48

THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER

demonstrate to China that the US "was a reliable government to deal with" was a mystifying proposition which more cynical observers of the events, both in and outside the US government, consider to have been an excuse justifying the simple convenience of the Islamabad link - a link which Washington had no overriding desire to shift.

Second, the knowledge of this secret diplomacy and its accompanying privileges obviously freed the Pakistani general of such restraints as might have inhibited him. He told his closest associates, including his minister of information, G.W. Choudhury, that his private understanding with Washington and Beijing would protect him. Choudhury later wrote: "If Nixon and Kissinger had not given him that false hope, he'd have been more realistic." Thus, the collusion with him in the matter of China *increases* the direct complicity of Nixon and Kissinger in the massacres. (There is another consideration outside the scope of this book, which involves the question: why did Kissinger confine his China diplomacy to channels provided by authoritarian or totalitarian regimes? Why was an open diplomacy not just as easy, if not easier? The answer - which also lies outside the scope of this book - is apparently that surreptitiousness, while not essential in itself, was essential if Nixon and Kissinger were going to be able to take the credit for it.)

It cannot possibly be argued, in any case, that the saving of Kissinger's private correspondence with China was worth the deliberate sacrifice of hundreds of thousands of Bengali civilians. And - which is worse still - later and fuller disclosures now allow us to doubt that this was indeed the whole motive. The Kissinger policy towards Bangladesh may well have been largely conducted for its own sake, as a means of gratifying his boss's animus against India and as a means of preventing the emergence of Bangladesh as a self-determining state in any case.

The diplomatic commonplace term "tilt" - signifying that mixture of signals and nuances and codes that describe a foreign policy preference that is often too embarrassing to be openly avowed - actually originates in this dire episode. On 6 March 1971, Kissinger summoned a meeting at the

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS 49

National Security Council and – *in advance of* the crisis in East-West Pakistan relations that was by then palpable and predictable to those attending – insisted that no preemptive action be taken. Those present who suggested that a warning to General Yahya Khan be issued, essentially advising him to honor the election results, he strongly opposed. His subsequent policy was as noted above. After returning from China in July, he began to speak in almost Maoist phrases about a Soviet-Indian plot to dismember and even annex part of Pakistan, which would compel China to intervene on Pakistan's side. (In pursuit of this fantasy of confrontation, he annoyed Admiral Elmo Zumwalt by ordering him to despatch the aircraft carrier USS *Enterprise* from the coast of Vietnam to the Bay of Bengal, while giving it no stated mission.) But no analyst in the State Department or the CIA could be found to underwrite such a bizarre prediction and, at a meeting of the Senior Review Group, Kissinger lost his temper with this insubordination. "The President always says to tilt toward Pakistan, but every proposal I get is in the opposite direction. Sometimes I think I'm in a nuthouse." The Nixon White House was, as it happens, in the process of becoming exactly that, but his hearers only had time to notice that a new power-term had entered Washington's vernacular of crisis and conspiracy.

"The President always says to tilt toward Pakistan." That at least was true. Long before any conception of his "China diplomacy," indeed even during the years when he was inveighing against "Red China" and its sympathizers, Nixon detested the government of India and expressed warm sympathy for Pakistan. Many of his biographers and intimates, including Kissinger, have recorded the particular dislike he felt (more justifiably, perhaps) for the person of Indira Gandhi. He always referred to her as "that bitch" and on one occasion kept her waiting for an unprecedented forty-five minutes outside his White House door. However, the dislike originated with Nixon's loathing for her father Pandit Nehru, and with his more general loathing for Nehru's sponsorship – along with Makarios, Tito and Soekarno – of the Non-Aligned Movement. There can be no doubt that,

50 THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER

with or without an occluded "China card," General Yahya Khan would
have enjoyed a sympathetic hearing, and treatment, from this president, and
thus from this national security advisor.

This is also strongly suggested by Kissinger's subsequent conduct, as Secretary of State, towards Bangladesh as a country and towards Sheik Mujib, leader of the Awami League and later the father of Bangladeshi independence, as a politician. Unremitting hostility and contempt were the signature elements in both cases. Kissinger had received some very bad and even mocking press for his handling of the Bangladesh crisis, and it had somewhat spoiled his supposedly finest hour in China. He came to resent the Bangladeshis and their leader, and even compared (this according to his then aide Roger Morris) Mujib to Allende.

As soon as Kissinger became Secretary of State in 1973, he downgraded all those who had signed the genocide protest in 1971. In the fall of the next year, 1974, he inflicted a series of snubs on Mujib, then on his first visit to the United States as head of state. In Washington Kissinger boycotted the fifteen-minute meeting that Mujib was allowed by President Ford. He also opposed Mujib's main request, which was for emergency United States grain shipments, and some help with debt relief, in order to recuperate the country so ravaged by Kissinger's friend and ally. To cite Roger Morris again: "In Kissinger's view there was very much a distant hands-off attitude toward them. Since they had the audacity to become independent of one of my client states, they will damn well float on their own for a while." It was at about this time that Kissinger was heard to pronounce Bangladesh "an international basket case," a judgment which, to the extent that it was true, was also self-fulfilling.

In November 1974, on a brief face-saving tour of the region, Kissinger made an eight-hour stop in Bangladesh and gave a three-minute press conference in which he refused to say why he had sent the USS *Enterprise* into the Bay of Bengal three years before. Within a few weeks of his departure, we now know, a faction at the US embassy in Dacca began covertly meeting with a group of Bangladeshi officers who were planning a coup

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS 51

against Mujib. On 14 August 1975, Mujib and forty members of his family were murdered in a military takeover. His closest former political associates were bayoneted to death in their prison cells a few months after that.*

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee was at that time conducting its sensational inquiries into CIA involvement with assassinations and subversion in the Third World. The "two track" concept, whereby an American ambassador like Ed Korry in Chile could find that his intelligence officers and military attachés were going behind his back and over his head, with secret authorizations from Washington, and running their own show, had not become a familiar one. However, exhaustive research by Lawrence Lifschultz of Yale University now strongly suggests that a "two track" scheme was implemented in Bangladesh as well.

The man installed as Bangladesh's president by the young officers who had slain Rahman was Khondakar Mustaque, generally identified as the leader of the right-wing element within the Awami League. He was at pains to say that the coup had come to him as a complete surprise, and that the young majors who had led it – Major Farooq, Major Rashid and four others, at the head of a detachment numbering just three hundred men – had "acted on their own." He added that he had never met the mutinous officers before. Such denials are of course customary, almost matters of etiquette. So are the ensuing statements from Washington, which invariably claim that this or that political upheaval has taken the world's largest and most powerful intelligence-gathering system completely off guard. That expected statement, too, was made in the aftermath of the assassination in Dacca.

The cover story (one might term it the coincidence version) leaks at every joint and comes apart at the most cursory inspection. Major Rashid was interviewed by Anthony Mascarhenas, the journalistic hero of the

* In December 2000 those responsible were convicted by a Bangladeshi court and (wrongly, in my opinion) sentenced to death. Some of the accused were unavailable for sentencing because they had taken refuge in the United States: a feat not achievable by the average Bengali immigrant.

52 THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER

Bangladesh war, on the anniversary of the coup. He confirmed that he had met Mustaque before the coup, and again on the days immediately preceding it. In fact, a senior Bangladeshi officer has dated meetings between Mustaque and the mutineers more than six months before Mujib's overthrow.

The United States ambassador in Dacca, Davis Eugene Booster, was aware that a coup was being discussed. He was also aware of the highly controversial congressional hearings in Washington, which had unveiled high-level official wrongdoing and ruined the career of many a careless foreign service officer. He ordered that all contact between his embassy and the mutinous officers be terminated. Thus his alarm and annoyance, on 14 August 1975, was great. The men who had seized power were the very ones with whom he had ordered a cessation of contact. Embassy sources have since confirmed to Lifschultz (a) that United States officials had been approached by, and had by no means discouraged, the officers who intended a coup and (b) that Ambassador Booster became convinced that his CIA station was operating a back channel without his knowledge. Such an operation would be meaningless, and also pointlessly risky, if it did not extend homeward to Washington where, as is now notorious, the threads of the Forty Committee and the National Security Council were very closely held in one fist.

Philip Cherry, the then head of the CIA station in Bangladesh, was interviewed by Lifschultz in September 1978. He was vague and evasive even about having held the job but did say, "There is one thing. There are politicians who frequently approach embassies, and perhaps have contacts there. They think they may have contacts." The shift from officer to politician is suggestive. And, of course, those who think they may have contacts may even act as if they do, unless they are otherwise advised.

Not only did Khondakar Mustaque *think* he had contacts with the United States government, including with Henry Kissinger himself, but he did indeed have such contacts, and had had since 1971. In 1973 in Washington, and in the aftermath of the unprecedented revolt of professional diplomats against the Kissinger policy in Bangladesh, the Carnegie

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS 53

Endowment for International Peace (publisher of the magazine *Foreign Policy*) conducted a full-dress study of the “tilt” that had put the United States on the same side as those committing genocide. More than 150 senior officials from the State Department and the CIA agreed to be interviewed. The study was coordinated by Kissinger's former aide Roger Morris. The result of the nine-month inquiry was never made public, due to internal differences at Carnegie, but the material was made available to Lifschultz and it does establish one conclusion beyond doubt.

In 1971 Henry Kissinger had attempted the impossible by trying to divide the electorally victorious Awami League, and to dilute its demand for independence. In pursuit of this favor to General Yahya Khan, he had initiated a covert approach to Khondakar Mustaque, who led the tiny minority who were willing to compromise on the main principle. A recently unearthed "Memorandum for the Record" gives us details of a White House meeting between Nixon, Kissinger and others on 11 August 1971, at which Undersecretary of State John Irwin reported: "We have had reports in recent days of the possibility that some Awami League leaders in Calcutta want to negotiate with Yahya on the basis of giving up their claim for the independence of East Pakistan." This can only have been a reference to the Provisional Government of Bangladesh, set up in exile in Calcutta after the massacres, and could only have been an attempt to circumvent its leadership. The consequences of this clumsy approach were that Mustaque was exposed and placed under house arrest in October 1971, and that the American political officer who contacted him, George Griffin, was declared *persona non grata* when gazetted to the US embassy in New Delhi a decade later.

Those involved in the military preparations for the coup have told Lifschultz that they, too, had a "two track" policy. There were junior officers ready to mutiny and there was a senior officer – the future dictator General Zia – who was ready but more hesitant. Both factions say that they naturally checked with their United States contacts in advance, and were told that the overthrow of Mujib was "no problem." This is at least partially

54

THE TRIAL OF HENRY KISSINGER

confirmed by a signed letter from Congressman Stephen J. Solarz of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, who undertook to investigate the matter for Lifschultz in 1980 and who on 3 June of that year wrote to him: "With respect to the Embassy meetings in the November 1974–January 1975 period with opponents of the Rahman regime, the State Department once again does not deny that the meetings took place." This would appear to be a rebuff to the evidence of Mr Cherry of the CIA, even if the letter goes on to say: "The Department does claim that it notified Rahman about the meetings, including the possibility of a coup." If true, that "claim" is being made for the first time, and in the name of the man who was murdered during the coup and cannot refute it. The admission is stronger than the claim in any case.

Congressman Solarz forwarded the questions about CIA involvement to the office of Congressman Les Aspin of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, which committee, as he said, "has the best chance of obtaining access both to CIA cable traffic and to the relevant figures in the intelligence community." But the letter he sent was somehow lost along the way, and was never received by the relevant inquiring committee, and shortly afterwards the balance of power in Washington shifted from Carter to Reagan.

Only a reopened congressional inquiry with subpoena power could determine whether there was any direct connection, apart from the self-evident ones of consistent statecraft attested by recurring reliable testimony, between the secret genocidal diplomacy of 1971 and the secret destabilizing diplomacy of 1975. The task of disproving such a connection, meanwhile, would appear to rest on those who believe that everything is an accident.

INSERT 79 - 1

HK had absolutely no foreknowledge of events leading up to the coup on July 15, 1974 in Cyprus. A credible intellect who studied the crisis would know (through Freedom of Information among other things) that rumors that were circulating at the time (summer 1974) were much like the rumors that circulated before the 1964 and 1967 attempts by Turkey to invade Cyprus. HK met with Gromyko in Nicosia on May 7 - a meeting attended by Archbishop Makarios - during a break in the Middle East shuttle. Makarios gave no sense of urgency regarding a potential coup. Makarios had, however, embarked on a high wire act with the Greek government, threatening to eliminate the National (Greek) Guard, but he had done such things in the past (for example, bringing in Czech arms in 1972 to counterbalance the Greek presence, and in general, flirting with the Communists and Non-Aligned).

Makarios, as it turned out, was the most surprised at the coup against him. Nobody knew anything and it took everyone by surprise.

So there was no conspiracy. And HK repeated many times in his press conferences (see especially July 20 and 22) that no war would be fought with U.S. supplied weapons. This is a matter of record.

Thomas Boyatt, whose prescient memo is mention by Hitchens, wrote a post-crisis analysis reporting on the utter confusion of intelligence in the period prior to the coup - with conflicts between the CIA

INSERT 79 - 1 page 2

(and its special contacts with Ioannides)
and the State Department. Boyatt concluded
that the intelligence preceding the coup
was at best conflicting. State foresaw the
probability of a major crisis if Ioannides
overthrew Makarios while CIA was reporting
in days preceding the coup that he had decided
against a move on the Archbishop. Nor was
our Ambassador in Athens (Tasca) particularly
interested in confronting Ioannides on the
issue. Given the precedents of 1964 and 1967
and the numbers of rumors circulating in days
before the crisis it was not at all clear -
even to Makarios - what the Greeks had
planned, although as Hitchens himself acknow-
ledges on the next page, Greek and Greek Cypriot
fanatics had made several attempts on the
Archbishop's life.

Thomas Boyatt, whose prescient memo is mentioned by Hitchens, wrote a post-crisis analysis reporting on the utter confusion of intelligence in the period prior to the coup - with conflicts between the CIA

INSERT 79 - 1

HK had absolutely no foreknowledge of events leading up to the coup on July 15, 1974 in Cyprus. A credible intellect who studied the crisis would know (through Freedom of Information among other things) that rumors that were circulating at the time (summer 1974) were much like the rumors that circulated before the 1964 and 1967 attempts by Turkey to invade Cyprus. HK met with Gromyko in Nicosia on May 7 - a meeting hosted by Archbishop Makarios - during a break in the Middle East shuttle. Makarios gave no sense of urgency regarding a potential coup.

INSERT 84

The full quote is needed to put this
excerpt in perspective. What HK told
the press conference of July 22 was as follows:

"May I make one general point. I
have read many learned articles during
the week of why we were taken by sur-
prise by the coup in Cyprus, and I simply
would like to point out to you ladies
and gentlemen that obviously the man most
concerned in Cyprus, namely Archbishop
Makarios, was also taken by surprise, to
that the information was not exactly lying
in the street."

## INSERT 86 -1

HK referred to his fond feelings for "President Makarios" on July 15. John Scali alternated between "President" and "Archbishop" Makarios in his various statements at the United Nations. The main point is that in his July 22 meeting with HK, Makarios himself was already talking about Clerides as Acting President although he [Makarios] planned to return to reclaim the presidency when Cyprus calmed down. (Clerides assumed the presidency thereafter but Makarios was back in his office in December 1974)

Insert 85-1 makes clear that the charge of "Kissinger's unilateralism" is bogus.

