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the German force was that a stronger "shield" would compel the attacker to concentrate his forces, thus offering a target for tactical atomic weapons.¹

The Christian Democrats themselves were divided. The case for a conventional defense was made by second-line defense spokesmen, Berendsen, Kliesing and Kiesinger. Blank, the Defense Minister, contributed nothing to the discussion of the strategic issues. It was not surprising that Adenauer, professedly no military expert, should have confined himself to broad political issues; but the absence from the debate of Strauss, the most effective Government spokesman on defense, and Jaeger, the Chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee (both CSU), was indicative of the division of opinion.²

Adenauer indicated his support for the "conventional force" school and voiced a muted criticism of American policy in a brief article on the dangers of an overemphasis of nuclear weapons, on July 27.³

¹Verhandlungen, 159 S., July 6-7, 1956, pp. 8777-78. General Gruenther developed this view before the "Herrenklub" in Bonn in May. See *Die Welt*, May 10, 1956

²Jaeger spoke during the conscription debates but did not discuss the strategic issues.

³"Auf keinen Fall Sicherheitsabbau," first published in a minor journal, *Westdeutsche Rundschau*, on July 27, and not reprinted in the official *Bulletin* until August 21, under the title "Lohnt sich der Aufbau der Bundeswehr noch?"--the change of title suggesting that the main purpose was to reinforce the flagging public support for the Bundeswehr, and not, as often thought, to voice his disagreement with American policy.

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He was reacting not only against the Radford Plan rumors but also against a remark by Eden that local war in Europe was inconceivable, and comments by Dulles at a press conference arising out of the Radford Plan incident, on July 18. Dulles' remarks on strategy differed sharply from those expressed by Adenauer, and suggested relative indifference to the size of the German contribution. Through disclaiming knowledge of current military plans or competence to discuss military policy, Dulles expressed general agreement with the "growing feeling throughout the world that recent developments call for a greater emphasis on modern weapons and their means of delivery . . . and perhaps less weight upon manpower." The full German commitment should be fulfilled "unless and until there is some change by the joint action of NATO."

if there is an agreement in the NATO Council upon lower force levels, there would be no particular reason that I can think of from a political standpoint why we should urge something higher than the force goals that the military people thought were important . . .

He expressed the hope that large armies would not be needed for "brushfire" local wars, that economic or financial sanctions, or selective nuclear threats, could control these. He did not deny a press rumor that he might accept a reduction in the German force, but merely said that he had not discussed the idea of a reduction with Adenauer.

When I discussed the matter with Chancellor Adenauer, it was in terms of the great importance of the Federal Republic's carrying out its present commitment to NATO.¹

¹For text of Dulles' press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1956, pp. 181 ff.

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This was indeed the weakest of support for a large German buildup; the impression was that Dulles anticipated some reduction in the German force levels as part of a broader replacement of manpower by nuclear firepower; with American and SHAPE doctrine thus undermining the arguments of German supporters of large conventional forces, it is hardly surprising that Adenauer inclined toward yielding to the pressures for short-term service and acceptance of the prevailing belief in the value of tactical nuclear weapons. Even so, he did not yield immediately. There is no doubt that his misgivings were serious, and he continued to express them after Heusinger had returned from American with a full report on the tendency of American military policy. He was reported to have been deeply impressed, but not wholly persuaded, by conversations with Strauss and with the American Secretary for War, Quales.

Two further factors made for an acceptance of the prevailing doctrine. Firstly, those differing with the current NATO strategy, by contrast with Strauss in 1961/62, lacked political standing and self-confidence in strategic controversy. These were back-bench defense or foreign policy specialists in the CDU, more likely to be alarmed by the discovery that their own strategic thinking differed from that of SHAPE than to embark on a public campaign against American and NATO strategic doctrine. Strauss, the strongest political figure interested in strategic questions, was wholeheartedly in favor of the prevailing trend toward nuclear doctrine.

Secondly, any leverage which Germany could exert in 1956 in favor of NATO conventional forces was extremely limited--the more so in the

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light of the delays in the buildup of the Bundeswehr. The notion of overwhelming Soviet conventional superiority, the figure of 175 Soviet divisions, had scarcely been questioned in 1956; and this was a truer picture of Soviet strength at this time than in the 1960's after successive Soviet manpower reductions. The difference between a German contribution of 500,000 and 350,000 men was not sufficient to influence the military policy and strategic doctrine of the American and British governments in favor of a policy of conventional resistance in Central Europe.¹ This must have been clear to Adenauer at the latest at the WEU meeting in mid-September. In these circumstances it is not surprising that he went no further in opposition to prevailing Western policy than to voice his own strategic views and misgivings. He did not develop them into a systematic critique of NATO policy.

Thus, the short-lived German attempt to swim against the tide of Western military policy was abandoned as soon as its implications and lack of prospects became clear. The strategic issues had been raised briefly in the debates in mid-1956, but had little public impact. The issue of nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr was not raised openly by the German government at this time, and German opinion was wholly unprepared when the question arose in 1957/58. But the origin of the nuclear issue in German policy was not the German reduction in the size of the Bundeswehr, but the NATO strategy of nuclear response accepted

¹This was not fully realized by German parliamentary opinion in 1956; Freund, op. cit., pp. 137-167, overestimates the influence of the German decision on subsequent NATO military policy.

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this when he saw that the alternative was not viable, but it was the
general acceptance of the trend, not Strauss' individual policy, which
brought the nuclear issue to the fore in Germany in 1958.

### III. Nuclear Weapons for the Bundeswehr?
1957-58

The decision in 1958 to arm the Bundeswehr with tactical nuclear weapons--more accurately, delivery vehicles capable of being fitted with nuclear warheads, which were to remain under American control--roused the deepest passions and gave rise to the most bitter controversies of the struggle over rearmament. Communication between Government and Opposition virtually ceased; the official positions hardened, the Government's hostility to disengagement or nuclear-free zones became obsessive, while the demagogy of the SPD's compaign "Kampf dem Atomtod" largely drowned the element of moral and political protest.

The first public discussion of nuclear weapons in Germany took
place in April and May 1957, precipitated by an SPD parliamentary
question (Grosse Anfrage) laid before the Bundestag on April 2, which
was debated on May 10. The SPD proposed that, as a contribution toward
halting the spread of nuclear weapons, Germany should refrain from
acquiring them for the Bundeswehr and should refuse to have allied
nuclear weapons stationed on German territory. The Government refused
both demands. It argued that, since allied strategy required the presence
of nuclear weapons in Europe, Germany could not expect to have a
privileged position as a nuclear sanctuary. As regards German atomic
weapons, an unconditional renunciation would reduce the Soviet incentive
to come to an equitable disarmament agreement. It was stated that the

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question of German atomic arming did not yet arise, and would depend on
the course of the disarmament negotiations and the development of the
American nuclear stockpile; two years was mentioned as the period before
nuclear weapons would become available.¹

The parliamentary debate had less public impact than a declaration
on April 12, by 18 leading physicists, including Nobel prizewinners
Max Born, Otto Hahn and Werner Heisenberg, voicing concern with "the
plans for equipping the Federal forces with atomic weapons." stating that
tactical atomic shells were as destructive as the Hiroshima bomb, and
though disclaiming competence to make concrete policy proposals, stating
that "we believe that a small country like the Federal Republic will
best protect itself and do most to advance world peace by expressly and
voluntarily renouncing the possession of nuclear weapons of any kind."²
Adenauer and Strauss damaged the Government by their intemperate
response, Adenauer "deploring" that the scientists had not first spoken
to him, Strauss describing the manifesto as "a frivolous experiment."³
The initial public reaction was, predominantly, to praise the physicists'
sense of public responsibility and to describe the issue as one of
conscience more than policy.

¹Verhandlungen, 209 S., May 10, 1957, especially speeches of Erler, Adenauer and Strauss, pp. 12052-74.

²Text in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 13, 1957.

³*Bulletin des Presse-und Informationsamtes der Bundersregierung*
April 16, 1957, pp. 633-634. Cf. cited below as *Bulletin*.)

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In virtue of the supposed two-year delay before a decision
on German nuclear weapons, the SPD did not succeed in making this a
major issue in the Federal election of September, 1957, which was won
by the Christian Democrats with an increased majority. The sense of having
been tricked was a secondary, but not negligible, factor in the
bitterness of the SPD reaction when the Government forced a parliamentary
decision authorizing tactical nuclear weapons for the Bundeswehr within
the framework of NATO planning in March 1958. As early as September 1957,
the Government and been offered a small number of American Matador missiles,
(range 500 miles) capable of being used with nuclear warheads, for
training purposes. ¹ The approval of the Bundestag Defense Committee
was required for the purchase of the Matadors. A more important decision
on long-term military procurement had arisen as a consequence of the NATO
Council decision in December 1957 to proceed with arrangements for
stationing both IRBM's (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) and
tactical nuclear weapons in Europe under a "dual control" system, the
Americans in all cases retaining control over the warheads. The
NATO Military Committee had been instructed to draw up a long-term
plan, MC70, to establish detailed arms requirements, including those
for tactical nuclear delivery systems, for each member. Parliamentary
approval of the principle of tactical atomic arming was required for
German acceptance of MC70.²

¹This was asserted by Erler in the Bundestag on March 20, 1958 and not denied by government spokesmen. Verhandlungen, p. 882.

⁴MC70 came to be emphasized in Strauss' retrospective accounts of the decision. See especially "Die Klare Konzeption," Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz, Nr. 20, 1960.

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The 1957 NATO decision on tactical nuclear weapons represented the concrete implementation of the 1954 strategy. The Eisenhower Administration did not place as high a value on the prevention of nuclear proliferation as the Kennedy Administration, but was willing to go some way towards satisfying European demands for nuclear weapons. In 1954, in order to facilitate NATO's adoption of the strategy of tactical nuclear response, the Administration had revised the Atomic Energy Act (the restrictive "McMahon Act," 1946) enabling atomic weapons to be supplied to allies provided the warheads remained under American control.¹

At the December 1956 meeting of they NATO Council the Governments of Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Turkey requested that tactical nuclear weapons be made available to the European forces. On April 12, 1957, it was announced that the U.S. would make available "advanced weapons," including Honest John, Matador, and Nike, to certain allies.²

The American readiness to implement this undertaking was somewhat greater by December, in that the tactical nuclear weapons, which were sought by the Europeans, would serve as something of a quid pro quo in return for the stationing of IRBM's now sought by America as a counter to the Soviet development of intercontinental missiles.³

¹R. Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*, p. 218

²Speier, *op. cit.*, pp. 220-221.

³European governments were unenthusiastic about having IRBM's which were seen as first priority Soviet targets in the event of war.

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Thus, no special German pressure was required to bring about the provision of tactical nuclear delivery vehicles for the Bundeswehr. Indeed, the extent of American support for the German Government's policy was shown by a remarkable television interview given by General Norstad in Germany in February 1958.

Q: Many people believe that the atomic arming of the German forces would increase the tension between East and West. The American forces in Germany have tactical nuclear weapons. Do the German troops also require them in your opinion?

Norstad: So long as the overall situation does not change, defensive atomic weapons are absolutely indispensable for the strengthening of the defensive power of the Bundeswehr--for the protection of the Federal Republic and all NATO nations; that is the purely military standpoint.

Now, however, from the German standpoint a comprehensive defense contribution by the Federal Republic is coming into being. It is wholly unthinkable that these forces should be condemned to a second-class function, in which they would be practically useless for defense.

We cannot give the German forces inadequate arms; the German nation cannot allow its soldiers to be armed with weapons long since obsolete.

It is. . .above all a question of morale. . .

Q. Would a denuclearized zone in Central Europe jeopardize your strategic conception?

Norstad: As long as the political and military foundations which would remove the danger of war do not exist, any agreement not to station tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would endanger our strategic conception--yes, I must say it, quite honestly, it would leave us defenseless.

¹Translated from *Bulletin*, March 4, 1958, pp. 364-365.

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It is true that an alternative was open to the German Government, had it placed more value on checking the spread of nuclear weapons or wanted to explore the possibility of using in its diplomacy a conditional readiness to refrain from adopting tactical nuclears. Accepting the premise of NATO strategy of the time, that tactical nuclear weapons were needed in close relation to the ground units, therefore on German territory, it could have proposed that these by American. There is no indication that the German Government ever explored this alternative. ¹

It would have run counter to Strauss' long-held views on the requirements of a modern force and to the political argument pressed by the Government from the beginning of 1958, that the Bundeswehr's arms should not be inferior to those of its opponent.

The Opposition parties did not propose any such moderate alternative but demanded not only a renunciation of German nuclear weapons but a prohibition of the stationing of all nuclear weapons on German territory. ²

¹This might have net with objections from NATO military planners, but would have been politically very popular in Western Europe; it is difficult to believe that the American Government would have seriously objected to the Germans' refraining from accepting tactical nuclears, provided the basic NATO requirement, according to the then doctrine, was accepted.

²The FDP formulation was relatively cautious: the Government was requested, "in view of the division of our Fatherland and the efforts for reunification, to seek through suitable control measures that nuclear weapons should not be stationed or stored in the Federal Republic or the other part of Germany, nor atomic launching pads constructed." The SPD resolution contained no such implied conditions. "The Federal Government is requested to undertake no obligations nor to carry out any measures directed toward equipping the Bundeswehr with atomic weapons, the stationing of atomic rockets or the construction of those rockets." Verhandlungen, 21 S., March 25, 1958, pp. 1167, 1168.

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As early as January the SPD began to prepare its grassroots "Campaign against Atomic Death," which sought to exploit the widespread fear that nuclear weapons would be dangerous rather than a source of security, as well as the ethical misgivings against German nuclear weapons or against nuclear strategy as such, while preserving sufficient ambiguity that the party as a whole was not committed to the view that NATO strategy was immoral. This line of opposition lent some color to Adenauer's argument that the issue was whether or not Germany should remain in NATO; whereas the suggestion that NATO's survival depended on the tactical atomic arming of the Bundeswehr would have seemed preposterous, the charge that the SPD demands would destroy NATO did not.

By July it became clear that the Campaign had failed to mobilize a majority against the nuclear decisions. In May the Federal Constitutional Court ruled against referenda at the Land level (sought by the SPD), but in practice the North Rhine-Westphalian election of July 7 was treated by both sides as a test of the electoral reaction. The unexpectedly clear CDU victory, for the first time an absolute majority in the Land Legislature, spelled the end of the SPD's anti-nuclear appeal to the electorate, and the effective political demise of Kampf dem Atomtod.

## The Government's Choice

It is not surprising, in the light of his strategic views and his responsibility for the establishment of the Bundeswehr, that Strauss should have favored its acquiring nuclear weapons. Nor is it surprising, given Adenauer's long-standing commitment to the Western Alliance, that he should have supported Strauss. Again, while all governments support

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the general principle of halting the spread of nuclear weapons, most
find reasons for making an exception in their own particular case. What
is surprising in the Government's stance, and calls for some explanation,
is the summary way in which it rejected the Rapacki Plan as a starting
point for negotiation, its refusal to consider the possibility of
negotiating for reunification on the basis of a renunciation of nuclear
weapons, and the continuing vehemence of its opposition to any form of
arms control in Central Europe which appeared to point the way toward a
nuclear-free zone or disengagement. It was because of this uncompromising
"rigidity" that Adenauer came under heavy criticism from abroad, and that
German policy was widely explained in terms of a determination to acquire
nuclear weapons, which would not be satisfied until they could be brought
under unfettered German control.

This interpretation went much too far. It is convenient to
examine, firstly, some of the reasons for Adenauer's opposition to
negotiation in 1958 under the banner "disengagement and relaxation of
tension." Secondly the more basic question of the persistent German
opposition to denuclearization. At one level, Adenauer's brushing aside
of the Rapacki Plan could be seen as the habitual action arising from the
impatience of old age, distrust of the Russians, and a lack of interest
in exploring alternatives to his chosen course. Other leading Christian
Democrats indeed showed greater interest in negotiation, even though
skeptical as to the outcome.¹

¹ There were suggestions that Gerstenmaier, President of the Bundestag, and Kiesinger, Chirman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, were prepared to consider negotiation and a postponement of the nuclear arming of the Bundeswehr.

