Oct. 17 04 01:43p

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3746 WORDS

10/17/04

## ARTICLE

As these lines are being written, the election process is still in full swing. But in a few days, what has mesmerized America for three months will be over. The focus groups, the pollsters, the spinners on talk shows combining eagerness to please with congenital insecurity, will vanish until another election cycle calls them forth again.

What will remain are the challenges that generated all the drama, brouhaha over the privilege of dealing with them.

[And] these are formidable. No president has ever faced an agenda of comparable scope. Never before has it been necessary to develop fundamental principles of values and values while reconstructing an international system on a global basis; to conduct a war without front lines and geographic definition; to develop principles to

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replace those of the Westphalian order, which went up in the smoke of
the World Trade Center.

The [challenge perhaps] most [analogous] to that [facing] the
[next] president is that inherited by President Truman when the end of
the Second World War in 1945 left a vacuum in Central Europe and the
Soviet Union emerged as a threat to the global equilibrium. But
Truman's task was largely centered on the Atlantic [sphere]. The
Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. [Today's]
principal threats are abstract and mobile; they have generated attacks
from Bali to Singapore, to Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis,
and New York. In the 1940s, the solution was straightforward, albeit
quite difficult: to construct a defensive line in the center of Europe
and an economic program to close the gap between expectation and
reality, which constituted the greatest threat to domestic stability.

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The challenge [to] the [next] president will be to achieve a domestic and international consensus regarding the nature of the threat and the means to deal with it. Truman could take the legitimacy of the international system for granted; the newly elected president will have to lead an international effort to define and then maintain it.

As [he] embarks on this task, all those concerned with the future of the country should find ways to cooperate. The controversies of the campaign testified to the vitality of our democracy. The time has come to give expression to what unites rather than divides us. As these lines are being written, the electoral outcome is still some days away. I supported President Bush during the campaign and hope for his success. But whatever the results, the US must not remain in campaign mode. The rest of the world must see that on the

Oct 17 04 01:43p

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fundamentals, America [is giving] itself a chance to implement a
common ________ until it can be tested in another electoral cycle.

It is to this effort that this article seeks to make a contribution.

Every international system reflects the ability to deal with two
sets of challenges: security and legitimacy. Both are unprecedented
in the present period.

The security challenge arises from two sources: the gravest
from acts until recently considered the task of internal police forces
rather than international policy; or it grows out of a scientific evolution
enabling countries to pose threats to survival as a result of
developments entirely *within* a state's territory.

Both threats make to some extent irrelevant the prevailing
concept of international elections. The legal basis of the existing
international system was established by the Treaty of Westphalia in

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1648. Seeking to avoid a repetition of the Thirty Years' War during which [nearly] 30 percent of the population of Central Europe was killed in a conflict at least formally over religious belief, the rulers based the new system on the principle of sovereignty, which postulated noninterference across national borders. Hence threats to the international order were defined as the movement of military units across established borders. At the same time, weapons were relatively small, requiring mobilization before war, and technology moved sufficiently slowly, allowing at least the theoretical opportunity for countermeasures.

September 11 marked the end of that period. Threats, it taught, could be organized by private groups and did not require mobilization. These private groups would operate from the territory of sovereign states, but their motives transcended the purposes of the host

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countries. These objectives were not under the control of the host state and not subject to negotiation since they arose at the overthrow of the political and social structures of the societies against which the terror was directed.

The threat to the social structure is compounded by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the Westphalian system, the balance of power could generally be upset primarily by conquest. In the world of privatized terror and proliferating weapons of mass destruction, threats to survival are inherent and can no longer be dealt with after the event. Preemption is therefore [an essential component of] the new international system. Inevitably this leads to a clash between traditional concepts of order and new realities. The nations used to the traditional pattern find it difficult to accept the new necessities, and all nations will insist on some rules of conduct that do

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not leave the decision on preemption to the unilateral, unconstrained
determination of a single state. Nor can it be in America's interest to
encourage every nation to define preemption in purely national terms.
How to relate legitimacy to preemption is therefore a key challenge for
the emerging international order.

