ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT - SALT

NAME: President Richard M. Nixon
OCCASION: Remarks to the 24th Session of the General Assembly of the UN
DATE: September 18, 1969

In addition to our talks on the Middle East, we hope soon to begin talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic arms. There is no more important task before us.

The date we proposed for the opening of talks has passed for lack of response. We remain ready to enter negotiations.

Since the United States first proposed strategic talks three years ago, the task of devising an effective agreement has become more difficult.

The Soviet Union has been vigorously expanding its strategic forces, weapons themselves have become more sophisticated, more destructive. But as the difficulty of the talks increases, so, too, does their importance.

Though the issues are complex, we are prepared to deal with them seriously, concretely, and purposefully -- and to make a determined effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic arms, but to reverse it.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Open At Helsinki

Following is the text of a message from President Nixon to Gerard C. Smith, Chairman of the U.S. delegation to the preliminary U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic arms limitation talks at Helsinki, which was read by Ambassador Smith at the opening session of the talks on November 17.

White House press release dated November 17

You are embarking upon one of the most momentous negotiations ever entrusted to an American delegation.¹

I do not mean to belittle the past. The Antarctic Treaty, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and most recently the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which we hope will soon enter into force, were all important steps along the road to international security. Other tasks remain on the agenda of the United Nations and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Today, however, you will begin what all of your fellow citizens in the United States and, I believe, all people throughout the world, profoundly hope will be a sustained effort not only to limit the build-up of strategic forces but to reverse it.

I do not underestimate the difficulty of your task; the nature of modern weapons makes their control an exceedingly complex endeavor. But this very fact increases the importance of your effort.

Nor do I underestimate the suspicion and distrust that must be dispelled if you are to succeed in your assignment.

I am also conscious of the historical fact that wars and crises between nations can arise not simply from the existence of arms but from

clashing interests or the ambitious pursuit of unilateral interests. That is why we seek progress toward the solution of the dangerous political issues of our day.

I am nevertheless hopeful that your negotiations with representatives from the Soviet Union will serve to increase mutual security. Such a result is possible if we approach these negotiations recognizing the legitimate security interests on each side.

I have stated that for our part we will be guided by the concept of maintaining "sufficiency" in the forces required to protect ourselves and our allies. I recognize that the leaders of the Soviet Union bear similar defense responsibilities. I believe it is possible, however, that we can carry out our respective responsibilities under a mutually acceptable limitation and eventual reduction of our strategic arsenals.

We are prepared to discuss limitations on all offensive and defensive systems, and to reach agreements in which both sides can have confidence. As I stated in my address to the United Nations,² we are prepared to deal with the issues seriously, carefully, and purposefully. We seek no unilateral advantage. Nor do we seek arrangements which could be prejudicial to the interests of third parties. We are prepared to engage in bona fide negotiations on concrete issues, avoiding polemics and extraneous matters.

No one can foresee what the outcome of your work will be. I believe your approach to these talks will demonstrate the seriousness of the United States in pursuing a path of equitable accommodation. I am convinced that the limitation of strategic arms is in the mutual interest of our country and the Soviet Union.

NAME: Richard M. Nixon, President
OCCASION: News Conference
DATE: December 8, 1969

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

Q. The United States today asked for a postponement in the SALT talks, the strategic arms talks. Can you tell us why and assess the talks for us, please?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, the postponement does not have any long-range significance. It is only for the purpose of developing positions in a proper way. As far as the progress is concerned, I would say it is encouraging. I say that somewhat cautiously, because I would not want to leave out the hope that we would have an agreement within a matter of weeks or even months.

But it is encouraging because both sides are presenting positions in a very serious way and are not trying to make propaganda out of their positions. Both sides, I believe, therefore, want a limitation on strategic arms. As long as this is the case, there is a chance for an agreement.

Now, it is going to take some time, because what is involved here, as distinguished from the test ban, as distinguished from the nonproliferation treaty, both of which were important, but which were basically peripheral issues, here you have the basic security of the United States of America and the Soviet Union involved. Therefore, both must bargain hard. But I believe that the progress to date has been good. The prospects are better than I anticipated they would be when the talks began.

# UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE 1970'S

## A New Strategy for Peace

A REPORT BY
PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON
TO THE CONGRESS
FEBRUARY 18, 1970

## ARMS CONTROL

There is no area in which we and the Soviet Union -- as well as others -- have a greater common interest than in reaching agreement with regard to arms control.

The traditional course of seeking security primarily through military strength raises several problems in a world of multiplying strategic weapons.

- Modern technology makes any balance precarious and prompts new efforts at ever higher levels of complexity.

- Such an arms race absorbs resources, talents and energies.

- The more intense the competition, the greater the uncertainty about the other side's intentions.

- The higher the level of armaments, the greater the violence and devastation should deterrence fail.

For these reasons I decided early in the Administration that we should seek to maintain our security whenever possible through cooperative efforts with other nations at the lowest possible level of uncertainty, cost, and potential violence.

- 107 -

Our careful preparations for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union were designed to achieve this objective.

## Preparations for SALT

Our immediate problem was to determine what measures would be most practical in slowing the momentum of armament and work out a procedure most likely to yield useful discussions.

In preparing for these negotiations, we were tempted to follow the traditional pattern of settling on one agreed position and launching discussions with the other side on this basis. We could have adopted the specific package proposal developed by the previous Administration or we could have quickly formulated an alternative plan. In my judgment there were two major problems with this approach.

First, I was convinced that we lacked the comprehensive and detailed body of facts and analyses to take account of the most recent developments in Soviet and U.S. strategic programs.

Second, we would have been engaged in a negotiating process -- with the inevitable investment of prestige -- before either side had defined its purposes. There was a danger of turning SALT into a tactical exercise or even more the kind of propaganda battle characteristic of some previous disarmament conferences.

Too much depended on these talks, for our nation and all mankind, to rush into them partially prepared. We decided that a clarification of objectives and factual data would allow us to discuss proposals in a coherent framework, and ultimately speed up negotiations. We assumed further that if the other side had a serious interest in exploring the possibilities of strategic arms limitations they would have a joint interest with us to analyze the issues which would have to be resolved before a satisfactory agreement could be reached. For an agreement to limit strategic arms can be lasting only if it enhances the sense of security of both sides. It is in the mutual interest therefore to clarify each other's intentions.

Therefore, instead of attempting to hammer out an agreed government position or a simple proposal, we chose a different course.

- 108 -

We first laid out preliminary models of possible strategic arms limitation agreements. We compared these both with each other and with the situation most likely to prevail in the absence of an agreement. This process greatly improved our understanding of the types of agreements we should consider and pointed up some of the fundamental issues. In order to resolve these issues, I directed the formation of a Verification Panel to examine the verification aspects and strategic implications of curbs on individual weapons systems and then combinations of them.

The Panel took each strategic weapons system in isolation (e.g., ICBM's or ABM's) and explored all the issues that would be involved in its limitation. We knew that any agreement had to be verified and we knew too the reluctance of the Soviet Union to accept on-site inspection. The Verification Panel therefore analyzed in detail what we could do unilaterally. Specifically, it surveyed our intelligence capability to monitor the other side's compliance with a curb for each weapon system; the precise activities that would have to be restricted to ensure confidence in the effectiveness of the limitation; and the impact of the limitation on U.S. and Soviet strategic weapons programs.

