R. S. Leghorn

April 28, 1956

# CONTROLLING THE NUCLEAR THREAT IN THE SECOND ATOMIC DECADE

In the age of nuclear-air technology and aggressive Communism bent on world domination, there is one task of the U. S. government which transcends all others in difficulty and importance. Security must be provided for the growth of Freedom and for the national way of the American people. The United States must also contribute substantially to world security, so that all peoples can evolve their own way of life in accordance with their own choices. This world responsibility is not just a moral one, but one of long-term self-interest, if indeed there are distinctions to be drawn between the two.

## I The Future Inadequacy of our Post War Policy

During the first atomic decade, U.S. security policies have rested upon first a monopoly and then a superiority in retaliatory nuclear-air arms. We may summarize as four points the many reasons our security reliance cannot continue indefinitely to rest on this superiority.

First, the Soviets are approaching a nuclear sufficiency. "Saturation" will see near absolute retaliatory fire-power in the hands of both antagonists.

Second, for the West to maintain its present over-all arms superiority indefinitely, a very major increase in defense budgets will soon be required. Although such measures are economically feasible, their political feasibility is in doubt. The West is now becoming conscious of other costs to liberal democracies in an indefinite arms race--the erosion of freedom and the growth of totalitarian characteristics which any long military struggle, cold or hot, imposes on a free society. Social and economic progress, so essential for the growth of freedom in the world, is seriously retarded by an arms competition which already takes about 15% of the gross national product of the West and 50% of its research and development resources. Not only is this military emphasis a drag on progress in the West, but it seriously retards the growth and stability of underdeveloped areas, and estranges uncommitted nations. Furthermore, the much greater percentage of military costs in Communist states retards the evolution of these states into less revolutionary and more tolerant social entities. To stay significantly and indefinitely ahead in an arms race is to risk losing the basic struggle through the non-military back door.

Third, although a "balance of mutual terror" has been urged as the basis for world security, mutual terror in reality is no security reliance at all, but a reliance on fear and insecurity. Any attempt to rely on a balance of mutual terror in the context of an all-out arms race would be a hopeless contradiction of Western purposes.

Perhaps the best way to indicate the utter folly of basing security on the pursuit of mutual terror is to mention the probably state of the world if we continue to be mesmerized by such a fallacious concept. Within ten years the U.S. and U.S.S.R. can be expected to have important numbers of operational intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with

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multi-megaton warheads, easily hidden or mobile. The prospects are far from promising that air defense developments can pace their growth, and even if technically feasible, air defense against them will likely prove economically fantastic. The flight time between the centers of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. will be of the order of thirty minutes, making warning of little avail. The decision to retali ate must be delegated to minor officials who might set the world on fire in a jittery or muddled moment. Fanatics or irresponsible third nations might do the same. Not only will many nations in time acquire these weapons, but we will probably find ourselves urging and helping partners to base their own security on a similar all-or-nothing massive response with hidden retaliatory missiles.

Today's security problems are difficult, but the illusory pursuit of a "balance of mutual terror" will lead to a predicament from which the world will have far greater difficulties extricating itself without major catastrophe. And the psychological implications of indefinite living under such a sword of Damocles are scarcely conducive to freedom's growth.

Fourth, history is strewn with examples of nations betrayed by illusions of superiority of one sort or another. Although this is a subtle point, it is terribly important that we Americans understand it well. To assume we can maintain indefinitely a superiority of military power is both a risky premise for our security system and also imposes an indefinite arms race which can bring serious trouble, perhaps sooner than later.

The above is not to suggest that we can relax our guard, for any nuclear-air inferiority would be disastrous for the West. On the contrary, we must show our staying power in the military race both to keep our bargaining strength in negotiations for armament controls and to convince the Soviets that "soft soap" cannot win a military advantage. Nor is it meant to suggest that we should not take full advantage of opportunities for military superiority where we can, such as with the imminent revolution in defensive nuclear weapons to be discussed later in this article. But it is meant to suggest that whereas the maintenance of at least a stand-off continues to be vital to security, superiority in offensive arms is a very dubious reliance as the foundation of our future security system. While pressing the arms program we must press even harder for a security system not depending on arms superiority and thus an indefinite arms race.

