REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE
TRAVEL PROGRAM FOR FOREIGN DIPLOMATS LUNCHEON

March 22, 1976

Chairman Anderson, Chairman Laird, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am especially proud that you have asked me to be your guest of honor at this annual luncheon at which you have -- on the last two occasions -- honored Vice President and then President Ford. I hope this sets a precedent for me -- I am available for promotion.

I note that the Luncheon Committee has been received on the Hill this morning, and we appreciate the equal time. I am happy to see Mel Laird here; earlier he was down in my office with a team of interior decorators. That, plus a rush security clearance on Mel a few weeks ago, has made me a bit nervous.

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No one who has been in and out of Washington over the past few decades can fail to be impressed with the exceptional caliber of diplomatic representation here, and indeed, at consular posts around our country. Many of the diplomats stationed here are graduates of American universities. Most of them speak English almost as well as I do. And, most importantly, they are impressively -- indeed sometimes disconcertingly -- familiar with the complexity of America's institutions, the variety of our people, and the range of American opinion.

Diplomacy has changed markedly since the days of my old friend Metternich. In those days diplomats could learn all they needed to know about the country to which they were accredited by attending the right salons and dances, or courting the Grand Duchess.

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Today, though we might all regret it, that is not enough.

Today the people count. And the people are increasingly aware
of the impact of government and international relations on their
lives. Interdependence, they know, is not a slogan, but a
reality. This has imposed on diplomats everywhere a new and
complex but fascinating responsibility to know more about
the culture and people of the country to which they are posted.

The enormous impact of public opinion on American
foreign policy is sufficient reason for foreign diplomats to take
advantage of the Travel Program -- and for me to seek to spend
as much time as I can listening to the American people and
exchanging views with them.

Since I became Secretary of State I have given nearly
20 speeches around the country. The format usually includes

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a major speech before regional groups interested in foreign
policy, a press conference, and other opportunities for
dialogues, so that I have been listening as well as talking.

Let me tell you a little of what I have learned.

-- First, it is clear to me that the American
people neither share nor understand the
cynicism and hypocrisy and the pretense
which seems to afflict Washington. Our
people know that their economic wellbeing
is tied to a global economy. They know that
their security depends on global stability.
And they know that their values must be defended
and their hopes must be shared and fulfilled
through cooperation.

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Americans still believe that their country
has a vital role to play in the world. They
are convinced that our problems, and the
world's problems, can be solved only with a
constructive American contribution. They
know that America has permanent interests and
purposes that go beyond partisanship and reach
far into the future and must be sustained long
after the issues and the passions of an election
year are past.

- Second, there is a continuing awareness of the
importance of our relations with our traditional
friends and allies among the industrial democracies

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of the North Atlantic Community and East Asia.

Our shared moral and cultural heritage and the
similarity of the domestic and international
challenges facing our societies, make coordination
among us ever more essential to the success of our
efforts, whether in relations among ourselves or
with other nations of the world.

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Third, there is a consensus in this country
on the need for peace through strength.

Reasonable people may disagree over how much
American strength is enough to protect our
security, or the precise balance of advantage one
should seek or expect in our relationship with
potential adversaries. Our people know we must
be strong -- in strategic and in conventional
forces -- if the global balance of stability is to be
maintained. They know as well that our power must
be useable -- and that the world must know we have
the will to use it when needed. The American
people seek security, peace, and stability, without
either confrontation or capitulation.

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-- And, finally, I have found an increasing
realization of the importance of relations between
America and other industrial nations and the
developing world. Foreign assistance legislation,
which had become increasingly unpopular in the
country and the Congress in recent years, has
regained support. The traditional generous impulses
of the American people always will be aroused by
human tragedies such as the recent devastation in
Guatemala. And our concept of fairness will, I believe,
support changes in the international economic system
to improve opportunities for developing countries to
share in its management and its benefits. We are,
of course, tired of the confrontationist rhetoric

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often directed against us, but we realize that
there is, after all, only one world. Problems
such as population, the environment, and the
use of the oceans can only be solved by
international accommodation and cooperation --
no one country alone has the resources or the ability
to do what must be done. If we are met fairly and in
a sense of mutual respect and practical cooperation
America stands ready to respond positively and to
help build a new era of international cooperation.

Ladies and Gentlemen, all of the nations represented
here today -- all of the nations that have at one time or another
benefitted from the Travel Program -- have much to do together.
International cooperation is no longer an idea; it is an inescapable

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necessity. The traditional patterns of international conduct
are no longer sufficient. Ambition, threat, and oppression
can only delay our common progress and hasten our mutual
decline. We have no more urgent task than to get to know
each other better -- to understand that the positive aspirations
of all our peoples can be reconciled and that, together, we
can build a better world for ourselves and the generations
that follow after us.

We here today represent different cultures, different
governments and different interests -- but the common ground for
our effort is the wellbeing of humanity, and our common
responsibility is to find ways to promote that wellbeing. The
Travel Program that many of you here today have so generously
sponsored and others of you have participated in, is an

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important contribution to mutual understanding and a
common determination to rise above the issues that divide
nations so that we may, together, work for the brotherhood
of man and the progress, with justice and freedom, of the
human community.

My congratulations to those diplomats who have been
able to take advantage of the Travel Program; and my grateful
thanks, on behalf of the Department of State and the President,
to the sponsors of the Program for their unique and
valuable private contribution to understanding among peoples
and nations.

The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[LC]

Speech

March 22, 1976

Dallas, Texas

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the World Affairs Council and Southern Methodist University.*

I have come here today to talk to you about the vital and intimate relationship between America's foreign policy and our national security. It is appropriate that I do so in Texas, a State so long dedicated to a strong and resolute America; a State that has given our Nation three distinguished Americans who presently serve in Washington and whom I am proud to consider friends—Bill Clements, the Deputy Secretary of Defense; George Mahon, the Chairman of the Appropriations Committee of the House of Representatives; and John Tower of the Senate Armed Services Committee. All three of these men have worked long and hard to assure a strong defense for America. All three deserve the grateful thanks of their countrymen.

As Secretary of State I am not, of course, directly involved in the preparation of our defense budget or in decisions regarding particular weapons programs. But as the President's principal advisor on foreign policy, no one knows better than I that a strong defense is crucial for our role in the world. For a great and responsible power, diplomacy without strength would be empty. If we were weak we could not negotiate; we could only hope or accommodate. It is the confidence of strength that permits us to act with conciliation and responsibility to help shape a more peaceful world.

Other nations must not be led to doubt either our strength or our resolution. For how others see us determines the risks they are prepared to run and the degree to which they are willing to place confidence in our policies. If adversaries consider

us weak or irresolute, testing and crises are inevitable. If allies doubt our constancy, retreat and political shifts are certain.

And so, as Secretary of State, I am inevitably a partisan of a strong America and a strong defense as the underpinning of a strong foreign policy. I have a responsibility to make clear to the American people and to other nations that our power is indeed adequate to our current challenges, that we are improving our forces to meet changing conditions, that America understands its interests and values and will defend them, and that the American people will never permit those hostile to us to shape the world in which we live.

I do not accept the propositions that other nations have gained military ascendancy over us, that the Administration has neglected our defenses, or that negotiations to reduce the threat of nuclear war are unwise. These charges sound remarkably like the "missile gap" claims which aroused anxieties in 1960 only to dissolve suddenly a few weeks after the election.

We do face serious challenges to our security. They derive from the unprecedented conditions of the thermonuclear age, the ambiguities of contemporary power, and the perpetual revolution in technology. Our task is to understand the real and permanent requirements of our security rather than to be seduced by the outmoded vocabulary of a simpler time.

What are the national security issues we face? What is the true condition of our national defense?

* First, the inevitable growth of Soviet economic and military power has produced essential strategic equality. We cannot halt this growth, but

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we must counterbalance it and prevent its use for political expansion.

*   **Second,** America remains the most powerful nation in the world. It will remain so, if the Congress approves the President's proposed defense budget. But evolving technology and the military programs of others impose upon us the need for constant vigilance and continuing major effort.

*   **Third,** technology has revolutionized the instruments of war and introduced an unparalleled complexity into the perceptions of power and the choices that we must make to maintain it. The defense establishment we have today is the product of decisions taken 10 to 15 years ago. Equally the decisions we make today will determine our defense posture in the 1980's and beyond. And the kind of forces we have will determine the kind of diplomacy we are able to conduct.

*   **Fourth,** as nuclear arsenals grow, the horrors of nuclear war become ever more apparent while at the same time the threat of all-out nuclear war to deter or resist less than all-out aggression becomes ever less plausible. Under the umbrella of strategic equivalence, testing and probing at the local and regional levels become more likely. Hence over the next decade we must increase and modernize the forces-air, land, and sea-for local defense.

