THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM THE PRESIDENT

In talking with a group of Congressmen they pointed out that neither State nor Defense has agreed to testify against the Javits' resolution on restricting the war powers of the President by leaving those powers with the Congress.

I do not know what the strategy is here, but this, of course, is a vital area where we should develop a firm line against the proposal and see that Administration representatives testify accordingly.

April 28, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN LEHMAN

FROM: AL HAIG

SUBJECT: Javits' Resolution on Restricting the War Powers of the President

The President has informed Dr. Kissinger that in recent discussions with a group of Congressmen they informed him that neither State nor Defense has agreed to testify against the Javits' Resolution on restricting the war powers of the President.

Would you coordinate with Timmons and MacGregor and the Departments in preparing a memorandum from Henry to the President outlining what the legislative strategy is with respect to the Javits' Resolution, including specific reference to State's and Defense's attitude on testimony.

Attachment

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 27, 1971

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I note that the present line with regard to our
China initiative is that trade with China should be on the
same basis as trade with the Soviet Union and other
Communist countries.

I realize this is our final objective.

The question is whether we should consider now the
timing of such announcements and whether this might not be
a good move to make at an earlier time than we had
anticipated for reasons that are obvious.

THE PRESIDENT HAS SEEN...

[LC]

May 5, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM Rose Mary Woods

Several weeks ago I had a conversation with Mary Roebling. She had been so pleased with being invited to the "Irish Evening at the White House" and particularly with your reception of her that she said she would like to do something special for you anytime.

One thought she has is that it would be good to invite one or two women leaders from all nations to Washington this Spring, this Fall or the Spring of 1972 to discuss how to maintain world peace.

She said that while she could not accept any position with the Administration because she does not want to go through divesting herself of all stocks, etc., that she is available in the capacity of an advisor or serve on a commission. In case you think well of the above idea, she would be glad to come down and help on that - she would be able to set it up so that these women could meet and talk and come up with some ideas.

ANY INTEREST?

If this could be of use, I could help make the project a success!

May 5, 1971

MR. PRESIDENT

Shirley Temple Black called to say:

"I saw President Sadat on Saturday, April 24, at night. He asked me to re-emphasize to President Nixon that he, Sadat, is the first Arab leader of the UAR who has actively sought peace.

"Also, President Sadat and Foreign Minister Riad like President Nixon very much and King Faisal spoke of his admiration for the President also.

"I was there on an unofficial trip. I was invited by the UAR Delegation at the UN and also when we were at the conference in Geneva. I had this unexpected meeting with Sadat the night before I left and did discuss briefly re-establishing diplomatic relations. We discussed Article 43 of the UN Charter which was acceptable to Riad and President Sadat, i.e. if both sides - Israeli's on East Bank and Egyptians on West Bank - pulled back and had UN peace-keeping forces on both banks rather than on one side or the other.

"Sadat liked this very much - said it was similar to a request he had made a couple of months ago asking for the super powers to do peacekeeping in that area.

"My personal opinion is that we in the U.S. are war weary and I think we should have the smaller nations too.

"I emphasized that I was on a personal visit and that this was my own opinion -- nothing officially.

"Extremely interesting trip - they received me most graciously."

Rose Mary Woods

MEMORANDUM

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 5, 1971

UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: JON M. HUNTSMAN

SUBJECT: Hubert Humphrey

The April 19 paper from Patrick J. Buchanan to the President entitled the "Resurrection of Hubert Humphrey" carries an article which stated that "Humphrey is struggling heroically to get well on this issue to make himself now an acceptable alternative to the party's left. The Prodigal Son, however is not welcome back home -- if the New Republic and I. F. Stone are to be believed. A little Machiavelli here might be of use. If the President who is not revered on the Left, were to publicly express thanks to HHH for the quiet support he has given on Vietnam ---HHH is likely to be astonished and stunned and his left-wing courtship broken off on the spot. Perhaps Dole or the Vice President even might compliment HHH on the "strong support" he has consistently provided for the war in Vietnam.

With respect to the underlined portion of the above paragraph it has been suggested that you should do this in the background.

Please submit your response to the Office of the Staff Secretary.

Thank you.

cc: H. R. Haldeman
A. Butterfield

CONFIDENTIAL

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 7, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: CLARK MacGREGOR

SUBJECT: Senator Jack Javits

At the June 3d reception given by the President and Mrs. Nixon honoring the Congressional 80th Club Senator Javits spoke to the President about Javits' conferences with Prime Minister Sato in Tokyo on May 22d and with President Thieu in Saigon on May 25th. Immediately after talking to the President Javits found me and advised me that the President wished to see him this week so as to hear Javits' report. Bob Haldeman advises me that this is not the case, that the President does not wish to see Javits, but rather that the President wishes you to see Javits and receive his report.

If this is also your understanding, will you take the initiative to schedule a session with Senator Javits? Will you then let me know the time and place of the session? Thanks, Henry.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Mr. Kissinger:

Do you wish to initiate an appointment next week for Senator Javits?

Yes, appointment ____

breakfast ____

lunch ____

DRH

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 12, 1971

FROM: CLARK MacGREGOR CM

SUBJECT: Senator Jack Javits

Please see my memos to you dated June 7th and June 9th.

Senator Javits' help on a number of the President's domestic legislative proposals is of critical importance. We must minimize the alienation of Javits from the President because of their differences on national security issues and Presidential powers. More than ten days have now elapsed since Javits was told he would "be heard" at the White House regarding Javits' late-May visits with Sato and Thieu.

I regard it as imperative that you see Javits on Monday. Will you do so, Henry?

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

JUN 2 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: JON HUNTSMAN

FROM: AL HAIG 151

SUBJECT: Senator Javits

As requested (P-1728), Mr. Kissinger had a breakfast meeting with
Senator Javits on June 22.

cc: Mr. MacGregor

CONFIDENTIAL

RGH:nm:6/22/71

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

[LC]

UNCLASSIFIED

July 27, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR :
FROM : DR. KISSINGER
H.R. HALDEMAN

I have several notes of items the President raised during the weekend for me to pass on to you.

First, he would like you to contact a number of key Conservatives to be sure to keep them locked up on the China question. We have had substantial mail opposing the China trip and obviously, it's coming from a stimulated Conservative element and the President feels it is necessary to counteract this.

Specifically, he's asked that you get in touch again with Ronald Reagan, Billy Graham, and Barry Goldwater and be sure that all of them know that we are not going to sell out on the China mission. In general, just hold their hands.

Also, he would like you to call Bill Buckley, Clare Luce, and Anna Chennault to cover the same points.

On a more difficult scale, he would like you to talk with Walter Judd and reassure him as best you can.

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
H. R. HALDEMAN
HENRY A. KISSINGER

Reference your memorandum of July 27 containing several notes of items the President raised the previous weekend, I have spoken on the phone with William Buckley and twice with Governor Reagan -- first on the Peking issue and this morning on the Chinese representation announcement. I am also scheduled to have breakfast with Senator Goldwater on Thursday, August 5th.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 4, 1971

UNCLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

SUBJECT:

HENRY A. KISSINGER

JON M. HUNTSMAN

Prime Minister McMahon

The President was pleased to read the following report which appeared in the November 4, 1971, News Summary:

"Prime Minister McMahon said he was "driven to despair" by conjecture like Muskie's that South Vietnam will go Communist after the US withdrawal. He said it would be a tragedy if after so much blood has been spilled that Vietnam was overrun by the VC. He said he doesn't know why Muskie is making his views known except for his Presidential aspirations. McMahon said he was told by those much better informed than Muskie that South Vietnam's prospects are good. UPI said many regarded this criticism of Muskie as a violation of etiquette. And Muskie's office denies the Senator ever made such conjecture."

