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Joseph Kane (Time Mag)/Kissinger

2:30 p.m. - 8/1/73

K: Hello.

JK: Mr. Kissinger, Joe Kane, Time Magazine -- I'm the hawk over here. I'm doing a short piece this week on the C mbodian bombings.

K: You can be a hawk on TIME, but still a dove by any normal standards.

JK: We do our best. There are two issues involved. One, the bombing itself and the subsequent efforts of reporting it.

K: The rules are that we are speaking on background without attribution to me.

JK: Right. What aroused my curiosity was on Monday Senator Symington said General Wheeler was testifying that the President, Secretary Laird and the NSC approved the operation. Then Symington seemed to draw a line between the NSC and your part of the deliberation.

K: I was part and approved. I fully approved. At that time I was not as strong as I am today bureaucratically so it may be what Symington had in mind, that technically I was not a member of NSC but still, I want to make it absolutely clear, I fully supported the decision and do so today. In fact, I think one has to separate two things -- the substance and the reporting. On the substance it is totally misleading to say the U.S. was bombing Cambodia; the U.S. was bombing North Vietnamese troops that were in Cambodia, not bombing Cambodia, but North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia that were attacking American troops in Vietnam in a 10 mile strip along the frontier with the encouragement of the Cambodian government. While the bombing was going on Sihanouk invited the President to visit Phnom Penh, he reestablished diplomatic relations and never protested a B-52 raid. The thing that got him was when ________ aircraft got across the frontier and hit villages.

JK: The attack he protested, but not the B-52s?

K: Never a B-52 and the reason we kept it secret is because we did not want to force Sihanouk into the embarrassing position of having him protest which would then give a legitimate reason for the North Vietnamese to be in the country and then force us to stop the bombing which we thought was essential.

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JK: If Sihanouk had to come forward and protest the bombing . . .

K: Then the problem would have been that the North Vietnamese would have said they were coming in afterwards or moved against him for putting up with it.

JK: But still the bombing was in his territory.

K: It was in his territory, in territory which for all practical purposes was occupied by the North Vietnamese.

JK: But still Cambodia.

K: Oh yes.

JK: Is there a subtlety that I am missing?

K: No, we are saying there was North Vietnamese troops that were in his territory but never acknowledged they were there.

JK: Because they did acknowledge they were there they could protest our bombing them.

K: That is right.

JK: The problem is that Secretary Rogers testified in April, 1970 that we rigidly respected their neutrality and the like.

K: He will have to speak for himself but I would say we did respect Cambodia's neutrality and it is an interesting question whether if you bomb enemy troops on neutral soil that are attacking you, but I'll let Rogers speak for himself

JK: How do we interpret the President's statement on April 30?

K: What he must have had in mind was that we never made any ground force attacks. Now on the so-called falsification of the reports, we, as General Wheeler pointed out, the President for the reasons indicated asked that the need-to-know be sharply restricted. The military set up a reporting channel, a special reporting channel; that special reporting channel put in the correct information. That is the only reporting channel of which we were aware. You asked Campbell whether we knew how it operated -- I didn't know how it operated. Why should I know?

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JK: Once the substantive decision was made and people say you had diplomatic reasons for the bombing -- between that time the policy was set and the implementation of the policy according to General Wheeler the President said utmost secrecy, need-to-know and so on. Did anyone say, 'How're you going to do that?'

K: I can only speak for myself. I never did and Laird apparently has also said he never told them how to do it. I don't know how many lateral contacts there may have been between various staffs but then we get to the problem that the military having reported this in a special channel and correctly, they had an internal accounting problem so that the falsification was to their own auditors and not the public. We also informed some key members of the House and Senate Armed Services Committee.

JK: So their need then was to balance their books.

K: That's my impression. The reporting wasn't reporting that was destined either for the press or for the Congress.

JK; The report ended up there with a large zero under Cambodia.

K: We are talking about '69 and not '73, when they were asked to submit the reports. You should ask people who know. I am just reconstructing my assessment. You had a new Secretary and new Deputy Secretary. He went to a data bank which had been sent this information. . . . . . There was no need for us to put out false reports because no one would have challenged the actions needed to bring the war to a successful conclusion. They went to the data bank and no one was thoughtful enough --- that is how I interpret this. From the White House point of view no one was deceived.

JK: At your level you were getting this data of 3600 sorties and 4600 tons and the like?

K: I didn't think I got the tons but I got the sorties.

JK: So you and again those who needed to know were not as Symington said _________?

K: Absolutely note.

JK: Whose job was it to notify members on Capitol Hill? Symington said only people xx pro this war were notified?

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K: That may be true but we notified the key members of the Armed Services Committee who happened to be pro, but this is how intelligence operations tend to be reported. Whose job was it? I don't know who decides. I know the President did the original briefing himself.

JK: He briefed?

K: Yes, Stennis, Russell, Rivers

JK: The President himself. The names that have been mentioned are Stennis, Russell, Rivers, Arends, .... There was a report that indeed Fulbright was advised.

K: I doubt it. I think Mel and some . . . . . . but again you have to ask him.

JK: I guess the part of the problem that the Senators seem to be having is one of (selectivity) of those that were not told as a group and secondly those figures Hughes sent down reflect this. The Pentagon had also two times to give information and they didn't. Now the Pentagon said this was something erroneous with the data bank but the Senators say what was a lie is now construed as an error. General Wheeler argued at every turn on Monday saying we did not falsify. Those who needed to know knew. Where does it _________ those who didn't need to know know?

K: I think there is a difference between _________ reports of '69 and 71. I think they were wrong in '71; reason for it in '73, very little reason for it. OK, I have to run off.

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TELCOM

Scotty Reston/Kissinger

3:30 p.m. - 8/1/73

K: Scotty, welcome back.

R: Thank you, it's great to be back. I was hoping we could get together. What kind of schedule have you got?

K: Let me see -- you want to have breakfast on Saturday or will you be out of the country?

R: I am not sure because I just got back and I will be damned if I know what the schedule will be. Probably not though.

K: Or we can meet late on Friday but I prefer Saturday morning.

R: All right, let us do that. Do you want to meet at the Metro Club or where?

K: Let me check if it is open otherwise we can meet at the White House.

R: OK, What time do you want to do it?

K: 8:30.

R: Splendid.

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Telcon
Stewart Alsop/HAK

Wed., August 1, 1973; 4:00 p.m.

K: Hello, Stewart. How are you?

A: Pretty good. I wanted to consult you about a piece I had in mind.
Have you read the Warneke report?

K: About 17 billion?

A: 14 I think. Signed by the whole intellectual...

K: Scotty Reston is attacking us for weakening the nation's defenses.

A: I don't see that. All those people are recommending that we simply eliminate all (aid) for Southeast Asia. In fact it means having refused to accept the basic Communist condition, to scuttle in Vietnam, we now do it on our own.

K: That is right. Also they want to do away with Minuteman.

A: They want to do away with Mirving of Minuteman. Watergate is having a heavy impact. Anything else going on has given opposition to the President a lot of fire power.

K: Right.

A: Ordinarily, in the old days, in Jack Kennedy's or Scoop Jackson's day, they would have been criticizing the Administration for permitting the US Army from cutting to where it can hardly cut its way out of a cold ______. Jackson says the US Navy now has gone from Number 1 to Number 2.

K: That is true in the number of ships.

A: They would have made a big stink about this.

K: That is right. The reason our defense budget is so relatively low is because to have had any chance to have it approved we have to trim it to the lowest edge of the safe level and then they knock off another 14 billion.

A: I think if you combine the emotional reaction of Vietnam and the emotional reaction to Watergate you can almost say this ancient argument is lost because the dominant wing of the Democratic Party has in effect adopted and approved on the basic views of Robert Taft which were defeated when you and I were young, Maggie. Now the

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only available opposition to the Nixon Administration has fully
adopted an isolationist position.

K: And a defeatist foreign policy, because in Vietnam they actually want to inflict a retroactive defeat on us. They have inflicted it on us in Cambodia with a totally needless bombing halt and they are trying to inflict it in Vietnam by withdrawing all support.

A: Doesn't the Cambodian bombing apply to all Southeast Asia?

K: Exactly.

A: So your hands are tied, which would make it impossible for the South Vietnamese to defend themselves. Teddy Kennedy doesn't go quite as far. He said we should feed them while they are assuring their defeat.

