- 3

impassive indefinitely while its southern flank was being turned. But Prussia's confusion amounted to a show of strength because it encouraged the Tsar and thereby prepared the schism of the Holy Alliance. Thus Prussia achieved through its indecisiveness what it failed to obtain through the vision of its leaders, the position where alone of the major powers it could make its assistance conditional on the satisfaction of its demands.

But it would be too much to say that the Prussian statesmen understood this. The inflexible dogmatism of the contending influences on the King had to produce the equipoise which would have been the policy of the Prussian ambassador at Frankfurt. For while the Prussian statesmen argued as if Prussia had perforce to throw in its lot with either the West or with Russia, Bismarck almost alone argued that not the unity of conservative interests nor yet the Danube Principalities, but Germany was Prussia's concern. And while the various contending groups made their option on the basis of their domestic views, Bismarck maintained that domestic claims — even those of the conservatives — had to be subordinated to the requirements of national strategy. If this was true, only one policy seemed indicated: to remain aloof — "to button ourselves into one great-coat of 400 thousand men," as Bismarck plastically expressed it — until the other powers and Austria, above all, were so committed that Prussia could utilize their embarrassments to profit within Germany. And to this end it was necessary to disintegrate the close alliance with Austria which for over a generation had been a basic postulate of Prussia policy. "I will give my head as a surety," Bismarck wrote to Leopold von Gerlach at the first rumors of the Balkan crisis, "that present-day Austria will never be our honest ally."

7. L. G.

8. L. G., p. 85, 8 July, 1853.

-9

The corollary that no sentimental ties should inhibit Prussia at a moment
of unexcelled opportunity, Bismarck reserved for a dispatch to Manteuffel:
"Among all our potential allies, Austria is precisely the weakest and most
unreliable. I have no doubt that we should separate ourselves from Austria
as soon as it breaks with Russia." In short, Austria was neither a
confederate nor an ally but a foreign power which could obtain Prussia's
cooperation only by tangible concessions. That he really considered
Austria Prussia's natural antagonist, Bismarck left for the future to unfold.

In the months immediately following the outbreak of the Balkan
crisis, Bismarck's quest for freedom of action for Prussia resulted in an
extraordinary ambiguity. Now leaning toward Russia, now toward the West,
moving from hesitant advocacy of neutrality to grudging agreement to Western
overtures, Bismarck seemed to parallel the vacillations of his monarch.
But while Frederick William IV hesitated because he was at a loss to deal
with a situation of such intricacy, Bismarck's seeming inconsistencies
masked his basic aim: to take away Austria's options, to exhaust it and
to undermine the source of its traditional strength in Germany. Thus every
Austrian proposal to the Assembly of the Confederation was met by dilatory
tactics or outright opposition incomprehensible if one analyzes only the
substantive issues involved. When Austria attempted to obtain the backing
of the Confederation for its declaration of strict neutrality in the Russo-
Turkish war, Bismarck pleaded lack of instructions and explained his delay
to Manteuffel as an attempt to prevent Austria to appear as "the spokesman
for the firm, Austria-Prussia." And when Austria sought to restrain
Russia by a conference of the four major powers in Vienna and a joint note

9. W.I., p. 354, 15 July, 1853.

10. W.I., p. 388, 9 November, 1853.

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international relations: A Prussian statesman could catalogue the
possible allies classing Austria, the confederate, as an antagonist and
France, the traditional "hereditary enemy," as a possible ally. But even
more impressive than the specific proposals was the matter-of-factness of
the tone which endowed power with an aura of nemesis. To be sure, Leopold
von Gerlach protested in shocked terms that Prussia would lose its soul
were it to make a pact with Napoleon and that nothing good could ever emerge
from a sinful act. But he misunderstood the nature of the new world which
his demoniac charge was conjuring up, a world in which only miscalculation
was evil and only failure a sin. It was a world without illusion in which
only giants or nihilists could live: "We must not let ourselves be caught
by phrases," Bismarck's letter concluded, "they count only against, never
for us. Instead we should boldly announce a specifically Prussian policy
which seeks its ends through the interests and the fears of others, not
through sentiments to which every one pretends and which no one possesses.
But equally we should not be surprised if others adopt the same principle."

