April 25, 1980 [x]

REMARKS OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER BEFORE THE
FOUNDATION FOR DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION LUNCHEON, APRIL 24, 1980

Totalitarianism & Terrorism Conference

Let me begin with the feeling with which I returned from Europe.
There seems to me, in the Western Alliance today, an absence of
a common analysis, an absence of a common purpose, and a lack of
mutual confidence. There is no agreement about what danger we
face, and in those areas where there is agreement, there is no
consensus as to how to deal with it. The problems of Iran and
Afghanistan, which have partly overlapping and partly different
origins, have tended to merge. There seems to me to be no
agreement as to their causes or their (interests or emphasis).
This is in my judgment true, despite, and perhaps, because
of recent decisions which announce solidarity. I know no
European who believes sanctions will work and yet, they have
voted sanctions. I know no European who knows what our strategy
is and yet, they have affirmed their solidarity. But what we need,
in the Western democracies, is not solidarity but conviction.
Let us be honest, some support sanctions to keep us from doing
other measures which they consider more extreme. Some support
the Olympic decision to stake a claim to their own independent
bi-lateral diplomacy. And, speaking equally frankly, I would
say: do we know the answers to these questions? Are we proposing
sanctions because we want to take further action or, because
we want to be stopped from further action? Do we threaten
military actions to conduct a crisis or, are we proposing them,

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as a high administration official who was quoted today in the
newspapers, in order to scare the Europeans to support us on
lesser measures? What exactly is our strategy either in the
Persian Gulf or in East-West relations? I do not ask that all
of it be spelled out publicly, but have we spelled it out
to ourselves. If present trends continue, we will see a
defacto growth of the neutralism of our allies masquerading
behind proclamations of solidarity which give us the privilege
of defending allies against direct attack while freeing them,
and us, for precisely the bi-lateral diplomacy which undermines
any confidence in the determination of Western actions and Western
resolutions.

We, therefore, in my view, face one of the gravest foreign policy
crisis in our history. The early eighties will be a period of
extraordinary danger that requires a united response by the
American people and by the industrial democracies. While it
is true that many of our allies are playing to their domestic

, and while it is true that there is an enormous
temptation of relying on clever diplomacy and special economic
deals to achieve particular advantages for individual allies,
and leave the defense to us. While I do not admire any of these
trends, we also, should not hide behind the reaction of govern-
ments that are confused and uncertain. The missing ingredient
for which we are responsible is clear and unambiguous leadership.
The missing ingredient is an American articulation of the nature
of the contemporary problem. What is the role of power in the
world today? What is the relationship between geopolitical

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change and global security? What is the American attitude toward
domestic change? How do we handle crises, which is involved in
Iran? How do we handle the long-term East-West relationship,
which is involved in Afghanistan? As long as we conduct endless
bureaucratic debates on the essential elements of our strategy
in the middle of a crisis, we cannot expect that other nations
can overcome their own hesitations, even when their hesitations
are not necessarily caused by our own actions.

To sum up what I have repeatedly stated recently, we face a con-
currence at this moment of four major crises. The crisis in the
balance of power which, if continued, will undermine the foundation
of any creative policy. We are still operating on strategic
theories developed in the middle fifties and on arms control
theories developed in the early sixties; at a time when nuclear
arsenals have grown exponentially, and the United States, for
nearly twenty years, has developed a military strategy that re-
jected a military purpose for that part of its arsenal to which
it paid the greatest attention, namely strategic nuclear weapons.
Somewhere along the line, we will pay a price for that and for
the refusal to adjust our weapons policies to realities of tech-
nology and to the facts of the Soviet build-up. The figures
that are being mentioned of percentage increase, no expert in
the field can take seriously. We are not raising abstract per-
centages, there is one simple test: are the gaps in capabilities
being closed, or are they increasing? I know no student of military
problems who can project that they will be closed in any foreseeable
future on current programs in any of the Western countries.

