[L-C]

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

49 WEST 49th STREET, NEW YORK 20

THE HUMANITIES

CHARLES B. FAHS, DIRECTOR
CHADBOURNE GILPATRIC, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
JOHN MARSHALL, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
JOHN P. HARRISON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ROBERT W. JULY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

CABLE ADDRESS:
ROCKFOUND, NEW YORK

TELEPHONE:
COLUMBUS 5-8100

June 20, 1958

Dear Kissinger:

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in writing me as you did on June 16, 1958, about Czeslaw Milosz's need of help. He must have forgotten it, but actually he and I saw each other in Paris in 1955. At that time, he wanted help from the Foundation to spend some time in India, for what I think were very good personal reasons but reasons which proved not to be sufficient to justify our recommending the assistance he sought.

Again, I am afraid I can't encourage you to suggest his approaching us. I am very keenly aware of the difficulties which writers are encountering in Europe at present. In my view, most of them have to devote so much to making a living by writing for radio, television and the press that a great deal of truly creative talent is being drained off and perhaps impaired. But the view here is that this is essentially a European problem and one with which this Foundation cannot at present be concerned. My personal hope is that Europe itself may somehow meet this need and it may well be that something along these lines can be worked out.

The other obvious source is, of course, the Ford Foundation, to which you have perhaps already sent an inquiry similar to the one that came to me. Milosz certainly must be well known to Shep Stone and Wally Nielson, but whether or not this is the kind of thing with which the Ford Foundation can concern itself in Europe I simply don't know.

I very much enjoyed my meeting with Milosz even though it didn't prove fruitful from his point of view. He is a remarkable fellow.

With kind regards,

JM:MEN

July 30, 1958

Mr. John Marshall
The Rockefeller Foundation
49 West 49th Street
New York 20, New York

Dear Mr. Marshall:

Thank you for your letter of June
20th. I appreciate your writing about
Czesław Milosz and, of course, understand
your position in trying to assist him.

Mr. Sinanoglu is a fine person,
and we are enjoying very much having him
at the International Seminar.

Henry V. Kieزلger

With kind regards,

of the International Seminar,
and we are enjoying very much having pin
Mr. Simonoglu is a fine person,

Dear Mr. Marshall:

New York 20th, New York
40 West 40th Street
The Rocketteller Foundation
Mr. John Marshall

July 30, 1958

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

THE HUMANITIES

CHARLES B. FANS, DIRECTOR
CHADBOURNE GILPATRIC, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
JOHN MARSHALL, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
BOYD R. COMPTON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOHN P. HARRISON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ROBERT W. JULY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD H. NOLTE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

TELEPHONE:
COLUMBUS 5-8100

July 2, 1959

Dear Kissinger:

I know from trying to reach you by telephone at Cambridge that you have just returned from Europe, but I'd be obliged if you could reply to this inquiry before too long for reasons that will be evident.

At the outset, I must acknowledge that this may seem a rather selfish inquiry in view of the fact that we have never here in this Foundation been able to take what might be referred to as an official interest in the International Seminar. In that sense, I am afraid this letter still has to be "unofficial."

But I have been repeatedly impressed with the fact that someone I find of interest in Europe had been, quite unbeknownst to me at the time, a member of the Seminar. For example, my attention last year was caught by Yves Bonnefoy's article in the July issue of *Encounter* and I made it my business to seek him out in France in the autumn, only to discover that he had been all summer with you at Harvard.

This makes me feel that at some appropriate time during this year's Seminar I should very much like to spend two or three days in Cambridge to gain some acquaintance with its members, particularly those from Europe. My specific inquiry is (1) if you would be willing to let me come up on this basis and (2) if so, when would be the best time?

I make this inquiry now because I shall have to plan my coming ahead a bit.

Perhaps in replying you'd be kind enough to send me a list of this year's participants, since it is quite possible that some from other sections of the world would be of interest to my colleagues here who have overseas responsibilities outside Europe.

With kindest regards,

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
10 Weld Hall
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

JM:MEN

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

THE HUMANITIES

CHARLES B. FAHS, DIRECTOR
CHADBOURNE GILPATRIC, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
JOHN MARSHALL, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR
BOYD R. COMPTON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
JOHN P. HARRISON, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
ROBERT W. JULY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
RICHARD H. NOLTE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

TELEPHONE:
COLUMBUS 5-8100

July 14, 1959

Dear Kissinger:

Thanks very much for your letter of July 7, 1959, about my coming up to Cambridge to see something of the International Seminar. It looks now as if I might come up for Tuesday, Wednesday, and possibly part of Thursday, July 21, 22, and 23. I realize that there won't be any meetings on July 22, but thought that possibly for that reason it might be easier to sit down and talk with some of the Seminar members on that day.

If a visit at that time seems appropriate, could you let me know when the seminars meet so that I could work out a kind of schedule accordingly. Of course, I have a few other engagements in Cambridge to work in as well.

As I look over the list of members, it seems to me that I should be particularly interested in a chance to talk individually with the following: Kirschner (Austria); Kitzinger, Tomlin (Great Britain); Cabau and Thibaud (France); Dechamps, Miss Feuersenger, and Stroehm (Germany); Nianias and Potamianos (Greece); Arbasino, Miss Grendi and Grottanelli (Italy); Pen (Holland); Vaarvik (Norway); Brandell (Sweden); Barlas (Turkey); and El Dessuky (Egypt).

