HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HOLLIS B. CHENERY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

September 7, 1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
Ambassador
American Embassy
Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you know, George and I have been exchanging ideas on Vietnam. He has encouraged me to send--for your own personal information--some of my current reflections even though they are still highly tentative. They are based on a day's discussion in Washington, the study of some documents sent to me by the Department (I have a classified facility) and newspaper stories. My observations should be judged against this fragmentary background.

I.

Let me begin with two quick impressions of Washington:

(a) I found in the Department a rather relaxed attitude towards new political upheavals in Vietnam. A number of officials predicted that a new government would probably take over in September and talked as if this were a national phenomenon beyond our power. I do not know enough about the situation in Saigon to judge whether this prediction is justified. My own view is that almost any coup is likely to be unfortunate because it will further undermine the structure of legitimacy which we must make every effort to develop. Also, if there should be a major shake-up in Saigon within a short time of your arrival, and that of Lansdale's and Porter's the effectiveness of the new country team may well be jeopardized by the charge that it has installed its own puppet government. (Or else the new government may feel obliged to adopt an excessively hostile attitude to disprove this charge).

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September 7, 1965

(b) In both DOD and State--but particularly in the former--I was struck by an attitude of disdain toward the government of Vietnam. My queries about Vietnamese conceptions with respect to the conduct of the war (in DOD) or the war aims (in State) were treated with tolerant amusement as if Vietnamese views were essentially irrelevant. This attitude may be justified. It seems to me, however, profoundly unhealthy in the long run. In the short term it is undoubtedly most efficient to keep the conduct of the war or the thread of negotiations in our hands. However, an overconcern with immediate efficiency could undermine the political basis of our effort. It should be our objective to prevent the war from becoming entirely American; the Vietnamese should feel a real sense of responsibility for it. This applies even more strongly to the conditions of peace; otherwise negotiations could undermine whatever political structure exists.

II.

Let me turn now to a more fundamental issue to which I propose--with your agreement--to devote more of my time: our goals in Vietnam in the middle and long-term. This can be expressed perhaps in the answers to questions as these: How do we conceive of "success" in Vietnam? What military and, even more important, political goals would we have to achieve? What kind of political structure should we encourage and/or build? In case of negotiations, what terms would we consider desirable? What terms are we willing to settle for? Assuming that there is a settlement--and for many reasons I have my doubts whether one should think of the outcome in these terms--where do we go from there?

The difficulties raised by the much-used word "negotiations" illustrate my point. Many of our public pronouncements--and some of the documents I have seen--give the impressions that the purpose of our military operations is to bring about unconditional negotiations. As a public relations posture, this has considerable merit. If this is its only purpose--if, in other words, we lack a concrete program--it also involves considerable dangers.

(a) It puts a floor under the risks the Communists run. If they know that they can always get to the conference table and that the terms will remain essentially the same they will have every incentive to continue military operations.

...

[Y]

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September 7, 1965

(b) Unless carefully handled, it may demoralize the Vietnamese government and people. A civil war turns finally on the hopes and expectations of the people affected. If the Vietnamese leaders should come to believe that they have become expendable--or even that a Laos type settlement is being prepared--they will begin to maneuver in the new context. They will try to obtain reinsurance at every level--including by direct dealings with the Vietcong. A long-term political program in Vietnam seems to me to require confidence on the part of our friends that they will not become pawns. Our reliability is thus much more at issue than our technical competence. This calls for careful coordination of our political thinking and that of the Vietnamese well before negotiations start. Otherwise all efforts to build a viable structure may be jeopardized.

(c) This is all the more urgent because the Communists will surely not enter the negotiations with any intention of "settling" but with the aim of winning at the conference table the prize which eluded them on the battlefield. They will strive not for stability but for victory. And by then the contest will be largely psychological.

When I was connected with the Berlin task force, I was struck by the reluctance of the Department to commit itself to a position in advance of negotiations because of the desire to retain flexibility. I can understand this attitude. But it also involves the risk that we become the prisoner of events or even of our own slogans. "Unconditional negotiations," "cease fire," "tacit mutual concessions" are useful phrases if some concrete meaning attaches to them. Otherwise they can be turned against us, and confuse and demoralize our friends. It is true that we cannot know all the elements of a negotiating position in advance. But we do know that we will have to adopt an attitude towards the NLF; we must know whether we will strive for an all-Vietnamese or simply a South Vietnamese solution; we must have ideas on how to police an agreement. If we cannot be precise on these issues, there is a grave danger that negotiations will primarily concern the extent of our concessions. Our Vietnamese allies may lose confidence. The Communists, in short, could repeat the pattern of previous successful civil wars.

This could happen in Vietnam. Let me give two examples: (a) Several official statements have indicated that we are fighting "foreign intervention" in Vietnam. We have said that we would be prepared to stop certain actions provided the North Vietnamese did likewise. I do not object to these statements. But I hope we are backing them up with detailed studies. Several questions seem to me to require specific answers:

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September 7, 1965

-- Do we know exactly what we mean by foreign interference?

-- Could we define precisely what we want to have stopped and by whom? I noticed in one report, for example, that we are not at all clear about how bulk supplies are shipped into Vietnam.

-- If there were agreement to stop specific activities, how do we know that the agreement has been observed? I notice in our reports that the ratio of confirmed to probable infiltrators is 1:10. I assume that we cannot confirm the latter.

-- How will we know whether these activities have started up again?

-- Are the mutual undertakings symmetrical not only as to the extent of the operation involved but also to its effectiveness over time?

-- Supposing the effects of what the North Vietnamese cease takes six months to be felt while what we stop has immediate consequences will we not be at a serious disadvantage?

-- Are we really fighting "foreign" intervention or a Communist take-over by military means? Would not our loss of honor, prestige and standing be even more severe if we are defeated by an indigenous Communist force?

(b) The second issue involves Senator Mansfield's proposal of a cease-fire which he claimed had the sanction of the White House. I do not know to what extent this is true, but if this term should come up again it would be useful to know what it means. Is the cease-fire to be between the Vietcong and the South Vietnamese government or between us and the North Vietnamese? Is the NLF to be recognized as a party to such an arrangement? (Can it, in other words, get official recognition by means of an armistice?) And if so, what protects us against the tactic so successfully used by Mao in China of using a cease-fire to restore his forces and to gain political recognition and then to break it when conditions are once more favorable? What happens to the areas under its control? A cease-fire which effectively divided South Vietnam leaving major territories under recognized Communist control would, in my view, be the beginning of the end.

Whatever the validity of this judgment, I believe that it is time to spell out our ultimate goals more concretely. And we will have to start a dialogue on war aims with the Vietnamese. Otherwise questions such as these raised here will have to be answered under pressure. Negotiating

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September 7, 1965

tactics will predominate over long-term strategy. The psychological and
political framework will be dominated by the other side.

This suggests two other requirements--one substantive, the other
tactical:

-- The substantive item is the need to develop some American proposals which are more positive, even offensive and which convey a clearer sense of purpose. There seems to me too much of a tendency to present a shopping list to the other side. This runs the risk that we will eventually negotiate in a Communist agenda. Why, for example, can we not insist on free elections in both parts of Vietnam?

-- Tactically, I think it is unwise to use the term NLF. By accepting the term "Liberation Front" we give credence to the claim that the Vietcong are fighting an oppressive regime and that their struggle has a substantial moral quality. The tenacity with which our opponents fight for such labels shows their awareness of the psychological element of policy.

A final word about negotiations: Civil wars seem to me the most difficult to end by negotiations and "settlements" which preserve a rough equilibrium are likely to be fragile. This is no accident. Civil wars usually evoke the most intense passions. Involving people of the same backgrounds and culture, inhabiting the same area, the terms are extremely difficult to enforce. This is why those civil wars which have ended since World War II have usually been concluded with the predominance of one side or the other--as in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, or China--without formal acknowledgment by the defeated side. Formal settlements as in Laos or Cyprus have almost invariably been the starting point of new conflict. (This may prove true even of the Dominican Republic). It seems to me that an outcome in which we achieve a major pacification without a formal settlement might not be the worst result of the Vietnamese war, provided we can couple military success with long-term political construction.

This is not to say that I am opposed to negotiations. If we have a clear program they can be constructive. But we must recognize that they begin a new phase of the struggle rather than mark its end. The stakes remain high and the conduct of affairs grows more complicated because it depends on so many intangibles. Negotiations require as careful and thoughtful preparation as do our military campaigns.

My original intention was to use the reflections about negotiations as point of departure for some observations on the political setting of the Vietnamese problem. This letter has, however, already become too long. I

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September 7, 1965

will, therefore, save the other comments for another letter which I
will send you soon.

Let me repeat that I may modify some judgments as I study more
documents and see more people. I thought you might want to have my
thinking as it develops, nevertheless. I would be grateful if you
treated this communication as designed for your own personal use.

A word about my schedule. My original plan had been to arrive in
Saigon around September 15th. At the strong urging of Bill Bundy I put
off my departure for a month. My present plan is to arrive around October
14th and to stay until about November 4th. If you prefer an earlier arrival,
I will do my best to arrange it.

Let me take this opportunity to wish you every success in your difficult
and delicate task.

With high regard.

September 10, 1965

Let me turn now to a more fundamental issue to which I propose
--with your agreement--to devote more of my time: our goals in Vietnam
in the middle and long-term. This can be expressed perhaps in the answers
to questions as these: How do we conceive of "success" in Vietnam? What
military and, even more important, political goals would we have to achieve?
What kind of political structure should we encourage and/or build? In case
of negotiations, what terms would we consider desirable? What terms are
we willing to settle for? Assuming that there is a settlement--and for many
reasons I have my doubts whether one should think of the outcome in these
terms--where do we go from there?

The difficulties raised by the much-used word "negotiations" illustrate
my point. Many of our public pronouncements give the impressions that the
purpose of our military operations is to bring about unconditional negotiations.
As a public relations posture, this has considerable merit. If this is the
only purpose--if, in other words, we lack a concrete program--it also involves
considerable dangers:

(b) Unless carefully handled, it may demoralize the Vietnamese government and people. A civil war turns finally on the hopes and expectations of the people affected. If the Vietnamese leaders should come to believe that they have become expendable--or even that a Laos type settlement is being prepared--they will begin to maneuver in the new context. They will try to obtain reinsurance at every level--including by direct dealings with the Vietcong. A long-term political program in Vietnam seems to me to require confidence on the part of our friends that they will not become pawns. Our reliability is thus much more at issue than our technical competence. This calls for careful coordination of our political thinking and that of the Vietnamese _well before negotiations start_. Otherwise all efforts to build a viable structure may be jeopardized.

....

- 2 -

-- Supposing the effects of what the North Vietnamese case takes six months to be felt while what we stop has immediate consequences will we not be at a serious disadvantage?

....

- 3 -

Whatever the validity of this judgment, I believe that it is time to spell out our ultimate goals more concretely. And we will have to start a dialogue on war aims with the Vietnamese. Otherwise questions such as these raised here will have to be answered under pressure. Negotiating tactics will predominate over long-term strategy. The psychological and political framework will be dominated by the other side.

This suggests two other requirements—one substantive, the other tactical:

A final word about negotiations: Civil wars seem to me the most difficult to end by negotiations and "settlements" which preserve a rough equilibrium are likely to be fragile. This is no accident. Civil wars usually evoke the most intense passions. Involving people of the same backgrounds and culture, inhabiting the same area, the terms are extremely difficult to enforce. This is why these civil wars which have ended since World War II have usually been included with the predominance of one side or the other—as in Greece, Malaya, the Philippines, or China—without formal acknowledgment by the defeated side. Formal settlements as in Laos or Cyprus have almost invariably been the starting point of new conflict. (This may prove true even of the Dominican Republic). It seems to me that an outcome in which we achieve a major pacification without a formal settlement might not be the worst result of the Vietnamese war, *provided we can couple military success with long-term political construction*.

