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reaching some 550,000. The official US policy on
withdrawals was the San Antonio formula formulated by
President Johnson, which required a prior North Vietnam
withdrawal and a reduction in the level of guerilla
violence before an American withdrawal. The dissident
Democrats - McGovern, Kennedy et al. - were recommending
an end of search-and-destroy operations and the
beginning of mutual withdrawal - a plank rejected by
the Democratic convention.

Nobody could have expected Richard Nixon - known
for relatively hard-line views all of his political
life - to go beyond the minority plank of the
Democratic party. But he did. By August 1969 he had
accepted the minority plank of the Democrats and had
gone far beyond it to a process of unilateral American
withdrawal.

From March 1970 onward, Hanoi knew that we were
prepared to establish a schedule of unilateral
withdrawal and indeed did so during the year. What we
would not do is give in to the one demand Hanoi did not
abandon until 1972: to overthrow the Saigon
administration and to replace it with their appointees.
(They clothed it in the demand for coalition
government, but in the secret talks we never found a
known political figure acceptable to them, even among
opposition leaders.) We offered many formulae for free
elections after US withdrawal, even including the
resignation of Thieu several months before the election
- an offer for which he never forgave us.

An agreement on honorable terms was thus
unavailable until 1972. Despite your sneering tone,
the definition of honor was quite simple: we would not
end the war by imposing a communist government on
people allied with us. Thus our only option was a
staged unilateral withdrawal. Had we tried to withdraw
without a political settlement faster than we did, we
might have been caught in a crossfire between North and
South Vietnamese forces and have left tens of thousands
of hostages. Your snide authors can ridicule all this
but they had no responsibility.

Be that as it may, as soon as Hanoi dropped its
political condition we settled in a matter of weeks.

There are certainly serious questions left over
from the Vietnam tragedy: was it really so bizarre not
to turn over to the tender mercies of Hanoi millions

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who in reliance on America's word had opposed the
North? Was it immoral to seek to avoid the boat
people, the concentration camps and the carnage in
Cambodia? Was it really so absurd to propose genuinely
free elections as a test of American honor?

I do not argue that mistakes were not made - even
less that a serious debate should not be held. If
there is a loss of confidence in this country, those in
government must bear a heavy responsibility. But a
major publication like *Time* ought to ask itself about
its role when it turns a tragedy into a psychodrama and
when its callous writers claim a monopoly of anguish.

Mr. Henry Muller
Managing Editor
TIME, Inc.
Time & Life Building
24th Floor
Rockefeller Center
New York, New York 10022

[LC]

DEC 12 1990

OFFICE OF RICHARD NIXON

December 11, 1990

Memorandum to Henry A. Kissinger:

I thought you might like to see
some unconventional wisdom on Gorbachev,
the Gulf and other current foreign
policy issues.

Regards.

REMARKS BY FORMER PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON
TO THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
PRESIDENT'S FORUM

New York City, December 7, 1990

A WAR ABOUT PEACE

In his book, _Great Contemporaries_, Winston Churchill described Lord Rosebery, a 19th century British Prime Minister, as one who had the misfortune of living in a time of great men and small events. Our leaders today do not have that problem. There is no question but that we live in a time of great events.

Nineteen eighty-nine even more than nineteen forty-five, which marked the end of World War II, will be remembered as the year of the century for the forces of freedom in the world. Nineteen forty-five marked the defeat of fascism. Nineteen eighty-nine marked the defeat of communism, an even greater threat to peace and freedom.

As a result of what happened in this historic year, we hear
today:

The Cold War is over.

The United States and the Soviet Union are no longer
adversaries but allies as we were in World War II.

We are witnessing the end of history -- a time when great
strategic issues no longer divide us and when we will compete
economically rather than militarily and when we can direct our
attention to the environment, global warming, world poverty, and
other issues where we have common interests.

We are told that we can rely on the United Nations to deal
with aggressive nations.

12

We see an unholy alliance developing between isolationists
on the right and the left who for different reasons say that the
United States should withdraw its forces from Europe and Asia and
concentrate on solving our problems at home.

Conventional wisdom in the Washington Beltway -- the modern
version of Plato's Cave -- is that we are on the brink of forging
a new world order in which all nations will be dedicated to
justice and international law.

Before going that far, let us see what has changed, why
changes have occurred, what has not changed, and what America's
role should be on the world stage now that the Cold War seems to
be over.

The changes in 1989 have been breathtaking. The Berlin Wall
came down. Germany was united. Communist governments were
driven from power in all of the countries in Eastern Europe and
except in Romania, this was accomplished peacefully.

The frosting on the cake occurred in our own hemisphere
early this year when Violetta Chamorro defeated Daniel Ortega in
a free election, the first time this has happened to a communist
leader in seventy years.