## II Alternative Approaches of Limited Early Promise

Today, ten years after the atomic age began, there is growing recognition of the inadequacies of an indefinite pursuit of offensive arms superiority or a "balance of terror." Many alternative courses are being advocated but offer little promise as our principal security reliance for the next decade.

Many people have again turned their attention to arms reduction and disarmament. Perhaps war can be eliminated by reducing or eliminating the means of war. Failures in the past have been analyzed.

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Quite logically, many analysts point to the absence of a world enforcement
system under world armament laws as the root cause, but unrealistically
they tend to neglect interim security measures as if a world enforcement
system could be achieved overnight. Others advocate immediate arms re-
ductions, but gloss over the immense complexities of reduction negotiations
and the need to establish and prove out inspection systems and safeguards
to insure compliance. Although we should press on with the development
of realistic measures to reduce arms levels eventually to internal police
proportions, and the strengthening of world means to enforce armament laws,
we cannot meanwhile plan to place our principal security reliance in dis-
armament measures.

Another alternative is to eliminate the causes of national
conflict. Economic causes can be reduced in time through "atoms for peace,"
world trade, technical and capital aid, and so forth. Ideological causes
of conflict can be reduced by improved international understanding and
social progress. Political causes of conflict could be reduced through
a political "settlement" with Communism. But conflicts of interest among
nations can never be entirely eliminated, and any system to secure "peace
on earth" must reflect this reality.

A third alternative is to develop methods other than armed
force for the arbitration of national conflicts. Certainly strong measures
can and must be taken to improve just and peaceful methods for handling
conflicts, such as diplomatic negotiations, mediation, and resort to the
International Court. But neither the strengthening of peaceful methods
for settling international disputes, nor foreswearing the use and threat
of armed force to further national objectives and settle conflicts are
in themselves sufficient to secure the peace. Peace on earth must be
actively enforced by systems to warn of, and deter its violation.

A fourth alternative is the elimination of the Communist
threat—the only major threat to our national security today. War would
be suicidal as well as morally repugnant. Overthrow of the regime by
violent revolution is most unlikely and might also be dangerous in a
nation with large nuclear stockpiles. We can, however, contain the
threat by denying communist states opportunities for further conquest,
and slowly reduce it by promoting the evolution of Communist states so
they will gradually abandon their dogmatic goal of world domination.
But our security reliance over the next decade should certainly not
depend on substantially reducing or eliminating the Communist threat.

If arms superiority is a questionably future security reli-
ance, and if these other measures do not offer early promise, where does
the Western world turn at this critical juncture?

### III <u>Controlling the Nuclear Threat</u>

During the past year, partial outlines of a world security
system for the next decade have emerged in various governmental proposals.
A satisfactory interim security system would, in my opinion, embrace sta-
bilizing measures as follows:

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1. the growth of internationally held arms information;

2. prevention of small wars by means of nationally demilitarized zones, occupied by armed U.N. police units whose integrity is guaranteed by the great powers;

3. prevention of NATO-Communist bloc war through graduated deterrence;

4. prevention of technological surprise;

5. prevention of surprise attack;

6. a ban on tests of large rocket missiles and explosions with widespread radioactive effects.

Such measures to control the nuclear threat could constitute the first phase of a four-phase program of world arms control. Phase II would see a reliably controlled freeze on nuclear and non-atomic arms, and possibly trial reductions, preparatory to the major staged reductions of Phase III. Phase IV would see the decisive transfer of authority to the U.N. for the enforcement of world armament laws.