## 86 - 2

HK defined the national interest as follows in a post-crisis discussion with his State colleagues on August 5:

> ... It must remain an objective of US policy that both Greece and Turkey remain members of the NATO structure, and those who make cynical comments about military bases in the Eastern Mediterranean should ask themselves what the United States would do in the foreseeable crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean if Greece and Turkey were not available to us?... It makes a great deal of difference whether they are run by governments that feel betrayed by the United States and are built on a nationalism that edges toward hostility, or whether they are basically friendly to the United States and intend to cooperate with us.

THE READER IS NOT INFORMED OF THE MAJOR DIPLOMACY CONDUCTED
BY THE US BEGINNING WITH THE SISCO MISSION TO ANKARA AND ATHENS.
AT THE SAME TIME, CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS 87 THE BRITISH WERE
TAKING THE LEAD AS A GUARANTOR POWER ON THE NEGOTIATIONS IN LONDON.

counsel of inertia or inaction – amply testified to in his own memoirs as
well as in everyone else's – translated later into equally strict and repeated
admonitions against any measures to block a Turkish invasion. Sir Tom
McNally, then the chief political advisor to Britain's then Foreign Secretary
and future prime minister, James Callaghan, has since disclosed that
Kissinger "vetoed" at least one British military action to preempt a Turkish
landing. But that was *after* the Greek colonels had collapsed, and demo-
cracy had been restored to Athens. There was no longer a client regime to
protect.

OF THE FOUR PILLARS
OF US POLICY, A MAJOR
ONE WAS PREVENTING
A TURKISH INVASION.
THIS WAS A CRUCIAL
POINT FROM THE VERY
FIRST WSAG MEETING.
IT IS ALL DETAILED
IN YEARS OF RENEWAL,
pp 207 ff.

This may seem paradoxical, but the long-standing sympathy for a partition of Cyprus, repeatedly expressed by the State and Defense departments, make it seem much less so. The demographic composition of the island (82 percent Greek to 18 percent Turkish) made it more logical for the partition to be imposed by Greece. But a second-best was to have it imposed by Turkey. And, once Turkey had conducted two brutal invasions and occupied almost 40 percent of Cypriot territory, Kissinger exerted himself very strongly indeed to protect Ankara from any congressional reprisal for this outright violation of international law, and promiscuous and illegal misuse of US weaponry. He became so pro-Turkish, indeed, that it was if he had never heard of the Greek colonels. (Though his expressed dislike of the returned Greek democratic leaders supplied an occasional reminder.)

SEE INSERT 87 - 1

SEE INSERT 87 - 2

Not all the elements of this partitionist policy can be charged to Kissinger personally; he inherited the Greek junta and the official dislike of Makarios. However, even in the dank obfuscatory prose of his own memoirs, he does admit what can otherwise be concluded from independent sources. Using covert channels, and short-circuiting the democratic process in his own country, he made himself an accomplice in a plan of political assassination which, when it went awry, led to the deaths of thousands of civilians, the violent uprooting of almost 200,000 refugees, and the creation of an unjust and unstable amputation of Cyprus which constitutes a serious threat to peace a full quarter-century later. His attempts to keep the

INSERT 87 - 2

It was not a matter of "protecting" Ankara
but rather of US interests. HK explained
this clearly at his December 7, 1974 press
conference:

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, my apoloyies for having made you come in on Saturday. I had planned to do this on Monday but forgot that I have a congressional appearance on Monday afternoon and Foreign Minister [of Israel Yigal] Allon on Monday morning.

I'd like to begin by reading a brief statement on military aid to Turkey, which I am doing on behalf of the President as well as myself.

As you know, Congress in October enacted legislation which will cut off military assistance to Turkey on December 10. As you are also aware, the Senate has now acted to extend the period prior to such a cutoff. It is absolutely essential, and the President and I strongly urge, that the House take similar action immediately.

To begin with, the congressional decision to terminate military assistance to Turkey has not served the purpose it was designed to accomplish. Rather, it undermines the ability of the U.S. Government to assist in bringing about a just settlement of the tragic conflict on Cyprus.

We had made progress with the Turkish Government in the development of steps designed to make possible the initiation of negotiations.

Congressional action in October setting a terminal date for military assistance contributed substantially to the difficulties that have prevented the beginning of negotiations. Unless the Congress acts now to permit the continued flow of military assistance, further efforts by the United States to assist in resolving the crisis will be thwarted and our ability to play a future useful role will be undermined.

The United States has made it clear that it

does not approve of actions taken by Turkey on Cyprus. We have equally made clear that Turkey should display flexibility and a concern for the interests of the other parties in that dispute.

The United States will continue to do all it can to assist the parties in arriving at an equitable and enduring resolution of the Cyprus problem. But if we are deprived of diplomatic flexibility, there will be little that we will be able to accomplish.

Even more important, the U.S. military assistance to Turkey is not, and has never been, granted as a favor. It has been the view of the U.S. Government since 1947 that the security of Turkey is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, to NATO Europe, and therefore to the security of the Atlantic community.

These are the reasons, and these alone, that we grant military assistance. They were compelling when we first decided to grant such aid. They are equally compelling today.

In 1947, our commitment to assist Greece and Turkey marked the turning point in the building of a security system which has contributed to Western security. Are we now to establish a new turning point which will mark the end of our commitment to a system which has served the free countries so well?

The security interests of the West may be irreparably damaged unless the Congress takes immediate action to permit military assistance to Turkey to continue.

This statement is made on behalf of the President as well as myself.

INSERT 82 - 2 cont'd

HK later observed in his final memoir on
the Ford years:

The American embargo on aid to Turkey went into effect on Febru-
ary 5, 1975. By way of response, Turkey closed all American military
installations except one air base. As the Cyprus situation turned into
a stalemate, the cutoff gradually ran so counter to other American
strategic objectives that both the Ford Administration and the Demo-
cratic congressional leadership wanted to end it. But congressional
discipline had so broken down in the post-Watergate "reform" era
that the embargo was not finally lifted until well into the Carter
Administration.

However, Makarios was engaged in a high-
wire act of his own with the Greek govern-
ment, threatening to eliminate the National
(Greek) Guard, but he had done such things
in the past (for example, sneaking Czech
arms onto the island in 1972 to counter-
balance the Greek presence and in general
flirting with the Communists for internal
support and the Non-Aligned).

As it turned out, Makarios himself
was surprised and barely made it off the
island before the assassination attempt.
He reappeared in London a few days after
the coup.

**Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao:** The day before yesterday I met Ambassador Malik. He said he would come to hear my speech. I replied, "You can't run away." So today he just threw a copy [of the speech] down on the table.

**Secretary Kissinger:** I was worried that I didn't go to his reception, as I went to yours. However, Malik solved my problem as he came to yours.

**Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao:** Yes. I recall that last night the three of us sat in a triangle, in a circle. You can draw the circle in many ways.

**Secretary Kissinger:** But it still comes out the same. We keep it constant; it comes out the same.

**Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao:** Well, but frankly, since we met last April there have been many changes.

**Secretary Kissinger:** Before we get to these, there is one aesthetic point I wanted to raise. You said we overthrew the government in Cyprus. We did not. We did not oppose Makarios. It would serve no political purpose for us [to have overthrown him]. The only problem is that his talents are greater than the island he runs. But that's a vice of most Greek politicians. Basically this is just for your information -- it is not an important point. This was not an event which we desired. Once it happened, our basic desire was to keep the Soviet Union out, not to permit them to undermine the situation. I liked your description of their policy [in the G. A. speech] very much.

**Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao:** Speaking of the Cyprus events, I have one question. You surely knew something of the situation before the event. Why didn't you take steps to prevent it? In our view it was a stupid event.

**Secretary Kissinger:** Yes. If I get you to come and visit Washington I could explain our system of government. (Laughter) There are many intelligence reports which float around, but if no one brings them to me I assume they do not exist. I can assume that a subordinate will leak to the press one I do see. What they don't leak are the ones I do not see.

When the coup occurred I was in Moscow. My people did not take these intelligence reports seriously as such reports had been very numerous in the past. Every three months there was a rumor of a possible coup. An intelligence officer even told Makarios about these rumors, but he

didn't believe them. He was away on a weekend holiday. If I had known
about the report, I would have stopped it [the coup]. Once the coup
occurred, I assumed that Turkey would intervene, as there was no
government in Cyprus and Greece was unstable. Our press is violently
anti-Greece. They were criticizing us [for our attitude on Greece].
The reason I didn't criticize Sampson was that we assumed we could
get rid of him in any 36-hour period. But we knew that the Soviets had
told the Turks to invade. We didn't want them [the Soviets] to have any
other excuse to involve themselves in the situation. But the "Second
World" in Europe, and the American press, kept egging on the Turks.

So it is an unfortunate situation, but it will come out all right. The
Soviets can't do anything for either party. We will move to a settlement
in a few weeks once the Greeks calm down.

Actually our problem is in claming down the Greek population in the U.S.
We already have the basis for an agreement with the Greeks and the Turks,
but if Congress cuts off aid, then they will remove our basis for a settle-
ment. So if you have any influence with the Congress please use it.
(Laughter) Fortunately there are more Chinese here than Greeks. They
have better discipline.

**Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao:** Well, it really was a bad situation at the
beginning, after things first happened. As for the situation later, we
can't criticize you.

**Secretary Kissinger:** I agree, the beginning was bad. But later it
became better. The worst thing that the Chinese can say about a person
is that he is stupid. (Laughter)

**Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao:** Since you have contacts with the two sides,
what do you think about the question of the withdrawal of Turkish troops?
Will they make a demonstration of good will?

**Secretary Kissinger:** As I know that you don't leak to the press (Ch'iao:
On that you can rely.) I will tell you. It is really contingent on our
Congress. While I am on my Middle Eastern trip I will go to Ankara.
While I am in Ankara the Turks will make a gesture of good will -- like
withdrawing five to seven thousand troops, or withdrawing from some
territory. Then we will ask Clerides and Denktash to agree to principles
for a political dialogue, for political talks. These principles essentially

have been agreed to already. The Greek government will then express
approval that political talks are starting. Then, nothing will happen
until after November 10, which is the date of the Greek elections.
They don't want anything to happen before then. After the election, we
will put the issue in a larger framework, one which will solve such
questions as territorial rights in the Aegean Sea, etc. This is all agreed
to, but our Congress may upset these plans. If these maniacs will only
leave the situation alone! I'm convinced that eighty percent of the madmen
in the world live in the Eastern Mediterranean. So I can't be sure [of the
outcome of the situation].

(At this point in the conversation, at 8:40 p.m., the living room conver-
sation broke up and the group resumed the discussion at the dinner table.)

**Secretary Kissinger:** We have a number of new friends here tonight. Ambassador Habib is our new Assistant Secretary for East Asia. Of course you know George Bush. (**Ch'iao:** Our old friend.) He may not be used to the frankness with which we discuss issues. (Laughter) I always tell our Chinese friends the outlines of our policies. There have been no disappointments thus far. It is so rare to meet officials who understand what we are doing.

Incidentally, I joked with the Mongolian Foreign Minister that I would visit
his country. He took me seriously and extended me an invitation. Should
I pay his country a visit? (Laughter) Seriously, there are no U.S.
interests in Outer Mongolia, other than creating a sense of insecurity in
other capitals. I don't have to pursue this. I want your frank opinion.

**Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao:** Considering this question, our position has
been the same since the Yalta Conference. I've always told this to the
Doctor. Maybe I am wrong, but you talked with Premier Chou about this.

**Secretary Kissinger:** Yes, but I don't know how you would view American
efforts to establish relations with Outer Mongolia. I know your historical
view and what it represents.

Well, I can defer a decision until a later occasion. The only reason to go
is to show activity in this area. But if you object -- to a visit by me -- I
won't go. Diplomatic relations, that we'll do. (To Ambassador Habib:)
Where do we stand on this?

**Ambassador Habib:** We have had no response.

**Mr. Solomon:** I believe their northern neighbor objects to Mongolia establishing relations with us.

**Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao:** There are two aspects to the situation there. We maintain diplomatic relations [with the Mongolian People's Republic], so there is no question of law. But this is really just a puppet state. It is in a situation of being occupied. So in such circumstances you will have to decide [whether or not to visit].

**Secretary Kissinger:** No, I can tell you now that it won't be done.

You spoke of changes regarding Cyprus. Are there any others -- our two countries?

**Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao:** Not just our two countries. Primarily I was referring to the world besides our two countries. As for changes in your country, I believe we have explained our view. This is your domestic affair, and it won't affect relations between our two countries.

**Secretary Kissinger:** Exactly. We will pursue the policies that we have agreed to. During the course of the evening I want to discuss some specific issues with the Vice Foreign Minister. As for the specific understandings, we will completely uphold them.

What changes do you see in the world since April?

**Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao:** (Pauses to reflect on a reply.) Superficially, Cyprus was the most drastic change. But our analysis is that two areas are in upheaval: the Balkans and the South Asian subcontinent.

**Secretary Kissinger:** Cyprus makes much noise, but no strategic difference -- unless we are prevented by domestic developments from conducting our foreign policy. The situation will probably come out with the Turks in a slightly stronger position.

In the Balkans, do you mean pressure on Yugoslavia? (Ch'iao: Yes.) You know that I will visit Yugoslavia in November. We told you about my visit to the Soviet Union. From there I will go to India, Pakistan, Romania, and Yugoslavia. So how serious do you think the pressures are on Yugoslavia?

line of supplies. This is a matter of record as was his commitment to do everything to prevent a Greek-Turkish war. The author does not mention the negotiations which the U.S. undertook in this regard.

Thomas Boyatt, whose prescient memo is mentioned by Hitchens, also wrote a post-crisis analysis on the utter con-fusion of intelligence in the period prior to the coup - with conflicts between reporting from the CIA and Ambassador Tasca in Athens (with their special ties with Ioannides) and the State Department. Boyatt concluded that the intelligence was at best conflicting. State foresaw the prospect of a Greek move against Makarios while the agency in the period immeditely prior to the coup was reporting that the Greek junta had decided against any move to unseat Makarios, (although the Greeks had tried

INSERT 79

HK had absolutely no foreknowledge of
the possibility of a coup on July 15, 1974.
Rumors circulating in weeks before the
coup were much like those that circulated
before the 1964 and 1967 attempts by Turkey
to invade Cyprus. In April 1974 at a special
session of the UN General Assembly the major
issue of contention between Greece and Turkey
was the matter of oil exploration in the
 Aegean Sea, not Cyprus. On May 7, during
the Syrian shuttle, Makarios met with HK
in Nicosia and hosted a meeting between
the Secretary and Soviet Foreign Minister
Andrei Gromyko. Makarios gave no sense
of urgency to his situation, telling HK:

"The problem of Cyprus is one of
patience. We have not had many
incidents between the two communities.
Often we have intra-Greek and intra-
Turk incidents...We hope to resume
the intercommunal talks...In my view,
if no formula can be agreed on in a

79 - p 2

short while, the Secretary General of the U.N. is coming here soon, and perhaps he can get the sides together."

Likewise, this lack of sense of urgency was reflected in HK's meeting with Joseph Luns of NATO in June; he mentioned only the Aegean oil problem. When HK met with British Foreign Secretary Callaghan on July 8-9, the subject of Greek-Turkish relations never came up, much less Cyprus.

