DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
1:30 p.m. 9/12/69

K thought the meeting went very well. Laird said he was trying to get a couple of messages across but didn't know whether he did or not. #1 The problem on troop contributing countries in New York, I think we have to be careful on briefing of NSSM 36. K indicated that was why he hasn't let it out of this building. Laird said Rogers suggests that they be briefed and Laird is going to designate Adm. Lemos to do briefing. The paper should be gone over very carefully and stay away from NSSM 36. He said he would send it over for HAK to look at.

#2 Laird needs a decision for planning on how they are going to proceed. Should it be 24 months? K thought that was right. He said he would get him an answer early next week. x

K said he had a troop announcement that he wanted Laird to look over. The President intends to issue it but no time has been set. He said our draft was more political than Lairds and thought that Laird could cover his points in his backgrounder the next day. K said he would send it over "Eyes only" and would appreciate comments.

By __________ NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon
Murray Marder
3:50 p.m. 9/12/69

In discussing the B-52 decision M said this thing has created more problems. Was there some indication that it would be worthwhile to try this. K said there was no particular indication. We just wanted to see. M didn't understand the partial 12 hour cessation and the 36 hour suspension. What they don't understand is why the 36 hours. Was it to see what would happen immediately after the ceasefire and if it was temporary or not. K said yes.
M assumed when this thing broke that it was a major peace move and produced an air of general elation. Now we are crushed by cancellation of the suspension. K said people started using code words on each other and suddenly ... wanted to know if they were talking for background and M said of course. M said this was a typical Johnson gimmick to say we stop for 36 hours and when they don't respond we are basically justified in proceeding. We heard this all through a Johnson era. K said we would not do this to elicit something. They might have wanted to continue the ceasefire longer so we wanted to see. We are not drawing any conclusions. We did not intend to make a big ploy of this. M wanted to know if we expected any specific action in Paris. K said the other side is very subtle. We are not claiming they double crossed us. M wanted to know what K thought of the public opinion or the opinion of Washington. K said he hadn't had time to focus on that today. Everyone seems so shell shocked by Johnson. Why would we work when look for an excuse to continue the war. We are not under any great pressure. Is it not conceivable that we are in good faith.

K said the President has said the only thing not negotiable is the right of the people of South Vietnam to determine their own fate. M said he was aware of the great weight that K and others put on the importance of the B-52s. K said no one has ever head him say anything one way or the other. M didn't think the B-52 capacity was going to be tossed away lightly. K didn't think he had every presented himself as an independent policy maker. M wanted to know if there was any validity that this was a composition of two opposing schools of thought. K said that was totally wrong. He was not saying we could not make mistakes though. M referred to Ron Zieglers record and it all seemed to becoming too ambiguous for him.

By 5/26 NARA, Dato

Telecon
Secretary Laird
4:00 p.m. 9/12/69

K said the President talked to Abrams and McCain after lunch. Abrams mentioned the menu and he told me to tell you that he wanted to go ahead with one more series. He wanted to see recommendations on a regular basis. Given their problems last week I wanted to make sure you knew. Laird thought it was handled poorly last week. He could have saved the disaster. K told the President this morning that it was a complete goof. I don't know why, but I had in my mind when you called that you were on the way to the airport. L said Abrams had gone to Thieu himself that morning. It was an order of the President but it is my job to see that he keep himself from giving orders that would have adverse implications.

On the Green Baret report this was the situation. Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Harlow feel it would be a disaster to let this go forward. They have said this to the President. I am to talk to Resor. Resor gave the record to Ehrlichman and it was supposed to be held until Ehrlichman can pass judgment. L said they have the idea we can change the report of the Generals. K said only the President or L could stop it, on the basis of national security. L said the confessions are very detailed as you know. He actually did it. K said it was a lousy record, and wondered why K was doing it. L said CIA had a backgrounder to the press. K indicated that the President was very unhappy about that and had K call Helms on it. L didn't know that but knew that Mullenhoff had been talking to people about it. K said he would shut him off immediately. K asked if L could hold it until Monday. K didn't call L back because he didn't have anything on it and was waiting for Ehrlichman's recommendation. L was going to call Ehrlichman and see if he had the confessions and if he didn't would send them over.

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
9:15 a.m. 9/15/69

Laird was upset that Ky let the cat out of the bag on the troop withdrawals. He used the same figures we are using. They both agreed there wasn't much either of them could do about it and K said he would be talking to the President soon, but wanted to talk to Laird first. Laird said we should be careful of how we used the chart that Col. Haig sent over this morning. K said he hadn't seen it yet and that he had been arguing with Col. Haig on it yesterday. Laird said you could use 480 and asterisk it and then say it will be below. We have 8,000 people in transit.

They discussed Ky's announcement again and K laughed but added that he was joking. He felt that the things that are out of control He felt that with the things out of control, he might as well smile about it.
K said he would see Laird at 4:30

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird 10:25 a.m.

9/15/69

K said the President feels we may have to go ahead with the announcement today. (a) the President wanted to have K check that with Laird and (b) he feels we ought to add a sentence that explains the figures.

Laird said if they are going to stay at 484 you know they will have to stay 5,000 below it. By forcing that I will get them down another 10,000. Everyone will raise hell with me for keeping the actual body count down. K said if we use 484, the actual body count would be 55,500. All we are doing is saying in order to do that, the figure is from 60-61. Laird thought that would be o.k. K said we have to do it by noon. If we brought second figures in line, this means 55,500 we are withdrawing from the country. You tell me that the actual numbers will have to be lower than 484 to hit troop ceiling. Laird said they would be below and you can use the figure 60-61, 500, that would be about right. We are keeping below ceiling. It might be more or less. K said by Dec. 15 we will have another announcement. Laird said for the purpose of this announcement you have to put something in like that. K asked, when we say troop ceiling of 549,500, that is what the Administration found when they came into office on January 20. Laird thought there would be a little bitching by Wheeler and Abrams. They wanted us to get back to talking about ceilings so we don't have to keep two books. Laird would see Wheeler himself.

