CHAPTER V

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

I. What Kind of Atlantic Partnership?

The fundamental solution to allied disunity must come from the political
field. Coordination of strategy cannot be effective without coordination of
policy. On too many issues where the vital interests of allies were at stake--
from Suez to the Congo, from Southeast Asia to negotiating tactics over Berlin--
the policies of the major allies have been unilateral or divergent. Unless
this condition is remedied, efforts to integrate military forces will only
emphasize the underlying problem of how to reconcile unity with respect for di-
versity, how to combine community with the need for flexibility.

Two solutions are usually given to these problems: (a) For the
immediate future an improvement in the process of consultation can ease strains
and revitalize the Alliance. (b) Ultimately a united Europe with federal in-
stitutions will make possible a true partnership among equals.

a. The Problem of Consultation

The inherently difficult problem of coalition diplomacy is magnified

V - 2

under present conditions by three factors:

(1) The firm commitment of the two superpowers to the existing balance provides allies with increasing scope for purely national actions.

(2) The internal workings of modern government are so complex that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterwards in international forums. The United States tendency to confine consultation to elaborating its own blueprints reflects less a quest for hegemony--as our European critics occasionally assert--than a desire to avoid complicating still further its own increasingly complex decision-making process.

(3) As governments have found in their domestic experience, access to the same technical data does not guarantee unanimity. In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, and with widely varying histories, differences are almost inevitable. And they are likely to be made all the more intractable by a technology of unprecedented destructiveness and novelty.

[Y]

V - 3

The American experience causes our policy-makers to be reluctant to admit that there may be objective obstacles to the process of consultation.

United States society, with its large area of consensus, encourages the belief that all problems are soluble through goodwill and a willingness to compromise.

A rationalistic streak produces a conviction that there are single, universally valid answers to most problems and that by getting the interested parties around a table, a consensus will emerge through the process of consultation.

Attitudes as these have their counterpart in Europe, particularly among those countries used to the leadership of a strong ally and content to confine their role to advice regarding the technical attainment of clear-cut goals.

They are especially common among individuals connected with the various European communities and commissions. Charged with the performance of tasks which are largely technical or the goals of which are very clear, they tend to believe that an intangible "community spirit" acts as the catalyst of agreement. This new, somewhat bureaucratized version of Rousseau's general will represents an attempt to conduct foreign policy by analogy to the domestic policy of stable societies.

V - 4

However, when coalition diplomacy deals with political instead of
economic issues, it grows more complicated. Nations are interchangeable
units only to economists or to island powers. In any concrete situation, dif-
ferences in history, geography and domestic structure become relevant. Then
the analogy of coalition diplomacy to domestic policy breaks down.

In stable societies, domestic decisions tend to be accepted because
there is a consensus on legitimacy. Those who are overruled consider maintenance
of domestic order more important than any particular grievance; if that condition
is not fulfilled, violence erupts and domestic policy acquires some of the
characteristics and sanctions of foreign policy--in extreme cases it leads to
civil war. In stable societies those who are overruled retain the hope of winning
another round later or of influencing the implementation of the decision.
In democracies, there is always the possibility of changing the government.

In a coalition of sovereign states, these safety valves do not exist.
Legitimacy resides in the individual governments. Decisions require their con-
sent--this is the essence of sovereignty. Even when they agree to be bound by
majority vote--a rare occurrence in coalitions and not the case with NATO--

V - 5

their sovereignty implies the right to renounce the treaty. In short, those who
dissent and are prepared to insist on their sovereignty cannot be bound inde-
finitely. Beyond a certain point the cohesiveness of an Alliance can be increased
only by a sharing of sovereignty and not by more intensive consultation among
sovereign units.

If fundamental differences occur among sovereign states which remain
allied, frustration is the inevitable consequence. Then partners are torn be-
tween the need to maintain an appearance of unity and the attempt to vindicate
their views. The difficulty of differing openly has the result that alliances
tend to regulate their internal affairs by means of a series of critical
confrontations.