Thank you.

cc: H. R. Haldeman
Alexander P. Butterfield

CONFIDENTIAL

[LC]

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1971

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I think we ought to find an occasion where we
can get Moorer in alone with me without Laird to talk about
national defense matters. Try to arrange this at some time
in the near future.

E WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 9, 1972

HENRY KISSINGER
DEPT

Its in some columns to the effect that the Chinese statement of their position was much more aggressive and belligerent than our statement of our position. You handled the question extremely well in your backgrounder. It occurred to me, however, that in some further discussion you may be having with members of the press, or possibly when you do a television program, you might have in mind this historical footnote.

You could begin by pointing out that I made the decision with regard to the tone of the statement of our position for two basic reasons. First, the more aggressive we stated our position the more aggressive the Chinese would have to be in stating their position. As a result of our presenting our position in a very firm, but non-belligerent manner, their position, while it was also uncompromising on principle, was not nearly as rough in its rhetoric as has been the case in previous statements they have issued over the years.

The second reason was that I realized while the statement of the Chinese position has been known to millions of Americans for many years the statement of the American position has not been known to the Chinese at all except to some at the very highest levels. In this first opportunity to present our position to the Chinese cadres and, to a certain extent, also to the Chinese masses we had to recognize that it would have no credibility whatever if it were stated in too harsh terms. This does not mean that we had any illusions that by stating our position in less aggressive rhetoric we were going to win converts but it does mean that the fear that has been pounded into the Chinese for the past 20 years of American aggression against them should not be increased by the tone of the statement of our position in the communique.

PERSONAL

- 2 -

Now to revert to the historical anecdote which shows that this approach on my part is not new. In July of 1959 when I visited Moscow we had an arrangement with the Soviets that I would have the opportunity to address the Soviet people by television and radio at the conclusion of my stay. We did not know until about two days before we were to leave the extent of the coverage or how long I would be allowed to talk. But then we learned that the coverage was probably going to be fairly extensive although not widely advertised and that I would be allowed to talk 30 minutes which meant, of course, approximately an hour when the translation was taken into account.

The preparation of this speech was a monumental task. State had done its best to prepare suggested remarks prior to the trip but Tommy Thompson agreed with me when we read State's draft as the trip neared the conclusion, and after I had had the Kitchen Debate and had traveled to several places in the Soviet Union, that the draft was too bland and too full of the usual bureaucratic banalities. On a crash basis, working late into the night for two nights before I was to go on, I dictated an entirely new draft with Thompson's very activist and helpful assistance. The fundamental decision we had to make was what tone the draft should take. I pointed out to Thompson that I would be speaking to two audiences -- the American audience at home, which with an election coming up the next year was very important to me, and the Russian audience in the Soviet Union who for the first time would be hearing a senior American official address them on television. After thorough discussion of the matter I finally told Thompson that interested as I was in seeing that we said the right things as far as the American audience was concerned, I finally had to confront the hard fact that this was the first time an official of my rank would be allowed to speak directly to the Russian people and that I did not want it to be the last time. Under the circumstances, I decided that we should be firm on our principle but that the tone should not be aggressive and wherever possible conciliatory, provided there was no compromise of principle.

The result was a speech which most of the Kremlinologists thought was very effective from the stand-point of the Russian audience. What effect, if any, it had on the American audience is subject to question. I do recall that the St. Louis Post-Dispatch had a favorable editorial on it -- perhaps the only

PERSONAL

- 3 -

time in my memory that that paper has editorialized favorably on anything I have done in the foreign policy area. As far as reaction of the general public is concerned, however, it certainly was not a positive and if anything might have been a slight negative.

Nevertheless, while because of the tremendous pressure we were under in attempting to get it prepared it was no gem of eloquence, I think even some of our more severe critics would have to agree that it was the statesman-like approach considering all the factors I have set forth.

I would suggest you read the speech. It appears in the Appendix of "Six Crises."

You can now easily see why this incident which occurred 13 years ago directly bears on the approach that we take in the communique. Having gone through that experience I was determined that in this document, which would be the first time Chinese leaders, and cadres, and to a certain extent even Chinese masses, would ever hear the American position expressed, I had to make the strongest possible effort to set it in a tone which would not make it totally incredible when they heard it. It would not have been credible, of course, had we set forth our position in more aggressive terms because 22 years of propaganda at the other extreme would have made it impossible for the reader of the communique, or those who heard it read on radio, to believe it at all if the tone was too harsh.

I am not suggesting that as a result of setting forth our position in a reasonable manner that any significant change was made in Chinese public opinion -- if there is a Chinese public opinion (and I, of course, am the first to recognize that there is not), but more important on the Chinese leadership, particularly the younger leadership that is coming up. But I think by handling it the way we did in the communique we might have had just a chance to change their picture of the American President slightly but perhaps significantly also. Before I came, the United States President was a devil with horns. As a result of our trip and possibly because of the tone of the communique on our part they still see the United States President as a devil but the horns may not be nearly as prominent

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1972

EYES ONLY

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I believe that the expectations for the Moscow trip are being built up too much. What I am concerned about is not that we will fail to achieve the various goals about which there has been speculation but that when we do make the formal agreements there will be no real news value to them because of their having been discounted by an enormous amount of discussion prior to the Summit.

There are two ways to attack this problem. First, as I have already indicated to you, it is vitally important that no final agreements be entered into until we arrive in Moscow and it is also important that speculation with regard to negotiation of such agreements be limited. I realize that the latter objective is very hard to achieve due to the fact that so many people will be talking to Dobrynin but we should make every possible effort to put a lid on speculation with regard to matters we expect to reach agreement on at the Summit with the Russians.

Another line of attack which should be used to the fullest extent possible is to begin a line of pessimism with regard to what may be accomplished in certain fields. This is particularly important insofar as SALT is concerned. When I see a news story to the effect that we are asking Congress for funds to implement our SALT agreement as if it were an accomplished fact, I realize how difficult it is going to be for us to make the agreement seem like an achievement at the Summit. We know that there would be no possibility of the SALT agreement had we not done the work we have participated in up to this time. On the other hand, there will be an attempt to make it appear that all of this could have been achieved

[LC]

EYES ONLY

- 2 -

without any Summit whatever, and that all we did was to
go to Moscow for a grandstand play to put the final
signature on an agreement that was worked out by Gerry
Smith, State, etc. The Mideast is another case in point.
Of course, we should attempt to see that very little is said
about the Mideast as a possible Summit agenda item, but
at any event we should indicate wherever the subject is
raised that we expect very little at the Summit on that score.

As far as the other items are concerned, probably most of
them are too far down the track for us to do much about them.
But I think that to the extent you can, through backgrounders,
in which you can possibly use Scali rather effectively in
those cases where you do not want to involve your own
credibility, you should indicate that there are some very serious
problems involved in reaching agreement on the major items,
that there are road blocks that we may not be able to break,
and thereby build a case for having a Summit for the purpose
of removing those road blocks.

