The White House
Washington

1970 FEB 3 PM 1 24

WA198 (COA19) EB INTL

PEOCKING BEI STARNBERG/TF 36 2 1856

PROFESSOR KISSINGER

THE WHITE HOUSE

SPANISH MINISTER FEDERCO SILVA IS PRIVATELY WASHINGTON

HILTONHOTEL UNTIL FEBRUARY 6TH STOP COULD YOU KINDLY CONTACT HIM

THERE LETTING HIM KNOW IF YOU COULD RECEIVE HIM WARMEST REGARDS

OTTO HABSBURG.

RECEIVED
KISSINGER'S OFFICE

1970 FEB 3 PM 2 37

FORM 0805 PRINTED BY THE STANDARD REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A.

2776

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 6, 1972

Dick:

HAK talked to Frank Sinatra today. Sinatra asked him to have dinner with him on the 18th of this month. He will get in on that afternoon, will be at the Madison and will call HAK and maybe run over and pick HAK up at the end of his day. HAK said that would be nice. Sinatra said Tina might be with him so they will take her to dinner.

HAK asked him where he will be in case anything happens, Sinatra said he will be at the Waldorf - he will call Monday and give us his number at the Waldorf.

A-6 Los Angeles Herald-Examiner, Wednesday, Nov. 15, 1972 A M

President May Greet New Faces, Old Faces in New Chairs

Musical Chairs in Cabinet Room

By HARRY KELLY
Herald-Examiner Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — When President Nixon sits down to his first cabinet meeting of his second term he may confront a wholesale change, with new faces as well as some old faces in new chairs, according to reports within the Administration.

One top-level Administration report suggests the President will end up with a reorganization plan affecting at least half the cabinet.

None of the reports can be taken as definitive. White House spokesmen have repeatedly stressed that the President has not decided who of his advisers will stay, who will leave with a friendly "Dear John" letter in hand and who may be shifted to a new job.

The President, according to White House press secretary Ron Ziegler, won't make up his mind on the reorganization of his administration — from cabinet officials and White House advisers, down to the super-grade bureaucrats — until he has had individual conversations with each cabinet official.

But a White House source holds that in addition to Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird and Secretary of Housing and Urban Affairs George Romney, who have already announced their intentions to leave their posts, these other cabinet officials are likely to leave:

Secretary of Transportation John Volpe, Attorney General Richard Kleindienst and Secretary of Labor James Hodgson.

In addition, according to this source, Secretary of Health Education and Welfare Eliot Richardson may be transferred to another position.

While warning against such speculation, Ziegler has acknowledged that the President's action in asking for the pro-forma resignations of all his presidential appointments was certain to excite reams of rumors and leaks — some of which are generated by the hopes or malice of aides and others.

One source reported that the president's White House chief of staff H.R. Haldeman was among those leaving and cited as evidence the fact he was selling his house. A White House spokesman said Haldeman was indeed selling his home in suburban Maryland but was buying a new one closer to the White House to cut commuting time.

Some reports suggest the possibility of the Administration enduring a Cabinet Room game of musical chairs with the advisers finishing this way:

Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State, replacing William Rogers.

Rogers, in turn, replacing Richard Kliendienst as attorney general until an opening

occurs for Rogers on the Supreme Court.

Former Treasury Secretary John Connally as Secretary of Defense replacing Laird.

Laird as secretary of Health Education and Welfare replacing Richardson.

Richardson, in turn, replacing Rogers as Secretary of State if Kissinger doesn't replace him.

There is substance behind some of the reports.

Some officials worry the Justice Department has received "too political" an image under Kleindienst and his predecessor, John Mitchell, who headed President Nixon's campaign in 1968 and temporarily in 1972.

Further, they say, Kliendienst's and the department's reputation were scorched by the ITT case and Watergate break-in. Some officials thus are reported to be urging that Kliendienst be replaced by someone like Rogers or Richardson, regarded as a "Mr. Clean."

Secretary of Labor Hodgson, according to Labor Department reports, will be sacrificed to AFL-CIO President George Meany's wrath. Meany, who won a line of credit with the Administration for refusing to endorse Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern, doesn't like Hodgson.

Nancy Kissinger Secretary of State would reward him with the title as well as the fact of being the President's chief foreign policy adviser and might repair the State Department's loss of morale and prestige.

Arguing against it is that Kissinger is a German-born Jew, which might add to the complications of negotiating a Middle Eastern settlement with Arab countries.

Both Connally and Richardson are also said to be in line for the Secretary of State's position in the second Nixon administration.

When he was Undersecretary of State, Richardson reportedly worked well with Kissinger and the State Department was plugged in on developments. But some officials believe that if Connally, the ambitious and aggressive Texas Democrat, should become Secretary of State, Kissinger would quit.

Another mentioned as a possibility to move into the Pentagon is William J. Casey, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Another persistent report is that Casey, who served in the CIA's forerunner, the World War II cloak and dagger outfit, the OSS, will replace Richard Helms, the career-man director of the CIA.

But other sources see little chance of Helms being removed. They say he is highly regarded in the intelligence community, the Administration and in Congress.

DEC 10 1968

HUDSON INSTITUTE

QUAKER RIDGE ROAD, CROTON-ON-HUDSON, N. Y. 10520 CABLE ADDRESS HUDSON 914 RO 2-0700

December 7, 1968

To the Fellow Members:

Here is a brief memorandum describing what happened at our annual Members' Meeting in October. (I should say our "informal annual meeting" because we did not use the meeting for routine business and I will have to send you in a few weeks' proxy ballots so that we can dispose of formal business by mail.) I thought you might also be interested in having an example of the chart collection series that Herman discussed, so I have enclosed one with the memo.

A number of those present in October felt that more opportunity for discussion among Hudson Members and staff would be desirable, and that we ought to have at least two meetings a year. Therefore, we have decided to have a spring meeting for Members at the Institute on Friday and Saturday, March 21st and 22nd. Next month I will send you more information about the program, which will emphasize discussion rather than presentations.

This memo on our October meeting can be thought of as part of a series of experiments designed to develop the best forms of communication and cooperation between the staff and Membership of Hudson. We would be very pleased to hear your views about this particular device, about the meeting, and about other possibilities. In any event, I hope that the memo will be of interest to those of you who were unable to get to the meeting.

MS/mhb

encs.: Memo to Members
Chart Collection Volume I

December 7, 1968

Memo to: The Members of Hudson Institute

From: Max Singer

Subject: Report on October 25-26 Members' Meeting

The thirty-six of our Public, Fellow, and Employee Members listed
at the end of this memo participated in a two-day meeting held on Octo-
ber 25th and 26th at the Institute and nearby at the General Electric
Center. The meeting was intended to stimulate thought and discussion
about current and looming public issues, as well as to report on Hudson's
current work and to talk about our purposes, procedures, and problems.

The part of the proceedings devoted to reporting on Hudson's work
focused on two of the Institute's current areas of interest: the project
entitled "Policy Issues Facing the Next Administration," and a proposed
policy context for certain kinds of public works projects.

