TALKING POINTS FOR RECEPTION
FOR CHINESE GROUPS

Mr. Burnham, Mr. Blumenthal, Dr. Brown, Ambassador
Huang, members and friends of the Committees and the Council:

-- As your three organizations meet to review the past and assess the future of your work in constructing new channels of communication between the United States and the People's Republic of China, I am struck by the realization that this relationship, new though it is, already has a history.

-- Indeed, this hotel -- the name of which aptly recalls a long and difficult voyage which ultimately led to enduring, momentous consequences -- is now itself a part of that history. The success of your work is demonstrated by how strangely difficult it now is to recall or to account for the days of "pre-history" when our two countries were so unproductively estranged.

-- I am delighted to see Ambassador Huang Chen and many others of our Chinese friends here this evening, thus underlining our mutual desire for improved relations.

-- It is this common desire that brings me here this evening. This Administration has a firm commitment to the improvement of relations with the People's Republic of China.

- 2 -

-- Despite periodic accounts of supposed up's and down's in our bilateral relations, there should be no doubt in anyone's mind that from the U. S. point of view we remain firmly on course.

-- The normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China is a permanent feature and essential element in our foreign policy.

-- A primary task in the second term of any Administration is to leave an ongoing legacy to its successors. That is our purpose with respect to our relations with the PRC. The United States has and will continue to have a material interest in a peaceful and independent China.

-- In the time since the Shanghai Communique, your organizations and the counterpart organizations in China have begun to forge links between the two societies that inevitably must influence the character of, and the prospects for, the overall relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

-- You know as well as any that the essential differences between the social systems and foreign policies of our two countries complicate the job of developing communication.

- 3 -

-- You know that it would be unreasonable to expect a smooth and unchecked progression. Communication, at its best, as Samuel Butler said, "is like a painting, a compromise with impossibilities."

-- But the painting is taking shape. As a result of the commercial, scholarly, artistic and athletic exchanges conducted by your three organizations, some of our country's most talented and influential men and women have achieved a far greater understanding of the people of China and their goals.

-- Through this process of understanding, immeasurable strength has been added to a fundamental tenet of our policy: that the United States has and will continue to have a material interest in a peaceful and independent China.

-- You have our thanks and our continuing support. With you, we will go on seeking practical steps to promote trade and scholarly and cultural exchange on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

-- With you and our Chinese friends, we will make the Shanghai Communique a document of truly historic importance.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 117372

THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, I AM STRUCK BY THE FACT THAT THIS RELATIONSHIP, NEW AS IT IS, ALREADY HAS A HISTORY. INDEED, THIS HOTEL IS NOW ITSELF A PART OF THAT HISTORY, HAVING HOUSED THE DISTINGUISHED AMBASSADOR FROM THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA FOR NEARLY A YEAR.

THE SUCCESS OF YOUR WORK IS DEMONSTRATED BY HOW STRANGELY DIFFICULT-IT IS NOW TO RECALL OR TO ACCOUNT FOR THE DAYS

OF PRE-HISTORY WHEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES WERE SO UNPRODUCTIVELY ESTRANGED. I AM DELIGHTED TO SEE AMBASSADOR HUANG CHEN AND MANY OTHERS OF OUR CHINESE FRIENDS HERE THIS EVENING, THUS UNDERLINING OUR MUTUAL DESIRE FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS.

IT IS THIS COMMON DESIRE THAT BRINGS ME HERE THIS EVENING. THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS A FIRM COMMITMENT TO THE CONSTANT IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA. DESPITE PERIODIC ACCOUNTS OF SUPPOSED UPS AND DOWNS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT IN ANYONE'S MIND THAT, FROM THE UNITED STATES' POINT OF VIEW, WE REMAIN FIRMLY ON COURSE. THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS A PERMANENT AND ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN OUR FOREIGN POLICY.

A PRIMARY TASK IN THE SECOND TERM OF ANY ADMINISTRATION IS TO LEAVE AN ONGOING LEGACY TO ITS SUCCESSORS. THAT IS OUR PURPOSE WITH RESPECT TO OUR RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

THE UNITED STATES HAS, AND WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE, AN INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL, STRONG AND INDEPENDENT CHINA; AND NO POLICY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION HAS HAD GREATER BIPARTISAN SUPPORT THAN THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC. IN THE TIME SINCE THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, YOUR ORGANIZATIONS AND THE COUNTERPART ORGANIZATIONS IN CHINA HAVE BEGUN TO FORGE LINKS BETWEEN THE TWO SOCIETIES THAT INEVITABLY MUST INFLUENCE THE CHARACTER AND THE PROSPECTS OF THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 117372

YOU KNOW, AS WELL AS ANY, THAT THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND FOREIGN POLICIES OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES COMPLICATE THE JOB OF DEVELOPING COMMUNICATIONS. YOU KNOW THAT IT WOULD BE UNREASONABLE TO EXPECT A SMOOTH AND UNCHECKED PROGRESSION.

COMMUNICATION AT ITS BEST, AS SAMUEL BUTLER SAID, IS LIKE A PAINTING, A COMPROMISE WITH IMPOSSIBILITIES. BUT THE PAINTING IS TAKING SHAPE. AS A RESULT OF THE COMMERCIAL, SCHOLARLY, ARTISTIC AND ATHLETIC EXCHANGES CONDUCTED BY YOUR THREE ORGANIZATIONS, SOME OF OUR COUNTRY'S MOST TALENTED AND MOST INFLUENTIAL MEN AND WOMEN HAVE ACHIEVED A FAR GREATER UNDERSTANDING OF THE PEOPLE OF CHINA AND THEIR GOALS. THROUGH THIS PROCESS OF UNDERSTANDING,

IMMEASURABLE STRENGTH HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE FUNDAMENTAL TENET OF OUR POLICY: THAT THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH CHINA MUST CONTINUE, AND THAT THE AMERICAN INTEREST IN CLOSER TIES WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC IS FIRM.

YOU HAVE OUR THANKS AND OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT. WITH YOU, WE WILL GO ON SEEKING PRACTICAL STEPS TO PROMOTE TRADE AND SCHOLARLY AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY AND MUTUAL BENEFIT.

WITH YOU AND OUR CHINESE FRIENDS, WE WILL MAKE THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE A DOCUMENT OF TRULY HISTORIC IMPORTANCE.

THANK YOU VERY MUCH. END TEXT.

KISSINGER

UNCLASSIFIED

PRESS

[LC]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 4, 1974

NO. 234

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

JUNE 4, 1974

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs:

Let me begin by placing the Foreign Assistance Program within the
context of our larger foreign policy purposes, and the global situation in
which American must pursue its national interests.

The Assistance Program originated in a world so accustomed to Cold War
that even the most routine relations among nations were carried out in the
shadow of global confrontation. The history of the post war period was a
never ending effort to maintain the peace through crisis management.
Fundamental problems persist; but they no longer dominate the conduct of
all international relations.

It is now possible to envisage a peace sustained by the growing
realization on the part of all nations that they have a stake in stability
and that stability is ensured by acting from a sense of justice and
moderation. In such a world all nations would share the benefits of stability,
and all would have an incentive to maintain it through cooperation.

Americans have a vital stake in the realization of this prospect. In
a world made interdependent -- by nuclear weapons, instant communications
and a global economy -- Americans can preserve their security, their
values and their prosperity, only by nurturing the shoots of stability and
cooperation. Our policies are shaped to that purpose:

- First, because there is an unprecedented opportunity for American
diplomacy supported by Congress and the American people to make progress
on the central issues which have threatened world peace for the past
quarter century.

- Second, because of the progress we have made towards the resolution
of old issues -- in the Middle East, in Indochina, with the People's Republic
of China is only a beginning and would be sacrificed should we fail to
persevere;

- Third, because recent events, such as the energy crisis have made
us acutely aware that the problems of a global economy under stress --

For further information contact:

PR# 234

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rampant inflation, raw material shortages, the threat of mass starvation --
could lead to new forms of confrontation, and renewed tensions, with
unforeseen consequences for peace.

We in the United States cannot alone underwrite the success of the
quest to resolve old issues or alone persevere in the face of continuing
obstacles to peace. Nor can we assure that the imperative of cooperation
will overcome nations' temptation to pursue short-term advantage.

But it is equally clear that hopes for a peaceful, cooperative and
just international order can only be realized with the strong participation
of this nation.

Our assistance programs are crucial vehicles for that participation.
They are not handouts. They are not relics from the Cold War. Security
and economic assistance programs are essential instruments as we seek
to shape a cooperative international order that reflects our interests.

The foreign assistance and security proposals for FY 1975 include
programs for:

- strengthening the peace in the Middle East and Indochina;

- assisting the poorest nations and the poorest within nations;

- supporting the efforts of our friends to defend themselves;

- giving substance to our efforts to build a new partnership in this
hemisphere.

My recent intensive discussions in the Middle East, at the United
Nations Special Session and with the Latin America Foreign Ministers have
strengthened my conviction that this program is fundamental to the
achievement of our purposes as a nation.

The program comes before you at a time when attempts are being made
to divide the world anew -- between north and south, developed and develop-
ing, consumer and producer. The United States must demonstrate, through
the concrete expression of our concern which the assistance program
provides, that all nations can achieve their aspirations for development
and defense by a cooperative approach. As both the world's leader in
times of crisis and the world's largest exporter and importer of raw
materials, we have a clear responsibility and a clear self-interest to
address this challenge with vision, realism and compassion.

Our basic point is not that of the 1950's and 60's -- that raising
the living standards in individual countries will necessarily bring stability
and peace -- but to build a cooperative approach to the problems of
economic growth and security which concern all nations. When you study our
proposals, therefore, I ask that you remember that the basic philosophy
behind them is to promote cooperation and to prevent confrontation and
pressure on our ourselves, our friends and our allies.

The world can respond in one of two ways:

- It can choose the path of autarchy, of attempts to achieve
unilateral and bloc advantage. That road leads to economic stagnation,
and growing political tensions, which unravel the fabric of global security.

PR# 234

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-- Or it can choose the path of collaboration. A cooperative world will reflect the imperatives of technology and the necessities of economics. It will yield a secure peace.

Our diplomacy and our assistance programs are key elements needed to help the world travel the right path.

We will, of course, be available to your Committee further to define what we perceive as a common endeavor.

## Middle East

A substantial portion of this program -- $2.3 billion or about half -- is devoted to two areas -- the Middle East and Indochina. This focus reflects our past involvements and continuing interests and the importance to global stability that these regions represent.

In the Middle East we are witnessing one of the most arduous but also one of the most hopeful developments of the past generation. A lasting peace in this troubled area can only result from the decisions and actions of the parties directly involved. In previous years, the critical obstacle to that objective has been a deep lack of trust between Arabs and Israelis. Each side saw its vital interests in play with scant hope of compromise. For Israel the issue was survival and physical security; for the Arabs it was justice and sovereignty. And no third party was sufficiently trusted by both sides and willing to take the risks to help bring them together.

During recent months the first crucial steps have been taken to break this impasse. Thanks to the far-sighted views of key leaders in the region, and with the active role of the United States, we have seen important steps toward peace and the partial erosion of decades of hostility and mistrust among the parties.

This process has also involved major diplomatic changes. While we have maintained improvements in our relations with the Arab nations. Many of these countries have turned toward a moderate course, giving up exclusive reliance on a single outside power and increasingly prepared to focus on development rather than dispute.

These tendencies are in the interests of all peoples in the Middle East; they are in our own interest. We have an obligation to reinforce them. The program we are requesting is designed to further the momentum that the peace process has now acquired. It recognizes that a settlement in the Middle East requires that Israel be confident of its own security and that the Arabs be confident that their legitimate aspirations will be realized.

First the program would provide Israel with the assistance needed to maintain its own security, giving it resolve to persevere in the negotiations assured of its own strength and our support.

Second, it would give tangible expression to our new and fruitful relations with various Arab countries and encourage those seriously

PR# 234

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prepared to work for peace.

Third, it would foster the peaceful development of the area, reducing the incentives to violence and conflict and deepening the interest of all the peoples in cooperation.

More specifically, with this program we would:

- make available to Israel $350 million in grants and credits to enable it to continue purchasing vitally needed military equipment from the US and to relieve it of some of the burden of its onerous defense costs. This would be a significant demonstration of our steadfast support for Israel's security.

- extend to Jordan roughly $207 million in grants and credits both to enhance its security and to assist its economic development. This would strengthen Jordan's ability to hold to the course of moderation it has consistently followed in the Middle East;

- provide $250 million in economic assistance to Egypt. There has been a dramatic turn in Egyptian foreign policy. Egypt has made the bold decision to move from confrontation to negotiation as a means of resolving the Arab-Israel dispute. Its leaders have shown a desire to substitute friendship and trust in the US for the hostility and distrust which has so long divided us.

