ESSAY | William Safire

# The Kissnix Factor

WASHINGTON

Who'd a Clunk it: a dozen years after the death of détente, after a decade of Reaganaut criticism about a "fatally flawed" pair of SALT treaties, comes now Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger — together again — to warn that the Reagan Administration may be going soft on the Russians.

In their first syndicated collaboration, our two foremost strategic thinkers complain about the zero option, brainchild of the Reagan hawks, in which the superpowers would turn the clock back to the days before the big Soviet intermediate-range missile escalation.

Not good enough, according to Kissnix: the presence of our nuclear missiles in Europe now offsets the Soviet advantage in tanks, planes and troops. Not only should we refuse to allow 100 missiles to remain to threaten the Far East, we should put a new condition on the deal we have long offered in Europe: Remove all missiles only when the Russians eliminate their conventional superiority. (Senator Sam Nunn, who shows signs of going squishy on S.D.I., supports this approach, as do Europeans who want their defense on the cheap.)

Kissnix is rebutted by a faction called Shultznitze, which says: We have to be willing to take yes for an answer. If we renege on our offer now, after having won our point, we will lose all momentum toward arms reduction.

Who's right — the out-of-office former détenteniks turned neo-hardliners, or the in-office former hardliners turned neo-détenteniks? The moorings of mind-set have slipped and pundits are forced to order à la carte. One man's selections:

1. The Kissnix criticism is right to insist on a "real zero" on medium-range missiles. The emplacement of 100 missiles to threaten China, Japan and Korea is too good a deal for the Russians, and would make I.N.F. verification 10 times more difficult.

One way to get down to real zero would be to place our countervailing 100 missiles in our Aleutian Islands, no matter how Alaska's Senator Ted Stevens kicks; that deployment would make useless the big Soviet Pacific naval base at Petropavlovsk. By taking advantage of "Seward's Folly," we could negotiate away each side's final 100 medium missiles entirely. (This would also remind Far Eastern trade predators that "protection" has another meaning.)

2. The Kissnix approach is wrong to insist on linkage of nuclear reduction to conventional reduction.

There is good linkage and bad linkage. It makes stabilizing sense to link

space shield development to reductions in offensive intercontinental missiles; it also makes sense to link progress on arms reduction to Soviet behavior on human rights, invasion of neighbors, support of the subversion of Central America and intensity of espionage. As Kissnix has long posited, weapons don't cause wars; warmaking policies cause the use of weapons.

Secretary Shultz has been suckered into public concentration on one medium-range treaty and should shift the world focus to good linkage, like the need to reduce the dangerous number of Soviet ICBM's and for the Russians to pull out of Afghanistan.

Bad linkage is all-or-nothing bar-gaining that gets nothing. Linkage, as we saw in the fast shuffle that was Reykjavik, can cut two ways: We were proceeding on a series of negotiations when Mr. Gorbachev suddenly

Good linkage, bad linkage.

revealed at the end that everything was linked to the abandonment of S.D.I. testing. That's the customary Soviet negotiating trick, as Ed Rowney, the man who does not flip-flop, points out: the threat of losing all gives the Russians leverage at the eleventh hour.

Bad linkage also undermines progress by avoiding sacrifice. Reduction of nuclear arms in Europe, which is inexorable, means that Europe will have to spend more to defend itself. The odd decouple is a fact; the American presence will one day be absent, and Europe will or will not assume the burden of its own defense. The U.S. can negotiate time for this transition to continental independence, but we should not delay nuclear reduction until the Russians become the Swiss, embracing general disarmament.

3. Both Kissnix fears and Shultznitzte hopes must focus on verifiability.

Ever since Anatoly Dobrynin predicted a future for on-site inspection at a Les Gelb dinner party in Alexandria six years ago, the Russians have been talking verification. Now, this week in Geneva, we will see how far they are prepared to apply glasnost specifically to their means of waging war. If the past is any indication, they will offer stunts and propose that the details be worked out later.

No deal. The safety of the world is in the details. ☐

that my remaining American sions aren't easily duplicate- erature, country and western and food aren't like tape dec said. "They're too American other culture to make."

Sure. That's Rob. You know Rob, who once said that the Japanese make junk. Rob, who once said nobody could ever top Detroit isn't even impressed when em- sing collectively in parking lots.

Well, forget it, Rob. There isn't thing that the Japanese can't do.

It won't be long until Japanese books fill my shelves. I envision et-sized classics with electronic finders. Books like "Zen and the gale Girl," "Yamamoto's Comp- "The World According to Carr "The Catcher in the Rice"" sexy, well-written and pe- r- structured.

Japanese magazines will do my coffee table. They'll carry books on sociology (I'm O.K., You Please Excuse Very Poor andWARD) and cosmology. (Why Things "...en to People Who S- Parking Lots.)

As an extra incentive to buy books, Japanese publishers will an outstanding guarantee. I don't like one, you write a letter author, who will write a sad, h letter in return. That's irresis- Score another 5 percent of my b- ings for the Japanese.

As for country and western music listen to just about anything. She will I resist when Japanese ar parlay the Oriental sense of urban sophistication and m technology into 48-track min- pieces? I can imagine such wor- "Marketing Director's Daug- and "Take This Job and Show How to Maximize Production So- My Contribution Will Be More able to the Company and the try."

Sorry, Nashville. Another 5 pe-

When it comes to food, I admit don't like to cook, which already my palate in a compromising tion. So once the Japanese get in fast-food business, I'll be ab- enjoy delicious cuisine at a fract- the price. "Where's the fish?" w come the staple of the adver- world, as I feast upon Big Sas- and B.L.T.'s (Better Like Tem-

That's the final 5 percent.

As soon as the Japanese ach- Total Apartment Domination, th enjoy a two-week celebratio- everyone will go out and buy ori- van Goghs and cameras to p- graph them. Then they will in- using my apartment as a beach- They'll be armed with tote bag- money and buy every square in- land available.

When they arrive, I'll greet t warmly. I'll bow and smile and v a funny robe. And I'll recite a hail my new neighbors:

"Little blue Walkman

Chirps glad songs in the morning Just like his makers."

If you can't beat 'em, buy 'em.

Gorbachev
Talks With
U.S. Group

SOVIET, From A25

another point reached in approach-
ing the problems of disarmament."

Gorbachev also emphasized a fa-
miliar theme—that Soviet foreign
policy is not threatening to U.S.
interests.

"There is no alternative to coexistence," Gorbachev told the American group. "This is not the question of whether we like each other or not. This is something outside politics.

"America will be such as is liked by the Americans," he continued. "But the Soviet Union, too, will not build its society by following recipes from the outside."

The ongoing Soviet economic and
political reforms do not "run
counter to the interests of other
nations," Gorbachev said.

The group of Americans, mem-
bers of the private Council on For-
eign Relations, arrived in Moscow
Sunday at the invitation of the So-
viet Institute for the Study of the
U.S.A. and Canada.

Among the other Americans were former secretary of state Cyprus Vance, former commerce secretary Peter Peterson, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones, former defense secretary Harold Brown and former U.N. ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick.

The group is to depart Saturday.

U.S. Bases Plan
Rejected by Spain

SPAIN, From A25

the United States had made a pro-
posal at all, but he added: "It is far
from Spain's position."

Specifics of the proposal were not
revealed but they are understood to
consist of a timetable for the with-
drawal of the 4,500 U.S. military
personnel and 79 F16 jet fighters
from the Torrejon air base, which is
13 miles east of Madrid.

At a briefing, a Spanish official
said the U.S. offer did not include
"indispensable components" of the
Spanish position.

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WALTER SCOTT'S

Personality Parade

Want the facts? Opinion? Truth? Write Walter Scott, 140 N. Hamilton Dr., Beverly Hills, Calif. 90210, or phone (213) 651-3375. Full name will be used unless otherwise requested. Volume of mail makes personal replies impossible.

AP Wide World

Q. Given the predicament of being stranded on a tropical island with (a) Jane Fonda, (b) Joan Rivers, (c) feminist author Betty Friedan or (d) Shirley MacLaine—which would you choose, and why?—H.L., Salt Lake City, Utah

A. This writer's choice is Jane Fonda, because she is intelligent, has a sense of humor and, at 49, is the youngest and in the best shape to climb trees for coconuts.

Q. I am interested in the case of James Earl Ray, who assassinated Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.

in 1968. Is it true that Ray was never tried by a jury? Where is he now? How long is his sentence? Is there any chance of his being paroled? Is he married?—Dee Kay, Johnson City, Tenn.

A. James Earl Ray, 58, occupies an isolation cell on death row in Nashville's Tennessee State Prison. He waived a trial by jury and pleaded guilty in exchange for a sentence of 99 years in prison, in lieu of the electric chair. He could possibly be considered for parole about the turn of the century. In October 1978, Ray wed Anna Sandhu, a courtroom illustrator. She visits him every few weeks.

AP Wide World

AP Wide World

James Earl Ray and Anna Sandhu with marriage license

Jewerly Blues Star

Q. Who originated "Washington Week in Review," which has been on National Public Television for 20 years? Was it the late Vice President Hubert Humphrey?—Carl Schneider, Newark, N.J.

A. "Washington Week in Review," which first went on the air in February 1967, was the brainchild of Max M. Kampelman, a lawyer and professor who served as Sen. Hubert Humphrey's legislative counsel in the 1950s. Kampelman, 66, is currently the chief U.S. arms-control negotiator, attempting to work out a reduction in nuclear weapons with representatives of the Soviet Union.

Q. What has happened to Maureen O'Hara, the gorgeous redhead who starred in "Miracle on 34th Street," "How Green Was My Valley" and in "The Quiet Man" and so many other films with the late John Wayne? Were she and Wayne ever "involved"? Is Maureen working, retired or dead? —Jackie Sullivan, Garden City, N.Y.