However, Makarios was engaged in a high-
wire act of his own with the Greek govern-
ment, threatening to eliminate the National
(Greek) Guard, but he had done such things
in the past (such as sneaking Czech arms onto
the island in 1972 to counterbalance the Greek
presence and in general flirting with the
Communists for internal support and the
Non-Aligned's most radical elements).

As it turned out, Makarios, himself
surprised, barely escaped assassination
on July 15 but resurfaced that evening taking
refuge in a British base on the island.

There was no conspiracy nor any
HK involvement or USG foreknowledge of
the coup. HK repeated many times in his
press conferences (July 20 and July 22 espec-
ially) that no war in the eastern Mediterranean
would be fought with a U.S. military pipe-

79 - p 3

Thomas Boyatt, whose prescient memo is mentioned by Hitchens, also wrote a post-crisis analysis on the utter con-fusion of intelligence in the period prior to the coup - with conflicts between reporting from the CIA and Ambassador Tasca in Athens (with their special ties with Ioannides) and the State Department. Boyatt concluded that the intelligence was at best conflicting. State foresaw the prospect of a Greek move against Makarios while the agency in the period immediately prior to the coup was reporting that the Greek junta had decided against any move to unseat Makarios (although the Greeks had tried

## INSERT 80

With regard to the "proximate cause" charge, the full material should have been included rather than a selective phrase. What HK wrote was that "Makarios, the proximate cause of most of Cyprus's tensions, was also the best hope for a long-term peaceful solution. For once he had exhausted all possible maneuvers, he could be eminently practical about his necessities."

And HK told his colleagues in early August:

> We never for a moment thought that he was the "Castro of Cyprus," and in fact, if we had had our preferences, there would not have been the coup, and we could have coexisted with him very well. It wasn't a question of coexistence; we didn't consider him anti-American particularly. His major drawback, if he has any, is that his talents are too large for his island and, therefore, he could be subject to the temptation to play on a scale which is disquieting—not to us but to the other parties interested in the Cyprus question.

A major factor which is ignored is the issue of Makarios' relationships with the Communists, relying on them for internal

80 - page 2

support especially after the military junta came to power in 1967, and his allying himself with radical elements of the Non-Aligned Movement. The earlier efforts to accumulate Czech arms in 1972 has been mentioned. This is crucial background to the tensions between Makarios and both Turkey and Greece in a period of deep concern about Soviet/communist expansionism, a fact which is never mentioned. A major point that HK made (particularly with the U.S. presidency collapsing) throughout the crisis was the need to avoid a war between two U.S. allies in NATO.

## INSERT 83

### 83-1

First, messages were sent, though Tasca chose to deal at a level below Ioannides. In addition to the views of all three embassies noted earlier, the strategy also included an effort to encourage the NATO and UN Secretary Generals to be out in front on initiatives to cool tensions between Greece and Turkey.

The reference to HK's role in the 40 committee is totally out of context as there was no committee activity on this crisis. Under no circumstances was he "dealing in private" with Athens. It was the CIA who established and ran ties with the junta.

### 83-2

This passage proves absolutely nothing about HK but does underscore the peculiar relationship between Tasca ("not sharing the State Department Desk Officer's [Boyatt] alarm"), the CIA and Ioannides.

Rather than blame on the US, what drove the situation out of control were actions by Makarios who was once again testing his dexterity on the high wire - with disastrous results. On July 2 he informed the Greek president

83-2 cont'd

that he was reducing the size of the
National Guard and demanded the with-
d withdrawal of the Greek officers who con-
trolled it. These two steps would greatly
reduce, if not eliminate, Athens's influence
in Cyprus and enable Makarios to rely even
more on the local Communist party and on
the Non-Aligned Movement internationally.
Yet even as late as July 12 - when our
new ambassador to Nicosia, Rodger Davies
(later assassinated in his embassy) pre-
sented his credentials, Makarios described
the situation as "delicate" but not "critical."
In fact, Davies reported to Washington that
Makarios gave no indication that he was
seeking any US intervention with Athens.

INSERT 84

"May I make one general point. I
have read many learned articles during
the week of why we were taken by sur-
prise by the coup in Cyprus, and I simply
would like to point out to you ladies
and gentlemen that <u>obviously the man most</u>
<u>concerned in Cyprus, namely Archbishop</u>
<u>Makarios, was also taken by surprise</u>, so
that the information was not exactly lying
in the street."

## INSERT 85 - 1

Contrary to Hitchens' falsified statement about de facto recognition of the Sampson regime, the following should be noted:

As early as July 16, 1974, in the second meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG) to review the coup crisis, HK told his colleagues that "We don't want to recognize Sampson."

In his White House briefing of reporters on July 20, 1974, HK said:

"We never extended recognition to any alternative government, nor did we have any dealings with any alternative government" and

"We have not recognized Sampson and we believe the outcome should be a constitutional arrangement acceptable to all of the parties..."

In his press conference at State on July 22, HK told reporters:

"Our basic policy is to recognize de facto governments. In Cyprus,

INSERT 85 cont'd

it is a more complicated problem,
because the governments in Cyprus
also have resulted from constitut-
ional arrangements that have inter-
national sanction, and therefore
we would expect this to be the sub-
ject of negotiation and not simply
to be decided on a de facto basis."

Or to quote HK's memoir, *Years of Renewal* with its extensive coverage of the Cyprus crisis (almost all of it ignored by Hitchens):

"Nikos Sampson...was not recognized
as President by <u>any</u> nation in the
world". (p 208)

Among the four objectives which HK
described for US policy: "to undo
the Athens-inspired coup" and "to
remove Sampson" (p 212)

"The Cyprus regime was not recognized
by any state." (p 214)

85 - 2

What Robert Anderson, at HK's instruction,
did in his press briefing was reaffirm US
support for the independence, sovereignty
and existing constitutional arrangements
for Cyprus. He assured the Cypriot Ambas-
sador he would do this.

85 - 3

This is a completely fabricated
account of HK's meeting with Cypriot
Ambassador Dimitriou. Not only did
the issue of condolences never even arise
(at that juncture midday July 15
there were unconfirmed reports that
Makarios was still alive), the Ambassador
himself was the one who said that Glafkos
Clerides [speaker of the Cypriot parliament
under Makarios] was the constitutional
successor, regardless of the fate of
Makarios.

HK never once "doggedly and astonishingly" refuse to answer the question of recognition. On the contrary, HK avowed the independence, sovereignty and existing constitutional arrangements for Cyprus.

His spokesman likewise did not wiggle
around the issue. The record is stated
in 85-1.

(Makarios was found alive the evening
of July 15)

## INSERT 86 -1

## 86 - 2

[Meeting with Cypriot Amb.]

## INSERT 87 - 1

Regarding the allegation about partition, HK made the following very clear at his July 22 press conference:

Q: Mr Secretary, does the United States have a position on partition?

A: Our position is that we support the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus and, therefore, this would not be an American solution; and we don't think this is a likely outcome.

Precisely in order to avoid Turkish pressures for partition, HK had come up with the idea, which he thought attainable, of two or three separate Turkish enclaves (but not one contiguous area).

## INSERT 87 - 2

INSERT 87 - 2

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, my apolo-
gies for having made you come in on Satur-
day. I had planned to do this on Monday but
forgot that I have a congressional appearance
on Monday afternoon and Foreign Minister
[of Israel Yigal] Allon on Monday morning.

I'd like to begin by reading a brief state-
ment on military aid to Turkey, which I am
doing on behalf of the President as well as
myself.

As you know, Congress in October enacted
legislation which will cut off military assist-
ance to Turkey on December 10. As you are
also aware, the Senate has now acted to
extend the period prior to such a cutoff. It
is absolutely essential, and the President and
I strongly urge, that the House take similar
action immediately.

We had made progress with the Turkish
Government in the development of steps de-
signed to make possible the initiation of ne-
gotiations.

Congressional action in October setting a
terminal date for military assistance con-
tributed substantially to the difficulties that
have prevented the beginning of negotiations.
Unless the Congress acts now to permit the
continued flow of military assistance, further
efforts by the United States to assist in re-
solving the crisis will be thwarted and our
ability to play a future useful role will be
undermined.

does not approve of actions taken by Turkey
on Cyprus. We have equally made clear that
Turkey should display flexibility and a con-
cern for the interests of the other parties in
that dispute.

The United States will continue to do all it
can to assist the parties in arriving at an
equitable and enduring resolution of the Cy-
prus problem. But if we are deprived of dip-
lomatic flexibility, there will be little that we
will be able to accomplish.

Even more important, the U.S. military as-
sistance to Turkey is not, and has never been,
granted as a favor. It has been the view of
the U.S. Government since 1947 that the
security of Turkey is vital to the security of
the eastern Mediterranean, to NATO Europe,
and therefore to the security of the Atlantic
community.

In 1947, our commitment to assist Greece
and Turkey marked the turning point in the
building of a security system which has con-
tributed to Western security. Are we now to
establish a new turning point which will
mark the end of our commitment to a system
which has served the free countries so well?

cont'd

INSERT 82 - 2 cont'd

INSERT 88

Not only did HK not oppose Makarios (the strategy
was to "undo" the Sampson coup, followed by
Clerides as Acting President and then the return
of Makarios), but he had this to say in retro-
spect:

"Once Makarios returned to Cyprus, he played
his usual complicated games, gradually edging,
however, toward a settlement on terms he
would have rejected indignantly two years
earlier. When he died of a heart attack
in 1977, I felt that with the by then
somewhat chastened archbishop had also
died the best hope for a rapid negotiated
settlement of Cyprus. When all was said and
done, Makarios more than any other Cypriot
leader had the imagination to accept reality
and the prestige to lead his compatriots in
the direction of their necessities. I can
imagine the sardonic gleam in the archbis-
hop's eyes were he aware how many of his
erstwhile critics missed him and his compli-
cated, occasionally devious maneuvers.
Makarios was, after all, a big man in a
world not blessed with an excess of them."

(Years of Renewal, p 238)

November 2, 2001

MEMO FOR HAK

FROM: Rose

(1) **Cyprus:** Attached. I went through your lengthy chapter in YOR but also Mary's 1000 page research paper on the crisis - which I must say was absolutely brilliant. I found some useful items not in your chapter.

There is one thing you should look at -- pp 88 on your talk with Chinese Foreign Minister Ch'iao and the attached excerpts from Peter's book. Hitchens has your quotes. If you want to give me a comment, I will type it in the margin.

(2) **Chile:** I talked to Mary today. She is in the middle of a political campaign for some local resident but promised she would have comment for you on the two Chile chapters next week (though without benefit of the research).

FORD/HK BRIEFED CONGRESSIONAL (REPUBLICAN) LEADERS
DECEMBER 10, 1975 AFTER CHINA TRIP WHICH INCLUDED
STOP IN INDONESIA.

ON INDONESIA:

FORD:

Turning to Indonesia I found it to be a very anti-communist country and its leaders are very anxious that the United States continue to play an active role in the Pacific area. I was very impressed with President Suharto, who is doing his best to pull together a country of 3,000 populated islands, to progress economically and to maintain a strong anti-communist stance.

*

HK:

The Chinese took a strong run at us last October, which we met very firmly. As a result they met us with the greatest respect during this visit. It is important for us to realize that we will have good relations with China only as long as they have respect for our strength and our unity and have a strong Presidency here.

With regard to Indonesia and the Philippines, we see these two countries as pillars of the ASEAN organization which is important to stability in Southeast Asia. They have great confidence in the United States, and our relations with them will be extremely important as we make the transition from the Vietnamese period to a new era in Asia.

In conclusion, let me say that in dealing with China there is no substitute to dealing at the presidential level. China has a new leader in Teng and we have a new President here. It is very important for both countries to check their perceptions periodically at the highest level. It was also important that the President visit Indonesia and the Philippines on this trip as a means of keeping China away from a "central kingdom" mentality. Overall the trip was very successful in building a new relationship in Asia in the post-Vietnam period.

HK TO ECONOMIC CLUB OF DETROIT - NOVEMBER 24, 1975

It is as clear as ever that no serious effort to resolve major problems in Asia can succeed without America's participation. The future of Japan and our other allies, the easing of tensions with potential adversaries, the problem of peace in Korea, the continuing independence of the nations of Southeast Asia—all depend significantly on a strong and responsible American policy.

This is why President Ford visited Japan and Korea a year ago on his first overseas trip. This is why he will leave for Asia again at the end of this week to visit the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

*

One of the basic purposes of our original commitment in Indochina was to provide a buffer of security and time for the many nations of Southeast Asia to enable them to develop their own strength and cohesion. In this regard our efforts proved successful. These nations have preserved their independence; they are assuming increasing importance. We have a substantial stake in the well-being of the Philippines and Indonesia, which President Ford will visit next week. We have important links with Thailand and strong ties of friendship with Singapore and Malaysia. And we have a longstanding association with our ANZUS partners, Australia and New Zealand.

TO: Henry Kissinger

From: Mary Brownell

Re: Hitchens' Chile Chapters

I have made specific comments relating to the Chile text of the Hitchens book. I did not have access to research papers or to official documents and testimony referenced in the chapter (other than selected documents recently declassified that are available on the internet). I am therefore relying on memory and public sources so some comments are more general than I would wish. Some of the specific facts mentioned by Hitchens in the chapter (particularly as relate to White House approval of specific CIA covert expenditures in Chile) seem to me to unlikely or to be twisted out of context. I was, however, unable to check the record.

I personally have a lot of difficulty dealing with Hitchens' prose and his sleazy method of combining truth and half-truth and completely untrue innuendo in the same sentence. There simply is no way to respond effectively to such tactics. I believe that responding to extreme, unsubstantiated charges, faulty logic and ideologically based interpretation gives the man more credibility than he deserves or would otherwise receive.

That said, his main charges relating to Chile (with some related comments) are:

* The White House (he's a bit schizophrenic as to whether it was you or Nixon driving the policy) approved and/or condoned a policy of kidnapping, assassination and military coup to overthrow the freely elected government of Chile. He labels the U.S. actions "state-supported terrorism."

2

* You personally oversaw the effort and were informed and aware of its minute details.

  --Hitchens' charges that it was illegal for an "unelected," official "without the knowledge or consent of Congress" to plan such actions. It is worth noting that Cord Meyer points out in his book that at the time the President did have legal authority to order such covert actions (p. 185). [Meyer, however, later labels the Schneider kidnapping/coup plans as "misuse of presidential authority," his unhappiness seemingly related largely to the damage done to the reputation of the Agency].

  --The degree to which you and Haig were informed by CIA of details of the operations was an area of considerable fuzziness and disagreement between CIA and White House officials during the various congressional investigations. Hitchens and Hersh both take the approach that the White House "must have been" informed but offer no hard evidence beyond suppositions to support their position. In the congressional report, "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders," it is noted that Karamessines testified that he kept you "generally informed of developments" (p. 247).

* Track II did not end on Oct. 15th and that you were aware of and, therefore, authorized the later efforts to kidnap (or assassinate) Schneider and overthrow Allende by military coup.

  --This debate really hinges on whether or not you saw/cleared off on the outgoing CIA operational cables conveying the decisions of the Oct. 15 meeting to the Station and on subsequent outgoing agency communications. You and Haig testified that you considered Track II ended (Haig, unlike you, testified he was aware of a second group of plotters) and were unaware of subsequent coup plans and of the passage of weapons to the plotters.