I suppose, if you agree, I would do well to sit in on the seminars themselves and then at other times during the day try to settle down with these people for rather leisurely individual talks. Do you have some Common Room, or something of the sort, for the Seminar where I could meet with them more or less informally? As I read off each of these names just now, I could see that in such a talk I would have a number of general questions to raise on which the comment of these people would be most interesting and helpful, representative as I take them to be of the abler younger group in each country. Of course, if they would care to raise questions with me, I'd do the best I could, but as you know, my general purpose in coming is essentially selfish, simply to take advantage of their being near by at a time when I would be relatively free to see them.

- 2 -

For my part, I'll definitely plan to come for those days, but with the understanding that because of some things that are pending here, I might have to shift my visit till a later week. If so, I'd let you know as soon as I could by telephone, though so far as I am concerned, it shouldn't matter to you very much when I come since I really hope you won't lay on anything for me but will rather just let me make my way as I am quite accustomed to.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

JM:MEN

Tuesday, July 21

9:15 - 10:45 Meeting of the Economics Group in Lamont, room 403.
9:15 - 10:45 Meeting of the Humanities Group in Lamont, room 502.
11:00 - 12:30 Meeting of the Political Group in Lamont, Room 403.

2:30 - Lamont 101 - Guest Speaker: Thurgood Marshall, Director-Counsel of the Legal Defense and Educational Fund of the NAACP. Mr. Marshall will speak on "The Negro in America."

Wednesday, July 22

8:30 a.m. - Bus will leave Memorial Hall for a visit to Deefield Academy. This private secondary school for boys is situated in an historic New England village in the western part of Massachusetts. The school has attained national prestige under the leadership of Mr. Frank Boyden, its present headmaster, who with the aid of his faculty and staff will act as host and speaker to our group before and after luncheon. The group will return in time for dinner.

8:00 p.m. - 2 Divinity Avenue, Geographic Building - International Seminar Public Forum. Mr. Adam Szpunar will speak on "Economic and Social Conditions in Contemporary Poland." The Japanese representatives will speak on a topic which will be announced. The talks will be followed by a reception at 6 Divinity Avenue.

Thursday, July 23

9:15 - 10:45 Meeting of the Economics Group in Lamont, room 403.
9:15 - 10:45 Meeting of the Humanities Group in Lamont, room 502.
11:00 - 12:30 Meeting of the Political Group in Lamont, room 403.

2:30 - Lamont 101 - Guest Speaker: James Burnham, Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the New York University and author of *The Managerial Revolution* and *The Coming Defeat of Communism*. Mr. Burnham will talk on "Soviet Methods of Operating Internationally."

7:45 - Bus will leave from Memorial Hall to go to the New Boston Art Center for those who signed, to be the guests of Mr. and Mrs. Paul Bernat at a production of "Twelfth Night."

Note: The leader of the political group is Professor Earl Latham of Amherst College; of the economics group is Professor Raymond Vernon who will be at the Harvard Business School next year; and Professor Allen Tate, poet and critic.

THE ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION

THE HUMANITIES

TELEPHONE:
COLUMBUS 5-8100

July 17, 1959

Special Delivery

Dear Kissinger:

Many thanks for your prompt reply to my letter about
coming to Cambridge next week. It seems still that this
is the best time for me to come, even if the group is to
be away on Wednesday: I have others to see in Cambridge
and could work them in that day. In fact, it might even
be possible for me to stay over Friday if, as seems likely,
there isn't enough chance to talk with all the people I
should want to see on Tuesday and Thursday. I appreciate
your kindness in suggesting that I go along with the group
to Deerfield on Wednesday, but I already have engagements
that day that would keep me in Cambridge.

Thus, I will come up as planned on Monday night and will
try to turn up at your office on Divinity Avenue at nine on
Tuesday morning. If I don't find you there, I think I
should, with your agreement, go over to the meeting of the
Humanities Group in Lamont. Perhaps we might meet there
later in the morning.

I am really looking forward to this visit.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
International Seminar
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

JM:MEN

November 1, 1960

Mr. Gilpatric
The Rockefeller Foundation
111 West 50th Street
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Gilpatric:

I am given to understand that Professor Khan S. Murshid, of Dacca University, Pakistan, is applying for a fellowship from the Rockefeller Foundation to support post-graduate study in this country. Dr. Murshid was a member of the 1960 session of the Harvard International Seminar, of which I am Director. He proved to be one of the very best and most intelligent participants we have ever had, and I would like to support strongly his application. He is a serious and perceptive scholar who would profit immensely from a year of study here, and I am sure that his own intellectual gain would also benefit his university.
I hope very much that you will be able to favor his application.

I hope very much that you will be able to favor this application,
I am sure that his own intellectual gain would also benefit his university.
scholar who would benefit immediately from a best of study here, and I
to support strongly this application. He is a serious and reflective
and most intelligent debater, we have ever had, and I would like
Seminar, of which I am Director. He proved to be one of the very best
Dr. Murphad was a member of the 1960 session of the Harvard International
Rockefeller Foundation to support post-graduate study in this country.
of Ducea University, Paratitan, is applying for a fellowship from the
I am given to understand that Professor Khan S. Murphad.

