:) And when this party gathers again in four years we will have justified the confidence of the American people:

-- by having rebuilt our strength,

-- by having vindicated our purpose,

-- by having restored our self-respect,

-- by having raised a standard of hope and--above all--
by having moved towards a strong peace, a just peace, a
lasting peace.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE PERSIAN GULF
SUMMARY

1. The Current Situation

The current fighting between Iran and Iraq appears
headed for a stalemate. Iraq has limited territorial
objectives: occupying Khurramshahr, Abadan and Ahwaz.
In addition Iraq will want to cut the oil pipeline into
Iran, stir up the Kurds in the north, and the Arab
population of Iranian Khuzistan. Their main political
objective is to create a situation in which Khomeini will
be overthrown. In the short run, Iraq emerges as dominant
power in the Gulf controlling large oil resources, which
it will eventually exploit for higher prices. Iraq is
fundamentally opposed to the U.S. interests.

Iraq is receiving political support from the Soviets,
but also from Saudi Arabia and Hussein, mainly because
they fear growing Iraqi power. The moderate Arabs share
Iraq's fear of both the PLO under Arafat and an uprising
of religious movements throughout the area (which the PLO
is encouraging and Khomeini is fomenting). Hence, the
moderate Arabs want Khomeini removed from power.

The Iranian President has already admitted Iran is
"isolated." By next spring, perhaps, the situation in Iran
will greatly worsen, if the pipelines remain cut. The
political outlook in Iran, however, is uncertain: it could
disintegrate into regional power centers, but there is also
the possibility that the war will produce a military leader
who will put the country back together; a military figure
could be either a conservative or even from the extreme
left wing group (e.g. like Col. Qaddafi in Libya). In the
case of a left-wing military regime, the Soviet might switch
to Iran, which is the potentially more powerful country.
In the case of a conservation military regime, the Soviets
might try to break up Iran by stirring up the Azerbaijani
in Northern Iran and the Baluchistani tribes between Pakistan
and Iran.

In any case, the Soviet Union stands to make some major
gains, as long as it can manipulate all sides. It supports
Iraq with arms, but has just signed a new treaty with Syria,
a bitter opponent of Iraq, and Moscow has even tried to
reassure Iran. The Syrians want Soviet reinsurance against
Iraq and even the Iranians recognize that the Soviets are
now the principal power. One reason for the rise of Soviet
influence is that the US is considered to be more and more

2

irrelevant and impotent. The recent dispatch of four American AWAC aircraft to Saudi Arabia was tactically advisable, even though the aircraft themselves are vulnerable to attack by Iranian aircraft. But Saudi Arabia was embarrassed that the move was portrayed as something arising out of their fears, rather than a US initiative.

As for the hostages in Iran: the Administration seems to be working constantly on arranging some last-minute bargain, e.g. supply of American military spare parts. This could still happen before the election, but the main problem seems to be that Iran, in a spirit of intense nationalism and anti-Americanism, will not be willing to make any deal.

Israel's position is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, they may see some value in Iraq bogging down in a long war, and similarly drawing Jordan in that direction. (Some believe Jordan is acting with Israeli support.) One aspect could be that Israel will eventually rule out a Jordanian solution to the West bank, on the grounds that Jordan has now joined the radical bloc of Arabs. On the other hand, they will worry about the growth of Iraqi military power and Soviet influence, and a new element of Arab unity.

Sadat's position is reflected in his growing worry over the weakening of the American position in the area.

## 2. Contingencies

There was a general agreement that the situation remains highly volatile and politically sensitive. A cautious posture in public statements and reactions seems warranted. Some specific contingencies follow:

### A. Release of hostages

Two points could be stressed: (1) we should insist on their immediate return, *after* which we *might* supply spare parts; (2) if they are returned, this is a great human relief, but the basic problems of the area--the increasing chaos and dangerous political trends against our interests--still remain; they are the result of Carter's inconsistent and weak policies; the release of the hostages makes it even more urgent that we develop a long-term strategy for the area.

### B. Attitude on AWAC Aircraft

The dispatch of these four aircraft is only a tactical response. There remains the question of a long-term cohesive strategy for dealing with the turmoil and threats to the general area. Nine months after the "Carter Doctrine",

3

there is no clear strategy. Pakistan's distancing itself
from us is a good example.