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But there were more substantial reasons for the German Government's misgivings against the kind of negotiation foreshadowed by East/West diplomacy in 1958. The Government believed that the Soviets were pressing a political offensive under the guise of relaxation of tension: firstly in order to obtain acceptance of "two Germanys," and secondly, to intimidate the European members of NATO through a campaign of threats aimed at inducing them to reject NATO's plans for stationing nuclear weapons in Europe. It was thought vital to resist both aims: to the extent that they were not recognized in the West generally--to the extent that the Soviet interest in reducing tension was taken at its face value--the situation was thought to be all the more dangerous. Soviet diplomacy might succeed in cementing the German division and fatally weakening NATO through playing on Western hopes and illusions.¹

Taking this view of the dangers of negotiation, and fearing the growth of anti-nuclear pressures against NATO, the German Government wished to come to a decision on the nuclear issue before international negotiations which might otherwise, in its view, imperil NATO's military survival and Germany's position in the Alliance. In a similar situation, before the Geneva Summit Conference of 1955, Adenauer had similarly sought to restrict the scope of negotiation by means of a _fait accompli_ he had been prepared to cast aside parliamentary scruples on civilian control over the Bundeswehr in order to rush through legislation to

¹Verhandlungen, 18 S., March 20, 1958, pp. 840 ff., 847 ff., speeches of Adenauer and von Brentano; 21 S., March 25, 1958, p. 1101, speech of Adenauer. In the debate of May 10, 1957, Strauss listed 16 Soviet warnings and threats against NATO's nuclear arming. Verhandlungen, p. 12066.

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bring it into existence.¹ In 1958, by grasping the nuclear nettle, the Government claimed to be showing that it was prepared to accept the risks of having nuclear weapons stationed in Germany in the interests of strengthening of NATO.²

The German objection to the Rapacki Plan and other proposals for a nuclear-free zone limited to Central Europe, arose largely out of the belief in a virtually unchanging Soviet political offensive against Germany and NATO insufficiently comprehended by Western public opinion and some Western governments. Denuclearization would mean that Germany would have imposed upon it permanently a different status from the other members of the Alliance. As the state most in need of protection, it would become, in a period when American vulnerability was beginning to cast doubt on the credibility of an American nuclear response, the state whose protection by the Alliance was most doubtful. This would be all the more serious if the withdrawal of American tactical nuclear weapons from Germany should lead to the withdrawal of the American forces themselves. Much was made of the military arguments that it would be easy for the Soviets secretly to bring nuclear weapons into the zone, and that the zone would be vulnerable to Soviet missile attack from outside its limits. But two underlying political fears would seem to have been even more

¹On this occasion the Government was severely criticized by Christian Democrat as well as Opposition spokesmen. Cf. Bundesrat, *Sitzungsbericht*, 142 S., June 10, 1955; Bundestag, *Verhandlungen*, 93 S., June 28, 1955. The only plausible explanation given for its bill for the call-up of volunteers, was its concern that German reararmament should be an established fact before the Summit conference.

²von Brentano, in *Verhandlungen*, March 20, 1958, p. 853. Cf. also Strauss, *ibid.*, January 23, 1958, p. 382.

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important. Firstly, denuclearization would represent so great a restriction (by contrast to Germany's voluntary renunciation of the production of nuclear weapons) as to imply that Germany would be something less than a full member of the Western community, a state in a special situation in which some measure of Soviet influence was internationally authorized. Secondly, such a Germany would fall back into the situation out of which the Federal Republic was beginning to emerge, that of pure object rather than an actor in international politics.¹

These intimations of a threat to German security might have been given less weight if the German Government had seen any prospect of achieving reunification at the price of denuclearization. The political gain might have seemed worth the risk. But the Government appears to have had no doubt, from its reading of Soviet diplomatic communications (this was the period of prolific correspondence between Bulganin and the Western heads of state) and from its direct contacts with the Soviet Government, that the latter was determined to seek the recognition of East Germany, and was quite unwilling to contemplate free elections for a united German Government. On the other hand, it was quite clear that there was very little effective pressure for German reunification on the Western side. British interest in the Rapacki Plan, indeed, demonstrated a fundamental indifference to German unity.

¹For the Government's arguments against the Rapacki Plan, cf. speeches of Brentano, Strauss and Kiesinger, *Verhandlungen*, January 23, 1958, pp. 302-303, 381-383, and March 20, 1958, pp. 870-871, 912-913.

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In this situation the choices open to the German Government
were merely a matter of diplomatic tactics; whether, like Adenauer, to
reject negotiation as at best a waste of time, at worst dangerous, or, as
Strauss on occasion suggested, to spell out a German proposal on
denuclearization, the real meaning of which was to demonstrate the
incompatibility between German and Soviet objectives.¹ Strauss' five
points included two which were widely advanced in the West and adopted
in the second version of the Rapacki Plan itself (November 4, 1958);
namely, that there should be a limitation on conventional forces within
the zone, and adequate inspection and control. He proposed, further, that
there should be a system, going beyond "mere guarantees" to prevent nuclear
weapons being used against the zone. This condition, implying large-scale
inspection on Soviet territory and possibly restrictions on the location
of Soviet missiles, reflected the German view that denuclearization, a
considerable loss of security, should be offset by controls to enhance
German security; though reasonable from the German standpoint, it was
obviously unacceptable to the Soviets. Fianlly, Strauss put forward the
regular German demand that steps toward reunification must be discussed
along with the nuclear-free zone, an attempt to move in the opposite
direction from the Soviet policy of international recognition of East
Germany. Whatever his intention, the tendency of his proposal--a spelling

¹ For Strauss' proposal, see Politisch-Soziale Korrespondenz, Bonn, March 1, 1958. This may have been intended, as suggested by Gerald Freund (Germany between Two Worlds, p. 63) primarily as a challenge to the authority of von Brentano as Foreign Minister, but it was not a serious challenge to NATO policy, in that Strauss' conditions for disengagement were so extreme that there was no chance of Soviet acceptance.

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out of the conditions under which a nuclear-free zone would be acceptable to the German Government--was to show that in the existing conditions it was unacceptable.

None of this is to deny that the control of nuclear weapons, however indirect, was an important motive of the German Government; but it is to suggest that this was by no means a nuclear obsession, that the German Government had made a quite realistic appraisal that there was no prospect of gaining reunification through renunciation of nuclear weapons in this period, and that it was not unrealistic to suppose that the real alternative--acceptance of a non-nuclear zone without German reunification--might have endangered West German security, as well as extinguishing the hope of international support for reunification.

## The Opposition to Atomic Weapons

Public opinion, which had been evenly divided on conscription and on rearmament as such, was overwhelmingly opposed to nuclear arms for the Bundeswehr in 1957/58, and equally strongly against stationing nuclear weapons in Germany. With one exception, the polling institutes found more than 70 per cent opposed to both.¹ An unprecedented volume of correspondence

¹ In April 1957, Divo found 72:13 against atomic arms for the Bundeswehr, 77:11 against stationing nuclear weapons in Germany. (Divo, *Umfragen*, p. 18) In December 1957, EMNID found 73:27 against atomic arms for Germany, 74:24 against stationing missiles in Germany (*Die Welt*, December 14, 1957). In March 1958, EMNID found even grater opposition 83:13 against launching-sites in Germany. (SPD Pressedienst, March 14, 1958.) The exception was the Düsseldorf Institute, Intermarket, which in May 1957 found only 51:33 against atomic arms for Germany, but 56:21 thought that the possession of nuclear weapons would increase the danger to Germany (Intermarket Report, May 7, 1957). This answer may have been influenced by the fact that the question was one of a series, the first of which was whether atomic weapons were necessary for Western defense.

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received by the press on the nuclear issue, the majority expressing fear and misgiving against German atomic arms, springing from the German past; many described the issue as one of conscience, few referred to concrete policy alternatives. ¹ Many intellectual and religious leaders, conscious of the silence of their predecessors under Hitler, believed it their duty to speak out against nuclear arming, raising both ethical and political objections. ²

Those concerned primarily with the political choice--commentators in the leading German newspapers for example--found neither the Government nor the Opposition policies persuasive. It was widely argued that the Government had sought to disguise the importance of the decision, as in the case of Adenauer's statement that tactical nuclear weapons were mainly a form of artillery; it was argued that it was not merely a technical question of adjusting to NATO's strategy, but a momentous political step, raising the question whether Germany could not take an initiative against the spread of nuclear weapons, or whether the post-Stalin Soviet Union might not be prepared to move toward a political settlement. Kennan's thinking found its echo in Germany as in the rest of the Western world. ³ The German Government,

¹ For examples, cf. *Die Welt*, January 4, 1958, and March 31, 1958.

² Many professors, writers and leaders of the Evangelical Churches signed the manifesto of Kampf dem Atomtod; these included Born, Gollwitzer, Böll, Andres, Kogon, and Niemöller. The ethical questions raised by nuclear weapons gave rise to intense discussion within the evangelical churches. Günter Howe (Herausgeber) Atomzeitalter, Krieg und Frieden, Witten/Berlin Eckart-Verlag, 1959, contains a collection of studies, some of which review this debate.

³ Kennan's Keith Lectures advocating disengagement in Europe were delivered in the autumn of 1957.

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clearly, had not sought an alternative. Those who had previously
asserted the claims of reunification against rearmament were, consistently
enough, opposed to a further assertion of the prior claims of NATO--but
many who had supported rearmament doubted the need for Gernan nuclear
weapons and were disturbed by the urgency with which the Government
forced a decision.

The SPD failed to focus these misgivings, either by formulating
a feasible alternative policy or by emphasizing the points on which
articulate opinion was most skeptical toward the Government--its apparent
unconditional decision for nuclear arming and against negotiation for a
non-nuclear zone on any terms. Instead it sought to exploit the mass
fear of nuclear weapons in order to bring pressure against the Government,
to what precise end remained unclear. Much of the driving force behind
the "Campaign against Atomic Death" came from those who believed that
any nuclear policy was immoral, but the official statements of the
Campaign's working committee, in order to achieve a wider basis of
support, used simple appeals to fear and political slogans depending
ultimately on questionable strategic premises.

The German people on both sides of the zonal
frontier is delivered up to certain atomic death
death in the case of a thermonuclear war. There
is no protection.

Participation in the atomic arms race and the use
of German territory for atomic bases could only
heighen this danger.

The goal of German policy must be relaxation of
tension between East and West. Only such a policy
serves the security of the German people and the
national existence of a freely democratic Germany.

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We call on the Bundestag and the Government not to take part in the atomic arms race, but as a contribution to relaxation, to make every effort to support a nuclear-free zone in Europe.¹

It was widely recognized in Germany that the Campaign was not mere demagogy, but expressed the sincerely held convictions of many of its participants as well as deep suspicion of the Government's motives, a belief in the need at least to seek a negotiated settlement of the German division, a belief in the evil of the spread of nuclear weapons such that, with Germany for the first time in some measure responsible for the future of the arms race, it should seek to halt it, not accept it as a fatal necessity. But the poverty of the political thinking behind the Campaign became clearer with the passage of time. Having abandoned its customary restraint in political controversy, the SPD engaged in unmeasured personal attacks on Strauss and threw constitutional prudence to the winds in its unsuccessful attempt to initiate provincial referenda. But, where Adenauer was a master of political simplification, the SPD leaders were not. In the North Rhine-Westphalian election, Adenauer was able to exploit the fear of Communism as a more relevant political emotion than fear of nuclear weapons. The SPD, a party of earnest functionaries, could not turn demagogic overnight. Ollenhauer's shortcomings for this sort of political struggle were summed up tellingly in a political cartoon in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (June 21, 1958).

¹ Manifesto of the Campaign against Anomic Death, translated from *Die Welt*, March 11, 1958.

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Ollenhauer to his audience:

Are you against atomic death?

Yes!

Are you against conventional death?

Yes!!

Are you against all death?

Yes!!!

Are you for me as Federal Chancellor?

## IV. Berlin Crisis and Revision of SPD Foreign Policy

With the failure of the Campaign against Atomic Death, nuclear weapons ceased to be a focus of political controversy. The period from the summer of 1958 to the end of 1960 saw two major developments in German foreign and military policy: the Berlin crisis and the revision of the SPD's foreign policy.

The two were not unrelated; by contrast with military policy Berlin tended to draw the political parties together. Despite the relative Western success in resisting the Soviet political offensive, renewed from time to time over a period of four years, the crisis was to impose serious strains on German-allied relations. Whereas for the British and American governments, having determined to remain in Berlin, the overriding concern was to avoid war, the Germans' principal fear arose from the ways in which Western diplomacy sought to resolve the crisis. On a number of occasions it was felt that Britain and America were going

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too far in search of a compromise--to the point of endangering Berlin's independence or legitimizing the East German regime.

The three principal crises in German-allied relations arose from the Geneva Foreign Ministers' conference of 1959, the building of the Wall in August 1961 and the American proposals of spring 1962. It was feared that the final Western proposal at Geneva would weaken Berlin (it was rejected by the Russians); Adenauer succeeded in having it withdrawn at the end of the year. The passive allied reaction to the Wall for a time shook West German confidence in its partners, and the 1962 proposals were felt to be a long step toward the recognition of East Germany. From the outset the Berlin crisis dominated German concern in foreign policy; for public opinion and for Adenauer himself it loomed far larger than the differences with American military policy which were the prime concern of Strauss after the advent of the Kennedy Administration.¹ On June 30, 1960, Herbert Wehner, hitherto the most militant SPD critic of Adenauer's foreign policy, astonished the Bundestag and German public by proposing a common foreign policy, stating that changes in the situation had rendered earlier differences irrelevant, that there was no immediate prospect for disengagement and that membership in NATO had become a necessity. The Christian Democrats attributed the change of course to electoral considerations--the SPD had lost two elections in which foreign policy had been a leading issue--and to an overdue recognition of the correctness of Adenauer's policy. Though not wholly unfair, this was obviously a partisan explanation.

¹The events of the Berlin crisis are discussed in detail in Part III.

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The third successive defeat of the SPD in 1957 had led to intra-party conflict between the "reformists" and the more traditional Marxist party functionaries: the reformists' success in obtaining party support for a revised program in 1959 strengthened the position of those seeking a more moderate opposition to Adenauer's foreign and defense policy.¹ But the international situation had indeed changed: not only had the Berlin crisis tended to unite all West German, but the SPD had been convinced by a number of circumstances, including conversations of Carlo Schmid and Fritz Erler with Khrushchev in March 1959, that the Soviets now rejected German unity as a Western democracy, even if Germany were neutralized. They continued to dispute with the Christian Democrats whether this had up till then been a real option.

Thus, with the advent of the Kennedy Administration, the SPD, now firmly committed to NATO, but reserving its position on the need for German nuclear weapons, and retaining its interest in negotiation with the Soviets even in the absence of promising prospects, was more attuned to the mood of the new administration than the German Government, which had fought a bitter and unpopular battle on the nuclear issue, and had come to see tactical nuclear weapons as indispensable for NATO strategy and German security, and which tended to postulate a far-sighted political offensive behind every Soviet proposal.

¹ For a brief account of SPD intra-party developments, see Freund, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-78.

Chapter Four

GERMAN-ALLIED DISCORD, 1961-1963

I. Foreign Policy Differences, 1961-1962

In the period of the Kennedy Administration, the remarkable harmony between German and American policies was broken. For the first time West Germany pursued foreign and military policies antagonistic to the U.S. The events of January 1963--de Gaulle's rejection of the British bid to enter the Common Market and the German support for de Gaulle through the signing of the Franco-German Treaty--gave rise to speculation that Europe was coming to demand full independence from the U. S. By giving de Gaulle the indispensible diplomatic support without which even he might not have dared to veto British entry, the German Government appeared to have been demonstrating an unexpected commitment to the Gaullist conception of Europe.

Subsequent developments in German policy have shown that this conclusion was drawn too hastily. Adenauer himself had not seriously intended to challenge the American position in Europe; his successors returned even more firmly to his former line of working closely with the U.S. Adenauer's decision to sign the Franco-German Treaty in circumstances which caused it to be interpreted as an anti-American gesture, represented a loss of command over events more than an acceptance of de Gaulle's views of Europe. But it also represented a gesture of protest against the Kennedy Administration's policies and its manner of conducting its relations with West Germany, as well as an expression of Adenauer's skepticism toward British membership of the

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European Community and a continuing emphasis on the Franco-German relationship as the cornerstone of the new Europe. Moreover, the Gaullist overtones of Adenauer's policy in January 1963 were not entirely artificial: the aspiration for European autonomy has, indeed, represented an important strand in German thinking on Europe, tending to increase in importance in the later 1950's. The shock of January 1963 led to a German reappraisal of priorities, from which, by the end of the year, there appeared to have crystallized an official consensus that European independence was not of immediate relevance, and that is should not be pressed at the expense of Atlantic ties: in the short run, the first priority had become a strengthening of German-American relations.