*   **Fifth,** while a weak defense posture produces a weak foreign policy, a strong defense does not necessarily produce a strong foreign policy. Our role in the world depends as well on how realistically we perceive our national interests, on our unity as a people, and on our willingness to persevere in pursuit of our national goals.

*   **Finally,** for Americans physical strength can never be an end in itself. So long as we are true to ourselves, every Administration has the obligation to seek to control the spiral of nuclear weapons and to give mankind hope for a more secure and just future.

Let me discuss each of these challenges.

## Long-Range Challenge of Defense

To cope with the implications of Soviet power has become a permanent responsibility of American defense and foreign policy. Sixty years of Soviet industrial and economic growth, and a political system that gives top priority to military buildup, have-inevitably-brought the Soviet Union to a position of rough equilibrium with the United States. No policy or decision on our part

brought this about. Nothing we could have done would have prevented it. Nothing we can do now will make it disappear

But while we cannot prevent the growth of Soviet military strength, we can and must maintain the strength to balance it and insure that it will not be used for political expansion. There is no alternative to a substantial defense budget over the long term. We have a permanent responsibility and need a steady course that does not change with the fads of the moment. We cannot afford the oscillation between assaults on defense spending and cries of panic, between cuts of $40 billion in Administration defense budget requests over seven years and charges of neglect of our defenses.

This claim on our perseverance is a new experience for Americans. Throughout most of our history we have been able to mobilize urgently in time of war and then to disarm unilaterally when victory was achieved. After World War II we rapidly demobilized our armies, relying largely on our nuclear monopoly to preserve the peace. Thus when the Korean war broke out we were little better prepared than we had been 10 summers previously. Only recently have we begun to understand-and then reluctantly-that foreign policy and military strategy are inextricably linked, that we must maintain defense preparedness over the long-term, and that we will live for as far ahead as we can see in a twilight between tranquillity and open confrontation. We need a defense posture that is relevant to our dangers, comprehensible to our friends, credible to our adversaries, and that we are prepared to sustain over the long term.

## Imperatives of Technology

Technology has transformed the conditions and calculations of military strength in unprecedented fashion.

The paradox of contemporary military strength is that a momentous increase in the element of power has eroded the traditional relationship of power to policy. Until the end of World War II, it would never have occurred to a leader that there might be an upper limit to useful military power. Since the technological choices were limited, strength was largely defined in quantitative terms. Today the problem is to insure that our strength is relevant to our foreign policy objectives. Under current conditions no matter how we or our adversaries improve the size or quality of our

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strategic arsenals, one overriding fact remains: An all-out strategic nuclear exchange would kill hundreds of millions on both sides in a matter of hours and utterly devastate the nations involved.

Thus the current strategic problem is virtually the diametric opposite of the historic one. Planners used to pursue increased overall power. Today we have a total strength unimaginable a generation ago, but we must design, diversify, and refine our forces so that they are relevant to—and able to support—rational foreign policy objectives. Historically military planners could treat the technology of their time as stable; today technology revolutionizes military capabilities in both strategic and tactical forces every decade and thus presents policymakers with an ever increasing spectrum of choice.

And yet the choices we make now will not, in most cases, really affect the structure of our forces for from 5 to 10 years—the time it takes to design new weapons, build them, and deploy them. Thus the policies Administrations are able to carry out are largely shaped by decisions in which they took no part. Decisions made in the 1960's largely determined our strategic posture for the 1970's. We can do little to change the impact of those earlier decisions; the Administration in power in the 1980's will be able to do little to change the impact of the decisions we make today. This is a sobering challenge, and it turns national security policy into a nonpartisan responsibility.

In choosing among the options that technology gives us, we—and every Administration—must keep certain principles in mind.

* First, we must not simply duplicate Soviet choices. The Soviet Union has a different geopolitical problem, a different force structure, and perhaps a different strategic doctrine.

* Second, because of the costs of modern forces, we face complex choices. In many areas we face a trade-off between quantity and quality, between numbers and sophistication.

* Third, because of our higher wage scales—particularly for our volunteer forces—any increase in our forces will weigh much more heavily on our economy than on that of adversaries whose pay scales are only a fraction of ours. For this reason, and the value we place on human life, we have always had an incentive, indeed an imperative, to put a premium on technology—where we are

superior—rather than sheer numbers.

* Fourth, we must see beyond the numbers game. Quality confers advantages as much as quantity and can sometimes substitute for it. Yet even we cannot afford every weapon that technology makes possible.

* Fifth, at some point numbers count. Technology cannot substitute indefinitely for numerical strength. The belief that there is an unlimited amount of fat to be cut in the defense budget is an illusion. Reductions almost inevitably translate into a reduction of effectiveness.

America possesses the economic and technological foundation to remain militarily preeminent; we can afford whatever military forces our security requires. The challenge we face is not to our physical strength—which is unequalled—but to our will to maintain it in all relevant categories and to use it when necessary to defend our interests and values.

## Strategic Forces and Strategic Arms Limitations

Our Nation's security requires first and foremost, strategic forces that can deter attack and that insure swift and flexible retaliation if aggression occurs.

We have such forces today. Our technology has always been ahead of the U.S.S.R. by at least five years; with appropriate effort we can insure that this will continue to be the case.

We are determined to maintain the strategic balance at whatever level is required. We will never allow the balance to be tipped against us either by unilateral decision or a buildup of the other side, by a one-sided agreement or by a violation of an agreement.

But we must be clear what maintaining the balance means. We must not mesmerize ourselves with fictitious “gaps.” Our forces were designed according to different criteria than those of the Soviet Union; their adequacy must be judged by our strategic needs, not theirs.

In the middle 1960's we could have continued the deployment of heavy throwweight missiles, following the Titan or the Atlas. But the Administration then in office decided instead to rely—in addition to our large bomber force—on an arsenal of 1,000 new, relatively light, sophisticated, and extremely accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles [ICBM] and 656 submarine-launched missiles on 41 boats. We deployed these systems rapidly,

4

halting our buildup of launchers in the 1960's when it was judged that technological improvements were more important than an increase in numbers.

The Soviet Union chose a different course. Because of its more limited technological capabilities, it emphasized missiles whose greater throwweight compensated for their substantially poorer accuracy. But—contrary to the expectations of American officials in the 1960's—the Soviets also chose to expand their numbers of launchers beyond what we had. Thus the Soviets passed our numerical levels by 1970 and continued to add an average of 200 missiles a year—until we succeeded in halting this buildup in the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement of 1972.

Therefore—as a consequence of unilateral decisions made a decade ago by both sides—Soviet missile forces today are somewhat larger in number and considerably heavier in throwweight, while ours are superior in reliability, accuracy, diversity, and sophistication. We possess far larger numbers of warheads—8,500 to their 2,500—and we have several hundred more strategic bombers.

Whether we move in the direction of greater throwweight will largely depend on recommendations made by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; it is not essentially a foreign policy decision. But in making it we will be governed by our needs not by a compulsion to duplicate the Soviet force structure. The destructiveness of missiles depends on a combination of explosive power and accuracy. For most purposes, as accuracy improves, explosive power becomes less important—and heavy land-based missiles become, in fact, more vulnerable. Since we have stressed accuracy, we may decide that we do not need to approach the level of throwweight of Soviet weapons although nothing—certainly no SALT agreement—prevents us from substantially increasing our throwweight if we choose.

Whatever our decision regarding technical issues no responsible leader should encourage the illusion that America can ever again recapture the strategic superiority of the early postwar period. In the 1940's we had a nuclear monopoly. In the 1950's and early 1960's we had overwhelming preponderance. As late as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 the Soviet Union possessed less than 100 strategic systems while we had thousands.

But today, when each side has thousands of launchers and many more warheads, a decisive or politically significant margin of superiority is out of reach. If one side expands or improves its forces sooner or later the other side will balance the effort. The Soviet Union first developed an ICBM; we matched it. We then added a lead in numbers of strategic missiles to the lead we already had in bombers; they caught up and surpassed us in missile numbers although we still remain far ahead in numbers of bombers. When our Trident submarines are in production by the end of this decade, we will begin to redress that numerical imbalance as well as improve the flexibility and survivability of our forces.

We were the first to put modern ballistic missiles on submarines and we were the first to put multiple warheads on missiles. Although we remain ahead in both categories, the Soviets found ways to narrow the gap. And the same will be true in the future, whether in missile accuracy or submarine, aircraft, or cruise missile technology.

