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# ANALYSIS OF SOVIET REACTION TO NUCLEAR POWER

## INTRODUCTION

The proposition has been put forward that a basic difference in attitude on foreign policy was one of the factors underlying the "resignation" of Malenkov in February 1955. On the assumption that any such difference might have shown up in Soviet theoretical debates over the years, an analysis was made of those scattered passages which have been noted over several years criticizing real or invented attitudes on international problems. The fact that these passages appear to be more frequent after 1950 may reflect nothing more than inadequate coverage in earlier years. Two main categories of discussion appear to be involved: (1) the significance of Moscow's strengthened international position, and (2) the possibility and consequences of war.

## I. IMPLICATIONS OF THE INCREASE IN SOVIET POWERS

Discussion of changes in Moscow's international situation which were first noted in 1949-1950 involved two points: the nature of capitalist encirclement and the greater or lesser need to maintain a strong state. Malenkov in November 1949 stressed the newly achieved security of the Soviet borders and Molotov a month later emphasized that the USSR had "emerged from the situation of international isolation." In April 1950, however, an article in Moscow University Herald drew a distinction between geographical encirclement which was no more and "political" encirclement resulting from the fact that the number of capitalist states "still significantly outnumber the states in the camp of socialism." Moscow was thus careful to retain the presence of an external menace as a justification for totalitarian policy.

Perhaps the most important element in Stalin's articles on linguistics in the summer of 1950 were the passages recapitulating his 1939 thesis on the necessity for strengthening to the utmost the organs of state, intelligence and defense so long as capitalist encirclement remains and denouncing the doctrine of the "withering away" of the state. In his attack in 1939 on "our comrades" who felt that with the arrival of socialism steps should be taken to "help our socialist state to die away," Stalin had acknowledged that "the forms of our state will again change in conformity with the change in the international situation. He did not make clear, however, whether such changes would take place gradually as capitalist encirclement was liquidated or only after it had been liquidated. There was therefore, inherent in boasts that capitalist encirclement had been liquidated, at least in its geographic aspects, arguments for any "theoreticians" who favored a relaxation in the dictatorial and war economy features of the regime.

Moscow was clearly very much alive throughout the postwar period to the possibility that Soviet successes would go to the head of at least some segments of the Soviet population, and the inference could be drawn from scattered comments that it faced real pressures perhaps even within high party circles for a modification in policy. Komsomolskaya Procura of September 28, 1946 carried an unusually sharp comment significantly only shortly after Stalin had told Alexander Werth that it was "impossible" for the Western powers to "encircle" the USSR.

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This article charged that: "remnants of capitalism are fed by the capitalist encirclement in which our country finds itself" and it made the point that the "most important function of the dictatorship of the working class is defense of Socialist conquests against attacks from outside" and that "even under complete communism, if capitalist encirclement is not abolished, the state will be preserved, and consequently the dictatorship of the working class as well as the guiding role of the party in this dictatorship." It is interesting to note the subject of capitalist encirclement being taken up with increasing heat after 1950. In August and September 1951, the Soviet press attacked the "mistaken notions of some comrades" who considered that the encirclement had been liquidated and "demanded that measures should be taken for a rapid dying off of our state." Each time, at the 19th Party Congress, Malenkov cited Stalin's injunction about strengthening the state and attacked the "vulgarizers of Marxism" who:

> "propagated the most pernicious theory of our cause -- the weakening and the dying off of the Soviet state in the atmosphere of capitalist encirclement."

N.A. Mikhailov in the commemoration address in January 1953 on the day of Lenin, returned to this theme in greater detail. Primarily it was never clear if the attacks on "some comrades" were to be interpreted in a purely historical or in a current sense. Mikhailov charged, however, (using the present rather than the past tense) that Soviet successes "engender a feeling of complacency and carelessness...among many insufficiently mature comrades..." He attacked talk of the "class struggle dying down" and, quoting Stalin at the time of the great purges in 1937, declared:

> Some comrades interpreted the thesis on the abolition of classes...and the withering away of the state to mean a justification of laziness and complacency, a justification of the counter-revolutionary theory that the class struggle is subsiding and that state power is to be relaxed...such people...must be driven out of the party...The abolition of classes is not achieved by the subsiding of the class struggle, but by its intensification.

There now appeared to be a definite link between Mikhailov's charges and the long-standing discussion of capitalist encirclement and the role of the state; and in view of the inter-relationship of internal and external policy in Marxist thinking, Mikhailov's reference to an estimate that the class struggle was subsiding suggested at least a corollary estimate of a reduced threat from the outside world. Pravda interpreted the phrase about "extinguishing the class struggle" in just this sense on February 6, 1953, in an article by Kozov who charged that:

> Certain propagandists have become enmeshed in a scholastic argument: does capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union continue to exist or is it something of the past? ... Certain luckless theoreticians have even gone so far as to say that, today, when the mighty camp

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of Socialism has been formed, imperialism has already ceased to be
a danger to us... Such people begin to think that the greater our
forward movement, the greater the successes of the Communist build-
ing, the more the capitalist world will give up attempts to harm
and damage the Soviet Union. Such views are an echo of the right-
wing opportunist theory...about the abolition of classes by exting-
uishing the class struggle and the peaceful growth of capitalist
elements into Socialism.

Kosev's comments were spelled out in greater detail in an article by Chesnokov in the January 1953 issue of *Kommunist* devoted largely to insisting that the U.S.S.R. must maintain its international revolutionary policy. According to Chesnokov:

(a) the change in the correlation of forces after World War II created among "some comrades...incorrect rights" and opportunist notions to the effect that the capitalist encirclement had been liquidated and that our party no longer was in need of support on the part of the labor movement of other countries.

(b) Soviet successes are "thanks only to the fact that the CPSU educated the peoples of the Soviet Union in a spirit of internationalism." The Soviet Union cannot destroy the capitalist encirclement alone.

(c) The obligation to "struggle for a rapid rate of construction of the socialist society" is due not merely to the peoples of the U.S.S.R., but also the world proletariat.

(d) He attacked the 'theory' of attenuating the class struggle as "opportunist and capitulant" and Stalin's analysis of the inevitability of class struggle within a country "refers equally to the mutual relations" of the two world systems.

(e) The "Philistines" are to be condemned who...suppose naively that international capital will leave the country of socialism alone and will indifferently watch the country of victorious socialism build communism and carry out a...liberating policy."

(f) Any idea of "pacifying" the imperialists at the price of questions of principle, i.e., "giving up sympathy and support of the liberation movement of other countries" and sanctioning imperialist policy or pacifying them even with small concessions is merely bourgeois liberalism and a break with the theory of class struggle.

