- 8 -

make an eventual conflict inevitable. Israel would return
to a ghetto existence and Egypt would face a war its
people have dreaded. The absence of alternatives clears
the mind marvelously. Major progress is therefore likely.

Egyptian-Israeli agreement is not inimical to an
overall settlement but the condition for it. The choice has
never been between an over-all and a partial settlement but
between a partial settlement as a first step or no settlement
at all. A step towards peace is better than the continuation
of conflict all the more so as both President Sadat and
Prime Minister Begin have both committed themselves to
an over-all solution.

An Egyptian-Israeli agreement must be seen in a wider
context. Both Israel and Egypt have an interest in
a tranquil Middle East. They recognize that a peace to
be lasting must command the support of all the principal
parties who will support it only if they have a share in
making it. Inevitably, progress between Egypt and Israel

- 9 -

will be based in principles that have application on a more
general basis. The day will come when Arab leaders who now
denounce the Sadat initiative will be grateful that the
largest Arab country took on its shoulders unilaterally the
burden of the most difficult decision. By solving the
psychological problem it will make it possible to overcome
the more practical obstacles. This is why coupling the
Egyptian negotiations with those of Palestine is important
both substantively and symbolically.

Syria will not exclude itself permanently from a
promising diplomatic effort: Having had the privilege of
meeting with the President of Syria I am convinced that he
will not refuse the opportunity of a genuine peace. In the
context of Syria's turbulent history and its internal
pressures, in the light of its perception of itself as the
heart of Arab nationalism he has sought to keep open the
option of negotiation. This attitude should be fostered.

- 10 -

The negotiations should be judged not by day-to-day tactics but by their general direction: Where distrust and hatred has been so deep, sometimes the best that can be done is to set a course and leave details for later. This is particularly true of the Palestinian issue.

The current negotiations will test Soviet attitudes on a general basis: If the Soviet Union genuinely favors a relaxation of tensions it will in the Middle East seek peace and not press for formal participation in a negotiating process which is already underway and to which it can make no contribution. The Soviet Union has nothing to lose from a peaceful solution -- indeed a normalized Middle East should enable all countries to pursue their interests on the basis of equality. If the Soviet Union insists on formal participation the motive must be either hurt vanity or an attempt to foster tensions to provide an opportunity for Soviet penetration. We have no reason to pay a price to assuage the former and we have an obligation to resist the latter.

If the process now underway succeeds -- as is likely --
Americans of both parties will have reason for pride. We
contributed a military balance which foreclosed the
military option. We shaped negotiations that started a sequence
of events which led to the breakthrough of Sadat's historic
journey. But the ultimate credit goes to the people of
the Middle East: to the audacious President of Egypt
who dared to smash the mold of a generation; to the
courageous Prime Minister of Israel who responded with a
sense of responsibility to a unique moment of history and
to all the peoples of the Middle East whose inarticulate
hopes, prayers and sacrifices have brought matters to this
point. That barren, heroic region which has spawned in its
lonely spaces three great religions may be on the verge of
proving once again that hope and faith can still come to
us from the East.

On a bare hill some three miles from downtown Cairo,
stands a simple house occasionally used by President
Sadat. Its principal feature is a wide veranda which overlooks
the Pyramids. The light and shadows constantly change the
shape of these massive triangles leaning against each other.
This shape is at once simple and monumental, as close to
eternity as man can reach by his own efforts. In no other
place in the world has man been forced to learn humility so
exclusively by his own accomplishments as in this sea of
sand split by the green valley of the Nile stretching in a
thin straight line for hundreds of miles. There is no
natural monument to dwarf him; the most breathtaking landmarks
are all man-made. The Egyptian has reared tremendous
edifices to remind himself of the finiteness of the human
scale and at the same time to stretch human aspirations through
recorded history defying time and human fallibility.

One wonders whether Sadat sat on that veranda when he
first began to contemplate his journey to Jerusalem -- a move

- 2 -

at once simple and awesome like the Pyramids themselves.

