PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

October 8, 1973

No. 362

TEXT OF SPEECH OF THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
PACEM IN TERRIS CONFERENCE

SHERATON-PARK HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

OCTOBER 8, 1973

(FOR RELEASE UPON DELIVERY, EXPECTED AT 8:45 PM E.D.T. MONDAY, OCTOBER 8.)

The Nature of the National Dialogue

This is an important anniversary. A year ago today - on October 8 - came the breakthrough in the Paris negotiations which led soon afterward to the end of American military involvement in Viet-Nam. It is strangely difficult now to recapture the emotion of that moment of hope and uncertainty when suddenly years of suffering and division were giving way to new possibilities for reconciliation.

We meet, too, at a time when renewed conflict in the Middle East reminds us that international stability is always precarious and never to be taken for granted. Pacem in Terris remains regrettably elusive. However well we contain this crisis as we have, contained others, we must still ask ourselves what we seek beyond the management of conflict.

The need for a dialogue about national purposes has never been more urgent and no assembly is better suited for such a discussion than those gathered here tonight.

Dramatic changes in recent years have transformed America's position and role in the world:

- For most of the postwar period America enjoyed predominance in physical resources and political power. Now like most other nations in history, we find that our most difficult task is how to apply limited means to the accomplishment of carefully defined ends. We can no longer overwhelm our problems; we must master them with imagination, understanding and patience.

- For a generation our preoccupation was to prevent the Cold War from degenerating into a hot war. Today, when the danger of global conflict has diminished, we face the more profound problem of defining what we mean by peace and determining the ultimate purpose of improved international relations.

For further information contact:

PR #362

-2-

-- For two decades the solidarity of our alliances seemed as constant as the threats to our security. Now our allies have regained strength and self-confidence, and relations with adversaries have improved. All this has given rise to uncertainties over the sharing of burdens with friends and the impact of reduced tensions on the cohesion of alliances.

-- Thus even as we have mastered the art of containing crises, our concern with the nature of a more permanent international order has grown. Questions once obscured by more insistent needs now demand our attention: What is true national interest? To what end stability? What is the relationship of peace to justice?

It is characteristic of periods of upheaval that to those who live through them, they appear as a series of haphazard events. Symptoms obscure basic issues and historical trends. The urgent tends to dominate the important. Too often goals are presented as abstract utopias, safe-havens from pressing events.

But a debate to be fruitful must define what can reasonably be asked of foreign policy and at what pace progress can be achieved. Otherwise it turns into competing catalogues of the desirable rather than informed comparisons of the possible. Dialogue degenerates into tactical skirmishing.

The current public discussion reflects some interesting and significant shifts in perspective:

-- A foreign policy once considered excessively moralistic is now looked upon by some as excessively pragmatic.

-- The Government was criticized in 1969 for holding back East-West trade with certain countries until there was progress in their foreign policies. Now we are criticized for not holding back East-West trade until there are changes in those same countries' domestic policies.

-- The Administration's foreign policy once decried as too cold-war oriented is now attacked as too insensitive to the profound moral antagonism between Communism and freedom.

One consequence of this intellectual shift is a gap between conception and performance on some major issues of policy:

-- The desirability of peace and detente is affirmed but both the inducements to progress and the penalties to confrontation are restricted by legislation.

-- Expressions of concern for human values in other countries are coupled with failure to support the very programs designed to help developing areas improve their economic and social conditions.

-3-

PR #362

-- The declared objective of maintaining a responsible American international role clashes with nationalistic pressures in trade and monetary negotiations and with calls for unilateral withdrawal from alliance obligations.

It is clear that we face genuine moral dilemmas and important policy choices. But it is also clear that we need to define the framework of our dialogue more perceptively and understandingly.

## The Competing Elements of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy must begin with the understanding that it involves relationships between sovereign countries. Sovereignty has been defined as a will uncontrolled by others; that is what gives foreign policy its contingent and ever incomplete character.