A. Maureen O'Hara, 66, last acted in a motion picture in 1971—"Big Jake," with John Wayne. She and Wayne were good friends but never "involved." O'Hara (real name: Maureen FitzSimons) was married three times. Her first marriage, to the director George Brown, was annulled. Her second, to the director Will Price, by whom she has a 42-year-old daughter, Bronwyn, ended in divorce. Her third, to Charles Blair, who ran an airline in the Caribbean, ended when he was killed in a 1978 plane crash. A widow of considerable wealth, O'Hara has homes in California, the Virgin Islands, New York and her native Ireland.

Sandra Grier-Lionel

Maureen O'Hara today

Q. Dylan Thomas, the Welsh poet who drank himself into the grave before he was 40, had an equally alcoholic and amoral wife, Caitlin. Is she alive?—C. Andrews, Flint, Mich.

A. Dylan Thomas died in New York in 1953. His widow, Caitlin, is 73 and for 30 years has lived on and off with Giuseppe Fazio, now 64, in his native Sicily. They have a 22-year-old son.

Bretwood/REB Helton

The late poet Dylan Thomas and wife, Caitlin, in 1946

Q. How many Presidents in this century served two full terms? Wasn't Franklin D. Roosevelt the first?—Rudy Weinberg, Costa Mesa, Calif.

A. Thus far in this century, three Presidents have served two full terms: Woodrow Wilson (1913-21), Franklin D. Roosevelt (three-plus terms, 1933-45) and Dwight Eisenhower (1953-61).

Q. How long do you think Don Regan will last as chief of staff?—J.L.T., Alexandria, Va.

A. President Reagan hates to fire anyone. If he hasn't asked for Don Regan's resignation and accepted it by the time your question appears in print, Regan may hold on indefinitely—depending, of course, upon the disclosures of the Iranian arms sales and distribution of the profits therefrom to the Nicaraguan Contras. Among those mentioned as Regan's possible successor are Drew Lewis, former Secretary of Transportation; former Sen. Howard Baker of Tennessee; former Sen. Paul Laxalt of Nevada; and James Baker III, Reagan's first-term chief of staff, who relinquished the position to become Secretary of the Treasury.

©WALTER SCOTT 1987

PARADE®

THE SUNDAY NEWSPAPER MAGAZINE

JANUARY 11, 1987

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©1987, Parade Publications, Inc., 750 Third Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part of any article without permission is prohibited. "PARADE" is a registered trademark of Parade Publications, Inc. "Walter Scott's Personality Parade," "Personality Parade," "Keeping Up With Youth," 'My Favorite Jokes' and 'Intelligence Report' are trademarks of Lloyd Shearer."

PAGE 2 • JANUARY 11, 1987 • PARADE MAGAZINE

IN STEP WITH:

BY JAMES BRADY

# Henry Kissinger

Henry Beaun

Henry Kissinger stepped down 10 years ago this month as one of the most powerful foreign secretaries we've ever had. Instead of fading into obscurity, he is today still influential, acute, eminently quotable.

## BRADY'S BITS

Two years ago, I hurried across to a pier on the Hudson River to do an interview for WCBS-TV with Kissinger, who was speaking to a maritime group. When I arrived, Dr. K waved me off. "No, no," he said, "this wasn't cleared with me. I never agreed to an interview." An eager-beaver PR man had promised to deliver Henry—but without his approval. I guess my face fell, and Kissinger saw it. "All right, Jim, I'll do it for you. Not for CBS. But for you." You don't forget things like that.

IT WAS EXACTLY 10 YEARS AGO THAT Henry Kissinger—stepping down as Gerald Ford's Secretary of State—last held high public office. But there are lots of Americans who can't spell George Shultz's name (that's right, no "c") who remember Dr. K.

How can we not? Since sliding gracefully into "retirement," Kissinger has written a couple of best-selling books, flirted with the notion of running for the Senate, trekked to Central America on a mission for President

Reagan, traveled several times around the world, had a heart-bypass operation, appeared on every Sunday-morning news show there is and had time left over to bring a lawsuit against *Penthouse* magazine for publishing an interview he thought he was giving to a historian. Some "retirement!"

At age 63, Dr. K is one of our most enduring elder statesmen. Much of the bitterness over his diplomatic stewardship of the Vietnam war has mellowed with time. You no longer hear stories of those crackpot days and nights toward the end of the Nixon Presidency when Mr. Nixon got Henry to kneel down on the White House carpet to pray with him. Even the Democrats seem to have forgiven him.

His first political patron, Nelson Rockefeller, who drafted Henry out of a Harvard professorship to become his adviser, is dead. Richard Nixon is in seclusion. Gerald Ford works on his library and plays golf. Of all of them, Dr. K is the most visible and, in many ways, the most intriguing.

He and his wife, Nancy (formerly Maginnes—years younger and inches taller), have a vast and elegant apartment in Manhattan. I was there once for a charity cocktail party and had been told the windows overlooking the East River were an inch thick and bulletproof, lest some terrorist in Queens (a mile away or more) be tempted to take a shot. As far as I could see, the windows looked perfectly normal and the only peril Kissinger faced was that, right on the heels of cocktails, he was having a Chinese delegation in for dinner.

I get the impression that in Nancy, Henry found the perfect wife. She puts

up with the diplomatic whirl, plays hostess magnificently, has nursed him through his illness and recuperation. And it was Nancy who came to Henry's rescue in that airport melee when he was harassed by political enemies in such vile, unprintable terms that she threatened to slug one of them.

Years ago, when he was still Mr. Nixon's national security affairs adviser, Kissinger called me to complain about inaccuracies in an article about his rich lifestyle. I countered by saying that if he had not refused to be interviewed, the story would have been more accurate. Okay, said Dr. K., he'd agree to sit down with a reporter to talk about "skirt lengths and sex and so on"—anything but his job. I can

still hear his peals of laughter.

BORN: May 27, 1923, in Fuerth, Germany.

**PERSONAL:** Married to Ann Fleischer, 1949-64; children: Elizabeth and David. Married to Nancy Maginnes since 1974.

**CAREER HIGHLIGHTS:**
* Appointed professor in Harvard's department of government, 1962; director of Harvard's Defense Studies Program, 1958-69; Assistant to President for National Security Affairs, 1969-75; Secretary of State, 1973-77; member of Georgetown University faculty since 1977.

**BOOKS:**
* Include Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 1957; The White House Years, 1979; For the Record, 1981; Years of Upheaval, 1982.
* AWARDS: Woodrow Wilson Prize, 1958; Nobel Peace Prize, 1973; Presidential Medal of Freedom, 1977.

PARADE MAGAZINE • JANUARY 11, 1987 • PAGE 19

Malcolm Forbes'
House Party

FORBES, From B1

guests' helicopters!

A separate dining tent just for chauffeurs and the rest of the help!

Elizabeth Taylor, looking fit on the arm of the host as she watched the pageantry! (Taylor was nearly blinded by the flashbulbs of scores of photographers. Publicity is, along with ballooning and motorcycling and Faborge eggs, one of Forbes' passions.)

And, moving slowly through two receiving lines, the Establishment itself. "In terms of corporate America," said son Tim Forbes, not inaccurately, "it's here tonight."

"There won't be a lot doing on Wall Street tonight," mused James Robinson, CEO of American Express, looking over the crowd. Among the financiers and industrialists were Donald Marron of Paine Webber, Rand Aras-kog of ITT, Felix Rohatyn of Lazard Freres, and GM's Roger Smith.

A bipartisan contingent of politicians included Forbes' old buddies Robert Strauss, Cyrus Vance and Abraham Ribicoff, who noted that "you'll probably find more Republicans" than members of the other party. This, as it turned out, was true; they included White Chief of Staff Howard Baker, former senator Paul Laxalt, Ambassador Walter Annenberg, New Jersey Gov. Thomas Kean and Henry Kissinger.

Not to mention an eclectic assortment of fellow media moguls like Christie Hefner (pointing out that Playboy parties attract younger guests), Penthouse publisher Bob Guccione, William Paley of CBS, Washington Post Co. Chairman Katharine Graham, New York Times publisher Punch Sulzberger and one of his newest columnists, retired editor Abe Rosenthal.

Plus your uncategorizable group of, well; Names in the News. Like Eppie Lederer (a k-a Ann Landers), who's Forbes' old chum ("Whatever he does, he does it better than anyone else") and model Jerry Hall (tossing her hair and saying that Mick—that's Jagger—wanted to be there in the worst way but had to complete an album) and Regis Philbin and writer Fran Lebowitz ("Malcolm is a friend of mine; we went to camp together") and Jerome Zipkin and Beverly Sills.

Hemline note: Lee Radziwill went long. Ivana Trump went short and poufy. Helen Gurley Brown went short and off-the-shoulder. Liz Taylor wore so many diamonds—at her ears, on her wrist, on the bosom of her Christian Dior gown, and one enormous rock on her finger—that no one thought to look down.

The 1,100 or so guests were to dine on cold, sliced breast of pheasant and whole baked Scotch salmon (requiring 20 chefs and 270 waiters) and 100 cakes iced to resemble the first issue of Forbes magazine, brought to each table by still more bagpipers. They were also to dance to the soothing strains of Lester Lanin, the dancing to be interrupted by 20 minutes of fireworks and laser beams.

Now, as to the question of the evening: Was this truly the Party of the Century, as the syndicated columnist Suzy has dubbed it? Donald Trump said he disliked comparing parties, though he told anyone who asked that this one was "fabulous." Rupert Murdoch thought it probably was as big as advertised. Columnist and novelist James Brady said it was too soon to tell.

