TELCONE

Amb. Bunker/Mr. Kissinger

10:00 a.m., December 17, 1972

B: Hello, Henry.

K: Ellsworth, how are you?

B: Fine. How are you?

K: Okay. Now, Ellsworth, we're getting reports here that radio Saigon is attacking me again, and if that doesn't stop, we're just going to cut off everything.

B: Well, you mean just recently -- today -- or what?

K: Today. Saying that I was forced by the President to go on television after having tried to fake progress. What it said was: that the President forced me to admit failure, although I didn't want to and so on. This is the tone that then goes on.

B: I see. Well, I hadn't seen that, no. Today -- it must have been just recently.

K: Well, it's December 17th, Saigon.

B: Oh, yeah.

K: Now if these guys want to commit suicide, they can keep this up.

B: Well, I'll get at it right away. It's an outrage of course. Absolute outrage. And I've been after them, you know, a dozen times on it. Well, I'll get at it right away, Henry.

K: Okay

B: Yeah, it is an outrage; absolutely. By the way, I thought your briefing was excellent.

K: Thank you.

B: Very good, very good.

K: Well, Al will be --

B: Al will be here Tuesday morning, huh?

K: Al will be there Tuesday morning and he'll bring you up-to-date.

B: Yes, good.

TELCONE

President/Mr. Kissinger

12/17/72 10:5 a.m.

HK: ..... got themselves into another hole in which -- they could have presented as a victory. They have now turned into a major set back-- I don't bother you with a lot of this stuff, but for example on the two-party military commission. The communists are now trying to use this to spread communist cadres into every village--it doesn't make any difference how it will come out, once it hits our press it will be a big issue. If this idiot in Saigon had signed the agreement early in November you'd never had heard of the two-party commission and no American would have given a damn how it was set up and he would have had a total veto over it. So he's getting himself marginal word changes and paying for it with tremendous difficulties later on.

RN: Yeh.....

HK: And he of course doesn't understand how he is undermining your confidence.

RN: Well he's done that, it's finished with him. As you know--After the Duc meeting I--

HK: Well, here you invite him to meet you at midway, which was afterall was a great imposition for you than he doesn't even have the courtesy to reply--not even the courtesy to turn him down.

RN: That's right. That's why this letter--I am going to take a hard look, it may be tougher than you think.

HK: Well, it's pretty tough now,

RN: In the meantime what we have to do Henry as I said is to strike forward now, we know it's tough, we are going to take some heat, we don't give a damn how they characterize it--they're going to take some heat because of the bomb, some people are going to say we are doing this and that, but as far as we are concerned, this is all, let's take all the heat that we need to take, remembering that it's never going to be easier later, it's going to be harder--5, 6 months from now, if we had to do these things, I mean if this thing were still going on we would have been voted out of the war--now we may still be, but at least we will have given them a hell of a wack.

HK: Well Mr. President you are making the peace enforceable, you are soaring up the courage of the other countries in that area, its a courageous and strong action and it's afterall what the people voted for you--they didn't vote for you as a bleeding heart.

CLASSIFIED

TelCon
Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

10:35, December 17, 1972

Z: Hello.

K: Ron?

Z: Hi, Henry.

K: How are you? You called me?

Z: Yeah, I want to get together with you in a moment, for my guidance for the day. Are there shattered windows?

K: Oh, nothing has hit it yet, has it?

Z: I understand from Kennedy that it's under way.

K: Oh, yeah.

Z: But nothing's hit the press except the rocketing and mining.

K: But the other stuff, they may have got the radio station which was one of the targets. When are we going to see our leader again?

Z: He'll be back today.

K: Okay, fine, is that what you wanted.

Z: Yeah. Let me go over some things with Dick just on the guidance and get my part set and then come up with you, okay.

K: Good.

Z: You don't mind, do you?

K: No, not at all.

Z: Now let me ask you something else. Have you received any calls from the Post?

K: No. I have taken any calls from--

Z: No, I'm not asking--that's not the thrust of my question. You haven't gotten any calls from the Social Coverage or anything of that sort.

K: No.

Z: Okay, good, if you do, let me know.

CLASSIFIED

AUG 22 1972 10:05

B. J. MANGUD

K: I don't even know what you are talking about.
not

Z: Okay. They were invited over for a couple of social events.

K: The only comment I've ever heard, I've heard nothing about the social ones, I ran into Kay Graham at a part two weeks, a week ago and she said that the calls of none of her reports are being returned anymore. And she wondered whether that was a design. I said, I frankly, haven't even noticed we are not doing it. But that's the only thing that I even know anything about.

Z: Okay.

K: Good.

Z: Bye.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED

Authorized: E012958-

B:STC SWAP Dated: 6/10/93

TelCon
Secy. Rogers/ Mr. Kissinger

10:40, Dec. 17, 1972

R: Henry?

K: Yes.

R: I just wanted you to know I called everybody; myself, the head of each geographic bureau, that might be questioned about the Vietnam at all and told them two things, that no one should talk to the press about Vietnam privately, publicly, by smirk or you know, looking dis-couraged or pleased or any other thing, and don't smirk or do a God damned thing, and by all means not to make any suggestion that there's any differences between you and any of us over hear because I'm afraid they'll try to figure out ways and say that somebody over here is critical and that kind of stuff.

K: Right.

R: I've done everything I can to stop it. If you hear of anything, get any suggestions, let me know by name. I'll keep it quiet but I told everybody if I find out anybody is talking to the press on the subject, I'll see that he gets fired.

K: Well, I appreciate that very much. We are not talking to anybody, we are returning any calls over here.

R: Well, as I've said, I've tried to get the word to everybody, but it's such a big building, but I've called INR and CUR and talked to Marshall Green and Stoessel and Kline and everybody and said they are responsible for any of their people, and if anybody is caught talking to the press, let me know.

K: Well I appreciate that. I will take some heat over the next few weeks.

R: Yeah, you're about to, and surely we don't want to add to it. That's why the government experience is sometimes things are good and sometimes things are not so good, but I just don't want us to contribute to it and will you tell anybody else, Haldeman or somebody that if they get any inkling that somebody over hear is talking to let me know.

K: Absolutely.

R: Son of a bitch Marvin Kalb comes down here and makes it appear, I don't know whether he's said anything lately, but you know he just-- he says the damndest things and he always makes it appear it's from the state department. He broadcasts from the State Dept.

2

K: Yeah. Well I think that's the maximum you can possibly do, and I'll understand. Inevitably somebody is going to find somebody who's smirked in the basement cafeterias.

T: Well in any event, sometimes you get word back, a play back of who it was if something happens like that. Of course, there is another problem. Sometimes these guys from the outside who use to be in the Department say something. Then they say "experts say". It may be some one who left the Dept. two years ago.

K: You know the bombing is being resumed today.

R: Yeah. The mining started yesterday didn't it.

K: Yeah.

R: When will the bombing thing come out?

K: Well it started about two hours ago so I guess--one of the targets was Radio Hanoi so they may not be able to scream for a couple of hours.

R: Okay. Well, nobody over here knows anything about it. Of course if they read it in the press, they all realize this is one of the possibilities. And I was asked if I knew anything about it and I said I suspected there was mining going on, but none of the rest of it--I wasn't sure.

K: That's what we told you on Friday.

R: Oh, I knew but I wasn't--

K: No, no, I understand.

R: I know, but if nobody knows it over here then nobody can tell anything.

K: Right.

R: Okay, Henry, I appreciate it. Thank you.

K: Right, bye.

TELCONE

President/Kissinger

10:45 a.m. - 12/17/72

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. Tomorrow night we're going to have Alice Longworth over. Are you free to come?

K: I'd be delighted. Yes.

P: Tell me, is Joe back yet?

K: I think Joe's coming back today or tomorrow.

P: Uh-huh.

K: I'm not sure - I know he'll be back tomorrow.

P: Did his wife go with him?

K: His wife was with him, yes.

P: Yeh. Well, I'll hold it open. I don't want too many. I'm just going to have Mrs. Nixon and Alice and myself and you, that'd be four and I might have Joe and his wife and I might have Howard Smith who likes to come to such things.

K: Yes, oh yes.

P: It'd be useful for our purposes.

K: Oh yes, very much.

P: I wonder if there's anybody else of that type that you'd talked to lately.

K: Well, Stewart. . .

P: I know but I had him on the plane. I don't want to overdo one, you know.

K: How about Wilson?

P: Well, we might have Dick Wilson. You know you just might. He's been awfully good, hasn't he?

K: He's been very good.

2

P: And you - I don't know whether he's married. Well if he is it doesn't make any difference I could have. . . . anybody else you can think of of that type that really has stood up when . . . well, Bill Whitehead.

K: Bill Whitehead but he doesn't have a huge following.

P: Dick Wilson.

K: But White is a fine fellow.

P: Yeh, White's fine. Well, fine, fine, I've got an idea but will you let me know about Joe.

K: I'll find out for you.

P: And just let - call somebody over here.

K: Right.

P: Call Steve Bull. The other thing I was going to ask you is on the letter for Haig

K: We sent it over last night. Have you had a chance to see it?

P: I haven't seen it yet. I'll have to look in the other room. They may have put it in there. When does he leave?

K: He's leaving tonight. It's a very tough letter.

P: Yeh, well that's why I wanted to be sure to get a look at it.

K: Oh, yes.

P: I'll have to cancel it, I have to do a church service at Noon. But I'll--

K: Well it should be over there now. It was supposed to wait for you after the affair last night.

P: I'll find it, it will be around here. And I'll get it back over to you by, say, 3:00 o'clock this afternoon.

K: That would be very good.

DREAMFIELD

AUTHOR'S LIBRARY
BY JAMES W. BANGOR - 10/04/85

3

P: And that will get everybody on their way.

