UNITED STATES CAPABILITIES IN THE BATTLE FOR MEN'S MINDS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page<br>Number</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Chapter I - DEFINITIONS. SCOPE OF STUDY</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>II - THE UNITED STATES OVERSEAS INFORMATION EFFORT<br>AND ITS CRITICS</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Organization Development Since World<br>War II</td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>USIA Budget and Type of Activities</td><td>5</td></tr><tr><td>State Department Educational Exchange<br>Activities</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Scope of United States Overseas Infor-<br>mation Activities</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>III - GENERAL APPRAISAL OF UNITED STATES PROPAGANDA<br>CAPABILITIES</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>IV - CONCLUSIONS</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>Summary</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>V - THE "PERSONAL" APPROACH</td><td>45</td></tr><tr><td>FOOTNOTES</td><td>67</td></tr><tr><td>CHART: DAILY PROGRAM SCHEDULE BY AREA AND LANGUAGE</td><td>95</td></tr><tr><td>APPENDICES:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>I</td><td>98</td></tr><tr><td>II</td><td>105</td></tr></tbody></table>

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# UNITED STATES CAPABILITIES IN THE BATTLE FOR MEN'S MINDS

## Chapter I
## DEFINITIONS. SCOPE OF STUDY

Political scientists concerned with definitions can and will argue about the precise meaning of the term "battle for men's minds." But it is entirely safe to assume that whoever uses this expression today in a political context uses it, consciously or subconsciously as a synonym for "psychological warfare." A very recent encyclopedic standard work 1/ on psychological warfare states at the very outset that there is a "general lack of agreement" among publicists and experts "on the meaning of ... psychological warfare." 2/ It cannot be seriously doubted, however, that in the particular international situation which now sees the two super powers, United States and U.S.S.R. arrayed against each other "psychological warfare" actually is understood to mean essentially the same as "propaganda." 3/ When Americans today speak of "propaganda" 4/ they think almost automatically, and as a rule, exclusively of the sustained effort by the United States Government, in particular the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and by certain private organizations such as Radio Free Europe or the People-to-People Program to influence the outside world--hostile, allied, or noncommitted--in our favor by the spoken or written word, by radio, films, exhibitions, exchange of persons and similar "information and education" activities.

One may argue, of course, that the lofty challenge contained in the words "battle for men's minds" should not be equated so gingerly with psychological warfare which connotes ruses, tricks

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and ruthlessness. Chester Bowles, ex-Governor of Connecticut and former United States Ambassador to India, has actually gone so far to state that: "Psychological warfare is a cynical phrase borrowed from Goebbels and Stalin." 5/ One might further insist that the comprehensive concept of psychological warfare must not, in turn, be transmuted into mere propaganda." It is true that these different terms and others used as near-synonyms, such as "ideological warfare," "political warfare," "campaign of truth," etc. are not exclusively a matter of semantics but that they signify also important differences of approach and concept. 6/

A realistic appraisal of United States capabilities for in-
fluencing opinion and attitudes 7/ overseas cannot be based,
however, on any abstract and "ideal" definition of what battle
for the mind _ought_ to mean. It is comparatively easy to design
behind a desk, in one's study or office, impressively grandiose
schemes as to what the United States _should_ do to persuade foes,
friends or neutrals. And, indeed, patriots with eager hearts
and excellent minds have in speeches, articles, and books advo-
cated comprehensive and imaginative psychological and propaganda
programs which, in their opinion, the United States could and
should adopt to gain bloodless victories in the cold war. It
would be wrong to condemn such schemes as unrealistic merely
because, quite often they contain elements which are novel and
unfamiliar and therefore seem fantastic, or because they require
the establishment of vast new organizations or the expenditure of
huge amounts of money. The technical and financial capabilities
of this country are such that they would almost certainly suf-

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fice to carry out even exceptionally ambitious and costly projects.
But there derive from our own history and tradition, from the
political, sociological and psychological pattern and climate of
our specific American life and society definite limitations of
capability 8/ in two directions: First there are things we
simply never would do--because we are what we are--even if we
could; and second there are things we might wish and even de-
cide upon to do but which nevertheless we could never do success-
fully for the same reason, i.e. because we happen to be Americans
and not Russians or Nazis or Chinese. 8/

In this study an attempt will be made therefore, to determine
United States capabilities in the struggle for men's minds by
answering not the question of what we could and should do ideally,
but what we could and might do practically, considering the basic
realities of our form of government and national character.

Since the American way of life and thought is to be our
yardstick for measuring these capabilities, it is proper and
logical to approach the entire matter in the light of the fact,
that to the nation at large--though not necessarily to the
"experts"--a battle for the minds of men means propaganda 9/
i.e. as far as American propaganda is concerned, the "overseas
information program" of the United States Government.