But Helen Gurley Brown voted in the affirmative. "When we came in and saw 38 helicopters on the front lawn," said Brown, "I mean thirty-eight helicopters, all strewn about like flowers. I mean just standing in line, every single person seemed to be somebody."

2

They've beaten
the Arabs,
so what's plaguing
Israel?

# THE KISSINGER COVENANT AND OTHER REASONS ISRAEL IS IN TROUBLE

by Milton Viorst

At dawn on June 5, 1967, the Israeli air force swooped down in a surprise attack on Egyptian air bases. Israel's plan was to go first after Egypt, its most formidable enemy, while urging King Hussein to keep Jordan out of the fight. Within hours, Israel had knocked out Gamal Abdel Nasser's entire air force, effectively settling the contest. Over the next few days, Egypt's army, operating without cover, was decimated by Israel's air and ground forces.

Notwithstanding Israel's appeal, Hussein joined the war, unaware that the outcome had been determined before his forces fired a shot. When Jordanian artillery shelled Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, Israel struck. In a three-day offensive, it captured the Old City of Jerusalem, destroyed Jordan's army and occupied the entire West Bank. Before the last battle against Jordan was fought, the Israelis turned on the Syrians, who appeared impregnable in their bastion on the Golan Heights. In the most brilliant military exploit of all, the Israelis stormed the Heights, and by the end of the week, Syria, too, was defeated.

In fighting both on land and in the air, Israel had demonstrated its superiority over the com-

bined power of its Arab neighbors. It ended the war occupying territory more than three times its size. It was in possession of what its generals called "strategic depth," with a defensive perimeter that included Egypt's Sinai peninsula and Gaza Strip, Syria's Golan Heights, and Jordan's West Bank. Israel, which had appeared out-matched in 1948 and again on the eve of the Six-Day War, had suddenly become invulnerable to the full power of the Arab world.

Like every Jew in my circle of friends, like every member of the worldwide community of Jews, I exulted at Israel's victory in 1967. It was a triumph that made us all feel better about ourselves. We stopped having to apologize for being weak, for being dependent, for being Jews. We were winners at last, after two thousand years of losing, and whatever concerns about Israel I have since acquired, that feeling of joy has remained. The issue since the Six-Day War—as it has been debated both in Israel and in countries friendly to Israel—is not a strong state versus a weak one. The issue is whether Israel can bring itself to use its power prudently and wisely.

In retrospect, it is clear the Six-Day War transformed Israel in ways that went far beyond the simple question of security. It resulted in gains for the winner too huge to be digested, costs to the losers too embarrassing to confront. From the shattered fragments of the conflicts emerged a

*From the book Sands of Sorrow: Israel's Journey from In-dependence, by Milton Viorst. Copyright © 1987 by Milton Viorst. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.*

THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY/JUNE 1987

23

structure of relations among the nations of the
Middle East dominated by Israel's military power,
hardly healthier for the victor than for the
vanquished.

The war dramatically changed the internal
dynamics of Israeli politics and culture. It was
only after the Six-Day War that the relationship
between Ashkenazim (Jews of European origin)
and Sephardim (Jews mostly from the Middle
East) exploded into open struggle. The war
created a new geographical reality on Israel's
borders and established a new psychological reali-
ty at home, sharply intensifying the competition
among diverse cultural groups and leading to the
dominance of the Israeli right-wing. In their own
land Jews, who take pride in no longer having
to be fearful and servile in dealing with anyone,
have created a social structure that demands that
Arabs be fearful and servile in dealing with them.

The war has also radically changed how Israel
relates to its neighbors. In creating a powerful ar-
my, Israel has freed the Jews of the age-old tor-
ment of impotence, imparting to them a sense of
mastery over their future. But in doing so, it has
failed to grasp the limits of what armed might
can achieve. Israel had persuaded itself that, given
the shift in the strategic balance in the Middle
East, the Arabs had the only advantage in
reaching an overall peace settlement. Israel has
come to rely on guns, so unfamiliar in the Jewish
past and so suddenly acquired, to solve problems
that are only peripherally military. The cockiness
was reinforced by an American policy, codified
in a pact devised by Henry Kissinger that virtually
guaranteed whatever arms and assistance Israel
requested. The result has been that while Israel
is now strong enough to repel its neighbors, it is
also strong enough to turn its back on the peace
process. Ironically, Israel's military
domination—supported by its increasing
conservatism—only makes it more difficult to
achieve peace in the Middle East.

Evening scores

When the Six-Day War was over, the Israelis
found themselves ruling more than 1.2 million
Arabs who lived in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip. Conflict between Israelis and the residents
of the occupied lands was inevitable. But the
presence of the new Arab population also exacerb-
bated the bitter ideological quarrels between the
Ashkenazim and Sephardim.

"Ashkenazim" was a term first applied to Ger-
man Jews, and over centuries came to designate
all Jews exposed to the main currents of Euro-

pean culture. "Sephard" was the name original-
ly given to the Jews of Spain that later applied
to all Jews influenced by the culture of Islam. It
was the Ashkenazim who founded modern Israel,
for Zionism was an Ashkenazi political move-
ment. The Jews who settled the new land were
for the most part Eastern Europeans, who
brought with them ideas current in the world they
left behind.

During the many centuries of Diaspora,
however, the idea of a return to Zion may have
been more deep-seated among the Sephardim.
Though rarely persecuted by their moslem
neighbors, the Jews of Islam were denied full par-
ticipation in the economy and society. Then, in
the late nineteenth century, with the Ottoman
Empire in decline and Arab nationalism on the
rise, their position became more precarious. For
the first time, European doctrines of anti-
Semitism circulated in the Arab world.

In its first months of independence, Israel
welcomed more than 300,000 European Jews, sur-
vivors of Nazism, but after that the Western in-
flux abated and immigration from the Arab
world soared. They came knowing little of
Zionism, without political designs, generally im-
poverished, and poorly educated for modern life.
By 1956, Israel's population had been increased
threefold by the arrival of Eastern Jews. Though
Sephardim were about 15 percent of the Jewish
people worldwide, within Israel their ratio grew
from barely a fifth at independence to nearly
half. With a substantially higher birth rate, by the
Six-Day War their ratio had increased to more
than a majority.

The Ashkenazi refugees, adapting more easily
to Israel's Western ways, made their way to the
cities, where they entered trade or industry. There
they were quickly absorbed into the middle class.
The Sephardim who followed them to the cities
tended, in contrast, to became an urban pro-
letariat, living in slums. Those who stayed behind
in rural areas clustered in state-constructed
"development towns," economically and social-
ly impoverished, a far cry both from the vibrant
Arab cities from which they had fled and from
the Jewish homeland of their millennial dreams.

In jobs, schools, and the army, the Sephardim
saw themselves as victimized by discrimination.
As Arab Jews, they were made to feel like
foreigners in a Jewish land. Mainstream Zionist
leaders, insensitive to their alienation, publicly
lamented the prospect of Israel's being "Levan-
tinized" or "Orientalized." They spoke openly of
the dangers presented by Sephardi ignorance of
democracy and the rule of law. Rather loftily, the

24

Thanks to Arab day labor, Sephardim have acquired a vested interest in having Israel keep the occupied territories.

Ashkenazi ruling elite called upon Sephardim to transform themselves into good Israelis, like themselves.

Insofar as the Sephardim might have been called Zionists at all, theirs was a religious, even "Messianic" belief, far from the political and social ideology of the Mainstream. Socialism was remote from their experience. Democracy was little known to them, and the "new" Jew was a goal to which they did not aspire. Family-oriented, they bristled at the challenge to patriarchy, at the pervasiveness of women in the labor market, at the freedom given to children—Western ways they saw threatening their traditions.

In contrast to the ideas the Ashkenazim had brought with them, the Sephardim brought to Israel the Islamic tradition of patriarchal rule and the Koranic view that religion is inseparable from the political structure. To this day, Sephardim have difficulty adapting not only to the Western theories of democracy but to a notion of pluralism, which is essential to stability in a heterogenous state. More disposed than Ashkenazim to a black-and-white vision of politics, they have tended to inject into the everyday contest for power a passion generally associated with the East rather than the West.

At the same time, the Sephardim have drawn the lines more sharply in Israel's struggle with its Arab neighbors. Despite centuries of relative tranquility in the Arab world, they made clear once they arrived that they nursed deep historic grudges. The Ashkenazim, though hardly fond of Arabs, have tended to regard them chiefly as a security problem, within Israel's power to somehow solve. The Sephardim, in contrast, respond to Arabs with emotions that are often raw, angry, intense.

Arabs today often claim to be bewildered by the hatred many Jews feel for them, since for centuries, they say, the two peoples lived in harmony. And it is true that Jews in the Arab world experienced no Inquisition, no pogroms, no Holocaust. But the Jews of the Arab world knew the relentless humiliation of second-class citizenship, and they did not forget it when they reached Israel. Though less angry than Ashkenazim at Christianity, they were readier to blame Islam for Israel's woes. They dismissed Ashkenazi concern

for the rights of Arabs in a Jewish state as effete European humanism. Israeli opinion polls have shown that nearly half of Sephardim currently sympathize with anti-Arab extremist movements, more than twice the ratio of Ashkenazim. The Six-Day War suddenly presented them with the prospect of evening scores against an old enemy.

