March 30, 1964

Professor Carl J. Friedrich
Littauer M-31

Dear Professor Friedrich:

Mr. Kissinger is on the West Coast during the Spring recess, but before he left he asked me to be sure to invite you to two seminars which he is organizing on Germany on the afternoon of April 23 and the morning of April 24 at the Center for International Affairs.

These seminars are preparatory to the collection of essays on a book on Germany, which I know Mr. Kissinger feels cannot make its most significant contribution without your participation.

Unable to reach you this morning, I mentioned these dates to your secretary in the hope that you would be able to attend. Mr. Kissinger will confirm the specific time upon his return on April 6.

June 19, 1964

Dear Carl:

To follow up our conversation of a few weeks ago, I would like to tell you how delighted I am that you have agreed to contribute to our German book. I know you will make a major contribution.

To confirm the technical details: we will pay you $1,000 for your contribution. We would appreciate it very much if you could let us have a draft by the middle of September. We plan to assemble the group again at the end of October. I think we can probably arrange to pay your transportation from Europe but I will have to get Bowie's opinion about this.

I have been doing a fair amount of thinking about the topic you might most usefully cover. Of course, anything that you will find interesting will be important. However, at the moment, the most serious gap in the book is the relation of Germany to the West and particularly its integration into Europe. I was, therefore, wondering whether you might not take this on--all the more so as it fits in so well with the research you are doing in any case. I am taking the liberty of making this suggestion because it does not seem to me inconsistent with the other idea that you had, namely to write about the changes in the value of the German elites. I believe these two topics could be combined.

I know it is a tall order which I would not even dare to suggest to anyone else. Could you let me know about this as soon as possible?

Warm regards.

Henry V. Kissinger

Warm regards,

unions else. Could you let me know about this as soon as possible?

I know it is a tall order which I would not even dare to suggest to
the German Highs. I believe these two topics could be combined.
other ideas that you had, namely to write about the changes in the value
this suggestion because it does not seem to me inconsistent with the
research you are doing in this case. I am taking the liberty of making
might not take this on--all the more so as it fits in so well with the
its integration into Europe. I was, therefore, wondering whether you
had in the past in the relation of Germany to the West and barterily
interesting will be important. However, at the moment, the most serious
might meet inadequacy cover. Of course, anything that you will find
I have been doing a fair amount of thinking about the topic you
opinion about this.

bay your transportation from Europe but I will have to get Bowles's
Gronb again at the end of October. I think we can properly arrange to
have a draft by the middle of September. We plan to assemble the
bund contribution. We would appreciate it very much if you could let
To confirm the technical details: we will bay you $1,000 for
our German pence. I know you will make a major contribution.

to tell you how delighted I am that you have agreed to contribute to
To follow up our conversation of a few weeks ago, I would like

Dear Carl:

Fittsner M-31
Professor Carl J. Krieglitz

June 19, 1964

INSTITUT FÜR POLITISCHE WISSENSCHAFT AN DER UNIVERSITÄT HEIDELBERG

69 HEIDELBERG
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-ANLAGE 6-10
TELEFON 270 91

Oct. 24,1964

Dear Henry:

I have just finished the rough draft of the chapter for your book. I hope it is what you had in mind, when you wrote me in June. At that time, you spoke of a meeting of the group about this time; having never heard from you again (we mentioned it, when I saw you at the Seminar) I assume that you decided not to hold such a meeting at present, or that Bowie vetoed the trip. It would have been difficult for me to manage, even though I postponed my trip to Yugoslavia. I wonder whether you are planning to come to the Berlin meeting so we could see each other, in fact mentioned it to Miss Hill and asked her to phone you. It occurred to me that we might arrange a get-together with several members at Heidelberg, following the meeting, if you wished. Unfortunately, I have some examinations (state) scheduled for that Monday, so could not leave Heidelberg then.

As for the MS, it is now about 10,000 words, without footnotes. I am not sure whether you want them or not. Your letter did not speak of it. I would be quite willing to add them. In any case, I hope that the length is about right. I know that two of the other pieces (Epstein, Bracher) were longer, but they seemed too long. Any other technical question: do you wish sub-headings; I have them myself, but have not put them in. Do drop me a line about these and other matters and let me know what your plans for mid-November are.

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Studies
Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass.

