DR. KISSINGER NEWSWEEK ARTICLE DRAFT ONE 11/20/89

"Policy," the Austrian Foreign Minister, Metternich, once wrote, "is like a play in many acts which unfolds inexorably once the curtain is raised. To declare then that the performance will not go on is an absurdity. The play will be completed either by the actors or by the spectators who mount the stage."

In recent weeks, the curtain has been raised on a new play at the center of Europe. Some of the actors are still on the sidelines, hesitant either because they are not yet convinced of their performance or because they are not sure what roles they will take. And no one is precisely sure of the nature of the play itself. Still, the chief actors have

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it would be extremely dangerous for the Western democracies - whatever their yearnings based on secret thoughts in light of their historical experience - to collude in an against all makes themselves advocates of the division of Germany. Sooner or later this will change the German political landscape and generate a dangerous nationalism. For it will deprive the present responsible, essentially pro-Western, leadership in all German political parties from shaping the future.

The fact is that the political world as we have known it is disintegrating before our eyes. Its chief features are:

- German unification in some form has now become inevitable whatever the misgivings of almost all of Germany's neighbors and of the victims of German brutality during World War II. So far the only statesman who seems to understand this fully is President Mitterrand of France - the Western country that viscerally fears German unification the most.

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undertaken as a Congressional mandate, as an Executive branch anticipation of Congressional pressures, or in the guise of responding to European factions to build up, the result will be a reduction in existing NATO strategy. The concept of flexible response cannot be sustained under current conditions. foreseeable NATO forces except under conditions of a drastic redeployment of the Soviet military establishment deep into Russia.

Thus the choice before NATO - assuming that the neutralization of a united Germany is avoided - is the creation of a European security system involving varying zones of limited armaments or a process of unilateral reductions which drains NATO of strategic significance.

But even if the Federal Republic remains in NATO - by far the best outcome for the stability of Europe - reassessment of NATO strategy and organization has become imperative. Specifically, against what threat and with what forces

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Whatever ~~else~~ happens, the relative weight of America and Europe within NATO is bound to alter. The withdrawal of major American forces and the emergent role of an integrated Europe make it necessary to rethink the organization that evolved when American had a nuclear monopoly and was dominant, both militarily and economically. In other words, Europe must assume a growing responsibility for its own defense with the United States playing a role which is essential and basically supportive of European efforts.

The evolution of such an organization depends importantly, on the development of the European Community. And this in turn will reflect what happens on the issue of German unification.

No, some leading French political figures have pointed out that the European Community was never designed to accommodate a united Germany with a population of 80 million. Such

This suggests a two-fold task: (a) Europe should be given some institutional voice within NATO, perhaps by means of the West European Union; (b) the political relations between the European Community and the United States should include some systematic method of political consultation at a higher level.

## The Future of East-West Relations:

For years the argument has been advanced - ever more insistently - that the Western democracies should "help" Gorbachev weather the hostile forces arraigned against him at home. I have always questioned the wisdom of tying Western policy to a single personality no matter how able and impressive. Long-range policy can survive only if it is sustained by a foreseeable consensus of Soviet leaders.

The concept of "helping" Gorbachev implies concessions that one would not make to anyone else, in other words, unilateral concessions. But if concessions reflect

In practice this means working out a concept for the
future of Central Europe that permit: German unification on
the basis of self determination; a special security status
for the territory of the present East German state; a
balance of forces on both sides of the present dividing line
in Europe, with most Soviet ground forces withdrawn deep
into the Soviet Union; and a major withdrawal of US ground
forces into the territorial United States. The level of
remaining forces and the duration of their stay is obviously
a subject for negotiation.

