REACHING THE TOP: U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY SINCE 1955
(d) 1985, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

[lc]

48

in sight for the Vietnam agonies placed the next summit with Brezhnev in a
new light from the American perspective. As related by Kissinger: "We were
becoming confident that we would be free of the Vietnam war by 1973; a summit
was no longer important to separate Moscow from Hanoi."29

On his trip to Moscow on May 4-9, Kissinger met with Brezhnev and Gromyko at the Politburo hunting retreat in Zavidovo. Brezhnev stressed the need for agreement on a treaty for the prevention of nuclear war and warned that U.S. military assistance to China was a matter of grave concern that could lead to war. His concern with a nuclear treaty had been conveyed on February 21, 1973 in a letter to Nixon,30 and Gromyko had indicated that Brezhnev's trip would be conditional on progress toward such a treaty. But what was emerging at Zavidovo reflected Soviet purposes more clearly, as revealed in Kissinger's account:

> It would have been difficult to draw up a more bald or cynical definition of condominium. The proposed treaty would protect the superpowers against nuclear destruction even in a European war while guaranteeing the devastation of each country's allies. Nothing would have been better designed to promote European neutralism or to depreciate the value of alliances.31

In the event, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War that was signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Washington on June 22, 1973 was quite different than that originally intended by the Kremlin. Despite Soviet efforts for a nuclear condominium, the United States was less pressed by Vietnam now and could afford to stall on the agreement until Moscow was willing to accept a watered-down version of their original objectives. Article IV of the Treaty simply stated that the two powers would undertake urgent consultations whenever the risks of nuclear conflict appeared in their relations, or in their relations with other countries.32 The wording of the agreement had been worked out during Kissinger's Zavidovo visit and required no further negotiations before signature at the summit meeting.

General Secretary Brezhnev had arrived in Washington on June 16 and rested at Camp David before meeting with the president, on June 18, for the start of talks and his official visit. After a welcoming ceremony on the White House lawn, he and Nixon met privately for discussions, using the translation services of the Soviet interpreter Viktor Sukhodrov, just as they had done the previous year in Moscow. The purpose of the meeting was

29 Ibid., p. 279. (You)

30 Ibid., p. 280.

31 Ibid., p. 277. (You)

32 As observed by Kissinger, the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War was invoked once in the decade after its signature: during the Middle East alert of 1973, when the U.S. warned the Soviets that their unilateral intervention would violate its provisions. Ibid., p. 286.

REACHING THE TOP: U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY SINCE 1955
(c) 1985, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

[Lc]

50

recognition of each other's "equal security interests."35 A host of other agreements were signed during this 1973 summit on such matters as cooperation in transportation, agriculture, oceanic studies, taxation, commercial aviation, trade, and the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

While these agreements were not as spectacular as the SALT I agreements at the 1972 Moscow summit, the president noted their importance in the larger context of bilateral relations: "These continued the process we had begun in 1972 of building an interlocking web of relationships to increase the Soviets' stake in stability and cooperation."36 Moreover, since virtually all of these had been negotiated ahead of time, the thirty-five hours the two leaders did have together during the visit could be devoted to frank talks to explore each other's minds--"the best use of summit diplomacy," according to Kissinger.37

## The Moscow Summit and State Visit, June 27-July 3, 1974

The Watergate investigation had been only an annoying distraction during Brezhnev's visit (John Dean had been scheduled to testify before Senator Sam Ervin's Senate Select Committee the very week of the visit, but that was postponed). At the time of his final summit meeting with Brezhnev in 1974, however, President Nixon was so fully enmeshed in Watergate that the summit meeting could have been called a success for its very occurrence, let alone its substantive results.

As before, the invitation for the return visit had been extended and accepted during the preceding visit, in this case Brezhnev's, and the prospect of an annual U.S.-Soviet summit meeting was now becoming part of the routine in bilateral relations. Also as before, Henry Kissinger was dispatched to Moscow in late March 1974 to arrange the details of the summit. But the timing and circumstances were anything but routine, as Kissinger later recounted:

> It was not a propitious time. Nixon's plight became more apparent with every day. The Soviets were being squeezed to the sidelines in the Syrian disengagement negotiations; obstacles to U.S.-Soviet trade were multiplying from unexpected quarters....With Watergate raging, MFN deadlocked, détente and SALT becoming increasingly

35 As stated in the Agreement on Basic Principles: "...both Sides will be guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations...." The text of the Agreement is reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol. 69, No. 1778 (July 23, 1973), p. 158.