K: Right.

P: So we can figure--

K: Because I think there is a better than 50/50 chance. The Paris
delegation made a very plaintive rebuttal to what I said yesterday.

P: I looked at the papers and I said that Colson would see how the radio
would handle it, and TV, but the paper play was about the same and
they all thought it was very objective. They thought it was about right.
What was your feeling.

K: That's my feeling. The NYTimes guy said I was defensive, but--

P: They are always going to characterize things, Henry, to suit their
own purposes. But if you see

K: But if you see it on television, I did it just the way I did the other one.

P: Sure.

K: And no one else is saying that.

P: Look, you notice after every press conference Dan Rather says I'm
nervous. Everybody else says I'm not. You know what I mean, it's
purely a thing, they'd say anything they want.

K: Well that's their way of suggesting that it was a bad wicket.

P: (laughter) Do you care?

K: Absolutely not.

P: You know it's a tough wicket, but why is it necessarily bad? The whole
thing that counts is how we look four years from now and not how we
look four weeks from now. I really read the act to people around here,
I said, you know what I mean, I didn't have any problem with them, but
some of them said oh, gee, it's too bad to have to do it before Christmas
and have to do it before the Inauguration, and then we just drag along
with talks and when things were going so well and everything, and I said
look, --

K: You could have said *there* was an option you had.

P: I know, we had the option but the point is--

4

P: It is really harder to do it then than now.

K: Absolutely.

P: The Congress will be back and they'd be badgering. You see, one of the beauties of doing it now we don't have the problem of having to consult with the Congress. Nobody expects me to consult with the Congress before doing what we are going to do tomorrow, you understand.

K: There is, I think, these are basically wanting to settle. We had an intelligent report today in which a very Senior Chinese official said that they were pressing Hanoi to settle, that they thought the decision was already made. But these guys are just a bloody bunch of bastards. Dobrynin told me yesterday that they told the Russians that you would have to settle just before Inauguration so you can see their strategy.

P: Yeah.

K: They were going to meet me again early in January--

P: And make us settle on bad terms.

K: Well, make us go back to the October 26 draft.

P: Yeah.

K: We could have easily lived with it in October, but if we accept now after all this arguing for changes would ;make us look impotent. With this blow they are going to get, they're going ;to scream for a few weeks, but with blow they're going g to--

P: They are going to realize that--

K: It's going to make the agreement enforceable, Mr. President, they are going to be very careful.

P: I think that point is the most, probably the most important point. With this blow, they are going to think twice before they break the agreement.

K: That's right.

P: The other point, however, too, is with this blow God knows which way it will react. It may be that if they react by being preference saying you cannot force us into it.

K: I doubt it.

45

P: This has been known to happen.

K: It's been known to happen but if they thought they had that option they would have done it already. They don't react to our moves that way they react to their analysis of the situation. If they felt confident in being able to face us down they would have broken off the talks.

P: Uh huh. Well let me say that's why this blow, I hope to God, Henry, I went over those for the first time, you know I don't do target lists usually, but I went over that God damned thing with Moorer and Rush and Moorer swears that this is everything they can get that's worth hitting, I mean without going -- taking out too much civilian stuff.

K: If the whole bloody country is again covered with clouds, so they have to do it with B-52s.

P: Well, the B-52s are no problem, the clouds--

K: No question.

P: And, what's the harm of that. I mean you can't just follow up with the--

K: You can't take out the power plant in the center of Hanoi, and you know if we had had 72 hours of good weather, we could have done the whole bloody thing in one blow.

P: Yeah. What happens then, is the clouds going to last forever. It always seems that they do, although I don't believe our--

K: The thing is going to last until the 20th now. We have had to cancel 65% of our strikes--

P: I do not -- anymore, you know, the president said to Clements about this, and Clements, well I tell you he's on the right wave length on that, he says our Air Force is so God damned impotent because we haven't got the right kind of planes.

K: Exactly.

P: Which is; also they cost too much considering what their job is. He's so right.

to cancel

K: He's right on both counts. We have, Mr. President, over 50% of our targets during the dry season, and now they only have three or four days of what they consider flying weather in months. Now that just means they've got the wrong airplane.

CLASSIFIED

6

P: By the way, at least the 52s will shake them want it.
    double loaded.

K: Yes. They are ~~double loaded~~. That's like a 4,000 plane raid in World
    War II.

P: It is?

K: Yeah.

P: 100 planes--

K: 30 planes are like a thousand and they are flying 127 double loaded,
    that's like 250, so it's really between 4 and 8 thousand planes, if
    they got them all over there. It's going to break every window in
    Hanoi.

P: Just the reverberations?

K: Yeah.

P: Well that should tend to shake them up a little bit. It does, doesn't it.

K: Oh, yeah.

P: We know how those things are. Assuming that they are expecting--

K: I don't know whether you've been in Saigon when they hit 30 or 40 miles
    away, how the ground shakes.

P: Well I know how the ground shakes when we even shoot of a 155, one of
    our own.

K: Well, this one is going to be two miles outside, and there are going to
    be about 50 of them. I don't think there are going to be too many
    windows in Hanoi tomorrow. But it would have been good if we could
    have taken all power plants simultaneously.

P: But as it is, what are we going to get.

K: Well we are going to get the ship yards in Haiphong, we are going to get
    the marshalling yards, the rail yards, radio Hanoi, we'll get the trans-
    mitters at the outskirts of town.

P: But we will miss the power plant.

7

K: It's in the center of town.

P: But it will still be there, and the day that it clears up they can go in and get it, can't they.

K: Absolutely.

P: That's a standing order to Moorer.

K: But it is a lousy set of airplanes. I think they are going give them quite a shock tomorrow, we're going to have a little screaming here.

P: Sure they are going to scream. They always do. They would have screamed otherwise but for the fact that the talks were broken. Now we'll give them something else to scream about.

K: Absolutely.

P: They'dl scream now, well the talks are broken and we have resumed bombing, so we ____ stop bombings. Ziegler said that handling it is going to be very very good that way. We are continuing our activities to prevent another enemy offensive.

K: That's right. They are building up.

P: I know, but we are doing it for other reasons.

K: Oh, no question about it.

P: I mean, let them give their reasons.

K: Yeah.

P: And the fact that it has some truth in it helps.

K: Well, Le Duc Tho asked that we send him a message as soon as he returns. He's returning tomorrow.

P: Yeah. That's the one you told me about yesterday.

K: Yeah. He'll be back within 6 hours--6 hours after he returns he'll get it.

P: He will hear this message.

K: That's what I mean.

P: Yeah. If he'll hear it, it won't have to be delivered by hand.

CLASSIFIED

8

K: Well, we are sending him another one too which he'll get about four hours before it hits.

P: What's it going to say?

K: It's just going to say your talks were conducted in bad faith and the only way to settle is to go back to November 23rd. That's taking out the *read* word "administrative structure" which they had agreed to last week, and--

P: We are ready to do that?

K: We are ready to do that immediately.

P: Well, anyway. When you come to think of it, you know, I was looking over all of that crowd and those people that have been in their Cabinets etc, and they are all are decent fine people and the rest, but when you really come down to it, at the top of the heap we've always got to have some who are willing to step up and hit the hard ones, you know, it's-- much as we love all of them, there are not many that's going to do that.

even
K: Well, when you really come down to it, back the Vice President caved in on us because the sum total of his recommendation was to do nothing. If Congress--when you've got to go wailing to Thieu and you can't do anything because Congress will cut you off, you are paralized.

P: Look, he is simply telling us why--warning us that Congress was going to cut us off. I already knew this was a problem. But the point was he would not, believe me, now believe me, he would not take this chance.

K: Absolutely not. No, no, that was clear to me.

P: I mean he was, it was just a cop out. He wanted us to go get Thieu to frankly to convince Thieu that you ought to reassure. Well, God damn it, I was so amazed at that because you went into that with him.

K: Hell, he's done it for two months and even if we did it, where would we be. Our strategy now has to be to turn on both of them.

P: As far as reassuring Thieu, no; one could reassure Thieu more than I've reassured Thieu.

K: Listen, you've made three solemn commitments to him.

RECLASSIFIED

Author: F. D. B. - 5/26/66
Date: 5/26/66

9

P: And I did it in two different meetings, and wasted a hell of a lot of time and I also wrote him three letters.

K: Of course, this insane son of a bitch, if he had got along with us early in November, then all these fine points that people talk about now, his sovereignty, who has the right to do what, all would have been washed out in the victory. Whatever he can gain, it doesn't outweigh -- doesn't even come close to what we had offered him.

P: I know.

K: And what he simply turned down.

P: Right.

K: I think you'll see that letter is a tough proposition.

P: Fine, fine. I don't want him to take any heart from the fact that we are hitting Hanoi, that's my point.

K: That's what we've got in the letter. The more I thought about it, the more I think that we ought to go to that other option, really, in January. Because what we are doing now over his total opposition may lead to his collapse.

P: Well, the problem with the other option, I thought about it, and we've really got to think of very hard, is for us virtually in going to liberate the defeatest thing, that we turn down our--

K: No, not if we keep military and economic aid; going, not as long as we have this letter from Thieu asking us to do it.

P: Yeah. Oh, you know what I mean though. Afterall, what if McGovern and Mansfield will say--well look, we could have had withdrawal for prisoners long ago when these insane people wouldn't do it. You see my point. It looks like--that's the thing that really sticks in my craw on that one. Withdrawal for prisoners, that's what it's going to be.

K: Yeah.

P: That is a problem, isn't it.

K: Well, it's a problem. On the other hand, the ultimate test is what is going to survive there if you do it. Two years ago it would haveled-- we couldn't get it two years ago, that's another total lie of these guys, the first time they ever agreed to split military and political issues was October 8th.