The most significant changes have occurred in the Soviet
Union symbolized by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mikhail
Gorbachev. Consider what he has done:

He withdrew the Red Army from Afghanistan.

He did not use the Red Army to keep his communist clients in
power in Eastern Europe as did Khrushchev in 1956 in Hungary and
Brezhnev in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

13

He has allowed West Germany to unite with East Germany.

He has negotiated arms control agreements.

He has adopted political and economic reforms which are so revolutionary that some observers have speculated that rather than being a dedicated communist and a Russian nationalist, he may be a closet democrat and a closet capitalist at home and a sincere partisan of peace and freedom abroad.

Before reaching those conclusions let us see why he acted as he did. In nineteen eighty-five, shortly after Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union, I asked Hu Yaobang, the Secretary General of the Chinese Communist Party, if he thought Gorbachev would adopt economic reforms in the Soviet Union like those Deng Xiaoping had adopted in China. He replied, "If he doesn't, the Soviet Union will disappear as a great power in the twenty-first century." He was right and Gorbachev knew it.

Look at what he confronted when he came to power six years ago. Everywhere he looked, communism was suffering from terminal illness.

His Third World communist colonies were all liabilities costing huge subsidies from Moscow and in Afghanistan costing lives as well as money.

In Eastern Europe, forces of revolution against Soviet-supported rulers were ready to explode.

At home, the Soviet economy was a basketcase plagued with corruption, alcoholism, and inefficiency.

Abroad, he saw that his major adversary -- the United States, under the leadership of President Reagan, had recovered from the malaise of the late seventies, was restoring its

1/4

military strength, and was embarking on a new weapons system -- SDI -- which the Soviet Union lacked the resources to match.

Gorbachev had no choice. He had to retrench abroad and reform at home. His first priority, then and now, was to restore the health of the Soviet economy. This was the most revolutionary decision of a Soviet leader since the Russian Revolution which brought the communists to power in 1918. For seventy years, Soviet economic policy had served Soviet foreign policy. Now Soviet foreign policy had to serve Soviet economic policy.

This explains his actions:

He withdrew the Red Army from Afghanistan not only because it was costing men as well as money, but primarily because it helped create a peaceful image for Gorbachev which opened the door for good relations with the West and the economic assistance he needed for his desperately sick economy.

He had to choose between using force to keep his puppets in power in Eastern Europe and economic aid from Western Europe. Not surprisingly, he chose Western Europe.

He let East Germany go because he needed financial aid from West Germany.

In the Gulf, he had to choose between his ally Iraq and financial aid from the nations allied against Iraq. Again, not surprisingly, he chose the allies. It has already begun to pay off. Just last week he negotiated a loan of $3 billion from Saudi Arabia, a country which before Iraq invaded Kuwait had not even recognized the communist government of the Soviet Union.

75

Whatever the reason, we welcome what he did. He is, without
question, very different from the Soviet leaders of the past. He
has changed since the time he totally supported Brezhnev's
aggressive policies in his relentless climb to power. But it is
a change of the head, not the heart. At a time he is using his
head, we should not lose ours.

Let us take a hard look at the Soviet Union after six years
of Gorbachev's leadership.

His political reforms have been revolutionary. Where there
was no freedom of the press, there is now some. Where there was
no freedom to criticize Soviet leaders, there is now some. Where
there were no free elections, there are now some. But we must
bear in mind that while Gorbachev deserves great credit for these
reforms, he has also put through legislation which makes him the
most powerful Soviet leader since Stalin. All of the evidence
points to the conclusion that his goal is not to abandon
communism but to save it, not to dismantle the Soviet Union but
to preserve it peacefully -- if possible but using force if
necessary.

While he deserves credit for his bold political reforms, we
must face up to the fact that his economic reforms have been a
total failure. For example, while China's per capita income has
doubled in the past ten years, Soviet per capita income under
Gorbachev has gone down. Bread lines have replaced vodka lines.
To get through the winter, Gorbachev has had to go hat-in-hand to
get assistance from his new friends in the West. The shopping
list he gave Prime Minister Mulroney indicates the depth of his
problem. It included pork, beef, flour, powdered milk, and

16

peanut oil.

The results of Gorbachev's policies in the Soviet Union are now clear for everyone to see. To put it bluntly, the Soviet economy is collapsing and the Soviet empire is disintegrating. Fourteen of the fifteen Soviet republics have declared independence from Moscow. The communist idea -- the glue that held the Soviet empire together -- has lost its potency. Of all the changes in 1989, the most significant is that communism has lost the ideological battle. In the Third World, in Eastern Europe, and most significantly in the Soviet Union people know that communist socialism doesn't work. The most dramatic proof of this is that while Gorbachev is enormously popular in the United States and in other non-communist countries, he is supported by less than twenty-five percent of the Soviet people. As has been the case in Eastern Europe, instead of a reforming communist as their leader, the people of the Soviet Union want reforms without communism.