For disagreements among sovereign states can be settled only by negotiation or by power, by compromise or by imposition. Which of these methods prevails depends on the values, the strengths and the domestic systems of the countries involved. A nation's values define what is just; its strength determines what is possible; its domestic structure decides what policies can in fact be implemented and sustained.

Thus foreign policy involves two partially conflicting endeavors: defining the interests, purposes and values of a society and relating them to the interests, purposes and values of others.

The policy maker, therefore, must strike a balance between what is desirable and what is possible. Progress will always be measured in partial steps and in the relative satisfaction of alternative goals. Tension is unavoidable between values, which are invariably cast in maximum terms, and efforts to promote them, which of necessity involve compromise. Foreign policy is explained domestically in terms of justice. But what is defined as justice at home becomes the subject of negotiation abroad. It is thus no accident that many nations, including our own, view the international arena as a forum in which virtue is thwarted by the clever practice of foreigners.

PR #362

-4-

In a community of sovereign states, the quest for peace involves a paradox: the attempt to impose absolute justice by one side will be seen as absolute injustice by all others; the quest for total security for some turns into total insecurity for the remainder. Stability depends on the relative satisfaction and therefore also the relative dissatisfaction of the various states. The pursuit of peace must therefore begin with the pragmatic concept of coexistence -- especially in a period of ideological conflict.

We must, of course, avoid becoming obsessed with stability. An excessively pragmatic policy will be empty of vision and humanity. It will lack not only direction, but also roots and heart. General de Gaulle wrote in his memoirs that "France cannot be France without greatness." By the same token America cannot be true to itself without moral purpose. This country has always had a sense of mission. Americans have always held the view that America stood for something above and beyond its material achievements. A purely pragmatic policy provides no criteria for other nations to assess our performance and no standards to which the American people can rally.

But when policy becomes excessively moralistic it may turn quixotic or dangerous. A presumed monopoly on truth obstructs negotiation and accommodation. Good results may be given up in the quest for ever elusive ideal solutions. Policy may fall prey to ineffectual posturing or adventuristic crusades.

The prerequisite for a fruitful national debate is that the policy makers and critics appreciate each other's perspectives and respect each other's purposes. The policy maker must understand that the critic is obliged to stress imperfections in order to challenge assumptions and to good actions. But equally the critic should acknowledge the complexity and inherent ambiguity of the policy maker's choices. The policy maker must be concerned with the best that can be achieved, not just the best that can be imagined. He has to act in a fog of incomplete knowledge without the information that will be available later to the analyst. He knows -- or should know -- that he is responsible for the consequences of disaster as well as for the benefits of success. He may have to qualify some goals not because they would be undesirable if reached, but because the risks of failure outweigh potential gains. He must often settle for the gradual, much as he might prefer the immediate. He must compromise with others, and this means to some extent compromising with himself.

The outsider demonstrates his morality by the precision of his perceptions and the loftiness of his ideals. The policy maker expresses his morality by implementing a sequence of imperfections and partial solutions in pursuit of his ideals.

There must be understanding, as well, of the crucial importance of timing. Opportunities cannot be hoarded; once past, they are usually irretrievable. New relationships in a fluid transitional period -- such as today--- are delicate and vulnerable; they must be nurtured if they are to thrive. We cannot pull up young shoots periodically to see whether the roots are still there or whether there is some marginally better location for them.

We are now at such a time of tenuous beginnings. Western Europe and Japan have joined us in an effort to reinvigorate our relationships. The

PR #362

-5-

Soviet Union has begun to practice foreign policy -- at least partially -- as a relationship between states rather than as international civil war. The People's Republic of China has emerged from two decades of isolation. The developing countries are impatient for economic and social change. A new dimension of unprecedented challenges -- in food, oceans, energy, environment -- demands global cooperation.

