TELECON
General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

April 10, 1974

12:20

K: Brent, I still don't have the material. I still have yet to see one
paper for the God damn meeting this afternoon.

S: It is on its way by special courier.

K: And I still have to see the talking points for Boumediene.
Why the hell should I go away for ten days if they are going to be
this way.

S: Well, the charts are on their way.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E6 12958</td></tr><tr><td>By CO NARA Date 6-8-74</td></tr></table>

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By C. NARA Date 6-8-74

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Sec. Kissinger

April 10, 1974

12:57 p.m.

K: Jack, how are you. We were so pleased with your telegram or with
your message. It was very cute.

J: We are so thrilled. I missed your call just before you left. I didn't
realize that you would be gone quite so long and on such a great event.

K: You are marvelous.

J: It couldn't be nicer and we are thrilled. You were at the Escondons?

K: Yes.

J: Did you see them at all.

K: Yes, we saw them several times.

J: How very nice. Are they all right?

K: They are fine and very nice.
It was

J: /Beautiful?

K: Yes. Couldn't have been nicer.

J: I am delighted for you. It makes everything else pale into very small
print.

K: I wouldn't say that.

J: It does. Henry, I have lots of questions but I'll only ask you the most
urgent one. One you are appearing at 4:00. I gather you would like your
appearance confined to Moscow?

K: Not absolutely. Maybe in the first round.

J: O.K. That will be fine. How much time can you give them.

K: Two hours if necessary.

J: I think you should tell what you have just told me to Sparkman.

K: O.K.

J: Fulbright will be gone; have you talked to Bill?

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Eo 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

2.

Javits

K: No.

J: I think it would be nice if you gave him a ring.

K: I will do that.

J: He is probably on his way back to the office now.

K: He is in town.

J: Yes, but he is going in a couple of hours.

K: I will call him immediately.

J: He was just here. He didn't even show up to vote this morning because he is anxious to get out.

K: I will call him this minute.

J: The other things I wanted to ask you is this. I was going to go to Europe on next Wed. night but I found that I couldn't see anybody there. I wanted to see Wilson and his team and Brandt and everybody is going to be away. The only thing going on in Europe is the Bilderberg which by the way both Nelson and David are going to.

K: Yes.

J: You know that.

K: Yes I do.

J: So I cancelled out of that and had an invitation from Jack Kubisch to participate in the Latin American --

K: That would be nice if you would do it.

J: When you say that immediately throws me. I really have no interest in doing anything that isn't ... very purposefully.

K: It would be very, very useful.

J: Are you going to take a hand in it yourself.

K: I will be there every minute of it.

3.
Javits;

J: If somebody would instruct me. Jack wants to come up. I assume
he will brief me on what you are trying to do.

K: Exactly.

J: The other thing I wanted to ask you is this. We want to fix a little attention because it was so prescient on this report on the Committee of Nine. You remember that.

K: Of course, I endorsed it.

J: Suppose, if I can get Wayne Hays to do it, I know you talked to him. If he and I joined in a letter to the State Department saying, will you give us your comment on this document and we will then cause it to be published as a Committee print.

K: I will give it a personal endorsement.

J: I think it would mean, really in analysis, probably another way of
declaring our present stand on Europe.

K: I would be delighted to do that.

J: You see what I mean.

K: Absolutely.

J: The other thing that can be done is this. Max Vanderstall is going to put out a white paper on it. I thought we could print it as a Congressional document or if the State Dept. considered it more appropriate it could do what it wished with it.

K: Let me think about that. Let me see if we have some mechanism of
doing it.

J: The last thing is there have been considerably stirrings here about
the Jackson Amendment and at your earliest convenience I should get some
idea from you as to your present stance. Joe Sisco is coming up for
breakfast and he will brief me to whatever extent he wishes to. But in
the final analysis because this thing is really engendering a lot of interest
among Jewish organizations, I should have a better idea as to where it
stands at this time. Are you proposing to have any near term meeting
again with Jackson.

K: No, I would not have such a meeting without talking to you first.

DECLASSIFIED
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By NARA Date 6-8-84

4.
Javits

J: Alright, and then do I gather that you told them that when you did
have a meeting you wanted me present.

K: I haven't formally done that yet, what do you think?

J: I think you should.

K: Ok, I shall.

J: But, I don't think that's as nearly as important for the reasons I'll
be able to give you.

K: Jack, are you going to be in town next week?

J: I'll be in town whenever you want, I mean I'll make it my business
to be.

K: Well, how about having breakfast Tuesday or Wednesday next
week and then we can review that whole situation.

J: Good, my office will work it out.

K: Good, wonderful. And let's have it at State.

J: At State.

K: We'll eat better here.

J: I'm for that.

K: Good.

J: I'll see you later and I am delighted and love to Nancy.

K: Thank you, hope to see you both soon.

J: Oh listen, you'll see me Saturday night, I'm coming to..

K: Oh, marvelous, teriffic.

J: I'm trying to get Marion to do it too.

K: Good., Bye.

END

DECLASSIFIED
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By CD NARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON
Senator Fulbright/Sec. Kissinger

April 10, 1974

1:05 pm

K: Mr. Chairman

F: Oh, how are you?

K: OK, how are you?

F: Well, welcome home. How are you.

K: I'm fine. I heard you were in town and I just got back and I wanted to say hello to you. How are things going/

F: Well, pretty well. I came just for the vote, I have to go back tonight. Are you coming up this afternoon?

K: Yes, but I understand you won't be able to be there.

F: Well, I'm going to anyway.

K: Oh, you will be there.

F: For the first hour.

K: That would be marvelous.

F: I put off, I was going to go but I decided since it was a coincidence you were coming and it was all arranged, I will wait and go a little later. I don't have to go till 7.

K: Oh, would you like us to do something on television. afterwards?

F: Sure.

K: Because I'll be through at 6, I leave the Committee at 6. I don't want to keep you there but I just wondered if that might be something we should do.

F: Sure, either that or do you reckon we could do it before or after. I guess after is best.

K: After is usually a little better.

DALLAS CHIEF
Authority E0 12958

By CB NARA Date 6-8-04

2.
Fulbright

F: Yes.

K: And what I intended to do Mr. Chairman, if you agree, is to talk about detente and SALT and my Moscow trip because there is really an unconscionable thing going on. It was not a failure. We went along as well as we have in any previous meeting.

F: Yes.

K: And it is being played now as if there is a failure of detente and also what I wanted to do before the Committee is to put some of the SALT facts before them.

F: Good.

K: If you think that is appropriate.

K: I sure do.

K: Because the myth is now being spread that SALTI was such a diasaster.

F: I know, you know how that stems from.

K: I know, and if you agree with me I would like to do that before the Committee and with you being there it really makes it worthwhile.

F: Good, fine.

K: Then I'll have the great pleasure of seeing you. And I just wanted to let you know again that I am hoping very much...

F: This is very much a coincidence. I didn't know you were coming today. You know they had that very controversial vote yesterday on the filibuster so I came up and by coincidence I stayed over until today.

K: I hope things are going to go well in Arkansas.

F: Well, one never knows. I think they are going reasonably well. I certainly am working hard at it.

K: That I understand.

F: Yes, it is a day and night business.

3.
Fulbright

K: Well, they took on a tiger when they took you on, I know that.

F: Well, we have given them a good run for their money ᵒ anyway.
I am delighted about you. I gave your bride my best.

K:" We got your telegram and we appreciated it very much.

F: Well, now I think you're fortified with some brains and I think
you'll do even better.

K: (Laughter) See you this afternoon.

END

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958

By

NARA Date 6.8.04

TELCOM
Amb. Dinitz/Sec. Kissinger

April 10, 1974

3:45 p.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador

D: Mr. Secretary. Welcome back. I am with Mrs. Meir on the other line.
Can I call you back in a few minutes.

K: I am going to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Do you think it
is for real?

D: I have her on the line now, Mr. Secretary. It seems to me it is for
real.

K: Well tell her -- the one thing that has to be understood in Israel. It is
my judgment as your friend -- not as a Secretary of State, now -- that if
this thing blows up and leads to another war the outcome is going to be an
imposed settlement with a 67 frontier.

D: I understand. I will tell it to her Mr. Secretary.

K: And tell her -- first of all give her my affectionate regards. Tell her
that it is my belief that she is really essential.

D: I will do this. Can I call you when you come back from the Senate.

