CHAPTER VI

# What Price Deterrence - The Problems of Limited War

Another way of putting this problem is to ask under what conditions power and the willingness to use it are most in harmony. There exists no over-all formula for military superiority nor any one military capability which will achieve deterrence in all circumstances. The same military capability which may prevent war in one contingency, may actually encourage it in another. The same weapons system which it would be folly to challenge given one set of objectives, may be useless to discourage different purposes. Thus a gap is created between the pressures of technology in the direction of the maximum development of power and the reality of the nuclear period that there exist upper limits beyond which increments of destructiveness do not pay strategic returns. It is therefore no longer possible to speak of military superiority in the abstract. What does being ahead in the nuclear race mean if each side can destroy the other's national substance? What is the significance of increasing the destructiveness of the nuclear arsenal when the enormity of present weapons systems already tends to paralyze the will? It may be a hard lesson to learn for a nation which has found safety in the

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magnitude of its power that henceforth security may depend on the nuance and subtlety with which its strength can be applied. The fate of the dinosaur and the mammoth should be sufficient illustration that brute strength does not always supply the mechanism for success in the struggle for survival.

As long as it was possible to assemble overwhelming power, strategy for us resolved itself into deciding on a certain level of military effort. But this condition was a fortunate historical accident and fleeting by its very nature. Strategy for other nations has always involved a sense of proportion as much as a sense of scale; it reflected the art by which a relationship was established between the various elements which make up a nation's strength and its ability to act. This may be the challenge of the nuclear age for American strategy. Any discussion of methods to overcome or mitigate the dilemmas of strategy in the nuclear age must therefore begin with a discussion of the components of strategy in general. Although there exist as many definitions as books on the subject, it may be useful to state five principles against which to test any proposed solutions:

1. Strategy must seek to determine the opponent's likely mode of action and take it into account in devising its weapons system and its tactical

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**doctrine.** A weapons system cannot be developed in the abstract; it reflects a set of assumptions about the nature of the war in which it will be employed, and these assumptions will also <u>underlie military structure</u>, <u>the training of the military personnel</u>, <u>which</u> <u>for the purpose of training</u> <u>and of the discipline which forms an integral part of it</u>, is to permit an effective response to the widest range of circumstances. But <u>the effectiveness of the response depends on establishing the patterns of behavior of combat in advance of actual hostilities</u>. <u>This</u>, <u>in particular</u> because <u>the presence and confusion of battle permits only a minimum number of improvisations</u>, <u>Tactical doctrine therefore seeks to anticipate</u>, <u>bring about</u> <u>in training and through indoctrination the contingencies which will be confronted in combat.</u>

As a result, the advantage conferred by surprise is not so much the ability to confront the opponent with overwhelming force, as the opportunity of presenting unexpected contingencies. "Nothing is easier to effect" said Machiavelli "then what the enemy thinks you will never attempt to do." An unexpected mode of action forces improvisation; it therefore deprives the opponent of the advantage of sober calculation. Moreover, while improvisation for the individual may inhibit only his best performance, in a group or organization, it may produce more serious consequences. An organization is distinguished from a collection of individuals by its ability to act pruposefully as a unit; it does so by reducing

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most problems to routine--a standard of average performance. Thus the other members of the group are enabled to take certain patterns of behavior for granted and to adjust their actions accordingly. A great momentum is thereby conferred through the specialization of functions coupled with cooperative effort. This in turn frees energies for problems which are not routine and for pushing forward areas of knowledge or of competence.

The solution of the

The test of any organization then is twofold: (1) whether what it defines as routine in fact applies to the problems it is most likely to confront; (2) whether the attempt to achieve predictability does not inhibit creativity or spontaneous reactions to unexpected contingencies. The two problems are in fact closely related. If the area of the predictable compared to the unexpected is relatively large, the unforeseen can be integrated into existing patterns of leadership; then mental energies can be devoted to creative and spontaneous solutions of new problems. If an organization is confronted by too many unexpected contingencies, however, its leadership will no longer be able to draw strength from the existence of the cooperative effort; the organization may lose its motility, its adaptability, its flexibility, and its ability to make any response to a challenge except by fleeing from it.

The principle of uncertainty on the contrary, the routine on which its action is based may inhibit adaptation; the machinery for making decisions may become overloaded. In extreme cases, members of the group may take independent action and thus increase the indeterminacy of the over-all performance. Or it may lead to panic: the inability to make

The prerequisite of effective organized response then is a concept of the challenge to which strategy is to be directed. The Romans stampeded when they first confronted Hannibal's elephants. This was not because the elephants were a decisive weapon by themselves; it was simply that the Romans had never considered a mode for dealing with the military use of elephants, and their panic

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reflected their inability to react to this contingency as a group. Within a
few years they had learned to master the charges of the beasts by discipline
rather than through flight; the elephants henceforth became part of the
expected mode of warfare, a contingency against which to prepare like any other.

Similarly, the German tank thrusts in 1940 demoralized the French above all
because such rapid maneuver had been explicitly rejected by French doctrine;
it appeared therefore "unnatural" to French commanders: they did not possess
a mode of action for dealing with it. Thus a weapons system by itself is
useless if it cannot be applied to contingencies which are likely to be confronted
and if it is not related to a notion of the kind of war in which it will probably
be employed.

2. This leads to a second postulate which is corollary of the first: one: **strategy should seek to make the actions of the opponent as predictable as possible.** There are two ways of achieving predictability: by understanding the opponent's behavior or by creating a calculus of risks to induce him to adopt a desired course of action at least to reduce his options. They former is the passive, the latter the active aspect of predictability. To be sure, it is dangerous in either case to ascribe to the opponent one's own

[y]

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notions of what constitutes rational behavior, particularly if the two sides
exhibit different cultural patterns or domestic structures. Nevertheless,
any society by virtue of being a society is capable of only a limited range
of responses to a challenge. This is because
the condition of group activity is a degree of
predictability of the behavior of society both towards its components and
towards other groups. It is the ordered appearance of events which makes
society seem natural and its existence eternal. A society which behaves
completely unpredictably will appear as arbitrary to its members and as
arbitrary to its members and as dangerous to other groups. It is possible
of course that a society behaves predictably towards its citizens and erratically
towards other societies. To the extent that it does so, it will not lose
social cohesiveness, but it may lose international standing; to the extent
that a society behaves unpredictably in its international relations
superior
other states can find security in relation to it only through a balance of power;
thus relations between it and the rest of the international community tend to
be based on force or the threat of force. However, from the point of view of
strategy unpredictability is an asset because it complicates enemy calculations.
It has been argued that the chief deterrents of the United States is not so

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much our power as our unpredictability, that whatever rational calculation or even our past pronouncements may indicate, we are likely to react on impulse-to a sudden challenge as in Korea. ¹⁾

Strategy should strive to reduce the unpredictable to the smallest.

society behave totally unpredictably, however; government proportions: No government can always act on impulse, no society can long

Herefore

should know

function without a pattern of continuity. It is the task of Strategy to discover

the opponent's of behavior

this pattern and to help channel it in the most favorable direction. This is

strategy

all the more important because ultimately it resolves itself into a balancing of risks. Were it possible to be preponderantly strong everywhere and were this strength always coupled with the willingness to use it, strategy would be equivalent to assembling overwhelming power. And this indeed is how it has presented itself to us in the past. But at the precise moment when the problems of strategy have become global, it has also become impossible to assemble a strategically significant over-all superiority. In seeking to defend a perimeter

of ²⁰ thousand miles, it is not feasible to be protected against all contingencies.

Next To attempt to do so can lead only to a dispersion of resources physically or psychologically. "He who defends everything" said Frederick the Great

"defends nothing." Thus strategy can only channel the opponent's moves; it can

1. Aron

*Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, May or

June 1956.

["June 19, 1930.", "J. von Neumann\n\n**Difficulties of Atomic Scientists' Methods on**", "\"defend nothing.\" Thus strategy can only channel the opponent's moves; it can\nor batepoint itself. \"He who defend everything\" said Frederick the Great", "To attempt to do so can feed only to 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ढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढढ

199

check
choose
rarely statemate all of them. It must therefore close the areas of greatest
concern which cannot be lost and the ground where the stand should be taken.

If it is aware of the opponent's past behavior and of his previous mode of
operation, it can seek to make certain actions unattractive. This indeed is

In these terms policy, involves a calculus of risks according to which
the meaning of deterrence that, on every calculation, aggression must be made
to seem to involve a net loss, at least against areas which one wishes to
protect. To the extent that this is achieved the moves of the opponent are
diverted into strategically unproductive directions or to a plane where his
relative disadvantages may be greatest. If military moves are foreclosed to
the other side, the struggle with the Soviet bloc will not be over, but it
may occur on a less cataclysmic plane. In the more likely contingency that

certain moves can be foreclosed, strategy should at least seek to channel the
Soviet
remaining options into areas which are strategically unproductive, to the opponent
or where our relative advantages are greatest.