## Menial labor

The war also provided Sephardim with a new grievance toward Mainstream Zionism. When Israel seized the West Bank and Gaza, overnight thousands of Arabs arrived to join the domestic labor force, and in the years of prosperity that followed, the Arabs took over most of Israel's menial work. Mainstream Zionists were troubled. A tenet of their egalitarian philosophy held that all work was honorable, that there would be no class of serfs, that Jews and not Arabs would perform the drudgery of the Jewish society. But before the war, when it was not the "Jews" but the Sephardim who did most of the dirty work, Mainstream Zionists, whatever their egalitarian commitments, seemed not to notice. As Arabs took over the drudgery after 1967, the Sephardim took better jobs and cheered. The Ashkenazim mourned their lost ideals.

For Mainstream Zionists, the West Bank presented a dilemma. The simple homeland of Zionist dreams had overnight become an empire containing two million Arabs, most of them without political rights. The Mainstream Zionists understood the risk to the Jewishness of Israel that incorporation of the Arabs of the West Bank presented. To refuse those Arabs citizenship would be apartheid. To accommodate them would shift Israel from being a Zionist nation to being a non-Zionist one.

Thanks to Arab day labor, Sephardim have acquired a vested interest in having Israel keep the occupied territories, even though they have little representation in the movements to colonize them. Their reasons are practical: The Arab work force offers an opportunity for upward mobility, and they have little patience with those who proposed to snatch it away by returning the land.

In his *In the Land of Israel*, Amos Oz, an Ashkenazi and a kibbutznik, recorded the words

25

of a second-generation Moroccan Jew:

They [Askenazim] gave us houses, they gave us the dirty work; they gave us education, and they took away our self-respect. What did they bring my parents to Israel for?... Wasn't it to do your dirty work? You didn't have Arabs then, so you needed our parents to do your cleaning and be your servants and your laborers....

Look at my daughter: she works in a bank now, and every evening an Arab comes to clean the building. All you want is to dump her from the bank into some textile factory, or have her wash the floor instead of the Arab. The way my mother used to clean for you.... If for no other reason, we won't let you give back those territories.

David Shipler, who for many years was *The New York Times* correspondent in Jerusalem, notes in his book *Arab and Jew* that Israelis almost never tell jokes that poke fun at their relations with Arabs. But one that he recalled concerned an old Ashkenazi pioneer who took his grandson from the city on a tour of the kibbutz where he had spent his life.

"See that road?" the old man says proudly to the boy. "I built it. See that house? I built it. See that field? I plowed it."

"Oh, Grandpa," the boy says, "Did you used to be an Arab?"

The conflicting perceptions of the Arabs have created an interesting paradox, with important political implications. Mainstream Zionists, claiming no animosity toward Arabs, consider their presence incompatible with a Jewish state, and so have urged the reintroduction of partition. The Sephardim, acknowledging their anti-Arab attitudes, see no injustice in having the large minority of Arabs as a permanent underclass. As the power in Israel has shifted towards the Sephardim, their views have prevailed.

That rise in the power of the Sephardim was fundamental to the growth after the Six-Day War of a new wave of Revisionism—the ultra-nationalist movement—that was more religious and much more populist than before. The Revisionist leadership remained in the hands of right-wing Ashkenazim of the Menachem Begin model, an elite of basically secular Jews from the old terrorist underground. But it was fortified by the bulk of the Sephardi population that, for the first time, gave these leaders a mass following.

Meanwhile, Orthodox Jews, having suddenly found truth in Revisionist doctrine, supported it

with fanaticism, acclaiming the virtue of violence committed in the exercise of God's Commandments. The coalition that came into being positioned the Revisionists to make their first serious bid for political power.

While shifting the balance of votes to the right, the new coalition also changed the rules of combat for the conduct of politics. Israelis had always practiced their democracy vigorously, with heavy doses of hyperbole, even of demagogy. But the new wave of Revisionism introduced into the political arena an element of physical aggressiveness, often passionate, sometimes violent, occasionally lawless.

## The promise

At the same time the clash between Sephardim and Ashkenazim was intensifying, Israel's notion of how it would survive outside threats was changing. For several years after the Six-Day War, Arabs and Israelis skirmished verbally and militarily.

Then, on the morning of Yom Kippur 1973, the holiest day of the Jewish year, Sadat sent Egyptian tanks rolling down the ramps on the western edge of the Suez Canal. It had occurred to few Israelis that granting the soldiers leave to go home for the holiday would present a risk. During the first week of battle, the United States watched Israel take a battering, and only barely kept even with the Russians, who were resupplying the Arabs with ammunition and light equipment. The war was into its second week when Israel, strengthened with new American equipment, reversed the tide in the Sinai. On October 14, after the Egyptians had advanced beyond the range of the Surface-to-Air missiles, Israel won a huge battle in the desert. The victory was followed by a crossing of the canal by the redoubtable General Ariel Sharon, a maneuver that threatened to encircle Egypt's Third Army, which was exposed in its bridgehead in the Sinai. During the ensuing days of fighting and dying, the momentum shifted increasingly to Israel. It was only then that the combatants, pressed by their patrons, the United States and the Soviet Union, showed a readiness to stop.

In the negotiations that followed the cease-fire after the Yom Kippur War, Israel sought not just to keep defensible borders, but also to gain a permanent commitment of aid from the United States to guarantee its security.

When Henry Kissinger began his shuttle diplomacy after the war, he was balancing two goals: pressing for concessions from all sides to

26

Kissinger's structure tied the U.S. to all decisions Israel made, while imposing on Israel no corresponding requirement to consider American interests.

establish some permanent negotiated settlement, and ensuring Israel came out of the agreement strong enough to act as the U.S. proxy in the area against Soviet threats. The "disengagement" agreement in Egypt went smoothly enough. The negotiations in Syria were more difficult. Golda Meir had resigned as Prime Minister in early April 1974, Yitzak Rabin, the former ambassador to Washington, was on his way in, and, just as important, Richard Nixon was on his way out as president. Nixon, convinced a triumph abroad could save him from the tightening vise of Watergate, repeatedly pressed Kissinger to go on at times when another president might have regarded the negotiations as hopeless.

To put together a deal that included territorial concessions by Israel and Arab agreements of nonaggression, Kissinger had to commit the U.S. to crucial involvement. At the final hour, with the beleaguered Nixon waiting in Washington to make an announcement of a peace agreement that he hoped would turn the nation's attention from Watergate, the Israeli negotiators balked. Faced with a public outcry over the PLO massacre of 24 children in Ma'alot in May, Israel demanded of Syria a pledge to forbid terrorists to cross the Golan into Israel. Hafez Assad's sense of Arab honor prevented him from proclaiming a position that might be construed as truckling to Israel. Neither side was willing to budge.

Kissinger filled the gap with a private letter promising America's approval of any response to terrorism that Israel might choose to make. The letter set no limits. To Israel, the letter constituted a promise that no future president would withhold American economic or military assistance as punishment for antiterrorist reprisals. It committed Washington to support such attacks before the world, most notably at the United Nations. In effect, it imposed a serious new limitation on America's ability to compel restraint within the cycle of violence that so often ran amok in the Arab-Israeli struggle.

## Chilly reception

Two weeks after Rabin's accession to office, Richard Nixon arrived from Washington on a

grand tour of the Middle East, desperate to rescue his presidency in what were, by now, clearly its dying days. Nixon's fantasy was to establish himself in the public mind as indispensable to peacemaking in the region. He was greeted in Egypt with enthusiasm, in Saudi Arabia with respect, in Syria with cordiality. Only in Israel was he received in chilly fashion.

Though Rabin had often proclaimed indebtedness to Nixon for opening America's depots to Israel and coming to its rescue in two wars, he made clear to the American president his dissatisfaction with current policy. Rabin said candidly he did not want Kissinger to press Israel to make further concessions for peace. He much preferred the old relationship with the U.S., Rabin said, in which Israel was supplied with all the arms it wanted, while sitting on the diplomatic status quo. Nixon, encouraged in the Arab capitals to intensify peacemaking efforts, received from Rabin's new government a sharp signal to slow them down.

Kissinger, however, feared that any slowing down would cost him his strategic objectives, since suspending the shuttle would become an invitation to Egypt and Syria to gravitate back to the Soviet camp. He saw the next logical step on his diplomatic agenda to be a shuttle to Jordan. He reasoned that unless a Jordanian presence, however symbolic, was reestablished on the West Bank, there could be no progress toward a Palestinian settlement, which he now considered fundamental to reaching his goal. Rabin rejected the idea of Jordanian involvement in the West Bank for a number of reasons, not the least of which was that he simply did not see the Palestinian issue as central to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

But Rabin did see in peacemaking a way to fulfill his life's mission of providing Israel with permanent access to the weapons necessary to maintain the Middle East's mightiest army. He reasoned that Kissinger, itching to preside over an American-brokered peace, would pay heavily to get it.

Israel had long relied on a tough, little, standing army, backed by well-prepared reservists, but Rabin decided that was no longer enough. He wanted Israel to approach the Arabs quantitative-

987

27

1

ly, both in levels of manpower and in weapons. Within months of the Yom Kippur War, Israel's military spending exceeded that of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan combined.

After Nixon resigned, Gerald Ford retained Kissinger, who arrived in Jerusalem in the fall of 1974, proposing a fresh round of shuttle diplomacy. He found Rabin amenable but determined to press a new and major condition. Rabin said Israel would negotiate only with Egypt.

Rabin's decision was based on the perception of Egypt as the preeminent Arab power, the only one whose armies were strong enough to threaten Israel. He calculated that there was still ground in the Sinai that Israel could safely evacuate. What he saw in return—as he acknowledged candidly—was the prospect of separating Egypt from the rest of the Arab world. Rabin stated he wanted peace with “normalization.” But the objective he really wanted was acceptance by the Arabs of permanent changes in Israel's boundaries.

