DAILY NEWS, THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 17, 1972

THE ROAD
TO PEKING

Nixon's
role
in the
triumph
of Chou

By STAN CARTER
NEWS Diplomatic Correspondent
Fifth of a series

ONE of the eight black-bound loose-leaf volumes that President Nixon studied in preparation for his journey to Peking contained a top secret analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency of the strange and still only partially explained events in China last fall—and the effect that the internal power struggle they revealed may have on his summit talks with the surviving Communist leaders.

What went on in China in mid-September is still shrouded in mystery. Communist cadres in the provinces have been told that Defense Minister Lin Piao—until then the regime's no. 2 man—was involved in a conspiracy to assassinate party Chairman Mao Tse-tung and that when the plot failed, Lin and his cohorts were killed in a plane crash in Mongolia while trying to flee to the Soviet Union.

According to the Trident jetliner, one of four purchased by China from Pakistan and used exclusively by high-ranking Chinese officers, did indeed crash in Mongolia, 100 miles beyond the Chinese border, on the night of Sept. 12. But American analysts doubt that Lin was among the seven men and two women whose bodies were recovered from the airplane, burned beyond recognition.

But it is clear that the power struggle has ended—at least for the time being—and that a moderate faction led by Premier Chou En-lai triumphed over a radical faction led by Lin Piao. Lin and hundreds of his followers have been purged, but are thought to be still alive.

Whatever the reasons for the purge, the timing for it seems to have been arranged by Chou's invitation to Nixon to visit the People's Republic of China.

Quarrel over resources

Despite the high classification of the CIA's sources, its conclusions are probably similar to those of analysts from other government agencies and from experts outside the government.

For example, Rand Corp. Sinologist William W. Whitson has come up with a theory fitting the known facts. It suggests that the power struggle was the culmination of a debate within the Chinese hierarchy over allocation of resources to China's nuclear weapons program—and that Chou's victory over Lin will make China less of a threat to U.S. allies in Asia in the immediate future than it has been considered in the past.

Whitson, a military specialist, is one of those China experts who does research for the government and also maintains

ation, probably including Lin Piao, Wu Fa-hsien, Li Tso-p'eng and Huang Yung-sherg, the historical image of the United States as the principal adversary most heavily armed with nuclear weapons targeted against China must have been the cornerstone of their premises for strategic planning and weapons development.

"President Nixon's visit to China could not have been a welcome shift in the image that had presumably guided their strategic thinking for 20 years."

Smaller bungs

Since the mid-1960s, China has exploded 13 nuclear devices, including three hydrogen bombs with yields of three megatons each, in 1968, 1969 and 1970. But the last two tests, in November, 1971 and January of this year, were of smaller devices with yields of 20 kilotons or less—the size of the Hiroshima A-bomb.

According to U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, the latest two tests could either have been of triggers for larger thermonuclear weapons or of prototypes of comparatively small, tactical nuclear warheads. If they were the latter, it would tend to confirm Whitson's theory that Chou, after defeating Lin, has shifted priorities to concentrate on medium and intermediate range missiles instead of a costly intercontinental missile arsenal.

"Such an emphasis would provide an immediate deterrent against the Soviet Union," Whitson says. "It would also promise the greatest intercontinental utility once an appropriate submarine or two had been built."

If Whitson is right, this will be disconcerting to U.S. military planners, who have advocated construction of an anti-ballistic missile defense system for protection of the United States against Chinese ICBM's expected to be operational as early as 1975, as much as against the nuclear-tipped Soviet intercontinental rockets already in their underground silos.

Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, acknowledged to Congress this week that "it is difficult to assess either the strategic nuclear threat posed by the People's Republic of China, or how that threat will evolve through the 1970s." But Laird said the Pentagon's estimate was that China could deploy between 19 and 20 ICBMs capable of striking the continental United States by mid-1976.

Obviously, this estimate would have to be changed if Peking has in fact switched priorities. As Whitson puts it, the "historic American air and naval threats to China's south and southeast coasts from the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam and Thailand are no longer significant." But Whitson also contends that the

Actors in the power play: Lin Piao,
center, flanked by Mao,
left, and Chou.

The visit signals the
vindication of Chou's
assertion that
Moscow poses a
graver threat to
Peking than
Washington does

ties with the academic community. His new book, "The Chinese High Command, 1927-1971—a History of Communist Military Politics," will be published this spring.

According to Whitson, Lin Piao vigorously opposed last year's decision by Chou—with Mao's concurrence—to reduce tensions with the United States.

The reason was that Lin and his supporters in the Air Force and Navy needed the supposed American threat to justify development of bigger and bigger nuclear weapons and long-range missiles to deliver them.

The cost of China's nuclear and missile programs are 2% of the still underdeveloped country's total national product—so high that Whitson argues that "some people across the river (a euphemism in Washington for CIA headquarters in Langley, Va.) say that we ought to encourage them to keep at it, because it will make them go bankrupt."

Challenge to Lin

Whitson's contention is that Chou En-lai, in contrast to Lin, recognized that the real threat to China was from Russia—which had massed one million troops on China's northern border and threatened a "surgical strike" against Chinese nuclear installations—instead of from the United States, which the premier could see was in fact withdrawing from Southeast Asia.

To cope with the Soviet threat, China needed tactical nuclear weapons as well as more modern conventional armament—not necessarily long-range ICBMs. Therefore, it is Whitson's belief that Chou wanted to slow down the costly advanced weapons program and thus welcomed Nixon's overtures to end the 23-year-old confrontation between the United States and China.

But the invitation to Nixon presented a challenge to Lin and the generals associated with past strategic planning. Whitson puts it this way:

"To many of the senior officers of the second military gener-

Soviet threat to China has also receded, even though it was real enough three years ago, when the Kremlin threatened the "surgical strike."

As proof that Chou no longer really fears a Soviet attack, the Rand Corp. expert cites recent reports that the Kremlin offered last November to settle the border dispute between the two communist countries on terms that the Chinese had previously proposed—and that the Chinese rejected the offer.

The party rules

But it is Whitson's thesis that Chou needed to play up the Soviet threat in order to put down the Lin Piao group, and was thus able to win the support of Army ground force commanders to change the emphasis of China's economic planning from electronics to heavy industry—meaning, for the Army, new tanks, other modern weapons and tactical nukes.

At the same time, Chou has used the Soviet threat to begin moving army officers out of the political jobs they assumed during the near anarchy of the 1966-69 cultural revolution and back to their strictly professional chores with their troops.

This reduction of the army's political power also was opposed by Lin, but Chou was able to make the counter-argument that it was necessary to "release the professional military men from their onerous political burdens" in order to meet the Soviet threat.

Showing that the communist bureaucrats had taken charge again. Chinese newspapers have repeated again and again over the past six months Mao's celebrated aphorism that "The party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the party."

During the same period, units of the People's Liberation Army from different parts of the country have held their first joint maneuvers in years, ostensibly because of the Soviet threat.

Next: A Yank's view of the new China

11

19

DAILY NEWS, TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 22, 1972

UPI Telephoto

President Nixon and American interpreter sit across table from Premier Chou En-lai before leaders' second round of talks which began at 1 a.m. today (New York time).

# Which Page in History Books?

By HENRY CASSIDY

Even before it started, President Nixon's visit to Peking was assured a place in history, but just what place remained a matter for conjecture as he continued his meetings with the Communist Chinese leaders.

Nixon's admirers compared him with Marco Polo, the 14th-century Venetian traveler who was among the first Europeans to find the way to China, or with Commodore Matthew Perry, American naval commander who opened Japan to the West in the 19th century.

The President's critics likened his voyage to a trip to Canossa, the castle in northern Italy where excommunicated Emperor Henry IV of the Holy Roman Empire went to do penance before Pope Gregory VII in 1077. Since then, Canossa has been a synonym for submission.

A survey of generally impartial news revealed wide variety of opinions on, precisely what might come out of Nixon's visit, ranging from a Marshall Plan for China to a world conference to outlaw nuclear weapons. Many expected some form of continuing contact.

The President had been the first to caution against raising

hopes too high. When he left Washington last Thursday, he insisted that he was "under no illusions" that 20 years of hostility could be swept away by one week of talks.

Several subjects were specifically excluded from Nixon conversations. Prince Norodom Simonkou, exiled ruler of Cambodia, said Premier Chou En-lai had assured him that Indochina would not be discussed with the President.

President Chung Hee Park of South Korea said Nixon had assured him that Korea would not be discussed.

What was actually being discussed was not made known to the public, but professional Chinese watchers could find a number of likely subjects.

Andre Malraux, French adventurer, author and veteran of the Chinese civil war, said it was possible that "on the surface, the trip will look absolutely fruitless," but that "in depth, it will be something else."

## Matter of Money

Malraux had expressed the opinion that Chairman Mao Tse-tung would ask Nixon for economic assistance, and the outcome of the President's trip would depend on his reply.

Prof. John K. Fairbank, director of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard, suggested: "One thing that might come out of Peking is a call for a conference of the nuclear powers in Tokyo."

Ross Terrill, Australian research fellow at Harvard, who made a six-week, 7,000-mile tour of China last year, said:

"Specifically, I expect there will be an agreement on cultural exchanges, an agreement on opening trade relations and an agreement on a form of diplomatic contact short of establishing diplomatic relations."

## Voice of Chaos

Bruno Shaw, editor-publisher of the prewar Hankow Herald and abrider of the "Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung," published by Harper & Row in 1970, commented:

"Neville Chamberlain's summit meeting with Hitler in Munich resulted in catastrophe. President Roosevelt's summit meeting with Stalin in Yalta resulted in selling a free China down the river. Both Chamberlain and Roosevelt were dealing with paranoïd madmen. And Mao Tse-tung is no less paranoid. The Peking summit meeting can lead only to disaster."

# Chou's Gift: Two Pandas

Peking, Tuesday, Feb. 22 (UPI)—Pat Nixon disclosed today that Premier Chou En-Lai will give the United States two giant white pandas in exchange for the two musk oxen the Russians are giving the Chinese.

After President and Mrs. Nixon learned that the Chinese were interested in obtaining musk oxen, which are native to the Arctic Circle area of North America, they arranged for two of the animals, named Milton and Matilda, to be shipped over from Taiwan to San Francisco zoo later this week.

# Army Band Serves Up Some Old Turkeys

By STAN CARTER

Peking, Tuesday, Feb. 22—It was an improbable scene—the central band of the People's Liberation Army of the Chinese People's Republic, 50 soldiers wearing olive drab cotton uniforms with red stars on their caps, faces fierce with concentration as they tootled out "Turkey in the Straw."

"Never," said President Nixon, "have I heard American music played better in a foreign land."

Hugging closely to the melody line, the band also played "Home on the Range" and "America the Beautiful" at the banquet that Premier Chou En-lai gave last night for the President.

China
Diary

The sumptuous banquet itself was an improb-

able event—virtually a love fest between two nations that have confronted each other bitterly for 23 years and have not yet established diplomatic relations.

## Restrained It Wasn't

The reception given to Nixon on his arrival earlier in the day was restrained, but the banquet was not.

It was held in the Great Hall of the People, a 561,786-sq.-foot structure of artificial stone built in 10 months during China's "Great Leap Forward" in 1959.

Six hundred guests feasted on shark fin soup, spungy bamboo shoots, fried and stewed prawns and steamed chicken with coconut in the immense banquet hall, 315 feet long by 230 feet wide, with a 50-foot-high ceiling.

We toasted Chinese-American friendship with mao-tai a potent Chinese liquor made from sorghum.

