TELCOM
President
Mr. Kissinger
6-19-69 9:55 AM

K said he and Bryce were talking about the commitments resolution - Dirksen has meeting of Caucus Cte this morning and wants to propose. K said his first inside instinct was to agree with the President's initial reaction. K said there is an issue of executive perogative that could come back to haunt us - Rogers feels the same way. President said he does not think we can win it. K agreed but said Pres might then be on record. Pres said to let Bryce go ahead on it. K said there was some thought of offering alternative resolution that limits it to the armed forces. Pres said he does not want that - leave it out. K said he would talk with Bryce accordingly.

Pres asked how K made out with Vance. K said he is totally emotional on cease-fire kick. K said he is having a study made which Pres will have in a day or so. Pres asked on how you enforce, etc., and K said right. K said they never made a proposal to NVN on cease fire and never made a deescalation proposal. K said he told Vance he was getting out on a limb - there are a lot of things going on that he does not know about - and K thinks he shook him up a bit. Pres said good play on our line to play - let them feel the rug will be pulled out from under them. K said problem was Holbrook on staff had been leaking to Harriman which was another disadvantage. K said he told Vance not everything goes on in Paris.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
6-19-69 10:55 AM

K said he had checked out those figures on safeguard deployment to be sure - gave Pres rundown and said whole thing will not be operational until end of 1973 or early 1974. Pres asked if that was for minutes or both and K said both.

Pres asked about situation with regard to number of attacks initiated by other side which K gave to the press. K said he did it week by week - did not do on total basis. K said figures show direct relationship between our casualties and number of enemy attacks initiated. K said Pres can easily demonstrate without any doubt that when our casualties go from 150 to 450, enemy attacks increase by exactly same proportions. K said if they hit this issue Pres might consider saying we have not increased our operation - pulling out 25,000 combat troops.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

*

TELCORN

Dr. Franklin Murphy
Mr. Kissinger
6-19-69 3:30 ish

M said he would be in Washington for FIAB meetings next Monday and
Tuesday. K said he need to have a conversation in depth with him
while he is here. M and K agreed to meet on Monday at 12:00.
K discussed problems with intelligence community - said he was telling
M as friend of President and M could talk to John Mitchell. K said
we have uncovered the damnest can of worms. K said M could believe
us more than what he will hear from the intelligence community. M
said he would see to it on Monday morning that no position is taken
about anything. K said if after M hears our evidence, he disagrees
we can get M an appointment with the President. M said he is confused
about comments made one day and then the comments made the next day.
K said this town is run by liberal Democrats and we keep forgetting it -
K had forgotten it.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TE LCON
Secy Laird
Mr. Kissinger
6-19-69 5:40 PM

L said this readout was worse than he had told K last night - there are
two new groups. L said he would send over a map tomorrow of them.
K said that puts it clearly beyond the upper limit doesn't it. L said
yes, beyond projected limit for this year. L said these are two new
construction starts. L said intelligence community will have this
info shortly but L thought K should have it in advance.

L said they are talking on the Hill about various proposals as far as
ABM. K said Pres has strengthened orders - only L and K can discuss
this. L said what they are talking about is missile thing. L said he
has said all along what was involved in phase one funding this year -
we do not have money to buy missiles in this procurement.

L asked if K had brown book of his - testimony before the commitee
(House Appropriations). L said it is the bible on this and he would send
it over - it has breakdown on page 68. L mentioned call he had from
Sen Brooke's Asst

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

Richard Neustadt
Mr. Kissinger

6-19-69 6:35 PM

K said he needs to talk to N about general problems and about Dan who may not know how much of a friend K has been during the past couple of weeks. K said he has preserved him for the future which is about all he could do. K asked about lunch on June 25 and N said fine. K asked if they should include Adam and N said it was fine with him. K said he would call Adam tomorrow. K and N discussed troop withdrawals. N asked who General was in Kennedy's pay.

K and N agreed to meet for lunch at 12:30 on the 25th. K said he would tell him *what* situation is re Dan so N can help out a bit and asked if they could discuss in front of Adam. N said he thought so. K said it is not endless story and will take about 15 minutes. N said he had told Adam it was not working out and N trusts his discretion. K said he would call Adam tomorrow

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELECON

Chalmers Roberts
Mr. Kissinger

June 19, 1969 -- 7:52 p.m.