Again emphasizing the danger I see emerging, our critics who
oppose summitry in any event will try to say that everything
we finally agree to was all worked out through the usual State
Department and other channels and that the Summit was really
not necessary except as an election-year spectacular.

With regard to the Summit on another point, I realize that
the Russians will have far more plenary sessions than did the
Chinese. They have to give a considerable amount of lip service
to the whole idea of collective leadership. In view of the fact
that Breznev, Podgorny, and Kosygin will be on their side
I think it is important for us to limit the participants on our
side. In other words, if they have those three as well as
Gromyko we should have Rogers, yourself and myself as the
three on our side, possibly adding Hillenbrand if that becomes
necessary. I suppose that Beam poses a problem and it might
be that you would have to have him included. Where I think
you should draw the line, however, is on the attendance at

EYES ONLY

- 3 -

plenary sessions, except where they are totally formal, by
Scali, Ziegler and other press people. The moment we add
them on our side they will have to add others on their side
and the meetings will become so big that they will be totally
useless. There, of course, should be a note taker on our
side and I suppose in this instance we would have to have our
translator because we should not rely only on theirs, but I
want you to make every possible effort to limit the number
of people who participate in the plenary sessions. Needless
to say, in any session I have with Breznev I only want you,
our translator and a note taker present on our side. Under
no circumstances would Beam or any State Department
representative be present.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 11, 1972

EYES ONLY

FROM THE PRESIDENT

Looking ahead on Vietnam we must take several political factors into consideration as we draw near to the Democratic Convention in early July.

I would not be surprised if the Democrats might lie low a bit on Vietnam insofar as troop withdrawals are concerned with the idea that they would like to have a pretty large residual force in Vietnam at the time of the Convention so that they could make an issue of the fact that after three years we still have not ended the American involvement. In other words, we should not take any particular comfort in the fact that Vietnam at the moment is not an issue. It is not an issue only because they are not making it an issue and may not even want to do so on a massive scale at this point. We can be sure, however, that once their Convention meets with the anti-war crowd constituting a majority of the delegates they will have a platform plank and an acceptance speech on the part of their candidate which will take us on hard on this issue unless we have defused substantially by that time.

I do not want to do anything in the April announcement that will in any way reduce the chances for some success on the negotiating front in the meeting you have in Paris at that time. As you know, I have very little confidence in what such a meeting may accomplish and I do not believe that they are going to negotiate until after the election. But in any event, we have to play the negotiating string out but we must not let that string hang us in the fall by failing to do what we can to present the very best possible case for our position on the assumption that no negotiated settlement will have been reached.

EYES ONLY

- 2 -

As far as the troop announcement in April is concerned, whether it is for one month or two months or three months is irrelevant. What is vital, however, is that a final announcement of some kind must be made before the Democratic Convention in July. Either in April or in June when we return from Moscow our announcement must be one which indicates that all American combat forces have left, that the residual force will be retained there until we get our POWs, that the residual force will be a solely volunteer force, and whatever else we can develop along those lines.

What I am emphasizing is that for over three years and through 12 fruitless meetings in Paris we have pursued the negotiating front. I think we must continue to do so throughout May and June for reasons that we are both aware. But before the Democratic Convention we must make a final announcement of some type or we will be in very serious trouble.

[LC]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

March 14, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR :

FROM :

DR. KISSINGER
H.R. HALDEMAN

I thought it might be helpful to try to summarize some of the points that we've been discussing over the last weeks ~~in regard to the points~~ that still need emphasis regarding the China trip, because as yet, they have not come through in any clear way to the general public.

The television coverage of the trip itself certainly established a basis of the dignity of the President and the manner in which he conducted the public part of the activities, and this will be very valuable in the long term.

On the other hand, there is still a great deal of mystery about how the President, Chou En-lai, and Mao Tse-tung, conducted themselves in their private meetings, and particularly, how the President handled the approach to and conduct of, these meetings.

The communique itself has been now discussed at such great length that the average person is undoubtedly tired of hearing about it. In the backgrounders and certainly on the television broadcast, that you do, the background-type of information will be of much more interest to the viewer than will the substantive details of the content.

It would seem to me that some of the points we've talked about that would be well to emphasize are the following:

1. RN goes into meetings of this kind better prepared than anyone who has ever held the Presidential office. He does this by taking the voluminous briefing materials that are prepared by the NSC staff, and by the State Department, reading them all, plus reading a lot of other materials, and then he talks to a great number of people about the various aspects of the briefings in which he is particularly interested.

2

2. He then sits down and in painstaking detail, makes up his own mind as to what his approach should be. He does not memorize his speeches, etc. He does not follow a predictable pattern and as a result he is able to handle any of the questions that come up on the spot without being frozen into an untenable position. This, of course, is a tremendous advantage to him in all meetings, but particularly in summit meetings with skillful leaders like Chou En-lai.

3. RN has the tremendous advantage of an exceptional knowledge of world problems which he gained in his eight years in the Vice Presidency, plus eight years of travel while he was out of office, plus the three years that he has been in office as President. In other words, he has been up against big league pitching in the foreign policy field for a longer period of time than any other world leader. He has had extended conversations with the great leaders of our time -- DeGaulle, DeGasperi, Adenauer, Khrushchev, Nehru, Yoshida, Sukarno, Churchill -- not to mention the current batch of leaders from both the large and small countries, whom he has met as President.

4. An interesting mark of his style is that he treats all leaders whether from large or small countries, with equal dignity and respect.

5. As far as tactics are concerned, he never gives an inch on principle. As a matter of fact, he is probably more rigid on principle than many of his advisors would want him to be.

6. He never quibbles over debating points. Instead, he always keeps his eye on the main goal and constantly finds ways to bring the subject back to that goal rather than being diverted into argumentative discussions that would have no effect as far as achieving our main purpose.

7. He has great qualities of subtlety and humor - he is never belligerent - but is very tough. He has developed the quality of speaking most quietly when he is making his strongest points - a quality also observed in Chou En-lai.

8. He has the quality of knowing the other man and all of his positions as well as he knows his own. This, incidentally, also

3

characterized Chou En-lai and was a factor which made
the meeting between the two of them such a fascinating
discussion.

He has a quality of absolute discipline which goes clear
back to the time when he had the seven hour luncheon with
Krushchev, and has carried through all the many summits
he's held as President, including the meetings with the
Chinese.

He never takes a drink during the course of the meetings or
prior to any important conversation, and he even carries
this to the extent of resisting the temptation which was so
obviously presented to him, particularly with the Chinese,
of eating nuts and candies, etc., that were put before him
during the course of the discussion. His personal theory
is that either drinking or eating tends to dull the reaction
time as far as he's concerned. Although, of course, he
would not apply this same test to others for whom either
eating or drinking may help their reactions, as was pre-
sumably the case with Churchill and some others.

9. He has a remarkable quality of candor, used not for the purpose of embarrassing his opposite number, but for the purpose of establishing a degree of mutual trust and confidence which is so essential for any meaningful discussion.

10. The quality of stamina. He has an ability to perform at his peak level regardless of the length of the session. This is a very important quality, of course, in dealing with the Chinese, and will be with the Soviets.

All of these above points are things that you and the President have often raised in the conversations about the summit meetings, and it would be extremely valuable if some of this kind of information would get into the public domain.

If you can, you should review your notes to see how many personal tidbits you could use to bear out these points without revealing the substance of the conversations.