A discussion of the latter three phases is inappropriate in this article, but it should be noted that the stabilizing measures of Phase I are primarily to control the *use* and certain *developments* of arms, as a prelude and necessary supplement to control on their *possession* and *production* in later phases. Furthermore, a period of a decade or so is likely before the world achieves Phase II--the arms freeze. The Soviets, while approaching the edge of disarmament, are not likely to agree to comprehensive arms controls, until they fully test the staying power of our arms program in the face of their smiles and peaceful gestures, and until their military power actually is much closer to equaling ours than it is today.

## IV The Growth of Arms Information

The crux of the entire security issue is internationally available information about national arms matters. In this dynamic age, the question of arms information has become so critical to world security that unilateral measures (national intelligence activities) no longer suffice. Measures are now required for the reciprocal exchange of arms information among the great powers ("blueprints" and mutual inspection) and for its multilateral acquisition through regional measures and through the U.N.

The first purpose of arms information is to deny an aggressor the element of surprise in attack. Results of inspection for this purpose must in this supersonic age be fed directly to national defense and retaliatory forces to be adequately effective. Such inspection must therefore be under national control. Aerial inspection of Russia is vital to us to counter-balance information freely available in the U.S. and to insure that inspection will not be obstructed as a police state can do so readily.

on the ground. Failure of arms limitation agreements in Korea has confirmed the need to supplement ground inspection will full and free aerial means.

Acceptance of aerial inspection would represent a very
major concession by the Soviets--of such magnitude that it can scarcely
be matched by the U.S. in political bargaining. It is extremely unlikely
that this deadlock can be resolved through negotiation, and yet until it
is resolved, the whole arms control issue is frustrated. More likely,
agreement to mutual aerial inspection will come after over-flight of the
U.S.S.R. is conducted in such a way they are powerless to obstruct it.
Although more prosaic methods have been publicly discussed, reconnaissance
satellites, which the Defense Department has announced it is studying,
are suggestive of an approach that might lead to resolution of the in-
spection deadlock.

Necessary though it is to prevent surprise, bilateral
inspection has its limitations, and a broad multilateral approach to
arms information is required. Regional approaches, such as in the
Defense Community of Western Europe, may prove useful in certain political
contexts, but the universal approach through the U.N. holds more general
promise.

In addition to the major amount of arms information avail-
able from "open" sources, a U.N. arms control agency could be furnished
copies of results of mutual aerial inspection, and U.N. ground inspectors
could supplement national inspectors at agreed control points. The agency
could be responsible for aerial inspection in parts of the world not
covered by reciprocal agreements, and the U.S. should put a small recon-
naissance force at its disposal for this purpose. It should participate
in the operation of reconnaissance satellites soon to encircle the earth.
Member nations, particularly neutrals, and private organizations might
be willing to make available information to supplement the efforts of the
U.N. inspectorate.

V The Control of Small Wars

In 1953, a special committee of the U.N. General Assembly
had difficulty defining aggression principally because of the problems
of defining economic and subversive aggression. It would appear, however,
that armed aggression across political boundaries should be easy to
define. Such a definition by international agreement would make it
easier to arrange collective security action to repel aggression against
small nations, particularly if inspectors of a U.N. Arms Control Agency
are available to report on acts of armed aggression.

Recent history, such as in the Rhineland prior to World
War II, has underlined the pitfalls of demilitarized zones as a security
measure—the vacuum seems to draw in aggressors. However, if police
forces recruited, trained and armed by the U.N. were stationed in nationally
demilitarized zones in critical areas at critical times, a substantial
deterrent would exist to small armed aggressions. Although their armaments
might at first be conventional, it would be desirable some day to provide

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them with limited quantities of small atomic weapons. If the great powers guarantee the integrity of such U.N. forces, a major deterrent would exist to prevent all except great power conflicts.

