DEC 09 2003

RICHARD NIXON LIBRARY & BIRTHPLACE FOUNDATION

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

DONALD L. BENDETTI,
Chairman

CAROLINE L. AHMANSON

LEONORE ANNENBERG

JOHN H. BARR,
Treasurer

TRICIA NIXON COX

FREDERICK B. DENT

JULIE NIXON EISENHOWER

ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH

GAVIN S. HERBERT

KENNETH L. KHACHIGIAN

HENRY A. KISSINGER

KATHERINE B. LOKER

CYNTHIA H. MILLIGAN

MARY MUTH

EDWARD NIXON

MAUREEN DROWN NUNN

HUBERT C. PERRY

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

DIMITRI K. SIMES,
President, The Nixon Center

J. PETER SIMON

PETE WILSON

JOHN H. TAYLOR,
Executive Director

LOIE G. GAUNT,
Assistant Secretary-Treasurer

December 8, 2003

via FedEx w/enclosure

FOR: HAK

FROM: JHT

RE: Last tapes report

Attached is the final installment of Robert Nedelkoff's report. Owing to time constraints, some conversations in series 806-810 are summarized - although Robert listened to every conservation in its entirety.

This batch of tapes will be opened to scholars and journalists this Wednesday, December 10.

With respectful regards as always.

18001 Yorba Linda Boulevard ★ Yorba Linda ★ California USA 92886-3949
Telephone (714) 993-5075 ★ FAX (714) 528-0544 ★ www.nixonlibrary.org ★ www.nixoncenter.org

# REPORT ON RECORDED SEGMENTS

Robert W. Nedelkoff

December 4, 2003

## INTRODUCTION

The following report concerns segments from recorded White House conversations, beginning on October 16, 1972, and ending on October 31, 1972, in series numbered 799 through 810, in which Dr. Henry Kissinger was either a participant in the conversation, or a subject of discussion in the conversation. The segments are classified as follows:

### Series of tape

#### (Conversation number) (Date of conversation)

Time of conversation

Identity of speakers

Code number of tape at which segment begins (where a segment falls within recommended deletion)

Text of segment.

Where the notation (?) appears, this means that a word or several words, as heard on the tape, were not intelligible even after several listenings.

Where a word is, or several words are, in parentheses and followed by a question mark, this means that it is the opinion of the reviewer that the word or words in question, given the context of the intelligible words immediately before and after the item in parentheses, most likely is the word, or are the words, in the conversation, but that the reviewer is not completely positive about the matter.

Abbreviations are as follows:

WH: White House

DOD: Department of Defense

NSC: National Security Council

POL DEL: Recommended deletion of political material

PRIV DEL or PRIV: Recommended deletion of material for reasons of privacy.

PERS RET: Recommended deletion as a "personal returnable" segment

NONHIST: Material of a non-historical nature.

HIST: Material of historical significance beyond the ordinary.

PR PROB: Material which may be discussed in press coverage of the released segments.

(Some segments may fall within one or more of these categories, in the reviewer's judgement, and are so indicated in the report.)

Intl: international

w/: with

cd: could

wd: would

shd: should

dept: department

Pres: President, Presidential

It should be noted that the sequence in which the tapes are numbered, and in which they
were listened to, usually, but does not always, correspond to the order in which they were
recorded.

Where speakers in a conversation are identified as "RN, to HK," for example, this denotes
that a telephone conversation is taking place rather than a face-to-face meeting, which is
identified as "RN, HK," for example.

Segments for conversations in which the President simply requests to see Dr. Kissinger, or where the White House operator simply states Dr. Kissinger's whereabouts with no further comment, have, with a few exceptions, been omitted.

799 SERIES

799-7 10/16/72

Between 9:29 and 9:32 am

RN, SB. RN: I can see Henry now, OK.

799-9 10/16/72

9:33 am - 10:12 am

RN, HK.

HK: I was working till midnight last night.

WHO calls RN; see Conv 31-49.

Sound of either RN or HK writing.

HK: I was working last night to get a military (?) S Vietnamese. That goddamn Laird - he had enough to get out- RN: Screw that. HK: That too, but he has found out 473 aircraft (?) them in the next 10 days- RN: He never did it before? HK: And he never could find any- RN: (?), just (?). (3 sec Nat Sec del, re intelligence)

HK: - went over some of the terms with him. RN: Does he (understand?). HK: Yeah. We've used him before. And he says that's as close to capitulation as the other side can (handle?). I just had breakfast with Alex Johnson. He (?) was outstanding. He sd, "of course if you had to pay a terrific price in the coalition govt"- RN: (?). HK: I sd, "what if we cd keep Thieu in?" He sd "don't be ridiculous; it can't happen." Well, I sd, "let's assume we cd get an agreement that the GVN remains in control of this area. We can (?) of what less we can get that we can live with." RN: (?) knows you've got - of course you can't discuss - there's nobody who can really give any judgment on the political side, except our own, because we can't tell anybody. HK: That's right. On the political side, I'm just 100% confident. RN: (?). One (?) the coalition. That or (?) the appearance. HK: I can kill that. The one thing that may happen, Mr Pres, the thing I wd have to say is probable, is that I have to take the whole circuit again next wk. That is to say, I'd come back from Saigon Saturday- RN: And not go to- HK: Not go to Hanoi, then go over to Europe again Tuesday, see Xuan Thuy Wednesday, go to Saigon Thurs- RN: In other words, you'd come from Saigon, not to Paris, but here. HK: I'd come here, go over to Paris again, then be in Hanoi the following (?). RN: That's (?). HK: And then you'd announce it on Tuesday, (?) the 31st. RN: The date is irrelevant. If later it's a little better because it's less risk (?). Politically it doesn't make any difference. HK: Well I wd- RN: The more I think of it, the more I don't think we ought to rush him or push him. I also want you to know that you have total flexibility with regard to the meeting with Thieu. I'll do it, (?) will do it, even now, anytime, if that's the price. The main thing is to make the deal. If we can make the deal, then we can do (?) the personal side of (?).

HK: Thieu may (?), assuming I can sell it to him, it's a big (dose?) for him to talk to me, then two days later I go to Hanoi. RN: Right. HK: If he knows it's coming, if he can (posture?) himself for a week, I come back, consult with him, go off - it will start leaking then, but Mr Pres, I don't think it makes a difference. RN: It's - nobody believes (?) if our chances are worth a damn, let it leak. We leak both ways. It'll get those people so goddamn confused, the press will go up the wall. HK: That's what I think. Nobody will believe it until we've done it. RN: No, nobody's going to believe it until we say it. Your theory is right there. That's why (?) not getting quite excited about the leaks or anything else. Nobody ever believes it till we say it. HK: That's right. And for the American public, when you go on TV, that's the end of the war. They can have it in the NY Times, the text of the agreement in the NY Times, it won't mean anything until you go on TV.

RN: On the Thieu thing, (?) do it. The meeting cd take place almost anytime. What I mean is- HK: (?) during the campaign? RN: I mean (?). HK: If I have (?) of telling him that if he'd like to talk personally with you in Hawaii- RN: But the deal's got to be made. (?) if he wants to go (seal it?) with you - I'd do it at Midway, there's a significance there. We meet at Midway, halfway, and that's a great (?). HK: It has much to recommend it. RN: But the point is, that's what it is. But the deal must be made, and that each of us wd fly back, and I'd then announce it from the West Coast. I'd maybe announce it there, and he'd fly back and make his there. That cd be possibly the way to do it. HK: It cd be a very good way of doing it. Of course first I'd have to settle (?). We have a lot of- RN: And that may blow today.

HK: I don't think so. But the (?) came in, that issue of the prisoners- RN: Well, if you think Thieu can take it, let the bastards out of jail, let 'em go tomorrow. HK: He can't take it, I don't think. But we'll have to see (Thuy?). RN: (?) military. HK: If he were smart he'd claim a terrific victory and clinch the deal. That's how he'd do it if he were very smart. RN: He'd claim a victory- HK: Clinch the deal. RN: "We have saved S Vietnam, and now I'm glad to talk. I'm glad to talk about reconciliation and peace with the enemy." HK: That wd be the smart thing to do. RN: You've got to (?) victory. Both sides have to claim victory. They'll claim victory too. But I've thought about this, and don't mention this to Haldeman or anyone, because I don't want anybody to worry - this is more important than any campaign we cd possibly do. What I mean is - because basically, the election isn't going to be affected by (?), if I've got the excuse to get the hell out of there, I wd go to Midway. HK: But actually if you go to Midway you shd go alone. You shdn't take a lot of Cabinet with you like last time. RN: No, I don't think we'd take Rogers this time. HK: My recommendation wd do it with just you and- RN: Well, Thieu can say he only wants to come alone, and we'd just meet alone. It'd be tough for Rogers, he'd have to (?). HK: That's a possibility. We cd do that next wk, there are a lot of possibilities.

RN: The way it wd be, you go see Thieu after yr meeting tomorrow and say, "all right, the Pres will meet you." But remember, under no circumstances, unless it's absolutely signed and sealed in blood. I will not meet him unless he's going to agree. Understand? I can't go there to (sell?) him, Henry. HK: That's out of the question. RN: Now look, he ought to take this deal. The best analysis of this I've heard in two sentences, like I sd: we can help him win his war, but we cannot win our war. There it is. HK: We can't even conclude it if we help him win his war, but we can certainly improve his situation. RN: We can help him win his war, but we cannot - you've just (got to put it like that?) - we have no certainty whatever of winning our war, unless they (are ready?) to cave in. But you never know, goddammit, you know the way the Germans and Japanese - hell, the Japanese wd still be fighting if we hadn't dropped the bomb on them. **PR PROB!** And the Germans - I dunno, they're more civilized people, I guess, but they damn well (?). HK: Of course,

in Malaysia, they offered a ceasefire, it was rejected, and a year later they caved. So it's not inconceivable that at this time next yr, maybe it-

RN: Is there no way, incidentally, that [Sir Robert] Thompson, who's totally, totally trustworthy - that you cd have him drop in in Paris and look this over? HK: That's a good idea. RN: I just think he'd be very good on it. He's (?). Well, (?) have in mind. The main thing is that, win or lose, it's a great effort, like in a great football game, a chess match, or a political campaign. You give it all you've got. But in any event, we're going to make it, one way or another. HK: No question. RN: If we don't make it this time, we'll just go the other road, stonewall it, get thru the election, bomb the bastards, get (?). HK: If we don't make it this time they'll settle right after the election. Then we'll ram it down their throat, ram it down Thieu's throat. After the election we don't give a damn. RN: And the N Viets will ram it down their throat too. HK: And if this goddamn stupid (?) of Thieu's, force us into ramming it down his throat. Now I wd think if he's, highly improbably, (?) go on to Hanoi, I wd push on. RN: Yeah. I wd think there's something to be sd for (the game plan?) with Thieu. You can see that (?) a great idea, (?) understand (?) but I think it appears to be a little too philosophical. No, I think there's something to be sd for talking to him so he makes the deal, and then comes back, and you come back and talk to me. And I think too, the morality, basically, of my standing up with him - it occurred to me last night- HK: He may not want to leave - for him to leave Vietnam for two days. RN: That's why Midway isn't much of a problem. HK: That's eight hours, still. RN: Fine. But if he's afraid there'd be a coup- HK: And he may not want to have it look as if it were- but I'll present it to him. So we have two alternates. RN: You can say we'll do it there, or "after the election, the Pres wd like to receive you at his home in San Clemente."

HK: So in any event, I cd come back, say Sat, from Saigon, report to you, then either you go and see him in Midway- RN: You and I. HK: You and I, or if he doesn't want that, we'll go on the other route, I'll go on the same track again, Paris, Saigon- RN: You'd go to Midway, then you'd push on from there to Hanoi. HK: Well, I'd have to go (?), I'd like to leave from Saigon (?). It may be too strong medicine for- RN: Well, you'd go with him, go back to Saigon, and then, you know, you don't have to fly the same plane, he goes back, you go back- HK: Your meeting with Thieu may be too (?). RN: I know what you're talking about, I'm just trying to figure- HK: But I'll offer it to Thieu, if this is something- RN: You just tell the N Viets, "now there's one thing the Russians and the Chinese have learned about this man, he's tough, but he keeps his word." And also you can tell them he's concerned about them, the (?), the widows, orphans, destruction of (?), and there's no man who's more generous where the peace thing is, but you must not test him, and that's the way it's got to be."

HK: The advantage of going to Hanoi at some point, either this or next weekend - next week, all (?) together, I wd like to (?) the game plan too. Because it gives everybody a little more chance to get set. On the other hand, if Thieu is enthusiastic, I think I ought to go now and not give him a chance to change his mind. But it's highly improbable. RN: On the other hand, Abrams is satisfied with the military side. HK: I called Abrams last night and sd, "I know you're loyal, I know you'll do what the Pres asks you." RN: Is he around now? HK: Well, he's here today but leaving tonight. I sd, "now you tell me, do you think we can afford this? You commanded a lot of"- RN: Do you think it wd be useful if I asked him to come over for a minute? HK: If you want to, sure. He'll want to bring Laird but that's fine. RN: He'd have to bring Moorer too, wdn't he? HK: I don't know. RN: The hell with it, (?). HK: I'll call him.

RN places call to Gen Abrams via WHO; see Conv 31-50.

RN: I just (?) he doesn't have to, (?) can bring Laird if he wants, I just want to (?). HK: He's leaving tonight. RN: But I think there's something to be sd for (?). HK: There's a lot to be sd for (?). I cd be on a plane by about 11. RN: If he gets off his ass and gets over here, I'm not going to spend any time on it. But you asked him that, what did he say? HK: He sd he thinks we ought to do it, he'll put (?). RN: He thinks we ought to do it. Now you're going to have Haig stay here to hold the fort. HK: Haig is better than I for this purpose anyway, because Haig is considered an extension of me. RN: And Abrams is considered to be Thieu's friend. HK: I think there may be (?). RN: Well, if you're gone, I guess I can get him in- HK: You can get him in and talk to him today. RN: Maybe that's why- HK: There's a lot to be sd for that too. RN: That's an idea. I might do that. With Laird, I don't know, (?) around- HK: No, Laird has been good on this. He's (?).

RN: Well, I can't be more relaxed or serene about the whole thing. My decision is made. If it doesn't go, fine. If it doesn't go, it's a great effort either way. HK: The game I'm playing w/the N Viets tomorrow is to tell them I'm definitely coming Sat (while?) they're going thru the documents or something, in order to use that as a (?). Then when I (?), I'll tell them there are three possibilities, one, that Saigon turns it down completely. Then Le Duc Tho has to come back to Paris and talk to me, I'll be (?). Second, Saigon accepts it w/a few reservations. Then we have to go on what you and I call (?). Or if Saigon accepts it completely, then I push on with our program. Then in addition to my going from Saigon, all things considered, the next possibility wd be (?) I don't mind going on the journey again, or yr meeting w/Thieu. The disadvantage of yr meeting Thieu is you (?) in the way. But I'll leave it up to Thieu, whatever he thinks (will help?).

RN: He's going to have the Pres standing there with him and also, (?) well, some people will say "we're propping up a corrupt SOB," it doesn't make any difference. You've got peace. HK: So either way we'll-

Gen Creighton Abrams calls HK; see Conv 31-51. [HK: The Pres just wanted to ask you the same question I asked you, and hear it himself. I look forward to seeing you in Saigon and the Pres will see you this afternoon.]

RN: (?) to delay the (?) and say "look, I expect you to sell him"- HRH enters.

HRH: I have to talk to both of you a second. We're in the soup with the League of Families in that they won't- RN: Henry didn't go? HRH: No, and they won't take the Vice Pres. RN: So I've got to go. HRH: Well, I'm not sure. But there's something else. We have another problem, which is that we moved the SALT announcement, which means that - they were banking on that as our news story today, which we don't have. So we don't have a news story, and we're giving the network news lead to this- RN: The families. HRH: And- RN: God, I can't go. HRH: (?) over (Rogers?) is for you to go over- RN: Yeah, I know, that's what you wanted me to do. I know it's come down to this, but for me to go there at this point is just - (?) override it? HRH: Well, Carlyle Hanson, their pres, last night gave a superb political all-out pitch for you on TV, they had a session last night, they talked about Cora Weiss and Dellinger bringing the prisoners back, and they were booed. And they got to the point where they sd, "we don't approve of this" and everybody cheered- RN: They can't take Henry now, before he takes off? HRH: Yeah, but that wd make news. RN: Are you kidding? HRH: In the sense that it will solve the problem w/the League of Families but it won't solve- HK: (?). HRH: That's right. HK: I'd be glad to drop over for 15 minutes and delay to the airport, and then tomorrow you can tell them (?) the airport. RN: I know. Bob, the problem is (?) use me to knock out a news story this morning, I think that's just plain- HRH: Well, if it isn't the right thing to do otherwise - now McGovern's turned them down, he isn't going to appear at all. RN: OK, I'll-

HRH: They're with us- RN: I don't see any problem, (?) still (?). They don't have (?) that can write that, not one. They'll all for amnesty, they're all for, Christ-

HK: I agree with Bob. I think if you gave an emotional 10 minutes on their inspiring us, that they- RN: I know. HRH: Maybe it's not the right thing to do, and if it isn't, we shdn't do it. But that's- RN: Well, Bob, you've gone to those poor women time and again, saying "I'm going to do my best," and not a goddamn thing has happened, except these three assholes that have come back-HRH: Except they're standing with you in spite of that, and because of what you are doing. RN: Anything I say will be interpreted as giving them hope that we're making progress, (?). That's what we can't do, you see that? I just think there's something to be sd, despite the- (?) HK: I'll be glad to go over for 15 minutes. RN: I just have the feeling- HRH: (?) probably shd, so that they can't say we- RN: I know the desire to have me go, because it'll be a bigger story. But don't underestimate the fact that HK will be on TV the night that he goes. HRH: (?) to make a public appearance today, too. HK: Can you set it up for 10:30? HRH: Sure. RN: The thing is, I think (?) the world and the country is waiting for me to say one (blip?), one way or another on this thing, and it's very hard for me to go over there without giving them a little hope. Henry can give them a little hope and it's all right. But my situation is - I don't know, it's just (?) a (loser?), (?) do it. HRH: Well, they know you're not coming and they know we've been working on other people, but they still think in the back of their minds that you're going to come and that's a problem, because you came last year.

RN: What time is their dinner tonight? HRH: It wdn't do any good to do the dinner tonight. If you were going to do it (?) this morning. RN: What about Henry's doing it (?). HRH: That's probably better. RN: He'd only talk for a minute but he'd get a hell of a play. HRH: Plus the other problem is, there cd be, if you go, an adverse- RN: My point is (?) the POW issue. There's the other thing, we haven't done it. I just have a feeling that seeing Henry with his strong voice on there, and also, then the next day he's in Paris. HK: But what wd I say? HRH: Just what you think you shd say. Like, "we appreciate the"- RN: Here's what I'd say if I were attending: "we have - I know there's nothing closer to the Pres's heart than (?)," then "the Pres refuses to exploit this issue for political issues." RN outlines a speech expressing appreciation "of you who have stood by peace with honor." HK: I cd do that in 3 minutes. RN: Right. HK decides making a few minutes' remarks at 10:30 is feasible. HK: But there's something to be sd for you doing it too. RN: The only problem is that whatever I say might be taken out of context. RN continues to outline a possible statement: "We will never make a settlement that will abandon our POWs; one of our conditions is a guarantee of their return."

HRH leaves.

