LIKE THAT ABOUT RICHARD NIXON. I SUPPOSE I TALKED MORE OR LESS THAT WAY SINCE THEY KEEP REPEATING THAT SENTENCE IN QUOTATION MARKS. IF I SAID THAT, HOWEVER, THIS PROVIDES EVIDENCE THAT NIXON WAS NOT INCLUDED IN MY PLANS FOR CLIMBING TO POWER. AND AS TO MY FEELING EMBARRASSED WITH HIM, AA NO I DIDN'T KNOW HIM, THAT'S ALL. I BEHAVED TOWARD HIM AS A CONVENTIONAL INTELLECTUAL, THAT'S ALL. I WAS WRONG. PRESIDENT NIXON SHOWED A GREAT VIGOR, A GREAT ABILITY. EVEN IN PICKING ME. I HAD NEVER APPROACHED HIM BEFORE HE OFFERED ME THIS POSITION. I WAS AS TONISHED. AFTER ALL, HE KNEW I HAD LITTLE FRIENDLINESS AND HE KNEW OF THE VERY LIMITED APPRECIATION I HAD ALWAYS SHOWN FOR HIM. BY ALL MEANS YES, HE DID SHOW GREAT COURAGE WHEN HE PICKED ME FOR THIS POSITION.

Q. YOU CERTAINL Y DID NOT LOSE ANYTHING, DR. KISSINGER. EXCEPT FOR THE ACCUSATION THEY NOW MAKE ABOUT YOU: YOUR BEING NIXON'S MENTAL NURSEMAID.

A. THIS IS AN ACCUSATION WITH NO MEANING AT ALL. LET'S NOT FORGET THAT, BEFORE HE KNEW ME, PRESIDENT NIXON HAD BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN FOREIGN POLICY. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN A CONSUMING ATTRACTION FOR HIM. EVEN BEFORE HE WAS ELECTED IT WAS CLEAR HOW FOREIGN POLICY WAS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEMS FOR HIM. HE HAS VERY CLEAR IDEAS ON IT. HE IS A STRONG MAN. IN FACT, A WEAK MAN DOES NOT BECOME PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES; IS NOT NOMINATED TWICE AS A CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY; DOES NOT SURVIVE FOR SUCH A LONG TIME IN POLITICAL LIFE. YOU ARE FROL TO THINK THE WAY YOU WISH ABOUT PRESIDENT NIXON, BUT ONE THING IS CERTAIN: ONE CANNOT BECOME A PRESIDENT TWICE AND STILL OY AN INSTRUMENT OF SOME ICISE. SUCH INTERPRETATION ARE EIGHER ROMANTIC OR UNFAIR.

Q. ARE YOU VERY ATTACHED TO HIM, DR. KISSINGER?

A. I HAVE A GREAT RESPECT FOR HIM.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU COULDN'T CARE LESS FOR NIXON. THEY SAY ALL YOU ARE UP TO IS TO DO THIS KIND OF WORK, AND NOTHING ELSE. #5#36 SAY YOU WOULD HAVE DONE IT WITH ANY OTHER PRESIDENT?

A. I AM NOT AT ALL SURE, ON THE OTHER HAND, THAT I COULD HAVE DONE WITH ANY OTHER PRESIDENT WHAT I HAVE DONE WITH HIM. SUCH A PARTICIPATION IS OF TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP. #1 MEAN THE KIND OF RELATIONSHIP?

LCO

9

KNOW

EXISTING BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND ME, IS ALWAYS A RESULT OF
THE ATTITUDE OF THE TWO MEN INVOLVED. IN OTHER WORDS, I DO NOT KNOW

OF MANY LEADERS, AMONG THE VERY MANY I HAVE MET, WHO WOULD
HAVE THE COURAGE TO SEND THEIR ASSISTANT TO PEKING WITHOUT
LETTING ANYONE ELSE KNOW IT. I DO NOT KNOW MANY OTHER LEADERS WHO
WOULD LEAVE THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH VIETNAM UP TO THEIR
ASSISTANT, WITH ONLY A VERY SMALL GROUP OF PEOPLE AWARE OF IT.
IT IS TRUE, THERE ARE THINGS WHICH DEPEND UPON THE TYPE OF
PRESIDENT, WHAT I DID COULD REALLY BE DONE IN AS MUCH WC HE MADE
IT POSSIBLE FOR ME TO DO IT.

Q. YOU YOU SERVED AS ADVISOR TO OTHER PREVIOUSLY AS WELL.
PRESIDENTS WHO WERE IN FACT OPPONENTS OF NIXON, I REFER TO
KENNEDY, JOHNSON.....

A. MY ATTITUDE TOWARDS ALL THE PRESIDENTS I SERVED HAS ALWAYS BEEN TO LEAVE IT UP TO THEM TO DECIDE IF THEY WISHED, OR DID NOT WISH TO KNOW WHAT MY OPINION WAS. WHEN THEY ASKED FOR IT, I HAVE IT TO THEM; TELLING ALL OF THEM WHAT I REALLY THOUGHT.

IT NEVER MADE ANY DIFFERENCE WHAT PARTY THEY BELONGED TO. I
ANSWERED WITH THE SAME INDEPENDENT ATTITUDE KENNEDY'S AS WELL
AS JOHNSON'S AND NIXON'S QUESTIONS. I GAVE THEM THE SAME KIND OF
ADVICE. WITH KENNEDY IT WAS MORE DIFFICULT, IT IS TRUE. IN
FACT, PEOPLE SAY I DID NOT GET ALONG TOO WELL WITH HIM. WELL...
IT IS THAT WAY. IT WAS BASICALLY MY FAULT. AT THAT TIME I WAS
MUCH LESS MATURE THAN I AM NOW. FURTHERMORE, I SERVED AS ADVISER
ONLY OCCASIONALLY. ONE CANNOT INFLUENCE THE DAILY POLICY OF A
PRESIDENT IF ONE ONLY HAPPENS TO SEE HIM TWICE A WEEK WHILE
OTHERS SEE HIM SEVEN DAYS A WEEK. I MEAN... WITH KENNEDY AND
JOHNSON I NEVER FILLED A POSITION WHICH COULD BE COMPARED TO THE
ONE I NOW HOLD WITH NIXON.

Q. NO MACHIAVELLIAN TECHNIQUE, DR. KISSINGER?

A. NONE. WHY?

Q. WHY, AT CERTAIN TIMES, HEAR IF YOU TALK ONE SHOULD BE LIKELY TO ASK NOT HOW MUCH YOU INFLUENCED THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES BKZ HOW MUCH MACHIAVELLI INFLUENCED YOU.

A. IN NO WAY. THERE IS VERY LITTLE IN FACT INICHE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD WHICH ONE GET FROM OR ADOPT FROM MACHIAVELLI' THEORY.
THE ONLY THING I FIND INTERESTING IN MACHIAVELLI IS HIS CONSID-
ERATION FOR THE I

INCE'S WILL. THIS MAY BE INTERESTING, BUT
NOT TO THE POINT OF INFLUENCING ME. IF YOU WISH TO KNOW WHO

(10)

INFLUENCED ME MOST, I CAN ANSWER WITH THE NAMES OF TWO PHILOSOPHERS, SPINOZA AND KANT. IT IS THEREFORE AMUSINGS THAT YOU TRY TO ASSOCIATE ME WITH MACHIAVELLI. PEOPLE ARE MORE INCLINED TO CONNECT MDOTO METTERNICH'S POLICY. THIS IS ANSOLUTELY CHILDISH. I ONLY WROTE A BOOK ON METTERNICH WHICH WAS TO BE THE XJRST OF A LONG SEC

ES OF BOOKUPON THE CONTRUCTIONAND DISINTEGRATION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.
THE SERIES HAD TO END WITH THE FICNT WORLD WAR. THAT'S ALL.
THERE IMANNOT BE ANYTHING IN COMMONG BETWEEN METTERNICH AND
ME. HE WAS CHANCELLOR AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT A
TIME IN WHICH, STARTI

Z FROM THE CENTER OF EUROPE ONE WOULD TAKE
AT LEAST SZHREE WEEKS TO GO FROM ONE CONTINENT TO THE OTHER.
HE SERVED AS CHANCELLOR AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AT A
TIME WHEN WARS WERE MADE BY PROFESSIO

L MILITARY PEOPLE AND
DIPLOMACY WAS IN THE HANDS OF ARISTOCRATS. HOW ONE CAN COMPARE
THIS TODAY'S WORLD, A WORLD WHERE THERE ARE NO GROUPS OF
LEADERS WITH COMPARABLE ATTITUDES, NO COMPARABLE DOMESTIC
SITUATION, NO COMPARABLE CULTURAL LIFE.