Measures of this nature, enhanced by moral, legal, and political support from agreements defining armed aggression, could very probably control small wars today in the Middle East and Asia where there is a natural political orientation toward a U.N. reliance rather than a great power reliance. Such measures could not, of course, control subversively fomented coups d'état, revolutions and civil wars, which internal police, social, economic and political measures must prevent, aided where possible by outside assistance. However, protection against external aggression would considerably strengthen the hand and will of weak governments in dealing with internal aggression.

## VI Prevention of NATO-Communist War Through Graduated Deterrence

Several years ago there was an unfortunate tendency both in the U.S. and the U.K. to rely on and appear to threaten a total response with total means (massive retaliation) to meet not only total aggression, but also to deter limited armed aggressions. Happily, leaders of both countries now discuss limited responses. A wide range of flexible military capabilities is being emphasized to provide a scale of deterrents so that all types of aggressive opportunities, from inspired revolutions to massive total attack, can be deterred. This emerging politico-military posture of the Anglo-American powers is increasingly described by the term "graduated deterrence."

The principles of graduated deterrence are now generally accepted, with one major exception. There is broad support for the principle of threatening or employing a limited response to deter or decisively repel limited aggression, and on the need for an ascending scale of deterrents to prevent the extension of aggression. The principle is recognized, as in laws of self-defense, that over-response to aggression is in itself aggression and inimical to self-interest (1). However, there is still considerable disagreement on how the decisions on limitation should be taken, and even more disagreement about what the limitations should be. Can they be pre-defined, and is it desirable to announce the nature of our response limitations, or to make promises regarding them, or to attempt their codification by international agreement?

Progress toward codification must in any event come in stages. The problem of limitation is extremely complex; in addition to consideration of all possible instances of armed aggression, we must weigh the many possible methods of limitation--by targets, types of weapons, geographically, and so forth (2). Obviously, considerable official study and public debate should precede any political action. But it would appear feasible to announce soon the principles of limitation to which we would expect to adhere in repelling aggression. Later, we could promise not to respond in certain very specific ways unless an aggressor did so first, and offer to negotiate international agreements concerning responses to aggression.

At the time of Korea, there had been little study and no political decisions on either the principles or specifics of limitation. As a result, we tended at times to overlimit and at other times to underlimit our response. Major dissensions and schisms developed in our country and its leadership, and between our allies and ourselves.

As our response to aggression must be swift and sure, limitations must be decided before the passions and pace of modern conflict take over. Historically agreements on limitations have been respected in war when backed by deterrent strengths to guarantee losses manifestly in excess of possible gains from violations.

## VII Conditions for the Use of Modern Weapons

There are three rules of modern warfare governing conditions of weapons use which especially commend themselves for attention and thus may serve the reader as examples of the sort of political decisions required. (Such decisions need not, of course, be taken irrevocably.)

1. Against conventional armed aggression, surface or air, if absolutely necessary to repel aggression we would use nuclear or chemical weapons, but only on our side of the de-facto, pre-aggression boundary or in the open seas. Thus against armed attack not involving mass weapons, we would use nuclear and chemical weapons purely defensively in the protection of United States or Allied territory, but would not retaliate with them across borders. Any retaliation or punishment to deter repetitions would be with conventional explosives.

This limitation is militarily feasible as a few of these weapons in conjunction with reasonable numbers of conventional forces can decimate and block massed surface or air conventional attack within a short distance of the border. Remaining bits can readily be dealt with by defending conventional forces, particularly when supplemented with chemical means. A conventional offensive to be successful might otherwise require a two-to-one advantage in numbers, but giving the technological advantage to the defense in this manner would mean that the offensive to be successful would have to muster an initial superiority many times as great. This limitation takes account of what S. B. Barber (3) has called the "second great nuclear revolution" when the power of defensive weapons will be fantastically increased, as retaliatory power has been in the past decade.