Nixon, walking down the long receiving line with Chou at his side, pumped the hands of more than 100 senior Communist officials, including a score or so high-level People's Army officers in olive drab. Most of the other Chinese guests were blue or black Mao suits. Most also wore Mao buttons on their left breasts.

Chou also wore a Mao button on his well-tailored black Mao suit, but it was a very small rectangular one with only a tiny picture of the Communist Party chairman on the left side and Chinese writing that said "Serve the People" taking up most of the emblem. It was, said an old Peking hand, about as neat as a poster.

Nixon smiled broadly throughout the evening. Chou grinned affably.

After the banquet, Chou escorted President and Mrs. Nixon to the front door of the Great Hall—a gesture old Peking hands could not remember him having made to a foreign guest.

# Peking? 'More Like the Bronx Than China'

Peking, Tuesday, Feb. 22 (Special) — Glimpses of China:

"Peking looks like a working-class neighborhood in the Bronx with rows of barracks-like red brick apartment houses," says UPI correspondent Norman Kempster.

"For that matter, Peking looks less Chinese than parts of San Francisco," he adds. "The colorful tile buildings with the pagoda roofs that Americans often equate with China are there, of course. But they are outnumbered by plain buildings of red brick and adobe.

"The streets are wide, and at times almost deserted. Is this the epitaph of the world's most populous nation? The stereotype of China is teeming streets and pungent smell. The reality, at least in the part of Peking I have seen so far, is near silence.

There are city smells, of course, but the predominant one is of coal smoke.

"Auto traffic is sparse. The scarcity of autos helps to keep the air clean in spite of the coal furnaces. I commented on the pure air to a Chinese newsman, who smilingly explained: 'The people have followed Chairman Mao's order to clean up pollution.'"

UPI correspondent Helen Thomas reported: "In the Peking fashion world, the look is strictly unisex. No more slinky, slit skirt, slippers or a Dragon Lady. But even though men and women dress alike, most of the girls are still quite feminine and pretty—even without makeup.

"Baggy slacks in blue and grays are the order of the day for females. Their coats and jackets are equally drab, and they wear their hair in short, blunt-cut styles. But there is a coquettishness in

femininity that cannot be denied, even when as members of the People's Liberation Army they face you with a fixed bayonet."

Robert S. Boyd, correspondent of the Knight Newspapers, said a Chinese press department official told the White House press office who is boss. He quoted him as saying: "This press room belongs to the Chinese government. If the White House wants to use it, they should make a request and we will consider it."

Boyd says: "Daily life going on as usual outside the Forbidden City where Nixon met with Mao. Granddads bask in the winter sun. Mommas push tots in bamboo strollers, Shoppers finger fat fish, round red apples, juicy grapes. Children scamper along narrow back alleys, oblique to the high drama a few hundred yards from them."

WASHINGTON STAR

10 February 1972

# Sihanouk Mixes Defiance, Worry in Peking

By HENRY S. BRADSHER

Star Staff Writer

HONG KONG—Prince Norodom Sihanouk has issued from Peking a defiant rejection of President Nixon's Indochina peace plan but the exiled Cambodian leader also has indicated concerned uncertainty about his own position.

Sihanouk's anxiety has produced an apparent shift in his attitude toward Nixon's visit to Peking.

Correspondents who have seen Sihanouk in Peking reported some months ago that he planned to go to Hanoi while Nixon was in China.

But more recent interviews have produced hints that he might be interested in talking with Nixon.

Sihanouk is acutely conscious of the fact that his is a marriage of convenience with the communists and that if divorce comes it could be Italian style.

He also is worried that within the Communist camp there are divisions over the attitude toward his Cambodian cause.

## Soviets Angered

Sihanouk recently angered the Soviet Union by accusing it of not wanting to see his forces or the North Vietnamese win in Indochina.

When Sihanouk first said last autumn that he would be in Hanoi while Nixon was in Peking, it was widely interpreted as indicating some sort of North Vietnamese-controlled meeting of Indochinese rebel forces to express defiance of the United States.

But nothing has been heard lately of such a meeting—and defiance has been voluminously expressed in the two weeks since Nixon disclosed his eight-point peace plan.

A French correspondent recently quoted Sihanouk as saying he was not asking to see Nixon. But the prince added, he would not refuse to meet him on "neutral ground." This raised speculation about another of Dr. Henry Kissinger's now-famous secret arrangements being somehow involved already or possible during spare minutes in Peking two weeks from now.

## 'Nothing to Lose'

Sihanouk has said in several interviews that he is confident Chinese Premier Chou En-lai will do nothing to hurt the Cambodian rebel cause. "We have nothing to lose by having the Chinese negotiate with the Americans because the Chinese have assured us that they will not surrender one iota on our demands." Sihanouk told one correspondent.

In that same interview in December, Sihanouk said the budget of his exile government in Peking is being met by long-term interest free loans from China. In a recent speech he said, "China is providing us with very modern weapons" for use inside Cambodia.

While Sihanouk often voices confidence in Chinese support, however, he seems to have worries about the North Vietnamese. It is Hanoi rather than Peking that has direct links to the Communist military operations inside Cambodia.

## North Viet Instructors

Sihanouk said last summer that his supporters inside Cambodia were aided by about 2,000 North Vietnamese instructors but in December he said they were no longer used.

China has its reasons for trying to prop up Sihanouk as a separate force from the aggressive, expanding Vietnamese. Peking presumably would rather deal with a separate Cambodia which it can try to influence than see Hanoi take over the country and become that much stronger and more difficult for Peking.

In the December interview, published by the Far Eastern Economic Review, Sihanouk expressed concern about "my Communists." It was unclear whether he meant those whom he had tried to suppress before his ouster two years ago or the North Vietnamese allies or both.

After the victory of his supporters in Cambodia which Sihanouk talks of expecting with full confidence, "it is possible ... the Communists will try to eliminate from power

the other forces" in Cambodia, Sihanouk said.

Returning to this theme later in the interview, Sihanouk said that if he remains "Chief of State after victory, I, like (Czech Foreign Minister Jan) Masaryk, will run the risk of being assassinated by the Communists or of being accused of deviationism or revisionism or of God knows what." Sihanouk has said in several interviews that the Soviet Union spurned him. Once he tucked himself under Chou's wing, Moscow lost interest in giving him the kind of support he wanted.

## Bitter Over Soviets

Sihanouk is still bitter that the Soviet Union was not among the 28 countries that recognized his exile regime as the legal government of Cambodia.

The Soviet Union and its followers have kept embassies open in Phnom Penh when the Chinese camp closed up rather

than do business with Marshal Lon Nol's government.

There long have been rumors that the Soviets have sought to keep contacts with those few opponents of Lon Nol who are not under Hanoi's control.

In recent weeks there have been reports through usually reliable channels that the Soviets in Phnom Penh have initiated efforts to bring a compromise between the government there and Hanoi. But the Soviets reportedly have assured Lon Nol that their efforts do not envisage the return of Sihanouk, whom Moscow wants to keep out of Cambodia for fear of getting Chinese influence with him.

These reports seemed linked with the combination of the Nixon visit to China, which has created uncertainty throughout Southeast Asia, and the shaky position of Lon Nol's government. The Soviets might think this is a good time to find Lon Nol receptive.

But if the reports are true, there is no certainty that Hanoi would be willing to make a compromise, even though it probably would have continued to use North Vietnamese.

supply lines through Cambodia to South Vietnam.

And back in Peking, Sihanouk would be angrily opposed to any Soviet effort to arrange the future for Cambodia which left him out.

It is this complex situation that just might be changing Sihanouk's mind from an earlier decision to go off and breathe angry anti-American fire in Hanoi during the week of Feb. 21 to curiosity about the possibilities of hanging around China within reach of Nixon or at least that cunning courier of the President.

Kissinger's reputation of being a realist raises the possibility that the combination of parlous plight in Phnom Penh, Sihanouk's fear of Hanoi and estrangement from Moscow and American friendship with China might make it worthwhile to talk to Sihanouk.

If Kissinger has not done that already, last November.

NEW YORK TIMES

21 February 1972

# The Asian Triangle

By HARRY SCHWARTZ

A straight line may be the shortest distance between two points in high school plane geometry, but it isn't in international politics. In the latter arena the roundabout way often turns out to be the shortest and quickest road to a desired result.

Anyone who doubts this non-European theorem of political geometry should examine the recent dramatic improvement of Soviet-American relations. In recent weeks, almost every day has brought news of constructive progress on long-stalled problems.

One day we read about a new agreement for Soviet-American research on health and environmental questions. Then we learn there will soon be a treaty limiting the number of ABM's Moscow and Washington will deploy. Next comes word that the Russians have agreed to new talks that the Lend-Lease debt owed this country since World War II a generation ago.

And even before these latest advances, Soviet representatives in Washington — with Ambassador Dobrynin in the lead—were overfilling their norms in the area of trying to make friends and influence people in the Nixon Administration. They were pointedly trying to make it plain that their instructions from Moscow were to permit no obstacles to arise to the President's visit to the Kremlin, regardless of how annoying or even provocative any particular local irritant in Soviet-American relations might seem.

There is even some speculation in certain Washington circles that the new liberal Soviet policy regarding visas to Jews wishing to go to Israel may be related to the Kremlin's desire to court American public opinion. Certainly Moscow learned the hard way these past two years that insensitivity in this area boomeranged here.

It is no accident, as Pravda likes to say, that this welcome epidemic of Soviet agreeableness has taken place in the weeks and months preceding President Nixon's arrival in Peking. The Kremlin has been wooing the President frantically, trying to get across the message that he doesn't need to make a deal with Mao Tse-tung because he can do better in Moscow when he flies there in May.

This transparent Moscow bidding for Mr. Nixon's favor substantially strengthens his hand in his talks this week with Chairman Mao and Premier Chou En-lai. Those two shrewd and practical leaders are fully aware of what the Kremlin is doing, and they could hardly help feeling the pressure to provide the President with some tangible benefits that would encourage him to resist Moscow's blandishments.

The President is in the position of the lovely maiden courted by two ardent swains, each of whom is aware of the other but each of whom is uncertain of what happens when the young lady is alone with his rival.

More than ever, now it becomes apparent that the great miscalculation of American foreign policy this past decade was Washington's underestimation of the depth and importance of the Sino-Soviet split, and of the radical

new opportunities that division offered. Even the trauma of Vietnam might have been avoided if first President Kennedy and then President Johnson had understood how fundamental a change had taken place in the world configuration of power.

One source of the error was confusion between rhetoric and substance. Because Moscow accused Peking of being eager for nuclear war and because the Chinese use ultra-leftist language as a matter of course, there was the widespread conviction for years that there was no point in trying the China gambit and the only path was the effort to improve relations with the "moderates" in Moscow.

Yet it was the Soviet Union, not China, that tried to slip nuclear weapons into Cuba in 1962. It was the Soviet Union, not China, that provided the most modern military weapons for North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and Egypt. And it is Moscow, not Peking, that is now engaged in an all-out effort to challenge the American military position on land, on and under the oceans, and in the air.

And domestically, there was for years an over-estimation of the power of the old China lobby, which hindsight now shows was a paper tiger well before the past year's dramatic events proved the weakness of Chiang Kai-shek's American supporters.

But all that is history. The main fact now is that the President of the United States has finally made the long overdue trek to Peking and is beginning the most interesting and potentially most important negotiations in recent American history.