3

The Agency record of the Oct. 15 meeting [Hitchens pp. 61-62] does include (end of paragraph 7) the note "[Dr. Kissinger requested that copy of the message be sent to him on 16 October.]" which fuels their view that you must have seen the outgoing message. Your memo to the President supports your position you thought the operation was ended.

Cord Meyer in his book (p. 187) says that "the record shows that from the time of Allende's election, the Agency was specifically enjoined from any action that might be construed as supporting coup plotting and these orders were carried out."

In Nat Davis' book (p.314), on the other hand, Dave Phillips relayed an account that Track II "just faded into oblivion as new crises demanded Kissinger's attention. We...were quite content...to put it on the back burner... In fact, Track II really expired in November 1971 or shortly thereafter" when a written dispatch was sent to Santiago suggesting "it was time to forget about a coup and concentrate on intelligence reporting."

* White House officials covered up U.S. involvement in the Schneider assassination and White House officials (you, Haig and Nixon) lied under oath about your actions and objectives and about your degree of knowledge of the operational details.

--Hitchens parrots Hersh's charges that coverup payments were made (by CIA); documents were destroyed or altered and officials perjured themselves. Korry, for example, is cited by Hersh as believing that White House logs were doctored to change the date of his meeting with the President and that you, in your memo to the President reporting the end of Track II, were creating a "paper trail" of deniability.

4

—Hitchens charges you have “hidden papers” in the Library of Congress that will provide proof of the alleged “crimes.” [With reference to the chapter comments I have made on this charge, I do want to flag the fact that there is one category of records at the LC that doesn’t neatly fit into what I have said. I’m assuming this charge permeates other chapters as well so the treatment in comments needs to be consistent with what is said elsewhere.]

Hitchens may base this charge, in part, on Hersh's reference that Justice Dept. attorneys *believed* "That Kissinger went so far as to make his own personal minutes of the 40 Committee meetings, which presumably were more detailed, and kept them separate from the official minutes that were routinely distributed to the bureaucracy." (p.265). [Bill Rogers' 1977 letter to the Justice Department stating that no such personal 40 Committee files were kept is footnoted by Hersh.]

* You personally share responsibility for the deaths of Gen. Schneider and President Allende.

* You condoned the human rights abuses perpetrated by the Pinochet government.

* The United States government was aware of and aided the forces involved in Operation Condor (and hence share responsibility for the resulting deaths, including Letelier's). The U.S. thereby supported internationalization of death squad.

—I do not remember when the first TDCS reports of intelligence sharing by the militaries of southern cone nations began. Nor do I remember how reliable the sources of the reports were considered to be. I do remember seeing only a few such reports spread over

time and I do remember, after several such reports had been seen,
to being alert to watching for them with some concern about their
significance. There were, I believe, a few brief notes later in the
CIA Daily briefings indicating the Agency also was watching with
some concern. I do not recall reports, at least until much later that
suggested actual coordination of operations against specific
targets. I do recall NSC and White House staffers being stunned
by the Leterlier murder in Washington when it occurred.

An FBI attache cable from Argentina (declassified fairly recently)
written after Letelier's assassination refers to an intelligence
source's report of "special teams" operating abroad against
terrorist targets "to carry out sanctions up to assassination." The
attache points out there are no indications of activity or planned
activity in the U.S. but wonders about the possibility of a
connection to the Letelier assassination. (Cable dated Sept. 28,
1976 would presumably be in response to request for any
information related to Leterlier killing). This gives you an
indication of how late in the administration this type of
information was being developed.

Hitchens does not source any of his material. It appears that Seymour
Hersh's book was almost certainly a, if not the, major source on Chile. I
have alluded to some of the similarities in the comments above. A few
additional comments on Hersh's account (pp. 258-296) follow:

* On assassination: Hersh passes on third-hand a comment by Dick Helms to the effect that when Nixon directed the Agency to "get rid of" Allende, we "knew" what the President "meant." (p.274). He also refers to a "senior member of the intelligence community" who, on a 1971 visit to Chile, heard of "intense pressure...to update contingency plans for the assassination of Allende." This source alleged that, later in D.C., men "at the top of the CIA" told him the

6

planning was "initiated in the fall of 1970 because 'Henry wanted it.'" There are several other "musings"/boastings on the subject mentioned, but nothing with any substance behind it.

* Hersh (p. 289) cites your request for further information following the first report of the Schneider kidnapping attempt as proof you knew Track II had not been called off. Hitchen's parrots Hersh on the subject.

RE: HITCHENS, CHAPTER 8

12/14/01

MEMO FOR HAK

FROM: Rose

Attached are the East Timor documents now in circulation.

TAB 1 The National Security Archives website

TAB 2 Suharto at Camp David, July 5, 1975

TAB 3 Your staff meeting, August 12, 1975

TAB 4 Your (unsigned) briefing memo for Ford

TAB 5 Your and Ford's meeting with Suharto in Jakarta, December 6, 1975

TAB 6 Your staff meeting of December 18, 1975 as printed in the Hitchens book

TAB 7 Your staff meeting of June 17, 1976

Apart from the Hitchens book, I thought you would

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The Kissinger
Transcripts: The Top
Secret Talks with Beijing
and Moscow

by William Burr (New
York: The New Press,
515 pp.)

East Timor Revisited

FORD, KISSINGER AND THE INDONESIAN INVASION, 1975.

Ford and Kissinger Gave Green Light to
Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor, 1975:
New Documents Detail Conversations with Suharto

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 62
Edited by William Burr and Michael L. Evans

December 6, 2001

Read the press release

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Jump to documents

The New Evidence

The Indonesian invasion of East Timor in December 1975 set the stage for the long, bloody, and disastrous occupation of the territory that ended or after an international peacekeeping force was introduced in 1999. President Bill Clinton cut off military aid to Indonesia in September 1999—reverses a longstanding policy of military cooperation—but questions persist about U.S. responsibility for the 1975 invasion; in particular, the degree to which Washington actually condoned or supported the bloody military offense. Most recently, journalist Christopher Hitchens raised questions about the role of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in giving a green light the invasion that has left perhaps 200,000 dead in the years since. Two newly declassified documents from the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library released to the National Security Archive, shed light on the Ford administration's relationship with President Suharto of Indonesia during 1975. Of special importance is the record of Ford's and Kissinger's meeting with Suharto in early December 1975. The document shows that Suharto began the invasion knowing that he had the full approval of the White House. Both of these documents had been released in heavily excised form some years ago, but with Suharto now out of power, and following the collapse of Indonesian control over East Timor, the situation has changed enough that both documents have been released in their entirety.

http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/

12/13/01

Other documents found among State Department records at the National Archives elucidate the inner workings of U.S. policy toward the Indonesian crisis during 1975 and 1976. Besides confirming that Henry Kissinger and top advisers expected an eventual Indonesian takeover of East Timor, archival material shows that the Secretary of State fully understood that invasion of East Timor involved the "illegal" use of U.S.-supplied military equipment because it was not used in self-defense as required by law.

Although Indonesia was a major site of U.S. energy and raw materials investment, an important petroleum exporter, strategically located near shipping lanes, and a significant recipient of U.S. military assistance, the country—much less the East Timor question—barely figures into Henry Kissinger's memoirs of the Nixon and Ford administrations. Gerald Ford memoir briefly discusses the December 1975 visit to Jakarta but does not mention the discussion of East Timor with Suharto. Indeed, as important the bilateral relationship was, Jakarta's brutal suppression of the independence movement in East Timor was a development that neither nor Kissinger wanted people to remember about their time in power. The two decided on a course of action of dubious legality and that resulted in the slaughter of thousands of Timorese may well have also discouraged further reflection, at least in public. No doubt the omissions from Ford's Kissinger's memoirs also reflect the low priority that East Timor had during the Ford administration. For senior officials, the fate of a post-colonial East Timor paled in comparison to the strategic relationship with the anti-communist Suharto regime, especially in the wake of the communist victory in Vietnam, when Ford and Kissinger wanted to strengthen relations with anti-communists and check left-wing movements in the region.(1) But it is not simply a matter of omission; on several occasions Kissinger has explicitly denied that he ever had substantive discussions of East Timor with Suharto, much less having consented to Indonesian plans.(2) The new evidence contradicts Kissinger's statements: Indonesian plans for the invasion of East Timor were indeed discussed with Suharto, and Ford at Kissinger gave them the green light. As Kissinger advised Suharto on the eve of the invasion: "it is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly but that "it would be better if it were done after we returned" to the United States.

Although these new documents shed important light on U.S. policy toward the East Timor question in 1975, much more needs to be learned about U.S. policymaking during 1975 and 1976. Unfortunately, most of the relevant sources are classified. The large collection of Kissinger-Scowcroft office files at the Ford Library remains unavailable, as are the records of the State Department's Indonesia desk and the Bureau of East Asian Affairs for the 1970s. The State Department's recent acquisition of Henry Kissinger's telephone conversation transcripts might include important material, although they will probably reflect the relatively low priority that the policymakers gave to the East Timor question.

## Background

The leftist military revolt that overthrew Portugal's authoritarian regime

12/13/01

April 1974 encouraged nationalist movements in the Portuguese colony East Timor calling for gradual independence from Lisbon—a position also initially favored by the new Portuguese government. One of these groups, the Timorese Democratic Union (UTD), had greater support among Timorese elites and senior Portuguese colonial administrators, while the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin), with its leaner, social democratic program, had the support of younger Timores and lower-level colonial officials. In January 1975 the two groups form an uneasy coalition. Increasingly, Fretilin enjoyed the greatest public support and led the push for rapid independence.(3)

Early signals from the Indonesian government indicated that it was prep to support East Timorese independence,(4) but Jakarta soon became interested in turning the region into the country's twenty-seventh province. Fears that an independent East Timor could be used as a base by unfriendly governments or spur other secessionist movements in Indonesia had convinced hardliners in the military to press for annexation of the territo In February 1975 the Indonesian military conducted a mock invasion of Timor in South Sumatra.(5) Military hardliners also backed the pro-integration Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti) with financial assistance and launched a propaganda campaign against the pro-independence groups.(6) Apodeti, however, never had the popular support enjoyed by Fretilin or UDT.

The new regime in Lisbon was preoccupied with its own internal politic controversies and could do little to ensure a steady transition toward independence. During 1974 and 1975 Indonesian authorities hoped that Portuguese would acquiesce in Jakarta's plans to acquire East Timor. A first the Portuguese seemed responsive, but by mid-1975 it had become evident that Lisbon supported self-determination for the people of East Timor. In July 1975 Lisbon rebuffed Jakarta with the issuance of Constitutional Law 7/75, setting forth a timetable for home-rule, including the election of a popular assembly that would determine East Timor's future with Portuguese sovereignty ending no later than October 1978.(7)

Events in East Timor, however, did not proceed in accordance with List schedule. The delicate UDT-Fretilin alliance had fallen apart in May, in part due to a propaganda campaign launched by the Indonesian government to inflame UTD concerns about Fretilin's alleged communist tendencies. UDT's fears were bolstered in June when Fretilin refused to attend an all party conference on decolonization hosted by Portuguese officials on M due to the presence of Apodeti representatives.(9) To Fretilin the issue of independence was not up for discussion, least of all with Jakarta. The event of Fretilin's popularity—and thus popular sentiment for independence in Indonesia—became evident in July when the party won 55 percent of the vote in local elections.(10) Convinced by Indonesian intelligence that Fretilin was planning a coup, UDT staged its own in August 1975 in the Timorese capital Dili in an effort to drive out Fretilin supporters. A Fretilin counterattack pushed UDT forces out of the city, however, and by September Fretilin controlled nearly all of East Timor, the Portuguese administrators having fled to the island of Atauro.(11) Despite having

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gained de facto control of the territory, Fretilin ended its call for immediate independence and now supported a plan similar to the gradual independent program proposed in June by the Portuguese.(12)

The Indonesian government did not seize the opportunity to move troops into Dili on the premise of restoring order. Suharto was still concerned about the reaction from the West and needed more time to get the UDT other anti-Fretilin groups to support integration.(13) The UDT, now refugees on the Indonesian side of Timor and in need of food and shelter had no choice but to sign a pro-integration petition drawn up by Indonesians. Meanwhile, in October Indonesian special forces began to infiltrate secret into East Timor in an effort to provoke clashes that would provide the pretext for a full-scale invasion. When these incursions—including the murder by Indonesian forces of five journalists employed by Australian TV—failed to elicit any noticeable reaction from the West, Indonesia stepped-up its attacks across the border.(14)

While Indonesian airborne troops—outfitted with American equipment-prepared to take Dili, Fretilin petitioned the United Nations to call for the withdrawal of the invading forces. Four days later, on November 28, Fretilin declared East Timor's independence—apparently in the belief that the sovereign state would have greater success appealing to the UN, but also thinking that Timorese soldiers would be more likely to fight for an independent state. Indonesia countered the next day with a “declaration integration” signed by Apodeti and UDT representatives and coordinate Indonesia's military intelligence service.(15) The invasion, originally scheduled for early December, was apparently delayed by the visit of Fc and Kissinger to Jakarta on December 6.

Operation Komodo, a general invasion of East Timor, commenced the next day. In the following weeks a series of United Nations resolutions—supported by the U.S.—called for the withdrawal of the Indonesian troops (16) An estimated 20,000 Indonesian troops were deployed to the region the end of the month. While casualty estimates vary, anywhere from 60,000-100,000 Timorese were probably killed in the first year after the violence began in 1975.(17) In 1979 the U.S. Agency for International Development estimated that 300,000 East Timorese—nearly half the population—had been uprooted and moved into camps controlled by Indonesian armed forces. By 1980 the occupation had left more than 100,000 dead from military action, starvation or disease, with some estimates running as high as 230,000.(18)

Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view.

Document 1

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TAB 2

Memorandum of Conversation between Presidents Ford and Suharto, 5
July 1975, 12:40 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.

Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, National Security Adviser Memoranda of Conversations Box 13, July 5, 1965 - Ford, Kissinger, Indonesian President Suharto

This document records a conversation between Suharto and Ford at Can David on July 5, 1975, five months before the invasion of East Timor. Speaking only a few months after the collapse of the Thieu regime in South Vietnam, the two presidents shared a tour d'horizon of East Asian political issues, U.S. military assistance to Indonesia, international investment, an Portuguese decolonization. Fearing greater political and ideological fervor in the region following the Communist victory in Vietnam, Suharto saw ideological concoction "Pancasila" (possibly misspelled "Pantechistita" the document) as useful, no doubt because its emphasis on consensus excluded any oppositional political activity.(19) Not taking "consensus" granted, Suharto wanted U.S. help in building up his military machine to increase its mobility for dealing with insurgent elements, noting that, "Especially at this moment, intelligence and territorial operations are very important." Ford proposed setting up a joint commission to scrutinize Suharto's military request but wanted Kissinger to settle the details.

Suharto brought up the question of Portuguese decolonization in East Timor proclaiming his support for "self-determination" but also dismissing independence as unviable: "So the only way is to integrate [East Timor] Indonesia." Without mentioning Freilin by name, Suharto misleadingly characterized it as "almost Communist" and criticized the group for boycotting the decolonization meeting in Macao. Suharto claimed that Indonesia did not want to interfere with East Timor's self-determination implied that it might have to because "those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced."

