[LCT]

FRED WARNER NEAL

Claremont, April 21, 1974

Dear Henry:

As you perhaps may know, the House Foreign Affairs Committee is going to hold a series of hearings on "American-Soviet Detente," beginning May 8. I have been asked to be the opening witness and am now preparing my statement.

I would like my testimony to be as helpful as possible. I think it would be more effective if it were possible for us to have a discussion before I appear. If you agree, and if you will be in Washington, I could be available at any time May 5, 6 or 7 (preferably 7th, but it really would not matter).

Congratulations on your marriage.
(I always seem to be congratulating you belatedly on something).

Sincerely,
Fred

CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCHOOL

Program in International Relations
Claremont, California 91711, Telephone 714-626-8511

June 16, 1975

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
U. S. Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

It was good to have seen you last week. Under separate cover, Bob Hutchins has sent you from Santa Barbara a formal invitation to address a Pacem in Terris IV Convocation along the lines which we discussed, enclosing also his letter to President Ford. I am extremely hopeful that if we can put this together it will have a significant impact on the climate of public opinion and help facilitate implementation of your over-all policies.

The idea of having a fall Convocation addressed by both
President Ford and Chairman Brezhnev depends, of course, on
Brezhnev's coming, and about that I realize we do not yet
know definitively. Obviously, the sooner we know the better.
Even if we have some idea about the visit as late as August,
we could still make it. If it proves impossible to know far
enough in advance or if the Brezhnev visit should not mater-
ialize at all, then we would hold the Convocation in December
instead of October, still asking the President to open it and
possibly trying to arrange a Brezhnev address by Telstar.
Please do advise me at the earliest possible moment about
the Brezhnev visit.

I discussed the idea of having both President Ford and
Chairman Brezhnev address the Convocation with my old friend
Phil Buchen at the White House, and he thought it was some-
thing Mr. Ford might look on with favor, assuming you approved
it. Phil will take Hutchins' invitation up with the President.
(I enclose a copy of my letter to Buchen, which, as you will
note, also refers to our discussions on the Trade Act, to
which subject I will return below).

I then discussed the matter with Dobrynin. He responded
with considerable enthusiasm, pointing out, of course, that a
Brezhnev address with the President depended on approval of
both Mr. Ford and yourself. Dobrynin said he will discuss it

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

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June 16, 1975

with you. If you could indicate that there are no objections
from the American side, assuming a Brezhnev visit, I will
appreciate it.

I mentioned that when we get down to picking members of
a discussion panel to follow your address I would like to
consult you on who would and wouldn't be good. We are thinking
of a session on problems of arms control, especially in the
U.S.-Soviet context, and may invite Schlesinger to hold forth
here. If so, I would like to consult you also on members of
a discussion panel for this one. In order to focus on the
question of proper Congressional-Executive relationships in
foreign policy, we may keep the panels to members of Congress.
What do you think?

Now on the subject of the Trade Act: As I told you, the
American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations is going to make
approaches to President Ford about it, and you will receive
copies of our various communications. Additionally, Carl Marcy,
who is our man in Washington--and invaluable because of his
Congressional contacts--is going to be in touch with Hal
Sonnenfeldt and his people regarding legislative language Marcy
has already worked out. Senator Mansfield said he would intro-
duce it if he ever feels there is even a small chance it might
be adopted.

In this connection, Phil Buchen urged the Committee to
arrange a small, informal conference with leaders of some Jewish
organization. I think this is a good idea, and we will work on
it.

In these matters, as in others, please let me know about
any assistance you think we can render.

Regarding the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations,
I was very pleased that you agreed to write me a note expressing
your opinion about the value of the Committee. This will be a
distinct help. Incidentally, if you ever see David Rockefeller
I wish you would tell him, too. Up until now, David has de-
clined to become a member.

I will take you up on your offer to let you know when I am
in Washington (even though this system has not been exactly
100 percent successful to date) and will communicate via Bremer
if this is okay.

FWN:mm

enc.

Reply to: Claremont Graduate School
Claremont, Calif. 91711

June 13, 1975

Mr. Philip W. Buchen
Counsel to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Phil:

It was great to have seen you. I enjoyed our conversation very much. And I do appreciate your having sandwiched me in.

Enclosed is the letter inviting the President to address the Center's foreign policy convocation. I am extremely hopeful you and he will find it attractive not only from the viewpoint of educating public opinion but also of enhancing Mr. Ford's stature.

As I told you, Kissinger seemed to think the general idea was good. Dobrynin was highly interested in the idea of having Brezhnev join with the President in addressing the convocation but emphasized that it could be considered only if it completely meets with the President's approval. I want to make clear that as much as we would like to have the two of them, it is Mr. Ford's participation that is of greatest importance.

The problem, of course, is the uncertainty surrounding the Brezhnev visit. As I understand it from the State Department the visit most likely depends on a SALT agreement; and while they feel optimistic that there will be one they aren't yet 100 per cent sure. While probably we could wait until the end of August, it is terribly important to know about it as soon as possible. I would appreciate it if you would advise me as soon as you know anything -- assuming, as I hope, that Mr. Ford is agreeable to the idea -- and that you will permit me to check with you from time to time.