In entering new shuttle talks with Kissinger, he made clear that he was no readier to implement the territory-for-peace principle insofar as “full peace” was concerned than Golda Meir had been seven years earlier. Kissinger, faced with negotiations on Rabin's terms or no negotiations at all, decided reluctantly to go along.

## Blank Check?

In February 1975, Kissinger arrived in the Middle East to begin the second Egyptian-Israeli shuttle, only to find negotiating conditions had sharply deteriorated in the previous months. Anwar Sadat, apprehensive about getting too far out in front of the Arab world, let it be known he wanted no agreement that did not bring with it a substantial gain in territory. Rabin answered that he preferred no agreement at all to giving away defensible terrain. Jordan and Syria had by now become extremely suspicious of Sadat and of the prospect of his making a separate deal that overlooked their interests. The Arab oil producers were talking of another embargo to put pressure on Israel. The Russians were waiting in the wings for the opportunity to cement together the pieces of their old Middle East power base.

Kissinger understood that the U.S. would be much embarrassed if his peacemaking program failed. Both Rabin and Sadat came away from visits with him convinced that he was more anxious for a successful shuttle than were either of them. That, of course, was precisely where they wanted him. Sadat retreated in the negotiations

from his original terms, but Rabin retreated even further, and after two weeks of bargaining, Kissinger decided to go home.

Back in Washington, Kissinger publicly blamed Israel for the breakdown. President Ford followed by announcing a “total reassessment” of American policy in the region and, in the ensuing weeks, imposed limitations on arms shipments and economic assistance to Israel. It was as severe a blow as had been struck since Eisenhower's day. Rabin stuck resolutely to his guns, while in Israel public opinion rallied to him and in America the Jewish leadership urged the White House to soften its response. In May, pro-Israeli pressure persuaded 76 U.S. senators to sign a letter calling on Ford to loosen the screws.

Rabin was confident that in time Kissinger would crack. He understood that Kissinger could not bear to convey to the Soviet Union the image that American power in the Middle East was in disarray. He bet that Kissinger, without other options, would return to Israel, bearing gifts.

Sadat took the initiative to restore movement in June by volunteering that if Israel moved as far back as the Sinai passes, Egypt would agree to the demilitarization of the evacuated area. Furthermore, it would allow Americans to man electronic warning stations within them to monitor compliance with the agreement. Ford and Kissinger, whatever their misgivings about American involvement, adopted the idea.

But the real breakthrough in talks occurred when Ford, shortly afterward, conveyed to the Israeli government the offer that Rabin had gambled on receiving. In return for Israeli evacuation of the passes and the oil fields, Ford said, the U.S. would assure Israel permanent, large-scale, military and financial support. It was a huge concession that would transform not only American-Israeli relations but the entire structure of power in the Middle East. Yet even with the groundwork laid in advance, it took Kissinger 12 days of shuttle diplomacy to negotiate the agreement, known as Sinai II.

In the context of the long struggle for Middle East peace, the Israeli-Egyptian segment of Sinai II was unquestionably a remarkable achievement. Israel, in giving up Egyptian land it had captured in 1967, agreed to take undeniable risks with its security, and in giving up the oil fields, with its economy. The cost of the Yom Kippur War to the Israelis had been astronomical. Economists calculated the total at nearly $7 billion, equal to more than a year of the country's gross national product. Egypt had also made a psychological break from the Arab world, as well as from Arab

28

7

history, to move away from the order of in-
exorable war that had defined its Israeli relations
since 1948.

But it turned out there was less promise and,
ultimately, more trouble than met the eye. The
Israeli-American segment of the Sinai II agree-
ment, the most painful to negotiate, carried
American involvement in Israel's security, begun
in Lyndon Johnson's day, into a new range. To
get Israeli agreement to Sinai II, Kissinger sealed
the pledge that Ford had made earlier to Rabin.
In it, the U.S. accepted an obligation to "submit
annually for approval by the U.S. Congress a re-
quest for military and economic assistance in
order to help meet Israel's economic and military
needs." The accord contained a further obliga-
tion that the American government "make every
effort to be fully responsive, within the limits of
its resources and congressional authorization and
appropriation, on an on-going and long-term
basis, to Israel's military equipment and other
defense requirements, to its energy requirements
and to its economic needs." The agreement also
guaranteed that if Israel faced an energy short-
tage, the U.S. would provide oil from its reserves,
transport it, and even provide oil to Israel when
an embargo was in effect against the U.S.

America's pledge, in effect, made it the custo-
dian both of Israel's security and its economy.
The agreement was not quite an American
"blank check" to Israel, but it came extremely
close. Kissinger's structure tied the U.S. to all
decisions Israel made, while imposing on Israel
no corresponding requirement to consider
American interests in making them.

Even more inexplicable than the military and
economic vows that Kissinger made was his
agreement in Sinai II to put an end to his beloved
step-by-step diplomacy. Having cajoled and
pleaded with Rabin for months to face the
Palestinian issue by dealing with Jordan, and hav-
ing lost face in Amman by failing to keep his own
pledge of a shuttle, Kissinger proceeded to cross
a Jordanian-Israeli "disengagement" accord off
his agenda. In scrapping the step-by-step strategy,
he agreed to abandon the peace process
altogether.

Furthermore, having rewarded Rabin once for
refusing to deal with Jordan, Kissinger proceed-
ed bizarrely to reward him a second time. Kis-
singer had warned Israel in 1974 that refusal to
come to terms with Amman would strengthen the
PLO. Shortly afterward, his concern was vin-
dicated when the Arab summit at Rabat trans-
ferred to the PLO all of Jordan's authority to
speak for the Palestinians. Rabin naturally said

he would have nothing to do with the PLO, and
Kissinger said the United States would not either.
In Sinai II, Kissinger made the now famous
American pledge of self-denial, agreeing not to
"recognize or negotiate" with the PLO. The
pledge has made Washington as ineffective in
dealing with the Palestinian question as Moscow
became, after breaking relations, in dealing with
Israel.

U.S. economic aid jumped from $126 million
in 1966 to $467 million in 1973 and three years
later, after the Kissinger covenant, to more than
$2.5 billion. U.S. aid is now $3 billion. Of course,
not all of the huge increase could be attributed
to the Kissinger covenant; Congress has often in-
creased Israel's appropriation beyond the level re-
quested by the administration. But U.S. Treasury
and Pentagon officials are now required by law
to meet with Israeli officials in crafting the budget
requests for foreign aid, requests designed to meet
the budgetary needs of the Israelis. More impor-
tant, the philosophy behind the agreement, more
than the letter of it, had been accepted: U.S.
foreign aid to Israel was to become a major part
of Israel's budget.

Rabin, who made up in shrewdness what he
lacked in committment to peace, knew well
enough how to respond to an opportunity that
he considered to be in Israel's interest. In Sinai
II, he provided so well for Israel that it never had
to settle with the Arabs again. When I asked
Rabin whether Sinai II did not give Israel a free
hand to do as it liked in strategic and political
matters in the region, he answered, "No doubt."
To make sure I had not misunderstood him, I
asked Rabin a second time whether Israel had the
military power to do as it liked in the Middle
East. He said, "Of course."

Intoxicated with strength

In a narrow sense, the huge amounts of
American aid and the Israeli military buildup
may have made Israel more secure; no country
has attempted to invade since the agreement was
signed. But the military might that Rabin had
been so instrumental in creating was at the
disposal not just of land-for-peace Mainstream
Zionists but of whatever ideology governed
Israel.

The prime minister who followed Rabin in
1977 was Manechem Begin, a Revisionist who
was prepared to go beyond the mission of defense
to assign Israel's armed forces a far more con-
tentious set of imperatives. Begin is remembered
for joining Sadat under the wing of Jimmy

29

Carter at Camp David and agreeing to evacuate Egypt's Sinai territories. But it is sometimes forgotten that, in return, he separated Egypt from the Arab world, neutralizing its power in the Arab-Israeli conflict. With the largest Arab army no longer a factor to be considered, Begin had a free hand to use his own military forces as he liked.

In late 1981, Begin's defense minister, Ariel Sharon, delivered a remarkably candid speech to Tel Aviv's Institute of Strategic Studies, in which he outlined Israel's new vision of military dominance. "Israel's national security interests," he stated, "are influenced by developments and events far beyond the direct confrontation area where Israel had focused its attention in the past.... Israel's sphere of strategic and security interest must be broadened to include in the 1980s countries such as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and regions such as the Persian Gulf and Africa, particularly the countries of North and Central Africa."

No matter how sympathetically Sharon's assertion is examined, it emerges as fantasy except that as minister of defense, Sharon was stating policy. The fantasy was that Israel, a tiny country of barely three-and-a-half million citizens, would exercise strategic dominance over an area covering 5,000 miles end to end, and containing hundreds of millions of inhabitants, nearly all of them muslim. Israel had by far the strongest army in the Middle East, and the Arabs were in disarray. Israel's security was guaranteed by the greatest of superpowers, which bestowed upon it a huge annual subsidy and all the arms it needed, while imposing on it no political limitations. In his speech, Sharon was extolling the power of an irresistable military machine that had gone out of control.

Six months later, Begin sent the Israeli army into Lebanon. Secretary of State Alexander Haig has written that he warned Begin repeatedly that the U.S. would not support Israeli action in Lebanon without an "internationally recognized provocation." This was an invitation to find one, which Israel had not trouble doing. When a prominent Israeli diplomat was shot in London, Israel blamed the PLO and its waiting army moved. Though subsequent investigation established that the PLO had not been responsible for the shooting, it hardly mattered. The Begin government concluded quite reasonably that it had met Washington's terms. "I was against that war," Rabin told me. "Begin became intoxicated by our military strength, but the war in Lebanon had to fail. We cannot impose peace

on our neighbors through the force of arms."

