GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

March 1, 1972

Dear Nancy:

Coleman asked me to work our some tours for your friends, the Zimmermans.

Enclosed are the tour tickets for the White House tour on March 31. The Zimmermans should be at the East Gate (East Executive Avenue) at 8:30 a.m. on March 31, where they should present the tickets.

The FBI tour has been set for 10:00 a.m. The Zimmermans should go to the 9th St. and Penn. Ave. N. W. Entrance and tell the tour desk that they are friends of Mr. Kissinger's. They will then be directed to Room 1732 for a tour.

Hope this is all satisfactory and that your friends enjoy their stay in Washington.

Miss Nancy Maginnes
219 E. 69th Street, Apartment 9L
New York, New York

APR 29 1972

CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

DEC 18 1970

Dear Colonel Maiello:

Thank you for your letter of December 11 and for sending me the photographs from the SHAPE Alumni Banquet on October 29. I was pleased to be present there and am delighted to know that others found it as interesting and enjoyable as I did.

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in writing to me.

Colonel Ernest A. Maiello, U.S. Army
Allied Powers Europe
Supreme Headquarters
Liaison Office
Washington, D. C. 20310

jlp:12/17/70

ALLIED POWERS EUROPE
SUPREME HEADQUARTERS

LIAISON OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20310

11 December 1970

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

Attached are photographs taken at the SHAPE Alumni
Banquet which was held at Fort Myer on 29 October 1970.

The former SHAPE personnel were honored by your
presence and greatly appreciated your address. I regret that
I was unable to attend because of my assignment in Vietnam.
However, Mrs. Maiello was present and she informed me that
it was an enjoyable and encouraging evening largely due to
your speech.

I hope that we will again have the pleasure of your
company in the near future.

Incl
As stated

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

MAILER 7/21/72

Type of Request & Date

PRESS

(Last name and pending date)

GENERAL

FEB-11-71 KISSINGER, HENRY A.

PLI
KISSINGER, HENRY A./M.*

Name: Norman Mailer

**Request:** is doing a piece on the conventions for LIFE magazine. Also included in the article if the politics of this year which starts out with the conventions and the articles in LIFE, but will be followed up in a book. Would like an hour - lunch, dinner or office appt.

FYI: Hugh Sidey called on his behalf

RSVP: To Sidey 293-4300

CSH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: yes 2/25 LUNCH

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

193

But a young Secret Service man had now come up to
the kiosk, and conducted him across the North lawn.
Inside the West Lobby a receptionist apologized politely
for the delay. Ushered through a door into a hallway,
he was met by Kissinger who gave the greatest of broad
smiles, pumped his hand, and said in a deep and gutty
German accent, "Today must be my day for masochism since
I dare to be interviewed by you."

Almost immediately, they were in his office, large
and full of light. "We have a momentous decision to
make instantly," said Kissinger. "It is: where shall we
eat? I can offer you respectable food if you wish the
interview here, not exciting but respectable, and we
won't be interrupted. Or we can go to a restaurant just
around the corner where the food will be very good and
we will be interrupted a little although not very much."

Similar in height and build, it was probable they
would not wish to miss a good lunch. So in much less
time than it took him to enter, he left the White House
(that most placid of mansions!) with Kissinger, hardly
noticing the same Secret Service man who unobtrusively--

194

it was the word!--had stopped the traffic on Pennsylvania Avenue while they crossed. If not for just such a rare American pomp, he could have had the impression that he knew Kissinger over the years. For as they walked along, chatting with no pain, it was much as if the learned doctor had been an editor of some good and distinguished quarterly, and they were promenading to lunch in order to talk over a piece.

In fact, that was the first topic--his piece. "We must, from the beginning," said Kissinger, "establish ground rules. We may make them whatever you wish, but we have to keep them. I can speak frankly with you, or not so frankly. But if I am frank, then you have to allow me the right to see what you put into my mouth. It is not because of vanity, or because of anything you may say about me, you may say anything you wish about me, in fact"--with the slyest grin--"you will probably hurt my position more if you say good things than bad, but I have, when all is said, a position I must be responsible to. Now if you don't wish to agree to such a procedure, we can do the interview at arm's length, which of course

195

I'm used to and you need show me nothing. Either course
is agreeable, provided we establish the rules."

