COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INC.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE 58 EAST 68TH STREET
NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

February 16, 1955

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I am delighted you will be able to join us for the next meeting of our group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy which, as you know, will be held here at the Council on Monday, February 21st, at 5:15.

I am sending you herewith the following documents:

1. a list of the members of the group

2. the original outline of the material to be considered by the discussion group - This has been somewhat altered, but nevertheless will give you a general idea of what we intend to cover.

3. a background paper prepared by Carroll Wilson for the first meeting

4. a digest of the first and second meetings

5. a summary of the group's conclusions at the first two meetings prepared by Carroll Wilson

6. a digest of the third meeting

May I also add my apologies for the voluminousness of the pile.

At our next meeting on Monday, the following two subjects will be discussed:

1. What is the probable nature of the military establishment five years hence? Will nuclear weapons be so integrated into our armed forces that it will be impossible to fight any kind of war without using them? If this is the present trend, should it be and can it be reversed?

2. Is limited nuclear warfare a practical possibility? Does it automatically tend to spread geographically? Is there any clear-cut line between tactical and strategic use of nuclear weapons which we and the enemy could both observe?

General James McCormack will lead the discussion on the first topic and Mr. Frank Nash on the second. General Lemnitzer will attend as a special guest to add his comments. I look forward to seeing you Monday.

The Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy held its fourth meeting at the Harold Pratt House on Monday, February 21, 1955 at 5:30 p.m. Present were: Discussion Leaders Major General James McCormack Jr. and Frank C. Nash; Gordon Dean, Chairman; Carroll Wilson, Research Secretary; Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; Lloyd B. Berkner; William Diebold, Jr.; George S. Franklin, Jr.; N.E. Halaby; William Henderson; Joseph E. Johnson; Mervin J. Kelly; Henry A. Kissinger; General Lyman Lemnitzer; Paul H. Nitze; Frank Pace, Jr.; Don K. Price; I.I. Rabi; Henry Roberts; David Rockefeller; Henry deWolf Smyth; Shields Warren; and Arnold Wolfers.

Mr. Dean opened the meeting by mentioning several recent magazine articles which he felt would be of interest to the group. (A list of these references was sent to members of the group on March 2.) Mr. Dean suggested that future discussions might profitably concern two questions which had not been mentioned: the peace-time uses of atomic energy, and the effects of nuclear weapons on foreign policy in the European field.

He noted that General McCormack had agreed to give an outline of the effects of nuclear weapons on the military establishment, the degree of integration of these weapons with orthodox weapons, and the probable character of the armed forces five years hence. He also introduced to the group General Lemnitzer, who had kindly consented to make some remarks upon the same subjects from the Army's point of view.

## Future Fashions in Weapons

General McCormack said that, with the indulgence of the group, he preferred to talk in terms of a flexible time limit -- say from five to ten years in the future -- for reasons both of security and of clarity, it being difficult to forecast technical developments against a precise date.

He had a few *caveats* for the group before commencing his discussion. Because of the fact that his topic contained important chunks of the question: "Where does the U. S. go from here to preserve its future security?" he cautioned that there are no "right" answers. He noted that among the pitfalls is oversimplification, as happens, for example, when one tries to distinguish too sharply between air defense and the air offensive, and fails to take into account the enormous counter-air responsibilities of the latter. He cautioned also against confusing the potential of offensive air power with war plans for its employment. As a deterrent, its capabilities should be all-embracing; in actual operations, national strategy would dictate which among these capabilities would go into force.

He also wished to outline his biases before continuing. Being in the Air Force, he proposed to confine his remarks mainly to Air Force mission areas. Further, since he believes that the military situation is always dynamic, he considers that new weapons do not change the basic military problems greatly, but rather provide new ways of performing old jobs.

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As an example of what he meant he cited the use of missiles vs. the use of manned aircraft. The Matador does a particular type of job in the European defense structure, but does not replace manned fighter bombers. Nor, he added, is there any escape from using conventional aircraft during the foreseeable future in any area of operations: strategic, tactical or air defense. New weapons, then, mostly change the makeup of the combat inventory.

The future force structure can only be discussed in the abstract, for it is not possible to forecast the proportions of various weapons now under development which will eventually enter the fighting inventory, since the balance between alternative weapons depends upon many ad hoc decisions. But General McCormack felt that, within the period in question, atomic warheads will become available in all varieties and quantities to both sides.

Naturally Soviet requirements are different, but the only safe assumption is that the USSR will be able to manage comparable technical achievements.

Delivery systems can be roughly classified as long range strategic, air defense, and tactical. Long range delivery will be by jet aircraft cruising in the high subsonic ranges -- about Mach .95 -- which naturally forces defense weapons into the supersonic range, multiplying defense problems, including the problems of the Early Warning system. Some of the delivery planes will have supersonic characteristics for short periods over defended areas, combined with an economic cruising speed.

In the field of long range missiles, the early subsonic types have a real value both as weapons and reconnaissance mechanisms. As weapons, they add to the defensive problem, even if used only as decoys. Also, they may be used for information gathering with electronic and photographic innards. Under some conditions, the missiles can be expected to return to base. Even though their flight characteristics are similar to those of conventional aircraft they will complicate the defense picture.

During the latter part of the time period in question, manned aircraft and missiles with supersonic characteristics may be expected to enter the inventory, operating at speeds from Mach 2 to Mach 20 over target areas at altitudes of from 500 feet to 500 miles. The apex of this line of development is the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile, against which defense is difficult, but not impossible. The General stressed that, even if the Soviets produce an ICBM first, although it would be extremely distressing, they still would not have an automatic winning advantage, because early ballistic missiles cannot be depended upon for point targets, and because the offensive advantage would in any event depend on the total means of offense, giving proper credit for opposing defenses.

Nuclear propulsion for aircraft will give practically unlimited range, and is the perfect complement to high performance missiles. While, as he had noted, the ICBM alone cannot win wars, the General compared the future role of the nuclear aircraft as an observation and an offensive and defensive device to the traditional Navy concept of "The Ship On Station."

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General McCormack next outlined the probable defensive picture five to ten years hence. A "ground electronic environment" is on the way; the DEW system is progressing nicely. There are, however, many problems yet to be solved. Sea warning wings are expensive. The Arctic stations are difficult to man, supply, and monitor. Furthermore, adding a real kill potential to the DEW line will be a big job. The family of missiles will expand from the Nike now in use to a variety of ground and air launched missiles for numerous defensive roles.

The next generation of medium and long range all-weather manned interceptors will be supersonic, larger, and more costly. Part of the range of ADC is in the planes and missiles, and part in the base structure, which together, determine the requirements of the Air Force for defense. By the end of the time period in question, defense will be solid for Continental North America, with a meaningful warning and kill potential against aircraft and winged missiles, stretching from Japan to Norway.

Atomic warheads will be useful in air defense, although they raise problems in their use. They will increase the kill ratio because of the larger radius of destruction. Already, practice missiles with seeker heads are scoring misses from zero to 50 feet with good frequency, but problems of interception are increased at the long distances -- say 100 to 200 miles -- which are necessary against enemy forces using atomic weapons. Also, it must be recalled that other things being equal, a bomber in level flight has a performance advantage over an interceptor which must maneuver into striking position. The use of atomic warheads in defense should provide a part of the solution to the difficult problem raised by the ICBM.

General McCormack defined tactical air as "the Air Force under control of the theatre commander to serve the needs of the theatre." It is not "engaged" in the sense that SAC and ADC are. One plane can fill two potential roles. For instance, a tactical bomber in Europe aimed at the USSR, must be treated by the Kremlin planners as a part of this country's strategic potential, but the same plane can be shifted to a more local role either there or in any other theatre of operation. The tactical Air Force is nearly all jet driven. The major problem it faces is to keep ahead of Soviet defensive planes. It must become supersonic, although in actually attacking ground targets it would only use as high a speed as is sensible. The fighter bomber needs speed for survival in the air battle. Another problem is that of information gathering, where, considering the speed of modern battle, there is generally more information available than can be handled within the necessary limits of time. Automation must be applied to strike intelligence.

Missiles will take over those jobs which they can do better than conventional aircraft, such as strikes against stationary targets of some size. The base structure will remain complex and diverse. Generally speaking runways will be reduced in length. Bases for missiles may be mobile.

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All in all the military structure of the future will be changed in external appearance, as necessary to do the old jobs under new conditions. All the ingredients of the structure, from manned aircraft to ICBM will be included. A major planning problem is the discovery of the best combination of gadgets. This balance between weapons types is probably unnecessary for the group to discuss except as it bears upon the problem of keeping both the defensive and offensive arms ahead of Soviet abilities.