Overtones of this same type of discussion and the folly of assuming that the capitalist world will not attack the Soviet Union could be read into scattered theoretical articles after Stalin's death. The *Pravda* editorial of April

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7, for example, asserted that:

> The historic experience of the Soviet Union has fully confirmed the possibility of the proletarian international method of liberating oppressed peoples as the only correct method.

While Kommunist in May 1953 made the point that:

> The confidence of the Soviet Union in the possibility of peaceful coexistence and cooperation of the two systems springs forth from groundless calculations on the view that adventurist circles in the capitalist countries will one fine day voluntarily renounce their hostile intentions with respect to the Soviet socialist state. Only political Manilovs can reckon on this...

Kommunist concluded that the possibility of maintaining peace was founded on power factors, including "sympathy and support of the working people of all countries" which "the world of capitalism cannot but take into account."

Whatever the significance, Beriya was charged in his indictment in June 1953 with seeking "the replacement of a policy...worked out by the Party over many years by a capitulatory policy, which in the final reckoning would have led to the restoration of capitalism." Again there is no way of knowing what if anything was the meaning of this charge; but if it had any connection with the attacks on a capitulatory policy earlier in the year, and they are interpreted literally, they implied that Beriya minimized the danger of attack from the West, felt that "peaceful coexistence" could be achieved by making certain concessions to the West, including selling "liberation" movements down the river, and perhaps favored a slower rate of capital construction and correspondingly some concessions to the consumer.

This latter relationship of economic planning to the international situation is, however, spelled out hardly at all in theoretical articles. Nevertheless, any persons arguing in favor of giving the Soviet citizen more consumer goods, would have been compelled out of logic to minimize the danger of external aggression. If, therefore, scattered criticism in 1951 to a "consumers approach" to the problem of production, which reappeared in Stalin's *Bolshevik* article in 1952 was actually directed at "some comrades" it is logical to assume that the comrades were less concerned than they were supposed to be over the possibility of conflict with the West. The unexpected mention of Voznessensky in a very roundabout fashion in December 1952 links him with favoring a consumer approach since he was charged with distorting the law of value, associated by Stalin with giving too much emphasis to the production of articles of consumption over those of production. By a somewhat tortuous association pattern, he may also have been associated with minimizing the international role of the U.S.S.R. Thus, the attack by Suslov on the writer Fedoseev in December 1952 for supporting Voznessensky, singled out for attack certain shortcomings of the periodical *Political Economy*. The shortcomings cited included "poorly elucidating questions of international life, particularly questions of the international labor movement" and showing the "growing forces of

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socialism throughout the world" too weakly. In November 1953 criticism of a "consumer approach" was associated, albeit in an historical context, to "right wing capitulants" who had sought in the past to "bring about an end of heavy industry." It was really not until Shepilov in the January 24, 1955 issue of Pravda attacked "vulgarizers of Marxism" that this stress on the production of consumer goods was overtly tied to an existing trend in Soviet thought and the conclusion drawn that any such policy would lead to "undermining the economic might of the Soviet land and its defense capacity." Conceivably, therefore, the Shepilov article like the Mikhailov speech in January 1953 served to bring into the open a dispute hitherto spoken of only in terms of policies rejected in the past.

## II. MOLOTOV'S CRITICISM OF MALENKOV

The resignation of Malenkov at a time of renewed stress on the importance of heavy industry to the defense of the country and its internal consumption needs had the effect of associating him in the eyes of at least some observers with support for a consumer policy; notwithstanding his earlier attack at the 19th Party Congress on "vulgarizers of Marxism" who favored weakening the Soviet state under conditions of capitalist encirclement. The question, therefore, is whether there are any grounds for the criticism levelled against Malenkov at the Supreme Soviet; and if any connection can be discerned between the policies and views which are obliquely attributed to him and the earlier attacks on "capitulants." Phrased differently, does the implication in the Soviet press that Malenkov might have been linked to Beriya mean that he was guilty of the same "capitulatory" tendencies as Beriya? Or, are all these charges sheer fabrications devised to indict the victim with the worst of possible crimes -- heresy?

A. The most direct attack on Malenkov was contained in Molotov's statement: "'World civilization' will not perish, no matter how much it might suffer from new aggression, but what will perish is that already rotten social system..." -- a direct refutation of Malenkov's statement in March, 1954 that a "new world war ...with modern means of warfare, spells the destruction of world civilization." Molotov's speech contained other admonitions of some interest which at least echoed aspects of earlier attacks on capitulatory policy:

B. On the subject of lessening tension, he declared:

> ...a lessening of tension in international relations cannot otherwise be achieved than by persistent struggle against the more aggressive circles and their intrigues, and consequently this struggle must not only not be relaxed but of necessity continued with yet greater persistence...naturally, we have in mind the sort of lessening of international tension which is possible not at the expense of this or that state, this or that people but by guaranteeing the possible strengthening of these democratic rights, so is demanded in the interests of progress in the life of states and peoples.../ faintly reminiscent of Chosnokov attacking the idea of concessions involving a liberation movement./

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C. On the subject of expectation of outside attack, he stressed Western "liberation policy", and warned against naively counting on the "love" of the capitalists -- again an echo of Chesnokov.

The appetites of the aggressive imperialist circles and their sinister reactionary dreams are not limited only to the countries of peoples democracy. They would also like to turn back our country to capitalism. They do not often talk about this openly but nevertheless, they do talk about it... [after mocking Churchill nostalgia at his failure to crush the Bolshevik revolution]. However, we should not be naive: the Communists, and all the Soviet people, should not count on the love and sympathy of the imperialists.

D. Molotov was rather interesting in his reformulation of the position of the U.S.S.R. in the world. He was careful to warn that no extreme conclusions should be drawn from the changes in the world situation (conceivably an echo of earlier attacks on misrepresentation of the changes) and a warning against underplaying the long-term revolutionary significance of the changes could also be read into his comments:

> Nowadays the Soviet Union is no longer in the same international situation as existed before the war... The international isolation of the U.S.S.R. is a thing of the past... of great importance in assessing the contemporary international situation as a whole is the fact that there has now been formed a correlation of the basic world forces. In so doing what has occurred should neither be exaggerated nor understated, nor the fact of the direction which events are developing. It must not be forgotten under any circumstances either that there is involved a great historic period of which only a little more than 37 years has been lived through up to the present. Can it be denied that in comparison to the prewar period a serious weakening of the position of capitalism and the capitalist classes has taken place? No it cannot. It is also obvious that these changes occurred in favor of socialism and in favor of democratic and socialist forces.

