*

Bill Donaldson/Secy Kissinger

2

D: Okay. It's not just the embargo but just the idea that, you know, finally now with all the pressure they put on, even the United States is now trying to make a deal with them. It just makes them feel that the whole strategy is brighter than maybe ...... I'm not questioning that we shouldn't have a contingency plan.

K: A contingency plan won't do us any good if we haven't opened the discussion.

D: Right. Okay. I guess I would want to haul out the contingency plan the minute we see that these other guys don't go along with us; in case they don't go along.

K: Yeah, but why is that better to open the discussion and then let it drag until the other guys don't go along with us?

D: I just think he might interpret it as a sign of weakness. Your judgment ...

K: Well, I'd like to see -- By the time the others have sewed up large chunks of this thing, it doesn't do us much good to open the discussion.

D: So far, you know, those deals are pretty small. I mean, 200 thousand barrels a day to the French is nothing. And the British haven't even ....

K: Well, we don't have to go that way. I think it will be a better pressure though if we have an option to go this way.

D: Right.

K: I have never seen the advantage in not getting yourself an option.

D: Right.

K: Secondly, I had a press conference this morning and I announced that the President was going to make an initiative next week.

D: Oh, you did.

K: Yeah.

D: Good. Well, that brings me to the second reason why I was going to call you. And, that is, first of all, I talked to both the Germans and the British Ambassadors. The British, you know, were very forthcoming and he said he would go back to them and he was all very friendly. The German guy was a little more guarded in the sense he felt they were in a sort of a special position now because they now share the EC thing.

K: Oh, bull!

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By 01 NARA Date 4/8/94

*

Bill Donaldson/Secy Kissinger

3

D: And I told him, I said we weren't asking you to be forthcoming on some program you know nothing about but we're just -- you know, everybody else has said something and all we want you to do is say that you think the idea of everybody getting together is a good idea and the Kissinger proposal is one that merits a good hard look and that we know the details.

K: Yeah.

D: He came over here and I had a long conversation. But he was balking a little bit.

K: Well, the Europeans are almost impossible right now.

D: Yeah. Along that line, the British have sent out a cable to all their Embassies and have sent us a copy of the thing and the net of it is that they want their Embassies to go into the OPEC people before their meeting on Monday and tell them how bad we think the price rise is, you know, that they've got to do something about it, roll it back. And they've come to us and I guess they are going to all the other OECD countries and asking for some help on it. Basically, if you remember, we made kind of an eleventh hour attempt at this OPIC meeting.

v

K: Yeah. I would not do any more.

D: You would not do any more?

K: No. Our position is now clear.

D: Would you absolutely -- the only reason I'd do something would be to sort of forthcoming to the British.

K: No, we've made it pretty clear. We've made it clear to the Saudis, we've made it clear to Iran, made it clear to Venezuela.

D: Yeah.

K: Our views by now are known.

D: Okay.

K: Good. Thank you, Bill. I'll see you tomorrow.

TELCORN
The President/Secy Kissinger

12:45 p.m., January 3, 1973

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. Everybody tells me you did a fine job at your press conference.

K: Well, I laid into them.

P: Good.

K: Actually, they asked our sort of question. What about this story that you're conducting an independent foreign policy? So this gave me a chance to say how often we meet, how you give me directions before I go, how I am in touch every evening, how I am on top of it in touch with Scowcroft whom you see regularly and Haig. And I said, but moreover I don't like the idea of a government of independent fiefdoms wasn't run by feudal barrons. The President is in charge of foreign policy. That's the way the constitution provides it; that's the way it is; that's the way it will always be as long as I'm in the Department and the President is in the White House.

P: That's good, Henry.

K: You know, that was --

P: Great!

K: Then they said: How can the President conduct foreign policy when he's being impeached? I said: Well, you've got one thing wrong. He's isn't being impeached. And they said: Well, as long as there's a threat of impeachment. I said: You read the President's annual Foreign Policy Report. He has designed a strategy; he is pursuing it. He is pursuing it for the sake of the peace of the world and he is in no way influenced by any of the domestic considerations which you imply and he will do what is right and only what is right.

P: That's very good.

K: And I also indicated at great length that you were spending a lot of time on the energy problem and I said you were going to approach various heads of government next week. We're spelling out these proposals and that gave me a chance to give them your approach to it, which is more than we could have done -- We couldn't release the letter so we would have had to have had Ziegler just say it.