Dear Mr. Gilchrist:

New York, New York
111 West 20th Street
The Rockefeller Foundation
Mr. Gilchrist

November 1, 1960

THE Rockefeller Foundation

111 WEST 50th STREET, NEW YORK 20

CABLE: ROCKFOUND, NEW YORK
TELEPHONE: COLUMBUS 5-8100

November 3, 1960

Dear Professor Kissinger:

In Mr. Gilpatric's absence, may I
acknowledge and thank you for your letter
of November 1, supporting the application
of Dr. K.S. Murshid for a fellowship from
this foundation.

Mr. Gilpatric is now in South Asia
but he will have your letter on his return
in early December.

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

The Rockefeller Foundation

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

February 28, 1961

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The Rockefeller Foundation, as you may know, has started a limited new program providing assistance to a number of scholars doing research on problems of fundamental importance in the field of international relations. Mr. Yigal Allon has applied to the Foundation for assistance under this program - a brief description of which is enclosed * - to enable him to carry out the research set forth in the attached statement.

I wonder if you would be willing to give us your frank judgment of this research proposal and of Mr. Allon's capacity for imaginative and original scholarship. Since our program is quite limited, we are especially anxious to know whether the scholar in question has given evidence of genuine research ability in the past and is likely to carry the present study to successful completion.

I look forward to hearing from you at your convenience.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Associate Director
Center of International Studies
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Encs. (2)

* Previously sent to you.

[L]

Yigal Allon

St. Antony's College, Oxford

# The Afro Asian Group in the United Nations
## Organisation from the Bandung Conference to the 15th General Assembly (April 1955 - April 1961).

### Chapter I. Introduction and Background

(a) Regionalism in the light of the Charter

(b) Early regional groupings

(c) The Bandung Conference and the United Nations Organisation.

### Chapter II. The Group as an Institution

(a) Membership

(b) Procedure

(c) Unity and Diversity

### Chapter III The Group in Action

(a) The General Assembly

(b) The Security Council

(c) The Social and Economic Council

(d) The Trusteeship Council

(e) The Secretariat

### Chapter IV Conclusion

(a) The Role of the Group in the 15th Assembly

(b) Appraisals.

It will be written as a thesis for the degree of Doctorate, and may subsequently be published in the form of a book in English and Hebrew after the necessary adaptation.

I. The first chapter will describe the background to the phenomenon known as the Afro Asian grouping in the United Nations as a political institution as well as an organisation. Although the Afro Asian group as it exists and functions now is not a "regional arrangement" in the sense which the Charter means, it is necessary for the sake of understanding and comparison to begin by describing the meaning of regionalism in the terms of the Charter. For the time being within the group there is a special sub group, the Arab League which has been recognised by the United Nations as a regional arrangement in the true sense of the term.

The early regional groupings of three major events will be discussed. (a) The establishment of the Arab League in 1945.

(b) The general cultural conference in New Delhi in 1947.

(c) The Delhi conference which assembled to discuss the question of Indonesia in 1949. I think that some roots of the present organisation may be found in these early groupings and therefore they have to be discussed. The group known as the Arab Asian bloc in the United Nations Organisation will be briefly touched as the first oriental group in the United Nations. These events led to the Afro Asian group and therefore should be discussed as part of the introduction.

The Bandung Conference marks among other things the unofficial establishment of the Afro Asian group as a bi-continental body since this was the time that more African countries were invited. Although the results of the Bandung Conference made it clear that the sponsors did not have in mind the formation of a bloc, yet the debates in general and the

results in particular may be regarded in my view as the political
programme of the expanding group: special attention will
therefore be devoted to the political environment, motives and
reasons for this momentous gathering such as non-alignment,
Communism, anti-Communism and the wide problem of ex- as well as
present colonialism.

II. This chapter will be devoted entirely to the external affairs and the working of the bloc in its meetings and caucuses. Unfortunately very little has been published in this regard and most of the work should be done by interviewing prominent Afro Asian delegates to the United Nations who participate in the group's consultations and also if possible to look into some unpublished files and reports on the functioning of the group. The way of accepting state members, the procedure of electing the Chairman and Secretary, how the agenda is fixed and to what extent the member delegates are committed to the group's decisions in the wide range of unity and diversity as it appears before the United Nations; all these will be discussed in this chapter.

III. In this chapter four major problems will be discussed. First the attitudes and positions which the group as a collective body, and its leading members as states, adopted towards the major international problems which appeared before the assembly such as the Suez crisis, the Hungarian Revolution, the Congo question and the problem of colonialism. A special enquiry will be made into the common attitude vis-à-vis the social and economic activities of the United Nations as regards under-developed countries. The problem of adequate representation in the service of the Secretariat as well as the Security Council and Trusteeship Council will also be covered.

IV. It seems that the Bandung Conference and the 15th Assembly mark the natural boundaries of the thesis. As the Bandung Conference is considered to be the birthplace, and therefore the logical beginning of a study of the Afro Asian group, so the

YUGAL ALAN
St. Antony's College, Oxford (UK)

15th Assembly which admitted seventeen new countries, particularly from the Afro Asian bloc, to the U.N. brings it right up to date. It will be useful to find out was the role was of the expanding group in the last assembly. This assembly can also be examined as a test case because most of the leaders of the Great Powers attended it and some of them, especially the Prime Minister of the U.S.S.R., tried to win over the Asian and African delegates, and it was also an important assembly because of other problems. First the great problem of the Congo in the heart of Africa in which many African countries were indirectly concerned, and secondly Khrushchev's suggestion of a complete change in the structure of the General Secretariat. This is the reason why the role of the group in the 15th Assembly is being included in the concluding chapter. I hope that this, together with a general summing up, will bring my work to a conclusion.