By __________ NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Sec. Rogers
10:50 a.m. 9/15/69

Rogers didn't see how we can do it. K wanted to know if we hadn't notified the Thais. Rogers said no. We have to tell them what we are going to say. K have to let them know and think take some chance on leaks or do what we are doing now. K indicated that the Philippines were told. Rogers didn't think we should do it until tomorrow. It was too bad the President had this feeling about secrecy. It was looking like Johnson. K agreed that we might have to wait and would talk to the President. Rogers said he would get the message out and if it leaks, so what. K wanted him to hold getting it out until he had talked to the President.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
3:00 p.m. 9/15/69

Laird said he had the last draft (1:30 p.m.) and wanted to know why they didn't buy the other draft with the actual numbers of troops. K said the President wated to go back from the last figure. In February, the figure was 543,540. Laird said the problem is you have a figure PMK but you have changed it. When the Administration took office it was 532,500. If you take your figure, you are going all the way to the end of February. These figures were announced each week in Saigon. You should use January 18 figure of 535,500. It is true that your figure is the highest but thats at the end of February. That date is the 22 of Feb. If you want to be factual, the day the Vietnamization program started was July 1. That particular figure is 539,500. K asked why don't we substitute the 539,500 figure. The President didn't want to say between 61 and 62. He could say at least 60 and use the other figure.

Laird said in the 1:30 statement there were two other erros. Troops on leave and in hospitals are also in body count. K wanted to know what accounted for difference in authorized and actual ceilings. Laird sent a memo this morning which lays that out cold. The easiest way to understand is to take Army company. The Commander has to stick with that authorized figure and he doesn't want to be overstaffed. K wanted to know if troops earmarked are not counted. L indicated they are not counted until they are in country. For seven days they are not counted. K said he would be coming over in a half hour and they would discuss it. Laird said the actual strength would be from 5 to 6 below. You can't keep every unit filled to authorized strength. He pushed it hard to be at 515. They have over-reacted. K understood. He wanted to find some language and get it cleared with Laird when he came over. Laird said about 60,000 will be withdrawn by Dec. 15. K said we needed some phrase that explains the differences from actual and authorized. Laird said he would have that for K when he cameover. K said we would use it as Laird wants it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon

Bill Sullivan

3:15 p.m. 9/15/69

K said he was trying to keep this thing (troop announcement) from getting out of hand. Everyone is knit-picking now. He was under the impression that the 25-40 figures would be cleared. Sullivan said the Australians and New Zealand were told. K wanted to know how he could pass instructions to State and have them carried out. Sullivan said through Ted Elliot or himself. K said he told the Secretary twice. Sullivan said he asked Friday and never did get any instructions. We have about two hours left which would give them 12 hours notice. K wanted to know if there would be an explosion in Thailand. Sullivan said they could explain it away by noting Ky's leak and that we had to move fast on it. K indicated that a lot of complicated things were coming out of the way as we are going through these figures. The 543,540 was February 22. Sullivan thought January 20 is the only figure you can use. Or, June 30, K added. Sullivan said it creates problems with our press here. They will accuse us of juggling numbers. K said he would call Sullivan from Defense after working on this with Laird.

Sullivan wanted him to know that we have offered free elections. K said we have to set up a communication system. It is a total breakdown. He thought the Philippines wanted to be told. Sullivan again said the only the Australians and New Zealand were told in advance. The others we asked were told to wait until after the thing had been cleared with the Vietnamese. It made sense. K said he would be back to Sullivan in an hour.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President
7:50 p.m. 9/15/69

The President forgot to ask if K got the message to the Romanian Ambassador. K said he was very short. K wanted him to know we were not giving this information to anyone but the countries who are contributing troops in Vietnam. The President asked me to inform you that what he said to your President in Bucharest was in full force. Bogdan started saying, what does this mean and what does that mean and K said all this has been covered before. K added **that his President should understand that nothing has changed in our views of the situation. Bogdan wrote all this down. The President thought this might help. They want to play a big role.**

The President said in some way, K's hunch may be corred. They can't simply ignore it. K said if they do, then they really show they are completely rigid or they have no respect at all. The President said then we would have to find some way of getting that respect. K thought they would do something, but the big question was whether they would do enough. They have been clumsy and they have problems. The President thought that was a good point K made that the intransigence dated from the time of Ho's illness. I think there is something to that. K said if they were politically flexible, they would now try to stall us past our deadline. They have made somewhat of a peaceful move. They have a tough problem. The President said right now if they don't want to be clumsy, they should do exactly what you suggest, to move to give us a tough problem. K said if Xuay Thuy comes back from Hanoi without anything, then we know they are out to break us and he will be back in the next few days. If the long road had a chance of success, they should keep us on it. They always have open to them that once we are down to lower figures, we will loose our combat effectiveness and then they will hit us. The President said we'll see.

Telecon
The President

8:25 a.m. 9/16/69

P - On that release, the one word I don't think is quite good enough is the word "approximately 60,000." People will think that is below.

K - We had between 60,000 and 61,500.

P - If you read your footnote. On the troop ceiling, that is not a hard figure. If the troop ceiling was 10,000 below ek when we started, they will say, are you ruling out the possibility that it could be 10,000 below in December.

K - I agree with you but Laird and Wheeler insisted on this word. Then we had "at least." Wheeler, in view of all the hanky-panky felt that if he agreed to 60-61, 500, Laird would force him to get 67,000.

P - Its silly to mess around with 5 or 5,000 people. The word approximate is just not good enough.

K - I could go back to Wheeler and say you insist on 61,000-65,000.

P - I don't want to be that precise. At least 60,000 troops will have to be withdrawn. I will insist on 60,000. I like the word "minimum."

K - I will pass it on to him as a Presidential order.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President
8:40 a.m. 9/16/69

P - Ziegler feels that you don't make a short explanation on your backgrounder.

K - I am happy to do it any way you want. I wanted to avoid the criticism(?). I would give one on the figures and one on the substance.

P - You could give one at 9:30 to cover everything. You can't give two backgrounders.

K - I didn't want to give just a set of figures. They have to be able to ask other questions.

