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established: that it be negotiated directly by the two German states, which
is another way of saying that the East German satellite would be consolidated.

Thus the primary purpose of a new approach should be to change the
terms of reference of the negotiations. Three factors must be reconciled in
any plan for Germany's future: (1) the German desire for self-determination,
(2) the East European concern for security and (3) the Soviet concern lest a
unified Germany impair its own security and shake its international position.
These objectives are, of course, incompatible to some extent. A great
deal depends on whether it proves possible to convince those most concerned
that to strive for absolutes will lead first to stagnation and ultimately to
crisis.

For present purposes it is not necessary to offer a detailed
program; rather, the primary need is to agree on a new concept. One
possible course would be to separate the issue of self-determination from that
of unification for an interim period, say fifteen years. Pressure for
immediate unification consolidates all opponents of Germany in Eastern
Europe and sub rosa in Western Europe as well. Self-determination, on the
other hand, is a moral imperative commanding wide consensus. If rejected by
the Communists, it would place them at least morally on the defensive.

Such a proposal could take the following form: The Western countries,
including the Federal Republic, could declare that, while the unification of
Germany remains the ultimate goal, their immediate aim is to enable the
population of East Germany to choose the form of government it prefers. The
Western Allies could, therefore, declare their willingness to acquiesce in
the existence of an East German state provided its government emerges from

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a process of free elections. For a period of fifteen years the territory now called the German Democratic Republic would have a status similar to that of present-day Austria. A loose confederation could be established between the two German states, but East Germany would be independent, neutral and demilitarized. For a period of ten years, the existing economic obligations of the present German Democratic Republic to the East European countries, including the Soviet Union, could be maintained. After that period, these links would depend on normal negotiations with the government then in office in East Germany.

A commission composed of the European neutrals, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria and perhaps Finland, would monitor the free elections and the demilitarization provisions of the treaty. After a period of fifteen years, there would be a plebiscite supervised by the same commission to determine whether East Germany wanted to continue as a separate state in loose confederation with the Federal Republic or whether it preferred unification. In either case, East Germany would remain demilitarized. Both German states would recognize the existing frontiers of Germany, including the Oder-Neisse line. After the neutral commission certified that the government of East Germany was freely elected, Berlin could become the capital of that state as well as the seat of the organs of the German confederation. No further reason to maintain Berlin as a separate political entity would exist.

Soviet troops would be withdrawn from East Germany. Within the Federal Republic foreign troops would retire an average distance of 100 kilometers from the Western borders of the new East German state, and the number

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of West German troops in that belt would be limited. The Federal Republic would renounce access to the ownership of strategic nuclear weapons.

Even if there were agreement in principle, many details would remain to be worked out: for example, the precise definition of demilitarization or what international undertakings would be consistent with the neutral status of the new state. But once the direction of an "Austrian" solution for East Germany is taken, the advantages would be plain: while Germany would have to defer full unification for fifteen years, the German states that emerged would no longer be antagonistic. There would be opportunity for conditions within Germany to be equalized gradually. A foreign regime detested by the population would be removed. The East European states would gain the security of a divided Germany for fifteen years and a demilitarized belt along their borders for the indefinite future. The East European economies could adjust to the loss of the East German partner over a ten-year period. The Berlin problem would be solved. Germany's frontiers would be settled both juridically and psychologically because the generation that was expelled from Eastern Europe would have largely disappeared by the time Germany was unified. Arms control schemes for Europe could be considered in a new atmosphere.

The price, of course, would be high. The Federal Republic would have to defer its hopes for immediate unification in return for agreement on a terminal date to the division of Germany. The Soviet Union would have to be prepared to give up the hope of a Communist Germany. The East European governments would have to change their policy of acquiescing in what seems most expedient to their senior partner. The Western Allies would have to overcome inertia and place the problem of Germany high on their agenda.

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But the rewards would be great. Such a program would end a situation that is bound to become more dangerous the longer it lasts. It would allow a more objective analysis of arms control in Europe. The construction of Europe could be placed on a sounder basis. Even were such a program rejected initially by the Soviets, it would change the framework of negotiations. Rather than begin with enhancing the status of the East German regime, as is the case with current schemes, the new program would focus attention on its oppressiveness as the principal obstacle to unification. By taking a stand on the issue of self-determination, the West would have a platform most likely to command international support. By separating self-determination from unification, an interim period for adjustments and a framework for meeting legitimate security concerns of Germany's neighbors are provided.

Nevertheless, it is improbable that any negotiating formula will advance German unity. Even the most reasonable program is likely to be rejected by the East. The long-term hope for German unity therefore resides in the unity of Europe. As nations lose their former significance, the fear of any one state will diminish. A united Western Europe moreover will be a powerful magnet for the countries of Eastern Europe. If an all-embracing European structure ever comes to pass, the existing dividing lines may seem less crucial.

This is why the existing rift in the West is so unfortunate. The practical result of the Franco-American rivalry is that each ally is tempted to add the Federal Republic to its side by holding out vague hopes and grandiose schemes for the achievement of Germany's maximum objectives.

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German leaders will be torn by the conflicting demands of their allies and their own national aspirations. The West, which has so often been rent by internal struggles, stands in danger of repeating its historic folly. Paris may have thought that by committing the Federal Republic to a treaty of special friendship, it was braking temptations of nationalism and providing for the construction of Europe. Washington's attitude toward the Treaty of Collaboration was motivated by a desire to combat Third Force tendencies. These competing efforts stand in danger of producing what they seek to prevent; the attempt to use Germany as a balance wheel will complete the fragmentation of the Atlantic Alliance.

