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other than a heavy bomber; it was anticipated that
any aircraft, say a 747 type, would simply be
designated as a heavy bomber if converted to carry
cruise missiles;

-- all air-launched cruise missiles with a range
greater than 2500 km would be banned;

(The current American position is virtually identical,
except that because of the 1200 sub-ceilings on MIRVed missiles,
both sides are free to deploy 120 heavy bombers with ALCMs; in
the proposal of the previous Administration, there were no
internal sub-ceilings; the US could deploy as many bombers with
ALCMs as it wished, so long as the overall total of bombers
with ALCMs and MIRVed missiles did not exceed 1320; since the
B-1 was included in planning, the actual requirement for heavy
bombers with ALCMs was open for decision; under the current
proposal each bomber with ALCMs over 120 will cause a reduction
of MIRVed missiles.)

## IV. Cruise Missiles and Backfire Bombers

A. Sea launched cruise missiles:

In January 1976, the US proposed the following for
handling launched cruise missiles:

-- cruise missiles with a range over 600 km would be
banned from deployment on submarines;

-- cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km but not
greater than 2500 km, could be deployed on 25 surface
ships, with no more than about 30 missiles per ship,
during a five year period;

-4-

## B. Backfire:

The USSR, for this same five year period, would limit the total number of Backfire bombers produced to 275; (there was thus a relationship between ship based cruise missiles and Backfire bombers, with a ratio of about 3 to 1);

- the Soviets did not accept the package, nor did they reject it as such; they argued that Backfire should be outside of any agreement, and that cruise missiles with a range of over 600 on both submarines and surface ships should be banned entirely;

(The current negotiations indicate that there is agreement that cruise missiles with a range between 600 and 2500 km can be tested from submarines and ships, but not deployed for a period of a three year protocol; when that period begins and ends is still not agreed.)

(In the current negotiation it seems that the Soviets will provide assurances against the "upgrading" of the Backfire, which they had also proposed to the previous Administration, and will agree to freeze production rates at present levels, which are estimated to be about 30 per year.)

## C. Ground launched cruise missiles

The proposal of January 1976, was that all ground launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 2500 km would be banned, but no other restrictions;

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the Soviets did not accept this, but it was left open. (Under the present agreement, ground launched cruise missiles with a range between 600 - 2500 km could be tested but not deployed for the three year period of the treaty protocol.)

## V. Mobile Missiles

In January 1976 this issue was open; the Soviets took the position that they could agree to ban mobile ICBMs, or permit them within the overall ceilings; since the US was proceeding with the M-x, it was likely that mobile ICBMs would have been permitted.

(In the current negotiations flight testing of a mobile ICBM would be banned for the three year period of the protocol, but the launcher for the missile could be tested.)

## VI. New Missile Testing

In January 1976 there were no restrictions on new missile testing, except that any missile tested with a MIRV warhead would thenceforth be considered a MIRVed missile even if deployed with a single warhead;

(The present agreement is still not resolved; the US had proposed a ban on any new ICBM testing for a three year period; the Soviets reportedly proposed one exemption for a new ICBM with a single warhead; according to the *NY Times*,

-6-

May 4, the US has proposed that each side be permitted to
test one new ICBM either single or MIRVed; it is not clear
how this would apply to new SLBMs).

***

In sum, the following is a rough comparison of January
1976 and the present.

## Aggregate Numbers

- January 1976: 2400 reduced to 2300 or below;

- Present: 2400 reduced to 2250;

## MIRVs

- January 1976: ceiling of 1320 on MIRVed missiles and heavy bombers armed with ALCMs over 600 kms;

- Present: the same, but also a ceiling of 1200 on MIRVed missiles and 820 on land based MIRVs;

## Cruise Missiles

- January 1976: banned over 600 kms in range on submarines, permitted on 25 surface ships, and permitted up to 2500 km in range on ground launched;

- Present: testing permitted up to 2500 km on sea or land, but no deployment for three years;

## Backfire

- January 1976: limited to no more than 275 for five years, i.e., through early 1981;

- Present: banned from deployment for 3 years;

## Mobile ICBMs

- January 1976: permitted and counted;

MAR 21 1978

Dear Mr. Bartoli:

I am quite sympathetic to the project you contemplate. This sort of undertaking is always to be encouraged, no matter the reason. And I would never expect to be compensated for whatever small part I might play in stimulating a thoughtful approach. I must admit, however, that my time these days is largely consumed by my own writing, and this has made it difficult to turn attention to a number of things in which I would have normally been quite interested.