Q. DR. KISSINGER, BUT HOW YOUHXXPLAIN THE INCREDIBLE WORSHIP
THAT PEOPLE HAVE FOR YOU; HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THE FACT OF BEING
ALMOST MORE FAMOUS AND POPULAR THAN THE PRESIDENT? HAVE YOU AN
EXPLANATION FOR THIS PHENOMENUM?

A. YES, BUT I WON'T TELL IT TO YOU BECAUSE MY EXPLANATION DOESN'T COINCIDE WITH THE HVHESIS HELD BY THE MAJORITY OF PEOPLE.
THE THESIS OF INTELLIGENCE, FOR EXAMPLE. INTELLIGENCE IS NOT ALL THAT IMPORTANT IN THE EXERCISE OF POWER AND OFTEN ALMOST OF NO USE AT ALL. AT THE SAME TIME, FOR A CHIEF OF STATE, A PERSON WHO DOES MY WORK DOES NOT HAVE TO HAVE TOO MUCH INTELLIGENCE.
MY THESIS IS COMPLETELY DIFFERENT BUT, I REPEAT, I WON'T TELL IT TO YOU, WHY SHOULD I WHILE I AM STILL ENGAGED IN MY WORK? RATHER, TELL ME YOUR OPINION I AM SURE THAT YOU ALSO HAVE A THESIS TO EXPLAIN MY POPULARITY.

11

Q. I AM NOT VERY SURE, DR. KISSINGER. I AM LOOKING FOR A THESIS THROUGH THIS INTERVIEW. AND I DO NOT FIND IT. I SUPPOSE THAT AT THE ROOT OF EVERYTHING IS SUCCESS. I MEAN, LIKE A CHESS PLAYER, YOU MADE TWO OR THREE SUCCESSFUL MOVES. CHINA FIRST. AND PEOPLE LIKE CHESS PLAYERS WHO CAPTURE THE KING.

A. YES, CHINA HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN THE MECHANICS OF MY SUCCESS. AND YER THIS IS NOT THE MAIN POINT. YES, I'LL TELL YOU. AFTER ALL, IT REALLY DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE. THE MAIN POINT COMSQ FROM THE FACT THAT I HAVE ALWAYS ACTED ALONE. THE AMERICANS LOVE THIS IMMENSELY. THE AMERICANS LOVE THE COWBOY WHO LEADS THE CONVOY, ALONE ON HIS HOGYE, THE COWBOY WHO COMES INTO THE TOWN ALL ALONE WITPHIS HORSE, AND NOTHING ELSE. PERHAPS NOT EVEN WITH A GUN, BECAUSE HE DOES NOT SHOOT. HE ACTS, AND THAT IS ENOUGH, BEING IN THE RIGHT PLACE AT THE RIGHT TIME. IN SUM, A WESTERN.

QM I SEE. YOU SEE YOURSELF AS A SORT OF HENRY FONDA, UNARMED AND READY TO LET THEM HAVE IT FOR HONEST IDEALS. ALONE, COURAGEOUS...

A. NOT NECESSARILY COURAGEOUS. IN FACT THIS COWBOY DOES NOT NEED TO BE COURAGEOUS. ALL HE NEEDS IS TO BE ALONE: TO SHOW THE OTHER THAT HE COMES INTO TOWN AND DOES EVERYTHING ALONE. THIS ROMANTIC AND WURPRISING CHARAIGER SUITS ME BECAUSE BEING ALONE HAS ALWAYS BEEN PART OF MY LYLE, OR, IF YOU WISH, OF MY TECHNIQUE. ARE MY INDEPENDENCE. THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR ME. FINALLY, CONVICTION; I AM ALWAYS CONVINCED THAT I MUST DO WHAT I AM DOING. AND PEOPLE BELIEVE IT. THEY FEEL IT. IT IS IMPORTANT FOR ME THAT PEOPLE BELIEVE ME; WHEN PEOPLE ARE TOUCHED, WHEN THEY ARE CONQUERED, THEY SHOULD NOT BE CHEATED. ONE CANNOT JUST MAKE COLD PLANS AND NOTHING ELSE. SOME PEOPLE BELIEVE THAT I ESTIMATE VERY CAREFULLY THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF MY INITIATIVES ON PEOPLE. THEY BELIEVE THAT I HAVE THIS ALWAYS IN MY MIND. BUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF WHAT I DO, I MEAN PEOPLE'S JUDGMENT, HAVE NEVER WORRIED ME. I DO NOT LOOK FOR POPULARITY, I DO NOT ASK FOR POPULARITY. AS A METTER OF FACT, IF YOU REALLY WANT TO KNOW, I COULD NOT CARE LESS ABOUT POPULARITY. I DO NOT FEAR TO LOSE MY PUBLIC; I CAN AFFORD TO SAY WHAT I THINK. I AM TALKING OF WHATEVER GENUINE IS IN ME. IF I WOULD LET MYSELF BE BOTHERED BY PEOPLE'S REACTION, IF I WERE TO ACT ONLY FOR A CALCULATED TECHNIQUE, I WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING. LOOK AT THE OTHERS: THOSE WHO ARE REALLY GOOD DO NOT USE TECHNIQUES ONLY. THEY APPLY TECHNIQUES AND AT THE SAME TIME FOLLOW THEIR CONVICTIONS. THEY ARE AS GENUINE AS I AM. I AM NOT SAYING THAT THIS MAY LAST FOREVER. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THIS CAN EVAPORATE AS QUICKLY AS IT CAME. BUT FOR THE MOMENT HERE IT IS.

Q. ARE YOU PERHAPS TRYING TO TELL ME THAT YOU ARE A GENUINE PERSON, DR. KISSINGER? MY GOD, IF I LEAVE OUT MACHIAVELLI, THE FIRST PERSON WITH WHOM I WOULD ASSOCIATE YOU IS A COLD MATHEMATICIAN, CONTROLLED TO THE EXTREME. I MAY BE WRONG, BUT YOU ARE A VERY COLD MAN, DR. KISSINGER?

12

Q. IN ACTICS, NOT IS STRATEGY. IN FACT, I BELIEVE MORE IN HUMAN RELATIONS THAN IN IDEAS. I USE IDEAS BUT I NEED HUMAN RELATIONS, AS I HAVE SHOWN IN MY WORK. HASN'T WHAT HAPPENED TO ME, HAPPENED BY CHANCE? I WAS A TOTALLY UNKNOWN PROSMSSOR. HOW COULD I TELL MYSELF: ZNOW I SHALL JUGGLE THINGS AROUND SO THAT I CAN BECOME INTERNATIONALLY FAMOUS?" IT WOULD HAVE BEEN PURE FOLLY. YES, I BJD WANT TO BE WHERE THINGS HAPPENED, BUT I NEVER PAID A PRICE TO BE THERE. I NEVER MADE CONCESSIONS. I HAVE ALWAYS LET MYSELF BE GUIDED BY SPONTANEOUS DECISIONS. ONE COULD SAY: IT HAPPENED BECAUSE IT HAD TO HAPPEN. THIS IS WHAT PEOPLE ALWAYS SAY AFTER SOMETHING HAPPENS; THEY NEVER SAY ANYTHING IF THINGS THAT NEVER HAPPENED; THE HISTORY OF THINGS THAT NEVER HAPPENED HAS NEVER BEEN WRITTEN. IN SOME WAY, HOWEVER, I AM A FATALIST. I BELIEVE IN DESTINY. I AM CONVINCED THAT ONE SHOULD FIGHT TO REACH A GOAL. BUT I ALWAYS BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE LIMITS IN THE STRUGGLE THAT MAN CAN WAGE TO JXACH A GOAL.

Q. ANOTHER THING, DR. KISSINGER: HOW CAN YOU RECONCILE YOUR ENORMOUS RESPONSIBILITIES WITH YOUR FRIVOLOUS REPUTATION? HOW CAN YOU GET MAO TSE-TUNG, CHOU EN-LAI, LE DUC THO. TO TAKE YOU SERIOUSLY, AND AT THE SAME TIME PASS FOR A LADIAM' MAN, OR EVEN A PLAYDFY? AREN'T YOU EMBARRASEDF

A. NOT AT ALL. WHY SHOULD I BE EMBARRASSED WHEN I NEGOTIATE WITH LE DUC THO? WHEN I TALK WITH LENUC THO I KNOW HOW I MUST ACT WITH LE DUC THO AND WHEN I AM WITH GIRLS I KNOW HOW I MUST ACT WITH THE GIRLS. ON THE OTHER HAND, LE DUC THO DOES NOT AGREE TO NEGOTIATE WITH ME BECASUE I AM AN EXAMPLE OF PURE RECTITUDE. HE AGREED TO NEGOTIATE WITH ME BECAUSE HE WANTS A FEW THINGS FORM ME IN THE SAME WAY THAT I ZHNT A FEW THINGS FROM HIM. LOOK HERE, IN THE CASE OF LE DUC THO, AS IN THE CASE OF CHOU EN-LAI AND MAO TSE-TUNG, I BELIEVE THAT MY PLAYBOY REPUTATION HAS BEEN, AND IS, USEFUL BECAUSE IT HAS SUCCEEDED IN REASSURING PEOPLE, TO SHOW THEM THAT I AM NOT A MUSEUM PIECE. AT ANY RATE, THAT FRIVOLOUS REPUTATION AMUSES ME.