Anglo-American military power, in addition to traditional air and naval mobility, now can employ the element of mass defensively in the historical manner of a continental power. This type of mass with mobility permits air-borne, marine, and naval containment forces in support of local units to be immediately effective in a narrow peripheral zone around the Russian-Chinese empires. It provides the tactical deterrent so seriously needed to strengthen local deterrents against conventional aggression, without the need to threaten or use nuclear weapons on Communist soil and thus invite nuclear counterattack. It is the counterpart to our present strategic deterrent, which would then play the double role of deterrent to a general NATO-Soviet war and deterrent to the spread of

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limited war to general war. Our current fascination with retaliatory
deterrence must not be allowed to blind us to the great promise in
defensive nuclear deterrence. Restraining use of nuclear weapons to
our own territory would have the further advantage of insuring they
would be used sparingly, and only when an Ally considered their use
vital to its own security.

2. In repelling nuclear aggression, unless the aggressor did so first we would not use nuclear weapons to attack "open" city areas, i.e., areas free from targets containing offensive mass weapons systems, and we would warn populations within destructive range of designated targets before attacking them.

In a general nuclear war the air battle will be decisive
and short. Other targets in cities (troops, transportation centers,
government offices, capital and labor concentrations, and the national
"will to resist") are not important to victory in the air battle and
can be dealt with otherwise while bringing the enemy to reasonable terms
during the exploitation phase of the war. Instead of using multi-megaton
weapons with widespread radioactive after-effects, we would attack
decisive targets precisely with smaller weapons, which could still pro-
vide a high probability of kill.

The definition of open areas, though complex, is not
impossible and will probably mean that areas can be "open" only if
located a few miles from "fair game" targets. The distinction can, of
course, be drawn most reliably once there is mutual inspection, but need
not necessarily await inspection. If deterrence failed to prevent nuclear
attack through irrationality or miscalculation, there would be a better
chance of terminating the war before mutual national annihilation. Even
if the distinction should break down in nuclear war, cold war gains would
be major.

While air defense efforts must still be intensified to
strengthen our defensive deterrents and to help insure that the Soviets
do not first discover a near-perfect system, defense of our cities is
more hopeful under this concept than in a war that was planned to begin
with an exchange of retaliatory multi-megaton city blows.

3. Except in reprisal, we would never use bacteriological weapons, or nuclear attacks having widespread radioactive effects.

Such attacks are not needed to repel conventional aggression,
nor would they be effective against decisive targets during nuclear war.
Their greatest effect is needless because it occurs after the short de-
cisive period is over. Though technically difficult, it should not be
impossible to define the types of nuclear attack which, if mutually ex-
changed, would result in radioactivity effects unsustainable by either
side and genetically perilous for all mankind. Of course, it is always
possible that research can lessen radioactivity effects from nuclear
explosions. And in the future, it may be necessary to consider a similar
restraint on the use of long-range ballistic missiles, if arms controls
do not check their development in time.

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The three "rules" are illustrative of the required clarifications to the conditions under which we would use mass weapons. Objections to political codification of limitations in repelling aggression are several. First, the complexities are said to make codification infeasible. But while complexity is granted, it would appear that we won't know whether codification is actually impractical until the issues are subject to thorough study and debate.

Modern war-gaming and maneuver techniques can be most helpful in testing the feasibility of various limitations, but it must be kept in mind that the problem of limitation is not military but political, involving as it does a balancing of over-all political risks and opportunities. The recent Carte Blanche and Sage Brush maneuvers in Germany and Louisiana are frequently cited as proof of the impracticality of excepting population centers and cities from atomic attack. But the way to evaluate the military risks in limitations is certainly not to give military power full sway in an exercise and then conclude that restrictions are impractical. The rules to be tested must first be established and then the military risks determined on each side. After all, there may be political inducements to both sides so great as to far outweigh any slight increase in military risks from a given limitation.