3. The third postulate is the reverse of the first; **if it is**
**advantageous not to be surprised, it is equally profitable strategically to**
**or ambiguous choices**
**seek to confront the enemy with unforeseen contingencies. And**
**Surprise can**
**be both military and psychological. Militarily it is stockmg brought about**

200

the unexpected timing and the unexpected nature of the conduct of operations.

An enemy may be aware of the probable nature of a military move, but he can still be caught off guard by its timing—the secret of Napoleon's successes was that he confused his enemies by the rapidity of his maneuvers. He therefore frequently attacked when he was not expected. Conversely, it is possible to be aware that an attack is imminent and yet to be found unprepared by its nature—as happened to us at Pearl Harbor. We knew that the Japanese were planning a military move but our plans did not foresee an attack on Hawaii.

The Japanese success would have been impossible without the advantage of surprise.

Psychologically the task of strategy is to present the opponent with as many ambiguous choices as possible. War has two components: a hostile intention and a hostile capability. A military capability is useless unless it is coupled with the will to employ it. Conversely a superior willingness to run risks can compensate to a certain extent for an inferior military capability. History is replete with examples of nations who grew because they outvillied, outwitted their opponents—the growth of Rome or Prussia from insignificant beginnings can serve as illustrations. Strategy therefore has to address itself to two equations: a physical and a psychological one. The material

200a

balance determines the feasibility of measures, the psychological equation their nature and the willingness to act. The temptation of American strategy is to concern itself only with military capability because traditionally we have fought our wars only against overwhelming threats which left no scope for ambiguity and because our victories had been produced as much by our productive capacity as by superior strategic skill. Conversely the Soviets have been extremely skillful in taking advantage of the psychological component of strategy. Wherever we have had a superior military capability they have sought to paralyze the intention to use it as with their consistent and highly successful campaign to ban nuclear weapons which all over the world has attempted to attached a special stigma to atomic warfare, the warfare we are best prepared to fight. Conversely, whenever they have presented a challenge, they have done so ambiguously either by leaving doubt about their ultimate intention or by posing risks out of proportion to the issue at stake or by presenting their claim as the expression of a "legitimate grievance" to be assuaged by individual concessions. To the extent that their aims have been obscure they have furnished us an incentive to defer a show-down to a more propitious moment or to a clearer case. Or else they have forced us to provide against a maximum number of contingencies. This illustrates the advantage of initiative: every successful move carries with it the possibility of several others; it therefore forces the opponent into defending against an ever-growing number of contingencies; if carried far enough it will reduce his strategy to sterility by absorbing all his energies in countermoves.

["202", "Thus strategy should seek to utilize its advantages by forcing the enemy to fight at a time of its choosing, or at a place of its choosing, or with methods of its choosing. And in the thermo-nuclear age a new dimension it is now part of a proper strategy has been added to make the enemy fight with a weapons system of one's choosing.\n\nWhen weapons technology was relatively stable, the choice of weapons systems was dictated by its availability. Today, however, there exist weapons systems ranging from conventional weapons of high complexity, to nuclear weapons with destructive powers from a kiloton and below to megaton weapons of no inherent upper limit. Each of these weapons systems, or their combination, has its own consequences for strategy. We have already seen that An all-out war fought with thermo-nuclear weapons would reduce the importance of industrial potential. It, therefore gives relative advantage to the side with inferior xtofxxiiixxiiiixxiiixxiiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiiixxxiii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203

5. If two strategies are available to achieve the same objective the less costly one should be chosen. This principle is almost at the level of common sense: it implies no more than that national policy should aim for its objectives without paying an exorbitant price. It is the classic principle of the economy of force. The cost of a strategy is determined by two related

factors: the nature of objectives and the destructiveness of the weapons systems employed. The more unlimited the objective, the more costly the war, at least against a major enemy. For a war ends only when acceptance of peace terms seem more advantageous or less costly than continued resistance; the more total the victory sought, the more absolute the alternatives which have to be posed.

Conversely, the greater the destructiveness of weapons, the more unlimited the objectives of the war tend to become. The greater the suffering, the more extreme the peace terms. If a nation can no longer profit from war it will tend to derive at least the degree of consolation conferred by the humiliation of the opponent. The costliness of war is therefore determined by the degree to which a balance is established between its objectives and the weapons systems employed. A war of annihilation fought with weapons of small destructiveness may turn into an exhausting war of attrition—as happened in the religious wars of the 17th century. A war for initially limited

in the religious wars of the 16th century. A war for initially limited
as well as destructive war may turn into an exhausting war of attrition—also peopled
with the weapons systems employed. A war of annihilation fought with weapons of
by the degree to which a balance is established between its objectives and
pulation of the opponent. The costliness of war is therefore determined
will tend to derive at least the degree of consolidation conferred by the
more extreme the balance terms. If a nation can no longer profit from war if
the objectives of the war tend to become. The more insistent the
Conversely, the greater the destructive power, the more limited
victory sought, the more specific the alternatives which have to be posed.
adversaries or less costly than continued resistance; the more total the
a major enemy. For a war ends only when acceptance of base terms seem more
The more limited the objective, the more costly the war, at least against
factors: the nature of objectives and the destructive power of weapons systems employed
of the economy of force. The cost of a strategy is determined by two related
its objectives without paying an exorbitant price. It is the classic principle
of common sense: it implies more than that national policy should aim for
less costly one should be chosen. This principle is almost at the level
of two strategies are available to achieve the same objective the
2.

503

204

objectives that inflicts enormous suffering will soon assume a total character--
as was the case with World War I. Thus the prerequisite of effective strategy
is a clear understanding of the national purpose and the development of
a weapons system which is adequate to achieve it.

II

The five postulates of strategy thus fall into three groups: the first two deal with the consequence of the enemy's actions; the next two involve the flexibility of one's own behavior; the third determines the cost to be paid. The art of strategy is to establish a balance between these considerations in creating a doctrine where power and the willingness to use it are most in harmony.

The reliance on all-out nuclear war inhibits the establishment of this balance, however. By insisting on a single method for dealing with every challenge, it seeks to escape the necessity for assessing or channeling the likely danger enemy intentions or for establishing a relationship between objectives and the force appropriate for them. Its assertion that every threat can be dealt with by overpowering force on the basis of purely military considerations reflects the lessons of our history which has never known a mortal external danger and which has always sought to identify strategic superiority with overwhelming strength.

which has always sought to identify strategic superiority with overwhelming
reflects the lessons of our history which has never known a mortal external danger and
does with by overpowering force on the basis of merely sufficiently considerations

the force appropriate for them. It's assertion that every force can be
enEMY infection, or for offsetting a relationship between objectives and
the likely danger

challenge, it seeks to escape the necessity for associating or homogenizing
between strategies, however. By inattentive on a single method for dealing with
the likely danger

The reliance on all-out nuclear war invalidates the offsetting of this
in harmony.

in creating a doctrine where power and the willingness to use it are most
aided. The art of strategy is to offset a balance between these considerations
the flexibility of one's own behavior; the third determines the cost to be
two deal with the consequence of the enemy's actions; the next two involve
two deals with the consequence of the enemy's actions; the next two involve
the live balances of strategy thus fall into three groups: the first

II

as was the case with World War I. Thus the brevity of effective strategy

objectives that invalidates anomalous suffering will soon assume a total character—

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205

Paradoxically, however, the very power of modern weapons which has made it very difficult to assemble a strategically significant superiority against and this in turn a major enemy has brought into sharp focus the basic problem of strategy in

the nuclear age: the relationship between a policy of deterrence and the strategy is peculiarly dependent on an assessment of the opponent's intentions and mode of behavior.

we are prepared to implement should deterrence fail. A policy of deterrence, moreover,

gearing its strategy to the most likely dangers, to be effective cannot avoid an assessment of the mode of behavior of its

it cannot substitute power for calculation. Since opponent for its goal is to prevent a war, its aim is to keep the opponent

from taking action, It must therefore convey to the aggressor that any military move will involve a net loss. And what is considered a loss will for purposes of deterrence be determined by the opponent's criteria, not ours.