Before breaking down these arguments to see if they have any relationship to previous policy, a recapitulation of the Molotov argument should be made and its possible implications. He, in effect, argued in traditional Stalinist terms that the way to peace is through increased struggle and certainly not at the price of weakening Communist movements anywhere; that it is naive ever to expect that the capitalist world would give up its efforts to destroy Communism; that the increase in strength of the Communist camp should not be exaggerated; nor, however, should the trend toward Communism be minimized.

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III. THE INEVITABILITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF WAR

A. The Problem

In his attack on the thesis that world civilization would perish in another war, Molotov emphasized from a different standpoint this same point, insisting on the inevitable survival and victory of the Communist system. In so doing, he seized upon a loose ideological formulation to charge Malenkov with heresy, but it remains obscure what differences, if any, this formulation covered.

There appear to be two possibilities:

(a) the 'Destruction of world civilization' phrase was found in practice to have undesirable implications; it was accordingly discarded by decision of the Presidium, with Malenkov either agreeing that the formula was inappropriate or defending it as a useful propaganda argument. In either event, he officially repudiated the formula in April, before the Supreme Soviet.

(b) Malenkov revealed in his formulation a very different view of the world situation than that held by other members of the Presidium. Molotov would, under these circumstances, have been criticizing an alternative policy rather than propaganda approach. A policy stressing the danger of atomic war to the whole Communist system as well as to the outside world would presumably be a policy urging greater caution. It would also presumably argue that the threat of the consequences of war was sufficient to prevent attack from the West -- provided, of course, the U.S.S.R. is equipped with sufficient nuclear weapons to retaliate.

In attempting to determine which of these two interpretations appears best to put the tenuous ambiguous evidence available, it is perhaps easiest to chronologically examine along the way the various arguments in favor of a policy difference and the question of why the formulation might have been used and so quickly discarded and whether the criticisms of the formula appearing in 1955 represent ex post facto charges of anti-Marxism or the real reason for its earlier repudiation. The following would seem to be pertinent developments:

B. Background Considerations

1. Since before World War II, the Soviet leaders have wrestled with the problem of how to encourage an active "struggle" against the "inevitability" of war. Stalin in his *Bolshevik* article on the *Economic Problems of Socialism* clearly sought to resolve some of the post-war difficulties which had arisen in connection with the issue of the probability of war. He sought apparently to maintain the threat of war as a justification for totalitarian policies but in terms which did not suggest whether that suggested that war was in fact inevitable (an apparent interpretation placed on Soviet policy by Foreign Communists in the 1949-51 period) or that the "forces of peace" were so strong throughout the world that no war was possible. In short, he sought to tread a middle path between the daggers of fatalism and complacency. It is of course, impossible to say whether the extreme interpretations were merely misunderstandings (as was said) in the ranks or actual differences of views in circles.

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2. At no time before Stalin's death was there any suggestion of a belief that atomic weapons threatened the basic theoretical premises of Communist dogma. For obvious reasons, when the U.S.S.R. did not have atomic weapons it stressed that they were "not decisive" and criticized the doctrine of "blitzkrieg," emphasizing that war is won by the basic factors of morale, strategy, manpower resources, artillery, etc. Beginning in 1951 with Stalin's self-interview on the subject of recent Soviet atomic tests, Moscow began to evoke the threat of retaliation, albeit in very muted form. Stalin pointed out that the U.S. "will use the atomic bomb" in the event of an attack on the U.S.S.R. and that the U.S. S.R. must therefore possess the bomb "in order to meet the aggressors fully prepared." The Soviet leaders continued to predict the destruction of the capitalist system in another war and were careful not to discuss the implications of nuclear attack on the U.S.S.R. The repetitious references to "peaceful coexistence" between states always spoke of this coexistence as a question of belief or possibility. Stalin alone spoke of "peaceful coexistence" and the settlement of differences being "necessary" (in May 1948, reply to Henry Wallace) -- but not because of the threat of mutual destruction but "in the interests of universal peace."

There was certainly no suggestions of concern over the ideological or practical impact of atomic weapons or Soviet policy in Malenkov's speech to the 19th Party Congress. Tired aspects of that speech are worth recalling in view of current Soviet criteria and Western speculation. First, he came out very strongly against any idea that "the laws of economic development may be created or abolished" and warning that such views would lead to "chaos" and "abolish political economy as a science." (Admittedly with obvious references to economic planning.) Secondly, he stated that "there is no force in the world that can halt the advance of Soviet society...We must keep our hand firmly on the helm and steer our course undeterred by provocation or intimidation." Thirdly, the idea that peaceful coexistence was not merely "possible" but a "necessity" appeared to evoke in response to Western discussion of the threat of atomic war rather than on Soviet initiatives. Immediately after the death of Stalin when the Soviet leadership indicated its concern lest there be "panic and disarray," Malenkov used the word "necessary" to describe the Soviet "policy of peace." Assuming that he was using "peace" in the Western sense, he clearly did not link this necessity to atomic weapons. In his speech of August 8, he spoke further of a policy of peaceful coexistence being an "obligation" for Western as well as Soviet policy makers. He did not imply this was so, however, because atomic weapons threatened civilization. Rather he argued that there was now no hope of "turning back the course of history" (i.e., "liberating" Eastern Europe) and with the U.S. no longer having a monopoly of the hydrogen bomb, any attack on the Soviet bloc would be "folly" and an "adventure." Apparently this was merely his way of phrasing the frequent official warning that an attack on the U.S.S.R. would meet with a "decisive rebuff." Malenkov's speech appeared, in fact, to reflect a greater security rather than insecurity based on an increase in Soviet power vis-a-vis the West. It also suggested an intention to use that increase in power to persuade the West that its "policy of force" was sheer "folly."

The concept of "civilization" being destroyed and the direct link between nuclear weapons and the necessity of peace came about in Soviet propaganda apparently as a response to Western statements. In one of the earliest examples, TASS on August 24 quoted a British newspaper as saying that agreement by negotiations were now "essential" in view of Soviet possession of hydrogen weapons. Moscow ignored a series of statements like that of Secretary Dulles to the UN General Assembly on September 17 that efforts must be made to "save the human race from extinction" until finally on October 3 Pravda printed an article by Ilya Ehrenburg in which he acknowledged in passing that atomic weapons were a "threat to civilization" but in a context intended to disparage as "ludicrous" a recent statement to this effect made by Secretary Dulles. He traced acknowledgement of the danger of atomic weapons to Soviet possession of them and claimed that U.S. policy had, as a result, entered an "impasse" from which it must turn. The English language magazine News in its November 1953 issue also referred to Secretary Dulles' admission that the hydrogen bomb threatens the very existence of civilization and urged that the U.S. should accordingly come forward with a revision of its "Baruch Plan" for atomic disarmament.