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Therefore, we are living precariously and we are bound to be confronted with more and more crises that are beyond our control. The global equilibrium is in profound disarray. We need only look at the so-called "arc of crisis" that has been proclaimed by the administration, and we will see India and Pakistan competing for Soviet favor, Iran clearly hostile to any American purposes, Iraq a radical state, South Yemen a Soviet base, Ethiopia a Soviet-Cuban base, Syria a Soviet ally, Libya a Soviet arms depot, Morocco under attack by Soviet arms; that is the "arc of crisis". The number of our allies of countries that we can rely on is shrinking to two. And of other countries that need us, their peril is shown by the fact that they will not avow their fears and seem to prefer impotent neutrality to a military relationship with the United States. I keep reading that in this chaos we can rectify the problem by solving the West Bank problem what ever that means -- which usually means creating a PLO state. The last thing we need, from the American point of view at this point, is another radical state created under conditions of a disintegrating regional balance.

Or, let us take the problem of domestic change. The most brilliant exposition of that subject was in an issue of COMMENTARY by our chairman. I simply want to emphasize that our conviction, that we can outflank Soviet purposes by a campaign that identifies ourselves in effect with all the radical forces in the world, is the beginning of disaster. The sign of a collapsing world order is infatuation with your opponent. Undermining friendly authoritarian governments without the slightest idea of with what to replace them,

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makes the world safe for radicalism; for they're the only groups that are organized and that have a domestic purpose. I know the conventional wisdom is that we are always on the wrong side of history, that we are supporting authoritarian regimes that do not have public support -- and how can you tell they don't have public support -- because they get overthrown. On that basis, the most democratic regimes in the world are those of Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq, Nicaragua, Cuba, they don't have any revolutions, so they presumably have public support. Subconsciously, that is what has effected many of our attitudes. I think it accounts for some of our attitudes at every stage of our policy towards Iran from the collapse of the Shah to the taking of the hostages.

In the crises that we now face: the twin crises of the hostages and of Afghanistan, I would like to make a few general observations. It is not becoming for somebody who himself has been in high office to offer tactical suggestions on how to deal with the immediate crisis. But, there are a number of general things that can be said about any crisis situation, which I would like to mention. The first is, it is essential to make an analysis of the situation. Is one facing a group of irritated individuals with a limited grievance that can be met, or is one dealing with a fundamental trend of which the particular event is a symptom? I would say that at least one of the purposes in Iran is to humiliate the United States to make us contemptible, to drive the events towards a radical solution. Then, it raises the next question: when confronted with a choice between moderates and radicals, do you deal with the problem by expiating presumed quilts? Do you deal

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with it by trying to placate the moderates, or by penalizing the
radicals? Is there a point, which I would apply
also to the presumed debates within the Soviet Politburo. If
there are these doves that no one has ever seen, are they strengthened
by making concessions to them or are they strengthened by giving
them the argument that the course of their opponents is too
dangerous. It is a fundamental question to ask. In any crisis
situation there are risks. In any crisis situation the advocates of inaction can always point to the risks of what is
being proposed and the risks of inaction can never be demonstrated.

There are usually in our government passionate factions as we have
seen again in today's newspaper. The great temptation of policy-
makers is to make a bureaucratic and not a strategic decision
by trying to combine the recommendations of both ends of the
spectrum. I have come to the conviction, in my experience,
that the fundamental decision the US government has to make in a
crisis is whether to act or not to act. If it acts, it will get
no awards for losing with moderation. If it acts, it has to pre-
vail. The worse danger, in my view, is gradual escalation in
which, at every stage, one advertises one's uncertainty and en-
courages the other side to go up on the escalation ladder one more
step until one gradually is at a point where things have gotten
substantially out of control. It is hard for outsiders to know
at what point action is necessary. It is not hard for outsiders
to know that the gradual backing into it, with advertisements
of insecurity, may combine the disadvantages of every course of
action and achieve, in the demonstrations of solidarity from our

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allies, the opposite result that we are seeking. They may be wanting
to strengthen not the government's policy, but that of their
bureaucratic opponent's. In short, I am saying that one can
survive a crisis only by a clear articulation of what the issue
is, what the purpose is, and a show, once one decides to act,
of implacability that cannot be effected by every gust. Public
opinion polls are no reliable guide in these matters.