P: Sure, much better for you.

*

The President/Secy Kissinger

2

K: No, much better for you.

P: Much better for you to say it though.

K: It gives a much better ride to the story.

P: Of course.

K: So I thought it was a pretty good press --

P: Oh, everybody thought so, yeah. Ron and Al both called me and said they thought it was great.

K: Al told you about that letter I had from the Saudis --

P: Yeah.

K: A fellow called McMullin going around there saying that on behalf of Ford that you're going to be impeached in two months.

P: That's a curious thing. Have you ever met him?

K: I don't even know who he is. Do you know who he is?

P: No, never heard of him.

K: Probably one of these goddamn oil executives.

P: No, but we know most of those. Hummm. But we'll run it down.

*

TELCORN

Secretary Schlesinger - Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1974

2:50 p.m.

K: I am going to send Dayan off in a few minutes. We have made
some very good progress. We are not all the way, not yet, but
90% of the way. They are psychopathic, though that this be kept only
to you. I have to meet with him again tomorrow. I am fairly op-
timistic, though. They want some assurances of longer term supplies
so I thought you could.

S: Well, that's a political thing. You understand we have now committed 1.3 billion. After we pass 1.5 billion it has to be a Presidential determination.

K: Under these conditions we will be able to do that though. I think
you could tell them its no problem and be willing to discuss a long
term supply proposal with them.

S: This is what the administration wants?

K: Yes.

S: Okay. The P

K: The President wants to do this if they are helpful in the political thing. Moreover, if...I think we will have less trouble from the Arabs if we do it clearly related to getting them to make concessions. We wouldn't be delivering these things until they have delivered a part of it anyway. If they could see some positive tone as a result of their positive thinking.

S: We will give them positive tone. The things we will not be too positive about are the following: (1) There are certain advanced items we just don't have in our inventory. They are asking for C which, you know is still in R&D. This sophisticated stuff just isn't available. (2) We can do the A-4s, we can go ahead with Skyhawks and 50 million dollars worth of choppers they want.

K: I'd be pretty good on Skyhawks and choppers.

S: The A-4s and other advanced to a lesser extent, though.

K: They are getting walleye's aren't they.

S: We have walleyes but what they want is the advanced walleyes, the extended long range walleyes. We just don't have those available.

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1973

3:35 pm

K: How are you? I wanted to check one thing to get your personal
judgement. I have had a very good talk with Dayan. They have
basically bought our concept. It is a tremendous advance. Really
incredible. But there are enough wrinkles in it for them so it
is hard to handle through diplomatic channels. If I talk to Sadat I could
get the ..... accomplished. But I know what our leader would think
if I was to go out there. I would just go to Cairo and Tel Aviv.

H: Yeah.

K: I can have our Ambassadors present it to him, but the explanations
would have to be so complex.

H: What are you telling me?

K: If I do it I should do it next week. some time if you are that
eager to get it settled.

H: Sure. Would you go to Cairo?

K: If we present this in Geneva and let the Russians hack at it we
may get a stalemate..

H: Is Dayan speaking for her?

K: yes. This thing is now for the first time within manageable
range but still not acceptable to the Egyptians. The Egyptians want
them to withdraw to the Mitla Pass...the Egyptians watn...two kilometers
at the Suez Canal. They are willing to give them two battalions. They
have given up the idea of tanks east of the Canal.. if they are willing
to have... but if every concession becomes the result of a cable.. do you
see what I mean?

H: I understand.

K: I don't want to present it to him because he will go into orbit.

*

- 2 -

H: I think we ought to do what will get this thing settled.

K: I got him good publicity yesterday.

H: Excellent, excellent. That problem is manageable.

K: I am not so eager to take another trip out there.... if this is the last Israeli position.

H: That's right.

K: I would go to Cairo and Tel Aviv and I may hop to Damascus to keep them quiet -- but essentially it will be Cairo and Tel Aviv for three or four days... My worry is we put it into Geneva and the Egyptians will ______ and I may have to get to break a deadlock.

H: That's a traditional problem, but the basic problem is if you go there and get caught up in a vice... I would hate to think, if you should go and get caught in a stalemate, I mean you are included in it.

K: He would like it and then he could get rid of me. How is our frame of mind?

H: Fine, much better than yesterday.

K: I left San Clemente very depressed. I am beginning to wonder how long this is manageable.

