critical of the manner in which it has operated and of the quality
of its output. In this respect their arguments merge into the
chorus of the many who are more dissatisfied with the nature of
the existing effort than with its scale.

The voices of criticism are extremely varied and often
sound off in exactly opposite directions. These are the most
common complaints which recur over and over again:

1. United States propaganda is essentially pragmatic and empirical, it does not offer its audience an integrated theory of society and history, a universal philosophical system, a general doctrine of salvation, an ideology with symbols and idols, an absolute faith. United States propaganda is not sufficiently concrete and practical, it propounds such abstract concepts as freedom, rule of law, democracy and tries to export ideas rather than cold facts.

2. It is too materialistic and tries to win friends by bribery. It is not sufficiently materialistic, omits stressing the economic advantages resulting from cooperation with the United States.

3. It is oversaturated with anticommunism. --It is not aggressive enough in attacking communism.

4. It paints too rosy a picture of the United States. -- Its picture of the United States is too seamy.

5. It is conceived as a typical American advertising campaign. --It should rely much more on the tried and proven advertising methods so successfully developed in the United States.

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[L]

6. It tries to make others over in our image.--It is by far too timid in stressing American culture and values.

7. It is not properly coordinated with United States foreign policy.--All it does is explain every twist and turn of United States foreign policy.

8. It places too much emphasis on international cooperation, the United Nations, etc.--It is provocative rather than peaceful and "furnishes a foil for imperialism." (See Appendix III)

9. It is not geared sufficiently to actual problems of the target audience based on an inadequate knowledge of their psychology, culture, history and language.

10. It is unimaginative and uninspiring.

11. It is, on the whole, ineffective.

It will be noted that the last three items on the above list which contain only the most frequent and by no means all the criticisms, to which the United States overseas information program has actually been subjected, differ from the preceding eight in that they lack indication of an opposing view. The reason is simply, that today, apart from the ex-officio defenders of the program, nobody appears inclined to advocate an opposing view on these specific points.

That disillusionment with our propaganda is virtually universal cannot be denied. But what measuring rod is applied by those who venture such opinions as "ineffective," "unimaginative," "too militant," "too timid?" One cannot, or at least one should not measure results obtained or methods used against some, often subjective and highly personal, ideal image. It is just possible

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[L]

that expectations were unreasonably high in the first place. This
study is concerned with ascertaining actual United States capa-
bilities and the decisive question we must now examine is this:
How much <u>can</u> we achieve, in the light of United States and world
realities?

## Chapter III

GENERAL APPRAISAL OF UNITED STATES PROPAGANDA CAPABILITIES

Very many among those who consider our propaganda ineffec-
tive do so on the basis of the observation that all over the world--
even in such allied nations as Canada or West Germany--there is
much, perhaps even increasing "unfriendliness" toward the United
States. USIA Director Allen, to quote once again one of his
statements from the February 1958 Appropriations Hearings (p. 11),
put it very realistically in these simple terms:

"The next question that arises which I know is in
the minds of you gentlemen (of the Appropriations
Committee) is: 'All right, granted all those things
you say about the necessity of having a USIA, why are
we not doing better?' Practically everybody who goes
abroad says he hears a lot of nasty things about the
United States. Such people often come to the USIA and
say: 'We are losing the propaganda war. We are getting
way behind the Russians in propaganda. Your agency must
not be doing any good.'"

As a typical example Allen mentioned a letter from a United States
citizen who, upon reading in his home-town paper that a number of
people in Toronto (Canada) cheered a newsreel showing the failure

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[L]

of a United States Vanguard launching, had commented thusly: "Why in the world are we not able to project ourselves better abroad? Why can't we make people understand that American people are good, kindhearted people who want peace?" In answer to this question Allen pointed out that in his opinion, based on 28 years of foreign service, "people abroad do regard America as a nation and as individuals the most generous and openhearted people," that, however, "as a world power the United States is involved in problems everywhere, whether we like it or not, and is bound to get a certain number of brickbats along with the bouquets."

Actually it is one of the basic misconceptions of the general public--and not only of the general public--that a primary objective of propaganda is to secure "friendship" and sympathy in a general sense, so that "unfriendly" remarks or attitudes--such as would be resented in the relationship between individuals--are, as a matter of course, considered proof of failing propaganda. Actually, the aim of propaganda is not to create in others benign sentiments, but to influence political opinion and thereby create certain unfavorable political reactions. The fact that the Italian landscape, language, charm and "humanity" have captivated innumerable people all over the world does not mean that these people are politically pro-Italian. Nor, on the other hand, will the foreign policy of, let us say Germany, be necessarily anti-Italian because many Germans, wrongly, consider the Italians loud, undisciplined and unreliable. Anyone who has been able to observe foreign reactions to America and the Americans can but fully agree with Mr. Allen that, indeed, millions and millions of

- 17 -

foreigners--including those in countries occupied for years by
our forces--are ineradicably convinced that we are kindlier, more
generous, more helpful than perhaps any other group of people.
But these very same foreigners may feel, and say, that we are
politically naive, mercurial, overconfident, too easily dejected,
etc., so that in spite of all "sympathy" even those who would love
nothing better than an immigration visa to settle on our shores,
might quite easily be decidedly critical and often most unfriendly
in their utterances and political attitudes. Others, on the
contrary, who privately accuse us of cultural barbarism, uncouth-
ness, lack of tradition, dollar and gadget craziness, etc.-- as
our British friends are remarkably likely to do--may be staunchly
and even all-out pro-American where international politics are
concerned. It is only fair to say that the experts and special-
ists--inside and outside the USIA--seem to have no doubt that,
indeed, the objective is: to be respected rather than loved.
In many cases it will, in fact, be much more important to convey
the impression that we are strong, resolved and powerful than
that we are kind, friendly and eminently peaceful. In any event,
lack of "love" for the rich and, therefore, envied United States,
a super power whose every action and omission is felt and anxiously
observed in all corners of the world, could not be remedied by
any amount of propaganda. (For further comments on this problem,
see Appendix IV).

In truth we are facing here the very basic overall question
of t e extent to which actual realities can be overcome, in the
long run, by words. The Scandinavian nations and West Germany

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are beyond any shadow of a doubt profoundly anti-Communist and--
because of recent or past history--also anti-Russian. The election
results in these countries prove this point even statistically.
Nevertheless, they are all geographically very near to the Rus-
sian colossus and all, including Germany, small in comparison.
They have the will and the desire to stay with the West, but what
permits them to do so is United States power, not United States
words. Sweden, during World War II, was thoroughly anti-Nazi
and still made a deal with the Germans permitting transportation
of Wehrmacht divisions from Nazi-occupied Norway through neutral
Sweden to the German front in Finland. Deals are made by the
weak with the strong not necessarily out of love or sympathy,
but frequently also out of fear. Should events--for example a
withdrawal of United States forces from Germany, or God forbid,
the loss of West Berlin--make Russian power appear actually in
the ascendance and United States power on the wane, the resulting
loss of confidence could not be remedied by anything the USIA
might do or say. It has been remarked over and over again, but
bears repeating, that the Berlin airlift and the naked fact of
our fighting a war to save free South Korea, proved an incom-
parably greater propaganda asset, by demonstrating our resolve and
firmness, than any paper or radio campaign. If the Arabs, who
rightly or wrongly see in Israel their number one enemy, find
that in point of fact the United States finances the very exis-
tence of that enemy, while the Soviets do not, they will not be
moved into our camp by propaganda, although a series of factual
occurrences--for example, a Soviet challenge to Nasser's Pan-
Arabism in Syria and Iraq might produce a United States-Arab

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[LQ]

rapprochement. If in certain South American countries, for entirely understandable reasons, we are unwilling to aid financially the exploitation of local oil resources by Government rather than by private enterprise, while the Soviets do offer such aid, the propagandist is essentially powerless to counteract the political repercussions resulting from such a situation of fact.

Propaganda is an auxiliary weapon which can very effectively *supplement* the military, economic, diplomatic weapons of a nation, but it cannot change basic factors which speak louder than words, and most certainly it is no substitute for power. When the German armies were beginning to be defeated in the field, Mr. Goebbel's vaunted propaganda became ineffective. Nonintervention--however justified--of the United States in Southeast Asia after the fall of Dienbienphu and the resulting definitive passing of North Viet Nam under communist control was a fact in the light of which the Chinese description of the United States as a paper tiger could not very successfully be gainsaid by even the most brilliant posters, pamphlets, broadcasts or cultural exchange programs. Once the Soviets had actually launched the first man-made satellite, the destroyed world image of a United States infinitely superior to the U.S.S.R. in technology was no longer repairable by argument. It is a widespread misconception that propaganda provides a kind of magic wand, or mysterious nostrum for influencing a worldwide target audience in any desired manner regardless of military, economic and political realities such as: China's growth into a world power; the U.S.S.R.'s Sputnik; Soviet penetration into the Middle East, Africa and even Latin America; the overthrow of the pro-Western government in Iraq; the replacement of a pro-Western

- 20 -

LcJ

by an, at best, neutral government in Lebanon, despite the
temporary deployment of United States forces in that country;
the reduction of French and British, and the lagging buildup of
German, NATO forces in continental Europe; the barbaric, but yet
successful suppression of the Hungarian freedom movement by
Russian tanks; the launching by the Kremlin of virtually cease-
less diplomatic offensives, increasingly more insolent and threat-
ening in tone. It might well be argued that the cumulative
effect of these events has been a decrease of United States
prestige and status in world opinion. But the critics who deduce
from the mere fact of such decrease that our propaganda has been
ineffective, simply attribute to the propagandist a magic power
which he does not possess and which the most authoritative prac-
titioners of the art have always been especially eager to disclaim.
The prestige and standing of this country depend--apart from
short-term tactical propaganda coups--not on words but on deeds;
i.e., on our actual foreign policy and the military, economic and
will power behind it. (On propaganda by deed versus propaganda
by word, see also Appendix V).

It should be noted that the impossibility--to all practical
intents and purposes--of actually "measuring" the success of our
propaganda, puts the United States official propagandists in a
distinctly awkward position. If, from the United States point
of view, things go well in a given area, for example in
Adenauer's Germany, in Pakistan or in Thailand, they cannot claim
this as proof of their skill, since the pro-United States poli-
cies and attitudes of these nations are quite obviously dictated

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L4

primarily by geographic, military, economic factors and by common--
to an extent--aims of their and our foreign policy. The only
argument the USIA could advance is that, nevertheless, *without* a
skillful United States information program the countries in
question might not have remained so persistently close to us.
Since, of course, such claim can never be proved it is hardly
worth making in the first place. If, on the other hand, things
go badly, if in Indonesia, for instance, or in the Arab countries
the trend of opinion and policy turns against the United States,
the United States propaganda apparatus will be saddled with at
least part of the blame.

One must have read the hundreds and hundreds of pages of
congressional hearings on the USIA budget to understand how
defenseless, in practice, the USIA representatives are against
this sweeping accusation that they are clearly ineffective or
worse, since they were unable to prevent such unfavorable turns.
Again the only argument--not susceptible of proof--would be that
*without* the effort of their agency, things might have been worse.

That the success which counts, namely the long-run success,
cannot be proved statistically or in any similarly conclusive
form, explains the somewhat shocking fact that, when challenged
to list their "achievements," our governmental propagandists will
invariably either mention such comparatively minor--though dramatic--actions as operation Magic Carpet (USIA-instigated gratis
transportation by United States planes of Moslem pilgrims from
Beirut, Lebanon, where they had been stranded, to Mecca) or else
dwell on mere quantity (number of readers who have used the USIA

- 22 -

LQ

library in New Delhi, of Mexicans who have taken USIA-sponsored courses in English, of local viewers who looked at a USIA Information Center window display in Kabul). This, of course, has been ridiculed as betraying a rather unsophisticated advertising and sales campaign approach. But the problem is a very genuine one: In our age and society, tangible statistical proof is basically considered the only really convincing one. At almost regular intervals, therefore, attempts are made, through the establishment or re-establishment of evaluation offices within the USIA, through public opinion surveys, etc. to "evaluate" concretely the effect of our overseas information program. From the manner in which, each year, the USIA representatives at budget hearings search for an answer to questions about their achievements, it is clear that these attempts have failed, as indeed they must, because the problem at hand is not one of facts and figures, but of intangibles and imponderables. It is just conceivable that one American book found on the shelves of a USIA library might give a future leader of his country his basic concepts of politics and society--as Sun-Yat-sen was originally won for socialism by a pamphlet that chanced to come into his hands. But such "conversion," which might become politically important only 20 years hence, could not today be registered on any "success chart." This is one reason why Congress and the public at large--although on one hand they see the need for, and may even overestimate the possible accomplishments of, an overseas information program--look at the whole undertaking with an innate feeling of suspicion and uneasiness: Its effectiveness cannot be "proved" and it may, therefore, be all "a lot of hocus

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[L]

pocus." (On the problem of measuring and evaluating propaganda, see also Appendix VI).

We have mentioned earlier that there are, in fact, critics who seem to feel, and some who actually say, that this entire effort to influence people abroad by a government-conducted program might as well be terminated, while others, on the contrary, urge heatedly an extremely massive expansion. In trying to assess realistically our capabilities; i.e., what in the light of our own public opinion, our governmental structure, our kind of society, we are politically and psychologically capable of doing, one can hardly come to a conclusion other than that neither of these two extreme views will win. However great the suspicion toward official propaganda, we will nevertheless, faced with the soviet threat, continue to maintain governmental machinery to present to the peoples of the world our case officially, authentically, systematically and not leave it merely to private initiative to counter the communist "ideological" offensive. We will also, however, unless a new Korean-type war or some near catastrophic event on the international scene shocks us into a state of virtual mobilization, not appropriate any essentially larger funds for "foreign information" than we do now, regardless of warnings and implorations. This means that the sum total available for the USIA type of activities and for the State Department administered exchange-of-persons program will continue to hover around the $125 million per annum level, within a range of $20 to $25 million plus or minus.

As the scale and general type (radio, posters, pamphlets, books, information centers, exchange-of-persons, etc.) of our

- 24 -

[L]

overseas information and education operations are likely to remain essentially what they are, so the contents and general tenor of the message to be transmitted appear destined to undergo no fundamental changes. The question is not whether this is desirable or undesirable. But, looking back over the 10-year period that has elapsed since the passage of the basic Smith-Mundt Act, keeping in mind the numerous changes in organization that have taken place since, the special congressional and presidential committees which have treated the whole subject thoroughly and conscientiously and made their recommendations--as have those innumerable authentic and self-appointed experts who have written millions of words on the United States propaganda effort--one can only arrive at the conclusion that the kind of propaganda we are now making and which, for all modifications and reforms has been of the same nature and character throughout the last decade, is exactly the type of propaganda which this nation is "capable" of making and which, therefore, it will continue to make.

