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Henry Steele Commager

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Henry A. Kissinger

William E. Griffith

Howard L. Boorman

Vera Micheles Dean

Gwendolen M. Carter

John J. Johnson

Lincoln P. Bloomfield

Holland Hunter

Arnold M. Rose

Eugene Rabinowitch

August Heckscher

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Twentieth Century Fund

issue 3

Scott, Foresman and Company

CHAPTER ONE

THE FUTURE

OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Henry A. Kissinger is Professor of Government at Harvard University and a faculty member of Harvard's Center for International Affairs. He holds a B.A., M.A., and Ph.D. from Harvard, and served in Europe with the U.S. Army during World War II. Mr. Kissinger has been a consultant to the National Security Council and to the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He has written many magazine and journal articles on world affairs and American foreign policy; his books include *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy and The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy*.

Perhaps the most hopeful international development since World War II has been the growth in cohesion and dynamism of the Atlantic Community. The internal rivalries of Europe, which had produced centuries of warfare, have been transcended; in their place have emerged the European Common Market and a striving toward political unity unlikely to be stopped by temporary setbacks. The dynamism and sense of mission which projected Europe overseas for a period of five centuries have now been turned first toward reconstructing Europe and then toward enlarging its influence in world affairs. This effort is all the more energetic because, for the first time since the carnage of World War II, Europe has an intact young generation eager to define a proper role for itself.

Relations between Europe and the United States have witnessed two phases. Until the late 1950's the United States was clearly the pre-

dominant partner. We possessed a monopoly on nuclear weapons within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Our economy sustained that of our allies. We were the senior partner shaping the policies of the North Atlantic alliance.

Beginning about 1960, this pattern began to change. We were still the strongest nation of the West, but the relative power of Europe was growing.

THE GOAL OF PARTNERSHIP

In many respects the increase in European strength and self-confidence provides the possibility of a durable and equal partnership. At the same time, it requires inevitable adjustments in thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. The misunderstandings which tend to draw public attention in many respects are a sign of vigor and dynamism. They are a testimony to the emergence of a strong and self-confident Europe—a consistent goal of U.S. policy in three administrations. Few of the recent fissures in the West have been the result of Soviet actions. This is another way of saying that the remedies are within our control. The possibility of establishing an Atlantic Community beckons as one of the great opportunities of our time, far transcending in importance the crises which form the headlines of the day.

52 THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

Yet the luster of the ultimate goal should not hide the obstacles in the way. The fact is that the West's opportunity has come at a period of considerable internal division. The cohesion of community will have to be supplied by dealing with disputes relating to four problems: (1) the future of Germany; (2) the future of the European community; (3) the nature of NATO strategy; and (4) the future of Atlantic relationships. They will be discussed in turn.

## THE FUTURE OF GERMANY

The perspective of nations differs with their geography, their history, and their power. No alliance can perfectly reconcile the goals of all of its members, particularly if one ally has

world-wide responsibilities while the others focus their attention on regional or national concerns. But the minimum condition for effectiveness is that the requirements of the alliance should not clash with the deepest aspirations of one or more of the partners.

These considerations are especially relevant to what has come to be called the "German problem." The Berlin issue has been so sensitive not primarily because the city is physically vulnerable, but because all Germany is psychologically vulnerable. To many in the West, the crisis over Berlin seems to turn primarily on an effort to find new modes of access to that beleaguered city. To these Western observers, conditions in Germany as a whole seem more or less tolerable. Not everyone accepts the division of Germany and some might prefer a unified Germany; but none of Germany's allies makes

As a symbolic plea for "humanity," peace, and brotherhood, a seven-foot wooden cross rests on Communist-placed barbed wire in front of the Brandenburg Gate separating East and

West Berlin. The huge cross, which appeals to the "conscience of mankind," was left by a Lebanese student after East German police refused to let him enter East Berlin.

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 53

reunification a major goal. Underlying many attitudes toward Germany is distrust—particularly in Great Britain—based on the experiences of two world wars. Thus, many voices in the West argue that the logical solution is to negotiate new access procedures to Berlin in return for accepting the “fact” of a divided Germany. To concede the continuance of a status quo which is not intolerable seems a small price to pay for a promise of stability.

However, stability gained in this manner would upset the domestic equilibrium of the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany); indeed, this is what makes the Soviets so anxious to secure recognition of the status quo. If the West tacitly or explicitly abandoned the principle of national unity, the Germans would consider it a sacrifice of their basic interests. Whatever stability might result from the settlement would seem to have been purchased at their expense. No German political leader can accept as permanent the subjugation of 17 million Germans by Communist guns. His minimum goal might be to ameliorate conditions in East Germany—a goal which he will be under increasing pressure to pursue independently if the allies prove indifferent to it.

## Impact of the Berlin Wall

The building of the Wall in Berlin and the hesitant Western response to it shocked the German public. Many in the West looked on the Wall primarily as another unilateral abrogation of a treaty obligation by the Soviets and an act of inhumanity to the people of Berlin; but for West Germans the Wall symbolized the difficulty, if not the end, of the previous hopes for unification of East and West Germany. For better or for worse, the policy of the Federal Republic had been based on the premise that there was no inconsistency between Germany's national aspirations and its Western orientation. In fact, the Western alliance had been sold to the German public with the argument that it represented the best method to achieve these aspirations. This belief was badly shaken by the Wall—though President Kennedy's visit to West Germany in June 1963 did much to restore German confidence. There he joined Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in a communiqué pledging continued efforts toward reunification; and in Berlin on June

26 President Kennedy said, “Real lasting peace in Europe can never be assured as long as one German-out of four is denied the elementary right of free men, and that is to make a free choice.”

Nevertheless, a difference in perspective in 1961 led to a disagreement between Bonn and Washington regarding the negotiations over Berlin. The United States held the unexceptionable view that a showdown cannot be faced until the West has demonstrated that all honorable means of negotiation have been exhausted. It was widely assumed that the primary Soviet goal was to stabilize conditions in central Europe. The United States was therefore inclined to seek some way to deal with the immediate irritant—the problem of access to Berlin—by making concessions which might enhance the status of the East German authorities without impairing the physical means of access. Progress on the national question would be achieved by increasing the contacts between the two parts of Germany. In these contacts, it was supposed, the superior strength of West Germany could not fail to make itself felt.