K: Stewart, I tell you, my TV has a life of its own. It just went on without any effort on my part. Hold for a second. ... Hello.

A: Have you disciplined it?

K: I have. This is the most disastrous period I can recall.

A: I agree with you.

K: There is a total lack of patriotism and of a long range view. Weekly we get estimates of Soviet development. We have always been told we have several times enough to kill them. Now they have more than enough to kill us.

A: Presumably they will Mirv before 1980 and it could be they will Mirv in Ted Kennedy's first term and he will then have some of these chickens coming home to roost on him.

K: I don't understand how anyone who wants to be President can pursue this policy. If we get run out of Indochina it will wreck our China policy. The Chinese were helping us get it settled and Congress pulled out the rug under them as much as under us because on what grounds can we get it settled while they are handing it over? So much depends on their judgment of our ability to act and since we seem in the process of being silenced so that whatever we want to do we can't do it.

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A: No, it is a disastrous policy. You are quoted in my magazine as comparing it to Dunkirk by that lady -- what's her name?

K: Jane Alexander. I said we already had our Dunkirk and we should at least get together now and try to salvage what can be salvaged. That she did not have.

A: After Dunkirk the British got together and at least did not lose the war. The opposition is so irrational that the only thing that can save us is the immediate threat of disaster.

K: When my liberal domestic friends say what's happened to our foreign policy, if I say it is intact they are furious. If I say it is lost they love it. The fact that they will live in the world NEW YORK in which that collapse has occured does not affect them at all.

A: I don't see why it is to their advantage to have a defeat inflicted on the US in Vietnam because the defeat was not inflicted by other people, but by ourselves. I am sure the time will come when this Warneke issue will become...I don't know whether Trident is the thing to do.

K: I don't think Trident is the thing to do but I do think it is better than being a country that retains its equivalent of the 75s while the other country has already gone beyond the 88s. If we develop nothing at all...under water or on land, while they are developing on every category, the day must come when they will overtake us decisively.

A: The liberal insists why worry while you still have Polaris, but it is not that simple.

K: Who will want the destruction of Russian cities while they still have most of their retaliatory left and ours has been destroyed. All you need is a breakthrough in antisubmarine warfare. It was axiomatic when I came in that Minuteman was invulnerable and when Laird said the SS-9 was established to defeat it he was attacked as a war-monger. Now they say get rid of Minuteman and go to sea. Just depend on Polaris.

A: I think the time will come when everyone will wake up and say it isn't nice to be much weaker than the Russians. But your superior intellectual is totally committed to the other side.

not

K: If we survive Watergate we are going down without an effort.

TELCONE

Bob Toth/Kissinger

5:30 p.m. - 8/1/73

K: Hello.

T: Hi, Bob Toth. I've been on vacation for 6 weeks so I don't know what's going on.

K: There are some congressional hearings on.

T: I heard about those. I have two quick ones. One, on Cambodia. I have heard that negotiations are under way between the two sides and I wanted to see if I can get anything from you on it.

K: No, you can't get anything out of me and it's in a sort of very tentative stage, but it isn't reasonable to expect that anything will happen before August 15. This is just on background.

T: Can you say where they're being held?

K: I don't think it is that clear. I wouldn't make a big affair out of it if I were you. It is in a very exploratory stage if it is indeed in any stage.

T: Have you come to any assessment what is going to happen after August 15?

K: . . . . . hearing reports from three weeks to a year and a half. . . that it will last.

T: As to how long they will survive?

K: But that is because we have the best intelligence service in the world.

T: Are you in the short range or the long range?

K: I will make up my mind after three weeks. There's no physical reason why they can't hold. My judgment is it will either go very fast or more protracted than most people think.

T: How will it affect the Vietnam settlement?

K: The whole thing is a disaster. I came back from the negotiations -- now this is only on background -- with the absolute conviction that Hanoi had taken itself in for the long haul and would not make tremendous moves. And with the feeling that a Laos and Cambodian settlement would be forthcoming. We had many reasons to believe that Cambodian settlement was attainable which I could demonstrate. With an August 15 deadline, why should anyone settle? Look at Sihanouk's problem. He needs Phnom Penh, if anything.

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T: So you think they really want to take it and then....

K: No, they want to see what happens.

T: After August 15 -- you don't think they want to take it after August 15?

K: No.

T: I understand you were rebuffed in seeing Sihanouk.

K: When the negotiations were fully settled the whole thing had a different meaning.

T: When are you going to China?

K: That, too, is affected by August 15.

T: Were you supposed to go before August 15?

K: That isn't the point. No one wants to tie the trip so close to Cambodia or that our China policy had anything to do with it.

T: Then you won't depart for sometime?

K: It will be decided in the next two weeks.

T: So it sounds like your pessimistic about the whole thing right now.

K: No, I think unnecessary difficulties have been created.

T: Do you see the President going back to the Hill?

K: I doubt it.

T: I heard that you said during a cocktail party or dinner at Kay Graham's that the President was 3 weeks from a nervous breakdown.

K: Absolutely total nonsense.

T: I didn't think that sounded like you. What kind of a state is he in?

K: Actually in a crisis he is steady. This may seem very unbelievable, but he is in a very steady condition, not panicked. He almost never discusses Watergate with me.

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T: There is nothing that you have to do with it really.

K: No, but if he were totally preoccupied he might be unburdening himself.

T: There is no doubt that he is under stress.

K: Under great stress but I have really seen -- he is very steady and firm right now. He conducts the conversations with the Shah, giving a 40 minute explanation of our overall strategy. While I make some points for him ahead of time he goes far beyond my points.

T: That's impressive.

K: It is.

T: It could be viewed as escapist. Are you going out to California?

K: If the President goes, yes.

T: The scuttlebut is he is going for a prolonged stay after he gives his
__________ on Watergate.

K: I don't think he has made a decision.

T: Will you have some time for me?

K: Can we wait until next week?

T: Fine, I will call you.

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Jack Anderson/Kissinger

4:10 p.m. - 8/2/73

K: Hello.

A. Fine. I enjoyed our visit the other evening.

K: I did too. What is this urgent matter you want to see me about?

A: It's a small memo one of my reporters brought in and I thought you might want to see it.

K: I would prefer tomorrow rather than today. What is the subject?

A: It is on the Ellsberg papers -- just a brief memo.

K: Come in at 10:30 tomorrow.

A: Sure, is that convenient for you?

K: Yes.

A: OK.

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Telcon

Dr. Simon Ramo/HAK

Thursday, August 2, 1973;4:30 p.m.

K: How are you?

R: This is Ramo.

K: Yes, how are you?

R: Fine. How are you?

K: OK.

R: I thought it was worth a phone call to mention to you that when we spoke briefly about my having a trip coming up to Moscow at their invitation -- that trip is now scheduled, and it has occurred to me that in addition to my going there to lecture on how to manage large technological endeavors and the like for their benefit, there may be something that you might conceivably want me to do for your benefit, someone you might want me to talk to.

K: Right. When are you going?

R: I am going to arrive there on September 7 and stay one week.

K: OK.

R: While you are making your notes you might as well make a note that I'm coming through London on the British European Airway Flight Number 672, arriving at 4:20 p.m. on September 7 and staying for a week. I'm not sure exactly who is my principal host. I think amongst the academicians who head their academy, a man by the name of Tesiarni, who may be known to you.

K: Yes, I know who Peshiani is.

R: Keronian.

K: Kerilin, yes.

R: One of them is, I understand, a son-in-law of Kosygin.

K: Yes. Pevishiani.

R: OK, good.

K: I will keep that in mind.

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R: I imagine that my coming here wearing the hat of a technological specialist or expert, but with the background of having been the chief scientist of the ICBM program, there is conceivably some way that you might have me talk to someone to get some information or viewpoint or slant that would be helpful to you, but if such a thing were to occur, obviously it would be something that you would have to arrange and not I.

K: OK.

R: That's my message.

K: Good. Many thanks. And I may be on the West Coast before you leave and then we could meet.

R: Good.

K: Nice to talk to you.

R: Henry, when you are on the West Coast if you can do so and give me a little notice we would be glad to do a little dinner for you, if you have an evening that you would like to use, to which we would invite people -- of course we would check with you first -- who might be of some interest to you to spend an evening with.

K: Well, let's talk about that when it's clear when the President is coming.

R: Right. Many thanks. Goodbye.

