Mit den besten Empfehlungen überreicht von

DR. GISELHER WIRSING

STUTTGART-Sillenbuch · Christ und Welt

UPI-163

(KISSINGER)

WASHINGTON--A DELEGATION OF RELIGIOUS LEADERS THOUGHT THEY HAD AN
APPOINTMENT WITH PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER HENRY A. KISSINGER TODAY,
BUT INSTEAD THEY HAD TO EXPRESS THEIR MORAL INDIGNATION OVER THE
VIETNAM WAR TO TWO OF HIS STAFF MEMBERS.

THE WHITE HOUSE SAID KISSINGER HAD NOT MADE A FORMAL APPOINTMENT
WITH THE DELEGATION. INSTEAD, KISSINGER ASSIGNED JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE,
HIS SENIOR STAFF MEMBER ON EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS, AND DOLPH M. DROGE,
ANOTHER STAFF MEMBER, TO MEET WITH THEM.

THE DELEGATION WAS LED BY THERESSA HOOVER, ASSOCIATE GENERAL
SECRETARY OF THE WOMEN'S DIVISION OF THE UNITED METHODIST BOARD OF
MISSIONS AND THE HIGHEST RANKING BLACK IN THE DENOMINATION.

AT A NEWS CONFERENCE LATER, MRS. RICHARD W. BARON SAID HOLDRIDGE
AND DROGE TALKED SO MUCH "IT WAS DIFFICULT TO GET A WORD IN EDGEWISE."

DR. ROBERT V. MOSS, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST,
A SPOKESMAN FOR THE DELEGATION, SAID THE GROUP TOLD THE KISSINGER
AIDES THAT THE WAR WAS IMMORAL AND UNJUST AND THAT "THE CONCEPT OF
NATIONAL HONOR ON WHICH THE ADMINISTRATION IS BASING ITS POLICY IS
A MISTAKEN ONE."

MOSS SAID HOLDRIDGE RESPONDED THAT THE DELEGATION WAS COMPOSED OF
RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE VIEWS OF THEIR
CONSTITUENCIES.

SCHINDLER SAID HE DETECTED NO FLEXIBILITY IN THE ADMINISTRATION
POSITION, AND THAT HOLDRIDGE "ACTED AS IF HE KNEW WHAT WE WERE GOING
TO SAY AND HE CAME PREPARED NOT TO HEAR."

6-8--PA415PED

WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1971 4

the HOLLYWOOD

AT THE FIELDS' PARTY

From the left: Jennifer Jones and Norton Simon, Jimmy and Gloria Stewart.

From the left: Betsy Theodoracopulos and the YOM, Raquel Welch, John Tunney and Harriet Deutsch.

From the left: Ted Kennedy and Andy Williams, Joe Namath with his back-up quarterback.

AT THE MUSIC CENTER GALA

Sam Chew and Charlotte Ford.

From the left: David Niven, Jack Warner, Bill and Edith (Head) Innen.

All MacGraw

LOS ANGELES —

THE FILM INDUSTRY GOT A TIMELY TRANSFUSION OVER THE WEEKEND ... thanks to Sunday night's Motion Picture and Television Relief Fund-raiser at the Los Angeles Music Center plus the $1000-per-couple pre-gala at Polly and Freddie Fields Saturday.

In a period when 80 per cent of movieland is jobless, 5,400 faithful fans, the Hollywood Establishment and international social set made the dying industry over $800,000 healthier.

"I woke up one morning at 3," laughs gala-producer Greg Peck, "and saw the entire Music Center complex ours for one night, where top stars would entertain to support MPTRF."

And no one turned him down ... Mitzi Gaynor, Jack Benny, Bobby Sherman, Pearl Baily, Bob Hope, The Fifth Dimension, Barbra Streisand and Frank Sinatra ... with special guest, Princess Grace of Monaco.

Some diehard cynics will insist they attended "memorial services for Hollywood's Vanishing Golden Era." But for most, the Richter scale of spirit hit a record high when the all-stars juggled a carbon copy performance between the Pavilion and Ahmanson Theatres.

In 20 years, only one other weekend has pulled such a coup — Doris and Jules Stein's Sweet Charity/Universal Hotel opening in the spring of 1970.

"This was much more competitive in terms of who was getting invited where," reflects Polly Bergen. Polly gave Sunday night's gala its biggest competition with a sensational private (250 people) dinner dance. Even the gala's patroness, H.R.H. Princess Grace, arrived — in a long white crepe, sporting granny glasses — and stayed for two and a half hours.

By the time the long black limousines pulled into the Music Center driveway at twilight, Sunday, a majority of guests had already been to a half dozen

parties in 24 hours. But the schedule didn't stop the Party-Pooped from converging on the mall by 7:30 p.m. for the gala.

Vincente Minnelli, who directed the show, had been downtown since 7:30 a.m. Billy Hibbert had placed 286 center pieces donated from his A.B. Green plant store on Esther Haratzy's original swirl printed tablecloths and matching umbrellas. And the Caribbean sounds of Vin Cardinal offered appropriate fanfare.

Only President Nixon and the Richard Burtons were missed.

THE POLITICAL SET ROSE TO THE OCCASION FOR A LITTLE PLUM POLITICKING.

John Tunney (who met with studio execs at the Hillcrest Country Club earlier in the day to hear their story) arrived with lovely sister-in-law Kelly and his hosts Armand and Harriet Deutsch. Ted Kennedy came with Andy Williams.

Vice-President Spiro T. Agnew, tanned from a brief stop-over at Franklin's Palm Springs digs, was with Governor and Mrs. Ronald Reagan. So was Henry Kissinger. And Ellie and John Shapiro (she's Senator Joe Tyding's sister) made it.

Hollywood — old and new — balanced by the Social Register streamed through the crush of papparazzi — Cary Grant, David Niven, Ali MacGraw, Bob Evans, the Freddie Brissons, Jimmy Stewart, Jerry Ohrbach, Henry Fonda ... Charlotte Ford (in shrimp crepe) with handsome Sam Chew (Main-line Philadelphia), Anne and Deane Johnson, San Francisco's Francis Martin, Jack Warnecke, Herb Caen.

Jack and Bonita Wather brought their friends in a super bus — with champagne and caviar.

Mall-milling was a short pastime for the early show in Dorothy Chandler's

ALL-STARS

5 WOMEN'S WEAR DAILY, WEDNESDAY, JUNE 16, 1971

Princess Grace and Cary Grant.

From the left: David Frost and Diahann Carroll, Bob and Natalie Gregson.

From the left: Wallis Weingarten, Veronique Peck, Frances and Edgar Bergen, Mary Jones and Beegle Duquette, Gregory Peck, Nelle McQueen and Polly Bergen, Barbra Streisand.
Photos by Frank Diernhammer and Noel Brooks

Pavilion. But fire regulation problems ensued and ticket-holders were greeted with the lower torsos of several workmen drilling last-minute alterations on the stage curtain.

