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could carry it out. I asked him whether he had any idea as to who could carry it out. Tri Quang said he would not want to get into the issue of personalities but he was certain that once the military government had disappeared the appropriate individuals would appear. I asked him whether he was just stating a philosophical preference or whether he was really politically discontent with the existing government. Tri Quang said that if he were politically discontent, I could be sure that there would be demonstrations in the streets and I could therefore assume that the absence of demonstrations indicated that his discontent had not yet reached extreme proportions.

I told him that I had been told the Buddhists were organizing all over the country and said that I was ignorant enough to ask direct questions. Did the Buddhists want to constitute a pressure group of political party? Tri Quang then launched into along monologue about the basic character of Buddhism. He said, first of all to answer my question, the Buddhists were organizing in order to fulfill their aspirations and that they were trying to get into a position in every province where they could make their voice heard. As to define the content of this aspirations Tri Quang said that he had to

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admit there was a certain ambivalence in Buddhism. Buddhism was really not well suited for the prosecution of the war. Since the Buddhists were really concentrating on a contemplative life and on the life of the spirit, Buddhist political leaders were, therefore, suffering from a great ambivalence when they were entering the political field. I asked him whether he suffered from this ambivalence and Tri Quang smiled before my question was even translated from which I assumed that he understood English much better than he had pretended. At any rate, he smiled and said he was not a political leader and therefore this question was not relevant.

I told him that political opponents of his had pointed out to me that his motivation was in effect negative. He was, I had been told, above all concerned with preventing things from happening. Not with making them happen. Was this charge justified? Tri Quang said, smiled again and he said the charge was absolutely justified. He had been concerned above all with preventing things from happening and this was perfectly natural. Vietnam had been torn for twenty years by war. The country had not had a legitimate government in the past century. The government was so corrupt that the major task he had had was to recall it to its duty. He did not feel that he needed to prescribe

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a positive program in order to criticize the disastrous programsthat were taking place.

I asked Tri Quang what he thought of the Buddhists students and professors.
that I had met. He said that, of course, they were a little theoretical
and abstract but I had to understand their bitterness. What future did they
have in life? The military had all key positions, the was seemed to progress
indefinitely. Everything depended on corruption and on influence and the
society was rotten to the core. Tri Quang then suggested that we meet again
in Saigon but I doubt that my schedule will permit this.

The overall impression that Tri Quang made on me was that of an
extremely powerful very subtle mind. He avoided the extreme vagueness of
Vietnamese Buddhists and the rather confused way of thinking of almost every
Vietnamese with whom I have spoken. He was matter-of-fact and precise. He
could become a very significant force in the country. If he or his group
became dominant my judgment would be that their love of power might
easily make them opposed to Communist expansion. They would surely be
extremely nationalistic and probably very anti-American and in the process
of achieving power they might well do irreparable damage to the American

of achieving power they might well do irreparable damage to the American
extremely nationalistic and properly very anti-American and in the process
easily make them opposed to Communist expansion. They would surely be
become dominant my mm m judgment would be that their love of power might
could become a very significant force in the country. If he or die brother
Vietnamese with whom I have spoken. He was matter-of-fact and precise. He
Vietnamese Budдhists and the rather confused way of thinking of almost every
extremely powerful very subtle mind. He avoided the extreme vagueness of
the overall impression that Trl Quang made on me was that of an
in Saigon but I doubt that my schedule will have to be met this.

society was rotten to the core. Trl Quang then suggested that we meet again
indelibly. Everything depended on corruption and on influence and the
pave in title? The military had all key positions, the war seemed to progress
and extract but I had to understand their pittiness. What future did they
that I had met. He said that, of course, I know they were a little theoretical
I asked Trl Quang what he thought of the Budдhists students and professors
taking place.

a positive program in order to criticize the diatribe that were

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position in South Vietnam.

I returned from Chi Quong to the Consular residence where the secretary general of Hue University was waiting for me. He was a dandy little man who told me all the problems of his University which seem endless and who had otherwise nothing very significant to add.

We left at two o'clock from the same hairraising air strip at which I had landed except that the plane luckily took off in the direction away from the watch tower so that we did not repeat the difficulties of the approach. The flight to Pleiku was as beautiful as is possible in the little Beechcraft that air American is flying here. In order to get there we had to fly along the sea along the coast and then turn inward and fly through a mountain pass where peaks of 10,000 feet were on both sides of the airplane. This is the monsoon season and thunderstorms break out late in the day rather suddenly and we had to go through one of those.

Pleiku is at a plateau of an elevation of about 3,000 feet surrounded by the mountain peaks on all sides that I have already described. The Laotian border is about fifty miles away. Pleiku is on the strategic road

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junction of Route 19. It is the headquarters of the Second Vietnamese Corps was the scene of the mortar attack of the VietCong which led to the American retaliation on North Vietnam. Pleiku is the headquarters of the Second Corps and is the nerve center for the major operations that have been conducted in the Central Plateau of Vietnam over the past six months. There are two Vietnamese divisions. One American division and one Korean division within the corps area of responsibility. The corps area comprises 45% of the entire land area of Vietnam and a population of about 2.8 million. Despite the fact that Pleiku is the headquarters of the Second Corps, it controls a perimeter at a radius of only ten miles from town and outside of this perimeter it is impossible to drive at night. The American compound has its own perimeter of about two miles. Every building is heavily sandbagged and on the outside there is a mortar shelter in the center of the compound. And a barbed wire fence which is constantly manned around the compound. Pleiku makes the impression and it looks like one of these frontier towns inside a stockade of the movies about the West on television. I will continue this evening.

apart the West on television. I will continue this evening,
and it look alike one of these frontier towns inside a stockade of the movies
which is constantly manned around the compound. Bleiku makes the impression
is a mortar shelter in the center of the compound. And a paraded wire fence
two miles. Every building is heavily sandbagged and on the outside there
to drive at night. The American compound has its own bermometer at about
of only ten miles from town and outside of this bermometer it is impossible
of the Second Corba 8x8x8 it controls a maximum bermometer at a radius
of about 2.8 million. Despite the fact that Bleiku is the headquarters
area comprises 42 % of the entire land area of Vietnam and a population
one Korean division within the corps area of responsibility. The corps
months. There are two Vietnamese divisions. One American division and
have been conducted in the Central Plateau of Vietnam over the best six
Second Corba is the nerve center for the major mmartxx operations that
American retaliation on North Vietnam. Bleiku is the headquarters of the
was the scene of the mortar attack of the Viet Cong which led to the
junction of Route 19. It is the headquarters of the Second Vietnamese Corps

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[x]

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I was greeted in Pleiku by the xmx Embassy's provincial representative for the Central Highlands, by the Director of the special operations for the CIA for the Central Highlands and by the Director of Field Operations at the CIA for Vietnam. The reason the CIA personnel was present is that the Central Highlands is the location of several special forces x camps designed to stop infiltration routes xx and or at least to survey them and because I was asked to gain some impression of the nature of this task. The CIA personnel was going to accompany me to one of those outposts 70 miles north of Pleiku and 20 miles from the Laotian border. A visit which took place the next day. I was taken from the airport at Pleiku to the headquarters of the second corps where I got one of km the usual deadening briefings. When I arrived at the airport, the place was swarming with helicopters and fighter planes because the battle of Pleime had just been fought. In Pleime is located 15 miles south of Pleiku and had been attacked by two VC regiments in a battle which I will describe in a little while. One brigade of the first calvary division had come to the rescue and also two battalions of Vietnam rangers, all of whom were sitting around the airstrip

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waiting to be airlifted to Pleime because the road was still being harrassed
by the Vietcong. There was also at the airport an absolutely absurd collection
of newspaper men who had been helicoptered to the battle field which was
absolutely secure and who were comporting themselves as if they had just been
saved from a horrible ordeal. They looked dirty, disheveled, unshaven and they
must have spent all of their time shoveling dirt, on each other because the combat
troops looked crisp and clean. I talked to several of them the regimental
Commanders to General Cunard, the Commander of the First Calvary Division and
to General No who shared a room with me inside the compound at Pleiku which he
was using as a command post. --all of whom looked infinitely fresher than the
newspaper men, men who were absurd caricatures of Ernie Pyle.

To return to the briefing at Second Corps Headquarters. THXXEXXXIXXXIX

Since I have last had contact with it, the Army has degenerated. They have
produced a group of experts in giving briefings whose major
interest is to overpower you with floods of meaningless statistics and
to either kid themselves or deliberately kid you. I endured the briefing of
which I will summarize the salient points and then had a long discussion with
Colonel Mataxis, who is the Senior advisor to the American advisor to the Second

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Corps and Colonel Williams who is the Deputy Advisor.

The gist of the briefing was as follows. Second Corps comprises 45% of the land area of Vietnam *x* mix has a population of 2.7 million of which 20% are montainyards---a backward tribe of people of Indonesian racial origin which have been pushed into the mountains by the Vietnamese in the several *y* million thousand years of Vietnamese colonization of the peninsula. The previous area that I had visited was an area of substantial VC infiltration. Second Corps has been until recently the area of most substantial VC military activity. In the Second Corps area the VC had at the beginning of the summer five regiments of which three were from the 325th North Vietnamese Division and two were VC regiments. These have been reinforced in recent months by at least two more regiments of the North Vietnamese Army and probably a third and they have also recruited two more regiments of VC mainforce units so that the *x* total force of VC units in Second Corps at the end of the monsoon season is ten regiments or over two divisions. It has a total of 44,500 mainforce and North Vietnamese units. Each North Vietnamese unit *x* as it arrives in *x* Second Corps area is given a shake down period in Con Tomb province an area just

Second Corbe area is given a sub-area based in Con Tiet province an area just
and North Vietnamese units. Each North Vietnamese unit is as it arrives in x
season is ten regiments or over two division. It has a total of 44,200 mainforce
to the main total force of AC units in Second Corbe at the end of the monsoon
and they have also recruited two more regiments of AC mainforce units so that
at least two more segments of the North Vietnamese Army and properly a third
and two were AC regiments. These have been reinforced in recent months by
five regiments of which three were from the 352nd North Vietnamese Division
activity. In the Second Corbe area the AC had at the beginning of the summer
Second Corbe has been until recently the area of most substantial AC military
brevette area that I had visited was an area of substantial AC infiltration
which thousand years of Vietnamese colonization of the peninsula. The
which have been pushed into the mountains by the Vietnamee in the several
30% are mountainous---a backward trip of people of Indonesian racial origin
of the land area of Vietnam maxime a population of 5.7 million of which
The rest of the briefing was as follows. Second Corbe comprises 42X
Corbe and Colonel Williams who is the Deputy Advisor.

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North of Pleiku. This is another way of saying that after the shake down period the regiments are then infiltrated Southward for operations in various parts of the Second Corps area. Recently there has been a movement of regiments from the Second Corps area South and there are likely to be nine regiments in the Third Corps area which is the area just around Saigon.

