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France today. I believe that far from being backward, nationalistic and all the attributes that our people in Washington described to De Gaulle he is remarkable and he has understood the evolving situation better than we have. Its not that he necessarily likes the situation but I think he has understood the shape of international politics over the next 15-20 years better than we. The trouble is that his conceptions are better than his strengths, probably our strength is better than our conceptions, but this creates a dilemma. Because after he dies it is not likely

a) kja that his succession can take place well within France. He has created a constitution constitutional system which I don't see how it can be maintained permanently. I system that he ah has created is either going to move towards Caesarism or it is going to go back to a Third Third Republic like type of government where all the political leaders that I know of in France, I don't think anyone is capable of playing the role De Gaulle is. I see some who could be dictators and I see some who could be Third of Fourth Republic prime ministers but I do not see that the domestic system of France will survive De Gaulle's stead.

b) The kind of foreign policy that he conducts requires the kind of nerves that people who rise in modern government generally dont have and it is really very Bismarkian and cold war blooded, everyone knows what its limits of power are, that is wrong, not taking into account the emotional and sentimental feelings and even though I think that the conception of the revolution in Europe Europe is correct it is more nearly correct than ours, I believe that he is starting an international system that is not going to be very stable. We are not artists

4/8/64--8

I am not necessarily arguing that a mediocre policy
our stability. During the period where an act of creativity is se
essential and for that you need a great man and the international order
is very lucky--it has great men who have created the institutions.

Q.

A. History gives very little proof of the existence of great men in every generation, particularly great men in one country arising in every generation and one of the problems of any international order is to what degree do you want to rely on either the capacities or the promises of the statemen or to what degree do you want to some institution which can absorb you. One problem with great men is that their conceptions are sometimes out of scale and that they are not easily absorbed by even their subordinates much less other members of the international system. Now in the present world I think one of the difficulties which has beset the international system ever since 1914 is the excessive reliance on the capacity of the statesman. Side by side with social structure which brings to the top men of less and less capacity because there is very little in the political process now which relates capacity to govern to capacity to try and get into high office. And also because of the tremendous shock that World War I gave to the self confidence of the western leadership group. Well, the easy way out is always two fold. One way out is to rely on the self restrain of the leading statesmen or on the assurances that they give to each other. When we are challenged by the French, for example, Acheson keeps saying after all Secretary McNamara has promised solemnly on numeral occasions he said our nuclear arsenal would always be available. Well, after all Secretary McNamara is not a permanent fixture of the American scene, it has

4/8/64--9

happened before in American political life that statesmen have changed their
minds and to rely on the assurance any one statesmen, particularly in
a system
as ours, is in itself an element of instability.
NOW it is always possible, now always but often possible, to escape
structural problems by assuming that those who have responsibility
are going to take a more favorable course or are going to show enormous
self restraint. Take the Common Market--I cannot understand the outrage
of most of the people who were instrumental in creating the Common Market
about the fact that the Common Market is discriminatory in its economic policy.
A Common Market, by definition, is bound to be discriminatory. Any study
of European history would have shown that in all the countries comprising
the Common Market a certain amount of mercantilism and protectionism has
always been strong. They didn't create a Common Market in order to abolish

Now we can argue about the height of
but a common market is discriminatory against the outside ew world
is in the nature of the common market. Also, once you create a structure
it creates a dynamism of its own and there the professions of fia faith
of people at the beginning of a process of are of very little interest.
Of course when you start a common market it is easy to describe the picture
of the world of the liberal economists of the 19th century
which everyone benefits from every conceivable development and in which
everybody maximizes through free exchange of goods. This is not
the way the international system has worked since the turn of the century.
There was no reason to suppose that if a common market was created it would
not turn into a rival of the United States. Similarly, I am convinced
if Britain joined the Common Market it would not be a bridge to Europe,
it would make Europe that much stronger and that would be what we

4/8/64--10

then see as De Gaullist as- pursued by British methods and that this would
be a rather potent combination. And this has nothing to do now, I am not
saying that MacMillan or Hume have in the back of their minds that they
are going to pursue a very tough policy once they are inside the Common
Market. Qdite the contrary. No matter what they have in mind now
there are certain structural necessities in which a certain system will
either go to pieces, which is also possible with the common market,
or, if it does take hold it is going to develop a momentum of its own.
This incidentally, as I will explain later, my chief objection to the
NATO multilateral force. I think no matter what the people now way
they want to do e with it it will create certain political strucutres
that five years from now are going to have a life of their own
and in which the logic of the structure is going to determine what the
statesmen will do as much . Now I am not arguing as a predeterminist
here and the biggest problem of judgment is always to decide what the range
of individual decision is. At the same time to rely too much on individual
decisions, on individual self restrain makes f00 for a very heavy strain on
the international system. This is my concern about the diplomacy of World
War II which I explained last time. In World War II we in effect postulated
that there was only one cause of war and this was the wickedness of the Germans
and the Japanese. Bath nations were thought to be prone to war
therefore the only security system which we could conceived was one
that guaranteed the world against the renewal of Japanese and German aggression.
In fact, we were so convinced of that we created in insisted on
unconditional surrender
both in central Europe and in Asia and this vacuum had a logic of its own.
Somebody was going to fill it. The fact that we didn't fill it, that fact

4/8/64--11

that we didn't believe that it made any difference whether there was a
vacuum of or not, indeed that it was even desirable that Germany be completely
smashed and Japan was completely smashed did not change the structural
problem. Russia was presented with a temptation in the center of Europe
Europe which simply would not have been open to it if one had tried to
reinforce whatever self restraint one though they had with some physical
limitations. (Now the dilemma that is presented is this: if you
face- rely very much on physical limitations, on stephen- structural limitations,
you could base your policy on a certain amount of mistrust. And you could
argue the mistrust breeds distrust and that you are starting a vicious
circle.) In 1945 we had insisted that the Soviets not establish themselves
in the Balkans and in Eastern Europe, which I think was probably possible,
then there are many peoee people who would argue that if there had been
a cold war as a result of this that we were to blame for it. Those who would
argue the opposite would have said yes a cold war might have been pursued,
and it would have been conducted on more familiar
and the temptations for Soviet pressure would have been less and therefore,
the long range possibilities would have been greater. But this is
a question of judgment and of philosophy. When there exists two German states,
you have a structural problem effecting the peace which has nothing to do
with the intentions of anyone who is going . Two German states are
bound to interact on each other regardless of what anyone may want to do.
Now during World War II there undoubtedly had been periods when there had been
an excessive preoccupation with the structure of the international system.
And when you have this excessive preoccupation you may have many wars hard
equally
and many cases of tension. Of the other hand, what you also usually have

4/8/64--12

are very limited objectives because you deal with the structural problems
very early, they are more easily solved. But undoubtedly there had been
periods which have been excessively concerned with structure. From 1914
on, at least from 1914 on, there has been an excessive concern it seems
to me with resting the international settlement on what were generally
considered enlightened attitudes towards peace. The men of good will, those
who wanted peace, thought that the way to have it

for its possible opponents by ascribing the best possible motivation
to them by and by rejecting the concerns with structural adjustment.