36 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 886.

37 Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 289.

[LC]

51

controversial, it was not a glorious moment to negotiate with
the Soviets. 38

The president, crippled by Watergate and attacked by what he called "anti-détente" forces under Senator Jackson's leadership, was hardly in a position to negotiate further agreement on strategic arms limitations in preparation for the summit. In fact, Kissinger later stated that "Jackson and others in the anti-détente lobby were determined that Nixon should have no negotiating chips in Moscow."39 At a National Security Council meeting on June 20, one week after Paul Nitze resigned as the Department of Defense representative on the SALT delegation, Defense Secretary Schlesinger presented the Pentagon's position. Nixon called it "an unyielding hard line against any SALT agreement that did not ensure an overwhelming American advantage."40

Disagreement on U.S. objectives centered on increasingly arcane concepts of "equal aggregates" versus "counterbalancing asymmetries," dealing with how to come to terms with measuring U.S. and Soviet nuclear missile capabilities. Concluded Strobe Talbott in Deadly Gambits:

While Kissinger saw Schlesinger as hung up on throw-weight, Schlesinger felt that Kissinger was excessively concerned with what was negotiable and not enough with what was strategically desirable. He suspected that Kissinger was pandering to Richard Nixon's desperation for a SALT II agreement in 1974 as part of his campaign to deflect attention from the Watergate scandal. As it happened, Watergate swept aside the Nixon presidency and, along with it, any chance of a SALT II breakthrough at the Moscow summit in 1974.41

The beleaguered president left Washington on June 25 for a stop in Brussels to attend ceremonies celebrating the 25th anniversary of NATO and to sign the Declaration on Atlantic Relations. Upon his departure from Andrews Air Force Base, he had stated that his purposes at the summit were threefold: 1) to strengthen bilateral relations with the Soviets; 2) to develop further areas of cooperation to displace confrontation; and 3) to limit the threat of nuclear arms.42 His official visit to the Soviet Union would include a trip to Minsk, capital of Byelorussia, and the southern coast of the Crimea, in addition to his talks in Moscow and his address to the Soviet people on July 2.

38 Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 994.

39 Ibid., p. 997.

40 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 1024.

41 Strobe Talbott, *Deadly Gambits*, p. 218.

42 President Nixon's departure remarks at Andrews Air Force Base, June 25, 1974, reprinted in U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol. 71, No. 1831, (July 29, 1974), p. 165.

[LC]

In terms of substance, the summit produced the Protocol to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, which reduced the number of ABM systems from two to one for each country, and the Treaty and Protocol on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, essentially restricting such testing to yields of less than 150 kilotons. Other agreements signed included further cooperative efforts on economic, industrial, and technical matters and energy, housing, and artificial heart research. But there was no progress on the subject of limitations on strategic offensive missiles; the most that can be said in that regard is that the two leaders agreed to resume negotiations on the subject at a "mini-summit" before the end of 1974. Upon his return to the United States on July 3, the president stated that although the two sides had not reached a final accord, they were now firmly committed to the resolution of remaining differences.

In retrospect, President Nixon considered the summit a "mixed bag" and made the following entry in his diary afterward:

> I am inclined to think that in arranging the next summit, it's the informal meetings that provide the greatest opportunity for progress. I think the formal ones--the plenary sessions--produce the least, because everybody's talking for the record and making a record....The larger the group, the less free the conversation is. That is something that is true in all forms of society, but it is particularly true in the Soviet Union and in Communist states.43

Kissinger, who at the time was acting in the capacity of both secretary of state and assistant to the president for national security affairs, considered the summit more successful than anticipated. The leaders had ample opportunity for serious discussions about the international situation and were not under pressures or expectations to produce another spectacular signing ceremony, as at the previous Moscow summit. As he saw it:

> The strange thing was that by all normal criteria, the summit had been a success. Significant agreements had been signed--not so earthshaking as on previous occasions but the sort of accords that showed that the superpowers took progress in their relationship seriously.44

But the time for further progress ran out with President Nixon's resignation in August. The three summits that had given rise to a period of temporary détente began to recede into the past, as U.S.-Soviet relations again began to decline.

43 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 1037.

44 Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 1177.

Georgetown School of Foreign Service/NASA
Conference on the Internationalization of
Agriculture (David Newsom request)

Wash, D.C.

Feb 17, 18 or 19,
1987

From Rosemary via CBN: Dave Newsom approached me with the invitation at Tab ____ for you to address a joint Foreign Service School/NASA conference next February on the impact of new developments in agricultural technology on foreign affairs. It will be the third in a series co-sponsored by Georgetown's School of Foreign Service and NASA devoted to diplomatic issues relating to science and technology.