....

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Saigon, September 14, 1965.

Dear Henry:

Thank you for your letter of September 7. The thinking
is magnificent--as evidenced both by your statements and by
the questions which you raise. This is the line of special-
ization which I was going to ask you to take, and now you
have done it by yourself. It is really a remarkable contri-
bution from someone who has never been here. I am thrilled
by the thought of what you will produce after you have been
here.

I am glad that you are coming October 15. It will
enable me to make better preparations than would be possible
for September 15. I am giving much thought as to how you
can best spend your time.

I would like to suggest that you talk this over with
Tony Lake and some of the Vietnamese experts in Washington,
and have them put down a list of things that you should do
and send it to me. Then I would like to work on it here.
This list should include not only what the Washington experts
think you should do, but also what you yourself would like to
do.

I would like you to plan to stay with me at least when
you arrive. You may feel that you can learn more by being
free later to mingle and bump into people in the evenings.
But I hope you can at least stay with me in the beginning.

With warm regards,

Professor Henry A. Kissinger,
Harvard University Center for
International Affairs,
6 Divinity Avenue,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 02138.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

September 24, 1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I very much appreciated your warm and thoughtful letter of
September 14th. I am delighted that you agree with the tentative
plans of my work. I have also talked them over with Bill Bundy
and Leon Unger. They seemed to consider the approach useful and
promised to cable and write you their views separately.

The main reason for this letter is to keep you informed of
my activities and to suggest a tentative schedule subject to modi-
fication by you. You will understand that it is hard to be too
specific when dealing with an unfamiliar country from such a great
distance.

Before I turn to other matters let me tell you with what
pleasure, admiration and agreement I have been reading your dispatches
to Washington. They are terse, to the point and refreshingly free of
the usual diplomatic waffling. Above all, they strike me as enormously
perceptive.

Let me now turn to the main purpose of this letter which I divide
into three parts: (a) the focus of my effort, (b) my proposed schedule
and (c) some technical matters.

I. <u>The Focus of My Effort</u>

You will have learned from Bill Bundy's cable and Leon Unger's
letter that I propose to look at some of the options before us in
Vietnam ranging from a victory involving the military collapse of the

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September 24, 1965

guerrilla movement to various negotiated outcomes. I am very conscious
of the intimate relationship between political and military factors,
and of the enormous sensitivity among the GVN to any hint of negotiations.
Nevertheless, it seems to me that unless we become explicit about our
purposes we could easily become trapped by our slogans. The best way
to avoid unfavorable concessions is to clarify our objectives before
negotiations develop their own momentum. In any event, when I talk
to the Vietnamese I will concentrate not on concessions but on their
views of a successful outcome and the building of a viable and dynamic
society.

As for the substance of my work, it seems to me that our program
must have three components: (a) military, (b) diplomatic and (c) political.
The first involves the deployment of our power; the second is related to
the whole range of negotiating postures; the third includes the area on
which the success of our operation will ultimately depend: the ability
to create a political structure in South Vietnam capable of enlisting
the allegiance of the population and winning the battle of ideas which
is the decisive aspect of any civil war.

As you know, I have continued my briefings in Washington and
have had the opportunity to study a wide range of documents. I have
seen many of the formal papers and some which have no agreed standing
but which circulate unofficially at high levels within various departments.
(I will discuss these with you when we meet.)

I have been struck by the fact that in Washington there does not
seem to exist any long-range integration of the many diverse operations
now taking place. What goes under the name of inter-agency planning is
really a device for coordinating essentially autonomous efforts which
may be based on different concepts and assumptions. The inter-agency
machinery prevents some duplication and avoids open competition (although
there are glaring examples of this). It does not insure that all agencies
have an agreed set of purposes. Because the inter-agency machinery seems
to address itself almost exclusively to operational matters, long-range
goals are neglected and differences with respect to them are magnified.

This has several consequences:

(a) Even when there is agreement on an ultimate course of action, there may be such wide divergence about timing as to make the seeming consensus meaningless. For example, the usefulness of the Acheson memorandum seems to me to depend almost entirely on when it is implemented.

....

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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September 24, 1965

In the Pentagon, the view is that its proposals become relevant only after victory is substantially achieved. In State, many fairly senior officials would like to move as soon as possible. This is not a trivial point, particularly in view of our relations with the Vietnamese government.

(b) The absence of an over-all concept leads to an overemphasis of the military component of our policy. The military are the group in the government best trained in long-term planning. In the absence of other considerations, the purely military approach is likely to predominate. The fact that it lends itself most easily to quantification contributes. I am not saying that we should reduce our military effort but that the other components of our policy must be as carefully planned and that the military and political actions need better coordination--at least in Washington.

(c) Another result is that the problems of the government of South Vietnam tend to be slighted. I continue to be unhappy that many in Washington view Vietnamese leaders as inevitable nuisances who, if we are lucky, will not be too obstructive. (I have some graphic examples which I shall save for a personal meeting.) As I pointed out in my last letter, I consider this attitude disastrous in the long run. I have no view about the adequacy of the current government but I am certain that we must contribute to the emergence of an indigenous structure which can lead the Vietnamese people to fulfill their hopes.

If we do not achieve a balance among the various components of our policy, the whole effort in Vietnam may go to pieces. Civil wars cannot be won by purely military means. Military power is necessary to provide security for positive acts of construction but it cannot substitute for them. Negotiations--or at least a willingness to enter them--may be important diplomatically. But unless handled with great delicacy, tact and sense of purpose they could undermine whatever internal stability Vietnam has achieved and whatever confidence has been built.

This is why I should like to look at the interrelationship of our efforts in the political-military area and attempt to define some criteria for measuring success or failure over the long term. Obviously, in a stay of three weeks, it will not be possible to develop final answers. But it might prove feasible to work out a check list of questions which require resolution along the lines of my last letter to you. I have continued working on this.

## II. My Proposed Schedule

Keeping in mind the tentative nature of my suggestions, here is what I should like to propose:

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September 24, 1965

I am arriving on October 15th after stopping for briefings in Honolulu and Hong Kong. I should therefore be fairly well rested. Since October 15th is a Friday, it seemed to me that it might be profitable for me to spend the week-end in talks with key American personnel including, if you agree, Lansdale's group. For the next four or five days I would like to meet as many of the following groups as possible: members of the Vietnamese governing directory; a few leading civilian political figures, including some Buddhists; a few key foreign diplomats (the Italian and British ambassadors and the Papal nuncio were especially recommended by Mike Dunn) and anyone else you consider useful. Perhaps a session with the RAND group might prove fruitful.

I then thought that I might visit two or three corps areas including the corps located in the Delta (IV Corps). In each corps area it might be helpful to have conversations with the following groups: American officers (in charge of U.S. troops); senior Vietnamese officers; and American advisors. If possible, I should like to see them separately. In each corps area I visit, I should like to visit one or two provincial capitals, talking to provincial and district chiefs and other leaders. In Hue I would appreciate an opportunity to talk to students as well as to Buddhist leaders.

I do not have a very clear idea how to organize the trips into the field. Some people have suggested using Saigon as a base and leaving it for several two-day trips. Others have advised one trip of about a week. Unger thought that I should stop off in Saigon for a few days between a trip north and another south. I will follow your judgment on this matter.

However we arrange the field contacts, I would propose to return to Saigon for five or six days at the end to continue my conversations with Vietnamese leaders in the light of my experiences.

My instinct is that the interviews will be most productive if the setting is informal and the groups are very small.

I do not mind--indeed I prefer--to work fifteen hours a day every day that I am in Vietnam (including the week-ends).

Needless to say, this schedule is tentative and based on fragmentary information. Please feel free to modify it in any way you think useful.

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September 24, 1965

III. Some Technical Matters

(a) I deeply appreciated your kind invitation to stay with you in Saigon. I accept with great pleasure for the portion of my trip before I go into the field. We can decide about the later period after my arrival in relation to what makes most sense for my program and for your own convenience.

(b) As you may know, I had met Lansdale several times before you asked him to join your staff. I, therefore, took the liberty of writing him a letter, a copy of which I enclose. After drafting it, it occurred to me that you might prefer to handle my Vietnamese contacts in another way. In view of this, I thought it might be best if I sent the Lansdale letter through you. If you agree with the letter, could I ask you to see that Lansdale gets the enclosed envelope. If you think it better to use other channels, please feel free to hold it up.

You can reach me in Boston until October 8th.

Looking forward to seeing you soon.

With warm good wishes and high regard.

[Y]

October 4, 1965

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I thought I would drop you a note just before
leaving to tell you that I have had further very
useful conversations in Washington expecially with
Alexis Johnson.

Alexis Johnson suggested that I make a special
effort to see Tri Quang, Father Quinh, Tran Van Do,
Quat and as many members of the National Directory
Committee as can be arranged. Of the foreign diplomats
he spoke especially highly of the Australian Ambassador.

It also occurred to me that as a professor I might
have some special access to the faculty and students of
Saigon and Hue Universities.

Of course, you are the best judge of whom it would
be useful to see and I leave the final decision up to you.

With kind regards.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

10 November 1965

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have just returned to the office, and I do not want to wait
any longer to tell you how much my stay in Saigon meant to me. You
are engaged in a noble enterprise on which the future of free peoples
everywhere depends. I was tremendously impressed by the way you
carried out your responsibilities, and I am most grateful to you for
your hospitality and courtesy. If you believe that I can be of any further
service to you at any point, please feel free to let me know.

My only regret is that the irresponsible Foisie story produc-
ed such a let-down. In order to clear matters up, I have written the en-
closed letter to Clark Clifford. I have also talked to both Mac and Bill
Bundy. It appears that they understand what happened--thanks in no
small part to your gracious and generous telegram.

I am going to Washington tomorrow. Bill and Mac Bundy,
Admiral Raborn and his staff, John McNaughton, and probably McNamara
have asked to see me. Next week Admiral Raborn plans to assemble a
group of senior officials for another report. I will write you my impres-
sions of the Washington scene as soon as possible.

In the meantime, let me thank you once more and extend every
good wish.

With warm regards.

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
Ambassador
American Embassy, Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco, California

Enclosure

10 November 1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Clifford:

It was a pleasure to talk to you from the West Coast though I
wish the occasion had been a happier one.

I do not recall when an incident has dismayed me more. Because it involves fundamental issues of honor and propriety, I am taking the liberty of summarizing the relevant facts on this my first day in the office after my return from Vietnam.

(1) When Ambassador Lodge asked me to come to Saigon as Special Consultant, I dropped everything on short notice to do so. My purpose was to be helpful to a policy which I strongly approve and to strengthen my authority for lending whatever prestige I may have to the Administration's effort after my return.

(2) Given the delicacy of the situation and to avoid any suggestion of free-wheeling, I arranged every appointment in Saigon (American or foreign) through the Embassy. An Embassy officer was present at each interview. Before each interview I received a briefing about what line to follow and what to avoid. A full report of each conversation was submitted to the State Department by the Embassy. These will reveal, I am confident, that at no time did I express sentiments resembling those of the Foisie story.

(3) On my next-to-last day in Saigon I reluctantly agreed--at the urgent request of Barry Zorthian, the Embassy Public Affairs Officer-- to meet with some selected newsmen. He thought that Embassy press relations required it.

(4) I established the following ground rules: (a) Only a few of the most responsible journalists should be invited; (b) The meeting should be entirely off-the-record; and (c) The purpose of the meeting should be

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Clark M. Clifford, Esq. - 2

10 November 1965

to let the Saigon correspondents tell me what they thought of the situation.
William R. Smyser, the Embassy control officer for my trip, will be able to
confirm both my reluctance to meet the press and my stipulations.

