PRESS INTERVIEW

Participants: Secretary Kissinger
Garric Utley, NBC News

**Sec. Kissinger:** I am really impressed by the way they have run this Conference.

**Mr. Utley:** On the few weeks' notice, the only thing I found that wasn't up to snuff was that once they didn't have the service in a restaurant...I waited an hour and 15 minutes for a lunch out there/and the only thing that didn't work.

I assume you're running, Peter, because I hear something in the back, so we can go right into this briefing.

The first question simply is the one that everybody in the United States is simply the price of tonight/is/Detente, and, on the road to detente from time to time you have to pay a price at the toll booth. How high was the price here in Helsinki?

**Sec. Kissinger:** Well, first of all, detente is in the interests of the United States. What it means is that the are trying to two nuclear super powers/reduce the danger of military confrontation. That is not a favor we do somebody for somebody else, that is something we do for ourselves and for other countries. As for the price/of any significant price that was paid in Helsinki, and I think the Conference established some principles which, if they're applied, will ease international relations.**and** If they are not applied, will leave

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things no worse than they were.

**Mr. Utley:** For example, the West was able to get some concessions out of the Communists...freer flow of information, Western newspapers, some easing of travel restrictions. Do you personally believe that the East European governments will carry this out anything more than a token gesture?

**Sec. Kissinger:** I think it depends on the general international situation. If relations continue to ease, they'll carry at least some of it out. And in any event, it gives us something to appeal to. If the Soviet Union, for example, were to invade another East European country, they wouldn't necessarily be stopped by the document but it would give them an additional obstacle, for whatever difference that makes. On our side, we recognize nothing that hasn't been recognized before and that has been challenged by anybody. So much is made of the recognition of frontiers, who is challenging what frontiers in Europe today.

**Mr. Utley:** This declaration of 30,000 words which has been signed here...do we intend to use it as a sort of a yardstick or a check list against which Communist performance and detente can be measured?

**Sec. Kissinger:** We are going to use it as a check list and as a criterion against which Soviet performance and Communist performance in Eastern Europe can be measured.

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**Mr. Utley:** And if they fail to come up to scratch on a higher definition, what would that mean for detente?

**Sec. Kissinger:** Well, it would certainly hinder detente. One of the byproducts, incidentally, of this Conference is a general loosening up in East-West relations. We have the President visiting a number of key East European countries; we have had talks with several of the Foreign Ministers of the key East European countries, all of whom want to improve relations with the United States. And I don't think anybody could be at this Conference and believe that it was the West which was on the defensive. Quite the opposite was true.

**Mr. Utley:** In the Hall, at Finlandia House, listening to speeches for three days, I was struck by a fact that, in this debate, so to speak, between East and West there was unanimity as to the need for necessity of detente in theory in general. But it seemed there was disagreement as to what detente, in fact, should mean...that is, we talked about and emphasized the concessions which we expected from the East, the East talked about recognition in the security of their borders. It seemed there were two sides, in any case, for talking by each other. Did you notice this? How do you react to this?

**Sec. Kissinger:** Well, I would say I had a slightly different impression. I had the impression that the West was, I would have to say almost surprisingly self-confident about its values. The East, when it appealed to any values, appealed to our

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values, not its own values. On the question of recognition
of frontiers, one has to remember every European country
has separate agreements with the East European countries
recognizing these frontiers. Nothing new was added by this
document to an existing state of affairs.

**Mr. Utley:** Where do you go now on the road of detente
after Helsinki?

**Sec. Kissinger:** Well, as the President said today, we have to make progress on the limitation of strategic arms. We should reduce the military confrontation in Central Europe. Beyond that, we should try to check the spread of nuclear weapons and, in the conduct of our relations to each other, that is, East and West, we must show the strength and we must try to move things to a more cooperative attitude. If these things don't happen, then we will again live in a tense period, and then the United States will do what is necessary. But we have a duty, and I think it's in the interests of all of our citizens that we try to reach the more positive evolution.

**Mr. Utley:** You think we'll get a SALT agreement?

**Sec. Kissinger:** I'll know a little better after tomorrow.
I'm hopeful that we'll get a SALT agreement.

**Mr. Utley:** And the reduction of troops in Central Europe?

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**Sec. Kissinger:** That's a little further off, but I think we have a good chance with that, too.

**Mr. Utley:** Let's call it quits, then. Over and out.

**Sec. Kissinger:** Thank you. Well done, well done.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

AUGUST 2, 1975

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY
(Helsinki, Finland)

THE WHITE HOUSE

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
WITH
THE PRESIDENT
AND
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
THE AIR FORCE ONE POOL
ABOARD AIR FORCE ONE

2:31 P.M. (Helsinki Time)

QUESTION: Mr. President, can you tell us where you made progress on SALT, and do you think that we will have a SALT agreement by the end of the year?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I should get into the details of where we made progress, but the two sessions with Mr. Brezhnev and myself resulted in progress. We have referred to the technicians in Geneva our areas of agreement, and they are going to work out the details.

I am encouraged -- it was constructive and friendly -- and our plans are no different today for any subsequent meetings than they were before.

QUESTION: Mr. President, progress is a bit of a vague term. Can you characterize it as significant progress, minor progress, and specifically do you still hope for an agreement to be signed by the end of this year?

THE PRESIDENT: I would say the progress was encouraging, and that is also a word that could be qualified, but it was encouraging.

It is very difficult, these negotiations, where it requires mutual give and take, so if we want the end result, which is peace, a reduction of the arms burden, it requires some understanding on the part of the Soviet Union and its people, myself and our people. So, when I say encouraging, I think we are edging toward that mutual objective.

QUESTION: By the end of the year?

THE PRESIDENT: Hopefully.

QUESTION: Sir, you say you are sending the technicians to Geneva to complete the areas of agreement. What about the areas in which you have not yet reached agreement? What do you do with them?

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THE PRESIDENT: It is anticipated that Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko will have at least two meetings where the areas of disagreement can be more clearly refined so that Mr. Brezhnev and myself, when we sit down at a final meeting, in case there has to be a resolution of the hard and final decisions, they will be clear cut and understandable.

QUESTION: We have been told in the past of three basic areas of disagreement. One was verification, one was cruise missiles and one was the BACKFIRE bomber. Can you give us a rundown on where now you're making progress and where you still don't have disagreement?

THE PRESIDENT: Those are very important areas, but I think it would be unwise for me to try to identify the particular areas of dispute in those instances. They are very precarious and are crucial points, and this is where Mr. Gromyko and Dr. Kissinger will try to more fully identify the differing positions and give us an opportunity, Mr. Brezhnev and myself, to achieve some kind of an honorable settlement.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you mentioned the give and take of negotiations. At Helsinki, did the Russians demonstrate a willingness to give as much as to take?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, I think they, by past performance and the discussions of several days ago, as well as today, indicated a forthcoming attitude. They, of course, have the same problem I have. They have to convince their people, as I have to convince the American people, that there is an area which is secure for all of us. So, I would indicate that their attitude was forthcoming within their limits and responsibilities.

QUESTION: Mr. President, are you satisfied that if the bases in Turkey remain closed down that you could still police the SALT I agreement? Are you talking about a new agreement, one that is going to make it much more difficult to police?

THE PRESIDENT: The closing of the bases in Turkey by the Congressional action makes it more difficult for us to adequately gather the necessary intelligence, which involves our security. There are, to some extent, alternative bases, but they would cost a great deal of money and they would involve some other negotiations between other parties.

I just don't think the Congress understands the problem. They want to close the bases, they want it to cost more money, they want to handicap our capability, and it makes no sense at all.

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QUESTION: Well, you are going to propose building some new bases? Is that what they have to do, give these bases?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I am going to continue my determined fight to remove the arms embargo, solve the Cyprus question, get our intelligence bases in Turkey reopened in full operation so that our security in the future is as good as it was in the past.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you find the Russians are prepared to talk now about negotiating reductions of arms in Europe, conventional arms, as well as nuclear; in other words, the negotiations known as Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction?

THE PRESIDENT: I have read and listened to Mr. Brezhnev's speech. I was impressed with speeches that were made by many others during the CSCE meetings. I am convinced that we can, how that the European Security Conference is over, that we can make more meaningful progress in MBFR.

QUESTION: Did you discuss that in your conversations with him the second time?

THE PRESIDENT: We discussed it in a very limited way because we concentrated on our SALT negotiations.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you said earlier that you have to convince your people, as the Russians have to convince their people, of the wisdom of the SALT talks. Do you think that the American people need much convincing about SALT?

THE PRESIDENT: I am convinced the American people want their President, their Government, to make responsible and safe agreements. On the other hand, I do not believe the American people want their President to give more than he gets.

So, that is the basic problem in our negotiating process. I can assure you that we will not give more than we get, but I still feel that in the process of negotiations, compromise, we can end up with what is good for both peoples.

QUESTION: Do the Soviets raise specific objections to some of the criticisms by Senator Jackson of the SALT agreements and the SALT negotiations when you are having these talks with them?

THE PRESIDENT: We never discuss personalities, we discuss the issues. We discuss the facts. We discuss our security, the objective of peace, and obviously they discuss their security. We don't get into personalities on the American scene, or otherwise.

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QUESTION: Mr. President, what about oil? What is going to happen now on the oil decontrol in view of Congressional rejection of your compromise proposals?

THE PRESIDENT: I am terribly disappointed that after I have made two constructive compromise efforts to phase decontrol over first a 30-month period, then a 39-month period, that the Congress would reject these proposals.

I am very grateful for what the Senate did. I am terribly disappointed in the attitude of the House because the House action does nothing to stimulate production on the one hand, and it does literally nothing to emphasize conservation on the other.

The House action, at least by a majority it does not have -- there is no other reason, or political ramification -- it does not have any substantive answer for the need for more American production and less reliance on foreign sources.

QUESTION: What is going to happen now?

THE PRESIDENT: I think the American people are far ahead of the majority of the Congress. They understand the problem and they will understand if and when I veto the extension.

QUESTION: "If" you would? Ron has always said that you would.