At this stage the need is not for detailed bargaining
but for a concept to be developed first with our allies and
then with the Soviet Union. The meeting in Malta thus cannot
settle anything and should not attempt to do so as President
Bush has repeatedly pointed out. But it can be useful in
exposing each side to the other's philosophy for handling

In recent weeks, the curtain has been raised on a new play at the center of Europe. Some of the actors are still hesitant, either because they are not yet convinced of their respective roles or because they are not sure what roles the others will choose to play. And no one is precisely sure of the nature of the play itself. Still, the chief actors have

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no other choice but to try and somehow determine what sort
of spectacle this curtain has been raised on and then simply
assign each other roles necessary to bring it to a conclu-
sion. For if they fail, the play will inevitably be complet-
ed by spectators mounting the stage.

The dramatic events in Eastern Europe and along the
Berlin Wall have brought to an end the immediate post-war
era. Traditional categories have become too familiar on both
sides of the dividing line, the uneasiness about the reemer-
gence of a unified Germany too great to permit the recogni-
tion that the process now in train will reshape the catego-
ries of thought of a generation.

Certainly, the West has no reason to get ahead of
German desires on the reunification question. Perhaps -
ironically - four decades of Communist rule have stimulated
not socialism but East German nationalism. In that case the
West has no reason to object. But it would be highly

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dangerous for the Western democracies - whatever their
secret thoughts in light of their historical experience - to
make themselves advocates of the division of Germany. Sooner
or later this will change the German political landscape and
generate a dangerous nationalism. For it will deprive the
present responsible, essentially pro-Western, leadership in
all German political parties from shaping the future.

- German unification in some form has now become
inevitable whatever the misgivings of almost all of Germa-
ny's neighbors and of the victims of German brutality during
World War II. So far the only statesman who seems to under-
stand this fully is President Mitterrand of France - the
Western country that viscerally fears German unification the
most.

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- NATO will have to be fundamentally altered to take
into account that transcendant fact of the transformation of
the German situation as well as the erosion of the percep-
tion of the Soviet threat.

_ The Warsaw Pact, too, will not be able to survive in its present form far into the next decade._

_ The European Community will have to accelerate its unification if it is not to be sundered by the centrifugal tendencies unleashed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union's East European empire._

_In light of these trends, East-West relations - including and perhaps especially arms control negotiations - will require reexamination._

All this has totally altered the upcoming Malta summit between President Bush and Gorbachev. What had been conceived - at least on the American side - as a relaxed, philosophical stocktaking, has been transformed into a first

discussion of a fast-moving, revolutionary situation. As at
Reykjavik, a US President will have to deal with an unex-
pected agenda imposed by actions of Gorbachev. Whether
Gorbachev had any choice or whether he accelerated his
actions to produce a sense of urgency at Malta cannot now be
known. Most probably it is a combination of reacting to
events and design. To be sure, President Bush will not fall
into the Reykjavik trap of seeking to negotiate the agenda
with which he will be confronted; but this does not change
the fact that the Malta summit is meeting under conditions
of incipient crisis unforseen when it was planned.

Let me discuss these issues in turn:

German Unification

In recent weeks German unification, for so long the
subject of non-committed (?) exhortation, has moved
center-stage. It is a prospect that understandably fills
many with uneasiness. But it is a fact that can no longer be

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avoided; all reflection on European policy must start from
that premise.

Until recently German unity was a slogan invoked
primarily on formal occasions. In so far as it had an
operational meaning, it was conceived as an outgrowth of the
unification of Europe. The two parts of Germany would grow
together as Europe did; the evolution of the European
Community - especially the extension of some of its benefits
to Eastern Europe - would heal the split in Europe, includ-
ing Germany. But recent events leave no doubt that the two
processes march to different drummers. The unification of
Germany has a different rhythm than the unification of
Europe, which follows its own momentum. The watershed is not
the desire for unity in the abstract but the pressure for
democracy.

When the new East German leader, Egon Krenz, was
appointed less than a month ago, he said that the so-called

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German Democratic Republic had to be a Communist state or it
was nothing. He was right. There is no historic basis for
the East German state except as a Communist outpost. If it
becomes democratic it loses the reason for its separate
existence.