## U.S. plan for Berlin access

Throughout 1961 and 1962 the United States constantly pressed the West Germans to come up with “constructive” proposals on the Berlin issue. When the Federal Republic failed to do so, there emerged in April 1962 a United States plan (backed by Britain) which provided for the following: access to Berlin was to be supervised by an International Access Authority on which East Germany would enjoy the same status as the Federal Republic. A number of commissions were to be created by the Federal Republic and East Germany to look into the technical problems connected with the unification. This, of course, gave the East German satellite a veto over any progress toward German unity. A nonaggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations of the Communist bloc was contemplated. Finally, there was to be an agreement to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons to other countries.

This plan represented the culmination of a serious U.S.-German misunderstanding which was brought into the open when the U.S. plan was abruptly “leaked” to the press by West German officials, who apparently hoped to

54 THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

On October 17, 1963, the West German Bundestag elected Ludwig Erhard (right), former Economics Minister, Chancellor to succeed Konrad Adenauer (left), who retired at age 87. Er-

hard was expected to follow a "middle-of-the-road" course, adhering to major policies formulated by Adenauer. Here, the two share a hearty laugh at a farewell party in Bonn.

launch a public campaign against what they considered to be "concessions" to the Soviet Union on the German question. Prior to this event, the position of the Federal Republic had been extremely ambivalent. Conscious of the danger of being accused of bellicosity, it accepted the need for negotiations. But Chancellor Adenauer and his associates were very uneasy about the way we posed the issue. They held that Soviet encroachments had already so sharply curtailed West Berlin's margin of safety that any further concessions were likely to undermine its viability. They were torn between the desire for initiatives on the German question and a suspicion that any proposals we made would only mask further concessions on Berlin. They remembered that in 1959, at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva, the Western pow-

ers first coupled a proposal on German unification with some concessions on Berlin. When the Soviets refused even to discuss unification, the West refrained from pushing the German plan but still kept possible modifications of Berlin's status on the agenda.

Chancellor Adenauer and his associates, having based their entire postwar policy on close ties with the West, and especially with the United States, chose not to bring into the open the full extent of their disquiet. Similarly, the United States preferred to stress German agreement to specific formulas in order to maintain the appearance of allied unity. However, nominal German agreement frequently depended on the Chancellor's knowledge that France's President Charles de Gaulle, who usually shared Adenauer's distaste for negotiations with the Russians,

THE FUTURE OF GERMANY 55

DIVIDED GERMANY

Major Postwar Developments

**June 5, 1945** The European Advisory Commission established four occupation zones in Germany; Berlin was divided into four sectors to be administered as a single entity by a quadripartite (Britain, France, U.S., U.S.S.R.) Allied Government authority.

**August 2, 1945** The Potsdam Agreement between Britain, the U.S., and the U.S.S.R. established a plan for control of Germany by the four Allied powers; denazification, disarmament, and demilitarization of Germany; development of German agriculture and domestic industries; reparation of German war debts; trial of war criminals; and a Council of Foreign Ministers to set up terms of peace to be accepted by a German government.

**January 1, 1947** The U.S. and Britain merged their German occupation zones into an economic "Bizonia."

**June 24, 1948** All land traffic between Berlin and West Germany was stopped on Soviet orders following Soviet charges that the Western powers had violated the Potsdam Agreement by initiating currency reform in West Berlin. The Allies began a 321-day airlift to supply residents of the blockaded areas.

**July 1, 1948** The Soviet representatives withdrew from the quadripartite government, and Berlin in fact was divided into two opposing administrations.

**May 5, 1949** The Soviets announced they would reopen land communications between Berlin and West Germany on the condition that the Council of Foreign Ministers renew their discussion of the Berlin question.

**May 12, 1949** The land blockade of Berlin came to an end.

**May 23, 1949** Ceremonies at Bonn inaugurated the German Federal Republic.

**May 23-June 20, 1949** The Council of Foreign Ministers met at Paris to discuss the questions of German unity, Berlin, a German peace treaty, and the Austrian state treaty. All powers agreed on the need for unity and on the principle of four-power control, but the Western powers and the Soviet Union could not agree on practical proposals.

**October 7, 1949** East Germany proclaimed the establishment of the German Democratic Republic.

**May 26, 1952** The foreign ministers of France, Britain, West Germany, and the U.S. signed a West German Peace Contract which ended Allied occupation of West Germany. The West pledged to protect West Berlin, and West Germany pledged to contribute to the Western defense.

**June 1, 1952** West Berlin residents were barred by Soviet authorities from the Soviet zone of Germany.

**June 17, 1953** Martial law, backed by Soviet troops, was declared in East Berlin after rioting workers threatened to seize control of the East German government.

**March 26, 1954** The Soviet Union announced that the German Democratic Republic had become a sovereign state, although Russian troops would remain there temporarily.

**May 5, 1955** The Federal Republic became a sovereign state.

**May 9, 1955** West Germany was formally admitted to NATO.

**November 10, 1958** Premier Khrushchev announced that the U.S.S.R. was handing its powers in Berlin over to the German Democratic Republic, which the U.S. did not formally recognize.

**November 27, 1958** Khrushchev sent notes to the three Western powers, demanding that Allied troops be withdrawn from West

Berlin, that supplies of food and raw materials and communications in West Berlin be placed under East German control, and that Berlin be declared a demilitarized "free city," garrisoned by the UN. He threatened to give East Germany control of Western military supply routes to the city if Western powers did not make an agreement with East Germany in six months. The three Western powers rejected Khrushchev's demands.

**April 29-30, 1959** Foreign ministers of the U.S., Britain, France, and West Germany met in Paris to formulate a unified policy on the Berlin question; they sought a step-by-step plan for German unification and demanded guarantees of freedom of access to West Berlin with maintenance of the status quo there until the city became the capital of a unified Germany.

**May 11-June 20, July 13-August 5, 1959** Big Four foreign ministers and representatives of West and East Germany met in Geneva to discuss the Berlin crisis and German reunification; the conference ended with the Soviet foreign minister stating that the West could continue its occupation for 18 months while definitive arrangements were being worked out.

**June 15, 1961** In a speech, Khrushchev declared, "The conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany cannot be postponed. . . . A peaceful settlement in Europe must be obtained this year."

**June 28, 1961** President Kennedy pointed out that Moscow's ultimatum had no legal basis, and strongly implied that the U.S. and its allies were determined to do whatever was necessary to protect their own rights and those of West Berlin.