10

P: Right.

K: So, the others offered it but it could never have been accepted. We in a way offered it. Now we have two more years of Vietnamization, we have the Vietnamese able to stand on their own feet, and they've asked for it. It's a totally different picture.

P: Well, then we go where. He will be surprised when he gets that want he ?

K: I don't think--

P: You see this is the way, if you did it this way, the way you do it you just blandly say that to Thieu, we accept. You go ahead and we'll get the prisoners and so forth and so on.

K: For all your reasons, I'vebeen very hesitant about it, but--well, I myself think that, either the North Vietnamese are going to dig in which I don't really believe, or they are going to cave quickly. And I think that's more likely.

P: I don't see how they can dig in either cause they just can't figure they're gonna take this indefinitely. Now, the one thing that can encourage them some will be some of those statements, public outcry--

K: Yeah, but they've seen that--

P: They've seen that. I checked before, and they saw it also. Let's face it, that's the beauty of the election. They saw all the public outcry was murderous during the election campaign and we won 61 to 38.

K: That's right. They just cannot be sure enough of getting you. They've tried it for four years and I just don't think they have enough self-confidence in order to do it and I think that the Chinese, actually I think the Chinese are pushing them harder than the Russians.

P: Do you really.

K: Oh yeah. We sent this note to the Chinese on Friday, midnight, saying the allies are a bunch of liars and they are tricking you, if you'd like to hear our story we'll be glad to tell you. Within 8 hours we get a phone call saying come on up and tell us why our allies are liars. And it fits in with all the intelligence reporting.

P: According to the intelligence reporting on Thieu.

K: No, the bastards on their Radio today put out another insane statement about my press conference in which they said in effect this means the talks have collapsed completely, that we will never resume them unless the other side changes its approach completely, and...........(end of tail)

DREASCHED

AUG 22 1969
B456 8/20/69 10:01

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10:58, December 17, 1972

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Hello, Henry, how are you.

K: Okay.

D: Did you say goodbye to your good right hand man.

K: Absolutely.

D: But I haven't seen you on TV. He was quite alone. And he didn't share your blessings.

K: He shares my blessings all right.

D: He does. Because I think he realize really.

K: Until your clients agree to something, there is nothing to wave Saigon off.

D: Well, I think he is a persevering man.

K: They are not going to try to do anything until his people--

D: Well, Henry, he will put all the blame on one side. I feel to share the blame on the generals.

K: The basic difficulty in the last session has been in Hanoi.

D: That's my impression. But the previous one, it was--

K: You have trouble enough in Saigon. You can handle that if Hanoi agrees.

D: That's why I think they tells us this will be a counterbalance because you can compromise all the time.

K: Well I want you to know we've resumed bombing again today.

D: Uh huh. On a -20th------.

K: North of the 20th

D: You mean a full scale.

K: Oh, yes.

10:58 17 December 1972
By: N. Kissinger

2

D: Well that's a pity.

K: That's putting it mildly.

D: Well you put it mildly, but I'm not sure you understand what I say.
It is rather--

K: They've given us no choice.

D: Do you really think---

K: At the next meeting we will go through the same--we had technical
experts meeting and they won't even agree on an agenda much less
to discuss substance.

D: You mean on the technical.

K: Well, on the protocols.

D: On protocols of this internal commission.

K: Yeah.

D: But, what kind of agenda. Is this agenda part of--

K: Well one possible agenda is to go through the protocols paragraph by
paragraph. To compare the paragraphs of each side.

D: And they don't want to compare it.

K: No, there always is something else they want to discuss. They want
to discuss understandings. No sense discussing understandings until
you have an agreement.

D: Understandings on the ICC or other things.

K: No, on other things. On prisoners, on getting our civilians out of
there.

D: There were no really discussion on ICC.

K: No, no they absolutely refused it. Another thing they want to discuss
with us is the Two Power Commission which is not in our competence
because where they've given us a protocol where their people would
appear in every village and have the right of conducting defense investigation
You know that's another peace that's impossible.

3

D: But in general, it was an understanding of your discussion too, I mean about this bilateral commission.

K: Listen, I think the two Vietnamese parties should discuss.

D: You mean in the details of their functions.

K: In the details of their functions.

D: Because as such, this _______________ is already in their agreement.

K: That scope we are willing---how the detail it operates should be discussed between the two parties.

D: Did you say they said from the very beginning this should be discussed between themselves.

K: I mean, it's just never rational that we would be able to convince Saigon to permit a team of communist officers to appear in every capital of South Vietnam.

D: I understand. Well I really hope that something comes of it, but nothing really moves ahead.

think

K: What would they/would happen when there are 15 days of negotiations and their dealing with the President. I mean did they really think they could keep a Presidential emissary in Paris for nine days and play games with him.

they

D: I don't know what I really think. All I know is what they are telling us.

K: Would you have believed this possible?

D: Depends on what kind of discussion is going on.

K: Do you have the transcript of the last day.

D: Yes, I just read it and while I am home.

K: Well, you read it and tell me whether this was the discussion of a serious man.

D: I have to read it, because I will tell him, Gromyko and Brezhnev, about it. I mention to them that I get it from you but when I go back I tell them. About the last meeting, that's what they asked.

4

K: I'll let you have the last two meetings if you want them.

D: No, no, no, I think this is quite all right.

K: I mean, they are all the same.

D: And it's rather typical, yeah.

K: It was typical of the last three days.

received

D: Yeah, I understand. Well, Henry, I will send a telegram from Sygornov, and he said well I know discuss with anything about it and he really just tell me 'quote' unquote' without, I understand how it happens.

K: I know it won't help with us too. The conversation.

D: Yes I know, I am sure that he knows, now he got admitted.

K: Well I'm sending you a letter from the President to Brezhnev.

D: Okay, send it now, aye?

K: Well within the next couple of hours. When are you leaving. I a

D: I am leaving at 6:00.

K: Well, you will have it before then.

D: Okay, I would like to read it before I--there may be some questions and I will call you immediately by telephone, all right?

K: Good. On this thing now in Vietnam, we are not asking you to do anything. We are still willing to settle on the basis that I described with you, and we are willing to do it quickly. But we are not willing to play games.

D: I understand.

K: And we are not going to be played with.

D: I understand. All right, Henry, when I read I call you back.

K: Fine. If they can keep reaction in moderate portions it would certainly help.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F-012058
By: N.W. LaDon Date: 04-04-58

TELCOM

Ozzie Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

11:02 a.m.

12/17/72

ØJ: Dr. Kissinger, thank you for calling back. There are a few points which we may be in danger of going astray--you may point me in the direction. First the TIMES is very strongly inclined that the fundamental question that Hanoi agreed to and then pulled back from had to do with accepting the DMZ in some form or other as a border--

HK: I can't go into the details of the negotiations, but the TIMES has been writing that sovereignty issue ------but that isn't the basic issue but there is a difference between sovereignty and recognizing some dividing line between north and south Vietnam because if you don't have that then you don't know where the provisions of the agreement begin or end.

J: It would not be wrong to consider some --

K: Yeh, but not in the context of sovereignty.

J: In the context of a--dividing line

K: That leaves the ultimate issue open.

J: The ultimate political issue would still be open

K: That's right.

J: Secondly, the question of political prisoners in the south which you covered in some detail October 26 didn't come up at all to possible inadvertence of the press on Saturday--that would seem to tie in fairly importantly with the question of the coalition of -- panel leading the an election

K: It has nothing to do with that.

J: A number of the possible participants in such a partite coalition are now in jail and should think--

K: Yeh, but either side can veto the membership this wouldn't arise--

J: because such people would be vetoed anyway.

K: That's not the issue, there is an issue about prisoners in the sense that the other side tends to reopen at every opportunity, but that isn't the one.. the prisoner issue could be settled very easily in the context of demobilization but it's hard to tell the government it has to release 10's of 1,000's of people who have fought against without there being any reduction of the people in the field against it at that time.

Page 2

J: The big mission now is to break the allies out there, would it be wrong to suppose that this would have some effort to get a coordinated effort

K: No, that's not wrong.

J: Saigon is going to cross purposes with us at least in public--

K: That's right, that's not wrong.

J: Simply to tell them what happened.

K: No, it's correct what you are saying.

J: Right. In the short run we would have to be trying to have Saigon and to keep a less important extent and other allies in step with us while we try to get this thing straightened out and avoid this sniping.

K: Exactly.

J: In your reference to the difficulty--

K: All of this is off the record

J: Yes, regarding your reference to the Oct. 31 ceasefire, you put on the record what had been reported previously about intelligence reports about a communist offensive--

K: Well it in fact took place.

J: You also went on to reference this offensive as presumably going on past the date of the ceasefire, something that would be tantamount to a violation of it.

K: That's right.

J: Had this come out before?

K: Not to the best of my knowledge--end tape

begin new tape (Page 3)

11:02 12/15/72 (contd)

OJ: is not an important issue at this time.

HK: It is--it was settled in October, they keep raising it in the protocols and in other ways in such a way that it stands by itself. If they make it part of the other process it is no problem at all.

OJ: How would it be part of other process?

HK: Well, if you say it is related to the process of demobilization for example.

OJ: I see. Hm huh.
Okay fine, thank you very much.

HK: Right.

DREASSIFIED

TELCORN

Phil Geyelin/Mr. Kissinger

11:50 a.m., December 17, 1972

K: Phil, you're trying to do me out of my job.

G: How?

K: By calling me in the office.

G: [Laughter] Come on, I didn't leave my name right, did I?

K: You left my name right. Power has gone off on my phone.

G: For Christ's sake, Henry, we have been holding back, not breathing a
word about Vietnam for weeks and weeks and now I'm more confused than
ever.

K: Because you can't face the fact that your friends there might be a little
bit intransigent.