This raises the key question. Because of his more benign foreign policy, should we help Gorbachev with his problems at home? The answer is that except for humanitarian aid we should help him only if it serves our interests as well as his.

His economic reforms do not meet that test. It is now obvious that they do not serve his interests. He is trying to combine a command economy with a free market economy. It won't work. There is no halfway house between communism and capitalism. As Andre Sakharov observed shortly before his death, "In the absence of radical reforms, to provide aid and

/7

technological assistance to the Soviet Union only serves to prop
up a failed system and to delay the advent of democracy."

Even if his economic reforms go far enough to work, it does
not serve our interest to provide aid to Gorbachev unless he
adopts a less threatening defense and foreign policy. While he
has announced cuts in his defense budget, his Foreign Minister
has stated that the Soviet Union is still spending twenty-five
percent of its GNP on defense. In contrast, the United States is
spending six percent of its GNP on defense. Even with his cuts
in his Soviet military forces, as a result of modernization, they
will be leaner but stronger than when Gorbachev came to power six
years ago. After the projected cuts in long range nuclear
weapons in the START agreement, Gorbachev will still have thirty
thousand nuclear weapons, the largest conventional army in the
world, and a modern blue-water navy.

There are some who say that if the United States makes
further cuts in its defense budget, Gorbachev will follow suit.
They are wrong. There is no question but that Gorbachev is a
refreshing new kind of Soviet leader. But he is not a
philanthropist. We should reduce our nuclear forces and our SDI
program only if he agrees to reduce his.

In foreign policy, we should applaud his withdrawing the Red
Army from Afghanistan. But except for Nicaragua where the people
voted out their communist leader, every one of Gorbachev's
communist clients in the Third World is still in power subsidized
by as much as $15 billion a year by the Soviet Union.

Before we consider helping Gorbachev, he should help himself
by drastically cutting his huge military budget and by cutting

/8

off aid and arms sales to Castro and other anti-U.S. communist
dictators.

The Cold War may be over in Eastern Europe. It is time for
Gorbachev to end the Cold War in the Third World.

What will happen to Gorbachev? Some of the experts give
him only a fifty percent chance of staying in power over the next
year. I believe the odds are considerably better than that.
There are three possible scenarios. He could adopt bolder, free
market reforms which might have a chance to rescue the Soviet
economy from its enormous crisis. I do not think this is likely
because I believe Gorbachev will not be able to bring himself to
cut the umbilical cord which unites him with his life-long
Marxist ideology. A second possibility is that he could be
replaced. This is not likely because there is no one currently
on the scene, including Yelstin, who has the support in the armed
forces, the KGB, and the Soviet bureaucracy necessary to bring
about a successful coup. The third scenario, and the most likely
one, is that Gorbachev, the tough-minded pragmatic politician
that he is, will use the extraordinary new powers he has acquired
for himself as President of the Soviet Union to crack down on
dissident groups -- using military force if necessary -- and will
stay in power by revoking some of the progressive political
reforms he has previously initiated. This will cost him some
support in the West. But unless he resumes an aggressive foreign
policy abroad, most Western political leaders will conveniently
ignore the repressive measures he adopts at home to stay in
power. As far as the United States is concerned, we should base

/9

our defense and foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union not on
speculations about Gorbachev's intent but on the reality of
Soviet capabilities as a nuclear and conventional superpower.

Let us now turn to Europe. We are witnessing the unusual
phenomenon of isolationists on the right and left urging that since
the Cold War is over, we should withdraw all of our forces from
Europe, particularly since the nations of Europe have recovered
from the devastation of World War II and should be able to
provide for their own defense.

But what would Europe be without an American military
presence? Great Britain and France are minor nuclear powers.
Germany is an economic superpower without nuclear weapons. The
Soviet Union even without Eastern Europe will still be a nuclear
superpower with the world's largest conventional army. No one
can seriously suggest that the British and French would use their
nuclear forces to deter a Soviet attack on Germany. With
United States forces gone from Europe and NATO dissolved, Germany
would have the option of going nuclear or neutral and would be
strongly tempted to become a political and economic ally of the
Soviet Union. Either of these options is bad for Europe, bad for
Germany, and bad for the United States.

We can and should cut our NATO forces substantially because
of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. But a significant
conventional and nuclear U.S. presence in Europe is necessary as
insurance against a possible renewal of the Soviet threat and as
reassurance for those who fear a resurgent German threat. I do
not share the concern that a united Germany would again become an
aggressive military power. But despite their public statements,

10

many European leaders have that concern.

Let us now look at Asia. Conservative and liberal isolationists say that because there is no longer a Soviet threat, we should bring our forces home from Japan and Korea particularly since they are now rich enough to defend themselves. They are wrong. Keeping an American military presence in Europe is important. Keeping one in Asia is indispensable if we are to have peace in the Pacific. Let us look at Asia without the United States.