During World War II, it was considered as a contributing cause of international
distrust to worry about the ab balance of power. -Pe Britain was constantly
castigated for wanting to, for concerning itself with the shape of the
post war world. It was thought then and it is thought by many today
that a happy atmosphere, personal relations (of) the leading statesmen, is going
to (be the solver of) international differences, and none of the problems which
were raised by the British during the war seemed to the American statesmen of
the times to be sufficiently important to try and force a diplomatic
confrontation with the Soviets. We had the constant problem, starting in
World War II for the United States, and perhaps at the end of World War I
for the Europeans, of separating the process of negotiation from other
pleasures that could be brought to bear. A problem was thought to be
either a negotiating problem or a military problem. But And therefore,
during World War II it did not seem to the Americans,

4/8/64--13

statesmen at the time to make a great deal of difference when a process was negotiated. They were not concerned. Normally the wise course for a status quo country is to try and negotiate their settlement while the enemy is still in the field. In other words, to add the pressure of the enemy (for) whatever pressures they can generate in order to force a settlement which preserves some kind of equilibrium. This is the course, as I said, that Metternich pursued during the war with Napoleon. To the degree that the common danger disappears the motive for common action disappears as well. The problem of the World War II settlement or non-settlement was that, with the complete defeat of Germany and Japan and with the demobilization of the United States and with the conviction that forces was not available to settle disputes, no motive existed for anybody, either for the Soviet Union or for any of the new countries to settle disputes on any other basis on which to base their policies. We see that in Cyprus today. Now the big difference say than between the Napoleonic settlement and the World War I settlement is that there has been a progressive lack of emphasis on the structure of the international settlement and the price that was paid for it was a rather rigid cold war because we then had to reconstruct such a kind of a balance. There was relatively little flexibility. Now what compounded the problem was, however, well, two things. There would have been a major problem even if arch angles had been in power in Moscow. We made too much of the fact, we give the impression very often that if only Communists were not governing in Moscow, there would have been no post war trouble. I would say that any Russian government would have been a major threat to the peace of Europe. After all, Russia was a problem throughout the 19th century when it had anything but a communist government. By taking away the traditional opponent of Russian expansion,

4/8/64--14

by weakening western Europe, because of the weakened position of western Europe
due to the war Russia was bound to be a predominant power in Europe no matter
who governed it. And this was going to be a destabilizing factor of the post
war world, again regardless of what we wanted, regardless of what
of who was in power. The situation was made more difficult by the fact
that an enormous (attribution) of power (for) the Soviet Union and for traditional
Russia occurred within the context of an ideological split in the world
and of certain philosophic convictions on the part of the Soviet leaders.
Throughout the war President Roosevelt was convinced that somehow he could bring
the Soviet leaders back into the (communists) community of nations. And in this
conviction he was in no way distinguished from President (Hitler) Eisenhower who
had exactly the same conviction and President Kennedy who also had the same
conviction and I have no doubt that President Johnson has also. Now the
problem is that the communist theory makes it very difficult for Soviet leaders
to be (receivable) to the charm of American negotiation. The attitude of Soviet
leaders towards American negotiators, as I may have pointed out before,
is very similar to American psychiatrists' (post)entation. They believe that they
understand us better than we understand ourselves. They believe that the
objective structure of society is more important than the individual wishes
of American statesmen. It is absolutely inconceivable for Khrushchev to come
back to the (Kroll) saying that Eisenhower was such a charming man at Camp
David that he had (seeped) stopped the pressure on Berlin. When Eisenhower
said the pressure in Berlin was abnormal he (me) meant abnormal in the
American sense. It isn't normal for a city to be surrounded by hostile territory.
That is not the case of Des Moines. Interpreted in (communist) language it meant
that objective conditions were such that some change had to (take) place, and I
think Khrushchev really meant-it believed that Eisenhower had promised him
some change in the case of Berlin. Now at a time when we relied very (much)

4/8/64--15

on the close personal relation that existed between leading statesmen during the war, the Soviets never had any such allusions and in fact there they were prevented by their philosophy from relying on this to any extent. In 1946 Stalin had an interview with Stassen in which he said the war had not been caused by Hitler; it had been caused by the capitalist system and that he couldn't see any difference between the German and the British system. He made the same kind of comment in 1945. Isn't the conviction that the systems produce wars Stalin really had not choice within his framework of value except to try to get tangible guarantees of security for the communist to rely on the word of the western statesmen would be an abdication of anything that they had stood for and, while I am not saying that they read Marx every day to find out what to do, there are certain patterns of thinking, certain interpretations of the nature of reality that are inevitable if you are a Leninist. One of those, at least, has to be that the verbal assurances of statesmen cannot substitute for tangible guarantees of the Soviets seems to carry the problem of tangible guarantees to a point where they make any statement about the international system impossible. Many westerners would argue why did the Soviets sacrifice the good will that they had accumulated during the war because good will to them was a transitory phenomenon dependent on factors which were not only outside of their control but which in there their philosophy were interpreted as hostile. To them the problem of the post war period was to get to expand their security belt as rapidly and as widely as they possibly could in order to be in the best possible position for the showdown which their theory told them was inevitable. I don't believe that Stall Stalin hesitated for a minute about the kind of policy that he had to pursue so that actually the excessive interest of personal relations on our side and the excessive interest in

4/13/64

The last time I talked about the impact of World War II on the structure of the post war world, I think there were essentially four reasons why the post war world had been so stable. Well maybe four. One is the destruction of whatever international structure had existed which was in part due to the policy of unconditional surrender. Now this doesn't mean that the policy of unconditional surrender was avoidable, simply means that one of the practical consequences was that it created a vacuum in the center of Europe and a vacuum in Asia which was bound to be built by someone, and the fact that we did not realize that it had to be filled made the long term situation even more difficult. During World War II (the previous) Romanian foreign minister wrote a book in which he warned what would happen if Soviet armies were permitted to march into the center of Europe without some attempt being made to achieve a settlement before they got there. It was ignored because it didn't fit into the spirit of the time. One of the criticisms that de Gaulle makes of American foreign policy is that he thinks we are not a good guardian of the international equilibrium considering that we gave away, in his view, gave away, half of Europe at the end of the war. Now to what degree we gave away half of Europe, to what degree it was avoidable is something which I will talk about a little more today. The fact is that the collapse of Germany, the collapse of the East European countries created, upset the European structure as it had developed over the previous two hundred years and put Russia into the center of the continent at a time when the west European countries were extremely weak.

The second factor was real related to the first. Not only did the international structure collapse, but there was no settlement about what a new structure should be. And when you combine the temptations created by a vacuum

131

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4/13/64--2

and the absence of any legitimate order, you had a basic structural reasons for tension.