**July 7, 1961** East Germany began to apply various restrictions to the 52,000 East Germans who worked in West Berlin, finally directing them to jobs in the East German economy.

**July 12 and 17, 1961** Allied notes to the Soviet government upheld Allied rights in Berlin, denied the validity of a separate peace treaty with East Germany, and reaffirmed the right of the German people to self-determination and unity.

**August 13, 1961** The border between East and West Berlin was closed by East German troops and police, and a concrete and barbed-wire fence was subsequently erected to prevent East German refugees from escaping into West Berlin.

**August 20, 1961** Fifteen hundred U.S. troops with U.S. and British armored vehicles arrived in West Berlin.

**October 17, 1961** Khrushchev in a speech before the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist party withdrew his threat to sign a separate peace treaty with East Germany by the end of the year.

**August 17, 1962** An East German youth, Peter Fechter, tried to scale the Berlin Wall and was shot by East German guards; he was left at the wall to bleed to death, neither side going to his aid. For the next three days West Berliners rioted at the Wall in the most serious demonstrations in recent years.

**August 22, 1962** The Soviet Union announced it was pulling its military command out of East Berlin. The Western powers responded that they regarded this action as invalid and held the U.S.S.R. to its responsibilities under the four-power agreements.

**June 23, 1963** During a trip to West Germany President Kennedy pledged that the U.S. would risk war to defend that republic.

**November 4-6, 1963** A U.S. Army truck convoy was detained 41 hours at a Soviet checkpoint on the Autobahn leading from West Germany to West Berlin; after strong U.S. protests to Soviet authorities the convoy was permitted to continue despite the refusal of U.S. personnel to dismount to be counted. A week later, another U.S. supply convoy was detained 52 hours.

56 THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

would exercise his veto in allied councils. At other times, the Federal Republic went along not because it considered our course desirable but because it felt that it was the least undesirable of the available options.

## France's role in negotiations

A more important result of the misunderstanding between Bonn and Washington was the emergence of France as guardian of the Federal Republic's interests. France's role was not without its own ambivalence. French leaders are not likely to have transcended their historical reflexes so thoroughly as to have become passionate believers in a united, powerful, and self-confident Germany for its own sake. But President de Gaulle understood that France by itself could no longer have a determining voice in world affairs. Its future influence depended on its ability to lead Europe, and this in turn presupposed close ties with the Federal Republic.

President de Gaulle grasped the fact that if Germany feels itself an outcast it cannot remain a willing partner of the West. He realized that an irredentist, dissatisfied Germany would be a menace to the security of all of Europe. He therefore deliberately flattered German self-esteem. In De Gaulle's view, devising negotiating formulas on Berlin was less important than making the Germans feel that when they were under stress they did not stand alone. He saw that there was no permanent solution to the Berlin problem as long as it was considered in isolation. To accuse the French of cynicism is irrelevant. They have pursued the policy appropriate for their objective.

As a consequence, the French position sometimes reflected German feelings more accurately than the German one did. French intransigence would, after all, have served no purpose—and it could not have been so effective—if French views had not been closer to the true convictions of Chancellor Adenauer than ours. That President de Gaulle used the United States' nuclear umbrella to pursue his “tough” policy added to the irony of the situation and to the irritation of some of our policy makers.

These misunderstandings created a diplomacy which combined the disadvantage of allied diversity with the inability to gain any real benefit from the negotiations. France refused to nego-

tiate. The Federal Republic approved diplomatic contacts with the Soviets only with great misgivings. Exploratory talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko were conducted in 1962, first by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and later by U.S. Ambassador to Russia Llewellyn Thompson. Thus, the Federal Republic, on an issue affecting it most immediately, stood on the side lines in a position to criticize the unfavorable features of specific proposals without having to weigh them against alternative courses. By assuming the role of chief negotiator, the United States played into the hands of the French and disquieted the Germans, and all without being able to bring about a settlement. Since we could not commit the West as a whole, the Soviets were in a position to treat our offers as fishing expeditions or to engage in fishing expeditions of their own. If they considered allied discord a feint, this gave them an incentive to be rigid. If they took it seriously, they could in effect bank every concession and use it as the starting point for the next round of talks.

Moreover, our desire to “stabilize” conditions in central Europe turned the conversations into an effort to find something in the Soviet catalogue of demands which could be conceded without destroying the freedom of Berlin. Instead of using the talks to define the West’s conception of the future of Germany and of security in central Europe, American spokesmen concentrated on what change in the status quo in and around Berlin might prove barely tolerable. They did not advance a program either for eventual German unification or for ameliorating conditions in East Germany. Such schemes were considered “nonnegotiable” and, therefore, likely to undermine any chance of a settlement. The impression was thus created that only the issues which the Soviets chose to raise stood between us and lasting peace. This set up a pattern of negotiations in which, in return for Western concessions, the Soviets would withdraw the threat which they themselves had initiated.

## Atmosphere of distrust

The more negotiations were conducted in this manner, the more relations between Bonn and Washington suffered. The mere fact of bilateral negotiations raised the specter of a U.S.-Soviet

THE STRUCTURE OF EUROPE 57

accommodation at the expense of our allies. Our tactics thus encouraged the Franco-German entente. The French inclination to establish Western Europe as a "Third Force" in world affairs would probably have been pursued in any case; but it was given impetus and opportunity by German uneasiness about our course.

By focusing the negotiations on access rights to Berlin, we stressed an issue most likely to lead to misunderstanding. A city divided by a wall, surrounded on three other sides by barbed wire, and existing as an enclave in hostile territory, is not ideally placed for the exercise of so-called "flexibility." This was illustrated by the original U.S. scheme for an International Access Authority, which the Germans leaked to the press in April 1962 as a means of torpedoing it. The American plan provided that the Authority, which would regulate access to Berlin, was to be composed of five Western and five Eastern nations and three neutrals—Sweden, Switzerland, and Austria. The Eastern nations included East Germany and East Berlin, and the Western group included the Federal Republic and West Berlin. The scheme thus implied a considerable enhancement of the status of East Germany, as well as a different political status for West Berlin—two concessions which lent color to the Soviet claim that Berlin should be a free city. On the narrower question of access, the determining vote would have been in the hands of three neutrals, two of them living in the immediate shadow of Soviet power. The people of Berlin would not be likely to believe that their security had been enhanced by substituting the judgment of Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland for the responsibility now exercised by Great Britain, the United States, and France. Of course, if an international authority actually manned the checkpoints on the access routes with its own personnel, the current situation would be greatly improved. If, however, the authority merely supervised the East German police, three small nations would be in the position of having to defend current Western rights and, in effect, to decide questions of peace and war.