Forever the target of vociferous, but conflicting, accusations that it is too obsessed with anti-communism, not anti-communist enough; too materialistic, not sufficiently materialistic; painting too rosy and too seamy a picture of the United States; intent on imposing on others the United States way of life and not emphasizing that way of life sufficiently; too abstract and too concrete; too slavishly tied to our foreign policy, too isolated from it; too much wedded to Madison Avenue thinking, neglectful of well-proven United States advertising methods; too softly peaceful and too blatantly provocative; United States

- 25 -

propaganda has practically no choice but to follow an in-between
line, to steer a careful middle course. The pendulum which in
earlier years was still swinging somewhat in different directions
at different times, has now, after ten years of experience, come
to rest at the median point, at dead center so to speak. The
"balance" reached is not, however, a mixture invented and pre-
scribed by some master propagandists, but simply a reflection of
the cross currents of United States public, especially congres-
sional, opinion. Faced with the extreme diversity of views that
find powerful expression in a genuine democracy like our, depen-
dent on approval of its program not by single groups but by the
nation at large, not by a few Congressmen but by congressional
majorities, the USIA cannot afford to deviate perceptibly from
that well-established middle road it has been following in the
past.

Nor can the American propagandist be expected to inspire
his world-wide audience by proffering a monolithic ideology, a
majestic structure of doctrine which like Marxist-Leninism--or
the Roman Catholic Church--could claim to draw all the answers and,
what is more, "absolute" answers from a single integrated system
of thought and faith. We are, for better or for worse, a prag-
matic nation; we believe in developing "practical" solutions,
"workable" compromises, individual roads to salvation; we are,
by our temperament and our history, deeply wedded to the non-
dogmatic approach. In the light of United States historical
and psychological realities it appears senseless to demand of
our propagandists, or others, that they come forth with a full-

- 26 -

fledged body of doctrine--a Capitalist Manifesto or the like--
simply in order to counter in kind the communist dogma. Any
militant ideology presupposes a mystical sense of certainty, a
fanatical fervor, an inclination to think in abstract and eso-
teric terms, and moreover an intolerance and one-sidedness, all
of which are alien to our national character. And if, perchance,
an individual or group of individuals in this country were, never-
theless, to work out such an ideology, then the rigidity and dog-
matism bound to go with it, would make it unacceptable to the
nation at large and thus unusable for official propaganda pur-
poses. (on the lack of ideological content in United States
propaganda, see also Appendix VII).

There are those who, without asking for a full system of
ideology and doctrine to be developed, call for the formulation
of general principles of a "universal appeal" similar to the
Wilsonian Fourteen Points and Rooseveltian Four Freedoms, or
for short inspirational slogans such as the "war to end wars."
(See Appendix VIII). It deserves to be noted, in the first
place, that these frequently quoted examples of American skill
in the field of propaganda refer to periods of active war, dur-
ing which the nation shows an exceptional willingness to accept
such high-flown imagery. Even more important is the fact that
there has been since a profound reaction, a deep disillusionment
among Americans regarding the very "catchiness" and alleged lack
of "realism" of Wilson's and Roosevelt's wartime prose. It can-
not be assumed that, after all that has been said, written--and
believed--about the undesirability of messianic messages, the
United States public would go along with the propagandists, if

- 27 -

they were to launch a campaign along similar lines. The experi-
ence with the truly concise and inspirational slogan "Liberation,"
which fell flat and was widely criticized after the Hungarian
events had revealed it to be at least "premature," had only added
to this general skepticism and shown, moreover, that bold propa-
ganda is indeed inadvisable unless sustained in actual fact by
an equally bold foreign and military policy. (See also p. 12 above)

The innate American aversion to any ideological or any messi-
anic element in United States propaganda is, however, but a symp-
tom of an infinitely broader, deeply ingrained belief that as a
matter of principle our propaganda should be hardheadedly sober,
realistic, factual, down-to-earth and rational. Many of us,
including Congressmen, may actually be quite emotional, but
virtually all of us, including Congressmen, feel that where
serious and important matters are concerned we should not be.
To this extent Americans--though in some respects fully as ir-
rational, sentimental, inconsistent, fiery, etc. as any Latin,
Russian or German--are true children of rationalism and enlight-
enment. They do believe that in the ultimate analysis an appeal
to reason is infinitely more powerful than an appeal to emotions,
though the latter may produce temporary results. In spite of
what is derisively called campaign oratory, the basic appeal in
our internal politics is to tangible, often economic interests.
Our two parties admittedly are vehicles for obtaining practical
power by practical politics rather than ideological groupings
bent on promoting any abstract political philosophy. Even our
churches--except possibly for the Bible Belt--have a tendency to

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(a)

advocate the Christian doctrine as a body of practical rules for
social conduct rather than as a mystical road to eternal salva-
tion. We are suspicious of flag waving; uniforms; rhetorics;
preaching, as opposed to teaching; symbolism, as opposed to con-
crete demonstration; alleged idealistic motivation, as opposed
to a frank admission of material interest; in short, we favor
the sober over the fanciful approach. It is only natural,
therefore, that when it comes to propaganda we should feel that
presentation of actual facts will, by its own inner logic, be
more persuasive in the end than any emoting and that it would
be "unbusinesslike" to indulge with the United States taxpayer's
money in any farfetched psychological experiments which might
or might not produce provable results. (On the "rationalism" of
United States propaganda see also Appendix IX).

This strong insistence on a sober, realistic approach as
well as the deep seated suspicion, mentioned earlier, of the
ideological and messianic must be kept most clearly in mind if
one wants to assess objectively the capabilities of official
United States propaganda to develop those imaginative and in-
spiring qualities which it is supposed to lack, so far.

The February 1958 USIA Appropriations Hearings (pp.22,23)
record a revealing dialogue between the Agency Director, Mr.
Allen, and Congressman Sikes. Sikes asked: "What has your
agency done as an answer to the new techniques and the new efforts
the Russians are using? What new steps are you taking?" After
a discussion of his question off the record Representative Sikes
concluded as follows: "Anything else? From your answer I would

- 29 -

have to deduce that you have not come up with anything substantial
and new ...." Somewhat later (Appropriations Hearings, p. 49)

Mr. Allen, in an exchange with Representative Clevenger, remarked:

> "...I myself am thoroughly aware of the necessity for
> being as careful as we possibly can in regard to the
> expenditure of (appropriated) funds. But most of the
> questions I have been asked since I have been in this
> agency, not only by this Committee but by outsiders,
> have been along the line of those asked by Congressman
> Sikes this morning; namely, 'Why aren't you doing
> imaginative things like the Russians are doing?'"

Mr. Clevenger's reply, which covers one and one-half pages in the
record, started with the sentence: "My answer would be that Mr.
Stalin himself said one way to whip America was to make her spend
herself into bankruptcy"; contained somewhere in the middle the
remark: "I have said it publicly and I have said it in this
room ... that a great deal of the action of this agency has been
provocative and disturbing rather than peaceful"; and ended with
the words: "... there is not one of you who has not had enough
(funds) for all the legitimate (!) things you should do."

The record of the appropriations hearings reveals extremely
"tough" questioning on the part of the Committee members. One
finds, for instance, that Chairman Rooney inquires: "Why is it
necessary to present $109.50 worth of books to the queen of a
certain country?" and, when the USIA representative starts to
answer, Mr. Rooney interrupts him with the question: "What as-
surance do you have that the queen or anyone else reads these
books?" (Appropriations Hearings, p. 973). This kind of inter-

- 30 -

rogation (for a list of additional examples of "tough questioning" see Appendix X) could easily be abduced to criticize the Congressmen involved for their lack of understanding and penny-pinching. But such criticism, while a psychologically satisfying outlet for the despair that must grip anyone who actually peruses the hearings page by page, would be an all too superficial reaction.

The Congressmen _must_ go through the complex USIA budget with the care and meticulousness of accountants responsible to the taxpayer. If they were merely sympathetic, cooperative and understanding, they simply could not find any hidden weaknesses (for some highly useful congressional probing, see Appendix XII). And, since the success, the effectiveness and reasonableness of an essentially psychological warfare program are in the ultimate analysis not measurable in very concrete terms (see p. 12, above), what can the Congressmen do, except address themselves to certain details, to certain tangible facts or figures of the budget? As long as we maintain--as we will--our American system of close budget control by Congress, this problem cannot be solved, regardless of how understanding the Committee members might be.

But there is one aspect of this annual budgetary ordeal on which, in this study we must dwell: Its unavoidable effect on the United States official propagandists. It would be contrary to all practical experience, to all laws of human psychology to assume that, under such circumstances they could and would venture to try something really novel, something that might be effective in terms of the target audience, but appear fantastic or even suspect to an outsider and to any normal American. It is also obvious that these propagandists will spend a dispropor-

- 31 -

tionate amount of time and effort on recording, reporting and
justifying in advance even the very normal and routine operations
they do undertake.

In view of the analysis contained in the preceding pages
(13 seq.) it cannot be expected, therefore, that United States
governmental propaganda will be more imaginative and inspiring
than it has been in years past.

That United States governmental propaganda does, of needs,
suffer from certain handicaps just because it is official and,
therefore, to an unavoidable extent, bureaucratic, formal, and
"restrained" has, of course, been recognized. For this reason,
and in accordance with our firm belief in the general superiority
of private over governmental initiative, there has been a very
strong emphasis at all times on the potential capabilities--
generally assumed to be very great indeed--of private American
individuals and organizations to supplement, or even outdo, by
their own methods and in their own way, the official United
States effort to influence opinion abroad. (For detailed docu-
mentation see Appendix XI). The classical and best known ex-
amples are Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia and Radio Libera-
tion (see pp. 23.24, below), all established by nongovernmental
groups and maintained with essentially private funds to broadcast
to the subjugated people behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains.

But the most impressive and most advertised large-scale
attempt to mobilize the entire nation for a coordinated, system-
atic effort by all major United States business, civic, scientific,
artistic, religious, press, radio, sports, etc. groups and

- 32 -

associations "to enlarge communications and contact between Ameri-
cans and citizens in foreign lands in the interest of better
understanding," is the so-called People-to-People Program launched
in September 1956 by President Eisenhower in a conference with
some 50 key leaders of American life. There was created a People-
to-People Foundation, Inc. with headquarters in New York City and
no less than 41 functional committees ("Advertising Organizations,"
"Banking," "Cartoonists," "Fine Arts Groups," "Hobbies," "Nation-
ality Groups," "Radio and Television," "Veterans," "Women's
Groups," etc.) composed of men and women recognized as top leaders
in their respective fields. The Foundation was supposed to work
out its own program and raise itself the necessary funds. Since
the USIA proposed budget for FY 59 contained a $.5 million item
essentially for USIA "cooperation" with the Foundation, the
latter's actual operations were subjected to detailed scrutiny
by the House Appropriations Committee. It turned out that the
Program's "achievements" were utterly marginal (distribution of
pamphlets to United States citizens going abroad on how to "make
friends;" presentation to five foreign advertising organizations
of an old (!) film "How to Build a Better Mousetrap" to explain
United States advertising techniques and so forth). It was also
revealed that the Foundation which had drawn up a $5 million
budget had actually raised, in one year and a half, only $30,000
and that much of whatever had been "achieved" was due to USIA
"guidance" or "inspiration." One must be grateful to the Com-
mittee members who by persistent and "tough" questioning brought
out these and other highly revealing facts. (For more detailed
documentation regarding the lack of genuine achievements on the
part of the People-to-People Program, see Appendix XII).

- 33 -

The virtual collapse of the People-to-People Program (PPP) will help to illustrate the fact that the American private citizen, while always eager to aid an obviously good cause, is not a persistent "missionary" in the field of foreign affairs, and that after a burst of enthusiasm, often characteristically accompanied by the creation of very ambitious plans and oversized organizations, he turns to more concrete problems nearer home. Thus, one might draw from the fate of the program the broader lesson that a sustained propaganda effort by private groups or individuals, even under glamorous and authoritative leadership from their own ranks, must not be expected and that virtually the whole burden of the effort rests squarely with the government.

The deeper problem regarding the People-to-People Program is, however, not its lack of vitality, but its very nature. Every line of the 40 pertinent pages of the 1958 Appropriations Hearings reveals that all its planning and all its operations are exclusively aimed at the creation of "friendship," "good will," "understanding" between United States and foreign citizens and groups, with the never expressed but overwhelmingly implied assumption that friendly personal contacts must, as a matter of course, generate not only personal sympathies between people but political sympathy for the United States. The fallacy of equating generally benign sentiments with political attitudes has already been pointed out in detail (see pp. 10-11 above). Americans from the Deep South may have struck up extremely close friendships with New Englanders, but that does not mean at all that they will have the slightest tolerance regarding the Yankee political position toward southern political problems. Exchange of letters across

- 34 -

international borders by high school girls, free distribution
abroad of copies of the United States magazine Women's Day, to
mention a few more of the People-to-People Program sponsored ac-
tivities, are simply not means of political persuasion. They may,
in fact, be counterproductive, because the letters may give, un-
intentionally, a very wrong impression of the United States and
Women's Day may, by its ads and stories--designed for Americans,
not for foreigners--easily do the same. One basic error in the
entire People-to-People Program concept lies in the belief that
nonpolitical activities by nonpolitical individuals, neither
equipped nor inclined to blend their gestures of goodwill with
some admixtures of appropriate political indoctrination, will,
nevertheless, automatically produce political results. But even
more serious is the misconception that these relatively shallow
public relations type gestures could really produce any deeper or
more lasting effect, political or nonpolitical, on the souls,
hearts or minds of the intended addressees. In this age where--
outside the United States--uncertainty and insecurity, doubts and
despair are very marked, it takes more, above all a greater in-
tensity and profundity, to move men.

For very similar reasons private American tourists and busi-
nessmen travelling abroad cannot be considered as an army of
natural propagandists. Their contacts with the local population
are, in the overwhelming majority of cases, superficial and
limited. Very few of them will be politically minded or politic-
ally articulate, or, if they are, possess the inclination and
aptitude to act as political missionaries on the side. Even fewer
will be sufficiently familiar with the local language (!), way of

- 35 -

thinking, and sentiments to influence the opinion of those they
do meet on more intimate terms. If these hordes of United States
visitors--little Portugal alone had 50,000 of them in 1958--behave
badly, as a very few will, they may cause some politically unde-
sirable resentment. On the whole, however, they will just be
appreciated for economic reasons and probably be liked personally,
but they will hardly change the political preferences of those
with whom they come in contact. In many cases they will be con-
sidered, regardless of what they do, with the same feelings the
inhabitants of Maine entertain for the "summer people" from the
big cities to the south.

Nor can the burden of United States propaganda outside the
United States be carried by our commercial information media;
however imposing their achievement may be in other fields. Com-
mercial, i.e., business enterprises are--quite legitimately--con-
cerned above all with the gaining of profit, so that, for example,
our publishing houses will not bother to have translated into
foreign languages (or distributed abroad in cheap English editions)
American books which might have an intrinsic propagandistic but
little or no market value. The output of commercial United States
information enterprise is largely nonpolitical to a degree which
precludes from the outset any but the most marginal "propaganda"
impact. But political or nonpolitical the product in any event,
even where a considerable foreign market is involved, is tailored
overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, to American needs and tastes.
This leads to the paradoxical result, which we must face realistio-
ally, that the product of our fabulous information industry, when

- 36 -

used on non-Americans, may actually be harmful instead of helpful
propaganda-wise.