Adenauer's almost inadvertent assistance to de Gaulle's sabotaging of the American conception of a "Grand Design" shows the extent of the breakdown in German-American communication after two years of the Kennedy Administration. The German Government failed to see that its role would be viewed in the U.S. as a hostile gesture. The U.S. did not see that its somewhat vague conception of a grand design had not been successfully conveyed to its trans-Atlantic partners, and that its Berlin policies had eaten into the reserves of German confidence. The differences over Berlin, it will be suggested were not in themselves of sufficient magnitude to explain the break in German American relations. But they were reinforced by other factors in ways that magnified their significance by evoking disagreement over fundamentals and resentment at American treatment of its allies.

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Firstly, the recurring American willingness to discuss the German question in ways that could imply an improvement in the status of East Germany struck at one of the most sensitive aspects of the Adenuuer policy, the myth that Western strength would lead to German reunification. Since it had become impossible to see what practical content could be given to this policy, the German Government and public opinion have become dependent on allied promises of diplomatic support for reunification, if and when some way should open up. This being so, they are exceptionally sensitive to the nuances of allied statements or overtures to the Soviets. Any indication of "acceptance" of the German partition--of which there were many during the crisis--tends to undermine the precarious foundations of German hopes for national unity.

Secondly, there were very considerable differences between the attitudes toward Communism within the two governments. Most Germans see Soviet objectives as unchanged and aggressive: world revolution as the fixed goal, Germany as the target of Soviet policy in Europe. Adenauer retained a Dulles-like skepticism as to the value of negotiation with the Soviets, preferring a stance of outright opposition to Soviet aims; other German leaders favored a greater element of "psychological warfare" in Western relations with the Soviets. The American administration's view was more complex. While determined to resist Soviet pressure, officials were keenly aware of the possibility of opening up areas of common interest. While the prevailing view saw immediate Soviet aims as predominantly hostile, Soviet society and policy were perceived to be changing; it was hoped that the development of

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common interests might lead to a moderation of the Cold War and that American policies might be able to encourage the tendencies toward polycentrism in the Soviet bloc. While such differences of approach need not be irreconcilable, in a time of tension and crisis they were all too readily magnified into deep German suspicion of American reliability.¹

A third factor conditioning the German reaction to the Kennedy Administration's policies was the loss of Adenauer's especially favored position in Washington due to his close relationship with Dulles. There had been an exceptionally close rapport between the two, and Dulles had almost automatically consulted Adenauer on matters affecting Germany. Not only had this rapport disappeared with the advent of a new, more pragmatic, administration, but also its methods of consultation left the Germans more uncertain of American intentions and at times strongly resentful of the limited extent to which they had been enabled to express their standpoint. Many Germans had come to regard an improvement in allied consultation procedures as the most important step toward reviving Atlantic relationships.²

¹For an instance of the German tendency to interpret American interest in negotiation as bordering on appeasement, see F.R. Alleman, *Zwischen Stabilität und Krise* (München: R. Piper & Co, Verlag, 1963), pp. 213-228. Alleman, Swiss-born associate editor of *Der Monat*, is by no means an extreme protagonist of the German form of Anti-Communism.

²For the case of the American Berlin note of April 1962 see Chapter XVI. Another instance was the Test Ban Treaty, (see Chapter XXII). While in any specific case of faulty consultation the responsibility is usually shared between both partners (the U.S. gives the Germans little time to consider a proposal, the German fail to formulate their preferences in advance) this would seem to underline the need for improvement in the institutions or the informal rules governing consultation, such that abrupt decisions on the one hand, or prevarication on the other, are held to be against the rules.

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In the light of these factors it becomes comprehensible that the German-American relationship had deteriorated to the point where Adenauer was capable of giving de Gaulle rather more than tacit support in his opposition to American Atlantic policy. On the specific issue of British entry into the Common Market, his misgivings were even clearer. For Adenauer, much more than for de Gaulle, the question of British entry presented a dilemma. On the one hand, it could be expected to enhance Atlantic solidarity, one of Adenauer's prime objectives, by typing Britain more firmly within the European framework; on the other hand, the very British tendencies which Adenauer suspected (opposition to supranationalism and over-readiness to seek rapprochement with the Soviets) might lead to a dilution or paralysis of the European community as he envisaged it. For de Gaulle, the question was whether political circumstances would be such that he could dare oppose British entry, his natural preference as a French nationalist; for Adenauer the choice was much more difficult--it seems unlikely that his resentment at MacMillan's policies had blinded him to the wider implications of the decision.

If Adenauer had long been suspicious of Britain, he had for even longer placed a special weight on relations with France. The Schuman Plan had originally been a Franco-German agreement open to others; in

¹ This is not to be taken to imply that Adenauer had the power at the end of January 1963 to reverse de Gaulle's decision: the signing of the Treaty had greatly weakened his bargaining position. The point is, rather, that his strong support for de Gaulle before and up to the signing of the Treaty, had created a situation in which de Gaulle was able to go as far as he did.

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the case of the EEC Adenauer had made major concessions in order to
induce the Franch to set up the Common Market and had worked with
France against the British free trade area proposals. The Franco-German
Treaty represented the culmination of a long-term and successful policy
almost an end in itself, a dimension of Adenauer's thinking which was
largely overlooked by the Americans in January 1963.

Finally, the feature in Adenauer's policy most difficult to
evaluate is the extent to which he had adopted some of de Gaulle's
conceptions of American-European relation, or indeed the extent to which
these had always been implicit in his thinking. The revival of European
power in world affairs has always been one of the prime motives of
the European movement. This was voiced by Adenauer, for example, in 1952:
"What is to become of Europe after these two wars? Here it lies, weak
and dismembered. Only if we unite it again, can it become a force. And
only if we unite it can we avoid the fate of becoming an appendage of
Asiatic Russia."¹

At this point, perhaps, fear of Russia was stronger than the
drive for European strength as such. But Adenauer, on occasion, spoke
also of the danger of long-term dependence on the United States.

In the long run the European countries cannot be fully
develop their entire strength for their own benefit and
that of mankind if they continue to find their salvation
and their security exclusively under the patronage of the
United States. [Dependency upon the United States] must not
become a permanent condition. . . because it would cause the
energies of Europe to wither and because surely the United

1 Kanzlerworte, p. 63.

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States will not be inclined to give Europe an unreasonable amount of assistance permanently.¹

In the negotiations on the establishment of the EEC, Adenauer was less committed than previously to supranationalism--now stressing cooperation and coordination--but in general he took the side of the Commission and the "integrationists" in the subsequent policy disputes.²

The *Bundestag* debates on the Rome Treaty were characterized by a remarkable paucity of general conceptions, but the note which was sounded most clearly was the desire for a revival of European power.

> Whoever draws a political balance-sheet must see how far Europe's world position has declined. I believe that the tragedy of 6 November 1956 [the date of the Suez cease-fire] has proved how weak and vulnerable this Europe has become such that it can be suddenly prevented from resorting to force in a case where its most vital interests are at stake.³

The desire for autonomy, then, had become an important strand in the German thinking on Europe. But events showed that it did not have the highest priority: whereas subsequent French policies and intimations suggested a militant desire for European autonomy, German policy after the January crisis became preoccupied with mending Atlantic fences.

European autonomy was tacitly relegated to the status of a long-term goal for the future.

¹From an address in Brussels, Sept. 25, 1956. Text in *Bulletin*, Sept. 26, 1956; English translation cited by Freund, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

²*Cf.* Leon N. Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1963, pp. 67, 125 ff, 188ff).

³Hans Furler (a leading German "European" spokesman, subsequently President of the European Parliamentary Assembly) in *Verhandlungen*, 200 S. March 21, 1957, pp. 11345-46.

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## II. 1963: Return to Atlantic Ties

De Gaulle's January 14 Press Conference came as a shock to West German opinion, which like American, had assumed that a way would be found to effect British entry; to the extent that de Gaulle's action was more than a defensive move against what he perceived as American hegemonial designs--to the extent that it was in fact a bid for immediate European autonomy, it required continuing German support. German opinion, however, welcomed the Franco-German Treaty as the symbol of the end of the centuries-old hostility, but refused to treat it as the first step toward freeing Europe from the American embrace. Lacking German support, de Gaulle could go no further in implementing his own conception of European-American relations: for the remainder of 1963 he was reduced to playing a negative role. The Germans, naturally enough, refused to make an open choice between America and France, but at the same time refrained from exploiting their potential bargaining strength as the party wooed from both sides. In practice, on the major issues of the year--the multilateral force, the test ban, preparation for the Kennedy Round--they took the American side, and intensified their military cooperation with the Americans more than with the French.

The basic German orientation in a situation in which, for the first time, the postwar pattern of Atlantic relations was challenged from within, in the name of European independence, is well conveyed in the two statements, the first an exposition of official policy by Defense Minister von Hassel, the second from a leading article in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, reviewing the year's events:

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The major importance [of the MLF], however, would be its political aspect. It would provide an additional political link between the European and the American partners to the Alliance. Its close interlacing with the nuclear potential of the United States would result in strengthening the deterrent on the one hand, and establishing strong ties between Europe and America on the other. This is its definite advantage as compared to other concepts which envisage a European nuclear force. In my opinion, the establishment of a European nuclear force of this kind would be more likely to slacken than to strengthen the ties between Europe and the United States. It has become apparent, with greater clarity than a few years ago that Western Europe can not assume a truly European responsibility for the use of nuclear weapons before it has become a political entity; in other words, it can assume this responsibility only after unification, i.e. after the careful and gradual integration of national sovereignty in a political community.¹

In the French part of Europe the German hears the question whether he wants to remain permanently a satellite of America. He scarcely understands the question, nor does the Frenchman at all understand the cheerful laughter with which he answers. President de Gaulle saw the necessity, after the War, of giving back to his people the feeling of being a great nation. . . As he wants an efficient, independent Europe with a Franco-Geman core, he has also called the Germans a great nation. But the Germans have experienced a different trauma in the recent past. Our self-respect rests above all on returning, after bitter error, but permanently, to the community of those who want to extend freedom at home and abroad. That is, to the ideals of the East, and that means: to Europe and the greater cultural area that coincides essentially with the sphere of Atlantic Treaty-up to the territories amputated by the Iron Curtain.²

¹ Kai-Uwe von Hassel, "Detentethrough Firmness," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1964, p. 189.

² Bruno Dechamps, "Von Herzen dankbar," F.A.Z., Dec. 24, 1963. It should be pointed out, however, that the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* has two voices: its "gaullist voice," if less typical, is no less forceful. Cf. the articles of Adelbert Weinstein, cited below.

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The new German orientation was reflected in a number of decisions. The earliest, is significant in itself but the more indicative of the desire to reduce American antagonism sparked off by the January events, was the Government's unusual action in insisting that the *Bundestag* reverse a previous decision authorizing the sale of steel piping to the Soviet Union. Its sole objective was to respond to an American protest that the sale would contravene NATO restrictions on the export of strategic materials.¹

German backing of the MLF represented a more significant decision. After a brief initial period of skepticism, the German Government became its leading European supporter; while accepting the general objection to a solely German-American force, it did not conceal its strong interest in the proposal. It was not swayed by the criticism that the amount of nuclear sharing achieved by the MLF is very slight, but settled for an immediate arrangement involving costs and little nuclear control, in the view that the element of nuclear sharing will inevitably increase over time. It refrained from bargaining for alternatives offering a greater degree of nuclear control--a possible German option in the new situation created by de Gaulle.

Three principal motives lie behind the German policy on the MLF. Firstly, it brings Germany indirectly into the business of strategic nuclear weapons, in a way that minimizes the political risks and costs. Secondly, it is a move toward military integration--a consistent goal of German military policy under Adenauer and Strauss--as, whatever its

¹For reports of this episode, cf. *Washington Post*, March 19, 1963; *New Republic*, April 6, 1963.

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shortcomings, the most imaginative proposal since EDC. Finally, the argument most frequently voiced by the Germans (cf. the statement of von Hassel quoted above), it serves to bind the U.S. more closely to European defense. As the most exposed NATO partner, still under the shadow of the Berlin crisis, Germany places a high value on reinforcing the American commitment to German defense. However limited its military functions, the MLF is a highly effective symbol of American-European interdependence. It is very likely that this was the most important German motive for supporting the MLF, not merely the most frequently voiced. An interest in entering the nuclear business would necessarily be much less publicly voiced, but there is little reason to suppose that this was the "real" motive; the indications are that in the circumstances of 1963, in the "first things first" mood of German officials, the interest in strengthening Atlantic interdependence was in fact the overriding objective of German policy on the MLF.¹

In the case of the test ban, German reluctance to sign was not due to a desire to support France, but to misgivings that the three-depository system for accession to the Treaty could be used to enhance the status of East Germany. When once this difficulty had been overcome through explicit Anglo-American statements that East German accession in Moscow carried no implications for recognition,

¹ Any such judgement can only be tentative: motivations are difficult to discover, and may fluctuate. The above is based on the analysis of the German foreign policy choices in 1963, and partly on conversations with German officials and observers of the German political scene, at the end of 1963.

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there was no further German objection to signing the Treaty; relations with America, and concern for allied and world opinion, as well as German public opinion, carried more weight than the desire to support France in its diplomatic isolation. In the case of the preparations for the Kennedy Round trade negotiations, German industrial and commercial interests favored the policies of trade liberalization sought by the U.S., coinciding with the political desire to strengthen Atlantic ties.

The climate of world politics in 1963 tended in certain further respects to favor German-American rapprochement. Increased American self-confidence after the Cuba confrontation and the relaxation of Soviet pressure in Berlin removed the need to seek agreement on a Berlin settlement, the main source of German-American friction. While the U.S. was less concerned with the Soviet threat, German concern remained high: in Germany it was widely denied that any meaningful *détente* had come about. Secondly, de Gaulle's challenge led America to a certain reappraisal of its relations with Europe, resulting in a higher evaluation of the importance of West Germany and greater readiness to consult the Germans in formulating Western policy (the limits of which, however, were soon demonstrated in the case of the test ban). The very successful Kennedy visit to Germany served to reaffirm and strengthen the closeness of the relationship.

Internal political developments played a major part in Germany's re-emphasis on Atlantic links. The succession to Adenauer occurred with astonishing smoothness; the Erhard Government appeared considerably more stable than either of the post-1961 Adenauer Governments; fears of a

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major succession crisis proved in the event to be groundless. Indeed,
the crisis occurred before rather than after Adenauer's resignation;
the damaging maneuvering for position took place in the two years of
the last Adenauer Government. Certain fortuitous factors eased the
transition: Erhard stood so far above potential rivals in terms of
electoral support that he became the overwhelming party choice; there
was no serious challenger to his succession. And the enforced resignation
of Strauss in the aftermath of the *Spiegel* affair prepared the way for
the emergence of a triumvirate in foreign and defense policy--Erhard,
Schroeder, and von Hassel--whoce policies differed only marginally from
those of Adenauer and Strauss, but whose more pragmatic and cautious
political style, and ability to work as a collective, made for a
continuity and stability of policy which might have proved unattainable
had the more brilliant but impetuous Strauss been playing leading role.

During the succession period many Germans detected the emergence
of a "Gaullist" faction within the ruling Christian Democrat Party,
in opposition to the prevailing "Atlantic" faction. ¹ The names of
Strauss, von Brentano and Adenauer himself were mentioned in this
connection. In many respects this is a misnomer. None of these shares
de Gaulle's long-term conceptions; von Brentano has been a leading
advocate of supranationalism and Strauss of Atlantic military ties.
This group of ex-leaders and their sympathizers share with de Gaulle

¹Cf. Rolf Zundel, "Der Pariser Bazillus," *Die Zeit*, August 30, 1963.

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a suspicion of current American policies, a preference for a "harder"
line against the Soviets, not militarily but diplomatically, in particular
with regard to East Germany. They could be expected to protest vigorously
in the event of any future U.S. pressure for concessions on the German
question, and to find widespread public support.