(5) The meeting with eight newsmen (list attached) took place for
lunch at Barry Zorthian's house on November 1st. He was present through-
out.

(6) I began the meeting by saying that it seemed to me inappropriate
to state any conclusions before I had done so to the Ambassador; Indeed, I
was still in the process of sorting out my impressions. I would be grateful,
however, for the views of experienced men about the situation in Vietnam,
especially with respect to the problem of strengthening governmental legiti-
macy and continuity. For the rest of the lunch I said, to all practical pur-
poses, nothing and listened instead to an often passionate debate among the
newsmen.

(7) No White House connection on my part was either stated or im-
plied. The whole conversation took place in the context of a State Depart-
ment release of about October 16th (repeated in Newsweek) announcing my
mission to Vietnam as consultant to Ambassador Lodge.

(8) Your name was never mentioned by me and it did not enter the
conversation in any way within my hearing. (I include the qualification only
because so many side arguments were taking place that I cannot be positive
what was said by everyone.)

(9) I reported to Ambassador Lodge about the meeting with the press when I saw him at breakfast the following day. I recall telling him that I was shocked by the violence of the press comments against the Saigon government but gratified by his own high standing among newsmen.

(10) The views ascribed to me are wholly at variance with the trend of my conversations with Vietnamese officials as contained in official Embassy reports or with my many informal talks with Ambassadors Lodge and Porter and with Phil Habib, the head of the Political Section. They will confirm, I am sure, my strong belief in governmental stability in Saigon. For whatever it is worth, I fully endorse the views of Ambassador Lodge in his cables on that subject.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Clark M. Clifford, Esq. - 3

10 November 1965

(11) My formal recommendations to the senior members of the American Embassy dealt with the *American*, not the Vietnamese, effort and with the subject of negotiations.

(12) Outside of this one meeting with the press there was no other contact--direct or indirect.

(13) The Foisie story hit Saigon just as I was preparing to leave for the airport to return home. I immediately went to see Ambassador Lodge, who shrugged it off as irresponsible. I also called Buy Diem, the Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, with whom I had established a good personal relationship. I told him (a) that I was in Saigon at the invitation of Ambassador Lodge, not at the request of President Johnson and (b) that the views ascribed to me were wholly false and, in fact, diametrically opposed to those I hold.

I do not know whether Foisie was riding his own hobby-horse or whether some Embassy official was using the occasion of your visit (and mine) to urge a point of view outside of channels. Perhaps an ambitious Saigon politician was trying to exploit the dislike of the press for the existing Saigon regime in order to undermine it.

We will probably never know. I can only say that I am deeply sorry that our names became linked in such an unfortunate way.

I am depressed and shaken that my effort to be helpful to the Administration and to Ambassador Lodge has ended so ignominiously. I have tortured myself these past few days to decide what I could have done otherwise and I still cannot understand what happened.

With high regard,

Clark M. Clifford, Esq.
815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

P.S. I am sending a copy of this letter to Ambassador Lodge.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

November 12, 1965

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
Ambassador
American Embassy
Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco
California

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I spent yesterday and part of today in Washington and I want
to send you a few quick impressions--for your own personal use.

The Foisie story has blown over thanks in part to your generous
telegram. I had a four-hour session with Bill Bundy, Alexis Johnson
and Len Unger covering the ground of some of the messages you let me
see (though, of course, I did not refer to them). I also met with
Admiral Raborn and his senior staff who were mostly interested in
discussing the PAT program.

I have been asked to return next week to see Mac Bundy, Rusk,
McNamara and the Joint Chiefs and I will drop you a note about that
afterwards.

Now for my impressions:

(1) The Clifford visit to Saigon was a great success. Bill Bundy told me that before his departure Clifford had been the most extreme of "doves." Since his return, he has been saying that the phrase "unconditional negotiation" was neither diplomatically wise nor politically prudent. We need, according to Clifford, a slogan more focussed on outcomes and on Communist concessions. To paraphrase an old saying: plagiarism is the sincerest form of flattery.

FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S EYES ONLY

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

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November 12, 1965

(2) Nevertheless, the subject of negotiations seems to me still beclouded by some of the confusions we discussed in Saigon centering now on a pause to the bombing of North Vietnam. My advice would be to hold off any further messages until I have had a chance to talk with the top echelon next week. Your view is well-known now and too much seeming pressure may be counterproductive.

(3) There exists a plan--about which you may know--to bring you back in December to review the whole subject of negotiations. If you have not yet been told, this should, of course, be treated especially confidentially. If you do come back, you may consider whether you and I should meet before you reach Washington so that I can fill you in. If there is no other way of doing it, I would be glad to come to some intermediate point (Hawaii or San Francisco) and ride back with you. If you think well of this idea, you may wish to make the suggestion to Washington at the appropriate time.

(4) Len Unger has asked me to review next week the preliminary papers of the working group on negotiations and on pacification. I will keep you informed.

May I ask you not to show this letter to any member of your staff?

I still think back to the exciting period in Saigon with admiration for all the dedicated people I met and with special warmth and gratitude for the role you are playing and the courtesies you showed me.

With kind regards.

As ever,

Henry A. Kissinger

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

November 23, 1965

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have just returned from three days in Washington where I saw Bill Bundy (several times), McNaughton and Yarmolinsky, Len Unger, McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, the Joint Chiefs and Admiral Raborn. I also met twice with the Vietnam Coordinating Committee. Dean Rusk was out of town.

Here are a few impressions:

(1) Bill Bundy seems to me pretty well persuaded of your point of view on negotiations. He submitted a paper for the Johnson City meeting which is in all major respects consistent with your point of view. There are a few lacunae which more staff work in Washington and Saigon could fill in. I will discuss these below.

(2) Your own position in Washington seems to me extremely strong. Bill Bundy volunteered the information that the reporting from Saigon is at the highest level ever. McGeorge Bundy said that the President has overcome any lingering suspicion from the time when you were a Presidential contender and has absolute confidence in you as a man in addition to being very pleased with your performance.

(3) McNamara struck me as unexpectedly understanding. He may be the senior official closest in tune with Saigon needs. The difficulty in Defense is on the second level, specifically in ISA where the negotiating options are wildly overestimated.

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(4) Goldberg's influence is not entirely wholesome. He simply does not understand the problems of Vietnam. Would a visit by him to Vietnam help or hinder?

(5) CIA is almost entirely absorbed in pushing an expansion of the PAT program. I have my doubts about this for reasons which I will write you in a brief memo I am preparing on the pacification problem. Basically my view is that the top priority should go to strengthening the existing cadres. Rapid expansion may wreck the whole program. My visits to the provinces lead me to believe that the existing programs are only about 15% effective.

A few recommendations:

(1) I would suggest tempering extremely optimistic predictions somewhat. Failure to realize them will undermine your influence when it counts. It is better to exceed expectations than the opposite.

(2) The pacification problem is of great concern in Washington. I will send you a few reflections about that within the week.

(3) Washington is intellectually unprepared for negotiations but committed to them as soon as the DRV asks for them. When this happens you will be confronted with a series of very concrete issues. These include:

(a) Forum for negotiations

(b) Participants at a conference

(c) Conditions for ending the bombing of the DRV

(d) Conditions for a cease-fire in the SVN

(e) Internal status of the SVN

(f) International status of SVN

(g) Presence of US troops

When negotiations start, it will not be fruitful to argue about their desirability. Disaster can be avoided only by a concrete Saigon position. Bits and pieces of it exist now. Should Phil Habib be asked to pull them together? My suggestion would be to keep the paper which results on ice until you return to Washington or the issue becomes more acute.

....

I will write you soon about the pacification problem and a
little later about some specifics with respect to negotiations.

I still think with nostalgia of all the splendid people with
whom I had the privilege of being associated in Saigon.

With warm regards.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

December 3, 1965

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Since my return I have been giving a great deal of thought to the problem of pacification. As our military strength increases, VC mainforce units are likely to be decimated and pushed away from the main centers of population. Attention can then shift from the need to avoid military defeat which has rightly absorbed our energies until now to the problem of political construction.

I know from many conversations with you how much importance you attach to this challenge. Your selection of Lansdale testifies to this. But you have inherited a grim situation because for the past year the military effort has had overriding priority. If I dwell on what remains to be accomplished, it is not to derogate the dedicated efforts of people I like and respect but to try to make a contribution to a new phase of our effort. I am sure you know how much I believe in what you are doing.

I. THE PROBLEM

Military success can be sustained only if we are able to create a political structure to fill the void created by twenty years of civil war, ten years of systematic Vietcong assassination of key officials and two years of political upheavals in Saigon. The problem of pacification seems to me to have the following aspects:

(1) The current Saigon government--while the best available--is still in a precarious position. It has little in common with governments in the Western sense. It lacks cohesion--ministers say extraordinary, sometimes

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December 3, 1965

disloyal, things about each other (with Ky a notable exception). It can
be basically weakened by the mere act of making a proposal to it (with
respect to negotiations or by overloading its administrative machine.)
Its authority in the countryside is still weak. It must be nurtured
carefully.

(2) Extreme centralization in Saigon has led to a cumbersome bureaucracy which is plagued by an enormous gap between conception and execution. I have never seen so wide a gulf between conception and execution or such a chasm between theoretical subtlety and administrative ability. This state of affairs is understandable in terms of Vietnamese history but it does represent a challenge to policy.

(3) In the provinces, the civil war and political turmoil in Saigon have produced a combination of attentisme, demoralization and lethargy. Assassinations, incompetence and governmental change all place a premium on hedging bets. As one follows programs from Saigon into the provinces one is struck by how many simply evaporate without a trace and how many of those which survive in truncated form do so in a form which makes them irrelevant. In addition to the factors mentioned above, the following causes seem paramount:

(a) The mere fact that many high sounding programs have been initiated and have then collapsed has induced a general atmosphere of cynicism and demoralization in the provinces.

(b) The official Mac V security map is different from the security situation as it affects the local population. This is because military units can be secure while the civilian population remains subject to blackmail and reprisal; because in most of the country outside of Saigon the VC are likely to have a preponderant influence at night (most knowledgeable people to whom I spoke placed the figure as high as 85% outside of Saigon, Hue and Danang) and because some of the Mac V criteria are very formalistic. For example, some of the roads shown as "open" are so only in the technical sense that they are passable by convoys; some of the local governments which Mac V considers established physically disappear at nighttime.

(c) In some areas the uncontested presence of local government may give a misleading impression of progress in pacification. When local government is harassed one can assume that it is thwarting Vietcong wishes. In other areas where it is not challenged, it may be due to improvement in security. It may also reflect a tacit agreement by the local authorities with the Vietcong whereby both sides coexist without getting into each other's way. This I would judge to be the situation in much of the Delta. In these areas official statistics are highly misleading: sweep operations are conducted but find nothing;

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December 3, 1965

the two sides share the tax revenue, etc. One advisor summed up this problem when I asked him how things were going in his province with the phrase: "I am watching a professional wrestling match."

(4) Because the security map is geared to military and not to pacification criteria, we, as well as the GVN, are in a real sense flying blind. Some of our aid may be going into areas where it helps build up a Vietcong tax base or where at the very least, its role is uncertain because of the difficulty of determining the dominant authority.

(5) Our exploding bureaucracy leads to a proliferation of programs which may overtax the slender resources of Vietnamese manpower and which makes it difficult to establish criteria for success or failure. It also has the following consequences:

(a) It may magnify the Vietnamese sense of impotence. In the provinces it is not rare to see American advisors outnumbering the Vietnamese staff of the province chief. This involves the danger that the war may come to seem more of a VC-American conflict than is desirable.

