[L.C]

- 12 -

For example, the disparity which is involved for a limited period of time might not prove acceptable for a more permanent arrangement.

For this reason, that is to say, the limited duration and the limited scope, it was decided that an Executive Agreement which, however, is submitted to the entire Congress, was more appropriate.

If you got to the point where you made a 25-year agreement, I don't want to prejudge that issue, but, as a political scientist and not as a presidential assistant, it would look more like a treaty to me. But I don't want to get into that.

Now, with respect to the second question, the general outlines of the agreement were shaped, really, in three ways. One was by negotiations in Helsinki and Vienna, which did most of the detail. But the policy decisions that were brought about through direct contact between the President and the Soviet leaders which led to the May 20, 1971 breakthrough and then, again, to the formula which led to the inclusion of the submarines -- when we were in Moscow there were four major issues that had not been resolved in Helsinki, which were known as issues, but the solution of which could not have been leaked because it hadn't been achieved. Those were the subjects that were most intensively discussed between the President and the General Secretary, primarily the issue of how you calculate the submarine limits, and at what point the replacement of submarines has to start, and which submarines had to becounted for replacement purposes, and questions of this type.

There were subsidiary issues having to do with the silos, I mentioned interpretative statements, and matters of this kind, none of which had been settled in Helsinki, and had to be settled in very extensive conversations between the President and the General Secretary and between members of our delegation in Moscow and their Soviet colleagues.

MR. McGREGOR: Senator Javits?

SENATOR JAVITS: I would like to revert to the question asked by Senator Fulbright and Senator Stennis, because they raise some, to my mind, very serious points.

On the assumption that the treaty can be denounced in six months, but the agreement cannot be denounced at all, if it is breached, either party can treat it as an end. What do you advise us to do about the September 1 date the President names, if by then we have not determined that we wish to authorize any additional weapons systems in view of the fact that the President has made it clear that he made this agreement on the assumption that we, too, would press forward with our weapons plans as the Russians are?

And the second part of that question is: Is this the total bill or are there more weapons systems to come

MORE

- 13 -

within the next five years that we are going to have to
authorize because we have made this deal?

DR. KISSINGER: First, I think it is not correct
to say that you have been asked to authorize weapons
because we have made this deal. All of the weapons that
you are being asked to authorize had been requested prior
to the deal and were judged to be necessary before the
deal. The question is not whether the deal impels them,
but whether the deal makes them dispensable.

This is the shape of the debate.

Secondly, I am frankly not sure about the withdrawal
provisions of the defensive agreement. I thought it had
the same withdrawal provisions.

It is my impression that the offensive agreement
has exactly the same withdrawal provisions of the defensive
treaty, so that we are protected.

Thirdly, as I have said, we are requesting both of
these programs on their own merit, and, therefore, it is
up to the Congress to decide how to deal with them.

SENATOR PERCY: Dr. Kissinger, I would like to
first express that in dealing with our two major adversaries,
you will always be as skillful and successful as you have
in skirting around the Executive privilege question.

I think in the case of the treaty and the agreements,
you have been, and the President has been, and Secretary
Rogers.

My question pertains to the second allowable site
that each party can have. Neither one of us has even begun
the preparation of those two sites. Neither one of us have
either site in our original defense strategy plans. Is it
possible that we could reach an agreement that neither one
of us go ahead with those two sites and would we take the
initiative in suggesting that might be a possibility?

DR. KISSINGER: The question of the deferral of
the second site had been considered and had been rejected
by both sides. The Soviet Union had taken the position that
it could not agree to an ABM limitation that did not give
it the right as long as we were in a position to defend
ICBM's in which they could not also defend some ICBM's of
their own.

So, therefore, our failure to go ahead with our
second site would, in effect, give them two sites to our one.
The only possibility for us would have been to scrap the site
we had and build an entirely new one in Washington, and it
seemed to us not a good policy to begin a disarmament
agreement by which we had to scrap everything that we had done
in order to build something entirely different from what we
started out to do.

MORE

- 14 -

MR. MacGREGOR: If you have any complaint about this process, I am the one to complain to, but I have not identified to date the following hands, and I would like to recognize you in this order, if I may. Senator Ervin, Congressman Gubser, Congressman Fascell, Congressman Leggett, and Congressman Frelinghuysen, and then we will go on from there.

SENATOR ERVIN: I would like to ask this question. I think we had the wisest of all Americans in Benjamin Franklin, and he said, "Beware of being lulled into dangerous security." My question is this: Wouldn't a ratification of the treaty and the approval of the Limited Arms Agreement make it all the more imperative for us to go forward with the Trident and with the B-1 bomber, and other programs, to keep from being lulled into a dangerous sense of security?

