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Q: That explains the concern expressed by West Germans?

A: You have only to ask yourself why those in Germany who in recent years have opposed every effort to strengthen NATO are supporting this proposal and those in Germany who have been friends of NATO for 40 years are worried about this policy. That in itself is a phenomenon that concerns me.

Q: How do you see the reactions of different Western politicians and leaders?

A: All of them have a terrible problem, that they all have elections of one kind or another. They've all been put into the position where the United States has indicated that it considers the withdrawal of its missiles desirable and they have to ask us to keep them there when parts of the population rioted against their being put there in the first place.

So if you know Europe you must sense their great uneasiness. The fact that they cannot express their uneasiness for domestic political reasons makes it even worse.

Q: What about the French position?

A: France also has elections next year. I think that Prime Minister Jacques Chirac is concerned, the government is concerned and the President is aloof because he enjoys the spectacle of a conservative French government not being in complete agreement with a conservative American Administration. So I find a consensus in their concerns but I don't expect Europe to take a very strongly negative position. I expect this agreement will go through. But President Nixon and I thought it was important that some Americans understood the nature of the situation.

Q: What of the way support and opposition line up in your own country?

A: In America you have people of the left and the right supporting the Administration negotiating position. The semi-radicals of the left and the isolationists of the right. There are many who support the position who really don't want any nuclear weapons in Europe. The people who are worried are the traditional defenders of the traditional American policy.

Q: We think that U.S.-Japan relations are facing a crucial period. What steps should be taken by both nations to ease the current high tensions, especially over trade?

A: I start from the premise that it is imperative that the tensions be eased and that the United States and Japan work closely together. Neither country has an alternative and conflict between our two countries would be a disaster for both.

I've been convinced for a long time that the case-by-case approach to the trade surplus is not working. We cannot go from computer chips to a construction contract for) the Osaka Airport to whatever other issue there may be at any one moment. We must come to some comprehensive agreement. We should try to agree on a global deficit we are willing to accept and then we could make additional efforts to achieve it. Than we

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et off this constant discussion, this moving from crisis to crisis. It
is an impossible situation for both governments.

For example, it must have been painful for Prime Minister Yasuhiro
akasone to come over here in an absolutely no-win situation. We could
not lift the sanctions for our domestic reasons. He needed us to lift
the sanctions for his domestic reasons. The issue has to do with one
tem -- on which both sides could be right for all I know -- and it is
not a dignified position for either government to be in.

Q: In an article on U.S. security interests in Asia, you touched on the famous 1 percent of the gross national product that Japan devotes to defense. You predicted that Japan would emerge as a major military power in the not-too-distant future, and you wrote that the decision of Japan to breach its limit of 1 percent of the GNP on its defense expenditure would cause alarm among Japan's neighbors. You also said that such an increase was unnecessary to maintain global equilibrium. Could you elaborate further?

A: There are a number of separate problems here. First on the point of alarm among Japanese neighbors. That is a fact and the Chinese have expressed alarm. And Korea has expressed alarm. I simply stated a fact.

Second, on the question of whether Japan should breach the 1 percent limit or not, the point I was trying to make is that this was essentially a decision that Japan has to make for its own national reasons. The United States should not press Japan one way or the other because this is a Japanese national decision. It is not a decision that should press for economic reasons. I pointed out that many people in his country want Japan to rearm in order to reduce our trade deficit. That's ridiculous. Now in terms of the global equilibrium, I do not think it is imperative for Japan to rearm. In terms of the regional position it is a decision for Japan to make.

In my view Japan will emerge as an increasingly significant military power. That will happen even if it sticks to the 1 percent limit because the Japanese GNP is rising and Japanese technology is improving constantly -- is already maybe the best in the world -- so that 1 percent will become a larger and larger sum. Second, a country with the traditions of Japan is likely to want to play a larger role in its own self-defense. The major point of my article was addressed to Americans, not to Japanese. I was telling Americans not to press Japan beyond a point that Japan might reach on its own thinking.