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Pierpoint/Kissinger

5:25 p.m. - 8/2/73

K: Hello.

P: Are you calling from Camp David?

K: No, I'm not in the inner circle anymore.

P: That's what I suspected. I watched the helicopter depart and I didn't see you go on it.

K: Now they got Haig and Ziegler against Laird and Harlow and they're snobs against me.

P: Henry, listen, let's talk about Cambodia for a minute. I understand the option has always been open to go back to Congress and ask for renewal of the bombing, but you have until noon tomorrow, as I see it, if you do it before the Congress leaves town.

K: Of course, we could call them back.

P: You could and dramatize the need. If you went to that dramatic length what was left of Phnom Penh would cause immediate . . . .

K: No, we won't do that.

P: Are you still keeping options open or have you decided to exercise -- can you tell me on a background basis?

K: On a background basis. We have to express our 100% concern to the Congress but whether we will ask it to do anything or not is what you, yourself think -- we would lose, don't you think?

P: Of course I do. The question is do you want the issue to prove to history and the people that you have done what you could?

K: But don't you think we have enough issues without looking for any new ones.

P: Yes, I would say so.

K: No, there are enough divisions in the country without starting brawls foreordained to failure.

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P: What do you calculate are the chances of the Phnom Penh government surviving without us?

K: I have no idea. I get estimates from three weeks to a year. My estimate is sometime this year it will collapse. It's a bloody tragedy because we would have had a negotiation sometime this June. -- This is off-th-record.

P: Are there any other steps short of bombing. Perhaps stepping up military aid and that kind of thing?

K: Up to a certain point. The bombing has been a bargaining piece with Sihanouk. I don't know how Sihanouk with all his screaming as long as we were bombing/we had traded it to him we had a bargaining piece. The more he screamed, the more of a victory it would have been for him.

P: But now you have lost it.

K: That's right. If Phnom Penh falls. . . . . .; if Phnom Penh holds there will be a negotiations.

P: You sound pessimistic.

K: No, I say we are more or less out of there. I am not pessimistic because I was reasonably sure I had a negotiation set for the middle of June. But I was waiting for Sihanouk to get back to Peking. By the time he did the bombing halt vote had taken place.

P: So he had a bargaining piece against you. Well, I am going to do a piece.

K: Don't mention me.

P: No, but it looks like the President is not going to ask for an extension.

K: If this turns out to be wrong then you have to assume a decision was made tomorrow morning.

P: No, I will hedge it a little. It isn't flat out.

K: OK.

P: Thank you, Henry.

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Dick Velariani/HAK

Thursday, August 2, 1973; 5:35 p.m.

V: I want to talk to you a little bit about Cambodia.

K: Am I surprised!

V: Did you just talk to Mansfield about it? I understand you met with him for an hour.

K: Yes, but we also discussed Cambodia, but we had other reasons.

V: Are you resigned to the bombing halt on the 15th? Is there any plan to ask Congress for an extension?

K: I don't think so. You don't think that would pass, do you?

V: I don't think so, but I wonder if you are going to ask.

K: I don't think so. We are on background, you know.

V: Yes, I understand. What effect do you think the halt will have?

K: In my view it has already killed the negotiations. In my view it will lead to the collapse of Phnom Penh. We get varying estimates on the fall of Cambodia from four weeks to four months to a year, and a lot of it now depends on the psychological impact. In addition there is the impact on surrounding countries.

V: What will happen if Cambodia went?

K: It will shake Vietnam; it will affect Laos, Indonesia. We had the negotiations all set. If you were the communists, wouldn't you wait until August 15?

V: I would. No contact with Sihanouk at all?

K: What has Sihanouk got left to deliver? One of the ironies may be -- all this you do not ascribe to anybody -- why does Sihanouk scream about the bombing, that he is the guy that brought an end to it. Either the Khmer Rouge will win, in which case they don't need him, or they will not and still will negotiate directly. If he comes back he will be a hero.

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August 2, 1973 (Thursday); 5:45 p.m.

Telcon

Bill Theis, Hearst Newspapers/HAK

T: Can you give me a reading on the Mansfield-China situation? I understand his trip has been canceled. I understand an apparent obvious reason is this Party Congress.

K: Yes.

T: Is there more to it than this?

K: They may not want him there during the time of the bombing cut-off.

T: This other reason would be a good surface one for their own purposes. Does this look as if it will be off until sometime after August?

K: The Mansfield trip?

T: Yes.

K: I think you should check with him. That is my impression, but I think he would be a better one to ask.

T: I have already talked to one of his people, but I wanted to check with you because I assume this may be a surface reason for it until the Cambodian situation is clear.

K: That may be true.

T: Is there anything you can tell me about your own trip?

K: A definite date has not been set yet.

T: Yes, well, thank you so much.

K: OK.

Telcon
Bernard Gwertzman/HAK

Friday, August 3, 1973; 10:00 a.m.

K: Hello.

G: Hi.

K: How are you?

G: OK. Just want to tell you we did put a story in about your speech, in the -- well, it wasn't in the first edition.

K: Oh, I see.

G: It was in the other editions. I thought it was a useful statement. I don't know how we implement it, though. Getting people, you know, united on a foreign policy.

K: Well, I don't think the foreign policy is all that divided.

G: No, but it's just this -- I've never seen a situation where the Congress is so mischievous, almost.

K: Yeah, but I think when they get back we may have a chance to do something.

G: Yes, well, OK, I hope so. It's not in their interest really to __________ this way, and actually it comes out in substantial issues other than of course the Indochina situation ~~XENX~~ it's really not all that bad. On foreign aid they've actually been more cooperative than you would have thought, so far.

K: Yeah. Well, we of course have a responsibility in taking the major initiatives here.

G: Yeah. We're in the process of doing another one of these world-wide round-ups that we did a couple of months ago on the effects of Watergate overseas, and that sort of thing, and I've gotten some of the memorandums in already and I've been surprised actually. I thought the situation would have deteriorated more than it has. Most of the memos seem to be saying the situation as far as foreigners is concerned is really not much different from May when we did this last piece where the reaction seemed to be that it really hadn't had much visible effect. I expect the real impact is at home rather than abroad on this.

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K: Well, you know, my honest opinion is that the effect abroad won't show up for another year, so we can still reverse it.

G: I see. That's probably right. But it does take a long time and actually the good will in some countries, of course, the impact of Watergate has been very positive, although not towards the President necessarily, but the impact of getting all this out in public apparently is very impressive in some countries. And I suppose it doesn't hurt for the United States to look a little humble in some countries' eyes -- that we have problems too. Because we tend to be rather condescending in many cases toward other countries' problems.

K: Yeah. I think that's right. Look, on that suggestion Clifton Daniel made. Scotty Reston talked to me about a similar thing many months ago.

G: I understand.

K: So if I do it, I have to give him the first crack at it.

G: Uh, huh. OK, I'll tell Clifton that.

K: But I'm not quite ready to do it yet.

G: Uh, huh. OK. Dave Beyser who has just joined us...

K: Yeah, I know him.

G: Oh, yeah. He's gonna want to do it at some point, because he's doing a piece on Hal Sonnenfeldt's problems, in getting confirmed. I think what he's looking for is some kind of support statement or something, from you.

K: Oh, with great enthusiasm.

G: Yes, well.

K: Sonnenfeldt is a pain in the neck, but an indispensable one.

G: Yeah, I know.

K: This security thing is an outrage.

G: I know, it's just crazy. Because the guys bringing it up are all crazy.

K: He is one of my indispensable staff members.

G: Well maybe I'll just take the quotes from you. Can I quote you on that?

K: Yes.

G: All right.

K: And ~~unquestioned discretion and loyalty and superb in substance.~~

G: "Unquestioned"... what was it "unquestioned loyalty"

K: and discretion.

G: So these security charges are crazy.

K: The security charges are -- well, don't say crazy -- outrageous.

G: Outrageous. Yeah. Anything going to happen in Indochina?

K: Not until the 15th.

G: Yeah. Have you got a date yet to go to Peking?

K: No.

G: They're gonna have their congress, I guess, soon.

K: I guess so.

G: Right. OK. Thank you.

K: OK. Bye, bye.

DECLASSIFIED
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Telcon

The President/HAK

Friday, August 3, 1973; 10:17 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Hello, Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. How are you?

K: OK. Sorry to disturb you.

P: That's all right.