G: I can face it.

K: It's got to be our fault.

G: I've never said that.

K: No, no; you've been --

G: If that's how you interpret it, than it seems to me that you didn't anticipate
that our friends might be intransigent.

K: No, I didn't. No, I tell you, I thought that after the big steps in October;
after getting that close, I just didn't think they'd go back to their tawdry
ways.

G: Well, I guess they'd just be deep down tawdry.

K: But I still believe, you know, when all is said and done, I still think -- it's
almost impossible to see how it can fail when you have been that close.

G: Yeah.

K: For your information, the thing that's shaking me -- first, agreements
in the text are bad enough but they're bad enough because they agreed to
them once and now pulling them back.

G: Yeah.

TELCORN
Phil Geyelin

- 2 -

K: But what's really sort of shaking all of us is the provisions in the agreement about international control are really very detailed. We told them that -- and the agreement, which they claimed they wanted to sign on October 31st, said it has to be put in place immediately. Now all we asked was that the protocols setting it up be negotiated now before it's signed. Well, first they tell us they're not ready; would take six weeks to get them; they produce the night before I leave and they are really horrors. You know, they are not things on which serious people can disagree. They are absolute nightmares. They reopen every political issue, you know, in the form of whom do these Commissions report to; they reopen all the coalition government issues. So, you know, they know that isn't going to be an easy negotiation, to put it mildly.

G: Well, what it is, you know, you had some fine principles but when you started to spell them out, they didn't have any principles at all. Really. I mean, at least, they've reneged on the principles.

K: Well, they've sort of sneaked them into the protocols, you see. They had provisions in the protocols that are actually totally contrary to the provisions of the agreement or they bent them so far that they are almost meaningless.

G: Yeah. Well, Murray was in effect right in saying that you got 99% agreement but the 1% is what the war is over.

K: Well, that isn't true either because, you know, it's interesting to me to see - Well, 99% -- If you read the transcript, I immediately said: For God's sake, this is a figure of speech and don't hold me to the number.

G: Yeah. I saw that you said that so I won't hold you to the number. You know, I felt the same way about the 1000%.

K: Yeah.

G: It's the ______ of public figures so we are prepared to excuse that. No, but it does come down to --

K: No, it's not what the war is about because this issue of sovereignty which Scotty Reston has played so hard, that isn't really the key problem. I mean, that's what Thieu is screaming for but between sovereignty and just abolishing the DMZ, there's a hell of a big difference.

G: Yeah. Yeah.

K: You don't have to -- If you're respecting the DMZ, doesn't mean that you have to recognize the sovereignty. But if you leave your troops and abolish the DMZ, then what the hell are the provisions mean that you can't reinforce

["*", "TELCONE", "- 3 -", "Phil Geyelin/Mr. Kissinger", "G: I mean, you're prepared [comments are fair]; relatively peaceful of ______ over sovereignty.", "K: We're not dying over sovereignty. There's got to be a *de facto* demarcation line at which the International Control starts and at which the inhibitions as to the introduction of equipment become operative. Otherwise, you haven't got anything.", "G: Yeah. Just the ceasefire, you mean?", "K: That's right. That's the basic issue.", "G: Well, then but they really are reopening the whole question of what the war is about though if they're talking, you know, there is one Vietnam. Certainly that was not in keeping with the principles enunciated in the October 26th?", "K: What, that there's one Vietnam?", "G: That wasn't what you . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TELCON

Phil Geyelin/Mr. Kissinger

- 4 -

K: No, no. I think it can be -- you know, then next week they'll sweat us another week or two.

G: Or they could be going -- just [bringing in the whole] --

K: I don't think so. No, that I don't believe. They may be playing with it but I don't believe that. But you see the thing that is worrisome to me, quite honestly now, Phil, whatever you may think of my judgment --

G: I have great respect for it.

K: No, but you can't doubt that there's really nothing that I have wanted more than a negotiated settlement of the war in Vietnam. I mean, leaving aside now whether all the provisions are right. Now as I begin going through these provisions with these guys and you come up against one after the other which really should be settled in 10 minutes if there were good will. Because, you know, believe me, I'm not asking for things that make it tougher for them. I just want when there's a little ambiguity, to get it spelled out enough. And every time you touch something, you come up against another horror. So that you almost get to the view that what they wanted was a sort of a charter for operations in the South. Now I'm not quite at that point yet but that's the thing which I didn't say yesterday but that begins to worry one.

G: Yeah.

K: Well, let me give you an example here.

G: They want you to license them.

K: Let me give you an example. I don't want you to use it -- just so that you can get a sense of what I'm talking about. We had provided that the four international commission operate in every province for the ceasefire. Now they've come up with restrictions on that Commission which really will mean that no country will join it except the Communist country. The Canadians would never join that Commission as they are proposing it, which no organic transportation, no organic communication, no freedom of movement; not even the right to supply their own accessories. It's impossible; you can't get any government to join it.

G: You had talked a little about this yesterday.

TELCORN

Phil Geyelin/Mr. Kissinger

- 5 -

K: That I did talk about. But then they also proposed a two-party Commission between the PRG and the GVN which according to them must operate in every village across Vietnam, in which Communist officers would then appear in every district and have the unrestricted right to conduct investigations without vetos by anybody.

G: Yeah.

K: Well, now, you know, you can say Thieu is an unreasonable son-of-a-bitch, as I would say, but how can we go to him and say: there's got to be a communist military team in every district in the GVN with an unrestricted right of movement and an unrestricted right to investigate things.

G: It's a bit much.

K: You know, so what they are trying to do now is to use these international peace commissions to spread themselves across the whole country.

G: So what do we do? Just slug away?

K: I believe -- I said it then, I believe it now -- what the agreement we had at the end of October in the spirit in which I thought we had developed it was a fair agreement which didn't guarantee anybody victory. It permitted a certain evolution and any of us can have their own guesses how that evolution would go but it depended on the organic strength of the political strength of the parties. That we are willing to accept. I think we can still get back to that. I think they have to go and prove their manhood every once and a while.

G: Don't you think we have to prove ours?

K: Well, you know, you always have different points of view.

G: No, but I mean does that mean that we now have to give it another turn of the screw?

K: Well, I don't want to speculate what decisions like that are going to be but the basic outcome should be the spirit of what we had worked out at the end of October.

G: Yeah. . . . . . [Change in Tapes] . . . . . . . . . . .

K: Okay, run off, have a good time.

TELCONE

Phil Geyelin/Mr. Kissinger

- 6 -

G: I'd like to talk to you a little further. I am torn between that kind of New York Times kneejerk to respond tomorrow morning.

K: I haven't seen it yet.

G: No, I mean the idea that you have to say something right away and the idea that I'd like to think about it a little. But I think if we tried to say anything tomorrow, it will be sort of noncommittal because I don't entirely understand it. I sympathize with what they're doing to you but I do think having watched the Berlin negotiations over the years and others that, you know, it's like saying you got every detail about how you are going to police the autobahn but you just haven't decided how long is Berlin.

K: No, but that isn't the point. You need a minimum of inspection of a complex ceasefire.

G: Well, I think you do. I've never been a great believer in ceasefires but you know what we think.

K: Yeah.

G: We think this is a Monk's game in terms of trying to find a ceasefire that will stick in a country -- or in a war -- or in a struggle of this kind. But I gather we're making a rather considerable effort on the ground with civilians and what not.

K: That's another piece of crap!

G: Why?

K: You mean, that we are doing -- we're putting in more civilians?

G: Well, why doesn't somebody say so?

K: Well, you know, we get caught -- the minute we do something -- I mean, the minute you begin to reorganize something, you get into a bureaucratic brawl. Next thing you know every goddamned Agency that's involved in that brawl leaks it's version. So the total number I think is about 500 that people are talking about, and even that will be reduced.

G: Well, why is this 10,000 figure left lying out there?

K: I don't know. 10,000 additional civilians?

G: Yeah, and all these --

TELCONE

Phil Geyelin/Mr. Kissinger

- 7 -

K: Total nonsense.

G: People are being called back -- the old timers, Paul Hair (sp?) --

K: Yeah, because you have a bunch of self-serving bureaucrats who when you begin to see how you can adjust your courts organization, for example, to a State Department organization. You need an adjustment of personnel. Next thing you know they go crazy recruiting people before you even have an agreement.

G: Well, I would really like to talk to you about that. Are you going to be around next week?

K: Yeah. Give me a call.

G: I don't suppose we can have a breakfast.

K: Certainly we can have a breakfast.

G: Can we?

K: Towards the end of the week, Thursday or Friday.

G: If I need to call you Monday, can I reach you on the phone?

K: Certainly.

G: Cause I really if I don't write today, I will write tomorrow.

K: Okay, give me a call tomorrow.

G: And I've read your thing but I really -- you know, we have been trying not to be troublesome.

K: No, no; you've been all right and it's your job to be troublesome.

G: No, but I mean, from October 26th on I took an oath that we will --

K: Phil, I have never ....

G: Got in the way of this .....

K: I think in my four years here there may have been two editorials on foreign policy that I thought were below the belt. That's not a bad record.

TelCon

The President/Mr. Kissinger

12:32 pm, December 17, 1972

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry, any further reports.

K: No reports yet, no. Because that makes waves. We won't get a report until about 2:00. That's not going over the target until about midnight. That's Noon here.

P: Uh huh. That's the second way. There are three waves.

K: Yes, the third one will be at 5:00 tonight.

P: Yes. Now with regard to the balance of the time then what they do is go over then in our continuation---

K: Then they go back to tack air.

P: Tack Air--you mean no B-52s at all?

K: No, no, then at night they go in B-52s again.

P: How many. We can't keep up with 100 I know.

K: I think they plan to keep up a 100 for three days and then they'll go down to about 50, I guess.