K: Yes.

D: I will do this. Thank you.

K: Right.

END

DECLASSIFIED
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TELECON

William Hyland/Secretary Kissinger

April 10, 1974

7:40 PM

H: Mr. Secretary?

K: Yes.

H: How are you?

K: OK.

H: Good.

K: Bill, on this Soviet proposal have you ever done any work - analytical work, so that the BS finally stops, of what we could make of it if we wanted to.

H: I've got it started here and it's almost finished, but it's not quite in shape.

K: It seems to me we could proceed, I mean, they said no sublimits, but they said information. Now supposing we don't debate what is information, what is sublimits, I suspect that one of their problems is that they don't want to follow the same mix as we do.

H: That's right.

K: You see what I mean.

H: They've got a mix of their own.

K: They undoubtedly have a mix of their own. Can we suggest something to them that is rational from their point of view and yet within some program that we have sensed they might do anyway. You see what I mean?

H: Yes.

K: And within the limit of what we might do anyway.

H: You remember a did a little memo before the Moscow....

K: No, you're prediction of the program turned out to be quite correct.

H: I've got that refined and including a more detailed look at the SLBs part.

K: And what's your estimate of that?

DECLASSIFIED
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DECLASSIFIED
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Hyland - page 2

H: Well, I think, on the basis of what we know, it's going to be about 150, but it's going to be very late in that...

K: Which is consistent with what they told us.

H: Yes. But there's a little room - our problem is the one that you raised, that is, they may only intend to do 150. We're up against this problem of verification.

K: On the other hand if there is no agreement, there is some number we're willing to live with without an agreement.

H: Yes, but without an agreement the numbers are going to go well beyond that.

K: For us?

H: For them. I mean they'll just keep building. That's the essential point. That's the one I'm trying to get at now.

K: But what you should do in your analysis is - there must be some ratio we're willing to live with in the absence of an agreement. Right?

H: Right.

K: Because that's how it's going to work out defacto. Instead of comparing the ideal against the real, let's compare the real under two circumstances.

H: With an agreement and without.

K: Exactly.

H: Right.

K: When can I have that to study? Can I have some of this tomorrow?

H: Yes. Can you wait until tomorrow afternoon?

K: Yes.

H: There's one other thing that I think we have to do, which I think is going to be neglected. That is this whole question of exchanges of notification of information.

K: Like what?

H: I think there's a lot in that, because even though we say we have to count every SLAM, the fact is you can't bring in a submarine, redo it's fire control system. Put in new missiles and turn it out like sausages.

Hyland - page 3

K: Well, that's what I think.

H: This is quite an elaborate process and unless it's done under total cover, we're
going to see it and we're going to be able to count it.

K: Exactly.

H: But nobody's working - I just discovered today no one is....

K: Yes, but is anybody working on these SALT proposals now?

H: Yes, we just had a meeting.

K: Who is we?

H: Well, the State Department people had a meeting.

K: Yes, but how about the French. What are they doing?

H: They're working under the Lodal thing now. Lodal's people told them quite a bit
Now there's several papers going.

K: Why did Lodal's people...

more

H: I have no idea what motivated all of this, but a great deal/came out then I
thought we were going to talk about. Anyway the numbers are available to almost
everyone and some notion of what went on is available. This is probably OK and
people are going to have to work with real figures.

K: Yes, but when are we going to get their analysis?

H: Probably by the beginning of the week - beginning of the next week.

K: OK, can you find out for me?

H: That's what was agreed upon today, but we can speed it up.

K: Speed it up.

H: All of this is going to be coming together at once, but the Defense's position is
already fairly...

K: Which is what?

H: Which is that none of it can be verified, so it's all phoney.

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Hyland - page 4

K: And therefore what?

H: And therefore, you know the - but this is at a fairly low level. I think we're going to find that this proposal can be worked. The question is whether the levels will be anything near what we can ____.

K: But that's what I would like you to look at.

H: Yes. We'll have....

K: What can we imagine that's not insane from the Soviet point of view?

H: Well, I think of a breakdown....

K: There's no sense telling the Soviet they can have 700 SLBM's when they haven't even begun to test it.

H: Right. And when they probably won't do nearly that many.

K: That's what I mean. We don't even see the submarines that can carry them.

H: No, I think we've got a fairly good handle on what their probable program is now.

K: OK, you better do a paper for me.

H: OK, I'll get it up to you tomorrow afternoon.

K: OK, good.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12-958
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-97

TELECON
Foreign Minister Fahmy/Secretary Kissinger

April 10, 1974

8:12 PM

K: How are you Ismail?

F: How are you Henry?

K: How nice to know you're in the country.

F: Congratulations.

K: Thank you.

F: How is Mrs. Kissinger?

K: Well, as well as can be expected under the circumstances.

F: You are terrible. Tell me, how come you don't want to see me?

K: Because I'm tired of Egyptians.

F: You are busy with Gromyko.

K: No, when can you come down?

F: What do you mean come down. Sisco said that I'm undesirable.

K: Nonsense. I had invited you for tonight and I was told you couldn't come.

F: Who said so? I was ready to come this afternoon.

K: I proposed 6:30 today and I was told you couldn't come.

F: This is not true. I was ready to come at 6:30.

K: Oh, the God-damned fools.

F: Yes, because I need to discuss things urgently with you.

K: So do I with you. Can you come for breakfast on Friday?

F: Yes, and I come on breakfast.

K: Come breakfast on Friday.

By CO NARA Date 6.8.74

DECLASSIFIED

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Fahmy - page 2

F: Good. I'll call you tomorrow.

K: Good.

F: And, by the way, you got President Sadat's latest message through Eilts?

K: On what subject?

F: About the Syrian...

K: Yes, and we're in touch with him.

F: I hope that you can use your influence.

K: Absolutely.

F: Especially now, you know.

K: Oh, Ismail, I fully understand it. So you call me tomorrow morning.
I expected you at 6:30.

F: What do you mean tomorrow. Tomorrow is Thursday.

K: No, I hear from you tomorrow and we will have breakfast on Friday.

F: Good. I'll arrive in the afternoon around 6:00 or something like that.

K: Good. I have to have a dinner with Boumediene. Unfortunately tomorrow.
not

F: I shall/tell him this.

K: At any rate this gives me a chance to see you before I see the Syrians.

F: Good and this, by the way, this green sport shirt which you wearing in Time
magazine or Newsweek awful.

K: Looked awful? Now you're dressing me.

F: Mrs. Kissinger was charming.

K: Mrs. Kissinger looked charming?

F: Yes.

K: Good, well she looks forward to seeing you. She's coming to Egypt with me
next time.

TELECON

April 10, 1974

8:50 PM

K: Is the President back?

S: Yes, he's back.

K: When did he get back?

S: He came back about 6:00.

K: I like his intense communication with me.

S: He hasn't called at all.

K: How did his trip go?

S: I gather it went pretty well from what Al said. He got a warm reception, good crowds. But I gather the St. Clair response on providing additional materials was received very badly on the Hill.

K: Oh, really.

S: That's what Al said. He didn't give me any details but apparently he's concerned about it. That was the sentence right after I said, how did the trip go? He said it went fine but then when right into the problems on the Hill. I guess they're quite concerned. I sent you over a Gromyko talker a few minutes ago.

K: Who did it? Sonnenfeldt?

S: Well, it was a combined effort. Sonnenfeldt, Clift, Lodal, you know different pieces.

K: What they have to do is to review all the items that he handled.

S: They're all in there.

K: Because that's what he intends to review. Including the Middle East.

S: The only things that are not in there the one on environment and the Mediterranean thing.

K: How about the test ban.

DECLASSIFIED
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Scowcroft - page 2

S: The test ban is in there.

K: OK. Should I call Haig?

S: I don't think it's necessary.

K: Why not?

S: He maybe already have gone. You want me to check.

K: No, I'll find out. OK.

S: OK, very good.

K: I'll see you - do I have an appointment with the President at 10:45?

S: Yes.

K: OK.

S: I won't see you before then tomorrow.

K: No.

END

TELECON
General Haig/Secretary Kissinger

April 10, 1974

8:58 PM

H: Hello.

K: Al, Dobrynin said that they really want something on SALT and that their proposal was not a final position and that they're willing to play with the numbers and also that while they don't want sublimits they're willing to have indications. Could we work something out that makes some sense.