In 1938, Chamberlin was the most popular man in England and his
course of action had the support of 95% of the population.
Eighteen months later, appeasement had become a byword for ab-
dication of leadership. So, in dealing with any crisis, firmness
of policy is the prime requisite. The worst outcome is to
fluctuate between different choices in the name of preserving
options or of insuring tactical flexibility. Success in foreign
policy depends on strategy, not on tactics. One should think
about options before one decides. But one should forget about
options once the decision has been made.

Now let me say a few words about East-West relations. I do not
believe that on Iran, European support can be more than symbolic
since fifty American lives must be more important to Americans
than to any country, no matter how close to us. On Afghanistan,
it is strange that the issue tends to be presented as if this
were a largely American problem. On that issue, on the nature
of Soviet purposes and the manner to resist it, some consensus
in the alliance is urgently necessary. What are we trying to do?

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Are we trying to punish the Soviets so that after we have
meted out a certain amount of punishment like a traffic fine,
we then go back to business as usual? Or, are we trying to
bring about a change of conduct? It isn't clear, either from
our statements or from the statements of other countries, what
the answer to that question is. I would say that the geopolitical
offensive that has Cuban troops in Angola, Ethiopia, Soviet bases
in South Yemen, Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Soviet arms depots
in Libya; that the upheaval that is now being encouraged, abetted
by us regrettably in Central America, must be stopped or events
will reach a point where massive changes are going to take place.
Even for the sake of the Soviet Union, it must be stopped, because
sooner or later, our public will insist on resistance. That means
we have to deal with a whole set of issues. We must deal with
the issue of the balance of power in a serious manner. We all
talk about secure second strike capabilities while the whole
thrust of technologies is in the direction of first strike capabil-
ities. We have none of us been willing to face the question of
conventional buildups. We have not dealt with the energy problem
on a global basis. Everybody knows that it requires cooperation
among the consumers which we have permitted the producers to define
as provocative while the cooperation of the producers is supposed
to be conciliatory. In the world today, it is said that our big
mistake is that we are not supporting governments that deserve
support. I would say our big mistake is that we are not
supporting governments in need of support. In the Persian
Gulf today the governments that need support will not be able
to meet our domestic maxims in any time frame that is relevant to

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their danger. In Central America today, we cannot wait for
perfection before we decide what steps to take. Wherever one
goes today one reads the analogy to 1914. There is a danger
that a series of minor crises will gradually get out of control.
It is also true that the remedy that one hears generally proposed,
that we must immediately begin negotiations, re-establish contact,
is equally perilous. I believe, and I have said so publically,
and I know there are people here who do not agree with me,
there must be negotiations in the nuclear age with the Soviet
Union. I also believe that the West is in no condition at this
moment to conduct it. I think it is wrong to give the impression
that we are not morally strong enough to negotiate, and we are
bound to be disarmed by any negotiations. It is equally wrong
to create the impression that negotiation is its own purpose.
I do not like the various bi-lateral negotiations that are now
beginning in Paris, maybe in Moscow, maybe in Vienna, maybe at
the European security conference, when nobody can define what it
is that we want. What we must want are rules of international
conduct that stop the constant pressure of Cuban troops, the en-
couragement of terrorism, that define coexistence. We cannot
get this until we are strong enough to insist on it. At that
point, we must be prepared to negotiate. At a minimum, while
all this compulsive attempt at starting negotiations whose agenda,
no one can define, is going on, the one negotiation that must
take place and should take place immediately is between the leaders
of the industrial democracy to answer what danger they discovered,
what purposes they can define, and what national leadership

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and it must be so, on a national
basis, by creating a new consensus on foreign policy, on our
role in the world, a new consensus without which we are doomed
to an accelerating retreat. But, a new consensus also, which
in my view should make it possible to overcome many, if not
all, of the danger which I have describe. In terms of resources,
in terms of creativity, and in terms of the flexibility that
pluralism brings to societies, we are still in a position to say
that the solution of the problems that I have outlined here is
almost entirely up to us.