EXECUTIVE

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

JUN 8 1971

Dear Don:

Many thanks for your kind invitation to me to attend your supper party for President Somoza. I appreciated your thoughtfulness and if my time were my own to plan for any distance in advance, I would have planned on being there. I was sorry not to be able to join you.

We haven't talked in quite awhile. I hope you will at least call my office the next time you are in the vicinity.

Mr. Don Kendall
Porchuck Road
Greenwich, Connecticut

jlp:6/7/71

RECEIVED

JUN 1 1971

GENERAL FILES

GENERAL

FC6-11-1/KISSINGER, HENRY A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

PRESS, jlp, 3/20/72

Type of Request & Date

(Last name and pending date)

Name: Abby Kendrick, "Abbie's Place" - WETA talk show

Request: Would like to interview Mr. Kissinger for her evening (9:30 p.m.) half-hour which appears Monday, Wednesday and Friday evenings. She is more interested in the person and his personal views (favorite books, likes and dislikes) than in policy. Open-ended request -- no time limit
Contact her at 536-6900.

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: NO - 3/27/72

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

from the office of
Senator Edward M. Kennedy
of Massachusetts

ADDRESS BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY
before the
National Committee on United States-China Relations
New York City

March 20, 1969

This conference is one of the most important public sessions on China policy in recent years. That fact alone is extremely significant. The time at which this conference is being held is also significant. For if we ever hoped that the communist regime in China would disappear, our hope is in ruins today, as thousands of Chinese soldiers engage Russian border troops in the continuing struggle by two powerful nations for domination of the world communist movement.

Thousands of American soldiers are dying in Vietnam in a land war in Asia whose purpose, we are told, is the containment of Peking. Demonstrations against American bases in Japan and Okinawa -- bases built in part to contain China -- shake the foundation of Japan. The shadow of Peking hangs dark over the discussions in Paris and over virtually every conference we attend on arms control. The success of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, on which the ink is hardly dry, depends in large part on the participation of China.

If we ever hoped that somehow our relations with China could be stabilized at a point of rigid hostility without domestic sacrifice, our hope was dashed when we were told last week by our government that we must now spend $7 billion as a down payment to protect our missiles and our nation from nuclear attack by China.

It is for these reasons that I consider this conference, and what can come from it, so important to the foreign policy of our nation. It is imperative that the issues you have discussed for so long become part of the national agenda of the United States. For almost twenty years, the United States has pursued the same unyielding policy of military containment and diplomatic isolation toward Communist China. However valid that policy may have seemed for the Cold War of the Fifties, it is demonstrably false in the Sixties, and must not be carried into the Seventies.

Every new Administration has a new opportunity to rectify the errors of the past. Each such opportunity consists in large part of the precious gift of time -- time in which the good intentions of the government are presumed; time in which the normal conflicts of politics are suspended; time in which the new government has a chance to show it is not tied to the policies of its predecessor.

If the new Administration allows this time to pass without new initiatives; if it allows inherited policies to rush unimpeded along their course, it will have wasted this opportunity. It will have compromised the promises it made to the American people, and worst of all, it will have disappointed the hopes and expectations of the world.

This is especially true in Vietnam. There is growing impatience with the continuing loss of American lives and the seeming frustration of our hopes for the reduction of violence and for the reduction of the American commitment. The advent of a new Administration affords a moment of hope for millions of Americans and Vietnamese. It is a moment that will not long be with us.

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The same opportunity exists for our policies throughout Asia. That is why it is all the more important that you who have been involved in the formulation and evaluation of those policies, both in private life and public service, meet here at this time to chart your recommendations.

For twenty years, our China policy has been a war policy. For far too long, we have carried out hostile measures of political, diplomatic, and economic antagonism toward one of the world's most important nations.

Now we must turn away from our policy of war and pursue a policy of peace. We must seek a new policy, not because of any supposed weakness in our present position or because we are soft on China, but because it is in our own national interest and the interest of all nations. By its sheer size and population, China deserves a major place in the world. As a nuclear power and a nation of 750 million citizens -- likely to exceed one billion by the 1980's -- China demands a voice in world efforts to deal with arms control and population control, with Asian security and international economic development, with all the great issues of our time.

Yet sixteen years after the end of the Korean War, we do not trade with China. We have no scientific or cultural exchanges. We oppose the representation of China in the United Nations. We refuse to give any sort of diplomatic recognition to the Communist regime on the mainland, and continue to recognize the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-Shek on Taiwan as the government of all China. Instead of developing ways to coexist with China in peace, we assume China will attack us as soon as she can, and we prepare to spend billions to meet that threat.

By some cruel paradox, an entire generation of young Americans and young Chinese have grown to maturity with their countries in a state of suspended war toward one another. Tragically, the world's oldest civilization and the world's most modern civilization, the world's most populous nation and the world's richest and most powerful nation, glare at each other across the abyss of nuclear war.