H: It is... in the Los Angeles Times.

K: That part is manageable. I think we have it won. What may not be is our...

H: No, that is manageable... the question is that this thing will rise or fall on what is accomplished. I think if there is opposition and it is real and now and not a situation where you are rendered inoperative then we ought to take it.

K: Let us analyze the plan and find out if the Israelis mean this is there final position because then there will be a deadlock... I may be able to bring about a meeting with Dayan and their top man but let me think about it. You think you can manage it if I find it desirable to go.

H: We can manage whatever is necessary.

K: OK, fine.

END

TELCOM

Ambassador Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1974

3:46 p.m.

D: ________ about the time of your arrival in Moscow. You remember
we discussed with you about 7 through 10 .... one or two days, really.

K: Right. Let's definitely set it for that.

D: 7-10 of March?

K: Right. That is I think better from my point of view.

D: We think it will give more time to work on some major problems
to be discussed at a summit meeting. It will give chance to discuss with
you when we have a proper opportunity.

K: Let's do it on Monday or Tuesday.

D: Do you have a lunch date of shall we just talk....?

K: Well, let me see what my schedule is.

D: Okay. I'll call you on Monday to see.

K: Good. I am going to upgrade the representation at the European
Security Council.

D: You are?

K: Yes. I'll give them some time. The thing is we will not be able

D: Anything new on the Middle East after your conference with Dayan.?

K: Not yet. I'm going to meet with him again tomorrow morning. Can I
call you? I think we are making some progress. It's not yet good, but
it isn't as bad as I was afraid it might be.

D: ________, not very useful in the political area. Okay, Henry. I'll
be in touch with you.

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin - Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1974

3:46 p.m.

D: 7-10 of March?

D: You are?

K: Yes.

K: Not yet. I'm going to meet with him again tomorrow morning. Can I
call you? I think we are making some progress. Its not yet good, but
it isn't as bad as I was afraid it might be.

D: ____________. not very useful in the political area. Okay, Henry. I'll
be in touch with you.

*

TELECON

Mr. Hyland/Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1974

4:25

K: How are you?

H: I'm fine.

K: Have you made a decision on what you want?

H: I would still rather take the State Department job.

K: OK, then I'll appoint you on Monday.

H: When do you want me to come on?

K: After we get your security clearance -- in about 2 weeks.

H: Fine. It will be announced on Monday?

K: Does that surprise you?

H: Well, I have been getting strange phone calls from the Department of State.

K: About what?

H: Oh, my biography and security clearance.

K: We'll announce on Monday. I don't want you to administer that place. I want you to shape it.

H: Are you going to be at the White House tomorrow.

K: May be.

H: Well, if you have a couple of minutes I would like to talk with you.

K: Why don't we aim for about 11:30

H: OK.

K: I'll need intelligence that is, that will give me a feeling for the Foreign press and what the mood is in the country.

H: We'll do that immediately.

TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1974

6:02 PM

(Missed the first part)

K: They can wait a week, I'm not all that definite.

S: I told him to press on as fast as they can.

K: I talked to Fulbright.

S: I think one of the main ones is the FBI check.

K: He was just appointed as Director General when he had a full check.

S: With him, I don't know. I think a good part of the problem is Timmons. A lot of other things are ____.

K: They do nothing but push papers around. We can't make the announcement on M__.

S: Not necessarily. I don't know about Davis.

K: If I can't announce Davis, I can't announce the Assistant Secretary either.

S: That's true too. Let me check. Let me see.

K: I've had Abshire looking at it. I had everyone here looking at it.

S: I'm going to call Timmons.

K: As soon as I can I'm getting him on the phone.

S: There isn't any FBI problem on it.

K: And for ____, get him off my back.

S: I don't know if there's a problem with the Sisco, Porter thing. With Davis, I understand. Somebody said you wanted Dean on Monday.

K: No, not at all. But I did want Dean soon. What is the problem?

S: Schlesinger wants me to pull ____ out now. ____.

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1974

6:12 PM

K: What is that thing Donaldson is telling me.

V: The story they have is the President is following up on
the energy action ________ foreign minister meeting called
tomorrow. That is the story he has.

K: Just when were in the progress of formulating our program.
Where do you think he got it?

V: I'll see if I can find out any more.