The "Gaullist" faction, then, serves to strengthen the German
bargaining position in relation to the U.S. and to define a little more
sharply the limits, on the German side, of the prevailing German-American
consensus. But even in the absence of such a faction the limits could
not be very different. The stability of Germany's Atlantic orientation
can be said, very broadly, to depend on two conditions: that Germany be
adequately consulted on all issues in East-West diplomacy, since almost
all carry some implication for the German question; and that the allies
should understand German interests and be willing to take them into
account in the formulation of Western policy.¹

### III. The New American Strategy

The NATO strategy of 1954 came under increasing criticism, as
much in Europe as the United States.² European writers were especially

¹Some of the problems of applying these principles are discussed in Part IV.

² For some of the leading criticisms, cf. Alastair Buchan, *NATO in the 1960's* (London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson; New York, Praeger, 1960, 1963); B.H. Liddell Hart, *Deterrent or Defence*, London Stevens, 1960; F.O. Miksche, *The Failure of Atomic Strategy*, (New York, Praeger, 1958); F.W. Mulley, *the Politics of Western Defence*, (London, Thames & Hudson; New York, Praeger; 1962); Henry A. Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice*, New York, Harper, London, Chatto & Windus, 1960); Robert E. Osgood, (footnote continued on next page)

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critical of the doctrine of the immediate tactical nuclear response to
attack, for its tendency to expand any fighting and for the inflexibility
which it was imposing on the NATO military capability, plans and training,
leaving the West with the dilemma of all-or-nothing; a crisis seemed
likely to lead to paralysis or escalation to all-out war.¹ There was
widespread skepticism as to the possibility of limiting a tactical
nuclear war in Europe.

American analysts were especially concerned with a different
kind of nuclear dependence, the reliance on a prompt American strategic
strike to deter all but "minor" Soviet attacks in Europe; the American
strategic threat would necessarily become less credible as America
became more vulnerable to Soviet nuclear retaliation. Hence American
analysts were interested in larger ground forces in Europe, in order
to resist everything short of "all-out" Soviet attack, for which it
was thought America would still be prepared seriously to threaten a
strategic strike.

In Europe in the later 1950's the role of the NATO forces was
conceived more and more in terms of limited military operations, or war
through miscalculation, no longer defense against massive invasion;
general war seemed unthinkable. Instead of perceiving the role of

(footnote continued from previous page)

NATO: The Entangling Alliance: Malcolm W. Hoag, "The Place of Limited War in NATO Strategy," in Knorr (ed.) NATO and American Security. 1

It was not strictly true, as sometimes alleged, that the NATO
forces could not fight without using nuclear weapons: conventional
arms existed at every level (artillery, tactical, air) at which nuclear
weapons had been introduced. But research and development was giving
increasing priority to tactical nuclear weapons, and, of more immediate
importance, many military commanders were coming to believe that it
was impossible to fight effectively without using the. Cf. F. Mulley,
*op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.

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the ground forces as holding operation while the "sword" was brought to bear, they were thought to have the more modest task of preventing limited aggression by ruling out the possibility of easy gains (the doctrine of the WEU Defense Committee). General Norstad advanced the concept of the pause: in the event of large-scale fighting, which he envisaged as the product of miscalculation or "momentary rashness," the NATO forces would "enforce a pause" in the hope that diplomacy could avert the recourse to strategic war.¹ If the role of the NATO ground forces was conceived in these terms, the policy of immediate tactical nuclear response was inappropriate: this would tend to expand a war, the opposite of what was being sought.

The new strategic ideas of the Kennedy Administration went beyond Norstad: where he was seeking a doctrine to rationalize the existing NATO forces, the new administration sought to change them. In this it was seriously hampered by the need to make ambiguous even contradictory statements: on the one hand, it was determined to improve NATO's non-nuclear forces in order to be able to meet a wide range of contingencies without being compelled to use nuclear weapons.² On the other hand, granting that the Soviets were superior in conventional force (though the United States came to hold that the extent of Soviet superiority had been exaggerated) it did not want to

¹General Lauris Norstad, "NATO: Strength and Spirit," *NATO Letter* January 1960, pp. 7-11.

²American strategists were critical of the tacit assumption that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would avert defeat; they had become sceptical of the earlier belief that nuclear weapons favored the defensive.

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forego the deterrent effect of the threat of the early use of nuclear weapons, or to suggest to the Soviets that they could afford to exploit a conventional superiority. Hence, while some official statements suggested a policy of meeting any conventional attack by conventional means, others denied that NATO strategy had changed, and there was no attempt to increase the NATO target of 30 divisions.¹

The Administration's own example provided the surest indication of its priorities: in the last analysis, it was not seriously concerned to be able to defeat all-out conventional attack, a contingency which it agreed to be unrealistic. But it was determined to improve its non-nuclear forces, both by a limited expansion of their numbers (an increase from 11 to 16 combat division), by improvements in conventional weapons and a revival of non-nuclear training. By stationing supplies for two divisions in Europe it showed the importance it placed on the ability to reinforce the divisions stationed there. Had the larger European allies been prepared to undertake a similar improvement in their "general purpose forces," NATO would today have an impressive capability for meeting a wide range of military situations.

¹American statements have edged towards asserting the desirability of non-nuclear defense against all-out conventional attack, even though the existing NATO force goals are accepted as adequate. Cf. the statement of Secretary McNamara to the House Armed Services Committee, January 30, 1963, p. 54. The address of Alain C. Enthoven to the Loyola University, 10 February 1963, was the most categorical endorsement of all-out conventional defense; Paul Nitze, at Cleveland on 4 March 1963, advocated non-nuclear action for a wide range of situations, but indicated that the more serious (i.e. likely) situations were at the lower end of the spectrum of violence.

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IV. <u>Strauss and the New Strategy</u>

Despite considerable friction with the U.S., the basic orientation of Germany's military policy remained firmly Atlantic. There was no change in the German belief in the indispensability of NATO or in the readiness to maintain the whole of the German armed forces under NATO command, nothing of the Gaullist <u>attentisme</u> towards the alliance. As before, the German Government sought greater military integration, and on occasion voiced its disagreement with France in this regard. It sought closer military cooperation with France, but only within the NATO framework. Likewise, disagreement with American strategic doctrine was fought out within this framework; having made a total commitment to NATO, the German Government claimed the right to play its part in determining what NATO strategy should be.

Furthermore, Germany was the only European state which substantially increased its conventional capability, the first priority of American military policy in Europe from 1961. As its contribution to strengthening NATO in the Berlin crisis of 1961, the German Government extended the period of conscription to 18 months and increased the target of the <u>Bundeswehr</u> from 350,000 to 500,000 men, reversing the change made in 1956. The defense budget rose from 10 billion D.M. in 1960 to 11.18 billion D.M. in 1961, 14.98 billion D.N. in 1962 to 18.36 billion in 1963.¹ Through the increase in conscription, in particular, and

¹Detailed annual budget statements are presented to the Bundestag, of which the defense budget is Chapter 14. Cf. for each year, <u>Bundeshaushaltsplan</u>, <u>Einzelplan 14</u>.

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through new arms purchases, the Germans had taken important steps toward improving the quality of their forces.

These increases, however, did not indicate that the Germans had accepted the underlying American strategy. Much of the increase in expenditure was a natural consequence of the buildup of the Bundeswehr; for example, the largest single item in the 1963 budget was 2.17 billion D.M. for the purchase of aircraft, already planned long in advance. By 1963 the defense budget represented less than 7 per cent of the gross national product, a figure still slightly lower than that of Britain or France (each between 7% and 8%). The extension of the conscription period removed a weakness which had from the outset been criticized by the German military. Germany had its specific objectives in the case of much of the arms expansion which did not necessarily indicate support for a revision of NATO strategy in favor of conventional forces.

In fact, the German strategic doctrine under Strauss, and, related to this, the objectives of German military policy, differed sharply from those of the Kennedy Administration and lent a special urgency to German policy on nuclear control in Strauss' two final years in office. Strass and those who followed his line of thought differed systematically with American thinking on most of the issues of European defense.¹ The starting point for both schools was American vulnerability to Soviet strategic missile attack, in consequence of

¹Strauss' thinking is most fully expressed in certain speeches and in interviews with the F.A.Z. See especially F.A.Z., April 26, 1961, September 28, 1961, August 3 and 9, 1962, October 16, 1962. Adelbert (footnote continued on next page)

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which "massive retaliation" by the United States strategic forces was no longer a feasible or credible response to limited Soviet attack (both head that a strategic strike was still credible in the case of "massive" attack in Europe). But Strauss did not accept the American policy of meeting a wider range of contingencies without recourse to nuclear weapons; his remedy for the declining credibility of an American strategic strike was to increase the European control over nuclear weapons.

Strauss emphasized the role of tactical nuclearers in the deterrence of limited attack, starting from the principle that deterrence depended on the aggressor's not being able to make a precise calculation of the risks or the margin of safety. He was bitterly critical of the notions of "threshold" and "pause" which were sometimes used to explain the new American strategy. As construed by Strauss, these would indeed have been dangerous concepts: an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons below a clearly indicated threshold could indeed become a license for violence below the threshold, and a commitment not to use nuclear weapons for a given period (Jaeger's interpretation of the concept of pause) could have invited attack aimed at achieving limited objectives within the period. It is true that nothing in American official

Weinstein, Defense Correspondent of the F.A.Z. and close to Strauss, kept up a barrage of criticism of American strategy throughout 1962. See F.A.Z., January 4, March 9 and 15, April 7 and 30, May 23, July 24 and 30, August 14 and 20, and December 12 and 17. For a more comprehensive statement, cf. Richard Jaeger, "Politik und keine Illusion" in R. Jaeger and F. Erler, *Sicherheit und Rüstung* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft and Politik, 1962), pp. 135-164. Jaeger, Chairman of the Defense Committee of the Bundestag, follows Strauss closely in strategic doctrine. For a succinct summary of the German approach, cf. Alastair Buchan and Philip Windsor, *Arms and Stability in Europe* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1963) pp. 81-82.

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statements lent color to these interpretations, which represented an even greater misconception of the spirit of the American commitment to NATO. But the images and slogans of strategic polemic have a life of their own: the obsession with "threshold" and "pause" continued to color German thinking and powerfully strengthened the view that American conventional strategy would weaken deterrence. Certainly it would have been dangerous if the Soviets had construed these notions in the same way as the German critics.¹

A second source of divergence was in the estimate of the likely origins of war. Whereas many American analysts took the same view as the SPD and most British writers, that the chief danger was war through accident or miscalculation, the Strauss school saw the danger as deliberate Soviet attack within any limit of safety designated by the West. According to the "British" view the Soviets were sufficiently anxious to avoid nuclear war to refrain from any deliberate attack: the Germans were more acutely aware than their allies of the shortcomings of the existing conventional forces, especially on the northern sector, against a well-prepared attack.

A third area of disagreement concerned the value of tactical nuclear weapons both for deterrence and ground warfare. The Germans on occasion used the image of a ladder to describe deterrence: each rung representing a position in the spectrum of nuclear weapons from

¹The Soviet military, at least, did not, but insisted that the main emphasis of American policy remained nuclear. Cf. V.D. Sokolovskii, *Soviet Military Strategy*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1963) p. 169.

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the smallest tactical to the largest strategic weapons, should be in
place--the absence of any rung would weaken the ladder. As regards
contemporary tactics, the German made the familiar argument that
tactical nuclear weapons could prevent an attacker from concentrating
his forces, hence would increase deterrence by reducing the chances
of military gain. Jaeger's analysis took the argument a stage further;
if the defender is much more reluctant than the attacker to use nuclear
weapons, the latter can afford to concentrate his forces in the initial
attack, but can also weaken the defense by threatening--or carrying out--a
nuclear strike against defensive concentrations or strong points.¹

The Stauss doctrine was not the only possible view of the German
national interest: SPD and FPD spokesmen accepted the American view
that a strengthening of the conventional forces was a common interest
of Germany and its allies. But Strauss' view, while partly resting on
a misunderstanding of American policy, reflected concern arising
directly from Germany's unique geographical situation as the territory
most directly exposed to Soviet ground attack, as well as representing
a difference of strategic opinion cutting across national frontiers
within the Alliance. What is remarkable is the persistence of the
element of misunderstanding, and indeed the scarcely veiled suspicion
of American, amongst the Strauss school since the advent of the Kennedy
Administration.

A number of factors contributed to this suspicion. Firstly, the
Kennedy Administration's strategy was warmly received by the SPD and
the British Labor Party--it did indeed take over some of the less extreme

¹ Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 153 ff.

of their ideas. In the light of Strauss' recent struggle with the
SPD on the nuclear issue, this association rendered the new American
strategic thinking suspect. Secondly, it appeared that Strauss, like
most others in the nuclear debate, had come to view his adversaries'
arguments largely in terms of their presumed motives, and that this
shaped his reaction to the new American thinking. If once the evolution
of American strategy were viewed with suspicion, it was easy to make the
sort of interpretations noted above in the case of the "threshold" and
"pause" (Norstad had for years used the concept of pause without
incurring suspicion). It was easy to suppose that the essential change
was that the U.S. no longer had the will to use nuclear weapons in
defense of European interests. The passive acceptance of the Berlin
wall served to reinforce this kind of suspicion.

It was only one stage further to see current American suggestions
not at all on their merits but as steps toward something further, namely
the *bête noire* of the German Government, disengagement. Thus, depreciation
of the value of tactical nuclear weapons, or suggestions that they might
be organized under a separate command, could be seen as steps toward
their withdrawal from the central front and possibly even from the
European theatre. In practice, America has increased its tactical
nuclear capability in Europe under the Kennedy Administration,¹ and

¹McNamara stated that tactical nuclear strength on the ground in Europe increased by 60% between 1961 and 1963. Speech to Economic Club, New York, November 18, 1963, text in *Survival*, January-February, 1964, p. 6.

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there was never a serious possibility that the American Army's interest in tactical nuclear weapons could have been overridden to the point of their being withdrawn from Europe. Moreover, few American civilian analysts, the leading American critics of tactical nuclear weapons, would have advocated this; what was true was that for many American analysts a reduction or withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons, or a renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons, were ideas to be discussed on their merits, the balance of advantage and disadvantage appearing rather close; for the Strauss school of thought, any of these notions was anathema.

The implications of doctrinal differences in policy were not only speculative. The new American policies brought about a certain reversal of expectations on the immediate diffusion of nuclear hardware within the Alliance. Strauss' fears of a freezing of all nuclear weapon deliveries may have been exaggerated, but it was true that certain developments which could reasonably be anticipated in 1960 were checked after 1961. This affected both ends of the tactical nuclear spectrum, the "Davy Crockett," much favored by Strauss, was not distributed to all of the NATO armies, but confined to the American Seventh Army, and the much heralded land-based MRBM, strongly backed by Norstad, was indefinitely shelved by the American administration in the Summer of 1962. The sudden announcement of Norstad's resignation in July 1962, generally attributed to his "European" stand in his policy disagreements with Washington, and the appointment of General Maxwell

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Taylor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sparked off a period of exceptionally strong Straussian criticism of American policy.¹

All of these factors contributed to sharpen the issue of nuclear control. Strauss' lack of confidence in the American will to use nuclear weapons infused a sense of urgency into his quest for German influence on the decision to use them. He was fertile in suggestions for control arrangements: in response to the American offer to provide the nuclear hardware as soon as the Europeans should agree on control arrangements, Strauss claimed that he could suggest as many as four or five possible solutions; the basic need was the political decision to give the Alliance its own nuclear capability,² None of the more ambitious suggestions for making NATO the "fourth atomic power," however, came close to resolving the problem of establishing a firm enough political control to satisfy all members, yet enabling the rapid decision that would be required by nuclear crisis or war. Strauss' suggestions leant so far in the direction of German influence over a NATO commander independent of the veto of other states as to be unacceptable not only to Washington but to most of the European allies. One such suggestion was the SACEUR should have the power to use nuclear weapons for defense of any member's territory at the request of that member;³ another was that the "states directly concerned"

¹See the reference above to the F.A.Z. for July and August 1962.

²*New York Times*, December 13, 1961.

³Cf. Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, London, Chatto and Windus, 1962, p. 115.

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should form regional commands: in the event of an attack on the central
sector, the decision would be taken by the U.S., Germany, France, and the
Benelux countries alone.¹ Strauss does not appear to have favored the
notion of an inner group for nuclear decisions, consisting of the larger
members, possibly out of apprehension that this might in practice
become a return to the French suggestion of a three-power directorate
for nuclear policy.