P: Good, good. All right, fine.

K: So, it's going to be massive, it's going to be brutal.

P: Sure. Well the main thing is we just don't want to go over the old purposes. This is not just--well it's tied together, it isn't just political. You just don't want them to drop it on the boondocks, you want them to hit something.

K: They are going to hit something, the danger is that they may miss and hit a populated area in which case it would be gory.

P: There will be some, sure. That always happens, doesn't it.

K: Well, yes, but the targets should be far enough away so that they have some margin.

P: We always know whether we are far enough away or not, Henry, we've

DISTRIBUTED

5-01/9 DECEMBER 17, 1972

AUG 21 1972 8:56

TelCon

Bob Toth, Mr. Kissinger

5:42, December 18, 1972

K: Hello.

T: Hi.

K: How are you?

T: Well I hope you're not as depressed as I am.

K: No, I'm on cloud nine.

T: Tell why that is, that's a good story.

K: I won't tell you, that's my secret.

T: Oh, gee. Look should I tell you that the bombing and the mining has got me a lot more down than your press conference even. And it seems to me that it's going to take quite a long time to turn this around.

K: Well, we'll see.

T: Is that fair speculation, you think.

K: No, I think the press with your exception has gone overboard in both directions all the time.

T: But what do you think might happen now Henry?

K: Well, I think we could still get the agreement.

T: Soon?

K: If we get it at all it will be fairly soon.

T: Within a month.

K: Oh, I just, you know, I find now that when I give a figure, I see 99% are in the headlines of the Los Angeles Times. I withdrew it as soon as I had said it.

T: Ah, you can't withdraw it with my editors here. (laughter) I'm sorry about that but that's what they say, he left 1% open.

K: Yeah, but you hear me.

T: That's right, but still, I mean if you're that close the story of about 90 or 95% I guess you do get in trouble when you say it, but how soon do you think, literally, are we talking about months rather than weeks?

K: Look, my judgment is they deliberately set up that last meeting so that they can settle it with one or two messages and the change of instructions to their people who are working on the technical things, so it's really a *dissention*.

T: Uh huh. Do you think they will?

K: I've given up guessing. I would have thought that factors that will make them make the deal, or will still make them want to settle.

T: What will our bombing and mining do to that?

K: Well, that's just what did our absence of bombing and mining do.

T: What do you think it did. Did you think it made them more recalcitrant?

K: Well, they in effect had a *seasefire* in the north and it probably took off some of the pressure.

T: Do you believe that?

K: Well, that's--I wouldnt say it.

T: Well, you know there's been some--I don't know whether you say Tony Lewis' piece today, he talks about you, emphasizing the President vs., I frankly didn't see this distinction in what he said but --

K: Listen, Bob, I'm not going to be one of these guys that plays these games here, and I'm not going to be the good guy and the President the heavy, and vice versa. If I have a disagreement in principle I--then I get out. And, until then I don't give a check list for this or that nuance.

T: That's good enough for me. Henry, can you say privately this way what the outstanding issue is, is it the sovereignty issue.

K: Look, there's been too much talk about the sovereignty issue, that's not the basic problem. It is not a sovereignty issue. You know, there's got to be some demarcation line between South and North Vietnam, or you don't know where the obligation to this agreement begins or ends.

3

T: Uh huh. Is that what they reneged on, the DMZ?

K: I just don't want to go into specifics. All I'm saying is that if they had stuck to what they had already agreed to in November, plus what has been achieved last week, we could have had an agreement. And I sent General Haig back because I thought we were ______ and they knew he was going back for that purpose. We could then leave on the mission while they were cleaning up technical details.

T: They knew that?

K: They knew it. And they didn't say, now wait a minute---

T: So they are sandbagging you. Do you think there is something about their being petulent, that we in effect reneged or so they say, on October 22nd--

K: Well, but then you would have expected them to start that way. It's a slow burn. If they had said all along we've got to stick with the old stuff, it would have been a hell of a mess, but it would have been understandable. But to go through the procedure of doing the clarifications and then suddenly bring it to a full stop after everyone has been informed, and then you are within sight of it, and then to hit you with a bunch of protocols that reopened every issue, so that you co; hadn't even cave on the outstanding one if you wanted to. All of this is off the record.

T: Yeah.

K: So all you guys are now going to be analyzing how we could break the deadlock on that one issue. That's easy.

T: But the protocols, by the very fact that they didn't even show any willingness to discuss them from the word "go", that might have been a hint that they were going to stonewall us.

K: Well, yes.

T: I mean, this is hindsight I; know, but---

K: Hold on just a second.

T: Sure.

(Mr. Kissinger here took another phone call)

4

TelCon

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

5:51, December 18, 1972

T: Helms didn't like what you were saying!!

K: What?

T: I said Helm's didn't like what you were saying.

K: Yeah, he got the President and he got me right back.

T: Right. Just one other thing, Henry, when you are talking about three days, you are talking about things went well the 20th, 21st and 22nd of November.

K: That's right.

T: And then half way through that first of the two sessions, things began going badly.

K: That's about right.

T: Is that why you came back, because things were going badly. Wel----

K: Well, I came back because everybody -- you know at that time it wasn't clear that they were going badly, it's just that the remaining then wouldn't seem to get settled.

T: Uh huh.

K: So I thought a week's break would give everyone a chance to think.

T: Uh huh. When you came back there was obviously no break, just the reverse.

K: That's about--well it went up and down, for the first week it wasn't clear.

T: It must have been terribly frustrating.

K: Well, it's pretty heartbreaking.

T: Did you get anything at all that they were playing this game deliberately or did it just come, you know, just being dropped out piecemeal. Did you have to read it as it came out.

K: It wasn't clear as late as Saturday we saw it, it had been a rough week,

5

But you could all give a good explanation for it that maybe they wanted to help us with Saigon by making it look tough. After that, when we got that close to the agreement and suddenly we kept getting hit with more and more crap.

T: But I couldn't help but feeling more and more depressed when I heard, you know, at the press conference. It just seemed, well, well.

K: You know, all you guys were adding I was depressed, but I think you guys were so depressed that you weren't getting any good touches.

T: Well, that may be so, that may be so. Cause none of us had expected quite much of a breakdown.

K: But don't go overboard that way now.

T: No.

K: Because it was deliberately left so that it can be relatively easily settled.

T: Well do you think you have to meet him again? I mean, you talked about exchanges of messages.

K: Well, you could theoretically p it could be settled by an exchange of messages plus some excelleration of the guys working on the protocols.

T: Who is that Rodman, no, I mean Engle.

K: No, that's Porter and Xuan Thuy.

T: Oh, I see, did they come back, Engel and Negroponte ?

K: Negroponte is on the trip with Haig.

T: Oh.

K: And Engel is coming back today.

T: I see, but they could do it by excellerating it over there.

K: Yeah.

T: So you wouldn't have to meet Le Duc Tho again?

K: No. But I think that it's probable that we would meet.

CLASSIFIED

Autumn 2020
BY: J. B. SMITH

6

T: Well, if it's probable that you would meet, then this introduces in itself a kind of time, or at least a time period before which you can't do very much. It takes you at least until the New Year doesn't it.

K: Well, Bob, it isn't essential that we meet. It really depends-- if they dealt with us they way they did in October, compared to what we did in October, this is a cinch.

T: Yeah. I just can't figure it. I guess you're the same kind of situation.

K: Of course, you know--

T: You're not depressed though, huh?

K: I can't be depressed in my job.

T: Well you were probably depressed when we were up. Now that we are down, you are up.

K: No, I'm not up.

T: Unemotional.

K: No, look, this is a tough period, it's certainly contrary to what all of us had hoped for and I've never worked on something that I knew that literally the prayers of the press were with us. So, you know, this is not something you take easily. But on the other hand now the objectives to be reached are as important as they ever were.

T: Well, I mean, you would council me not to be down though.

K: I would council you to stay steady. Really.

T: Yeah.

K: Okay, you know, a messy war is apt to end in a messy way. But both sides have gone too far, it's never going to be the same war again.

T: No. And they can't ever recover their virginity either. What they've conceded in the October--

K: That's exactly right. We can never get back the same unity with Saigon, so it's --

T: Gonna break apart. Are you going down to Florida.

TELCONE

Ambassador Jha (India)/Mr. Kissinger

9:35 a.m., December 18, 1972

K: Hello.

J: Henry.

K: How are you?

J: Fine. I was going to call you today.

K: You were?

J: Yes

K: You want to invite me to India, to Independence Day.

J: Of course. Well, when shall we meet?

K: When shall we meet? How about Friday for lunch?

J: I am going to be away but I can make it Friday. ....... work and fly back in the morning and join you for lunch.

K: You would be out of town Thursday?

J: Yeah, Thursday is bad. But Friday I can make it, all day any time.

K: Wednesday I can't do it. Well, I can do it some other time except lunch on Wednesday.

J: All right, let's do that.

K: I'll call you and give your office a time.

J: And you called me for something?

K: Yeah, I called you because I understand you're having drinks with Moynihan today.

J: That's right.

K: Now two things. You're not to charm this poor fellow; he's a Harvard professor.

J: Uh-huh.

K: And not used to Indian wiles.

TELCORN

Amb. Jha/Mr. Kissinger

9:35 a.m., December 18, 1972

J: [Laughs]

K: The second thing is what I wanted to tell you.

J: Yeah.

K: We give him a letter -- is that you people understand that the reason that we are sending him is because he has a direct relationship to the White House.

J: I know that.

K: And therefore if they want to tell him something that's only for the President and me, we will set up communications that way.

J: Uh-huh.

K: So he is being sent because, you know, we do want to make a new start in our relationships.

J: Yeah.

K: And we wanted somebody whom we had personal confidence in.