American movies for example have a world-wide audience, but
while the Soviets and Chinese produce feature stories of purely
political design or with strong political overtones for commercial
showings in many, especially Asian countries and furnish their
own versions in the languages of those countries, our movie indus-
try actually shuns the political field and certainly has not
undertaken the production of films in English or foreign language
versions, aimed primarily at the political susceptibilities of
foreign target groups. The opinion is sometimes expressed that
the high entertainment value of American movies is in itself a
propaganda asset. But this is where the paradox arises: While
the popularity of United States movies for entertainment is unique,
especially among the younger age groups abroad, they also create,
among the unsophisticated and the sophisticated alike an image
of the United States, its life, culture, tastes and ideals which
is so distorted that part of the official United States informa-
tion effort must actually be used to dispel the misleading image.

For somewhat different reasons the same paradox applies also
to the American daily press, political magazines and news services.
Papers like the *New York Times* or *New York Herald Tribune*, wire
services such as AP and UP are unparallelled in the entire world
as regards broadness of coverage and objectivity of reporting.
But this very objectivity and extraordinary range of coverage,
the extreme frankness with which our foreign policy, our military
strategy and in general our innermost doubts and designs are

- 37 -

discussed and speculated upon, confuse, bewilder and disturb
virtually anyone who is not intimately familiar with American
ways and tradition. America speaks with many voices and the out-
side world which picks these voices up through many channels (air,
news services, press, travellers) seems never very certain which
one is authentic. The chorus in its rich varieties sounds quite
harmonious to us, but disharmonious and fearsome rather to those
who listen anxiously or maliciously all over the world for a clue
to our intentions, our strength or weakness. America would not
be America without its free press, without its public debate
of all issues, without its unrestrained expression of opinion by
all and sundry, but it would be unrealistic to assume that this
daily stream of freely flowing words makes it easier to guide and
influence the impressions and thinking of foreigners in that
specific, predetermined direction which would be desirable from
the propaganda point of view. On the contrary those particularly
eager that we create the proper impression of a united, purposeful
nation have noted that the freedom with which we rush into print
has again and again provided our enemies, especially at moments
of diplomatic or military crisis, with arguments and material
highly useful to them and quite damaging to United States aims
and policies. An ironical commentary on the fact that we even
supply friend and foe with the most detailed description of the
strategy, tactics, cost and problems of our very "propaganda"
operations will be found in the February 1958 Appropriations Hear-
ings (p. 48). Mr. Allen, the USIA Director, related to the Com-
mittee that recently he had lunched with the First Secretary of
the Soviet Embassy who had thumbed through the impressively thick

- 38 -

[L]

volume of the 1957 United States Senate Appropriations Hearings on the USIA budget, "knew everything in it and kept asking me questions about it." Mr. Allen expressed the wish "that we had a similar volume, one-third as thick, telling us what goes on inside the Soviet Government about their propaganda." This elicited from (Sub) Committee Chairman, Representative Rooney, the following remarks, or rather groan of despair: "It certainly may be one of our weaknesses that we live in a goldfish bowl and put everything on the table we possibly can.... They (the Kremlin) just seem so darn smart, while we always seem to wind up behind the eight ball."

If one considers that the official United States overseas information program furnishes only an infinitesimally small percentage of the total intake of United States "news" which the outside world receives daily through commercial and other private United States channels, one will not be inclined to overestimate the influence of that official information program in shaping the picture which foreigners form in their own mind of the United States, its culture, civilization, aims, policies, strengths and weaknesses. As regards mere volume, our official information output is small indeed compared to the unofficial one. This and the further fact that United States commercial information media are entirely and jealously independent of the government and not inclined to slant their products to United States overseas propaganda objectives, must never be lost sight of in any objective assessment of United States capabilities in the propaganda field. (On the role of United States commercial information media in the

- 39 -

United States overseas propaganda effort, see also Appendix XIII).

## Chapter IV
CONCLUSIONS

### Summary

We may now pause to look back and summarize the findings of our lengthy analysis. What we have found can be stated with extreme brevity. The scale, methods and contents of United States propaganda--basically unchanged over the last decade--are the result neither of a chance development nor of spontaneous decisions by any master planners. They are instead the organic product of our national character, our kind of society and our specific form of government which, taken together, set very definite practical limits to what we can do and how we can do it. Examining the criticisms to which our existing propaganda effort has been so richly subjected, we were driven to conclude that, in actual fact, in view of those limits it is unrealistic to call for an effort different in size, techniques or nature from what we now have. The funds available, the media used, the "message," the aims and objectives, even the target areas will remain essentially unchanged, because they happen to be dictated by inherent necessity rather than by choice.

This, then, is a first answer to our basic question regarding "United States capabilities." We clearly possess the capability--i.e., the physical means as well as the actual will and aptitude--to continue at today's scale our present world-wide information campaign and thus to provide our friends, our foes and the noncommitted with the absolutely essential proof of American "presence" in the battle of words and ideas. This fact

- 40 -

that we are in a position to maintain a world-wide official propaganda apparatus with outposts in virtually every corner of the globe, with its own radio, press and publication services, its own "information centers," its own specialized personnel, is in itself a guarantee that no part of the global psychological battlefield remains uncovered. It means that the battle will not be lost anywhere simply by default, and that everywhere the American point of view will be systematically and persistently presented to some extent, and Soviet propaganda counteracted to some extent.

The question of course is: "To what extent?"

Our finding that the United States overseas information program cannot be expected either to expand markedly or to deviate perceptibly from its present factual, sober, unimpassioned "medium" line, implies as a logical corollary, the conclusion that the capability of the program to achieve results will likewise not be different from what it has been in the past.

This means, in effect, that it will remain possible in allied and noncommitted countries to provide essentially friendly elements with arguments for the American case, to clarify some misunderstandings, correct some misconceptions; and blunt, to a degree, the communist ideological attack. But it also means that we cannot expect to stimulate by our propaganda any significant number of neutrally inclined West Europeans, Asians or Africans to become partisans for the United States, or to "convert" the communists or near-communists in those areas. To overcome in an insecure and changing world the boiling waves of "isms" (neutralism, anticolonialism, nationalism, doctrinarie socialism, communism), all of them largely irrational, appears, judging from past

- 41 -

[Lc]

experience, to require an emotionally and ideologically stronger
propaganda medicine than the United States is actually capable of
supplying.

As regards our propaganda directed by radio at the nations
behind the Iron Curtain, it cannot be assumed--after what has
actually happened in Hungary in 1956--to possess any capability
other than to maintain a last link, an ultimate thin thread of
communication with the captive people. The intense and exceedingly
costly efforts made by the various red governments to jam these
broadcasts are conclusive proof that they are considered with very
great misgivings by the communist regimes. That alone is a more
than sufficient reason to continue these programs at no less than
their present scale. The ceaseless jamming is not conclusive
proof, however, that the broadcasts actually do present any tan-
gible threat to communist control within the red orbit. The almost
insane fear of the masters in the Kremlin of any, even the most
harmless, direct communications between the outside world and
their subjects could very well provide adequate motivation for
their efforts to drown out the radio voices of the West. The
totalitarians will not, as a matter of principle, tolerate any
breach of that exclusive monopoly of communications which they
have established inside their empire.

We ourselves, though, must have no illusions as to what these
broadcasts can really achieve under present conditions, even if
we assume that quite a number of listeners do receive the signals
despite the jamming. Prior to the Hungarian tragedy it could well
be argued that appropriate broadcasts might so arouse the restive

- 42 -

and dissatisfied in the satellites, and possibly even in the
Soviet Union proper, as to create some very real problems for the
communist leaders. But after the overwhelming demonstration of
Soviet power in Hungary, and with communism world-wide on the
offensive rather than on the defensive, it simply would not be
reasonable to expect that any amount of broadcasting--beyond
helping the suppressed to preserve for some distant better day
their hatred of tyranny and love of freedom--could actually cause
more than entirely marginal difficulties for the regime. The over-
all situation has become such that mere words coming in over the
air can no longer produce concrete political effects. Our
continued broadcasts *will*, however, prove to the suppressed--and
to their masters--that the West has not simply written off the
areas behind the Iron Curtain, that our interest in their fate
remains strong and that we stay on the alert for new opportunities
that may arise one day. We can still keep a light burning in some
souls; we cannot hope any longer to generate any real heat. (For
further comments and analysis regarding United States propaganda
aimed at audiences behind the Curtain, see Appendix XIV).

Since all we can achieve propaganda-wise behind the Iron
Curtain--where ruthless totalitarian governments exercise un-
challenged physical and very powerful psychological control--is
to maintain this very slender link to the captive people, the true
target area for the United States propagandist is, and must be, the
free world, where men and women can still be reached, and where,
especially in the noncommitted countries, the battle is joined.

- 43 -

[L.C]

What our propaganda capabilities are in regard to the Free
World we have already stated: We cannot inject into our "infor-
mation campaign" those elements of ideology, emotionalism and
fanaticism, or such imaginative novel techniques and bold methods
as would in a powerful sweep convert communists, overwhelm neutra-
lists and create waves of thought and sentiment favorable to
United States objectives. But we can by a sober and persistent
effort, covering--if on a limited scale--all parts of the Free
World, explain our case to those not yet blinded by prejudice or
resentment, dispel false notions regarding our way of life and
intentions, and, most important, make it impossible for the
communist side to gain further ground *unopposed*. In short, our
capabilities are defensive rather than offensive and our partic-
ular type of defensive moreover, is bound to be of the static
rather than of the dynamic kind.

This final result of our analysis is shockingly disappointing
and has caused deep anguish to the present writer who, as an
inveterate believer in the important role to be played by
"psychological" weapons in our life and death struggle with inter-
national communism, embarked on this study in the firm expectation
to reach very encouraging conclusions, which possibly even might
lead to a number of positive and impressive suggestions on how
to make bigger and better propaganda in the future. It was a
sobering and humiliating experience for this researcher to dis-
cover gradually that, in the light of existing realities he would
not be able to arrive at such conclusions or suggestions, without
exploiting unduly the scholar's somewhat irresponsible freedom to
indulge in theorizing.

- 44 -

## Chapter V
### THE "PERSONAL" TOUCH

Yet, however justified and realistic it may be to conclude that our propaganda on the whole must remain what it is because it is precisely the kind which corresponds to the American way, a lingering doubt persists, whether so trivial and resigned a conclusion does not overlook some hidden potentialities.

It has become customary, in comparing the relative achievements of United States and Soviet propaganda, to point out certain "advantages" enjoyed by the latter. The Soviet Union speaks with one voice, the United States with many; Soviet propaganda uses lies and trickery; ours, while it may slant its presentation in certain ways, is essentially factual; the communists possess a full-fledged ideology; we, being pragmatists and practical, do not; they appeal unashamedly to emotions, we to reason, common sense and "enlightened" self-interest; the communists attract the resentful and dissatisfied by advocating changes for the better through an overthrow of the existing order, the United States basically is a status quo power; the Soviets spend billions on propaganda compared to our mere millions.

There is, of course, an element of truth in each of these anti-thetic comparisons, but, as the propaganda experts never fail to emphasize, the Soviets, above all, can rely in virtually every country of the globe on fanatically devoted, faithful local communists to spread the red gospel. Thus, Kremlin propaganda everywhere may work through local people fully familiar with the

- 45 -

language, thinking, sentiments, prejudices and current daily problems of the population. Tailoring of approach and methods to any given target audience is thereby assured to a degree no "foreign" propaganda can hope to attain. Moreover, since the local communists are not "foreigners", their activities will not be considered and resented, except by the discerning few, as an attempt from the outside to influence indigenous opinion. Consequently communist propaganda can afford to exploit events on the local scene to the full and attack local institutions and personalities, including the national government, in the most violent fashion without being accused of interfering in another nation's internal affairs. Finally, since the work of the local stooges permits reduction of overt Soviet propaganda to a minimum, the communists in many countries are able to contrast sanctimoniously the official United States propaganda efforts in the area with the seeming absence of similar efforts by the USSR.

The advantages resulting for the Soviets from this possibility to use "national" communist parties throughout the world as their mouthpieces are obvious. Somewhat less obvious are the methods by which the Soviets actually gain such a devout disciplined following in so many countries in the first place. Since the communist parties claim to be mass movements and since mass meetings, mass demonstrations and similar "collective" actions are a typical and characteristic form of communist operations, it apparently is often taken for granted that they also rely mainly on mass propaganda. It must be noted, however, that official communist newspapers and pamphlets, official communist literature in general as well

- 46 -

[L]

as official communist speakers are quite frequently so dogmatic, repetitious and boring that nobody who is not a communist or near-communist already will be converted by them.

There is in fact complete agreement among students of communist techniques that communism--in countries outside the Iron Curtain--gains adherents and follows primarily by the "direct" or "personal" approach, i.e. by working on individuals through individuals. While there are, of course, cases in which intellectuals, or even others are won over by the mere reading of Marx' or Lenin's writings, almost invariably one will find that men or women now communists were originally converted by a teacher, fellow student, co-worker, relative, friend or neighbor belonging to the communist faith, or even more likely, by a member of the party apparatus specifically charged with recruiting. A prospective recruit may be asked, of course, to participate in communist discussion groups, read communist literature, take part in meetings and demonstrations etc., but he is first made, and then kept receptive for these experiences through individual treatment administered by party missionaries. While the party always aims at "mobilizing" the masses it creates any capability it may have for doing so by maintaining a network of small "cells" in factories, offices, universities, civic organizations, professional associations, army units, youth groups, city blocs, villages, etc., where the cell members can most easily and effectively reach and work on people with whom they happen to be in close contact. And the very first cells in areas or countries boasting today sizable communist parties were as a rule founded not by "workers" or foreign agents,

- 47 -

but by a handful of local prophets, more often than not intel-
lectuals who through personal proselytizing. very slowly collected
around them tiny groups of believers. The spirit and methods
being much more nearly those of a nonconformist religious sect,
living on the fringes of society than of a modern "mass" party.
(For further elucidation of the communist "personal approach"
tactics see Appendix XV).

The actually individualistic approach of the proclaimedly
"collectivist" communist movement is also demonstrated by the
elementary fact, all too often overlooked, that even rank and file
members and mere sympathizers are invariably assigned some
individual task, such as distribution of pamphlets, attendance at
study groups, collection of signatures for petitions demanding
"peace," disarmament, release of political prisoners, etc. There
is, in other words, always a call for action, of some sort; people
are asked to do certain concrete things and thus given a sense of
direction, personal importance, participation and commitment!
It is a strange paradox that materialistic communism should
actually appeal to man's innate idealistic urge to dedicate him-
self to a cause and make personal sacrifices, be it simply by
contributing time and effort or by undergoing, in extreme cases,
imprisonment, exile or a martyr's death. Our own approach is
different, we offer to those we want to attract to our side ideas
and arguments, but do not set any very specific task for the
individual, and instead of stressing any need for personal sacri-
fice we rather proclaim the right of our friends to engage freely
in the pursuit of happiness. (In this connection see the quota-
tions set forth in Appendix XVI).