We are at one of those rare moments where through a combination of fortuitous circumstances and design man seems in a position to shape his future. What we need is the confidence to discuss issues without bitter strife, the wisdom to define together the nature of our world as well as the vision to chart together a more just future.

## Detente with the Soviet Union

Nothing demonstrates this need more urgently than our relationship with the Soviet Union.

This Administration has never had any illusions about the Soviet system. We have always insisted that progress in technical fields, such as trade, had to follow -- and reflect -- progress toward more stable international relations. We have maintained a strong military balance and a flexible defense posture as a buttress to stability. We have insisted that disarmament had to be mutual. We have judged movement in our relations with the Soviet Union, not by atmospherics, but by how well concrete problems are resolved and by whether there is responsible international conduct.

Coexistence to us continues to have a very precise meaning:

-- We will oppose the attempt by any country to achieve a position of predominance either globally or regionally.

-- We will resist any attempt to exploit a policy of detente to weaken our alliances.

-- We will react if relaxation of tensions is used as a cover to exacerbate conflicts in international trouble spots.

The Soviet Union cannot disregard these principles in any area of the world without imperiling its entire relationship with the United States.

On this basis we have succeeded in transforming U.S.-Soviet relations in many important ways. Our two countries have concluded an historic accord to limit strategic arms. We have substantially reduced the risk of direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation in crisis areas. The problem of Berlin has been resolved by negotiation. We and our allies have engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on major issues of European security including a reduction of military forces in Central Europe. We have reached a series of bilateral agreements on cooperation -- health, environment, space, science and technology, as well as trade. These accords are designed to create a vested interest in cooperation and restraint.

PR #362

-6-

Until recently the goals of detente were not an issue. The necessity of shifting from confrontation toward negotiation seemed so overwhelming that goals beyond the settlement of international disputes were never raised. But now progress has been made -- and already taken for granted. We are engaged in an intense debate on whether we should make changes in Soviet society a precondition for further progress -- or indeed for following through on commitments already made. The cutting edge of this problem is the Congressional effort to condition most-favored-nation trade status for other countries on changes in their domestic systems.

This is a genuine moral dilemma. There are genuine moral concerns -- on both sides of the argument. So let us not address this as a debate between those who are morally sensitive and those who are not, between those who care for justice and those who are oblivious to humane values. The attitude of the American people and government has been made emphatically clear on countless occasions, in ways that have produced effective results. The exit tax on emigration is not being collected and we have received assurances that it will not be reapplied; hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government are being given specific attention; the rate of Jewish emigration has been in the tens of thousands where it was once a trickle. We will continue our vigorous efforts on these matters.

But the real debate goes far beyond this: Should we now tie demands which were never raised during negotiations to agreements that have already been concluded? Should we require as a formal condition internal changes that we heretofore sought to foster in an evolutionary manner?

Let us remember what the MFN question specifically involves. The very term "most favored nation" is misleading in its implication of preferential treatment. What we are talking about is whether to allow normal economic relations to develop -- of the kind we now have with over 100 other countries and which the Soviet Union enjoyed until 1951. The issue is whether to abolish discriminatory trade restrictions that were imposed at the height of the Cold War. Indeed, at that time the Soviet Government discouraged commerce because it feared the domestic impact of normal trading relations with the West on its society.

The demand that Moscow modify its domestic policy as a precondition for MFN or detente was never made while we were negotiating; now it is inserted after both sides have carefully shaped an overall mosaic. Thus it raises questions about our entire bilateral relationship.

Finally the issue effects not only our relationship with the Soviet Union, but also with many other countries whose internal structures we find incompatible with our own. Conditions imposed on one country could inhibit expanding relations with others, such as the People's Republic of China.

We shall never dondone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice. But the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions? Are we

PR #362

-7-

ready to face the crises and increased defense budgets that a return to
Cold War conditions would spawn? And will this encourage full emigration
or enhance the well-being or nourish the hope for liberty of the peoples
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union? Is it detente that has prompted
repression -- or is it detente that has generated the ferment and the
demand for openness which we are now witnessing?