Since the United Nations have no secret records all the material is available both in Britain and the U.S.A. This is the reason why I decided, with the approval of my supervisor, Professor Agnes Headlam-Morley, to bring the work as up to date as possible. It seems to me that about half the work should be done, if possible, in America, especially when I come to the point of interviewing delegates and officials of the U.N., as well as checking documents available at the United Nations headquarters. It might also be advisable to visit a few countries both in Asia and Africa, though this should not be regarded as indispensable.

I intend to accomplish the work by the end of 1962.

March 7, 1961

Mr. Gerald Freund, Consultant
The Rockefeller Foundation
Social Sciences Division
111 West 50th Street
New York 20, New York

Dear Mr. Freund:

Thank you for your letter of February 28th. I met Mr. Allon when he participated in the Harvard International Seminar, of which I am Director, during the summer of 1957. Since I have never seen him do academic work I cannot really say very much about his research proposal or his capacity for scholarship. However, I thought him a highly intelligent person, and very imaginative, and he would seem to me a very good gamble even though somewhat different from what I imagine your usual grantees are like.

[LC]

THE Rockefeller Foundation

I wish to acknowledge, with the thanks of the Foundation, the receipt of your confidential statement concerning Mr. Yigal Allon.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Associate Director
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

GERALD FREUND
Consultant for Social Sciences

Page 4.

of French Indo-China or in the Congo which will jeopardise the economic and political advance of the country and thus aggravate the embittered feelings of its people against the richer countries; slow down the development of a saner relationship between the new and the older countries; and present an irresistible temptation to Moscow and Peking to fish in troubled waters. Or, even more serious, it may lead to a request for, or create the temptation to, intervention by the West or the Soviet Union, or both. At the worst case, and this could happen in Laos, it might bring the Russians and the Americans face to face with the attendant dangers of escalation to a higher level conflict, conceivably, in an area of greater importance than Laos, it could lead to world war, particularly since it will be some years before the Western powers have the forces to intervene effectively at the level of limited or conventional war.

6. In case this line of reasoning is considered unduly alarmist, it is worth looking back at a few of the war situations that have occurred since 1945. They seem to fall into the following categories.

1. Colonial independence struggles

Indonesia 1946-50
Indo China 1952-54
Cyprus 1955-58
Algeria 1956-

2. Terrorism

(a) Communist inspired. Philippines. Late 1940s.
Malaya 1950-54.

(b) Non Communist inspired, Kenya 1952-59.

3. War between new states

Israel - UAR 1956

Jordan - UAR - Iraq (potential) 1958.

4. Civil war situations

Guatemala 1957

Congo 1960-

Laos 1960-

It is possible to suggest that certain kinds of disorder or war situations are less likely to occur in future than in the past, e.g. colonial independence struggles. But one cannot rule out their occurrence, for instance in Kenya or Uganda, and the other forms of disorder are if anything more rather than less likely to occur. And it seems even so more certain that there will be active Communist intervention, diplomatic or military, wherever and in whatever form they do occur.

7. If one is right in thinking that it is an urgent Western interest (to put the problem at its lowest) to avert a breakdown of civil order, wherever, and from whatever cause, it may occur, then a great deal more thought must be given as to how this requirement is to be met. The problem is undoubtedly complicated by the vast quantity of arms in general circulation in the world to-day and the large traffic in them,

.../-

legal and illegal, that exists. Moreover, advances in military
techniques for winning battles against an organised enemy, such as the
tank, the amphibious vehicle, the helicopter, the bazooka, the repeating
rifle, parachute troops, seem to have at best only a very limited
success against terrorists, rebels, or indigenous forces, as the experience
of Cyprus and Algeria has shown.

In fact, one of the most impressive aspects of post World War II
experience has been the enormous and disproportionate effort that is
required to restore civil order once it has broken down. Discontent which
at one level can be kept under control by an ordinary police force may,
once it has erupted into violence, require the efforts of a 100 battalions,
and a long period of time, to restore order. There is therefore, as
policemen have long recognised, a high premium on prevention, since cure
may prove a long and bloody business and leave scars that may endure for
generations.

8. No realistic discussion of this problem of "Keeping the Peace" can take place with reference to the policies of the Western powers alone. Many of the areas where civil disorder is most likely are now sovereign countries, and even in a situation of colonial unrest or where a Western power has special treaty obligations, the Afro Asian powers are likely, with Soviet support, to insist on immediate reference to the United Nations. The problem must, therefore, be considered primarily, though not exclusively, in terms of intervention by the United Nations, with the likelihood that the Western powers will have little say in the direction of such intervention. This makes it all the more important to contribute Western ideas and experience to the evolution of sound principles for U.N. intervention and the organisation of U.N. forces at the planning stage, rather than criticising the shortcomings of U.N. action at the operational stage.

9. The Study

If the foregoing considerations are correct they suggest the
following terms of reference for this study.

