Reflections on Adenauer's Visit to Moscow

by Henry A. Kissinger

The Adenauer visit to Moscow is the first fruit of the "Geneva spirit". To be sure, it was arranged before the summit conference. But it was made inevitable by our agreement to a summit conference and foredoomed by its course. For when the President of the U.S. agreed to confer with the Soviets, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic whose aspirations for German unity depend at least in part on Soviet good will was in no position to reject an invitation to Moscow. And in an atmosphere of seeming conciliation, in which, moreover, the issue of German unity had seemed to fall under the table, Adenauer could hardly afford to return from Moscow without any results. To be sure, Geneva was a necessary stage in our diplomacy. But the manner in which it was conducted (except perhaps for our aerial inspection proposal) has severely mortgaged the future course of our policy.

The first thing the Adenauer visit did was to explode the idea that the maintenance of the status quo is inevitable because the risks of German unification are too great for either side. However valid this argument is in the abstract, it is contrary to all historical experience and contrary to the dynamics of the current situation. Whatever will occur in the next decade, the one contingency which will surely not come to pass is a continuation of the status quo. If the lines through Europe remain as they are now, Western Europe will drift into neutrality and the Federal Republic will disengage itself from NATO and become increasingly attracted to a direct deal with the East. If a real detente occurs, we will