Henry V. Kießinger

Sincerely yours,

Warm regards.

doing worth doing?
International Begegnungen. Is this some-
House to ask on behalf of the Heidelbergers
I have been asked by the Americans
you as soon as you return.

You as soon as you return.
I am sorry we missed each other
but I hope very much to have lunch with
you as soon as you return.

we might still expect you.
brother until the last afternoon whether
your letter put I remember asking you
I don't know what happened to
December 8th.

December 8th.

Thank you for your note of

Dear Carl:

Germany

Friedrich-Ebert-Strasse 6

69 Heidelberg

an der Universität Heidelberg

Institut für Politische Wissenschaften

Professor C.t. Friedrich

December 16, 1964

June 8, 1965

Professor Carl J. Friedrich
Diplomatic Academy
Theresienweg
Favoritenstrasse 15
Vienna 4, Austria

Dear Carl:

I thought you might like to have a word about
my present thinking with respect to the German book.

Stolper has redone his piece and so, of course,
have you. On the basis of what I have seen, it seems
to me probably unnecessary to hold another conference.
Rather, I will be in touch with each of the authors
and make whatever suggestions occur to me in July.
In other words, it is not necessary for you to hold
any time in July.

I do hope, however, you will let me know when
you are back, since I would very much like to have a
chance to see you.

Best regards.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

August 6, 1965

Memo to: Henry A. Kissinger

From: Karl Kaiser

Concerning: C. J. Friedrich, "Germany and Europe"

p. 51: To say that "the only major sector of German life which has not as yet been to any marked extent Europeanized is the farming population" appears somewhat too strong. The farming organizations have been at least as active on a European level as the trading organizations and in this field, like in the other areas of trade organizations and labor unions, a "European spirit" is developing.
(See Leon Lindberg, "Decision Making and Integration in the European Community," *International Organization*, Vol. 9, No. 1, 1965, p. 74; and Lindberg, *The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration*, the chapters on agriculture.)

JAN 26 1966

January 26, 1966

Professor Carl J. Friedrich
Institut für Politische Wissenschaft
an der Universität Heidelberg
Friedrich-Ebert Anlage 6-10
Heidelberg, West Germany

Dear Professor Friedrich:

Thank you for reviewing and commenting upon your edited chapter. The manuscript arrived on January 20.

Through Mrs. Greenberg and a helper of mine and the incomparable facilities of Widener Library, I believe we will be able to gather the missing publication data. (This mention of a library reminds me of one of the fringe benefits of conservative annotation: someone making out a tentative research reading list as he goes can judge quickly what the particular library at his disposal is likely to have. More fringe benefits accrue to someone who wants to buy books and of course to someone who is noting pagination, which often differs in American-British, German-Swiss, etc. editions.) I had no trouble in following your instructions, erasures, and the like. I do notice three trouble spots still in the text, however, which I am calling to your attention here for final disposition.

1. On p. 13 appears the following sentence: "Stimulated by the sentiments aroused by the French Revolution and hardened in the fight against the foreign invader, nationalism in Germany was so fierce precisely because it was not shared by a good many men, who remained primarily attached to their local governments, such as the Bavarian monarchy, even when they did not cherish the cosmopolitanism of a Goethe." I wonder whether the final "not" wasn't put in inadvertently by a typist; for it seems to follow without need for comment that a _non-cosmopolite_ would be attached to his local institutions, whereas it would be worth remarking if one who professed to cherish cosmopolitanism _still_ or _also_ or _nevertheless_ gave his whole allegiance to local government. Would you take another look at this?

2. On p. 15 you declined to give the first name of the diplomat Abetz. This perhaps only postpones the question till the indexer asks, but in any case it is out of keeping with the rest of a paragraph where _Aristide Briand_, _Gustav Stresemann_, and _André Gide_ are named. Supply the name for consistency?