C. <u>Consequences of the Current Fighting</u>

Crises around the world are multiplying, mainly because
of the decline in the American power which has been a stabilized
factor. Now, after the overthrow of the Shah, as well as
our conduct in Korea and in Central America, no country can
be certain of our support. The constant growth of crises
constitutes the real threat of peace, for sooner or later
a crisis will explode out of control.

D. <u>The Impact on Camp David Agreements</u>

The accords remain a useful first step; now what is
necessary is to devise a longer term plan.

* * *

4

General Conclusions
---

The war in the Persian Gulf demonstrates the increasing
irrelevance and impotence of the US in world affairs.

-- Our decline is reflected in the continuing hostage crisis.

-- It is also evident in King Hussein's decision to support Iraq; four years ago he certainly would have turned to Washington, not Baghdad, or Moscow.

-- American weakness allows the Soviets to make gains.

-- What is needed is for the U.S. is not tactical gimmicks (i.e. sending radar planes), but a long term analysis of the trends and a strategy to support our friends and protect our interests.

-- Release of the hostages will not end the crisis, because the problem of the future direction of the Iranian revolution will remain, as will the question of reconstituting regional stability.

In sum, the crisis demonstrates the need for a change
in both the philosophy of our foreign policy and in our
leadership.

THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION AND THE
___
IRANIAN CRISIS

I. The Present Situation: Background

On the immediate issue, the fate of the hostages, there
is no way to predict what will happen between now and November.
The Iranian Parliament seems on the verge of taking up the
question. Secretary Muskie's letter to the new Iranian
Prime Minister is an obvious effort to start a negotiation.
The Iranian's reply was sharp in rhetoric but also left
the door open to further exchanges and negotiations.

The key issue in any negotiation may well be how
far the Carter Administration is willing to go in "repenting"
past American policies, as demanded by the Iranian Prime
Minister. The Administration is clearly edging in the
direction of making an "apology" of some kind, even while
it denies that it is doing so. The Administration used to
insist, when the crisis began, that we would never even
negotiate until the hostages were released; now it appears
that we are _offering_ to negotiate before the hostages
are released. The Administration used to insist that it
would never "apologize" for past American policy; now the
State Department spokesman states ambiguously (Sept. 10)
that the United States is prepared to discuss "anything
and everything" with Iranian authorities to win the release
of the hostages.

-3-

Every President since Franklin Roosevelt
has agreed on the vital strategic importance of
Iran. The Persian Gulf is a region whose security
is vital to the West's security and prosperity. It
has long been a focus of Soviet and Russian expansionist
ambitions. Iran is the most powerful country in
the region in terms of population, resources, and
military potential. And Iran has been a close friend
and ally of the United States since the end of World
War II. Each President has expressed his commitment
to Iran. President Carter added his voice on New Year's
Eve 1977, when he said that:

> Iran, because of the great leadership of
> the Shah, is an island of stability in one of
> the more troubled areas of the world.

The collapse of a friendly regime in Iran in early
1979 was thus a monumental geopolitical disaster, one
of the West's most serious setbacks since World War II.
A strategic country, once a close ally, was taken over
by our enemies. The security of the Persian Gulf and
that of our remaining moderate friends in the Middle
East was placed in serious jeopardy. The region was
radicalized. Iran's new anti-Americanism and its
severe oil production cutbacks have radicalized OPEC
and are directly responsible for the doubling of the
price of oil in 1979 and the gasoline crisis endured
by Americans last year.

-4-

B. The President's Record

The Iranian crisis is the biggest foreign policy
crisis of the Carter Administration, and the President's
handling of it is a legitimate subject of public
examination. The President's continuing failures in
this crisis are moreover a symptom of his weakness and
misjudgments in <u>all</u> areas of policy. And indeed his
approach to foreign policy is partly responsible for
producing the crisis and for exacerbating it once it
began.