They had by now reached Sans Souci, and Kissinger's
advance to his table was not without ceremony. Since he
was hardly back twenty-four hours from Paris and some
talks with the North Vietnamese, the headwaiter teased
him over the pains of quitting Parisian cuisine. Passing
by the table of Larry O'Brien there were jokes about
Watergate.

"That was good luck, Henry, to get away just before
it hit the fan," said O'Brien.

"Ah, what a pity," said Kissinger. "You could have
had me for the villain of the sixth floor."

And a friend intercepted him before he could take
his seat. "Henry, what truth to the rumor that McGovern
is picking you for Vice President?"

Kissinger chucked. "Twenty-two thousand people
in the State Department will be very happy." He was
animated with the pleasure these greetings had given him.
While not a handsome man, he was obviously more attractive
to women now than when he had been young, for he enjoyed
what he received, and he was a sensuous man with a small

196

mouth and plump lips, a Hapsburg mouth; it was not hard
to see his resemblance to many a portrait of many an
Austrian archduke and prince. Since he gave also every
sign of the vanity and vulnerability and ruddy substance
of a middle-aged man with a tendency to corpulence--the
temptation to eat too much had to be his private war!--
his weaknesses would probably be as amenable to women
as his powers, and that German voice, deep, fortified
with an accent which promised emoluments, savories, even
meat gravies of culture at the tip of one's tongue, what
European wealth! produced an impression altogether more
agreeable than his photographs. So one mystery was
answered--Kissinger's reputation as a ladies man. And a
difficulty was commenced--Aquarius' work might have been
simplified if he liked the Doctor less. A hint of some
sinister mentality would have been a recognizable aid.

Yet even the demand for ground rules was reasonable.
The meal ordered, Kissinger returned to the subject--he
repeated: he would obviously expect the rules to be
clarified before he could go further. Nor was there much
impulse to resist him with argument. Secretly, he

[L.C]

197

respected Kissinger for giving the interview--there was indeed not a great deal the Doctor could gain, and the perils were plentiful, including the central risk that Kissinger would have to trust him to keep his side of the bargain. Since his position not only as Assistant to the President on National Security Affairs but as court favorite must excite the ten thousand furies of bureaucracy--"this man who can't speak English that they keep hidden in the White House" being a not uncommon remark,--the medium of this interview was not without its underlying message: Kissinger, in some part of himself at least, must be willing to function as a cultural ambassador across the space of mind between the constellations of the White House and the island galaxies of New York intellectual life. So Aquarius made his own speech. Like a virgin descending the steps of sexual congress, he said that he had never done this before, but since he was not unsympathetic to Kissinger's labors, and had no wish to jeopardize his position, which he would agree was delicate. . . so forth. They set up some ground rules.

"Now what should we talk about?" asked Kissinger.

198

Well, they might talk about the huge contradiction
between the President's actions in Russia and China as
opposed to Vietnam. "You know, if not for the bombing
I might have to think about voting for Nixon. Certainly
no Democrat would have been able to look for peace with
Russia and China. The Republicans would never have let
him. So Nixon's achievement is, on the one hand, immense,
and on the other ghastly." Kissinger nodded, not without
a hint of weariness to show his familiarity with the
argument.

"If I reply to you by emphasizing the difference
in our styles of negotiation in each country, it is not
to pretend that these negotiations preempt moral questions,
but rather that I'm not so certain we can engage such
questions properly if they're altogether stripped of
context. For instance, it would be impossible to discuss
the kind of progress we made with China and Russia unless
I were to give you the flavor of those negotiations for
they were absolutely characteristic and altogether
different. For instance, I was not unfamiliar with
Russian matters, but my ignorance about China was immense

[L-C]

199

on the first secret visit, and I had no idea of how
they would receive me"--a hint of the loneliness of his
solitary position now passes across the table at Sans
Souci--"nor even what we necessarily would be able to
talk about. (But the Chinese are exceptional. I found
them immensely impressive--by degrees of course--because
in the beginning I made the mistake of assuming that they
negotiate like the Russians, and they don't. Not at all.
With the Russians you always know where you stand. If,
for example, you are hammering out a joint statement, you
can be certain that if you ask them to remove a comma in
one place, depend on it they will ask you for a comma in
return. Whereas the character of men like Chou must
emerge to a great degree from experiences like the Long
March, and so I discovered--and not immediately--that you
always had to deal with them on the real substance of the
question. I remember when the President visited China,
and I was working with Chou on the joint statement we
would issue describing our areas of agreement and difference.
I asked if a certain point the Chinese had brought up could
be dropped because the wording would be difficult for us

in America. In return I would give up a point to them.
Chou said 'Explain to me why this point causes you
difficulty, and if your explanation makes sense I will
cede it to you. If it doesn't convince me however, then
nothing can make me give it up. But I don't need or
want your point. You can only give your points back to
your President, you cannot give them to us.' So he
shamed me," Kissinger finished.