H: We're looking at 5 or 6 different premeditations and combinations within the general numbers that they produced, but it will take a few more days to do it, but that's exactly what we're doing.

K: What is our threat. We will be fully merved anyway.

H: The US figure, give or take a few, by 1980 is no particular problem if we can
any kind of handle on their figure, it would be alright too because they could
probably not reach it, by 1980.

K: I'm not - I would just.

H: We're looking...

K: Excuse me, I've a call from Dinitz. He's at a basketball game.

H: That's exactly what we're doing right now. Did you see that note that I...

K: Yes. He said it would just confuse the issue there. I have to take that call now.

END

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TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Sec. Kissinger

April 12, 1974

9:05

K: I have been talking to Fahmy. I told you to send a message to Brandt, didn't I.

S: Yes, we have one there.

K: Ok. What do you mean you have one there?

S: We drafted it and it is ready and I didn't know what kind of timing but it is ready.

K: It has got to go today.

S: Right, well then we'll just get it to you right now.

K: Wait a minute. It shouldn't be just a general message. It should explain to him the difficulty of the Egyptian situation and that the Egyptians are counting on some economic & support from Germany.

S: I have got that in but not quite as strong -- I ought to strengthen it then.

K: Make it very strong and say that it is my judgment that on the one hand and the Federal Republic has an unusual opportunity if he makes an offer before being asked. And secondly, that there will be a profound dis appointment in Cairo, in my judgment if it doesn't happen. So my very strong advice is to make some generous proposal.

S: Alright, I'll stress this Henry, because what I have is not that strong.

K: And explain to him my judgment of the complexity of the Egyptian position. But not too much anti-Soviet because they are too much afraid of the Soviets themselves in Bonn.

S: Why don't we put it in terms of the delicacy of their position.

K: And tell Brandt if I can do anything -- this is a message to go to Bahr for Brandt.

S: Oh, this you didn't say, Bahr for Brandt, 'Ok. And it is in the other channel you told me.

K: Yes, but can we get it this morning.

DALLAS/FIELD
Authority E6 12958
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-84

TELCONE
The President/Sec. Kissinger

9:14 a.m., April 12, 1974

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: How are our Algerian friends?

K: I thought that was a spectacular day yesterday, Mr. President.

N: They are a little bit, shall we say provencial but...

K: But they are very influential in the Arab world.

N: Very influential and they are just like the Chinese. Puritanical as hell. You notice they smoke but they didn't drink.

K: Yes. Boumediene said to me on the way out, he said just tell your President that whatever his contemporaries are doing to him, history within one mandate (meaning one term of office) will record him as one of the greatest peace makers in history.

N: That's nice of him.

K: You made a tremendous impact on him.

N: We had a good talk. I thought that in the evening what he wanted to do was make a little speech. That is why I let him do it. That let everybody hear it and then keep it a little light. I think sometimes these guys are so humorless,

K: On the other hand, the human touch for them is enormously important. I had mentioned to them in the afternoon your plans of going to the Middle East.

N: They hit me with it.

K: I told them you had no specific plan to go to Algeria but then I am glad they did hit you with it. I think myself now the way this present schedule is, we may have to lean on the Israelis a little bit. If we can get the disengagement done in the first few days of May then -- I think very much you ought to go in the last week of May or first week in June.

2.
The President

April 12

N: Depending of course upon this House thing. We have to see what is happening there. If They've left us off the hook by that time or got us on, we've got to do one or the other.

K: Do you think they can do it that fast.

N: I don't know. I haven't the slightest idea. They probably want to drag it on. I don't know. Doesn't make any difference.

K: I think in any event, when the disengagement with Syria is done -- which I hope to be able to know in two at most three weeks then the trip by you to the Middle East would be an enormous event. And one that is...

N: Before Russia.

K: I think it must be before Russia; and it would be politically of the first magnitude in the Middle East. I have been talking to the Egyptian Foreign Minister and he says they need it. They just don't want it, they need it as a symbol of their new orientation. Conceivably we could do it after Russia: but if you do it before Russia, the Russians would be extremely miffed.

N: I know, but they would get over it.

K: My own guess, Mr. President, is...

N: They travel in the Middle East. Why don't we?

K: Exactly. My guess is that around May 25th would be a good time.

N: Let me think of it in terms of planning. Henry, with regard to Gromyko, we see him at 11:00. I have just gone around the track with Podgornyy, and there is not much. How long do we have to take with this fellow again?

K: I guess an hour and a half or hour and fifteen minutes. I've got the Egyptian For. Min. here in my office. I am in the back office. I will come over about 10:30 if you agree.

N: I am pretty tight this morning. Come over about 20 minutes till, will you?

K: O.K. The major problem is he will want to go over all the bilaterals. That's easy. The major thing he will hit you with is Soviet participation in the Middle East.

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3.
The President

April 12

N: Right. I know that. Podgornyy hit me with it too and I said you would consult etc.

K: You can't go much beyond that.

N: I know that. I told him there were some places we have influence and some places you have.

K: The Egyptians are violently opposed to it. The Syrians are opposed to it. And the Israelis are opposed to it. It is the one thing they have all agreed on.

N: What do you say to him then.

K: I think we should say after the Syrian disengagement we are prepared to go back to Geneva and to agree that everything is done through Geneva.

N: You noticed how Boumediene picked up immediately on my line that look you're not going to have a permanent settlement with a lot of governments sitting around in Geneva. I said you have got to have some private talks between things. He said that is the practical way it is done. I said of course we have this public forum. He got the point, didn't he.

K: Mr. President, I know these Arabs.

N: You have spent more time with them than anybody else.

K: This was a spectacular success yesterday. I told you what the For. Min. said to me after the morning. In the afternoon, and after the evening, first Boumediene said to me on the way out, then Boutiflika took me aside.

N: Who is Boutiflika.

K: The For. Min. He said we've got to get the President to Algeria. He said get disengagement done fast so that we can do it.

N: Good.

K: It is not only to have a junket, Mr. President. It will be/political event in the Middle East of the first magnitude.

N: Of course it is. And We've done it. I'll see you then about 20 mins. to 11:00. Make it a quarter till. You and I know this subject so well I will do a dance around the son of a gun.

K: We don't have to talk about it.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCORN
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

April 12, 1974

9.25 am

K: ... which items are possible?

S: Just a second, let me get it. Defense says there are no problems for
are sensors for tank detection, sensors to avoid radar detection,

K: How about the helicopters.

S: No. Those we haven't given anybody. March 46 torpedoes and our
personnel cluster bombs. That's all that they say there are no problems
on.

K: Where they say there is a problem, what are they willing to do?

S: Most of the others, they say, the problem is the possibility of
technical compromise.

K: We are talking now about Kuwait buying the Goddamned stuff.

S: That's right. They are afraid of where they might end up.

K: They will end up in Egypt.

S: I know, and what might happen to them there. You know, who might
have access to them. That's the basis of their objection to most everything
else.

K: Well, how about the toe missiles? They must be certainly compromised
already. You tell Wickam I want him to go over the list again by next Monday.
And to remember that they are still part of the US Government.

S: O.K. If we resolve that...

K: That, they are part of the Government.

S: (Laughter)

K: You tell Wickam now to stop playing games on every Goddam proposition
that we make to him and that by Monday, I want him to stretch it as far as it
can be stretched and let us know how to do it.

S: O.K.

K: Thank you.

END

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Authority</td>
    <td>EO 12958</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>By</td>
    <td>CO NARA</td>
    <td>Date</td>
    <td>6-8-94</td>
  </tr>
</table>

TELCOM

Kubisch/Sec. Kissinger

April 12, 1974

10:15 a.m.

K: Jack, these letters are still not what I want.

JK: I'm sorry.

K: What I want is to say clearly what it is we expect. When you say we can settle on some things that were left pending in Mexico that leaves it open to everything. It depends on his understanding of what was left pending in Mexico.

to

JK: You want/ name specifically what...

K: I think what we should say is: Since this meeting takes place so short a time after Mexico, we do not believe that any major results can occur. What we can do is reconfirm the spirit. Set up working groups for the preparation for the next meeting and perhaps if you want that scientific and technical thing or whatever and secondly, once you have established that you should say it would be unfortunate if the meeting in Washington with the American press in the present state of our situation would focus on the divisive aspect because that would destroy that new spirit. And we have to say that clearly. Can we do that?