The need to maintain an appearance of unity has at least three consequences: (1) It puts a limit on the pressure that can be applied to a recalibrant ally. (b) Since agreement depends on the act of a sovereign government, its allies are tempted to mobilize domestic pressures on it, thus multiplying resentments. (c) It distorts the nature of the dialogue. Misgivings are sometimes subordinated to a facade of amity. Simultaneously--and somewhat contradictorily--a premium is placed on intransigence. Ruthless allies can use

their partners' desire for harmony to impose a given course. But if this
happens too frequently, the result is that a dangerous build-up of frustration
occurs side by side with declarations of friendship. This has been happening in
the Atlantic Alliance.

Consultation, therefore, is far from a panacea. It is least effective
when it is most needed: when there exist basic differences of conception or of
assessment. It works best in *implementing* a consensus rather than in *creating* it.
Nevertheless, an improvement in the consultative process should be one of the
primary objectives of the Alliance.

In assessing the prospects, it is important to distinguish two types of
consultation: (a) functional consultation which concerns the implementation
of an agreed objective and (b) political consultation which concerns the defini-
tion of the objective or the reconciliation of conflicting interests.

The rationalistic bent of American policy-making and the dominant position
we have enjoyed in the Alliance cause many of our proposals for strengthening NATO
to amount to a form of functional consultation. The thrust of these proposals
is to create a structure which makes it physically impossible for any ally (except

V - 7

the United States) to act autonomously. The MLF is an example. Since its weapons
are American and since it can perform its mission only if used in conjunction with
American forces, consultation with respect to it must take place within the frame-
work of American strategic doctrine. Similar suggestions have been made in
Europe where it has been argued that some of our allies might give up some of
their national aspirations in return for a greater voice in Washington. For ex-
ample, some British Labor leaders have urged that Britain give up its independent
deterrent in return for more influence on American decisions.¹

In assessing these proposals, it is important to distinguish between the
situation of a political community involving an effective sharing of sovereignty
and consultation under conditions where each of the allies remains fully sovereign
but becomes an adviser to the dominant partner. If there is an effective sharing
of sovereignty, to include political as well as military decisions, a unitary
system of decision-making is inevitable and desirable. If the allies--and par-
ticularly the United States--insist on their sovereignty, however, it becomes
relevant to inquire whether a system of functional consultation is as useful for

¹ See Patrick Gordon Walker, "The Labor Party and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, pp. 391-8.

V - 8

the long-term political vitality of the Alliance as it is for the conduct of
general war.

Any process of consultation must be responsive to the following questions:

Who has a right to be consulted? Whose voice carries weight? Who has enough competence?

These three levels are not necessarily identical. Many agencies in our
own government have a right to express their views, but not all carry the same
weight. When some of Britain's Labour leaders suggest that they want a greater
voice in our decisions in return for giving up British nuclear weapons, the answer
has to be: Like whose voice? Like that of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency? Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or the State Department? Or the Commerce
Department? In our interdepartmental disputes, clearly, the outcome often depends
on the constituency which the agency or department represents. The weight given
to advice is inevitably related to the competence that it reflects.

If the United States retains indefinitely an effective monopoly of nuclear
power, and freedom of decisions with respect to it, we would probably find in time
that Europe simply does not have sufficient technical competence for its views

V - 9

to carry weight. None of our allies would have an incentive to conduct the
studies required for effective consultation. This in turn is likely to breed
irresponsibility on both sides of the Atlantic. A right of consultation without
the ability to make a serious judgment may be the worst possible system. Over
a period of time it is bound to reduce Europe's voice in Washington; while within
Europe it must produce a sense of impotence or extreme nationalism.

In short, when the conceptions of national interest do not conflict or
when allies are prepared to accept a secondary role, functional consultation can
be useful. But in an Alliance in which each member--and especially the senior
member--jealously guards its sovereignty the crucial problem is to provide not
only a forum for the expression of a point of view, but also a focus for decision.
If that issue is evaded, coalition policy is reduced to the lowest common denom-
inator. Or else a vicious circle is set up with a sense of impotence on one side
and a "father-knows-best" attitude on the other. In such structures, difficult
decisions can be avoided or blamed on the short-sightedness, weakness or belli-
cosity of other allies. Tutelage, in other words, cannot be made a healthy rela-
tionship in the long run.

V - 10

American policy has been characterized by a profound ambivalence with
respect to this problem. In the field of strategy we have insisted on a unitary
system of command and control. With respect to East-West relations, the pre-
dominant tendency has been to deal bilaterally with the Soviet Union. For
example, American disarmament schemes have typically been discussed with our NATO
allies only when they were on the verge of being formally submitted. Finally,
the United States has enunciated a "grand design" of Atlantic partnership in
which the United States and Europe are to share equally in the burdens of world
responsibility.