I don't think you should limit this to the discussions with Chou En-lai. You could go back to specifics on the meetings with DeGaulle, Wilson, Pompideau, Ceausescu, Tito, etc. to make some of these points.

4

Also, you are uniquely able to make the point that RN has acquired
a great deal of respect from world leaders because of his conduct of
these sessions without resorting to staff or notes.

I'm sure it's presumptuous of me to raise these points, but I thought
they might be helpful. I have the very strong feeling that the most good
you can do in talking with private groups and certainly in your appearance
on television, will be in the area of establishing public confidence in the
President as a man, and as President, rather than in the area of explain-
ing further, the ramifications of the content of the communique, or the
substance of the talks leading to it.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 12, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR RAY PRICE

Copies for: Bob Haldeman
John Ehrlichman
✓Henry Kissinger

FROM THE PRESIDENT

As I have been working on the Canadian Parliament speech, and also looking back on the speech I made at Philadelphia, I come again to the weakness in our speech writing -- a weakness that will be particularly harmful as we go into the campaign months. The speeches I make are to the great credit of the speech writing team generally highly literate, highly responsible and almost invariably dull. This means that though they may for the moment get a reasonably good audience reaction by trying to put some ad lib in which will make them go over on delivery, that they seldom leave anything memorable in the minds of the vast majority of our listeners which they can take away with them.

This brings me back again to my harping on the need for illustration, anecdote and colorful words which would inevitably be remembered. I am not talking about gimmicks. I abhor gimmicks and the clever tricks which are fine for Governors, Mayors, Senators, but simply not up to Presidential standards. What I am referring to is a greater use of illustration, parable and striking colorful language which will grab attention and keep it. I realize that all illustrations and analogies have great dangers, because any clever critic, and almost everybody in the press of course is an antagnostic critic to our efforts, will point out why the illustration doesn't fit. On the other hand, this means that we at least get the attention of the critic and through what the critic writes or says perhaps the attention of the listener and those who read about the speech.

- 2 -

This was brought home to me when I was scanning the
biography of "Jennie" last night and read of the fascinating
relationship between young Winston Churchill and the great
American orator Burt Cochran. Incidentally, ask Mr. Berman
to check to see if anybody has written a decent biography of
Cochran. If no one has one of our bright young men should
undertake that responsibility and he might come up with a
best seller because the man was so interesting. If someone
has written a good biography send it around to me because I
would like to read it.

But getting back to my original theme from which I have
digressed -- Cochran, Churchill says, was his model as a
speaker and also gave him great guidance in his early years
on speech writing. Now I don't mean to suggest that I should
write or sound like Churchill. He is one of those rare birds
where God broke the mold when he died. On the other hand,
we can at least learn from him and if it would be too arrogant
to do so from him at least we ought to be able to learn from
Burt Cochran who despite his many gifts never went to the
top of the greasy pole in the United States.

On page 70 of the second volume of "Jennie", Churchill makes
a very interesting observation about Cochran's speech writing
advice. I would commend the first paragraph at the top of
page 70 to all of our speech writers to read as a pretty good
way to find a means to put more life, meaning and above all
more memorable phrases in the speeches that we write.
After pointing out the necessity for reading very broadly on
the subject and then getting down to the writing he says
Cochran told Churchill, "try to simplify the most abstruse
questions with familiar, easily understandable illustrations."

That was the secret of Churchill's better speeches and frankly
the secret of most of the better speeches made by the better
speakers in the English-American tradition.

It isn't, I know, what is fashionably taught in our modern
institutions of higher learning because it will be criticized
as "overblown", "simplistic", etc. But the difficulty with
the modern so-called experts on speeches in our educational

- 3 -

institutions is that they fail to realize that the major point
to get across in a speech is not substance but to make it
somewhat memorable and if possible somewhat exciting.
Anyone can take enormously potent substance and make a
successful speech. The November 3rd speech, the so-called
Checkers speech, the announcement of the trip to China were
such great events that the substance itself became memorable
and how it was said may have helped a bit, but really didn't
matter all that much. On the other hand, we don't have
many block busters like that left. What we have to take is
a minimum of substance and get a maximum of mileage out
of it. The only way we can do this is to improve the quality
of our speech writing and the best way to improve the
quality is to follow Cochran's advice to Churchill -- more
easily understandable familiar illustrations and whenever
possible a colorful phrase or two that will stick in the minds
of the hearer.

As all of you know, Churchill did not invent the phrase "iron
curtain" which he used at Fulton, Missouri, but the words
added enormous bang to the substance. Let us, like
Churchill, learn from Cochran without, of course, Cochran's
19th century flamboyance.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

April 30, 1972

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

I have some later views on the strike on Haiphong-Hanoi which you should have in mind prior to your meeting Tuesday.

Looking at our long-range goal of giving the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to meet attacks that may be launched next year or the year afterwards, as well as the subsidiary reasons of the possible effect in getting faster action on negotiation, as well as the effect on the American public opinion, I believe it is essential that a major strike for three days, rather than two, involving a minimum of 100 B-52s, as well as as much TAC Air as can be spared, should be planned starting Friday of this week.

The only factor that would change my decision on this is a definite conclusion after your meeting Tuesday that the North Vietnamese are ready to make a settlement now, prior to the Soviet Summit.

By settlement, I do not mean, of course, accepting all our eight points, but a very minimum, something like a cease fire, a withdrawal of all their forces to the pre-Easter lines and the return of all POWs.

We have to recognize the hard fact -- unless we hit the Hanoi-Haiphong complex this weekend, we probably are not going to be able to hit it at all before the election. After this weekend, we will be too close to the Russian Summit. During the Summit and for a couple of weeks afterwards, our hands will be tied for the very same good reasons that they were tied during and after the Chinese Summit. Then we will be in the middle of June with the

2

Democratic Convention only three to four weeks away and it would be a mistake to have the strike at that time. Another factor is that the more time that passes there is a possibility that the Congress will act to tie our hands. Finally, support for taking a hard line, while relatively strong now, will erode day by day, particularly as the news from the battle area is so viciously distorted by the press so that people get a sense of hopelessness, and then would assume that we were only striking out in desperation.

On Tuesday, the tactics of your host will be to try desperately to give us some hope that we are going to get a settlement in order to keep us from making a strike on the Hanoi-Haiphong complex. They will offer to discuss the eight points, they will offer to discuss the cease fire, they will offer to discuss POWs. All of this you must flatly reject. They may say that they have to report to the politburo. This you should also reject on the ground that they have had our eight points for seven months and our latest offer for three weeks. It is time for them to fish or cut bait on Tuesday with some very substantial action looking toward an immediate settlement.

Incidentally, as I have already told you, you ought to withdraw our proposal of release of only those POWs who have been held for four years or more on the ground that their stepped-up attacks now make it necessary for us to demand the total release of all POWs as a minimum condition. I am not suggesting that they will agree to this but that is the position you must go into the talks with.

Under no circumstances in talking with them is the term "reduction of the level of violence" to be used. I saw it in one of the papers which someone on your staff prepared prior to your trip to Moscow.

[LC]

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This is the kind of gobbleygook that Johnson used at Manila and also that was talked about at the time of the 1968 bombing halt. It means absolutely nothing at all and is too imprecise to give us a yard stick for enforcement.

What you must have in mind, is that if they get a delay as a result of their talk with you, we shall lose the best chance we will ever have to give them a very damaging blow where it hurts, not just now, but particularly for the future.