People even took advantage of the 45-minute delay to play. Upstairs, a bluebook crowd partied in the Founders Room — the Otis Chandlers, Jules Steins, Reese Milner, Tony Duquette, Ted Bensinger, Dennis Stanfill, Jane Feldman, Bradley Jones, Kirk Douglas. "I've never had so much fun in the Founders Room before," reported Mary Jones.

And down front, George Cukor huddled with Mrs. Sam Goldwyn; Denise Minnelli played hostess in the first three rows; Edith Head took front row center with Jetta and Harold Grieve. . . . Norton Simon with his bride Jennifer Jones. . . . The Dis Brodys discovered the Bennett Cerfs next to them. . . . Jayne Meadows flashed down the aisle in black sequinned HotPants.

Then the Princess arrived, slipping into seventh row center, in Dior's printed white, green, blue chiffon. . . . flanked by her brother John Kelly, niece Mrs. John Paul Jones and old friend Rupert Allen. The granny glasses had been put away.

And across the mall, the Ahmanson group was gathering. The smaller theatre drew the Ronald Reagans, Vice-President Agnew, Armand Deutsch, John Tunney, Henry Fonda, Mervyn Leroy, David May, Freddie Brisson and all the Sinatra generations.

WHEN THE SHOW GOT UNDERWAY, THERE WASN'T A HITCH.

Bouncing Bobby Sherman ("I couldn't wait to get home to tell daughter Laurie about him," said Wallis Weingarten) opened and Sinatra closed (to the tune of a thousand Kleenex).

The Princess appeared on stage, in another Dior (white crepe with jew-

eled floral bodice). "It was a very emotional moment for me," she said later. "There are so many dear and treasured friends here."

The show ended at midnight, an hour late, so many bypassed the special Hollywood tribute film, clipped by Cukor for the Mark Taper Forum.

There were three weekend casualties — George Frelinghuysen slipped at home beforehand, hurt his back and is hospitalized; Sam Colt (Ethel Barrymore's son) was "jostled by a waiter" and fell into the reflecting pool; Rosemary Stack "applauded so hard that my diamond/coral ring came apart."

By 1:30 a.m. the super group arrived at Roz and Freddie Brissons to hash it all over with a buffet and liquid libation. Frank was there. So was Agnew, Reagan, Kissinger, Princess Grace, Cary Grant, Greg Peck.

"We stayed up until 4:30," said women's chairman Roz. "The whole thing was glorious. People were crying in those theatres, throwing their programs in the air, standing in ovation. And my task, introducing Frank, was one of the roughest assignments I've ever had."

Greg and Veronique (hard-working co-chairman) were "still sipping tea at home when dawn broke. We just couldn't sleep," she confessed. "It was a magical, sublime evening never to be repeated or recorded except in our memory."

The response was superlatively unanimous.

Edith Head summed it up this way: "I've never heard such emotional pitch, so many bravos in an American theatre before. It was an evening of unified sentiment that rarely happens in America ... like a homecoming."

The Princess has now escaped the mad merriment to visit her writer-uncle George Kelly, in Ranch Santa Fe, 100 miles down the coast. But she'll return to Hollywood and stay with the Mervyn Leroys, Thursday, for the final fling.

— KARIN WINNER

UPI-41

(VIET REPORTS)

LONDON--THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT SAID TODAY NEWSPAPER PUBLICATION OF THE TOP SECRET PENTAGON PAPERS INDICATES THE UNITED STATES HAS A "GENERAL PROBLEM" AND THAT WHITEHALL IS "CONCERNED."

THE FOREIGN OFFICE SAID BRITAIN'S AMBASSADOR, LORD CROMER, HAD BEEN ORDERED TO MAKE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OVER PUBLICATION OF THE PAPERS ON AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE VIETNAM WAR.

THE STATEMENT CAME AS DR. HENRY KISSINGER, PRESIDENT NIXON'S SPECIAL ADVISER ON NATIONAL SECURITY, MET PRIME MINISTER EDWARD HEATH FOR LUNCH AT HEATH'S OFFICIAL RESIDENCE, NO. 10 DOWNING ST.

LORD CROMER "HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO EXPRESS TO THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN AT THE THREAT TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES IN THE LIGHT OF THE PUBLICATION" OF THE PAPERS, THE FOREIGN OFFICE SAID.

IT ADDED THAT "WE ARE CONCERNED AT THE STATUS OF EXCHANGES OF AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL NATURE."

"THE POINT WE HAVE MADE," A FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN SAID, "IS THAT THERE IS A GENERAL PROBLEM WHICH WE WOULD LIKE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT TO BEAR IN MIND."

KISSINGER WAS IN LONDON FOR THREE DAYS AT THE INVITIATION OF SIR BURKE TREND, SECRETARY TO THE CABINET, FOR TALKS ON OPERATIONS OF THE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE COMPARABLE BRITISH MACHINERY IN WHITEHALL.

6-24--TS1032AED

MAY 1, 1971

NEW REPUBLIC

15

The Nixon Watch

Signals to Mao

On February 1, 1969, his twelfth day in office, Mr. Nixon sent a note to Henry Kissinger. The President said that his assistant for national security affairs should explore every means of developing friendly relations with Communist China and should tell East European Communists with whom Kissinger was in touch that this was a very serious purpose of the new administration. Nothing was said about passing the word to Peking, but that of course was the point.

So began what the President, in this year's edition of his annual foreign policy review, called "the movement toward normal relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China." It has been a slow movement, too slow for those critics who hold that the US and not the Peking government is principally responsible for the hostility that has prevailed since the Communists took over mainland China in 1949. But there is a rationale for the pace of Mr. Nixon's effort to encourage some movement and lately to hasten it a bit. Because the rationale will continue to govern the Administration's actions and responses to Peking's actions, no matter what the critics in Congress and elsewhere may say, it is set forth here as it was explained to me last week at the White House and State Department.

The guiding rule is that the American government should do nothing and propose nothing that could invite an explicit rebuff from Peking. The rule arose from a review of China policy that the President ordered four days after he sent the note to Kissinger and that he discussed with the National Security Council on the following May 15. It was a prescription for minimal disturbance of domestic opinion and for minimal political risk, calling as it did for cautious and minor steps toward accommodation that were no more likely to arouse either opposition or public enthusiasm at home than they were to draw an immediate response from Peking. But something more than that must be said for the rule of caution. It was rooted in a judgment that the Peking government would move on its own initiative to improve relations with the US, or respond to American moves toward that end, only when and if such a move or response was considered in Peking to be absolutely necessary and in the vital interest of the People's Republic. In the view thus adopted, the most that the US should try to accomplish was to convince the Peking Communists that, when and if they deemed a favorable move or response to be in their essential interest, the Nixon administration would welcome any sign that they did and would respond within the limits of what it considered to be American necessities and interest.