Mr. Philip W. Buchen

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June 13, 1975

We will hold the Convocation in one of the big hotels, or possibly some place like Constitution Hall. I am assuming an evening session beginning at 8 p.m., with the President ready to depart as soon as he and Brezhnev (if both participate) conclude their addresses.

Please do let me know if you have any questions about all this. I could, of course, come East to talk about it if desired, at any time you wished.

I am enclosing also, for your information, a copy of the *Pacem in Terris III* Convocation.

Regarding the other subject of our conversation -- the Trade Act -- I took your suggestion about getting together (i.e., members of the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations) with representatives of Jewish groups very seriously and will keep you appraised of developments.

I will also be sending you in a few days the letter to the President about the matter which we discussed. In regard to this matter also, please do let me know if we can be useful in any way.

Again, it was nice to have seen you again after all these years. All best wishes.

Enclosure

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

June 16, 1975

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

To: The Secretary

Thru: C - Mr. Sonnenfeldt

From: EUR - Arthur A. Hartman

Fred Warner Neal's Request for a Written Statement

In your June 10 meeting with Fred Warner Neal of the American Committee on US-Soviet relations, you promised to send him a written note expressing appreciation for the work of his Committee. The draft of a short letter, saying that we welcome the efforts of his organization to contribute to public understanding of the Administration's policy toward the USSR and of the issues involved, is at Tab 1.

Recommendation:

That you sign the letter to Mr. Neal at Tab 1.

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Suggested letter to Mr. Neal

Tab 2 - Memorandum of Conversation, June 10, 1975

EUR/SOV:BMZook:sb RB
X 20821 6-12-75

CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCHOOL

August 27, 1975

Hon. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

I hope this finds you back safe and successful from your
most recent Middle East adventures.

With regard to the *Pacem* in *Terris* IV Convocation, the
following has occurred to me: since there is at present no cert-
ainty of date of the Brezhnev visit, we will simply have to go
ahead planning the Convocation for the first week in December.
On the other hand, it does seem to me there would be an enormous
advantage if both the President and Brezhnev were able to address
it "live" the opening evening, December 1, preceding your own
address the next morning. Not only will the Convocation be a
significant event in itself, but there will be a considerable
spotlight on it. And both as regards the large audience present
and those who will see it on television, addresses to the *Pacem*
in *Terris* Convocation would involve a very large middle group
whose support is crucial.

Therefore, would it not be possible to arrange the Brezhnev
visit for the first week in December? I make this suggestion on
the assumption there is no particular advantage to you in having
it in late October/early November and that for the purposes of
foreign policy and diplomacy the first week in December would
serve just as well as an earlier time.

I have made this suggestion also to President Ford and to
Dobrynin. I would be very anxious to know what you think about
it.

FWN:mm

P.S. Please don't forget to respond also to my letter of
August 11.

THE CLAREMONT COLLEGES ■■■■■

Claremont Graduate School / Pomona College / Scripps College / Claremont Men's College / Harvey Mudd College / Pitzer College

Personal

October 2, 1975

The Hon. Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:-

I write to you somewhat frantically concerning *Pacem in Terris IV*. Indeed it is something of a Macedonian cry. As you know, I put this together in considerable part as an effort to support you and your foreign policy. I assume that you share my interest in seeing to it that it does not go down the drain. This is a real possibility unless I am able to talk with you about it *very* soon.

I now understand there is a great likelihood that you and President Ford will be in China on the very day -- December 2 -- you are scheduled to open the convocation. I don't know whether there is any point to putting on the play without Hamlet. What bothers me is not so much the enormous investment already put into the production as the fact that without Hamlet the stage is likely to be dominated by his adversaries.

First question: Is there any conceivable way that you can arrange to delay this trip so that you could be in Washington at least on the evening of December 1? We could, I think, arrange your opening at that time rather than the morning of December 2.

Or, concomitantly, is there any possibility that if you leave for China before December 1 you could be back in order to make the concluding session on the afternoon, or evening, of December 4? We could accommodate to that also.

Second question: If any of this is impossible, then how do you suggest we handle your absence? Even if you do not personally participate, surely there should be an adequate presentation of your policies, of the Administration position. Obviously it must be by someone who would command respect and attention (and who would be adequate to appear with Senator Kennedy and the distinguished discussants). It seems to me that Vice President Rockefeller is the best man to do it, all things considered. If you agree, will you ask him? If you think otherwise, then what? Perhaps your address presented by Ingersoll as Acting Secretary? Or perhaps you making a videotape presentation which could be shown to the convocation audience?

Personal

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Third question: In any of these events, that is in the event of a substitute for you, what I would like to do is to announce the program with you included in it, with a notation that your appearance is subject to reconfirmation. Then in the event your absence December 1-2 becomes firm and public, we could announce a change. This would ease things for us somewhat. Do you have any objections? As you know, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, Secretary of the Treasury Simon and CIA Director Colby have firmly accepted invitations to participate.

Fourth question: What is the situation regarding a Brezhnev visit? The significance of a trip to China with an indefinite postponement of a visit from Brezhnev obviously raises questions far beyond the Pacem in Terris convocation.