P - I don't think Ron understands the pressures of giving the whole thing at once. The people have to meet their deadlines. They might not stay. The big story is the figures.

(The President was talking to Ziegler in his office. Came back on the phone to K and said "You start it at 9:00)

By NARA Date 5/26

TELCON
General Wheeler
Mr. Kissinger
9:35 a.m., 9-16-69

W said I wanted to talk to you about the statement "approximately 60,500 troops". K said I just want you to know the President is willing to have an understanding between us that you are not going to get pushed like the last time. W said I think this is disastrous. The effect on Abrams will be very bad indeed.

K said you are appealing to the wrong guy. I was called by the President at 8:00 p.m. last night and he ordered it differently. He says he will not push you beyond 60,000 and he is going to guarantee that you will not be pushed. W said well he is the boss. K said I understand you. I frankly did not know that your troops were down so low. I don't mean the 539,000 at the beginning. Lemos led me to believe they would go from 515 to 535 again. W said the problem is every time a plane takes off or lands, this land changes.

K said I need to know when something bothers you before it gets into bureaucratic channels. I understood we were up to 525. If that were the case, there would be no problem. If you see something that concerns you Bus. If you come to me on a private basis - just tell me as an American I am concerned, I give you my word it will go to the President immediately. I have no interest in being in this job when we lose our first war. W said I wanted to tell you I thought that other operation went very well. K said the one I talked to you about? W said yes. K said, and we can go ahead as planned. And Bus, you tell me in the next few days what sort of checks I should put in the process so that you will not get stamped on figures. If I get hit with it, then it is too late.

mlh

By ________ NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Richardson
10:00 10:10 a.m. 9/16/69

K was going over the papers for the Review Group meeting this
afternoon and hadn't realized it before but the issue on the Middle
East desalting policy has really turned into one operational problem,
namely, the $40 million desalting program for Israel.
K said he should have put this into the Under Secretaries Committee.
It isn't a policy consideration for the NSC. In view of the Meir visit,
we can turn over those papers to you or proceed to this meeting
now and R could send one of his people to it. It may be an advantage
since we have everyone together now.

Richardson agreed with that procedure. K could decide, in the light
of what emerges today, if there is any need to do anything but send
a memo to the President.

K said Cargo and Pederson come automatically. He didn't suppose
that would cause too much bureaucratic damage. Richardson said
he would make sure Cargo will review the paper but also look at it
in light of a State proposal.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
McGeorge Bundy
10:50 a.m. 9/16/69

Bundy was sorry that he had picked a troop withdrawal day to come and see HAK. K apologized for not being able to see him last evening.

Bundy wanted to make sure he was doing what he should be doing on the East-West center; should he talk to Osgood. I think the Xxxx Science board is willing to go ahead as soon as the White House wants them to. We need to give this thing a Bundys suggested a letter to McElroy and K said he would do that but would pass it by the President first. K said that Youde who is taking Michael Palister's place in England was in. He asked K's reaction to is. Bundys said Wilson wanted reassuring and K gave it to him, as he was confident of the President's thinking. K said he would call McElroy within the next few days.

K thought Bundys article in Foreign Affairs was especially good, and particularly thoughtful and helpful. K said he would show it to the President and also around Washington.

William D. McElroy
Director, National Science Foundation
632-4001

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Secretary Rogers
Mr. Kissinger
1:00 p.m., 9-16-69

K said I wanted to tell you how sorry I am about your recent loss.
R said thank you.

R said we have just gone over this speech. We are quite concerned
about the lack of substance. There has to be something in there
about the Middle East. R said at least the President has to acknow-
ledge that there is something there.

K said first of all, why don't you send over some paragraph of what
the President should say. K said what the President wanted to do
was state general philosophy and not go through a shopping list.
R said at least you have to refer to them. It is like a man saying
you wanted a short speech so here it is. K said you convinced
him that he should make a short speech.

R said he needs more than rhetoric. We will get a paragraph over
to you tonight. K said fine.

mlh

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
2:30 p.m. 9/16/69

K said the President was working on the UN speech and K wondered if he could help Laird. Laird was confused, didn't know if the President got his message clear on Hershey.

K said on the draft, he didn't mind if you want to go with it tomorrow if you can give me some idea of what's in it about the reduction. d
Laird thought the President wanted him to go on Firday. K indicated the President was announcing the space program tomorrow and he didn't want to scoop Laird. Laird indicated that we would brief all units today or tomorrow but he thought it was better to go tomorrow. The draft situation is this; we have to get the word to local draft boards as soon as possible. K had the impression that Laird wanted to go tomorrow. Laird did but simply because we have to get word out as fast as we can. K said the President's only concern is that the space program is going tomorrow. Laird thought he had better not do it. Laird said he would take the 29,000 and announce that we are going to stretch it out and cancel Nov and Dec and the 29,000 we will spread over Oct, Nov and Dec. K mentioned that was about 10,000 per month. Laird went on to say that we will go back to 10,000 for three months, 29,000 for one, and then 25,000 for the rest of the year. We will still press for the President's plan of random selection and that if Congress fails to act, the Administration will take action in the 19-20 year old area. Laird got word that the President wanted to tie this in with Hershey. He thought that would be a mistake. K felt the President had no such intention.

On another matter, Laird had memo on Laos. As you know, we have tentatively agreed to 8,000. These people are nickel and diming us. We sent them 4,000 and I checked and until four weeks ago they still had 2,000 in the wearhouse. Some of these rifles have found their way into the Philippines and other places and I want the Laotian troops to have them. I am on top of this. K said the President was eager to do the maximum possible. He has been putting the heat on me.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Laird thought it would be good if he briefed the President on this. We don't have enough support forces with these rifles in Vietnam. The Congressional people think they should have them in Vietnam before sending them to Laos if they aren't going to be used there. K indicated that the President has been trying to get something done in Laos and everyone tells him he can't do it. Laird suggested giving them 1,000 or 2,000 at a time. When they have trained their men on them, then they will get more. Laird didn't want them to get the idea that we are committed to 2,000 and slip a few out. K said he would rephrase the instructions and pass it by the President, to get his views. Laird said we flew 4,000 about five months ago and when he found they still had 2,000, it bothered him. He wanted K to know he was on top of it.