It can be argued, of course, that deterrence is best achieved by assembling an over-all superiority in strength. But the effectiveness of the threat of all-out war will depend on the belief of the opponent that it will in fact

be implemented. As a result is that deterrence reflects not only a physical, but also a psychological equation, compounded of the assessment of the contenders

each other's of the capabilities and intentions of the other side and the importance they attach to given regions; an equation in which the credibility of military power may be as important as its existence and, in which an area may be protected

as much by the fact that it is thought important enough for the threat of

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206

all-out war to be credible as by the balance of forces on the spot. The paradoxical result of the thermo-nuclear stalemate may be that the side which attaches greater importance to a particular objective than its opponent which can therefore act with greater determination and run greater risks

the psychological equation may favor may gain an advantage because of its superior readiness to run risks. it sufficiently to overcome the physical balance: our reluctance to engage in all-out war has been the shield behind which the Soviets could repress the revolution in Hungary and the Chinese escape de East in Korea. The reliance on all-out thermo-nuclear war, therefore, neglects the

XM psychological aspect of strategy and of deterrence. For the most agonizing decision a statesman can confront is the problem of whether to unleash all-out war: all pressures will make for hesitation short of an unambiguous attack on the survival of his state. In any other situation he will be inhibited by the incommensurability between the cost of the war and the objective in dispute. And he will be confirmed in his hesitations by the conviction that as long as the XM strategic retaliatory force remains intact, no shift in the territorial balance is significant. Thus both the horror and the power of modern weapons will tend to paralyze action: the former because it will

few make XM issues seem worth contending for; the latter because it causes disputes to seem irrelevant to the over-all strategic equation. These inhibitions will be reinforced if the aggression takes place by proxy, for the sophisticated

will be reinforced if the aggression takes place by proxy, for the soppressiveness to seem irrelevant to the overall strategic equation. These conditions

make such issues seem worth considering for the latter because it causes disputes more

of modern weapons will tend to polarize action: the former because it will
influence territorially the balance is significant. Time both the horror and the horror
that as long as the US strategic retentory force remains intact, no aircraft
to diabetes. And he will be confined in his perceptions of the conviction
by the incomشنarspiffity between the cost of the war and the objective
on the am干部 of the state. In any other situation he will be indebted
out war: all pressures will make for hesitation short of an unambiguous attack
decision a statesman can confront is the problem of whether to emerge to all-
the war in Korea.

HK the reliance on all-out thermo-nuclear war, therefore, neglects the in Korea.

paying much the attention could be given to the revolution in Hungary and the Chinese scale of the
overcome the hypothetical balance: our chance to score in all-out war may be once more lost
may gain an advantage because of its superior readiness to run risks. it sufficiently to
education may favor
the psychological

which are therefore not with greater determination and more forceful risks

which attaches greater importance to a particular objective than its opponent
paradoxical result of the thermo-nuclear战略 may be that the side

all-out war to be credible as to the balance of forces on the side. The

50P

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weapons systems suitable for all-out war are less useful against non-nuclear or underdeveloped powers and the military will always resist their employment for these purposes as a strategic diversion. Thus the psychological equation almost invariably operates against the side which can extricate itself from a situation *only* by the threat of all-out war. It is not that nations will no longer fight for what they consider their "vital" interests; it is that the line between what is considered vital and peripheral will shift if every objective has to be weighed against a thermo-nuclear holocaust. Who can be certain that faced with the catastrophe of nuclear war even Europe, long the keystone of our security, will seem worth the prize? And if all-out war will seem a less and less attractive method for protecting the status quo, it will be almost unthinkable to achieve strategic transformations.

As the power of modern weapons grows, the threat of all-out war loses its credibility. Our capacity for massive retaliation did not prevent the Korean war, the loss of Northern Indo-China, the Soviet-Egyptian arms deal or the Suez Canal crisis. A deterrent before the implementation of which one recoils is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, whatever the credibility of our threat of all-out war, it is clear that all-out thermo-nuclear war does not

our threat of all-out war! If it clear that all-out thermo-unclean war does recoil is a contradiction in terms. Moreover, whatever the credibility of or theuez xxx criteria. A deterrent before the implementation of which one Korea war, the loss of Northern Indo-China, the Soviet-Asian arms deal the credibility. Our capacity for massive retaliation did not prevent the Van the power of modern weapons grows, the threat of all-out war loses be almost meaningless to achieve strategic transformations.

seem a less and less attractive method for protecting the status quo, if will keystone of our security, will seem worth the braves? And it all-off war will certain that used with the catastrophe of unclear war even Europe, found the objective has to be weighed against a thermo-unclean holocaust. Who can be the fine between what is considered vital and borderless will shift it every no longer tight for what they consider their "vital" interest? If that a situation only by the threat of all-out war. If it is not that nations will almost invariably operates against the side which can extricate itself from for these b Ambrose as a strategic division. Thus the bioproliferation education or underdeveloped powers and the military will always resist their employment weapons systems suitable for all-out war are less useful against non-unclean

307

not represent a strategic option for our allies. Thus a psychological gap is created by the conviction of our allies that they have nothing to gain from all-out war and the belief of the Soviet leaders that they have nothing to fear from our threat of it; such a gap which may actually encourage an all-out war. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons having made it unlikely that any responsible statesman will lightly unleash a general war, one of the gravest dangers of all-out war lies in miscalculation. This is the only war it is within our power to avoid assuming we leave no doubt about our capabilities and our determination. But even this "avoidable" war may break out if the other side becomes convinced that we cannot interfere locally and that our threats of all-out war are bluff. If that should happen the Soviet bloc may then decide, as its nuclear arsenal grows, to absorb the peripheral areas of Eurasia and to confront us with the choice between yielding or the destruction of American cities. And because the Sino-Soviet leaders may well be mistaken in their assessment of our reaction to such a contingency, the relief that "massive retaliation" may bring about the total war it seeks to prevent.

This is another way of saying that even if successful the threat of all-out war purchases deterrence at a fearful cost and at a potentially exorbitant risk. It either requires us in every crisis to stake our survival on the

209

credibility of a threat we will be increasingly reluctant to implement or
it will force us into the kind of war our strategy should make every attempt
to avoid. The costs of thermo-nuclear war are two fearful for it to be the
only response to a challenge. Even if it could be won, we should seek our
objectives at smaller sacrifice. Thermo-nuclear war has thus set our states-
manship a problem long familiar to less fortunate nations: that absolute
security is no longer possible. Whatever the validity of the identification
of deterrence with maximum retaliatory power, we will have to sacrifice a
measure of destructiveness to gain the possibility of fighting wars that
will not amount to a national catastrophe. Policy, it has been said, is
the science of the relative. The same is true of strategy and to understand
this fact, so foreign to our national experience, is the task history has set
our generation.

### III

What strategic doctrine can avoid the dilemmas of all-out war then?
Two basic answers have been given:

The first proposal asserts that the objective of all-out war (breaking the enemy's will to resist) but it would seek to reduce its costs by confining it either to military installations or to a battlefield, however defined.

The second solution would seek to limit the objective of war and strive for an aspect of y. discussion of limited war in section IV, establishing a relationship.

["The second solution would seek to limit the objective of war and strive to\nget it either to military installations or to a battlefield, however defined.", "The first proposal would not change the objective of all-out war (pressing Two basic answers have been given): What strategic doctrine can avoid the difference of all-out war then?", "", "### III", "our generation.\n\nthis fact, so foreign to our national experience, is the task history has set\nthe science of the relative. The same is true of strategy and to understand\nwill not amount to a national catastrophe. Below, it has been said, is\nmarginal of destruciveness to gain the susceptibility of fighting were that\nof deference with maximum resiliency power, we will have to sacrifice a\nsecurity is no longer possible. Whatever the affinity of the identification\nmanipulate a problem long familiar to feeble fortunate nations: that adequate\nobjectives at smaller sacrifice. Thermo-nuclear war has thus set our states-\nonly response to a challenge. Even if it could be won, we should seek our\nonly response to a challenge. Even if it could

210

establishing a relationship between the purpose of the war and the force employed. Each will be examined in turn.

The first position accepts the continued possibility of all-out war but seeks to mitigate its horrors. The proposals have taken several forms: to refrain from the use of thermo-nuclear weapons unless the other side uses them first; to confine an all-out war to specific targets, again unless the other side breaks the agreement, tacit or expressed, first; to retaliate by a specific formula, for example, by inflicting double the amount of damage as of the opponent; or to eschew any kind of nuclear weapon and fight a conventional war.

The position of the advocates of *graduated deterrence* has been strengthened by a new advance in nuclear technology: the development of the "clean" thermo-nuclear bomb which has no fall-out. The clean bomb eliminates the last stage of the fission-fusion-fission process which furnished the mechanism for the first thermo-nuclear weapons. Since its resolution only uses fission to "trigger" the fusion and since fusion produces very little radioactive material, the fall-out is confined to the radioactivity caused by the trigger mechanism and this is not a serious problem. Thus it is possible to confine the effect of thermo-nuclear bombing to a target area, although the effect from blast and heat would still be considerable.

2. See, for example, *N. Neely, Bomb Cities*; Buzzard, "Graduated Deterrence" *World Politics*; Amster, "Design for Deterrent Air System," Convair Corp.

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None of the advocates of what has sometimes been called "measured retaliation" is naive enough to believe that an agreement to limit targets or to use only "clean" bombs if it could be negotiated would restrain the other side by its legal force. The argument is based on an interest which we and the Soviet bloc are thought to share: to prevent thermo-nuclear devastation. If this is true, so the argument goes, both sides will have a powerful incentive to abide by an understanding to limit the application of force. An international agreement establishing certain rules of measured retaliation would not preclude the necessity of preparing for unrestricted thermo-nuclear war—if the Soviet bloc felt strong enough to launch a surprise attack with impunity it would presumably do so. But it might reduce the probability of an attack caused by a form of bureaucratic inertia: the existence of war plans built around all-out war may cause some crisis to set in motion measures designed to forestall an imagined enemy move. An attempt to establish principles of "measured retaliation" would have the disadvantage of forcing the opposing military staffs to consider alternatives. While the international agreement may not be decisive by itself, it would furnish an additional motive for not precipitating an all-out war unless the opponent makes the first move.