HK: The only thing is, if you give any indication it's imminent- RN: But you never know, if you flip an eyelid - I'd just be extremely careful. HK: Last time it was (successful?). RN: But a year has passed, more (?) and demagoguery and hopes (?). It just shows you can go to the well once too often. HK: I'd be delighted to do it, Mr Pres. If they indicated displeasure with me, so what? RN: They won't do that. Now there might be somebody yelling "why don't you do something about this or that?" and that might get on TV, but I don't think (?). But the main thing is, after the election we're going to beat these bastards. RN reiterates his determination to deal with the "Establishment" after his re-election. RN: It's the bureaucracy, the universities in the East, in the media, all across, a weakness of character in the country - do you agree? HK: Not so much in the country as in the establishment. RN comments that apart from the Chicago Tribune and the NY Daily News "there have been slim pickings" in terms of media support of Admin. RN: May 8 was really the watershed,

the turning point.

799-10 10/16/72

10:13 am - 10:19 am

RN, HRH.

Discussion of HK appearing before Natl League of Families. HK enters. HK: The disadvantage of my doing is it might be interpreted as a political move. But I'll do it. RN: Who's checked to see what the situation is? Who's our contact with them? HRH: Scowcroft. HK: I think you'd get a hell of a reception from them. RN: Well, (?). HK leaves. RN, HRH disc RN's planned radio address on philosophy of govt.

799-11 10/16/72

10:22 am - 10:23 am

RN, HK.

HK: I had one other thought, just to have it in mind: supposing I (?) to Hanoi, cd I then offer Thieu to meet you in Midway next wk? RN: Anytime. HK: See, supposing we did it this way: I come back from Hanoi. You meet Thieu in Midway. Then we come back (?). RN: That's (?). Now don't clear that w/HRH or anybody; I don't want this discussed even with him. (?) and I'll cancel the whole schedule to do it. HK: That wd be an even more dramatic way; I go to Hanoi. RN: Then fly to Saigon. HK: I go from Saigon to Midway. Or I'll come here and- RN: No, you go to Midway and I'll meet you there. I'm afraid you'll have Rogers (on your hands?) but what's the difference? I'll talk to Thieu and he'll just meet w/the Foreign Minister.

799-12 10/16/72

10:24 am - 10:25 am

RN, HRH. HRH describes arrangements for RN's appearance at Natl League of Families. HRH: We say that Henry is coming, then you show up and we say you just decided to come instead of Henry.

799-13 10/16/72

Between 10:25 and 10:27 am

RN, SB. RN: Tell Henry to come back in.

799-14 10/16/72

10:27 am - 10:28 am

RN, HK. RN: Henry, I just wanted to check one line with you: can I say "we will not impose a Communist govt on the people of S Vietnam against their will?" HK: Certainly. RN: I'm going to say "since we last met, as you know, serious negotiations have been underway. I will not comment; I do not want to raise false hopes by any comment on our chances of success. But we have four conditions for settlement." RN lists conditions. RN: How's that? Fair enough? HK: Excellent.

799-19 10/16/72

11:42 am - 12:54 pm

RN, HRH.

RN feels his surprise appearance before Natl League went all right, but he feels it was high-

risk. RN: That's why I'm not doing any appearances. HRH: It went all right, but I agree. It was a close call. We shd have sent Henry. You cd have had somebody get up at any time and say something like "what about bombing?" or whatever and that's what TV wd have covered.

JDE enters, discusses draft of water bill. Disc of RN's radio speech, trips to Camp David and Philadelphia. RN asks about timing of announcement re SALT II. JDE comments that "Henry says it went to State and they screwed it up" so an announcement is not feasible before election.

Disc of Social Security bill.

Discussion of Donald Segretti and libel law; transcript in Kutler, pp. 163-165.

Discussion of RN's remarks before Natl League; HRH, JDE feel that RN's statement against amnesty went down particularly well.

(5 min 58 sec Pers Ret del)

Discussion of RZ's performance as Press Secy; RN contrasts his supportiveness of RZ with the way LBJ treated George Christian.

799-23 10/16/72

3:59 pm - 4:30 pm

RN, Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr., ML, AH.

Group poses for photo.

SB enters. RN: There's a call I just came in; hold it. Tell them I'll be back in a half-hour. SB leaves.

RN: I thought in addn to wishing you well on yr assignment, I'd perhaps discuss the situation, (?) when Henry goes on there, to Vietnam, we'll know probably by the end of the day tomorrow (?). (?) session will be 5 o'clock their time.

Gen Abrams thinks Thieu may want changes in language re Intl Control Commn. RN: You've had a chance to analyze this in the last (?), wd Thieu (?) in good conscience?

RN: What Henry's outlined - do you think, having been in the field, that this is something we shd do? Obviously, we're in a position to do a considerable amount of, let's say, convincing on Thieu, but we can't do that unless it's in his best interests, or not simply his, but what we've been fighting for out there. CWA: I think it's time to take this further step. (?) in (?) terms, it's been a long process. In the beginning they really didn't (?) military forces. They didn't have the traditions, the leadership, a lot of other things. They didn't have an effective govt for their own people. Well, time has gone on, and they've developed a substantial military force, with a lot of substance to it. I think this is another step in the process, and I also think the N Viets really haven't been (?) for a couple of yrs, that the N Viets, or Hanoi's project has suffered more than you've ever dared to claim. CA thinks Hanoi suffers from "a severe manpower problem." CA: Now if the Vietnamese perceive this as a (?), it has the opportunity that they needed. You know, it's not all bad. It's like trying to mix water and oil, it takes a lot of doing and a little trust, but you're still mixing water and oil. CA thinks that in the long haul, a long-term military personnel presence in S Vietnam is undesirable "because it's a different thing out there, it's not like Europe. In Europe they have a lot of traditions in common with us. The legal system there is (more compatible?)." CA guardedly optimistic about feasibility of maintaining S Viet military strength by resupplying S Vietnam with petroleum, oil, lubricants, ammunition.

RN: Another point we have to bear in mind is that apart from these military matters

that have to be worked out there's a q as to whether the North's agreement on the political future is one we can accept. It seems to me that - one condition I laid down is that there cannot be a coalition govt. RN feels the critical issue is the strength of the S Viet military: "if they're not strong, none of the supervisory agencies in the world cd insure his survival." RN expresses view that "the mining and bombing has got to have knocked a lot" out of N Vietnam "and that's why they're talking now, because they're hurting bad." RN thinks another factor in N Viets' being more amenable at negotiating table "is their terror at the election; they think we're going to win and they're (afraid of what will happen?)." RN: To them, the election is a worry, so let them worry, and make the best deal you can. RN expresses view that after election "we can continue this, with bombing, mining, six months or so, but then there has to be a day of reckoning."

AH assesses Thieu's psychological state: "He's a little paranoid. He goes to the '68 syndrome, and back the '63 syndrome. He told me Diem and his brother were murdered, not just because the US colluded with what was done, but more importantly because his generals thought he was turning soft on communism, and was negotiating with them. And that's the (?). So I think it takes an awful lot of doing. Henry's going to have to (talk to him?) (?)."

RN notes that even economic aid to S Vietnam will meet with criticism from some segments of US public opinion.

RN: You've got to remember that (?) and he knows that turning these conditions down will not be in the best interests of S Vietnam. Now the N Viets are negotiating for the first time in good faith, to the extent those bastards have good faith - but they're trying to find a settlement and they've made very significant concessions. If that gets out, and if he blocks the settlement, he'll be gone for sure, because we'll flush him, but that wdn't be good for us either, because there's nobody else to run the place. That's our problem. What it gets down to is that you and Bunker can, in good conscience, think it over, and when you come to the hard place - we have to lean (on?) him as much as necessary.

AH: (?) the fact that a coalition govt wd (?). RN: That's why I sd to Henry today, it must not in fact (in those?) terms be a coalition govt, and if we can get that down he'd damn well better accept it.

RN wishes CA success, asks about Army football.

## 800 SERIES

### 800-2 10/16/72

5:03 pm - 5:26 pm

RN, AH.

RN: (?) Henry now, he's certainly done plenty, which is good, he's got plenty of game plans. As you know, (?) this scheme I had, it wd be decisive, but only if Thieu agrees, (?), if I were Thieu, I'd take that in a minute, but it might make Thieu look like a puppet. He might look more like a puppet, though, if he doesn't (?) Henry.

RN talks to William R. Hearst on phone; see Conv 31-75. RN finishes call.

RN: On the other hand, if he stands there as an equal, under those circumstances - the other thing we offered is I see him after the election in San Clemente.

WHO calls RN; see Conv 31-76. RN finishes call.

RN: The situation is, he's got plenty of options, but the point is, Al, what we now do is for Thieu's benefit, and he's got to agree to it. AH: I didn't want Gen Abrams to think he was going to have an easy job over there. It's tough and it's going to take some doing. RN: Abrams has got the point now that he's expected to be an advocate; he's not expected to sit there and second-guess it. AH: He understands it. RN: But he's got to go arm-twist this fellow and play him the (?). AH: My judgment is he'll be tough. Now Henry's not going to be able to sell him, but Gen Abrams can. Because he's got- RN: He's got confidence in Abrams. AH: And Thieu's mad as hell at Henry. RN: He thinks Henry's selling him down the river, being with the enemy. AH: That's why it's good to have Abrams there. RN: Is there anything more we can tell Abrams? AH: I had a talk with him this- RN: (?). He's right too; we can't stay out there forever. AH: The fact we've been able to hold that thing is a credit to the discipline of the Air Force and the Navy - I can't say I'm surprised to hear of these riots on the ship, they've been out there 9 months, some of them, and that's tough going. So I think we've got to get it, but I think Henry's first option isn't going to float. RN: He can't (go?) on Thursday? AH: No. RN: Then what (?) come back here? AH: I think he's going to have to spend 3-4 days w/Thieu, work him over, give Thieu a shot at that document to tighten up a few screws for face-saving purposes, then come back here and meet again in Paris, and that doesn't hurt, because I'd like to see this settlement announced, even though it's probably not good from HRH's point of view, I'd like to see the settlement less closer to Nov 7 because- RN: There's less chance for it to fall apart. AH: That's my view. Because I think there's going to be a period of 30 days of the goddamndest murder and-

RN: My view is, have the settlement announced and then ride it thru, and Henry's got to reconcile himself to this. Have you told Henry - does he know he isn't going to be able to sell Thieu? AH: I told him. I sd him I thought this was going to be too big a nut for him to swallow in that short period, even from the standpoint of saving his own face w/his own bureaucracy, because my judgement of Thieu was he is more flexible than the people around him, his nitpickers. The bureaucrats are trying to preserve their goddamn positions. I think we'll be all right if he's brought thru the- RN: You see, if they change the thing too much, then you've got the N Viets to sell again, and they may want to do that. AH: They shdn't be doing anything more than a few minor nitpicks. This is a good position. You know, I'm about as skeptical as anyone can be on this subject, (?). RN: And also, the truth is, after all this time, with all the arms they've gotten, if the S Viets can't hack it, then they ought to be punished.

RN talks to Robert W. Galvin on phone; see Conv 31-77; one item withdrawn. RN finishes call.

RN: Well, it is in the best interests of Thieu and - well, the hell with Thieu, except his interests are the same as Vietnam's; he's the only one who can lead it. And (?) not that you do it on the basis of the POWs' wives, but their agony they go thru has got to stop. And that's only part of the agony.

RN talks to Martin S. Hayden on phone; see Conv 31-78.

RN: What do you think? I don't know. Maybe the idea that Henry's (?) the problem. It wd only be in the event he felt that's what he needed but maybe that's wrong. AH: I'd say you want two things from him. One thing is (?) wayout (?) enthusiastically for the settlement, wayout. RN: Let me say I will not see him unless he is. AH: That's right. RN:

I will not go and then have him bargain; I can't have him bargain. AH: You can't have him bargain and you can't have him carp about it. RN: Anyway, we ought to press it thru. Suppose we (?) before the election? AH: Well, I think afterwards we have to settle. Tell him to come with us or without us; that's the way he ought to be told. RN: And he'll come. AH: I think he'll come. Otherwise he'd be committing suicide and I don't think he's that kind of a man. RN assesses May 8 as "what did it" in terms of persuading N Viets to come to terms. RN reviews his remarks to Natl League of Families, noting his pledge not to abandon POWs, and to prevent imposition of Communist govt in N Vietnam, as well as his pledge not to rely on N Viet goodwill for release of POWs. RN repeats that he wants Gen Abrams to be an advocate of the settlement. AH: I'll see him tonight. RN: You can tell him that the Pres feels that he is the man who can make or break this. You can say (and?) never say this to Henry, that he doesn't think Bunker can do it, but that Abrams has got to tell Thieu, "you can trust the Pres. You shd take this deal, you can come out w/honor, but the main thing is if you don't take it, you will lose the confidence of the Pres." And I've sacrificed a lot for him.

## 801 SERIES

### 801-3 10/17/72

8:17 am – 8:34 am

RN, RZ.

Discussion of possible meeting w/the younger Winston Churchill. RN: Say have him come in for an off-the-record meeting, some coffee. RN: He's a very smart fellow and he has some of the ability of his grandfather and – well, his father, apart from his drinking, was a hell of an able guy too. But then again, his grandfather did drink a bit, as well.

Discussion of disappearance of Hale Boggs and Rep Nick Begich in presumed airplane crash in Alaska; RN reminded of the deaths of Will Rogers and Wiley Post in Alaskan plane crash in 1935.

Disc of RZ's possibly announcing RN's forthcoming radio address.

RZ: So then Kissinger going to- RN: That'll get play today. RZ: And then I announce at 11 he's going to Saigon? RN: We don't know yet if he's going, it's very much in the air as to whether, it may – he may have (?) two days to prepare the ground, he may have to come back. RZ: I'll check. RN: (?), we'll see. What do we have today? RZ: The announcement of the trade agreement, the Kissinger trip if that works out, yr trip to New York. RN: That's enough.

(2 min 53 sec Pers Ret del)

### 801-4 10/1/72

Between 8:36 and 9:59 am

RN, AH.

HRH enters.

RN: Well, what time is Henry (?)? Noon? AH: I think it will be around noon, maybe 1. RN: (?). AH: Yes, I can (?) telephone calls, (?). RN: If it's possible he may have to stay there another day, I was thinking, with all the crap he has to do there – is Sullivan (sitting in?) in the meeting? I suppose it's all right to give him a little credit now, though. I have (no?) confidence in the man, because of his closeness to Harriman. What do you think?

AH: I think he's ambitious enough that he- RN: Yeah. HRH: (?). RN: He's showing the (?).
One point, Al, that you be sure to, if you can- Henry has raised, on 2 or 3 occasions, his
point that we (?) if this blows, in order to keep our (marbles?) (?) the N Viets (?) the
bombing halt. It cannot be (?). I'm (leaving out?) the military effect, on which I disagree
w/him on principle, it wd be devastating (?) for there to be a bombing halt. Henry shd know
that. But he's so personally involved in this thing, he wants to be able to throw this, that
and the other out, that that's one (goodie?) which is not negotiable. I covered all the other
things with him. You covered that with Henry?

HRH: Yes, he raised with me and sd, when he was going thru his new scenario of
going thru to Hanoi and then holding it up, and I sd, "you can't do that. Once you've gone
there, then you've got to go all the way, (?)", (?) the other side, he sd "you have to suspend
from then on thru to (?), that you can't even consider." From a political viewpoint in this
country, you can hold for a couple days while you're finishing a settlement, you cannot hold
for an extended period to carry it thru the election. RN: No way. That wd knock the bejesus
out of us. HRH: That's almost the only thing that cd lose the election. RN: That's very
serious. Henry has no understanding. We polled this. The bombing halt people were
against 82-18. Now Henry's got to get it thru his -see, he talks to these goddamn liberals
who think the bombing halt's a great thing, because he asked me, "wd it be good to have
that before the election?" I sd, "hell no, the bombing halt is the most devastating (?)."
HRH: The last think he told me was he completely agreed. RN: So put that in the message,
that that's one thing we cannot have, no bombing halt, except for the time he's visiting,
unless there's an agreement. AH: He shdn't go to Hanoi unless there's an agreement.
HRH: He cannot go to Hanoi- RN: And that under no circumstances can he go to Hanoi
unless there's an agreement. You know what I mean, he sd: "they want me there so much."
RN: I sd, "of course they want you." But he can't go there unless it's in the bag. I sd,
"Henry, the moment you go to Hanoi, it's got to succeed; there can be no question of
failure."

HRH: And (?) the worst time we're going to have here, politically, is the time
between Henry going to Hanoi and the time you announce -put into effect a ceasefire. RN:
We may not come to this thing (?). AH: I tell you, our little friend Thieu is very tough. He's
refused to see Bunker two days running now, he's had his key advisors in two days, I think
they're going to walk into a goddamn buzzsaw with this guy and we may have to get very
tough with him. HRH: He may be anticipating something a lot worse than what he's been
getting- AH: He thinks he's (?) a ceasefire in place. These guys around his capital -that's
where the difficulty's going to be now. I think the political side (?) is one thing. RN: You
think we have to stiff-arm him? AH: I think we do, but I think we may find ourselves in a
position that we have to hold thru the election. RN: That's all right too. AH: I think a
public break- RN: I think a decision with regard to going there, that's the main thing he
has to reevaluate. Can you convey to Henry that Thieu's got to, that he's refused to see
Bunker? AH: He knows that, he also knows that I've been opposed to the Hanoi thing on
(?). I told him that the only circumstances under which he shd go to Hanoi are a) that we
have a good settlement, b) that Thieu is enthusiastic about it. RN: That's right. And if we
put it past the election -I'm not as worried as (?) about it, as I indicated, (?) that after the
election, you know, they won't settle, (for?) they will. AH: They'll settle because these guys
are hurting. RN: And also after the election, there won't be a question of there being

anybody else, and they're going to be looking down the gun barrel. They know it, and know they'll be punished worse. AH: On the other hand, we know we've gotten what's necessary for a good settlement, and the knowledge of our flexibility adds a great deal.

RN: Anyway, you've passed on to Henry - you see, even going to Saigon poses problems, because it raises expectations, and it'll look like Thieu turned him down. Now his going to Saigon and coming back here is fine, (?) for the purpose of negotiating, discussing matters, but it'll leak out. Have you told Henry that Thieu doesn't trust him? AH: He saw that in the minutes, the verbatim text of what Thieu sd to me, it was very clear. RN: So he knows as far as his own (stake?) there, it isn't very much.

RN: I postponed my decision on that Israeli aircraft thing till he gets back. There's no great hurry on that. The Israelis haven't got a hole to piss in. And as far as the Jewish vote is concerned, tell them to go to hell. **PR PROB** Now Henry (doesn't need?) to put that in there, but we've got to get some (?) with the Israelis to get a settlement there. After the election we've got to settle with the Israelis, you know. AH: What I think Henry was trying to do there- RN: Get it all (announced?) we're going to give it to them later. we've been doing that and they've been getting tougher and tougher. AH: They're tough now. But I think he wanted to get it in before the election so that it doesn't look like a policy of the new Administration. RN: He shdn't be interested in the election. Henry doesn't understand politics. There's no reason why he shd. We're going to act as if there's no election as all. We're not going to be concerned about what (Rabin?) (won't?), Max Fisher and all those people. The hell with it. If the Jews want to go off, (?). AH: I think they helped us on that Soviet Jewry thing. RN: Now I'm going to give them the aircraft, but I don't want it to look as if, from the election standpoint, that it's a blatant cave-in to the Jewish community. I will privately tell Rabin, if you like, tell him, "the Pres is sympathetic to this, the State and Defense Depts are not, but if he does this now, it will look like a straight election ploy, and will hurt (Rabin?)." You can say, "the Pres is sympathetic to this, and he will help at a later point." I don't want to give it to them now, under election pressures, see?