Forget the domestic reaction. Now is the best time to hit them. Every day we delay reduces support for such strong action.

Our desire to have the Soviet Summit, of course, enters into this, but you have prepared the way very well on that score, and, in any event we cannot let the Soviet Summit be the primary consideration in making this decision. As I told you on the phone this morning, I intend to cancel the Summit unless the situation militarily and diplomatically substantially improves by May 15 at the latest or unless we get a firm commitment from the Russians to announce a joint agreement at the Summit to use our influence to end the war.

In effect we have crossed the Rubicon and now we must win -- not just a temporary respite from this battle, but if possible, tip the balance in favor of the South Vietnamese for battles to come when we no longer will be able to help them with major air strikes.

We know from experience, based on their record in 1968 that they will break every understanding. We know from their twelve secret talks with you that they talk in order to gain time. Another factor is that as we get closer to the Democratic Convention, the Democratic candidates and the supporters of Hanoi in the Congress, will increasingly give them an incentive to press on and not make a deal with us with the hope that they can make a deal with the Democrats after the election.

I will be talking with you about the statement you will make when you see them, but my present intuition is that you should be brutally frank from the beginning -- particularly in tone. Naturally you should have a few conciliatory words in for the record because the record of this meeting will without question be put out at some time in the future and possibly in the very near future. In a nutshell you should tell them that they have violated all understandings, they stepped up the war, they have refused to negotiate seriously. As a result, the President has had enough and now you have only one message to give them -- Settle or else!

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 13, 1972

FROM THE PRESIDENT

In reflecting on the three squadrons that will be ordered into South Vietnam, my reaction is that their temporary presence there should not affect our withdrawal program in fact or in theory. After all, as you are acutely aware, the remaining 60,000 that we have in Vietnam have no significant combat capability. They are mainly support forces which could be substantially reduced without any impact on the South Vietnamese ability to hold off the North Vietnamese. In other words, I think that we should compensate for the number that come in as a result of the three new squadrons by reducing the support forces in roughly the same amount. This will mean that some of them will be coming out sooner than expected, but it will also mean that the remaining forces that we have in Vietnam as of the first of July will have a lot more military capability than would otherwise have been the case. With our four months withdrawal program on the table I would much rather have three squadrons with their complements as part of the 49,000 that we have to bargain with than to have an equal number of headquarters units, etc., which really aren't serving any useful service except of giving assurance to the South Vietnamese of an American presence and, of course, giving that same assurance in form of a warning to the enemy.

In the event that we do not decide to do it this way, I am inclined to think that candor should be the way we should handle it and simply say that the additional forces are there for temporary duty only and are not there for ground action. On the other hand, it would be preferable to follow the first course of action I have suggested unless it is not militarily feasible.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 16, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB HALDEMAN

COPY FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I was amazed to hear from Don Kendall that since Maury Stans left the Department of Commerce nobody, including Peterson or Flanigan, has had the courtesy or the good sense to say even boo to him about the extensive negotiations that are going on with the Russians on trade.

In the first place, this is rather stupid because Stans started the negotiations and has forgotten more about the situation than either Pete Peterson or Pete Flanigan will learn; but beyond that Stans, who is a loyalist in the highest degree, has been deeply hurt by the fact that simply because he took on a thankless job that neither of the other two -- particularly Peterson -- would ever have taken, no one here at the White House has bothered to talk to him about a subject in which he is deeply interested.

Peterson is gobbling up all the credit for the trade negotiations and a lot of this credit, of course, should go to Stans. Flanigan is going along on the trip and, of course, will do the briefing there and that will put him in the show. I don't mind Flanigan and Peterson getting their share of credit but certainly we have got to find a way that Stans is properly recognized for the heroic role and the very loyal role he played throughout in working on these negotiations. I want you to bring in both Flanigan and Peterson and dress them down for this oversight.

P.S. I want Henry to find a way in Moscow, or in some other way, to see that Stans' work is recognized in a statement or in some other way.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 18, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR:

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

As I told Al on the phone last night, I am still totally unsatisfied with the efforts we are making on the propaganda front on Vietnam. What I am referring to here is not so much to what is said in Washington by White House spokesmen or in Paris by Porter, but statements that are made by MacV and, even more important, the propaganda directed to the people of North Vietnam and North Vietnam's military forces in South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

What concerns me is that my study of every war in this century indicates that a propaganda chief was an almost indispensable adjunct to the military and political leaders. This was true in World War I and World War II particularly. In Korea, of course, we forgot everything we learned in previous wars and did most things pretty poorly.

It is too late perhaps to do anything except on a patchwork basis as far as this present operation is concerned. At least, however, we can push Helms and the intelligence community to come up with some fresh ideas with regard to how we deal with propaganda directed to the North Vietnamese wherever they may be.

But looking to the future I think we have to have a topflight man probably on the White House staff and of course as a direct deputy to you at the NSC to advise on and to direct where necessary the propaganda offenses which are always needed to complement our military and political actions. Of course at the present time we rely on a number of people around the White House to give us advice in these fields--Ziegler, Scali, Klein, and even sometimes Haldeman.

- 2 -

But we must realize that not one of these that I have mentioned
has the all-round qualifications to assume the responsibilities
that I have in mind. I want someone full time who will direct his
attentions to how we handle things in a propaganda way, both
covertly and overtly. I do not have in mind that this individual
should ever directly or indirectly talk to the Press. He should be
an inside man advising us and also carrying out the ideas that we
may have on the propaganda front. This is a very specialized field
and we need someone who will bring us a broader gauged under-
standing of the situation so that we do not make mistakes with the
best of intentions in the PR area, and also so that we take better
advantage of some of our positive actions than has previously been
the case. Immediately upon our return from Moscow I want to talk
to you about this and see if we can't work out some way to tackle
the problem.

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 19, 1972

FROM THE PRESIDENT

In order to counter-balance the sickenly pro-communist stories appearing in the New York Times from Tony Lewis we have to do far more than we are presently doing with regard to what is happening to morale in North Vietnam. I want you to find a way through Helms to have leaked out the statement by the Frenchman with regard to North Vietnamese morale. I do not want to hear any of those objections to the effect that this may compromise a source and all that sort of thing. You may well remember that we failed to get out the story of Mrs. Ghandi's intention to take over West Pakistan because we were so concerned about compromising sources and as a result we have never gotten our side of the story across. I want this handled in a more effective way and I can think of nothing better than to get this story out from this French source. I think he is the French Consul in the Hanoi area. It is vitally important that while we are gone every possible leak or story which we can get out in this respect be gotten out. Give Haig that responsibility, working with whoever is left here on the news side.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1972

FROM THE PRESIDENT

The Connally trip is vitally important, not only from the stand-
point of our personal relationship, but also in terms, I believe,
of the good it can do in the foreign policy area. What I have in
mind is that he should go first-class with a Presidential-type
aircraft to four countries in Latin America -- Peru, Brazil,
Argentina and Colombia. After that I think it might be well for
him to go to Australia and New Zealand, two countries who sturdily
support us and who seldom get attention because they are so
far away. If there is another country further on around which
he could stop at on the way back get a recommendation to me
by the end of today -- Friday -- so that I can tell Connally now
about his trip. It is my view that he and Mrs. Connally should
leave on the trip a couple of days after we return. Even though
Shultz may not be confirmed by that time he will have been
thoroughly indoctrinated and Connally's leaving as Secretary of
the Treasury might have an added benefit. Don't consult a lot
of people in State about this thing. Just give me your own
recommendation later today.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN CONNALLY

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I have some other random thoughts that might be of use to you on your trip. None of them are particularly important, but they may give you some items that would be useful in your meetings with the local press, in the conversations you have with the various leaders, and in toasts and other statements you may be called upon to make.

