upheaval anywhere. Bismarck asserted that power supplied its own legitimacy; the conservatives that legitimacy represented an independent force. Bismarck believed that a correct evaluation of the attributes of power would yield a doctrine of self-limitation; the conservatives that force could be restrained only by a superior principle.

The inextricable element of the debate between the conservatives and Bismarck therefore resided less in their goals than in the perspective from which they viewed them. Bismarck's was the point of view of an observer standing outside of the events, careful in assessing their qualities, rigorous in drawing conclusions, pitiless in applying them. The conservative position on the other hand involved the conviction almost instinctive and therefore clumsily stated, that the maxims of analysis do not necessarily supply imperatives of conduct. For the strength of analysis is the irrelevance of the personal attitude to the subject of analysis; but the impetus of action involves a personal commitment. To analysis man is a force among many, a means to be manipulated. To his intuition he represents an end. To announce that self-interest always motivated man is to utter a platitude for the crucial question is precisely the nature of man's self-interest. To preach the value of commitments is equally hollow unless the commitment can be given some content. It is the paradox of analysis that it may evade the convictions which animate conduct, that increased understanding may only lead to a paralysis of will. It is the paradox of action that it is unable to relate man to the forces outside himself whose makings he sees but whose motives he can grasp only by analogy. Conservatives have always insisted that the balance between these two sides of human conduct is derived from a sense of reverence, a recognition of forces transcending man and of a recognition of

the Sovereign. And lest Gerlach seek refuge in asserting the identity of
the claims of legitimacy and of national interest, Bismarck anticipated his
argument: "Or perhaps you find the principle I violated in the fact that
Prussia must always be an enemy of France. . .I could deny this, — but even
assuming you are right I would still not consider it politically wise to
let other states know of our fears in peacetime. Until the break you
predict occurs I would think it useful to encourage the belief that a war
between us and France is not imminent. . .that the tension with France is not
an organic fault of our nature on which everyone can count with certainty.
. .A sentimental policy knows no reciprocity; it is an exclusively Prussian
peculiarity; every other government seeks the criteria for its actions solely
in its interest, however it may cloak them with legal deductions."

But in a world in which morality was a euphemism for self-interest,
where could safety be found? How could Prussia, the weakest major power
with the most difficult frontiers, survive? "When I speak of diplomatic
relations," Bismarck replied, "I do not mean military alliances because the
peace is not yet threatened; rather I mean all the nuances of possibility,
probability and intention to conclude an alliance in case of war which remain
the basis of influence in peacetime. Whoever belongs to the combination
which will be at a disadvantage in war-time, is always more conciliatory;
whoever isolates himself completely surrenders his influence particularly if
he represents the weakest of the major powers. Alliances are the expression
of common interests and goals. . .but we have indicated our willingness for
an alliance precisely to those whose interests are most contrary to ours;
Austria and the other German states. . .If we consider this the last word of
our foreign policy. . .then we must get used to the idea that in case of war

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we shall stand alone in the palace of the Assembly of the Confederation
holding in one hand the German Constitution . . . I do not demand that we make
an alliance with France and conspire with it against Germany. . . I want nothing
else than to take away the belief of others that they can ally themselves
with whomever they please while we would rather lose our skin than
to defend it with the aid of France. . . My sole concern is that we do not
reject options calculated to give other cabinets the impression that we are
not congenitally in need of assistance against France, that on the contrary
all alliances are open to us if we are not treated with dignity. But when I
advocate this. . . I expect that I am shown that these advantages are illusory
or else a better plan into the combinations of which the semblance of good
relations with France does not fit. . ."

But Gerlach had no better plan. For what was at issue between him
and Bismarck was not a policy but an attitude. To Gerlach an alliance with
Napoleon was contrary to the maxims of morality and the lessons of Prussian
history; to Bismarck it depended entirely on political utility unencumbered
by any moral cruples. To Gerlach there existed a moral standard the
approximation to which defined a proper policy; to Bismarck the only acceptable
criterion was success. Gerlach sought safety in determinacy; Bismarck in
dexterity. Gerlach's was the view of a generation which had known
catastrophe. But to Bismarck the Napoleonic period was a historical episode;
he was too much an empiricist to believe in the possibility of inherent
fatality and he tended to ascribe the Prussian collapse in 1806 more to an
incorrect conception than to a moral retribution. Because he lived with an
intuition of disaster, Gerlach was conscious of the risks of a power in the
center of a Continent. Because to Bismarck disaster revealed only false

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assessment of forces, Bismarck saw primarily the opportunities of a central position.

Thus the exchange between Bismarck and Gerlach had reached an impasse, even if the latter would not admit it. He reassured himself by again invoking Bismarck's great days as the spokesman of the conservatives against the Revolution. But his tone of quiet resignation spoke more eloquently than his arguments. "In my dispute with you I often conceive the idea that I and my views have grown outdated and that perhaps we should attempt a different policy which we must get through and then transcend." Almost as a reflex action of the spirit he repeated his old maxims that Napoleon's absolutism would eventually force him into foreign adventures, that in a Franco-Russian alliance, Prussia would be the weakest partner, that Prussia would in this manner lose the confidence of the other German states and he accused Bismarck that his policy lacked principle and objective.

It was futile of course to charge Bismarck with lacking what he explicitly rejected. But Bismarck was not satisfied with resting on the incommensurability of their positions. Instead, he proceeded to demonstrate that the maxims of legitimacy, so self-evident to Gerlach, were themselves contingent, that to endow with sanctity the ephemeral domestic structures of states could only lead to the neglect of the more basic national interests. As usual Bismarck began with a statement of seeming conciliation only to draw from it a consequence which checkmated his adversary all the more surely. He insisted that his personal opposition to the Revolution remained unchanged but he confessed himself at a total loss how to draw any practical conclusion from this attitude in foreign affairs. "How many governments exist in the

6. J. B. II, 21 May, 1857.