RN: With regard to the N Korean thing and so forth, those goddamn N [sic] Koreans - if he wants to screw around, the hell with it, we'll get out of there. AH: By acting quickly yesterday, they took all the anti-US rhetoric out of their proclamation. RN: Martial law - why do they have martial law? Because they can't run their country, or what? Abrams' point about Vietnam also applies to that place. Now we've got to maintain a thin line there, a tripwire, but my God, for us to have three divisions there is ridiculous. AH: Well, they have to adjust a little bit. Actually we've taken quite a bit out. RN: I know we have. AH: And we haven't given them what we told them they were going to get in return for their withdrawal. RN: We have to give them enough (?). AH: They are, but they've had a little (?).

RN: Now the other thing, in regard to this paper over here [text of settlement, according to tape subject log] that I discussed with Bob, the whole line is that I (?) have instructed Bob, I've given him a command that nothing must leak out of this stuff, and therefore we have ordered that that paper's not to be duplicated and not to leave the White House. HRH: And I sd that (to Bill?) (?). RN: And he can come over and look at it, but not (?). He's a leaker. I just don't want it (?) to those assholes over there. And anyway, that paper shdn't go over there. You know, Bob, what Bill wants it for. He doesn't want it to take it home. He wants it so they can go over it and critique it. And by the time it gets down

to the desk officer and so forth, first it'll leak. Second, they'll come in with 34 objections, none of which mean a goddamn thing. HRH: They've already- RN: But Bill wants to let Marshall Green have a crack, and the desk officer have a crack. The same thing we went thru with SALT, Berlin, the [Shanghai] communiqué. They do it to prove their manhood. But we're not going to let it leave the White House. Be sure you warn Henry - you'd better get a cable to him now that he's going to have to (?) and reevaluate in terms of Thieu's - or do you think he knows this? AH: I think he knows. RN: Well, if he knows, and comes back, it's not going to be (fatal?). So he comes back, and then he goes over to Paris again. But he cannot go over to Hanoi. And there's not going to be a stop to the bombing.

RN: Anything else of interest in yr shop today? AH: I think we've covered the key points. The ground situation in S Vietnam is good. RN discusses opposition or lack of support for his foreign policy decisions from "the so-called intellectuals, of course the media, the university community, the religious groups, and the so-called business elite. The only support we've had is from the labor leaders, some of the ethnics, the farmers, the military and veteran organizations, some of the Main Street business types, and groups like the POW families." RN: Where is the national character now? It makes me ashamed to say it, because I'm from that group, but the lawyers, the business people - they don't have it anymore. They're not fit to govern. **PR PROB?** RN reviews where support did and did not come from after his November 3, May 8, Cambodia, Laos decisions. RN: Now with the business community, you've got jackasses like John McCloy who say nothing on one hand, and on the other you've got Don Kendall. And where did Don come from? He started out selling Good Humor bars out of a cart. He's a hardhat, you know. He's got a lousy education, but - now Henry has his doctorate, and some of our others are well educated, but when you look at most of the American upper class, the educated class, they're like the British upper class before WWII - lackadaisical, homosexual. HRH discusses a scene in the film "Young Winston," in which the editor of the London Times tells the elder Randolph Churchill, "we will criticize the govt, but we will never to anything to bring the govt down." HRH: I blurted out, "I wish we had a Times like that."

RN: Well, where the hell are the great press lords here, like the ones who supported Winston Churchill? We've got the Chicago Tribune, the Chicago Daily News, the Copley chain, Paul Miller at Gannett and Martin Hayden in Detroit. HRH: And the NY Daily News, and the Orlando Sentinel. RN: And the Omaha World-Herald ain't bad. What I'm getting at is this: do you think Henry wd read any of those papers? And he won't see anyone from those papers. You know why? Because they aren't the ones that the Georgetown people think are of the best class.

RN expounds on his view that the US elite is opposed to him "because I'm not one of them and they know it. I can talk to George Meany, and to Frank Fitzsimmons, and can go and talk to a Mexican lady who gives me a bracelet, and they can't stand that."

RN, HRH, AH discuss AH's future work. RN: When you go over to the Army, I want you to kick 'em in the ass. RN notes that the future Army "will be about half black, but don't make any mistake, they're good people. I was watching Green Bay play Washington last night, and both running backs were black, and they were doing great."

RN: Well, I suppose Henry can go on to Saigon, that's all right. It doesn't pose that much of a problem. AH: We have to do this. HRH: Saigon's fine. AH: We have to communicate with this guy. RN: Let me say this, Al: if he doesn't settle now, the most

important thing I sd was at the end of the conv w/Abrams, and you can pass it on (?). If this man does not cooperate, is not reasonable now, he has seriously eroded the friendship he has from the man in this office. He either takes it or he's out. We just can't go along to win this war. Do you agree? AH: This is, (?) difference in objectives is beginning to crystallize. He can't achieve his without us.

RN: I only wish there was some way Henry cd come back and we cd say (?) delay till after the election (?). AH: I'm still confident that's the way it's going to come out. RN: I want that sd, I (want that to be public?). I don't want it to be delayed, but I'd like for somebody to say "we'll put it slowly, so the reason we do this is that we cannot negotiate in this election atmosphere." HRH: (?) election? AH: Or to run right thru and say "the election means nothing, we're going to keep going," so that no one can say it's influencing the talks. And if that's the position we're taking, that's fine. I think it's right.

RN: I know Henry's concern, too. It's understandable, he's come this long way, he's fought this battle, he's done a brilliant job and the rest, and he's panting to put this (?) star in his crown. And we want to go there. But you can't pay a price that wd risk that star. Of course Henry knows that if it's done after the election, the sophisticates will all say, "anybody cd do that." Not really. First we have to win the election. Anyway, do you think Henry's gotten the word? AH: I do. RN: What were you going to say? AH: I was going to say, I think we've got it, and we're going to take our time and do it right. If we get it before, that's fine. If we get it after, fine too.

RN: Keep in very close touch with Bill this week for the reason, except for the Henry thing, that I'm up in domestic stuff up to my teeth. I'm not going to be able to handle a lot of this stuff. Tell Bill, "he's working on the water bill, and the Social Security veto, so until Congress is out, just postpone a lot of this stuff. AH: Yes sir.

AH leaves.

RN: Nobody will ever know how much he [AH] has done to keep this ship afloat. HRH: He told me yesterday- RN: Just a minute. RN leaves, returns.

RN: He didn't tell me, but I read it in the lines, I think, (?). See Henry is, (?). HRH: Al gave me a very complex analysis of this whole thing, on the basis of Henry's enormous personal complexity, and it boils down to, he can share your view, he has a (?) than you do, that what you have at work here is a very strong internal motivation that has nothing to do with the merits of the case, and that there is a super (strong amount?) of insecurity there. RN: If you want to make notes of this for yr private file- HRH: (OK?). And that the thing -that Henry does want to make peace, that he does feel it has to be done before the election -that's the one thing that worries Al. And- RN: The thing that shook him, though, is that- HRH: The girl- RN: The (little?) girl told him this, which is good. PERS RET? [Tape subject log states this refers to Nancy S. Maginnes]

HRH: Interestingly enough, and this is an indication of the thing, because I raised this with Al, and I jumped on it before (?), but Henry and I had a discussion of the problem of replacing Al, and Henry sd he'd give it some thought, and wd it be possible, and wd I object, if he considered moving Scowcroft into that position, which, incidentally, I think wd be a superb idea. RN: I agree. HRH: But I sd I think- RN: (?) I mean, first, it's not important. Second, he's got brains and so forth, but he isn't quite the right man- HRH: But he's too intellectual. He doesn't belong in that job. RN: He's way ahead of [Maj Gen "Don"] Hughes intellectually. HRH: That's right. He's at least Haig's equal intellectually,

and on personality he's low-key and solid enough that he can take all the shit, which is
important. I had quite a long talk with Henry about that, and Al sd afterward, "you have
no idea, the instant change in Henry's attitude toward me and toward doing this stuff, that
that talk had." And I sd, "obviously not because he gave a shit about Scowcroft, but only
because what was implicit in that talk, was my confirmation to him that he was expected to
stay on after the election." And Al sd, "that's exactly right." See, Henry, he fishes for stuff
like that. He fished with me about post-election stuff and I've never confirmed- RN: He's
too proud to ask. HRH: I sd, "Henry, I don't know if you're going to stay. I don't know if
I'm going to say; we'll know when the time comes."

SB enters, notes Ralph Marrinson is on phone, leaves.

RN talks to Ralph Marrinson on phone; see Conv 31-99.

HRH: What Al sd is that the one thing he's concerned about on this trip, he sd, "I cd be wrong about the psychology, but he's a very complex man. I think it's very important," and that's why he's resisting pushing a wire too far. RN: He's (?) confidence in him. HRH: "Don't give him any feeling of lack of confidence because he'll overcompensate and overreact. It's important to make our signals now be that 'you're doing the right thing and we're with you.' He's gone thru the doubts, he has them. And-RN: Well, yesterday morning, I sat down and wrote him a two-page handwritten note, going over all the things, (?) that I had total confidence in him, (?) these things in mind, and that (?). I sd "Henry, (?) till you get in the airplane." HRH: You cdn't have done any better, because- RN: He needs this, because he needs to know that failing is not going to hurt (?). And I sd, "if it fails, I take the responsibility. If it succeeds, great." And that'll make him do the right thing a little better. HRH: So Al was just asking for my help in making sure that - not with you, but that rumbles don't develop out of here that Henry is under pressure. RN: Good. HRH: Al's point is, as long as he believes that he's coming out all right, regardless of how he settles this, then he won't be pushed to try to deliver a coup that maybe wd be delivered at too great a price. RN: I know. HRH: And Al's worried about that. He's worried that if we get the settlement two wks before the election, whether (?) keep it (?) for two weeks.

RN: My personal feeling is this: I know everyone feels a settlement wd be great and everything and I think it would- HRH: It would, but you don't need it. RN: But we've got to do the right thing. And while it wd be good, the risks are enormous. We talk about a high-risk thing, going over to speak to the POW wives - that's nothing compared to this. HRH: That's right. RN: And that's why you don't push it to that risk. HRH: That's the point. Al comes back, he says there's a possibility of it all falling into place, of a good settlement, an agreement by Thieu, and being able to put it together. If we get that we shd move ahead with it. Because if we get that it will stick together. RN: Al's feeling, and Abrams' feeling, which I went into directly with Abrams, I sd, "let's forget the election, do you think this is a good settlement?" Abrams sd, "yes, they ought to take it." And I sd, "if you feel that, I want you to go over there as an advocate, not as an observer." Well- AH: Haig's still afraid of the bloodbath thing. RN: It could happen; it's been a long war. But I don't think it will.

HRH: The other thing I was concerned about, and Al put it pretty much to rest - the thing that bothered me was that if Henry goes to Saigon, and Thieu doesn't go along, then our pattern, our agreement as of now is that if Thieu doesn't- RN: (?) Vietnamese will blow

it. HRH: That Henry comes home, but the N Viets, having anticipated that Henry comes to Hanoi, but rebuffed- RN: They go public. HRH: Then (?) they go public. Al's point on that is that if that's what they do, it's because they don't really want this settlement anyway. And they'll blow it - use that as an excuse to blow it. If they blow it on that excuse, then the odds are really good that they wd have screwed us after the settlement anyhow. RN: The way to put a lid on that - I sd, "Henry, the greatest danger to Thieu (?) is that the N Viets go public." But I sd "on that point, you can obfuscate it so much in yr own briefings that it wd wash out as an issue." I think that's really true. Let them go public, then Henry goes public and says "they insisted on this and that." HRH: The only bad position we can end up in that I see on this other thing is- RN: The main thing is that we're going to negotiate and work like hell. But after the election we're going to settle this war and it's going to be over. We're not going to have Thieu act like a goddamn fool here. We're carried the S Viets long enough. They're going to have to shape up and run this thing. RN notes Gen Abrams' view that the Viet situation is fundamentally different from having US forces in Europe. RN: Now what we don't need now is to have Rogers come in w/a manifesto of 30 or 40 points that State doesn't like about the settlement. Not necessary that he wd, but the pattern's been that way. That wd send Henry up the wall, and also, State shdn't do this.

RN, HRH disc RN's planned radio address on tax issues.

(2 min 45 sec Pers Ret del)

RN, HRH disc schedule conflict between poss funeral service for Hale Boggs and rev sharing signing ceremony.

(27 sec Pers Ret del)

RN, HRH disc Boggs plane crash, again noting Will Rogers plane crash. Disc of VP's schedule.

(4 min Pers Ret del)

RN, HRH ponder appointing George Champion Jr to some Admin post. (HRH refers to Champion's "drinking problem"; Champion died at 93 in '97)

(4 min 5 sec Pers Ret del)

RN, HRH disc how to counteract McGovern "corruption" charges.

(9 min 42 sec Pers Ret del)

HRH: Press coverage of the meeting with labor leaders? RN: Fine.

801-5 10/17/72

9:59 am - 10:21 am

RN, RZ.

HRH enters. RZ discusses what he shd say at briefing re RN's meeting w/labor leaders, leaves.

RN, HRH disc press coverage of recent Watergate stories.

SB enters, discusses press coverage of upcoming meeting w/foreign labor leaders, leaves. RN reiterates his view that Dem campaign practices have been as bad as anything alleged in Watergate.

(2 min 1 sec Pers Ret del)

HRH: By next Tuesday you may know something about Henry, and (?) you will. RN: He'll be on his way back, is the most likely thing. HRH: I think more likely he'll already be back, because I don't think he's going to get it done in Saigon, so I don't think he'll go

to Hanoi, and he'll be back Sat night. HRH: That's fine. Then back over to Paris to (meet?) again. HRH: On his way to Paris (?). RN: You know, the problem, Bob, with the fellows, (?) insecure and so forth, is they're great. It's that compulsion and insecurity that drives him on to greatness. 710 Henry has got it, you know. Hell, Hitler was that way, but he (was a?) great man. So was Napoleon. He was great, but anyway when you say someone's a (great man?) - Christ almighty. **PR PROB!!** HRH: When you look at Churchill (?) when he (drinking?) all the time. RN: And when you look at De Gaulle, De Gaulle had a lot of that stuff in him. So did MacArthur. They all had their problems.

David C. Hoopes enters, leaves.

HRH: "Haig has been informed that although Dr Kissinger has not yet completed his meeting in Paris, sufficient progress has been made to warrant his proceeding with trip to Saigon. It is planned to announce at 11 o'clock this morning, that you have asked Dr Kissinger to (do so?)." RN: Get Haig in though. Before that announcement is made I want to talk to him about its nature.

HRH calls AH on phone. HRH: Before you move the 11 o'clock announcement, the Pres wants to talk to you about how to word it. RN: Put it this way: I think it's important for him to be thinking in terms of - that announcement, I don't want him to hype it. Just say this is for consultations with Thieu, and downplay the idea of any possible breakthrough or progress. HRH, to AH: Don't build an announcement that hypos this thing, just say it's for consultations. Just as low a key as possible. RN: And be sure to call Rogers. HRH, to AH: And call Rogers beforehand. HRH finishes call.

RN: Well, be sure Henry's, (?) He'll try desperately to (?). Did you hit it hard with him? HRH: As hard as I could. And he knows how I feel on the question, he tends to avoid that but there can be no question in his mind. I put it very coldly to him. I sd, "Henry, the trip to Hanoi is of absolutely zero value. There's no plus for us in any way, shape or form." RN: And I sd to him, "if you go to Hanoi - if you go - it is imperative that there are no pictures of you smiling." He wdn't think of such a goddamn thing, that he must not go to the enemy smiling. I sd, "be cordial in yr personal dealings, to the extent it serves your purposes, but no picture. If you come off the airplane (?) there must be no pictures of you smiling. But tell Al that I think that we've got to discourage him from going to Hanoi. Only if it's an absolutely sure shot, and if Thieu is fully aboard, must he go to Hanoi. HRH: That's what I've sd, that "there are overriding negatives to yr going to Hanoi, and no counterbalancing positives at all. You're running enormous risks with no potential gain at all if you do it."

(3 min 57 sec Pers Ret del)

RN notes that Hobart Lewis thinks the next Secy of State "shd be a good economic man."

801-7 10/17/72

Between 10:33 and 11:06 am

RN, SB.

RN suggests that Dr. William O. Chase (apparently the WH dentist) sit in on RN's meeting w/representatives of the American Dental Assn.

HRH enters; SB leaves.

(1 min 24 sec Pers Ret del)

RN discusses the preferable "play" to be given on his remarks on history of US labor unions during his meeting w/foreign labor leaders.

(4 min 44 sec Pers Ret del)

(1 min 3 sec Pers Ret del)

RZ enters.

RN reiterates his idea of RZ discussing at press briefing RN's analysis of US labor movement's history.

AH enters.

RN: (?) the State Dept, what you had in mind? AH: It's a very (?) briefing, totally (?) in any way. RN: The main thing I want you to do is not hypo this. This is a routine consultation, Gen Haig has been there, and the Pres insists in all these talks that there be constant consultation w/the Govt of S Vietnam. This is a routine consultation, use that word, on the basis of negotiations. If they say "does this mean a breakthrough?" say "I think it wd be a great mistake to say this." The idea of routine- AH: We wdn't put the word "routine" in the announcement. RN: But in yr (guidance?), you say, "this is just one of those regular consultations that he thought we shd have on the military and the other end." AH: They'll ask him if Abrams is related. And I'd say everything related to Vietnam is related. RN: You can say it's a coincidence. AH: I wdn't use "coincidence" because they're both going in to see Thieu. RZ: Just the other type of question that will come: did the Pres decide to ask him to go after today's meeting in Paris? RN: I wd say, "no." If you say it's as a result of that meeting, you're out on that limb that we don't want to be on. We don't want to say he decided it today. But you can say, regarding the meeting with the POW families, that the Pres discussed this w/Dr Kissinger before he left. RN instructs RZ to state "we have learned that it appears the meetings are likely to conclude today; if so, he will go on." RN reiterates that RZ state that "we will not permit the imposition of a Communist govt on S Vietnam." RN: And incidentally, they may ask you what price we'll impose on the deserters who went to Canada. Say we want to castrate 'em. RZ: I'll have to tell them (?). RN: So they'll never reproduce. But say because of the (?), just say sterilize 'em. **PR PROB!**

RZ, AH leave.

(1 min 7 sec Pers Ret del)

SB enters, discusses upcoming meeting w/ADA representatives.

### 801-14 10/17/72

Between 11:24 and 11:26 am

RN, to AH: Have you gotten a more extended report from Henry? Fine, OK. If you'd inform me - wd you let me know when you do hear what he says? Anything that comes in I want to see.

### 801-22 10/17/72

Between 3:00 and 3:02 pm

RN, to AH: Have you taken a further message yet? Is he on his way or going? You'll let me know as soon as you get anything. Fine.

802 SERIES 10/17/72

802-1 10/17/72

After 3:03 pm - 6:24 pm

RN, HRH, JC; recording begins with meeting in progress.

JM, CMacG, JDE enter.

(3 min 33 sec Pers Ret del)

RN assesses re-election commercials, use of foreign-policy themes in them, World Series.

(3 min 20 sec Pers Ret del)

Discussion of how to present distinction between RN's tax reform position and McGovern's.
Hale Boggs plane crash. RN's schedule; planned radio talks. JC thinks RN "has the best
radio voice of any Pres this century." Impact of recent address re crime, drugs. Rev
sharing signing ceremony. Discussion of support of RN from African-Americans such as
James Brown and Sammy Davis. RN: Sammy's a little weird. HRH: He may be weird but
he's for you, and he's taking a lot of flak. There's talk about boycotting his albums and
shows because he's supporting you.

(50 sec Pers Ret del)

Congressional relations; forthcoming veto of water bill.

(10 min 5 sec Pers Ret del)

RN comments that he is reluctant to indicate support for Jesse Helms' first Senate race
"because Helms is against everything I stand for, except the flag; he's for that. The same
goes for [William L] Scott."