Israel's intoxication with its military strength has also meant that during Likud's reign there have been no serious negotiations on returning any of the captured lands on the West Bank as a way of settling the Palestinian problem. Israel's emphasis has been almost exclusively on military buildup. Israel's defense budget grew from $616 million in 1966 to $3.7 billion in 1976 to $4.5 billion in 1980. Its ratio of defense spending to gross national product grew from 8.7 percent in 1966, about the same as the U.S., to nearly 30 percent in 1980, six times the American level. Israel's huge financial obligation for arms, notwithstanding generous American subsidies, have sapped the country's economic system. They have depressed the standard of living, discouraged immigration and encouraged emigration, and forced deep reductions in educational and social programs.

Meanwhile, the signs are plentiful that the Arab obsession with war against Israel has faded. For a decade, at least, I believe the Arabs have been ready to live with Israel in peace. In an interview I had in 1986 in a Gulf country, an Arab fundamentalist leader told me that Islam could never make peace with Israel. "The Jewish people can live among us as they always have," he said, "but we are against a Zionist state." Then he stopped and sat quietly for several minutes. "Can I speak off the record?" he said finally. I replied that he could, which is why I cannot identify him. "That's my public position. But the Arab people need peace and stability to develop, and we cannot make war with Israel anymore. My private position is that we ought to make peace at once."

In looking back on the two decades that have passed since the Six-Day War, it is evident that Israel, having won all the battles, has lost the peace. The victory of 1967 set off a chain reaction that transformed the nation's character. Ignoring Ben-Gurion's admonition to remember that the land belonged to two peoples, Israel shifted its preoccupation from construction of the Jewish state to preservation of its conquests. Zionism, a humane set of values that for nearly a century had inspired the dream of a Jewish homeland, itself took on a new flavor, which was more aggressive, less generous, increasingly nationalistic. If the recompense for these losses was greater security, one might perhaps defend the transaction. But as the end of the 1980s approaches, with the Middle East still in ferment, Israel's condition has never appeared more precarious. ■

32

White House rejects
Nixon-Kissinger idea

Washington Times

By Jeremiah O'Leary

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

4/28/87

The Reagan administration will not seek to link imbalances between Soviet and NATO conventional forces and tactical nuclear arms with treaty negotiations on reducing intermediate- and short-range nuclear forces in Europe, the White House said yesterday.

"We are concerned about conventional force imbalances and are discussing this with our allies, but we are not seeking to tie this to an intermediate nuclear force (INF) treaty," presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said.

The mutual balanced force reduction talks in Vienna is the venue in which the United States will make clear its concerns about Soviet numerical superiority in non-nuclear forces and tactical nuclear artillery, he said.

Responding to a joint article by former President Richard Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger advocating removal of U.S. intermediate-range forces only when Soviet conventional forces are brought into balance, Mr. Fitzwater said: "We are concerned ... but we don't believe

see ARMS, page 10A

ARMS

From page 1A

they need to be tied to the INF agreement.

"We are engaging in discussions in Vienna to establish a new mandate for NATO and Warsaw Pact members to discuss conventional force reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals."

Mr. Fitzwater said the United States has accepted an interim arrangement with the Soviet Union for leaving 100 long-range INF warheads on each side and is pressing the Soviets for total elimination.

Referring to Mr. Nixon, the spokesman said, "We welcome his comments and expertise, but it does not alter the question."

Mr. Fitzwater also criticized Mr. Nixon's questioning of the Strategic Defense Initiative. Mr. Nixon, in a joint article with Mr. Kissinger published on Sunday, called SDI "a myth."

"I think that's pretty harsh treatment for a research program that was identified by the president from the very beginning as one for which new technologies would have to be developed and which would take years to demonstrate its potential," he said.

A senior official said later that President Reagan did not want to come down too hard on Mr. Nixon in reacting to the article.

Sen. Sam Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and Rep. Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, have objected to removal from Europe of U.S. Pershing II and cruise missiles unless battlefield parity is achieved.

The irony of the Reagan vs. Nixon-Kissinger situation is that Mr. Reagan was a strong critic of the two strategic arms limitation treaties (SALT) negotiated during the Nixon presidency by Mr. Kissinger.

Mr. Reagan himself now is facing criticism on the grounds that U.S. nuclear missiles in Europe offset the Soviet edge in troops, armor and tactical battlefield artillery.

The president, Secretary of State George Shultz and Chief of Staff Howard Baker all have expressed hope that a U.S.-Soviet arms accord can be signed this year at a summit in Washington with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

A10

New York Times 4-29-87

To: H. Kissinger
FYI
Public Affairs

# Soviet Draft Accord Would Cover U.S. Warheads for Bonn Missiles

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 27 — Soviet negotiators said today that American nuclear warheads for West German short-range missiles would have to be eliminated as part of an agreement on missiles in Europe, American officials said today.

The Soviet position, presented at the Geneva arms talks, was portrayed by some Americans as creating a new obstacle to an accord.

Some Western Europeans are uneasy about the elimination of American missiles on the ground that it would foster a "denuclearization" of Europe. The Americans have sought to allay the concern by saying that an accord would still leave nuclear weapons in Europe, including West Germany's short-range missiles with American warheads.

Medium-range missiles can reach targets 600 miles or more away; short-range missiles have ranges of 300 to 600 miles. West Germany has 72 Pershing 1A missiles in the short-range

The two sides had agreed to eliminate medium-range missiles from Europe, while keeping 100 warheads each outside Europe. The Soviet draft would reportedly bar the United States from deploying its 100 in Alaska, within range of Soviet territory. The United States wants to reserve the right to deploy in Alaska.

The Soviet draft would also block the United States from converting any of its Pershing 2 medium-range missiles into Pershing 1B short-range missiles. The United States wants to retain this right unless all American and Soviet short-range missiles are eliminated.

The draft talked about a "global approach" on short-range missiles, but did not commit itself on eliminating them from Asia as well as from Europe. The United States says there can be no distinction between short-range missiles in Europe and in Asia.

During a meeting with his ministers, Mr. Kohl was unable to forge a common position between Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, who favors the offer, and Defense Minister Manfred Wörner, who opposes it.

The meeting today had been described as a showdown, but in the end, Mr. Kohl sought to buy time. His spokesman, Friedheim Ost, said Bonn wanted to study the Soviet draft treaty.

Foreign Minister Genscher has aligned himself with Secretary of State George P. Shultz, who favors accepting the Soviet offer, as well as with the opposition Social Democratic Party.

Chancellor Kohl's own Christian Democrats have opposed the elimination of the Soviet short-range missiles, on the ground that such a step would accelerate the denuclearization of Europe in the face of Soviet superiority in nuclear battlefield weapons and in conventional forces. The Christian Democrats favor "equal ceilings at a low level" in the short-range category.

> Some Americans see a possible new setback.

Class, with the United States controlling the nuclear warheads.

As the Soviet demand raised a new problem in the negotiations, the White House rejected a suggestion by former President Richard M. Nixon and his Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, that the United States link a settlement on missiles in Europe to an agreement that would reduce Soviet conventional forces.

Marlin Fitzwater, the White House spokesman, said the United States would seek to reduce conventional forces, but opposed linkage.

On the West German missiles, American officials say that the Soviet Union did not raise the issue during Secretary of State George P. Shultz's recent trip to Moscow. But today, in presenting a Soviet treaty draft in Geneva, Soviet negotiators said the American warheads for the Pershing 1A's must be destroyed, American officials said.

Although some Americans portrayed the Soviet move as a setback, one senior official said NATO should consider eliminating the warheads for the Pershing 1A's. He said it was not realistic to expect to keep them under a ban on American and Soviet missiles.

The Soviet treaty draft pointed up other disagreements.

Reagan aide cautious on Soviet proposal

Rowny cites imbalance in conventional forces, risk to Asia

By Gary Thatcher

4-28-87

Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

(front page)

Washington

A senior Reagan administration official has expressed serious reservations about the latest Soviet arms control proposals, even as the Soviets formally put them on the table in Geneva.

Ambassador Edward L. Rowny, a
special adviser to the President and
the secretary of state on arms control
matters, says the Soviet proposals dif-
fer from American demands in certain

key areas and should be accepted
"only as an interim step" toward a
more comprehensive agreement ban-
ning certain kinds of intermediate-
range nuclear missiles.

Mr. Rowny also warned against fo-
cusing on intermediate-range nuclear
forces (INF) and losing sight of "the
big picture" of United States-Soviet
relations. An INF agreement, he said,
should be no more important a goal
than reducing long-range strategic nu-
clear forces, ending the Soviet occupa-
tion of Afghanistan, or altering Soviet

human rights policies.

Rowny's remarks, made at a break-
fast meeting with reporters, come as
the Reagan administration moves
closer to its first nuclear arms control
agreement with the Soviet Union. The
Soviets officially introduced their lat-
est offer in Geneva yesterday.

The Reagan administration is com-
ing under increasing criticism for its
arms control policies, not only from
within the US but also from some of
America's European and Asian allies.

Please see ROWNY back page

Speaker Jim Wright. Never have I ever seen a smile so candid, so straightforward, so lovable, so confidence-inspiring, so filled with promise for peace and friendship for all mankind, as that of Mr. Wright.

I had my doubts at first about Jim Wright. I don't know why.

Perhaps it was that free luxury condo furnished him by George Mallick, his business partner but also employee of Billy Bob Barnett, owner of the lion's share of the Fort Worth Stockyards — recipient of $12 million in EDA grants authored by Jim Wright.

Maybe it was his persistent votes not only against Contra aid but against Jonas Savimbi in Angola, in favor of a nuclear freeze, and his whole-hearted endorsement by Moscow. Maybe, for a proud "Southern conservative," it was his curious recent slither to a rating of 14 out of 100 from the American Conservative Union. But to see the man's smile is to love him.

