DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Frank Lincoln

6/13/70 10:45 a.m.

K: I appreciated the note you sent.

L: We are supposed to meet with the President Tuesday at 2:00?

K: Right.

L: I'd like to talk to him about Southeast Asia. I am sorry I missed the meeting of the Board. I understand he suggested the Board to over there.

K: A few of them.

L: I didn't understand whether he meant all or a few.

K: No, just a few of them.

L: Would there be any objection to my talking to the President about Southeast Asia?

K: Not at all. I'll make sure you have a few minutes to see him afterwards.

L: Well, either before or at the end. About 15 minutes would be fine. I don't know if there's any sense in my talking to you about it you are so ataurated.

K: It's not that I'm saturated with ideas--but my schedule is so full.

L: I understand. Well I have some personal matters from some friends of the President's too. I would like about 15 minutes.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Joe Sisco

6/13/70 10:50 a.m.

K: I read your reporting memo on your talk with Dobrynin. I'm trying to understand--my impression was that the President hasn't approved the initiative.

S: I understand and they understand this.

K: Supposing the President says you can't do anything.

S: That's fine. Then we say we've reevaluated and we just go ahead with the bilateral talks. The only thing they are afraid of is that there might be a peace in this area with an American stamp on it. It's coming along well now.

K: Are we going to get them out today?

S: It looks that way.

K: But the long run is not good?

S: No, not good.

K: Is it going to spill over into Lebanon?

S: I think it might be contained. But we've got some serious questions ahead of us to answer.

K: Like what?

S: Like 'do we intervene?' They are going to turn to Big Brother.

K: Next week some time I've got to get you in for 15 minutes with the President.

S: Any time at all.

K: You just come over and walk up with me.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Stans
6/13/70 11:10 a.m.

K: The President would appreciate it if you would delay your testimony until the 22nd.

S: Well I don't know. I'll see what can be done. I can't do anything today. I'll try to on Monday.

K: He'd appreciate it. The indications are that we won't get a proposal until the 17th.

S: Right. My man is in Tokyo. I haven't heard from him yet.

K: Right. Secondly on this sale of airplanes. I am sure we will approve it. It isn't being held upk in this office. I'll get the answer in two weeks, but we can't have it decided unilaterally.

S: It isn't. State has opposed. Defense is for it and Commerce is for it. I have the authority to decide unilaterally under these circumstances. Rogers said he would decide on the South African jets in five days--he may approve it. On the Portuguese, he wants them to buy it through somebody else other than the air force.

K: Okay, let's keep it at that. Despite what you may hear we have no White House reason to oppose it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President
6/13/70 11:17 a.m.

P: What's new in your shop today?

K: We're going to complete the evacuation from Jordan today probably, at the latest tomorrow morning. But we'll have most of them out today. The immediate situation is quiet--the long-term one is very complex with the extremist wing of the Fedayeen, the Maoist wing, showing that it can dominate the moderate Fedayeen and the King.

P: By getting rid of the generals?

K: Yes, and by removing the army as an effective counterweight to them and letting the King run the day to day things while they conduct the Arab-Israeli confrontation. It appears that within a month it will spill over into Lebanon.

P: It already has. What about Vietnam?

K: We're picking up at the usual rate in Cambodia. We got another hundred-plus rifles and 500 mortar rounds. We've got well over 13 million in small arms and 16,000 of the individual weapons. So that's going along. The other side is doing its harrassing raids. I have asked Defense to write a letter. . . they are still stonewalling the tactical air strikes you have ordered. I have requested a letter explaining why they are not hitting beyond a certain line--they say they are but they're not, not beyond the Mekong--just to galvanize them into action. They claim they can't find targets, but they're surrounding the towns and taking them, so we know they're there.

P: Is that new man out there now?

K: He just got out there. I've seen lit as much of a fire as possible. They have a program now of turning over captured equipment to the Cambodians. Brezhnev made a speech yesterday which the New York Times plays as an attack on you. But that's not true. He says that the differences are deep but also that peaceful coexistence is their firm line and they want to settle disputes with the U.S. on that basis. It's not soft, but it's not excessively aggressive either. They have to make some bows toward the Chinese.

P: Oh sure, I understand why they do that. But the Times has to try to show that their theory is right and that all of this trouble is because of Cambodia. They are having a hell of a time because the Chinese didn't march in and the Russians didn't break off and the SALT talks are going on.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President

6/13/70 11:17 a.m. page 3

P: If they could just get some break over there. Is Heath just a lousy candidate?

K: He's just a weak campaigner. Bruce says Heath would be a good Prime Minister but he just comes across as a weak copy of Wilson. That's why they like Hume so much--he's such a contrast.

P: He doesn't think it will turn around again?

K: He thinks maybe the newspaper strikes might change things. But he thinks Britain will have a major economic crisis again this year. Wages have increased and prices haven't caught up with them. But they will

P: And then the foreign exchange problem will occur again. Wilson just let wages go up to win the election. If it could just be close enough they might still have to have another election.

K: I think Bruce is a good man. He realizes that some of the settlement might have to be made outside--he's not a prima donna. He suggested setting up a back channel. I think you would be pleased with him.

P: Did you really lay it on the line to him?

K: I said once you say something you don't want it to come back to you 50 different ways; you want it done. He's a strong and honorable man.

P: Will he do it?

K: He'll call me on Monday or Tuesday. He wanted to talk to his wife. But he'll do it.

P: We should announce it in July. But I don't want it to look like we're doing it out of weakness.

K: Around the 15th, or we could slip it to the end of July.

P: We should do it from strength. I don't want to appear to be driven into it.

K: Early in July we ought to go back into the other channel and answer the note. We would have waited 4 weeks by then.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President

6/13/70 11:17 a.m. page 4

P: I see your point. They are going to have to give some serious thought to where they are.

K: What would be ideal would be if we could go back into the other channel and if they agree to a meeting tell them at the meeting that we are going to appoint a new ambassador. Then we might get something for it. But the timing might not work out.

P: It might. That would be good.

K: But we shouldn't do it until our forces are out of Cambodia.

P: Getting back to the Breshnev speech. . .

K: The Times says he says escalating the war was just escalating our defeats, and it put one of these flashy headlines on the story that won't support it. He didn't mention Cambodia at all. He said our divisions are very deep. And on that they hang their story. But you would say the same thing.

P: I have. The Times is falling into our line. Don't be concerned with the day to day stories. The real thing is what's happening underneath. They don't know, and they mustn't. They when it happens we will drop it on them like a bomb.

K: The Chinese said that around June 20 they would be willing to talk again. I think we should have some visable activity in Warsaw.

P: Good.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon

Bob Haldeman

6/13/70 12:30 p.m. (C_a.)

H: What's happening?

K: nothing much.

H: How's your war going?

K: Brilliantly. We've got to keep it going long enough to get
our big victory in October.

H: How's Jordan?

K: We'll have all the civilians out by tonight--at the latest
tomorrow morning. The long-term situation is lousey, but the immediate
crisis situation is good.

H: Any new crises building?

K: No. When are you coming home?

H: I talked to him this morning. I don't know.