- make $100 million available in the form of a Special Requirements Fund to be able to seize opportunities to reinforce the peace process as we get further into negotiations. We would consult closely with Congress on the use of this money.

We have a vital stake in a lasting Mid-East settlement. We are asking Congress for the resources which will enhance our ability to play a constructive role in this process.

## Indochina

Now let me turn to Indochina. The Paris Agreement of 1973 brought:

- an honorable termination of direct American military involvement and the return of our prisoners;

- peace in Laos and a substantial reduction -- though unfortunately not an elimination -- of hostilities and casualties in Vietnam;

- a prevailing military balance of forces, despite the efforts of North Vietnam to upset the equilibrium; and

- a substantial lessening of the risk of confrontation among outside powers.

We have a moral obligation to persevere. It is rooted in the history of our involvement and the continuing efforts of our friends. Many Americans' lives were lost and much American treasure spent in Vietnam. Now our allies have assumed the direct responsibility for their own defense. We owe them the opportunity to achieve economic progress and political stability.

PR# 234

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Failure to sustain our purposes would have a corrosive effect on interests beyond the confines of Indochina. Our willingness to bear vastly reduced but still vital burdens in the area will influence other countries' assessment of our resolve and stamina. And renewed warfare in Vietnam could put renewed pressure on relationships we are developing with other interested powers.

Our immediate objective in Vietnam is to consolidate the gains for peace and stability I have already noted.

-- In economic assistance, our objective is the earliest possible development of a South Vietnamese economy which is self-sustaining.

-- In military assistance, we seek only to provide our friends with the minimum required to defend themselves and to deter a renewed North Vietnamese offensive.

The achievements of recent years may hinge on sums that are small in proportion to the total effort that has been made. Including the separate legislation for military aid, our total Vietnamese assistance request is about what we spent in a single month in 1968 at the height of US involvement.

We hope that in time, North Vietnam will recognize the futility of its efforts to win a victory of arms, and it will turn to political accommodation within the terms of the Paris Accords.

A stable military situation and eventual accommodation cannot be achieved if South Vietnam's economic problems are allowed to get out of hand. Our request for $750 million in economic and humanitarian assistance is essential to ward off that danger. In the past year, South Vietnam has experienced problems over which it had very little control--sharp decline in dollar revenue following the withdrawal of our troops, and world inflation:

-- at the peak of our involvement in the war, Vietnam's dollar earnings from US Government activities ranged between $350 and $400 million a year. Last year, following the withdrawal of US troops this figure dropped to just over $100 million.

-- at the same time, the costs of Vietnam's imports soared as global inflation boosted the prices of raw materials and semi-finished products.

South Vietnam has done an excellent job of adjusting to these challenges. It initiated a dramatic austerity program, increased tax collections, raised exports and dramatically cut imports. But its foreign exchange reserves have fallen dramatically.

Substantial assistance is still necessary. Our programs, however, are designed to do more than shore up the Vietnamese economy. They are shaped to nurture Vietnam's capacity for self support by:

PR#234

-- stimulating reconstruction and development;

-- returning refugees to productive lives and;

-- helping the Vietnamese to defend themselves.

The country has made good use of our assistance. By August 1 we will submit to Congress a five year projection which will reflect our expectation of a gradually declining US role.

We are also seeking $362.5 million in military assistance and $110 million in reconstruction funds for the Khmer Republic. The Cambodians are fighting for their survival against forces aided and advised by the North Vietnamese. The country's economy has been shattered and the level of combat is intense. The people have paid a heavy price. A negotiated settlement of this war is the only responsible outcome. The Government of the Khmer Republic has consistently affirmed its desire for a peaceful settlement through direct negotiations with its adversaries.

In Laos, a ceasefire has been achieved and the process of political accommodation begun. The country is shifting from war to rehabilitation and reconstruction. The $142 million assistance package we are seeking will help it to carry out that transition.

## Development Assistance

The development assistance package before you has been importantly shaped by this Committee to focus on food, education and population programs. We offer it at a time when relations between developed and developing nations, and among developing nations themselves, are in rapid flux.

The energy problem symbolizes this change--the dangers of confrontation between developed and developing nations, the severe plight of the poorest nations, as well as the potential for new forms of mutually beneficial cooperation. No nation has an interest in prices that set off an inflationary spiral and economic recession which reduces income for all. For example, the price of fertilizer has risen in direct proportion to the price of oil, putting it beyond the reach of many of the poorest nations and thus contributing to worldwide food shortages.

Confrontation can only drive prices up, production down and nations apart. It will corrode the structure of global stability and peace.

Thus consumers and producers, developed and developing, must join in meeting the challenges of global economic interdependence -- not by creating restrictive blocs but by seeking higher levels of income and production for all nations, not by attempting to achieve unilateral advantage but by meeting the legitimate aspirations and interests of all people.

A nation's foreign policy must be rooted in its most basic beliefs. The economic assistance program of the United States is a faithful expression of our moral values. It reflects the humanitarian dimension of the American character. Our people could not be fulfilled by a foreign policy devoid of concern for the survival of the 800 million people who

PR# 234

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must exist on less than thirty cents a day.

Assistance also is a device by which we pursue our national interest.
The programs we are proposing will place us in a better position:

-- to enlist the developing nations' cooperation in sustaining an open
global economy;

-- to promote a long-term balance between demand for goods and their
supply; and

-- to be responsive to the concerns of countries and areas of importance
to us.

The United States must pursue a comprehensive approach to our
relations with the developing nations. Both aid and trade can play a major
part:

-- The Development assistance program reflects Congressional priorities; long-term food, population and education programs. It places particular emphasis on helping developing nations increase their agricultural production. $675 million would be spent for that purpose.

--Another crucial source of assistance is the International Development
Association, which concentrates on the needs of the poorest. American's
share of IDA funding has been significantly reduced as other nations
have increased their contributions. But failure to contribute our share
now would unravel the whole fabric of multilateral assistance. I urge
the House to follow the Senate and approve our $1.5 billion request for
the US share of IDA's fourth replenishment -- Developing nations meet
more of their foreign exchange needs through trade rather than aid.
Congressional passage of the Administration's trade bill would be a crucial
contribution to the development process. The bill contains our request for
authority to grant generalized tariff preferences which are of major
economic and political significance to the developing nations.

Security Assistance

Let me say a word about our security assistance programs apart from
those in Indochina and the Middle East. While our programs in those two
areas demand our greatest attention in terms of resources, we must still
buttress the security of friends in other parts of the world.

We cannot claim that nations have achieved the capacity for self-
defense when they have not. Political and economic development can only
take place in a more secure world.

Our military assistance programs and our foreign military sales credits
help build such a world. These programs have been modified to encourage
nations to bear the primary burden for their own defense. As a result,
countries are meeting more of their defense requirements through their own
resources. But in specific situations, grant assistance must continue to
play a major role. The bulk of this grant assistance, excluding
Indochina, is directed to Korea, Turkey and Thailand. In each we have
very substantial security interests. The rest of the program will provide

PR# 234

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modest amounts of materials and training to nations in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and East Asia.

We must provide adequate credit levels to our friends and allies as we reduce direct government assistance. The foreign military sales program promotes the self sufficiency we seek and our partners are pursuing.

## Latin America

We will consult further with Congress as our long-term approach to development and security assistance is more explicitly defined. But let me outline for you how our approach is taking shape in an area of special concern for us all -- Latin America.

The United States and the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are together forging a new association -- a new partnership. The initiative to create a new relationship came from Latin America. But our goal is now a common one: to make the global agenda of interdependence a program for cooperation in the Americas.

To help us towards that goal, the Administration: -- is seeking $345.6 million in bilateral economic assistance. Our $267.5 million in development programs will focus on food production, rural development, and development of human resources;

-- is asking $500 million to complete our share of the last replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank. This appropriation, originally authorized in 1972, would fulfill an agreement made more than four years ago, on which we are in arrears. The Bank is effectively promoting development and deserves our support.

-- is asking that the $150 million ceiling on credit arms sales be lifted. Latin America spends a smaller percentage of its total product on arms than any other developing area than any other developing area except Africa south of the Sahara. The credit limitation has not worked to discourage arms purchases. It has worked to reduce our, access, not the access of others, to governments in the area. It is, as well, unworthy of a relationship of equals;

-- finally, the generalized tariff preferences in the Administration's trade bill are of particular importance. I strongly urge that Congress consider them in light of our interest in seeing our partnership with Latin America grow on a basis of trade, not aid alone.

Let me conclude.

The past decade has been difficult. We witnessed the tragedy of assassination. We endured a long and costly war. We learned that our desire for a world which shared our institutions and prosperity was not matched by our ability to bring about such a world.

The impact of these events has been profound. But history is strewn with civilizations which interpreted the future only in the light of their fears. Victims of the past, they were blind to the opportunities and danger

PR# 234

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before them.

The assistance package before you has been designed with opportunity and risk very clearly in mind. The United States can make a decisive contribution to building a more cooperative, more peaceful, more stable order. The proposals we have put forth for your consideration are vital tools in this effort. They will allow us to reinforce peace where it is threatened and build cooperation where it is needed. Our security and our well-being require nothing less.

In your deliberations on our proposals I ask that you consider the world -- as it is and as it is becoming, and as it might be. I hope that you will then agree that a strong American commitment to assistance is vital to our interests and our values.

A successful American foreign policy cannot be the province of one branch of government or of one party. Only if it reflects the bipartisan support of the Congress and our people will American diplomacy have the required constancy of purpose.

I ask you to support this legislation because it is what the nation requires and because it is a worthy expression of Americans' purposes in the world.

* * * * * * * *

[LC]

NEWS
RELEASE

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Department of State
Office of Media Services

Press Conference:

SECRETARY KISSINGER ON SYRIAN-ISRAELI
DISENGAGEMENT, EUROPE, SALT

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

June 6, 1974

Press conference by Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger in the International
Conference Room of the Department
of State, June 6, 1974.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will go right to questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, I hope you don't mind if the first question won't be about the Middle East this time. But you see, sir, we won't meet with you before the Ottawa meeting of NATO. So I thought I should ask you about rumors, reports, that the first Declaration, NATO Declaration of Principles, might be ready, and, moreover, it might be initialled by you and your colleagues. Could you tell us, sir, what the situation is?

A Well, as has been reported in the press, the United Kingdom has submitted a redraft of the NATO Declaration as it stood at the time that work on the Declarations was suspended in March. This British draft is now being discussed in the NATO Council. And our impression is that good progress is being made. I don't want to predict whether it will be completed at the time of the Ottawa meeting. I would think, though, that the chances are good and that there is a possibility that it may be initialled in Ottawa.

Q Mr. Secretary, I won't disappoint you about the Middle East. I am wondering what role you foresee for the Soviet Union in the Middle East, assuming that the peace conference is successful and the situation is stabilized. The reason I ask is that about 3-1/2 years ago you were quoted as saying that your objective ultimately was to expel Russia from the Middle East. And I am wondering whether that is still your objective; and if so, whether you are on the brink of achieving it.

A As I remember that quotation, which was for background at the time -- (Laughter)

Q It was subsequently printed, though, as I recall, and attributed to you.

A That is correct. And I believe we were talking about expelling Soviet troops from Egypt. Obviously the Soviet Union is a major power with global interests. Obviously, the Middle East is an area of great concern to the Soviet Union. Therefore we have no intention, indeed we have no capability, of expelling Soviet influence from the Middle East. We do not believe that the influence of a country in the Middle East is directly related to who conducts a particular negotiation. As we know, as we go into the next phase of negotiations in the Middle East, which will certainly involve the Geneva forum in some manner, the Soviet Union participates in that as the Cochairman of the Geneva Conference. And in any event, whatever the Soviet role in a particular negotiation, there is no American intention of expelling the Soviet Union from the Middle East.

Q Mr. Secretary, in a court deposition, while you were away, John Ehrlichman swore that he sent for David Young to come to San Clemente on July 14, 1971, and that you objected to Young being assigned to the unit President Nixon, was creating to investigate the Ellsberg case, and that the next day the President decided to assign Young to the unit in a conversation with Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and yourself.

PR 237/19

Q In your appraisal, sir, overall, will the machinery for bringing peace to South Viet-Nam be achievable now?

A Well, the machinery for bringing peace to South Viet-Nam has not worked as well as one might have hoped. On the other hand, the level of military operations is substantially below what it was before the cease-fire, and, of course, the United States managed to disengage its forces without overthrowing a government with which it was allied.