(25 min 58 sec Pers Ret del)

RN: Now on another subject, (?) that they would understand but we have no ideas as to
what will happen on that. CMacG: Henry's traveling from Paris to Saigon? RN: That's
right. He'll be back (here?) in about two days.

(8 min 4 sec Pers Ret del)

RN feels that "some of the people who have supported us least in Congress are the ones I
worked for the most. I campaigned 3 days for Charles Percy in '66 and he's never voted
for us once. The same with Saxbe. There hasn't been any loyalty there."

(2 min 14 sec Pers Ret del)

Media relations.

(3 min 10 sec Pers Ret del)

JC discusses how RN shd address Vietnam, water bill veto, taxes and spending in his
speeches and statements.

(14 min 34 sec Pers Ret del)

JC outlines how to present the Admin achievements in war on drugs, economic gains.

(9 min 53 sec Pers Ret del)

CMacG et al discuss how to counteract charge RN is "hiding" in White House.

(12 min 5 sec Pers Ret del)

RN discusses the value of strategic public appearances, such as his appearances in
Savannah and North Dakota. He feels there is value in having a certain remoteness as part
of a leader's aura, and points to De Gaulle as an example.

802-9 10/17/72

6:30 pm - 7:17 pm

RN, SB, APB.

Schedule. SB leaves.

RN writes something [probably signs veto of water bill].

HRH enters; APB leaves.

Q of how to reconcile planned dinner for retiring Sens and Congressmen w/possible
memorial service for Hale Boggs.

(7 min 17 sec Pers Ret del)

RZ enters. RZ: I called Winston Churchill; he's not in the Washington area, he's in London. RZ describes talk w/younger Churchill who had expressed interest in meeting w/RN in future, "but he's not in the area now." RZ leaves.

(4 min 44 sec Pers Ret del)

SB enters. RN: Can I see Haig? SB leaves.

(1 min 38 sec Pers Ret del)

AH enters.

RN: Anything new yet? AH: They're airborne and I expect a message any minute. RN: I'll be over at the EOB if you get anything. AH: Fine sir. RN: They are going to Saigon? AH: Yes sir. RN: You think Henry's committed in his own mind on this? I thought he was going to keep his options open till the end of the day when I - or do you think he's made some progress on the (?) issue? AH: I think he went to the big issues first and the ones he knew he cd (fall off of?), it didn't make too much difference, he did next. And then sent the message that he got the big things settled. HRH: When does he get to Saigon? AH: He'll be there Wed night. HRH: That's tomorrow morning. AH: And I've got a stack of messages waiting for him and he shd have a few waiting (?) come back from us very quickly. RN: All right.

AH: There's been a certain amount of leakage which I think must be coming from Hanoi. Because one of the networks called Ron and sd "we've heard that Kissinger may be going to Hanoi." And Ron has denied it, of course he doesn't know, and he's denying it flat cold and (says?) he plans to come back here. HRH: But you know, Henry - with Saigon, they're going back to prepare to receive him in Hanoi, and obviously they're getting stuff out of his correspondence and-

RN: Al, one thing we've got to do - Henry is passionately desirous of going to Hanoi. We've got to keep him out of there unless there's an ironclad deal. He cannot go to Hanoi. Have you covered that in any of the messages, or does he need to hear it from me? AH: That (was in the bombing?) (?). I think he understands it. RN: (?) a bombing halt and he cannot go to Hanoi under any circumstances unless it's a signed, sealed and delivered deal. Now Henry's rather confident about his abilities in these things and in this case we cannot take even a 5% risk on the Hanoi trip. Christ, Ramsey Clark and the others, if they (?) Kissinger was going, I wrote in a memo, told him that if he ever went to Hanoi, he mustn't be caught smiling. Ever. That's the worst thing that cd happen. Good God, it'd be terrible. He'd be with the enemy. AH: That's right. RN: God, I hope he doesn't go to Hanoi. You don't think he's misleading us on this, because I made it clear he shd not go to Hanoi. AH: He agonized - of course, I started on him when we got back, I sd "that Hanoi thing is a

loser," and in his own sense it's a loser. RN: Yep, if he goes there and it doesn't work, it's a loser.

HRH: If he doesn't go to Hanoi when we arrive here? RN: He'd be back Saturday. AH: He'll be back Saturday, and he'll need every minute of that time to work on Thieu and I think Thieu's going to be tough. RN: (?), not now. He'll go after the election (?). AH: It'll happen with or without him and he can't commit suicide; he'll come along. On that we can be confident. But what I'm afraid of is these bastards may have just (?) us right to the time when they have these battalions around Saigon, which they can't hold very long, Thieu knows that, and hope to get the signature just in time for them to put their flags up and claim they control a good part of the areas around Saigon. And Thieu - that's why Thieu's going to be tough. And they've moved in the last 48 hours all around. RN: Battalions? Have they? AH: Yes. They're threatening Route 1, Rte 13, Rte 7. RN: Henry, I suppose, has talked to him about that. AH: I sent messages on it and Henry knows he'd better watch his step on this one. RN: We can't have a ceasefire; the hell with it. AH: Not if it's going to unravel everything. And we're in the driver's seat here. RN: Well, we're in a better bargaining position after the election. (The North?) doesn't to face that fact but you know it. McGovern's out, we're in, and we've won on this issue, and they know damn well we'll be in for 4 years, what do you think they're going to do? They'll settle real fast. AH leaves.

(1 min 18 sec Pers Ret del)

Discussion of how to counteract the charge that RN is "holing up" in WH.

(7 min 16 sec Pers Ret del)

RN: That's another thing, we've got a hell of a good thing (?) and with Kissinger.

(1 min 10 sec Pers Ret del)

Impact of RN's appearance before POW families; RN feels "JDE has never understood the tremendous importance of the amnesty issue or the bugging-out-of-Vietnam issue."

(9 min 17 sec Pers Ret del)

## 803 SERIES

### 803-2 10/18/72

10:07 am – 11:05 am

RN, Masayoshi Ohira, Nobuhiko Ushiba, AH, Sadaaki Numate, James J. Wickel; WH photog, press at start of meeting.

RN greets the Japanese Amb to US, et al. Camera noise. WH photog, press leave. RN, MO et al discuss present state of Japan-PRC relations. RN emphasizes that other Asian nations, especially S Korea, are nervous about PRC-Japan détente, and that these nations need some reassurance about the sincere and peaceful intentions of the two nations.

Following a discussion of S Korea,

RN: For the first time my evaluation is that the N Viets are negotiating seriously. Dr Kissinger, as you know, has had 20 meetings with them in Paris, but while there was a great deal of talk, there was really no serious negotiation in my view, until the last meeting in which Gen Haig participated. There still are some major differences. This is not simply a two-party negotiation; it's one that involves three parties. And that is why Dr Kissinger

now, along w/Gen Abrams and Amb Bunker, are talking today w/Pres Thieu, so that he is
fully aware of and participates in the negotiations. There's one point I think the Foreign
Minister wd be interested in: there's been a lot of speculation that with the election 3 wks
ago, that the US wd make decisions in these negotiatons because of our desire to have a
settlement before the election. That is totally untrue. The situation is totally different from
1968. Then, the bombing halt did have a positive effect in building up Mr Humphrey in his
race for the Presidency. Today Vietnam is not a negative issue for us. Consequently, I have
directed Dr Kissinger that in all these negotiations, we must not think of the election at all
and do what is right. If we can make the right kind of deal now, we'll make it, and if not,
we'll wait until after the election. We think this is the sound way to approach this. In that
connection too, that means there will be no bombing halt before the election unless there
is a settlement. And there will be no pressures on our negotiators to make a bad settlement
now, because of the election. This is our position. Also the Prime Minister shd know that
any speculation to the effect that we will agree w/the other side to impose a coalition govt
on S Vietnam is false; we will never agree to that. We want peace but it must be peace with
honor, and peace with honor means that the people of S Vietnam must not have imposed on
them a Communist govt against their will. I wd say finally, however, on what predictions
can be made, that there comes a time when a war shd come to an end. And we believe that
the war shd end on an honorable basis. We have some reason to believe the other side
shares this view. We are still far apart in some critical areas but we are making
extraordinary efforts to negotiate seriously. And if the other side negotiates seriously, there
is a chance, not a certainty but a chance, that it can come to an (?) end. But the election
is not a factor here. Reply of Ambassador low-toned, not readily intelligible. Remainder
of conversation concerns development of US-Soviet trade relations, except toward end when
RN expresses hope that USSR will seriously discuss the Northern Islands issue w/Japan and
prove as amenable as the US was in the Okinawa talks.

803-3 10/18/72

Between 11:05 and 11:12 am

RN, SB. RN asks SB to check on arrangements for smokers visiting Oval Office. RN: And ask AH if he can come in.

803-4 10/18/72

Between 11:05 and 11:12 am

RN, SB. SB: AH is going thru those papers w/WPR and Alex Johnson. RN: Don't rush him. Have JDE come in. Tell Al I'm doing some things and it can be in an hour or so, don't rush him.

803-9 10/18/72

11:45 am - 11:59 am

RN, AH.

RN: Did you finish all right? AH: Yes sir. RN: Rogers and Alex are in good shape?

AH: (?) until he read that (?) message.

MS enters w/refreshments, leaves.

RN: So he realizes (?). AH: Yes, I told him there were still two major differences, but

he sd "my God, if we've got this we've got total surrender." And that's Alex Johnson's view
too. RN: (?). AH: A little bit but he started (?) and sort of backed off and he sd if we can
get it, great, if we can't we can't. RN: What is your - about the Japanese (?), they all (?)
with somebody. AH: That was a good meeting. RN: (?) if anything happens, (?).

AH: Well- RN: What's yr evaluation of the (state of play?) at the moment. AH: I think we're in good shape, sir. RN: Of course on the military side, to be sure - Laird needs no call from me? AH: No. I called him again this morning, and the Chairman called back to reassure me that Weyand can't use all he has right now. They do have a problem w/this area, they're very close to these populated centers and they have to have a target or we've got problems. The way this thing is going to come out - they're unilateral statements on Cambodia and Laos, they watered it down, and Henry says they're unacceptable. So he's put them on notice to that effect. Then there are Articles 7 and 8, Article 7 dealing with their reinforcements in the South and our resupplying. He sd he had the language he wants from them, but they won't (?) satisfied w/the POW issue in the South. So in effect all they're really (?) on now is to get Thieu to accept some kind of forthcoming position on his political prisoners. Then in effect, as far as the North is concerned, we've broken the deadlock. And that cd probably be done very quickly. So it all goes back to nothing but the Thieu problem. I think if Thieu comes thru and recognizes what he has and is willing to take it on, that this wd mean (?) 3-4 more days and Henry will then have to take Thieu's comments, (?) advice, meet one more time w/Le Duc Tho. Now whether that meeting takes place in Paris or Vientiane, I don't think makes any difference if we have Thieu on board. RN: That's my (?). If he goes to Vientiane without Thieu on board- AH: That's bad. RN: With Paris - everybody thinks Paris is going to fail. Vientiane is just too close to the seat of power.

AH: There are things happening, the North is leaking out. They leaked out this morning- RN: (?) from there? AH: Yesterday they did that somehow. Today they put out the word that Friday the 20th is a decisive time, and they gave this to the Canadians and the Japanese, and they're either going to go for a permanent real ceasefire and peace, or a continuation of this kind of situation. So they're trying to build a (?) line, a crisis point. And I think this 3 or 4 day delay, or 5 days, is ideal because it's slowing their forces in the South (off-pace?) and they're having a hell of a time managing it. RN: Why is (?)? AH: Because they - these guys only have so much staying power and they can go about a week-RN: I see, just delaying their- AH: They'll have shot their wad, they'll be starting to fold up and Thieu will be on the strong side of that. RN: Is Thieu going to (?) them up a little? AH: Right. RN: Boy if I were Thieu I'd be working on the (?) if I ever could. They are having their biggest success in that one area. AH: This Star story from Bradsher in Saigon says everyone's pointed toward the ceasefire, so we've got a great psychology at work. RN: He's a bad man, a son of a bitch. AH: He is bad. But they know - you know, this kind of thing where everybody has the sense they want it- RN: You'd say the S Viets want a ceasefire? Well, the people really are sick of killing. Goddammit, Thieu can't keep it from them. AH: No he's - he himself is going to have problems if this thing goes on too much longer. RN: They're killing 2 or 300 a week right now. God, that's got to stop. I mean, I know (?) w/ S Vietnam, there comes a point when there just isn't any more reason to do it. Now of course, Thieu is in a spot, because the stories that play that Henry's going there to work on Thieu - Thieu cannot appear to be the fellow to block this son of a bitch. Of course that's another thing. (?) Abrams. AH: But all we have to do - as I told Ron this morning,

["just play it down, keep our cool and let this thing work itself out. We're in the driver's seat.", "RN, AH discuss briefing statement re US-Soviet wheat deal and trade agreement, poll data re public's attitude toward trade agreement.", "RN: So Rogers realizes this is really a hell of a deal of the political side. AH: He left as happy as (?). RN: Alex Johnson (?). Do you- AH: Absolutely, totally. My only concerns are tiny and (?) about the security (?). RN: But on the other hand, you're always going to have a security situation. Those people are going to fight as long as they live. AH: We'll (?) on board or we'll do it right afterwards. I think we've got, and I don't think Hanoi's going to fall off, because it's compensation for them and the fact that we (?) Thieu if it has to go that way. RN: Well, (?) too, (?) out there and we're stopping the bombing and the mining. That's a hell of a thing. Otherwise they face a real (live?) Pres who's demonstrated he'll bomb the hell out of people if necessary, and we'll bomb them to kingdom. They've had enough - you wait. AH: And they're going - those mines, as you know, there's 30 days before anyone can touch them, that's well into December, and that's going to be a long tedious job with (?) to do it for them, that keeps them on good behavior. What we're going to have is a couple of weeks of hell, with a lot of killing going on. RN: We've got to prepare the way for that by saying - predicting that, saying "(?) the ceasefire and so forth.\" AH: You're going to have to be strong in yr statement when you announce this agreement. In other words, it's somewhat threatening to Hanoi that if they don't play the game we're right back at them. RN: That if they don't reach an agreement, we'll have to take appropriate action. AH: We don't have the millennium yet, that is. RN: I agree w/you that if we can get this thing postponed 4 or 5 days- AH: It hooks it up so that when the hell starts, you don't have about a 2 or 3 wk period where people say \"peace my ass, they're killing people every day, what kind of a deal did we buy here?\" You want to bring it up closer so that when the fighting starts people will still feel the aura of what's been done, and it all happens after the election. Because there's going to be a bloodbath, we have to assume that. RN: The South's going to kill the North (?). AH: They've both given instructions to each other, get out and - (?) but even that is-", "RN: So Henry's finished his first day w/Thieu now? AH: He hasn't met Thieu yet. It's now midnight and he'll see him in the morning. He's met w/Bunker and Abrams. RN: That's amusing to me, that the sonofabitching networks, one of them was trying to make the appearance that [William] Sullivan was the big hero of all this, isn't it great he's going, the young guy that was with Harriman at Geneva - shit. But I don't care. There's enough credit for everybody in this. AH: Nobody's going to be fooled about this. This is May 8, and Laos and everything you've done - it can't come out any other way. The big thing is- RN: To do it, and best (?) before the election. The N Viets (?). And after the election we do it. We cannot screw around w/Thieu after the election. But I think Abrams will step up to this and say, \"now if you jeopardize this, you jeopardize yr support from the best friend you have in the world, the Pres of the US.\" How does Abrams feel? AH: He feels from his heart that it's time to get out. He's not saying it from loyalty, he believes it from his heart. So we're in great shape."]

803-18 10/18/72

2:40 pm - 3:16 pm

RN, Nikolai S. Patolichev, Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, WPR, PGP, PMF, Helmut "Hal" Sonnenfeldt; WH photog, press at start of meeting.

Discussion of US-Soviet trade agreement.

NSP, AFD, PMF leave.

Discussion of Lend-lease, US-Soviet economic relations. PGP, HS leave.

RN: (?) what shd I say? (?) agreement. WPR: We worked that out. RN: I thought you shd know, I put - the real problem is Thieu. He's scared - I don't know what (?) political stand (?) but it's a hell of a deal for him. You see, the enemy (?), they're moving around Saigon. You call Mel and (?) Haig has told (?) for God's sakes, be sure they're putting everything that can (put off?) an attack around Saigon, because that will give Thieu a little bit of assurance. It's the right thing to do, to (sell?), to get this goddamn war over with. WPR: If you look at that (?), it is a (?). RN: It isn't just the (?) coalition govt, it's the (?). WPR: (?) supervision, and it leaves the political future to the Vietnamese. RN: (?) both sides. The other thing is this - (?) Abrams, when I told him, I sd, if you believe (?), Mel called him, Haig called him. Bunker can't do it at this point. I told Abrams, tell him this is the best deal he can get and if he doesn't take it he will seriously erode the friendship of the man in this office.

804 SERIES

804-1 10/18/72

Between 3:23 and 5:43 am

RN, HRH.

(5 min 19 sec Pers Ret del)

Following disc of domestic issues.

RN: I was talking to Al an hour or so ago. HRH: He's- RN: It's 3 or 4 days. Well, Al's judgment is it's going to come off, but it won't come off that quick. Here's what's going to happen: Thieu's going to have something he's going to contribute, Henry's going to have to meet Le Duc Tho again. Now he may have to do that and I approved that under those circumstances, that if it's a deal, then he goes to Vientiane and sees him there, then goes back to see Thieu (?) delayed a day or two. HRH: So he goes to Vientiane and sees him and then back to Saigon and up to Hanoi? RN: Yep. HRH: And then back here. RN: But you see it isn't going to be (?). HRH: He's got, still, three days- RN: I don't think it's going to be- HRH: Depends on how long he has to stay in Hanoi. RN: Tomorrow will be the first of 3 or 4 bloody days with Thieu. It shdn't be so (?) what he'll say to him.
(5 min 46 sec Pers Ret del)

JDE enters. Discussion of budget meeting recommendations.

AH enters.

RN: Al, I was just going to tell you that Rogers stayed behind and we talked, and he was ecstatic about the agreement. He sd it was a total capitulation. So I thought you'd be interested to know we're not going to have any flak from State for a while. My point is that after all the agony we went thru on SALT, and the Shanghai Communique, and the Berlin agreement, you're not going to have it on this one. AH: Not a chance. RN: (?) but basically

his reaction and Alex Johnson's and the others, if it's any indication, the deal's a good deal for everybody in the (?) and that's why Abrams reacted the way he did. AH: That's right. RN: Rogers didn't raise (?) a damn thing. AH: (?). He did very well, incidentally on the trade thing, exactly the way you wanted it done. RN: I knew he wd.