THE PRESIDENT: There is 99 and nine-tenths percent chance answer that I am going to veto it, but I do want to wait until I get back, and I think the American people are a lot smarter than the majority of the Congress in this case.

QUESTION: Mr. President, you have had a series of setbacks in Congress while you have been on the road -- your veto was defeated on the health matter, the military appropriations bill, one of them was defeated today, and the Turkish aid matter was not expedited.

That leads me to the question, had you been in Washington, do you think you could have twisted some arms and pulled some votes?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think so. The one veto that they overrode, I fully anticipated that they would. I wanted to make the point that I was holding the line at $60 billion deficit, and by the majority or the two-thirds vote of the Congress they have breeched the $60 billion deficit figure. I think the American people will support my position.

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Page 5

QUESTION: Mr. President, while we are on the question of Congressmen, I understand the Silbert nomination is being returned to the White House by the Senate. Will you study that or resubmit, or what plan do you have for it?

THE PRESIDENT: Frankly, I had not heard of that action. I reiterated the nomination of Mr. Silbert, and as far as I know, there is no reason why I should change.

QUESTION: Mr. President, at the conclusion of today's talks, you wished Secretary General Brezhnev good health. You negotiated with him over a period of five hours or more. How do you think his health is?

THE PRESIDENT: I thought he looked very well this morning. In fact, I said it sincerely because I did feel that he looked better -- active and strong.

QUESTION: Better than he did the last time that you saw him?

THE PRESIDENT: I hate to compare, but I can only say that I thought he looked well and he acted strong, and it was a very good face-to-face negotiation.

QUESTION: Based on what happened today, do you expect the General Secretary will be in Washington this fall, as you intended all along?

THE PRESIDENT: There is no change in our overall plan in this regard. We have not talked about details. The plan still is in effect.

QUESTION: Is there anything new on the Middle East in terms of the possibility of an agreement between Israel and Egypt?

THE PRESIDENT: I am very cautious, very cautious, more optimistic today than I was a few days ago, but I don't want to go any further than that.

QUESTION: Would you say why you are more optimistic?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I would not want to go into any specifics.

Henry, would you like to add anything on that?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: We will have to wait. We will see Ambassador Eilts, who is meeting us in Belgrade, and we will then get a full report of the Egyptian reaction.

The mere fact that the dialogue is going on and is not being broken off gives us some hope that we can move it forward, but we have not yet had a formal Egyptian reply, which we will get tomorrow night, and then Eilts is coming back to Washington with us to wait for the Israeli reply to whatever it is that the Egyptians have. But we have not seen yet what the Egyptians have.

QUESTION: Mr. President, in Washington a former Agriculture Department official testified that another big grain sale to the Soviet Union is going to drive up food prices by 10 percent next year.

I was wondering if that was a topic in your discussion with Mr. Brezhnev in Helsinki and exactly where the sale of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union now may stand?

THE PRESIDENT: I noticed that Mr. Schnittker had testified. I believe the sale of roughly ten million tons of American agricultural commodities have been made, and I think this is good for the farmer.

I don't believe there will be any increase in food prices as a result. I think it is good from our point of view in the balance of trade. I think it is a tribute to the great productivity of the American farmer.

In the future, we have to be very alert to the weather conditions that happen in the next month. Every indication is we will have a bountiful harvest in America. If that happens, we are in a very good position: One, to make additional sales; number two, to protect the consumer; number three, to help our balance of payments.

But for the next month, I think we have to be very alert, and I will personally keep my finger on the situation. I will welcome recommendations of other people in my Administration. This is a matter that involves the farmer, the consumer, our foreign relations, and it is a matter that the President himself must watch very carefully.

QUESTION: How did Jack and Mrs. Ford enjoy the trip?

THE PRESIDENT: Jack thinks the Finnish people are fantastic. I gave Mrs. Ford $100 to spend, and she gave me back three Finnish coins.

Did you do any better?

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QUESTION: Oh, yes, I spent with no trouble
at all.

THE PRESIDENT: So, I would say they both had
a very good time.

QUESTION: Sir, there is some feeling in
Europe that the United States was not going along with
any eagerness in this effort to get some sort of
monetary or economic talks going. Were the Europeans
trying to drag us into some sort of arrangement which,
in order to help their economic recovery, might affect
the way in which the United States is recovering?

THE PRESIDENT: I am not going to discuss
whether there will or won't be an economic conference.
There was agreement that the recovery of Europe and the
recovery of the United States were very closely inter-
twined. I was very happy to point out that our recovery
was coming more quickly than theirs.

They were most interested in how we had achieved
this. They wanted us -- and I agreed -- to recognize
that there was this interrelationship, this inter-
dependence, and in the months ahead, we will keep a
very close liaison because economic recovery for the
free world -- this includes more than the four countries --
is vitally important to the political stability of the
free world.

QUESTION: What was your personal reaction to
Mr. Brezhnev's speech, especially the controversial part
where he talked about no country has a right to tell
another country how to manage its internal affairs?

THE PRESIDENT: Overall, I thought Mr. Brezhnev's
speech was very moderate. I did notice that part of
the speech. I thought, as he said that, that I as President
or any other President would not want some other country
telling us how to manage our domestic affairs.

I think each country has a certain sanctity of
internal operations -- we do, other countries do. I
understand it. They can try to be suggestive, maybe
persuasive, but I don't think we can assume the stature
of telling another country what they should or should
not do internally. I don't think they would want us
to do it.

QUESTION: Did you notice the section of
President Ceausescu's speech in which he complained
about Radio Free Europe, and do you have any reaction to
it?

THE PRESIDENT: I listened very carefully to
that part of the speech. He didn't complain, as I
recollect, about Radio Free Europe.

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QUESTION: He didn't name it.

THE PRESIDENT: But he said, and I noted it very carefully, other countries' radio activities are involved in other countries. We do have Radio Free Europe; we do have the Voice of America. But I understand that other countries, including neighboring Communist countries, also have radio signals that go into Romania, so I am not sure he was talking only about us.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you think the world is better today because you signed, or all these nations signed, this document?

THE PRESIDENT: Helen, I am absolutely confident, I am totally convinced that because of 35 nations participating in the Conference on European Security and Cooperation, Europe and the world are all better off.

I will know better two years from now whether our promises have been kept, but I detect very strongly a feeling and an attitude on the part of the leaders of these countries that the promises they made will be maintained.

QUESTION: When you talked to the Embassy this morning, you talked about making sure that these promises were fulfilled. How do we go about enforcing CSCE?

THE PRESIDENT: Persuasion, example. I believe that some of the unfortunate things that have happened in the last 20 years in Europe will not happen again because of the signing of the CSCE and the speeches that were made there. Those kinds of unfortunate events can be avoided in the future. CSCE was a great plus.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you feel at all defensive in a forum like this because of the problems of the Western Alliance which are highly visible -- Portugal's problems, the economic situation, the Greek-Turkish problem, all of which affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in one way or another -- do you feel you are operating at a disadvantage as leader of the free world in that respect?

THE PRESIDENT: I recognize we have problems, but look back at the problems of another era. Are they any worse than the economic problems in the 1950s? Are they any worse than the conflicts among Eastern European countries in the 1950s and 1960s? Are the problems today any more serious than the problems of the past?

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I don't think so. They are different, but they are not worse, and when you now have the Conference on European Security and Cooperation there is a bulwark. I think it gives us strength to meet those problems.

QUESTION: Mr. President, do you think that with American price controls running out on oil September 1, should you go ahead and veto the plan, that it will have any effect on the OPEC's oil pricing plans for this fall?

THE PRESIDENT: My judgment is no. I have been assured by my economic advisers that the decontrol that Congress is forcing on me because they won't accept a reasonable compromise -- not one but two -- that there will be no serious economic price rise consequences.

QUESTION: Are you talking about petroleum in America, or are you talking about worldwide oil prices?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, we really don't know what OPEC is going to do. They have got a great over-supply. They had a tremendous increase in price. We hope that through the IEA and the joint consumer-producer negotiations that there can be a responsible action both as to the producers, as well as the consumers.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. President.

END (AT 2:58 P.M. HELSINKI TIME)

The Secretary
of State

[LC]

Speech

INTERNATIONAL LAW, WORLD ORDER,
AND HUMAN PROGRESS

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the American Bar Association Annual Convention.*

My friends in the legal profession like to remind me of a comment by a British judge on the difference between lawyers and professors. "It's very simple," said Lord Denning. "The function of lawyers is to find a solution to every difficulty presented to them, whereas the function of professors is to find a difficulty with every solution." Today the number of difficulties seems to be outpacing the number of solutions—either because my lawyer friends are not working hard enough, or because there are too many professors in government.

Law and lawyers have played a seminal role in American public life since the founding of the Republic. In this century lawyers have been consistently at the center of our diplomacy, providing many of our ablest Secretaries of State and diplomats, and often decisively influencing American thinking about foreign policy.

This is no accident. The aspiration to harness the conflict of nations by standards of order and justice runs deep in the American tradition. In pioneering techniques of arbitration, conciliation, and adjudication, in developing international institutions and international economic practices, and in creating a body of scholarship sketching visions of world order, American legal thinking has reflected both American idealism and American pragmatic genius.

The problems of the contemporary world structure summon these skills and go beyond them. The rigid international structure of the cold war

August 11, 1975
Montreal, Canada

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

has disintegrated. We have entered an era of confused economic power, proliferating nuclear weaponry, and multiple ideologies and centers of initiative. The challenge of our predecessors was to fashion stability from chaos. The challenge of our generation is to go from the building of national and regional institutions and the management of crises to the building of a new international order which offers a hope of peace, progress, well-being, and justice for the generations to come.

Justice Holmes said of the common law that it "...is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified." But international politics recognizes no sovereign or even quasi-sovereign power beyond the nation-state.

Thus in international affairs the age-old struggle between order and anarchy has a political as well as a legal dimension. When competing national political aims are pressed to the point of unrestrained competition, the precept of laws proves fragile. The unrestrained quest for predominance brooks no legal restraints. In a democratic society law flourishes best amidst pluralistic institutions. Similarly in the international arena stability requires a certain equilibrium of power. Our basic foreign policy objective inevitably must be to shape a stable and cooperative global order out of diverse and contending interests.