In short, I am for a host of reasons inclined to help, but I am afraid circumstances forbid my taking on as large a role as either of us might otherwise prefer. I would still be glad to be of whatever assistance I can, however, and if you could find an arrangement under which I could do so, I would be delighted. I would in any case be glad to talk about it, should it be possible to get together, either here in Washington or in Europe.

I wish it were otherwise, but I am sure you will understand.

Mr. Edgardo Bartoli
Palazzo Taverna
Via Monte Giordano 36,
Rome

JC:clw

March 6, 1978

Palazzo Taverna,
Via Monte Giordano 36,
Rome

Dear Dr. Rittiger,

I take the liberty of writing to you, as you suggested I should do, in order to submit to your attention the project that I have had in mind for some time and about which we talked when we met at Desideria's luncheon, last November. The long delay is due to the fact that I have been trying to collect as much documentation as possible about your policy as Secretary of State, but, I am sorry to admit, with rather unsatisfactory results.

As you may remember, it was my intention to write a small book on the relationship between political ideologies and foreign policies, in the shape of a reassessement of your political teaching and of your achievements as Secretary of State. The book should have consisted of two parts: an introductory essay and an interview with you. Given the poor results of my research now I would rather reduce the first part to the essential giving more space to the second one, and possibly inverting the order of the two. The entire work should result less academic and more polemic.

The interview should be as much offhand as possible, and shuttle from factual to historical-methodological grounds. The questions, therefore, should be varied and sometimes huddled, concealing the systematic design under casual associations of thought. For instance: relations USA-Europe, relations USRR-Europe, differences between Soviet and American notions of "realpolitik"; then, if European communists themselves accept that Moscow adheres to the same 19th century vision of world politics which Communism was meant to abolish, and if we take for granted their ideological independence from Moscow, shall we conclude that the same independence does or does not apply to foreign policy? Why Mr. Berlinguer declared on the eve of last elections that NATO could be "a shield for governmental experimentations" protecting the Communist Party from the risk of a Dubcekian fate (interview of June 15, 1976) and a fortnight later he maintained in East Berlin that "a Marxist

2.

cannot consider NATO a shield in his struggle for socialism".

I would like to insist on the usefulness of such a
book in this very moment. I think it would be interesting to
demonstrate once more - and not in terms of past national ex-
periences, but in terms of foreseeable international future -
that certain "experimentations" necessarily imply certain
consequences which, once produced, cannot be altered again by
means of new experiments. Italy is increasingly separated from
the rest of Europe by its own internal vicissitudes: the
"national emergency", which is the trump-card of the Communists,
outshines any other issues, and encourages the new majority to
put aside major problems of tomorrow in order to clear the way
for the solution of lesser ones of today. In other words, no
matter what will happen when Tito is no longer there, what
matters is to negotiate a "social contract" with the Unions
today.

Difficult though it is to estimate how much time
the work would require, one can assume that a medium-size interview
is the equivalent of four to eight hours of recorded conversation.
Therefore, the first part of the work could be crammed in one day
or scattered over one week or two. Subsequently, I should send
back to you the transcription of the tapes for additions and
alterations that you might carry out at your ease.

Finally, a practical note. In the event of your acceptance, I should be grateful if you let me know whether you wish a compensation, and the amount of it. It would be useless to conceal the fact that this is a most painful point for the publisher, Mr. Laterza.

I am grateful for your attention, and look forward to
hearing from you. Should you accept, at least in principle, I will
be delighted indeed. Should you require more details, I will promptly
follow all your instructions. I only hope very strongly that you will
discard the third hypothesis.