K: I wanted to check with you about one matter. We have drafted a letter to send to the Speaker and to the Majority Leader about the bombing, not asking for its extension, but...

P: Yes, I know.

K: but making the point of the impact of it ending and saying that we will fulfill all commitments that we can within the law. So it makes a clear record of what our position is. We didn't want to send this obviously without discussing it with you.

P: Well, we discussed it before, you remember.

K: I know we did, but I just wanted to make sure that it's...

P: Did you talk to Bryce or...

K: Yes, it's been all discussed with the Congressional people, and with Bryce.

P: Bryce, and Laird, I suppose, yes.

K: Well, Laird would like to leave well enough alone.

P: Well, sorry, we're still gonna send this. In other words, Laird didn't want to make the record, huh?

K: That's right.

P: Well, we're gonna make the record. Bryce has no objection to making the objection, has he?

K: No, he has no objection. And Timmons and the others think it's a good idea.

DECLASSIFIED
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P: Why do they think it's a good idea?

K: Well, because they can't then claim we sold them out in partnerships.

P: In other words, we put the responsibility on them.

K: I have the distinct impression now a lot of newsmen are calling him about the implications of this.

P: That's right.

K: And they are not at all so sure of themselves now. This was a great game as long as we were the villains.

P: Yeah. I'm all for the letter. I'm just trying to think of whether we should do more.

K: No, the danger, Mr. President, if you ask for an extension and then get voted down, then the signal is even stronger.

P: I know, I know, so we can't do that. Well, I think a letter -- when should it go?

K: Well, it has to go today.

P: All right.

K: While they're still in session.

P: All right. And Bryce is the only one that needs to look over the language. He knows the sensitivities of these people. Let him take a quick gander. He won't get into the substance. Because I'm here, and I won't be able to look it over, see.

K: Right. I will go over it.

P: Just with Bryce. When you start doing it by committees, that's no good.

K: Right.

P: You've already drafted the letter?

K: That's right. We have the text here.

DECLASSIFIED
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P: Good. And the text of it, basically, is...

K: The text of it is that.

P: I mean the substance.

K: The substance of it is that with the support of the American people you have managed to bring peace to Indochina and Laos, and we were in the process of doing this in Cambodia. The Congressional action has the effect of withdrawing this military support while these negotiations were in progress, and you want to point out that the consequences of this are very serious. And it has already weakened the negotiations with the prospect of it and will make them almost impossible...

Just

P: You say, it is my responsibility to point out to the members of the Congress that the consequences are very serious and that...

K: Then it has a paragraph that says you want to point out to Congress that as far as you are concerned it does not mean an abandonment of our moral responsibilities and commitments, that you will do everything within what is permitted by law to strengthen the Cambodian government, and I ask at the same time you want to warn the North Vietnamese not to mistake this and that the American people will stand behind peace, or something like that.

P: Yeah, well, the peace agreement.

K: Yeah. So it's a strong letter.

P: We know that the American people are firmly committed to enforcement of the provisions of the peace agreement. Good. You don't need to show it to anybody. I got the sense of it. Send it off.

K: Right.

P: You see the point is -- uh, I can't understand Laird's point of leaving well enough alone. What the hell does he mean?

K: Well he thinks it was a great triumph for him to get the August 15 thing.

P: (laughs) Oh, you mean the idea that we got it that far. Is that what you mean?

-4-

K: Well, he wants to take credit for having gotten us out of there. And, you know, he's been trying to do that all the time.

P: No, I understand. I get it now. OK, Henry, send it off.

K: Right. You had a note from Heath which was just a holding action, saying when he gets back from Ottawa he's going to deal in detail with it. I had a tremendous reaction last night from that International Platform Association.

P: Oh, good.

K: Which is sort of middle America. These are the lecture bureaus from all over the country.

P: Chautauqua, and all that stuff.

K: And I spoke in the sense that I mentioned to you that foreign policy, we can't have a moratorium in the quest for peace and that we must not let our domestic divisions tear us apart. And it was a tremendous ovation, and I had to fight my way out of there.

P: Good.

K: It just shows that basically you have a lot of strength in the country.

P: Yeah, ha, ha, right, right. Well, this Cambodian thing is really, really shocking then. That was one where I must say we ≠ just got schnookered there, where Laird and Ford, of all people, you know, Laird misled me.

K: Absolutely.

P: He got his telephone call, you know, to Ford, goddarn it, he didn't say that was what it was about.

K: Of course, I know that.

P: And I was ____.

K: But it was the John Dean week, Mr. President, and you wouldn't have won it anyway. But you were...

P: I guess we wouldn't have won it, would we?

K: No. You would have been smashed.

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P: Yeah.

K: So...

P: All right. We'll make the record.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: We'll hope the poor little Cambodians can hang on for a little
longer than we think.

K: Well, if they can hold on for longer than we think, then we can
make it.

P: Yeah, you never know about these ~~tk~~ things, you know, and to heck...

K: One other thing, Mr. President, in this connection. The second
man in Cambodia we have there, who is now Charge because we
finally got rid of the Ambassador -- would like four more military
attaches in a sort of semi advisory capacity. And Defense and
State are crying, and we would like to order this.

P: Order it.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: Of course, order it. Absolutely, there should be no crying and no
bitching around. Immediately.

K: I think if we have to go down, the record must show that we did
everything.

P: Four attaches is nothing anyway. Immediately, and the very
best they've got.

K: Absolutely.

P: And ther's no crapping around.

K: Right.

P: OK, Henry.

K: Thank you.

TELCOM

Senator Mansfield/Kissinger

10:27 a.m. - 8/3/73

K: Hello.

M: Yes, Doctor, how are you?

K: OK, how are you?

M: Good.

K: I just want to call you about this Mansfield Lecture at the University of Montana. They have given me some dates and I wondered whether you wanted to be there, and if so I will have my office check with you the dates -- they are in November sometime -- or whether I should just make do without the reference to your schedule.

M: You make the date and I will make every possible effort to be there with you.

K: They gave me 8 dates and I will have my office check with your office to find if there's any date you can't make it, then I will check one of them and it would be a joy for me if you would be there also. On that other matter I have already made clear what our interest was.

M: Good. Fine, Henry.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
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DECLASSIFIED
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TELCONE

Bill Safire/Kissinger/John Knutson

12:35 p.m. - 8/3/73

K: Hello.

S: Henry, I'm sitting here with John Knutson a reporter for the New York Times. There is an important question I'd like you to answer for him. I'd like to put him on now and ask him to ask it without using me as a middle man.

K: OK.

S: John.

JK: Dr. Kissinger, I have some information on excellent authority that among the 17 wire taps that you requested was one on Mr. Safire's phone.

K: One, I did not request any wire taps at all. That is Point 1. I knew about them and I gave the names of some people in specific categories. What are the ground rules here? This is not for quotation.

JK: No, I should think it's not on the record. We can make it deep background.

K: Secondly, to the best of my knowledge in this group there were no wire taps on Bill Safire and I can say the only slight disclaim I have to make is the newsmen's wire taps were in no way brought to the attention of my office. So I can say certainly Bill Safire's telephone was not tapped as part of that particular operation. Now whether the Ulasewicz and Caulfields; therefore the "plumbers" about whose existence I didn't know, did it, that I cannot judge.

JK: You say you suggested some 17 names, is that right?

K: As I explained to the press, there were three categories among the government officials. Those who were had unfavorable information in their security files; those who were discovered by investigation and those who had access to the documents that were leaked where we supplied the names of the people who had access to the documents.

JK: And Mr. Safire did not fall into the third category?

K: Mr. Safire did not fall into the third category and to my certain knowledge he was not part of the national security wire taps that were initiated in 1969 which are the only wire taps of which I have any knowledge.

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JK: Do you know the names of the 17 individuals?

K: No, I know the names of the government people involved - most of them.

JK: But there are one or two of them that you don't have knowledge of.

K: It is inconceivable to me that Safire was part of it -- if he was I would have no knowledge of it. It is possible that there were people being tapped that I didn't know about, yes.

JK: Would General Haig perhaps know?

K: What General Haig knows, I know. It is not conceivable to me that the NSC office knew about it so if Safire was tapped it was as part of a totally different thing, not connected with that original batch. You have to understand that after the original batch my office had no connection with any internal security operation so it would have had to be in another group if it happened, which I don't know. But I can say that emphatically.