## Iraq

No issue has been more frequently raised in the campaign
[nearing its] end than the American effort in Iraq, most of it focusing
on the decision to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. I supported
that [course], but the debate about it is no longer relevant to the task
[at hand]. The 9/11 Commission has wisely pointed out that terrorism
is a method, not a policy. The basic adversary is radical,
fundamentalist, militant Islam, aiming to overthrow both moderate

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Islamic societies and all others it perceives as standing in the way of restoring an Islamic caliphate. For that reason, many societies that questioned America's decision nevertheless have a stake in a successful outcome of the Iraqi crisis. If a radical government emerges in Baghdad because the United States is defeated or [tires] of solitary exertions, even more if Iraq falls into Taliban-fed chaos, the entire Islamic world will be in turmoil. Moderate governments will topple or fight for their existence; countries with substantial Islamic minorities, such as India, will [witness] a mounting violent challenge. Terrorism will spread across Europe. The challenges to America will multiply.

The international community therefore has a major stake in the outcome. The US acts as the custodian of global stability even while domestic obstacles prevent the admission of these realities in many

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countries - though it is not possible such a one-sided arrangement
[can continue] indefinitely or indeed much longer.

There is no shortcut around the necessary next steps: the
restoration of security, especially in areas that have become terrorist
sanctuaries, and the holding of elections. These tasks cannot wait for
an international consensus. And with respect to them, America has a
global responsibility.

Having experienced the challenges of creating local security
forces in Indochina, I would warn against approaching that enterprise
in too mechanical a spirit. In Vietnam, it took longer to make units
combat-ready than simply fulfilling the requirements of a training
manual. And many units that were prepared to risk their lives in
defense of their home regions were far less effective when used as a
strategic reserve to support an overall design - though, in the end, the

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South Vietnamese forces beat back an all-out North Vietnamese invasion so long as they had American air support.

[Ultimately] the effectiveness of Iraqi forces will depend not only on their military training but above all on the degree to which the emerging Iraqi institutions gain domestic legitimacy. Units without political allegiance risk degenerating into unstable mercenaries least reliable when most needed.

But national elections are only the first and perhaps least complicated step on the road to Iraqi self-government. Democracy in the West evolved over centuries. It required first a church independent of the state; then the Reformation, which imposed pluralism on religion; the Enlightenment, which asserted the autonomy of reason from both church and state; the Age of Discovery, which broadened horizons; and finally capitalism, with its emphasis on

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competition and the market. None of these conditions exists in the
Islamic world. Instead there is a merging of religion and politics
inimical to pluralism. A genuine democratic government has emerged
only in Turkey and there only on the basis of imposition over 20 years
by an autocratic leader. This is not to say that individually Muslims
are incapable of operating democratic institutions, only that their
emergence faces great cultural obstacles and overcoming traditional
temptations. It also should cause us to be modest in expectations and
patient in the execution of political reform.

Special understanding is needed of the obstacles to democracy
in a multi-ethnic and multi-religion society such as Iraq. In the West,
democracy evolved in homogeneous societies. There was therefore no
institutional obstacle to the minority becoming a majority. Electoral
defeat is considered a temporary setback capable of being reversed.

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But in societies with distinct ethnic or political divisions, minority status turns into permanent discrimination, implying the threat of political extinction. In such conditions, political contests are over constitutional arrangements to protect the minority by means beyond the electoral process or civil war.

This is a particular issue in Iraq. The country is composed of three major groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, with the Shiites representing about 60 percent of the population and the other two groups about 20 percent. For 500 years, the Sunnis have dominated the other groups by military force and, during Saddam's rule, with extraordinary brutality. To them, the democratic process implies a radical change in status. The insurgency in the Sunni region is not only a national struggle; [it] is a means to restore political dominance. By the same token, the political process for the Kurds means little if it

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does not assure their autonomy while the Shiites support it to some
[degree] to reverse the historic pattern of Iraqi rule. The Shiites
tolerate the American presence - ambivalently - to achieve this goal.
But it remains to be seen to what extent they retain this posture as
the transfer of power progresses.