The best hope to prevent a latent nihilism in Germany from again menacing the West is to give the Federal Republic a stake in something larger than itself. The future of the Federal Republic depends on two related policies by the West: (1) recognition of the psychological and political dilemmas of a divided country and (2) the ability to make the Federal Republic part of a larger community. These policies are interdependent; to pursue one without the other is to defeat both. It is to the construction of this larger community that we must now turn.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

What Kind of Atlantic Partnership?

Two solutions are usually offered for enhancing Allied cohesion: (1) an improvement in the process of consultation and (2) the development of a united Europe with federal, supranational institutions as the precondition for an Atlantic partnership.

The Problem of Consultation

The inherently difficult problem of coalition diplomacy is magnified
under present conditions by three factors:

1. The firm commitment of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to the existing balance of power provides their allies with increasing scope for purely national actions.

2. The internal workings of modern government are so complex that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterward in international forums. The American tendency to confine consultation to an elaboration of its own blueprints often reflects a desire to avoid complicating still further our own increasingly complex decision-making process.

3. As governments have found in their own domestic experience, access to the same technical data does not guarantee unanimity. In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, differences are almost

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certain to arise. And they are likely to be intensified because the histories of the states vary widely and because of a technology of unprecedented destructiveness and novelty.

The American historical experience causes our policymakers to be reluctant to admit that the process of consultation may have objective limits. United States society, with its large area of consensus, encourages the belief that all problems are soluble through goodwill and a willingness to compromise. A rationalistic streak produces a conviction that there are single, universally valid answers to most problems and that agreement is sure to emerge if the interested parties gather around a table. This creates a temptation to conduct Alliance diplomacy as if it were analogous to the domestic policy of stable societies.

However, the most difficult issues of coalition diplomacy are more complicated. Differences in history, geography and domestic structure become relevant. The analogy to domestic policy breaks down.

In stable societies, domestic decisions tend to be accepted because there is a consensus on legitimacy. Those who are overruled generally consider maintenance of domestic order more important than any particular grievance; if they do not, domestic policy acquires some of the characteristics and sanctions of foreign policy and, in extreme cases, leads to civil war. In stable societies those who are overruled retain the hope of winning another round later or of influencing the implementation of the decision. In democracies, there exists the possibility of changing the government with the next election.

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In a coalition of sovereign states, these safety valves are not available. Legitimacy resides in the individual governments. Decisions require their consent--this is the essence of sovereignty. Even when they agree to be bound by majority vote--a rare occurrence in coalitions and not the case with NATO--their sovereignty implies the right to renounce the treaty. In short, those who dissent and are prepared to insist on their sovereignty cannot be bound indefinitely.

If fundamental differences among sovereign allies persist, the partners are torn between the desire to maintain the appearance of unity and the attempt to vindicate their views. The need to present a facade of harmony has at least three consequences: (1) It puts a limit on the sanctions that can be applied to a recalcitrant ally. (2) One of the few pressures available is to mobilize domestic pressures against an obstructive partner, thus multiplying resentments. (3) Because misgivings are sometimes subordinated to an appearance of amity, the real views of the governments cannot always be deduced from their formal statements. Simultaneously--and somewhat contradictorily--a premium is placed on intransigence. Ruthless allies can use their partners' desire for harmony to impose a desired course. But if this happens too frequently, there is a dangerous build-up of frustration that cannot be smothered indefinitely by declarations of friendship. This has been happening in the Atlantic Alliance.

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Consultation, therefore, is far from a panacea. It is least effective when it is most needed: when there exist basic differences of assessment or of interest. It works best in _implementing_ a consensus rather than in _creating_ it. Nevertheless, an improvement in the consultative process should be one of the primary objectives of the Alliance.

Many American schemes for strengthening NATO have taken the form of making our predominant position psychologically more acceptable; we try to create a structure which physically prevents any Ally (except the United States) from acting autonomously. This tends to turn our Allies into advisors in an American decision-making process. It then becomes relevant to inquire whether such a system serves the long-term political vitality of the Alliance.

The effectiveness of any process of consultation is tested by the answers to the following questions: Who has a right to be consulted? Whose voice carries weight? Who has technical competence? These three questions do not necessarily have identical answers. Many agencies in our own government have a right to be heard, but not all have the same influence. When some Europeans ask for a greater voice in our decisions in return for giving up some of their military autonomy, the issue they raise is: compared to whose voice _within_ the United States government? That of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency? Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or the State Department? Or the Commerce Department? In our interdepartmental disputes, the outcome is clearly affected by the constituency that the agency or department represents. The weight given

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to advice is related to the competence that it reflects and this in turn
depends on how seriously a given department takes its role.

These considerations apply even more strongly in an alliance of
sovereign states. The challenge is not only to provide a forum for the
expression of a point of view--important as this is--but also to bring
about a framework which encourages the emergence of responsible attitudes.
Setting up lines of communication without paying corresponding attention
to what flows through them is to evade the key problem. If the United
States insists on retaining a dominant position and complete freedom of
action--if integration becomes in practice an exegesis of American
schemes--we will probably find that the political will of Europe will
eventually be broken. Before a government makes a major effort to
acquire the competence necessary for developing a serious point of view,
it must be convinced that its views matter not only by the grace of a
senior ally but also because of structural necessities.

American policy has not always been sensitive to the psychological
prerequisites for effective consultation. It generally holds that
influence in the Alliance is apportioned as in a stock company: the partner
with the largest number of shares in a common enterprise is supposed to have
the greatest influence.