Q Mr. Secretary, going to the Syrian disengagement agreement, did you make any promises to either side of economic aid or military aid as an inducement to enter into the agreement; and secondly, why should the United States get involved in large-scale economic aid for Arab countries when a number of the oil-rich Arab countries are having trouble finding places to invest their money?

A Every assurance that we have given to either side will be submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, as was the case in the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

With respect to economic aid, there was some misunderstanding of what I said in my testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee the other day. I did not mean to say that $100 million was earmarked for Syria. What I intended to say was that in our request to the Congress, there is a fund for special requirements of $100 million. Syria, together with other countries, would be eligible for support from that fund in the context of the implementation of the agreement and for purposes of economic reconstruction. This is not a commitment by the United States. And for that matter, Syria has not asked for it.

We have told Syria -- indeed, we have said so publicly -- that Syria would be eligible for support if the Congress approves that special requirements fund. And we have also pointed out to the Congress that before we appropriated any funds, or before we made any funds available from these special requirements, we would consult with the appropriate Members of Congress.

The relationship between economic aid and what oil-producing countries may want to give is, of course, a complicated issue. The United States will support reconstruction when we believe it serves our national interest and the cause of peace in the area. We believe that it will serve these objectives if Arab countries pursuing a moderate course can see that the United States takes an interest in their welfare and in their development. And in those conditions we will be prepared to consider requests from Syria as we have already submitted requests for Egypt.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you say something about your discussions with Senator Jackson on the question of MFN [Most-Favored-Nation] and how that's coming along?

A Well, as you know, Senator Jackson, Senator Ribicoff, Senator Javits, and I have met on several occasions. The last time was yesterday morning, for breakfast, in order to see whether a solution could be found to the related issue of MFN and Senator Jackson's concern with emigration problems.

We had a good talk, and we believe that some progress is being made. But I do not think I should go into the details until we have had some further discussion.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us why an arrangement was made so that Mrs. Meir could read parts of a private American assurance publicly to the Israeli Knesset concerning, I believe, the issue of terrorism?

And this particular assurance, while it might have been given to appropriate Members of the Congress, has still not been shared with the American public.

Could you tell us what, if any, arrangements were made concerning the American relationship to terrorism?

-4-

A Just a minute. I think you didn't state the situation correctly.

What Mrs. Meir read to the Knesset is the entire American assurance with
respect to terrorism, and there is no other part to that assurance.

And we chose this method because -- as you know having been there -- it was
an issue of very deep concern to the Israeli public, and because Mrs. Meir felt
that she had to explain why she accepted a slightly different wording in the
agreement with Syria than she had in the case of Egypt.

Obviously, the Members of Congress are aware of a public statement by the
United States and in my briefings before the Committees, I believe I made this
clear.

Q Mr. Secretary, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations
has carefully compiled a list of 170 Palestinian terrorists, of which all have
been either released -- at least, rather, a hundred of those have been released --
or never put to trial. And this harks back to the statement you made at a press
conference here last December, that the ones that murdered 16 in Rome would be
severely punished.

Now I'm just wondering, first of all: Were they -- have they been severely
punished?

And what makes you think they ever will be?

A If I said they would be severely punished -- I don't remember saying that --
but if I said it, it must have been an expression of a hope, because it is
certainly outside of our control, what the Italian courts will do to terrorists.

We are, of course, strongly opposed to terrorism in all points, and we hope --
we are convinced that it cannot be stamped out unless the government in whose
jurisdiction terrorism takes place, is prepared to take appropriate measures. So
our position has not changed.

Q Mr. Secretary, the next stage of the peace talks in the Middle East, which
you have mentioned -- you said there would be movement toward Geneva -- could you
tell us:

One, were any assurances given to the Syrians on further Israeli withdrawals
following the disengagement?

And two, what the U.S. position is on a role for the Palestinians as a
separate delegation in the peace conference?

A The issue of the Palestinians has not yet come to us. Our present position
is that the delegations at the Geneva peace conference were established at the
opening session.

As to what will happen in the next stage of the negotiations: The full record
is contained in the published agreement, the last paragraph of which states that
this disengagement agreement is not considered by either party as a final peace
agreement, but as a step toward fulfillment of resolution 338. This is the full
record. There is no other record.

Q Nothing beyond that --

A There is no other record.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you get any assurances that the Governments involved are
prepared to stamp out terrorism?

A We have stated our view, which is that the movement of terrorists -- that
armed attacks across the cease-fire line--would be inconsistent with the cease-fire.

The position of the Government toward terrorism has been repeatedly stated in
public. It is a very complicated issue and I have stated that our assurances with
respect to it are contained in the document that Mrs. Meir has read.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you --

A Just a minute --

-5-

Q Could you tell us what is the status at present of the bilateral negotiations on SALT II?

A The status of bilateral negotiations on SALT II is that we are still discussing with the Soviet Union some method by which the general approach, which the Soviet Union developed when I was in Moscow, can be reconciled with figures which we could consider.

We have not yet achieved a solution to this problem but we are continuing to discuss it.

Q Without going into details, Mr. Kissinger, could you tell us whether Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko has given you assurances on the question of emigration -- either in terms of an increase in numbers or a cessation of harassment of Soviet citizens of Jewish origin?

A I do not believe that any useful purpose would be served for me to go into -- to engage in a public discussion of Soviet emigration policies.

Q Mr. Secretary, on September 7th, 1973, you testified under oath before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in response to a question on your knowledge of David Young's activities, that you did not -- quote -- "know the David Young was concerned with internal security matters." -- end quote.

On February 6th, 1974, you testified under oath before the Senate Armed Services Committee -- quote -- "The next morning," -- and that would be December 23rd and 24th of '71, -- "I went to Mr. Erlichman's office and he placed a part of the tape of the interview with Admiral Welander conducted by David Young, which concerned the alleged theft of documents from my office by that Navy yeoman." -- end quote.

I wonder if you could:

(a) reconcile these two statements;

(b) tell us whether or not the Special Prosecutor or any other prosecutor or agency of the United States Government has contacted you with reference to a perjury investigation of the statements; and

(c) tell us whether or not you have consulted and retained counsel in preparation for a defense against a possible perjury indictment?

A I have not retained counsel, and I am not conducting my office as if it were a conspiracy.

I stand on the statements that I have made and I will answer no further questions on this topic.

Q Mr. Secretary, on that question -- what you have engaged in here -- it's been a matter of evasion and failure to recollect, and some other patterns that we've seen over a period of weeks through the Watergate period. I wonder why you cannot answer the direct question -- if you had any role in initiating the wiretaps on your subordinates.

A I testified for nine hours before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in which I explained in great detail the origin of the wiretapping -- my role with respect to the wiretapping. I did this in the presence of the then Attorney General, Elliot Richardson, on the basis of documents which were before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

That record is available for anybody to see.

And therefore, I do not believe it is appropriate to characterize my answers as evasive. I gave a full explanation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of the circumstances.

Q You still have not answered the direct question of whether you had a major role in initiating the wiretaps upon your subordinates. Did you go to John Mitchell? That's it, in a precise fashion.

-6-

A I stated in public that after the program was established, that I --
that my office supplied, for which I am responsible -- supplied the names of
individuals who had had access to documents and that some of those were
subsequently wiretapped.

Q Did you recommend that they be wiretapped? Can't you answer that direct question?

A I answered the question that I supplied those names --

Q Did you make those recommendations?

A I did not make a direct recommendation. But as Elliot Richardson pointed out, that in the context of the general program that existed, plus the supplying of the names, it led to the wiretapping of some individuals who had had access to the documents in question.

Q What kind of a recommendation was made?

A I think that this is a press conference and not a cross-examination.

Q Mr. Secretary, General Park Chong-hui, in South Korea, revoked entry visa to Miss Elizabeth Pond, Tokyo correspondent of the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR for her reporting of facts about political instability and general apprehension among the Koreans as to General Park's real intentions.

Such apprehension was heightened by the fact that the Christian leaders, students, and the pro-Western intellectuals who clamor for the return to a free, democratic society were arrested in a large scale, and are to be put on a show trial accusing them of conducting so-called Communist-inspired anti-Park demonstrations.

In view of the close association between the American and the Korean peoples, and the mutual aspirations of ideals of freedom and democracy, I wonder if you care to comment on the situation in South Korea today?

Secondly, would you work on [laughter] to have the visa revocation to Miss Elizabeth Pond lifted by the South Korean Government --?

A I frankly have not had a sufficient opportunity to study all the circumstances.

Q Mr. Secretary, the Government has carefully avoided discussing oil in connection with the present visit of Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia.

But yesterday in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee, John Sawhill publicly announced that oil was a major topic of discussion.

I wonder, with that in mind, if you could provide some more details about the relationship the United States envisages now with Saudi Arabia?

A I didn't see the testimony, but oil does not happen to be the main subject of discussion. In fact, oil is not formally on the agenda though obviously it is a subject on people's minds.

The major subjects on the agenda are technical cooperation between Saudi Arabia and the United States with respect to industrial development, scientific cooperation, technological help on such matters as solar energy and agricultural development, and some discussions on meeting the defense needs of Saudi Arabia.

The only discussions on oil matters that are on the agenda are a very brief review of the overall world energy situation and an exchange of opinions by both sides.

There is no negotiation going on on energy matters.

Q Are you planning any trips to South America or Latin America before the U.N. General Assembly, or otherwise -- do you plan two trips -- one before and one after -- before March, 1975?

-7-

A I am definitely planning a trip to Latin America before the next Latin American Foreign Ministers Conference in March, 1975. I doubt that I'll be planning one before the General Assembly.

Q Mr. Secretary, about the President's trip. There have been some misgivings expressed about the President going to the Middle East at this time, so soon after your disengagement agreement. Could you tell us what are the compelling reasons for that trip at this time?

A Our interests in the Middle East are composed, first, of making progress on the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations and second, to establish a new relationship between the United States and the countries in the area.

The success of the two disengagement negotiations has created conditions in which the long-term relationship between the United States and these Arab countries, as well as Israel, can be put on a new basis. It involves the judgment of all of the leaders in the area that this would be a most opportune time for the President to symbolize the American commitment to this new relationship -- to inaugurate it through conversations with leaders whom he has not had an opportunity, in some cases, to meet -- and in all cases, not to meet for a considerable period of time.

And it was the combination of these factors that induced the President to go on this trip.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, in connection with the forthcoming peace negotiations, what commitments or promises you have made to the governments of Egypt and Syria to bring about the withdrawal of Israeli forces from occupied territories?

A The only commitment that the United States has made is that it would maintain its efforts to bring about a just and permanent peace in the area. It has made no commitments as to any specific terms that might be negotiated. But we remain committed to making an effort to bring about a just and permanent peace.

Q Mr. Secretary, if there are still irreconcilable differences on SALT at this point, do you anticipate that there will be any agreement when you and the President do go to Moscow? And second, do you now anticipate that the Interim Agreement will be renewed?

A The Interim Agreement can be renewed only within the context of some other agreement on SALT. We would not renew the Interim Agreement by itself. And, therefore, your first question really supplies the answer to the second question. I do not know whether it is possible to achieve an agreement on SALT by the time of the Summit. And, obviously, if we do not there will not be an extension of the Interim Agreement. If there is no full agreement, it is conceivable that there might be some substantial progress.

We have always stated that SALT involves the basic national interest of the United States and also the basic security of the world, and we, therefore, will not rush negotiations in order to bring about -- because of an artificial deadline; nor will we refrain from making an agreement simply because it might be subject to misinterpretation. At this moment we are not ready to indicate that an agreement is possible.

Q Mr. Secretary, how do you see the relation now between the United States and Israel in view of the new relationship between the United States and a few Arab states like Syria and Egypt?

A Before the recent negotiations that have taken place in the Middle East, the Middle East was polarized between countries supported by the Soviet Union and Israel supported by the United States. This relationship had the advantage of simplicity. It also had the potential for explosion. And it was one of the factors that contributed to the outbreak of the October war and to the dangerous escalation which some of the diplomacy surrounding it involved.

We believe that the security of Israel, to which we remain committed, can best be assured in the context of a peace settlement in the Middle East and that this peace settlement, in turn, can be best produced if the United States is trusted by both parties. The United States friendship for Israel has not been diminished and will not be diminished as a result of its unceasing friendship for several of the Arab countries.

-8-

Q Mr. Secretary, in connection with the disengagement, what commitments has the United States made to assure, by surveillance or other means, that both sides abide by the agreement of the separation of forces?