DR. KISSINGER: That is the position of the Administration.

CONGRESSMAN GUBSER: I seem to get from your remarks that we do, under the treaty, have the option of going ahead with Malmstrom instead of the protection of the National Capital. Is that correct or was that possible at one time?

DR. KISSINGER: This was considered at one time, and then when we reached a point where we were talking about two sites, the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that if there were to be two sites, they would rather have the second site around the National Command Authority than in Malmstrom. Whether we could have obtained Soviet acquiescence in two ICBM sites rather than having the second site in Washington, we cannot judge today, because we accepted the recommendations of our military leaders that if there were to be a second site, that second site should be in Washington.

CONGRESSMAN FASCELL: Dr. Kissinger, what does the protocol address itself to, and what were the circumstances which brought it about; and, secondly, we know what is excluded from the Interim Agreement and we know what we can proceed with in terms of qualitative improvements because they won't be deployed until 1975. What is it that the Russians have excluded from the Interim Agreement and what is it that the Russians can proceed with in terms of qualitative improvement that might not be deployed until after 1975?

DR. KISSINGER: The protocol came about because the submarine question could have been an extraordinarily complicated one, and the complications arose from this fact. We do not have a program for building missile-carrying submarines until 1978 at the earliest. The Soviet Union had been producing over the last few years at the rate of eight missile-carrying submarines a year. It has built additional facilities which would enable it nearly to double this production rate, although up to now they have used it mostly for the conversion of older submarines into more modern types. But they do have a very substantial production capability.

MORE

- 16 -

This was the situation we faced. So we developed a formula which enabled the Soviet Union, if it wished, to go beyond their present level up to 62, which is well short of their capacity, but only at the price of trading in some of the older ICBMs and some of the older missiles on earlier nuclear submarines, so that the Soviet Union has to trade in 240 missiles in order to be able to build up to this agreed level.

So the submarine agreement has the dual advantage of stopping the Soviet program on construction well short of its capacity; and secondly, retiring for the first time by international agreement a substantial number of other missiles that we, in our annual statements, had been carrying as part of the Soviet missile force.

So we needed a protocol to determine those things.

Then there was the second question of at what level does the process of trading-in start? That is to say, at what point do you determine that the Soviet Union must trade in these ICBMs and older submarine missiles for newer ones. The ambiguity here arose from the fact that while our intelligence is adequate to tell us when they are putting submarines at sea, and how many submarines are under construction in the sheds at any given moment, there is some difficulty in defining the term "under construction."

If you start the process of "under construction" when the hull sections are being built, before they are moved into the sheds, you get a different figure than if you get the figure in the sheds. Therefore, this was a subject of some complicated negotiation to determine the level at which the trade-in would start, which is, as expressed in the communique, at the level of 740 ballistic missiles on submarines, which includes 30 older ones, which is to say, therefore, at the level of 704 to 710 of the newer submarines.

This is the explanation for this rather complex calculation of the protocol.

MORE

- 17 -

Now as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, their bombers are outside of this system and theoretically they could start building up their bomber force without being limited by this agreement.

Historically, the Soviet Union has not put the emphasis on its bomber force that we have. Its operating procedures and experience is far below the level of our Air Force. We do not consider it probable that they will make a major effort in that field, but this is one field in which they could make progress.

The field in which it is most likely that they will make progress is in the modernization of the missiles that are permitted under the agreement. That is, they will not violate the numbers of the agreement, but they will improve the quality, accuracy, number of warheads and this is what will represent a threat to our strategic forces.

CONGRESSMAN LEGGETT: Doctor, I want to commend you and the Administration on the negotiation of what I think is an extremely remarkable agreement. I have my reservations that perhaps the Department of Defense is stampeding in the opposite direction, though, of the spirit of the negotiations.

I am concerned that in the bill that we marked up yesterday in the Armed Service Committee we increased the hard site Sprint nuclear program clearly outlawed as far as deployment 100 percent.

We accepted the budget figures which had a 900 percent increase in the ULMS or Trident program. Of course, the answer you originally gave was that we needed this as a bargaining chip perhaps for Phase 2 or 3, however, it seems to me we have successfully negotiated the limitation on the number of land-based missiles without an accelerated program, limited the submarine tubes without an accelerated program.

We perhaps have wasted several million dollars in the ABM program in making that a bargaining chip and aren't we perhaps doing the same thing in developing the big bargaining things which obviously will never be deployed if you are successful in your negotiating program?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me say two things: One, it is not easy to prove the motivations of the other side in making an agreement. I would think it probable however that we could not have negotiated the limitations on offensive weapons if it had not been linked to the limitations on defensive weapons and to their desire of stopping the deployment of the ABM system.