13

Had Austria known of the policy proposed by the Prussian envoy in Frankfurt, had it even understood that this policy was now possible it might have arrested its headlong rush into isolation. But to the unimaginative a crisis deferred appears a dilemma overcome, to the timid a contest avoided seems a guarantee of continued tranquillity, and to the uninspired correct policy defines itself by the direct opposite of failure without the possibility of intermediary nuance. So Austria realizing that the Balkan

13. L.G., p. 117.

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strife could not be banished by refusing to recognize its existence,
only three months after it had reduced its army and only two months after
it had declared its neutrality began to reverse its course, offering both
sides its misgivings as a gauge of its good faith. It not only supported
the Western note of December 5, but it rejected a Russian offer of a treaty
in effect reaffirming the Holy Alliance and it began to concentrate an army
in Hungary on the flanks of the Russian advance into the Danube principalities.
And all the time the increasing tension between the Western powers and Russia
revealed that the conflict was approaching which could not but engulf the
Central Empire. For the facts of geography and history brook no denial by
the fears of statesmen.

If Austria was to commit herself, however, it required the good-will
of Prussia, unless it was prepared to risk its position in Germany. But
whatever the hesitations of his neighbors, Bismarck had no doubt which was
Prussia's proper course. While the contending influence in Prussia argued
about which camp Prussia should join as if no other option were even conceivable,
Bismarck advocated that Prussia stand alone as a symbol that the period where
moral claims could insure Prussia's assistance was over, that henceforth
Prussia's cooperation was dependent on the satisfaction of her demands.
For this reason he did not oppose the rejection of the Tsar's proposal for
a reaffirmation of the Holy Alliance made concurrently to Prussia and
Austria; but he urged that the refusal be couched in terms which would keep
open Prussia's Russian option: "There are many who consider insults to
Russia a proof of patriotism; but these are not the people whose admiration
is of any practical use for Prussia." The full force of his eloquence

14. L. G., p. 129, 20 February, 1854.

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hardly less than the self-righteousness of the liberals, came to assist his old mentor Gerlach in the struggle against the Western alliance. For while he was little concerned about the unity of conservative interests, BISMARCK was all the more determined to prevent Austria from escaping its dilemmas by a show of Confederate unity. "Are we unable to stand on the most moderate pinnacle without fainting into the arms of the nearest individual with strong nerves?" Bismarck wrote to Gerlach. "Does anyone seriously believe that Austria will engage in a life-and-death struggle with Russia without being certain of our help or even secured against an attack on one part? ... A cowardly policy has always led to disaster." "It is not my province to criticize, that His Majesty the King disdains exploiting the embarrassments of other powers," Bismarck wrote to the Prince of Prussia. "I would not consider the alliance [with Austria and the Western Powers] a misfortune had it not been discussed on a plane where the ardor of the contending parties has replaced cold calculation. ... Our interests and those of the West are not identical; their desire to put our power in the service of their ambitions is only natural. Sooner or later the moment must come when we refuse to comply with this wish. Our freedom of action remains unimpaired if we refuse to join the Convention."

The Prince of Prussia might call Bismarck's the policy of a schoolboy (eines Gymnasiasten) but only because he failed to understand its import. PREDELCTION For the policy proposed by Bismarck was not motivated by a preference for Russia not an unreasoning hatred of Austria; Rather it was the calculation of a scientist who had weighed the factors, considered the possible combinations, and sought to manipulate into being a structure which would reflect the real power-relationships. Bismarck strowe for Prussian freedom of action not from

18. L. G., pps. 138-140, 7/9 April, 1854.

19. W. I., p. 436.

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the doctrinal motives of either his friends or his adversaries, but to let
Prussia's inherent power assert itself to demonstrate the tenuousness of the
myth which had assured European tranquillity for over a generation. If
Prussia could stand alone in the middle of a European crisis, it would not
permit itself to be paralyzed indefinitely by so fragile an instrument as
the German Confederation.

