- 20 -

Q Mr. Secretary, would you go over again
once more under what conditions you would withdraw your threat
to resign?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that the committee
which looked over the records initially, which still has
all the records available, and which has a primary
interest in the Senate in the conduct of foreign policy,
might appropriately do it. There may be other mechanisms
for doing it. I want to make absolutely clear, I am not
making this as a threat in order to gain support. I am
stating an objective fact.

It is impossible and incompatible with the dignity
of the United States to have its senior official and to
have its Secretary of State under this sort of attack
in the face of the dangers we confront and the risks
that may have to be run and the opportunities that may
have to be seized. This is a fact. This is not a threat.

MORE

- 21 -

[L.C.]

Q But, Mr. Secretary, does not that same objective of fact apply to the President of the United States even though he is an elected official?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President is the only nationally elected official. For a President to resign under attack would raise the most profound issues of national policy and in my judgment a President can leave office only according to the constitutional processes that have been foreseen for it, a position which I believe has also been maintained by the leaders of the Democratic Party.

I strongly support that position. An appointed official has no such responsibility to the elective process. An appointed official has a responsibility only to the immediate conduct of his affairs.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you have raised the threat of resignation on the eve of a trip to the Middle East during a month when you are going to the Soviet Union as the senior foreign policy official of the United States. I am sure a lot of people are wondering, could this threat have waited until the end of these negotiations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Not while there were daily editorials asking for an explanation of a shady affair, not while editorials say his fitness for public office is at issue, not while headlines say "A blot on Mr. Clean." Under what conditions do you suppose one can conduct one's affairs?

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you intend to continue this trip, or might you drop out and return to Washington at some point?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I intend to continue this trip, but I would be glad to return for any Congressional committee that wants me.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us who has physical custody of the documents that are being leaked today? What groups of people have custody of those documents?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe the House Judiciary Committee has custody of some of the documents that are being leaked.

Q The Senate Foreign Relations Committee?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't believe they have them. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee in all my dealings with them never leaked any of these documents. I do not know whether they have custody of them. I don't believe so.

MORE

- 22 -

Q The White House has copies of them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The White House probably has copies of them, I don't know.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did you at the time when these decisions were made have any doubt about the ethicality -- save the legal aspects -- did you at that time have a question in your own mind whether it was ethical or not and now with the benefit of hindsight do you have any doubt at all in your mind that it was ethical.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: At the time I found it an extremely painful process. It involved in some cases individuals with whom I had been closely associated. It involves threats to individuals, who if they had been found to be security leaks, would have reflected badly on my own judgment.

So I did not find it a task that was particularly pleasant. But I could not quarrel with the judgment and I did not quarrel with the judgment of those who found it necessary.

At my confirmation hearings I testified in executive session -- not in public session -- I testified in executive session that stricter regulations then were then in force or had been in force in previous Administrations would be compatible with the objective of national security.

Q You said a few minutes ago that you told the President you were going to come out here and raise these issues. Two questions: Have you discussed with him specifically the possibility of your resignation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I did not discuss the content of what I would say with the President.

Q Have you discussed the possibility of your resignation and if so, what has been his reaction?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not discussed the content of this press conference with the President before giving it. I felt this was a matter in which I had to state my view.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END (AT 2:15 P.M. Salzburg time)

JUN 74 21:40

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 11, 1974

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Salzburg, Austria)

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

HOTEL /ALEXMANNSTEIN
BAD REICHENHALL, AUSTRIA

(Questions to and answers by Foreign Minister
Hans-Deitrich Genscher were not interpreted.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to speak in English
in order not to violate my native language too violently.
(Laughter)

I welcome the opportunity to meet the Foreign Minister
for the first time and to establish the relationship that is
essential and characteristic of German-American relations,
of confidential and open and full discussions.

From our side we had a very useful and a very
satisfactory talk. I agree with what the Foreign Minister
has said and I can really add nothing to it except that we
have agreed to stay in close and frequent contact by all means
at our disposal and I hope very much that he will come to
Washington in July.

Q Mr. Secretary, to what extent has a new element
been introduced by your earlier announcement that you are
contemplating resignation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have said everything that I
have to say about that earlier subject and I will be glad to
answer any other questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you discuss any stop in West
Germany on your way to the Moscow summit?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, but I discussed a stop on
the way back from the summit in Germany for some football
games and of course very important conversations. (Laughter)
But I need some very substantive reason.

Q Mr. Kissinger, do you feel that after talks here
at the Foreign Ministers meeting in Bonn that European-American
dialoque is making very satisfactory progress?

dialogue is making good progress. We are making progress on the NATO declaration and we are separating the discussions between the Community and the United States from theology and консультинг on the practice and I think that the consultative

procedure that is now evolving in practice promises to meet the needs of both sides.

Q Have you got any reservations at all about the European approach to the Arabs on political, technical and economic cooperation?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I have not been patient in expressing our views and we have no reservations about the technical, economic and scientific cooperation. We have expressed some hesitation at the prospect of 20 Arab foreign ministers meeting with nine European foreign ministers without a very clearly defined agenda, but we have made no secret of that conviction and having stated our views, it is up to our friends to make their decision.

Q Mr. Secretary, what do you think are the possibilities on the way to the Soviet Union the President will stop over in Brussels, or somewhere else in Western Europe, to sign some kind of a new statement on principles between Western Europe -- principles of intent between Western Europe and the United States?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on that. There is a possibility that he will stop somewhere in Europe on the way to the Soviet Union, but no final plans have been made.

Q Did you discuss troop cuts in Europe on the part of the United States?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States is planning troop cuts in Europe except in the context of the negotiations on mutual force reductions which are, of course, made as a joint NATO exercise.

Q Mr. Secretary, the European Security Conference seems to be stalemated right now for the time being. Do you foresee any kind of move to get it going again?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had a very full discussion on the European Security Conference and the Foreign Minister reported to me in detail the conclusions of his colleagues and himself. We shared the views that were conveyed to us. We would like to make progress. We stand ready to make progress and we hope that in the next few weeks, 'progress will be made, but it doesn't depend only on us.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you discuss a possible meeting in the near future between President Nixon and the new Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We didn't discuss it specifically here, but we considered such a meeting in the near future highly desirable.

Q How would you rate the chances for a summit-level ending to the European Security Council?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: This depends, as the Foreign Minister and I agreed, on the substance of the negotiations. All of us are not opposed in principle to a summit meeting. We are in principle, ready for a summit meeting provided the substance of the negotiations justifies it and we cannot yet make that determination.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did you bring a message from President Nixon to the Foreign Ministers?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No, I did not bring a message from President Nixon to the Foreign Ministers.

Q Or any guidance?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I always have guidance when I speak to Foreign Ministers.

(The question was asked in German.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The question was whether we expect the NATO declaration to be signed at the forthcoming NATO meeting in Ottawa.

We believe a possibility exists, at least to complete the text at the Ottawa meeting. The formal signature and the location has not yet been decided.

Q Mr. Secretary, can the United States be satisfied with a consultation procedure with the Common Market which involves in effect a veto right for any of the nine to halt this procedure when the others want it?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, it is my understanding that the consultation procedure that is now being envisioned can either go via the Presidency by unanimous consent, which is not new, or bilaterally by any of the countries composing the nine. So we believe that between those two forms it should be possible to work out adequate procedures. A major goal, in any event, is the substance and not the legal form.

Q Mr. Kissinger, if there is nothing new in the consultation procedure, what reason do you have to believe that the consultations will be improved?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The element that is now in the consultation procedure is the greater use of bilateral consultation. But I believe that there has been a change in the spirit and attitude of consultation. For a period last year and early this year an issue seemed to be made of defining European detents by opposition to or at least in separation from the United States.

(A question was addressed to the Secretary in German.)

I have the impression, as a result of some of the discussions to which I sometimes unintentionally contribute, that it is now better understood on both sides of the Atlantic that this attitude is not in the interests of either side and in recent months, consultations have taken place on a more pragmatic and more open-minded basis.

But I think the Foreign Minister should perhaps say a few words on that.

For the benefit of the traveling press here, the United States supports in principle the attitude on peaceful exchange in the European Security Conference and we will attempt to work out appropriate language within the Bonn group.

Q Mr. Secretary, can you envision any eventuality that might interfere with your plan to return to Germany the first week in July?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will have to see, but I expect to be there for the final game.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 5:20 P.M. Salzburg Time)

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

JUNE 11, 1974

THE WHITE HOUSE

HOTEL ALEXMANNSTEIN
BAD REICHENHALL, AUSTRIA

Q Mr. Kissinger, do you feel that after talks here
at the Foreign Ministers meeting in Bonn that European-American
dialogue is making very satisfactory progress?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think the European-American
dialogue is making good progress. We are making progress on the
NATO declaration and we are separating the discussions between
the Community and the United States from theology and concen-
trating on the practice and I think that the consultative

MORE

- 2 -

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I have not been reticent
in expressing our views and we have no reservations about the
technical, economic and scientific cooperation. We have
expressed some hesitation at the prospect of 20 Arab
foreign ministers meeting with nine European foreign ministers
without a very clearly defined agenda, but we have made no secret
of that conviction and having stated our views, it is up
to our friends to make their decision.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States is planning no
troop cuts in Europe except in the context of the negotiations
on mutual force reductions which are, of course, made as a
joint NATO exercise.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had a very full discussion
on the European Security Conference and the Foreign Minister
reported to me in detail the conclusions of his colleagues and
himself. We shared the views that were conveyed to us. We
would like to make progress. We stand ready to make
progress and we hope that in the next few weeks, progress
will be made, but it doesn't depend only on us.

MORE

- 3 -

Q Or any guidance?

We believe a possibility exists, at least to complete
thetext at the Ottawa meeting. The formal signature and
the location has not yet been decided.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The element that is new in
the consultation procedure is the greater use of bilateral con-
sultation. But I believe that there has been a change in the
spirit and attitude of consultation. For a period last year and
early this year an issue seemed to be made of defining European
detente by opposition to or at least in separation from the United
States.

MORE

- 4 -

I have the impression, as a result of some of the
discussions to which I sometimes unintentionally contributed,
that it is now better understood on both sides of the
Atlantic that this attitude is not in the interests of either
side and in recent months, consultations have taken place
on a more pragmatic and more open-minded basis.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

[LC]

Hold for release until 6:00 p.m. EDT Friday, June 14, 1974.

INTERVIEW WITH THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE

WITH

CORRESPONDENTS HOWARD K. SMITH AND TED KOPPEL

FOR THE ABC-TV SPECIAL
"KISSINGER - AN ACTION BIOGRAPHY"

MR. SMITH: Mr. Secretary, in a speech you made in 1972 you said these words: "When the voice of controversy is still, all that will matter is whether what has been done has made a difference, whether it has marked an episode or an epoch." Which has it marked?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I like to believe
the
that/foreign policy of this Administration marks a
turning point in our foreign policy, partly due to the
efforts of the Administration, partly because world con-
ditions reached a point where changes became inevitable.
But I think that the international order that emerged in
1945 had run its course by 1969 and we have had the
opportunity to begin shaping a new order.

MR. KOPPEL: But is it the beginning of an epoch, or have these incidents that have occurred over the past year or two, in fact, over the course of this Administration, how do you think historians -- you are yourself a historian -- how will they be regarded?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is presumptious to claim
that one has started an epoch. I think we have the building

A-2

blocks of what could turn a new phase of foreign policy:
the opening to China, the new relationship with the Soviet
Union, the beginning of making peace in the Middle East,
the end of the American military involvement in Viet Nam,
and what I am sure will be seen in retrospect is the
beginning of a new relationship with Europe and Japan.

But nothing runs automatically in foreign policy.
I think we have the opportunity to start making an epoch,
but it requires constant tending, and one can't take it
for granted. And, above all, one shouldn't claim it for
oneself.

