I-2

treated with scepticism by some of our allies. Despite repeated pro-
testations of newfound unity, there have been periodic and visible symptoms
of distrust about our conduct of the Berlin negotiations from both Bonn
and Paris. According to the President's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, the disagreement about nuclear matters has impaired
the United States' line of communication with France. The smaller
European nations are torn between their worry about Franco-German
hegemony and their eagerness to play on the European stage a role denied
them within the confines of their own borders. At the same time, our
policy in colonial areas, notably New Guinea, has disillusioned some
staunch friends and has reduced the enthusiasm with which they had
theretofore given priority to Atlantic, over European, relationships.

The merit of these contrasting views is not at issue. Their
existence has diverted attention from tasks of construction and channeled
energies into debates about short-range purposes.

Any Atlantic policy must take into account and seek to remove
uneasiness. At time, it has been acute and visible; on other occasions
it has been obscured by protestations of unity. Yet, while it would be

I-3

wrong to take every criticism at face value, it would be equally dangerous
to assume that all reassuring declarations are final. We are still the most
powerful nation in the West. Our displeasure still carries a serious
penalty. For many whose public life has been identified with the forging
of Atlantic ties, it is not easy to admit their disquiet. Some of the
causes have in fact been recognized and are being dealt with. But it is
important to understand the legacy that has been left, lest the West be
deflected from the opportunities before it.

important to understand the legacy that has been left, least the West be
causes have in fact been recognised and are being dealt with. But it is
of Atlantic race, it is not easy to admit their dispute. Some of the
beauty. For many whose public life has been identified with the forging
powerful nation in the West. Our diatribe still carries a serious
to assume that all reasoning declarations are false. We are still the most
wrong to take every criticism at face value, it would be equally dangerous

I-3

II-1

## II. The Problem of United States-German Relations: Berlin and the Issue of Reunification.

Any leader of an Alliance inevitably confronts a problem of perspective, particularly if the Alliance is essentially regional in nature and his interests are world-wide. To such a country, other nations may well appear factors in a security arrangement. Stability may easily seem to be the acceptance by all units of the status quo.

But the components of an international system may tend to think of themselves and the issue in a different fashion. They consider themselves, not as factors of a security arrangement, but as expressions of a historical existence or of national aspirations. Throughout the early nineteenth century, this used to be a source of misunderstanding between Great Britain and its friends on the Continent. When Great Britain thought of an equilibrium, it generally meant a Central Europe strong enough to resist attacks from both East and West. But when Austria or Prussia (then Britain's tacit allies) invoked the equilibrium they also meant a Germany in which the other partner could not

II-3

in order to maintain the appearance of Allied unity. However, occasionally German agreement has meant no more than that the Chancellor preferred to let President De Gaulle exercise his veto in Allied councils. Or else it indicated not that the Federal Republic considered that our course was desirable but that it was the least undesirable of the available options.

One result has been that part of the polemic between Washington and Bonn has been conducted by means of inspired leaks to the press. During the summer and fall of 1961, many articles in the United States press pointed out that Germany's bills for World War II would be coming due. We were said to be delaying proposals until after the German elections so that a new government would be able to bear the brunt of the inevitable unpleasant decisions. There have been persistent demands for initiatives and imagination from the Germans.

On the German side, the suspicion has been frequently expressed that the United States would sooner or later confront Germany with a fait accompli. Inspired stories have doubted the validity of our nuclear guarantee. It has been argued that the constant demand for

II-4

[N]

initiatives really masked a desire for the Germans to offer the kind of intolerable concessions we were reluctant to make ourselves. The constant assertions about the vulnerability of Berlin were said to be the best proof of the decreasing reliability of the United States nuclear guarantee. For if nuclear deterrence were still in undiminished force, Berlin would be no more vulnerable to military attack than Hamburg.

This distrust—however much it may be officially denied or temporarily obscured—has enabled France to act as the guardian of the interests of the Federal Republic. The close Franco-German relationship is the direct result of our German policy at least through the spring of 1962 and our stand on the nuclear question with respect to France. That President De Gaulle has used the United States nuclear umbrella for his "tough" policy adds to the irony of the situation and to the irritation of some of our policy-makers. But as President Kennedy has recently remarked: "Life is not fair."

Rather than deplore French tactics, it becomes important to understand the issues which led to the present state of affairs. The

II-5

disagreement has concerned both substance and method. In the pro-
cess we brought pressure for flexibility on the Federal Republic
on the wrong issue: that of access rights.