And the hysteria of Frederick William IV — who was beginning to
show the symptoms of the mental illness which was to lead to his abdication —
brought about what could not be accomplished by an act of will. At the very
moment when the signature of an alliance with Austria and the Western
PPOURTALES
Powers seemed imminent, its chief proponent, Poutales, was forced to resign
and even the Camarilla was at a loss to explain what had caused the fall of
20
their most hated adversary. Whether Frederick William IV had finally
reacted to Gerlach's Pietist warnings against "unfaithful servants" or whether
in his panic he blamed the advocate of commitment for the conditions which
had made it necessary, the projected alliance was defeated for the time being.
But while the Camarilla was celebrating the victory of the conservative
cause, Bismarck engaged in two conversations which demonstrated his virtuosity
in reducing the beliefs of a decade into forces to be manipulated. Upon
his return to Frankfurt, he visited the Russian ambassador to explain to him
that the refusal of the convention was a victory of the pro-Russian party
at Berlin and that He Bismarck was their chief exponent. Had the British
ambassador seen the jubilant report of his Russian colleague, he would have
been vastly surprised. For he had just been told by Bismarck that the
rejection of the convention had had nothing to do with pro-Russian sympathies.

20. EYCK I, p. 233.

21. EYK I, p. 236; Martens-Traites VIII, p. 440.

On the contrary, the fall of Pourtales was due to a victory in Berlin of
the national party which had not opposed the convention in principle but had
been put off by the threats of the English press and of English statesmen.

Here was AN example of the policy of keeping all options
LAST open until the moment which was to characterize all of Bismarck's
diplomacy, the confusing frankness, the bold caution, the unanswerable
personal appeal. But it was a diplomacy doomed to futility with a monarch
FREDERICK WILLIAM of Frederick William's indecision. For no sooner had he
freedom of action than he came to it, and on April 20 he signed a treaty
of alliance with Austria which guaranteed Austria's territory and even
promised Austria Prussian assistance if Russia should refuse to halt its
advance across the Danube or to evacuate the Principalities.

In this manner ended the first phase of the Crimean War as anti-
climactically as it had begun and with Austria seemingly successful in
imposing its policy on Prussia. But Austria's victory was only apparent.
For an alliance represents an accretion of strength only if its members are
in accord about their objectives. In the absence of such an agreement the
requirement for unity can be used to exact a veto over allied actions and
the policy of the alliance will be shaped by its weakest, or at least its
most irresolute components. Anyone familiar with the psychology of the
Prussian King, moreover, could be certain that he would shrink from the
consequences of his audacity. It was one thing to make a treaty to please
the traditional ally in Vienna; it was quite another to put that treaty to

22. Valentin, p. 98; L. G., p. 43, 17 April, 1854.

23. Stern VIII, p. 70.

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the only use which had any meaning for Austria: to force Russia to evacuate the Danube Principalities. As soon as they had gotten over the initial shock the Camarilla and Bismarck therefore set about to deprive the treaty of all meaning by an exegesis of the treaty which furnished Frederick William with a justification for inaction. Gerlach conceived the rather unimaginative interpretation that the treaty of April 20 obliged Austria to obtain Prussia's concurrence before it took any measure to force Russia to evacuate the Principalities. In practice, this would have restored conditions precisely to the point before the treaty was signed and not even the unstable King could be induced to accept so flagrant a breech of his undertaking. Bismarck therefore entered the fray with a solution more intricate if no more honorable. The treaty of April 20, he argued, was not an alliance at all but merely an engagement to conclude an alliance and he suggested to Manteuffel that he act as if another interpretation were unthinkable outside of an insane asylum.