MR. KOPPEL: During the course of this program,
Mr. Secretary, we have seen you express concern over the
excessive expectations. And indeed when you come back now
and one sees these cartoon figures of you on magazine
covers it is almost as though you were superhuman. Are
you able to keep up this same pace?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think none of my
associates will consider me superhuman. Those who suffered
with me through these enterprises. No foreign policy should
be geared to one individual. Every person must be
replaceable. And if you gear foreign policy to one man
you are really forcing it into a pattern that by definition

A-3

cannot be sustained. My contribution can be to recognize
a trend and to start events in the right direction. But
if what I am doing is successful, I must succeed in
institutionalizing it so that it can be carried out by
successors and so that it becomes a bipartisan foreign
policy.

MR. SMITH: Can you define where Richard Nixon
begins and ends and where Henry Kissinger begins and ends
in the carrying out and the conception of American foreign
policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The ultimate responsibility
for the conduct of foreign policy rests with the President;
and the role of the Secretary of State is to execute it.
I have worked very closely with the President since 1969.
I talk to him at least once a day. We have many very long
discussions about the philosophy and the approach of the
foreign policy; and it would be very hard to say where one
man's contribution begins and the other one's ends. But
there is no doubt about the following: the hard decisions
must be made by the President. The ultimate responsibility
for those decisions rests with the President and not with
the Secretary of State. He has the responsibility; and,
therefore, he deserves the credit for it.

A-4

MR. SMITH: Do you think you could have achieved as much in the same way under a different President?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, relations between a President and a Secretary of State or a President and his National Security Adviser always depend on a very personal mix. I think the particular time of this President is especially well suited for the conduct of foreign policy. He prefers to make decisions with a small group. He then thinks them through in isolation. He is prepared to assume the responsibility for hard decisions. Therefore, these radical departures that were made in relations with the People's Republic of China, with the Soviet Union, and perhaps even in the Middle East, are due importantly to the particular approach of this President.

MR. KOPPEL: Mr. Secretary, a few days ago the American public saw something that they rarely see, and that is Henry Kissinger losing his temper at a press conference. And it was on the subject of wire tapping. And since what we are trying to do here is put you in an overall broader context, I wonder if you, quietly and calmly, would explain the whole context of the wire tapping in May and later on in 1969.

A-5

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The office of which I was
in charge in the White House, the National Security Office,
handles the most sensitive information in the Government,
on the security of which may depend, in some cases, the
security of the United States, and in all cases the
confidence that other countries can have in us in protecting
confidential information. Therefore, when major leaks
occur of that information, it must be a matter of profound
concern to the National Security Adviser as well as to the
President.

In 1969 a series of major leaks occurred. The
President decided, after consultation with the Attorney
General and the Director of the FBI, to institute -- or to
reinstitute -- a system that had existed in the United
States Government since the Presidency of Franklin Roosevelt;
namely, the use of wire taps to protect national security
information.

The decision was made by the President, and it
was executed by the Attorney General and by the Director
of the FBI. I was requested in case of leaks to supply
the names of individuals who had had access to that
information, for investigation, to the FBI. In conducting
their investigation, the FBI, at times, not in the case of

A--6

all individuals, used wire taps. When these wire taps
revealed information that in the judgment of the FBI
reflected on national security, they sent a report to
my office. They never sent a report about personal,
political, or any other conversations.

When in the opinion of subordinates in my office
that information on national security was sufficiently
serious that it should be brought to my attention, it was
brought to my attention.

After ten months I decided that internal security
matters really didn't fall into my area, and I recommended
that these reports be sent to other offices.

The questions that are raised is: was this
procedure legal? There is no question that it was legal
when it was ordered by the President. Did it follow proper
procedures? Every individual case was authorized by the
Attorney General and requested by the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. In no case did it concern
any other matter except the leakage of national security
information.

And it is true I resented having this question
raised time and again after I had spent at least seven
hours with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee explaining

A-7

every individual case, in the presence of the then
Attorney General, Elliot Richardson, who supported my
testimony on the basis of his records and other information.

MR. KOPPEL: The other question that remains --
and I think this is the one that prompted you to cut the
questioning off the other day -- is the degree of your own
participation in this, and whether or not you initiated or
whether the President initiated the wire taps.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The President ordered the
institution of the system of wire taps. I was ordered, as
part of the system, to supply the names of individuals who
had had access to information that had leaked. And I
supplied the names in cases there were leaks, for investigation
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as was my
responsibility as an Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs. The system was operated by the
Federal Bureau of Investigation and authorized by the
Attorney General after the initial decision by the President.
I did supply the names of those individuals who had had
access to the information that had had leaks; and I have
so testified for a year.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Secretary, let me state a

A-8

hypothesis, and you tell me if I am wrong.

If I were in charge of secret and sensitive negotiations and there were serious leaks, I would not hesitate for a moment to investigate everybody who had access to that information. I think Ambassador Bohlen in his biography said his phone was tapped from the first day he entered Franklin Roosevelt's service, and it happened in other administrations. So I wouldn't be defensive about it; I would say it was necessary.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It was my duty to protect the information that was entrusted to me. And the investigation served no other purpose except the protection of the highest state secrets.

MR. SMITH: Mr. Secretary, has Watergate had an effect on your handling of American foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is a strange phenomena because, on the one hand, as a professor I would have said that it is impossible for central authority of the government to be so systematically under attack without our foreign policy suffering, because, after all, foreign policy depends on the expectation that other people have of the steadiness of one's performance or one's ability to fulfill one's promises.

A-9

Nevertheless, it is also true that I have not
noted any significant impairment of the conduct of our
foreign policy. And this is due to a number of factors:
One, the essential bipartisan support our foreign policy
has had. Secondly, the fact that the United States is
such a powerful country and such a significant factor in
the world that other countries cannot avoid dealing with it.
And I think also the amount of public support that has been
given to foreign policy and which does not seem to have been
affected by Watergate.

B-1

10

MR. KOPPEL: Mr. Secretary, don't we have to re-
gard this question on two levels: one, the surface level.
No one really expects the leaders in the Kremlin, for example,
or the leaders in the Politburo in Peking, to publicly make
any reference to Watergate and to humiliate the President.
But isn't it also true that below that surface, they would
have to regard what might be a weakness of the American
Administration and take it into account.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. It is clear that they
have to take it into account, and you cannot measure the
impact of Watergate by the public references other countries
would make. You can measure it either in terms of risks
they are prepared to run toward the United States, or in
terms of opportunities that the United States is losing.

The first clearly hasn't happened. No one has
mounted a major challenge against the United States.

The second, Watergate has certainly not affected
our Middle East policy.

is

Now, if there/a somewhat greater reluctance for
other countries to undertake new initiatives with us,
that is very hard to judge. I don't believe that it would
be possible to prove that this is the case.

MR. KOPPEL: Let me ask one more difficult question

B-2

11

before we finish, the question that was raised by the
President's former Chief of Staff, Bob Haldeman, in the
course of this program, and I have to pose it this way:

Is it possible that a man who has such sensitive
antennae as yours, who is so attuned to the careful
nuance of language, that he could be around the White House
and attend these senior staff meetings that Haldeman re-
ferred to, without being unaware of Watergate and its re-
lated matters, the cover-up.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Watergate was never discussed
at any of the staff meetings. Indeed, Mr. Haldeman took
the position that he didn't know anything about Watergate,
and therefore it couldn't be discussed.

Hard as it may be to believe, I never had any
knowledge of Watergate or its related matters, because
Watergate and its related matters never came up at any
staff meeting.

MR. KOPPEL: There must have been, though, an
almost deliberate intent then on your part to keep yourself
as far removed from that as possible. Everyone in the
country knows what was going on.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I asked some of my

B-3

12

associates whether they knew anything -- what the story of
the Watergate was, and they told me they didn't know.

Watergate became a major issue only in April 1973. Until that time, I accepted what was generally asserted, namely that it was an operation conducted by a number of individuals at the Committee for the Re-election of the President.

And until the matter blew up in April 1973, I had no knowledge of it. The middle of April, 1973, one of the lawyers handling the case came to me and gave me a picture because of his concern for what it might do to national security -- and I believe that is shown in one of the transcripts.

MR. KOPPEL: Forgive me, I just wanted to raise one additional question, since you bring up the matter of transcripts.

In the transcript, there is an oblique reference by the President in which he says -- and I don't have the language down correctly -- he asked -- he being you, in this instance -- that it be done, the wiretapping, and I assume it was.

Is there some way you can explain that reference?

B-4

13

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is a large unintelligible section in that reference, and I cannot explain the reference. It was part of another conversation. It must have been based on a misapprehension. The facts supported by the records are exactly as I have described them.

The system was instituted by the President and the Attorney General and the Director of the FBI, that after the system was instituted, I supplied names for investigation.

MR. SMITH: Can I ask you about some specific things now, some of which you are criticized for -- you are praised for many things, but there are some criticisms.

On October 25th in the last Middle East war, we declared a world-wide military alert. And at that time, you said, in a short while, a week or ten days, you would tell us the grounds for it, and we would understand.

But we haven't heard the grounds, yet. Could you tell us?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have briefed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in considerable detail about the grounds.

Upon further reflection, it was thought undesirable to put the whole record out, because it would require the

B-5

14

release of intelligence information that was rather sensitive, and also the release of very confidential exchanges between the President and the General Secretary Brezhnev. And it was thought that if we once start publicly revealing these exchanges, as well as our sources of intelligence, that the damage would be out of proportion to the possible benefits.

But I believe that the Congressional committees who have heard the full story have never questioned the necessity of doing it.

MR. SMITH: Second, would you still consider the cease-fire agreement you negotiated in Viet-Nam to be a peace with honor?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. I would still consider it a peace with honor. It is important to remember the context in which it was negotiated. There was a mounting crescendo of public opposition in the United States to the war. There were increasing pressures to end it almost at any price. Congressional resolutions to cut off, to put a terminal date, proposals to over-throw a government with which we were allied.

We thought that we would have to end our military

B-6

15

involvements in a war that had cost 50,000 American lives,
without the dishonor of overthrowing a government which,
when it was established, had every reason to believe that
it enjoyed American support, and in a manner that gave this
government a reasonable opportunity to defend itself.

Of course, if we would have fought two or three
years longer, we might have obtained more satisfactory terms.
In the conditions that then existed, in terms of the public
pressures to which we were exposed, and the general anguish
in America, I believe that it was a peace with honor.

We ended our involvement on the terms we have pub-
licly stated of giving the Vietnamese an opportunity to
defend themselves, and not overthrow any government with
which we were allied.

MR. SMITH: One more question. One critic has
said that you could have got the same agreement much, much
earlier had you acceded to the proposition that the North
Vietnamese be allowed to keep troops in South Viet-Nam.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is always easy to pick
out isolated aspects of the negotiating record and to take
them out of context.

There was one issue, and one issue only, that

B-7

16

prevented an agreement. The issue of North Vietnamese troops in South Viet-Nam was substantially settled in 1971. The one issue that stood in the way of an agreement was the North Vietnamese insistence until October 8, 1972, that we overthrow the government with which we were allied. It was a pre-condition of any other negotiation. This was the one irreducible demand they made. This is the one demand we didn't meet. We had always made clear that if the North Vietnamese were prepared to settle for a military cease-fire, and did not make this political demand, that we would find a way of settling the war.

MR. KOPPEL: Mr. Secretary, you have suggested on several occasions that you want to institutionalize foreign policy here, and that you want to be able to hand over the structure that you have been building to your successor. It is however, precisely one of the points on which you were most vulnerable to criticism, that is, that you are a one-man show, that you have this small inner circle of advisers with whom you deal.

Is that process in train? Have you begun handing over?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First of all, it depends

B-3

17

what you mean by "institutionalization." There are many
aspects of it. One is, obtaining public support. I
think this has been quite satisfactory.

Secondly, and even more importantly, it is the
question of getting Congressional support and to make
foreign policy a truly bipartisan effort. I think that has
been reasonably successful. In fact, I would say that has
been very successful.

The third element is to institutionalize it within
the Department of State.