The analysis of our capability to verify individual weapons systems provided the building blocks for analyzing various combinations of limitations. These building blocks were combined in various positions which can be grouped in three general categories. This will enable us to respond to a broad range of Soviet proposals. These categories are:

1. Limitations on numbers of missiles. A ceiling would be placed on numbers of missiles without an attempt to re-strain qualitative improvements like MIRV (multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles). In general, these options would stop the growth of some or all strategic missile forces. They would not change the qualitative race.

2. Limitations on numbers and capabilities of missiles. These options would not only limit the numbers of missiles but also their capabilities, including qualitative controls over such weapons as MIRV's. The hard issues here center around verification since the determination of quality requires a more intensive inspection than quantity.

3. Reduce offensive forces. This approach would attempt to reduce the number of offensive forces without qualitative restrictions on the theory that at fixed and lower levels of armaments the risks of technological surprise would be reduced.

- 109 -

Each of these options was analyzed in relation to various levels of strategic defensive missiles, ABM's.

The manner in which these studies were carried out contributed to their scope and their success. Discussions explored substantive issues rather than exchanging rigidly defined bureaucratic positions. Consistent with the overall philosophy of the NSC system, we focused on comprehensive assessments of the issues and alternatives rather than on attainable compromises. This presented me with clear choices, clear disagreements, and clear rationales. In the process we established a comprehensive inventory of the possibilities of a wide range of limitations. This should greatly enhance our flexibility in the forthcoming negotiations.

The SALT negotiations involve fundamental security issues for our NATO allies, as well as Japan. We have fully consulted them, engaging their views and expertise at every stage of the process. In July we discussed in great detail the relationship of SALT to the overall strategic balance with our allies and we presented the various options as we saw them then. In early November we consulted in greater detail on our approach to the first phase of SALT. We intend to continue to work closely with our allies as the negotiations continue. We consider our security inseparable from theirs.

This process involved the most intensive study of strategic arms problems ever made by this or any other government. And this process had several advantages. We were not tied to a single position; instead we had building blocks for several different positions depending on our decisions and what might prove negotiable. Opening talks with the Soviets could concentrate on the principles and objectives underlying any type of strategic arms agreement.

Preliminary talks in Helsinki opened November 17 and continued until December 22. Our experience there confirmed the validity of our approach. The discussions were serious and businesslike. The Soviet representatives demonstrated considerable preparation. They also seemed to welcome the "building block" approach. We were able to develop an agreed work program for further discussions without acrimony and in full awareness of the likely nature of such discussions. Above all, we could explore each other's purposes without getting bogged down in negotiating details.

From a discussion of basic principles and objectives we plan to move in April in Vienna to more specific positions.

President Nixon's News Conference of March 21, 1970

Following are excerpts from the transcript
of a news conference held by President Nixon
in his office in the White House on March 21.

White House press release dated March 21

Q. Mr. President, the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee yesterday voted out unani-
mously and sent to the floor a "sense of the
Senate" resolution concerning the U.S. posi-
tion at SALT [strategic arms limitation talks].
Could you make a remark about that?

The President: Well, the Senate resolution, I understand, simply says that the United States and Soviet Union should try to negotiate a freeze on offensive and defensive missiles.

Of course, that is what SALT is all about, so
I think the resolution really is irrelevant to
what we are going to do. That is our goal. It
takes two, however, to make the deal.

If the Soviet Union will come along with
that, as we hope they will, then perhaps we can
make some arrangements. I can certainly say in
this respect, though, that it is somewhat more
intricate than the resolution would imply.

We found in our preliminary discussions that
the Soviet Union did not come in with general-
ized language, which had been previously their
tactic in arms negotiations; but they came in
with very precise weapon-systems-by-weapon-
systems analysis.

Now, whether we eventually have a compre-
hensive agreement or a system-by-system agree-
ment remains to be seen. We are prepared for
either.

But our goal certainly is to limit both offen-
sive and defensive missiles, and if the Soviet
Union has the same goal, we will make a bar-
gain.

*The President's Message to Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, Chief of the United States Delegation to the Vienna Negotiations. April 16, 1970*

As you and your colleagues resume the effort begun at Helsinki to achieve the limitation of strategic armaments, I reaffirm the statements in my message to you last November. I expressed then—and I express now—the hope that an agreement can be reached on the limitation and eventual reduction of strategic arsenals with proper recognition of the legitimate security interests of the United States and the Soviet Union and of third countries. Your current instructions will enable you to move from general explorations to a discussion of more specific proposals toward these ends.

In proceeding with this momentous task, you will have as your guide the detailed and comprehensive studies conducted within our government since the first day this Administration took office. You know of my firm commitment to the search for an early, equitable, verifiable agreement. You have authority to approach the issues in the most comprehensive manner.

The effort to limit strategic armaments remains an integral part of our work for a lasting peace, a peace from which all peoples will benefit.

It is my hope and expectation that your Soviet colleagues will carry into the Vienna meetings the same determination to bring about a mutually acceptable agreement.

It is appropriate that your opening session is taking place in a building in which the negotiations for the Austrian State Treaty were successfully completed 15 years ago. The United States is grateful to Austria for the arrangements which have been made for this conference.

President Nixon's News Conference of May 8, 1970

Following are excerpts from the transcript
of a news conference held by President Nixon
in the East Room at the White House on May 8.

Arms Limitation Talks With the U.S.S.R.

Q. Mr. President, in your inaugural address, you said that one of your goals was to bring us together in America. You said that you wanted to move us in international terms from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. You said you wanted to bring peace to Viet-Nam. During the past 2 weeks, it seems that we are farther than ever from those goals. How do you account for this apparent failure?

The President: Don't judge us too quickly. When it comes to negotiation, I would suggest that you recognize the fact that some very important talks are going forward on arms limitation with the Soviet Union. We are still far apart. But I will predict now that there will be an agreement. When that agreement comes, it will have great significance. I say that having in mind the fact that we are far apart from the Soviet Union in our policy toward Southeast Asia, in our policy toward the Middle east; but I say that where the problem of arms is concerned, here is where our interests are together. The Soviet Union has just as great an interest as we have in seeing that there is some limitation on nuclear arms.

NAME: President Richard M. Nixon
OCCASION: News Conference at the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles
DATE: July 30, 1970

ARMS LIMITATION

Q. Mr. President, last Sunday the Russian naval commander engaged in a bit of saber rattling directed at us. And I recall that Admiral Hyman Rickover and General Thomas Power of SAC in the last year warned that we are falling behind in the armaments race and they warned of nuclear blackmail if the Russians get ahead. Now with that in mind, do you think we can afford to disarm at this point or what is your feeling in that regard?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, we have certainly no intention of disarming. What we are talking about in the SALT negotiations is not disarmament but a limitation of arms where we limit what we do and they limit what they do. The very thing that you refer to makes it very important for us to pursue those negotiations, because the Soviet Union, since 1967, for example, when we stopped any deployment of land-based missiles, since that time, has deployed 724 ICBM's, either SS-9's or SS-13's.

Since that time when we launched our last nuclear submarine with missile-carrying capabilities, the Soviet Union has deployed 13 more. And by 1975, assuming they continue their present building pace, they will catch up with us in nuclear submarines.