Q. AND I THOUGHT THAT IT WAS AN UNDERSERVED REPUTATION, A MISE EN SCENE MORE THAN TRUTH.

A. WELL, OBVIOUSLY IT IS PARTLY EXAGGERATED. BUT IN PART IT IS TRUE. HOW TRUE IT IS OR HOW MUCH TIME I SPEND WITH WOMEN DOES NOT MATTER. WHAT MATTERS IS HOW IMPORTANT WOMEN ARE IN MY LIFE, IF THEY PLAY A MAIN ROLE. WELL, THEY DON'T. FOR ME WOMEN ARE ONLY AMUSING, A HOBBY. NOBODY SPENDS TOO MUCH TIME ON A HOBBY. AND GLANCING AT MY APPOINTMENT BOOK YOU CAN SEE THAT I SPEND A LIMITED AMOUNT OF TIME WITH THEM. I'LL SAY SOMETHING MORE: I OFTEN PREFER TO BE WITH MY TWO CHILDREN. I SEE THEM

OFTEN, ALTHOUGH NOT AS OFTEN NOW AS BEFORE. AS A ROLE I SPEND
CHRISTMAS, IMPORTANT HOLIDAYS AND SEVERAL 430 IN SUMMER WITH
THEM AND I GO TO BOSTON ONCE A MONTH TO SEE THEM. YOU CERTAINLY
KNOW THAT I HAVE BEEN DIVORCED FOR YEARS. I DON'T FIND IT HARD
TO BE-DIVORCED. THE FACT THAT I DO NOT LIVE WITH MY CHILDREN
DOES NOT MAKE ME FEEL GUILTY. SINCE MY MARRIAGE WAS FINISHED,
AND IT WAS NOT EITHER ONE BUS FAULT, THERE WAS NO REASOF NOT TO
HAVE A DIVORCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, I AM CLOSER TO MY CHILDREN
NOW THAN I EVER WAS WHEN I WAS MARRIED TO THEIR MOTHER. I AM
AL SO HAPPIER NOW WITH THEM.

Q. ARE YOU AGAINST MARRIAGE, DR. KISSINGER?

A. NO. MARRIAGE OR NO MARRIAGE IS A DILEMMA THAT CAN BE SOLVED
AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE. I MAY GET MARRIED AGAIN... I MAY
HAPPEN. BUT, YOU KNOW, WHEN ONE IS SERIOUS AS I AM, TO CO-
EXIST WITH SOMEONE ELSE AND SURVIVE THAT CO-EXISTENCE IS VERY
DIFFICULT. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A WOMAN AND A MAN LIKE ME
IS UNAVOIDABLY VERY COMPLEX... ONE MUST BE VERY C
317). IT

P
HARD FOR ME TO EXPLEVN THESE THINGS. I AM NOT A PERSON THAT
CONFIDES IN JOURNALISTS.

Q. I HAVE UNDERSTOOD THAT, DR. KISSINGER. I HAVE NEVER IN-
TERVIEWED ANYBODY WHO AVOIDS QUESTIONS AND CLEAR CUT DEFINITIONS
AS YOU DO, NOBODY WHO DEFENDED HIMSELF FROM OTHER PEOPLE'S
ATTEMPT TO PENETRATE HIS PERSONALITY. AS YOU SHY, DR. KISSINGER?

A. YES, RATHER. BUT I ALSO BELIEVE I AM VERY BALANCED. YOU
SEE, SOME PEOPLE DESCRIBE ME AS A TORMENTED MYSTERIOUS PERSONS S
SOME PENNY DESCRIBE ME AS AN ALMOST CHEERFUL TYPE WHO ALWAYS
SMILES, ALWAYS LAUGHS. BOTH PICTURES ARE INCORRECT. I AM
NEITHER... I AM... I SHALL NOT TELL YOU WHAT I AM. I SHALL
TELL NOBODY. END.

DECEMBER 16, 1972

An Interview with Oriana Fallaci

KISSINGER

In his White House office, November 4, Henry Kissinger
talked with the distinguished Italian journalist, Oriana
Fallaci, and his remarkable taped conversation with her,
reprinted in full here, first appeared in the magazine L'Eu-
ropeo. "Why I agreed to it," Mr. Kissinger later com-
mented, "I'll never know."

The Editors

Fallaci: I wonder what your feelings are, these last few
days, Dr. Kissinger. I wonder if you too are disappointed,
like us, like most of the world. Are you disappointed, Dr.
Kissinger?

Kissinger: Disappointed? Why? What has happened,
within the last few days, to disappoint me?

Q: Something unpleasant, Dr. Kissinger: although you said that peace was "within reach," and although you confirmed that an agreement with the North Vietnamese had been drawn up, peace has not come. The war goes on as before, and worse than before.

A: There will be peace. We're determined to obtain it and we shall have it. It will come within a few weeks or even less, i.e. immediately following the resumption of negotiations with the North Vietnamese for the final agreement. This is what I said ten days ago and I repeat it. Yes, we'll have peace within a reasonable period if Hanoi accepts another meeting before signing the agreement, a meeting to define the details, and if they accept it in the same spirit and with the same attitude adopted in October. Those "ifs" are the only uncertainty of the last few days. An uncertainty, however, that I refuse even to consider; you are giving in to panic, and one shouldn't panic in cases like this. Nor succumb to impatience. The fact is that ... Well, we've been conducting these negotiations for months, and you newspaper people wouldn't take them seriously. You kept on saying they wouldn't end in anything concrete. Then, suddenly, you proclaimed that peace was already around the corner, and now, finally, you say the negotiations have failed. That way you take our temperature every day, four times a day. But you take it from Hanoi's point of view. And ... please take note, I understand Hanoi's point of view. The North Vietnamese wanted us to sign on October 31: a proposition that was reasonable and unreasonable at

the same time and . . . No, I don't want to engage in
polemics on this subject.

Q: But had you actually engaged to sign on October 31?

A: I say and repeat that they were the ones who insisted on this date and that, to avoid an abstract debate about dates that seemed in fact merely theoretical at the time, we replied that we'd make every effort to conclude the negotiations within October 31. But it was always clear, to us at least, that we wouldn't be able to sign an agreement until the last details had been discussed. We couldn't be expected to respect a date merely because, in good faith, we had promised to exert every effort to do so. So where does that put us? At the point where those details still need to be discussed and a further meeting is indispensable. They say it isn't indispensable, that it isn't even necessary. I maintain it is indispensable and that it will take place. It will take place as soon as the North Vietnamese summon me to Paris. But this is only November 4, today is November 4, and I can quite understand the North Vietnamese not wishing to resume negotiations just a few days after the date on which they had asked us to sign. I can understand this adjournment on their part. But it isn't conceivable, to me at least, that they should refuse to agree to a further meeting. Especially now, when we have already covered ninety percent of the road and are near our destination. No, I'm not disappointed. I should be, certainly, were Hanoi to break the agreement, were Hanoi to refuse to discuss any alterations. But, no, I can't believe it. I can't even suspect that we've come so far only to fail on a matter of prestige, of procedures, of dates, of nuances.

Q: And yet, it looks as if they've really stiffened, Dr. Kissinger. They've reverted to a harsh vocabulary, they've proffered serious, almost insulting charges against you ...

A: Oh, that doesn't mean a thing. It's happened before and we've never paid any attention. I'd say that serious charges, even insults, are part of a normal picture. Essentially, nothing has changed. Since Tuesday October 31, since, that is, we've calmed down here, you keep on asking me whether the patient is ill. But I can discover no illness. And I really believe things will fall out more or less as I claim. Peace, I repeat, will come within a matter of weeks after talks are resumed;

18

THE NEW REPUBLIC

not within a matter of months. Within a matter of weeks.

Q: But when will talks be resumed? That's the point.