Influence is, of course, an intangible quality. However, to
measure it entirely in terms of contribution to a common effort is much too
mechanical. President de Gaulle, with his disconcerting habit of cutting
through slogans to the underlying reality, has put his finger on the fact

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that as long as NATO is an alliance of sovereign states, a too literal
conception of "integration" can easily lead to an evasion of responsibility.
Difficult decisions can be avoided, and failure can be blamed on other
allies. Even a major effort may not result in a corresponding increase in
influence. In an alliance of sovereign states, a country's influence
requires that its effort be considered essential and that its partners
do not take it for granted. In determining an ally's real--as opposed to
his formal--role, one can do worse than inquire what its choices are in
case of disagreement. To combine technical integration with insistence
on sovereignty can in time erode the moral basis of joint action.

Heretofore, American policy has assumed that the chief obstacle
to close United States-European cooperation on a global scale is that
the resources of the European nation-state are inadequate for the
requirements of the modern age. According to this school of thought, the
political integration of Europe will solve the problem of Allied
consultation. A united Europe will be prepared to share world-wide
burdens which a Europe of national states is reluctant to assume. Under
Secretary of State Ball has expressed the American view as follows:

> The problem will never be fully solved until Europe
> gets on further with the achievement of its own unity--
> until it organizes itself on a scale commensurate with
> the requirements of the age.

> There are quite obvious reasons for this. The
> undertaking of world responsibility requires a world
> view. The discharge of such responsibility under
> post-colonial conditions must be based on the command
> of vast resources for defense and foreign aid--and
> on the will to use them. Western Europe collectively has

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more than enough resources, but a fragmented Europe
cannot efficiently mobilize them in support of a common
effort and a common view. √

8/9

1

George W. Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1964), p. 216.

The nature of world responsibility is rarely defined; it is
assumed to be self-evident. Thus, United States Ambassador to Germany,
George McGhee, spoke as follows:

This Atlantic partnership entails increasing
contributions in formerly remote areas like Vietnam
and Central Africa from countries which, like Germany,
have only recently acquired the ability to contribute. 2

8/9

2

George C. McGhee, "Some American Thoughts on Current Issues," speech on July 16, 1964, DOSB, Vol. LI, No. 1310 (August 3, 1964), p. 138.

American policy seems to consider that its goals in these areas are in
the common interest and, therefore, beyond challenge; what it desires is a
sharing of the cost.

But is it really true that willingness to assume global
responsibilities is related to availability of resources? The American
national experience would seem to contradict this assumption. Through
the greatest part of its history, the United States possessed the resources
but not the inclination to play a global role. Conversely many European
states maintained overseas commitments when their resources were much
smaller than they are today.

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For many European countries, the combination of decolonization and
two World Wars has been traumatic. Having been forced to relinquish their
overseas possessions, they no longer consider that their security is
directly affected by what happens in, for example, Southeast Asia. Rather
than run the risk of nuclear destruction on behalf of a distant area from
which they have been recently ejected, they prefer to shift the risks and
the burdens to us. They are reasonably sure that long before upheavals in
other continents threaten the safety of Europe, the United States will
have entered the fray. In other words, they treat America's extra-European
concerns in much the same way that the United States looked at Europe's
quarrels until 1941.

This problem is not eliminated by drawing distinctions--often
moralistic in tone--between "responsibility" and "interest." Under Secretary
Ball, echoing similar statements by Secretary Rusk, has argued that:

> We Americans have few national interests--in the narrow
> sense--outside our own territory but we have assumed
> vast world responsibility. . . . The willingness to accept
> world responsibility--as distinct from the preservation
> of national interests--is, in our observation and
> experience, not universal among the NATO membership. ☑

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3

Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," *op. cit.*, p. 215.

Aside from the fact that our European Allies are likely to consider
a "disinterested" foreign policy as both mercurial and unsteady, the distinction
misses the central point. The chief reason for the reluctance of most of our

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Allies to assume world responsibility is precisely that in the past decade they have been obliged to give up their global interests. Sharing our burdens would give impetus to Atlantic cooperation only if our Allies have the same view as we of what is at stake outside of Europe and if they believe that the United States would curtail its commitments but for their assistance. Neither condition is met today. The very commitment of the United States to a global role--our often-invoked sense of world responsibility--reduces the incentive of our Allies to share in it, much as the commitment of Britain and France to the European balance of power permitted the United States to evade the problems of security in the period before 1941.

Thus, European unity is not a major cure-all for Atlantic disagreements. In many respects it may magnify rather than reduce differences. As Europe gains structure, it will be in a better position to assert divergent perspectives whose ultimate cause is structural rather than personal. Phrases like "indivisible interest" are correct when applied to the defense of Europe or East-West relations; they come close to being platitudes in other parts of the world. A wise Alliance policy will not gear everything to the expectation that common positions can be developed on a global basis; it will also take account of the fact that the interests of Europe and America are not identical everywhere.

This fact is relevant to any assessment of the degree of centralization of Atlantic policy which it is in our interest to promote. Over the next decades the United States is likely to find itself increasingly

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engaged in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Our European Allies will almost certainly consider that their vital interests are not at stake in these areas. If Atlantic policy is completely centralized, it may grow stagnant. The Alliance will be able to agree only on doing nothing. Or else, it will engage in a series of pretenses. The behavior of our Allies toward American requests for assistance in Vietnam is a good example. The Soviets may use our involvements in other continents as a pretext to blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alliance beyond the breaking point.