J: Exactly. Well, Henry, possibly I can make it to lunch on Thursday, is that okay?

K: Lunch on Thursday?

J: Yeah.

K: I think that would be all right, yes.

J: All right, then let's do that. We'll make it lunch on Thursday.

K: Okay.

J: I'll just delay my departure by a couple of hours, it makes no difference.

K: Is that all right?

J: Yes, perfectly.

K: You want to leave in the afternoon, so let's make it 12:30.

J: That would be wonderful.

TELCOM (Secure Phone)

11:25 a.m. - 12/18/72

Moorer/Kissinger

K: Hello.

M: Henry.

K: Tom, how are you? I just wanted to check on the progress of this operation.

M: It seems to be going along on schedule. It's still night there. . . . . . . . . . . and a large number of missiles.

K: A large number?

M: We haven't gotten the exact feel for the number but we have achieved surprise in the sense it was not until they were able to ______ the aircraft with their radar that they realized the attack was on the way.

K: I have had a report that we lost two of our B-52s.

M: No, we lost one; the other returned to base.

K: All right.

M: There were 48 total.

K: You expect to lose two or three.

M: Sure, that's not surprising. That's the hardest missile center in the world. More of them came from around Hanoi. That's where we are concentrating. I don't like to lose any planes but one out of 50.

K: We're going to keep this up a few more hours.

M: We had one this morning, one about noon and one in the afternoon. Once day light occurs then other planes will start in as visibility permits. We are going around it . . . . .

K: How does visibility look?

M: Not as bad as the forecast yesterday. We will just have to wait.

DECLASSIFIED

2

K: Well, that's the local --- good, start bombing on Hanoi if the weather is good.

M: Of course. I just talked to Vogt several times and if that is not possible because of the weather than we will use ____ and bomb other places. We are making up a whole list now.

K: When you get these ____ things over with start on the communications again.

M: Yes, now we are starting in on the mines. We went throughout the area surrounding entrances to Haiphong but there will be occasions when the weather is entirely suitable for the mining. When it is not suitable for ground targets.

K: Well, that's entirely up to you. When you hit in the buffer zone let us know.

M: All right.

K: I will be ready to let you ____ within 5 miles of the buffer zone but make a special effort to be accurate.

M: We will do it but we have to watch the weather for that. I will be in touch.

K: Good.

M: The (President ?) tells me he talked to you yesterday and he wanted to be damn certain this was for keeps and I passed that on to everyone by telephone and by message.

K: Good. OK, Tom.

TELCORN (Secure. Phone)

Laird/Kissinger

1:10 p.m. - 12/18/72

K: Hello.

L: Hi, Henry. It's awful hot up there.

K: Hot where?

L: Around Hanoi and Haiphong.

K: I am putting out the word . . . . . . . . . that I was reluctant
and giving you the blame. '

L: I don't care.

K: No, Mel.

L: In the first two waves we lost one B-52

K: Is the second wave completed?

L: The second wave is not over target and we are out of the areas.
There was one B-52 hit. There is one on fire but we hope he can
land. We had one B-52 on the first wave, one damaged and one
F-111 lost. Two on the first wave, none on the second wave, but
one hit badly. The third wave will go about 4:50 our time. And
then I will have 51 B-52's in there so that will be a big one going
over about 4 o'clock but we will just keep it up.

K: All right. Now tomorrow are they going in the same numbers?

L: We come down a little bit - about half tomorrow, then back at the
same level the next day.

K: About 60 tomorrow?

L: That's right. Then pick up the next day. There is no visibility.
At present they are using instruments.

K: So we can't use TACAIR tomorrow?

DREAMFIELD

AUG 27 1978 10:01 AM

501019 11:00 AM

JAS 18

2

L: I don't think we will be able to use TACAIR in the area where we are getting that weather report. We are also putting in MIGs, 6's, B-52s and F-111s.

K: It's amazing they haven't said anything yet.

L: They have said something. They said we were hitting up there but . . . We acknowledged we are using air power in North Vietnam.

K: I have notices that.

L: We will not say anything about numbers or anything else.

K: Right. OK.

L: Well, I wanted to give you a little update on it.

K: Do you think we will take some heat?

L: I think we will take head. I think over our losses we will take the heat.

K: We were bound to lose some whether we __________ 50 or 100.

L: We estimate for each 100 sorties we would lose about two B-52s.

K: Do you think it will drop?

L: I don't think it will drop. Those B-52s in that kind of an area can't maneuver much. They just have to watch them come at them.

K: OK. Let me know.

L: OK. If you get any questions, give me a call.

K: OK. Thanks, you are a great sport as always.

DEPARTMENT (1)

501019-856-2107

TELCONE

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

3:06 p.m., December 18, 1972 (?)

D: Hello, Henry.

K: You never answer the phone very quickly.

D: Well, you see, sometimes I'm not very close. As of now, I'm really
packing.

K: Oh, you're packing.

D: And so my telephone actually really and truly is one of my -- you know
the place -- on the third floor, from which you called. The second one
is in my office.

K: Anatol, I'm sending over to you a draft of that letter for Brezhnev.

D: Yes.

K: And while we're getting it typed and ready for the President's signature
if you have any comments, you can call me back.

D: Okay, it will be very nice. You are already sending now?

K: I'll send a messenger in 5 minutes.

D: Okay, so within 15 minutes I will call you back.

K: Okay, good.

D: And then we have a talk in this connection.

K: Good,

D: All right?

K: Good.

D: Thank you very much, Henry.

K: Bye.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MW Dake
Date: 12/3/74

CLASSIFIED

Autobiography E012 958-

Bespoke Secretary 0103

TELCONE

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Oh, you're packing.

D: Yes.

K: Okay, good.

K: Good,

D: All right?

K: Good.

K: Bye.

D: Bye, bye.

wgh

TELCORN

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

December 18, 1972 [Between 3:10 p. m. and 3:22 p. m.]

HAK: Marvin.

M K: Henry, how are you?

HAK: You're rewriting the last chapter making me a villain.

MK: No, I don't even know what to do frankly. I'm thoroughly confused.

HAK: [Laughter]

MK: Listen, I gather from what I heard this morning, you couldn't do that December 30th broadcast now?

HAK: Well, I don't know. Let me ask Haldeman again but given the attitude toward CBS here, I wouldn't be optimistic.

MK: Is there a change?

HAK: No.

MK: What is the -- I would also just parenthetically love to be able to sit down with you when you felt you have some time for the book.

HAK: Yeah, if we can keep it off of Vietnam, I'll be glad to.

MK: Well, I'd be delighted. I mean, there are plenty of things that we can discuss.

HAK: No, I'll be glad to.

MK: Good. And finally, may I ask whether on Saturday, the military side of what has now become apparent had already been decided?

HAK: Not absolutely finally.

MK: Not finally. And your own sense at this point -- I suspect you can't put any time clock on it -- but is there any possibility in your mind that with the resumption of military action of this sort that you can bring them along into what you termed as constructive attitude on negotiations? I'm just wondering where the parallel in the past has been that's produced this snow -- I suppose October is one example.

HAK: Yeah, I would say October is one example.

MK: You think it can work?

HAK: I hope so.

CLASSIFIED

AUTUMN FESTIVE

TELCONE

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

December 18, 1972

MK: I certainly do too.

HK: Listen, Marvin, however this goddamn thing comes out, there's nothing I've ever done that I've wanted to succeed in more than this one.

MK: I'm sure. That's never been a question in my mind.

HK: I know that. And one of the moving things in having been part of it has been the real good will of the journalists who were part of this enterprise.

MK: Sure

HK: And I've never had any question about that

MK: Is there any --

HK: You know, the one thing I want to say about the negotiations -- I really don't want to go into them otherwise -- is this: There's going to be a lot of speculation on whether this or that provision caused this or that stalemate. I don't think there's anybody on the American side who has any question about the fact that this thing could have been solved if there had been a desire to solve it. And there just was a basic decision to stall last week. Now why that was, that's just very hard to know.

MK: You think that they wanted to take another military crack?

HK: Now we have some information to that effect -- you know, the October information was totally reliable. The other information I'm not so sure about. You know, it could also be: this is a bunch of old men who made a very close decision in October running up against a deadline they couldn't change and now there isn't any deadline that particularly affects them.

MK: And would this be when you say a basic decision, a kind of a basic change of heart?

HK: Not necessarily. They may just be diddling each other along.

MK: Uh-huh. Henry, I tell you the thing that absolutely upsets me more than anything else is whether this kind of an action on Vietnam could spill over and in fact affect dealings with Brezhnev or dealings with Chou. How can we persuade them that the old determination to reach a deal on our part remains valid?

HK: Well, I think that is -- That I'm not so worried about. Look, what we are trying to get is really -- Marvin, when this thing is over, I'll explain it to you.

TELCORN

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

December 18, 1972

MK: Right.

HK: What we've asked from them is nothing that they couldn't accept. Really. I mean, it's not -- in fact, they've accept --- we could settle now on the basis of what we had already agreed to on November 23rd plus one or two things we agreed to last week.

MK: Um-humm. But then what happened?

HK: I don't know. I wouldn't have sent Haig back if we hadn't believed it was ready to go.

MK: In other words, sending him back was on the sole assumption on progress of positive things.

HK: Of almost certain success.

MK: Yeah.

HK: Because he was going to go on from here.

MK: Yeah.

HK: And it was to give us two days head start on launching the second round.

MK: Yeah. What about the -- the thing I -- just to be clear in my own mind -- was there an effort on Al's part to add to the October 20th deal with a provision that would have the effect of dividing Vietnam?

HK: No, not really. And there's a lot of talk about sovereignty; that is not the issue. We were prepared to stay well within the 54, you know, on concept.

MK: I see.

HK: Of one Vietnam with two zones.