K: I talked with him also. He didn't seem in very good spirits.

H: Really? He had probably just gotten up.

K: Is he going to Walkers Key?

H: I don't know. Any problem with that?

K: Absolutely not. Breshnev made a speech which the NYT analyzed as
a slap at Nixon, which it isn't. It's not a friendly speech, but it's not bad.

H: You going to New York tomorrow?

K: Maybe.

H: Are you happy?

K: I'm content. The President asks that; you ask that. Go ahead,
cheer me up. What's the news? I'm just afraid you've made Laird a
White House assistant.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Haldeman

6/13/70 12:30 p.m. page 2

H: No, Councilor to the President.

K: That would liven things up.

H: And Rogers Secretary of Defense, and we're moving Pursley
over as Secretary of State.

K: I'd be happy if you would move him almost any place.

H: I don't know what he's doing. It's hot as hell down here.

K: It's pretty quiet here. I'm catching up on things. One thing,
I think I ought to start seeing people like Chalmers Roberts again. State
is starting its campaign about being shut out again.

H: Yes, but we ought to pick who we see and then give them a
big one.

K: Chalmers Roberts has been pretty fair.

H: I think we should work on it at the beginning of the week.

K: They're cranking up a campaign again.

H: I agree, but we should do it selectively.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Dave Packard

6/13/70 2:05 p.m.

P: I was just looking into the things the President is worrying about in a briefing with DIA: I'm trying to get what we might do to be more effective. It would be helpful to get to the President to talk to him for about 20 minutes and let him see some of these things first-hand. He might get a much better idea of what we're doing and what needs to be done. We can give you memos but I think this would be better.

K: The one thing that is maddening is to send over a Presidential order and have nothing happen.

P: There's not much that can be done now in Cambodia.

K: How can it be that they can take a town and we can't hit one.

P: We can't use tactical air for attacks on towns unless we have ground control with it. We can't run out there with tactical air and get the thing settled. It would be helpful if he understood the problem.

K: I'll try to get it set up, but is there nothing that can be done?

P: The situation is, the logistical movements coming into the Laos panhandle. There's not much coming into Cambodia yet. What is coming is coming in boats in the jungles. We've only had one secondary explosion so far. We haven't been able to do much yet.

K: But when we can take a town they must be moving.

P: But we can't tell much be reconnaissance. By the time the pictures are developed the people have moved. You can't fire from the air without someone to tell you who's the enemy and who isn't. It's a little more complex than it appears. If we could get a presentation to the President of what the problem is it would be helpful.

K: I'll see if I can arrange it. I get the same questions every day. I'll arrange an appointment if it can be done.

P: He's in Kay Biscayne tomorrow?

K: Yes, but he won't want to see anyone. He never wants to be disturbed down there. And he's probably going to Walker's Key.

P: I think we should allocate half an hour. We could go through it in 10 minutes, but he usually lokes to discuss these things. I understand his concerns, but it would be helpful if he understood what can and can't be done.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Dave Packard

6/13/70 2:05 p.m. page 2

K: His present impression is that nothing is being done.

P: We'll have these memos over to you. But I think the best thing would be if he could see it--we've got some pictures.

K: I'll try to set it up Monday. I'll put the request in to him immediately.

P: Another thing is the weather. You can't use tactical air through the clouds without radar people on the ground guiding it. I've been working on it and decided I had better double-check. We're doing everything we can and we'll get these memos together. But it would be most helpful if we could see him for a few minutes and give it to him first-hand.

K: I'll do my best.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON (at home)
Mr. Kissinger/Pete Vaky

Sunday, June 14, 1970

K: Pete, I have something for you that will curl your hair. Well, your hair is curled already. Can I discuss something with you that will stay in our-office and not go to State.

V: Yeah.

K: Can you give me your word on that?

V: Yes. What is this about?

K: It's something that the President is planning -- it's Presidential business, but if you have any problems with that, then I'd rather not discuss it.

V: Well, it depends on what it would be.

K: I want your advice on some Presidential business. You've got to be able to tell me whether you can ... I think your prerogative is, your pre-eminent loyalty has to be to the President.

V: Oh, no, I'll do that, Henry. I won't pass it on. I take it's something I won't like.

K: No, I'm not saying... It's something on which I need your advice; that's why I'm asking you.

V: Yeah.

K: But I don't want it discussed at State until the President is ready.

V: Oh, okay. No, I won't have any problems.

K: He's thinking of going down to Mexico. He's got a honeymoon this weekend, an anniversary this weekend. He spent his honeymoon in Acapulco, and he thought it might be a nice thing -- a sentimental thing if he went back there. Are you with me? He thought while he was at it, that could be the occasion of his seeing Diaz Ordaz.

V: Yeah. I guess they could do that. They are not ready, of course. He was thinking further on down the road. This coming weekend?

K: Yeah.

By NARA, Date 5/26

V: The weekend you'll be there.

K: The son of a bitch is upstaging me.

V: Well, that's a problem because the championship matches are in Mexico, and he may feel he has to be there.

K: I've told him that already. He would go down Thursday and he thought Diaz could give a dinner for him Friday night or Thursday night.

V: Well, we can sure try.

K: What do you think?

V: I think it's perfectly in order to try to do that, although I think it's giving them short notice. There's no reason not to ask them, Henry, that I can see.

K: And will they count that as a meeting?

V: They might not. They might still want to see him because what Diaz Ordaz wanted was to see him about the end of August by which time the boundary settlement agreement would be going forward a little better, and they could sort of do something besides just have a meeting. I don't think from Diaz Ordaz's point of view you satisfy his desire to have a continuous meeting.

K: You don't.

V: No.

K: Well, would Diaz Ordaz consider coming up?

V: Yeah. Now, there's one other thread that's in here -- you know the ... Dwight Chapin cleared off on the memorandum that had been sent up to them which the President agreed to meet Diaz Ordaz in Puerto Vilarto in early September.

K: Yeah, but this is...

V: We just sent the directive over to State and authorized them to go ahead and talk to the Mexicans to set up such a date. There's no reason why he couldn't do both. Would he be willing to do that?

By NARA, Date 5/26

K: I doubt it.

V: There is a mechanical problem. I don't know how fast they would be moving, but we'd have to pull them off the other one.

K: Yeah, but since he hasn't definitely decided yet... Now, the other thing is -- he thought if he's in Acapulco, he might go down to Peru and look at the earthquake.

V: Well, that would be very nice.

K: Would that be a good gesture?

V: Yeah -- a very good gesture.

K: It would?

V: Yes.

K: You're sure?

V: Yes, I'm sure.

K: Well, he'd send Finch down ahead and Finch then would report to him and then he'd say as long as you're in Acapulco, why don't you come on down?

V: I think it would be a nice gesture. There are two things to remember. It's hard to know... There may be something in the Peruvian situation that I'm not aware of that, from the Peruvian point of view, they might find it an embarrassment or something, but I doubt it. It's just a word of caution. Secondly, if he does go down, and does establish hopes and expectations that aid is going to be given... I expect we will be giving substantial aid, but it will mean... they will take it as his personal interest in the area and they will expect that something will follow from it.