Yours, very sincerely

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Jochen Bauer, Hauptstraße 14, Elsbach, 3443 Sieghartskirchen

Dr. Henry Kissinger c/o Susan Mc. Farlane

July, 21-1978

Dear Dr. Kissinger

I spoke yesterday July 20, 1978 with your secretary, Mrs. Mc Farlane, and she informed me, that you are not coming to Salzburg in July. She also stated that you are fully engaged the whole Summer '78. All this to my deepest regret, however, understand my persistance - when I say that I still have hopes of perhaps a later possibility of inviting you to appear in "Ihr Lieblingsprogramm". As before, I would like to make an appointment with you - naturally at your convenience - and discuss the plans we have concieved pertaining to our TV Program.

Of course it would be preferable for us to film here in Austria. However - if this is not possible for you - we are willing to shoot where you either desire - or happen to be.

Mr. von Karajan has been informed of the impossibilities of an August appointment. We have not as yet heard from him.

Dr. Kissinger I hope you see from our persistance, the

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importance of this project. We do not wish to intrude
upon your person - however - we do feel that our cause
is an important one.

Please let us know any date when you believe to be
available - and when I may, at least, speak personally
with you, if only for a few minutes.

Thanking you - in advance - I remain

Yours respectfully

Jochen Bauer

CJB
Mrs. G. Bay

[LC]

1323 E. 164th Street
South Holland, Illinois, 60473

January 20, 1978

Dr. Henry Kissinger
c/o NBC
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N. Y. 10020

Dear Sir:

Watching the NBC TV special conducted by you and David Brinkley I wrote an article "Henry Kissinger Belongs in the White House." I never meant anything so much in my life!

I am an East Prussian D.P. from the Luthunian borders and I am not in your class and never strive to be. But I am just very concerned about world affairs as any dedicated citizen should be. And I fear a Communistic threat hanging over our immediate head. What disturbs me is the way the communists "wormed" themselves in and gained power all over Europe. The letter I received in the mail yesterday from the Citizens' Legal Defense Fund for the FBI stated, "As far back as April, 1976, respected foreign correspondent, C.L. Sulzberger, wrote, 'It is believed Moscow has found a way to paralyze the operations (attributed in part to the KGB's Department of Disinformation) the effectiveness of the CIA and FBI is held to be extremely anemic by apparently internal U.S. political arguments.' There is still time to block Moscow's plan if the American people are prepared to act now."

**The Prisoner of Conscience:** The Bukovsky File which sordid story appeared in the August 1977 issue of the READERS DIGEST and Simas Kudinka, the Luthunian who jumped ship, whose story will be told on TV January 23 and the escape of the journalist, Donald Woods whose patriotic story was printed in the January 15 issue of the Chicago Tribune, and I am sure you have stories on file miles long.

I listened to President Carter's first State of the Union address. He talks very smooth. But between you and me, Sir... don't quote me...I am a true believer and try to be a achiever for humanity in a Christian way, but the Communist and their tricks inclines that someone on his knees in easier to kick. You may interpret this with your own intelligence.

magdalena

But we let them have our grain and they sell it for a higher price...and gain in space and their power to devour the whole universe goes on...

I believe that you are for real, having experienced what I have and you belong in the White House and should have another chance! I pray for it and believe you righteously deserve to be there and because God blessed you with an intellect that is perfect you should not be blamed for other people's shortcomings.

Please keep up the dedicated work! It is a blessing in disguise that you are on our side. The communists in Europe frighten me... The East Prussian D.P.

P.S. As soon as my article has been printed, if you are interested, I will mail it to you, under this address.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

July 17, 1978

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was surprised to learn from news accounts of
a supposedly confidential report by the Senate
Select Committee concerning my testimony before
the Committee on Angola. I cannot believe that
these accounts are accurate. I was all the
more surprised to read that an investigation
has been going on for two years, since at no
time during this period was I contacted by any
member of the Committee staff. Had I been
extended this elementary right of fairness, cer-
tain facts would have become obvious.