We can either continue this race in which they continue their offensive missiles and we go forward with our defensive missiles, or we can reach an agreement. That is why at this point we have hopes of attempting to find, either on a comprehensive basis, and lacking a comprehensive basis, a selective basis, the first steps toward which the superpowers will limit the development of and particularly the deployment of more instruments of destruction when both have enough to destroy each other many times over.

(cont'd)

ARMS CONTROL - SALT

Q. To pursue the question of our military preparedness a bit further, twice within the past week statements have been made by high ranking naval officers, Admiral Rickover and Admiral U. S. Grant Sharp, to the effect that our military preparedness is suspect. And they went further. Each gentleman said that in his opinion it is doubtful that we could win a war with the Soviet Union. Given the eminence of these gentlemen, as Commander in Chief, how do you regard the validity of those statements?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I would first react by saying that if there is a war between the Soviet Union and the United States, there will be no winners; there will be only losers. The Soviet Union knows that and we know that.

That is the reason why it is vitally important that in areas like the Mideast we attempt to avoid to the greatest extent possible being dragged into a confrontation by smaller powers, even though our interests in the area are very, very great. That is why it is very much in our interests in the SALT talks to work out an arrangement if we can, one which will provide for the interests of both and yet not be in derogation of the necessity of our having sufficiency and their having sufficiency.

One other point I would make briefly is this: What the Soviet Union needs in terms of military preparedness is different from what we need. They are a land power primarily, with a great potential enemy on the east. We are primarily, of course, a sea power and our needs, therefore, are different. But what is important now is to find a way to stop this escalation of arms on both sides, and that is why we have hopes in the SALT talks which, I emphasize again, do not involve disarmament for the United States or the Soviet Union, but do involve a limitation and then eventually a mutual reduction.

# The World Interest: A Generation of Peace

Address by President Nixon¹

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, distinguishing chiefs of state and heads of government, Your Excellencies the Foreign Ministers, and delegates here assembled:

I am honored to greet the members of the United Nations on behalf of the United States as we celebrate this organization's 25th anniversary. On this historic occasion I wish to pay a special tribute to the founders of the United Nations, to Secretary General U Thant, and to all others who have played indispensable roles in its success.

In considering an anniversary and in celebrating one, there is a temptation to recount the accomplishments of the past, to gloss over the difficulties of the present, and to speak in optimistic or even extravagant terms about our hopes for the future.

This is too important a time and too important an occasion for such an approach. The fate of more than three and a half billion people today rests on the realism and candor with which we approach the great issues of war and peace, of security and progress, in this world that together we call home.

So I would like to speak with you today not ritualistically, but realistically; not of impossible dreams, but of possible deeds.

The United Nations was born amid a great upwelling of hope that at last the better nature of man would triumph. There was hope that Woodrow Wilson's dream of half a century ago—that the world's governments would join "in a permanent league in which they are pledged to use their united power to maintain

peace by maintaining right and justice"—would at last be realized.

Some of those early hopes have been realized. Some have not.

The U.N. has achieved many successes in settling or averting conflicts.

The U.N. has achieved many successes in promoting economic development and in fostering other areas of international cooperation, thanks to the work of dedicated men and women all over the world.

These are matters that all the members of the United Nations can point to with very great pride.

But we also know that the world today is not what the founders of the U.N. hoped it would be 25 years ago. Cooperation among nations leaves much to be desired. The goal of the peaceful settlement of disputes is too often breached. The great central issue of our time, the question of whether the world as a whole is to live at peace, has not been resolved.

This central issue turns in large part on the relations among the great nuclear powers. Their strength imposes on them special responsibilities of restraint and wisdom. The issue of war and peace cannot be solved unless we in the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrate both the will and the capacity to put our relationship on a basis consistent with the aspirations of mankind.

Commenting here today on U.S.-Soviet relationships, I see no point in responding in kind to traditional cold-war rhetoric. The facts of the recent past speak for themselves. An effort to score debating points is not the way to advance the cause of peace.

In fact, one of the paramount problems of our time is that we must transcend the old pat-

¹ Made before the 25th anniversary session of the U.N. General Assembly at the United Nations, N.Y., on Oct. 23 (White House press release (New York, N.Y.)).

November 16, 1970

601

terns of power politics in which nations sought to exploit every volatile situation for their own advantage or to squeeze the maximum advantage for themselves out of every negotiation.

In today's world, and especially where the nuclear powers are involved, such policies involve the risk of confrontations and could spell disaster for all. The changes in the world since World War II have made more compelling than ever the central idea behind the United Nations: that individual nations must be ready at last to take a farsighted and a generous view. The profoundest national interest of our time—for every nation—is not immediate gain, but the preservation of peace.

## Basis for Reducing U.S.-U.S.S.R. Differences

One of the reasons the world had such high hopes for the United Nations at the time of its founding was that the United States and the Soviet Union had fought together as allies in World War II. We cooperated in bringing the U.N. into being. There were hopes that this co-operation would continue.

It did not continue, and much of the world's, and the U.N.'s, most grievous troubles since have stemmed from that fact of history.

It is not my intention to point fingers of blame, but simply to discuss the facts of international life as they are.

We all must recognize that the United States and the Soviet Union have very profound and fundamental differences.

It would not be realistic, therefore, to suggest that our differences can be eliminated merely by better personal relationships between the heads of our Governments. Such a view would slight the seriousness of our disagreements.

Genuine progress in our relations calls for specifics, not merely atmospherics. A true detente is built by a series of actions, not by a superficial shift in the apparent mood.

It would not be realistic to suggest that all we need to improve our relations is "better mutual understanding."

Understanding is necessary. But we do understand one another well enough to know that our differences are real and that in many respects we will continue to be competitors. Our

task is to keep that competition peaceful, to make it creative.

Neither would it be realistic to deny that power has a role in our relations. Power is a fact of international life. Our mutual obligation is to discipline that power, to seek together with other nations to insure that it is used to maintain the peace, not to threaten the peace.

I state these obstacles to peace because they are the challenge that must be overcome.

Despite the deep differences between ourselves and the Soviet Union, there are four great factors that provide a basis for a common interest in working together to contain and to reduce those differences.

The first of these factors is at once the most obvious. Neither of us wants a nuclear exchange that would cost the lives of tens of millions of people. Thus we have a powerful common interest in avoiding a nuclear confrontation.

The second of these factors is the enormous cost of arms. Certainly we both should welcome the opportunity to reduce the burden, to use our resources for building rather than destroying.

The third factor is that we both are major industrial powers, which at present have very little trade or commercial contact with one another. It would clearly be in the economic self-interest of each of us if world conditions would permit us to increase trade and contact between us.

The fourth factor is the global challenge of economic and social development. The pressing economic and social needs around the world can give our competition a creative direction.

Thus, in these four matters, we have substantial mutual incentives to find ways of working together despite our continuing difference of views on other matters.

## A New Road in International Relations

It was in this spirit that I announced, on taking office, that the policy of the United States would be to move from an era of confrontation to one of negotiation.

This is a spirit that we hope will dominate the talks between our two countries on the limitation of strategic arms.

There is no greater contribution which the United States and the Soviet Union together

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Department of State Bulletin

could make than to limit the world's capacity for self-destruction.