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

DT

NARA Date

E012958

4/2/64

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM
THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED
AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY
NUMBER _IA_ ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD
(GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET
(GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which
Contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

TELECON
Bill Timmons/Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1974

7:50 PM

K: Bill, how are you? Bill, I want to talk to you about
the man I want to appoint as Assistant Secretary for Congressional
Relations.

T: I've some concern about him. I understand he's a career
man.

K:

T: I don't know what Congressional background or experience
he has.

K: He's probably the best Foreign Service officer I've got.
He wants the job. He's extremely intellectual. Probably the
best Foreign Service officer around. I think he would learn
the job very well. If Marshall Wright could do it, for
God sake.

T:

SANITIZED

We're familiar with some of the career people.
There's an awful lot of technicalities on who can ____ and
who can't. I just question whether he can do the job properly.
Naturally I hope to work closely with your Congressional guys.

K: In that respect you would have no problem at all.

T: Of course I never heard of him. Jerry Jones called me
today to clear him. I asked if he was career.

K: Only because I couldn't find anyone else. I spent 4
months looking for someone.

T: You're entitled to somebody that can get along with you.

K: I would say good. If I tell Nat Davis he's got to take
his marching orders from you, there's no question that
he'll do that.

T: All those guys on the Congressional ____ try to do ____.

K: That I can guarantee you.

By: OT
NARA Date: 6/8/84

DECLASSIFIED

TELECON

Nat Davis/Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1974

7:58 PM

K: I'm running into a little static at the White House. I forgot to clear you with Timmons. Would you mind going to see him in the morning. Would you call him tomorrow?

D: Certainly, I'll do my best to do what he wants. As long as it's what you want.

K: Make him think that you're taking him seriously and taking me seriously. That you're the President's man.

D: Yes sir.

K: If you'll call him in the morning, I'll appreciate it.

D: Call him about 9:00?

K: What?

D: Should I call him about 9:00 in the morning?

K: Yes.

D: Yes sir.

END.

TELECON
President Nixon/Secretary Kissinger

January 4, 1974

8:12 PM

N: Hello, Henry.

K: Mr. President. I just wanted to bring you up to date on the meeting with Dayan. We spoke about Israel. We're 75% of the way at last. We made very good progress. Have we gone to the depth of the zone. I haven't talked to the Israelis. The Israelis are willing to be at the West end and the Egyptians want them at the East end. That's a difficulty that we're now talking about the same plan with just different numbers.

N: Good, Henry. That's very good.

K: I think we have a chance now of making some progress. I'll report to you after the meeting tomorrow.

N: You're meeting with him again?

K: Yes. So we know what's happening, when and where.

N: That's fine, Henry, just fine.

K: Every paper including the Star has a headline that you're in full control of Foreign policy.

N: Eventually, they have to write it.

K: We never could get it printed.

N: Why do you think they're printing it now. It's a curious thing, isn't it.

K: The Washington Post has a separate story on the first page, with a big headline "Kissinger says Nixon in full charge". The New York Times had a big print of it's story on the subject.

N: The main thing is that it's all working.

K: I think we can handle that.

N: I followed that one in those reports.

K: We think you should have it.

N: I know. I wouldn't be you with it. You will let me know. I'm just thinking of you. It's still in the dry season. They hung on this long.

K: We can already begin to ____ if they got to the middle of May they could make it.

N: The make slow progress here. The energy ____.

K: We can get some other equipment in there and...

N: Part 2 of the energy thing played well. A lot of people are asking, "What is the President planning".

K: I think we would make your proposal thing next week on the energy action group. We want those letters out so we can release them.

N: You got out just in time. It's going to rain here for the next few days.

K: I'll call you tomorrow to report to you.

N: You're feeling all right?

K: I feel fine, Mr. President. Those four days did me a world of good.

N: Now if we can find time to get you back out here. ____ Don't let them corrupt you again.

K: I'm going to a Chinese Restaurant with Nancy and let them corrupt me.

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

O

NARA Date

4/8/84

SANITIZED

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 3 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7292 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

NLN FORM 101 (revised 6-85)

By OJ NARA Date 6/26/94
DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958

K: Yeah.

C: But anyway, that's all right. And I have designs on one of your people.

K: Who?

C: [SANITIZED]

K: My God, no. We've got him tied up in a new assignment. What do you want him for?

C: Well, I wanted to make him the Economic National Intelligence Officer. He would organize the whole community for us.

K: I've just had a brawl with Schlesinger on him.