This mixture of approaches is self-defeating. The emphasis placed on a
unitary strategic system for the Alliance has reversed the proper priorities. The
real challenge to the consultative process is less in the field of strategy than
in diplomacy. The ability to fight a centrally controlled general war is useful;
but the ability to devise common policies in the face of a whole spectrum of
eventualities is much more important. Most of our allies are less concerned
with nuclear operations than with their influence on diplomacy in peace time or
during periods of crisis. They consider joint planning the conduct of day-to-day

V - 11

diplomacy important because major changes can occur through an accumulation of
seeming nuances. They are concerned with the development of diplomacy and crisis
management. They are interested in an agreed definition of what issues are to
be considered a _casus belli_. And they seek an opportunity to participate in
political control over any war which might break out.

Bilateral East-West diplomacy is inconsistent with the insistence on uni-
cary strategic control. Over a period of time such diplomacy will enable the
Soviets to appeal to each ally on the basis of the unreliability of the other.
Sooner or later our allies will protect themselves by initiating direct negotia-
tions of their own. When NATO has proved unable to develop even a common trade
policy toward the Communist world, it is not surprising that countries are reluc-
tant to entrust their survival to a NATO ally, however close. Policies on a
whole range of issues such as Suez, the Congo, negotiating tactics over Berlin
or the defense of Southeast Asia have been unilateral or divergent. The United
States is now in the curious situation of staking a great deal of its prestige
on establishing the NATO Multilateral Force and a system of unitary strategic

V - 12

control while East-West negotiations for arms control are dealt with more or less unilaterally.

These inconsistencies are all the more disruptive because the United States finds its concept of consultation challenged within the Alliance for the first time. According to the American concept, influence in the Alliance is apportioned as in a stock company with the partner holding the largest number of shares having the greatest influence. Influence is an intangible quality, of course. However, to measure it entirely in terms of contribution to a common effort is much too mechanical. President de Gaulle with his disconcerting habit of cutting through slogans to the underlying reality has put his finger on the fact that among sovereign states influence is related importantly to the availability of options. To the degree that a country is known to be committed, other nations have a reduced incentive to pay a price for its cooperation. American influence within NATO decreased in part because our allies are convinced that they do not hazard our support to the defense of Europe if they disagree with our policy. And the influence of many new nations--weak, disorganized and confused as they are--depends almost entirely on the belief that they are still free to choose their side.

In short, a contribution, no matter how large, that is known to reflect
no significant range of options may not increase the influence of the contributor
significantly. A country can gain a major voice in an alliance of sovereign
states only if its effort is considered essential and if its partners do not take
it for granted--in other words, if the partners believe that there exists a
possibility that the contribution could be withdrawn. In determining an ally's
real--as opposed to its formal--role, one can do worse than inquire what its
choices are in case of disagreement.

Thus one of the points at issue between the United States and President
de Gaulle concerns conflicting conceptions of what constitutes influence. The
United States takes the view that since the interests of the Alliance are indi-
visible, each ally should play his role on the basis of a division of labor
within a plan developed by the United States. De Gaulle tries to demonstrate
that alternatives to United States leadership are possible because he considers
that this will enhance the bargaining position of France and of Europe. He relies
not on a legal right of being consulted, which in his view may not be honored in
a crisis, but on bringing about a situation where he must be consulted because
no settlement is possible without him.

Thus rather than discuss the mechanics of consultation, the United
States will have to address itself to the kind of future it envisages for the
Atlantic area. It will prove impossible in the long run to combine our pre-
ferred strategic doctrine with an unimpaired insistence on our sovereignty. If
we insist on our freedom of action while depriving our allies of theirs, either
NATO will fall apart or we will break the political will of our allies.

If it is impossible to envisage a true political community of the nations
bordering the North Atlantic, it becomes important to ask how unitary a system
of control for strategy and diplomacy is desirable. What kind of structure is
more vital in the long run: An Atlantic system that automatically involves all
its sovereign partners in every crisis around the world? Or one that permits some
autonomy? On many issues--particularly East-West relations--united action is
essential. With respect to others, some degree of flexibility may be useful.

