THE WALL STREET JOURNAL THURSDAY, MAY 26, 1994

A15

Haldeman Diaries Are a Reality Check

"Richard Nixon's foreign policy goals were long-range. And he pursued them without regard to domestic political consequences."

—Henry Kissinger's eulogy at Richard Nixon's funeral, April 27, 1994.

"Henry [Kissinger] argues against a commitment ... to withdraw all combat troops because he feels that if we pull them out by the end of '71, trouble can start mounting in '72 that we won't be able to deal with and which we'll have to answer for at the elections. He prefers, instead, a commitment to have them all out by the end of '72 so that we won't have to deliver finally until after the elections."

—Bob Haldeman's White House diaries, Dec. 21, 1970

The recently released diaries of President Nixon's chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman—a 681-page edited book version

Politics & People

By Albert R. Hunt

and twice as much unedited text available electronically on CD-ROM—haven't gotten as much attention as they deserve. ABC-TV's "Nightline" did an excellent two-part series, but otherwise they have been depicted as chiefly kiss-and-tell stories.

They are much more. Historian Stephen Ambrose, author of a highly acclaimed three-part volume on Richard Nixon, says the diaries are so valuable that he could write another book just on them. These are more revealing than episodic accounts from the Nixon tapes: Practically every day of the Nixon presidency Mr. Haldeman, more than anyone else, was with the president; every day, with extraordinary discipline, the chief

of staff recorded the day's events. (Mr. Haldeman died last November shortly after the diaries, many of which were dictated, were fully transcribed.)

There's plenty of titillation for Watergate wallowers. The coverup of White House misdeeds begins almost innocently but then is clear. There's shocking antisemitic and antiblack bigotry attributed, without any ambiguity, to Richard Nixon. A mean-spirited paranoia permeates. President Nixon not only sought to viciously smear political opponents, but even deliberately planted falsehoods about a longtime friend, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Arthur Burns, an act that the president vehemently denied at the time. The president repeatedly talks of the press, bureaucrats, academics and Congress as "out to get us," or less passionately as the "bastards who are here to screw us."

This dispels any lingering doubt that it was Richard Nixon who set the tone and mood that led to the Watergate break-in, to the infamous plumbers unit, to illegal wiretaps and bugging, to trying to use the Internal Revenue Service for political purposes and to abusing the FBI and CIA.

But the diaries also provide fascinating glimpses of Mr. Nixon as a leader. The buildup to the opening to China, and Mr. Nixon's prescience, make that achievement seem even more impressive.

An incredibly insightful account of presidential decision-making is contained in the seven pages on the 1971 weekend when the president summoned all his top economic advisers for a secret marathon meeting at Camp David. The result was the decision to institute wage-and-price controls and go off the gold standard. Many Nixonites later regretted these moves, but the Haldeman book shows a president skillfully navigating the political, domestic and international ramifications, and the differences among power-

ful advisers like John Connally, Arthur Burns, Paul Volcker and George Shultz.

Mr. Ambrose, the Nixon historian, says that his research suggests that the diaries are amazingly reliable. Jo Haldeman, the author's widow, says her husband saw the diaries as "a valuable research source for historians" that would "help put the Nixon presidency in better perspective."

Both Ms. Haldeman and Prof. Ambrose agree that other than Richard Nixon the book's central figure is Henry Kissinger; it's not a flattering portrait. When Ms. Haldeman called Mr. Kissinger some weeks ago to tell him about the book, he expressed displeasure, suggesting it would be better if it never were published.

Mr. Kissinger, who says he hasn't read the book, nevertheless suggests that many conversations "may have been taken out of context." Moreover, he questions Mr. Haldeman's expertise: "Haldeman was not a foreign policy man."

Nice try, Henry, but no dice. Mr. Haldeman, a Kissinger admirer at the time, shows an incredibly petty and insecure man. Mr. Kissinger threatens to resign on at least seven occasions when he feels he's not getting his own way. The spiteful personal feud he conducts with Secretary of State William Rogers, whom he believes is "out to get" him, is so constant that President Nixon complains about what an "emotional drain" Mr. Kissinger is. Walter Isaacson, who recently wrote a superb, if critical, biography of Mr. Kissinger, says that after reading the Haldeman diaries he fears he "understated the paranoid atmos-

phere" that affected the Nixon White House in general and Henry Kissinger in particular.