I have visited all the countries that you will be visiting on this trip. You probably have in your file a record of my visits and of the state visits that have been made while I have been President by the heads of government or state of the countries you will be going to. In any event, here is a brief run-down which you may find useful.

I was in Colombia in 1958 and I received the Colombian President on a state visit in 1969.

I was in Brazil twice as Vice President, again in 1967 as a private citizen, and Medici paid a state visit here earlier this year.

I visited Bolivia as Vice President in 1958.

I visited Peru as Vice President in 1958 and then on a private visit in 1967. We gave a luncheon for the wife of the President of Peru at the White House after Pat had visited Peru immediately after the earthquake.

I visited Argentina in 1958 and again as a private citizen in 1967.

I visited New Zealand in 1953. It was the first foreign country I visited after becoming Vice President. At least two New Zealand Prime Ministers have visited Washington since I became President.

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I visited Australia in 1953 and again on a private visit in 1967. Two Australian Prime Ministers have come to Washington since I have been President. Incidentally, while you are in Australia if you can work it into your schedule you should call on former Prime Minister Robert Menzies. He has been quite ill and it may be that he will be unable to see you, but he is a great friend of the United States and one of the top world leaders I have ever met.

You are aware of the number of visits I have made to Vietnam. In 1953 I was in both Saigon and Hanoi -- before the country was partitioned. In 1956 I visited Saigon again. While I was out of office I was there at least 6 times and have been there once since becoming President.

I was in Kuala Lumpur in 1953 and then again in 1967 as a private citizen, and have seen the Prime Minister in Washington.

I visited Singapore in 1953 and again in 1967 when I first met Lee Kuan Yew. He has been in Washington on two occasions since I came into office and I would consider him among the top half-dozen world leaders with a profound understanding of international affairs.

I visited Cambodia in 1953 and attended a performance at the Kennedy Center for the Royal Cambodian dancers when they were in Washington. You might mention there how much I regret that you will be unable to go to Angkor Wat, and that I trust the North Vietnamese will be driven from that area so that thousands of tourists will not be denied the privilege I had in 1953 of seeing this wonder of the world.

I visited Iran in 1953 when I first met the Shah, and again in 1967 as a private citizen. As you know, he was here on a state visit to Washington and I was there just a week ago after my Moscow trip.

I was in India in 1953 and again in 1967 as a private citizen, and in 1969 on a round the world trip.

- 3 -

I was in Pakistan in 1953 and in 1956. I also was in Pakistan on two occasions while I was out of office as a private citizen and visited Pakistan on my round the world trip in 1969 as President.

I have been received by the present Pope on three different occasions.

In each country that you visit you will probably be asked whether you are carrying a personal message from the President to the head of government or head of state. You should answer in the affirmative in each case. I have never followed the practice of writing letters that are hand-delivered because this really has very little meaning. But you can say that you had a long discussion with me before you left and that I have asked you to take up several matters of mutual interest with the head of government or head of state and also to brief them on my recent trip to the Soviet Union, and to get their views on international problems generally. I think it is well to always emphasize the last point because it builds them up to let them feel that we are interested in their views as well as passing on our views to them.

A general theme for your trip might be along the following lines: as you know, I have made several speeches to the effect that there are five major economic and political power centers in the world today -- the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan. Some may interpret this as meaning that those are the only countries I thought that mattered. That is only true insofar as their present industrial and potential military capacity is concerned. On the other hand, over half the people in the world and over half of the world's resources are not in these five major power centers. The so-called third world which except for Italy will cover all the countries you are visiting will prove to be decisive down the road as they develop their resources and play the role on the world stage of which they are capable. You can say I am sending you on this trip because of my own long-time interest in these vitally important countries in the third world and my recognition of the fact that when we are talking to our adversaries, the Chinese and the Russians, we are not forgetting our allies and friends in the third world area.

I am sure you will have a great trip. The picture and story made front page in the Times and Post this morning.

EYES ONLY

YES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1972

COPY FOR Bob Haldeman

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I think the tactics of our left-wing friends on Southeast Asia are becoming rather clear in the last few days. They are petrified at the thought that our diplomatic and military initiatives may succeed. Consequently, they have made a decision at the highest level to attempt to destroy American confidence in the South Vietnamese and Cambodians through articles by left-wing reporters who are sent to cover the political and economic situation there. The Times had one story on South Vietnam's "recession" and there is a story in the Times again today by Craig Whitney on Cambodia's political problems.

Along the same lines, it is no accident that after Tony Lewis wrote those shocking Communist-line pieces from Hanoi for the Times, Selig Harrison now is on the scene in Hanoi writing about how nice the little 12-year-old boys and girls are who are attending school in Hanoi. This propaganda offensive is extremely subtle and it may be even too subtle for the average person to understand. But make no mistake about it. This will be their line from now until the election and we need some effective action to combat it. For example, some positive statements and/or pieces about the situation in Cambodia and South Vietnam would be in order if we can get any such statements out in a way that they can get public attention. Also, we must continue to try to discredit people like Harrison and Tony Lewis who obviously would never be let in to Hanoi unless they had a prior commitment to write the Communist party line while they were there. Colson will be able to help on this point. Clawson's crack at Lewis in the Times, while I know it disturbed some of our house liberals, was a master stroke and a similar analysis of Harrison's background might well be in order.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1972

Would you go over the record of all of our conversations with the
Soviet leaders and get the best anecdotes and colorful phrases
which they used during the course of our meetings. You will
recall that I had this done from the record of your meetings
with Brezhnev. I would like the record of both meetings to be
looked over again with this in mind so that I can have a good
compilation of anecdotes and of the most colorful language that
any of the three used during the course of our meetings. I am
not interested here in substance but only in anecdote and phrase-
making material.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1972

FROM THE PRESIDENT

In thinking back over the briefing books I read before going to Moscow I was impressed by several of the Kremlinologists whose works were summarized in the books. I was wondering if at some time, not in the immediate future but perhaps after the Democratic Convention, it might be worth while to get in people like Robert Conquest, Leites, and three or four others of the best Kremlinologists for a talk. Consider the matter and if you think well of it have them in. If not, drop it. I was just thinking it might be of use to us, not so much that it would be of use to them, to get their views as to where we go from here.

[LC]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 24, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM THE PRESIDENT

I talked to Ronald Reagan and he raised three points that I would like for you to look into.

1. The Irish airlines' problem, where it may be that we have been a bit too rigid and too rough in order to protect the rights of our domestic airlines at too great a cost to the Irish. You should discuss this with Flanigan and see if we could modify our views somewhat in order to avoid having Prime Minister Lynch, who is our friend, be embarrassed by his laborite opposition.

2. He also mentioned the fact that he had talked to Home. I told him I was seeing Home. Home has two points that he's going to make at that time, both of them I think we already have well in hand. One is that the British feel strongly that the French and the Germans have to be brought into participation on the nuclear defense problems more than they have up to this point. This is a very sensitive matter as we know, but at least we should be prepared to discuss it with Home. The other point is one that is quite obvious. Home feels that before we go to the European Security Conference we should get together on our side with the British, the French, and the Germans and develop a line from a propoganda standpoint that will be pushing their line very, very, hard in a way that will tend to break up the alliance.