Not all types of Air Force uses depend to the same extent on atom armaments. Strategic forces will depend primarily upon atomic devices, since it would hardly make sense to employ these relatively few, very valuable delivery vehicles with other than the most efficient weapons available, especially considering the great distances involved and the problems of penetrating heavily defended areas. However, this reasoning does not apply in the same degree to fighter-bombers, tactical-bombers, or defensive planes, in which fire-control systems have been designed to make lesser weapons do the job in some cases, while providing for the use of nuclear weapons for cases where they are needed.

General McCormack had also been asked to consider whether or not the present trend toward integration of atomic devices into the Air Force's armament program can be reversed. He suggested that the real question is not one of reversing this trend, but rather of estimating whether or not conventional weapons can do the job required of the air arm under the terms of this country's commitments. He felt that in general, at least theoretically, the answer to this latter question could be "Yes," but noted that in order to fulfill security needs with only conventional weapons a very much higher force level than now exists or is contemplated would be necessary. As an example, he suggested that to do the same job without atomic devices, the air force of tomorrow would have to be of the order of the level of World War II forces, adjusted for the greater distances that would now be involved -- say 5 to 10 times the aircraft inventory now planned. Mr. Kelly added to this point that the weight of TNT places very great limits on non-nuclear forays, given the present size-limitations of the Air Force.

## Atoms and Armies

General Lemnitzer said that the question uppermost in the public and congressional mind concerning the army of tomorrow is "Why have an army if a new war will be atomic?" The General felt that the answer to this question is that regardless of the nature of any future war, there will be many tasks that can be done only by so-called conventional methods. He cited the recent operation in the Tachen area as an example. The Seventh Fleet was equipped with very modern devices against any eventuality, but before any operations were begun, conventional maneuvers were carried out with mine-sweepers and patrol planes. He suggested that this example is just another way of saying what the President said in his state-of-the-union message -- that this country must be prepared to fight any kind of a war, and that to prepare for one sort of war merely tempts the enemy to launch some other type of attack.

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The General felt that the need for a strong army arises implicitly from the defined object of fighting a war, which is to create a world situation after conflict more amenable than the world situation before conflict. Generally speaking, this object implies controlling masses of people on land, which can be done only through land-based forces. In fact, the use of atomic or other dramatic weapons against a power simply to "end" a war swiftly may produce a vacuum politically into which can rush some worse totalitarian power. When considered in this broader sense, World War II is certainly not over.

Changes in future armies will be in equipment, organization, and tactics, but there will be no change in the basic purposes of war. Currently, new organizational methods are being developed and tested at Forts Benning and Hood. After those changes which are now being considered have been stabilized, there will likely be no further changes within the 5-10 year period.

Atomic weapons force dispersion upon both sides in war, and this dispersed pattern determines tactics. The effect is to place a premium upon intelligence, speed, and quality of attack. The penalty of error is higher than before, measured both in wasted firepower for overlooked targets and casualties from over-concentration. While the last war employed linear battle lines, the pattern is now shifting to deeper lines with all vital units well dispersed within the command area. This deployment aggravates communication and mobility problems; the necessary swift assembly and departure of forces can be accomplished best with helicopters and tracked vehicles.

The larger number of small self-contained units into which the traditional division will be fractured will place a premium upon individual leadership, and what might be called "mobile-mindedness." The new philosophy of defense can be shown by comparing the conventional depth of a fighting line -- 5 to 10 miles -- with the 50 miles of penetration that the new line must be prepared to absorb.

Closer analysis of proposed all-A bomb wars shows other reasons for depending upon conventional forces to accomplish the desired aims. For one thing, targets of an appropriate size are not available to be atomized at all times and places. In Korea, for instance, there were only two good concentrations vulnerable to atomic attack; both of these Inchon and Pusan, were in United Nations hands. Also, while the defense against an ICBM may be difficult near target areas, the allied experience with V-bombs during the last war showed that the most forthright solution to the defensive problem is overrunning the launching sites with a land army.

General Lemnitzer stressed that to the extent that atomic devices are being integrated into the armaments program to the exclusion of "conventional" weapons, a mistake is being made. He pointed out that the army has tried to be prepared for any eventuality -- either military or political -- by designing weapons with an atomic capability such as the Honest John or the Corporal to fire missiles with any type of warhead.

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It had been stated that there were two good targets for atomic attack in Korea, both in US hands. Dr. Rabi wondered if in the course of the next five years such a situation were to recur whether or not the US would dare to present such tempting targets. He supposed not, and queried General Lemnitzer on the problems imposed upon supply systems by the required dispersal. The General suggested that the use of many small depots would solve the problem without too greatly reducing efficiency. He felt that certainly no fewer men would be required to do an adequate job than are required under a concentrated scheme, perhaps more might be needed. He also defined "small" as the number of men that command is willing to present as a target at any one time and place. Mr. Nitze recalled that some observers feel that any future war will be an atomic war because it is almost impossible to conceive of an army operating efficiently while so dispersed as to present only tasteful targets, at least without raising force requirements to an impossible level.

The Korean experience was explained further by General Lemnitzer. He noted that the concentrations of men and material could not have occurred at the high level it did if the enemy had had greater air power. As it was, the UN forces had a dispersal plan ready for swift action. Mr. Halaby wondered if such dispersal plans of the army could gain the necessary assistance from naval and air units, and it was suggested that they could. Mr. Berkner pointed out that dispersal is not the insurmountable problem that it seems at first glance, because there have been many technological innovations which make the task easier. General Lemnitzer agreed with this statement, but declined to estimate just how much of a job such a dispersal program might be, although he did state that a new division would be expected to hold an area three to five times larger than that held by a World War II division.

The problem of mass force being used against a dispersed battleline was raised by Mr. Johnson. General Lemnitzer replied that the nub of the new tactical plan is resiliency, and that under certain conditions of attack much land might be lost temporarily in return for a higher long-range goal. To Dr. Rabi's suggestion that this new scheme presupposes a higher quality of troops than is in reality available General Lemnitzer replied that he felt the quality of American troops is dependably high, but that steps must be taken to recognize and enlarge the number of men who meet the higher requirements of atomic war.

The first portion of the meeting ended with an exchange between General McCormack and Mr. Nash concerning the extent to which the present size limit of the Air Force literally forces use of atomic devises. Mr. Nash maintained that 137 wings cannot be expected to do an effective job without using the most efficient pay loads available. General McCormack reiterated that US aircraft will continue capable of using lesser weapons for situations where atomic weapons are not needed, but the cost would be fantastic to maintain the air power necessary for the US to meet its global commitments with an air arm restricted to using conventional firepower.

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Local War and the Bomb

Mr. Nash explained that he was going to behave as an advocate of the proposition: Given certain conditions it is possible for the US to conduct a local nuclear war without either being wiped out in the local area, or receiving a retaliatory strategic strike against this continent. He said that his consideration would bypass the complex question of military efficacy, and in addition to assuming that in the mythical local war in question targets of suitable size exist, he would assume that the USSR has a nuclear potential, and that in the event of war the number one enemy might be expected to respond with direct action in support of whatever local power had become engaged with the US.

Mr. Nash cited the President's remarks as reported in *The New York Times* of January 12, 1955, in which the Commander-In-Chief stated that the US would not normally use a nuclear weapon in a brush fire war, but warned that if force were employed against American interests this country could respond with light, mobile units. Mr. Nash continued that he could not conceive of nuclear weapons being used as a primary weapon in a local war, but he cautioned that no practical limit can be imposed upon what elements of power this country may choose to bring to bear against an enemy. There is no sharp line between strategic and tactical employment of devices, so he thought it best to use the terms "local" and "all out."

Now Mr. Dulles one year before, on January 12, 1954, had used the term "massive retaliation" in delineating US policy. As some observers have pointed out, the net impact of Mr. Dulles' term, and of his remarks about this country picking the place and time of future actions, had been to issue an ultimatum to the Kremlin in terms of an implied nuclear retaliation. Mr. Nash noted that Mr. Finletter had used such an argument even before 1954. To some extent the Dulles ultimatum was attuned to domestic political pressures requiring the GOP to take an obvious initiative in foreign policy. However, as Brodie had put it (see the list of articles in Council letter of March 2, 1955), these statements show no conscious move toward a quantitative limit on actions in wartime, and defense policy makes no sense without some such limit. For instance, if massive retaliation is to be the final policy, then the policies of domestic stockpiling and overseas NATO preparation are worse than useless. Mr. Nash stressed the contradiction implied by this observation.

