WAR COLLEGE
Air University
United States Air Force
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

INSTRUCTION CIRCULAR)
PHASE 60-6)

25 April 1960

U.S. STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

(25 April - 3 June 1960)

1. OBJECTIVE:

To examine the probable direction of future U.S.
strategy and to further develop an appreciation of the
impact of foreseeable developments upon U.S. strategy for
the post-1963 period.

2. DISCUSSION:

The history of America is now the central
feature of the history of the world; for the
world has set its face hopefully toward our
democracy.... Our nation is that one among
all the nations of the earth which holds in
its hands the fate of the coming years. We
enjoy exceptional advantages, and are menaced
by exceptional dangers; and all signs indicate
that we shall either fail greatly or succeed
greatly....

Theodore Roosevelt

This observation by Theodore Roosevelt some 50
years ago is still pertinent today. Previous phases of
the curriculum have provided an understanding of U.S.
national and military strategies, the factors which con-
dition them, and current and foreseeable technological
and scientific developments. Phase 60-6 is designed
primarily to correlate these factors with future U.S.
concepts, strategy and organization.

It would seem likely that in the post-1963 time period the United States and the Soviet Union will continue to have the capacity of destroying the other in nuclear war. So long as the United States maintains this capability, even if committed to a reactive military strategy, it seems unlikely that the USSR will deliberately launch such a war. Thus, the requirement of a U.S. strategy for the future would seem to be to maintain military forces capable of deterring the USSR from initiating general war and capable of waging such a war successfully should it eventuate.

Given the nature of Communism and the Sino-Soviet threat, it can reasonably be expected that the USSR and the Chinese Communists will continue to exert pressures designed to weaken the power position of the United States. The Sino-Soviet Bloc has demonstrated the ability and the intent to use political, economic, unconventional and small wars to further its avowed purpose of world domination. Therefore, U.S. strategy for the future must be designed not only to deter general war but it must also be capable of protecting the entire spectrum of U.S. national interests.

While there is general agreement on the need to maintain forces adequate to deter or wage general war successfully, there is substantial disagreement on the structure and size of the forces required for this accomplishment. A continuing military problem is the determination of a force structure necessary to accomplish the primary tasks and one which, simultaneously, would be sufficiently versatile to deal effectively with lesser conflicts.

The learning objectives of Phase 60-6 must be tempered to the realism of current and forecast budgetary considerations. The impact of rapid advances in science and technology on U.S. strategy for the future is so profound as to necessitate the careful weighing of the costs of newly developing weapon systems, with the costs of maintaining, simultaneously, a strong, deterrent military posture.

Within this context, Phase 60-6 is further designed to provide an understanding of the strategic implications

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of the rapid advances being made in science and technology,
and to provide an opportunity for the student to organize
and record original and imaginative concepts of strategy
for the future.

3. PHASE DEVELOPMENT:

PART I - THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT

OBJECTIVE:

To take a forward look at the protracted conflict
and to gain an understanding of the probable inter-relationships
between military means and political, economic and technologi-
cal ends in the post-1963 period.

PART II - CONCEPTS FOR FUTURE SECURITY

OBJECTIVE:

To evaluate various proposals and concepts for U.S.
security and world peace.

PART III - U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

OBJECTIVE:

To evaluate various concepts of future military
strategy.

PART IV - NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM

OBJECTIVE:

To provide views of prominent speakers on selected
subjects dealing with U.S. strategy for the future before
an audience of senior military officers, civil servants,
and distinguished civilians.

During this part, the War College is privileged to
have members of the National Security Forum as classmates.

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This part provides an exceptional opportunity for the interchange of ideas and points of view between the War College and these prominent civilians. Through the medium of this lecture series and related seminars, it is considered certain that the War College graduates and National Security Forum civilian participants will be better informed and prepared to exert significant influence in the evaluation of matters pertaining to the future security of the United States.

### 4. APPLICATION IN THE CURRICULUM:

Phase 60-6 calls upon the student to bring to bear on the problem of U.S. national strategy for the future all that he has learned in the preceding phases. With the International Relations background gained in Phases 60-1 and 60-2, with what he has learned about current U.S. military strategy in Phases 60-3 and 60-4, and with his appreciation of the Major Influences on U.S. Strategy for the Future acquired in Phase 60-5, the student is prepared to look to the future and consider not only military strategy but the larger problem of national strategy. Original and imaginative concepts of strategy for the future are stressed.

### 5. PHASE REQUIREMENT:

#### A. Discussion

Seminars are frequently scheduled subsequent to lecture and discussion periods. They will be devoted primarily to group discussions of the lecture content and related readings and to their relationship to the future strategy of the United States.

#### B. Written

Individual and seminar solutions to the problems contained and described in detail in Appendix F will be prepared.

4

["APPENDIX B\nTO\nINSTRUCTION CIRCULAR\nPHASE 60-6", "LECTURE SCOPES, READING REFERENCES,\nAND BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES", "TABLE OF CONTENTS", "PART I", "THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT", "<table><thead><tr><th>LECTURE NO.</th><th>LECTURE TITLE AND LECTURER</th><th>PAGE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1</td><td>The Protracted Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

[Lc]

<table><thead><tr><th>LECTURE NO.</th><th>LECTURE TITLE AND LECTURER</th><th>PAGE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>7</td><td>Political Gaming<br>DR. LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD</td><td>29</td></tr><tr><td>8</td><td>The Nature and Feasibility of Future<br>Wars<br>DR. HERMAN J. KAHN</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>9</td><td>The Formulation of Strategic Objectives<br>and Plans for the Future<br>DR. HERMAN J. KAHN</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>10</td><td>The USAF and Forward Strategy<br>GENERAL THOMAS D. WHITE</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>11</td><td>A Scientific and Technological<br>Strategy for the Future<br>DR. WILLIAM O. DAVIS</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>12</td><td>Defense Organization for Future<br>Security<br>BRIG.GEN. ROBERT C. RICHARDSON</td><td>43</td></tr><tr><td>13</td><td>Industry and Strategy for the Future<br>LT.GEN. CLARENCE S. IRVINE</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>14</td><td>Underseas Warfare and Future Strategy<br>REAR ADMIRAL LAWSON P. RAMAGE</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>15</td><td>An Economic Strategy for the Future<br>DR. HENRY C. WALLICH</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>16</td><td>Domestic Economic Policy and Future<br>Strategy<br>DR. RAYMOND J. SAULNIER</td><td>65</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">PART III</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE</td></tr><tr><td>17</td><td>The U.S. Army and Forward Strategy<br>GENERAL LYMAN L. LEMNITZER</td><td>71</td></tr></tbody></table>

ii

[L.C]