As described to the attending Members by Herman Kahn, the Policy
Issues project (formerly known as the Analytic Summary), is intended to
meet the need of senior government personnel for efficiently organized
background analysis of a host of foreign and domestic policy issues. The
sample chartbook enclosed with this memo illustrates the current stage of
our experiment on presentational format. Nearly all our researchers are
contributing to this effort, and our intention is to create 5 - 7 basic
chart collection volumes--like the one enclosed with this memo--each with
accompanying volumes of background, explication, and documentation, plus
a number of modular units of charts and notes and (in some cases) explica-
tion and documentation that may be combined into special volumes on a wide
variety of subjects.

2

Herman and I described the public works interests of the Institute, particularly emphasizing the ideas developed by Hudson for Colombia's Choco Valley, the Amazon River, the Mekong Delta, and New York City's East River area. We feel that the cooperation of government and private investors in this type of enterprise, which is useful, visible, and dramatic, could help combat low morale in underdeveloped countries and in the great cities. In our opinion such a project will be most effective as one of several components of a Year 2000 "ideology." The Year 2000 not only has a charismatic appeal, but as the focal point of programs it has the advantage of being remote enough to permit substantial accomplishments, yet near enough to be meaningful--both to the ordinary citizen concerned about the world in which his children will live, and to those elite groups whose energies are presently sapped by a sense of the inevitability of revolution or decay.

Other issues discussed during the meeting ranged from gun-control legislation to the perils of "Faustian" choice, all related to an over-all theme: the dichotomy in the United States and abroad, of intellectual and popular cultures, and the problems this creates for communication and government. In connection with this theme, Frank Armbruster described the fragile alliance of radical students and conservative workers in last spring's near-revolution in France, and also the discrepancies in our country between the views of the upper middle class and those of the "forgotten man" on such issues as law and order, distribution of pornography, American commitments abroad, school taxes, and traditional values.

Focusing on the intellectual component of the dichotomy (and defining the intellectual as "a person who forms opinions on the basis of indirect

["3", "evidence"), Raymond Gastil identified the natural inclinations of the intellectual toward relativism, pacifism, and egalitarianism. These, he contended, are resurgent today after a period of eclipse during and after World War II, and he predicted that they will continue to flourish until developments comparable in shock value to Hitler's aggressions once again reduce their influence.", "Herman Kahn and Anthony Wiener also discussed the problems of increased participation in government by intellectuals. They considered the ethical issues involved in the erosion of absolute values--for example, the \"manipulative rationality\" of policy researchers--as well as the practical problems raised by the \"trained incapacity\" of the specialist, his frequently imperfect (or erroneous) understanding of his context, and his characteristic reluctance to operate elsewhere than at the leading edge of technology, even when the situation calls for less advanced techniques and tools.", "Military and other aspects of foreign affairs were discussed by a number of speakers. Friday afternoon, while the Board of Trustees convened in separate session, Donald Brennan presented the case for developing a substantial BMD system in the context of an agreement (explicit or tacit) to limit offensive missile forces (thus protecting against offensive responses to defenses). After dinner, three visiting Members, Louis Sohn, Dalimil Kybal and Charles Herzfeld, discussed the merits and drawbacks of such a policy.", "Herman Kahn presented the Hudson majority's position on the Vietnam war--briefly, that if, as he believes, Ho Chi Minh is unwilling to make any faintly reasonable settlement, it is both necessary and possible to"]

4

modify our policies and their presentation to change the war into one
which is, and which is perceived to be, a "just war." If the war con-
tinues on this basis, he argued, any one of a number of practical im-
provements in our conduct of the war, especially reasonable attention to
police work, will permit us to bring the war to a satisfactory conclusion.
An alternative point of view was offered by William Pfaff, who denied
that the war has rational justification and that the average American is
psychologically committed to its continuation.

At the Saturday session, Bill Pfaff also spoke on the altering
political forces of Western Europe; specifically, on the dwindling impor-
tance of traditional parties and class consciousness, and the individual's
resultant disorientation and sense of impotence. The following speaker,
Johan Holst, analyzed the impact on the West of Russia's intervention in
Czechoslovakia.

The debate among the audience, stimulated by the discussion of
Czechoslovakia brought up again a point made the previous day: that ways
ought to be found for increasing the participation of Hudson's Public and
Fellow Members in its work. Several Members recommended publication of a
newsletter, perhaps bimonthly. Others suggested that we have two meetings
a year, one to present a progress report, the other to elicit varied
viewpoints on substantive issues of public policy.

Other topics debated by the visiting Members included; whether the
Institute is "spreading itself too thin"; the low turnover rate among
senior personnel; the possibility and desirability of obtaining contracts
from private corporations; the Institute's optimal size, and more generally,
Hudson's analytical techniques and its criteria for choice among possible

5

areas of concentration. In addition, John Menke, Chairman of the Executive
Committee of the Board of Trustees, described Hudson's present financial
situation and led a discussion of the aims and methods of a possible fund-
raising campaign.

It was also announced that Hudson is editing a new periodical, "Arms
Control and Disarmament," and is preparing to edit a journal of futures
studies starting next fall.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

<table><tr><td>Introduction</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>The Basic Foci of the Policy Issues Project</td><td>2</td></tr><tr><td>Some Reasons for Professional and Independent Policy Research</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>On the Art of Policy Research (Some Problems and "Tricks")</td><td>4</td></tr><tr><td>On Speculating, Extrapolating, Projecting, Forecasting, and Predicting</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>Miscellaneous Topics in Policy Research</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Outline of the Policy Issues Project</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>The BNSP Approach</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Basic Policy Themes and Attitudes</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>The Seven Levels of Analysis</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Introductory thumbnail Themes and Sketches: Some Important Archetypes of Personalities and Philosophies</td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>Appendix: thumbnail Descriptions of the Thirty BNSP Themes</td><td>18</td></tr></table>

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## Introduction

The Hudson Institute Policy Issues Project draws from three different Hudson programs: the first, sponsored by Hudson, focuses on development issues for rich and poor nations. (It is supported in part by a grant by Robert Sprague and in part by Hudson's own funds.) The second is the general Hudson program on foreign policy and defense issues, consisting largely of work done for various agencies of the U.S. government. (As far as the Policy Issues Project is concerned the most important part of this work is a study called "Analytic Summary of National Security Issues.") Finally, we have a special grant for the Policy Issues Project itself, which is used to supplement, complement, or in other ways fill in gaps that are not covered by the first two programs.

Each chart page normally summarizes from 5 to 150 pages of text. One volume in a chart collection thus corresponds roughly to a volume or two of a normal text.

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The Basic Foci of the Policy Issues Project:

Chart 1 outlines the project from a methodological point of view; Chart 2 from a topical or subject-area point of view. Chart 3 focuses attention on important, and often misunderstood, characteristics of policy research (as opposed to academic research). Chart 4 lists our objectives for the project, or at least the criteria by which we would prefer the product of the Policy Issues Project to be judged.