He felt that some light might be shed on the problem by considering more closely the conditions which had led to the decision not to use atomic weapons in Korea. From his own experience with the Office of Research Operations in the Spring of 1954 he could state that there were indeed promising targets in red hands in Korea, but he felt that by the time the studies had been evaluated the tide of battle had turned sufficiently to eliminate the need for a decision. By that time Mr. Malik had gotten out his olive branch, and it had seemed wiser not to take the chance of getting a rather unspecific effect from a big bang, as seemed to be likely from the nature of the topography and troop locations, thus undercutting the psychological threat of atomic energy. However, Mr. Nash felt that if the situation had continued to deteriorate, the US would have used atomic bombs.

9

Formosa raises a slightly different set of issues. For instance, if there were clearly military targets on the mainland, and during the course of an attempted invasion of Formosa the Seventh Fleet were being harassed, would the solution be in using more conventional weapons or using nuclear weapons? Further, would the President be obliged to consult with US allies before moving? If the alternatives are use of a nuclear device, or heavy commitment of US ground forces, and if the allies refuse to condone a nuclear strike, then the President cannot accede to their wishes without giving up the American initiative to act in its own best interests.

On the other hand, if the USSR began to roll into Europe with conventional forces, the US could probably not resist with conventioaal weapons alone. Also, if the Soviet SAC were to launch a strike against this country certainly atomic devices would be employed as a measure of defense if warheads were available. One thing that the Korean situation had shown, however, is the importance placed upon the continued good will of this country's allies. During the period of decision about using atomic weapons in Korea, Mr. Attlee had flown to this country to express British opposition. Mr. Pearson had sided with Mr. Dulles in favor of massive retaliation, but the plea of the major US ally prevailed. Certainly this country could not try to employ a nuclear device without prior consultation with its allies unless the situation were so bad that annihilation was imminent.

There is the added factor of public reaction in this country, for if the Hydrogen bomb is viewed as a "horror weapon" domestic considerations may preclude its use. The current Russian drive for selective disarmament may build enough world pressure to force the US to agree to outlawing nuclear weapons. Mr. Nash called attention to the views of Col. R.S. Leghorn (also on the list of March 2nd) who insists that it is possible through refined techniques to strike military targets without jeopardizing innocent civilians, and who concludes from this reasoning that the US should oppose selective disarmament even if provision is made for effective enforcement. Mr. Nash added that the limits on outlets for strictly peaceful uses of atomic energy are such that a necessary corollary to disarmament would be cessation of production of fissionable materials.

If selective disarmament becomes a reality, is the US still superior to the USSR through its greater mobility, industrial potential, resources, etc? Mr. Nash again detected a contradiction between the policy of massive retaliation on one hand, and the present planning for full mobilization on the other, since the former is based upon a "quick" war, and the latter implies a long war with a period of extended buildup followed by attrition of the enemy.

At any rate, Mr. Nash observed that if any disarmament program is forthcoming with genuine safeguards, then he is convinced that world conditions will have been altered so radically (by a lifting of the iron curtain, for instance) that a general amelioration of frictions will produce full, not partial, disarmament. If no effective safeguards can be had, and if the US is not prepared morally to use massive retaliation, then the question arises as to whether or not the US can take the initiative in a local war.

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As Leghorn puts it, as long as the American public sees the result of a
nuclear bomb as another Nagasaki, then there can be no massive retaliation.
But if through technological means the city ceases to be a target inseper-
able from military targets, then the US nuclear potential can serve as a
real deterrent to war. Only in this way (according to Col. Leghorn) can
the US soothe its allies, fight neutralism throughout the world, and harness
its strength to a moral purpose.

Mr. Nash remarked that the US failure to use atomic weapons in Korea when the enemy was not in a position to retaliate, the propaganda claim that the bomb would be used only against Asians by the occident notwithstanding, had sacrificed an opportunity to prove that the weapon is not just a "nasty" device, which this country will never use. As far as one specific instance is concerned, if the Soviet Union were willing, the Communist Chinese might employ an atomic device in some future Formosan embroilment, although to do so the USSR would have to expect direct retaliation from the US. Certainly such examples raise important issues, and while there is no certain answer, Mr. Nash concluded that the use of nuclear weapons locally by either side is remote unless catastrophe threatens.

Mr. Wolfers said that he was worried by the assumption that a great
advantage accrues to the first person to use a nuclear device. He suggested
that it may be more prudent to limit the area of attack if by doing so the
extent of retaliatory suffering can also be limited. He also said that he
is not certain that the balance of vulnerabilities favors the US. But
General McCormack stated that American policy must not forego in advance any
sort of action, nor can it allow the Soviet Union to aggress in successive
gradual steps with impunity. The General continued that wars are limited
in terms of their objectives, not the weapons used therein. Therefore, the
use of nuclear weapons in a local area instead of massive retaliation might
signal this country's intention to contain a war, not to spread it.

That the Air Force is not prepared to fight a conventional war was implied by General McCormack, stated Mr. Wolfers. If nuclear war is going to be suicidal, than the dilemma becomes apparent. Mr. Wolfers noted further that he had understood General Lemnitzer to say that the Army is prepared to fight both kinds of war, so he asked General McCormack to comment. The General replied that there is in his opinion no necessity for a general suicidal war, noting that he has been the most cheerful member of the group in this regard. The preventive lies within our own hands, but the respon-
sibility rests with this country to make it plain to the Kremlin that the crushing weight of US atom-armed strategic vehicles will in any general war reward the folly of aggression.

Mr. Nitze concurred, but inquired about the war plans level of think-
ing. General McCormack said that of course the Air Force could fight in
local areas without recourse to atomic weapons as was the case in Korea.
Mr. Price thought that it would be more practical to determine if a local
war in which both sides utilized atomic weapons might be prevented from

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turning into a general war. Mr. Berkner opined that if both sides used
atomic weapons, then decision on the ground would be impossible, and one
side would have to revert to strategic use of the bomb. General Lemnitzer
felt that this conclusion is not supported by studies the Army has made.
Furthermore, he wished to reemphasize that the Army is not against the use
of atomic devices, but is prepared to use all the weapons in its arsenal
to advantage. He reiterated his belief that the final determination of any
war rests on controlling masses of people on the ground -- by ground forces.

Dr. Rabi noted that Japan seems to have been an exception to General Lemnitzer's rule, since it was bombed into surrender. The General replied that the Soviet Union is not an island empire that can be either starved or frightened into submission.

General McCormack expressed the view that it helps counterbalance
anxiety over the existence of atomic weapons to consider that the possession
of such weapons by the US has deterred general war for a number of years
and still allows us the luxury of talking about preventing both small and
big wars. Mr. Rockefeller suggested that the use of atomic devices for
tactical purposes would tend to evolve into their use for strategic pur-
poses, as he supposed that poison gas would have evolved if it had been
used during World War II. General McCormack still disliked the sharp
distinction between atomic and non-atomic war, and insisted that the limits
of war depend more upon objectives than upon weapons. Mr. Berkner, how-
ever, could not agree. In view of the present timbre of public opinion
this country could not avoid using atomic weapons to prevent a rout in
Formosa, in which case the war might grow; in fact the public mind might
very well be a factor making for expansion of the war. Mr. Nash suggested
that the sinking of a single US carrier might suffice. Differing with him,
Mr. Price felt that "national honor" plays a smaller part in policy deter-
minations today than before in history, so unless the sinking of a carrier
were interpreted clearly as an act intended to spread the war, the public
opinion might still restrain widening hostilities.

Mr. Kelly could not agree that if the US were losing Formosa -- which
has become a symbol of American intention to stay in Asia -- that the public
would tolerate action short of all-out war. Mr. Johnson noted that perhaps
the tendency of war is indeed to maximize, as Clausewitz had said.

Mr. Johnson wondered if the Hydrogen bomb is a good tactical weapon,
considering the effect that fall-out might have upon friendly troops and
civilians. General Lemnitzer felt that it is. Mr. Rockefeller wondered
then how any line can be drawn between tactical and strategic uses of the
bomb. Mr. Price agreed that a local war is no more likely to spread under
the influence of a nuclear attack than a conventional attack.