This would reduce the danger of war. And it would enable us to devote more of our resources, abroad as well as at home, to assisting in the constructive works of economic development and in peaceful progress: in Africa, for example, where so many nations have gained independence and dignity during the life of the United Nations; in Asia, with its rich diversity of cultures and peoples; and in Latin America, where the United States has special bonds of friendship and cooperation.

Despite our many differences, the United States and the Soviet Union have managed ever since World War II to avoid direct conflicts. But history shows, as the tragic experience of World War I indicates, that great powers can be drawn into conflict without their intending it by wars between smaller nations.

The Middle East is a place today where local rivalries are intense, where the vital interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are both involved. Quite obviously, the primary responsibility for achieving a peaceful settlement in the Middle East rests on the nations there themselves. But in this region in particular, it is imperative that the two major powers conduct themselves so as to strengthen the forces of peace rather than to strengthen the forces of war.

It is essential that we and the Soviet Union join in the efforts toward avoiding war in the Middle East and also toward developing a climate in which the nations of the Middle East will learn to live and let live. It is essential not only in the interest of the people in the Middle East themselves, but also because the alternative could be a confrontation with disastrous consequences for the Middle East, for our nations, and for the whole world.

Therefore we urge the continuation of the cease-fire and the creation of confidence in which peace efforts can go forward.

In the world today we are at a crossroads. We can follow the old way, playing the traditional game of international relations, but at ever-increasing risk. Everyone will lose; no one will gain. Or we can take a new road.

I invite the leaders of the Soviet Union to

join us in taking that new road: to join in a peaceful competition, not in the accumulation of arms, but in the dissemination of progress; not in the building of missiles, but in waging a winning war against hunger and disease and human misery in our own countries and around the globe.

Let us compete in elevating the human spirit, in fostering respect for law among nations, in promoting the works of peace. In this kind of competition, no one loses and everyone gains.

## Major and Immediate Concerns at the U.N.

Here at the United Nations, there are many matters of major and immediate global concern on which nations, even when they are competitors, have a mutual interest in working together as part of the community of nations.

In approaching these matters each of us represented here, in our national interest as leaders, and in our self-interest as human beings, must take into consideration a broader element: the world interest.

It is in the world interest to avoid drifting into a widening division between have and have-not nations.

Last month I proposed a major transformation of the American foreign aid program. A major thrust of my proposals is to place larger shares of American assistance under international agencies, in particular the World Bank, the U.N. Development Program, the regional development banks. We seek to promote greater multilateral cooperation and the pooling of contributions through impartial international bodies. We are also encouraging developing countries to participate more fully in the determination of their needs. Within the inter-American system, for example, new mechanisms have been established for a continuing and frank dialogue.

In the spirit of the U.N.'s Second Development Decade, we shall strive to do our full and fair share in helping others to help themselves—through Government assistance, through encouraging efforts by private industry, through fostering a spirit of international volunteer service.

It is in the world interest for the United States and the United Nations, all nations, not

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603

to be paralyzed in its most important function,
that of keeping the peace.

Disagreements between the major powers in
the past have contributed to this paralysis. The
United States will do everything it can to help
develop and strengthen the practical means that
will enable the United Nations to move de-
cisively to keep the peace. This means strength-
ening both its capacity for peacemaking,
settling disputes before they lead to armed con-
flicts, and its capacity for peacekeeping, con-
taining and ending conflicts that have broken
out.

It is in the world interest that we cooperate,
all of us, in preserving and restoring our natural
environment.

Pollution knows no national or ideological
boundaries. For example, it has made Lake Erie
barely able to support life, it is despoiling Lake
Baikal, and it puts Lake Tanganyika in future
jeopardy. The U.N. is uniquely equipped to
play a central role in an international effort to
curtail its ravages.

It is in the world interest for the resources of
the sea to be used for the benefit of all—and
not to become a source of international conflict,
pollution, and unbridled commercial rivalry.

Technology is ready to tap the vast, largely
virgin resources of the oceans. At this moment,
we have the opportunity to set up rules and in-
stitutions to insure that these resources are de-
veloped for the benefit of all mankind and that
the resources derived from them are shared
equitably. But this moment is fleeting. If we
fail to seize it, storm and strife could become
the future of the oceans.

This summer the United States submitted a
draft United Nations convention on this matter
which I hope will receive early and favorable
attention.

It is in the world interest to insure that the
quantity of life does not impair the quality of
life.

As the U.N. enters its Second Development
Decade, it has both the responsibility and the
means to help nations control the population
explosion which so impedes meaningful eco-
nomic growth. The United States will continue
to support the rapid development of U.N. serv-
ices to assist the population and family plan-

ning programs of member nations.

It is in the world interest that the narcotics
traffic be curbed.

Drugs pollute the minds and bodies of our
young people, bringing misery, violence, and
human and economic waste. This scourge of
drugs can be eliminated through international
cooperation. I urge all governments to support
the recent recommendations of the U.N. Com-
mission on Narcotic Drugs, to take the first step
toward giving them substance by establishing
a United Nations Fund for Drug Control. And
I urge all governments to support a strengthened
narcotics treaty that would govern all produc-
tion by restricting it solely to medical and
scientific purposes. The United States has al-
ready circulated such a proposal for considera-
tion at the next session of the U.N. Narcotics
Commission.

It is in the world interest to put a decisive end
to sky piracy and the kidnaping and murder of
diplomats.

In this Assembly last year I called for inter-
national action to put an end to air piracy. This
problem has grown even more acute. Recent
events have dramatically underscored its grav-
ity and also underscored the fact that no nation
is immune from it. The United States has taken
a number of steps on its own initiative. But this
issue requires effective international actions, in-
cluding measures to permit the suspension of
airline services to countries where such piracy
is condoned.

The increase of kidnapings of accredited
diplomats is a closely related matter that
should urgently concern every member of this
Assembly.

Finally, it is in the world interest to insure
that the human rights of prisoners of war are
not violated.

In an address earlier this month proposing a
cease-fire in Indochina, I called for the imme-
diate and unconditional release by both sides of
prisoners of war and innocent victims of the
conflict. This is not a political or a military
issue. It is a humanitarian issue. The United
Nations should register its concern about the
treatment of prisoners of war and press all
adversaries in this conflict, indeed in every con-
flict, to honor the Geneva Convention.

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I have mentioned some of the problems on which the United Nations can, if its members have the will, make substantial progress. There are many others. I urge this body, and the U.N. system, to move ahead rapidly with effective action. And as we move ahead, the United States will do its full share.

## Building a Structure of Peace

The United States came to its present position of world power without either seeking the power or wanting the responsibility. We shall meet that responsibility as well as we can.

We shall not be so pious or so hypocritical as to pretend that we have not made mistakes or that we have no national interests of our own which we intend to protect.

But we can with complete honesty say that we maintain our strength to keep the peace, not to threaten the peace. The power of the United States will be used to defend freedom, never to destroy freedom.

What we seek is not a *paix Americana*, not an American Century, but rather a structure of stability and progress that will enable each nation, large and small, to chart its own course, to make its own way without outside interference, without intimidation, without domination by ourselves or any other nation. The United States fully understands and respects the policy of nonalignment, and we welcome joint efforts, such as the recent meeting in Lusaka, to further international cooperation.