Then, the question is: How do you institutional-
ize foreign policy in a large bureaucracy?

I was not selected because of my skill in manage-
ment. I was selected, I assume, because of my approach to
foreign policy, and hopefully a certain ability to inspire
others to work with me.

I believe that we are well underway to institution-
alized foreign policy in the Department in this sense. I
believe there is a new spirit. We have appointed the ablest
younger men we could find. Our method of operation is
somewhat chaotic, but the rewards for this, one cannot
test them every month. I believe that at the end of a

E-9

18

year -- a year and a half -- you will see that the Department of State will operate with a new spirit and with an attitude which I hope will carry forward under my successor.

MR. SMITH: Let me say what I think institutionalization would mean. It would mean that while Henry Kissinger is very busy making rather creative advances in the Middle East, parallel movements should be made at the same time by others in Latin American, in Europe, in Japan, and other places where we have not been very successful.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I believe that, first of all, in Latin America, I think we have been very successful in recent months. I think there has been a total change in the relationship between Latin America and the United States, as a result of two Foreign Ministers meetings, one in Mexico City and one in Washington. And I would actually claim that Latin American policy has had a totally new impetus.

Relations in Western Europe and Japan, any new policy departure, requires first a period of gestation and then it will suddenly, seemingly suddenly, come to

B-10

19

fruition.

The China approach was prepared over a period of
two and a half years. The only reason it didn't get
under public debate was that I was then in the White House
and I did not submit myself to as much public scrutiny.

Now, the new relationship with Western Europe and
Japan has had to go through many difficult periods because
of a really substantial change in the internal structure,
the economic strength, self-confidence of these countries.

I believe with Japan, we have already turned the
corner. I expect that with Europe within the next year
we will turn the corner. And I think when the record of
this administration is written, the relations with Japan
and Western Europe will appear rather good.

I nevertheless agree that there should be other
foci of responsibility than the Secretary within the
Department.

MR. SMITH: And you think you are on the way of
doing that, or will be on the way? You have been very
busy with one subject while you have been there.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I do my job the way I think
it should be done, I must succeed in doing that.

(w)

20

3-11

MR. KOPPEL: Mr. Secretary, you have expressed the point of view -- and I think we are reaching the end, now -- but you have expressed the point of view that the President is fully justified in going overseas at this time to the Middle East, and then, later this month to Moscow.

If you ever felt that foreign policy was being manipulated for the sake of domestic political reason, what would you do?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would resign. And I would say so publicly. Foreign policy has to reflect the continuing values of the American people, and it cannot be the subject of partisan politics.

MR. SMITH: May I ask you a personal question -- almost personal? When I first knew you, you were very academic, and, if you will excuse me, rather wooden in expression on television programs and in debates, and you wrote books I found rather difficult to plow through, and now you have been transformed into someone who is articulate and the American people follow what you are saying, and a wit has been shown that wasn't there before.

What -- how did this transformation occur? Was it always there and we just didn't know about it, or

B-12

21

what happened?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It must have been always there, or maybe I was trying to live up to the Harvard mold.

MR. SMITH: Now you are living down to the State Department one.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I guess so.

MR. SMITH: People say you prefer to deal with dictators rather than democratic leaders because of your success.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think that is true. My overriding concern has been Europe. That is what I have written books about.

MR. SMITH: To what extent do you think you are a creator of events and agreements and settlements, or serving the purpose of a mid-wife in delivering things that have been germinating for a long time and now matured to happen?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No one can create a political structure in a vacuum. I think it is the statesman's responsibility to recognize the trend of events and to understand it correctly. And if he understands it correctly, then he can perhaps shape ten percent of it. But anyone

B-13

22

who pretends that he creates something totally new in a
vacuum, doesn't understand the nature of foreign policy.

MR. SMITH: You have had a string of successes
that have been spectacular to the public. Do you live
with the fear that you are violating the laws of compen-
sation and that somewhere in the future a trip waits to
throw you down?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In the conduct of foreign policy
you are up against individuals of more or less equal
ability all the time. Also, you may make a mistake in
judging the course of events. It is impossible always
to succeed. And you shouldn't live with the fear of failure.
That doesn't mean you don't have the fear of failure. But
it is improbable that you will succeed always.

MR. SMITH: It is said that your relations with
President Nixon are very formal, and rather distant and
aloof, more so than with his other aides. Is that true?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My relations with the Presi-
dent are very business-like, and concentrating on substance.

MR. SMITH: Thank you, very much.

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 7627

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03523 01 OF 04 180708Z

P1

ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-07
PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SAM-01 SAB-01 SCCT-02
ACDA-19 MC-02 AEC-11 SCI-06 AECE-00 IO-14 DRC-01 /131 W
060531

7 180635Z JUN. 74 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1689

UNCLAS SECTION 1 OF 4 AMMAN 3523

PASS WHITE HOUSE PRESS

F.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: SECRETARY KISSINGER'S JUNE 17 JERUSALEM PRESS CONFERENCE

1. PURSUANT DEPARTMENT'S REQUEST IN DEPARTMENT OPS CENTER - EMBASSY AMMAN TELECON, EMBASSY TRANSMITS SECRETARY'S JUNE 17 JERUSALEM PRESS CONFERENCE.

2. TEXT FOLLOWS. QUOTE:

SECRETARY KISSINGER: SO MANY OF YOU LISTENING TO RON'S BRIEFINGS HAVE GOT THE IDEA THAT I HAD LEFT THE TRIP THAT WAS FELT USEFUL ON THIS LAST DAY FOR ME TO ANSWER SOME QUESTIONS AND RON AGREED, PROVIDED I DIDN'T MAKE AN OPENING STATEMENT. (LAUGHTER)

I WILL BE GLAD TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS.

Q. OR KISSINGER, IT HAS BEEN ALMOST A WEEK SINCE YOU MADE YOUR STATEMENT ABOUT RESIGNING UNLESS YOUR INTEGRITY WAS RESTORED. DO YOU FEEL ANY BETTER ABOUT IT?

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03523 01 OF 04 180708Z

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I WILL ANSWER THIS QUESTION, BUT THEN I WONT ANSWER ANY OTHER QUESTIONS ON THAT SUBJECT. WE WILL KEEP IT THERE. I STICK BY WHAT I SAID A WEEK AGO AND NOW THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE IS GOING TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER.

Q. THERE IS A REPORT IN THE MORNING PAPERS THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAS INSTRUCTED YOU TO GET IN TOUCH WITH PALESTINIAN LEADERS IN THE NEAR FUTURE. DO YOU HAVE A COMMENT ON THAT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THERE IS NO BASIS TO THIS REPORT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, HOW CERTAIN ARE THE TECHNICIANS AND THE SCIENTISTS THAT INFORMATION GIVEN TO EGYPT CANNOT BE USED TO MANUFACTUR A BOMB?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO GET THIS AGREEMENT INTO SOME SORT OF A PERSPECTIVE. WE HAVE AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR REACTORS, I BELIEVE, WITH 28 OTHER COUNTRIES. YOU CAN CHECK THE EXACT NUMBER. THE ISSUE OF DIVERSION HAS NEVER BEEN RAISED IN THE FACE OF OUR SAFEGUARDS EXCEPT IN THE LAST MONTH BECAUSE OF THE INDIA NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. THE INDIA NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OCCURRED WITH MATERIAL THAT WAS DIVERTED NOT FROM AN AMERICAN REACTOR UNDER AMERICAN SAFEGUARDS, BUT FROM A CANADIAN REACTOR THAT DID NOT HAVE APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS.

WE HAVE ALWAYS BEEN CONFIDENT THAT THE SAFEGUARD AGREEMENTS UPON WHICH WE HAVE INSISTED AND ON WHICH WE SHALL INSIST IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, ARE ADEQUATE TO PREVENT THE DIVERSION OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS FOR MILITARY PURPOSES. NEVER THELESS, WE WILL REVIEW THESE SAFEGUARDS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAVE TO TAKE PLACE WITH EGYPT OR WITH ANY OTHER GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH WE WILL NEGOTIATE A SIMILAR AGREEMENT TO MAKE DOUBLY SURE THAT THERE AREN'T ANY LOOPHOLES IN IT.

THIS REACTOR WILL TAKE FROM SIX TO EIGHT YEARS TO BUILD AND IN THAT PERIOD, WILL, OF COURSE, PROVIDE AN INCENTIVE TO CONCENTRATE ON, AMONG OTHERS, ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RATHER THAN ON MILITARY PURPOSES: A PERIOD OF TIME WITHIN WHICH WE

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03523 01 OF 04 180708Z

BELIEVE THAT THE TURN TOWARDS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAN BE
FINALLY ACCOMPLISHED.

Q. ARE THE ISRAELI OFFICIALS THAT YOU HAVE MADE THIS EXPLANATION
TO SATISFIED WITH IT? ARE THEY CONFIDENT AS YOU ARE THAT THERE
WILL BE NO DIVERSION?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: NEEDLESS TO SAY, FOR A COUNTRY THAT HAS
LIVED AS PRECARIOUSLY IS ISRAEL, ANYTHING WITH EVEN A VAGUE
POTENTIAL FOR AFFECTING THE MILITARY SITUATION IS A SOURCE OF
SOME CONCERN.

I BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT THOSE ISRAELI OFFICIALS WITH WHOM
I HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK AND WITH WHOM THE PRESIDENT HAS
HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK, REALIZE THAT THERE IS NO DANGER OF
MILITARY DIVERSION, THAT THEY ARE REASSURED AND I BELIEVE THAT
THIS WHOLE MATTER IS GOING TO BLOW OVER VERY QUICKLY.

A. MR. SECRETARY, HAS THERE BEEN ANY DISCUSSION IN ANY DEGREE
OF DETAIL BETWEEN YOU OR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ISRAELIS ON THE
PROBLEM OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE 1967 TERRITORIES THAT WERE
SETZED BY THE ISRAELIS AND WHAT IS THEIR REACTION?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THERE HAS BEEN NO DISCUSSION IN THE TALKS
BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE ISRAELIS ON THIS TRIP AND FOR
THAT MATTER BETWEEN MYSELF AND THE ISRAELIS ON ANY PREVIOUS
TRIP OF A SPECIFIC LINE TO WHICH ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW IN THE
COURSE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

WE HAVE DELIBERATLY ADOPTED A STEP BY STEP APPROACH IN
WHICH THE UNITED STATES DID NOT PUT FORWARD ANY PRECISE IDEA,
BUT RATHER PERMITTED THE PARTIES TO CRYSTALIZE THEIR OWN THINK-
ING AND ONLY WHEN THAT HAD OCCURRED HAS THE UNITED STATES
PUT FORWARD SPECIFICS. THOSE WHO WERE ON TRIPS WITH ME KNOW
THAT WE SPENT SOMETIMES AGONIZING WEEKS LETTING THE PARTIES
CRYSTALIZE THEIR OWN THINKING BEFORE WE EMERGED WITH SOMETHING
CALLED THE UNITED STATES PROPOSAL TO BRIDGE GAPS THAT HAD
ALREADY BECOME VERY NARROW.

SO THE UNITED STATES HAS NOT TALKED TO ISRAEL EITHER ON
THIS TRIP OR ON MY PREVIOUS TRIPS ABOUT MY PARTICULAR LINE BUT

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 AMMAN 03523 01 OF 04 180708Z

ONLY ABOUT THE GENERAL PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL THAT WILL BE PART OF A NEGOTIATION, TO WHICH ISRAEL HAS OF COURSE ALWAYS AGREED.