3. Incidentally, I told Reagan that I would see him when he passed through Washington on his way to Miami. This will be sometime probably on the weekend before the convention begins. Pass this on to Haldeman so that he can schedule it at that time.

2

Also, with regard to the meeting with Home, it may be that this will
open the door for other Foreign Ministers to see me. Certainly, at
the very least, we should see Gromyko in the event he requests a
meeting. I would try to keep the number of Foreign Ministers I see
down to a bare minimum. Home, I think, can be justified on the basis
of our long-time personal friendship. Incidentally, in seeing him, it
occurred to me that I might do it either at breakfast, or possibly a two-
hour trip on the Sequoia. In any event, you work with Haldeman for an
appropriate date and also give him your best advice as to how we can
see a limited number of Foreign Ministers along the lines I have outlined
here.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 15, 1972

FROM:
THE PRESIDENT

RE:
*Your Briefing of the Press on Friday*

On further reflection with regard to our talk last night, I think it is very important that you handle this briefing in a rather detached matter of fact way and not in a manner that could be interpreted either as anger or sorrow.

What is particularly vital is that you leave no impression that you are attempting through the briefing to defend your statements made in previous briefings where the Press have gone overboard in being more optimistic than they really should have been as to when the negotiations would succeed, and have failed to recognize adequately the caveats that you worked in and of course the ones that I constantly worked into my speeches before the election, particularly in the television speech on the Thursday night before the election, to the effect that, while we were very close to agreement and were confident we would get an agreement, there were still some very sticky matters that had to be worked out. That is why it is particularly important that you hit hard on the point that, while we want peace just as soon as we can get it, that we want a peace that is honorable and a peace that will last, and those two considerations--an honorable peace and a lasting peace--are the overriding considerations as distinguished from any deadline for rushing into a peace agreement which is not adequately nailed down in its details and which could lead to another war in the future.

I think what you should do is to start out with a statement to the effect that you want to give the Press an up-to-date report on the status of the negotiations. You could then go on to say that considerable progress has been made on a number of details that you are not going to go into but which are indispensable before any final agreement is reached. Since October 8th we have narrowed differences in some areas but, on the other hand, with reluctance and objectivity you must report that there are other areas where there are still some significant differences where we have not reached agreement.

- 2 -

These differences are ones which could be described in one sense as being primarily technical in nature, but until these differences are resolved, the peace agreement would not meet the conditions that I laid down in my television speech just before the election that we will not be stampeded into an agreement after this longest war in modern history which would give the appearance of temporary peace but which, because of its defects, would lay the foundations for war later on. We feel we have an obligation after all of this time to both North Vietnam and South Vietnam, the people who have suffered in war for over 25 years, to make an agreement which has a chance to last, and that is why we are insisting on getting these details worked out so that there are no misunderstandings. We do not want to have a repetition of the situation in 1968 where there were misunderstandings with regard to the bombing halt and we have been paying the price for it ever since.

You are having this briefing for the purpose of laying out the differences in an objective way, not with any sense of recrimination but for the purpose of letting both Hanoi and Saigon know what the conditions are that we will insist upon before we will agree to a final settlement.

It is very important that you emphasize that the goals we have been seeking from the beginning were laid out by the President in his speeches of January 25th and May 8th, and that those goals in principal were agreed upon on October 8 and that was why you felt justified in saying that peace was at hand and why we still believe that we can and will reach agreement. We have always insisted that there be a ceasefire. While we have agreed on this goal, adequate machinery for policing a ceasefire has not been agreed to. On the contrary, we have been greatly concerned that Hanoi has been making massive preparations which can only be interpreted unfortunately as laying the foundation for starting up the war again and for breaking a ceasefire. That is why we are particularly insisting on strengthening the language with regard to the ceasefire so that it will be one that will be enforceable and so that there will be no doubt on either side in the event that it is broken.

A second goal is the return of our POWs. We have agreed in principal on this but Hanoi has recently unfortunately insisted upon some conditions with regard to civilian prisoners in the south which are totally unacceptable and, under the circumstances, we have to have this matter cleared up before we can be reassured that our POWs will be returned.

Third, we have insisted that the South Vietnamese people shall determine their own future and that a Communist government shall not be imposed upon them against their will.

- 3 -

Hanoi has been insisting on conditions which would be inevitably interpreted at this time as imposing a Communist government on the people of South Vietnam and this we will never agree to. Incidentally, you should point out, this is a new condition which they had not insisted on before.

It is very important that you come back to the three fundamental conditions that we have laid down as often as possible so that they will get into the lead of the story. You can say that, as far as we're concerned, we are very close to agreement and all it will take will be an exchange of messages accepting the clear understandings that we had a month ago. On the other hand, Hanoi has backed off from some of those understandings and this we cannot accept.

You should lean hard on the point that the President wants absolute assurances with regard to the POWs with no unacceptable conditions attached thereto. That we want a ceasefire which has a chance to be permanent rather than some temporary truce. That we want a political settlement that does not impose a Communist government on the people of South Vietnam against their will but allows the people under the proper international supervision to determine their future with all political parties having an equal chance to present their case to the people.

I think that at some point you should get in, very firm and clear, that the President has had a strong desire to get the war settled from the day he entered office. There were strong political considerations for him to get it before the election. Now we have the upcoming Christmas season with his very strong personal desire to get the war settled because of the very special circumstances with regard to the POW as well as to all of the people of North and South Vietnam who are suffering as a result of the continuance of the war.

On the other hand, the President insists that the United States of America is not going to allow any artificial deadline to stampede us into making the wrong kind of agreement which would bring great elation and joy now that peace is here when actually it would only mean that what we would have agreed to was a temporary truce which was a prelude to another war.

You should also point out that the President insists that the United States is not going to be pushed around, blackmailed or stampeded into making the wrong kind of a peace agreement. We owe responsibility to those who have fought and died in the war, to the people of North and South Vietnam who have a right to have a chance to live in real peace in the future, and to people around the world who look to us for leadership, to stand for the right principle in bringing this war to an end, and the President is absolutely committed to standing firm on these grounds.

[LC]

- 4 -

In fairness, you should say that South Vietnam as well as North Vietnam must share some of the responsibility for the fact that we have not reached agreement as soon as we all would have liked. A peace agreement is only as good as the will of the parties to keep it and only as good as the will of the parties to implement it vigorously and effectively. Neither South Vietnam nor North Vietnam can expect an agreement which will humiliate the other or one which will give one an advantage over the other which will enable one nation or the other to start up the war again.

Both the North and the South must recognize that they have an obligation to change their conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box, and that both the South Vietnamese and the Communists in South Vietnam as well as the North must be prepared to present their cases to the people and to accept the verdict of the people as to what kind of government the people have. You should of course point out that a ceasefire does not by definition impose a coalition particularly in view of the political elements that we have agreed to.

As to the prospects for the future, we are going to continue to press for a settlement but we are patient because, after this very long war, we will not settle for a very short peace. We will continue to negotiate whenever the other side is willing to negotiate seriously on these remaining points which admittedly are technical, but lacking goodwill on both sides could prove to be fatal in breaking the agreement down if we do not work them out at this time. We have of course been continuing our military air operations and our mining operations pending final agreement, and we have a volunteer armed force in Vietnam which we will keep there until all of our prisoners of war are returned. As far as military activity is concerned, on our part we are closely watching the other side and, as any ominous buildup may develop, we will be prepared to react accordingly.