The third factor, which I spoke about last time, was communist ideology. I would like to say a few more things about that today. No matter who was in power in Russia, a western Europe as weak as it was, a Germany completely smashed a east Europe destroyed would have created enormous temptations for Russian expansion. The communist ideology, in my view, gave it a particular impetus. There was the conviction on the part of the communists that in communist theory, or in Leninist theory they possessed incomparable truths for setting the future trend. This meant that good will, willingness to compromise, all the phrases that are very characteristic of the way we conduct some aspects of our international relations seems relatively unimportant to them. The good will that has been accumulated during the war by heroic Russian defense was without any question and indeed without any sense that a sacrifice was being made because of the communist conviction of Stalins that the social and economic pressures in the catholic world would certainly produce a crisis and this crisis would almost certainly lead to war a-wide unless through some accident the Soviet world could get so strong in the interim that it would be too risky for the west. This therefore led to on the part of the Soviets to the policy which looked primarily for tangible guarantees about security. They were looking, as I pointed out before, for absolute security and, in the process, they were bound to create insecurity in all the surrounding countries. Against anyone's wishes in the period 1945-47 the western countries found themselves inevitably drawn into an attempt to fill the vacuum that had been created and to try to thwart the communist pressures for expansion. Now this then led to the fourth factor that affected post war relationships which was our conjecture of foreign policy. I would like to say a few words about that today.

4/13/64--3

I think the, until the outbreak of World War II and for a good period
afterward the United States suffered from delusions which seem to be that
what was an unfortunate historical situation represented the normal pattern
of international relations. We were secure behind two great oceans
and we thought that the question of war and peace always appeared in absolute
terms, and there developed in our thinking about policy a separation between
force and diplomacy which had plagued us in the entire post war period including
today. There was the notion that either relations between states would be based
on pure reason, willingness to compromise, negotiating skills or they would be based
on war. In war there was no substitute for victory. In peace there was no substitute
for willingness to compromise. How to relate these two factors to each other and how
to deal with all the intermediate shadings of pressures, threats, conciliations that
were available, this has been one of our serious difficulties. As I pointed out last
time, as late as 1945, the end of 1945, much of the thinking in the United States
concerned, took seriously the idea that we could perform about the role in
international affairs that India later tried to take on for herself. That is that
we should be mediators between Great Britain and Prussia, that themenial takes-of
task of the balance of power would be performed by Britain and that we would
intervene only to take the edges off this competition. This, incidentally, is
always the delusion of countere countries that know they will be protected
-net no matter what there their policy is. One of the ironies of the situation
is that many in Great Britain, in fact, the majority in Great Britain today
take towards us exactly the same position as we use to take towards them in the
1940s, Unfortunately for precisely the same reasons. Up to 1945 (or) probably up
to 1947, we did not believe that anything we did would basically affect the
balance of power and conversely we knew that no matter what we did somebody else
would take care of the grubby details of security. Therefore we could afford a

4/13/64--4

posture, and the rather petty day-to-day considerations
rather me elevated moral conscience and the rather little
which are related to equilibrium seem to us a peculiar European fallacy,
something the nature of European wars, European shortsightedness and our moral
superiority were stock and trade of American/origin. Today, when you read the
British press this is roughly, not to speak of the Indian press, not to speak of
absolutely
the Ghanian press, but you read the British press, American stupidity is/proverbial;
American concern with security, the cold warriors in Washington, being manipulated
by the military industrial bloc in this country, this is part of the British folklore,
and the only hope that most British British see is that the British moral influence
and superior negotiating skills is going to prevent the mad Americans from one day
incinerating the world. This is absolutely axiomatic even among people who think
they are close fire friends of the United States. Now, this reflects the fact
that Britain no longer has any direct responsibility or thinks it has any direct
responsibility for the overall balance of power, and it seems to me that it doesn't
even feel any responsibility for the local balance of power. They feel protected;
they know that any threat to the overall security will either be met by us
or will not be met by us, and they aren't even sure if they want us to meet it,
or don't want us to met it, but in case, the decision is out of their hands. One
of the consequences of Suez, of the Suez fiasco, was in way the psychological application
of-Great abdication of Great Britain from Great power status. Now this has some
advantages, but it has the disadvantage that they can afford, or think they can afford,
a somewhat aloof, peckstone posture and a more elevated posture than they could afford
were they responsible for conducting a more precautionary foreign policy. And any
time one conducts foreign policy, one should keep in mind, as we don't often do,
only can we succeed in any given instance, whether any particular policy
is correct but what kind of impact we have on the conception of those with whom we
deal of their role in international affairs. If one of the results of their policy

4/13/64--5

is a sense of impotence on the part of everyone who deals with us, then the long-term impact on the international structure is not necessarily happy. This is also something to which I will come back. But this shift in relationships forced us in 1945, 46, 47 gradually to assume the role of balancer of the equilibrium that Britain and to a lesser extent France performed up to the end of World War II.

Now this was not at all a natural thing for us to do. For example, early in 1946 when Churchill made his speech at Fulton about the Iron Curtain American press comment and American Congressional comment was almost uniformly hostile.

For example a Senator from Kansas said "Churchill apparently is intent on using the United States as a threat against Russia to stop Russia's march against Europe and into the United States and at the same time arouse the people of the United States to permit this country to act at preserving the British Empire. This we must never permit to happen." Then in the Christian Science Monitor said "We can agree with/Churchill that there is an imperative need of settlement of some assurances, but perhaps it is a two way street, for anything more than a frantic arms race, there is need of assurances on both sides. Then It is fear and suspicion and cultivated hate which destroys assurances. It is frankness, fairness, adherence to right which builds assurance more than any alliance. If America has to choose between a Stalin world and a Churchill world the result cannot be in doubt. But there is a better world. Is there no time still to win it?" Then a Republican representative from Indiana, I pick Republicans (because they can't be accused of having these thoughts as communists), "no greater disservice has been done to America in my recollection than was done by former Prime Minister Churchill in Fulton, Missouri when he had the afrontery to propose that the United States and Britain enter into a military alliance. That proposal was an ugly exhibition of power policy and a sinister challenge with good intentions of our Americans." He said at the speech of the former Prime Minister was made on American soil