JK: Well, we have a contradiction. I'm not sure how it's going to be resolved.

K: The only thing I can say is if there's a contradiction it must have been done in channels through other orders.

JK: My source claims that Safire was in the group of 17.

K: If he is then somebody put people into that group that I didn't know about.. on the governmental side. That I do not believe. I have never seen anything to indicate that.

S: Let's follow that up a moment. On the 17 there were 13 in the government and four. . . Let's take the 13 in the government.

K: That's right, you were not part of that.

S: You can go down in your mind of those that you know were among those 13.

K: That's right. There was no conceivable way you could have been in that category. The group that was decided by the President, the Attorney General, Haldeman and Hoover - this is what I have, the only group I have any knowledge of.

S: What you're suggesting now is that a few of those 13 - if you can only identify 10 to yourself, then there is a possibility of the ones that you do not know I could have been one.

DECLASSIFIED
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K: It is possible that orders were given since the authority was from Mitchell. I think if the authority came from Mitchell it is possible that somebody could have requested Mitchell to authorize a wiretap that I did not know about. Or it is possible that some of these extra curricular activities were conducted -- that you were a part of those, like Caulfield or the "plumbers". Do you see what I mean?

S: Right. Who would know?

K: You can see whether Haig knows as a result of what he's learned in his new job. I have had occasion to review the records in my office. Those records confine to the 1969 authorization and I know that you're not part of those.

S: How can you know that, Henry?

K: I know you're not part of the group that I had knowledge of. I do not know whether either is part of the 1969 authorization and what is part of other programs -- direct orders were given of which my office was not aware.

S: There's one thing that puzzles me. Is it possible that I'm one of those 13?

K: That I think is impossible.

S: You can't know that because you don't know all 13.

K: The reason I don't think it's possible is because at that time the only discussion concerned newspaper leaks of classified documents to which you didn't have access. In that original group there was no way you could have figured. Now it is possible that some other enterprise was started and that I couldn't judge and it is even possible that they may have added names directly just between Haldman and Mitchell.

S: To the 17?

K: I don't know 17 or ...

S: Or to the 13 plus the 4; everybody's been operating on the 17. You're telling me I was not one of those 17. Maybe I was 18th.

K: I don't have any of the reports here. The FBI has all the reports. If it was done as part of the so-called National Security Council operation.

S: You're telling me it was not done as part of that.

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K: It was not done as part of the National Security operation of which I was familiar. I have to repeat I cannot know what else may have been done. I just cannot believe it. But a lot of things happened that I couldn't believe.

S: Right. Check your memory, is there anything looking back might lead people to believe

K: On the basis of my knowledge I would consider it totally impossible and preposterous. I have never heard the President question you, never heard Haldeman talk this way; the only reason I'm not saying it flatly is because I've seen so many things happen that I would have thought impossible but I hadn't the least suspicion that it could be true.

S: OK. John, do you have any more?

JK: No, I think you've been very thorough. I'm going to have to go back to my original source, but I take you at your word. OK.

S: Many thanks for returning the call.

K: I will check with Haig, but I cannot conceive it.

S: Why don't I call Haig right now.

K: Why don't you call Haig.

S: What do you think is the quickest, best way to do it -- for me to call Haig or for you to check?

K: I'll check Haig and get him to call you within ten minutes.

S: Great.

August 3, 1973 (Friday) 3:02 - 3:06 p.m.
Telcon

HAK - Senator Jacob Javits of New York

J: Henry, How are you?

K: Fine, and you?

J: Have I done any damage to your favorite causes this week?

K: No, Jac, you are not our problem.

J: Maybe I should be. It might help me. I saw Dobrynin last night.

K: We put a reference to the Gario fund in the communique.

J: Thank you. Dobrynin said I should talk to you about the Parliamentary interchange. Presently I am asking the Foreign Relations Committee to put it on its agenda to have a statement from the Foreign Relations Committee to have a Parliamentary Interchange. Once decided the problems of money and protocol can be handled. I do this on Dobrynin's assurance that enough important Ministers are on their delegation to justify it.

K: I talked to him at lunch yesterday. It was going to be as an executive agreement of as something between the two parliaments.

J: I think both ways rather than an executive agreement. If the Foreign Relations Committee agrees, I am sure the Foreign Affairs Committee will follow suit. You can then ask the State Department to arrange it.

K: Good.

J: I have one other thing, Herbert Salzman, in OPEC, that is now finished. You have decided on a new president. He served magnificently and he is now is a director. There is a job in OECD as a representative which I think he could fill admirably. And John Hannif thinks he could fill it admirably.

K: I will look into it.

J: Will you be away for any amount of time?

K: Not really, I may go to San Clemente with the President.

J: Why don't you join us? We are going to Africa in mid August. To Nairobi and then to the World Peace and World War Conference. Come, it will be a great 2 weeks.

K: I would love to, but I can't. Invite me some other time.

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Telcon

Tom Braden/HAK

August 3, 1973; 4:10 p.m.

B: Hello. How are you?
Remember we talked about the possibility of doing a TV thing
for Europe. Any chance of doing it next week? It could be as
long or short as you want -- 5, 10, 15 minutes.

K: Can you call me early next week? I would rather wait a couple
of weeks until we get the hearings behind us.

B: The hearings will be behind us, won't they?

K: I don't know.

B: I thought they were ending some time the middle of next week.

K: I don't know.

B: I don't either. That is a good question. Why don't we try it then.
Let's see how that goes and I will call you.

How are you, Henry?

K: Pretty good. How are you?

B: I'm pretty good, too. Joanie's at the bottom of the Colorado River.

K: Oh, really. When is she coming back?

B: Tomorrow.

K: Let's get together next week.

B: You are not leaving for awhile, are you?

K: Not for two weeks.

B: Let's get together when Joanie comes back.

K: Terrific.

B: Goodbye.

Telcon Friday August 3, 1973

Herbert Schlosser

S: I read about your speech and prayed that at last all this insanity might end.
How are you, Henry?

K: I am fine. Herb, you are a good friend. Are you staying out there all summer?

S: I will be in and out. Your speech on September 11. I may fly out a few days
to California for the week of the 27th.

K: I may be out the week of the 27th. Why don't you call me when you come
out there. Let's have dinner again.

S: Good idea. I saw Freddie. He is a funny guy. I have been doing a lot of traveling. To Wyoming, I am traveling a bit more with the new title.

The dinner honoring you in September, I would like to go and wondered who I
could get in touch with.

K: Mrs. Mosbacher or Nancy. Nancy's phone number is
home number is

SANITIZED

SANITIZED

S: I will follow up with her. How are you?

K: I am fine.

S: Take care. I hope to see you and will stay in touch. I will be in Washington the week of the 20th. Where ever you are I will find out.

K: Thank you for calling.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Schlesinger

(Secure) 10:05 a.m. 8/4/73

HK: Jim, I wonder whether you can think about this--there are two things. It seems to me that your office is trying to get us on record on things on which Defense should take the responsibility to do. We shouldn't have to prepare ourselves for the Ervin hearings. The four attaches to Cambodia that we are sending-- if your guys leak it we are in trouble.

JS: Our people are taking a look at the problem. If that is defensible --that we send combat advisors over there,

HK: Defend it otherwise--we are trying to save Cambodia.

JS: The Pentagon was on that. The only problem with those guys is the legality.

HK: Can't we make them advisors on logistics?

JS: It is legally defensible but whether it is politically defensible is another thing. ______ will be out there in about three months and once they get there, there will be a leak from Phnom Penh.

HK: That we have people there to supervise our equipment and give intelligence?

JS: We can use that as legally defensible, but it doesn't sound plausible. Okay I'll look into it. What is the other thing?

HK: The other one that worries me is that Spey engine--State and Defense wanted to ______ opposition. So now it looks as though all objections are White House motivated. So it looks bad with the Soviets.

JS: I'm not too clear on this--

HK: There is a Roels Royce engine which the British want to sell. I want Defense to do it instead of us only because of the leak problem so that the Russians won't come after us.

JS: The engine is for the Chinese?

HK: Yes, the British will go ahead anyway.

JS: Let me go over this again then.

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Hk: Brent will work out with one of your ISA fellows what to say that is all right.

JS: Right; on the other, I agree entirely. My concern is about the legality of those 4 advisors, but on the second one I thought it was already well in hand.

HK: I did too. Let Brent work out with one of the guys at ISA. Did you talk to Foster?