Over the next decades the United States is likely to find itself increasingly en-
gaged in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Our European allies
will probably not consider their vital interests at stake in these areas.

President de Gaulle's views on this subject are far from unique in Europe, even
if his methods are.

If the Atlantic system is absolutely centralized, policy may be reduced to the lowest common denominator. The Soviets may use our involvements elsewhere to blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alliance beyond the breaking point. On the other hand, if Europe is accorded some capacity for autonomous action--military and political--its concern would be no greater, but the temptation for Soviet advances might be reduced. Put positively, a structure which permits a variety of coordinated approaches towards the new nations could enhance the vigor of our policies, the self-confidence of our allies and the long-term vitality of the Alliance. Paradoxically, the unity of the Atlantic area may well be furthered by a structure which grants the possibility of autonomous action while reducing the desire for it.

V - b - 1

B. <u>The Grand Design and European Integration.</u>

Since the war and with increasing emphasis since 1961, the United States
had argued that the most effective structure for Atlantic cooperation is a
partnership between the United States and a united Europe. Heretofore, coopera-
tion has been inhibited by the weakness and division of Europe. "When one
partner possesses over fifty percent of the resources of an enterprise and the
balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others, the relationship is unlikely to
work very well." Real partnership was possible only among equals.

As a result, American policy has often equated the building of an Atlantic
Community with the progress of European integration. This concept of Atlantic
partnership, strongly urged also by such wise Europeans as Jean Monnet, has
been described by the image of "twin pillars" or "dumbbell." Former Secretary
of State Herter wrote:

I believe the present Administration holds the view which
has come to be termed the dumbbell concept--meaning that an
economic and political alliance is stronger if it has been
agreed to by partners of equal weight on both sides.²

Christian Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2, January 1963, p. 301.

George W. Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia on February 6, 1962, DOSB, XLVI, March 5, 1962, pp. 366-67.

[Y]

V - b - 2

The European side of this partnership is to be a United States of Europe organized on federal lines with supra-national institutions.

There is no doubt that the dumbbell concept represents one form of Atlantic partnership. The drawback of an excessive, almost doctrinaire commitment to it is that we run the risk of accepting the symbol as a reality. This may cause us to beg the key questions by the very terms in which we state them.

The single-mindedness with which the dumbbell concept is pursued obscures four fundamental questions which the United States must answer for itself if it is to make progress towards building an Atlantic Community: Is it true that partnership is possible only among equals? If it is true, what has been the real progress towards European political integration? To what extent is it in the American interest to promote one form of European unity to the exclusion of other possible plans? Will a Europe unified along federal lines inevitably see its world responsibilities in the same light as we?

Given the nature of America's relations with the rest of the world, it seems strange that partnership is possible only among equals. In the Western

V - b - 3

Hemisphere alone, we are trying to construct a viable system composed of nearly
a score of countries very unequal in size and strength. And in every other part
of the globe the precept that we can deal effectively only with countries of
equal power is unlikely to inspire confidence in the prospect of cooperation
with the United States.

Aside from its psychological impact, the proposition is open to substantive
doubt. History would seem to indicate that the most difficult partnerships
are those among equals. The advantage of shared burdens must be weighed against
possible disadvantages created by the improved bargaining position of the equal
partner. The increased difficulty of negotiating with a strong partner may well
be a price worth paying; but we should recognize that it is a price we would have
to pay.

But granting that a strong Europe is on balance in our best interest,
it becomes important to inquire whether it is wise--both from the point of view
of Europe and even more from that of the United States--to insist that there is
only one reliable method of bringing about unity: that of federal, supra-national
institutions. In the aftermath of de Gaulle's abrupt rejection of Britain's
membership in the Common Market, a myth has grown up to the effect that the willful

V - b - 4

act of a single individual interrupted what would have been a uninterrupted
advance towards political integration. Britain would have entered the Common
Market, an "outward looking" Europe would have been constructed and progress
towards European supra-national institutions would have been constant.

However, no man could have single-handedly brought about the consequences
ascribed to de Gaulle. For de Gaulle's policy to prove so disruptive, signifi-
cant underlying factors must have been operating.