The January elections [in Iraq], therefore, are not the end of a
process but the beginning of an extended [contest among] the various
groups with the constant risk that [they] will resort to civil war or to a
national struggle against the US to obtain legitimacy, or both - indeed,
they [all] maintain militias as a last resort. It thus seems necessary to
supplement the national political process with a significant element of
federalism. This would give the various factions a democratic
expression that coincides with an operational democratic consensus; it

Oct 17 04 01:45p

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might provide some guarantees for the concerns of the various groups
and a safety net if national reconciliation proves impossible.

The nature of the political evolution also suggests that it is
neither in America's interest nor that of the affected countries that it
be conducted together with other states. If the US insists on being the
sole interlocutor for the Iraqi government regarding its political
evolution. . . .

Some degree of internationalization is desirable. This is not
because of an abstract concern with multilaterallism. Rather it is the
only realistic course toward political stability. The survival of the
institutions emerging from the political process depends in the first
instance on security but ultimately to a significant extent on its
international acceptance. The United States would signal a
commitment to international cooperation by asking the United Nations

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to create a contact group to advise on Iraq's political evolution after
the January elections. Logical members would be countries [having]
experience with military Islam and much to lose by the radicalization
of Iraq, such as India, Turkey, Russia, Algeria, together with the
United States, Britain, and other nations to be agreed. In the context
of common approach to a political evolution, the issue of military
contribution by other nations, including NATO, can be raised.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Militant Islam is the most immediate challenge to international
order; nuclear proliferation is the most insidious threat to the survival
of civilization. In a world of multiple nuclear powers, the principles of
deterrence will erode for at least three reasons: it will not always be
clear who is seeking to deter whom; the calculus of deterrence may no

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longer be uniform – that is to say, the possibilities of miscalculation multiply exponentially; nuclear materials may spread into the possession of non-state actors, removing a direct target for deterrence.

Dealing with nuclear proliferation requires a diplomacy that is inherently preemptive; it is meaningful only before the process of proliferation has become irreversible. But this also means that it is difficult to demonstrate the extent of the danger and, above all, how imminent it is. The diplomacy therefore concentrates on technical issues while the underlying challenge is political. For the country undertaking the journey toward proliferation, the motive is never purely technical. For countries such as Iran and North Korea, the two most imminent proliferators, the purpose is to become major international players and to discourage attempts to influence their

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domestic policy - in other words, the exact opposite of the general incentives put before them, which increases their dependence on foreign help and obliges them to rely on the promises of countries against which the process of proliferation is directed in the first place.

Inevitably there emerge disputes about the process of negotiation obscuring the purpose of the anti-proliferation diplomacy.

The pressures and incentives that need to be assembled are of a magnitude to command a multilateral approach involving the key countries bordering Iran and North Korea. If the pressures involve the threat or use of military force, the attitude of neighboring countries - China with respect to North Korea, Russia with respect to India - becomes especially crucial.

To achieve a successful nonproliferation policy, the next administration will need to clarify these issues. The controversies

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about the appropriate forum detract from the main task, which should
be to decide on a precise program to be negotiated. In Europe, the
discussion about the method for dealing with Iran too often is
presented as a means to restrain American bellicosity instead of as an
elaboration of common purposes. And on North Korea, the dispute
concerns whether the United States should negotiate bilaterally with
Pyongyang.

It goes without saying that the nonproliferation issue cannot be
resolved diplomatically without the direct participation of the
interested parties, including the proliferating country. But [in the case
of] Iran, care must be taken lest proliferation assume a symbolic
character in an ongoing Atlantic controversy. And with respect to
North Korea, the insistence on US-North Korea bilateralism would
leave America as the sole enforcer of any agreement at the borders of

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China. And it would enable Pyongyang to use the agreement for
repeated bouts of blackmail on the pattern it followed after the
bilateral agreement of 1994.

The most urgent task for the United States is to clarify together
with other interested parties an answer to the following questions:

(a) How much time is left before the process of proliferation in
North Korea and India becomes irreversible? In other words, how
much time do we have to execute whatever policy is [reached]?

(b) If negotiations make progress, what precisely do we insist on, and what concessions or assurances are we prepared to offer in return?

If we cannot answer these questions, nonproliferation policy will
turn into a means to legitimize proliferation.