R said he was a little amazed at the President's statements in his Press Conference, especially having gone through the careful exercise about troop withdrawals and considering what K said about 'only one chance.' R asked how he could possibly get so mad at Clifford that he hopes to beat his time-tables. What are you serving up to Hanoi except a unilateral withdrawal? K said it depends on how you read the statements. R said it struck everybody as an amazing statement. He asked K if we had had any such time-table as Clifford is suggesting for 69 and 70. K reminded R that this conversation was off the record, and said that what the President gave is the time-table. R agreed that the President makes it so by saying it. K said the President never speaks without thinking.

R said The President keeps saying that Thieu will come up with a new offer and asked if that were in the near future. K said it is within the reasonably near future. In response to R's query as to whether this would occur in Paris or Saigon, K said he would suspect in both places. R asked if that were a political movement internally in the south, and K said yes.

R questioned the last thing the President said about the Soviet tests, and their having a footprint that matched the Minutemen sites in the U.S. He asked if they really match the South Dakota, North Dakota and Montana Minuteman sites. K said this referred to the distribution of silos and not the whole thing. K said he had to buzz off because the President was calling him.

Ids

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELECON

The President
Mr. Kissinger

June 19, 1969 -- 7:55 p. m.

The President asked if K survived. K responded that the press conference was effective. The President said Secy Rogers was pleased -- he had called -- and said further that he (the P) thought we got across a few points, particularly on Clifford and all the things they are after us on, which had to be made. The President also said he had wanted to come out strong in defense of Governor Rockefeller, especially since Marianne Means had asked that question (since she was the one whose paper had written the editorial recommending against the President's European trip).

The President asked if K thought they understood the MIRV point. K said he had just received a call from Chalmers Roberts who wanted an explanation of the footprint statement. K said that, upon reflection, this would be a chilling thought to all in attendance. The President said that by 1973 they will have targetted 80 per cent of our Minutemen sites which absolutely requires that we have the ABM. They discussed how it only takes one ABM to knock out the whole business -- and not 3 ABM's to knock out 3 missiles as commonly thought. K said they probably won't understand the footprint but the discussion this remark will start will build a very solid case for the ABM -- it will become overwhelmingly apparent that the ABM is necessary. The President said he had made it clear that we wouldn't compromise -- we have it won. K said it showed how far we had gone -- from 20 to 50 -- and that this point was very strongly made. He said, however, Fulbright will holler about declassifying certain information (in the press conference).

The President then said the Fulbright Resolution on national commitments is such a stupid thing. K said the examples which the President gave made a very forceful case against such a resolution, and that it wasn't too violent. The President said even with Clifford he was temperate. He said we couldn't let Clifford, Harriman, et al, get away with blaming us for their screw-up. K said that point was very important to make; the problem is how one plays it from here -- to make it clear they were basically responsible. The President said all they did while in office was get the shape of the table -- the bombing halt was merely to get the table-shape. He said he thought a good point was made on the ceasefire. K said he thought calling attention to the President's speech was important -- that there had been agreement -- but that it might get fudged up in the press write-ups. They may not get the difference between "ceasefires" and a "ceasefire." The President said he made the difference obvious about ceasefires in conventional and in guerrilla wars.

We'll see how they handle it in the morning. K said he thought it was a very effective press conference.

Ids

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCON
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
6-19-69 AM

R said he had been talking to Ron Ziegler about this morning's news
story on troop withdrawals. R said Ziegler told him K had anticipated
R by 12 hours. K said whenever there is a backgrounder over here,
he will tell R ahead of time - K will always check with R's people.
K said in this case as it happens he knows where it comes from and
it is not a State Dept source. R asked if K had seen broadcast - it
starts off with White House source stated. K said no, if White House
source he does not know who it is. R said there was a backgrounder.
K asked if he could drop in to see R before he sees Elliot - about
12:50. R said yes. K mentioned how concerned President was about
the previous leaks. R said we have been mum over here.