But this is not enough. Preoccupation with interests and power is at best sterile and at worst an invitation to a constant test of strength. The true task of statesmanship is to draw from the balance of power a more positive capacity to better the human condition—to turn stability into creativ-

PR 408

2

(LC)

ity, to transform the relaxation of tensions into a strengthening of freedoms, to turn man's preoccupations from self-defense to human progress.

An international order can be neither stable nor just without accepted norms of conduct. International law both provides a means and embodies our ends. It is a repository of our experience and our idealism—a body of principles drawn from the practice of states and an instrument for fashioning new patterns of relations between states. Law is an expression of our own culture and yet a symbol of universal goals. It is the heritage of our past and a means of shaping our future.

The challenge of international order takes on unprecedented urgency in the contemporary world of interdependence. In an increasing number of areas of central political relevance, the legal process has become of major concern. Technology has driven us into vast new areas of human activity and opened up new prospects of either human progress or international contention. The use of the oceans and of outer space, the new excesses of hijacking, terrorism, and warfare, the expansion of multinational corporations will surely become areas of growing dispute if they are not regulated by a legal order.

The United States will not seek to impose a parochial or self-serving view of the law on others. But neither will we carry the quest for accommodation to the point of prejudicing our own values and rights. The new corpus of the law of nations must benefit all peoples equally; it cannot be the preserve of any one nation or group of nations.

The United States is convinced in its own interest that the extension of legal order is a boon to humanity and a necessity. The traditional aspiration of Americans takes on a new relevance and urgency in contemporary conditions. On a planet marked by interdependence, unilateral action and unrestrained pursuit of the national advantage inevitably provoke counteraction and therefore spell futility and anarchy. In an age of awesome weapons of war, there must be accommodation or there will be disaster.

Therefore there must be an expansion of the legal consensus, in terms both of subject matter and participation. Many new and important areas of international activity, such as new departures in technology and communication, cry out for agreed international rules. In other areas, juridical concepts have advanced faster than the political will

that is indispensable to assure their observance—such as the U.N. Charter provisions governing the use of force in international relations. The pace of legal evolution cannot be allowed to lag behind the headlong pace of change in the world at large. In a world of 150 nations and competing ideologies, we cannot afford to wait upon the growth of customary international law. Nor can we be content with the snail's pace of treaty-making as we have known it in recent years in international forums.

We are at a pivotal moment in history. If the world is in flux, we have the capacity and hence the obligation to help shape it. If our goal is a new standard of international restraint and cooperation, then let us fashion the institutions and practices that will bring it about.

This morning I would like to set forth the American view on some of those issues of law and diplomacy whose solution can move us toward a more orderly and lawful world. These issues emphasize the contemporary international challenge: In the oceans where traditional law has been made obsolete by modern technology; in outer space where endeavors undreamed of a generation ago impinge upon traditional concerns for security and for sovereignty; in the laws of war where new practices of barbarism challenge us to develop new social and international restraint; and in international economics where transnational enterprises conduct their activities beyond the frontier of traditional political and legal regulation.

I shall deal in special detail with the Law of the Sea in an effort to promote significant and rapid progress in this vitally important negotiation.

## The Law of the Sea

The United States is now engaged with some 140 nations in one of the most comprehensive and critical negotiations in history—an international effort to devise rules to govern the domain of the oceans. No current international negotiation is more vital for the long-term stability and prosperity of our globe.

One need not be a legal scholar to understand what is at stake. The oceans cover 70 percent of the earth's surface. They both unite and divide mankind. The importance of free navigation for the security of nations, including our country, is traditional; the economic significance of ocean resources is becoming enormous.

From the 17th century until now, the law of

3

the seas has been founded on a relatively simple precept: Freedom of the seas, limited only by a narrow belt of territorial waters generally extending 3 miles offshore. Today, the explosion of technology requires new and more sophisticated solutions.

* In a world desperate for new sources of energy and minerals, vast and largely untapped reserves exist in the oceans.

* In a world that faces widespread famine and malnutrition, fish have become an increasingly vital source of protein.

* In a world clouded by pollution, the environmental integrity of the oceans turns into a critical international problem.

* In a world where 95 percent of international trade is carried on the seas, freedom of navigation is essential.

Unless competitive practices and claims are soon harmonized, the world faces the prospect of mounting conflict. Shipping tonnage is expected to increase fourfold in the next 30 years. Large, self-contained factory vessels already circle the globe and dominate fishing areas that were once the province of small coastal boats. The worldwide fish harvest is increasing dramatically, but without due regard to sound management or the legitimate concerns of coastal states. Shifting population patterns will soon place new strains on the ecology of the world's coastlines.

The current negotiation may thus be the world's last chance. Unilateral national claims to fishing zones and territorial seas extending from 50 to 200 miles have already resulted in seizures of fishing vessels and constant disputes over rights to ocean space. The breakdown of the current negotiation, a failure to reach a legal consensus, will lead to unrestrained military and commercial rivalry and mounting political turmoil.

The United States strongly believes that law must govern the oceans. In this spirit, we welcomed the U.N. mandate in 1970 for a multilateral conference to write a comprehensive treaty governing the use of the oceans and their resources. We contributed substantially to the progress that was made at Caracas last summer and at Geneva this past spring which produced a "single negotiating text" of a draft treaty. This will focus the work of the next session, scheduled for March 1976, in New York. The United States intends to intensify its efforts.

The issues in the Law of the Sea negotiation stretch from the shoreline to the farthest deep seabed. They include:

* The extent of the territorial sea and the related issues of guarantees of free transit through straits;

* The degree of control that a coastal state can exercise in an offshore economic zone beyond its territorial waters; and

* The international system for the exploitation of the resources of the deep seabeds.

If we move outward from the coastline, the first issue is the extent of the territorial sea—the belt of ocean over which the coastal state exercises sovereignty. Historically, it has been recognized as 3 miles; that has been the long-established U.S. position. Increasingly, other states have claimed 12 miles or even 200.

After years of dispute and contradictory international practice, the Law of the Sea Conference is approaching a consensus on a 12-mile territorial limit. We are prepared to accept this solution, provided that the unimpeded transit rights through and over straits used for international navigation are guaranteed. For without such guarantees, a 12-mile territorial sea would place over 100 straits—including the Straits of Gilbraltar, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb—now free for international sea and air travel under the jurisdictional control of coastal states. This the United States cannot accept. Freedom of international transit through these and other straits is for the benefit of all nations, for trade and for security. We will not join in an agreement which leaves any uncertainty about the right to use world communication routes without interference.

Within 200 miles of the shore are some of the world's most important fishing grounds as well as substantial deposits of petroleum, natural gas, and minerals. This has led some coastal states to seek full sovereignty over this zone. These claims, too, are unacceptable to the United States. To accept them would bring 30 percent of the oceans under national territorial control—in the very areas through which most of the world's shipping travels.

The United States joins many other countries in urging international agreement on a 200-mile offshore economic zone. Under this proposal, coastal states would be permitted to control fisheries and mineral resources in the economic zone, but freedom of navigation and other rights of the

4

international community would be preserved. Fishing within the zone would be managed by the coastal state, which would have an international duty to apply agreed standards of conservation. If the coastal state could not harvest all the allowed yearly fishing catch, other countries would be permitted to do so. Special arrangements for tuna and salmon, and other fish which migrate over large distances, would be required. We favor also provisions to protect the fishing interests of land-locked and other geographically disadvantaged countries.

In some areas the **continental margin** extends beyond 200 miles. To resolve disagreements over the use of this area, the United States proposes that the coastal states be given jurisdiction over continental margin resources beyond 200 miles, to a precisely defined limit, and that they share a percentage of financial benefit from mineral exploitation in that area with the international community.

Beyond the territorial sea, the offshore economic zone, and the continental margin lie the **deep seabeds**. They are our planet's last great unexplored frontier. For more than a century we have known that the deep seabeds hold vast deposits of manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, and other minerals, but we did not know how to extract them. New modern technology is rapidly advancing the time when their exploration and commercial exploitation will become a reality.

The United Nations has declared the deep seabed to be the "common heritage of mankind." But this only states the problem. How will the world community manage the clash of national and regional interests, or the inequality of technological capability? Will we reconcile unbridled competition with the imperative of political order?

The United States has nothing to fear from competition. Our technology is the most advanced, and our Navy is adequate to protect our interests. Ultimately, unless basic rules regulate exploitation, rivalry will lead to tests of power. A race to carve out exclusive domains of exploration on the deep seabed, even without claims of sovereignty, will menace freedom of navigation, and invite a competition like that of the colonial powers in Africa and Asia in the last century.

This is not the kind of world we want to see. Law has an opportunity to civilize us in the early stages of a new competitive activity.

We believe that the Law of the Sea treaty must preserve the right of access presently enjoyed by

states and their citizens under international law. Restrictions on free access will retard the development of seabed resources. Nor is it feasible, as some developing countries have proposed, to reserve to a new international seabed organization the sole right to exploit the seabeds.

Nevertheless, the United States believes strongly that law must regulate international activity in this area. The world community has an historic opportunity to manage this new wealth cooperatively and to dedicate resources from the exploitation of the deep seabeds to the development of the poorer countries. A cooperative and equitable solution can lead to new patterns of accommodation between the developing and industrial countries. It could give a fresh and conciliatory cast to the dialogue between the industrialized and so-called Third World. The legal regime we establish for the deep seabeds can be a milestone in the legal and political development of the world community.

The United States has devoted much thought and consideration to this issue. We offer the following proposals:

* An international organization should be created to set rules for deep seabed mining.

* This international organization must preserve the rights of all countries and their citizens directly to exploit deep seabed resources.

* It should also insure fair adjudication of conflicting interests and security of investment.

* Countries and their enterprises mining deep seabed resources should pay an agreed portion of their revenues to the international organization, to be used for the benefit of developing countries.

* The management of the organization and its voting procedures must reflect and balance the interests of the participating states. The organization should not have the power to control prices or production rates.