K: Yeah.

V: But it would be, bearing those in mind, I would think that's a good idea.

K: You would? Would you do it on the way down or on the way back? Can it wait until next Monday or should it be this Thursday?

By NARA, Date 5/26

- 4 -

V: I would do it on the way back.

K: You'd stop in Peru on the way back?

V: No, I would go to Peru. The sooner you go there, the better, and then stop in Acapulco on the way back.

K: Right. It means an all-night flight for all of us. I hope you realize that.

V: Well, let's see... I don't know what the flying time would be.

K: Seven hours.

V: He would fly from here?

K: Yeah, it's seven hours, I think.

V: Yes, it is a long flight. I would think that's the more desirable rather than tacking that on the end of the holiday. It looks like an afterthought. And as long as you are going to the expense of making this gesture, you ought to get the maximum out of it, so...

K: Well, can it be set up that quickly?

V: Well, if we started right away, it could be. He would leave here on Thursday?

K: He'd leave Wednesday night, I guess.

V: All right. Look at it... You don't have to stay there more than a day or so. Thursday -- Friday come back and stop off in Acapulco.

K: No, he'd do Acapulco Thursday night. He'd leave here Wednesday night.

V: Oh, I see, because of the date.

K: He'd fly all night, arrive in Peru on Thursday morning.

V: And then come back Thursday night.

K: Yeah.

V: And the alternative would be fly to Acapulco Thursday.

K: And go to Peru Monday.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

V: Then he wouldn't be in such a rush to get back.

K: Then he'd fly Monday night.

V: Well, I'm inclined to the earlier one, Henry, as being a more dramatic gesture.

K: But you think it's a good gesture? Well, can you keep both of these things quiet?

V: I won't say a word. Do you want me to do anything at this point?

K: Well, what could you do?

V: Well, there's nothing. It would be messy. Well, what do you think the arrangements are?

K: Well, once he's made the decision, we can make the arrangements.

V: All right.

K: Good.

V: What do you want me to do about your Mexico trip. Nothing at the moment?

K: No, that stays until the President decides. Let me understand. What is your decision again... your view again about the Diaz Ordaz... There's nothing wrong with the Acapulco Part as long as we don't insist that that is the State visit.

V: That's right, and there's nothing wrong with trying to see Diaz Ordaz, but from Diaz Ordaz's point of view he had wanted a meeting with the President that could be...

K: Of course, if he goes to Peru, he really doesn't have to have a Diaz Ordaz dinner, does he?

V: Once you get in the country, I think he would want to and he probably should.

K: Yeah, but we could just do that a social dinner.

V: Right, but Diaz Ordaz had been looking forward to a meeting with the President which he could say was a sort of official meeting

By NARA, Date 5/26

between the two Presidents, and by which time they would have
hoped to have had some business transaction...

K: No, no, but if there's a meeting this Friday?

V: Diaz Ordaz would not consider that as a substitute for what he thought had been coming up in September. He would still want to have another meeting, which you could again do. You would invite him to Puerto Villarto which is where they filmed "The Night of the Iguana" north of Acapulco, which is a beautiful spot and have a formal meeting again.

K: Yeah, but he won't do that.

V: Well, then, if he does this one, he should understand that probably Diaz Ordaz will not consider this a particularly substantive meeting.

K: But do we have to face that issue?

V: You do to this extent -- that we have already probed formally for this kind of another meeting, sort of a second one to the one he had last year.

K: And have they already started talking about it?

V: Oh, yes. And they were authorized to do so. You remember...

K: I remember, but when did they start doing that?

V: They were doing that about a month ago, and they exchanged ideas, and it was left that we would come back to them with... What we did was explore with the Mexicans the feasibility of this.

K: But if the President has had to go down there, we really don't have to face this issue now. We... They won't feel any worse if we tell them after this meeting that we considered this a meeting than before.

V: Oh, that's right. But if he goes to Acapulco, he has to count on seeing Diaz Ordaz.

K: All right, if he goes to Acapulco, he has to see Diaz Ordaz. If we want to see Diaz Ordaz, we might just as well do it in a good atmosphere. Do we have to take Rogers down with us, too?

By NARA, Date 5/20

V: It would be a nice gesture, Henry.

K: But then it's no longer a honeymoon trip.

V: Well, it would be nice for Rogers to go to Lima. He doesn't have to stay there. He can go on. For the meeting with Diaz Ordaz, Rogers doesn't necessarily have to be there or he could join the President for just that as an alternative. The President ought to have Meyer there and one of the Latin American officials.

K: But then it becomes very official.

V: Well, you can't avoid it, Henry.

K: Well, what if he just went down for his honeymoon anniversary and then had Diaz Ordaz have a social dinner for him?

V: Well, the point there is it won't obviate the pressure. Once the Mexicans know he's there, they're going to want to talk a little bit of business or else assume that he will come back again in September.

K: That's right. That's the choice.

V: And if he does that, he will almost have to come back again in September.

K: But I think if he really wants to get a rest down there... I just think to set up a big apparatus with Assistant Secretaries, Secretaries, agendas, etc., looks like an insane rush.

V: I agree with that. But you say that if he does this, he will not want to go back in September.

K: Probably not.

V: My point is that from the Mexican point of view...

K: The thing I have to get in his head is that if he wants to use this as a substitute for September, he's got to have the State Department and the whole apparatus present. On the other hand, if he does not have them present, then he's got to go back in September.

V: Right. Or, alternatively, ask Diaz Ordaz to come up to San Clemente.

K: Right.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

V: But he has to have another meeting with Diaz Ordaz that will be the official part of it because he can't use this as a substitute. He's already indicated he would be willing to have this kind of a meeting. Now you can't have this social part which I agree with you, it would be nice to retain the social nature of this sort of thing, but then also say that would substitute for the official visit.

K: I think it looks too frantic to make it official meeting.

V: I agree with you, but you must understand that the Mexicans will still want a meeting.

K: I understand that, but my judgment is there can be no official meeting without State Department participation. There can be, on the other hand -- that will destroy the social character of it.

V: Right. I agree with you. If that's the case, that's the way to structure it, Henry.

K: And then I think we ought to get Diaz Ordaz to San Clemente.

V: All right. If you can do that and make that commitment, that I think would be fine.

K: Okay. Good. Let me get back to Haldeman. Please keep this to yourself.

V: I won't say a word.

K: Okay, good.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Haldeman/Kissinger

11:33 am

6/15/70

H: On Peru he says if he is doing it he must overnight in Lima.

K: I have come to the same conclusion.

H: He is both ways on whether to go.

K: To either place?

H: But going to Mexico depends on whether the family wants to. If they do then the next question is do we add Peru and that questions hangs on overnighting in Lima and that depends on whether we can avoid adverse demonstrations. He also wants a reading on whether there's anything substantive we can go to Peru with.

K: The answer is yes, but we don't have to do it there. I don't know what it is but I can't give the order of magnitude. What's the timing?

H: Thurs. night. So he will get to Acapulco Friday night and leave Tues. night.

K: And go to St. Louis?