- 48 -

[10]

The preceding paragraphs of this chapter will have shown that the picture of Soviet mass propaganda seducing men by Big Lie tactics, mass hypnosis and blatant promises of material betterment, is an oversimplification. There are, as we have pointed out, two additional characteristics of Soviet propaganda, often not sufficiently emphasized: Most extensive use of *local* elements in each country to spread the gospel; reliance on individual contacts and on calls for individual "participation," as a primary means to gain a more than ephemeral influence over people. It is difficult to assume that without these characteristics Soviet propaganda could win so many disciples as it actually does.

The truth is that, quite independently and obviously not influenced by a conscious or subconscious desire to imitate communist methods, we in the United States have likewise arrived at the conclusion that personal contacts between our propagandists and local people are the most effective and important single means at our disposal to get our propaganda across. A very characteristic statement to this effect by an American newspaper correspondent abroad is quoted in the Hickenlooper Report (p. 176): "One ounce of personal contacts is worth a ton of literature." (Other similar statements will be found in Appendix XVII). And we, too, have recognized that American propaganda in any given country can really reach wider circles only, if it is spread there by local nationals advocating our views. Exhortations should in official statements, congressional reports and, generally, in pertinent writings that we must in our overseas propaganda rely to a very consider-

- 49 -

[L]

able extent on the "cooperation" of local elements. (For
documentation see Appendix XVIII).

In theory we have worked it out quite nicely. In 80
foreign countries we have USIA missions headed by a "carefully
selected" Public Affairs Officer (PAO) with a small American
and somewhat larger indigenous staff. The PAO and his senior
American coworkers who, of course, are supposed to be intimately
familiar with the culture, history, politics and language
of the country in which they operate, establish and maintain
contact with "opinion leaders" of the host country who, in
turn, having been duly influenced by such contacts, present
the American view to their conationals. To understand how
the system works in reality one must look at a few basic
facts. First of all it must be remembered that the total
number of American USIS personnel in those 80 countries is
less than 1000 (FY 1958: 918) a majority of whom, moreover,
are in the technical, administrative or clerical categories.
The USIS missions do employ slightly more than 6000 locals
(FY 1958: 6234) world-wide, but virtually all of them are
messengers, drivers, printers, draftsmen, interpreters,
translators, etc. who--in being, in addition, so obviously
in the pay and service of a foreign power--will rarely be
usable as political missionaries to any considerable extent.
The burden, clearly, must be carried by a few hundred people;
the Public Affairs Officers and their senior staff. Even if
this small group could devote itself exclusively to "personal
contacts," it would, for purely physical reasons, be able to

- 50 -

[L]

do so on only a very narrow front. But the Public Affairs
Officer and his chief assistants run the entire United States
information program in a given foreign country and their
administrative and routine operational workload is such (see
Appendix XIX) as to make it mathematically certain that only
a minor fraction of their time can possibly be spent on the
"personal contact" endeavor. This means not only that the
actual number of individuals "contacted" is bound to remain
very limited indeed, it means also that each single one of
these contacts must, of needs, be relatively brief and super-
ficial. There simply cannot be any time for night-long
discussions or frequent sessions, for that persistent and
sustained effort, in short, which would actually be required
to influence an individual more deeply. It is an illusion
to believe that in the struggle for men's minds and souls
a few conversations in the Public Affairs Officer's office,
at lunch, or over cocktails could produce any but minor or
short range effects.

The theory of the well selected Public Affairs Officer
staff which, fully familiar with a given country, its culture
and language, exercises influence on the local scene through
personal contacts, is further shattered, in practice, by
the near-fantastic fact that USIA personnel is rotated
every two to four years from one country to another! Already
in 1953 the Hickenlooper Committee had noted that:

"Much criticism by overseas Americans was centered
on the policy of the Department of State of moving

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[L4]

USIA personnel from post to post every two or three years," [so that] "officers are shifted just when they become intimately acquainted with their areas." (Hickenlooper Report, p. 178)

The Committee's final report had specifically recommended (p.26) against this policy of quick rotation, but the February 1958 appropriation hearings revealed that it has by no means been abandoned. Even more incomprehensible is the circumstance that this frequent shifting was discussed in those hearings in detail, but, as the record shows, not because of its very grave implications regarding the effectiveness of operations, but merely because of the high cost of the many transfers involved! (For details see Appendix XX).

That this self-defeating personnel policy could be calmly continued without arousing more than intermittent suggestions for a change is deeply revealing. There may be administrative arguments for such a policy, but it seems unfair to assume that the USIA would have consciously sacrificed efficient fulfillment of its mission in the field to any technical and organizational considerations. Rather, since the USIA and the State Department before it, have applied the short tour system to our overseas information personnel for years without any discernible hesitation, there must prevail a basic conviction that such short tours, on the whole, are not detrimental to the effectiveness of our propaganda campaign, that a "good" USIS officer will "learn" a new country in a few months and, by and large, do equally well wherever he may be stationed, and

- 52 -

that even familiarity with the local language, though certainly
desirable, is not essential.

This brings us face to face with the deeper aspects of the
personal approach issue which is the subject of the present
chapter. There flows from American humanism and humanitarianism
a belief, almost an article of faith, that human beings all
over the world are very much alike, that their basic aspirations,
interests, fears and hopes are not really too different. It
is only natural, therefore, that we should instinctively de-
emphasize in our own mind the extraordinary differences that
exist in the system of values and mentality of even such closely
related nations as the French and Italian. Thus we come, not in
theory perhaps but in actual fact, to the conclusion that it
cannot really be so very important, whether in dealing with
Frenchmen or Italians we do know their history and literature,
their peculiar social stratification, their specific philosophy
of life, in short, their true national individuality. Americans
are also more "modern" than almost any other national group one
could think of, in the sense that they live in the present and
look into the future. This also leads us to a national non-
concern with the underlying historical developments which have
shaped those foreign nations which constitute our target audience
today.

We are, furthermore, practical men not given to discuss
abstract and intangible matters. Thus our conversations among
ourselves deal with facts and actual problems at hand. It is not
our custom to engage our friends, neighbors, coworkers and

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[LQ]

acquaintances in arguments on religion, art, philosophy or
political and social theory. This is one of the reasons why
social coexistence in this country is decidedly smoother and
easier than elsewhere: Since we have been taught to avoid
arousing arguments on controversial or "private" issues we
can meet new people as if they were old acquaintances; what
they will have to say to us and we to them follows comparatively
well established conventional lines and rarely will there be
unpleasant surprises, or a need to explore at great length their
individual psychology.

Those among us who had their fill of the interesting but
often quite disagreeable, and always exacting, complexity and
tenseness of human relations abroad, will be only too grateful
for the more relaxed and relaxing atmosphere of fellowship
and good will so truly characteristic of this country. But
we must learn to recognize the fact that the world around us
is complex throughout and possessed by a mentality--even in
the United Kingdom, Germany and Scandinavia, all relatively akin
to our own ways--which is very different, indeed, from our own.
We must learn that in order to influence individual foreign
opinion leaders through personal contacts one has to struggle
for their individual souls with far greater intensity and
articulateness than that to which we are accustomed. We must
pay not only lip service to but actually believe in the basic
psychological rule that to persuade one must be able to talk to
others in depth and at length in their language and in their
terms of reference. And we must recognize, above all, that any

- 54 -

LQ

such deeper understanding of the local scene and local people
simply cannot be developed in a few months, or even two short
years, by the Public Affairs Officer and his helpers who,
moreover, as American officials cannot and must not integrate
themselves into the local way of life as would, for example,
an American student or professor working and living completely
in foreign surroundings during his stay abroad.

But there is an even more difficult side to our individual
approach issue. Mere knowledge and understanding, however
profound, of a given civilization would not be enough. The
individual charged with the task of influencing the political
opinion and attitudes of important foreigners would, in addition,
have to possess that instinctive interest in matters political,
that flair to converse, argue and debate, that intensity, firm-
ness of conviction and missionary drive which are not easily
found in our society of today. The art of conversation is not
one generally practiced in our country. And as regards debate
on political economic, social, philosphic, literary issues we
excel in its public forms such as panels, forums, meetings,
conferences and congresses, but these are organized, somewhat
stylized affairs with a moderator, time limits, and "question and
answer" periods. They are aimed at providing information and
exchanging views rather than at winning adherents to a cause,
and based on the tacit understanding that all present accept, in
any event, the basic American concepts of democracy, freedom,
private initiative and tolerance, within those concepts, of one
another's views. Not many among us are prepared, temperamentally

- 55 -

or by experience, to argue with doctrinaire German, brilliant Italian, supercilious Indian or resentful Indonesian intellectuals and opinion leaders in terms meaningful and convincing to them.

William H. Whyte, one of the editors of *Fortune*, has pointed out that due largely to our "congenital dislike of abstract thought" there has arisen a myth among Europe's "top intellectuals, the cream of Europe's professional class," that "Americans are barbarians. The United States is a dehumanizing technocracy." The world renowned Swiss theologian Karl Barth, a ranking leader of protestant thought in Europe, gave the following answer in December 1958 to a Lutheran clergyman from the Soviet Zone of Germany who had asked whether the faithful should devote their efforts to "praying away" the communist regime: "Might you not fear that He might grant your prayer in the frightful fashion of letting you awake one morning among the fleshpots of Egypt as a man beholden to the American way of life." (See on Whyte and Barth and for other pertinent quotations Appendix XXI). Our long training in making our points by adducing factual, technical, often economic arguments; the modern habit of expressing whatever we have to say in a studiedly dehydrated and aseptic style; the pose, demanded by our customs, of appearing coolly "realistic" rather than emotionally and spiritually committed, have not only helped to create this insane-ly false picture of the United States, they have also made it extremely difficult for the normal product of our colleges and universities and for members of our middle and upper class in general to become suddenly missionaries in a world of turmoil

- 56 -

It is often believed that the grotesque image of our
civilization as soulless, superficial, mechanized and largely
materialistic is due primarily to the fact that the world, out
of malice or lack of perspicacity, notices merely our liking for
cars and gadgets, skyscrapers and supermarkets, coca-cola, neon
lights and financial success, but fails to discover the deep
human and cultural values which, in reality, characterize our
way of life. Looking more closely for the reason why we are
so frequently not recognized for what we are, one will find that
actually the very manner in which we present ourselves and our
case makes it exceptionally difficult for those to whom we
speak to guess that we have so very much more to offer than we
are capable of expressing. As we have pointed out before (see p.
10 above), people abroad, despite all hostile propaganda to the
contrary, do believe us to be most kindhearted, helpful and
generous (see Appendix XXII, opinions expressed by Indian
students). But the world expects more of the United States,
only possible rival of the USSR for world leadership. It is
characteristic for our age that men everywhere, especially those
who do think and ponder, i.e. the educated ones, live in a
spiritual and intellectual vacuum and look around avidly for
something more profound than facts and figures. However, while
those among us who have lived and travelled in Europe and Asia
will again and again encounter grateful praise of American good
will and of aid and assistance lent to nations and individuals,
hardly ever will we find anyone who has gained from contacts with
Americans a new inner certainty and a feeling that we, perhaps,
might know the answers to many of the doubts and problems beset-

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ting the world today.

In fact the very ease and naturalness typically shown
from the outset by Americans meeting with foreigners are cause
for disillusionment in the long run. The absence of false fronts
and the pleasant human touch found even in United States VIP's,
civilian or military, are almost without exception the subject
of delighted surprise by non-Americans who often find the
rigidity and formality of their own stratified society somewhat
exacting. But invariably there seems to come a moment when
the other side, wanting to extend the conversation *beyond* mere
niceties and *beyond* the business at hand, begins to be baffled
by the lack of a genuine response. This lack of responsiveness,
the somewhat uninspired way in which we discuss, if at all,
ideas, ideologies, abstract principles, matters of faith and be-
lief, raises an anxious question in the minds of many regarding
the depth of our thinking, the degree of our understanding and
the intensity of our faith. The very suspicion that we might
be shallow and merely technicians of routine is so particularly
shocking to our interlocutors because they know full well that
their fate as well as ours depends overwhelmingly on the strength
of *our* resolve and on *our* ability to grasp not only the political,
military and economic but also psychological and spiritual
situation of the world.

We of course are essentially unaware that from the point
of view of most non-Americans something is amiss and that they
are left with a feeling of emptiness because they expect from

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members of the educated class of the leading nation in the
Free World a wider range of interest, deeper speculative insight,
a stronger eradiation of faith, and more impressive formulations
than become apparent in our personal encounters with them. One
must perhaps have participated, like the present writer, for
many years in countless meetings between Americans and non-
Americans to even guess that the myth of our shallowness and
incapability to comprehend complexities or sensing the finer
and more cultural values of life, is due not so much to certain
blatant symptoms of our form of civilization, like loud jazz
or loud advertising, as to this inner disappointment springing
again and again from individual contacts. It is surprising how
often even those abroad who tell of close personal relations
with an American private citizen, civilian official or military
men, are also puzzled by the difficulty to establish communi-
cation and engage in a dialogue at a level transcending the
sphere of good-fellowship or matter of fact subjects.

Our nation is not rent by the deep cleavages between
communists, socialists and conservatives, clericals and anti-
clericals, protestants and catholics, employers, and employees
classes and masses, government and people, which occur in so many other
countries. There prevails among us complete consensus on the
value of our institutions--the United States being the abso-
lutely unique example of a nation whose constitution has remained
virtually unchanged for almost 170 years--and all of us, except
for infinitesimally small fringe groups, are deeply beholden to
the same general way and philosophy of life. Thus, there is
indeed no need on our domestic scene to fight and win all-out

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[10]

battles for men's political minds and loyalties. Even our news-
papers and newspapermen are in the very first place intent on
providing information material and only secondarily on swaying
political opinion. We think of ourselves as a competitive
society and such we are in the economic field, but as regards
ideology and really basic political concepts we live in a world
of harmony rather than of clash.

This climate, in which we are rarely faced with the necessity
to argue outside the notions and limits accepted by all of us,
does not prepare us for the free-for-all debate that rages in a
world where our self-evident truths are not taken for granted, or
even aggressively challenged. Since, in addition, the art to
converse and the faculty to articulate ideas effectively and
impressively are little practiced in our dealings with one
another (see p. 29 above), it is infinitely more difficult than
generally realized to find the right people for the task of
influencing foreign "opinion leaders," or potential opinion leaders
through personal contacts. The difficulty is all the greater
because those relatively few who are qualified must also happen
to possess a profound knowledge of the target area--and its
language--in which they are to operate.

But let there be no misunderstanding. The problem is not to
find men with a purely oratorical skill, a glib golden tongue,
but personalities whose verbal expressiveness is simply a natural
outgrowth of genuine intellectual and spiritual depth and
dynamism. They should be able, in private conversations and in
meetings with small groups to give the impression of men who,
having thought and pondered far and deep about the complexities

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LZ

of our age, do possess, nevertheless, the clarity of mind and
strength of faith to arrive at conclusive answers, answers
which could serve as guidelines and beacons in a world of un-
certainty. No doubt we cannot and should not imitate communist
fanaticism, but we too could speak, at least on occasion, with
a spark in our eyes and with an intensity that does not have
to be reserved for bad causes. There seems to be an assumption
that a good cause must always be advocated in a rather cool and
detached manner and that a show of faith and the use of inspira-
tional language are somehow not quite proper. Actually we cannot
hope to impress, except by spokesmen who are "impressive," who
can truly mobilize unusual inner resources and reveal by what
they say and how they say it, that their insight and vision reach
beyond the obvious. Mere dialectical cleverness would never be
sufficient. An element of passion, a sense of adventure, a
zest for unusual situations, an overwhelming desire to influence
others and shape their thinking must be combined with great
intellectual and psychological alertness to enable a man to find
precisely those political, historical and economic, those
philosophical, metaphysical and religious, or those simple
human arguments which will be most effective with a given group
or individual.