RN: Now, as I understand it, they will be meeting – he sees Thieu for the first time tomorrow. That will be the hairiest day. And cd I suggest this? Henry's a fine negotiator but he's not a very good poker player. He's always thinking of the deal, but what it is is he sometimes tells people too soon. If he thinks the political (deal?) is one Thieu can buy, I wdn't throw that in the pot right away. Put it this way: I'd put the political one as not something they'd agreed to, but something the Pres is insisting on. You can say they are still talking about the coalition govt and all this stuff, but here is, we've finally got, the Pres says "this is our position; we won't go any further at all." And then say the Pres has laid down as a condition that there will be no coalition govt – use that term – in appearance or in fact. Then when he does show Thieu the paper, Thieu will say "Jesus Christ." I like this talk leaking out of State or someplace that it is a coalition, because when Thieu sees it, he'll find it's a hell of a lot better than he thought. Do you agree with that? AH: I hope Henry's going to do it that way. He ought to get into the security things, the tough things and then put the (?). RN: He shd say this is something I insisted upon and he thinks maybe we're going to (sell?) that to the N Viets. I don't think he shd present that as something they agreed to. He's got to say "we bargained for this, this is what the Pres insisted upon." Why don't you say "the Pres (?) this out for me" or something like that, "he thinks this is one you can live with, it gives you total charge and it's not a coalition govt, and has the future of S Vietnam decided by the S Vietnamese. But in order to get this – we're going to insist on this, but it's going to be awful hard for the N Viets to take." That's the tactic I think ought to be used, rather than going into there full-blown and giving him that. So I'd say – see what I mean? Don't be too forthright. Henry's good at that. Just tell him this is (?) it shd be. AH: That's the way I'd do that. "We don't know whether we can get this, but the President's going to insist on it." RN: "But in order to get this we need yr help on the security." AH: And the prisoners. RN: And this is where Abrams has got to weigh in hard and say, "You accept this." So he plans to meet for 3 days? AH: That's the current plan and he'll probably need every bit of it. RN: 3 days from now or has he met w/Thieu? AH: (?). RN: Three more days of meetings w/Thieu? AH: He'll probably need a day in between, but he'll probably have to insist on a reaction so he can get Sullivan (?) to Vientiane, Phnom Penh and Bangkok. The (?) thing is to get Habib back to Seoul. RN: But I wdn't tell the Koreans a goddamn thing unless he has that. AH: He'll only do that if Thieu buys initially. RN: I'd just say – I wdn't worry about that. They're in a bad way at the moment. AH: But it's well to keep them quiet.

AH leaves.

RN, HRH, JDE discuss schedule, planned appearances in Philadelphia and Ashland, Kentucky, veterans' legislation.

805 SERIES

805-5 10/19/72

11:02 am – 11:20 am

RN, AH.

RN: Wait a minute. You're going to have Sullivan go? AH: Yes sir, but he's not going to tell them what the plan is, but to hold their hand a little bit, give them a genl picture of what the situation is. RN: Cd I suggest this? (?) send a personal (?) Kissinger (?), "as I indicated in my handwritten instructions to you, I want you to tell Pres Thieu that I personally studied this proposal at great length and have concluded that it is in the best interests of S Vietnam that the proposal be accepted. You must also tell him in the strongest terms that, for 4 years as Pres, and during all the yrs I have been out of office, there has been no American public figure that has more consistently stood up for S Vietnam, and for a non-Communist govt in S Vietnam and for him personally. You can also tell him that he can be sure he can count on that continued level of support, provided, and you get this straight, that if the enemy breaks the terms of the agreement, we will react accordingly. Also tell him that I wd like (?) to meet w/him personally, and if he considers it desirable to do so, (?) or before the agreement is signed. The purpose of yr telling him this is indicate my all-out support for him. You must tell him I am not trying to twist his arm. I'm not trying to blackmail him or bulldoze him into a settlement for election purposes, that I want him to come along as an equal partner in the spirit that we established (?) in 1969, in ending the war and continuing to build a S Vietnam, under his leadership, which will be strong militarily and economically." I think that's (?). What do you think? AH: It's a good idea. I'll put (?). Attach a cover (?). RN: Right. I think if you can pass it on-

AH: I think he feels a little more confident, Henry - especially because the III Corps area doesn't look so bad. RN: Henry feels confident with Thieu? AH: Henry does, and Thieu was apparently willing to discuss his going to Vientiane and Hanoi, and that's like saying "you can sleep with my wife on Sunday after I give you permission for Saturday." So I think he must be moving (him?).

RN: What's yr judgment about a meeting with him? I didn't want to do it, understand. On the other hand, if that's the thing- AH: I think it's a good offer. I think - before the election I'm not sure. It wd have to be an awfully neat, abided-by arrangement. RN: You can put it basically, you might say after the election, that we'll (?) before the election. AH: I think it's better for you, when you make yr announcement, to make it very short, and very much like the China thing. RN: "I announce this, I want to thank those who have served, particularly those - the next of kin of those who have died, given their lives, the relatives of those POWs and MIAs, and to the American people for their support." AH: And there's still much to be done to have this thing succeed and we intend to do all that's necessary. RN: "And that we'll do all that is necessary. Good night." It shd be very brief; I can do it in 3 or 4 minutes. AH: 10 at the outside. RN: No, I'm not going to do 10. You see, the trouble is - I know this is going to come up, Henry's got (?), it's going to be one of those gobbledygook things about this, and I'm not going to go into any details, I'm not going to do it. I'm just going to say that we have (?), we have reached an agreement w/the N Viets with the complete approval of Thieu. On "blank," there will be a ceasefire. The agreement provides for all prisoners of war, all MIAs to be counted and so forth. The agreement provides for (replacement?), for the govt of S Vietnam to stay in, and to work out

that agreement, provides for continued military assistance for the govt of S Vietnam,
replacing (?), of reconciliation or some bullshit, whatever you want. But then (?) to the
American people, in the longest, most difficult war in history. RN recaps what he plans to
say thanking American people in his address.

RN: That can be sd in 4 minutes; that's better than 10 minutes of gobbledygook. AH: It is better. RN: "On our side, it is our intention to keep this agreement, and we intend to take action to see that the agreement is kept." Now I can't believe Thieu won't take it. AH: Well, he just may, because politically it's a solid plus. RN: It's a hell of a thing for him politically. The more I think of it politically, when he reads that, he's smart enough to know if he screws that thing up beyond belief - well, here he's going to be President, he's going to have military, economic assistance, and here are these assholes, the VC, he can handle them. AH: If he can't handle them there's something wrong. He knows these guys are (extended?) to their limit or they wdn't have given him those political terms. RN: Basically what this is, is a settlement of military issues without a settlement of political issues. (?) and then I told RZ, "don't knock down the idea they're going to try to force a coalition govt." (?) these jackasses like Rather and the rest. You see the point of it? (?) don't have it. AH: Exactly. RN: The idea we're going to force Thieu to have a coalition govt - that's the one point he's got to hammer. There will be no coalition govt, we've refused a coalition govt. AH: After (?), but not now. Because it's (?). RN: At this point let them all gas around and jackass (?). Well, I think Rogers is trying to keep his people in line, because he's all for it, but it's good you had that agreement over here. I'm confident if that damn agreement had gotten over to the State Dept, the way that place leaks, the whole thing wd be out; it'd be in the damn NY Times. AH: Now we've got so much disagreement- RN: You are keeping all the copies? AH: Yes sir. They're not even allowed out of my office. RN: Don't let the copies out to anybody. I don't want a copy. Where the details are concerned, I don't need to have them here. That's your job and Henry's, to fix them. The most important thing is to keep the agreement here. Don't let it leak.

AH: I think we'll know tomorrow. And even if (?). RN: Maybe if it's delayed, but frankly I'm relaxed about any delays. Then he'll just have to go to Vientiane, I suppose, just tell Le Duc Tho "I'm sorry we can't do it but we'll make the deal the day after the election." Then tell him "you must keep it, (?) the election." Say that the Pres keeps his word both ways. You know, when you think about that trade agreement thing, as I was saying to Rogers, (?) you're keeping Rogers informed, or Sullivan's probably keeping him informed-AH: No, I'm keeping him informed. He's well abreast. I haven't given him this one yet. I always (?) to you first. RN: (?) messages, just say it's tough going, we think some progress has been made, but that I sent a message of reassurance to Hughes and he thought it wd be helpful in any disagreement.

AH: Yes, we've gotten, I'm told, Defense to give us a few more goodies to sweeten
the military pot, like defensive aircraft. RN: OK. (?) before the ceasefire, or they'd be
replacements? AH: Replacements, but to do it in this package which we have for airlifting
in, which we won't make the decision to do it till Thieu agrees, and that wd be tomorrow.
RN: Airlift it in? There's a period of time you can airlift in without (?). (?) to replace now?
AH: I don't think so, not (?), but we have enough to go in there before the ceasefire takes
place. RN: Jets? Do they have any jets in the South? AH: No, we to give these (?) F-5's.
RN: They're not hurting, they're (?) the jets. As a matter of fact, what the hell is the

difference? The N Viets started the jet war and the rest, the Russians aren't going to let them do it. AH: They buy this package, they're just not going to start again for a long time. RN: (?) then they'll start, you think so? AH: Yes. RN: They'll start sometime but as long as I'm around they'll always have a deadly fear (of me?) I think. See, that's the beauty of having somebody in office who doesn't have to face the fact of running for re-election, because I can- AH: That's exactly right. And also we start giving them that aid, they'll get used to the bucks, and getting the place built up, and they're not going to throw that away lightly after this 20 year slaughter of their people. Once we can get the thing stopped and get the benefits of peace understood and accepted, as Henry says, it's like the Soviet Union at the end of WWII. They just cdn't take on another thought of crisis. They backed away every time (?) in the 40s and 50s. RN: (?) the first one (?) was Eisenhower, or whatever it was. He sd (?) and they sd "the hell with it, we're not going to fight." AH: I think the North will have the same problem. So I think we've got everything working for us, and this is going to work out. RN: That's right. AH: Either before the election or just after. This will be the miracle of yr four years, that you've done what you set out to do.

## 806 SERIES

### 806-1 10/23/72

Between 11:20 and 11:35 pm

RN, AH.

AH: Henry's on the phone w/Dobrynin now, (?). RN: That's all right, sit down. Anything new? AH: No, we got sort of a (threatening?) (?) from the N Viets (?). They'll wait. RN: I've decided we can't do anything until the election (?). It'll hurt us some but after the election we'll bomb the bejesus out of them. **PR PROB** I'm not going to tell Henry that but that's what we're going to do. We'll go another round with them if they want; if not, screw them. AH: (?) if they won't settle. RN: Hell, they've had it. Is Henry feeling better? AH: Yes, he's tired. RN: The point is we shd talk briefly tonight and see Rogers tomorrow at 10. Were you able to reassure him (?) about Rogers? AH: Yes. He's been very good all thru this and Laird's been excellent. Laird's been away on this (?). I've of course, nobody knows what the hell's in that (plan?). We're keeping it here, because any leakage at all on this (?) thru the bureaucracy- RN: And the N Viets know it's- AH: They know (?). RN: They (?). They've lied about this (?).

AH: I think we're in good shape. Henry had a hell of a time with Thieu; he's a paranoid of the first order. RN: Sure. Well, after the election he'll be less paranoid. Because then, after the election, I'll be cold as steel. I feel that now, don't you? What else can you say to him? AH: We've got a good arrangement, we've got the means to do it, we're just going to have to get the hell out of there. We've done all that has to be done. If he can't cut it with all his men and all that equipment, then he wasn't worth saving in the first place. RN: He can't cut it to- AH: He'll cut it all right because they're the one that need it, and they do want settle. That I have no doubt about.

RN: Of course Thieu is paranoid and I think (?) what Rogers says, with the Koreans and Chinese Nationalists are- AH: Well, Henry will (?) the atrocious charges and- RN: What? AH: He made some really atrocious charges. RN: He covered that in his memo, (?) went to Peking and Moscow, (?) was building up the Amer press against (?). He must not

(?) about - I wonder if Bunker's lost his influence over him at (?). Apparently Abrams had no influence on him. AH: Although he made a hell of a try. Bunker, I think, at the time of the elections last Oct, he lost his patience with Thieu and Thieu just cut him off. RN: Which one, the last bunch? AH: Yes, when he rigged that goddamn thing, it disturbed Bunker a great deal.

RN: We'll make this quite brief tonight. AH: Henry's all right; I think he's a little relieved. I'm a little relieved we don't have to do this before the election because it's going to be messy and it cdn't help, it cd only hurt. RN: Right now we don't want (him?) hurt. (?). AH: That's easy (?) wait for 2 wks. I think we ought to let Henry get out and when we hear from the N Viets substantively and do a little press backgrounder, just not on substance, just on what's been going on, we've made progress, have some things to settle. RN: (?) though, we've got to use the word "progress." AH: Well, we've made incredible progress. RN: The point is, we (?) he's got to say it. He can. They say, "now what about the election?" and he says "we believe we will maintain progress in this respect, without regard to the election." I think he ought to put that (?) the meeting, or the election (?)? AH: I think if we can do it Wed or Tues of next wk, the more time we buy between now and then, the better. This will be a fast briefing. (?) will take 3 wks to go to the other side. RN: I think it'll (?) tell Thieu, (?). AH: Well, Henry had to leave it a little, he and I smoothed it over a bit before he left, (?). This morning when he left, on the other hand (?) mentioned he made it impossible for us to continue our support if (?). I think the guy's a mental case. And very insecure, it has to be that. I think he's personally insecure in his own group. RN: Jesus Christ, (?) we don't want to flush the whole thing. AH: I think we've given him enough to chew on now; he'll survive. He knows we're determined to do this. If he really thinks about it, he's got a pretty damn good deal. And it'll take a few weeks; he'll start posturing thru this.

RN: Well, he seems to be leaking something out of Saigon, that the ceasefire (?) and the rest, that may be (?). AH: And of course they're planning like hell for a ceasefire, (the S Viet forces?). RN, AH briefly discuss press coverage of RN's appearance in NYC motorcade.

AH: This actually has turned out very well, it's been good, solid steady progress in search of peace. No one can doubt that you've made every effort. RN: That's for sure. (?) is that - to say, now we've made an offer, (?) refuse to accept it. Who are they going to believe, them or us? If they pull that game, then we'll bomb the shit out of them - I really will bomb this time. AH: I think they're going to do it. I may be wrong. RN: With Thieu, I think what to do is be tough on him privately but good to him publicly. AH: Henry's (?). AH: What else? He's (bringing?) Dobrynin over. RN: I thought you'd done that. AH: I did, he's doing it again. RN: It's good that you and Henry did. I just can't be around gassing with the Ambassador. It's a big game, they know it, and know we're trying, and that their client embarrassed us on this settlement. AH: I'll go get (him?).

806-2 10/23-24/72

11:35 pm - 12:05 am

RN, HK, AH.

RN: Well, ready for another trip? HK: (?) another trip. (?). RN: How about tomorrow? Well, let's just talk briefly, about what we'll have Ziegler put out, (?) briefing

tonight and tomorrow we'll talk to Rogers.

HK: Haig, I know, has kept you informed of the (?) of the negotiating situation since I left. What I thought was a good agreement before has become immeasurably better. RN: Oh, I know. HK: They've agreed to (?) an intl conference within 30 days, that establishes a guarantee that (?) the names of the countries they include, the whole intl machinery, they accepted our - keeping their prisoners in S Viet jails, which is a terrible setback for them. They've accepted verbatim our replacement provision, which means in effect (?) military aid. They've accepted a provision for Cambodia which when I read it to Lon Nol, he was practically in tears of gratitude. They've accepted our Laotian conditions. They've withdrawn their demand that Thieu had to promise to resign sometime before the election. In other words, when we compare the agreement with what you sd you'd do on May 8, we've almost exceeded it. We've certainly reached- RN: We've got more guarantees? HK: We've got more guarantees, and these guys, after having stonewalled us for 10 years, have caved on every single issue. For example on the replacement provision, they've sd "for purposes of peace, and not for offensive purposes, the following replacements are permitted." So I've had what I (?) the insolence of knocking out the phrase "for purposes of peace and not for offensive purposes" by saying it was ridiculous. He sd it doesn't mean anything, it's in every agreement. And we just say "the following weapons can be replaced." Now the agreement, I think we can be proud of. It's the very best we cd have gotten. Now we have a massive problem with Thieu- RN: I know. HK: And I'm afraid that the fellow's off his head. I mean, he has a real problem. It is a tough problem for him to keep even the vestiges of- RN: He wants us to be in there, (?). HK: But (?).

RN: The problem I see w/the whole thing, looking at it coldly, on the merits - who else? HK: We can't do anything. If we overthrow him now - first of all, he's so insane he'll take everything with him. And I think- RN: He's (crapping?) on (?). HK: Because I'm afraid we make him - the reason we need him now, to stay after we leave, is so we don't make a mockery of all the suffering. RN: We can't lose 55,000 people if- HK: Because if we send him down the chute, the way - the way he treats Bunker, for example, is so unbelievable. I don't know if Haig told you - we had a meeting scheduled for 2 in the afternoon. We get a message it's put off till 5, then we get a message it's cancelled. Then Bunker sd he wanted to see him to discuss my schedule, for 10 minutes. He gets a call back, saying "stay on the phone, you'll be told." He (?) me the phone (?) and some little jerk calls him up and says "the Pres will call you. Stay near the phone." Another 45 minutes and Thieu calls up and says, "I'm going to a Cabinet meeting. Stay near the phone." This maneuver goes on for 3 ½ hours. He sits by the phone, a 77-yr-old man. And then a little shitass calls him from the palace and says, "The Pres cannot see you until 8 in the morning." By then it's 9:30 at night. Bunker says, "Can't I come by for 10 minutes, because it means (?) in Washington, the way the clock runs." The little fellow says "this can't (?)." Half an hour later Thieu himself calls, screaming like a maniac, saying "Kissinger's people are inciting a revolution, they're all over Saigon, just as Haig's people had been before him, inciting my people against me." My people didn't even speak to any Vietnamese. And of course- RN: (?). HK: Yes, but my staff, my driving staff he claimed was around town-

RN: Well, my point is we know your traveling staff and Haig's didn't do a goddamn thing, just sort of carried briefcases and worked on things for you. But anyway, where do

we stand? HK: Where we stand is, the only rational explanation we have for what he did, which he didn't make but which I have to make on his behalf, is: if he has 3 wks he can get his army deployed, he can get his province chiefs lined up, and he can have a better chance of surviving the ceasefire. Secondly, if he doesn't yield to me when I come there, then he's not an American stooge, he's done it on his own. And if he does it in a shitty way, we can follow our pride. That's the rational explanation. But I don't exclude the irrational explanation, that after the election he'll be just as miserable and paranoid as-

RN: So (?) we, and then what do we do? All the sacrifices are in vain. HK: Then I think what we shd do - and I'm having (?) already - we shd go thru this agreement and see which cd be implemented bilaterally. And just let him fight and lose his own war. Then if the tragedy is that this- RN: (?) he will? HK: See, one reason I'm glad that we now have to do it after the election, unless you absolutely have to have it before the election. RN: As a matter of fact I did promise Nelson I'd have a little talk with him and he's going to call today. It's been a long day, (?) speaking for 20,000 people, but Nelson's great. If you call him tomorrow, just give him a briefing - I sd "what do you think, Nelson?" And he sd, "don't do it now. It's too close to the election. It'd look like an election trick, like with Johnson." He also told me an interesting thing which will please you. The NY Daily News does their famous poll - he has the advance of the one that's coming out in the next 2 or 3 days. In NY it's 58-32. HK: New York City? RN: New York State. If the News poll is 58-32 in NY State it's like winning the State - assuming all the undecided goes to the other side, we still win the state by a million and a half. Nelson says Jeez - there's a (?) this asshole McGovern, sd he's been the most irresponsible son of a bitch. The thing is, I feel if you can (?).

RN: Now you talked to Dobrynin? HK: I just talked to Dobrynin and sd "if the Pres has to choose between a blowup in Saigon and one in Hanoi, he'll choose a blowup in Hanoi. But on the other hand, we cannot take on Saigon before Nov 7, but if they go thru one more negotiating round with us, and if we can get some of these changes, we will consider the possibility of a final document. They gave us 20 changes; 16 are crap. One is cosmetic. I mean, they're so paranoid - these committee is (?).

RN: The thing I'd like to see you do - right now I'd like to see you crush McGovern. He's a bad man. If you can keep this thing (confused?) for a while, I'd like to see if you cd put yr next meeting about Tues or Wed of next week. If they blow it, we're going to (take?) them on. HK: My view is this: basically we screwed them because we got more concessions out of them - it wd have taken us months to (?) the prisoners. If they go public, we can surface the agreements, say that was the basic agreement, but say that there are always at the end of the agreement there are fine points that have to be worked out. Secondly there's the issue of their troops in the South which we hadn't listed in the agreement, on which we had a separate understanding with them.