President Eisenhower's address to the UN General Assembly on December 8, 1953. On December 10, the Soviet press reprinted excerpts of his speech including his statement that an acceptance of the atomic stalemate in which two atomicLOSSi eyed each other malevolently would mean to acknowledge "hopelessly the probability that civilization would be destroyed." In its official reply of December 21 Moscow did not use this phrase but spoke of the "particular danger of the atomic weapon which exists today for the peoples of the whole world" and the need to spare "mankind...the horrors of an atomic war." The U.S.S.R. went on to propose a ban on the use of atomic weapons as its contribution toward this end. The Pravda editorial of December 26 again used this vivid phrase of the "horrors of another war;" in support of the Soviet proposal while an article in Izvestiya of January 19, 1954 by a "General in Retirement" on the subject of "where the policy of strength leads" concluded that it leads to war which "under modern conditions means colossal destruction." The point of his article was that the U.S. and its allies would both suffer this destruction on their home territories in another war and that the only alternative is negotiations "based on a sober calculation of the rights and interests of both big and small countries."

While these phrases evoking the image of atomic destruction continued to be used sparingly, they had clearly become a part of the Soviet political vocabulary prior to Malenkov's speech in March. Pravda on January 30, for example, noted that a disarmament conference could "contribute to the freeing of mankind from the terror of atomic bombing;" Bulgarian premier Chervenkov in a speech of February 25 also referred to the "new and unheard of destruction" in another war which will be "particularly terrible now that there are weapons like the atomic bomb." Marshal Bulganin in a February 22 Armed Forces Day address spoke in turn of the importance of strengthening the armed forces as the "best means...for monstrous and unprecedented calamities." -- a sentiment he repeated in March saying that the U.S.S.R. could not "reckon on the humaneness of the imperialists."

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C. <u>Relationship to International Situation</u>

Against this background of comment, Malenkov's statement in March becomes
much less startling. He denied that there was no alternative to a "fresh world
terror" the "cold War" (an obvious reference to U.S. statements), warned that
the Western cold war policy was one of "preparations of a new world slaughter
which with the existence of the modern means of destruction would mean the des-
truction of world civilization." He proceeded to argue that Moscow was, in fact,
interested in a policy of real peace which he contrasted with Western "aggres-
sive" aims.

Two conclusions stand out at this point. Malenkov's statement was not an
isolated comment but one of a series of statements intended to demonstrate Soviet
peaceful intentions and to warn the West that its present policy was leading to
catastrophe. In this sense, it was a direct descendant of his August 8 speech.
Secondly, however, it faced up publicly for domestic as well as foreign audiences
to the consequences of atomic warfare -- if only to conclude that the West should
change its policy and the U.S.S.R. should continue to strengthen its armed forces
pending such a change.

The "destruction of civilization" formula received very little publicity. It was used in a Home Service commentary of March 29 which questioned why U.S. ruling circles, apparently aware of the threat to civilization, should publicize their "war plans...contrary to the conscience of mankind." A World Peace Council resolution of April 1 and a Soviet note to the Western powers of March 31 also incorporated the idea of the destruction of civilization. It was expressly repudiated by Malenkov on April 26.

The decision to discontinue this line of propaganda approach was obviously taken, therefore, sometime in early April. In examining the international situation at this time, the two factors which appear most likely to have a 'fected this decision are Secretary Dulles' call for "united action" in the Indochina situation on March 29 in response to the deteriorating situation in Dien Bien Phu, and the "policy of massive retaliation" which he had enunciated on January 12. Moscow waited until March 25 to comment on Secretary Dulles' January doctrine of "massive retaliation" which it claimed represented an attempt to spread "fear and war hysteria" in order to sabotage the forthcoming Geneva Conference. Editorials in *Pravda* on April 5 and *Izvestiya* on April 6, speaking about the recent WPC resolution, linked these "threats" more directly to the Indochina situation and asserted that:

The threats of using atomic and hydrogen weapons do not engender
fear or apathy among the peace-loving peoples but growing indig-
nation and determination. (Izvestiya, April 6.)

...the struggle for banning such weapons, new threats heard in Washington today of employing force against people who are defending their liberty and national independence bring about results which are quite contrary to those that the aggressive forces count on. Not terror, not fear, not submission to threats but a universal indignation...a universal desire to defend peace is taking hold of the nations. (Pravda, April 5.)

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TASS in turn on April 7 broadcast an interview with Joliot-Curie which stressed the urgency of extracting from governments a pledge not to use atomic weapons. Curie urged action in the face of "serious and directly threatening danger," on the part of "all those who have not fallen into the panic which certain people trying to blackmail them are attempting to stir up."

To judge from these references, Moscow was concerned in early April that the U.S. would be able to reduce all opposition to its intervention in Indochina by evoking the spectre of its atomic might. Its annoyance may, at the same time, have been a reflection of its own indecision over whether or not to test U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons. In this game of bluff, it was essential that the Soviet bloc be able to put up a bold front; but Malenkov in his reference to the "destruction of world civilization" was pictured in the West as having admitted that the U.S.S.R. was reluctant to risk a nuclear war. At the same time, he initiated the use of a concept of total destruction which Moscow may have felt was having the effect of creating attitudes of apathy and fatalism rather than of desired militancy on the part of Communist supporters within and without the Sino-Soviet bloc --notably in the context of the accidental fall-out from the Bikini tests. If this analysis is accurate, then Malenkov was given the task in April of making good his faux pas and retouching the picture of a U.S.S.R. capable of destroying capitalism in another war with its own atomic armaments. Summed up simply, the Soviet leadership concluded that the Malenkov phrase weakened rather than strengthened the foreign policy positions of the Sino-Soviet bloc at a critical juncture. Concern over a posture of weakness was undoubtedly enhanced in view of the Communist decision, taken already or subsequently, to accept a cease-fire in Indochina.

Three questions remain to be examined: (1) was Malenkov personally responsible for the emerging propaganda campaign on the subject of the destruc- tiveness of modern war or merely its spokesman on one occasion; (2) did his use of the phrase imply a different propaganda or policy estimate; and (3) does the current campaign to discredit this concept reflect merely an effort to indict Malenkov or is it related to current Soviet foreign policy problems, perhaps in connection with Quemoy and Matsu.

## D. Current Criticism

Taking into account the possibility that current charges may constitute a rewriting of history, they still offer a useful guide to interpretation. The charges fall into two categories: (1) The U.S. cannot "halt the course of history" by resort to atomic weapons; no weapons can alter the "laws of social development." This statement was apparently first made by Lieutenant General Shatilov on February 22, Red Army day.