There are indications that we have rethought our policy toward Germany. Certainly President Kennedy's triumphal tour through West Germany in June 1963 did a great deal to restore confidence. The accession of Chancellor

Erhard permitted a new start to be made in German-U.S. relations which is likely to be vigorously pursued by President Johnson. But meanwhile, U.S.-European relations had been severely strained by President de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, at which he abruptly announced the termination of the negotiations looking toward Britain's entry into the Common Market. It is to this problem that we now turn.

## THE STRUCTURE OF EUROPE

### Britain and the Common Market

The Common Market came into effect in 1958, at a time when Great Britain was not prepared to join. The theory of its chief advocates, such as Jean Monnet, was that as the Common Market became a going concern Great Britain would have no alternative except to join.

These expectations seemed to be borne out by events. By August 1961 Great Britain had announced its willingness to enter the Common Market. Negotiations in Brussels to achieve this end proved protracted, but by January 1963 most of the technical obstacles seemed to have been overcome. At that time, however, President de Gaulle announced that in his judgment Great Britain was not ready to enter Europe. De Gaulle's pronouncement produced a storm of indignation both in the United States and in Europe.

It is fruitless to debate here whether Britain complicated its task and invited rejection by haggling too long over technical details. It is also likely that many in the United States attached excessive weight to one particular method for European integration—that is, through the economic path of the Common Market. It is altogether possible that Great Britain's entry into the Common Market would not have automatically solved the problems of Atlantic relationships. To be sure, Britain's political maturity would have weighed heavily in European councils; with Britain playing a leading role, Europe's policy would probably have been more subtle, more skillful, and, at least in form, less demanding than De Gaulle's at present. Yet the direction in which Britain's influence would have

58 THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

been exercised is still far from clear. Would Britain have tried to counteract a possible Paris-Bonn axis by organizing the smaller European states and Italy against this Franco-German alliance? Would Britain, within the Common Market, have been a spokesman in Europe for a British-American view on international affairs?

There are many who would answer each of these questions affirmatively. Yet there is reason for doubt. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had chosen his difficult path in order to revitalize Britain's claim to greatness. This vision implies a Europe led by Britain and playing its own specific role in international affairs. The great-power status which Great Britain has so

tenaciously sought to sustain throughout the postwar period could now be achieved only through the closest association with the Continent. But to do this effectively, Great Britain might have had to adopt views similar to France's, ameliorating these views with a Britain's own subtle style. One ironic result of Britain's entry into the Common Market might well have been that Europe henceforth would have conducted De Gaulle's policies with British methods. It is quite possible that President de Gaulle excluded Britain from the Common Market not because he thought Britain insufficiently European but because he was afraid it would be too much so.

French President Charles de Gaulle's January 1963 veto of Common Market membership for Great Britain distressed other EEC members as well as the United States. On February

5, West Berlin students demonstrated in support of British entry into the Common Market; signs read "We want unity not grandeur" and "Europe doesn't want a führer."

THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

59

## Aftermath of De Gaulle's pronouncement

President de Gaulle's press conference, followed by the signing of a Franco-German treaty of friendship a week later on January 22, led to a serious crisis in European and Atlantic relationships. Within Europe there was concern that the breakdown of the negotiations with Britain indicated a return to traditional European nationalism. Opponents of President de Gaulle's conception invoked the danger of Franco-German hegemony. Within the Atlantic alliance the fear was that Europe might turn inward. There was speculation about Third Force tendencies and the danger of a separate accommodation with the Communists.

In the months following De Gaulle's press conference, the basic issues have become somewhat less obscured by passion. It has become clearer that no European power can achieve hegemony by physical means; the only way for any country to lead Europe is to identify itself with the prevailing mood. By the same token, the best means for the United States to counteract Third Force tendencies is to conduct itself so that the advantages of an Atlantic partnership always outweigh the seeming benefits of a narrower conception.

This process seems to be well launched. It was expressed in a speech by President Kennedy in Frankfurt on June 24, 1963, to the effect that the forms that European integration may take are up to the Europeans to decide. The United States' interest is to deal with whatever structure emerges, provided that structure recognizes the interests of the wider Atlantic Community.

This is a wise course, for the roads to European political integration are various. Some argue as if the idea of a federal Europe had to be fundamentally opposed to the concept of the nation state. However, the dispute is for the immediate future more theoretical than practical. Any progress toward European political union will in the first instance have to be made by the existing states. The ultimate form of a political union can be left until further progress toward integration is made—particularly once defense has joined economics as a subject of common European policy.

The major thrust of United States policy should be less to try to bring about a particular

European arrangement than to relate our policy to whatever ultimately emerges as a European structure. The relationship of our policy to the aspirations of a revitalized Europe is most dramatically illustrated in relation to the complicated issue of the control of nuclear weapons.

## THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Since 1960, the issue of the control of the nuclear weapons of the NATO alliance has been the subject of consultation and dispute. France has attempted to build up its own retaliatory force, following a path long since trodden by Great Britain. The Federal Republic of Germany at various times has asked for information about nuclear weapon stockpiles in Germany, for a guarantee that these will not be withdrawn without the consent of NATO, and for a degree of unspecified joint control over weapons fired from German soil. The French effort is designed to reduce reliance on the United States' retaliatory force; but the German proposal bears primarily on the issue of tactical nuclear war, for the nuclear weapons on German territory are neither designed nor intended for a retaliatory strategy. Other NATO allies have speculated about some form of joint control designed less to contribute to an affirmative decision to employ nuclear weapons than to provide a veto over their use.

### American objectives

The thinking of the United States has suffered from the attempt to combine several more or less incompatible courses of action: we would like to head off the multiplication of national nuclear establishments, and we are stressing the increased importance of conventional forces; but we would also like to retain the determining voice in the nuclear policy of the NATO alliance. It is, however, not likely that our European allies will agree to integrate their conventional forces in a joint command and to place increased reliance on a conventional defense, while the United States reserves for itself a monopoly on the means of responding to the Soviet nuclear

60 THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

EUROPE'S QUEST FOR UNITY

Landmark Events Since World War II

**March 17, 1948** Britain, France, and the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg) signed the Brussels Pact, a 50-year treaty of economic cooperation and military aid.