For half a century we have objected to communist efforts to alter
the domestic structures of other countries. For a generation of Cold War
we sought to ease the risks produced by competing ideologies. Are we
now to come full circle and _insist_ on domestic compatibility as a
condition of progress?

These questions have no easy answers. The government may under-
estimate the margin of concessions available to us. But a fair debate
must admit that they _are_ genuine questions, the answers to which could
affect the fate of all of us.

Our policy with respect to detente is clear: We shall resist
aggressive foreign policies. Detente cannot survive irresponsibility in
any area, including the Middle East. As for the internal policies of
closed systems the United States will never forget that the antagonism
between freedom and its enemies is part of the reality of the modern age.
We are not neutral in that struggle. As long as we remain powerful we
will use our influence to promote freedom, as we always have. But in
the nuclear age we are obliged to recognize that the issue of war and
peace also involves human lives and that the attainment of peace is a
profound moral concern.

PR #362

-8-

The World As It Is And The World We Seek

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly two weeks ago, I described our goal as a world where power blocs and balances are no longer relevant; where justice, not stability, can be our overriding preoccupation; where countries consider cooperation in the world interest to be in their national interest.

But we cannot move toward the world of the future without first main-
taining peace in the world as it is. These very days we are vividly reminded
that this requires vigilance and a continuing commitment.

So our journey must start from where we are now. This is a time of
lessened tension, of greater equilibrium, of diffused power. But if the
world is better than our earlier fears, it still falls far short of our
hopes. To deal with the present does not mean that we are content with it.

The most striking feature of the contemporary period -- the feature
that gives complexity as well as hope -- is the radical transformation in
the nature of power. Throughout history power has generally been homogen-
eous. Military, economic and political potential were closely related. To
be powerful a nation had to be strong in all categories. Today the vocabulary
of strength is more complex. Military muscle does not guarantee political
influence. Economic giants can be militarily weak, and military strength
may not be able to obscure economic weakness. Countries can exert political
influence even when they have neither military nor economic strength.

It is wrong to speak of only one balance of power, for there are
several which have to be related to each other. In the military sphere,
there are two super powers. In economic terms, there are at least five
major groupings. Politically, many more centers of influence have emerged;
some 80 new nations have come into being since the end of World War II
and regional groups are assuming ever increasing importance.

Above all, whatever the measure of power, its political utility has
changed. Throughout history increases in military power -- however slight
-- could be turned into specific political advantage. With the overwhelm-
ing arsenals of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of marginal advantage
is both pointless and potentially suicidal. Once sufficiency is reached,
additional increments of power do not translate into usable political
strength; and attempts to achieve tactical gains can lead to cataclysm.

This environment both puts a premium on stability and makes it difficult to maintain. Today's striving for equilibrium should not be compared to the balance of power of previous periods. The very notion of "operating" a classical balance of power disintegrates when the change required to upset the balance is so large that it cannot be achieved by limited means.

More specifically, there is no parallel with the nineteenth century.
Then, the principal countries shared essentially similar concepts of legiti-
macy and accepted the basic structure of the existing international order.
Small adjustments in strength were significant. The "balance" operated in
a relatively confined geographic area. None of these factors obtain today.

Nor when we talk of equilibrium do we mean a simplistic mechanical
model devoid of purpose. The constantly shifting alliances that main-
tained equilibrium in previous centuries are neither appropriate nor
possible in our time. In an age of ideological schism the distinction
between friends and adversaries is an objective reality. We share ideals
as well as interests with our friends, and we know that the strength of
our friendships is crucial to the lowering of tensions with our opponents.

PR #362

-9-

When we refer to five or six or seven major centers of power, the point being made is not that others are excluded but that a few short years ago everyone agreed that there were only two. The diminishing tensions and the emergence of new centers of power have meant greater freedom of action and greater importance for all other nations.