The difference as to Berlin can be stated as follows: the
United States has held the unexceptionable view that a showdown
cannot be faced unless a demonstration has been made that the West
has exhausted all honorable means of negotiation. For a long time
the predominant view was that the primary Soviet goal was to stabi-
lize the status quo in Central Europe. The United States tendency
was therefore to seek for some way to deal with the immediate irri-
tant, the problem of access to Berlin, by making some concessions
which would enhance the status of the East German authorities without
impairing the physical means of access. Unification or progress in
the national question would be achieved by increasing the contacts
between the two parts of Germany. In these contacts the superior
strength of Western Germany could not fail to make itself felt. All
of these elements were contained in the United States plan leaked to
the press in April, 1962, which provided for an International Access
Authority on which East Germany would enjoy the same status as the

II-6

Federal Republic, a number of East-West German commissions to deal
with German problems, a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the
Warsaw Pact, and an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear wea-
pons to other countries.

The position of the Federal Republic and France has been quite
different. The Federal Republic, for reasons connected with its
domestic structure and Germany's past, has been reluctant to make
its disquiet apparent, so that in many ways the French position more
accurately reflects German feelings than the official German one.
One may accuse the French of cynicism. But this is irrelevant. The
French position would make no sense--and it could not have been as
effective--if French views had not been closer to the true convictions
of the Chancellor than ours.

Germany and France, then, have been of the view that any nego-
tiation confined to Berlin could only end in a deterioration of the
Western position. Given the fact that Soviet salami tactics had al-
ready sharply curtailed whatever margin of safety existed, any further
concessions were likely to undermine the viability of Berlin. The

II-9

concessions, the Soviets would withdraw an unprovoked threat.

In short, by urging the Federal Republic to be "flexible" on the question of access to Berlin, we may have pressed our allies on the wrong issue. A city divided by a wall, surrounded on three other sides by barbed wire, and existing as an enclave in hostile territory is not ideally placed for the exercise of ingenuity in devising formulae. Moreover, there is no reason to suppose that any new arrangement would not be as susceptible to being broken as the existing one. After all, it can hardly be argued that the Soviet Union has brought the world to the brink of war over Cuba in order to improve the West's position.

The more negotiations focused upon access, the more narrow our margin of maneuver grew, and the more difficult U. S.-German relations became. This is illustrated by the U. S. proposal for an International Access Authority which was leaked by the Germans in April, 1962, as a means of torpedoing it. It provided for an Authority to regulate access to Berlin which was to be composed of five Western and five Eastern nations and three neutrals. The Eastern nations included East

II-10

Germany and East Berlin. The Western group included the Federal Republic and West Berlin. This immediately raised issues about the tacit recognition of East Germany, as well as of giving Berlin a different political status lending color to the Soviet claim that it should be a free city. On the more narrow question of access, the determining vote would be in the hands of three neutrals, two of them living in the immediate shadow of Soviet power. The people of Berlin are not likely to believe that their security has been enhanced by substituting the judgment of Austria, Sweden and Switzerland for the responsibility now exercised by Great Britain, the United States and France.

In effect, we confused our real priorities and the most crucial problem raised by the Soviet pressure against Berlin. The major issue in Berlin is not ingenuity in devising negotiating formulas. Nor is it to satisfy the increasing demands of restless spirits for "new ideas" whose rate of obsolescence has proved enormously high. The major problem and opportunity was to turn the crisis into a demonstration that alliance with the United States had protected Germany's

II-14

its own fate by all available means, including appeals to the Human
Rights Commission of the United Nations. The West could concede
that the present territory of the East German satellite be given a
distinct juridical status. This would permit its demilitarization
and, if necessary, the maintenance of existing economic ties with
the East for a specified term of, say, 10-15 years.

Beyond any specific program it is crucial to keep in mind what
is really at stake in Germany. The building of the Berlin wall and
the meek Western reaction to it have given a shock to the German
body politic which has not yet crystallized into a tendency but
whose reality we can ignore only at our peril. It would be short-
sighted to assume that flexibility in Germany is an end in itself.
It is far from obvious that its content will always be interpreted
in ways consistent with a vital Atlantic partnership. A Federal Re-
public substituting political manipulation for a clear, consistent
pro-Western policy would not be an unmixed blessing for the West.