Q. SECRETARY KISSINGER, TWO QUESTIONS; THE FIRST ONE IS WILL THE UNITED STATES AND THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS FORMALLY REACH SOME FORM OF LONG-TERM MILITARY AID AGREEMENT TODAY?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: OF COURSE I SHOULDN'T ANTICIPATE WHAT MAY BE IN THE JOINT STATEMENT THAT IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION, AND IN FACT, WHICH I WILL HAVE TO BE DISCUSSING RIGHT AFTER THE PRESS CONFERENCE, HOWEVER, ENOUGH HAS BEEN SAID PUBLICLY BY SENIOR OFFICIALS ABOUT THE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE BY THE UNITED STATES TO LOOK AT THE MILITARY NEEDS OF ISRAEL ON A LONGER TERM BASIS THAT I DON'T THINK YOU WOULD GO OVERBOARD TO SPECULATE THAT WE WOULD AGREE TO THIS.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 7629

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03523 03 OF 04 180734Z

21

ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-07
PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SAM-01 SAB-01 SCCT-02
ACDA-19 MC-02 AEC-11 SCI-06 AECE-00 IO-14 DRC-01 /131 W
----------------------- 060726

Z 180635Z JUN 74 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1691

UNCLASS SECTION 3 OF 4 AMMAN 3523

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE PRESS

SECRETARY KISSINGER: ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS AGREED THAT IT DID NOT INSIST ON HOLDING ALL THE TERRITORIES ACQUIRED OR OCCUPIED IN THE 1967 WAR. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HER NEIGHBORS HAS CONCERNED TO WHAT PRECISE LINE ISRAEL SHOULD WITHDRAW. THIS IS AN ISSUE THAT DID NOT HAVE TO BE FACED IN THE STAGES OF NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH WHICH WE HAVE BEEN GOING.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WE REALLY CAN'T SENSE VERY WELL WHAT THE MOOD OR THE STYLE OF THE TALKS IS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND THESE LEADERS. COULD YOU DESCRIBE A LITTLE BIT INVOLVING WHEN YOU ARE IN THE ROOM, WHAT IT IS LIKE AND HOW THEY APPROACH SUBJECTS AND SOMEWHAT OF THE TONE OF WHAT GOES ON?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE PRESIDENT'S STYLE IN NEGOTIATIONS IS A VERY REFLECTIVE STYLE, THAT IS TO SAY HE DOES NOT GO IN THERE WITH TEN SPECIFIC POINTS TO BARGAIN ON A SPECIFIC AGREEMENT. HE BELIEVES THAT AS PRESIDENT HIS GREATEST CONTRIBUTION IS TO SET A GENERAL DIRECTION, TO MAKE SURE THE PARTIES WITH WHICH WE ARE DEALING UNDERSTAND OUR BASIC PURPOSES AND THEN TO LEAVE IT TO OTHERS TO FILL IN THE DETAILS OF THE DAY TO DAY NEGOTIATIONS. THAT IS ALL THE MORE NECESSARY AS IN A SIX TO FOUR HOUR MEETING ONE CAN IN ANY EVENT ONLY COVER THE MAIN DIRECTIONS.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CLC]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03523 03 OF 04 180734Z

THEREFORE, IN THESE MEETINGS, THE PRESIDENT ALWAYS ATTEMPTS TO
MAKE SURE AND IN MY VIEW DOES SO VERY EFFECTIVELY TO PUT ACROSS
TO THE LEADER WITH WHOM HE IS TALKING WHAT THE GENERAL PURPOSES
ARE OF THE UNITED STATES.

HE THEN ELICITS FROM THEM A STATEMENT OF THE DIRECTIONS IN
WHICH THEY WANT TO GO. I WANT TO STRESS, THE PURPOSE OF THIS
TRIP IS NOT SIMPLY TO DESIGN OR PRIMARLY TO DESIGN A NEGOTIATION
PROCESS FOR THE NEXT THREE MONTHS, BUT TO BRING ABOUT AN
UNDERSTANDING WHICH CAN SUSTAIN THE PROCESS OVER THE NEXT
FEW YEARS.

SECONDLY, IN DISCUSSING THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS,
WE ATTEMPT TO DEFINE WHAT THE LONG-TERM PURPOSES ARE THAT WE AND
THE COUNTRY WHICH WE ARE VISITING CAN SHARE WITHIN THE
FRAMEWORK OF WHICH THEN THE PRECISE TECHNICAL ARRANGEMENTS CAN
BE WORKED OUT.

PETER,

Q. DR KISSINGER, THERE WAS AN AIR OF HASTE ABOUT THE DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES WHICH WAS ISSUED IN CAIRO. CAN YOU TELL US WHEN
PREPARATIONS FOR THAT DECLARATION BEGAN?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU CAN DEDUCE FROM
THE TYPOS AN AIR OF HASTE. THE PREPARATION FOR THE DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES BEGAN ABOUT TEN DAYS--ON MY LAST VISIT TO PRESIDENT
SADAT, AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREE-
MENT, IT WAS AGREED FIRST TO SET UP THE COOPERATION COMMISSION
AND, SECONDLY, THAT SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THAT COMMISSION WOULD BE
SPECIFIED OUT DURING THE COURSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

SO AS SOON AS I RETURNED, PREPARATIONS BEGAN ABOUT SPELLING
OUT THE DETAILS OF THAT ASPECT OF IT. THE NUCLEAR PART HAD
BEEN NEGOTIATED SINCE APRIL, I BELIEVE, BY A VISITING TEAM OF
EGYPTIANS AND IT HAPPENED TO CRYSTALLIZE AT ABOUT THE TIME
OF THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT AND THERE WAS NO LONG-TERM DESIGN TO
MAKE IT COINCIDE WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT. IT JUST HAPPENED TO
COINCIDE WITH THE PRESIDENTIAL VISIT AND IT WAS, THEREFORE,
INCLUDED AS PART OF THE GENERAL PACKAGE. THE BASIC IDEA HAD BEEN
IN PREPARATION BEFORE THE PRESIDENT ARRIVED.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03523 03 OF 04 180734Z

IT WAS THEN DISCUSSED IN GREAT DETAIL BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS AND WAS REDUCED INTO A CONCRETE STATEMENT ON THURSDAY NIGHT. THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTY THAT EXISTED WAS THAT THE PARTY WAS DIVIDED BETWEEN ALEXANDRIA AND CAIRO AND, BY PASSING THE DOCUMENTS BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN ALEXANDRIA AND CAIRO, A FEW LINES OF THE COMMUNIQUE WERE INADVERTENTLY DROPPED. ZEIGLER SAID HE WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT. (LAUGHTER). I SURE AS HELL WON'T. (LAUGHTER)

Q. THERE IS A FEELING HERE IN ONE'S CONVERSATIONS WITH ISRAELIS THAT THERE IS A MOOD WHICH PRESUMES THAT THE ARAB STRATEGY RIGHT NOW IS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION PREPARATORY TO THE LONG-RANGE DESIGN OF CONTINUING AN OFFENSIVE TO LIQUIDATE THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

ON THE BASIS OF YOUR TALKS WITH THE ARABS TO DATE WHAT REASSURANCE, IF ANY, CAN YOU GIVE THE ISRAELI POPULACE THAT THIS IS OR IS NOT IN THE LONG RANGE DESIGN OR SCHEME OF THE ARAB NEIGHBORS THAT SURROUND THEM?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: PEOPLE WHO HAVE LIVED FOR 25 YEARS WITH THE THREAT OF EXTINCTION, WHOSE NEIGHBORS FOR ITS ENTIRE HISTORY HAVE NOT RECOGNIZED ITS EXISTENCE, NEEDLESS TO SAY LIVES WITH A PREMONITION OF CATASTROPHE THAT IS NOT TRUE OF ALMOST ANY OTHER STATE, AND THEREFORE THE SENSE OF CATASTROPHE, PARTLY AS A RESULT OF JEWISH HISTORY, PARTLY AS A RESULT OF ISRAEL'S HISTORY, HAS TO BE DEEP IN THE SOULS OF EVERYBODY HERE AND WE, AS AMERICANS, HAVE TO UNDERSTAND IT.

ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS OUR CONVICTION THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN THE EXISTENCE OF ISRAEL, THE ARAB STATES, EVEN THE MORE RADICAL ONES LIKE SYRIA, ARE TALKING ABOUT A CONTINUING STATE OF ISRAEL AND THAT SOME OF THE ARAB STATES SEEM TO HAVE MADE A RATHER CRUCIAL DECISION TO SEEK TO WODK OUT MODALITIES OF COEXISTENCE WITH THE STATE OF ISRAEL.

NOW THIS IS AN ENTIRELY NEW EXPERIENCE FOR ISRAEL, AND IT IS ALSO DIFFICULT AND A PAINFUL ADJUSTMENT FOR ISRAEL TO SEE THAT THE POLARIZATION THAT HAD BEEN CHARACTERISTIC OF THE AREA THROUGH MOST OF THE HISTORY IF ISRAEL, WITH THE UNITED STATES TOTALLY ON ONE SIDE AND THE SOVIET UNION TOTALLY ON THE OTHER,

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CLC>

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 AMMAN 03523 03 OF 04 180734Z

IS ALSO CHANGING TO A MORE COMPLEX RELATIONSHIP.

IN MY EXPERIENCE ONE OF THE MORE MOVING ASPECTS OF THE DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS HAS BEEN TO SEE THE TRANSFORMATION OF THAT FEAR INTO A SENSE OF SECURITY HAS DEVELOPED THROUGH THE PROCESS THAT THE PRESIDENT INITIATED LAST OCTOBER, AND I BELIEVE THAT AS A RESULT OF THIS TRIP AND OF THE EVENTS THAT WILL FOLLOW THIS TRIP, THAT ISRAEL WILL UNDERSTAND THAT ITS LONG-TERM SECURITY IS MORE SURELY GUARANTEED BY WHAT IS NOW GOING ON AND IN FACT IT IS THE ONLY WAY TO ASSURE IT.

THIS DOESN'T MEEN, HOWEVER, THAT AS ONE GOES THROUGH PARTICULAR PHASES THERE MAY NOT BE ELEMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY AND EVEN ELEMENTS OF PAIN, BUT WE WILL FACE THEM WITH A SENSE OF PARTNERSHIP AND UNDERSTANDING THAT HAS BEEN CHARACTERISTIC OF OUR PREVIOUS EFFORTS.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 7628

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03523 02 OF 04 180721Z

12

ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 DRC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
NSC-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03
NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SAM-01 SAB-01 SCCT-02
ACDA-19 MC-02 AEC-11 SCI-06 AECE-00 IO-14 /131 W
------------------------------
060633

7 180635Z JUN 74 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1690

UNCLAS SECTION 2 OF 4 AMMAN 3523

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE PRESS

Q. HOW MUCH, A MILLION AND A HALF A YEAR?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: NO, WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT EITHER SPECIFIC FIGURES OR ABOUT A SPECIFIC TIME. WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE PRINCIPLE OF IT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHAT WILL THE NEXT STEP BE IN THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: OF COURSE, YOU REMEMBER THAT IN EGYPT PRESIDENT SADAT POINTED OUT THAT THERE WERE SOME FURTHER EXCHANGES NEEDED BETWEEN THE VARIOUS ARAB COUNTRIES BEFORE THE ARAB COUNTRIES COULD DECIDE WHICH WOULD BE THE MOST APPROPRIATE NEXT STEP. WHAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO DO IS TO EXCHANGE INFORMALLY IDEAS WITH ALL OF THE PARTIES TO SEE WHICH COURSE WILL CRYSTALLIZE AND THAT, IN TURN, WILL REQUIRE THAT THERE ARE SOME PRIOR DISCUSSIONS AMONG THE ARAB COUNTRIES.

AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES AND ISRAEL IS CONCERNED, WE EXPECT TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER IN THE UNITED STATES NEXT MONTH AND THE PRIME MINISTER AT AN EARLY DATE, AND WE WILL THEN DISCUSS A COMMON APPROACH TO THE NEGOTIATION.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03523 02 OF 04 180721Z

Q. MR. SECRETARY, HAS PRESIDENT ASSAD DEFINITELY AGREED TO ATTEND THE GENEVA CONFERENCE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THAT QUESTION HAS EVER BEEN FFORMALLY PUT TO HIM THIS WAY. BUT CERTAINLY ALL OUR DISCUSSIONS WERE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE THEORY OF HIM ATTENDING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, AND I DON'T BELIEVE THERE IS ANY PROBLEM ABOUT THAT.