K said on the Hershey thing, was Laird against doing anything this week and not couple it with the space announcement. Laird said he would check on that. In his meeting tomorrow, he would be talking about (briefing) the troop thing and wait until Friday on draft call.

K told him to make sure his briefers stick to the figures K used in his backgrounder. Laird indicated that he had a copy of the backgrounder and also had one of his men there.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Ambassador Waller
6:15 p.m. 9/16/69

Waller indicated that he had sent over a message from P. M. Gorton which was delivered to John Holdridge. It concerned meat. When K laughed and said he couldn't bear it, Waller also laughed and said he understood. K want on to say the only reason he was laughing is that he has found himself becoming an expert on things he previously knew nothing about.

Waller just wanted to bring this message to K's attention since Hewitt was likely to call Mr. Kissinger personally to make sure we received it. Waller said at the moment they were under voluntary restraints. It has a very harsh effect.

K said he would look into it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
6:30 p. m. 9/16/69

K said he checked with the President on the Hersey thing and nothing is going to happen this week.

As K understood the draft announcement, Laird would cancel calls for Nov. and Dec. and make October stretch out over the next rest of the year. Laird indicated they were going to press forward on draft legislation. He had talked with Stennis and Russel. K indicated that Bryce Harlow had different views. He wanted to let it go until next year. Laird said if we take the action on Jan. 1, we are covered. We have to at least talk about that. My problem here is that Ron said the White House indicated that Nixon is considering discontinuing the draft. Laird didn't think he would get into that. K said he didn't have to explain. He knew the problem. If they put out big stories, even a good announcement sounds weak. In the President's office with Ehrlichman present, K urged that Ziegler be ordered to not comment on draft and to refer it to you. K didn't know what Ziegler said, but he would check it.

On Resor's memo, Laird thought he should have it delivered to K. It was agreed to give us 24 hours notice. K wanted to know if Laird thought we have to let it come forward now. Laird didn't know how we could overrule him, Malbry and Abrams are strong on it. K said Laird was going to be murdered. Laird indicated that Ehrlichman said if we reversed the thing, it would be worse. Laird would have to do it in the name of the President. K said we were all in the same fix. Laird said they would announce it in Saigon on Thursday.

K said with Mort Halperin leaving, we have that big hole and we need someone who can work with the military. He wanted Laird to consider the Kennedy request. Laird asked if he could have some more time, and K said o.k.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Richardson
6:40 p.m. 9/16/67

Richardson wanted to know what the reaction generally was to the
President's announcement today, and wanted to know if there was any
problem on the numbers. K said he hadn't seen any newspapers and
he would be the last one to be told.

Richardson said they had a long meeting on L. A. It was a very good
meeting and thought they arrived at a decision which will be discussed
between now and the NSC meeting. R took the position that work on
the President's speech should start now and not wait for the technical
papers. It is a matter of tone, and it should sound like a policy
statement. K thought we needed some philosophy and general attitude(?).
They discussed Pete Vaky and they both agreed that he was great.
K liked the way he followed the papers from us to the President and
back again.

Richardson wanted to discuss the question that came up at breakfast
of going below the surface on assumption of what the facts are. On
Vietnam strategy and how well it is working. R talked to Charlie Cook
and R was not sure what K had in mind. K said the President has
ordered that a group be created fix with a charger similar to the
Verification Committee. Under that we would have to have working
groups and those should be chaired by the lead agency in the field.
R thought the key thing was the working group activity. The problem
would be to turn up the people who are capable of the highest
possible objectivity, so they can get down to the roots of these things.
Since they were going to have breakfast on Friday and they would talk
about it then. R didn't know whether K knew Cook but he had a balanced
judgment, is not a guy who pushes any particular hobby horse and is
unfooled. As long as the group doesn't include Holbrook. K thought
he was o.k. but there were some WH objections. The point is, R said,
not the qualifications or merits of the individuals so much as the kind
of people that ought to be involved at the working level. K thought he
and R could agree on this; that they should be working people without
bias.

By __________ NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Gerard Smith
7:15 p.m. 9/16/69

Smith was looking for a draft of the speech and finally got one from Rogers.
K said he sent it to Smith through Ted Elliot as soon as he got it back from
the President. K told Elliot that he was looking to him to make sure
every agency would get a copy.

Smith mentioned that he thought K had said something about a book or
article he wrote on the liberal vs strict interpretation on agreements.
K said he never wrote anything on it.

Telecon
Dick Pederson
7:25 p. m. 9/16/69

K said we couldn't rewrite the speech from beginning to end. Pederson said the only big section was on the Middle East and disarmament. K said the Secretary agreed to send over the passages that he wants added. The President refused to talk more than 25 minutes. Smith has to be careful he doesn't try to work in his pet projects. K said the President was taking Chinese Communists out completely.

They agreed to work that Pederson would come over tonight about 10:00 to see Mr. Kissinger after WH dinner and they would work on changes.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
9:00a.m. 9:50 a.m. 9/17/69

K said Pederson came over last night and they worked on the speech. On the Middle East they put in all the substantive changes but the one that says "no substantial changes of borders." Rogers thought there should be something in there that looks respectable. K thought his change on Vietnam was more subtle. The President insisted on saying "in the issues between the great powers, the U. N. may not be able to solve them." R said Rogers thought that would be o.k. K looked over Rogers' earlier drafts and have recommended to the President to put in some of his specifics on space. They decided there was no need to meet now but would do it after the President had done final draft.

K said he had sent over the exact draft the Presiden was working on.
This includes the changes which Pederson and K discussed. If the
Pres. makes additional changes, K said he would send them over.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird
11:45 a.m. 9/16/69

dLaird wanted to discuss wire that went to Ambassador of Thailand which agrees to his program cutoff date for the majority in April. That means the majority won't be out of the country until May. The last of 6,000 won't be out until Sept. Laird couldn't sign off on that because the President told him that he wanted them out by Dec of this year. K said he would get on top of it and cut off some of that time. Laird said particularly after the President tells him something he can't do until he tells me otherwise. Laird wanted 10,000 and the President wanted 5,000 so they settled for something in between. Laird didn't want to get K involved but K said that's what he is here for.