## Chapter II
THE UNITED STATES OVERSEAS INFORMATION EFFORT AND ITS CRITICS
### Organization Development Since World War II

In the closing days of World War II an Executive Order 10/
transferred to the State Department the overseas information

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activities of the Office of War Information (OWI) and of the
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OIAA) 11/
both of which were abolished. The State Department's Office of
International Information and Cultural Affairs, established in
early 1946 and later renamed Office of International Information
and Educational Exchange, 12/ served as the main, but definitely
modest propaganda agency of the United States until a congres-
sional enactment (Smith-Mundt Act) in 1948 specifically directed
the Secretary of State--heretofore concerned with information
operations only by virtue of an Executive Order--"to provide for
the preparation and dissemination abroad of information about the
United States, its people and policies, through press, publica-
tions, radio, motion pictures and other information media, and
through information centers ... abroad." 13/

As a result of this Act, of a more liberal grant of funds
by Congress, of the Korean War and the growing cold war the
State Department's overseas information and education operations
grew steadily in scope and importance until in January 1952 a
major intradepartmental reorganization created the International
Information Administration (IIA), officially described as a "semi-
autonomous" unit of the Department. Finally, on 1 August 1953
the IIA was transformed into an independent agency, the U.S.
Information Agency (USIA), the head of which (director) reports
directly to the President through the National Security Council,
of which he is a member. The USIA--with the exception of the
Educational Exchange-of-Persons Program retained by State--has
been responsible since for all official United States Information
activities abroad. 14/

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USIA Budget and Type of Activities

The USIA 15/ in FY 1958 had a budget appropriated 16/ of $95.1 (1957: $113) 17/ million, used as follows:

<table><thead><tr><th colspan="3">In Million Dollars</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1. General Headquarters, Washington, D. C. 18/</td><td>8.1</td><td>(8.8)</td></tr><tr><td>2. Overseas Missions 19/ (202(204) "Posts" in 80(79) countries)</td><td>40.4</td><td>(47.1)</td></tr><tr><td>3. "Administrative Support" of Overseas Missions 20/</td><td>10.8</td><td>(10.8)</td></tr><tr><td>4. Media Services</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;a. Broadcasting Service 21/ (of which VoA 15.4(16.9))</td><td>17.4</td><td>(20.3)</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;b. Press &amp; Publication Service 22/ (of which "America Illustrated" 1.1(0.8))</td><td>8.1</td><td>(9.8)</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;c. Motion Picture Service 23/</td><td>4.9</td><td>(7.3)</td></tr><tr><td>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;d. Information Center Service 24/</td><td>5.3</td><td>(8.6)</td></tr><tr><td>5. Cooperative Programs with Private Organizations 25/</td><td>0.5</td><td>(0.5)</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3">(Figures in parenthesis are for FY 57)</td></tr></tbody></table>

The above very basic figures should be kept in mind regardless by each and everyone who discusses the degree of effectiveness of our existing overseas information program. It is very significant, for example, that in FY 58 40 million dollars was the total amount available for all USIA missions in 80 different countries. Out of this 40 million there had to be paid the salaries and allowances of the American and local personnel of all 202 USIA "posts;" from this sum must also be

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financed the activities of all posts regarding the local radio, television, newspapers and periodicals; the production for a local audience of pamphlets, leaflets, posters, and motion pictures; the translation of books into local idioms; the operation of United States information centers and assistance to binational centers; 26/ the "cultural" activities (lectures, etc.) as well as exhibits and the teaching of English. True, while USIA overseas missions are to do all these things and more on their own budgets they are backstopped by the "Media Services" (No. 4 of our table) in the United States. The "Broadcasting Service" 1958 budget, for example, provides 0.5 million dollars of package programs, music and equipment to be shipped to the missions for local use. The "Motion Picture Service" furnishes films--including, in some cases, foreign language versions--to the missions; the "Information Center Service" sends package exhibits, training aids for the teaching of English, etc. But again, if one considers that the total '58 budget for the Media Services is but #35.7 (1957: $46) million - including $15.4 (1957: $16.9) for the Voice of America--it is clear that as regards each single country, i.e. target areas, the Services can only supplement the local mission program within rather narrow limits.