We do know that not far from this guest house Israeli and
Egyptian negotiators have been meeting now for over a week
in an old hotel called the Mena House Hotel. It is in
keeping with the spirit of an area where mirage and reality
blend that the negotiators are at a bureaucratic level which
guarantees that no significant progress will be made until
Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat meet in Ismailia.

But the mere presence of Israeli diplomats in Cairo has lent
itself to the symbolic manifestations of public feeling so
dear to the Arab heart -- the massive demonstrations, signi-
ficant whether they are spontaneous or government-sponsored.

Two great peoples have met again as equals after a march
through the millenia. Both have suffered and endured;
both have been obsessed with permanence -- the Egyptians in
architecture and the Jews in law. Both have now embarked
on the quest for that most elusive of all permanencies: a
lasting peace.

- 3 -

And these two eternity-obsessed nations are likely to
realize their dreams. The very audacity of Sadat's act --
like the artificial mountains which are the Pyramids --
dwarfs the small calculations of the recent past. Ups
and down are inevitable in the process; there will be compli-
cated negotiations; but the parties have fated themselves
to success.

One need only recall the situation of two months ago:
then all was preparation for a Geneva conference. But that
conference was distrusted alike by Egypt and Israel and
their frustration was compounded by their inability to make
their views explicit. Major procedural problems -- the
function of the plenary and the working groups, the nature
of Palestinian participation, the precise role of the Soviet
Union -- were unresolved. A procedural deadlock was probable
and once resolved would have been followed by a substantive
stalemate as the incompatibility of publicly stated positions
became apparent. All the most intractable issues were lumped

- 4 -

together. The danger was real that in the very process of
organizing the conference the most radical elements would
have a veto since nothing could take place without them.

And the Soviet Union would be able to exercise a veto
over any plausible moderate solution. All the while, Israel --
maddened by isolation and the fear of an imposed peace --
would withdraw into sullen intransigence. Progress at
Geneva would have depended on a kind of American pressure
on Israel incompatible with our domestic political realities.

We were in danger of being caught between the parties:
accused of insufficient exertions by the Arab side and of
excessive pressures by Israel. While the Soviet Union was
gaining an increasing voice through the frustration of all
parties, Egypt -- treated as just one of a number of partici-
pants -- would be reduced to passivity losing control over
its destiny in a welter of unmanageable and unpredictable
claims.

- 5 -

Considerations such as these must have been in
President Sadat's mind when he decided to cut through
the Geneva summit that was getting as complicated as it was
irrelevant; and go to the heart of the problem: the psycho-
logical gulf that had separated Israelis and Arabs since
the creation of the Jewish state.

On the one hand, in a recurring irony of history, the
Jewish people persecuted and ostracized for centuries found
itself again condemned to a ghetto existence even at the
very moment when it had built its own state. On the other
hand, the Arabs, their pride stung by the creation of Israel
and convinced that Israel was occupying their national
te-ritories, had refused the very existence of the Jewish
state. This created a vicious circle: Israel saw security
in purely geographic terms of physical control while the
Arabs demanded geographic concessions as the price of a
legitimacy that diplomacy turned so esoteric as to be

- 6 -

almost meaningless. Intermediaries could help to a certain
point. They could lay a foundation. But it is never
certain that the account by a diplomatic intermediary of the
views of the parties to a dispute reflects reality, gulli-
bility or his own preference. The mere fact that an inter-
mediary was necessary in the Middle East, then, was a measure of
the real depth of distrust there.

President Sadat's bold move cut through the suspicions
of a generation. By going to Jerusalem, he allowed the
people of Israel to judge for themselves his commitment to
peace; he could see for his part the trauma of a people that
had never known a day without war in its national existence.
Sadat was right that the heart of the problem was psycho-
logical. In dealing with the essence of the issue, Sadat
has done more to resolve it than all the wars and negotiations
of the last three decades.

Matters in the Middle East now can be reduced to a
few fundamentals:

- 7 -

There is no alternative to the Sadat-Begin negotiations.