Mr. Franklin expressed a feeling of some comfort from the fact that
both Russia and the US had shown considerable restraint in the Korean war.
But Mr. Johnson speculated that if Korea had been lost to the Communists, and
Japan had been attacked, then the US would have reverted to its atomic ar-
senal to redress the balance. Mr. Kelly agreed, and added that this country's

April 12, 1955

TO MEMBERS OF THE STUDY GROUP ON
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY:

I am sending you herewith Mr. Marechal's digest of the
group's fourth meeting, held on February 21st.

As you know, the fifth meeting will be held here on
Tuesday, April 19th, at 5:15, with dinner at 7:00 and adjourn-
ment around 10 o'clock. Mr. Wilson will start off the meeting
by considering the problem of whether the defense forces of
five to ten years hence will be able to retain the capacity
to fight effectively with conventional weapons, and Mr. Finlet-
ter will discuss the political-military problems of U.S.
policy as applied to the Formosa situation, including the
question whether we can use tactical A-bombs without the like-
lihood of the war spreading both geographically and in the
nature of the weapons used.

If you have not already done so, please let me know
if we may expect you on the 19th.

Lorna Brennan
Administrative Secretary

Please call Mrs. Spiegelman
at LEhigh 5-3300.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

April 14, 1955

The sixth meeting of the group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy will be held here at the Council on Wednesday, May 4th, at 5:15. Dinner will be served as usual at 7:00, and the group will adjourn around 10:00.

At this meeting the group will continue the series of case studies which Mr. Finletter is beginning with Formosa at the next meeting on April 19th. The two areas to be discussed at the May 4th meeting are Western Europe and the Middle East. In the case of each area, the group will consider to what degree we would be dependent on nuclear weapons to block Russian forces. In the case of the Middle East, particularly, we shall discuss whether we would have to use massive retaliation by thermonuclear weapons, or whether tactical A-bombs would suffice. In the case of both areas, we shall consider what would be the likelihood of a war in which tactical A-bombs were employed spreading both geographically and in the size of the weapons used. In the case of Western Europe, we shall also consider to what extent the importance of German rearmament has been affected by the development of the new weapons. Professor Arnold Wolfers will lead the discussion on Western Europe. General James M. Gavin, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, will lead the discussion on the Near and Middle East, and General Richard Lindsay, Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, will be on hand to comment and give us the benefit of his views.

I hope very much you will be able to take part in this meeting, especially as it will be the last one this spring. Please let me know.

Messrs. Dean, Wilson and Franklin have all felt that the group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy has opened up a number of interesting questions which the Council should explore more thoroughly than is possible by the group method alone. The Council has therefore completed arrangements with Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Director of the International Seminar at Harvard and Editor of Confluence, to spend 15 months at the Council thinking through some of the problems raised in the group. While here, he will write a book on the subject, which we hope will be an important contribution. He will ask assistance from members of the group, both individually and collectively. You may have seen Mr. Kissinger's two most recent articles: "Military Policy and Defense of the 'Grey Areas';" in the April issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, and "American Policy and Preventive War," in the Spring 1955 issue of the YALE REVIEW.

The Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy held its fifth meeting at the Harold Pratt House on Tuesday, April 19, 1955 at 5:30 p.m. Present were: Thomas K. Finletter, Discussion Leader; Carroll L. Wilson, Chairman; Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; Hanson Baldwin, Lloyd B. Berkner; George S. Franklin, Jr.; N.E. Halaby; Mervin J. Kelly; Henry A. Kissinger; General Richard Lindsay; Colonel David Macdonald; Ben T. Moore; Charles P. Noyes II; James A. Perkins; Don K. Price; I.I. Rabi; Henry L. Roberts; David Rockefeller; Henry deWolf Smyth; Shields Warren; and Arnold Wolfers.

Mr. Wilson said that before taking up the topics before the group he would like to recall for a moment an important point from the last meeting, about which some questions have been raised. As he understands it, General McCormack made the point that, without nuclear fire power, the Air Force would need to be at least ten times as large as it now is, or as is contemplated in order to meet American commitments throughout the world. The General also felt that all planning assumed Air Force use of nuclear weapons. General Lemnitzer expressed the Army's viewpoint as one which maximizes technical ability and minimizes manpower requirements for defense. Mr. Wilson noted that, since the last meeting, President Eisenhower, when asked on March 16th whether or not the United States would ever use atomic weapons in a limited war, replied to the effect that if such weapons could be limited to strictly military targets, without involving civilians, then of course they would be used.

Mr. Franklin felt that, while the two generals seem to differ on the extent to which conventional weapons play a major role in the defense picture, both still maintain that the services are keeping up their ability to use solely conventional weapons. He wondered if others in the group had gotten the same understanding. Mr. Wilson felt that General McCormack's view is that officially the Air Force is prepared to use to the greatest advantage any or all weapons which may be available, but that personally the General seems to feel that the Air Force is becoming increasingly dependent upon its atomic devices. Mr. Kelly observed that both men seem to be saying that the job could be done either conventionally or atomically, but he also felt that General McCormack makes a personal reservation about the degree to which the extensive U.S. commitments increase the dependence upon the maximum weapon.

Mr. Baldwin stated that some people in a position to have qualified opinions believe that a defense of Quemoy and Matsu limited to conventional weapons would require six to ten times the air strength of a nuclear defense. Mr. Baldwin felt that a majority of the Joint Chiefs -- with General Ridgway dissenting -- believes that the islands are defensible only through the use of atomic weapons, a view with which Mr. Baldwin does not agree. The Air Force and the Navy are committed to this program more than the Army, but the land forces too will become increasingly dependent upon an atomic program if their manpower ceiling continues to be reduced and tactical atomic devices become more plentiful.

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Mr. Baldwin reported that in recent Army maneuvers the strength of an
infantry division was reduced from 18,500 men to 13,500. The experimental
battle order of these maneuvers provides for dispersion between battalions
and not within them; the experimental division is composed of seven battalions
instead of the conventional nine. Obviously, if this new battle plan based
on atomic necessities, is adopted, the ground forces will become more committed
to atomic weapons. Mr. Wilson suggested that if the Air Force depends upon
atomic devices and the Army depends upon conventional devices it is likely
that the Army will be forced to adopt a more nuclear-oriented plan. Mr.
Kelly felt, however, that the difference between the two services is the
result of normal time lag. He continued that the changed emphasis in the
last five years presages similar change in the next five years, but that this
trend toward dependence on atomic weapons might be reversed by moral and
political forces.

Mr. Baldwin detected somewhat more difference between the positions
of the Air Force and the Army. He suggested that the Army may feel, perhaps
"subconsciously," that increased use of the atom in war obviates the need
for an army, so, to protect itself, it tends to emphasize purely tactical
devices. He stressed that the political and psychological considerations may
be even more important determinants of policy than purely military feelings.
For instance, he suspected that the President would not elect to defend
Quemoy and Matsu with atomic bombs, even if that were the only way to insure
defense. Mr. Kelly admitted that there is considerable reluctance for this
country to be the first to use these weapons, but he felt that once the ice
is broken atomic tactical weapons could be used freely.

Mr. Halaby suggested that perhaps the Air Force is not prepared to
support the Army's conventional policies, either in terms of the logistical
movement of masses of men, or the pin-point bombing necessary to support
those men. He referred to the situation which might develop if the Troop
Carrier Command could not move an army geared to conventional warfare.

On this subject, Mr. Baldwin noted that TAC is developing a force of
medium and fighter bombers using either atomic or conventional weapons, and
suitable for engaging in a peripheral war, but that so far this development
has been limited to one wing, which is only half-full. Mr. Kelly observed
that from the development of small and large weapons are rather well balanced,
but he added that he is not in a position to know whether or not the appli-
cation of these developments is balanced.

Dr. Warren suggested that the nature of modern submarine warfare is a
deterrent to large-scale troop movement, but Mr. Baldwin felt that there
are suitable protective measures available. Mr. Halaby felt that anti-sub-
marine devices have been developed, but he doubted that they have become
operational. Mr. Baldwin was of the opinion, however, that some such devices
are in operation. Mr. Halaby also noted that the lead time of the Army's
military orders is as much as one-half again as long as that of the Air
Force, and that this production inertia may explain the apparent difference
in emphasis between the two services.

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Mr. Perkins felt that after the initial decision to use atomic devices each planning stage makes their use more inevitable. Mr. Baldwin noted that all the services seem to anticipate that a future war would consist of either all-out atomic action, or deep land penetration of the Soviet Union; in the war colleges there is no consideration given to peripheral war plans.

