[lc]

MAY 24 1993

May 19, 1993

Dear Henry,

A relative recently asked me about the
following unfamiliar anecdote in the book by Walter
Isaacson (pp. 520-1):

"Do you have any feelings about the Great
Seal? (in connection with a press conference you would
hold October 12, 1973).

"For all I care you could get a seal from the
zoo and put a thing around its neck," Kissinger barked back.

"Then, noting that McCloskey seemed hurt,
Kissinger added: 'I don't care about the seal as long
as there are two heralds in front of me as I come in.
An Irishman ought to be able to know where some heralds
are ...'"

Isaacson has since told me that the exchange was
provided by a source he wouldn't name and that it came
from a conversation between you and me that'd been taped.
Does that sound right? It beats me.

Otherwise, it's a throwaway.

The Aspen Institute

David T. McLaughlin
President

April 12, 1993

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates Inc.
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20006

APR 21 1993

Dear Henry:

Ed Bleier told me of your recent conversation about the Aspen/Wye Communications Conference in the fall. I was delighted that you had told him that you would do your best to get there.

The meeting will be at our newly renovated facilities in Aspen, Colorado on October 28-31. It is my pleasure to invite you formally to join us there and to give a keynote address to the conference on the current international situation and prospects. Many of the participants remember well your last appearance at one of these meetings and have much regretted that you have not been able to be with us again since then. I hope that this year will work for you.

We expect, as usual, that 50 to 60 of the top executives from the television industry will be there for a discussion of a broad range of domestic and international issues. While we would of course suit your schedule, the ideal time for you to speak to the group would be the opening session on the evening of October 28 or the closing session on the morning of October 31. We would, of course, arrange for your travel to Aspen, most likely on one of the private aircraft that will be traveling in and out of Aspen during the meeting.

I look forward to hearing from you about this. Your contribution to the meeting would be invaluable and I hope that you will be able to join us.

Wye, MD: P.O. Box 222, Queenstown, MD 21658 • (410) 820-5426 • FAX (410) 827-9182

Aspen, CO: 1000 North Third Street, Aspen, CO 81611 • (303) 925-7010 • FAX (303) 925-4188
Washington, DC: 1755 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Suite 501, Washington, DC 20036 • (202) 736-5800 • FAX (202) 986-1913

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

June 24, 1993

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

May we ask of you the favor of transmitting
Dr. Kissinger's note to President Menem
when he arrives?

With his appreciation and good wishes,

His Excellency
Ambassador Raul Granillo Ocampo
Embassy of Argentina
1600 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20009

12/11 '93 22:38

☎372 6 316250

KADRIORG, ESTONIA

☎001

The Baltic Institute for
Strategic and International Studies

BASIS for Strategic Studies

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue, New York
USA

MEMBERS OF THE BOARD:

Prof. Shlomo Avineri
I.I.E. President Algirdas Brazauskas
Secretary of State Zbigniew Brzezinski
Dr. Ricardo Diez-Hochleitner
Moj Grun Albrender Finkeln
Mr. Roland Evans
Dr. Ziad Farid
Dr. Lars Fredén
Dr. Paul A. Goble
Minister H.C. Max Jakobson
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger
Prof. Dr. Boris Meissner
Mr. Harry Männil
Sir Arvi Parho
H.E. President Guntis Ulmanis
Dr. George Urlan
Prof. Dr. Werner Weidenfeld

Tallinn, November 12, 1993

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

As Patron of the newly established Baltic Institute for Strategic and International Studies, I would like to thank you for having decided to express your interest in the Institute by accepting membership on its Advisory Council.

Enclosed please find the revised and finished statutes of BASIS. As well, we wish to extend an invitation to you to attend the Inaugural Conference for the Institute, scheduled to be held in Tallinn on 16-17 December 1993. A list of proposed topics has been enclosed for your perusal and a finalised conference programme will be sent to you within the next two weeks.