(b) Competition among the advisors enables the Vietnamese to play them off against each other.

(c) Some of the "progress" being reported is based on internal agency criteria which may not be related to a central plan or to what is relevant to the fundamental problems outlined above.

(d) There is a tendency to expand partially successful programs too rapidly. This overtaxes them while at the same time other areas of equal importance are slighted. For example, at the moment the PAT program is highly fashionable. I am not sure, however, whether, instead of expanding PAT, we should not use the limited pool of manpower to create follow-up cadres in agriculture, education, public safety, etc.

(6) Overshadowing everything is a social or maybe even philosophical problem: The Vietnamese have a strong sense of being a distinct people but little sense of nationhood. Our deepest challenge then is to discover how a nation can be built when the society is torn by internal schisms and in the middle of a civil war. All new countries have had the problem of achieving political cohesion; none have had to do so in the face of such overwhelming pressures as Vietnam.

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December 3, 1965

## II. RESOURCES AVAILABLE

### A. Vietnamese Governmental Structure

The Vietnamese political structure exists on three levels: the Saigon government, the military hierarchy (especially the Corps Commanders) and the provincial administration.

(1) **GVN:** The Saigon government is trying hard but as I pointed out above it faces major problems in achieving legitimacy, internal cohesion and administrative thrust. We must be careful not to swamp it with requirements drawn from American standards. The practical consequence may be to overtax the capacity of the Vietnamese administration. Alexis Johnson has wisely said that some of our pressures try to connect a garden hose to a fire hydrant. Nevertheless by patience and a continuation of your current close relationship with the Ky government, the GVN can become an increasingly useful instrument.

(2) **The military hierarchy:** The military hierarchy suffers from two disabilities: (a) It is overloaded by its efforts to combine the control of military operations with the supervision of pacification missions. (b) In the Corps Commanders there is a tendency towards autonomy verging on war-lordism. Thus General Thi told me that he was less concerned with continuity in Saigon than with stability in I Corps. This tendency is sometimes magnified by American administrative procedures. For example, the decision to create regional USOM offices coinciding with corps boundaries should strengthen the autonomy of Corps Commanders by giving them direct access to American aid. On the one hand, the Corps Commanders are elements of security. On the other, they are obstacles to a coherent national policy on pacification. The challenge is to focus them on the military arena while creating alternative structures for civil government.

(3) **Provincial government:** This is now the weakest link in the chain. The provincial and village governments have been the principal victims of Vietcong depredations and Saigon instability. They are caught further between the civilian and military chains of command and torn by the competition of American agencies. Any pacification program will have to rebuild the structure of local government from the bottom up.

### B. American Administrative Resources

Perhaps it would be most helpful if I gave you a brief inventory of agencies in the pacification field together with my assessment of their strengths and weaknesses:

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December 3, 1965

**AID:** USOM has the most elaborate bureaucracy in the field and the largest resources. Its top personnel is excellent. Charles Mann struck me as tough-minded, and I liked the way he went about getting on top of his job. Colonel Sam Wilson, for all his public relations flair, is also first-rate and thoughtful. He understands the pacification problem as well as anyone. Roy Werle is exceptionally able. I was much impressed with his analysis of the situation.

In the provinces, the absence of a career service makes for spotty quality. In the provinces I visited the USOM personnel struck me as the least able American group.

The most serious shortcoming of USOM seems to me to be its ever-growing bureaucracy. This almost forces it to emphasize big projects which can be implemented on a national basis, preferably in all 43 provinces simultaneously. I do not think, however, that Vietnam has either the human resources or the administrative apparatus to operate on such a scale. The result is that programs are almost bound to disintegrate or that they are carried out on the basis of essentially irrelevant criteria.

For example, much of the USOM program is based on the premise that any project that strengthens the economic infrastructure also enhances the position of the Saigon government. But this is not inevitably true. In areas where the VC predominate at night or where government is based on a tacit agreement between the local government and the VC, building up the economic infrastructure may simply extend the Communist tax base. USOM must acquire the ability to operate selectively.

**CIA:** We have discussed CIA operations often enough at breakfast not to need to repeat the problems here. I liked the top personnel of the CIA; they struck me as calm and business-like. My impression was that penetration of the VC apparatus was on the whole extremely poor. In the pacification field, the PAT program seems to me useful. Of all pacification efforts it was the easiest to follow from Saigon into the provinces. My concern would be that expressed in my recent letter. The principal virtue of the present PAT program is that it exists. In practice many teams do not live up to their goals. I would guess that at most 30% of the teams are really operating as designed. This suggests that it would be wiser to improve the quality of the existing operation than to expand too dramatically--all the more so as I just do not know where the high-level manpower is going to come from. If pacification cadres are expanded I would prefer seeing resources put into follow-on cadres to existing PAT teams in the fields of agriculture, public safety, etc.

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December 3, 1965

(Perhaps USOM could create a school for these analogous to the Cape St. Jacques operation.) Also, in the long run, CIA is not the best locus for a major pacification program. In the short run, however, any attempt to move responsibility for PAT is likely to bring more trouble than it is worth.

**JUSPAO:** I did not see enough of it to form a judgment.

**MAC V:** I will confine my comments to Mac V's role in the pacification field. Mac V's strength is its large pool of extremely able, dedicated personnel--probably the most capable group of any agency engaged in field operations. Mac V's weakness is its tendency to try to do too many things simultaneously. Mac V is fully occupied with fighting the war and advising the Vietnamese military establishment. Pacification will never be its primary concern. Moreover, it is not a task which comes naturally to the military. The efforts of the Marines in Danang or of some Special Forces officers in the Highlands are touching. Nevertheless, the special qualities developed in a decade or more of combat training do not include the ability to make astute political judgments in volatile and complex circumstances.

This problem is compounded by the system of military reporting which emphasizes tangible and concrete achievements. This produces a preference for programs which can be expressed numerically--such as the distribution of food and medical supplies--and to a neglect of efforts which depend on intangible qualities such as the discovery of local leadership groups. There is also a natural and understandable concern with police and security functions over other governmental tasks. Finally, Mac V struck me as the most bureaucratic agency operating in the pacification area. The military should understand the importance of pacification; but on balance I would think it best to resist Mac V's efforts to expand its operating role; indeed it would be wise to reduce it.

**Lansdale Group:** In many respects this is the most complex, the most promising and also the most difficult to assess. Lansdale is without doubt a man of extraordinary gifts. He is an artist in dealing with Asians. He is patient, inspirational, imaginative. He has assembled an extraordinary group of individualists--each a remarkable personality in his own right. Anybody who could first collect such a group and then retain its loyalty over two decades is not an ordinary person.

Many of the ideas of the Lansdale group struck me as highly original. In addition to Lansdale, I was particularly impressed by Mike Deutsch, Dan Ellsberg and Valeriano.

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December 3, 1965

At the same time, the artistic and highly individualistic temperament of Lansdale and his group have caused them to cut themselves off--sometimes needlessly--from the other elements of the mission. Most other elements of the country-team cordially dislike the Lansdale operation. Some of this is an inevitable by-product of an unusual administrative arrangement. But some tensions could be avoided by greater tact on the part of Lansdale and his colleagues. They too often take the attitude that they will settle the pacification problem singlehandedly, that Lansdale alone has the magic recipe and that the major contribution of other members of the mission should be to get out of the way. One evening while discussing the pacification problem with members of the mission, one of Lansdale's people said in answer to the question of what to do: "Turn the whole effort, U.S. and American, over to Lansdale with full powers." Such an attitude is unrealistic and, above all, compounds tensions.

Similarly, tensions could be reduced if Lansdale confided somewhat more in others. From what I saw, I would judge that many of his reports could be shown to Phil Habib without compromising Lansdale's relationships. Failure to do so exacerbates what would in any case be a difficult relationship.

In addition to these administrative problems, Lansdale and his associates may be drawing too much on a precedent which is no longer fully relevant. The Philippine insurrection has as many points of difference from the Vietnamese civil war as similarities to it. In the Philippines the insurrection had never reached the scale of the war in Vietnam. There was no foreign base for the guerillas. The indigenous government was much stronger. There was a tradition of working with Americans. The situation in Vietnam is much more complex, much less susceptible to bravura, individual efforts.

Lansdale's group is essentially a collection of expediters and operators; they are extremely adept at getting individual efforts launched. But this is not enough in a large country whose social structure has been torn by twenty years of civil war. In fact, their tendency to push uncoordinated ideas adds an additional strain to an already overtaxed structure.

The challenge presented by the Lansdale group is to prevent their efforts from flying off in all directions; to encourage them to become more explicitly members of a team; to recognize that pacification requires the sustained effort over a long period of time of all elements of the mission and not the solo performance of one small group which itself is not too well organized. If this is achieved the Lansdale group will make the profound contribution which its talents warrant.

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December 3, 1965

**The Embassy:** I can add little to your own knowledge here. I was much impressed by the Embassy personnel. Phil Habib is thoughtful and energetic-- one of the very best political officers whom I have met anywhere. His staff is equally capable. I was particularly struck by Smyser, Burke and Levine. The institution of provincial reporter is an extraordinarily original innovation. Their judgments about conditions in the provinces were perhaps the best of any group in Saigon.

Bill Porter grew on me the more I saw of him. He is discreet, thoughtful, absolutely loyal to you, very perceptive--the best type of foreign service officer. He can be a major source of strength to you.

I did not see anything of Chadbourne. I did not have the impression that he played a major role in coordinating the diverse elements of the mission. At least I never heard his name mentioned for good or ill.

**Over-All Assessment:** In terms of ability the Saigon country-team is one of the strongest missions--if not the strongest--that I have encountered anywhere. It also faces stupendous tasks which exceed in complexity those before any other comparable group. A great deal of dedicated, selfless effort is taking place. The following shortcomings should be seen as reflections of the magnitude of the task and not as indications of personal inadequacies:

(1) The various elements of the mission are pursuing programs which have been devised in isolation from each other and are not fully related to over-all criteria generally accepted by all members of the country-team. The result is a considerable overlap in some areas and a neglect of others.

(2) There is no consistent review of programs. Many programs are still on the books even though they may have petered out or may no longer be relevant. The failure to terminate them unfortunately uses up the very scarce pool of available manpower.

(3) Too many projects reflect the personal predelictions of some individual in Saigon or some provincial officer. This is understandable. When we first started operating on a massive scale in Vietnam almost any effort was likely to be useful. Today the contribution of any program should be weighed against the additional demoralization of the Vietnamese administrative structure which failure would entail.

(4) The somewhat ad hoc approach to the launching of pacification projects has a tendency to gear our programs to the capabilities of the U.S. bureaucracy not to those of the Vietnamese. The result is that we may unintentionally overload Vietnamese resources of administrative skill and of manpower.

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December 3, 1965

(5) The Mission Council is useful in preventing an outright clash among the elements of your country-team. It is less suitable for developing a truly coordinated approach geared to a central concept. It does not meet frequently enough. The head of the various agencies are too harassed to do the detailed planning which the new situation requires. Because each agency is above all eager to push its own programs there is a tendency to operate through what is in effect a series of non-aggression treaties. Unless one agency's program directly impinges on another element of the mission, there is a premium on not challenging it for fear of submitting one's own cherished projects to general scrutiny. This process avoids direct competition; it also encourages proliferating bureaucracies and a tendency to try to avoid choices by attempting to carry out every available option, a course which given the scarcity of available resources is bound to produce disappointments.