<table><thead><tr><th>LECTURE NO.</th><th>LECTURE TITLE AND LECTURED</th><th>PAGE</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>18</td><td>The U.S. Navy and Forward Strategy<br>VICE ADMIRAL BERNARD L. AUSTIN</td><td>75</td></tr><tr><td>19</td><td>The Marine Corps and Forward Strategy<br>GENERAL DAVID M. SHOUP</td><td>79</td></tr><tr><td>20</td><td>Aerospace and Forward Strategy<br>BRIG. GEN. HONER A. ROUSHEY</td><td>81</td></tr><tr><td>21</td><td>United States Forward Strategy<br>GENERAL NATHAN F. TWINING</td><td>85</td></tr><tr><td>Special</td><td>The Need for a New Military Strategy<br>GENERAL NAYFELL D. TAYLOR</td><td>86</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3" style="text-align: center;">PART IV</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3" style="text-align: center;">THE NATIONAL SECURITY FORUM</td></tr><tr><td>22</td><td>The World Situation<br>GENERAL CHARLES P. CABELL</td><td>89</td></tr><tr><td>23</td><td>Political Aspects of National Strategy<br>THE HON. PAUL H. NITZE</td><td>91</td></tr><tr><td>Special</td><td>National Security in the Space Age<br>LT. GENERAL BERNARD A. SCHRIEVER</td><td>92</td></tr><tr><td>24</td><td>National Defense Problems in a<br>Challenging Age<br>THE HON. JAMES H. DOUGLAS</td><td>95</td></tr><tr><td>25</td><td>Small Wars and Future Strategy<br>DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER</td><td>101</td></tr><tr><td>26</td><td>Future Security Through Deterrence<br>GENERAL THOMAS S. POWER</td><td>105</td></tr></tbody></table>

iii

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

DR. BERNARD BRODIE

Present Position: Senior Staff Member, The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California

Birthplace and Date: Chicago, Illinois, 20 May 1910

Education:

University of Chicago, 1932, Ph.B.; 1940, Ph.D. in
International Relations; Carnegie Fellow, Institute for
Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, 1941.

Positions Held:

Instructor, Dartmouth College, 1941-43; Technical Expert
with U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, San Francisco
Conference, 1945, Associate Professor, Yale University,
Director of Graduate Studies, Department of International
Relations, 1945-51; Resident Professor National War College,
1946-47; Consultant, Air War College, 1947; Senior Specialist
in National Defense for the Legislative Reference Service,
Library of Congress, 1946-49; Special Assistant to Chief of
Staff, USAF, 1950; Member, Board of Consultants, National
War College, 1955-57; Senior Staff Member (Research and
Development for Air Force), The RAND Corporation, Santa Monica,
California, 1951 --; Lecturer, Graduate Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, Geneva, Switzerland.

Writings:

Books: *Sea Power in the Machine Age*, 1941 (rev. '44)
*A Guide to Naval Strategy*, 1942 (rev. '43, '44, '58) *The
Absolute Weapon*, 1946 (editor and co-author) *Strategy in
the Missile Age*, 1959.

Articles: Contributor to *Foreign Affairs*, *World Politics*, *Brassey's Annual*, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, *Harpers*, *Yale Review*, *Virginia Quarterly Review*, *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *Saturday Review*, *The Reporter*, *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, and others.

Previous War College Lectures: 1947, 1948, 1949. 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953 and 1957.

LECTURE NO: 1 25 April 1960, 0830 Hours

TITLE: THE PROTRACTED CONFLICT

LECTURER: Dr. Bernard Brodie

PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

This lecture introduces a comprehensive study of U.S. strategy for the future. In previous phases, the College has received analyses of current U.S. military strategy and the technological factors affecting the future. This address is concerned primarily with providing a strategic estimate for the future with emphasis on the probable nature and intensity of the communist threat in the 1963-1975 time period. As the initial speaker in this phase, the lecturer could contribute to the phase objectives by including a discussion of the following questions:

A. What will be the probable nature and intensity of the Sino-Soviet threat which will face the United States in the 1963-1975 time period?

B. What do you foresee to be the possibility of change in Sino-Soviet strategy for the future?

C. What strategy should the United States pursue against the threat of communism?

READINGS:

Recommended:

Possony, Stefan T., Speech. "The Military Front: The Spectrum of Military Conflict," 20 July 1959. (Reading Selections Vol. II).

Platt, William J. "A Prologue to the Spectrum of Conflict," *Stanford Research Institute Journal*, Fourth Quarter 1959.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

HONORABLE WALTER H. JUDD

Present Position: Member of Congress from Minnesota's Fifth Congressional District in Minneapolis, Minnesota

Birthplace and Date: Rising City, Nebraska
25 September 1898

Education:

University of Nebraska, B.A., 1920, M.D. 1923;
Fellowship in Surgery, Mayo Foundation, University of
Minnesota 1932-34.

Positions Held:

Served in Army 1918-1919; Instructor of Zoology at the
University of Omaha, 1920-24; traveling secretary, Student
Volunteer Movement in Colleges and Universities 1924-25;
Medical Missionary under Congregational Foreign Mission
Board, Nanking, China, 1925-26, Shaowu, Fukien, China, 1926-31;
Medical Missionary, Fenchow, Shansi, China, 1934-38; lectured
throughout U.S. on American foreign policy and interests in
the Pacific (advocated boycotting of Japanese goods and embargo
on shipment of American war materials to Japan), 1938-40; physi-
cian and surgeon, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1941-42. Dr. Judd
was elected a member of Congress in 1942 and has been re-elected
every two years since then.