JK: Sure. I guess I was not clear in my own mind what you wanted.

K: Can we get that done today please.

JK: Oh, yes.

K: Good. Thank you.

END.

TELCONE

Sec. Schlesinger/Sec. Kissinger

April 12, 1974

10:20 a.m.

K: Jim, how are you.

S: Pretty good. How are you.

K: Thank you very much for your note.

S: Well, I tell you, Henry. I knew about that wedding well in advance
because my yeoman service told me about it.

K: Who is your yeoman service.

S: I have a yeoman in your office. Don't you know about that.

K: Oh, sure.

S: But I did not want to give it away. Those fellows do yeoman work.
Congratulations and all that kind of thing. Did you have a good recess.

K: Yes. I had a good rest.

S: Now there are two problems which are minor but could become
larger. One of them is in Egypt. I don't know whether your people have
brought you up to date on that. But this fellow Murphy who came in with the
low bid obviously does not have the resources to carry out the excavation
operation and he is going to be trying to put the bite on the Navy. I had
while you were away great trouble holding John McClellan on the line
just for the US Navy's present participation in the thing. And as you know
we have previously had problems with Hebert and Mahon. That has got to
be very carefully watched and those fellows have got to be kept in line.
Eilts over there in Cairo has been making commitments according to the
cables that I saw a couple or three days ago with regard to what
could be done to help out Murphy. We are going to get ourselves very
tangled up. You had better caution Eilts on what he says to the Egyptians
about Murphy.

K: All right. But you know we are getting ourselves into one hell of a fix
here. The Egyptians are being squeezed by the Russians.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By C0 TARA Date 6-8-94

2.
Schlesinger

April 12, 1974

S: The substantive problems are mighty clear to me but some how or other we are going to have to have a way of helping them which is direct and is supported by the Congress.

K: I agree.

S: Because the chaps up there on the Armed Services Committee and Appropriations Committee that deal with our budget just regard it as inconsistent with the law for the Department of Defense to be doing little favors for the Egyptians out of the monies appropriated for US defense.

K: Yes.

S: McClellan was very hard to bring around on this one. I spent about an hour with him. And as you know Hebert was a bear.

K: Yep.

S: That is one area we are having trouble and Eilts should not make commitments.

K: I have to check into that. I am not familiar that he is making commitments.

S: I saw a telegram the other day. Now that is a very delicate operation and it should be handled through coordination between State and ourselves.

K: I agree.

S: The second problem is Diego Garcia. I believe that Gov. Holton needs a little bit more instruction but he has not been much of a help on that. State papers refer to that as a Pentagon proposal and it may or may not be a Pentagon proposal.

K: No, no. We support it completely.

S: Can you get with some of the senior people up there otherwise it is all...

K: What is it you want us to do?

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E6 12/95</td></tr><tr><td>By CO NARA Date 6-8-94</td></tr></table>

3.
Schlesinger
April 12, 1974

S: Let me get back through Larry Eagleburger, with a set of proposals.
Basically if you can turn around Mansfield.

K: That I don't think I can do because I ran into him at a dinner last
night where he hit me on it. I supported it but I don't think I can turn
him around but I can maybe neutralize him a bit.

S: That's the main thing, if you can get these fellows just to be a little
quiet. I don't think the opposition up there is as deep seated and across
the board as one might think. It is just that there are some . . . noisy
people who are opposed to it. The Armed Services Committee deferred
it to the 75 budget without prejudice but the House has put the money in
and I think Tower and Jackson will help us out when it goes to conference.

K: Good. If you can make a specific proposal I am fully behind it. I am
not aware of the fact -- I must say that whenever Holton talks to me --
when I went up to the For. Relations Committee he urged me to get
strongly behind it.

S: Well, good, good.

K: Whatever mistakes have occurred were inadvertent. There might be
things on which we disagree and in which they do to Diego Garcia what your
guys are doing to me on SALT.

S: Now stop that. What are my guys doing to you on SALT.

K: All this stuff that they put out that I am for a softer position and Defense
is just as happy that it isn't working so and so forth.

:S: Are you referring to an article by Marder last weekend. I thought
that came out of State.

K: Absolutely not. It couldn't come from State.

the
S: The tone, as I read that article, was that the reason that/thing fell
apart was that the President listened to the Pentagon rather than to you.

K: But that isn't true either.

S: I know it's not true.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-95

4.
Schlesinger
April 12, 1974

K: Because the proposal is exactly what I recommended.

S: Look there are fellows up there on the Hill that are continually attempting to invege me into saying something unfavorable about SALT I. In trying to get us into a dustup. As a matter of fact at the National Press Club yesterday they -- somebody pulled the same thing and I continue, needless to say, as I have for three years now, two years now, said that SALT I was a good deal.

K: Forget now what your guys are saying about SALT but it wouldn't be inconceivable that some of our guys are sniping at Diego Garcia, but I don't have the impression that Holton is one of them.

S: No, I don't think - I think Holton is a good man. But he's a little unfamiliar with the tactic and you might get him to sit down with Dave Abshire and give him a few pointers and also to get a plan on some of these things.

K: OK. And also if your legislative people will will tell me what I can do I am fully in support of Diego Garcia. I would like to talk to you, Jim, about SALT. Whether there is anything we can do with the Soviet proposal. Dobrynin came in now and said, you know, indicated there might be some flexibility about numbers, either by letting us go up a bit, if we need higher numbers, or I think, they might even accept a bigger ratio on MIRV missiles. What we have to do is compare it with what they can do without an agreement and what we're willing to do if there is no agreement.

S: Right.

K: I continue to believe the worse outcome would be if we stick with our program and they go all out.

S: Yes. That would be a very bad outcome.

K: At the figure of 1100, that's roughly our program for MIRV missiles.

S: Yes.

K: I think 1142 is our program by 1980 if I understand it. So then the question is, since we're not giving anything up, of our current program, do we intend to have a larger program. If we don't intend to have a prospect of getting a larger program, is the limit that is set for them somewhat lower than they would do anyway or what are we giving up. You see that's what I would like

5.
Schlesinger

April 12, 1974

to analyze. I don't know the answer.

S: Right. Well, let's get a little analysis.

K: And maybe you and I could get together next week.

S: Well, you know I'm leaving on Tuesday to go over to Germany.

K: For how long?

S: I'll be there the balance of the week. I want to see if we can strengthen the NATO position in the North ___ region.

K: I strongly favored it.

S: As you know, every time we look at that it looks as if the Americans and Germans can hold: ... in the South, speaking conventionally. The North ___ region is kind of: full of holes. The British particularly are very ____. The Germans are improving markedly on this and I wanted to throw our influence in behind the North ___ region because there's not much point in holding in the South if you're going to collapse in the North. And also I'd review the troops and tell them what a great job they're doing and all those things.

K: I think it's important. Well then we may have to meet shortly after you get back because I'll be leaving for the Middle East shortly after that. I have to run to a Gromyko meeting.

S: I promised our friend Dayan 200 tanks and 500 APCs. But we're not now holding them up pending clarification of what the hell is going on there politically.

K: And also hold up a bit on the Syrian business.

S: OK.

K: Good thank you.

END

By CD NARA Date 6-8-94

TELCOM

Paul Volcker/Sec. Kissinger

April 13, 1974, 10:25

V: Yes, sir.

K: Did you get the cigars I sent you yesterday?

V: I didn't notice any.

K: I sent you some cigars through the Sec. of the Treasury but he probably is going to take credit for it himself.

V: That's right. Thank you.

K: We've got another draft which we sent to you. I was wondering whether we could have your skeptical comments by about 3:00 which is when I would start working on it.

V: Where did you send it?

K: Do you want it sent to your home?

V: Better send it to my home -- well you can send it to my office and I will be down there in two hours maybe.

K: Well, where is your home?

V: 2936 Cleveland Ave.

K: O.K. We will send a copy out there.

V: O.K.

K: Thank you, Paul. Can you give us your views about 2:30.

V: I will do so.

K: Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By NARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON

George Vest/Secretary Kissinger

April 12, 1974

10:35 AM

(Missed first part)

V: ______ mentioned SALT and a number of them interpreted what you said and are writing, or proposed to write, that you have said there will be no SALT agreement this year.

K: There will be a permanent SALT agreement. Which is what I said before. But it is possible there will be a SALT agreement. I wasn't making any great news.