While at times Strauss pursued nuclear control strenuously,² he
and his supporters appeared to have been aware that, as in the case of
his suggestions on Atlantic federation, the ideal solution must lie in
the quite distant future. Thus, German spokesmen were able to express
considerable satisfaction with the limited advances achieved, in
particular at the Athens Conference in May 1962, at which some of
Strauss' more modest proposals had been accepted: America undertook
to supply full information on the nuclear weapons stationed in each
member's territory and to discuss with them the arrangements for their
use; this was acknowledged as a first step toward nuclear
"Mitspracherecht."³ Adenauer, who held aloof from the rest of the
strategic controversy, from time to time voiced the desire that
NATO should resolve the problem of nuclear control in the sense of
becoming a nuclear power.⁴

¹ *New York Times*, December 13, 1961.

²He went so far as to use informal suggestions of a deadline to build up a sense of urgency abroad. Cf. Beaton and Moddox, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

³Jaeger, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-164.

⁴See, eg., *New York Times*, November 17, 1961, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, December 28, 1962.

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As a consequence of this cluster of disagreements, German and American policies were at cross purposes during the first two years of the Kennedy Administration. While the development of the *Bundeswehr* accorded with the American policy on NATO, Germany gave no diplomatic support to the American proposals for a revision of NATO strategy, and in the field of tactics and logistics, for example, did not adopt the American *desideratum* of the capacity to offer non-nuclear response. On the other hand, America obtained something of what it sought, while Strauss obtained almost nothing in the direction of his special concerns ("Davy Crockett," MRBM, nuclear control, or a modification of American strategic doctrine).

It seems doubtful that America could have won greater German support for its policy of non-nuclear options by concessions on nuclear control, the main German interest, because of American reluctance to surrender anything substantial and the difficulty of reconciling the different European interests. To have sought indirectly to satisfy German concerns, e.g. by common planning for tactics on the use of nuclear weapons, was likely in the short run merely to underline the disagreements, American being interested in withholding nuclear weapons, Germany in the possibility of using them. If the Americans had little leverage, Strauss had even less, given America's existing control over the nuclear warheads and Germany's treaty undertaking not to manufacture them. Neither was prepared to invoke the more serious sanction of a reduced commitment to the alliance (employed fruitlessly by de Gaulle) hence dealock was unavoidable. It can be argued,

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however, that the Americans contributed to the deadlock by certain omissions in their doctrine and declaratory policy, in particular that they failed to communicate forcefully enough their commitment to hold European territory against attack. Second only to deterrence, "forward defense," i.e., the determination not to give up German territory in war, has the highest priority in German military thinking. NATO has frequently endorsed the policy of forward defense, though with little conviction, in that the Western forces have been too few, and have not been stationed where they could effectively implement such a guarantee. The omission from American policy statements of references to forward defense--the principle of defending all of the territory of member states--necessarily feeds German concern that this is not a major goal of American military policy. A clear American commitment to forward defense might have gone some way toward dispelling German suspicions of a weakening of American policy.

Closely related to this was a failure to make clear the distinction between time periods underlying much of German and American thinking. Granted that the Americans argued that the present value of the Western conventional forces had been underestimated, the burden of their argument was that the Western forces should be improved to the point where they could in the future resist a wide range of attack without having to rely on the use of nuclear weapons.

Experience of the buildup of the Bundeswehr, for example, would suggest that such improvements in the NATO forces would require a considerable period. For the present, the American policy was that nuclear weapons might have to be used as a substitute for more adequate non-nuclear

forces, hence the numerous American undertakings on their use against major attack or to prevent a Western military collapse. America might have better impressed the Germans through a more forceful and specific commitment on the first use of nuclear weapons in relation to the present forces, combined with insistence that this was a poor strategy for local defense and that it was a first priority to improve the non-nuclear defenses. By allowing the distinction of time periods to become blurred, American policy gave the impression of a present reluctance to use of nuclear weapons, which in turn led to a single-minded German search for ways of ensuring that they would be used. This was a distorted impression of the likely American reaction if there should be fighting in Europe--which would surely be a determination that the aggressor should be denied any gains, or even deprived of some of his East European territory--and lead to the paradoxical position that the Germans tended to favor the British and French policies--where military weakness left no option but to threaten the early use of nuclear weapons--over the American, which reflected a far greater willingness to devote manpower and resources to the task of local defense in Europe.

## V. West German Policy after Strauss

The most obvious change introduced by the new Defense Minister, von Hassel, was a new political style--German interests were expressed with a new moderation, the prevailing theme was confidence in America and basic agreement on military policy. This reflected more than a change in personalities; the outcome of the Cuba crisis greatly

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reduced the sense of urgency of the previous strategic disagreements,
since it had largely dissipated the fear of a Soviet challenge in Europe.
In 1963, American resentment at de Gaulle's public questioning of
American reliability led the Germans to emphasize publicly their
confidence in the United States. The new emphasis on agreement rather
than differences, and the increasing German support for the MLF, lent
a more pronounced "pro-American" color to the new policy. By making
a definite offer, however limited, on nuclear control, the Americans
had removed the issue from the level of diplomatic shadow-sparring to
that of the implementation of a concrete policy.

On the other hand, the German Government had not accepted the
American doctrine on Central European defense. In the absence of
Strauss, German policies are no longer sharply focused on a competing
strategic doctrine; what has emerged is a spectrum of views, probably
somewhat closer to the Strauss doctrine than to that of McNamara. On
the one hand, many German officials acknowledge the desirability of
increasing the non-nuclear options, and many share the American interest
in improving the quality of the existing forces; but many continue to
believe that only a prompt recourse to nuclear weapons could be effective
against most kinds of Soviet attack. The German Government has not
adopted the American-sponsored conventional strengthening as a major
German national interest; it does not, for example, bring this forward
as a foreign policy goal in its relations with Britain and France.¹

¹ In the case of the visit to Bonn by British Foreign Secretary Butler, for example, on Dec. 9 and 10, 1963, the German Government was reported to have raised the questions of East-West negotiation, the (footnote continued on next page)

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But the prospects for a revision of NATO strategy in the American sense depend mainly on British and French policy; only if Anglo-French indifference and hostility toward a conventional buildup were overcome, could NATO seriously improve its non-nuclear options. So long as the conventional strategy can be dismissed as an American attempt to foist a new strategic doctrine on unwilling Europeans, Britain and France can easily resist American pressure; only if sustained German pressure were also exerted on behalf of the strategy would it begin to become politically feasible.

One reason for the passivity of the German policy on ground defense--it no longer opposes American strategy, but neither does it give it real support--is that, in contrast to the American tendency to assert that even large non-nuclear attacks can be met by conventional forces, the Germans reassert the traditional formula that any major attack can only be met by the use of nuclear weapons. So long as this doctrine is held, there is little incentive to urge the buildup on Germany's allies,¹

Kennedy Round and the MLF; there was no suggestion of a German interest in the strengthening of NATO's ground forces. Cf. *The Times*, December 10, 1963; F.A.Z., December 11, 1963.

¹One problem for American policy is the lack of clear definition of a target. The 30-division target had the merit of being clear-cut; the goal of resistance to all-out conventional attack would be clear but too extreme to be feasible. The argument that more than 30 divisions would be valuable even though it might still not be possible to resist all-out attack without recourse to nuclear weapons, is not at all persuasive to those predisposed against incurring the costs of conventional defense.

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While overt conflict has disappeared from American-German military relations, the two inevitably have different preoccupations and priorities. American policy in NATO continues to emphasize the goals of strengthening the conventional forces, burden-sharing, and the central control of nuclear weapons. The Germans, on the other hand, remain overwhelmingly more interested in deterrence than in defense; but their second-priority goals also differ from the American: forward defense, a say in the use of nuclear weapons, the political reorganization of NATO, and the deployment of a land-based MRBM.

It is likely that these interests will find expression in German policy in the coming period. It is unclear how the emphasis on deterrence affects specific policy choices; it tends to reduce political support for any measure which appears to contribute to war-fighting rather than deterrent capabilities. The goal of "forward defense" has more operational significance: being essentially a political objective (a determination not to surrender any considerable part of German territory) it is more promising as a basis for allied consensus than Strauss' strategic doctrine on the early use of nuclear weapons: it has long been widely acknowledged that the alliance can satisfy Germany's vital interests only if it can defend the whole of German territory. In raising this issue--in a sense, a return to the Schumacher demand that the allies must unite their fates with that of Germany--by changing the forum from that of strategic polemic to that of the political basis of alliance--the German Government may have taken a step toward resolving part of the strategic dilemma in Central Europe.

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Concerning NATO reorganization, the Germans are motivated partly by the desire to avoid a three-power directorate (there was alarm at Norstad reviving this proposal early in 1963), partly by a desire to move toward a more integrated military grouping under effective political control, preferably supranational. In contrast to Strauss on nuclear control, his successor has been hesitant to take initiatives. The German Government appears for the time being satisfied with the future potential of the MLF, but it can be expected that the issue of the control of tactical nuclear weapons will be revived within the Alliance, with strong German interest if not on German initiative. Similarly, though interest in the MRBM is somewhat latent, the military desire for a replacement of the present fighter-bombers and for some European-based counter to the large Soviet MRBM force, is likely to keep alive the European pressure for this addition to NATO's armory.

While most of these issues seem likely to arise, it can safely be predicted that there will be others. The rapid fluctuations in the problems confronting German military policy since 1949 suggest that it is likely that new, unforeseen issues may dominate the debates of the later 1960's. One possibility would be an American decision to reduce the scale of the American military contribution in Europe; balance of payments pressures may outweigh the foreign policy objections against force reductions. Or the Franco-American conflict may generate new crises within the Alliance; or political détente may bring difficult problems of readjustment. In any case it is likely that the renewal of the NATO Treaty in 1969 will spark off new controversies,

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such as at one extreme, the question whether to move further in the
direction of military supranationalism, at the opposite extreme, if
Franco-American relations deteriorate, the continuation of the alliance
itself. From its past record, Germany could be expected to be one of
the strongest protagonists of the alliance.

Chapter Five

ISSUES IN GERMAN-ALLIED RELATIONS:
STRATEGY, BERLIN, REUNIFICATION

I. Some Misconceptions

The preceding account of German policy has drawn attention to certain of the leading problems in German-allied relations, in particular military strategy, Berlin and reunification; closely associated with the latter are the questions of political <u>détente</u> and arms control in Central Europe. On the other hand, the account suggests that certain popular fears concerning Germany are misconceived though natural in terms of the German pst, they have little relevance to the present. One of these, fear of a new "Rapallo," a German "deal" with the Soviets, will be discussed in a later chapter.

Three further misconceptions deserve brief mention: the analogy
with Stresemann's policy, viewed as the cultivation of Western ties in
order to strengthen Germany for the pursuit of irredentist aims in
the East; the view that the key to German policy is a determination
to gain full control of nuclear weapons, by whatever means; and an
exaggeration of German influence in alliance diplomacy based, for
example, on Washington's coolness toward ideas of disengagement.

Setting aside the much disputed question of Stresemann's motivation,
there is no basis for the view that the real purpose of contemporary
German policy is to build up the armed forces for the sake of an
irredentist eastern policy. True, the government has damaged Germany's
international standing by the extent to which it has paid lip-service

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to the notion of the recovery of the former German homeland, e.g., through
official participation in rallies of the expellees and the practice of
displaying maps illustrating the German territorial claims in the trains
of the federal railways. The desire for the electoral support of the
expellees has been allowed to override all other considerations.¹ But
it is clear that the government is not **planning** for the recovery of the
former territories by the use of force; we have seen that the whole of
the **Bundeswehr** has been placed under NATO command, its logistic
interdependence with the American forces has been increased, and the
lack of German interest in military operations, as distinct from
deterrence, was one of the sources of German-American friction in
military policy after 1961.

There is no more foundation for the view that, underlying
Germany's specific concerns in the nuclear field, the crucial factor
is an unacknowledged one, a determination to gain unfettered control
of nuclear weapons. By contrast with Britain or France, there is very
little political pressure for nuclear independence. On the other
hand, it is probable that before 1961 the government, and Strauss in
particular, expected that the multiplication of nuclear weapons under
NATO would lead to their **de facto** control by the European members.
We have seen that Strauss sought persistently to increase the German

¹This is not to deny that there is an element of justice in the demands of the expellees, especially in the suggestion of special rights for national minorities to enable the return of individuals who would desire to return to their former homelands even under the present regimes. But this does not justify official encouragement of the idea of a return to the 1937 frontiers.

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and European influence over the decision to use nuclear weapons, but he has never publicly challenged the American physical control over the nuclear warheads.¹ There is no evidence of concealed actions in the nuclear field which would reflect a private policy at variance with the public one,²

Many commentators, impressed by Germany's economic strength since the late 1950's, have supposed that the Federal Republic's diplomatic influence has been comparably great.

As regards NATO strategy this has clearly not been the case. In general, the German will has prevailed only where it has coincided with the predominant tendency in Washington; in the case of German-American disagreement, Bonn has exercised a certain negative influence (on the revision of NATO strategy or the Western Berlin proposals) but has been unable to achieve its positive goals. In the case of disengagement where the German view prevailed, Dean Acheson rather than Kennan represented the typical American view.³ The central factor in German dependence on the alliance.

¹In 1961 Helmut Schmidt charged that Strauss had earlier attempted to change this, but was unable to document his charge; Strauss was able to show that he had frequently stated his acceptance of the existing procedure, *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 17 and 18 March, 1961.

²For a fuller discussion of this point, see Beaton and Maddox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 109-120.

³Acheson's case rested less on a close analysis of the consequences than on apprehension of what he took to be the forces behind the demand for disengagement: "the same old yearnings and errors. . .neutralism, withdrawal from conflict. . .the same fatal--and lethal--attempt to crawl back into the cocoon of history." Dean Acheson, "The Illusion of Disengagement," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1958, p. 371 He also voiced the principal strategic argument of the opponents of disengagement: that on American withdrawal from Germany would inevitably entail an American withdrawal from Europe.

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II. <u>Three Problems in German-Allied Relations</u>

At the present time Germany's commitment to the Atlantic
alliance is exceptionally strong and, by contrast to the situation
during most of the Adenauer era, is not politically contested.
However, the strain on the relationship during the Berlin crisis,
under leaders as "Atlantic" in outlook as Kennedy and Adenauer,
shows that it would be rash to take for granted the permanence of
Germany's present commitment. We have little solid understanding of
contemporary alliances, especially the strains to which they may be
subjected. They differ from past alliances in the intensity of the
relationships during periods of peace, and are exceptionally rigid
because of the clear-cut cleavage which determines how the leading
states will group themselves. It is even possible that the widespread
belief that there is no alternative to the existing alliances may drive
the member states into more intransigent attitudes in their disputes
with one another, to the point where it may be perceived that, for
China and possibly France, there is an alternative, a state of disaffection
so acute that it comes to make little difference whether the formalities
of alliances are preserved.

In the case of Germany, an alternative has been perceived
and much debated: there has been much speculation in the West as to
the conditions under which Germany might be expected to remain within
the alliance, the conditions which might lead to its turning elsewhere.
The present study is based on the premise that direct, clear-cut

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answers are not possible; it will examine in some detail three of the
principal issues in German/Western relations in the belief that it is
of value to seek to grasp these in their full complexity.

NATO Strategy

One of the central issues in the strategic controversies has
been the conflict between peacetime reassurance and wartime requirements
(as one school of thought would put it) or between deterrence and defense
(in the formulation of the opposing school). American strategic
analysts, first and foremost (but not only they) have argued that
policy should be based on the force requirements for war--that it is
too sanguine a view of history to suppose that war has abolished itself.

Even if this should be granted, the account of German policy has
shown that there is in Europe a more live concern with nuclear control
than with the American strategists' conception of NATO requirements
for limited war, and it seems unlikely that this will change. Rightly
or wrongly, the problems arising from the withdrawal of American
protection or American reluctance to risk nuclear war for Europe seem
more serious than the problem of war, if America remains firmly
committed to Europe's defense. Any discussion of nuclear strategy,
therefore, must consider the problem of nuclear control, not merely that
of establishing suitable NATO forces for carrying out a common strategy.