The pattern is clear. No net advantage can long be preserved by either side. A perceived inequality could shake the confidence of other countries, even when its precise military significance is difficult to define. Therefore, we certainly will not permit a perceived or actual imbalance to arise against us and the Soviet Union is likely to follow similar principles. The probable outcome of each succeeding round of the strategic arms race will be the restoration of equilibrium at a higher and costlier level of forces and probably with less political stability. Such temporary advantages as can be achieved are not strategically decisive. The long leadtimes for the deployment of modern weapons should always permit countermeasures to be taken. If both sides remain vigilant, neither side will be able to reduce the effects of a counterblow against it to acceptable levels.

Those who paint dark vistas of a looming U.S. inferiority in strategic weapons ignore these facts and the real choices facing modern leaders.

No nuclear weapon has ever been used in modern wartime conditions or against an opponent possessing means of retaliation. Indeed neither side has even tested the launching of more than a few missiles at a time; neither side has ever fired them in a North-South direction as they would have to do in wartime. Yet initiation of an all-out surprise attack would depend on substantial confidence that thousands of reentry vehicles launched in care-

5

fully coordinated attacks-from land, sea, and air-
would knock out all their targets thousands of
miles away, with a timing and reliability exactly as
predicted, before the other side launches any
forces to preempt or retaliate and with such
effectiveness that retaliation would not produce
unacceptable damage. Any miscalculation or tech-
nical failure would mean national catastrophe.
 Assertions that one side is "ahead" by the margins
now under discussion pale in significance when an
attack would depend on decisions based on such
massive uncertainties and risks.

For these reasons the strategic arsenals of the
two sides find their principal purpose in matching
and deterring the forces of the opponent and in
making certain that third countries perceive no
inequality. In no recent crisis has an American
President come close to considering the use of
strategic nuclear weapons. In no crisis since
1962 -and perhaps not even then -has the strategic
balance been the decisive factor. Even in Korea
when we possessed an overwhelming superiority, it
was not relevant to the outcome.

It is against this background that we have
vigorously negotiated mutual limitations in strate-
gic arms. These are compelling reasons for pursuing
such talks.

* Since successive rounds of competitive pro-
programs will almost certainly yield only equilibrium,
we have sought to regulate the competition and to
maintain the equivalence that will exist in any case
at lower levels.

* Stabilizing the strategic balance frees re-
sources to strengthen our forces in areas where
they are most needed; it will ease the problem of
enhancing our capabilities for regional defense and
in sea power -the areas where an imbalance could
have serious geopolitical consequences.

* Agreed limitations and a more calculable
strategic relationship will facilitate efforts to
reduce political confrontations and crises.

* And, finally, the American people expect
their leaders to pursue every responsible approach
to peace and stability in the thermonuclear era.
Only then can we expect them to support the sacri-
fices necessary to maintain our defensive strength.

We have made progress toward these goals. In
the 1972 SALT agreements we froze antiballistic
missile systems in their infancy and thus avoided

potentially massive expenditures and instabilities.
We halted the momentum of the Soviet missile
buildup for five years--a period in which, because
of the long leadtimes involved, we had no capacity
for deployment of our own. We intended to use
that five-year interval to negotiate a longer term
and more comprehensive agreement based on
numerical equality and, failing that, to close the
numerical gap by our own efforts as our moderni-
zation programs developed.

This is precisely what President Ford achieved
at Vladivostok a year and a half ago and what we
are trying to enshrine in a binding treaty that
would run through 1985. Both sides would have
equal ceilings on missiles, heavy bombers, and on
multiwarhead missiles; this would require the
Soviets to dismantle many weapons while our
planned forces would not be affected. And neither
the weapons of our allies nor our forward based
nuclear systems-such as carriers and tactical
aircraft -would be included; these had been Soviet
demands since 1969.

These are major accomplishments which are
overwhelmingly in our interest, particularly when
we compare them to the situation which could
have prevailed had we failed to achieve restraints
on Soviet programs. Nevertheless very important
issues remain to be resolved. We will make every
effort to conclude a satisfactory agreement, but we
will be driven solely by the national interest and
not by arbitrary or artificial deadlines.

The SALT agreements are the opposite of the
one-sided concessions to the U.S.S.R., as they are
so often portrayed. Soviet offensive programs were
slowed; none of ours were affected. Nor has the
Administration countenanced Soviet violations of
the first SALT agreement as has been irresponsibly
charged. In fact we have carefully watched every
aspect of Soviet performance. It is the unanimous
view of all agencies of our Government-only
recently reconfirmed-that no Soviet violation has
occurred and that none of the ambiguous actions
that we have noted and raised has affected our
security. But we will remain vigilant. All ambigu-
ous information will be carefully analyzed. No
violations will be tolerated. We will insist on full
explanations where questionable activity has
occurred.

We will maintain the strategic balance at
whatever level is required-preferably within the
limits of successful SALT negotiations, but if

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necessary without those limits. We will not heed
those who maintain that all that is required are
limited, minimum deterrence forces-to threaten
the Soviet civilian population. To follow their
advice would deprive us of all options save capitu-
lation and the massive destruction of civilian life; it
would create a large numerical imbalance against us
which could have significant political conse-
quences, possibly tempting our adversaries and
upsetting our friends.

But neither will we be deflected by contrived
and incredible scenarios, by inflated versions of
Soviet strength, or by irresponsible attacks on
SALT into diverting defense resources away from
vital areas-the forces for regional and local defense
and our Navy. For these are the areas where short-
falls and imbalances can rapidly turn into geopoliti-
cal shifts that jeopardize our fundamental interests
and those of our allies.

Military Strength for Regional Defense

Under conditions of nuclear parity, world
peace is more likely to be threatened by shifts in
local or regional balances-in Europe, the Middle
East, Asia, Latin America, or Africa-than by
strategic nuclear attack. Thus our forces that can
be used for local defense deserve our particular
attention and increased resources.

The issue is not the simplistic one of the size
of the Soviet army. There is nothing new about the
size of the Soviet army. During the entire postwar
period, the Soviet standing army has always been
larger than ours; at times it has been three times
the size. The Soviet Union has a much greater land-
mass to defend and perceives major defense prob-
lems both in Eastern Europe and on its Asian front
where nearly half of the Soviet army is now
stationed. We, by contrast, enjoy the shields of
friendly neighbors and wide oceans. And we are
linked with close allies with substantial forces of
their own.

The new and long foreseen problem is that
under conditions of nuclear balance our adversaries
may be increasingly tempted to probe at the
regional level. This temptation must be discour-
aged. If leaders around the world come to assume
that the United States lacks either the forces or the
will to resist while others intervene to impose solu-
tions, they will accommodate themselves to what
they will regard as the dominant trend. And an

unopposed superpower may draw dangerous con-
clusions when the next opportunity for interven-
tion beckons. Over time the global balance of
power and influence will inevitably shift to the
advantage of those who care nothing about Ameri-
ca's values or well-being.

Thus our strong capability for local and re-
gional defense is essential for us and, together with
our allies, we must build up these forces. In a crisis
the President must have other choices than capitu-
lation or resort to strategic nuclear weapons.

We are not the world's policeman-but we
cannot permit the Soviet Union or its surrogates to
become the world's policeman either if we care
anything about our security and the fate of free-
dom in the world. It does no good to preach strate-
gic superiority while practicing regional retreat.

This was the issue in Angola. The United
States had no significant stake in a purely Angolan
civil war. The issue was-and remains-the unac-
ceptable precedent of massive Soviet and Cuban
military intervention in a conflict thousands of
miles from their shores-with its broad implications
for the rest of Africa and, indeed, many other
regions of the world. The danger was, and is, that
our inaction-our legislatively imposed failure even
to send financial help to Africans who sought to
resist-will lead to further Soviet and Cuban pres-
sures on the mistaken assumption that America has
lost the will to counter adventurism or even to help
others do so.

It is time, therefore, to be clear that as far as
we are concerned Angola has set no precedent. It is
time that the world be reminded that America
remains capable of forthright and decisive action.
The American people know that the United States
cannot remain aloof if basic principles of responsi-
ble international conduct are flouted and the
geopolitical balance is threatened by a pattern of
outside interventions in local conflicts.

The United States has made clear its strong
support for majority rule and minority rights in
southern Africa. We have no stake in and we will
give no encouragement to illegal regimes there. The
President and I have made clear that rapid change
is required and that the opportunity for negotiated
solutions must be seized. We will make major
efforts to promote these objectives and to help all
parties to return to the negotiating table. The
proposals made today by [British] Foreign Secre-

7

tary [James] Callaghan in the House of Commons seem to us a most constructive approach. We welcome them.

But let no one believe that American support can be extorted by the threat of Cuban troops or Soviet arms. Our cooperation is not available to those who rely on Cuban troops. The United States cannot acquiesce indefinitely in the presence of Cuban expeditionary forces in distant lands for the purpose of pressure and to determine the political evolution by force of arms.

