small, allied and neutral, to chart their own future
would be diminished by the growing fear of Soviet
power. Massive shifts against us would occur, not because
a majority freely chose such a course, but because the
upsetting of the overall balance left them no alternative.

The hopeful progress toward European unity would be
undermined. The French and Italian Communist Parties
both opposed the creation of the European Common Market as
a conspiracy of monopoly capitalism. Until quite recently
they have consistently opposed European progress toward
integration. Lately they have come to accept the
European Community as a fact of life; they now say they
seek to make it more "democratic" and to transform it,
by "a process of innovation...in the spheres both of
institutions and of general orientations", as Berlinguer
expressed it. They can be counted on to reorient the

Common Market towards closer relations with the state
economies of Eastern Europe and toward more flamboyent
of the Third World's demands for a "new international
economic order." It can be assumed that they will not
encourage European political unity on a basis compatible
with continuing cooperation with the United States. And
over time either the governments with Communist partici-
pation will pull these others towards them, at best to
some extent or deep fissures will open up in the European
Community between the traditional Atlanticists and the
"New Left". Either outcome will be destructive of
European unity and Atlantic solidarity.

Thus whatever hypothesis we consider, the accession
of Communists to power in Western Europe will have a
profound impact on the international structure as it has
developed in the post-war period. We may have to adjust
to it, but we cannot be indifferent or delude ourselves

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that the advent of Communists to a significant share
of power in Western Europe would ~~not~~ be less than
in our relationships.

## The American Response

The attitude of the United States towards
such developments must of necessity be complex. The
decisive role must be played by European governments',
The final decision must be that of the European voters.
We cannot substitute for either. But we can contribute
to a framework of resolution.

What we can do, first of all, is frankly recognize
the problem that we will face if the Communists come to
power in Western Europe, and understand the practical
decisions this will impose on us as a nation.

It is often pointed out that every country is different,
that there is no single and simple phenomenon of
"Eurocommunism". This is true enough. In some

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countries the role of the Communist Parties is growing;
in others they remain very weak. In some countries
they have considerable experience in taking advantage
of the democratic political process; in other countries,
their only experience until recently is an underground
conspiratorial existence.

Yet for all the differences among the Communist
parties, their perception of the historical process is
the same. And their understanding of the role they must
play is identical. They share the same Leninist conviction
that it is their historical mission to take power in the
name of the working class. Their tactics conform to
their situation. They may not all succeed at the same time
and in the same way, but they leave no doubt about their
phased view of the future and their common goals. We must
never permit any doubt to arise as to our view of this
process and its dangers.

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Second, we must avoid the impression that we
consider Communist success a foregone conclusion,

*the ratio of Communists to the population is 1/3 to 1/5 or more, and in some cases up to 1/2 or more, or ambiguous declarations.*

*Communist parties are riddled with weaknesses and internal strains, and are cursed with the fact that they address the darker side of the human spirit, that they do not speak for the humane values which have inspired the peoples of the Western world, and that they are unlikely to appeal to a majority in a Western nation except in a moment of the most unsettling crisis. In no Western European country has the Communist Party ever fairly won more than about a third of the vote. Their most powerful weapons are fear, distrust and discouragement; their principal asset is the myth of their inevitability. Therefore it is essential that the democracies solve their problems together -- and that the United States*

-35-

make its contribution to the effort in the framework
of an unambiguous policy toward Europe and its future.

America's
Our first duty in this country is to avoid confusing
the issue. We must not mislead our friends. It is for the
voters of Europe to make the choice. But we do them
no favor if we encourage the notion that the advent of
Communists into power will not represent a watershed in
To our own attitudes and policies.
European-American relations.

If it is proper to speak out about human rights,
if this is the time when the United States should make
clear its "historic birthright" to promote political
freedom throughout the world, as the President has said,
then we surely have a duty to state our convictions on the
an issue that is central to the future of the Western
alliance.
The issue of Eurocommunism and its compatibility
with the democratic process. There is no greater
challenge to the cause of those who cherish the rights of

-36-

man. Human rights is not an abstract, concerned
only with the particular juridical procedures of Chile,
Cuba and Albania, and unrelated to the basic questions
of political structure and process in the fulcrum
nations of Europe. We cannot fail to reckon the setback
to European freedom that will result if Communist minorities
gain decisive influence in European politics; we must not
ignore the effect on freedom throughout the world
if the global balance tips against the West.

Some have argued that such comments from this side
of the Atlantic are counterproductive. I am not so sure.
Much of the electorate in allied countries values the
friendship and alliance with the United States. We should
not ignore them, or demoralize them, or undercut them.
The small gradual gains scored by the Communist parties
over the years occurred -- by definition -- at the margin,
among voters who had not voted Communist before; who did

-37-

not vote by anti-American reflex; who for one reason
or another were persuaded that the Communists were now
desirable or acceptable where they were not before;
used their means to prevent or
or who made a protest vote. Many did not really want
to see the Communists in power, but believed no harm was
done by showing their frustration.

There is no evidence that voters are influenced
to vote Communist by American statements. On the contrary,
many in these countries must have been influenced by voices here
in this country which implied that the traditional American
to the Communists
opposition had changed.