You have the Soviet Union, a nuclear superpower which while reducing its forces in Europe has strengthened its naval and nuclear forces in Asia.

You have China which will be a nuclear superpower within ten to twenty years.

You have Japan, an economic superpower without nuclear weapons and without a U.S. defense guarantee. Japan would have no choice but to go nuclear or to make a deal with the strongest of its neighbors, the Soviet Union. Japan can afford to massively increase its defense forces. But even more than is the case with Germany's neighbors in Europe, the Japanese in Asia are feared by the Koreans, the Chinese, the Philippines, the Taiwanese, the Malaysians, and the Indonesians, all of whom suffered under Japanese occupation in World War II. A U.S. military presence in Japan and Korea is indispensable if we are to preserve peace in the Pacific.

Let us now look at China. We should continue to deplore the tragedy of Tiananmen Square eighteen months ago. But the Bush

11

Administration is right to restore diplomatic and economic cooperation with the P.R.C. This is in our interest and in the interest of the Chinese people. It is in our interest because China has a veto in the U.N. Security Council and plays an indispensable role in trying to resolve the continuing conflicts in Southeast Asia. And in the non-military area, how can we possibly have a coordinated international initiative on problems of environment with one-fifth of the world's people not cooperating?

The restoration of a cooperative relationship between China and the United States is without question in the interest of human rights for the Chinese people. China is not a democracy and will not become one in the foreseeable future. But as we saw in Korea and in Taiwan, economic progress inevitably leads to political progress. Economic cooperation, tourism, Chinese students studying in the United States will strengthen the prospects for political reform. That is why Secretary Baker was following the right course in meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister and why the Administration was justified in supporting the resumption of World Bank loans to China. For the United States to continue to isolate China economically and diplomatically only strengthens the hardliners in China. The only hope for political reform is to re-establish the cooperative relationship we had with China before the tragic events at Tiananmen some eighteen months ago.

Let us now look at the crisis in the Persian Gulf. It is time for some straight talk as to why 400,000 young Americans are spending Christmas in the deserts of Saudi Arabia.

12

Some liberal pundits and politicians have criticized Bob Dole for saying that we are there for oil and Jim Baker for saying that we are there for jobs. There are more important reasons, but let us not be so hypocritical as to say that preventing an international outlaw from controlling forty percent of the world's oil reserves was not a critical interest of the United States and a justifiable reason for sending forces to the Gulf. Let us suppose that instead of Kuwait this was Nepal, or Upper Volta, or Paraguay being gobbled up by a neighboring state. Does anyone seriously suggest that we would be sending in the Marines to liberate them?

It is equally hypocritical to contend that we are there in support of democracy. None of our Arab allies are democracies and putting the Emir of Kuwait back in power is not going to bring democracy to the Kuwaiti people.

And it is not enough to justify our sending armed forces to the Gulf because Saddam Hussein happens to be a cruel leader. President Bush has been criticized for equating him with Hitler. Whether he is that bad is irrelevant. He is bad enough. His army rapes, loots, and murders the defenseless people of Kuwait. He has held thousands of hostages as human shields. To praise him for releasing hostages he should not have taken in the first place is ludicrous. He has violated international law by using chemical weapons in his war against Iran and even against his own people. If our aim in the Gulf were to punish cruel leaders, we would not be allied with Assad who ordered the massacre of 20,000 innocent men, women, and children in the city of Hama in his own

/13

country, who has supported international terrorism and possibly
the bombing of civilian aircraft, and whose troops have committed
brutal atrocities in his campaign to dominate Lebanon.

We are in the Gulf for two major reasons.

Saddam Hussein has unlimited ambitions to dominate one of
the most important strategic areas in the world. Because he has
oil, he has the means to acquire the weapons he needs for
aggression against his neighbors, including at some future time, a
nuclear arsenal. If he succeeds in Kuwait, he will attack others
and will use whatever weapons he has including chemical and
nuclear to achieve his goals. If we don't stop him now we will
have to stop him later when the cost in the lives of young
Americans will be infinitely greater. If the Baker diplomatic
initiative fails to get him out of Kuwait and if it becomes
apparent that sanctions won't work, we must use force as approved
by the United Nations resolution. If it comes to that, our
diplomats should always remember that where an insatiable
aggressor is involved, while war is bad, a bad peace is worse
because it can lead to a bigger war.