While Lisbon still had legal sovereignty over East Timor, apparently neither Ford nor Suharto discussed the implications for Indonesian policy. Although Washington had worked closely with the Salazar dictatorship ruled Portugal for decades, it was now deeply suspicious of the new social democratic regime in Lisbon; with its exaggerated concerns about a Communist coup, the Ford administration considered the possibility of expelling Portugal from NATO and supporting an independence movement in the Azores (where the U.S. had important military facilities). Thus, 1 Ford's and Kissinger's perspective in 1975, Portugal's role in the region was of little interest and did not pose an important obstacle to Indonesia action. That some left-leaning Portuguese officers had contacts with Frei undoubtedly made the White House even less inclined to concern itself with Portugal's response to Indonesian action in East Timor.(20)

TAB 3

The Secretary's 8:00 a.m. Staff Meeting, Tuesday, August 12, 1975, Sec [excerpt], with cover memorandum on highlights of meeting attached

Document 2

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Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Transcripts of State Meetings of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 1973-77, box 8

Apparently encouraged by his meeting with President Ford, Suharto returned from Washington on July 8 and made his first public statement suggesting that an independent East Timor was not viable. Only days later UDT leaders launched their coup with the hope that they could suppress Fretilin. During an August 12 discussion of the coup, Henry Kissinger, his close advisers were not altogether sure what was happening, but did disagree with Assistant Secretary Philip Habib's statement that the Indonesians would not let a "communist-dominated group," i.e., Fretilin take over. Kissinger, in particular, assumed that an Indonesian takeover would take place "sooner or later." Believing that Australia, a key region ally, would feel "impelled" to support self-determination for the Timoreans, Kissinger and his advisers wanted to avoid controversy over the issue. They quickly agreed that the State Department should make no comment on the coup or related events.

A few days later, the Australian ambassador in Jakarta relayed a statement by U.S. ambassador John Newsom that summarized Washington's approach to a problem that Kissinger and his advisers had not specificall discussed on August 12. The message noted Newsom's August 16 comment that if Indonesia were to invade East Timor, it [should] do so "effectively, quickly, and not use our equipment."(21) The U.S. ambassador recognized that there was a congressional prohibition on Indonesia's use of military gear financed by U.S. aid for anything but defensive operations. Kissinger would come to understand the problem he did not already, but as document four suggests, he was not willing to give it to Jakarta's hands.

Document 3

Memorandum to President Ford from Henry A. Kissinger, "Your Visit to Indonesia," ca. 21 November 1975

TAB 4

Document 3A

Enclosure to Document 3, State Department Briefing Paper, "Indonesia East Timor," ca. 21 November 1975

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Box 227, President Ford's Visit to the Far East Indonesia Nov-Dec. 1975

This Kissinger memorandum, prepared for President Ford some two weeks before the two were to visit to Jakarta, indicates that the administration's larger strategic interests in Indonesia made it unlikely that Washington would make a fuss over East Timor. The eventual fate of East Timor was

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evidently a relatively low priority for Kissinger and his staff—it was the twelfth and final item mentioned in the memo.(22) While Kissinger, in memo, acknowledged that the Indonesians have been “maneuvering to absorb the colony” through negotiations with Portugal and “covert military operations in the colony itself,” he apparently did not expect an overt invasion using U.S.-supplied military equipment. Indeed, his memo and briefing paper on “Indonesia and Portuguese Timor” both indicate that to so would violate U.S. law, suggesting that this consideration had induce “restraint” on the part of Jakarta. Moreover, and in contrast to Habib’s v.(23) that Fretelin was “Communist-dominated,” the author of the briefing paper more accurately characterized the Front as "vaguely left-wing."

## TAB 5

THIS IS YOUR AND
FORD'S MTG WITH
SUHARTO DEC 6, '75
WHICH WAS IN
CABLE FORM. I SENT
YOU THE TIMOR
EXCERPT RETYPED.
FULL CABLE AT
THE TAB.

## Document 4

Embassy Jakarta Telegram 1579 to Secretary State, 6 December 1975
[Text of Ford-Kissinger-Suharto Discussion], Secret/Nodis(24)

Source: Gerald R. Ford Library, Kissinger-Scowcroft Temporary Parallel File, Box A:
Country File, Far East-Indonesia, State Department Telegrams 4/1/75-9/22/76

On the eve of Indonesia's full-scale invasion of East Timor, President Ford and Secretary Kissinger stopped in Jakarta en route from China where they had just met with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. During his meeting with Suharto, Ford emphasized America's continuing commitment to America's affairs despite the "severe setback of Vietnam." Discussion then turned the problem of Communist influence in the Non-Aligned Movement and insurgency movements in Thailand and Malaysia. Ford told Suharto that he would be "enthusiastic" about building an M-16 plant in Indonesia to provide small arms to help Southeast Asian governments counter region insurgency movements. Kissinger also approved of the proposed arrangement "because of its indication of wider cooperation."

DON'T HAVE

On 4 or 5 December, while still in Beijing, Kissinger received a cable from the State Department suggesting that the Indonesians had "plans" to invade East Timor.(25) Thus, Ford or Kissinger could not have been too surprised, in the middle of a discussion of guerrilla movements in Thailand, Malaysia, Suharto suddenly brought up East Timor. Suharto noted that while Indonesia "has no territorial ambitions," Fretelin has not cooperated with negotiations and has "declared its independence unilaterally." The current situation, he said, "will prolong the suffering of the refugees and increase instability in the area." Suharto then assured the Americans that "the four other parties" favor integration, with the apparent implication that a mere majority among the "parties" to the conflict—absent a popular referendum—alone constituted an act of self-determination. "We want a understanding," Suharto continued, "if we deem it necessary to take rapid action."

Ford and Kissinger took great pains to assure Suharto that they would not oppose the invasion. Ford was unambiguous: "We will understand and not press you on the issue. We understand the problem and the intention you have." Kissinger did indeed stress that "the use of US-made arms could

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create problems," but then added that, "It depends on how we construe i whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation." Thus, Kissinger's concern was not about whether U.S. arms would be used offensively—a hence illegally—but whether the act would actually be interpreted as such—a process he clearly intended to manipulate.(26) In any case, Kissinger added: "It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly

Indeed, timing and damage control were very important to the American Kissinger told Suharto: "We would be able to influence the reaction i America if whatever happens happens after we return. . . If you have m: plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President retu home." Kissinger also asked Suharto if he anticipated a "long guerilla v apparently aware that a quick military success would be easier to spin th long campaign. Suharto acknowledged that there "will probably be a sn guerilla war" but he was cagey enough not to predict its duration. Nevertheless, his military colleagues were optimistic; as one of the architects of Indonesian policy, General Ali Murtopo explained to a U.S. scholar some months before the invasion, "the whole business will be se in three weeks."(27)

With the U.S. position on the East Timor "business" settled, Suharto tur to economic problems, especially petroleum investments. With the rece bankruptcy of the state oil company, the regime needed more revenue ar Suharto wanted to get it from the oil companies that invested in Indones Noting that the oil companies were sharing larger shares of their profits Middle Eastern states than they were with Indonesia, Suharto told Ford : Kissinger that he wanted to negotiate an "understanding" with them. Bc Americans were sympathetic and said that he would have their support. Kissinger, however, noted carefully that whatever Suharto did he should "not create a climate that discourages investment." The possibility that East Timor affair could prove to be a disaster for Indonesia and someday impair the "climate for investment" never seems to have occurred to eitf Kissinger or Ford.

## Document 5

Secretary of State Kissinger's Daily Schedule, 5 and 6 December 1975

Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Executiv Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Box 227, President Ford's Trip to the Far East (Follow-Up) Nov-Dec. 1975

This brief schedule details Secretary Kissinger's two-day visit to Indone with President Ford. So far, no record of Kissinger's meeting with Adar Malik has been found.

## Document 6

Transcript of Staff Meeting, Tuesday, June 17, 1976, Secret [excerpt]

I INSERTED AT TAB 6 THE ONE DOCUMENT THAT HITCHENS HAD IN CHAP 8 IN ALMOST ITS ENTIRETY. IT IS YOUR DECEMBER 18 1975 STAFF MEETING AFTER YOUR RETURN FROM ASIA AND IN WHICH TIMOR FIGURED PROMINENTLY.

TAB 7

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Source: National Archives, Record Group 59, Department of State Records, Transcript of Staff Meetings of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, 1973-77, box 9

Washington's initial response to the invasion was to delay new arms sales to Indonesia pending an administrative review by the State Department, ostensibly to determine whether Indonesia had actually violated the bilateral agreement stipulating that U.S.-supplied arms could only be used for defensive purposes. Military equipment already in the pipeline continued to flow, however, and during the six-month review period the U.S. made four new offers of military equipment sales to Indonesia including maintenance and spare parts for the Rockwell OV-10 Bronco aircraft, designed specifically for counterinsurgency operations and employed during the invasion of East Timor. (28) The administrative delay and the subsequent offers were the subject of a December 18, 1975, meeting between Secretary Kissinger and his advisers in which he chastised his staff for writing a memo recommending that arms sales to Indonesia be cut off for violating the end-use agreement. While the memo was not widely distributed, Kissinger was angry that word might leak about how "Kissinger overruled his pristine bureaucrats and violated the law." The secretary told his staff that he "took care of it with the administrative thing by ordering Carlyle not to make any new sales." If Congress asked about the policy, Kissinger said, "We cut it off while we are studying it. We intend to start again in January." (30)

THE JUNE 17, 1976 MTG

->

Six months later, and exactly one month before the formal annexation of East Timor by Indonesia, the subject of East Timor again came up during staff meeting between Secretary Kissinger and his State Department burkers. The question was raised as to whether or not the U.S. should send representative to accompany an Indonesian parliamentary delegation to Timor—an invitation declined by most other countries. Robert H. Mille, an adviser from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, recommerdes against accepting the invitation, suggesting that "broader objectives with respect to Indonesia — including overall support to Timor," would be better served "if we don't have high-profile participation." Miller hoped to prevent "Congressional [sic] sentiment with regard to Indonesia from being rekindled." Philip Habib, under secretary of state for political affairs, agreed: "There's no need to take this action . . . Let them go ahead and see what they've been doing. We have no objection . . . They're quite happy with the position we've taken. We've resumed, as you know, all of our normal relations with them; and there isn't any problem involved." In apparent reference to the continuing arms sales, his deception of Congress or possibly to Indonesia's bloody invasion and occupation, Kissinger responded: "Not very willingly. Illegally and beautifully."

## Notes

1. Benedict R. Andersen, "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications in Peter Carey and G. Carter Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroad. The Forging of a Nation* (Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1995),

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40.

2. At a 1995 press conference Kissinger told former East Timorese resistance leader Constancio Pinto, "Timor was never discussed with us when we were in Indonesia" and then qualified this remark by stating the learned about the invasion plans at the airport as the presidential party w about to leave. See "Ask Kissinger about East Timor: Confronting Henrik Kissinger," East Timor Action Network, August 1995
<http://etan.org/news/kissinger/ask.htm>. During a radio interview in 1995 Kissinger continued to treat the discussion with Suharto on East Timor's incidental and nonsubstantive: "We were told at the airport as we left Jakarta that either that day or the next day they intended to take East Timor." See

<http://www.etan.org/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/radio.htm/map>

3. Adam Schwarz, *A Nation in Waiting: Indonesia's Search for Stability* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2000) 198-204, for a fine overview of the East Timor issue.

4. Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik said in June 1974 that "the independence of every country is the right of every nation, with no exception for the people in Timor." See Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1974* (Washington, D.C.: Center for International Policy, June 1974), 18.

5. John G. Taylor, "East Timor: Contemporary History, A Chronology of the Main Events since 1974," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 239.

6. Hamish McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia* (Blackburn, Australia: Fonta & Morris, 1980), 202-203.

7. Ibid. 204.

8. Ibid., 203.

9. Schwarz, *A Nation*, 202.

10. Taylor, "East Timor: Contemporary History," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 239.

11. John G. Taylor, "Emergence of a Nationalist Movement," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 35; James Dunn, "Timor in International Perspective," ibid., 63-64.

12. Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1978*, Part 2, 19.

13. McDonald, *Suharto's Indonesia*, 207.

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14. Ibid., 210-11.

15. Ibid., 211.

16. Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1978, Part 2, 19.*

17. James Dunn cites a study by the Catholic Church suggesting that as many as 60,000 Timorese had been killed by the end of 1976. This figure does not appear to include those killed in the period between the start of civil war in August 1975 and the invasion on December 7. See James D. “The Timor Affair in International Perspective,” in Carey and Bentley, *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 66; The 100,000 figure is cited in McDor. 215, and also in Taylor’s chronology, “East Timor: Contemporary History in Carey and Bentley, *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 239. McDonald’s figure includes the pre-invasion period while Taylor’s does not.

18. Schwarz, 205; Estimates vary widely. On November 12, 1979, Indonesia's foreign minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, estimated that 120,000 people had died in East Timor since 1975. See Taylor's chronology, "East Timor: Contemporary History," in Carey and Bentley *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 240; Amnesty International estimates that 200,000 died from military action, starvation or disease from 1975-1999. See Amnesty International, "200,000 Dead. Enough is Enough." *New York Times* (advertisement), September 23, 1999.

19. For "pancasila," see Schwarz, *A Nation*, 10, 24, 41-42, 45-46, 292-9.

20. Andersen, "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications," Carey and Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 138-39.

21. The comment is cited in a telegram written by Australian Ambassador Richard Woolcott on August 17, 1975 (Cited in Munster, G.J. and Wals, eds), *Documents on Australian Defence and Foreign Policy*, 1968-75 (Sydney, 1980), 200.

22. The memo was drafted by Edward C. Ingraham, director of the Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore office at the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

23. See *Document 2*.

24. "Nodis" means "no distribution" without the permission of the State Department's Executive Secretary.

25. The cable, entitled "Plans for Indonesian Invasion of East Timor," remains classified but is cited by title and cable number in a list of cable that Kissinger received while traveling in East Asia. The list may be found in National Archives, Record Group 59, Executive Secretariat Briefing Books, 1958-1976, Box 227, President Ford's Trip to the Far East (Follo

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Up) Nov.Dec. 1975. The National Security Archive has submitted a req
to the State Department for declassification of this and other cables on E
Timor cited on the list.

26. Indeed, later that month Kissinger asked his advisers whether "We could construe a Communist government in the middle of Indonesia as self-defense?" See Mark Hertsgaard, "The Secret Life of Henry Kissinger; minutes of a 1975 meeting with Lawrence Eagleburger," *The Nation*, October 29, 1990, at

<http://etan.org/_vti_bin/shtml.exe/news/kissinger/secret.htm>.

27. Andersen, "East Timor and Indonesia: Some Implications," Carey ar
Bentley, eds., *East Timor at the Crossroads*, 137.

28. Center for International Policy, *Human Rights and the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program, Fiscal Year 1978, Part 2, 19-20*. Max Holland, who co-wrote the Center's report, discovered the State Department's administrative delay and the continued offers of security assistance. The editors thank him for bringing this report to our attention.