3. On p. 31 appears the following passage: "The entire course of this complicated policy of German adherence to European unification must be seen also in its juxtaposition to the Soviet Union's persistent efforts at interfering with this development.

position to the Soviet Union, a beninoent effort of interfering with this development.

policy of German adherence to European utilization met be seen also in its further

3. On b. 31 abbrs the following passage: "The entire course of this complicated

Aussige Gide are named. Subsequently the name for consistency.

keeping with the rest of a baroque where Vlatide Brandt, Gustav Streeßmann, and
only heartbeat the question till the indexer says, put in and case it is out of
2. On b. 18 you declined to give the first name of the diplomat Vepz. This befits

you to local government. Would you take another look at this?

to claim the cosmopolitanism still or also or nevertheless save the whole significance
for his local institutions, whereas it would be worth remarking if one who broached
seems to follow without need for comment that a non-cosmopolitan would be attached
to him whether the final "not," means, but inadvisably by a title; for it
Bavarian sovereignty, even when they did not cherish the cosmopolitanism of a Germany,
many men, who remained primarily attached to their local governments, and as the
nationalism in Germany was so fierce precisely because it was not eroded by a good
py the French Revolution and prolonged in the fight against the foreign invader,
1. On b. 13 abbrs the following sentence: "Stimulated by the sentiment eroded
causing to your attention here for final diabolution.

I do notice three trouble spots still in the text: however, which I am
etc. editions.) I had no trouble in following your instructions, erasure, and the
who is noting differentiation, which often titters in American-Slovak, German-Slovak,
tringe penalties accrue to someone who wants to pay pokes and of course to someone
to judge quickly what the particular tipster at his diabole is likely to have. More
annoyance: someone making out a tentative research reading that as he goes can
(This mention of a tipster reminds me of one of the fringe penalties of conservative
Widener Tipster). I believe we will be able to gather the missing information data.
Through Mr. Greenert and a dealer of mine and the incomparable facilities of
arrived on January 20.

Thank you for reviewing and commenting above your edited chapter. The manuscript

I am sorry to have to repeat this again, but I am unable to send you a copy of my

Dear Professor Friedrich:

Heidelberg, West Germany

Friedrich-Ebert University 3-10

an der Universität Heidelberg

Professor Carl J. Friedrich

January 28, 1986

JAN 5 1986

When in 1948 at the urgent insistence of Winston Churchill over 600 delegates gathered at The Hague to discuss possible ways for the unification of Europe, the venerated British leader in his inaugural address said: "Europe requires all that Frenchmen, all that Germans and all that everyone of us can give." It was a remarkable address, reintroducing the Germans to the European family of nations.¹ At the end, there was a long silence broken at last by applause from the French delegation. At that moment, the new Europe was born. For the Germans present, led by Konrad Adenauer, it was the dawn of a new life.

## 1. The Defeat and its Consequences

Churchill's bold phrasing, welcoming the Germans back into Europe's family of nations, so soon after the horrors of Hitler's disastrous war, was not only courageous but imaginative. The German delegation, mostly recruited from the American and British Occupation Zones, contained a sizeable percentage of those who were to become the leaders in Germany's activities on behalf of and in cooperation with Europe's new forces. At the same time, French intellectuals had quietly begun (in contrast to their government's avowed policy) to build

2

a bridge to their German brethren. Belonging to that
genuine fellowship of European arts and letters, they
had by the founding of such magazines as Merkur and an
imaginative cultural policy in the universities of their
zone laid the foundations for a new approach which became
manifest in the initiatives of men like Robert Schuman
and Jean Monnet and led to the Council of Europe and
the European Coal and Steel Community. It was a different,
and as events were to prove, a promising approach to
resuscitating among Germans those older strands of
European sentiment which are described below. Christian
Democrats, Free Democrats and Social Democrats, they all
acknowledged the victorious ideology of the Western Allies
as their own, and were soon to accept the Allied proposal
for building a provisional constitutional order under
Allied supervision. 2 It was a stony road that lay ahead,
and the division of their country loomed as an inescapable
consequence of the estrangement between the Western
powers and the Soviet Union. Inescapable because the
alternative of remaining an Allied pawn was hors de
discussion for all practical purposes. It is necessary
to recall these circumstances because the situation of
a divided Germany provides the peculiar dialectic of

3

Germany's complex relation to the new Europe. On the one hand, a united Europe suggested a new community transcending the national communities of the past. As such it could provide a focal point for political activity which ultimately might create the stability and strength from which to negotiate a return to German unity (and freedom for the Eastern part of the country!) as part of a larger European community.³ On the other hand, the Soviet Union and its satellites could use the persistent will for the unification of Germany as a lever by which to put the unification of Europe into jeopardy. There have been successive proposals by the U.S.S.R., its German satellite and other Soviet Bloc countries which implied that the abandonment of its Western and more especially its European ties was the precondition for the unification of Germany.⁴ In the face of such proposals and moves, the Federal Republic's commitment to Europe has remained unshaken and its involvement in the Community of Six has made her one of the main protagonists, if not in fact the main one, for a united Europe with firm supernational institutions. "The stone that was rejected has become the cornerstone."⁵