I. To consider the military or security responsibilities of the colonial powers towards their remaining colonial territories, in terms of averting civil disorder during the transition period. Clearly this is as much a political rather than a military problem, but it does involve a consideration of the training of indigenous security forces, in police and intelligence work, of measures to prevent infiltration and the illegal supply of arms, and of whether military formations, especially white troops, can effectively contribute "aid to the civil power".

II. To consider the responsibilities of the leading Western powers towards countries that have recently gained, or are about to gain, their independence. This area of consideration is naturally prompted by the events in the Congo, and the inadequate framework of internal security which Belgium bo quartered to the new government. But it has a wider application to other countries of Asia and Africa; and overlaps with the question of technical assistance.

III. To consider the responsibilities, capabilities and limitations of the United Nations in this respect, and the most effective form of assistance that the Western powers can render to it.

.../-

FORCE AND PEACE

Our subject is the use of force in the preservation of peace. This does not include the preservation of peace by other means, e.g. diplomacy, good government, money; nor does it include the use of force for other purposes, e.g. annexation, retention of outposts. It does, however, include the failure to create or apply force and the withdrawal of force, whereby peace is endangered.

Force in this context means armed force. Peace means international peace.

Background. The breakdown of civil order is increasingly a threat to
other states. Civil order is a matter of international concern and an
international responsibility.

Division of Subject:-

1. Circumstances likely to produce civil disorder of this kind:-

(i) Assertive nationalism and ebbing colonialism. Carelessness of nationalists about law and order. Tendency of colonial powers to run down police, magistracy etc. and so contribute to the breakdown of law and order. Cyprus, Algeria, Kenya etc.

(ii) Nationalism vs. an authority not in retreat. Madagascar, Hungary, Tibet, Panama.

(iii) Ideological conflict fostered by Cold War. Korea, Vietnam, Laos, Iraq.

(iv) Social and economic pressures, class conflict. Cuba, Bolivia, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Belgium.

(v) Racial conflict. Palestine, Burma, South Africa, Ceylon.

(vi) Religious conflict. Punjab, Bengal, Ceylon.

(vii) Incompetence, inadequate machinery of government, failure of central authority. Indonesia, Lebanon, Congo.

(viii) Deliverate promotion. Azerbaijan, Greece, Malaya.

(ix) The unpredictable remnant. Suoz.

N.B. Instances of civil strife averted: Pakistan, Jordan, Franco, Turkey, Tanganyika.

2. Internationally are some of these circumstances more dangerous than others?

(i) by their nature

(ii) by their location?

3. The usefulness of force

(i) to prevent these circumstances arising or reaching flashpoint
(including prevention of gun running and infiltration).

(ii) when they have arisen.

1/4.

4. The nature of the force that can usefully be brought to bear. Its training and techniques. Its transport. Its intelligence. The limits of its commission.

5. The provenance of force

(i) Major Powers. When will they and when won't they intervene? Are they more bashful now than five or ten years ago? - Korea, Hungary, Lebanon, Cuba, Nigeria. The quarantining of disorder: danger of escalation.

(ii) Regional fire brigades. An African High Command. The usefulness of Seato and Cento.

(iii) The U.N.

6. The U.N. Political

(i) The Charter (c.VII).

(ii) Capacity

(a) Legally - Uniting for Peace resolution

(b) In practice - Suez, Laos, Congo, South Africa

(iii) The changing voice of the UN and attitudes of the major Powers towards a majority and a secretary-general reflecting underprivileged opinion.

(iv) The usefulness of the UN in enabling the major Powers to abstain from direct or overt conflict.

7. The U.N. operational

(i) The functions, size, command and location of an international force.

(ii) Arms control, disarmament, and an international force.

8. The improvement of internal security forces?

- by Colonial Powers?

- by neighbours?

- by international means?

Peter Calvocoressi

13.1.61.

March 22, 1961

Mr. Gerald Freund
The Rockefeller Foundation
Social Sciences Division
111 West 50th Street
New York 20, New York

Dear Mr. Freund:

Thank you for your inquiry of the 13th
about Peter Galvacoressi. I am afraid that I
do not know him except from his writings, and
cannot really give you a recommendation.
However, his project does appear interesting.

[LC]

THE Rockefeller Foundation

I wish to acknowledge, with the thanks of the Foundation, the receipt of your confidential statement concerning Mr. Peter Calvocoressi.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge 38, Mass.

The Rockefeller Foundation

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

March 21, 1961

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The Rockefeller Foundation, as you may know, has started a limited new program providing assistance to a number of scholars doing research on problems of fundamental importance in the field of international relations. Mr. R. Smith Simpson has applied to the Foundation for assistance under this program - a brief description of which is enclosed - to enable him to carry out the research set forth in the attached statement.

I wonder if you would be willing to give us your frank judgment of this research proposal and of Mr. Simpson's capacity for imaginative and original scholarship. Since our program is quite limited, we are especially anxious to know whether the scholar in question has given evidence of genuine research ability in the past and is likely to carry the present study to successful completion.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Associate Director
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Mass.