In Chart 5 we define three terms that we have used in Charts 1 and 4, terms which are likely to be reasonably familiar to any well-educated European but unfamiliar to an American. We use these relatively esoteric terms because they describe more exactly one of the major emphases of our project than any other terms. Very roughly, we can think of a paradigm as being something between a model and a metaphor, i.e., not quite as rigorous, definite or "answerable" as a model, but somewhat more so than a metaphor. In some sense each of the volumes of Chart Collection 1 and its associated discussion can be thought of as a paradigm for some public policy issue.

Chart 6 indicates various kinds of agreement or disagreement that might be achieved between the authors of these volumes and the reader or even among the authors themselves. What is generally attempted is, of course, a first-order agreement, agreement on what to believe about the real world or about what policies are to be pursued. We are, of course, not uninterested in this subject, but we are very consciously not making this our highest priority effort, particularly as the authors themselves are not in first-order agreement. We have an informal test of what a second-order agreement is. If A and B have achieved second-order agreement about some issue, each one should be able to explain to C what the agreement or disagreement is about and the other side should agree with the essentials of that explanation.

We believe that if the reader consciously tries to think in terms of second-order agreement he will understand better the material that is being presented and gain a good deal more from the exposition even-- or especially--if he does not share various first-order agreements, attempted or implied (perhaps unconsciously or accidentally) in this exposition.

Chart 8 indicates some important distinctions between long and short run. We consciously try in this project to focus attention on points "A" and "B," destinations and routes. But we have found it is difficult to do so and unfortunately more than half our time and energy is spent on points "C" and "D." Charts 9, 10, and 11 illustrate typical issues raised by the terms "destination," "routes," and "directions." Chart 12 outlines various potential eventual products of the project.

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1. Notes:

**Chart 11:** After every policy choice we have also noted, in the parens following, an unfortunate by-product of that policy choice. However, these latter efforts are by no means an uncontroversial and obvious prediction. Rather they indicate the kind of position that most analysts seem to take. In many cases we would argue that, by appropriate policies one can pursue the main objective and decrease or reverse the cost paid in terms of the by-product indicated. Thus **Chart 11** may be somewhat simplistic in its assuming the given connection between policies and by-products. But the principle still remains that very few policies, even if widely accepted, can be pursued without serious costs, and that to note that a policy has costs is not a particularly significant observation. Such estimated costs must be balanced against the estimated gains.

2. References for Collateral Information:

R.K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, Free Press, 1949; rev. ed. 1956). A useful analysis of the functions of paradigms in sociology; see esp. p. 12-16.

3. References for more Reading:

*The Year 2000*, Chapter 10, "Policy Research and Social Change"

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## Some Reasons for Professional and Independent Policy Research:

In some ways page two is the most basic page in all the chart collection, explaining why we need policy research. We start with some of the most quoted paragraphs of a very widely quoted author who argues that a democracy can easily establish machinery and find appropriate human resources for domestic policy making but may find it much more difficult to deal with foreign affairs.

Charts 2, 3 and 4 give some additional reasons why the United States needs, at least in some areas, additional methods of reviewing, evaluating, formulating, initiating, and adopting new policies.

Among other things the charts indicate our concern about an over-emphasis on "booklearning" (a slightly vulgar way of referring to the fact that increasingly young Americans reach adulthood without dealing in any serious way with the practical world). To some great degree the relevant experience on which they will draw in meeting the more important vocational and public policy problems has been mostly limited to a "conceptual world" formulated by various authors, teachers and acquaintances they have come in contact with during their formal education. In this conceptual world the only problems seriously discussed or considered are those in which there is documented information or the "romantic" formulations typical of intellectuals and young people. The real existential world in which one achieves information and orientation by direct observation, orally transmitted information from various kinds of "amateurs" or experienced people, but both without academic credentials, or the hard and concrete result of relevant experience, is almost completely ignored. This often seems to lead to an almost invincible inability to deal with problems and formulations which are outside the academic purview. Since most serious policy issues contain elements of this sort, it effectively creates an inability to deal with these aspects of policy problems. This is probably also one of the sources of that strange phenomenon that often exists in current discussion, that is, in many cases, the most educated people in the country seem to be the most illusioned or misled.

We are talking above about one kind of "trained incapacity." The phrase comes from Veblen and refers, among other things, to the kind of incapacity which can only come with good professional or academic training. There are, of course, many other forms of "trained incapacity." It is by no means a monopoly of the academics or the professions. Every group (presumably including policy researchers) has its own typical "trained capacities." These "trained incapacities" are important and must be recognized and dealt with. They are a major explanation of why the obvious is so often missed.

What can one do about these problems? Well, we outline in *Chart 5* the basic tools of policy research. They are not a very impressive looking group and we hasten to admit in *Charts 6 and 7* that they are easily beaten, either by individuals with relevant knowledge, experience, perception, judgment, insight and intuition or by various people with special backgrounds, roles, positions, or perspectives. Despite this, we argue that there is a rather important role for these five tools and the individuals who can use them well and indicate some of the reasons for this importance in *Chart 8*.

POLICY RESEARCH

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## ② AN OVEREMPHASIS ON ACADEMIC EDUCATION CAN RESULT IN:

- EXPANSION OF THE ADOLESCENT SUBCULTURE

- MANDARINISM (INTELLECTUAL AS "FATHER & MOTHER OF HIS COUNTRY")

- MERITOCRACY

- OVEREMPHASIS ON "BOOK LEARNING" (CONCEPTUAL WORLD & DOCUMENTED INFORMATION RATHER THAN EXISTENTIAL WORLD & PERCEIVED OR ORALLY TRANSMITTED INFORMATION)

- "TRAINED INCAPACITY"

- INTELLECTUAL AND/OR EDUCATED PAROCHIALISM

- ALIENATION FROM ONE'S OWN CULTURE OR SUBCULTURE

- OTHER ALIENATION FROM THE PRACTICAL WORLD

## ④ THE POWERLESSNESS OF THE POWERFUL

1. IS IT TRUE THAT THE ONLY TWO SUPERPOWERS ARE NORTH KOREA AND NORTH VIETNAM? (HOW ABOUT RUMANIA, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, FRANCE, AND CHINA?)

2. THE POWERFUL (E.G., U.S., JOHNSON' ADMINISTRATION, BERKELEY AND COLUMBIA ADMINISTRATIONS, SOVIET UNION, CPSU, ETC.) USUALLY BELIEVE THEY CAN GET AWAY "WITHOUT THINKING" (I.E., WITH MORE OF THE SAME AND/OR BUSINESS AS USUAL).

3. THE "POWERLESS" KNOW THEY HAVE TO BE INGENIOUS, CLEVER, DEDICATED, DISCIPLINED, OR SOMETHING. THEY ALSO KNOW THEY SHOULD TRY TO USE JUJITSU (USE THE STRENGTH AND MIGHT OF THE OPPONENT TO GET LEVERAGE).

4. THIS IS AN ENORMOUS ADVANTAGE THE FLEXIBLE, AGILE, AND AUDACIOUS POWERLESS HAVE OVER THE RIGID, SECURE, SMUG, AND DOGMATIC POWERFUL.