4

## 2. The Ancient Roots of European Consciousness in Germany

To interpret this remarkable development is the task of the pages that follow. It is not an easy task, for in some respects this development is more truly miraculous than the economic reconstruction which has been paralleled by similar developments in France, Italy, and other European countries (not to speak of Japan). Germany's share in the building of the new Europe has by now become so much part of the accepted order of things that one tends to forget how extraordinary this many-faceted cooperation, when projected against the background of Hitlerism, actually is. Of course, in a sense even Hitler with his oratory about the greater Germany and fortress Europe himself contributed to a European awareness on the part of many provincial Germans, just as Napoleonic had done at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when he disrupted the ancient and tottering structure of the empire as it had lived on since the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Indeed, it is important to recall that the tradition of the medieval empire created for many Germans a sort of European consciousness quite different from the national traditions of England, France, and Spain.⁶ Only Italy among the larger European

5

countries had a similar medieval heritage, associated
with the universal sway of the papacy, carrying on in
its imperial pretensions the half-forgotten glories of
the Roman empire. By contrast, England, France, and
Spain built the image of the modern world in terms of
their national consolidation. It provided them with an
assured sense of self which the Germans and Italians
lacked. Having been at the heart of medieval Europe
the two peoples whose rulers had wielded the two swords
of the medieval order are, in a sense, traditionally
more inclined toward casting their political thought
into a European mould than their Western sisters. All
one has to do is to look at an elementary history book
as used in the schools of Italy and Germany to sense
this divergent outlook and feeling. It would be absurd
to claim that for the average German or Italian such
reflections were a vital part of his interest in European
unification; but it would also be quite superficial to
neglect the role which such sentiments play in the minds
of the intellectual elite.⁷ This elite is more important
in Europe than is generally recognized in the United
States; the hierarchical structure of European intellectual
life even affects the left-wing circles, with their

6

[Lc]

Marxist propensity to think in elite terms.

But whether one considers the so-called elite,
or the common man, there can be little question that
there has been and is today a difference among Germans
as to what is their identity. This *difference* found
expression in the characteristic contrasting of two
divergent conceptions of a nation: one based on the
territorially defined state and the other on the nation
(<u>Staatsnation</u> and <u>Kulturnation</u>).<sup>8</sup> It was held by many
that the German nation could only be defined in cultural
terms, because it was scattered over a good part of
Europe, regardless of frontiers. Many Germans, that is
to say German-speaking and German-feeling persons, had
been settled in the countries bordering on Germany for
centuries and could neither be excluded from the German
people nor effectively made a part of the German state.
This situation enticed Hitler to seek by force the
establishment of a Greater Germany which would include
all Germans by enslaving the host peoples or transferring
them. On the rebound, most of these German minorities.
to the East have been expelled since 1945 and become
incorporated within the German boundaries. But there
is still Austria and, in a different sense, German-speaking

7

Switzerland. If identity is defined (as modern sociology tends to do) in terms of membership in a reference group rather than in those of territory, the Germany sense of identity is related to all the people who speak German, and this gives them a greater affinity to identifying themselves with Europe as the home of all Germans. At the same time, the notion of their affinity to the Germanic element of European culture, a heritage of the Romantic age, provides deep roots for a feeling of consanguinity with Scandinavia and Britain. Reinforced by the profound hold which Shakespeare has had upon the German imagination ever since the Classic era of Schiller and Goethe, this feeling makes many Germans sympathetic to a policy of an inclusive Europe which necessarily comprehends the English people as a matter of course; Europe is unthinkable without England for them. If Germans readily respond to inclusion of the Eastern European peoples, seeing themselves as the heartland, they equally determinedly insist upon partnership with Britain. Indeed, one of the main obstacles to German national identity, objectively and subjectively, is the Germans' close bonds with all European peoples; it is England and Scandinavia in the North, France in Western Europe.