Thus the deepest stake in Germany is its long-term political
orientation. While a change of front is not in the cards, it would

III-1

### III. The Issue of Nuclear Weapons.

The strains in German-United States relations produced by divergent approaches to the Berlin crisis have been serious enough. They have been compounded by the disputes about strategic questions. The new defense policy urged on our NATO allies by the new Administration, and even more, the manner of presenting it, caused many Europeans to doubt our steadiness and a few to question the continued validity of our nuclear guarantee.

As in the political field, the full extent of European disquiet has been suppressed by the necessity of presenting a facade of Allied unity and the reluctance of many of our friends to antagonize their most powerful ally. Only France has brought these concerns into the open, sometimes in extremely brutal fashion. Yet irritation at French tactics should not obscure that they could/have been successful had there been no uneasiness to exploit.

Perhaps the basic difficulty has been that we have treated what is essentially a political and psychological problem as it if were primarily technical. Thus, the speeches of Secretary McNamara at successive NATO meetings have been generally hailed as extraordinarily brilliant.

III-2

Yet they have almost invariably been followed by periods of intense disquiet. This is because the general tendency of our approach was to demonstrate a military capacity which was not really in question, while ignoring or brushing aside the political considerations which were the real core of the uneasiness. Moreover, our somewhat school-masterly approach, while probably reflecting the realities of the relative sophistication on nuclear matters compounded the irritations. No responsible minister likes to be told publicly that the policy with which he is arises from identified/influenced ignorance. The full extent of the schism became apparent in the aftermath of Secretary McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor on June 16, 1962. Though he used arguments reported to be similar to those that had gone unchallenged at the NATO ministerial meeting in Athens only a month before, the public reaction this time was intense. Freed of the restraints imposed by formal diplomatic meetings, many Europeans--this time even in Great Britain--seized the pretext to give vent to their frustrations. The shocked surprise at the Pentagon/in response to Secretary McNamara's speech only underlines the extent to which Europe and the United States have grown to be at cross purposes on strategic questions.

III-4

to maintain within the Alliance on nuclear matters. With respect to this
problem, assurances of our overwhelming power are simply irrelevant. And
insistence on the "self-evident nature" of our nuclear guarantee smacks
to Europeans of self-righteousness. They believe, rightly or wrongly,
that any guarantee has to be implemented from case to case. There have
been too many Allied disagreements from Suez to the Congo to Berlin to make
them consider it <u>in</u> conceivable that in a crisis we and our allies
might see things differently.

The technical issues have been dealt with previously. This article
will emphasize the political implications of the nuclear controversy within
NATO.

Perhaps the most creative U.S. policy since World War II has been the
fostering of European unity. We have consistently held that a strong and
united Europe would be of benefit to freedom everywhere. Even though such
a unit would prove more difficult to bargain with because of its economic
strength, we have always considered this a cheap price for the long-term
benefits.

* See "The Unsolved Problems of European Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1962.

III-10

nuclear war. While many of our European critics overstated their case when they stated that a conventional build-up might invite Soviet attack, we have considerably exaggerated the benefits to be derived from increasing the NATO shield forces from twenty-three divisions to thirty. Though many rationales for the thirty division goal have been developed, they suffered from isolating a few remote possibilities as the major objective of strategy. For example, it has been argued that thirty divisions could stop the Soviet field armies now deployed in Eastern Europe. But why the Soviets should attack only with those forces without reinforcing them has never been made clear.

Moreover, it is clear that the choice between nuclear and conventional war is no longer entirely up to the West. The conventional build-up of NATO at whatever level could be made irrelevant by a Soviet decision to introduce nuclear weapons. Thus, while advancing a strategy whose effectiveness depended on a credible and certain interplay between conventional and nuclear capabilities, we insisted on retaining the determining voice in the nuclear policy of the Alliance.

* See my article, "The Unsolved Problems of European Defense."

III-14

This triggering effect is one of the incentives for the acquisition of a
nuclear arsenal and one of our reasons for opposing the spread of nuclear
weapons within the Alliance.

The question then becomes how we can avoid being triggered against
our will. Is it wise to engage our prestige in seeking to delay the
physical acquisition of a nuclear capability by our European allies? Or
would it be better to use our influence to guide what we cannot prevent?
A great deal turns on the significance of the notion of Europe as a Third
Force.