["4/13/64--6", "proposing that America and Britain join a power bloc gave our people their first intimate contact with the repulsiveness of international policy. Its propaganda has filled America with ssu suspicion and distrust and has made the path of peace more difficult.\" And then a eeliumin oollumnist, well known for his conservative views, wrote, this is not, so elegant--\"hold your hats, boys, we are off again hwell Bent for tonight's tumble with all the 1930 build up with which Roosevelt and Churchill succored their nations into a war against Germany with strictly economic while fisihing out to the customers a somewhat 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4/13/64 -- 7

can prove that another policy could, in fact, have succeeded. MY own judgment for what it is worth, and on final examinations I would say it is worth a lot, my own judgment is that the Soviets probably had no intention when they moved into Eastern Europe of staying there and that they were rather amazed at the fact that we did not get into negotiations with them earlier. I think that they wanted, at first, to get the kind of relation to Eastern Europe which they finally developed towards Finland. And this is supported to be true by the fact that they permitted reasonably free elections in Hungary and Poland when they first came in. Elections which went against the local Communist party and that their efforts at that time was to gain a maximum degree of influence for the Communist party, and that only after it became apparent that we were able to keep on negotiating that they gradually increased their hold, and was really the Communist regimes weren't installed until the end of '46, early '47 and '48. Now as I say this cannot be true today anymore and the price that is paid for this is not so much in terms of any fiscal of anybody's power since the difficulty is that with the divided Germany there are bound to be tensions in Europe regardless of what the major countries want and that the structure that has emerged as a result of this has elements of instability in it that cannot be measured simply in terms of the intentions of the at any given moment. The one man who was very much in favor of a determined effort to negotiate with the Soviets was in '45, '46, '47 was Churchill. He made a speech in 1948 in which he said the question is asked what will happen when they get the atomic bombs themselves and have accumulated a large store. You can judge yourselves what will happen then by what is happening now. If these things are done in the green woods what will be done in the dry. If they can continue month after month disturbing and tormenting the worldtrusting to our

4/13/64 - 8

inefficiency in using the strange new power against them. What will they do when they themselves have large quantities of atomic bombs? No one in this century can believe that we have a limitless xixixix period of time before us. We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final we ought not go go charging along in waiting for something to turn up which I mean waiting for something bad to turn up. The Western nations will be far more likely to reach a lasting settlement without if they formulate at just demands while they have the atomic power before the Russian Communists have got it too. But, curiously enough, in the period after 1945 there was at first an interval which we didn't recognize that a government was necessary. And then there was the period in which we were, even though we had the atomic monopoly, obsessed by the idea that we were too weak to have negotiations. In the period after 1948, after George Kennan formulated the doctrine of containment, the theory was that it was essential for the race to create decisions of strength. That with these positions of strength, there would come a change in the negotiating positions of the powers. As Acheson says "what we must do is create positions of strength. If we create such strengths it will come about as in the difference in negotiating position of the party. With that there should come a willingness on the side of the Kremlin to recognize success. This is how, in my opinion, that from 1948 on, basic doctrine of American foreign policy was the doctrine of containment to lead through the Administration and for all the personal dislike of each other of Dulles and Acheson it isn't very easy for me to see what significant respect their policies differ. The policy in effect was that the West was weak that the West being weak had to build up military power (and to create military alliances. And only after this had been achieved could one confront the Soviet Union in negotiations. The kind of policy then diplomacy

4/13/64 -- 9

that is defines it cold war diplomacy began with this rather
peculiar interpretation of the doctrine of containment. Peculiar interpretation
because it took no account whatever of the fact that we possess an atomic
monopoly during five years of that time and a graphic strategic superiority
during another five years of that time. And it xxxxxxxx also took no account
of the fact that ten Soviet Union had just fought a war in which they had
lost 20 million dead and had a third of Russia during the whole industrial
plan utterly devastated. The German army xxxxx hadn't retreated from Russia
and in order to blow up every building including the chimney so that the
advancing Russians would not find any way to warn themselves. Obviously they
did not carry out this order. The devastation of western Russia was
fantastic. The myth that the Russians could launch themselves into Western
Europe and march into on France the way Hitler had never took into account
what they would do if they got to and secondly that Russia was not
as strong as it appeared and that the West above all would never be stronger
than it was in the period 1948-1953. In effect, I think now in retrospect,
that the policy of containment was from the political point of view a time
wasting policy. But from the Soviet point of view a highly desirable policy.

The one thing they must have done through many periods if Stalin
was rational at all. And certainly after Stalin's death, through many months
asking themselves whether this was the day on which the American demarche
would arrive demanding a negotiation on say Germany or Eastern Europe. And
any day that we were convinced that we were so much stronger that we
hadn't built up more forces was really one in which we completely confused
actual and potential power. Actual power one overlooked the atomic bomb
which curiously enough, we did do in the 40's. Our actual power was
relatively small but still even then, even if the atomic bomb had never

4/13/64 -- 10

existed for the Soviets to launch themselves into Europe and to get
involved with a conventional war with us. We had an impact industrial
arsenal and they were adjusting smash. Even that I think was against
all probability. So that my criticism of the containment policy is
not that it was defensive as some of the campaign oratoriums suggest
My criticism is that is was a time wasting and sterile policy, and that
no one ever explained what would happen first of all what a position of
strength was, whether one was talking of mobilized divisions or whether
one was talking of overland all industrial power or overall strategic
power. And secondly no one ever explained how you went about conveying
position of strength to the other side. What exactly did the people
who formulate this visualize would happen if that magic position of
strength were achieved. And this again, apart from the fact that
no number of divisions we could conceivably create in Europe would ever
make up for the first explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb. But this is
a strategic situation which I. Just exactly how was one going
to convey a situation of strength to the Russians. According to Secretary
Acheson, and even to Kennan, the notion was that the Soviets had an
inherent desire to expand. And if they were (bordered by this desire to
expand inevitably something would happen within the Soviet system, and would
crumble and as Acheson said they would recognize the facts that it has
never been clear to me why if this was true, the Soviets would just sit there
and wait for us to build up a structure which would make them crumbled.
If it was true that they had to move, it was practically certain that
once we got close to these positions which would make things hard for them
there would be some kind of a crisis in which they would try to break out
of the . But what if they weren't going to crumble which was

4/13/64

after all not unlikely. How exactly can one translate a position of strength
into a negotiating position if one isn't prepared to start an offensive war.
Indeed, if one isn't even prepared to use the threat of war. Well, this is
a dilemma which we never really solved and, therefore, we were engaged in an
allusive quest for some kind of absolute strength which did for a long time
(acted as if) form a substitute for any political conception and indeed many of the measures
of which we are rather proud may have had on the Soviets an impact quite the
opposite of what we intended. Take for example the Berlin blockade of 1948.
Now it is of course true that we launched an airlift and that Berlin did not fall.
On the other hand, if you look at it from the Soviet point of view, they managed
to force us into an airlift (by nothing more than) putting some barriers across
the roads, we were afraid to test the access on the ground even though
we had atomic superiority and therefore, the thing wound up in a stand off
with the possibility of a new crisis of a similar nature being present ever since
1958. To what degree this affected their decision, their conviction that they
could move into Korea it isn't easy to say. We went to extraordinary lengths
even when we were challenged, not only did we take no initiative to get a
diplomatic settlement, we also went to extraordinary lengths to prevent any
direct confrontation with them even when their position was extremely weak,
(our position was) extremely strong.