The following table shows the number of American and local personnel actually manning the USIA posts abroad:

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<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Region</th><th colspan="2">American</th><th colspan="2">Local</th></tr><tr><th>FY 58</th><th>FY 57</th><th>FY 58</th><th>FY 57</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Far East</td><td>240</td><td>271</td><td>1,692</td><td>1,854</td></tr><tr><td>Near East</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>a. Africa</td><td>47</td><td>42</td><td>194</td><td>151</td></tr><tr><td>b. Near East-South Asia</td><td>227</td><td>233</td><td>1,602</td><td>1,505</td></tr><tr><td>Europe</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>a. W. Europe</td><td>244</td><td>329</td><td>1,571</td><td>2,003</td></tr><tr><td>b. E. Europe</td><td>37</td><td>37</td><td>628</td><td>689</td></tr><tr><td>Latin America</td><td>123</td><td>131</td><td>637</td><td>675</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td>TOTAL</td><td>918</td><td>1,043</td><td>6,324</td><td>6,877</td></tr></tfoot></table>

The fact that the total number of American USIA personnel overseas is (FY 58) but 918 and that these 918 individuals are distributed over no less than 80 countries should be a key element in any assessment of what the USIA can accomplish.

## State Department Educational Exchange Activities

As mentioned earlier the official United States exchange of persons program continues to be administered by the State Department. In FY 1958 under this program a total of 4,238 foreigners from 101 countries and colonies came to the United States, and 2,114 citizens were sent abroad as the following table shows: 27/

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<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2">Area</th><th colspan="2">Professors and Teachers</th><th colspan="2">Students</th><th colspan="2">Leaders and Specialists</th><th colspan="2">Total</th></tr><tr><th>For.</th><th>US</th><th>For.</th><th>US</th><th>For.</th><th>US</th><th>For.</th><th>US</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Am. Republics</td><td>174</td><td>125</td><td>294</td><td>75</td><td>185</td><td>42</td><td>653</td><td>242</td></tr><tr><td>W. Europe</td><td>614</td><td>530</td><td>933</td><td>870</td><td>238</td><td>2</td><td>1,785</td><td>1,402</td></tr><tr><td>E. Europe</td><td>--</td><td>--</td><td>--</td><td>--</td><td>--</td><td>--</td><td>--</td><td>--</td></tr><tr><td>Far East</td><td>162</td><td>120</td><td>451</td><td>49</td><td>291</td><td>50</td><td>904</td><td>219</td></tr><tr><td>Near East-South Asia</td><td>86</td><td>133</td><td>423</td><td>22</td><td>193</td><td>44</td><td>702</td><td>199</td></tr><tr><td>Africa</td><td>19</td><td>39</td><td>76</td><td>1</td><td>99</td><td>12</td><td>194</td><td>52</td></tr></tbody><tfoot><tr><td>TOTAL</td><td>1,055</td><td>947</td><td>2,177</td><td>1,017</td><td>1,006</td><td>150</td><td>4,238</td><td>2,114</td></tr></tfoot></table>

A total of $20.8 (FY 57:20.0) million was appropriated 28/ for the program, including a small amount of $0.25 million for aid to American sponsored schools in Latin America.

## Scope of United States Overseas Information Activities

The "United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948" (Smith-Mundt Act) which--for the first time after World War II--gave the Secretary of State statutory authorization to maintain an "information service" had carefully circumscribed the latter's scope in these terms: 29/

"to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its peoples and policies promulgated by the Congress, the President, the Secretary of State and other responsible officials of Government having to do with matters affecting foreign affairs"

with the objective

"of promoting better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual

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understanding between the people of the United
States and the people of other countries."

In April 1950, two months before the outbreak of the Korean War, President Truman announced that he had directed the Secretary of State "to plan a strengthened and more effective national effort to use the great power of truth in working for peace." 30/ As soon as the war broke out the President asked Congress to implement his call for "a great campaign of truth" by granting a supplemental appropriation of $89 million for information activities in FY 51. Congress did not grant that request in full but did make available for that year, in regular and supplemental appropriations, a total of $94 million, twice the amount appropriated in FY 50.

Edward W. Barret, as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs actually in charge of the entire "information" effort, issued a number of authoritative statements shortly before and during the Korean War which, while insisting on the "truth" theme and the absolute need for factualness 31/ in our propaganda, formulated, first in more general and finally in very specific terms, four chief objectives:

"(1) Exposing to the world ... the truly reactionary vicious and phony nature of Kremlin Communism.

"(2) Building up a spirit of unity, ... determination and confidence in all nations of the free world.

"(3) Inculcating in other peoples ... a desire to cooperate with America - by disproving Soviet lies about us and by making clear that we are a resolute,

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strong and honest nation, whose moral ... and
physical strength can be counted on.