The division between us goes back to American support of the Chinese Nationalist regime during World War II, and to the immediate post-war struggle between the Communists and the Nationalists. In the beginning, our policy was uncertain. The Communists gained power over the mainland in 1949. Between then and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the United States seemed to be preparing to accept the fact of the Chinese Revolution. After the retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan, our government refused to go to their aid and refused to place the American Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait to prevent a Communist takeover of the island. To do so, we said, would be to intervene in the domestic civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists.

This policy was fully debated by the Congress and the public. Although we deplored the Communist rise to power, we recognized we could do nothing to change it. We anticipated that we would soon adjust to the new Asian reality by establishing relations with the Communist regime.

This situation changed overnight on June 25, 1950, when North Korea attacked South Korea. Fearing that the attack foreshadowed a Communist offensive throughout Asia, the United States ordered the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait and sent large amounts of military aid to the weak Nationalist Government on the island. To the Communists, the meaning was clear. We would use force to deny Taiwan to the new mainland government, even though both the Communists and the Nationalists agreed the island was Chinese.

Shortly thereafter, in response to the attempt of our forces to bring down the North Korean Government by driving toward the Chinese border, China entered the Korean War. With hindsight, most experts agree that China's action in Korea was an essentially defensive response, launched to prevent the establishment of a hostile government on her border. At the time, however, the issue was far less clear. At the request of the United States, the United Nations formally

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The folly of our present policy of isolating China is matched by its futility. Almost all other nations have adjusted to the reality of China. For years, Peking has had extensive diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with a number of the nations in the world, including many of our closest allies. Outside the United Nations, our policy of quarantine toward China has failed. To the extent that the Communist regime is isolated at all, it is isolated largely at China's own choosing, and not as a consequence of any effective American policy.

Our actions toward China have rested on the premise that the People's Republic is an illegitimate, evil and expansionist regime that must be contained until it collapses or at least begins to behave in conformity with American interests. Secretary of State Dulles was the foremost exponent of this moralistic view, carrying it to the extent that he even refused to shake hands with Chou En-Lai at the Geneva Conference in 1954. That slight has not been forgotten.

The Communist regime was said to be illegitimate because, we claimed, it had been imposed on the supposedly unreceptive Chinese people by agents of the Soviet Union. Communist China, according to this view, was a mere Soviet satellite. One Assistant Secretary in the State Department called it a Soviet Manchukuo, suggesting that China's new leaders were no more independent than were the Chinese puppets whom Japan installed in Manchuria in the 1930's. This evaluation grossly exaggerated the extent to which Soviet aid was responsible for the Communist takeover of China, and the events of the past decade -- amply confirmed by the intense hostility of the current border clashes -- have shattered the myth of Soviet domination of China.

The Communist regime was said to be evil because of the great violence and deprivation of freedom that it inflicted on millions of people who opposed its rise to power. Obviously, we cannot condone the appalling cost, in human life and suffering, of the Chinese Revolution. Yet, in many other cases, we have recognized revolutionary regimes, especially when the period of revolutionary excess has passed. Even in the case of the Soviet Union, the United States waited only 16 years to normalize relations with the revolutionary government.

Unfortunately, we have tended to focus exclusively on the costs of the Chinese revolution. We have ignored the historical conditions that evoked it and the social and economic gains it produced. We have ignored the fact that the Nationalists also engaged in repressive measures and deprivations of freedom, not only during their tenure on the mainland, but also on Taiwan. We have created a false image of a struggle between "Free China" and "Red China," between good and evil. Given our current perspective and the greater understanding of revolutionary change that has come with time, we can now afford a more dispassionate and accurate review of the Chinese Revolution.

Finally, there is the charge that the Communist regime is an expansionist power. At bottom, it is this view that has given rise to our containment policy in Asia, with the enormous sacrifices it has entailed. The charge that the Communist regime is expansionist has meant different things at different times. On occasion, American spokesmen have conjured up the image of a "Golden Horde" or "Yellow Peril" that would swoop down over Asia. Today, most leaders in Washington employ more responsible rhetoric, and it is the Russians who perpetuate this image of China.

Virtually no experts on China expect Peking to commit aggression, in the conventional sense of forcibly occupying the territory of another country -- as the Soviet Union recently occupied Czechoslovakia. Such action is in accord with neither past Chinese actions nor present Chinese capabilities. Despite their ideological bombast, the Chinese Communists have in fact been extremely cautious about risking military involvement since the Korean War. The Quemoy crises of the 1950's & the 1962 clash with India were carefully limited engagements. The struggle over Tibet is widely regarded as an assertion of traditional Chinese jurisdiction over that remote area. China has not used force to protect the overseas Chinese in the disturbances in Burma, Malaysia, or Indonesia. Her navy and air force are small. She can neither transport her troops nor supply them across the long distances and difficult terrain of a prolonged war of aggression.