Q. HAVE YOU NOTICED ANY CHANGE IN ATTITUDES OR CONCERN AMONG THE LEADERS YOU DISCUSSED BECAUSE OF THE UNCERTAINTY YOU CAST OVER YOUR FUTURE BECAUSE OF YOUR COMMENTS IN SALZBURG?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I HAVE NOT DISCUSSED THE ISSUE WITH ANY OF THE LEADERS WITH WHOM WE HAVE MET AND I HAVE NOT HAD THAT IMPRESSION. OF COURSE, THERE IS SOME HOPE IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. (LAUGHTER)

Q. CAN YOU GIVE US AN OVERVIEW OF WHAT YOU THINK HAS HAPPENED IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL IN TERMS OF WHAT IS THE SITUATION NOW, AS YOU SEE IT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK, TO UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION NOW, ONE HAS TO CONSIDER IT IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF WHAT HAS OCCURRED IN THE SIX OR SEVEN MONTHS SINCE THE INITIATIVE, IN WHICH THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP CULMINATED, BEGAN. WHEN THIS INITIATIVE BEGAN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS POLARIZED BETWEEN THE ARAB WORLD ON THE ONE SIDE, AND ISRAEL ON THE OTHER, WITH THE ARAB WORLD BACKED BY THE SOVIET UNION, ISRAEL BACKED BY THE UNITED STATES.

AS A RESULT, EVERY CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAD THE INSLLUABLE QUALITY OF A SUPERPOWER CONFRONTATION AND THE UNITED STATES' ROLE WAS SEEN AS THAT OF SIMPLY REPRESENTING ONE OF THE SIDES IN A DISPUTE WHICH HAD BEEN FESTERING FOR 25 YEARS. LAST NOVEMBER, THERE BEGAN A DIPLOMATIC TURN IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES, WITHOUT GIVING UP ITS TRADITIONAL FRIENDSHIP AND SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL, AT THE SAME TIME BEGAN TO MOVE INTO A POSITION WHERE IT COULD BE HELPFUL TO ALL

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 AMMAN 03523 02 OF 04 180721Z

OF THE PARTIES IN THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION AND WHERE IN TURN,
THE OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST BEGAN TO RECONSIDER THEIR
ONE-SIDED RELIANCE ON ONLY ONE OF THE COUNTRIES.

THIS PROCESS LEADING TO DISENGAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS CUL-
MINATED IN THE PRESIDENTIAL TRIP WHICH HAS TO BE SEEN ON MANY
LEVELS. ON THE ONE LEVEL, AS A SYMBOLIC AFFIRMATION OF A DRAMATIC
REVERSAL IN THE WHOLE HISTORIC EVOLUTION OF THIS AREA; AT THE
SAME TIME AS ENABLING THE UNITED STATES TO BEGIN A RELATIONSHIP
WITH ALL OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA, NOT BASED ON THE EXIGENC-
IES OF A PARTICULAR CRISIS, BUT BASED ON THE LONG-TERM PROS-
PERITY AND PROGRESS OF THE AREA, AND THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT AND
CONVERSATION IN ALL OF THESE COUNTRIES HAS SERVED TO CRYSTALLIZE
AND TO PUT INTO A FOCUS THIS DIRECTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND ALL OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA.

AND THIROLY, IT HAS ENABLED THE PRESIDENT TO ENGAGE IN
PREFLIMINARY CONVERSATIONS, NOT ABOUT THE TACTICS OF HOW PEACE
SHOULD BE MADE, BUT ABOUT THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE PEACE
EFFORTS, AND I THEREFORE THINK THAT THE MIDDLE EAST POLICY, IF
WE CAN STAY ON THIS COURSE, AND WE ALL RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS
A VERY TRICKY AND COMPLICATED AREA, COULD MARK ONE OF THE
TURNING POINTS IN THE POST-WAR DIPLOMATIC HISTORY.

Q. DR KISSINGER, IN YOUR OPINION AND THAT OF UNITED STATES, HOW CAN THE PALESTINIANS EFFECTIVELY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY BE BROUGHT INTO THIS WHOLE NEGOTIATING PROCESS THAT HAS JUST BEEN DESCRIBED?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: OF COURSE, THE MOST EFFICIENT WAY FOR THE
PALESTINIANS TO BE BROUGHT INTO THE PROCESS IS THROUGH A JORD-
ANTAN NEGOTIATION IN WHICH THERE IS THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND
FOR WHICH ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS DECLARED ITS READINESS IN PRINCIPLE.
AS FOR OTHER STEPS THAT MIGHT BE TAKEN, I THINK
IT IS PREMATURE TO SPECULATE AT THIS POINT WHEN THERE ARE
OTHER ISSUES, SUCH AS BORDERS AND TERRITORY, THAT REQUIRE MORE
URGENT CONSIDERATION.

Q. MR SECRETARY, A FEW MINUTES AGO IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ON WITHDRAWAL FROM THE OCCUPIED LANDS, YOU SAID AT THE END OF YOUR RESPONSE, "TO WHICH ISRAEL HAS ALWAYS AGREED".

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 7630

PAGE 01 AMMAN 03523 04 OF 04 180738Z

21

ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-07
PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SAM-01 SAB-01 SCCT-02
ACDA-19 MC-02 AEC-11 SCI-06 AECE-00 IO-14 DRC-01 /131 W
060738

Z 180635Z JUN 74 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1692

UNCLAS SECTION 4 OF 4 AMMAN 3523

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE PRESS

Q. CAN YOU COMMENT ON REPORTS THIS MORNING THAT YOU ARE ALSO ABOUT TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT WHEREBY ISRAEL WILL BE GIVEN ASSISTANCE IN THE DIRECTION OF A NUCLEAR POWER PLANT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, IT IS OF COURSE DIFFICULT FOR ME TO COMMENT ON THINGS THAT WILL BE IN A JOINT STATEMENT, BUT IT IS REASONABLE TO ASSUME THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO MAKE AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL THAT WE HAVE ALSO MADE WITH EGYPT.

Q. YOU SAY WE ARE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: IN PRINCIPLE.

Q. YOU MEAN ON THE NUCLEAR PLANTS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WHY DON'T YOUUWAIT UNTIL WE -- I DON'T THINK I SHOULD ANSWER ANY MORE QUESTIONS ON WHAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE IN A COMMUNIQUE THAT MAY OR MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED.

Q. OR KISSINGER, YOU STATED THAT I WOULD BE MOST DESIREABLE IF JORDAN WOULD BE THE SPOKESMAN FOR THE PALESTINIANS, HOWEVER, BOTH SYRIA AND EGYPT MADE IT ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THEY REGARD

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03523 04 OF 04 180738Z

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, POSSIBLY SOME OF THE BRANCHES, AS A LEGITIMATE SPOKESMAN FOR THE PALESTINIANS. DOES THE UNITED STATES INTEND TO DEAL WITH THE PLO AND WOULD IT RECOGNIZE THEM AS THE LEGITIMATE SPOKESMEN OF THE PALESTINIANS IF EGYPT AND SYRIA INSISTED ON THIS?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: NO, WHAT I SAID WAS THAT THIS IS ONE AND PERHAPS THE MOST EFFICIENT WAY OF DOING IT. WE CONSIDER THE QUESTION NOW PREMATUER. WE WILL NOT MAKE OUR DECISION BASED PRIMARILY ON WHAT THIS OR THAT OTHER STATE IN THE AREA MAY RECOMMEND.

O, DR KISSINGER, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO RECOMMEND AS A NEXT STEP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DISENGAGEMENT TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THE UNITED STATES HAS ALWAYS FAVORED IN PRINCIPLE TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN AND IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT ISRAEL IS NOT IN PRINCIPLE OPPOSED TO TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN. THE PROBLEM IS WHETHER ONE CAN FIND SOME FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH THESE TALKS MAY TAKE PLACE. IF THE TWO PARTIES AGREE ON TALKS, THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE PREPARED TO BE HELPFUL AND TO PLAY A USEFUL ROLE.

THE PRESS: THANK YOU DR KISSINGER.

END, (AT 8:31 AM JERUSALEM TIME)

UNQUOTE:
PICKERING

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 7627

21

ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 RSC-07
PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SAM-01 SAB-01 SCCT-02
ACDA-19 MC-02 AEC-11 SCI-06 AECE-00 IO-14 DRC-01 /131 W
060531

7 180635Z JUN 74 ZFF-4

FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 1689

UNCLASS SECTION 1 OF 4 AMMAN 3523

PASS WHITE HOUSE PRESS

E-P. 11082: N/A

2. TEXT FOLLOWS. QUOTE:

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO GET THIS AGREEMENT INTO SOME SORT OF A PERSPECTIVE. WE HAVE AGREEMENTS ON NUCLEAR REACTORS, I BELIEVE, WITH 28 OTHER COUNTRIES. YOU CAN CHECK THE EXACT NUMBER. THE ISSUE OF DIVERSION HAS NEVER BEEN RAISED IN THE FACE OF OUR SAFE-GUARDS EXCEPT IN THE LAST MONTH BECAUSE OF THE INDIA NUCLEAR EXPLOSION. THE INDIA NUCLEAR EXPLOSION OCCURRED WITH MATERIAL THAT WAS DIVERTED NOT FROM AN AMERICAN REACTOR UNDER AMERICAN SAFEGUARDS, BUT FROM A CANADIAN REACTOR THAT DID NOT HAVE APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

REIEVE THAT THE TURN TOWARDS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAN BE
FINALLY ACCOMPLISHED.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 7628

12

ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 ORC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03
NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SAM-01 SAB-01 SCCT-02
ACDA-19 MC-02 AEC-11 SCI-06 AECE-00 IO-14 /131 W
------------------------------ 060633

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE PRESS

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER THAT QUESTION HAS EVER BEEN FORMALLY PUT TO HIM THIS WAY. BUT CERTAINLY ALL OUR DISCUSSIONS WERE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE THEORY OF HIM ATTENDING THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, AND I DON'T BELIEVE THERE IS ANY PROBLEM ABOUT THAT.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

AND THIRDLY, IT HAS ENABLED THE PRESIDENT TO ENGAGE IN
PREFLIMINARY CONVERSATIONS, NOT ABOUT THE TACTICS OF HOW PEACE
SHOULD BE MADE, BUT ABOUT THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF THE PEACE
EFFORTS, AND I THEREFORE THINK THAT THE MIDDLE EAST POLICY, IF
WE CAN STAY ON THIS COURSE, AND WE ALL RECOGNIZE THAT THIS IS
A VERY TRICKY AND COMPLICATED AREA, COULD MARK ONE OF THE
TURNING POINTS IN THE POST-WAR DIPLOMATIC HISTORY.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 7629

21

ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-07
PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SAM-01 SAB-01 SCCT-02
ACDA-19 MC-02 AEC-11 SCI-06 AECE-00 IO-14 DRC-01 /131 W
------------------------------
060726

7 180635Z JUN 74 ZFF-4

UNCLAS SECTION 3 OF 4 AMMAN 3523

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE PRESS

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PETER,

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I DON'T KNOW WHETHER YOU CAN DEDUCE FROM
THE TYPOS AN AIR OF HASTE. THE PREPARATION FOR THE DECLARATION
OF PRINCIPLES BEGAN ABOUT TEN DAYS--ON MY LAST VISIT TO PRESIDENT
SADAT, AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT,
IT WAS AGREED FIRST TO SET UP THE COOPERATION COMMISSION
AND, SECONDLY, THAT SPECIFIC DETAILS OF THAT COMMISSION WOULD BE
SPECIFIED OUT DURING THE COURSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

IT WAS THEN DISCUSSED IN GREAT DETAIL BY THE TWO PRESIDENTS AND WAS REDUCED INTO A CONCRETE STATEMENT ON THURSDAY NIGHT. THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIFFICULTY THAT EXISTED WAS THAT THE PARTY WAS DIVIDED BETWEEN ALEXANDRIA AND CAIRO AND, BY PASSING THE DOCUMENTS BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN ALEXANDRIA AND CAIRO, A FEW LINES OF THE COMMUNIQUE WERE INADVERTENTLY DROPPED. ZEIGLER SAID HE WOULD TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THAT. (LAUGHTER). I SURE AS HELL WONIT. (LAUGHTER)

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 7630

21

ACTION SS-20

INFO OCT-01 NEA-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-07
PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SAM-01 SAB-01 SCCT-02
ACDA-19 MC-02 AEC-11 SCI-06 AECE-00 IO-14 DRC-01 /131 W
------------------------------
060738

7 180635Z JUN 74 ZFF-4

DEPT PASS WHITE HOUSE PRESS

Q. YOU SAY WE ARE?

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 AMMAN 03523 04 OF 04 1877382

THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, POSSIBLY SOME OF THE BRANCHES, AS A LEGITIMATE SPOKESMAN FOR THE PALESTINIANS, DOES THE UNITED STATES INTEND TO DEAL WITH THE PLO AND WOULD IT RECOGNIZE THEM AS THE LEGITIMATE SPOKESMEN OF THE PALESTINIANS IF EGYPT AND SYRIA INSISTED ON THIS?