The political and military reactionaries now imagine that they can halt the course of history and reverse it. However, history develops not in accordance with adventurous plans...but in ac- cordance with objective laws to which even the warmongers are subject.

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Pravda on February 26 reprinted an article from *International Life*. This subject concluded:

> ...only adventurers in politics imagine that, with the aid of atomic weapons, they can cancel the forward development of mankind along the road of progress. Weapons have never altered or cancelled the laws of social development. They have never created or abolished conditions which could alter social structures of entire countries and peoples. There is no basis, nor can there be any basis, for considering that atomic weapons will prove to be such a factor. Taking into account the fact that the U.S. no longer has a superiority in atomic weapons, in which its position of strength policy is based, the illusory nature of the atom politicians' attempt to set the development of mankind into reverse becomes even more obvious.

An East German commentary of March 2 echoed this assertion and *Pravda* again on March 5 in an article by the theoretician Konstantinov asserted:

> Stalin said that the laws of artillery cannot be stronger than the laws of history. Imperialists may attempt to blackmail the peace-loving people with atomic bombs, but they cannot change the progress of history. The people have been and are the main force of history. They precisely have decided and will decide the fate of progress, the fate of civilization.

Finally *Kommunist* No. 4 for April in an editorial entitled "Peoples Decide the Fate of the World and Civilization" reviewed the issue from a doctrinal and practical policy standpoint. (2) Exaggerated bulk of the "destruction of civilization" represents an imperialist effort to encourage passivity. Concern with this aspect of the problem was apparently first voiced in the French Communist press. The organ of the French peace movement *Le Combat Pour La Paix* issued apparently around February 15 commented that "it does not seem that we should compliment ourselves excessively" over the current information campaign stressing the effects of atomic weapons "since it would seem to pursue two quite contradictory but equally dangerous objectives" namely encouraging the belief that the bomb is so terrible that no one will use it and at the same time spreading the idea that in the event of conflict the use of such weapons would not only be inevitable but "absolutely indispensable." The article concluded that the peace movement should "alert public opinion" on the subject of open preparation to use atomic weapons but "not by vague and sentimental appeals or apocalyptic descriptions of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but by exposing clearly, gravely and objectively the positions taken and decisions adopted." This advice was first given official Communist party support in a letter from Maurice Thorez to the director of the Newspaper *Nouvelles de Bordeaux et du Sud-Ouest* of March 12 in which he warned that:

> The atomic danger is so very real menace which amply justifies the protest and the atTEMPT of the people against so frightful an eventuality. Exaggerations [however] are only grist for the mill of the American imperialists who would like to prepare an atomic war with impunity by spreading false ideas among the masses like these. 'Nothing can be done!' 'What's the use of fighting!' 'It is the end of the world!' or like the other: 'The atomic peril is so great that they would not dare to drop their bombs; they would not

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Cy]

want to commit suicide.' It does not matter to the warmongers that these arguments are contradictory. What is important to them is to discourage, disarm, demobilize the masses, to turn them aside from action necessary for peace.

Thorez appeared, however, to have almost quoted verbatim sections of *Kommunist* which interestingly enough was released by the Soviet censor on March 12 -- the day of the Thorez article. The April issue referred to above charged, on the one hand, that the thesis of the destruction of world civilization was used by "apologists of imperialism" to frighten "weaknerved and unstable" elements, to sow seeds of fatalism, and to undermine a "creative and optimistic attitude toward the future and to shake faith in the certainty of the victory of the new over the old." It described as equally harmful the view that the warmongers might not dare to use the atomic bomb, fearing mutual destruction.

These lines of argumentation were shortly reflected in the Soviet bloc press. The Soviet home service on March 14 charged that the Western "atom mongers" would have "liked to frighten the peoples...to compel the peoples to believe in the inevitability of an atomic war...so as to demoralize them and inflict their will upon them." Voroshilov on March 26 referred to the civilization thesis as an imperialist "fable" and warned that the U.S.S.R. could not be "inimidated" and would "reply to any provocation in an appropriate fashion." A *Rude Pravo* editorial of March 28 argued that talk of civilization being destroyed was intended to create a "spirit of passive acceptance of the inevitability of war." Radio commentaries from Novosibirsk and the U.S.S.R. and Sofia of March 30 and 31 respectively asserted that "we will not be frightened" by such talk since we know that another war will spell the destruction of capitalism not of civilization. The East German Communist Grotewohl on March 21 phrased the issue in purely tactical terms, saying that: "for us fighters against remilitarization it is better and more correct to draw from this fact / atomic destruction/ the conclusion that a third world war will destroy not us but the imperialist forces."

## E. *The Need for a Policy*

The need for clearer directions on how to handle the issue of the destructiveness of atomic weapons was very obvious in the winter of 1954-55. The inauguration of renewed agitation on the issue of banning atomic weapons was inevitably accompanied by stress on their destructiveness; but there was obviously no directive on how far to go with this line of comment. Even individual officials differed, at least in what they felt they should say to foreigners. For example, one Soviet General told his French counterpart in Berlin at the end of December that he did not agree that there would not be any victors in another war; but in London in early January the Soviet naval attache told his U.S. counterpart that another war would probably mean the end for everybody. In early January we find the Polish newspaper *Tribuna Ludu* begging the issue by saying that another war "offers such prospects as the destruction of the entire globe or the disappearance of capitalism from it;" while Ehrenburg writing in *Pravda* urged "concern for the future of mankind, for its civilization" since in an atomic war "you will be found everywhere by the lethal atoms."

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An article on atomic and conventional weapons by Major General Talensky in *International Life* (No. 1), issued for the press on January 17 likewise contains a compromise formulation warning on the need to vigilance against "any adventure threatening mankind with incalculable disaster." The author went on to warn, however, that a third world war would mean the "beginning of the collapse of the capitalist system" and that if the NATO forces unleash atomic war, Western Europe will suffer most and "naturally also the U.S.A."