-- First, all operational briefings of the
Congress concerning Angolan activities
were the responsibility of the Central
Intelligence Agency. It was my under-
standing that dozens of briefings had
been given various Congressional
committees including the Select Committee
on Intelligence. Thus, I had every rea-
son to assume at the time that the
Congress was being kept currently, accu-
rately and fully informed. I have seen
no information since then that would
cause me to change this view.

The Honorable
Birch Bayh
Chairman, Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence
363 Russell Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

The Honorable
Birch Bayh

July 17, 1978

Page Two

-- My own information about the operations in Angola came almost exclusively from the Central Intelligence Agency. I had no reason to doubt then, nor do I today, that I was being supplied accurate information.

-- I appeared before the Select Committee on November 21, accompanied by the Director of State Department Intelligence. I had not been invited to testify about Angola, but rather to discuss general intelligence procedures regarding the control of covert operations. When the Committee nevertheless raised questions about the operations in Angola, I repeatedly warned the Committee that I was testifying from memory and without the aid of any briefing material.

-- Following my testimony I volunteered additional information in a letter drafted and cleared by the intelligence community. I had no reasons to doubt then, nor do I have today, that the contents of my letter represented the best information available to the intelligence agencies at that time.

-- Shortly thereafter I forwarded a detailed chronology concerning Angola to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to which I had a special responsibility as Secretary of State.

-- Finally, I testified in public session in January before the African Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The Honorable
Birch Bayh

July 17, 1978

Page Three

This testimony was prepared and reviewed
by the appropriate bureaus in the State
Department, including the Intelligence
Bureau.

In light of this record, it is outrageous that unsubstantiated accusations, attributed to unnamed sources on your Committee, that I misled the Congress should appear. I stand on the accuracy of my testimony which was made in the light of the knowledge available to me at the time. I must protest the methods being employed by these unnamed sources which are reminiscent of the malicious practices discredited twenty-five years ago. I am sure the Committee will want to take immediate steps to put an end to anonymous reports, unjustified accusations and irresponsible statements.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I was surprised to learn from news accounts of a supposedly confidential report by the Senate Select Committee concerning my testimony before the Committee on Angola. I cannot believe that these accounts are accurate, especially since they allege statements by me which were never covered in my testimony. I was all the more surprised to read that an investigation has been going on for two years, since at no time during this period was I contacted by any member of the committee staff. Had I been extended this elementary right of fairness, certain facts would have been obvious.

--First, all operational briefings of the Congress concerning Angolan activities were the primary responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency. It was my understanding that dozens of briefings had been given various Congressional committees including the Select Committee on Intelligence. Thus, I had every reason to assume at the time that the Congress was being kept currently, accurately and fully informed. I have seen no information since then that would cause me to change this view.

--I appeared before the Select Committee on November 21, accompanied by the Director of State Department Intelligence. I was not invited to testify about Angola, but rather to discuss general intelligence procedures. When the Committee nevertheless raised questions about the operations in Angola, I repeatedly warned the Committee that I was testifying from memory

-2-

and without the aid of ~~detailed~~ briefing material.

--Following my testimony I volunteered additional information in a letter drafted and cleared by the intelligence community. I had no reasons to doubt then, nor do I have today, that the contents of my letter represented the best information available to the intelligence agencies. ~~At that time.~~

--Shortly thereafter I forwarded a detailed chronology concerning Angola to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to which I had a special responsibility as Secretary of State.

--Finally, I testified in public session in January before the African subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. ~~This testimony was naturally proposed~~
~~and~~
~~the next time~~

In light of this record, it is outrageous that unsubstantiated accusations, attributed to unnamed sources on your committee, that I misled the Congress should appear. I stand on the accuracy of my testimony which was made in the light of the knowledge available to me at the time. I must protest the methods being employed which are reminiscent of the malicious practices discredited twenty-five years ago. I am sure the Committee will want to take immediate steps to put an end to anonymous reports, unjustified accusations and irresponsible statements.