There followed, beginning in June of 1969, the

gradual relaxations of US curbs upon trade with China and travel to China that preceded Peking's invitation to the American table tennis players and Chou En-lai's remark that "a new page" in Chinese-American relations had been turned. This series of Nixon actions had a rather odd history. A long list of actions that the Administration might take without risking the feared rebuff was completed by an interagency study group on July 17, 1969. It included, at least in outline, all of the gestures that have been made since then, including the ones announced by the President on April 14. The most substantial of these, a partial lifting of the embargo on exports to and imports from China, was based upon a list of nonstrategic export items that was compiled for the President last November. A decision as to the items to be allowed and not allowed for export without special license could have been made and the complex regulations implementing the choices could have been drafted at any time since then. But the choices had not been made and the regulations had not been drafted when Mr. Nixon announced the concessions in principle. Similarly, the regulations that will determine how many dollars can be remitted to China for what purposes, in accordance with another of the latest concessions, had not been thought out and prepared. The bureaucracies at State, Commerce and Treasury were at work on the regulations last week. Until they are completed and approved by the President, nobody can know how much the concessions really amount to.

What they amount to is not, in the White House and State Department view, terribly important. Like the earlier gestures, they are undestood to be token actions - signals that the Nixon administration is ready to get down to serious business whenever the Peking government is ready. The important thing, in the Nixon view, is that with its tennis invitation and the admission of a few American correspondents to mainland China the Peking government has signaled back its conclusion, for its own reasons and in its own interest, that a "movement toward normal relations" is in order. By definition, normal relations must in the end require the admission of the People's Republic to the United Nations and diplomatic recognition of the Peking government by the United States. By the generally accepted definition, normal relations in this sense cannot be accomplished until and unless the US is prepared to dump Chiang Kai-shek's "Republic of China" and hand its island home, Taiwan, over to the Chinese Communists. Mr. Nixon is still saying that he will never do that. Peking is still saying that he must. So Mr. Nixon appears to be hooked.

But is he? The hope at the White House, verging upon confident belief, is that he isn't hooked. Or, that, if he is for the moment, the same play of forces and national interest that has led to the current turn toward accommodation will get him off the China hook. Put in simpler fashion than it is put at the White

16

THE NEW REPUBLIC

House and State Department, the Nixon hope is that the Peking government will be induced and the Taiwan government will be compelled to resolve their seemingly irreconcilable differences and arrive on their own at the "China solution" of China's problem that many critics of the Administration have advocated.

The basic judgment that Peking would move toward accommodation with the United States only when the Chinese Communists consider accommodation to be essential for them enters importantly into the Nixon calculation. If, the official reasoning runs, the Peking government considers accommodation essential enough to seek or welcome it at all, it must be prepared to pay some price for it. A corollary conclusion is that the worst mistake the US government could make at this point would be to offer the accommodation free of charge. This is why the Administration opposes and predictably will continue to oppose such Senate resolutions as George McGovern's, calling upon the Administration to acknowledge forthwith that the People's Republic is "the sole legitimate government of China" and support its admission to the UN. Why not, the Nixon argument goes, wait at least long enough to find out whether Peking, in return for a developing accommodation with the US, may be willing to set aside the Taiwan issue for a while or perhaps (as Sinologist Doak Barnett has suggested) accept a government restricted to Taiwan as an autonomous affiliate of the People's Republic?

The Administration is closer to a drastic alteration of its relationship with and support of the Taiwan government than is commonly realized. At a press conference on January 29, Secretary of State Rogers was asked whether it is "a fair inference" that the

Administration no longer considers the Taiwan government to be the legitimate government of all China. Rogers replied that he would not question the inference. In the President's February foreign policy review, the People's Republic is synonymous with "China." Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China is synonymous only with Taiwan. In the section of the review dealing with China relations, the President said that "while I cannot foretell the ultimate resolution of the differences between Taipei (Taiwan's capital) and Peking, we believe these differences must be resolved by peaceful means." It was Mr. Nixon's coded way of agreeing with Senator McGovern that "the future status of Taiwan" must eventually be left "to a peaceful resolution by the people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits."

At the President's order, Henry Kissinger late last year conducted intensive interagency studies of the issues and problems connected with the diplomatic recognition of the Peking government and with its surely approaching admission to the UN. The studies have been completed. What they recommend and what Mr. Nixon will decide after reviewing the findings is unknown. But the fact that they were ordered is sign enough of the President's recognition that Asia is changing and that US policy must change with it.

Vice President Agnew provided another sign of impending change last week. He griped to a supposedly off-record assemblage of reporters that he was unhappy with and had opposed the trend away from unqualified American support of Taiwan. For the first time since he and Mr. Nixon took office, the White House staff made it known that the President was unhappy with his Vice President's performance.

John Osborne

POLITICAL PRO... CONTINUED

to try to get some of his
friends on the committee to
restore the funds. Mahon
heard about the maneuvers
and told Laird to keep his
hands off committee business.

AS was true of him in the
House, Laird at the Pentagon
can sometimes be a little cute,
or even just careless. Not long
ago he displayed a 4-inch-di-
ameter piece of oil pipe at a
press conference and left re-
porters with the impression
that it had been cut, during
the recent South Vietnamese
invasion of Laos, from a pipe-
line running down the Ho Chi
Minh trail. A week later re-
porters discovered that the
piece of pipe was a trophy
from an old South Vietnamese
raid into Laos and may have
been taken more than a year
ago.

Generally, however, Laird
understands when to press an
issue and when not to. After
the South Vietnamese
hurriedly pulled out of Laos in
March, for example, he was
considerably more cautious in
evaluating the operation than
other Administration spokes-
men, including the President.

"I think the problem was
some inclination on the part
of some to oversell the Laos
operation," he said when I
asked for his opinion of it.
"I've never oversold it. The
purpose was to disrupt as
much of the enemy supply
movement as they could. The
operation was limited to from
five to eight weeks. It was
limited to less than 2 per cent
of the South Vietnamese regu-
lar forces. I recommended the
operation and I recommended
we give them air support. You
won't be able to assess the re-
sults until September or Oc-
tober. That's when the enemy
will be hurting for supplies."

Earlier this year when Amer-
ican air operations over Cam-
bodia began to include heli-
copter support for South Viet-
namese operations, Laird
vigorously denied that there
had been any change in United
States policy against flights
over Cambodia other than
bombing missions, and said
that he did not wish to en-
gage in a discussion of
"semantics" with reporters.

An aide, when asked what
Laird's biggest problem is, re-
plied: "Credibility, of course.
Mel knew full well that Amer-
ican air support had been
changed from bombing raids
to include support of South
Vietnamese troops, but the
White House told him to deny
that there had been any
change. And, like a good sol-
dier, he followed orders."

HE may perceive more
clearly than Nixon the polit-
ical risks of not announcing a
final date for withdrawal of
troops from Vietnam; even

such cautious, ear-to-the-
ground Republican politicians
as Senate Minority Leader
Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania
have been pressing for an-
nouncement of a date, be-
cause of a feeling that Ameri-
cans want to know more than
just that troops will continue
to leave at about the same
rate as in the past two years.

Early in January, Laird pre-
dicted United States "combat
responsibility" in Vietnam
would be over by midsummer,
and would be approaching an
end by May 1. The pronounce-
ment may have contributed
to a morale problem among
G.L.'s who are still there. Cit-
ing Laird's remarks, many
said they believed that they
would not have to go into the
field after May 1. Some re-
portedly expressed fears about
being "the last man to die"
in Vietnam.