O. DR KISSINGER, WOULD YOU BE WILLING TO RECOMMEND AS A NEXT STEP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS DISENGAGEMENT TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND JORDAN?

END. (AT 8:31 AM JERUSALEM TIME)

UNQUOTE:
PICKERING

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 OTTAWA 01936 01 OF 04 192242Z

GIVEN BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION MINISTERIAL MEETING IN OTTAWA, JUNE 19, 1974.

2. SECRETARY: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN. WHAT I WANTED TO EXPRESS WAS THE SATISFACTION OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WITH THE OUTCOME OF THIS MEETING. THE DISCUSSIONS WERE FOR THE FIRST TIME ORGANIZED BY SUBJECT MATTER RATHER THAN ON THE BASIS OF FORMAL STATEMENTS BY THE VARIOUS MINISTERS, AND THE RESULT WAS AN EXTRAORDINARILY GOOD AND CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION ON ALL THE SUBJECTS THAT WERE RAISED, SO MUCH SO THAT IT RATSES THE QUESTION WHETHER WE SHOULD NOT EXTEND THESE MEETINGS IN THE FUTURE TO PERMIT MORE TIME FOR DISCUSSION.

3. OF COURSE, THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENT WAS THE FINAL AGREEMENT ON THE NATO DECLARATION. WHEN THE UNITED STATES FIRST PROPOSED THIS IDEA 14 MONTHS AGO, WE STARTED FROM THE PREMISE THAT CONDITIONS IN THE WORLD HAD CHANGED FUNDAMENTALLY IN THE 25 YEARS, SINCE THE ALLIANCE HAD BEEN FOUNDED, AND THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR THE ALLIANCE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THESE CHANGED RALATIONSHIPS -- CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC SITUATION, THE NEW FACT OF CONSTANT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, THE IMPACT OF EVENTS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD ON THE ALLIANCE.

4. WE ALSO FELT THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR A NEW GENERATION TO SEE THAT THE SPIRIT OF CREATIVITY IN THE WESTERN WORLD WAS STILL ALIVE, AND FOR THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE ALLIANCE TO DEDICATE THEMSELVES TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE NEW REALITIES AND TO SHAPE CONSTRUCTIVELY THEIR COMMON FUTURE.

5. THE PROCESS WHICH LED TO THIS DECLARATION HAD ITS UPS AND DOWNS, AS IS NORMAL IN AN ALLIANCE COMPOSED OF FREE NATIONS; BUT THE FINAL RESULT CREATES A FRAMEWORK WHICH STATES THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE AND PERMITS US TO MOVE FORWARD JOINTLY.

6. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE AMERICAN VIEW THAT A DECLARATION DOES NOT REPRESENT A SET OF LEGAL OBLIGATIONS, BUT RATHER THAT THE REAL MEANING OF SUCH A DECLARATION WILL BE WHEN IT IS NEVER INVOKED AS A DECLARATION BUT BECOMES A

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM 01-1550

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 OTTAWA 01936 01 OF 04 192242Z

LIVING PRACTICE.

7. ON SUCH ISSUES AS CONSULTATION, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT NO ONE CAN BE COMPELLED TO CONSULT. BUT IF ONE CAN CREATE A COMMUNITY OF SHARED ASPIRATIONS THEN THERE WILL BE A DESIRE TO CONSULT. SO AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, WE LOOK AT THIS DECLARATION AS AN EXPRESSION BY THE FREE COUNTRIES OF THE ATLANTIC AREA THAT THEY WILL GEAR THEIR POLICIES TO THE NEW REALITIES; THAT THEY RECOGNIZE THEIR DESTINY IS COMMON IN THE NEXT QUARTER OF A CENTURY AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE LAST QUARTER OF A CENTURY.

8. AS THE COUNTRY WHICH HAS MOST INTERESTS OUTSIDE OF THE TREATY AREA OF ANY OF OUR ALLIES, WE WILL METICULOUSLY IMPLEMENT THE PRINCIPLE OF CONSULTATION AND WILL DO OUR UTMOST TO MAKE THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION, AND THE SPIRIT WHICH IT REFLECTS, AS VITAL AN ELEMENT IN THE NEXT 25 YEARS AS IT HAS BEEN IN THE LAST QUARTER OF A CENTURY.

9. IT REMAINS FOR ME ONLY TO THANK THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT FOR ITS HOSPITALITY, FOR THE EXCELLENCE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS, AND TO JOIN WITH WHAT THE BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY SAID WHEN THE DECLARATION WAS ADOPTED: "IT IS AS WELL THAT THE DECLARATION WAS AGREED TO IN OTTAWA, THE CAPITAL OF THE COUNTRY THAT SYMBOLIZES THE CONNECTION BETWEEN NORTH AMERICA AND WESTERN EUROPE".

10. I WILL NOW BE GLAD TO TAKE YOUR QUESTIONS.

11. Q. DR. KISSINGER, MAY I JUST ASK ONE QUESTION. ONE OF THE CONCERNS OF THE CONFERENCE, ESPECIALLY AMONG THE EUROPEAN NATIONS, WAS THIS VERY PRINCIPLE OF CONSULTATION. WILL THIS NEW AGREEMENT OBVIATE THE SORT OF THING THAT HAPPENED LAST FALL WHEN THE UNITED STATES UNILATERALLY CALLED A NATO ALERT, WHEN THE UNITED STATES UNILATERALLY CALLED A WORLD-WIDE NATO ALERT. THIS CAUSED A GREAT DEAL OF CONSTERNATION AMONG MEMBER NATIONS.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 2741

PAGE 01 OTTAWA 01936 03 OF 04 192321Z

70
ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-20 SSO-00 PA-04 PRS-01 NSC-07
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 INRE-00 ACDA-19 PM-07
SAJ-01 SP-03 TRSE-00 L-03 OIC-04 DRC-01 /107 W

084304

R 192147Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3783
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USSMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY REYKJIVIK IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMFMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE

UNCLASS SECTION 3 OF 4 OTTAWA 1936

USYAC

28. Q: I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE SUGGESTED TO THE ALLIANCE THAT IT SET IN PROCESS A REASSESSMENT OF ITS MINIMUM EXPECTATIONS FROM THE RUSSIANS IN THE COURSE OF THE PRESENT TALKS ON CSCE, AND THAT TO GET TO PHASE THREE YOU WANT TO SET UP A PRICE FOR A SUMMIT. CAN YOU TELL ME IF THIS IS AN ADVANCE IN THE PACE TOWARD SUCH A SUMMIT?

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 OTTAWA 01936 03 OF 04 192321Z

29. SECRETARY: THE VIEW THAT WE EXPRESSED HERE IS AS FOLLOWS. A NUMBER OF OUR ALLIES, AND WE OURSELVES, HAV EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IF THE RESULTS OF STAGE TWO JUSTIFIED IT, THERE WOULD BE A SUMMIT. YET TO MY KNOWLEDGE NO ONE HAS YET DEFINED WHAT HE WOULD CONSIDER A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME OF STAGE TWO IN DETAIL THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A SUMMIT. SO I PROPOSED TO OUR ALLIES THAT WE AREE AMONG EACH OTHER ON WHAT WE WOULD CONSIDER A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME OF STAGE TWO THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A SUMMIT. THIS WAS NOT AN ATTEMPT EITHER TO PROMOTE IT OR TO OPPOSE IT, BUT SIMPLY TO CLARIFY OUR THINKING AND GO FROM THE GENERAL FORMULATION TO THE SPECIFIC ONE.

30. QUESTION: MR. SECRETARY, YOU MENTIONED THAT WE MUST SEPARATE THE PROBLEM OF LONG-TERM POLICY FROM THE POLICY OF MILITARY EMERGENCY. THIS SOUNDS FINE UNTIL WE HAVE A MILITARY EMERGENCY. HAS THIS BEEN WRITTEN INTO THE DECLARATION, THAT THAT WILL BE AN EXCEPTION IF IT ARISES? HOW WILL WE NOT ARRIVE BACK AT THE SAME PLACE WE FOUND OURSELVES IN DURING THE MIDDLE EAST CRISES?

31. SECRETARY: TO THE EXTENT THAT EMERGENCIES ARE FORESEEABLE AND TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO DO CONTINGENCY PLANNING, OBVIOUSLY IT SHOULD BE DONE IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH THE ALLIANCE. HOWEVER, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT EMERGENCIES WOULD ARISE IN WHICH WE WOULD HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE SEEN TO BE IN THE INTERESTS OF THE ALLIANCE AS A WHOLE THAT WE MIGHT HAVE TO ACT, INFORMING OUR ALLIES AS RAPIDLY AS WE POSSIBLY COULD. THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD BE EXTREMELY RARE, AND WE WOULD SEEK TO AVOID THEM TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE; BUT IT WOULD BE IRRESPONSIBLE TO PREDICT THAT THEY CAN NEVER HAPPEN.

32. Q3: MR. SECRETARY OF STATE, COULD YOU MAKE ANY STATEMENT CONCERNING YOUR MEETING TODAY WITH THE PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER.

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 OTTAWA 01936 03 OF 04 192321Z

33. SECRETARY: I HAD A GOOD TALK WITH THE PORTUGUESE FOREIGN MINISTER WHO EXPLAINED SOME OF THE INTENTIONS OF THE PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT WITH

RESPECT TO ITS AFRICAN DEPENDENCIES AND SOME OF ITS DOMESTIC SITUATION. I LISTENED TO HIS ACCOUNT WITH SYMPathy, AND WE WILL CO-OPERATE TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN.

34. Q: MR. SECRETARY, THE LANGUAGE OF THE DECLARATION SUGGESTS THAT THE UNITED STATES IS GOING TO MAINTAIN ITS TROOPS AND NUCLEAR FORCES IN EUROPE AT THEIR PRESENT LEVEL. FIRSTLY, IS THAT CORRECT, AND SECONDLY, HOW LONG DO YOU THINK THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION AND SUCCEEDING ADMINISTRATIONS CAN HOLO THE LINE ON TROOPS IN EUROPE WITHOUT PROGRESS ON THE TROOP REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS?

35. SECRETARY: THE DECLARATION ALSO SPEAKS OF THE NECESSITY OF CONTINUING NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO DETENTE. THE UNITED STATES WILL MAINTAIN ITS FORCES IN EUROPE AT THE LEVELS WHICH ARE JUDGED NECESSARY BY THE ALLIANCE AND WE HOPE VERY MUCH THAT THE CONGRESS WILL SUPPORT US IN WHAT IS IN THE COMMON INTERESTS OF THE WEST.