Should you be able to attend the Inaugural Conference, please contact us as soon as possible so that we may make the appropriate arrangements. We look forward to welcoming you in Tallinn.

Lennart Meri

Enclosed: Statutes of the Institute
List of proposed topics

Weizenberg 39, Tallinn, Republic of Estonia Telephone 372-6-316707, 372-6-316741 Telefax 372-6-316250
Bank Account No. 120 233 Estonian Social Bank Ltd. Code 420 101 351

12/11 '93 22:38

☎372 6 316250

KADRIORG, ESTONIA

Statutes of the
Baltic Institute for
Strategic and International Studies

1. The BASIS, (henceforth the Institute) is an independent international institution, based in Tallinn, the aim of which is to provide a neutral and unbiased forum for the development of knowledge in the sphere of domestic, national security and foreign policy.

2. In pursuance of this role the function of the Institute will be research, study, and discussion of issues pertaining to national security policy in all its aspects (political, economic, military), particularly relevant to Northern Europe and the Baltic Region.

3. The institute will be established under the patronage of the President of the Republic. The duties of the President will be to form an advisory council of eminent persons, whose task will be to monitor the efficient working of the institute. The council will be invited to convene at six monthly intervals to this end chaired by the Patron.

4. The affairs of the institute will be managed on a day to day basis by the Director, nominated by the President and approved by the council. It will be the Director's responsibility to engage administrative staff as necessary, and to manage the finances of the institute, subject to scrutiny by the council at annual intervals. The institute will be financially self supporting, and declare all sources of income and support in its annual accounts.

5. Membership of the institute will be open to all qualified specialists in public and academic life. Applications for membership will be reviewed by a membership committee consisting of the Director of the Institute, two members of the council, and a member of the Institute staff, these last at the discretion of the Director.

6. The work of the institute is to be completely independent of political bias or direction, and in accordance with established international standards for academic work. The institute will work to the highest standards of international expertise, accuracy, and impartiality. It will be the function of the council to ensure that this remains so.

7. In addition to the permanent staff of the institute it will be the responsibility of the Director to approve the association of research fellows working with the institute, and to administer any grants and scholarships available for support of independent research in Estonia or abroad.

8. The Director will be responsible for the programme of the institute which will be developed and administered by the staff and will be subject to review by the council at its biannual meetings.

DEC 13 1993

300 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10010

Tel. (212) 387-3400
Telefax (212) 387-3535

Rizzoli International
Publications, Inc.

December 11, 1993

Ms. Suzanne McFarlane
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York
by facsimile: 759 0042

Dear Ms. McFarlane:

Per our conversation, I enclose two pages from our forthcoming book *Soccer! The Game and the World Cup*, which we are publishing in association with our sister company La Gazzetta dello Sport. As I explained, the book is one of the official publications of World Cup USA 1994, and includes a foreword by Joseph Blatter (secretary of FIFA) and an introduction by Alan Rothenberg.

The book is a heavily illustrated oversize, Rizzoli-style book-- though with a substantial text on the history of soccer and the World Cup.

I met Dr. Kissinger at a Rizzoli Bookstore party in October 1992, if memory serves, and we chatted briefly about our shared passion. Of course, I remembered the remark you see reproduced as so typically full of wit and insight; so we would very much like to use it. Our book contains numerous other quotes about soccer from soccer administrators and players--from Maradona to Roberto Baggio-- which we hope will be enjoyed by the audience.

I shall send a complete Xerox of the book in a very few days; but in the meantime, I wonder if you could let me know by phone if Dr. Kissinger feels this request is acceptable.

DEC 11 '93 08:27PM UNIVERSE PUBLISHING

P.1

October 3, 1993

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Our father is a hard working, loving, gregarious, sensitive family man. Our parents have been married for 53 yrs. On Sunday Dec. 5, 1993, our father, Merrill (Pete) Miller, will be 80 years young. We are compiling letters & pictures of people who have a special place in his heart. It would be greatly appreciated if you would send a short congratulatory note and/or picture. You would make this special day complete. Thank you so much for your time and effort.