So, what drove these negotiations for the first year was their desire to limit our ABM deployment. And it was not until we insisted that we could not agree to an ABM treaty without offensive limitations that they reluctantly included the offensive limitations.

MORE

- 18 -

Secondly, I think we will deploy, even if we are successful in the negotiations that it is very likely we will deploy ULMS and Trident and then retire a similar number of the older submarines, use them for replacement purposes rather than additions to the current submarine fleet.

So, I cannot fully accept the assumption that they will not be deployed. What would almost certainly happen though if an agreement were successful is a substantial replacement of the older Polaris boats.

CONGRESSMAN LEGGETT: Of course, those older Polaris are a quarter billion dollars a piece, zero defects and a third of a mile CPI. It is hard to conceive that they are obsolete or will be.

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to go into the technical weapons characteristics. I think you will get more competent witnesses than me on that subject.

CONGRESSMAN FREYLINGHUSEN: I am sure we all appreciate both your presentation and the question and answer period which you have given us. I would like to congratulate you on a masterful presentation. I think Clark is to be congratulated on the music that he has provided to supplement the high points.

My question gets back to this level of defense spending. The President and you both said you hoped for an earlier resumption of the SALT talks. Assuming ratification of the treaty, you didn't really answer Senator Fulbright's question as to whether the Soviets might not consider defense spending an indication of our sincerity or insincerity. Do you think that there is any chance that there is not an expectation on the part of the Soviets with respect to defense spending that might jeopardize successful talks following the ratification of the treaty?

In other words, does the other side hook our spending and our attitude towards defense to further talks?

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, this last round of talks took nearly 2-1/2 years. So, even if the talks start again this fall, they are likely to be prolonged. We would expect that the first session will deal with general principles rather than with detailed negotiating packages.

All the more so in the next round, we are getting into the more complicated issues of how to control technological change where national means of inspection are not as reliable as they are with respect to sheer numbers.

Now, there is no question that the Soviet Union will judge our intentions in part by the level of our defense spending. for good or evil, and that we cannot take the position that our defense spending is irrelevant to our general political relationship.

MORE

- 19 -

[L.C]

The question is: If we spend too little on defense, if we create such a unilateral weakness then we destroy their incentive to negotiate seriously. If we spend too much and give them the idea that we are gearing up simply for getting a tremendous spurt to get ahead of them, then we create the other problem.

So our problem is to get our defense expenditures at a level that does not create a unilateral weakness and give them pressure for agreement but does not get us into an area where it had the counter-productive tendency of generating a new round on their side.

We believe that we are navigating that course. But it is a serious question and it is a serious problem and we have to be alert to both of these dangers.

MR. MacGREGOR: John Hunt wishes to make a statement in explanation for the departure of a number of members of Congress.

CONGRESSMAN HUNT: Let me thank you for the clear and concise explanation of your mission this morning. On behalf of the Armed Services Committee, you will notice some of us are leaving. It is not because of any discourtesy to you, sir, or because we are not interested.

The fact is we have a conflicting schedule of sub-committees that are getting ready for an important mark-up of the legislation this afternoon in the absence of Mr. Hebert.

So, if you permit me for a moment to explain, that is the reason they are leaving.

DR. KISSINGER: Thank you. I thought they were like my Harvard students. (Laughter).

CONGRESSMAN HARRINGTON: At the risk of being repetitive, to follow on Congressman Freylinghusen's question and Senator Fulbright's question, I am puzzled that this year and last year we saw a $6 billion increase in defense spending requested and if the estimates given us the Assistant Secretary of Defense Moot are correct, we can expect a $5 billion increase in Southeast Asia.

I have seen before the tide was even out, before our committee, hundreds of millions of dollars sought for additional spending in the procurement bill for the better-ment of systems that were not part of your agreement in Russia.

On three levels I am puzzled, one, sound economic policy which appeared to be both centered in the White House as a concern prior to the present occupancy in the White House looking toward the era of 1964 and 1968, public confidence that has been led to believe that somehow out of this whole business will come a reduction, not an increase, in the overall spending in the defense area and in general, whether or not in going to these talks you didn't have enough of an outline of questions in coming before Congressional committee and members of the Executive Branch did to be able

MORE

- 20 -

to live this year with the procurement and appropriations bill
as they were without adding to them in the way and with the
timing I think has been chosen to do it.

I would like to have you address yourself to some
of those considerations, particularly as a constituent
might say to me, "What do you mean it is going to cost more
for defense? I thought you fellows were negotiating for
reductions in tensions and costs." I think that is the
problem most of us have.