H: He has scratched that.

K: When do you think we will know,

H: Later today. The main question is the family and he doesn't face the others until that.

K: Time is getting awfully short. The dinner will have to be Sat. or Monday.

H: Monday would be the best. At the end of the holiday would be the best. If we had to we could go to Mexico City for it. But I think that's a mistake. Diplomatically it would be all right but logistically it would be a mistake.

K: Monday would be fine because it would remove the pressures. I will not raise it at lunch today.

H: I don't think you had better. Unless you talk to the President beforehand.

K: Can I just go over there?

H: Yeah. And you might make the point you are lunching with the Mexican Amb. and if he had an answer you could bring it up.

K: I have some other work and I will bring it up.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger

12:50 pm

6/15/70

H: Rogers is calling and says he needs to talk to the President about the Under Secretary question and his trip to VN.

K: It's just intolerable that he never discussed with me anymore.

H: The Under Secretary thing he should discuss with the President since it's a Presidential appointment.

K: But he should discuss it with me -- after all I have to work with the guy. You can't stop it but it's intolerable. Then after he talks to the President he goes to the Dept. and says what his orders are. Laird always discusses with me and I tell him to go to the President. But there's nothing you can do.

H: There isn't. We had no attempts over the weekend.

K: If he said what I am going to discuss with the President and what do you think about it, I would say go ahead. He doesn't work as a colleague with me. I have killed myself trying -- going over there, memos, etc.

H: I will see if I can play this back that we. But if everything went right it wouldn't be any fun.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telcon
Herb Klein
6/15/70; 3:15 p.m.

Klein: There are two or three things I wanted to ask about. Have you seen the pink sheet being circulated around about you by someone called AFNS (DFNS?)?

HAK: I haven't seen it.

Klein: It's one of these right-wing things saying what a Communist you are.

HAK: Oh, great, send it up to Harvard. My former colleagues will be disappointed.

Klein: I claimed yesterday you are not about to succumb to the pressures of your colleagues when I was on TV.

HAK: I am just waiting for a high price.

Klein: It's just a lot of bunk but I thought you ought to see what somebody is circulating around. I will send it to you personally. The most important thing is this. When we were negotiating with Lodge about becoming head of the Citizens ABM Committee he knew you had lined up the appointment for him with the Vatican. He now is taking the position since he had taken that post he can allow his name to be used on the letterhead as a front man, but can not act in any official way.

HAK: I think that is correct. I don't think you can have a serving Ambassador do this.

Klein: OK. That is what I wanted to ask.

ms

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Haldeman/Kissinger

4:40 pm

6/15/70

H: He agrees you should talk to Chalmers Roberts.

K: He already mentioned that. But that's not what's bugging me.

H: Frankel? Oh, you mean Rogers.

K: I understand he is still trying to settle the textile issue bilaterally.

H: I wonder if it's true.

K: That's what U.A. Johnson says. That has a long and complicated 7 months' history.

H: I know.

K: I will talk to Rogers.

H: He talked to you about that other.

K: He mentioned it about 1:00.

He also says no on Frankel. He wonders about Sample. He doesn't handle your kind of stuff.

K: Not really. Beecher could but he is out of town.

H: We could get Roberts to send them something. He says not Frankel or ____.

K: I will see if I can think of someone. What about that other?

H: The trip is off. Mexico or anywhere. The family cannot go. The anniversary will be at Camp David.

K: Maybe Diaz-Ordaz would like to go up there.

H: And have a Mexican dinner.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Rogers/Kissinger

6:00 pm

6/15/70

R: One, on the M.E. I hope we can get an answer from the President soon. On the arms we can play it by ear. I would like to get ~~negotiations~~ started.

K: Don't ~~x~~ max you think we should wrap them up together?

R: On the arms the President could delay a decision if he has a problem. It's ~~x~~ rather hairy with Jordan and Lebanon.

K: I will try for an answer on Wed.

R: I will fill in for Elliott. You have heard from Gerry Smith. He thinks we should get another option.

K: We have a Verification meeting next week.

R: Could we move it up? The President would like something done by Oct.

K: I think the basic elements of the option are there in B. I think we have to look at it. I don't know if three days will make much difference.

R: This Thurs?

K: A week from Wed.

R: They don't have the other -- the next meeting is Monday.

K: Yes and after that we could let them go. Once the President decides he will go for the limited one which I think he will I don't think it will be such a problem.

R: They will still have a lot of negotiating and the President will be able to make a final decision but if I could get a limited option. Could we do it Friday?

K: I won't be here. I had the impression he didn't want movement on this before July 1.

R: He thinks it will move quickly and it won't. They will close shop the end of ~~Mx July.~~ If he is really thinking of an agreement in early October, time is of the essence. Gerry keeps asking for new instructions. I don't like them to think we are slow.

K: They were told they would get instructions the week of next Monday. They have been given the details. I just don't think a week makes that much difference.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger

6:00 pm

6/15/70

R: Not life and death but the more heat on the team (?) the better particularly if the President is serious about wanting it in Oct.

K: He doesn't want them to run wild. He thinks the agreement can be gotten.

R: I'm sure he doesn't want them running wild but I think *it* will be longer than we think even if the other side goes ahead. I don't think we should do it in principle. That's a disaster.

K: They have talked all over the lot. There are not that many issues that remain to be negotiated. 200 units and that's just negotiated. The major issue is ABM radar. I think it's going to solve itself fairly quickly. The problem is before October if we let them run too quickly.

R: I may talk to Gerry on the phone.

K: Gerry is always eager. I really think we have it in good shape. It's gone as it was conceived. I think we can bring it off.

R: I hope so. It troubles me about the Russians saying about agreement in principle. If you think it's in the bag --

K: I really have that feeling. At least I am pretty certain that the President would like to keep Gerry leashed.

R: It's not a question of keeping Gerry leashed. You never have trouble slowing things down. *Gerry can* delay for 6 mos.

K: It's never happened with Gerry. He did seabeds in two weeks once he had the go ahead.

R: We are a long way from a treaty. If you think it's no problem, ok.

K: I am as eager. We all agree on an agreement by Oct. but the way we have gone has been faster than before on arms control.

R: Fine. You will try on the M.E. to have something by Wed.

K: Right.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Secy. Stans/Kissinger

6:10 pm

6/15/70

S: My man is back and has come in to see me with his decision over there. He will call there at 7:00 tonight on whether it's in the ball park. In respect to the machinery it's workable and base period is negotiable. They want a one year agreement and they want a letter at the end of a year that we will not ask for an extension. That's impossible. My man is convinced it's negotiable. I told my man that the one year and letter is not possible but everything else is possible and will not give us significant difficulty. He wants to come with the Foreign Minister next week. ? ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: Which is what?

S: At least 3 or 4. Two answers. The original agreement of last Nov. was 5 years and we have had no problems with that. A one year agreement will get Congress so mad they would pass that bill. When he gets here we can work it out and they left room. Rogers called me and said the President asked him about it.

K: *(!, %!

