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The American people can be proud of what they have done to safeguard the strength and well-being of the industrial democracies.

We now face different international challenges. The allied statesmen who shaped the postwar international order would not recognize the planet we inhabit today. The growth of nuclear arsenals and the proliferation of nuclear weapons give confrontation and conflict a perilous new dimension; multiplying centers of power and influence call for new approaches to international issues; interdependence has spawned a host of unprecedented social, ethical, and economic dilemmas. No government alone can resolve the range of problems before it. In the words of a famous Pennsylvanian, we must hang together or we shall surely hang separately.

In an age of undiminished ideological competition, America will never forget that its most important relationships are with those nations which share our principles, our way of life, and our future. It is for this reason that next Saturday President Ford will meet in Europe with the heads of government of Britain, West Germany, France, Italy, and Japan at what has come to be called the economic summit.

The immediate task of the summit is to deal with economic questions. But in a more fundamental sense, it is a step to confirm and consolidate allied cooperation in every sphere at a crucial moment in history. It will not resolve all problems, but it can set goals for common policies and chart a direction for common action.

## Central Role of Industrial Democracies

Clearly, the postwar era of international relations is ended. No single upheaval marked this transformation in the way that two World Wars shattered the earlier structure of the international order. But the cumulative evolution of a generation has profoundly altered our world.

In the forties and fifties the world was divided into rigid blocs locked in continual confrontation. Western Europe and Japan needed our military shield for security and our aid for reconstruction. Crises were frequent—in Greece, Berlin, the Taiwan Strait—and in Korea and Indochina there was war.

The industrial democracies responded with courage and imagination, building new institutions and relationships. America's nuclear supremacy and economic strength gave us the predominant

role in our alliances and in world leadership. We drew on our domestic experience of reform and organizing skill in dealing with global issues. We mobilized vast material resources. The American people, with pride in victory and with fresh memory of the folly of isolationism, confidently assumed the responsibilities of an active foreign policy.

Today, as basic conditions have changed, so have our challenges. America's role is still crucial but we can no longer overwhelm our problem with resources. Thirty years of exertion have distributed power in the world and require wider participation. We have reached a new stage of alliance relations, marked by greater equality and sharing of initiative and responsibility. Europe's unity has grown hand in hand with its economic and political revival. The European Community is heading toward political unity and a greater European role in both political and economic issues. Japan and Canada have made remarkable progress.

We welcome and support these trends. The unity of the industrial democracies is one of our greatest material, and moral, assets. Collective approaches to our common problems have become more and more indispensable:

* The military strength of our alliances is the foundation of the global balance of power that permits all nations to live in peace and security. A strong joint defense is the precondition for all other policies.

* There can be no durable progress in East-West relations unless we maintain our political cooperation. If the Soviet Union is permitted to play one ally off against another, the reduction of tensions becomes a tool of political warfare and not an instrument of peace.

This Administration has never had any illusion about the nature of the Soviet system or about some of its objectives. But neither must there be any illusions about how to deal with it. In the thermonuclear age, there is no alternative to coexistence. Rhetoric cannot remove the Soviet nuclear arsenal or reduce the risk of needless confrontation. We will never give up our vital interests or those of our allies. But we must also seek to ease tensions and resolve conflicts. The principal challenge is to make coexistence compatible with our values and, over time, to turn it into a more constructive relationship.

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In relations with Communist countries, therefore, all allied governments are challenged to maintain a steady course. We must pursue a strategy far more complicated than that of the past. Our peoples must understand the need for both strong defense and efforts to seek more constructive relations; we must vigilantly defend our interests and seek to negotiate solutions to the underlying problems. We must face up to this moral complexity for it is the reality we face. If we cannot pursue both the course of conciliation and the requirements of conciliation, we will not be able to achieve either.

Together the industrial democracies have been the engine of global prosperity. We account for 65 percent of the world's production and 70 percent of its trade. The international financial and trading system depends crucially on our performance. Together we have led the global effort of assistance to developing countries and the fight against hunger and disease.

But the institutions and practices created at Bretton Woods in 1944, which fostered expanding trade and monetary stability for a generation, were founded on realities in the process of change: American preponderance, the exclusive participation of the developed countries, and the openness of the free market. Today fresh centers of economic power, in both the industrial and developing worlds, strain the system. New participants, practices, and demands have given rise to disputes over energy, food, raw materials, and rules for exploitation of ocean resources. Economic issues are now a central dimension of international politics.