A: Whenever Le Duc Tho wants to meet me. I'm here, waiting. But without any anxiety, believe me. For God's sake! Before, two or three weeks used to elapse between each meeting! I don't see why we should get the wind up now if we have to wait a few days. The only reason for the nervous tension that has seized you all is that people are wondering: "Will talks really be resumed?" When you were cynical and didn't believe anything would happen, you didn't notice time passing. You were over-pessimistic at the beginning, and over-optimistic after my press conference, and now you're over-pessimistic again. You refuse to realize that everything is proceeding as I always thought it would from the moment I declared that peace was at hand. I calculated it would take a couple of weeks then, if I'm not mistaken. But even if it were to take more . . . Enough, I don't want to talk of Vietnam any more. I can't afford to at the present time. Every word I utter makes the headlines. At the end of November, perhaps . . . Look, why don't we meet again at the end of November?

Q: Because it's more interesting now, Dr. Kissinger. Because Thieu, for instance, defied you to talk. Please read this cutting from The New York Times. It carries Thieu's words: "Why don't you ask Kissinger what issues we differ on, what points I refuse to accept?"

A: Let me see it . . . Oh! No, I shan't answer him. I shan't respond to his invitation.

Q: He's already given his own answer, Dr. Kissinger. He's already told the world that the disagreement stems from the fact that, according to the terms accepted by you, the North Vietnamese troops will remain in South Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger, do you believe you'll ever be able to win over Thieu? Do you think the United States will be compelled to sign a separate treaty with Hanoi?

A: Don't ask me that. I have to stick to what I said in public ten days ago. I cannot, I must not consider a hypothesis that I don't believe will materialize, a hypothesis that must not materialize. All I can tell you is that we are determined to make peace, and that we will make it within as short a delay as possible, after my next meeting with Le Duc Tho. Thieu may say what he likes. It's his business.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, if I put a pistol to your head and enjoined you to choose between a dinner with Thieu and a dinner with Le Duc Tho . . . which would you choose?

A: That's a question I can't answer.

Q: What if I were to answer it saying I like to think you

would prefer to dine with Le Duc Tho?

A: I can't, I can't . . . I don't want to answer that question.

Q: Can you answer this question then: did you like Le Duc Tho?

A: Yes. I found in him a man deeply dedicated to his cause, very serious, very strong, and always courteous, well-bred. Sometimes, too, very hard, difficult to come to terms with, in fact. But this is something I've always respected in him. Yes, I feel great respect for Le Duc Tho. Of course, we met on strictly professional terms, but I believe, I believe I could feel a certain softening in the background. It's a fact, for instance, that at times we even managed to crack a joke together. We said that one day I might go to lecture on international relations at Hanoi University and that he would come to Harvard to lecture on Marxism-Leninism. Well, I should say our rapport was good.

Q: Would you say the same of Thieu?

A: I had a good rapport with Thieu too, at first.

Q: Exactly, at first. The South Vietnamese said this time you didn't greet each other like the best of friends.

A: What did they say?

Q: Yes. Would you deny it, Dr. Kissinger?

A: Well of course we had and still have our own points of view, and not necessarily the same points of view. Let's say Thieu and I greeted each other like allies.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, it is now obvious that Thieu is a harder nut to crack than formerly thought. As regards Thieu, do you feel you've achieved as much as you could or do you still hope to do something more? In one word: are you optimistic as regards the Thieu problem?

A: Yes, I do feel optimistic! I've still got something to do! Lots to do! I have by no means finished, we have by no means finished! And I don't feel powerless. I don't feel discouraged. Not at all. I feel prepared, confident. Optimistic. Even if I can't speak of Thieu, even if I can't tell you what we're doing at this point in the negotiations, that doesn't mean that I'm about to lose confidence in my ability to tie everything up within the delay I've mentioned. That's why it's useless for Thieu to ask you journalists to make me list the points we disagree about. It's so useless that his plea doesn't even irritate me. Besides, I'm not one of those people that allow themselves to be swayed by their emotions. Emotions are of no use. Least of all are they of any use in helping one to attain peace.

Q: But the dying, those that may die, are in a hurry, Dr. Kissinger. There was a dreadful picture in this morning's

DECEMBER 16, 1972

papers: a picture of a very young Vietcong who died two
days after October 31. There was also a horrifying news
item: about the twenty-two Americans shot down in their
helicopter by a Vietcong grenade three days after October
31. And while you condemn haste, the American Depart-
ment of Defense is sending fresh arms and munitions to
Thieu. Hanoi is doing the same.

A: That was unavoidable. It always happens before a cease-fire. Don't you remember the maneuvers in the Middle East at the time of the cease-fire? They lasted for two years, to say the least. You know, the fact that we're sending Saigon arms and that Hanoi is sending arms to the North Vietnamese quartered in South Vietnam means nothing. Nothing. Nothing. And don't make me talk of Vietnam any more, please.

Q: Won't you even talk of the fact that, according to some, the agreement you and Nixon have accepted is, to all practical purposes, an act of surrender to Hanoi?

A: That's absurd! It's absurd to say that President Nixon, a President who, towards the Soviet Union and Communist China, and on the eve of his own election has taken up a stance of assistance and defense as regards South Vietnam against what he considered a North Vietnamese invasion . . . it's absurd to think that such a President could surrender to Hanoi. And why should he surrender now? What we have done is not a surrender. What we have done is give South Vietnam an opportunity to survive under conditions that are, today, political rather than military. It is now up to the South Vietnamese to win the political contest awaiting them, as we have always maintained. If you compare the agreement we have accepted with our proposals of May 8 last, you will see that it's almost the same thing. There are no great differences between what we proposed last May and what the draft of the accepted agreement contains. We haven't added new clauses, we haven't made new concessions. I totally and absolutely reject the opinion of a "surrender." But that's really enough about Vietnam now. Let's talk of Machiavelli, Cicero, anything except Vietnam.

Q: Let's talk of war, Dr. Kissinger. You're not a pacifist, are you?

A: No, I really don't think I am. Even if I respect genuine pacifists, I don't agree with any pacifist and especially with half-and-half pacifists: you know, those that are pacifists one way and anything but the other. The only pacifists I agree to talk to are those that bear the consequences of non-violence right to the end: but even to them I talk willingly merely to tell them that they will be crushed by the will of those that are strong and that their pacifism can lead to nothing but horrible suffering. War is not an abstraction: it's something depending on prevailing conditions. The war against

Hitler, for instance, was a necessary one. By that I don't mean that war is necessary as such, that nations have to wage war to preserve their virility. What I mean is that there are certain principles for which nations must be ready to fight.

Q: And what can you tell me about the war in Vietnam, Dr. Kissinger? You have never been against it, have you?

A: How could I be? Even before I occupied the position I occupy today . . . No, I have never been against the war in Vietnam.

Q: But don't you think [Arthur] Schlesinger is right when he says that all the war in Vietnam has managed to prove is that half a million Americans, with all their technology, were unable to defeat poorly armed men dressed in black pajamas?

A: That's a different problem. If it is a problem whether the war in Vietnam was necessary, a just war, rather than . . . Opinions of that kind depend on the position one takes up when the country is already caught up in the war and all there remains is to devise a method to extricate it. After all, my, our part has been to reduce increasingly America's involvement in the war, and then terminate the war. Eventually, history will judge who achieved most: whether those who merely criticized or we who tried to reduce the war and then ended it. Yes, judgment belongs to posterity. When a country is involved in a war, it's not enough to say: we must put a stop to it. One must end it wisely. And that's very different from stating that we were right to start the war.

Q: But, Dr. Kissinger, don't you think it was a useless war?

A: I may agree. But don't forget the reason why we started that war was to prevent the North gobbling up the South, to enable the South to hold on to its territory. Of course, by that I don't mean that we had no other aim; it was something more as well. But today I am not in a position to judge whether the war in Vietnam was a just one or not, whether it was useful or useless for us to become involved in it. But are we still talking of Vietnam?

Q: Yes, and, still concerning Vietnam, do you think you might say that these negotiations have been and are the most important undertaking in your career, or even in your life?

A: The most difficult undertaking. Often, too, the most painful. But maybe it isn't right to describe them as the most difficult undertaking: it is more accurate to say that they have been the most painful undertaking. Because they involved me emotionally. You see, approaching China was a difficult task from an intellectual point of view, but not emotionally difficult. Peace in Vietnam, on the other hand, has been an emotion-

(L/C) 19

20

ally difficult task. As for describing those negotiations as the most important thing I've ever done ... No, what I wanted to achieve wasn't merely peace in Vietnam: it was three things. This agreement, the *rapprochement* with China and a new relationship with the Soviet Union. I have always attached great importance to the problem of a new relationship with the Soviet Union. No less, I might say, than to the *rapprochement* with China and the end of the war in Vietnam.

Q: And you've done it. You succeeded with China, you succeeded with Russia, you almost succeeded with peace in Vietnam. So, at this point, Dr. Kissinger, I'll ask you the same question I asked the astronauts when they were flying to the Moon: "What next? What will you do after the Moon, what more can you do than your astronaut's job?"