There is an even more important long-term reason for turning
back his aggression. The whole world is heaving a collective
sigh of relief as the Cold War appears to be coming to an end.
Many believe that we are entering a new era where armed
aggression will no longer be an instrument of national policy.
We can't be sure that their hopes will be justified. But we
can be sure that if Saddam Hussein gains from his aggression
against Kuwait there are other potential aggressors in the world
who will be tempted to wage war against their neighbors. If we

/14

fail to roll back his aggression -- peacefully if possible, by force if necessary -- no potential aggressor in the future will be deterred by warnings from the United States or by U.N. resolutions. If we succeed in getting him out of Kuwait and in eliminating his capacity to wage aggressive war in the future, we will have the credibility to deter aggression elsewhere without sending in American armed forces because potential aggressors will know that when the United States warns against aggression we have the means and the will to back up our warnings.

We all hope that Saddam Hussein will wake up out of his dream world and get out of Kuwait. Some of the Administration's critics sincerely believe that diplomacy and sanctions will eventually convince Saddam Hussein that he should get out of Kuwait. We cannot be sure that they are right but we can be sure that diplomacy and sanctions will have no chance whatever of succeeding unless Saddam Hussein knows that if he doesn't get out of Kuwait peacefully the American people and our allies will be united in using military force to drive him out. His choice is between peace now or suicide later for his country and possibly for himself.

If we have to resort to force, it will not be just a war about oil. It will not be a war about hostages. It will not be a war about democracy. It will be a war about peace -- not just peace in our time but peace for our children and grandchildren for generations to come. That is why our commitment in the Gulf is a highly moral enterprise.

Now that we have travelled around the world, let us look at

[LC]

/15

the United States. Forty-four years ago in his Iron Curtain speech in Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill said, "The United States stands at the pinnacle of world power. This is a solemn moment for the American democracy. For with primacy in power is joined an awe inspiring accountability for the future."

Those words are as true today as they were then. The Soviet threat has declined but as the crisis in the Gulf demonstrates, the world is still a dangerous place and the United States must continue to play the leading role on the world's stage -- not as a world's policeman but in conflicts like the Gulf where our vital interests are involved. We have to play that role because there is no one else to take our place -- not the British, not the French, not the Russians, not the Japanese, and despite some woolly-headed dreaming to the contrary, not the United Nations.

Some question whether we are able to play that role. It is fashionable in some academic circles to say that the United States, like the Soviet Union, is in decline and no longer has the means to play a leading role on the world's stage.

Don't you believe it. We have some awesome problems -- drugs, crime, the urban underclass, the deficit. But before World War II the United States produced twenty-four percent of the world's GNP. Today we produce twenty-six percent and by the end of the century it will be twenty-eight percent -- two and one-half times as much as Japan and five times as much as a united Germany.

The United States today is the world's only complete superpower -- economic, military, and political. As Herb Stein has pointed out, "The United States is a very rich country -- not

/16

rich enough to do everything but rich enough to do everything
important."

There is a major new factor, however, since Churchill spoke
those words in 1946. For forty-five years after the end of World
War II, the United States has carried the major burden of foreign
aid, including aid to Japan and Germany who are now our major
economic competitors. It is time for other rich countries like
Japan and the nations of Western Europe to assume the major
portion of that burden since our military power still protects
them as well as ourselves. For example, Japan gets sixty-percent
of its oil from the Gulf. The United States gets ten percent of
its oil from the Gulf. At a time when we are doubling our troop
strength in the Gulf, Japan should at the very least double its
economic contribution which now is only $2 billion a year.

This brings us to America's major role in the world today.
It is not military or economic. It is ideological.

Communism has been rejected because it didn't work. Freedom
is now on trial: will freedom provide the economic and political
progress the communists promised and did not produce? Democracy
and freedom do not automatically produce progress. Look at the
enormous problems in the new democracies in Eastern Europe and
the problems in Brazil and Argentina which are trying to make the
painful transition from command to free-market economies.

The United States is the oldest and most successful
democracy in the world. Our challenge is to provide an example
for others to follow.

If we are to provide that example we cannot tolerate a

/17

permanent underclass. We cannot tolerate second-rate education.
We cannot tolerate poor productivity. We cannot tolerate
political gridlock. There are some who say that the answer to
our problems is to give more power to government. We reject that
proposition. Our answer is for government to adopt policies
which give more power to people.

America is a great country. We have become great not
because of what government has done for people but because of
what people have done for themselves and their country. Only by
policies which make our economy sound, protective, compassionate
and free can we provide an example for others to follow.

It is because I believe our Republican candidates support
such policies that I am here today. And that is why I believe
that by contributing to their campaigns you are contributing to a
better future for America and the world.

As you know, this is the centennial of the birth of one of
the greatest of our Presidents, Dwight Eisenhower. It is also
the centennial of the birth of another giant of the twentieth
century -- Charles de Gaulle. DeGaulle once said, "France is
never her true self except when she is engaged in a great
enterprise."

I profoundly believe that is true of America; it is true of
individuals; it is true of every man and woman in this room.