But The real stumbling bloc to Austria's utilization of the alliance lay in Frankfurt not in Berlin, however. In order to marshal a maximum force, Austria had insisted on a clause inviting the German Confederation to accede to the treaty of April 20. The Austrian negotiators apparently never doubted that the acquiescence of the Confederation would prove to be a mere formality. For was this not precisely the prior Austro-Prussian accord for which Bismarck had been calling these many years? Were not the minor powers reduced to the secondary status which Bismarck had been insisting was properly theirs? But no sooner did the new Austrian ambassador to Frankfurt, Prokesch-Osten, seek to implement the agreement than he ran into the same

24. EYCK, I, p. 239.

25. G.E.II, p. 78; W. I, p. 442; L.G., p. 148.

stubborn opposition by Bismarck as his predecessor had encountered in his
effort to proceed by a majority vote. For this was the moment Bismarck had
been anticipating when Prussia could operate within the Confederation like a
parliamentarian forging a union of all discontented to overthrow the
ruling faction. Nothing had occurred to affect Bismarck's basic aim to
eliminate or to reduce Austria's influence in Germany; on the contrary the
degree of its Balkan embarrassments only placed Austria into the para-
doxical position of attempting to expedite a decision in a body it had
itself designed to inhibit decisive action. And the Prussian envoy was
fully alive to the irony of Austria's situation. No sooner had he learned of
the treaty than he wrote to Manteuffel that it would find the approbation
to the degree that it offered guarantees against the danger of war.
Bismarck knew the particularist self-will of the secondary German states
and their sense of impotence too well not to be able to count on an effort
on their part to eliminate all risks to themselves.

And he was not to be disappointed. A meeting of the secondary
powers in Bamberg called attention to the fact that the treaty of April 20
lacked reciprocity, because it failed to couple a request to the Western
powers to cease military operations with the demand that Russian evacuations
be the Principlaities. In any other situation, Bismarck would have dismissed
this gesture with biting irony as an act of impudence by minor powers
emboldened to conduct a European policy through the protection afforded them
by Austria and Prussia. But now when it was a question of paralyzing Austria
Bismarck could not speak highly enough of the statesmanlike demeanor of
Saxony and Bavaria and he expressed the fear that Prussia might "brutalise the
%

26. W. I, p. 440, 21 April, 1854.

- 20

27 little ones proud of the fact that Austria appreciates us." He did not deny that the secondary powers were weak reeds, but he replied that Prussia by using their desire for peace was merely catching "their wind in its sails." In the meantime, the King had had another change of heart and had sent another of his special emissaries to Vienna to urge restraint.

So it happened that all of Austria's maneuvers had again availed nothing becauseFINNAE is no substitute for conception. Great goals can not be attained by a policy of limited risks, and Austria knew much better what it wished to avoid than what it could avoid. On June 3, finally took the irrevocable step which a year previous might have avoided its dilemmas or at least minimized them. A sharp note was dispatched to Russia requesting that a date be set for the evacuation of the Danube Principalities and threatening military measures in case of refusal. It only underlined the futility of its position that Austria did not dare to submit the note in Berlin before dispatching it. It did not matter that Frederick William was induced through a personal meeting with the Austrian Emperor to support the Ultimatum, nor that the German Confederation on July 24 agreed to the treaty of April 20 exactly two months too late. In its hour of greatest peril Austria, the state which could not survive without allies, had been forced to take its risks alone and only the instability of the Prussian monarch had prevented Austria's total isolation. The events of the summer of 1854 were an augury of what might be in store for the anachronistic Empire if a man ruthless enough to exploit its embarrassments should ever govern Berlin. The capacity for mischief by a determined Prussian policy was being demonstrated every day in Frankfurt by the Prussian envoy who chose the precise

27. L. G., p. 157, 10 June, 1854.

28. Stern VIII, p. 79.

23

because the statesman does not have the privilege to decline to respond to a problem put to him. The statesman moreover must always act on insufficient knowledge, for if he waits until all facts are in it will be too late to do something about them. Each act of policy therefore represents a balance between the opportunities of a course of action and its dangers. This is a question not only of calculation but of timing. To act precipitately may mean to conjure up the very eventualities one seeks to avoid; to fail to act may lead to the surrender of all opportunities. The art of statesmanship is therefore to a large degree the art of finding the right moment for action.