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS

It is obviously easier to point out difficulties than to suggest remedies. Also many of the problems outlined in this letter are beyond immediate solution because they reflect the dilemmas of a war-wracked country whose social cohesion --as opposed to its sense of identity--was never highly developed. With all these qualifications here are a few random suggestions:

(1) The pacification program needs above all some clear and unambiguous success. Over the past decade the history of civil government in Vietnam is replete with plans which were insufficiently realized, with high hopes which eventually proved empty, with the formation of many cadres which finally evaporated. This has produced cynicism and hopelessness. Any project which is seen through from conception to completion would--in addition to its intrinsic merit--demonstrate the possibility of doing something about Vietnam's present plight. This could then have an important multiplier effect throughout Vietnamese society.

(2) The major obstacle to progress now is the gap between conception and execution produced by the inadequacy of Vietnamese provincial administration and the American tendency to do too much too quickly on too vast a scale.

(3) The remedy is to begin with pilot projects which are known to be within our capabilities and those of the Vietnamese, however modest these may be. After success they can then be extended further and further. This suggests the need for a careful review of projects, criteria and means. Projects no matter how good in conception should be carefully and critically examined for

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December 3, 1965

feasibility. For example, I think that the Lansdale group's idea of "revolutionary villages" has much to commend it. But before it is launched, a survey of existing cadres should be made; the security situation should be studied (lest these villages become prime VC targets); the feasibility of achieving some concrete results should be examined; in short, we must make sure that the idea does not turn into another strategic hamlet program.

(4) To begin with relatively small areas is, of course, the approach of HOPTAC and similar enterprises. To be sure, these have not lived up to expectations. But the cause was not faulty conception so much as insufficient follow-up and inadequate coordination.

(5) Pacification to be effective must have an administrative mechanism to plan, coordinate and follow-up our programs. In theory Lansdale's co-ordinating group is supposed to do this. However, he does not seem to me well suited by temperament or bureaucratic positioning to perform the planning and coordination function. Since he is at the same bureaucratic level as those he is suppoed to be coordinating, his sporadic efforts to achieve cohesion add to the already powerful resentments against him and reduce his effectiveness in the area where he has exceptional talents: of dealing directly with the Vietnamese. Lansdale can and should play an important role in planning; he cannot, in my view, be the chief executive officer.

In order to be acceptable to all the elements of the mission, planning and coordination should be conducted at the level of the Ambassador or the Deputy Ambassador. I think it would be unwise for you to engage your own prestige in every administrative squabble. This leaves Bill Porter or Chadbourne. I did not see enough of Chadbourne to form an impression as to his abilities; I know that he is not now very effective. At the same time, I was extremely well-impressed by Bill Porter's grasp of the subject, his loyalty to you, his discretion and by the respect in which he is held by the other elements in the Embassy. However, you will have a much better feel than I for who would be best suited for this role.

(6) The Program Review Committee should meet frequently--at least several times a week--and initially probably daily. Its first task should be to take an inventory of where we actually stand--specifically:

(a) The committee should prepare a map which reflects the security situation not as it applies to military units but as it affects the civilian population. Such a map would show where village government functions day and night. It should indicate where we have reason to

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December 3, 1965

suspect collusion between local officials and the VC. Where roads are declared open, we should make clear what force is required to keep them so, what traffic in fact moves on them and under what conditions. I believe that the Mac V pacification criteria will not be of much help in preparing such a map. Yet without such a map it is impossible to develop a well-designed program.

(b) Each agency should be required to submit a list of projects related to pacification, their *actual* status and their anticipated needs. This is necessary to prevent duplications and to coordinate efforts.

(c) There should be a survey--province by province--of *actual* manpower availability.

(7) With this survey as a background, the Program Review Committee should then:

(a) Design pilot projects in a few areas which we know to be within the capabilities of the Vietnamese and within the ability of the military to protect. These should be given top priority and energetically, indeed ruthlessly, pushed. Expansion should be avoided until there is a demonstrable success. The Program Review Committee should run periodic spot checks to insure that projects are, in fact, being carried out. For this purpose, the provincial reporters should be charged with an inspection function on your behalf and that of the Program Review Committee in addition to their existing duties.

(b) The Program Review Committee should also review the plans of each agency not only to slow down the bureaucratic proliferation but also to make sure that plans are related to a central concept.

(c) Lansdale should be a member of the Program Review Committee. He should be its principal contact with the GVN.

(8) One useful role for your son on his visit might be to consider one specific pacification program (either one of his, which he has mentioned to me and which I found most interesting) or one of Lansdale's and find out what it would actually involve--from gaining approval of the GVN to operation in the provinces.

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December 3, 1965

(9) One minor recommendation: Though I have used the word pacification throughout this letter as a term of art, I think it should be changed: It has an excessively passive, perhaps even condescending, sound to it--too reminiscent of colonial wars when one pacified the "natives."

This letter has grown much too long. I doubt that I have said much that is unknown to you. Rather I have tried to put together some thoughts which may be relevant to the direction in which I know from our conversations you intend to move. I have tried to confine my observations to views which I know are shared by many senior officers of your mission or in the provinces. I am deeply persuaded that Vietnam is the hinge of our national effort where success and failure will determine our world role for decades to come. And I have very great confidence in your ability to see it through.

As ever,

Henry A! Kissinger

P.S. After finishing the letter two other thoughts occurred to me.

(1) One of the longer-term problems is the lack of commitment of students and intellectuals in general to the war effort. In the short-term this makes no difference. In the long run, it provides a focus for any opposition group and it deprives us of what may be an untapped reservoir of intelligence and idealism. It seems to me that if we proceed by the approach outlined above--by selecting some high-priority areas for pacification--we could then challenge students and professors with something like a Vietnamese version of the Peace Corps to go into these provinces and work for their people. These individuals could then serve as nuclei for other areas as they are pacified.

(2) The difficulty in pacification now is that there are many programs but little authority. The Program Review Committee could supply this lack.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

December 3, 1965

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

In reading the attached letter over it occurred to me
that I might sum up its central recommendation as well as add
a few thoughts which have occurred to me since:

(1) The basic recommendation is that we try to have a success story somewhere in the pacification field. The criteria for success should be a program that (a) can be consistently pursued over an extended period and (b) can be expanded to other parts of Vietnam as it develops.

(2) The fundamental problem is to develop an ideology which can enlist popular and especially intellectual support. We cannot defeat the VC only by administrative or economic measures. There must be something to affirm, not only to reject. This is the reasoning behind my recommendation to enlist Vietnamese students for work in the countryside.

(3) I wonder whether it might not be a good idea to establish close ties between various faculties of the Vietnamese universities and sister institutions in the United States. If some American faculties established some kind of permanent link with their colleagues in Vietnam it might help break down the sense of isolation of Vietnamese intellectuals.

I will write you soon about the negotiations problem.

[N]

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

April 8, 1966

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you know, Len Unger has asked me to take another
trip to Saigon. I see several advantages in this:

(1) It will keep my competence up and thus enable me to speak with more authority on behalf of our effort when I return.

(2) It may give me a chance to bring you up-to-date on the situation in Washington which, as I see it, is extremely fluid.

(3) It will enable me to contribute, however slight, to the most crucial effort in which the United States is now engaged.

(4) As you may know, I have sat in on several committees in Washington and might be a sympathetic link for you.

However, I should want to be in Saigon at a time of maximum usefulness to you and I, therefore, wanted to ask your ideas on this subject. My preferred date would be July but, if you consider it very important, I might make it earlier.

....

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HOLLIS B. CHENERY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SEYMOUR M. LIPSET
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

July 1, 1966

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

It was nice of you to write me about my paper and
I am glad you found it useful.

I am looking forward to coming out again in the
middle of July. I have written the enclosed letter to
Phil Habib about my plans. Needless to say, I will
be at your disposal for anything that you consider
useful. Bob Komer, Andy Goodpaster and Bill Bundy
will be backstopping the trip on the Washington side.

Warm regards.

July 1, 1966

Mr. Philip Habib
American Embassy
Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco, California

Dear Phil:

As you have undoubtedly learned from the cables, I will
be arriving in Saigon about July 15th (you will hear about the
precise date from the Department).

I thought I would write you today about my thoughts about
my visit. The major use of my visit as I see it, in addition to
whatever impact it may have on your operations, would be to
enable me to speak with some authority in Washington on matters
in which the Saigon view might perhaps be dismissed as parochial.
As you know, my view and that of the Embassy are very close
indeed. (I would say indistinguishable.)

I thought that I might look into the following three areas:
(1) the political constellation in Saigon and how it might evolve
over the next few years, (2) the impact of military operations
and pacification on political evolution, (3) constitutional develop-
ment and (4) the whole complex of negotiations.

It would be a tremendous help to me if you could set up
appointments with as many leading political figures of as many
different shades of opinion as possible including, of course,
members of the Directory--especially those I saw last time
like, Ky, Chieu, etc.

....

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HOLLIS B. CHENERY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
ALEK INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SEYMOUR M. LIPSET
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

August 9, 1966

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

This is just a note to tell you how much I appreciated
your many courtesies to me on the occasion of my visit
to Vietnam.

Since my return I have had one day in Washington
mostly at an extensive meeting with Harriman, who is
taking a major interest in the problems of Vietnam right
now. I hope I have slowed down some of the pressures
with respect to the elections.

I will be seeing McNamara, Moyers, Rostow, Komer
and General Wheeler this week. I will drop you a note
afterwards.

With kind regards.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

August 12, 1966

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I thought you should know that at a conversation with Rostow yesterday he spoke in the warmest terms of you and also of the President's regard for you. He asked me whether I thought you might be willing to stay on as Ambassador. I told him that I could not speak for you but had not noticed any particular restiveness.

This is, of course, only for your personal information.

With warm regards.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

August 12, 1966

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

This is just a note, after my visit to Washington, to bring
you up-to-date.

As you may know, Harriman has a charter to deal with the
problem of negotiations. He will be in Saigon in the middle of
September. Anything that can be done to give him a full picture
--especially of the domestic situation--would be very useful.

I liked very much your cable in reply to the Department's
suggestion about the next step in the negotiating process. For
your information, the notion that local administration should
remain undisturbed was added by Unger and has not been con-
sidered much less approved. I am personally violently opposed
to it since it must lead to a division of the country. If you remain
firm, I am sure we can eliminate it.

Please do not discuss this with anybody except Habib.

Warm regards.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

August 18, 1966

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I had a long talk with Bill Bundy yesterday and I think that some of the problems that existed during my last week in Saigon have been smoothed out--partly as a result of your personal letter to Bill. (You might also like to know that among the military in the Pentagon, you are a great hero because of those cables.)

With respect to negotiations, I have urged Bundy that Saigon be brought in at the formative stage of any program and he has agreed to this. You will be receiving, therefore, within the next week or so the presently existing working paper on negotiations which has had a very restricted circulation. I have looked it over and I do not think there is much in it with which you will violently disagree. I simply wanted to flag it for you because a full and detailed statement of your views taking the paper as a point of departure would be very helpful. You can be sure that I will do what I can to help out.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

August 18, 1966

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

When I left you requested that I put some thoughts about pacification
down on paper. Inevitably such a process tends to put emphasis on areas
still capable of improvement and what follows should be read in that context.
Let me begin with two general observations:

(a) I always find it inspiring to visit Vietnam. I can imagine no more vital assignment in today's world. Vietnam has become the hinge of our national effort. If we fail there, I foresee decades of mounting crisis. If we succeed, it will mark a historic turning point in the postwar era. Just as the Cuban-Berlin confrontation may have convinced the Soviets of the futility of seeking political breakthroughs by military means, so Vietnam can put an end to Chinese expansionism by the use or threat of force.

(b) The process of prevailing will necessarily be slow. We are engaged in Vietnam in rebuilding a political structure. In Europe the transition from feudalism to the modern state took three centuries. We must not be impatient if it takes a few years in Vietnam--especially as the problem there is compounded by a century of colonialism and two decades of internecine war.