Your Fans Forever,

Denise Miller Bloom
1000 Longaker
Northbrook, IL 60062

Kenny Miller -
c/o Denise Miller Bloom
1000 Longaker
Northbrook, IL 60062

The National Security Archive

Documenting U.S. Foreign Policy

A Project of the Fund for Peace

26 October 1993

Newton N. Minow, Esq.
Counsel
Sidley & Austin
875 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Minow:

Following up on your interest in our documents reader on the Cuban Missile Crisis, I have taken the liberty of adding your name to an informal mailing program that we call "the document of the month." As you know, we publish large collections of documents on microfiche as well as the readers, but we also regularly receive highly interesting items which deserve wider or more immediate circulation. Such an item is this month's classic fly-on-the-wall-of-state document, a practically verbatim "memcon" of a Kremlin meeting in March 1974 between General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, together with 15 of their closest associates. Written from notes by Kissinger aide Peter W. Rodman, the complete document is 37 pages long; so we have included in this month's mailing only the first five pages -- to give a sense of the flow of the meeting -- together with two amusing incidents in the remainder of the document.

On pages 12 and 13, Brezhnev provides a lengthy commentary on diplomatic language: "I can never be a Foreign Minister. I would have to set aside a couple of years to study the most complicated words from every encyclopedia in the world and insert them one after the other in each phrase.... Foreign Ministers speak in such an interesting way and resolve nothing." Kissinger interjects: "That gives them job security." The back-and-forth continues until Brezhnev notices Rodman taking notes, to which Kissinger replies that the notes are "for our diplomatic language training.... our Foreign Service charm course."

It's hard to imagine other Secretaries of State, for example Dean Rusk or Cyrus Vance, bantering with Brezhnev in this fashion. Anatoliy Dobrynin, for one, has made no secret of his admiration for Kissinger's methods, and his shock at the relative stiffness with which the Carter administration pursued its discussions with the Soviets, particularly in the failed March 1977 Vance mission to Moscow.

For further comic relief, see page 19, in which Brezhnev tousles the hair of one of the Americans, and then walks off with Rodman's briefcase. After Rodman retrieves the item, "Mr. Gromyko affirmed that it was a joke." What a cut-up, that Leonid.

Archive analyst William Burr obtained the release of this document -- previously classified SECRET/NODIS -- through the Freedom of Information Act just a few weeks ago. If you would like a copy of the complete document, please call the Archive's administrator, Lynne Quinto, and we will be glad to mail it to you. Thank you again for all of your support and that of the Carnegie Corporation for the Archive, and welcome to the document of the month club.

1755 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20036
202-797-0882
Fax 202-387-6315

•-21

P840153-1082

RIGGS

GSS SENSITIVE EUROPE
(S/S-7406895)

[LLO]

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NOTICE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the
CPSU Central Committee

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Polit Bureau
of the CPSU Central Committee, and Minister
of Foreign Affairs of the USSR

Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the US

Andrei M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General
Secretary

Georgi M. Korniyanenko, Member of the Collegium
of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Chief,
USA Department

Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium
of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief,
Near East Department

Viktor Sukhodrev, USA Department (Interpreter)

Oleg Sol保留, USA Department

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., US Ambassador to the USSR

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the State Department

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs

Carlyle E. Maw, Legal Advisor, State Department

William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence
and Research, State Department

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary-designate
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, NSC

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

TIME AND DATE: Tuesday, March 26, 1974 - 5:09-9:43 p.m.