I presume you have received my messages via Jerry Bremer that I need urgently to discuss these questions with you. I do not see how we can possibly delay going ahead with plans including preliminary announcements and television arrangements beyond the end of next week. If I could see you either October 9, October 10, October 11 or October 12, something might still be salvageable. I would like to know about this Friday October 3 if at all possible and in any event no later than October 6. Otherwise, I am afraid things may work out adversely for our mutual interest. Believe me, I want to be cooperative, but I do need some help.

P.S. Dictated by telephone to Washington.

*Christmas Reviewed*

OUR discussions at home about politics and world affairs had more impact on our children than we realized. At the end of our church's Christmas Eve service, the minister leaned across the pulpit to address the restless youngsters in the congregation: "Who is the good-natured, plump man who goes all over the world on Christmas Eve working miracles?"

Our ten-year-old son answered, "Henry Kissinger!"

—Contributed by Judith B. Ayers

Island provide unemployment benefits for strikers after a designated penalty period. During the 1971-72 walkout against the New York Telephone Company, a staggering $43 million was paid in benefits to striking employes. Although laws in other states prohibit direct aid to strikers, organized labor has frequently found ways of effectively

criminal penalty, one D.C. attorney told the Washington Star.

*Disincentive.* Today's unemployment-compensation system frequently serves to encourage recipients *not* to work. A Labor Department-sponsored report by the Public Research Institute determined that recent liberalization of jobless benefits may be persuading as many as

CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCHOOL

CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA 91711

December 8, 1975

PERSONAL

Hon. Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

I gather your trip to China was something like *Pacem in Terris* IV--it went off better mechanically than substantively. I very much appreciated having you--and Larry Eagleburger--arrange for Moynihan to speak. From a "public relations" point of view for *Pacem* IV it was superb theater. So far as making any contribution to your own positions, or the Administration's foreign policy (as I understand it), or to American-Soviet detente, Moynihan was almost a total disaster.

I suppose the lesson, which is hardly a new one, is that there
is nobody in this whole benighted administration other than your-
self who can speak authoritatively on foreign policy.

I am now shifting back to the work of the American Committee
on U.S.-Soviet Relations. There seems to be almost no movement at
all (except for Don Kendall's current piece of personal diplomacy)
in regard to trade legislation. I should think it would help make
your upcoming Moscow trip a little easier if there could be some
public indication of interest in this matter before you get there.
Is there any chance of it?

Two other things:

1. You may recall that when I discussed the question of Portugal with you and Sonnenfeldt a couple months ago, it appeared there was no concrete evidence of significant Soviet assistance to the Portuguese communists. Unless I am very much mistaken, there still is none. Can you not have somebody say so?

2. Would somebody please explain to me the importance of Angola? If the Soviet Union were interfering significantly in

Hon. Henry Kissinger

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December 8, 1975

Portugal, this would clearly violate the limits of a detente relationship since the United States' interests in and connections with Portugal are well established. I don't see that Soviet intervention in Angola--which, after all, is hardly unilateral--can be viewed in the same category. This was a point I tried to make at the Pacem in Terris Convocation. If I am wrong, I wish somebody would tell me.

My contribution for the holidays is attached.

FWN:mm

CLAREMONT GRADUATE SCHOOL

CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA 91711

March 23, 1976

Dear Henry:

Thank you for your letter of February 27. As I trust you know, you have my enthusiastic general support, especially but not only in regard to American-Soviet relations. I am speaking here both personally and on behalf of the American Committee on U.S.-Soviet Relations. I am unable to agree with you, however, about Angola in its relationship with the U.S.S.R. There are places where Soviet intervention would clearly jeopardize detente but they are not ubiquitous; and Angola, in my opinion, is not one of them. I fully appreciate, I think, your idea of linkages. I consider it in general quite valid, but I always thought it was to be applied selectively. I am afraid that raising the issue of Angola in the way it has been raised, especially at this time, has furnished ammunition to opponents of detente and, therefore, may be deleterious to our best interests overall. I enclose my testimony to the House Armed Services Committee as a further indication of my thinking. I would welcome the opportunity to discuss it with you further.

I was delighted by the March 15 publication in the Chicago Tribune about the Harris Poll regarding you and your policies. I suppose you have seen it. In all events, warm regards and the best of luck.

FWN:mm
enc.

Testimony of Fred Warner Neal*
Presented to the House Armed Services
Committee Hearings on the Military Budget
December 18, 1975

Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a statement of my qualifications elsewhere. In the interest of brevity, permit me to limit the amenities to saying that I think these hearings are enormously important and that I am honored to be asked to take part in them. I, of course, have not seen the military budget and in any event would not presume to advise this committee on its details. The military budget, on the other hand, is more than the sum of its detailed items; it is an instrument in foreign policy and an important factor in international affairs. It is primarily about this aspect of it that I wish to say something.

Here I can only sketch out the major points of my theses.
I hope questions and discussion will put meat on the bones.