MK: Right.

HK: But you know you can't have a goddamned thing without a demarcation line. I mean, none of the provisions make any sense unless you make clear where South Vietnam, however temporary it is, begins and North Vietnam ends.

TELCON

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

December 18, 1972

MK: Well, if they don't -- in the terms of the October 20th, they had said that they would agree to the 54 -- the vague 54 formula.

HK: That's right.

MK: And we had accepted the idea of the unity, independence, etc. in Vietnam.

HK: We didn't attempt to change that.

MK: ..... did all the stories get going on this point about the division of the two?

HK: Well, you know, there are two separate issues. Obviously, Thieu claims sovereignty over all of South Vietnam but that's between him and the PRG.

MK: I understand that.

HK: And we'll recognize Thieu and no doubt the North Vietnamese will recognize Madame Binh.

MK: Um-humm.

HK: But that's not new.

MK: Right.

HK: And that's going to come out in the wash.

MK: Right.

HK: And the second question is: what is the relationship between North and South Vietnam? And there you have two problems. Are they two separate states? Or pending unification, how are they demarcated and do they respect that demarcation line? Now that second point is not necessarily the same as the first.

MK: And on that point there was --

HK: We would be perfectly willing to live with the reaffirmation of the provision about the DMZ of the 54 agreement. We are not trying to add to those.

MK: And in effect they at this point are not prepared to even do that?

HK: That's been the big hangup.

MK: I see.

UNCLASSIFIED
AUG 12 1972
D86101

TELCONE

Marvin Kalb/Mr. Kissinger

December 18, 1972

HK: And that's new.

MK: I see.

HK: Now don't describe that to me.

MK: No, no; I understand that. I understand that. But what you said on Saturday was that they had agreed to this before and then reneged.

HK: That's right.

MK: And that it -- we're talking about this point now?

HK: That's right. Even that, Marvin, we could handle. You see what I'm trying to avoid now is get into a debate with you and Bernard Gwertzman and a lot of other bright people trying to revise formula how to lick this problem.

MK: Yeah.

HK: I can find the formula to lick it once there's a decision to settle it.

MK: Um-humm. Right. I have no doubt of that either.

HK: I mean, that's been the disheartening about it.

MK: Yeah.

HK: I may let you read sometime the transcript of the last day's meeting and you tell me then what you think.

MK: I'd love to. Can I come over?

HK: [Laughter] Well, let things gell a little more.

MK: Okay. Listen, if you could find time, please ask one of your girls to call. Anytime at all.

HK: Good.

MK: Thank you very much.

HK: Okay, but, Marvin, don't use any of this stuff today, will you? I'm not going to talk to anyone else.

MK: If you don't want me to, I will not.

TELCOM

Cap Weinberger/Mr. Kissinger

3:22 p.m., December 18, 1972

W: Henry, this is Cap.

K: Yes, Cap.

W: I thought it was very necessary for us to get together with a couple of people as early this week as we could to see if we could get agreement on the Defense budget and then take that into the President ....

K: I agree.

W: We could then have an agreed upon product. And we're getting right down to printing problems. Do you suppose anytime tomorrow or Wednesday?

K: Let's try for it no later than Wednesday.

W: That would be fine. Well, then we'll try and do it. I would normally have Ken Dam and Frank Carlucci as the two people that are from our office, no one else, and whatever you want.

K: Good. I'll have Odeen and Kennedy.

W: Okay, that will be fine. Well, then we'll just try to get all the ______ into the study and meet at the same time.

K: Good, excellent.

W: Thank you, sir.

K: Bye.

W: Bye.

wgh

DRL ASSIGNED

Author: E012697-
Date: 10/05
By: B.S. M. D.

TELCON
Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:38 p.m., December 18, 1972

K: Anatol.

D: Oh, Henry, you have too many meetings.

K: That is true.

D: You have to sit alone and to think it over. I think it's much better when you're thinking alone.

K: You tell your goddamn clients to behave themselves and I'll get some more time.

D: [Laughter] Well, I think when you're sitting your thinking is much better than when you have too many councils because when there are too many councils, you are always very difficult to make your mind.

K: I call meetings only after decisions are made to tell them what to do.

D: Oh, I see. This is a different approach I should say because otherwise it is really -- how many men, so many opinions.

K: That is true.

D: And then they have no responsibility. They go home. It is fine that they give their piece of advice and they don't care at all. And you have to be seated there and thinking what will be consequences.

K: That is true.

D: Henry, I look through this draft. I think it's really a good one. But I would like to make some comments to you. It's up to you to decide what to do.

K: Sure.

D: If you don't mind. Do you have a text?

K: Yes, I have it in front of me.

D: Okay. Second page -- on this limitation strategic arms negotiations.

K: Yes.

D: As I discussed with you before and this is really -- I informed Brezhnev before. My impression was -- I think I'm right -- that you put it in this way: let them try, I mean, both of us. In this case, no harm in trying.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012058
By: M.W.ARADE

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:38 p.m., December 18, 1972

D: (cont'd) If possible, maybe to find some agreement which could be
possible on summit itself.

K: Exactly.

D: Here it is not clear. It's simply rather exploring his own.

K: That's a good point.

D: There is no clear statement on this point. Just to try.

K: I think you are -- I will add a sentence.

D: Yeah, just to make --

K:I I will add a sentence where it says: in these negotiations when they resume -- I will add a sentence that says: Ambassador Dobrynin and Dr. Kissinger should be instructed to make a major effort to reach some agreement in time for the summit.

D: Or at least -- Or maybe better put: at least to try through the channels.
I mean, there --

K: That's what I mean.

D: Yes. I mean, the President and Brezhnev try to make a major effort through our channels -- Kissinger and Dobrynin to find a -- if it would be possible to find really something to sign in an agreement.

K: Exactly.

D: This I think would be helpful. Then, second, you have a paragraph -- I'm sorry, I read your text about with the various other weapons systems. You put it: As you know from our exchanges in this channel, our concerns are with the central weapons systems. This is yours.

K: Yeah, I think we can dump all this stuff out.

D: Maybe not drop it, just make it more -- so it is thought about clearly.
In a sense, let's try to find an agreement or in this case --

K: No, I think -- put it

D: I have no objection to as you put it but in this case when you put "our position": You have expressed parallel concerns with ...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012658
By M.W. Rauch 04/04/72

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:38 pm, December 18, 1972

- 3 -

K: That's right, let's leave it out.

D: Or maybe just put in: And some other things without really specifying because we always -- there's a question of ________. So maybe say: And some other questions without really -- We will need to consider carefully how to devise a framework -- this is all right. Not to just limited because otherwise it looks -- this is not exactly right, you see?

K: I understand.

D: Because you describe our position and it looks -- And from this point it is not quite correct. Maybe just to put it very -- some other questions you raise but rather obligations because and it will not really make an obligation.

K: Yeah, I understand.

D: That's as a point of reference because this is not so. If it's possible to make some correction. Then at the end of this: In addition I am prepared to continue to explore the possibility of working out a -- As I mentioned today, this .... of use. I thought it was for "non-use".

K: Non-use. I understand. Correct.

D: Because otherwise --

K: Yeah, of course.

D: There is again a [laughter] different kind of business. Did you think this was to the "non-use" or --

K: Oh, I understand

D: It also says: Agreements which ..... known about non-use so put it in this way.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

K: Are those the major points?

D: On this there are two points or rather three points on this paragraph. one, on this non-use. Second, I don't know -- is it necessary to put

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F012058
By N.W.aga 00504

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MW. Kissinger

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:38 pm, December 18, 1972

- 4 -

D: (cont'd) again: to explore? Maybe just to continue the discussion of working out of mutually acceptable agreement because when it was "explore" it looks like a continuing sign in my country. They explore all the time. All the things. You understand what I mean, Henry?

K: I understand.

D: And so maybe to put: In addition, to continue the discussions to work out a mutually --

K: Okay.

D: But explore even step backwards really.

K: Right.

D: Because you already --

K: What time are you leaving, Anatol?

D: I am leaving from here at 6:30.

K: Okay. So I've got to get this done.

D: I think there is still plenty of time.

K: Well, I have to get back to my meeting too. What other things do you have?

D: And then here: I have kept in close touch with exchanges on various subjects between Ambassador Dobrynin and Dr. Kissinger. I would like before Ambassador Dobrynin to put: Minister Gromyko and then Ambassador Dobrynin. You understand?

K: Yes, Foreign Minister Gromyko. Yes, I got it.

D: Yes. There's a second --

K: I got it. The second line --

D: Between the Minister, Ambassador Dobrynin and Dr. Kissinger.

K: Anatol, I understand perfectly.

["TELCON", "Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger", "4:38 pm, December 18, 1972", "- 5 -", "D: Yes, he is involved very much in this business and I would like him to be mentioned.", "K: Right.", "D: Yes. Third, page number three. This is it: On this issue of negotiations of Vietnam. The Soviet Union has played a constructive role in these past months. I rather leave my personal --", "K: I'll take out the sentence on the constructive role.", "D: No, no; it's quite all right.", "K: Is it?", "D: No, it's quite all right. I don't quite like this second sentence: I hope that you can exercise your influence in ways that will move us toward a just and enduring peace. It sounds as if you are now mainly responsible. What I am suggesting really, if you don't mind, put it something like this one: The Soviet Union has played a constructive role in these past months. You already have it. And then: Any further efforts of USSR will be appreciated.", "K: Good.", "D: And then a point: And then it says: ..... I assure you that such a peace remains my paramount goal, as I know it remains your goal.", "K: Good.", "D: And that's everything then.", "K: Very well.", "D: I think it will be better.", "K: Good.", "D: And nothing on the 4th, nothing on the 5th. I think it's all right ......