212

And given the knowledge by both sides of the consequences of all-out war,
a war that is kept within a certain pattern during its initial phase is
likely to remain limited. In fact many advocates of "graduated deterrence"
believe that even a unilateral declaration of self-limitation can achieve their
purpose.

The opponents of graduated deterrence maintain that any limitation
of the horror of war, if believed, will also reduce the aggressor's risks and
thereby increase the likelihood of attack. It would do this, moreover,
without guaranteeing that eventually thermo-nuclear weapons would not be used,
partly because the tendency of war is towards maximum violence, partly because
distinctions which have practical meaning are very hard to make: "If the
effectiveness of the deterrent" wrote a leading British weekly, "resides
precisely in its certainty and its horror, then any attempt to reduce either
the certainty or the horror will reduce the power to deter." 2)

The dilemma of the nuclear age is, however, precisely the impossibility
of combining both maximum horror and maximum certainty. The greater the power,
the stronger the inhibitions against its use. The smaller the risks, the more
certain that they will in fact be run. Thus the reliance on an all-out xxx

2 Graduated Deterrence in the *Economist*, November 5, 1955.

Graduated Deference in the Economist, November 2, 1922.

certain that they will in fact be right. Time the reference on an all-out war
the stronger the inductions against its use. The smaller the risks, the more
of comprising both maximum horror and maximum certainty. The greater the power,
The difference of the nuclear age is, however, precisely the impossibility
the certainty or the horror will reduce the power to deter."

precisely in its certainty and its horror, then and ought to reduce either
effectiveness of the deterrent, wrote a leading British weekly. "Resides
distinction which have practical meaning are very hard to make: "It the
barely because the tendency of war is towards maximum violence, barely because
without guaranteeing that eventually thermo-nuclear weapons would not be used,
thereby increase the likelihood of attack. It would do this, moreover,

of the horror of war, it believed, will also reduce the aggressor's risks and
The opponents of graduated deterrence maintain that such limitation
beneath.

believe that even a unilateral declaration of self-limitation can relieve their
likely to remain limited. In fact many advocates of "graduated deterrence"
a war that is kept within a certain pattern during its initial phase is
And given the knowledge by both sides of the consequences of all-out war,

ETS

strategy is efficacious only if not put to the test and if put to the test
and if put to the test it may produce either a cataclysm or surrender. The
argument in favor of "measured retaliation" is its attempt to relate the need
for posing an adequate sanction to the willingness to act; that it seeks to
escape the inconsistency of a policy of deterrence whose major sanction is
national catastrophe. To be sure from the point of view of power, an inter-
mediary use of nuclear weapons would reduce the effectiveness of the deterrent
because it does not pose the maximum sanction. But from the aspect of
psychology, it may reduce the probability of war by enhancing the credibility
of the threat and the willingness to act. Graduated deterrence then represents
a realization that it is no longer possible to combine the advantage of
every course of action, of a deterrent based on a threat of maximum destructive-
ness and a strategy of minimum risk.

In fact the argument for graduated deterrence falls down at the precise
point where its advocates succumb to the temptation to combine incompatible
courses. It fails when it is advanced as a cheaper strategy for winning an
all-out war. It has been argued for example that a form of graduated deterrence
could be employed to deprive an enemy of his nuclear capability. According

214

to this strategy even an all-out war could be confined to military targets
such as airfields because the bombing of cities would be unwise in the early
stages of a war and unnecessary after air superiority has been achieved through
the destruction of the installations of the opposing air force. But in
practice this distinction will probably not prove very helpful. To begin
with most military installations, such as airfields, are for logistic reasons
located close to cities. Any war fought explicitly to destroy them may there-
fore involve almost as many casualties as a war fought without limitations.
Even an attempt to define a concept of "open cities" and to move air force
installations a certain distance from centers of population would not solve
this difficulty necessarily. The problem of fall-out would remain; indeed
an enemy could plan his attack to produce a maximum of casualties from

3. See Paul Nitze, "Atoms, Strategy and Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1956.
p.

215

fall-out. The reliance would therefore have to be placed on mitigating the
consequences of all-out war either by using "clean" bombs or by employing
lower-yield weapons of below a megaton whose fall-out is generally not of
major proportions.

In a strategy aiming for total victory, the psychological equation which
makes it profitable for *both* sides to carry out these restrictions no longer
holds, however. The purpose of an all-out war is to render the enemy defenseless;
or in *xxx* terms of nuclear technology to deprive the enemy of his nuclear
capability. <sup>4)</sup> Such a strategy is tantamount to a quest for unconditional
surrender; for an enemy deprived of nuclear establishment will be reduced to
impotence. It would, therefore, be the most rational strategy for the side
which has a strategic advantage either in base-structure or in weapons systems,
for it would put the enemy at its mercy at minimum cost. But, as we have seen,
war is not only an instrument for imposing one's will on the defeated; it is
also a tool for frustrating this intent by making victory too costly. For
the side which stands to lose the air battle and which seeks to exact a
maximum price for its own defeat, the most rational strategy may therefore
Rather than fight an air-battle it may concentrate on population centers;
consist of maximum destructiveness in order to deprive the enemy of the
opponent

<sup>4.</sup> *Ibid.*, p.

¶ 1944. b.

consist of maximum effectiveness in order to deprive the enemy of the
opponent

*Father then light an air-battle it was concluded at a population center*

maximum price for its own defeat, the most rational strategy not therefore

the side which stands to lose the air battle and which seeks to exact a
siaa a tool for transferring this intent by making victory too costly. For
war is not only an instrument for inducing one's will on the defeated; it is
for it would but the enemy at its merely at minimum cost. But as we have seen,
which has a strategic advantage either in base-attitude or in weapons systems,
inodefence. It would, therefore, be the most rational strategy for the side
amender; for an enemy debited of unclear expenditure will be reduced to
capacity. (4)

Such a strategy is tantamount to a quest for unconditional
or inxxx terms of unclear technology to deprive the enemy of his unclear
power, however. The purpose of an all-out war is to render the enemy defenseless
while it proclaims for power sides to carry out these restrictions no longer
In a strategy aiming for total victory, the balance of power education which
major proportions.

lower-field weapons of below a magnitude whose all-out is generally not of
consequences of all-out war either by using "clean" pomsa or pD embossing
all-out. The reference would therefore have to be placed on mitigating the

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216

fruits of his victory or to make it too costly for him to seek total victory.

Thermo-nuclear weapons coupled with an adequate delivery system confer precisely this possibility. The transformation brought about by the thermo-nuclear stalemate is therefore not that victory in an all-out war has become technically impossible, but that it can no longer be imposed at acceptable cost. Graduated deterrence cannot be used as a subterfuge to impose unconditional surrender or for depriving the enemy of his nuclear capability which amounts to the same thing and any attempt to do so may bring on a nuclear holocaust. As a result, many cherished doctrines of air warfare will have to be abandoned: one of the cardinal principles of aerial strategy is that the air is indivisible, that wars can be won only by dominating it completely. 5)

But any attempt to deprive the opponent of his retaliatory force would bring an all-out war whatever the means used. A power without a retaliatory capability is at the mercy of its opponent and it will not accept this without using all weapons at its disposal. Thus air-doctrine will have to find applications for its power which do not drive an enemy to this extremity. The need for a reassessment of the doctrine of complete air-superiority represents moreover not only a strategic option, but a technological necessity. With the advent of missiles it will be impossible to destroy all launching sites; complete domination of the air against a major power will become technically impossible. 6) But even if graduated deterrence will

5. Sir John Slessor, *Strategy for the West*, p. 105.

6. See below, p.

p. See below, b.

2. Sir John Slieader, *Strategem for the West*, b. 102.

impossible. (c) But even if graduated deterrence will

complete domination of the air arena, a major power will become technically the advent of mass杀 if will be impossible to destroy all launching aircraft moreover not only a strategic option, but a technological necessity. With need for a reassessment of the doctrine of complete air-embarrassment applications for its power which do not drive an enemy to this extremity. The making all weapons of its diabolus. Time air-doctrine will pass to find capability is at the mercy of its opponent and it will not accept this without an all-out war whatever the means need. A power without a retaliatory

the air is indivisible, that were can be won only by dominating it completely. 2)

to be spammed: one of the cardinal principles of serial strategy is that

prosecrate. As a result, many oriented doctrines of air warfare will pass

amounts to the same thing and any attempt to do so may print on a nuclear

force of arranger or for depriving the enemy of his nuclear capability which

cost. Graduated deterrence cannot be used as a substitute to impose uncoq-

technically impossible, put that it can no longer be imposed at acceptable

unclear asthmate is therefore not that victory in an all-out war has become

precisely this belligerent. The transformation brought about by the thermo-

Thermo-unclear webbou combined with an adequate delivery system coupler

units of his victory or to make it too costly for him to seek total victory.