A: Oh! And what did the astronauts answer?

Q: The question bewildered them, and they answered: "We'll see... I don't know."

A: Neither do I. I really don't know what I'll do afterwards. However, unlike the astronauts, I'm not bewildered. I've always found so many things to do in life and I'm certain that when I leave this job ... Of course, I'll need some time to recuperate, a decompression period; one can't be in the position I now occupy, then leave it and begin something else at once. However, once decompressed, I'm certain of finding a worthwhile job. I don't want to think about it now. It could influence my ... my work. We are living in such a revolutionary period that to plan one's life, nowadays, is to revert to a Victorian middle-class mentality.

Q: Would you go back to teaching at Harvard?

A: I might. But it's very, very unlikely. There are more interesting things. And if, after all the experience I've acquired, I'm unable to keep on leading an interesting life, it will be my own fault entirely. Besides, I've by no means decided to give up this job yet. You know, I enjoy it very much.

Q: Naturally. Power is always seductive. Dr. Kissinger, to what extent does power fascinate you? Try to be sincere.

A: I will be. You see, when one wields power, and when one has it for a long time, one ends up thinking one has a right to it. I'm sure that when I leave this job I shall feel the lack of power. However, power as an instrument in its own right has no fascination for me. I don't wake up every morning exclaiming by God, isn't it extraordinary that I am able to dispose of a plane, that a car with a driver waits at my door? Who would have thought it possible? No, I'm not interested in such reflections. And if I do happen to entertain them, they certainly never become a determinating factor. What interests me is what one can achieve with

power. Splendid things, believe me ... However, it is not the craving for power that has spurred me on to take this job. If you examine my political past, you will discover that President Nixon couldn't have been included in my plans. I've been against him in three elections.

Q: I know. You even once declared that Nixon "wasn't suited to be President." Does this fact ever make you feel embarrassment in Nixon's presence, Dr. Kissinger?

A: I don't remember the exact words I may have used against Nixon. I presume that is more or less what I must have said, since the phrase is constantly quoted between inverted commas. However, if I did say it, it's a proof that Nixon was not included in my plans for a rise to power. As for feeling embarrassment in his presence ... No, I didn't know him, that's all. My attitude towards him was the conventional highbrow one, that's all. I was wrong. President Nixon has shown great strength, great skill. In summoning me to his side, too. I had never met him when he offered me this job. I was astonished. After all, he was acquainted with the unfriendly and unsympathetic attitude I had always assumed towards him. Yes indeed, he showed great courage in turning to me.

Q: He made a good deal, Dr. Kissinger. Except for the charge people proffer against you today, that you are Nixon's mental nurse.

A: It is an utterly senseless charge. We mustn't forget that, before he ever met me, President Nixon had been very active in matters of foreign policy. It had always been his consuming interest. Even before he was elected it was obvious that foreign policy mattered greatly to him. He has very clear ideas on the subject. He is a strong character. Besides, a weakling would never have been twice nominated presidential candidate, would never have survived in politics for so long. You can think what you like of President Nixon, but one thing is certain: you don't become President of the United States twice running because you're another man's tool. Such interpretations are romantic and unjust.

Q: You're very fond of him, Dr. Kissinger, aren't you?

A: I have great respect for him.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, people say you don't care about Nixon. They say all you care about is the job you are doing. They say you'd have done it under any president.

A: I on the other hand, am not at all so sure I could have done what I've done with him with another president. Such a special relationship, I mean the relationship between the President and me, always depends on the style of both men. In other words, I don't know many leaders, and I've met several, who would have

DECEMBER 16, 1972

[LW] 21

the courage to send their aide to Peking without telling anyone. I don't know many leaders who would entrust to their aide the task of negotiating with the North Vietnamese, informing only a tiny group of people of the initiative. Really, some things depend on the type of president. What I've done was acheived because he made it possible for me to do it.

Q: And yet, you have been an adviser to other presidents too, presidents who were Nixon's opponents, in fact. I mean Kennedy, Johnson.

A: My position towards all presidents has always been the same: I let them decide whether they wanted my opinion or not. When they asked for it, I gave it to them, telling them all, indiscriminately, what I thought. I was never concerned with what party they belonged to. I answered Kennedy's, Johnson's and Nixon's questions with the same independence. I gave them the same advice. There was some difficulty in Kennedy's case, true. In fact, people usually state that I disagreed with him. Well, yes, it was my fault, in substance. I was much too immature at the time. Moreover, I was only a part-time adviser; one can't hope to influence a president's day-to-day politics if one only meets him twice a week while there are others who see him every day. I mean that in Kennedy's and Johnson's time I was never in a comparable position to the one I now enjoy with Nixon.

Q: Not Machiavellian by any chance, Dr. Kissinger?

A: No, not at all. Why?

Q: Oh, only that, listening to you, one sometimes wonders not how much you have influenced the President of the United States, but to what extent you have been influenced by Machiavelli.

A: To none whatever. There is really very little of Machiavelli's one can accept or use in the contemporary world. The one thing I find interesting in Machiavelli is his estimate of the Prince's will. Interesting, but not such as to influence me. If you want to know who has influenced me most, I'll answer with two philosophers' names: Spinoza and Kant. Which makes it all the more peculiar that you choose to associate me with Machiavelli. Most people associate me with Metternich. And that is childish. My only connection with Metternich is a book I wrote: it was to be the first volume in a lengthy study of the construction and disintegration of international order in the nineteenth century. The series was to cover the whole period up to the first world war, that's all. There can be nothing in common between me and Metternich. He was chancellor and foreign minister at a time when it took three weeks to travel from Central Europe to the ends of the continent. He was chancellor and foreign minister at a time when wars were conducted by professional soldiers and diplomacy was in the hands of the aristoc-

racy. How can one compare such conditions with the ones prevailing in today's world, a world where there is no homogeneous group of leaders, no homogeneous internal situation and no homogeneous cultural background?

Q: But, Dr. Kissinger, how do you explain your incredible superstar status, how do you explain the fact that you have become almost more famous and popular than a president? Have you any theories?

A: Yes, but I won't tell you what they are. Because they don't coincide with the common theory. Intelligence, for instance. Intelligence is not all that important in the exercise of power, and is often, in point of fact, useless. Just as a leader doesn't need intelligence, a man in my job doesn't need too much of it either. My theory is quite different, but, I repeat, I won't tell you what it is. Why should I, while I'm still in the middle of my job? Instead, you tell me yours. I'm sure you too have some theory on the reasons for my popularity.

Q: I'm not sure, Dr. Kissinger. I'm looking for a theory in this interview. But I haven't found one yet. I expect the root of all lies in success. What I mean is, like a chess player you've made two or three clever moves. China, first of all. People admire a chess player who makes away with his opponent's king.

A: Yes, China was an important element in the mechanics of my success. And yet, that isn't the main point. The main point . . . Well, why not? I'll tell you. What do I care after all? The main point stems from the fact that I've always acted alone. Americans admire that enormously. Americans admire the cowboy leading the caravan alone astride his horse, the cowboy entering a village or city alone on his horse. Without even a pistol, maybe, because he doesn't go in for shooting. He acts, that's all: aiming at the right spot at the right time. A Wild West tale, if you like.

Q: I see. You see yourself as a kind of Henry Fonda, unarm ed and ready to fight with his bare fists for honest ideals. Solitary, brave.

A: Not necessarily brave. This cowboy doesn't need courage. It's enough that he be alone, that he show others how he enters the village alone and does everything on his own. This romantic, surprising character suits me, because being alone has always been part of my style, or of my technique if you prefer. Independence too. Yes, that's very important to me and in me. And, finally, conviction. I am always convinced of the necessity of whatever I'm doing. And people feel that, believe in it. And I attach great importance to being believed: when one persuades or conquers someone, one mustn't deceive them. Nor can one do everything by calculation alone. Some believe I carefully plan whatever consequences on the public one of my initiatives or efforts may have. They believe that is a con-

22

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THE NEW REPUBLIC

stant preoccupation of mine. On the contrary, the consequences of my actions, I mean public opinion's verdict, have never worried me. I'm not asking for popularity, I'm not seeking it. In fact, if you really want to know, I care nothing for popularity. I'm not at all afraid of losing my public support, I can afford to say what I think. I am referring to what is genuine in me. If I let myself be perturbed by public reaction, if I acted merely on the basis of a calculated technique, I should achieve nothing. Take actors, for instance, the really good ones don't rely on mere technique. They also follow their feelings when they play a part. Like me, they are genuine. I don't mean to say that all this will last forever. In fact, it may evaporate as quickly as it came. But for the time being it's there.

Q: Are you trying to tell me, Dr. Kissinger, that you're a spontaneous person? Heavens: if I'm not to think of Machiavelli, the first type my mind associates you with is a mathematician, someone who is almost spasmodically cold and controlled. I may be mistaken, but I believe you're a very cold man, Dr. Kissinger.