V: That's why I called you right away because they were 'jumping.'

K: It is exactly the situation we described earlier. There will not be a comprehensive agreement this year but it still remains to be seen whether we can get a substantial part of it.

V: Right, I get the picture.

K: OK.

V: I'll get to them right away.

K: Good, thank you.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority E0 12/95</td></tr><tr><td>By CO NARA Date 6-8-95</td></tr></table>

April 12, 1974

4:35 PM

(Missed first part)

to have

S: __/two tickers now by Mike Mansfield saying the President told him he plans to visit Helsinki next month.

K: Impossible.

S: I know, but we've got to answer it now.

K: I've already said it isn't possible.

S: How are we going to respond to these particular ones?

K: I've already said it publicly. They asked me, is the President going to Helsinki next month and I said no.

S: Oh, you said today.

K: Yes.

S: Oh, great.

K: When I saw Gromyko off.

S: Oh, OK. Good. Then we can just refer to that.

K: Say look. Are you looking at my schedule? Have you seen what this maniac is doing to me day after day?

S: Well, this week it's just been terrible.

K: I know but I have that United Nations speech. I haven't even had a chance to look at it yet.

S: Yes, that's right. I must say things get on - no, I don't know anything about it. I presume you order them, like Famly this morning; van der Stoel tomorrow morning.

TELCON

Sen. Mansfield/Sec. Kissinger

April 12, 1974,

4:45 p.m.

M: Afternoon, Henry.

K: How are you.

M: Not so good. I was asked by Reuters and UPI about the President's going to Moscow. I said he was going and I said he was also going to the security meeting at Helsinki in May. That is what he told me and I thought he wanted me to get out the information -- that he in effect authorized me without saying it. I don't say much when I come out of these meetings. I said he was going to Helsinki in May and would go to Moscow sometime he thought the middle of June.

K: Frankly, he had that a little bit screwed up. I have done something unintentional to embarrass you. When I saw Gromyko off someone asked me if he was going to Helsinki in May and I said absolutely not.

M: The Manchester Guardian called up and said there is not meeting in Helsinki in May, that there is a meeting in Geneva to wind it up. There is no Helsinki meeting.

K: What do you want me to do to counteract the bad reporting coming out of the press of your meeting and his going to Moscow. I need an explanation.

M: I will say he was considering going to it when concluded and I assumed he meant Helsinki but I was mistaken.

K: The fact is if it is concluded it will be at Helsinki.

M: When concluded it will be in Helsinki.

K: Right. If you say he is considering going to it whenever it is concluded then you will be on safe ground. It is not yet definitely decided.

M: I said he was going. He was pretty positive. I don't want to embarrass him. He has enough troubles as it is.

K: That would be a little embarrassing with our European Allies because we have not told them yet. As I recall it now he was considering going to Helsinki for the final meeting of the security conference which would be held in Helsinki. It was my mistake when I said he was going next month. I misunderstood him. That will clear it up.

K: Exactly.

M: Fine. Thanks.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12758
By CO NARA Date 6-8-94

April 12, 1974

5:07 PM

S: Yes sir.

K: Have we heard from the President about his Atlanta trip?

S: No, we haven't heard. I thought the thing was all settled, apparently now
it's all up in the air again about which one he's going to do.

K: Yes. Well, will you tell him we really have to answer. I would prefer him
giving a dinner. It would be easier from me if he didn't.

S: You would have to do the speech then, wouldn't you.

K: Yes. I have to know. Can you find out from Haig?

S: Sure. They ought to be down there about now. I'll see if I can get it. You prefer the dinner?

K: Right. And I've got Mansfield to retract it.

S: Good. I'll just tell Jerry Warren then to just do nothing.

K: Right.

S: OK.

END

TELECON

Jack Kubisch/Secretary Kissinger

April 12, 1974

6:00 PM

K: Have you seen that cable from ____________ which indicates that the Latin Americans are furious with us about that Latin American Foreign Ministers meeting and they're looking for some demonstration of independence?

JK: Furious for what reason?

K: I don't know. My point Jack is, I cannot afford a God-damn ____________ disastor here and I'm not interested in a revival meeting. Maybe we should cancel the God-damn thing.

JK: I don't know what he's referring to.

K: Why don't you look at that cable.

JK: OK.

K: It's only for me. Take a look at it and then just have somebody go up there and tell these guys I'm delighted to cancel the meeting. I've got more important things to do.

JK: I think that would be a disastor.

K: Right now the whole ____________ God-damn thing is heading into a disastor.

JK: I think the ____________ real problem was when a couple of weeks ago when I was stressing hard for a ____________ and getting things all worked out before they arrived in line with our conversation and they were resisting it. When you saw that and I saw it you told me to ease off. They're ____________ feeling much better about the thing now. I'll come and read the cable.

K: OK.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12/95
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-94

April 12, 1974

8:46 PM

K: Brent, have we heard from Key Biscayne?

S: Yes. On the dinner, Al said it looks good. That he'll will agree to the dinner.

K: On Wednesday.

S: Yes, he said he prefers Thursday and I said Wednesday is much better because they'll be wanting...

K: No, we can't keep them here on Thursday.

S: So he said he'd be working on Wednesday, but he said it looks good for that.

K: How about -- and he's not giving the speech.

S: And he's not giving the speech.

K: I guess he's in retirement again.

S: I don't know what turned all that around.

K: He doesn't want to have a press conference.

S: Oh, is that what was going to be -- oh, that's right. And he signed the real treaty paper.

K: OK.

S: The revision of it.

K: Otherwise is everything sane?

S: Otherwise everything is sane and quiet. I don't know how long he's going to stay down there but they canceled the Monday staff meeting. At least through Monday I guess.

K: Oh, Thursday would be better probably because he doesn't want to come back on Wednesday.

S: Oh, maybe. You think he would stay that long.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

Scowcroft - page 2

K: Well, I think we ought to lock one of the dates.

S: He said he would get back to me tomorrow on it.

K: We can hold them another night.

S: But Wednesday would be preferable.

K: Oh, yes, because they couldn't be quite as obnoxious as they are or which they're planning to be.

S: Are you going to try to talk to him about -- well I don't know if you'll have a chance -- about the Canadian locomotive thing?

K: We've got to get it settled by this week.

S: We really do. And I think you're talking to him is the only way to do it.

K: Yes, but I didn't want to do it before he went to Key Biscayne and into the clutches of Rebozo.

S: No, that's a good point.

K: OK.

END

TELECON

April 12, 1974

8:50 PM

K: What do you make of that cable?

JK: I've read it. I don't think that Rample used a representative of the Latin Americans. As you know Guyana is not a member of the OAS, it's very logical for the rest of them to come. I know he's got a problem because of his third world is gone but I can't Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and some of the others would s have this. However, but I would like as your authorization to get back in touch with Ferguson and Schauerte in New York and also we can penetrate here because the Peruvian and Argentine and others are arriving tomorrow evening. I'll find out what they're cooking up.

K: Why don't you call Rabasa.

JK: OK. I'll do that.

K: The limit would just be a total disaster if they did any stunt like that in Washington.

JK: What I'm thinking of -- you know they're going to have a meeting Tuesday afternoon at the Argentine Embassy -- and I image that ____ is thinking of trying to get them to say, OK, we are here and we're prepared to meet with the United States, but we want everyone to understand what we said and did in New York is in no way compromised by our country. Something like this. I imagine he's the one who is offering to try and promote it. I'll find out from the Latins what's going on if you have no objections.

K: No. Thank you.

END

DELLADIFEL
Authority EC 12958
By C9 NARA Date 6-8-84

TELECON

Winston Lord/Secretary Kissinger

April 12, 1974

10:12 PM

K: When you talk at the beginning about that __economy__, I think you should talk about the world having become global, one by the thrust of human aspirations and secondly by the requirements of science. Where the compartmentalization leads to a total and needless duplication of effort and lack of knowledge. Then the commodity thing is also not particularly well expressed. I don't disagree with it. I mean, what was it about the lack of knowledge that bothered us?

L: You mean in particular to raw materials?

K: Yes. I think if you put it into the context that it just __for a long period
than that can only be done by a correct understanding of needs and
resources. You see what I mean -- rather than have it just sound like a sort of
college paper. OK. I will leave a few pages which are marked -- not too well.
I don't so much disagree with it, it just doesn't have any level. OK. Thank you.

L: Right.