## Formosa and the Bomb

Mr. Finletter directed the attention of the group to the first of the area studies which had been suggested for the evening meeting: How does the political-military situation apply to Formosa, and can tactical weapons be used without spreading the area of the war or aggravating its seriousness within the area? (Before outlining the problem, Mr. Finletter paused to note that it is understood that anything said or not said by those in the Group who hold positions of responsibility in the government would not be construed as endorsement of any propositions set forth by the "amateurs" in the Group.)

Mr. Finletter enumerated some of the facts of the Formosan situation, noting that of course there is no absolute information on the intentions of Communist China and Russia in the area. He suggested that a consideration of the defense of Quemoy and Matsu -- without assistance of the American Air Force -- depends upon a number of unknown quantities:

1. The number, quality, and capability of the Nationalist troops, of which from one-fifth to one-fourth the total of 400,000 to 500,000 are reported to be on the off-shore islands.

2. The quality and location of the Communist troops, as well as their ability for transporting themselves across the five to ten miles of water.

3. The resources of the Nationalist navy and the US Seventh Fleet.

4. Communist air potential, including fuel supply, airfields, and logistic support.

On the last of these four points, he understood that there is a road and rail network as far as Fuchow, but not to Amoy, which must be supplied with material and food from coastal shipping. He noted that the Chinese are quite capable of having coolies transport gasoline in buckets, so the absence of elaborate supply mechanisms does not guarantee the Communists will not be able to supply themselves with jet fuel. Indications are that they possess enough landing fields to provide air superiority.

On the size of the Communist Air Force, one set of public figures lists 600 MIG 15 planes equipped with wing tanks which extend their range to include the entire Formosa area. There are some MIG 17 craft which have characteristics substantially equal to the American F 100 series fighter, that is, supersonic speed. Rumor has it that small quantities of the MIG 19 model are now in China. Bomber potential is based upon the IL 28, and the IL 32, the latter being a jet bomber with a radius of 1000 miles, considered as good as the Canberra.

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Mr. Wilson suggested that Mr. Finletter's presentation be suspended temporarily so that the group might discuss the purely military aspects of the situation. Mr. Baldwin said that, while it is not possible to estimate the Communists' strength with absolute accuracy, he personally feels that it has been over-estimated. He agreed that the Communists can supply their Air Force, and that there is evidence that they are stock-piling fuel, bombs, and artillery shells. Admittedly, the defenses of Matsu Island are of recent origin, probably existing in strength only since the evacuation of the Tachens, but those of Quemoy are substantially underground where heavy bombardment would be required to dislodge them. Of course, if the Communists were to overrun some of the lightly defended small islands, they would be able to intensify greatly the Nationalists' supply problem. At present there is one strip on Quemoy which can accommodate 47's, and seaplanes can land near Matsu, but these operations are risky, lying as they do within the range of Red artillery. Sea supply is subject to the hazard of mines, such as the magnetic mine used in Korea, and this might be particularly effective around the beaches of these islands, many of which are in shoal water. Mr. Baldwin surmised that the aim of the Communists is to wear down the defenders of the off-shore islands while keeping the islands themselves alive to serve as a lever with which to split the Western allies.

Mr. Baldwin continued that some observers in Washington think that the US Air Force could wipe out its Communist counterpart. General Ridgway has been quoted as saying that the beaches of these islands are too lightly defended, and that US troops would be needed to hold them. The Communists even without air superiority, could land on the beaches at night. Mr. Baldwin stated that it is possible that even with US air superiority the Communists might be able to overrun the islands in one huge night assault across the relatively short water barrier. He felt that if the United States collects to defend the islands it can do so without using the atom, but such a limitation presupposes a much greater air strength and the use of US ground troops. He noted that the majority in Washington agrees upon the need for tactical A-bombs to defend the islands properly.

In response to Mr. Noyes' question as to whether or not atomic bombs will be necessary to gain air superiority, Mr. Baldwin replied that the official answer is "yes," but that his personal answer is "no." He stressed however, that when plans are based upon the use of nuclear weapons, these weapons quickly become indispensable.

Mr. Baldwin noted that the figure of 600 MIG's is that number which could be concentrated on the off-shore islands. It has been reported that the USSR has delivered another 500 MIG's, but the location of these planes has not been made public. The strength of the Communist air arm would probably limit the use of Formosa to that of an advanced base, at least until the US could establish its own radar and supply network. While there is no radar on Formosa at present, with a proper installation plus anti-aircraft and fighter protection, the fields there could be kept in use. The IL 28 is difficult to intercept, but if it flies in low enough for accurate bombing it does become vulnerable. Okinawa is a usable staging area for air operations over Formosa.

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Mr. Wolfers asked about how important the Chinese industrial potential is to the problem of containing future Communist aggression in Korea, Indo-China, or other areas. Mr. Kelly observed that the Chinese potential, minus Soviet support, does not threaten the United States, and General Lindsay pointed out that communications are the key to Soviet support. Mr. Halaby wondered if a tactical A-bomb would be effective against a railroad, and General Lindsay replied that a direct hit on a railroad choke point would put the lines out of operation for one week. Mr. Halaby inquired about the use of nuclear weapons against troop concentrations, particularly at seaports. Mr. Baldwin noted that in view of the short distance over water from Amoy the garrison on Matsu must be able to withstand and repulse at least the first assault against it.

General Lindsay raised the question of what constitutes indication of an attack -- air attack, collections of junks, or increased artillery activity? Each of these might signal an attack, thus raising the problem of where and when to strike. All these are vulnerable to attack with the atomic weapons currently available to the Seventh Fleet. Mr. Baldwin noted that if the bomb were used against an enemy ship concentration, there would at least be no room for an accusation that America had atomized civilians; Mr. Halaby pointed out that this same line of thought applies to anti-aircraft use of atomic devices. Mr. Baldwin suggested that the likelihood of an atomic device spreading the war increases along the spectrum from anti-submarine use, to anti-aircraft use, to tactical use in Asia, to tactical use in Europe, the last of which would certainly result in all-out war. However, in ten years or so, when the balance of armaments may have altered, the war might spread, even from an attack on a Russian submarine.

## Political Aspects of the Formosa Problem

Following dinner, Mr. Finletter opened the session with a discussion of the political aspects of the Formosa problem. Mr. Finletter noted that the morale problem would be serious if it is true that the actions of this country had encouraged the Nationalists to arm Quemoy and Matsu, and now the US forced the Nationalists to withdraw. Such an action would have a bad effect, not only on the Nationalists, but on the twelve to twenty million Overseas Chinese, although he had also heard the contrary view that the Overseas Chinese would welcome a more moderate American position toward Formosa. He stressed that American emphasis on force in Asia, particularly without the benefit of allies or of specific treaty obligations might alienate the "hind of Asia." He contrasted the American actions in Korea, which had been "lawful," that is, under the aegis of the United Nations. Furthermore, US opinion seems to be against the use of troops in Asia, and no public official with the possible exception of the Vice-President has spoken in favor of such use. In Indo-China, the United States acted in a unilateral fashion, which appears to many Asians to have been mainly for the purpose of supporting French colonialism, and this action, coupled with this country's military emphasis, has destroyed much of the reserve of good will from the period of American anti-colonialism in the early twentieth century. He contrasted American policy in the Near East, which has shown profit by keeping "hands off" as much as possible. Mr. Dulles said in 1953 that the United States was rejecting the idea of a NATO-type organization in order to leave the initiative to the near-Eastern powers, and it might be said that this policy was rewarded by the Iranian and Iraqi defense of the United States at Bandung.

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Mr. Finletter outlined the history of the American position toward Formosa, which commenced with a lawful United Nations multilateral policy, and progressed through the Truman order of 1950 to the Seventh Fleet which was designed to preserve the integrity of Formosa until a peaceful conclusion of the war in Korea could permit a decision by the Big Four or the UN General Assembly. Later in 1950, a US note to the Soviet Union repeated the terms of the Japanese peace treaty, which included the rendering of certain islands such as Okinawa to a trusteeship under American administration, and the Japanese relinquishment of title to Formosa and the Pescadores without assigning that title. The problem remains as to exactly where the title rests. Presumably, it does not rest in the US alone, but in the forty-eight nations which signed the Japanese peace treaty, particularly nations of Southeast Asia and SEATO, which have the most direct interest in the area.