PLACE: Brezhnev's Office, Council of Ministers Building
Krenlin

SUBJECTS: Other Arms Control; CSCE; MBFR; Economic Relations

SECRET/NOTICE

<table><tr><td>Conv. C.</td><td>1974</td></tr><tr><td>Conv. C.</td><td>1974</td></tr><tr><td>Approved by</td><td>1-15-74</td></tr><tr><td>TS authority to:</td><td>1-15-74</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">( ) CLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">( ) DOWNGRADED to ( ) S or ( ) C</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">( ) S or ( ) C OFR</td></tr><tr><td colspan="2">( ) C OFR</td></tr></table>

COPY AVAILABLE

MR Cases Only:
EO Citations

DECLASSIFY
(X) DECLASSIFY
IN PART

Non-Responsive Info
BIA-3A7

FEMA exemptions
PA Exemptions

(X) RELEASE
(X) EXPIRE

( ) DECEIVED

IS FPC/CDR
Date. 4/27/95

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

From the NATIONAL SECURITY ARCHIVE, 1755 Massachusetts Ave., NW, Washington, DC 20036

P040153-1083

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

**Brezhnev:** I just got a code message from President Nixon. He is very displease with you.

**Kissinger:** It happens every Tuesday afternoon.

**Brezhnev:** So it is nothing out of the ordinary? I was so pleased. I thought it was something new.

**Kissinger:** Did you go behind my back and complain to him?

**Brezhnev:** No, I didn't complain. It must be something you told him. He must have taken an objective view of the situation.

**What do we do?** Should we turn to something new? Or return to the Middle East?

**Kissinger:** I leave it to the General Secretary.

**Brezhnev:** All right.

OTHER AFTERS CONTROL

On ending underground nuclear tests -- could we do something?

**Kissinger:** Mr. General Secretary, there are two separate problems. One question is whether you and we want to agree to end the tests at some future time. For example, January 1, 1976, as you proposed. The second problem is whether we should make it in the form of an appeal to other nations and feel free to resume if they test. Since we know that other countries will test after January 1, (1976), that second proposition just means we will find another reason to test after January 1, and it has the objective consequence of embarrassing those other countries.

We could study the question -- we have never examined it -- of some date in the future, say 2-3 years from now, at which there would be a moratorium. That we could study. The other is difficult.

**Grommke:** What is the second proposal you mean?

**Kissinger:** You have one proposal, but it has the objective consequence of leaving both free to test but with a new excuse.

SECRET/NOD'S

SECRET/NODIS

-3-

**Gromyko:** But the substance of our proposal is that we two agree to stop underground testing as of January 1, [1976]. At the same time we appeal to others to stop.

**Kissinger:** But if they don't, we are free to resume. Since we know . . .

**Gromyko:** But we would not resume testing immediately. We would wait for a couple of years after we would agree to stop. Our own agreement would be effective January 1. For a certain period we two could wait and see what other countries do, and then the agreement itself could contain a clause saying the two would observe the situation for say 1 or 2 years and then consult together to see what to do next, to see what others do.

**Brezhnev:** Neither you nor we stand to lose anything from that. But we would therefore show the desire of our two countries to proceed along the path of detente and that our line is aimed at furthering detente. So it contains no danger to our two countries.

**Kissinger:** No, I understand the proposal. As I said, it has two difficulties. One is the problem of verification, because below a certain threshold we don't know whether tests are being carried on. That, for a limited period, one could consider.

**Brezhnev:** I think we could give some thought to giving a certain threshold on tests and discontinue the rest.

**Kissinger:** That would be something we could study. The second difficulty we have is to make it in the form of an appeal to third countries.

**Brezhnev:** But that is what we contemplate.

**Kissinger:** Because this will provoke major disputes with our allies to the East and your allies to the East. Our allies to our East and yours to your East -- they're not the same countries.

**Brezhnev:** God be with them. We would be entering into an agreement with you. I don't see anything wrong.

**Kissinger:** We can have a serious discussion about a test ban with a threshold. Whether to couple it with an appeal to others would be more difficult.

SECRET/NODIS

PR40153-1085

SECRET/NODIS

And of course, there are detailed issues to be considered, such as peaceful nuclear explosions and how to deal with them. But those are not issues of principle.

**Brezhnev:** That would be the subject of a special study.

**Kissinger:** That we could solve.

I think we could find a solution on the basis of a threshhold test ban.