A: In tactics, not in strategy. In fact, I believe in human relations more than in ideas. I make use of ideas, but I need human relations, as I've shown in my work. After all, didn't what has happened to me happen by chance? For God's sake, I was a totally unknown professor, wasn't I? How could I possibly tell myself: "Now I'm going to fix things so as to become an international celebrity"? It would have been pure folly. I wanted to be where the action is, true, but I never paid a price to get there. I never made any concessions. I have always been guided by spontaneous decisions. One might retort: then it happened because it had to happen. That's what people always say when things have happened. One never hears it said of things that haven't happened; nobody has ever written the history of things that haven't happened. In a sense, however, I am a fatalist. I believe in fate. True, I believe one must fight to attain a goal. But I also believe there are limits to the fight a man may engage in to reach his goal.

Q: Another thing, Dr. Kissinger: how do you reconcile the tremendous responsibilities you have shouldered with the frivolous reputation you enjoy? How can you succeed in being taken seriously by Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and Le Duc Tho on one hand and be judged a carefree Don Juan or even playboy on the other? Doesn't it embarrass you?

A: Not at all. Why should it embarrass me when I go off to negotiate with Le Duc Tho? When I'm talking to Le Duc Tho, I know how to behave with Le Duc Tho, and when I'm with a girl, I know how to behave with a girl. Besides, Le Duc Tho isn't agreeing to negotiate with me because I'm an example of all the moral virtues. He agrees to negotiate with me because he wants certain things from me as I do from him. As a matter of

fact, in case of Le Duc Tho, as with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, I believe my playboy reputation has been and still is useful, because it has helped and helps to reassure people, to show them I'm not a museum piece. In any case, my frivolous reputation amuses me.

Q: And to think I believed it undeserved, a put-on act rather than the truth.

A: Well, it's partly overdone, of course. But it's partly, let's admit it, true. What counts is not how true it is or how much time I devote to women. What counts is to what extent women are part of my life, a central preoccupation. Well, they aren't that at all. To me women are no more than a pastime, a hobby. Nobody devotes too much time to a hobby. Moreover, my engagement book is there to show I only devote a limited portion of my time to them. What's more, I often prefer to visit my two children. I still see them often, although less frequently than before. As a rule I spend Christmas, other holidays and several weeks in summer with them, and I go to Boston once a month to see them. You probably know I've been divorced for several years. No, being divorced doesn't bother me. The fact that I don't live with my children doesn't give me any guilt complexes. Since my marriage was through, and not owing to any fault on either side, there was no reason not to divorce. Besides, I'm much closer to my children now than when I was their mother's husband. I'm also much happier in their company now.

Q: Are you against marriage, Dr. Kissinger?

A: No. The problem of marriage for or against is a dilemma that can be solved as a question of principle. I might marry again... oh, yes, I might. However, you know, for a serious person like me, after all, it is very difficult to co-exist with someone else and to survive such co-existence. The relationship between a woman and a man of my type is unavoidably very complex. One must be cautious. Oh, how hard it is for me to explain these things. I'm not a person that usually confides in journalists.

Q: So I gather, Dr. Kissinger. I've never interviewed anyone that evaded close questions and definitions like you, anyone that defended themselves as strenuously as you from attempts to penetrate their personality. Are you shy, by any chance, Dr. Kissinger?

A: Yes, I am rather. On the other hand, however, I believe I'm fairly well balanced. You see, there are those that describe me as a mysterious, tormented character, and others who see me as a merry guy always smiling, always laughing. Both these images are untrue. I'm neither the one nor the other. I'm... No, I won't tell you what I am. I'll never tell anyone.

Copyright Rizzoli Press Service-L'Europeo 1972

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

DECEMBER 16, 1972

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE BRIEFING ROOM

11:43 A.M. EST

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger will be on the record this morning, as he always is.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, as you know, I have been reporting to the President and meeting with the Secretary of State, the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and other senior officials. I am meeting with you today because we wanted to give you an account of the negotiations as they stand today.

I am sure you will appreciate that I cannot go into the details of particular issues, but I will give you as fair and honest a description of the general trend of the negotiations as I can.

First, let me do this in three parts: what led us to believe, at the end of October, that peace was imminent; second, what has happened since; third, where do we go from here?

At the end of October we had just concluded three weeks of negotiations with the North Vietnamese. As you all know, on October 8th the North Vietnamese presented to us a proposal which, as it later became elaborated, appeared to us to reflect the main principles that the President has always enunciated as being part of the American position. These principles were that there had to be an unconditional release of American prisoners throughout Indochina; secondly, that there should be a cease-fire in Indochina brought into being by various means suitable to the conditions of the countries concerned; third, that we were prepared to withdraw our forces under these conditions in a time period to be mutually agreed upon; fourth, that we would not pre-judge the political outcome of the future of South Vietnam, we would not impose a particular solution, we would not insist on our particular solution.

The agreement, as it was developed during October, seemed to us to reflect these principles precisely. Then, toward the end of October, we encountered a number of difficulties. Now, at the time, because we wanted to maintain the atmosphere leading to a rapid settlement, we mentioned them at our briefings, but we did not elaborate on them.

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Now let me sum up what the problems were at the
end of October.

It became apparent that there was in preparation a
massive Communist effort to launch an attack throughout South
Vietnam to begin several days before the cease-fire would have
been declared, and to continue for some weeks after the
cease-fire came into being.

Second, there was an interview by the North Virt-
namese Prime Minister which implied that the political solu-
tion that we had always insisted was part of our principles,
namely, that we would not impose a coalition government, was
not as clearcut as our record of the negotiations indicated.

Thirdly, as no one could miss, we encountered some
specific objections from Saigon.

Under these conditions, we proposed to Hanoi that
there should be one other round of negotiations to clear up
these difficulties. We were convinced that with good will on
both sides, these difficulties could be relatively easily sur-
mounted and that if we conducted ourselves on both sides in
the spirit of the October negotiations, a settlement would be
very rapid.

It was our conviction that if we were going to bring
to an end 10 years of warfare, we should not do so with an
armistice, but with a peace that had a chance of lasting.
Therefore, we proposed three categories of clarifications in
the agreement. First, we wanted the so-called linguistic
difficulties cleared up so that they would not provide the
seed for unending disputes and another eruption of the war.
I will speak about those in a minute.

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Secondly, the agreement always had provided that
international machinery be put in place immediately after
the cease-fire was declared. We wanted to spell out the
operational meaning of the word "immediately" by developing
the protocols that were required to bring the international
machinery into being simultaneously with a cease-fire
agreement. This, to us, seemed a largely technical matter.

Thirdly, we wanted some Reference in the agreement, however
vague, however allusive, however indirect, which would
make clear that the two parts of Vietnam would live in
peace with each other and that neither side would impose
its solution on the other by force. These seemed to us
modest requirements, relatively easily achieveable.

Let me now tell you the sequence of events since
that time. We all know of the disagreements that have
existed between Saigon and Washington. These disagreements
are, to some extent, understandable. It is inevitable that
a people on whose territory the war has been fought and
that for 25 years has been exposed to devastation and suffering
and assassination, would look at the prospects of a settlement
in a more detailed way, in a more anguished way, than we
who are 10,000 miles away. Many of the provisions of
the agreement inevitably were seen in a different context
in Vietnam than in Washington.

I think it is safe to say that we face, with respect
to both Vietnamese parties, this problem. The people of
Vietnam, North and South, have fought for so long that the risks
and perils of war, however difficult, seem sometimes more
bearable to them than the uncertainties and the risks and
perils of peace.

Now, it is no secret, either, that the United States
has not agreed with all the objections that were raised by
Saigon. In particular, the United States' position with
respect to the cease-fire had been made clear in October, 1970.
It had been reiterated in the President's proposal of
January 25, 1972. It was repeated again in the President's
proposal of May 8, 1972. None of these proposals had asked
for a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces. Therefore,
we could not agree with our allies in South Vietnam when
they added conditions to the established positions after an
agreement had been reached that reflected these established
positions.

As was made clear in the press conference here on
October 26th, as the President has reiterated in his speeches,
the United States will not continue the war one day longer
than it believes is necessary to reach an agreement we consider
just and fair.

So, we want to leave no doubt about the fact that if
an agreement is reached that meets the stated conditions of
the President, if an agreement is reached that we consider
just, that no other party will have a veto over our actions.

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But I am also bound to tell you that today this question is moot because we have not yet reached an agreement that the President considers just and fair. Therefore, I want to explain to you the process of the negotiations since they resumed on November 20th and where we are.