* If these essential U.S. interests are guaranteed, we can agree that this organization will also have the right to conduct mining operations on behalf of the international community primarily for the benefit of developing countries.

* The new organization should serve as a vehicle for cooperation between the technologically advanced and the developing countries. The United States is prepared to explore ways of sharing deep seabed technology with other nations.

* A balanced commission of consumers, seabed

5

producers, and land-based producers could monitor
the possible adverse effects of deep seabed mining
on the economies of those developing countries
which are substantially dependent on the export of
minerals also produced from the deep seabed.

The United States believes that the world
community has before it an extraordinary oppor-
tunity. The regime for the deep seabeds can turn
interdependence from a slogan into reality. The
sense of community which mankind has failed to
achieve on land could be realized through a regime
for the ocean.

The United States will continue to make
determined efforts to bring about final progress
when the Law of the Sea Conference reconvenes in
New York next year. But we must be clear on one
point: The United States cannot indefinitely sacri-
fice its own interest in developing an assured
supply of critical resources to an indefinitely pro-
longed negotiation. We prefer a generally accept-
able international agreement that provides a stable
legal environment before deep seabed mining
actually begins. The responsibility for achieving an
agreement before actual exploitation begins is
shared by all nations. We cannot defer our own
deep seabed mining for too much longer. In this
spirit, we and other potential seabed producers can
consider appropriate steps to protect current in-
vestment, and to insure that this investment is also
protected in the treaty.

The Conference is faced with other important
issues:

* Ways must be found to encourage marine
scientific research for the benefit of all mankind
while safeguarding the legitimate interests of coast-
al states in their economic zones.

* Steps must be taken to protect the oceans
from pollution. We must establish uniform interna-
tional controls on pollution from ships and insist
upon universal respect for environmental standards
for continental shelf and deep seabed exploitation.

* Access to the sea for land-locked countries
must be assured.

* There must be provisions for compulsory and
impartial third-party settlement of disputes. The
United States cannot accept unilateral interpreta-
tion of a treaty of such scope by individual states
or by an international seabed organization.

The pace of technology, the extent of eco-
nomic need, and the claims of ideology and nation-

al ambition threaten to submerge the difficult
process of negotiation. The United States therefore
believes that a just and beneficial regime for the
oceans is essential to world peace, for the self-
interest of every nation is heavily engaged. Failure
would seriously impair confidence in global treaty-
making and in the very process of multilateral
accommodation. The conclusion of a comprehen-
sive Law of the Sea treaty on the other hand would
mark a major step toward a new world community.

The urgency of the problem is illustrated by
disturbing developments which continue to crowd
upon us. Most prominent is the problem of
fisheries.

The United States cannot indefinitely accept
unregulated and indiscriminate foreign fishing off
its coasts. Many fish stocks have been brought
close to extinction by foreign overfishing. We have
recently concluded agreements with the Soviet
Union, Japan, and Poland which will limit their
catch and we have a long and successful history of
conservation agreements with Canada. But much
more needs to be done.

Many within Congress are urging us to solve
this problem unilaterally. A bill to establish a
200-mile fishing zone passed the Senate last year; a
new one is currently before the House.

The Administration shares the concern which
has led to such proposals. But unilateral action is
both extremely dangerous and incompatible with
the thrust of the negotiations described here. The
United States has consistently resisted the unilater-
al claims of other nations, and others will almost
certainly resist ours. Unilateral legislation on our
part would almost surely prompt others to assert
extreme claims of their own. Our ability to negoti-
ate an acceptable international consensus on the
economic zone will be jeopardized. If every state
proclaims its own rules of law and seeks to impose
them on others, the very basis of international law
will be shaken, ultimately to our own detriment.

We warmly welcome the recent statement by
Prime Minister Trudeau reaffirming the need for a
solution through the Law of the Sea Conference
rather than through unilateral action. He said,
"Canadians at large should realize that we have
very large stakes indeed in the Law of the Sea Con-
ference and we would be fools to give up those
stakes by an action that would be purely a tempo-
rary, paper success."

That attitude will guide our actions as well.
To conserve the fish and protect our fishing indus-

6

try while the treaty is being negotiated, the United
States will negotiate interim arrangements with
other nations to conserve the fish stocks, to insure
effective enforcement, and to protect the liveli-
hood of our coastal fishermen. These agreements
will be a transition to the eventual 200-mile zone.
We believe it is in the interests of states fishing off
our coasts to cooperate with us in this effort. We
will support the efforts of other states, including
our neighbors, to deal with their problems by
similar agreements. We will consult fully with
Congress, our States, the public, and foreign gov-
ernments on arrangements for implementing a
200-mile zone by virtue of agreement at the Law
of the Sea Conference.

Unilateral legislation would be a last resort. The world simply cannot afford to let the vital questions before the Law of the Sea Conference be answered by default. We are at one of those rare moments when mankind has come together to devise means of preventing future conflict and shaping its destiny, rather than to solve a crisis that has occurred or to deal with the aftermath of war. It is a test of vision and will, and of statesmanship. It must succeed. The United States is resolved to help conclude the conference in 1976—before the pressure of events and contention places international consensus irretrievably beyond our grasp.

Outer Space and the Law of Nations

The oceans are not the only area in which
technology drives man in directions he has not
foreseen and toward solutions unprecedented in
history. No dimension of our modern experience is
more a source of wonder than the exploration of
space. Here, too, the extension of man's reach has
come up against national sensitivities and concerns
for sovereignty. Here, too, we confront the poten-
tial for conflict or the possibility for legal order.
Here, too, we have an opportunity to substitute
law for power in the formative stage of an interna-
tional activity.

Space technologies are directly relevant to the
well-being of all nations. Earth-sensing satellites,
for example, can dramatically help nations to
assess their resources and to develop their poten-
tial. In the Sahel region of Africa we have seen the
tremendous potential of this technology in dealing
with natural disasters. The United States has urged
in the United Nations that the new knowledge be
made freely and widely available.

The use of satellites for broadcasting has a

great potential to spread educational opportunities,
and to foster the exchange of ideas.

In the nearly two decades since the first artifi-
cial satellite, remarkable progress has been made in
extending the reach of law to outer space. The
Outer Space Treaty of 1967 placed space beyond
national sovereignty and banned weapons of mass
destruction from earth orbit. The treaty also estab-
lished the principle that the benefits of space
exploration should be shared. Supplementary
agreements have provided for the registry of
objects placed in space, for liability for damage
caused by their return to earth, and for interna-
tional assistance to astronauts in emergencies.
Efforts are underway to develop further interna-
tional law governing man's activities on the moon
and other celestial bodies.

Earth-sensing and broadcasting satellites, and
conditions of their use, are a fresh challenge to
international agreement. The U.N. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is seized with the
issue, and the United States will cooperate actively
with it. We are committed to the wider exchange
of communication and ideas. But we recognize that
there must be full consultation among the coun-
tries directly concerned. While we believe that
knowledge of the earth and its environment gained
from outer space should be broadly shared, we
recognize that this must be accompanied by efforts
to insure that all countries will fully understand
the significance of this new knowledge.

The United States stands ready to engage in a
cooperative search for agreed international ground
rules for these activities.

Hijacking, Terrorism, and War

The modern age has not only given us the
benefits of technology; it has also spawned the
plagues of aircraft hijacking, international terror-
ism, and new techniques of warfare. The interna-
tional community cannot ignore these affronts to
civilization; it must not allow them to spread their
poison; it has a duty to act vigorously to combat
them.

Nations already have the legal obligation,
recognized by unanimous resolution of the U.N.
General Assembly, "to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting, participating [or] acquiescing
in" terrorist acts. Treaties have been concluded to
combat hijacking, sabotage of aircraft, and attacks
on diplomats. The majority of states observe these
rules; a minority do not. But events even in the last

7

few weeks dramatize that present restraints are inadequate.

The United States is convinced that stronger international steps must be taken—and urgently—to deny skyjackers and terrorists a safe haven and to establish sanctions against States which aid them, harbor them, or fail to prosecute or extradite them.

The United States in 1972 proposed to the United Nations a new international Convention for the Prevention or Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism, covering kidnapping, murder, and other brutal acts. This convention regrettably was not adopted—and innumerable innocent lives have been lost as a consequence. We urge the United Nations once again to take up and adopt this convention or other similar proposals as a matter of the highest priority.

Terrorism, like piracy, must be seen as outside the law. It discredits any political objective that it purports to serve and any nations which encourage it. If all nations deny terrorists a safe haven, terrorist practices will be substantially reduced—just as the incidence of skyjacking has declined sharply as a result of multilateral and bilateral agreements. All governments have a duty to defend civilized life by supporting such measures.

The struggle to restrain violence by law meets one of its severest tests in the law of war. Historically, nations have found it possible to observe certain rules in their conduct of war. This restraint has been extended and codified, especially in the past century. In our time new, ever more awesome tools of warfare, the bitterness of ideologies and civil warfare, and weakened bonds of social cohesion have brought an even more brutal dimension to human conflict.

At the same time our century has also witnessed a broad effort to ameliorate some of these evils by international agreements. The most recent and comprehensive is the four Geneva Conventions [of 1949] for the Protection of War Victims.

But the law in action has been less impressive than the law on the books. Patent deficiencies in implementation and compliance can no longer be ignored. Two issues are of paramount concern: First, greater protection for civilians and those imprisoned, missing, and wounded in war; and, second, the application of international standards of humane conduct in civil wars.

An international conference is now underway to supplement the 1949 Geneva Conventions on

the law of war. We will continue to press for rules which will prohibit nations from barring a neutral country, or an international organization such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, from inspecting its treatment of prisoners. We strongly support provisions requiring full accounting for the missing in action. We will advocate immunity for aircraft evacuating the wounded. And we will seek agreement on a protocol which demands humane conduct during civil war, which bans torture, summary execution, and the other excesses which too often characterize civil strife.

The United States is committed to the principle that fundamental human rights require legal protection under all circumstances; that some kinds of individual suffering are intolerable no matter what threat nations may face. The American people and Government deeply believe in fundamental standards of humane conduct; we are committed to uphold and promote them; we will fight to vindicate them in international forums.