In March Laird told televi-
sion interviewers that with-
drawal would continue at its
present pace. At the time the
Secretary made that state-
ment, Nixon was still refus-
ing to say publicly what would
happen beyond this spring,
and Laird's comments were
widely interpreted as part of
his efforts to prod the Presi-
dent into a faster withdrawal.
Nevertheless, he steadfastly
maintains that the President
has always supported his po-
sition.

"We set our goals," Laird
told me during our conversa-
tion in his office. "We laid
them over out 18 months ago.
Let me show you."

Getting up from the couch
where we were sitting, he
took a sheaf of papers about
the size of a package of blue-
prints from his desk and
showed them to me. There
were page after page of in-
tricate diagrams and charts
filled with legends, numbers
and dates.

"Look," he said, "we knew
where we'd be each year, at
each point. We've followed
every part of this plan out, on
schedule or ahead of schedule.
Here are our helicopters, for
instance. We planned to have
500 or so in the hands of the
South Vietnamese by 1972.
We'll be there before that.
Right now they have about
370. Last year the Vietnamese
had just over 20 air squadrons;
they've got more than 30 now
and will have some 50 next
year. The South Vietnamese
force levels will be 1,100,000
next year. In fact, they're al-
ready at 1,059,000.

"There has been controversy
[within the Administration]
on the troop withdrawals," Laird
continued, "but the
President and I have agreed.
I expect us to maintain a U.S.
presence in Vietnam until the
prisoner-of-war issue is set-
tled. So you can't project the
reduction in our forces with-

out keeping in mind that one
factor. We are willing to take
every American out of Viet-
nam providing that question
is settled."

Laird is proud of his de-
cision to "go public" on the
prisoner-of-war question
During the Johnson Adminis-
tration little was said about
American prisoners in North
Vietnam. Public discussion of
their plight is not only useful
politically in the United States,
Laird believes, but can also
turn the P.O.W. issue into a
better bargaining chip with
the North Vietnamese. Many
critics of this approach say,
however, that by making an
issue out of the prisoners,
Laird has made it more diffi-
cult to get them released; the
Communists, say the critics,
could attempt to increase the
pressure of American public
opinion for a total withdrawal
by refusing to free the
P.O.W.'s until the last U.S.
troops are out of Vietnam.

WHATEVER their differ-
ences, Laird's relations with
Nixon appear to be generally
good, and he seems to be far
more successful than Secre-
tary of State Rogers at con-
taining Kissinger. He has, for
example, been able to keep
Kissinger's Defense Programs
Review Committee involved in
only broad budgetary guid-
ance work. The committee
was designed by Nixon and
Kissinger to bring together the
judgments of the Central In-
telligence Agency, Defense,
State and Treasury Depart-
ments, and the Office of Man-
agement and Budget on such
matters as the number of air-
craft carriers and strategic
bombers needed by the United
States.

He has lost some battles,
though. One of his most sig-
nificant defeats came last De-
cember when the President
and the National Security
Council turned down his sug-
gestion to begin reducing
American forces in Europe,
which now total about 300,000,
Sensing increasing opposition
in Congress to the large par-
ticipation in NATO, he pro-
posed a token withdrawal of
20,000 to 30,000 troops, which
was opposed by Kissinger.
Laird, however, helped to
defeat the plan recently in-
troduced in the Senate by
Mike Mansfield that would
have cut U.S. NATO forces by
half, even before talks pro-
posed by the Soviet Union on
mutual troop reductions in
Central Europe.

When the Sihanouk govern-
ment was overthrown in Cam-
bodia last year, Laird quickly
decided that South Vietna-
ese troops should be sent to
raid North Vietnamese sanctu-
aries in the country. After a
few raids, the troops were
called off because Nixon and

the Joint Chiefs felt the South
Vietnamese could succeed
only with support from Amer-
ican troops and aircraft. Laird
argued that the South's forces
could do the job alone, but
was overruled when the N.S.C.
decided upon last May's con-
troversial joint invasion.

After the trial of Lieut. Wil-
liam Calley, the President did
not consult with Laird before
announcing that he would per-
sonally review the case after
it goes through Army appeal
channels and that Calley
would be allowed to live in
his quarters rather than being
confined to a stockade. Laird
had not publicly expressed
himself on the case, except to
say the procedures of military
justice would be carefully fol-
lowed.

If he does not have the
clout that Kissinger has with
Nixon, Laird is influential.
"The President still asks my
advice on a lot of things be-
sides defense, like revenue-
sharing and health legisla-
tion," he says. "I encour-
aged him to put that $100-mil-
lion in the budget for cancer
research."

LIKE most successful poli-
ticians, Laird likes to be with
people. He chafes when he has
to spend a whole day in his
office, and sometimes roams
the halls of the Pentagon look-
ing for an aide he wants to
see, instead of summoning the
man. A big and active figure,
he walks fast and misses the
easier Congressional days
when he could often play golf
a couple of times a week. Now
he is lucky to play once a
month. (One of his partners is
his friend Bill Rogers, the
Secretary of State.) In good
weather, he enjoys a swim in
the pool that he built in the
back yard of his $75,000
Bethesda home shortly after
becoming Secretary. Some of
his friends in the neighbor-
hood believe the swimming
pool was just a cover for in-
stallation of a bomb shelter.

Every morning after arriv-
ing at the Pentagon, his first
order of business, over rolls
and coffee, is two briefings on
Vietnam. The military gives
him a rundown on the previ-
ous day's operations. Then a
Pentagon task force headed by
Warren G. Nutter, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for In-
ternational Security, and Army
Brig. Gen. Fred Karohs meets
with Laird for sometimes as
long as two hours to bring
him up to date on the progress
of pacification, troop with-
drawals, Vietnamization and
other aspects of the military
and political situation in
Southeast Asia. When the
news is bad, Laird knows he'd
better start preparing some

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

2-F

Washington Post, Tuesday, June 1, 1971

Marquis Childs

Another Date
For Historians

THE DATE, Jan. 9, 1971, is not yet ringed in the history books. But if hopes for an agreement with the Soviet Union on the limitation of nuclear arms are realized, that will be a day to remember.

The Soviet ambassador, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, was about to return to Moscow for a session of the Polit-buro to review Soviet-Amer-ican relations. He was asked to come to the White House to meet with President Nixon. The President gave him a personal message to be delivered to Premier Alexei N. Kosygin.

The message dealt with the stalemate in the stra-tegic arms limitations talks (SALT) at Vienna and the urgent need to break that stalemate to check still an-other upward spiral in the weapons of annihilation. This was the start of a se-ries of exchanges between the President and the Pre-mier preparing the way for the simultaneous announce-ment in Moscow and Wash-ington which Mr. Nixon hailed as "a significant de-velopment in breaking the deadlock."

High officials in the ad-ministration who have worked so long and so hard for this breakthrough have solid hope for an agreement limiting defensive missiles with a supplement setting specific numbers for offen-sive missiles, before the end of the year.