Principal Activities:

Congressman, Physician, Missionary and Lecturer. Dr. Judd
is an internationally recognized authority on US foreign policy
and is a member of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs which
has shaped US relief, recovery, rearmament and economic develop-
ment programs abroad. Dr. Judd served as a Delegate to the
General Assembly of the United Nations in 1957 and as a Delegate
to the World Health Organization Assembly in 1950 and 1958.

Previous War College Lecture: 1953

Ld

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

HONORABLE ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.

Present Position: Partner, Firm of Berle, Berle and Brunner; Professor of Law, Columbia

Birthplace and Date: Boston, Massachusetts,
29 January 1895

Education:

A.B., A.M., and LLB, Harvard University

Positions Held:

During 1918-19 served on the Staff of American Commission to negotiate peace with Germany; Special Council for the RFC; in 1933 was appointed Financial Advisor to the U.S. Embassy to Cuba, and became Chamberlain of New York City in 1934; served as Assistant Secretary of State from 1938-44; U.S. Ambassador to Brazil, 1945-46; appointed delegate for the U.S. Government to Inter-American Conference for Maintenance of Peace, Buenos Aires. 1936-37; Delegate to the Eighth Pan-American Conference, Lima, Peru in 1938; Pan-American Conference, Havana, 1940; became President of International Conference on Civil Aviation in Chicago, 1944 and Chairman of the U.S. Delegation; Trustee, Free Europe Committee (Radio Free Europe); Member Over-all Panel Rockefeller Bros. Fund Committee; Chairman of the Board, College de L'Europe Libre (Strasbourg).

Principal Activities:

Practiced law with various law firms and became a partner in the firm of Berle, Berle, Agee and Land; lectured on Finance at Harvard Business School from 1925-28, and served in the capacity of Professor of Corporation Law at Colombia University since 1927.

Writings:

Author: *Tides of Crisis*, Reynal and Company, New York, 1957. Has written various articles in magazines and is the author of several legal books.

8

LECTURE NO: 2 26 April 1960, 0830 Hours

TITLE: A FORWARD POLITICAL STRATEGY

LECTURER: Honorable Adolf Berle, Jr.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

This lecture is concerned primarily with outlining
an optimum U.S. political strategy for the 1963-1975
time period.

It has been said that many U.S. political decisions
have come about as a reaction to pressure or events
initiated by the Soviet Union rather than as a result of
a forward U.S. political strategy. The lecturer could
contribute to the phase objectives by outlining an optimum
U.S. political strategy and by including a discussion of
the following questions:

A. What should be the U.S. political objectives
for the future?

B. What should be the nature of a political strategy
designed to attain these objectives?

READINGS:

Recommended:

Acheson, Dean G. Speech. "Revising Forward Political Strategies and Improving the Organization of the Free World." 21 July 1959. (Reading Selections Vol II).

Acheson, Dean G. "The Premises of American Policy," *Orbis*, Fall 1959 (Reading Selections Vol II).

"United States Foreign Policy in A New Age," *Background*, Department of State Publication, October 1959. (Handout).

11

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

GENERAL CORTLANDT VAN RENASSELAER SCHUYLER, USA (Ret)

Present Position: Executive Assistant to the
Governor of New York State

Birthplace and Date: Arlington, New Jersey
22 December 1900

Education:

U.S. Military Academy, B.S., 1922. Coast Artillery School, 1936. Command and General Staff School, 1937.

Military Background:

Commissioned 2nd Lt., Coast Artillery Corps, 1922.
Advanced through grades to General (temporary), 1956;
various early assignments with Coast Artillery; instruc-
tor in Dept. of Mathematics, U.S. Military Academy, 1927;
Jan. 1943, Chief of Staff, Hqs., Antiaircraft Artillery
Training Command, Camp Davis, N.C.; Nov 1944, Chief of U.S.
Military Representative on Allied Control Commission for
Rumania; June 1947, Chief of Plans and Policy Group, Plans
and Operations Division of U.S. Army General Staff; Jan.
1951 assigned to Army element of Supreme Hqs Allied Powers
in Europe; Feb. 1953-July 1953, Commander, 28th Infantry
Division, Goeppinger, Germany; July 1953 to 1959, Chief of
Staff, SHAPE; Retired from U.S. Army in November 1959; 1959
to present date, Executive Assistant to the Governor of
New York State.

Decorations:

Distinguished Service Medal; Legion of Merit; Commander,
French Legion of Honor.

Previous War College Lectures: 1949, 1957, 1958.

LECTURE NO: 3 27 April 1960, 0830 Hours

TITLE: MILITARY MEANS AND POLITICAL ENDS

LECTURER: General Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, USA, (Ret)

PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

The purpose of this lecture is to provide an analysis
of the implications of a nuclear stand-off upon U.S. stra-
tegy for the future.

It seems probable in the post-1963 period that the
U.S. and the USSR will continue to have the capability
to destroy the other in general war. This situation is
likely to have far-reaching implications on U.S. politi-
cal and military strategies for the future. The lecturer
could contribute to the phase objectives by addressing
himself to the following questions:

A. What are the most significant political and military opportunities and limitations likely to develop in the post-1963 period under a condition of nuclear stand-off?

B. Will the future security of the United States require greater or less emphasis on alliances as a means of maintaining U.S. national interests?

C. In the post-1963 period, what types of conflict are most unlikely to occur?

D. With respect to both general and small war what
is the relationship of the composition of U.S. military
power to the credibility aspects of a strategy of deter-
rence?

E. What should be the size and composition of U.S. military power in the post-1963 period in order that U.S. national security interests will be maintained?

13

READINGS:

Recommended:

Palmer, General W. B. USA. Speech. "The Military Situation of the United States." 1 May 1959. (Reading Selections Vol. II).

Rockefeller, Nelson A. "Purpose and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960. (Reading Selections Vol. II).

Hayward, Vice Admiral John T. USN. "The Navy of 1960-1970." *The General Electric Defense Quarterly*, October-December 1959 (Reading Selections Vol. II)

14

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

AIR CHIEF MARSHAL SIR GEORGE H. MILLS, G.C.B, D.F.C., A.D.C.

Present Position: United Kingdom Representative to the
NATO Standing Group; Representative of the United Kingdom
Chief of Staff in Washington, D.C.; Chairman of the British
Joint Services Mission.