36. Q: (TRANSLATION FROM FRENCH). MR. SECRETARY OF STATE, YOU SPOKE IN SEPTEMBER IN BRUSSELS ABOUT A PARALLEL DECLARATION BETWEEN SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES, PARALLEL TO THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION. WHAT IS THE STATE OF THIS DECLARATION? CAN YOU TELL US ANYTHING ABOUT IT?

37. SECRETARY: THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER IS VISITING THE UNITED STATES THIS WEEK AND I EXPECT TO MEET WITH HIM ON FRIDAY. THE UNITED STATES IS, IN PRINCIPLE, PREPARED TO SIGN A PARALLEL DECLARATION WITH SPAIN. THIS WILL UNDOUBTEDLY BE ONE OF THE SUBJECTS OF CONVERSATION. WHAT PRECISE DECISION WILL BE MADE AS TO THE TIMING AND CONTENT, I CANNOT

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 OTTAWA 01936 03 OF 04 1923217

FORETELL UNTIL I HAVE TALKED WITH THE SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER.

38. Q: IN ARTICLE 11 OF THE DECLARATION IT REFERS TO AREAS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA WHEREIN SOME MEMBERS ARE AFFECTED. DOES THIS MEAN IN PARTICULAR THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WOULD YOU BE ABLE TO TELL US SOMETHING OF WHAT YOU TOLED YOUR COLLEAGUES ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION, ESPECIALLY IN VIEW OF THE STATEMENT BY THE EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER, MR. FAHMY, THAT EGYPT WOULD MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES.

39. SECRETARY: WE HOLD THE VIEW THAT EVENTS OUTSIDE THE TREATY AREA IN MANY PARTS OF THE WOULD CAN INTIMATELY AFFECT THE SECURITY AND WELL BEING OF THE ALLIANCE. OBVIOUSLY, THE MIDDLE EAST IS ONE OF THE AREAS THAT IS NOT FORMALLY COVERED BY THE TREATY, AND NOT FORMALLY SUBJECT TO THE VARIOUS CONSULTATION PROVISIONS, BUT WHICH NEVERTHELESS AFFECTS THE WELL BEING AND SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES SO INTIMATELY THAT IT WOULD, AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, BE NECESSARILY A SUBJECT FOR CONSULTATION.

I GAVE MY COLLEAGUES AN ACCOUNT OF OUR MID-EAST POLICY AND OF THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT TRAVELS. WITH RESPECT TO THE EGYPTIAN STATEMENT, AS I UNDERSTOOD THE EGYPTIAN STATEMENT IT WAS THAT IF ISRAEL DEVELOPED NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEN EGYPT, BY ONE WAY OR ANOTHER, WOULD SEEK TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS OF ITS OWN.

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 OTTAWA 01936 04 OF 04 192310Z

42' Q: THIS MORNING YOU TALKED ABOUT THE SPIRIT OF CREATIVITY IN THE WEST, AND THIS DOCUMENT PICKS UP AND EXPANDS ON LANGUAGE IN THE EARLIER DOCUMENT ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND COMMON HERITAGE, COULD YOU INDICATE WHERE THE ALLIANCE HAS OPERATED IN THE PAST TO PROMOTE THOSE AIMS IN EITHER GREECE OR PORTUGAL PRIOR TO THE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT IN PORTUGAL?

43' SECRETARY: THE PREFERENCE OF THE OVERWHELMING MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE FOR THE BASIC VALUES OF DEMOCRACY AND WELL BEING HAVE BEEN MADE CLEAR ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS, INCLUDING, ONCE AGAIN, IN THE COMMUNIQUE AGREED TO TODAY. THAT INFLUENCE CAN BE MOST EFFECTIVELY EXPRESSED BY THE GENERAL CONSENSUS OF ITS ATTITUDES THAN BY ANY SPECIFIC DECISIONS THAT IT CAN TAKE AT NATO MEETINGS.

44' Q: YOU SURVIVED WITH ONLY ONE SENTENCE IN THE DECLARATION RELATING TO ECONOMICS. DO YOU THINK THAT THIS GIVES YOU ENOUGH FOUNDATION SO THE ALLIANCE CAN GET ITSELF TOGETHER BETTER IN THE EVENT OF A NEW ENERGY CRISIS THAN IT DID IN THE LAST ONE?

45' SECRETARY: THIS DECLARATION CANNOT BE USED AS A LEGAL DOCUMENT PRODUCING INEVITABLE RESULTS. THE COMMON INTERESTS OF VARIOUS MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, TOGETHER WITH OTHER COUNTRIES, IN THE ENERGY PROBLEM HAS BEEN EXPRESSED IN THE WASHINGTON ENERGY CONFERENCE AND SOME OF ITS FOLLOW-ON MACHINERY. IT WILL NOT BE THE DOCUMENT AS SUCH THAT WILL PRODUCE COMMON ACTION AS THE SHARED CONSCIOUSNESS THAT WE WILL DO OUR UTMOST TO CONTINUE TO PROMOTE. IT IS OUR VIEW, AND I BELIEVE IT IS SHARED BY MOST OF OUR ALLIES, AND IT IS EXPRESSED IN THIS SENTENCE, THAT OBVIOUSLY THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS IS CLOSELY RELATED TO OTHER FIELDS.

46' THANK YOU, MR. SECRETARY.

FURDNEY

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED 2675

PAGE 01 OTTAWA 01936 02 OF 04 192258Z

70

ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-20 SSO-00 PA-04 PRS-01 NSC-07
CIAE-00 INR-10 NSAE-00 RSC-01 INRE-00 ACDA-19 PM-07
SAJ-01 SP-03 TRSE-00 L-03 OIC-04 DRC-01 /107 W
------------------------------
083870

0 492147Z JUN 74
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
TO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3782
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY REYKJIVIK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE

UNCLASS SECTION 2 OF 4 OTTAWA 1936

USAC

12' SECRETARY: ONE HAS TO SEPARATE TWO PROBLEMS, THE
PROBLEM OF LONG-TERM POLICY AND THE PROBLEM OF
MILITARY EMERGENCIES. I THINK IT IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE
THAT EMERGENCY SITUATIONS WILL ARISE IN WHICH THE
UNITED STATES IN THE COMMON INTEREST MAY FEEL THAT
IT HAS TO ACT. I BELIEVE THAT ANY NATO ALLY,
ANALYSING THE SITUATION AS IT EXISTED AT THAT TIME,

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 OTTAWA 01936 02 OF 04 192258Z

WILL BE GRATEFUL THAT THE UNITED STATES ACTED DECISIVELY. HOWEVER, IN ALL SITUATIONS WHICH ARE NOT EMERGENCY SITUATIONS, THE UNITED STATES FEELS AN OBLIGATION TO CONCERT ITS GENERAL POLICIES WITH THOSE OF ITS ALLIES.

13. Q. DR. KISSINGER, YOU STATED IN YOUR APRIL, 1973 SPEECH THAT THERE WERE THREE DECLARATIONS YOU WERE SEEKING. MAY I ASK WHAT HAS HAPPENED TO THE OTHER TWO, THE ONE CONCERNING THE EEC AND THE GENERAL ONE INVOLVING JAPAN?

14. SECRETARY: NO, THAT IS NOT QUITE CORRECT. IN MY APRIL 1973 SPEECH I POINTED OUT THAT JAPAN EVENTUALLY HAD TO BE BROUGHT IN TO THIS OVERALL STRUCTURE. THE IDEA WAS TO HAVE ONE COMMON ATLANTIC DECLARATION. LATER THERE WAS AN ATTEMPT MADE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE EMERGING EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNITY AND TO SEEK TO DRAFT A DOCUMENT THAT ESTABLISHED A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THAT EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNITY AND THE UNITED STATES. BUT IT BECAME APPARENT DURING THE COURSE OF DRAFTING THIS DOCUMENT THAT UNTIL THAT EUROPEAN POLITICAL UNIT WAS MORE FULLY ARTICULATED, IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO STATE GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS TO ITS METHOD OF CO-OPERATION WITH THE UNITED STATES.

IT WAS THEREFORE DECIDED TO PERMIT THE PRACTICE TO DEVELOP SOMEWHAT FURTHER BEFORE A FORMAL ATTEMPT WOULD BE MADE TO REDUCE IT TO WRITING. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS DOCUMENT TAKES CARE OF THE NECESSITIES IN THE ATLANTIC AREA, THROUGH WE ARE PREPARED TO HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NINE WHEN THEY FEEL READY TO DO SO.

16. WITH RESPECT TO JAPAN, THE NEED TO GIVE JAPAN A SENSE OF BELONGING TO A STRUCTURE LARGER THAN ITSELF CONTINUES TO BE AND WILL REMAIN ONE CONSIDERATION OF AMERICA'S POLICIES.

17. Q: DR. KISSINGER, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THIS DOCUMENT WAS PUBLISHED HERE AND APPROVED HERE, AND IN

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 OTTAWA 01936 02 OF 04 192258Z

VIEW OF THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE ALREADY BRIEFED YOUR NATO ALLIES ABOUT WHAT IS EXPECTED AT THE MOSCOW SUMMIT. WHAT IS THE PURPOSE AND POINT OF THE SUMMIT MEETING THAT WILL BE HELD NEXT WEEK IN BRUSSELS?

18. SECRETARY: THE PRINCIPAL PURPOSE OF THE SUMMIT MEETING TO BE HELD NEXT WEEK IN BRUSSELS IS TO GIVE THE PRESIDENT AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS PERSONALLY WITH HIS COLLEAGUES AT THE HEAD OF GOVERNMENT LEVEL IN NATO OUR PLANS FOR THE SUMMIT AND OUR LONG-TERM EXPECTATIONS FOR WESTERN POLICY.

19. THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE SUCH A MEETING IN MANY YEARS, AND IT SEEMS TO US A LOGICAL FOLLOW-UP OF THIS DECLARATION THAT HE HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXCHANGE VIEWS WITH HIS COLLEAGUES BEFORE GOING TO MOSCOW.

20. SECONDLY, THE PURPOSE OF THE MEETING, OF THIS VISIT TO BRUSSELS, IS TO HAVE A FORMAL SIGNING OF THIS DOCUMENT WHICH WILL GIVE ADEQUATE SOLEMNITY TO ITS IMPORTANCE.

21. Q: DR. KISSINGER, SOME PAPERS AND SOME RADIO STATIONS HAVE MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS SOME DISAGREEMENT UP TO THE LAST MINUTE BETWEEN FRANCE AND THE UNITED STATES WITH REGARD TO PARAGRAPH 11 OF THE ATLANTIC DECLARATION. WOULD YOU SPECIFY WHAT KIND OF COMPROMISE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN YOU AND THE FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE?

22. SECRETARY: THE PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO PARAGRAPH 11 REALLY CONCERNED LESS THE SUBSTANCE OF THE TWO OR THREE COMPETING FORMULATIONS WHICH EXISTED THAN TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS INTENDED BY THE PRACTICE OF CONSULTATION, WHETHER IT WAS INTENDED TO BE A LEGAL OBLIGATION OR A PRACTICE REFLECTING THE SPIRIT OF THE ALLIANCE. IT STANDS TO REASON THAT NO GOVERNMENT CAN EVER WAVE A DOCUMENT AT ANOTHER AND CLAIM THAT THIS PROVIDES A FORMAL OBLIGATION TO CONSULT. AND EVEN IF IT DID, THAT

UNCLASSIFIED

Department of State

TELEGRAM

CLC]

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 OTTAWA 01936 02 OF 04 192258Z

WOULD NOT PRODUCE CONSULTATION.

23' I HAD A VERY SATISFACTORY TALK WITH THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER, AND ONCE WE UNDERSTOOD EACH OTHER'S PURPOSES WE FOUND FORMULATIONS WHICH TOOK ACCOUNT OF EACH SIDE'S CONCERN AND WHICH MET THE APPROVAL OF ALL OUR ALLIES.

24' Q: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THAT WIRETAP INQUIRY YOU REQUESTED, AND IS IT STILL YOUR INTENTION TO RESIGN IF IT IS NOT CLEARED UP?