HK: I think you will look very good having what is already a very good agreement, being in a position to score a spectacular - but for principle you want to wait a few more weeks to see if you want to tidy up. RN: I was going to say, in regard to Bill Rogers, he's been handling himself damn beautifully. How's Sullivan? HK: Sullivan is enthusiastic. I told him his whole career in State next term (would be based on how he handled this?) He's an ambitious bastard. We can trust him.

RN: I think you shd consider doing a backgrounder. On my (?) all I talked about was

"peace with honor." I didn't even say we'd made progress on it. So I'd stay totally away from it. Ziegler's stayed totally away from it. Nobody sd a damn thing. In fact we aren't leaking; it's Hanoi that did the leaking. HK: I can't get away with a backgrounder; I have to go on the record because it'll blow. RN: I think in terms of the election, you've got to say "the most important thing is not to do the election gimmick. The thing to do is the right thing at the right time." HK: Can I say "major progress?" RN: All right (?). HK: I can say most of the major issues are settled.

RN: Now with Bill- HK: He doesn't know that I plan to go to Hanoi? RN: No. We never told him. With Bill, the thing to do is just- HK: I'll tell him the truth. RN: Tell him the truth, because now I think he's totally committed. The important thing is to do the right thing, all around. And the right thing is for Thieu to take the deal. I'm thinking that after the election, we ought to use the big guns, and I ought to tell him. HK: After seeing this man in action, I'm afraid to throw you together with him. RN: All right. HK: We shd use a meeting with you as a reward after he agrees to it.

RN: Of course, under this agreement, we have no obligation to recognize the VC. The (draft?) covered that very effectively. HK: Now at the press conf, they'll say "what about a coalition govt?" and I'll say "that is not an issue. The President has (handled?) that." HK notes that re negotiations between S Viet parties, "we didn't prescribe anything." HK notes that "these guys are terrified not so much of the Communists, but of peace." RN: How did Abrams behave? HK: Excellent. The first day he didn't say anything, the second day he made an excellent speech. HK describes Abrams' gist. RN: So he put himself solidly behind the agreement. HK describes his conv w/Gen Weyand and Ellsworth Bunker, who approved of the agreement.

HK: Now let me tell you, Sullivan took this to Souvanna Phouma, who's a sophisticated guy. RN: Yes, smarter than Thieu. HK: Souvanna Phouma sd "they're defeated, they're totally wiped out." He told the Thais "they're finished for yrs to come." Lon Nol sd, "Tell the Pres thank you for saving SE Asia."

RN, HK disc cable describing Thieu's claim that "HK's people are inciting revolution." HK: I'm thinking now that if these hysterical bastards collapse on us, then it's better that you do this after the election than if you do it as an expedient before.

RN: What are you doing about the bombing? We're not bombing above the 20th, I know. HK: It is a hell of a (?) to ask Hanoi to- because Saigon doesn't accept their terms. RN: Just so we keep it in as a card. Just say "we're continuing it in the battle area," that's how I'd put it. HK thinks the principal problem w/S Viets now "is their nitpicking either on changes that are insane, that the N Viets can't accept, or (their not accepting ones we can get?).

RN, HK, discuss schedule. RN: Well, I'm pulling for you. I know it's hard to do these things. You think we shd have changed Bunker last yr? I know if he can't (talk to?) Thieu- HK: I think we shd leave him there. The problem was, he wd only talk to Thieu. RN: The burden we bear is with Thieu. We recognize that he's irrational, but if he goes, the whole thing goes to pieces. HK: The other mistake we made was to (tell Thieu?) (?), because he uses that for his own theater, to stage (before his group?).

HK: I told Dobrynin that the next time I meet w/him, what we agree to is final.

806-6 10/24/72

Between 8:59 and 10:04 am

APB, HRH.

HRH discusses scratching himself w/paper clip. RN enters. SB enters. Disc of schedule. APB, SB leave.

Discussion of safety concerns re RN's motorcade appearances.

RZ enters. RZ: I wanted to talk to you about the picture of HK and WPR. I think (?) reporting on this (?). Why don't we just do it in here? I think you shd also tell Henry that when they take the picture there can be a certain amt of laughing - it shdn't be stern, but shd be serious. And I wanted to check this with you - when they ask the only thing I'm going to say, "while some progress is made, and I caution you against excessive speculation, Dr Kissinger, after he finishes his discussions w/the Pres, will be meeting w/you sometime this wk." HRH: Meeting w/the press? RZ: Yes. RN: Is there an announcement today? RZ: I was going to refer to it as a holding pattern. RN: I'm afraid of that because we've got to wait till we've got some message from the N Viets about what he's going to do. It's about 75% he's going to do it, but if we sd anything about that- HRH: (?) wd put it out anyway. RZ: The only advantage of doing it kind of checkmates the countercharge, prevents anyone from saying "we're not being told where we stand on these things," which is easy enough to counter, but it sort of loses (?). RN: I think I'd rather say "I know there's a great interest in Henry (?), I'll be discussing the matter with Henry, and (?) if anything (works out?). I know there's interest and I haven't had a chance to raise it yet, but I will raise it w/the Pres and Dr Kissinger, and something will be worked out later this wk," but you certainly shdn't say today or tomorrow. RZ: Good. Thanks. RZ leaves.

Further discussion of schedule, motorcade safety.

Brief disc of Daniel Schorr story on Watergate.

806-7 10/24/72

Between 10:04 and 11:15 am

RN, RZ, HK, WPR.

RN: Five seconds, five seconds are what these assholes get. They're not getting any small talk or anything; get them in, take the picture, get them out.

RZ leaves, returns w/WH photog, press. Camera noise.

RZ, photog, press leave.

HK: So I then sd to Le Duc Tho, he sd (?) so I sd the hell with (?). But as (?) some technical foulup, there is one or two days' delay, (?) to get out in 60 days.

HK: Nothing compares to the behavior of the S Viets. As I told the Pres, I was there for 3 days, and not one official function was given for me or Bunker. Not one gift, not one token of appreciation. HK describes Bunker's waiting for phone call again, and "Thieu called, screeching so loud you cd hear him around the room, saying Kissinger's men were inciting revolution." You have to wonder about his sanity. WPR: I wonder what he's going to say in his broadcast. HK: See, what this weird bastard's doing- I talked to Bunker this morning and he sd their foreign ministry set up a dispatch this morning rejecting the imposition of a coalition govt. Unless he's completely crackers - what he's doing is setting

up a straw man and today they're holding (?) over Vietnam rejecting a coalition govt. What the son of a bitch may be doing is to say (he'll turn us out?) over a coalition govt, which we never were trying to impose. On the other hand if he keeps this up he's going to put himself in a press and public opinion position where he's the only obstacle to peace.

WPR: I think it's still quite possible to salvage it but if they go public it's an obstacle. HK: See, we had told them, which was probably a mistake - can I bring Bill up to date with the details? RN: Sure. HK: I'd already done it w/the (General?), and if you've already talked to Sullivan- WPR: No, well, I talked to Sullivan a little bit, but why don't you go ahead? HK: First we had the meeting on the 17th w/Xuan Thuy. Now they'd already made major concessions. At that meeting, they agreed for example to insert the phrase into the political provision that the institutions (?) which the elections were to be held were to be negotiated between the parties. They agreed to call an intl conference in 30 days, which was not in the original draft, and they agreed to our composition of the conference, it's not (the original composition) but it includes the Secy Genl of the UN for the first time, and it (excludes?) India which is tough on them. They did that at the meeting. Then there were two (?), one in which they have to leave their (?) in S Viet jails, and the other in which we have the right to replace S Viet arms. Those they had not agreed to. I told them that we cdn't consider - they asked, "what is the time schedule in which you can sign this agreement," and we sd "if everything falls into place, it wd be Oct 31, around there," but it's unrealistic until we have an agreement. So that in the 24 hours (?) they sent us our concurrence to our text of the two - now Bill Sullivan sd, "let's throw in that phrase on the prisoners, they'll never agree to it, but it'll give us some time." They accepted it. (?) the provision. So then (?) time, we sent them a series of understandings. They had, for example, on the replacement of weapons, an introductory phrase "for purposes of peace, (?)," which really is the most crappy language. Then we sd we had to have a written statement from them on the following. The first wd affect the US prisoners, (?) text, "(?) make arrangements for their repatriation and return of the US. (?) action will be applied to Laos and Cambodia." They accepted that as a (?) date. Then they accepted the (?) date that ceasefire (?) in 30 days. Then we sent them the (?) message on Cambodia. "(?) on the basis of public statements and (?) in meetings w/Dr Kissinger (?)." HK reads provisions re Laos and Cambodia. HK: To which they replied as follows: first, they accepted all our text on the prisoners. HK reads N Viet reply.

HK: I don't know what more we cd have done. HK reiterates Souvanna Phouma and Lon Nol's reaction. HK: But in Vietnam, we had a nightmare of a time. The first day I saw Thieu alone and (?) he sd "why don't you present this to the Natl Security Council?" I presented it to the NSC. RN: Who's on that? HK: The Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Chief of Staff. He went around the table; no one raised any objections and Bunker sd it was totally different from the Haig visit. I asked for a private meeting w/him after that, and gave him the schedule. I sd, "if there's any problem w/the schedule, tell us now." He sd, "there's no problem. I'd like you (?) meet w/the NSC tomorrow." I sd "Sullivan's going to leave tomorrow to brief other countries; do you have an objection to that?" He sd "no." So the next morning I met w/the NSC and they asked questions which were very low-key, which I thought wd cd easily take care of. "How does reinforcement work?" and so forth. That took four hours. Then Abrams met w/Vien, we (?) in sixty days. At the end of the meeting Thieu proposed we have a meeting of the task force. They met and they had 26 nitpicking

suggestions and two fundamental ones. One was that whenever they mentioned withdrawal of US forces, they wanted mention of withdrawal of N Viet forces, and you know that's impossible. Second, they considered the Committee of Natl Reconciliation a coalition gov't, and they wanted to drop that out. And the fact is Pham Van Dong told de Borchgrave that the Natl Commission is just cosmetics. So a meeting was scheduled for 2 that afternoon. I read him all the new concessions they had made (?) and sd "I'm now going to Cambodia. What do we do?" He sd (?). RN: So you thought you had a breakthrough? HK: Yes, because he sd "how do I institute the ceasefire?" It's a serious q from him. "Do I institute it unilaterally and ask the Natl Assembly to ratify it, or get the Natl Assembly to declare it first?" I sd "it's yr preference."

HK: So I went to Cambodia and had an emotional meeting w/Lon Nol who cdn't have been thrilled. So it breaks your heart, when I (?) and had a talk w/Thieu that can only be described as insane. I told him, I began by saying "before we finalize the agreement, I have one more (?), the N Viets have proposed modifications in Article 9G which is the one about the committee, and I'll see whether I can get the (de facto?) to pull out troops from Northern Military Region 1 and that will be taken care of by the infiltration." He sd "it doesn't make any difference. We will not accept it (?) with or without modifications. We will not make peace unless every last N Viet has left this country. You have betrayed us. For a yr you and the Pres have been plotting. You have made a plot with China and Russia. Sure, you've kept me informed of the private meetings, which was all a lie because you've been (?) this agreement all along." A paranoid outburst, "(?) the press campaign against me." It was weird, because he was sitting there crying, and his interpreter was crying. And this went on and on. WPR: And Ellsworth was there? HK: Oh yes, he was totally shaken. I never went anywhere - when I was alone Ellsworth was with me and at the (council?) meetings Sullivan was there. So I sd, "how can you say this?" Here is (?) Bunker, of his 77 years he spent five yrs here. He sd, "you broke yr faith with me when you (asked me?) to step down last yr and yr Secy of State sd we can't (expect it?) for two months. You are cowards (?)." I sd, "now on the ceasefire, you say all N Viet forces have to be withdrawn. We proposed in Oct '70, Jan, May of '72, the withdrawal of N Viet forces was never mentioned in any of our proposals. How can we now go to the American people when the other side can now accept yours, and our proposal, and say"- RN: This is really insulting (?).

HK: He (?) that was the case, he sd "then you started betraying me when you talked about my resignation prior to the election." HK describes a following conversation wherein Thieu "brought up the coup and Diem, and I sd 'if you find one American official who (?), you notify us and he'll leave this country in 24 hours.' This is a tragedy. So we had to notify the N Viets that we were not ready to sign this agreement, even though we'd told them. It's a total breach of faith w/the N Viets because we'd told them that they (?) Art 7 and 8, and if they gave us these understandings, which I think you'd agree you'd have thought were not possible 3 weeks ago."

HK: What we've asked from the N Viets is one more meeting in which we'd present the S Viet case. Most of the changes are so crappy, if we (?) a ceasefire (?) effect. Now they want (?) in Saigon (?). Now Sullivan and I are (?) because mainly they're concerned with 9G. We cannot ask for N Viet forces to be pulled out (?). On the other hand I talked to Weyand-

(4 sec Nat Sec del, re intelligence)

HK: - every intelligence representative from the military gets a briefing about this situation. By the (?). For example before I left, the CIA told me the situation in MR III was very bad. There, I can't find one intelligence person, from military or CIA, who confirmed that assessment. HK describes Weyand's assessment. HK: Given the fact that this provides the infiltration of (?), I think we're a hell of a lot better off making it now than six months from now after another infiltraton puts another 100,000 men down there. So what we've done is, we've asked for another meeting w/Le Duc Tho in Paris. I think we have to give them an undertaking that whatever document is agreed to in that meeting will then not be changed no matter what anyone says. Because otherwise they're going to (?), we're going to find themselves in a process where we bomb the bejesus out of them (?) and never settle this thing. As it is, it's 50-50 whether they'll follow through with it. They told us they want a 5 yr economic agreement, and create an economic commission between the US and DRV. Now if they agree to these, they can't (?) to fight a war in the South.

RN: What is the situation (?) with Thieu? I suppose we're talking about (?). HK: I talked to Bunker this morning. He tells me that they're (?) all over S Vietnam, attacking the idea of a coalition govt, and they sent out a circular dispatch to all foreign countries attacking it. Now there are two possibilities: one, that this wily bastard is setting up a straw man. That wd be the rational possibility, that he's buying some time to (?). If he's not rational, he's just saying to hell with it, if (?) now, he'll destroy it anyway. WPR: I'd say the first (?). He's made up his mind he's got to go along, continuing plans for a ceasefire even now, but he wants to have the best possible (?). WPR describes Thieu's stance as "a face-saving device, and he wants to wipe out the North's face-saving device." WPR: I think our strategy shd be to try to get both of them not to get their heels dug in too much, nor shd we. We have to be sure everybody's fluid, that they keep talking." HK: You always come to the point where the (?) issues seem terribly important, but the most important issues have been settled. RN: Well, if he doesn't (?) he'll commit suicide. Now you gave the (?) where I sd "now look here, these (?) will seriously jeopardize his support from this office."

HK: He's got unlimited American economic aid, (?). Now if we'd put this out as our own proposal we'd have been run out of town. Can you imagine what Murray Marder wd have sd.

RN: When is he planning to make his broadcast? HK: I think tomorrow evening. RN: Let's suppose that he says (?) a coalition govt. If he goes too far, well, we can't let him face us down. That's one point. The second is, by not letting him face us down, that means that we strike him down. But if we strike him down then everything's lost in the South. HK: If he says he won't accept a coalition govt, we can say there's no discussion of a coalition govt right now. We can say categorically we haven't insisted on a coalition govt. That's a code word.

WPR: What we shd say is that the proposed agreement is not a coalition govt, but a machinery to (?) an election, and he stays in power until after the election. RN: (?). WPR: We can say it provides the present govt will say in (?) until the- RN: We've always sd in all our proposals that the VC can participate in the election machinery. Good God, that's what this is about. HK: We can say that the ceasefire provisions implemented May 8, the political provisions implement Jan 25, even give the S Viets greater control over it because they don't specify what kind of elections these are.

HK: I think we can say that the essential (articles?) - I don't think that we shd say

anything unless we're pushed against the wall. But supposing the other side goes public with the agreement, I think we should say that when you conclude an agreement, you always come up against nuances that still require working out. Second, that there are some phrases in there, such as "administrative structure," that (have different meanings?) in Vietnamese and English. That requires working out. Third, there are some practical provisions about the disposition of forces w/respect to the ceasefire. All of these are so minor compared to what's already been achieved that we've asked for one more meeting.

HK: There's one other thing they accepted, (?) all these things on Cambodia. I referred to the Jan 25 speech of Thieu's resignation. I said "with respect to certain developments within S Vietnam, the matter referred to in the DRV statement," which was Thieu's resignation, "was being discussed in the context of (?) proposals of Jan 25."

WPR: Essentially, we've got to say that nothing in the agreement provides for a coalition govt. HK: You can say that. RN: That's right. WPR: The problem, as I see it, is, assuming the N Viets make the (?) which (?) radio that they're doing it (?) that "if we agree to it in every way and Thieu's blocking it, why don't they bring him along?" HK: First, we can't back into a position where he's (?). We can say it was always understood that it was necessary to work out (?) the (final?) details. RN: And we can say we've always said we will not make a deal about the future of S Vietnam without Thieu's - without that govt's participation.

HK: The other point of (?) the matter, if they press too hard on the fact that we've already agreed, then they'll be forced to public the agreement. If they publish it, we'll defend the hell out of it and say "you can see for yourself, it's 95% done, but we want to do it right." WPR: We want to take a position that we've damn near reached a settlement but we don't want (?) details - HK: To produce any misunderstandings that may blow up later.

RN: Well, it seems the problem is (?) he's acting like a maniac. Is there anything we can do - Bunker can't see Thieu and calm him down before the speech? HK: Nobody can see him. Bunker said, and I agree with him, that there are only two possibilities: that Thieu understands completely and is setting it up for his acceptance in such a way that he can claim victory over the N Viets and over us, or that he's flipped his lid. If he's flipped his lid it won't do any good (?). WPR thinks Thieu "is acting mainly to solidify his chances of survival with his people."

RN: Let me sum up the points briefly. First, we don't want any settlement before the election; that must be avoided at all costs. Second point, unless what the North says and the South says is so far out of the ballpark as to make it not credible, we've got to leave the impression that serious progress has been made. We have not said that, but it has to be said. That may put us on a limb. The third point is that unless he's gone ape - and your judgement was - did Bunker think he was nuts or going thru a ploy? The thing about these Asian leaders, and Asian Communists, is that they're great actors. HK: Bunker thinks he's paranoid but playing a (?). WPR: I don't think he's nuts. I think he's a little annoyed he wasn't (?) sooner. RN: The point is at the present time we're in a position - I'll tell you what: it isn't an excuse, but it is to a great extent a reason for our problems here: the N Viets, by (?) and saying they're going to have a victory celebration, that does put Thieu in a spot.

RN: Now you left Thieu w/the idea that we're not pressing to get this done before the election? HK: On the contrary I told him Bunker was going to resume conversations, and I was coming back to report to you and Bill, and we were not pressing for an urgent decision, but I also left him w/the idea that we'd inexorably move toward that point. I sd "we are maintaining our position but you (?) participate in making yr peace and we won't press you." WPR: I think among ourselves we have to say it's not possible before the election, but we shdn't say it publicly. RN: We shd say we are pressing for the right kind of agreement, and the election does not represent a deadline. RN, HK, WPR discuss what RZ shd say at next briefing.

HK: As you pointed out, Bill, the (?) that he is getting ready to cave is that he's holding meetings all over the country about implementing a ceasefire. RN: Since you left? HK: Still, and they have working groups (?) about expediting a withdrawal. It's weird. It was (?) that he was weeping, that he was-(7 sec Nat Sec del, re intelligence)

HK: And they sd after this meeting, that he was whistling, and (?). But for example the head of the Viet CIA called (?) a half-hour before I left to find out how they cd get communications equipment.