We have issued these warnings before. I repeat them today. The United States will not accept further Cuban military interventions abroad.

We are certain that the American people understand and support these two equal principles of our policy—our support for majority rule in Africa and our firm opposition to military intervention.

Angola reminds us that military capabilities by themselves cannot solve our foreign policy problems. No matter how massive our arsenals or how flexible our forces, they will carry little weight if we become so confused in our decision-making and so constrained in defining our interests that no one believes we will ever act when challenged.

The issue is not an open-ended commitment or a policy of indiscriminate American intervention. Decisions on whether and how to take action must always result from careful analysis and open discussion. It cannot be rammed down the throats of an unwilling Congress or public.

But neither can we avoid decisions when their time has clearly come. Global stability simply cannot survive the presumption that our natural choice will always be passivity; such a course would insure that the world will witness dangerous challenges and major changes highly inimical to our interests and our ideals.

## Strength and Will of America

If America's defense is to match the Nation's needs it must meet three basic requirements.

* Our strategic forces must be sufficient to deter attack and credibly maintain the nuclear balance.

* Our forces for regional defense, together with

those of our allies, must be clearly capable of resisting threat and pressure.

* And at home we must once again unite behind the proposition that aggression unresisted is aggression encouraged. We must be prepared to recognize genuine threats to the global balance, whether they emerge as direct challenges to us or as regional encroachment at a greater distance. And we must be prepared to do something about them.

These are the real issues our leaders now face and will surely face in the future. They require answers to some hard questions, such as the following: Where can our defense dollars be most productively spent? What programs are needed that are not already underway? What would be the costs of these programs and over what period of time? What, if anything, would we have to give up? What are the premises of our defense policy—against what threats and with what diplomacy?

Administration and critics alike must answer these questions if we are to have an effective national policy. And in this spirit, I have spoken today about the relationship between defense and foreign policy.

Military strength is crucial to America's security and well-being. But we must take care not to become so obsessed with power alone that we become a "Fortress America" and neglect our ultimate political and moral responsibilities.

Our Nation is the beacon of hope to all who love freedom not simply because it is strong, but because it represents mankind's age-old dream of dignity and self-respect. Others before us have wielded overwhelming military power and abdicated moral responsibility or engendered fear and hatred. Our resources—military, industrial, technological, economic, and cultural—are beyond challenge; with dedication and effort they shall remain so. But a world of tenuous balance, of a nuclear equilibrium constantly contested is too barren and perilous and uninspiring. America has always stood for something deeper than throwing its weight around; we shall see to it that we shall never relinquish our moral leadership in the search for a just and lasting peace.

We have gone through a difficult decade not because we were weak, but because we were divided. None of our setbacks have been caused by lack of American power or even lack of relevant

8

power. The fundamental challenge to America, therefore, is to generate the wisdom, the creativity, and the will to dedicate ourselves to the peace and progress of humanity.

America's ultimate strength has always been the conviction and basic unity of its people. And despite a decade and more of testing—despite assassination, war, and institutional crisis—we still remain a vital and optimistic and confident people.

It is time once again for Americans to hold their heads high. It is important to recall once again some fundamental truths:

* That we are still the strongest Nation on the face of the Earth;

* That we are the most generous Nation in history—we have fed the starving, opened our arms and our hearts to refugees from other lands, and given more of our substance to the poor and downtrodden around the world than any other nation;

* That we are needed to maintain the world's security;

* That we are essential to any hopes for stability and human progress;

* That we remain the bulwark of democracy and the land of promise to millions who yearn for freedom and a better life for themselves and their children;

* That we, therefore, have a responsibility to hold high the banner of freedom and human dignity for all mankind.

Our record of achievements should be but prologue to what this generation of Americans has it within its power to accomplish. For the first time in history we can work with others to create an era of peace and prosperity for all mankind. We shall not fail.

With faith in the goodness and the promise of America we shall master our future. And those who celebrate America's tricentennial will look back and say that this generation of Americans was worthy of the ideals and the greatness of our history.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

DINNER TOAST
FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL

March 25, 1976

Distinguished Guests:

On behalf of the Americans here this evening --
and on this occasion at least, I can speak for the
Congressmen present as well -- I wish to thank
you for the cordial hospitality you have provided.

The spirit that has prevailed throughout our
discussions has been exemplified here tonight
in this warm and charming setting.

My staff had led me to believe that our
deliberations would be arduous and difficult, but
they clearly under-estimated -- and it is not

-2-

the first time -- our mutual talent for decisive
and consummate statesmanship. In fact, I am
convinced that our efforts of the last few days
have cemented Turkish-American friendship for
another half century -- although I would certainly
hope that we have the occasion to see one another
again sooner. If no other irritants to the
Turkish-American relationship arise in the
meantime, I am fully confident my staff will
somehow create one.

-3-

I particularly appreciate your willingness to
come to the United States at this time to discuss
issues of special mutual concern. Your visit has
contributed significantly to our mutual efforts to
maintain the vitality and substance of the traditional
friendship between Turkey and the United States.
Samuel Johnson has said that a man should keep
his friendships in constant repair. The relations
between our countries have undergone some damage,
and repairs have been required. But perhaps
it is only in the firmest of friendships that adverse

-4-

periods can be surmounted through the reason and
determination of the partners. The tone and
substance of our discussions have reaffirmed our
common dedication to the maintenance of the vitality
of our close relationship.

In the past several days, we have met as equal
partners on matters vital to both our countries.
We have come to appreciate even more fully the
legitimate requirements and limitations of each side.

And following the patient and thorough work by
negotiators of both countries, we have reached
the point where agreement on a new defense relationship

-5-

will allow our overall relations to be set on a
steady course in the years ahead.

While the immediate impact of our discussions
will touch most directly on our bilateral
relationship, the cause of the entire Western
Alliance has been served. We regard the close
ties we have with our allies and friends as the
indispensible prerequisite to all that we seek to
accomplish in the world -- to maintain global
stability, to foster our most cherished values
and objectives, and to help build a new era of
international cooperation. The inevitable

-6-

trials which lie ahead can best be met by a
vigorous and healthy collectivity of states determined
to be responsive to the needs and desires of their own
people.

We owe to you, Mr. Foreign Minister, a great
debt of gratitude for your cooperative and
constructive attitude in these talks.

It is in this spirit -- which augurs such promise
for the continuing vitality of the relationship
between the U. S. and Turkey -- that I raise my glass
to the Foreign Minister and to the enduring
friendship between the peoples of Turkey and the

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER
FOLLOWING MEETING WITH TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER CACAYANGIL

MARCH 26, 1976

(Already in progress)

QUESTION: Does it (the agreement) mean that the bases will all be reopened?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: When the agreement is approved.

QUESTION: You're going to send a concurrent resolution to the Hill?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes.

QUESTION: Do you expect the Congress to go for this one?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We've had consultations and it indicates that we probably will succeed in getting it approved.

QUESTION: Really? Without any commitment on Cyprus in the agreement, or is Cyprus mentioned?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's not mentioned in the agreement but we've had talks on Cyprus also.

QUESTION: Can you tell us anything about the letter to Hanoi? Can you put that in some perspective: for us? Can you, Mr. Secretary, tell us about the message to Hanoi with a view toward normalizing relations?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I stated in November and the President in December that we were in principle prepared to normalize our relations with Hanoi. We have now indicated this to Hanoi and asked them what issues they wanted to discuss in connection with that, and now we will await their reply. Of course, for us, one of the key problems is that of the missing in action, an accounting for them. And that will be one of our principle concerns together with restrained behavior in Southeast Asia.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, what about Hanoi's publicized position about their feelings: that the U.S. should contribute to reconstruction aid to the North?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of course they are free to raise any issue that they wish, and I don't want to prejudge their raising any issue, but I would not hold out much prospect for that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if I could ask you one question about the Middle East. Ambassador Scranton's speech has touched off a certain amount of controversy. Can you be precise about anything the Ambassador said at the United Nations in any way alters the shape or the spirit of the American position vis-a-vis Israel?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The speech of Ambassador Scranton repeated positions with respect to occupied territories that the U.S. had expressed in 1968, 1969 and 1970. It reflected no change in our relationship to Israel or in our policy towards Israel.

QUESTION: Are there any variations in our position on that, sir?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There's no change in our basic policy.

QUESTION: How would you explain the fact the Israelis were unhappy about it, and the Arabs, in fact, were rather pleased by what the United States said?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can only explain our policy. I cannot psychoanalyze the reaction of all the participants in an emotional area.

QUESTION: Thank you, Doctor.

**********

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S FAREWELL RECEPTION
FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL

- Benjamin Franklin Room -

March 26, 1976

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, when Bob Ingersoll first was suggested as Deputy Secretary of State, I did not know how I could possibly get along with a man so flamboyant, so aggressive, so eager to overshadow people, and I think it is a great tribute to my self-effacing nature that I managed to get along with him.