There is no substitute for adequate military defense. The question, of course, is what is adequate, and it inevitably invokes comparisons with Soviet military posture. My first point is addressed to this question. It seems to me that the United States has military strength over-all superior to that of the Soviet Union. Over the last 15 years the gap has been constantly narrowing, and on balance I consider this a good thing. Not only is deterrence the more reliable the more it is based on equality but the greater equality the two sides have the greater chance there is for mutual reductions of armed strength. Mutuality

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[LC]

in military terms is a difficult concept, but if we want to get
out of the dangerous bind we are in it is essential. I am
speaking here of mutuality as the best basis for agreement. I
don't mean to suggest that we necessarily have to emulate the
Soviet Union in every military gadget they may devise. On the
other hand, I do think the best way to deal with the Russians
is on pretty much of a quid pro quo basis.

American military superiority is clearest in the thermo-
nuclear area because of our superiority in numbers of warheads.
Despite all talk about numbers of delivery vehicles, throw-weight
and other factors, it is essential to keep in mind always that
it is nuclear warheads that count in ability to inflict damage,
and here nobody, not even Senator Jackson, has suggested that we
do not have a great many more than the Russians.

Indeed, American military superiority is one of our problems.
We have always had it, and basically our military planners have
really never accommodated themselves to the idea that we should
ever let the Soviet Union catch up with us. The pattern has
been that each time as the USSR has moved to catch up, the
United States has moved to keep ahead on the theory that if we
don't the Soviets will get ahead of us. This might be called
the dialectics of the arms race.

The classic example, of course, was our insistence on MIRVing
on the eve of SALT I, ostensibly because of perceived Soviet
intentions to build ABMs, which, as it turned out, they never

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built. From the point of view of wanting to limit the arms race, we should have eliminated our MIRVS right then and there provided the USSR agreed not to MIRV at all. But we didn't Indeed, hardly had SALT I been concluded than we began development of the cruise missile on the theory that the Soviet Union would MIRV and overcome our lead. Had our positions been reversed, maybe--even probably--the Russians would have done the same thing. But our positions were not reversed. The responsibility for initiating new weapons developments has been ours, every time.

Not only has none of this contributed to American national security but it has had exactly the opposite effect. Additionally, it is this "bargaining chips" psychology that keeps the arms race going. And one cannot take the danger of increased nuclear arsenals lightly.

One of the purposes of the policy of seeking a detente with the Soviet Union was to get both countries in a position where we could dispense with the bargaining chips approach. It doesn't seem to have worked. Our present bargaining chip is the long-range cruise missile. It is clearly a strategic weapon. There is no way we can persuade the Russians to equate it with the Backfire bomber, which is not clearly a strategic weapon. Some compromises may be arranged, but--mark it well--if we do proceed with cruise missiles, so will the Soviet Union, and off we will

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be again, that much closer to catastrophe. If that is what you want, leave funds for the cruise missile in the budget. If that is not what you want--and I can't really believe it is--strike them out.

That the Pentagon is asking for the cruise missile now is almost enough to make one think that someone, somewhere, really doesn't want to put an end to the arms race. Let me say again, I think such psychology exists also among the Soviet military planners, but they seldom have a chance to manifest it; the American fear of being overtaken almost always brings out our new ideas first. Such American ingenuity we could do without.

The second major point I would like to make is that considerations of military posture should always be--indeed, should only be--thought of in relation to political-psychological factors. Here both sides, the United States and the Soviet Union, are still prisoners in varying degrees of Cold War psychology which often leads them to attribute the worst possible motives to each other. This is, I think, more deep seated in the United States than in the Soviet Union, but it is by no means absent there. I don't think we should consider this in terms of "bad guys and good guys" but as political and psychological realities which exist.

It is this Cold War psychology that is the real reason why American-Soviet detente is so necessary. Because until we get

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[LC]

over it, we are only going to have the kinds of weapons agree-
ments we have had up until now--which are more agreed-on in-
creases than anything else--or no agreements at all. It may
be we have put the cart before the horse. We have declared a
detente, and then marched right to the nuclear arms bargaining
table. Clearly the ultimate significance of detente is the
need to control and limit and if possible eliminate thermonuclear
weapons. But before we can get to this it is probable that we
need more bridge-building agreements on other subjects with
the Soviet Union. I think we should keep the arms negotiations
going, by all means, but we must avoid the danger that lack of
instant success will damage the detente process itself.

In our detente relationship we have made some progress in
non-strategic weapons fields, but the door is wide open for more.
I am thinking especially of limited geo-political agreements.
For example, an agreement mutually to limit--not eliminate, but
limit--arms shipments to the Middle East. For example, an
agreement to keep both Soviet and American military forces out
of the Mediterranean Sea, and out of the Indian Ocean. For
example, an understanding mutually to stay out of certain areas
of the world.

The Soviet Union, having become a great power, manifests
the great power syndromes, especially what might be called the
"I'm as powerful as you are" syndrome. The United States can no
longer expect to expand its military capabilities without the Soviet
Union doing likewise. The United States can no

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longer expect to maintain a global military presence without
the Soviet Union doing likewise. I think this is as unwise for
them as it is for us, but that is the way the situation is. The
only way out of it, of course, is not by military and geopolitical
competition but by military and geopolitical agreement as a
part of American-Soviet detente.