THE TALKS at Vienna have just recessed, to be re-sumed in Helsinki in early July. Chief U.S. Delegate Gerard C. Smith returned here to be told of the immi-nent announcement of the breakthrough shortly before Mr. Nixon went on televi-sion to dramatize it. Until agreement was reached at the highest level, the phrase in the Nixon announcement, Vienna was shrouded in deepest gloom.

Hope for an agreement is based on the whole complex of circumstances that led to the breakthrough. The tech-nical details of a potential agreement were evolved out of the 15 volumes on SALT and the balance of strategic nuclear weapons compiled by the staff of the Presi-dent's adviser on national-security affairs, Henry A. Kissinger. Kissinger has de-voted at least three times as much thought and energy in his 16-hour days to SALT as to Vietnam.

The terms of a potential agreement were put on the table at one of the most mo-mentous meetings in the his-tory of the National Secu-rity Council. Present were the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The verdict of the JCS was that the contemplated agree-ment was an acceptable risk.

THIS WAS, of course, of the first importance, since the balance of nuclear weap-onry is a matter of life and death for nations and peo-

ples. Furthermore, JCS ap-proval would be essential for Senate ratification with both Democratic and Repub-lican hawks certain to cast a cold, suspicious eye on any agreement.

The technical details hav-ing been spelled out on both sides, either Washington or Moscow, in order to back out of the potential break-through, would have to make a political move. That would be a conspicuous turn-about after the top men had gone so far. In the view of those nursing the whole business along for many months, this is a responsibil-ity that neither side would want to assume.

Although many commen-tators read dour and even ominous meaning into Com-munist Party First Secre-tary Leonid I. Brezhnev's lengthy speech at the Com-munist Party Congress at the end of March, this was not the view of Kissinger and his staff. They saw inti-mations of the several open-ings that may now lead to a standoff—competitive coex-istence—between the two systems.

Twice before this same hope was rudely shattered. Once was when the Ameri-can U-2 spy plane was downed over Sverdlovsk on the eve of a summit meeting in Paris and a visit by Presi-dent Eisenhower to the So-viet Union in return for Ni-kita Khrushchev's tour of the United States. Then in August, 1968, President Johnson had his bags packed to fly to a meeting with Ko-sygin that would formally open arms-control talks. The Soviet invasion of Czecho-slovakia put an end to that.

It could happen again. But those masterminding this newest exercise are deter-mined that it will succeed.

E 6964

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — Extensions of Remarks

July 1, 1971

A SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY

HON. JAMES R. MANN
OF SOUTH CAROLINA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, July 1, 1971

Mr. MANN. Mr. Speaker, in all branches of life, one often gets what one most protests that one does not want, and this is because one acts in such a way as to bring it about. This is called realizing one's own worst fears. And it is not an uncommon experience, being studied in our most advanced college psychology departments under the course label, "Victimology." It is the study of how certain victims act in such a way as to enhance the chances that they will be victimized in particular ways. There is even some thought, along these lines, that soon it is not only repeating criminals who will have to be rehabilitated, but repeating victims as well.

Mr. Speaker, I would submit that one of the leading candidates for study in such courses should be the United States of America, especially as pertains to what we, in this Congress, are doing with respect to the ending of poverty. We have had a war on poverty, but during it poverty has grown by leaps and bounds. We have over the years provided a great number of programs calculated to boost incomes, but the number of those who live under the poverty line has swelled, not shrunk. And most recently, we have sought to have the whole welfare system brought under Federal control, which, I submit, will cause many heretofore proudly self-supporting people to succumb to the siren's song and the enveloping arms of the dollar.

Leo Tolstoy had it right all along. Being a novelist of great ironic talents, he well knew the power of the self-fulfilling prophecy. He well knew that the more artificial contrivances you set up in society to destroy poverty, the more poverty will have a tendency to grow by leaps and bounds. I would submit that we all have a need to listen to the words of Tolstoy, as quoted in a recent editorial from the Greenville, S.C., News, if we are to stop our great Nation from becoming a victim and its own worst enemy on the question of poverty.

## TOLSTOY ON POVERTY

When he received his diploma in 1848 Leo Tolstoy described himself as "knowing literally nothing." With that estimate of himself as a starter he went on to become one of the greatest novelists and possessed of some sound political and economic sense.

A few years before his death in 1910 he addressed letters to the Czar advocating representative assemblies and other government reforms. He was unheeded and his native Russia succumbed to communism.

He also had some ideas about the salutary influence of labor which seem applicable to this era when the welfare state idea is in the ascendency. Not long before he died the noted novelist said: "The more is given the less people will work for themselves, and the less they work the more their poverty will increase."

And poverty is a commodity of which this nation has a growing surplus in the midst of plenty, notwithstanding the increase in giving.

THE NEW JUNKETERS: AGNEW IN KOREA, KISSINGER IN VIETNAM AND CIA IN ISRAEL

HON. JOHN R. RARICK
OF LOUISIANA

Tuesday, June 29, 1971

Mr. RARICK. Mr. Speaker, now that our decisionmakers have learned that the American people are opposed to the use of their young men to police every trouble spot in the world, many will be amazed to note that our great intellectual leaders have now promoted themselves to the position of world peacemakers. Some will never realize, much less acknowledge, that a nation which cannot even settle its own problems, can gain little respect or credibility in trying to settle the problems of foreign nations— regardless of how many U.S. tax dollars are spent or promised.

Yet, this week we find Vice President AGNEW in Korea, Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's Assistant for National Security Affairs, in Vietnam, and Richard Helms, Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, in Israel.

And in Chile, while it is not certain which of our international diplomats consummated the friendship binding mission, President Nixon has given the Marxist regime of Allende of Chile $5 million to buy military equipment, apparently to help Allende and Castro in defensive aggression against their non-Communist neighbors.

Meanwhile, the wraps are still kept tight on the pending Presidential approval of the sale of 120 used U.S.-made commercial jets to Red China. Speculation has it that the Communist Chinese will assure us that the jets will not be used for military purposes.

I had earlier introduced House Joint Resolution 535, to provide for people-power over war to prevent our over-enthusiastic diplomats and presidential representatives from committing the use of American men to any future military endeavors to protect U.S. property in foreign countries. I include several related newspaper articles to be inserted at this point along with the text of my bill.

The articles follow:

From The Washington Post, Thursday, July 1, 1971

AGNEW ASSURES SEOUL ON AID
(By Selig S. Harrison)

SEOUL, June 30.—Vice President Spiro T. Agnew assured President Chung Hee Park today that the United States would continue to underwrite the cost of maintaining South Korean forces in South Vietnam and cautioned against "premature" troop withdrawals.

Aides to the vice president said only that the "warm and cordial" 50-minute meeting between the two leaders "covered a number of topics lightly and did not go into complex matters."

But informed sources said that the Vietnam withdrawal issue dominated the exchange.

[South Korean patrols tracked down and killed three North Korean infiltrators in a clash some 20 miles north of Seoul, at about the same time Agnew and other foreign dig-

nitaries were attending a diplomatic reception, UPI reported.]

Defense Minister Jung Nae Hyuk announced today that the 52,000-man South Korean contingent in South Vietnam would be reduced by 15,000 between December of this year and June of 1972 "unless we are requested to reconsider this timetable by South Vietnam."