**Brezhnev:** Very well.

**Kissinger:** And we could start discussions to that effect. I don't think we should discuss here how to establish a threshhold, or peaceful nuclear explosions.

**Brezhnev:** Very well. I take it then we have reached an understanding in principle.

**Kissinger:** Yes.

**Brezhnev:** Good.

What about the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of nuclear submarines and other nuclear-bearing craft. Did we reach an agreement?

**Kissinger:** Not completely.

**Gromyko:** We had the impression we agreed on everything.

**Kissinger:** I know. When I use professorial language, it is very complicated.

**Gromyko:** That is a tragedy.

**Kissinger:** I thought we were talking about the Black Sea and Baltic.

**Gromyko:** It is a peaceful lake.

**Kissinger:** I think that will create great difficulties for us. Especially as it applies to aircraft carriers.

SECRET/NODIS

P840153-1086

SECRET/NODIS

-5-

**Brezhnev:** I really don't see any difference of principle between submarines and aircraft carriers. Both are capable of shooting at each other. Why should we be there?

**Kissinger:** Because, as I explained yesterday, carriers have many uses. [They smile.]

**Brezhnev:** You mean many political uses or many technical uses?

**Kissinger:** Both. But especially technical uses.

**Brezhnev:** Then I guess we will have to add some of our missile-carrying warships to effect a balance.

**Kissinger:** Our Chief of Naval Operations thinks there is already more than a balance.

**Brezhnev:** That is what our naval chiefs say but the other way around.

**Kissinger:** That is the tragedy.

**Brezhnev:** Yes, but surely you and I know how many submarines we have. You know how many we do, and we know how many you do. Because they roam about in a friendly manner, not far from each other.

**Kissinger:** That is in the spirit of cooperation.

**Gromyko:** The whole secret is they both watch each other openly.

**Kissinger:** As I said, missile-carrying submarines are somewhat easier to deal with than carriers.

**Brezhnev:** And when do you think that question could lend itself to a solution?

**Kissinger:** Missile-carrying submarines?

**Brezhnev:** Yes, in the Mediterranean.

**Kissinger:** First, it would depend on what framework. I've never examined that question, to be quite candid.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL

-12-

**Brennane:** Dr. Kissinger, I have derived great pleasure hearing the two Foreign Ministers talk at length with each other, and I keep thinking "How are they able to do this?" My conclusion is that I can never be a Foreign Minister. I would have to set aside a couple of years to study the most complicated words from every encyclopedia in the world and insert them one after the other in each phrase. I will set aside a couple of years and maybe then I will be up to it.

My second conclusion is that Foreign Ministers speak in such an interesting way but resolve nothing.

**Kissinger:** That gives them job security.

**Brennane:** I am really thinking of volunteering for one of these commissions in Vienna. It will be a school of practical study.

**Gromyko:** But not on Basket III.

**Brennane:** The other day I phoned Comrade Gromyko and I said "My deeply respected Andrey Andreyevich - - -"

**Kissinger:** The President never says that to me - but then I am not in office as long as he.

**Brennane:** And I said, "I was quite convinced that as soon as I telephoned, you would raise your phone and reciprocate. And I was so impressed I ventured never to forget that. I was impressed by your gesture for me, and you can be assured of my feelings for you for many years. And availing myself of this opportunity, I would like to know how you feel and at the same time inquire about the health of Lydia Dmitrievna, your spouse, and please pass on to her my best wishes, and please let me express my hope that the forthcoming telephone conversation will give you the greatest pleasure and bring forth no problems. Because my many years of experience give me every confidence you are directing every effort toward these goals that I and my colleagues are seeking, and I am sure our conversation will be a success. Now I will say a few words - but I forget one thing." But he then broke into conversation saying, "I entirely reciprocate your feelings." And I said, "Andrey Andreyevich, if I were not assured of your feelings I would not have called."