Another period which, if you read it, will show you what our conception of international affairs was during the Korean War. If you read the statements of leading Americans prior to the outbreak of the Korean War, it is probably correct that they must have given the Soviets (the belief) that Korea was outside our defense periphery. Actually, I think in this respect a speech by General MacArthur was at least as damaging as a speech by Secretary Acheson because MacArthur being close to the scene made a speech in which he pretty well, in fact, which preceded Acheson's speech.

4/13/64--12

in which he put Korean outside the Far Eastern defense perimeter. So this was not simply a political decision of the State Department; this was the considered opinion of the military (also). I think if you had asked the military a week before the Korean War if they would ever permit forces to Korea their answer would have been absolutely preposterous. Their notion was that the major threat would be in Europe and that they had to get ready for a European War. This reflected another kind of nostalgia. In the past we could always stay aloof for from any international crisis until that it was for us or when the challenge had become overwhelmingly clear. After 1945 when we became more responsible for the balance of power, we wanted to have both the benefit of intervening, of maintaining the balance of power, and of intervening at the place that it seemed most appropriate for us to fight. Almost any crisis that has occurred since 1945 has found our military and for that matter our civilians, convinced that this was the wrong place for a showdown. Whether it was Korea or Laos or Vietnam or Berlin, it is never the right place for a showdown and, no one has ever explained to me why aggressors- aggressors should pick the place for a showdown that was convenient for the defender. One of the disadvantages you have, it being on the defensive, is that you will always be fighting at a place that is disadvantageous and that the issue, unless the fellow who has the initiative is foolish, that the issue will always be one which is somewhat embarrassing for you, whether it is a difficult political issue or a difficult military issue and therefore the idea that any particular war is the wrong war at the wrong place at the wrong time may have been correct, but it is not the kind of judgment which the side on the defensive can afford to make. Well, as it happens then, Korea was outside our defense perimeter, the communists did attack, and then the vicious circle of this separation that we had established between our position of strength and our diplomatic posture became very apparent.

4/13/64--13

We intervened in Korea and again the notion was, the predominant notion was, that this was part of a Soviet master plan; they were going to suck us into Korea and then hit us in Europe, and therefore we weren't going to fall for that. And the obsession of the administration and of the military was with Europe, and again in most discussions the atomic bomb was not taken very seriously. The Russians were assumed to have the capability of moving at will, as if this question didn't exist. But after we got into the Korean war and after we had scored an unexpected victory at Inchon then, if ever, we had a position of strength, then, if ever was the time to negotiate. But then we decided we were going to make the outcome dependent on the military situation. Well, by making the outcome dependent on the military situation actually gave the other side an incentive to put in more military resources because if you only negotiated on the basis of the military situation then they had to restore the military situation before there could be negotiation. We made no overture after Inchon and marched out to the Yalu and were hit. Then we didn't have a position of strength anymore. So down we went to the peninsula again and then we were again really beginning to win and again the Chinese armies at that moment in June '61, the Chinese armies even without the melodramatic measures the Chinese armies were beginning to be completely defeated and the notion that the unlimited force of Chinese manpower is nonsense because the only Chinese manpower that mattered is the one that can equip a train and that in 1961 was extremely limited. Well, when they lost very large numbers of prisoners and when their line began to crack, they then asked for armistice negotiations and at that point, they had learned their lesson in Washington, they weren't going to be caught by the military again, and they stopped practically all military operations so that then where previously we hadn't negotiated and hadn't wanted to make everything dependent on the military outcome, after that we wanted to make everything dependent on the negative (negotiating outcome) without almost any military pressures. (An the communist very skillfully moved the sight

[N]

4/13/64--14

of the armistice negotiations into no man's land, giving us another incentive.
It was not inefficient to us to start an offensive (which the negotiating team would
find itself behind the front. And I believe that one of the reasons why the armistice
wasn't concluded (very rapidly as it well might have been the fact that, by
stopping our military operations when we did, we moved any incentive they had
to make a settlement, so that in a capsule the Korean War showed our dilemma,
When we were strong we didn't know how to use our strength to support our
diplomacy, in fact we didn't know how to use our diplomacy to support our
strength, and then we didn't know how to use our strength to support our
diplomacy. (You want to contrast the situation, take the way the Laotian settlement
was negotiated, and the way the Korean one was negotiated. In Korea we stopped
all military operations except for defensive actions as soon as armistice
negotiations began. In Laos, after we asked for a cease-fire, the communists stepped
up their attack (and through out the negotiations the communists advanced) so that
they had moved from controlling about a quarter of Laos to controlling about two thirds
of Laos by the time the armistice agreement was made. And every attack gave
us an added incentive (of course) to come to a settlement. I am not trying to argue
here the merits or demerits of various decisions which had been made in the
Korean War. (More fundamental point that I want to make is that the Korean War
was a mere microcosm of the dilemmas we faced throughout the post war period.
The United States (We have never been able to gear up rarely been able to gear (our
and to others and that by this separation between the two, our military policy
became extremely esoteric, almost an end in itself and our diplomacy tended (tended
to get obsessed with finesse and with gimicks. And this has been a dilemma, which
that has beset us, coupled with the structural problem which the war (has) created

4/13/64 -- 15

which the war has brought about which makes it very difficult to come to
any lasting settlement on the model of some of the previous settlements
proposed.

Questions

Would you comment on the possible plan to end the Cold War
after that time?

I read the plan to end the Korean War I didn't read the plan to end
the cold war.

That was to re-arm Germany and Japan the United States
will control their activities.

Let me say something about the Korean War, first because that will fits
into ... I think we made a great mistake in the Korean War in
a number of areas. I think it was very dangerous to permit the Chinese
on their first encounter with the Russians to come out with withdrawal.
In a situation in which they were enormously superior to us and in which
rarely had engaged an entire ... We mistook the nature of the issue
of the time. We were concerned with hoards of Chinese manpower when
in fact the only possible significant manpower was restrained manpower.
A manpower which they could assert. That they had almost fully committed
in Korea. And they probably could not have made ...
Secondly I think we made a mistake in believing that there was a massive
plan by which they would draw us into Asia and then hit us in Europe.
The curious aspect of this might have been true if we had lived in a world

4/13/64 -- 16

of conventional polisy. But the notion that the Soviets would tie up

in Asia and then occupy Europe in a public monopoly

that our far superior industrial potential seemed to me a very incorrect

one. And that doesn't make it true

to make a statement I don't agree

with MacArthur's plan for winning the way. I think it would have been
disaster to have a belt of radio-active cobalt along the Yalu River
and to start dropping 30-50 atomic bombs on China. At the time I don't
think we had 30-50 atomic bombs to begin with were dropped. Secondly