HK notes that "the S Viets have forbidden the purchase of blue material" for flags; apparently this is a test of loyalty to Thieu. WPR concerned that "if Thieu goes in the next six months" a bad signal will be sent. RN: And it affects such people as the Japanese, Indonesians, Filipinos, S Koreans.

HK again notes Souvanna Phouma's approval of agreement. RN makes some concluding remarks. RN: We are faced with the problem that we have two unpredictable people here, Dong and Thieu. To a point, it's out of our hands. WPR raises concerns about McGovern. RN thinks the present uncertainty is such as to throw McGovern and Shriver off balance, so works to Admin benefit.

WPR leaves.

RN notes Dr Fritz Kraemer's imminent arrival. HK: Cd he wait one minute? Now they want to deliver their message and I want to make sure - I want our message to be delivered simultaneously.

806-8 10/24/72

Between 11:04 and 11:15 am

RN, SB. SB: Henry's with Dr Kraemer. RN: Have them come in at 11:30.

806-9 10/24/72

11:15 am - 11:45 am

RN, HK, Fritz G.A. Kraemer; WH photog at start of meeting.

RN greets HK and Dr Kraemer; group poses for photo. RN mentions his admiration for FK's analyses of world events. RN: When so many people with intellectual capabilities are so hopelessly unrealistic - well, we call them "doves" but that's too good a word for them - it's important to have a really intelligent appraisal of these great forces at work, and I appreciate it very much. And I was so pleased to read Thimmesch's article, it's a fascinating story. FK regards article as "fairly well (written?) and friendly." RN notes FK's farm work in Maine. FK notes "while I am now an old man, then, physically, I was

an ox." FK notes an FBI investigation of him "and no one could have been more decent or objective to me than the FBI, so much so that I (told them?), were I on the other side of the desk I would have been tougher."

RN: We are now in a position, a period, of enormous change in the world, a period where (?) those of so-called good intentions, (?) the leaders of the Soviet Union and PRC. FK remarks on the contrast between what he views as the insecurity of Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny compared to self-assurance of Khruschev and Stalin, observing that USSR, when challenged in a serious situation, is likely to back down, as in Egypt. FK contrasts this to China, "whose leader, Mao, as I noted in an analysis in 1965, is of a different character, definitely a great man (historically?)." FK analyzes significance of technical cables regarding NLF flag display. FK suggests "that the coming of the ceasefire enforced in legal terms, so that the enemy doesn't have time to use the gap between the announcement and the action taken (?). Second, I wd make every effort to have (?) twelve hours." FK cautions against any "rush" in negotiations due to elections.

RN: We have often said we must do what is right; if we can do what is right early, let's do it. HK: We have used the elections, not in order to support the Pres, but in order to (run up?) the other side against a deadline we cd not change. In the past we've always had a situation where, if we gave a deadline, they made a concession just before the deadline and then we had to change it. This time we have a deadline they cannot change. We'll leaving it (?) whether they will or not, to get the maximum of concessions.

HK: Our difficulty has not that we've made concessions before the election. Our difficulty has been think of demands which cd (?) beyond the election, because every demand we (?), they meet within 24 hours. But we've made the proposal, for example, that their prisoners have to stay in S Viet jails, which we thought was unacceptable, and they accepted it. Now it's not an easy thing for them to sign a document where they release our prisoners, but all (?) Viet military prisoners have to stay in jail.

RN notes N Viets "have taken a hell of a beating. The mining, the bombing has hurt. We've clobbered the bejesus out of them, so I think they've reached the point where - well, they may have read Mao. He was always willing to retreat."

HK notes that "we asked for a ceasefire in Cambodia and they accepted it in 36 hours." FK: What about Laos? HK: They accepted that. HK quotes, in French, Souvanna Phouma's assessment of agreement. HK: And you can't say he's a man that doesn't understand the situation.

RN: Let me say that, after the long ordeal this country's been through, (?) with hundreds of thousands of demonstrators and the whole Establishment of this country, and the journalists, professors, ministers, the only support we got, from the people with guts - with a few exceptions from the categories I mentioned, because there are always exceptions - were from workers, some of the ethnic groups, farmers, Southerners. The further away you get from Washington the greater the support. RN warns that "it wd be a dagger in our heart and our (?) around the world if we sink these people [S Vietnam]." RN: And we can't let Thieu be the sole judge of this, because he's too close to it.

FK: May I raise one strategic question? If it shd prove within a number of fronts, that we, the US, are not able to deal with the entity N Vietnam, with 31 million inhabitants, then the (?), the question will arise among friend, foe, entities, with whom can the US ever deal successfully? Because this entity of 31 million, supported by the Soviets and China but not

by their manpower, is so small that anybody from Rio de Janeiro to Copenhagen and from Hanoi to Moscow can draw the conclusion that obviously the enormous American power couldn't deal with this. Therefore I wd say, as a lawyer, "deductio de (?) minus," if they cannot deal with Vietnam, (?). RN: That's why the foreign policy of the US is on the line here. How easy it wd have been to flush the whole thing on Jan 20, 1969, but we cdn't do it. That's why I agree, with those conditions in mind, that we have to meet this challenge. We have to see what the North and South says, but we're going to have to squeeze every ounce out of this that we can. Because the war in Vietnam isn't about Vietnam as far we're concerned. It's about SE Asia, it's about the world. FK: In fact, (?) formulate (?) without S Vietnam, we cannot (?) Cuba, if there is a (?). FK recalls the effectiveness of the French Foreign Legion in battle despite their small numbers.

RN assures FK that "I value yr advice and I want you, Henry, to continue to send it in." RN: You and Henry, with yr very impressive intellectual backgrounds, are always (?) to emphasize what a person's ideas (?). But I want to see that there's one thing more important than IQ's and that's CQ. We have students coming out of Harvard and Yale with astronomical IQs, but that's all they have, and you and Henry have character, which is what counts. FK notes abilities of AH, and refers to quote "from my unfortunate interview with David Landau, for his book." RN presents gifts. RN: I understand you have a remarkable son, Sven. HK: An extraordinary (boy?).

806-10 10/24/72

11:45 am - 11:46 am

RN, RZ. RN OK's statement on death of Jackie Robinson. RN unhappy w/photo session w/HK and WPR. RN: He came out smiling, and that's the picture they're going to use, and who knows how they'll react in Saigon. RN, RZ disc photo arrangements for upcoming meeting w/police. RN: I don't mind 30-45 seconds on this one.

806-13 10/24/72

11:58 am - 12:32 pm

RN, APB.

Draft for speech on education.

HRH enters; APB leaves.

(40 sec Pers Ret del)

RN, HRH assess poll data re Vietnam. RN: We're at the mercy now of Thieu and Pham Van Dong. Thieu's making his speech at (5?). Let's hope that goddamn thing doesn't blow it.

Remainder of conversation focuses on domestic poll data, Watergate, domestic issues.

807 SERIES

807-7 10/26/72

9:22 am - 9:54 am

RN, HK.

RN: What is Ron's comment on the NYT story on the plan? Did they (?). HK: Yes,

but we've had a number of very major developments which we haven't had a chance to preview, which completely supersedes it. The DRV has gone public. RN: (?). HK: The story out of Paris was leaked by the French and wasn't completely accurate. RN: I was referring to the Frankel story. HK: That came out of State or out of Paris. It was just wrong enough - but what's happened is that Hanoi has now publicly released the text, not the text, but another (?) that they demand we sign by Oct 31. What I planned to do was brief this morning. RN: Let's think about this. What's the purpose of the briefing? If its purpose is to blow things, we're not interested in that. HK: Not that, but they've published their whole version of the agreement, so it's essential that- RN: We set it straight. HK: -that we give a very moderate account. I was going to say, let me talk about 3 levels, first procedurally, secondly substance, third, where we go from here. Procedurally we've made very great progress during the month of October. The difficulty arose from the fact Hanoi was determined to get us to sign an agreement before the election or before Nov 1 and therefore they always insisted on some deadline. HK outlines what he plans to say at briefing. HK: "90% of the agreement is done but there are still some problems that need to be settled. First, we'd like to bring the intl machinery into being on the day the ceasefire is signed, because we have overwhelming intelligence that the other side is planning activities for two days afterwards." RN: (?) HK: And that there'd be a bloodbath; we're trying to avoid that. The q is one of timing. "The second issue is, in the Pham Van Dong interview which he gave in violation of our agreement to secrecy, he mentioned that there's an agreement to have elections in 6 months. There is no such agreement. Thirdly, there were some cases where the Viet language seems to produce a different translation from the English. Then there are some subsidiary issues, such as making it possible for the agreement to be signed by four parties rather than two." I say, "let us get this into perspective. The Pres has consistently said he is not governed by arbitrary deadlines."

SB enters, discusses veto signings. RN, SB leave; RN returns.

RN: Let me just shorthand it in one sense: you naturally shd cover all these procedural problems in (?) the settlement. The things that need to come home to the American people are, one, this agreement is one that assures the return of our POWs and accounting of our MIAs. Second, this agreement is one that, I can assure you gentlemen, is true to the Pres's commitment that we will never agree to imposing a Communist govt in S Vietnam. This is not a coalition govt. Say "the Pres's condition has always been that we will not agree to a coalition w/the Communists." Third, this is an agreement in which the US is not making a deal w/the N Viets without the full participation of and consultation w/the govt of S Vietnam. And that - what I'm getting at is that you, in 3 sentences, can knock down the criticism. "And finally, what the Pres has emphasized, time and again, is to make the right agreement; it does not matter if it comes before or after the election, but we want the right agreement at the right time." HK: The earliest time. RN: At the earliest time, but the important thing is that the agreement be right. I'd like you to put in some of that purple rhetoric if you could. The great danger is that we get suckered, I don't know how you put it. HK: The great danger is that the following week, McGovern says "you blew the best chance of peace you ever had." I don't think they'll come now, next week. I think we have to assume they'll play for all the marbles, to knock you out. RN: If they're playing that kind of a game there'll be no agreement after the election. HK: I think we shd give them one week to come back and if they don't we'll just blister them again.

RN: Now I think you shd say "the statements all over the lot by the opposition have made our task more difficult." HK: But I think we can say we can make an infinitely better deal than we could four years ago.

RN: Incidentally, you'd better put the bombing back on for the 20th if they play games like this. HK: I wdn't do it yet, because they may have told their cabinet to be ready for a ceasefire by this weekend. RN: (?) the options. We can't be in a foxhole begging Dobrynin, begging the N Viets to come back to the table. I ordered (?) sorties yesterday. HK: We can step up the sorties to the 20th. RN: The problem I see with our bargaining position is that if (?) McGovern's going to say the prospects for peace have gone (down the tubes?). We'll kill the son of a bitch on that point. HK: On Nov 8, if we haven't heard from them, we go N of the 20th again until they go back to the conf table. But I wdn't do it before Nov 8. RN: I think that's true. And if McGovern says we blew our chances for peace, that's a dangerous thing for him to do. He doesn't know if they're coming back or not.

HK: I think my briefing shd be conciliatory toward Hanoi. RN: Not soft; that wd kill us here. HK: Not soft, but I wd say that 90% of the agreement is done.

HK: I got in touch with Thieu during the night. Now that the (others?) have blown he's completely rational. He says we can say there's just a few points where he was in disagreement with us, minor points (needing?) clarification. RN: Henry, this is going to be settled. The problem will be with the DRV people, they may have less control of their Cabinet than we thought.

HK: Now the next q, Mr Pres. Shd I say that we offered to have one more meeting w/them to clean up the text so (?) we'd reduce the bombing? RN: No, reducing the bombing is total dynamite here. You can say that in private, but saying it publicly wd kill us. It's very bad. All the other things, though, just get up there. You can be conciliatory toward Hanoi, but I'd treat McGovern and his people with utter contempt. They've made the task of negotiating much more difficult. If they ask you the difference between this and McGovern's plan, say that first, it has an absolute guarantee with regard to getting back our prisoners. Second, it provides for a ceasefire. Third, it provides for continued help to the govt of S Vietnam. Fourth, it provides for an honorable withdrawal from Cambodia and Laos. It's a peace with honor, as opposed to peace with surrender.

HK: What do you think of my giving them a very positive account of the terms. RN: Absolutely. Say it's a damn good agreement. HK: And "why haven't we signed it?" Because there are a number of problems- RN: Because the important thing about an agreement is not that it is made, but that it can be enforced. And that Thieu raised some (mainly technical?) problems. HK: So essentially, I'm affirming that there is an agreement on these points. RN: If you can, point out that this is not like the Laos one in '62. Say that that one wasn't buttoned down enough, and we've been in a long war in Laos ever since, and that this time we're not going to make that mistake. Say that we don't want just to make an agreement, but to make one that is going to be kept. Say that the Pres has sd all along this has to be a buttoned-down agreement. You say, "now this agreement may not be totally satisfactory to either side, but it's one where they agree to live and let live."

RN: What are you going to say if they ask "didn't the peace groups bring this about?" HK: I'll say "gentlemen, you look at what the peace groups wanted, and compare it to this." HK notes his plans to talk with Hedley Donovan, Wm Buckley and Joe Alsop. RN: And I'd call Howard Smith, Dick Wilson and Bill White, too. RN, HK discuss NY Times story

briefly. HK: I think the French probably leaked it. RN: Well, good luck Henry. HK: (I'll need it?) because the Vietnamese are nuts on both sides. RN discusses strategy of Battles of Tannenberg and Lemberg, re the theme of "taking advantage of opportunities when they come."

RN notes Pat Buchanan's view that McGovern's two strongest issues in terms of garnering press attention are Vietnam and his "corruption" charge. RZ enters. RN: Ron, where are you having Henry's briefing? RZ: I think the press room; it'll be crowded but we'll do what we can. RN: The beauty there is that you don't have to announce it; (he just comes in?). Just make sure there are cameras. The cameras there work so much better than the East Room. HK leaves. RN: This shr be low-key anyway.

808 SERIES

808-5 10/27/72

11:16 am - 11:41 am

RN, Harold Lee; WH photog at start of meeting.

RN, HL discuss Asian affairs. HIST RN offers long-range assessment of future of US-PRC, Japan-PRC relations. RN discusses Vietnam agreement, reiterating the same points he told HK to stress in briefing. RN again criticizes attitude of media, noting that "among the Georgetown crowd, the columnists, only Joe Alsop's been with us. He's been great." HL notes that Mme Anna Chennault had called him, and sent her love to RN. RN: I shr call her; I understand she's been ill somewhat. HL asks about HK announcement of the previous day. RN: On that I can assure you that we're going to get (the agreement?) then we're moving on to the big game, with the Russians. RN compares Chou's style with Brezhnev's.

(34 sec Pers Ret del)

RN continues comparison of PRC and USSR diplomatic styles, briefly discusses Japan again.

808-13 10/27/72

3:45 pm - 4:40 pm

RN, HK.

HK: I talked to Reagan yesterday and he's ecstatic. I talked to Connally; he's delighted. Reagan just cdn't say enough. Of course he realizes this is not a coalition govt, and is a complete backdown by the other side. RN: Well, we're just going to hang on with our (?). And let me say, I've been thinking that if the other side doesn't agree to negotiate before the election (it's all right?). HK: I agree. RN: In the meantime they'll have to negotiate. HK: They made a statement today saying they'll meet me on Oct 31. Le Duc Tho will be there to initial the agreement and if then on Nov 1 I want to talk about other things, how to implement the agreement, they'll be happy to see me. And I'm telling all the newsmen, not next wk, but the wk after; we're in no hurry. RN: We'll talk after we see this fellow; how long do we want to see him? HK: About a half-hour. RN: Who's coming in, (Rogers and Sullivan?). HK: Sullivan. If you can tell him how much you appreciate what he's doing- RN, HK disc Harris poll reaction to recent McGovern statements.

Prince Souvanna Phouma, Pheng NOrindr, William H. Sullivan, Alec G. Toumayan enter; WH press, photog at start of meeting.

SP thanks RN for receiving him. RN: You have had a chance to be briefed by Amb Sullivan; what is your opinion of the (lag?) in the agreement as it affects Laos and Vietnam? SP: I was telling Secy Rogers this morning that we would be happy if the dates of the ceasefires in Laos and Vietnam cd be closer together. SP describes his worry that Pathet Lao would take undue advantage of lag. SP: The Pathet Leo command, meaning the N Viet command, has given orders to attack on all fronts. I just talked to Deputy Secy Rush and described to him our needs in defensive military equipment. SP mentions (P?)-28 bombers, helicopters w/machine guns, antiaircraft weapons to defend such places as Long Thieng and Bouamlong from N Viet air attacks. SP also concerned about antiaircraft defenses of Vientiane.

RN: What is the future of Laos after the ceasefire? SP: We want to avoid (repetition?) of the problems of the past and implementation of the agreement that we signed among ourselves last. We reached agreements in 1961 and 1962; after which we were able to establish our govt in its present form, the tripartite govt. SP reiterates Laos' intent to remain neutral, describes his expectations re integration of Pathet Lao Congress into Natl Congress, Pathet Lao into National Army.

RN: Who has the most influence on the Pathet Lao, the Chinese or Russians? SP: There is a pro-Soviet camp and a pro-Chinese, but I cd not say which faction has the upper hand. SP thinks "the problem in Cambodia is different from that of Laos. In Laos there already exists an agreement between the different factions."

HK mentions that the present agreement "puts two (?) together, the current settlement plus the (implementation?) of the 1962 settlement. (?) are now going on, from a political solution to a ceasefire solution in Laos, and this is in fact what the N Viets are doing with us; this is why I sd we are one cycle behind."

RN: Let me get the Prime Minister's judgment at this point: if Hanoi has decided at the highest level that for the time being, it is to their interest to have a pause in their military adventures in S Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, that will be to the benefit of Laos, will it not? The way I try to judge this, I leave to the experts like Dr Kissinger and Amb Sullivan the details, but in the final analysis, what really counts are what the principal parties' motives are, what they consider to be their interests. I think that's the key question. And I feel at the moment there is a chance that N Vietnam will conclude their interests are best served, for a time, to pay attention to their own problems. SP: There will be a benefit to our nation. As for our trusting in their word, that is very difficult.

RN: Since 1962, how many Laotians have been killed in the war, military and civilian? SP: 50,000, and perhaps (more?). The refugee problem has been great. There have been 600,000, of a population of (two?) million. RN: I want to say to the Prime Minister that we have no illusions about the intentions of the N Viets. We believe this agreement, when it is formalized, will mean something only if necessity leads the leaders of N Vietnam to turn away from their foreign adventures. And it cd be because of the casualties they've taken, it may now lead them to the conclusion that it is time for a pause. I'm assuming that's the correct conclusion. Then it means that we, Laos, Cambodia, must use this time to strengthen the institutions of those that defend the countries, so that if the aggression is resumed, you will be strong enough to resist it. Playing their part in this

chess game will be the Russians and Chinese, and it is possible that each of them, for their
own reasons, will conclude that it is not in their interest to continue to fuel the aggression
of N Vietnam. As I've often sd to Dr Kissinger and Amb Sullivan, the Prime Minister is very
sophisticated; he knows his neighbors and country very well. I want to assure him that we
want an agreement, we want to make it in good faith, and we want to end this war. We are
under no illusions about the intent of the enemy. On the other hand, we do not assume their
intent is the same as ours. RN discusses US offer of aid for Indochina reconstruction,
drawing comparisons between present N Viet exhaustion after years of war and the state
of Japan after WWII. RN emphasizes that Laos, as well as Cambodia and S Vietnam, will
be included in American economic reconstruction plans.