## Multinational Enterprises

The need for new international regulation touches areas as modern as new technology and as old as war. It also reaches our economic institutions, where human ingenuity has created new means for progress while bringing new problems of social and legal adjustment.

Multinational enterprises have contributed greatly to economic growth in both their industrialized home countries, where they are most active, and in developing countries, where they conduct some of their operations. If these organizations are to continue to foster world economic growth, it is in the common interest that international law, not political contests, govern their future.

Some nations feel that multinational enterprises influence their economies in ways unresponsive to their national priorities. Others are concerned that these enterprises may evade national taxation and regulation through facilities abroad. And recent disclosures of improper financial relationships between these companies and government officials in several countries raise fresh concerns.

But it remains equally true that multinational enterprises can be powerful engines for good. They can marshal and organize the resources of capital, initiative, research, technology, and markets in ways which vastly increase production and growth. If an international consensus on the proper role

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and responsibilities of these enterprises could be
reached, their vital contribution to the world
economy could be further expanded. A multilater-
al treaty establishing binding rules for multination-
al enterprises does not seem possible in the near
future. However, the United States believes an
agreed statement of basic principles is achievable.
We are prepared to make a major effort and invite
the participation of all interested parties.

We are now actively discussing such guidelines
and will support the relevant work of the U.N.
Commission on Transnational Corporations. We
believe that such guidelines must:

* Accord with existing principles of international law governing the treatment of foreigners and their property rights;

* Call upon multinational corporations to take account of national priorities, act in accordance with local law, and employ fair labor practices;

* Cover all multinationals, State-owned as well as private;

* Not discriminate in favor of host country enterprises, except under specifically defined and limited circumstances;

* Set forth not only the obligations of the multinationals, but also the host country's responsibilities to the foreign enterprises within their borders;

* Acknowledge the responsibility of governments to apply recognized conflict-of-laws principles in reconciling regulations applied by various host nations.

If multinational institutions become an object of economic warfare, it will be an ill omen for the global economic system. We believe that the continued operation of transnational companies, under accepted guidelines, can be reconciled with the claims of national sovereignty. The capacity of nations to deal with this issue constructively will be a test of whether the search for common solutions or the clash of ideologies will dominate our economic future.

## Conclusion

Since the early days of the Republic, Americans have seen that their nation's self-interest could not be separated from a just and progressive international legal order. Our Founding Fathers were

men of law, of wisdom, and of political sophistication. The heritage they left is an inspiration as we face an expanding array of problems that are at once central to our national well-being and soluble only on a global scale.

The challenge of the statesman is to recognize that a just international order cannot be built on power but only on restraint of power. As [Justice] Felix Frankfurter said, "Fragile as reason is and limited as law is as the institutionalized expression of reason, it is often all that stands between us and the tyranny of will, the cruelty of unbridled, unprincipled, undisciplined feeling." If the politics of ideological confrontation and strident nationalism become pervasive, broad and humane international agreement will grow ever more elusive and unilateral actions will dominate. In an environment of widening chaos, the stronger will survive and may even prosper temporarily. But the weaker will despair and the human spirit will suffer.

The American people have always had a higher vision—a community of nations that has discovered the capacity to act according to man's more noble aspirations. The principles and procedures of the Anglo-American legal system have proven their moral and practical worth. They have promoted our national progress and brought benefits to more citizens more equitably than in any society in the history of man. They are a heritage and a trust which we all hold in common. And their greatest contribution to human progress may well lie ahead of us.

The philosopher Kant saw law and freedom, moral principle and practical necessity, as parts of the same reality. He saw law as the inescapable guide to political action. He believed that sooner or later the realities of human interdependence would compel the fulfillment of the moral imperatives of human aspiration.

We have reached that moment in time where moral and practical imperatives, law and pragmatism point toward the same goals.

The foreign policy of the United States must reflect the universal ideals of the American people. It is no accident that a dedication to international law has always been a central feature of our foreign policy. And so it is today—inescapably—as for the first time in history we have the opportunity and the duty to build a true world community.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

U.S. MAIL

The Secretary
of State

[LC]

Speech

August 11, 1975

Montreal, Canada

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

PR 408

2

## The Law of the Sea

One need not be a legal scholar to understand what is at stake. The oceans cover 70 percent of the earth's surface. They both unite and divide mankind. The importance of free navigation for the security of nations, including our country, is traditional; the economic significance of ocean sources is becoming enormous.

3 (16)

The seas has been founded on a relatively simple concept: Freedom of the seas, limited only by a narrow belt of territorial waters generally extending 3 miles offshore. Today, the explosion of technology requires new and more sophisticated solutions.

4

In some areas the continental margin extends beyond 200 miles. To resolve disagreements over the use of this area, the United States proposes that the coastal states be given jurisdiction over continental margin resources beyond 200 miles, to a precisely defined limit, and that they share a percentage of financial benefit from mineral exploitation in that area with the international community.

Beyond the territorial sea, the offshore economic zone, and the continental margin lie the deep seabeds. They are our planet's last great unexplored frontier. For more than a century we have known that the deep seabeds hold vast deposits of manganese, nickel, cobalt, copper, and other minerals, but we did not know how to extract them. New modern technology is rapidly advancing the time when their exploration and commercial exploitation will become a reality.

* The new organization should serve as a vehicle for cooperation between the technologically advanced and the developing countries. The United States is prepared to explore ways sharing deep seabed technology with other nations.

5

Producers, and land-based producers could monitor the possible adverse effects of deep seabed mining on the economies of those developing countries which are substantially dependent on the export of minerals also produced from the deep seabed.

The United States believes that the world community has before it an extraordinary opportunity. The regime for the deep seabeds can turn interdependence from a slogan into reality. The sense of community which mankind has failed to achieve on land could be realized through a regime for the ocean.

The United States will continue to make determined efforts to bring about final progress when the Law of the Sea Conference reconvenes in New York next year. But we must be clear on one point: The United States cannot indefinitely sacrifice its own interest in developing an assured supply of critical resources to an indefinitely prolonged negotiation. We prefer a generally acceptable international agreement that provides a stable legal environment before deep seabed mining actually begins. The responsibility for achieving an agreement before actual exploitation begins is shared by all nations. We cannot defer our own deep seabed mining for too much longer. In this spirit, we and other potential seabed producers can consider appropriate steps to protect current investment, and to insure that this investment is also protected in the treaty.

* Ways must be found to encourage marine scientific research for the benefit of all mankind while safeguarding the legitimate interests of coastal states in their economic zones.

* Steps must be taken to protect the oceans from pollution. We must establish uniform international controls on pollution from ships and insist upon universal respect for environmental standards for continental shelf and deep seabed exploitation.

* There must be provisions for compulsory and impartial third-party settlement of disputes. The United States cannot accept unilateral interpretation of a treaty of such scope by individual states by an international seabed organization.

The pace of technology, the extent of economic need, and the claims of ideology and nation-

al ambition threaten to submerge the difficult process of negotiation. The United States therefore believes that a just and beneficial regime for the oceans is essential to world peace, for the self-interest of every nation is heavily engaged. Failure would seriously impair confidence in global treaty-making and in the very process of multilateral accommodation. The conclusion of a comprehensive Law of the Sea treaty on the other hand would mark a major step toward a new world community.

The Administration shares the concern which has led to such proposals. But unilateral action is both extremely dangerous and incompatible with the thrust of the negotiations described here. The United States has consistently resisted the unilateral claims of other nations, and others will almost certainly resist ours. Unilateral legislation on our part would almost surely prompt others to assert extreme claims of their own. Our ability to negotiate an acceptable international consensus on the economic zone will be jeopardized. If every state proclaims its own rules of law and seeks to impose them on others, the very basis of international law will be shaken, ultimately to our own detriment.

We warmly welcome the recent statement by Prime Minister Trudeau reaffirming the need for a solution through the Law of the Sea Conference rather than through unilateral action. He said, "Canadians at large should realize that we have very large stakes indeed in the Law of the Sea Conference and we would be fools to give up those stakes by an action that would be purely a temporary, paper success."

6

Unilateral legislation would be a last resort.
The world simply cannot afford to let the vital
questions before the Law of the Sea Conference be
answered by default. We are at one of those rare
moments when mankind has come together to
devise means of preventing future conflict and
shaping its destiny, rather than to solve a crisis that
has occurred or to deal with the aftermath of war.
It is a test of vision and will, and of statesmanship.
It must succeed. The United States is resolved to
help conclude the conference in 1976—before the
pressure of events and contention places interna-
tional consensus irretrievably beyond our grasp.

great potential to spread educational opportunities
and to foster the exchange of ideas.

Earth-sensing and broadcasting satellites, and
conditions of their use, are a fresh challenge to
international agreement. The U.N. Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space is seized with the
issue, and the United States will cooperate actively
with it. We are committed to the wider exchange
of communication and ideas. But we recognize that
there must be full consultation among the coun-
tries directly concerned. While we believe the
knowledge of the earth and its environment gain
from outer space should be broadly shared, we
recognize that this must be accompanied by efforts
to insure that all countries will fully understand
the significance of this new knowledge.

Hijacking, Terrorism, and War

Nations already have the legal obligation,
recognized by unanimous resolution of the U.N.
General Assembly, "to refrain from organizing,
instigating, assisting, participating [or] acquiescing
in" terrorist acts. Treaties have been concluded
combat hijacking, sabotage of aircraft, and atta-
on diplomats. The majority of states observe these
rules; a minority do not. But events even in the last

(c) 7

New weeks dramatize that present restraints are inadequate.

## Multinational Enterprises

and responsibilities of these enterprises could be reached, their vital contribution to the world economy could be further expanded. A multilateral treaty establishing binding rules for multinational enterprises does not seem possible in the near future. However, the United States believes an agreed statement of basic principles is achievable. We are prepared to make a major effort and invite the participation of all interested parties.

## Conclusion

men of law, of wisdom, and of political sophistication. The heritage they left is an inspiration as we face an expanding array of problems that are at once central to our national well-being and solubility on a global scale.

U.S. MAIL

The Secretary
of State

Speech

August 14, 1975

Birmingham, Ala.