In the case of France, the Molotov formula required a particularly sharp reorientation of party line. The editorial in the February issue of the party journal *Cahiers du Communisme* had commented, for instance, that "there are no lack of warnings which prove scientifically that the annihilation of all life on earth has become technically possible" and it went on to cite an admonition by Joliot-Curie in January that recent NATO decisions constituted preparation for an atomic war" containing and I weigh my words, the possible annihilation of the human race." Whatever truth there might have been of rumors of a split between Curie and Thorez over the need to conform with Molotov's formula, Curie fell in-to line in early April. His "recantation" -- delivered with no reference to his previously expressed views -- constituted an interesting reformulation of the *Kommunist* line. He charged that the U.S. was seeking to legitimize atomic weapons by turning all attention to the horrors of thermonuclear warfare and warned that "should tactical atomic weapons be employed, all types of thermonuclear weapons would be quickly brought into use." He warned against both attitudes of "resigned fatalism" over the possibility of avoiding atomic war, and against the danger of assuming that the possession of thermonuclear weapons constituted a deterrent to war. He concluded by amplifying Molotov's warning on the destruction of capi-talism in another war along the lines of classic Soviet military doctrine stres-sing the many factors comprising military strength.

> ...those who wish to provoke atomic warfare as a crusade to destroy a regime different from their own will find that they have made a serious mistake. Their own unstable and less po-pularly supported regimes, would collapse under the material and moral stress resulting from the destruction caused by atomic weapons.

Moscow in effect criticized the concept of world destruction on exactly the same grounds that it used to criticize the problem of the probability of war: namely that belief in the inevitability of war would generate feelings of fatalism and make people feel that *nothing could be done*, and on the other hand attitudes of complacency that *nothing need be done*. Passivity rather than the activism required of a Communist movement was, in fact, clearly one factor of concern on this question.

Moscow's attack on alleged U.S. efforts to "halt the course of history" through the use of atomic weapons, its allegation that "people" not weapons make history reflected from one standpoint this same apparent worry that fear of atomic weapons would, in fact, serve to inhibit Communist revolutionary activities. Specifically, the U.S.S.R. appeared intent on denying that the U.S. could by its use of the threat of intervention with atomic weapons against Communist revolu-tion in fact deter further Communist expansion. The effort made to deny that

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atomic weapons will block the "course of history" and reference to "exaggeration of the strength of the warmongers and underestimation of the peace forces" suggest further that the facts of atomic destruction may have caused some doubts in Communist circles concerning the future of Communist revolution.

## IV. SUGGESTIONS OF POLICY DIFFERENCE

The possibility has been suggested that certain rather peculiar aspects of Moscow's discussion of the problems of war and atomic weapons since 1953 were related to indecision over this whole problem. Two issues seem to warrant analysis: (1) the relationship between the Gus "heresy" on the "paralyzation" of the laws of the inevitability of war and revolution and the recent assertion that weapons cannot "abolish" the laws of social development; and (2) discussion in the summer and autumn of 1954 of changes in Western thinking induced by Soviet possession of the hydrogen bomb.

### A. The Gus Deviation

M. Gus in the November 1953 issue of *Zvesda* initiated a theoretical discussion which has been linked to a controversy over the inevitability of war. With one exception, his article was completely orthodox. He noted:

> ...the unequal development of capitalist countries - that is what breeds war...It has already become an axiom for humanity that wars of annihilation for the repartition of the world are inseparable from the imperialist system. That is the objective law of history discovered by Marxism-Leninism. The operation of this law will only come to an end once and for all with the cessation of the existence of the imperialist system. But from this it does not follow that the human race is deprived of the possibility of limiting or preventing the operation of the law of the inevitability of war....On the contrary, Marxism-Leninism gives us the opportunity and teaches how to weaken and limit the destructive, ruinous action of the law of the inevitability of imperialist wars. Practice has already shown and proved that we are able to prevent war and to *paralyze* the operation of this law.

Gus, in effect, paraphrased Stalin's discussion of the inevitability of war in 1952, in which the peace movement is pictured able to prevent a particular war but unable to overcome the inevitability of war itself. An article by Yudin in the Cominform Journal following the party congress had generalized Stalin's thesis in words very similar to those of Gus:

> ...society...is not at all powerless against economic laws. On the contrary, by getting to know economic laws...society can restrict their sphere of action, can successfully utilize them in the interest of society.

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Both Yudin and Gus wrestled with the doctrinal problem discussed above of how to encourage popular "struggle" against "inevitability," but Yudin was careful not to cast doubt on the inexorable operation of the "laws" of society by using such an extreme word as "paralyzed" to describe the effect of popular action in the "cause of peace."

It should be noted that Gus referred very explicitly to the single issue of the inevitability of war. In the January 1954 issue of *Kommunist*, however, V.Khruzhkov, agitprop head, used the Gus article as a peg to discuss "the struggle between genuine Marxists and various kinds of revisionists...concealed and open enemies of Marxism [which] is of an international nature." Khruzhkov claimed that these enemies of Marxism sought to destroy it "under the guise of defense of its principles." He continued to say:

> The subjectivist, voluntarist views on the nature of economic laws, which have been propagated by a number of Soviet economists and philosophers seriously hindered scientific work in the field of political economy of socialism, hampered the theoretical generalization of practice of socialist construction. Thus, for example, there are 'theoreticians who presume that it is possible to "paralyze" the law discovered by Lenin of the irregularity of the political and economic development of capitalism during the epoch of imperialism with all the consequences resulting from this law. This in essence revives the subjectivist view which acknowledges the possibility of the "abolition" destruction of objective laws of the development of society. There is no need to prove that a view such as this has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist science...

Several points of this attack are of interest. In the first place, it appeared to foreshadow the Shepilov article of January 1955 in its attacks on economists and philosophers ("teachers" in Shepilov's article). The charge of attempting to destory Marxism under a guise of defense of its principles fits Shepilov's charge that economists drew false conclusions using as justification the basic economic laws of capitalism and socialism. Similarly the charge that their views hampered the construction of socialism fits directly into the Shepilov context.

Gus' "heresy" seems out of place in an attack of this type. As noted earlier, however, economists or politicians favoring a slower rate of capital expansion and defense build-up must argue that there is little danger of war. Hence, Gus not only committed a heresy by suggesting that the inevitability of war could be paralyzed but perhaps bolstered by his thesis arguments on the part of some people in low or high places for a more moderate economic program. In view of the great similarity of the Gus presentation to previous discussions of the same problem, it is quite possible that Gus was only an unwitting victim of this dispute; but the value of his argument to the "opposition" made his rebuff essential.

**Zvesda** in February 1954 took its cue from Khruzhkov and "corrected" Gus for his earlier error. Placing the problem in the original context of the impact of the peace movement on the inevitability of war, the author attacked the idea derived from the scope of the peace movement that:

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Lenin's thesis that imperialism inevitably engenders wars must be considered obsolete because the movement for the defense of peace seems able to remove the inevitability of wars between capitalist countries in general.