The conference will be opened by new Agriculture Secretary Lyng and attended by government and private industry reps concerned with the issue. Much of it will be technical in nature, but Newsom wants the foreign policy dimension addressed as well and hopes that you will agree to address the conference on either February 17, 18 or 19 at about 3:45 p.m. (They would choose the day of the day-long conference depending on your availability).

I could tell that Dave did not know whether this would interest you or not but that he wanted to make a try with his invitation. If you are not interested, an oral turndown - based on scheduling - would be manageable. Newsom is leaving this weekend for a four month sabbatical in Europe and the issue would be turned over to Peter Krogh.

You are on the West Coast for a TCW meeting and a Rand/UCLA Center Board meeting, on February 17, 1987 through dinner (and thus the next morning at a minimum). The afternoon of the 18th and the 19th of February 87 are as yet unbooked, if you had any interest in this. If not, you may just want to turn this aside right now on grounds that you will be in the West and it is not clear when you will be returning.

(Note re Dave Newsom: He as much as told me has is dropping his prior request to you for the present concerning the plan for you and NMK to host a Dean Rusk fellowship fundraiser at your NY apartment. Remember that one?; you're off the hook.)

___ No interest; tell Newsom politely it appears I am on West Coast through the period in question and it doesn't appear manageable

___ Keep invitation open; indicate I can't yet make a decision whether I'm available on 18th or 19th; they should come back again but 17th is out

___ Accept in principle, if they can do it on 19th. But they'll have to come back again for final confirmation on that day only.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service
Office of the Dean

August 12, 1986

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Henry:

The School of Foreign Service and the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy have a three year cooperative arrangement with the National Aeronautical and Space Administration to present conferences on diplomatic issues relating to science and technology.

The next will take place in February, 1987 and will be devoted to the impact of new developments in agricultural technology on foreign affairs. The first, in 1985, dealt with various diplomatic aspects of communications; the second, this past February, was concerned with the implications of biotechnological advances. Attendees include those from government and private industry concerned with the issues.

While part of the day long conference will be devoted to the scientific aspects of the subject, we feel it important to address the political and economic aspects as well. We are inviting Secretary Lyng to open the conference.

U.S. agriculture is increasingly dependent on export markets for its health and because of the relatively high domestic support crisis it is also vulnerable to foreign competition both in terms of imports and third country markets. This dependence has major implications for U.S. relations generally with other nations which import U.S. agricultural commodities (e.g., the USSR) or export such commodities in competition with the U.S. (e.g., Australia and the EC). At the same time, as agricultural exports have become an increasingly visible element in U.S. trade they have also become a potential tool of U.S. foreign policy, which in turn has important consequences for U.S. agriculture. In short, agricultural trade has become an element in our domestic political health as well as in our geopolitical relations.

Washington, D. C. 20057
202-625-4218

DRAFT PROGRAM

THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF U.S. AGRICULTURE

School of Foreign Service
Georgetown University

February 17, 1987

8:30 - 9:00 Registration and Coffee

9:00 - 9:15 **Introductory Remarks**

Dr. Peter F. Krogh
Dean, School of Foreign Service

9:15 - 10:30 **The Internationalization of U.S. Agriculture: An Overview**

Keynote Speaker

10:30 - 10:45 Coffee Break

10:45 - 11:30 **Panel 1: The Internationalization of U.S. Agriculture: Implications for the U.S. and the World**

Expert from World Bank or Major University

11:30 - 12:30 **Panel 2: The State of Agricultural Science and Technology Today and Its Impact on U.S. and World Agriculture**

12:30 - 2:00 Luncheon

**The Future of U.S. Agriculture: A View from the Hill**

Member of Congress

2:15 - 3:30 **Panel 3: U.S. Agriculture and Third World Development**

Expert or Third World Official

3:30 - 3:45 Coffee

3:45 - 5:00 **Panel 4: U.S. Agriculture and U.S. Foreign Policy**

Former Secretary of State

5:30 - 6:30 Reception

YOUNG & RUBICAM INC.

285 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10017-6486

MAY 13 1986

EDWARD N. NEY
Chairman
(212) 210-3051

May 12, 1986

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Henry:

As you will see from the enclosed correspondence, I proposed
Peter Georgescu for membership in the Council on Foreign
Relations last September.