I think the moral that were beginning being generated in the
world had to resort to those measures would have outplayed any
we made. I think that we could have won the Korean War by continuing
the military operations through 1951. And would probably not have
required no more than hot pursuit of Chinese airplanes that were using
airfields beyond the Yalu. I would not have been in favor of bounding very
deep into China not only because it was necessary. I think one could have
knocked out their airforce and if military operations had continued in
June 1951. This was the opinion of every commanding part that the Chinese
army would attract and commanders on the spot are usually very conservative
They usually want three times as many troops as they have. At that time
I was sent their on some mission. The mission was to study in two
weeks the impact of the American army on Korea. For which I was extremely
not qualified having no pre-conceived notions. I had no knowledge.
At that time in June and July 1951 we were capturing large numbers of
Chinese prisoners. The Chinese had no heavy equipment at all, except

C

4/13/64 -- 17

practically no heavy artillery and were constantly being pushed back.
It took the center of our army, though not even on the front, it was in
reserve for the move. In short, it was the judgment of
everybody present that we probably could have destroyed the Chinese
army that was in Korea by continuing military operations in Korea. At
that point my view would have been that we should do this and then stop
at the narrow neck of the peninsula. And offer to put either the rest
of Korea under the UN administration or give it to the Chinese if they wanted
to. The major objective of this would have been that in their first encounter
with the West the Chinese would have suffered a defeat that was clear
for everybody. That all this talk about the paper tigers that they are
now able to engage in war would lose a great deal of
its credibility and since any diplomacy in this area depends to some extent
on why people think one does what one does. It makes life different without
action. The results are interpreted as the result of geneorsity or as the
result of panic. So I will agree with the objectives of MacArthur. I did
agree completely with the means he would have chosen to achieve this. I
think in the circumstances at the time to use 30 nuclear weapons and to
have a of radioactive cobalt would
have been an absolute disaster. And also to bring the Chinese nationalists
into Korea would have been a great mistake because while it is conceivable
to me that the Chinese would have settled that some other
line than the one it is not conceivable to me that they would
settle with the Chinese nationalists. And so I suppose I would agree with

4/13/64--18

subjective idea that measures have been recommended. Now on
the idea that rearming Germany and Japan cold war. Well we
rearmed Germany and Japan and if I the cold war, the restrictions
on rearming German rearmament to say the least and I don't
believe that removing these restrictions was inconceivable the only restriction
on German rearmament that makes any difference is the restriction that
they cannot have nuclear weapons. There is no possibility of their getting
nuclear weapons at the time that recommended it. This would
have wrecked NATO as surely as anything could have been done. There was no

with the German government that would have started a nuclear weapons production and if a war was started on the issue that of whether the Germans should have national nuclear weapons no one was

. if this was the plan I think most of it was carried out and I don't believe that

QUESTION:

It is conceivable that in Washington were passing
on information but I don't think the Korean War hinged on any information
that they might have gotten. The issue of the Korean War was purely the
dilemma that was by our philosophy of containment,
which I explained last time. It was not that the Chinese knew about, and therefore could take adequate preparation. We made it as clear as we could without any documents, we made it as plain as we could that we did not want a big war in Asia. That our major intention was focused on Europe and that we were willing to settle for

I don't believe that any particular information was

4/13/64 --19

the reason for the stalemate. The real reason for the stalemate was
our conception of war what a of overseas
and . We were convinced of two things.
The of Europe and the resistance depended on the
conventional forces. As you read today in the *Times*
the description of 68. Again the obsession was that we
were conventional forces that this had to be limited and
very little attention was paid to the fact that for the Soviet planning
group the important problem was not the imbalance of conventional
forces but what we might call without strategic forces and
with what conventional forces we could mobilize after the first six
months of the war. And it would have been an absolutely foolhearted
Soviet plan of five years after the end of their war with its projected
Soviet army in Europe. In the face of our vast ghastly
inferior industrial potential and in the face of our atomic monopoly.

atomic monopoly we had set off a devised 1949
but I don't believe that they had any strategic power and if they had
they would undoubtedly have been destroyed in the first two weeks of the
war. So that I think that the danger that was represented by the
the forces on an element of power which predict-

then emphasized our military and was concentrated on a series
of operations which at the time wasn't . And the illusion
that the defender can pick the most of operations and that
for the wrong doing at the wrong place and at the wrong
time. This was a pathologic problem of the Korean War.

4/13/64 -- 20

QUESTION: How did the

That was only obvious to the people that made it. And then in retrospect
mistakes always...even today the people who made those obvious mistakes
but say what would we have done if we had reached the
Where would be if we were there? Would we be any better off than we were
on the 38th parallel. What is the difference if we had been two hundred
miles. Secondly they say that they got caught by military problems once
and then they advanced after

Thirdly they would say that taught the lesson that was important to teach
namely that aggression . And, therefore they settled on the
line of the status called . Fourthly they said they thought

built up NATO and kept our alliance together which might not
have worked if they had advanced. Well, there are many good arguments to
this. I would argue that the alliance would have been even stronger if
we had gone into . Because we would have paid the price
for the months but after a few months people would have learned
so to us even more. As for the Korean Wars, we won first one and in the
North Korean. As for the second one there were considerable risks that the
Chinese were running, they must think that if they could get away with it
then they are psychologically superior to us. Because if they could take
us on at a time when they had literally nothing and we had
superiority doesn't talk to each other for what they think we might do when we
get really strong. But it is a mistake to discuss the major decisions of
foreign policy with all the good arguments that are on one side, all the
bad arguments are on the other. The good arguments are an easy decision.

4/13/64---P1

anyone can make. It's the close decisions that depend on what philosophy
of action is to be resolved. If you don't think it is important that the
Chinese with the WTst are defeating. You don't think it is
important that in order to make a general proposal you first have to get
somekind of military position. Then you make a different point of view
and I think the difference here between my view and that of the predominant
group would be a philosophical one of what you thought the danger was.
The predominant group didn't want to conduct a very active diplomacy.
They wanted to have time to build up conventional forces in Europe. My view
is, as I pointed out last time, the best time for us to force

was when we were so strong. And that therefore we should have
conducted both when we were challenged a more accurate military policy.
That by waiting for some almost hypothetical moment when there would be
sufficient strength were making it easier for the other side to
get to the moment of really greatest achievement. And therefore eased
their attack.

QUESTION: Just how real a Communist threat do you think Communist China is today?