He pointed out that the laws of society do not cease to operate until the material conditions of society change and noted that Gus:

> ...deals with the problem of the law of the inevitability of wars and proletarina revolutions, that is of the law of the unevenness of economic and political development of capitalism in his own way, arbitrarily. According to Gus it appears that if a law cannot be destroyed, it can be "paralyzed"...Such a position has nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist theory.

Here, Gus is linked very definitely with those theoreticians criticized by Stalin for exaggerating the strength of the peace movement -- a criticism which follows from his article. While both his argument and the world civilization thesis of Malenkov might have provided arguments for those elements of Soviet society favoring a more liberal internal policy, there appears to be no overtly closer relationship.

It is, of course, conceivable that discussion was in progress in high party circles concerning the impact on Soviet doctrine of the total devastation of atomic attack and that Malenkov propounded the thesis on the impossibility of another war, with all the implications of such a view on internal and foreign policy. He would, in fact, be propounding the view that a weapon could "paralyze" the law of social development of which war and revolution are an important by-product. In this sense, does it seem possible to construe an attack on Gus as an oblique attack on Malenkov?

## B. Contradictory Analyses of U.S. Policy

1. **The Problem.** There appeared to be a curious difference in emphasis between discussion in the winter of 1954-55 of a possible "new" more moderate line in U.S. foreign policy and talk of U.S. aggressive aims in connection with Germany and alleged preparations to use atomic weapons. The warnings against assuming that Western ruling circles would refrain from using atomic weapons out of fear of the consequences to themselves appears to represent the latest twist in this wavering line of interpretation and from one standpoint would seem to repudiate earlier suggestions that U.S. policy might be in a less dangerous phase.

Several questions arise in this connection: (1) to what extent did talk of a more moderate trend in U.S. policy reflect an actual estimate or was this another case of Moscow looking for or claiming success for its own "policy of strength"; (2) was Moscow merely being forced to react to stress on the importance of co-existence phrased by Western leaders; or did some elements in Soviet society, including perhaps Malenkov, take Western statements more seriously, and, in any

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in the Italian party organ *L'Unita* on December 17. The U.S. leaders were said to have concluded that another war "would of necessity be an atomic war" and would involve a major risk to the whole capitalist system. They had accordingly adopted a policy of avoiding any risks of war until they had retaken a net atomic superiority, but of maintaining the profits of war by rearming West Germany. An article by the former Comintern official Kuusinen in *International Life* (released for publication on December 11) echoed Courtade and charged that the U.S. had decided to avoid a test of strength for the time being and hence was avoiding the "adventurist course" proposed by Knowland et al of taking a "calculated risk" of war. Kuusinen concluded as had Kommunist in September that, if the supposition is correct that the U.S. is counting on a "certain not quite defined period of preparation for a new war...that does not mean that the expansion of imperialism is halted for this period (i.e., presumably the U.S. will continue to expand by economic and other non-military means). The Polish newspaper *Trybuna Ludu* in January attributed the "bankruptcy" of the U.S. policy of strength to the existence of Soviet atomic weapons and claimed that the "new line" in U.S. policy represented the begrudging fact that the Soviet bloc cannot be destroyed in an atomic war without the U.S. also being endangered.

Radio Moscow in Serbo-Croat on January 25 makes the last reference noted to the "new line" in U.S. policy, claiming that it was "but fine phrases" intended to deceive popular opinion and that the U.S. has "not renounced its reckless policy."

### 3. The Threat of Surprise Attack.
In examining what might have prompted the disappearance of this apparently emerging propaganda line, the timing and circumstances point strongly to the NATO discussions on the use of atomic weapons as an important factor. The Chinese Communist attack on Yikiang and strong U.S. reaction probably only heightened Soviet concern with the implications of the NATO decision. The tendency to play up again the danger of attack, rather than to lull vigilance with talk of U.S. abandonment of an "adventurous" policy, predated this new war scare in the Far East.

The U.S.S.R. had shown itself peculiarly sensitive throughout 1954 to the danger of atomic attack specifically of the "Pearl Harbor" variety. As noted earlier, it reacted to Western warnings of massive retaliation with threats of its own that it would destroy capitalism in another war. Marshal Vasilevsky and Admiral Kuznetsov warned in May and July respectively against the danger of being caught "unawares" by anything "unexpected" and Bulganin asserted specifically in a speech of July 21, 1954 that the U.S.S.R. was forced to possess atomic and hydrogen weapons "so as not to be left without weapons in case of a surprise."

In December, when the Soviet press was talking of a less adventurous policy in the U.S. Marshal Vasilevsky demonstrated in a *Pravda* letter of December 4 to Marshal Montgomery an acute awareness of Western plans to use atomic weapons in the event of war with the U.S.S.R. and he bitterly attacked this "reckless" effort to make such war appear "inevitable and even necessary" -- warning, in turn of its danger for "countries with a small territory and a large population." A broadcast to the U.K. urged support for the prohibition and control of atomic weapons as the only solution for a country "whose very existence is menaced" by bombs placed in the lands of U.S. generals. *Pravda* on December 16 made this

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more vivid by attacking a statement by U.S. General Stevenson and warning that the "candidates for a madhouse are preparing to unleash an atomic war" and "tomorrow...may try to engineer a provocation." The Pravda editorial of December 18 warned that the Soviet people were "watching closely...the international situation," would not be "caught unawares" and would offer "crushing resistance" to any aggressor. An article by "Observer" in Pravda on December 19 discussed "new elements in the international situation." In the light of earlier talk of a less reckless U.S. policy, it was interesting to note the charges that "aggressive circles...are again making every effort to intensify international tension," that they "are preparing a position for aggressive action against the camp of democracy and Socialism. They are no longer concealing their designs." Pravda quoted a U.S. commentary to the effect that:

> ...there were people in the U.S. Government who considered that the U.S. should use its power in order to paralyze the development of Communist countries," that there are open demands for a recourse to arms and that a "large and influential group has been formed in the Government, military command, and the U.S. Congress which considers that, even by taking great risks, the Chinese Communist regime should be prevented from consolidating its power.

The NATO discussions were attacked as a device to make the use of atomic weapons appear inevitable, which served to obscure the "main question: can [their] use be allowed at all." and which gave "their blessing to a U.S. general to unleash atomic war in Europe whenever he deemed it convenient."