K told R that Cy Vance had been in yesterday and filled R in on their
conversation. K said he asked Vance about searching our files.
Vance said it never made it to Washington; there was tough internal
fight and it was never put to the other side.

R said he thought the book they sent over this time was much better.
R said he worked on it quite a lot and thinks it has most of information
President needs - pretty good general tone that answers the questions.
K said we do not change things just to change them. R agreed they had
not been too good. K said the only time we do them is when Q&As do
not come over in time. R said the book that was sent over last time was
bad and he was embarrassed and R wants to be sure from now on that
books are a lot better.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCON
Mac Bundy
Mr. Kissinger
6-19-69 PM

B said he was getting ready to go to Moscow - has had very good cooperation from Departments. His one problem is to find knowledgeable, sophisticated Republican - they are all in Washington. B said he would like to take Francis Bator. K said he has no problems with that.

B said they used to pay - it is no trick for him to manage administratively and B is inclined to think that is simpler than requesting funds. B said that is what Bob Osgood recommends but B thought he should check with K. K said he has never had occasion to draw on these Presidential funds. B said he does not exclude it and if it would mean a lot to B, he will raise it. B said no - he does not want to have any embarrassment since it is quasi Government business, etc. K and B agreed to leave it that way.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON
Atty Genl Mitchell
Mr. Kissinger

6-20-69 10:55 AM

M said he had call from Genl Cushman who said he is working hard on
report and wondered if M would be agreeable to being friend of court
an go over draft before it is presented. M said this seemed a strange
request which he left up in the air. K said he would not do it - it
then means either that the AG, with all that implies, helped force
the report down or if not that, it makes it hard for us to jump on it
after. K said he is sure Cushman did it in good faith but it is a risky
thing for M to do in K's opinion. M said that was his impression but
he wanted to get K's opinion. K said if they tell the truth that is all we
ask from them.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

*

TELECON

Cy Vance

1:20 p. m. 6/20/69

Vance wanted to express his views on the way the ceasefire issue
was handled in the press conference. It implied that we had
proposed to the other side a standstill ceasefire. He was also
upset about the international supervisory group.

HAK said this was offered in the President's speech and was
not intended as an attack on anyone else. HAK wanted to know
what Vance thought of the troop withdrawals. Vance thought it
was great.

HAK informed Vance that Mort's paper was done. He also said
that it is hard to control what is said in a press conference.
He said he thought Vance would find in the next few eeks that the
other thing will get clearer. This is not our last word on this but
regretted that it came out this way.

DECLASSIFIED

*

Telecon
Jerry Smith

2:20 p. m. 6/20/69

Smith wanted to know if HAK had talked with General Allison yet. HAK said no. Smith said Allison wasn't happy with the study the Swi have proposed.

HAK said he would go along with whatever Jerry wanted. The only problem is that the President would prefer to hold the Swi back. He would like to see what others are going to put on the table first. There is a lot to be said by seeing what happens and if it is difficult, go the other road.

Smith said he wanted to make the point that this wasn't a gimmick.

HAK said the President was afraid people will start leaking it if he gives it too much of a blessing. If you want to make sure, I will be glad to get you an appointment. Jerry said he would do whatever HAK suggests.

HAK said on the other hand, he swears he(?) wasn't looking at Smith when he made that statement. HAK didn't think any purpose would be served to identify the other person.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon
Joe Sisco

3:25 p. m. 6/20/69

Sisco wanted to brief HAK before he saw Rafael.

Elliot and S met yesterday on this. Wally is sending a cable that they offered to give an analysis of our reply (?). Wally said he would rather do this thing on Monday so Eban has some time to focus on it. All Richardson did was say:

1. We have received their reply 2. It is in the form of a ______ proposal,

3. we are examining it carefully to see what it means and hope to talk next week.

Sisco said it means there are some advantages but a number of fundamental
differences remain. They are: (1) the proposal leaves open the possibility
of direct negotiations (2) it makes reference to peace but is not as explicit
as it should be (3) (Missed this one) (4) it does not include the safeguards
that we wrote into ours regarding refugee question.