DR. KISSINGER: It is our intention and conviction
that as these talks proceed into other areas that we will
be able to bring about a substantial reduction in defense
expenditures as a result of these talks.

There are, of course, certain savings in the ABM
program. What we are finding out is that the combination
of certain trends has produced requirements which are
not themselves the cause of the agreement, but which have
come to a head at about the same time by accident as the
agreement.

One of these problems is that for a number of years
we had significantly slowed down the modernization of
our strategic programs so that our strategic weapons now
were essentially designed in the early 60s, while those of
the Soviet Union were designed in the late 60s and this has
created a certain technological requirement.

This is the reason for this additional expenditure.
This other figure for Southeast Asia that you mentioned is
a projection forward of current rates and may or may not
be necessary, depending on how long current rates are being
sustained.

CONGRESSMAN HARRINGTON: I am quoting Assistant Secretary Moot.

DR. KISSINGER: I know and he projected them forward
over a period of months which may or may not be necessary
because he was being proper with the Congress by giving his
best estimate, but he was projecting current expenditure
rates.

If there were negotiations, for example, if the
offensive slows down, there are many factors that could
affect this. I am just trying to give you an idea.

Thirdly, the increase in the defense spending
has been caused to a considerable extent also by military
pay increases which now consume about 54 percent of our
defense budget. I have seen a chart -- I think the Secretary
of Defense can do it much better than I -- that shows what
the present defense establishment would cost if the pay scales
were still those of eight or 10 years ago.

So, it is a combination of these factors that have
produced the increase of defense costs while forces have
actually been shrinking.

MORE

SENATOR COOPER: I would like to join with others in thanking you and showing appreciation for your very fine statement.

The first question I will ask is not one that I suggest myself, but it was asked the day the agreement was announced. I am sorry Senator Jackson is not here, but he wouldn't mind my saying he asked the question.

Are there any other understandings, secret understandings, which have not been made public or will not be made public? I think we will be asked, and it is just as well to ask it now.

DR. KISSINGER: There are no secret understandings. We have submitted to the Congress the list of all the significant agreements and interpretive statements, and so forth. What we have not done is to go through the record to see whether Ambassador Smith might have said something that they interpreted in a certain way, and this is why we put on the qualification "significant", because otherwise we would have to submit the entire record.

According to the best of our judgment, there are no secret understandings, and all the significant interpretive statements have been submitted to the Congress.

SENATOR COOPER: May I ask one more question? I notice in your explanation, it is said that the United States asked for a prohibition on mobile land-based missiles. You later withdrew that. But you did say that if the Soviet Union went ahead with deployment, you would consider it serious enough to break the agreement. Is the Soviet Union going ahead with mobile land-based missiles?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me make one other comment with respect to the first thing about secret understandings.

There are, of course, in the discussions, general statements of intentions. For example, we have conveyed to the Soviets what I have also said here publicly on the record: that the option of converting the Titans into submarines, given our present construction program, was not something we would necessarily carry out. But we do not consider that as a secret agreement, that sort of thing. This was simply a statement of general unilateral intentions.

Now, with respect to the land-based mobile missiles, we have made an interpretive statement according to which the deployment of land-based mobile missiles would be inconsistent with the purposes of the agreement. Then this raises the question of whether our national means of verification are adequate to monitor this.

The national means of verification are adequate to monitor over a period of time whether a land-based mobile missile is being deployed. The margin of error with respect to total numbers would be great, if you have a margin of error of five percent, and I am giving you a fictitious figure; it might be 15 percent with respect to mobile missiles.

MORE

- 22 -

But the fact of the matter is, what we have to
monitor is not total numbers of land mobile missiles; what
we have to monitor is the fact that they are deploying any
of them. We are quite confident that within a reasonable
period of time after the initial deployment, and maybe not in
the first month, but over a three- to four-month period, and
well before they can develop a substantial capability, we
will be able to tell whether they have deployed a land mobile
missile and we can draw the appropriate conclusions.

So as to the fact of deploying a land mobile mis-
sile, we are confident that we will discover it well before
they could deploy enough to have any effect.

CONGRESSMAN MOYNIGHAN: Dr. Kissinger, you have said
that these agreements, our confidence in them, is not based on
trust, but enlightened self-interest, and yet I think you would
agree with any bilateral arrangements, with the credibility of
the other party to the contract, where that is very important,
you have also said that there is reason to believe that the
area of distrust and suspicion may be at an end.

I just wonder, in view of that question of credi-
bility, is there any specific reason that you have for coming
to this conclusion?