In all modesty I bring to this Smiling Pageant a wealth of international experience. I am not a good smiler myself, and therefore consider myself disqualified for elective office in this great republic. But how many Americans have attended the Miss Asia-Pacific Beauty Pageant? Not to mention the contest for Miss Yugoslavia? Miss Namibia? I mean, I am an assiduous student of the matter and say Jim Wright can beat all these girls when it comes to meaningful smiling.

Or take the great smiles of recent American history. Poor Richard Nixon suffered terribly from his Tricky-Dick "Would you buy a used car from this man?" smile. And Jimmy Carter's curiously dysfunctional smile — not related to his words — caused cringing among even the Democratic faithful and is really responsible for Amy bilging out of Brown. The poor girl grew up confusing tragedy with low comedy!

Richard Grenier is a columnist for The Washington Times.

Anyway, Mr. Wright's smile has Jimmy Carter's and Richard Nixon's beat hands down.

Secretary of State George Shultz (like me not a great smiler) last week surrendered to the irresistible Wright radiance, bringing forth to everyone's delight the love-match, Six-Point, Executive-Legislative Peace Plan, not to be confused with Daniel Ortega's Eleven-Point San-dinista Peace Plan, and however many points they have in the Arias Peace Plan. Mr. Shultz and Mr. Wright — the speaker in recent days seemingly thinking that “checks and balances” means Congress should have its own secretary of State, namely himself — together last week sang a love duet, each singing alternate stanzas. Two hearts that beat as one. It was simply thrilling.

Now I realize I might be in a minority position here. Mean people have called Mr. Wright's a "Pennzoil" smile, his manner Uriah-Heep porous, and have suggested that, chas tened, he should be waiting with egg on his face for the Nicaraguan free elections "scheduled" by Daniel Ortega for 1984, a promise which prompted Mr. Wright's misty-eyed "Dear Comandante" letter. That was three years ago.

A blizzard of sleaze charges has been blowing, moreover, and if Mr. Wright were in the Reagan Cabinet he would almost certainly be under special investigation. It has been suggested that the speaker's proper calling is selling underwater building lots in Florida. Needless to say, remarks like this make me highly indignant, and are offensive to gentlemen selling underwater building lots, as Mr. Wright would clearly not make a living in this rather specialized profession.

Even some of Mr. Wright's sympathizers — presumably breathlessly awaiting those Cuban free elections Fidel Castro promised three decades ago — have turned against the speaker for negotiating directly with Daniel Ortega when the policy of the U.S. government opposed it.

A chorus of editorial catcalls has come from the most liberal newspapers.

The whole thing makes me mad, that a man so lovable, so dedicated to peace and personkind, who went so far as to travel by limousine with Henry Kissinger from air-conditioned room to air-conditioned room in far Nicaragua (once), should be dragged in the mud like some cheap politician.

You won't let me vindicate Jim Wright with an International Smiling Pageant? In which he would come sashaying down the runway in the latest swimwear, eyebrows alert, winsomely smiling down all competition no matter how toothsome? Do I get a second choice? All right, then give me an American parliamentary system. A caprice.

I have pointed out that under a parliamentary system the Iran-Contra Affair would have been over in a week. The Reagan government would in all likelihood have won a vote of confidence. And that would have been it.

I have warned that our constitution's wonderful separation of powers — adopted for a cozy, little country removed from world affairs, a constitution since imitated by absolutely nobody — is daily more likely to give us governmental gridlock. This is particularly true when the legislature places its partisan interests foremost and the executive is timid.

Under the parliamentary system, chosen by most democracies, there is no separation of powers, as the executive is the emanation of the legislature. Very well, you say. That would make champion pork-barreler and smiler Jim Wright prime minister! But would it?

I would like to see Jim Wright, emblematic standard-bearer of a Democratic parliamentary delegation, standing for what he stands for, smiling bewitchingly as he led his forces to the hustings in a grand American national election.

Would the Smiler win? What do you think? You think you've seen smiling? Would you see smiling then.

Richard Perle, Disarmed
but Undeterred

His Once Pervasive Power Waning,
The Hard-Liner Awaits the Summit

W.Post 11/23/87 p.31

First of three articles

By Sidney Blumenthal
Washington Post Staff Writer

When Richard Perle stepped down as assistant secretary of defense on June 1, he believed he could have it all.

Critics called him the "Prince of Darkness," but he saw himself vindicated as a true champion of Western security. And he would have the benefits that have accrued since leaving government, including $300,000 from Random House for his forthcoming novel; "at least" $50,000 from U.S. News & World Report for a monthly column; consulting retainers; lecture fees; and an office at the American Enterprise Institute.

Perle had thrived in the power vacuum in national security policy that opened up during the collapse of the Nixon presidency, and for the rest of the decade he had attempted to block every effort at arms control by Republican and Democratic administrations alike.

When Ronald Reagan came to power, so did he, and throughout the 1980s he continued to confound rivals and their schemes for arms control. By the time Perle left the Pentagon, he had done more to shape the administration's nuclear arms

policy than perhaps any individual except Reagan himself.

In fact, the intermediate nuclear force (INF) agreement, which is expected to be signed during the upcoming summit between Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, has its origin in a 1981 proposal advanced by Perle—a proposal his critics say was a public relations ploy to gloss over Reagan's initial opposition to arms control.

Out of office, Perle never intended to be without influence. The familiar short, spherical figure, often topped by a Greek fisherman's cap, frequently visited the Pentagon as a consultant to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, or showed up at Foggy Bottom, where he signed on as a consultant to Secretary of State George Shultz. And, twice since leaving office, he could have been found at the White House, where he had been summoned by President Reagan to advise on the INF treaty with the Soviet Union.

But the appearance of Perle's on-site power has been belied by a new reality. When Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze was in Washington in September to confer with Shultz, Perle's former top deputy and acting successor, Frank Gaffney, was pointedly kept out of the important meetings, though rep

resentatives of the State Department and the NSC were present.

With the retirement of Weinberger last week, Perle's ultimate link to the top was severed. Virtually the instant Weinberger departed and Frank Carlucci arrived, Gaffney was forced out. By midnight Friday, Gaffney's belongings were boxed and he was gone. On the spot, Gaffney called a press conference to express his "worries" about the Reagan administration's eagerness for an arms control agreement.

Almost immediately, rumors circulated that this was the beginning of a purge of the Perle network at the Pentagon, but Perle himself suggested that the ousting of his allies would run counter to the interests of the new defense secretary. "Frank Carlucci strikes me as too shrewd a bureaucrat to conduct a purge," he said yesterday.

In the crucial weeks leading into the summit, Perle's reaction to it has been visible on "Nightline" but unseen at the negotiating table. His fame may be building just as his influence is waning. Perle must contemplate his arms legacy from his Chevy Chase home.

His recent wealth can be measured by the enormous hole gouged in his backyard, where his new study will be. But even as Reagan and Gorbachev prepare to sign an arms agreement, Perle, who held the key Pentagon arms control post in the Reagan administration, now negotiates with contractors and inspectors.

But his hours are his own, as he

See PERLE, B8, Col. 1

## PERLE, From B1

likes it. He has more time to be with his wife Leslie and 8-year-old son Jonathan.

The icons once featured on Perle's Pentagon walls are in storage, awaiting display in the study. There is, of course, the picture of his late mentor, the Democratic hawk of hawks, Sen. Henry (Scoop) Jackson, for whom he worked throughout the 1970s. There is the testimonial letter from 20 conservative Republican senators, sent Perle on his leaving the Pentagon, expressing "our profound hope that we will not be without your guiding hand in these last two years of the Reagan administration." And there is the framed Winston Churchill quote, which succinctly summarizes his approach:

> Never give in,
> never give in
> never, never, never, never
> in nothing great or small,
> large or petty—
> never give in.

Now Perle has the leisure, if he wishes, to sit at home in the afternoon, sip his espresso, play Bach's "Goldberg Variations" on his new CD and pet his mutt Rembrandt. "He bit Rick Burt," says Perle, referring to the U.S. ambassador to West Germany who, as an assistant secretary of state for politico-military affairs, was among Perle's chief rivals. "He's basically a good dog."

Slouched in a wicker chair, feet up, peering over his expansive waistline, Perle recites his favorite bit of doggerel, by Hilaire Belloc: "Pale Ebenezer thought it wrong to fight, but Roaring Bill who killed him thought it right."

"It's a comment of moral judgment on international affairs," he says. "More espresso?"

Thus in a single sweep he reveals two Perles: the overlord and the sybarite. Together they have been an effective team, advancing a pugnacious policy by means of personal charm.

Perle, at 46, is the self-indulgent prisoner of luxe, a man for all desserts, beluga caviar, Monte Cristo cigars, Gau-loise cigarettes ("Don't tell my wife") and bread imported from a favorite Parisian bakery. In the late 1970s, he contemplated franchising a chain of soufflé restaurants: the gourmet's mushroom cloud. In office, he was the Robin Leach of NATO, using its meetings to explore the great attractions of Europe.

To his enemies he may be the Prince of Darkness, but to those who know him well he is Richard the Shopper. "I never shop in the United States," he says. "You learn a lot when you shop abroad. I don't think there's anyplace where I can't find something."

His friends consider him, as one put it, "one of the most wonderful people in Washington." They know him as a gracious and generous host, a delightful companion and, above all, a loyal ally in the greater cause.