Geneva as a negotiating forum is dead. This is just as well. It could only have led to a deadlock or to an imposed settlement and in either case to an enlarged Soviet influence. If Sadat and Begin somehow fail in the new conditions to find solutions, it is certain that lesser diplomats meeting around a conference table in Switzerland later can scarcely be expected to succeed.

In short, failure now makes inevitable conflict later.

Israel would return to its ghetto existence; Egypt would face a war its people dread. The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously. Major progress is therefore likely.

At that point, Geneva can be useful in retifying what has been negotiated and to provide a forum for other parties to form the negotiating process.

- 8 -

An Egyptian-Israeli agreement should involve principles applicable to the other parties. Sadat and Begin are too wise not to base progress between Egypt and Israel on principles that have wider application. They know from history that a peace to be lasting must in time reach out to all principal parties and that those parties will support it only if they participate in making it. The day will come when Arab leaders who now denounce the Sadat initiative will be grateful that the largest of Arab nations took on its own shoulders the burden of the first and most difficult decision for peace. By solving the psychological problem Egypt has now made it possible to overcome the obstacles

- 9 -

to peace everywhere in the Middle East. This is why coupling
the Egyptian negotiations with those of Palestine is important
both substantively and symbolically. At the same time on
this issue where distrust and hatred has been so deep, it
may be best to set a general course and leave details for
later.

Having had the privilege of working closely with the
President of Syria I am convinced that he will not turn
his back on a genuine peace. In the context of Syria's
turbulent history and its internal pressures, in the light
of its perception of itself as the embodiment of true Arab
nationalism President Asad has sought to keep open the
option of negotiation. This attitude should be nurtured.

The current negotiations will test Soviet attitudes:

If the Soviet Union genuinely favors a relaxation of tensions
throughout the world, it will in the Middle East allow the

- 10 -

processes toward peace to occur and not preks for formal
participation in negotiations which are already underway and
to which it can make no contribution. The Soviet Union has
nothing to lose from a peaceful solution -- indeed a
normalized Middle EAst should enable all countries to
pursue their global interests on the basis of equality.
If the Soviet Union encourages intransigence the motive
must be either hurt vanity or an attempt to foster tensions
and improve the opportunities for Soviet penetration. There
is no reason to assuage the former, and it is in the interests
of all nations to resist the latter.

If the process now underway succeeds -- as with
occasional disappointments is likely -- Americans of
every persuasion and party will have reason for pride.
We contributed a military balance which foreclosed a
military solution. Our nation because it was trusted by
both sides helped shape a negotiating process that started
a sequence of events which culminated in the breakthrough

- 11 -

of Sadat's historic journey. Our country has handled the sequence of events growing out of the Sadat initiative with wisdom and delicacy: offering assistance but not intruding on the process of negotiations.

The ultimate credit should of course go to the people of the Middle East: to the audacious President of Egypt who dared to smash the psychological mold of a generation; to the courageous Prime Minister of Israel who seized a unique moment of history and to all the peoples of the Middle East whose inarticulate aspirations, prayers and sacrifices have created the appropriate psychological framework.

Already that barren region which has spawned in its lonely spaces three great religions has become for this season once again the focal point of humanity's highest hopes.

TIME Article - FINAL

December 22, 1977

On a bare hill at Giza, some three miles from downtown Cairo, stands a simple rest house occasionally used by President Sadat. Its principal feature is a wide veranda which overlooks the Pyramids. The light and shadows constantly change the shape of these massive triangles leaning against each other. These are structures at once simple and monumental; they have endured the elements and man's degradations for as close to eternity as man can reach by his own efforts.

It no other place in the world is man forced into humility so exclusively by one of his own accomplishments. In this sea of sand split by the green valley of the Nile stretching a man's vision in a thin straight line for hundreds of miles, there is no natural monument to dwarf him. The most breathtaking landmarks are all man-made, defying time and human fallibility. The Egpytian has reared tremendous edifices to remind him both of the finiteness of the human scale and the reach of human aspirations through recorded history.

- 2 -

One wonders whether Anwar Sadat sat on that veranda when he first began to contemplate his journey to Jerusalem -- a move at once simple and awesome like the Pyramids themselves.