The advances are: (1) explicitly recognizes the State of Israel (2) basic notion of binding binding agreement between parties has been bought (3) signed by both parties has been bought (4) notion of freedom of passage has been bought with one small reservation (5) the previous proposal calls for very substantial UN role which will give Israel trouble but based on irrevocable period of five-year stint once decision has been taken by Security Council. The crucial question is the border question.

Sisco said we have a long distance to go. There is enough in this to have
another round and to make it plain where the differences are. This reply
means (1) it is clear the Russians want to continue talking (2) this answer
means the Soviets want to help keep the lid on the situation. What it does
not demonstrate is whether they are willing to put screws on Arabs to get
binding peace we are talking about. This is pretty much what HAK predicted.

They agreed to have breakfast on Tuesday 8:30 in the WH mess.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
The President

6:21 p. m.

6/20/69

The President invited HAK for a boat ride. HAK mentioned that a friend was coming from New York and he had not heard from him yet. The President said that was fine, but he could come Monday. HAK agreed.

The President said we won Proudy(sp?) which gives us 51 now. Mansfield was disturbed because the ratio was 2 to 1. HAK said Mel thinks the only compromise is to say we aren't deploying any this year anyway. The President said let it appear that it is extorted without being a surrender (?). This was hard for Proudy. The press conference helped him a little.

HAK said he told Ron to get the rest of it out today.

The President thought the back channel was just right to Bunker. It was exactly what he wanted to say. HAK said State wanted to send cables to Australia to express some concern. He mentioned that Thieu was having a cabinet meeting, and the President wanted to know if this came from State or Bunker. HAK said it was a public announcement.

HAK said Vance called and was unhappy about the ceasefire thing.

The President said that apparently the press conference had solid impact from the standpoint of style. Sometimes that can have more of an effect. The President told Harlow that if in 1970 we are at the level Clifford suggests, we have had it.

President said he would see HAK tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

6:30 p. m. 6/20/69

Secretary Rogers was a little upset by the memo the President sent him on these cables. He had an answer he was going to send to the President but wanted to discuss it with HAK first. It was not his understanding that HAK's staff would clear operational cables.

HAK said he thought we should keep matters where they are. It is certainly satisfactory for everyone's point of view. There was one cable that the President noticed in the regular reading material that HAK gives the President on all Paris negotiations that was in question. This cable had not been cleared but added that we couldn't clear all of Roger's cables. The system that now exists will be no problem -- concerning policy cables that was the only thing he had in mind. Rogers said if he really wants to see everything we send over. Rogers also express concern over the fact that when he clears a cable then Walsh has to call Sneider and Sneider has to clear it. HAK didn't think this was right and said the Secretary should have the last word. k

Rogers said he would talk to the President about this and HAK agreed that he should. He said he has a general line they follow and that the day to day negotiations really should be done at State. He said it doesn't make any difference what we say in the public sessions but a change in direction he would certainly clear with WH.

HAK assured him that this was the procedure that had been followed in previous administrations even back to Eisenhower. Rogers wanted it to go back that far, but

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON

Robert S. McNamara
Mr. Kissinger
10:50 a.m., 6-21-69

McN stated he was calling on a semi official matter - that he needed
HAK's opinion on the effect on your program of some of these comments
that are being made, in particular Clark Clifford's.

HAK said they are disastrous. McN stated that it looks as if they are
not disastrous it is a severe penalty. McN stated that he has been
keeping his mouth shut but if it would be helpful, he would be willing
to try to shut them off and stop off some of this stuff.

HAK said these people are still operating in the Johnson syndrome.
They are fighting to get us to do things that we are doing but which
they are making very difficult because of the timing of their statements.
HAK indicated to McN that it would be very helpful if he could talk
to this people.

McN said that is all I want to know. I will talk to Clifford and Averill
next week. McN said "Henry, you shouldn't tell anybody anything
because it goes around this town like wildfire. HAK said I don't tell
anyone anything.

McN said Ethel is giving a luncheon and I will see Averill and talk
to him about shutting up. In the case of Cy Vance (HAK interrupted
to say that he had a long talk with Cy and he is an absolutely honorable
and dedicated man. McN asked, "does his statement hurt you?"
HAK said it hurts us from the point of view of troop withdrawal state-
ment. I would just as soon he kept quiet. HAK stated that he would
be glad to see any of these people at any time.