Birthplace and Date: Swanley, Kent, England

26 March 1902

Education:

Berkhamsted, Buckinghamshire R.A.F. College, Cranwell
(Commissioned 1921)

Positions Held:

From 1922 to 1924 served with Squadron in Iraq; 1924
to 1929 with Squadrons in England, attended courses including
Photographic Instructors Course. Served in India 1930-34.
Attended Staff College, England, 1935. Air Ministry 1936-39.
At beginning of 1940 was in command of No. 115 Bomber Squadron.
Remained in Bomber Command for much of WW II, including tour
at Command Headquarters. Served on Directing Staff of Staff
College, Bulstrode. Director of Policy on Staff of Assistant
Chief of the Air Staff (Policy) 1943-45. In February 1945
commanded Balkan Air Force with Headquarters in Italy. In
July 1945 became Air Officer in charge of Administration,
Middle East Air Force. Director of Plans on Staff of Assist-
ant Chief of Staff (Plans, Air Ministry) 1946-49. Air Officer
Commanding No. 1 Group (Bomber) 1949-50. Head of United
Kingdom Military Delegation to Western Union Military Staff
Committee 1950-51. Served as Air Officer Commanding, Malaya,
1952. In April 1953 was appointed Air Officer Commanding-in-
Chief, Bomber Command. Commander of the Allied Air Forces,
Central Europe, 1956-59. Assumed present position U.K.
Representative, Standing Group, NATO, and Chairman, British
Joint Services Mission on 1 July 1959.

Previous War College Lectures: 1951, 1954, 1957, 1958.

16

LECTURE NO: 4 2 May 1960, 0830 Hours

TITLE: THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

LECTURER: Air Chief Marshal Sir George H. Mills
G.C.B., D.F.C., A.D.C., R.A.F.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

The purpose of this lecture is to examine how the
Western Alliance may best insure its future in the 1963-
1975 time period.

Communist doctrine requires of the Sino-Soviet Bloc
that it seek world domination and the dissolution or
destruction of any opposing power factors. The leaders
of the Free World, Great Britain and the United States,
join together with France, Canada and a number of other
friendly nations, in what is universally referred to as
the Western Alliance. Western power and influence con-
sist of a number of elements, independent or semi-
independent of each other, which brought together in a
common pool, appear to World Communism as an effective
deterrent to its aims and objectives. Destruction of
this combination of power would seem to be a principal
Communist target. World Communism, therefore, seems to
seek disruption of this common Western effort by encourag-
ing splits among the Western strategies. The lecturer can
contribute to an understanding of this subject by including
a discussion of the following questions:

A. Will common Western strategy be the only viable threat in the future to the Communist objective of world domination?

B. Some nations of the Western Alliance are more powerful than others, particularly in military and economic strengths. Can the West retain its future independence without pooling its strengths under a common Western strategy?

17

C. Can one nation, or any combination of nations, evolve and pursue a successful future strategy of its own irrespective of the views of the remaining member nations of the Western Alliance?

D. At the present time, power is concentrated in a minority of the member nations of the Western Alliance. To what degree should majority rule determine Western strategy for the future and to what degree should the minority, or even an individual member nation, determine or influence the situation?

E. It would appear that all Western Alliance nations are not in agreement on the military posture required to meet the Communist threat of the 1963-1975 time period. Would the speaker suggest an optimum military posture which should be developed within the Western Alliance for the future mutual security of its member nations?

F. The moral strength of the Western Alliance is directly related to its respect for the rights and sovereignty of its member nations. What advantages or disadvantages in the development of an effective common Western strategy for the future may result from this respect?

G. In the 1963-1975 time period numerous, if not all, Western Alliance nations will probably possess some nuclear capability. What changes in Western strategy will be required as a result?

## READINGS:

### Recommended:

* Kennan, George F. "Peaceful Coexistence: A Western View," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1960. (Reading Selections Vol. II).

* Harnwell, Gaylord P. "Science, Technology and the North Atlantic Community," *Orbis*, Summer 1958. (Reading Selections Vol. II).

18

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

WING COMMANDER JOHN GELLNER, RCAF (Ret)

Present Position: Contributing Editor (Military Affairs) of Saturday Night, Canadian weekly publication.

Birthplace and Date: Trieste, 18 May 1907

Education:

Studied law in Czechoslovakia, Austria and France.
Doctor of Law, Masaryk University of Brno, Czechoslovakia.

Positions Held:

Practiced law in Brno, Czechoslovakia.

Principal Activities:

Instructor, University of Toronto; Professional lecturer and author; Contributor to numerous Canadian and United States periodicals; Military analyst Canadian Radio and TV networks. Wg. Cdr. Gellner travels annually throughout Europe and normally resides 4 months each year in Austria. He will go to Algeria in May to write a series of articles for Canadian publications.

Military Background:

Flew tour with RAF Bomber Command early in World War II, then transferred to RCAF and flew second tour. In Royal Canadian Air Force from April 1940 to November 1958; Awarded DFC; Member, Directing Staff, RCAF Staff College, 1955-1958; Retired from RCAF in 1958.

Previous War College Lecture: 1959

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LECTURE NO: 5 2 May 1960, 1030 Hours

TITLE: THE ROLE OF NORTH AMERICA IN
STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

LECTURER: Wing Commander John Gellner, RCAF (Ret)

PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

The purpose of this lecture is to discuss the
potential contribution of North America to the future
security of the Free World.

The bulk of military, economic and political power
in North America rests with Canada and the United States.
Because of its particular situation, the United States
has developed regional alliances and other special rela-
tionships throughout the world to facilitate its actions
on behalf of U.S. security and that of other free nations.
Yet, because of this network of relationships, U.S. actions
in a given area are often suspected of resulting from pres-
sures of U.S. interests in another area. Or it may indeed
be the case that U.S. ability to act in a given situation
is affected by its interests elsewhere. Further, because
of these widespread alliances and special relationships,
the United States often finds itself overly committed and
is accordingly forced to spread its resources thin or even
to abandon certain tasks. It would seem logical for
Canada and the United States, in support of their mutual
interests, together to plan for the disposition of their
individual and collective resources and the acceptance of
individual and shared responsibilities in that manner best
designed to promote the maximum in North America's power
potential.