Another objection to political limitation is of course that the military should not have their hands tied in any way--"the purpose of war is victory." However, Clausewitz reminds us that war is the pursuit of political objectives by other means, and of course our whole concept of civilian control of the military is to insure that military means serve political purposes. A less kind expression of the same principle has it that war is too important to be left to the generals--which in these nuclear times translates that deterrents and limitations are too important to be left to the military alone to deal with.

Others object that the Communists would not respect any agreed rule. Certainly the effectiveness of rules must never be based on paper promises or moral suasion. They must be constructed only upon strong self-interest on both sides to see they are kept in force.

Another objection is that we should not reveal our response beforehand. Certainly we should not reveal the military details of our response. However, it is the very essence of deterrence that a potential aggressor be kept fully aware of the consequences of aggression.

It is also incorrectly assumed that any target distinction for nuclear war would weaken our deterrence by removing the fear of instant, massive retaliation against Soviet cities, and there has been a tendency to overlook the many advantages in renouncing "open" city attacks. (as admirably set forth recently by Admiral Sir Anthony Buzzard (4) and Denis Healey, M.P. (5).

Our deterrence in Europe would in fact be strengthened by establishing two distinct deterrents in this manner; there is considerable evidence today of a slow erosion of political solidarity in Europe, caused in no small part by dissatisfaction with NATO military concepts which, in event deterrence fails, offer little but instant obliteration of cities.

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Today, the West has a marked superiority for nuclear counter-force warfare (blows only against decisive military targets) as well as massive retaliatory strength of sufficient, though not ideal, invulnerability. We have the strength for a double nuclear deterrent: - against initiation of counter-city blows, we have our massive retaliatory capability, and against initiation of counter-force warfare, we have poised a definitely superior counter-force capability. If we were contemplating inferior counter-force strength (which we are not, and must not), then we might be wary of drawing the distinction and put our sole reliance in the risky, all-or-nothing threat of massive retaliation alone. But with counter-force superiority or equality, drawing the distinction is to our practical and moral advantage. Instead of our fixation with the problem of an aggressor's starting total war, we need to become more concerned about checking the spread of small engagements, incidents, and errors from limited violence to total violence. Plans to withhold counter-city blows can be most useful in checking swift deterioration to total nuclear war. And, it should be noted in passing, drawing the distinction will become even more feasible and advantageous as we achieve mutual inspection.

The development of modern rules of warfare could do much to strengthen world security by diminishing fears that resistance to aggression means total war and self-destruction, and by adding the power of moral and legal force to military deterrent power. Defining limitations is particularly desirable now to strengthen the will of the Free World to resist Communist aggression, to encourage acceptance of collective action, and to relieve the moral stigma associated with U.S. military power because of "unconditional surrender", Hiroshima and "massive retaliation". Today it is the Western will that requires strengthening, even more than its military power.

## VIII Preventing Technological Surprise

The dynamics of technological progress in our age introduce a new and major element of instability in international relations. Carefully calculated power relationships can be quickly upset by technological innovations. However, because a period of time up to years is required to proceed from the test stage to forces-in-being, it should not be impossible to provide for warning of technological surprise, as a prelude to control of weapons development in later phases of disarmament.

The Soviets have already proposed an exchange of ground observers at unspecified military posts. Unfortunately, the U.S. proposals April 3, 1956, in London seek ground control only to check on military movements and force levels, including a reference only to later monitoring of nuclear tests. If test sites are included, and if the ground parties are appropriately instrumented, technological surprise can be mutually prevented through disclosure and verification of weapons tests.

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Additionally, of course, international scientific exchanges and ventures can decrease the danger of technological surprise, and inspection to warn of operational surprise will contribute to these purposes also. But helpful as such measures can be, an inspection effort must be specifically organized for the purpose, first, of warning of technological surprise and later of controlling weapons development.

## IX The Control of Surprise

In the terms of classical military concepts, the offense is most effective when combined with the elements of concentration, mobility and surprise. Nuclear weapons and aircraft today are such ultimates of concentrated fire-power and mobility that if the element of surprise is added, the offense acquires an almost insuperable advantage.