K said he got Ziegler under control. He has orders to see Laird about anything on the draft. Laird was going to send K a copy of Ziggler's statement.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
1:00 p.m. 9/17/69

Discussed more changes on UN speech.

Rogers wanted to make a point again about putting something in on the
Middle East. Joe Sisco thought that we would be under attack the next
day because of the phantom jets.

The both thought the work on the speech that was done overnight improved
it very much, and that

Rogers wanted to suggest that the President make some remarks about
the President and Secretary General of the UN. Any kind word from
him would be appreciated.

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
1:50 p.m. 9/17/69

K had been thinking about Rogers suggestion on Middle East and thought
he had a good point. K said he would stick in one sentence on arms
limitations. Rogers thought it would help a little, but wouldn't fight
for it if the President didn't want it. K indicated that he felt strong on
not putting in anymore on Chinese other than the one sentence.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
100 1:00 p.m. 9/17/69

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President
1:52 p.m. 9/17/69

The President wanted to know if K had anything to clear with him since
he would be out of reach for about 45 minutes.

K said we were getting a number of word changes from State but nothing major. They wanted to put in something in the Middle East section in order to take some heat off the phantoms. The President thought that was fair enough. It will needle the Russians too. He didn't care about the other changes. K said Ray Price was going over it. The President said again that he wanted to keep it as short as possible and K indicated we have been able to omit three more paragraphs.

The President wanted to wait until the whole speech was finished before
seeing any of it. K said he would have it in to Rose in 15 minutes.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Senator Mundt

3:40 plm.

9/17/69

dMundt was talking with the President and Walter Judd at the White House dinner last night and the President asked that Judd see K. Judd was worried about what we agreed to do before the President's trip overseas. He will probably want to talk about that.

Mundt asked if K knew Vladimir Petrov. Petrov has been, on his own, working with a group of people at the Russian Embassy. Petrov sent Mundt about an 8-page report on Russian reaction on various matters of foreign policy -- moving toward China. Mundt thought it would be good if K saw Petrov.

K indicated that he corresponded with him quite often and respected his thinking very much. Mundt said the name of the report is "Current Soviet Thinking"

K said he would be happy to see Judd and would contact him.

By ____ NARA, Dale 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
9/17/69, 6:30 p.m.

K said the President worked on this again for about one hour and made some changes which are not of substance. I'll get it to you as soon as it exists. R said I think it is pretty good. Send it out to the house. Anyone giving that speech would have to make some of his own changes. K said there was one change that will hurt Charlie Yost -- he took out one of the flowery UN paragraphs. R said I can't argue with that especially since the UN has not been that successful. K said he just wanted R to know that the version he has is not absolutely correct and we will get the new version to him the second it is ready.

R said he thought Mel's press conference went pretty well. K said I think we got more mileage out of this one than we did out of the first. I think Ky's story helped us. R said we ought to tell them we planned it.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
The President
Mr. Kissinger
9/17/69, 7:30 p.m.

P said have one of your people take a minute to check for reports on
the effects of our menu series. K said yes. Of the first two, the
first one was on the low side -- possibly because of bad weather.
The second one was very good and got some personnel. K said again
not a word from anyone. If they could figure out a way of stopping
it, they would do it. P said they must have a significant problem as
to who is going to be Mr. Big. K said he met with the Indians today.
They had three points. Everyone was protesting unity of leadership.
They are much less vituperative about US. Pham Van Dong said
they would withdraw forces and coalition government could ask them
to withdraw. K said they have never admitted they even had forces
there and never admitted they would do it simultaneously with us.
K also said if Communists dominate coalition government they will
not need North Vietnamese troops there anyhow. K said I do not
think if they desire to settle they will do it through the Indians.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
The President
Mr. Kissinger
9/18/69, 11:30 p.m.

The President asked what the score was on the Green Beret thing. K said that is one hot potato that Laird pushed into our lap in a way that we could not refuse to handle. K asked what part P wanted to know. K said the problem was -- we had a long talk about it -- the four of us -- we were in agreement that the trial would be disastrous. On the other hand, Resor with the assistance of Lance(?), because Laird had washed his hands of it, had come full speed ahead recommending a trial and wrote a memo saying he would fight anyone that tried to stop it. Since they already have the confessions, since they were going to leak the confessions and Harlow said there will be Congressional investigation....

P asked what about Resor -- what is going to be done about him. P said I don't like that fellow. P said just tell Laird that I don't want him around. I don't have confidence in him. P said I am going to ask him for his resignation. K said Resor acted very poorly -- everyone was saving his own hide.

P asked why did the story come out today when we were making a speech at the UN? P said it dominates the headlines. They should never have allowed that to break now. K said you are absolutely correct. P said it is in both evening papers and on TV. P said that is inexcusable and I think deliberate. K said I think Laird did not want it out on Friday to compete with him. P said pin Haldeman in the morning and ask why he allowed this to happen -- they have to control this. They can't let anything compete with anything we do. P said tell Haldeman I think it was badly handled. P said we need a PR man who knows you can't compete with your own story. Discuss that with Haldeman. K said I share some of the blame, too. P said it is a PR problem not yours or Haldeman's. P said this shows a weakness in our organization. Also shows need for PR man who has nothing else to do. K said I agree. P said I am going to count on you to mention this to him -- we really need a PR man. P said I don't think Haldeman or Ehrlichman really want one. K said I didn't think of it -- I just didn't have it on my mind. P said Ziegler should have but he is just a youngster -- he can't think of those things -- we need an experienced man. P said we have to have a "big time" man that controls the flow of news.

By: Aco

NARA, Date

3/27

Telecon
Secretary Romney
11:10 a.m. 9/19/69

Romney repeated his invitation to have K over for dinner. Romny would be leaving Wed and wondered if they could do it before.