The defense chief said yesterday that all Korean forces would be withdrawn by the end of 1972, "since there would be no reason for us to stay after the U.S. has left."

The timing of the two statements has been widely viewed here as part of a bargaining process designed to bolster the South Korean hand in talks with Agnew and South Vietnam's Premier Tran Thien Khiem. The two leaders are among 170 delegates from 59 countries scheduled to attend Thursday's inauguration of President Park for a third term.

It is understood that South Korea has its eye on surplus military equipment stocks in South Vietnam left behind as the U.S. forces withdraw.

Military leaders here are anxious to obtain these as extra dividends over and above the $1.5 billion in aid for the moderation and maintenance of the Korean armed forces already projected over the five-year period ending in mid-1976.

Agnew is reported prepared to offer a grant of surplus equipment from Vietnam arsenals with a current market value of more than $100 million as an inducement to freeze South Korean plans for troop withdrawals.

Informed sources said that the White House has recently shifted from a relatively detached attitude on the Vietnam troop issue to an active interest in seeing the Korean forces remain for at least another two years.

One of the most important factors behind this change is believed to be a reappraisal of military needs resulting from U.S. withdrawal plans.

One of the reasons for the reluctance of Korean leaders to extend their troop commitments in South Vietnam beyond next year is a fear that the United States might suddenly back away from its support for the Korean forces under domestic political pressure.

Rather than risk the possibility of an awkward exit from Vietnam, some Korean leaders have argued, it would be better for Seoul to fix the timing and terms of disengagement on its own initiative.

In addition to the Vietnam issue, Korean leaders are also expected to press Agnew for a reaffirmation of military aid pledges given during negotiations on modernization of the Korean forces conducted intermittently for the past 10 months. But it was not clear whether this came up for more than passing mention today.

From the Washington Post, Thursday, July 1, 1971

KISSINGER ON MISSION TO VIETNAM, PAKISTAN

President Nixon is sending Henry A. Kissinger, assistant for national security affairs, to Vietnam and other countries for a first-hand foreign policy report, the White House announced yesterday.

Kissinger is scheduled to leave today for two or three days in Saigon. He will then visit Thailand, India and Pakistan, completing his trip with a stop in Paris to consult Ambassador David K. E. Bruce, chief U.S. delegate to the Vietnam peace talks.

Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler said that Kissinger would return to the United States about July 10 and report to the President and Secretary of State William P. Rogers at San Clemente, Calif.

The President will go to California Tuesday and stay about two weeks, Ziegler said.

July 1, 1971

E 6965

While there he will work primarily on budget planning, but Rogers will be there part of the time for a foreign policy review, Ziegler said.

Ziegler said plans for Kissinger's trip had been under discussion "for some weeks." He insisted that no major change in policy was indicated by the visit and that no untoward developments at home or abroad prompted it.

There was widespread speculation, nevertheless, that the President wanted to explore possible new moves in the Vietnam war. Official sources, however, maintained that the trip was one more attempt to bring information up to date on Vietnamization, Hanoi's military intentions, the economy and prospects for the presidential election Oct. 3.

Kissinger is expected to confer with President Nguyen Van Thieu, but officials here discouraged speculation he may also meet with Communist officials at the Paris peace talks.

The stops in India and Pakistan will enable Kissinger to obtain the latest information on the Pakistan refugee problem and to express the President's hope for a peaceful solution to the problem.

Ziegler said that en route to California Tuesday Mr. Nixon would stop in Kansas City to brief Midwestern editors and publishers on his domestic legislative proposals.

Among officials who will confer with the President in San Clemente will be, in addition to Rogers and Kissinger, Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally and George P. Schultz, director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Ziegler said that "the President used this period last year" in San Clemente to work on the 1972 budget, which he sent to Congress last January. He will begin work on the 1973 budget on this trip, the press secretary said.

[From the Washington Star, July 1, 1971]

CIA CHIEF LEAVES ISRAEL AFTER 3 DAYS OF TALKS

TEL AVIV.—Richard C. Helms, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency director, slipped out of Israel today as quietly as he had arrived, after three days of talks with Israeli leaders.

Helms and his aides left aboard the U.S. jetliner that brought them here Monday.

News of Helms' secret visit to Israel leaked out Tuesday night. Yesterday, the Foreign Ministry confirmed he was here to meet with Prime Minister Golda Meir, Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.

As Helms departed, Israeli newspapers blossomed with front-page reports the Israeli government is again under strong American pressure to adopt "a more flexible attitude" toward a Middle East settlement.

Haaretz reported there have been hints the United States may withdraw its support in the U.N. Security Council unless Israel shows more leeway, particularly on the question of withdrawal from the Arab territory it captured in the 1937 war.

Up to now there has been a tacit understanding between the two countries that the United States would use its influence to prevent Israel from coming under attack in the Security Council, political sources said.

Haaretz said there also have been hints the United States may have to accede to Soviet pressure for a big-power statement on the Middle East.

Israel is opposed to four-power intervention in efforts to reach a settlement with the Arabs.

In a report from its Washington correspondent, Davar said American officials are predicting a resumption of fighting this fall unless a breakthrough can be made. The report stated they were using this argument in efforts to get a more flexible Israeli approach.

(The Associated Press reported from Moscow that Egyptian Foreign Minister Mah-

moud Riad and his Soviet counterpart, Andrei A. Gromyko, discussed Soviet-Egyptian relations and the Middle East situation yesterday. Riad arrived in Moscow on Tuesday for a five-day official visit.)

[From the Washington Post, July 1, 1971]

NEED FOR COMPROMISES SEEN—U.S. FORMULATING "IDEAS" FOR INTERIM SUEZ ACCORD

(By Marilyn Berger)

In an effort to narrow the negotiating gap between Egypt and Israel before the U.N. General Assembly meets in September, the United States has started to formulate a number of ideas designed to reconcile the opposing views.

The hope in Washington is to arrive at an interim agreement by the end of the year to reopen the Suez Canal. The United States is trying to reestablish some momentum in negotiations so that they can move into high gear when the foreign ministers of all the states will be in New York in September for the General Assembly.

The "idea," U.S. officials insist, fall short of proposals. But it is clear that the United States is planning to submit suggestions to both sides to move them off their current negotiating demands.

Both sides will be required to make adjustments in their positions," said a U.S. official yesterday. "Both sides will need to be more flexible if common ground is to be achieved."

Maariv, the Israeli mass circulation evening newspaper, reported yesterday that the United States was preparing a number of "proposals" including:

Israeli withdrawal to a line running about 35 miles from the Suez Canal to allow the reopening of the waterway. According to Maariv, this is said to be a compromise between Israel's reported suggestion for a 25-mile pullback and Egypt's demand for a 116-mile withdrawal.

Crossing of the canal by Egyptian civilians only, except for a token Egyptian military force within the framework of a U.N. force to supervise the cease-fire or as part of mixed Israeli-Egyptian patrols.

Extension of the cease-fire for as long as possible, in terms of years, a compromise between Jerusalem's demand for a permanent cease-fire and Cairo's call for a very limited one.