We do know that not far from this rest house Israeli and Egyptian negotiators have been meeting now for over a week in an old hotel. It is in keeping with the spirit of a region where mirage and reality blend that the negotiators are at a bureaucratic level which guarantees that no significant progress will be made until Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat meet in Ismailia. But the mere presence of Israeli diplomats in Cairo has lent itself to the symbolic manifestations of public feeling so dear to the Arab heart -- the massive demonstrations are significant whether they are spontaneous or government-sponsored. Two great peoples have met again as equals. Through the millenia both have suffered and endured; both have been obsessed with permanence -- the Egyptians in architecture and the Jews in moral law.

- 3 -

And these two eternity-obsessed nations are likely
to realize their dreams. The very audacity of Sadat's
act -- like the artificial mountains which are the Pyramids --
dwarfs the small calculations of the recent past. Ups and
downs are inevitable in the process; there will be compli-
cated negotiations; but the parties have fated themselves
to success.

One need only recall the situation of two months ago:
then all was preparation for a Geneva conference. But that
conference was distrusted alike by Egypt and Israel.
Major procedural problems were unresolved -- the scope of
the plenary and the working groups, the nature of Palestinian
participation, the precise role of the Soviet Union. The
procedural deadlock would in all likelihood have been
followed by a substantive stalemate as the irreconcilability
of the opposing publicly stated positions became apparent.

- 4 -

All the most intractable issues were thrown together.

The danger was real that in the very process of organizing the conference the most radical elements would achieve a veto since no progress could take place without them. In turn, the Soviet Union would be able to exercise a veto over any plausible moderate solution. All the while, Israel -- maddened by isolation and the fear of an imposed peace -- would withdraw into sullen intransigence. Progress at Geneva would have depended on American pressure on Israel to a degree probably incompatible with our domestic political realities. We ran the risk of being caught between the parties: accused by the Arab side of insufficient exertions and by Israel of excessive pressures. The Soviet Union would gain an increasing voice as the frustration of all parties came to focus on us. Egypt -- the most eager for peace of the Arab countries, yet treated as just one of a number of partici-

(N)

- 5 -

pants -- was threatened with being reduced to passivity, with losing control over its destiny in a welter of unmanageable and unpredictable claims.

Considerations such as these must have been in President Sadat's mind when he decided to cut through the Geneva minuet that was getting as complicated as it was irrelevant; and go the heart of the problem -- the psychological gulf that had separated Israelis and Arabs since the creation of the Jewish state.

In a recurring irony of history, the Jewish people, persecuted and ostracized for centuries, found itself again condemned to a ghetto existence of international isolation at the very moment when it had built its own state. The Arabs, their pride stung by the creation of Israel and convinced that Israel was occupying their national territories, had refused to accept the very existence of the Jewish state. This created a vicious circle: Israel saw security in purely geographic terms of physical control while the Arabs

- 6 -

demanded geographic concessions as the price of a legitimacy
that diplomacy turned into legal formulas so esoteric as to
be almost meaningless. Intermediaries could help to a
certain point. They could lay a foundation. But no nation
or leader will ever be totally convinced whether an inter-
mediary's account of the views of the opposing side reflects
reality, gullibility or his own preference. The mere fact
that an intermediary was necessary, that direct talks were
rejected, reflected and fueled the prevailing distrust.

President Sadat's bold move cut through the suspicions
of a generation. By going to Jerusalem, he allowed the
people of Israel to judge for themselves his commitment to
peace; he could see for his part the trauma of a people that
had never known a day without war in its national existence.
Sadat was right that the heart of the problem was psycho-
logical. By grasping the essence of the issue, Sadat
has done more to resolve it than all the wars and negotiations
of the last three decades.

Were Sadat and Begin somehow to fail to find solutions, lower-level diplomats meeting around a conference table in Switzerland later could scarcely be expected to succeed.

In short, failure now would make conflict later inevitable.

Major progress is therefore likely at Ismailia or afterwards.

At that point, Geneva could be useful in ratifying what has been negotiated and to provide a forum for other parties to join the negotiating process.