- 2 -

August 18, 1966

With this as a background, here are my observations:

(1) **Organization of the Embassy:** The organization of the Embassy has been vastly improved since my last visit. The plethora of competing agencies each operating their own program on the basis of partly conflicting and largely uncoordinated criteria has been replaced by an increasingly effective structure under the extremely able leadership of Bill Porter. Porter is on top of his job. He has replaced competition by coordination; he is well on the way to imposing effective direction on the basis of carefully considered criteria. The basic structure for progress exists now. Eight months ago I commented to you that each agency was conducting its own program. Today, the problem is how to translate structure into performance--a difficult but not insuperable task.

(2) **The American Effort in the Provinces:** Here two major changes for the better have occurred:

(a) The four principal American elements (Mac V, CAS, AID and JUSPAO) are coordinating their efforts.

(b) Joint reports force them to take cognizance of each other's activities.

Three weaknesses remain:

(a) The joint reports are useful in producing coordination. They have the drawback of encouraging a series of non-aggression treaties among the various agencies. People forced to live together in small Vietnamese provincial towns in some isolation and danger are not likely to compound their difficulties by challenging each other systematically. This suggests the need for an independent group of inspectors--similar to the old provincial reporters--at the Embassy.

(b) Saigon is under too much pressure to show immediate progress. As a result, technical and economic problems tend to overshadow the political issues--especially in the provinces.

(c) The inter-relationship of political, military and economic factors in the pacification field while theoretically recognized has not yet been achieved. In particular Bill Porter requires a greater degree of influence on the problem of how to achieve local security.

....

- 3 -

August 18, 1966

(3) The Situation in the Provinces: Candor compels me to say that I did not find any substantial change in the provinces with the possible exception of Bin Dinh. It may be that the "secure" areas are more so--though security is a relative concept. (For example, whenever I asked our advisers in how many hamlets listed as "secure" they would be prepared to sleep, they would list at most 25% of the so-called pacified areas.) The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me as follows:

(a) The criteria for pacification require further elaboration. The official Mac V criteria include too many subjective elements and lead to over-optimistic conclusions. For example, one criterion is the elimination of the VC infrastructure. But his is very hard to demonstrate. In Hau Nglia I was told that 18 hamlets scattered across the province were "pacified." There are 180 hamlets in that province. It seems to me impossible that the infrastructure could have been eliminated in such a small percentage of hamlets which, moreover, are not clustered. Another criterion involves the existence of village fortification. This tells us little unless we know something about the capabilities, training and motivation of the cadres manning these fortifications. Another criterion involves the existence of an elected village government. This may be irrelevant. In the Hoa Hoa areas there is high security even though elections are likely to be formalistic. In other areas there can be elections without security.

(b) One of the difficulties is the short term of duty of provincial advisors. I found almost no one who knew about conditions in October 1965. Thus there is no collective memory. New people start with great enthusiasm but little sophistication. By the time they learn their job it is time for them to leave.

(c) Some areas listed as pacified may be so because the VC find it convenient to leave a source of supply undisturbed. It seems to me essential to make a survey of how much of each province is subject to VC taxation--especially in the Delta provinces with respect to rice. For example, in one province shown on our maps as 70% pacified I was told by our sector advisor (supported by the other American components) that 80% of the population was subject to VC taxation. In all rice producing provinces I visited anywhere from 30 to 60% of the disposable rice seemed to be going to the VC.

- 4 -

August 18, 1966

(d) The cadre program suffers from growing pains and too rapid expansion. We simply do not know enough about what the cadres are doing. It was difficult to find individuals who had made spot checks of the cadres. The usual pattern seems to be that the cadres are performing a PF function. There is doubt about the cadres' motivation. There is a danger that they will degenerate into another armed group adding to the pressures on the countryside and inadequately related to long-term political objectives.

(e) Even if the cadres were more effective, they are being employed in a wasteful manner because of the reluctance of ARVN to undertake pacification missions and the low priority given to RF and PF. In classic anti-guerrilla doctrine, the regular army provides a perimeter within which the RF and PF provide local security and the cadres supply local government. In Vietnam exactly the opposite is true. The cadres are frequently at the most exposed point while ARVN sits in provincial towns protected by RF and PF.

(f) Even when the cadres become more effective, their impact will be limited because the structure of local government and security to fill in behind them does not exist.

(g) The U.S. military effort while useful in thwarting Main Force activity is inadequately related to pacification missions--except in the Marine and recently the 25th Division area.

(4) A Few Recommendations:

(a) We urgently require a security map less formalistic than the existing one. Its criteria should determine who can make the villagers do what at what time of day.

(b) High priority should be given to improving local government through systematic training programs and adequate supervision. I would recommend that Vungtau be used to train village chiefs and selected PF's in addition to cadres. This may mean a reduction in the cadre program to what can be phased with the development of local administration and security forces.

- 5 -

August 18, 1966

(c) RF and PF should be organically part of the pacification effort. This suggests that they should be removed from the Ministry of Defense and probably put under the Ministry of Reconstruction.

(d) At least half of ARVN (i.e. one division in each corps) should be assigned to pacification on the basis of an over-all concept. These forces, too, should be under the same central direction as other pacification efforts.

(e) A study of all available security forces should be made. Overlap should be eliminated and central direction established.

(f) Bill Porter should be given staff assistance in the area of local security. Perhaps a general officer should be put on his staff to advise on the use of RF, PF and the part of ARVN assigned to pacification.

(g) A study should be made on how the United States military effort can be better geared to pacification. A larger percentage of the Army forces should be assigned this mission. I was much impressed by the 25th Division in this respect.

(h) A group of inspectors responsible to Bill Porter should be created to tour the provinces and survey results.

(i) I wonder whether the tours of duty of provincial advisors could be extended to 18 months or perhaps two years. This is against our rotation policy but we might be able to find enough volunteers.

(j) Priorities should be firmly established. We can wreck the effort by trying to do too much as surely as by trying to do too little. The Vietnamese administrative resources permit only a limited number of projects to be carried out at one time. To ask too insistently for too broad a spectrum is to encourage the tendency to build Potemkin villages.

(k) Roles and missions of the American effort should be carefully restudied and rationalized. I understand that this is under way.

(l) Progress in the provinces requires structure in Saigon which is stable and representative of the major political forces. This requires patience and imagination. We must avoid applying American criteria;

- 6 -

August 18, 1966

but we should also not rest content with surface stability. You and I
agree on this. The way you and Phil handled the election issue seems
to me very sophisticated.

(m) We do not know enough about the Vietcong. We should make a major effort to identify local leaders to encourage possible defections. CAS should be given as a top priority to make a provincial "profile" of enemy leadership.

I realize that much of what I am recommending is already being thought
about. I want to repeat my respect for the gallantry and dedication of your
effort.

[Y]

Saigon, Viet-Nam

October 19, 1966

EYES ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
American Ambassador
Saigon, Viet-Nam

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

As you know, for the past week I have been working with Phil Habib on a National Reconciliation Program. The more I have reflected on it, the clearer it has become to me that we face two difficulties: (1) devising an adequate program; (2) developing an organizational structure to give it effect.

A formal paper on the program is being submitted to you. This letter deals primarily with organizational issues. I am becoming increasingly concerned that in Viet-Nam it is relatively simpler to figure out *what* to do than *how* to do it. A National Reconciliation Program without a clear organizational charter is therefore likely to be empty.

I. **Objectives**: A summary of the objectives of the program may be helpful:

a. It is designed to separate the problem of the internal structure of Viet-Nam from its international aspects. This will reduce the danger that the Vietnamese political evolution is discussed in forums which have a minimum understanding of the complexity of the local situation or of its tolerance to stress.

b. Such a program would greatly improve our diplomatic position. We could take an affirmative stance on the issue of the role of the NLF. Those members of the insurrection--at all levels--prepared to participate in the reconstruction of the country, will be given an opportunity for doing so. By the same token, those who persist in military actions have clearly indicated their commitment to violent methods.

c. If successful--and the consensus of agencies here is that it can be--it might roll up the VC infrastructure. This in turn will reduce the

be--it might roll up the AC infrastructure. This in turn will reduce the
c. It successful--and the consequence of agencies here is that it can
clearly indicated their commitment to violent methods.

doing so. By the same token, those who perpetrate in military actions have
rate in the reconstruction of the country, will be given an opportunity for
Those members of the insurrection--at all levels--prepared to partic-
We could take an affirmative stance on the issue of the role of the M.P.
p. Such a program would greatly improve our diplomatic position.

tolerance to stress.

a minimum understanding of the complexity of the local situation or of its
that the Vietnamese political evolution is discussed in terms which have
of Viet-Nam from its international aspects. This will reduce the danger
s. It is designed to separate the problem of the internal structure

helpful;

I. Objectives : A summary of the objectives of the program may be

organizational charter is therefore likely to be empty.
to do than how to do it. A National Reconciliation Program without a clear
concerned that in Viet-Nam it is relatively simpler to figure out what
desires primarily with organizational issues. I am becoming increasingly
A formal paper on the program is being submitted to you. This letter
it effect.

an adequate program; (2) developing an organizational structure to give
clearer it has become to me that we face two difficulties: (1) devising
National Reconciliation Program. The more I have reflected on it, the
As you know, for the past week I have been working with Bill Hieblop on a

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

Saigon, Viet-Nam
American Ambassador
The Honorable Henry Capot Lodge

RARE ONLY FOR THE AMBASSADOR

October 19, 1999

Saigon, Viet-Nam

[A]

FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

-2-

Main Force units to poorly armed conventional troops, which can be fairly easily defeated.

II. **Requirements:** In order to achieve these objectives, the American effort requires coherence, purpose, and discipline:

a. The program must be responsive to political direction.

b. The various agencies must relate their programs to an agreed over-all concept.

c. There must be a clear locus of responsibility.

d. There must be a chain of command which makes it possible to monitor the execution of the program.

These conditions are not met today. Some crucial aspects of the program, outlined in the basic memorandum, do not exist at all. Thus there is no middle-level defector program, though everyone agrees that this is the most prom ising area of activity. Other programs--such as high-level defection--are carried on in a random, unsystematic, and, above all, fragmented manner. As for the Chieu Hoi program, it is now split up among USAID, JUSPAO, MACV (in turn subdivided between Psywar and J-33), and CAS. There is no clear assignment of responsibility. Williams is technically the coordinator, but he is, in my view, not up to the job. He possesses no staff to monitor the manifold activities he is charged with supervising. (He does not even have a full-time secretary.) He has no executive authority or means of discipline. And his expertise is not in the political aspect of the problem, which are crucial.