Looking beyond the immediate future, it is not difficult to visualize an increasingly powerful China fomenting the already strong tendencies toward turmoil in other parts of the world. If we insist on remaining the sole trustee of global policy, the strain on our resources and ingenuity may well be too great. The day will come when we will consider a measure of autonomy in Europe a blessing rather than an irritant. In this century no one could have foreseen at the beginning of any decade what the world would look like at its end. Things have not grown less complicated or more predictable. Those centers of initiative which still exist should not be discouraged. It is not always the least-responsible allies that wish to reserve some measure of control over their destiny.

If we face the fact that the interests of Europe and the United States are not identical everywhere, it may be possible to agree on a permissible range of divergence. Each partner will regain a measure of flexibility. The temptation for Soviet adventures might be reduced. Europe

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could assume greater responsibility for its defense and its future. Put positively, the Atlantic Alliance will have to decide whether to emphasize immediate convenience or long-term political vitality. At any given point of time, centralization of decisions guarantees the greatest degree of coordination. Critics of such schemes can always be put on the defensive by being accused of fomenting distrust. In the long term, however, excessive concentration of decision-making in the hands of the senior partner may deprive our Allies of the incentive to be responsible and it may create profound fissures when a conflict of interest becomes apparent.

This suggests that the vitality of the Alliance would be served by an Allied structure which makes possible a variety of coordinated approaches on some issues. For responsible attitudes to emerge, participants in a consultative process must do more than simply advise. Influencing another country's actions--however benevolent that dominant partner may be--will be demoralizing in the long run. If coalition diplomacy becomes largely an exercise in affecting essentially American decisions, most of our Allies will lose the incentive to make responsible judgments. The type of leader comfortable with such a relationship may be only too ready to shift the burden of difficult choices to our shoulders; this very quality may make him unreliable when he is most needed in times of crisis. For decisions to be meaningful, our Allies must consider their own, not ours.

Paradoxically, some autonomy in political decision for Europe is psychologically important for the cohesion of the Alliance. Though this proposition will be granted by most American policymakers in the abstract,

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they tend to resist independence when it takes the form of challenging our judgments. A decade and a half of hegemony have accustomed us to believing that our views represent the general interest. The difficulty with which decisions are reached in our government produces temptations to turn Allied consultation into an attempt to implement essentially American conceptions.

Nevertheless, the future well-being of the Alliance depends on our willingness to adjust the pattern of relationships which grew up after the war. Though historically we are the children of Europe, with respect to the postwar evolution, we are somewhat in the position of a father toward a grown-up son. He can always take the attitude that, since their interests are identical, he will continue to control all the resources. He can challenge the son to name circumstances in which their interests might differ. He can tell him that no legitimate request will ever go unheeded. Such an attitude will either drive the son to open rebellion or, if accepted, will break his spirit.

Since the war Europe has been first nurtured and then protected by us. Now we require wisdom and delicacy in handling the transition from tutelage to equality. Grandiose schemes of great technical complexity may magnify inward insecurities. What is needed is a recognition that it is in the long-term interest of the United States to share responsibilities even more than burdens. This will involve a painful loss of some of our former pre-eminence--a process to which no nation has ever adjusted easily. The assertions of European self-will which we find so irritating today can be the growing pains of a new and healthier relationship which ultimately is important for us as well.

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In too much of the current dialogue we offer our good intentions
as a guarantee of the validity of our actions. But the nature of our
intentions is not at issue. It is important for us to realize that our
style and our commitment which have been responsible for so many constructive
measures can also dissolve the identity of others. Our optimism makes us
press for final answers to any problem. These often take the form of
abstract models in which other nations are considered interchangeable
entities. Our pragmatism produces a willingness to try everything once
and a restless quest for ever "new" remedies. Thus, sudden changes in our
policy are not uncommon--witness the checkered career of the MLF. Decisions
within our government are influenced by a combination of bureaucratic
pressures in which the immediate often predominates over the long-term.

All of this can make our impact undermine the sense of responsibility
of even close allies. Most societies lack the cohesiveness for the
restless quest for novelty which seems natural to us. The constant adjustment
of policies to differing pressures can be demoralizing for countries whose
margin for maneuver is more limited. What appears as open-mindedness to
us may be seen as unsteadiness by others. The fluctuations in our German
policy from impatient aloofness in 1961 to ardent wooing in 1963 to a more
distant policy in 1965; the changes in the MLF from indifference to
passionate advocacy to aloof goodwill in the space of three years; the
frequent alterations of our strategic doctrine; the tendency of our
bureaucracy to conduct their internal battles by lining up support in foreign
capitals--all suggest that it is necessary even for the stability of our own

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47

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policy to have self-confident partners with a strongly developed sense of identity. Reluctant as we may be to admit it, we could benefit from a counterweight to discipline our occasional impetuosity and to supply historical perspective to our penchant for abstract and "final" solutions.

The real case for European autonomy is not burden-sharing but the establishing of a psychological balance between us and Europe.

For centuries one of the most difficult problems of Western political thought has been how to reconcile unity with respect for diversity.

Overemphasis on either unity or diversity destroys the delicate balance of creativity. Excessive stress on unity leads to a deadening conformism; exalting diversity as an end produces a relativism hostile to great conceptions and, on the political level, an overconcern with national peculiarities. To strike this balance is the big unsolved problem before the Western Alliance.

## The Grand Design and European Integration

Since the war and with increasing emphasis since 1961, the United States has argued that the most effective structure for Atlantic cooperation is a partnership between the United States and a united, supranational Europe. "When one partner possesses over 50 per cent of the resources of an enterprise and the balance is distributed among sixteen or seventeen others, the relationship is unlikely to work very well."⁴ Real partnership,

8

4

George W. Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, February 6, 1962, DOSB, Vol. XLVI, No. 1184 (March 5, 1962), p. 366.

according to American spokesmen, is possible only among equals.