Concerning this common strategy, the two central questions to be
discussed--which indeed represent the core of the strategic differences
between Strauss and the Kennedy Administration are: how important
are the advantages to be derived from a stronger conventional defense,

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and (by far the most serious objection to this approach) does such a policy, as many Europeans fear, in fact weaken deterrence? Before coming to these questions, the heart of the European strategic controversy, it will be necessary to attempt a preliminary general analysis of deterrence and war, and a reappraisal of the nature of the contemporary Soviet threat (if indeed it remains a threat) to Europe.

## Berlin

The most obvious effect of the Berlin crisis on German/allied relations was to create friction, to replace former confidence by suspicion. But the opposite effect may prove in the long run to have been equally important: Soviet pressure on Berlin greatly increased Germany's sense of the value of the alliance--whether permanently or only temporarily remains uncertain. At a time of rapid change in American/European relations and Franco/American hostility, the German evaluation of the alliance must have major consequences, and this will continue to be the case whatever new issues come to dominate German foreign policy, and whether it is inclining Germany toward or away from an Atlantic orientation.

In the post-1958 Berlin crisis, this was a relatively constant limiting factor. The German/allied differences were more complex. But the Berlin crisis is likely to repay careful analysis: although some circumstances will not repeat themselves, it would seem more likely than not that there will in the future be periods of Soviet pressure against allied interests. While France was acutely aware of the political implications of the crisis, its handling by Britain and

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America was not skilful. Political defeats were avoided by good fortune more than good judgement, and-in part by Soviet failures to make the most of their opportunities. The Berlin crisis is rich in material both for the study of nuclear-age conflicts and for an understanding of the tensions within today's alliances.

## Reunification and Related Issues

German reunification is likely to remain at the heart of many German/allied differences: Germans cannot avoid ambivalent attitudes, however they may ultimately define their *raison d'état*. Under present conditions it is very unlikely to lead to German pressure for war, but rather to pressure on Western diplomacy. In times of tension, Bonn is apt to interpret any weakening on "the German question" as a sign of allied betrayal, but in periods of *détente* German pressure may become even more insistent, especially if *détente* consists in "tension-reducing" moves in Central Europe which leave the German partition unchanged.

Very broadly, the Soviets are interested in arms control in Europe in order to supplement the political *status quo*, America and Britain in order to contribute to global relaxation, the Germans to open the way to "political settlements", i.e. reunification. From the German standpoint, the Rapacki Plan combined the worst of many evils: it was perceived as discriminatory, and it represented a form of arms control supposed to relax tensions without in any way contributing to German unity.

To the extent that any arms control scheme in Central Europe, unless deliberately linked to a move in the German question, is likely to embody these defects in German eyes, the concept of arms control takes

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takes on negative connotations of which Germany's allies have
seemed largely unaware. Of the three issues examined in this study,
German reunification is the most obviously divisive, unless allied
policies are shaped with exceptional awareness and skill.

Chapter Six

THE SOVIET CHALLENGE

I. The Ambivalence of Soviet Policy

An analysis of Western military strategy in Europe requires an assessment of Soviet policy. The prevailing Western view is dominated by Soviet change; many would deny that there is in any sense a Soviet challenge, a military threat, But we must inquire whether the Soviets have entirely abandoned the ideal of world communism: have they indeed become a purely consolidationist power, or is their policy ambiguous? And if so, how can the West induce Soviet restraint? The present chaper will seek to define, as precisely as the subject admits, the nature and extent of the Soviet challenge to Europe in today's circumstances, Soviet military policy as such being treated in the following chapter.

The principal obstacle to a sober reappraisal of the Soviets is the tendency, encouraged by some Western political leaders, to oversimplify in a highly optimistic manner the nuances of the contemporary Soviet situation. The Western image of the Soviets tends to oscillate between extremes: if the Soviet leaders are no longer world revolutionaries, they must have come to accept the status quo; if they have no master plan for achieving world communism, they must be mere pragmatists reacting to events. If the Terror has been curbed, Russia must be virtually a democracy. This tendency to view the Soviets as either totally alien and different, or else essentially similar to the West, is not unrelated to the spectacular Western misjudgments of the past: the expectation

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that wartime collaboration would be prolonged after 1945, the expectation of massive Soviet aggression after they acquired nuclear weapons,¹ the belief in the permanence of the "monolithic" Sino-Soviet alliance. Current expectations of prolonged détente and permanent rupture with the Chinese as the Soviets become "fat" and bourgeois, may have little more foundation.

This is not to deny that the Soviet Union is fast changing; but any understanding of its distinctive character is impeded by the tendency to assimilate it to the West. Confusion is increased when Western opinion projects into the indefinite future a transient trend in Soviet policy. In 1964 it is forgotten that for the first two years of the Kennedy Administration Khrushchev, even though the Sino-Soviet conflict was already embittered, spurned the early American gestures toward a détente, preferring to engage in a war of nerves over Berling and the missile adventure in Cuba. Already he has come to be regarded as a staunch partisan of détente.

Some Western specialists, pointing to more basic Soviet changes would argue that the ideological commitment to world communism has been effectively abandoned. Many revisionist tendencies can be

¹ This is now less remembered than the other misjudgments; but Churchill was voicing a widespread fear when he inquired: "The question is asked, what will happen when they get the atomic bomb themselves and have accumulated a large store? You can judge yourselves what will happen then by what is happening now. If these things are done in the green wood, what will be done in the dry? If they can continue month after month disturbing and tormenting the world, trusting to our Christian and altruistic inhibitions against using this strange new power against them, what will they do when they themselves have large quantities of atomic bombs?" Speech at Llandudno, 9 October 1948, quoted in Kissinger, *The Necessity for Choice*, p. 178.

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discerned: destalinization, the questioning of Marxist economic dogmas, the abandonment of the doctrine of the inevitability of war.
To the Chinese, Khrushchev is a successor of Bernstein and Kautsky.¹
The Soviets appear to be serious in wishing to restrict conflict to the level of political and economic competition. These changes are not in question; what is in question is the conclusion sometimes drawn from them: that the "cold war" is now merely a psychological survival from an earlier period, based entirely on suspicion and misunderstanding, since there is no longer a conflict between Soviet and Western political objective. The "revisionist" analysis leaves out of account precisely that aspect of Soviet policy under Khrushchev which has posed the most serious problems for Western policy-makers: the political challenge with military overtones, whether in the slow-motion form of the Berlin crisis, or the attempted *fait accompli* in Cuba. Moreover, the "optimistic" appraisal of Soviet policy makes the very questionable assumption that Soviet policy-makers act, or are coming to act, in accordance with a constant scale of preferences² (always preferring defensive, safe options to offensive,

¹ "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace," by the editorial departments of Renmin Ribac (People's Daily) and Hengqi (Red Flag), 19 November 1963 (Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1963), pp. 1-8.

² Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Deterrence as an Influence Process," pamphlet of the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, May 1963, pp. 30-32, questions the assumption of stable preferences, ("normalized goals"), and refers to its importance as a tacit premise in discussions of Soviet policy.

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risky, ones)--an assumption which, *prima facie*, cannot account for the characteristic zig-zag of Soviet policy since Stalin's death.

Khruschev is not merely a statesman of the type of Palmerston or Theodore Roosevelt--a forceful defender of the national interest, but one who accepts the existing balance of power. To say this is to overlook both the strand of ideological fundamentalism in his thinking and the potential consequences of some of his policies, if not checked by a Western diplomacy prepared, in the last analysis, to resort to armed force.

It is conceivable that the period of zig-zagging may belong to the past--that the pressures of ideological controversy and the failure of brinkmanship may lead the Soviets to follow a more circumspect policy or that Khrushchev's successors may prove less impetuous, more bureaucratic. But it may prove self-defeating to base policy on such hopes. There is much to be said for the contention, at first sight paradoxical, that a Western "hard line" offers the best chance for Soviet moderation. The Kennedy of the Cuba crisis was more successful in inducing Soviet restraint than the Kennedy seeking to negotiate a compromise on Berlin. A "hard" response tends to check an impending challenge; a policy determined to give the Soviets "the benefit of the doubt" encourages further probes and may increase the risk of fatal miscalculation.

The central question for the appraisal of present Soviet intentions has been formulated in the following terms by John Strachey:

> For my part I do not believe that the new evidence which we now have has done more than confirm the commonplace

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conclusion that Russia is still a nation-state-with-a-mission, but that on the other hand she now has a considerably lessened sense of that mission. Only those with very special causes to plead will deny that Russia still feels a mission or, on the other hand, that she feels this mission less compulsively, and even less ardently, than one she did. . .What matters is to form an estimate of how much the compulsive character of the Soviet Government's mission to spread communism has cooled and waned.¹

This formulation requires one *caveat*. It lends some credence to the "cooling of the lava" image of Soviet change--a slow but continuous process, at some point in which revolutionary ardor will have cooled until the Soviets no longer pose a threat. This not only exaggerates the degree of revolutionary fervor felt by the individual (surely today's communist missionaries have already become highly bureaucratized) but also suggests continuous irreversible process. Whether or not it is possible to chart the general direction in which history is moving, it never moves gradually and evenly along a straight course. A somewhat better image might be that of a succession of volcanic eruptions, tending to decline in force. But both images are misleading, in that they overlook the interaction between Soviet and Western policies; while it may be true that the West cannot control the periodic eruptions of the Soviet volcano, its response is

¹John Strachey, *On the Prevention of War*, London, Macmillan, 1962, p. 224. Strachey provides a very suggestive analysis of communist intentions in terms of the evolution of Marxist ideas: but his account of the Sine-Soviet conflict, in the present writer's judgement, overestimates the significance of the war and peace issue in the dispute, and too readily accepts the Soviet-Yugoslav version of the Chinese position.

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is not limited to settling the population beyond the range of the
volcano--the one possibility which is not open.

An assessment of the Soviet challenge should not be based
merely on the projection of a favorable trend. It should acknowledge,
firstly, the extent to which foreign policy decisions, especially,
are the product of Soviet-Western interaction. Secondly, it should
take account of the probability that future Soviet policies will be
highly responsive to international situations, which may greatly
fluctuate: we must take account of situations which could tempt
aggressive Soviet intervention as well as those which point toward
Soviet restraint.

A Note on the Sino-Soviet Conflict

The popular view of the Sino-Soviet conflict errs precisely in
making the most optimistic of a range of possible interpretations.
The Soviet championing of peaceful coexistence is seen as the heart
of the conflict--the Soviet willingness to press the issue as proof of
their seriousness. Certainly the Soviet emphasis on the avoidance
of war is a welcome development; and they may even become so committed
to this to prevent a return to more challenging policies. But there
are many reasons for skepticism.

Firstly, many of the Soviet polemics on peace and war,
conincided with the period of brinkmanship on Berlin and Cuba,
demonstrating that the doctrine of caution did not wholly govern
Soviet policy. Secondly, if détente fails to bring political gain,
pressure may mount on the Soviet leaders to attempt a more militant

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policy; new situations may appear to hold out opportunities for such a policy. Thirdly, in the event of a Sino-Soviet <u>rapprochement</u>, the ensuing common policy may well be more militant than the present Soviet line, either because of the normal tendency to compromise between two extremes, or because of the persuasiveness of some of Mao's tactical arguments in the context of traditional Soviet tactical doctrine.

It is very questionable whether the war and peace issue has been the main source of the conflict, or whether it is not the ground on which the Soviets have chosen for their stand. Any hypothesis on the causes of the conflict is highly speculative: where many factors are relevant it is by no means obvious which is the most important. These include a series of issues on which the Soviets have neglected Chinese interests: nuclear weapons, summit diplomacy, consultation on bloc policies, the relative attention paid to Chinese concerns (e.g. Formosa) in contrast to Soviet concerns (e.g. Berlin), the volume of economic aid to China, and the Sino-Indian conflict. The Soviets have rejected any Chinese claim to equality. Their "revisionist" trend in ideology has clashed with the apparent Chinese need for reasons of internal policy for a more "Stalinist" ideology. It is clear that Mao believes that he has a far better grasp of political strategy and tactics than Khruschev. Finally, the controversy has developed into an all-out struggle for the allegiance of the world's Communist Parties.

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There are even serious grounds for doubting the Soviet version of the war and peace issue: the Chinese claim that their position has been distorted, that they are equally opposed to nuclear war, but argue, in effect, that for reasons of morale the Soviets should maintain the fiction that communists need not fear a nuclear war, just as Stalin after 1945 maintained the fiction that nuclear weapons were not important, while hastening to develop a Soviet nuclear capability.¹

## II. Implications of Internal Policy

It is clear that Soviet foreign policy is profoundly influenced by internal Soviet developments; but an understanding of this quite subtle relationship is distorted by the crude concept of democratization often employed to describe it. A Russian democracy, it is assumed, would be peaceful; this furnishes a strong incentive to equate destalinization with democratization. In, fact, history lends little support to the belief that democracies cannot be war-like;² but the more important point is that there can be no understanding of the present Soviet political system--if the Soviets are regarded

¹See, for example, the pamphlet cited above, "Two Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace," the argument appears in many of the Chinese statements.

²It might be argued that a Russian democracy would not: all observers refer to the Russian public's dread of war. While this is certainlv the case, it is necessary to remember that democratic opinion is often easily persuaded that its government is acting defensively; it cannot be expected that Russian public opinion will quickly become self-critical.

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as virtually a democracy. There is no reason to suppose that change
is necessarily leading as far as this: modern industrial states are
not necessarily democracies. Industrial German, for example, had to
undergo two defeats before a viable political democracy could be
established.

The scope of internal Soviet change has been summed up by Alex
Inkeles as follows:

For the hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens
who now sleep more securely, without the continuous fear
of the early morning knock at the door, the change is real
enough. They would think us mad to argue that this was
not a 'real' change. Yet such changes do not add up to
democratization.¹

Western conceptions of individual rights are alien to the
Soviet system. The structure of political power in Soviet society
has changed very little; the Soviet leadership has been able to
make adjustments without sacrificing the basic features of the
regime:

> . . . the monopoly of power in the elite of the one-party
> system, the absolute dominance of the state in the control
> and direction of economic life, the limitation of freedom
> of opinion and expression to those few cases and to that
> degree which the regime regards as politically harmless,
> and the use of force or extralegal measures, however
> selective, to impose the will of the leaders in such a way
> as to make an ultimate mockery of the law and constitution.²

¹Alex Inkeles, "The Challenge of a Stable Russia," in Alexander Dallin (ed.) *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 285.

²Inkeles, *loc. cit.*, p. 293.

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The major political change is in the distribution of power within the ruling party. Stalin's despotism over the party has given place to a more regularized dictatorship of the party secretariat within the party; under Stalin, the role of the "apparatus" was limited by the Secret Police and even, to some extent, the governmental bureaucracy. The Secret Police was the basic source of Stalin's arbitrary power; Khrushchev, having to rule through the apparatus, inevitably lacks the same degree of personal power over it.¹

With the elimination of Stalin's personal despotism and the Terror, the most extreme features of Stalin's political style, lavish adherence to his personal policies and doctrinal formulations have disappeared. The internal pattern is one of limited, controlled relaxation. The Party, a body of professional politicians skillful in manipulating Soviet society, and monopolizing the leading positions in Soviet public life, has good prospects of retaining control over the system as a whole. If there is a close parallel between internal and external policy, we should expect to find that Khrushchev has modified Stalin's policies, transformed them.

## Relation between Domestic and Foreign Policy

Soviet doctrine states that domestic policy takes precedence over foreign policy. The external function of the state is subordinate to, and reflects, its internal function.² While this places the

¹Wolfgang Leonhard, *The Kremlin since Stalin*, *passim*, esp. pp. 11-13.

²Wolfgang Leonhard, *op. cit.*, p. 2, citing the 1958 handbook, *Foundations of Marxist Philosophy*.

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emphasis correctly--the regime is oriented more towards internal than
foreign goals ¹--the Soviet view of the external world has a considerable
influence over Soviet policy as a whole. Military policy makes heavy
demands on Soviet resources, rather heavier than would be necessary
if consistent priority were given to domestic goals. ² It is difficult
to explain Soviet foreign policy after 1945, for example, solely as
a reflection on internal policy. The "hard" ideological line may have
reflected Stalin's domestic concerns, his determination to regain full
control over Soviet society, and at this stage the regime may have
reserved an external enemy. But granting an interest in stimulating
anti-Western feeling, this did not require the systematic pursuit of
political gains (Czechoslovakia, Berlin, Korea) whose effect was
self-defeating, the West being finally provoked (though not until
after Korea) into the costly arms race which now restricts Soviet
domestic options. Soviet foreign policy in this period can be
explained in terms of expansionist goals or the belief in the
inevitability of struggle with the imperialists, but hardly as a
mere adjunct of domestic policy.