It was the curse of Austrian policy during the Crimean war not so much that its measures were badly conceived but that they took so long to conceive that by the time they were executed they hastened the contingencies they attempted to forestall; not that the Imperial Cabinet behaved recklessly but that it was so afraid of recklessness that it left itself no room for maneuver save in sudden fits of panic. Thus Austria gradually found itself isolated in Germany despite its recognition of the need for the backing of the German Confederation and separated from Russia despite its dread of Napoleon's design on Italy. And the more desperate its position grew, the more fitful became its measures because the Austrian cabinet sought to compensate for each opportunity lost by redoubling its energy when it finally brought itself to act usually at the wrong moment. There was about the diplomacy of the Crimean war a quality of repetitiveness therefore, only that each succeeding phase deepened the schisms and increased the risks and thereby contributed even more to Austria's confusion. Each phase began with a long period of Austrian hesitation followed by an impetuous act almost off desperation; then came a sudden return to the realization

of the limits of its own strength and a frantic search for support above
all in Germany; all this accompanied by an almost contemptuous demon-
stration of Austria's impotence by Bismarck wherever he had the slightest
discretion and an overpowering concern on his part lest the Prussian
government fail to grasp its opportunities.

So it was after Russia accepted the Austrian summation of June
3 and agreed to withdraw its troops from the Danube Principalities. It
is in the nature of a policy of petty advantage to be panicky in adversity
and immoderate in victory. Thus Austria when its worst premonitions had
failed to materialize, acted as if all risks had disappeared and sought to
exact another benefit by joining the Western powers in submitting four
demands to Russia as the sine qua non of a peaceful settlement. The
"Four Points" insisted on a European guarantee of the constitutional
position of the Danube Principalities and of Serbia; freedom of shipping
on the Danube; a revision of the treaty regulating the passage through the
Straits in the interest of the European equilibrium; and a surrender by
Russia of its claim as the sole protector of the Christians living in the
Ottoman Empire. Their real significance was not their content, however,
but that Austria had crossed its Rubicon. Henceforth its measures in the
Balkans could no longer be justified by its fears for the survival of the
Austrian Empire. It was not the return to the status quo ante which was
now at issue, but a strategic gain which in the nature of things could be
achieved only at Russia's expense. The Austrian troops which entered the
Danube Principalities on the heels of the withdrawing Russians "to prevent
clashes with the Turks" symbolized that the Holy Alliance was irrevocably
finished.

31. Stern VIII, p. 83.

But to the extent that Austria raised its sights, it separated
itself from its support within Germany partly because Austria's diplomacy
was beginning to outrun the legal basis furnished by the treaty of April 20;
partly by supplying Prussia a pretext to escape its commitments. For
Bismarck chafing at the bit and the Camarilla could not fail to see that
here was another opportunity to appeal to their King's irresoluteness if not
to his statesmanship. In this manner the contest of the previous spring was
repeated with Austria pressing for Prussian assistance to clinch the fruits
of its recklessness and Frederick William IV vacillating in the face of the
onslaught of the Camarilla with its lectures of the unity of conservative
interests and of Bismarck with his preachments of the reality of power
relationships. It was expressive of Bismarck's view of international relations
that he was more afraid of an accretion in Austria's power than of a temporary
isolation of Prussia. As soon as he learned of the Austrian invasion of the
Danube Principalities, he was convinced that the Austrian troops would never
leave. But equally he was certain that Prussia should prevent this contingency
even at the risk of war. For any increase of Austria's strength would lead
to a relative weakening of Prussia in the inevitable clash over Germany.