This Vietnā Cong build-up has occurred at a time when the United States had introduced the first calvalry division and a Korean division into the Second

Corps area. The build-up on the Western side/has been matched by a build-up of twenty battalions of fifty battalions on the VC side and for reasons which I will explain a littl e later this means that a rough strategic balance has been maintained.

XINNKMEEK Since February, eleven regimental sixe operations have been conducted
fought by
in the Second Corps area by the VC. The battle of Pleime was/something the
equivalent of a division. At the result of this heavy VC pressure, all the
available forces in the Second Corps area have been constantly engaged in
combat and none have been able to engage in pacification work. As a result
the effort of pacification has been almost entirely static. In the last three
months, the VC have destroyed thirty new life hamlets and they have overrun

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towns
four district towns--a problem which has been fudged by the Vietnamese by simply changing the designation of this town from district capital to something else and moving the district capital elsewhere. This has enabled the government to maintain that no district towns have been lost. In other words, if present operations continue, the problem of pacification can go on indefinitely. Since January 1st the government has lost 283 towns out of 2,825 or in other words 10% of the population it held January 1st. It has not regained any of those except one district town which I visited the next day and which is really a beleaguered outpost.

The briefers at the Second Corps headquarters claimed 63% of the population was under government control but this followed the specail MAC V definition of control. And then I asked in how much of the population which was technically under their control was also under their control at night. The answer was 30%. Even this I would doubt because it simply was not consistent with what Had been told to me elsewhere. Even if the 30% figure is accepted it indicates the enormity of the problem. It also indicated that we can go

it indicates the enormity of the problem. It also indicates that we can go
with what had been told to me elsewhere. Even if the 30% figure is accepted
answer was 30%. Even this I would doubt because it simply was not consistent
technically under their control was also under their control at night. The
of control. And then I asked in how much of the population which was
was under Government control but this followed the special MAC A definition

TheANI at the Second Corps headquarters claimed 68% of the population
is really a beleaguered outpost.

any of those except one district town which I visited the next day and which
other words 10% of the population it held January 1st. It has not regained
January 1st the Government has lost 283/mmxx
out of 3,832 or in
operations continue, the problem of pacification can go on indefinitely. Since
to maintain that no district town has been lost. In other words, it present
else and moving the district capital elsewhere. This has enabled the Government
simply changing the designation of this town from district capital to something
four district towns--a problem which has been judged by the Vietnamese by
towns

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from technical victory to technical victory and not really advance in the
major problem of establishing control over the population. I asked the
briefers my now standard question about the quality of personnel. There
are twelve provinces in the Corps area and I asked about three categories
how many of the twelve were substandard, how many were just barely getting
by and how many were outstanding. One province chief had recently been
killed in a road ambush so I got answers for only eleven. Of the eleven province
chiefs four were considered substandard which was defined as lacking initiative

down in the Administration and probably being corrupt. Five were
in the category of barely getting by which meant some corruption and under
American pressure some initiative. Two were described as outstanding. Of
the district chiefs in each ten per cent were described as outstanding, eight
percent were described as bandits, the rest one could not give a clear description
and therefore considered in the category of barely getting by. I asked the
G-2 briefer whether we knew the infiltration routes sufficiently well in order
to have a check on a deal whereby in return for their infiltration

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we would cease doing certain things. The G-2 briefer said that at the moment the VC were moving whole divisions through our area without our knowing it. Unknowingly until months later, when these unites appeared in combat. They had managed to assemble six battalions or two regiments twenty miles from Pleiku at Pleime. We did not know it until they had attacked us. The terrain was such that it was simply impossible to check infiltration routes. I asked the briefers how long they thought it would take to finish the job they said a minimum of five and more likely ten years.

I had dinner with Genera Kinnard, General Knowles, Colonel Mataxis, and Colonel Williams. The two Generals were the Commander and Deputy Commander of the First Airborne division the two Colonels are the American advisors to the Second Corps. I have found that the formal briefings only give a very crude picture of what is going on and I, therefore ask these officers to reconstruct for me the battle of Pleime in order to let me understand how the VC were operating and what our military problems were. The reconstruction of the battle seems to be as follows: two months ago the VC attacked an American

of the battle seems to be as follows: two months ago the AC attacked an American
AC were operating and what our military problems were. The reconstruction
reconstruct for me the battle of Pline in order to let me understand how the
crude picture of what is going on and I, therefore asked these officers to
to the Second Corps. I have found that the formal briefings only give a very
of the First Vittorine division the two Colones are the American advisors
and Colonel Williams. The two Generals were the Commander and Deputy Commander
I had dinner with General Kinnard, General Knowle, Colonel Matzelis,
a minimum of five and more likely ten besides.

the prieters how long they thought it would take to finish the job they said
each that it was simply impossible to check infiltration routes. I asked
at Pline. We did not know it until they had attacked us. The terrains was
managed to assemble six battalions of two regiments twenty miles from Pline
matrix until months later. When these units assembled in combat. They had
the AC were moving whole divisions through our area without our knowing it
we would cease doing certain things. The C-2 prietier said that at the moment

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special forces camp at Duc Co about fifty miles from Pleiku on the Cambodian border. Duc Co like all special forces camps was manned by <u>nhuaux</u> a battalion or 650 men with fourteen American advisors. The VC attacked in regimental strength. One battalion assaulted the camp and the other two battalions set an ambush for any relief force that might be sent. The relief force was, in fact, sent and ambushed and <u>muggax</u>s suffered heavy losses. Duc Co was finally relieved by a helicopter operation which broke the seige. Even though the attack on Duc Co was unsuccessful the camp the whole area around Duc Co has since been controlled by the VC. The special forces whose job it is to interdict communications roads have been in effect confined to defending their own camp. Secondly the officers were of the view that the attack on Duc Co was a training mission for a new regiment and that it had never been designed to take the camp that the real purpose was to ambush relief forces. The VC had obviously studied Duc Co operations very well in preparing for the <u>Pleime</u> battle. This time they moved six battalions into action, five combat battalions and one battalion of <u>nhax</u> porters. The battalions were positioned as <u>fax</u> follows: One battalion was stationed South of Pleime as an assualt force, another battalion was stationed on the most logical helicopter landing <u>sight</u> and the <u>sight</u> that

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corresponded almost exactly to the landing site at Duc Co. Three battalions
were put into an ambush along the road leading to Pleime. In other words,
the attack on Pleime the dispositions of forces indicated that overrunning
Pleime was not the primary objective indeed had it been the total force
available was more than sufficient to overrun Pleime. The attack opened
with the battalion force assault on Pleime and it was kept going until all
relief forces were in action. The second command advisor suspected that there
would be an ambush along the road into the camp but they had no choice except
to proceed into it. The only difference was that instead of sending a normal
three battalions they sent five battalions by stripping one provincial capital
of its defending forces. The five battalions fought their way through but at
a loss of 300 casualties which means 20% of the force. Simultaneously a
helicopter operation was launched to relieve Pleime however since our advisors
suspected that their might be a trap they landed their helicopters four miles
away or marched through the dense jungle that existed there. At any
rate, when the VC realized that the helicopter operation was not into the
area for which they had prepared they began pulling their forces out of the
Pleime area. They disappeared in groups of five to seven each and by the time

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the relief forces had reached Pleime the VC had completely disappeared. The evening was spent by the First Cavalry Commanders planning operations to try to bring the VC into combat but they were convinced that they would not succeed.

The lessons of this operation seemed to me to be these: (1) The American maxx advisors were able and skillful. They avoided a disastrous defeat for our relief force. (2) The press reports for a siege of Pleime and of a defeat for the VC seemed to me grossly misleading. I do not believe that the VC ever had any intention of taking Pleime nor do any of the officers who actually conducted the battle. (3) The VC managed to assemble two regiments stick them for six days in a area covering over thirty miles without any detection. They then fought for four days in the phase of 500 American air force sorties and a major assault before melting back into the jungle.

This does not indicate to me the action of a demoralized foe who does not know what he is doing. (4) The entire force of Second Corps is engaged in VC and there is not a single battalion left for pacification missions.

(5) If the VC had had a reserved battalion ready they could have taken the

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from
provincial capital of Kontum which the reserve force was stripped.

In other words, the operation while successful can in all likelihood be
considered a draw. XXXXXXXX

I then talked to Colonel Mataxis and Colonel Williams about the military
and political situation in II Corps. They felt that the major change in the
situation was that the United States was no longer losing. They said that
we were far from turning the corner towards victory. They described to me
the events of the year. In the early part of the year the Vietnamese forces
had been put on so-called pacification missions. That is they were strung
out
in small units all along the coast and into capitals. The VC concentrated
and knocked off all the sea coast between Danang and Nha Trang and including a strategic valley in much of the rice harvests of Vin Din province
is grown. This valley is still under VC control as is most of the coast
Since then the government forces have been regrouped but practically nothing
of what was lost earlier in the year has been regained. Since July, four
district towns in Khontum have been taken by the VC. Only one of those has
been recaptured, while the others have been abolished as districts by the government
in order to maintain the facade that no district towns had fallen into Viet Cong hands

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The junix VC pressure now was so great that speical forces were no longer deployed to stop infiltration but they were concentrated in some twenty base camps and they were always having to keep 1/3 of the force inside of the camp and 1/3 just outside the camp and only 1/3 available. for patrol. Even the figures on pacification were misleading according to Colonel Mataxis. In the province Nine thin was pacified because the VC had put no effort into et. Similiarly, Da Lat which was in the second Corps area was being pacified because it was being used as a rest and recuperation area by both sides. I asked Colonel Mataxis about the quality of his district chiefs. He said three were outstanding, five were barely getting by, three were not worth the powder to blow them up and one had recently been killed. He estimated that only about twenty-five

of the population
per cent/in II Corps was under government control at night even though
the official statistics show sixty percent under governmental control.

We spoke about the security problem with respect to Vietnamese forces.

Colonel Mataxis said that not a single operation of larger than battalion
size had ever been conducted with Vietnamese troops had ever been successful

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because the security had always been compromised. They had captured Viet Cong documents which contained details of information about operational plans that had to come directly from the highest headquarters. Colonel Matusis said that ninety-five per cent of the contacts established between the government of Vietnam units and VC units were initiated by the VC and almost no large scale governmental operation established contact unless the VC had set up an ambush. This indicates another aspect of the problem here. If the VC can move undetected and if they initiate all military operations, it is difficult to see how the press reports and indeed the official MAC V reports of the destruction of main force units can possibly be accurate and how the objective can be realized. Because my room was being used as a command post for the first cavalry division, I sat around with a group of officers and with the chief of special operations of the CIA just talking about things in general. The morale of these people was a curious mixture of dedication to their job and exasperation with the problems they were facing here. The CIA men told about what happened when the so-called hob tac areas were established. These were so-called oil

so-called poppy areas were established. These were so-called oil
problems they were facing here. The CIA man told me about what he told
when the
was a curious mixture of dedication to their job and exasperation with the
of the CIA just talking about things in general. The morale of these people
sat around with a group of officers and with the chief of aboriginal operations
room was being need as a command boat for the first calibration division. I
be accurate and how the objective can be accomplished. Because my
official MAC A reports of the destruction of main force units can be accomplished
operations, if it is difficult to see how the press reports and feed the
here. If the AC can move undetected and if they initiate all military
type AC had set up ahead. This indicates another aspect of the problem
and almost no large safe governmental operation established contact unless
the AC Government of Australia and AC units were initiated by the AC
Matsuzaki said that ninety-five per cent of the contacts established between
biana that had to come directly from the highest headquarters. Colonel
documents which KAXK contained details of information upon operational
because the security had always been compromised. They had captured Viet Cong

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spots which were to be absolutely secured and from which government influence
would spread. Hob tac was the fad for operations last year. There seems
to be a fad for every year in Vietnam. This year it is the destruction of
mainforce units and pacification.