29. Carlyle Maw, Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance.

30. Mark Hertsgaard, "The Secret Life of Henry Kissinger; minutes of a 1975 meeting with Lawrence Eagleburger," *The Nation*, October 29, 1990.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

SECRET /NODIS/XGDS

WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

By _dell_ NARA, Date _7/2/101_

PARTICIPANTS:

President Ford
President Suharto, President of Indonesia
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for NSA
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant
to the President for NSA
Mr. Widodo (Indonesian Interpreter)

DATE & TIME:

July 5, 1975 - Saturday
12:40 p.m. - 2:00 p.m.
(1:44 Secretary Kissinger joined)

PLACE:

Laurel Cabin, Camp David, Maryland

President: Let me reiterate how pleased we are to have you visit. Secretary Kissinger told me you were here in 1970 when President Nixon was in office. We are just as concerned about our good relations with Indonesia as we were earlier.

Let me say now that we are as firmly committed and interested in Southeast Asia. The events in Indochina have in no way diminished our interest or commitment in the area.

We are committed to detente with the Soviet Union, but it has to be a mutual relationship. We will not let them have a bigger piece of the benefits. We will continue it as long as it is mutually beneficial. We recognize that the Soviet Union keeps assisting and strengthening its friends, just as we do. But they cannot take advantage of us.

In my trip to Brussels, I told my NATO allies that we were committed to them completely, and I want you and the countries in your area to feel the same.

SECRET /NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY _Henry A. Kissinger_

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION

SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652

EMPTION CATEGORY _5 (b)(3)_

AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON _Imp. to Det._

Declassified
Photocopy from original M. L. Ford Library

SECRET / NODIS / XGDS

- 2 -

We want to continue our assistance programs. As you know, that depends on the Congress, which has been cutting our program in recent years. This Congress is interested, but it is my intention to increase aid. We are able to make available some military equipment items to help you in your situation - four naval vessels, which may not be in tip-top condition, some tanks, aircraft such as C-47, and four C-123 transports.

Suharto: May I first convey my appreciation and gratitude, Mr. President, for your invitation to visit the United States. And on behalf of the Government and people of Indonesia, may I convey our heartfelt congratulations for the 4th of July. I would take this valuable opportunity and discuss the problems affecting not only Indonesia but all of Southeast Asia in light of recent changes which have swept the peninsula. I had already obtained valuable information from Mr. Habib and from you in respect to furthering American responsibility to its allies in the Southeast Asia region. After obtaining that information and valuable assessment, we have no fear that the United States will abandon its responsibility toward peace in the Southeast Asia region. Considering the bitter and sad experience of the American people in Vietnam, the U.S. has given such great help and to have it turn out so it is necessary to assess why it happened to come out so very badly after such American sacrifice.

If you would allow me, I will elaborate on Indonesia's problems in our struggles for independence against Communism; it will help us understand. It is not the military strength of the Communists but their fanaticism and ideology which is the principal element of their strength. To consider this, each country in the area needs an ideology of its own with which to counter the Communists. But a national ideology is not enough by itself. The well-being of the people must be improved so that it strengthens and supports the national ideology. From the experience of Laos and Vietnam in the past, they seem to have forgotten this national ideology to get the support of the people. Despite their superiority of arms in fighting the Communists, the human factor was not there. They lacked this national ideology to rally the people to fight Communism.

It is in this spirit that Indonesia has been unifying and nationalizing the people to prepare to fight the threats which eventually will be made against our independence. So we are busily engaged in encouraging and consolidating in Southeast Asia this national ideology and cooperating with others in the areas of culture, economics, and so on. This is of course to prepare for any eventuality of an Indochina eventually dominated by the Communists.

What will happen after Vietnam? There are two possibilities: Whether they will apply Communism just within their borders in order to improve the

SECRET / NODIS / XGDS

Declassified
Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

- 3 -

conditions of their peoples. If so, we are okay. Ho Chi Minh has always wanted to unify all of Vietnam. We don't know yet what is going on and whether they will unify or whether there will be two separate Vietnams.

**President:** How long do you think it will take for them to decide this?

**Suharto:** I have been trying to find out from the Communists and Tito, and the judgment is that the consolidation will take five years, but by then, they will be unified.

**President:** How about the relations between Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos?

**Suharto:** Let me explain. As far as Cambodia, they recognize the GRUNK and Sihanouk -- although he is still in exile. I asked Tito why he didn't support Sihanouk's return and he said it would take some time. Tito's reply was that due to prevailing conditions in Phnom Penh, it is not safe for Sihanouk to return. There are still some dangerous elements. But my personal opinion is that they don't want him back yet. My information is that it will take Cambodia about five years to consolidate, so it will be similar to Vietnam. Considering that the time for consolidation is so long -- five years -- they might want two Vietnams and one Cambodia, all three joining a non-aligned world. So they may want to stay separate but with their policies aligned.

Even if it takes some time to consolidate, events will certainly encourage similar elements in Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and elsewhere. Of course, this Communist ideological solidarity will take the form of encouraging these elements to step up their activities among labor, farmers and youth. When they have built up the Communist movements, the Vietnamese will be able to supply the military equipment necessary for them to undertake military activities.

**President:** Are all the Communists working together?

**Suharto:** The Soviet Union and the Chinese don't work together. They are competing to expand their own individual influence in the region.

The second possibility is that they may not stay within their borders but seek to Communize the region and the world. If so, we have to find out whether they will support the Soviet Union and China. Right now, I think Vietnam won't take sides, because then it would become a target between the two. Instead it will work for independent national Communist movements. But in any case, these events will have brief impact on the neighboring countries. The question

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

- 4 -

is how to counter it. Knowing well the Communist tactics -- infiltration, fanaticism, etc., it is essential for each country to have a strong national ideology -- to strengthen itself in the political, economic and military areas.

We are fortunate we already have this national ideology -- Pantchesita(?). The question is, is it strong enough? Here it is important that we strengthen our economic development so we can support our Pantchesita(?). Therefore if we fail in economic developments, it will create a lack of confidence of our national ideology and create doubts in the people and leave them susceptible to other ideologies.

**President:** You have done very well in controlling inflation. We have had problems in that regard, but we are now making progress. I understand if you don't make economic progress there will be the growth of a Communist ideology in Indonesia.

**Suharto:** The principal factor is creating a national stability principally in the economic and monetary fields. The role of the US in her responsibility toward this area -- the U.S. won't abandon her role, but the American assistance role should be reviewed, both in relation to Indonesia and all of Southeast Asia. Particularly in assisting and supporting those countries in establishing national resilience. That would help in creating a regional resilience and help keep out Communism. But we are running against time because the Communists are working very hard in these countries to convert them to Communism.

The best way of fighting subversion is intelligence and territorial operations, so we can detect Communist activity when it first arises. In carrying these out when the people are participating, we rely heavily on communications. Therefore, communication between areas is very important to knowing when problems emerge, so we can deal with them immediately. If the danger becomes greater and the insurgency becomes greater, we will require mobile units to send to these areas to squelch subversion. To supply and maintain this mobility we will need both sea and air transport so we can put down insurgency before it becomes too big to stop. Especially in the navy field, we need to improve the conditions of the navy -- not big ships but to be able to transport men and materials to be able to carry out these operations. Particularly, ships which can fight any attempts to interfere with these operations to cope with insurgency. Indonesia has many islands so we will need many of these ships with great mobility.

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Especially at this moment, intelligence and territorial operations are
very important. We are in a better condition to do this than other Southeast
nations. With American assistance, we have built a national resilience
and we are working hard at building it further.

**President:** How big a Navy do you have and how big do you need?

**Suharto:** We have many capable navy men prepared to man the Soviet ships we have -- that were gathered to liberate West Iran. These ships are now mothballed and useless, however.

If you will agree with those principles to strengthen the national resilience -- especially in the military field, we can set up a joint committee to decide what is needed in the Navy, Army and Air Force. We don't need new equipment, just to make them serviceable.

**President:** I think we should set up a joint commission to decide what is needed and what we can do to supply those needs. I will talk to Secretary Kissinger.

**Suharto:** But the most important need is not in the military field but in the economic area. This is where we must build the nation. Indonesia can be an example to other countries of the importance of strengthening their national resilience.

**President:** Our Ex-Im Bank has been working with your people. I would expect we would continue to work with you on providing more credits and grants. It is important that we help with everything we can make available in order to contribute to the essential development you have described.

**Suharto:** In view of our efforts to accelerate developments, we have four sources: The IGGI (Inter-Governmental Group for Indonesia), international organizations like the World Bank, the Ex-Im Bank, and private banks. These four go from soft to hard terms for loans. We are already obtaining joint Ex-Im commercial loans, and terms are still lower through commercial banks. We hope to continue these loans.

**President:** In Fortune I saw a ten-page story urging private investment. Is the investment picture encouraging?

**Suharto:** The figure has now reached $5 billion. What remains is for industry which requires having capital input. Examples of these huge projects are liquefied natural gas ($800 million), nickel ($900 million), copper, and others. These will require the assistance of other countries to get the credits.

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With regard to our efforts to strengthen our national resilience, I want to mention the archipelago principle. This principle has been followed by the Indonesian people for years. The purpose is to force ourselves in as a unified nation without any territorial ambition. From various countries we have gotten favorable response, but I see some hesitancy in the U.S. about this principle. Indonesia doesn't want to create difficulties with other countries establishing this principle in its territory.

**President:** We were encouraged at the progress of the Law of the Sea Conference and we hope for further progress. We do understand your problem. We do have reservations, and we would be happy to meet with your people to work it out. We must have maneuverability if we are to carry out our responsibility in the world. I assure you we will work with your people to try to work out a mutual understanding.

**Suharto:** Talks have been conducted bilaterally between us already. The third point I want to raise is Portuguese decolonization. Starting with our basic principle, the new Constitution of 1945, Indonesia will not commit aggression against other countries. So Indonesia will not use force against the territory of other countries. With respect to Timor, we support carrying out decolonization through the process of self-determination. In ascertaining the views of the Timor people, there are three possibilities: independence, staying with Portugal, or to join Indonesia. With such a small territory and no resources, an independent country would hardly be viable. With Portugal it would be a big burden with Portugal so far away. If they want to integrate into Indonesia as an independent nation, that is not possible because Indonesia is one unitary state. So the only way is to integrate into Indonesia.

**President:** Have the Portuguese set a date yet for allowing the Timor people to make their choice?

**Suharto:** There is no set date yet, but is agreed in principle that the wishes of the people will be sought. The problem is that those who want independence are those who are Communist-influenced. Those wanting Indonesian integration are being subjected to heavy pressure by those who are almost Communists. The Communist elements practically sabotaged the recent meeting in Macao. I want to assert that Indonesia doesn't want to insert itself into Timor self-determination, but the problem is how to manage the self-determination process with a majority wanting unity with Indonesia. These are some of the problems I wanted to raise on this auspicious meeting with you.

**President:** I greatly appreciate the chance to learn your views, especially on the events in Vietnam as they consolidate -- and the thought it would take five years to consolidate.

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I would like to mention OPEC.

[Secretary Kissinger enters.]

We appreciate your not joining the embargo in '73-74. We are concerned about OPEC raising prices in the fall meeting. We are concerned about the effect on the economic recovery of the United States, the world, and the Third World. I know you feel badly about the Trade Bill's penalties against OPEC members. We are trying to get Congress to change that to make the penalties selective, not comprehensive.

**Suharto:** We share with the other OPEC states the view that we should not confront the consumers in this energy crisis. We are also aware that some producers have taken a tough stand. We are a small producer, but the others still listen to us. The September meeting I don't think will focus on a price increase but how to keep the purchasing power of the producers from falling. Therefore Indonesia, with the others, is studying the problem seriously so that oil revenue will benefit the people despite the inflation and recessions which have beset the world.

**President:** We have been through difficult times and we are now coming out of it. The oil price increase would have an injurious effect on our recovery and thus our ability to help the world's economic recovery.

In the past you have sent a special emissary to contact Secretary Kissinger on occasion. I would like that arrangement to continue under me if you agree.

**Suharto:** I fully share the importance of sending an emissary to contact Secretary Kissinger. I haven't done it so much recently because of the problems that both our countries have been facing recently. I would also agree to resuming these contacts so we can maintain a similarity of views on problems, like with Japan and Australia.

**President:** Lunch is ready.

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PROCEEDINGS

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Joe.

MR. SISCO: Nothing.

MR. EAGLEBURGER: Nothing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Phil.

MR. HABIB: We have had an incomplete series of reports on a coup in Portuguese Timor, which is creating a little bit of flak in Indonesia and Australia. We are not sure what happened, but evidently one of the Timorese Liberation for Independence groups has taken over the government one way or another. We don't know what their intentions are.

The Indonesians are quite upset and are mobilizing some forces very quietly.

When the situation becomes clear, we will know whether or not it is sufficiently serious that the Indonesians will take action. It is quite clear the Indonesians will not let a hostile group -- that is to say a Communist-dominated group -- take over.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. But who is that group?

MR. HABIB: As best we can tell, it is a group called the UDT, the Democratic Union of Timorese, which is not a Communist-controlled group. There is another group on the island which has some armed forces which is a

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Communist-dominated group.

If it is the UDT, it may very well be that the Indonesians are behind it and are not telling anybody yet. But from intercept traffic, we are not sure that the Indonesians are that fully clued in. And we will just to have to wait. We should have some more information today.

In any event, whichever way it goes, if it is an Indonesian move, or the Indonesians move against it, I think it is a situation in which we should just do nothing. It is quite obvious that the Indonesians are not going to let any hostile element take over an island right in the midst of the Indonesian archipelago.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is quite clear that the Indonesians are going to take over the island sooner or later.

MR. HABIB: Eventually. That is always expected. The only ones liable to react verbally will be the Australians, who will feel impaled to say something.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why should Whitlam care about the disappearance of a vestige of colonialism?

MR. HABIB: Whitlam has said over and over again they don't mind what happens to Portuguese Timor so long as it is with the consent of the people -- and he has taken

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that high posture, and his party is on record.

As a matter of fact, he said something like that to you when he was here. And they have assumed that it eventually if it will be free, the preferable thing would be to let it stay in Portuguese hands for a couple of years while it sorts itself out.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What does "sort itself out" mean in Timor?

MR. HABIB: The answer is until the Indonesians have organized sufficiently the Timorese into some kind of pro-Indonesian enosis group.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Aren't you getting carried away a little bit?

MR. HABIB: It is a Greek word I learned from Tom Enders, who speaks Greek fluently. Or is that Latin you speak?

But in any event, the important thing is that we should not get ourselves sucked into this one by having opinions, unless you disagree -- I mean publicly.

(Laughter)

I think it is just made to order --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You didn't mean that last phrase at all.

MR. HABIB: Well, subject to your confirmation,

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I have provided the guidance yesterday we should have no comment.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Our Indian desk takes the news for this week, doesn't it. Why is there a daily comment on what is going on in India about the cancellation of the Presidential trips?

MR. ATHERTON: I have seen one story in the *Times* this morning.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I saw another story in the *Times* on Sunday. I didn't even know there was such a study going on.

MR. ATHERTON: There was a memorandum to you on this. That is the only thing.

MR. HYLAND: This intelligence quote -- by Binder.

MR. ATHERTON: There is an intelligence study on internal developments. But on the question of the President' visit, the only thing I know of is the memorandum we had with you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Has that gotten to me?

MR. ATHERTON: I think so.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't want to hurt Gwertzman's feelings that I have seen a memo before he does.

MR. ATHERTON: Gwertzman's story today refers to

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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THE SECRETARY'S PRINCIPAL'S AND REGIONAL STAFF MEETING,
TUESDAY, AUGUST 12, 1975

PP 2 - 5 Reports of coup in Portuguese Timor. Habib recommended that the US not get involved. Secretary agreed that we should express no public opinion.