And this President is not a progressive or a liberal. He is a Republican conservative who built his career on anti-Communism. Marxists will see it as another triumph of the "unity of opposites" so central to the Hegelian dialectic. Political mathematicians will see it as just another confirmation that the long way around is often the shortest.

Harry Schwartz is a member of the editorial board of The Times.

Robert Pryer

NEW YORK TIMES

20 February 1972

View From Hanoi:

# A Different Salute For the President

HANOI — As President Nixon begins his state visit to the People's Republic of China, the people of neighboring North Vietnam are looking the other way.

For China's budding romance with North Vietnam's mortal enemy, despite all the recent protestations of undying friendship between Hanoi and Peking, has left relations between the two nations strained.

The decline of Chinese influence and prestige in North Vietnam is apparent in the stores. Posters and emblems of Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Ho Chi Minh are displayed in windows and on street kiosks, but Mao Tse-tung, an undisputed member of the gallery of heroes six months ago, has disappeared. Books in some foreign languages — English, French and Russian — are available but Chinese literature, including Chairman Mao's Little Red Book, has vanished.

More dramatic still is the way Hanoi has dealt with Chinese radio broadcasts. Much resentment is directed at China's Vietnamese-language programs which have kept up an aggressively polemical justification of Peking's diplomatic about-turn in relations with Washington. This is all the more embarrassing to the Vietnamese since Hanoi Radio and the newspapers have not mentioned Mr. Nixon's trip. Hanoi has declared the broadcasts of its Chinese ally "out of bounds" to Vietnamese listeners, a distinction shared with the Voice of America, the British Broadcasting Corporation and Radio Bangkok.

This cooling of a beautiful friendship has revived traditional antipathies between the two peoples. On a guided tour of Hanoi's museums and galleries it was firmly impressed on a visitor that the Vietnamese are as proud of their historic victories over "Chinese imperialism" as they are of their more recent exploits against the Japanese, the French and the Americans.

Even though a common commitment to Communism has served to gloss over many of the old differences, they remain not far below the surface. The culturally conservative Vietnamese found Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution distasteful, and they were irritated at the insistence of the Chinese Red Guards that Vietnam owed its military successes to the inspiration and guidance of the Great Helmsman, Chairman Mao. As a young diplomat put it, "we got tired of their never-ending messages and advice."

North Vietnam now wants to dissociate itself from the Peking-Wash-

# COMMUNIST DISSENSIONS

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

23 February 1972

## How Soviets try to undercut Peking summit

By Paul Wohl

*Written for The Christian Science Monitor*

In an attempt to undercut the effect of President Nixon's talks with the Chinese leaders, Soviet propaganda has launched a double-pronged attack on the Peking regime.

On the one hand, Soviet propagandists have stepped up their efforts to discredit Chairman Mao tse-tung and his associates by playing up signs of internal dissent.

On the other hand, Moscow is going all-out to make trouble among Peking's non-Chinese subjects.

According to a recent Radio Liberty report by Gretchen S. Braynard, a powerful new Soviet radio station in Almaty, the capital of Kazakhstan, broadcasting in the Uighur language, has greatly increased the range and audibility of its transmissions since the beginning of the year.

### A powerful minority

Tens of thousands of Uighurs fled to the Soviet Union in 1962 after Peking began to clamp down on the non-Chinese peoples of Sinkiang—or Chinese Turkestan, as it used to be called before World War I.

Millions of Uighurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, and other Turki peoples remain in Sinkiang under Chinese rule. These non-Chinese people now are believed to have become a minority, but they are sufficiently important to disturb the precarious order in this strategic frontier area.

Sinkiang is close to the Chinese oil wells and refineries. Most of China's nuclear facilities are in Sinkiang. The Russians, who before the revolution had settlements and strongholds in this province which they retained until about 10 years ago, are no strangers there. Two of the mixed Soviet societies formed under Stalin's auspices in the early years of the Chinese People's Republic were located in Sinkiang.

In small numbers the largely nomadic populations on both sides of the mountain range which separates Chinese and Soviet Turkestan still manage to cross the high mountain passes.

### Turki military unit formed

In 1969, when fighting broke out at several points of the Sino-Soviet border, the Soviets organized a special army unit re-

cruited among Turki refugees from China. The nominal command of this corps was entrusted to Uighur leader Zunmin Taipov, who at one time had been a general in the Chinese Army. General Taipov, is still in Kazakhstan officially working in a transportation post.

In few places are national minorities politically and strategically more important to both Communist great powers than in Central Asia.

This may explain why Peking is especially sensitive to stepped-up Soviet propaganda among the Uighurs. On Dec. 5, 1971, in the Security Council of the United Nations, Chinese delegate Huang Hua said:

> "We should like to ask the representative of the Soviet Union a question. In 1962 the Soviet government engineered a counter-revolutionary rebellion in China's Sinkiang Province, and carried out subversive and diversionist activities against China."

### Aggressive plans hinted

> "Several tens of thousands of Chinese civilians who were forcibly taken away by you under coercion still remain in your hands. You have used some of them for anti-Chinese scheming activities. Are you going to use them as a pretext for launching armed aggression against China?"

For the time being Moscow seems to be stronger politically in central Asia than Peking.

Izvestia earlier in the month accused Peking of forcefully turning its national minorities into Chinese either "through physical liquidation" or through internment in "re-education camps."

### Charges embellished

This policy, according to the Soviet government's daily, has led to "massive protest movements, especially in Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang and Tibet." All three provinces are "regions of strategic importance which Peking may need as a base for foreign adventures."

Such articles and broadcasts are picked up and usually "embellished" by pro-Soviet media in south Asia as part of Moscow's anti-Peking campaign.

At the time of the Sino-American talks the Soviets may hope that this kind of propaganda will damage Peking's image in Asia and among the Muslims in general.

NEW YORK TIMES

23 February 1972

# A New Confrontation

By JAMES RESTON

of capitalist imperialism will
not be lost on *People's Daily*
readers.

## Relaxed cordially

This display of relaxed cordiality goes subtly but substantially beyond the spirit of the official explanation offered to the Chinese during the months preceding the Nixon visit.

That explanation was the
same one Chairman Mao him-
self offered when he met with
his top Chinese rival, Gen.
Chiang Kai-shek, during the
fighting that led to the Commu-
nist victory.

It is always necessary to give
the enemy tit-for-tat, the chair-
man explained at that time, but
sometimes tit-for-tat is best
given by negotiating, depending
upon the circumstances.

Yesterday's *Peoples Daily*
publicity for the visit extended
even to the point of selecting an
applicable quotation from the
chairman's writings to serve as
the daily Mao thought.

## Principles of coexistence

It was one that could equally
well have been written by the
more internationally minded
Premier Chou En-lai: "We res-
olutely advocate the practice by
all nations of the five principles
of peaceful coexistence. These
are mutual respect for sover-
eignity and territorial integrity,
mutual non-aggression, non-in-
terference in each other's inter-
nal affairs, equality and mutual
benefit."

These principles, the basis of
China's stated foreign policy
since the mid-1950's, when Pre-
mier Chou joined with Prime
Minister Nehru of India and
Prime Minister U Nu of Burma
in proclaiming them, are more
than platitudes to the Chinese.

Officials in Peking unvarying-
ly interpret them as expressing
China's stand on the status of
Taiwan, the island garrison
now held by Generalissimo
Chiang's Nationalist forces,
which is one of the knottiest
problems in any attempt to
improve relations between
China and America.

The extensive publicity
prompted speculation in some
wire-service reports reaching
here from Peking that the Chi-
nese may be preparing to give
the President a large public
meeting at some stage.

No such meeting is known to
be scheduled at this time, but
such occasions can be organ-
ized on relatively short notice in
the People's Republic.

WASHINGTON, Feb. 22—It will be
surprising if President Nixon or any-
body else in his official or unofficial
party comes back from China unaf-
fected by their experiences in that
country. For China has a way of mak-
ing its visitors think about the organ-
ization and purposes of life, and com-
parisons, while odious, are unavoid-
able.

Much that one sees in China is
obviously troubling and even hateful
in American eyes. Here, one feels, is
what Walter Lippmann calls "the an-
cient order of things when the whole
of men's existence, their consciences,
their science, their arts, their labor,
and their integrity as individuals are
at the disposition of the rulers of the
state." And yet not quite.

Mao Tse-tung's four rules of discipline are rigid: (1) The individual is subordinate to the organization (2) the minority is subordinate to the majority; (3) the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and (4) the entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee."

The Chinese system of "democratic centralism," again defined by Chairman Mao, is more flexible, and sounds not unlike Spiro Agnew's lectures to the American press or Mr. Nixon's advice to the anti-Vietnam Democratic Presidential candidates.

Freedom and democracy, Chairman
Mao says, are the two opposites of
a single entity, contradictory as well
as united, and both essential. "Within
the ranks of the people, we cannot
do without freedom nor can we do
without discipline; we cannot do with-
out democracy, nor can we do without
centralism. This unity of democracy
and centralism, of freedom and disci-
pline, constitutes our democratic cen-
tralism...."

Nobody in the President's party will
have time to test these Communist
guidelines, but despite its authoritarian
system China obviously has a manner,
a purpose and an ideal which touches
something deep in the American spirit.

On the surface at least, both dis-
cipline and freedom are evident in
China. It is no accident that Lin Piao,
Chairman Mao's chosen constitutional
successor, didn't show up for the talks,
or that there were no crowds to greet
Mr. Nixon at the Peking airport. Yet
subordinate officials do talk up freely
in China and the general atmosphere
is certainly not one of a resentful or
intimidated people.

The official Chinese manner toward
Americans, unlike the contentious at-
titudes of the Korean talks is correct,
calm and patient. Chou En-lai, with
his cool straight eyes, talks not only
about China and the United States, but
about centuries and civilizations and
the future of the human family.

The Chinese purpose is plain enough.
Chou En-lai didn't invite Mr. Nixon
to Peking to conduct a class in moral
philosophy. He is concerned about the
unity of his country (getting back
Taiwan); the security of his country
(the Soviet troops on his northern
border and the American troops in
Southeast Asia); the future of his
country in relation to the rising power
of Japan.

It is said that opposites attract, and
this is undoubtedly true of Americans
in China, if not the other way around.
The Chinese are so plain that they
make us feel fancy, and even self-in-
dulgent. There is no ostentation, even
in the Great Hall of the People. Their
noisy propaganda is even more irrit-
ing than our singing commercials, but
there are no cosmetics, no conspicuous
 waste, no elaborate trash, and very
little glint or glitter.

No doubt some of the Americans in
Peking will find this too uniform and
even dab in comparison to the rush
and hurry and color of the spectacular
American costume party, but to others
the austerity of China must seem a
relief. Certainly China does not fit our
stereotypes of the flamboyant and in-
scrutable Orient, or Chairman Mao's
warrior propaganda about all power
coming out of the barrel of a gun.

All this sounded very ominous from
far off, but once in China, it must
be hard for Americans to think of any
people with more preoccupying prob-
lems at home or of any soldiers who
look less like invading conquerors than
the Chinese.

It is odd that our young "Maoists"
in the United States concentrate on
the violence and ignore the virtue in
the Mao cult. It is, to be sure, virtue
by compulsion, and it is a revolution-
ary creed, but it is only in China that
one realizes why they emphasize that
they are seeking a "cultural" revolu-
tion—a philosophical ideal that will
destroy the acquisitive materialism of
the West.

The Chinese do not deny that there
is a great confrontation in the world
between the United States and China,
but they see it, not as a confronta-
tion of armies and military power,
but as a "Confrontation of Societies,"
of ways of life, and they believe that
their system of democratic centralism
will in the end prevail.