But democracy is exactly what its population demands
and what its government has promised to bring about. The
impact of free elections is quite different, however, in the
German Democratic Republic in contrast to its East European
neighbors. In Eastern Europe free elections arguably
strengthen the nation; in the German Democratic Republic
they are likely to undermine it. Free elections - if they
are genuinely free - will almost certainly be contested by
parties analagous to - and in time identical with - the
political parties of the Federal Republic. The outcome of
elections will in all probability be an overwhelming victory
for these parties. They will almost certainly seek - if not

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immediately, then in a few short years - to synchronize West
and East German policies and move the two halves of the
country towards unity. To be sure, the Soviet Union has the
power to stop this; but the division of Germany will then be
imposed from the outside and - unlike today - will have no
significant support from any German government.

These tendencies will be accelerated by economic
realities. Now that the border between the two Germanies is
to all practical purposes open, it will become necessary to
equalize economic conditions in the two parts of Germany.
Otherwise the exodus of especially the younger and more
ambitious element will drain the East German economy. But
equalization requires massive help from the Federal Repub-
lic. That is unlikely - and indeed senseless - if the
Communist party insists on maintaining its dominance over
East German political life. Why should the West sustain and
build up a non-democratic German state?

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To be sure, the fact that the two German states have
similar domestic institutions and comparable economic
programs does not mean automatically that they must merge
into one state. 19th century Germany was organized as a
Confederation and based on a Customs Union. It is conceiv-
able that something like that could be the outcome. A
confederation may have the advantage of permitting the
creation of a special zone of limited armaments to meet
Soviet security concerns. But the key fact is that the
decision will be fundamentally shaped by the wishes of the
German people. Outside pressures can impose a solution only
if they are prepared to use force against a people whose
desire for freedom was strong enough to puncture the Berlin
Wall after 28 years of repression. And it must be remembered
that in the 19th century the German Confederation and the
Customs Union were the precursors of the national state.

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Moreover, even if the outcome is a confederation, the long-term membership of the German Democratic Republic in the Warsaw Pact is extremely questionable. It is hard to imagine how an East German government dominated by more or less the same political parties as in the Federal Republic could be NATO allies in Western Europe and Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe. The issue of the military role of the so-called German Democratic Republic will arise inevitably with free elections in East Germany and the synchronization of economic policies of both Germanies.

Without doubt, the Soviet Union is entitled to security guarantees against its well-founded historic nightmare of renewed German military aggression. Some sort of special military status for the territory of the German Democratic Republic is desirable; the presence of some Soviet forces for an agreed critical period is conceivable. The United States should be prepared to negotiate on these subjects

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with an open mind together with its allies and the Soviet
Union. But the Warsaw Pact is a weak reed for this purpose.
It would be far better to work out new arrangements corre-
sponding to political realities either as part of an arms
control arrangement or of a European peace treaty whose time
may at last have come.

If the German Democratic Republic cannot stay in the
Warsaw Pact indefinitely, what about West German membership
in NATO? Gerasimov's reference to the impossibility of
unification so long as the two Germanies are each part of
opposing military blocs suggests that perhaps Gorbachev has
decided to play the German card: to offer unification in
return for German neutrality, perhaps conceding German
membership in the European Community so long as NATO is
abandoned. And indeed in his speech to the East German
parliament on the occasion of the celebration of the 40th
anniversary of the German Democratic Republic in October,

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Gorbachev referred favorably to a proposal along those lines
made by Stalin in 1953.

Such a maneuver for all its surface plausability would
be both reckless and in disregard of the lessons of history.
The two European wars of this century resulted importantly
from Germany's attempt to pursue a purely national policy in
the center of the Continent. The united Germany which came
into being in 1871 had more neighbors than any other Europe-
an state. Its attempt to protect itself against all possible
combinations threatened each neighbor individually and thus
contributed to bringing about the very military structures
whose rigidities led to war. And today a nation of 80
million standing alone in the center of the Continent would
be the most dangerous for European stability - in the end
even for the Soviet Union. Moreover, how would one define
military neutralization for a nation of this weight and
talent? How would one verify it? Over a period of time, such

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a Germany is bound to become a military factor as well. Or
else the Soviet Union would be tempted to use the neutral-
ization provisions to establish its hegemony over Germany.
Either event would threaten European stability.