Now, when the challenge has moved so much closer,
the citizens of allied countries must not be given the
impression that we regard Communist ascendancy as inevitable
or acceptable; it is neither. We cannot adopt a posture
of resignation, We must not tender an "anticipatory

surrender." We must not take steps that legitimize them, either by word or action. Paradoxically, we weaken whatever moderate elements may exist in Communist movements by settling too eagerly for verbal reassurances.

Thirdly, the United States can strengthen the moderate, progressive and democratic governments of Western Europe by two steps, one negative, the other positive. We must avoid demands which, whatever their intrinsic merit, magnify domestic fissures in European countries or the sense of impotence of European governments.

The fear of inflation runs deep in Germany; any political leader must consider this beyond considerations of economic theory. The future of their energy supplies -- nuclear and otherwise -- is associated by many Europeans with their ability to master their destiny. It must be viewed in a context broader than the requirements of non-proliferation.

At the same time, the United States can contribute to a

- 40 -

For finally, Communist parties in Western Europe find their opportunities less in their inherent strength than in the demoralization, division or disorganization of their opponents; they find their issues when the democratic system seems ineffective for solving the social problems of the day; when the center does not hold, and when societies become polarized over major domestic concerns.

The basic causes of Communist gains thus go deep. Disillusionment with democratic government and democratic leaders is a pervasive phenomenon in many European countries. In an era without war or depression, in a world of bureaucratic states and mass production, there is no galvanizing crisis and little opportunity for heroic performance. A relativist age debunks authority and puts nothing in its place as an organizing principle of society. Massive

- 41 -

impersonal bureaucracy disillusions the citizen with the
responsiveness of his government, and simultaneously makes
more difficult the task of management of elected political
leaders. The young people in too many democratic countries
are offered too few challenges; their elders too often have
lost confidence in their own values and therefore despair
of offering either discipline or example. Democratic
leaders are consumed in the chores of winning and holding
office; they are rarely able, by their background, to
demonstrate the force of conviction and utter determination
that a leader of a "revolutionary" party can convey.

The very success of Western societies in maintaining
prosperity at a level undreamt of even forty years ago
contributes to boredom and moral malaise. Intellectuals
condemn society for materialism when it is prosperous and

-42-

for injustice when it fails to insure prosperity. The
widespread economic difficulties of the last four years --
recession and inflation unparalleled in a generation, to a
large extent induced by the extraordinary increase in oil
prices -- have compounded the social problems of almost
every Western country. Runaway inflation and unemployment
fuel the frustration of all whose hopes for economic advance-
ment are cruelly rebuffed.

Moderate governments and moderate solutions face
mounting pressures and growing obstacles, which by their
nature are beyond the capacity of individual governments
to control. The interdependence of our economies means
that inflation and recession surge across national boundaries
to engulf the entire industrialized world, and beyond,
compounding the sense of individual impotence. Only in

- 43 -

cooperation can the democratic countries tackle their
economic problems and put their economies back on the path
of steady non-inflationary expansion. This was the purpose
of the economic summits among Western leaders begun by
President Ford at Rambouillet and Puerto Rico, and continued
successfully in London by President Carter.

The democratic forces of the West have it in their
ground for communist power to determine whether the Communist Parties have opportunities to succeed. Anti-Communism is not enough; there must be a response to legitimate social and economic aspirations, and their must be reform of the inadequacies from which these anti-democratic forces derive much of their appeal.

With able leadership -- and Western cohesion -- the democracies can meet their challenges. Effective performance by governments can restore the confidence of their peoples.

- 44 -

The unity and cooperative action of the democracies is crucial to all that America does in the world. President Carter has made important efforts to reaffirm the overriding priority of those alliances to our foreign policy. He has renewed with vigor the essential practice of intimate consultation and cooperation. Western unity defends not only our security but our way of life and the most basic moral values of our civilization. On this we cannot be neutral. To foster these principles is mostly of commitment that inspired the imaginative periods of American diplomacy.

The stagnant societies of the East serve both as a warning and a hope. They remind us (that the West's intellectual vitality, even more than its material prosperity, is the envy of the world. The winds of change are truly blowing from the West. The men and women of Eastern Europe

- 45 -

are aware that the West, for all its doubt and sense of
spiritual dilemma, is the vanguard of modernization, the
vital source of learning and the arts, and the home of
the free human spirit. The developing countries yearning
for progress turn to the West, not the East, for assistance
and support. Our technology, our creativity, our un-
equaled economic vigor are the forces that will shape the
future of the planet.

This is not the time for resignation or acquiescence.
It is a time for confidence, determination and hope. The
power of free men and women and free nations acting in
concert, confident of their strength and of their destiny,
remains unmatchable by totalitarian regimes or totalitarian
movements. The spirit of freedom will never be crushed.
But freedom can be lost gradually. Such a danger exists

- 46 -

today in Western Europe, and that threat could have con-
sequences not only in Europe but throughout the community
of industrial democracies and the world.

We must make clear what we believe, and where we
stand. We can develop programs to reverse this trend.
Western Europe, our closest partners and the cradle of much
of our civilization, is too precious for us to do otherwise.

Thank you.