For they do not believe in the nat-
ural goodness of man, they do not
believe that the free societies of the
West can combine freedom and dis-
cipline without compulsion, and some-
times we wonder ourselves. Accord-
ingly it will be odd if Mr. Nixon and
his party don't come back thinking a
little more about this "Confrontation
of Societies," which is probably the
oldest confrontation in the history of
human conflict.

28

Far East

NEW YORK TIMES

23 February 1972

NIXON SEES CHOU
FOR FOUR HOURS
OF POLICY TALKS

Peking Lets Public Know About
Visit With Extensive Reports,
Stirring Wide Excitement

By MAX FRANKEL
Special to The New York Times

PEKING, Wednesday, Feb. 23
—President Nixon and Premier
Chou En-lai met for four hours
of policy discussions yesterday
afternoon as China finally let
her people know that a major
event was under way.

Nothing was disclosed about
the direction of conversation.
But if the excitement in the
streets was an indicator, the
mood inside the Great Hall of
the People was cordial. Cer-
tainly cordiality among the
leaders of the two nations was
evident as they appeared to-
gether this evening at the per-
formance of a revolutionary
ballet.

Chinese citizens crowded im-
patiently around downtown
newstands after lunch for a
copy of Jenmin Jih Pao, the
newspaper of the Chinese Com-
munist party, which devoted
two of its six pages to an ex-
traordinary layout of pictures,
text and dry announcements
about the President's arrival,
his meeting with Chairman Mao
Tse-tung and his exchange of
banquet toasts with Premier
Chou Monday.

The First in a Long Time

Chinese officials, editors and
interpreters carefully avoided
any explanation of this decreed
news treatment or of the pub-
lic reaction. One editor con-
ceded the obvious—that it had
been a long time since a visitor
to Peking had received such
concentrated journalistic notice.

There was visible discontent
among Peking residents when
the papers sold out at 4 P.M.,
two hours after distribution.
The rare occurrence added to
the crush around the bill-
boards on which the papers
are displayed in the principal
downtown shopping streets.

The Peking radio read the

same announcements through-
out the day, but it could not-
furnish what the people so
clearly wanted most—a glimpse
of the President and Mrs. Nixon
and of their senior aides, and of
their reception in Chairman
Mao's rarely photographed pri-
vate study.

There were three large photo-
graphs on page 1—of the Mao-
Nixon handshake, the Chair-
man's book-strewn study and
the Chou-Nixon handshake at
the airport. The Premier's "five
principles" of peaceful coexist-
ence were printed conspicuously
in a box at the top of the
page above a large headline
reading, "Chairman Mao Tse-
tung Meets President Nixon."

A Book-Strewn Study

The second page was also
devoted to the visit, with the
text of the toast and four more
large pictures. The three other
major newspapers on sale here,
which are not available to for-
eigners, were said to have
provided similar coverage.

Yesterday afternoon Peking
television added a 10-minute
film of Mr. Nixon's activities
Monday, including a 90-second
sequence showing the Chairman
and the President in animated
discussion.

There are not many tele-
vision sets in Chinese homes,
so the display was largely
symbolic. Most symbolic of all,
perhaps, was the fact that Mr.
Nixon was shown smiling
broadly in almost all cases.

Conspicuous at Premier
Chou's side in all the public
receptions for the President
have been Yeh Chien-ying, an
old army marshal now ap-
parently managing the military
and influential also in foreign
affairs, and Li Hsien-nien, the

Deputy Premier who has long
handed domestic affairs for
Mr. Chou.

Politurob Hit by Purges

The Politurob has been de-
pleted by a series of unan-
nounced purges, notably of Lin
Piao, the Defense Minister once
designated as Mr. Mao's succes-
sor, the army chief of staff,
the navy's political commissar
and the air force commander.

The press coverage confirmed
in a role of unusual prominence
the man who joined Premier
Chou for the private talks with
Mr. Nixon and Henry A. Kis-
singer this afternoon. He is
Chiao Kua-hua, a deputy For-
eign Minister and the leader of
China's delegation to the United
Nations last fall, who has been
present on every occasion when
Mr. Chou pressed the policy of
"coexistence" in international
forums—at the Geneva confer-
ence on Korea and Indochina in
1954; at the conference of
nonaligned nations in Band-
ung, Indonesia, in 1955 and at
the Geneva conference on Laos
in 1961-62.

The others at the Intensive
discussion between the Premier
and the President were Chang
Wen-chin, in charge of Eu-
ropean, American and Austra-
lian affairs at the Foreign
Ministry, and Wang Hai-jung,
the deputy director of protocol,
who is said to be Chairman
Mao's niece.

The President also brought
John Holdridge and Winston
Lord of the National Security
Council staff. The other mem-

bers of the official delegations,
led by Secretary of State Wil-
liam P. Rogers and Foreign
Minister Chi Peng-fel, held a
separate conference at the same
time. The same groups will
meet again tomorrow after-
noon.

Spirited Social Gathering

The four hours of policy dis-
cussion were followed, after
separate private dinners, by
another warm, spirited social
gathering of the leaders in an-
other part of the endless Great
Hall of the People in the center
of Peking.

The occasion was a special
performance of "Red Detach-
ment of Women," one of the
eight flag-waving dance dramas
that were elevated to a high
ideological pitch during the
Cultural Revolution under the
tutelage of Chairman Mao's
fourth wife, Chiang Ching, a
former actres and current mem-
ber of the Politurob.

Miss Chiang, smiling and
chatting amiably, led the
Nixons into the Great Hall
auditorium.

The ballet, depecting Red
Army triumphs over greedy
capitalists during the civil war
against the Chinese National-
ists, elicited applause from the
President. He and other Amer-
icans joined the laughter when
young girls danced out their
exercises in rifle marksman-
ship.

Premier Chou's wife, Teng
Ying-chao, herself a prominent
party official, attended the
performance.

The Chinese women wore
dark pants suits with tunic
coats in the customary style.
Mrs. Nixon wore a two-tone
lavender dress with a patterned
top and loose skirt.

BALTIMORE SUN

23 February 1972

Chinese media
using two tones
in reporting visit

By JOHN E. WOODRUFF

Hong Kong Bureau of The Sun

Hong Kong—The extensive
publicity given President Nixon
in the Chinese press and radio
yesterday was in sharp contrast
with the relatively routine han-
dling of the visit by the New
China News Agency's overseas
service.

In addition to the big spread
—unprecedented for a Western
visitor—in *The People's Daily*,
the Chinese radio stations vir-
tually are turning over entire
newscasts to the presidential
visit. The newscasts are the
main source of news for
hundreds of millions of peasant
farmers.

The overseas reports, on the
other hand, have provided only

mandatory information, though
seemingly more promptly than
during visits by dignitaries who
were not accompanied by press
contingents as large as Mr.
Nixon's.

The combination of Chairman
Mao Tse-tung's decision to
meet Mr. Nixon on the first day,
of his visit and the lavish news
display seems certain to end
any lingering speculation—ei-
ther inside China or outside—as
to the acceptability of the trip
to the Chinese leadership.

The fact that a rare photo-
graph of the chairman's inner
sanctum was provided by a
visit with the President of the
country the Chinese have been
taught to regard as the center

27

NEW YORK TIMES

22 February 1972

‘A New Start’

The Chinese Army band played "America the Beautiful" and "Home on the Range." President Nixon quoted Chairman Mao Tse-tung approvingly, used his chopsticks skillfully and clinked glasses with every Chinese official in sight. Premier Chou En-lai urged his guests to drink up, sent his greetings to the American people, and chatted amiably on camera in English with the Nixons. One might have thought the Peking banquet a reunion of old friends rather than the first social meeting of the leaders of two nations that have been bitterly hostile for more than two decades.

It can be said that all that happened on the first day of the Nixon visit to Peking was a matter of form without much substance. And even as to form, invidious comparisons can be drawn between the warmth and the size of Peking receptions for other foreign visitors—for example Rumanian President Ceausescu last year—and the relatively small and tightly insulated welcome Mr. Nixon has thus far received.

Nevertheless, it is possible to overdo skepticism; President Nixon's first day in Peking is not to be so lightly dismissed. The point is that before the eyes of the entire outside world (though not of the people of China) the leadership of the People's Republic has given a cordial welcome to a United States President whose troops are still on Taiwan and whose forces are still fighting in Vietnam. What Chairman Mao and Premier Chou have done so far suggests that they believe it is not only the Americans who have a stake in the Nixon visit. Their prestige, though to a lesser degree than that of the President, is also on the line.

Premier Chou's speech at yesterday's banquet indicated what he and his colleagues expect from the visit: "We hope that through a frank exchange of views between our two sides to gain a clearer notion of our differences and make efforts to find common ground" from which "a new start can be made in the relations between our two countries." This is fair enough; there is much common ground between the United States and China on such matters as the desirability of reduced tensions, of increased trade and of cultural exchanges as a starter.

Mr. Nixon and his Chinese opposite numbers know that there will still be major differences between them when he departs from China. But what both sides seem to have in mind is an agreement to disagree where this is inevitable, and to do so without war while searching for and cooperating in areas where mutual benefit is possible. It is a rational approach that must aid the cause of peace and understanding between these two great peoples who have been separated too long.

old and experienced. They had more learning, but we had more truth."

When Mao launched the Cultural Revolution with a call to struggle against the bureaucratic tendencies of the political and economic elite, it was natural that his first and most enthusiastic supporters should be the Red Guards. But when these "little generals" became involved in fierce factional struggles, Mao called them severely to order, and they have now been made aware that, if the world belongs to youth, it does not belong to them alone.

The assumption at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution that each person was capable of finding the correct direction for himself, on the basis of his own understanding and application of Mao's thought, led to anar-chistic tendencies and armed clashes among the Red Guards and among many other groups brandishing contrasting interpretations of Mao's directives.

‘Guided Spontaneity’

Mao had no sympathy with such behavior. His ideal might perhaps be defined as "guided spontaneity." When he heard in February, 1967, that the Shanghai commune wanted to abolish chiefs, he declared bluntly: "This is extreme anarchism, it is most reactionary. In reality, there will always have to be chiefs."

The phase of unbridled spontaneity has now been succeeded by one in which the implementation of the directives from Peking is once more closely supervised by the party. Will the new, purified party apparatus forever remain exempt from bureaucratic tendencies? Mao himself does not appear altogether convinced of this—which is no doubt why he has spoken of future Cultural Revolutions.

Nevertheless, it is clear that China after the Cultural Revolution is qualitatively different from what she was before 1966.

Today, unlike before, ordinary workers and peasants dare to speak up and make-suggestions to those in authority. In this climate, the policies of economic decentralization and small-scale industry local industry which Mao has been promoting since the campaign for rapid industrialization in 1958 known as the Great Leap Forward, are being applied more effectively than ever.

Synthesis Is Emerging

Instructed by his experience of the last 14 years, Mao is moving toward a synthesis between the Leninist principle of discipline and the primacy of the party organization, and the populist faith in the peasant masses, which has been the distinguishing mark of his own thinking ever since the nineteen-twenties. The resulting system is by no means perfect, but it

stands as a challenge both to other developing countries and to the Soviet Union.

As for China's relations with foreign countries, Mao clearly stands out, among all the major leaders of the Chinese Communist party, as the least pro-Soviet and least anti-American.