It depends against whom. I don't believe that it is world war in China
for example. That they would be able to sustain a very big operation for
very long. Unless the Russians support them. But even then this is

. I do not believe that their strength is as great as
it appears. Even when they attack the Indians only every third Chinese
soldier had arrived and they were attacking in ways that somebody fell

4/13/64 -- 22

but they picked up his rifle. They have very great skills in psychological warfare and if the Indians hadn't fought every battle by the book so that as soon as they were surrounded they would surrender. They just sat there. The Chinese do not have a very strong capability for sustained operations outside their territory. To land in China and to get involved in a guerrilla war that would be a formidable undertaking. But to fight outside of China in any large area scale way would not be very effective. It would not be as formidable I think on the other hand you would have to consider that what now in Vietnam in any case is very accurate. And the guerrilla war will continue and . For the next two lectures I will discuss the general framework of our post-war policy. I wanted to discuss United States relations with Europe. Partly in terms of the context of the last two lectures and partly in terms of the evolution that has brought us to the present point of view, to the present situation. I think that it is fair to say (that) World War II (ended) the predominant American view was that at the end of the war American troops would be withdrawn and Europe would be primarily responsible for its own security. Roosevelt said (at that point) that it was absolutely impossible to conceive that American troops would stay in Europe much more (than) a year after the end of the war. They immobilized very hastily and I think the predominant view was druing the post-war period that Britain would support the major security function and that we could withdraw to our more or less traditionalized relations. These we thought as I pointed out before would be maintained through harmony of Great Briatin, the United States and the Soviet Union. The Europe we got to know at the end of the war was one that created a number

4/13/64 -- 23

of illusions in our minds from which we are still suffering today. All of Europe at one stage or another had been smashed. Many European countries had lost before with the exception of Great Britain. It had lost the way to somebody. Every European country had been occupied by somebody during the war. The European social and political structure was smashed and so was European economy. The only country that came through the war more or less in contact was Great Britain, And Great Britain, in turn, suffered from a number of difficulties (through) the way the victory was achieved. On the one hand, Britain gained (it) had enormous prestige for having stood alone after the Nazis had overrun Europe. And we had been very careful during the war, and very (also) during the war. (And) the British had been very skillful during the war. To create the impression that there was an equality of partnership. Great Britain emerged from the war with the illusion, which was very understanding (she) that (it) was still an absolutely first-class power. And that it could have a very (part) on American policy through its special relationship with Washington, just as it had done during this. The war at the impact of Great Britain that the competence was the complaint of the states whose weakness had been made manifest by the war, the states that had collapsed when the Nazis attacked, were treated by Britain as an enemy or foreign people. (This) collapsed with the result an attitude that was epitomized by a diary entry of King George after Dunkirk in which he said, at last without allies there is a certain sense of relief. The confidence, in short, was the backward area, the unstable area and if you want to read the state of mind, this particular state of mind, how long it persisted, (look up) the last speech of Hugh Gaitskill of the labor party conference about four months before his death in which he explained why Britain shouldn't join Europe, the notion being that it was a strange group of people with whom Britain had no inward relationships. The inward relationships of Great Britain were competent, not even after the war but, with the

4/13/64--24

United States and with the ~~Common Market~~. And many of the problems that had existed in Europe after the war and in European/American relations after the war can at least in part be explained by this. Our common error is to assume that everything that has gone wrong in Europe since the war is due to de Gaulle, and that but for him we would now have achieved European integration, British membership in the Common Market and great harmony in Atlantic relationships.

No one has every explained to me how you can achieve both European integration and British membership in the Common Market the British are even less eager to have integration politically with the French but this is a question to which we will return. At any rate, the British attitude towards Europe in the '40's and '50's was one of extreme distrust and its primary emotional allegiance was to the United States. You have not only the Gaitskill attitude, translation you have after the American transformation of the skybolt missile, when Britain had a choice to make between whether to rely further on closer association with us in strategic matters or closer association to the continent it unhesitantly chose closer association with us. I am not saying this critically, I am just trying to point out that the psychological root of the present crisis in European American relationships goes back much further than the willful decision of a particular individual. This also caused Britain to be extremely suspicious of any effort to unify the continent. Almost every step that was taken towards European integration was done without Great Britain and very often against British opposition. The coal and steel community, the Common Market, European defense community, all excluded Britain by Britain's choice. France seems antipathetic today, but in 1954, 55 it made its membership in the European defense community conditional on Britain joining it. Far from wanting Britain out, they were eager to have Britain in, and Britain refused. When the Common Market was created, it

4/13/64--25

was the British conviction that it would fail and, in a certain sense, they would
am make it fail. This was one kind of problem that Britain had. The other kind
of problem was that to win a war and to emerge as a second-class power may be
psychologically more difficult than to lose a war and to start from scratch.
The European countries emerged (in the immediate post war period) in a state of
complete collapse. Britain was the more vital, more
e other hand the continental countries at least had the great advantage that they
could start, that they could make new beginnings and that they were free, at least
to some extent, from some of the nostalgias of their traditions. Britain had
suffered from the fact that it had had a glorious period during the war, only
to have at the end of the war to go through a long period of austerity and then
to see a year-by-year decline of its world position, and, somewhat infrown, frustrated
sense, a tendency of British policy in the post war period, particularly in the
last ten years, is in part due to the fact that the British adjustment (had) been
somewhat more gradual, (on the other hand) more serious than that of the continental
countries where the (increase) was in part imposed (by) the outside. In short, the
e internal troubles of Europe at the moment between the continent and Great Britain
is) not entirely due to de Gaulle. What de Gaulle has (done is to take) the tendencies
that existed and give them the sharpest possible formualtion. Now so much for
the internal European relationships. The American European relationships, also
developed (its) pattern in the post war period, and (there) too the somewhat deceptive
appearance of Europe at the end of the war has effected contemporary policy.
We found a Europe which (is) economically and politically matched. On the first
hand, once we understood that we had any obligation, our first attempt was to
restore European economic strength, it was based on the assumption that once
a country's (your) economy recovers its political structure would also be stabilized, and that
then Europe, (which) we (were hoping) would be unified, would become a partner of the

4/13/64--26

United States in some undefined way. The basic premises of our policy were
that Europe should first recover economically, that the defense of Europe could
be organized by building up NATO and applying the positions of strength theory
to central Europe, that Europe should be integrated and that European integration
would automatically produce the greatest good (of) the greatest number, for
everyone. Now, in our dealings with the Europeans, in their weakness, in their
utter dependence on us, there developed also on both sides a pattern that was
bound to change when Europe regained its strength and self confidence. On our
side there was a certain fate father knows best attitude, a tendency to believe
that Atlantic cooperation meant that the European role was essentially technical
implementation of American theory. On the European side there was a sense of
impotence, a great sense of insecurity. Their attitude towards us was more that
of a lobbyist and that of a supplicant rather than of a sovereign nation adjusting
national interests. For over a decade and a half the Europeans expressed their
disagreement when they had it with us more (than) the hesitation with which they carried
out the agreement- agreed measures than by stating frankly what their point of view
was. They would sign any document that was put before them and then they would carry
it out, if they did disagreed with it but they very rarely expressed a particular
European point of view. In these circumstances it was very natural for us
to develop the idea that the Atlantic community such as it was would in effect
on a Europe which would not agree with and therefore took from
economic assistance but the notion that Europe might be politically
independent, and have views different from ours was never seriously discussed in that
whole period. (In that whole period much of American policy toward Europe was based
on the need for reassurance. If the Europeans were uneasy about something they would
make formal declarations of support, and one of the replies that former Secretary
Acheson would always make to De Gaulle is "why doesn't De Gaulle understand