In this regard, I would like to say a word about detente in
connection with the current bruhaha about Portugal and Angola.
If, as is so constantly assumed and repeated, the Soviet Union
were actively and significantly trying to influence the course
of events in Portugal to produce a Communist-dominated state,
I think this would be a violation of the limits of detente,
because Portugal is in an area of prime interest to the United
States and is a member of our most important alliance system.
But my very strong impression, based, I should say, on pretty
reliable authority, is that we have no hard evidence that the
Soviet Union has actively and significantly tried to influence
the course of events in Portugal. Indeed, I strongly suspect
that a Communist take-over in Portugal right now is one of the
last things Moscow wants, just because the Kremlin is acutely
aware that it would jeopardize the detente relationship with
the United States.

But Angola is something else. There is nothing in our
detente relationship with the USSR that says Moscow should not

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[LC]

try to influence events in Angola, a country which is not and
never has been a prime interest area as far as the United States
is concerned and which does not affect our security in any way.
Nor, since Angola is not of strategic importance to the USSR
either, there is nothing about detente which would limit our
intervention. What should limit our intervention in Angola,
in my opinion, is common sense.

In this connection, there is a great deal of misunderstanding
about the nature and uses of detente. Senator Tunney, for instance,
was quoted in the *Los Angeles Times* Tuesday as saying that we
should "make it clear to the Russians that we view their inter-
ference there [in Angola] as inconsistent with detente, and that
if they want progress in SALT talks, if they want American grain
and American investment, if they want American technology, then
they had better seriously weigh the cost of their interference
in Angola." Such remarks seem to me to reflect a serious mis-
understanding of the nature of detente. It should be based on
mutuality. It is not something we give the Russians. We pursue
the SALT talks--I trust--because they are in the interest of the
United States. We are under no compulsion, as a result of
detente, to sell our wheat to the USSR, or to trade with them,
although I think these things are to our advantage also, in
addition to helping our relationship generally. But detente is
no mechanism for American policing of the world, and any attempt
to use it as such is sure to backfire.

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As far as Angola is concerned, I think we should try to discourage intervention, but it can't be accomplished by threat, especially when we have thrown the first big stone. The fact is that the recent active Soviet intervention in Angola seems to be in considerable part a reaction to earlier American intervention. Regardless of this, the Angola situation illustrates exactly the kind of agreement, or understanding, I think we should be trying to work out with the Soviet Union--an understanding that neither side would intervene, at least without prior consultation with the other. There are many areas of the world similar, of overriding importance neither to us nor to the Russians. And since detente is aimed at avoiding confrontation, it behooves us both, I think, to come to understandings about as many of such areas as is possible.

I would like to see the United States take the initiative in this as a step to further detente. Instead, I hear the anguished voice of Henry Kissinger warning that the Angola situation threatens detente, and the lilting Celtic tenor of Pat Moynihan--as so often turning the catchy phrase at the expense of substance--declaring that the Russians are trying to "colonize Africa." One wonders whether the Administration's preoccupation with this, just as its apparent willingness to let the Backfire-cruise missile dispute hold up SALT II, does not reflect more concern with Ronald Reagan than with Angola. If it is more

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than this, it reflects a misunderstanding of the nature of detente.

How tragic it would be if the progress we have been making toward detente were to stumble fatally over an in-house fight in the Republican Party. And stumble fatally it could. Because we face dangerous technological-political time factors. A SALT II agreement now is possible. In 1977 it may not be, not only because of the inexorable pace of weapons technology but also because of internal Soviet politics. Secretary Brezhnev has, so to speak, put all his eggs in the detente basket, depending on American reciprocity. If it fails, or is perceived in the Kremlin as having failed, there would inevitably be serious political repercussions in the Soviet Union. And Brezhnev's successors, likely to perceive such a situation not only as a rebuff but as a second rebuff--the rebuff to Khrushchev being considered the first--would not be likely to continue to make pursuit of detente a priority, if indeed they pursued it at all.

The Soviet commitment to coexistence and avoidance of war is, I think, a fundamental strategic position unlikely to change. But the detente policy can be considered a tactic of coexistence which could be abandoned were it thought not to be succeeding. I would hope, in such case, we would not return to the Cold War, but I am by no means sure of it.

I was asked to say a word about current Soviet views of American policies, and American military policy in particular.

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There are almost as many opinions on this subject as there are Soviet experts. There are those who say you can never trust the Russians, and there are some who say you should always trust them. I suppose I fall somewhere in between, since I don't trust any government 100%, including my own. In any event, I can only present my own observations, based I should say, on experience--military, diplomatic and academic--extending back more than 30 years. It is important to understand these Soviet views, no matter how skeptical we may be of them. If some of them illustrate why we have some of the problems we do with the Russians, and why they are often difficult partners in international undertakings, at the same time, I think, they also illustrate the potentialities of peaceful American-Soviet relations.