The CIA man said that the operation was supposed to begin with a
simultaneous arrest of eighty well-known, well-documented, VC agents inside
the Hob tac area. In order to accomplish this it had to be cleared with
about three governmental officers. And everyone checked out whether any
relatives of his might be on that list. When the operation started/the first
eight people arrested, five were Buddhists, this one got Tri Quang on the
telephone who called up the Prime Minister and said that unless these five
Buddhists were released in XINHONG or not, there would be Buddhist riots
on the street. Thereupon the Prime Minister decided to release all eight and
this was the end of the arrest of the known VC agents and it was symbolic of
what happened to Hob tac. What hob tac did was to establish the perimeter outside
which the units would not operate except for the 25th division which was brought
in as a kind of reserve and which was being marched around the perimeter

PE RSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

by the VC according to the CIA agents to lure it away from their main areas
of attack. Be that as it may, Longan province, the province just south of
Saigon has been 80% under VC control ever since hobtac started.

Several others present had horror stories to tell of inefficiency,
corruption and utter confusion. The consensus seemed to be that the primary
hope was that the other side was equally as confused.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

Unedited notes written at the
end of each day.

October 27 - Hue

I started the day with a conversation with Honang Van Giau, the former student president and how a faculty member in the faculty of letters of the University of Hue. He was the leader of the militant faction of the Hue students--the chief organizer of student riots in Hue during the past year. It was a very long conversation, but as in all meetings with Buddhists it is extremely difficult to summarize what he said, because some of it was so ambiguous and because for every affirmative statement it would be possible to record the opposite. His very manner exuded ambiguity--head thrown back, a very soft and gentle voice, a somewhat dreamy expression. Giau has an enormously expressive face and speaks French almost without accent and with great plasticity. I have also noticed that in conversations with Vietnamese one of two things happens. Either they will speak in a most tentative ambiguous fashion or they are tremendously assertive and practically monopolize the conversation and one has the impression that one's major role is to cue long prepared monologues. These may really be two sides of the same coin. Vietnamese may be so unsure of themselves that when they do not monopolize the conversation, they feel they are extremely vulnerable. Then they become so tentative and so unwilling to commit themselves that it is next to impossible to find out what they are really getting at.

I began the conversation with Giau by asking him what he thought of the situation in South Vietnam. He said the first thing to remember about Vietnam is that it is an extremely divided people. There are the Northerners,

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Henry A. Kissinger

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those from the Central area, and the Southerners. The Northerners were a
pensive people; the Southerners were a reflective people (frankly, I don't
remember which he called which, and he absolutely refused to define what
he meant by those terms, saying that they were self-explanatory.) The
Centralists (those from Anaman) were the only ones who had a certain sense
of reality. They were the administrators who provided the political or-
ganization. Nevertheless he said it was important to grasp that Vietnamese
nationalism did not attach to the nation in the Western sense, but to the
people. There was a great sense of distinctiveness, but there was not a
strong sense of political solidarity. Quite the contrary; the people had never
been so divided.

I asked what was responsible for these divisions. Giau said that the
real problem was that in the last twenty-five years South Vietnam has never
had a government that was representative of the will of the people or that
had any legitimacy. The only legitimate government was that of Hanoi, which
had gained its legitimacy by the victory over the French. All others were
simply imposed either by foreigners or by themselves. He thought that the
major need was to get a government which had the moral right either to
prosecute the war or to make peace.

Asked about the war, Giau launched into a long monologue, which is very
hard to summarize. On the one hand he said that the pre-eminent requirement
was to achieve peace. On the other, he said that peace could have many meanings
and that one had to specify its conditions carefully. He argued that the present

[N]

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

Unedited note written at the
end of each day.

- 3 -

government had no right to make peace, any more than it had a right to make
war. And he, therefore, did not need to specify what the conditions of peace
might be, because the conditions of peace depended again on the kind of government
which would emerge if the popular will ever have a chance to register itself.

I asked what personalities or programs he had in mind for a government
that would have this legitimacy. He said that this was a very Western question.
He did not feel that he had to have a personality in mind and that in any case
to ask about personalities is to invite Ceasarism. It was not a question of
personalities but of giving the popular will a chance to express itself. I
asked whether he knew what the popular will was or whether he was simply
speaking about the opinion of students in Hue. Did he ever go into villages?
He avoided answering this question, but implied, just like the rector of the
university two evenings before, that what the villages thought was really
relatively less important than what the educated people thought.

He then said that the tragedy of Vietnam was that a global conflict was
being fought on its territory at the expense of the Vietnamese people. The
real issue was between China and the United States; not between North and
South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese were, after all, still Vietnamese. Now
the war was decimating the Vietnamese people. The United States was reluctant
to bomb China and used its B-52s to destroy Vietnamese civilians. We are being
punished, he said, for our own extermination of the Khmers --of the people
that the Vietnamese replaced on the Vietnamese peninsula.

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Henry A. Kissinger

- 4 -

He added that the United States was making beggars of the Vietnamese. He asked me what I thought of the Vietnamese people, and I said that I was struck by their dignity and by their grace. He said, yes, this is our outstanding quality because we have a great sense of individuality, but go to the garbage dump at Danang where the Americans dump their disposal and see the Vietnamese civilians scrouge around and you will realize what you are doing to us. Look at the prostitutes in the streets of Danang and see how you degrade us.

A minute later he was saying, however, that the prerequisite of stability in Vietnam was the closest understanding between the Vietnamese government and the Americans. He felt that the present government was especially deficient in never speaking frankly to Americans and never facing the future of Vietnam explicitly with the Americans.

I asked what he wanted us to face. He said, well, it was necessary to recognize the need for a social revolution and this revolution had to be undertaken jointly by Americans and Vietnamese. I asked whether there was not some danger that if we pressed too hard we would be charged with precisely what he was accusing us of: reducing the Vietnamese to a second-rate status. He replied, no, if we were defending the Vietnamese people against the government everyone would understand. I said that I thought he had said we should do it with the government. Giau said we should do it with a legitimate government, but this government, being non-representative of the people, could not do it and, therefore, the United States might have to impose it on this government. In other words, he was asking us to carry out a revolution against the existing government with very little indication of support if we did do it.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

I returned to the question of peace and asked him what he thought
would happen under conditions of ceasefire. He said that then we Vietnamese
can talk to each other. He said he had no fear about being unable to deal
with the Vietcong under conditions of peace. The fact that we were sparing
Hanoi and Haiphong indicated that we really wanted negotiations to turn
the war into a global problem overlooking the purely Vietnamese national
interest.

October 28th.

I did not get much sleep that night because of the military operations
Early the next morning I had breakfast which the provincial reporter who
was accompanying me. He said that/the official briefing there had been
a vast exaggeration of the amount of pacification. He pointed out what
Colonel Mataxis had already told me but he had not been present. That four
district capitals have been overrun, that many of the roadblocks in many of
the provinces were done through collusion between the VC and the provincial
governors. That fMMK in Kontum province thd American advisory team went out
only in twos not for fear of VC but because they were afraid that the GVN
people might assassinate it since considerable tension had developed between
them. In no town that he was aware of in Kontum province did anyone travel further

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than five miles from the town in which he was stationed at any time of the day.

And, of course, would not go out of his perimeter defense which meant his house at night. On the other hand, he felt that the air strikes haddemoralized the VC and that also the NorthVietnamese army units were getting demoralized, through the air attakcs. He therefore found it hard to judge what the real situaion was. He added that when he was at Stanford he was a strong supporter of our Vietnamese operation and that he had been extremely unhappy with the XEMUITX teach-ins but that a year in Vietnam had made him almost despearte about the course of events.

Continuation of October 28th.

After breakfast I was picked up by the two CIA people and taken to the mountainyard training center for the political action teams. The mountainwards whom are troops in Pleiku ealled mountainyards are a tribal people of Indonesian racial origin who have been pushed into the mountains by the Vietnamese despised by the Vietnamese because of their dark color and because they are more primitive. The center seemed to me well run and

in Vietnamese installations
I took a tour of its installations. As always,/it is very hard to tell how

I took a tour of its installations. We always, \_it is hard to tell how in Vietnamese installations

and because they are more primitive. The center seemed to me well run and
by the Vietnamese despite the Vietnamese because of their dark color
people of Indonesian racial origin who have been pushed into the mountains
mountainwards whom are troopers in bleeu called mountainmen are a tripal
the mountainhard training center for the political action team.
The

After breakfast I was picked up by the two CIV people and taken to
Continuation of October 28th.

about the course of events.

kunzixx teach-ins put that a year in Vietnam had made him almost deserts
of our Vietnamese operation and that he had been extremely ungrateful with the
situation was. He added that when he was at Stanford he was a strong supporter
through the air attacks. He therefore found it hard to judge what the real
the AC and that also the North Vietnamese army units were getting demoralised,
house at night. On the other hand, he felt that the air strikes had demoralized
Vud' of course, would not go out of the barometer defense which meant he
than five miles from the town in which he was stationed at any time of the day.

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much of it was eyewash and how much of it was real. In every classroom I visited, for example, the one where they were forging argitural tools people were working with a frenzy and a dedication which I have not found to be general in Vietnam but perhaps I am getting as suppicious as everybody else.