**Kissinger:** He would say to me, "I essentially reciprocate your feelings."

P840153-1094

SECRET/NODIS

-13-

**Brezhnev:** My call was to find out when your plane was coming. [Laughter]
He said, "It is coming one hour late." We talked twenty-two minutes. But
I wanted to hear the two Foreign Ministers talk to each other.

**Kissinger:** But I am a new Foreign Minister . . .

**Brezhnev:** I have one shortcoming: I like a precise discussion. But we
talked for twenty minutes about our mutual respect and admiration, and we
concentrate on the last word. So I listened to you most attentively. You
agreed to inform each other. I will inform President Nixon, Korniyenko,
Sonnenfeldt.

**Kissinger:** I know Sonnenfeldt was communicating with somebody, because
he is not communicating with me.

**Brezhnev:** I haven't even been able to suspect Sonnenfeldt of ever engaging
in clandestine activity. The only thing I can guess is that he writes you
notes and tells you "Don't agree to anything they say."

**Kissinger:** What really happens is, I move my lips and he speaks.

When I speak to your Foreign Minister, he never says, "I entirely agree."
The most I get is, "I essentially agree with you."

**Brezhnev:** As I see it, that is again a case of his reciprocating your words.

"Thank you, Mr. Kissinger, for thanking me for my gratitude. I am deeply
indebted to you. Thank you for my hearing of these words so pleasant to
my soul."

That is what is called a respite or disengagement.

**Kissinger:** I don't think I would achieve this felicity of phrase . . .

**Brezhnev:** [referring to Rodman] What is he writing this for?

**Kissinger:** We need this for our diplomatic language training.

**Gromyko:** I don't know what he is writing.

**Kissinger:** We will initial it. We will introduce it into our Foreign Service
charm course.

SECRET/NODIS

P840153-1100

SECRET/NODIS

19

**Brezhnev:** I think, Dr. Kissinger, we could reach an agreement on that on a bilateral basis, that is, we could agree that we would discontinue testing, say two years, and at the end of that period, review the situation to see where we stand.

**Gromyko:** Without including a formal proposal in the agreement.

**Kissinger:** That is a possibility. But we should have technical discussions about the threshold. We are prepared to have them either in Washington or Moscow.

**Brezhnev:** We agree.

**Kissinger:** Then we should form an opinion, but in principle.

**Brezhnev:** Good.

Now, what about the question then of reduction of forces in Central Europe?

**Kissinger:** I think we should discuss that.

Can we take a 10-minute break? And bring our technical expert in?

**Brezhnev:** Certainly.

**Kissinger:** We are prepared.

[There was a break from 7:05 to 7:30. Mr. Lodal came in. Brezhnev roughed up Lodal's hair and commented that he needed a haircut; Kissinger agreed. Dobrynin pointed out that Lodal's hair was not long by American standards. On his way back to his seat, Brezhnev picked up Mr. Rodman's case containing Dr. Kissinger's briefing books and walked off into the next room. Mr. Rodman followed him. Brezhnev turned around and came back. Mr. Rodman retrieved the case. Mr. Gromyko affirmed that it was a joke. The meeting then resumed.]

MBFR

**Brezhnev:** I would like to say a couple of words on this question.

**Kissinger:** Please.

SECRET/NODIS

OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER
TOKYO

August 4, 1993

Dear Henry,

Many thanks for your note of July 27. I am touched
by your warmth and personal feelings. As you may know,
I will leave the office of the Prime Minister tomorrow.
I have cherished my friendship with you, and would like to
reciprocate the desire to see each other more often in the
future.

With warmest personal regards,

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, NY 10020
U. S. A.

AUG 16 1993

CONSULATE GENERAL OF JAPAN

299 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10171
(212) 371-8222

August 11, 1993

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, N.Y. 10020

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I have been asked by former Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to forward the enclosed letter to you. He is very appreciative of your support and values your friendship highly.

On behalf of both of us, I would like to take the opportunity to thank you for your continued interest in Japan-U.S. relations.

I hope that all is well with you and look forward to seeing you soon.