- 8 -

Egyptian-Israeli agreement is not inimical to an overall
settlement but the condition for it. The choice has never
been between an over-all and a partial settlement but
between a partial settlement as a first step and no
settlement at all. A step towards peace is better than the
continuation of conflict, all the more so since both President
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin have both committed themselves
to an over-all settlement.

An Egyptian-Israeli agreement should involve principles
applicable to the other parties. Sadat and Begin are too
wise not to base progress between Egypt and Israel on
principles that have wider application. They know from
history that a peace to be lasting must in time reach out
to all principal parties and that those parties will support
it only if they participate in making it. The day will come
when Arab leaders whonow denounce the Sadat initiative will
be grateful that the largest of Arab nations took on its
own shoulders the burden of the first and most difficult

decision for peace. By solving the psychological problem
Egypt has now made it possible to overcome the other obstacles
to peace everywhere in the Middle East. This is why
coupling the Egyptian negotiations with the Palestinian issue
is important both substantively and symbolically. At the
same time, on this issue where distrust and hatred have gone
so deep, it may be best to set a general course and leave
details for later negotiations.

Having had the privilege of working closely with the
President of Syria I am convinced that he will not turn
his back on a genuine peace. In the context of Syria's
turbulent history and its internal pressures, in the light
of its perception of itself as the embodiment of true Arab
nationalism, President Asad has sought to keep open the
option of negotiation. This attitude should be nurtured.

The current negotiations will be a test of Soviet
policy: If the Soviet Union genuinely favors a relaxation
of tensions throughout the world, it will in the Middle
East allow the processes toward peace to occur and not press
for formal participation in negotiations which are already
underway and to which it can make no contribution. The
Soviet Union has nothing to lose from a peaceful solution --
indeed a normalized Middle East should enable all countries
to pursue their global policies on the basis of equality.

-11-

If the Soviet Union encourages intransigence the motive
must be either hurt vanity or an attempt to foster
tensions and to improve the opportunities for Soviet pene-
tration. There is no reason to assuage the former, and it
is in the interests of all nations to resist the latter.

If the process now underway succeeds -- as is likely,
even with occasional disappointments -- Americans of every
persuasion and party will have reason to be proud. We con-
tributed a military balance which foreclosed a military
solution. Our nation, because it was trusted by both sides,
helped shape a negotiating process which culminated in the
breakthrough of Sadat's historic journey. The President
has handled the sequence of events growing out of the Sadat
initiative with wisdom and delicacy: offering assistance
but not intruding on the process of negotiations.

The ultimate credit should of course go to the peoples
of the Middle East: to the audacious President of Egypt

who dared to smash the psychological mold of a generation;
to the courageous Prime Minister of Israel who seized a
unique moment of history and to all the peoples of the
Middle East whose inarticulate aspirations, prayers and
sacrifices have created the prevailing climate for peace.
Appropriately enough for this season, the barren region
of the Middle East which has spawned in its lonely spaces
three great religions has become once again the focal point
of humanity's highest hopes.

On a bare hill at Giza, some three miles from downtown
Cairo, stands a simple rest house occasionally used by Presi-
dent Sadat. Its principal feature is a wide veranda which
overlooks the Pyramids. The light and shadows constantly
change the shape of these massive triangles leaning against
each other. These are structures at once simple and monu-
mental; they have endured the elements and man's depradations
for as close to eternity as man can reach by his own efforts.
It no other place in the world is man forced into humility
so exclusively by one of his own accomplishments. In this
sea of sand split by the green valley of the Nile stretching
a man's vision in a thin straight line for hundreds of
miles, there is no natural monument to dwarf him. The most
breathtaking landmarks are all man-made, defying time and
human fallibility. The Egpytian has reared tremendous
edifices to remind him both of the finiteness of the human
scale and the reach of human aspirations through recorded
history.