A number of parallels between domestic and foreign policy
suggest themselves: under Khruschev both have seen a limited
relaxation, a rationalization, a change in technique more than
objective. Just as the Terror and the drive for total conformism

¹It could be said the "Communism in one country" is coming to
replace "Socialism in one country" as the operative goal of Soviet
policy.

² See discussion in the following chapter.

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proved an obstacle to domestic advance, so the Stalinist rigidity
impeded foreign policy.¹

Some of the limits to the policy of external relaxation can
be seen in relation to the bloc, the foreign Communist Parties, and
the restrictions on communication with the West. The Soviets seek to
retain a general control over the foreign policy and ideology of
the East European states, and fear is expressed that a break with
China might lead to tightened control. As regards the foreign
Communist parties, since their *raison d'être* is a rejection of the
prevailing political system, the Soviets are impelled to sustain
their sense of separateness, while assigning them temporary roles
which enable them to serve current Soviet interests. Soviet-Western
communication remaining limited: "Members of the elite are carefully
selected for exposure to close contact with the West. As before,
the "Iron Curtain" shields Soviet opinion from all but the most
restricted expression of foreign views.

Certain parallels can be discerned between the party's mode
of operation in domestic foreign policy, which may explain certain
peculiarities in the latter, e.g., its striving to maintain the
initiative and to manipulate foreign opinion. Internally, the party
has a monopoly of the political striving for ambitious goals, it
has a bias toward gradiose programs and extravagant claims and

¹Indeed, Stalin himself in his last years was already ceasing to be a "Stalinist" in foreign policy, and was pointing the way toward the policy of "peaceful coexistence." Cf. Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin's *Foreign Policy Reappraised* (Harvard University Press, 1963).

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predictions. Control of the media of communication makes it possible to generate "enthusiasm" and to ignore unfulfilled predictions. Externally, the regime also seeks to maintain the initiative and formulates extreme goals, seemingly in the hope of shaping the general direction of events, while the West ends to react to Soviet moves, just as Western governments react to domestic pressures and problems.

Just as the Soviet method of mobilizing domestic support involves the manipulation of opinion, they seek to influence international events by creating favorable pressures, through the manipulation, e.g., the "struggle for peaceful coexistence," or through stigmatizing opponents as "cold war" leaders. While all politicians take initiatives and have a manipulative approach to persons and ideas, the Soviet leaders have far greater scope to indulge these tendencies. Western politicians must heed public opinion, group interests, and party attitudes; they cannot move far ahead of a popular consensus. Even though skilled in rhetoric, they are exposed to the criticism of interested parties; the scope for manipulation and deliberate untruth is limited. By contrast, the Soviet leaders operate in a political vacuum; they require popular acquiescence, but are not obliged to respond to popular criticism or initiatives; Soviet associations are not in a position to bring pressure against the government; distortions of the truth cannot be countered. It is natural that the Soviet leaders should carry the approaches and methods shaped by such a vacuum into the international field.

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In sum, the Soviet external policy is not merely a reflection of internal policy; the two interact, and to the extent that foreign policy does reflect the internal situation, this includes its more permanent features as well as its changes.

### III. Ideology and Foreign Policy

In contemporary Soviet life there are many suggestions of what has been termed "ideological erosion," a decline in commitment. The contrast between the attitudes of the Soviets and the Chinese needs no underlining. Soviet artists and writers, though loyal to the basic ideals of the regime, are interested in their art and their right to depict society as they experience it, not in promoting the immediate goals of the party. By contrast with the trenchant writings of Lenin or even the ritualism of Stalin, today's ideological pronouncements, except when relieved by Khuushchev's earthy metaphors, are colorless and scholastic, all too obviously the product of a committee.

To many in the West, it may appear that the credibility of the doctrine must have been undermined by the breakdown of Marxist predictions of the decline of the capitalist world. But the Russians lack immediate experience of Western economic growth and social progress with an underlying reality of sharpening contradictions, increasing exploitation.¹

¹For an example of this kind of reason, see O. Kuusinen (ed.) *Fundamentals of Maxdsm-Leninism* (Lawrence & Wishart, London, 1961), pp. 321 ff.

More important than the question, how strongly is the
ideology believed, is the question, what political function does it
serve? This, surely, is to justify the maintenance of the Communist
Party's political monopoly, its control over appointments and the
media of communication, in terms of the party's task of mobilizing
the society for the building of communism. Conformism to the official
doctrine is a prerequisite for a public career. In some respects
indoctrination has been intensified under Khrushchev; it is possible,
as suggested by Brzezinski, that it is coming to replace the Terror
as the characteristic cement of the political system.¹

The Realpolitik Interpretaion of Soviet Foreign Policy

To argue that the ideology has an important internal role
is not, however, to show that it is important for foreign policy.
Some analysts have interpreted Soviet foreign policy in purely
"national interest" terms. Certainly, much of Soviet policy
can be understood in this way, e.g., Stalin's attempt to create a
defensive coalition against Hitler, the Soviet interest in controlling
or neutralizing adjacent states, or the present search for influence
in the under-developed world.

On this view, it is not the Soviet commitment to a communist
world, but the emergence of a new kind of international system,

¹Z.K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics* (Praeger, 1962), p. 79. For other discussions of the role of ideology, cf. Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (Vintage Books, 1960), pp. 32-39; Robert V. Daniels, *The Nature of Communism* (Random House, 1962) *passim*, esp. pp. 349-356; Richard Lowenthal, "The Logic of One-Party Rule," in A. Dallin, *op. cit.*, pp. 58-74.

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"bi-polarity," which is the essential source of the Soviet-Western conflict. The two leading powers are bound to become rivals; the lesser, if increasing in power, it is bound to challenge the greater, just as German, for example, was coming to challenge Britain's position as the leading power at the turn of the century. But "world revolution" has become mere aspiration, a dream. As one writer has put it, the Soviet concentration on short-range objectives has "caused the means to eat up the ends."¹ In practice, the Soviets, like any other power, are interested in maximizing their influence within the constraints of the existing international system.

The difficulty with this approach is the essential indeterminacy of the concept of national interest: different states at different times define their national interest in terms of dominating others, holding a balance or minimizing their international involvement. It may often be difficult or impossible to distinguish a state with limited objectives from one with hegemonial ambitions successfully kept in check. Frequently, "ascendant" powers--Spain, France, finally Germany--have sought to dominate the international system. If the Soviets confronted Europe alone, if American power were not interposed, they would have to be exceptionally free from the traditional power-seeking tendencies of states if they were to refrain from seeking to dominate the continent. In the long run, European integration may

¹The phrase is that of Barrington Moore, quoted by Samuel L. Sharp, "National Interest: Key to Soviet Politics," in A. Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 53.

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create a balance between two equals, in the intervening period
the European balance of power is less secure than in the past,
depending as it does on the intervention of a single power, in
some respects an outsider.¹ It is clear that one objective of
Soviet foreign policy is to bring about a withdrawal of American
power, especially from Europe.² This, clearly, would serve Soviet
national interests, but it would not be compatible with the present
balance of power; the national interest is not synonymous with
restraint. Even if the motivation of Soviet foreign policy may be
becoming more "traditional", its effects could be "revolutionary."

Thus the _Realpolitik_ interpretation, though not unilluminating,
is incomplete. Bipolarity (even if somewhat modified) is a fundamental
feature of contemporary world politics, the framework within which
international conflicts take place. But in order to discover how
intensely the Soviets pursue the struggle for influence, what their
short- and middle-range objectives may be, what costs and risks they
are prepared to incur, it is necessary to examine actual Soviet
behavior and the thinking which lies behind it.

¹Britain, it is true, stood somewhat outside the continental
balance; and the continental powers were at times dependent on British
policy. But the difference in degree between the positions of Britain
and America amounts to a difference in kind.

²Cf. H.S. Dinerstein, "Soviet Goals and Military Force," *Orbis*
*Vol. IV, No. 4, Winter, 1962; J.M. Mackintosh, *Strategy and Tactics*
*of Soviet Foreign Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 307 and
*passim*.

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The Defensive Interpretation

One variant of the national interest thesis is the defensive
interpretation of Soviet policy. In its crudest version, this amounts
to no more than a reversal of the view that every Soviet move is
"aggressive." Both simplifications overlook the point that many
diplomatic moves, more especially in a bi-polar relationship, are both
defensive and potentially offensive. A measure which increases one
state's security may threaten that of another, which is obliged to
take account of this consequence, whether or not intended. It cannot
be sure that it was not intended, or will not be exploited in the
future, whatever the immediate intentions.

It is clear that the Soviets have vital security interests in
East Europe, and also that there has been an element of defensive
motivation behind many of the most forceful Soviet policies. For
example, one purpose of the Berlin blockage was to prevent the
formation of a West German state, which represented a major
consolidation of the Western position, a firming of the balance of
power unfavorable to the Soviets. To have prevented this, however,
might well have prevented the recovery of West Europe: the Soviet
move had vast offensive as well as defensive implications. Most
cases of decisive Soviet action (e.g., Korea, the Berlin Wall) have
involved defensive as well as expansionist motives--a desire to halt
an unfavorable political trend, not a purely offensive move.

The Soviets are not driven to expand by compelling economic,
political or ideological pressures--the need for resources, rule by

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a military case or dictator in need of external triumphs, or the
pressure of an ideology that glorifies the military values or the
spontaneous revolutionary fervor akin to that of the French Revolution.
If the ideology does create expansionist pressures, these are more
subtle and indirect, arising perhaps from the need to fulfill
expectations of the gradual expansion of the socialist camp. This
possibility will be examined below.

Another form of defensive interpretation is that the
Soviets are motivated by an obsessive, paranoic desire for security
which is defined in so absolute a manner that nothing less than
world supremacy would satisfy them.

Their revolutionary quality derives, however, not
from the fact that they feel threatened--a measure of
threat is inherent in the relation of sovereign
states--but that nothing can reassure them. Because their
doctrine requires them to fear us they strive for absolute
security: the neutralization of the United States and the
elimination of all our influence from Europe and Asia.¹

Such an interpretation, which can be illustrated liberally
by reference to Soviet ideology,² was a plausible reading of Stalin's
policies, but is much less so of Khrushchev. The earlier atmosphere
of siege has disappeared, the doctrine of capitalist encirclement
has been replaced by the question, "who encircles whom?"--and the
image of two competing camps, the socialist ever outstripping the
imperialist. The strength of the earlier obsession, however

¹Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (Harper, 1957), p. 358.

²Cf. Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism* (Free Press, Glencoe, 1953) pp. 384-390 and 399-416.

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may be reflected in Khrushchev's persistent reiteration of the new
doctrine that peaceful coexistence is now possible because the socialist
camp has increased in strength to the point of being the main determining
force in world events. In this new situation, Soviet attempts to
undermine the Western alliance have more and more the character of
an advance from a secure basis, less and less that of an attempt to
minimize the potential menace of a superior adversary.

Though valuable as a corrective to crude expansionist
interpretations of Soviet policy, the defensive view itself precludes
an inquiry into the complexity of Soviet objectives and their fluctuations
according to changes in the situation. Nor does it begin to capture
the distinctive characteristics of the Soviet approach to foreign policy.

The Impact of Ideology

Ideology supplies the clue to this distinctive character.
The long-range Soviet goals are more than mere aspiration or, as
suggested by Robert Daniels, prediction. The Soviet government does
not simply forecast the triumph of communism, but takes it for
granted that it will participate in its achievement. As Khrushchev has
expressed it:

The future is with our socialist system. Capitalism
is at its ebb, heading for collapse. This does not mean
that it is already lying down with its legs stretched out;
much work has yet to be done to bring it to such a state.
But this is inevitable, just as death inevitably comes to
the living organism or plant after a specific stage of
development.

¹Khruchchev on the Shifting Balance of World Forces, a special
study presented by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey, prepared by the Legislative
Reference Service of the Library of Congress, 1959, emphasis added.

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By and large, however, the doctrine looks to the internal evolution of the capitalist societies to bring about the necessary conditions for the transitions to "socialism."

As for the prospects of the countries of modern
capitalism, it would be best if we leave the countries
evaluation of these prospects within the competence of
the Marxist-Leninists of each particular capitalist
country. After all, they know the situation in their
countries better than anyone else. Here we can only
state the general direction in which the basic laws of
social development, laid down by the science of historical
materialism, are operating and will continue to operate
in these countries.¹

Thus there is no specific strategy or blueprint for the
attainment of world communism. The policy is, in large measure, to
wait on events, in the confident belief that they will develop
favorably. In the present phase, for example, support for neutralism
not only provides the Soviets with immediate diplomatic gains but is
thought to advance the processes which will exacerbate the final
crisis of capitalism. This would represent a sound long-term
strategy if the underlying historical analysis were correct.

The more immediate relevance of the doctrine is to provide the
categories within which the Soviets view international politics,
to define the leading actors and their appropriate roles. The division
of the world into two camps, perceived in terms of a black-and-white

¹Speech by Kuusinen, April 22, 1960, quoted in G.F. Hudson, Richard Lowenthal & Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute* (New York, Praeger, 1961), p. 122.

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value system, is taken for granted. Within flexible limits, the
Soviets are constrained to play the role of the leading "socialist"
state, the sponsor and protector of "socialist revolutions."

Soviet expectations as to the duration of this historical
process are extremely vague. Khruschchev has suggested that:

> History will possibly witness such a time when
capitalism is preserved only in a small number of states,
maybe states for instance, as small as a button on a
coat.¹

In one of the few detailed projections of the future,
Academician Strumilin, discussing the relative growth of the two
camps in the period 1960-1980, suggested as a "cautious assumption,"
that no more than 10% of the imperialist countries and 30% of the
neutrals might take the socialist road in this period.² Soviet
doctrine can make way for an indefinite postponement of the hopes
for a communist world.

The most important effect of this long-range ideological image
is to increase the potential instability of international relations.
Soviet policy in the past has been noted for spectacular changes of
direction. In the underdeveloped world there is a clear-cut
alternative to the present "right-wing" course, viz. a "Chinese"
policy of left-wing militancy, support for the local communist
parties instead of the "national bourgeoisie." In favorable
circumstances, the Soviets might sponsor militant action to bring
the party to power.

¹Hudson, Lowenthal & MacFarquhar, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

²Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XIII, no. 38, p. 4.

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In Europe the immediate prospects for militancy are much less promising. The danger is that doctrinal expectations render the Soviets prone to exaggerate the significance of economic or political crises, as signs of the final collapse of capitalism, a vindication of their doctrine of history. In such a situation they might well exert political and economic pressures to further weaken the European states.

Furthermore, it is possible that the interests of the ruling party may lead it to engage in foreign adventures, for two different reasons. While it does not appear to require international tension in order to maintain the allegiance of the populace, it may find tension convenient in order to justify its allocation of resources, in particular the restriction of consumer goods in favor of military expenditure.¹ Secondly, as has been argued by Adam Ulam,² the decline of ideological commitment within Soviet society may give the party an interest in achieving foreign success in order to fulfil ideological expectations and thus enhance the Party's authority, and its claim to preserve a political monopoly. While it is difficult to suppose that foreign success could check major domestic pressures, it might serve

¹It is possible that in the past the regime required an external enemy, both in order to induce acceptance of its rigorous controls and, possibly, so that the leaders could rationalize their own actions. Even today the need for preparedness against the imperialists is a standard theme of Soviet official statements. For a recent example, cf. speech by Khrushchev to the Young Communist League, April 19, 1962, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XIV, no. 16, pp. 12-15.

²Adam B. Ulam, "Soviet Ideology and Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, January, 1959, reprinted in Ulam, *The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism* (Harvard University Press, 1963).

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to forestall such pressures, just as, for example, in the mid-nineteenth
century British politics focussed on Palmerston's foreign policies
rather than domestic conditions. This possibility further draws
attention to the importance of the interaction between Soviet and
Western policy. The extent to which the Soviets could afford to
pursue foreign success would depend on the degree of resistance they
encountered. The authority of the regime might be even more damaged
by failures in foreign policy, than strengthened by successes.