From the Montainyard training center we visited a Montainyard village where refugees had been resettled. The Montainyards live in a differnt fashion from the Vietnamese. Their houses are built on stilts and whole family groups live in one long house which may house as many as fifty people in separate compartments. One side of the house is a kind of veranda on which they grind rice and MAXX dry tobacco leaves. Underneath the house there are pigs and other livestock. In the middle of the village there is a house with a very high gable also on stilts somewhat like an Alpine chalet which is called the happy house where all bachelors of the village live until they are married. The government and the American economic advisory team thought it would be a good idea to have another community center in this montainyard and they, therefore, built a very impressive concrete installation which was intended to be a market. In fact, it is the most impressive building in the

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

I paid a brief call on General Vin Loc, who is the Commander of the Second Vietnamese Corps. He is almost universally despised by the American advisers as dilletant, playful and erratic, and extremely emotional. I cannot judge these qualities. He does have a huge office in II Corps Headquarters Building in the middle of which there is a replica of a Montagnard village built as a fireplace. General Vin Loc is tall for a Vietnamese and he wore a natty paratroop uniform with a blue scarf. Like very Vietnamese, with the exception of General Ky, he spoke entirely in terms of "I", and again one had the sense that his Corps was an autonomous region rather than part of a unified national system. He spoke of the battle of PEX Plei Me entirely as if it had been a victory brought about by his superior generalship. He said that the Americans did not always understand Vietnamese conditions. They did not have the smell for VC dispositions. He was particularly critical of the First Cavalry Division, which he thought was too bureaucratic, too slow, and too afraid to suffer casualties.--almost a mirrow image of the criticisms that the Americans make of him. He pointed out that in the last three months

that the Americans make of him. He pointed out that in the last three months
and too strict to answer caustic--simult a mirror I made of the criticsmsa
the First Cavalry Division, which he thought was too puerocratic, too slow,
did not have the smell for AC dispositions. He was particularly critical of
that the Americans did not always understand Vietnamese conditions. They
as if it had been a victory brought about by his superior generality. He said
of a unified national system. He spoke of the battle of NAX. Piel Me entirely
one had the sense that his Corba was an autonomous region rather than part
with the exceptional Generall Ky, he spoke entirely in terms of "I", and again
more a nutty barstrop uniform with a pine scart. Like very Vietnamese
village built as a fireplace. General Vin Loc is tall for a Vietnamese and he
disarmers Building in the middle of which there is a replica of a Montsquard
I cannot judge these duties. He does have a unde office in II Corba Head-
Americans advisers as dilettant, playfull and erratic, and extremely emotional.
the Second Vietnamese Corba. He is almost universality despised by the
I said a priet call on General Vin Loc, who is the Commander of

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4b

50 hamelts have been lost and that there was a large no man's land in his
mountainous II Corps region where no side operates or where whichever side
operates id dominant. He confirmed that he had every battalion engaged in
fighting VCs and that he had none available for clearing operations. Otherwise
as that
his analysis of the situation was essentially the same/of his American advisers--
for all I know he may have gotten it from his American advisors.

His analysis of the situation was essentially the same\* of his American advisors--
as that

fighting A/Cs and that he had none available for clearing operations. Otherwise
operators is dominant. He confirmed that he had every station equipped in
mountainous II Corps region where no side operates or where whichever side
has premises have been lost and that there was a large no man's land in his

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village if not in Pleiku. It now stands utterly deserted because montainyards
never trade with each other. They prefer to wait for weeks until they can go
for
-to another settlement to trade/what they need.

From the montainyard village I visited the special forces C detachment
which is attached to Phe II Corprs. Speical forces as I have said before
are the units wearing green berets that are designed to operate behind enemy
lines. The purpose of stationing them in the highlands was originally
to harrass VC lines of communications or at least to keep them under
observation. They are now operating out of some twenty camps, each with
an American team of fourteen men. These are the so-called A teams and
650 either montainyards or Vietnamese. In the highlands they are almost
entirely montainyards.

One of the results of the VC summer events has been to push these special
forces back largely into their camps and to make it very difficult for them
to do more than occassionally harrass the infiltration. routes. They can certainly
not keep them under constant observation and no camp patrols more than twenty
kilometers from its base.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

I received the usual eyewahs briefing about the splendid accomplishments
of the special forces teams which gave the impression that the war was being
won. I then asked how many what the maximum radius of their patrols was
I was told 20 kilometers. I asked whether the situation was better worse
or the same as this time last year. Major Terry the Commander of the
Detachment thereupon said it would break my heart to think that we have
not made any progress since last year. I asked him to give me some examples
of progress he said he really could not think of any particular improvement.
In fact, he pointed out that in places like Duceo, which had been recaptured,
the practical result had been that the VC had remained in control of the
population and the routes around the camp. Major Terry said the fact was
that they did not go as far as they used to from their camp and that many of
the Vietnamese commanders of the special forces units were suffering from
"campitis"; that is, staying in their camp and praying that they would not be
attacked. I asked him how many of these special forces A teams are used
in the role of advisors to Vietnamese camp commanders. I asked him how

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41

many of his camp commanders in his twenty camps were sub-standard, adequate and outstanding. He said 60% were sub-standard, 20% were out-standing and the remainder were in between. Sub-Standard commanders were those who did not move out of their camp unless they absolutely had to, and many of them had deals with food contractors, from which they received kickbacks. They mentioned the case of one camp commander who, when the special forces tried to stop his profitable sideline, refused to move out of his camp until his kickback was restored to him.

I asked them about the district chiefs and how they rated them in terms of competence. They said 20% were very good, 33% were utterly incompetent, and the remainder were somewhat in between.

Dac Go
From the special forces camp I went to the air field to go to Dac Go, which is the northern-most outpost in Kontum Province, fifteen miles from the Laotian border on the main infiltration route of the Viet Cong. It contains a special forces camp and it contains a regimental headquarters of the Vietnamese Army. Dac Go had been overrun by the VC in June and recaptured

Vietnamese Army. Dac Go had been overruled by the AC in June and recaptured
a specialist forces camp and it contains a reclamation headquarters of the
the Iratien border on the main infiltration route of the Viet Cong. It contains
which is the northern-most outboard in Kontum Province, fifteen miles from

From the specialist forces camp I went to the air field to do some
Dac Go
work.

were utterly incompetent, and the remainder were somewhat in between.
rated them in terms of competence. They said 20% were very good, 33%
I asked them about the district chief's knowledge and how they

out of his camp until his kickback was restored to him.
when the specialist forces tried to stop his profitable sideline, refused to move
received kickbacks. They mentioned the case of one camp commander who,
had to, and many of them had deals with food contractors, from which they
were those who did not move out of their camp miles away so closely
at hand and the remainder were in between. Sup-Standard commanders
agreed and outstanding. He said 60% were out-of-standard, 20% were out-
many of his camp commanders in his twenty camps were out-of-standard.

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only in August. It can be reached only by air since all the roads to it are closed. XXX It is about 100 miles north of Plei Ksu. When we arrived we found one of the L19 spotter planes circling the airfield to look for possible VC snipers. The airfield is right next to the special forces camp, which contains 14 Americans, at the moment 50 Seabees, and 650 Montagnards. The Seabees are there in order to dig underground installations, since all units will have to be sheltered underground, the post being constantly exposed to VC attack. The Americans there were an extremely impressive group, and as soon as one gets away from the really almost compulsory lying of the headquarters, one has to be moved by the dedication of these people--stuck out in an area as bait where they can be attacked at any moment by VC units of any size and who are almost certainly doomed if the VC ever consider it worth their while to take the camp. The Montagnards are living in little huts beside the American shelters; each Montagnard having an underground shelter near his hut in which he lives with his wife. The Montagnards will not fight unless their families are with them. Another attribute of the

not tight unless their families are with them. Another attribute of the
shelter near his put in which he lives with his wife. The Montagu's will
punta beside the American shelter; each Montagu having an underground
room in an area as vast where they can be attacked at any moment by AC units
on the ground; one has to be moved by the dedication of these people--attack
as soon as one gets away from the readily almost comphactive thing of the
VC attack. The Americans there were an extremely impressive crowd, and
will have to be sheltered underground, the boat being constantly exposed to
Bespées are there in order to put underground installations, since all units
take 14 Americans, at the moment 50 Bessey's, and 60 Montagu's. The
VC answer. The strike is right next to the specialist forces camp, which con-
tains one of the 110 abetter号s around the strike to look for possible
closed. XNK. It is about 100 miles north of Bielefeld. When we arrived we
only in Vlothoat. It can be reached only by air since all the roads to it are

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[Y]

Montagnards is that they are absolutely loyal for their term in service.

They fight strictly as mercenaries, and then at some point they will simply put down their arms and leave. I looked at the camp and got a brief description from Captain Ruehlin, the Camp Commander. We then drove to the regimental headquarters, which is located two miles away from the special forces camp. The nature of the situation is shown by the fact that for this distance, even through there are 650 troops in the special forces camp and 2,000 at regimental headquarters, the road between the special forces camp and the Vietnamese regimental headquarters is impassable at night as it is always infested by VC guerrillas. Also, no planes can land at the airfield after 4 o'clock since the VC might shoot the plane down at dusk. The reason they are reluctant to shoot planes down in the daytime is not because they are unable to do it, but because they would give away their position and be subjected to airiel bombardment. At regimental headquarters I first spoke to the province chief, regimental commander and district chief, who are Vietnamese, separately. The province chief, a Lieutenant Colonel,

are Vietnammee, separately. The XX province chief, a Lieutenant Colonel, is abate to the province chief, a regimental commander and district chief, who subjected to exist: ariel bombardment. At regimental headquarters I find that are maple to do it, but because they would give away their position and be they are reluctant to shoot planes down in the daytime is not because they after 4 o'clock since the AC might shoot the plane down at dark. The reason away intimated by AC guerrilla. Xiao, no planes can stand at the airfield and the Vietnammee regiments headquarters is impossible at night as it is and 3,000 at regimental headquarters, the road between the specialist forces camp for this distance, even through there are 600 troops in the specialist forces camp the specialist forces camp. The nature of the situation is shown by the fact that drove to the regimental headquarters, which is located two miles away from description from Captain Rieplin, the Camp Commander. When we then simply but down their arms and leave. I looked at the camp and got a prett They fight like strictly as mercenaries, and then at some point they will Montgards is that they are sp ecially loyal for their term in service.

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[Y]

told me the usual story that the population of Kontum was 80,000, that 80% of it was under governmental control and so on and so forth. I asked him how many hamlets he had lost since March. It turned out that 62 hamlets had been overrun since then and 39 since July. I asked him whether any roads were open in his province. He said curiously enough, only civilian buses are now operating in his province, that no military traffic can move. I asked him what he would need to move between Kontum, which is his province capital, and Dac Go, where we were, a distance of about 50 miles. He said it would require at least two battalions. I asked him how much force he would need to move from Kontum to Pleiku. He said there he would need at least three battalions. Since he did not have anything like this force available, it meant that all roads were closed. I asked him why civilian buses could operate then. He said that the VC were taxing them and he thought that this was the best solution to the problem. I asked the province chief also told me that he had a total of thirteen regional force companies at his disposal, or four battalions altogether, most of whom he kept in Kontum, his provincial capital.

["sitogether,' most of whom he kept in Kontum', pack his provincial capitals.", "of thirteen redoubt force companies at his diaboast' or 'in four battalions\nthat he KREMER, KRAMER, KRAMER, KRAMER, KRAMER, KRAMER, K

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[y]

I then talked to the regimental commander who told me that he had been fighting for fifteen years and was very tired and hoped that he would be transferred out of this region. I asked what his modus of operation was. He said that there were many VC in Kontum province that he could not send his patrols outside the range of his own artillery. The range of his artillery pack of some of his batteries is fourteen kilometers, but the real range, I found out later, is 11 kilometers. I then asked the province chief what he did with his regional forces in Kontum and he said he also did not move them outside the range of his artillery, which, in his case, happened to be element kilometers. In other words, the Kontum province, which is shown as 80% pacified on the map, has abolished its two northern-most districts since they were taken over by the VC. In the two districts still held by the government, government forces move only at a maximum of fourteen kilometers from one district to two and ten kilometers from another district to one--and that is in the daytime.