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As a result, American pronouncements have often assumed that before Europe could be an effective partner of the United States it would have to unify. This concept of Atlantic partnership, strongly urged also by such wise Europeans as Jean Monnet, has been described by the image of "twin pillars" or "dumbbell." Former Secretary of State Herter has written:

> I believe the present Administration /the Kennedy Administration[
> . . . holds the . . . view, which has come to be termed the
> "dumbbell" concept--meaning that an economic and political
> alliance is stronger if it has been agreed to by partners of
> equal weight on both sides. ✓

8/9 5

Christian Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1963), p. 301.

The European side of this partnership is to be a United States of Europe organized on federal lines with supranational institutions.

There is no doubt that the dumbbell concept represents one form of Atlantic partnership. But an excessive, almost doctrinaire commitment to it runs the risk of treating a symbol as the only possible reality. This may cause us to beg the key questions by the very terms in which we state them.

The single-mindedness with which the dumbbell concept has been pursued obscures three questions: Is it true that partnership is possible only among equals? What has been the real progress toward European political integration? To what extent is it in the American interest to promote one form of European unity to the exclusion of other possible plans?

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Given the nature of America's relations with the rest of the world, it seems strange that partnership should be said to be possible only among equals. The assertion that we can deal effectively only with countries of equal strength is not conducive to inspiring confidence among the great majority of the nations of the world which are weak. Moreover, the proposition is open to doubt. History would seem to indicate that the most difficult and rigid partnerships are those among equals--witness, for example, the alliance between Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to World War I. In Atlantic relationships we should recognize that an improvement in Europe's bargaining position toward us is inseparable from an increase in European strength and cohesion; we should be prepared to pay this price for European unity, but we must realize that there is a price to be paid.

Granting that a strong and united Europe is on balance in our best interest, we must nevertheless inquire whether it is wise--either from the point of view of Europe or of the United States--to insist that there is only one reliable method of bringing about that unity: that of federal, supranational institutions. In the aftermath of De Gaulle's abrupt rejection of Britain's membership in the Common Market, it has become almost a commonplace that the willful act of a single individual interrupted what would otherwise have been a smooth advance toward political integration. According to this view, once Britain would have entered the Common Market, an "outward-looking" Europe would have emerged. Progress toward supranational political institutions would have been continuous. In the opinion of the

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"integrationists" in Europe and in the State Department, European unity would have been promoted by a "community spirit," which in turn was to be fostered by supranational commissions. Expert judgment unaffected by considerations of national interest was to move European political integration forward, step-by-step, toward a final culmination in which the supranational authorities would be dominant. All this is said to have been destroyed by De Gaulle's abrupt exclusion of Britain from the Common Market.

However, no man could have single-handedly brought about the consequences ascribed to De Gaulle. Significant underlying factors must have been operating to obstruct the idealized progression envisaged by the European integrationists on both sides of the Atlantic. It was always somewhat unrealistic to imagine that the methods by which economic integration had been achieved could be applied automatically to the political arena. The "community" approach--which equates method and purpose--works best when the objective is clear. It answers the question of how a common objective can be realized. It is much less useful in *defining* this objective.

In the aftermath of World War II, this was obscured because Europe had been so shattered by the war that immediate needs were overwhelming. Leaders did not think that their problem was to choose among different objectives; on the contrary, the task of meeting minimum necessities absorbed all their energies. Most countries on the Continent had governments so weak or were so eager to overcome a past--or both--that an abdication of some of their sovereignty seemed a respite from overwhelming uncertainties. For many in Europe, economic activity became a means to avoid facing nearly

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insoluble moral or political issues. And the economic imperatives were
so urgent that the governments were only too glad to turn them over to
supranational experts.⁶

For a splendid discussion of the problem of Europe's identity
see Stanley Hoffmann, "Europe's Identity Crisis: Between the Past and
America," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 4 (Fall 1964).

As Europe recovered economically, political confidence returned as
well. Inevitably this strengthened the national state, the traditional
repository of European loyalties. This process took place with varying
intensity in each country. Germany and Italy, partly to escape their past,
were more ready to submerge themselves in a federal Europe than Britain and
France. Smaller countries accustomed to the protection of some major power
had less difficulty with the supranational concept that those that had been
major powers themselves. France and Great Britain--with the longest history
as national states--have consistently aimed for a confederal, rather than a
federal, solution; that is, a structure that preserves the identity of the
states and in which decisions will be made, at least initially, on the
basis of agreement among governments. Four years before De Gaulle came to
power, the abortive European Defense Community demonstrated the obstacles
faced by a supranational approach to political integration.

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But if De Gaulle cannot fairly be charged with being the sole obstacle to European integration on the federal model, he is responsible for confusing the debate about the future of Europe in at least two ways:

(1) The controversy between the federalists and the confederalists has become a test of attitudes toward De Gaulle. The line-up is not a reliable guide to the real views of the participants because many who strongly oppose De Gaulle's style and domestic policy are in agreement with him about the organization of Europe. (2) Some of the most ardent advocates of Britain's entry into the Common Market are also dedicated proponents of a federal Europe, which is as unacceptable in London as in Paris. Thus opponents of European integration have often combined forces with dedicated advocates of it to advance sweeping schemes certain to be vetoed by the French President.

This confusion has been magnified by the role of the United States. Our strong support of supranational, federal institutions has contributed to the stalemate in European discussions. While not sufficient to bring about our preferred solution, our influence is strong enough to block approaches with which we disagree. Moreover, despite our ardent support for European unity, our impact has often been the contrary of what was intended. While affirming the need for European integration, we have unintentionally tended to undermine a European sense of identity.