III. **Resources available:** The obvious solution--and a necessary one--is to create an interagency committee, charged with implementing the National Reconciliation Program. But coordination is not enough; there must be a locus of responsibility. Theoretically, this could be vested in an individual, say from Ambassador Porter's office; in practice, I believe that this will not work as long as each agency retains its own chain of command. Field representatives will be responsive to those who make out their efficiency reports; agencies will be free to attempt end runs in Washington. On the other hand, creating an entirely new agency is not practical. Too much dislocation would be involved; problems of staffing might prove insuperable. The issue then is how to organize existing resources to best effect. This will involve giving operating responsibility to one of the agencies represented on the interagency

FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

-3-

committee. Let me, therefore, survey the available choices, listing
the strengths and weaknesses of each.

a. **Strengthening the Existing Structure:** This in effect would mean giving the coordinator of Chieu Hoi-Williams-operating responsibility and a large staff. The advantage of this procedure would be that it involves a minimum of dislocation. The disadvantages are as follows: Williams does not seem to be up to this job--a view shared by every person I have consulted. He made his reputation on small programs, which could be run as one-man shows. He is an expediter, not an organizer. He would not understand the political requirements nor be able to implement them. He has no staff of his own, nor is it possible to give him an adequate one in the necessary time. His best role is as liaison man to the GVN for a new structure.

b. **USAID:** AID has a Chieu Hoi staff which is reasonably capable in the technical side of the program. The advantage of vesting responsibility in AID is that field representatives are available; a line of authority does exist. The disadvantages are as follows: (1) of all agencies AID strikes me as the most bureaucratic; (2) field personnel is extremely uneven--ranging from poor to mediocre; (3) the orientation of the program would be towards technical, economic objectives. The political side would be neglected or else implemented by personnel chosen for other qualities; (4) the existing Chieu Hoi program would fare relatively best under such an arrangement. Next to no competence exists for a middle or high level defection program.

c. **JUSPAO:** This organization is most eager to take over the program. Its energetic director would no doubt give it high priority. JUSPAO, moreover, has a major propaganda effort already under way. This could no longer be expanded. JUSPAO will also be needed to exploit any successes of the National Reconciliation Program. Nevertheless, the disadvantages seem to me to outweigh the benefits: (1) JUSPAO has the same personnel problems as AID, perhaps even more acutely; (2) its orientation would be equally unbalanced, though in a different direction; (3) JUSPAO seems to me peculiarly ill-equipped to handle or even to monitor the covert side of the operation; (4) the danger would be overwhelming that showy, public relations efforts would overshadow political achievements.

d. **MACV:** MACV has the great advantage of discipline, organization, and good personnel. When Westmoreland gives an order, it is executed within the limits of the capability of the personnel--a statement which cannot be made

the limits of the capability of the personnel--a statement which cannot be made
and good personnel. When Westmoreland gives an order, it is executed within
q. MVAC: MVAC has the great advantage of discipline, organization.

political achievements.

would be overwhelming that any public relations efforts would overshadow
to handle or even to monitor the covert side of the operation; (4) the danger
though in a different direction; (3) JUBAO seems to me benefitarily ill-equipped
because even more carefully; (2) its orientation would be equally unbalanced,
outweigh the penalties: (1) JUBAO has the same personnel problems as a VID,
Reconciliation Program. Nevertheless, the disadvantages seem to me to
exaggerate. JUBAO will also be needed to exploit any successions of the National
plus a major propaganda effort already under way. This could not doubt be
its energetic director would no doubt give it high priority. JUBAO, moreover,
c. JUBAO: This organization is most eager to take over the program.

detection program.

Next to no competence exists for a middle or high level
arrangement. (4) the existing Chen Hoi program would fare relatively better under such an
be neglected or else implemented by personnel chosen for other duties;
would be towards technical economic objectives. The technical side would
uneven--ranging from poor no medicine; (3) the orientation of the program
strikes me as the most bureaucratic; (5) field personnel is extremely
does exist. The disadvantages are as follows: (1) of all agencies AID
in the technical side of the program. The advantage of vesting responsibility
p. JUBAO: AID has a Chen Hoi staff which is reasonably capable
architecture.

the necessary time. His best role is as liaison man to the GAN for a new
has no staff of his own, nor is it possible to give him an adequate one in
understand the political requirements nor be able to implement them. He
is a one-man show. He is an expeditor, not an organizer. He would not
consulted. He made his reputation on small programs, which could be run
does not seem to be up to this job--a view shared by every person I have
a minimum of delegation. The disadvantages are as follows: Williams
and a large staff. The advantage of this procedure would be that it involves
giving the coordinator of Chen Hoi--Williams--operating reasonableness
a. Strengthening the Existing Structure: This is effect would mean
the strengths and weaknesses of each
committee. Let me, therefore, survey the available choices, listing

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FOR THE VAMB22VADOR ONLY

[A]

FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

-4-

about all other agencies and certainly not about coordinators. Moreover, the military have the resources for a substantial program and advisors down to the district level. The disadvantages are as follows: (1) I would be uneasy to see MACV assume more and more political responsibilities; (2) the chain of command from Washington may prove complicated with State-DOD frictions and the JCS reluctance to give orders to a theater commander; (3) necessarily preoccupied with military operations, MACV may not be able to give the National Reconciliation Program an adequate priority. Or else it may slant it towards military intelligence; (4) Chieu Hoi is not a "natural" activity for the military; (5) it may run counter to our efforts to extend the civilian base of GVN.

e. **OSA:** In many respects this program is a natural for CAS. It has professional personnel and, next to MACV, the most disciplined command structure. It has wide experience with defector programs; it possesses or knows how to acquire the necessary knowledge--province by province as well as on the national level. It has field representatives to monitor operations. Its drawbacks are: (1) there may be disadvantages to have CAS too visibly engaged in operations affecting the political structure; (2) CAS would do relatively better with middle-level and high-level defection than with Chieu Hoi, for which little in its experience prepares it; (3) there may be a certain lack of experience with supervising interagency efforts.

f. **Ad Hoc Administrative Arrangements:** It might be possible to appoint as chairman of the interagency committee a personality who is given executive authority and is known to have the full backing of the Ambassador. Though this arrangement would have many of the disadvantages of the existing structure, these could be counterbalanced to some extent by the prestige and force of the chairman of the committee. Two possibilities suggest themselves:

1. **General Lansdale.** General Lansdale has the advantage of being available. Also, among key Embassy personnel he might have the greatest flair in carrying out the program. His disadvantages are: (1) his egocentric personality, which may cause him to turn the program into a one-man show and make it impossible to obtain the cooperation of other agencies; (2) the inadequacies of his team. They strike me as second-rate, publicity-conscious, and undisciplined; (3) Lansdale's inexperience with running big operations. In other words, by appointing Lansdale, you would be going for the home run. He will either succeed brilliantly or fail disastrously. My judgment is that he would fail.

2. **Phil Habib.** Habib is subtle, energetic, and extremely capable. If he could be freed of other duties, he would be my first choice. But he is

FOR THE AMBASSADOR ONLY

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overworked as it is and indispensable in his present position. His tour of duty is drawing to a close, and he has no apparatus in the provinces.

IV. Recommendations: After weighing the various alternatives, I would make the following recommendations:

a. An interagency committee should be created under the Mission Council, charged with implementing the National Reconciliation Program. It should include representatives of the Political Section, USAID, JUSPAO, CAS, and MACV. Its members should be at least of Ministerial rank or its equivalent.

b. The committee should be chaired by OSA, which should be given action responsibility both nationally and in the provinces. They will probably have to appoint a full-time deputy for this program. If you do not accept this, my second choice would be MACV.

c. USAID should continue to provide the technical back-up.

d. JUSPAO would have primary responsibility for implementing the psywar aspects but subject to the direction of the chairman of the committee.

e. Phil Habib should be charged with giving political guidance to the committee and especially its chairman.

f. Williams would be given primary responsibility for liaison with the GVN.

If you want to gamble, you could put Lansdale in charge of the National Reconciliation Program, though I recommend against it. In that case, some friend would have to speak very seriously to him about his mode of operation.

I hope this letter is of some use.

With all good wishes and high regards,

Sincerely,

Henry A. Kissinger

Henry V. Klaasen

Sincerely,

friend would have to ask very seriously to him about his mode of operation.
Reconciliation Program, though I recommend against it. In that case, some
If you want to sample, you could but sample in charge of the National
the CAN.

t. Williams would be given primary responsibility for liaison with
committee and especially its chairman.

e. Will Hapip should be charged with giving political guidance to the
committee and especially its chairman.

b. Halmer sabsenta put subject to the direction of the chairman of the committee.

c. U2AID should continue to provide the technical back-up.

cept this, my second choice would be MACA.

d. Will Hapip should be charged with giving political guidance to the
action reasponsibility both nationally and in the provinces. They will prop-
p. The committee should be chaired by O2A, which should be given
its equivalent.

e. CV2' and MACA. Its members should be at least of Ministerial rank or
It should include representatives of the Political Section, U2AID, JU2BAO,
Council, charged with implementing the National Reconciliation Program.
s. An intersagency committee should be created under the Mission
make the following recommendations:

IV. Recommendations: After weighing the various alternatives, I would
of duty is drawing to a close, and he has no alternative in the provinces.
overworked as it is and indigeneable in his present position. His tom
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FOR THE VMBV22ADOR ONLY

[x]

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

October 24, 1966

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
Ambassador
American Embassy
Saigon
APO 96234
San Francisco, California

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have just returned to my office and I would like to take this
opportunity to tell you how very much I appreciated everything you did
to make my stay so pleasant, and how much I respect the role you are
playing in Vietnam in this difficult period. Please be sure that you
can count on me for any assistance.

With warm regards,

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

October 28, 1966

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you for your very nice note of October 21. I was in
Washington yesterday and saw your cable. It was very well received,
in particular by Katzenbach and Rostow.

I neglected to mention to you in my last note that by coincidence I passed through Tokyo while Harriman and Rusk were stopping off on the way to Manila. As they may have told you, I had a brief talk with them at the airport. I have also left a memorandum for the Manila contingent in Washington, urging them to give Saigon an opportunity to develop the program at a pace consistent with Vietnamese realities.

I am going to be seeing George for lunch today.

With warm regards and every good wish.

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

October 31, 1966

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
American Ambassador, Saigon
A.P.O. 96243
San Francisco, California

Dear Pa:

We have just had a lovely weekend with Emily who was home from school for the first time. She is really doing quite well and seems to have overcome substantial initial home-sickness. She adored your letter and is especially eager for your homecoming. They all are dying to see you both.

Henry was, as usual, very complimentary about your performance and he sends you his best and warmest regards. We had a most interesting lunch together last week. We agreed that whoever is given the "pacification" assignment, AID or the military, it will never be successful until there is a doctrinal shift. The problems are not really bureaucratic or administrative; they are ideological. I have said this before, but I become more firmly convinced than ever that until there is a real coalescence of revolutionary purpose in the villages, districts and provinces it is difficult if not impossible to do the job. One way to look at it is that Viet-Nam under Ho achieved the first objective of its revolution in 1954 with the ouster of the French. Simultaneously Ho imposed the second stage on the North - radical and basic change in the economic, social and political structures. Ho, however, followed a model which the leaders of the South were not prepared to adopt or accept. So the South, in effect, declared itself in revolutionary opposition; but it has been plagued since with its own failure to identify and pursue a revolutionary alternative. It has only had half of its revolution. The other half is smoldering and must be made to burn.

purn.

revolution. The other half is amorphous and _must_ be made to
revolutionary alternatives. It has only had half of its
blamed since with its own failure to identify and purify a
declared itself in revolutionary opposition; but it has been
not prepared to adopt or accept. So the South in effect,
Ho, however, followed a model which the leaders of the South were
and basic change in the economic, social and political structures.
Simultaneously Ho imposed the second stage on the North - radical
its revolution in 1924 with the onset of the Branch.

at it is that Viet-Nam under Ho achieved the first objective of
it is difficult if not impossible to do the job. One way to look
of revolutionary purpose in the villages, districts and provinces
firmly convinced than ever that until there is a real coexistence
they are ideological. I have said this before, but I become more
siftt. The problems are not really bureaucratic or administrative;
military, it will never be successful until there is a doctrinal
that whoever is given the "bacification" assignment, VID or the
had a most interesting lunch together last week. We agreed
performance and he sends you his best and warmest regards. We
Henry was, as usual, very complimentary about him.

your homecoming. They all are going to see you path.

sickness. She admired your letter and is especially eager for
duite well and seems to have overcome amputental initial home-
was home from school for the first time. She is really doing
We have just had a lovely weekend with Emily who

Dear Pa:

San Francisco, California
V.P.O. 36543
American Ambassador, Saigon
The Honoraple Henry Capot Lodge

October 31, 1966

PERSONAL & CONFIDENTIAL

[L]

- 2 -

The war has made that task substantially more difficult in some ways. The United States has also impeded it by artificially larding over the existing economic and social structure with various types of preservatives. We are, in short, stuck with a doomed status quo. The hope it seems to me lies in the emergence of truly revolutionary leadership perhaps from among the 117 assembly members, perhaps elsewhere, which will have the agitational, motivational and organizational power to set out and implant an acceptable alternative.