END

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Authority EC 12958</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>By C. NARA Date 6-8-74</td>
  </tr>
</table>

TELCONE

Win Lord/Sec. Kissinger

April 13, 1974

4:30 p.m.

K: Win, have we heard from Volcker.

L: Yes. He is pleased and in fact everyone thinks it is much better. His only substantive problem is on the food where we say we hope to increase our food assistance he thinks that is sort of ambiguous and he doesn't know whether we are promising more than we can deliver but all we are saying is that we will strive to increase it and he just thinks it is sort of ambiguous but he couldn't come up with any better wording himself but otherwise he had some stylistic suggestions that's all. Shultz and Cooper all feel it is much better.

K: O.K. Cooper does also.

L: Yes. He likes the tone now. I have also given you a memo on the major initiatives.

K: I have here. O.K. fine.

L: We will be here to go over it.

K: Right. I don't know whether there will be all that much need to go over it. All right. Let me work on it for a bit.

L: Good.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-94

TELCOM
Sisco/Sec. Kissinger

April 14, 1974

K: Joe.

S: Yes.

Kes

K: I hope you have a good explanation for your wife.

S: I will tell you. I just went out and I hope you've done the same thing now that you're a married man. I went out and took an hour off and bought her a little plant for Easter.

K: I just hope you remembered that she knows you left about two hours ago.

S: No, but I left about 45 mins. ago.

K: Look, Jim Callaghan called me and I told him we were not going to make a statement condemning the Israeli raid on Lebanon.

S: We certainly aren't.

K: O.K.

S: We didn't bother you. The Lebanese are thinking in terms of calling a Council meeting on Monday afternoon. The Israelis told me this afternoon that we were able to convey to the Lebanese a conviction that if they keep the border quiet -- that is the Lebanese -- the Israelis will keep it quiet. In other words the Israelis have done all they are going to do. I communicated that to the Lebanese. Now whether that is going to be enough for them to not call a meeting of the Security Council or not we will have to wait and see. I doubt it. I think the Israelis have been very restrained in this raid.

K: O.K. Because I promised Callaghan that we wouldn't do anything and that I would call him again Monday morning.

S: That's very good and we can talk about it again on Monday -- to have a look at it from New York. We shouldn't do a thing, Mr. Secretary.

K: O.K.

S: We tried quietly of course to prevent this Council meeting from being called and the Lebanese haven't made a final decision and I suspect they will think about it a little bit more over the weekend, but the Israelis, I just say, have been very restrained on this one.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EC 12958

By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

TELCONE

Sisco - page 2

K: Have you done that letter to Callaghan.

S: I've been over it. You didn't ask me to do it but I've been over it about an hour ago and it is in your office. I think somebody else did it -- EUR or someone. It is a summary on Fahmy, your talks etc. And you have also the Asad letter there.

K: Gromyko, the shit, excuse me, as soon as I said to him that I would meet him in Geneva that of course he lapped up. Now he wants to meet me in Damascus if I go to Damascus.

S: (Laughter) It is becoming positively shameful on his part the way he is doing this.

K: It is one of the dumbest performances I've ever seen.

S: He really said this to you very directly.

K: Yes, so I said I would have to think about it. Now I will tell this -- what is that Syrians name.

S: Shahibi. You had better get the real pronunciation from the interpreter. He is outside standing by.

K: I will just tell him, Look it is that same baloney again. I have no interest in it. I can't refuse it if Asad wants it.

S: I think Geneva is reasonable and I think he ought to be satisfied with that. How did that go.

K: It was entirely social except for the end. And I told him I would meet him in Geneva on the way, second I will be willing to have Geneva reopened after the Syrian disengagement is done. And third I will be willing to make a statement that we will pursue coordinated policies as a result of the Geneva meeting.

S: That's fair and he lapped all of that up I am sure. He has something to take back with him.

K: It is a pathetic performance.

S: It certainly is -- very pathetic.

TELCONE

Sisco/Sec. Kissinger

April 14, 1974

A:15 p.m.

K: One thing Fahmy wants is that I see the Syrian, I mean the Libyan
that you were supposed to see.

S: Yes, because on that let me tell you what has arisen. I think that
would be fine. Can we set that up for next week.

K: Yes, set it up for Tuesday.

of the

S: Because one other complications that has come up is that I think
Marwan -- who has been in New York, I didn't know that -- has been
talking to this fellow and I think he feels as if he hasn't had very much
attention. But also, he feels he has a catagoric commitment on airplanes
and all kinds of things and you know we are not very clear just what kind
of commitments he thinks he has. I think the fact that you would be
willing to see him and talk to him about...

K: He has a commitment from us on the radar -- I don't mean a commitment. We got Sadat's view.

S: That was our view on the radar, but this man is talking about airplanes
and all sorts of things I gather.

K: Fahmy wants us to give them the C-130s they have already paid for.

S: This is apparently what he -- he feels that he has a commitment of
somekind on the C-130. I am told this by Don Easum.

K: What do you think of that.

S: I myself would rather start on the radar and move slowly on this and
I think it is important for you to sound him out and see how this fellow
sounds.

K: I think I will give him the radar and say we will have to see what
happens on the airplanes but it is definitely in the ballpark.

S: I will have Don Easum get a hold him and say you would like to see
him on Tuesday.

K: Do you think that Don Easum could avoid telling him that I am the
obstacle to the airplanes. This is what he has done.

S: No, I'm sure he has not. But I am sure we can get across.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-84

Sisco - p.2

K: No, no, but that is what Fahmy said the guy told him. That he had been told by Easum.

S: No, no. Easum has not even talked to this fellow. Easum has not talked to him at all. I spoke with Easum about two hours ago and I know that he has not talked to him. I think it is Marwan. You know there is a little interplay going on between Fahmy and Marwan, Henry, that we've got to watch. Fahmy is trying to put him in his place and Marwan, of course, is playing around the edges.

K: Like you and me.

S: Ours is not serious. There's no competition. I don't know in there case.

K: Where is that Goddamned article that describes you as a yes man. I've yet to see it.

S: Last Sunday's Washington Post. You're not missing anything.

K: I want to protest it.

S: I wish you would. We'd like that.

K: O.K.

S: Thank you.

K: Bye.

END

TELCOM
Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

April 14, 1974

20:20 p.m.

S: Yes, sir.

K: Where are you?

S: In the office.

K: Oh, if I had known that I would have called you. Have we heard
about the Goddamned party.

S: We haven't heard anything further. I think it is -- you know, it is
a matter of the day. And I guess it is a little hard to get to him down
there now. But I don't think there is any question about it taking place,
I just think it is -- and I don't know what the difference between Wednesday
and Thursday is as far as he is concerned -- why he seems to prefer
Thursday. I know you need to know.

K: O.K. I hope you have seen that cable from Algiers that these guys
used the fact that we said -- that the White House said he was there
as the leader of the Third World all over the Third World-- Boumediene.

S: No, I've not seen that.

K: Who had that bright idea to put that out.

S: I okayed it. I didn't put it in but I okayed it.

K: That is the sort of thing that really should be checked.

S: I guess so. The argument was that that was the principal reason that
he was coming to the United States. But you are absolutely right. It
should not have been there.

K: It is not so crucial. O.K.

S: I'm going to hit him again in the morning on that.

K: O.K. Good, thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EC 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-64

TELCONE

Sisco/Sec. Kissinger

April 14, 1974

2:50 p.m.

K: You were not planning anything tonight were you, Joe.

S: Not a thing.

K: I am talking to our Syrian friend and he thinks in view of the return of Asad it would be a good idea if we sent Asad a little more than I have. He will not go back until Tuesday night. Especially about the Soviet conversation including the one today. That is to say we should send to Syria the substance of what I said to the General yesterday together with the conversation today in which I agreed that I would meet Gromyko in Geneva prior to going to the Middle East. I want Asad to understand that I will have nothing to discuss with Gromyko then because I will not have any new ideas -- Gromyko then proposed we would meet in Damascus and I told him this was a matter I would have to think about in order to get Asad's view, but my own personal view is that of course it is entirely up to the President that I did not see any particular usefulness that could come out of it. Do you think we could draft something and get it off to Syria tonight.

S: Sure.

K: If your wife has not left you after 23 years she never will.

S: 27 years.

K: It is more than I would put up with you.

S: It is the last portion that is not covered in the message.