Of course, as you all know, this is a very "resigning" Department. Pat Moynihan resigned twice between the time he was announced and before he was sworn in (laughter) and we haven't had a computer readout yet about how many times he resigned afterwards. Joe Sisco resigned every year about five months before the fall semester started (laughter) -- anybody's fall semester (laughter). I panicked this week because Hal Sonnenfeldt has not submitted his monthly resignation (laughter). Of course, I have been known to threaten to resign from time to time (laughter), but you must have noticed that lately I have

2

muted this theme somewhat out of fear that somebody
might take it seriously (laughter); so I don't know how
to deal with somebody who resigns once and then sticks
to it. (Laughter.)

There are few associations I've had, in and
out of Government, that have meant more to me than my
association with Bob Ingersoll. In a town that is
characterized so much by envy, by self-advancement,
by petty considerations, he has always, in his quiet
bearing and dignity, made clear that he was here to
serve the national interest and that he wanted to be
judged by what he did for his country and for this
Department. So all of us who have worked with him
have benefited enormously from his substantive
contribution, but I think we will remember him even more
for his extraordinary human qualities.

I met Bob when he was Ambassador in Japan,
at a time when our relations with this most crucial country
for us, whose friendship we value so greatly, were in a
state of some difficulty due to some actions in which
I was not entirely innocent; but Bob helped to put this
relationship on a very steady and stable basis and has been

3

one of the major architects of the new and mature
relationship we now have with Japan -- which I believe
is better than at any time in the postwar period.

I asked Bob to come to Washington as
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia. The
perquisites of Assistant Secretaries of State are not
quite as elegant as those of Ambassadors in Tokyo
and the residences that we furnish are somewhat less luxurious.
In fact, they're nonexistent. (Laughter.) Nevertheless,
Bob took that very crucial job at considerable personal
sacrifice to himself and did it as ably, and in as
unassuming a manner, as we've all come to appreciate.

A few months later I asked him to be Deputy
Secretary.

Now, to work for me in any capacity - is a
punishment that is inflicted by a Calvinist God on people;
but to work as a Deputy in an organization that I had
with my peculiar methods of this organization is peculiarly
difficult.

I believe, and you all know it anyway, that
whatever coherence and steadiness the Department possesses
is due importantly to the work of Bob.

4

Now, I understand that at the end of
Foreign Service efficiency reports one is asked to say
for what position the officer is qualified. Now,
I hate to tell you what I often think when these things
come along (laughter), but we will do this in more
intimate surroundings. (Laughter.)

But, as far as Bob is concerned, there is no
position in the United States Government to which he
would not be a great ornament, and I hope very much that
this Department -- or any other Department -- will have
the good fortune of having him dedicate himself to
national service again. But until he does so I know I
speak for everybody in this room when I tell him we wish
him all the best, that we all hope we'll have a chance
to stay in touch with him, and that we are most grateful
for his dedicated service and his enormous human
contribution.

(Applause.)

DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL: Mr. Secretary,
Nancy, Elie and distinguished guests, colleagues, I am
overwhelmed by these comments the Secretary makes on this
occasion. It doesn't happen that way every day, I want

5

you to know. (Laughter.) But of course I'm No. 2
and being No. 2 I have to try harder (laughter) --
but it's impossible to try hard enough to keep up with
No. 1. I stand in awe of your grueling schedule,
your energy, your capacity not only to survive but to
thrive on three to five hours of sleep every night,
your ability to look at a memo with just a glance
or to hear the start of a phrase by a colleague and
catch the essence of the issue immediately, your global
concept of foreign policy, and your matchless ability
at negotiation. We all stand in awe of those capabilities,
Mr. Secretary.

In fact, one of your senior officials said just
yesterday that he thought it would be very appropriate
for history and the future conduct of foreign policy
if, before you leave this Department 10 or 15 years
from now (laughter) -- if you would set down the
principles that have guided our foreign policy under
your leadership and those principles of tactics that
you've used so successfully in so many negotiations.

In fact, I look forward to the opportunity,
as I return to private life, to do what I can to further

6

the understanding of foreign policy and the development
of a consensus -- as you have been attempting across the
country in the many speeches that you've made, Mr.
Secretary. The only problem is that by ability to do
so will wane as I no longer have the stimulation of the
very best foreign policy seminar in the world right
here in the State Department, and I hear it is much
better than that foreign policy seminar you used to give
at that small college about a hundred miles north of
Yale. (Laughter.)

I feel that I'm going to lose my security
blanket which comes from the daily Embassy cables. These
give comfort to senior Government officials who feel
that by having inside information on what's going on
around the world they are much ahead of the rest of the
citizens, but I'm going to have to rely after this on
my classified information from _The New York Times_ and the
_Aviation Weekly_ (laughter) -- unless I can tie up with
a few Congressional staffers who will pass on some classified
information to me. (Laughter.)

I'm also going to miss, and won't be able
to get from the newspapers, the very spicy cables that

7

come from our Ambassadors, commenting on things
in their posts and prodding the Department to get
on with their favorite projects. And you even have
lost the one you were referring to, Mr. Secretary --
the colorful Pat Moynihan's monograms, whose series
ended when he joined Scoop Jackson's campaign; and I
understand now he's plumping for your job.

You won't have to lose heart though because
Bill Porter and Bill Sullivan are still going to be out
there sending in those cables, and they have a bit of
humor themselves and sometimes a needle. So I'm sure
that you're going to be stimulated even though we don't
have Pat's cables to come in.

I've been very privileged, Mr. Secretary,
to serve under your leadership these past four years --
and I've also felt very privileged to serve with the
Foreign Service, who have tided Elie and me over the
very rough spots at the beginning of our careers in these
three jobs. Without it we couldn't possibly have swum.
And even sometimes now I'm not sure we can swim even with
them helping us.

It's been a great experience.

8

I've also appreciated the privilege of serving with other members of the Executive Branch, the Congress, the regulatory agencies, and particularly the Diplomatic Corps -- they have been my eyes and ears as to what's going on in Washington and have taught me some of the niceties and some of the pitfalls I should avoid.

We are going to miss all of you and we hope that, as Ken Rush says before he went to Paris, "You'll all come and see us." And we don't mean it the way he did. He said, "Come and see us before we leave for Paris." (Laughter.)

But we hope you'll come and see us in Chicago after we're ensconced there. But I hope you won't think too ill of us if I should mention that next week we're going to be enjoying the ski slopes of Aspen, because we really will be thinking about you (laughter), but we'll be really enjoying it anyway.

You know, it's too final to say good-bye; and Elie and I learned a phrase in Japan which is much more appropriate for this evening. It's JAI MATA SAYONARA. That means: "Until tomorrow, farewell." And for those of you who still haven't dropped all of your French words

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

STATEMENT ON FY 1977 SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on
behalf of our security assistance program for Fiscal Year 1977.

As you know, important developments in the Middle East
delayed the submission of our Fiscal Year 1976 program, with
the result that our last discussion of this subject occurred only
in November. Now, the FY 1976 legislation is nearing comple-
tion at the same time that hearings are beginning on the FY 1977
bill. This nearly simultaneous consideration of our security
assistance plans over a two year span provides us with a
unique opportunity to continue the important dialogue on
this subject with hardly any interruption.

(c)

- 2 -

Security Assistance and Foreign Policy

I have described the turbulent age we live in as the context
for our foreign policy and our security assistance. The advent
of strategic nuclear parity; the passing of the rigid bipolar
structure and the rise of new power centers in the world; the
continuation of regional conflicts with their arms races and
pressures for nuclear proliferation; the advent of a new and
complex range of economic problems -- all of these pose vast
challenges to global stability and summon us to renewed
efforts to help build a peaceful and secure international order.

Security assistance is a fundamental element in the
overall design of the foreign policy we have pursued in the
past several years to meet these challenges and thereby to

(LC)

- 3 -

advance and defend our interests. Indeed, this foreign policy
design is predicated on the bed-rock of security, as any
nation's foreign policy must be.

Our security assistance policy has been an effective
instrument for decades in maintaining the strength of our
<u>alliances</u>, which have been, and are, the anchor of world peace
and stability. [ If we fail to use that instrument wisely, and
flexibly in response to changing circumstances, we risk cutting
ourselves off from that anchor. ]

In recent years we have begun to reduce tensions with
<u>potential adversaries</u>, and to lay the foundation for a more
stable and cooperative future. The progress achieved thus
far could not have been achieved without our own strength
and that of our allies, and our will to use that strength.