Vietnamese forces never move at night unless they are forced to by the VC.

and ten kilometers from another district town--and that is in the daytime.

forces move only at a maximum of fourteen kilometers from one district to
by the VC. In the two districts still held by the government, government
msd, has abolished its two northern-most districts since they were taken over.

In other words, the Kontum province, which is shown as 80% pacified on the
the range of his artillery, which, in his case, happened to be element kilometers.

Kontum has regional forces in Kontum and he said he also did not move them outside
out later, is 11 kilometers. I then asked the province chief what he did with
of some of his batteries at fourteen kilometers, but the real range, I found
patrols outside the range of his own artillery. The range of his artillery
said that there were many AC in Kontum province that he could not send his
transferred out of this region. I asked what his mode of operation was. He
been fighting for fifteen years and was very tired and hosed that he would be
I then talked to the regional commander who told me that he had

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I then asked the province chief how many ~~widdrages~~ hamlets had a governmental apparatus at night. It turned out that only 90 out of the 252 hamlets, or about 30%, had governmental officials willing to stay there at night.

I then had lunch in the very primitive regimental mess. After lunch I took Major Tyler, who is the provincial adviser for Kontum Province; Major Allen, who is the adviser for the regiment; and Captain Ruehlin aside to discuss the situation with them. I asked them to tell me with frankly how they rated the ability of the Vietnamese whom they were dealing.

y
The said that the province chief was incapable; he did not react quickly, he did not do the job; he was unwilling to delegate responsibility--in fact there was a remarkable lack of interest on his part in prosecuting the war.

I then asked about the district chiefs. Major Tyler said there had been five districts in Kontum province; two had been lost, one had been combined with another. Of the two districts that were left, the district chiefs were venile, cowardly, incompetent and almost every other had adjective they could apply to them. Major Tyler, and Major Allen, neither one of whom

could apply to them. Major Tyler, and Major Allen, neither one of whom
can be said to be a chief, are, in the first place, the chief of the chief
and, accordingly, incompetent and almost every other had negative effect
with another. Of the two districts that were left, the district chief was
therefore, as a rule, a chief of the chief.

I then asked about the district chief. Major Tyler said there had been five
districts in Kontum province; two had been lost, one had been combined
there was a remarkable lack of interest on his part in broadcasting the war.

He did not do the job; he was unwilling to delegate responsibility--in fact
The said that the province chief was incapable; he did not react quickly.

It was said that they rated the ability of the Vietnam era whom they were dealing with

Rueben said to discuss the situation with them. I asked them to tell me
Province. Major Allen, who is the adviser for the regiment and Captain
I took Major Tyler, who is the provincial
adviser for Kontum

I then had lunch in the very primitive regimental mess. After lunch
at night.

I asked about the government officials willing to stay there
and spent 30% of his governmental officials willing to stay there
dovernments as far as night. It turned out that only 30 out of the 500
I then asked the province chief how many hamlets had a

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seemed hysterical, said that they had the distinct impression that the Vietnamese had no interest in <u>example</u> catching the VC. There was a tendency on the part of all Vietnamese units to avoid casualties. There was a stigma to losing troops. Major Tyler told me that he knew of many operations that had been conducted by the provincial chief with his regional forces south of Kontum when all the intelligence reports said that the VC were north of Kontum. I asked Major Tyler and Major <u>contacts</u> Allen what percentage of <u>example</u> had been initiated by the Vietnamese. Major Tyler said that in his three months on the job not a single contact with the VC had been initiated by the Vietnamese units. All contacts had been initiated by the VC. Major Tyler added that all the operations conducted with Vietnamese units were penetrated; for example, he had run two road-clearing operations between Dac Go and Kordung with two battalion each. Before each of these road-clearing operations two bridges were blown. No bridge had ever been blown as long as the VC controlling the road and collecting taxes. Captain Ruehlin praised the Montagnards highly by comparison with the Vietnamese. In addition to the military incompetence, Major Tyler said

with the Vietnamese. In addition to the military incompetence, Major Tyler said
and collecting taxes. Captain Knebelin bristled the Montsauarda highly by comparison
were flown. No bridge had ever been flown as long as the AC controlling the road
with two patrolling each. Before each of these road-clearing operations two bridges
for example, he had run two road-clearing operations between Dac Go and Kordung
Tyler added that all the operations conducted with Vietnamese units were benetristed;
initiated by the Vietnamese units. All contacts had been initiated by the AC. Major
said that in his three months on the job not a single contact with the AC had been
Allen what percentage of maximums had been initiated by the Vietnamese. Major Tyler
contacts

reports said that the AC were north of Kontum. I asked Major Tyler and Major
provincial chief with his regional forces south of Kontum when all the intelligence
Tyler told me that he knew of many operations that had been conducted by the
Vietnamese units to avoid casualties. There was a stigma to losing troops. Major
had no interest in example catching the AC. There was a tendency on the part of all
seemed hysterical, said that they had the distinct impression that the Vietnamese

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that the civil administration in Kontum was a disgrace. The only food that the refugees have received has been through American travel; not a single Vietnamese airplane has landed at either Kontum or Dac Go in three months. Until they took out some Montagnards for the November 1st. I asked how much force it would take to open the road to Kontum. Major Tyler said that it would take three battalions to open it and five battalions stationed along it to keep it open, and those forces were simply not available. I asked about the possibilities of an agreement in which in return for an end of VC infiltration we stopped doing certain things, such as bombing North Vietnam. All the Americans agreed that monitoring VC infiltration through Kontum province was absolutely impossible. They pointed out that the elephant grass was twelve feet high and unless one physically stumbled on a man it was impossible to see him even from an airplane.

I had asked before arriving in Dac Go to see some village in the Montagnard area. However, we, therefore, formed a convoy after we had been at regimental headquarters and set out a distance of ten kilometers.

been atlements headquarters and set out a distance of ten kilometers.
Montsurdard sires. 'TAKEN' Me, therefore, formed a convey after we had
I had saked before arriving in Das Go to see some village in the
trom an airplane.

unless one physically atawned on a man it was impossible to see him even
possible. They pointed out that the elephant grass was twelve feet high and
that monitoring AC infiltration through Kontum province was sparsely im-
certain things, and so bombarding North Vietnam. All the Americans agreed
an agreement in which in return for an end of AC infiltration we stopped doing
and those forces were simply not available. I saked about the possibilities of
three battalions to open it and five battalions stationed along it to keep it open,
it would take to open the road to Kontum. Major Tyler said that it would take
they took out some Montagnards for the November fat. I saked how much force
號牌 airplane has landed at either Kontum or Dac Go in three months. Until
refugees have received has been through American travel; not a single Viet-
that the civil administration in Kontum was a disaster. The only food that the

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There must have been a slight amount of danger because the district chief
bowed out of the operation. We visited a village where Major Tyler had told
me the district chief had reported three weeks previously that 300 VC had
been seen and that the village had to be abandoned. The fact is that only 6
VC had appeared in the village and that the district chief had simply panicked.
At any rate he was not about to go on a trip with us in that direction. We formed
a convey with two weapons carriers, one in front and one in the rear and an
American L19 flying low over head and along the side of the road. I am sure
that the greatest danger to which we were exposed was the fantastic speed with
dirt
which we went over a/road which was absolutely full of holes. We never went
below 50 miles. The village was a typical Montagnard village with a happy
house in the middle and house on stilts elsewhere. Of course at night the
village is completely exposed to VC infiltration. Unless one sees the country-
side one cannot understand the complexity of the problem. On both sides of
the road elephant grass grew higher than the jeep. If a VC patrol had by
accident been there and had decided to fake us out it could have fired on us

accident been there and had decided to take us out. It could have tired on us
the road. An elephant grass drew higher than the jeep. If a AC patrol had had
side one cannot understand the complexity of the problem. On both sides of
village is completely exposed to AC infiltration. Unless one sees the country-
home in the middle and home on stilts elsewhere. Of course at night the
below 60 miles. The village was a typical Montsquarnd village with a happy
which we went over a road which was absolutely full of holes. We never went
dirt.
that the greatest danger to which we were exposed was the凶rastic speed with
American L19 flying low over head and along the side of the road. I saw some
a convex with two messengers carriers, one in front and one in the rear and so
At any rate he was not about to do on a trip with us in that direction. We formed
AC had addressed in the village and that the district chief had simply banked.
been seen and that the village had to be spammed. The fact is that only 6
me the district chief had reported three weeks previously that 300 AC had
bowed out of the operation. We visited a village where Major Tyler had told
There must have been a slight amount of danger because the district chief

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and gotten away before anybody could possibly have reacted. Beyond the
elephant grass dense jungles start, and of course all the hills and countryside
no pretense is made of government control. XX I was met by the village chief
who gave me a bracelet, which is the Montagnard sign of friendship, and a
model of a "happy house". We then raised raced back to the airfield, because
it was getting late in the day and we had to get off before dusk.

After dropping our two escort officers off at Pleiku--airplanes being
used here the way taxis are in the United States--we had a harrowing flight
back to Saigon. This is the monsoon season and late in the day thunderstorms
are building up. Since the Beachcrafts in which we were flying have no radar,
the pilot had to fly low so that he could fly by visual observation, and since
we had to get through some mountain passes we had a rough, uncomfortable
time.

When we arrived in Saigon we hit the grand-daddy of all traffic
jams. November 1st is a national holiday in Vietnam to celebrate the over-
throw of Diem add the troops were rehearsing a parade in the center of town.

throw of Diem and the troops were representing a barque in the center of town.

James. November fat is a national holiday in Vietnam to celebrate the over-

time.

we had to det through some mountain bases we had a rough, uncomfortable
the pilot had to fly low so that he could fly by visual observation, and since
are building up. Since the Beachfront in which we were flying have no radar,
back to Saigon. This is the monsoon season and late in the day thunderstorms
need here the way taxis are in the United States--we had a harrowing flight

it was getting late in the day and we had to det off before dark.
model of a "happy home." We then asked raced back to the airport because
who gave me a prancelet, which is the Montgward ad of friendship, and a
no brineae is made of government control. XX I was met by the village chief

elephant grass genea jumbies atari, and of course all the hills and countryside
and dotten away before anybody could possibly have reacted. Beyond the

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It took us two hours to get from the airport to the Embassy residence and, since my car had not managed to get to the airport, I had to ride in an open jeep with the CIA man, who, all the way into town, was telling me harrowing tales of inefficiency, confusion, and general bungling. He told me about one eager Vietnamese First Lieutenant who wanted to arrest five VC whom he knew to be in a village. It then turned out they were all related to the village chief, who complained to the province chief, who instructed the First Lieutenant never to arrest anybody without first consulting him. He said that this was the end of another eager First Lieutenant.