But Mr. Kissinger's greatest flaw was Vietnam. The president's foreign policy czar initially envisioned a get tough policy the first year that would drive Hanoi to the bargaining table. "He [Mr. Kissinger] wants to push for some escalation, enough to get us a reasonable bargain for a settlement within six months," Mr. Haldeman reports on July 7, 1969. This became a familiar, and movable, refrain.

"If we just had one more dry season, the opponents would break their backs," Mr. Kissinger tells the president in San Clemente on Aug. 24, 1971, more than two years later. The ever-loyal chief of staff couldn't resist adding: "This, of course, is the same line he's used for the last two years, over and over.... it's amazing how it sounds like a broken record." From 1970 through 1972 almost 6,000 Americans lost their lives in Vietnam.

Today Mr. Kissinger still is one who perpetuates the myth that Vietnam was lost not because of a flawed policy, but due to a lack of political will at home. The facts are that for seven years America had more than 150,000 troops in Vietnam, reaching a peak of 536,100; that in current dollars we spent almost a quarter of a trillion dollars on operational costs; and that the U.S. dropped four times as many bombs as during the entire Second World War.

Henry Kissinger remains a central figure in American life today, the darling of much of the business community, the foreign policy establishment and the media. He's on the board of CBS, writes a column for the Los Angeles Times syndicate, and can command space or airtime for his views almost at his convenience. The next time Mr. Kissinger is pronouncing on some momentous event, take a look at the Haldeman diaries. They're a good reality check.

Henry Kissinger

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June 1, 1994

To the Editor of the Wall Street Journal:

In his column of May 26, Albert Hunt juxtaposes a quote
from my eulogy at President Nixon's funeral - that Nixon
pursued his foreign policy goals without regard to political
consequences - with a quote ascribed to me by Haldeman that
unilateral withdrawal from Vietnam in 1971 would serve no
political purpose and that we should continue winding down the
war in 1972. And Hunt demonstrates his self-indulgent
righteousness by twisting a Haldeman entry indicating
impatience with my alleged predictions about the pace of
Vietnamization into the proposition that six thousand American
lives were unnecessarily sacrificed by me (or by Nixon and me)
after that entry.

Though Hunt ridicules my comment to pay attention to
context, some concern with context is essential. For one
thing, Hunt has not bothered to check the diaries which would
have revealed that the alleged comment by me was not
volunteered but was Haldeman's interpretation of my reaction
to what Nixon had told him a few days earlier. More
importantly, American policy throughout the Vietnam War was
driven by a strategy developed early in the Nixon
Administration. Even before the inauguration, Nixon ordered
a full review of Vietnam policy. Extending over many months,
it examined a number of options. Nixon chose Vietnamization
and pursued it consistently. He explained it in many public
speeches, as did I in press conferences. A voluminous record
exists attesting to the substance of American policy.

What then is the Haldeman quote supposed to prove? A
careful reading of the diaries suggests that in December 1970
Nixon, disappointed in the outcome of the Congressional
election, told Haldeman domestic politics would force him to
liquidate the Vietnam War in 1971. The choice of addressee

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page two

alone is the best proof that Nixon was blowing off steam rather than changing strategy, for Haldeman was concerned with public relations, not substance, and any change in strategy would have been discussed with me, the NSC machinery, and others responsible for implementing such a policy. According to the diaries, Haldeman apparently raised the issue with me, and I stated that we should continue the strategy of winding down the war implicit in the Vietnamization policy.

The entries are limited to a 2-week period in December 1970. In 600 pages, there are no further diary entries to that effect, and a voluminous written record, including the diaries, proves the opposite. I have no recollection of such a conversation probably because it was submerged by the endless chatter about public relations emanating from Haldeman's office. Had I taken it seriously, I would have written a memorandum to Nixon and not dealt through Haldeman, whose interest in substance was minimal (as indeed the diaries show).

That a first-term President was concerned about reelection is surely not a revolutionary discovery. That I opposed unconditional withdrawal is not startling news either; I have explained the reason for it in innumerable public statements: in my memoirs; in my recently published book, *Diplomacy*, and indeed in articles before I entered government. I believed that setting a fixed deadline would have wrecked our bargaining position and been impossible to justify to the families of casualties incurred in the interval. Furthermore, my negotiations with Le Duc Tho it made it apparent that setting a deadline for withdrawal would not end the war - despite the contrary claim of the Peace Movement. Until the end, Hanoi consistently insisted that America overthrow its allies and install a Communist-dominated government. That we were never willing to do. That, too, has been amply documented. Mr. Hunt might have pointed out that the strategy of complete unilateral withdrawal in 1972 described in the quote was never carried out.