Mr. Finletter suggested that the best course of action for the United States--and he conceded that it might risk weakening the Nationalists' morale--could be to get the United Nations to accept responsibility for Formosa, and to return Quemoy and Matsu to the mainland government. He cautioned that immediate action was probably not possible along this line, and that the eventual disposition by the United Nations of Formosa should most properly depend upon a plebiscite. He noted that the Communist attitude toward the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores by the UN is hostile, but felt that this should not deter the US from delivering the matter to the UN. A more serious question is whether or not the Communists will negotiate with the United Nations. He observed that any negotiations between the United States and Communist China would have to be approved by the UN anyway, so eventually the recognition of the Peiping regime will become involved in the over-all settlement of the Asian crisis.

In response to a question by Mr. Wilson, Mr. Finletter said that he felt the Communists could not possibly take Formosa and the Pescadores by force even against a defense based upon conventional weapons alone. He considered the problem of Indo-China and indirect aggression, saying that he does not favor the use of arms by the United Nations except on request of the Asians, and upon a sound juridical basis. Talk of armed intervention tends to destroy the American political and moral advantage.

On the problem of the Overseas Chinese, Mr. Haskins observed from his personal experience that the Chinese in Indonesia are, first of all, an important segment of opinion, and secondly of two minds about the Nationalist government. It is easy to tell to which side allegiance is given. In Java storekeepers go so far as to hang out their signs in Nationalist or Communist colors; the two sides seem to be almost evenly divided, with no cross-link between them.

Mr. Kissinger queried whether we must restrict our policy in Southeast Asia by acting only with a juridical basis, as implied by Mr. Finletter. Under certain circumstances, he felt, this would mean that we tied our hands so that we could not prevent the area falling to Communist aggression. Mr. Altschul noted that if the other Asians feel about US policy toward Quemoy and Matsu in the same way that the European allies do, then this country risks losing Asian support also, particularly if defense of the islands depends upon using an atomic device. Mr. Berkner suggested that the Communist policy may be to try to force the US to use an atomic weapon against Asians to increase the power of Red China in Asia, and Mr. Finletter agreed that such an action on the part of this country would be a political asset for both China and Russia.

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Mr. Finletter continued that with the necessary preparations the UN could be able to act quickly in any emergency in Asia just as it did in the Korean crisis, but Mr. Baldwin pointed out that the Soviet Union had not been meeting with the Security Council at that time and would probably veto any such future action.

Mr. Halaby asked if a higher level of conventional armament must be substituted for the use of nuclear weapons if these are constrained. If the Asian embroglio leads to war with Russia the US will need overseas bases, or if a fight starts over Quemoy and Matsu it may involve a second front attack. This country must be willing to pay such a price if it seeks to continue its present policy.

Mr. Finletter cautioned against using an atomic bomb in a cause not shared by the mind of Asia, or the mind of the Grand Alliance. He hoped that the bomb will never need to be used, but he stressed the extreme danger of using it unilaterally. The United States must present to the world an appearance of urgently seeking peace; it is time to stop talking in terms of war.

Mr. Halaby cited what he termed the "agonizing anomaly" of a national policy which through budget limitations and strategic planning relies upon SAC in global terms, while persisting in a World War II strategy of island-hopping in Asian quarters.

Mr. Kelly doubted that the small islands have any value except for face saving for America and Chiang, and General Lindsay agreed that they have no military significance. However, it was pointed out that the islands do have importance as an index of American determination to stay in Asia, as well as an importance in sustaining the morale of Nationalist forces, which of course bears upon the quality of a defense of Formosa. General Lindsay conceded that the islands have some utility as observation posts, but he maintained that from the viewpoint of the defense of Formosa the islands can make no contribution. Mr. Perkins inquired if the islands might become a military liability, but General Lindsay felt that at least they could serve as some slight threat to Communist coastal shipping.

## Formosa and US Policy

Mr. Franilin reiterated the efficacy of exchanging evacuation of the islands for firm allied support on the defense of Formosa and the Pescadores. Mr. Wolfers noted that there are differences between the ways in which the Asians and Europeans see this situation. He felt that any "retreat" by the US might tend to lose the support of those Asians who are already in arms, but might gain the support of a much larger group from the neutralist camp -- the more than one billion persons of India, Burma, et al. -- as well as the forces of Europe. He added that for the first time in recent years nearly all factions of European politics are agreed on what the US should not do in Asia. He made the further point that if the US takes on China not only will it be fighting a nation of 600 million souls, but it risks either having the USSR enter the war directly, or else remain aloof with a clear field to tinker in Europe while the US is tied down in Asia.

Mr. Perkins wondered if the abandonment of Quemoy-Matsu would really enlist the support of Europe for a defense of Formosa from the Communists. Mr. Wolfers thought that it would, so long as the position is "regularized," but he added that a war for the sake of Chiang is always going to be unpopular.

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Mr. Wilson discussed the view held by many that once an atomic weapon is used, a war is almost certain to spread geographically and in terms of the weapons used, so that finally each side is attacking the home base of the other with thermonuclear bombs. He doubted that this was so. It takes a conscious decision to strike at the home base of another power, and the fact that immediate retaliation could be expected on one's own home base, is an exceedingly important deterrent. Mr. Wilson conceded, of course, that human beings do not always act rationally. Mr. Perkins noted that atomic devices raise a problem of survival, increasing with each tactical detonation the temptation to strike at the prime source of enemy power.

Mr. Berkner recalled the extent to which the Korean war was unique. It involved two halves of a relatively weak nation, and the US was prepared to act decisively. Therefore, the US could decide upon the Yalu as one boundary of the conflict. Perhaps the US still has the power to choose the boundaries of war, but as the enemy strength mounts this choice narrows. Mr. Wilson returned to his earlier suggestion that if, as Mr. Berkner suggested, the polar powers become more evenly matched by 1957-8 the situation would make for a deterrence to all-out war, as well as limiting the choice of boundaries in limited war. He noted that if the USSR responded to an American nuclear attack on the mainland with a bomb on Formosa, the conflict might either spread to all-out war, or be proclaimed a draw.

Mr. Smyth suggested that the Soviets care more for winning the mind of Asia than for bombing Formosa into submission, for there may be more military value to the USSR in the friendship of Southeast Asia than in any successful hostile action.

Mr. Altschul stated in sum that the US seems to be placing increasing reliance upon weapon systems which for political reasons it is growing reluctant to use.

Kelsey Marshal
Rapporteur

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Study Group on
<u>Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy</u>

Fifth Meeting

April 19, 1955

Thomas K. Finletter, Discussion Leader - Coudert Brothers
Carroll L. Wilson, Chairman - Metals and Controls Corporation
Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur - Columbia University

Frank Altschul - General American Investors Corporation

Hanson W. Baldwin - The New York Times

Lloyd V. Berkner - Associated Universities, Inc.

Robert Bowie - Department of State

George S. Franklin, Jr. - Council on Foreign Relations

N. E. Halaby - Associate of Laurance Rockefeller

Mervin J. Kelly - Bell Telephone Laboratories

Henry A. Kissinger - Harvard University

General Richard Lindsay - United States Air Force

Colonel David Macdonald - Air War College

Ben T. Moore - Council on Foreign Relations

Charles P. Noyes II - Rockefeller Brothers Fund

James A. Perkins - Carnegie Corporation of New York

Don K. Price - The Ford Foundation

I. I. Rabi - Columbia University

Henry L. Roberts - Council on Foreign Relations

David Rockefeller - Chase Manhattan Bank

Henry deWolf Smyth

Shields Warren - New England Deaconess Hospital

Arnold Wolfers - Yale University

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, I NC.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

April 29, 1955

Enclosed is Mr. Marechal's digest of the April 19th meeting, at which Mr. Finletter began the group's series of case studies by leading the discussion on Formosa.

As you know, the next meeting, which is the last one this spring, will be on Wednesday, May 4th, starting with tea at 5:15. Dinner will be served at 7:00, and discussion will go on until around 10:00. The two areas to be discussed are Western Europe and the Middle East. Professor Arnold Wolfers will lead the discussion on Western Europe; General James M. Gavin, Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, will lead the discussion on the Near and Middle East; and General Richard Lindsay, Director of Plans, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, will be at the meeting to comment and give the group the benefit of his views.

If you have not already done so, please let me know
whether or not to expect you on the 4th.

Please call Miss Taber
at LEhigh 5-3300

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Sixth Meeting

May 4, 1955

General James M. Gavin, Discussion Leader - Assistant Chief of Staff
for Operations

General Richard Lindsay, Discussion Leader - Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations

Arnold Wolfers, Discussion Leader - Yale University

Paul H. Nitze, Chairman - Foreign Service Educational Foundation

Carroll L. Wilson, Research Secretary - Metals and Controls Corporation

N. E. Halaby - Associate of Laurence Rockefeller

Caryl P. Haskins - Haskins Laboratories

Frank C. Nash - Nash, Ahern and Abell

Frank Pace, Jr. - General Dynamics Corporation

Don K. Price - Ford Foundation

General Walter Bedell Smith - American Machinery and Foundry, Inc.