513

prove ineffective in setting bounds to the devastation of all-out war, it
may be the means to establish the framework for what may prove the greatest
challenge to strategy in the nuclear age: the problem of limited war.

IV

Is limited war a conceivable instrument of policy in the nuclear period?
Here we must analyze precisely what is meant by limited war.

It is a historical accident reflecting the nature of our foreign involve-
ments that we should have come to consider limited war an aberration and that
we have paid little attention to its strategic opportunities. In a sense
this is due, too to the manner in which we legitimized the limited wars we
have fought. For every war in which we engaged in the Western Hemisphere
was a limited war in the sense that it did not involve a mobilization of all
our material resources. But since we generally justified them as expeditions,
punitive or ax otherwise, they rarely entered our national consciousness as
part of the phenomenon of limited war.

Our wars in the Western Hemisphere illustrate, however, that limited
wars have been both more frequent and more productive than the disputes
produced by the Korean war indicated. The dispute tended to confuse the
issues, moreover, because they did not sufficiently distinguish between the

issues, moreover, because they did not sufficiently distinguish between the
produced by the Korean war indicated. The conclusion tended to confuse the
of limited war.
departs which was since valued on the basis of the Korea War.

Our wars in the Western Hemisphere illustrate, however, that limited
part of the phenomenon of limited war.

butionary or 'otherwise,' they rarely entered our national consciousness as
our material resources. But since we generally identified them as expeditions,
was a limited war in the sense that it did not involve a modification of all
have fought. For every war in which we engaged in the Western Hemisphere
this is true, too to the manner in which we legitimated the limited war we
have had little attention to its strategic opportunities. In a sense
ments that we should have come to consider limited war an operation and that
It is a historical accident reflecting the nature of our foreign inno-
ance from the "pure" core.

Is limited war a conceivable instrument of policy in the unearlier period?

## IV

Challenge to strategy in the nuclear age: the problem of limited war.

May be the means to capitalize the framework for what may prove the greatest
brave ineffectiveness in setting bounds to the deviation of all-out war, if

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218

various forms of limited war. Some wars are inherently limited, for example,
because of the disparity in power between the protagonists. A war between
the United States and Nicaragua even if it engaged the full resources of
Nicaragua would not require more than a fraction of our strength xe whatever
the objectives we set ourselves. Such a war would be all-out in relation
to Nicaragua but limited with respect to us. Another variation of this
form of limited war occurs if the stronger power is restrained from exerting
its full potential by moral or political or strategic considerations. This
was the case in the Korean war in which the Chinese probably made the maximum
military effort of which they were capable while we limited our commitment
for a variety of reasons. Still another kind of limited war is one between
the difficulty of supply
major powers in which logistics prevent one side from making a total effort.

An example of this kind of war is the Russo-Japanese war of 1905 in which the
Russian commitment was limited to the forces that could be supplied over a
single-track railway. Finally there are limited wars which result not from
limitation of technology or logistics or from a disparity in power but from
a conscious policy decision. If we apply these types of limited wars thus fall into three broad categories which are present situation, are being distinguished:

a conscious bottom decision. Limited were given to (three broad categories: pe
limitation of technology or logistics or from a disparity in power put from
single-track radius). Limitly there are limited were which result not from
Russian commitment was limited to the forces that could be subordinated over a
An example of this kind of war is the Bracoo-Japanese war of 1942 in which the
major powers in which fetterbar prevent one side from making a total effort.
the difficulty of probably
for a variety of reasons. Still another kind of limited war is one between
military effort of which they were capable while we limited our commitment
was the case in the Korean war in which the Chinese properly made the maximum
its full potential. By most or political or strategic considerations. This
form of limited war occurs if the stronger power is restrained from exerting
to Nicaragua put limited with respect to us. Another variation of this
the objectives we set ourselves. Such a war would be all-out in relation
to Nicaragua would not require more than a traction of our strength than whatever
the United States and Nicaragua even if it engaged the full resources of
because of the disparity in power between the provinces. A war between
various forms of limited war. Some were independently limited, for example,

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219

a) Wars involving either the Western powers or the Soviet bloc against powers which are clearly outmatched and where outside intervention is not likely. Examples would be Soviet intervention in the satellites, or U.S. military action in the Western Hemisphere or perhaps Chinese absorption of positions of Central Asia such as Tibet.

b) Conflicts which are initially directed against a minor power or a peripheral area but which involves the prospect of spreading to include one or more of the major powers, such as <u>HK Kong</u>, the Chinese move directed against the off-shore islands or the Anglo-French "police action" against Egypt or a Soviet military move into the Middle East.

c) Finally there is the problem of limited war which begins explicitly as a war between the major powers. It is clear that this is the most explosive situation. If a war between major powers can be kept limited, it is clear that the first two situations would stand a good chance of being kept from spreading as well.

Of course, limited wars between major powers have been frequent in the history of warfare. For <u>all</u>ong time they were due to technological limitations. Before the industrial revolution the productive processes of a country yielded

Before the industrial revolution the productive processes of a country helped
history of war and. For some time they were due to technological limitations.

Of course, limited war between major powers have been frequent in the
abusing as well.

that the first two situations would stand a good chance of being kept from
situation. It a war between major powers can be kept limited, it is often
a war between the major powers. It is clear that this is the most explosive
c) Finally there is the problem of limited war which begins explicitly as
Eagot or a Soviet military move into the Middle East.

against the oil-shore islands or the Anglo-French "butter action" against
more of the major powers, such as GREEKSHOMEAKON the Chinese move directed
beyond area put which involves the broadeot of abrading to include one or
p) Conflicts which are initially directed against a minor power or a bert-
boattions of Central Asia such as Tibet.

military action in the Western Hemisphere or perhaps Chinese absorption of
likely. Examples would be Soviet intervention in the satellites, or U.S.
bowers which are clearly unmatched and where outside intervention is not
a) Were invading either the Western powers or the Soviet bloc against

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such a relatively small increment above bare subsistence, that wars tended to remain limited for lack of resources: mapower could not be kept in the field indefinitely so that a state had the choice either to hire mercenaries or to see its armies disband as the harvesting season approached. In neither case could the homefront produce sufficient weapons to sustain the kind of continuous campaign which characterized the two World Wars. Thus considerations of domestic policy, if not a strategic concept, combined to keep wars limited. In the 17th century, for example, Louis XIV employed almost his whole army constantly for a period of close to twenty-five years. But his military establishment utilized only a small proportion of the national resources. This was not due to self-restraint but to the nature of his domestic structure which made it impossible for him to conscript his subjects or to levy income taxes or to confiscate property.

His military establishment was therefore limited by the availability of resources and with it the wars he fought. On the other hand, the wars of Prussia while they did not exceed those of France in scope involved an incomparably greater mobilization of national resources. This came about because Prussia's inferiority in resources enabled her to survive as a major power only by a domestic tour

de force which organized the entire state for war. Still Prussia's exertions
only gave her a precarious parity with the other powers; she did not force
them to emulate her. Wars remained limited because the major powers were able
to mobilize only a small proportion of their national resources for war and
because the one power which was not so restricted did not thereby gain a
decisive
decided advantage.

Since the French Revolution the domestic restrictions on the capacity
of governments to mobilize national resources have increasingly disappeared.

*side by side with* which

And this has occurred *at a time when* the industrial revolution made it technically
possible to devote a substantial proportion of the national product to war
without bringing about the kind of privation which would *have* to take the social order.

To be sure, there still exist differences not in the *power*, but in the *willingness*
to exact sacrifices: one of the sources of Soviet strength is her readiness
to devote a much larger proportion of the national income to military expenditures
than the United States. But for purposes of present strategy it is clear
that no major power will be forced to adopt a strategy of limited objectives
because of insufficient resources. With modern weapons, a limited war will be
an act of policy, not of necessity.

This is why section III seems to anticipate IV. I think some of the chapter is needed.

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What then is a limited war under modern conditions? One can think of many models: a war confined to a geographic area, a war that does not utilize the whole weapons system (such as eschewing the use of thermo-nuclear weapons), a war which utilizes the whole weapons system but limits its employment to specific targets. But none of these military definitions seems adequate: a war may be confined geographically or in terms of targets and yet be total in the sense of draining the national substance, as happened to France in World War I. The fact that the most destructive weapons are not employed, or that the destructive capability of the existing weapons is small, is no more a guarantee against excessive suffering. In the Thirty Year's War the power of weapons was negligible compared to modern armaments and the number of men in each army was small by present day standards -- impact the Austrian Field Marshall Montecuccoli put at 15,000 the absolute maximum number of men which would be efficiently commanded in one army. 7) Yet it is estimated that at least 30 per cent of the population of Germany died during the course of it. And a new world war fought with what have come to be known as conventional weapons would also produce appalling casualties because the destructive-ness of these weapons has increased between five and tenfold over World War II.