AMERICAN UNITY AND
THE NATIONAL INTEREST

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Southern Commodity Producers Conference.*

Senator Sparkman, Senator Allen, Mayor Siebels, Ladies and Gentlemen: I want to discuss with you today the basic elements of our foreign policy and why Americans can be proud of their nation's role in the world and confident of its future.

Since the first settlers sought refuge on this untamed Continent, America has represented to all the world man's capacity to shape his own destiny. And for the past 30 years global peace and prosperity have depended to an extraordinary degree on our efforts. When World War II ended, this country took the lead in helping Europe and Japan recover from devastation. We created institutions that have expanded trade and prosperity worldwide. We forged peacetime alliances with the major industrial democracies. We have maintained the balance of power; we have mediated conflict. We have fed the hungry, contributed to economic development, educated young men and women from other lands, and welcomed refugees from oppression to our shores.

No other nation has made such a contribution. No other nation can make such a contribution now. And today, the age-old issues of war and peace, of maintaining stability and advancing human hopes, of preserving the peace and promoting progress continue to summon a vigilant and purposeful America.

But Americans have a right to ask: The world

may need us, but do we need the world? Do our policies abroad serve American interests and American ideals?

A look at our contemporary agenda leaves no doubt that peace for us is inseparable from global tranquillity and that our well-being is intimately bound up with the prosperity of the rest of the world.

* Never before in history have the weapons of war been so gigantic, so dangerous, and so unsuitable for the pursuit of political objectives. We have no more fundamental task than to maintain the strategic balance, for we otherwise risk our survival. We have no more urgent obligation than to check the nuclear arms race, for we otherwise risk global holocaust.

* While in military terms the world is still bipolar, there are now many centers of economic power and political initiative. Clearly, political, military, and economic power are no longer synonymous. Of the democratic nations only the United States is strong in every field. Thus our responsibilities are inescapable. Whether this country acts or fails to act has profound consequences.

* While the world has been free of war on a global scale for more than a generation, regional and local conflicts still abound. Unless they are resolved through diplomacy they pose grave risks to the general peace. We have seen all too clearly that conflict in the Middle East threatens confrontation between the superpowers and economic dislocation for all nations.

PR 411

2

* The ever-present danger of local conflict takes on a more ominous dimension as we face the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If we do not halt their spread, nuclear war will become ever more possible and the risks of theft, accident, and black-mail will multiply. Should the United States withdraw from its security commitments, this process would accelerate, for nations which now rely on us may feel compelled to develop their own nuclear weapons.

* Events have proved that industrial and developing nations are part of a single international economic system on which the prosperity of all depends. The supply and price of energy, the availability of food and other vital raw materials, the strength of currencies and the flow of trade are all vital for a healthy and productive American economy.

Much depends upon this generation of Americans. Because of our size, our strength, our traditions, America is a leader among nations, whether we like it or not. We cannot always assure our preferred solutions, but few solutions are possible without our cooperation. If we do not care about global stability, if we do not help resist aggression, if we do not work for a more equitable and productive world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no nation will take our place—at least no nation that believes in our values. Force and the threat of force would become the rule of the day, and mankind's material and spiritual fortunes would be dealt grave blows. Ultimately we would pay the price ourselves.

Other nations must do more, but this nation must continue to do its share. We still have a unique and irreplaceable contribution to make to a world of peace and prosperity and justice. Our leadership remains needed to mobilize friends and allies to organize a wider international cooperation.

We have the advantage of the boundless assets with which this country is blessed: Our industrial strength and agricultural productivity, the sinews of military power, and the talent of a free people. But these will serve us little without unity and common purpose. We must know what we want for America and we must be willing to defend and to promote it. We must avoid extremes of belligerosity followed by extremes of abdication. We need a steady course that our people can understand, which gives courage to our allies and pause

to our adversaries. In this period of global change, when the simple categories of the immediate post-war period no longer match the complex realities of the modern world, dialogue, public support, and confidence are needed more than ever before.

The citizens of this country have met this challenge. Your sense of responsibility has sustained an enlightened American participation in the world. You knew that America could not thrive in isolation; you understood that our values deserved to be defended and promoted; you realized that the basic decency and generosity of the American people made our leadership not a matter of arrogant pride but a contribution to the well-being of mankind.

Today the issues that rent our unity in the past decade are behind us. The resilience of our national spirit is being demonstrated anew. We can move forward together with confidence to face the great challenges of our time. Let me now discuss the challenges we face and how we plan to meet them.

## National Defense

First, we have maintained and improved our national defense. Peace requires an equilibrium of power—and this Government will maintain it. No great nation leaves its safety to the mercy or the goodwill of others. Any realistic hope of better relations with the Communist powers—and there is such hope—depends on a strong America which leaves other countries no realistic course except restraint and cooperation. So long as potential adversaries continue to expand and improve their forces, we will maintain a defense that cannot be challenged.

## Friends and Allies

The second pillar of our foreign policy is steadfast support of allies. Our alliances with the major industrial democracies have prospered for 30 years because they reflect common interests in a new era, as well as a shared heritage of principles and values. They are an essential element of global stability. These bonds were forged a generation ago to protect weaker allies against a military threat. Today we work together as equals on issues far beyond security. We have strengthened our European defenses, but we have also coordinated our respective approaches to easing tensions with the

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East; and we have cooperated closely in our
economic and energy policies.

As a result, our ties with Europe and Japan have never been stronger. This was reaffirmed in the President's visit to the NATO Summit in Brussels at the end of May, in his meeting with key Allied leaders in Helsinki, and in his recent consultations in Washington with Prime Minister [Takeo] Miki of Japan. Beyond the technical problems of the daily agenda lies the deeper necessity for the great democracies to demonstrate that in an age of turmoil they can shape their own destinies.

Our smaller allies and friends around the world are important factors in global stability. We have learned the lesson of Viet-Nam: American military involvement cannot substitute for a nation's efforts to mobilize its people to defend itself. Nor will we permit allies to blackmail us by pretending that their security means more to us than to them. But the fact remains that military assistance to allies is an essential national interest of the United States. It contributes to local or regional balances of power; it helps deter local conflict; it cements important political relations; and it makes much less likely the need for direct American involvement. When we cut off supplies to an ally, for whatever reason, we inflict a setback on ourselves—as has been demonstrated by the severe damage to our national security caused by the embargo of military supplies to Turkey. Nothing would undermine local or global stability more than if America were to prove unwilling to continue to provide material support to those small and brave friendly nations who want and need our help. If our adversaries maintain their support for their allies, by what reasoning—and at what price—can we do less?

## Relations with the Soviet Union

On the basis of our strength and allied unity, this Administration has sought to place our relations with the Communist countries on a more stable and long-term basis. There must be no misunderstanding of what we are doing. We are trying to manage a fundamental conflict of moral purposes and interests in the shadow of nuclear holocaust; we are striving to preserve peace while defending our essential values and ideals.

In a crisis situation, such as the Mayaguez incident, or the October 1973 Middle East alert, or the Jordanian crisis of 1970, or the Soviet attempt

to build a naval base in Cuba in 1970, we have reacted firmly and decisively—and in the face of an outcry from some who now accuse us of being insufficiently vigilant. It is the firm policy of this Administration to resist encroachment and attempts to gain unilateral advantage.

At the same time, the hope for lasting peace depends on building habits of restraint and moderation among the superpowers. The United States has stated these principles on many occasions, and embodied them in formal documents in our summit meetings with Soviet leaders. Similar principles of international conduct were stated in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe signed by 35 Heads of Government in Helsinki 2 weeks ago. They are not a guarantee of peace but a definition of peace—a standard of behavior to which we must insure adherence by our own determination and vigilance. They are a framework for our own efforts, not a substitute for them.

We also successfully engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations to resolve concrete political problems. This effort has brought some success. A Four-Power agreement on Berlin in 1971 ended two decades of constant crisis. And our relationship with the Soviet Union has helped so far to restrain big-power conflict in the Middle East.

Central to our agenda has been the limitation of strategic nuclear armaments. In 1972 we reached an agreement which froze the Soviet numerical buildup for 5 years and restricted no American programs. Therefore we consider the 1972 SALT [Strategic Arms Limitations Talks] agreement to be unquestionably in America's interest. It prevented an existing missile gap from widening, and it permitted us to maintain and even to increase our lead in multiple warheads, bombers, and other areas of military technology.

Last November in Vladivostok President Ford reached agreement with General Secretary Brezhnev on the principles of a new accord which is also unmistakably in our interest. If achieved, this agreement will bring about strict numerical equality of strategic systems. It will limit the strategic arms competition for a 10-year period. Thus for the first time defense planning will not be driven by fear of unknown military expansion by the other side. And once this common ceiling is implemented we can move immediately to negotiate mutual reductions.

4

We have negotiated other arms control agree-
ments with the Soviet Union to prevent accidental
war, and to prohibit the stationing of nuclear
weapons on the deep seabed or in outer space.

The negotiations in Vienna on force reduc-
tions in Central Europe will be the next test for the
process of relaxing tensions. If progress toward
peace in Europe is to prove durable, it is time to
reduce on a secure and mutual basis the large
standing armed forces now facing each other in the
center of the Continent.

The United States pursues the process of easing tensions from a position of self-confidence and strength. It is not we who were on the defensive at Helsinki; it is not we who were being challenged by all the delegations to live up to the principles being signed. At Helsinki, for the first time in the postwar period, human rights and fundamental freedoms became recognized subjects of East-West discourse and negotiation. The Conference put forward *our* standards of humane conduct, which have been—and still are—a beacon of hope to millions.

The winds of change are blowing from the West; the ideals of liberty and the challenges of technical innovation come from the West. The efforts of Communist countries to participate in the rest of the world, after decades of autarchy, are a sign of the vigor and attraction of our economic system. These are assets of our diplomacy, which we should be prepared to use.

In the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality, the relaxation of tensions is the only responsible course, and the only policy that can be pursued by any Administration charged with responsibility for the lives of Americans. The American people have no desire for a policy of confrontation for its own sake. When both sides have the military power to annihilate mankind, it would be utter recklessness to invite tension needlessly.