**April 18, 1948** The Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), comprising 17 West European nations, was created to assist the Economic Cooperation Administration, which had been established by the U.S. Congress to administer foreign aid through the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan). The first major step toward integration in Western Europe, the OEEC set up a program for the progressive removal of quotas on trade among its members.

**July 1, 1950** The European Payments Union was set up by the OEEC to ease intra-European trade and payments; the EPU provided for extension of credit to debtor nations and enabled each nation to settle its accounts with the others as a group instead of separately. At the end of 1950 the EPU was replaced by the European Monetary Agreement, under which credit was no longer automatic.

**April 18, 1951** The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), originally proposed by French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman ("Schuman Plan"), was established by treaty. The plan, which went into effect the following year, provided for a supranational authority over the coal and steel industries of Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, and West Germany; its purpose was to ensure a free flow of vital raw materials among member nations by fixing prices, setting import and export quotas, and allocating materials. The ECSC was envisioned as the first of a series of "communities" that would gradually link the economies of the six member states.

**May 27, 1952** The Pleven Plan for the establishment of a European Defense Community was proposed by France. The plan envisioned the creation of a European army under supranational control.

**September 10, 1952** Europe's first sovereign supranational assembly came into existence as an organ of the European Coal and Steel Community.

**February 10, 1953** The ECSC began operations by establishing a common market for coal, iron ore, and scrap.

**May 1, 1953** The European Coal and Steel Community established a common market for steel.

**August 30, 1954** France rejected the European Defense Community treaty (Pleven Plan) and the plan collapsed. French opposition to the treaty was based on fear and distrust of Germany's growing power, a desire to establish close military and political ties with the United States and Britain rather than with Germany,

and a disinclination to accept an abandonment of national sovereignty in a supranational community.

**October 23, 1954** The Western European Union was formed by West Germany, Italy, and the Brussels Treaty powers to provide a framework for regulating and coordinating the military forces and arms production of its member states.

**March 25, 1957** Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, West Germany, and Italy signed the Treaties of Rome, which created: (1) The European Economic Community (EEC or Common Market), with the goal of eliminating tariff barriers among member states, adopting a common tariff on imports from outside, and promoting free movement of labor and capital within the community; (2) the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), which created an agency for the common development of atomic energy within the community.

**January 1, 1958** Europe's Common Market and Euratom came into being as the Rome Treaties of March 25, 1957, took effect.

**February 3, 1958** The Benelux nations signed an agreement for a 50-year economic union which called for the free movement of persons, goods, services, and capital among the nations and the eventual conduct, as a unit, of business with other nations.

**March 19-21, 1958** The 142-man European Parliament assembly—first constituent assembly of the ECSC, the EEC, and Euratom—met for the first time. Members are elected by and from the legislatures of member countries.

**November 20, 1959** Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and Great Britain completed plans for a European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which would create a trading area with no internal tariffs or quotas, but would retain a separate external tariff system for each nation.

**May 3, 1960** The EFTA came into effect.

**December 14, 1960** A 20-nation convention establishing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to replace the OEEC was signed in Paris. In addition to work in the trade field, the OECD expanded and coordinated programs for foreign aid to underdeveloped countries. OECD members included the EEC and EFTA nations, as well as Greece, Turkey, Spain, Ice land, Ireland, Canada, and the United States.

**August 10, 1961** Great Britain requested negotiations aiming at full membership in the Common Market.

**September 30, 1961** The OECD came into being and held its first meeting in Paris.

**November 8, 1961** Negotiations with Great Britain for EEC membership opened in Paris.

THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 61

**January 14, 1962** The first stage of the European Economic Community ended. Trade among member states had increased 73 per cent since Jan. 1, 1958; industrial production had increased 32 per cent; and the combined gross national product of member countries had increased 21 per cent. Imports from other countries had increased 27 per cent and exports to nonmember countries 28 per cent. Customs duties were reduced 40 per cent for industrial products, 35 per cent for nonliberalized agricultural products, and 30 per cent for liberalized agricultural products. The timetable for the common external tariff was speeded up; the Social Fund regulation had provided $50 million for the retraining and resettlement of workers; and $276.8 million had been granted by the Overseas Development Fund to countries associated with the organization.

**January 16, 1962** The United States and the EEC signed an agreement in Brussels for a reciprocal reduction of tariffs.

**May 15, 1962** The Council of Ministers of the EEC voted to accelerate the tariff reduction and to apply a new common tariff against imports from the rest of the world.

**July 1, 1962** An EEC agricultural policy that created, in effect, a federal West European ministry of agriculture to replace the six member states' national programs came into force.

**November 1, 1962** Greece became an associate member of the Common Market; a gradual cut in customs duties between Greece and the EEC nations was planned for a 12-year period.

**January 14, 1963** Association status for Britain in the Common Market was advocated by French President Charles de Gaulle in a news conference in which he suggested that Britain should not seek full membership.

**January 22, 1963** France and Germany signed a treaty for cooperation and consultation in the areas of foreign policy, defense, and culture.

**January 29, 1963** Negotiations dealing with Britain's entry into the Common Market ended in failure when France exercised its veto right to force negotiators to suspend their talks and, in effect, rejected the British application. The action was viewed by many as a step by President de Gaulle to create a French-led European Community which would be independent of U.S. economic and military power.

**February 18, 1963** Ministers of the 7 member states of the EFTA, at a meeting in Geneva to evaluate the changes arising from Britain's failure to gain entry to the Common Market, agreed that there was no possibility of either individual or collective agreement with the Common Market in the foreseeable future.

**April 10, 1963** The British declared that they planned to play a full part in the Common Market's political and economic future.

**May 15, 1963** The Council of Ministers of the Common Market voted unanimously to accelerate tariff reduction within the EEC.

threat and freedom of action in employing nuclear weapons.

From this point of view, the French national nuclear effort is not as senseless as is often made out. It is easy enough to demonstrate that national nuclear forces in Europe are ineffective because they cannot withstand a determined surprise attack, while to use them independently against the Soviet Union would be to commit suicide. However, the key question is whether these forces are intended to be used separately. Could the Soviet Union ever conduct a surprise attack against the strategic forces of Great Britain or France without running an unacceptable risk of a counterblow from the United States or from the other European ally, temporarily spared? Alternatively, if the strategic forces of one of our European allies were to attack the U.S.S.R. without our consent or perhaps against our wishes, it is of course possible to assert that we would then leave our ally to his fate. However, in reality such a course would be extremely unlikely. It is not simply that the Soviets might retaliate against us in any case. More important, to "punish" a recalcitrant ally by leaving him at the mercy of a Soviet counterblow would be scarcely less serious for us than for the offender.