McN said I tried to be helpful to you. These people ought to take
your advice on what is helpful to the Administration. We ought to do
anything we can to help this Administration and correct problems.
HAK said these people with whom I have worked are not being ignored
and their views are not being disregarded. McNamara said, "I will
go to work on this". HAK said that is very generous of you.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCOM

Ambassador Lagdameo (Philippines)
Mr. Kissinger
5:00 p. m., 6-21-69

Ambassador Lagdameo called to say that his party had been advised
of matter and that he said it was perfectly alright - time and every-
thing.

HAK said fine, we will be back with you early next week when we
make a decision and thank you very much.

mlh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/1966

Telecon
Ambassador Yost
9:40 a.m. 6/23/69

Ambassador Yost heard that there may be an NSC meeting on Wednesday on China. HAK said no there wouldn't be. The Ambassador probably heard of the paper being prepared for the Review Group. He said they couldn't possibly have an NSC meeting on China without Yost attending

HAK thanked Yost for his letters and added that Yost's SALT point had been taken care of.

Yost said he would be sending a paper on the Middle East to HAK this week.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecon
Secretary Laird

10:00 a.m.

6/23/69

Laird wasnted HAK to know that he would be testifying today on the ABM and Helms was going with him. He read Helms' statement and made a couple changes. Helm's xk insists on putting in the business tha the Russians are not individually guided. HAK said that statement gives totally the wrong impression. Laird said that the Russians, as well as ourselves, try to have the impace in a small area in the ocean. and what regulates the impact is the point of release.

HAK wanted Laird to call him and let him know how it turned out.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCON
The Vice President
Mr. Kissinger

6-23-69 10:58 AM

VP said he is very much disturbed about the ineffectiveness of Senate leadership responding to constant hammering of doves in Senate. VP said Dirksen does not seem to be organizing anything. VP referred to Hughes speech last Friday - exceedingly well done; effectively transferred the war and was very critical. VP said he knows Hughes from Governors' Conf and someone is writing his stuff. VP said he wanted to enlist K's help. A week from Tuesday the VP is giving a speech and he would like to essentially make it a rebuttal of Hughes. VP asked if K would give him some help on it. K said he would be glad to and would get an outline over by Wednesday.

VP and K discussed their meeting today and decided to meet at 3:30 because of K's meeting with the Pres at 5:15.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O.12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCON
President
Mr. Kissinger
6-23-69 11:48 AM

K said he was going to FIAB lunch today. Murphy was in yesterday and they had received some info about SS 9 and were really shaken about it. K said CIA tried to correct it a bit. K asked if he could tell them some of our concerns about intelligence community. Pres said yes and to tell them quite bluntly. Pres said to tell them what he said in the meeting: when they leak, leak high as well as low. K said Pres said they have mixed their conclusions with their facts. K said there is massive problem with MIRV - does not want to bother Pres with lot of technical details but we are going thru same process again of dragging things out of them. K said talk of some alternative for SS 9 which is absurd along the line of DuBridge. K brought up points Pres made: if they thought it was saturated, why testing new one; what is reason for it and what is purpose of testing. Pres said right - let them know we lack confidence in the thing. Pres said he really believes himself that there are many people instead of giving us intelligence, giving us their opinion. Pres said it is o.k. to give opinion but should be separated from fact - he is interested in opinions but does not want them mixed with facts. Pres said to also get point across that he has made survey and found that from 65 to 69, they were 50 percent low on estimates. K said certainly and he could throw them the table.

K said he is going to see John Mitchell shortly and will tell him what Pres said last night. Pres said fine. Pres said Rogers did not raise any objection on keeping that open so that is done. K said we have slight complication in Turkey - some fear of disorders. Pres said to skip it then. K said we cannot do that but we will not make it overnight - exploring seaside place or airport. P said we do not want to run any substantial risks - K said we are checking out most carefully. P said on Iran he wants clear understanding that if he goes there, the Shah's visit will be postponed til next year. P asked when K was going to announce. K said we could hold until Saturday for Sunday papers. P said he just does not want State to leak. K agreed that more and more people know it now.