The lecturer is requested to develop his views as to
the combined as well as the respective individual potential
of Canada and the United States in terms of their opportunity
and capability to contribute to the future security of the
Free World. In this relation, he might wish to give his
consideration to the following questions:

21

A. Are there areas where Canada feels United States courses of action are not producing desired results for Free World security? If there are such areas, could Canada accomplish better results than the United States, or does the remedy lie in a change of approach? What changes in approach should be made?

B. Are there areas in which Canada might substitute for the United States, thus relieving the United States for other tasks?

C. The worldwide network of regional and special relationships to which the United States is a party necessarily involves the United States in all areas of the world, as, for instance in Panama and Cuba. While Canada does not have such extensive commitments, to what degree does she consider herself entangled in these U.S. alliances?

D. Are there areas where either country is now "going it alone" in which a joint approach would prove to mutual advantage?

READINGS:

Recommended:

Bowles, Chester, "The China Problem Reconsidered," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960 (Reading Selections Vol. II)

Mutchmor, James R. "Don't Take Canada for Granted," *The Christian Century*, 12 August 1959.

Tannenbaum, Frank, "The Political Dilemma in Latin America," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960. (Reading Selections Vol. II)

Rubottom, Roy R., Jr., "Communism in the Americas," *Department of State Publication*, March 1958. (Handout).

22

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

COLONEL JOSEPH V. ADAMS, JR., USAF

Present Position: Chief, Air Battle Analysis Division
Deputy Director for War Plans, DCS/P&P

Birthplace and Date: Birmingham, Alabama

28 August 1915

Education:

Mississippi State, Starkville, Mississippi.

Military Background:

Graduated with first class of Cadets, 1941, Mather Field, Calif.; 1941-1943, Pilot and Operations Officer, advance flying training school, Mather Field, Calif.; 1943-44, Operational Officer and Director of Flying, Ellington Field, Texas; 1944, completed Command and General Staff School, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas; 1944-45, Assistant Director of Training and Operations, Ellington Field, Texas; 1945-46, completed B-26 and B-17 Transition School, Del Rio, Texas and Hobbs, New Mexico, respectively; 1946-47, Squadron Commander, (SAC) Schilling Air Force Base, Salina, Kansas; 1947-49, Air Base Group Commander, 97th Bomb Wing (SAC), Biggs Air Force Base, Texas; 1949-51, Director of Operations, 97th Bomb Wing, Biggs Air Force Base, Texas; 1951, completed Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia; 1951-52, Chief, Plans Development Branch, Director of Plans, Hq., 3rd Air Force, London, England; 1952-54, Deputy Director of War Plans, Hq., 3rd Air Force, London; 1954-57, Deputy Division Chief, Director of Plans, Hq., Strategic Air Command, Omaha, Nebraska; 1957, assumed present position.

Decorations:

Legion of Merit, Commendation Ribbon, American Defense Service Medal, American Campaign Medal, World War II Victory Medal, National Defense Service Medal.

Previous War College Lectures: None

24

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

DR. LINCOLN PALMER BLOOMFIELD

Present Position: Director of the United Nations Project at M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies and Associate Professor of Political Science at M.I.T.

7 July 1920

Education:

Harvard 1941; returned to Harvard on subsequent leaves of absence to complete the Master of Public Administration degree, on a Littauer Fellowship (1952), and the Ph.D. on a Rockefeller Fellowship (1955).

Positions Held:

Prior to war was Acting Supervisor for Oregon of the U.S. Surplus Marketing Administration; served as a Naval Lieutenant during World War II; served in the U.S. State Department from 1946 to 1957 with the title of Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.

Principal Activities:

Lecturer at Service War Colleges; Consultant to Department of State; member of Board of Editors of International Organization Board of Directors of the American Unitarian Association, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Publications:

The United Nations and the Strategy of Peace, Evolution or Revolution; The UN and the Problem of Peaceful Territorial Change (Harvard University Press, 1957), Law, Politics and International Disputes (International Conciliation, No. 516, 1958); and articles in Foreign Affairs, International Organization, American Political Science Review, U.S. Naval Institute

LECTURE NO: 6 3 May 1960, 0830 Hours

TITLE: WAR GAMING AND STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

LECTURER: Colonel Joseph Adams

LECTURE NO: 7 3 May 1960, 1030 Hours

TITLE: POLITICAL GAMING

LECTURER: Dr. Lincoln P. Bloomfield

PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

The purpose of these two lectures is to develop an understanding of the utility of war gaming as a technique for developing and evaluating military doctrine and strategy, as well as problems affecting national strategy.

The formulation of military concepts and plans, and the consequent justification of military requirements, in relation to a total national strategy require analytical systems of evaluation to assist in the decision-making process. Other than the actual working out of national and international events or the actual conduct of war, the research tool of war gaming provides a useful means for educating leadership; identifying, defining, and analyzing complex problems; and testing and refining plans. The progressive application of gaming techniques to future national and military strategical concepts gives promise of inestimable value.

The lecturers could significantly contribute to the phase objectives by discussing the following questions:

A. What are the potential benefits of war gaming in the military services, with particular reference to gaming at the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff level?

B. What types of games may be played and what assessment may be made of combat interaction in aerospace strategy?

29

C. What application of war gaming techniques may be made in the analysis and study of international political, economic, and psycho-social problems?

READINGS:

Recommended:

Hoeber, Francis P., "Soviet Economic Potential and Strategies," *The Stanford Research Institute Journal*, Fourth Quarter, 1959.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

DR. HERMAN KAHN

Present Position: RAND Corporation
Santa Monica, California

Birthplace and Date: Bayonne, New Jersey
15 February 1922

Education:

B.A., University of California at Los Angeles;
M.S., California Institute of Technology, 1947.

Positions Held:

U. S. Army, 1943-45; with Douglas Aircraft, University of California and Northrop Aircraft; Physicist, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1948-58; early part of 1959 became Director, Center of International Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey; late 1959, returned to RAND Corporation and assumed present position.

Principal Activities:

Member of Technical Advisory Group at the AEC on
nuclear-powered airplanes, 1950; Consultant to the Scientific
Advisory Board to the Air Force on protective construction,
1956-1957; Consultant to the Gaither Committee on Strategic
Warfare, 1957.