Encs. (2)

* Previously sent to you

R. SMITH SIMPSON

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF PROPOSAL

An analysis in depth of the current character and quality of U. S. diplomacy, its strong points, its shortcomings and the reasons for these shortcomings is long overdue. This is the analysis which I desire to undertake. It is a neglected area because materials are few and largely unrevealing. Much of its success must depend upon inside knowledge gained by participation in the diplomatic process both abroad and in Washington, and on enough continents to effect a broad enough distribution of experience on both developed and under-developed countries. The limitations and scantiness of materials can be met only by living experience and the inside knowledge which such experience provides.

The question of how to improve our diplomacy necessarily boils down to policy, machinery and personnel. Policy and machinery, or organization, have been much discussed. How to obtain the right kind of people and create the conditions for them to perform adequately are questions which have been superficially analyzed. This is due in large part to the fact that those in the State Department and Foreign Service who have been grappling with these problems have lacked a fundamental and disinterested grasp of the problems - they have had a status to preserve - and those who have been endeavoring to assist from the outside have lacked a grasp of the subtleties which govern the actual thinking and operations of our diplomats. Hence, we have been chipping away piece-meal at various parts and aspects of this broad subject, with a study of some parts here and a memorandum on other parts there, a Congressional sub-committee hearing touching on some problems, a Brookings or Maxwell School study touching on others. One person who is going at the subject of what makes diplomats tick is Zara Steiner, at Princeton, and I have been encouraging and assisting her. But she has not been living this business and rapidly reaches a point beyond which she can only conjecture and imagine. A participant in diplomacy for some 20 years well knows how and why things are done or not done - knows the subtleties of reasoning, the governing mentality, the persuasive climate, the unwritten practices and "regulations", which determine what end how much are done and not done. This is the real stuff of foreign policy and diplomacy, for as Robert Bowie said in his contribution to the *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science last July: "The foreign policy of a state is what it actually does."

The proposed analysis would therefore review the current environment of diplomacy, the kind of diplomacy which this environment requires, and so the human qualities, the educational preparation, the training and briefing and the inter-agency relationships which this diplomacy exacts. The analysis would then focus on the more critical problems

which present-day diplomacy faces - problems concerned with (1) the gatherance and interpretation of information, (2) action, (3) communication between our government and our diplomatic missions, between our missions and local officials, private citizens and organizations, and within our missions, (4) specialization which international relationships require and the converse problem of unification, (5) the evaluation - promotion complex and its impact upon morale, (6) training, including who should be trained for what, (7) the destruction of a permanent hub of officials in Washington headquarters around which the diplomatic service can revalue, (8) the relations of the diplomatic service with Congress and the universities and the role of the ambassador.

In other words, to select one of the recent studies of our national strategy and its deficiencies, *A Forward Strategy for America*, I would add a third action which we need to take in addition to building up U. S. power and linking U. S. diplomacy more meaningfully to the U. S. power position, namely, developing and improving the resources of our diplomacy. It is to this third and much neglected aspect of our strategic need to which my analysis would be addressed.

An outline of the proposed study is attached.

Apart from statistics and formal data, is the information,
often complex which is needed on social problems, or on social
aspects or ramifications of political and economic problems.
Importance of this information. Difficulties of obtaining it.

Need for information is not only official, but unofficial
(U.S. business men, labor leaders, et al. need it and frequently
travel in effort to get it).

Hence, need of travel and, therefore, of travel funds and
sufficient staffing to permit adequate travel by Foreign Service
Officers.

Publications of private foundations and institutes have
increased and their relevance to the economic and social reporting
required by our current needs is very marked. But the problem is
presented of how our FSOs are (1) to be thoroughly grounded (or
at least familiar with) widely scattered materials, sometimes of a
quite prolific abundance, in preparation for their assignments
abroad, and (2) to keep abreast of such materials while in course
of an assignment. Relevant factors are briefing (in Washington
and at post) and staffing of posts.

## Political Information

What sources are to be tapped? To what extent can a mission
confine itself to the capital? To what extent and how does a mission
tap opposition sources? This latter problem not acute in Europe
where governments function on democratic principles (including
freedoms of assembly and discussion), opposition parties are accepted,
and their rights fully recognized. The problem exists where these
circumstances do not exist.

Does the State Department reward, penalize or adopt a neutral
attitude toward an officer recalled at the request of a Government
because he has cultivated contacts among the opposition? Use of
"cover" techniques for overt information-gathering activities. Use
of U.S. newspapermen as "intermediaries" in the information-gathering
process, and its limitations.

Problem also exists of how to make and sustain contact with
underprivileged masses. Barriers to such contact: cultural and
social (differences in standards of living - such as poverty,
squalor, unhygienic living conditions, risks of contagious diseases);
strange (and unhygienically) prepared foods, which impede exchange
of meals; strange methods of eating (as in India); linguistic;
psychological (including suspicions of motive in seeking social
relationships). Techniques of coping with the problem.

Time and again political developments catch us by surprise.
What problems do these failures reveal?

The Rockefeller Foundation

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

April 24, 1961

Dear Professor Kissinger:

One of our current Foundation fellows, Mr. Mario Ojeda, has requested a renewal of his fellowship in order that he might work for a second year at Harvard.

My colleagues and I would be very grateful to you for
giving us a confidential estimate of the caliber of
Mr. Ojeda's work at Harvard to date, together with an
indication whether or not, in your judgment, a second year
at Harvard would be specially beneficial to his scholarly
career. You undoubtedly know that Rockefeller Foundation
fellowships are renewed only in exceptional circumstances,
when a man has been doing work of considerable significance
to his own development and to scholarship in his field.
Your opinion as to whether or not Ojeda meets this high
standard will be very valuable to us in giving further
consideration to his request.