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Obviously, our concern today is not so much the danger of direct Chinese aggression as the danger of indirect aggression, based on Chinese efforts to subvert existing governments and replace them with governments friendly to Peking. Yet, until Vietnam led to our massive involvement in Southeast Asia, Peking enjoyed only very limited success in its attempts to foster "wars of national liberation." Although China of course will claim to play a role wherever political instability occurs in Asia, Africa and even Latin America, its record of subversion is unimpressive. On the basis of the past, it is very likely that nations whose governments work for equality and social justice for their people will be able to overcome any threat of Chinese subversion.

Furthermore, we can expect that time will moderate China's revolutionary zeal. Experience with the Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist nations suggests that the more fully China is brought into the world community, the greater will be the pressure to behave like a nation-state, rather than a revolutionary power.

Ironically, it is Communist China's former teacher, the Soviet Union, that is now determined to prevent any moderation of Chinese-American hostility. We cannot accept at face value the current Soviet image of China, for the Soviets have far different interests in Asia than we do. Although we must persist in our efforts to achieve wider agreement with Moscow, we must not allow the Russians to make continuing hostility toward Peking the price of future Soviet-American cooperation. Rather than retard our relations with Moscow, a Washington-Peking thaw might well provide the Soviet Union with a badly needed incentive to improve relations with us.

We must not, however, regard relations with Peking and Moscow as an "either/or" proposition. We must strive to improve relations with both. We must be alert, therefore, to any opportunity offered by the escalating hostility between China and the Soviet Union to ease our own tensions with those nations.

Both of us -- Chinese and Americans alike -- are prisoners of the passions of the past. What we need now, and in the decades ahead, is liberation from those passions. Given the history of our past relations with China, it is unrealistic to expect Peking to take the initiative. It is our obligation. We are the great and powerful nation, and we should not condition our approach on any favorable action or change of attitude by Peking. For us to begin a policy of peace would be a credit to our history and our place in the world today. To continue on our present path will lead only to further hostility, and the real possibility of mutual destruction.

Of course, we must not delude ourselves. Even if the United States moves toward an enlightened China policy, the foreseeable prospects for moderating Chinese-American tensions are not bright. It is said that there is no basis for hope so long as the current generation of Communist Chinese leaders remains in power. This may well be true. Yet, Peking's invitation last November to resume the Warsaw talks, although now withdrawn, suggests the possibility that China's policy may change more rapidly than outside observers can now anticipate.

We must remember, too, that the regime in Peking is not a monolith. As the upheavals of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution have shown, China's leaders are divided by conflicting views and pressures for change. We must seek to influence such change in a favorable direction. We can do so by insuring that reasonable options for improved relations with the United States are always available to Peking's moderate or less extreme leaders.

The steps that we take should be taken soon. Even now, the deterioration of Chinese-Soviet relations in the wake of the recent border clashes may be stimulating at least some of the leaders in Peking to re-evaluate their posture toward the United States and provide us with an extraordinary opportunity to break the bonds of distrust.

What can we do to hasten the next opportunity? Many of us here tonight are already on record as favoring a more positive stand. We must actively encourage China to adopt the change in attitude for

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[L]CJ

which we now simply wait. We must act now to make clear to the Chinese and to the world that the responsibility for the present impasse no longer lies with us.

**First**, and most important, we should proclaim our willingness to adopt a new policy toward China -- a policy of peace, not war, a policy that abandons the old slogans, embraces today's reality, and encourages tomorrow's possibility. We should make clear that we regard China as a legitimate power in control of the mainland, entitled to full participation as an equal member of the world community and to a decent regard for its own security. The policy I advocate will in no way impede our ability to respond firmly and effectively to any possibility of attack by the Chinese. What it will do, however, is emphasize to China that our military posture is purely defensive, and that we stand ready at all times to work toward improvement in our relations.

**Second**, we should attempt to reconvene the Warsaw talks. At the time the talks were cancelled, I wrote the Secretary of State, asking the Administration to make an urgent new attempt to establish the contact that we so nearly achieved at Warsaw, and to do so before the air of expectancy that hung over the talks is completely dissipated. If the talks are resumed, we should attempt to transform them into a more confidential and perhaps more significant dialogue. The parties might meet on an alternating basis in their respective embassies, or even in their respective countries, rather than in a palace of the Polish Government. Whether or not the talks are resumed, more informal official and semi-official conversations with China's leaders should be offered.