Our present day society clearly is not a natural breeding
ground for personalities of this type, but nobody who knows this
country intimately would deny that they do exist. The crux of
the matter is that we have not really been looking for them.
Wedded to our sober concepts of life and men, we prefer the

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team workers, the organization man, the well balanced and experienced "expert in communications," to the unusual, tense and intense individual who shows a somewhat disturbing originality in thought, speech and action. Sir Bruce Lockhart, Director General in World War II of British propaganda services (known as Political Warfare Executive or PWE) wrote later of this staff: "I cannot say that PWE was an easy team. Every good propagandist must possess the qualities of a prima donna." And in describing the "extraordinarily varied composition" of the PWE whose members were "drawn from almost every walk of life" he remarked: "I do not think that any profession provided any initial advantage of training. A propagandist is born, not trained." (Propaganda in War and Crisis, edited by Daniel Lerner, New York, 1951, pp. 279-280. See also Appendix XXIII on the general qualifications of propagandists and on the highly unorthodox careers and personalities of Lockhart and of De Gaulle's Minister of Information Andre Malraux, art critic, writer, revolutionary, soldier of fortune, resistance leader).

To look for "prima donnas" or for men as colorful and even fantastic as Lockhart or Malraux is, of course, the last thing we would ever do, but we should understand that our routine recruiting methods and the criteria we normally apply to secure "competent" government personnel are hardly apt to net the imaginative, very unusual types that would, in personal contacts, deeply impress foreign opinion leaders.

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Lc

RECOMMENDATIONS
---

There should be established, therefore, an entirely new and essentially non-bureaucratic recruiting procedure for person-to-person propagandists, who would serve abroad either as an integral component of the USIS organization or, in some cases, as individual missionaries not overtly connected with USIA. The selection of these propagandists must not be based on any formal technical criteria. It would be useless to send learned professors, brilliant Ph. D.'s well known writers, top advertising and public relations experts, or successful businessmen, unless they happen to possess that peculiar and rare combination of qualifications required to be politically persuasive in foreign surroundings. A young graduate student, an ex-military man, a well-to-do citizen with no particular trade or profession may, on the other hand, unaccountably turn out to be precisely what is needed. Even outstanding intelligence and expert knowledge of a foreign area would not, in themselves, be sufficient qualifications. Decisive would be the overall personality of a man or woman rather than any single trait. Whether or not a person possesses the required particular blend of characteristics could only be established, even tentatively, on the basis of prolonged personal interviews by individuals who themselves are exceptionally alert and dynamic as well as knowledgeable and experienced.

Screening by extended interview should, however, be only an initial step in the process of selection. There ought to be created also a Research and Testing Center where those

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tentatively chosen would receive such general or special train-
ing as might appear necessary or desirable, but where, above all,
their actual aptitude could be definitely ascertained through
daily observation and through assignments such as holding
seminars with foreign exchange students at American colleges, or
escorting, on their trips through the United States, foreign
visitors brought to this country under the State Department's
Exchange-of-Persons Program.

It would, in fact, be of very great importance if the Center
could become an instrument for the discreet political indoctrina-
nation of foreign exchangees in the United States. It is
generally assumed that the Exchange-of-Persons Program is part
of our propaganda effort and that non-Americans are invited to
study, teach, travel, etc. in this country with the ultimate
purpose of influencing their political attitudes. Actually
one will find that Senator Smith, co-sponsor of the Smith-Mundt
Act (see p. 2 above), stated specifically in the debate on the
Smith-Mundt bill that the educational exchange program in order
to be truly effective "must be objective, non-political and above
all have no possible propaganda implications," (International
Educational Exchange Program 1948-1958, Department of State
Publication 6710, p. 4). It appears, indeed, that the deeply
ingrained American concept which considers a general feeling of
"good will" and understanding toward the United States to be
virtually the same thing as a pro-United States political
attitude (see p. 19 above), has led to a situation in which no
attempt is made to indoctrinate the exchangees politically, on

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[LJ]

the optimistic assumption that the desired political effect
follows automatically. This belief is so completely unchallenged
that the exchange program is the one part of our propaganda effort
which is uniformly and warmly praised.

It is most interesting to note, however, that a careful and
systematic survey undertaken by the Woodrow Wilson School of
Public and International Affairs in regard to the effects of
the United States-Belgian exchange program which started in
1920, i.e. 28 years prior to the Smith-Mundt Act, reveals a more
doubtful picture. A very detailed report on this survey, rendered
by O.W. Riegel, in *The Public Opinion Quarterly* contains in a
summary of conclusions the following statement:

"That former grantees retain political and social
attitudes substantially more pro-American than
those of non-grantees. . . is not demonstrated by
the evidence gathered in this survey" (Public
Opinion Quarterly, Vol. XVII, No. 3 - Fall 1953-
p. 327).

Riegel does point out that the grantees, i.e. the Belgians who
had been in the United States under an exchange grant, did retain,
after their return home, feelings of war friendliness toward
individual Americans. (Further observations by Riegel in
Appendix XXIV). On the basis of personal contacts with a consider-
able number of grantees, Asian and European, this writer can only
confirm that virtually without exception our visitors are simply
overwhelmed by American hospitality, friendliness and human
warmth, and that quite a number among the younger ones are so
completely captivated that they either wish to prolong their

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stay beyond the original duration of the grant, or even come
to settle permanently in the United States. The writer has
also been aghast, however, at the complete lack of understanding
for our foreign policy and our political attitudes and institu-
tions shown by very many foreign grantees (students, engineers,
lawyers, government officials, etc.) who had never, during their
stay in the United States, encountered anyone willing or able to
reshape their political views. Since the average United States
citizen is not politically minded and not inclined to serve as
a private political missionary vis-a-vis our foreign visitors,
there is a very real need for some tactful governmental action
to fill the gap. The short one week orientation courses given
most exchangees at the beginning of their time in this country
are, of course, merely in the nature of a general briefing, from
which lasting political results cannot be expected in the ultimate a-
nalysis it takes an individual to influence individuals, and the
overt or covert use of selectees from the proposed Research and
Testing Center to work on foreign exchangees in the United States
would be very much more than merely a method of testing our
future overseas propagandists. (For additional illustrative
material re the Exchange-of-Persons Program see Appendix XXV).

The proposed Research and Testing Center, while originally
established as a mere staging organization for a special cate-
gory of propagandists, could ultimately develop into an institute
with a staff and facilities sufficiently large to examine
systematically and comprehensively the entire question of United
States propaganda potentialities, a task that simply cannot be
undertaken by the USIA which must, of needs, dedicate itself
to operations rather than mediation.

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## FOOTNOTES

1. A Psychological Warfare Casebook by William E. Daugherty, Operations Research Office, in collaboration with Morris Janowitz, University of Michigan. Published for Operations Research Office (as Technical Memorandum ORO-T-360) by the Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, (March) 1958, XXIII and 880 pages. Quoted henceforth as "Casebook."

2. Casebook, p. 11.

3. Roland I, Perusse, Psychological Warfare Reappraised (in Casebook, pp. 25-35) mentioned (p. 25) the following terms that "have come into common usage to characterize the more unconventional policies that have been adopted to meet the peculiar international crisis in which the United States finds itself today:

   Cold War; War of Ideas; Struggle for the Minds and Wills of Men; War for the Minds of Men; Thought War; Ideological Warfare; Nerve Warfare; Political Warfare; International Information; Overseas Information; Campaign of Truth; Propaganda; Propaganda Warfare; War of Words; Indirect Aggression; Agitation, International Communication."

Perusse adds: "Some of these terms have actually been used as synonyms for psychological warfare by writers on the subject, as for example, equation of psychological warfare with propaganda."

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4. A very long and instructive list of attempted definitions of the term "propaganda" by lexicographers, lawyers, sociologists, psychologists, political scientists, will be found in L. John Martins's _International Propaganda, Its Legal and Diplomatic Control_, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis 1958 (VII and 284 pages) pp. 10-12 and pp. 211-212.

5. Chester Bowles, _The New Dimensions of Peace_, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1955, p. 371--Perusse op. cit. concludes (p. 32):

> "The principal lesson....is that the term _Psychological Warfare_ had best be avoided in any characterization of ...our informational output or our foreign relations generally. The term has decided negative connotations, both at home and abroad..."

Likewise former United States Secretary of the Air Force, Thomas K. Finletter, _Power and Policy: U.S. Foreign Policy and Military Power in the Hydrogen Age_, Harcourt, Brace and Co., New York, 1954, p. 126:

> "Psychological Warfare is a bad term because the word 'warfare' implies that deceit is justifiable, if it serves our purpose. Deceit is standard practice in ... war. It is not correct practice in peacetime .... It is neither consistent with our principles nor is it good business."

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[x]

Similarly, Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *Psychological Warfare a Misnomer* (in *Casebook*, pp. 18-21) who suggests instead, "under cold war conditions..." the name "Political Communications."

William E. Dougherty, *Changing Concepts* (in *Casebook*, pp. 12-18) asks himself whether "Political Warfare would be a better term to use?" but concludes (p. 18) "... even as ambiguous as the term 'psychological warfare' has become, both in official and popular parlance, the term 'political warfare' is no better..." --It also deserves to be noted that the "Psychological Strategy Board", established by Presidential Directive of 20 June 1951 to plan and coordinate United States "psychological operations," at a high level (regular members of the Board: Under Secretary of State, Deputy Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence Agency) was abolished by Presidential Directive of 3 September 1953 which created, instead, the still existing Operations Coordination Board. It is true that more was involved than a mere change of name, the new OCB having functions somewhat different from those of the old PSB. Yet, the change resulted from recommendations by the William Jackson Committee, appointed by the President to examine into the entire matter of psychological operations and the Jackson Report (Parts of which were released to the public, see *New York Times*, 9 July 1953, p. 8) had indicated that Psychological Warfare--and Propaganda--were unsatisfactory labels to use. In other words there is a

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[il]

strong trend, in official and unofficial circles to avoid
both terms. Paul M. A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare,
Combat Forces Press, Washington, 2nd Ed. 1954 (XV and 317
pages) remarks (p. 268) that indeed the terms Psychological
Warfare and Propaganda were, and still are, unsatisfactory,
but, he adds drily: "The world itself is unsatisfactory--
in terms of the traditional, humane, rational United States
point of view."

6. Perusse, op. cit. pp. 27-28; Harold D. Lasswell, *Political Psychological Warfare* (in Casebook pp. 21-24) p. 24.

Without wishing to contribute on his part to the homeric battle of definitions the author of the present study does want to point out that Psyche in Greek means soul and that, therefore, the proper target of psychological warfare should be men's soul, while the target of the battle for men's mind would be men's brain. The two terms would seem therefore to emphasize: one an appeal to "emotions" and the other an appeal to "reason."

7. However much the definitions of Psychological Warfare, Political Warfare, Propaganda, etc. differ, there is general agreement that, in essence, these variously labelled activities are aimed at influencing opinions and attitudes. See, for example, Department of the Army *Dictionary of United States Army Terms*, SR 320-5-1, revised edition November 1953: "Psychological Warfare--the planned use...of propaganda and related informational

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measures directed toward enemy, neutral, or friendly groups
to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior
of nations."--Ladislas Farago, one of the earliest advo-
cates in the United States of Psychological Warfare--
which, incidentally, he equates with Political Warfare--
says (War of Wits: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelli-
gence, Funk and Wagnalls, New York, 1954 p. 323): "It
/Psychological Warfare/ deals with opinions and their
communication to others. It is organized persuasion by
non-violent means..."--L. John Martin, op. cit. p. 12
suggests this definition of Propaganda: "... a system-
atic attempt through mass communications to influence the
thinking and thereby the behavior of people..."

8. See Linebarger, op. cit. p. 279: "American propaganda is always limited precisely because it is American," and op. cit. p. 281: "It is foolish to ask Americans to be strong in bitterness, strong in hatred.... We are not Japanese, or Prussians, or Russians...."

9. That this should be the case is in itself of psychological,
and therefore, political significance, since the word
propaganda--even more than psychological warfare (see
above Note 5)--has decidedly derogatory connotations.
L. John Martin, op. cit., p. 5, observes that the term
had acquired these connotations "already in the early
19th century," he then reports the following comment on
propaganda in W. T. Brande's *Dictionary of Science,*
*Literature and Art*, published in 1842 (!): "... the

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name propaganda is applied in political language as a
term of reproach to secret associations for the spread
of opinions and principles which are viewed by most
governments with horror and aversion."

10. No. 9608 of 31 August 1945. In an accompanying press
release the President declared: "The nature of present-
day foreign relations makes it essential for the United
States to maintain international informational activities
abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign
affairs." The Order itself stated as the scope of these
informational activities "that other peoples receive a
full and fair picture of American life and of the aims
and policies of the United States Government," see "Over-
seas Information Programs of the United States," Report of
the Committee on Foreign Relations, presented by Mr.
Hickenlooper (83rd Congress, 1st Session, Senate Report
No. 406), IX and 209 pages; p. 62 and p. 138. Quoted
henceforth as "Hickenlooper Report."

11. The OIAA conducted United States information operations relative to Latin America, the OWI those relative to all parts of the world.

12. There had been government sponsored exchange-of-persons programs under which foreigners, largely students, were brought to the United States or United States citizens to foreign countries (through scholarships, fellowships,

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[L]

visiting professorships, and grants for the visits of
technical and other experts and leaders) with various
countries (Belgium since 1920, Latin America since 1939,
China since 1942 and the Near East since 1943) even be-
fore the passage of the Fullbright Act (Public Law 584-
79th Congress) of 1 August 1946, inaugurated the present
world-wide educational exchange program of students,
teachers, "national leaders" and specialists. For the
pre-Fullbright official United States "cultural relations"
activities--which were not limited exclusively to exchange
of persons but included also interchange of publications
and art objects; publication and circulation of trans-
lated books; maintenance abroad of American libraries
and cultural centers, etc.--see Francis J. Colligan
Twenty Years After: Two Decades of Government-Sponsored
Cultural Relations, State Department Bulletin XXXIX,
No. 995 (21 July 1958), pp. 112-115.

13. Smith-Mundt Act, Section 501.

14. The actual history of the many organizational changes re-
lating to the administration of United States overseas
information programs from World War II to the creation of
the USIA is definitely more complex than indicated in
the mere outline provided here. For details see
*Hickenlooper Report* which provides a full and instructive
picture not only of the organization, but also of the
general scope and specific problems of United States

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overseas information activities for the entire period
1945-1953.--See also William E. Daugherty, *Post World
War II Developments* in *Casebook*, pp. 135-145 which
sketches developments up to 1946.--For earlier periods
see *Casebook*, Chapter II (pp. 59-118) *Psychological
Warfare in American History*; see also Harold D. Lasswell,
*Organization of Psychological Warfare Agencies in WWI*
(in *Casebook*, pp. 120-126); and William E. Daugherty,
*United States Psychological Warfare Organizations in WWII*,
(in *Casebook*, pp. 126-135).