As my letter of proposal indicates, in his early years, Peter,
a native of Bucharest, and his brother spent about seven
years in a work prison. Thanks to Congresswoman Bolton and
President Eisenhower, a swap was made and the Georgescu boys
eventually ended up in the United States. Peter is a
phenomenonly good person who, as you may have read recently,
has been named president of all of Young & Rubicam's adver-
tising operations worldwide.

I know a very large number of people are waiting to join the Council and believe Peter's name was brought up at the membership meeting held earlier this year. The next meeting of the committee will be June 4, at which time I hope that Peter will be accepted. Given your close ties with General Scowcroft, perhaps you could put in a good word for him.

Best wishes.

ENN/VW
Enclosures

cc: L. Eagleburger

P. S. I spent some time with Ambassador and Mrs. Rodgers
at the Embassy in Paris a couple of weeks ago. I know you

YOUNG & RUBICAM INC.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

-2-

May 12, 1986

and Larry made that introduction for us and hope that sometime we will have an opportunity to chat about that post.

From Paris I went on to Munich for a meeting of The Board for International Broadcasting, of which I am a member and which, as you know, oversees Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. While there I spent a good deal of time with Ambassador Burt and his charming wife. Some contrast. E. N. N.

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

Office of the President

April 16, 1986

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

APR 18 1986

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of April 8, 1986. I have sent
word to the undergraduate admissions committee that I am
interested in Juan Nigorra's application for transfer
admission to the undergraduate division.

As you might imagine, transfer admissions are done on a
limited and highly competitive basis. Last year more than
1300 students applied for the 290 spaces available in the
sophomore and junior classes. If recent trends are any
indication, this year's competition should be even more
intense.

My support for Juan's application will make certain that it gets the most thorough review possible, but I am afraid that I can promise no more than that. Given the enormous pressure involved in this process, my interest may have relatively little influence.

I hope Juan makes it. Thank you for your interest on
his behalf. Best wishes.

TSH:gw

WASHINGTON D.C. 20057
202-625-4134

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

JUN 6 1986

June 6, 1986

Office of the President

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I have just been in touch with the undergraduate admissions office about Juan Nigorra's application for transfer to the undergraduate division. I am sorry to inform you that the committee on admissions has not found it possible to offer Juan a place in the School of Foreign Service next fall. Juan should be receiving word to that effect directly from the committee at this time.

When I last wrote to you I explained that the transfer admissions process is a highly competitive one, receiving a great number of applications for limited openings and requiring outstanding qualifications. However, because of your interest in this matter I asked the admissions committee to perform a very careful and thorough review of Juan's application. I am afraid that the committee had grave reservations concerning Juan's ability to succeed in the School of Foreign Service's rigorous curriculum. Despite my request for special consideration of his application the committee was not prepared to offer him admission.

I do want you and Juan to know how carefully we considered his application before coming to this decision. I only wish that the outcome could have been more favorable for him. Many thanks for your interest and care on Juan's behalf. Best wishes.

TSH:gw

Dictated by Timothy S. Healy, S.J., but signed in his absence.

[LC]

Paul H. Nitze

Current
Policy
No. 886

Permitted and
Prohibited Activities
Under the ABM Treaty

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Paul H. Nitze, Special Adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters, before the International Law Weekend Group¹, New York City, October 31, 1986.

At Reykjavik, a number of issues arose with respect to the interrelationship between limitations on defense and space programs and reductions in offensive systems. One issue involved the relevant time period, or date, to govern certain obligations that the United States and the Soviet Union would undertake regarding these problems. General Secretary Gorbachev insisted on a time period of 10 years. President Reagan was prepared to agree to this time period provided agreement could be achieved on three subjects, namely, the regime of control over defenses, the program of reductions in offensive ballistic missiles during those 10 years, and what each side was to be allowed to do after the 10 years.

On the issue of the regime of control over defenses, President Reagan proposed to Mr. Gorbachev that both sides strictly abide by the limitations of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Mr. Gorbachev insisted on what he called measures to strengthen the ABM Treaty but what, in fact, amounted to an attempt to amend it. Specifically, he proposed to restrict to the laboratory testing of all space elements or components of antiballistic missile defense.

¹The International Law Weekend Group is comprised of the American branch of the International Law Association, the International Law Committee of the Association of the Bar of New York City, the American Society of International Law, and the American Foreign Law Association.

The positions of the two sides in part reflect substantially different views as to what defensive research, development, and testing activities should be permitted over the next 10 years. The United States believes that the nature of activities permitted and prohibited by the ABM Treaty, based on the treaty text and the negotiating record, is clear. The Soviet side, under the guise of "strengthening" the ABM Treaty, wishes, in effect, to amend the treaty to prohibit activities that it was not intended to prohibit. What follows focuses on this issue.