Even in a mood of self-satisfaction, he expresses concern for two friends tainted by the Iran-contra scandal—Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, whom he recruited to come to Washington and work for Jackson, and Michael Ledeen, who, at key moments, carried messages among the National Security Council staff, the Israeli government, and Israeli and Iranian arms merchants. Perle wonders if Abrams will be "all right" and why journalists have written terrible things about Ledeen. "At least," he says, "Elliott's not going to satisfy critics of the Central American policy."

## The Munich Analogy

History, Perle asserts, has absolved him. With the INF agreement pending, he claims he has blocked "bad" arms control in favor of "good" arms control.

"It's a very important agreement as a precedent establishing the principle I've been arguing for for 20 years," he says, "which is that you have to have the patience of Job to get good agreements out of the Soviet Union."

When Perle became assistant secretary of defense, his power, in a normally third-rank job, became almost total because of the vacuum above him. Reagan, who had strong ideological intuitions, was unengaged with the detail of a subject that is nothing if not detail. And Weinberger, who had the greatest mandate for military spending since the end of World War II, had scant knowledge of nuclear strategy.

Weinberger was a lawyer in search of a brief, and Perle was a walking brief. "To a substantial degree, Weinberger relied upon Richard to present him with options and strategies," says a high-ranking Defense Department official. "Senators and congressmen have no desire to stress how day-to-day activity within those institutions is influenced by the staff," says Perle, the former Senate staffer. The same applies to Cabinet officers.

Perle has viewed all previous arms control treaties in the light of the appeasement of Hitler at Munich. Russia, in his use of the analogy, is Nazi Germany. "I don't see any point in denying the analogy because it touches Soviet sensitivities," he says. And he has long taken to flinging quotations from Samuel Hoare, a prominent British appeaser, at his opponents, as if they were hellbent for a nuclear Munich.

"What I've extracted," he says, "is the dynamics in which one gets caught up in desiring negotiations to succeed. As a result, one's objectives get transformed so that in the end you don't know what you were negotiating in the first place. What becomes paramount is getting an agreement."

The public, for its part, feels relief and lowers its guard, a "psychological price that is quite damaging." To Perle, this popular sentiment for peace negotiations is how democracies perish. We have nothing to fear but the lack of fear itself.

"One reason Perle was effective is that he never said he was opposed to an agreement," says a former friend who broke with him over his tactics. "But deep in his heart the notion of an agreement is deeply repugnant to him. We discussed this many times. His whole line of argument about why agreements have to be avoided—once you start dealing with the Soviet Union you can't control the process, the political system can't tolerate complexity—this suggests a profound distrust of the American political system."

"I consider his actual views on arms control to be *corpus mysticum*," says a conservative congressional source. (Though he has worked on the arms control issue with Perle for years, this person does not wish to be identified. Nor do most of those who have had relations with Perle.)

"On the one hand," says this source, "he's been consistent all along in saying a good arms control agreement can be gotten if we're tough enough. There has to be perfect verification. In principle, he says such a thing exists. However, Richard has never met an arms control agreement he's liked. He himself has never, never, never drafted an arms control agreement, even the 'zero option.' One is left, in understanding Perle, with this *corpus mysticum*. It has accounted for a lot of his success."

As Gorbachev moved point by point to the terms of the "double zero" treaty—an agreement by both sides to remove medium-range missiles from Europe—it appeared that Perle might have it both ways, claiming the credit—proof at last of his good faith—yet remaining the critic.

But while he says he approves of the INF agreement, in the next breath he adds, "The administration, I hope, will exercise appropriate discipline and not claim that this is the millennium."

For Perle's policies it is far from the millennium. Even as the Senate is preparing to consider the agreement, it is moving to reverse his past efforts to undo arms control. Perle was, after all, the principal architect of the assault on the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and the U.S. repudiation of SALT II limits.

Thus a culminating achievement of the Reagan presidency is dissolving into a tableau of paradox and irony. As Reagan puts himself in the now unbroken line of arms controlling presidents, the accord may not herald the fulfillment of Perle's arms control strategy but the beginning of its reversal.

**Why is Perle for the treaty?** "It is because he invented it, because it doesn't include strategic weapons and because he despises Europeans," wrote Henry Kissinger in *The Wall Street Journal* in May.

"Look, there are people who will concoct an infinite number of theories why I am a dark and malevolent force," Perle says. "And the 1981 theory was that the 'zero option' was a ploy to frustrate any agreement because the Soviet Union would never agree. The 1987 theory is that I've been hoist by my own petard, that I don't really like this agreement, that it's a bluff, that our bluff was called, and there's nothing we can do about it."

"The 1988 theory will be that I was for this agreement because it will thwart a strategic agreement by saving the administration's appetite for some kind of agreement. It's already beginning to emerge."

## Behind the Scenes

Three ideas are advanced to explain Perle's influence. First, that he is brilliant. Second, that he is an uncreative figure, who simply prevents movement toward arms control. And, third, a combination: that he has been clever at stopping things.

A former Reagan administration official and Perle ally, offering a view held across the spectrum, says: "There is nothing easier than stopping something. If you're smart besides, that's a bonus."

Arms control, in fact, is an incredibly laborious process—SALT II took seven years to produce. Progress in negotiations often cuts against the interests of key bureaucracies. Slowing down an already slow machine requires only persistence and manipulative arts.

The culture of the policy community is calm and dry. And when Perle discusses missile throw weights in his plummy voice he can sound like a late-night jazz disc jockey making urbane judgments on the discography of Bix Beiderbecke. He has mastered the art of keeping his head in public. On other occasions, however, he has been less restrained. To pursue his ends, his charm offensive has its limits. He has relied upon directness, indirection and misdirection.

Those Perle believed were standing in his way were verbally lashed, to their faces and behind their backs. "He gets satisfaction out of being brilliant, and he lets that get in the way of being effective," says Perle's early mentor, Paul Nitze, now arms control adviser to the secretary of state and an architect of the early Cold War policy. "He has humiliated people in debate, but he's not persuaded people. He's demonstrating brilliance. People don't like to be humiliated."

"Whenever he saw someone as a political problem," says a Perle associate who worked closely with him for years, "he'd identify a vulnerability. If he disagreed with a person, it was a matter of life and death. There was a willingness to play very rough."

This ally participated in the network of which Perle was the hub; its spokes ran to the Pentagon and Capitol Hill, to the White House and Foggy Bottom. "There was a constant discussion of people to be promoted, people to be helped, people to be gotten rid of," he says. "This is a good Bolshevik principle: We have to build our own cadres, people who support our philosophy."

Wherever Perle could exercise influence, balance was not his goal. For example, as the Defense Department

In a statement sent to the conference, Mr. Belonogov said the Nixon era was "the most fruitful and productive in the 40 postwar years" for American-Soviet relations.

In his address, Mr. Kissinger sought to lay the basis for a foreign policy that avoided the "endless oscillation between optimism and despair" that characterized America's attitude toward engagement in world affairs.

What several scholars called "upward revisionism" was also prevalent in the view many took toward Mr. Nixon's domestic program.

There was strong criticism of Mr. Nixon's civil rights policies. But several scholars said that, contrary to his conservative reputation, Mr. Nixon presided over a substantial expansion of the welfare state. Carl Lieberman, a professor of political science at the University of Akron, said Mr. Nixon approved of indexing Social Security payments — a boon to the elderly.

### Domestic Spending Noted

Joan Hoff-Wilson, a professor of history from Indiana University, said the Nixon years marked the first time in the postwar era that domestic spending exceeded military spending.

And several scholars called attention to Mr. Nixon's family assistance plan, which would have provided a guaranteed annual income for all Americans, had it passed Congress. Barry D. Riccio, a historian at the University of Illinois, concluded that Mr. Nixon was "a paradoxical figure who despised liberals while endorsing liberal objectives" and who showed that "the party of conservatism could also be the party of innovation."

### Truman's Stature Cited

Mr. Ehrlichman pointedly contrasted Mr. Nixon's domestic activism with President Reagan's policies, which he characterized as "a sense of almost governmental indifference to the problems of needy Americans."

Stephen E. Ambrose, a professor of history at the University of New Orleans, said that the revisionist attitude toward Mr. Nixon — as toward any President — was inevitable, and that, given his low standing at the end of his Administration, he had nowhere to go but up.

Professor Ambrose compared histo-

riography on Mr. Nixon to the treatment of Harry Truman, who was regarded as a failure when he left office and now is remembered fondly by historians.

But Herbert S. Parmet, a professor of history at the City University of New York who can also be cast as a revisionist, said the fundamental question for historians was, "Is Watergate inseparable from the Administration?"

In the view of many at the conference, it was not, in part because of Mr. Nixon's personality, which was described at least two dozen times as "complex."

### 'The Seed of Watergate'

"Richard Nixon was gripped by a paranoid view of the world that was divided into two camps, good and evil," Mr. Hayden said. But he added that Mr. Nixon's opponents, he among them, developed a "paranoid style of our own."

Alan F. Westin, a professor of political science at Columbia, said the result was that the Nixon Administration seemed to operate under a theory of "totalitarian democracy." Professor

Ambrose, expressing the view of many Nixon critics, said his undoing was his failure to bring an early end to the Vietnam War. "It was the continuation of the Vietnam War which prepared the ground and watered the seed of Watergate," he said.

The conference did not seek to reach any conclusions, though by the end it was clear that the judges of history would be as passionately divided as were Mr. Nixon's contemporaries.

Mr. Haldeman called the meeting "a giant step forward" toward "the realization that there was much more to the Nixon Presidency than Watergate."

Professor Kutler said that, while "revisionism perhaps is as certain as death and taxes," Watergate would not be pushed aside so easily.

"Watergate at times seems to get lost in the mists of history," he said;

"an odd fate for an event that consumed and convulsed the nation and tested the constitutional and political system as it has not been tested since the Civil War."