Personal

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Not for publication**

# STUDY GROUP REPORTS

## NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Discussion Leaders: General James M. Gavin
General Richard Lindsay
Arnold Wolfers

Chairman: Paul H. Nitze
Research Secretary: Carroll L. Wilson
Rapporteur: Kelsey Marechal

Sixth Meeting

May 4, 1955

## Digest of Discussion

(This digest has not been edited by the participants).

## COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

58 EAST 68TH STREET

NEW YORK 21

The Study Group on Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy held its sixth meeting on May 4, 1955, at the Harold Pratt House. Present were: General James M. Gavin, Discussion Leader; General Richard Lindsay, discussion Leader; Arnold Wolfers, Discussion Leader; Paul Nitze, Chairman; Carroll L. Wilson, Research Secretary; Kelsey Marechal, Rapporteur; Frank Altschul; Hanson W. Baldwin; George S. Franklin, Jr.; Caryl P. Haskins; Col. William R. Kintner; Henry A. Kissinger; Ben T. Moore; Frank C. Nash; Charles B. Noyes II; Frank Pace, Jr.; Don K. Price; Henry L. Roberts; Shields Warren.

The meeting began with Mr. Kissinger giving the impressions he has gained from the meetings he has attended and various working papers of the group; he felt that so far there is a certain consensus on two general subjects: The nature of the military establishment in the near future, and the possibilities of preventing a limited nuclear war from spreading, either in area or power. On the first of these two subjects he felt that the trend of the meetings has been toward a belief that the US services are becoming increasingly dependent upon nuclear weapons in training, equipment, and planning. He noted that the Army does not support this theory fully, but even if this one service is able to retain its ability to use conventional weapons it may be forced to fall back upon the ultimate weapon, because the other services will not be in a position to give it sufficient logistic support. On the second of the two matters, he believed that the group tends to feel that the use of tactical atomic weapons in a limited war may be impossible because, not only is it difficult to draw a clean line between tactical and strategic uses, but also because no belligerent is likely to accept defeat until all his destructive resources have been brought to bear.

Mr. Kissinger discussed the concept of stalemate or at least nuclear potential as a deterrent force. He noted that such a policy must take into account the reactions of the enemy, for whom the temptation to make a surprise nuclear assault grows with his increased fear of this country's nuclear potential. He suggested that the calculus of forces depends not only on the relative strengths of two countries, but also upon their mutual power relationship. For example, the United States and the United Kingdom are in a position to pose a mutual nuclear threat to each other, but their destructive potential is neutralized by their long-standing friendship. Some states, which might be antagonistic toward the United States, are too weak to be in a position to do anything about it. Obviously, in the case of the United States and the Soviet Union, neither friendship nor a monopoly of power stand in the way of a collision of interest, so that there is a very real danger that Soviet fear of the American nuclear potential may lead the Kremlin to try to strike the first blow. Under such conditions it is a difficult necessity of the United States to inform the enemy that it has no intention of attacking, but this raises the question of how best to order the political scheme before commencing any necessary limited military operation so as to make it evident that this country's goals are limited.

Mr. Nitze did not agree that the consensus of the group is that the armed services are becoming unable to fight a conventional war. Mr. Altschul felt that it might be said that the experts in the group detect a tendency

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toward this condition of atom-dependence. Mr. Nitze suggested that, while the services still have a conventional ability of high order, some of their leaders seem to feel that non-nuclear methods may not be adequate to the tasks which had been outlined for the services to perform.

On the subject of guarantees against all-out war, Mr. Nitze posed the question of whether or not the US can rely upon any Soviet pronouncements. It is also a problem as to whether or not, given its current biases, the Soviet Union would want to rely upon US statements. It seems evident then that any guarantees must be in the nature of a course of action which limits in fact the goals of this country. Mr. Nitze continued that it is most easy to speak of limited objectives when one is using limited means to attain them, and Mr. Kissinger agreed that if any brush fire war were to be fought without nuclear weapons it stands a better chance of staying a limited war. He suggested that there are many ways in which this country might demonstrate its limited objectives, such as by gaining an obvious military superiority in a particular situation, and then making gratuitous political concessions. Mr. Nitze noted that this problem tends to run over into the areas of arms limitations and regulations, and Mr. Altschul suggested that there is a very real basis for doubting that any rules will hold in modern war. Mr. Nitze recalled that it had been possible in Korea to agree upon certain rules and restraints, but Mr. Noyes cautioned against the dangers of unilateral limitations, and General Lindsay agreed that while the United States might follow the rules the enemy might not.

Mr. Nitze suggested that if the object is to keep a limited nuclear war within bounds this might be done by either limiting one's own objectives, or by preventing the enemy from expanding the field of operations through greatly superior force. Mr. Kissinger reiterated that once a war becomes nuclear it is much harder to set any effective limits.

## Mr. Wolfers: A Limited War in Europe

Mr. Wolfers began by noting that many persons are skeptical about the possibilities of limiting a war, and that even recent attention to the problem of limitations has been on the assumption that, while a brush fire war might be limited, any conflict in Europe would commence World War III. He wished to review for the group the problem of whether or not a European war might also be limited.

The limits of a war may be in the objectives of either side, ranging from a simple desire to stop enemy aggression, to a demand for unconditional surrender. The area of a war can be limited also; however, in the case of Europe it is obvious that all major powers would be involved. Weapons systems can run the gamut from simple to all-out devices, but it is in the selection of targets that the greatest range of choices exists for controlling the nature of war. Mr. Wolfers suggested that targets might be divided into seven main groups in ascending order of their relation to all-out war. The first three are purely tactical targets: A) Military forces within the combat zone, B) targets necessary to insure air command over the combat zone which might include bases outside the zone, C) logistic and transportation targets immediately affecting the combat zone. The four remaining targets are of a more clearly strategic nature, including D) the enemy's nuclear power in being, such as air bases and bomb stockpiles, E) nuclear power

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potential -- the industries producing bombs or bombers. The last two clearly strategic targets, those of all-out war, are F) all other industries, and G) the urban population centers.

For the purposes of discussion, Mr. Wolfers wished to make certain assumptions. First of all, he assumed that the decisions on both sides would be essentially rational, although he noted that there are certain irrational elements which he wished to discuss later. In the nature of a war game, he postulated that 1) the Soviets would attack Europe, 2) at the start of hostilities a condition of nuclear parity would exist or, at least, the Soviet Union would possess substantial intercontinental nuclear striking power, 3) both sides are vulnerable to strategic attack, 4) the USSR would not initiate attacks on targets F and G, since it has great superiority in conventional weapons and would probably hope to limit the war to those areas where it has no such superiority, 5) because of this Soviet "conventional superiority" NATO forces would use atomic weapons at least for tactical purposes. He wished to postpone discussion of thermo-nuclear weapons, but noted that the fall-out problem makes them monstrous in densely populated Europe, and also that the largest weapon is most likely to be profitable for the country having the weakest delivery system.

Given the above assumptions, what targets would be available for atomic weapons? In the initial phase of the war the US would use tactical weapons in the combat zone against troop concentrations and air bases. It would also attack the bases of Soviet fighters outside the zone in order to obtain air superiority over the combat zone. There is great need to be selective in such operations because most of these primary targets would be in allied territory, and also because if the US attacks Soviet bases in-discriminately, Soviet forces might retaliate with attacks upon NATO port cities. In other words, it is to the interests of the US to try to restrict the size of the combat zone.

Strategic uses of nuclear weapons are not so clear-cut. Two major questions arise: Does any substantial military profit accrue to the nation that is first to use atomic weapons on strategic targets, and if they are so used: To what extent are they advantageous? If the United States initiates this phase of the war it would be against the bases of the Soviet SAC. While it is not a reasonable expectation that one blow could knock out SUSAC it might under certain conditions be worth the risk of retaliation to try to gain the great advantage of at least a temporary monopoly of nuclear striking force. No matter which country strikes first, however, it seems certain that the USSR cannot destroy SAC, while it is conceivable that the US might destroy SUSAC. Given a certain amount of dispersion and a high level of strength it might be said that the country to get in the second blow has almost as great an opportunity for damaging its enemy as the initiator of the attack. The United States would expand the attack to include the enemy's nuclear production facilities only if it were certain that the US has a sufficient stock of planes and bombs to suffice for ultimate victory, for the USSR would certainly retaliate against American productive facilities. Never, except in retaliation, would the US strike at targets F and G, for it must seek to win the objectives of war without self-destruction. It would make no sense for the United States to sacrifice its cities and fifty million of its citizens just because it could inflict comparable damage on the Soviet Union.