8

Germany, Italy in South Germany, and the Slavic people in East Germany. Germany's wide-open frontiers have forced Germans into close contact with their neighbors, in cooperation and conflict. How different is the geographical position of England, France, Spain and Italy, shut off on at least three sides by sea and mountains. Hence such curious and yet highly significant sayings as that "it is non-German to be only German." (es ist undeutsch bloss deutsch zu sein.)⁹ It is this very uncertainty created by an openness in all directions which invites Germans to seek a new identity in being Europeans, even to speak in terms of an emergent European nation. The danger here is suggested by the language of de Gaulle. Against it, strong voices have been raised, especially on the side of Social Democrats. "I think we should not attempt to pool former nationalisms and now to bring them together in the same nationalist spirit to form a common nationalism for two or six countries," the leading spokesman of the S.P.D. in foreign affairs, Fritz Erler, has written. And he added: "Europe should be open to the world and not a closed shop."¹⁰ Such sentiments are in the best tradition of European cosmopolitanism. It was universalist. It

9

is now often forgotten that European sentiment in the past thought of humanity as a whole--it naively thought mostly of European nations when speaking of mankind.

The Socialists and more especially the Marxists were the preservers and developers of genuine cosmopolitanism, conscious universalism. The closing sentence of the Communist Manifesto was not spoken in vain.

### 3. Marxism's Contribution

Marx and Marxism have been a potent factor in the growth of European sentiment in Germany.¹¹ While the traditionalist and conservative may be thinking in romantic terms of the by-gone glories of "Gothic Man," the forward looking rationalist and progressive who is the typical Social Democrat would adopt an international outlook. Such an international outlook was essentially European. When Marx and Engels exhorted the proletarians of all the world to unite in order to throw off their chains, they thought of the world as primarily a European world. The First and Second Internationales were predominantly European organizations, and the international solidarity was a solidarity among the nations of Europe, including Russia, of course. That this remained true down to the First World War can be

10

shown by numerous passages in letters and speeches. 12 1/2
One knew that there existed in the world another vast
proletariat which was being subjected to imperial
exploitation, but it remained for Lenin, stimulated by
the ferment among British Liberals, to sound the trumpet
against imperialism and thus to universalize the
essentially European slant of Marx' and Engels' original
approach. 13 The "culture-bound" orientation toward
Europe found mute expression also in the failure to
produce any sustained thought on the subject of how so
radically European a program as the Marxist one could
be adapted to the needs of people of a different, a
radically different general outlook and belief. But
this very limitation of Marx' basic analysis helped to
make a powerful ingredient in the transformation of
Germans into Europeans. If the enemies of German
socialists denounced them as "comrades without a father-
land," (vaterlandslose Gesellen), the German socialist
could well respond that Europe was his fatherland, and
when Socialists from all over Europe embraced each other
at their successive international gatherings, they laid
the emotional foundation for a future political order
which today is aspired to by a Spaak, a Mollet and a

13

[LC]

11

Schmid (not to speak of the older generation of the
Herriots, Bernsteins, Bauers and Renners) in common and
persistent effort. It is too often forgotten that the
weakness of Marxism in Britain is part of Labour's
hesitation about joining hands with their continental
comrades, in this and in other tasks. But because of
the German empire's strident nationalism, this European
sentiment became a more powerful emotional force among
German socialists than elsewhere. To be sure, the talk
of "Kaiser Bebel" rightly hinted at the fact that German
socialists did not remain unaffected by the currents
against which they struggled. In vain do we look among
German socialists for a figure like Jean Jaures, the
martyred advocate of Franco-German reconciliation and
European solidarity. But there were very ardent advocates
of Europe and Franco-German reconciliation, such as
Eduard Bernstein, who in the midst of World War I could
issue a call for the new Europe. As a conclusion of a
set of articles he reprinted a sharp critique of a
manifesto of the Social Democratic majority which had
proclaimed that the party "supports everything that is
calculated to lead the European states onto the road of
a closer legal, economic and cultural community," not

12

because he objected to it, but because he thought that
the majority resolution was too weak. 14

4. Paneuropa and German Self-criticism

If the postwar era did not bring any immediate
revival of the European mood, this temporary eclipse
of European initiatives must be attributed to two trans-
European and indeed universalist thrusts. First and
foremost there was the Wilsonian internationalism,
world-wide in its scope, American in its inspiration and
institutional ideas. 15 Second, and hardly less important,
there was Communist internationalism, now also world-
wide in scope, but Russian in inspiration and its
revolutionary institutional proposals, such as sovietism.
In reaction and response to these there was the revival
of nationalist notions, epitomized at first in the
vindictive policies of Clemenceau and Poincaré, but
afterwards radicalized in the Fascist movement and carried
to criminal excess in the National Socialist holocaust.