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page three

One would think that the sheer paucity of the diary entries on the subject, the frequency with which the foreign policy motivation appears and the voluminous written record would prove the opposite of Mr. Hunt's thesis - namely that Nixon's Vietnam policy was driven by the substance of his strategy and not by electoral politics.

Attempting to demonstrate the truly reckless charge that American lives were risked frivolously, Mr. Hunt quotes a Haldeman entry in 1971 about the protracted nature of the conflict and the erroneousness of predictions of success for the past two years. Alas, Hunt's relentless quest to relive the Sixties warps his perspective. When Haldeman recorded his impatience in August 1971, he had apparently forgotten that two years earlier in October 1969 he had recorded my advocacy of quite a different strategy (pp. 95 and 97). In Diplomacy (p. 682) I published the text of my warning about the risks of Vietnamization. When Nixon decided otherwise, I did my utmost to carry out his decision, recognizing that the choice was a close call and that the strategy was reasonable. In fairness to Nixon, the strategy succeeded until engulfed by Watergate, and it might have worked more rapidly had the American domestic turmoil not inhibited both a stronger military response and the establishment of a bottom line for our diplomacy. Nor did Haldeman - aggressively non-substantive throughout - ever offer an alternative, either in his diaries or elsewhere. To use such "evidence" for the charge that the American government was responsible for the death of 6000 servicemen is truly irresponsible.

Vietnam was a tragedy because the commitment over four Presidencies of both parties grew out of America's idealistic tradition and the extrication became a nightmare because that idealism turned on itself. But America will never learn the

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proper lessons from the anguish so long as those who smugly
claim a monopoly of moral concern smear those who found
themselves charged with discovering a way through this
labyrinth.

In the meantime, I stand by my eulogy for President
Nixon.

The Editor
Wall Street Journal
200 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10281

Dictated from London

June 1, 1994

2 WST

[N]

3

WST

[N]

Nixon, disappointed in the outcome of the Congressional election, told Haldeman domestic politics would force him to liquidate the Vietnam War in 1971. The choice of addressee alone is the best proof that Nixon was blowing off steam rather than changing strategy, for Haldeman was concerned with public relations, not substance, and any change in strategy would have been discussed with me, the NSC machinery, and others responsible for implementing such a policy. According to the diaries, Haldeman apparently raised the issue with me, and I stated that we should continue the strategy of winding down the war implicit in the Vietnamization policy. The entries are limited to a 2-week period in December 1970. In 600 pages, there are no further diary entries to that effect, and a voluminous written record, including the diaries, proves the opposite. I have no recollection of such a conversation probably because it was submerged by the endless chatter about public relations emanating from Haldeman's office. Had I

4

WSJ

[Y]

allies and install a Communist-dominated government. That we
were never willing to do. That, too, has been amply
documented. Mr. Hunt might have pointed out that the strategy
complete in 1972
of unilateral withdrawal described in the quote was never
carried out.

servicemen is truly <u>contemptible</u>.

But America will never learn the proper lessons from the
anguish so long as those who smugly claim a monopoly of moral
<u>concern</u>
<u>thought</u> smear those who found themselves charged with
discovering a way through this labyrinth.

Sincerely yours,

MAY 31 '94 12:41 212-759-0042

P.4

would prove the opposite of Mr. Hunt's thesis - that Nixon's Vietnam policy was driven by domestic politics.

Mr. Hunt quotes a Haldeman entry in 1971 about the protracted nature of the conflict and the erroneousness of predictions of success for the past two years. He shows that American lives were risked frivolously. Alas, Hunt's relentless quest to relive the Sixties evokes his perspective. Haldeman's diary reflects the mood of a moment, not an accurate record of past events. When Haldeman recorded his impatience in August 1971, he had apparently forgotten that two years earlier in October 1969 he had written down my advocacy of quite a different strategy (pp. 95 and 97). In *Diplomacy* (p. 682) I published the text of my warning about the risks of Vietnamization. When Nixon decided otherwise, I did my utmost to carry out his decisions, recognizing that the choice was a close call and the strategy (reasonable). In fairness to Nixon, he succeeded until engulfed by Watergate, and it might have succeeded more rapidly had not the American domestic turmoil inhibited both a stronger military response and the establishment of a bottom line for our diplomacy. Nor did Haldeman - aggressively non-substantive throughout - ever offer an alternative, either in his diaries or elsewhere. I insert on back.