It was always somewhat unrealistic to imagine that the methods by which
economic integration had been achieved could be transferred automatically to
the political area. To question the automaticity of the development Jean Monnet
and his disciples have envisaged is not to deny their great contribution to
European unity and to the concept of Atlantic partnership. The fact remains that
their exaltation of what they call "community spirit" may have been excessively
mechanical. In their view, European integration will grow out of a "community
spirit" which in turn is being fostered by joint efforts. Expert judgment
undiluted by the blinders of national interest will move European political
integration forward, step-by-step, towards a final culmination where the
supra-national authorities are dominant.

V - b - 5

But this "community" approach--which equates method and purpose--works best when the objective is clear. It answers the question of how a common objective can be realized. It is much less useful in defining this common objective.

Immediately after the war, this problem was not apparent. Europe had been so shattered by the war that its immediate necessities seemed to exhaust the range of options open to it. Most countries on the continent had governments so weak or a past they were so eager to overcome--or both--that an abdication of some of their sovereignty came as a respite from uncertainties and insecurities. For many in Europe, an absorption in economic activity was a device to avoid facing seemingly insoluble moral or political issues. And the economic imperatives were so urgent that it seemed sensible to turn them over to supra-national experts.

As Europe recovered economically, political confidence returned as well. Inevitably this strengthened the traditional repository of European loyalties: the national state. This process took place with varying intensity in different countries. Germany and Italy, partly to escape the temptations of their past, were more ready to submerge themselves in a united Europe than

[Y]

V - b - 6

Britain and France. Smaller countries, accustomed to being within the orbit of some major power, had less difficulty with a federal concept than those states which had been major powers themselves. France and Great Britain--whose sense of national identity was least damaged by the war--have consistently opted for a confederal, rather than a federal, solution. Four years before de Gaulle came into power, the abortive European Defense Community demonstrated that political integration was much more difficult to achieve than economic integration and was unlikely to be reached by the same methods.

Ironically, the success of the Monnet method in the economic field has complicated its applicability in the political realm.

Moreover, the European integrationists have advocated incompatible goals. They passionately wanted Britain in the Common Market; they were equally passionate in their advocacy of federal institutions. They have never explained how they propose to reconcile these two objectives.

But if de Gaulle cannot fairly be charged with being the sole obstacle to European integration on the federal model, he is responsible for completely confusing the debate within Europe in at least three ways: a) The debate between

[Y]

V - b - 7

the federalists and the confederalists has become a test of attitudes
towards de Gaulle, and the line-up is not a reliable guide to the state
of mind of Europe. b) Many who strongly oppose de Gaulle's style and domestic
policy are in agreement with him about the shape of Europe and, indeed, about
the tactics to pursue towards the United States. c) Many of the most ardent
advocates of Britain's entry into the Common Market are also dedicated proponents
of a federal Europe. Thus, opponents of European integration can combine with
dedicated advocates to advance sweeping schemes certain to be vetoed by the
French President. The result is to stifle the attainable in visions of the
desirable.

This confusion is compounded by the role of the United States. Though
American policy has ardently supported a federal Europe, its impact has often
been the contrary of what was intended. While affirming the need for European
unity, we have unintentionally tended to undermine a European sense of identity.

This is partly due to the fact that to some Europeans an Atlantic com-
munity based on the existing NATO states seems preferable to the dumbbell
concept. The smaller countries in particular see in European integration the
threat of the hegemony of powerful neighbors, If they have to choose between

V - b - 8

hegemonies, they prefer the leadership of a country three thousand miles away
and with a tradition of using its power with restraint.

Moreover, during the long period of American predominance, there has
come into being on both sides of the Atlantic a group of experts comfortable
with the existing relationship. Having worked well together for many years
they tend to see problems from the same perspective. Committed to the notion
that all problems are soluble through pragmatic, cooperative analysis, they
resist the implication that the capacity for pressure may be inseparable from
the political process. Thus, both in Europe and the United States many who
urge European integration balk at the prospect of an autonomous European policy
--which in turn is one of the likely consequences of European integration.

On both sides of the Atlantic many consider the quest for European autonomy
inherently divisive. They tend to put the issue in terms of trust of the United
States. They argue that they have more confidence in the United States than
in any of their neighbors. If United States policy is wise, European unity
will be unnecessary. If it is mistaken, an autonomous European policy would
only magnify the disaster.

V - b - 9

This attitude in particularly noticeable in the field of defense.