PP 5 - 7 Leaks re question of Presidential visit to India. Secretary referred to Gwertzman article in N.Y. Times. Atherton was certain source was not NEA; he undertook to assure that all hands would keep quiet on this subject.

PP 7 - 9 Argentina sitrep by Rogers. Secretary requested ARA briefing memorandum on dynamics of internal situation in that country.

PP 9 - 12 Panama Canal negotiations. Rogers mentioned favorable reaction to announcement of Bunker's return, and Secretary agreed that Defense group could visit Panama in early September. Rogers discussed Defense desire to play larger role in negotiations. Secretary stated that he would not permit DOD reps to be on negotiating team because of larger considerations related to such a step. Rogers promised Secretary a memorandum on subject.

PP. 13-16 CSCE implementation on maneuvers. Armitage discussed situation with respect to Autumn Forge series of NATO exercises. Secretary agreed with Hyland-Lord view that maneuvers should be notified. Armitage promised memorandum on subject.

P. 17 Secretary said that Somali Ambassador should have appointment with President in order to deliver message from President Siad.

PP 17-20 Rhodesian situation. Mulcahy gave status report on prospective negotiations and South African interest in settlement.

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pp 21-28 Articles in press (e.g., Zumwalt) re allegations of Soviet SALT violations. Hyland suggested possibility of classified "white paper" for selected Congressmen. Secretary approved idea of paper and requested that it deal with origin of agreement as well as question of violations. Secretary said he would not testify before Senator Jackson, but was willing to appear before Morgan.

pp 29-31 Indian situation. Atherton discussed reimposition of pre-censorship and resultant problem for VOA correspondent. Secretary agreed that correspondent should be withdrawn quietly in event of pre-censorship. Secretary requested NEA to get Prime Minister Chavan's visit dates changed to avoid conflict with Japanese Emperor's visit.

pp 31-34 Sitreps by Buffum on Vietnam UN membership issue, Israeli UN expulsion question, and North Korean UN resolution. Habib discussed North Korean desire to negotiate peace treaty with US, noting US requirements that South Koreans and Chinese be included.

pp 35-38 Secretary's speech at UN Special Session. Secretary requested from Enders, by end of day, listing of unresolved issues and general outline of speech. (Needed for discussions with President at Vail.)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Your Visit to Indonesia

UNsIgNed

I. PURPOSE

Your Jakarta visit will be a dramatic reaffirmation of the significance we attach to our relations with Indonesia, the largest and most important non-Communist Southeast Asian state and a significant Third World country. In our relations with Indonesia we are seeking to move progressively away from a donor-client relationship and from preoccupation with aid issues toward ties that stress a broader sharing of interests and views. Your visit offers an excellent opportunity to encourage a more mature dialogue with the Indonesian leadership on issues of importance to us and less focused on our aid relationship.

A key mechanism for moving this process forward will be the Joint US-Indonesian Consultative Commission first agreed upon during your Camp David meeting with Suharto on July 5. We expect that a formal announcement of the Commission's formation can be made during your brief visit, which provides an occasion to make the announcement under the most auspicious circumstances. We expect the Indonesians to welcome this step.

As a result of the Camp David meeting, Suharto is more confident of the steadiness of our commitment to our friends in Asia and our close ties with Indonesia in particular. At the same time, the Camp David meeting may have given the

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Indonesian side an overly optimistic impression of our ability to assist Indonesian development and security programs and an inadequate appreciation of the growing constraints that are acting to depress US aid levels everywhere. Your visit can be helpful in alerting Suharto to the likelihood of a declining US aid level and making him understand the reasons.

Our goal now is to encourage Indonesia's sense of self-reliance commensurate with its importance to the region, and to focus our dialogue increasingly on broader issues of continuing major interest of the two governments:

- The US role and US interests in East Asia, both for their own sake and to balance Soviet and PRC pressures;

- Indonesia's perceptions of its place in Southeast Asia against this broader backdrop;

- Indonesia's importance in North-South and other multilateral issues and our growing efforts to make a constructive contribution on such issues;

- Regional cooperation in Southeast Asia;

- And our increasingly varied and close bilateral relations.

## II. BACKGROUND AND STRATEGY

In the post-Vietnam environment, U.S. interests in Indonesia are based both on its present position in the region and, especially, on its anticipated future role. Indonesia, the fifth most populous nation in the world, is more than three times the size of any other Southeast Asian country and includes within its border about half the region's total population. It is potentially one of the richest. Its geographic location and resources are of major strategic importance in the region. Flanking the Southeast Asian mainland, Indonesia controls the sea passages between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, including

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Japan's life line to Middle East oil; its own oil fields
provides a significant portion of Japan's oil consumption
and a small but increasing part of our own oil imports.
Its other major resources -- rubber, tin and tropical
products -- are also of some significance to the United
States.

On the international scene, Indonesia, under Suharto
has sought to carve out for itself a somewhat unique
diplomatic position as an anti-Communist but non-aligned
country capable of carrying on a dialogue with both
radical "third world" states and the west while cautiously
pursuing policies generally compatible with the latter.
The government's desire not to offend politicized Moslem
elements in Indonesia, however, influences it to side with
the Arab states on certain issues, such as zionism; more-
over, it values highly its membership in OPEC and supports
OPEC actions, although it has never played a very active
role at OPEC meetings.

Within the region, Indonesia is generally recognized
as "first among equals" in the five-nation Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and increasingly regards
the organization as the cornerstone of its regional poli-
cies.

Realization of Indonesia's potential is hampered by
severe domestic problems and by economic backwardness which
even its increased oil revenues have scarcely begun to
overcome. Because of the Suharto Government's decision in
the late 1960s to favor economic development over military
preparedness, Indonesia's armed forces are poorly equipped
and inadequately supplied. At best, it will be years before
Indonesia can play a significant regional security role.
The speed with which Indochina fell upset Suharto's calcula-
tions that Indonesia would have an extended grace period to
develop its internal strength before confronting a communist
threat from the north. To meet the changed situation
following the loss of Indochina, President Suharto appears
to have become, if anything, even more convinced in the
months since your meeting at Camp David that Indonesia's
policies must be based on the maintenance of close ties
with the United States -- although not to the extent that
its non-aligned image is tarnished.

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President Suharto will want to hear about your dis-cussions in Peking, particularly as they relate to Southeast Asia, and may also express some uncertainty about detente. He undoubtedly will take the opportunity to explain Indonesia's own views on regional security, and the future of ASEAN. He will probably describe the GOI's own tactics of gingerly approaching the question of restoring relations with the PRC and the GOI's assessment of the potential communist threat to Southeast Asia (which he sees largely as one of insurgency and subversion in the short run).

We expect Suharto will reaffirm Indonesia's non-aligned posture and its commitment to the doctrine of "national resilience", a somewhat mystical "do it yourself" concept of developing internal strength by combining equal parts of military self-reliance, broad based economic development and a political identity between the government/military and the people. Nevertheless President Suharto will probably try to obtain further general US understand-ings regarding economic and military assistance. He may express concern that, despite indications we gave at Camp David, the prospect for future aid seems uncertain.

President Suharto may also bring up other issues raised earlier at Camp David or of mutual interest to the two governments: Law of the Sea, Portuguese Timor, Indonesian exclusion from receiving tariff preference under the 1974 Trade Act and U.S. policy on Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) imports. We anticipate, however, that his comments will be general and philosophic in character and that he will not expect detailed definitions of U.S. policy in response.

A straightforward, low-keyed, generally frank presentation will be most effective with Suharto. He may still harbor latent concerns as to the constancy of US policy toward Indonesia and Southeast Asia, and he is especially anxious that we recognize the magnitude of Indonesia's need for outside aid. Our desire to move away from preoccupation with aid toward a more balanced dialogue should thus be projected with caution, avoiding the impression of a change in the U.S. attitude toward Indonesia. The main forum for more detailed exchanges on this subject will be the Joint Commission.

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### III. US-INDONESIA JOINT COMMISSION

A key aspect of our strategy for the visit will be the announcement of the formation of a Joint US-Indonesia Consultative Commission. The announcement should specify that its first meeting is to be held in Washington next spring. Although the Indonesians have clearly intended that the first meeting be held in Jakarta, your visit and the fact that the announcement itself is being made in Jakarta should help us persuade the Indonesians to agree to Washington as the venue.

As worked out with the Indonesians, the Commission's purpose will be to broaden the range of our consultations with the Indonesian Government on major issues -- the latter to include cooperative programs in various fields, although the Commission will not actually negotiate programs or supervise their execution. The two co-chairmen will be Foreign Minister Malik and Secretary Kissinger, with representation on our side to include Treasury, Defense and such other agencies (AID, for example, or Commerce) as may be indicated by the agenda topics. The Commission is being created for renewable two-year terms and will meet annually, alternating between the two capitals. It will be supported by informally constituted subcommissions, initially a Joint Economic Subcommission and a Joint Security Subcommission, which will meet annually and be chaired on the U.S. side at the Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary level.

In discussing the Commission with Suharto, you may wish to stress the following points:

- We are especially pleased that agreement has been reached on establishing the Commission, and we look forward to the first meeting in the Spring.

- We see it as a most useful device for broadening the range of consultation and cooperation between our two countries and, on our side, as an indicator of the special importance we attach to our ties with Indonesia.

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IV. ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

1. Indonesia and the People's Republic of China

Of all the non-communist Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia has remained the most cautious about establishing (or in Indonesia's case, re-establishing) relations with Peking. Many Indonesians believe the PRC was behind the 1965 communist coup attempt and are highly skeptical of PRC pledges of non-interference in the internal affairs of its neighbors. They see their problem complicated by a sizeable Chinese minority in Indonesia (more than three million). Although Indonesia will probably normalize its relations with the PRC eventually, opinions differ within the GOI as to how quickly to proceed.

Suharto will be looking forward to your comments on your discussions with the Chinese and will be curious about our own plans for normalization with the PRC. You may wish to pass on any insights gained from your talks in Peking on Chinese intentions towards Southeast Asia (a topic in which Suharto will be keenly interested), while avoiding any appearance of advising the Indonesians on how they should handle their own relations with China. It is not in our interest to push Indonesia toward the PRC.

2. US-Soviet Detente

Indonesia's relations with the USSR are correct but wary. The GOI seeks aid from the Soviet bloc and receives a small quantity. (Aid from the USSR itself, terminated in 1965, will be resumed with a $100 million Soviet credit for hydroelectric projects announced in November 1975). The GOI, however, remains innately suspicious of Soviet intentions. Especially in the context of your comments on China, Suharto may inquire briefly about detente. He will be seeking primarily a reassurance that we, too, are careful to keep our guard up in dealings with Moscow.

3. Indonesia's Regional Policies

Indonesia's answer to the potential threat by a communist Indochina is to build up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN - pronounced AH-see-an) as a cohesive regional organization (but without provoking Hanoi by portraying it as a defensive alliance); to encourage

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greater "national resilience" in each of the ASEAN countries; to step up its own defenses without diverting excessive resources from its economic development programs; to hold out a wary hand to Hanoi and Saigon (both of whom it recognizes) as an inducement to choose cooperation rather than confrontation with their non-communist neighbors; and to persuade the U.S. to maintain its presence in the region, especially in the form of "over the horizon" forces. As he did at Camp David, Suharto will want to acquaint you with his views of the region, Indonesia's position therein, and perhaps how he envisages the U.S. role. He will probably express concern about Malaysia's growing internal security problems (see below) and possibly about Thailand's as well.

## Your Talking Points

- We welcome Indonesia's lead in developing regional cooperation, particularly through ASEAN. In our view, ASEAN represents an encouraging and constructive Southeast Asian effort to work toward regional self-reliance and security.

- We recognize that ASEAN is, and must remain, an organization of the Southeast Asian states themselves. We want to cooperate both with ASEAN's member countries, and with ASEAN itself in way that ASEAN states find useful, but we look to ASEAN itself to give the lead in determining the extent and nature of our cooperation.

- For our part, we intend to maintain an effective presence in the region. We will honor our treaty commitments and we are determined to maintain our close ties with friends such as Indonesia.

- (If Suharto asks) We intend to retain our bases in the Philippines and certain facilities in Thailand with the agreement of the governments concerned.

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4. The Malaysian Insurgency

The Indonesians profess great concern over the situa-
tion in Malaysia, where the chronic communist insurgency
has become appreciably more active in the past year.
Indonesia sees this as an opportunity for the Vietnamese
Communist regimes to open a new and (for Indonesia)
dangerous front by moving in with material support for
the insurgents. While Malaysia is among their closest
friends, the Indonesians fault the Malaysian Government
for failing to take the domestic measures Jakarta be-
lieves necessary to minimize the threat -- particularly
an easing of the legal and economic discrimination that
favors the Malay plurality (44%) at the expense of the
wealthier Chinese minority (38%). The Indonesians have
some justification for their concern, but we believe
their fears exaggerated. They are also concerned, but
less immediately, with the insurgent threat to Thailand.

Your Talking Points (if raised by the Indonesians)

-- We share Indonesia's concern over developments that could give the communists an opening to support subversion in the ASEAN region. Thailand and Malaysia appear particularly vulnerable in this regard. We hope that Indonesia, as Malaysia's close friend will help with advice and counsel.

-- For our part, we sent a small military team to both Malaysia and Singapore at the request of those governments to discuss defense equipment needs. We are helping both governments in selecting military equipment and are planning to offer Malaysia credit (about $15 million) for some of the purchases the year.

5. US Security Assistance to Indonesia

At Camp David President Suharto expressed concern to you about the potential threat of arms smuggled from the north to support insurgencies in Indonesia's neighbors and eventually in Indonesia itself. He sought our cooperation in reviewing Indonesia's equipment requirements.

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During subsequent consultations in September with an Indonesian military mission we agreed to provide a modest military package ($30 million in grants and $12.5 million in credit for a total of $42.5 million) of helicopter, ships, communication and radar equipment to meet Indonesia's primary threat -- the sea infiltration of arms -- and to maintain more effective control of the archipelago. Since we could not supply all their requirements, we agreed to work with them on a longer term effort to rehabilitate their military forces.

The level of military assistance which we told them they would receive this year, however, was later readjusted by switching approximately $10 million from grant to credit. Given Congressional attitudes, overall prospects for security assistance in future years are not bright, a fact that the GOI may not adequately grasp. They could, in fact, be disappointed next spring if FY 1976 security assistance is significantly reduced as is quite possible.

## Your Talking Points

- We recognize the seriousness of Indonesia's security concerns and have proposed to Congress approximately doubling the present level of our overall security assistance to Indonesia in the present fiscal year.

- For budgetary reasons we have had to make certain readjustments this year in the mix of grants to FMS credits. Increasingly, in the future, security assistance will be in terms of credit.

- We will continue to cooperate with Indonesia in the security assistance field within the limits of our capabilities. At the same time, Indonesia should not gauge US interests in Indonesia solely by our bilateral aid levels.

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## 6. North-South Economic Issues

Indonesia supports restructuring the world economy to bring greater equilibrium between rich and poor countries, but prefers to deal with practical questions rather than ideological confrontation. The Indonesians responded favorably to the U.S. "comprehensive" speech at the UNGA Special Session, but remain skeptical about our willingness to fulfill our promises and differ with us on such fundamental issues as our reliance on market forces to bring about changes in world economic structure. They dislike our criticism of OPEC and the non-aligned.