Publications:

"How Many Can Be Saved?" *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, 1 January 1959, by Herman Kahn; "Some Specific Suggestions for Achieving Early Non-Military Defense Capabilities and Initiating Long-Range Programs," The RAND Corporation, "Research Memorandum, RM-2206-RC," January 2, 1958 (Rev. July 1, 1958); "Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence," *Stanford Research Institute Journal*, November 1959; "The Nature and Feasibility of War and Deterrence," P-1888-RC, The RAND Corporation, January 20, 1960.

Previous War College Lecture: 1959.

32

LECTURE NO: 8 4 May 1960, 0830 Hours

TITLE: THE NATURE AND FEASIBILITY OF FUTURE WARS

LECTURE NO: 9 5 May 1960, 0830 Hours

TITLE: THE FORMULATION OF STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND PLANS FOR THE FUTURE

LECTURER: Dr. Herman J. Kahn

PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

The purpose of these two lectures is to examine the
likely nature of nuclear wars and the strategic objectives
and plans necessary for the conduct of and survival in such
wars during the post-1963 time period.

The lecturer can contribute to an understanding of
these subjects by presenting his views in areas such as
genetics, economic recovery, long term medical effects
and other associated problems. He could present his con-
clusions on the ability of the United States to survive
and recuperate from nuclear war. He should discuss the
implications of his conclusions as they might be applicable
to the design and evaluation of our strategic forces of the
future.

READINGS, LECTURE NO. 8:

Recommended:

Reinhardt, G. C., A Book Review, "War - 1974." _RAND Report_ P-1326, 2 April 1958. (Reading Selections Vol. I).

Horelick, Arnold, "Some Soviet Views on the Nature of a Future War and the Factors Determining Its Course and Outcome," _RAND Report_ T-97, 15 September 1958. (Reading Selections Vol. I).

33

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

GENERAL THOMAS D. WHITE

Present Position: Chief of Staff,
United States Air Force
Washington, D. C.

Birthplace and Date: Walker, Minnesota
1901

Education:

St. John's Military Academy, Delafield, Wisconsin,
1914-18; B.S., U. S. Military Academy, 1920; Air Corps
Primary and Advanced Flying Schools, 1924-25; Georgetown
University, 1927-28; Air Corps Tactical School, 1937-38;
Command and General Staff School, 1938-39.

Military Background:

Chief, Intelligence Section, Air Corps, 1939-41;
Military Attache, Rio De Janeiro, and Chief, Air Staff
Intelligence, 1944; Deputy Commander, 13th Air Force,
Commanding General, 7th Air Force, 1945-46; Chief of
Staff, PACUSA, Tokyo (which was redesignated FEAF in
1947), 1946-48. Commanding General, 5th Air Force, 1948.
Director of Legislation and Liaison, Department of the
Air Force, 1948-51; Director of Plans, Office of Deputy
Chief of Staff, Operations, 1951; Deputy Chief of Staff,
Operations, 1951-53; Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters,
USAF, 1953-57; Chief of Staff, Headquarters, USAF, 1957
to present.

Previous War College Lectures: 1950, 1951, 1952, 1954,
1956, 1957, 1958, 1959.

36

**LECTURE NO:** 10 5 May 1960, 1330 Hours

**TITLE:** THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND FORWARD STRATEGY

**LECTURER:** General Thomas D. White

PURPOSE AND SCOPE:

The purpose of this lecture is to present the views
of the Chief of Staff on the role of the United States
Air Force in U.S. strategy for the future.

The Chief of Staff could contribute to the phase
objectives by presenting his opinions relative to the
probable nature of warfare in the 1963-1975 time period
and the probable role of the United States Air Force in
furtherance of U.S. national interests during that era.
He could indicate foreseeable trends, both political
and military, and their implications in terms of U.S.
Air Force planning for the future.

READINGS:

Recommended:

Dyson, Freeman J., "The Future Development of Nuclear Weapons," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960. (Reading Selections Vol. II).

Jackson, Henry M. "Organizing for Survival," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1960. (Reading Selections Vol. II).

Barlow, E. J., "Is Deterrence Enough or Should We Be Prepared to Fight a General War in the 1960's?" *RAND Report* P-1850, 11 December 1959. (Reading Selections Vol. I).

37

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

DR. WILLIAM O. DAVIS

Present Position: Director of Research
Huyck Corporation

Birthplace and Date: Buffalo, New York
11 November 1919

Education:

B.A. New York University, 1939 with study at Cambridge
University, England, on a Carnegie Scholarship 1937 to 1938.
Ph.D. Nuclear Physics, New York University - 1950.

Positions Held:

In 1940 Dr. Davis joined what was then the Army Air
Corps as a Flying Cadet. At the close of World War II he
was commanding the 824th Bombardment Squadron (B-24's) of
the Fifteenth Air Force. From 1950 to 1953, member of the
staff of the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory as an Air
Force Officer. From 1953 to 1955, Chief of Scientific
Research, Hq. Air Research and Development Command; 1955
to 1957, Deputy Commander - Air Force Office of Scientific
Research; 1957 to 1958, Assistant to the Director of Labo-
ratories, Wright Air Development Center; resigned from the
Air Force as a Colonel in 1958; 1958 to 1959, Vice President
and President - Turbo Dynamics Corporation. Presently
Director of Research, Huyck Corporation.

Principal Activities:

Cosmic ray neutrons, special weapons development,
research management and the study of technological warfare.

Previous War College Lectures: 1954, 1955.

**LECTURE NO:** 11 6 May 1960, 0830 Hours

**TITLE:** A SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE

**LECTURER:** Dr. William O. Davis

**PURPOSE AND SCOPE:**

The purpose of this lecture is to investigate the feasibility of devising a scientific and technological strategy which would improve the relative power position of the United States.