A broad alliance of democracies is organically incapable of surprise initiation of war--morally, institutionally, and psychologically. Therefore, although we now have a superior ability to launch a surprise attack, it is a meaningless military asset because we lack the will to do so. Thus we have nothing to lose by negotiating away our present superior surprise capability in return for control over surprise attack by the Soviets--a Soviet capability that will soon become ominous because of their fast-growing air capabilities.

A totalitarian, secretive, amoral state, in contrast with a democracy, is well adapted for surprise initiation of war. In the next few years the Soviets can be expected to solve the problems of concentration (a large and deliverable thermonuclear stockpile) and mobility (intercontinental air weapons systems and submarine-missile systems). We shall then be in perilously severe straits as the defender. Military coalitions may permit some defense in depth, and future nuclear air defenses will be of major importance. But in themselves they are not likely to prove sufficient unless we can also prevent surprise attack. It is for this reason that the problem of warning and control of surprise capabilities are becoming crucial for us.

It would appear that Soviet surprise capabilities may become critically dangerous to U.S. security, assuming present trends are not altered, by the period 1958-1960. Thereafter, the position will become increasingly grave.

We can reduce our vulnerability to surprise, and provide control over surprise attack by:

a) taking giant steps at base dispersal throughout the Free World and seven seas, well beyond those apparently now envisioned;

b) increasing present emphasis on the development of nuclear air defenses;

c) installing inspection reciprocally with the Soviets to warn of impending attack, along the lines of the combined

U.S. and U.S.S.R. inspection proposals for disclosure and verifi-
tion of movements.

d) later seeking an agreement to restrict movements of long range weapons systems--air and naval--in order to limit the numbers that cannot be accounted for by the inspection system at any one time to a force less than that necessary to launch a decisive attack.

e) seeking an agreement to ban testing of large rocket missiles, pending international control of rocket activity for peaceful purposes.

X Control of Rocket Weapons

Our government is now committed to two inconsistent and contradictory courses of action in the area of national security. On the one hand, we have a crash program to develop long range rocket missiles. On the other, we are pressing a program to prevent the possibility of surprise attack. As already mentioned, once developed, produced and operationally deployed, these rocket weapons will render meaningless any warning of attack.

In our search to halt the mad arms race without jeopardizing security, have we sufficiently considered a ban on testing long range rocket missiles and explosions of widespread radioactive effects? Could we not start "disarmament" by controlling certain mass weapons the world does not yet have?

Before the Germans had effective V-2 rockets, their test firings had run to the thousands. The enormous technical complexities of the IRBM and ICBM, particularly with their "aiming" and re-entry to the atmosphere at meteoric speeds, indicate that at least hundreds must be test-fired before either side will have a reliable weapon. A ban on testing would likely prove an effective control.

Each nation must, of course, be assured that no other nation is conducting tests. Public information about air sampling outside Soviet territory suggests the reliability of present intelligence methods for the detection of large radioactive explosions. Recently released information about intermediate and intercontinental rocket missiles indicates they are roughly the size of large aircraft and fly hundreds of miles high. They could presumably be detected by radars within sight of test ranges. Although their extreme altitudes suggest that radars could be located quite a distance from test sites, it is difficult to estimate from reports whether test firings could be detected from the periphery of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. with sufficient reliability for control purposes, as in the case of large radioactive explosions. But in any case, just a few radars and ground observers in each country would constitute a fully reliable inspection system, and the Soviet proposals last May urge an exchange of ground control parties at key military points.

What do we risk in trying to ban IRBM's and ICBM's? These are retaliatory terror weapons, hardly useful for defense or counter-attack against military targets; explosions with restricted radioactive effects and other delivery systems are mandatory for these latter purposes, of course, pending an enforceable disarmament