The Soviet regime, as I understand it, sincerely and honestly wants agreements with the United States leading to a reduction of military forces, especially thermonuclear weapons. Of course, they seek such agreements in their own interests. They want them not only because they understand that they, no more than we, could survive a thermonuclear war, and that, as Khrushchev once put it, Communism cannot be built on the ruins of a nuclear holocaust. They want such agreements also because the strain on their economy of their present military posture is keeping them from achieving the kind of society they want at home. These are quite reasonable motives, which many, if not most,

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Americans have also. Of course, the USSR wants trade, and of course, it can benefit from American technology, but these are not vital to it, and they are not the major reasons for the detente policy.

But the Russians are cautious because they don't quite trust us. It is not that the Soviet leadership believes the United States wants to launch an attack on them, although Moscow has its fear-mongers just as Washington does. It is more that the Soviet leadership fears that the United States will utilize its military superiority in ways they consider inimical. Let me cite three ways they consider inimical: First and most important, the Soviet Union has pledged to support, militarily, if need be, socialist regimes--as defined in Moscow--once they are established. And there is suspicion that if the USSR is militarily inferior to the United States, we might use our military might to undermine such socialist governments without the USSR being able to come to their aid. Secondly, they fear that a militarily superior United States might use its superiority to influence regimes in areas of strategic importance to the USSR--Iran, for example--to take anti-Soviet positions. Thirdly, there is the matter of Soviet leadership in the Communist world. This has two aspects. One is that such leadership is seen as requiring that the Soviet Union be second to none. The other is that the Kremlin distrusts American motives toward "national

[L]

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liberation" movements, for which the USSR has a much-proclaimed
sympathy. Moscow has said it will not stir up such revolutionary
movements and will not intervene in them militarily if "the
imperialists"--meaning the United States does not. Indeed,
the stated Soviet position is that it may not intervene even
if the United States does, but it wants to be in a position to
do so if need be, and it thinks that, in any event, military
inferiority on its part would only encourage American inter-
vention.

(One should add that as a part of the policy of detente the
Soviet Union has been almost ostentatious in keeping hands off
areas which are of clear strategic importance to the United
States, such as Latin America).

There is one more Soviet fear, and that involves China. For
some years, before the detente process got underway, Moscow was
almost paranoid about the possibility of an American-Chinese
alliance against it. This fear has now abated. But nevertheless
when Moscow considers the possibility of serious trouble with the
Chinese, their crystal ball is not altogether clear as far as the
United States is concerned, especially if the detente process
does not succeed in producing a real _modus vivendi_ between our
two countries. In any event, the Chinese puzzle is never far
out of the Soviet mind where military posture is concerned.

-13-

[LC]

There has been an increasing sophistication in Soviet understanding of decision-making processes of the United States, thanks in part to the efforts of two men, Ambassador Dobrynin and Georgi Arbatov, Director of the politically influential Institute for Study of the USA. There is understanding of both political and bureaucratic pressures that are involved in the making of policy. This understanding is not totally unblurred by ideological considerations, and certainly the gyrations of American democracy sometimes bewilder them, a result with which I, as an American, have some sympathy. Nonetheless, it is my impression that over-all, at top advisory positions in the Soviet Union, there is probably a clearer understanding of how our system operates than there is here about how their system operates. Of course, this advice is not always taken at the top decision-making levels, and in the USSR, as elsewhere, internal political considerations are usually ultimately dominant.

The Russians see themselves as having made numerous concessions to the United States in the interest of detente--as has Secretary Kissinger--and they are somewhat puzzled about why detente has currently run into such heavy weather. The villains are usually considered to be three kinds: unreconstructed Cold Warriors, of whom Senator Jackson is usually cited as a prototype; the military-industrial complex, consisting of Pentagon professionals and big business interests with lucrative military

-14-

[LC]

contracts; and the Zionists. The latter, according to Moscow's views, are being used by the former.

Being Marxists, the Russians see economic motives as being predominant in American military posture--economic motives of three kinds--first, profits of firms making weapons; second, military production to aid the economy overall; and third, protection of American investments overseas, and acquisition of new ones, especially in Third World countries.

On the other hand, the Russians see in American business- that part of it not tied to the Pentagon--a pro-detente force. This is explained in three ways: first because of the desire for profits from trade; second because of the desire for inter-national stability; and third because big capitalists are con-sidered hard-headed pragmatists able to assess their nation's interest soberly without ideology or emotion.

Finally, the Soviet Communists claim to be--and I think they are--optimistic about the long-range future, which, they are convinced, belongs to Communism. They see the capitalist world currently as being in an intense crisis, not a crisis that is going to bring it down right away, but one which will ultimately fundamentally weaken it. This observation is pleasing to them, of course, because they think it means that capitalism will that much quicker give way to socialism and that the superiority of the Soviet Communist institutions will become apparent. On the

-15-

other hand, they view the crisis in capitalism with some concern--
first because they realize that crisis in a particular capitalist
country can result in a right-wing, anti-Soviet regime, as
happened in Germany; and second because, according to Leninist
ideology, capitalist crises tend to result in war. And while
war, according to present Soviet Communist ideology, is no longer
inevitable, it still is a dangerous possibility.