In fact, National Socialism built upon a strand
of strident nationalism which had been growing in Germany
ever since the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the
nineteenth century. Stimulated by the sentiments aroused
by the French revolution and hardened in the fight

13

against the foreign invader, nationalism in Germany was
so fierce precisely because it was not shared by a good
many men who remained primarily attached to their local
governments, such as the Bavarian monarchy, even when
they did not cherish the cosmopolitanism of a Goethe. ¹⁶
There was none of that natural self-assurance and quiet
assumption of superiority which characterized British
and French nationalism. Instead there was aggressive
compensatory pride (Ueberheblichkeit) coupled with a
feeling of insecurity and a sense of urgency to make up
for lost time. Yet, until 1848 this emotionalism of
German nationalism, akin to Italian sentiments and to
the more recent passions in other emergent nations,
remained so strongly liked to liberalism and democracy
that it still seemed to befit the people of "thinkers
and poets." But when the Revolution of 1848 failed and
the task of unification was taken over by Prussia under
the leadership of Otto von Bismarck, this aggressive
nationalism became increasingly associated with militarism
and the imperial policies of a Kaiserreich which rested
upon the power of Prussian arms. Bismarck had known how
to curb its excesses in the interest of a policy of
balance of power, but under his feeble successors including

14

the emperor William II who responded to its longings with a number of oratorical outbursts it became increasingly heady and expansive. Having met disastrous defeat in the First World War, it turned into the revolutionary undercurrent of the Weimar Republic. Its avowed Europeanism and internationalism, discredited by economic disaster consequent upon the peace treaties, was swept away by the rising tide of uncompromising nationalism.

Before these disasters engulfed Europe and the world, the immediate European response was a first flowering of European attempts at unification associated with the names of Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann and given vivid intellectual expression in the work of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, entitled *Pan-Europe* (1923). Germany, emerging from the devastations of the postwar inflation, was swept by a veritable wave of European sentiment in the sequel to the Locarno treaties which seemed to herald the emergence of a united continent, united in an identity which separated it from the revolutionaries in Moscow and Washington.17 This new Europe was argued over in the restaurants and convention halls of Geneva, until the world economic crisis engulfed it. Stresemann and Briand died and the new spirit died

15

with them. Germany after 1930 became increasingly attractive to Hitler's ideology of German hegemony in terms of obscurantist racist notions of Aryan supremacy.

Geneva and the League of Nations became a symbol of alienation and decay, even though Europe remained the meaningful stage of political aspiration. The "world" that Hitlerism recognized was the world of Europe rather than the world of Asia, America, and Africa, and the Germans were to be the masters of this Europe which would continue to dominate the globe. ¹⁸

The exigencies of wartime propaganda have obscured this facet of Hitlerism and the appeal which it contained for many men in France, and other European countries. The skillful subversive diplomacy of an Abetz was built upon it. The Diary of a Gide mirrors it. Some of Gide's passages on Goethe ¹⁹ provide as startling a testimony on "Germany and Europe" as do the searching evaluations of modern French literature by an Ernst Robert Curtius. ²⁰

While Hitler was readying his legions for the Blitzkrieg that was to settle the problem of European unity by blood and iron, French, German and Italian intellectuals were discussing their common heritage in the inns of Switzerland. Switzerland herself

16

appeared then as she always had been the paradigm of that Europe of which the Germans were at once the "heart" and the nemesis.

It is not without interest at this point to remind oneself that some of the greatest Germans, Goethe, Hegel, Nietzsche, have been among the most bitter critics of their people. Unlike critics in France and England, their hostile comments have recurrently been cast in terms of derogatory comparisons of Germany with other European nations. Goethe's and Hegel's admiration for France and Napoleon are well-known. Neither man displayed any marked enthusiasm for the movement of national liberation which did so much to consolidate German national sentiment prior to the overthrow of Bonaparte's imperial domination of Germany. Neither Goethe nor Hegel had any patience with sentiments which would have the world get well by imbibing the Germany spirit ("und es mag am Deutschen Wesen einmal noch die Welt genesen," as E. Geibel had written). Yet they saw Europe and the Europeans as the pinnacle of humanity, as the true heirs of Greece and Rome. And Nietzsche, the tormented seeker of greatness, the prophet of the superman to come and rule the world, contemptuously brushed aside