Scientific and technological excellence is possibly the outstanding characteristic that distinguishes a populous, industrialized nation from an equally populous but underdeveloped nation. It is unlikely in this technical era that a nation lacking a well-developed and progressive body of scientists and technicians can ever attain the status of a leading world power. Although there is some question as to the degree to which the scientific and technological strength of a nation can be increased through a concerted effort at manipulation, there does appear to be substantial agreement that the relative power position of a nation is directly related to its strength in this vital area. The lecturer could contribute to the phase objectives by including a discussion of the following questions:

A. To what degree can the scientific and technological excellence of a nation respond to concentrated efforts for its improvement?

B. To what extent can science and technology be pointed specifically toward increasing the relative power position of a nation?

C. What would the speaker suggest as a broad plan designed to increase the scientific and technological capability of the United States? How could this capability be used to improve the relative power position of the United States?

39

Bilateral Agreement
---

U.S.A. - U.S.S.R.

| **Date** | **Terms** |
|---|---|
| Nov. 16, 1933 | Litvinoff pledges<br>1. "...it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the U.S.S.R....to prevent the activity on its territory of any group or organization which has as an aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States - its territories or possessions." |

**Violations**

Dec. 1933, the executive Committee of the Communist International met at Moscow and adopted resolutions designed to instruct its various sections upon the means they must employ and the activities in which they must engage in order to prepare to overthrow by force the governments of their respective countries. These resolutions pointed out: "There is no way out of the general crisis of capitalism other than the one shown by the October revolution, via the overthrow of the exploiting classes by the proletariat, the confiscation of the banks, of the factories, the mines, transport, houses, the stocks of goods of the capitalists, the lands of the landlords, the church and the crown." (Nov. 21, 1933, Litvinoff said that the Third International was not mentioned in the pledges and that "You must not read into it (agreements).")

2. Page 23 of the election platform of the Communist Party, 1934, says: "The revolutionary way out of a crisis begins with the fight for unemployment insurance, against wage cuts, for wage increases, for relief to the farmers - through demonstrations, strikes, general strikes leading up to the seizure of power, to the destruction of capitalism by a revolutionary workers' government."

[L]

U.S.A. - U.S.S.R.

2.

2. "The

3. Although the Comintern (Third International) was dissolved in 1943, Soviet inspired communist activity continued in the U.S.A. This was shown by the trial and conviction of eleven Communists in 1949. The trial revealed that the American Communist Party, acting on orders issued by Dmitri Manuilsky - former Comintern leader - had returned to a policy of violent revolution.

2. "The Government of the U.S.S.R. while reserving the right of refusing visas to Americans desiring to enter the U.S.S.R. on personal grounds, does not intend to base such refusals on the fact of such person having ecclesiastical status."

March 1955, the U.S.S.R. expelled Rev. George Bissonette who ministered to the needs of Roman Catholic Americans in Moscow. The U.S.S.R. refused entry to his successor, the Rev. Louis Dion for 4 years on the grounds that the Litvinov-Roosevelt agreements provided for reciprocity in the admission of clergymen - although the 1933 agreement contained no provision to this effect.

Nov. 16, 1933

3. "Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to adopt the necessary measures to inform the consul of the other Party as soon as possible whenever a national of the country which he represents is arrested in his district. The same procedure shall apply if a prisoner is transferred from one place of detention to another.

The rights of U. S. citizens were guaranteed - particularly the right to a fair public and speedy trial and the right to be represented by counsel of their choice.

Many Americans have been imprisoned in the U.S.S.R. and in countries under its dominion without trial or with patently unfair trials. Homer Cox and John Noble were kept

U.S.A - U.S.S.R.

3.

in slave camps for 4 and 10 years,
respectively. Both reported meet-
ing many other Americans in such
camps, some of whom presumably are
still there.

July 30, 1956

U. S. A. has also protested the de-
tention of U. S. personnel in the
USSR involved in air craft incidents
since 1949. The U. S. Government has
sought to obtain precise identifi-
cation of nationals.

July 11, 1958, the U. S. protested to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington the attack on an unarmed U. S. transport plane; the failure of the Soviet Government to inform the U.S. authorities of all information regarding the incident or to permit U. S. representatives access to the crew members involved, although the American crew men were held in Soviet custody for 10 days.

June 11, 1942 Lend Lease

1. The United States agreed to supply the USSR with defense articles, services and information. The USSR agreed to provide information it was in a position to supply.

There was a complete lack of reci-
procity in exchange of military and
technological information.

2. The USSR was to return to the United
States at the end of the war the undestroyed d
defense articles. In lend-lease settle-
ment negotiation the U. S. had expressed
willingness to settle for "fair" value of
articles remaining on the basis of usefulness

The United States Government has
attempted over the years to obtain
the return of ships leased to the
Soviet Union. 157 have been returned
to the U. S.; 322 have been reported
by the Soviet Government as lost or

[LJ]

U.S.A. - U.S.S.R.

4.

to the Soviet peacetime economy. The U. S. position was based on the principles used in settlements with other lend-lease recipients.

unseaworthy; and 75 dilapidated craft were sunk in the presence of U. S. observers. The disposition of the remaining 31 naval vessels still in the possession of the U.S.S.R. has not been decided upon by the U. S. although the U.S.S.R. has offered to purchase them.

Ninety-six of the 121 merchant ships transferred to the U.S.S.R. under lend-lease were in the custody of the Soviet Union on V-J Day. Nine of the merchant ships have been returned to the U.S., and 3 have been reported lost since V-J Day. The U.S.S.R. has not returned to the U. S. the remaining 34 ships. None of the 29 Army water-craft lend-leased to the U.S.S.R. have been returned.

January 1951 the U. S. proposed that the U.S.S.R. pay $800 million in settlement of its lend-leased account. The last offer the Soviet Government made was $300 million (August 1951) No progress has been made on this aspect of the negotiations since that time.

In regard to this agreement, Eugene Lyons states that "Stalin demanded and was granted a quid pro quo: one million additional tons of military and industrial supplies. The U.S. at once began shipping that tonnage, most of which was duly delivered, but Soviet Russia reneged on the bases.

3. An agreement under lend-lease was reached between the U. S.S.R. and the U.S. for the use of aviation bases in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk region by the U.S. Air Force.

[LC]

Bilateral Treaties

GREAT BRITAIN - U.S.S.R.