Q: There is talk in Congress of proposing that Japan's defense
pending increase at its economic growth rate plus 1 percent.

A: That's crazy. That would mean a rate of 4 to 5 percent, and that
would really produce problems in Asia. It would also probably produce
problems in Japan. It is that sort of argument that I was dealing with.

Q: In the same article you also wrote that Japan could make a more
significant contribution to global peace by increasing aid to
developing nations than with a larger military program. Could you
laborate on this point, too?

A: Again, the proposal was aimed at the general proposition that
Japan in this country that Japan is economically so powerful because
it is not spending enough on defense and that therefore the United
States should put pressure on Japan to increase defense spending. I am
trying to discourage that proposition by urging that if we bring
pressure on Japan to increase its national expenditures it should be in
the direction of global economic development.

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'87.05.11 10:02

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Q: What kind of aid do you have in mind?

A: I would start with helping the Third World with its debt problem. I don't have a complete proposal, but I think it cannot go on that every year there is a crisis with one country that is fixed temporarily, and the next year there's a crisis with another country, and that the crises always get resolved by the country's borrowing more money and thereby decreasing its total debt burden. It is in the long term unwise for nations or for Western governments to loan money that comes back to them right away in the form of interest payments.

A: Way has to be found to stimulate the economies of these countries. That also would ease some of the economic pressure on Japan because if it could export more to those countries, our total trade deficit wouldn't be so large. Japan's recent new lending program will be very constructive and make a significant contribution if it is part of a global program, if it isn't tied to buying only in Japan, and if it becomes part of a general effort to increase the economic growth of these countries.

Q: How do you view the recent turmoil in China where it appears that anti-Western sentiments may once again be gaining an upper hand?

A: Also anti-Japanese.

Q: That's right. How should the United States and Japan respond and should they respond separately?

A: They should respond together. But either separately or together, such of us has to have patience and understanding. To develop a country, a billion people with such a complex history as China is very difficult. After all China has never wanted to be like other nations, to the process of modernization creates two problems within one. It superficially looks to them as if they become less Chinese and have to give up some Communist ideas and that obviously creates some political uncertainty. The Chinese have decided that they cannot tolerate political turmoil and economic change together, so they're trying to keep the political situation calm while they go through economic reform. To what extent this is possible I cannot judge, but I don't think we should be impatient, and I have every confidence that the Chinese leadership is genuinely dedicated to economic reform and modernization.

Q: Maybe you are up to here with this question, but what's your evaluation of the so-called policy of glasnost?

A: Mr. Gorbachev is extremely intelligent and more flexible than previous Soviet leaders. I think the purpose of glasnost is to improve the efficiency of the Soviet economy and thereby liberate some creative energies. As far as the industrial democracies are concerned, they have to judge it by the foreign policy and not only by the domestic policy, but in that respect we have to encourage equitable proposals. What others me about Gorbachev's foreign policy is that almost every proposal he makes has the objective result of destabilizing the Western

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Q: Foreigners are amazed at the rapid development of events surrounding Gary Hart. You know the U.S. Presidency well. What qualities are most important for a President in this country?

A: Character and courage are most important. I say this in general, not in relation to Gary Hart. Character and courage. You should, of course, require a minimum of intelligence but you can always hire intelligent people. You cannot hire character, nor can you hire courage. You need both of these qualities because when you're President, the really difficult decisions could almost always go either way. That's why they come to you as President, because the easy decisions are all made at the lower level.

When you make the decision you cannot know the outcome, so therefore you have to act on the basis of judgments you cannot prove. You cannot prove that the judgments are correct, and so it takes a person of principle with certain convictions to find a way through these dilemmas, and you also need the courage to act on these convictions. A mere factual analysis only teaches you that the big decisions are close to 50/50.

(c) 1987, Los Angeles Times Syndicate