JS: Yes, he'll work it up this week. The thing went well on the Hill. The House was in agreement; the Senate was a little nasty-- Fulbright--but they stood for it, and they will bitch later on, but they can't say they weren't informed about what we were doing.

HK: Right. The STAR said Defense insisted on it over my opposition. I didn't know I opposed it.

JS: I don't know whether that came from--maybe from the Joint Staff, but State had seen it beforehand and my own feeling is that you have enemies at the State Department and not here. Maybe it came out of there after they got the draft. It is unfortunate that we can't keep anything for three days.

HK: Yes, but above all, I didn't oppose it.

JS: Right, I told Jaffee to say that.

HK: I agreed to it as a necessity which is now we all felt.

JS: Exactly. All right, Henry.

HK: Good. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCON

B. Gwertzman/Kissinger

10:20 a.m. - 8/6/73

K: Hello.

G: Hello, Bernard Gwertzman. I'm calling because I'm in the midst of writing a story at my editor's request on the efforts in the Middle East after the Security Council vote last month. I get the impression from people involved in this that we are trying to convey to the Israelis in a friendly way a feeling that

K: I know whom you have been talking to.

G: OK, but I want your feeling on it.

K: My feeling is -- off the record -- I just don't go around saying by more friendship. What does that mean in the Middle East? If those who believe they have the persuasive power are useful and I do not believe they will get very far.

G: So in other words what these State Department people are saying is not a firm administration position.

there is

K: We will move when/something concrete to say as an administration.

G: I am more interested in the fact that it is because the Israelis should be more initiative because the Saudi Arabians are feeling the heat.

K: I will tell you one thing off the record. The ______ thing we can do is get the Saudi Arabians . . . . . . For the Americans to take the initiative is insanity. . . . . . . . . of the Arab dispute is going to be one that the American government is going to get

G: I get it. As I see it I shall indicate clearly that this is not everyone's view.

K: Just say it is a key effort.

G: In our continuing discussions with the Israelis.

K: Yes.

G: OK, that makes it clear. It didn't sound like one of your ideas, frankly. You're right, the Israelis don't give a damn at all.

K: I am not saying I agree with the Israelis.

G: The US position should be low key.

K: Until we get one of the parties moving in a sensible direction.

TELCONE

John Scali/Kissinger

9:55 a.m. - 8/7/73

K: Hello.

JS: Henry?

K: John, how are you?

JS: Alright. I'm just about to get this started here after about a week-long
series of tests which --

K: How are you?

JS: A lot of little problems, but nothing major. But it is a real experience
to undergo the kind of detailed and intensive probing that they do in a
situation like this and I would recommend it at some point.

K: Really:

JS: Yes. They said instruments are a device into every conceivable
orifice. But that wasn't what I wanted to call you about. I was
wondering (a) whether that letter that I sent to you -- and what the
result was?

K: I'll get the answer in my next -- this week.

JS: Alright, and the reason I follow up on that is that entirely independently,
not knowing that I had sent you this letter, the State Department was
about to send a cable to Embassy Moscow asking them to take up with
the Russians what is considered to be their very objectionable
behavior in the disarmament and terrorism committee. And I said
hold off on that for a moment.

K: Good.

JS: So shall I tell them to continue to hold off on it?

K: Yes. Tell them to hold off until Thursday.

JS: Alright. Fine. Now the other thing I wanted to mention was this.
I saw the Korean Foreign Minister last week before I came here as
part of the consultations with Rogers as so generously promised, and
the thing that this man kept coming back to time and time and time and
time again in our very private discussions was the to be
the necessity for me to bring up this whole situation with our friends
in Peking.

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K: That I have already done.

JS: Well, can we advise them in any way of their - are you going to redo it or --

K: Well, you see, thanks to this Congressional action my visit to Peking has now been delayed.

JS: I know that.

K: And I haven't had any word from them.

JS: Well, the Chinese attitude on this Korean question at the UN will be a critical factor. Well, if the Chinese say for example, no, we want a single Korea to be admitted and not two nations, why then life is going to get very complicated. I think that our State Department position of agreeing that, yes, you can dissolve UNCURK but keep the UNC just makes no sense at all because they are just synonymous with one another. And if we have to mount an all-out campaign to agree that we will give up UNCURK but insist on keeping the UNC --

K: I think you could get the Chinese to go along with the one year postponement of the UNC.

JS: Well, if we can do that then we are in business. Because if they can spread enough charm and goodwill among some of their friends then I think we can get some votes. But it not, Henry, I think we are just going to mobilize a lot of troops and expend a lot of effort and come up with zap, because to most people, and I think, I hear this, the distinction between UNCURK and UNC is one of nothing more than convenience. So, in any event, anytime the Foreign Minister says to me, now you got to be sure to bring this up with the Chinese, I sort of look blankly at them and say, well, I am sure we will take this into consideration. But I don't want to go ahead and tell them that we have discussed it unless it is something that you want mentioned to them, particularly if you have the Secretary of State's efforts to grab the leading role in this whole thing. You know, he's got a bit hot on for moving ahead on this and making sure that we are working step by step with the Koreans which is alright with me, but I want to make sure that I am not disclosing anything or saying anything that --

K: Let me see whether I can get that answer out of the Chinese.

JS: Alright. And then we will just go on from that -- we will just note whenever they mention this we will say, yes, we'll take all of this into consideration or some such thing.

TELCONE

Marvin Kalb/Kissinger

11:18 a.m. - 8/7/73

K: Hello.

MK: Yes, Henry.

K: Marvin, there was one point at the end of our meeting yesterday which, on reflection, I think was unfair to Haldeman. You asked me whether I had put up with a lot of humilities. That isn't really true. There was coolness and an occasional harassment but it wasn't that sort of a situation.

MK: OK. I will change that, but in any case don't be concerned about that.

K: No, but I don't think it is fair to create what was a wrong impression.

MK: I will take care of it; don't worry about it.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:25 a.m., August 7, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, hello, Henry, you're back.

K: That is right.

D: Fine, because I was told that you are going away two days. Then it appears only for a brief period in the morning and then disappears again.

K: No, it was my son's birthday. I brought him the presents you gave me.

D: Oh, when it was - yesterday?

K: In Boston.

D: Oh, I see, I didn't know. He is 11 now or what?

K: He's 12.

D: Oh, 12. So I'm one year behind. I'm looking forward to playing chess with him. (Laughs)

K: (Laughs) They were really lovely gifts.

D: I think it is a good one. So they are staying now in Boston, yes? Not with you during the summer period.

K: No, he's in Boston, but he'll come down towards the end of next week.

D: Oh, I see. Because I think he would rather like to be with you this summer, that is my impression.

K: That is true.

D: Henry, I called you yesterday about this - I received answer from Brezhnev. You remember this information you mentioned about the Chinese and French fear about agreement on nuclear war.

K: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED

["Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger", "2", "*", "D: Well, I received the following telegram from Gromyko -- and Brezhnev too. So the summary is like this one: Brezhnev appreciates the fact of continued exchanges of this kind of information through confidential channel.", "K: Right.", "D: While Brezhnev instructed me to tell you and for the President Nixon -- through you for President Nixon -- about the following: That, first, we had no discussions on this matter with Peking. Neither we nor the Chinese side have shown an initiative in any forum in that respect. As President Nixon was already informed -- you remember during Brezhnev's visit in the United States?", "K: Right.", "D: In the middle of June we suggested to the Chinese side an [immigration] treaty and gave them an appropriate draft. And yet Peking has not yet reacted so far in any way. Has not raised it. We, on our part, also have not raised this question again.", "K: Right.", "D: In Moscow, unfortunately, Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues have received [the impression] the fact that President Nixon did not show positive attitude to the fears of the Chinese representatives as to the conclusion of an agreement. . . . . . . . . . .

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MW D. Lee
Date: 04/24/94

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

3

D: Well, I think if it was discussed -- I mean, it's just specifically about France and China.

K: Right.

D: But it is not evasive answer. But simply I didn't ask -- I'm practically sure if we didn't discuss this most probable -- I mean, there was no discussion at all with others.

K: Right.

D: So they're saying that the Soviet side has given no cause for confidential information. Such rumors have obvious aims -- this is said the answer from Moscow -- and clearly represent efforts to lessen the importance of the agreement on nuclear weapons and nuclear war concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States. That is precisely how Mr. Brezhnev evaluates this.