15. USIA officially is the name of the headquarters organization in Washington; the overseas missions and posts of the agency are technically known as USIS (United States Information Service).

16. In addition there were available to the USIA in FY '58 $2.1 (1957: 0.04) million in certain foreign currencies generated by the sale abroad of U.S. agricultural commodities (Public Law 480) namely:

For Translation, Publication and Distribution of American textbooks:

Iran $140,000; Turkey $50,000; Argentina $250,000; Colombia $21,000; Finland $180,000; Spain $90,000.

Total: $806,000

For Assistance to Binational (Cultural) Centers:
Turkey $250,000; Bolivia $98,000; Brazil $317,000;
Colombia $81,000; Peru $85,000; Spain $450,000
Total:
$1,281,000.

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Typical example: The Turkish Pound equivalent of $250,000 will be used to construct a headquarters building for the Turkish-American Association. The Turkish Government will give a plot of land, valued at $140,000 in a choice location in Central Ankara.

The increased financing of USIA activities by such local currency funds generated under Public Law 480 might be one way to obtain more money for the agency. In the February 1958 hearings before the House Appropriations (Sub) Committee, Sub-Committee Chairman Rooney remarked at one point: "... as I see it we might very well be getting to the point where you [USIA] do not need to come before this committee any longer with regard to this agency's [USIA] appropriations. You may operate on the Public Law 480 billions." When, however, the USIA representative pointed out that "the law [480] as it stands now permits us to use funds only for the publication and translation of books and for assistance to binational centers," Rooney declared that he was "entirely opposed to the use of any of these Public Law 480 funds . . . unless the money is appropriated through the Appropriations Committee of the House and Senate and approved by Congress." Rooney concluded: "We should not permit the use of all this loose money amounting to billions of dollars without any control whatever by the Congress. . . ."

In the current FY 1959 there will be available $2 million

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for books and $1½ million for "Binational Centers" to the USIA under Law 480.

(Figures and statements quoted in this note are taken from the 85th Congress, 2d sess., *Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives: United States Information Agency President's Special International Program*, pp. 85, 89 and 90. Henceforth it is referred to as *Appropriations Hearings*.)

17. See *Appropriations Hearings*, p. 2

18. Under this title we have lumped the amounts budgeted for the Office of the Director of USIA and his Assistant Directors for the Office of Policy and Plans, Office of Research and Intelligence, Office of the General Counsel, Executive Secretariat, Office of Public Information, Office of Administration (for which $3.7 alone (1957: $4.3) million was alloted), Office of Security, Secretariat of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information. There are further included small items of $0.1 million (1957: 0.2) for "emergency relocation" of the USIA, and an amount of $½ million in FY 1958 as well as in FY 1957, of reimbursement to the Department of State for "administrative support" of USIA headquarters.

The final figures (8.1 and 8.8) represent an addition of budget items listed in tables in *Appropriations Hearings*, pp. 351, 360 and 370.

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19. The USIA "missions" in the field form part of the U.S. diplomatic representation (Embassy) in the country where they operate. The main "post" is at the seat of the Embassy; other posts may be found in additional important cities of the country of operation. At the head of each USIA mission is a Public Affairs Officer (PAO) who, with his staff, works out an overall plan of the information campaign to be conducted in that country. (See example of a "Country Plan" in *Hickenlooper Report*, Appendix LX, pp. 75-77.) The country plan starts out with the basic U.S. foreign policy objectives in the country in question. According to the 8th semiannual (January-June 1957) USIA Operations Report to Congress, the proposed country plan is then submitted by the PAO to the "Country Teams," composed of the Ambassador and the heads of other U.S. missions in the country (military, economic or Point Four). "All discuss the plan, with ultimate approval resting on the Ambassador. When the plan moves forward to Washington it comes as the joint recommendation of all U.S. agencies on the scene. And in Washington, after appropriate discussion with other arms of the government, the Agency reshapes the plan"--taking also into account budgetary considerations--" until with final concurrence from the Department of State, it is an approved action document. Throughout the year on a day-to-day and sometimes even hourly basis, Agency officers confer with the Department of State for policy guidance on issues as they arise. This guidance not only is reflected

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immediately in the Agency's USIA output to the world from
Washington, but also is sent to each PAO for his informa-
tion. It is his business then, under direction of the
Ambassador, to present his policy in such terms as to
demonstrate to the local people that it is in their interest
to support the U.S. view." (Quoted from U.S. Information
Agency, 8th Review of Operations, January 1-June 30, 1957,
p. 4).

20. Administrative Support cost in the terminology of the USIA budget means exclusively the amounts which the State Department receives as reimbursement from the Agency for administrative support rendered to Agency operations by the Department. As indicated in footnote 18 above the Agency reimbursed State $0.5 million in FY 1958 as well as in 1957 for support to USIA headquarters operations in Washington. The additional amount of $10.8 was reimbursed in each of those FYs for State's support of the Agency's overseas operations as pointed out in footnote 19 above the agencies overseas missions from part of our Embassies abroad thus a proportionate share of the overall administrative costs of our diplomatic representations overseas is debited to USIA. These costs include a prorata contribution by the Agency to the salaries of State's administrative apparatus and repayment for use of State Department facilities (buildings, utilities, communication networks, automobiles, office equipment, etc.) For details see Appropriations Hearings, pp. 370-373.

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21. The total includes $\frac{1}{2}$ million (1957: $2\frac{1}{4}$ million) for television activities. For details on "Broadcasting Service" see Appropriations Hearings, pp. 275-309. The attached photostat of a table found on pages 281-282, Appropriations Hearings shows daily broadcast schedules as of June 30, '57 and June 30, '58 (actual) and of June 30, '59 (planned).

22. The Press and Publications Service produces pamphlets, leaflets, posters, cartoon books, magazines (for example America Illustrated) reprints, photographs, plastic plates, feature columns, technical newsletters and a Daily Wireless Bulletin of fast-file press releases. The latter consists mainly of official news, U.S. editorial comment and texts not normally carried by the commercial news services (as for example the full text of letters from President Eisenhower to Soviet leaders.) Part of this output is procurred on a contract basis from private agencies and from writers employed to cover events in the U.S. (short feature stories on foreign visitors, on U.S. personalities, organizations, development, etc.). Production is also undertaken at many individual overseas posts and at Regional Production Centers (Manila, Beirut) which actually are taking a large share of the preparation, translation and printing of materials. Material produced by the Press and Publication Service--centrally, regionally or locally--is distributed through the posts abroad to local newspapers, broadcasting stations, government officials, civic leaders

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labor organizations, institutes of education, etc. For
details see Appropriations Hearings, pp. 9, 165-224.
See also Hickenlooper Report, pp. 54-55.

23. The Motion Picture Service produces original films by contract with private operators or acquires existing films from private organizations. It appears from a detailed list of films originally produced for, or acquired by, the Agency over the years that they are exclusively of the newsreel and short education reel type (visits of foreign dignitaries. to U.S.; artistic, cultural and sports events and subjects; scientific, medical, agricultural, industrial, home economics items; with only rather few more directly propagandistic reels included such as: Our American Heritage, the 4-H Clubs, Inter-American Cooperation; What Happened in Guatemala; American Thanksgiving; Woodrow Wilson Spokesman of Tomorrow, President Eisenhower's Press Conferences). The USIA representative at the February 1958 Appropriations Hearings listed the following original USIA productions of calendar year 1957 as the most notable achievements:

Defensive Sky Power (explaining the American capability in the fields of rockets and missiles), Explorer in Space (the U.S. satellite), King Mohammed V's (Morocco) visit to the U.S., The Greatest Treasure (about the Library of Congress), Document A-1952-Report of the U.N. Special Committee on Hungary, The Washington Mosque, Defenders of the New Republic (produced in Pakistan on the achievements of the Pakistan Army with the help of the U.S. military), The Lady

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from Philadelphia (Marion Anderson), A Pilgrimage of Liberty. In FY '58 a total of $1.4 (1957: 1.8) million was available for the original production or acquisition of motion pictures and an additional $0.3 (1957: 0.7) for the production of foreign language versions. (An additional amount of $1.7 million for production of films or foreign language versions in the field is available from the $40.4 million for "overseas missions.") The remainder of the FY 1958 $4.9 (1957: 7.3) million for the motion picture service went for salaries and travel of the staff (about $1 million both in FY '58 and '57) for the printing of release prints sent to the missions and for supplies, equipment, projectors and mobile units likewise shipped to the missions in FY '59 the USIA produced altogether 144 original reels. The missions arrange for the showing of USIA, self-produced or acquired, reels by mobile units (of which the Agency now has approximately), at U.S. Information Centers or Binational Centers (see footnote 24 below) or, where feasible, at commercial movie theaters, institutes of education, etc. Some of these films reach a considerable audience. The aforementioned "Defensive Sky Power", for example was put into 24 different languages. The USIA advised Congress that "It has been shown throughout the Free World and has had a very considerable reaction." For further details see Appropriations Hearings, pp. 224-246.

24. The Information Center Service backstops the net of over 200 such Centers the USIA now maintains in 75 countries.

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It assists likewise the binational centers which are joint ventures of the U.S. and of the country where such centers are located. The Centers maintain libraries of (mostly U.S.) books, magazines, newspapers and other cultural materials (music and records, etc.); arrange for lectures, the showing of films, musical hours, the teaching of English, and cultural exhibits. The Information Center Service also donates books, subscriptions to magazines and newspapers and other publications to foreign educational institutions, libraries, etc. and in rare cases to key individual foreigners. There is contained in the $5.3 (1957: $8.6) million figure for the Information Center Service an amount of $0.4 million for this "Presentation Program." (An additional $.3 million for the Presentation Program is available to the field posts from the $40.4 million for "Overseas Missions.") Long lists indicating types of books and which magazines are thus donated--the donations come to the recipient through the overseas mission even if they are paid for not from the local mission but from the Information Center Service budget--will be found in *Appropriations Hearings*, pp. 256-266 and pp. 96-112. It is interesting to note that the list of donated magazines subscriptions planned for FY '59 is headed by *Atlantic Monthly* (661); *Harper's Magazine* (631); *Time*, International Edition (566); *Newsweek*, International Edition (456); *Readers Digest* English Edition (410), German Edition (65) French Edition (54), Italian Edition (17); *Poetry* (262);

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Saturday Review (225); National Geographic (216); Foreign
Affairs (192); American Heritage (176); Sports Illustrated
(148); Jack and Jill (139); Language Learning (132); U.S.
News & World Report (104); Popular Mechanics Magazine,
English Edition (105); New Yorker (107); Art News (111);
Holiday (96). In regard to the very many additional maga-
zine titles on the list, the number of subscriptions to be
donated is very small, frequently less than 5 and only
occasionally more than 20. The Information Center Service,
finally provides for the production and sale of low-priced,
paper-backed American books through commercial channels.
USIA at the February Appropriations Hearings advised that
the program, started on a pilot basis in FY '56, was ex-
panded in FY '57 and '58 "to the point where to date we
have published over 4 million books in 15 languages and
placed them on sale in 20 different countries." The
Information Service budget for FY '58 provided altogether
$0.8 (1957: $1.5) million for the promotion of sales of
American books abroad. Actually the Agency had at its
disposal in FY '58 for the book program an additional $0.8
million and for support of Binational Centers an additional
$1.3 million, in certain foreign currencies generated by
the sale of U.S. agricultural commodities abroad (see foot-
note 16 above). For further details see Appropriations
Hearings, pp. 246-254 and pp. 267-275; also Lawrence S.
Morris "U.S. Information Centers Overseas," Institute of
International Education News Bulletin XXVI (1 March 1951)
pp. 7-9.

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[L]

It should be noted that beginning with FY 1957 there has been, *outside* the USIA, a U.S. Government program specifically designed to help finance the appearance abroad of U.S. orchestras; theatrical, musical, dance groups; individual artists; and athletic teams. This Artistic and Athletic Presentations Program is administered by the Department of State and financed by an allocation from the Funds Appropriated to the President for the President's Special International Program. In FY 1958 $3 (FY '57: 2) million were so allocated for U.S. Artistic and Athletic Presentations and in foreign countries. For details see *Appropriations Hearings*, pp. 466-489.

25. This $0.5 million budget item "Cooperative Programs with Private Organizations" finances the activities of the USIA "Office of Private Cooperation" described by its Director as "an idea factory . . . [which] originates ideas, makes contacts with private individuals, groups, institutions and companies and persuades or encourages them to supplement what USIA does" (*Appropriations Hearings*, p. 308). The chief task of the Office actually is to aid and assist the People-to-People Program--on which see p. 31 segg.--although it does, in addition, give some help, including some financial support, so-called "seed Money" for specific projects sponsored by committees or nonprofit groups who operate outside the People-to-People Program whose budgets are limited. (See *Appropriations Hearings*, p. 344)

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[d]

26. See note 24 above.

27. These statistics regarding the State Department Educational Exchange Program are taken from 85th Congress, 2d sess., Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Department of State, pp. 818, 820 and 821. Further details on the Educational Exchange Program, *Ibid.*, pp. 816-852.

A useful survey over the Program since the Passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948 has been released by the State Department in November 1958 under the title *International Educational Exchange Program 1948-1958*, Department of State Publication 6710, 66 pages. The booklet shows (p. 63) that in Fiscal Years 1949 through 1957 altogether 33,365 foreigners were brought to the U.S. and 13,625 U.S. citizens sent abroad as educational exchangees.

28. The Educational Exchange Program in FY '58 was paid for not only by the $20.8 million appropriated funds. To finance that program the State Department used also foreign currencies to the value of $3.3 million available to the Department for cultural exchange purposes under Public Law 480 (on which see note 16 above). In FY '59 a larger amount, namely $5.7 million, will be available to the Department's Exchange Program under that law.

29. *Smith-Mundt Act, section 2.*

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30. Fight False Propaganda with Truth. Presidential address before American Society of Newspaper Editors. Washington: 20 April 1950. (Text in Vital Speeches of the Day, XVI, pp. 442-444, 1 May 1950.)

The following passages from the President's speech are quoted because they reveal so clearly a basic American approach to the problem:

> "Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the Communists have.... All too often the people subjected to Communist propaganda do not know Americans . . . as we really are . . . . Everywhere that the propaganda of Communist totalitarianism is spread, we must meet... and overcome it with honest information about freedom and democracy . . . [underlining supplied] We should greatly extend . . . our efforts for making the truth known to people in all the world. . . . We must make ourselves known as we really are. . . . We have tremendous advantages in the struggle for men's minds and loyalties. We have truth and freedom on our side."