- 2 -

(N)

We do know that not far from this rest house Israeli and Egyptian negotiators have been meeting now for two weeks over a week in an old hotel. It is in keeping with the spirit of a region where mirage and reality blend that the negotiators are at a bureaucratic level which guarantees that no significant progress will be made until Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat meet in Ismailia. But the mere presence of

OK

OK

(Meeting is Sunday; magazine comes out Monday)

OK

OK

- 3 -

- 4 -

The danger was real that in the very process of organizing the conference the most radical elements would achieve a veto since no progress could take place without them. In turn, the Soviet Union would be able to exercise a veto over any plausible moderate solution. All the while, Israel -- maddened by isolation and the fear of an imposed peace -- would withdraw into sullen intransigence. Progress at Geneva would have depended on American pressure on Israel to a degree probably incompatible with ~~our~~ domestic political realities. We ran the risk of being caught between the parties: accused by the Arab side of insufficient exertions and by Israel of excessive pressures. The Soviet Union would gain an increasing voice as the frustration of all parties came to focus on us. Egypt -- the most eager for peace of the Arab countries, yet treated as just one of a number of partici-

- 5 -

pants -- was threatened with being reduced to passivity,
with losing control over its destiny in a welter of unmanage-
able and unpredictable claims.

Considerations such as these must have been in President
Sadat's mind when he decided to cut through the Geneva
minuet that was getting as complicated as it was irrelevant,
and go the heart of the problem -- the psychological gulf
that had separated Israelis and Arabs since the creation
of the Jewish state.

- 6 -

There is no alternative to the Sadat-Begin negotiations.
Geneva as a negotiating forum is dead. This is just as
well. It could only have led to a deadlock or to an imposed
settlement and in either case to an enlarged Soviet influence.
Were Sadat and Begin somehow to fail to find solutions,
lower-level diplomats meeting around a conference table in
Switzerland later could scarcely be expected to succeed.
In short, failure now would make conflict later inevitable.
Israel would return to its ghetto existence; Egypt would
face a war its people dread.

The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously.
Major progress is therefore likely [at Ismailia or afterwards].
[At that point, Geneva could be useful in ratifying what has
been negotiated and to provide a forum for other parties
to join the negotiating process.]

- 9 -

-10-

If the Soviet Union encourages intransigence the motive
must be either hurt vanity or an attempt to foster
tensions and to improve the opportunities for Soviet pen-
tration. There is no reason to assuage the former, and it
is in the interests of all nations to resist the latter.

If the process now underway succeeds -- as is likely,
even with occasional disappointments -- Americans of every
persuasion and party will have reason to be proud. We con-
tributed a military balance which foreclosed a military
solution. Our nation, because it was trusted by both sides,
helped shape a negotiating process which culminated in the
breakthrough of Sadat's historic journey. [The President Carter
has handled the sequence of events growing out of the Sadat
initiative with wisdom and delicacy: offering assistance
but not intruding on the process of negotiations.]

who dared to smash the psychological mold of a generation,
to the courageous Prime Minister of Israel who seized a
unique moment of history and to all the peoples of the
Middle East whose inarticulate aspirations, prayers and
sacrifices have created the prevailing climate for peace.
Appropriately enough for this season, the barren region
of the Middle East which has spawned in its lonely spaces
three great religions has become once again the focal point
of humanity's highest hopes.

Time
1/77

- 2 -

- 3 -

- 4 -

- 5 -

- 6 -

- 7 -

- 8 -

-9-

-10-

**The current negotiations will be a test of Soviet policy:** If the Soviet Union genuinely favors a relaxation of tensions throughout the world, it will in the Middle East allow the processes toward peace to occur and not press for formal participation in negotiations which are already underway and to which it can make no contribution. The Soviet Union has nothing to lose from a peaceful solution -- indeed a normalized Middle East should enable all countries to pursue their global policies on the basis of equality.

-11-

-12-

er an intermediary's account of the views of the opposing side reflects reality, gullibility, or his own preference. The mere fact that an intermediary was necessary, that direct talks were rejected, reflected and fueled the prevailing distrust.