"(4) Building behind the Iron Curtain psychological obstacles to further Soviet aggression." 32/

Careful perusal of innumerable official statements of our propaganda aims, issued since Barret formulated his four objectives in such plain words, reveals that they are still fully descriptive of United States policy. George V. Allen, Director of USIA and therefore indirectly Barret's successor, explained the scope of his agency's effort in the February 1958 appropriations hearings in terms 33/ which, in effect, seem merely a translation of the Assistant Secretary's sentences--written in a hot war period--into the slightly less direct language of the cold war. It is very symptomatic that even in the heat of the Korean battle and in the very context in which he stated his four objectives, Mr. Barret most expressly rejected the "flamboyant approach" remarking that "much greater progress can be made ... by telling our story forthrightly." 34/ This insistence on sobriety is a basic and recurrent element in all statements on means and methods made over many years by successive State Department and USIA officials.

35/ A USIA 1957 Report to Congress contains, in fact, the almost paradoxical statement that "Increasing care has been devoted ... to eliminating from USIA output anything that could be interpreted as propaganda!" 36/ Not only, then, are truthful facts considered our main weapon--because we firmly hold that, compared to the Communists we have the infinitely better story to tell, and that this story is bound to convince if only it becomes properly

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known to the outside world--37/ but there is, in addition, general
agreement among those actually in charge of the United States
overseas information effort that our case must be presented to
the world with dignity and tact and not in the form of a blatant
advertising campaign. 38/

There is similar agreement on the fact that while our effort
is worldwide, intended to reach all corners of the globe and
the masses as well as the elites, there must nevertheless, for
practical reasons, be selective targeting, i.e. special preoccu-
pation with critical geographic areas--at present, for example
the Afro-Asian area--and key social groups of "opinion leaders."
39/ Congressional hearings and all other pertinent official and
nonofficial literature abound with innumerable statements recog-
nizing the need for tailoring our information output to specific
target audiences, 40/ for shifting the emphasis from one target
group to another, 41/ one target area to another, 42/ and one
type of information media to another 43/ in accordance with
changing needs and opportunities. In actual fact, however, the
physical and financial resources of the USIA, compared to its
worldwide mission, are such that this agency simply cannot afford
to specialize or expand strongly in any given field without
leaving other fields--only thinly covered as it is--virtually de-
nuded. One illustrative example: When for FY 59 USIA requested
$1,370,128 more than in FY 58 for its Near East-South Asia-Africa
activities--which covered no less than 27 countries--this was
deemed to constitute "a basic shift in agency resources in the
direction of the Near East-South Asia-Africa program." 44/

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Examining the "shifts of emphasis," generally discussed in terms of "policy," one will discover that in terms of actual operations the increase or decrease of personnel and fund allocations involved is incredibly small.

## Common Criticisms of United States Overseas Information Effort

That our overseas information activities are nearly always criticized and virtually never praised is certainly known even to those not specifically concerned with propaganda and psychological warfare matters. It came, nevertheless, as a shock to this writer to find, when he began to study systematically books, newspaper items, magazine articles, speeches, congressional records, etc., dealing with the subject, that this criticism should be so all-pervading, scathing and bitter as it actually is and that, with the exception of the exchange-of-persons program which appears to enjoy uniform even somewhat unthinking approval, this negative attitude should refer to practically all aspects of policy and operations, with the Voice of America (VOA) often singled out for particularly biting attacks.

There is in much of this criticism an expressed or implied feeling that governmental propaganda is something basically wicked or, at least, un-American; and, if not wicked, then unnecessary, since our just cause and our obvious national achievements in all fields need no official sales campaign, but would be advertised much better and more convincingly by private individuals, organizations, and media (such as United States businessmen and travelers abroad, American news services, newspapers, commercial radio and movies, etc.). It would be unrealistic to assume that this more

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or less "old fashioned" traditional American hostility toward any government-conducted information operations is no longer of importance in the year 1958, with such operations having actually been carried on for years and with the Communist propaganda offensive more intense and threatening than ever. It is very revealing that the exceptionally experienced and knowing Director of USIA (Allen) at the very outset of the February 1958 USIA appropriations hearings for FY 59 should have asked and answered affirmatively, of course, these two questions: "Why should we have a USIA?" and "Why is not private activity by American organizations and institutions sufficient to take care of this effort to reach other people abroad?" (For a fuller documentation of American antagonism in and out of Congress, toward organized official propaganda abroad, see Appendix I).

There are, on the other hand, strong and authoritative voices which, on the contrary, berate our entire post-World War II overseas information effort as piddling, pitifully undersized and inadequately supported by Congress and the nation, and demand a "crusade" on a gigantic scale for which there must be made available very large sums--$500 million per annum appears to be the magic figure--vast armies of highly trained officials and experts, and huge networks of radio and television stations. (For Senator Benton's "Marshall Plan of Ideas," David Sarnoff's "Sarnoff Plan" and similar schemes see Appendix II).

Those who in the ultimate analysis would like to see the entire official propaganda apparatus scrapped and those who, instead, want it enormously expanded, are invariably also highly

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