In this campaign, the Administration repeatedly
stresses the President's grave responsibility for
keeping the peace and protecting the free world. What
does the Iranian crisis tell us about how President
Carter is meeting this responsibility? The danger of
war, or crisis, does not result from some single
deliberate decision to press a button; it comes from
statesmen losing control over events. It comes from
allowing events to drift out of control to the point
where we are faced with only the horrendous choice
between resorting to military action (always a last
resort), or else acquiescing in some major development
that is disastrous to our interests. Allowing that
situation to develop in the first place means that our
policy has <u>already</u> failed. Success in foreign policy
means never letting things develop to that point.

events at an early stage according to *our* purposes,
only exacerbates crises. It is the hallmark of
impotence, and impotence means that we will drift
into further crisis. The resulting chaos only leads
to disaster. The ability of a statesman to remain
in control of events is the true test of his stewardship.
Mr. Carter has failed this test at every stage of this crisis.

1. Accelerating the Overthrow of the Shah. -- When our ally the Shah of Iran came under pressure from fanatically anti-American and anti-Western elements, the Administration treated it as a human rights problem instead of as a potential threat to free world strategic interests. When the crisis in Iran developed in 1978, the Administration never had a policy at all.

As evidence pours out of the Administration's
internal deliberations during this period -- including
damaging revelations by William Sullivan, President
Carter's former Ambassador in Iran -- the truth is clear:
The President lost control even over his own Administration.
At least four different factions with conflicting
premises and goals began to compete: First, there were
those in the State Department, as Ambassador Sullivan
has admitted, who came to the incredible conclusion long
in advance that it was in our interest to force our
ally the Shah out of office at any price, regardless of
the damage to the security of the Persian Gulf or to
the interests of the whole free world. Second, there

-6-

were others who naively wanted to replace the Shah
with a coalition government -- including the revolution-
aries -- headed by a moderate such as Shapour Bakhtiar.
Third, there was our Embassy's even more naive plan to
form a coalition under a pro-Khomeini figure, such
Bazargan, and then strike a bargain with Khomeini.
Finally, there was the President's national security
adviser who was toying with a military coup [to block
Khomeini, but he was overruled].

The story as confirmed by Ambassador Sullivan is
one of constant squabbling, hesitation, confusion,
and indecision:

-- Our President made no firm decisions; he allowed
<u>all</u> policies to be pursued.

-- Since all of the options involved forcing out the
Shah and including the revolutionaries in a coalition,
the inevitable result was to demoralize the many
groups in Iran resisting the revolutionaries, including
all the pro-Western and pro-American elements in Iran.

-- Since all of the options involved placating the
revolutionaries in some degree, this could only convince
them that their victory was only a matter of time.

-- They wanted total power, not simply sharing it in
a coalition. And this is what they got.

Of all the possible outcomes of the Iranian crisis,
we ended up with the very worst.

-7-

The President cannot escape his responsibility for the outcome. He proved incapable of making a clear decision among conflicting choices -- which is precisely the President's job. And all the conflicting options presented to him by his senior officials showed the philosophical naivete that has characterized this Administration: the impulse to ditch a friend, to seek to appease radical enemies, to focus on the immediate with no apparent consciousness of the enormous strategic interests that are at stake in the long term.

2. **Inviting the Hostage Crisis.** -- The same pattern of indecision and ineptitude was repeated after Khomeini came to power, helping to produce the hostage crisis:

-- The initial hesitation to grant asylum to the Shah when he first left Iran only advertised our fear.

-- The American Embassy was occupied briefly in February, without any apparent lessons drawn from this by the Administration.

-- We attempted to curry favor with the new regime, even offering to sell arms to help suppress the Kurds -- one month before the Embassy takeover.

-- Andrew Young called Khomeini a "saint."

-- Later, there were warnings by our Embassy that admitting the Shah for medical treatment would pose a danger. The Embassy takeover came three weeks after Carter's decision to admit the Shah, and three days after a broadcast message by Khomeini on November 1

-8-

calling on "students" to "expand with all their
might their attacks against the United States" on
November 4. During that interval, no precautions
were taken to protect our Embassy.

Again, the same deadly combination of indecisiveness
and philosophical self-paralysis. The Administration
seemed incapable of understanding the challenge that
it faced -- from a fanatic regime that was a sworn
enemy of the United States, of Israel, of the Western
world. Naively thinking it could charm them by
assuring them of our goodwill, the Administration
ignored warning signals.