4/13/64--27

that Secretary McNamara has repeatedly said that the America nuclear umbrella is
avia available for the defense of France. Why doesn't he question the sincerity
31st
of Secretary McNamara. That as late as last October 21st Secretary McNamara
and President Kennedy said no more American troops would be withdrawn from Europe.
- a promise which has survived until exactly April 1s 12th, so the fact that Americans
can
- (could) change their minds is not absolutely something which is absolutely unknown
in history. Seen Secondly and also extremely important Europeans are not
accusing us of anything they haven't done themselves, the fact that an ally
might occasionally back out on a commitment is not absolutely unknown in
European history; every European country has done it at some stage over the
last 25 years, and most importantly what is at stake here is that a southern country
can not make its survival dependent entirely on a promise of another sovereign
country. The issue is not whether we are sincere or not or whether we are more
moral than others--I said this isn in Columbus Ohio a couple of weeks ago
a someone complimented Harvard on having a red blooded American on its side faculty--
the issue is not whether we are more moral than others, the issue as it has
developed, apart from who is correct in the particular technical analysis is to
what degree a sovereign country has to assume some measure of control over its
own destiny. The problem which will affect relations over the next 50-years-
to 15 years is not who pushes the button in case of nuclear war, but what is
the
- the conception of the role of/various participants in a community if you have a group
of participants who basically think of themselves only as carrying out technical
schemes that are developed elsewhere, you run a great risk of developing a sense
of impotence in which what ever contribution they might make in a partnership
to a minimum. On the other hand you run the danger if you resolve
of sovereignty that you wreck any possibility of cooperation. Still we

4/13/64--28

haven't run into any danger in the last 50 years until De Gaulle came along
of resolving the of sovereignty except our own. The nature, the tone of
our relationships with the Europeans we had during the period of American
there were particular instances where our intentions were for believing
that there were terminal dates of European economic recovery, terminal dates
of European military strength, first one which would require no more American
second one which would magically transform the situation in central Europe
in favor of some negotiations at no time during the containment policy
was it every made clear to us what proposals were made when the position of
strength was in fact achieved. Now these policies overlook the fact that any
decision any structure develops its own logic regardless of the intention
of the members. The least reliable job to what a structure will do
is what its founders say at the beginning. The evolution of the Common Market
was not what the people would say who signed the document, would make it by creating
it but much rather the logic of its development would bring about as time went on.
Similarly today when we discuss the multilateral force, you shouldn't ask what
the German defense minister says he intends to do in 1965 when he finally resigned,
the real question is what will the defense minister think in 1972, and this will
depend to some extent on what the pressures are that filter through such a structure.
European American relationships were fundamentally changed by three developments:
European economic recovery, European integration and the process of decolonization.
European economic recovery led to the emergence of what has really been the
traditional European pattern, but which to us seems very new and unusual. As
Europe regained its strength, it also regained its self confidence,
and after all this was the confidence which projected itself 300 years around the
world, and it created empires in every part of the country, and it was
never very likely that such a region could recover its strength, would be

4/13/64 -- 29

content to play a subsidiary role in the process of policy-making. The
notion that Europe would take the economic burden off our shoulders but
continue to play on the political role was always a highly unrealistic one. For
example, ever since 1964 at least we have been urging almost the Europeans to play a larger role in economic developments.
And specifically we have been urging them to play a bigger role in Latin
America. Yet when General de Gaulle up in Mexico the American press gave the impression that the stability of our & relations with Latin America depended on whether we could make speeches there promoting Western hemisphere unity or exalting his own . His of all it is our impact influence in Latin America is so fragile that the visit of one man can undermine it, we are really in trouble because such a man is bound to come whether de Gaulle now takes the chance? or not. But more importantly we have to understand that a price has been paid for any political act.
And if you ask Europeans to play a larger role in economic development, inevitably they will play a larger political role, too. They are not going to be content and it isn't conceivable simply to pay money and to let us play our traditional hegemonial role. Now whether that is desirable or not I personally do not think it is undesirable to have two different Western approaches in the underdeveloped countries. But this is a different question. The major point that I am trying to make now is that any policy has inevitable authority of inducing the EMEAP Europeans first of all of promoting European recovery plus . The second, European interest in the underdeveloped areas in terms of economic aid programs is going to require a greater degree of European political participation. This process has been

4/13/64--30

accelerated by the European economic integration which we supported. Now
again the orthodox theory has been based on liberal economics of the 19th
century that the greater more integration you had the more virginal the
society, the better it would be, not only for Europe, but for the whole rest
of the world. It was said that the European common market should
be outward looking and could then promote Atlantic solidarity, well-being,
peace and all other good things. Well, in a way this is true,
In another way it is inevitable that when you create a common market
it is bound to be somewhat discriminatory. This is what makes it a
common market. One doesn't create a common market in order to have
restraint because if one wants to be restrained one doesn't need a common
market. It was inevitable that as the European common market was developed,
the bargaining power of the Europeans vis-a-vis us was bound to (intrigue)
us. Add any tariff cutting negotiations with a common market of the European
countries (was) bound to be more (typical) than (it) would have been with a group
of individual European countries. This may be the price that we are paying,
I personally believe that it is the price we are paying. But it is not
inward-sensitive to pass the debate in terms of whether they are looking
outward or outward-looking because to some degree they are bound to be both.
outward-looking and again any study of European history indicates that
mercantilism and protectionism has always been stronger on the continent
than it has been in other areas. Then the process of decolonization had the
inevitable result of enabling the Europeans to focus most of their attention
on European matters; and from European American relationships. They were no
longer drained by extra-European adventures, one of the major reasons de Gaulle
has fire for getting rid of Algeria was to play a more active role in Europe
and in Atlantic relationships. Indeed throughout the process of decolonization

4/13/64--31

we use to insist that the obligations of the alliance were confined to
attacks by the Soviets, and that outside of Europe it was highly desirable
that there exist some Western country that was not tainted by
colonialism, least the colonial countries in desperation. Well
history is working somewhat faster now than it did in previous times, but
this is precisely the attitude that the Europeans are adopting toward
our embarrassment now in Latin America, South East Asia and other places.
There too they maintain that it is helpful to the overall strength of the free
that there be
countries to-make-two different approaches, and that they not be too closely
identified with us having been ejected from all these areas hardly under
American pressure. They don't feel as great a commitment to them in
any event as they did in the and again, without arguing about who is
right or wrong in any particular instance and even allowing the possibility
that both sides are wrong-someday-are- right from their point of view
the particular task of the relationship now in the Atlantic area is to a
considerable extent effected by the policies that we follow, that they followed
in 1950. One of the hardest things to understand about foreign policy is
that the price one pays for any action usually comes about a decade later.
for
and that when it is paid, those who are better or worse-are responsible for it
rarely know that they were the causal factors, because when the issue arises
it will appear in some form in which it can be claimed of on the
sof shortsightedness, stupidity of particular individuals making particular
decisions at a particular moment.