DR. KISSINGER: We are not basing this agreement on
trust, and we believe that this agreement can be verified; and
secondly, that it has adequate safeguards to prevent its being
violated. We also believe that we have started a process by
which we can move international relations into a new era, and
we base this on the fact that we agreed with the Soviet Union
over the past two years on the issue of Berlin, which has
removed one of the primary causes of tension in the world for
the foreseeable future, and a whole spectrum of agreements on
health, space, environment, rules of navigation, that we are
on the verge of making progress with them in other fields such
as commercial agreements, and finally, we have signed a Declara-
tion of Common Principles which it would have been no point to
sign unless we meant to move in a major effort in that direction.

So, for all of these reasons, we believe that there
is a basis, that we have an opportunity both in the Soviet
Union and in the United States, to move into a new era. Whether
both sides have the wisdom to do it, and even if they have the
wisdom they are not caught by events in areas in which they
cannot control their decision, this remains to be seen. But
I think we have the opportunity to turn a significant page in
history, and as far as this Administration is concerned, we are
going to make a major effort in that direction.

SENATOR PELL: It is an excellent presentation. I
have three short questions.

First, if the Soviet expenditures for arms remains
static, or should decline, or ours go up, wouldn't that have
a reverse effect on their willingness to move into SALT II?

Secondly, are any of the provisions of the seabed
disarmament treaty in conflict with our own treaty which you
have negotiated, in view of the fact that we apparently still
consider the possibility of weapons of mass destruction stored
on the seabed floor, and they are prohibited by the seabed
disarmament treaty?

MORE

- 23 -

Third, why, in this set of negotiations, was the constitutionally normal course of Congressional consultation, advise as well as consent, not engaged in?

MR. MacGREGOR: When did you stop beating your wife?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the seabed, I am not aware that we have any intention of deploying weapons on the seabed, and we have no intention of violating the seabed agreement, so unless you know of some weapon that I am not aware of, I would have to say that this is not planned.

We believe that the defense expenditures will stay roughly in balance and that the Soviet incentive to come to an agreement will not be reduced by our being stronger. On the contrary. So the judgment has been that our strength, if anything, gives them an additional incentive to make a negotiation, if we do not carry it to a point where they are convinced that this is just a subterfuge for a massive effort to get ahead of them. If that should become their conviction, then, in fact, we have a problem.

I have to repeat: We have to navigate between that, on the one hand, weakening ourselves unilaterally, and on the other hand between having them see these negotiations simply as a stage by which we try to achieve superiority. Either of these things would be self-defeating.

As for the process of consultation with the Senate, as Senator Fulbright knows, this is not my specialty, but it has been my understanding that Mr. Smith and the appropriate Secretaries have been in close consultation, and we have tried from here to be on a personal basis in contact with key Senators.

MR. MacGREGOR: Might I add in that respect, Senator Pell, that at least since I have been here, that is, January 4, 1971 to date, it has been Ambassador Gerard Smith's intention, following the directions of the President, to make himself readily available to the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives, here in Washington as well as in Helsinki and Vienna. I would be delighted to talk to you further about that, but I had thought that was worked out to the reasonable satisfaction of the Members of the Congress.

MORE

- 24 -

CONGRESSMAN FRASER: Dr. Kissinger, let me say
first that I have thought that the consultations with Ambassador
Smith have been good, both here in Washington and in Vienna.

I listened with some care to the answer you gave to
Senator Percy's question on the ABM sites. I can appreciate
the Soviets would want to have a symmetrical arrangement with
ours, but I was not quite clear from your answer whether in
fact you have evidence that the Soviets intend to go ahead
with their option to protect an offensive missile site.

The reasons I ask that is that since building the
National Capital Defense is not a bargaining chip clearly because
we have now put a cap on ABM and since we have a two to three
times lead over the Soviet Union building a site over the
Capital is not going to give us any significant benefit from the
possibility of attack. It will not even give us more time.

Unless we already know the Soviets are going to build
a second ABM, why couldn't we wait on ours and save the
taxpayers several billions of dollars?

DR. KISSINGER: It depends on how you define
"how do we know". We have no evidence that they have started
construction. We have the impression that they have the firm
intention of proceeding. I have no evidence whatever to the
contrary that they do not intend to proceed.

All the conversations the Presidential party had with
them left the impression that they have the firm intention of
proceeding with their second site. As for the argument of how
much time you gain, the effort to overwhelm in itself, is
apt to give some additional time but I would not insist
that this will add a huge span of time to the warning.

CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: Dr. Kissinger, the President
and you have made it quite clear that it would be desirable
to have the treaty ratified and the Executive Agreements
approved by Congress in order that Phase II could begin in
October.

We fully understand the system of the Soviets and
there is no ratification on their part as we have it here, and
I am sure the Soviets understand that this is an election year and
we have political conventions and there may be an opportunity
not to meet, that is a ratification and approval of the Executive
Agreements.