## ⑤ WHY "TRAINED INCAPACITY"?

1. CLASSIC TENDENCY TO EXERCISE FAVORITE OR ACCUSTOMED MUSCLES (SKILLS OR FORMULATIONS)

2. NORMAL PAROCHIAL PROFESSIONALISM AND EMPHASIS

3. ARBITRARY OR EVEN BIASED BUREAUCRATIC OR ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRAINTS

4. MISPLACED GLAMOUR OR INCENTIVES

5. IDEOLOGICAL BIASES

6. SHEER LACK OF IMAGINATION, COURAGE, EXPERTISE OR OTHER REQUIREMENT FOR USEFUL INNOVATION

## ⑥ FIVE TOOLS OF POLICY RESEARCH

1. EMPIRICAL RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, AND SIMPLE THEORY.

2. METAPHORS AND HISTORICAL ANALOGUES.

3. ANALYTIC MODELS INVOLVING:

A. AN ANALYZABLE DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEMS,

B. THE DEVISING OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES,

C. THE EXPLICATION OF CRITERIA, OBJECTIVES, OR VALUES, AND

3. PROPHEDEUTIC AND HEURISTIC METHODOLOGIES AND PARADIGMS.

5. SCENARIOS, GAMING AND OTHER USE OF "ARBITRARY" SPECIFICATIONS AND STIMULATION; E.G., SURPRISE-FREE PROJECTIONS, STANDARD AND CANONICAL WORLDS, ETC.

## EXCERPTS FROM HUDSON INSTITUTE BROCHURE

### ...New elements...have reduced the value of experience as a guide to policy planning. Thus there are new needs for research and analysis that complement the decision-maker's traditional sources of advice and ideas. Organizations devoted to such studies must strive for a diversity of personnel working together in an organized manner, yet in an atmosphere of freedom of inquiry and emphasis. They must seek to provide a degree of time and detachment which rarely is possible in the studies of an official agency and a degree of focus and integration which is rarely available in a university or center for international studies...

### ...Major purpose is not to design blueprints for public policy or instructions for specific policy objectives...emphasis is usually on providing a broad, workable, conceptual framework within which intelligent and successful policy is more likely to be developed.

Hudson Institute studies emphasize long-range objectives and/or crucial issues, especially those that are not currently perceived as pressing and immediate...the Institute attempts to act as a "lobby for the future" or at least as a "lobby" for these important but not urgent issues...there are many operations-research, system-analysis and policy-research organizations which are filling "felt" needs of the government....Rather than filling needs already felt to be urgent, Hudson seeks to do better (or differently) what senior members of the government must ordinarily do for themselves: namely, to determine what issues are important and which may become urgent though they are not yet recognized as such. Although its usefulness is not always so easily appreciated, research to this end--at least if done well--seems necessary for long-range policy effectiveness.

SOME REASONS FOR PROFESSIONAL AND INDEPENDENT

① ...it is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior to other governments. Experience, instruction, and habit almost always succeed in creating in a democracy a homely species of practical wisdom and that science of the petty occurrences of life which is called good sense. Good sense may suffice to direct the ordinary course of society; and among a people whose education is completed, the advantages of democratic liberty in the internal affairs of the country may more than compensate for the evils inherent in a democratic government. But it is not always so in the relations with foreign nations.

Foreign politics demand scarcely any of those qualities which are peculiar to a democracy; they require, on the contrary, the perfect use of almost all those in which it is deficient. Democracy is favorable to the internal resources of a state; it diffuses wealth and comfort, promotes public spirit, and fortifies the respect for law in all classes of society: all these are advantages which have only an indirect influence over the relations which one people bears to another. But a democracy can only with great difficulty regulate the details of an important undertaking, persevere in a fixed design, and work out its execution in spite of serious obstacles. It cannot combine its measures with secrecy or await their consequences with patience. These are qualities which more especially belong to an individual or an aristocracy; and they are precisely the qualities by which a nation, like an individual, attains a dominant position.

If, on the contrary, we observe the natural defects of aristocracy, we shall find that comparatively speaking, they do not injure the direction of the external affairs of the state. The capital fault of which aristocracies may be accused is that they work for themselves and not for the people. In foreign politics it is rare for the interest of the aristocracy to be distinct from that of the people.

...Almost all the nations that have exercised a powerful influence upon the destinies of the world, by conceiving, following out, and executing vast designs, from the Romans to the English, have been governed by aristocratic institutions. Nor will this be a subject of wonder when we recollect that nothing in the world is so conservative in its views as an aristocracy. The mass of the people may be led astray by ignorance or passion; the mind of a king may be biased and made to vacillate in his designs, and, besides, a king is not immortal. But an aristocratic body is too numerous to be led astray by intrigue, and yet not numerous enough to yield readily to the intoxication of unreflecting passion. An aristocracy is a firm and enlightened body that never dies.

-- Alexis de Tocqueville's
Democracy in America

⑥ THE CUSTOMARY AND (IF AVAILABLE) BEST TOOLS
RELEVANT KNOWLEDGE, EXPERIENCE, PERCEPTION,
JUDGMENT, INSIGHT, AND INTUITION

⑦ IN GENERAL POLICY RESEARCH CAN OFTEN BE BEATEN BY:

<table><tr><td>INVENTORS</td><td>"UNINVOLVED"</td></tr><tr><td>ENTREPRENEURS</td><td>"INVOLVED"</td></tr><tr><td>INNOVATORS</td><td>SCHOLARLY</td></tr><tr><td>PROMOTERS</td><td>PRACTICAL</td></tr><tr><td>"LOCAL"</td><td>"BUREAUCRAT"</td></tr><tr><td>"FOREIGNER"</td><td>"REVOLUTIONIST"</td></tr></table>

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On the Art of Policy Research:

Chart 1 indicates some common pitfalls of this kind of analysis, while Chart 2 attempts to illustrate these pitfalls to make them somewhat more vivid. It is possible to find such pitfalls showing up as mistakes in the output of almost every policy research organization in the United States, no matter how competent, so that mentioning them does not suggest "being in favor of Mother."

Chart 3 points out that we should distinguish on the one hand between those advanced and modern technologies which are really available for the projected schedule and those which are going to be available someday but perhaps not soon enough and reliably enough to be planned on. On the other hand, in new situations we should not only seriously consider recent and recently outmoded technology but even ancient and passé technology. In many applications, revival of an old-fashioned technology can be as useful as inventing something very new. In Chart 4 we point out the many directions one can go in looking for useful lines of investigation. In particular, as discussed in Chart 5, one may wish to move "Sidewise in/to Technology." This would mean neither more advanced nor less advanced than current U.S. or European technology, but simply different. Possibly the most interesting chart on this page is 6, which explains some of the reasons why this kind of policy research organization is almost completely restricted to the United States of America. There seems to be nothing like it in any European nation, or in the Soviet Union.