Israeli officials, meanwhile, confirmed that the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency, Richard C. Helms had arrived for talks with top Israeli leaders, including Premier Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan and Foreign Minister Abba Eban.

There was speculation that Helms' visit was connected, in part, with Israel's request for further military aid. Israeli officials have sounded an added note of urgency because of the assurances the Soviet-Egyptian treaty appears to provide for Cairo's military needs and the implications for the balance of power in the region. Israeli has a request in for additional Phantom jets that has not been acted upon in Washington. Delivery on all the aircraft promised was to have been completed by the end of June.

In Washington a spokesman at CIA declined any comment on Helms' trip. "We do not comment on any of our peoples' travels, including the director," the spokesman said.

In Amman, meanwhile, Jordanian officials rejected Israel's plan to pay $100,000,000 to Arab residents of East Jerusalem in compensation for property they lost in 1948.

U.S. GIVE $5 MILLION CREDIT TO CHILE

The State Department said yesterday the United States has agreed to extend to Chile $5 million in credits for the purchase of military equipment.

Department spokesman Charles W. Bray said the credits were extended in response

to a request by the Chilean government and that the credit level is similar to that of recent years.

Bray said the funds would be used by Chile to buy a new C-130 transport aircraft and what he described as paratrooper equipment.

The decision to extend military credits to Chile was the first such gesture by the Nixon administration toward the eight-month-old Socialist government headed by President Salvador Allende.

Chile's request was seen as an indication of Allende's desire to maintain the traditionally friendly relations between the two countries.

[From the Evening Star, Washington, D.C., Mar. 6, 1971]

UNITED STATES AGAIN BIDS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH RED CHINA

H.J. RES. 535

Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States for a referendum on war

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, to be valid only if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several states within seven years after the date of final passage of this joint resolution:

"ARTICLE —

"SEC. 1. Except in case of attack by armed forces, actual or immediately threatened, upon the United States or its territorial possessions, or by any non-American nation against any country in the Western Hemisphere, the people shall have the sole power by a national referendum to declare war or to engage in warfare overseas.

"SEC. 2. Congress shall have the power to carry out this article by appropriate legislation."

THE NEW U.S. POSTAL SERVICE

HON. LAMAR BAKER

OF TENNESSEE

Thursday, July 1, 1971

Mr. BAKER. Mr. Speaker, an unprecedented event takes place today, July 1, 1971. This is the date the new U.S. Postal Service begins operations.

Everyone agrees what American citizens need, and rightfully deserve, is a modern mail system. With postal reform, I feel the time is at hand when this urgent need will be fulfilled at long last. We are seeing important changes every day.

I am convinced that the Postal Reorganization Act, signed last August by President Nixon, represents a new charter for improved mail service, and more importantly, a new bill of rights for the more than 700,000 postal employees who are to be commended for their dedication and loyalty.

While working conditions have virtually remained unchanged and modern

DER SPIEGEL

DAS DEUTSCHE NACHRICHTEN-MAGAZIN

DEUTSCHLAND

Westpolitiker Breschnew (M.), Verbündete Stoph, Honecker auf dem SED-Parteitag: „Den Weg der Entspannung gehen“

„Keine Sorge, Nixon ist kein Johnson“

Eineinhalb Jahre nach ihrem Start driftet Willy Brandts Ostpolitik in freundliche Gewässer: US-Präsident Richard Nixon und der sowjetische Parteichef Leonid Breschnew haben letzte Woche erkennen lassen, daß sie aus innen-

politischen Gründen ihre Entspannungspolitik forcieren möchten. Beide scheinen bereit, Verhandlungen über Truppenabzug und Raketenabwehr mit ihren Berlin-Gesprächen und den Bonner Ostverträgen zu akkordieren.

Nach anderthalbstündigem Politgespräch unter vier Augen zog Gastgeber Richard Nixon am vergangenen Dienstag Bilanz: „Wissen Sie, Herr Bundeskanzler, das ist doch eine gute Sache, wie die Dinge laufen. Sie haben viel in Gang gebracht.“

Dann verknüpfte der Präsident Brandts Ostpolitik mit seinen Plänen zur beiderseitigen Truppenverminderung in Europa („Mutual Balanced Force Reduction“, MBFR) und zur Begrenzung der strategischen Waffen („Strategic Arms Limitation Talks“, Salt): „Eine Berlin-Regelung würde sich günstig auf MBFR und Salt auswirken, und Fortschritte bei MBFR und Salt würden sich günstig auf Berlin auswirken.“

Staatsmann Brandt sah es historisch: „Ich stimme Ihnen zu, Herr Präsident,

Wenn wir zu Rande kommen, dann haben wir mehr erreicht, als unsere Vorgänger und selbst Präsident Kennedy je erreicht haben.“

Am selben Tag und beinahe zur gleichen Stunde verkündete Nixons weltpolitischer Gegenspieler, der sowjetische KP-Chef Leonid Breschnew, auf dem VIII. SED-Parteitag in Ost-Berlin mit ungewohnter Konzilianz seine Bereitschaft zu einem Arrangement: „Die Lage ist so, daß jetzt im Westen realistisch denkende Kreise auf den Plan getreten sind ... Wir zollen den Regierungen der kapitalistischen Länder Achtung, bei denen unser Bestreben Anklang findet ... den Weg der Entspannung ... zu gehen.“

Vor allem innenpolitische Sorgen veranlassen Washington, Moskau und Bonn, so demonstrativ ihren Entspan-

nungswillen zu bekunden: Nixon braucht für die Präsidentschaftswahlen im November nächsten Jahres dringend einen nennenswerten außenpolitischen Erfolg, da seine Administration die Probleme der Nation — Vietnamkrieg, Inflation, Massenarbeitslosigkeit, Rassendiskriminierung — nicht bewältigt hat; Breschnew muß die sowjetische Volkswirtschaft von einer Lawine von Rüstungskosten entlasten, will er seine innenpolitischen Versprechen erfüllen; Brandt ist darauf angewiesen, eine befriedigende Berlin-Regelung zu präsentieren, damit nicht auch noch seine Ostpolitik, wie die Reformpolitik, in Anfängen und Halbheiten steckenbleibt.

Einsatz suchen nicht nur die USA in der Außenpolitik:

▷ Die Sowjet-Union baut ebenfalls auf MBFR, weiß aber, daß sie die USA

dafür nicht zum Partner bekommt,
solange sie sich gegen eine dem We-
sten akzeptabel erscheinende Berlin-
Regelung sträubt.

Die Bundesrepublik ist auf den gu-
ten Willen der vier Mächte in den
Berlin-Verhandlungen angewiesen
und darf mithin die beiden Großen
nicht durch Vorbehalte gegen
MBFR verärgern.

Allein die DDR störte bislang die Harmonie. Sie kommt durch die Gespräche zwischen Nato und Warschauer Pakt über Truppenreduzierung und die Viermächte-Verhandlungen über Berlin der erschten Völkerrechtlichen Anerkennung nicht näher. Diese kann sie allenfalls von der gleichberechtigten Teilnahme an einer Konferenz aller interessierten Staaten über die europäische Sicherheit (SKE) erwarten — die ursprünglich nach dem Wunsch der Russen sicherlich nicht zuletzt der DDR zuliebe vor einer MBFR stattfinden sollte.