Indonesia exerts a moderating influence among Third World and OPEC countries. A sustained dialogue with Indonesian leaders could narrow the gap between our differing views of the policies best suited to improve the economic position of the Third World. Indonesian leaders have to be persuaded about the sincerity of U.S. North-South policies. At the same time they should be aware that U.S. domestic public support is essential for policies to benefit the developing countries and that several recent third world actions, particularly in the UN, have endangered that support.

### Your Talking Points

- We sympathize with the Third World desire to bring a better equilibrium between the developed and developing countries, and we also recognize Indonesia's commitment to this goal.

- We have demonstrated the seriousness with which we propose to deal with these issues. Secretary Kissinger's speech to the UNGA Special Session contained more than 30 proposals covering trade, commodities, agriculture, finance, and technology. Many of them should be of particular benefit to Indonesia.

- In some areas we may differ on how best to pursue North-South objectives. We think market forces have a key role to play, for example, and their exclusion leads only to inefficiencies and dislocations.

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We believe both producer and consumer interests should be taken into account in discussing commodity policies.

-- If we deal with the specifics of these issues we should be able to narrow our differences and reach practical solutions. We hope to discuss these matters with Indonesian policy makers in all appropriate fora: The Joint Commission, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation and elsewhere.

-- Indonesia should also be aware of our political problems in this area. We need the support of the U.S. public to pursue policies to benefit the developing countries. We would welcome Indonesia's help in discouraging Third World positions which can only erode U.S. public support for a forthcoming U.S. posture.

7. Energy Issues

The Indonesians place considerable emphasis on solidarity with OPEC. Nevertheless they have played a passive moderate role at OPEC meetings and during the latest round kept their price increases significantly below those of other OPEC countries. They did not participate in the Arab oil embargo. The United States accounts for the bulk of Indonesia's oil investment (about 86%) and an increasing amount (about 11%) of our crude oil imports are from Indonesia.

There are two energy related issues which the Indonesians could raise in discussions: (a) Indonesian mandatory exclusion (as a member of OPEC) from the 1974 Trade Act benefits and (b) their hope for a favorable FPC ruling which would permit the GOI to go ahead with a major project to export liquefied natural gas (LNG) to California.

Your Talking Points (if the subject is raised)

-- We have noted Indonesia's recent decision to hold its oil price increases below that sanctioned by OPEC. We have also appreciated Indonesia's moderate stance in other issues relating to OPEC. But we believe that in the long run Indonesia stands to gain most from increasing production and sales.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority
JAN 09 1975 08

SECRET

- 12 -

-- The Federal Power Commission will be taking up the Indonesian LNG case in the very near future. Meanwhile, the Administration's Energy Resources Council will be working toward decisions on our overall energy policies, including the question of LNG imports. While we cannot foretell what these decisions will be, we are very much aware of Indonesia's interest in LNG.

-- We favor Congressional action to enable Indonesia to become eligible to receive those tariff preferences conferred by the 1974 Trade Act. However, Congressional concern over OPEC policies will make this difficult.

## 8. US Economic Aid to Indonesia

At Camp David President Suharto emphasized that "Indonesia's most important need was economic rather than military", reflecting the realistic Indonesian view that domestic socio-economic and political problems are the chief threat to the country's stability. Particularly on Java, where 80 million people are already as densely crowded as anywhere on earth, unemployment and grinding poverty are endemic. Compounding Suharto's political problems are signs that despite ten years of development under the "New Order" the gap between the rich and poor is growing, while corruption and maladministration remain widespread.

In response to Suharto's comments at Camp David, you expressed your intention to increase aid to Indonesia. Subsequently you proposed to the Congress an additional $20 million in loans for Indonesia, bringing the total proposed U.S. assistance package of $85 million for FY-1976. (Japan this year is providing almost twice as much, while the other members of the Indonesia aid consortium are providing roughly $230 million). Prospects for future U.S economic assistance are less clear since there are proposals now under interagency review which could cut our aid significantly as part of worldwide budgetary reductions.

## Your Talking Points

-- We fully recognize Indonesia's continuing need for developmental assistance. We have asked Congress for $20 million in additional development loans to Indonesia this year for a total of more than $80 million in aid, the biggest single increase we have proposed this year for any Asian country.

SECRET

To J. 15

DECLASSIFIED
Authority

SECRET

- 13 -

-- We intend, within Congressional limits, to maintain a meaningful aid contribution to Indonesia. At the same time, Indonesia should not gauge U.S. interest in Indonesia solely by bilateral aid levels.

-- Private foreign investment can become an increasingly important source of capital and technology for Indonesia's economic growth. We hope your Government will actively continue to encourage the foreign investor.

-- We also hope that Indonesia will support our proposals at the UNGA Special Session to protect developing countries against cycles in their export earnings, to provide them with better access to western capital and to expand international facilities to finance development, to promote the transfer of technology, and to achieve an international consensus governing relations between trans-national enterprises and governments.

## 9. Indonesia and the UN

Indonesia walks a tightrope in its UNGA voting, maintaining a show of solidarity with the non-aligned majority while attempting to avoid too frequent opposition to the U.S. and the West. This is reflected in abstentions and behind-the-scene efforts at compromise. In 1974 Indonesia worked hard to defend the seat of the Lon Nol delegation. The 1975 record has been mixed: On Korea Indonesia voted for the friendly resolution and abstained on the hostile one; on Zionism, however, it voted with the majority, to some extent because of internal political considerations arising from the pressure of Moslem political parties in Indonesia.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority
W/W979508

SECRET

- 14 -

## Your Talking Points

- Despite the continued tendency of the UNGA non-aligned majority to use its voting strength irresponsibly, we are making every effort to avoid acrimonious confrontations.

- We understand Indonesia's dilemma in wanting to avoid taking issue with the non-aligned majority, and we appreciate Indonesia's support when we receive it.

- If the UN is to retain its importance, however, greater realism and consideration for the actual issues must be injected into the UNGA. It is in the interest of major countries such as Indonesia to ensure that the UN acts more effectively and responsibly. If every country voted forthrightly for what it actually believed, the extremists in the UN would find themselves a small minority.

## 10. Indonesia and the Law of the Sea

Indonesia has long sought international recognition of the archipelago principle, under which all waters within the Indonesian archipelago would be under extensive Indonesian control. We have not accepted the principle, but we have indicated that we could accept an objectively defined archipelago as part of an over-all Law of the Sea treaty which effectively guarantees our transit and over-flight rights through both archipelagos and international straits. After over two years of negotiation, we have narrowed our differences with Indonesia. We are prepared to resume bilateral discussions with the GOI on this subject whenever the Indonesians wish. A short while ago they expressed a desire for bilateral talks, but most recently seem to have backed away again.

## Your Talking Points (if raised by the Indonesians)

- We understand Indonesia's position on the archipelago question.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

SECRET

- 15 -

-- The United States can accept the archipelago principle in the Law of the Sea negotiations as part of a comprehensive treaty protecting our interests in transit through and over archipelagoes and international straits.

-- We are willing to continue detailed law of the sea consultations with Indonesia to find a mutually acceptable solution to this important problem.

## 11. Indonesia and Human Rights

The human rights problem in Indonesia concerns about 35,000 suspected communists still under detention from the 500,000 or so arrested in the chaotic months following the attempted communist coup of September 1965. Held without trial or in many cases formal changes, these detainees have attracted a good deal of world (and Congressional) attention and criticism of Indonesia.

The Indonesians recognize the issue as a serious problem and are troubled by the criticism. They feel themselves in a dilemma. However, they are convinced the wholesale release of the detainees would lead to civil strife and a recrudescence of the Indonesian Communist Party.

We have frequently discussed the issue with the GOI in a quiet, non-accusatory manner, seeking to speed resolution of the problem, and we have alerted them to the human rights provisions of our aid legislation. The Indonesians have been responsive. During a recent US visit by a high level Indonesian delegation headed by General Ali Murtopo, one of Suharto's close advisors, the group raised the issue with Members of Congress and told them that they plan to step up the phased release of more detainees.

We believe it would be helpful if you raised this issue in a low key.

### Your Talking Points

-- The matter of the detainees in Indonesia has attracted a good deal of attention and concern in the U.S. and has affected Congressional and public attitudes toward Indonesia.

SECRET

Authority
UDD979508

DECLASSIFIED

SECRET

- 16 -

-- The Congress has placed human rights restrictions on both economic and security assistance legislation which could make implementation of these programs more difficult. We understand that the delegation led by General Murtopo (Moor-TOE-poh) discussed this constructively with Members of Congress.

-- Indonesia's release of about 1,500 detainees during the past year and the implementation of what we understand are present plans for the phased release of more detainees has already had a favorable impact on Congress and the U.S. public.

12. Indonesia and Portuguese Timor

Indonesia was content to leave in Portuguese hands the small colony (600,000 people) that shares with Indonesia the island of Timor. With the dismantling of the Portuguese empire, however, Jakarta has become concerned that the backward and resource-poor colony would attain what the Indonesians expect would be a weak, unviable independence leaving it susceptible to outside -- especially Chinese -- domination.

For about a year Jakarta has been maneuvering to absorb the colony through negotiations with Lisbon and covert military operations within the colony itself, showing considerable restraint. A small scale civil war between quarreling Timorese parties has opened the way to wider Indonesian intervention in support of pro-Indonesian factions. Portugal, meanwhile, has almost completely lost control of the colony.

A merger with Indonesia is probably the best solution for the colony if the inhabitants agree. Indonesia use of US-supplied weapons in an overt occupation of the territory, however, would contravene U.S. law. We have quietly pointed this out to the GOI, and it appears to have been a restraining factor.

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED

~~W~~ 979508

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

INDONESIA AND PORTUGUESE TIMOR

Portuguese Timor is a small (population 600,000) hitherto neglected Portuguese colony occupying half the island of Timor. The other half is Indonesian territory. The inhabitants of the two halves are ethnically indistinguishable, although centuries under separate rule have created social and cultural differences. Indonesia does not claim the colony, and the Suharto government has been content to leave it indefinitely in Portuguese hands. The GOI does, however, look with concern at the idea of an independent Portuguese Timor, fearing that its backwardness and lack of economic viability would open it to pervasive outside -- especially Chinese -- influence which could spread into Indonesia.

Background

A small scale civil war broke out between rival political parties in Portuguese Timor last August. Unable to restore order, the Portuguese evacuated their remaining citizens and moved their administration to a small offshore island. Fretilin, a vaguely leftist party favoring early independence, quickly gained ascendency when it won the support (and the weapons) of the 2,000-odd Timorese soldiers from the disbanded Portuguese garrison. The Indonesians, however, have trained and equipped units from the two main rival parties and sent them back into Portuguese Timor with a stiffening of disguised Indonesian special forces troops. The latter have been pressing Fretilin back toward Dili, the capital. Latest reports indicate that hostilities have decreased while the pro-Indonesian forces consolidate their position.

Meanwhile, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, meeting recently in Rome with his Portuguese counterpart, obtained the latter's agreement to a statement reasserting Portugal's responsibility for the territory and calling for a conference between the Timorese parties and the Portuguese to end the fighting and resume the "orderly" process of decolonization disrupted last August. The statement favors Indonesia, in that it refutes Fretilin's claim to control of the territory and has Fretilin outnumbered in a conference by the two rival parties now under de facto Indonesian control.

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

## Current Situation

Preoccupied with the crisis at home and with their focus on colonial problems limited to agonizing over Angola, Portugal's chief interest is to get out gracefully, leaving behind a semblance of order on which legal factions can agree. The Portuguese have called a conference of the three main Timorese parties, suggesting Darwin as the site. None of the three parties have rejected the proposal, but there is disagreement and bickering over the location.

Meanwhile, the Indonesian UN Mission has circulated a policy statement emphasizing Portugal's continuing responsibility for "orderly decolonization" of Timor, calling for an act of self-determination by the "entire people", pledging to abide by the outcome, and welcoming them to "become independent through integration with Indonesia" if they wish. In a passage aimed at Fretilin, the statement declared that "Indonesia cannot accept a solution imposed by any party through armed force".

## Prognosis

A Portuguese sponsored conference of the three main Timorese parties (assuming it is eventually held) could result in a cease-fire call and perhaps a token return of the Portuguese administration to Dili, although an actual restoration of Portuguese authority seems most unlikely. Although the Indonesians would probably give a cease-fire their public blessing, we expect that they will keep up their clandestine pressure on Fretilin until the party is defeated or breaks up. The GOI has displayed patience and some subtlety in its efforts to date, however, and will try to reach its objective with minimum outside impact.

## U.S. Interest

We have taken the position that the U.S. should eschew involvement in the Timor situation and leave its resolution to the Indonesians, Portuguese, Australians and Timorese themselves. There are no present calls for our involvement, with the parties concerned in direct touch with each other and none seeking our help.

A particular concern for us has been the possibility of an overt Indonesian military move into the territory, inevitably using US-supplied weapons in the process. We have brought the matter quietly to the attention of the Indonesian leaders, however, and this has been a major factor in restraining Jakarta to date.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORD/KISSINGER - SUHARTO

DECEMBER - 6, 1976

Suharto: I would like to speak to you, Mr. President, about another problem, Timor. When it looked as if the Portuguese rule would end in Timor we sought to encourage the Portuguese to an orderly decolonization process. We had agreement with them on such a process and we recognized the authority of Portugal in carrying out of decolonization and in giving people the right to express their wishes. Indonesia has no territorial ambitions. We are concerned only about the security, tranquility and peace of Asia and the southern hemisphere. In the latest Rome agreement the Portuguese government wanted to invite all parties to negotiate. Similar efforts were made before but Fretelin did not attend. After the Fretelin forces occupied certain points and other forces were unable to consolidate, Fretelin has declared its independence unilaterally. In consequence other parties declared their intention of integrating with Indonesia.

Portugal reported the situation to the United Nations but did not extend recognition to Fretelin. Portugal, however, is unable to control the situation. If this continues it will prolong the suffering of the refugees and increase the instability in the area.

Ford: The four other parties have asked for integration?

Suharto: Yes. After the UDT, Indonesia found itself facing a fate accompli. It is now important to determine what we can do to establish peace and order for the present and the future in the interest of the security of the area and Indonesia. These are some of the considerations we are now contemplating. We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.

Ford: We will understand and will not press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the intentions you have.

Kissinger: You appreciate that the use of US-made arms could create problems.

Ford: We could have technical and legal problems. You are familiar, Mr. President, with the problems we had on Cyprus although this situation is different.

Kissinger: It depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self defense or is a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return.

There would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorized way. The President will be back on Monday at 2:00pm Jakarta time. We understand

your problem and the need to move quickly but I am
only saying that it would be better if it were done
after we returned.

Ford: It would be more authoritative if we can do it
in person.

Kissinger: Whatever you do, however, we will try to
handle it in the best way possible.

Ford: We recognize that you have a time factor. We
have merely expressed our view from our particular
point of view.

Kissinger: If you have made plans, we will do our
best to keep everyone quiet until the President
returns home.

____: Do you anticipate a long guerrilla war there?

Suharto: There will probably be a small guerrilla
war. The local kings are important, however, and
they are on our side. The UDT represents former
government officials and Fretelin represents former
soldiers. They are infected the same as is the
Portuguese army with communism.

Discussion turns to other issues.