Finally, Charts 7 and 8 give a series of points that tend to differentiate the professional from the "amateur." (It should, of course, be realized that many full-time people who have been in this business a long time are still, at least from this point of view, either amateurs or very narrow professionals.) Every one of the concepts in Chart 7 seems to be of great importance in more than a few studies. It is important to be constantly aware of them so that one can actually raise them explicitly in discussion; often they hit at the very heart of an issue. But rather than being explicitly aware of them, most analysts keep them in the background. Chart 8 is a good checklist in evaluating whether a study has been done in a rather routine way or whether there has been a real attempt to use the tricks of the trade and a relatively sophisticated approach.

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1. References for Collateral Information:

Can We Win in Vietnam?, p. 308 ff. (for discussion of sidewise in
technology concept).

The Year 2000, op. cit., p. 389-398, "Ways to Go Wrong" (on pitfalls in policy research).

Herman Kahn and Irwin Mann, "Ten Common Pitfalls," RM-1937 (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, July 17, 1957), esp. pp. 49-52.

On Thermonuclear War, p. 119-126 (on choosing a preferred system).

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RESEARCH (SOME PROBLEMS AND TRICKS)

COMMON PITFALLS FOR OPERATIONS RESEARCHERS, SYSTEM ANALYSTS, POLICY RESEARCHERS, AND EVERYONE ELSE

REAL UNCERTAINTY

ENEMY REACTION

OVER-
CONCENTRATION

FANATICISM

HERMITISM

BUTCH

7. SOME IMPORTANT AND RECURRING ISSUES AND CONCEPTS

1. ANCIEN REGIME MORALE (SEE CHART 2, P.16)

2. NIH (NOT INVENTED HERE) FACTOR

3. KEEPING BUSY, EXERCISING MUSCLES

4. REASONABLE BUT IMPORTANT GOALS

5. THE NEED FOR AND THE MISLEADING CHARACTER OF SUBCRITERIA

6. SIDEWISE IN/TO TECHNOLOGY

7. TEN COMMON PITFALLS

8. ENGINEERING SINS

9. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS SINS

10. ANALYTIC/INTUITIVE MIX

11. "EMPEROR HAS NO CLOTHES"

12. PLAYING OFF EXPERTS

13. TRAINED INCAPACITY (SEE CHART 2, P.2)

14. "FANATIC" VS "DIM VIEWER"

15. DESIGN VS. ANALYSIS

16. GOOD (OR BETTER) IS THE ENEMY OF THE BEST

17. BEST IS THE ENEMY OF THE GOOD (OR BETTER)

18. VALUE OF NEGATIVE ATTITUDES, "HOSTILE INSIGHTS," AND IDEOLOGICAL BIASES AND PERSPECTIVES

19. THE "HOT SNOW LOAD" PROBLEM

20. VARIOUS MEASURE/COUNTER-MEASURE FALLACIES

8. GOOD POLICY STUDIES OFTEN EMPHASIZE:

1. DESIGN OVER ANALYSIS

2. THE "EASY" SCENARIOS (WHEN "HOT-SNOW LOAD DESIGN" IS IMPRACTICAL)

3. THE HARD PROBLEMS (WHEN THESE HAVE BEEN IGNORED OR DE-EMPHASIZED)

4. "PREFERRED" SYSTEMS (NEVER "OPTIMAL" SYSTEMS)

5. THE "BEST" SOLUTIONS WHEN THESE ARE INEXPENSIVE

6. THE "GOOD" SOLUTIONS FOR MORE SITUATIONS

7. FOUR TYPICAL (OR AT LEAST CONCEPTUAL) STAGES IN A STUDY: FIRST, PLUNGING IN; SECOND, SELF-CONSCIOUS METHODOLOGY AND FORMULATION; THIRD, "FANATICISM"; AND FINALLY, "SOBER EVALUATION AND COMMON SENSE." ADMINISTRATORS AND DECISION-MAKERS NEED TO HAVE GREAT CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE STAGE OF THE STUDY AND THE NATURE OF THE DECISION (SEE ALSO CHART 4, P.7)

8. DEFINING AND FORMULATING PROBLEMS AND ISSUES (NEVER: "TELL ME THE PROBLEM AND I'LL GIVE YOU THE ANSWER.")

9. CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE ROLE OF "CRISES" AND "SPECIAL SITUATIONS" IN DECISION-MAKING THAT INVOLVES A MAJOR CHANGE OF POLICY

10. BLUNT, STARK, EVEN BRUTAL TRUTHS

11. COST-EFFECTIVENESS (NOT DESIRABILITY OR FEASIBILITY)-- BUT NOT TO EXCESS

12. A FORTIORI ANALYSIS

13. TOUGH-MINDED MEASURE/COUNTER-MEASURE ANALYSIS

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5a

On Speculating, Extrapolating, Projecting, Forecasting and Predicting:

We are attempting to examine, look at, and discuss the future. We are not, of course, trying to pick the winner of a horse race, only to describe most of the important horses that are running--important perhaps because the probability of winning is high or because the payoff for winning is so spectacular, or for an appropriate combination of probability and intrinsic importance. We would also like to give some "feel" or orientation as to the reasonable odds on various horses, though this last is often most difficult.

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5b

1. <u>Scholarly References:</u>

Aristotle, <u>Politics</u>.

Quigley, Caroll, <u>The Evolution of Civilizations</u> (New York: Macmillan, 1961).

Sorokin, Pitirim, <u>Modern Historical and Social Philosophies</u> (New York: Dover, 1963), esp. Chapter XIV.

<u>Social and Cultural Dynamics</u>, Vol. 1, p. 775-779 (for "Sorokin's scenario").

2. <u>References for Collateral Information:</u>

<u>The Year 2000</u>, Chapter I, "Change and Continuity."

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7a

On Speculating, Extrapolating, Projecting, Forecasting and Predicting
(Cont.):

The second class of variables, the Slowly (Exponentially or Linearly?) Changing, are the kind most usually studied when one is "predicting." One can often do amazingly well on these variables, at least in the short or medium run, and occasionally even in the long run. (However, it is interesting to note that almost all of the predictions of increases in population in the twentieth century have been wrong.) While these variables change, the change tends both to be slow and proportional to what already exists, so that if one knows what the variable is and the rate of change, extrapolation is possible.

A good example of a prediction based on the first two classes of variables is de Tocqueville's famous anticipation (in 1835) of the cold war and bipolar world (Chart 4). We note, by the way, that de Tocqueville did not rely on published surveys, etc., but largely on just talking to people, accumulating what skeptics might call "anecdotal information." We hope to develop forecasts of similar value--here again, at least in emphasis, is a divergence between academic and policy research.

Chart 5 illustrates a typical result of this technique of prediction and it gives a distribution of population by age. For if the age breakdown of death rates and birth rates are known, one can predict the future profile even with a fair amount of inaccuracy in the death rates. It is interesting to note that both Costa Rica and Sweden have about the same number of workers per unit population, that is, those under 65 and those over 14 add up to about the same percentage of the population. However, if one compares a demographic profile such as Costa Rica's to one such as Sweden's, one can see that Costa Rica will have about a 30-year period or so in which the number of dependents is sharply reduced because there is a sharp decrease in the per cent of under-age people, and it takes a long time before the older age brackets fill up. This situation can greatly facilitate capital assimilation.