We seek good relations with all the people of the world. We respect the right of each people to choose its own way.

We do hold certain principles to be universal:

- That each nation has a sovereign right to its own independence and to recognition of its own dignity.

- That each individual has a human right to that same recognition of his dignity.

- That we all share a common obligation to demonstrate the mutual respect for the rights and feelings of one another that is the mark of a civil society and also of a true community of nations.

As the United Nations begins its next quarter century, it does so richer in experience, sobered

in its understanding of what it can do and what it cannot, what should be expected and what should not.

In the spirit of this 25th anniversary, the United States will go the extra mile in doing our part toward making the U.N. succeed. We look forward to working together—working together with all nations represented here in going beyond the mere containment of crises to building a structure of peace that promotes justice as well as assuring stability, that will last because all have a stake in its lasting.

I remember very vividly today my visit to India in 1953 when I met for the first time one of the world's greatest statesmen, Prime Minister Nehru. I asked him, as he considered that great country, with its enormous problems, what was its greatest need. He replied: "The greatest need for India, and for any newly independent country, is for 25 years of peace—a generation of peace."

In Africa, in Asia, in Latin America, in Western Europe, in Eastern Europe—in all the 74 nations I have now visited—one thing I have found is that whatever their differences in race or religion or political systems, whatever their customs, whatever their condition, the people of the world want peace.

So let the guns fall silent and stay silent.

In Southeast Asia, let us agree to a cease-fire and negotiate a peace.

In the Middle East, let us hold to a cease-fire and build a peace.

Through arms control agreements, let us invest our resources in the development that nourishes peace.

Across this planet, let us attack the ills that threaten peace.

In the untapped oceans of water and space, let us harvest in peace.

In our personal relations and in our international relations, let us display the mutual respect that fosters peace.

Above all, let us, as leaders of the world, reflect in our actions what our own people feel. Let us do what our own people need. Let us consider the world interest—the people's interest—in all that we do.

Since the birth of the United Nations—for the first time in this century—the world's peo-

November 16, 1970

605

ple will have lived through 25 years without a
world war.

Let us resolve together that the second quarter
century of the United Nations shall offer the
world what its people yearn for, and what they
deserve: a world without any war, a full genera-
tion of peace.

## President Nixon Hosts Dinner for U.N.'s 25th Anniversary

Following is President Nixon's toast at a
White House dinner on October 24 honoring
31 chiefs of state and heads of government
who had attended General Assembly observ-
ances of the 25th anniversary of the United
Nations.

White House press release dated October 24

Your Excellencies, the heads of state, the
heads of government, the other distinguished
guests who are present on this occasion:

In the 170-year history of this house, never
have so many heads of state and heads of gov-
ernment been in this room together. And it is
my great honor to welcome you all here as a
group and also individually and to tell you that
I only regret that each of you could not on
this occasion receive the very individual honor
to which your station would entitle you.

I know that during the past week you have
been exposed to a great number of speeches, as
well as a great number of dinners. I will not
impose another speech on you tonight, and
also, I know you will be glad to hear, I shall
not ask any of you to make a speech.

But on such an occasion, I must speak what
all of us feel in our hearts on this 25th anni-
versary of the United Nations. And that is
that over and over again in the speeches at
the U.N. Assembly in New York ran the theme
that the overwhelming majority of the three
and a half billion people on this earth wanted
peace and that the responsibility of the lead-
ers of those people was to develop policies
which would bring peace and keep the peace.

In this room are heads of government. and
heads of state who have great responsibilities
to their own people and an even greater re-
sponsibility to the people of the world to work
for the cause of peace and justice among all
nations.

And for that reason, on this occasion we
are particularly honored that you would take
time in your busy schedules to come from New
York to Washington to see us here so that we
could express on behalf of the people of the
United States, first, our deep friendship for all
the peoples of your countries and, second, our
complete devotion to the cause that the United
Nations stands for: of just and lasting peace
among nations.

And thinking of appropriate words for this
occasion, I think we could all perhaps best
turn to the past. This room has seen many his-
toric functions. Twenty of those who are in this
room have been honored at dinners here. And
over the years the great leaders of the world—
emperors, kings, presidents, prime ministers—
have been honored here.

There is one portrait in the room, that of
Abraham Lincoln, who is perhaps more than
any other American President honored all over
the world.

When people think of Lincoln, most agree
that his most eloquent address was the Gettys-
burg Address. But Lincoln did not agree with
that. He rated his second inaugural, and par-
ticularly its conclusion, as being the best of all
of his public statements.

And I think as we look at the next 25 years
of the United Nations that perhaps the words
with which he concluded that second inaugural,
at the end of a very difficult and terrible war
between the States of this country over 100
years ago, that those words would give us the
inspiration for the future:

"With malice toward none, with charity for
all, with firmness in the right as God gives us
to see the right, let us strive on to finish the
work we are in . . . (to) achieve and (to)
cherish a just and lasting peace among our-
selves and with all nations."

And in that spirit, let us raise our glasses
to the United Nations: To the United Nations.

606

Department of State Bulletin

A Conversation With the President—January 1971

Following are excerpts from the transcript
of an interview with President Nixon which
was broadcast over television and radio on Jan-
uary 4. Interviewing the President were John
Chancellor of NBC News, Nancy H. Dickerson
of the Public Broadcasting Service, Eric
Sevareid of CBS News, and Howard K. Smith
of ABC News.

White House press release dated January 4

Negotiations With the Soviet Union

Mrs. Dickerson: Mr. President, I would like
to ask you an overall question about our rela-
tions with the Communists. When you took
office, you said this was going to be an era of
negotiation, not confrontation. But in reality,
haven't we returned to something of a cold war
situation in regard to our relations with the
Soviets? And how were our relations affected
by their duplicity during the Middle East crisis
when they helped rebuild the missile sites?

The President: Well, Mrs. Dickerson, when we talk about an era of negotiation rather than confrontation, we must remember that negotiation means exactly that. It means that you have two parties that have very great differences with regard to their vital interests and the negotiation process will sometimes be very, very extended. It does not mean that we are going to have—negotiation does not necessarily mean agreement.

Now, let's be quite specific. Mr. Kosygin
[Alexsei N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Soviet
Council of Ministers] in his statement just a
couple of days ago to the Japanese newspaper-
man, as you know, complained about our policy
in Viet-Nam as he has previously; he com-
plained about our policy in the Mideast.

We, of course, have been concerned about
their movements in the Caribbean. We have
been concerned by what you mentioned, their
own activities in the Mideast, and of course, we
have been concerned about their continuing
harassment from time to time of the Berin
access routes.

Nevertheless, on the plus side, let's see what
has happened. Over the past 2 years the United
States and the Soviet Union have been negotiat-
ing. We have been negotiating, for example, on
arms control. Those negotiations will begin
again in Helsinki in March. I am optimistic
that we will reach an agreement eventually. I
do not suggest now that we are going to have
a comprehensive agreement, because there is a
basic disagreement with regard to what stra-
tegic weapons—what that definition is.

But we are now willing to move to a non-
comprehensive agreement. We are going to be
able to discuss that with the Soviet in the next
round at Helsinki.