But America will never learn the proper lessons so long as money controls waging war and a generally poor system the debate is conducted by smearing those of both parties who

0 OCT '44 19:51

P.20

0122 991 120

CLARIDIES LONDON

90:20

01-JUN-1994

212 759 0042 PAGE.004

Dear Mr. Bartley:

In his column of May 26, Albert Hunt juxtaposes a quote from my eulogy at President Nixon's funeral to the effect that Nixon pursued his foreign policy goals without regard to political consequences with a quote ascribed to me by Haldeman that withdrawal in 1971 would serve no political purpose. And Hunt caps his invincible self-righteousness with using a Haldeman entry indicating impatience with my alleged predictions about the pace of Vietnamization to prove that six thousand American lives were unnecessarily sacrificed by me (or by Nixon and me) after that entry.

Though Hunt ridicules my comment to pay attention to context, some background is essential. When Nixon assumed the Presidency, he ordered a full review of Vietnam policy (even before the inauguration). Extending over many months, it examined a number of options. Nixon chose Vietnamization and pursued it consistently. He explained it in many public speeches, as did I in press conferences. A voluminous record is available to prove its emphasis on substance.

What then does the Haldeman quote prove? To begin with, I have no recollection of the episode at all - probably because it got lost in the endless PR chatter. Reading the diaries, it appears that in December 1970 Nixon, disappointed in the outcome of the Congressional election, told Haldeman that the Vietnam War had to be liquidated in 1971. That alone indicates that Nixon was blowing off steam rather than changing strategy, for Haldeman was concerned with public relations, not substance, and any change in

-2-

strategy would have been discussed with me and the NSC machinery.
According to the diaries, Haldeman apparently raised the issue
with me. If Haldeman is to be believed, I stated that we should
continue the strategy of winding down the war implicit in the
Vietnamization policy and that early withdrawal would not even
serve a political purpose.

All this occured in a 2-week period in December 1970. There
are no further diary entries to that effect in 600 pages, and a
voluminous written and diary record that proves the opposite.

That a first-term President was concerned about reelection
is surely not a revolutionary discovery. That I opposed uncon-
ditional withdrawal is not startling news either; I have explained
the reason for it in innumerable public statements: in my memoirs;
in my recently published book, *Diplomacy*, and indeed in articles
before I entered government. I believed that setting a fixed
deadline would wreck our bargaining position and be impossible
to explain to the families of casualties incurred in the interval.
In my negotiations with Le Duc Tho it further became apparent that
setting a deadline for withdrawal would not end the war - despite
the contrary claim of the Peace Movement. Until the end, Hanoi
consistently insisted that America overthrow its allies and
install a Communist-dominated government. That we were never
prepared to do.

One would have thought that the paucity of diary entries
and the frequency with which the foreign policy motivation
appears throughout, together with the voluminous written record

-3-

Mr. Hunt quotes a Haldeman entry in 1971 about the protracted
nature of the conflict and the erroneousness of predictions of
success for the past two years to show that American lives were
risked frivolously. Alas, Hunt's relentless quest to relive the
Sixties sways his perspective. Haldeman's diary reflects the
mood of a moment, not an accurate record of past events. When
Haldeman recorded his impatience in August 1971, he had apparently
forgotten that two years earlier in October 1969 he had written
down my advocacy of quite a different strategy (pp. 95 and 97).
In Diplomacy (p. 682) I published the text of my warning about the
risks of Vietnamization. When Nixon decided otherwise, I did my
utmost to carry out his decisions, recognizing that the choice
was a close call and the strategy reasonable. In fairness to
Nixon, it succeeded until engulfed by Watergate, and it
might have succeeded more rapidly had not the American domestic
turmoil inhibited both a stronger military response and prevented
the establishment of a bottom line for our diplomacy. Nor did
Haldeman - aggressively non-substantive throughout - ever offer
an alternative, either in his diaries or elsewhere.

But America will never learn the proper lesson so long as
the debate is conducted by smearing those of both parties who

-4-

Sincerely yours,