Thus the safest course would be a Germany that remains
integrated into NATO with the territory that is now the
Federal Republic coupled with a regime of limited armaments
in Europe and special provisions for the territory that is
today the German Democratic Republic.

Thus the problem of German unification is in the first
instance conceptual. It requires an idea of process, that is
how Germany might be unified and over what period of time;
whether it becomes a single country with federal institu-
tions; a confederal state; or something in between. It must
be considered as well with what sort of European and Atlan-
tic institutional framework it can be compatible.

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What the United States and its allies must avoid is the siren call of colluding in the division of Germany. Neither the United States nor its allies need to get ahead of internal German discussions; they do have a responsibility to help provide a framework for them. They must not appear as an obstacle to German national aspirations. Indeed, intensive consultations with our allies must precede any East-West discussions. For that reason alone the Malta summit can go no further than the most tentative explorations.

## NATO and the European Community

After the perforation of the Berlin Wall, NATO can never be the same again. Any attempt to continue business as usual can only lead to the gradual atrophy of the institution. Events in East Germany have culminated a process of attrition within NATO that has been going on for several years under the impact of arms control negotiation and

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"Gorbachev fever." Almost all NATO countries have stopped any serious effort to modernize and improve their armaments. The postponement of the modernization of the medium range nuclear missiles on the territory of the Federal Republic will prove to be permanent; there is no political party in Germany that would be prepared even to discuss it under current conditions. But the argument made against modernizing Lance missiles - that Germany being geographically exposed must take special measures to avoid becoming a nuclear battlefield - logically applies to all nuclear weapons deployed on German soil. Thus the establishment of a nuclear free zone in Central Europe - perhaps embracing all of German territory - was the inevitable next phase of the NATO debate though its onset might have been delayed until after the German elections. And once the concept of a nuclear free zone exists, a doctrine of no first use of nuclear weapons cannot be far behind. For given the range of

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nuclear weapons, the nuclear free zone can avoid the danger
it seeks to escape only by foregoing the use on its territo-
ry of weapons based outside it. Even before the upheavals in
East Germany, the process starting with the INF argument had
severely undermined the traditional patterns of NATO.

Recent events in East Germany will surely accelerate
this trend. The decline of conventional forces on the
central front appears to have grown irreversible. The
reduction by the Federal Republic of the length of compulso-
ry military service will cut the German armed forces from
600 thousand to 420 thousand - a larger proportional
<u>unilateral</u> reduction than any foreseen in the conventional
arms control negotiations on the Soviet side. And the
Soviets will surely insist on additional reciprocal cuts as
parts of arms control negotiations later on. Then too the
present international climate makes a significant reduction
of American ground forces in Europe highly probable. Whether

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undertaken as a Congressional mandate, as an Executive branch anticipation of Congressional pressures, or in the guise of responding to European factions to build up, the result will be a reduction in existing NATO strategy. The concept of flexible response cannot be sustained with foreseeable NATO forces except under conditions of a drastic redeployment of the Soviet military establishment deep into Russia.

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is NATO being organized? What reductions of US forces can be made? What residual US forces should be left in Europe and in the service of what strategy? What is to be the role of European forces? What is to be the relationship between conventional and nuclear forces? What military organization would best reflect the new realities?

This is not the occasion to give an answer to questions which should constitute the agenda of the fullest and deepest Atlantic consultations since the formation of NATO. But a number of principles can be stated: NATO should be adapted to new realities, not abandoned. The end of NATO would spell political chaos in Europe triggering nationalist rivalries and Soviet hegemonial designs.

