A NEW PHASE IN VIETNAM?

Op de dag voordat bekend werd dat Parijs
aanvaardbaar was als plaats van samenkomst
voor besprekingen tussen vertegenwoordi-
gers van de regeringen van de Verenigde Sta-
ten en Noord-Vietnam, ontvingen wij het hier-
na volgende, speciaal voor „Ons Leger” door
E. Hinterhoff geschreven artikel.
Terwille van de actualiteit drukten wij het on-

vertaald af. Vertaling ervan zou immers een
maand uitstel betekenen.

Wij zijn er echter van overtuigd dat onze le-
zers de Engelse taal voldoende machtig zijn
om van de hierna volgende mening van Hin-
terhoff inzake de kwestie Vietnam kennis te
nemen.
(redactie)

The dramatic announcements made re-
cently by President Johnson, offering once
again to Hanoi a new possibility of bring-
ing war to an end and which were pre-
ceded by the dismissal of General West-
moreland from his command, mark a new-
perhaps the final one-phase of war in
Vietnam.

The setback suffered by President Johnson at the Hampshire primary elections as well as recent series of Gallup polls, showing the steady trend of his decreasing popularity, were the best proofs of growing frustration of American public opinion with the dragging war, showing no signs of any positive results.

In spite of the repeated assurances made
both by President Johnson as well as by
his close advisers like Dean Rusk and
McNamara (he was quoted already in
1964 as saying: 'I have met nobody in Sai-
gon who has any doubts in victory.') and
above all from General Westmoreland, it
has become obvious that the situation in
Vietnam, in spite of astronomical expen-
ditures and crippling losses, was not only
showing any prospects of a satisfactory
solution, which would enable the U.S. to
extricate itself without loss of face, but
on the contrary, was fraught with danger
of a military defeat, coupled with a poli-
tical humiliation with far-reaching impli-
cations.

It would be interesting, at the threshold of
this new phase to examine American op-
tions in Vietnam and possibilities of their
application: theoretically speaking, there
could be the following four options:

a. unilateral withdrawal;

b. negotiations;

c. containment, and

d. counter-escalation, wrestling the ini-
tiative from the enemy and trying to se-
cure a military solution which would al-
low to negotiate from a position of
strength.

All these options deserve a closer look:

Unilateral withdrawal

There is an increasing number of people
in the United States as well as in Western
Europe and in Britain in particular, who
have been clamouring since years for an
unilettaral American disengagement from
Vietnam. Some of them are idealists, paci-
fists or simply misguided so-called intel-
lectuals, often imbued with anti-American
and pro-Communist feelings. The others,
especially those who take part in stormy
demonstrations in various capitals, belong
to a widely spread and well organised (and
often subsidised) Communist-led fifth
column. Many of those belonging to the
first category, usually highly respectable
and well-meaning people feel that, after
all, American withdrawal needs not to be
a serious blow to American prestige and
long-term security plans in the Far-East
and in South-East-Asia; they argue that
de Gaulle had the courage acting against
the trend of public opinion in France, to
withdraw from Algiers and eventual Fran-
ce and Algiers are now on very good
terms. Furthermore, some of them argue
that there is no use worrying whether the
whole of Vietnam will become Communist
because this is an inevitable trend and
even if it will expand into the neighbou-
ring Laos, Cambodja and Thailand, recon-
stituting Indo-China under Ho Chi Minh's

leadership, still, in view of his indomitable
character, there is no danger that the
whole area may become Red China's satel-
lite.

By the way, all these people forget or
ignore what will happen to hundreds of
thousands of Sout Vietnamese, who have
been supporting present Government in
Saigon and were America's loyal allies;
no doubt all of them will be buttered in
the same way as tens of thousands of Al-
gierian Moslems who were fighting along-
side the French against N.L.F. After Fran-
ce's withdrawal there was a mass blood-
bath in Algiers beyond any description.
Finally, some of them argue that the
whole American involvement in Vietnam
in defence of the integrity and democracy
in South Vietnam is quite purposeless in
view of the corrupt nature of all its sub-
sequent regimes. These arguments are the
most dangerous because they resemble
similar ones which were put forward soon
after the war, when American Administra-
tion was twisting Chiang Kai Shek's arm
forcing him to agree to a "coalition" with
the Communist enabling them, in due
course to gain power; during those years
there was not enough slur to be poured
upon Chiang Kai Shek and his 'corrupt'
and 'indolent' administration, which has
succeeded in making from the island of
Taiwan an economic miracle and an
example of democracy.