31. E. W. Barret, "Expanding Techniques for a Truth Strategy," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXIII, pp. 945-948, 11 December 1950:

> "From start to finish the Kremlin [sales campaign] strategy is wide open to counterattack. The ingrained dishonesty of the Soviet promises . . . can be unmasked and spot-

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lighted. The soft spot here is identical with that in
the Soviet organization itself. It cannot stand against
truth. . . Consequently, it is obvious that the most
telling weapon we can bring to bear on the Soviet Union
in this war of ideas is of ideas is an information pro-
gram--or propaganda program if you want to call it that--
which deals exclusively with facts. And I mean all the
facts. . . This is the weapon which has the firepower
to pierce the Iron Curtain."

Barret has also treated his theme in a full-size book
*Truth is our Weapon*. Funk and Wagnalls Co., New York,
1953, XVIII and 365 pages.

32. E. W. Barret, "Counteract Defeatism by Winning the Cold War," *State Department Bulletin*, Vol. XXIV, p. 408, 12 March 1951.

33. "The information program in 1959 will support the U.S. efforts to . . . make peoples in all countries aware of the facts and results of the new imperialism as exemplified by the brutal repression of Hungary . . . to unify the free nations in common defense . . . to explain to the peoples of the recently emerged free countries how United States objectives coincide with their own; to give neutral nations an understanding of the compatibility of their self-interest with our own. . . to establish an honest picture of Americans as a people sincerely determined,

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[c]

to solve their problems in a progressive evolutionary manner; for example, by clarifying the solid advance of the Negro in the U.S. in contrast to distorted and sensationalized impressions based on isolated difficulties to explain America's economic system in which virtually all U.S. families share in ownership benefits and responsibilities to further evolutionary changes in the Communist orbit."

Quoted from "General Statement of the USIA Director" on aims and objectives of USIA program, *Appropriations Hearings*, p. 7

It is interesting to note that both in Barret's four objectives of 1951 and Allen's statement of 1958 the passages on "explaining America" to the outside world take much of the space that, however, Barret emphasized our being a "resolute, strong . . . nation, whose . . . physical strength can be counted upon," while 7 years later Allen stressed American sincerity, economic and social progressiveness, etc. without specifically mentioning U.S. resoluteness or physical strength. As regards our reaching those inside the Red Orbit, Barret spoke of our building behind the Iron Curtain "Psychological obstacles to further Soviet aggression"--i.e., in effect, creating sufficient unrest within the orbit to prevent the Soviet leaders from seeking outside adventures. Allen in 1958 speaks more guardedly of furthering evolutionary changes in the orbit. The outbreak, and ultimate failure,

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10

of the Hungarian revolution, which had occurred in the meantime, obviously induced this specific clarification that only gradual changes in the Soviet Empire could and would be expected. But Barret himself had already remarked as early as 4 December 1950: "... if, as some demand, we try to incite citizens in slave areas to open resistance at this time, we will merely be inviting our friends to commit suicide." (See Buel W. Patch, "Non-Military Weapons in Cold War Offensive," *Editorial Research Reports* of 12 April 1951, pp. 259-267.)

34. Quoted from article cited in footnote 32 above, where also the following characteristic remarks will be found:

"There are those . . . who say we should plaster the countryside of Europe with American billboards and send American trucks through continental villages. It would simply support the ... tendency of too many Europeans to think that the current conflict is basically just one of the U.S. versus the U.S.S.R.... we are just trying to buy the minds of men with American dollars."

35. USIA Director Allen in February 1958:

"I think the USIA ought to be a steady, dignified, responsible, long-range activity. It should avoid the flamboyant or the campaign type of program. It will represent the majesty and dignity of the American Government better when it speaks with a calm and self-reliant rather than a strident tone."

(*Appropriations Hearings*, p. 14)

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36. U.S. Information Agency: 8th Review of Operations: January 1 June 30, 1957, p. 5. Similarly, R. E. Button, Director of the USIA Broadcasting Service in the February 1958 appropriations hearings:

"The Radio Broadcasting Service carried out its mission of broadcasting factual nonpropagandistic and anti-Communist material in accordance with current directives. . . . We put into effect policies designed to avoid any tone of strident propaganda on the Voice broadcasts and we made these policies known and carried out by the entire staff."

(Appropriations Hearings, p. 279)

37. See in addition to statements by President Truman (Footnote 30 above) and Assistant Secretary of State Barret (Footnote 31 above), both made in 1950, USIA Director Allen in 1958:

"What advantage do we have over the Russians? The chief advantage. . . is that we have a better product to sell. . . . We have human liberty, freedom and dignity, which is infinitely superior to anything the Russians have to offer. We must. . . emphasize that aspect of American life and democracy all the time." (Appropriations Hearings, p. 15)

38. See notes 34 through 36 above.

39. In response to a question by a committee member as to how

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the USIA seeks to reach individual citizens in foreign
countries, the Agency submitted for the record a written
statement (Appropriations Hearings, p. 26/7) which starts
out as follows:

"To the extent that the Agency's resources permit it seeks to reach directly as extensive a foreign audience as possible through . . . such media of mass communication as radio, television, movies and exhibits. . . . However, the realities of our operations require us to concentrate our efforts in most areas of the free world toward reaching the people who lead local opinion. / underlining supplied] In . . . less developed areas . . . these people are, for the most part, the limited number who are literate. Where feasible we simultaneously carry on projects aimed at reaching a mass audience. But in many countries, reaching the leaders is the only practical way of reaching the bulk of the population." (underlining supplied)

The statement concludes by citing as practical examples
Iran, Pakistan, India. Regarding Iran it is stated that
there "USIA concentrates on reaching the educated and
influential as well as the mass. . ." How the "educated
and influential" are approached is not specified, but
films shown in commerical theaters, and privately, place-
ment of newspaper stories, pictorial news posters, local
language radio programs and railway freight cars serving

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as minature information centers are listed as the means used to reach the "general public." For Pakistan the statement lists VOA broadcasts (7 hours a week), "regular" USIS programs over Radio Pakistan, USIS films distributed by the Pakistan Ministry of Information in its countrywide program USIS documentaries shown in commercial theaters (a single such documentary having been seen by 8 million people), and exhibitions as media to reach the people at large; adding: "However, in Pakistan also we make an effort to get our story told for us by people recognized as leaders of local opinion." Only two short sentences illustrate the case for India and Afghanistan: "In India 1 million adults and 2 million students viewed our Atoms for Peace exhibit during a 2 year tour of 30. . . Indian cities. In Kabul . . . one exhibit in the windows of the USIS library attracted 15,000 viewers in 4 hours."

It deserves to be noted that while the question was how do you reach *individual* citizens, the answer enumerates the *mass* media employed to reach the people without any reference to the person-to-person approach that might be used; for example, by the Public Affairs Officer in regard to key local personalities. This omission in a written statement to Congress is interesting because the PAO's work on individuals is so very often stressed in less formal utterances as a main weapon in the USIA arsenal.

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In another statement (*Appropriations Hearings*, p. 162) submitted by USIA for the record in response to a criticism that "Our propaganda <u>In Latin America</u> does not reach the average citizen," the Agency declared:

"Each of our country programs, while employing the usual communications and cultural media has its own characteristics growing out of local conditions. . . Our activities cover the range of mass communications. . . . We do not, however, address ourselves to general or undifferentiated audiences. We do not, however, have the capacity for reaching directly the large mass of the more than 170 million people in the area. But we aim for, and do reach, selected individuals and groups. In each country we determine which group and individuals are the most important. . . because of their strength. . . or their capacity to influence public opinion. . . . For example, where the comparatively small intellectual and student class are the key elements. . . a major USIS task may be to convince these groups. . . . A conscious effort is made, therefore, to produce scholarly output designed to . . . influence these intellectual opinion holders."

40. See, for example, note 19 above on careful preparation of "campaign" plans for each individual target country.

41. Examples: Elimination in 1957 of VOA broadcasts to India in the Cujarat and Teiegu languages in order to increase

[LJ]

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broadcasts to India in other local idioms (*Appropriations Hearings*, p. 29). Planned new publication to interpret American policy for the intellectual leadership of Burma (*Appropriations Hearings*, p. 57).

42. Examples: Continued systematic "withdrawal from those aspects of the ⌜USIA⌝ Vietnamese program which are being taken over by the ⌜friendly!⌝ Vietnamese information service itself;" reduction of program in Thailand, Austria and Germany (*Appropriations Hearings*, pp. 29, 57, 59) while efforts are being intensified in the increasingly more critical Mid-East-Southeast Asia-Africa area.

43. Examples: Planned increase in the USIA television activity in view of the "spread of television stations and receivers in the world." (*Appropriations Hearings*, p. 305, also p. 59) and of the Exhibit as well as the Low-Priced Book Program (*Appropriations Hearings*, p. 247/8)

44. *Appropriations Hearings*, p. 75. (See also on shift to Near East-South-Asia-African area, *Appropriations Hearings*, pp. 7, 13, 71-74, 78-80.)

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[L.C]

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>June 30,<br>1957</th><th>June 30,<br>1958</th><th>June 30,<br>1959</th><th>Increase<br>or de-<br>crease (-)</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Near East, South Asia<br>and Africa</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>1. Washington originations:</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Arabic</td><td>2:30</td><td>1:30</td><td>2:00</td><td>:30</td></tr><tr><td>Bengali (West)</td><td>1:30</td><td>2:30</td><td>:30</td><td>:15</td></tr><tr><td>Bengali (East)</td><td></td><td>:30</td><td>:30</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Greek</td><td>:30</td><td>:30</td><td>:30</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Hindi</td><td>:45</td><td>:30</td><td>:30</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Gujarati</td><td></td><td>1:30</td><td>1:30</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Malayalam</td><td></td><td>1:30</td><td>1:30</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Persian</td><td>1:00</td><td>:30</td><td>:30</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Tamil</td><td>3:30</td><td>2:30</td><td>:30</td><td>:15</td></tr><tr><td>Telugu</td><td></td><td>1:30</td><td>1:30</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Turkish</td><td>:45</td><td>:30</td><td>:30</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Urdu</td><td>:30</td><td>:30</td><td>:30</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal</td><td>6:15</td><td>5:15</td><td>6:15</td><td>1:00</td></tr><tr><td>2. Recorded programs (originated in Washington or field for direct broadcast from Courier, Colombo, Salonika or Tangier):</td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Arabic (Cairo originations)</td><td>6:30</td><td>3:30</td><td>7:00</td><td>3:30</td></tr><tr><td>Bengali (West)</td><td>3:30</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Greek</td><td>:15</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Hindi</td><td>:30</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Gujarati</td><td>1:30</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Malayalam</td><td>1:30</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Persian</td><td>:30</td><td>:30</td><td>:30</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Tamil</td><td>3:30</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Telugu</td><td>1:30</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Urdu</td><td>:30</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Subtotal</td><td>8:45</td><td>4:00</td><td>7:30</td><td>3:30</td></tr><tr><td>Total, Near East</td><td>15:00</td><td>9:15</td><td>13:45</td><td>4:30</td></tr></tbody></table>

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APPENDIX I

One of the most outspoken and persistent citizen-critics of United States propaganda is Eugene W. Castle who a few years ago set forth his views in a 278-page book, *Billions, Blunders and Boloney* (New York: Devin-Adair, 1955). Mr. Castle was one of altogether three nongovernmental witnesses to testify during the February 1958 USIA appropriations hearings before the House Sub-Committee on Appropriations. Introducing himself as a "former newspaper reporter and newsreel producer" who had actually directed propaganda activities in World Wars I and II "for military and civilian branches of the U.S. Government," he mentioned having been a "propaganda consultant and public relations advisor to more than 50 leading American corporations."

The following are excerpts from his prepared opening statement:

"The USIA represents a $1 billion failure. During the past decade it has wasted this huge sum on unnecessary and largely unwanted propaganda to foreigners, most of whom dislike and distrust all propaganda, both domestic and imported. . . . The USIA should be padlocked and its essential functions be assumed by the Department of State. . . . This action would remove the propaganda label from the official pronouncements of the Government of the U.S. and would automatically end the dangerous 'shouting war' between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. . . . Since we need money for missiles our Government should stop the further annual waste of tens of millions of dol-

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lars on a mess of messages, gadgets and gimmicks created by a bureaucracy of 12,000 crisis provoking press agents. All too often the misdirected efforts of the USIA have proved to be their / the men in the Kremlin best press agents. . . outside of Moscow. Time and again this agency has misinterpreted, magnified and intensified the errors of our foreign policy and the misfortunes that invariably occur in the daily lives of 172 million free Americans. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson has correctly called the USIA the most wasteful agency in Government . . . the USIA is presently seeking civil service status for an army of press agents to perpetuate its overly staffed organization as an excuse to enlarge further many activities which are totally unwarranted . . . To grant this request / for civil service status will only perpetuate the impulsive and 'crisis provoking' propaganda excesses of the Agency. Its activities and personnel should be reduced and not enlarged . . . We do not need costly documentary films produced / by the USIA in foreign countries to show foreigners what they look like at the American taxpayer's expense. Moreover, our Voice of America should be stripped of its propaganda nonsense that both discredits and harms our country. Like the BBC it should be converted into a factual news service. . . The cause of peace would be better served if the President and the

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Secretary of State would take diplomacy away
from the USIA press agents and return it to our
ambassadors. . . Our Government should take the ini-
tiative immediately and for once lead instead of
follow the Kremlin by being the first to proclaim
that, as a constructive step toward world peace,
we are going out of the propaganda business. . . .
Since no American would accept mind-molding propa-
ganda from foreigners, now is the time for us to
proclaim to the world that we no longer intend to
inflict a shouting war upon people anywhere. In-
stead, we will rely henceforth upon our ambassadors
to defend and tell the truth about us to all foreign
governments and peoples. And we will rely instead
on the three great American press services, the
Associated Press, the United Press and the International
News Service, to bring the true, hour-by-hour and
day-by-day story of America to the newspapers of the
world which they serve so well. Now we need much
less USIA and much more U. S. A." (Appropriations
Hearings, p. 490, 491, 492, 493, 494)

The remainder of Mr. Castle's testimony (Appropriations
Hearings, pp. 494-503) consists largely of U.S. newspaper and
magazine items critical of U.S. overseas "information" activities
submitted by the witness for the record. His final comments on
the USIA were these:

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"The USIA insists it is necessary to sell America. Nothing is farther from the truth. This is merely an excuse to maintain an overstaffed bureaucracy. If we continue to let them go their way it can only lead to disaster. . . . If you want coffins for young Americans, perhaps much sooner than may be necessary, let the USIA run its uninterrupted course under its present leadership."

(Appropriations Hearings, p. 503)

It is interesting to note that when Mr. Castle in May 1958 delivered before the American Public Relations Association an address similar in form and content to his opening statement before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, it was considered sufficiently important to be included in the 15 June issue of the well-known, fortnightly publication *Vital Speeches of the Day* (Vol. XXIV, No. 17, pp. 536-540) under the title "How to Win the Cold War." In this address Mr. Castle quotes a number of remarks by influential congressmen--i.e., of the late Senator McCarran, of former Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations Clevenger (Republican) and of the present chairman of that subcommittee Rooney (Democrat)--expressing profound skepticism regarding U.S. official propaganda.

Representatives Rooney and Clevenger have been for years, and still are, the senior members of their respective parties in the Appropriations Subcommittee. They also are taking customarily a particularly active part in the annual hearings on the USIA budget. Their opinions deserve, indeed, full attention.