Is it absolutely necessary that the treaty be ratified and Executive Agreements approved by Congress before Phase II can begin, sometime in October? Indeed, cannot Ambassador Smith meet with his counterparts, even though the Senate and the Congress have not finished their work as far as the treaty and Executive Agreement are concerned?

If I may ask just a second question, I think it is
in the report, but what problems were there, or why didn't
we pursue with greater determination the inclusion of MIRV's
in the Executive Agreement?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question,
actually, the Soviets do go through a ratification procedure.

MORE

- 25 -

They have their Supreme Soviet approve it but with all
respect, it is a little more tractable than our Congress.

The reason why, really, we can have some
exploratory informal talks and we probably will at various
levels, but the reason it would be difficult to start formal
sessions is because we have to know from what base we are
operating. It is rather an embarrassing position to have a
senior negotiator operate on the basis of the assumption of
a ratification.

Also, it would be somewhat presumptuous towards
the Congress to assume a ratification that has not in fact
taken place. Yet, on the other hand, unless you make some
assumptions, you really have not got a fixed base from which
you can operate.

Therefore, the beginning of the second phase of
SALT really has to follow congressional ratification. We
understand the pressures of this year and this is simply a
fact.

Now, with respect to MIRV, MIRV is a complex issue
for this reason: You can count numbers with national means of
verification, but it is much more difficult to determine how
many warheads are confined in the master warhead.

Now, you have some indications but it is not very
easy. Therefore, with respect to the deployment of MIRV,
the inspection requirements have to be a little bit more
rigid than would be otherwise the case.

Now, we have made two proposals, two linked
proposals, one is a ban on the testing of MIRV, this we are
prepared to monitor by national means of inspection, and
second, a ban on the deployment of MIRV for which we asked
for spot-checks on on-site inspection. Now we considered the
test ban absolutely crucial because we could have been some-
what more lenient on the frequency of on-site inspection if
there had been a test ban on MIRV's because without testing,
by definition, it is not easy to deploy them. It is, in fact,
impossible to deploy them.

The Soviet Union, for not ununderstandable reasons,
because they are behind in MIRV technology, refused a test
ban. They also refused a deployment ban as such. What they
proposed was a production ban but without inspection. A
ban on production is totally unverifiable in the Soviet
Union while they could verify ours through our budget and other
methods through which our industrial production generally becomes
known.

So, the Soviet counter-proposal for a production ban
without a test ban was generally unacceptable to us and when we
reached that stalemate, we could not proceed any further.
This was the obstacle to proceeding on the MIRV's.

CONGRESSMAN ZABLOCKI: What encouragement do you
see, or optimism that this may be an area that in Phase II we
may find some common ground on?

MORE

- 26 -

DR. KISSINGER: Phase II, Mr. Congressman, will be very much more difficult than Phase I, because there, we will deal with technological problems and there we will require even more ingenuity with respect to Phase II than was shown in Phase I.

If one can have optimism with respect to it, it is because now the Soviet technology has gone somewhat further probably so that they may be more willing to accept a test ban which will at least put a limit on further deployments, and secondly, you will remember when we started these negotiations in 1969, we were going through a crisis in the Middle East and the Berlin Crisis. We were emerging out of this whole miasma of suspicion and it was the first time we engaged with the Soviets in any major negotiation, so the climate was different.

Now, we have established a pattern in which the Chief of State on our side, the President and their political leaders, can be in constant contact with each other and I believe we can perhaps move a little more creatively in the early stages of SALT II than we could in the early stages of SALT I.

I must also say that the subject is more difficult. Certainly, we had conversations of the breadth and precision in Moscow that would have been unimaginable three or four years ago with respect to strategic questions, but this gives us some hope that at least we can talk about the gut issues.

SENATOR FULBRIGHT: Can I ask you to comment on one aspect, on the significance of ABM, so much more has been said about the agreement.

How do you evaluate what appears to me to be a renunciation of the effort to create a defense? What you have left in the ABM is surely nothing more than a token. Hasn't each country, in effect, said, "We recognize, we have no defense to almost total devastation in view of the capacities for destruction, or within the existing weapons", and if that is true, isn't this the experience, and I don't know why you would say it would be much more difficult.

If they live up to that and we give them no reason to believe we haven't accepted in good faith that our population is hostile to their weapons, and vice versa, and it seems to me it ought not to be more difficult if you believe in that.

DR. KISSINGER: I believe, Mr. Chairman, this is a very good point. The limit on ABM's or effective ABM's of both sides, really creates a situation, as I said in my statement, in one sentence, in which the offensive weapons of both sides really have a free ride into the country of the other.