But the United States has never accepted that the Soviet Union is free to relax tensions selectively or as a cover for the pursuit of unilateral advantage. In Portugal, a focus of current concern, the Soviet Union should not assume that it has the option, either directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own future. The involvement of external powers for this purpose, in a country which is an old friend and ally of ours, is

inconsistent with any principle of European secu-
rity. Events in Portugal have their origin in the
dynamics of Portuguese history. But 80 percent of
the Portuguese people have declared unmistakably
their desire for a democratic system and demo-
cratic parties. The attempt by an anti-democratic
and doctrinaire minority to thwart this desire is
meeting inevitable and growing popular resistance.

The United States welcomed the Portuguese
revolution. We and our allies have supported its
aims diplomatically and materially. We sympathize
with those moderate elements who seek to build
Portugal by democratic means. We will oppose and
speak out against the efforts of a minority that
appears to be subverting the revolution for its own
purposes. The Portuguese people should know that
we and all the democratic countries of the West are
d deeply concerned about their future and stand
ready to help a democratic Portugal. And at some
point we and our European allies must ask our-
selves whether major Communist influence in a
government is compatible with membership in an
alliance dedicated to resisting Communist
aggression.

This Administration shall never forget the
moral difference between freedom and tyranny.
Nor shall we forget that peace, too, is a moral
imperative. We have been firm in the face of
challenge even as we have sought to ease tensions
and move the world closer to peace. We will not let
the American people be lulled into a false sense of
security. We shall continue on our course.

The combination of strength and conciliation
requires self-restraint in our public debate. Let us
put an end to the swings between confrontation
and false hopes, between belligerence and exhilara-
tion which have marked earlier periods. Let us not
take for granted the stability and relative tranquil-
lity that we have achieved. Let us stop acting as if
we had anything to fear from progress toward
peace. Let those who offer us tough rhetoric define
what precisely they propose to do. What is their
exact alternative? What borders do they plan to
change and by what means? What level of expanded
defense expenditures are they willing to sustain
over what period of time and for what purpose? Are
they not urging a policy of deliberate confronta-
tion? Can we gain support from any of our major
allies for such a radical alternative?

Above all, let us face the fact that many of

5

our difficulties abroad are of our own making. If we are to be vigilant against Communist encroachment, we must stop dismantling or demoralizing our intelligence services. If we are to maintain the world balance of power, we cannot assault our defense budget or impose arms embargoes against key allies. If we are to advance our interests in our diplomacy, we cannot deny ourselves flexibility by legislating blanket restrictions on economic relations with other countries. In short, America cannot be strong abroad unless it is strong at home.

## The New Dimension of Economic Challenge

Partly because of our success in maintaining the world balance of power and fostering the growth of other nations, a new dimension of economic issues is coming to the fore in international relations: Energy, food, other commodities, and trade.

In this realm of diplomacy, the strength of the American economy is among our greatest assets. All of America's objectives—our military security, our economic well-being, our relations with allies and adversaries and developed and developing nations—hinge on the vitality of the American economy. As President Ford said, "A resurgent American economy would do more to restore the confidence of the world in its own future than anything else we can do."

The world now needs that confidence. The industrialized nations have been undergoing the most serious economic crisis since the 1930's. As then, they are experiencing that economic stagnation breeds political instability, that it undermines the public support which enables governments to act with assurance and democratic societies to thrive. And, as then, we are learning how much the solution depends above all on an intangible quality of confidence and belief in a better future.

The industrial democracies are now being tested. They must surmount social and economic strains and reinvigorate their free institutions. President Ford's talks at Helsinki with allied leaders and his meeting in Washington with the Prime Minister of Japan focused on the crucial importance of a thriving American economy to world economic recovery; they produced a determination to deal with the global economic challenge cooperatively. The United States is prepared to intensify its consultations and to seek a coordi-

nated approach. We are aware of our global responsibility and we shall meet it in the months to come.

The success of these efforts will be of vital importance to the rest of the world. The industrial nations account for 65 percent of the world's output and 70 percent of its trade. Thus, the economic well-being of the developing nations, too, depends on broad cooperation with the industrialized world. Unfortunately, too many nations seek to exact by ideological confrontation what can only be achieved through reasoned cooperative dialogue. The United States is prepared for a serious and constructive cooperative dialogue. We are ready to develop equitable economic relations with all nations. But we will never accept bloc pressure or blackmail.

Early next month, a Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly will convene in New York to deal with the issues of economic interdependence. It will be a fateful occasion because it can determine the nature of the relationship between the developed and the developing countries. On the President's behalf I will present a series of American proposals looking toward a new approach to the relationship between the industrialized countries and those needing their help. We do so because we are convinced that our own economic health will be served by a world economy which is both expanding and perceived as fair. And our own security will be enhanced if we live in a world where frustration and despair give way to cooperation and a sense of our interdependence.

We enter this dialogue with confidence and good will. Our technological innovation, the productivity of our farms and industries, our educated and industrious people, and the blessing of our physical resources have given us the strength and responsibility for leadership.

In no area is this more striking than in the field of food. Our agricultural productivity is admired and desired all over the world. America's farmers and those who process and sell our food can be proud of their contribution to American strength in what is becoming an increasingly important dimension of our foreign policy and world leadership. America has generously provided food aid to scores of foreign nations. But the gap between consumption and production is growing constantly. While we are prepared to continue food aid this cannot provide a long-term answer to feeding the world's hungry. Therefore, a World Food

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Conference was convened in Rome last November at United States initiative. Acting on many American proposals, the Conference organized a comprehensive international program to expand food production in developing countries and to channel resources—including the new wealth of the oil producers—to improving the financing, production, storage, and distribution of food.

We intend as a matter of principle to make our food policy a model for cooperative relations between producers and consumers of vital and scarce commodities and between developed and developing countries. In this way we serve our own as well as a general interest. America's farmers will benefit from a steady global demand for their product; as world production is expanded, the burden of shortages and higher prices will be lifted from our consumers; our political relations with scores of developing nations will be enhanced; and conditions of order worldwide will be improved.

## The American Responsibility

Thirty years ago the United States was the world's only great power. Since then our allies and our adversaries have naturally grown in strength, recovering from the devastation of World War II. The cold war world of two rigid blocs now belongs to history: the Communist world is fragmented; our allies and friends and the new nations have asserted their own identities. The diversity even among the developing countries—among producers and consumers of vital materials such as oil—is increasingly apparent. We live in a world of some 150 independent nations, a world of diffused power, subject to the domination of no nation.

Such a world is an exciting challenge for America. For it is the kind of environment most consistent with *our* values. It is not we who have to fear from the relaxation of tensions or the spread of initiative and opportunity. We can only benefit from diversity, change, economic competition, the free flow of ideas, and the sharing of responsibilities. We have the capacity to shape from this complexity a new pattern of order and new hope for human progress.

But what this nation can do in the world depends upon how we conduct ourselves at home. For our national strength in every respect rests on our unity as a people. There is a fundamental difference between the requirements of foreign policy and of domestic policy. In our own society, only

some issues are matters of governmental concern; we can address these issues selectively, accommodate the different groups concerned, and legislate a solution that hopefully disposes of the problem.

Foreign policy, on the other hand, is the sum total of our nation's action abroad. Our involvement with the world outside is continual. Our action cannot be fragmented into a series of individual compromises except at grave risk. Every decision sets in motion a sequence of events and is, in turn, perceived by other nations as symbolic of our intentions and capabilities. Though we are a system of separated powers in Washington, to the world we are *one* government and *one* nation.

Our democratic system—and the broad participation of all of our people and private and public institutions—presents a constant challenge to fashion unity out of diversity. We have done so in moments of crisis in the past; we must do so today in a moment of historic opportunity.

And here the recent controversies between the two branches of our government give cause for serious concern. The Administration is held responsible for virtually every difficulty around the world—whether or not they resulted from its policies—and then is hamstrung in its capacity to act flexibly and purposefully.

* In energy, the lack of determined action on conservation and alternative sources seriously jeopardizes our efforts with other oil-consuming nations to reduce our vulnerability and to improve our bargaining position towards the producers.

* In Latin America, attempts to give impetus to a new dialogue are impaired by trade restrictions and automatic legislative sanctions that reduce our negotiating flexibility.

* In East-West relations, the leverage required to protect our national interest has been reduced by blanket legislative restrictions which have failed as well to achieve the humanitarian objectives they were meant to serve.

* In the the Eastern Mediterranean, the stalemate over our military relations with Turkey threatens to unhinge the Eastern flank of NATO. The President has proposed a compromise to break this Congressional deadlock; the Senate, nearly half the House, and the leaders of both parties in both Houses have supported it. When the Congress reconvenes in September we hope for a rapid,

7

cooperative solution before irreparable damage is
done to our national security.

The country cannot afford the dominance of *either* branch over the other. This is not a constitutional or legal dispute. The issue is how to conduct a single, purposeful foreign policy in our democratic system. Our Constitution gives the Congress wide authority in key areas of our foreign and defense policy. But the President represents the nation abroad; he must have the possibility of shaping and carrying out a coherent policy. Accommodating special or parochial interests through a series of compromises does not necessarily produce coherence; contention between the Executive and Congress risks falling between two stools on too many grave issues.

The two branches of our Government have shown their ability in recent years to work cooperatively. On many issues honest differences of opinion were reconciled and a common position achieved: the Romanian trade agreement; the basic direction of our Middle East policy; the preparation for the Special Session of the General Assembly; and many issues in arms control and policy.

Let us build on this. The President is a man of Congress; he regards its members as his colleagues, and he has pledged to cooperate with them. The Administration will make every effort to consult, inform, and work with the Congress in the making of foreign policy. And let me say that the close cooperation between the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee and the Administration has given strength and impetus to our foreign policy. When we are divided, when partisanship produces

bitter debates, we can do damage that outlasts our present emotions; we harm not only the country's fortunes today but the hopes of future generations. But when we are united together there is no force stronger than the power of free men acting in unity.