Unfortunately, contrary to all these sirene
voices, American withdrawal from Viet-
nam-either unilateral or an enforced one.
- would be one of the most catastrophic
solutions which could be envisaged; it
would be a blunder of first magnitude

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with far-reaching repercussions not only in the United States but in the whole world and in Western Europe in particular. The Nemesis of history — in the form of chain reactions — is swift, irreversible and merciless...

One of the first implications as far as the U.S. is concerned, will be the necessity to evacuate Thailand: when I was in Bangkok in the autumn 1966, I was told by some senior officials that, if it would ever come to an American withdrawal from Vietnam, the Thais would never allow the American 'fall-back' into Thailand: the Thais, being 'flexible' realists will understand that, in case of American presence in Thailand, their country will become the next target for Communist expansion and that, instead of relying upon American military assistance, which — after a withdrawal from Vietnam — would have lost its credibility, they would prefer to come to terms with Ho-Chi-Minh.

American withdrawal would also mean an end to all schemes of 'containment' of Red China and Communist influence, radiating either from Peking or Hanoi, will spread unhindered all over South-East-Asia with the countries of that area seeking one by one an accommodation with the Communists. In such a situation a 'domino' theory, ricucled by some, will prove to be a tragic reality: President Johnson, in his speech on 12th February 1968 said: 'we are not going to surrender'. His words have been commented by Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, who said: 'Simply to pull out would start a whole chain of disasters; for the U.S. around the world: we would never be able to return to South-East-Asia. Asian regionalism and neutralism would be destroyed. Asian nations will make the necessary arrangements to live with Communist China; our alliances elsewhere would be undermined and crumble...' The worst implications, of course, would be felt in Europe where American deterrent system would lose its credibility and NATO as a collective defence system would collapse, with its members stampeding into bilateral arrangements with the Soviet Union, which would be only marking time for expansion westward without a single shot being fired.

Briefly speaking, the consequences of American withdrawal would be simply terrifying: the U.S. would become nothing but an outsize Britain, a Fortress of America, besieged gradually from all directions of the compass, without any role in the international arena, economically impoverished and torn apart by racial riots, financed by the Communists of all brand. Fortunately, President Johnson, in all his statements, has been categorically ruling out any possibility of American unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam. Whether his successor in the White House will also follow a similar policy is an open question, which belongs to crystal gazing beyond the scope of this article.

And yet, a possibility of an unilateral withdrawal — in certain circumstances — could not be ruled out: such situation may arise, for instance, as a result of a policy of the Government in Saigon — after all, South Vietnam is still a sovereign country — which could ask the Americans to leave. There are good reasons to believe that such a move may have been contemplated by late President Diem in summer 1963, when he, being increasingly disappointed with his American allies (and vice-versa...) was sounding a possibility — through the intermediary of French ambassadors in Saigon and Hanoi — coming to terms with Ho Chi Minh in order to reach a political solution, which would have resulted in a neutralisation of an unified Vietnam — a solution which, at that time, was an theme to American Administration. The only way to prevent Diem from doing so was to remove him by the way of a military 'coup' — engineered, as stated by one of the greatest authorities on Vietnam, late Prof. Bernard Fall — not without American connivance.