In 1936, he remarked to Edgar Snow: "We are certainly not fighting for an emancipated China in order to turn the country over to Moscow." And, when Mao pressed ahead with the civil war in 1947 instead of heed-ing Stalin's counsels of dis-banding his army and settling for token representation in a coalition government, the Soviet dictator showed, to say the least, a marked lack of enthusiasm for a victory by the Chinese Communists and the emergence of a second major Communist power.

Stalin, Mao said in October, 1962, "blocked the Chinese revolution in 1945. After the victory of the revolution, he again suspected that China would be like Yugoslavia, and I would turn into a Tito." The conflict that burst upon public notice a decade ago thus had deep roots, and Mao was its most intransigent protagonist.

Lio Shao-chi, while by no means in favor of submission to Moscow's hegemony, did regard the Soviet Union as in some way still a member of the same socialist family. For Mao, since 1962 at least, there has been nothing to choose between "Soviet social-imperialism" and "U.S. imperialism"; both are big powers pushing other people around. It was thus easier for him than it would have been for Liu to move toward a lessening of tension with Washington when the Soviet Union—following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the border clashes of 1969—began to appear even more of a threat to China than did the United States.

This was all the more natural because the only real foreign friends Mao has ever had have been Americans. Apart from Edgar Snow, Mao was well acquainted, in Yenan days, with a number of other American journalists.

Mao Confided in Visitors

To these visitors from another world, he confided himself with a freedom he could not employ with most of his Chinese comrades. Toward the end of World War II, he had long and frank talks not only with the diplomat John S. Service, but with Maj. Gen Patrick J. Hurley, the United States Ambassador, who introduced him to American folklore also by giving an Indian war whoop in his arrival in Yenan.

And in the nineteen-fifties and nineteen-sixties, Mao met more than once with members of the small American colony in China, especially with Anna Louise Strong, whose 80th birthday he took

time out to celebrate personally, on the eve of the Cultural Revolution.

This does not mean, of course, that his repeated denunciations of American policy and of the role of American imperialism in the world are, as the Russians suggest, merely cynical window-dressing for the pursuit of China's national interest. But it does mean that the famous "love-hate relationship" is not a phenomenon to be observed only on this side of the Pacific, and that, if a beginning is made in the resolution of some of the issues dividing the United States and China, there is a foundation of human contacts on which better relations can be built.

WASHINGTON STAR

5 February 1972

Koreans Clash

SEOUL (UPI) — North Korea sank a South Korean fishing boat and kidnaped five other off the west coast in the first sea incident this year, the Defense Ministry announced today. Several fishermen were also reported wounded in the incident yesterday.

34

NEW YORK TIMES

18 February 1972

City's Police Given
Thank-You Dinner
By Chinese Mission

By ISRAEL SHENKER

It was a moment to exchange
nightsticks for chopsticks, as
the Chinese Mission to the
United Nations gave a party,
here last night for the New
York City police.

To say thank you in the way
that seemed to them appropri-
ate—although no other mission
to the United Nations has ever
done as much—the Chinese
diplomats had invited not only
top police officials, but also a
delegation of about 15 foot
patrolmen who have been pro-
viding security,

At the Roosevelt Hotel, where
they have resided since their
arrival here Nov. 11, Chinese
diplomats in blue tunics mingled
with policemen who had
changed from their uniforms
and were dressed in their
civilian finest.

A buffet table stocked with
Chinese specialties was set up
in the Madison Room on the
mezzanine, and small tables
were placed around the buffet.
Policemen and their wives
helped themselves to Chinese
specialties, then sat with their
hosts. Guests and hosts ex-
changed messages of good
spirit and cheer.

The Chinese informally
thanked the police for the
work they have been doing in
assuring their security; the
police replied with expressions
of gratitude for the hospitality.

When Police Commissioner
Patrick V. Murphy arrived
shortly before 8 P.M. with his
wife, he said: "I'm delighted to
have been invited and that
they're pleased with the serv-
ice and protection they're re-
ceived."

Given Night Off

For the occasion, a number
of policemen—who bore their
printed invitation (one in Chi-
nese, one in English)—had been
relieved of their regular tours
of duty.

Many of the policemen were
informally dressed. One wore a
white turtleneck sweater. An-
other, Edward Farrell of the
17th Precinct station, explained:
"I wear a tie at wakes and wed-
dings—that's it."

"It's a very pleasant eve-
ning," said Philip A. Lacovara,
special counsel to the Police
Commissioner, who was sitting
at a table with Chiao Kuan-hua
and Huang Hua, the principal
Chinese delegates to the United
Nations.

"The Chinese are good hosts,"
he said.

Strains of the song "Close to
You" wafted via Muzak from
the lobby below through the
open door of the Madison
Room. Inside, guests sampled

BALTIMORE SUN

22 February 1972

Analysis

2 levels to China greeting

By JOHN E. WOODRUFF

Sun Staff Correspondent

Hong Kong—The early stages
of President Nixon's visit to
Peking suggest that he and his
Chinese hosts intend to conduct
their outward dealings on at
least two carefully separated
levels.

At one level, the Chinese are
giving the President a strictly
correct but unenthusiastic pub-
lic greeting, thereby minimizing
the grounds their fellow Com-
munists elsewhere might find
for criticism of their new ac-
quaintance ship.

At another level, both sides
apparently are seeking to
spread the impression that
their substantive talks are
progressing even faster than
they expected, a prospect that
only can be designed to make
their mutual rivals in Moscow
wonder how well things really
are going.

The greeting given the Presi-
dent at Peking's airport was
strictly according to protocol
and nothing more.

The Chinese played The Star-
Spangled Banner before the
March of the Volunteers and
displayed the American flag
alongside their own. But they
stopped far short of filling the
boulevards with the school chil-
dren who have greeted some
heads of state.

Premier Chou En-lai, perhaps
the best human barometer of
Peking's intentions, shook
hands with the President as he
got off the presidential jet but

showed no outward signs of
personal enthusiasm.

What the Chinese may have
in mind in adopting this stiff-
but-correct approach can be
judged by the loud criticism of
President Nixon's trip already
coming from Moscow and from
North Korea.

Other important Communist
countries — North Vietnam
among them—have their own
reasons for being skittish about
the trip but are less open in
their criticism.

The Americans, too, have
friends in Asia who are not
happy about the trip, and the
cautiously correct approach to
protocol could thus ease some
potential problems on the
American side also.

But it is at the second level,
the level at which the appear-
ance of substantive progress is
to be created, that both sides
are apparently seeking to cre-
ate a special impression.

It was a development at this
level that left American televi-
sion networks using an hour of
costly satellite time yesterday
afternoon to transmit live pic-
tures of an almost-empty Tiem-
annen square in the expecta-
tion that President Nixon's first
talks would be with Premier
Chou En-lai at the Great Hall
of the People.

While cameras transmitted
the pictures of the empty
square, the President was at-
tending what television com-
tators had described repeatedly
earlier yesterday as the high-
light of the trip: His first talk
with Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

In the absence of hard infor-

mation, most analysts here as-
sumed that the President him-
self had not known that he
would meet Chairman Mao so
soon.

Most found it hard to imagine
that he would not have taken
special pains to get television
coverage had he known when
the moment was coming —
even if it amounted to no more
than a picture of the presiden-
tial motorcade turning into a
driveway near the chairman's
residence.

Most found it equally hard,
though, to picture the President
missing a chance to create the
impression of faster-than-ex-
pected progress — even at the
cost of a slight cut in one
aspect of the trip's massive TV
coverage.

Just to be sure that the point
got across, the New China
News Agency announcement
left open no possibility that the
President had paid any mere
protocol visit to the chairman.

"They held serious and frank
discussions," the announcement
said.

Serious and frank discussions
are the kind people have in
Peking when they get right
down to business even though
they disagree.

They are also precisely the
kind of discussions in which the
rulers of China's and America's
mutual chief rival — the Soviet
Union — will find the most
ease for apprehension, espe-
cially when they seem to be
proceeding ahead of all predic-
tions.

soup, shrimp, eggroll, duck,
Chinese wine, tea, coffee and
some American drinks as well.

One policeman struggled to
convey the quality of the
exotic food. "It's like a spa-
ghetto," he suggested, "with
other stuff."

Political Link Denied

Chinese hosts, exchanging
pleasant conversation with
their guests, denied any politi-
cal significance in their ges-
ture: the invitation, they said,
had nothing whatsoever to do
with President Nixon's visit to
Peking.

Policemen arriving late—the
personal invitations went to
about 10 high police officers as
well as about 15 patrolmen, all

with their wives—were for a
buffet dinner at 6:30.

There were two Chinese in
the lobby, and others in front of
the Madison Room, waiting to
welcome guests.

One policeman expressed as-
tonishment. Shaking hands with
his second Chinese diplomat,
the policeman said, "Another
one!" When yet another diplo-
mat extended his hand, the
policeman exclaimed, "And an-
other one!"

"They're very affable and
eager to make us comfortable,"
Mr. Lacovara said. "It's a par-
ticularly nice evening for the
patrolmen."

32

NEW YORK TIMES

18 February 1972

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Mao: II

# What Is There to Talk About?

By ROSS TERRILL

Some people wonder if China and the U.S. have anything to talk about with each other, but this gets a step ahead of reality. At present, even regular channels for dealing with each other—diplomatic ties—do not exist.

The first task of Mr. Nixon's talks is to move toward diplomatic relations with a nuclear power that is the world's most populous nation and Asia's most influential, yet whose Government officials no U.S. President has spoken with since Mr. Mao came to power 23 years ago.

The case for relations with China does not hinge on their being good relations. It is modes of coping with differences that are required. Mr. Nixon's trip, by one of those psychological mutations which reset the course of political history, could start to make it unthinkable for the U.S. to attack China, or for either side to allow small wars to turn into nuclear massacre. From the U.S. standpoint, the President's admirable initiative in visiting Asia's heart is a first small step toward finding ways to keep peace and further justice in Asia, without putting half a million men under arms there, and without spending tens of billions of dollars a year on weapons of death and destruction.

The stumbling block, of course, is Taiwan. But it may not be quite the skein of despair it seems if we disentangle its three separate strands.

First, as long as the Chiang Kai-shek Government exists, claiming to be the government of China, the Chinese civil war is not over. Second, there is the question of U.S. air bases, weapons, and 9,000 military personnel on Taiwan. Third, there is the political separation of a territory Peking (and Chiang, too) regards as part of China.

Why divide the issue into three? Because the third aspect, in my view, is not the urgent nerve center of the

issue, and because it is easier and more in tune with the history of the problem, to start with the first and second aspects.

Historically, the political separation of Taiwan from the mainland became a top grievance of top urgency to Peking only after Chiang set up his rival government on the island, and after the U.S., reversing its previous stand, put military forces in and around the island. In fact, Peking does not ask the U.S. to "hand Taiwan over" to China, but only to allow both Chinese parties to sort the political future out without the interference of American military force.

Peking is adamant on the point of principle that Taiwan is part of China. Adamant, too, that U.S. force should not prejudice future relations between Taiwan and the mainland. But Peking may be flexible—may have to be—on Taiwan's concrete political situation for some years to come.

In other words, the following developments could edge the two sides toward a stage of give and take on Taiwan:

* The burying of the issue of the civil war, and a political evolution in Taiwan leading to a government that is truly a government of the province of Taiwan itself, without pretensions to be more.

* Further reductions of U.S. military operations on and from Taiwan, so that China faces no military threat from the island.