3. <u>Mishandling the Hostage Crisis.</u> -- When the Iranian terrorists assaulted our Embassy and took our people prisoner on November 4, once again the Administration's pattern of indecision, helplessness, and naivete repeated itself.

The President and his Administration, from the
beginning, misjudged what they were facing. The
radicals seized our hostages for one essential reason:
to undermine the position of any moderates remaining in
Iran and to strengthen the power of the radical elements
hostile to America and indeed to all moderate forces
in the Middle East. The seizure of our hostages was
thus a challenge to the United States with implications
far beyond the human challenge of the safety of our
people held captive. America's ability-- or inability--

to master this challenge quickly and decisively was
thus of enormous importance to our strategic position
in the Middle East and indeed around the world.

By this measure, the Administration has failed
utterly. Even if our hostages come home soon, the
United States has already suffered a major defeat
and humiliation, of global implications. We are
seen throughout the world as an impotent bystander,
unable even to protect itself while a radical regime
holds 52 innocent Americans without a shred of legality
and in the face of repeated international condemnations
in the UN and the World Court. It is a sorry record:

-- In the first days of the hostage seizure,
the Administration denied that there was a crisis.
We even thanked the Barzagan government for the care if
had taken of our hostages. We looked on helplessly
as the Barzagan government was overthrown.

-- The Administration showed itself utterly naive about
negotiating with a fanatic regime. The naming of Ramsay
Clark as an envoy was a blatant signal of appeasement.
Clark's sympathies are now well known. It may

be a stroke of luck that Clark was never received--
indeed he was treated with contempt -- when he was
first sent as an official emissary of Jimmy Carter.

-10-

Then, the Administration tried threats; it froze Iranian assets and moved naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Yet its attempt at a strong policy was totally undercut by disavowals of the use of force. Three weeks after the seizure, the White House was telling the press that the President's statements did not in any way imply retaliation or "punitive military action." No wonder the threats had no impact.

Then the Administration put its faith in so-called "moderate" forces in Iran--defining as "moderate" those elements that were visciously anti-American for leftist reasons instead of for rightist reasons. At each stage some additional reason was found to do nothing.

Never did Iran pay any serious price for keeping the hostages. Never at any point were the radical elements confronted with a hard choice of either releasing the hostages or suffering consequences. No wonder it has dragged on so long.

The tragic rescue mission of April confirmed yet again that the Administration was badly divided. The Pentagon's postmortem report on the rescue mission shows not bad luck, as the President claimed, but mismanagement. This is the responsibility not of the brave men who lost or risked their lives but

-11-

(4)

of the men who sent them there.

Since then we have seen a policy of benign neglect, adjusted periodically to the public opinion polls. The President has substituted political manipulation for effective action. There were early-morning announcements of nonexistent "breakthroughs" on the mornings of primary elections; he hid in the Rose Garden to avoid debating Senator Kennedy, using his nonexistent Iranian policy as an excuse. He profited politically from the natural instinct of patriotic Americans to rally behind their leaders in a crisis. When the rescue mission failed, at a cost of eight American lives, he simply announced that his problems were "manageable"--so that he could resume campaigning when his political needs required it. It was one of the most cynical performances ever by an American President.

In light of the Iranian terrorists' objectives-- to strengthen the forces of radicalism and undermine the American position -- they have succeeded admirably. Our friends in the Middle East are weakened; our adversaries are strengthened. Even the Camp David peace process has been adversely affected by the Iranian revolution, and the radical PLO strengthened.

### C. Where Do We Go From Here?

A Reagan Administration will pursue a **firm** and **unambiguous**

-12-

policy if faced with a similar crisis. The President
will be in charge of his own Administration.

We will base ourselves on two clear, firm
principles:

-- The taking of American hostages cannot be
accomplished with impunity. A price will be paid.
America will never again allow itself to be humiliated
in this way.

-- No country can remain on good terms with the
United States and conduct business as usual with a
terrorist regime holding American hostages.

America will learn once again to distinguish between
its friends and its enemies. We have already learned that
repudiation of friends, and appeasement of implacable enemies,
do not work. They only dishonor America.