In assessing this concept, it is important that we distinguish be-
tween strength and the purposes it will serve. In the sense of being
powerful, Europe will be a Third Force partly because of our own policies.
Whether Europe will use this power for short-term gains or for larger pur-
poses depends on whether the leaders on both sides of the Atlantic have
the vision to develop common purposes and a structure to give them effect.
If this is true, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Europe need not be
disruptive of Atlantic unity. But even in the nuclear field one of two
things can happen with the growth of European nuclear power: (1) Either

III-16

Rather than obstructing the development of European nuclear strength, we should seek to channel it in the most constructive direction. Rather than expending energies on proving that such strength is militarily senseless, we should try to define purposes for it which meet European concerns. For example, it is possible that Europe may view the problem of local defense differently if it could feel that it had resources of its own by which to set limits to an eventual Soviet policy of devastation. If the defense of the Atlantic area is indeed indivisible, it must be possible to develop a strategy which is acceptable to all members. A strategy which is in constant dispute is bound to be ineffective whatever its technical merit. It is senseless to speak of self-evident guarantees in the face of the many disputes which have rent the Alliance. And even if our guarantee is obvious it does not follow that it will lose its effect just because Europe shares some of the responsibility for the nuclear defense. Central control of nuclear weapons, which we correctly consider crucial, can then become a device by which to tie the Atlantic nations together politically.

III-17

There are many signs that this has been recognized by the
Administration. In an important speech in Copenhagen, the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, McGeorge
Bundy, has stated: "It would be wrong to suppose that our aversion for
individual weak and non-integrated nuclear forces would automatically
be extended to a unified and multilateral European force which could
be effectively integrated into joint NATO defense planning."

A great deal depends on how we interpret such words as "unified,"
"integrated" and "multilateral." Heretofore when applied to the concept
of a NATO force we have interpreted it to mean that such a force had to
be seaborne and that the crews had to be of mixed nationality. To this
concept of control by the threat of mutiny was added the requirement of
a multilateral control mechanism which has never been precisely defined.

We must be careful to take our stand on fundamentals. We must
not commit ourselves to a rigid pattern with respect to a European force
and insist that we would support only one particular technical solution.

insisting
It is not wise for us to use up our credit in insisting on patterns
which we cannot impose. We have every right to indicate our preference

IV-2

of Adenauer, so this argument runs, will prove more flexible in the conduct
of diplomacy, while De Gaulle's heirs will either stop the French nuclear
program or turn it into an appendage of ours. The entry of Britain into
the Common Market will give us a voice in European councils which is in
danger now of being submerged by the sentimental/predilections of two figures
who are lonely in their own countries and who have made no provisions to
perpetuate their policies. With the assistance of Great Britain we can
rally the smaller European nations and Italy into a bloc to prevent
the Franco-German axis from dominating Europe and turning the emerging
unity into a Third Force. The new Trade Bill will enable us to forge links
for the Atlantic area similar to such institutions as the Coal and Steel
Community which ushered in the Common Market.

These arguments have plausibility. It is to be questioned,
however, whether they represent the most creative act of statesmanship
of which we are capable. Waiting for the disappearance of two great leaders
may make us the prisoner of events in a rapidly changing world. It may cause
us to miss the many opportunities for constructive action available at a
moment when old patterns are disappearing and the new await the courage
of an act of creation. It is not self-evident that the succession in Germany

IV-3

or in France will inevitably have the consequences we expect of it. As we have seen, a more flexible German policy is likely to find its chief field of activity in the national question rather than in European or Atlantic ties.

This tendency can be prevented only by forging now the Atlantic relationships which can to an extent serve as a substitute for thwarted national aspirations.

In France it is highly unlikely that the French nuclear program will end with de Gaulle--even if that contingency did not appear somewhat distantly in the future. Too many vested interests, bureaucratic, industrial, and military, will have been created for the program to be abandoned. In any case, our energy should be focused on creating a framework for a common Atlantic nuclear policy rather than expending energies on sterile debates about the relationship between national sovereignty and security. It is true, of course, that France has used our nuclear umbrella to conduct policies to reduce our influence on the Continent. But the way to counteract this--assuming that we consider this desirable--is not to bewail the fact nor to withdraw into petulant aloofness. The correct policy would be to conduct ourselves so that our other allies will always consider the advantages of an Atlantic partnership greater than those of a more narrow European conception.