You should point out on the plus side that, as far as the war is concerned as we enter this Christmas season, we can all be thankful that no draftees are going to Vietnam, that our casualties have been at either zero or near zero levels for the last three months, that no Americans are engaged in ground combat and that, for the first time since the war began, both sides are negotiating seriously to try to find a peaceful settlement.

You can say that you have talked to the President, that he is confident that we will reach agreement. However, he is also just as insistent that it be the right kind of agreement and that we will not rush into an agreement which is the wrong kind of agreement, because of his desire to have a just and lasting peace.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 16, 1972

FROM: THE PRESIDENT

Here are some further reflections on your briefing today, Saturday, having in mind the need to strengthen the portions which might be interpreted as meaning that we were willing to go along with the present pace of negotiations without taking some action to stop the ominous enemy buildup, an action that would bring the negotiations to a quicker conclusion.

Since October 8th and since you made your "peace is at hand" statement, we have been patiently trying to work out technical details so that there will be no misunderstandings. The clarifications and changes that we have insisted upon have had only one purpose--after a very long war we don't want to end it with a settlement which will bring only a short peace.

But now the remaining differences can be settled within the matter of a few hours by an exchange of messages between the two sides and without a further meeting, provided there is a serious intent on both sides to negotiate a real and lasting peace rather than to try to gain some advantage which will enable one side or the other to renew the war.

We have been talking with the enemy for over four years. During that four years _________ thousand Americans, North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese have lost their lives. The time has come now to bring the talking and the war to an end. Reluctantly you would have to say that, for the past 30 days, the way the other side has gone up the hill and down the hill on various proposals would indicate a filibuster rather than a serious intent to reach a settlement and end the fighting.

We want a rapid settlement for three basic reasons.

First, from a personal standpoint, our POWs--we want the release of our POWs, some of whom have been incarcerated for over five (or six) years.

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Second, we want to stop the fighting because, while our U.S. casualties are minimal with several weeks in which there have been no killed in action, South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese are dying in battle by the thousands every week.

And third, we want a settlement now because we will not tolerate allowing the peace talks to be used as a cover for a military buildup which could mean a step up in the war in the future.

Both the North Vietnamese and the South Vietnamese must share responsibility for the delay in reaching a settlement. Each side wants to gain advantages at the peace table it has not and cannot gain on the battlefield. It is time to have the ceasefire and let the people of South Vietnam decide at the ballot by their votes what kind of government they want for South Vietnam. It is time (pick this up from the previous memorandum) that we move this conflict from the battlefield to the ballot box.

Consequently, we are going to step up our pressure on both sides for a faster settlement. In taking this course, we are doing it in the interests of both sides. Neither side can gain from continuing the war--from prolonging the war. Neither side can gain from prolonging the peace talks. We are ready to resume the talks and to reach a rapid settlement whenever the enemy is ready to do so.

In the meantime, the President will continue to order whatever actions he considers necessary by air and sea to prevent what now appears to be an ominous buildup in North Vietnam for the purpose of launching a new offensive against South Vietnam.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY

January 25, 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : DR. KISSINGER

FROM : H.R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT : Vietnam

I got into a discussion with the President yesterday about your appearance before Congress. Below is a summary of that discussion. Perhaps it will be helpful in relation to your appearance.

1. When you go to the Capitol you must at all costs give no quarter whatever to the doves. Any tilt to your remarks must be toward the side of those who have stood with us rather than to those who have always opposed us.

2. We must emphasize these points:

A. This was a peace with honor which achieved the major goals for which the war was waged.

B. We were able to get a settlement that under no stretch of the imagination can possibly be described as a coalition government and one that assures the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their future without having a Communist government imposed upon them, directly or indirectly.

C. The settlement we achieved, rather than being a bug-out which might have ended the war for us, is one that ends the war for the 50 million people of Indochina. This is a fundamental

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point that has not adequately been brought
out except in the line that the President wrote
into his speech at the last moment. The
difference between the Senate and House doves'
position of POWs for withdrawal and the peace
we finally got is very simply that the prisoners
for withdrawal proposal would have meant that
the United States would get out and let the war
go ahead. In other words, it would end the
war for us and have the war continue for those
that remained with 1,000 casualties a week at
least ad infinitum. What we have done by
sticking in there was to get a peace which ends
the war for the long-suffering people of South
Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos as well.

D. You should be prepared to point out how the
settlement has been improved from October
and also why it was not possible to settle in
December. It is obvious that our critics are
already beginning to pick up the line with some
assist from Hanoi that we could have had the
same settlement we eventually achieved in
October or in December when the talks broke
down. We know this is totally untrue but
the point must be made simply and directly
without too much detail.

E. You should flatly indicate, whenever you get
the opportunity, that the resolutions passed by
the House and Senate caucuses over the years
we were negotiating and by the full Senate from
time to time prolonged the war, and only by
the strong action that we took in December were
we able to convince the enemy that the enemy
should settle and not take the risk of waiting
for the Congress to give them ever more than
they were willing to settle for with us.

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In essence, the simple points must be made that our opponents in the Congress and in the media wanted to end the war in Vietnam with dishonor and what amounted really to an abject surrender and defeat for the United States. We persisted in seeing it through until the war was ended with honor. Our opponents would have ended the war in a way that would have led at the very least to a Communist coalition government for South Vietnam or a totally Communist government for South Vietnam. We have ended in a way that assures the people of South Vietnam the right to determine their own future in free, internationally supervised elections, which means that there will be no Communist government unless the people want it and this is something that no one anticipates will really happen.

Finally, our opponents with all their talk about peace were only interested in getting peace for America and would have ended our involvement in a way that would have allowed the war to continue indefinitely for the long-suffering people of Indochina. In other words, peace with honor means peace with independence for South Vietnam and peace for the people of Southeast Asia. Peace with surrender and dishonor means peace for us but a Communist government for South Vietnam and continued war for the 50 million people of Indochina.

You should make these points strongly and vigorously before the Congress in your opening statement without going into any detail. Perhaps the opening statement should be no more than 10 minutes and then you could field questions. Rather than educating the Congress on all the details, it is more important that we leave them with three or four simple, hard messages that they can understand and that they, we hope, will go out and peddle to others.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Camp David

March 4, 1973

FROM THE PRESIDENT

One of the major problems that will confront us with regard to the aid program for Vietnam will be what the POWs say when the last ones return and they are able to recount how they were treated by the North Vietnamese during their imprisonment.

It has been encouraging to note that those who have spoken out so far have been positive with regard to aiding North Vietnam.

On the other hand, I can imagine that there are some pretty gory stories that can come out and this will just turn off the Congress with a vengeance in the event that we do not find some way to deal with it at this point.

This is something that will have to be handled with very great discretion. I think you should discuss it with Moorer and Richardson on a very confidential basis to see if there is any way that they feel they could talk to, possibly, some of the leaders - the camp captains, like Denton, Risner, et al, with the idea that they enlist them - if possible - for support of the aid program when it comes out on the ground that this is the most effective way to avoid hostilities breaking out again.

In any event, it is very important for us to have some idea as to what is going to come out so that we can cope with it effectively at that time.