A The military provisions of the agreement have been, by the request of the parties, kept on a classified basis. It is no secret that the United States has participated in some surveillance on the Egyptian-Israeli agreement, and it is safe to assume that similar measures will be taken in the case of the Syrian-Israeli agreement. And the precise details will be submitted to the appropriate Congressional committee.

Q Mr. Secretary, to follow an earlier question on the Palestinian delegation, would the United States oppose a separate seating for a Palestinian delegation at Geneva, since you said they are constituted already?

A That issue has not yet arisen.

Q Dr. Kissinger, has there been any contact between this country and the Palestinians?

A There has been no contact between this country and the Palestinians.

Yes Barry.

Q Further down the road, will you be retiring from the field of shuttle diplomacy? And what is the next participating stage of disengagement -- stage 2 Egypt, or stage 1, Jordan?

Q Question please, the question again.

A The question is will I be retiring from the field of shuttle diplomacy?

I certainly believe that the role that I played in the first two disengagement negotiations should not become the normal pattern of negotiations in the Middle East, whatever sorrow my presence here may bring to some of my associates. But that does not exclude that at some particularly critical point, at the request of the parties, I may not be prepared to help out. But as the normal pattern, I do not believe that I should be involved in the sort of activity that led to the Syrian disengagement as the regular pattern of negotiations.

What the next stage of the diplomacy will be I think we can see more clearly after we have had an opportunity to consult more fully with the parties in the area, and after they have had more of an opportunity to consult among each other.

Q Mr. Secretary, would you expect the new leaders of Israel to come soon to Washington to consult with you on the next stages?

A We have invited the new leaders of Israel to come to Washington. And the date of their visit is really for them to determine. They will always be welcome here.

Q A follow-up question, please, on the shuttle diplomacy. There was a big question raised, Mr. Secretary, about the efficacy of binding the American Secretary of State into that kind of pattern. I wonder if any of these criticisms have validity, in your opinion? If so, how do you evaluate your approach?

A I believe there is obviously some validity to these criticisms. On the other hand, one has to assess the allocation of one's time in relation to what other things one might be doing. The assessment that we made was that the Syrian-Israeli disengagement was so pivotal -- so much in the evolution of the Middle East depended on it -- that nothing more important could be done at that period.

It is also true that we did not think that it would take quite as long as it did take and that, once being embarked on it, we were very much impressed with the danger of the situation unraveling if we put in a pause.

So I would have to say that, as a general pattern, it is probably not a good idea for the Secretary to be away for 4-1/2 weeks. It's not a matter about which one should be doctrinaire, however. It depends on the importance of the exercise.

-9-

Q Mr. Secretary, at a couple of press conferences ago, you talked about the drift in Europe toward a unity not favorable to the United States; and you said that you'd want to support a unity in which there was an Atlantic tie and a unity that was organic. What's the substance of this Atlantic tie, and what does "organic" mean?

A The dialogue that developed last year between the United States and Europe took on an extremely legalistic cast, in which the form of negotiation became almost more important than the substance -- at least, to some of the participants in the debate. What we meant by "organic" was that, as a matter of course, the two sides of the Atlantic would consult with each other on matters that were considered of vital importance to each. We did not believe that the issue of consultation should be a matter of special dispensation but should be a natural evolution of the confidence that had developed between the two sides of the Atlantic.

Our objections to some of the tendencies which we thought had developed in Europe earlier this year were directed toward the tendency of some to define "European unity" entirely in opposition to the United States. However, I believe that events of recent months have clarified conditions enormously; that the spirit in which consultation is now taking place is much more spontaneous; and I believe that the debates of last spring served a very useful purpose in recalling each side of the Atlantic to fundamentals and creating the basis for a much more constructive relationship.

Q Mr. Secretary, may I ask two questions related to what you have already said. One is that you said some progress was being made, in response to a question about your meeting yesterday with the Senators. Some progress -- in which direction is it? From the Soviet Government, on the end of harassment or easing of restrictions; or, from the Senators, toward seeing the viewpoint of the Administration? That's A.

B -- may I go on? -- because I haven't had much of a chance to talk with you in the last 5 weeks. (Laughter.) With relation to the terrorism assurances that Israel has received, has the Syrian Government given you any assurance? -- which I'm not clear about. Two, why hasn't the United States undertaken a similar action, but with regard to Lebanon, where perhaps 99.99 percent of the terrorists come from?

A With respect to the first question, it was the consensus of all the participants at the breakfast yesterday morning that it would not serve the objectives that we all want if we engaged in a detailed public discussion of every aspect of the emigration question. Therefore, we would prefer to wait until some of the issues are further clarified and have achieved enough of a definition so that they're suitable for public discussion.

With respect to the issue of terrorism, we obviously had discussions on that subject with Syria. It would be totally contrary to any purpose that anybody may wish to achieve with respect to this to force a public disclosure of the content of these discussions -- which were entirely bilateral and reflected statements of American views on the subject.

With respect to other acts of terrorism from other territories, the United States has always stated its view that it regrets acts of terrorism from wherever they originate.

Q There are a couple of new governments in Europe, and I would like to ask you: Do you have plans, or does the President have plans, to personally take up contacts with some of the new leaders -- possibly in connection with one of his forthcoming travels?

A I have definite plans to take up contact with several of the European leaders; and the President also has some tentative plans, which have not yet matured.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the Indian nuclear explosion changed the balance of power in South Asia; and do you still plan to visit India at some later date?

-10-

A I do not believe that the Indian nuclear explosion changes the balance of power, though if India had asked our advice we would probably have not recommended it. But we do not believe it changes the balance of power since its resources will be relatively limited. Nevertheless, we are opposed to proliferation.

I have had to delay my trip to India not as a result of the nuclear explosion but as a result of the extension of the Syrian-Israeli disengagement talks; and I still plan to visit India in the relatively near future.

Mr Morgan?

Q Mr. Secretary, there have been repeated reports of various arrests -- and even atrocities -- in Chile. By the same token, the new Greek regime has not moved rapidly toward any new phase of democratization in that country. I wonder if you can comment on the state of our relationship with those two countries in the framework of the long-term stability or instability which this kind of regime offers.

A Our relations with other countries depend, in part, on the general interest we have strategically -- in part, on the impact these countries have in their particular region -- and, in part, on our moral approbation of the governments concerned.

We prefer -- obviously -- democratic governments; and wherever we have influence, we attempt to make it felt in that direction.

Obviously, we also would prefer governments that have a potentiality for stability, as well as progress, for their people. And to the extent that those conditions are not met, it means that all of our objectives in a particular area are not realized.

Q Mr. Secretary, what are the responsibilities of the United States if the Israeli-Syrian agreement were to start coming apart? And don't some of the things that you've already talked about make the United States, in effect, the guarantor of that agreement?

A The United States is not a guarantor of the agreement. Obviously, the United States, having played a central role in negotiating it, will, in normal conditions, be asked by the parties to interpret this or that clause of the agreement. But the United States has undertaken no commitment to guarantee the agreement and does not consider itself a guarantor of the agreement.

Q Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

PRESS

[LC]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

June 7, 1974

NO. 241

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

JUNE 7, 1974

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

In previous appearances before this Committee I have discussed the Middle East and Indochina, our relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and our desire to build an enduring structure of peace. The subject before us today -- the Foreign Assistance Program -- links, and is linked, to all of these issues. It symbolizes my conviction that the world political order perhaps for years to come will be profoundly influenced by the capacity this program provides for a major American contribution to a more just, peaceful and cooperative world.

We have in recent years witnessed a tendency to take peace for granted, to assume that our security is guaranteed, to believe that we could reduce our efforts to support American interests abroad. We have begun to take initial success for final achievement. This is a time of lessened tension, of greater equilibrium, of diffused power. But if the world is better than our earlier fears, it still falls far short of our hopes.

If we are to move toward a world where power blocs and balances are no longer relevant; where justice, not stability can be our overriding preoccupation; where countries consider cooperation in the world interest to be in their national interest, we must begin from the world as it is.

Thus the Assistance Program before you proceeds neither from future possibilities of stability and peace, nor from past illusions of unlimited American power and resources, but from present realities. It is neither a Cold War nor a Utopian scheme.

We confront a world in which:

-- The prospects for avoiding a return to confrontation with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China depend upon America's determination and ability to help resolve such sources of potential great power conflict as Indochina and the Middle East. Conversely, the progress we have made to date in these areas would have been inconceivable without the detente that now exists between ourselves and the Soviets, and ourselves and the PRC.

-- The prospects for lasting peace within Indochina and the Middle East depend upon America's capacity for constructive action, for main-

PR# 241

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taining the confidence of old friends and gaining the respect and trust
of nations too long alienated from us, and

-- The prospects for global stability and cooperation depend upon
America's contribution to overcoming the confrontation of energy and raw
material producers and consumers, the growing imbalance of food and
population, the surplus of despair and the the scarcity of physical
resources.

The fabric of international cooperation we are striving to weave is
delicate; it is made of many interrelated threads. We cannot hope for
peace if nations perceive the world order to be unjust. We cannot
preserve America's values and our property in a world of unrestrained
confrontation and unlimited competition.

Our economic assistance is designed to reinforce developing nations
efforts to bring a better life to their citizens, increasing their
stake in a cooperative global economy at a time when events threaten to
divide the world anew -- between North and South, developed and developing,
consumer and producer. Our security assistance is designed primarily to
help other strengthen the peace in areas where it is threatened, and to
provide a framework of cooperation that will prevent new threats from
emerging.

From this perspective it is possible to see these programs for what
they are -- not as "do good programs" but as the vital tools through
which we help build an international climate conducive to American
interests.

-- If detente fails now, it will have the most profound consequence
not just for the remainder of this Administration but for the next decade.

-- If we miss the unprecedented opportunites for peace in the Middle
East and Indochina that now exist, they will not soon return.

-- If we fail to manage the growing pains of an interdependent
world, we risk a return to the autarchic polices of the Thirties --
policies which led to a collapse of world order.

Against this background, let me describe our approach to each of the
principal elements of the program we have proposed to the Congress:

## Middle East

Let me begin with the Middle East.

America has a vital stake in a lasting Mid-East settlement. Our
traditional concern for the security of Israel, our transformed relations
with the Arab states, the danger of great power confrontation which
chronic Arab-Israeli conflict creates, and the necessity for a cooperative
approach to the energy problem -- all demonstrate the American interest.
We are asking Congress for sufficient resources to make it possible for
us to play a constructive role.

PR# 241

At the end of October here is what we faced. The Arab world was convinced that the United States was one-sidedly supporting Israel, and that there was a basic hostility between American objectives and Arab objectives. Our relations with Europe and Japan were under severe strain because of the emerging oil problem and pressures for a rapid Middle East settlement. The Soviet Union was the principal friend of the Arab countries, and Israel was concerned about its future.

This process has also involved major diplomatic changes. While we have maintained our steady support of Israel, we have also moved toward fundamental improvements in our relations with the Arab nations. Many of these countries have turned toward a moderate course, giving up exclusive reliance on a single outside power and increasingly prepared to focus on development rather than dispute.

This is in the interests of all peoples in the Middle East; it is clearly in our own interest. The program we are requesting is designed to further the momentum that the peace process has now acquired. It recognizes that a settlement in the Middle East requires that Israel be confident of its own security, and that the Arabs be confident that their legitimate aspirations can be realized.

The program we propose would provide Israel with the assistance needed to maintain its own security, strengthening its resolve to persevere in the negotiations assured of its own strength and our support.

It would give tangible expression to our new and fruitful relations with various Arab countries and encourage those seriously prepared to work for peace.

It would foster the peaceful development of the area, reducing the incentives to violence and conflict and deepening the interest of all the area's peoples in cooperation.

More specifically with the program -- which we regard as a package -- we would:

-- make available to Israel $350 million in grants and credits to enable it to continue purchasing vitally needed military equipment from the US and to relieve it of some of the burden of its onerous defense costs. This would be a significant demonstration of our steadfast support for Israel's security.

-- extend to Jordan roughly $207 million in grants and credits both to enhance its security and to assist its economic development. This would strengthen Jordan's ability to hold to the course of moderation it has consistently followed in the Middle East;

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-- provide $250 million in economic assistance to Egypt. There has been a dramatic turn in Egyptian foreign policy. Egypt has made the bold decision to move from confrontation to negotiation as a means of resolving the Arab-Israel dispute. Its leaders have shown a desire to substitute friendship and trust in the US for the hostility and distrust which has so long divided us.

-- make $100 million available in the form of a Special Requirements Fund to be used to reinforce the peace process as we get further into negotiations. We would consult closely with Congress on the use of this money.