So that therefore, the difference in numbers is somewhat less significant than you would assess otherwise. There is still a danger that one side will get such an enormous numerical advantage in warheads that it can completely obliterate the force of the other.

MORE

- 27 -

But in the absence of significant defenses, even relatively small forces can do an enormous amount of damage.

Therefore, too, if we can move into the second phase of SALT, into an explicit recognition that both sides will try to stay away from counter-force strategies, from the one danger that now exists, or the overwhelming danger, that they will try to destroy each other, then perhaps the premium on MIRV's will be reduced, because, as you remember very well, Mr. Chairman, MIRV's were developed at first as a hedge against ABM.

So I think we will find, in perhaps unexpected ways, that the new strategic relationship that is created by this treaty will create realizations on both sides as to the significance of usable strategic power that over a period of the next negotiations could have quite dramatic impacts.

I am very glad that you asked that.

MR. MacGREGOR: It is very close to 12 noon.

We appreciate your participation and your presence and your patience, and we thank you for launching what the President has called an effective Legislative-Executive partnership.

END

(AT 11:55 A.M. EDT)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 15, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF THE PRESIDENT
AT A CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFING ON THE
ARMS LIMITATION TREATY AND AGREEMENT

THE STATE DINING ROOM

9:18 A.M.

Ladies and gentlemen, we are beginning a little late because I understand traffic is quite heavy around the White House this morning due to the arrival of the President of Mexico. We must go forward with the schedule, because there is a Joint Session, as you know, today and we do want the members of the committees present here today to be able to attend that session. We will have to adjourn this meeting at approximately 12:00 o'clock, or at best, five minutes after 12:00, to give you plenty of time for questions.

A word about the format of this meeting. I will make a statement, and then I will have to depart in order to prepare for the arrival of the President of Mexico. Dr. Kissinger will then make a statement, and then it will be open to questions to members of the committees who are present here.

In order to facilitate recognition of Members, someone who knows all of the Members who are here, Clark MacGregor, will moderate the question and answer period, but we will try to be just as fair as possible among the members of the committees and between the House and the Senate, and Clark will, of course, be responsible in the event it isn't fair.

In any event, let me come directly now to my own remarks, which will not be too extended, because Dr. Kissinger today will be presenting the Presidential views. He will be telling you what the President's participation has been in these negotiations. The views he will express I have gone over with him in great detail, and I will stand by them.

MORE

Page 2

I noted in the press that it was suggested that I was calling down the members of these committees for the purpose of giving you a pep talk on these two agreements. Let me lay that to rest right at the outset. This is not a pep talk and Dr. Kissinger is not going to make you a pep talk either.

When I came back from the Soviet Union, you will recall in the Joint Session I said that I wanted a very searching inquiry of these agreements. I want to leave no doubt about my own attitude.

I have studied this situation of arms control over the past 3-1/2 years. I am totally convinced that both of these agreements are in the interest of the security of the United States and in the interest of arms control and world peace.

I am convinced of that, based on my study. However, I want the members of the House and the members of the Senate also to be convinced of that. I want the Nation to be convinced of that.

I think that the hearings that you will conduct must be searching because only in that way will you be able to be convincing to yourselves and only in that way will the Nation also be convinced.

In other words, this is not one of those cases where the President of the United States is asking the Congress and the Nation to take on a blind faith a decision that he has made and in which he deeply believes.

I believe in the decision, but your questions should be directed to Dr. Kissinger and others in the Administration for the purpose of finding any weakesses that you think in the negotiations or in the final agreements that we have made.

As far as the procedures are concerned, as you know, you will be hearing the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the head of the CIA, and of course, Ambassador Smith, in the sessions of your various committees.

I know that a number have suggested that Dr. Kissinger should appear before the committees as a witness. I have had to decline that particular invitation on his part, due to the fact that Executive privilege had to prevail.

On the other hand, since this is really an unprecedented situation, it seemed to me that it was important that he appear before the members of the committee in this format. This is on the record.

All of you will be given total transcripts of what he says. All of you will have the opportunity to ask these questions and in the event that all of the questions are not asked on this occasion, he, of course, will be available to answer other questions in his office from members of the committee as time goes on, during the course of the hearings.

What we are asking for here, in other words, is cooperation and not just rubber-stamping by the House and the

MORE

Senate. That is essential because there must be follow-
through on this and the members of the House and Senate,
it seems to me, must be convinced that they played a role
as they have up to this point, and will continue to play a
role in this very, very important field of arms control.

Now, let me go to the agreements, themselves,
and express briefly some of my own views that I think are pro-
bably quite familiar to you, but which I think need to be
underlined.