Were Europe thrown on itself, it would undoubtedly unite sufficiently to assure its security. It clearly has the potential to do so. But, having been sheltered for nearly two decades by American power, many Europeans are concerned lest the emergence of a European identity in the area of defense undermine the American guarantee. In times of crisis, Europeans are conscious, above all, of the need of American protection; in periods of calm, they have no incentive to undertake a joint European enterprise.

American pronouncements sometimes encourage these tendencies. The threat of the withdrawal of American forces has been used to obtain European support for American strategic views and even to sway our allies on essentially economic issues such as tariffs against American poultry. These threats have, on the one hand, inhibited a European quest for autonomy; on the other hand, they have encouraged some advocates of European unity to give their case an anti-American cast.

In short, there have been many reasons--besides the arbitrary decision of an individual--which have contributed to the slow progress towards European

V - b - 10

political unity, and it is a reckless policy which overlooks them. When Europe
was economically shattered and in fear of Soviet invasion, it was united by
common necessities and perils. But economic recovery has removed some
imperatives and the periods of detente have diminished the fear of foreign
dangers. Finally, American policy has been extremely ambivalent: it has urged
European unity while recoiling before its probable consequences. We have
sought to combine a politically integrated Europe with a closely integrated
Atlantic Community under American leadership. It is unlikely that these objec-
tives can be reconciled.

Official American doctrine assumes that the only reason Europe has not
accepted a greater share of world responsibility is that the scale of the nation-
state is inadequate for the requirements of the modern age. Once Europe is
politically integrated and commands adequate resources for a global role, it
will, so the argument goes, be prepared to assume world-wide responsibilities.
Indeed, one of the motives for European integration is often said to be the pos-
sibility it provides for assuming world responsibilities. Under Secretary of
State Ball has expressed the American view as follows:

V - b - 11

The problem will never be fully solved until Europe gets on further with the achievement of its own unity--until it organizes itself on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the age.

There are quite obvious reasons for this. The undertaking of world responsibility requires a world view. The discharge of such responsibility under post-colonial conditions must be based on the command of vast resources for defense and foreign aid--and on the will to use them. Western Europe collectively has more than enough resources, but a fragmented Europe cannot efficiently mobilize them in support of a common effort and a common view.¹

The implication is sometimes strong that the nature of world responsibility is self-evident. Thus, United States Ambassador to Germany, George McGhee spoke on July 16, 1964 as follows:

> This Atlantic Partnership entails increasing contributions in formerly remote areas like Vietnam and Central Africa from countries which, like Germany, have only recently acquired the ability to contribute.²

American policy clearly considers that its goals in these areas are in the common interest and, therefore, beyond challenge; what it desired was a sharing of the cost.

1. George W. Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1964), p. 216.

2. George C. McGhee, "Some American Thoughts on Current Issues," speech on July 16, 1964 to DOSB, LI, 1310, August 3, 1964, p. 138.

V - b - 12

But is it really true that adequate resources always produce
a willingness to assume global responsibilities? The American national
experience would seem to contradict it. Through the greatest part of
its history, the United States possessed the resources but not the
inclination to play a global role. Conversely, many European states
maintained overseas interests when their resources were much smaller
than they are today.

For many European countries the process of decolonization following
two World Wars has been traumatic. These countries have been transformed
from world powers into purely European states. Having shed their
overseas interests, they no longer consider that their security is
directly affected by what happens in, for example, Southeast Asia. Rather
than run the risk of nuclear destruction for a conjectural danger, they
prefer to wait until the actual danger materializes. In other words, they
treat America's extra-European concerns in much the same way that the United
States treated Europe's quarrels until 1941. Not so committed to the notion
of ideological conflict as the United States, they are more likely to seek
a measure of protection in equilibrium. To many of them, Communist China

V - b - 13

is not a threat; it may even be seen as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

This problem is not eliminated by drawing distinctions--often moralistic in tone--between "responsibility" and "interest." Under Secretary Ball echoing many similar statements by others, including Secretary Rusk, has argued that:

> ...we Americans have few national interests--in the narrow sense--outside our own territory but we have assumed vast world responsibility...The willingness to accept world responsibility--as distinct from the preservation of national interests--is, in our observation and experience not universal among the NATO membership.¹

This distinction says a great deal about the American conception of foreign policy. By disavowing interest, our policy-makers try to demonstrate the moral foundation of our actions and indicate a commitment deeper than "mere" interest. For other nations, such assertions may cause uneasiness. A responsibility not butressed by interest may appear to them as subject to revision. It is conceivable to grow tired of a responsibility but an interest cannot be shed. To our allies, a "disinterested" foreign policy is an unreliable foreign policy; nothing in their tradition leads them to think in such categories.