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7b

1. References for More Reading:

Robert U. Ayres, "On Technological Forecasting," Vol. II-A, Working
Papers of the Commission on the Year 2000.

Daniel Bell, "Twelve Modes of Prediction," *Daedalus*, Summer 1965.

Nigel Calder, *The World in 1984* (Penguin, 1965).

Robert Prehoda, *Designing the Future: The Role of Technological Forecasting* (Chilton, 1967).

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8a

Next are what we call "predictable" variables. These are of special
significance not because they are necessarily the most important but be-
cause they are reasonably predictable and usually overlooked so that com-
petent policy research can play an important role in dealing with them--
i.e., this is an area in which one can often "do something," even if
nothing often is done unless attention is directed, perhaps by a policy
research organization, to the issue. Naturally we will concentrate, to
an extent, on this category of variables.

But what do we mean by "predictable"? For one thing, we can dis-
cuss situations in which certain variables can be described by typical
scenarios or sequences. We need not claim that the described pattern
will inevitably be followed, simply that it may be followed and the pos-
sibility should be allowed for.

Thus, any of the "simple" theories given in Chart 3 are examples of
rather good "predictive rules" that are often suggestive of what may hap-
pen, although none of them are inevitable. We have rephrased them here
to show how they can be used to raise questions.

A most important example of a simple prediction which is often under-
estimated (or overestimated) is that decision-makers die and others take
their place. The typical underestimation of the significance of this fac-
tor is to ignore the fact that these men will be replaced. The typical
overestimation comes in believing that such changes will necessarily pro-
duce immediate and dramatic differences. They sometimes do, but more
usually they mean, at most, the start or acceleration of a developing or
continuing process.

Another important example of a "predictable" effect occurs when a
single dominating variable is crucially important--when there is what can
be called a prime mover. Examples of prime movers might include the
Japanese desire for prestige and status (discussed later); the role the
ownership of the means of production plays in Marxian theory; the pervad-
ing (and oppressive) influence of the United States on Latin American
radical movements and their search for self-definition; some of the ef-
fects of modernization on traditional societies; the so-called "Americani-
zation" that occurs in a high-consumption 20th-century society; and so on.
Similarly, if there is some overriding problem, such as defense from an
imminent threat (early NATO), or dealing with a near-universal war guilt
(postwar Germany), or internal war against a well-entrenched government
(almost any postwar subversive movement), and so on, then typically there
are only a small number of solutions possible and one of these will be
identified and used.

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9a

Miscellaneous Topics in Policy Research:

As indicated on the first chart, there seem to be two basic approaches to policy planning; an ideological approach (said to be preferred by many European thinkers), and the Anglo-Saxon tradition of "muddling through."

To some degree we attempt to combine the two traditions by, in effect, "planning to muddle through." But there are certain areas (e.g., Central War) in which we find it almost essential to do the kind of programmatic, theoretical, ideological thinking that we associate with continental Europe; but on most of the issues in which the Institute has serious interests, most staff members would focus on the Anglo-Saxon tradition of incremental changes. As Chart 2 indicates, there are, of course, many costs as well as benefits of such planning.

Chart 3 points out that many problems can be formulated in terms of a hierarchy of considerations: adjectives in the first column apply to the kinds of issues and problems focused on by subordinates; adjectives in the second column apply to the kinds of issues and problems brought up by one's superiors. One personally, of course, feels himself to be concerned with both kinds of issues.

Chart 4 indicates the many different kinds of research that come up. It is important to understand which kind one is doing; this is by no means always transparently clear, or even if clear, consciously understood and implemented. Yet the techniques used, the kinds of documentation, discussion, etc., all change with the character of the research. Chart 5 makes a basic point by indicating one reason why there are great difficulties in devising or setting forth any social utility function--in giving any objective social meaning to such statements as "better," "more likely," "preferable," and the like. An individual may also have these same kinds of inner tensions and contradictions. (I.e., individuals are not really so well-integrated that the Committee Paradox may not apply to them.)

Chart 6 indicates typical manners of dealing with the Committee Paradox. The crucial point is that there is no way to choose between systems A, B and C, given that Tom, Dick and Harry have such different evaluations of these systems. However, if one can modify the systems so that while the various opponents do not get everything that, in principle, they could have had, but their interests are still recognized, then one has formulated choices which are much less agonizing.

Chart 7 raises one of the most emotional issues that come up in our discussion--the difference between useful and un-useful generalizations. Conservatives often tend to emphasize the reality of the distinctions raised in various types of generalizations; liberals more often tend to deny this reality, emphasizing exceptions or the temporary or frivolous nature of the distinctions. We wish to ignore the ideological issue and simply describe the use and abuse of generalizations.

Chart 8 makes the obvious point that in discussing any plan one must be conscious of its purposes--e.g. if whether it is serious or not. We will also consider a very special kind of plan or policy issue which can be called a "basic" policy, generally a collection or "package" of assumptions, plans, predictions, theories, etc. We often make many alternative such basic policies in order to compare them; Chart 9 indicates some reasons for doing this.

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10a

## Outline of the Policy Issues Project:

As currently planned, the project will go to ten levels in straight-forward outline (I, A, l, a, i, (I), (A), (l), (a), (i)), beginning with a list of ten basic areas (I-X in *Chart 1*), which are then elaborated to the second level (A-I in *Chart 1*), and so on. After the second level there will be some inconsistencies in level of elaboration, i.e., some areas will call for more elaboration (even to the tenth level) than others. We are also examining other methods of organizing, storing, procuring, retrieving and presenting information; some of the more promising ones are listed in *Chart 3*.

*Chart 2* shows the issues we intend to deal with--or have already dealt with--in chart collections such as this volume (I on the chart).

OUTLINE OF THE POLICY

1

TWO LEVEL

I. METHODOLOGY, FORMAT, EXPOSITION, AND OTHER "NONSUBSTANTIVE" ISSUES

A. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT

B. METHODOLOGIES FOR STUDYING THE FUTURE

C. METHODOLOGY AND ROLE OF SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS, AND THE CURRENT PLANNING PROGRAMMING BUDGETING SYSTEM