Such situation could also arise if the U.S. would accept General Gavin's suggestion — strongly endorsed by George Kennan — to establish along the coast American fortified 'enclaves', leaving the task of fighting the Vietcong to Southvietnamese armed forces; fortunately as a result of a scathing criticism made by General Maxwell Taylor, for a time, American ambassador in Saigon, General Gavin's strategy has been rejected; it would be of interest to quote General Maxwell Taylor's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in January 1966: 'To button up our troops in defensive positions and thus to sacrifice their unique attributes of mobility and firepower would constitute the abandonment of our allies on the battlefield and would assign a most inglorious mission to our troops... The effect of such behaviour on our South-vietnamese allies would be disastrous... Our only alternative would be to accept dishonourable terms or to continue to sit out war indefinitely on a supine defensive...'

And yet, an unilateral withdrawal could be a decision of a Government in Saigon, constituted as a result of negotiations with N.L.F. — what brings us to the second option, namely:

## Negotiations

Normally, negotiations for a peacesettlement follow a cease-fire and the end of hostilities. This is the method which American Administration had in mind with its suggestions on various occasions, directly or indirectly. One of the methods applied by the U.S. which — as it was believed in Washington, would 'bring Ho Chi Minh to the conference table', was the bombing of North Vietnam. Yet, in spite of the gradually increasing intensity of the bombing, it did not bring about the coveted results.

Under the growing pressure of criticism at home and abroad, President Johnson, unduly sensitive to such criticism, began modifying his terms for starting negotiations, insisting however on a reciprocity, namely on a gradual de-escalation of hostilities. Yet, no amount of bombs dropped upon many targets in North Vietnam did have any impact upon Ho Chi Minh's rigid and inflexible terms formulated in his Four Points namely: unconditional cessation of American bombing, cessation of all acts of war, American withdrawal and freedom for the Vietnamese people to settle themselves their own affairs. These terms provide no reciprocity whatsoever and since they have been made public, Ho Chi Minh did not make the slightest concession.

Yet, under the incessant pressure of criticism from all quarters, President Johnson, in his speech in San Antonio, Texas, on 29th September 1967, made a very important concession: 'The United States is willing immediately to stop aerial and naval bombardment of North Vietnam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We would assume that while discussions proceed, North Vietnam would not take advantage of the bombing cessation or limitation.' In other words, President Johnson has agreed to negotiate not after the ceasefire but while fighting will go on, without even insisting on any control measures that the enemy would not take advantage of the concessions offered by the Americans. Having agreed to negotiate while fighting, President Johnson and his advisers have unfortunately disregarded painful experience of a similar situation in Korea, when the Chinese Communists in Korea were on the verge (in mid 1951) of having to draw back to their positions near the 38th Parallel, due, partly to over-extension of their supply lines and partly, due to American air interference of them, the Russians suggested to American and U.N. officials that negotiations might be possible. Although peace talks did start, the hostilities were not terminated or not even suspended. But American military pressure, especially in the air had been greatly reduced, giving to the enemy greater freedom of action in moving his troops and supplies, especially, the troops, with the result that peacetalks dragged for over 2 years with nearly twice as many American casualties (52,000) than if they had moved in June 1951 to drive the Chinese Communists forces out of Korea, which could have been liberated. President Eisenhower revealed recently a previously unknown secret fact that when Korean negotiations had once again bogged down, he made it known to the Communists (through Mr. Nehru) that unless they were resumed and concluded promptly, he would order whatever action might be necessary to end the war. The Communists promptly returned to negotiations and agreed to a cease-fire in short order.

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Yet, the greatest danger which could result from negotiations while fighting, provided that Ho Chi Minh would accept the San Antonio formula as a basis for negotiations, would have a disastrous impact upon the morale of the Saigon Government which could be justified in doubting the credibility of American undertakings and fearing American intentions 'to sell out' South-Vietnam. In this respect it would be very important to quote an extract from a captured enemy document, containing the text of a speech delivered to Communist cadres and combat leaders in South Vietnam on April 10, 1966 by a Northvietnamese General Nguyen Van Vinh: 'Fighting while negotiating is aimed at while opening another front with a view of making puppet i.e. South Vietnamese) armed forces more disintegrated, stimulating and developing enemy's internal contradictions. Hanoi has told its troops that the diplomatic offensive aiming at peace talks must be co-ordinated with an all-out military drive to secure decisive victory. Armed uprisings in cities are called for.