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If the process continues to drift, we will sooner or later need to address the issue of how we would react in the face of a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin either in this country or on friendly territory. At what point will the risk become so great [that it elicits] consideration of how to impose nonproliferation regimes together with like-minded countries?

## The Long-Term Challenge

The most fundamental challenge to the international system is [not?] the less immediate threats discussed earlier but the transformation of the entire system. Historians agree that the emergence of a unified Germany unbalanced the European system in [a] sense by introducing a state stronger than each of its neighbors individually. Disraeli called the event of greater significance than the

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French Revolution, because he sensed that the emerging balance of power would imply German hegemony or also could be restored only by [an] increasingly rigid alliance system.

The emergence of China as a potential superpower is of even greater significance marking as it does a shift in the center of gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China is obliged to grow at a rate of about 7 percent a year to maintain its cohesion as it undertakes the unprecedented task of development with a living standard along the coast approaching that of Europe and with an interior containing a population of perhaps 900 million, some of whom with a level of some of the least developed nations. The impact of China and, a little later on, of India on the international system will exceed the diplomatic upheaval of the nineteenth century. To be sure, unlike Germany, China is unlikely to seek to vindicate its role by

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military power. For one thing, China's leaders are - or at least have
been - more careful, more deliberate, more tending to accumulate
advantages by nuance than the impetuous German leaders after
Bismarck's retirement. More importantly, with modern technology war
between major powers is an absolutely last resort, not a political
option. None of the leaders who entered World War I would have done
so had they known what the world would look like at its end. Every
leader of every major country - and especially the prudent leaders of
China - have no doubt about the consequences of a major war. They
will resort to it to protect their sense of honor and fundamental
national interest, as will America. But the fundamental relationship
with China should not be dominated by strategic considerations. China
will not conduct so imprudent a policy as the Soviet Union, which
threatened all its neighbors simultaneously and challenged the United

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States to a contest of survival. But it will seek the diplomatic and
political role to which its growth entitles it.

No one can predict what judgment leaders will make decades
from now. But both nations' leaders have a responsibility to affect the
judgments emerging generations make of the challenges they face. In
China, they need to forestall the nationalism which is replacing
Communism from taking a confrontational turn and, in America, it is to
transcend the tendency toward the immediate and of viewing history
[through] the prism of the most recent experience rather than of the
long-range view.

An interesting recent article described the difference in national
style as the difference in the major intellectual games, between chess
and go. Chess has only two outcomes: a draw and checkmate. The
purpose of the game is checkmate, and the battle is conducted in the

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center of the board. The purpose of go is relative advantage; the game is played all over the board, and the purpose is to increase one's options and reduce those of the adversary. The goal is less victory than strategic progress.

China and the United States require a strategic dialogue less focused on the short term than on a common definition of long-range purposes. They need to keep the Taiwan issue from undermining the relationship while remembering the importance of solving it by peaceful means. In relations between China and the United States, the future of Korea will play an increasingly prominent role. It is not simply a non-proliferation issue but a challenge for a security system for all of Northeast Asia involving the nuclear future of many countries.

Finally, the process of globalization will raise [the] issue of energy supplies and access to raw materials beyond the capacity of

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the market and requiring a minimum of foresight lest they trigger a
modern version of colonial rivalry.

All this will bring us back to Atlantic relations. The political
campaign has cast Atlantic disagreements in terms of American short-
term tactical errors. This is a misreading of reality. Tact has not
always distinguished every American statement. But the problem goes
deeper. Criticism of US culture and policy has been a staple of
European opponents for fifty years. What is unusual now is that
governments in key countries are making no efforts to stem the tide,
occasionally even stirring it up. A groundswell of public opinion is
forming, increasingly defining a "European" foreign policy as
distinctiveness from the United States.

The real issue then becomes to what extent the Atlantic
relationship is still special - that is, what will the allies do for the

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relationship beyond the international consensus reflected at the UN?

Much of European debate implies that the answer is "very little." That
answer spells the slow disintegration of an allied relationship and of a
world order with the Atlantic partnership as its centerpiece. The
relationship, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character -
that is, the United States and Europe should be prepared to do things
for each other beyond the immediate concepts of interest.