- Whatever the balance of conventional forces, some American nuclear establishment must be retained on the continent of Europe - though its level is subject to negotiation. If the defense of Europe is treated entirely as a

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matter of conventional weapons, the world would have returned to traditional patterns in which for centuries wars developed despite conventional balances that seemed on paper more or less even. This is because success in conventional war depend on so many intangibles of leadership and maneuver that it has proved historically very difficult to calculate.

On the other hand, Europe should not rely for its defense
rely on American nuclear weapons based on American soil or
at sea. The apparent lack of credibility of such a distant
deterrent brought American ground forces, nuclear and
conventional, to Europe during a period of huge American
nuclear superiority in the first place. The growth of the
Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile and the trend of strategic
arms control negotiations are in the process of depriving
the initiation of strategic nuclear war of all rationale -
this is indeed the stated purpose of the negotiations. And
those Europeans who wish to ban nuclear war from this

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territory can hardly ask America to run risks in defense of
a distant country which that country is unwilling to run on
its own behalf. Thus one of the principal and urgent tasks
of NATO in the next phase must be to link the nuclear
defense of Europe and America in some organic manner.
Otherwise we are on the road to Soviet hegemony if
perestroika succeeds or nationalist chaos if perestroika
fails.

- Conventional arms control negotiations must be
redesigned. They are now based on the continued existence of
two military blocs. But this is the least likely outcome in
Eastern Europe and especially in East Germany over the next
decade. Arms control proposals must therefore be brought
into line with emergent political reality. They must be made
consistent with a special status for the territory of the
present German Democratic Republic and reflect the new
political organization that is certain to emerge in Europe.

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- Whatever else happens, the relative weight of America and Europe within NATO is bound to alter. The withdrawal of major American forces and the emergent role of an integrated Europe make it necessary to rethink the organization that evolved when American had a nuclear monopoly and was dominant both militarily and economically. In other words, Europe must assume a growing responsibility for its own defense with the United States playing a role which is essential and basically supportive of European efforts.

Some leading French political figures have pointed out that the European Community was never designed to accommodate a united Germany with a population of 80 million. Such

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a state would, in that view, throw the entire European
design out of balance.

That view is accurate historically. But as occasionally
happens with French logic, it is carried to extreme conclu-
sions when applied to the future. Whatever may be the
nostalgia for Monnet's original design and however justified
historic fears, the European Community can not survive if it
emerges into an obstacle to German unification. Whatever may
be said publicly in the present confused period, German
domestic politics will turn increasingly anti-European if
the Community should appear to thwart German national
aspirations.

The concern that a Germany unified even on a confederal
basis would represent a disproportionate weight has merit.
But those who are concerned have the possibility within a
united Europe to correct their action to prevent German
hegemony. Surely Britain, France, Spain, and Italy, not to

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speak of the smaller states, could shape a consensus that prevents domination by any one European country, however powerful. Thus the strongest argument for Britain's whole-hearted participation in the construction of a united Europe is precisely the need for Britain's political experience in establishing an appropriate balance within the European Community.

The precise evolution of internal European arrangements is for Europeans to decide. But Americans can point to one anomaly in existing Atlantic relations. Within Europe the weight of political decisions is moving from the nation to the European Community within which the United States is not represented and with which it has no mechanism of regular political consultation. But within NATO - in the crucial field of military security - matters are left to the nation state with no means of expression for the emergent European political entity.

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This suggests a two-fold task: (a) Europe should be given some institutional voice within NATO, perhaps by means of the West European Union; (b) the political relations between the European Community and the United States should include some systematic method of political consultation.

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reciprocal interests, we would not be helping Gorbachev but
ourselves.

Ironically, events in Eastern Europe and especially in
Germany provide an insight into Gorbachev's role in the
Soviet power structure. They reveal that his position is
probably much less precarious than has been thought. No
single Soviet leader could on his own have brought about the
recent revolutionary changes in the Soviet position in
Eastern Europe and especially in East Germany. The change
may not have been possible without Gorbachev's courage and
daring, But it could not be carried out except with the
support of the Red Army and the KGB. Those two institutions
may have thought that the only other route - that of repres-
sion - would require an effort of such scale and brutality
as to isolate the Soviet Union and thwart any hope of
modernizing the society with outside help.