In this setting, our immediate aim has been to build a stable network of relationships that offers hope of sparing mankind the scourges of war. An interdependent world community cannot tolerate either big power confrontations or recurrent regional crises.

But peace must be more than the absence of conflict. We perceive stability as the bridge to the realization of human aspirations, not an end in itself. We have learned much about containing crises, but we have not removed their roots. We have begun to accommodate our differences, but we have not affirmed our commonality. We may have improved the mastery of equilibrium, but we have not yet attained justice.

In the encyclical for which this conference is named, Pope John sketched a greater vision. He foresaw "that no political community is able to pursue its own interests and develop itself in isolation" for "there is a growing awareness of all human beings that they are members of a world community."

The opportunities of mankind now transcend nationalism, and can only be dealt with by nations acting in concert:

- For the first time in generations mankind is in a position to shape a new and peaceful international order. But do we have the imagination and determination to carry forward this still fragile task of creation?

- For the first time in history we may have the technical knowledge to satisfy man's basic needs. The imperatives of the modern world respect no national borders and must inevitably open all societies to the world around them. But do we have the political will to join together to accomplish this great end?

If this vision is to be realized, America's active involvement is inescapable. History will judge us by our deeds, not by our good intentions.

But it cannot be the work of any one country. And it cannot be the undertaking of any one Administration or one branch of government or one party. To build truly is to chart a course that will be carried on by future leaders because it has the enduring support of the American people.

So let us search for a fresh consensus. Let us restore a spirit of understanding between the legislative and the executive, between the government and the press, between the people and their public servants. Let us learn once again to debate our methods and not our motives, to focus on our destiny and not on our divisions. Let us all contribute our different views and perspectives but let us, once again, see ourselves as engaged in a common enterprise. If we are to shape a world community we must first restore community at home.

With Americans working together, America can work with others toward man's eternal goal of a Pacem in Terris -- peace abroad, peace at home and peace within ourselves.

* * * * * *

His Imperial Majesty
The Shah

There have been a number of important developments which have occurred in the last 12 hours of which I will want to inform you fully and to seek your wise judgment and [insert counsel] counsel.

You are fully aware of the efforts that we have been making to achieve an effective cease fire in the Middle East in conditions which would make possible early progress towards a fundamental settlement. In the hours after the cease fire was agreed, there undoubtedly have been violations, by both sides in our judgment. We are not aware, however, of any major continuing violations at this time.

At the behest of the United States and the Soviet Union the Security Council has authorized that an augmented UNTSO observer group be positioned between the lines. This is in process. In the meantime, the Soviets have suggested joint Soviet-American military forces to make the cease fire effective. For reasons that you understand we do not believe this proposal is either desirable or necessary in the present situation.

There is before the Security Council today a proposal for the establishment of a United Nations peace keeping force. We are supporting this proposal fully provided it is made up only of non-permanent members of the organization. We do not believe the insertion of Soviet forces in any guise in the Middle East at this time would be a stabilizing factor. We hope therefore that you will intervene where ever you believe it would

be desirable to help achieve support for this proposal.

I want you to know also that the Soviets have threatened possible
unilateral action if joint U. S. -Soviet military action continues are not
brought into the area. Because of this we have taken certain precautionary
measures and we have informed the Soviets that any such unilateral action s
could have serious consequences. W

We are awaiting a Soviet response. In the meantime we believe
your active intervention in support of a UN force, exclusive of the
permanent members, would be helpful. The President would also appreciate
any additional thoughts and suggestions you may have.

Warmest regards.

This is an important anniversary. A year ago today -- on October 8 -- came the breakthrough in the Paris negotiations which led soon afterward to the end of American military involvement in Viet-Nam. It is strangely difficult now to recapture the emotion of that moment of hope and uncertainty when suddenly years of suffering and division were giving way to new possibilities for reconciliation.

