GENERAL MILLS, INC. • EXECUTIVE OFFICES • 9200 Wayzata Boulevard • Minneapolis, Minnesota

JAMES H. RUBEN
Vice President

April 9, 1981

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
1800 K Street, N.W., Suite 520
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am writing to you in my capacity as both a continuing director of the Minnesota Kicks organization (even though I sold my financial interest) and a continuing member of the Executive Committee of the NASL to thank you for the letter that you wrote on our behalf to Dr. Havelange, President of FIFA.

Hopefully the letter will serve as a door opener allowing for an in-person meeting. Should that occur, I believe it would be in the best interest of the NASL to have the Commissioner and representatives of the Executive Committee to meet with you before hand for a briefing.

Should for any reason that not be the case, I would like to give you some additional background information for FIFA discussions as follows:

1. With respect to your comments about no team being profitable in 1980 in the NASL, you could add the fact that no team, with the exception of the Minnesota Kicks, has ever reported an operating profit since the foundation of the NASL in 1967. (The Kicks realized a modest profit for one year.)

2. In the U.S. the level of popularity of the game is such that NASL ticket prices are substantially below that of other major sports (averaging approximately one-third of those of professional football.) The increasing attendance figures are misleading regarding dollar income.

APR 16 1981

#

Mailing Address: P. O. Box 1113, Minneapolis, Minnesota 55440

This is recycled paper

- 2 -

3. The current network television contract negotiated for between the NFL and the American network pays $600 million over five years to the 24 NFL teams (each team gets $5 million cash prior to the start of their season.) It is anticipated that during the next negotiations, which will take place in 1983, the NFL will be demanding $1 billion revenue for the ensuing 5 years.

4. It is critical to the development of American soccer that the NASL develop profitable financial stability in order to continue its major funding of USFA and youth soccer organizations around the country. The NASL not only contributes substantial financial support to the United States Federal Soccer Association and to the Canadian Soccer Federation, but the development of North American citizens as players within the NASL has provided our national teams with virtually all of its competitive talent.

5. Finally, if the professional game in the United States were to develop to the same degree of popularity as exists in the rest of the world, the amount of revenue available for the continuing development of soccer worldwide would increase exponentially inasmuch as the USA and Canada together comprise the largest professional sports and entertainment markets in the world.

I hope this additional information may be of some use to you.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

James H. Ruben

JHR:pm

cc: Phil Woosnam
    Executive Committee

P.S. Just for your information, I have a new assignment at General Mills. I am now director of acquisitions and divestitures worldwide and also in charge of our long range strategic planning.

HENRY A. KISSINGER

October 7, 1981

Dear Jim:

I appreciate your letting me know about
your move to Modern Merchandising, and
I want to wish you every success. I am
sure it will be an opportunity for great
creativity and challenge.

With my congratulations and best wishes,

Mr. James H. Ruben
President
Modern Merchandising, Inc.
5101 Shady Oak Road
Minnetonka, Minnesota 55343

OFFICE OF
HENRY A. KISSINGER

February 3, 1981

Dear Mr. Rudin:

Mrs. Henry Kissinger has asked me to write to you on her behalf as she is preparing to leave the country in a few days for an extended period of time. She wanted you to know that she very much appreciated your asking her to serve as a member of the Benefit Committee for Southern Roads/City Pavements but as this time she feels that she cannot take on the commitment.

She wanted me to let you know that she thanks you for thinking of her and regrets that she has to decline.

Mr. Lewis Rudin
International Center of Photography
1130 Fifth Avenue
(at 94th Street)
New York, New York 10028

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Dear Ken:

Thank you for sending me the copy of
your recent article and Joe Sterne's
editorial. I found them most inter-
esting.

I hope to be able to attend the next
meeting on November 30th--I will just
be returning from a three week trip abroad
and the exact return date is not yet
final. My office will be in touch with
you.

Also, I appreciate your kind words.

Mr. Kenneth Rush
The Atlantic Council
1616 H Street NW
Washington, DC 20006

CHAIRMAN

KENNETH RUSH

VICE CHAIRMEN

HENRY H. FOWLER
THEODORE C. ACHILLES
HARLAN CLEVELAND
EMILIO G. COLLADO
WM. McCH. MARTIN
DAVID PACKARD
EUGENE V. ROSTOW
ANDREW J. GOODPASTER

TREASURER

WILLIAM H. G. FITZGERALD

SECRETARY

TOM KILLEFER

DIRECTOR GENERAL

FRANCIS O. WILCOX

DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL

JOSEPH W. HARNED

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR GENERAL

MARTHA C. FINLEY

DIRECTORS

DAVID M. ABSHIRE
DAVID C. ACHESON
DONALD G. AGGER
ANNE ARMSTRONG
WILLIS C. ARMSTRONG
EDWARD W. BARRETT
ANDREW H. BERDING
JUSTIN BLACKWELDER
LANDRUM R. BOLLING
GENE E. BRADLEY
L. DEAN BROWN
WILLIAM A. M. BURDEN
HODDING CARTER III
WILLIAM J. CASEY