A deepening of the dialogue between the two sides of the
Atlantic is imperative. The ultimate challenge for US foreign policy is
to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to
conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if
the international order were composed of many centers of power, even
while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. The challenge for
Europe is whether it views Atlantic relations as a partnership or as part

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of an international system of multipolarity very similar to pre-World
War I Europe in which major power centers engage in shifting
coalitions to maximize their advantage from case to case. That
system broke down in the early twentieth century; its modern version
is not likely to be more successful.

No article can deal with the entire gamut of American foreign
policy. I have confined myself to some of the structural issues. Their
deepest challenge was perhaps best summed up by the philosopher
Immanuel Kant over two hundred years ago. In his essay, "Perpetual
Peace", he wrote that the world was destined for perpetual peace. It
would come about either by human foresight or by a series of
escalatory catastrophes that leave no other choice.

That is the ultimate challenge the newly elected President will
have to face.

M

Theresa Cimino

From: Jessee Incao [jincao@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Monday, October 18, 2004 3:43 PM
To: 'Theresa Cimino'
Subject: FW: Message for Dr. Kissinger

-----Original Message-----

From: William_Rogers@aporter.com [mailto:William_Rogers@aporter.com]
Sent: Monday, October 18, 2004 3:22 PM
To: jincao@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Message for Dr. Kissinger

Comments on the article

1. A suggested insert on the economic challenges:

Perhaps something along the following lines, taking the cue from the
language at the bottom of page 24 and the top of page 25:

"Finally, China's economic renaissance, the rapid growth in India, and the globalization in every corner of the world, beneficent as these conditions may be for individuals, are creating massive issues of policy, issues which can be postponed only at peril to the world economy. The equitable management of access to energy and raw materials is beyond the capacity of the international system as presently constituted, requiring it does a minimum of foresight lest we trigger a modern version of the rivalries over commodities of the colonial era, and a commodity pricing crisis which could drive the world into general recession.

"Nor can it be safely assumed that America's deficit on current account with the rest of the world -- now tending toward the rather tidy sum of $700 billion every year -- or the accumulation of America's international debt -- now something like two and half trillion dollars -- can be sustained for long.. These imbalances, together with the issues of currency misalignment and trade policy, must be addressed immediately, and with great seriousness, by the new Administration -- and addressed, not in isolation, but of necessity with our trading and financial partners who are as directly affected as we. Unilateralism is by definition impossible in international economics."

2. Another on constitutional guarantees.

The discussion on page 13 might be interpreted by some as a suggestion
that the one device needed to resolve the tensions between the three
religious communities in Iraq is federalism. Consider amending the

1

M

• language from the bottom of page 13 to the top of page 14 as follows:

"It will thus be necessary to supplement the national electoral process with a significant element of federalism, and to establish clear cut constitutional protections for those who, in consequence of a democratic vote, might find themselves in the minority. Democracy must not be seen as a suicide pact by the Sunnis and the Kurds. Federalism and a healthy dose of self-government on local affairs would give the various factions a democratic expression that coincides with an operational democratic consensus; federalist structures, and the ironclad assurance that free speech, freedom of conscience, and due process of law are constitutionally and forever beyond the reach of any majority, might provide some guarantee for the concerns of the various groups, and a safety net if national reconciliation proves impossible."

This communication may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential or exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. Anyone who receives this message in error should notify the sender immediately by telephone or by return e-mail and delete it from his or her computer.

William Rogers
Arnold & Porter LLP
555 Twelfth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1202

William_Rogers@aporter.com

Telephone: 202-942-5915

Fax: 202-942-5999

For more information about Arnold & Porter LLP, click here:
http://www.arnoldporter.com

2

OCT-19-2004 11:24

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.02/12

Oct 17 04 02:15p

3746 WORDS

10/17/04

## ARTICLE

What will remain are the challenges that generated all the brouhaha over the privilege of dealing with them.