IV. Ideology In the Short Term: Operational Principles

Past discussion of the role of ideology in Soviet foreign policy
has focussed too much on long-term questions which, important though
they are, are peculiarly difficult to assess. The recent study of
Soviet tactics has shed light on the much less familiar "operational
principles" which, influencing Soviet short-term choices, are more
relevant to an understanding of Soviet behavior. ¹ Two aspects of the
short-term impact of ideology deserve mention: its tendency to
emphasize the element of conflict in international politics, and the
elaboration of a set of tactical principles alien to Western political
thinking.

¹Cf. the writing of Leites, Brzezinski and Daniels, already
cited; also Robert Strauss-Hupe, et al., *Protracted Conflict* (New
York, Henry A. Kissinger, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New
York, Harper, 1957) Chapter 10, offers a succinct analysis to the
problem such tactics pose for Western policy.

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The role of the Soviet leadership is envisaged in terms
of the successful prosecution of conflict. What is absent is the
Western notion of conflict *resolution*, the assumption that a compromise
between competing interests is normally desirable. ¹ The flavor of this
apprehension of world politics as continuing struggle can best be
conveyed by Soviet utterances:

One of the perfidious suggestions which the adversaries
of peaceful coexistence make, consists in proposing to
"terminate" the ideological struggle. . . There is not and
cannot be anything in common between the question of the
relations between states with different social systems and
that of the ideological struggle. Peaceful coexistence
between the bourgeois and the communist ideologies, a
compromise or an armistice between them are impossible.²

Khruschev has pointed up the specific connotations of the term "camp," as the most appropriate way of conveying the notion of conflict:

Some (Yugoslav) politicians express their disagreement
with the very notion of a socialist camp and want to substitute
for it the word commonwealth or some similar word. I believe
that there is not and cannot be any more precise definition
than the term socialist camp, which expresses most completely
the nature of relations among the socialist countries in a
situation where the two systems, the socialist and the capitalist,
exist. As long as these two systems representing two poles
exist, the two camps opposed to each other must also exist.³

¹Though, very significantly, in justifying his Cuba policy, Khrushchev affirmed the need for "reciprocal compromises" between the nuclear powers, a departure from the usual pejorative Soviet usage of the term. Cf. Khrushchev's report to the Supreme Soviet, 12 December, 1962, "The Present International Situation and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union" (New York, Crosscurrents Press, 1963) p. 26

²From Voprosy Ekonomiki, 1956, quoted in W.W. Kulski, *Peaceful Coexistence* (Chicago, Regnery, 1959) p. 132.

³Pravda, April 16, 1957; quoted in Kulski, *op. cit.*, p. 134.

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In recent years an important doctrinal change has taken place: Soviet theorists have come to assert that peaceful co-existence includes co-operation as well as conflict. "Peaceful coexistence is a dialectical process combining organically the sharpest class struggle between socialism and capitalism and cooperation of states of the two opposing systems for the sake of maintaining peace."¹ That this is an innovation points up the extent of the previous emphasis on conflict, a factor which the Chinese have been able to exploit in the ideological quarrel.

The first requirement for the successful management of conflict is to determine the basic features of the current historical phase. This is explained by Brzezinski as follows:

> In policy-making, these phases are not so broad as the general Marxist historical stages (for example feudalism or capitalism). Rather, they identify the basic character of the specific phase within the present epoch—as, for instance, a revolutionary phase, a quiescent phase, a phase dominated by aggressive imperialism, or a phase in which the essential force changing history is "the liberation struggle of the colonial peoples." Once properly understood, the nature of a particular phase reveals who—the main enemy is and what measures ought to be adopted.²

Prior to the formulation of specific policies, Communist policy-makers must agree on the answers to a number of general questions:

¹Statement of N. Inozemtsev, 17 January 1962, quoted in Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind* (New York, Praeger, 1963) p. 206. Tucker discusses the changing Soviet doctrine of coexistence, *on. cit.*, pp. 201-222.

²Z.K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, pp. 104-105.

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The following sequence of questions is usually examined by the Communists when defining their policy: what is the nature of the present historical phase? What is the meaning of the relationships prevailing between economic forces and political institutions? What direction are they taking? Who is our major enemy? Is the enemy subjective or objective? Who are our allies, subjectively and/or objectively? At what point will we part with our allies? What ought to be the pace of our efforts to stimulate further change?¹

Soviet tactical thinking employs a unique set of concepts: while some of the basic ideas behind these are universal (questions of choosing one's political allies, for example, or choosing the most advantageous timing) Soviet thinking is distinguished by the elaborateness of its "operational code," the detail with which its injunctions are worked out.² This is the operational code of a "challenger," a party or power which sees its role in terms of making gains against the interests of hostile and powerful opponents.

Many of its maxims are complementary: one should push to the limit, for example, but maintain due caution, avoid "adventures." While the existence of potentially conflicting maxims can make for disagreement, it can also make for a high degree of tactical flexibility, an instant readiness to respond to the particular way

¹Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 103-104. Much of the Sino-Soviet controversy is argued in these categories.

²The most comprehensive and imaginative reconstruction of such a code is Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism*. Many of Leites' hypotheses are necessarily matters of speculation, and many of his observations would have to be revised to take account of post-Stalin changes. Nonetheless, his work offers a uniquely suggestive introduction to the conceptual world of Soviet tactical thinking.

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in which a situation develops. Even though the maxims do not unambiguously prescribe a single course of action for each situation, intense tactical self-consciousness obviously exercises an important influence on Soviet policy. The leaders are alert to particular dangers and opportunities: their tactical code has led them to adopt diplomatic procedures puzzling to those first confronted with them. This corpus of tactical injunction stands in marked contrast to the tendency of Western leaders to proceed according to pragmatic individual judgements or, for that matter, with the personal intuitions of a Hilter or a Mussolini.

In essence, the operational code posits that there is always on correct line for the party in every situation, one policy which fully realized its inherent opportunities. Failure to take advantage of these, failure to pursue the struggle with sufficient vigor, could expose the movement to unnecessary setback. The potential for advance, and its limits, depend on the existing "balance of forces." "Adventurism" the pursuit of gains not justified by the existing balance of forces, is as dangerous as "opportunism" excessive accommodation to the interests of the opponent; adventurist policies can lead to the destruction of those who have rashly committed themselves to an unattainable goal; retreat is justified, even mandatory, if the balance of forces is sufficiently adverse.

The concept of the balance of forces provides the keystone of this tactical doctrine, the "objective" calculation on which correct policy is to be based. In practice, since the factors entering

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into calculation are diverse and open to subjective interpretation,
there is no assurance of agreement among communists as to the correct
line.¹ Even the broad decision on the nature of the current historical
phase is largely arbitrary. The decision on what, concretely, can
be achieved, has to be reached by a process of trial and error.
The consequent process of probing is the source of much of the Western
difficulty in comprehending Soviet day-to-day policy. It is possible
that the maxim "push to the limit" lies behind much of the tenacity
of Soviet diplomacy; the unexpected *volte-face* occurs at the point
where the Soviet leaders conclude that nothing is to be gained from
continued pushing. Only a determined effort to achieve a goal can
justify a policy retrenchment.

One of the recurring themes in Khruschev's statements has
been the shift in the world balance of forces in favor of the Soviets.
This claim has been based partly on such "objective" factors as Soviet
economic growth, but also on an optimistic interpretation of political
and psychological developments, for example the Sputnik and the
Soviet interpretation of neutralism. The Marxist view that technology
is the basic source of historical progress may have led the Soviets
to exaggerate the short-run importance of the Sputnik.

The launching of the Soviet sputniks first of all
shows the outstanding successes scored by the Soviet
Union in the development of science and technology and
also that the U.S.S.R. has outstripped the leading
capitalist country, the United States, in the field of

¹Cf. Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Concept of the Balance of Power in Soviet Policymaking," *World Politics*, October, 1951.

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scientific and technical progress. The launching of
the sputniks also shows, without doubt, that a serious
change has occurred in the balance of forces between
the countries of socialism and capitalism in favor of
the socialist nations."¹

In the period 1957-1961 the Soviets exploited to the full
the symbolic value of their success with the Sputnik. The notion
that they had taken the lead as a world power gained currency. The
image fostered by Khrushchev was not effectively challenged until in
late 1961 the U.S. Administration made detailed statements on the
superiority of the existing U.S. strategic forces over the Soviets,
while U.S. missile production programs, ensured that such a ratio of
superiority would be maintained well into the decade. During the
post-Sputnik period, many Western observers gained the impression
that a dangerous euphoria lay behind the Soviet policy. There was
much to suggest that Khrushchev was exploring the possibility of
acting on his claim that the balance of forces justified Soviet
advances. Certain Soviet statements suggested that the crisis of world
capitalism had entered into a new stage, comparable to that succeeding
World War I and World War II.² On Berlin Khrushchev's language
suggested a readiness to abandon the customary Soviet restraint.

The positions of the U.S.A., Britain, and France in
West Berlin have turned out to be especially vulnerable.
These powers are still trying to cling to the old positions,
but they cannot fail to realize that sooner or later the

¹Khrushchev on the Shifting Balance of World Forces, p. 8.

² Cf. Richard Lowenthal, "The End of an Illusion," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1963.

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occupation regime in this city will come to an end.

It is necessary step by step to continue bringing
the aggressive imperialist circles to their senses, to
compel them to reckon with the real situation. If they
balk, we will take decisive measures. . .
1

The attempt to place missiles in Cuba in 1962 was an
exceptionally bold initiative--perhaps based on tension between
an over-confident analysis and the frustration of specific policy
offensives--the withdrawal, without substantial quid pro quo,
equally unprecedented.² The Cuban episode, despite its exceptional
drama and hazard, could be viewed as an extreme prototype of the
tactic by which the Soviets seek to discover the limits of the
opportunities open to them.

The Role of the Foreign Communist Parties: an Illustrative Case

In the present phase the foreign communist parties play a
subordinate role in Soviet foreign policy. Even so, it can offer
instructive illustrations of the protean character of Soviet policy,
the way in which, responding to a favorable situation, communist aims
can expand from the very limited to the very ambitious. One such
opportunity was the unexpected victory of the unilateral disarmament
movement at the annual conference of the British Labor Party in 1960
(reversed in 1961). A surprisingly frank disclosure of the Communist
of such a movement and the party's role in relation to it is provided

¹Khrushchev's report (January 1961) on the conference of world communist parties (November 1960), *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol 13, no. 4, p. 10.

²It would be explicable in terms of the operational code as interpreted by Leites, according to which retreat in such situations would be justified.

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by R. Palme Dutt, a veteran leader of the British Communist Party.

The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament united very varied trends and sections of opinion on a limited immediate programme, for the abandonment of British nuclear weapons. These included (1) pacifist and religious sections; (2) young people not previously drawn into political activity; (3) mixed political elements, including leaders, like Bertrand Russell, who had previously advocated an atomic war against Communism, but now recognized its bankruptcy; liberal imperialists who advocated the official Liberal Party line of abandoning the British H-bomb in favor of the Americnn H-bomb; naive idealists who believed that the "moral example" of Britain abandoning the H-bomb would show the way for the other Powers; even a few sought to introduce an anti-Soviet and anti-Communist slant on this basis; (4) the main body of the Left, represented by the Communists, militant Socialists, and militant trade unionists, who combined the fight against the British H-bomb with the fight against NATO and the American bases and for a general ban on nuclear weapons.

In the view of the Left, the demand for "unilateral nuclear disarmament," that is, immediate renunciation of nuclear weapons by Britain in advance of a general ban, represented a special immediate demand appropriate to the conditions of Britain, that is, to end the role of Britain as the main NATO base for the launching of nuclear weapons, and consequently the main target for destruction in a nuclear war. The Communist Party understood the significance of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, despite some political confusion of some of the Campaign's leaders and supporters, and gave full co-operation to it as a broad united movement of all opposed to the H-bomb, drawing in new strata not yet reached by the Party.

The C.N.D., with its single elementary demand and vivid actions, such as the Aldermaston Marches, appealed especially to young people and middle-class strata. The Party's influence helped to draw in the trade unions to support the demands of the C.N.D. (at first there was some resistance to this, owing to the healthy instinctive aversion of trade unionists to pacifism) and thus built up a powerful common front of the organized working class and pacifist middle strata against the official nuclear strategy. It was the trade unions that had the main role

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to play in transforming the policy of the Labor Party.
At the same time the Communist Party was confident that
the experiences of the struggle and the participation of
the Communists and militant trade unionists would help to
develop political understanding of C.N.D. supporters. This
indeed proved to be the case as the demands of C.N.D.
supporters and even of its literature began to extend from
the isolated concentration on the British H-bomb to include
also the American H-bomb and the American bases, and even
NATO.

V. <u>Soviet Objectives in Germany</u>

It is not only the volatile character of Soviet policy which
creates difficulties for the evaluation of Soviet objectives. Because
of the failure of most Soviet policies in Germany, or for that matter
in West Europe since 1943, it is easy to conclude that the ostensible
objectives have had little relevance. For example, Melvin Croan has
recently written that: "Any judgement to the effect that Soviet
policy, while pursuing minimal aims leading to the Bolshevization of
East Germany, has all the while set as its maximum goal the winning
over of the entire country to Communism represents, at best, an
extremely flaccid and rather misleading hypothesis. Once accepted,
such a generalization necessarily tends to obscure rather than to
clarify the many complexities and ambiguities of Soviet behavior."²

¹R. Palme Dutt, "British Labor Movement and Nuclear Disarmament," *International Affairs* (Moscow, December, 1960), pp. 53-54. Emphasis added.

² Melvin Croan, "Reality and Illusion in Soviet-German Relations," *Survey*, October 1962, p. 13.

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While it is true that the hypothesis in question may fail to
explain the details of Soviet behavior--which in Germany has consisted
largely of response to unfavorable situations--it surely characterizes
Soviet hopes and priorities. While the Soviets have never succeeded
in formulating a promising political strategy for the communizing
fo Germany, Soviet policy has always had a dimension absent from
Western policy: succession of attempts to influence the balance of
power in Germany, either by directly influencing West Germany or
by weakening the international groupings of which West Germany has
become a part. The West has had no such active policy toward East
1
Germany.

Soviet policy toward Germany can be viewed as existing on three
levels. First, and most vital, has been to establish and consolidate
control over the former Soviet zone; secondly, the level of
reunification diplomacy, and thirdly, that of political offensives
to isolate West Germany from its partners. Only the first two levels
have their parallel in Western policy--the policy of consolidating West
Germany's place within the various Western associations, and reunification
diplomacy. The latter closely resembles disarmament diplomacy; there
is a high content of gamesmanship, and for the most part the proposals
advanced are so patently one-sided--so obviously calculated to lead to
the incorporation of Germany in one or other of the power groupings--
that they have no prospect of being accepted. The one exception, the

¹In a sense, Western non-recognition has represented a form of pressure against East Germany; but Western diplomacy against East Germany has been entirely passive--even if, possibly, more effective than the Soviet initiatives in the West.

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Soviet proposal for an armed neutral Germany discussed previously, is a doubtful case; very significantly, it was not reunification diplomacy in isolation, but also involved the third level, that of a political offensive against West Germany's alignment.

It is possible to distinguish four major instances of such political offensives. The Berlin blockade of 1948-49 appears to have begun as an attempt to prevent the establishment of a West German state; quickly realizing that this was fruitless, Stalin sought to gain control of Berlin itself. At first his chances appeared good, since the West was unwilling to challenge the blockade on the ground, yet at the outset few supposed that Berlin's needs could be supplied by airlift. Had he prevented the formation of West Germany, Stalin would surely have prevented the political and economic recovery of West Europe as a whole; in this respect, the Berlin blockade was the most serious of the Soviet actions, mostly confined to propaganda, against the Marshall Plan. Had Stalin forced the West to yield Berlin, it is very doubtful whether West Germany would have had sufficient confidence in Western protection to enter into close relationships with the Western powers.

In the early 1950's, the Soviets undertook a sustained diplomatic campaign to prevent the establishment of E.D.C., and the subsequent German entry into NATO. Some of the likely consequences of their success have

¹The fact that different aspects of this diplomacy contradicted one another seems to have caused surprisingly little difficulty. In France, the Communist Party and the peace movement emphasized the evils of German rearmament; in Germany, as we have seen, the Soviets pressed the idea of armed neutrality.