II. SPECIAL POLICIES AND ISSUES (TO BE TREATED WITHOUT USE OF SPECIALIZED JARGON OR FRAMEWORK)

A. RACE ISSUES

B. URBAN PROBLEMS

C. CHANGING VALUES (REVOLUTIONARY POTENTIAL)

D. CONSERVATION AND SOCIAL UTILITIES

E. SPACE

F. POPULATION EXPLOSION

G. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

H. INTERNATIONAL TRADE

I. OCEANS AND OCEANOGRAPHY

J. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

K. MULTI-NATIONAL CORPORATIONS

L. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION ISSUES

M. DEFENSE SYSTEMS

N. FUTURE BUSINESS ISSUES

III. ALTERNATIVE BASIC POLICY THEMES AND PACKAGES

A. LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

B. POLICY ISSUES

C. POLICY THEMES

D. ASPECTS AND USES OF A BASIC POLICY PACKAGE

IV. SOME RELEVANT PHILOSOPHIC, CULTURAL

A. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND NA-

B. BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL NA-

C. NATIONAL, ETHNIC, AND CULTURAL

V. FOREIGN AREAS

A. INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

B. IMPORTANT IDEOLOGIES

C. ALLIANCES, BLOCS, AND AREAS

D. THIRD WORLD ISSUES

E. TEN MAJOR POWERS

F. COUNTRIES OF SPECIAL INTEREST

G. OTHER COUNTRIES

H. SPECIAL ISSUES AND CHALLENGES -

VI. MILITARY POLICIES AND ISSUES

A. INSURGENCY WAR

B. LOCAL WAR

C. EUROPEAN WAR

D. NTH COUNTRY WAR

E. CENTRAL WAR

F. "ESCALATION THEORY"

G. SPECIAL VIETNAMESE ISSUES

VII. ARMS CONTROL POLICIES AND ISSUES

A. ARMS COMPETITION ENVIRONMENT

B. SPECIFIC ARMS CONTROL MEASURES

C. COMPREHENSIVE ARMS CONTROL SYST

2

PROPOSED VOLUMES FOR CHART COLLECTION #3

(CHART COLLECTION #3 COMBINES POLICY ISSUES, LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYTIC SUMMARY PROJECTS)

SOME BASIC METHODOLOGICAL, CONCEPTUAL AND SUBSTANTIVE INPUTS

1. BASIC METHODOLOGY, CONTEXT AND OVERVIEW

2. DETAILED OVERALL OUTLINE

3. SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CONTEXT

4. SOME VIEWS OF SOCIETY, AGGRESSION, WAR, ETC.

5. ALTERNATIVE BASIC DOMESTIC POLICIES

CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT

6. "THE YEAR 2000" CONTEXT

7. SOME ETHNIC AND CULTURAL ISSUES

8. REVOLUTIONARY AND ETHNIC NATIONALISM

9. SOME "GREAT SOCIETY" ISSUES

10. PUBLIC WORKS FOR NEW YORK CITY

11. PUBLIC WORKS FOR OTHER AMERICAN CITIES

12. PUBLIC WORKS FOR LATIN AMERICA

13. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR VIETNAM

14. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FOR LATIN AMERICA

15. URBAN DEVELOPMENT FOR THE YEAR 2000

BASIC NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

16. NUCLEAR WAR: SOME BASIC CONCEPTS AND IDEAS 31.

17. TACTICS, ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION FOR CENTRAL WAR 32.

18. VARIOUS OUTBREAK, WAR-FIGHTING AND WAR-TERMINATION SCENARIOS AND CONTEXTS 33.

19. TACTICAL NUCLEAR WAR 34.

20. INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY 35.

21. CURRENT VIETNAMESE ISSUES (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) 36.

22. MILITARY AND MILITARY-RELATED ASPECTS OF EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES 37.

23. MILITARY AND MILITARY-RELATED ASPECTS OF ASIAN SECURITY ISSUES 39.

24. MILITARY AND MILITARY-RELATED ASPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AND INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING 40.

25. MILITARY AND MILITARY-RELATED ASPECTS OF COMMENTS ON CURRENT ARMS CONTROL ISSUES 41.

SPECIAL NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

26. THE CRISIS OVER CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1968: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 43.

27. SOME POSSIBLE NEW CHALLENGES: OUTER SPACE, UNDERSEA, ETC. 44.

28. R&D POLICY ISSUES 45.

29. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS/COST EFFECTIVENESS AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS 47.

30. "EDUCATING" NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKERS 48.

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12a

Basic Policy Themes and Attitudes:

We start in *Chart 1* with common "stereotypes" that are much used in public discussion today. These stereotypes have often had more meaning in the past; and may easily have even less meaning in the future. This could occur because the world changes, attitudes change, or the people concerned may have done enough thinking on their own, or for other reasons developed their own individual points of view. In this case the syndrome, collection, or cluster of highly related attitudes indicated by these stereotypes may not apply. In any case, almost everyone likes to think of himself as possessing individuality and being "his own man." One is thus often annoyed when some stereotyped label is applied to him. But to a surprising degree, such labels seem to be reasonably useful. We will not bother discussing at all the first five categories of stereotypes, but emphasize number 6. *Chart 2* attempts to look at the left-right stereotype in some detail. (The chart really applies somewhat better to continental Europe than to England, and somewhat better to England than to the United States.)

Roughly speaking, of the 27 items on the chart, the first nine tend to focus on the classic distinctions, which are now becoming less important. The next nine focus on distinctions which were often important in the past and are likely still to be important in the future, while the last nine tend to be new kinds of issues which, we argue, will be of extreme importance in the future but have not been of great importance in the past.

*Chart 3* indicates that in order for us to discuss basic national security policy in any serious way, we have found it almost necessary to abandon the stereotypes of *Chart 1* and to devise and name thirty new clusters. In many cases these clusters have a left and a right version-- though there are, of course, many other distinctions within the clusters. However, we have found that for practical purposes most Americans can be included in one--or a combination of a small number--of the thirty clusters indicated here.

*Chart 4* tries to indicate the kind of attitude clusters which many in the future will emphasize. *Chart 4* is a secular chart (leaving out both religion, and, in some degree, tradition). Both omissions we feel are plausible and increasingly characteristic of the modern and future world. We will argue that column 3 has been the important column in the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, but that it is becoming increasingly less important. We expect increasing movement to or towards the first two columns.

We will define the "humanist left" as focusing most attention on the first column (though many members of this humanist left will still have great interest in and some emphasis on columns 2 and 3). Similarly we will define the "responsible center" as including groups which might have great interest in columns 1 and 3, but which will tend to focus much more on the second column than on either of the other two.

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12b

We are going to argue that increasingly confrontations will be be-
tween what we have loosely characterized as the "humanist left" and the
"responsible center." There is, of course, a presumption raised by these
labels that the humanist left is extremist and irresponsible, while the
responsible center is neither humanist nor advanced (or progressive).
These connotations may be accurate but, at this point, we do not intend
them; there will certainly be many--if not most--cases in which these
presumptions and connotations will not be accurate.

The objective is to pick labels which those who are labeled will accept. Thus the responsible center will not object to being characterized as responsible and center, even though they will often object that the humanist left does not have a monopoly of the qualities indicated. Similarly, the humanist left might object to the idea that the responsible center has been attributed the two qualities indicated.

Charts 5 and 6 indicate that we could use many other labels for the humanist left and responsible center.

# 1. References for Collateral Reading:

Gabriel Almond, *The American People and Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1962).

Arnold Wolfers, "The Goals of Foreign Policy" in *Discord and Collaboration* (op. cit.).

(CIC)

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PAGE 13

# LEVELS OF ANALYSIS

## GIBLE AUTHORITIES

ONS, ETHICAL AND MORAL ADVISORS
E AND THREE
SS, AND VARIOUS PRESSURE GROUPS
COUNCIL, CABINET, AND ASSOCIATED

TREASURY, ETC.