During the long period of American predominance, a group of experts comfortable with the existing relationship has grown up on both sides of the Atlantic. Having worked well together for many years, they tend to see problems from the same perspective. Though they generally favor European

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integration, they consider the quest for European autonomy inherently
divisive. According to them, if United States policy is wise, European
autonomy will be unnecessary. If United States policy is mistaken, an
independent European policy would only magnify the problem. Thus, both in
Europe and the United States, many who urge European integration balk at
the prospect of an autonomous European policy--which is one of the likely
results of European integration.

This attitude is particularly noticeable in the field of defense.
Were Europe thrown on itself, it would probably unite sufficiently to
assure its security. It clearly has the potential to do so. But, having
been sheltered by American power for nearly two decades, many Europeans are
concerned that the emergence of an autonomous Europe in the area of defense
will undermine the American guarantee and force them into assuming direct
responsibilities. American pronouncements sometimes encourage this concern.
The threat to withdraw American forces has been used to obtain European
support for American strategic preferences. Proposals such as the MLF have
the practical consequence of preventing the emergence of a European point of
view on nuclear matters. These American attitudes have inhibited a European
quest for autonomy; they have also caused some advocates of European
identity in the defense field to give their case an anti-American cast.

These tendencies are reinforced by the fact that some Europeans
prefer an Atlantic structure based on the existing NATO states to a united
Europe. The smaller countries in particular fear that European integration
will result in the hegemony of powerful neighbors. They see no advantage in

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European autonomy. Since they must follow the lead of a dominant country
in any event, they prefer the hegemony of an ally 3,000 miles away and with
a tradition of using its power with restraint. Consequently, these countries
are a ready-made constituency for schemes to perpetuate the relationship
between Europe and the United States that developed after the war.

In short, American policy has been extremely ambivalent; it has
urged European unity while recoiling before its probable consequences.
We have sought to combine a supranational Europe with a closely integrated
Atlantic Community under American leadership. These objectives are likely
to prove incompatible. Indeed, the United States will have to reconcile
itself to the fact that no matter what structure emerges in Europe, a
difference in perspective with the United States is probable, particularly
about policies outside of Europe. A wise policy will try to mitigate the
impact of this difference; it will not be able to remove it.

This latent difference could well be accentuated by the manner in
which European unity is achieved. History teaches that the more abrupt
the political transitions, the more drastic have to be the efforts to
reestablish some sort of cohesion. A Europe that grows out of the collapse
of all traditional loyalties must have as its primary problem the discovery
of some specific purpose for its existence. Too doctrinaire an approach to
European unity could produce either a collapse of political will or, more
likely, a new and virulent form of nationalism, perhaps even more intense
than the nationalism of *patries*. A Europe constructed largely on theoretical
models might be forced into an anti-American mold because its only sense of
identity could be what distinguished it from America.

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It is hard to understand why many European federalists believe that a European parliament would mitigate this danger. The decline in the role of the European national parliaments has been apparent for decades. In no European country--not even Great Britain--does parliament exercise an effective control over the formulation or the conduct of foreign policy. Party discipline has become so pervasive that in European parliaments the majority almost always ratifies the decisions of the cabinet. And where the party system is ineffective--either because the parties are weak or because there are too many of them--the result is paralysis of government rather than parliamentary control.

These conditions are likely to be magnified by all-European elections. The need to establish a consensus comprising Schleswig-Holstein and Sicily, Scotland and Bavaria will surely tempt demagogic appeals. A parliament emerging from such a process of direct elections may be completely unrelated to the calm deliberative body envisaged by so many European federalists.

This suggests the need to reexamine American priorities. The mechanical notion that one particular form of European integration automatically will solve the problem of Atlantic partnership should be abandoned. The United States should leave the internal evolution of a united Europe to the Europeans and use its ingenuity and influence in devising new forms of *Atlantic* cooperation. The passionate commitment of so many American policymakers to a single formula of European integration, that of supranationality, confuses form and substance.

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It could in fact bring about results quite contrary to those intended. Many European federalists have been devoted adherents of Atlantic partnership; Jean Monnet, their most significant figure, has been a staunch and remarkable friend of the United States. By contrast, President de Gaulle's career is filled with examples of abrupt and unilateral tactics designed to exalt the status of France, occasionally at our expense. It would be one of history's frequent ironies if the structure for Europe proposed by Monnet would generate the greatest pressures for the kind of policy generally described as Gaullist, while the structure advocated by De Gaulle turned out to be best suited for flexible Atlantic arrangements. Our bent for structural remedies sometimes blinds us to the fact that institutions produce their own momentum, which cannot necessarily be foreseen from the intentions of their founders.

While the United States should welcome any unified Europe that reflects the desires of Europeans, it is doubtful that either our national or Atlantic interests require our passionate commitment to a supranational structure for Europe. A very schematic and rigid conception of Atlantic partnership can easily fail to do justice to the richness and variety of relationships possible within the Atlantic context. Is each European country always inherently closer to its European neighbors than to the United States? If we separate the question into political, military or economic components, is the answer always uniform and does it always point in the same direction? Would it not be wiser to retain some flexibility?

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There may be various roads to European unity. The one traced by the Fouchet Plan--calling for institutionalized meetings of foreign ministers and subcabinet officials--is not the least plausible, and indeed it is the one most consistent with British participation. It has the advantage that it would produce some immediate progress without foreclosing the future and thus would put an end to the process of demanding the desirable in order to defeat the attainable. It would also permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than the "twin pillar" concept now in vogue. A confederal Europe would enable the United States to maintain an influence at many centers of decision rather than be forced to stake everything on affecting the views of a single, supranational body.