[end of tape]", "wgh", "DECLASSIFIED\nAuthority EO 12955\nBy W. A. Date 05-01-72"]

TELCONE

4:38 p.m., December 18, 1972

K: Anatol.

K: That is true.

K: That is true.

K: That is true.

K: Sure.

K: Yes.

TELCORN

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:38 p.m., December 18, 1972

- 2 -

K: Exactly.

K: That's a good point.

D: Yeah, just to make --

K: That's what I mean.

K: Exactly.

D: This I think would be helpful. Then, second, you have a paragraph -- I'r sorry, I read your text about with the various other weapons systems. You put it: As you know from our exchanges in this channel, our concerns are with the central weapons systems. This is yours.

K: No, I think --

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:38 pm, December 18, 1972

- 3 -

K: I understand.

K: Yeah, I understand.

D: Because otherwise --

K: Yeah, of course.

K: Oh, I understand

K: Right.

D: Okay.

CLASSIFIED

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:38 pm, December 18, 1972

- 4 -

K: I understand.

K: Okay.

K: Right.

D: Because you already --

D: Yes. There's a second --

DATE: 12/12/76

TELCONE

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:38 pm, December 18, 1972

- 5 -

K: Right.

D: No, no; it's quite all right.

K: Is it?

D: No, it's quite all right. I don't quite like this second sentence: I hope that you can exercise your influence in ways that will move us toward a just and enduring peace. It sounds as if you are now mainly responsible for what I am suggesting really, if you don't mind, put it something like this one: The Soviet Union has played a constructive role in these past months. You already have it. And then: Any further efforts of the USSR will be appreciated.

K: Good.

D: And then a point: And then it says: ... I assure you that such a peace remains my paramount goal, as I know it remains your goal.

K: Good.

D: And that's everything then.

K: Very well.

D: I think it will be better.

K: Good.

[end of tape]

wgh

ASSISTED

TelCon

Stu Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

5:58 pm, December 18, 1972

K: Hello.

A: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes, Stuart

A: How are you? Are you angry with me again?

K: No, no, as long as you are writing about people doing a hatchet job on me I don't mind.

A: You don't mind.

K: If you praise--

A: If I nominate you for State, the department of the Secretary of State you get angry, and if I nominate you for oblivion you are perfectly happy, huh?

K: That's right. That didn't bother me. She was probably quite accurate too.

A: Well, something is going on.

K: You think?

A: Yeah. As I say in my last paragraph, it may all be balderdash, but something--it's my vision that something else is in progress. Don't you smell that yourself.

K: Well, it's -- in some respects, yes, and yet it doesn't make any sense.

A: NO, I agree with you.

K: I mean, what would be the point in it?

A: Well, you know, big stakes in '76 is one point.

K: Yeah, but it's easy enough to get me out of here. I mean, I'm not clinging to my job.

continuing

A: When do you have to make your decision, Henry, about applying to Harvard.

K: Well, by the end of January.

DPR ASSISTED

2

A: As soon as that.

K: But I have no intention of going back to Harvard. So it's an easy
decision.

A: Uh huh.

K: But, you know, I had hoped to have Vietnam wound up by now, so I
would have been in a better position to make the decision.

A: Yeah. I have alas to write about this subject. Other words, a sense
of compulsion.

K: I wish you'd write out of a sense of compassion.

A: Well, I'll try compassion too.

K: Don't go to any extremes.

A: No, I won't go to extremes. But one of the things I had in mind, I
dug out the President's San Clemente press conference, you remember
that, it was towards the end of August or the beginning of September.

K: Yes.

A: He said in effect if we don't get an agreement with the North Vietnamese, as it happens I have it in my pocket, San Clemente, President Nixon said the following: "As far as the furture is concerned, we believe that our training program for South Vietnamese not only on the ground but in the air is going forward so successfully, if the enemy refuses to negotiate seriously then the South Vietnamese will be able to undertake total defense of their country." Everybody says that you have no options, I don't think this is true, I think you have that option.

K: People have constantly underestimated us on Vietnam; they've constantly
thought maybe the North Vietnamese too, that they could maneuver the
agreement into the sort of surrender we have said time and time again
that we wouldn't do.

A: You are not going to --

K: And if you look at the behavior of our liberals after this draft agreement
was announced--

A: Yes.

K: You could see that suddenly you got Driver running around pitying poor
Thieu with our journalists drooping that this was really a disguise
sell out.

3

A: No, no, we could have had it four years ago which is a lot of nonsense.

K: And that we could have had it four years ago so that the people who are pushing eveyrtime it looks are the ones that are going to be killing us when the deal is made.

A: That's right.

K: And it isn't so much a question of killing us, there's nothing in this for us, it's a question of the self-respect of America. We will not make a deal that knowingly turns that country over to the communist.

A: Or the forces that raises this out until there really isn't no alternative.

K: Exactly. Now we are willing to make a deal where they will have to survive with their own efforts. And where it's not a hundred percent certain where, you know, they'll have to struggle for survival. That we are willing to make.

A: Henry, this is a subject where you and I have discussed for many and for a long, long time.

K: It's one of--

A: I want to ask if you really made a deal. This is what I keep gnawing away at.

K: No, I'm not saying--

A: But you have a piece of paper that would have to be signed by Saigon Hanoi and Washington, which is always seemed to me as kind of a square circle, which I thought you published until the Oct. 26, but It now seems to me at least a 50/50 chance you won't get that piece of paper. If you don't get the piece of paper, it does not seem to me that all is lost. You follow the route supplied by the President and you get your press conference, you don't get your pri soners back, that your great problem.

K: I don't want to speculate on what we are going to do but--

A: At least you have options, right?

K: We have options and we are at peace. We take this route to the point where it began to look that they were playing with us.

A: Then you stop playing.

DELEGATE
Authorized
BOSCHSDERF
12.26-10.05

4

K: And then we stop playing. We've never said--we are not McGovern.

A: Uh hun.

K: And we don't want to deal at any price. And if you're not going to, you know, the press can have a great old time with press conference at the end of October, history isn't made that way.

A: You're right. Let me ask you a question which you probably will not wish to answer, but when you said we believe that peace is at hand, did that phrase come springingly to your brain or was it one that had been prepared in advance by the President.

K: No, actually, I'll answer it. It came from my brain but it had been discussed with the President, and all such speculations but the President pulls me back, and there was a disagreement between me and the President. Total and absolute demonstrable outrageous nonsense. It isn't excluded that some of my heroic associates are putting them out, they're having a hell of a time knowing how to position themselves, you know, whether to the left or to the right of me.

A: Whatever they can get to the easiest.

K: They don't know exactly how this thing is coming out.

A: That's right. The same is true of the doves in the Senate of course. They don't want to take a firm position in case they might be knocked out of it, by events.

K: [basis] Well, on this basis I can only tell you that there was never any presidential nothing that was done inappropriate was not previously cleared by the President, fully discussed with him, encouraged by him, or whatever other word you need.

A: Uh huh. Well it was no surprise to him in other words.

K: You think I could survive here if I surprised him with negotiations.

A: The phrase itself might have been your own phrase for a, that it might have gone further than he expected, it happens to all of us even with your remarkable control of the magnate.

K: No, you know, look Stuart, I admit in retrospect it was a mistake.

A: Even with the President you went too far.

K: No, what the mistake was that, can you hold on a second (another phone rang).

UNCLASSIFIED

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin, Mr. Kissinger
6:08 pm, December 18, 1972

D: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes Mr. Ambassador.

D: Well, I couldn't leave without saying hello to you.

K: Well, Anatol, a very merry Christmas and Happy New Year to you.

D: Exactly what I wanted to tell you. You are always ahead of me.

during

K: It was a joy working with you/last year and I hope the next year will be even more significant.

D: Exactly, I am hoping so too, and I hope you have many more other meetings and all will be fine. It is important that we have a good relationship with this country, really.

K: It's a very unusual relationship.

D: It's true what you said, and it's very good message and I will deliver it to Mr. Brezhnev personally.

K: It has all of the points.

D: Exactly. Everything is--

K: You've got the other message also.

D: Yes. Oh, I would like to ask you one question. You said ______ you mean the text of November 25, have you got one.

K: Yes.

D: Everything in it *is* agreed upon __________, except two points.

K: Except the word "administrative" which they had also agreed upon.

D: Yes, oh, I see. That was on November 25, it was agreed upon, you just want the same thing.

K: As it was at Noon on November 25.

D: As it was at Noon, I like this expression. What about ________?

K: That was agreed upon then.

2

D: Oh yes, November 25th. Well, I think it's rather--my impression it's rather good proposal but I don't know how they look at it, but I will tell Brezhnev all about.

K: You really--they must stop the idea that they can play with us.

D: I think they have understood this already. Don't you think they already

K: I mean, what made them think that they could keep the Assistant to the President for nine days in Paris with a lot of nonsense that they put before us.

D: I understand.

K: And when we are under daily pressure and they expect no reactions.

D: I agree.

K: You know, if on the third day they said, look there are five problems let's think them for a while. That would have been a perfectly legitimate point of view.

D: I understand.

K: At any rate, Anatol, let's not talk about this now. I really want to tell you that I consider you a friend --

D: And the same here, that was my thoughts, where I'm going we still will be very good friends in years to come, and I do hope I get to work with you next year.

K: I hope that we will make a great success of Brezhnev's visit here.

D: I am sure. Last year, this is really a serious, I hope we have a major breakthrough happens.

K: Because we are now dealing with each other from the point of view --

D: And this is all important, really. After all if we can keep agreement once, one more will.

K: And this will not only preserve our peace.

D: Okay, when I get back I will call you immediately. Best regards to the President.

K: Thank you, I'm seeing him for dinner. Thank you again.

CLASSIFIED

Author: E12.95F-

Date: 11/09/93