S: He asked me about where it stood. I told him I had heard that Miazawa was coming next week. He said Miazawa and Aichi are coming. I told him the story. He told me to handle it. Miazawa wants a discussion made with me privately. Rogers said to work it out. I said I would meet with Miazawa and keep Johnson informed. That's where we are and we are prepared at 7:00 tonight to tell him to come with the Foreign Minister and we would meet and work it out.

K: Terrific!

S: I didn't tell Mills about the latest. He agreed to move it till Monday. When they say they are coming I will ask for a few more days.

K: Your persistance paid off. We can get three years.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By", "NARA, Dato 5/26", "Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers", "6:30 p.m. (paraphrased, not verbatim)", "June 15, 1970", "K: Hello Bill", "R: Hello Henry", "K: About this SALT thing. I know from my conversations with the President that this is his time schedule. However, you should, of course, call him if you think ...", "XX R: Schedule we had laid out with Jerry. . . . July first.", "K: It is not all that vital", "R: I was worried about getting Jerry all stirred up.", "K: There are no huge issues.", "R: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

By NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

K: You mean plans beyond October 15.

R: Gordan always says that you must know. Give me some idea.

K: Good idea. When are you going?

R: 2 weeks When is Mel coming back?

K: Next week. Following week let's have that meeting.

R: . . . . troops out of Thailand.

K: I don't think that's a good idea. Definitely before you go we will have a meeting. I read the Unger cable and was much impressed.

R: The President wants air support . . . I think it is inconsistent.

K: Slightly.

R: Just have the Joint Chiefs and Mel at the meeting . . .

K: We will have a Sequoia type meeting.

R: OK Henry, thanks, goodby

K: Goodby

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON
The President/Mr. Kissinger

7:45 p.m., June 15, 1970

K: Mr. President

P: Henry

K: Yes

P: How did your, what's the group?

K: WSAG

P: Do you think they got the message? They said they were trying so I just hope they got it. No doubt about what we were going to do -- we were going to take gambles and risks.

K: It was very useful, your speaking to them. You couldn't have made it more plain.

P: Maybe they are going to come up with some things. I am going to watch it every 24 hours.

K: More urgency. Also the fact that they heard from you directly, your attitude towards (what) you think, that is terribly important.

P: What do you have in mind about the Lon Nol government? Not support government or not ____.

K: I don't think your position is that we tie ourselves to the man.

P: Never!

K: Just as long as it is a non-communist government in Phnom Penh. There was no problem about that.

P: Packard came through nicely. Just think what a spot we would have been in if we hadn't done the Cambodian thing.

K: He is a good guy.

P: What would have happened if we had allowed them to romp around down there? We would be in a desperate position. Doesn't he (Packard) believe that? He might not have thought it at the beginning. Before we could not have, now we can afford to take it. Otherwise,

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

(page 2)

w we couldn't. I have a feeling we must now write it. How often (does the WSAG Group get together)? When is your next meeting?

K: Wednesday afternoon, every other day.

P: Will you report to me every 24 hours?

K: I get a daily report, I will let you know.

P: Talked with Bill about DuBridge. Bill doesn't have any candidates for Under Secretary. I have tottled him off Peterson. Guy that really pushed him (Peterson) was Norstad.

K: The Soviets don't want one because they are behind.

K: On that I think they will come out very well. Had a break on the textile thing today.

P: That's another thing Bill talked about. He said what do you want me to do. Aichi is coming to talk to him over the weekend. I think Stans is talking to him. What's happened?

K: Had word through direct channel. Aichi said he would come over if we wanted. Stans is talking to them. They have accepted the proposal of 2 months ago. They are arguing over the length of time. We asked for 5 years, they offered one year -- even Stans thinks we can compromise on three years. Mizawa will come over here and he will present my proposal as their own with one year. Stans will reject it. Aichi will come over and on political grounds rather than economic grounds give some ground. We will compromise and come up with 3 years.

P: They will all understand on political grounds, has to be *after* the election in 1972, we did theirs for their election, they have to do ours. (The President asked about Stans testimony)

K: Stans testimony postponed until Monday. When it's sure they are coming we can get another postponement.

P: Mizawa will be here that soon?

K: Stans will ask for another postponement (said something about Stans talking to someone about postponement).

P: Henry, if we can pull this off, is Stans happy?

K: Stans is delighted except for the time.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger
(page 3)

P: We know damn well we can get two, maybe we can get three.

K: We may do two with a clause for another year.

P: It is negotiable -- couldn't be 5 and couldn't be one -- comes to 4, than 2 or 2 1/2.

K: We used to say if we could get 80%, it would be good -- now we have 100% of everything except the length of time. We played a tough game with them. I told them it wasn't textiles but the credibility of their position -- they kept coming back with the Kendell formula.

P: Don didn't, what do you think will bring them around?

K: You took his word for it and you did things that were very difficult for you and ____.

P: That was a real Butch, if we could have gotten the ____.

K: It set us back 6 weeks. We made two mistakes. State gave them our fall-back position first. Sato has to prove we are sons of bitches -- we had worked out, when they were here, that we would give them a tough position and they could bargain us down. __ they said way back about 4 years.

P: We will talk in the morning. Do you have any idea about the Under Secretary thing? I want you to talk to Bill about it.

K: I'll talk to Bill (Rogers) about it. It's of great interest here.

P: I have talked to him. Tell him I raised it with you.

K: Alex Johnson would be the best.

P: You might mention that to Bill, make a lot of points for him with the Foreign Service. I think it should go back to one Under Secretary.

K: You could put Alex in there, bring in a young lawyer to take his place.

P: I just wouldn't have two Secretaries of State, One Under Secretary and an Assistant Secretary. How does he get along with Alex?

K: Fine I think.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
(page 4)

P: Tell you what you should do. You raise it with Bill -- Do you have any better, I don't have anybody -- let him come around to Alex so he doesn't think we pushed someone off on him.

K: One other point, Bill is getting terribly anxious about pushing SALT. He may have mentioned it to you.

P: He mentioned it briefly, but nothing before October 1st.

K: He thinks to get it before October 1st, we have to turn Smith loose now. We have a verification meeting next week. Smith wants to come back. It may be a good idea if you talk to Smith. I think it is terribly important that you get the credit for this. Tell Smith you have reasons for going slowly.

P: Why don't we do this, you, Bill and I get together to have a talk about this.

K: May be a good idea next week.

P: Maybe this week, after this speech. On this guy, I haven't got a candidate.

K: Do you mind if I go to Mexico on Thursday?

P: Sure, sure.

K: I will stop at the LBJ Ranch for a briefing on the way back, if you agree.

P: That is always a good idea. He may be able to keep some of them off our back.

K: Okay, right, Mr. President.

wh

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Admiral Moorer

6/16/70 8:27 a.m.

K: You seemed a little startled by my comment when I came in. Had you read the New York Times?

M: Oh sure, I had read it.

K: Well, that nonsense that we put Vogt in there just to dilute peoples' influence.

M: No, I just brought him along.

K: Exactly.

M: No, my mind as thinking about something else.

K: I thought you might have interpreted it as a dig at you.

M: No. About that Blue Ribbon Panel group--that's a bucket of worms.