Every European state was formed through some process of integration during the past four centuries, and Germany and Italy achieved unity less than 100 years ago. European history suggests that there is more than one way to build unity. In Italy, it came by way of plebiscite and annexation abolishing the individual states. In Germany, unification occurred under the aegis of one state but as the act of sovereign governments which remained in existence after unity was achieved. The resulting structure clearly did not lack cohesiveness. History is rarely so linear and simple a process as some of the enthusiasts for a particular form of European integration suggest.

European history demonstrates also that stability in Europe is unattainable except through the cooperation of Britain, France and Germany. Care should be taken not to resurrect old national rivalries in

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the name of Atlanticism. The United States should not single out one ally
as its special partner. The attempt to force allies to choose between us
and France--a tendency which, despite all disavowals, is real--must
magnify the European nationalism that French policy has already done so much
to foster.

Our concern thus returns to the somewhat out-of-scale figure of
President de Gaulle. Conceivably he is as petty and as animated by
remembered slights as some of our commentators suggest. It is also possible
that a man so conscious of his historic role has larger purposes. In a
period of detente with the Soviet Union, it should not be impossible to
conduct a serious conversation with a traditional ally. President de Gaulle
has repeatedly expressed his willingness to coordinate strategy rather than
to integrate it. It is a welcome sign of progress that, at the NATO meeting
of December 1964, Secretary McNamara and French Defense Minister Messmer
agreed on a procedure to begin exploring what this means with respect to
strategic nuclear forces.

But a more fundamental dialogue is needed. Irritation with De Gaulle's
tactics does not change the fact that in his proposal of 1958 for a Directorate
he pointed out what has remained the key problem of NATO: If the Atlantic
Alliance is to retain any vitality, it requires a common foreign policy--or
at least an agreed range of divergence. In its absence, the attempt to
devise a common military strategy is likely to prove futile. As long as the
Alliance cannot agree even on a common trade policy toward the East, it will
be impossible to convince the Allies to relinquish their freedom of action

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over decisions affecting their very survival. Lord Avon and Dean Acheson have come to the same conclusion. The time seems ripe to create a political body at the highest level for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the North Atlantic.

Organizational devices should never be confused with substantive solutions. Nevertheless the following outline could serve as an illustration of a desirable direction if not as a detailed blueprint for action. The political body could be constituted as an Executive Committee of the NATO Council. It could be composed of six members: five permanent members (the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic and Italy) and one rotating member representing the smaller NATO countries. The rotating member could be elected by a vote of the NATO Council from which the permanent members are excluded, thus protecting the rights of the smaller countries. The Allies would agree to accept a two-thirds vote as binding with escape clauses to be described.

The Executive Committee should formulate common Atlantic purposes and define the limits of autonomous action where interests diverge. It should give political guidance for the military arrangements described in the previous chapters. It should be the political authority for the proposed Allied Nuclear Force. It should be charged with developing a common strategic doctrine.

As long as the Alliance is composed of sovereign states, the delegation of authority will clearly have to be limited. Each Ally, whether or not a member of the Executive Committee, would have to be given the right to appeal its decisions to the NATO Council, where a two-thirds

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majority would carry. Each Ally should have the right, for an interim
period at least, to refuse to be bound by such a vote. However, it should
be required to make a formal declaration to that effect within a given
time. A negative vote either in the Executive Committee or in the NATO
Council would not be taken as an indication of non-compliance. Instead,
a formal notification that a country refuses to carry out the common
decision would be required. The purpose of separating the two stages
would be to enable the Allies to record their disagreement and yet to carry
out the majority's decision for the sake of unity.

Within this framework, the European countries could, if they
wished, form a closer association. For example, the Western European
Union might well be given responsibility for the European component of the
Allied Nuclear Force and, indeed, the European contribution to joint NATO
plans. As Europe gains structure, the Executive Committee could draw
nearer to the "twin pillars" concept. But Atlantic partnership, in this
approach, could become operative even if European unity were delayed. Atlantic
partnership and increased European cohesion thus could be pursued
simultaneously, with no advance commitment to giving priority to either
course. An Atlantic Community could thus develop on a two-pronged basis.

Conceivably such a policy could end the sterile debate over the
relative benefits of integration and coordination. It might heal a rift
that, if continued, is bound to hazard everything that has been painfully
built up over fifteen years. It would leave the internal evolution of Europe
to the European countries and concentrate our efforts where we can be most
constructive: in the elaboration of Atlantic relationships.

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This requires that we become clear about the notion of Europe as a Third Force which is used so often in a pejorative sense in our discussions. In the sense of being powerful Europe is bound to be a Third Force, partly because we ourselves have made it so. Whether Europe will use its strength for a narrow or a wider conception depends in large part on the ability of leaders on both sides of the Atlantic to develop common purposes and a structure to give them effect. We can best counteract Third Force tendencies based on a form of neutrality by conducting ourselves so that most of our Allies will always consider the advantages of an Atlantic partnership greater than those which could be gained by a more parochial approach.

For this purpose steadiness and reliability are more important assets than an erratic quest for ever-more refined formulae. Confidence presupposes that the leaders of other countries can gear their actions to ours over a period of time. The United States should use its ingenuity to forge a variety of Atlantic institutions not only in the political realm but also in the spheres of economics, scholarship and the arts.