"And the Vietnamese?"

"They could hardly be more different. The problem
is to convince them we really want peace."

"Don't you think a million tons of bombs a year
makes it hard for them to believe?"

"No. I know this has to sound unendurably callous
to you, but the North Vietnamese are inconceivably tough
people, and they've never known peace in their lives.
So to them the bombing is part of the given. They are
able to live with it almost as a condition of nature.
But when it comes to negotiation, they refuse to trust
us on the most absurd little points. Let them feel if
they will that we are not to be relied on in the larger

201

scheme of things--that is not my point of view, but an
argument can obviously be advanced--it is just that they
refuse to trust us on the pettiest points where it would
not even be to our interest to cheat them. So they are
not easy to comprehend. On the one hand they have a
fortitude you cannot help but admire; on the other,
they are near to little lawyers who are terrified of the
larger processes of the law--and so cling to the most
picayune items. That is one difficulty in dealing with
the North Vietnamese. The other is their compulsion to
the legalistic which bears no relation to reality, nor
to the possibility of reality. In effect they expect
us to win their war for them for they want us to write up
into the peace agreement their literal investiture of the
government of South Vietnam. And that obviously we can't
do. There's nothing we want more than for the war to end,
but they must take their chances too. They have to win
their own war."

"When they began their offensive in April, why then
didn't the President just let them drive ahead and solve
the problem for you? Why, just at that point, did he
choose to escalate the bombing?"

202

Kissinger did not reply. The difficulty in continuing the discussion was that they would now be obliged to talk about the character of Richard Nixon rather than the nature of the North Vietnamese; given Kissinger's position, that was hardly possible; so the character of the interview changed. If it was easy for Aquarius to have the idea that Nixon and Kissinger were more in accord on Russia and China than on Vietnam, there was no evidence for it. Kissinger took pains to express his respect. "The President is a very complex man," he said, "perhaps more complex than anyone I've known, and different from the public view of him. He has great political courage for instance."

"Yes. It was no ordinary gamble to go to China."

"And he made moves in Russia which would take too long to explain now, but believe me he showed extraordinary decisiveness."

"Still, don't you think it's a vice that he has a personality which is of no use to the country?"

"Nixon is wary of exhibiting anything personal in himself. You have to consider the possibility it's for very good cause considering the way he has been treated by the Media."

203

"Still his wariness creates contempt."

"And a spirit of debunking which I don't find very happy. It was like that in the Weimar Republic. Just the kind of wholesale debunking that may yet lead to totalitarianism." Kissinger shrugs. "I wonder if people recognize how much Nixon may be a bulwark against that totalitarianism."

"Can he be if his personality does not inspire?"

"I'm not certain."

"As people grow up, don't they form their characters to some extent on the idea a President gives of his person to the public. Nixon may give too little."

"In the absolute sense, it could be true that in the Presidency one needs to have a man it is worth being like."

"While Nixon offers nothing authentic of himself."

"Let us say," said Kissinger, "that he is not primarily a moral leader."

"But in your opinion, a political genius?"

"Absolutely."

It was Aquarius' opinion as well, but that was a thought he could return to. Their lunch broke up with the passing of their table by Art Buchwald who announced

204

to Kissinger that Dobrinin was coming to his house one
night soon to play chess, and schedules permitting, he
thought, granting Dobrinin's status as a chess player
that they should make a date to team up against the
Ambassador. Kissinger agreed.

On the way back to the White House, they talked
companionably of the hazards of working life, of jet-lag
and fatigue. "How much sleep do you get?" asked Aquarius.

"I am happy if I can average five hours."

"Is it enough?"

"I always thought my mind would develop in a high
position. But, fatigue becomes a factor. The mind is
always working so hard that you learn little. Instead,
you tend to work with what you learned in previous years."

They said goodbye in the white office in the White
House with its blue sofas, its oriental rugs, and its
painting by Olitsky, a large canvas in blue-purple, a
wash of dark transparencies with a collection of pigment
near the center as if to speak of revery and focus. "I've
only come to like modern art in the last few years."
Kissinger remarked.