K: Right and you might expand it a little more -- what you have in the message

S: O.K.

K: Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-94

TELECON
John Dunlop/Secretary Kissinger

April 14, 1974

6:14 PM

D: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you? Look, Brent Scowcroft talked to you earlier this week and in the meantime I've been so scheduled with visiting Foreign Ministers that I've never had a chance to follow it up. I just wanted you to know that I am extremely interested in this.

D: That's very generous of you. What I told him was this....

K: Would you like to talk to me about this at some point?

D: Well, what I said to him was this. I -- it represents somewhat of you would recognize a little bend in the course of my normal range of activities, interests and so forth. I would like to think over the weekend, I said to him about it, and then I would be back to him and if it seemed fruitful, I would like to talk to you.

K: Right. The way you should think about it is that I need somebody to whom I can essentially turn over the economic affairs.

D: Well, it's damn interesting. There's no question about it.

K: Subject to only my overall foreign policy direction. And with George Shultz leaving there's really no one here that can provide this combination of wisdom and knowledge.

D: As I said, it's an extraordinarily interesting range of ideas. It's a little bit -- of course the areas where I have operated I've known all the institutions and the characters and the personalities for 30 years and moving into an area where I know less than that, is one of the things I will personally need to think about.

K: On the other hand you have been watching. Any businessman or outsider I'd bring in wouldn't even know where to begin.

D: Well, that's true. Well, let me do this, let me think about it and I'll be back to him and then if it seems useful as I.....

K: I just want you to know that if you do decide....

D: I appreciate very much your calling me about it and I will take it very seriously.

K: Good, wonderful.

END

TELCONE

The President/Kissinger

9:20 a.m. - 4/15/74

K: Mr. President. I missed you last night.

P: I only called to wish you a Happy Easter.

K: Thank you. I am in New York today to speak to the UN. It is not
going to shake the world.

P: We seem to have a little problem on the Lebanon border but that was
inevitable.

K: Both sides are guilty there. I had a good talk with the Chinese last
night. You know the highest ranking official ever was here. They
fully reaffirmed our policy and he went on and on about your visit.
And he strongly reaffirmed the course that was outlined.

P: Did they give you any indication of the problems?

K: I have the feeling Chou is on the way out. They didn't mention him
once during the evening. And every time I brought him up they changed
the conversation to Mao. Now as I think back, I had over three hours
with Mao and Chou didn't say a word.

P: Mao (?) has killed off his people like Stalin.

K: That's right. That's the second man he's killed off. To be number 2
man is suicide. That conversation with me was his way of putting his
own stamp on the thing so that they could get rid of Chou without
hurting the relationship with the US.

P: Why do you think they want to get rid of him?

K: Domestic politics. I think it's a tragedy. I think it's a clash between
Chou and Madame Mao. This guy yesterday talked as if he were in
charge. He didn't say he was in charge but talked with great assurance.

P: We didn't meet him?

K: No, he was purged in the Cultural Revolution and just rehabilitated
after you were there.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By C0 NARA Date 6-8-95

TELCOM

Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

April 16, 1974,

10:35 a.m.

K: How about the dinner for tomorrow.

S: The dinner is all set for tomorrow.

K: Business suit.

S: Business suit, at 7:30.

K: I'm surprised he doesn't do it at 6:00. Including wives.

S: Including wives.

K: That includes my wife.

S: That includes your wife. It will be a big dinner. Over 100 of them are Latin Americans.

K: How can it be that many Latin Americans?

S: By the time you get the delegations, the OAS ambassadors, plus whatever wives there are it comes out to something like 100.

K: But why did we have to have the OAS ambassadors.

S: Gee, I don't know. I just followed the instructions of the Dept. of State.

K: The Dept. of State is a bunch of horses asses. Wouldn't it have been better to get another guest list?

S: I assumed this was with your blessing.

K: You know that they wouldn't check with me, those bastards.

S: We can still cut out the OAS ambassadors. I don't think any of the invitations have actually gone.

K: O.K. Well, let me talk to them.

S: O.K.

END

TELCOM
Sisco/Secretary Kissinger

April 17, 1974

9:25 a.m.

(Missed first part.)

The Secretary referred to the Gwertzman article in the NY Times.
He had obviously been given many details (included in the article)
of the different positions taken by the Middle East countries.
Fahmy was unhappy about the article.

St: I will check with NEA and let you know.

K: I've got to get this stopped, Joe. We cannot have it.-- What encourages Kissinger to proceed.--The moderate Egyptian position compared to the tough Syrian position. If we want to overthrow Sadat, this is a good way of doing it.

S: I would agree and all I can say to you is that I have not talked to him
and I will see what I can do to find out who has.

K: I may have to remove Atherton if I can't get any attention in these Bureaus, I've got to be brutal.

S: Let me look into it and give you an answer.
Do you have 30 more seconds; I was about to call you. We have a good balanced resolution. The British have worked one out in New York.
We have also worked one out over night. Will you give me the authority to just go ahead and work this out and I can assure you that it is very balanced.

K: But mention it to the Israelis.

S: Sure. Of course we will. Because I think we might be able to come out all right at the end of the line.

K: If you discuss it with the Israelis.

S: All right. Good, thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority 60 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-74

TELCORN

The President/Sec. Kissinger

April 16, 1974

3:00 p.m.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: How did your speech go over.

K: I think it went over very well.

N: Good, good.

K: I said some pretty tough things about forming cartels of producers and they did not go up the wall. On the whole, the reaction, actually, was better than even the NY Times reported because it just breaks their heart to say anything positive. I quoted some things that you said in 69 when you appeared before the UN about the need to dedicate ourselves to deeds and not just to retoric.

N: I guess we are going to have the For. Ministers dinner tomorrow night

K: That's right, Mr. President.

N: 8:00., Blk. Tie.

K: No. They were told not to bring blk. tie so they aren't ready for it.

N: We still make it 8:00.

K: 8:00 will be fine.

N: And women are coming.

K: Yes.

N: That's good. That will be good because Mrs. Nixon just having taken this trip, she ought to be there.

K: I think it would be essential for her to be there.

N: I just plan to speak briefly.

K: If you want me to, I will send over a few suggestions, but you usually do these things so well.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority CO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-67

K

President - p. 2

N: Yes. We will just make it a warm, sympathetic kind of a thing.

K: That's right. The major point with them is to give them the sense
that they've moved to the center of our attention, historic relationships.

N: Right. I had told Al to have the people prepare me a thousand words. Maybe I will just read it, or I don't know. Do you think I should do that or do you want me to just wing it.

K: Why don't we draft something and let you see it and then you can decide.

You could certainly read it.

N: If we read it, we could make copies and pass it around so they wouldn't
have to translate it.

K: I think there would be a lot of advantages.

N: Would they have a response?

K: I suggested that one of them respond. And they will let me know
tomorrow morning.

N: It won't be Sevilla Sacasa will it.

K: Oh, no. God no. It will be a Foreign Minister -- maybe the Brazilian,
maybe the Argentinian.

N: There response should also be in the same way. They should read it.
What I am thinking of is so it won't be a long dreary time in translating
and everything. Maybe we could just have a thousand words written
that I could read and I would ad lib a couple of things at the end and that's
that. And then hand it out to them. I don't know. That's a possibility. You
see if talk and translate and they talk and translate we are looking at about
an hour and a half at least. While they like speeches, we don't like them that
well.

K: Yes.

N: Basically, what you want more is just a friendly gesture don't you.

K: What is most important is the warm gesture. Another thing we could
do. I don't know how the room will be set up -- whether it will be round
tables or a long table. Because if it were round tables one could have

The President, p. 3

an interpreter at each table.

N: It sort of has a bad feeling when you hear that mumbling all the time.

K: Yes. That is true.

N: I don't like that but we could still use round tables. I think the round tables make it more...

K: It is a more intimate evening.

N: Also we avoid then the protocol.

K: Exactly.

N: I will determine on the reading tomorrow.

K: We will have something for you tomorrow morning.

N: That's good. I had a little call from Mansfield reporting on his dinner with the Chinese. He says the Chinese are very supportive and friendly about the President and about you etc.

K: Oh, they are all out.

N: And they asked about his coming there and he said well, tell me. They said go see Wong Chen. I said, fine Mike, go see Wong Chen, we are all for it.

K: Absolutely.

N: I think it is an indication that they want to warm things up a bit.