Above all, the distinction misses the central point. The chief

1 George W. Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

V - b - 14

reason for the reluctance of most of our allies to assume world responsibility
is precisely because in the past decade they have been obliged to give up
their global interests.

In other words, it is not likely that even a united Europe would
be prepared to assume a greater share of world responsibility in the
American sense. Nor is burden sharing likely to provide an impetus to
European integration. For burden sharing to become an incentive for
integration, the Europeans would have to agree with us about what is at
issue in most areas and they would have to believe that but for their
assistance the United States would curtail its commitments. Neither
condition obtains. The very commitment of the "United States to a global
role reduces the incentive of other countries to assume its burdens, much
as the commitment of Britain and France to the European balance of power
permitted the United States in the period prior to 1941 to evade the
problems of the international equilibrium. In any event, should our
European allies wish to carry a greater part of a common load, they may feel
that they can do so within the framework of the nation-state or of a

[N]

V - b - 15

fairly loose Atlantic community.

If partnership in burden sharing does not provide the incentive
some of our policy-makers expect, there is another impetus to European
unity: that of being able to vindicate an autonomous policy in a world
where only superpowers carry weight. This was the most usual argument
advanced by the Conservatives to justify Britain's entry into the Common
Market.

The old established European states are not likely to make
the wrench of breaking with their past for the primary purpose of
acting as junior partner in assuming burdens defined elsewhere. The
stronger Europe becomes, the less content it is likely to be with so
subordinate a role. This is not to say that a united Europe will
inevitably be hostile or even competitive; it does mean that one of
the motives for European unity is to acquire an *option* for an independent
policy. And the more Europe acquires the characteristics of a unitary
state the more this will be true.

V - b - 16

History teaches that the more abrupt the transitions, the more drastic have to be the efforts to re-establish some sort of cohesion.

A Europe which grows out of the collapse of all traditional loyalties would have as its primary problem the discovery of some specific purpose for its existence. There is a grave danger that too doctrinaire an approach to European unity will produce either a collapse of political will or, more likely, a new and virulent form of nationalism, perhaps even more intense than the nationalism of *patries*. A Europe constructed largely on theoretical models might be forced into an anti-American mold because its only sense of identity is what distinguished it from America.

It is hard to understand why many European federalists believe that a European Parliament would mitigate this danger. The decline in the role of the national European parliaments has been notorious. In no European country--not even in Great Britain--does parliament exercise an effective control over the formulation or the conduct of foreign policy. The party system has become so powerful that in European parliaments the majority almost invariably ratifies the decisions of the

[Y]

V - b - 17

Cabinet. But where the party system is ineffective--either because the parties are weak or because there are too many of them--the result is paralysis of government rather than parliamentary control.

These conditions are likely to be magnified by all-European elections. The need to establish a consensus comprising Schleswig-Holstein and Sicily, Scotland and Bavaria will surely tempt demagogic appeals.

A parliament emerging from such a process of direct elections may be completely correlated to the calm deliberative body envisaged by so many European federalists.

This suggests the need to re-examine the passionate commitment of so many American policy-makers to one particular formula of European integration, that of supra-nationality. Jean Monnet's career has been a testimony to his devotion to Atlantic partnership. De Gaulle's career is filled with examples of abrupt tactics designed to exalt the status of France above all else. It would be one of history's frequent ironies if the structure for Europe proposed by Monnet would generate the greatest pressures for the kind of policy generally described as Gaullist, while

[Y]

v - b - 18

the structure advocated by de Gaulle turned out to be best suited for
flexible Atlantic arrangements. Our bent for structural remedies sometimes
blinds us to the fact that institutions produce their own momentum which
cannot necessarily be foreseen from the intentions of their founders.