**Third**, we should unilaterally do away with restrictions on travel and non-strategic trade. We should do all we can to promote exchanges of people and ideas, through scientific and cultural programs and access by news media representatives. In trade, we should place China on the same footing as the Soviet Union and the Communist nations of Eastern Europe. We should offer to send trade delegations and even a resident trade mission to China, and to receive Chinese trade delegations and a Chinese trade mission in this country. Finally we should welcome closer contacts between China and the rest of the world, rather than continue to exert pressure on our friends to isolate the Peking regime.

**Fourth**, we should announce our willingness to re-establish the consular offices we maintained in the People's Republic during the earliest period of Communist rule, and we should welcome Chinese consular officials in the United States. Consular relations facilitate trade and other contacts. They frequently exist in the absence of diplomatic relations, and often pave the way for the establishment of such relations.

**Fifth**, we should strive to involve the Chinese in serious arms control talks. We should actively encourage them to begin to participate in international conferences, and we should seek out new opportunities to discuss Asian security and other problems.

**Sixth**, we should seek, at the earliest opportunity, to discuss with China's leaders the complex question of the establishment of full diplomatic relations. For the present, we should continue our diplomatic relations with the Nationalist regime on Taiwan and guarantee the people of that island against any forcible takeover by the mainland. To Peking at this time, the question of diplomatic recognition seems to be unavoidably linked to the question of whether we will withdraw recognition from the Nationalists and the question of whether Taiwan is part of the territory of China. Both the Communists and the Nationalists claim Taiwan as part of China, but our own government regards the status of the island as undefined, even though we maintain diplomatic relations with the Nationalists.

We have failed to agree on solutions involving other divided countries and peoples -- as in Germany -- and we cannot be confident of greater success in the matter of Taiwan. There are critical questions that simply cannot now be answered:

* Will the minority regime of the Chinese Nationalists continue to control the island's Taiwanese population?

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* Will the Taiwanese majority eventually transform the island's government through the exercise of self-determination?

* Will an accommodation be worked out between a future Taiwan Government and the Peking regime on the mainland?

To help elicit Peking's interest in negotiations, we should withdraw our token American military presence from Taiwan. This demilitarization of Taiwan could take place at no cost to our treaty commitments, or to the security of the island. Yet, it would help to make clear to Peking our desire for the Communists, the Nationalists, and the Taiwanese to reach a negotiated solution on the status of the island.

A dramatic step like unilateral recognition of Peking would probably be an empty gesture at this time. As the experience of France implies, unilateral recognition of Peking is not likely to be effective unless it is accompanied by the withdrawal of our existing recognition of the Nationalists. And, as the case of Great Britain suggests, Peking may insist on our recognition of the mainland's claim to Taiwan before allowing us to establish full ambassadorial relations. These problems will have to be negotiated, and we should move now to start the process.

Seventh, without waiting for resolution of the complex question of Taiwan, we should withdraw our opposition to Peking's entry into the United Nations as the representative of China, not only in the General Assembly, but also in the Security Council and other organs. The Security Council seat was granted to China in 1945 in recognition of a great people who had borne a major share of the burden in World War II, thereby making the United Nations possible. It was not a reward for the particular political group that happened to be running the country at the time.

In addition, we should work within the United Nations to attempt to assure representation for the people on Taiwan that will reflect the island's governmental status. It may be that the Chinese Nationalists can continue to enjoy a seat in the General Assembly. Or, if an independent republic of Taiwan emerges, it might be admitted into the United Nations as a new state. Possibly, if a political accommodation is reached between the Communist regime on the mainland and the government on Taiwan, the people of Taiwan might be represented in the United Nations as an autonomous unit of China, by analogy to the present status of Byelorussia and the Ukraine in the United Nations as autonomous provinces of the Soviet Union.

From its inception, the United Nations has displayed remarkable flexibility in adjusting to political realities. There are many possible solutions to the China problem in the United Nations. Without insisting on any one, we should move now to free the United Nations to undertake the long-delayed process of adjusting to the reality of the People's Republic of China, and we should clearly indicate to Peking our willingness to discuss these questions.

In dealing with the problems of diplomatic recognition and United Nations representation, I have placed primary emphasis on the need to initiate discussions with Peking in these areas. Since it is impossible to predict when or how the Chinese will respond to a change in American policy, we cannot maintain a hard and fast position on these questions. We cannot afford to close any options by endorsing detailed schemes at this time. What we can do, however, is act now on the broad range of initiatives I have mentioned, and make clear to Peking that our views are not rigid on even the most difficult issues that have divided us so bitterly in recent years.

We will have to be patient. Peking's initial reaction to serious initiatives on our part will probably be a blunt refusal. But, by laying the groundwork now for an improved relationship in the Seventies and beyond, we will be offering the present and future leaders in Peking a clear and attractive alternative to the existing impasse in our relations.

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