[And] these are formidable. No president has ever faced [an agenda] of comparable scope, never before has it been necessary to recreate a phantasmal, reconstitute an international system on a global basis; to conduct a war without front lines and geographic definition; to develop principles to

of world order

OCT-19-2004 11:25

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.03/12

The [challenge perhaps] most [analogous] to that [facing] the
(next) president is that inherited by President Truman when the end of
the Second World War in 1945 left a vacuum in Central Europe and the
Soviet Union emerged as a threat to the global equilibrium. But
Truman's task was largely centered on the Atlantic [sphere]. The
Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. [Today's]
principal threats are abstract and mobile; they have generated attacks
from Ball to Singapore, to Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis,
and New York. In the 1940s, the solution was straightforward, albeit
quite difficult: to construct a defensive line in the center of Europe
and an economic program to close the gap between expectation and
reality, which constituted the greatest threat to domestic stability.

OCT-19-2004 11:25

KAI DC

212 753 7248

3

*at the same time*

*an*
*domestic and international consensus regarding the nature of the*
*threat and the means to deal with it. Truman could take the*

*The Atlantic Alliance emerged fully-fledged as*
*legitimacy of the international system for granted, the newly elected*
*create president will have to deal with an international effort to define and then*
*which does not exist, maintain it.*

*from what*
*It was, but now*

*of the country should find ways to cooperate. The controversies of the*
*campaign testified to the vitality of our democracy. The time has*
*come to give expression to what unites rather than divides us. As*
*these lines are being written, the electoral outcome is still some days*
*away. I supported President Bush during the campaign and hope for*
*his success. But whatever the results, the US must not remain in a*
*after November 2*
*campaign mode. The rest of the world must see that on the*

OCT-19-2004 11:25

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.06/12

5

1648. Seeking to avoid a repetition of the Thirty Years' War during which [nearly] 30 percent of the population of Central Europe was killed in a conflict at least partially over religious belief, the rulers based the new system on the principle of sovereignty, which was postulated without interference across national borders. Hence threats to the international order were defined as the movement of military units across established frontiers. At the same time, weapons were relatively small, requiring mobilization before war, and technology moved sufficiently slowly, allowing at least the theoretical opportunity for countermeasures.

September 11 marked the end of that period. Threats, it taught, could be organized by private groups and did not require mobilization. These private groups might operate from the territory of sovereign states, but their motives transcended the purposes of the host

OCT-19-2004 11:25

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.07/12

The threat to the social structure is compounded by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the Westphalian system, the balance of power could generally be upset primarily by conquest. In the world of privatized terror and proliferating weapons of mass destruction, threats to survival are inherent and can no longer be dealt with after the event. Preemption is therefore [an essential component of] the new international system. Inevitably this leads to a clash between traditional concepts of order and new realities. Nations used to the traditional pattern find it difficult to accept the new necessities, and all nations will insist on some rules of conduct that do

OCT-19-2004 11:26

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P.08/12

## Iraq

No issue has been more frequently raised in the campaign
[neaning its] end than the American effort in Iraq, most of it focusing
on the decision to overthrow the Saddam Hussein regime. I supported
that [course], but the debate about it is no longer relevant to the task
[at hand]. The 9/11 Commission has wisely pointed out that terrorism
is a method, not a policy. The basic adversary is radical,
fundamentalist, militant (islam, aiming to overthrow both moderate

OCT-18-2004 12:50

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P. 03/18

12

groups can become status quo into permanent discrimination, implying the threat of political extinction. In such conditions, political contests are over, constitutional arrangements to protect the minority by means beyond the electoral process of civil war, and beyond and after elections.

This is a particular issue in Iraq. The country is composed of three major groups: Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, with the Shiites representing about 60 percent of the population and the other two groups about 20 percent. For 500 years, the Sunnis have dominated the other groups by military force and, during Saddam's rule, with extraordinary brutality. Thus, in Iraq, elections, if they require radical change in status, The insurgency in the Sunni region is not only a national struggle; [it] is a means to restore political dominance. By the same token, the political process for the Kurds means little if it

OCT-18-2004 12:50

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P. 04/18

13

does not assure their autonomy while the Shihites support it to some

[degree] to reverse the historic pattern of Iraqi rule. The Shihites tolerate the American presence - ambivalently - to achieve this goal.

If it remains to be seen to what extent they retain this pose as the transfer of power progresses.

