56a

their recommendations had been solely concerned with building up our air defense. Yet the partisans of strategic air force had psychology, if not logic, on their side: for with a fixed ceiling on defense expenditures it was clear that any new appropriation had to lead to the reduction of existing forces; a new capability could in practice be developed at the expense of an existing one. As a result, budgetary pressures compound the inherent conservatism of the military and lead to the subordination of doctrine to the battle for appropriations.

And the coupling of considerations of strategic doctrine with the budgetary process forced each service into justifying its requests by stating the Soviet threat in the most extreme terms. Thus the Navy in 1949 supported its appropriation by invoking a Soviet submarine fleet numbering 250. 32) It became apparent only later, according to the testimony

32. Testimony of Secretary Sullivan before the House Appropriations Committee, p. 1352.

258

for airlift may decline. But in the interim period airlift is our only means for attaining strategic mobility for limited war.

The dispute about the need for airlift has been one of the cardinal disagreements between the Army and the Air Force. It is not the purpose of this book to attempt to resolve a conflict which has occupied the Joint Chiefs of Staff for several years. For the significance of the dispute resides not so much in the contentions advanced by either side as in the fact that under the present definition of missions it is insoluble and the present organization for arriving at decisions can only exacerbate it. In terms of existing missions both the Air Force and the Army position are unassailable. The Key West agreement gives the Air Force the primary mission of defeating the enemy air arm. To invest 2.6 billion dollars in planes of no combat effectiveness which will add neither to the strategic nor to the tactical capability of the Air Force must to any responsible Chief of the Air Staff appear a diversion of resources. This will be particularly true when each service is operating under a fixed budgetary ceiling, and when the rapid rate of technological change requires large outlays for the introduction of missiles and the reequipping of most units. But to the Army, charged with destroying its enemy counterpart, its strategic mission becomes meaningless if it cannot get into position to fight.

[y]

259

To the Army the airlift is not a marginal requirement but the condition of all effective action. The rigid division of functions among the services, therefore, inhibits the consideration of airlift in terms of over-all strategy.

The Army, to which the airlift is essential, is ~~recommended~~ precluded by the Key West agreement from developing it, and Secretary Wilson's latest clarification of missions reinforces the prohibition against an Army air arm. <sup>(13)</sup> The Air Force, which has primary responsibility for air transport must in turn consider it a marginal requirement in terms of its primary mission; indeed, the Key West agreement in effect precludes the Air Force from considering the airlift in the only terms which are most meaningful to the Army and to the over-all situation: that of over-all strategic mobility.

Thus our process of arriving at strategic decisions breaks down at the precise point where the rigid division of functions causes one service, ~~responsibility~~ in the basis of means of conclusion, to be assigned a capability which is technically in its area of competence, but which is subsidiary to its primary mission, although essential to the primary mission of another service. These situations illustrate how all the pressures in our military establishment work against considering either force levels or doctrine in terms of an over-all strategy, how the intimate connection between primary mission and budgetary awards impels our service chiefs with the best intentions in the world into becoming essentially advocates of a service point of view. To be sure, the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not considered as representing a service while they sit on <sup>(13)</sup> Department of Defense Press Release, November 26, 1956.

260

[y]

that body during the B-36 Hearings, Secretary of the Air Force Symington went so far as to insist that the Chief of the Air staff was not responsible

and did not consult with the General Counsel prior to his meeting with the Chief and did not call the meeting. This was not done to his knowledge and did not result in his being appointed to the position of Chief of Staff. But this subtle distinction is meaningless in practice. Their service chiefs have risen to their position

through a lifetime of dedication to one arm. They are a product of its qualities that of loyalty and献-mental loyalty are培育in their use and that may be previously the qualities which will enable them to meet the problems, its training schools, its environment. While in office, moreover,

the service they must spend the major portion of their time considering problems of

spent by the service men is far greater than that devoted to problems of over-all strategy. Maintaining the morale of their service can never be far from their mind. And the problems of mastering the primary mission of each service are becoming so complex that they almost inevitably inhibit a consideration of their relationship to an over-all mission,

more accurately or better, they lead to a psychological distortion in which over-all strategy tends to be equated with a service's primary mission. The test of an organization is how naturally and spontaneously it enables its leadership to address itself

over-all to the problems of greatest concern; there is little in the organization of our National Defense Establishment that leads the service chiefs naturally to a consideration of over-all strategic doctrine.

Against the background of the primary mission of the Air Force, the appropriations for additional airlift funds may justly seem exorbitant; but 15.16. See Symington Hearings, p. (Testimony of General Vandenberg).