In short, we have both opportunity and responsibility in the Middle East. Opportunity to reach the goal of the negotiated peace that is so vital to world peace and that has so long eluded us. Responsibility to assist those countries in the area which have accepted that goal and which need our help in reaching it. We hope that you will be able to act swiftly on these proposals, both to signal the support of the US Congress for our policies in the Middle East and to enable us to act rapidly with funding.

## Indochina

Now let me turn to Indochina.

An American foreign policy once almost totally preoccupied with one country -- Vietnam -- now addresses broader concerns. But we must not forget what is needed to sustain that situation. A concerted effort was required to reach the present equilibrium in Vietnam. A concerted effort is still required to move toward a lasting peace.

This Administration devoted its first four years to building South Vietnam's capacity for self-defense and eliminating our direct military involvement. In our second four years, we are pursuing a program which is building South Vietnam's capacity for self-sufficiency, a program designed to eventually reduce our economic and security assistance.

By August 1, we will submit to Congress a five-year projection for Cambodia and Laos. We will submit similar projections for Cambodia and Laos.

But two decades of gradually increasing economic dependence on the United States cannot be ended in one year or two without the most serious consequences for the Vietnamese people -- and for ourselves. As we learned in Europe following World War II, no nation, even one at complete peace, can make that rapid a transition.

We have a moral obligation to persevere. It is rooted in the history of our involvement and the continuing efforts of our friends. There is no escaping the fact that many American lives were lost and much American treasure spent in Vietnam. Now South Vietnam has assured the direct responsibility for their own defense. We owe the Vietnamese people the chance to succeed.

Failure to sustain our purposes would have a corrosive effect on interests beyond the confines of Indochina. Renewed warfare in Vietnam

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-- In economic assistance, our objective is the earliest possible development of a South Vietnamese economy which is self-sustaining;

We hope that in time North Vietnam will recognize the futility of its efforts to win a victory of arms, and will turn to political accommodation within the terms of the Paris Accords.

A stable military situation and eventual accommodation cannot be achieved if South Vietnam's economic problems are allowed to get out of hand. Our request for $750 million in economic and humanitarian assistance is essential to ward off that danger. In the past year, South Vietnam has experienced problems over which it has very little control -- a sharp decline in dollar revenue following the withdrawal of our troops, and world inflation.

South Vietnam has done an excellent job of adjusting to these challenges. It initiated a dramatic austerity program, increased tax collections, raised exports and dramatically cut imports. But its foreign exchange reserves have fallen severely.

Substantial assistance is still necessary. Our programs, however, are designed to do more than shore up the Vietnamese economy. They are shaped to nature Vietnam's capacity for self-support by:

-- returning refugees to productive lives; and

In the past, Vietnam has made good use of our assistance. We are confident they will do so in the future.

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We are also seeking $362.5 million in military assistance and $110 million in reconstruction funds for the Khmer Republic. The Cambodians are fighting for their survival against forces added and advised by the North Vietnamese. The country's economy has been shattered and the level of combat is intense. The people have paid a heavy price. The Government of the Khmer Republic has consistently affirmed its desire for a peaceful settlement through direct negotiations with its adversaries. Clearly, a negotiated settlement of this war is the only responsible outcome.

In Laos, a ceasefire has been achieved and the process of political accommodation begun. The country is shifting from war to rehabilitation and reconstruction. The $142 million assistance to rehabilitation and reconstruction. The $142 million assistance package we are seeking will help it to carry out that transition.

## Development Assistance

In development assistance we are responding to a new situation with a new program -- a program shaped in large measure by last year's Congressional mandate to focus on basic human needs. It is our purpose to give effect to the principles we have enunciated at the Washington Energy Conference, at the Special Session of the General Assembly, and at the recent meeting of the Organization of American States in Atlanta.

If we are to avoid the division of the world into confronting groups, it is essential that the United States possess the ability to give effect to its conviction that the improvement of conditions around the world, and the constructive use of resources, requires the joint effort of all nations.

The energy problems symbolizes this reality -- the dangers of confrontation between developed and developing nations, the severe plight of the poorest nations, as well as the potential for new forms of mutually beneficial cooperation. No nation has an interest in prices that set off an inflationary spiral and economic recession which reduces income for all. For example, the price of fertilizer has risen in direct proportion to the price of oil, putting it beyond the reach of many of the poorest nations and thus contributing to worldwide food shortages.

Thus consumers and producers, developed and developing, must join in meeting the challenges of global economic interdependence -- not by creating restrictive blocs but by seeking the legitimate aspirations and interests of all people.

A nation's foreign policy must be rooted in its most basic beliefs. The economic assistance program of the United States is a faithful expression of our moral values. It reflects the humanitarian dimension of the American character. Our people cannot be fulfilled by a foreign policy devoid of concern for the hunger, illiteracy and despair which still haunt so many of our fellow men.

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-- to be responsive to the concerns of countries and areas of impor-
tance to us.

We face two challenges:

-- The immediate problem is that the poorest, the 800 million people who subsist on 30 cents a day, have no means to pay the sharply higher prices for the fuel, food and fertilizer imports on which their survival depends. An urgent, generous and substantial program is required -- a program to which both the newly rich oil producers and traditional aid donors contribute. It would be unconscionable as mankind approaches the 21st century to allow a quarter of humanity to be overwhelmed.

-- The long-term challenge, on which man's ability to survive on this planet may depend, is to achieve a balance between food production and population growth. Since 1969 global production of cereals has not kept pace with world demand. As a result current reserves are at *their* lowest levels in 20 years. A significant crop failure today could bring major disaster in its wake.

All nations must join in meeting these challenges -- the resource
poor and the resource rich, the developed and the developing. Oil prices
are a major cause of the immediate crisis, so the oil producing nations
should make a generous contribution. Indeed, they are now considering
programs totalling $5-10 billion. Both the terms and the amounts of
these programs must match the magnitude of the problem.

The United States must also respond. We must contribute or other
nations will not. We must contribute or world population and food
imbalance will engulf us all in tradegy.

First, the Administration is considering urgent action America can
take to meet the short-term crisis caused by fuel, food and fertilizer
shortages. We commend members of this Committee for their thoughtful and
positive consideration of this problem.

Second, a long-term approach is required:

-- The development assistance program reflects Congressional
priorities: long-term food, population and education programs. It places
particular emphasis on helping developing nations increase their
agricultural production. $675 million would be spent for that purpose.

-- Another crucial source of assistance is the International Develop-
ment Association, which also concentrated on the needs of the poorest. We
are heartened that this Committee and the Senate support IDA and urge the

PR# 241

- 8 -

the entire Congress to approve our $1.5 billion request for the US share in IDA's fourth replenishment.

— Developing nations meet more of their foreign exchange needs through trade than aid. Congressional passage of the Administration's trade bill would be a crucial contribution to the development process. The bill contains our request for authority to grant generalized tariff preferences which are of major economic and political significance to the developing nations.

We wish to consult further with the Congress as both our short and long-term approaches are more explicitly defined.

## Security Assistance

Political and economic development can only take place in a more secure world. Thus security assistance is a necessary complement to our efforts to assist development.

As you know, we have greatly modified our security assistance programs in the past five years to encourage nations to bear the primary burden for their own defense. But in specific situations, grant assistance must continue to play a major role. The bulk of grant assistance, excluding Indochina, is directed to Korea, Turkey and Thailand. In each we have very substantial security interests. The rest of the program will provide modest amounts of materials and training to nations in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and East Asia.

And where we decrease grant assistance we should provide adequate credit to our friends and allies to enable them to purchase the arms they require. The foreign military sales program promotes the self-sufficiency we seek and our partners are pursuing.

## Latin America

If the technically advanced nations can ever cooperate with the developing nations, if people with similar aspirations but varying circumstances can ever achieve common goals, then it must start here in the Western Hemisphere.

But as Senator Mansfield wrote in his eloquent report on our meetings with the Latin American Foreign Ministers in Mexico City, "Too often, in recent years, rhetoric has substituted for reality in our dealings with the other American states. Too often, too, there has been surface cooperation but sub-surface confrontation between the United States and the nations to the South."

We launched at Mexico City a new search for partnership -- one founded on reality and not illusion. This Hemisphere reflects the great diversity of the developing world -- of nations only beginning to emerge from illiteracy, disease, grinding poverty, and nations already on the road of self-sustaining growth.

For our relations with the most advanced Latin American nations, trade is particularly important. I strongly urge the Congress to support the generalized tariff preferences contained in the Administration's trade bill.

PR #241

For the majority of our southern neighbors still requiring economic assistance, we ask that you provide:

-- $345.6 million in bilateral aid. Our $267.5 million in development programs will focus on food production, rural development, and development of human resources;

-- $500 million to complete our share of the last replenishment of the Inter-American Development Bank. This appropriation, originally authorized in 1972, would fulfill an agreement made more than four years ago, on which we are in arrears. The Bank is effectively promoting development and deserves our support.

We also request that the $150 million ceiling on credit arms sales be lifted. Latin America spends a smaller percentage of its total product on arms than any other developing area except Africa south of the Sahara. The credit limitation has not worked to discourage arms purchases. It has worked to reduce our access, not the access of others, to governments in the area. It is, as well, unworthy of a relationship of equals.

* * * * *

Mr. Chairman, the fundamental question before us is whether together the Executive and Legislative Branches can define and support an Assistance Program which will help:

-- create lasting peace in the Middle East and Indochina.

-- establish the basis for relationships of mutual restraint and respect with the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China.

-- bring into balance food production and population growth.

-- lower the burden on the United States by building other nations' capacity for self-development and self-defense.

It is my profound conviction that the Foreign Assistance Program before you makes a substantial contribution to these goals. Early Congressional action is urgently required to symbolize America's will to move decisively toward their achievement.

In a world shadowed by monstrous nuclear weapons, where global economics and global communications link the prosperity, the destiny and even the survival of all mankind, we can conceive of no alternative to a network of relations that remove the incentive for war and deepen the stake in peace. We believe very strongly that the central issue of our time is whether economic problems and political problems are going to be solved with a cooperative attitude, or through a process of confrontation.

If this is the reality, then obviously programs of foreign assistance are not handouts. They are done on behalf of an international order and

PR# 241

- 10 -

and on behalf of an approach to the solution of problems that is in all of
our interests, and very much in the American interest.

The burden Americans are being asked to bear is small -- less than
one percent of our national product. It is our lowest level in the
past quarter century.

But the question is not one of percentages or comparisons. Rather
we must ask whether what we are doing is adequate to meet the need, and
whether anything less would fulfill our purposes as a nation.

A renewed American commitment to assist development and defense
is essential. As we approach our 200th anniversary let us demonstrate
that the United States has gained the wisdom of maturity, not the
weariness of old age. As we consider our assistance programs, let
us ask not what we want to achieve this year or next, but what kind
of a world we want to shape for the remainder of this century.

***

Not for publication until
released by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee

JUNE 7, 1974

-2-

We confront a world in which:

- The prospects for lasting peace within Indochina and the Middle East depend upon American's capacity for constructive action, for maintaining the confidence of old friends and gaining the respect and trust of nations too long alienated from us, and

-3-

[LC]

The prospects for global stability and cooperation depend upon America's contribution to overcoming the confrontation of energy and raw material producers and consumers, the growing imbalance of food and population, the surplus of despair and the scarcity of physical resources.

The fabric of international cooperation we are striving to weave is delicate; it is made of many interrelated threads. We cannot hope for peace if nations perceive the world order to be unjust. We cannot preserve America's values and our prosperity in a world of unrestrained confrontation and unlimited competition.

Our economic assistance is designed to reinforce developing nations efforts to bring a better life to their citizens, increasing their stake in a cooperative global economy at a time when events threaten to divide the world anew -- between North and South, developed and developing, consumer and producer. Our security assistance is designed primarily to help others strengthen the peace in areas where it is threatened, and to provide a framework of cooperation that will prevent new threats from emerging.

If detente fails now, it will have the most profound consequences not just for the remainder of this Administration but for the next decade.

-4-

[cc]

-- If we miss the unprecedented opportunities for peace in the Middle East and Indochina that now exist, they will not soon return.

-- If we fail to manage the growing pains of an inter-dependent world, we risk a return to the autarchic policies of the Thirties -- policies which led to a collapse of world order.

## Middle East

America has a vital stake in a lasting Middle East settlement. Our traditional concern for the security of Israel, our transformed relations with the Arab states, the danger of great power confrontation which chronic Arab-Israeli conflict creates, and the necessity for a cooperative approach to the energy problem -- all demonstrate the American interest. We are asking Congress for sufficient resources to make it possible for us to play a constructive role.