The January elections [in Iraq], therefore, are not the end of a process but the beginning of an extended [contest among] the various groups with the constant risk that [they] will resort to civil war or to a national struggle against the US to obtain legitimacy, or both. Indeed, ALL THE FACTORS AND ARMS THAT FAREwell maintain militias as a last resort. It thus seems necessary to supplement the national political process with a significant element of federalism. This would give the various factions a democratic expression that coincides with an operational democratic consensus; it

OCT-18-2004 12:50

KAI DC

212 753 7248 P.05/18

14

The nature of the political evolution also suggests that it is
neither in America's interest nor that of the affected countries that it
be conducted together with other states. If the US insists on being the
sole interlocutor for the Iraqi government regarding its political
evolution....

Some degree of internationalization is desirable. This is not
because of an abstract concern with multilateralism. Rather it is the
only realistic course toward political stability. The survival of the
institutions emerging from the political process depends in the first
instance on security but ultimately to a significant extent on its
international acceptance. The United States would signal a
commitment to international cooperation by asking the United Nations

OCT-18-2004 12:50

KAI DC

212 753 7248

P. 06/18

15

The group chose certain states to include
of Iraq, such as India, Turkey, Russia, Algeria, together with the

United States, Britain, and other nations to be agreed on. In the context
of a (the overall process of)
common approach to a political evolution, the issue of military
contribution by other nations, including NATO, can be raised, as
will be shown, which it is properly considered.

910.1

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longer be uniform - that is to say, the possibilities of miscalculation multiply exponentially; nuclear materials may spread into the possession of non-state actors, removing a direct target for deterrence.

calibrate the precise difficult to demonstrate the extent of the danger and, above all, how

to tenor then. It is imminent. The diplomacy therefore concentrates on technical issues while the underlying challenge is political. For the country undertaking the journey toward proliferation, the motive is never purely technical. For countries such as Iran and North Korea, the two most imminent proliferators, the purpose is to become major

To enhance their power relative to the other players and to discourage attempts to influence their policies.

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domestic policy - in other words, the exact opposite of the general
incentives put before them, which are designed to
increase their dependence on
foreign help and obligate them to rely on the promises of countries
against which the process of proliferation is directed in the first place.

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B10 -d WRT:1RA +A)JSTOY

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## The Long-Term Challenge

The most fundamental challenge to the international system is [not?] the loss of immediate threats discussed earlier but the transformation of the entire system. Historians agree that the emergence of a unified Germany/unbalanced the European system in [a] sense by introducing a state stronger than each of its neighbors individually. Disraeli called the event of greater significance than the

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French Revolution, because he sensed that the emerging balance of power would imply German hegemony on also could be restored only by [an] increasingly rigid alliance system.

The emergence of China as a potential superpower is of even greater significance marking as it does a shift in the center of gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific. China is obliged to grow at a rate of about 7 percent a year to maintain its cohesion as it undertakes the unprecedented task of development with a living standard along the coast approaching that of Europe and with an interior containing a population of perhaps 900 million, some of whom exist at] not significantly better than with a level of some of the least developed nations. The impact of China and, a little later on, of India on the international system will be deeper, wider and quicker than exceed the diplomatic upheaval of the nineteenth century. To be sure,

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military power. For one thing, China's leaders are - or at least have been - more careful, more deliberate, more tending to accumulate advantages by nuance than the impetuous German leaders after Bismarck's retirement. More importantly, with modern technology war between major powers is an absolutely last resort, not a political option. None of the leaders who entered World War I would have done so had they known what the world would look like at its end. ~~Today,~~ every leader of every major country - and especially the prudent leaders of China - have no doubt about the consequences of a major war. They will resort to it to protect their sense of honor and fundamental national interest, as will America. But the fundamental relationship ~~will not~~ be dominated by strategic considerations. China will not conduct so imprudent a policy as the Soviet Union, which threatened all its neighbors simultaneously and challenged the United

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States to a contest of survival. But it will seek the diplomatic and political role to which its growth entities it.

No one can predict what judgment leaders will make decades from now. But both nations' leaders have a responsibility to affect the judgments emerging generations make of the challenges they face. In China, they need to forestall the nationalism which is replacing Communism from taking a confrontational turn. In America, it is to transcend the tendency toward the immediate and of viewing history [through] the prism of the most recent experience, rather than of the long-range view.