K: Right.

D: And so Mr. Brezhnev would like to reaffirm that in the field of mutual exchange of confidential information he strictly adheres to the understanding reached between him and President Nixon during the visit.

K: Right. Which means what -- strict confidentiality?

D: Yeah.

K: Right.

D: And from time to time exchange on the information will make some doubts in the minds of each other side.

K: Exactly. Well, that is our view. And we will continue that.

D: So this is the answer. I hope it satisfies you.

K: No, I --

D: And the President.

K: No, I can't speak for the President but I'm sure it will satisfy him.

D: Yeah. Well, so this is --

K: No, no, I think it's a very constructive attitude.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
By NARA Date 6/9/09

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

11:25 a. m., August 7, 1973

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

K: That is right.

K: In Boston.

D: Oh, I see, I didn't know. He is ill now or what?

K: He's 12/

K: That is true.

K: Yeah.

["DECLASSIFIED", "Authority E.0.12958", "By: NARA Date 6/9/69", "Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger", "2", "D: Well, I received the following telegram from Gromyko -- and Breshnev too. So the summary is like this one: Breshnev appreciates the fact of continued exchanges of this kind of information through confidential channel.", "K: Right.", "D: While Breshnev instructed me to tell you and for the President Nixon -- through you for President Nixon -- about the following: That, first, we had no discussions on this matter with Peking. Neither we nor the Chinese side have shown an initiative in any forum in that respect. As President Nixon was already informed -- you remember during Breshnev's visit in the United States?", "K: Right.", "D: In the middle of June we suggested to the Chinese side an [immigration] treaty and gave them an appropriate draft. And yet Peking has not yet reacted so far in any way. Has not raised it. We, on our part, also have not raised this question again.", "K: Right.", "D: In Moscow, unfortunately, Mr. Breshnev and his colleagues have received [the impression] the fact that President Nixon did not show positive attitude to the fears of the Chinese representatives as to the conclusion of an agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By NARA Date 6/9/09

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

3

K: Right.

K: Right.

K: Right.

K: Right. Which means what - strict confidentiality?

D: Yeah.

K: Right.

K: No, I --

D: And the President.

D: Yeah. Well, so this is --

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By AB NARA Date 6/9/69

TELCONE
HAK/Ambassador Dinitz

August 7, 1973/4:44 p.m.

D: Good afternoon. I am sorry to disturb you but I wanted to bring to your attention two small points. First of all I had a very nice and pleasant talk yesterday with ________.

K: Oh good.

D: We sat for one hour and we discussed many things and he told me that you had a very pleasant visit together. But not over. I don't know if you had a chance to see the front page of the "New York Times" today.

K: Oh yes. and I know who did it and I've given the strictest orders to these people to shut up.

D: And the same thing appeared in the "Baltimore Sun".

K: Oh no, no, no, no, obviously he gets a background.

D: I know. He told me and he's beginning ________ campaign.

K: Well, he's not going to begin it. He's not going to continue it because I'm going to stop it.

D: Yes. So I just wanted to tell you he called me today and he said he wants to have lunch with me so we had lunch. The purpose of the lunch was to be apologetic about what he has done. I just wanted to inform you of what I told him. I said, Joe, I don't understand what you are doing. You are undermining the very tree that you are sitting on. If you wanted to say aggravate the Israelis, increase the blackmail of the Saudis and tell to the oil companies that blackmail operates then you have achieved all these three things. I got a letter from Israel saying my cable that I sent about my conversation with you will not even be answered because if you negotiate with us to the press we will answer you to the press. So he said yes but what was wrong with the story in the New York Times even the White House was as you can see did not deny it. I said to the White House, even the story in the Times didn't have any demands from Israel at this stage and moreover I said to him I am not discussing the White House now I am discussing the ________ of a consorted campaign against Israel which will either force us to go public on it and I just wanted to know if this is your intention. He was very apologetic and then he said if I did anything to harm it wasn't my intention but let me add that what I said to you still stands. You know. So I felt I should report it to you for.

K: OK, Well, I already told him yesterday to shut up

last night

D: The second Dr. Kissinger. I saw Eban/in New York and I told him exactly what you told me to tell him that you'd -- you'll see him. Now I heard rumors, I don't know if they are correct, that you might be leaving on the 15th of August overseas.

K: Certainly not overseas.

D: Not overseas. Somebody told me.

K: If at all I'll go to San Clemente.

D: So what I wanted to remind you simply. Whenever you know one way or another that I can tell him so he can - he's going to Brazil tonight you see. If he is coming he will come to Washington only for this purpose because he doesn't always go to see the Secretary and he would prefer that the meeting would be unpublicized. You know, just the two of you or the three of us rather can meet. So shall I tell him that I'll tell him during the week you know.

K: By early next week.

D: By early next week. OK. I thank you very much. I'm sorry I disturbed you but I thought I

K: It's OK no problem.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By A2 NARA Date 6/9/69

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By Ab NARA Date 6/9/69

TELCON

Kissinger/Safire

August 7, 1973/6:15 p.m.

S: Hello Henry

K: Bill, how are you?

S: Alright. You are interested - through Garmet - that you wanted to see me before or talk to me before I did my next column on this tapping business.

K: Well I thought that he and I if you wanted to could meet with you. It's entirely up to you. He promised me he would try to find out some of the facts. I've told you I've searched my files and there is absolutely nothing in mine about it. I do not want to go to the FBI myself because this will leak.

S: Well, my column is on Thursday. Which means I have to file it around 1:00 tomorrow.

K: Well, I didn't say I wanted to see you before your next column. I just said. To me this a human problem. I don't care what you write in your column.

S: Well, I'm not worried about my feelings so much as I am about getting this thing out and in the open. I've got a couple more names of people who are tapped. I don't have all 17 but we are getting close. We'll get down to about 3 or 4 who haven't been named yet. I have a hunch - strong hunch - and good lead that they are White House non-NSC types. I told Haig today that I thought it was a terrible mistake to try to keep up this - to keep them dripping out like Chinese water torture. The smart thing is to simply say these were the people and this and that and its all over. He disagrees. So we'll have to flush it out. I want to get those tapes and transcripts and stuff back. XXXXXXXXXXXX I view it as unconstitutional (?) blackmail. I was not tapped for a national security purpose.

K: Now lets get something. Bill, lets get the possibility straight. It could be that. I am surmising now and we are talking here not for use in the column. Is that correct.

S: Then let's not talk. I'll be glad to go on background or not for quotation not for attribution but I can't be compromised. I've got to be able to use things.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By NARA Dje 6/9/69

Kissinger/Safire

K: Well, Bill, you know I tell you this country is going to be destroyed by people who are thinking of their own purity. That's a fact. That's your privilege.

S: I'm also concerned that the FBI which is a notorious leaking agency has some conversations and taps and stuff of the President with his aids. I think that is reprehensible. Cause if it was a tap on me it includes conversations I had with the President in 1969.

K: Well, I am trying to determine what year they are talking about to begin with. When this hopped and Len told me he'd find that out. But he has had one or two other preoccupations as you can tell from the newspapers.

S: I recognize that.

K: It hit him very suddenly and.

S: Henry, if you think that all I am thinking about is my purity your avengence or something like that I am very sorry.

K: You see what is conceivable to me is that in some other tap you showed up as tapping been indescrete and that then somebody on what they defined as national security ordered the tap. But it is not conceivable to me that a middle level bureaucrat did that.

S: Then, it would have to be Bob Haldemann.

K: I am not the only judge here of what constitutes national security. After all all the taps that were done since 1970 that have been declared as national security were not done, none of them were done through my office or indeed with my knowledge.