K: No question.

N: Another thing that is probably true too is that every time we sort of start to make a move towards our Soviet friends, they sort of move a little towards us.

K: Exactly. That's what these idiots can't understand. That our China policy-- what our critics don't understand our China policy absolutely depends on our Russian policy. The reverse would also be true. If we moved away from the Russians, then the Chinese then would be free.

The President, p. 4

N: Well, we are coming along and just remember if we have been able to take the heat of this last year and accomplish what we have we sure as the dickens are going to be able to take it a little while longer.

K: Mr. President, I believe that the public opinion is on the verge of turning if we can just --if there were just one unambiguous event like a House vote in your favor or something like this.

N: It is hard to get those people to ever come to a point because of politics, but we will see. We have some things that maybe will be interesting next week. The main this is that is very interesting both in terms of our foreign policy and even in my travels in Ohio and Michigan there is an undercurrent of support there that is just ready to break loose. What do you think?

K: That is my absolute conviction -- that is my firm conviction.

N: In foreign policy it never has left us.

K: In foreign policy the liberals are sort of trying to create the impression now that there is something wrong with our foreign policy. Our foreign policy is in great shape. What can they point to.

N: That is one of the reasons that the trip was hard for them to swallow.

K: Exactly. And why the summit is hard for them to swallow. If they were sure it would be a failure, they would want you to go. It's because they know damn well it will be a success. That it's a guaranteed success that they don't want you to go. And they can piss on SALT, we will have enough other agreements. The average person doesn't know what SALT stands for.

N: And on SALT WE WILL/HAVE SOMETHING.

K: We will certainly have something in the field of arsm.

N: And that's all you need.

K: Something on the ABM...

N: Everything has to be step-by-step.

K: Exactly.

N: Fine Henry. See you tomorrow.

K: Right, Mr. President.

N: Bye.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0 12/95
By C8 NARA Date 6-8-97

TELECON

Congressman Otto Passman/Secretary Kissinger

April 16, 1974

5:00 PM

P. Mr. Secretary.

K: Mr. Chairman, you called me last when I was in the middle of some frenzy and I never had a chance to return you call.

P: The only purpose in calling, I realize that unless we can find some money for Vietnam, those people could get in trouble. Let Parker go ahead and take 60 million dollars out of the development loan fund and leave it to me to fight it out for him. You're familiar with it, aren't you?

K: Yes, I'm familiar with it.

P: And course those people on the other side here are going to cut your throat anyway and last year they cut it to 3 and I moved it back to 450. If they need that extra money the 49 million I put in my supplemental I pulled that through. He says he must have 60 million dollars more and I said go ahead and take it out of the developmental loan account. But the way I was reading the record he was just a little bit afraid to do that. What's your views?

K: I'm sympathetic to it. But let me check it with my associates and call you back.

P: I'll tell you this. He's out of the country anyway but I want to back this President up and I know that he requested, recently had intended request, I think 119, he cut it to 114 and I asked him to find 60 elsewhere so I feel the responsibility to help you get the money.

K: I'm very sympathetic to it.

P: I'll be back in Washington Monday.

K: Why don't we talk on the phone then.

P. That's fine, if you don't mind.

K: Terrific. Thank you, have a good rest.

P: Thank you. Bye.

END

April 16, 1974

5:15 PM

L: Yes, sir.

K: I just wanted to tell you I thought that Latin American speech came out fairly well -- not the Latin American one, the other one.

L: I thought it was better than we thought it was and I think it's gotten good reactions and the fact that it went well in the N.Y. Times. I think it's shows you thoughtly addressed this major problem which, you know, you have been given credit to having thoughtfully addressed. Now we have to make sure it's followed up. I thought we maybe ought to get a memo out to people like Enders and Buffum and make sure the various proposals get attention.

K: Right. OK. I just want you to know that -- will you tell the others who helped you.

L: I certainly will. I appreciate and I'll pass that on.

K: Good, thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-74

TELECON

Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretary Kissinger

April 16, 1974

8:10 PM

K: Hello.

S: Henry.

K: Yes.

S: Dobrynin called Hartman a little while ago and told him that they had gone back to their German source on the Berlin matter and that it had been confirmed and that the source was Bahr (?). This now raises the question of what we do about this because it changes the situation completely as far as....

go to

K: I'd have Hillenbrand/Scheel.

S: Scheel. That's right. That's really the choice, is either Hillenbrand to Scheel or calling Staden in here. I don't see any point you're communicating with Bahr (?) on this. I think they should decide that among themselves. Although I don't think we should tell Scheel who the XXXX Soviets say their source is.

K: No.

S: You know, we get mouse-trapped in this thing if the Russians claim they have this on authority.

K: No, just say this is our information, is it correct, and what should we tell the Russians. Say Gromyko raised it, I said I couldn't believe it, he then said he would check their source, they did check their source and they didn't tell us who it was but they say they have reason to believe he's responsible.

S: And I think we have to tell the Germans in any demarche that this completely changes the situation - if correct - this would completely change the basis on which we've been operating in our defense of the German decision.

K: Why?

S: Well, because we've taken the position that the Germans did this and we agreed since it was not illegal. If the Germans now say that they've always been willing to withdraw if we veto it, first of all this is the agreed position between the four Western powers.

K: Well, I would just say you no doubt understand the implication of this - I wouldn't speak to them out to him.

S: OK, we'll do that first thing in the morning.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E6 12958
By CO NARA Date 6-8-84

TELCON
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

April 17, 1974

10:10 a.m.

K: Can't I have five minutes with the President.

S: Al is with him to ask him now.

K: All I need is five minutes.

S: I know, and I think the answer is yes. But you know the mood over here is not very good this morning. I think the answer is going to be yes but I don't have ...

K: What did they think was going to happen. Did you have any question.

S: No. I don't even know whether it is that but he is not in the cheerest mood. I'm sorry but he just would not answer last night and he is in with him now.

K: Ok. I will be over in 10 minutes. We are dealing with a nut house here. Do you want to come to that lunch, or do you want to come to any part of the Latin American ministers conference.

S: Not unless you think I should.

K: No, I would just like to have you get a little exposure to some of these guys.

S: Well, I will come to the dinner.

K: Oh, are you invited to that? That's a little more above your level.

S: I understand that.

K: O.K. I will see you shortly. How many dozens of people going to sit in on that meeting with Schuetz.

Sx

S: How many do you want with you.

K: Who is scheduled now.

S: Just you.

K: Well, that's insane: of course.

S: Well, you need a notetaker and with your meeting I think it is Sonnenfeldt and a State Dept. notetaker.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By NARA Date 6-9-84

TELCOM
Fahmy/Sec. Kissinger

April 17, 1974

10: 15 a.m.

K: Hello.

F: Good morning, Henry.

K: Ismail, how are you.

F: How are you.

K: O.K.

F: Humm.

K: I wanted to check with you about your appointment with the President.

F: Yes.

K: Would it be convenient for you to do it also, I'll say Monday next week.

F: Monday, next week?

K: Yes.

F: I can't stay. I'm leaving on Friday.

K: Oh, you are. All right, then we will do it tomorrow.

F: I'm coming tonight and if it is possible...

K: We have the Latin American Foreign Ministers here and it is hard for me to leave them. That's my problem.

F: I'll see him for 15 minutes, you know.

K: You and he cannot talk for 15 minutes. You will be fighting with each other as always.

F: Oh, no.

K: No, no. We will arrange it for tomorrow afternoon.

F: If you please, thank you very much.

K: Good.

F: O.K. Bye, bye. END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority CO 12958
By NARA Date 6-8-87

TELCON

Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

April 17, 1974

10:20 a.m.

S: Yes, sir.

K: We must get that appointment with Fahmy.

S: I understand that.

K: Can we do that -- I don't know when to do it. I'd like to do it at a time that our bloody Foreign Ministers are out of town. 4:30 in the afternoon -- that's probably too late to make the evening news.

S: Yes, it really has to be about ...

K: How about 2:30.

S: 2:30, let me try that.

K: Can you?

S: I will see...

K: We don't need a long time. Tell him half an hour is all we need. In fact that is all that is required.

S: Alright. I will shoot for 30 minutes at 2:30.

K: This toast is alright.

S: No barn burner.

K: Actually -- Latin America it will be-- not bad. These guys are the biggest gasers you've ever seen.

S: O.K. Good.

K. O.K.

END