C: Oh, really?

K: No, we're making him Joint Deputy to me and to Flanigan.

C: Scowcroft told me you were thinking of that.

K: Yeah.

C: Well, otherwise.

K: Well, I'm impressed that my associates share my judgment of my people.

C: [laughs] Well, he's first-class. I worked with him on Vietnam.

K: He is outstanding.

C: He has the brilliant capability of talking about economics without talking about economics - which I think is pretty critical.

K: Okay.

C: Well, I think that's great.

K: Nice to talk to you. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
E0123456789

*

Telcon
Bill Timmons/HAK

11:31; 1/6/74

K: Bill.

T: Yes.

K: I thought you were going to see Nat Davis yesterday.

T: Well, I got tied up, Henry, and I scheduled a meeting with him at 9:00 in the morning on Monday.

K: O.K. Good, because I....

T: We're going to get together and have coffee and...

K: Because I would like, want to announce him tomorrow. I can slip today.

T: Well, I got tied up on something for....

K: That's alright.

T: On the West Coast and we chatted on the phone a bit and...

K: No, no, that's fine. But I want you to know that his strict instructions from me are going to be in the closest association with you and the reason I'm picking him is, I was thinking of him as Under Secretary to tell you how highly I thought of him. As Under Secretary for Political Affairs. And I wanted to pick my highest type fellow who's going to be good on substance. His instructions will be to get his strategy from you, but I will need your advice anyway because this isn't a field in which I know a hell of a lot.

T: Henry, have you done any consultations on the Hill about Nat?

K: Well, the only thing I've done is with Fulbright.

T: Uh huh. He's not curious about Aiken and Frelinghuysen and some of those, but they probably know of him if they don't know him personally.

K: Well, should I call them do you think?

T: Well, let's wait till tomorrow.

*

-2-

K: Well, why don't we put it off until Tuesday, then, Bill.

T: O.K., I understand this is part of a package so you have to do them all....

K: Well, that's my problem, that I have somebody that I want to move out of the Executive Secretary's job to take his place, and then I have somebody out of another job into the Executive Secretary's place.

T: Yeah, a kind of dominoes.

K: That's right. So I have to hold up all the other appointments.

T: Well, I'll call you after I talk to him in the morning.

K: Now, Bill, I don't want to impose this on you, but if you want to call a few of these Congressmen yourself, just to show your relationship to it but also to give me a feel, I'd be glad to divide it up with you.

T: Yeah. The thing that worries me a little bit is that the Republicans that we have to count on when the crunch gets going on the Hill, rather than the Democrats, I'm afraid they are going to be a little reluctant because of Nat having served as Sergeant Shriver's deputy and got most of his promotions in Lyndon Johnson's White House, and I think he's going to be suspect to them, certainly in the early days.

K: Had he been Sergeant Shriver's deputy? No, he was on the staff of the Peace Corps.

T: Well, I haven't talked to Nat directly but I understand that he ... over to the Sergeant's deputy, now he might have had several deputies. At least I think that's going to give some of our Republicans some concern. Well, we'll chat after I talk to him in the morning.

K: Good. O.K.

T: Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

*

Telcon
Sen. Javits/HAK

January 6, 1974 - 11:40 a.m.

K: Hello.

J: Good morning, Henry.

K: Jack, welcome home.

J: And a Happy New Year to you.

K: Happy New Year. Sorry I missed you in Acapulco.

J: What a shame. Everybody was expecting you. The Escadangs were devastated.

K: Well, I.... Why were they devastated? They could use their house.

J: I know, but they were all set to/elsewhere and they'd have been so honored with you.

K: Well, I'll be down eventually.

J: Well, Mary had talked about it and, you know, said what arrangements she was making. She was so proud that you would come down and use it. We missed you because we knew it would do you good.

K: Oh, it would have been great. But first I didn't feel well...

J: Oh you didn't?

K: No. I came back with the flu and...

J: Listen, you and I have to have a very special talk about your physical conditions. You know, in this respect I have the ______ to dictate to you.

K: I wish you would.

J: I'm very serious about it because you know I'm almost twenty years older than you are and I think I'm in a hell of a better shape than you are.

K: That's right.

*

-2-

J: I'd like to, you know, talk to you about that because in the first
place you'll have more fun out of life as you go along, and in the
second place you're too good a man to run yourself down the drain
unthinkingly. On that score, you know.