Allerdings, mit dem Wechsel von Ul-
bricht zu Honecker könnte eine flexi-
blere Ost-Berliner Haitung verbunden
sein. Im Warschauer Außenministerium
bekamen westdeutsche Besucher letzte
Woche die Meinung zu hören, Ulbricht
habe wegen Berlin gehen müssen. Man
wundere sich in Warschau, wie naiv die
westliche Presse auf den Machtwechsel
in Ost-Berlin reagiert habe.

Für die Moskauer Absicht, in Berlin
weiterzukommen, habe Honecker „nicht
die gleiche Größe“ wie Ulbricht — es
sei leichter, bei ihm Moskauer Wün-
sche durchzusetzen.

Taktvoll vermied es Breschnew in
Ost-Berlin daher auch, die deutschen
Genossen mit seinem jetzt vordringli-\chen Interesse an MBFR zu konfron-
tieren. Statt dessen forderte er die
DDR-Regierung in seiner Parteitags-
rede auf, mehr Selbstbewußtsein zu
zeigen.

Die Angst, daß die eigenen Interessen
durch einen MBFR-Dialog vernachläs-
sigt werden könnten, plagte freilich bis-
lang auch Bonn. Willy Brandt und seine
Ostplaner hatten geargwöhnt, die Ber-
lin-Verhandlungen könnten durch ein
MBFR-Arrangement in den Hinter-
grund treten. Doch seit den unerwart-
ten Fortschritten bei den Gesprächen
der alliierten Experten im Berliner
Kontrollratsgebäude Ende Mai, späte-
stens jedoch seit Brandts jüngstem
Treffen mit US-Präsident Nixon fühlt
sich Bonn dieser Sorge ledig.

Kanzler und Präsident waren sich
eingegangen, daß es eines formellen Junktims
zwischen Berlin und MBFR — sowie
zwischen Berlin und der SKE — gar
nicht mehr bedürfe. Nach menschli-
chem Ermessen werde eine befriedigen-
de Berlin-Regelung ausgehandelt sein,
noch bevor die Ost-West-Gespräche
über die Truppenreduzierung in ein ent-
scheidendes Stadium treten.

Nicht einmal Nixons Berater, ge-
schweige denn die westlichen Verbün-
deten, sind sich bislang auch nur über
ein Verhandlungskonzept einig, das
dem Warschauer Pakt unterbreitet wer-
den könnte. Außenminister Rogers
neigt dazu — so des Kanzlers Sondie-
rungsergebnisse in Washington —, es bei
dem Angebot einer lediglich symboli-
schen Reduzierung der Truppenstärken
von nicht mehr als fünf Prozent bewen-
den zu lassen. Alles weitere müsse vom
Verlauf des Dialogs mit dem War-
schauer Pakt abhängig gemacht werden.

Nixons Sicherheitsberater Henry Kis-
singer hingegen, mit dem sich Bonns
Ostexperte, Kanzleramts-Staatssekretär
Egon Bahr, traf, will die Politik der
kleinen Schritte überspringen und mit

sondern mindestens noch die Tschecho-
slowakei mit einbezichen müsse; besser
sei sogar noch ein Rückgriff auf den
Entspannungsplan des früheren polni-
schen Außenministers Adam Rapacki,
der auch Polen einschloß.

Vor allem aber müsse sichergestellt
sein, daß nicht nur Sowjet-Union und
USA, sondern auch die Bundesrepublik
MBFR-Nutznießer werde. Der unter
permanenter Finanznot leidenden sozi-
alliberalen Koalition müsse die Chance
geboten werden, auch die Bundeswehr
zu verkleinern. Ein Kanzlerberater:
„Sonst bauen die beiden Großen ab,
und die Bundeswehr ist die größte Mili-
tärmacht in Europa. Wir wollen auch
einmal eine für uns günstigere Vertei-
lung der Lasten.“

Doch anders als im Sommer 1966, als Nixon-Vorgänger Johnson den CDU-Bundeskanzler Ludwig Erhard mit unnachsichtigen Maximalforderungen nach westdeutschen Stationierungskosten erpreßt und so an seinem unrühmlichen Ende mitgewirkt hatte, waren die Amerikaner diesmal bereit, politische Rücksichten zu nehmen.

Noch vor Brandts Ankunft signalisierten sie erstmalig ihre Bereitschaft, das Brandt/Nixon-Gespräch wenigstens nicht mit dem neuerlichen Streit um Truppenkosten zu belasten. Die US-Botschaft in Bonn ließ das Kanzleramt wissen: „Keine Sorge, Nixon ist kein Johnson.“

Die Herren widmeten sich
den Themen, bei denen sie
eine gleiche Interessenlage
verbindet. Erleichtert stellte
der Kanzler nach dem Ren-
dezvous im Weißen Haus
fest: „In der Beurteilung der

Berlin-Verhandlungen und der Ostpolitik hat sich eine nahtlose Übereinstimmung der Auffassungen ergeben.“

Noch bei seinem letzten Besuch in Washington im April 1970 hatte Brandt deutliche Reserve der Nixon-Administration gegenüber seiner neuen Ostpolitik registriert. Diesmal erntete er freundschaftlichen Zuspruch. Brandt-Intimus Conrad Ahlers deutete den Sinneswandel der Amerikaner: „Die haben jetzt die Ostpolitik entdeckt, man könnte auch sagen, sie haben sie von uns übernommen.“

Zwei Tage später entdeckte Brandts
DDR-Kollege Willi Stoph vor dem
SED-Parteitag in Ost-Berlin die West-
politik der Sowjet-Union. Ähnlich wie
vor ihm Breschnew bekannte sich nun
atich der SED-Ministerpräsident zu ei-
ner Berlin-Regelung, „die den Interessen
aller Verhandlungspartner entsprechen“
soll.

Brandt, Gastgeber Nixon: „Viel in Gang gebracht“

einem massiven Angebot auf Reduzie-
rung von mindestens zehn, höchstens 30-
Prozent der Truppenstärke den Ent-
spannungswillen des Ostens testen.

Die Beamten von Rogers schließlich
empfehlen, den Plan ihres Chefs mit
dem Konzept Kissingers zu verschmel-
zen: Schon bei Verhandlungsbeginn soll
dem Ostblock ein Zweistufen-Plan an-
geboten werden, der als ersten Schritt
eine symbolische Truppenverminderung
vorsieht, zugleich aber einen konkreten
Vorschlag über das Ausmaß der weite-
ren Truppenverdünnung enthält.

Der in Ostverhandlungen erfahrene
Bahrriet seinem Gesprächspartner
Kissinger, dieser Empfehlung zu folgen.
Er kündigte freilich zwei Bonner Bedin-
gungen an: Die Bundesrepublik bestehe
darauf, daß sich die Truppenverinde-
rung nicht auf das Gebiet der beiden
deutschen Staaten beschränken dürfe,