25' SECRETARY: AS YOU KNOW, I NEVER COMMENT ON DOMESTIC AFFAIRS IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY. (LAUGHTER)

26' Q: MR. SECRETARY, I UNDERSTAND YOU HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE ALLIANCE ASSESS ITS MINIMUM EXPECTATIONS FOR GOING FORWARD WITH THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE TO STAGE THREE, AND PERHAPS AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL.

27' SECRETARY: I AM SORRY, I MISSED THE FIRST PART OF YOUR QUESTION?

UNCLASSIFIED

FORM

June 19, 1974

No. 255

#24

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
OTTAWA, CANADA

JUNE 19, 1974

DR. KISSINGER:

Ladies and Gentlemen:

What I wanted to express was the satisfaction
of the United States Government with the outcome of this
meeting. The discussions were for the first time organized
by subject matter rather than on the basis of formal state-
ments by the various ministers, and the result was an
extraordinarily good and constructive discussion on all
the subjects that were raised, so much so that it raises
the question whether we should not extend these meetings
in the future to permit more time for discussion.

Of course, the most important event was the final
agreement on the NATO declaration. When the United States
first proposed this idea 14 months ago, we started from the
premise that conditions in the world had changed fundamentally
in the 25 years, since the alliance had been founded, and
that there was a need for the alliance to take account of
these changed relationships -- changes in the strategic
situation, the new fact of constant negotiations between
east and west, the impact of events in other parts of the
world on the alliance.

PR #255

2

We also felt that it was important for a
new generation to see that the spirit of creativity
in the Western World was still alive, and for the
governments of the Alliance to dedicate themselves to take
account of the new realities and to shape constructively
their common future.

The process which led to this declaration
had its ups and downs, as is normal in an alliance
composed of free nations.

But the final result creates a framework which
states the aspirations of the Alliance and permits us
to move forward jointly.

It had always been the American view, that
a declaration does not represent a set of legal obligations
but rather that the real meaning of such a declaration

PR #255

3

will be when it is never invoked as a declaration, but
becomes a living practice.

On such issues as consultation, it is obvious
that no one can be compelled to consult, but if one can
create a community of shared aspirations, then there
will be a desire to consult.

So far as the United States is concerned, we
look at this Declaration as an expression by the free
countries of the Atlantic area -- that they will gear
their policies to the new realities -- that they
recognize their destiny as common in the next quarter
of a century, as it has been in the last quarter of a
century.

As the country which has most interest
outside of the Treaty area of any of our allies, we
will meticulously implement the principle of consultation
and will do our utmost to make the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization and the spirit which it reflects, as
vital an element in the next twenty-five years, as it
has been in the last quarter of a century.

It remains for me only to thank the Canadian
Government for its hospitality, for the excellence of

PR #255

4

with
the arrangements, and to join/what the British Foreign
Secretary said, when the Declaration was adopted:
That it is well that the Declaration was agreed to
in Ottawa, the Capital of the country that symbolizes
the connection between North America and Western Europe."

And now I'll be glad to take your questions.

O: May I just ask one question: One of the
concerns of the conference, especially among the
European nations, was this very principal of consultation.
Will this new Agreement obviate the sort of thing that
happened last fall, when the United States, unilaterally,
called a world-wide NATO alert.

This caused a great deal of consternation
among the member nations.

A One has to separate two problems, the
problem of long term policy and the problem of
military emergencies, I think it is always possible
that emergency situations will arise in which the
United States in the common interest may feel
that it has to act. And I believe that any NATO
ally, analyzing the situation as it existed at
that time will be grateful that the United States
acted decisively. However, in all situations which are

PR #255

5

not emergency situations, the United States feels an
obligation to concert its general policies with those
of its allies.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you stated in your April
1973 speech there were 3 declarations that you were seeking.
May I ask you what has happened to the other 2 -- the one
covering the ECC and the general one involving Japan?

A No, that is not quite correct. In my
April 1973 speech, I pointed out that Japan eventually had
to be brought into this overall structure. And the
idea was to have one common Atlantic declaration. Later
there was an attempt made to take account of the emerging
European political unity and to seek to draft a document
that established the relationship between that European
political unit and the United States. But it became
apparent, during the course of drafting this document,
that until that European political unit was more fully
articulated, it was very difficult to state general
principles as to its method of cooperation with the United
States. It was therefore decided to permit the
practice to develop somewhat further before a
formal attempt would be made to reduce it to writing.
We believe that this document takes care of the

PR #255

6

of the necessities in the Atlantic area, though we are
prepared to have further discussions with the Nine
when they feel ready to do so.

With respect to Japan, the need to give
Japan a sense of belonging to a structure larger than
itself continues to be and will remain to be a concern
of America's policy.

Q Dr. Kissinger,

in view of the fact that this document
was published here and was approved here, and in view
of the fact that you have already briefed your NATO
allies about what is expected at the Moscow Summit,
what is the purpose and point of the summit meeting
that will be held next week in Brussels?

A The principal purpose of the summit
meeting to be held next week in Brussels is to give the
President an opportunity to discuss personally with
his colleagues at the head-of-government level in
NATO our plans for the Summit and our long-term
expectations for western policy. The President has
not had an opportunity to have such a meeting in many

PR #255

7

years, and it seems to us a logical follow-up of this
Declaration that he have an opportunity to exchange
views with his colleagues before going to Moscow.

Secondly, the purpose of the meeting -- of
this visit to Brussels is to have a formal signing
of this document which will give an adequate solemnity
to its importance.

Q Dr. Kissinger, some papers and some
radio stations have mentioned that there was some
disagreement up to the last minute between France
and the United States with regard to Paragraph 11
of the Atlantic Declaration. Would you specify what
kind of compromise took place between you and the
French representative?

A The problem with respect to Paragraph 11
really concerned less the substance
of the two or three competing formulations which
existed than to reach an understanding of what was
intended by the practice of consultation -- whether
it was intended to be a legal obligation or a
practice reflecting the spirit of the Alliance.

It stands to reason that no government
can ever wave a document at another and claim that

PR #255

8

that this provides a formal obligation to consult.
And even if it did, that would not produce consultation.

I had a very satisfactory talk with the
French Foreign Minister. And once we understood each
other's purposes, we found formulations which took
account of each side's concerns and which met the
approval of all our allies.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is the status
of that wiretap inquiry you requested, and is it still
your intention to resign if it is not cleared up?

A As you know, I never comment on domestic
affairs in a foreign country.

(Laughter)

Q Mr. Secretary, I understand that you have
suggested that the Alliance assess its minimum expectations
for going forward with the European Security Conference
to stage 3 and perhaps at the summit level. Would you --

A I missed the first part of your question.

Q I understand that you have suggested
to the Alliance that it set in process a reassessment
of its minimum expectations from the Russians in the
course of the present talks on CSCE, and that to get
to Phase 3, you want to set up a price for a summit.

PR #255

9

Can you tell me if this is an advance on the pace towards
such a summit?

The view we expressed here was as
follows. A number of our allies and we ourselves
have expressed the view that if the results of Stage 2
justified it, there would be a summit. Yet to my
knowledge, no one has yet defined what he would consider
a satisfactory outcome of Stage 2 in detail that would
justify a summit. So I proposed to our allies that
we agree among each other/what we would consider a
satisfactory outcome of Stage 2 that would justify a
summit. This was not an attempt either to promote it
or to oppose it, but simply to clarify our thinking
and go from the general formulation to the specific one.

Q Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that we
must separate the problem of long-term policy from
the policy of military emergency. This sounds fine
until we have a military emergency. Has this been

PR #255

10

written into the Declaration, that that would be an
exception, if this arises? How will we not arrive back
to the same place that we found ourselves in during this
Middle East crisis?

A Well, to the extent that emergencies are
foreseeable, and to the extent that it is possible to
do contingency planning, obviously it should be done in
full consultation with the Alliance. However, it is
conceivable that emergencies would arise in which we
would hope that it would be seen to be in the interests
of the Alliance as a whole that we might have to act,
informing our allies as rapidly as we possibly could.
Those circumstances should be extremely rare, and
we would seek to avoid them to the maximum extent
possible; but it would be irresponsible to predict
that they can never happen.

Q Mr. Secretary of State, could you
make any statement concerning your meeting today
with the Portuguese Foreign Minister?

A I had a good talk with the Portuguese
Foreign Minister, who explained some of the intentions
of the Portuguese Government with respect to its
African dependencies and some of its domestic situation.

PR #255

11

I listened to his account with sympathy, and we will cooperate to the extent that we can.

Q Mr. Secretary, the language of the Declaration suggests that the United States is going to maintain its troops and nuclear forces in Europe at their present levels. One, is that correct? And two, how long do you think the present administration and succeeding administrations can hold the line on troops in Europe without progress on the troop reduction negotiations?

A Of course, the Declaration also speaks of the necessity of continuing negotiations leading to detente. The United States will maintain its forces in Europe at the levels which are judged necessary by the Alliance, and we hope very much that the Congress will support us in what is in the common interest of the West.

Q (In French) Mr. Secretary of State, you spoke in September in Brussels about a parallel declaration between Spain and the United States, parallel to the Atlantic Declaration. What is the state of of this declaration? Can you tell us anything about it?

PR #255

12

A The Spanish Foreign Minister is visiting the United States this week and I expect to meet with him on Friday. The United States is in principle prepared to sign a parallel declaration with Spain. This will undoubtedly be one of the subjects of conversation. What precise decision will be made as to timing and content, I cannot foretell until I have talked with the Spanish Foreign Minister.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in Article 11 of the Declaration, it refers to areas outside the NATO area wherein some members are affected. Does this mean in particular the Middle East? And would you be able to tell us something of what you told your colleagues about the Middle East situation, especially in view of the statement by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mr. Fahmi, that Egypt would make nuclear weapons in certain circumstances.

A We hold the view that events outside the treaty area, in many parts of the world, can intimately affect the security and the well-being of the Alliance. Obviously the Middle East is one of the areas that is not formally covered by the treaty and not formally subject to the various consultation

PR #255

13

provisions, but which nevertheless affects the well-being
and security of the countries so intimately that it
would, as far as the United States is concerned,
be necessarily a subject for consultation.

I gave my colleagues an account of our Mid-East
policy and of the President's recent travels.

With respect to the Egyptian statement, as I
understood the Egyptian statement, it was that if
Israel developed nuclear weapons, then Egypt, by one
way or another would seek to develop nuclear weapons
of its own.

I have stated in Jerusalem, and I have
repeated it here, that we see no possibility that
Egypt can develop nuclear weapons by means of the
reactor that we have agreed to sell; that it will take
six to eight years to install, or to build, and which
will be subject to safeguards which we consider
substantially fool-proof.

Q Dr. Kissinger, this morning you talked
about the spirit of creativity in the West, and this
document picks up and expands on language in the
earlier document about human rights, democracy, and
common heritage. Could you indicate where the

PR #255

14

Alliance has operated in the past to promote those aims
in either Greece or Portugal prior to the change
in government in Portugal?

A The preference of the
overwhelming majority of the members of the
Alliance for the basic values
of democracy and well-being have been made clear on a
number of occasions, including, once again, in the
communique agreed to today. That influence can be most
effectively expressed by the general consensus of
its attitudes than by any specific decisions that it
can take at NATO meetings.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you survived with only
one sentence in the Declaration relating to economics.
But do you think this gives you enough foundation
so that the Alliance can get itself together better in
the event of a new energy crisis than it did in the last
one?

A This Declaration cannot be used as a
legal document producing inevitable results. The
common interests of various members of the Alliance
together with other countries in the energy problem

PR #255

15

have been expressed in the Washington Energy Conference
and some of its follow-on machinery. And it will
not be the document as such that will produce common
action as the shared consciousness that we will do
our utmost to continue to promote.

It is our view, and I believe it is shared
by most of our allies

that obviously the field
of economics is closely related to other fields.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

* * * * * * *