When I came to the residence after this exhausting day I was told that the Embassy had arranged a dinner with the labor attaché, to which I had reluctantly to go. However, I was so exhausted that I don't really remember very well what was said, except that the labor attaché too complained about corruption and inefficiency and the inability of the government to get any popular base.

page.

c. corruption and inefficiency and the insufficiency of the government to get any sistemar
very well what was said, except that the labor attache too combined about
had reluctantly to do. However, I was so exasperated that I don't really remember
that the Embassy had arranged a dinner with the labor attache, to which I

When I came to the residence after this exasperating day I was told

end of another esdr First Lieutenant.

never to arrest anybody without first consulting him. He said that this was the
chief, who combined to the province chief, who instructed the First Lieutenant
knew to be in a village. It then turned out they were all related to the village
esdr Vietnamese First Lieutenant who wanted to arrest five AC whom he
tales of inefficiency, connivance, and general pungency. He told me about one
jeep with the CIV man, who, all the way into town, was telling me harrowing
since my car had not managed to get to the airport. I had to ride in an open
It took me two hours to get from the airport to the Embassy residence and,

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October 29th

I began the day with a call on the Australian ambassador. He had been recommended to me by Alexis Johnson as the best of the foreign diplomats here, which is damning with faint praise, indeed. Most foreign diplomats here whom I have met, with the exception of the Canadian and the ICC representative are a sorry lot. Partly this must reflect the low priority attached to Saigon in most foreign offices in the world; partly it is due to the fact that I know of no capital where sources of information are so scarce and so unreliable as in Saigon. To be dependent on Vietnamese, or even American briefings, to have to access to the provinces, to not be able to speak to subordinate officials, means that one receives a picture of the world that has absolutely no relationship to what goes on in the Vietnamese countryside. This difficulty is compounded by a feature peculiar to the Vietnamese scene. The German psychiatrist in Hue told me that one of the strange aspects of Vietnam is that there is no distinction in Vietnam between rumor and fact. A rumor repeated often enough becomes in itself a fact. Vietnamese are unable, according to

often enough becomes in itself a fact. Vietnamese are mere, according to
there is no distinction in Vietnam between rumor and fact. A rumor repeated
beyond doubt in Hue told me that one of the strange subjects of Vietnam is that
is compounded by a feature peculiar to the Vietnamese scene. The German
relationship to what does on in the Vietnamese countryside. This difficulty
officials' means that one receives a picture of the world that has absolutely no
to have to access to the provinces, to not be able to ask to authorities
appears in Saigon. To be dependent on Vietnamese, or even American pressures,
I know of no capital where sources of information see so advance and so nuclei-
to Saigon in most foreign offices in the world; partly it is due to the fact that
controversial are a sorry lot. Particularly this must reflect the low priority attached
here whom I have met, with the exception of the Canadian and the ICC repre-
here, which is damming with Saint-Pierre, indeed. Most foreign diplomats
been recommended to me by Aixia Johnson as the best of the foreign diplomats
I began the day with a call on the Australian ambassador. He had

October 26th

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the psychiatrist, to distinguish between a rumor and reality and will, therefore,
after a while, repeat rumors as if they were reality. Whether or not this
judgment is correct, the fact is that fantastic rumors spread and are repeated
again and again no matter how often they are denied. The diplomatic corps in
Saigon whose social contacts are confined to a very small group of Vietnamese
and American officials are at the complete mercy of these rumors. The same,
incidentally, is true of foreign newsmen, who are a sorry lot--drinking very
evening at the bar of the Caravel Hotel and neurotically keeding on each others
stories. They have no effective means of communication information.

The Australian ambassador was not only an impressive man relatively,
but also in absolute terms. Because there is an Australian military unit in
Vietnam, he was one of the few Ambassadors in a position to get around and he,
therefore, had a reasonable judgment of his own. I asked him to compare the
situation as he found it on his arrival 18 months ago, 6 months ago, and today.
He thought the situation was definitely better than it was 6 months ago when
everybody expected a VC takeover. It has deteriorated compared to what it was

everybody expected a VC takeover. It was deteriorated compared to what it was
He thought the situation was definitely better than it was 6 months ago when
situation as he found it on his arrival 18 months ago, 6 months ago, and today.

therefore, had a reasonable judgment of his own. I asked him to compare the
Vietnam, he was one of the few Ambassadors in position to get around and be,
but also in specific terms. Because there is an Australian military man in

The Australian ambassador was not only an impressive man relatively,
stories. They have no effective means of communication information.

evening at the par of the Cnravel Hotel andjemotically needing on each others
incidentally, is true of foreign newsmen, who are a sorry lot--drinking very
and American officials are at the complete mercy of these rumors. The same,
Salton whose social contacts are confined to a very small group of Vietnamese
again and again no matter how often they are denied. The diplomatic corps in
judgment is correct, the fact is that fantastic rumors abrade and are retested
after a while, repest rumors as if they were real. Whether or not this
the paymaster, to distinguish between a rumor and reality and will, therefore,

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18 months ago. That 18 months ago it was still possible to travel on some of the major roads. For example, the road to Dalat was open; the roads into the Delta were open. He pointed out several other arteries that were passable.

In the meantime all major roads had been cut and VC control of the countryside had greatly increased. In other words, he felt we were not nearly back to where we were 18 months ago. I asked him whether he thought we had turned the corner toward victory. He said he did not think so; we had turned a corner from avoiding defeat, but we were far from victory. I asked him about the impact of

the mere fact of negotiations. It was his view that/negotiations would have a disastrous impact on the political situation in Vietnam. The greatest necessity in Vietnam at the moment was to have a stable government. If negotiations started they would bring with them an immediate jockeying for position, and above all the civilian politicians would claim that now the military had to relinquish power since the military were not particularly well fit to conduct negotiations.

Moreover the almost neurotic suspiciousness of Vietnamese would convince them that the United States was preparing some secret deal and their deviousness

that the United States was preparing some secret deal and their demonymism
Moreover the stigmatized semanticism of Vietnam would convince them
military were not partially well fit to subdue the conduct negotiations.

politicians would claim that now the military had to reindustrialize power since the
brink with them an immediate jockeying for position, and above all the civilisn
moment was to have a stable government. If negotiations started they would
on the political situation in Vietnam. The greatest necessity in Vietnam at the
negotiations. It was his view that negotiations would have a dissatisfactory impact
the mere fact of
ind defeat, but we were far from victory. I asked him about the impact of

toward victory. He said he did not think so; we had turned a corner from avoid-
we were 18 months ago. I asked him whether he thought we had turned the corner
had greatly increased. In other words, he felt we were not nearly back to where
In the meantime still major roads had been cut and AC control of the countryside
Delta were open. He pointed out several other arteries that were passable.

the major roads. For example, the road to Dalat was open; the roads into the
18 months ago. That 18 months ago it was still possible to travel on some of

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would lead them to say that the VC would not accept negotiations. He thought that it was impossible to accept the Liberation Front as negotiating partner, because this would be taken throughout Vietnam as proof of an imminent takeover by the VC and it would, therefore, be next to impossible to gain a modicum of political stability. Finally he felt that the non-Communist elements in Vietnam were so divided, so much wrapped up in their own factional interests, that the Communists would not be confronted with a united group. The result would be that the Communists would be able to play off the various groups against each other. He did not think that infiltration could be monitored and he felt that the

he realized that ICC formula should be avoided. He said/all of this sounded very impressive in Saigon, but he had to confess that his own public opinion had absolutely no understanding of the issue in Vietnam and that even his officials in the Foreign Ministry did not always understand that some of the Western concepts simply did not apply here. He thought that the Saigon government was suffering from the four months malaise that had affected every government since the collapse of Diem. Every new government started with euphoria and the expectation

of Dien Bien. Every new government started with embroils and the expectation
the four monthsohlalae that had affected every government since the collapse
had not apply here. He thought that the Saigon government was entering from
Ministry did not always understand that some of the Western concepts simply
understanding of the issue in Vietnam and that even his officials in the Foreign
in Saigon, but he had to confess that his own public opinion had sparsely no
ICC forms should be avoided. He said all of this sounded very impressive
he realized that

other. He did not think that inflation could be monitored and he felt that the
that the Communists would be able to play off the various groups against each
Communists would not be confronted with a united front. The result would be
we are so divided, so much wrangled up in their own factional interests, that the
political instability. Firstly he felt that the non-Communist elements in Vietnam
by the VC and it would, therefore, be next to impossible to gain a modicum of
because this would be taken throughout Vietnam as proof at an imminent takeover
that it was impossible to accept the Liberation Front as negotiating partner,
would lead them to say that the VC would not accept negotiations. He thought

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of stability, but then after four months the divisions within the society re-
asserted themselves, the difficult economic problems became apparent, and
the government has proved unable to carry out its programs and was brought
down by its enemies, who considered their own objectives more important
than anything else. He thought that this was true of the present situation and
he had heard rumors of a possible coup by General Ko. At any rate, he felt
that there was great devisiveness among the generals. In fact, he
was getting so suspicious that he was wondering if any of the troops that were
in town for the November 1st Independence Day Celebration of the overthrow of
Diem might not be used for a coup. He doubted that, but he thought that a
period of stress might easily develop in the ruling directorate, which would give
the civilian politicians a chance. He did not think that the civilian politicians
were capable of forming a united government. He could not see any person around
whom they could rally or who would have more than temporary support. For
the time being he thought that the military was still the stablest element in
the population. He did not believe, however, that the economic situation--unless

the population. He did not believe, however, that the economic situation--unless
the time being he thought that the military was still the most effective element in
whom they could rely or who would have more than temporary andport. For
were capable of forming a united government. He could not see any person around
the civilian politicians a chance. He did not think that the civilian politicians
period of areas might easily develop in the ruling directorate, which would give
Dien might not be need for a comb. He doubted that, but he thought that a
in town for the November fat Independence Day Celebration of the overflow of
was detting so arabicized? that he was wondering it any of the troops that were
that there was great devianence among the generals. In fact, he
he had heard rumors of a possible comb by General Ko. At any rate, he felt
than anything else. He thought that this was true of the present situation and
down by its enemies, who considered their own objectives a more important
the government was proved unable to carry out its programs and was brought
saarded themselves, the difficult economic problems became apparent, and
of instability, but then after four months the divisions within the society re-

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it were remedied--might lead to so much instability that even the military
directorate would disintegrate. We parted with the intent of seeing each other
again, but I do not see how it can fit into my schedule.

I had lunch with Richard Symser, my control officer, and we discussed developments in Hanoi, in which he specializes, and general problems which had come up in my absence--none of which were of any importance.

I then went to see Phil Habib, the Political Consular, to give him
some of the impressions of my trip, which I have already recounted.