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But if the Soviet leadership is united in loosening its hold on Eastern Europe, it is not yet clear what its long-term objectives are. There are three possibilities: (a) the Soviet leaders may believe that loosening the Communist hold on Eastern Europe will enable it to maintain the existing structures at less cost; (b) the Soviet leaders may be playing the German card, that is, using the prospect of a neutral unified Germany to expel American military power from the Continent. In the Soviet view, this may reduce Soviet risks if perestroika fails and lay the basis for eventual Soviet hegemony over Europe if perestroika should succeed; (c) a serious Soviet attempt to negotiate a new equilibrium between itself and the Western democracies.

Unfortunately, statements from Soviet leaders can be found to support each theory. Reading tea leaves may not get us very far - perhaps because the Soviets have not yet made up their own minds between the various options.

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Cooperating with the Soviet Union to keep Germany divided is not a viable option. It would not maintain the status quo but become a major step towards undermining it by turning Germany's national feelings against its Western allies. Thus the first option really merges with the second one: to use the fluidity of the current situation to increase long-range Soviet power in Eurasia. Some Soviet leaders are bound to believe that by disembarassing themselves of the baggage of a failed ideology, they can continue the Russian tradition of disintegrating any power center within reach of Russian strategy.

Last summer an eminent Soviet scientist and member of the Supreme Soviet - reported to be close to Gorbachev - argued to me that the Soviet Union's strategic position was unchallengeable so long as Germany and Japan were denuclearized and the Soviet Union retained a large stockpile of nuclear weapons. Hence, he argued, the thrust of

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Soviet policy should be to remove American nuclear weapons from Eurasia. After that, it would be safe to use Germany and Japan to rebuild the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union could always control any attempt by these countries to achieve political gains by the threat of its nuclear monopoly in Eurasia. Nor would they dare to thwart Soviet designs so long as they were totally vulnerable.

At the time I thought these were theoretical musings of an intellectual. I am no longer so sure. It is not impossible that Gorbachev is gambling for high stakes. He - or some of his colleagues - may calcualate that a neutral unified Germany would enable the Soviet Union to hold together the Warsaw Pact and to appeal to Western Europe on the basis of the fear of Germany while using Germany's military importance and Soviet enforcement of the disarmament provisions of such an agreement to achieve gradually political domination over Central Europe.

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Gorbachev is too intelligent not to recognize the perils of such a strategy. On the road to hegemony there will be many chasms into which the Soviet Union may fall. Thus I consider it possible that Gorbachev may be prepared to negotiate a true equilibrium. This requires both the Soviet Union and the United States to break some traditional patterns. On the part of the Soviet Union it requires abandonment of the strategy of weakening every other power center in Eurasia and probably the world. On the part of the United States it requires a willingness to accept the Soviet Union's national frontiers without a foreign policy challenge. The Soviet Union must be prepared to settle for a balance of power. The United States must be willing to coexist with an unfriendly ideology. We have no reason to approve the internal arrangements of the Soviet Union. But we should be prepared to leave its erosion to the forces of history rather than to foreign policy challenges.

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the present crisis. Before there can be detailed negotiations there must be some agreement on a route of march.

**Conclusion:** Great presidencies occur when there is a coincidence of opportunity with leadership. The Bush presidency has an opportunity unprecedented since the immediate post-war period when American and European statesmanship forged order out of chaos. The current Administration has a similar opportunity in more complex but more hopeful conditions. In 1815 a European Congress created a new order at Vienna that lasted a century. The peace settlement in Versailles of 1919 lasted barely twenty years. The hope must be that the Western democracies with American encouragement will help create an international structure worthy of the aspirations of mankind.