I am not predicting that we are going to have
an agreement next month or 2 months from now
or 3 months from now. But in terms of arms
control, we have some overwhelming forces that
are going to bring about an agreement even-
tually, and it is simply this: The Soviet Union
and the United States have a common interest
in avoiding the escalating burden of arms—you
know that they have even cut down on their
SS-9 and big missile deployment lately and
development—and, second, the Soviet Union
and the United States have an overwhelming
common interest in avoiding nuclear competi-
tion which could lead to nuclear destruction.

So, in this field, I think we are going to make
some progress. In the Mideast it is true we are
far apart, but we are having discussions. On
Berlin we are far apart, but we are negotiating.

The strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) will resume in Vienna. [Footnote in White House press release.]

And finally, with regard to the rhetoric—and the rhetoric in international affairs does make a difference—the rhetoric, while it has been firm, has generally been noninflammatory on our part and on theirs.

So, I am not without the confidence that I had at the beginning. I always realized that our differences were very great, that it was going to take time. But the United States and the Soviet Union owe it to their own people and the people of the world, as the superpowers, to negotiate rather than to confront.

Mrs. Dickerson: Mr. President, you always have put a certain value on personal diplomacy. Do you think this would be a good time for you personally to talk with some of the Russian leaders? Do you think it is a good time to have a summit, of sorts?

The President: Mrs. Dickerson, as you know, I have had conversations with the Russian leaders through the years and, of course, with Ambassador [Anatoliy F.] Dobrynin, a very skilled diplomat, here in Washington and with Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] when he was here.

Now, as far as another meeting is concerned, a meeting at a higher level, that is a matter that has been speculated about. If it appears at some time that a meeting of that type would be what is needed to bring about the final summation in one of these areas, for example, the SALT talks or the Mideast or the rest, we will certainly have such a meeting.

But unless there is the chance for progress, a summit talk is not in their interest, and it is not in our interest, and not in the interest of world peace. It creates a false sense of security.

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## ARMS CONTROL

"...through negotiation we can move toward the control of armaments in a manner that will bring a greater measure of security than we can obtain from arms alone."

The President's Message to the Congress
Transmitting the Ninth Report of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, February 26, 1970

The World has no more urgent interest than reducing the danger of war, and above all, nuclear war. This creates responsibilities for all nations, but particularly for the nuclear superpowers.

The control of armaments is not a new issue in this decade or the post-war period. Man has long sought to create the mutual trust and techniques to limit and reduce arms. The historical record has been tragic. Arms control has generally foundered because it failed the test of international crises -- nations could not resolve the very issues that stimulated weapons competition. At the same time, political settlements were threatened by arms rivalry -- nations could not define levels that did not stimulate ever new competition and thus new antagonisms and insecurity.

### Progress to Date

In an age of great technological change and enormous nuclear power, we face even larger challenges. This Administration is dedicated to the limitation and reduction of arms. We are proud of our accomplishments.

**Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.** The worldwide reach of scientific knowledge enables virtually any nation in time to acquire nuclear weapons. Last year, the United States ratified the treaty to halt further proliferation of nuclear weapons. More than 100 nations have either signed or ratified this treaty, and negotiations to implement its verification procedures are in progress. If all nations act on its principles and abide by its obligations, the incentive for any additional nation to acquire nuclear arms will recede.

**Preserving Peace in New Frontiers.** Modern technology has opened up the vistas of outer space and the ocean depths for mankind's benefit. But it has created as well the temptation to exploit these new environments for

- 146 -

military gain. We and other nations have acted to prohibit nuclear weapons in outer space. This Administration took the initiative to negotiate a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from the seabeds. The United Nations overwhelmingly approved the treaty this fall, and I will soon submit it to the Senate.

**Curbing Biological and Chemical Threats.** Modern science has spawned the most deadly means of biological and chemical warfare. This Administration has moved on several fronts to reduce this threat:

- The United States renounced all use of biological and toxin weapons and first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. Our biologocal and toxin research will be confined to small programs solely for defensive purposes. I have approved a plan to destroy stockpiles of these agents and associated munitions. We announced the conversion of one major biological facility to the investigation of the health effects of certain chemicals.

- On August 19, 1970, I submitted to the Senate the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use in warfare of chemical and biological weapons. If ratified, the United States would join 95 other nations, including all the major powers, in supporting this treaty.

- In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, we will urge further international control over the biological and chemical means of war.

**Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)**

The most important area in which progress is yet to be made is the limitation of strategic arms. Perhaps for the first time, the evolving strategic balance allows a Soviet-American agreement which yields no unilateral advantages. The fact we have begun to discuss strategic arms with the USSR is in itself important. Agreement in such a vital area could create a new commitment to stability and influence attitudes toward other issues.

**A New Method of Preparation.** In previous arms control negotiations our usual practice was to develop a single proposal, based on what would command a consensus among diverse views in the bureaucracy. This frequently led to rigidity in the negotiations; unless the other side adopted an almost identical stance, the talks deadlocked. Time and energies were then consumed in re-negotiating a position within our government.

I concluded that we needed a new approach -- to give us a firmer grasp of the issues, to provide maximum flexibility in negotiations, and to speed

- 147 -

up the overall negotiating process. Because flexibility is a virtue only within a framework of clear purpose, I ordered the most comprehensive study of weapons systems bearing on the negotiations.

We assigned the analytical tasks to a special NSC group, the Verification Panel. It first examined the various weapons systems to determine the effect of conceivable limitations on our current and projected military programs, their effect on Soviet programs, and -- on the basis of this analysis -- the strategic situation ensuing from particular weapons limitations.

The Panel looked as well at verification. Confidence that obligations are being adhered to is a basic requirement for stable arms control agreements and should be of equal concern to both sides. We made a detailed analysis of our ability, and the measures needed, to verify compliance with each agreement. We also studied counteractions if we detected a violation, and whether we could take them in time to protect our security.

The result was the development of individual "building blocks" for all offensive and defensive weapons. We can combine these blocks in various clusters of limitations and reductions to produce alternative proposals for the negotiations.

This enables us to respond quickly and meaningfully to any Soviet counterproposals; at home we are not the prisoner of bureaucratic jockeying to come up with an agreed response. The focus in our dialogue, either with the USSR or within our own government, can be on substantive issues.

**Differing Perspectives.** We made major efforts to understand the position of the Soviet Union. Of all possible areas for negotiation, limitation of strategic weapons requires the greatest such efforts, for no nation will maintain an accord which it believes jeopardizes its survival.

This task of developing an equitable agreement is greatly complicated by our differing strategic positions and perspectives.

Even within the United States, and no doubt in the USSR, there are widely divergent views over the key elements of an effective and credible strategic posture. The technical issues are highly complex and the political and strategic considerations engage our vital interests. It would be surprising, therefore, if there were not also large initial differences between the US and the USSR.

The composition and level of our respective strategic forces reflected different geographical factors and historical development. This posed a major problem of establishing an equivalence between weapons systems with dissimilar characteristics and capabilities:

- 148 -

- Our deployments of offensive missile launchers were completed by 1967; the USSR continued to build different types of land-based ICBM's and a nuclear-powered missile submarine force that will equal ours within three years at current rates. The USSR has constructed a large ICBM, the SS-9, for which the US has no counterpart. Deployed in sufficient numbers and armed with the multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's) of sufficient accuracy, this missile could threaten our land-based ICBM forces. Our MIRV systems, by contrast, do not have the combination of numbers, accuracy and warhead yield to pose a threat to the Soviet land-based ICBM force.