IV-4

We have constantly to remember the fundamental choice we made a
decade and a half ago. Then we decided that a strong, self-confident Europe
would be more in our interest than a supine, demoralized one. We must be
prepared to live with the implications of that choice. We can, of course,
choose to ally ourselves in Europe with all those who oppose the Franco-
German partnership and who support our immediate policies. But it is

German partnership and who support our immediate benefits. But it is
choose to ally ourselves in Europe with all those who choose the Franco-
prepared to live with the implications of that choice. We can, of course,
would be more in our interest than a single, demoralized one. We must be
decade and a belt ago. Then we decided that a strong, self-confident Europe
We have constantly to remember the fundamental choice we made a
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essential that we distinguish between the tactically convenient and the long-term. Many of those in Europe who support our stand against de Gaulle's defense policies are more inclined towards Third Force positions than he is: they see in aborting the nuclear program a convenient opportunity to attack the very concept of joint defense. It would be extremely dangerous to forget that the American nuclear umbrella, now sometimes ruthlessly exploited by France to gain a reputation for toughness, can be equally well invoked-- and in the long run more inimically-- to conduct policies amounting to neutralism. Many of the parties now most critical of their countries' relations to Washington urged precisely such a course less than three years ago.

Nor should we assume that developments in Europe are necessarily in the direction of greater political cohesion, or that economic ties inevitably produce political strength. A post-Adenauer Germany may lack his far-sighted dedication to a greater community. A post-de Gaulle France may be rent by internal schisms. An Italy dominated by the "opening to the Left" may seek to substitute manipulativeness for statesmanship. The Iberian peninsula could, after the death of its aged dictators, descend into chaos. Not all of these events are within our control. But the shock of all of them could be mitigated by a stronger Atlantic Community.

The role of Great Britain in Europe thus becomes crucial.

It goes without saying that its wisdom and statesmanship will
become major factors in European councils. A Europe with Britain
in a leading role is bound to be more subtle, more skillful,
perhaps more moderate, at least in style. Yet the direction of this
influence is still far from clear. Will Great Britain organize
a Fronte of the smaller powers and Italy against the France-
German axis? Will it be a spokesman in Europe for the U.S.
view on international relationships? Will our problems with
Europe necessarily ease with Britain's entry into the Common Market?

There are many who would answer each of these questions affirm-
atively. Yet it appears to be one of those axioms most in need
of reexamination. There is a danger in overlooking what can make
worthwhile to Great Britain the courageous decision of loosening
its Commonwealth ties and seeking its function in Europe. What
remains of Britain's aspirations to greatness is not likely to be
satisfied with playing the role of parliamentary opposition to
a Europe whose impetus comes from Germany and France. Nor can
it be meaningful to British leaders to subject their people to
the traumatic experience of organic ties with Europe only to
bring about a divided structure paralyzed by the rivalry of great
power bbocs within it.

It is much more likely that the vision that has impelled
Prime Minister MacMillan on his lonely and heroic path is of a
Europe led by Britain and playing its own specific role in

international affairs. It is the result of the realignment that the great power status so tenaciously sought in the entire post-war period can now be achieved only through the closest associations with the Continent. Nothing so pedantic as acting as our spokesman in Europe can justify Britain's present course. The contrary is likely to be the case. Britain is more likely to become the spokesman of Europe with us. But to do this effectively Great Britain will have to adopt much of France's program, ameliorating it with its own subtle style. It would not lack irony if one result of Britain's entry into the Common Market were that Europe would henceforth conduct de Gaulle's policies with British methods.

This is not undesirable in itself. A real partnership can only gain strength from the strength of the partners. It does imply, however, that if we want to shape events we must do so soon and that we cannot rely on time to do our work for us.

Similar considerations apply also to the view that the new Trade Bill passed by Congress will be a means to transcend many of the difficulties described in this article. A new era of Atlantic economic relationships could build structures for an eventual Atlantic partnership similar to those which preceded the foundation of the European Community. However, the two situations are not necessarily comparable. In 1947, Europe's economy started from scratch. Shattered by the war, a consolidation of its units across national boundaries promised benefits to everyone. It is

far from clear that a growing dynamic European economic group will
see matters in the same light. The Trade Bill did not receive
the notice in Europe that it has in the United States. Across
the Atlantic it has been treated less as the inauguration of a
new era than as a commercial transaction whose benefits will have
to await detailed negotiations.

But it is really likely that Great Britain is making its
sacrifices inherent in joining the Common Market only to submerge
these benefits by drastic tariff reductions in favor of the U.S.?
It is probable that the Common Market, having abolished its
internal tariffs, will need to lower its external walls. Though
this may be the ultimate outcome, we would do well to prepare our-
selves for some hard bargaining. It is quite possible that
economic integration will follow and not precede Atlantic partner-
ship.