Aquarius was to think again of focus. Because
Kissinger opened to him a painful question on the value

205

of the act of witness: lunch had been agreeable. Yet
how could one pretend that Kissinger was a man whose
nature could be assessed by such a meeting; in this sense,
he was not knowable--one did not get messages from his
presence of good or evil, rather of intelligence, and
the warm courtesy of Establishment, yes, Kissinger was
the essence of Establishment, his charm and his presence
even depending perhaps on just such emoluments of position
as the happiness he obtained in the best restaurants. If
there was a final social need for Establishment, then
Kissinger was a man born to be part of it and so auto-
matically installed in the moral schizophrenia of
Establishment, a part of the culture of moral concealment,
and yet never was the problem so perfect, for the
schizophrenia had become Aquarius' own. Kissinger was a
man he liked, and in effect was ready to protect--he would
even provide him with his own comments back to read. So
Aquarius wondered if he had come into that world of the
unendurably complex where one gave parts of one's
allegiance to men who worked in the evil gears and bowels
and blood left by the moral schizophrenia of Establishment,
but still worked there, as one saw it, for good more than

206

ill. It was a question to beat upon every focus of the
brain, and he prepared with something near to bewilderment
to go down to Miami again and see if there were moral
objects still to be delineated in the ongrowing blur of
his surest perceptions.

The Brookings Institution
Advanced Study Program
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

ROUND TABLES FOR BUSINESS EXECUTIVES ON
GOVERNMENT, THE ECONOMY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

November 1968 - June 1969

-- A series of eight monthly Round Tables for top management executives on major political, economic and social problems and their impact on governmental decision-making.

-- Designed to strengthen business leadership through searching discussions -- with scholars and public officials -- of basic issues and forces that are shaping the direction of government in domestic and international affairs.

PRELIMINARY PROGRAM*

* revised 10/15/68

ROUND TABLES ON
GOVERNMENT, THE ECONOMY AND AMERICAN SOCIETY

SUMMARY SCHEDULE

Round Table One

DECISION-MAKING IN GOVERNMENT -- PROBLEMS OF CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE

November 13-14, 1968

Round Table Two

NEW APPROACHES TO SOCIAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS OF
PUBLIC ORDER

December 11-12, 1968

Round Table Three

AMERICAN FEDERALISM IN TRANSITION

January 15-16, 1969

Round Table Four

FEDERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE

February 19-20, 1969

Round Table Five

POLICY TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INVESTMENT

March 19-20, 1969

Round Table Six

CURRENT AND FUTURE DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

April 16-17, 1969

Round Table Seven

DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR FUTURE NATIONAL
SECURITY

May 14-15, 1969

Round Table Eight

GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS IN THE FUTURE

June 18-19-20, 1969

(4)

ROUND TABLE ONE
NOVEMBER 13-14, 1968
DECISION-MAKING IN GOVERNMENT -- PROBLEMS OF CONTINUITY
AND CHANGE

Wednesday, November 13

6:00 p.m. Reception/Dinner/ CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT --
THE ROAD AHEAD

DAVID S. BRODER, Political Correspondent and Columnist,
The Washington Post

MYER FELDMAN, Partner, Ginsburg and Feldman, former
Legislative Assistant to Senator John F. Kennedy and
Counsel to President Johnson

STEPHEN HORN, Senior Fellow in Governmental Studies,
The Brookings Institution, former Administrative Assistant
to Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell and Legislative
Assistant to Senator Thomas H. Kuchel

JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, Senior Fellow in Governmental Studies,
The Brookings Institution, former Deputy Under Secretary of
Agriculture and Administrative Assistant to Senator Joseph
S. Clark

Thursday, November 14

8:00 a.m. Breakfast/ Discussion

9:30 a.m. THE FEDERAL DECISION-MAKING SYSTEM

WALLACE S. SAYRE, Eaton Professor of Public Administration
and Chairman, Department of Political Science, Columbia
University

12:00 noon Luncheon/ ORGANIZATION OF THE PRESIDENCY --
SOME LESSONS FROM THE IMMEDIATE PAST

DOUGLASS CATER, Author, former Consultant to the Secretary
of State and Special Assistant to President Johnson

2:15 p.m. THE SUPREME COURT AND NATIONAL POLICY

ARCHIBALD COX, Samuel Williston Professor of Law,
Harvard University, former Solicitor General of the United States