-5-

-6-

More specifically with this program -- which we regard as a package -- we would:

In short, we have both opportunity and responsibility in the Middle East. Opportunity to reach the goal of the negotiated peace that is so vital to world peace and that has so long eluded us. Responsibility to assist those countries in the area which have accepted that goal and which need our help in reaching it. We hope that you will be able to act swiftly on these proposals, both to signal the support of the U.S. Congress for our policies in the Middle East and to enable us to act rapidly with funding.

## Indochina

Now let me turn to Indochina.

By August 1, we will submit to Congress a five-year pro-
jection which will reflect our expectation of a gradually
declining role in South Vietnam. We will submit similar pro-
jections for Cambodia and Laos.

[t]

In the past year, South Vietnam has experienced problems over which it had very little control -- a sharp decline in dollar revenue following the withdrawal of our troops, and world inflation:

-10-

self-support by:

We are also seeking $362.5 million in military assistance
and $110 million in reconstruction funds for the Khmer Republic.
The Cambodians are fighting for their survival against forces
aided and advised by the North Vietnamese. The country's
economy has been shattered and the level of combat is intense.
The people have paid a heavy price. The Government of the
Khmer Republic has consistently affirmed its desire for a
peaceful settlement through direct negotiations with its adver-
saries. Clearly, a negotiated settlement of this war is the
only responsible outcome.

Development Assistance

-11-

Thus consumers and producers, developed and developing,
must join in meeting the challenges of global economic inter-
dependence -- not by creating restrictive blocs but by seeking
higher levels of income and production for all nations, not by
attempting to achieve unilateral advantage but by meeting the
legitimate aspirations and interests of all people.

-12-

We face two challenges:

-- The immediate problem is that the poorest, the 800
million people who subsist on 30 cents a day, have no
means to pay the sharply higher prices for the fuel,
food and fertilizer imports on which their survival
depends. An urgent, generous and substantial program
is required -- a program to which both the newly rich
oil producers and traditional aid donors contribute.
It would be unconscionable as mankind approaches the
21st century to allow a quarter of humanity to be over-
whelmed.

-13-

balance between food production and population growth.
Since 1969 global production of cereals has not kept
pace with world demand. As a result current reserves
are at their lowest level in 20 years. A significant
crop failure today could bring major disaster in its
wake.

The United States must also respond. We must contribute
or other nations will not. We must contribute or world popula-
tion and food imbalances will engulf us all in tragedy.

The United States should pursue a comprehensive approach
to our relationship with the developing nations. Both aid and
trade can play a major part in meeting the two challenges we
face:

-14-

-- Another crucial source of assistance is the International Development Association, which also concentrates on the needs of the poorest. We are heartened that this Committee and the Senate support IDA and urge the entire Congress to approve our $1.5 billion request for the US share in IDA's fourth replenishment.

-- Developing nations meet more of their foreign exchange needs through trade than aid. Congressional passage of the Administration's trade bill would be a crucial contribution to the development process. The bill contains our request for authority to grant generalized tariff preferences which are of major economic and political significance to the developing nations.

We will wish to consult further with the Congress as both our short and long-term approaches are more explicitly defined.

## Security Assistance

-15-

the primary burden for their own defense. But in specific
situations, grant assistance must continue to play a major
role. The bulk of grant assistance, excluding Indochina, is
directed to Korea, Turkey and Thailand. In each we have very
substantial security interests. The rest of the program will
provide modest amounts of materials and training to nations in
Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and East Asia.

## Latin America

But as Senator Mansfield wrote in his eloquent report on
our meetings with the Latin American Foreign Ministers in
Mexico City, "Too often, in recent years, rhetoric has substi-
tuted for reality in our dealings with the other American states.
Too often, too, there has been surface cooperation but sub-surface
confrontation between the United States and the nations to the
South."

-16-

-17-

* * * * * * *

- avoid the division of the world into competing blocs of developed and developing nations.

-18-

If this is the reality, then obviously programs of foreign
assistance are not hand-outs. They are done on behalf of an
international order and on behalf of an approach to the solution
of problems that is in all of our interests, and very much in the
American interest.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 11, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Salzburg, Austria)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

CHVALIER HAUS
SALZBURG, AUSTRIA

AT 1:11 P.M. Salzburg Time

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I have requested this meeting as a result of the series of articles that have appeared growing out of my press conference last Thursday. I am speaking to you extemporaneously on the basis of my best recollection of events.

Last Thursday a number of you commented on the fact that I seemed irritated, angered, flustered, discombobulated. All these words are correct. After five weeks in the Middle East I was not thinking about the various investigations going on in the United States. I did not prepare myself for the press conference by reading the records of investigations that I believed had been completed.

I have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in public session, in executive session, and then at a closed meeting with Senator Sparkman and Senator Case, where at my request we went over each FBI report on the wiretap that existed. The meeting with Senators Sparkman and Case was also attended by Attorney General Richardson and Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus, who supplied what information they could from their records or their recollection.

Since that press conference there have been many articles and several editorials. I was prevented by the short time interval between the press conference and the President's departure from holding a press conference in the United States before we left.

However, I got in touch with Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Sunday, and I sent him the following letter yesterday morning which I will now read to you.

I repeat, I was informed when I was told about this system, that it was reinstituted, a system that had existed in previous administrations, even though it may have been administered from different offices. I was asked to have my office supply names in three categories: individuals who had adverse information in their security files, individuals who had had access to information that had leaked, and individuals whose names had appeared as a result of the investigation that submission of the previous two lists might entail.

My office, for which I bear full responsibility, submitted those named in carrying out this program. I would be prepared to let any appropriate investigative body examine the list to make certain that no name was submitted through my office that did not fit into one of these categories.

In submitting these names, we knew that an investigation was certain and that a wiretap was probable and I so testified in the Executive Session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, no matter how sentences are now taken out of context.

I testified both to Senator Cane and to Senator Muskie that in submitting the names we knew, of course, that a wiretap was a probable outcome. The basic issue is whether through my office or with my knowledge any names were submitted for any purpose other than the protection of national security and whether the information was used for any purpose other than the protection of national security.

When a wiretap was installed, the FBI would send a report to my office only when, in the judgment of the FBI, the conversation involved violations of national security. It is totally incorrect and outrageous to say that these tapes that were submitted to my office involved a description of extra-marital affairs or pornographic descriptions.

I do not know what the original logs show. The system that was followed in the operation of the national security wiretaps was, first of all, that no verbatim transcript was ever sent to my office. What was sent to my office was a page and a half: summary of conversations that seemed to the FBI to involve issues of national security. These memoranda were then screened in my office and if, in the judgment of those who screened the memoranda, they were of sufficient importance, they were shown to me.

MORE

(W)

When I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I was aware that my recollection of particular events differed in a few cases from the memorandum. I nevertheless submitted the memorandum pointing out, and I quote, "You have to remember, Senator Cane, I was one of those who strongly recommended that the report be given to the committee and that when there was a difference between my recollection and this report, I nevertheless decided to stick to my recollection."

There were three cases, all of which have now been leaked, of such differences, each of which I explained in detail to the committee, to the best of my recollection, after which the committee confirmed me by a vote of fifteen to one, and I believe that the one negative vote was unrelated to this particular issue.

Now then, this raises a number of questions. The first is, was the program legal? I have already answered that. The second is, was the program administered ethically and properly? I have been innuendoed according to which allegedly the criteria which I testified to were violated and according to which the first four people that were submitted, according to these criteria, did not really meet these criteria but were united, according to this report, by having worked for the Johnson Administration. Let me point out that I, too, worked for the Johnson Administration and that I knew President Johnson before I knew President Nixon and that I have never been ashamed of having worked for President Johnson.

Secondly, three of the four people on that original list were appointed to the National Security Council staff by me over the strong objection of all of my associates. Two of them were appointed to the National Security staff by me over the strong objection of the security officers and I personally gave them a clearance.

Can anybody, in all fairness, believe that three months after appointing these individuals to my staff I would initiate a wiretap program designed to prove that they were security risks, or would not a fair interpretation have to assume that criteria were established that were being set?

Stories have been leaked to the effect that I harrassed the Director of the FBI with such phrases that, "I will destroy the leakers," and that he was somewhat reluctant about this program. I repeat, the program was instituted on the recommendation of the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI by the President.

The memorandum that was leaked in which I allegedly said, "I will destroy them," is a memorandum that was also available to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was a memorandum written by the Director of the FBI, nine-tenths of which deals with a telephone call that he initiated to me informing me of the security risks that he was dealing

with my material or with the NSC material. At the end
of this conversation, devoted entirely to a recitation
by the Director of the FBI to various security
violations, I said to him, according to his memorandum --

I have no recollection of this event to day -- but
according to this memorandum I said, "Keep up the
investigation and if you find somebody, we will destroy
them."

I think the connotation of this remark in
entirely different from that which has appeared in
the public press.

All of these facts have been put before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. I know there have been semantic
disputes about the word "request", "recommend", "initiate"
I spent some time with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
explaining what the significance of the word "request" might
be in the context and what the significance of the phrase
"initiate" might be.

Of course, in the sense that we submitted the names
of individuals who belonged in the categories which we were
ordered to produce, we initiated submitting names. The point
I am making is my office did not initiate any requests for
 wiretap that were not triggered either by a security
violation or by fulfilling the criteria of adverse information
in the security files and that last criterion was met only once,
at the beginning of the program.

These are the facts of the national security wire-
tap program as I remember. I do not apologize for it. It
is not a shady affair, as has been alleged. It followed legal
procedures. I fully testified to it and I stand ready to
testify again before any appropriate committee.

Now let me turn to another matter that is also
constantly being invoked; the issue of the plumbers and
David Young. I testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and I said in a press conference that I
did not know about the existence of the plumbers by that
or any other name. I did not know that David Young was
working for the plumbers.

I said this under oath and I repeat it today. I
hope none of you are ever in a position that you have to
prove the negative of a knowledge.

Now, since then, various stories have come to the fore
There is the argument that I was responsible for the creation
of the plumbers because of my concern about the theft of the
Pentagon papers, a concern which was transmitted to the
President. There is the argument that I misled the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee because I did not tell the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee that I had heard a tape in
which David Young interviewed an admiral who had information
with respect to his security.

There is the argument that I was on a helicopter ride with Mr. Ehrlichman in which the plumbers were discussed. Let me deal with these issues in order. It is perfectly true that I was profoundly disturbed by the publication of the Pentagon papers. Any Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs who was not concerned when 10,000 classified documents appeared in the public print would not be doing his duty. Nor can my concern be explained away by calling to the intrinsic insignificance of the individual documents or maybe the whole body of documents.

My concern was at that time we were preparing the secret trip to China. I was engaged in secret negotiations with North Vietnam that ultimately led to the end of the American participation in Vietnam. We were also engaged in secret discussions on strategic arms limitation. I was profoundly concerned and so expressed my views to the President, that these initiatives might be aborted if other governments had the idea that the United States Government was not in a position to protect its secrets and that anybody could publish any document and then the proof of its intrinsic significance was left to the Government.

I recognize that national security has been abused in recent years, but because there have been abuses does not mean that there was not justified concern by honorable people. It did not occur to me in expressing my concern that this might lead to the burglary of a doctor's office. It did occur to me that measures might be taken to protect the government against a recurrence of these leaks.

I was in China when David Young was assigned to Mr. Ehrlichman's office. I returned from China the morning of July 13 to learn that Mr. Ehrlichman had recruited one of my staff. To this I expressed a strong objection. My impression was as I have testified publicly and as I here repeat, that Mr. Young was assigned to a declassification project that was to last three months and then was publicly announced. I had no reason in the world to deny knowledge of the existence of a group designed to prevent leaks because there was nothing wrong as such with attempting to prevent leaks.

MORE

What was wrong was some of the activities that were being conducted by the office. And Mr. Krogh, who headed the office, has publicly stated that I had no knowledge of its activities. So the only thing at issue is whether I deliberately lied about knowing about the existence of an organization, the substance of which by common agreement I had nothing to do with.

Mr. Ehrlichman describes three meetings, on the 13th, 15th and a subsequent date in July. He places me at only one of these meetings, on a helicopter ride from Los Angeles to San Clemente.

My recollection of that day is that it was the day on which the President announced his China initiative and which I had just returned from China. After the China initiative was announced, the President, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, I think Mr. Scali and I want to a restaurant in Los Angeles to celebrate the events. We then spent a half hour to 40-minute helicopter ride from Los Angeles to San Clemente.

My only recollection of this helicopter ride is that Mr. Ehrlichman was needling me about not being able to use my staff properly and therefore having asked for the assignment of Mr. Young to his staff. I repeat, I have no recollection that the plumbers, by that or any other name, were discussed on that helicopter ride, although I leave open the possibility that given the noise of a helicopter ride there may have been some misunderstanding.