If this occurred, the *de facto* situation in Taiwan may not change as rapidly or violently as many Americans fear. The territory's political future would hinge on several factors: the political strength that its various elements, including pro-Peking elements, are able to demonstrate; Japan's attitudes; and the question of how secure or insecure China feels on its southeastern underbelly.

Whatever ensued, U.S. military

force would not be involved, as is wise from everybody's point of view, and Peking and Washington could get on with normalizing their relationship.

There are other large matters for America and China to deal with, after all, among them Indochina, disarmament, trade and cultural ties. Effective dealing with China must be arrived at, for China is on the world map to stay; dealing with her 800 million is not so much an option as a necessity.

Mr. Nixon and Mr. Mao may spark an era of give-and-take not previously known in U.S.-China relations. Before the rupture of 1949, Peking and Washington had much to do with each other, but the lines of influence ran overwhelmingly one way. America was the active force, with trade, missions, and weapons; China the passive object, because she was too weak and disunited to be otherwise.

But now contacts are renewed on quite a fresh basis. Peking's new ties with the U.N. and the U.S. mark a big step into world politics, after two decades of relative isolation, and decades of humiliation before that. China is not a superpower, but she is a major power and she has nuclear weapons.

It is only twenty-two years since Senator Wherry vowed: "With God's help, we will lift Shanghai up and up, ever up, until it is just like Kansas City." Today Kansas City is no more likely to be a model for Shanghai than is Shanghai to be a model for Kansas City (or Manila or Bombay). The influences are now two-way. China enters our world on something like equal terms. A dialogue without end has begun in which there cannot be victors and need not be victims.

Ross Terrill, an Australian, teaches political science at Harvard and is author of "800 Million: The Real China." This is the second of two articles.

BALTIMORE SUN

22 February 1972

## Nixon trip draws
Indian criticism

New Delhi Bureau of The Sun

New Delhi—Prime Minister Indra Gandhi expressed disappointment yesterday of President Nixon's visit with Chinese leaders.

The Prime Minister told an election rally in New Delhi that some superpowers are still trying to decide the destiny of other nations in the world.

Mrs. Gandhi said India would welcome any genuine friendship between the United States and

China but, she added, if it is directed against any other country it would not help ease tension in the world.

Unfortunately, she said, there is little evidence of any change in the medieval and outmoded concept of "balance of power and spheres of influence."

"Voices are already being heard that the two leaders might discuss issues pertaining to new power groupings and treaties in Asia and the world. Present tension in the world will not in any way lessen if such developments come about as a result of these meetings," the prime minister said.

31

balanced statement outlining the position that the Chinese premier will adopt in his talks this week on bilateral Sino-American relations.

The speech, which was translated into English as Chou delivered it from a stage in the dining room, concentrated on three main themes.

First, it placed the blame on the United States for the Sino-American deadlock that has existed since the end of the Korean War 17 years ago.

Chou recalled that the Peking regime "publicly stated" as early as 1955 that "The Chinese people do not want to have a war with the United States" and expressed its willingness to "sit down and enter into negotiations with the United States government."

Although he did not elaborate, the premier was apparently referring to the U.S.-Chinese diplomatic talks that began in Geneva that year and later moved to Warsaw. During that period, Chou also invited American newsmen to China, but his offer was rejected by John Foster Dulles, then secretary of state.

## Revising History

Revising history somewhat, Chou went on to say that China's policy toward the United States is one "which we have pursued consistently." His apparent aim in stressing this point was to suggest that it was the United States which had changed its attitude, not China.

Citing Mr. Nixon's Washington departure speech, in which the President said that the U.S. and China "can have differences without being enemies," Chou emphasised the theme that a "normalization" of Sino-American ties is possible at present. He further stressed that their divergent social systems should not pre-ent the United States and China from establishing "normal state relations."

But spelling out his main condition for such a development, Chou made it clear that the United States must recognize Peking's sovereignty over Taiwan, the island doubt of Chiang Kai-shek's rival Nationalists.

This condition was implicit in Chou's assertion that the United States and China could establish formal diplomatic relations on the basis of the so-called "five principles of peaceful coexistence"—a set of principles that affirms, among other things, mutual respect for "territorial integrity."

Hence Chou was signaling that the United States must accede, at least in theory, to Peking's demand that its control extends to Taiwan.

The administration has been edging in that direction since the fall. On Nov. 30, in a significant switch from previous United States policy, White House national security adviser Henry Kissinger explained that the United States now holds that Peking and "the government on Taiwan" should negotiate the settlement of their differences directly.

Although Kissinger added that the United States still has a defense commitment to Taiwan, his statement implied that the administration now regards the Taiwan issue as a Chinese problem to be resolved without American interference.

That effectively means that the administration believes that there is only one China—which is not far from Pei-king's claim.

Turning to the third theme in his speech, Chou emphasized that Peking intends to continue improving its relations with the American people no matter how its dealings with the U.S. government evolve.

He repeatedly stressed that the current detente reflects "the desire of the Chinese and American people." Insisting that "People alone are the motive force in the making of world history," he expressed confidence that their view would prevail.

## President's Speech

Mr. Nixon's banquet speech contrastingly appeared to be more general and even rather ambitious, emphasizing as it did that a reconciliation between the United States and China "can change the world."

Seeking to reassure the Chinese, who have been sensitive to foreign designs on their country for more than a

century, the President said that "Neither of us seeks the territory of the other," and "Neither of us seeks domination over the other."

The President also sought to invoke Mao's immense prestige, quoting a poem by the chairman calling for urgent action and ending: "Seize the day, seize the hour!"

Written in 1964, the poem actually reflected Mao's frustration at the time at having been shoved aside by adversaries within the Chinese Communist Party. It therefore augured the approach of the Cultural Revolution, during which the chairman purged his party opponents.

Earlier yesterday afternoon, Mr. Nixon met with Mao for an hour at the chairman's residence.

## Rogers Absent

The only American at the meeting besides Mr. Nixon was Kissinger. In addition to Mao, the Chinese present were Chou and Wang Ha-jung, the deputy director of protocol at the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The interpreter was Tang Wen-sheng, a Chinese girl born in New York who is also known as Nancy Tang.

The minimal role being played by the State Department in this summit was mirrored in the fact that Secretary of State William P. Rogers was absent from the encounter between Mao and the President.

No substance of the discussion between Mao and Mr. Nixon has been divulged beyond the Chinese news agency's description of the talk as "serious and frank."

Judging from Mao's recent performances, observers here speculated that the discussion probably focused on philosophical generalities. Allowing for interpretation from Chinese into English and vice versa, the dialogue really lasted only half an hour.

But Mao is expected to meet again with Mr. Nixon this week, perhaps in the central China city of Hunchow, and their discussions may then run longer.

## Visit With Mao

The New China News Agency disclosed that yesterday's meeting between Mao and the President took place at the chairman's residence in the Chungnanhai compound inside the walled Forbidden City. Other senior Chinese leaders also live in the compound, which is landscaped with willow trees, beds of gladiola and chrysanthemums, and small lakes.

Mao's residence is an old one-story villa with a yellow tile roof, which was occupied by court mandarins during the days of imperial China. It contains a large living room adjacent to a small dining room, and a study in which Mao works.

Mao lives there with his wife, Chiang Ching, who emerged as a vociferous radical activist during the Cultural Revolution but has lately been more subdued.

At the banquet last night, President and Mrs. Nixon awkwardly chopsticked their way through an extravagant dinner that featured such delicacies as shark's fin, steamed chicken in coconut milk and sweet melon from remote Sinkiang Province in northwest China.

Mr. Nixon's chopsticks were later appropriated by John Burns, the permanent correspondent here of The Toronto Globe and Mail. At one point in the dinner, Chou and the President separately roamed among the tables, offering toasts with mao tai. At the end of the dinner, the President made the unusual gesture of striding across the dining room to compliment the orchestra for its performance.

Peking, meanwhile, continues to bear up under the biggest invasion of American journalists in its 2,000-year history. Television crews wander through the streets, baffling Chinese with their massive equipment and their peculiar antics.

A large crowd was observed by this reporter today in one hutung, or alley; on closer inspection the center of the activity turned out to be Columbia Broadcasting System news commentator Walter Cronkite, being filmed against the backdrop of Chinese in blue suits.

"I think I've got an audience here," Cronkite quipped, "I can't understand why they don't ask for my autograph."

29

a distinguished visitor. The President had been planning on an audience and had expected it to turn to more philosophical talk than some of the concrete policy discussions with Premier Chou. Although the top-level meetings are said to be on no fixed schedule, there is now a distinct possibility that Mr. Nixon will meet with the Chairman a second time, either here or at his vacation home in Hangchow.

The unexpected detour delayed the first Nixon-Chou conference for 90 minutes, until 6 P.M., and delayed the banquet by a half hour, to 7:30. But the conference was largely

an opening formality anyway, for picture-taking and introductions of the two delegations.

The President and the Premier are to meet in a small group this afternoon while Secretary Rogers and others meet separately with their counterparts.

Beads of bulbs lit the tiled rooflines of the colossal Hall of the People last night to signal the celebration inside. Premier Chou had invited the entire American press corps, the air-line crews and other technicians traveling with the President. From the Chinese side came their hosts and interpreters and many scholars and

journalists, military officers and other distinguished citizens. Most of them appeared to have some professional interest in American affairs.

### Foreign Diplomats Absent

As at the airport, there were no invitations for members of the diplomatic corps. This was to emphasize the "bilateral" and unusual nature of an affair of state between two governments that do not have diplomatic relations.

By drawing his subtle distinctions between the United States Government and the American people, Premier Chou carefully held to this formula. The central and obvious pur-

pose of the Chinese formula has been to suggest that popular pressures are forcing changes in American policy and that the Chinese can encourage the process by meeting with Mr. Nixon without in any way be-traying their claims of struggle against American "imperialism." Mr. Nixon, by contrast, offered a much looser statement. He himself observed that "more people are seeing and hearing what we say than on any other such occasion in the whole history of the world" and thus he spoke not only to his hosts but to the vast audience beyond — perhaps principally to that audience.

WASHINGTON POST
22 February 1972

# Nixon Sees Mao, Chou in Day of Cordiality

By Stanley Karnow

Washington Post Staff Writer

PEKING, Feb. 22 (Tuesday)—Chinese Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, who has the status of a deity here, dramatically blessed a potential reconciliation between the United States and China yesterday by granting an audience to President Nixon only four hours after the President's arrival in Peking.

Mao's apparent endorsement of an eventual improvement in Sino-American ties was further underlined last night by Premier Chou En-lai, who hailed the President's visit as a "positive move" that offers an opportunity for the "normalization" of relations between the United States and China.

Chou also suggested that "normal state relations" between the United States and China could be established if the Taiwan issue were resolved to suit Peking.

Responding to his Chinese host at a lavish banquet held in his honor, the President voiced a hope that the gulf separating the United States and China could be bridged if not closed.

The President asserted that the "common interests" of the United States and China in their mutual quest for peace "transcend" their differences. He said, "There is no reason for us to be enemies."

These expressions of optimism, though carefully qualified, punctuated a day that several experienced American China specialists traveling with the President described as more cordial than anything they would have imagined.

Recalling the bitter hostility that characterized United States-China relations as recently as three or four years ago, these specialists were impressed by the friendly atmosphere generated by the Chinese authorities at the banquet tendered for the President last night.

The President and Chou met this afternoon (1 a.m. EST) in a salon at Peking's Great Hall of the People.

The huge dining room in the Great Hall was decorated with large U.S. and Chinese flags, for the banquet held there last night.