<table><thead><tr><td>Date</td><td>Terms</td><td>Violation</td></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>March 16, 1921</td><td>Great Britain and the R.S.F.S.R. concluded a trade agreement which raised the British blockade against the F.S. F. S. R., prohibited Bolshvik propaganda in Great Britain and granted de facto recognition of the R.S.F.S.R.<br>(de jure recognition was granted Feb. 1, 1924.)</td><td>May 8, 1923, Great Britain delivered the "Curzon ultimatum" to the U.S.S.R. threatening to terminate trade agreement of 1921, unless impounded British fishing vessels were released and the U.S.S.R. disowned and recalled agents in India, Persia, Afghanistan engaged in anti-British propaganda.<br>2. Feb. 23, 1927, The British Govt. protested Soviet violations of the 1921 trade agreement and failure to abstain from propaganda.<br>3. May 26, 1927, Great Britain severed diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. and ended the 21 trade agreement, because of Soviet treaty breaches and failure to abstain from propaganda. (Nov. 5, 1929, Great Britain resumed diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.)</td></tr><tr><td>May 26, 1942</td><td>Mutual Assistance Pact between the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain. This pact was a joint alliance against Germany providing for immediate support in case of attack. It was a mutual assistance pact against Germany which was to endure for 20 years - thereafter being subject to abrogation provided that one of the contracting parties gave 12 months notice of its intention to terminate the treaty.</td><td>May 7, 1955, the U.S.S.R. unilaterally abrogated this pact. This action was one aspect of a Soviet campaign to prevent the ratification of the Paris Agreements which ended the occupation of West Germany and brought the newly formed Federal Republic into NATO. -- Soviet note to Britain in Dec. 1954 contained warning that their alliance would be annulled if the Paris agreements were ratified.</td></tr></tbody></table>

GERMANY

Concerning control machinery of Germany. Germany not a signatory.
The U.S.A., U.S.S.R., and the U.K. signed this agreement on the
control machinery in Germany. This agreement, also included the
Provisional Government of the French Republic.

<table><thead><tr><th>Date</th><th>Terms</th><th>Violation</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>May 1, 1945</td><td>1. "Supreme Authority in Germany will be exercised, on instruction from their respective Governments, by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the U.S.A., the U.K., and the U.S.S.R. (and) the Provisional Government of the French Republic, each in its own zone of occupation, and also jointly, in matters affecting Germany as a whole, in their capacity as members of the supreme organization of control constituted under the present agreement.</td><td>1. March 20, 1948, the Soviet representative walked out of the Allied Control Council.<br>2. April 1, 1948, the U.S.S.R. imposed a rail and road restriction on Allied traffic to Berlin.<br>3. Nov. 27, 1959, the Government of the U.S.S.R. notified the Government of the U.S. that the Soviets regarded as null and void the May 1, 1945, agreement on Germany.</td></tr><tr><td></td><td>2. An Inter-allied Governing Authority (Konabdatura) consisting of three Commandants, one from each Power, appointed by their respective Commanders-in-Chief, will be established to direct jointly the administration of the Greater Berlin area. Each of the Commandants will serve in rotation, in the position of Chief Commandant, as head of the Inter-allied Governing Authority. (The Komandatura was originally provided for in the Sept. 12, 1944, agreement concerning the Zones of Occupation in Germany. Therefore, any violation of the May 1, 1945 agreement may be also considered a violation of the Sept. 12 agreements.)</td><td>1. In Berlin, the Communist controlled police of the Soviet sector refused to be opened by the legal controls authorized by the Allied Komandatura.<br>2. April 1, 1948, the U.S.S.R. imposed rail and road restrictions on Allied traffic to Berlin.<br>3. June 16, 1948, the Soviet representative left the Komandatura.<br>4. June 26, 1948, the U.S.S.R. imposed a total blockade of Berlin.<br>5. July 1, 1948, the Soviet Government announced that it did not intend to participate in any more meetings of the</td></tr></tbody></table>

Germany

2.

Date
***
Terms
***

Violation
***

Komandatura.

6. Berlin blockade. July 2, 1948 to
May 12, 1949.

7. Nov. 30, 1948, the German communists set up their own city Government in the Soviet sector of Berlin.

8. June, 1952, the Soviet-dominated East German and East Berlin authorities have introduced discrimination between the populations of the Soviet and Western sectors of Berlin on a wide scale. Their West Berliners have been barred from virtually all entry into the Soviet Zone even for the purpose of visiting property which they hold there. Virtually all movement across the boundary between the Western sectors and the Soviet Zone has been stopped and a variety of measures have been aimed at discouraging movement across the Soviet and Western sectors. There measures have included a ban on purchases by West Berliners in East Berlin; offering West Berlin workers employed in Soviet dominated enterprises the alternatives of dismissal or change of residence to the Soviet sector of the Zone; arbitrary seizure of West Berlin vehicles in the Soviet sector; interference with public transportation; and arrests, kidnappings, shootings and other acts of intimidation against West Berliners.

Germany--

3.

<table><thead><tr><th>Date</th><th>Terms</th><th>Violation</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>June 5, 1945</td><td>The U. S., U.S.S.R., Great Britain and France concluded a declaration regarding the Defeat of Germany and Assumption of Supreme Authority by Allied Powers.<br><br>1. Allied Powers to determine future boundaries of Germany.<br><br>2. All armed forces of Germany or under German control...equipped with weapons shall be completely disarmed.<br><br>3. Detachments of civil police to be armed with small arms only, for the maintenance of order and for guard duties, will be designated by the Allied Representatives.</td><td>9. Nov. 29, 1955, Maj. General, P.A. Donovan disclosed that the U.S.S.R. considered that the occupation of East Berlin was ended and that it was now a part of the German Democratic Republic.<br><br>10. Nov. 27, 1959, the U.S.S.R. announced that it considered that the May 1 agreement was null and void.<br><br>July 6, 1950, without concurrence of the United States, France or Great Britain, the Soviet-controlled government of Poland and Eastern Germany signed an agreement determining the German-Polish frontier. (Oder-Neisse)<br><br>Beginning in 1948, the Soviets built up a sizable "police force" in their zone, arming it with military-type weapons and having it trained by former German Army Officers. In 1954, 140,000 German military personnel were under arms in the Soviet Zone plus a police force of 100,000</td></tr></tbody></table>