But institutions based on present concepts of national sovereignty are not enough. The West requires a large goal: the constitution of an Atlantic Commonwealth in which all the peoples bordering the North Atlantic can fulfill their aspirations. Clearly, it will not come quickly; many intermediate stages must be traversed before it can be reached. It is not too early, however, to prepare ourselves now for this step beyond the nation-state.

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A Final Word

When the Atlantic Alliance was founded in 1949, no one would have thought it possible that within fifteen years its pervasive problem would turn out to be the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe. In the face of what was believed to be the imminent threat of Soviet aggression, it would have seemed absurd to predict that fissures would open because the fear of Communist invasion had largely vanished. When Europe dreaded the return of America's traditional isolationism, it would have been incredible that some day our Allies would feel so confident of our support that they would consider it safe to disagree with our policies or even to oppose them.

In a way, then, many of the difficulties in the Atlantic Alliance could be a source of pride for the United States. They are the result of the success of policies ushered in by the Marshall Plan and consistently pursued through four postwar administrations. The West today is less imperiled by outside pressures than by a tendency to consume its own substance.

Yet it is easy to draw too much comfort from this. History is the tale of civilizations that sought their future in their past. There are no plateaus in international affairs; what is not a stepping stone soon becomes the beginning of a decline. Succeeding generations will not be able to draw comfort from the fact that an unmet challenge was produced by great achievement.

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In the life of societies and international systems there comes a time when the question arises whether all the possibilities of innovation inherent in a given structure have been exhausted. At this point, symptoms are taken for causes; immediate problems absorb the attention that should be devoted to determining their significance. Events are not shaped by a concept of the future; the present becomes all-intrusive. However impressive such a structure may still appear to outsiders, it has passed its zenith. It will grow ever more rigid and, in time, irrelevant.

The West today confronts such a challenge. It has had centuries of great achievements punctuated by catastrophic upheaval. Its propensity for disaster has been high; but heretofore each tragedy was followed by a new burst of creativity. Are the stresses of today a sign of consolidation or the first symptoms of decay? Will they lead to renewal or to disintegration?

For a while longer the West can continue along familiar routes. The traditional machinery of the Atlantic Alliance is well designed to produce the appearance of amity. But if the Alliance continues to confuse form and substance, energy will increasingly have to be spent in reconciling illusion with reality. Each nation will be thrown on its own resources and will emphasize policies that magnify divisions. At each previous critical juncture the West--though with much travail--found political forms adequate for its needs. It made the transition from feudalism to the nation-state. Its challenge now is whether it can move from the nation-state to a larger community and draw from this effort the strength for another period of innovation.

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Its ability to master this problem will largely determine whether the West can remain relevant to the rest of the world. Confronted by turmoil and hatred in the former colonial areas, the West desperately searches for means to demonstrate its good faith to its erstwhile subjects. But every satisfied demand spawns new pressures. The inward insecurity produced by centuries of subordination is not allayed by dealing with its manifestations any more than a tidal wave is understood by studying the surface of the ocean. In many of the new nations, popularity is unattainable partly because of the memory of colonial rule, partly because these nations often do not know what they really want. Their greatest need is a sense of purpose. But this can be conveyed only by example, not by preachments or by efforts to ingratiate that compound the new nations' sense of insecurity with our own.

What the West can mean to others depends therefore in great part on what it means to itself. In the heyday of colonialism, Western political forms were widely imitated. The leaders of independence movements fought their oppressors in the name of principles they had acquired from them. The reason was that for all the wrongs it committed, the West appeared dynamic, creative and vital. If the West is still to contribute to the rest of the world, it will have to begin by demonstrating in its internal relationships that its wellsprings of creativity have not run dry.

The opportunity is great. The dynamic periods of Western history occurred when unity was forged from diversity. This is the task once again. The struggles for prestige and influence can be salutary if at some point

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they lead to a heightened sense of community. Conversely, fifty years from now no one will care who was "right" with respect to the issues that form the headlines of the day if in the process the West has torn itself to pieces.

The challenge is whether the difference in perspective between the two sides of the Atlantic, which is at the heart of many disagreements, can be turned into a source of strength. Our idealism and impetuosity would gain depth if leavened by the European sense of tragedy. And the European consciousness of history could recover dynamism if bolstered by our hopefulness.

The deepest question before the West may thus be what kind of vision it has of its future. With the growth of bureaucracy and expertise on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a danger of becoming mired by the prudent, the tactical or the expedient. Problems that are recognized are treated with considerable adeptness. But many problems are not recognized. The solution of immediate issues has priority over the shaping of the future. The expert has a vested interest in the existing framework; doing the familiar very well has, after all, made him an expert. His weakness is that he may confuse creativity with a projection of the present into the future. He respects "facts" and considers them something to be adjusted to, perhaps to be manipulated, but not to be transcended.

In the decades ahead, the West will have to lift its sights. When technique becomes exalted over purpose, men become the victims of their complexities. They forget that every great achievement in every field was

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a vision before it became a reality. Both sides of the Atlantic would do well to keep in mind that there are two kinds of realists: those who use facts and those who create them. The West requires nothing so much as men able to create their own reality.

It has become fashionable to compare the disagreements of the West with rifts in the Communist world. But this comparison fails to do justice to the possibilities of the Atlantic area. In the Communist world schisms are inevitable and unbridgeable. Western societies have been more fortunate. Their evolution has been richer because at their best they have managed to relate diversity to community. Free from the shackles of a doctrine of historical inevitability, the nations of the West can render a great service by demonstrating that whatever meaning history has is derived from the convictions and purpose of the generation which shapes it.

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