For these reasons, independent national nuclear forces, whatever their military effectiveness, will have the practical consequence of impelling the coordination of policies which President de Gaulle first proposed in his scheme for a Directorate in 1958—an offer never seriously taken up. To be sure, President de Gaulle undoubtedly has other goals in mind as well. The question before NATO, nevertheless, is whether coordination can be achieved without an expensive and wasteful duplication of effort.

Several plans have been advanced. In May 1961 President Kennedy formally offered to "commit to NATO, . . . five—and subsequently still more—*Polaris* atomic submarines . . . subject to any agreed NATO guidelines on their control and use." This pledge was fulfilled by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara at the Athens ministerial meeting when he announced that five *Polaris* submarines had already been committed to NATO, with more to come. President Kennedy also expressed a willingness to consider "a NATO seaborne force, which would be truly multilateral in ownership and control. . . ." And

62 THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

THE DEVELOPMENT OF NATO

Chronology of Major Events

**August 24, 1949** The North Atlantic Treaty went into effect. The pact, signed by foreign ministers of the U.S., Great Britain, Canada, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Italy, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Portugal, provided that the signatories would consult together whenever the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any one of them was threatened. By Article 5 the signatories agreed that an attack upon any of them would be considered an attack upon them all and would be met with individual or collective resistance.

**September 17, 1949** The first session of the North Atlantic Council, policy-making body of NATO, began.

**September 15-26, 1950** The North Atlantic Council, meeting in New York, centered its discussion on the means of defending the NATO area against aggression similar to that recently experienced by South Korea. The Council agreed to set up an integrated European defense force under a supreme commander, with West Germany contributing to the defense effort.

**December 18, 1950** The Brussels Conference of Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Pact nations approved a plan for arming Western Europe. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was designated Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR).

**April 2, 1951** General Eisenhower took formal command of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), and began to organize an integrated NATO army for the defense of NATO land areas in Europe. An international force made up of units assigned from member states to Eisenhower's command replaced regional planning groups in Europe.

**February 18, 1952** Greece and Turkey became members of NATO.

**February 24, 1952** The NATO Council at a meeting in Lisbon adopted a comprehensive program of military expansion; the objective was to increase ground forces and air strength, and to develop strong naval support. The office of secretary-general of NATO was created and a new permanent council was formed with headquarters in Paris.

**April 13, 1955** A draft agreement was published according to which the U.S. would from time to time make available to NATO atomic information deemed necessary to the development of defense plans and to the training of personnel in the use of and defense against atomic weapons.

**May 9, 1955** West Germany became a member of NATO.

**May 6, 1956** The NATO Council appointed a special committee of three to study and make recommendations for cooperation in nonmilitary matters. Cooperation was initiated along political, economic, scientific, and cultural lines.

**February 1957** The NATO Council set up a Committee of Economic Advisers, which began a study of the new Soviet economic offensive against the West and the best measures of counterattack.

**May 1957** The NATO Council at a meeting in Bonn reiterated its policy of relying upon both nuclear and traditional weapons for the defense of Europe. NATO authorities were asked to study the best balance between the latest weapons and conventional arms.

**December 19, 1957** Shortly after the advent of Sputnik, the Council's heads of government session decided to establish stocks of nuclear warheads in Europe and to put intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) at the disposal of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. The U.S. subsequently concluded agreements

with Britain, France, Canada, West Germany, Greece, Turkey, and The Netherlands for the transfer of nuclear weapons information and military equipment to help them train their forces and develop nuclear defense plans. But there was to be no transfer of either information or equipment to help a receiving nation "design, develop, or fabricate its own nuclear weapons."

**November 21, 1960** General Lauris Norstad, NATO's Supreme Commander in Europe, proposed the creation of a NATO nuclear "task force," strategic as well as tactical, which would make NATO an atomic power in its own right. The proposed NATO deterrent would be brought into play only with the consent of all 15 NATO members.

**December 16, 1960** A meeting of the NATO Council of Ministers in Paris received the U.S. suggestion that NATO be given control of five Polaris submarines stationed in the alliance area, each carrying 18 missiles, provided the European allies bought 100 more missiles from the U.S. The suggestion was referred to permanent NATO Council representatives for study before the next ministerial meeting at Oslo in May 1961.

**May 1961** At the NATO Council spring meeting at Oslo, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk emphasized that nuclear warheads in NATO areas would remain under U.S. control and that the allies should build up their conventional forces.

**May 5, 1962** At the NATO Council meeting in Athens, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara declared that the U.S. would place under NATO's command in the Atlantic five fully equipped Polaris submarines with a total of 80 missiles. The vessels, however, were to remain directly under U.S. control. McNamara also stressed that it was important for the allies "to strengthen further their nonnuclear forces and to improve the quality and staying power of these forces."

**January 14, 1963** French President Charles de Gaulle rejected Anglo-American proposals for a multilateral NATO nuclear force armed with Polaris submarines; he declared the plan to be inconsistent with France's long-range defense objectives.

**January 28, 1963** Exploratory talks on the U.S. proposal for forming a united Western nuclear striking force were opened at NATO Permanent Council headquarters in Paris. The talks were an outgrowth of the December 1962 Nassau agreement by Kennedy and Macmillan to assign U.S. and British nuclear bombers and, ultimately, Polaris missile submarines to a NATO-manned and NATO-commanded atomic striking force. There was no official reaction to the joint proposal, but reports were that the plan was received without enthusiasm by the European NATO states.

**May 24, 1963** The NATO foreign ministers announced their approval of measures intended to lead to the creation of an inter-allied nuclear striking force. The projected force would include Britain's 180-plane V-bomber fleet; three U.S. Polaris missile-firing atomic submarines assigned to the Mediterranean; and nuclear-armed tactical air squadrons assigned to NATO by eight other members, including France. The units would be financed and manned by individual governments and would be subject to national authority; under a "double key" system the U.S. and Great Britain would retain the ultimate authority over nuclear weapons used by the force.

**August 21, 1963** Proposals for an East-West treaty to reduce the danger of surprise attack were taken up by the NATO Permanent Council in Paris. Members were reported to have opposed any agreement limited to the territories of East and West Germany.

THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 63

Secretary of State Dean Rusk has reaffirmed our willingness to participate in consultation to this end.

At the regular NATO ministerial conference in December 1962, nothing was done about the creation of a NATO multilateral force. A week later, on December 21, President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan signed the Nassau Agreement, which provided for two multilateral forces: one that would absorb the strategic forces of Great Britain and France together with a United States contribution of nationally owned submarines; another in which the nonnuclear countries of NATO would create a truly multilateral Polaris force, which was later explained to mean that it would be jointly financed, owned, planned, manned, and operated. Making NATO into a "fourth nuclear power" was supposed to provide a mechanism for joint planning and a substitute for national nuclear establishments. In practice, it is unlikely to provide either.

## Guidelines for weapons control

If NATO were supplied with strategic nuclear weapons and with a delivery system capable of destroying Soviet targets, NATO would also have to define guidelines for the "control and use" of these weapons. In other words, what conditions would have to be met before the firing button could be pushed? Given the fact that a control system for a single national force is not a simple matter, there is little probability that our allies could come up with a meaningful control system that would involve the simultaneous consent of seventeen nations. Indeed, many on both sides of the Atlantic have recognized the problem as insoluble.

A multilateral NATO nuclear force superimposed on the existing framework would bring about three, or perhaps even four, kinds of strategic forces within the alliance: a very large one under exclusive United States control; two smaller national forces (one British and the other French); and, finally, a medium-sized NATO force, in which all the countries already possessing national forces would also participate. This plethora of forces would present formidable problems of command and control. It also would be likely to signify to the Soviets that there are degrees of intensity of the American nuclear

commitment to Europe. Why else would we devote such gradations of retaliatory power?

Moreover, what is to be the purpose of such a multilateral NATO force? Presumably, if, as U.S. Secretary McNamara has said, our strategic forces already cover every Soviet target without help from forces deployed overseas, a NATO force will be superfluous militarily. And whatever its mission, it must be coordinated with the much larger forces controlled exclusively by the United States.

If we create such a multilateral NATO nuclear force, we will not be at the end, but at the beginning, of a process. Once the joint force has been established, it will be next to impossible to head off pressures to turn it into a militarily useful instrument both by increasing its size and by giving our allies a more determining voice than is now envisaged. This may be desirable, but we should at least embark on such a course with our eyes open.

## U.S. veto over nuclear policy

If a NATO force as now conceived is militarily unnecessary, is it a political answer to Europe's concern about our nuclear predominance? This raises squarely the issue of the American veto in the nuclear policy of the alliance.

If we retain a veto, then two types of strategic forces will exist for the defense of NATO: (1) a relatively small one—the NATO nuclear force itself—which would require our consent, together with the consent of whatever control mechanism the NATO countries devised; and (2) another much larger force—our Strategic Air Command (SAC), which would remain under our exclusive control. Our European allies could prevent the use of the smaller force, but they could not compel its use without our consent. With respect to the larger United States force—from the military point of view, the crucial one—our allies could neither prevent nor compel its use.

In case of disagreement with our European allies, one of two things would happen. If we wished to use nuclear weapons and the Europeans did not, we could still employ SAC. If they desired to use nuclear weapons and we did not, both the NATO nuclear force and SAC would be inactive. In other words, a NATO

64 THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

nuclear force with an American veto would multiply safety catches but not triggering devices. It can easily be represented as a shift of nuclear weapons from one American headquarters to another.

If, on the other hand, we agreed to give up our veto, a major and perhaps insoluble constitutional issue would be raised in the United States. Can a group of foreign powers commit us to nuclear war without our consent? While the present situation is not very different, a great deal may depend on maintaining this nuance. The attempt to eliminate it may evoke a debate casting in doubt the extent of our nuclear commitment to NATO.

If we did give up our veto, would we be committing ourselves to the use of the NATO nuclear force only or to the use of our *entire* strategic force? In the former case, we would again have raised doubts whether the NATO force represented the limit of our commitment. In the latter case, a separate NATO force would be unnecessary, for we would then be obliged to use all our nuclear forces at the behest of whatever majority had the power of decision in the control body.

The discussion about the veto illustrates that the European concern about nuclear control is not as baseless as is often alleged. If disagreements with our European allies were inconceivable, we could agree to use our nuclear arsenal whenever a certain number of our allies requested it, according to plans mutually agreed upon in advance. Since we are unwilling to do this, it must be that we wish to reserve for ourselves the right to differ with the interpretation of our allies about the nature of vital interests or the means to defend them. Jealous as we are of our prerogatives, we should understand, even when we do not agree with, the attempts of some of our allies to achieve a greater voice in determining their fate.

The multilateral NATO force is thus unlikely to prevent the diffusion of nuclear weapons; it may well accelerate it. It will neither stop the acquisition of nuclear arms by West Germany nor satisfy over any extended period whatever demands may exist there for a greater voice on nuclear matters. It *will* stop the building up of conventional forces, for none of the countries reported ready to join the NATO nuclear force is likely to increase its defense budget beyond

the expenditures required for the multilateral force.

Finally, the NATO nuclear force will not represent any significant burden-sharing. Since some of the European countries will possess some kind of veto, our strategic planning could not count on the NATO force. The strategy envisaged by Secretary McNamara would then require us to maintain whatever strategic forces are thought necessary for a U.S. counterforce response—as if the NATO force did not exist.

## Effects on Allied cohesion

As for the other political effects often advertised as the chief, if not the sole, purpose of the NATO nuclear force, Allied cohesion is unlikely to be strengthened. On the contrary, Europe will be fragmented even further. France will be isolated, but at a heavy price. We will have shifted the relative weight in Europe toward countries which, while more pliable in the short term, may prove more unstable in the long run. If the influence of West Germany in the multilateral force becomes too great, neutralism may grow in Britain, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries.

The effort to isolate France by developing in the nuclear field a structure in which West Germany would be the key European member may in fact overstrain the fabric of European cohesion and Atlantic solidarity, and also undermine the domestic stability of West Germany. It is in nobody's interest—least of all West Germany's—to set in motion events that can end only with suspicion and concern in most of the countries of the West about Germany's nuclear role. This is bound to aid the Soviet thrust to divide the West through the fear of Germany. A divided country, which in the space of fifty years has lost two wars, experienced three revolutions, suffered two periods of extreme inflation and the trauma of the Nazi era, should not—in its own interest—be placed in a position where, in addition to its inevitable exposure to Soviet pressure, it becomes the balance wheel of our Atlantic policy. We are encouraging tendencies that we may later regret. There must be better ways for West Germany to demonstrate its devotion to the Atlantic alliance than to become the largest European contributor to a multilateral nuclear force.

THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

65

A French "go-it-alone" policy has been President Charles de Gaulle's reply to President Kennedy's appeals for a close

European-American partnership. Here, De Gaulle thrusts his arms upward in a military "Victory" signal during a speech.

## THE FUTURE OF THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

The major challenge in the construction of an Atlantic Community is in two fields: strategic coordination and political direction. With respect to strategy it is important to return to first principles.

The goal of a strong, unified, and self-sufficient Europe, which American policy has consistently pursued for a decade and a half, is as valid today as it was when first developed in 1947. We may not have fully understood then that an economically powerful Europe would be more self-assertive in both the political and military fields. We may have believed subconsciously that our policy would relieve us of economic burdens without requiring a redefinition of Atlantic relationships. But whether or not we fully realized the implications of what we were doing, the Europe of today stands as a testimony to our

foresight and our ability to subordinate short-term advantage to long-term benefits.

However, there has been at times a tendency to recoil before the inevitable implications of our policy. It was always in the cards—indeed, it was our stated purpose—that as Europe regained its economic health it would also seek to develop its own specific policies. It never occurred to us originally that the relations of the European states to each other should not be closer than each of them was to the United States. On the contrary, the original conception was that a cohesive Europe would be a more effective partner for the United States. An Atlantic partnership was then thought of in terms of establishing a relationship with a Europe whose internal structure would be firmer than the Atlantic bonds.

This great conception can be reversed today only by undermining the structures that have been laboriously developed over the past fifteen

66 THE ATLANTIC COMMUNITY

[Lc]

years. Fifteen years ago it might have been possible to try to construct an Atlantic Community on the most-favored-nation principle; that is, that no nation have closer relations to any other than to the United States. Today this attempt jeopardizes all that has been achieved.

Thus, we should use our influence to place the national European nuclear programs in the service of a European conception. This would also be the most reliable road to an Atlantic partnership. The emerging European force could then be related to ours through political coordination and joint strategic planning.

This is not to say that the United States should support every strategic theory developed in Britain or France. It is plain that we have certain interests in any European nuclear development which we are bound to foster:

(1) The European forces should be well protected so that they do not invite preëmptive attack or have to be used precipitately because of their vulnerability.

(2) These forces should possess an effective command and control system so that they are at all times responsive to political direction.

(3) They should be a part of a strategy that includes the possibility of flexible response.

(4) They should become an instrument to foster European integration.

(5) They should be coordinated with our forces.

It may be argued that such a course would turn Europe into a Third Force. However, it is important that we distinguish between strength and the purpose this strength will serve. In the sense of being powerful, Europe is bound to be a Third Force, partly because we ourselves have sought to make it so. This fact is now beyond our power to reverse. Whether Europe will use its new-found strength for short-term objectives of its own or for larger ends depends on whether the leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have the vision to develop common purposes and a structure to give them effect. If a political framework can be created, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Europe need not be disruptive to Atlantic unity.

One of two things can happen with the growth of European nuclear power: (1) Europe will in fact become strong enough to defend itself (this should not be a source of concern to the United States—quite the contrary) or (2)

Europe will learn through hard experience that the security of the Atlantic area is in fact indivisible. If the American strategic analysis is even approximately correct, the latter is by far the more likely outcome. There is, therefore, no need to show so much concern over a development which may well tighten Atlantic bonds whatever the motives of individual leaders. Even a purely national French program should make France more eager for integrated planning than we are, since France has a great deal more to lose by its absence.

If Europe is determined to behave irresponsibly, the best we can do is to delay the time when it is able to do so—but not by much. If Europe wishes to have a nuclear capability there is nothing we can do to prevent it. And the effort to obstruct it may bring on what we are seeking to avoid.

However, the ultimate problem is the degree of political cohesion which can be achieved. Given the extraordinary importance of creating a political framework for the Atlantic area, this may be the occasion to implement the proposals for some form of Atlantic coordinating body put forth in various forms by such men as former U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Lord Avon,¹ and President de Gaulle. A great deal might be said for having a group composed initially of senior and highly respected private citizens charged with making recommendations to the governments concerned. The objectives would be to give Atlantic partnership more concrete form and a symbolic expression.

It may be argued that the model of the Common Market demonstrates that it is preferable to move step by step without abstract discussion about ultimate ends. However, the lessons of history cannot be applied so mechanically. Today, we stand in danger of being mired by the prudent, the tactical, or the expedient. What we need now is an assertion of our future goals to give us perspective.

Indeed, excessive realism may well be the chief obstacle to realizing the opportunities before the West. On both sides of the Atlantic, affairs are conducted increasingly by experts of high technical competence, superior intelligence, and great skill in exercising power. Prob-

¹Anthony Eden, former British foreign minister and prime minister, who became Earl of Avon in 1961.

67

lems recognized as such are treated with considerable adeptness. But many opportunities are not recognized. The expert has a vested interest in the existing framework; doing the familiar as well as possible, after all, has made him an expert. His temptation is to confuse creativity with a projection of the present into the future. He respects "facts" and considers them something to be adjusted to, perhaps to be manipulated, but not to be transcended.

The unsatisfactory nature of much of our dialogues with Europe derives from the fact that current European leaders, particularly in Germany and France, are a very different sort. Whereas many of our officials look on the daily flow of messages and the tactics for dealing with them as the essence of policy, this is what seems most ephemeral to men like Adenauer or, even more, De Gaulle. Their reality is their concept of the future or of the structure of the

world they wish to bring about. The overly pragmatic approach of many of our policy makers seems to many Europeans to involve the risk of latent unsteadiness, just as the European's conceptual tendency appears to our officials as overly legalistic and theoretical.

In the decade ahead, the West will have to lift its sights to encompass a more embracing concept of reality than that which is fashionable in many quarters today. In many ways this problem will be even more acute after Adenauer and De Gaulle have disappeared from the scene; the generation which follows them stands as much in danger of exalting technique over purpose as do their contemporaries in the United States. But on both sides of the Atlantic we should remember that there are two kinds of realists: those who manipulate facts and those who create them. The West requires nothing so much as men able to create their own reality.