But I do not use this as an alibi. I have no recollection of such a conversation and no one has ever placed me at any meeting of the Plumbers or any meeting where the Plumbers were discussed subsequently.

Now, let me turn to the question of whether the fact that I listened to a tape in which Mr. Young interviewed Adair Walender indicated that I had been less than candid in testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The question which I answered before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was as follows. "Did you, when he, namely David Young, left your employment and was transferred to Mr. Ehrlichman, have any idea at that time or any subsequent time that he was to be requested to engage in illegal activities, such as conspiracy to burglary or whatever they might be?"

This, ladies and gentlemen, is the question I was answering before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, not the question whether I ever heard anything of David Young.

But I do not want to engage here in legal quibble. What did I know about the interview of David Young? In the fall of 1971 there were a series of massive leaks of National Security Council documents which appeared in the columns of Mr. Anderson. Some of them included verbatim summaries of meetings of subordinate bodies of the National Security Council

I was told at that time by Mr. Ehrlichman that he was conducting the investigation and that I was to have nothing to do with any part of that investigation. As a result, a member of my staff, Admiral Welander, reported to General Haig that he concluded from the internal evidence of some of the documents that had leaked that they must have come from his office. General Haig asked me what to do with this and I told General Haig to send Admiral Welander to Mr. Ehrlichman.

(w)

Some weeks later, Mr. Ehrlichman called me to his office and played for me the tape that included the questioning of Admiral Welander by David Young. I knew, of course, that David Young was working for Mr. Ehrlichman. But to conclude from this fact that a one-time interview of an individual that my office had discovered and my office had sent to Mr. Ehrlichman; to conclude from this fact either that Mr. Young was conducting a security investigation or even more, that Mr. Young was conducting security investigations as his regular activity is inconceivable.

If Mr. Ehrlichman had sent somebody to my office for an interview, I would certainly have assigned a staff member to that task, and it would have been impossible to draw from that the implication that this was my staff member's full time duty.

At the time of the press conference in which David Young's name was raised, I did not know that he wrote a report on his investigation. Of course, I had never seen that report.

Since then I have seen the report in the form of a diary which was submitted to the Senate Armed Services Committee and it makes clear that at no time during this investigation did David Young have any contact with me whatsoever; did David Young talk to me or communicate with me.

Now it is true that the conduct of a government is complex and that the responsibilities of the Assistant for National Security are complicated. Moreover, I was engaged in many activities in which the protection of documents was the smallest part.

I do not doubt that now when this transcript is analysed it is possible to find this or that nuance and to engage once again in the process of defaming public officials, but I know for a fact that the testimony I have given was truthful to the best of my recollection.

I joined this Administration five years ago when this country was deeply divided. I felt that with my particular background I had a special obligation to understand the dangers of national division and to do my best to overcome them.

(w)

I say it here only because I wanted to spare the United States the indignity and humiliation of having its Secretary of State, while engaged on a trip to the Middle East, constantly exposed to these public charges and this is all I want to say, but I will be delighted to answer any questions and I will stay as long as there are questions.

Mr. Lissagor.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the nature of this meeting it seems terribly important for you to identify those whom you regard as engaged in defaming your character. Can you do that?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not know the name of the unnamed sources who allege that my testimony before the Senate Committee was untruthful, who claim to know that the facts contradict what I said and I do not know their names.

Q. Then may I follow, please? How can there be a public accounting of those as you suggested at the end of your remarks?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that if public officials must give an accounting of their activities, those who print the accusations should state where these accusations come from so that a judgment can be made about the motive of the individuals making them.

I have submitted all the documents that I have voluntarily, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last year and I explained every document of which I had personal knowledge to the Senate, first in the session with Senator Sparkman and Senator Case and then in the meeting of the full committee. I could do no more than that.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said today that you felt there were more leaks coming. Is that one of the reasons why you decided to speak to us today?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I am speaking of the leaks with which I am familiar and since I know that not all of the documents have yet leaked, there could be more leaks.

Q. Do you expect that campaign -- if you can characterize it that way -- will continue?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Chancellor, I do not want to make any estimate of whether this will continue, nor do I even want to question the good faith of those who are leaking the documents. I know the documents that are being leaked. I submitted them to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Individuals reading them without an explanation of their context can easily come to some of the conclusions that have been made. I understand this.

- 15 -

(c)

Q Well, then, who gets the public accounting, sir? If you say that fairness requires exonoration or a public accounting of those who engage in these practices, what sort of public accounting would you have in mind?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have in mind that those who leak documents should step forward and explain what they are doing and why they are doing it.

Q Mr. Secretary, you seem to imply here that if this campaign is not stopped, you are going to resign. Is that a fair assumption from what you said?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am not concerned with the campaign. I am concerned with the truth. I do not believe that it is possible to conduct the foreign policy of the United States under these circumstances when the character and credibility of the Secretary of State is at issue. And if it is not cleared up, I will resign.

Q What has the President said to you in relation to what you told us, and I am sure you have in various versions given him your same thoughts. What was his reaction?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a question of my honor and I told the President that I should give you a public accounting and have agreed and we had no further discussion on it whatsoever.

Q Is this primarily a matter of interpretation? Are you asking that these documents be made public so we can get the just position of the document?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If the individuals mentioned in these documents agreed, I have no objection to their being made public.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you tell us, please, just who it was that asked you to supply the names of the three criteria you gave. I don't think you gave us a name who asked you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: These three criteria were established at the meeting attended by the President, the Attorney General, and the Director of the FBI. I do not remember which of the three individuals gave the precise order, but I understood the order to come from the President.

Q Was it one of those three who passed on to you the three criteria?

(w)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I cannot conduct my office if I have to devote my energies to disproving allegations of perjury, nor do I believe that the United States can conduct an effective foreign policy with a Secretary of State who is under such attack and therefore, I am simply stating a reality.

I have attempted, however, inadequate, to set some standards in my public life. If I cannot set these standards, I do not wish to be in public life.

Q Would you be satisfied if the leaks ceased, as of now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I think this issue now has to be resolved.

Q If the Senate Foreign Relations Committee requests hearings and went through the whole matter again and gave you a clean bill of health, would you then withdraw your threat to resign?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

Q Is that the method that you prefer?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will not propose a method.

Q Do you think these leaks are designed to force you to resign, sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't believe that, and I do not believe that I am surrounded by a conspiracy. I have not had unfortunate experiences with the press. I think if this can happen to someone whose relationship with the press has been as good as I believe mine has been, then we are facing a national problem, not a personal problem. I do not believe there is the slightest personal animosity against me about this.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I am still not quite clear in my own mind: what you feel your role was in initiating thekkestapping program. Now you said the decision, if I understand you correctly, was actually made at a meeting between the President, the Attorney General, then Mr. Mitchell, and the head of the FBI, then Mr. Hoover. Now, do you feel that you played a major role in getting that program started or do you feel you were kind of an innocent bystander who, in effect, played a minor role? What is your own concept of your role?

Q. The White House has copies of them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The White House probably has copies of them, I don't know.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, did you at the time when these decisions were made have any doubt about the ethicality -- save the legal aspects -- did you at that time have a question in your own mind whether it was ethical or not and now with the benefit of hindsight do you have any doubt at all in your mind that it was ethical.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: At the time I found it an extremely painful process. It involved in some cases individual with whom I had been closely associated. It involves threats to individuals, who if they had been found to be security leaks, would have reflected badly on my own judgment.

So I did not find it a task that was particularly pleasant. But I could not quarrel with the judgment and I did not quarrel with the judgment of those who found it necessary.

At my confirmation hearings I testified in executive session -- not in public session -- I testified in executive session that stricter regulations then were then in force than had been in force in previous Administrations would be compatible with the objective of national security.

Q. You said a few minutes ago that you told the President you were going to come out here and raise these issues. The questions: Have you discussed with him specifically the possibility of your resignation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I did not discuss the content of what I would say with the President.

Q. Have you discussed the possibility of your resignation and if so, what has been his reaction?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not discussed the content of this press conference with the President before giving it. I felt this was a matter in which I had to state my view.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END (AT 2:15 P.M. Salzburg time)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 11, 1974

THE WHITE HOUSE

YAVALIER HAUS
SALZBURG, AUSTRIA

AT 1:11 P.M. Salzburg Time

I have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in public session, in executive session, and then at a closed meeting with Senator Sparkman and Senator Case, where at my request we went over each FBI report on the wiretaps that existed. The meeting with Senators Sparkman and Case was also attended by Attorney General Richardson and Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus, who supplied what information they could from their records or their recollection.

"Dear Mr. Chairman:

"You have no doubt seen the news reports and editorial comments relating to my testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time of my confirmation hearing. They involve fundamental issues concerning the truthfulness and completeness of my testimony; hence they raise issues of public confidence and directly affect the conduct of our foreign policy.

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"You will remember that my testimony concerning the national security wiretaps ordered by the President and carried out by the FBI under the authority of the Attorney General was in three parts: public testimony, an extensive executive session, and a session with Senators Sparkman and Case in which we went over relevant FBI files.

"The meeting with Senators Sparkman and Case was conducted in the presence of then Attorney General Richardson and the then Deputy Attorney General Ruckelshaus. I emphasize this because no new material has appeared since my testimony except a brief excerpt from a Presidential tape, a large part of which is described as unintelligible.

"The documents now being leaked were available to me before my testimony. They were given to Senators Sparkman and Case prior to my meeting with them. In a few cases my recollection differed in emphasis from the documents. In those cases I pointed out apparent discrepancies and explained them at the time.

"The innuendoes which now imply that new evidence contradicting my testimony has come to light are without foundation. All the available evidence is to the best of my knowledge contained in the public and closed hearings which preceded my confirmation.

"You are familiar with the details of my testimony, so I shall not repeat them here nor do I have any reason to change the testimony presented to your committee in any particular..

"Nevertheless, at this sensitive period, I feel it important that the committee which first examined the evidence and which has a special concern with the conduct of foreign affairs should have an opportunity to review it once again.

"I should add that if the committee decides on a review, I would not object should it wish to examine relevant security files and reports on wiretaps into my office. I, of course, stand ready to appear at any time."

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Since sending this letter, there have been many
more articles and more are undoubtedly in the process
of preparation. In these circumstances, it is not appropriate
for me, as Secretary of State, to go with the President
to the Middle East without having a full discussion of the
facts as I know them, keeping in mind only that I do not
have all my records here with me.

I shall now discuss these facts with you. I shall
afterwards stay for as long as there are any questions. There
will be no ending of the question period as long as there
are any questions left to be asked.

First, what is it we are talking about? The im-
pression has been created that I was involved in some
illegal or shady activity that I am trying to obscure with
misleading testimony. The fact of the matter is that the
wiretaps in question were legal, they followed established
procedures. When they were established, the then Attorney
General and the then Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation assured me that they were reinstituting
procedures that were carried out in previous administrations.

Before public reputations are attacked or destroyed,
elementary fairness requires that this particular statement
be looked into and that it be made clear whether the
national security wiretaps were in fact carried out in
previous administrations. The history of these wiretaps
derived from a series of leaks that occurred in the spring
of 1969. As Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, I had the duty to call the attention of the President
to what seemed to me violations of national security.

These violations cannot be assessed only by
analyzing the intrinsic merit of individual documents,
but they must be also analyzed in terms of the confidence
other governments can have in a government that seems
totally incapable of protecting its secrets. After a
series of egregious violations, the President ordered,
on the advice of the Attorney General and the Director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigations, the institution of
a system of national security wiretaps.

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I testified both to Senator Case and to Senator
Muskie that in submitting the names we knew, of course, that
a wiretap was a probable outcome. The basic issue is whether
through my office or with my knowledge any names were
submitted for any purpose other than the protection of
national security and whether the information was used
for any purpose other than the protection of national
security.

When a wiretap was installed, the FBI would send
a report to my office only when, in the judgment of the
FBI, the conversation involved violations of national
security. It is totally incorrect and outrageous to say
that these taps that were submitted to my office involved
a description of extra-marital affairs or pornographic
descriptions.

I do not know what the original logs show. The
system that was followed in the operation of the national
security wiretaps was, first of all, that no verbatim
transcript was ever sent to my office. What was sent to my
office was a page and a half summary of conversations
that seemed to the FBI to involve issues of national
security. These memoranda were then screened in my office
and if, in the judgment of those who screened the memoranda,
they were of sufficient importance, they were shown to me.

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One of the leaks that I have read recently speaks of
54 logs that were allegedly sent to my office. The word
"logs" of course, is a lie. What was sent to my office was
a page and a half summary.