K: Well, I'd like to see you apart from getting advice on my physical
condition.

J: Listen, I'm the maddest tennis player and athlete alive.

K: I know it. In fact, I'm told in Acapulco that you two are trying to time
their visit so that you're not there because they don't mind playing with
you in the morning but I understand you track them out on the tennis
court in the middle of the day.

J: That's bad. (laughter) Oh, I'm not that bad.

K: I forget which Mexican told me that they were in awe of you because
not only did you play every day, but you played in mid-day.

J: (laughter) That's wonderful.

Well, Henry, you've been doing lots of things. Have they been going
well?

K: They've been going well. You know, we're sitting on a powder keg.

J: I know we are.

K: And in this phase now at last the Israelis have understood that we're
saving them rather than destroying them.

J: Yes. And I think you've got a better relationship now with the people
of the country and you know, that's very, very important.

K: You mean the Israelis or the Americans?

J: Well, the Americans. I think that's worked around very well. I
think you stand well and I... Yeah, I really do, I think that there are
always a few sign posts but politically my - as I smell the wind - it's
very good as it stands now and especially as you begin to make a team
of the Department, which is, I think the very, very big objective, one
of those objectives which nobody will give you a medal for but which
will make you a historic Secretary of State.

K: Well, I agree with you.

J: You know what I mean? If you stand on their shoulders, which they are

*

-3-

more than willing you should do, but those shoulders have to be stout
and strong.

K: Well, you know, my problem has been that after I became Secretary I was immediately thrown into the Middle East crisis. But now I've got all my people appointed and Bill has been very good about confirming them. So I think within two weeks of the Congress coming back all my top people should be confirmed and then I have my own team in there.

J: Very good. I hear Sisco's staying.

K: Sisco is staying. We are going to announce him tomorrow or the day after, as Under Secretary. Do you think that's a good appointment?

J: Very good. I think especially with you he will draw enormous resource from the confidence you will vest in him. He's a man who flowers and blossoms if confidence is vested in him. And he gets very conspiratorial if it's drained away.

K: That's a very sharp observation. You are right.

J: You see, it works in reverse with Joe.

K: In fact, that was one hesitation I had about appointing him because I had just seen his conspiratorial side. But I have now recognized him, in his travels with me that if you work closely with him he is really very loyal. He

J: Not only is he loyal, but you know, he isn't kidding me. He's got damn good standing with the Arabs. And he's earned it, which is all O.K. You know what I mean? And he values it highly, too, which is good too.

K: Now, Jack, I'm thinking of appointing somebody in charge of Congressional relations who's a bit of an off-beat appointment. It's Nat Davis. I don't know whether you know him.

J: I know a little bit about him.

K: He was our Ambassador in Chile. He's the youngest career minister we've got. He was in the Peace Corps with Shriver and when our Ambassador to Guatemala was killed when LBJ was President, he volunteered to go down there as Ambassador. I've had him back here as Director General of the Foreign Service. He's so good that if Sisco hadn't stayed I would have made him Under Secretary. But I thought it would be better to have somebody with substantive knowledge

*

-4-

He can always learn about the Congress but maybe I'm wrong there.

J: Can I be exposed to him?

K: Will you be exposed to him?

J: I say, can I be exposed to him?

K: Sure. Are you in town tomorrow?

J: I will be tomorrow.

K: Would you like to meet him?

J: Yeah. Shall I just call him, or will he call...?

K: I'll ask him to call you.

J: Alright. I'll see him late in the afternoon.

K: Good. Wonderful.

J: That's great. And, Henry, do we need to talk about anything?

K: Well, let's have breakfast. We don't need to talk except, I mean we don't need to talk on an emergency basis.

J: Well, is tomorrow morning agreeable to you, because I'm coming down tonight.

K: Is that the only day you're in town?

J: Well, I could be in town Tuesday morning but it would interfere with the doctor's appointment I have at Bethesda. I could rearrange that.

K: Because I have made an appointment which I could probably change.

J: Well, if you can change it, fine. But if you can't, if you have your office leave a message on this phone I'll do it Tuesday morning and rearrange my appointment at Bethesda.

K: O.K. Could you do it early, as we have staff meeting at 8:00.

J: Or even earlier.

K: Let's do it at 7:45.

*

TELCON
Amb. Dinitz - Secretary Kissinger

January 7, 1974

11:55 a.m.