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Also if both countries sustained crippling atomic blows the Soviet Union would have the long-run advantage of its large land army and its proximity to Western Europe.

In the second phase, there are two possibilities. First assumption is that the Soviet armies are retreating but the war is not won. The farther the combat zone is pushed eastward into the Soviet Union the greater becomes the advantage to the US of tactical atomic warfare. Therefore, it is wise policy in this case for the US to carry on prolonged war ending perhaps in a negociated peace, instead of switching to the suicidal alternative of exchanging blows on targets F and G. The second possibility is that the Soviets will be pushing the NATO forces out of Europe. Under such conditions even the recourse to attacks on F and G might not end the war in our favor. It would be to the advantage of the United States in this situation to trade space for time while keeping its strategic retaliatory power in readiness. Continued peripheral strategy would be preferable to attacks on F and G. It follows then that in all cases the United States should avoid initiating attacks on F and G, with the likelihood that this restraint will induce the USSR to use similar restraint.

Irrational factors which might upset these calculations apply probably less to the Kremlin hierarchy, which tends to be insulated from emotional elements, than to us. The Moscow leaders still have their prejudices, however their prejudice is likely to be toward dependence upon conventional land forces. In the end phase of a war if the USSR were near defeat its leaders might arrive at the Hitlerian conclusion to seek to drag the victors down with them; the offer of reasonable peace terms instead of a demand for unconditional surrender could prevent such a disaster. Certain irrational elements might be introduced by our Allies out of resentment if they alone suffered atomic damage while the US and USSR went unscathed; however the main problem would seem to lie on the Potomac. Both the Congress and popular opinion are forces to be reckoned with by the military planners, but Mr. Wolfers doubted that many people in this country would demand attacks on F and G if they knew there was a clear chance that American cities would be bombed in return. Fear of bombs falling on the United States might go so far as to prevent SAC from being used at all. Mr. Wolfers hoped that emotional domestic forces might be kept in balance so as to allow the military minds to make rational decisions. He felt that the military would act rationally in matters of target selection. For a time, during the period of US atomic monopoly, some Air Force planners seemed to think in terms of destroying everything in sight, but he felt that the Air Force, too, has come to the realization that it must be selective in its target choices.

Mr. Wolfers concluded that if the Soviet Union initiates any of the possible phases of nuclear warfare the US will retaliate in kind. If during a war the US should obtain a virtual monopoly of atomic weapons it would use it for the quickest attainment of reasonable objectives. However, under conditions of atomic parity it would not initiate blows at F and G at all, but try to get an acceptable compromise. Therefore, if this reasoning is correct, the United States will continue to need a superior and well protected SAC, and other forces skilled in the use of tactical A-bombs.

General Lindsay wished to clarify the extent to which fall-out limits the uses of hydrogen weapons. He noted that since fall-out varies inversely

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with the distance of the fireball from the ground it need not always be an obstacle to the use of hydrogen weapons, which are also being developed now in more efficient sizes. Mr. Wolfers felt that it is still not to the best interest of the United States to introduce a weapon the use of which gives comparative advantage to the nation with the weakest delivery system. In reply to Mr. Noyes, General Lindsay stated that there is a distinct difference between atomic and hydrogen weapons, but Mr. Noyes minimized this distinction by noting that nearly all of the targets in the world are vulnerable to a 500 KT bomb.

General Gavin explained that the use of various weapons must be properly related to the economy of weapons resources. This country could refrain from using big weapons if the small ones can do the job, and to illustrate the advantage of such restraint General Gavin pointed to the increasing importance of fissionable materials in the air defense picture. If in the near future surface-to-air and air-to-air uses of atomic devices surpass air-to-ground by five to ten times, then it is easy to see the importance of atomic frugality.

General Lindsay observed that there might be exceptions to this rule of limiting the size of the blast. For instance, a thermonuclear weapon used against an air base can deny its use to the enemy for a much longer period than a small atomic device, so that if a base is in a remote area it may be preferable to use the larger weapon. Of course, if an air base is in a densely populated area, the better policy may be to use a smaller weapon and plan for re-attack.

General Lindsay wished to make a few remarks about the idea of a "short war." He noted that many Air Force men seem to have been thinking in terms of a very short all-out war, quite unlike the type of war envisaged by Mr. Wolfers. However, these Air Force planners are coming to the realization that they must be prepared for a long war and, without ignoring the use of ultimate weapons, must retain the ability to use all sorts of devices for either offensive or defensive purposes.

Mr. Franklin proposed that the perfection of an ICBM would change the order of progression of the steps in Mr. Wolfers outline since the enemy's major strategic striking force would no longer be concentrated at air bases, but would be scattered over many launching sites, some of them perhaps in population centers. Mr. Wolfers agreed that these targets might be hard to find, particularly if they are portable; in such case, the United States would direct its attention against the productive facilities for the ICBM. General Lindsay felt that because of control problems and other technical difficulties, it will be a long time before the ICBM is used as anything but an auxiliary to conventional weapons.

Mr. Franklin noted the difficulty of discovering launching sites for ballistic missiles which might be used within the combat zone against troops. Mr. Wolfers observed that those sites in the zone or even over a larger area could be destroyed by atomic weapons without extending the combat zone indefinitely. Mr. Baldwin pointed out that air bases as they are known today may disappear entirely from the combat zone with the development of more accurate missiles and the perfection of vertical take-off fighters. This situation then would tempt the military to use its largest weapon against these dispersed targets. He also pointed out that it is difficult to differentiate tactical

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from strategic uses, for many of what seemed to be tactical targets are in
the midst of densely populated areas in Europe so that any bomb directed
against them becomes a strategic weapon as well; in Europe, therefore, any
use of the atom tends toward all-out war.

In response to Mr. Nash, Mr. Wolfers attempted to define the combat
zone. He agreed that theoretically planes could take off for tactical mis-
sions in Europe anywhere from the Urals to the East Coast of the United
States, but noted that it would be unusual for planes to be operated from
bases so distant from the actual center of operation. Since air control
depends largely upon fighters which have limited range, the actual area of
operations might be divided into several war theaters within the over-all
zone. Mr. Nitze felt that the distinction is more likely to be made between
targets than between areas, and Mr. Nash predicted that the combat zone would
cover the globe.

Mr. Wolfers recalled that during World War II the Allies had bombed
German cities not only to blanket production facilities with destruction,
but to undercut civilian morale. If Germany could have retaliated against
the Continental United States, however, the US might well have exercised
greater discrimination.

Mr. Baldwin felt that the situations in Asia and Europe are not compar-
able. An atomic device might be used in the Formosa Straits without broaden-
ing the scope of the war, but this would not be the case in Europe. Mr.
Wolfers agreed that any type of war over Europe would be destructive, but he
felt that there is no need to assume that the war zone would spread automati-
cally to encompass the entire world. Mr. Nitze agreed that there is no reason
to assume that massive retaliation would follow inevitably from the use of
atomic weapons in Europe. Mr. Wolfers noted that if the United States could
gain an atomic monopoly in some fashion, then of course it would be in a pos-
ition to use this monopoly to end the war quickly.

Mr. Nitze said that if it is true that the United States might be able
to wipe out SUSAC, then of course it could exploit the resulting atomic mono-
poly. He wondered if it is actually possible that either the US or the USSR
could gain such a monopoly, for if either side sees a way to do so it will
certainly try. Mr. Baldwin stressed that there are other delivery means
which must be considered in any evaluation of strategic potential.

Mr. Noyes wondered if the USSR would be tempted to strike at American
population centers; Mr. Altschul warned that whereas the United States would
not initiate such an attack, the Soviet Union does not display any such moral
inhibitions. Mr. Wolfers agreed that if the Soviets felt they could knock
out SAC by a surprise raid they would try to do so, but he said that in all
probability a single strike cannot end even this one part of a modern war.
Yet, Mr. Altschul stressed the seriousness of the problem that would be faced
by this country after an even partially successful Soviet attack. Mr. Wolfers
agreed that a round against this country's cities would tax its resources to
the limit; therefore, the US must not invite such an attack, Mr. Roberts noted
that the defense of cities is designed particularly to guard against the
irrational acts of the enemy.