We meet, too, at a time when renewed conflict in the Middle East reminds us that international stability is always precarious and never to be taken for granted. Pacem in Terris remains regrettably elusive. However well we contain this crisis, as we have contained others, we must still ask

[Y]

-2-

-- For most of the postwar period America
enjoyed predominance in physical resources
and political power. Now like most other nations
in history, we find that our most difficult task
is how to apply limited means to the accomplishment
of carefully defined ends. We can no longer
overwhelm our problems; we must master

[Y]

-3-

-- For a generation our preoccupation was to prevent the Cold War from degenerating into a hot war.

-4-

[Y]

-5-

-6-

[Y]

-7-

One consequence of this intellectual shift is a gap between conception and performance on some major issues of policy.

-8-

[Y]

-9-

Thus, foreign policy involves two partially conflicting endeavors: defining the interests, purposes and values of a society and relating them to the interests, purposes and values of others.

-10-

-11-

General DeGaulle wrote in his memoirs that "France cannot be
France without greatness." By the same token America cannot be
true to itself without moral purpose. This country has always had
a sense of mission. Americans have always held the view that

-12-

-13-

understand that the critic is obliged to stress imperfections in
order to challenge assumptions and to goad actions. But
equally the critic should acknowledge the complexity and inherent
ambiguity of the policy maker's choices. The policy maker must
be concerned with the best that can be achieved, not just the best
that can be imagined. He has to act in a fog of incomplete knowledge
without the information that will be available later to the analyst.

[Y]

-14-

There must be understanding, as well, of the crucial importance of timing. Opportunities cannot be hoarded; once past, they are usually irretrievable. New relationships in a fluid transitional period -- such as today -- are delicate and vulnerable; they must be nurtured if they are to thrive. We cannot pull up young shoots periodically to see whether the roots are still there or whether there is some marginally better location for them.

[Y]

-15-

Western Europe and Japan have joined us in an effort to reinvigorate our relationships. The Soviet Union has begun to practice foreign policy -- at least partially -- as a relationship between states rather than as international civil war. The People's Republic of China has emerged from two decades of isolation. The developing countries are impatient for economic and social change. A new dimension of unprecedented challenges -- in food, oceans, energy, environment -- demands global cooperation.

Detente with the Soviet Union

-18-

We have substantially reduced the risk of direct US-Soviet confrontation in crisis areas. The problem of Berlin has been resolved by negotiation. We and our allies have engaged the Soviet Union in negotiations on major issues of European security including a reduction of military forces in Central Europe. We have reached a series of bilateral agreements on cooperation -- health, environment, space, science and technology, as well as trade. These accords are designed to create a vested interest in cooperation and restraint.

-19-

been made -- and already taken for granted. We are engaged in
an intense debate on whether we should make changes in Soviet
society a precondition for further progress -- or indeed for
following through on commitments already made. The cutting
edge of this problem is the Congressional effort to condition
most-favored-nation trade status for other countires on changes
in their domestic systems.

-20-

[Y]

-22-

Finally the issue affects not only our relationship with the Soviet Union, but also with many other countries whose internal structures we find incompatible with our own. Conditions imposed on one country could inhibit expanding relations with others, such as the People's Republic of China.

We shall never condone the suppression of fundamental liberties. We shall urge humane principles and use our influence to promote justice. But the issue comes down to the limits of such efforts. How hard can we press without provoking the Soviet leadership into returning to practices in its foreign policy that increase international tensions? Are we ready to face the

-23-

For a generation of Cold War we sought to ease the risks produced
by competing ideologies. Are we now to come full circle and
insist on domestic compatibility as a condition of progress?

-24-

These questions have no easy answers. The
government may underestimate the margin of concessions
available to us. But a fair debate must admit that they _are_
genuine questions the answers to which could affect the fate of
all of us.