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[d]

Characteristic statements made by both representatives
during the February 1958 Appropriations Hearings are quoted
on page 17 of our study. Not quoted there but of special
interest in the context of this appendix is the following remark
by Mr. Clevenger: "I do not know what you are broadcasting now,
but from what I have seen in days gone by, when we got trans-
cripts of them, I think it is very dangerous to furnish a back-
ground or a foil for imperialism." (Appropriations Hearings,
p. 50) Illustrative for Mr. Rooney's basic concepts is the
following February 1958 dialogue between him and a USIA repre-
sentative (Mr. Clark) regarding the USIA FY 1959 program for
Spain (Appropriations Hearings, pp. 117-118):

"Rooney: . . . It would appear from what you say that we need to spend all this money $801,000 for USIA FY '59 operations in Spain to square ourselves with the Spanish people, because we have gone in there and spent all this American money U.S. Government programs and activities in Spain 1953-1957: $734 million net and brought American military personnel there who bolster the Spanish economy.

"Clark: Gives a breakdown of the $801,000 requested

"Rooney: Do not let us get away from the main question. Why do you need this money in view of the huge expenditure of American funds by way of American aid, our military and tourists? Is it to square ourselves with the Spanish people for going there and spending our money?

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[c]

"Clark: I do not think anybody used the word 'square.'

"Rooney: I used it. You know what it means, do you not?

"Clark: I think I know the implications and I do not think it is a fact.

"Rooney: What word would you use?

"Clark: The request . . . is to present officially the U. S. story to Spain.

"Rooney: Why do we need to do that at all /underlining supplied/ with the huge sums of the American taxpayer being spent in Spain?

"Clark: Because our position in Spain . . .

"Rooney: Is it bad?

"Clark: It is distorted.

"Rooney: It is bad, in other words.

"Clark: No, I will not say it is bad.

"Rooney: How distorted?

"Clark: /Explains 'as an example' that newspapers in Spain have attributed to the U.S. malicious motives in trying to run up the price of olive oil which the Spanish peasent and almost every housewife needs for cooking./"

"Rooney: And what does the Spanish Government do about this?

"Clark: Nothing.

"Rooney: Nothing whatever?

"Clark: No sir, but the Spanish Government has per-

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mitted us in our official publications to set the record straight.

"Rooney: Isn't that very nice of them. Why do they not do it themselves. .. ?

"Clark: Mr. Chairman, I cannot speak for the Spanish Government.

"Rooney: Will you please speak for the American Government?

"Clark: √Repeats that he cannot explain, as an American official, why the Spanish Government does not do it. √

"Rooney: Is it possible that we would be better off to spend no money at all in Spain, to let things go and have our State Department tell the Spanish Government that we want them to do the explaining for us?

"Clark: Mr. Chairman, I think that is a question you will have to address to the State Department. ..

"Rooney: Who told you to ... √spend] all this money in Spain? The State Department?

"Clark: They did not tell us. This budget has been worked out with State and with the [U.S.] Embassy in Madrid."

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APPENDIX II

On March 22, 1950 Senator William Benton--who as Assistant Secretary of State (1945-1947) had launched (1946) the Voice of America broadcasts in Russian--delivered a speech before the U.S. Senate on the subject *The Struggle for the Minds and Loyalties of Mankind* in which he proposed a "Marshall Plan of Ideas." The most important features of his plan were:

1. Steadily increasing pressure, through the U.N. and through our own diplomacy, for world-wide freedom of information.

2. A comprehensive world-wide program to exhibit documentary and educational motion pictures designed to explain the democratic principles and ideas underlying U.S. foreign policy.

3. Expansion of the existing student exchange program to bring to the U.S. as many as 100,000 foreign students a year "even though such an extensive program might cost us as much as $100 million per annum."

4. Creation of a world broadcasting network (short, medium and long wave) by the U.S. "with an ultimate goal of reaching virtually every radio set in the world!"

5. "The use of any and all possible means to reach people shut off from the free world by censorship or suppression."

6. Establishment of a nongovernmental agency to help inspire and guide the efforts of the millions of private American citizens who might use their talents,

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resources and contacts overseas to help in this
struggle for the minds. This suggestion actually
became a reality when in 1956 President Eisenhower
launched the People-to-People Program. See page 31
of this study.

Senator Benton called his program "realistic, practical, hard-
headed and hard-boiled," and described it as an "appeal to
reason and truth." He warned expressly against "the constant
temptation to ape the Russians in their tactics of subversive
warfare and so-called black propaganda;" rejected specifically
any idea that "we open an 'Agit-Prop' school in Washington for
our foreign sympathizers, training them in the tactics of
infiltration . . . general strike . . . street fighting;" and
answered negatively the questions: "Should we secretly finance
undergrounds behind the Iron Curtain? Should we, through
blinds and front organizations surreptitiously buy . . . news-
papers and radio stations abroad?" "No," he said, "in our
hands such weapons would be self-defeating. Every step we take
should be open, honest, identified and to the fullest possible
extent in co-operation with other governments." (Congressional
Record of 22 March 1950, 96, pp. 3821-3826).

Eight years later Mr. Benton, by then publisher of the
*Encyclopaedia Britannica* and no longer a senator, wrote an
article for the *New York Times Magazine* (16 March 1958, p. 9)
"Five Ways to Breach the Iron Curtain," expounding the opti-
mistic thesis that "the Soviet lead in propaganda would vanish,
if we could get through to the Russian people." The five ways,

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[d]

similar to but not identical with the Marshall Plan of Ideas
and aimed at the red orbit rather than at the world at large,
were these:

1. A Congressional resolution that the U.N. should "sponsor" complete freedom in the exchange of information between the people of the orbit and those of the U.S.

2. "Fullest use" by President Eisenhower of the "world-wide moral power" of the U.S. Presidency in the manner of Jefferson, Lincoln, Wilson and Roosevelt. The President might ask the Soviet Government to provide the necessary press and radio facilities for a presidential "peace appeal" directly to the Russian people. "He could even ask for a monthly talk to the Russian people and offer Khrushchev the same opportunity to address the American people."

3. Construction, at once, of vastly expanded and more powerful radio transmitters, beamed behind the Curtain, with an offer to the Russians to operate a radio station in Washington, if they will permit us to operate one in Moscow.

4. If the U.S.S.R. will agree to a rigid system of nuclear disarmament, the U.S. is prepared to spend up to $10 billion annually ₮ to aid the economic development of less favored nations.

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5. Ask the Soviets to let as many American students attend U.S.S.R. universities as they might be willing to accommodate. Promoting the exchange of scientists and scholars: "Our scientists and scholars can become most potent ambassadors."

Again Mr. Benton stresses the fact that there is "no belligerence" in his proposals which only "reflect the desire of the American people for lasting peace." It should be noted that the Benton Plan, 1958 version, set forth in the _New York Times Magazine_, is actually an adaptation of testimony given by Benton somewhat earlier before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

* * * * * * * * *

"U.S. Counterattack: The Sarnoff Plan" is the significant title of a chapter contributed by David Sarnoff, President of the Radio Corporation of America, to a book by Anthony Trawick Bouscaren, _A Guide to Anti-Communist Action_, (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1958, XII, 244 pages). Sarnoff's plan (op. cit., pp. 25-35) is decidedly more aggressive than Mr. Benton's scheme. He states specifically that the arena of our counterattack is the "whole globe" and that "our cold war targets are not only behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, but in every nation, the U.S. included." He does, in fact, emphasize that "we need _every_ <u>underlining supplied</u> country newspaper, magazine, radio and TV station effectively supporting our side" and asks that the strongest individual anti-Communist

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voices be provided with better facilities for making themselves
heard in their own countries. He further suggests the use of
mobile film and mobile big screen television units to carry
our message abroad, and mass production of cheap, light-weight
radio receivers to be made available to listeners behind the
Curtains as well as in other critical areas. His plan, Sarnoff
says, is designed "to inspire millions in the free countries
with a sense of moral dedication to the enlargement of the
area of freedom, based on repugnance to slave labor, coerced
atheism, purges and the rest of the Soviet horrors."

His foremost target, however, is the people inside the red
orbit; his main theme:

"Our potential fifth columns are greater by
millions than the enemy's. . . . We have
everything to gain by promoting a spirit
of mutiny."

His guiding objectives:

"Keep alive throughout the Soviet Empire
the Spirit of resistance. . . . Provide
moral and material aid to resistance move-
ments in the satellites, China and Russia
. . . . Make maximum use of fugitives from
the Soviet sphere."

The main weakness of our efforts to date to talk to the
masses and elite groups in the Soviet camp, Sarnoff feels, is
that "*we have not been consistent* [italics in Sarnoff's text]

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[d]

in what we had to say to them." "As long as we regard
Communist rule as permanent," he adds, "we can have no strong
psychological bridges to those . . . under its yoke; the only
free world goal that is relevant to them is one that envisages
their eventual emancipation." Sarnoff, in other words, con-
siders "liberation" a necessary theme of any U.S. propaganda
aimed at the people under red domination. He believes that our
propaganda should, moreover, get down to specifics wherever
possible. "It should expose the weaknesses, failures, hypo-
crisies, internal tensions of the red masters . . . offer
guidance to types of resistance open even to the individual
. . . appeal to universal emotions, to love of family, of
country, of God, of humanity." He wants the red sphere "ringed
with broadcasting facilities of a massiveness to overcome
jamming" and is convinced that "under the new approach," i.e.,
the Emancipation or Liberation theme, "the Voice of America
will acquire large audiences . . ." He points out that besides
the VOA we have also Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberation
and that there are still other American "voices," "those of our
free labor movement, American war veterans, the churches, youth
and women's organizations." He is certain that "the flow of
printed matter across the Iron Curtain . . . can be enormously
enlarged" and mentions in this connection "magazines and news-
papers which outwardly look like standard Communist matter, but
actually are filled with anti-Communist propaganda."

He recommends "maximum exploitation" of "tens of thousands
of fugitives from Communist oppression . . ." whom he wants

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[c]

to draw into "well-organized, well-financed anti-Communist
organizations and activities." He adds: "Officer's corps
of emigrees can be formed. . . . The existence of such nuclei
of military power should help generate hope and faith among
their countrymen back home."

As regards organization, he suggests:

1. A Strategy Board for Political Defense, the Cold War equivalent of the JCS, to function directly under the President and with cabinet status for its head;

2. "A network of schools and universities devoted to training cadres for the Cold War" and preparing them "for the intellectual, technical, intelligence and similar requirements" of ideological-psychological warfare."

3. "A sort of West Point of Political Warfare--analogous to the Lenin School of Political Warfare in Moscow-- staffed by the ablest specialists obtainable, it would seek out likely young people willing to make the struggle against communism their main or sole career." In support of his suggestions for such special training he points out that the Cold War offensive will require ever larger contingents of specialized manpower and that "already, limited as our political Warfare efforts are, there is a shortage of competent personnel."

While these organizational recommendations refer to U.S.

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propaganda world-wide, the people behind the Iron Curtain
clearly remain the primary objective for Sarnoff. He cites
"... the uprising in East Germany [1953], the strikes in
Pilsen [Czechoslovakia], the dramatic mutinies in the Soviet
Arctic [as] examples of revolutionary actions that failed;"
but he adds, "they attest that _insurrection is possible_
[underlining supplied]. Stating that "we must seek out the
weakest link in the Kremlin's power," he remarks that "a
successful uprising in Albania, for instance, would be a body
blow to Soviet prestige and a fateful stimulus to resistance
elsewhere." East Germany he also considers as one of the
"weakest links" in the Soviet camp. "Its revolt," he says,
"would ignite neighboring Czechoslovakia and Poland."

Since Bouscaren's book, in which the Sarnoff Plan was
unveiled, was published in 1958 it is, of course, surprising
that Sarnoff does not mention the events of 1956 in Hungary
and Poland. The explanation will be found in the following
prefatory note to the Sarnoff Plan chapter in the Bouscaren
opus:

"In April 1955. . . Sarnoff suggested to
President Eisenhower a course of action which
would involve minimum risk and yet advance
the cause of freedom. Although little or
nothing has been done to implement the
Sarnoff plan, it is herewith presented . . .
it constitutes a practical program in cold
warfare." (op. cit., p. 17)

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In other words the Sarnoff Plan was actually prepared in
early 1955, prior to the suppression of the revolt in Hungary,
and one is left to wonder, whether Sarnoff, in the light of
what has happened since, would still emphasize so strongly
the liberation theme and the chances of mutiny and rebellion
inside the red orbit.

* * * * * * * * *

Years before the Sarnoff Plan, very similar blueprints were
developed by others with this characteristic difference that
in 1955 Sarnoff felt compelled to think of propagandizing the
Free World as well as the orbit, while the earlier schemes,
possibly taking the Free World more for granted, were concerned
exclusively with reaching those behind the Curtain.

Typical: "Propaganda to Eastern Europe" by Brutus Coste,
Rumanian ex-diplomat in Public Opinion Quarterly; and
Paul A. Linebarger, "Hotfoot for Stalin" in Nation's Business;
both articles appeared in early 1951.

Characteristic passages from Coste's article:

"Propaganda can make essential contribution to
the eventual liberation of Eastern Europe only
if it is conceived as a means preparatory to
action. What . . . action? Passive resistance
in the first place . . . in the second place
the sort of action. . . undertaken on a world-wide
scale by the Communists and . . . best described

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as subversive-unorthodox warfare . . . Broadcasts addressed to Eastern Europe should be aimed at stimulating the majorities with the future action in view and toward demoralizing and disrupting the ruling groups. Their first function is to create not only hope but certainty that Soviet communism will be defeated. The fundamental theme . . . is the inevitability of the victory of freedom . . . constant stress should be laid on the strength and determination of the Free World . . . News reports and commentaries . . . should avoid representing Western policy in purely defensive terms. The fact that the Atlantic Pact has been discussed in such terms has had disheartening effects. [It should be made] clear that there is . . . no tendency over here to uphold . . . the policy of appeasement . . . show that the West . . . knows and understands what is going on in Eastern Europe and that it not only condemns the man responsible but keeps a record of their crimes for the day of retribution.

"Another means of conveying . . . hope is to report the public activities of exiled leaders . . . . If the exiled leaders were allowed to discuss over the radio their view with regard

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to the future political and economic reconstruction
of our nations, the benefit would be twofold . . .
first . . . an indication that talk about
eventual liberation represents more than empty
words . . . second . . . a very useful bit of
political education would in this way be accomplished.

" . . . no Sunday or religious holiday would . . . pass without at least a prayer [In the broadcasts] for their [the subject peoples] liberation.

"The Western World in general and the U.S. in particular could set up a program of practical training for young refugees from Eastern Europe . . . in the various branches of central and local government . . . in modern business management . . . public works . . . labor relations . . . public welfare . . . education. . . .

"Another function of Western propaganda should be that of helping the Eastern European people to preserve their traditional Western and national values; spiritual, moral, intellectual and artistic . . . There should be regular talks by noted Western thinkers and writers on the spiritual values of free men . . . also regular courses on the traditional ethical concepts of these [Eastern European] peoples and on their history . . . [and] regular lectures on all

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