At four in the afternoon I called on General CXIX Schieu, the number
three man in the directorate and secretary-general. He had
requested the meeting, because, he said, he wanted quelques éclairissements;
however, when I came to see him in his office at the elegant Gia Lon Palace
he had no more to say than at our previous meeting. He made a strong attack
on the civilians who had bungled the government and said that the military were
the only group that would be able to handle the government. He said that it was,

the only group that would be able to handle the government. He said that it was
on the dividends who had bungled the government and said that the military were
he had no more to say than at our previous meeting. He made a strong attack
however, when I came to see him in his office at the elegant Gis Leu Palace
reduced the meeting, because, he said, he wanted dyadne eclairemont
three men in the directorate and another the secretary-general. He had
At four in the afternoon I called on General OK Schlen, the number
some of the impressions of my trip, which I have already recounted.
I then went to see Phil Hapip, the Political Comander, to give him
which had come up in my spade--done of which were of any importance.
caused developments in Hanoi, in which he specializes, and general problems
I had lunch with Richard Symar, my control officer, and we dis-
again, but I do not see how it can fit into my schedule.
directorate would disintegrate. We bartered with the intent of seeing each other
it were remedied--might lead to so much inaptitude that even the military

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of course, considered to me a transitional period, which might last two years.
It was not intended to be for all eternity. He evidently opposed the attempt by
religious groups to inject themselves into the political life; they were hopelessly
split among each other. I asked him what he thought the Buddhists wanted con-
cretely and he said "La pouvoir". I asked him if he thought they knew what to
do with the power and he said no, they couldn't even agree among themselves,
much less with other religious groups. I made several attempts to draw him into
a discussion of the military situation, but, as with almost all other Vietnamese,
he seemed to be more concerned with the domestic structure than with military
problems. For example, at one point I asked him what would happen if the war
were still going on next year at this time, and no basic change had occurred in
the situation. He said, well, the war has been going on for twenty years and
he didn't think anything would happen. He didn't think that demoralization would
set in. He violently attacked the French for undermining their effort, but when
asked for specifics he said that all he had was a general impression and his

saked for a specific he said that all he had was a general impression and his
set in. He violently attacked the French for undermining their effort, but when
he didn't think anything would happen. He didn't think that demoralization would
the situation. He said, 'well, the war has been going on for twenty years and
were still going on next year at this time, and nope, change had occurred in
problematic. For example, at one point I saked him what would happen if the war
he seemed to be more concerned with the domestic structure than with military
a discussion of the military situation, put, as with almost all other Vietnam's,
much less with other religions droubs. I ambe several attempts to draw him into
do with the power and he said no, they couldn't even agree among themselves,
creety and he said "Is bonjour." I saked him if he thought they knew what to
 split among each other. I saked him what he thought the Buddhist wanted con-
religions droubs to inject themselves into the political life; they were hopelessly
It was not intended to be for all eternity. He vigorously opposed the attempt by
of course, considered to me a transitional period, which might last two years.

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knowledge of the French mentality. If the French had not sold out the free
Vietnamese in 1954, they would not be in the present mess and they could
never forgive South Vietnam for trying to fight the Viet Cong--a task/which
the French had failed. He again outlined the attempt that would be made to
establish a civilian government and he then took me to the front door of the
palace and we parted.

In the meantime an unbelievable traffic jam had developed in the
center of town because the main thoroughfare was blocked off--the military
having decided to rehearse their Independence Day parade in the middle of
the day. As a result it took us an hour and a half to get to our next appointment
which was supposed to be only fifteen minutes away and which was with the
published of the leading intellectual paper, whose name I have now forgotten,
who is also the closest political operator of former prime minister Quat.
As a result the conversation lasted for less than half an hour.
I would undoubtedly be asked about Vietnam; what was the most important thing
that he wanted American to understand about Vietnam. This question absolutely

that he wanted American to understand about Vietnam. This creation apocausally
I would undoubtedly be asked about Vietnam; what was the most important thing
I did with the American government that when I came back to America
I told that the publisher that when I came back to America
I did with the American government that when I came back to America
I did with the American government that when I came back to America

I did with the American government that when I came back to America
I did with the American government that when I came back to America
I did with the American government that when I came back to America
I did with the American government that when I came back to America

the day. As a result it took us an hour and a half to get to our next appointment
having decided to reenact their independence Day parade in the middle of
center of town because the main thoroughfare was blocked off--the military
In the meantime an unbelievable traffic jam had developed in the
parade and we parted.

each and we partied.

a civilian government and he then took me to the front door of the
the French had left. He again outlined the attempt that would be made to
never forgive South Vietnam for trying to fight the Viet Cong--a task which
Vietnamese in 1964, they would not be in the present moment and they could
knowledge of the French mentality. If the French had not sold out the free
parade and we partied.

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threw him and he seemed incapable of forming any coherent reply to it. I
asked him whether he thought the war was the most important fact to understand;
this seemed to him an extraordinary idea and he finally said, no, the thing he
wanted people to understand was that the government had no roots and that the
Vietnamese people were divided. I asked him what prospects he saw. He
argued that the thing to do was to establish a socialist government, not socialist
in the sense of owning the means of production, but socialists in the sense of
fulfilling the aspirations of the people. I asked him whether he could identify
any group or any individual or any program which could embody this. He said,
as all Vietnamese I have met, that he did not know any individual and could not
even specify any good group. He did think that the trade unions might be a
possible focus. Considering that the trade unions in the whole country have a
membership of only 200,000, that there is practically no industry outside of
Saigon, this did not seem to me a very likely prospect and I told him so. He
then said that an effort should be made to organize the peasants. Only by
organizing the peasants against could the battle against the VC be won. I asked

organizing the peasants against could the people against the AC be won. I asked
then said that an effort should be made to organize the peasants. Only by

Bation, this did not seem to me a very likely prospect and I told him so. He
memorandum of only 200,000, that there is practically no industry outside of
possible localities. Considering that the trade unions in the whole country have a
enough abundance and good dronks. He did think that the trade unions might be a
as all Vietnamese I have met, that he did not know any individual and could not
and dronks or any individual or any program which could embody this. He said,
fulfilling the aspirations of the people. I asked him whether he could identify
in the sense of owning the means of production, put affiliates in the sense of
arrived that the thing to do was to establish a socialist government, not socialist
Vietnamese people were divided. I asked him what prospects he saw. He

wanted people to understand was that the government had no roots and that the
this seemed to him an extraordinarily illogical and he thusly said, no, the thing he
spared him whether he thought the war was the most important fact to understand;
then him and he seemed incapable of forming any coherent reply to it. I

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him whether he thought that the peasants had any understanding of the difference
between various social systems or whether they did not, above all, want to be
left in peace. He said that he thought that the peasants were very shrewd and
could be mobilized. Again, I would not know whether he is right, but my im-
pression is that he is nearly as far removed from the peasants as I am.

I then asked him how he thought the war with the Vietn Cong could end. He said
that he thought that what we really faced was a confrontation with Communist
China--not with the Vietn Cong--and that it could never be won by fighting the
Vietn Cong along; that Communist China had to be attacked. I asked him what
would happen if Communist China were not attacked. He then said, in that
case we have to come to a political settlement. When I asked him what he
meant by a political settlement, he said, well, the Geneva Accords of 1954.
I then asked whether he would be willing to see American troops withdrawn
as would be required by the Geneva Accords, and he escaped into vague
generalities.

I have found that almost all Vietnamese are splendid in making
phrases but extremely weak in specifics and they often get extremely restive

bursae put extremely weak in apecities and they soon get extremely reative

I have found that almost all Flemishmen are splendid in making

denarsities.

as would be required by the Geneva Accords, and he escaped into adame

mesent by a political settlement, he said, well, the Geneva Accords of 1964,

as we have to come to a political settlement. When I asked him what he

would happen if Communist China were not attached. He then said, in that

Vietk Cond stong: that Communist China had to be attached. I asked him what

China--not with the Vietk Cond--and that it could never be won by fighting the

I then asked him how he thought the war with the Vietk Cond end. He said

bresilion is that he is nearly so far removed from the peasants as I am.

left in peace. He said that he thought that the peasants were very sorely and

between various socialist states or whether they did not, spoke all, want to be

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when they are pressed to give concrete content to their thoughts.

In the evening I had dinner which was given in my honor by Buy Diem, the special assistant to the prime minister and one of the more interesting people in Vietnam. Buy Diem has managed to survive in the prime Minister's office through all the changes of government in the post-Diem period. He is, in fact, considered by many the "eminence grise" of the Ky government. He controls the papers which get on the Prime Minister's desk and he is, therefore, used by many people to bring things to the attention of the government, including our own people. At the same time, he speaks fluent English. Other guests were General Thang, the minister of reconstruction; Tran Van Do, the foreign minister; Mr. Nimh, the minister of social welfare; General Lansdale; Phil Habib; and the Korean Ambassador. It is significant for the hierarchy in this country that the foreign minister was the lowest in the terms of protocol, and that General Thang, who technically would not rate very high, was the highest.

proud.

and that General Tung, who technically would not rate very high, was the
in this country that the foreign minister was the lowest in the terms of protocol,
Philippe; and the Korean Ambassador. It is significant for the hierarchy
minister; Mr. Ninn, the minister of socialist welfare; General Lamsdse;
were General Tung, the minister of reconstruction; Tran Van Do, the foreign
our own people. At the same time, he apeska fluent English. Other guests
needed many people to bring things to the attention of the government, including
controls the papers which get on the Prime Minister's desk and he is, therefore,
in fact, considered by many the "eminence driea" of the Ky government. He
office through all the channels of government in the boat-Diem period. He is,
people in Vietnam. By Diem has managed to survive in the prime Minister's
the special assistant to the prime minister and one of the more interesting

In the evening I had dinner which was given in my honor by Bay Diem,
when they are pleased to give concrete content to their thoughts.

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graceful

Buy Diem, who has extremely GRADUATE manners and a cunning face in the literal sense of the world, was a most gracious host. He served a Vietnamese meal, which is a nice combination of Chinese and French booking. Before dinner he told me about the thinking of the government with respect to the future political evolution of the country. He said that they realized that sometime before TET, which is a national holiday at the end of January, they would have to present to the people a program to give the existing government a constitutional rule. The notion was to announce a constituent assembly to meet three months after the announcement which would then have eighteen months to prepare a constitution, which would in turn go into effect a year after it had been approved. In other words, a process of three years. Buy Diem also mentioned that they had not yet decided on the way this constituent assembly would be formed. It might consist of an appointed group; it might be a co-opted group; or it might be an elected group. They were weighing the three choices, but they would make a decision within the next four weeks. Of course, like every thing else in Vietnam, it is next to impossible to say what this statement

every thing else in Vietnam, it is next to impossible to say what this statement put them would make a declaration within the next four weeks. Of course, like dross; or it might be an elected dross. They were weighing the three choices, be formed. It might comest of an abashed dross; it might be a co-opted

tioned that they had not yet decided on the way the constitution assembly would be approved. In other words, a process of three years. By Diem siao men-
meet three months after the announcement which would then have eighteen months
a constitutional rule. The notion was to announce a constitution assembly to
they would have to present to the people a program to give the existing government
sometime before TET, which is a national holiday at the same end of January,
the future political evolution of the country. He said that they realized that
Before dinner he told me spout the thinking of the government with respect to
Vietnamese meal, which is a nice combination of Chinese and French cooking.
tace in the literal sense of the world, was a most dramatic post. He served a

By Diem, who has extremely商务mannish manners and a commanding
drastic
forceful

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means--if it means anything. It may be that the pressures by Americans ask civilians for civilian governments have simply led the Vietnamese to keep fobbing us off with general statements and have induced poor Buy Diem to impress me with these vistas.