Allow me to thank you in advance for your helpfulness
in this matter.

Professor Henry Kissinger
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

GF:mjs

May 9, 1961

Mr. Gerald Freund
Fellowship Adviser
The Rockefeller Foundation
111 West 50th Street
New York 20, New York

Dear Mr. Freund:

Before leaving the country for
several days, Mr. Kissinger asked me to reply
on his behalf to your letters of March 21st
and April 24th, and also to apologize for
not having answered them earlier. He has been
away from the office most of the last month,
and wanted me to tell you that he knows neither
Mr. R. Smith Simpson nor Mr. Mario Ojeda.

NICHOLAS NYARY
World Affairs Council
Boston

Application for a research grant in international relations
to the Rockefeller Foundation and outline of proposed study.
by Nicholas Nyary

## Statement of Purpose

For some time this writer has planned to draw certain
historically relevant conclusions from British strategy in
the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. However,
pressures of professional activities as director of the
Boston World Affairs Council and lecturer at M.I.T. and
Tufts University have left but scant opportunity to pursue
research in this area.

Because our mentality has been so completely conditioned
by the countless implications of the Cold War, it has been
my long standing ambition to review some of the military
and non-military strategic attitudes and resources which
influenced British official thinking in the French Revolution-
ary Wars.

The historical perspective we enjoy offers some
interesting insights into the evolution of British strategic
thinking, a strategy which was obliged to serve a status
quo power and its allies in their struggle with a revolution-
ary challenger.

It is the hope of this writer that an analysis of
British policies may give a new perspective to our own
troubled age.

## The Thesis

For over two decades Britain led continental coalitions
and carried out global operations against both a popular
doctrine and the effectively organized massive revolutionary
forces of France. The intriguing fact remains that two
decades of defeat and bungling was climaxed by final military
victory at Waterloo.

Surprisingly, the wealth of material on the period does
not include an evaluation of over-all British strategy. The

NICHOLAS NYANY
World Affairs Council
Boston

history of naval operations by Alfred Mahan and Sir John Fortescue's volumes on the military campaigns lead them inevitably to diametrically opposite conclusions. In the intervening half century no synthesis of their evaluations of British strategy has been attempted.

The many excellent works on the political, diplomatic and economic history of the age seem fragmented from our point of view, and one cannot find any studies on the utilization of ideological, economic, social and other resources in response to the total national challenge presented by the France of Lazare Carnot and Napoleon.

The systematic study of international relations theory today seems to be limited to the use of 19th and 20th century history. This seems regrettable because the upheavals preceding the Congress of Vienna no doubt originated what we call modern total wars.

This writer's doctoral dissertation on British subsidies, to be submitted shortly to Columbia University, served as the point of departure for this proposed work.

# *Outline of Proposed Study on British Strategy, 1789 - 1815*

**Introduction:** How well and how fully were British national resources utilized or dissipated, coordinated or fragmented? How thoroughly did British governments perceive the existence of national resources? On what resources did governments mainly depend for the conduct of the struggle?

**I :** What historic precedents conditioned the frame of mind of British statesmen? What was the impact of their two most recent strategic lessons; one to which William Pitt was naturally drawn, was the success of his father in the Seven Years' War. To conquer Canada on the battle fields of Germany with the subsidized armies of Frederick was an example too tempting to dismiss out of hand. The ominous implications of the American Revolutionary War on the other hand could be belittled, ascribing them to the incompetence of Lord North and the "king's friends" and to the opposition of the Whig gentlemen.

**II :** The French Revolution brought about an ideological cleavage between France and the other powers which could not be bridged. The revolutionary mentality took pride in severing all ties with the old order and its representatives, resulting in a complete breakdown of the dialogue between the antagonists. With its new set of political and social values France was able to draw on national resources which could not be utilized by her protagonists without similarly subscribing to revolutionary standards. The dynamics of

NICHOLAS NYANY (cc)
World Affairs Council
Boston

mass society could not be applied by governments controlled by traditional elites. The plight of royalist refugees added a further complicating factor.

III: Was the witch hunt on the domestic scene, which attempted to weed out "French principles" an unmitigated evil and waste, or did Pitt succeed in carrying on his war because he effectively bribed the middle classes, moneyed and landed interests?

Did the frustrating and tragic role of liberal Whigs, led by Charles James Fox, represent a potential but unfulfilled national asset or was Pitt's pragmatic conservatism the only realistic position? What specific economic, military and ideological policies set his conservatism apart from the emotionalism of the Burke-ites?

IV: On the Continent, did "Pitt's gold" stem the French tide and eventually reverse it, or were military subsidies merely a substitute for a policy?

How adequate was British diplomacy and propaganda in coordinating coalitions and in gauging the potential staying power and determination of its members? What were the ancillary effects of British continental policy in terms of economic warfare, the Continental System, and British financial and trade policy?

V: How was the country's economic strength to be husbanded and utilized for the war effort? To what degree has economic thinking been converted from the traditional concept of fixed treasure to the new accumulation of wealth through productivity? What role did these concepts play in government's preference for financing the war through loans rather than taxation?