Security assistance also underlies our efforts to help to resolve regional conflicts. In a world of heightened nuclear peril we have no choice but to try to contain disputes which hold the seeds of wider, global confrontation. Conditions rarely favor the use of unilateral arms transfer embargoes as an effective means of controlling these regional conflicts; rather, the carefully considered transfer of defense equipment, and supporting assistance, often offers the only way to maintain the stability of regional power balances.

(te)

-5-

Our security assistance policy also must be considered in
the overall context of our bilateral relations with recipient
nations. [ No nation, rich or poor, is indifferent to its security
or is prepared to entrust its survival to the goodwill of its
neighbors.] In a world of increasing numbers of arms suppliers,
nations do not welcome indifference from those to whom they
turn for help, and such behavior on our part can damage our
overall relations with the country in question. By the same
token, our defense supply links to other countries can enhance
our bilateral cooperation across the broad range of foreign
policy issues.

Our security assistance policy is carefully managed and regulated to serve these foreign policy aims. Through the last few months we have been working closely with the Congress to find ways to improve the regulatory elements of our security assistance policy, without sacrificing the flexibility which is essential to its effective application.

## An Overview of the Authorization Requests

In preparing our specific authorization requests for Fiscal Year 1977, the Executive Branch pruned individual

-7-

country programs very carefully before we submitted the request
to the Congress.

-- The proposed Foreign Military Sales credit
program and our resultant request for New
Obligational Authority are both approximately
$200 million less than for 1976. The New
Obligational Authority Request is for $840 million,
down from $1.065 million last year. This will
fund a total program of over $2 billion, of which
approximately half is for essential assistance
to Israel.

-- Security Supporting Assistance, a vital component
of our Middle East peace effort, has been reduced

-8-

from $1.92 to $1.8 billion.

-- The supporting assistance request includes $34 million for the International Narcotics Control Program, down from last year. We reduced it in the expectation that major equipment items for the opium poppy eradication efforts in Mexico and Burma will already have been provided. Turkish control of its opium poppy production, the vigorous eradication efforts now being undertaken in Mexico, and the beginnings of excellent results in Burma offer hope that this international security assistance program, which means so much to the health of our own people, is achieving its objectives.

-9-

--

Foreign Military Training is programmed at $30.2 million. This program is highly cost-effective in improving the efficiency of allied and friendly military forces and in developing relationships between American and foreign military personnel. While friendly foreign governments are to an increasing extent paying for the training they receive from the United States, this modest grant program provides the means to pursue this avenue for long-range benefits in terms of understanding and military cooperation.

-10-

## Regional Programs

### I. Middle East

In Fiscal Year 1977 we are again requesting a large security
assistance program for the Middle East, which absorbs almost
70 percent of our total program.

When I presented our first, sizeable security assistance
request for the Middle East to the Committee last November,
I stressed to you that this program was designed to protect
and further interests of vital importance to the United States
and that it is a central part of our efforts to help achieve
progress towards peace in the Middle East. This is still
true.

- 11 -

We continue to have a historical and moral commitment to the survival and security of the State of Israel which we must fulfill. We also have important interests and friendships in the Arab world - an area of more than 150 million people, and the site of the world's largest oil reserves. We likewise have an urgent need to avoid perpetual crises in the region which strain our relations with allies, jeopardize our hopes for world economic recovery and risk a direct U. S. -Soviet confrontation.

The ability of Israel to persevere in its own defense is one of the essential constants of our Middle Eastern policy. Although Israel has recently imposed even more stringent

-12-

domestic austerity measures, it clearly must have substantial economic and military assistance, which can come only from the United States. Our program for Israel represents our best judgment of the minimum assistance required from us to maintain the defensive strength and economic health which Israel requires for its security and survival.

Our request for Egypt also rests on valid requirements and considerations of U. S. national interests. Egypt contains almost one-third of the population of the Arab world and holds a historic position of leadership in it. Egypt has courageously committed itself to pursuing peace and to ending its long-time close dependence on the Soviet Union, while moving towards closer relations with the West, and emphasizing economic

-14-

We also have strong interests in Jordan, which is of
strategic importance in the Arab-Israeli dispute. Jordan
has long been recognized as a force for moderation in
the Middle East, and as a strong friend of the United
States. Jordan is working to overcome its serious problems
of economic underdevelopment. Our security assistance
helps Jordan to develop and maintain its politically moderate
course, while furthering our mutually friendly and cooperative
relationship.

Syria must be an integral part of any peaceful settlement
of the Arab-Israeli dispute, which is the main objective of
our policy in the Middle East. A close working relationship
with Syria is essential to the success of our peace efforts.

-15-

And our security assistance program is an important part of this relationship.

Our security assistance to and improved relations with Arab nations do not undermine in any sense our traditional friendship with Israel. To the contrary, the policy of encouraging constructive and moderate forces in the Arab world is the best way we can help the parties to attain a durable peace that will assure the survival and security of Israel.

During the past year, the Middle East Special Requirements Fund permitted us to respond promptly to special needs arising from our Middle East peace efforts. We will continue to need this capability to move rapidly to support activities

-16-

contributing to peace in the area and to maintain our
Support Mission in the Sinai.

Despite the progress of the past year, much remains
to be done to achieve peace in the Middle East. Our
efforts to generate further movement in the Middle East
peace negotiations are entering another difficult and
critical period. We are determined to maintain the
momentum toward peace. We are currently engaged in
intensive consultations with all the governments directly
concerned to try to reach agreement on how to proceed.

Our security assistance program, and our close,
cooperative relations with countries of the region, will be

-13-

Europe

In Europe, Greece and Turkey continue to be the focal points of our program. [It] is unnecessary to review here the unfortunate repercussions of the recent Cyprus dispute on our bilateral relations with these two key NATO countries; what is important now is to give substance to our concern for security and stability in the area and the friendship that has so long characterized our relations with these nations. The MAP, FMS, and training funds requested should help to return our mutual defense relationships to a more normal footing, and allow both Greece and Turkey to play more effective roles within NATO.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee already has before

-19-

it the new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain
which the President submitted to the Senate last month for
its advice and consent. [ I consider this agreement particularly
significant as an earnest of US support at a time when Spain
itself is moving into a new era in its domestic and international
activities. ] We look forward to Congressional approval for the
entire agreement, including authorization for the essential
security assistance component for the term of the treaty.

## East Asia

In East Asia, the focus continues to be on Korea. The
funds we have requested will enable us to reach our
modernization plan objectives in FY 1977. Korea's impressive

-20-

economic development will permit us to end grant materiel
assistance in this program year. [ Korea has now embarked
on a five-year Force Improvement Plan of its own, funded
through its own resources. Given our major security interests
in the Korean Peninsula, and the tension which persists in
that strategic area, this year and in the future, we will, of
course, continue to request significant FMS credits for mutually
agreed Korean defense needs. This example shows how such
phase-outs can be accomplished according to a
nation's economic growth.]

For Thailand we have requested continuing grant MAP and FMS
credit funds. We believe the essential objectives of our support
for Thai self-sufficiency remain valid.

-21-

Latin America

In Latin America, the common program denominator continues to be training. We believe that while the cost is negligible, it provides significant dividends in terms of working level contacts between American officers and their Latin American counterparts, some of whom may be expected to rise to positions of leadership in their respective governments. [ Proposed FMS credits are modest in relation to both the purchasers' means and modernization requirements, and entirely consistent with the tendency of Latin American governments to hold defense expenditures to a low level in favor of development spending. ]

-22-

## Africa

The African programs are similarly modest. The only grant aid recipient is Ethiopia, which faces both external and internal security threats. As in Latin America, our emphasis on military training should pay valuable dividends in terms of good-will and cooperation.

## Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination

I would like to turn now to an issue which is of concern to both the Congress and the Administration -- the relationship between our security assistance program and the domestic conduct of some of the governments that receive our assistance.

I have, on several occasions, expressed our firm belief that the security of the United States and its allies is the paramount rationale for extending security assistance.

-23-

Certainly we cannot -- and we do not-- ignore

domestic practices which deny those human rights that
civilized states commonly agree are inalienable.

Nor, in my view, should the United States ignore domestic
practices which are prejudicial to equal status among human
beings. We make our views -- and those of Congress --
known to the governments concerned. We are convinced,
however, that withdrawal of security assistance
is an extreme measure that harms our other objectives
while holding little promise for effecting desirable changes.

Indeed, experience has shown that our influence with other
nations depreciates as we cut the bonds that hold us together.

-24-

Moreover, such withdrawal, or even the threat of
withdrawal, depreciates the strength of the mutual
defense relationship which we share with our allies
and offers encouragement to our potential enemies.

## Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, I have addressed my remarks
to the essentiality of our security assistance program,
its place in our overall foreign policy design, and the basic
criteria under which it is employed. I have focused on
the area of greatest present urgency, the Middle East, and
have reviewed our proposals for other regions. I am now
ready to respond to your questions on these or other matters
pertaining to our security assistance program as planned
for Fiscal Year 1977.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

March 26, 1976

No. 153

STATEMENT BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN ASSISTANCE
OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
MARCH 26, 1976

Fiscal Year 1977 Security Assistance Program

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on behalf of our security assistance program for Fiscal Year 1977. As you know, important developments in the Middle East delayed the submission of our Fiscal Year 1976 program, with the result that our last discussion of this subject occurred only in November. Now, the FY 1976 legislation is nearing completion at the same time that hearings are beginning on the FY 1977 bill. This nearly simultaneous consideration of our security assistance plans over a two-year span provides us with a unique opportunity to continue the important dialogue on this subject with hardly any interruption.

I have described the turbulent age we live in as the context for our foreign policy and our security assistance. The advent of strategic nuclear parity; the passing of the rigid bipolar structure and the rise of new power centers in the world; the continuation of regional conflicts with their arms races and pressures for nuclear proliferation; the advent of a new and complex range of economic problems — all of these pose vast challenges to global stability and summon us to renewed efforts to help build a peaceful and secure international order.

Security assistance is a fundamental element in the overall design of the foreign policy we have pursued in the past several years to meet these challenges and thereby to advance and defend our interests. Indeed, this foreign policy design is predicated on the bed-rock of security, as any nation's foreign policy must be.

Our security assistance policy has been an effective instrument for decades in maintaining the strength of our alliances, which have been, and are, the anchor of world peace and stability. If we fail to use that instrument wisely and flexibly in response to changing circumstances, we risk cutting ourselves off from that anchor.

In recent years we have begun to reduce tensions with potential adversaries, and to lay the foundation for a more stable and cooperative future. The progress achieved thus far could not have been achieved without our own strength and that of our allies, and our will to use that strength.

For further information contact:

PR #153

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Our security assistance policy also must be considered in the overall context of our bilateral relations with recipient nations. No nation, rich or poor, is indifferent to its security or is prepared to entrust its survival to the goodwill of its neighbors. In a world of increasing numbers of arms suppliers, nations do not welcome indifference from those to whom they turn for help, and such behavior on our part can damage our overall relations with the country in question. By the same token, our defense supply links to other countries can enhance our bilateral cooperation across the broad range of foreign policy issues.

In preparing our specific authorization requests for Fiscal Year 1977, the Executive Branch pruned individual country programs very carefully before we submitted the request to the Congress.

- The proposed Foreign Military Sales credit program and our resultant request for New Obligational Authority are both approximately $200 million less than for 1976. The New Obligational Authority Request is for $840 million, down from $1.065 billion last year. This will fund a total program of over $2 billion, of which approximately half is for essential assistance to Israel.

- Security Supporting Assistance, a vital component of our Middle East peace effort, has been reduced from $1.92 to $1.8 billion.

## Regional Programs

### I. Middle East

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We continue to have a historical and moral commitment to the survival and security of the State of Israel which we must fulfill. We also have important interests and friendships in the Arab world — an area of more than 150 million people, and the site of the world's largest oil reserves. We likewise have an urgent need to avoid perpetual crises in the region which strain our relations with allies, jeopardize our hopes for world economic recovery and risk a direct US-Soviet confrontation.

The ability of Israel to persevere in its own defense is one of the essential constants of our Middle Eastern policy. Although Israel has recently imposed even more stringent domestic austerity measures, it clearly must have substantial economic and military assistance, which can come only from the United States. Our program for Israel represents our best judgment of the minimum assistance required from us to maintain the defensive strength and economic health which Israel requires for its security and survival.

Our request for Egypt also rests on valid requirements and considerations of US national interests. Egypt contains almost one-third of the population of the Arab world and holds a historic position of leadership in it. Egypt has courageously committed itself to pursuing peace and to ending its long-time close dependence on the Soviet Union, while moving towards closer relations with the West, and emphasizing economic reconstruction and development. It is clearly in our interest to demonstrate that countries which pursue such policies can obtain the support of the United States. Our security assistance to and our growing friendship with Egypt are aimed at achieving this objective.

Syria must be an integral part of any peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute, which is the main objective of our policy in the Middle East. A close working relationship with Syria is essential to the success of our peace efforts. And our security assistance program is an important part of this relationship.

During the past year, the Middle East Special Requirements Fund permitted us to respond promptly to special needs arising from our Middle East peace efforts. We will continue to need this capability to move rapidly to support activities contributing to peace in the area and to maintain our Support Mission in the Sinai.

Our security assistance program, and our close, cooperative relations with countries of the region, will be as important to our efforts in the future as they were to helping us to achieve the interim Sinai Agreement in 1975. We will continue to need the sustained,

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strong support of the Congress and the American people in these efforts

## II. Other Regional Programs

Aside from the Middle East program request for $2.9 billion, the breakdown of our Fiscal Year 1977 requests is as follows:

| | | % of Total Program |
|:---|:---|---:|
| Europe | $448 million | 11% |
| East Asia | $496 million | 12% |
| Latin America | $208 million | 5% |
| Africa | $ 59 million | 1% |
| Near East | $ 47 million | 1% |

### Europe

In Europe, Greece and Turkey continue to be the focal points of our program. It is unnecessary to review here the unfortunate repercussions of the recent Cyprus dispute on our bilateral relations with these two key NATO countries; what is important now is to give substance to our concern for security and stability in the area and the friendship that has so long characterized our relations with these nations. The MAP, FMS, and training funds requested should help to return our mutual defense relationships to a more normal footing, and allow both Greece and Turkey to play more effective roles within NATO.

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee already has before it the new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Spain which the President submitted to the Senate last month for its advice and consent. I consider this agreement particularly significant as an earnest of US support at a time when Spain itself is moving into a new era in its domestic and international activities. We look forward to Congressional approval for the entire agreement, including authorization for the essential security assistance component for the term of the treaty.

### East Asia

In East Asia, the focus continues to be on Korea. The funds we have requested will enable us to reach our modernization plan objectives in FY 1977. Korea's impressive economic development will permit us to end grant material assistance in this program year. Korea has now embarked on a five-year Force Improvement Plan of its own, funded through its own resources. Given our major security interests in the Korean Peninsula, and the tension which persists in that strategic area, this year and in the future, we will, of course, continue to request significant FMS credits for mutually agreed Korean defense needs. This example shows how such phase-outs can be accomplished according to a nation's economic growth.

### Latin America

In Latin America, the common program denominator continues to be training. We believe that while the cost is negligible, it provides significant dividends in terms of working level contacts between American officers and their Latin American counterparts, some of whom may be expected to rise to positions of leadership in their respective governments. Proposed FMS credits are modest in relation to both the purchasers' means and modernization requirements, and entirely consistent with the tendency of Latin American governments to hold defense expenditures to a low level in favor of development spending.

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## Africa

I would like to turn now to an issue which is of concern to both the Congress and the Administration — the relationship between our security assistance program and the domestic conduct of some of the governments that receive our assistance. I have, on several occasions, expressed our firm belief that the security of the United States and its allies is the paramount rationale for extending security assistance.

Certainly we cannot — and we do not — ignore domestic practices which deny those human rights that civilized states commonly agree are inalienable. Nor, in my view, should the United States ignore domestic practices which are prejudicial to equal status among human beings. We make our views — and those of Congress — known to the governments concerned. We are convinced, however, that withdrawal of security assistance is an extreme measure that harms our other objectives while holding little promise for effecting desirable changes. Indeed, experience has shown that our influence with other nations depreciates as we cut the bonds that hold us together. Moreover, such withdrawal, or even the threat of withdrawal, depreciates the strength of the mutual defense relationship which we share with our allies and offers encouragement to our potential enemies.

## Conclusion

********

ADDED STATEMENT ON AUTHORIZATION

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS A FEW ADDITIONAL REMARKS TO A QUESTION WHICH, I GATHER, HAS QUITE RECENTLY BECOME THE SUBJECT OF SOME CONCERN. I REFER TO THE QUESTION OF PROCEDURES FOR AUTHORIZING AND FUNDING THE ASSISTANCE CONTEMPLATED FOR SPAIN WHICH APPEARS TO ARISE FROM SUBMISSION OF THE AGREEMENT TO THE SENATE AS A TREATY. I MUST SAY I AM SOMEWHAT SURPRISED BY THE CONCERN BECAUSE WE HAD NO INTENTION, THROUGH THIS SUBMISSION, OF IMPOSING ON THE CONGRESS ANY PARTICULAR MODALITY OF AUTHORIZATION AND FUNDING. WHILE WE HAVE SUBMITTED A TREATY, WE SEE MERIT IN HAVING THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PARTICIPATE AS WELL. IF THE CONGRESS PREFERS AN ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZING BILL AS A VEHICLE FOR THIS PARTICIPATION, PERHAPS IN THE FORM OF A JOINT RESOLUTION, WE WOULD WELCOME IT AND LEND OUR SUPPORT.