The three objectives that we were seeking in these negotiations were stated in the press conference of October 26th, in many speeches by the President afterwards, and in every communication to Hanoi since. They could not have been a surprise.

Now, let me say a word first about what were called "linguistic difficulties" which were called these in order not to inflame the situation. How did they arise? They arose because the North Vietnamese presented us a document in English which we then discussed with them. In many places throughout this document, the original wording was changed as the negotiations proceeded and the phrases were frequently weakened compared to the original formulation. It was not until we received the Vietnamese text, after those negotiations were concluded, that we found that while the English terms had been changed, the Vietnamese terms had been left unchanged.

So, we suddenly found ourselves engaged in two negotiations, one about the English text, the other about the Vietnamese text. Having conducted many negotiations, I must say this was a novel procedure. It led to the view that perhaps these were not simply linguistic difficulties, but substantive difficulties.

Now I must say that all of these, except one, have now been eliminated. The second category of problems concerned bringing into being the international machinery so that it could operate simultaneously with the cease-fire and so as to avoid a situation where the cease-fire, rather than bring peace, would unleash another frenzy of warfare.

So to that end we submitted on November 20th, the first day that the negotiations resumed, a list of what are called protocols, technical instruments to bring this machinery into being. These protocols -- and I will not go into the details of these protocols -- they are normally technical documents and ours were certainly intended to conform to normal practices, despite the fact that this occurred four weeks after we had made clear that this was our intention and three weeks after Hanoi had pressed us to sign a cease-fire agreement. The North Vietnamese refused to discuss our protocols and refused to give us their protocols, so that the question of bringing the international machinery into being could not be addressed.

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[L]

The first time we saw the North Vietnamese protocols was on the evening of December 12th, the night before I was supposed to leave Paris, six weeks after we had stated what our aim was, five weeks after the cease-fire was supposed to be signed, a cease-fire which called for that machinery to be set up immediately.

These protocols were not technical instruments, but reopened a whole list of issues that had been settled, or we thought had been settled, in the agreement. They contained provisions that were not in the original agreement, and they excluded provisions that were in the original agreement. They are now in the process of being discussed by the technical experts in Paris, but some effort will be needed to remove the political provisions from them and to return them to a technical status.

Secondly, I think it is safe to say that the North Vietnamese perception of international machinery and our perception of international machinery is at drastic variance, and that, ladies and gentlemen, is an understatement.

We had thought that an effective machinery required, in effect, some freedom of movement, and our estimate was that several thousand people were needed to monitor the many provisions of the agreement. The North Vietnamese perception is that the total force should be no more than 250, of which nearly half should be located at headquarters; that it would be dependent for its communication, logistics, and even physical necessities entirely on the party in whose area it was located.

So it would have no jeeps, no telephone, no radio of its own; that it could not move without being accompanied by liaison officers of the party that was to be investigated, if that party decided to give it the jeeps to get to where the violation was taking place and if that party would then let it communicate what it found.

It is our impression that the members of this commission will not exhaust themselves in frenzies of activity if this procedure were adopted.

Now, thirdly, the substance of the agreement. The negotiations since November 20th really have taken place in two phases. The first phase, which lasted for three days, continued the spirit and the attitude of the meetings in October. We presented our proposals. Some were accepted; others were rejected.

But by the end of the third day we had made very substantial progress, and all of us thought that we were within a day or two of completing the arrangements. We do not know what decisions were made in Hanoi at that point, but from that point on, the negotiations have had the character where a settlement was always just within our reach, and was always pulled just beyond our reach when we attempted to grasp it.

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I do not think it is proper for me to go into the
details of the specific issues, but I think I should give you
a general atmosphere and a general sense of the procedures
that were followed.

When we returned on December 4th, we of the Ameri-
can team, we thought that the meetings could not last more than
two or three days because there were only two or three issues
left to be resolved. You all know that the meetings lasted
nine days. They began with Hanoi withdrawing every change
that had been agreed to two weeks previously.

We then spent the rest of the week getting back
to where we had already been two weeks before. By Saturday,
we thought we had narrowed the issues sufficiently where, if
the other side had accepted again one section they already
had agreed to two weeks previously, the agreement could have
been completed.

At that point, the President ordered General Haig
to return to Washington so that he would be available for the
mission, that would then follow, of presenting the agreement to
our allies. At that point, we thought we were sufficiently
close so that experts could meet to conform the texts so that
we would not again encounter the linguistic difficulties which
we had experienced previously, and so that we could make sure
that the changes that had been negotiated in English would also
be reflected in Vietnamese.

When the experts met, they were presented with 17
new changes in the guise of linguistic changes. When I met
again with the Special Advisor, the one problem which we thought
remained on Saturday had grown to two, and a new demand was
presented. When we accepted that, it was withdrawn the next
day and sharpened up. So we spent our time going through the
17 linguistic changes and reduced them again to two.

Then, on the last day of the meeting, we asked our
experts to meet to compare whether the 15 changes that had
been settled, of the 17 that had been proposed, now conformed
in the two texts. At that point we were presented with 16
new changes, including four substantive ones, some of which now
still remain unsettled.

Now, I will not go into the details or into the
merits of these changes. The major difficulty that we now face
is that provisions that were settled in the agreement appear
again in a different form in the protocols; that matters of
technical implementation which were implicit in the agreement
from the beginning have not been addressed and were not pre-
sented to us until the very last day of a series of sessions
that had been specifically designed to discuss them; and that
as soon as one issue was settled, a new issue was raised.

It was very tempting for us to continue the process
which is so close to everybody's heart, implicit in the many
meetings, of indicating great progress, but the President
decided that we could not engage in a charade with the Ameri-
can people.

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We now are in this curious position: Great progress
has been made, even in the talks. The only thing that is
lacking is one decision in Hanoi, to settle the remaining
issues in terms that two weeks previously they had already
agreed to.

So, we are not talking of an issue of principle that
is totally unacceptable.

Secondly, to complete the work that is required to
bring the international machinery into being in the spirit that
both sides have an interest of not ending the war in such a way
that it is just the beginning of another round of conflict.
So, we are in a position where peace can be near, but peace
requires a decision. This is why we wanted to restate once
more what our basic attitude is.

With respect to Saigon, we have sympathy and compassion
for the anguish of their people and for the concerns of their
government. But if we can get an agreement that the President
considers just, we will proceed with it.

With respect to Hanoi, our basic objective was stated
in the press conference of October 26th. We want an end to the
war that is something more than an armistice. We want to
move from hostility to normalization and from normalization
to cooperation. But we will not make a settlement which is
a disguised form of continued warfare and which brings about,
by indirection, what we have always said we would not tolerate.

We have always stated that a fair solution cannot
possibly give either side everything that it wants. We are
not continuing a war in order to give total victory to our
allies. We want to give them a reasonable opportunity to
participate in a political structure, but we also will not
make a settlement which is a disguised form of victory for
the other side.

Therefore, we are at a point where we are again perhaps
closer to an agreement than we were at the end of October,
if the other side is willing to deal with us in good faith
and with good will. But it cannot do that if every day an issue
is settled a new one is raised, that when an issue is settled
in an agreement, it is raised again as an understanding and
if it is settled in an understanding, it is raised again as
a protocol. We will not be blackmailed into an agreement.
We will not be stampeded into an agreement, and, if I may
say so, we will not be charmed into an agreement until its
conditions are right.

For the President and for all of us who have been engaged
in these negotiations, nothing that we have done has meant more
than attempting to bring an end to the war in Vietnam. Nothing
that I have done since I have been in this position has made me
feel more the trustee of so many hopes as the negotiations in
which I have recently participated. It was painful at times to
think of the hopes of millions and, indeed, of the hopes of many
of you ladies and gentlemen who were standing outside these
various meeting places expecting momentous events to be occurring,
while inside one frivolous issue after another was surfaced in
the last three days.

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So, what we are saying to Hanoi is, we are prepared to continue in the spirit of the negotiations that were started in October. We are prepared to maintain an agreement that provides for the unconditional release of all American and allied prisoners, that imposes no political solution on either side, that brings about an internationally supervised cease-fire and the withdrawal of all American forces within 60 days. It is a settlement that is just to both sides and that requires only a decision to maintain provisions that had already been accepted and an end to procedures that can only mock the hopes of humanity.

On that basis, we can have a peace that justifies the hopes of mankind and the sense of justice of all participants.

Now, I will be glad to answer some of your questions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you explain what in your mind you think Hanoi's motivation was in playing what you called a charade?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't want to speculate on Hanoi's motives. I have no doubt that before too long we will hear a version of events that does not exactly coincide with ours. I have attempted to give you as honest an account as I am capable of. I believe -- and this is pure speculation -- that for a people that have fought for so long, it is paradoxically, and perhaps easier to face the risks of war than the uncertainties of peace.