VI: What factors, at home or abroad, caused a generation of new statesmen, led by Canning, to rely less and less on the old principles of the war? And finally, how by encouraging nationalistic principles on the Continent and in Spain they found a new popular concept which outflanked the powerful impact of "French principles".

Some tentative conclusions:

In this the first modern world war British strategy injected global considerations. From the first tentative steps in "filching sugar islands" in the West Indies, Henry Dundas and his forces developed an instinctive (later explicit) strategy of extensive warfare and a comprehensive global economic policy to counter the massed, intensive concepts of national war developed by the French Revolution.

Henry V. Klaasen

Sincerely yours,

the Rockefeller Foundation.
slder him an excellent choice for副
this standard in his research program. I would com
It he should continue to maintain

extremely well, and was very thoughtful and original.
me at the Council on Foreign Relations. He did
one stage, in 1950, when he did some research for
but has been closely associated with him only at
I have met Mary for several years.

have been out of town most of the last few months.
your letter about Nicholas Mary earlier, but I
I am sorry not to have replied to

Dear Mr. Kremml:

New York 20, New York
111 West 20th Street
The Rockefeller Foundation
Vastant Director, Social Science
Mr. Gerald Kremml

September 31, 1961

The Rockefeller Foundation

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

October 11, 1961

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

The Rockefeller Foundation, as you may know, has for the past several years provided assistance to a number of scholars doing research on problems of fundamental importance in the field of legal and political philosophy. Mr. Klaus Epstein has applied to the Foundation for assistance under this program--a brief description of which is enclosed--to enable him to carry out the research set forth in the attached statement.

I wonder if you would be willing to give us your frank judgment of this research proposal and of Mr. Epstein's capacity for imaginative and original scholarship. Since our program is quite limited, we are especially anxious to know whether the scholar in question has given evidence of genuine research ability in the past and is likely to carry the present study to successful completion.

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
104 Fletcher Road
Belmont, Massachusetts

Encs. (2)

October 24, 1961

Miss Patricia Harris, Administrative Assistant
The Social Sciences Division of The Rockefeller Foundation
111 West 50th Street
New York 20, New York

Dear Miss Harris:

Thank you for your letter of October 11th about Klaus Epstein. I am pleased to write the following recommendation.

I have known Professor Epstein since we were graduate students together at Harvard ten years ago. I consider him the outstanding scholar of my generation at Harvard and one of the most unusual ones I have ever met anywhere. He is of a type who is almost extinct--a man who does all his own research rather than administering a research project.

He has a truly encyclopaedic knowledge of history in general and of German history in particular. His book on Erzberger is recognized as the outstanding work on the subject. There is no one I know, either in this country or abroad, who is as well qualified to work on the topic he has selected: German Conservatism from Möser to Hegel.

I realize that this recommendation sounds somewhat unbalanced and departs from the usual judicious format. However, it reflects my real enthusiasm for Professor Epstein as a scholar and as a teacher. Any award to him would be a credit to the organization making it.

Henry V. Kieinger

Sincerely yours,

Any award to him would be a credit to the organization making it. My real enthusiasm for Professor Ebert is a scholar and as a teacher, and debuts from the usual judicious format. However, it reflects I realize that this recommendation sounds somewhat unplaced to Hegel.

work on the topic he has selected: German Conservation from Goethe, known, either in this country or abroad, who is as well qualified to recognize as the outstanding work on the subject. There is no one I and of German history in particular. His book on Kraberger is re-He has a truly encyclopaedic knowledge of history in general a research project.

to Hegel.

a research project.

--a man who does all his own research rather than assimilating

manual ones. I have ever met anywhere. He is of a type who is almost

outstanding scholar of my generation at Harvard and one of the best

I have known Professor Ebert since we were graduate

extinct--a man who does all his own research rather than assimilating

Ebert.
I am pleased to write the following recommendation.
Thank you for your letter of October 11th about Mr. Ebert.

Dear Miss Harrell:

New York 30, New York
111 West 20th Street

The Social Sciences Division of The Rockefeller Foundation
Miss Patricia Harrell, Administrative Assistant

October 30, 1961

November 8, 1961

Mr. Gerald Freund
Social Sciences
The Rockefeller Foundation
111 West 50th Street
New York 20, New York

Dear Mr. Freund:

You may remember that we corresponded last June about Wayland Hilton-Young, who was interested in obtaining a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. Mr. Young has now decided that he would like to pursue this matter after all, and I am writing in order to reactivate his file.

My own view is that I disagree with almost all of his conclusions, but think he is brilliant and dedicated, and I am always stimulated by what he writes. I think he would be an excellent risk for a grant from the Foundation.

The Rockefeller Foundation

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

November 29, 1961

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Thank you very much for forwarding Mr. Wayland Young's
statement concerning his proposed book. The project looks inter-
esting though, as you say, perhaps a bit ambitious. Since we still
do not have an address for Mr. Young, I am taking the liberty of
enclosing an application form which I would be grateful to you for
sending on to him. Perhaps he would be good enough to return it
directly to me.

Mr. Young might also be informed that it is now too late
for us to process applications for consideration by our Advisory
Committee meeting in mid-December; but the Committee will meet
again in the spring or autumn of next year, and we would be pleased
to submit his application for consideration at that time.

With best wishes,

GF/df

Enclosure