By going to Jerusalem, President Sadat cut through the mindset of a generation: He allowed the people of Israel to judge for themselves his commitment to peace; he could see for his part the trauma of a people that had never known a day without war in its national existence. Sadat was right that the heart of the problem was psychological. By grasping the essence of the issue, Sadat has done more to resolve it than all the wars and negotiations of the last three decades. Matters in the Middle East now can be reduced to a few fundamentals:

**There is no alternative to the Sadat-Begin negotiations. Geneva as a negotiating forum is dead.** This is just as well. It could only have led to a deadlock or to an imposed settlement, and in either case to an enlarged Soviet influence. Were Sadat and Begin somehow to fail to find solutions, lower-level diplomats meeting around a conference table in Switzerland later could scarcely be expected to succeed. In short, failure now would make conflict later inevitable. Israel would return to its ghetto existence; Egypt would face a war its people dread.

The absence of alternatives clears the mind marvelously. Major progress is therefore likely. Geneva could be useful later in ratifying what has been negotiated and to provide a forum for other parties to join the negotiating process.

**An Egyptian-Israeli agreement is not inimical to an overall settlement but the condition for it.** The choice has never been between an overall and a partial settlement, but between a partial settlement as a first step and no settlement at all. A step toward peace is better than the continuation of conflict, all the more so since both President Sadat and Premier Begin have committed themselves to an overall settlement.

**An Egyptian-Israeli agreement should involve principles applicable to the other parties.** Sadat and Begin are too wise not to base progress between Egypt and Israel on principles that have wider application. They know from history that to be lasting a peace must in time reach out to all principal parties and that those parties will support it only if they participate in making it. The day will come when Arab leaders who now denounce the Sadat initiative will be grateful that the largest of Arab nations took on its own shoulders the burden of the first and most difficult decision for peace. By solving the psychological problem, Egypt has now made it possible to overcome the other obstacles to peace everywhere in the Middle East. This is why coupling the Egyptian negotiations with the Palestinian issue is important both substantively and symbolically. At the same time, on this issue where distrust and hatred have gone so deep, it may be best to set a general course and leave details for later negotiations.

Having had the privilege of working closely with the President of Syria, I am convinced that he will not turn his back on a genuine peace. In the context of Syria's turbulent history and its internal pressures, in the light of its perception of itself as the embodiment of true Arab nationalism, President Assad has sought to keep open the option of negotiation. This attitude should be nurtured.

**The current negotiations will be a test of Soviet policy.** If the Soviet Union genuinely favors a relaxation of tensions throughout the world, it will in the Middle East allow the processes toward peace to occur and not press for formal participation in negotiations which are already under way and to which it can make no contribution. The Soviet Union has nothing to lose from a peaceful solution; indeed, a normalized Middle East should enable all countries to pursue their global policies on the basis of equality. If the Soviet Union encourages intransigence, the motive must be either hurt vanity or an attempt to foster tensions and to improve the opportunities for Soviet penetration. There is no reason to assuage the former, and it is in the interests of all nations to resist the latter.

If the process now under way succeeds—as is likely, even

The search for peace: Geneva Conference in December 1973...

...the Sinai I talks at Kilometer 101 in January 1974...

...and in 1975, Sadat and Kissinger meet in Egypt prior to Sinai II

*A barren region is once again the focal point of humanity's hopes.*

with occasional disappointments—Americans of every persuasion and party will have reason to be proud. We contributed a military balance which foreclosed a military solution. Our nation, because it was trusted by both sides, helped shape a negotiating process which culminated in the breakthrough of Sadat's historic journey. President Carter has handled the sequence of events growing out of the Sadat initiative with wisdom and delicacy, offering assistance but not intruding on the process of negotiations.

The ultimate credit should of course go to the audacious President of Egypt who dared to smash the psychological mold of a generation; to the courageous Premier of Israel who seized a unique moment of history; and to all the peoples of the Middle East whose inarticulate aspirations, prayers and sacrifices have created the prevailing climate for peace. Appropriately enough for this season, the barren region of the Middle East, which has spawned in its lonely spaces three great religions, has become once again the focal point of humanity's highest hopes.

TIME, JANUARY 2, 1978

35