7. Montecuccoli, p. 74 (He insisted that not even Wallestein's armies exceeded 15,000 men).

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In short, there exists no way to define a limited war in purely military terms; the end result of a reliance on purely military consideration is certain to be all-out war, the attempt to render the enemy defenseless, to deprive him of any possibility of establishing a relationship between cost of continued resistance and the terms sought to be imposed. The goal of such a war is to bring about a situation in which the conditions of peace are dependent entirely on the victor's will.

A strategy based on purely military considerations is therefore an attempt to solve by force one of the dilemmas of international relations: the incommensurability between a nation's approach to domestic and to foreign policy. Domestic policy is limited only by technical feasibility and by the sense of justice of the majority of the citizens, at least in a democracy. (Even totalitarian regimes are limited by the sense of justice of their citizens. To achieve acquiescence they institute elaborate propaganda machines to achieve a consensus and a secret police apparatus to liquidate dissenters). But foreign policy adds another dimension: the sovereign will of other states which may have different criteria of justice

225

as justice domestically becomes an object of negotiation. It is little
wonder that the reaction of a nation like ours which has never experienced
the limits of its domestic possibilities is a rebellion against this double
standard which treats what is defined as absolute domestically as contingent
abroad. Our prediction for all-out war is a symptom of our quest to transform
foreign policy into an aspect of domestic policy, to bring about a situation
abroad where the will of other nations, or at least of the enemy, is no
longer a factor to be considered. A limited war, by contrast, is fought for
a specific objective which, by its very existence, will establish a certain
commensurability between the force employed and the goal to be attained. It
reflects an attempt to affect the opponent's will, not to crush it; to
make the conditions to be imposed seem more attractive then continued resistance,
but to strive for conditions and not for complete annihilation.

Limited war presents the military with particular difficulties, however.
An all-out war is relatively simple to plan because its limits are set by
military considerations and even by military capacity. The targets for an
all-out war are relatively fixed; the force requirements determined by the
need to assemble overwhelming power. The characteristic of a limited war
on the other hand, is the existence of ground-rules which define the relationship

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of military to political objectives. Planning here becomes much more
conjectural, much more subtle and much more indeterminate, if only because
a war against a major enemy can be kept limited<sup>1</sup> if both parties desire it—
and this alone tends to introduce a factor outside the control of planning
officers. The military can <u>therefore</u> never be certain how many forces the
opponent will in fact commit to the area in dispute and since they will wish
to guard against every contingency they will relate their force levels they
<sup>1</sup> that even for limited war they will request
request to the capabilities of the enemy, which in practice means <u>forces</u>
adequate to fight an all-out war. The military <u>therefore</u>, tend to resist
limited war as outside their scope either on grounds of military doctrine
or by stating force levels inconsistent with a policy of limited war.<sup>2</sup> And
from the purely military point of view they are correct for <u>limited war</u>
is essentially a political act, <u>its</u> distinguishing feature is precisely that
it has no purely military solution: the political leadership must for this
reason assume the responsibility for defining the framework within which the
military are to develop their plans and capabilities. To demand of the military
that they set their own limits is to set in motion a vicious circle of over-
stated requirements which paralyze action of military planning on the basis

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effort to crush the enemy and political planning which becomes increasingly defensive. The prerequisite for a policy of limited war is the reintroduction of the political element into our concept of warfare and the surrender of the notion that policy ends when war begins or that war has goals different from those of national policy.

V

This raises the question to what extent the nuclear age permits a policy of intermediary objectives. Do any of the factors apply today which in the past made possible a diplomacy of limited objectives and military policy of limited wars?

In the great periods of European cabinet diplomacy between the Treaty of Westphalia and the French Revolution and between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of the first World War, wars were limited because there existed a political framework which led to a general consciousness of limited risks. This political framework was due to several factors: There was, to begin with, a conscious decision that the upheavals of the Thirty Year's War and of the Napoleonic wars should not occur again. This decision proved most effective in the period immediately following the wars, but it gave the

most effective in the field immediately following the war, but it gave the
War and of the Neoclassic wars should not occur again. This decision proved
to begin with a conscious decision that theभावाच of the Thirty Years's
limited risks. This political framework was due to several factors: There was
there existed a political framework which led to a benefit consciousness of
Vienna and the outbreak of the First World War, were were limited because
Treaty of Wehrhafte and the French Revolution and between the Congress of
In the great periods of European capital外交d Diplomacy between the
limited wars?

had made possible a diplomacy of limited objectives and mittled policy of
of intermediary objectives. Do and of the factors apply today which in the
This raises the question to what extent the unclear fate benefits a policy
of

cases different from those of national policy.

the announcement the notion that policy ends when war begins or that war has
reintroduction of the political element into our concept of warfare and
increasingly defensive. The brurendustrie for a policy of limited war is the
excessivorknops of creating the enemy and political branding which becomes

228

international orders created by the Treaty of Westphalia and the Congress
of Vienna the breathing spell necessary to convince the major powers that
none of the outstanding disputes involved their survival. More important
was the fact that the international order did not contain a revolutionary
power. No state was so dissatisfied with the peace settlement that it sought
to gain its ends by overthrowing it and no power considered that its domestic
NTM notion of justice was incompatible with that of the other states. Finally,
in an era of stable weapons technology, both the strength of the powers and the
assessment of it were relatively fixed, the risks of surprise attack and of
unforeseen technological developments were relatively small. All this did
not make conflicts impossible, but it limited them to disputes within a given
framework; wars occurred, but they were fought in the name of the existing
framework and the peace was justified as the better arrangement of a basically
unchanged international order. 8
10)

If we inquire which of these factors--fear of war, legitimacy and a
stable power relationship is present today, little cause for optimism remains.

None of the major powers accept either the present framework of the international

8 10. For a fuller discussion, see the author's *A World Restored*. London: Houghton Mifflin, 1957.

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Almost up to the outbreak of World War II a weapons system would be considered good for a generation at least, while today it may be out-dated when it has barely passed the blue-print stage. Yet the failure to plan on the basis of these "prematurely aged" weapons might at any given point of time create a vital weakness. In the technological race, moreover, the side which has adopted the military doctrine that its opponent can always strike the first blow is at a distinct disadvantage, for it cannot afford a single mistake; it cannot afford to fall behind even for an instant. It must phase its planning and procurement over an indefinite period while its opponent, if he is determined on a show-down, can plan for a target date and need prepare only for the war he is planning to fight.

But if neither an agreed legitimacy nor a stable power relationship exists today, they may be outweighed by the third factor in the equation: the fear of thermo-nuclear war. Never have the consequences of all-out war been so unambiguous, never have the gains seemed so incommensurable with the sacrifices. What statesman who declared war in 1914 would not have recoiled had he known the shape of the world in 1918? Today every weapons test augurs much horror. The miscalculation of a short, inexpensive war which produced

231

World War I is therefore no longer possible. And even a leader of Hitler's deranged frame of mind would hesitate before the consequences of thermo-nuclear devastation. One of the arguments against limited wars asserts that they offer no inherent guarantee against their expansion and that they may gradually merge into an all-out war. On purely logical grounds, the argument is unassailable. But it assumes that the major protagonists will be looking for an *excuse* to expand the war while in reality both sides will probably grasp at every excuse, however illogical, to keep a thermo-nuclear war holocaust from occurring. It is clear that a war cannot be limited unless both sides wish to keep it limited. The argument for limited war is precisely that both sides have a common and overwhelming interest to prevent it from spreading. The fear that an all-out thermo-nuclear war might lead to the disintegration of the social structure should be used to guarantee the "limits" of both war and diplomacy.

The key problem of present day strategy is therefore to devise alternative capabilities to confront the opponent with contingencies from which he can extricate himself only by thermo-nuclear war, but to deter him from this step by our retaliatory capacity. We have seen that the most difficult decision for a statesman is war whether to risk the national substance for the objective in dispute by unleashing an all-out war. Thus the psychological advantage

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will always be on the side of the power which can shift to its opponent the decision to initiate all-out war. All Soviet moves in the post-war period have had this character; they have faced us with problems which by themselves did not seem worth an all-out war but with which we could not deal with an alternative capability. We refused to defeat the Chinese in Korea because we were unwilling to risk an all-out conflict; we saw no solution to the Indo-Chinese crisis without dangers we were reluctant to confront. A strategy of limited wars might reverse or at least arrest this trend. Limited war is thus not an alternative to massive retaliation, but its complement, for it is the capability for massive retaliation which provides the sanction against expanding the war.