NT, AND THEIR OPERATING DEPART-
ARIOUS LEADERS, ELITES AND
RESTS, VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL

## 3 THE EXPERTS

1. MORALISTS, PHILOSOPHERS, THEOLOGIANS, AND PROPHETS

2. MIXTURE OF 1 AND 3

3. POLITICIANS, STATESMEN, POLITICAL SCIENTISTS, AND
"SPECIAL INTERESTS"

4. STRATEGISTS, LONG-RANGE PLANNERS, AND OTHER STUDENTS
OF BASIC POLICY PLUS 3 ABOVE

5. SYSTEMS ANALYSTS, SENIOR STAFFS, AND CONSULTANTS

6. OPERATIONS RESEARCHERS, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
STAFFS, SPECIALIZED EXPERTS

7. ECONOMISTS, ENGINEERS, SOCIAL SCIENTISTS, GEOGRAPHERS,
BUSINESS MEN, ETC.

## 6

### IS THIS?

#### POSSIBLE GUIDING PRINCIPLES

<table><tr><td>LIBERTY</td><td>EQUALITY</td><td>LIBERTY</td><td>ORDER</td></tr><tr><td>EQUALITY</td><td>FRATERNITY</td><td>PLURALISM</td><td>HIERARCHY</td></tr><tr><td>FRATERNITY</td><td>"CLASSLESS"</td><td>DIVERSITY</td><td>:</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>MONOLITHICITY</td><td>"CLASSES"</td><td>EFFICIENCY</td></tr></table>

SOCIAL JUSTICE

SOCIAL ORDER

## 7 OR THIS?

### (ESCALATION IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY)

MINOR MODIFICATION OF CURRENT SYSTEM

ALL-OUT WAR SYSTEM WITHERED AWAY

A. RULE OF LAW

B. PLURALISTIC SECURITY COMMUNITY

C. RULE OF FAIT ACCOMPLI (INTERNAL WAR)

D. INSTRUMENTAL WARS (RATIONAL SELF-INTEREST RESTRAINTS)

E. AGONISTIC WARS (LIMITED BY ABSOLUTE RULES)

F. POTLATCH WARS (SPACE, FOREIGN AID, "SHOWY" SYSTEMS, ETC.)

G. OTHER SUBSTITUTE FOR CENTRAL WAR

ELIMINATION OR CONTROL OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION BY:

A. AGREEMENT OR REVULSION

B. LARGE SETBACK TO CIVILIZATION

OTHER BASIC CHANGE IN SYSTEM

A. BLOC SYSTEMS (WITH RESTRAINTS AND RITUALS)

B. COMMUNITY SANCTIONS

C. CONDOMINIUMS (U.S.-S.U.?, COLLECTIVE SECURITY?, U.N.?)

D. CONCERT OF (LARGE OR SMALL) POWERS

E. "WORLD GOVERNMENT"

F. WORLD EMPIRE (OR EMPIRES)

G. DISARMED, BUT "UNCONTROLLED" NATIONS

### DRAW THE LINE?

CIDES (JAINS)

VEGETARIANS

(RELIGIOUS PACIFISTS)

E WARS (WORLD WAR I PACIFISTS)

EAR PACIFISTS)

(STRATEGISTS IN THE FIFTIES)

DECISION-MAKERS)

INES (ALMOST EVERYBODY ELSE)

DYING MACHINES (3 PEOPLE)

ROYING MACHINES (X)

## 10 HOW WOULD THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT CHOOSE?

<table><thead><tr><td></td><td>PROBABILITY OF FAILURE</td><td>DESTRUCTION IF FAILURE</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>WEAPON SYSTEM X</td><td>.2</td><td>100% OF U.S. & S.U. POPULATION</td></tr><tr><td>DOOMSDAY MACHINES</td><td>.1</td><td>HUMANITY</td></tr></tbody></table>

THE SEVEN LEVELS OF POWER

## THE SECOND LEVEL

1

### SECOND LEVEL: THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND BEYOND

1. SYSTEM BARGAINING

2. COMMON IDEAS AND IDEALS

HUMAN DIGNITY

FOUR FREEDOMS (OF EXPRESSION, OF RELIGION, FROM WANT, FROM FEAR)

EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY

3. COMMON INTERESTS REQUIRING ACTIVE COOPERATION

WORLD HEALTH & NUTRITION

TRADE LINKS & COMMUNICATIONS

TRANSPORT, TRAFFIC, TRAVEL & TOURISM

INTERNATIONAL LAW, REGULATIONS & AGREEMENTS

4. "A DECENT RESPECT TO THE OPINIONS OF MANKIND"

PEACEFUL NATIONAL IMAGE

WARS MUST APPEAR DEFENSIVE OR "JUST"

GENEROSITY TO FRIENDS, NEIGHBORS & DEFEATED FOES

5. COMMON INTEREST IN SURVIVAL

NO DOOMSDAY MACHINES

RESTRAINED WARFARE (INSTRUMENTAL OR AGONISTIC)

ARMS CONTROL

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (WORLD ORDER)

NO CONTAMINATION OF WORLD ENVIRONMENT

2

### A'S EGOTISTICAL "P"

BARGAIN

1. A "CHEATS," BUT NO
BY HIS EXAMPLE.

2. A CHEATS, AND ONLY
BY HIS EXAMPLE.

3. NOBODY CHEATS.

4. OTHERS CHEAT, BUT
PARTICULAR PRECE
STABILITY OF THE

5. EVERYBODY CHEATS.

6. EVERYBODY CHEATS BY

## THE THIRD LEVEL

4

### THIRD LEVEL: THE NATIONAL INTEREST

1. PHYSICAL SECURITY

IMMUNITY OF NATIONAL TERRITORY TO THREAT OR SEIZURE

SAFETY OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS AT HOME & ABROAD

SECURITY OF UNITED STATES PROPERTY AT HOME & ABROAD

2. NATIONAL IDEALS (FOR OURSELVES, SOMETIMES FOR OTHERS)

"THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY TO OURSELVES & OUR POSTERITY"

PROGRESS & EFFICIENCY

REWARD FOR HIGH LEVEL OF EFFORT

JUSTICE, MANIFESTLY DONE

3. THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE

PRESERVATION OF U.S. CONSTITUTION AND INSTITUTIONS

PRESERVATION OF LAW AND ORDER

MAINTAINING HIGH RATE OF GROWTH & EXPANSION

PRESERVATION OF HIGH LIVING STANDARD

4. NATIONAL POWER AND INFLUENCE

PROTECTION & SUPPORT FOR OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES

DETERRENCE & CONSTRAINT OF OUR ENEMIES

VOTING ON & AMENDING BASIC CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS

ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION IN NEW WORLD SYSTEMS

5. NATIONAL HONOR & DIGNITY

PRESTIGE & REPUTATION

INTERNAL LOYALTY, SUPPORT AND SELF-RESPECT

RESPECT FROM ALLIES, NEUTRALS AND ENEMIES

5

### METAPHOR

DISUT

"ESTIMATED"
DISUTILITY
OF WAR

"SIEGE