K asked if they could do it after his return since his schedule was already full and he would love to do it.

If asked questions on Vietnam, Romney wnted to know assumed the latest is what the President said in the UN speech. K agreed and said that was practically along the lines of Romney's views a few years ago.

K said he would see him when he returned from his trip.

By. NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Governor Rockefeller
11:15 a.m. 9/19/69

K said he had read the Governor's report and thought it was excellent. Every concern he had has disappeared. It is a first class report. There were no avoidable volunerabilities. Rockefeller thought we really ought to deal with the with the problem. State is screaming about organization but R mentioned that to K ahead of time. R mentioned that he saw John Hannah and Hannah said the only way to do anything was to start all over. K said Hannah would settle for anything.

R mentioned that David had been asked to be on a new committee. K said Peterson, President of Bank of America would be chairing the committee. K talked to David about the report and David thought it was good also.

R wanted to know if K thought the President would really read the report and K said of course.

R said he talked to both Rogers and Richardson about the organization and that he felt very strong about it. K said Meyers was a weak man. These business executives are all weak. R said they have to be able to push a button and if its not there, they don't know what to do. R was impressed by something that Arnie (Nachmanoff) said, which didn't go into the report, that there is nothing the U. S. can do to shape these events. Meyer was trying to needle him(?) back to democracy. K said they agree that the previous elections were bought. R asked what Meyer had done to help him and of course nothing had been done. R saw the Minister of Foreign Affairs in Brazil. Our government pushed him into leetting the 15 prisoners go and he didn't want to do it. He only mentioned this because we are not willing to take any responsibility for initiative and tit is devistating for a country that is on its own. R thought Richardson understood this much better than anyone else. K indicated that he was having breakfast with Richardson and they would discuss this. R said unless they do something, L. A. is lost and Richardson can't do it all.

K thought it would be a good idea to have a public version of the report out and would talk to the President about it. R thought that would help.

R had one more letter to write to the President on how to establish relationships with the military group to swing them back to the other side but needed guidance. State wants to do it through the press but R didn't agree. K wanted K's thoughts on who they could have who would be useful in this field. He didn't quite have the answer. K said to just present the problem in a letter to the President.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon

Santiney

3:40 p. m. 9/19/69

K wanted to know if there was anything he needed to know that he didn't already since Santeny had just returned from Hanoi. S stated there was and said he could write but it would be better if they could get together. K explained the difficulty in him getting away. S said he couldn't get away from Paris and couldn't K send one of his boys. K asked if he would talk to someone at the Embassy. K said the question would be what S would say to them. He could just give them a general account and a more detailed one to K.

K said since S was in Hanoi, he would be in the best position which way he should go and should let K know. S said he would write. K agreed and if there was any need, he would send someone. S should address the letter to Tony Lake at the White House. K said he could not refuse to let one of Amb. Lodge's people call S but would let S decide when he receives the phone call what he would say.

S said he would write tomorrow and await further instructions after K receives the letter.

K reiterated that their relationship would be protected.

S said he would be at his country home this weekend if K wanted to reach him and back in Paris on Monday.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Governor Scranton
5:10 p.m. 9/19/69

K said he was returning the Gov.'s call. Scranton said when he saw
Tom Whitehead the other day, the President was also present. Whitehead
spoke to S about some of the problems in the State Dept. S volunteered
that if there was anything he could do, he would try and the President
said S should talk to Kissinger. S didn't want K to misunderstand him,
but if there was anything he could do, K should just call. In no uncertain
terms, S said he didn't give a damn about his own neck.

K said he would talk to S about the problem at an early date. S said he
would be in Washington on Wednesday and K said let's shoot for that.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Sec. Laird

5:40 p.m. 9/19/69

Laird wanted to know if there were any cuts that effect Nato or Taiwan. K said he wanted to get the Under Secretaries to discuss consultations procedures on that business. Laird said he would hold up on the ships in that case, but that would be the only thing we should hold up on. We can go with the 25 other sh;ips and go with the Air Force package. We won't announce the other days, about the Marines that go to Okinawa. The 5th Marines will be reduced at Pendelton. K saw no problems in that.

Laird said he had gone over this memo, but hadn't had a chance to talk discuss it with anyone. Laird had been looking at how many committees we have. Everything in that is something we have in NSSM 3 that was reviewed by the Under Secretaries. He thought we were "committeeing" ourselves to death. K said, after a decision is made on NSSM 3, it would save Laird from getting BOB directive telling him to cutt $3 billion without having this cleared. Laird thought there should be a separate instead of Under Secretaries committee. K said he was going to Camp David and would raise the question with the President.
Laird thought we should take a long look so we don't have too many committees studying the same things. He thought it would be good to have some sort of buffer there. Mayo is the only one who is different on it. K said he would talk to the President to see if we could redefine it. Laird said he spends several hours each morning on Vietnam, and his people the people that work with him have so many committees to attend. K said we haven't done anything new on Vietnam. The committee is just go work on the figures that everyone is moving around. It is a substitute for the Review Group. Laird said that Packard wasn't working on Vietnam so Laird would have to brief him.
K suggested sending Nutter then. K said the problem with the Review Group, when it gets into technical subjects, they don't always have the competent people there. This would substitute on Vietnam matters.
K Laird said they don't have their input properly presented on this basis. He would have to send Dave. K said he could send Nutter and we would have Sullivan from State. Laird asked K to come over and discuss it over lunch. K suggested they wait until next week.

Laird wanted to know how K thought the draft thing came out and K thought it was good. Laird pointed out that Mendall Rivers came over to our side at the end.

By NARA, Dale 5/27

Telecon call
Secretary Rogers 7:07 p.m. 6/19/69

Rogers had some changes in the speech. He suggested that HAK, Price and himself sit down for a couple of hours and go over it line by line. Ksa id the President wouldn't care about word changes. He will settle for whatever we agree to. He asked that Rogers send over his changes. Rogers wanted more on disarmament. On the hijacking, we should say that it would be inscribed on the agenda. K suggested that Rogers send over those things that involve major revisions then we would incorporate them for the President to work on in the morning. K said he would be coming back to the office after the dinner to work on it and they agreed to meet in Rogers' office at 10:30 on Wednesday.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.O. 12958 *
By DS NARA Date 4/15/06

TELCONE
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
9-20-69, 8:45 a.m.