But, if you consider that during that period that
eight or 10 people were being subjected to investigation, that
the period covered in which my office received these reports
was one year, you have to see that this meant that on the
average four and one-half reports a month were sent to my
office, of which I saw -- I cannot be sure what percentage
-- maybe one or two.

The implication that my office was spending its time
reading salacious reports by subordinates is a symptom of
the poisonous atmosphere that is now characteristic of our
public discussion.

I repeat, if we can find an appropriate forum which
will do no damage to the individuals involved, I would not
object letting anybody see the reports that were received in
my office.

After May, 1970, it was decided that my office was not
equipped to deal with internal security matters. And after
May, 1970, no reports from the FBI were sent to my office for
the remainder of the period that the national security wiretaps
remained in force.

During this period, General Haig maintained, at my
direction, contact with Director Sullivan of the FBI. The
reports from that time on were sent to Mr. Haldeman's office.
If a report of sufficient gravity had been sent to Mr.
Haldeman's office, Mr. Sullivan might inform General Haig and
if in the judgment of General Haig the report was sufficiently
serious, I would be informed of the content, but I would not
see the report.

To all of this I have testified in executive session
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and I would have
no hesitation, if the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
decided to declassify the report. I would only ask that the
individuals whose names are mentioned be given an opportunity
to have the material deleted that refers to the reasons
why particular cases in my recollection arose.

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When I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I was aware that my recollection of particular events differed in a few cases from the memoranda. I nevertheless submitted the memoranda pointing out, and I quote, "You have to remember, Senator Case, I was one of those who strongly recommended that the report be given to the committee and that when there was a difference between my recollection and this report, I nevertheless decided to stick to my recollection."

Now then, this raises a number of questions. The first is, was the program legal? I have already answered that. The second is, was the program administered ethically and proper? I have seen innuendos according to which allegedly the criteria which I testified to were violated and according to which the first four people that were submitted, according to these criteria, did not really meet these criteria but were united, according to this report, by having worked for the Johnson Administration. Let me point out that I, too, worked for the Johnson Administration and that I knew President Johnson before I knew President Nixon and that I have never been ashamed of having worked for President Johnson.

Can anybody, in all fairness, believe that three months after appointing these individuals to my staff I would initiate a wiretap program designed to prove that they were security risks, or would not a fair interpretation have to assume that criteria were established that were being met?

The memoranda that was leaked in which I allegedly said, "I will destroy them," is a memorandum that was also available to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It was a memorandum written by the Director of the FBI, nine-tenths of which deals with a telephone call that he initiated to me informing me of the security risks that he saw dealing

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All of these facts have been put before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I know there have been semantic disputes about the word "request", "recommend", "initiate." I spent some time with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explaining what the significance of the word "request" might be in the context and what the significance of the phrase "initiate" might be.

Of course, in the sense that we submitted the names of individuals who belonged in the categories which we were ordered to produce, we initiated submitting names. The point I am making is my office did not initiate any requests for wiretaps that were not triggered either by a security violation or by fulfilling the criteria of adverse information in the security files and that last criterion was met only once at the beginning of the program.

These are the facts of the national security wiretap program as I remember. I do not apologize for it. It is not a shady affair, as has been alleged. It followed legal procedures. I fully testified to it and I stand ready to testify again before any appropriate committee.

Now, since then, various stories have come to the fore. There is the argument that I was responsible for the creation of the plumbers because of my concern about the theft of the Pentagon papers, a concern which was transmitted to the President. There is the argument that I misled the Senate Foreign Relations Committee because I did not tell the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that I had heard a tape in which David Young interviewed an admiral who had information with respect to his security.

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I was in China when David Young was assigned to Mr. Ehrlichman's office. I returned from China the morning of July 13 to learn that Mr. Ehrlichman had recruited one of my staff members. To this I expressed a strong objection. My impression was as I have testified publicly and as I here repeat, that Mr. Young was assigned to a declassification project that was to last three months and then was publicly announced. I had no reason in the world to deny knowledge of the existence of a group designed to prevent leaks because there was nothing wrong as such with attempting to prevent leaks.

My recollection of that day is that it was the day on which the President announced his China initiative and which I had just returned from China. After the China initiative was announced, the President, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, I think Mr. Scali and I went to a restaurant in Los Angeles to celebrate the events. We then spent a half hour to 40-minute helicopter ride from Los Angeles to San Clemente.

My only recollection of this helicopter ride is that Mr. Ehrlichman was needling me about not being able to use my staff properly and therefore having asked for the assignment of Mr. Young to his staff. I repeat, I have no recollection that the Plumbers, by that or any other name, were discussed on that helicopter ride, although I leave open the possibility that given the noise of a helicopter ride there may have been some misunderstanding.

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Now, let me turn to the question of whether the fact
that I listened to a tape in which Mr. Young interviewed
Admiral Welander indicated that I had been less than candid
in testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The question which I answered before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee was as follows. "Did you, when he, namely
David Young, left your employment and was transferred to
Mr. Ehrlichman, have any idea at that time or any subsequent
time that he was to be requested to engage in illegal activities,
burglary, conspiracy to burglary or whatever they might be?"

But I do not want to engage here in legal quibble.
What did I know about the interview of David Young? In the
fall of 1971 there were a series of massive leaks of National
Security Council documents which appeared in the columns of
Mr. Anderson. Some of them included verbatim summaries of
meetings of subordinate bodies of the National Security Council.

If Mr. Ehrlichman had sent somebody to my office
for an interview, I would certainly have assigned a staff
member to that task and it would have been impossible to
draw from that the implication that this was my staff member's
full time duty.

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Since then I have seen the report in the form of a
diary which was submitted to the Senate Armed Services
Committee and it makes clear that at no time during this inves-
tigation did David Young have any contact with me whatsoever;
did David Young talk to me or communicate with me.

I do not doubt that now when this transcript is
analyzed it is possible to find this or that nuance and to
engage once again in the process of defaming public
officials, but I know for a fact that the testimony I have
given was truthful to the best of my recollection.

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None of you in this room have ever heard me attack
the motives or the purposes of those who disagreed with us.
All of you in this room know from your profession that
the truth very often has intangible aspects.

I believed also that because of my previous associa-
tion, I had a special obligation towards those who were
not frequently members of this Administration and I intended
to discharge this through all the turmoil of the national
debates, but it seems to me that our national debate
has now reached a point where it is possible for documents
that have already been submitted to one committee to be
selectively leaked by another committee without the benefit
of any explanation, where public officials are required
to submit their most secret documents to public scrutiny,
but unnamed sources can attack the credibility and the honor
of senior officials of the Government without even being
asked to identify themselves.

I have been generally identified, or it has been
alleged that I am supposed to be interested primarily
in the balance of power. I would rather like to think
that when the record is written, one may remember that
perhaps some lives were saved and that perhaps some
mothers can rest more at ease, but I leave that to
history.

What I will not leave to history is a discussion
of my public honor. I have believed that I should do what
I could to heal division in this country. I believed that
I should do what I could to maintain the dignity of
American values and to give Americans some pride in
the conduct of their affairs.

I can do this only if my honor is not at issue
and if the public deserves to have confidence. If that cannot
be maintained, I cannot perform the duties that I have
exercised, and in that case, I shall turn them over
immediately to individuals less subject to public attack.

So, I have put before you the facts as I know
them. They are consistent with my testimony before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I do so not to
maintain a position in the Government which I will not main-
tain for one day beyond the public confidence; I do so
because simple fairness requires that either there be
an exoneration or that there be a public accounting of those
who engage in this defamation of character.

I repeat, I am willing to repeat, under oath
before congressional committees, what I have said here.

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Mr. Lisagor.

Q Mr. Secretary, in the nature of this meeting it seems terribly important for you to identify those whom you regard as engaged in defaming your character. Can you do that?

Q Then may I follow, please? How can there be a public accounting of those as you suggested at the end of your remarks?

Q Dr. Kissinger, you said today that you felt there were more leaks coming. Is that one of the reasons why you decided to speak to us today?

Q Do you expect that campaign -- if you can characterize it that way -- will continue?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: This is a question of my honor and I told the President that I should give you a public accounting and he agreed and we had no further discussion on it whatsoever.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It occurred at that meeting.

Q I am saying was it one of those three people who told you what the criteria was?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is correct.

Q You don't remember which one?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I do not remember that, no.

Q Could you also elaborate on the third criteria. I wasn't really clear as to what it referred to.

Q Would you give us the three again?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The three criteria were individuals who had adverse information in their security files, individuals who had access to documents that had leaked or individuals who in the course of an investigation appeared as possible sources of leaks. That third category, of course, was largely supplied by the FBI, since we did not conduct our own investigation.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, are you suggesting that it is the
responsibility of reporters who have written stories of these
leaks and/or editors who have printed those stories that they
should come forward and identify their sources?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am suggesting that when the
credibility of senior officials is put in question on the
basis of unnamed sources for the selective leaking of documents
and when this attack affects not only the individual concerned,
which may be a personal injustice, but affects the standing
of the United States in the world, then I believe an obligation
exists in one way or another to do this, yes.

Q Dr. Kissinger, I am sorry if you answered it and I missed it, but are you saying that it is the responsibility of the person who provides the information or the responsibility of the news media that uses it to identify these sources?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to get into a debate
about the ethics of the news media and what their responsibility
should be, and if it eases the discussion, I will withdraw
that particular remark, because it is not the central point
of my presentation.

The central point of my presentation was to repeat again
on the public record the things that I said in an executive
session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and to do
it in a concise and manageable form and to say that it is not
possible to conduct national policy in the face of this sort
of attack.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you are under attack and you think
you are being defamed. I also understand that you may have
opposed the President's current trip because of his problems
in the same area. Did you oppose the trip and what do you think?
Should it go on under your criteria?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I did not oppose the President's
trip. The President's position is quite different from mine.
He is an elected official. He was invited by the heads of
government in a period of great transformation of international
affairs and he has a duty as a President, as long as he conducts
the Presidency, to conduct it in the name of the national
interest and not be deflected by what may go on domestically.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, you are suggesting, sir, that those who have made these accusations should state why they aremaking them. Are you suggesting that there is something insidious about this process?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I really don't want to get into the debate on side issues. It is not necessary. I am not trying to imply that there is/anything insidious about it. But I am trying to imply that there is something happening in our public debate when coming back from a 5-week negotia-tion, I am being asked a question for which I had no con-ceivable way of being prepared, that could not have been further from my mind and because I was naturally flustered in the reply, as any honorable man would be when he is asked whether he has retained a counsel for purjury after having just returned from an extended mission abroad, that then that fact is being used to prove there must be something hidden and there has been something less than candor, but I do not want to turn this into a debate between myself and the news media.

I am trying to call attention to an objective problem that exists and to the difficulty, if not impossibility, of conducting national policy in such an atmosphere, whose ever fault it is.

Q Could I beg a question, sir? You say you are concerned about affecting the standing of the U.S. in the world and yet, at a very critical time, you have raised the prospect of your own resignation which would indeed affect the standing of the U.S. in the world. On that basis, is it not required that you more specifically define the circumstances under which you will shelf your statement about the threat to resign?

I have attempted, however inadequate, to set some standards in my public life. If I cannot set these standards, I do not wish to be in public life.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I think this issue now has to be resolved.

Q If the Senate Foreign Relations Committee resumed its hearings and went through the whole matter again and gave you a clean bill of health, would you then withdraw your threat to resign?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, I am still not quite clear in my own mind what you feel your role was in initiating the wiretapping program. Now you said the decision, if I understand you correctly, was actually made at a meeting between the President, the Attorney General, then Mr. Mitchell, and the head of the FBI, then Mr. Hoover. Now, do you feel that you played a major role in getting that program started or do you feel you were kind of an innocent bystander who, in effect, played a minor role? What is your own concept of your role?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My concept of my role to which I testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and which Elliot Richardson also supported, I may say, from the record -- not on the basis of conversations with me as has been alleged in a newspaper article -- my concept of my role was that on a number of occasions I called to the attention of the President, it would seem to me, very significant security leaks.

This, then, led the President, I believe on the recommendation of the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, to institute a program of wiretapping. I did not, myself, propose this program. I was new in the Government and therefore, I also was unaware of the fact that such a program, according to the Director of the FBI, had also been carried out in every previous administration since Franklin Roosevelt.

So, in retrospect, I would have to say I undoubtedly contributed, by my description of the security problem, and being new in Government, it is possible that in one or two cases I may have taken an exaggerated view of them. I did not recommend the program as such, though this does not mean that I disagreed with it. I find wiretapping distasteful. I find leaks distasteful, and therefore, a choice had to be made. So, in retrospect, this seems to me what my role has been.

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