While the United States should welcome any structure that
reflects the desires of Europeans, it is not easy to discover the
specifically American or Atlantic interest behind our passionate commitment
to the "twin pillar" concept of Atlantic partnership. A very schematic
and rigid conception of Atlantic partnership can easily fail to do
justice to the richness and variety of relationships possible within the
Atlantic context. Is it really possible or useful to group the countries
of Europe on all issues? Is each always inherently closer to its European
neighbor than to the United States? If we separate the question into
political, military or economic components, is the answer always uniform
and does it always point in the same direction? Would it not be wiser to
retain some flexibility? The more rigid the structure within Europe, the
more complicated will be the problem of American influence.

V - b - 19

There may be various roads to Atlantic partnership and European cooperation. The one traced by the Fouchet Plan--calling for institutionalized meetings of foreign ministers and sub-cabinet officials-- is not the least plausible, and indeed it is the one most consistent with British participation. It has the advantage that it would produce some immediate progress without foreclosing the future and thus put an end to the process of demanding the desirable in order to defeat the attainable. It would also permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than the "twin pillar" concept. A confederal Europe would enable the United States to maintain an influence at many centers of decision.

In reassessing our Atlantic policy, it seems high time that we cut through slogans to such questions as: Is it wise to insist that the only road to European unity is by institutions unacceptable to both France and Britain? Is the best way to promote Atlantic cohesion by staking our prestige on a device--the Multilateral Force--which compels us to oppose the existing nuclear programs in Europe while bringing a host of presently non-nuclear countries (among them Germany, Italy, Greece and

V - b - 20

Turkey) into the nuclear business, occasionally with only their
reluctant assent? Can it be in the interest of NATO, of the Federal
Republic or of the United States to make Germany the senior European
nuclear partner in NATO and to create an institution which can rally
all anti-U.S., anti-German and anti-nuclear sentiments against us?

Every European state was formed through some process of integration
during the past four centuries; and Germany and Italy achieved unity
less than one hundred years ago. European history suggests that there
is more than one way to achieve integration. In Italy, it came by way
of plebiscite and annexation abolishing the individual states. In Germany,
unification occurred under the aegis of one state but as the act of
sovereign governments which remained in existence after unity was
achieved. The resulting structure clearly did not lack cohesiveness.
History is rarely so linear and simple a process as some of the
enthusiasts for a particular form of European integration suggest.

European history demonstrates further that stability in Europe is
unattainable except through the cooperation of Britain, France and Germany.

[Y]

V - b - 21

Care should be taken not to resurrect old national rivalries in the name of Atlanticism. The United States should not choose a special partner among its European allies. Our attempt to woo the Federal Republic or to force our allies to choose between us and France--a tendency which, despite all disavowals, is real--must magnify the European nationalism which French policy has already done so much to foster.

Our concern thus returns to the somewhat out-of-scale figure of President de Gaulle. Irritation with de Gaulle's tactics does not change the fact that in his proposals of 1958 for a Directorate he put his finger on perhaps the key immediate problem of NATO. If the Atlantic Alliance is to retain any vitality, it requires a common foreign policy--or at least an agreed range of divergence. In its absence, the attempt to devise a common strategy is likely to prove futile. Lord Avon and Dean Acheson have come to the same conclusion. The time seems ripe to create a political body at the highest level--composed perhaps of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic and Italy--for concerting the policies of the nations bordering the North

V - b - 22

Atlantic. Such a body should discuss how to implement common Atlantic purposes and define the limits of autonomous action where interests diverge.

Such a body could give political guidance for the military arrangements described in the previous chapter. It could be charged with developing a common strategic doctrine. Within its framework, the European countries could, if they wished, form a closer association. Thus, the West European Union might well be revitalized by being given the task of working out the European contribution to joint NATO plans.

As Europe gains structure, conceivably this could end the sterile scholastic debate over the benefits of integration as against coordination. It might heal a rift which if continued is bound to hazard everything that has been painfully built up over fifteen years. Both the United States and France are able to thwart each other's purposes. Neither can create an alternative structure--France even less than we.

It has become fashionable in the West to compare its disagreements to the rifts in the Communist bloc. But this comparison does an injustice

V - b - 23

to the possibilities of the Atlantic area. In the Communist world, schisms
are inevitable and unbridgeable. Western societies have been more
fortunate. Their evolution has been richer; they have forged unity by
drawing strength from diversity. Free from the shackles of a doctrine
of historical inevitability, the nations of the West can render a great
service by demonstrating that if history has a meaning it is up to us
today to give it that meaning.