OUR PRINCIPAL CONCERN WOULD BE TO ASSURE THAT ANY

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ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION REINFORCES THE ACTION OF THE
SENATE IN ADVISING AND CONSENTING TO THE ENTIRE AGREE-
MENT RATHER THAN SEEMING TO RESERVE JUDGMENT ABOUT SUCH
AN ESSENTIAL PART OF IT AS THE ASSISTANCE PACKAGE.

WE WOULD HOPE THAT THIS CONCERN WOULD BE SHARED
AND ACCOMMODATED IN ANY RECOMMENDED ACTION. IN OUR VIEW,
IT ARGUES FOR ANY AUTHORIZATION TO BE FOR THE FIVE-YEAR
TERM OF THE TREATY,

[LC]

_Whereas_, on January 24, 1976 there was signed
on behalf of the United States of America and Spain
a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the
two countries;

_Whereas_, that Treaty has been submitted to the
Senate for the advice and consent of the Senate to
its ratification;

_Whereas_, the Supplementary Agreements to that
Treaty, and the exchanges of notes related to those
Supplementary Agreements, provide for certain under-
takings by the United States of America as part of
its obligations under that Treaty,

1. _Resolved_, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, That the President is authorized to implement the provisions of the Supplementary Agreements to the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and Spain, signed at Madrid, January 24, 1976, and the exchanges of notes related thereto.

9. SEC. 2. (a) There are authorized to be appropriated the amounts required by the aforesaid Supplementary Agreements, and the exchanges of notes related thereto, for the purpose of carrying out the programs and activities as are provided for therein.

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1. (b) Foreign assistance and sales programs

2. and activities carried out with funds made available pursuant to subsection (a) of this section

3. shall be conducted in accordance with provisions

4. of law applicable to foreign assistance and military sales programs of the United States: Provided,

5. that section 620(m) of the Foreign Assistance Act, of 1961 shall not apply with respect to such

8. programs and activities, and that this resolution

9. satisfies the requirements of section 7307 of

11. Title 10 of the United States Code with respect to

12. the transfer of naval vessels pursuant to Supplementary Agreement Number Seven: Provided further,
14. that in carrying out the provisions of Article VI

15. of the aforesaid Supplementary Agreement Number

16. Seven, relating to modernizing, semi-automating,

17. and maintaining the aircraft control and warning

18. network in Spain, the United States contribution of
19. not to exceed $50,000,000 shall be financed from

20. Department of Defense appropriations and shall not

21. be subject to provisions of law applicable to foreign

22. assistance and military sales programs of the United

23. States.

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1 SEC. 4. The authorities contained in this

2 resolution shall become effective only upon

3 ratification of the aforesaid Treaty of Friendship

4 and Cooperation and shall continue in effect only

5 so long as that Treaty remains in force.

I am happy to have the opportunity to testify on the
Administration's request for security assistance authorization for
fiscal year 1977. [ The request follows closely on the heels of
that for the current year, about which I testified before this
Committee last November. ]

## Security Assistance and Foreign Policy

Security assistance is an essential element of our
overall foreign policy. That policy is designed to help build
a more peaceful, stable, and prosperous world order in which
America's own security, prosperity, and values will be furthered.

The basic elements of our foreign policy -- which we
believe will guide any Congress and Administration, whether

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Republican or Democrat -- include these:

-- to maintain our own strength and purpose as a nation;

-- to maintain and continually revitalize our relations
with allies and friendly countries with which we share
values and interests;

-- to reduce the risk of war with our potential adversaries
and move toward more rational and normal relationships
despite continuing differences;

-- to discourage the spread of nuclear weapons capability,
and otherwise to help to resolve regional conflicts that
threaten world peace;

-- to resolve international economic issues in a way which
enhances economic and political stability, prosperity,
and justice.

This is the context for designing and deciding upon
our security assistance policy. These are the purposes it
must -- and does -- serve.

The foundation of our foreign policy is security. Our
own military strength, our alliances, and the security assistance
programs which support them have been the bedrock of our
security since World War II, and they remain so today. [In an
era of devastating nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear balance
between the United States and the Soviet Union, the conventional
strength of our alliances is essential to maintain global stability
and to leave our potential adversaries no rational alternative to
restraint and cooperation.]

The persistence of regional conflicts continues to pose
risks to global stability. The carefully considered transfer of

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defense equipment may be essential in creating and stabilizing
regional balances of power, as a pre-condition to the attack
on the root causes of disputes.

Finally, every nation has the paramount concern and
sovereign responsibility to maintain its own security and to
define its needs. The United States cannot expect to retain
influence with nations whose perceived defense needs we disregard.
Conversely, defense supply links to these countries can enhance our
influence and cooperation with them on other international issues
of importance to us.

Thus, we believe it is important that arms transfers
continue to be approached in the context of our overall national
interests and objectives. These include foreign policy as well
as our defense readiness and our economy. We fully recognize

the vital role of Congressional support and oversight for the
security assistance program.

Our specific authorization requests for Fiscal Year 1977
reflect cost-conscious attention by the Executive Branch.

The New Obligational Authority request is for $840
million; down from $1,065 million last year. This will
fund a total program of over $2 billion, of which
approximately half is for essential assistance to Israel.

- Security Supporting Assistance programs have been
reduced from last year by over $100 million to $1.8

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billion. Nearly 95% of this amount is requested for the Middle East. The programs supported by these funds are a vital component of our Middle East peace effort.

-- The International Narcotics Control Program is reduced from last year to $34 million. We reduced it in the expectation that major equipment items for the opium poppy eradication efforts in Mexico and Burma will already have been provided. [Turkish control of its opium poppy production, the vigorous eradication efforts now being undertaken in Mexico and the beginnings of excellent results in Burma offer hope that this international security assistance program, which means so much to the health of our own people, is achieving its objectives.]

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- Foreign Military Training is programmed at $30.2 million. This program is highly cost-effective in improving the efficiency of allied and friendly military forces. [Foreign governments are to an increasing extent paying for the training they receive from the United States. This modest grant program provides long-range benefits in terms of mutual defense and military cooperation.]

## Regional Programs

### I. Middle East

In Fiscal Year 1977 our security assistance program for the Middle East absorbs almost 70 percent of our total program.

Our request has been designed to protect and further interests of vital importance to the United States and is a central

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Every American Government since 1947 has demonstrated
a moral commitment to the survival and security of the State
of Israel and we are certain that all future governments will
continue to honor that commitment. We also have important
interests and friendships in the Arab world. There is, therefore,
an urgent need to avoid perpetual crises between Israel and
the Arabs. These crises strain our relations with allies,
jeopardize our hopes for world economic recovery and risk a
direct US-Soviet confrontation.

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domestic austerity measures, its assured survival depends
upon substantial economic and military assistance, which can
come only from the United States. Our program for Israel
represents our best judgment of the appropriate assistance
required from us to maintain the defensive strength and
economic health which Israel requires for its security and
survival.

Our request for Egypt -- which is entirely for non-military
supporting assistance -- also rests on basic requirements and
considerations of US national interests. Egypt holds a historic
position of leadership in the Arab world and has courageously
committed itself to pursuing peace. Egypt has demonstrated its
good faith and sincerity by ending its long-time close dependence
on the Soviet Union and by moving toward closer relations with the

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West. It is clearly in our interest to demonstrate that countries which pursue such policies can obtain the support of the United States. [Our security assistance to and our growing friendship with Egypt are aimed at achieving this objective.] In this connection we have advised the Congress of our intention to provide Egypt with six C-130 transport aircraft. We are pleased that this Committee has set aside a separate time in the near future when we may discuss this transfer in some detail.

Jordan, which is of strategic importance in the Arab-Israeli dispute, has long been recognized as a force of moderation in the Middle East. [Jordan is a strong friend of the United States and is working to overcome its serious problems of economic underdevelopment. Our security assistance contributes to Jordan's development and helps Jordan to maintain its politically moderate course.]

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Syria will play an integral part in any peaceful
settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Our non-military
supporting assistance program with Syria is essential to
maintaining the close working relationship we need as we
continue our peace efforts.

We stress that our security assistance to, and improved
relations with, Arab nations do not undermine in any sense our
traditional friendship with Israel. The policy of encouraging
constructive and moderate forces in the Arab world is the best
way we can help all the parties to attain a durable peace that will
assure the survival and security of Israel.