4:30 p.m. Adjournment

(5)

ROUND TABLE TWO
DECEMBER 11-12, 1968
NEW APPROACHES TO SOCIAL ISSUES AND PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC ORDER

Wednesday, December 11

6:00 p.m. Reception/ Dinner/ PROBLEMS OF SOCIAL DISCONTENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT

THE HONORABLE RAMSEY CLARK, Attorney General of the United States

Thursday, December 12

9:30 a.m. INCOME MAINTENANCE PROPOSALS FOR ALLEVIATING POVERTY -- ASSESSMENT AND PROSPECTS

ROBERT J. LAMPMAN, Professor of Economics, University of Wisconsin

12:00 noon Luncheon/ SOCIAL WELFARE POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE -- ISSUES AND TRENDS

ALVIN L. SCHORR, Professor and Director of the Income Maintenance Project, Brandeis University

2:15 p.m. NEW DIRECTIONS IN CIVIL RIGHTS AND RACE RELATIONS

STERLING TUCKER, Director of Field Services, National Urban League

4:30 p.m. Adjournment

(6)

ROUND TABLE THREE
AMERICAN FEDERALISM IN TRANSITION

JANUARY 15-16, 1969

Wednesday, January 15

6:00 p.m. Reception/ Dinner/ PROBLEMS AND TRENDS IN FEDERAL-
STATE RELATIONS

THE HONORABLE TERRY SANFORD, President, Urban America, Inc.,
former Governor of North Carolina.

Thursday, January 16

9:30 a.m. MAJOR ISSUES IN STRENGTHENING INTERGOVERNMENTAL
FISCAL RELATIONS

DICK NETZER, Professor of Economics and Head, Department
of Economics, New York University

12:00 noon Luncheon/ THE CAPACITY OF GOVERNMENT TO MEET
URBAN PROBLEMS

THE HONORABLE PAUL N. YLVISAKER, Commissioner of
Community Affairs for the State of New Jersey

2:15 p.m. THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL SYSTEM -- PROBLEMS
OF REFORM

THE HONORABLE HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., United States
Senator from Tennessee

NORTON E. LONG, Professor of Political Science,
University of Illinois

4:30 p.m. Adjournment

ROUND TABLE FOUR

FEBRUARY 19-20, 1969

Wednesday, February 19

6:00 p.m. Reception/ Dinner/ ECONOMIC POLICY GOALS AND ISSUES

HENRY C. WALLICH, Professor of Economics, Yale University

Thursday, February 20

9:30 a.m. PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC REGULATION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION

WALTER D. FACKLER, Acting Dean, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago

12:00 noon Luncheon/ THE FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC POLICIES FOR THE COMING YEAR

(to be announced)

2:15 p.m. TRENDS IN FISCAL AND MONETARY POLICIES

G.L. BACH, Frank E. Buck Professor of Economics and Public Policy, Graduate School of Business, Stanford University

4:30 p.m. Adjournment

(8)

ROUND TABLE FIVE

MARCH 19-20, 1969

Wednesday, March 19

6:00 p.m. Reception/ Dinner/ CENTRAL ISSUES IN FOREIGN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, Professor of Economics,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Thursday, March 20

9:30 a.m. POLICY TRENDS IN FOREIGN TRADE AND INVESTMENT
(to be announced)

12:00 noon Luncheon/ PROBLEMS OF REFORM IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM

PIERRE-PAUL SCHWEITZER, Managing Director and Chairman
of the Board of Executive Directors, International Monetary Fund

2:15 p.m. ECONOMIC POLICIES TOWARD LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

ISALAH FRANK, William L. Clayton Professor of International
Economic, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University

4:30 p.m. Adjournment

(11)

ROUND TABLE EIGHT (CONCLUDING PROGRAM)
GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS IN THE FUTURE

JUNE 18-19-20, 1969

Wednesday, June 18

12:00 noon Luncheon/ Formation of Discussion Groups for Review of Problems in Government-Business Relations

2:15 p.m. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF CORPORATE GROWTH

EARL LATHAM, Joseph B. Eastman Professor of Political Science, Amherst College

6:00 p.m. Reception/ Dinner/ GOVERNMENT IN THE ECONOMY -- ISSUES AND PROSPECTS

JAMES H. LORIE, Professor of Business Administration, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago

Thursday, June 19

8:00 a.m. Breakfast/ Review by Discussion Groups

9:30 a.m. THE FUTURE OF THE CORPORATE ENTERPRISE

KENNETH E. BOULDING, Professor of Economics, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado

12:00 noon Luncheon/ MAJOR FISCAL POLICY ISSUES

(to be announced)

2:30 p.m. MAJOR ISSUES IN FEDERAL BUDGET POLICY

(to be announced)

4:00 p.m. MAJOR MONETARY POLICY ISSUES

(to be announced)

6:00 p.m. Reception/Dinner/ A CONGRESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMIC POLICY ISSUES AND TRENDS

(to be announced)

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

JUN 5 1971

Dear Mr. Malof:

Thank you for your invitation to me to
address your mid-June round table discus-
sion group and for your understanding of the
uncertainties of my schedule.

I am still hoping that I will be able to join
you in June 15 but would appreciate, if it is
not too great an inconvenience, your getting
in touch with David Halperin in my office at
the end of the preceeding week to confirm
this date.

Mr. Peter Malof
Coordinator of Business Programs
The Brookings Institution
1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

jlp:5/28/71

RECEIVED

JUN 1 7 1971

CENTRAL FILES

The Brookings Institution
Washington, D. C.

ROUND TABLES FOR CORPORATE EXECUTIVES
1971 SERIES

--Informal monthly discussions to probe and exchange knowledge, perceptions and views on governmental thinking and action in major problem areas of public policy.

--A program of executive education for policy-level corporate representatives drawn from a cross-section of business, industry and commerce.

## PRELIMINARY PROGRAM FOR ROUND TABLE FIVE

### DATES

TUESDAY, JUNE 15 - THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1971

held at The Brookings Institution, 1775 Massachusetts Ave., N.W. and The Hotel Dupont Plaza, Dupont Circle, Washington, D. C.

### THEME

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND NATIONAL SECURITY

the changing American role in world affairs / dynamics of the foreign policy process / impact of research and technology on strategic issues / American-Soviet relations and the future of Europe / issues and trends in arms control / international economic policy-making / policy stakes in Asia / policy stakes in the Middle East / the needs of a viable defense posture

### PREPARATORY READINGS

1. U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: Building for Peace. A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, February 25, 1971.

2. Toward A National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence. Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird on the Fiscal Year 1972-76 Defense Program and the 1972 Defense Budget.

3. From Setting National Priorities: The 1972 Budget by Charles L. Schultze, Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin and Nancy H. Teeters:

(a) Chapter 2, "Foreign Policy Assumptions," pp. 25-32.

(b) Chapter 3, "Major Defense Options," pp. 33-70.

(c) Chapter 4, "Special Defense Issues," pp. 71-117.

(d) Chapter 5, "Foreign Assistance," pp. 118-133.

1971 Round Tables
for Corporate Executives

List of Participating Companies

AEROSPACE CORPORATION

ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA

BORG-WARNER CORPORATION

CATERPILLAR TRACTOR COMPANY

CHEMICAL BANK NEW YORK TRUST COMPANY

CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

DEERE & COMPANY

THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY

IBM - FEDERAL SYSTEMS DIVISION

JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY

KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION

KOPPERS COMPANY, INC.

THE MARATHON OIL COMPANY

MONTGOMERY WARD

OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATION

PHILIP MORRIS, INC.

PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY

SHELL OIL COMPANY

STANDARD OIL COMPANY (NEW JERSEY)

TRW SYSTEMS, INC.

WESTERN ELECTRIC COMPANY

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION

Round Table Five
International Politics and National Security

June 15-17, 1971

## PRELIMINARY AGENDA AND SCHEDULE

(subject to change)

### Tuesday, June 15, 1971

6:30 p.m.
Room 201
Brookings

Reception

7:00 p.m.
Room 110
Brookings

Dinner / THE CHANGING AMERICAN ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

### Wednesday, June 16, 1971

8:00 a.m.
Embassy Hall
Dupont Plaza Hotel

Breakfast / DYNAMICS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS

Ray S. Cline, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

10:00 a.m.
Room 203
Brookings

IMPACT OF RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY ON STRATEGIC ISSUES

12:15 p.m.
Room 110
Brookings

Luncheon / AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THE FUTURE OF EUROPE

Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

2:30 p.m.
Room 203
Brookings

ISSUES AND TRENDS IN ARMS CONTROL

Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director, U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

6:30 p.m.
Room 201
Brookings

Reception

7:00 p.m.
Room 110
Brookings

Dinner / INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY-MAKING

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger -- from W.F.B.

COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY

FOUNDED IN 1693

WILLIAMSBURG, VIRGINIA 23185

June 26, 1970

Mr. William F. Buckley, Jr.
Editor
The National Review
150 East 35th Street
New York, New York 10016

Dear Mr. Buckley:

One of the recent editorials in the *National Review* discussing academic "repressive tolerance" as it related to Messrs Moynihan and Kissinger mentioned that, if Harvard didn't want them, they might emulate Rostow and Rusk by going to Texas and Georgia.

As a new Assistant Professor at UGA (in English) I would like to suggest that both Professor Moynihan and Professor Kissinger submit applications to the appropriate departments at Georgia; they would join the great number of fine scholars already in Athens and would contribute much to the intellectual life of the South.

Mr. Kissinger, it is said, has an eye for a pretty face, and we have more than our share of those at Georgia. (Alternatively, he could bring Miss St. John along!)

Mr. Moynihan would not lack for fellow Irishmen to discuss the wonders of ethnicity with; furthermore, he might be able to provide valuable information on how we can apply the doctrine of benign neglect to Governor Maddox.

One more point: the football at UGA will certainly be far superior to anything they saw at Cambridge, Mass.

Who knows, if Moynihan and Kissinger do come the academic fortunes of the University might rise to undreamt of heights; it would become an institution that all would envy. And, in future years, Harvard, Princeton, and your sainted alma mater might aspire to become the Georgias of the North.

RECEIVED
JUL 17 1970
CENTRAL FILES

1974-51 street, apt. A10

Brooklyn, N.Y. 11204

January 30, 1969

Dr. Henry M. Kissinger, Adviser
White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Greetings and wishes of success in your responsible position as an Adviser to the President!

The enclosed copy of a letter I am sending to the Secretary of State mentions at least a few problems that the new Administration may face and which require, in my judgment, prompt and careful consideration.

We are fortunate in having Mr. Richard Nixon as the President!

I am pleased, as well, with the choice of his Cabinet and most of the appointments Mr. Nixon made.

I am tempted to make a suggestion that when the White House Conferences are made, especially for discussions on the problems of our relations with foreign countries, such conferences should include non-members, experts in sociology, psychology, psychiatry, history, anthropology, and other related disciplines dealing with human activities. Their views may shed some new insights into the problems under the discussion. Of course, these people should be notified far in advance about the scheduled conference, to give them time to reflect on the topics to be considered. Active minds are always busy and must be aware of new activities much earlier than usually, but their active minds may be eager to contribute their share toward the solving of the problems.

Mr. William Rogers
Secretary of State
Department of state
Washington, D.C.

1974-51 street, apt. A10

Brooklyn, N.Y. 11204

January 30, 1969

Dear Mr. Rogers:

This is to wish you and your Department a success in bringing peace and friend
ly relations with other nations!

The present Administration has inherited many intolerable problems requiring
immediate attention, yet difficult of solving in a short time.

When the "bad man" in the White House decided to impose his decision on a peo-
ple of different culture, living in an entirely different environment and stan-
dard of living, he did it without the consent of our people. The whole world be-
came conscious of our immoral ways in dealing with small nations. The war in
Vietnam aroused protests against us throughout the world! It involved us so
deeply that the old Administration did not know how to get out of it. Neither
was it able to pay due attention to our own internal problems!

My suggestion is to stop the war quickly and have our troops removed. It can
be done! The money saved we could use for a much better purpose-to help the
underdeveloped nations. One cannot fool other people by simply saying pleas-
santaries. We must prove the sincerity of our intentions. After all, it is for
our own benefit to live in a friendly world!

The old Administration used all kinds of excuses, even telling false stories, to justify its policy of war in Vietnam.

I had a thorough military training, starting at the age of 10, in the Imperial
Russia. I took part in the World War 1 and the subsequent Russian Revolution
(on the losing side). Even from purely military strategy, the Vietnam "war was
unjustified. In old Russia, we studied quite thoroughly China, Japan, southeast
Asia, India, and other eastern countries. For some strange reason, the man in the
White House ignored the policies of Soviet rulers and decided to make friends
with them. Perhaps, the man in the White House became convinced that Chinese
were more dangerous to the world and that the Soviets, "somehow" will help us
in stopping Chinese aggression. This policy was of tremendous help-to Soviets!
Somebody in the White House forgot to tell the bad man that neither Chinese,
nor Soviets, not even Vietnames wanted us in Vietnam!