K: I talked to Fitzhugh about it yesterday and told him what I thought of it--which is nothing.

,M: It would cut me right out of the picture.

K: And finish the armed services. I told him the Chiefs would have to be moved into the line of authority.

M: Well, good. I hope you'll hold to that line.

K: But that's not what I was calling you about. I just get a call from the President about Kompong Speu. He just read that there are 1500 troops there and 5,000 outside. And he said don't let anybody tell me now that there aren't any troops there. He doesn't want to hear what can't be done; he wants to hear what can be done. He wants a report by the end of the day.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

David Pakkard

6/16/70 8:35 a.m.

K: The President just read the newspaper and read that there are 1500 troops in Kompong Speu and 5000 on the outside. He said anyone who says he can't find targets there now should look for another job.

P: Well then maybe we should look for another job.

K: He wants that road opened if it takes the whole Vietnamese army and he wants a report in two hours, not of what can't be done, but what can be done.

P: The problem is they're holed up inside the town. We've got it surrounded. But the trouble with air strikes--the enemy's in the middle of the town--we could bomb it but it would destroy the town.

K: No, don't do that. My job is to transmit orders, but also to make some sense of them. Can you give me a report in two hours.

P: I'll try. One other thing. We've got to get together on the SALT talks. [P mentioned someone who had expressed dissatisfaction.]

K: Yes, but he's smoking pot. We're doing what we said. We're going to have a Verification Panel meeting next week.

P: I think we should move that up. On the command control of the ABM, I can't approve that. We need to get some instructions over.

K: The President has a reason why he wants to move at this pace. It's definitely going to be done next Wednesday.

P: If you are satisfied with the pace . . . Mel came back saying . . .

K: One minute Mel says they are going too fast, the next . . . On the basis of something he hasn't studied, the President has an overall strategy he's trying to follow with the Soviets. We're going to get an agreement.

P: If you are satisfied with next week . . .

K: We're bringing Smith back next week and we're going to get the thing moving. It's a big concern to the President/ He has had a long opportunity to address this and this is the schedule he feels most comfortable with.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Farley/Kissinger

9:26 am

6/16/70

K: I am getting the daylights bugged out of me by Cabinet members that claim that Gerry is unhappy about his instructions. It's ironic that I am helping him not to go fast and therefore I am the reason there's no settlement. If you press the President you won't get what you want. We have a schedule.

F: I talked to Gerry Thurs. & Fri. and we talked yesterday and I think some of this will let up.

K: The Community of Principles is impossible?

F: It doesn't fit. Part of this is what people get into in one city on one subject too long.

K: I didn't show the Laird memo to the President and get him a letter from the President. Then he blames us for holding him back. I take that very ill.

F: I foresaw the injustice of this and I hope I have gotten Gerry to see it. It isn't directed at you.

K: I can take care of myself. But I could have let that Laird letter get through.

F: What I am saying is that I hope the lid is back on.

K: If he generates pressure the President will go into a shell and you will get nothing nothing. We have a reasonable schedule now. There's a Verification Panel next Wed. and a decision early the following week. Why shouldn't that meet his concerns?

F: I think it should and I said it to him yesterday. I think based on that it's cut off now.

K: I get a call every day now from a Cabinet member. They can go to the President but when things are going so well it's a pity to raise a hassle.

F: Gerry suggested that it would be desirable for him to attend the Verification Panel mtg.

K: I think that's good.

F: Just as the breakfast with Laird helped I think Gerry's chance to see if he is in the same tune with these things.

K: I think so and he should meet with the President.

F: He spoke to Rogers too.

K

BY NARA, Date 5/26

Farley/Kissinger

9:26 a.m.

6/16/70

-2-

K: It shouldn't be too dramatic. I want him back and I will see he sees the Pres.

F: I think that's good for his-confidence and will take care of these ____.

K: I have him a letter that I requested last week although I am tempted to tear it up. I may have the President hand it to him.

F: That would be more personal. Really, a letter dispatched would look like something cranked up.

K: Unless he wants it before then. Ask him.

F: I will. I see an advantage to it the other way.

K: Tell himx to take the heat off. He has gotten everything he asked for and he will get this.

By NARA. Date 5/26

TELCORN

Farley/Kissinger

12:14 p. m.

6/16/70

F: Gerard Smith agreed completely with your thought to hold the letter from the President since he will be back. He will be coming in the evening before -- Tues. evening.

K: Good.

F: He wants to avoid reporting to Congressional Committees. I thought that would agree with you. We will not announce it until it comes out.

K: We will not. We should have a picture with him and the President.

F: At that point it will be known.

K: Did you tell him about the other views?

F: He was shamefaced. He was up tight begore -- he expressed regrets at being overzealous.

K: It should not be an exercise who extorted what from whom. We will manage it. We must settle these matters on a practical basis.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Prof. Doty/Kissinger

2:30 pm

6/16/70

D: We have our OSI and air defense papers finished and we are here soaking up ______ about SALT. We wondered if there was something useful we could ______ do for the morning.

K: Some reasonable MCA level for us. If we didn't want to defend Washington.

D: About some other site?

K: Or if we stuck with the two sites in the north. I haven't thought it through. It will break all your hearts but we are doing well on SALT. Tell my friends at Cambridge who did it.

D: It's certainly moving.

K: If people stop pushing us. We know what we are doing and we will get an agreement.

D: Nothing else? We will look at the paper on forward basing. That doesn't look very tractable for a time. There's an interagency paper on it but in terms of what we can do. We will do that.

K: I will see you in the morning. 7:45.

By

NARA, Dale

5/26

TELCON

Max Frankel/Kissinger

2:32 pm

6/16/70

F: Are you loosing office space in that crowded circle of advisors?

K: That's one leak you haven't printed -- that I am being pushed out.

F: Someone did come out with that but that collapsed with the first level of informants so we let it drop.

K: I thought that Beecher story on Sunday was an absolute absurdity. The WSAG has always had the same membership. Only during the President's decision and it's execution was it changed and contracted to maintain security. Principles only for three days. No one asked that it be expanded and so if someone is taking credit for that he is not telling the truth. Marshall Green for example was not excluded even during the restricted period and Gen. Vogt has always atteneded. So the only office that added an additional man was Defense. ISA reviewed this and it's not new.

F: If the basic premise is right then there must be changes in ISA coming.

K: We don't tell Laird how to staff his orders. If previously they didn't go to ISA it's his problem and not ours. Another point, there was never a direct order to the Joint Chiefs. All orders want through the Secy.

F: I left a message with your gal saying we are having (at this point there was some discussion on the fadt that HAK had not gotten the message.) It's a plea that you give Rick Smith and me an hour of your time sometime. A job of reconstruction geared to Cambodian decision. To show that this was no rash outburst but carefully thought through.

K: May I speak just as an individual -- there were more senior officials (ignorant of or opposed to) it than is possible.

F: A more coherent account and what? ? ? ? . There are lots of things you can not talk about but we would really very much value your interest and it would be in your interest as well as ours.

K: How about 5:00 tomorrow? or 3:00?

F: 3:00 or 5:00 we are available.