809 SERIES

809-2 10/28/72

9:10 am - 10:26 am

RN, HRH.

Discussion of CBS news broadcast, radio speeches.

(1 min 27 sec Pers Ret del, during which RMW enters)

RN discusses speech draft. HK enters.

(52 sec Pers Ret del)

RMW leaves.

RN: I wanted to say I think, Henry, you're doing a great job in terms of getting this
story across and everything. I was just reading this news story and raised two or three
flags, that I noticed that one of the networks went to great plains to go to Columbus, Ohio
and sd (?). HK: I wanted to raise that - I really have serious doubts whether that
surrogates briefing from me is a good idea tomorrow. HRH: (?) out of town. RN: Can
Haig do that? HK: Or Rogers. HRH: If you open the meeting, which you're now talking
about doing, and Henry then briefs them- HK: It makes it a very political thing. HRH: No,
no more political than your briefing Paul Warnke. You're briefing his side, our side. These
are officials of the govt, every one of them- HK: And it's been leaked to the newspapers
already. RN: (?). HRH: Can't do it, (?) newspapers, wires out to all those people- RN:
Why not? He can make political points, make them well. I had already worked out with
Colson the point that needed to be made. I think there's something to be said for this, (?).
The other point being made, I guess, is the Lubell theory, that any settlement tends to
(hurt?) us. But we don't have any choice. When the time comes to settle, the time comes
to settle and that's all there is to it. RN instructs HK to show the handwritten letter from
him to press, "wave it, but don't let them read it." HK: I can't let them read it because it
mentions Hanoi.

HRH assesses how to respond to charges made by "opposition" [McGovern?
Shriver?] in Columbus. HRH: We've got to be awful careful not to overreact to that. RN:
The main thing is we've got to win on the political side. HK: Which is why it's best to keep
me out of that issue on the political side. The basic issues we have on a piece of paper. RN:
I really think it might be best for WPR to do the surrogates thing; it might give him a chance
to sing. HK: The problem is - the basic thing they have to get out, they don't need to know
the subtleties. If they know the basic difference between our position and the McGovern
position, that's (all that's needed?). RN outlines what he wants surrogates to do: explain

that RN will not permit anything less than a settlement that returns POWs, withdraws US troops, and prevents a Communist or coalition govt in S Vietnam.

HK: My instinct it's a great mistake to permit McGovern to say that I (agreed?) to a whole bunch of people going out to the country to debate him. RN: He's got a point. HK: And that this proves that it's a political deal all along, that they were brought in from all over the country. One of the strengths is that people are not so ready to tackle me on (?). HRH: The other side of that is that this is a subject of political distortion, and that the (?). RN: The PR is more important than substance right now. We've got to have somebody out there that's hitting our side and hitting it well.

HK: You also have a major problem w/the PRC about their announcing the grain deal. RN refers to his radio address re American farmer: "I don't do anything in these speeches that isn't cleared. Whose fault is it? HK: No one's, everyone acted in good faith. RN: Well, then that's too bad. HK concludes that Earl Butz, to extent anyone was at fault, shd have had Agriculture staff "run it by (us?)." HK: The trouble arose in this case because someone thought it had been checked.

HK: Warnke has demanded a briefing and we can't refuse him. RN: You are not to do it. HK: Haig's doing it. RN: Good. You are not to do anything like that. Have Haig give him exactly the briefing you gave the press, nothing more. McGovern was offered one and he refused it. Now Warnke's coming around but that's what Haig's giving him. That's the way it's going to be played.

HK: The N Viets (haven't?) answered and (?) is (?) like crazy, whether we are, I'll be meeting - the trouble we're going to have is, suppose they accept Nov 1- RN: When do you initial the deal? HK: When I come back and we sign the goddamn thing. I'm already positioning them, the ones that call in saying "if there is another meeting"- RN: (?). HK: I'll have to come back here, consultation w/the Pres, consultation w/Saigon, so it's a process of a couple of weeks. Then I'm seeing the Wash Post today, Marilyn Berger, they're beginning to hack away at the thing, as you sd, now the liberals are on the side of Thieu. RN: Yes, like they were on the side of Chiang Kai-shek. HK: "We barely avoided getting scuttled" is what Marilyn Berger sd. RN: Fine. The American people don't give one damn about that. HK: No one reads Marilyn Berger on the editorial page of the Post. RN: The real question is, with all our problems, political or not, do they want Nixon or McGovern? That's the real question. We've got to point out this is not a Communist or coalition govt (deal?), peace with surrender. RN, HK, HRH briefly disc whether AH shd do surrogates briefing. HK: My own instinct is that it's better not to politicize it too much.

RMW enters with speech changes, leaves.

HK: I called Jay Lovestone yesterday about (?) and he's coming in Tues to see me. So I don't think there's going to be any trouble w/Meany because Meany accepts what Lovestone gives him on foreign policy. HRH: Meany has asked for a 5 minute natl radio purchase for next week. RN: You think he's going to endorse McGovern? He can't do that. HK: Haig was going to brief him yesterday and he called and sd he had a cold and had to do it later. That's why I called Lovestone, to get the temperature.

RN: Now there'll be this chipping away, and Henry, this chipping comes, and (there isn't much we can do?) about it, and you're going to have the networks, Kalb, and the NY Times. Now keep the Times (folded?) in but don't talk to the Post. Play them like a yoyo. That's our main (?) with the Times and the networks. What did you think of the Howard

Smith deal? HRH: He did a very solid job of pointing out that this job cdn't have been done 4 years ago or even 4 wks ago. RN: That shows you what helps. Now do you think it wd be worthwhile for Henry to talk to that asshole Cronkite? **PR PROB** HK: That I'd love to do. I can see Cronkite, I can see Chancellor.

RN criticizes "that point of a campaign where everybody jacks off, jackasses about every little thing, and it doesn't matter unless it's close. And right now it's too late; McGovern's not going to come back, and he and his people knows it, and that's why they're going for smears. We're going to win by at least as much as Eisenhower won in '52, and that's the point. And the second point is that we can't let these people in the press, the professors, some of the clergy, get away with what they've been saying. We've got to play it tough there." HK points out "that at least it's better to have them talk about this [status of Vietnam negotiations] then about corruption and all that." RN: Oh, that's (true?).

HK notes upcoming 3rd anniversary of RN's Nov 3 speech. RN remarks that "looking back, May 8 was the one that made the difference." HK points out that the timing of RN's announcement of '69 speech, during Moratorium demonstrations, was itself effective.

HK: The trouble w/the S Viets is the one fly in the ointment. RN: What about Thieu? (?) a meeting? HK: I don't think you shd offer to see him before the agrees. I'd offer to have him see you 2 wks after the deal. RN: After the election is no problem. I'd see him then. The thing is, if he goes, S Vietnam sinks; that's the problem.

RN: Well, you want me to do anything about this SOB Thieu? HK: What I am considering is whether we shdn't write him a letter from you. If he's already going public we ought to- RN: (?) so he at least knows I'm his friend. He's not pissing on me yet. HK: No, he's still pissing on me. RN: Well, he'll piss on you and piss on Rogers, but he knows he can't do this without me. RN reiterates that Thieu "can count on my friendship and support, and we'll work this out, but public statements will only result in less support from the US." HK: I think his basic hangup has nothing to do with the terms of the settlement, but with our leaving. He has (?) his whole army, he has his (?) in every battalion. RN: Good luck.

HK leaves.

RN writes something. HRH: If he feels that strongly we have to drop him out of this [surrogates briefing?]. We ought to have Rogers (?). RN: Rogers will get the political points thru. Henry will give them all that gobbledygook and he'll leave them confused. I'll just say, "Bill, get out there and get these points down." I think he'll be effective on this. Then I'll come in and present a (?) "tell you what this really means." HRH: You shdn't brief them, but there's no reason you shdn't make those three points. You'd come in loud and clear.

(2 min 1 sec Pers Ret del)

CWC enters. RN: I'm going to come back here, start the meeting w/the surrogates myself, then have Rogers do it. I think he's - I can't have Kissinger for the reasons I don't-but you can tell Rogers that he's the man to make these points in a very simple, political way. RN outlines the points: no communist govt, return of POWs, ceasefire, "and that the McGovern program is one of abject surrender and abandoning our POWs." HRH: The point is not to brief these people as such, not to educate them, but give them the line. RN: And get all the McGovern and Shriver quotes, put them out there, "McGovern sd this," so forth.

RN, HRH, CWC discuss upward movement of McGovern poll numbers in Pennsylvania. CWC notes that this was illusory because the polling was done before HK's briefing.

## 810 SERIES

### 810-1 10/31/72

11:04 am – 11:10 am

RN, RZ. Recording begins w/conversation in progress.

RZ discusses what he shd say at press briefing re Vietnam settlement. RN emphasizes that AH (who apparently is to do a briefing) reiterate "no coalition govt." RZ: And I'll say "as the Pres sd, we'll give the people of S Vietnam the right to determine their own future." On the part about "is Kissinger going this weekend to (?) an agreement?" I'm going to say "I'm not going to say anything here that wd contribute to those speculations." RN: That's right. Say that when there's anything new to be announced, it will be announced. RZ: See, there may be a wire-service thing out saying that (?) unattributed officials say the agreement will be signed this weekend. I'll knock that down. RN: All right. Well, say that it would be unwise to set any deadlines as to when such an agreement is announced. The important thing is that this is the right agreement. There will be no deadline. After a long and difficult war, we are not going to have a hasty peace. Do you have that line? And that it wd be unwise to speculate about a deadline. And always say "The Pres sd." And say he had a long (discussion?) w/Dr Kissinger about it. RZ: I'll say a meeting. RN: And say we're not negotiating to meet a deadline but to make the right kind of peace. RN suggests RZ contrast the planned "right kind" of agreement to the hasty agreements made in '62 and attempted in '68. RN: We're not going to stampeded into an agreement that wd make only a temporary peace, and this is why the Pres insists that the understandings are totally clear.

### 810-2 10/31/72

11:10 am – 11:36 am

RN, Nelson A. Rockefeller, HK; WH photog, press at start of meeting.

RN greets NAR and HK. WH photog, press leave. NR discusses his upcoming Natl Press Club speech, in which "I'm going to say I strongly believe every American shd be proud of this Pres and what he has done (for peace?)."

HK: There was just a blast from Hanoi. RN: What did they say? HK: They're not saying they won't negotiate. While they're saying it's crooked, that we're looking for one pretext after another to avoid signing – actually they weaken their cases by saying we've changed the deadline for signing 3 times, which is true, which proves that none of these deadlines have anything more than theoretical significance. But I don't think we ought to get in a debate with them. RN: That's right. You start getting into a debate about who shot John and debating points, and so forth- well, what do they say finally? HK: They don't make a point. RN: They just say "sign the agreement?" HK: Well- HK reads N Viet statement.

NR: Isn't it true that they gave, from Hanoi, in their leak, interpretations that were not the interpretations (?). HK: There were three major (factors?). One, and I had a long (?) on this – when we were in Saigon we found they'd given instructions to their (?) to

ignore a ceasefire for 3 days and seize as much territory as possible. We have that. This
is why we want the intl (?). Second, they put out a misleading interpretation of the
administrative structure, and thirdly we'd told them innumerable times not that we were
going to put the troops into the agreement (?), but they had to withdraw some of the troops
from the North, and once they were withdrawn, the no-reinforcement provisions wd see to
it that they wdn't get back. We were watching for those troops to get out, and they didn't
get out. For these three reasons we didn't sign it. RN: What's yr evaluation of where all
this stands? HK: My evaluation is that they want to put the heat on you before the election.
I think that the factors that led to a settlement are still valid. RN: Yeah. HK: I think they're
going to wait now until the election, and we shd step up the bombing this wk. RN: Yes. The
point is, I think it's good for Nelson to make this point, I think in terms of our putting
everything out, that wd tend to leave the impression that there's a total stalemate. And also
you get into who sd what, and so forth. I think yr idea of the backgrounder about (?)
meeting earlier now, what wd you think? HK: It's just because of yr speech on Thurs. But
I cd do it Friday morning, I cd say this is where we stand.

NR: This info about the instructions to the Viet Cong isn't public yet? HK: No. So I
wdn't use it yet. NR: (?). RN: I wd say that we, of course at this time, there are bound to be
differences, but we aren't going to make a hasty peace that won't last. We want an
agreement about which there will be no misunderstanding. I think you can be extremely
helpful on this.

HK analyses current N Viet stance. HK: They have a lot of their cadres hanging out there that are getting chewed up, and they've got to explain to their cadres that they've made them (go out?) of these territories a month prematurely. They're going to take a terrific shellacking if there's a ceasefire- RN: Is it a good thing? HK: Militarily it's a good thing. But if they lose too many they may not be able to make a ceasefire. But I think we ought to start moving those B-52s up to the 19th parallel. That's the only thing those bastards understand. RN: That's right. HK: And that restriction was an internal one; we've never told them where to go. We can't go beyond the 20th before the election but we can go to the 19th; that's where all their supply dumps are.

HK: They haven't sd they won't talk; that's the one thing they haven't sd. NR: If they really want peace, all you're saying that "let's sit down and clarify a number of points which you've already (?) six days ago and (?) for a couple of days." HK: I'll say "we just told them they had to pull some troops out from the North before the signing, that wasn't in the agreement but it was going to become part of the agreement because of the infiltration provision, on the contrary, they gave instructions to their troops to seize the maximum amount of territory, and they gave an interview before the agreement (making assumptions?) about a coalition govt."

RN: I'll tell you what the real problem was. It was moving a little too fast, and Thieu
(wasn't coming along?). HK: They were trying to stampede us into signing before the
election without Thieu, and we told them that we had to (consult him?) before we signed.

NR agrees that Thieu "is really the strong man we've got to have." HK views it as
important for Admin press statements to have a conciliatory tone.

HK: I'm seeing Lovestone this afternoon and I'll explain to him what the game is.
We'll get Meany. What's McGovern going to say, that we shd sign the agreement? RN:

Probably, but then he'd say that if elected he'd abrogate that part providing for arms for S Vietnam.

(1 min 50 sec Pers Ret del)

NR describes a shift to support in RN's favor among Catholic and Jewish communities in New York. NR comments that "the Catholics have been for this since Cardinal Spellman got us in it in the beginning" and expresses view that Spellman's impassioned speeches about persecution of Catholic Vietnamese was a major factor in US involvement in Vietnam. **PR PROB?** HK suggests that RN emphasis national interest in future statements re agreement. HK: It makes it clear that it isn't a political ploy. RN: Good to see you, Nelson. After the election we'll sit down. Good luck Henry.

810-15 10/31/72

2:52 pm - 3:23 pm

RN, HK.

HK: Nelson gave basically a very good speech at the Press Club, but it read better than it spoke, and there were no applause lines in it at all. RN: His speeches are usually that way. But anybody can do applause lines. HK describes what NR sd re agreement, contrasting armistice to peace, which had produced standing ovation. HK: And then he got applause when he sd that the agreement wd be one every American can be proud of, and those were the only two times.

HK: I think, Mr Pres, we're at a (?) now. HK notes plans to talk to LA Times, NYT, Marvin Kalb. HK: I thought it better to talk to Kalb rather than Dan Rather because he doesn't understand it so well. RN: You're getting out that there's not going to be a coalition govt. HK comments that N Viets "must be standing there in front of their cadres with egg on their face. They anticipated a victory." HK thinks N Viets "cannot negotiate again this week. It's too humiliating for them, to ask us to sign on the 31st, and negotiate on the 1st, and having promised them a bombing halt right after the negotiation, they must have concluded it was especially diabolical because it wd give you the bombing halt just before the election. I'm looking at it from their view; that's how their minds work. And that's why they're attacking me for the first time, as well as you, by saying when I sd peace was at hand I wasn't telling the truth." RN: (?) peace too. HK: But the other horn of their dilemma is that they can't kick the agreement over without losing their position that we shd sign the agreement. I think on Nov 8 we ought to write a (?) friendly letter saying "if you want to negotiate, then we'll negotiate." Since Oct 22, we have the better record. All in all, I think this is going to come out in the best possible way. For one thing, I don't know how this is coming out in the polls, but it's overriding Watergate. RN: That's good. HK: And it shows you as strong, because you're not taking the easy way out by signing just before the election. And I've never gotten as much mail - I had 432 telegrams, of which almost all were totally favorable. And the news summary is misleading, because it tends to include such negative (stories?).

HK: I think when you announce this toward the end of November, it's going to be a good start for your Admin. But I think we ought to start moving those B-52s further north, because the only thing those sons of bitches - and then the day after the election, we ought to start reconnaissance around Hanoi again, and after a week, if they don't answer, we ought to start bombing again. RN: They'll answer. Because they have another problem. What do they say now? If we haven't signed the agreement, they say all bets are off, they're going to continue

the war? After the election, if they continue the war, we'll knock the hell out of them. HK thinks N Viets "are hanging on in the hamlets by the skin of their teeth; they can't stay on beyond the end of November. They'll settle. We're in the driver's seat. We'll have some rocky days but"- RN: We always do, but we'll get through. All right, let's not have any settlement for a while. We'll make the bastards cave a little more.

RN: Nelson's point that got the applause was when- HK: He sd "I'm proud to have a Pres who is willing to insist it's a peace and not an armistice and every American I know shares this pride." And then during the question period he sd "that's the President's position and I stand behind it and I'm proud of it," and he got more applause. RN: This puts that jackass McGovern in quite a position.

RN: And how about that offensive that was supposed to come? That didn't (amount to?)- HK: They made a kind of offensive but (?). That's the only real problem, that they'll get so weak that they won't be able to sign. HK notes Joe Kraft column: "he sd that putting the PRC against the Soviet Union, then both against N Vietnam, was the most dexterous performance," but then he sd it was all for nothing because it wasn't worth it. RN: Yeah, all for nothing, isn't it sad we did those acrobatics, huh? He's worried, of course. To save the respect and honor of the United States, that was the thing.

(1 min 58 sec Pers Ret del)

RN: We're going to play this game out. And it's going to be a tough game after the election but we're not going to screw around with these people. They were trying to screw us. Seizing territory and talking about coalition govts, that was not good faith. I wonder what we're going to do (?). Henry, they've got to be (weak?), they've got to be- HK: After promising peace to their people, they can't keep going for another 4 years; that's out of the question. RN: I think that's Thieu's problem too. I noticed last wk he had (568?) killed in action. HK: You know, Max Frankel sd, "I think you're just putting on a big act w/Thieu, that you're giving him 4 weeks to get ready." RN: Ready for what? HK: For peace. RN: You think you've got him calmed down? You've got to get him to quit bitching about that settlement. HK: Mr Pres, what he'll do - it won't help you before the election - but after the election he'll say he got great concessions from you. He'll claim victory. HK notes that Thieu reacted favorably to idea of meeting RN in San Clemente; "he likes it all right."

RN: Henry, do all the backgrounders you can, and particularly when you do lunch with people like Chancellor, and Sevareid, and Howard Smith, say that the Pres wants you to get together with the senior people, the (leaders?). They'll like that.

RN: One of our problems with the press - now you've lived for a while in Washington, and seen the Georgetown set, and the NY set - they're up the wall because we're winning. And McGovern shd be upset about this - when they find out they're not winning, they're blaming McGovern for it. And it's not McGovern's fault, he's not the one who's screwing up. It's what he stands for.

RN: We'll have problems getting money from Congress [for S Vietnam]. HK: I think it depends on how well you do in the election, I wouldn't-

(2 min 15 sec Pers Ret del)

HK: Hanoi is not going to break with you, not before Nov 7. They'd like to hurt you but they don't want to disavow the agreement. RN: I wdn't worry about it.

RN, HK disc press blaming McGovern. RN: The press are showing their yellow stripe there, blaming him. They cd say "well, we were really wrong, and it wasn't his fault." HK: Well,