This brings up what the Soviets refer to as the "correlation
of forces." They believe that the effectiveness of military
posture, the success of foreign policy and their ultimate triumph
in the world depends not on any one circumstance or set of cir-
cumstances but the over-all situation at home and abroad. They
currently see the correlation of forces as building in their
favor. I don't believe this is necessarily the case, and I
think a wise foreign policy can make sure it doesn't happen.
But it should not be a factor in determining our military posture,
unless the USSR acts to threaten our security interests, which
it has not done and which I do not believe it will. Concern
for the correlation of forces may be one reason for concern about
Soviet moves in Angola. But the way to prevent this is by working
out agreements with the Soviet Union to avoid such developments.
I think such agreements are possible because one important factor
in the Soviet view of a favorable correlation of forces is detente
and the necessity for avoiding conflict with the United States.

-16-

[Lc]

In short, peace is considered a favorable condition.

I think we should take the Soviet Union up on this and, so to speak, turn the tables on them as far as detente goes. Because peace, which only detente can guarantee, can be utilized to turn the correlation of forces in our favor. I have never understood why some American critics of the Soviet Union are so worried about this idea of correlation of forces. For myself, I have no fear about competition with the USSR, ideologically or any other way, if we can put our own house in order and make our own system work as it should. But internationally we must do it on the basis of mutual accord with the USSR. If the United States wishes again to become the beacon of peace, hope and well being for all the peoples of the world--and I think we should want to--that is the way to do it.

*Fred Warner Neal
Chairman, Graduate Faculty in
International Relations
Claremont Graduate School
Claremont, California

Santa Barbara, California.

Box 4068,

Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions,
Mr. Fred Warner Neal,

Peraonal Assistant
Suzanne 2. McFarlane

Sincerely,

I know he will find them of great interest.

He will keep them in his personal library, and

wishes to thank you for your courtesy in forwarding
volumes of proceedings of Pacem in Terrae IV, and
Secretary Klaasinger has received the three

Dear Mr. Neal:

October 21, 1976

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 4283

PAGE 01
ACTION SS-15

LONDON 20280 151822Z

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 w

P 151742Z DEC 76
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8790

UNCLAS LONDON 20280

E.D. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OGEN
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR THE SECRETARY

REF: STATE 302717

014057 /53-R

1. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM JOHN NEGROPONTE TO DAVID PASSAGE FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER:

2. BEGIN TEXT: DEAR HENRY: DIANA AND I WERE DEEPLY MOVED BY YOUR MESSAGE OF CONGRATULATIONS AND GOOD WISHES ON THE OCCASION OF OUR WEDDING. WE ARE FULL OF OPTIMISM IN THE FACE OF THE TEST WHICH LIES AHEAD, AN OPTIMISM STRENGTHENED BY THE KIND WORDS WHICH YOU AND NANCY HAVE EXTENDED TO US. NEEDLESS TO SAY, YOUR MESSAGE HELD A VERY SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR ME PERSONALLY AND GAVE ME ONE VERY IMPORTANT ADDITIONAL REASON TO BE A TERRIBLY GRATEFUL MAN THIS HOLIDAY SEASON. WITH WARMEST REGARDS, JOHN NEGROPONTE. END TEXT.

ARMSTRONG

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM DS-1652
9-66

Minneapolis, Minnesota.
4846 South Lyndale,
Mr. Mark Nehotte,

Personal Assistant
Suzanne 2. McFerrane

Sincerely,

You were very nice to be so patient.

matters. I know he wishes he had more!
very little time the Secretary has to devote to any
I hope you will forgive the delay and understand how
at last the picture signed by Secretary Klaasinger.
I am very happy to be able to return to you

Dear Mr. Nehotte:

June 1, 1976

Mark Nehotte
4846 So. Lyndale
Minneapolis, Minn. 55409

Honorable Henry Kissinger,
% The White House
Washington D.C. 20510

My dear Mr. Kissinger,

Hi. I would like to congratulate you for
the magnificent work which you have done in
the past. I am very interested in politics and
hope to join the field in the future. Could you
be kind enough to sign the enclosed picture
to me personally? It would be a great
honor!!!

Thank you and I wish you the best
of luck in 1996.

Washington, D. C.
1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Los Angeles Times
Bureau Chief
Mr. Jack Nelson

Suzanne S. McFarlane

Sincerely,

and Mr. Pickerell.
The Secretary has asked me to let you know that
he did indeed enjoy seeing the photographs taken by Jim
Pickerell in Los Angeles. It was very thoughtful of you
to send them, and the Secretary wishes to thank both you

Dear Mr. Nelson:

November 3, 1972

THE BOARD OF FOREIGN SCHOLARSHIPS

A Presidentially Appointed Board Responsible to the Congress and the Public, Author-
ized Under Public Law 87-256 the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961

OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

October 31, 1974

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

As you may know from members of your staff, the Board
of Foreign Scholarships is planning to honor Senator
and Mrs. William Fulbright at a special dinner Monday
evening, December 16. The dinner will be at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars of
the Smithsonian Institution with cocktails at 6:30
and dinner at 7:30.

This session will be the Board's final official act
in expressing its gratitude and that of past Boards
to the man who conceived this program and has been its
staunchest supporter in the Congress for 28 years. In
a sense we feel that we will be representing the some
115,000 American and foreign students and faculty who
have benefited from a program of which Arnold Toynbee
has said: "Along with the Marshall Plan, the
Fulbright Program is one of the really generous and
imaginative things that have been done in the world
since World War II."