I have noted a great deal of speculation about
who won and who lost in these negotiations. I have said
that neither side won and neither side lost. As a matter
of fact, if we were to really look at it very, very fairly,
both sides won, and the whole world won.

Let me tell you why I think that is important.
Where negotiations between great powers are involved, if one
side wins, and the other loses clearly, then you have a built-
in tendency or incentive for the side that loses to break
the agreement and to do everything that it can to regain
the advantage.

This is an agreement which was very toughly
negotiated on both sides. There are advantages in it for both
sides. For that reason, each side has a vested interest,
we believe, in keeping the agreement rather than breaking it.

I would like you to examine Dr. Kissinger, and
the other witnesses, before the committee on that point.
I think you also will be convinced that this was one of
those cases where it is to the mutual advantage of each side,
each looking to its national security.

Another point that I would like to make is
Presidential intervention in this particular matter, Presidential
coordination, due to the fact that what we have here is not one
of those cases where one department could take a lead role.

This cut across the functions of the Department of
State, the Department of Defense, it cut across, also, the
AEC, and, of course, the Arms Control Agency.

Under these circumstances, there is only one place
where it could be brought together, and that was in the White
House, in the National Security Council, in which all of these
various groups participated.

There is another reason, which has to do with the
system of government in the Soviet Union. We have found that
in dealing with the system of government in the Soviet Union,
that where decisions are made, that affect the vital security
and in fact, the very survival of a nation, decisions and dis-
cussions in those cases are made only at the highest level.
Consequently, it is necessary for us to have discussions and
decisions at the highest level if we are going to have the
breakthroughs that we have had to make in order to come to this
point of a successful negotiation.

MORE

Page 4

The other point that I would make has to do with what follows on. The agreement that we have here, as you know, is in two stages: One, the treaty with regard to ABM defensive weapons; and second, the offensive limitation, the Executive Agreement, which is indicated as being, as you know, not a permanent agreement -- it is for five years -- and not total. It covers only certain categories of weapons.

Now we are hoping to go forward with the second round of negotiations. That second round will begin, we trust, in October. That means that we can begin in October, provided action is taken on the treaty and on the offensive agreement that we have before you at this time, sometime in the summer months; we would trust before the 1st of September. I don't mean that it should take that long, but I hope you can finish by the 1st of September so we can go forward with the negotiation in October.

The other point that should be made with regard to the follow-on agreements is not related to your approval of these agreements. It is related to the actions of the Congress on defense. I know there is disagreement among various Members of Congress with regard to what our defense levels ought to be. I think, however, I owe it to you and to the Nation to say that Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues made it absolutely clear that they are going forward with defense programs in the offensive area which are not limited by these agreements.

Under those circumstances, since they will be going forward with their programs, for the United States not to go forward with its programs -- and I am not suggesting which ones at this point; you can go into that later -- but for the United States not to go forward with its offensive programs, or worse, for the United States unilaterally to reduce its offensive programs would mean that any incentive that the Soviets had to negotiate the follow-on agreement would be removed.

It is for that reason, without getting into the specifics as to what the level of defense spending should be, as to what the offensive programs should be, I am simply saying that if we want the follow-on agreement, we have to take two steps: First to approve these agreements; and second, we need a credible defensive position so that the Soviet Union will have an incentive to negotiate a permanent offensive freeze. That is what we all want.

These are just some random thoughts that I had on this matter. I will simply close by saying that as one stands in this room in this house, one always has a tendency to think of some of the tragedies of history of the past. As many of you know, I have always been, and am, a great admirer of Woodrow Wilson. As all of you know, the great tragedy of his life was that after he came back with the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations, due to ineffective consultation, the Senate rejected the treaty and rejected the League.

We, of course, do not want that to happen. We do not think that it will happen. We have appreciated the consultation we have had up to this point, and we are now going forward with this meeting at this time.

MORE

Page 5

I will only say that in looking at what Wilson said during that debate, when he was traveling the country, he made a very, it seemed to me, moving and eloquent statement. He said: "My clients are the children. My clients are the future generation."

This is an election year, and I realize that in an election year it is difficult to move as objectively as we ordinarily would move on any issue, but I would respectfully request the Members of the House and Senate, Republican and Democratic, to approach this in the spirit that Wilson explained in that period when they were debating whether they should go forward with the League of Nations, remembering that our clients are the next generation, that approval of these agreements, the treaty limiting defensive weapons, the agreement limiting offensive weapons in certain categories, and also the continuation of a credible defense posture, will mean that we will have done our duty by our clients, which are the next generation.

Thank you.

END (AT 9:30 A.M. EDT)