The conduct of limited war has two prerequisites, however: a doctrine and a capability. As long as we consider limited war as an aberration from the "pure" case we will not be able to grasp its opportunities and we will conduct such wars as we may engage in hesitantly and ambiguously, oscillating between temptations of expanding it (that is bringing it closer to our notion of what war should be like) or ending it at the first enemy overture. Such a doctrine would have to surrender any illusions of what is attainable

Given a doctrine would have to surrender any illusions of what is attainable of what war should be like) or enabling it at the first enemy overcome.

between temptations of expanding it (that is bringing it closer to our notion of combat enough as we may engage in defeatably and unduly), offsetting the "bureaucracy" we will not be able to grasp its opportunities and we will end a capability. We long as we consider limited war as an operation from the conduct of limited war has two consequences; however, a doctrine against expanding the war.

for it is the capability for massive retaliation which provides the sanction of war is thus not an alternative to massive retaliation, but its complement, limited war, might reverse or at least make it more difficult to conduct. Limited Chinese criteria without danger we were reluctant to confront. A strategy we were unwilling to risk an all-out conflict; we saw no solution to the indefinite capability. We returned to defeat the Chinese in Korea because did not seem worth an all-out war put with which we could not deal with an enemy had this character; they have faced us with problems which pertain themselves to the decision to initiate an all-out war. All Soviet moves in the boat-war field will always be on the side of the power which can shift to its opponent the

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233

by limited war. It is not a cheaper substitute for massive retaliation; on the contrary, it involves the realization that with the end of our atomic monopoly the possibility of imposing unconditional surrender at an acceptable cost has disappeared. At the same time a strategic doctrine which admits the possibility of fighting a limited war and the renunciation of unconditional surrender should not be confused with the acceptance of a stalemate. For the notion that there is no alternative between unconditional surrender and the status quo ante is much too mechanical. If the military position of an enemy became untenable and if he were offered choices other than all-out war or surrender, he might accept local withdrawals without resorting to all-out war.

In the face of our retaliatory capacity amputation may seem preferable to suicide. Even should limited war give us no more than the possibility of a local stalemate it would represent a strategic improvement for at the moment our problem is precisely our inability to defend major areas except by the threat The Hemo-nuclear hollo causch of all-out was which we should strain every effort to avoid.

There exist two reasons, then, for a strategy of limited war: that limited war represents the only means to prevent the Soviet bloc from overrunning the peripheral areas of Eurasia and at an acceptable cost and that it offers

thebergament areas of Burgenland at an acceptable cost and that it offers
war represents the only means to prevent the Soviet Union from overrunning

There exist two reasons, then, for a strategy of limited war: that limited
of all-out war, which we should attain every effort to avoid.
the Heereswarte, u. A. Clever, who const

problem is because our inability to defend major areas exceeds by the threat
local armament if would represent a strategic improvement for at the moment on
an outside. Even should limited war give us no more than the possibility of a
in the face of our retaliatory capacity submission may seem premature to
surrender, he might accept local withdrawal without reporting to all-out war.
become unnecessary and it be were offered other than all-out war or
status quo and it is much too mechanical. If the military position of an enemy
notion that there is no alternative between unconditional surrender and the
surrender should not be confused with the acceptance of a armament. For the
possibility of lighting a limited war and the remuneration of unconditional
coats has disappeared. At the same time a strategic doctrine which abates the
monopoly of the possibility of imposing unconditional surrender at an acceptable
on the contrary, it involves the relaxation that with the end of our atomic
by limited war. It is not a cheaper expenditure for massive retaliation!

333

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our best chance to obtain strategic transformations in our favor. But why must we prevent the hostile domination of Eurasia? Would our retaliatory power not protect us even if we were confined to "Fortress America?"

The argument usually advanced for retaining a foothold in Eurasia is couched in military terms. It is said that we must maintain in friendly hands some areas ix on the Continent of Eurasia and above all in Western Europe because of the facilities which our allies provide for our Strategic Air Force. But we have a strategic interest in Eurasia independent of the range of our heavy bombers which will soon be increased to intercontinental range and which may in time be made obsolescent by missiles: the geopolitical fact that in relation to Eurasia the United States is an island power at present only in manpower, but later on even in industrial capacity. Thus we are confronted by the traditional problem of an "island" power--of Carthage with respect to Italy, of Britain with respect to the Continent--that its survival depends on preventing the opposite land-mass from falling under the control of a single power, above all one avowedly hostile. If Eurasia were to fall under the control of a single power or group of powers and if this hostile power were given sufficient time to exploit its resources, we should confront an

I note you consistently use this word incorrectly. If you prefer the active form, then "the threat contains us."

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overpowering threat. For the loss of Eurasia would involve the loss or the upheaval of Africa and were this to happen, the strategic relationship described in the previous chapter would be reversed. Then we could be attacked from around a perimeter, then the U.S.S.R. might make good a surprise attack--and it would not be inhibited by moral scruples as we have been from exploiting its strategic advantage. At best we would be forced into a military effort not consistent with what is now considered the American way of life. At worst, we would be neutralized and cease being masters of our policy.

If this is true, we cannot cast off the peripheral areas of Eurasia without dire consequences. If the United States ever became too confined to "Fortress America" or even if Soviet expansion went far enough to sap our allies' will to resist, the Western Hemisphere would be confronted by three quarters of the human race and not much less of its resources and our continued existence would be precarious.

But there is no necessity for this to occur. It should not be forgotten that the defense of the Free World is a problem not only of power, but of will. In 1941, Germany alone nearly defeated the U.S.S.R. and today the combination of the United States and Western Europe should be able to contain it. The

236

industrial resources of the Free World still exceed those of the U.S.S.R.
by a considerable margin and in Asia China appears strong at least partly
because of the irresolution of her opponents. The task of creating a new
balance of power would therefore be far from hopeless if one considered nothing
but the available resources. But the will to use this strength is lacking
because of the memory of two world wars, the ambiguities of nuclear technology,
and the almost uninterrupted expansion of Soviet influence. While a balance
is attainable therefore along existing lines on the Eurasian Continent, it
will always remain tenuous. As long as Soviet armies are poised on the
Elbe, Western Europe will be insecure. As long as China STRIDES UNOPPOSED
through Southeast Asia, the uncommitted Powers will seek their safety in
neutralism. The Soviet bloc presents to the outside world a vision of ruthless
strength allied with artful cunning, of a constant readiness to utilize force
coupled with the diplomatic skill to secure the fruits of such use. The
United States, therefore, faces the task not only of stemming the Soviet tide
but also of reducing the Soviet sphere and demonstrating the limitations of
Soviet power and skills. The last is almost as important as the reduction
of the Soviet sphere and demonstrating the limitations of Soviet power and

skills. The last is almost as important as the reduction of the Soviet
assailed sphere, for to the extent that the Free World, now eaved by a sense of
its impotence, realized that the Soviet bloc, too, behind its facade of
monolithic power shrinks from certain consequences, its resolution and its
policy will both become stronger.

A strategy which admits the possibility of fighting limited actions
is more likely to achieve this objective than the threat of a total nuclear
war. The threat of an all-out war will be either considered bluff or it will
transform every dispute into a question of prestige which will inhibit
any concessions. Actions short of total war, on the other hand, may help
restore fluidity to the diplomatic situation, particularly if we analyze pre-
cisely what is meant by reduction of the Soviet sphere. The Sino-Soviet bloc
can be reduced short of waging general war in two ways: by a voluntary with-
drawal or by an internal split. The former is unlikely and depends on many
factors outside of our control but the latter deserves careful study. While
it is impossible to predict the precise circumstances of such a split; its
general framework can be traced: the U.S.S.R. may be induced to loosen its
hold on its satellites if it finds that the effort to hold them in line absorbs

238

ever more of its strength. And this effort may become increasingly
difficult if the satellites should become convinced that Soviet policy forces
them to shoulder risks of no benefit to their own country. A split between
the U.S.S.R. and its satellites can come about then through the creation
of contingencies which accentuate potential differences within the Soviet
bloc. It was not easy for Britain to risk all-out war for Northern Indo-China
it
but/is doubtful whether Poland would willingly engage in a "Russian" war, or
how much the U.S.S.R. would risk to increase the power of China. Similarly,
Tito's break with Moscow was due at least in part to his disenchantment over
the Soviet Union's lukewarm support on the Trieste issue which in turn was
caused by the unwillingness of the U.S.S.R. to risk an all-out war for a
peripheral objective. Thus one of the most fundamental indictments of the
exclusive reliance on all-out war is that it's inability to differentiate
its pressures may actually contribute to the consolidation and the unity of
the Soviet bloc.

It is therefore misleading to attack the little-war thesis on the
ground that it does not offer a military solution to our strategic problem,
for its merit is precisely that it may provide a political solution. Had

239

we defeated the Chinese army in Korea in 1951 we would have confronted the U.S.S.R. with the dilemma whether to risk everything for the sake of increasing the power of China; and we had we followed our own victory with a conciliatory political proposal to Peking we could have caused it to reconsider the advantage of too close an association with the U.S.S.R. But even if we had failed in our primary task of dividing the U.S.S.R. and China, we would have greatly improved our position towards our allies and even more toward the uncommitted nations in Asia. The best counter-argument to the charge of colonialism is political moderation after a military victory. A stalemate, on the other hand, always leaves open the question whether what is advanced as moderation is or at least of irresolution, not in reality a sign of weakness. Indo-China gave us a similar opportunity, if under less favorable circumstances, although the Indo-Chinese problem would hardly have assumed its present dimensions had China suffered a decisive reversal in her first military encounter with the United States. Thus, if limited actions are implemented as part of a policy which offers the other side a way out short of total surrender or total war, they may bring about local reversals which may start a chain reactions difficult to control and might magnify the tensions within the Soviet bloc. A strategy of limited war,

240

then, would use our retaliatory power as a means to permit us to fight
local actions on our terms or to shift the risk of initiating all-out war
to the other side.