A Chinese Army orchestra set the tone for the evening, by playing tunes like "Home on the Range" and "America the Beautiful." Such music would have been banned as "dangerously imperialist" when Mao's tumultuous Cultural Revolution was shaking China not long ago.

Not only were many Chinese dignitaries rarely seen by foreigners included among the 800 guests, but these Chinese mingled freely with the Americans present in unprecedented fashion.

This reporter, for example, sat beside Wang Hsiao-yi, a leader of the Peking Municipal Revolutionary Committee, which was founded in April, 1967, during one of the more hectic periods of the Cultural Revolution.

A State Department official who speaks fluent Chinese found himself listening to a Chinese general tell of his role fighting the United States in the Korean War. And an expert on the White House staff, who formerly tried to analyze. China from Hong Kong, chatted through the meal with a high-ranking Chinese officer previously known to him only as a misty figure in research documents.

The warmth of the atmosphere, which was also fuelled by much toasting in the fiery Chinese sorghum liquor known as mao tai, compensated for the fact that Mr. Nixon was not greeted by big crowds upon his arrival here yesterday morning.

The President, who did not know in advance what kind of turnout would welcome him, was reported to have been somewhat disappointed that there were no crowds at the airport and along the route to the city.

But the estimation of observers here was that the Chinese authorities' decision to give the President a low-key public reception essentially reflects their current relationship with the United States.

Since China does not have formal diplomatic relations with the United States, the Chinese could not depict the President's presence here as a state visit. And since the United States and China are poles apart ideologically, they obviously could not treat Mr. Nixon as a sympathetic comrade.

Thus, the Chinese are making a claim by their conduct that they consider the President's visit to be an exercise in bilateral communications. For that reason, the foreign diplomatic community here has been excluded from functions connected with the visit.

It is regarded as highly significant, however, that news of the President's activities is being spread throughout China by Peking's official New China News Agency.

Displaying extraordinary speed, the agency recorded in dispatches that Mr. Nixon met with Mao Tse-tung yesterday, and that he was given a banquet last night.

Chou En-lai's banquet speech appeared to be a carefully

28

GENERAL

NEW YORK TIMES
17 February 1972

APOLLO 17 TO LAND
IN A LUNAR VALLEY

Site Near Heights Chosen
for Last Shot, Due Dec. 6

By HAROLD M. SCHMECK Jr.
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Feb. 16—
Apollo 17, the last scheduled
United States manned flight to
the moon, will have as its tar-
get a rugged area of steep
mountains and dark valleys
where scientists hope to find
clues to the ancient lunar past.

The National Aeronautics
and Space Administration an-
nounced today that the last of
the Apollo moon landings is
targeted for a site, south of
the Taurus Mountains and the
crater Littrow, about 20 degrees
north and 30 degrees east of
the center of the moon as
viewed from earth. The landing
site is in a valley of dark-
colored material that some sci-
entists believe is volcanic ash.

The flight is to be launched
Dec. 6, according to the an-
nouncement today, and will be
the first of the Apollo moon
ships to leave earth after dark.
The blast-off is scheduled for
9:38 PM., Eastern Standard
time, or at any time during the
four hours thereafter.

The proposed landing site is
named Taurus-Littrow for the
two major features of the moon
near it. It was chosen after
a search through the detailed
photographs taken during the
Apollo 17 mission last summer.

Keystone Sight

"Taurus-Littrow is a key-
stone site in the Apollo pro-
gram," said the announcement
today. It was chosen to help
scientists fill in some of the
major gaps in their concept of
the moon's present state and
past history—a picture that is
based on evidence already com-
piled through man's first four
landings on the moon—Apollo
11, 12, 14, and 15, and supple-
mented by unmanned landings
and photographs.

Although the landing point
will be in the valley, it will be
within a few miles of steep
mountains and therefore, should
be within range of the two
astronauts and their lunar rover
vehicle, a space agency spokes-
man said. The landing will be
made by Capt. Eugene A.
Cernan of the Navy, and Dr.
Harrison H. Schmitt, who will
be the first civilian scientist-
astronaut to fly to the moon.
The command module pilot will
be Comdr. Ronald E. Evans of
the Navy.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
10 February 1972

Russia gets edge
in submarine race

By*George W. Ashworth*
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Official tallies here show the Soviet nu-
clear-powered submarine fleet is larger now
than the corresponding U.S. fleet.

According to latest intelligence estimates
compiled in the Pentagon, the Soviet Union
has 100 nuclear-powered submarines, vs.
95 of the United States.

At present, the United States holds the
lead in strategic missile-carrying sub-
marines with 41, as compared with 25 for the
Soviet Union.

But the Soviets also lead in other categories, with a total of about 75 nuclear submarines of the cruise-missile and attack types.

At present rates of construction, the So-
viet edge which has been gained over the
past year will increase. The United States
is not now building any new strategic-mis-
sile submarines. It is, however, building
attack submarines at the rate of six a year,
as of the new budget. The Soviet Union is
building around 12 nuclear submarines a
year. Thus, until the Soviet program abates,
the gap will widen.

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird has
sounded repeated alarms over the develop-
ment of the Soviet fleet.

At a press conference late last year, he
noted that the Soviet Union was building
strategic-missile submarines faster than
previously anticipated. Thus, the secretary
said, the Soviets could be expected to equal
the United States in the size of the missile-
submarine fleet sometime in 1973. The
earlier estimate had been 1974.

Already the keel has been laid for the
42nd modern Yankee-class Soviet missile
submarine.

All of this is somewhat disquieting in
many Washington quarters.

The Pentagon can be expected to make
much of the Soviet submarine program in
its budget requests before Congress this win-
ter and spring. And it is likely that con-
cerns over submarines will fall on more
sympathetic ears than will other expres-
sions of woe.

The U.S. submarine program has always

"Large, steep-sided moun-
tains of light-colored highlands
dominate the terrain and are
expected to provide samples
older in age and different in
composition from those re-
turned from the Mare Imbrium
Basin on Apollo 14 and 15,"
said the announcement.

In the vicinity is a rock
slide in which material has
slid into the valley from the
heights of a 7,000-foot moun-
tain. There are also cone-
shaped structures that look
like volcanic cinder cones.

The announcement said that
the dark material of the land-
ing area was thought to be
explosively produced volcanic
ash. The appearance of the

region has led geologists to
suspect that it may be one of
the areas of most recent vol-
canic activity.

If it is assumed that the
moon cooled from the outside
in during its formation, the
youngest volcanos should have
produced material from the
greatest lunar depths. This also
means that the material should
be of the greatest age in terms
of the moon's history.

Apollo 17 and Apollo 16,
scheduled to be launched on
April 16, will complete the
United States' present program
of manned-exploration of the
moon. No further manned land-
ings have been scheduled.

been popular on Capitol Hill, and there is
every reason to expect that it will remain
so.

In practical terms, the Soviet lead will
probably mean relatively smooth sailing
for the Pentagon's request for $942 million
next year to pay for advanced work on a
new submarine missile, and reactors for a
new submarine, to keep momentum if the
present Polaris/Poseidon fleet is deemed
inadequate.

Last year, the Pentagon only planned to
build five new attack submarines. But Con-
gress came up, not only with the money
sought for the five, but with extra money to
get started on a sixth.

The newest types of U.S. submarines are
of high speed, with much more powerful re-
actors and drive trains than before, to keep
up with Soviet developments. Latest Soviet
attack submarines are somewhat faster
than the submarines the United States has
been building.

Whether the United States actually goes
ahead with the present plans for the new
submarine, known as ULMS for undersea
long-range missile system, will depend
more upon the outcome of the SALT nego-
tiations than on compilations of Soviet
building programs.

But there is little doubt that the very fact
of large Soviet submarine-development
program will put heavy pressure from many
quarters — not only the Pentagon — for the
administration to make sure that it is stay-
ing at least within range of the Soviets.

Given an inability in SALT to reach an
agreement on limitations of missile-bearing
submarines (and initial negotiations appear
to be focusing on land-based missiles), it is
likely that the ULMS will be built. The
new program could be curtailed, of course,
or even put off if the Soviets started to slow
down their construction.

If the Soviets do not slow down, it will be
very costly for both nations. It is estimated
that the new ULMS program could cost ulti-
mately $20-$30 billion. Each new U.S. attack
submarine is costing about $250 million.
Costs are also high for the Soviets.

Yet it is clear now that the submarine
race between the two superpowers may not
be abating, as many hope in this era of ne-
gotiation, but may be on the verge of ac-
celeration. And unless there is agreement
or a slowdown, there is probably very little
that anyone can do to stop it. Simply put,
both nations care too much about the sub-
marine and its abilities in both conventional
and nuclear conflicts to let the other side
pull far ahead or stay there.

4

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

17 February 1972

# 'Peak-less summit':
## what to expect

By Courtney R. Sheldon

Washington

President Nixon sets off for alien Peking for a summit which may have no peak.

The climb to a commanding height with a clear and common vision of the world waits another day, perhaps decade.

Two almost total strangers meet after having feared each other's every move for a quarter of a century. Misty suspicions are all around.

Yet the atmosphere at the hour of departure is almost festive. Television and camera paraphernalia far outweigh the locked luggage of the diplomats in the presidential party.

There is a spirit of "we're off to see Chou in the wonderful land of Mao."

A cautious feeling grows that the consultations between President Nixon and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai are not a "Mission Impossible."

If aims are modest—and everyone concerned insists they are—hospitality in Peking could have an ameliorating effect on the world.

The Soviet Union may look on glumly, even ominously. But most nations are today more concerned about the Soviet Union's potential for military and economic swashbuckling than China's.

The theory of balance of power as a preserver of peace is generally accepted. Peking, 1972, could be a setting for beginning to establish a triangular balance between the world's three main power centers.

The record of summit confrontations is somewhat depressing almost every veteran Washington official admits.

There is so little time to do so much. Later, governments are, upended overnight. Promises are forgotten.

Encouragingly, the first high-level get-together between China and the United States does not follow usual summit patterns.

No one is expecting large and spectacular agreement. Establishing future ground rules for conducting civil conversations between the U.S. and China would be a major accomplishment.

And despite the best of intentions to stay with the diplomatic grind for days on end, there will be a complication on both host and guest to escape to the countryside to see the glories of ancient China.

It is easy to imagine Mrs. Nixon, who will be an un-official ambassador, saying to the President, "Dick, you simply must come see the people."

In advance of the Nixon-Chou meetings, whose agenda has been kept secret, both nations have behaved with decorum. The desire by both to talk is deep.

It has not escaped the attention of diplomats in all countries—though not much is made of it in the U.S.—that more advance concessions have been made by Mr. Nixon than by Mr. Chou and the father figure of China, Mao Tse-tung.

A Chinese Communist partisan would say it is only fitting, since it is the U.S. which has surrounded China with threatening military bases—in Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand.

President Nixon's explanation is somewhat different:

"At the end of this century, Communist China will have a billion people that will have unlimited atomic weapons and it can be exporting them all over the world, and it is essential that whoever is the next president of the United States develop policies now that will get Communist China to change so that we can open a dialogue with them."

That was Mr. Nixon in his 1968 campaign for the presidency. He doesn't talk quite as openly today about the nuclear weapons causation, but it is obviously in his thought more than ever.

Premier Chou has his nuclear worries, too. At one time, before the U.S. began its pullback in Vietnam and reduction of forces all around China's perimeter, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union were feared. Now, the China focus is on the Soviet Union border.

Dissimilar in so many respects, China and the U.S. have one common goal above all—survival of their peoples and cultures. A nuclear war, it was long ago apparent, would likely consume both the attacked and the attacker.