S: Well we know that Mr. Ulitz but the likelihood of him initiating it is small. Bob Haldeman tells me that he had nothing to do with this until he from you you and you found it distasteful
He looks kind of hard at you and Haig.
we'll

K: Well, just have to find, first of all the time when it happened. If we can find that then at least we can know who did it. But as far as I am concerned Bill, by no conceivable stretch of the imagination could my office have had an interest in it. Since the easy way to take care of any leaking of yours was to keep classified information out of your hands which it was easy for us to do. In 1969 our offices had nothing to do with each other. Isn't that correct. The first time that I remember where you

["Kissinger/Safire", "and I worked closely together was on the annual report and except for\nthe speeches on the first presidential trip.", "S: That was the first Vietnam speech.", "K: That's right. ALIEN X X X X X", "S: Alright, well.", "K: That wasn't based on a great deal of classified information. I mean\nat the first time that you and I remember, now maybe there were other\nMARS X X X incidents but the first time that I really worked with you\nwas on that annual report which you put in doing this when we were in\nKey Biscayne together.", "S: That's right. We had a good walk one late around that golf course.", "K: I know. We had several good talks. I remember very well several\npredictions; you made. Now my problem is let me find out when it\nhappened. That's issue number one. Because that can settle it\nimmediately. I have a theory of what must have happened but I don't\nwant to.", "S: What would this. If it was 1970 or 1969 what would the difference be?", "K: Well, if it was 1970 then you would know that my office could not have\nhad anything to do with it.", "S: Right.", "K: If it was 69 it could have had but need not have had. Do you see what I\nmean.", "S: Right. I've gotten a list of the NSC people who were tapped. Some who\nhave been named and some who have not. What I'm trying to do is to\nmake up the full list and there are 3 or 4 holes in the list and the\nthing to close out the list should not be an enormous one. I guess that\nsomebody that was tapped, everybody becomes terrified about it. You\nknow. At any rate. That's how I fell about it. Any additional information\nI could/but would not necessary attribute I would be very grateful for.", "K: Well, I have made an effort. I do not find you in any file that I have.\nNow that doesn't totally exclude, There could not be X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 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DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
By A NARA Date 6/9/69

S: Well that. The three basic points are who ordered it, when did it cover, and the third point of home or at the office.

K: I am sure it was not the office because I don't recall anyone who was done in the office but I may be wrong on that too.

S: You mean the majority of taps were home taps not office taps.

K: But again I can't be sure.

S: But that's your general feeling.

K: That's my impression.

S: Well, I'm trying to find out one who ordered it and when. This stuff is lying there and its not going to help the country to have it lie there, particularly the president with his aids.

K: That is between you and Haig or whoever.

S: The reason for this call is to say that anything that can be provided would be greatly appreciated.

K: By tomorrow noon I doubt that I can.

TELCORN

Len Garment/Mr. Kissinger

6:31 p. m., August 7, 1973

K: Len.

G: How goes the Republic, Henry?

K: The Republic goes fine. I just had a call from Bill Safire, which were he not a valued former colleague I would consider blackmail. He says he's doing a column on his thing for Thursday's paper on which if I want to clear myself, I have to give him some information by 1 o'clock tomorrow, which I said I wouldn't do. Now have you been able to find out what period it was when it occurred in his case, if it indeed occurred.

G: No, not yet. And we're going to run into a problem because we'll have to get that from the FBI. Where are you, in your office?

K: Yeah.

G: I asked for some information on this and it hasn't come along with a lot of other things that are delayed. Let me check and call you back.

K: Now wait a minute. He also claims he's got the names of some of the other people and he won't rest now until they're all out.

G: Oh, boy.

K: Now I don't know whether it's possible to appeal to his -- whether the word patriotism still means anything.

G: Yeah, but that might be a little risky with him at this point. I don't quite know what he's up to except that I think he sees himself being portrayed in a very favorable light among his colleagues for some reason or other. I think that he's -- Well, let me see if I can get the information on when. But even then you say he won't rest until he knows the names of the others.

K: Yeah. Well, it's up to you how you want to handle it.

G: The specific information he wants from us is who knew about this, who authorized it and when did this take place. If it was late in the game, then presumably you were out of it because you would have handed off the whole operation.

K: Yeah, but if it was early, that still doesn't mean that I was in it.

G: But then it's a question of -- then he just has to believe you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By: NARA Date 5/9/09

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By: NARA Date 5/9/69

Len Garment/Mr. Kissinger

2

K: Well, but I'm not so much concerned about myself now because goddammit I mean, there's no sensible motive I would have had but I'm not interested in myself. I'm interested in having on top of everything else that door reopened.

G: Well, I have the feeling from the chat I had with Bill that it's dangerous to fuss that much with him. He was laying down some specific demand. When did he call you? A short while ago.

K: Yeah, about 15 minutes, yeah. Well, it's entirely -- I'm not going to call him again. If I could know for my own personal information when it happened.

G: Haldeman said that he -- Did he tell you that he spoke to Haldeman?

K: Yeah. Haldeman, who said he had nothing to do with it which is an outrageous lie. Because Haldeman knew about every last one of them. He also wasn't listed in the May 22nd statement as one of the people who put people on.

G: Well, ......

K: He was the absolutely essential figure.

G: Yeah. This is complicated because I think what Bill is doing is laying the foundation to the extensive use of very private material and very private quotes in his book.

K: On the phone?

G: No, not on the phone. In the meetings that he attended with the President and others. In other words, if he is victimized by this whole thing, dealt with badly --

K: Oh, I see.

G: He's going to say: Well, no more rules of the game. I cannot write an honest book in spite of all of this without just laying it all out, just as I have in my notes. Be a hell of a book. So my guess is that nothing that is said will satisfy him.

No,

K: Well, I don't think ... I don't propose to talk to him again.

G: Let me see what information is available. . . without being too comprising and embarrassing. I'll find out about --

TELCOM
Len Garment/Mr. Kissinger

6:45 p.m., August 7, 1973

K: Hello.

G: One piece of information. It was during July and August of 1969. And apparently not the complete months. I'm trying to get a little bit more detail on that. Now I may be able to get new information as to whether or not I can say separate from you that you -- state flat categorically that you did not receive any information from them.

K: I have found nothing in my files, Len, either -- I'll let you see my files.

G: I'm not interested in seeing your --

K: But in my files I have nothing that refers to him in any form. Either in the form of conversations I have had or in the form of reports we've received. I've also had all my telephone conversations checked and all my own memos checked. And so it is inconceivable to me but I just --

G: Who knows, who knows.

K: But you know it could have run through my office on the way to the front office without my ever seeing it.

G: Yeah. Well, Henry, I'll have that other piece of information in a few minutes. Now as to the circumstances of the tap itself, who ordered it or approved it, now we can only find that out by going to the Bureau and that could be a mess at this point.

K: I wouldn't do that.

G: So I don't think -- we better not do that.

K: .... give the times to him? The dates.

G: Yeah. I don't see any problem with that if that's going to make him happy.

K: No, it won't.

G: There's no point in doing that, Henry, unless there was something about it established -- I mean, if you were off visiting the moon during that period or something.

K: Well, we were taking a trip around the world during that period.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By Ab NARA Date 6/9/69

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By NARA Date 5/9/09

TELCOM

Garmet/HAK

August 7, 1973/7:10 p.m.

G: Henry, the reports to you would not indicate that you knew that he was tapped. In other words you have. He was on the line to people who were clearly under surveillance but there would be no indication that there was a tap on him.

K: Wait a minute now.

G: Do you follow me.

K: He was what.

G: There are indications of conversations with him and of course as part of summaries of reports on - one for example Brennan(?) and some others. But there was no indication that he was tapped. None at all.

K: Is that true?

G: Yes.

K: Can you assure him of that?

G: I can assure him of that but suppose I do that. Is he going to write about that?

K: Well, you have to ask him. You can tell him that you.

G: I didn't do it personally, I had somebody do it because I don't want to be going through the material but I can tell him that.

K: You see. I just don't recall. I don't doubt that he could have shown up in somebody's tap.

G: He shows up in other persons taps.

K: Like Ellsburg.

G: Right

K: That is possible. But that does not mean he was tapped.

G: That's correct.

K: And that sounds right to me.

Garmet/HAK

G: Right. It was during July and August of 1969.

K: And I have a vague recollection that could have happened.

G: What do you mean like Ellsburg. How would he turn up there?

K: No, no. Ellsburg. (both talking at once)

G: Thats how this happens. In the summaries that went to you.

K: Yes but see I wouldn't have seen the summaries that were addressed to me unless they concerned NSC personnel. They were automatically shipped on to Haldemann.

G: Right.

K: You see what I mean.

G: I see. Well, in whatever came to you. That has been reviewed. Whatever came to you there is nothing to indicate there was a tap on Safire.

K: Do me a favor and call XXX him.

G: OK

K: Will you call me back.

G: Do you want me to do it now. Alright I have to reach somebody and hold him off. Where is he now? At home?

K: I would guess so. Because I told him you were reviewing it.

EX