What is our great enterprise? Exactly forty-nine years ago
today, the attack on Pearl Harbor plunged the United States into
World War II. Fifty-six million people lost their lives in that
war, making the twentieth century the bloodiest in history. Our
challenge is to make the twenty-first century a century of peace

/18

and to leave as our legacy not just the defeat of communism and
fascism but the victory of freedom.

This is truly a great enterprise worthy of a great people.
Only by meeting that challenge can we be true to ourselves.

OCT 01 1990

RICHARD NIXON

September 26, 1990

577 CHESTNUT RIDGE ROAD
WOODCLIFF LAKE, NEW JERSEY

In view of the incredibly naive positive appraisals of Gorbachev's proposed economic reforms which have appeared in most of the prestige media, I thought you might find it refreshing to see a more realistic analysis of recent developments in the Soviet Union.

The memorandum was prepared by Monica Crowley, a recent Colgate graduate, who has joined my staff as a foreign policy consultant.

Hon. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

[LC]

WHY GORBACHEV'S NEW ECONOMIC PLAN WILL NOT WORK

by Monica Crowley

President Gorbachev has finally recognized the magnitude of the Soviet Union's economic crisis and has determined that drastic times call for drastic measures. But they are to be his measures, implemented on his terms.

In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on September 21, he issued an appeal for expanded powers. He explained that the crisis requires immediate address by a more powerful executive. Consequently, he claims, he would be able to take political and economic action with the necessary dispatch and resolve.

Prime Minister Ryzhkov, supporting Gorbachev's proposal, emphasized its urgency by pointing to the potential potato shortage. As of September 18, only 2% of Moscow's winter stock of potatoes and only 10% of Leningrad's requirement have been accumulated. Gorbachev, he argues, would be able to preemptively extinguish social malcontent--potentially revolutionary--by exercising broad executive control. He claims that if these powers are granted, he will be better equipped to manage the ensuing economic chaos and associated social unrest. If these powers are not granted, any resulting revolutionary upheaval will not be blamed on Gorbachev, but rather on the parliament that would not grant him the power he needed for its prevention.

Gorbachev is a brilliant politician, a master of consensus-building and persuasion. His ability to effect compromise is an indispensable skill in managing political issues. But he is inviting disaster by trying to use this compromise capability to placate both sides of the economic debate.

He fails to realize that while compromise is useful and effective in resolving Soviet political disputes, it is the wrong way to decide economic questions. Gorbachev advocates a compromise between the Shatalin plan to transfer the system to a form of capitalism in five hundred days, and the Ryzhkov plan to retain elements of the command economy and institute economic reform more moderately.

He does not recognize that a free-market economy and a command economy cannot be combined. Their basic principles are so fundamentally different that any plan with characteristics of both will collapse under the weight of its own contradictions and negations.

Gorbachev had the opportunity to choose between either free-markets or central planning. He did not. He is depending on his style of leadership to carry him through this controversy. But he cannot apply a political solution to an economic crisis.

His approach to this economic debate illustrates his dilemma. He is advocating greater authoritarian and administrative control--precisely the pillars of the command system he has been claiming he wants to dismantle. This discrepancy is a revealing commentary on Gorbachev, the leader. His words have inspired, but his leadership has failed to deliver. And the reason for this nonperformance is clear: Gorbachev may be President of the Soviet Union, but he is still the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. His new economic plan tries to reconcile characteristics of both offices. Stripped of its free-market rhetoric, the plan, if implemented with his new executive control, will simply solidify Gorbachev's own central power.

RICHARD NIXON

April 9, 1990

I could not agree more with you that we
should not become involved in a public pissing
contest with regard to the positions we advocated
during the final Vietnam War negotiations.

As you are probably far more aware than I am
since you make so many public appearances, our
"friends" in the media constantly try to drive a
wedge between us. Among the preconceived notions
which seemed to be behind many of the questions
during almost four hours of interviews were the
following:

That on a number of occasions you acted on
your own in negotiations, not only on Vietnam but
on other issues without getting my approval and in
some cases contrary to my own views.

That you were "more trusting" of the North
Vietnamese than I was.

That you opposed the so-called Christmas
bombing in 1972. (They base this on reports that
appeared in Scotty Reston's and Joe Kraft's
columns.) And that you reluctantly went along when
I insisted that we had to resume the bombing.

That your motives in trying to get a
settlement before the election were primarily
political.

I tried to knock down all of these mis-
conceptions. But as you know, when a reporter
starts with a preconceived notion, it is difficult
to get him to change his evaluation.

Page 2
The Honorable Henry Kissinger

April 9, 1990

As you will of course recall, you often told
me, as I have noted in my diaries, that Nancy
believed that in view of McGovern's way-out
position, our continuing to take a hardline on
negotiations was politically helpful rather than
harmful. While I shared that view, I often told
you that if we could get the right deal before the
election, we should do so regardless of what we
thought the political consequences might be. If
we couldn't get the right deal, we should refuse
to make an agreement even though we thought that
the political effect would be negative. I
believed that you shared that view then and still
do.