This line of comment, so out of keeping with a talk of a less reckless U.S. policy, continued in January. Lieutenant General Gritchin writing in Pravda on January 7 on "what the American atom-maniacs should not forget" charged that U.S. military and political strategists were again "trying to persuade their countrymen that the U.S. Air Force is allegedly capable of dealing a lightning blow at targets in the U.S.S.R. and the Peoples Democracies without fear of retaliation" -- an attempt, prompted, it was said by the fact that Western public opinion had been "intimidated" by its own talk of nuclear war. The article went on to warn that hopes for "some exceptional role for strategic aviation and the theory of the Blitzkrieg are entirely unfounded," and any "Blitzkrieg would end in a fiasco." Pravda the following day charged that the NATO decisions "show vividly...that the atom mongers not only have not given up their senseless intention to unleash an atom venture, but have already started working out concrete plans for its implementation" -- a charge reiterated in Izvestiya on January 13. On January 17, the Soviet censor passed for the press an edition of International Life containing an article attacking the distinction drawn by NATO between tactical and strategic atomic weapons by Major General Talensky which included the following extracts: "...by its very nature the atomic weapon strengthens the danger of the unleashing of an adventurous war...[with reference to NATO decisions]." "...the conditions are thus created making it more easily possible to unleash an atomic war in secret from the peoples....At any moment as a result of a criminal adventure on the part of a small circle of political and military leaders...mankind may be faced with the accomplished fact of the beginning of a destructive atomic war." New Times in March continued this public discussion of the danger

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of a surprise attack stating in an article by Major General Isayev: "Can the American imperialists expect better results from "preventive war" in other words, from sudden and treacherous attack? Atom bombs dropped a little after those launched by the aggressor will be no less destructive."

### C. Conclusion

It remains difficult, of course, to determine whether a change of estimate took place in December concerning U.S. intentions. Conceivably the only indecision involved concerned the best way to handle the prospect of German rearmament. Some circles also felt that care should be taken not to arouse fears of imminent aggression in the Soviet bloc peoples and hence a tentative effort was made to put off the danger period into an indefinite future. Soviet agitation on the subject of atomic weapons, surprise attack and its inauguration of a world-wide signature campaign in January is likewise subject to differing interpretations. It has all the earmarks of real concern tied perhaps to the Formosa straits situation; at the same time, it could be nothing more than traditional exploitation of popular attitudes in the West.

The possibility of Soviet indecision over the trends in U.S. foreign policy can certainly not be discounted in view of the plethora of comment on the subject in the U.S. press. Moscow has obviously noted this comment and has concluded in its rare detailed discussions of the internal political scene in the U.S. that a real struggle for power is in progress between rival financial interests. It reproduced as fact in its discussions of the "change" in U.S. foreign policy the line-up of "extremists" and "moderates" presented in the American press and it noted the importance of exploiting these differences of views. Molotov in his February 8 speech noted that there was an acceleration of opposing trends for and against war and that important differences on this issue existed not only between and within capitalist countries but "even within individual parties." The task of Soviet diplomacy, he said, was to "exploit these contradictions...in the interests of weakening the aggressive anti-democratic forces." The Soviet press has continued to report on differences in approach toward the Formosa question reflected in U.S. public statements. At the same time, there has been a suggestion that in Soviet approaches to the J.S. attempts should be made to exploit any differences which might exist in high places. In this connection, Bulganin's questioning of Ambassador Bohlen in April as to which "groups are in the ascendancy" in the U.S. may have been a real reflection of a policy estimate. In this event, Soviet talk that U.S. circles are pressing for a show-down with Communist China may reflect concern as well as propaganda exploitation.

1. **Kommunist Suggests Possible Policy Differences.** There was, at the same time, in Moscow's handling of this issue a suggestion of possible high level differences of opinion over the meaning of atomic weapons for Soviet policy. **Kommunist** claimed, in this connection that "some people" seemed inclined to believe in the "absolute force of modern weapons," to exaggerate the strength of the West, and to underestimate the "forces fighting for peace." With perhaps more obvious reference to Malenkov, **Kommunist** claimed that "these people were unable to figure out in time the real sense and objectives of the fable about

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the destruction of world civilization... and began uncritically to repeat this fable in their oral and printed speeches."

If it is assumed that there is any basis for these charges, then *either*
Malenkov failed, as is alleged, to see the ramifications of using what is clearly
identified as a Western concept, and/or he was, in fact, one of those who came
to believe in the "absolute force of modern weapons" and who perhaps interpreted
"Western comments as a reflection on the part of Western leaders of the same con-
cern over the dangers of atomic warfare which he felt himself. If Moscow in fact
believes what it claimed, namely that Eisenhower favored a policy of coexistence
out of fear of atomic warfare, then a "misinterpretation" of Western talk of
the "destruction of civilization" would be quite understandable. In this case,
Malenkov would have been guilty of the complacency displayed by those who were
accused of believing that the horrors of atomic warfare had reduced the possib-
ility of war itself.

MAN'S FUTURE.

Sir,

Limiting nuclear weapons to 'tactical' use is, surely, a worthwhile step towards Lord Russell's ideal, provided it does not make total war more likely. While we were 'tactically' naked, the unlimited 'strategic' deterrent was necessary, and while the Russians could not retaliate against U.S. cities, it was effective. When the impending 'strategic' stalemate arrives, however, 'strategic' deterrence will no longer be effective for anything short of total aggression, and 'tactical' deterrence becomes essential. Limited use of nuclear weapons could now provide this, and make both limited and total wars less likely. Moreover, with a 'tactical' as well as a 'strategic' stalemate thus provided, disarmament and other issues would be easier to agree. Your proposal is therefore trebly worthwhile, in principle.

I suggest these steps, appropriately timed, in practice:-
1. Announce our future pursuance of the moral principle of limiting all wars - in weapons, targets, area and time - to the minimum necessary to deter and repel the aggression, and to return to negotiation - without seeking unconditional surrender.
2. Establish distinctions between H. and A. weapons.
3. Re-nounce all use of H. and bacteriological weapons, unless the aggressor uses them.
4. Establish definitions of town and cities, and their geographical limits.
5. Renounce use of A. and chemical weapons against town and cities, unless the aggressor so uses them, deliberately (regardless of targets in them), except those in the front-line of land fighting - not proved "open".

None of this need wait on Communist agreement, but in war they would virtually have to conform - purely in their own interests. In time, the minds, weapons and plans of both sides would become attuned to limited use of armaments, thus helping, if not paving the way for their limited possession (which requires not only agreement but control). Meanwhile, step 1, alone, would arrest the present loss of confidence and initiate its accumulation. With step 3, man's future prospects would be much improved.

The obvious risk of limitations breaking down in war is, surely, preferable to certain total destruction from the start of any aggression beyond our conventional weapons. It is also worth chancing to make all wars less likley, and to help disarmament, which alone can ultimately abolish them. Meanwhile, this risk would discourage any tendency to use 'tactical' atomic weapons where conventional arms suffice, or to perpetuate the possibility of using them longer than necessary.

Yours etc.

17. 7. 55.