The Temptation To An Interesting recent article described the difference in national style as the difference in the major intellectual games, between chess and go. Chess has only two outcomes: a draw and checkmate. The purpose of the game is checkmate, and the battle is conducted in the style of the United States and China.

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China and the United States require a strategic dialogue. focused on the short term than on a common definition of long-range purposes. They need to keep the Taiwan issue from undermining the relationship while remembering the importance of solving it by

Finally, the process of globalization will raise issues of energy supplies and access to raw materials beyond the capacity of

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International trading system as presently managed

25
the modified and requiring a minimum of foresight lest they trigger a
modern version of colonial rivalry and a commodity pricing crisis
which could drive the world into a general recession
All this will bring us back to Atlantic relations. The political

Amencas
campaign has cast Atlantic disagreements in terms of American short-
term tactical errors. This is a misreading of reality. Tact has not
always distinguished every American statement. But the problem goes
deeper. Criticism of US culture and policy has been a staple of
European opponents for fifty years. What is unusual now is that
governments in key countries are making no efforts to stem the tide,
occasionally even stirring it up. A groundswell of public opinion is
forming, increasingly defining a "European" foreign policy as
in terms of the
content that is
Amenca's
distinctiveness from the United States.

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Much of European debate implies that the answer is "very little." That
the most successful alliance in
answer spells the slow disintegration of an allied-relationship and of a modern
civilized sea which had been -
world order with the Atlantic partnership as its centerpiece. The
Common purpose
relationship, to be meaningful, needs to have a special character -
that is, the United States and Europe should be prepared to do things
for each other beyond the immediate concepts of interest.

A deepening of the dialogue between the two sides of the
an (justifiable) fear that the international system...
Atlantic is imperative. The ultimate challenge for US foreign policy is
to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to
conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if
the international order were composed of many centers of power, even
while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. The challenge for
Europe is whether it views Atlantic relations as a partnership or as part

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No article can deal with the entire gamut of American foreign
policy. I have confined myself to some of the structural issues. Their
deepest challenge was perhaps best summed up by the philosopher
Immanuel Kant over two hundred years ago. In his essay, "Perpetual
Peace," he wrote that the world was destined for perpetual peace. It
would come about either by human foresight or by a series of
escalatory catastrophes that leave no other choice.

TOTAL P. 18

3746 WORDS

10/17/04

## ARTICLE

[And] these are formidable. No president has ever faced [an agenda] of comparable scope. Never before has it been necessary to reconstruct an international system on a global basis; to conduct a war without front lines and geographic definition; to develop principles to

2

The [challenge perhaps] most [analogous] to that [facing] the
[-next] president is that inherited by President Truman when the end of
the Second World War in 1945 left a vacuum in Central Europe and the
Soviet Union emerged as a threat to the global equilibrium. But
Truman's task was largely centered on the Atlantic [sphere]. The
Soviet challenge was concrete and geographically definable. [Today's]
principal threats are abstract and mobile; they have generated attacks
from Bali to Singapore, to Riyadh, Istanbul, Moscow, Madrid, Tunis,
and New York. In the 1940s, the solution was straightforward, albeit
quite difficult: to construct a defensive line in the center of Europe
and an economic program to close the gap between expectation and
reality, which constituted the greatest threat to domestic stability.

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5

6

7

Iraq

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9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

The Long-Term Challenge

21

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military power. For one thing, China's leaders are – or at least have been – more careful, more deliberate, more tending to accumulate advantages by nuance than the impetuous German leaders after Bismarck's retirement. More importantly, with modern technology war between major powers is an absolutely last resort, not a political option. None of the leaders who entered World War I would have done so had they known what the world would look like at its end. Every leader of every major country – and especially the prudent leaders of China – have no doubt about the consequences of a major war. They will resort to it to protect their sense of honor and fundamental national interest, as will America. But the fundamental relationship with China should not be dominated by strategic considerations. China will not conduct so imprudent a policy as the Soviet Union, which threatened all its neighbors simultaneously and challenged the United

23

24

25

The real issue then becomes to what extent the Atlantic
relationship is still special – that is, what will the allies do for the