-25-

But in the nuclear age we are obliged to recognize that the
issue of war and peace also involves human lives and that
the attainment of peace in a profound moral concern.

## The World As It Is and The World We Seek

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly two
weeks ago I described our goal as a world where power blocs
and balances are no longer relevant; where justice, not
stability, can be our overriding pre-occupation; where
countries consider cooperation in the world interest to be in
their national interest.

But we cannot move toward the world of the future
without first maintaining peace in the world as it is. These
very days we are vividly reminded that this requires vigilance
and a continuing commitment.

-26-

Throughout history power has generally been homogeneous.

-27-

-28-

military power -- however slight -- could be turned into
specific political advantage. With the overwhelming arsenals
of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of marginal advantage
is both pointless and potentially suicidal. Once sufficiency is
reached, additional increments of power do not translate into
usable political strength; and attempts to achieve tactical
gains can lead to cataclysm.

-29-

More specifically, there is no parallel with the
nineteenth century. Then, the principal countries shared
essentially similar concepts of legitimacy and accepted the
basic structure of the existing international order. Small
adjustments in strength were significant. The "balance"
operated in a relatively confined geographic area. None of
these factors obtain today.

Nor when we talk of equilibrium do we mean a
simplistic mechanical model devoid of purpose. The constantly
shifting alliances that maintained equilibrium in previous
centuries are neither appropriate nor possible in our time.
In an age of ideological schism the distinction between friends
and adversaries is an objective reality. We share ideals as
well as interests with our friends, and we know that the strength

-30-

When we refer to five or six or seven major centers
of power, the point being made is not that others are excluded
but that a few short years ago everyone agreed that there were
only two. The diminishing tensions and the emergence of new
centers of power has meant greater freedom of action and
greater importance for all other nations.

-31-

We perceive stability as the bridge to the realization of human
aspirations, not as an end in itself. We have learned much
about containing crises, but we have not removed their roots.

- 32 -

-- For the first time in generations mankind is
in a position to shape a new and peaceful
international order. But do we have the
imagination and determination to carry
forward this still fragile task of creation?

-- For the first time in history we may have the
technical knowledge to satisfy man's basic needs.
The imperatives of the modern world respect
no national borders and must inevitably open
all societies to the world around them. But
do we have the political will to join together
to accomplish this great end?

- 33 -

- 34 -

With Americans working together, America can
work with others toward man's eternal goal of a Pacem in
Terris — peace abroad, peace at home and peace within
ourselves.

# The Nature of the National Dialogue

-2-

-3-

-4-

-- Thus even as we have mastered the art of
containing crises, our concern with the nature of
a more permanent international order has grown.
Questions once obscured by more insistent needs
now demand our attention: What is the true national
interest? To what end stability? What is the
relationship of peace to justice?

-5-

-6-

-7-

-8-

-9-

-10-

-11-

-12-

understand that the critic is obliged to stress imperfections in
order to challenge assumptions and to goad actions. But
equally the critic should acknowledge the complexity and inherent
ambiguity of the policy maker's choices. The policy maker must
be concerned with the best that can be achieved, not just the best
that can be imagined. He has to act in a fog of incomplete knowledge
without the information that will be available later to the analyst.
He knows -- or should know -- that he is responsible for the
consequences of disaster as well as for the benefits of success.
He may have to qualify some goals not because they would be
undesirable if reached, but because the risks of failure outweigh
potential gains. He must often settle for the gradual, much as he
might prefer the immediate. He must compromise with others,

-14-

-15-

Detente with the Soviet Union

-17-

On this basis we have succeeded in transforming
US-Soviet relations in many important ways. Our two countries
have concluded an historic accord to limit strategic arms.

-18-

-20-

-21-

-22-

-23-

-24-

These questions have no easy answers. The government may underestimate the margin of concessions available to us. But a fair debate must admit that they are genuine questions the answers to which could affect the fate of all of us.