The instructions are contained in a document, captured by American Airborne troops on April 17th, 1968 in the Binh Dinh province of the Central Highlands. It is the directive of unit 491, the political staff of the North Vietnamese 3d Division Headquarters.

The directive does admit that the time is approaching when Hanoi will have to accept diplomatic contacts with American 'imperialists'. But, it goes on, 'such action is not inconsistent with our basic policy on the resistance to Americans for national salvation. Our military objectives are aimed at winning a decisive victory at the beginning.'.

Consequently, nothing could prevent the snowballing effects of negotiations while fighting, which will bring about growing defections of Southvietnamese soldiers to the winning side and a stampede of politicians to the band-wagon of the National Liberation Front. Against the background of the collapse of Government in Saigon and of law and order in South Vietnam (all this happened also in the years 1948-1949 in China) obviously, a new Government, based upon the N.L.F. formed in such an atmosphere, will ask Americans and their allies to leave its country.

If such evacuation would take place while negotiations will proceed while fighting will continue, it would mean that it could become some hundred times worse than Dunkirk, with all American equipment, which had cost billions of dollars, being left to the winning side. The political and psychological implications of such a scuttle could be, indeed, terrifying both in the United States as well as abroad.

Furthermore, the purpose of negotiations — as far as both parties are concerned — is quite different: whereas Ho Chi Minh is aiming at the reunification of both Viet-

nams under his leadership, Americans are much more modest aiming only at the return of the status quo ante, namely to the situation which existed in 1954, in other words, to the same situation which invited Communist aggression in the first place.

There is no doubt that a declaration by the U.S. of a Vietnam united under a regime, being the result of free and unfettered elections, might have strengthened the U.S. bargaining position and lifted the morale of all in Vietnam — both North and South — who oppose the Communist regime in Hanoi. After all, about 1 million people left North Vietnam, showing in this way their disapproval of a Communist regime.

If American Administration would go even further, expressing its support to the idea of neutralisation of the whole area of South East Asia as (in fact has been stipulated at Geneva in 1954), with the iron-cast guarantees, signed by the Great Powers, of the territorial integrity of the area as well as freedom from interference in its internal affairs, such an approach would be the best proof of a real statesmanship. Most likely, such initiative would have enlisted de Gaulle's support, because he has also put forward a similar idea—a few years ago. Unfortunately, there seems to be very little prospect of any American initiative of such kind, because American Administration has been since many years a prisoner of the policy of 'containment' and of status quo.

Consequently, unless negotiations will begin one day after an agreement with Hanoi about the choice of a suitable place will be reached, it is most likely that Americans will continue to apply their political, and above all, military strategy of containment of the enemy without any clear-cut political and strategic plans.

This brings us to the third option, namely to the strategy of containment, sometimes called 'holding strategy'.

## Containment

Before embarking upon its brief analysis it would be worthwhile to remember that, in accordance with American Constitution, ultimate responsibility for the overall operational conduct of war lies on the shoulders of American President, being also Commander in Chief of U.S. armed forces. Without going into history one could say that, unfortunately, American Presidents to begin with Roosevelt, have not been too successful in the field of grand strategy. This goes also for Truman, who has prevented Mac Arthur from reaching a complete and total victory in Korea. Equally the same goes also for Kennedy, who, by refusing air support to the landing of Cuban patriots at the Bay of Pigs, contributed to Castro's regime staying in power.

This time it is President Johnson, who, in his dual capacity as a President and a

C.I.C. has been imposing his will in the form of operational directives as well as various restrictions and limitations in use of military and air power upon General Westmoreland, whom, in spite of growing criticism, he has been supporting to the hilt. Unfortunately, President Johnson, in taking his military decisions, obviously after consultation with his advisers, very often takes into consideration several other factors, especially domestic ones, and above all, considerations of foreign policy, in particular reactions of the Soviet Union and of Red China. By doing so, he has been trying to avoid, or at least, to minimise any possible risks of damaging the so-called 'detente', or provoking China. When in February 1965, after a successful raid by Vietcong upon the American base in Pleiku, a decision to escalate the war in Vietnam was taken, President Johnson — against the advice of his Chiefs of Staff, who were recommending a massive bombing campaign to last some 16 days directed at some 96 major targets and to be continued, if necessary, in order to stun the enemy military, economically and psychologically — settled for a policy of 'gradual reponse'. The initial American bombing raids were directed against military barracks, made of wood which could be repaired in a matter of hours, with new targets being added slowly and grudgingly over the past 3 years, long after the North Vietnamese were given time to build their formidable air defences, which did not exist when the bombing campaign started in February 1965.