My military training was geared toward the work of a staff officer. I proved
that by applying "comparative" method in military procurements, we could save at
least 80% in useless expenditures for war purposes. The term comparative was
used to differentiate it from another term, "relative", which I believe has a
better place in abstract thinking, such as mathematics. I dealt with actual military
figures. I was successful to demonstrate that the procurement orders of
some military commanders were 10 times of their actual needs; that practically
every branch of the military forces failed to use what equipments and supplies
they had available to the fullest extent. I was fortunate to have a close relative
as a high staff officer, an inspector, and an executive assistant director
of the largest steel works in old Russia. After demobilization, I was appointed
as a junior member of a Commission to obtain war material from the German Command
then having its high staff located in Odessa. Having pretty fair information
about the available of military supplies outside the reach of Germans, the
Commission was much more successful in obtaining from Germans what we really
needed. Again, when I was put in command of a couple recruits! units, to organize
them as 'fighting' units against Communists troops, it was left entirely to some
ingenuity on my part to equip, clothe, feed, and train them! I was, perhaps, the last
man to be militarily defeated by the reds. After that, I succeeded eluding the
enemy and escaping to freedom.

Great losses due to unchecked procurement procedures, poor records on the thing

kept on hand and depts, unreliable figures used in estimating the actual needs
overambitious calculations of the military chiefs, may send this country to a
"poor house". During the First World War, Russia mobilized 15 million people, but
we never had that many people, neither on the front, nor in active duty else-
where. The longer war lasted, the less enthusiastic were the people to go to war.
Many were deserters, many were in hospitals or "sick" at home, Even more people
were somewhere in transition-going back and forth. No military unit was ever com-
pletely staffed, but procurements, usually, were based on the fictious figures.

In this country, the above considerations should also include the manufacturers
of military goods. Because these manufacturers will influence some legislators
to have their factories working full-blast, the military men will have a greater
influence to make war expenditures larger and larger. President Eisenhower, some-
how sensed it and tried to overcome the undue influence of military men, but less
(Yes, it was the bad man, then in the Senate, who defeated Eisenhower)! The re-
lative of mine I mentioned earlier also told me that the military sometime or-
der "new" weapons which they just "forget to use", that are stored up needlessly
in warehouses.

I have another suggestion to make-resolve the Palestine question quickly, whe-
ther or not Israel or Arabs want it or not. Have Israel first withdraw from the
occupied territories of last June. This may help the adjustment, if not fully, sa-
tisfying, in solving other problems, such as boundary lines, refugees, compensatio-
ns. Too much delay may still further strengthen Soviet position in these re-
gions to the detriment of our legitimate interests there.

I am particularly disturbed, as failure of resolving the Arab Refugee problem. To
me it seems an ugly result of trying to help Jews to settle in Palestine!

The old Administration had some strange ideas but lacked understanding of the
problems. I wonder what kind advisers the old man in the White House had? Take
for instance the letter White House sent to the head of Turkish Republic in
1964. I visited Turkey in May, 1966 and mingled with all kinds of people to feel
their sentiment toward us. I heard the expressions of agony and anger of ordina-
ry people one usually meets at Turkish open cafes. They felt that our President
refused to help the Turks if Russians attack them as a result of a quarrel with
Cyprus Greeks. These people demanded that Turkish Government withdraw its for-
ces from Korea and reconsider ties to NATO. Take another instance of lack of un-
derstanding-the recent appointment of Robert Komer as an Ambassador to Turkey.
Mr. Komer was objected to for his part in "pacification" activities in Vietnam.
Turks did not want him, although the Turkish authorities did not oppose the ap-
pointment. This time time Turkish students became vehement and mobbed Mr. Ko-
mer's car. How an ambassador can accomplish anything good under such conditions
The tragedy of that man in the White House was his failure to see that others
may not accept his ideas. This man was more carefull in his relations with our
own men in Congress!

I know Russia better than any other average Russian. I can speak various dialects
used in different parts of Russia, including the language of 35 Muslims in
habiting Russia. I shall be very happy to be of any assistance should you de-
cide to take a trip to that country.