K: Or 6:00. I will let you know before the end of the day.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger

2:55 pm

6/16/70

P: I wondered if you are going to meet with your group at 3:00.

K: The group you met with yesterday? No, at 2:30 tomorrow.

P: I don't want to wait until then for their report.

K: I will have it by the end of the day. Moorer sent out a message that carried out every intention of yours. He had sent out the message and sent it over here for information only and not to be cleared.

P: Good. On the other hand the time is of the essence particularly in regard to the activities. I think they must find a way for a ? ? to put a division of SVN in there to raise hell. You have to change the balance. Have they considered that?

K: There is a SVN task force. I don't know it's size. It's taking that town that was at stake. Moorer talked to Abrams. It's been taken by the SVN.

P: The one I read about this morning?

K: It was taken this morning. They are positive.

P: How about the only road that goes to Thailand? They need to get a group in there and open the road. When the enemy has a communication line of 500 (?) miles and the ARVN has 20 and when the SVN have air power and they don't, we have to go in and beat them.

K: I had Chalmers Roberts in today. On SALT he remembers what I said last year and it's turning into a success story. He says don't let the Sentate screw it up with voting against ABM.

P: They are behind in MIRV so they don't want to bargain that but they will bargain on the ABM.

K: And Frankel called to say that they are doing an article on Cambodia, even as we were saying I should call him, and that it wasn't a rash act.

R: I don't want to undercut Semple.

K: He is coming in with Smith.

P: He is no good. You had better talk to Haldeman. Zeigler has been stiff-arming Zeigler.

K: I will clear it with Zeigler.

By NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger

2:55 pm 6/16/70

-2-

P: Tell him what the request is.

K: Semple had it once and they cut him to pieces.

P: I wouldn't give in quite as easily as that because it will hurt Semple.

K: I will talk with Zeigler.

P: On the Cambodia thing I think it's not bad. It's a question of people trying -- They are reacting to news. The power balance is such that the NVN has no business toppling that government. It's one of our jobs to ensure it. We can make it possible for SVN to go in in enough force to stand with Cambodia for awhile. It's important. Sure we get some stepped up activity. As a result we will hit the north. At this time when we have momentum, keep pushing it. I feel strongly about this. We have to give them some problems. July 1 all Americans will be gone but not all SVN. They are to be there and in Cambodia. I want that clearly understood.

K: I will make sure that it's across. I think things are breaking.

P: It will only if we continue to do it.

K: We have SALT licked.

P: We have to play it our way. He didn't think in all cases fairness that Smith would announce. Bill is politican enough to know that I will announce it.

K: He wants to send instructions to Smith.

P: They will screw him up.

K: We will have Dobrynin's answer next week. It's in the bag.

P: Something is.

K: The difference is that Dobrynin and I could have settled it. In the details there isn't much left.

P: We don't want Gerry Smith to settle it in fanfare in July.

K: It shouldn't be that you made Cambodia and someone else SALT. I made that to Roberts. You held firm on SALT now and the options and how they are working out.

P: He is interested in SALT.

By NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger

2:55 pm

6/16/70

XXX -3-

K: He thinks it's a major coup.

P: After our meeting this morning the M.E. track we are on is right to disaster. We will continue to draw (?) arms in and have no understanding how it will come out. We cannot wait until elections.

K: The worst is to put in a little arms and a little proposal.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Richardson/Kissinger

3:45 pm

6/16/70

K: I just looked at -- we are having a meeting on NSSM 84 and I get conflicting stories on whether you are invited or not. I wanted you invited. The theological dispute that arose was whether it should be DPRC or Review Group. Laird is against DPRC for it so I was going to have the DPRC members come and call it a Review Group.

R: I wasn't sure if I was invited or not.

K: I will cancel today and have it tomorrow unless you can come. k

R: I will check my Calendar. While I'm doing that -- Do you think the President thinks well of Turner Shelton?

K: He does and would like him to get a position. But I would like him to explain not on the telephone. Why?

R: We were thinking about a post for him.

K: He wants Bulgaria. That would delight the President. Or anywhere.

R: We thought about Nicaragua.

K: I would think -- I will let you know. If you could make him Ambassador it would discharge a commitment made to him before the President took office.

R: The other thing I was going to inquire about is the AID message. Any movement on that?

K: The President hasn't fully moved. I have told you that before. That seabeds came up after a long deliberation. It's on the front burner.

R: OK. I have just been looking over things I have had some relationship with.

K: When are you being sworn in?

R: Wed. I think but I am going over Monday.

K: Two things -- I would like to talk about the Cambodian thing and your reflections of, now that you are out of it, the whole WH-State Dept. relationship.

R: How about the first thing first and the other next week?

K: Certainly.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Richardson/Kissinger

3:45 pm

6/16/70

-2-

R: I could be at a meeting tomorrow morning.

K: I will tell them to reschedule for tomorrow morning. NSSM 84.

R: I will plan to come to the VSSG meeting too.

K: Review Group at 10:00 tomorrow morning.

R: That will be fine.

K: I would like your intellectual input. It's been turned into a mass meeting of third raters and it isn't what this requires.

R: I will be there tomorrow morning and Thurs. morning.

Further conversation: 3:57 pm 6/16/70

K: I have gotten Cargo. Everybody is now assembled and he tells me your off ice was informed.

R: It was but as I started to say I wasn't informed that your plan was to convert the Review Group into a special meeting and I didn't know the footing on it.

K: That is my fault and not hour office's fault. In fact, my office got it screwed up.

R: I will talk to Bill. You go ahead and if I have any additional thoughts I will get them to you. I cannot come now.

K: If you were going to stay long enough I will break a commitment to you.

R: You mean sometime?

K: You think I already have?

R: No. I didn't exactly quite understand what had happened.

K: I was too eliptical. I mentioned to Alex about the San Clemente thing. That was originally intended as a briefing by Abrams of the President and for no purpose but to provide a peg for the speech. Then Laird and ______ decided they had to come. It never was intended as a discussion meeting.

R: I was aware because you had said Abrams was coming.

K: The original intention was to get him in and out.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Richardson/Kissinger

3:45 pm 6/16/70

-3-

R: I have no question about that. It does point up the kinds of sensitivities that exist.

K: It's a totally self-inflicted wound. I felt badly about it. On Friday he did understand.

R: I understood that.

K: Get together with Cargo. What they did was to make it a special Review Group into a ______ so it's a mob scene.

R: If I have any thoughts I will pass them on.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Vice President
6/17/70 9:50 a.m.

VP: Have you seen Ambassador Tasca today?

K: No, but I will.

VP: I spent an hour with him yesterday. He is eloquent and strong for some of the things that need to be said about our detractors in NATO and Greece. I hope that you will call upon him if there's a chance today.

K: He will be called upon.

VP: He feels strongly about these things and he's got some good information, which indicates that things are better in Greece than the public accounts say. Papadapoulos, he feels, is our only hope for a democratic government.

K: I don't know why it's our job to install domestic regimes. All of the self-righteous breast beating is a little much.