- The USSR has a large force of intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles. We do not. On the other hand, our alliance commitments and their regional military programs caused us to base our tactical aircraft abroad; we also retain air power on carriers.

- The USSR has deployed an Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system, thus far in the Moscow area. We have initiated an ABM program based on different strategic principles and missile systems.

Our analysis indicated critical areas of prospective strategic instability:

- Offensive systems have clearly developed to a point where certain further improvements as well as increased launcher deployments could pose a threat to land-based missile retaliatory forces and thus threaten stability.

- Instability also could develop through the unchecked extension of defensive capabilities. One side might believe that its defenses could clearly limit the damage it might suffer from retaliation, and therefore that it was in a position to strike first.

We took these factors into account in shaping negotiating positions for SALT. There have been three phases so far, alternating between Helsinki and Vienna: Helsinki I (November 17 - December 22, 1969); Vienna I (April 16 - August 14, 1970); Helsinki II (November 2 - December 18, 1970). The negotiators are now slated to reassemble in Vienna on March 15.

## The Course of SALT Negotiations

There has been speculation both here and abroad concerning the talks. Progress has been facilitated by our agreed policy of privacy with respect

- 149 -

to the negotiating exchanges. I will, of course, respect that agreement. I
am, therefore, free to discuss only the general character of the talks and
underlying issues which have emerged.

We believed that progress could best be made if the initial exchanges
encouraged agreement on the definition of the subject matter and the nature
of the issues. Thus, we did not launch discussions in the traditional manner
of hard, detailed proposals that might lead to early deadlock, each side
supporting its opening position. Instead, we explored some general concepts
of strategic stability and related them to the issues posed by limiting indivi-
dual weapons systems. Our negotiating team, ably led by Ambassador Gerard
Smith, reviewed our analysis, explaining how we thought agreements might
evolve and their verification requirements.

This essentially exploratory approach, which included a general treat-
ment of verification, enabled each side to gain greater understanding of the
other's thinking. There was broad consensus on certain general strategic
concepts. At the same time there were clear differences on whether certain
systems should be included in discussions of an initial agreement.

Both sides proceeded in a thoughtful, non-polemical manner. Calm,
reasoned dialogue produced a common work program for future sessions.

In the later phases of the talks, we moved from an analysis of issues to
a discussion of concrete measures. Initially, the U.S. suggested possible
approaches involving both numerical and qualitative limitations on strategic
offensive and defensive systems, including MIRV's. We also put forward an
alternative comprehensive approach which would not constrain MIRV's, but
would involve reductions in offensive forces in order to maintain stability
even in the face of qualitative improvements.

The Soviet Union, for its part, submitted a general proposal which
diverged from ours in many respects, including a major difference on the
definition of strategic systems.

When it proved difficult to make progress on the basis of the initial
approaches and proposals, our preparatory work enabled us to move rapidly
to a modified approach taking account of Soviet objections. Our approach
incorporated alternative provisions for either limitation or a total ban of
ABM. Modified proposals were put forward by the Soviet Union as well.
On some issues, our views coincided or were quite close; on others there
remained important differences. In many respects, Soviet suggestions on
various aspects of offensive and defensive limitations lacked the specificity
and detail to permit firm conclusions about their overall impact.

- 150 -

**SALT Issues For the Future.** We have been able to move from preliminary exploration of substantive issues to concrete negotiations in a fairly short period. The dialogue has been serious and businesslike. The rate of progress, however, has been influenced by differing perspectives.

This Administration has established and enunciated a concept of strategic sufficiency. We have reflected this concept in the nature and number of our strategic forces and the doctrines for their employment. All these aspects of our posture are fully aired in each year's budgetary process. As I have pointed out in the section on Strategic Forces, Soviet deployments make us uncertain whether the USSR has made a similar national commitment to strategic equilibrium.

There also remain specific differences that have gradually emerged in our exchange of proposals. These involve what an agreement should cover and how it should be verified.

- We have approached the question on what armaments to include in an initial agreement with different definitions. While recognizing that a variety of offensive systems could be construed as strategic, we believe that priority should go to those that form the core of offensive threats, ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy strategic bombers.

- The USSR has broadly defined "strategic" offensive weapons as those that can reach the other side's territory. These terms include our theater nuclear delivery systems including those on aircraft carriers. But our carrier and land-based air forces abroad are essential components of integrated theater defenses created under alliance commitments in response to common threats. On the other hand, the Soviet approach would not include limitations on its own theater nuclear forces, including their own medium or intermediate range missiles. During the course of the negotiations we have been making efforts in consultation with our allies to take account of this difference in perspective.

- There has also been a difference over whether a separate agreement limiting ABM's alone would be in our mutual interest. The U.S. believes that to be stable and satisfactory, an agreement should include limitations on both offensive and defensive systems.

- As I said last year, the requirement for adequate verification of any agreement is essential to both sides. We have not yet found a way to overcome certain differences. They are particularly difficult in connection with our attempts to limit or ban MIRV's or ABM's. We will continue working on solutions to these problems in future negotiations.

- 151 -

In light of these complex issues and our differing approaches, we are neither surprised nor discouraged that progress has not been more rapid. The discussions have produced the most searching examination of strategic relationships ever conducted between the United States and the USSR. Each side has had the opportunity to explain at length the particular strategic concerns caused by the present and prospective posture of the other. Both sides know better how an agreement could deal with these concerns.

The Soviet position has not been presented in the detail that ours has, but the negotiations have reached a point where views are better understood and the basis of an agreement may be emerging. Further progress is therefore possible when negotiations resume.

We need to determine how comprehensive an agreement is feasible. On the one hand, even a relatively modest accord would create a stake for both sides to preserve progress and build upon it with further agreements. Moreover, it could influence attitudes towards issues outside SALT. On the other hand, if all the effort that has gone into SALT were to produce only a token agreement, it could be counterproductive. There would be no reason to be confident that this could serve as a bridge to a more significant agreement. Therefore, we shall strive for an initial agreement which is as broad and comprehensive as possible. It must deal with the interrelationship between offensive and defensive limitations.

Two principles should be recognized. The strategic balance would be endangered if we limited defensive forces alone and left the offensive threat to our strategic forces unconstrained. It would also be dangerous, however, if only offensive forces were restrained, while defenses were allowed to become so strong that one side might no longer be deterred from striking first. To limit only one side of the offense-defense equation could rechannel the arms competition rather than effectively curtail it.

We also have to clarify the relationship between the process of negotiations -- which may be protracted and involve several stages -- and actions taken during the talks and even after an initial agreement. It is clear that restraint is essential. If the Soviet leaders extend their strategic capabilities, especially in ways that increase the threat to our forces, we would face new decisions in the strategic field.

Last summer, in a press conference on July 30, 1970, I stated what appeared to me to be the only alternatives:

"We can either continue this race in which they continue their offensive missiles and we go forward with our defensive missiles, or we can reach an agreement. That is why at this

- 152 -

point we have hopes of attempting to find, either on a comprehensive basis, and lacking a comprehensive basis, a selective basis, the first steps toward which the superpowers will limit the development of and particularly the deployment of more instruments of destruction when both have enough to destroy each other many times over."