There was only one area where we had a
significant difference of opinion. I felt that
you had more confidence in the negotiating process
than I had. On the other hand, as I noted in my
*Memoirs*, I had to admit, once you negotiated the
Paris Peace Agreement, that you were right and I
was wrong on this score.

Since I assume that Walter Isaacson's
questions will try to tear off this scab again, my
present intention is not to agree to an interview
unless you strongly feel otherwise. It isn't that
I do not consider him to be a top-flight reporter,
but I do not want to provide any further
opportunities for those who were critical then and
are critical now of our efforts to end the war
with honor to drive a wedge between us.

With warm regards,

The Honorable
Henry Kissinger

HENRY A. KISSINGER

PERSONAL

April 2, 1990

Dear Mr. President:

I read your interview in *Time* with a mixture of
melancholy and amazement.

Melancholy because I shall always be grateful to
you for giving me the opportunity to serve my
adopted country and repay it for the safe haven
from persecution for my family and me. And I
shall forever consider it a privilege to have
worked for a President whose role in foreign policy
was seminal in charting the main directions of
everything that followed since. It is a pity that
you permitted yourself to be drawn by *Time* into a
typical journalistic trap designed to make an
extraordinary record controversial by tempting its
implementors to debate their respective contribu-
tions. Provocative questions of journalists should
not be confused with reality. Though you seemed to
go along with your interrogators' implication, the
fact is that I have never - either in my memoirs or
elsewhere - questioned who was in charge nor implied
that I substituted my political or strategic judge-
ment for yours.

Amazement because a host of factual inaccuracies
escalated previous incorrect innuendos. If you
wish, I would be happy to make available to John
Taylor the various memoranda, telephone conversa-
tions and other documentation that leave no doubt
of the inaccuracy of these assertions. Let me
point out some flagrant examples:

The "Peace is at Hand" press conference: You state
that you did not want to "breathe a word about ne-
gotiations" but I went public to help you politically
in the "peace is at hand" press conference. But

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919
TELEFAX (212) 759-0042

p. 2

PERSONAL

the record does not sustain this: I was as eager as
you to keep the negotiations secret. However, on
the morning of October 26 Hanoi broadcast the fact
of the negotiations as well as the text of the
agreement as it then stood. It invited you to
send a representative to Paris to sign the text.
Saigon soon weighed in with its own version of
events. In these circumstances, it was impossible
to be silent. You therefore - quite correctly -
instructed me in the Oval Office to brief the media
about the Administration position. Unbeknownst to
me - I learned of it only after the press conference
was completed - you instructed Ziegler to turn on the
sound for television. Until that moment TV had not
been permitted to use my voice because of the fear -
to paraphrase your own remark - that my accent might
jar Midwestern constituents. We can only speculate
whether I would have chosen different words had I
known I was on "live".

The notion that I wanted a settlement before the
election for domestic political reasons. A review
of the documents - which, again, I will happily
share with John Taylor - leaves no doubt that I
never urged any action for domestic political
reasons. The pace of negotiations was determined
largely by Hanoi. After stonewalling for three and
a half years, they switched tactics in September
and began to move toward our position. On October
8 they accepted the secret proposals of May 1971,
which you had approved, as well as your public
peace offers of January 25 and May 8. Prior to
the October 8 negotiation - on September 28, to be
exact - you accepted Hanoi's proposal that the
October 8 talks last three days, with a view to
settling by the end of October. It was the right
decision. Had we refused to negotiate on that basis,
Hanoi would have published its proposals immediate-
ly and our position would have become untenable.
How could we refuse Hanoi's acceptance of your
proposals as a basis for negotiations? How could
we have broken off talks in which we had obtained

p. 3

PERSONAL

greater concessions than you had publically asked for? You had approved every negotiating proposal, all of which were submitted to you before every negotiating session. You will not find in any of them or anywhere else references to their impact on the forthcoming election. Nor do they show any disagreement by you with the various negotiating positions.

The implication that I was more trusting of North Vietnam than the President. This, too, repeats previous innuendos; it is no more supported by the record than the other charges. There was indeed a difference between us concerning not Hanoi's motives but its intentions. In late August you sent me a note via Haig pointing out that you thought the deadlock could not be broken and that a continued deadlock would give ammunition to your opponent in the election. I was of the view that Hanoi would make concessions not because I trusted our adversaries but because I thought they were realists. Once Hanoi had accepted your proposals, the debate between us became moot. You knew that the negotiations with Le Duc Tho starting October 8 would be decisive. You had approved Hanoi's request for a three-day meeting. On October 2 you told Gromyko that this meeting of October 8 would represent our final effort to conclude the agreement by the end of October. In fact, in the three days starting October 8 Hanoi made concessions going beyond your public demands. In these circumstances, it was no longer possible to argue that our bargaining position would improve after the election, and you never did so. We were running out of money, having spent so much of the year's budget to repel Hanoi's spring offensive. Laird had already proposed a 40% reduction in aircraft sorties and a withdrawal of all forces (mostly B-52's) sent to Asia to deal with the spring offensive. Harlow had stressed that a continuing resolution to replenish funds would result in a bitter fight with uncertain outcome and would probably end with a Congressionally imposed terminal date, that is to say, our defeat.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Dear Mr. President:

Melancholy because I shall always be grateful to
you for giving me the opportunity to serve my
adopted country and repay it for the safe haven
from persecution for my family and me. And I
shall forever consider it a privilege to have
worked for a President whose role in foreign policy
was seminal in charting the main directions of
everything that followed since. It is a pity that
you permitted yourself to be drawn by *Time* into a
typical journalistic trap designed to make an
extraordinary record controversial by tempting its
implementors to debate their respective contribu-
tions. Provocative questions of journalists should
not be confused with reality. Though you seemed
to go along with your interrogators' implication,
the fact is that neither did I question who was in
charge nor imply that *at times* I substituted my
political or strategic judgement for yours.

p. 4

It was not clear what we would be fighting for
after Hanoi had accepted and gone beyond your own
proposals.

A public debate between us would be a disaster. It
would be all the sadder in the light of my admira-
tion for your leadership during a tragic period.
None of these tactical issues will affect what I
believe must be the verdict of history: that in a
desperate hour you vindicated America's honor with
a foreign policy which, under your leadership, set
the basic directions culminating in the revolutionary
changes of last year.

I can think of nothing that our long-time critics
would greet more joyfully than an opportunity to
pit our recollections against each other.

The Honorable
Richard M. Nixon
577 Chestnut Ridge Road
Woodcliff Lake, N.J. 07675

p. 3

PERSONAL

The implication that I was more trusting of North Vietnam than the President. This, too, repeats previous innuendos; it is no more supported by the record than the other charges. There was indeed a difference between us concerning not Hanoi's motives but its intentions. In late August you sent me a note via Haig pointing out that you thought the deadlock could not be broken and that a continued deadlock would give ammunition to your opponent in the election. I was of the view that Hanoi would make concessions not because I trusted our adversaries but because I thought they were realists. Once Hanoi had accepted your proposals, the debate between us became moot. You knew that the negotiations with Le Duc Tho starting October 8 would be decisive. You had approved Hanoi's request for a three-day meeting for the purpose of concluding an agreement by the end of October. On October 2 you told Gromyko that this meeting of October 8 would represent our final effort to conclude the agreement by the end of October. In fact, in the three days starting October 8 Hanoi made concessions going beyond your public demands. In these circumstances, it was no longer possible to argue that our bargaining position would improve after the election, and you never did so. We were running out of money, having spent so much of the year's budget to repel Hanoi's spring offensive. Laird had already proposed a 40% reduction in aircraft sorties and a withdrawal of all forces (mostly B-52's) sent to Asia to deal with the spring offensive. Harlow had stressed that a continuing resolution to replenish funds would result in a bitter fight with uncertain outcome and would probably end with a Congressionally imposed terminal date, that is to say, our defeat.

p. 3

PERSONAL

greater concessions than you had publically asked for? You had approved every negotiating proposal, _all_ of which were submitted to you before _every_ negotiating session. You will not find in any of them or anywhere else references to their impact on the forthcoming election. Nor do they show _any_ disagreement by you with the various negotiating positions.

The implication that I was more trusting of North Vietnam than the President. This, too, repeats previous innuendos; it is no more supported by the record than the other charges. There was indeed a difference between us concerning not Hanoi's motives but its intentions. In late August you sent me a note via Haig pointing out that you thought the deadlock could not be broken and that a continued deadlock would give ammunition to your opponent in the election. I was of the view that Hanoi would make concessions not because I trusted our adversaries but because I thought they were realists. Once Hanoi had accepted your proposals, the debate between us became moot. You knew that the negotiations with Le Duc Tho starting October 8 would be decisive. You had approved Hanoi's request for a three-day meeting. On October 2 you told Gromyko that this meeting of October 8 would represent our final effort to conclude the agreement by the end of October. In fact, in the three days starting October 8 Hanoi made concessions going beyond your public demands. In these circumstances, it was no longer possible to argue that our bargaining position would improve after the election, and you _never_ did so. We were running out of money, having spent so much of the year's budget to repel Hanoi's spring offensive. Laird had already proposed a 40% reduction in aircraft sorties and a withdrawal of all forces (mostly B-52's) sent to Asia to deal with the spring offensive. Harlow had stressed that a continuing resolution to replenish funds would result in a bitter fight with uncertain outcome and would probably end with a Congressionally imposed terminal date, that is to say, our defeat.