VP: I know, but the Soviets are stirring things up in the back door and in the front door they are being very conciliatory. A Bulgarian diplomat visited Greece for the first time. They are trying to woo them away from us and the French are willing to sell them anything they want. He feels that Papadopoulos wants to move toward a democratic government, but there are people standing in the eaves shoudl he go down the drain who aren't interested in that at all. He's an eloquent spokesman. Sometimes you can't shut him off; he erupts like Old Faithful.

K: I've scheduled a meeting the President for him at 2:30. And he will be at the NSC meeting.

VP: I'll sort of encourage him.

K: Good, because the Secretary of State doesn't have exactly the same view, as you may know.

VP: I've got some troubles of my own, as you can tell from the news reports. I don't know what we're trying to do, but nobody's going to protect the Administration but itself. The surprising thing

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Vice President

6/17/70 9:50 a.m. page 2

is that nobody but the New York Times, very guardedly, reported the
most inflammatory thing that student said. He said that Governor Reagan
is bent on killing people. How you can appoint someone who says
something like that to a fact-finding mission is beyond me. All this
worry about the government's credibility. If we give in to that kind
of thing in the name of credibility we ought to fold up the whole ball
game.

K: There are different theories of government regarding
this sort of thing.

VP: I am realizing that more and more every day.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Bob Haldeman
6/17/70 ca. 10:00 a.m.

H: We missed you this morning.

K: I had a group of scientists in.

H: One problem--the loan to Turkey, we were holding it up to get the heroin thing solved, it has been released by State without our approval. If it's possible to retrieve it, we should.

K: By Mousnihan?

H: By Ehrlichman.

K: That was lousey staffing in my office. It's my fault.

H: We released it?

K: We approved it, and may not have put a rider on it to hold it.

H: Are you on top of it?

K: Aware of it.

H: And trying to get on top. Okay good. When do you go to the soccer game?

K: Tomorrow. What is the President doing this weekend?

H: Camp David.

K: Has Al talked to you about getting the Sequoia or something set up for next Tuesday?

H: No.

K: The President wants a meeting with some of the senior people.

H: What senior people?

K: Rogers, Packard, Helms, Siscomx. On the Mid-East package. Can you let me know if it's feasible on his calendar?

H: I wish I had a calendar. I don't know what he's doing. I'll find out.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Bob Haldeman

6/17/70 ca. 10:00 a.m. page 2

K: Let me know.

H: You set up an appointment with Tasca?

K: He set it up. I said do you want to see him and he said yes, how about 2:30. Also on this Fitzhugh thing. I think it's important that he see him. Are you aware of it? I sent you a memo.

H: No.

K: It's about the Blue Ribbon Panel reorganization of the Department of Defense. Laird has steam-rollered them into things the President couldn't live with.

H: I've got something coming up on that?

K: We sent it up yesterday.

H: I try to get it done.

K: Maybe late this afternoon?

H: M I'll try.

K: It will have to be today to do any good. 5:00 or 5:30. If you make it at 5:00 the NSC meeting has got to end, which wouldn't be bad.

H: It has to end anyway--he's got Ryland at 6:00. You getting him tonight?

K: I hope so.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE
Rogers/Kissinger

10:42 am

6/17/70

K: I have been trying to get an answer on the M.E. as I promised you. The President is still anguishing over it. He would like to have another go ground on the Sequoia next Tues. night.

R: That will be awfully late.

K: He is so focused on the speech now.

R: He does that today.

K: I think what we might do is go ahead on the package and have a discussion on what comes after. You think next Tues. is too late?

R: We have waited quite a while. I will be away and I have got to launch the thing.

K: When are you going?

R: A week from Sunday.

K: Another meeting too on withdrawal. That we will do.

There's

R: x nothing we can develop that hasn't been and it's just the decision. The decision is to launch a peace offensive. Get x talks started. The chances are it won't.

K: We can go ahead and horse around with the figures which aren't important.

R: On the figures it's just keeping Israel happy.

K: One of the thoughts he has had but not decided is he feels he has promised Rabin to replace the two they have lost. 8 Phantoms.

R: That's no problem.

K: That doesn't give you any pain?

R: No. The figures are not important if we don't announce them. ? ? ? ? ? and keep Israel happy.

K: The theory has to be -- if they feel they are getting screwed in either way the have no incentive to go on peace. The planes are a carrot. He is afraid it will blow in the middle of the election campaign.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger

10:42 am

6/17/70

R: I think it will blow up before then.

K: I like calling you for reassurance.

R: I think it will come soon. The peace offensive won't work and we will have to make it plain we are providing planes and take the heat. It will not wait until Sept. He thinks they will go on the cease fire. They will have a hell of a time extending it 90 days after the U. N. begins. Once we get a cease fire? ? ?

K: Unless we have a new situation.

R: We have a lot of worries if he wants to know -- what the hell do we do if Lebanon has the same trouble Jordan did and they ask for troops?

K: He has that on his mind. Given the shortage of time let me raise it after the speech.

R: I don't think it's a tough decision. The phrasing is tough and we are working on that now. The general framework we should go ahead with. We will get a lot of credit even if it doesn't work.

K: And let's see if we can scrap that meeting.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Richard Neustadt

6/17/70 11:10 a.m.

K: I find that I have youx on my calendar on the 19th. But I am also going to Mexico.

N: I heard that.

K: I wondered whether there's any flexibility in your plans.

N: I think not this time. When are you going?

K: At noon tomorrow. I'm stopping off at the ranch so I'm going to get one of those wild tours. I will be back Sunday night. Do you have any time next week free?

N: I've got to check.

K: I don't have anything world shaking but you and I haven't talked together in too long.

N: What happens to you on the first of July?

K: I'll be out of Cambodia.

MX

N: [Laughed] Well of course, I should have realized that significant date.

K: You mean the day of the first?

N: Either Breakfast or dinner.

K: I'm tied up for dinner. Lunch is no good?

N: I would have to check it.

K: I cannot normally do breakfast; I would have to skip a staff meeting.

N: No, don't do that. Let me check and I'll get back to your office.

K: Okay. Bad news talk to David Young who's handling these things for me.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Kraslow/Kissinger
5:22 pm 6/17/70

K: I have a couple of requests. One, we have a new man who is diplomatic correspondent from London. We would like you to meet him. Could you have dinner with us one evening? (A group from the newspaper)

HAK: Could we set the time next week? Call me Monday.

K: I will call Dianne. Donovan went to Klein for more information on the decision on Cambodia. I said nothing about our discussions. Herb said he would take it under advisement.

HAK: We have had an identical request. I have made clear you should be given first consideration.

K: Donovan wanted it in regard to this decision.

HAK: If you here anything this is the story.

K: I have a personal problem and if you could make the time -- nothing regarding policy or a job.

HAK: Could it wait?

K: Yes.

HAK: Can you give me a hint?

K: It's about you and I find myself in an awkward position.

HAK: Want to come in at 7:00?

K: Earlier if possible.

HAK: Or 6:45. for 10 mins.?

K: It shouldn't take longer than that.

HAK: I don't know what it is but I appreciate it.

K: Nothing for a story or politics. Wholly personal.