The depressing thing is how few Americans seem to understand the prerequisite intellectual-doctrinal shift needed. Even so brilliant a man as McNamara can say, as he did in May to the Newspaper Editors in Montreal, that poverty and material want is the cause of "insurgency" and political unrest in places like Viet-Nam. This is plainly false. The two are largely irrelevant. Cuba had the highest per capita income in Latin America. Honduras is sublime in its impoverished stability. India is not plagued with political unrest and its poverty is worse than Viet-Nam's ever was. I am afraid that this misconception, however, is deeply rooted in what we call policy and in what results in program. With such an erroneous and materialistic doctrine it is plainly impossible to fix proper objectives, priorities or criteria for measuring success. The overriding problem, of course, is not in Saigon so much as it is in Washington, the White House, State and AID.

The steps required to remedy the situation seem to me to be so radical as to be perhaps impossible to implement:

1. The seeking out of revolutionary leadership in South Viet-Nam.

2. The drastic curtailing of economic and social aid programs so that they are entirely focussed on supporting the political pursuits of these leaders in a specific, restrained and subtle fashion.

3. Patience and understanding as the existing power structure is overthrown, reshaped and reformed. A "people's army" must emerge. There must be popular uprisings in the countryside, probably violence and more bloodshed.

4. Gradually a revolutionary alternative to the northern model will emerge. It may be autocratic; it may appear ruthless and dictatorial by western standards, but it will be authentic.

I really don't see any other way.

model will emerge. It may be autocratic; it may appear ruleless

propably violence and more pogesed.

mut emerge. There must be better abstrange in the counterlage,
structure is overthrown, reformed and reformed. A "behave's a sum"

3. Patience and understanding as the existing power.

brutalities of these leaders in a specific, restrained and ample fashion.
programs so that they are entirely focused on supporting the political

3. The drastic curtailing of economic and social aid

South Viet-Nam.

1. The seeking out of revolutionary leaders in

pe so radical as to be berabe imposable to implement:

Washington, the White House, State and VID.
riding problem, of course, is not in SF, so much as it is in
objectives, priorities or criteria for measuring success. The over-
and materialistic doctrine it is plainly imposable to fix brober
call policy and in what results in program. With such an erroneous
agreement that the macception, however, is deeply rooted in what we
meet and its poverty is worse than Viet-Nam's ever was. I am
in its imoversated stability. India is not plagued with political
the highest her capita income in Latin America. India is supreme
This is plainly false. The two are largely irrelevant. India had
cause of "inflation," and political unrest in places like Viet-Nam.
Even so brilliant a man as McNamara can say, as he did in May to the
understand the precedent intellectual-doctrinal shift needed.
The decreasing thing is how few Americans seem to

organizational power to set out and implement an acceptable alternative.
berabe elsewhere, which will have the agricultural, motivational and
revolutionary leadership berabe from among the ill-ὰssentially mempe,
duo. The hope it seems to me lies in the emergence of truly
tables of preeminences. We are, in a sort, stuck with a doomed status
laxing over the existing economic and social structure with various
in some ways. The United States has also imbeded it by artificially
The war has made that task substantially more difficult

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November 21, 1966

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

Thank you very much for your letter of November 8 which was
waiting for me in Washington on my first visit there since Manila. I
appreciated your generous comments about my contribution very much.

I am in substantial agreement with you that the National
Reconciliation Program--as indeed all others--must be geared to
Vietnamese interests and capabilities. Even before leaving for Saigon
I told Bundy and Harriman that the November 1 deadline was very close
and ran the risk of making it difficult to organize a good follow-on program.
Effective implementation has struck me all along as more crucial than
running a race with a self-imposed deadline. Finally, such a program
to be meaningful must be truly Vietnamese. You can be sure that I
am making these points in Washington now.

Nevertheless it is difficult to have these views prevail right now.
You may recall my comment in Saigon that something in this area would
almost surely be done--the only choice was whether it would be done in
Saigon or in Washington. I am afraid that recent events have shifted the
balance toward Washington for the following reasons:

1. The slippage of the date of the proclamation without advance notification to Washington was unfortunate--all the more so as Harriman had been making a great deal of it in his post-Manila trip and requests for information are now coming in from many capitals.

for information are now coming in from many capitals, had been making a great deal of it in the boat-Manila trip and requests notification to Washington was unfortunate--all the more so as Harriman had the privilege of seeing the trip in advance.

balance toward Washington for the following reasons: Sidon or in Washington. I am afraid that recent events have shifted the sim coat entirely be done--the only choice was whether it would be done in You may recall my comment in Sidon that something in this area would Nevertheless it is difficult to have these views prevail right now.

I am making these points in Washington now. to be meaningful must be truly Vietnamese. You can be sure that I running a race with a self-imposed deadline. Finally, and a program Effective implementation has struck me all along as more crucial than and ran the risk of making it difficult to organize a good follow-on program. I told Bungy and Harriman that the November I deadline was very close Vietnamese interests and capabilities. Even before leaving for Sidon Reconciliation Program--as indeed all others--must be desired to I am in substantial agreement with you that the National appreciated your generous comments about my contribution very much. waiting for me in Washington on my first visit there since Manila. I

Thank you very much for your letter of November 8 which was appreciated by your generous comments about my contribution very much.

My dear Mr. Ampsaasador:
San Francisco, California
APO 96243
American Empsaas, Sidon
Ampsaasador
The Honorsple Henry Capot Lodges

November 21, 1966

FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S EXES ONLY

[A]

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2. The proposed organization is not clearly understood in Washington; and this is compounded by the objections of some leading figures to Barney (though Harriman has worked with Barney and respects him). There is a feeling that additional responsibility has been given to an organization which has not yet proved itself with respect to Chieu Hoi and which may be overloaded by the middle-and high-level problem.

3. Some White House aides who are usually on your side have been infested by the general restiveness because they believe a proclamation was promised the President in Manila.

All of this has produced a state of affairs where there will be increasing pressure from Washington to show some "progress." In my judgment this can be dealt with best by in effect running with the ball yourself. To this end I would suggest that you send a cable at an early opportunity--and certainly *before* your departure--considering the following points:

a. A general commitment to the concept of National Reconciliation; this could contain your view as to limits as well as possibilities.

b. An analysis of the reasons for the slippage in the date of the proclamation. The fact that the GVN has been absorbed in reconstituting and strengthening the central government might be mentioned. It would also help to stress that a program of this delicacy requires careful preparation. For these reasons you believe that a realistic program is better than a proclamation which falls flat. The delay gives an opportunity to follow the proclamation with a well thought-out program.

c. A fuller discussion of the organizational framework--especially as it affects middle-and high-level cadres.

d. Some description of the supporting programs of relevant U.S. agencies over a period of time. Each of them prepared a draft during my visit and portions of this could probably be used. This would have the advantage of reducing temptations to intervene in day-to-day operations.

With such a document I would be in a much stronger position to urge Washington to give you an opportunity to implement your program without too much second-guessing. I have been so frank because I think I understand what you are up against. You can be sure that I will do what I can to support your efforts.

With warm regards and every good wish,

Henry V. Klaander

Sincerely yours,

I can to support your efforts. I understand what you are up against. You can be sure that I will do what without too much second-drafting. I have been so frank because I think under Washington to give you an opportunity to implement your program. With such a document I would be in a much stronger position to operations.

have the advantage of reducing temptations to intervene in day-to-day during my visit and portions of this could properly be made. This would U.S. agencies over a period of time. Each of them prepared a draft of this. Some description of the supporting programs of relevant so it affects middle- and high-level cadre.

c. A fuller discussion of the organizational framework--especially to follow the proclamation with a well thought-out program. better than a proclamation which falls flat. The delay gives an opportunity preparation. For these reasons you believe that a realistic program is also help to areas that a program of this delicacy requires careful and strengthening the central government might be mentioned. It would proclamation. The fact that the GVN has been absorbed in reorganizing p. An analysis of the reasons for the alib House in the date of the this could contain your view so to limit us well as possibilities.

s. A general commitment to the concept of National Reconciliation; the following points:

early opportunity--and certainly before your departure--considering your own. To this end I would add that you send a capable at my judgment this can be dealt with best by effect running with the increase pressure from Washington to show some "progress." In All of this has produced a state of affairs where there will be

procurement was promised the President in Manila. been inflated by the general readiness because they believe a

3. Some White House sides who are usually on your side have

Hot and which may be overloaded by the middle- and high-level problem. to an organization which has not yet proved itself with respect to Chen him). There is a feeling that additional responsibility has been given figures to Barney (though Harriman has worked with Barney and respects Washington; and this is compounded by the omissions of some reading 2. The proposed organization is not clearly understood in

- 3 -

[A]

APO San Francisco,
California 96243

November 29, 1966

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Henry:

Your letter of November 21 was informative and useful as always. And as always, we are taking your advice. You will already have seen some cables reflecting the necessary points of view. Your own understanding of the situation and your support for our efforts is most gratifying.

Patience is a hard virtue to extol. But, like you, I am convinced that this National Reconciliation Program needs to be well-founded or it will founder. Either the Vietnamese will be brought along step by step or it will get no-where. An empty proclamation on November 1 would have scuttled the approach before it left the ways. We will, I hope, get a Proclamation around January 1, if we keep working on it, and it should be well-done with a supporting base on our side and within the GVN.

I have put Barry Zorthian in charge. Now that we have reorganized the Revolutionary Development effort, he has some time. He is spiritually attuned to the effort and is a hard driver. Phil is going to keep his hand in as he can within normal physical limits. You will have noticed that Phil went along with Barry for a recent talk with Tri: That wasn't by accident. He will also, as he has already, urge the fullest reporting and see to it that Washington is kept informed of progress on a regular basis. I am keeping my eye on the program and will make sure that our people perform.

With appreciation and warm regards,

[LC]

December 5, 1966

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I was on the verge of writing you when your letter of
November 29 arrived. I had already seen your cables and they have
completely changed the atmosphere in Washington. I think if you can
keep up the reporting at regular intervals the Washington pressures
will be very sharply reduced. I am also seeing to it that the crucial
people, especially in the White House, are being kept aware of your
measures.

I look forward very much to seeing you when you return here.

With warm regards,

Henry A. Klaarner

Sincerely yours,

With warm regards,

mesmerized.
people, especially in the White House, are being kept awake of your
will be very apparently reduced. I am sure seeing it that the crucial
keep up the reporting at regular intervals the Washington press
completely changed the atmosphere in Washington. I think if you can
November 29 arrived, I had already seen your copies and they have
I was on the verge of writing you when your letter of

My dear Mr. Ampsaassor:

San Francisco, California
APO 96243
American Empsaass, Sidon
Ambassador
The Honorsple Henry Capot Lodge

December 5, 1966

[A]

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

March 27, 1967

PERSONAL

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
Ambassador
American Embassy, Saigon
A.P.O. 96243
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

This is just a note to tell you with how much regret I learned of your decision to leave Saigon. No doubt you are leaving at a moment when a major phase of our effort has been completed, due in large part to your dedicated leadership. And you will continue to perform a major national service in other posts. But those of us who have witnessed the difficulties and complexities and uncertainties of 1965 know how much you did to keep matters steady and to recall everyone to fundamentals.

It has been a privilege to be associated with you. I hope our paths will cross again before too long.

With high regards,

KISSINGER