*HENRY E. CATTO
SOL C. CHAIKIN
G. A. COSTANZO
FREDERICK L. DEMING
RUSSELL E. DOUGHERTY
WILLIAM D. EBERLE
ROBERT ELLSWORTH
SHERWOOD L. FAWCETT
WILLIAM C. FOSTER
GEORGE S. FRANKLIN, JR.
LINCOLN GORDON
JOHN E. GRAY
*ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.
CHRISTIAN A. HERTER, JR.
JOHN D. HICKERSON
MARTIN HILLENBRAND
CLAIRE GIANNINI HOFFMAN
J. R. HOYMAN HOVEY, JR.
THOMAS L. HUGHES
FRED CHARLES IKLE
JOHN N. IRWIN II
U. ALEXIS JOHNSON
ISAAC C. KIDD, JR.
LANE KIRKLAND
HENRY A. KISSINGER
PETER F. KROGH
CAROL LAISE
JOHN M. LEDDY
LYMAN L. LEMNITZER
WALTER J. LEVY
WINSTON LORD
JAY LOVESTONE
SANFORD N. MCDONNELL
GEORGE C. MCGhee
ROBERT M. MCKINNEY
LAWRENCE C. MCQUADE
HARALD B. MCMGREN
LEONARD H. MARKS
EDWIN M. MARTIN
SAMUEL W. MEEK
PAUL H. NITZE
FREDERICK E. NOLTING, JR.
ROBERT E. OSGOOD
GEORGE R. PACKARD
EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO
HENRY H. PORTER
JACQUES J. REINSTEIN
STANLEY R. RESOR
EMMETT J. RICE
CHARLES W. ROBINSON
ROBERT V. ROOSA
H. CHAPMAN ROSE
NATHANIEL SAMUELS
J. ROBERT SCHAETZEL
ADOLPH W. SCHMIDT
BRENT SCOWCROFT
JOSEPH J. SISCO
HELMUT SONNENFELDT
FRANK A. SOUTHARD, JR.
STEPHEN STAMAS
TIMOTHY W. STANLEY
CARLETON M. STEWART
RALPH I. STRAUSS
ROBERT STRAUSZ-HUPE
GEORGE A. STRICHMAN
LEONARD SULLIVAN, JR.
PHILIP H. TREZISE
WILLIAM C. TURNER
CYRUS R. VANCE
MARINA V. N. WHITMAN
WATSON WISE
JOSEPH J. WOLF

*UNTIL ENTERING THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

HONORARY DIRECTORS

GEORGE BALL
EUGENE R. BLACK
C. DOUGLAS RONSON
JOHN FERGUSON III

RALPH C. M. FLYNT
ALFRED M. GRUENTHER
ANDREW HEISKELL

HENRY M. JACKSON
JACOB K. JAVITS
RUTH C. LAWSON

HENRY CABOT LODGE
JOHN J. MCCLOY
LAURIS NORSTAD

EDMUND ORGILL
HERMAN PHLEGER
WILLIAM P. ROGERS

DEAN RUSK
CORTLANDT V. R. SCHUYLER
CHARLES M. SPOFFORD

THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL
OF THE UNITED STATES

1616 H STREET, N.W. • WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006

TELEPHONE (202) 347-9353
CABLE: ATCOUN

September 25, 1981

The Honorable
Henry A. Kissinger
The Center for Strategic and
International Studies
1800 K Street, NW
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Henry:

In view of the indispensable role you played
in the settlement of the Berlin problem, I am sure
you will be interested in reading the enclosed
article I wrote for the Baltimore Sun on the 10th
anniversary of the signing of the Berlin Agreement,
together with an accompanying editorial by Joe
Sterne. The article was written at Joe's request.
He was familiar with the negotiations since he was
stationed in Germany at the time.

The four Ambassadors who negotiated the Agree-
ment were asked by German Television to participate
in a 75-minute television program discussing the
Agreement on the occasion of the 10th anniversary.
Amb. Abrassomov showed considerable courage in being
willing to participate. Although the broadcast was
only from stations in West Germany and West Berlin,
it could also be heard in practically all of East
Germany and East Berlin and everything is carefully
monitored from Moscow. He, of course, had to stick
to the Soviet legal position, but all in all conducted
himself well. The following day he gave an elaborate
luncheon for the Ambassadors and their wives at which
caviar, vodka and toasts flowed for several hours,
according to Soviet custom. In a private talk he
indicated that he was very concerned about what the
Soviets consider the hard position of President Reagan,
which concern I think is all to the good.