K said I had a chance to talk to the President yesterday about the B-52 business. He agrees with you that three or four a week is what we ought to do. I noticed there was a MACV cable in this morning re some troop concentrations in the Fishhook area. Maybe that would be a good one to go after.

L said we will go on one in that area and I will have a report to you
Monday morning.

K said, secondly, on the Thai business. The President goes along
with having them out on the dates we discussed, i. e., making the date
of withdrawal instead of deactivation. On that program, the Vietnam
Committee, the President is most eager to get it established. K
said, and on the way to handle the Defense budget, the President thinks
you and I should get together. L said what about the other meeting
- to see the Chiefs? K said that is OK, but I have not got a date.
K said the President approved it. L said it should be limited to one hour -
no more - no less. K said he understands he is to make no affirmative
statement that they can come back to the Pentagon and say they have
Presidential approval. L said what they want to argue about is the
budget guidelines. In my little memorandum I sent you last night, I
explained that. We can get it out of the way now and we will be a
little better off. K said the President agreed to it. The only thing
is I have to get Dwight Chapin to give us a time. I will get back to
you with a time. L said fine.

mlh

By CCO NARA, Dale 5/27

Telecon
Secretary Richardson
10:20 a.m. 9/22/69

K said he was talking with the President and the P is thinking of giving a backgrounder for a few newspaper men on Wednesday. K wondered if R would get some Q & As on the philosophical side for us today. He didn't want the whole State Dept in a tither about it so if R would get one of the Under Secretaries to work, he would appreciate it. R said he would.

R asked if K saw the Roberts column yesterday, K said yes and thought it was good. R said he took no credit or blame for the article. It went further than we could have officially go but at the same time, it was useful to have a little daylight wedged out.

K said he thought the New York Times is an outrage. They give us no clue to what they would do.

R mentioned a letter Bundy sent to Scottie Reston and Jonathan Moore. It deals head on on what is the US/Southeast Asia interest. It does it better than anything R has ever seen and thought it might be a good idea for K and the President to dead it before the backgrounder. He said he would send a copy over right away. He said some of the paragraphs sound as if Nixon had written them himself.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Jerry Smith
10:30 a.m. 9/22/69

S wasn't on a secure phone so would be a little cryptic. He wanted to know how the letter stands that they discussed in New York on Thursday. K said the President agrees with Smith, has stated this to the Secretary, K has also stated it to the Secretary but the Sec. seems to think that we can't pull back. If Smith can convince the Sec., he would have full backing here. Smith didn't think the Sec. would really try. He (the Sec.) thinks its is inevitable. If someone could urge him. K said if they are given two choices, why do we have to take those theirs. K wanted to know if they would propose something today and Smith said he wouldn't be surprised. We don't have much time left. K said he has given the President's views to Elliott. Since then the President has personally told it to the Secretary. Smith said he would try to get the Sec. on it today. K told him to let him know what happened and if necessary he would be glad to call him too. Smith didn't think he would have any more success than he had last night. He said that if we didn't have any more bargaining power than that, we shouldn't be there. Unless some force intervenes, he thought the thing he was going to end up in the wrong place. He would do his best and call K back.

By NARA, Date 5/27

Telecon
Congressman Cramer - Florida

11:25 a.m. 9/22/69

The congressman had some relatives of Cubans who are on strike at a prison since August 28. They are asking for some action here in the U.S. either through OAS or the Un. They have written a wire to Mrs. Nixon. They wondered what report the Red Cross had on their investigation. Cramer thought there should be a planned course of action and that these people are entitled to a conference.

K said he would have Pete Vaky contact him and put him in touch with the right people at OAS, UN or State.

(Called Pete Vaky at 11:30. He would call the Congressman and handle from there - S. D.)

By NARA, Date 5/27

TELECON

Governor Rockefeller
Mr. Kissinger

11:45 a.m., September 22, 1969

R said he had a nice talk with George Woods this morning. He's very keen about the report. Apparently the story is, however, that they want to take Latin America out of the State Department. Of course, that story is not true. R asked when this will go to the NSC. K said in early October; that copies were distributed to a fairly restricted group last week.

R asked if K remembered that they discussed Panama. R said he is going to see on Friday Gen. Torrijos, who had tried to help on political problems. R said he also talked to Meyer. K said they don't want R to do it, to which R agreed. K said they have been betting on him (K) to get R not to see him. K said he had ignored them. This surprised R, who said he had been thinking about how these problems can be handled. He bet Meyer is not doing anything about Haiti either. K said he is supposed to be; K gave him a directive after he and R talked.

R thought, in order to get this kind of job done -- Brazil, Panama, Nicaragua, Haiti -- where military dictators are involved -- a special Task Force was indicated to follow these in the NSC to keep a running check on them. K said he thought this was a damned good idea and he will get it established this week. R said he would write a memo right away to K, giving suggested names, etc. K asked R to get it to him quickly; this is something he can do on his own authority and he will do it right away. R said he thought Joe Carlino was best. He or a number of people like him -- cooperatives -- could go out. K said he didn't think we could get going here in any reasonable time. R said he was sure that is true. K asked R to think some more about this. K said his problem is he has to choose his targets on where he insists White House directives should be carried out -- he said his credit isn't unlimited. He said he would like to get something done along these lines, and he will get a special Task Force going.

R said the problem with Meyer is he doesn't want to take the initiative. R felt this should be a CIA operation with the Task Force in K's office. They should supply some people like Joe Carlino who could go to these countries.

K asked if R were coming to the next FIAB meeting. R said he was going to try to. K said the President is meeting with them the 24th

By

NARA, Date

- 2 -

of October. R said that was the second day of the meeting and he would make it a point to be present. K said if R were to begin to get active, he could use that as a vehicle. R thought this was a very good idea. K said this is the type of proposal R could put before that Board -- he laughingly said if R wants to make an issue of something, he is not the easiest man to keep quiet.