I know something of the exceptionally heavy schedule
which you follow and the many demands upon your time.
However, given the importance of this occasion and
also knowing of your admiration and respect for Senator
Fulbright, I wanted you to know about these plans and
to invite you and Mrs. Kissinger to be our guests in
paying tribute to the man who has played such a key
role in this field.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPM (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : S - Mrs. Bonnie Andrews

THRU: S - Mrs. Jane M. Rothe

FROM : CU/BFS - Elsie T. Oppenheim

DATE: November 22, 1974

SUBJECT: Arrangements for Dinner Hosted by Board of Foreign Scholarships in Honor of Senator and Mrs. Fulbright, December 16, 1974

This will informally confirm arrangements for the dinner in honor of Senator and Mrs. Fulbright hosted by the Board of Foreign Scholarships on Monday, December 16 at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution. Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger have accepted Chairman Lyle M. Nelson's invitation to attend as his personal guests.

Cocktails will be served in the Rotunda at 7:00 p.m. with dinner in the Library at 8:00 p.m. Please note that the time has changed slightly from that which I gave Mrs. Andrews earlier.

At the conclusion of the dinner at about 9:30 p.m., the Chairman has asked the Secretary to present a special scroll to Senator Fulbright commemorating the occasion and expressing the gratitude and thanks of all the members of the Board, past and present, and the more than 115,000 people who have participated in this significant international program for academic exchange. The Board hopes that the Secretary will make some brief impromptu remarks at that time. The Chairman will then present an album of photographs and letters to Senator Fulbright with some brief remarks.

I am enclosing a list of the current members of the Board, with their titles, as well as others who we anticipate will attend the dinner. We expect a total of 30-32 persons at this event. I have also enclosed a map which indicates parking areas to the building and the entrance to be used.

Please let me know if anything additional is required. I understand from Mrs. Hill that a briefing memorandum to the Secretary would be helpful with some suggested remarks for the Secretary to make during the presentation at the dinner. A briefing memorandum through regular channels will be prepared as soon as the list of acceptances is available.

Please let me know by December 12 at the latest whether Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger are definitely attending. Mrs. Andrews indicated to me earlier that there might be some conflict on December 16. Dress for the occasion is informal with business suits for the men and gowns or street length dress for the women, whichever is preferred.

Attachments:

Approved.

CU/BFS:ETOppenheim:clb

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

GUEST LIST

CURRENT MEMBERSHIP, BOARD OF FOREIGN SCHOLARSHIPS

Chairman

Lyle M. Nelson
Professor of Communication
Chairman, Department of Communication
Cypress Hall, C-3
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

Vice Chairman

Donald S. Lowitz and Mrs. Lowitz
Attorney-at-Law
Aaron, Aaron, Schimberg & Hess
1 First National Plaza
33rd Floor
Chicago, Illinois 60670

Members

James H. Billington, D.Phil. and Mrs. B.
Director, Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, Room 326
Smithsonian Institution Building
1000 Jefferson Drive, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20560

John E. Dolibois and Mrs. Dolibois
Vice President for Development
and Alumni Affairs
Murstein Alumni Center
Miami University
Oxford, Ohio 45056

Lane Dwinell
94 Bank Street
Lebanon, New Hampshire 03766

J. Archie Hargraves, D.Rel.
President, Shaw University
118 East South Street
Raleigh, North Carolina 27606

David H. Lissy and Mrs. Lissy
Executive Secretary to the Department
and Special Assistant to the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare
Room 5239 North Building
Department of HEW
Washington, D.C. 20202

Miss Martha Twitchell Muse
President and Executive Director
The Tinker Foundation
645 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10022

James R. Roach VACANCY
Dean, Division of General and
Comparative Studies
University of Texas, Box 7607
Austin, Texas 78712

Mrs. Anne Pannell Taylor and Rev. T.
514 Trippe Avenue
Easton, Maryland 21601

James D. Theberge and Mrs. Theberge
Director, Latin American and
Hispanic Studies
and Senior International Economist,
Center for Strategic and International
Studies, Georgetown University
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20005

Duncan Wimpress, Ph.D.
President, Trinity University
715 Stadium Drive
San Antonio, Texas 78284

Assistant Secretary and Mrs. John
Richardson, Jr.

Senator and Mrs. J.W. Fulbright
A.
Miss Maria/Stevens, Deputy Director, CU/BFS
Mrs. Elsie T. Oppenheim, CU/BFS and Mr. O.

STAFF DIRECTOR

Ralph H. Vogel and Mrs. Vogel
Bureau of Educational and
Cultural Affairs (CU/BFS)
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

XEN/ERS XXIV/XXV/XXVI

As of 11/22/74

Office of the Chairman

NOTE:

The entrance to the Smithsonian Institution Building is off Independence Avenue and visitors should park in the grey-shaded area adjacent to Buildings 1, 2 and 3 behind the Smithsonian Building. The entrance is indicated at the east end by an asterisk.