At dinner we spoke about the possibilities of negotiations. Buy Diem said that Vietnam could never accept the partition of the country. I, misunderstanding him, said that no one had ever proposed the partition of the country and I am sure it would be unacceptable to the United States too. It turned out that he was speaking of the partition of all of Vietnam, while I thought that he meant a partition of South Vietnam into Communist and non-Communist zones. The point he was making was that Vietnam would not accept the 17th parallel as a dividing line. It might accept a de facto division, but not a de jure partition. He also objected violently to the notion that the Geneva Accords of 1954 might regulate the international status of Vietnam, and when asked what he found objectionable to these international accords, he said that it was out of the question for South Vietnam to survive without American protection and it was, therefore, necessary

Vietnam to survive without American protection and it was, therefore, necessarily
to these international accords, he said that it was out of the question for South
the international status of Vietnam, and when asked why he found objectionable
opposed vigorously to the notion that the Geneva Accords of 1964 might regulate
If might accept a de facto minimum partition, but not a de jure partition. He said
marking was that Vietnam would not accept the 17th parallel as a dividing line.

To South Vietnam into Communist and non-Communist zones. The point he made
besides the partition of all of Vietnam, while I thought that he meant a partition
it would be unacceptable to the United States too. It turned out that he was
him, said that no one had ever proposed the partition of the country and I am sure
said that Vietnam could never accept the partition of the country. I wasn't understanding
At dinner we spoke about the possibilities of negotiations. By Diem
me with these vias.

topping us off with general statements and have induced poor Bù Diem to impose
a禁法, for civilian governments have already led the Vietnamese to keep
meau--if it means anything. It may be that the breaches by Americans at

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that Vietnam be free to make an alliance with the United States. He also stressed that South Vietnam and never signed the Geneva Convention and, therefore, could in no sense be bound by it. General Thang then took the floor to explain his ideas for rural reconstruction. The first point he made was that the ministry that General Ko had taken over, which was supposed to coordinate all the efforts of pacification, was in a sense superfluous because this was properly his job. He then explained at great length how he would train cadres and how these cadres would go into selected provinces. By now I had gotten familiar with Vietnamese grandiloquence and therefore I asked him how many cadres he actually had in training. It turns out that for the whole of Vietnam he has exactly 70 people in training and that of those 70 people, 60 came from the National Police--in other words were already doing the job of pacification for which he was allegedly training them.

Tran Van Do said next to nothing except while we were talking about negotiations he kept saying that the chief necessity is to beat them, beat them, beat them over the head until they agree. The Minister of Social Welfare

them, best them over the head until they agree. The Minister of Social Welfare about negotiations he kept asking that the chief necessity is to best them, best Tran Van Do said next to nothing except while we were talking

for which he was sadlyingly training them.

the National Police---in other words were already doing the job of pacification
he has exacify 10 people in training and that of those 10 people, 80 came from
cadres he actually had in training. It turns out that for the whole of Vietnam
to similar with Vietnamese grandioquence and therefore I asked him how many
and how these cadres would do into selected provinces. By now I had gotten
properly his job. He then explained at great length how he would train cadres
all the efforts of pacification, was in a sense perpendicular because this was
the ministry that General Kho had taken over, which was supposed of coordinate
to explain his ideas for rural reconstruction. The first point he made was that
therefore, could in no sense be pound by it. General Thanh then took the for
attracting that South Vietnam and never signed the Geneva Convention and,
that Vietnam be free to make an alliance with the United States. He said

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[Y]

was also totally silent, as was the Korean Ambassador. The meeting broke up
at 11:30. Since the apartment was located on the main street of Saigon and since
I had never walked around in Saigon, I asked the Political Consul of the Embassy
whether he would walk around the block with me to let me see just what went on
in the streets at night. He refused, claiming that it was too dangerous.

The dinner also illustrated the difference of approach between Habib,
the Political Consul, and General Lansdale. By now it is obvious that when a
Vietnamese develops a plan that it is next to meaningless; that at best it repre-
sents an aspiration, but not a reality. The problem is what Americans are
going to do about this. There are many possibilities. (1) To give up in desperation
and listen to it as an interesting piece of fiction; (2) try to bound the
table in exasperation and keep in insisting on a performance which is certain
to come; (3) patiently, almost psycho-therapeutically, try to transform what is
at the moment a dream into a possibility of a reality. Habib follows the second
approach. For a good hour at the dinner table he was pounding away at General
Thang, trying to get him to formulate a concerte program and telling him when

Tusand, trying to det him to formulate a concert program and telling him when
approsch. For a good hour at the dinner table he was bounding awry at General
at the moment a dream into a抱ability of a reslity. Happily follows the second
to come: (3) patiently, simeat psycho-tinnersbatically, try to transform what is
table in exasperation and keep inulating on a performance which is certain
and flaten to it as an interesting piece of fiction; (3) taxhousek to bound the
doing to do spout this. Type are mmz抱abilities. (1) To give up in deasperation
three
aents an sabpiration, but not a reslity. The problem is what Americas are
Vietnamese develops a plan that it is next to meaningless; that at least it repre-
the Political General, and General Lanadsle. By now it is opinions that when
The dinner table illustrated the difference of approach between Happi,
in the streets at night. He retraied, claiming this it was too dangerous.
whether he would walk around the block with me to let me see just what went on
I had never walked around in Safon. I asked the Political General of the Empaey
at 11:30. Since the apartment was located on the main street of Safon and since
was also totally silent, as was the Korean Empaasador. The meeting broke up

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he was going to do what. He also tried to get Landdale to assist him in this
effort. Lansdale would not do that. Lansdale, who had always struck me as
a little muddle-headed and disorganized in Washington, has a cruious way with
these Asians. He looks at them with his big eyes, he is enormously gentle and
patience, and gradually they blossom under his tutelage. Whether this will
lead to results is anybody's quess.--Since it is not clear to me if anyting can
lead to results in this country--but I am convinced that if results are possible,
they are more likely to come through the Lansdale method than through the desk
pounding American method.

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bombing American method.

they are more likely to come through the Lansdale method than through the deck
lead to results in this country---but I am convinced that it results are possible,
lead to results is anybody's dues---since it is not clear to me if anything can
benevolence, and gradually they praise under his tutelage. Whether this will
these Vansau. He looks at them with his big eyes, he is enormously gentle and
a little muddle-headed and disorganized in Washington, has a craven way with
effort. Lansdale would not do this. Lansdale, who had slaved atuck me so
he was going to do what. He tried to get Lansdale to assist him in this

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November 2nd. The day started with a meeting with Tran Quang Phuan, Secretary-General of Van Hanh University, a new Buddhist institution in Saigon, A former minister of social welfare. I began the conversation by asking Phuan about the probable course of events during the next few years. Phuan expressed great pessimism unless certain things could be accomplished.

What was needed, he felt, was a social revolution, although he was frank in acknowledging this term did not have a precise significance, and in many peoples' minds constituted nothing more than a vague yearning for justice.

As Phuan understood the concept, a social revolution would provide for justice through the development of greater social cohesion. Phuan felt that in an underdeveloped country the government was the instrument that must play the major role in instituting social changes. The difficulty was that the Vietnamese governments had so lacked the requisite cohesion since they had generally been composed of men who did not know each other at the outset so that considerable time was required before any sort of team spirit could be developed. Furthermore, governmental leaders generally did not represent

developed. Furthermore, governments leaders generally did not represent
class considerations time was required before any sort of team spirit could be
been composed of men who did not know each other at the outset so that
governments had so lacked the requisite cooperation since they had generally
major role in instituting social changes. The difficulty was that the Vietnamese
underdeveloped country the government was the instrument that must play the
through the development of greater social cooperation. Piusu felt that in such
Va Piusu understood the concept, a social revolution would provide for justice
peoples, minds constituted nothing more than a vague desiring for justice.
in acknowledging this term did not have a precise significance, and in many
What was needed, he felt, was a social revolution, although he was truth
Piusu expressed great beatement unless certain things could be accomplished.
saking Piusu spont the probable course of events during the next few years.
Saidon, A former minister of social welfare. I began the conversation by
Secretary-General of Van Hau University, a new Buddhist institution in
November 1967. The day started with a meeting with Tran Quang Phuon,
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any group within the population. They represented nobody but themselves.

This kind of government encouraged the development of three types of attitude
within the politically aware population, which was in itself a minority. (1)

trouble-making based on a genuine distaste for any political authority.

(2) withdrawal to private concerns and indifference to public matters. (3)
individuals who would serve the government because they were in effect paid
off. All three attitudes were useless to a government in attempting to
effect a social revolution. This created a vicious circle which guaranteed
political impotence. Governments were capable enough of drawing up plans
which on paper looked good; in reality they were totally impracticable because
they failed to take into account consideration the inadequacy of the
governmental resources, particularly human resources, to do the job.

I asked Phuan how it might be possible to bring about a situation
in which the social revolution he saw as desirable could take place. Phuan
answered that currently all viable social groups should be encouraged. Asked
to identify these he said that he was thinking of all sorts of groups, if necessary

to identify these he said that he was thinking of all sorts of drombs, if we necessarily sauntered just currently all visible socialist drombs should be encountered. Vaked in which the socialist revolution he saw as desirable could take place. Pumpan I asked Pumpan how it might be possible to bring about a situation governmental reasons, barically human resources, to do the job. they supposed it failed to take into account consideration the inadequacy of the which on paper looked good; in reality they were totally impracticable because political impotence. Governments were capable enough of drawing up plans effect a socialist revolution. This created a vicious circle which guaranteed out. All three existing statures were useless to a government in attempting to individuals who would serve the government because they were in effect paid (3) withdrawal to private concerns and indigference to public matters. (3) trouble-making based on a dummy dataset for any political authority. within the politically aware population, which was in itself a minority. (1) This kind of government encountered the development of three types of attitude and group within the population. They represented nobody but themselves.

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including even sports clubs. Of course, he said somewhat slyly, Buddhists constituted a very important social group in themselves and he said that the Buddhists were working hard to improve their team spirit. He acknowledged that within the Buddhist movement the same internal fragmentation and fractionalization were evident, as appeared elsewhere in Vietnamese society.

Phuan was not explicit as to how he envisioned the process would develop from encouraging social groups to achieving the social changes he had in mind. I asked him if he could identify any government which might be able to take the steps he believed necessary. As all my other Vietnamese contacts, Phuan declined to do so. He pointed out that it was difficult to predict ahead how a man would perform before he had actually served. As an example he cited the case of former prime minister Quat, who had appeared to be an extremely capable man, but who had demonstrated in office that while he possessed dignity and administrative skill, he nevertheless lacked the decisiveness that was needed in a leader.