(missing first part)

D: ...the speculation must be leakage from the government.

K: Of course it is leakage from the government.

D: Already this morning I have talked to people and in reading the papers. ...Told them to try to stop this because this could create speculation in the international press.

K: Exactly, not to speak of San Clemente.

D: I know, I didn't want to tell them this, but this is what I had in mind.

K: Can you shut them up?

D: I think so. I have already ...I am doing something and I will try again. The point is the speculation is already going on, it is difficult now to do something....not 100% helpful.

K: How late in the day can I see you?

D: At any time.

K: Good. I will be in touch.

*

TELCONE

Secretary Kissinger/Joe Sisco

1/6/74 12:20 p.m.

K: Joe, I already got what I called about.

S: I sent it over a little after 11:30
Was it all right?

K: I had to change two paragraphs;if you don't get better than that Joe
I'll--

S: Do you suppose I'm relaxing?

K: I think you are slipping a bit
No it's very good. I changed the end a little bit.

S: You noticed what I was trying to do--I thought I was being very subtle
in that last paragraph.

K: No, no you did very well. I'm just spelling it out a little more.
What is your thinking now that you had a chance

S: I still think we've got to go and in view of the fact that Fahmi is leaving
around Friday for Moscow I think we ought to be shooting for Wednesday
myself

K:But I think Fahmi should put it off

S: That's a little embarrassing, but I bet he sends you back a message
in the next 12 or 24 hours saying--of course we struck that sentence
out, so he doesn't know we're

K: But I told Eilts to raise it when he gets there

S: And he won't get there until tomorrow night and won't see Fahmi until
Tuesday so I think on Tuesday, we'll get a big scream from Fahmi that
you do it right away.

K: Yeh, Okay. Bye.

S: Have a good day.

TELECON
Dean Rusk/Secretary Kissinger

January 6, 1974

12:45 PM

K: The President said he was going to call you back and he thought I was going to call you. It was decided that your view was probably the right one and not ask you to serve.

R: I got that view more strongly since there's a chance I'll be called as a witness.

K: I'm trying to keep the investigation confined to allegations of domestic spying. That would have presented no problem.

R: That's bound to get to me.

K: Then it will get into areas -- it isn't a question of legality, it's how much of the thing they'll pull out.

R: You mentioned something immoral. Can you tell me what you referred to.

K: Some claims I made about Dominican Republic and attempts on Castro.

R: There's no problem as far as I'm concerned. I explained a political assassination was contrary to the policy of the U.S.

K: I happen to believe it's against national interest. First to investigate matters like this, I think we won't have an intelligence agency left.

R: Some things should not be confused. The Director of the CIA chairman of an intelligence committee and that included the FBI. I used to get every morning a whole series of rap ups. I have no doubt that some came out of the FBI material.

K: Some of the domestic files from CIA and are FBI reports.

R: You have a good many in the State Department files on State Department people. I think it's unwise from the President's point of view to have me on. I'm certainly going to be a witness and it's better not to have one of the witnesses who might be pummeled very hard by the Congress to members of the panel.

K: That was our view. I still would like to get you together with the President.

By 01 NARA Date 6/8/84

DECLASSIFIED

*

Rusk - page 2

R: That fellow who resigned from the CIA. I never heard of the guy. One thing I suspect the panel might ask of the President and the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense -- we should have given more to the CIA. I never looked at the CIA budget. That was worked out by the Director and the Director of the Budget. My guess is that 3 key members of the NSC should look at those things.

K: It's clear that excessive subordination hasn't been adequate. I never knew they had a domestic branch. I never heard of Angleton. He's saying I got him fired. I had no idea the guy existed.

R: Has the announcement of the members of the panel been made?

K: Yes.

R: At some point somebody should make it clear the President that all the other members of the NSC will be available to the panel for any assistance. That would include all of us.

K: I see. I really think we should separate illegal activities and domestic activities and we should not have this an open season on covert activities.

R: There's a piece of paper lying around during the Truman administration which was a treaty between the CIA and the FBI regarding their respective jurisdictions.

K: When are you coming through here again?

R: Let me look and see what my present commitments are. I have to go and visit Lady Bird this week. I don't have anything schedules to come up January. I could come there between the 2nd and 4th at the end of the (first) week in February on my way to Princeton.

K: Why don't you do that.

R: I'll get in touch with you.

K: OK. Do that.

R: My best to the President.

END