R repeated that he would write a memo today. CIA could be the operatives if they haven't lost their nerve in the covert field. K said he was chairman of a committee here which handles that type of thing. R said this was excellent. K said, when R comes down, he would like to have a talk with him and ask his advice on one or two things.

R said he thought K was getting closer and closer to the meat for his own program. R said he was reading an article which said pulling these troops out of Vietnam was a sign of weakness. K said it makes sense only if we are getting ready to move in another direction; on its own, it doesn't make any sense.

R said he had gotten a request from somebody on the White House staff (A Gilbert Brownell) asking him to make a statement on the troop withdrawals. He said he was not going to make a statement for anyone on this unless it came from K. K said, that's right; he didn't know R was being asked, and he didn't know Gilbert Brownell, but that he would check into it. K said if it is important enough for an 'R statement,' he would personally call R -- he wouldn't even have one of his staff men do it. K said R had been terrific -- he had supported us on every essential thing in the foreign field and he is confident that R will give his full personal consideration on any important item. He agreed that R shouldn't diddle himself away on minor things.

lds

By NARA, Dale 5/27

Telecon
Secretary Laird
3:20 p.m. 9/22/69

L said he had gone over the memo on the National Security Defense Program Review Committee. He thought everything was o.k. except on the nuclear weapons part. K indicated that he had taken that out himself. He suggested that it could be put into the Under Secretaries Committee. Laird thought it would be o.k. to make it a sub committee but he thought this group was most concerned. There are some advantages of limiting it to this group. K said if Laird was in agreement with this, except the nuclear deployment he would go ahead. Laird was not sure whether K wanted to make it a separate committee and K said he would discuss it with the President. Laird said it really didn't make much difference. From an organizational structure, it would be clearer that way, but at the same time, he didn't feel that would be enough of a difference. Subject #2. On Menu. Laird had three fairly good ones for this week, and in the areas where we have the best intelligence information - 25, 26, and 27. They would be a little above the Fishhook area - 351, 352, 353, 350. K said for him to go ahead. Subject #3. Laird said there was something that K should look at that is going on in the White House - the matter of communications. At the present time, the WH has the last say on communications.
O'Connell is ready to retire and they are having a hard time deciding who should replace him (OEP). Commerce wants to take over all the communications work. Laird thought the authority should stay in the White House. It is better to deal directly with the WH rather than spread communications all over Commerce. Stans feels Commerce should take it over. Laird said he would write a letter to K so he would have some basis to take action. Laird had not talked to Gen. Lincoln. Lincoln may not want to push it because it is in his hop. K's recommendation would be to support having the communications stay in the WH. Subject #4 - (Missed first part) Laird said we are never going to be able to make the 71.9. It will have to be around 75. or 76. The word is going to get out about what the target is.
K said he would get after Chapin. K said the President is still uneasy about the Green Beret thing. He would like, Mitchell, Laird and himself to sit down and review the hold situation. Laird said he would come over with the options.
The President would also like the three of them to sit down and discuss Vietnam (without Wheeler and Helms). Laird said he would be out of town on Friday so K said lets shoot for Thursday. On the other (G.B.) K suggested 4:30 on Tuesday but said he would confirm after checking with Mitchell.

By Cao NARA, Dalo 5/27

Telecon
The Vice President
12:05 p. m. 9/23/69

The VP was having a Q & A with U. S. News and World Report and wanted to know if there was anything particularly sensitive he should know.

On Vietnam, K mentioned that when people say our policies have failed, do they realize that the other side has rejected our proposals although they have been forthcoming.

On troop reductions, the VP assumed the reductions of 70,000 were out of the inventory. K said actually the reductions would be higher but he should fudge it a bit.

K agreed that he should duck any questions on the Green Beret.

On the Middle East, K said aloot depends on what the Soviets are going to do. We still have the 4- and 2-power talks.

On the Sino/Soviet - K said we are not doing anything to encourage it. We are taking this seriously into consideration. We are not going to get into the position of backing one against the other.

The problem in Laos is that in 1962 we made an agreement with Hanoi supported by the Soviet Union at an international conference. We are trying to get NVN to live up to that agreement it made. We have done nothing that wasn't requested by the neutral government. The Communists republirox recognize and it was an established with Communists agreement.

By CCO

NARA, Dato

Telecon
Robert Pierpont
3:30 p. m. 9/23/69

Pierpont wanted to clarify remarks made by Thieu in his press conference, or was reported to have said, that Nixon and Thieu agreed on conditions for future troop withdrawals beginning in 1970. They agree that troop reductions would be based on 2 of the 3 criteria, (1) progress in Paris, (2) decrease in Communist military activity. Up until now, they have all been determined by #1.

K said he hadn't read the text of what he said but we have always said our withdrawals would be based on the criteria and in Thailand K said if the withdrawals proceed, the other criteria become more important. We would never give up the third criteria. P said, then K would put more emphasis on the latter two. K said if we keep withdrawing and they don't, the relative rate of withdrawals would be slower than if they do. At some point the ability of the SVN to take over isn't going to be uniform. If there is no movement on their side, the other two criteria become more important but, again, we would not give up the third. P said, what K is saying is that Nixon(?) wouldn't be able to make a commet like that. K again said that we have made our three criteria and we are sticking to that.

P thanked K for his time.

By NARA, Dale 5/27

Telecon
Amb. Dobrynin
Mr. Kissinger
9/23/69, 6:50 p.m.

Dobrynin said I have not seen you for years. I have something to do at the Embassy on Saturday and Sunday -- could I see you for a few minutes if it is convenient for you. D said maybe on Friday. K said I am going to Camp David on Friday but will be back Saturday afternoon -- I can see you Saturday afternoon. D asked if K had a specific time. K said he didn't know when he would arrive back but say tentatively 3:00 on Saturday. K asked D if he had anything specific he wanted to discuss. D said just several things. K said he would call D when he arrived back from Camp David. D said he would await K's call after 2:00 p.m.