What has transpired in world politics since the joint China-U.S. announcement on July 15, 1971, that a summit meeting would be held may be more important than what happens in Peking now.

Premier Chou happily tells visitors that this declaration was what paved the way for China's entrance into the United Nations.

It was taken by other nations as a signal, even U.S. officials now concede, that China inevitably would take over the UN seat held by the Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan.

Then Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security affairs, said that Taiwan's future was a matter solely for Communist China and the Nationalist Chinese to decide between themselves.

The impact of the impending Nixon-Chou talks may well have cut several ways in the India-Pakistani war.

On the one hand, U.S. overtures to China could have helped persuade the Soviets to sign a treaty of friendship with the Indians. This could narrow China's options in respect to its relations with India.

On the other hand, the strong U.S. support for Pakistan made it easier for China to stand aside and not get involved in the subcontinent's war.

Secret warnings from the Soviet Union to China may well have been a larger factor in immobilizing China. The story is only half told at this point.

The trend toward normalizing U.S.-China relations with the U.S. has produced mixed reactions in Japan. China now appears in a better position to extract concessions from Japan in return for eventual exchange of ambassadors between the two countries.

Mr. Nixon's actions have upgraded the status of China in respect to all its neighbors, many of whom had once followed the U.S. lead in treating China as an outcast.

Even before there was serious thought given in either Washington or Peking to a summit meeting, the winding down of the Vietnam war was taken by Premier Chou as a favorable omen.

## Patrol terminated

Way back in 1969, the U.S. terminated quietly the two-destroyer patrol of the Taiwan Strait. This was the first signal to China

2

WASHINGTON POST

29 February 1972

“Sellout” of Taiwan?

Already it appears that President Nixon, of all people, will have to defend himself against the charge that in Peking he somehow sold out Taiwan. The basis of the charge seems to be that in the joint communique released in Shanghai, he did not re-iterate the American treaty commitment to Taiwan, even while he pledged to withdraw all American forces and military installations from Chiang Kai-shek's Island redoubt. Regular readers of this page know that we have had our reservations about the Peking summit. The charge that the communique presages the abandoning of Taiwan to a Communist onslaught, however, strikes us as insupportable. There may be other questions to raise-of these, more in time-but hardly this one.

Would Premier Chou En-lai have signed a document in which the United States asserted a commitment to defend against Peking's "armed attack" a government which Peking regards as an interloper on territory of its own? Of course not. In a news conference in Shanghai, however, Henry Kissinger, the President's chief adviser, said: "We stated our basic position with respect to this issue in the President's world report in which we say that this treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed on that position."

In that report, Mr. Nixon said: "With the Republic of China, we shall maintain our friendship, our diplomatic ties, and our defense commitment." If it is contradictory for him to seek improved ties with Peking and at the same time to maintain a treaty commitment to Taiwan, then it is a contradiction which Peking is ready to accept in the interim for other reasons-mostly anti-Soviet reasons-of its own.

Look closely at the allegation that, by finally acknowledging publicly and unequivocally that "there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China," Mr. Nixon has undermined Chiang Kai-shek. On the contrary, this has been Chiang's (as well as Mao's) contention all along. Logic may some day demand that the United States grant one or the other's claim to represent that "one China." Politics tolerates, at least for now, the compromise - suspended judgment—which Mr. Nixon has just struck.

Look closely, too, at President Nixon's pledge in
the Shanghai communique to withdraw American

forces from Taiwan. He described withdrawal as an "ultimate objective"—no timetable, no tie to any other event—and said it was being pledged with the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves in mind. "In the meantime," forces will be reduced, he went on, "as the tension in the area diminishes." The context and Mr. Kissinger's later comment made plain that Washington alone will be the judge of whether "tension in the area" diminishes; moreover, that "area" involves "the general state of relationships in Asia and in the world."

Then, the United States has never promised to keep troops and run bases in Taiwan, only to help to defend it ("in accordance with its constitutional processes") against "armed attack." Article VII of the U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty, written in 1954, gave Washington "the right to dispose such United States land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense." But, Secretary of State Dulles told the President and Senate, Article VII "does not make such disposition automatic or mandatory." Reporting out the treaty, the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee added: "We are free to station forces or not, as circumstances may indicate."

As it is, until the Vietnam war there were never more than a few hundred American personnel on Taiwan, the low number reflecting an American consensus that no Communist attack was likely. Some 9,000 or so extra Americans were sent there to support operations in Vietnam; their ranks had already begun to be thinned as requirements in Vietnam diminished. Having previously celebrated that thinout as proof of the success of Vietnamization and as evidence of the Nixon Doctrine at work, the Nixon administration is now giving it a third outing, this time as a gesture of accommodation to Peking.

In all, we see no substantial grounds for any charge that Mr. Nixon is abandoning Taiwan. The striking fact is that China was willing to receive him *without* securing a firm American pledge on withdrawal; this lapse we attribute chiefly to Peking's wish to warm relations with Washington in order to stand off far harsher pressures from Moscow. If anyone is to suffer politically for the communique's statements on Taiwan, we suspect it will be Chou En-lai.

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"A MOVE TO CATCH UP WITH HISTORY"—

Q On balance, what are the advantages and disadvantages to the United States of the new Nixon approach to Peking?

A On balance, the advantages far outweigh the disadvantages, in my judgment. In fact, I look at it mainly as a move that begins to catch up with the course of history. It has been very unnatural for us to have practically no effective communication with the Chinese for more than two decades, and it was certainly in the cards that at some point both we and the Chinese would see that at least minimal steps toward normalization would be in our mutual interest.

I think the main dangers lie in the side effects—first of all on Japan, and secondly on the Soviet Union.

We have already paid some price in our relationship with Japan, not from the substance of what we've done but the style in which we have done it. I personally think it was an error of judgment to announce a presidential trip to China without prior consultation with the Japanese. It had an adverse effect on Japan. Nevertheless, I don't think it is an insuperable problem. If we from here on consult closely with the Japanese, and make a strenuous effort to restore Japanese confidence in the essential importance of our relationship, I think the damage that has been done will not be permanent. But this should be one concern in our minds as we go down this road.

As for the Soviet Union, if the U.S. Government decided to try to establish a close relationship with the Chinese at the expense of relationships with the Soviet Union, this could have dangers in it. But I don't think this is either possible or likely in the period immediately ahead.

Q Dr. Barnett, what practical results do you see coming out of the four-power balance you've been talking about?

A One thing that would be desirable would be to see if there is some basis for collaboration to solve certain problems. On this I think Korea is extremely important.

Korea is the area in Asia where the interests of the four powers most obviously converge and potentially are in conflict.

My judgment is that none of the four powers would like to see a major conflict in Korea which might involve them, and it would be useful if the United States began to explore whether talks could begin about a possible four-power agreement to stabilize the situation in Korea.

Q Would Korea continue to be divided?

A The first goal would be to stabilize the military situation in Korea, but not foreclose ultimate political unification. Such talks would obviously have to start from the existing situation.

The Korea possibility is a promising one—not immediately, but something that the four powers might in time regard as a common interest, of wanting to dampen down the dangers of conflict. This would be very useful, and might be a precedent for some collaboration among the four powers in other critical areas in Asia.

AFTER PEACE COMES TO VIETNAM—

Q Do you think there is a chance of collaboration in Southeast Asia?

A Southeast Asia is extraordinarily difficult because of the Vietnam war. But if one can foresee a time when the Vietnam struggle is brought to an end, then the idea of neutralization of Southeast Asia may become one that deserves serious consideration.

Obviously, it would have to involve a great deal of negotiation among all the powers involved, as well as the local nations in Southeast Asia.

Q Is Mr. Nixon's trip to Peking likely to have much immediate effect on the Vietnam war itself?

A Peking has made a strong point of its commitments to Hanoi and the Viet Cong, and of its belief that a solution to the war has to take place in Vietnam and not in Peking. I'm inclined to take this seriously—that Peking assumes that the pressures on the U.S. will lead gradually to withdrawal, and that Hanoi is not prepared at this time to make any major concessions in their position, and that it would either be impossible or undesirable for Peking to try to exert too much pressure on Hanoi. So I would be rather pessimistic that out of the meeting in Peking there can be any major steps regarding Vietnam.

Now, having taken the gloomy view, let me say I would not totally rule out the optimistic view. It is still possible that Peking suddenly may see more advantages from its point of view than Hanoi does from its point of view in some compromise that would lead the United States to totally withdraw from Vietnam.

The advantage for Peking would be obvious: to encourage a total withdrawal of American military forces in Vietnam rather than have to face up to the "residual force" of troops and warplanes that Mr. Nixon says he intends to leave in Southeast Asia until there is a settlement.

economic and financial affairs posts and telecommunications. Chong presided over the conference.

The following nations not yet ready to contribute to the ESF are Indonesia, Italy, Republic of Korea, Republic of the Philippines, and the United Kingdom.

However, representatives of these nations indicated a desire for support of the Khmer Republic in ways outside the scope of the ESF, such as technical aid.

Except for the United States and Italy, the rest of the delegations to the one-day meeting was headed by their

New Zealand, John Ross, first secretary of the embassy; Philippines, Ambassador Generoso P. Provided; Thailand, Ambassador Chana Saendavivasa, Vice United States was represented by Roderick O'Connor, while Italy's representative was Umberto Plaza O'Connor, is coordinator, supporting assistance. Ageley for International Aid (AI), Washington.

Before the conference started, the delegation heads paid their calls on Prime Minister Marwan Lon Nol, Prime Minister Delegated Bisawath Sirikot Matak, and Chief of State Chong Heng.

EXCHANGE SUPPORT FUND

SAIGON POST 21 JAN 72

Nations Okay Khmer Aid

(Special to The Saigon Post)

By TITO V. CARBALLO

PHNOM PENH—Six nations have formed a consortium to establish Exchange Support Fund (ESF) for the Khmer Republic and pledged an initial US$19,08,000. They also agreed that the ESF be inaugurated on March 1.

The fund pledges were made by the following nations, out of the 12 that attended the conference held Saturday: Australia, US$1,096,000; United States, US$12,500,000 (this was appropriated already by the U.S. Congress last week); Japan, US$5,000,000; Thailand US$250,000; Malaysia, US$100,000; and New Zealand, US$112,000.

It was decided in the conference held at the Govern-

ment Palace, that the Khmer Republic, will put up a counterpart fund of US$15 million.

Immediately after the six nations announced of decisions by their governments to contribute to the establishment of the ESP, delegation heads said they would enter into an early bilateral negotiations with the Khmer Republic to expedite establishment of the ESP.

The funds contributed by the consortium, with the help expressed that the non-contributing countries who attended the confab might later participate, will be used as follows:

1) Prop up the riel (Khmer currency) has been floated;

respective envoys to the Khmer Republic: Ansiralla, Ambassador Graham Barton, Keakes; Indonesia, Ambassador Boedjoe; Japan, Ambassador Noboru Sugiaran; ROK, Ambassador Teak Koun Lee;

2) Support the continuing re-activation of the Republic's trade controls;

3) Subsidize (to stimulate the Republic's export-import trade) the reduction of tariff duties on imported goods whether the Republic has a trade agreement or not with the exporting nation.

The establishment of the ESP was proposed to the Republic by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to stabilize the country's national economy. It was learned that the IMF proposal was made during if IMF conference held in theJS the latter was on 1971 and attended by Sok Chhong, second vice president of the Council, in charge of finances and coordination of

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