This unduly caution, motivated, no doubt, by political considerations, had unfortunately adverse effects from psychological, political and military points of view. As it was only gradually stepped up, it failed to produce the necessary psychological impact upon the Northvietnamese, who got used to it and consequently 'did not bring Ho Chi Minh to the conference table...' as it was expected in Washington. At the same time, it allowed a political opposition to bombing to develop both in the U.S. and in Western Europe (in Britain in particular) fanned by left-wing politicians, often blended with anti-American undertones. Finally, due to the Soviet help, it allowed Hanoi to organise the most sophisticated air defence system, which resulted in crippling losses of aircraft and above all, in pilots belonging to the cream of the American flying personnel. According to findings of the Russian Study Center at the College University, Hamilton N.Y. dated January 1967 since the autumn 1965 the number of conventional aircraft guns in North Vietnam has risen from 1.500 to 5.000, possibly 7.000. In the autumn of 1965 there were only four batteries firing Soviet SAM missiles. By early October 1966, their number has risen to 25-30 each with 6 launchers...' If one takes into consideration that this assessment was made in 1966 and that since that date the Russians

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One of the most examples of the futility of these operations has been the recently launched counter-offensive in the northern provinces, which although successful, proved to be of no practical results because the enemy simply disappeared, vanishing 'like fish in the sea'. General Giap applied the same method during the American reliefoperation of Khe Sanh, which, although very successful, did not result in a direct encounter with the enemy, what would have given to the Americans a possibility of taking advantage of their overwhelming technological superiority.

It would seem that one of the most pressing things would be to transfer war to North Vietnam, which would, first of all, gradually relieve present pressure, exercised by North Vietnamese regular divisions, at present fighting in South Vietnam, as they will be withdrawn as soon as possible to North Vietnam. The term 'transferring war' to North Vietnam must not be understood as an invasion of that country, as it would require at least one million men, possibly more and, in any case, far more than what the United States could muster, but would mean simply penetrating part of the territory, lying north of 38th Parallli with the intent of blockini all major routes and passess into South Vietnam. Such an operation, in order to ensure its success, must be coordinated with an amphibious landing — and this is a speciality of the Marines — somewhere near the port of Haipong, in order, by expanding the bridgehead to isolate the port of Haipong from the rest of the country, to cut in this way the flow of war material brought in increasing quantities from the Soviet bloc countries.

This would be the easiest way to stop Soviet arms deliveries, avoiding unnecessary, which might have risen as a result of the bombing of Haipong or even of mining all sea approaches to it. When this operation would be coordinated with an intense and precise bombing of all rail and road communications with China, it would mean drying up, in a very short time, of all sources of supply of arms to Giap, what would amount to a very serious situation in which Giap may find himself. It is worth recalling that during the first Indo-China war, the situation of the Viet-Minh improved radically only after the Communists had won the civil war in China, which had since become a 'base' and a source of arms supply to the Viet Minh.

His rificulties could be further increased by bombing the rice-growing Red River delta region, what could result in flooding the area in question. If, in the meantime, the port of Haipong would be cut from the rest of the country, and at the same time, the disruption of road and rail communications with China would make the import of badly needed rice into North Vietnam, more difficult if not impossible, all this would mean the threat of starva-

tion of population and of armed forces as well. Needless to say, that this method, certainly more humanitarian than bombing, ought to be coordinated with a dynamic effort aiming at flushing Vietcong guerillas from the Mekong rice growing area, from where it has been smuggled by junks into North Vietnam.