VI

Limited war will make extremely heavy demands on the discipline and
subtlety of the leadership and the confidence of the public. For limited
war is psychologically a much more complex problem than all-out war: an all-
out war involves national *survival* and the suffering it entails (will
eliminate all disputes about the nuances of policy. Limited war, on the
other hand, presents no such clear-cut issues: here defeat may not be thought
to carry the same penalties nor does victory offer a final solution. The
temptations of all-out war or of *ending the war* will always be present and
*both tend to inhibit decisive action*.

The choice depends on a complicated interrelationship of factors, compounded
of military capability and the importance the contenders attach to the issue
in dispute. Thus while during an all-out war the psychological equation is
relatively stable, national survival being at issue for both contenders, in
a limited war the psychological equation is constantly shifting. For the
limiting condition of limited war is the possibility that it may spread to
become all-out. It is clear that limited war which threatens the opponent's

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Thus limited war has the same psychological complexity as a policy of deterrence. In some areas, a power will have a considerable psychological potential for limited war apart from its force levels because the region matters to it a great deal or is thought by its opponent to matter to it a great deal. This was the case with China in Korea for example; it may be true of the United States in Central America. There may even be areas which are thought so important to one of the contenders that they will be protected by the belief of the opponent that any attack on them will lead to a general war. In such a case, protection for the areas will be achieved less by local defense than by the over-all strategic balance. This has been the case up to now with Western Europe with respect to the United States or the satellite regions with respect to the U.S.S.R. As the horror of thermo-nuclear war grows, however, the over-all strategic balance will be a less and less adequate protection to threatened areas because fewer and fewer regions will seem worth an all-out war. As the consciousness of the nuclear stalemate grows the psychological balance can increasingly be achieved only by the capability for local action. Limited war would therefore become a test for the determination of both sides, a gauge of the importance they attach to disputed issues. If one side attaches

243

greater importance to an area or an issue and is willing and able to pay a higher price it may achieve a strategic transformation.

In any case, the key to a policy of limited war is to keep the challenge to the opponent below the threshold which would unleash all-out war. The greater the risk in relation to the challenge, the less total the response is likely to be. The possibility of local adjustments therefore depends on three conditions: a) the ability to generate pressures other than the threat of thermo-nuclear war, b) the ability to create a climate of opinion in which survival is not thought to be at stake in every issue, c) the ability to keep control of public opinion should a disagreement arise over whether national survival is at stake. The prerequisites for a policy of limited war, then, is not only the capability for it, but its plausibility to the other side. Soviet reactions to our measures will depend more on what we are thought to intend to do, than what we really intend.

But is it possible to bring about a climate in which national survival is thought not to be at stake? Pressures severe enough to cause withdrawal may, after all, be severe enough to be thought to threaten survival, especially in a regime like that in Soviet Russia. On the other hand, the problem is not how to reassure the Soviets, which is probably a well-nigh impossible

244

effort, but how to give effect to the one interest we presumably have in common: that we both wish to avoid all-out thermo-nuclear war. Given this attitude, total war is likely in only two contingencies: if the Soviets see an opportunity to achieve hegemony in Eurasia by peripheral actions which we are not able to deal with by a graduated employment of force; or if the U.S.S.R. should misunderstand our intentions and treat our every military move as if it were the prelude to an all-out war.

It therefore becomes the task of our diplomacy to convey to the Soviet bloc that we are capable of courses other than all-out war or inaction, and that we intend to use this capability. Fortunately, the imbalance in our national strategy has been caused less by our diplomacy than by our military policy. Indeed, our difficulty has been precisely the fact that our moderate pronouncements have seemed incongruous in the face of an all-or-nothing military policy and that our diplomacy has been deprived of flexibility because "massive retaliation" has had as its logical corollary the slogan "there is no alternative to peace." A modification of our military doctrine would therefore go a long way towards creating a framework of limited objectives; the next step would be to convey this change to the outside world and to the Soviet bloc.

245

This raises immediately the question which has been at the root of many of our pronouncements with respect to the course of action we propose to follow in case of Soviet aggression: the degree of ambiguity desirable. There has been a general belief that a degree of ambiguity about our intentions is a factor of deterrence because the aggressor cannot be certain that an attack will not involve an all-out response. We have therefore carefully refrained from announcing which areas we proposed to defend locally or what strategy we would pursue in case we did engage in limited war. But the ambiguity of our statements which seeks to keep our options open may cause us to inherit the worst of both worlds. It may cause the aggressor to believe that aggression will involve only local resistance for why else would we qualify our announcements of massive retaliation? If then we react totally, our ambiguity will have encouraged a perhaps unnecessary all-out war. On the other hand, an aggressor interprets our ambiguity as a token of our reliance on an all-out strategy, he may treat every U.S. counter-move to aggression as a prelude to all-out war and deal with it accordingly. The ambiguity of our pronouncements therefore introduces an element of instability no matter how it is interpreted. As a result, just as we have to moderate, the sanctions of deterrence in order to mitigate the consequences of war should deterrence fail, we may have to make our intentions explicit to avail the penalties of misunderstanding.

To be sure, a diplomatic program which seeks to sketch the political and psychological framework of limited war will not inevitably prevent an all-out war. If the Soviets feel strong enough to knock us out by surprise attack, they will presumably do so—and no effort should therefore be spared to maintain the level of all-out war capability described in the previous chapter. But it may prevent an all-out war caused by our failure to develop alternatives or by Soviet miscalculation or misunderstanding of our intentions.

246

The same program which may reduce the danger of miscalculation would
educating opinion
also go a long way towards eliminating the public in the realities of the
nuclear period. This is of course less of a problem in the Soviet bloc
where the absolutism of dictatorship confers a much greater freedom of action.

In the Western world, however, and particularly in the United States,
a considerable change in the concept of war is required. It is important
not only for our leadership to understand that total victory is no longer
possible but also for the public to become aware of the dangers of pressing
for such a course. A long history of invulnerability causes our public opinion
to look at war more in terms of the damage we can inflict than in terms of
the losses we might suffer and to react to frustration abroad by a demand
for absolute solutions. It is the essence of a policy of limited war, on
the other hand, that there are no final answers; and this is not the result
of a policy but of necessity. The public must therefore be made aware
that our real option is not between a strategy of all-out or of limited war,
but between a strategy of limited war or inaction. It would be tragic if
our government were deprived of its freedom of maneuver by the ignorance
on the part of the public of the consequences of a course of action before

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As a result, our policy of coalitions has suffered from the same difficulty as our strategic doctrine: in the absence of clarity about the kind of war we proposed to fight our alliances tended to inhibit the freedom of maneuver of all members. In every concrete instance from Korea to Suez the consequences of military action seemed to outweigh the goals to be achieved. There has been about our concept of alliances the same abstractness as about our concept of power; (indeed, it was its reverse side.) Just as in our strategic doctrine, we purchase destructiveness at the expense of the will to employ it, so in our system of alliances we have sometimes acted as if the existence of an alliance and not the resolution behind it were the guarantee of security. It is precisely this resolution, however, which is being sapped by the fact that our allies face a dual dilemma; they are in danger of losing their social substance either by the devastation of all-out thermo-nuclear war or by the ravages of Soviet occupation. They demand of an alliance therefore that it protect them against these contingencies or at least that it reduce the likelihood of this occurrence. And their ability to assess the meaning of the technology in relation to their fears is inhibited by a large measure of ignorance about nuclear matters - the product in part of our Atomic Energy Act - with the result that the strategic revolution of the past decade poses an even greater challenge to understanding among most of our allies than in the United States.

In the past, coalitions have generally been held together by a combination of three motivations: (1) to discourage aggression by assembling superior

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power and to leave no doubt about the alignment of forces--this in effect
is the doctrine of collective security; (2) to provide an obligation for
assistance. Were the national interest unambiguous and unchangeable, each
power would know its obligations and the alignment of its potential opponents
without any formal part. But the national interest fluctuates within limits;
it must be adapted to changing circumstances. An alliance is a form of in-
surance against contingencies, an additional weight when considering whether
to go to war. (3) To legitimize the assistance of foreign troops or inter-
vention in a foreign country.

An alliance is effective, however, only to the extent that its power
appears formidable and its purpose unambiguous. They mere assembling of
overwhelming strength is meaningless if it cannot be brought to bear on the
issues actually in dispute. The strongest purpose will prove ineffective if
it cannot find a military expression in terms of an agreed strategic doctrine.

war
Thus the French system of alliances in the interwar period broke down when
put to the test because its political purpose and the military doctrine on
which it was based were inconsistent with each other. The political basis

To assure
of the French system of alliances was the integrity of the small states of
Militarily, this implied an offensive strategy on the part
Central and Eastern Europe. The only means for their independence resided