In short,
we cannot wait either for the political succession
in Germany and France or Britain's entry into the Common Market
or the impact of the Trade Bill to begin constructing the political
structure of the Atlantic partnership. Invocations to unity are
no longer enough. The nature of the partnership will have to
be defined. Confidence has to be built not only in our tactical
skill but in our long-term purposes.

With respect
to the Federal Republic we must continue the
process which appears to have already started of establishing
the proper priorities. Ingenuity in finding formulae for access

to Berlin is less important than convincing Germany of the vitality
of the Atlantic relationship. The two goals need not of course
mutually be inconsistent.

But the former should not be
institution
sought at the expense of the latter. Any contribution for the future
to be meaningful to Germany must include some notion as to develop-
ments on the question of Eastern Germany. We cannot avoid this
issue by ignoring it. To do so will only invite irresponsible
elements to pose an antimony between German national aspirations
and its membership in the Atlantic community.

With respect to France, we face the nuclear question and
the suspicion that France's real goal is to conduct a Third Force
policy outside the Atlantic partnership. As for the former, it
would be wiser to concede that our hegemonic position in
nuclear matters is at an end. Our best course is to support a
European Atomic Force without prescribing in too much detail
its internal exam arrangements. Our best guarantee against
irresponsibility by our allies lies in closer political ties not
in technical gimmicks against unauthorized use.

The problem of Europe as a Third Force cannot be dealt with
abstractly. We will not prevent Europe from going this route by
exhortation. Our best course is to propose an Atlantic partnership
which is so close that alternative suggestions appear as the

expressions of narrow nationalism. Unless we behave extremely unwisely, it should always be possible to have the advantages of the greater community exceed those of the lesser ones. This requires however an attitude in which we show less concern about the assertions of independence which are inseparable from sectional self-confidence. It is much the better course to focus energies on goals to achieve rather than conjectural dangers to avoid.

It may be time to consider more seriously the proposals for some form of Western General Staff put forth in various forms by such figures as Dean Acheson, Lord Avison and even President de Gaulle in his scheme for a Directorate. Whether this is institutionalized at the governmental level or whether it is started as a semi-official body of senior and respected citizens, there is an urgent need to develop common policies and, even more importantly, common views of the future. The Atlantic Community requires urgently some vision of its future in order to submerge the tactical into larger purposes.

It may be argued that the model of the Common Market demonstrates the preferability of moving step by step without abstract discussion about ultimate ends. However, the lessons of history cannot be applied mechanically. There is a method appropriate to each level. In the late Forties, it was a major spiritual act to be willing to confront the technical tasks of reconstruction. In the Sixties

we stand in danger of being overwhelmed by the clever, the tactical
or the expedient. What is needed now is an assertion of our future goals
to give us perspective.

Indeed it may well be that excessive "realism" on both sides
of the Atlantic may be the chief obstacle to realizing the
opportunities before the West. The cult of the expert has brings
with it a high degree of tactical competence. But it also
produces an excessive concern with the short-term. The expert
becomes such because he does the familiar as well as
possible, not because of his capacity to chart the unknown. There
is a great premium on elaborating familiar themes and confusing
manipulation with creativity.

Many of the problems in our relations with Europe derive
from a misconception of "realism." This is the cause for the
tendency to accept "facts" in Germany. It produces the over-
concern with the technical aspect of the nuclear question at the
expense of the underlying political and psychological factors. It
has led to a notion of stability which causes us to negotiate
essentially on terms advanced by the other side. We cannot make
proposals known to be unacceptable for this disturbs the
climate of confidence. But we have an obligation to seek out what
"positive" is "primitive" in Soviet proposals in order to demonstrate our
flexibility.

This excessive pragmatism is one of the reasons our reliability as so often questioned in Europe. A country which judges every dispute on its merits is bound to be considered an inconsistent ally. For one does not have to be an ally to be judged on this basis. Such a notion of realism almost invites pressures not only from opponents but from friends as well. For every country has an incentive to structure reality in the direction desired by it. Not the least worry is the aspect of our relations with Europe and the Federal Republic as well as with France we have not persisted in our course once it met determined opposition. It required a leak to the press and an abrupt press conference by Chancellor Adenauer to cause us to reverse the diplomatic tactics that had XXX strained U.S.-German relations. While in the case of France stubborn persistence on its course and occasionally brutal absence from Allied councils had had the same consequence that we have made step by step retracted from our original position. Had we tried together the assistance to the French nuclear program which we have already offered into a package about a year ago, we could have negotiated a greater French participation in the local defense of Europe. Or else we could have demonstrated that France was placing short term considerations of national advantage above the common concern of the Allies.