### Distinguishing Research from Development

First, it should be noted that nowhere does the ABM Treaty use the word "research." Neither the U.S. nor the Soviet delegations to the SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] negotiations believed that it was possible to verify limitations on research. In fact, neither side wished research to be limited, and the ABM Treaty makes no attempt to do so. In a major statement before the Soviet Presidium in 1972, shortly after the ABM Treaty was signed, then-Soviet Defense Minister Grechko stated that the ABM Treaty "places no limitations on the performance of research and experimental work aimed at resolving the problem of defending the country from nuclear missile strike."

The United States has traditionally distinguished "research" from "development" along the lines outlined by Harold Brown in a 1971 statement to the Soviet SALT I delegation. Research includes conceptual design and testing conducted both inside and outside the laboratory. Development follows research and precedes full-scale testing of systems

and components designed for actual deployment. Development of a weapon system commences with the construction and testing of one or more prototypes of the system or its major components.

### Development and Testing in the ABM Treaty

The ABM Treaty does address and, in certain articles, places specific limits on the development and testing of certain ABM systems and components.

**Article I** prohibits deployment of ABM systems for a territorial defense or for defense of an individual region except as provided in article III; it limits deployment, not development or testing, and limits ABM systems, not ABM components.

**Article II** defines an ABM system as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory." According to article II(1), the components of an ABM system "currently" consist of: ABM interceptor missiles, which are missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role or tested in an ABM mode; ABM launchers, which launch ABM interceptor missiles; and ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role or tested in an ABM mode.

**Article III** specifies the areas in which ABM systems or their components may be deployed and the number that may be deployed in those areas.

**Article IV** exempts from the limitations of article III systems or their components used for development or testing and located within agreed test ranges.

**Article V** prohibits the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based, and mobile land-based ABM systems and ABM components.

[L]CJ

**Article VI** prohibits giving non-ABM systems or components an ABM capability or testing them in an ABM mode.

**Agreed Statement D**, reinforcing restrictions on deployment in article III, provides that, if ABM systems or components based on "other physical principles" than those used for ABM components in 1972 and capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, limitations on those systems would be subject to discussion in accordance with article XIII and agreement in accordance with article XIV.

## Permitted Development and Testing Activities

Taken together, the provisions of the ABM Treaty permit various types of ABM development and testing activity. I will describe that activity in four general classes.

* First, the treaty does not limit the development and testing of devices that are neither components of an ABM system, as defined in article II, nor substitutes for such components. Such elements are not, and were not intended to be, governed by the treaty's development and testing prohibitions.

* Second, the treaty permits tests that are not in an ABM mode (e.g., against satellites) of devices that do not have an ABM capability. The term "tested in an ABM mode" is specifically addressed in a classified agreed statement negotiated in 1978 by the United States and the Soviet Union in the Standing Consultative Commission. That agreement provides, in part, that an interceptor missile is considered to be "tested in an ABM mode" if it has attempted to intercept a strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory. The term "strategic ballistic missile or its elements in flight trajectory" would include a ballistic target-missile with the flight trajectory characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile or its elements over that portion of the flight trajectory involved in the test.

In practice, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union considers "flight trajectory" to include an orbit in space or "tested in an ABM mode" to encompass tests against targets in space that do not follow a ballistic missile flight trajectory. The Soviet Union conducted tests against objects in earth orbit in the 1970s both prior to and after deploying their antisatellite weapon. Based both on this understanding of "tested in an ABM mode" and on the fact that components, as defined in article II, were not involved, the United

States recently conducted the Delta 180 SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] experiment to test our ability to track targets in orbit. Since no device in the experiment was tested in an ABM mode and no device in the experiment could substitute for an ABM component, none of the devices in this experiment was itself an ABM component; the experiment, therefore, was fully consistent with the ABM Treaty.

* Third, the treaty permits the development and testing at agreed test ranges of certain ABM systems and components based on physical principles used in 1972. As modified by article V, article IV permits both the United States and the Soviet Union to develop and test fixed, land-based ABM launchers and ABM radars located at permitted test ranges and to launch ABM interceptors into space from those ABM launchers.