The transfer of the war into North Vietnam has been urged for a long time by military leaders in Saigon. However, these suggestions were always rejected in Washington for political reasons, because it has been always feared that it would cause another outburst of hysterical outcry in the West against American 'aggression' against North Vietnam and above all, that it could be considered as a provocation by Red China and possibly by the Soviet Union.

Obviously, for any more extensive operations in North Vietnam — except, perhaps, as indicated above of a limited nature — General Westmoreland or his successor would need more troops than he could ever get. Equally, it is doubtful whether the South Korean Government, in view of the deteriorating situation, as a result of the Pueblo incident, would be prepared to send another division to Vietnam. On the contrary, if North Korea would intensify the tension or even open hostilities — as a sort of a 'second front' to help Ho Chi Minh — one could not rule out that the Southkorean Government may ask for evacuation and return of its two divisions, which have very much distinguished themselves in fighting in South Vietnam. It would be equally futile to expect any reinforcements from all other countries, which sofar have been actively supporting the United States in South Vietnam.

The only, sofar untapped source of fighting manpower is the Republic of China on the island Taiwan with its some 600.000 first class armed forces (peace-time, which could be at least doubled, in case of mobilisation) equipped by the Americans with most modern weapons and poised in full battle-trim for a return to the mainland. These troops could either make a series of landings, in accordance of carefully prepared plans, on China's eastern seaboard or take an active part in North Vietnam from where they could enter the southern provinces of China through the 'backdoor'. Most likely, these military operations, will be coordinated with a series of mass unprisings, well prepared in advance, against Mao's regime, which could spread like a landslide.

Sofar various suggestions made by Chiang Kai Shek to this effect have been falling upon deaf ears in Washington, where any idea of such a solution seems to be a fool... in the same way as it was in 1951, when President Truman, by rejecting General McArthur's plan for the use of Chinese Nationalists in Korea, which prevented the achievement of a complete victory. Since that time the combat value of

Chinese Nationalists has increased enormously as a result of massive American military aid and intense training. One could say that today, Chiang Kai Shek's armed forces represent a powerful, modern fightingmachine, the use of which could dramatically change not only the whole situation in Vietnam — as e result of American victory — but in the whole Far-East. Obviously, if Chiang Kai Shek would secure control of the mainland, it would automatically mean the cessation of all armsdeliveries to Hanoi, what alone would be sufficient to bring war in Vietnam to an end.

Although the possibilities of using Chinese Nationalists has sofar never been mentioned in any official statements made by American spokesmen or high ranking politicians in spite of their visits to Taiwan, including visits by Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, one could safely assume that the hesitation to use them may be because of President Johnson's reluctance to avoid the war and his fear that such a decision could provoke Red China, possibly the Soviet Union.

As regards Red China, Chiang Kai Shek's landing would result in such an upheaval and absorb Mao's shattering regime to such a degree that in such a situation, he will certainly have no time to think about sending his troops to North Vietnam. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, any theoretical physical intervention by the Russians against Chinese Nationalists must be completely ruled out, because it would unite the whole Chinese nation against the white 'imperialists' and invaders. On the other hand, it is quite possible that the Russians may have no objections because Chiang Kai Shek would replace Mao's intransigent and militant anti-Soviet regime, which created an atmosphere of dangerous tension and friction along the Soviet border.

Needless to say, a change of guard in Peking would also mean a dramatic change of the whole worldbalance and especially in the Far-East, transforming it from an area of dangerous tension into an area of peace and stability.

If President Johnson really wants to implement his pledge, he must realise that victory at a conferencetable bust be preceded by a victory on the battlefields and not otherwise.

As war in Vietnam has shown, the Americans are fully capable of winning victories on the battlefields. It is only up to their High Command to plan the conduct of operations in such a way that it could enable them to take fullest advantage of their technological and numerical superiority in order to achieve the badly needed victory. Only then — and not before — one could think seriously about conducting peace-talks, aiming at a constructive solution not only of the problem of Vietnam but of the whole area of South East-Asia.

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