I retain that hope and in this report reaffirm my commitment to its fulfillment. At this stage what is needed are political decisions to move towards an agreement on the basis of an equitable strategic relationship. We have taken this decision.

## Conclusion

It is essential that the United States maintain a military force sufficient to protect our interests and meet our commitments. Were we to do less, there would be no chance of creating a stable world structure.

But it is an illusion to think that the ideal guarantee of security -- for ourselves or for the world -- rests on our efforts alone. While maintaining our strength, therefore, we are also making a sustained effort to achieve with the Soviet Union agreement on arms limitations. Only a designed balance of armaments can ensure security that is shared and equitable, and therefore durable.

It is for that reason that we have defined our security requirements in terms that facilitate arms control agreements. The doctrine of strategic sufficiency is fully compatible with arms limitations. So too are the role of our conventional forces and the purpose of our security assistance.

Our goal is security -- and if others share that goal, it can be assured through mutual design, rather than mutual exertion. It will, in any event, be maintained.

# A Redefinition of the United States Role in the World

## Address by President Nixon¹

¹Made to the Nation on radio on Feb. 25 (White House press release).

### Relations With the Soviet Union

We now come to a matter that affects every nation: the relations between the world's two great superpowers.

Over the past 2 years in some fields the Soviet Union and the United States have moved ahead together. We have taken the first step toward cooperation in outer space. We have both ratified the treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Just 2 weeks ago we signed a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons from the seabeds.

These are hopeful signs, but certain other Soviet actions are reason for concern. There is need for much more cooperation in reducing tensions in the Middle East and in ending harassment of Berlin. We must also discourage the temptation to raise new challenges in sensitive areas such as the Caribbean.

In the long run, the most significant result of negotiations between the superpowers in the past year could be in the field of arms control.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union have produced the most searching examination of the nature of stra-

tegic competition ever conducted between our two nations. Each side has had the chance to explain at length the concerns caused by the posture of the other side. The talks have been conducted in a serious way without the old lapses into propaganda.

If both sides continue in this way, there is reason to hope that specific agreements will be reached to curb the arms race.

Taking a first step in limiting the capacity of mankind to destroy itself would mark a turning point in the history of the postwar world; it would add to the security of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and it would add to the world's peace of mind.

In all our relations with the Soviets, we shall make the most progress by recognizing that in many cases our national interests are not the same. It serves no purpose to pretend they are; our differences are not matters of mood, they are matters of substance. But in many other cases, our separate national interests can best be pursued by a sober consideration of the world interest.

The United States will deal, as it must, from strength: We will not reduce our defenses below the level I consider essential to our national security.

A strong America is essential to the cause of peace today. Until we have the kind of agreements we can rely on, we shall remain strong.

But America's power will always be used for building a peace, never for breaking it—only for defending freedom, never for destroying it.

America's strength will be, as it must be, second to none; but the strength that this nation

is proudest of is the strength of our determina-
tion to create a peaceful world.

We all know how every town or city develops
a sense of community when its citizens come
together to meet a common need.

The common needs of the world today, about
which there can be no disagreement or conflict
of national interest, are plain to see.

We know that we must act as one world in
restoring the world's environment before pollu-
tion of the seas and skies overwhelms every
nation. We know we must stop the flow of nar-
cotics; we must counter the outbreaks of hijack-
ing and kidnaping; we must share the great
discoveries about the oceans and outer space.

The United States is justly proud of the lead
it has taken in working within the United
Nations, and within the NATO alliance, to come
to grips with these problems and with these
opportunities.

Our work here is a beginning, not only in
coping with the new challenges of technology
and modern life but of developing a worldwide
"sense of community" that will ease tension,
reduce suspicion, and thereby promote the
process of peace.

That process can only flourish in a climate of
mutual respect.

We can have that mutual respect with our
friends without dominating them or without
letting them down.

We can have that mutual respect with our
adversaries without compromising our princi-
ples or weakening our resolve.

And we can have that mutual respect among
ourselves without stifling dissent or losing our
capacity for action.

Our goal is something Americans have not
enjoyed in this century: a full generation of
peace. A full generation of peace depends not
only on the policy of one party or of one nation
or one alliance or one bloc of nations.

Peace for the next generation depends on our
ability to make certain that each nation has a
share in its shaping and that every nation has
a stake in its lasting.

This is the hard way, requiring patience,
restraint, understanding, and—when neces-
sary—bold, decisive action. But history has
taught us that the old diplomacy of imposing a

peace by the fiat of great powers simply does
not work.

I believe that the new diplomacy of partner-
ship, of mutual respect, of dealing with strength
and determination will work.

I believe that the right degree of American
involvement—not too much and not too little—
will evoke the right response from our other
partners on this globe in building for our
children the kind of world they deserve: a world
of opportunity in a world without war.

310

President Nixon's News Conference of March 4, 1971

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by President Nixon in the East Room of the White House on March 4.

Q. Mr. President, a few months back, you were quite optimistic about the successful conclusion of SALT talks. Are you less optimistic now?

The President: I am just as optimistic now as I was then about the eventual success. As you will note from our world policy report, the two great superpowers now have nuclear parity. Neither can gain an advantage over the other if the other desires to see to it that that does not occur. Now, under these circumstances, therefore, it is in the interest of both powers to negotiate some kind of limitation, limitation on offensive and defensive weapons. We will be stating a position on that on March 15 when the new talks begin in Vienna. As far as when an agreement is reached, I will not indicate optimism or pessimism. As far as the eventualità of an agreement, my belief is that the seriousness of the talks, the fact that there are great forces, the danger of war, the escalating costs, and the fact that neither power can gain an advantage over the others, I think that this means that there will be an agreement eventually between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Yes, sir.

Q. On both offensive and defensive weapons?

The President: I should add that I know that the suggestion has been made that we might negotiate a separate agreement on defensive weapons alone. We reject that proposal. We will negotiate an agreement that is not comprehensive but it must include offensive as well as defensive weapons, some mix.

THE PRESIDENT'S
NEWS CONFERENCE OF
APRIL 29, 1971

Q. Mr. President, the State Department has said that the legal question of the future of Taiwan and Formosa is an unsettled question. Would you favor direct negotiations between the Nationalist and the Communist Governments to settle their dispute?

THE PRESIDENT. Well, I noted speculation to the effect from various departments and various sources that the way for these two entities to settle their differences was to negotiate directly, I think that is a nice legalistic way to approach it, but I think it is completely unrealistic. I am only saying at this point that the United States, is seeking to in a very measured way, while maintaining our treaty commitments to Taiwan—we are seeking a more normal relationship with the People's Republic of China.

There is one other thing I think it's very important to make.

There has been speculation to the effect that the purpose of our, or one purpose of our normalizing our relations or attempting to normalize our relations with Mainland China is to some way irritate the Soviet Union. Nothing could be further from the truth.

We are seeking good relations with the Soviet Union and I am not discouraged by the SALT talk progress. I can only say that we believe that the interests of both countries would be served by an agreement there. We seek good relations with the Soviet Union. We are seeking good relations with Communist China and the interests of world peace require good relations between the Soviet Union and Communist China. It would make no sense for the United States, in the interest of world peace, to try to get the two to get at each other's throats, because we would be embroiled in the controversy ourselves.