K said Scotty Reston had called him - P said not to return it. K said he wrote friendly article. P said o.k. to return it but not to give any information. P said if any question about why we are not talking, tell him cold bloodedly that it is because of Okinawa.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCONE
Ambassador of India
Mr. Kissinger
6-23-69 3:02 PM

Amb said he was calling about what K had told him the other day.
The PM has replied to say she would welcome the event and is looking
forward to it. She prefers the 29th. K said we also prefer the 29th.
Amb said she has said not the 28th - the 29th would be preferable;
otherwise the 30th. Amb asked if he could send telegram back immediately
to say it is the 29th. K said yes. Amb said he has told them not to
mention it to anyone. K said we will be getting in touch with the Amb
formally to work out announcements, schedule, etc.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCORN

John McCloy
Mr. Kissinger
6-23-69 3:10 PM

K said he had talked to the Pres about McC's letter and he agrees entirely with McC's concept of the letter. K said in fact we are pretty much counting on McC's organizing the board in that way. K said he wanted to talk to McC on how you do this. McC said problem is how you organize when you have a position as adviser - this is a little complicated. K said President feels that McC is responsible to him - McC is not the spokesman for the agency. McC said it is delicate business. K said we would think of McC sittin in on some of the NSC meetings dealing with that subject. McC said he thinks there is a real tendend tendency to shift the channels of power. K said this is exactly our worry. K asked when McC was coming back and McC said he was leaving Canada tomorrow - has very important meeting in NY on Wednesday, then he is pretty much in the clear. McC said he would give K's office a mix ring when he gets back to NY. K said we are having an NSC meeting on this subject on Wed morning but K does not think McC should attend unprepared. K said for McC to call him on Wed and they will fix a time - K is eager to have McC get working on this. K said we do not want McC to be ourx spokesman - we need someone with McC's wisdom.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCORN

Rowland Evans
Mr. Kissinger

6-23-69

3:15 PM

K said in looking through our records it turned out that State Dept
recommended Midway format. E said he would like to see K some
time this week.

E asked K where Horner piece came from - from K. K said
definitely not. E said it was not from the White House then. K said
he did not way that - it did not come from K. E asked if K had read
it and K said yes. E asked K what he thought of it and K said E should
talk to Ziegler.

E asked about an early breakfast this week and E and K agreed to
meet at 8:00 on Friday, June 27 at the Metropolitan Club.

---

6-23-69 3:20 PM

K said he was calling back to make sure that E would not say K
disavowed thing. E said no - he would not say anything like that.

E said there was an obvious reason for it as there was
nothing in the Times or in the Post and he was just curious.

E said he would not even mention K. E said he has call in to Ziegler.

K said he is off background by his own choice for a while.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCON
Rowland Evans
Mr. Kissinger

6-23-69 3:15 PM

---

6-23-69 3:20 PM

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCORN

G Smith
Mr. Kissinger

6-23-69 3:20 PM

K said he got a testy note from S that K should check things
with him. K said he sent back testy note that he would do whenever
he knew S would know. S said K means that someone else is doing it -
K said on speeches he cannot always guarantee that he will be involved.
K said he is going to keep a closer eye on it now.

S said he was calling to see if Farley could attend Wednesday meeting
in addition to Keeney. K asked whether he could not have one or the other.
S said he would like to have both and it seems fashionable now for
Secretaries and Under Secretaries of various depts to be present. K said
that was only because Packard was involved in the study. K said he
thinks the world of Farley but he will have to check it with the President.
S said he thinks it would be helpful to Farley in future handling of
negotiations.

K said he would like to make a suggestion that is none of his business.
K said he thought Phil might be the one to do the consulting in
Europe - he is inspiring, etc. K said it is personal suggestion and not
a Presidential one. S agreed and said he had already suggested this.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958

By DS NARA Date 4/15/196

TELCONE
Secy Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
6-23-69 5:05PM

R asked about possibility of postponing or delaying NSC meeting for an hour because of Canadian meeting which R feels he should attend. K agreed and said he would try to make it 11:00 - he will let R know in about an hour.