The effort to deprive Austria of the imports of its policy was
only the reverse side of a proposal that Prussia utilize the estrangement
between Austria and Russia to reduce Austria's power. But where Bismarck
in the spring has sought to achieve this through so arranging the commit-
ments of the powers that Prussia's greater freedom of action would enable
it to exact concessions as the price for its assistance, he now spoke of
more forceful measures. Nothing could have demonstrated the disintegration
of the Metternich system more clearly than the fact that a Prussian diplomat
could openly counsel an attack by Prussia on Austria. The proposal was
revolutionary not so much because of its disregard of Confederate bonds,
important as this was, as for its challenge to the very legitimizing
principle of the Vienna settlement. That a state might seek to obtain an
improvement of its strategic position had not been unknown in Europe after
1815 although every effort was made to endow territorial changes with the

- 27

reiterating the theme of the need for a maximum of ruthlessness: "...
We should not wait until France has 200 to 300 thousand men at our borders
and Austria has mobilized its army against us. Instead we should march
into Austria, quickly and unexpectedly, while Bohemia is still without
troops. . . I will insist at least until experience has taught me otherwise:
Austria will not make war as long as it does not have Germany and us
behind it and certainly not if we threaten it. . . We have three threats
available: 1. An alliance with Russia and it is nonsense always to swear
at once that we would never go with Russia; even if it were true we
should retain the option to use it as a threat; 2. A policy in which we
throw ourselves into Austria's arms and compensate ourselves at the expense
of perfidious confederates; 3. And with a change of cabinets to the left
whereby we would soon become so "Western" that Austria would be out-
distanced and would seek in vain to cling to our coat tails. The others
are prepared really to commit any villainy against us; why should we not
threaten with it at least?"

Here was the distillation of Bismarck's tactics and of the new
diplomacy. The same report listed among possible options an alliance with
Russia, an alliance with France and a liberal ministry as if only considera-
tions of utility determined the choice. Here was the Russophile discussing
an alliance with France, the reactionary speaking of a shift to the left.
Even domestic politics was reduced to a factor to be manipulated for
its contribution to the primary task of undermining Austria's influence in
Germany. No wonder that Gerlach to whom a pro-Russian policy was an article
of faith and not of national interest reacted with horror to these proposals.

34. L.G., p. 172, 18 October, 1854.

out by a more liberal government, which would soon outdistance Austria, carried by the Westwind of public opinion. I trace this possible development of Prussian policy in the tone of someone who is unhappy about events which are unfortunately outside his control and everyone of my colleagues seemed very upset and disquieted by it. They fear such eventualities more than the cholera."

A statesman is ultimately distinguished by his conception of alternatives. And it was Bismarck's skill that he perceived combinations which had been thought impossible for over a generation. To be sure, he was hampered not only by the lack of imagination of his government but by that of his colleagues who could not believe in his "seriousness." Their reports abound in excuses for him or in almost desperate efforts to reconcile the violence of his language with his "conservative" political views. But much as they might make allowances for his impetuosity, they were again and again confronted with experiences which demonstrated that Bismarck would let no doctrines of confederate loyalty interfere with his conception of the requirements of Prussia's greatness. Thus at the very moment that Prussia was negotiating with Austria about adapting the alliance of April 20 to the new situation, Bismarck showed his diplomatic reports counselling an attack on Austria to his Russian colleague in Frankfurt. He even went so far as to suggest that Russia conclude an alliance with France with which it was at war, and directed against Austria with which Prussia was just then allied. In short, states were conceived as units of infinite adaptability inhibited only by their inherent dynamism. And when the Russian ambassador, true to the canons of the "old" diplomacy, attempted

39. W. I., p. 505, 20 October, 1854.