It may be that they are waiting for a further accentuation of the divisions between us and Saigon, for more public pressures on us, or perhaps they simply cannot make up their mind. But I really have no clue to what the policy decisions were.

Q Dr. Kissinger, from your account one would conclude that the talks are now ended in terms of the series you completed. Is that true? Secondly, if it is not true, on what basis will they be resumed?

DR. KISSINGER: We do not consider the talks completed. We believe that it would be a relatively simple matter to conclude the agreement, because many of the issues that I mentioned, in the press conference of October 26th, have either been settled or substantial progress toward settling them has been made.

Therefore, if there were a determination to reach an agreement, it could be reached relatively quickly. On the other hand, the possibilities of raising technical objections are endless.

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So, as Le Duc Tho said yesterday, we will remain in
contact through messages. We can then decide whether or
when to meet again. I expect that we will meet again, but
we have to meet in an atmosphere that is worthy of the
seriousness of the endeavor. On that basis, as far as we are
concerned, the settlement will be very rapid.

Q Dr. Kissinger, you have not discussed at all
the proposals that the United States made on behalf of Saigon
which required changes in the existing agreement that was
negotiated. Can you discuss what those were and what effect
they had on stimulating Hanoi, if they did, to making counter-
proposals of its own?

DR. KISSINGER: As I pointed out, there were two
categories of objections on the part of Saigon, objections
which we agreed with, and objections which we did not agree
with. The objections that we agreed with are essentially
contained in the list that I presented at the beginning and
those were the ones we maintained. All of those, we believe,
did not represent changes in the agreement, but either
clarifications, removal of ambiguities, or spelling out the
implementation of agreed positions.

In the first sequence of meetings between November 20th
and November 26th, most of those were, or many of those were
taken care of. So that we have literally, as I have pointed out
before, been in the position where every day we thought it
could and indeed, had to be the last day.

The counter-proposals that Hanoi has made were again
in two categories. One set of changes that would have totally
destroyed the balance of the agreement and which, in effect,
withdraw the most significant concessions they had made. I
did not mention those in my statement, because in the process
of negotiation they tended to disappear. They tended to
disappear from the agreement to reappear in understandings
and then to disappear from understandings to reappear in
protocols. But I suspect that they will, in time, after
the nervous exhaustion of our technical experts, disappear
from the protocols as well. So, there were major counter-
proposals which we believe can be handled.

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But then there were a whole series of technical counter-proposals which were absolutely unending and which hinged on such profound questions as whether, if you state an obligation in the future tense, you were therefore leaving open the question of when it would come into operation, and matters that reached the metaphysical at moments and which, as soon as one of them was settled, another one appeared, which made one believe that one was not engaged in an effort to settle fundamental issues but in a delaying action for whatever reason.

Now, those issues can be settled any day that somebody decides to be serious. Now it is clear that the interplay between Saigon and Hanoi is one of the complicating features of this negotiation, but the basic point that we want to make here is this:

> We have had our difficulties in Saigon, but the obstacle to an agreement at this moment is not Saigon, because we do not have, as yet, an agreement that we can present to them. When that point is reached, the President has made clear that he will act on the basis of what he considers just; but he has also made clear that he does not want to end such a long war by bringing about a very short peace.

Q Can a useful agreement be made operative without Saigon's signature?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, this is a question that has not yet had to be faced and which we hope will not have to be faced.

Q For the agreement to be just, according to the President's terms, must there be substantial withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops from the South?

DR. KISSINGER: The question of North Vietnamese forces in the South has three elements: the presence of the forces now there, their future, and the general claim that North Vietnam may make with respect to its right to intervene constantly in the South.

With respect to the last question, we cannot accept the proposition that North Vietnam has a right of constant intervention in the South.

With respect to the first question, of the forces now in the South, the United States has made three cease-fire proposals since October 1970, all of them based on the de facto situation as it existed at the time of the cease-fire, all of them approved by the Government of South Vietnam. Therefore, we did not add that condition of withdrawal to our present proposal, which reflected exactly the positions we had taken on January 25th and on May 8th of this year, both of which had been agreed to by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

We believe, however, that if the agreement that has been negotiated is implemented in good faith, that the problem of the forces will tend to lose its significance, or at least reduce significance, partly because of de facto withdrawals that could occur, and partly because if the provisions with respect to Laos, Cambodia, and no infiltration are maintained, the consequences in attrition will have to be obvious.

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Q Are we back to Square 1 now, Dr. Kissinger, would you say?

DR. KISSINGER: No. We have an agreement that is 99 percent completed as far as the text of the agreement is concerned. We also have an agreement whose associated imple- mentations are very simple to conclude if one takes the basic provisions of international supervision that are in the text of the agreement, provisions that happened to be spelled out in greater detail in the agreement than any other aspect, and, therefore, we are one decision away from a settlement.

Hanoi can settle this any day by an exchange of messages, after which there would be required a certain amount of work on the agreement, which is not very much, and some work in bringing the implementing instruments into being.

Q Would you tell what that one percent is?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you know, I have found I get into trouble when I give figures, so let me not insist on one percent. It is an agreement that is substantially completed, but I cannot go into that. But that alone is not the problem. The problem is as I have described it in my presentation.

Q I am a little confused, Dr. Kissinger, as to whether what remains you would describe as fundamental or one of these technical problems, because you have ranged between the two and I am little lost as to what is left.

DR. KISSINGER: The technical implementing instruments that they have presented are totally unacceptable for the reasons which I gave. On the other hand, I cannot really believe that they are serious. What remains on the agreement itself is a fundamental point. It is, however, a point that had been accepted two weeks previously and later withdrawn. So we are not raising a new, fundamental point. We are raising the acceptance of something that had once been accepted.

Q Is it a political issue?

DR. KISSINGER: I really don't want to go into it.

Q What is the future of the Paris peace talks?

DR. KISSINGER: I think that the sort of discussions that have been going on in the Paris peace talks are not affected by such temporary ups and downs as the private peace talks, so I am sure that Minister Xuan Thuy and Ambassador Porter will find many subjects for mutual recrimination. (Laughter)

Q Dr. Kissinger, isn't the fundamental point the one you raised about the right of North Vietnamese forces to intervene in the future in South Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: I will not go into the substance of the negotiations.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, you already mentioned a fundamental disagreement in which you say it is the U.S. insistence that the two parts of Vietnam should live in peace with each other. Is that not the fundamental disagreement here?

DR. KISSINGER: As I said, I will not go into the details. I cannot consider it an extremely onerous demand to say that the parties of a peace settlement should live in peace with one another, and we cannot make a settlement which brings peace to North Vietnam and maintains the war in South Vietnam.

Q But isn't their position basically that Vietnam is one country, and that this peace agreement is supposed to ratify that point?

DR. KISSINGER: As I said, I will not go into the subsistence of the discussions, and I repeat: The issue that remained when we sent General Haig home is one that had already been agreed upon once, so it could not have been something that happened by oversight.

Q Dr. Kissinger, was Hanoi messaged ahead of time that you would talk to us?

DR. KISSINGER: No. But I suspect you will get that message to them very quickly.

Q Was there any understanding in Paris before you left that each side would be free to express itself without damaging the possibility of future talks?

DR. KISSINGER: No. Le Duc Tho correctly stated our agreement at the airport: that we would not go into the substance of the talks. Now, I recognize that what I am doing here goes to the edge of that understanding -- (Laughter) -- but the President felt that we could not permit a situation to continue in which there was daily speculation as to something that was already accomplished, while the record was so clearly contrary; therefore, we owed you an explanation not of the particular issues, but of the progress of negotiations, and exactly where they stood.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, I am not quite clear on a technical point. You talked about an agreement, understandings and protocols. Are there in fact three different sets of documents under negotiation? What are these understandings?

DR. KISSINGER: There are agreements, understandings and protocols. It always happened in a negotiation that there is some discussion which is not part of the agreement which attempts to explain what specific provisions mean and how they are going to be interpreted. This is what I meant by understanding. The protocols are the instruments that bring into being the international machinery and prisoner release. Their function is usually, in fact always, a purely technical implementation of provisions of an agreement.

These protocols do not, as a general rule, raise new issues, but rather they say, for example, with respect to prisoners, if the prisoners are to be released in 60 days, they would spell out the staging, the point at which they are released, who can receive them, et cetera.

Similarly with respect to international machinery, they would say where the teams are located, what are their functions and so forth. Our concern is that the protocols, as we now have them, raise both political issues, which are inappropriate to implementing protocols, and technical issues, which are inconsistent with international supervision.

We have other protocols that deal with prisoners and withdrawals and mining that also present problems, but which I don't mention here because those are normal technical discussions that you would expect in the course of an agreement.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 12:38 P.M. EST)