R said he guesses Pres is thinking of Turkey and K said yes. R said it presents all kinds of problems and asked if he had made up his mind. K said yes. K asked if R is concerned because of demonstrations and R said that plus fact of election and plus ex Greece. R asked if K wanted to send Agnew to Greece. K said VP told him ex his talk with Rogers convinced him he should go. R said they did not encourage it. K said VP said he put up proposition that if they had slight modification and some more enlightened policies, he could then go. R said it depends on what they mean by slight modifications. R said it would not make sense for any American to make such a trip now.

R asked about Saigon. K said he mentioned it to Pres and said that both R and Greene (personally) had expressed similar worry. K said he thinks Pres is eager to do it but K also has sense that something may be brewing there. R said when you look at it from standpoint of President's own security and purpose of trip it is hard to relate the two. K said he feels it would be hard to be in SEA and avoid it. R said it will be interpreted as twisting Thieu's arm, plans not going right, etc. R said when you combine that with physical hazzard, you have to ask what the point is. K said he sees R's point and will make it to him strongly.

K said Dean Rusk was in today to see him and President dropped in K said Dean in effect repeated what he had already said to R about trying to shift some of responsibility to Hanoi, making clear that Hanoi is obstacle rather than Saigon. K said Rusk did not say in any clear way how to do it. K said Rusk was very strong about Clifford. K said he promised Dean he would relate to R what went on. R asked if he (Rusk) indicated willingness to say anything publicly. K said yes - he will be on Issues and Answers the end of July and if given opportunity will be willing to say something. K said if we ever have delegation thing to get accomplished, Rusk would be ideal one to send. R said what he needs is a post and R thinks he might take one - R has talked to President about this.

R said he might give Pres a call about Saigon.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

TELCON
Secy Laird
Mr. Kissinger
6-23-69 5:20 PM

L said he wanted to give K a report on meeting over there. K said
Aiken told him that Fulbright made another ass of himself.

L said Fulbright and Gore briefed press and said L changed his
position re SS9 - changed it from first strike to second strike weapon.

L said it was complete misrepresentation. L said he will have to
get his Pentagon boys together and explain it to them. L said they
asked him if it could be xx used as second strike and he said of course.
L said it has second strike capability but that is no change.

L said everything else went fine. L said he thought he should tell K
this in case he sees report that it has turned into second strike weapon.

jm

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

By

DSNARA Date

4/15/06

TELCON
Scotty Reston
Mr. Kissinger
6-24-69 2:55 PM

R said he has been away and feels out of touch and asked where we stand. K said he thought R had caught the spirit of what we are trying to do in his article last Sunday. R and K discussed deescalation (portions of conversation were not heard because of IO calls). K said if Hanoi thinks we need to waid until they get out completely, it ruins negotiating process. K said it is very tough problem on how to maneuver in this limited space. R said one wonders if one's son sends note home saying he is coming home on such and such a date but parents of boy down street do not receive such news. K said the whole thing is tragic process - one of those things where you pay for everything in an accumulated way. R said it is hard when we get all those men out of there and parents down the street see Johnnie coming home and wonder where their boy is. K said he can only agree with R - problem is to keep any direction you are taking turning into a panic. Any action of such importance has consequences and effects our domestic stability. R said he ran into a few people in Administration who said one of things they wonder about is how long moderate line can be held in face of pressure from right. K said we certainly do not like it from that sense but we have been determined to hold it up to now - a little more compassion from the left would make our psychological state easier. K said it is tactically easy to threaten with right but no one in this building has disposition to do that. R said he thinks we are going along as well as we can - does not know what else K could do. K said he appreciated what R wrote - he likes to be morally in step with R.

R asked K's thoughts about Clifford piece. K said circumstance is arguable but not so different from what one may want to do - doing at this time is a little rough. K said he knew Clifford's views and what we were doing is not so different - too bad he needed to go phx public. K said he was telling R this privately. R asked if idea of keeping AF there made any sense. K said Clifford's formula is for indefinite war and we would like to get it over with. If forces have to be kept, AF is better kind of force to keep there. R said even by 1971, if we have even 100 casualties a week it will be rough - K agreed.

K said for R to let him know when he was coming to town again.

jm