* The fourth class of development and testing activity permitted by the ABM Treaty involves ABM systems based on physical principles other than the physical principles used in 1972 and components of such systems capable of substituting for the ABM components defined in article II. Agreed Statement D to the ABM Treaty, which has the same legal standing as the main text of the treaty, permits the "creation"—i.e., the development and testing—of, for example, space-based ABM systems that are based on "other physical principles" and their components.

This legally correct reading of Agreed Statement D is fully justified by the treaty text and the negotiating record. The President, nonetheless, has decided that, as long as we continue to believe that our program objectives can be met, the United States will not restructure the originally planned SDI program and, therefore, need not conduct its SDI activities according to this "broader" interpretation of the treaty in order to achieve the SDI research objectives.

During the SALT I negotiations, the United States sought to constrain the development and testing of devices, other than the three components defined in article II, that might perform an ABM function, including, for example, devices based on other physical principles. The Soviet delegation, however, refused to consider any such limitations, arguing that the sides could not agree about something that could not be defined or understood and that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union had any idea what devices or combination of devices might substitute for an ABM component, as defined in article II.

A careful reading of the treaty text and review of the negotiating record

demonstrate that in Agreed Statement D, ABM systems based on other physical principles and their components are not, and were not intended to be, subject to the constraints on development and testing specified elsewhere in the treaty. Specifically, the restrictions of article V of the treaty do not apply to ABM systems based on other physical principles and their components.

## Reykjavik and Beyond

In Reykjavik, substantial differences between the United States and the Soviet Union over Soviet-proposed restrictions going beyond those of the ABM Treaty prevented progress toward agreement on a comprehensive framework for a predictable and stable arms control regime. The United States believes that both sides should adhere to the ABM Treaty as currently formulated. Specifically, the United States need not accept limitations on development and testing activities going beyond those provided by the treaty. We also must register both our concern over Soviet ABM-related activities that suggest that they may be preparing an ABM defense of their national territory and our conviction that the Soviets should dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar being constructed in direct violation of the treaty.

In contrast to the U.S. position, the Soviets proposed in Iceland to modify the ABM Treaty to confine to the laboratory research and testing on any space elements of space-based systems. The Soviets intended to impose constraints on our SDI research program far more severe than those imposed even by the "narrower" interpretation of the ABM Treaty. Such additional constraints would kill the SDI program. The President could not accept this.

The United States calls upon the Soviet Union to recognize that its proposal would impose constraints that have no basis or justification in the ABM Treaty. We must reject Soviet attempts to amend the ABM Treaty indirectly by reopening questions of permitted and prohibited activities under the treaty. The Soviet Union must understand that the United States opposes restrictions on development and testing beyond those that were negotiated, agreed, and codified in the ABM Treaty.

With such an understanding, we can move forward toward a comprehensive, stabilizing agreement on a future arms control regime providing for defensive research and testing, strategic offensive reductions, and a jointly managed transition to greater reliance on defenses. ■

2

[LC]

69 CHESTER SQUARE LONDON SW1

10 October 1986

Dr Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K. Street NW
Washington DC 20006

OCT 16 1986

Dear Henry,

Just a short note to congratulate you on your Newsweek article which I thought was excellent. It presented the problems in an easily understandable way and gave constructive indications as to what should be done about them. I saw President Reagan on television before I left New York, saying that he was going to Iceland with a "realistic" attitude. He said, "I repeat, a realistic attitude, which should answer some of the domestic criticism we have been receiving". Do you think he reads Newsweek?

All of us enjoyed our dinner with you and your colleagues and found many of the comments of great interest. I will be following up with you on the developing American Express-Advent International relationship. Maybe when you are over to see Loel we could have a chat. I will probably see him in Lausanne on 20 October.

I must say that Kalb's resignation is irritating. These damn journalists whose moral burden is so heavy that as soon as they get a bit short of breath, they have to jettison it, give me a pain. It's a big mistake to have your conscience as press spokesman. If you do, you may have to pay a big price. However, any administration that decides to frighten a foreign leader and writes internal memoranda concerning how it is going to do it, after all that has happened in recent years, deserves all that it gets.

Congratulations again for your excellent contribution and I hope to see you again soon. My best to Nancy,

[LC]

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Director
(617) 495-1148

John F. Kennedy School of Government
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

December 1, 1986

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates, Inc.
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006

DEC 4 1986

Dear Henry:

At Kyoto you mentioned that you felt out of touch with recent academic work on strategy and arms control. Why not come spend an afternoon with us and let us describe what we are doing? Or join the Advisory Committee of this Center? You once told me that you did not wish to speak at Harvard. If that still holds, we could make it a purely private visit. In any case, you would be welcome.

JSN/vmc