## Conclusion

Ladies and gentlemen, our nation has gone through a searing decade. Assassination, war, and internal turmoil have all left their mark upon us. We began the 1960's secure in our belief in the goodness of our purpose, confident of our power to shape our future, and proud of our youthful vitality. Yet 15 years later, tested by extraordinary events, many came to believe that we were powerless to affect the world and that our boldness had given way to the weariness and timidity of old age.

Already we can begin to see that the pessimists, as so often, spoke too soon. Despite a constitutional crisis unmatched since the 1860's, our Government remains strong and our freedoms stand undiminished. People the world over have been reminded by our adversity that their only real hope for a better life lies in America's continued commitment to a free and peaceful world. The Administration has responded by making clear that we will not retreat from our obligations abroad, and that we will not be shaken by divided purpose at home.

Once again, a troubled world needs a strong and confident America. It offers us no simple choices but rather what Americans have always welcomed: A challenge to our courage, an opportunity to fresh accomplishment, a summons to greatness.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 15, 1975

No. 411-B

QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD
FOLLOWING ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SOUTHERN COMMODITY PRODUCERS CONFERENCE
JEFFERSON COUNTY CIVIC CENTER THEATRE
BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

AUGUST 14, 1975

**Chairman Hayes:** The Honorable Secretary of State, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, I know I speak in this particular instance for every person within the sound of my voice that we appreciate your presence. But more than that, we appreciate the forceful, effective, and dynamic way in which you set forth a plan for us to continue to search for peace in this troubled world. We give you our sincerest thanks for your appearing on our behalf. (Applause.)

Now Dr. Kissinger being a wise man, I do not questions his decisions,
but he has invited a question and answer session, which I think perhaps
should be limited to fifteen minutes.

The first question: Are unions going to dictate foreign policy regarding loading and shipping of grain to Russia and other countries? (Applause)

Secretary Kissinger: This is my first experience in having a question applauded. (Laughter.)

The Administration has favored the sale of grain to the Soviet Union and to other countries. As I pointed out, we consider our agricultural productivity one of our most important national assets, including the field of foreign policy.

We regret attempts that may be made by individual groups to influence the over-all policy by such measures. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Labor and other senior officials are now talking to the unions concerned, and we are trying to meet those concerns that reflect their working conditions, freight rates or similar matters. We hope that we can work out a cooperative solution very rapidly, because we think it is very important. (Applause.)

Chairman Hayes: Do you have comments on the reports
coming out of Washington that Israel and Egypt are close to signing a
peace agreement?

For further information contact:

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PR# 411-B

**Secretary Kissinger:** What is being discussed between Israel and Egypt at this moment is not a final peace agreement, but an interim step which, however, if it is achieved, would mark considerable progress on the road to peace, perhaps the biggest single one that has yet been taken.

The two parties are at this moment still in the process of negotiation, and there are still important issues that still remain to be resolved. However, progress has been made in recent weeks. The two sides, with American mediation, are negotiating with each other in good faith and seriously; and we are hopeful that further progress can be made.

We should know within the next couple of weeks whether these hopes will be realized, but certainly over recent weeks progress has been made. (Applause.)

**Chairman Hayes:** Perhaps this would be the appropriate place for the next question. You, Dr. Kissinger, have been quoted in the press recently as saying that we have a commitment to Israel -- and continuing as an incomplete quotation, "...but this is not to be construed as a status quo." Would you comment on this?

**Secretary Kissinger:** The United States has no legal, formal commitment to Israel in the sense of an agreement ratified by the Congress. On the other hand, we have a close historical relationship, and successive Administrations since the creation of the State of Israel -- of both of our major political parties -- have affirmed that the survival and security of Israel represent a major American concern.

At the same time, we believe that progress towards peace in the Middle East is essential. We have supported an evolution in the relations between the Arab states and Israel, by which they would negotiate a peace settlement, and in which in return for the relinquishing by Israel of Arab territories, the Arab countries would make commitments towards peace. (Applause.)

The United States has been the only country that has been able to move this negotiating process forward, and we remain committed to moving the process forward. Our basic commitment in the Middle East, therefore, is both to the survival and security of Israel but also to the achievement of a permanent peace. (Applause.)

**Chairman Hayes:** The next question refers to your previous remarks, presumably about Portugal. The question is: Do you have any firm evidence that the Soviet Union is aiding the Communist Party's efforts to subvert the revolution in Portugal for its own purposes?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Undoubtedly there exists a school of thought right now in Washington that I have already said too much about Portugal. (Laughter.)

But there is some evidence along the lines that the question suggests. But above all, the purpose of my remarks is to make clear the fundamental American attitude towards any future action that might be contemplated.

We have to remember that events in Portugal have their own dynamics that rest on Portuguese conditions. We also have to remember that the influence of the Western democracies in the country furthest from the Soviet borders in Western Europe depends as much on the determination of

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PR# 411-B

the Western countries as it may on the influence of the Soviet Union.
(Applause.)

**Chairman Hayes:** Dr. Kissinger, you have been quoted as saying that we are living in a new world and in a new era, and facing a new world and facing a new era. Would you like to expand on those comments?

**Secretary Kissinger:** That's another forty-five minutes. (Laughter.)
I am sure you will all be very patient.

What I meant with this remark was that in the immediate postwar period, the world was essentially divided into two big blocs: the Communist Bloc on the one side with the Soviet Union in the lead; the Western world on the other with the United States in the lead.

In the thirty years since the end of World War II, conditions have changed quite fundamentally.

Western Europe and Japan have grown in strength and self-confidence and in their ability to play a political role.

The Communist countries are characterized by the division between the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China and by other fragmented trends.

In addition, the growth of nuclear weapons has given a new significance to the nature of military power, so that where in the immediate postwar period it was possible to conduct a relatively simple foreign policy, now we live in a much more fluid world requiring much more complicated decisions, and a world in which the question of peace and war takes on added urgency.

What we have attempted to do is to create a structure in which all these divergent forces can find a place in which we can defend our values and our interests, but at the same time reduce the dangers of nuclear war.
(Applause.)

**Chairman Hayes:** We are going to have to limit it to about two more questions because of our time. This one says: Dr. Kissinger, what do you think of the world fund from which food can be purchased from any country where supply is available, instead of a world food bank?

**Secretary Kissinger:** We are not developing now a world food bank. We are in the process of developing for the special session of the General Assembly a number of proposals which include proposals in the field of food, in which our purpose is to use our productivity as a model and as a means to show how scarce resources can be used for the benefit of mankind, while at the same time giving incentives to those who produce these commodities.

We have not yet finally decided on what these proposals should be.

We have advocated in the past the development of an agreement for nationally-held grain reserves which would help our farmers during periods when there is a shortage of demand and which can be used in case there are major catastrophies in the world. We are in the process of negotiating this now.

PR #411-B

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Another purpose of this scheme would be to avoid putting ourselves in
the position of being the sole country that holds reserves, and by
establishing requirements for other countries holding reserves, to
create a constant market for our agricultural products. (Applause.)

**Chairman Hayes:** We are approaching our deadline. This is the last question. The question is: The present Administration has promoted the philosophy of full agricultural production and the free market system. Do you think the Government has a fair policy when it arbitrarily restricts the exporting of farm commodities?

**Secretary Kissinger:** I sometimes have the impression that the audience likes the questions better than the answers. (Laughter.)

We are committed to full agricultural production and the free market
system, and we are not conscious that we have arbitrarily restricted
the exporting of farm commodities.

In the present situation it is clear that the United States is the only
country that has the reserves that other
countries must purchase. Therefore, we are trying to bring about in
as orderly a manner as possible, the disposal of these reserves --
precisely to avoid the pressures against the free market system that
will inevitably develop if there are precipitous actions.

All the decisions that are being taken now are within the frame-
work of the free market system, and they are designed to vindicate
towards the farmers our request to them for full production, and
therefore, our obligation to help them move that production. (Applause.)

**Chairman Hayes:** Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. I will not attempt again to express our appreciation; but I want this audience to stand and give Dr. Kissinger your expression of appreciation, if you will.

(Applause.)

**Chairman Hayes:** Be seated, ladies and gentlemen.

That ends our formal program and television coverage, I presume. So, I am in a somewhat more relaxed mood at this particular time and have a few personal remarks that I want to make and a small gift or a token -- perhaps more of an expression -- of some thoughts that are in my mind, and are obviously in the minds of the people in this state and in the Southland.

Dr. Kissinger, for thousands of years on Mount Sinai and in North Alabama
(laughter and applause), on Montsana Mountain overlooking the valley
where I was born and where I was raised and where we farmed, there
grows a species of the acacia tree, and it is rarely found anywhere else
in all the world. In the Bible it is called "shittim wood." God
bestowed a special honor and privilege upon shittim wood. He commanded
that the Tabernacle be built of shittim wood; he decreed that the Ark
of the Covenant should be built of shittim wood; and he ordained that
only shittim wood would be acceptable as an offering.

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PR#411-B

Dr. Kissinger, in your years of service to your mankind -- particularly in these most productive later years, in service to your mankind -- as you go throughout the world seeking to modulate these problems and to bring about peace among fellow men, it seems somehow significant and reasonable that we should have a common way of expressing our appreciation to you for this. And so this little gift today is that expression from the people of Alabama for our common ties to God and to peace.

I have here in my hand a symbol, a gavel, made from shittim wood. We ask you, as you continue your efforts towards peace among mankind and as you preside over important meetings, to use this gavel, remembering that it is an expression originating from the Holy Bible in the 25th Chapter of Exodus, where God has made this an acceptable offering, and in the hopes that it will help in some small way to bring about an early peace throughout the entire world.

So we proudly present this gift to you as a small token and rememberance of this very fine occasion.

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Hayes, ladies and gentlemen, I would like to express my appreciation for these very warm and, to me, very moving words. It means a great deal to me to have the opportunity to visit other parts of the country than the Capital -- which is often so consumed in its day-to-day problems -- because it reminds me that the spirit of America is what makes possible the role our government is playing towards bringing peace in the Middle East and our efforts to promote peace throughout the world. It is the idealism and the confidence of people such as yourselves that make it possible and worthwhile. I want to say that it is an honor to serve you. Thank you.

(Applause.)

**********