SEP 28 1981

THE

SUN

A 14

BALTIMORE, THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 3, 1981

DONALD H. PATTERSON, President

PAUL A. BANKER, Managing Editor

REG MURPHY, Publisher

J.R.L. STERNE, Editorial Page Editor

## Berlin: 10 and 20 Years Later

For Berlin, this is a time of round-numbered anniversaries. Three weeks ago the divided city, in its divided way, marked the twentieth year since the dread pre-dawn when East German troops began building the Berlin Wall. Today is the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, the pact that has brought a measure of peace to the city that had so long been the flash point of Cold War.

It is hard to envisage two events that better symbolize the gulf between East-West confrontation and negotiation as they exist in an imperfect world. The Communist-built Wall was a challenge that President Kennedy prudently met by sending 1,500 American troops to West Berlin—no farther. It was a war scare, but no war. The Four-Power Agreement can hardly be said to have brought normalcy to a once-great capital; rather, it institutionalized abnormalcy, and in so doing lessened tensions and improved the lot of both Berlins.

On the page opposite Kenneth Rush, the chief U.S. negotiator of the Berlin Agreement [Henry Kissinger has called him the "hero" of the enterprise], gives us an illuminating glimpse of the secret diplomacy of ten years ago. To break an impasse, "encrusted in long-standing, bitter controversies," Mr. Rush relied on back-channel talks involving two Soviet ambassadors,

the West German chancellor and his adviser, plus Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. Excluded were the British and French chief negotiators and U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers. The task was not to reconcile contradictory legal positions but to ease around them by ambiguity, omission and euphemism. For this, Mr. Rush relied on his lawyerly wiles, often prodding Soviet Ambassador Pyotr Abrasimov to join with him in seeking face-saving solutions.

While this provides intriguing insight on diplomatic history, the most pertinent message coming to us from a decade distant is that detente has its uses. "The agreement bears testimony," writes Mr. Rush, "to the feasibility of solving grave issues with the Soviet Union by negotiation when both parties consider it in their best national interests to do so." In an era when the detente efforts of our last three presidents are too often disparaged, it should be remembered what was accomplished in Berlin.

President Reagan may well be justified in stiffening the Western stance toward an aggressively arming Soviet Union. But his stewardship will be lacking if he now fails to move from confrontation to the negotiation so necessary to make the American-Soviet rivalry a little less dangerous.

THE SUN, Thursday, September 3, 1981

Page Two

Berlin: The Agreement That Works (Continued)

The words "maintain" and "continue" make unmistakably clear that there is no change in the previous relationship as approved by the Allies. The term "developed" makes clear that future changes can be made to expand and strengthen these ties.

The agreement contains for West Berliners other vital improvements of a humanitarian nature, including the right to visit East Berlin and East Germany, to carry West German passports and to be represented abroad by West Germany.

The negotiations were extremely difficult. The issues were highly complex and encrusted in long-standing, bitter controversies.

After a year of negotiations, no real progress had been made and none was in prospect. Acute distrust and suspicion persisted on both sides. There was strong evidence that the Soviet leadership was subject to doubts about the feasibility of its own Western policy and was torn by an acute internal struggle over what course to follow. In my own case, the National Security Defense Memorandum (NSDM) under which I operated was so hard-line and rigid as to permit no room for real negotiation. There was little hope of my being able to secure more flexibility in view of deeply felt differences among and within the various bureaucracies (State, Defense, CIA, etc.) represented on the National Security Council.

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security assistant, were fully aware of the problem and decided that an attempt should be made to break the impasse through secret negotiations between me and Pyotr Abrasimov, the Soviet ambassador to East Germany who represented the Soviet Union at the Berlin negotiations. Subsequently, it proved feasible for me to carry on these secret negotiations also with the Soviet ambassador to West Germany, Valentin Falin. His residence in Bonn was near mine and we could meet frequently without detection.

These discussions were so secret in our own government that not even the secretary of State, William Rogers, was informed of them. Of course, the British and French also were without any knowledge of them.

With the strong and unwavering support of President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger, a detailed tentative Berlin agreement was worked out by the two Soviet ambassadors and me. The seemingly insoluble differences were overcome in a series of intensive talks over a period of some three months up to August 1, 1971.

There remained the complicated and difficult task of securing approval of the secret tentative agreement in the Four Power ambassadorial forum, without revealing the secret negotiations or that there was a tentative agreement, complete to the last comma. This was done, with some minor changes, in almost daily sessions of the Four Power ambassadors and their staffs from August 11 to August 18, 1971.

Some problems arose with the State Department. This was understandable in view of the fact that the department had no knowledge of the secret talks. The problems were resolved and the final Berlin Agreement was signed on September 3, 1971.

During the 10 years of its existence the Berlin Agreement has worked well and continues to do so. Some controversies have arisen, but none of a serious nature. Millions of people continue to benefit from it in a humanitarian way.

The agreement bears testimony to the feasibility of solving grave issues with the Soviet Union by negotiation when both parties consider it in their best national interests to do so. But this is only one of several means needed to meet the world-wide competition and threat which the Soviet Union will continue to pose.

Kenneth Rush was the principal U.S. negotiator of the 1971 Four Power Berlin Agreement.