The interdependence of all our economies—consumer and producer, industrial and developing—emphasizes the necessity of cooperative solutions. Only cooperative solutions can maintain and spread global prosperity; an era of economic warfare would spell common decline. The industrial democracies, as the wealthiest and most technically advanced, would best survive economic conflict; but we take no comfort in suffering less when everybody will suffer. How these economic issues are addressed by the world community will determine the kind of world that our children will inhabit and the nature of international relations over the last quarter of this century.

The actions of the industrial democracies, therefore, are crucial to the peace and prosperity

of the world. And the United States has most at stake.

In 1973 the United States called for a reaffirmation of the solidarity of our alliances with the Atlantic community and Japan. We emphasized the overriding need for a fresh, common approach to the interrelated issues of politics, economics, and security. We stressed the necessity of galvanizing our peoples with the challenge of new positive endeavors. In the last 2 years this need has been brought home by economic difficulties. All of our countries have been in the throes of recession and inflation more severe than at any time since World War II.

The European experience in the 1920's and 1930's teaches us the crucial relationship between economic vitality and the health of political institutions and global stability. Then inflation and depression tore the fabric of democratic societies. Social and political divisions weakened the capacity of democratic governments to overcome economic and social problems. In some countries the confidence of people in free institutions eroded; the habits of accommodation that bind societies together gave way to extremism and mounting civil strife. Strains within nations spawned economic nationalism; increased tensions between nations led to war.

Similar economic problems, if of a lesser magnitude, have assaulted almost the entire industrialized world in the last few years—unemployment, loss of production, rapid inflation. The oil embargo and the quadrupling of oil prices dealt further severe blows; a central element of the price structure of our economies was now at the mercy of other countries whose interests were hardly identical with our own.

The deepest consequence is not economic but the erosion of people's confidence in their society's future and a resulting loss of faith in democratic means, in governmental institutions and leaders. Criticism degenerates into demagogy. In some countries public cynicism is reflected at the polls or in the weakening of traditional party loyalties; in other countries it spawns the resurgence of extremist political parties of left and right; in yet other countries it leads to communal or ideological violence. In America we suffered the additional tragedies of a divisive war and constitutional crisis, though our institutions have shown a resilience that is the envy of our partners.

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In every one of the industrial democracies a new generation accustomed to freedom and military security questions the very values and institutions that have brought these conditions about. It does not remember the spirit of the late forties and fifties—the immediacy of the dangers that brought about our alliances, or the enthusiasm with which we undertook the Marshall plan and collective defense.

Instant communications force the pace of events and expectations. Unwieldy modern bureaucracies become obstacles to creative government, making more difficult the tasks on political leadership. The technical complexity of issues challenges the capacities of leaders, legislators, the media, and the public.

Ironically, democratic ideals are most cherished in countries where they are least practiced by governments and most disparaged in the countries of their origin where they too often are taken for granted. What we need now is the boldness and creative spirit that animated our response to crisis a generation ago. We must infuse our actions with an overriding sense of our common heritage and common future.

This worldwide crisis to the democratic process is the deepest challenge before the leaders at the economic summit. They meet to give their peoples the sense that they are masters of their destiny, that they are not subject to blind forces beyond their control.

I am confident that this test will be met. The industrial democracies will demonstrate, as so often before, that the greatest force in the world today is the voluntary association of free peoples.

## The Economic Summit

It is the economic issues which must be solved first. Since the Great Depression, the well-being of our citizens has been a fundamental goal of all our societies. High unemployment and the persistence of poverty have become politically and morally intolerable. Inflation, which eats away at the living standard and status of all classes of society, is rightly regarded as a social evil. The striving for a share in national prosperity drives groups into sharper competition with each other. As competing sectors press for higher wages, more credit, increased federal spending, or rising industrial or agricultural prices, the claims on the economy expand faster than its capacity to produce. A slackening of capi-

tal investment retards the growth of productivity. Budgets become chronically unbalanced. If these trends persist, all industrial democracies will be locked in a cycle of growing frustration—with raised, but unfulfilled, expectations and sluggish growth and continuing inflation.

In such a situation the close and important ties among the industrial nations are imperiled. Trade is threatened by protectionist measures that attempt to shift the burden to consumers and other nations. Continued instability of exchange rates, swings in short-term capital movements, and periodic crises in the international monetary system—all these reflect and exacerbate instability in our economies.

Because of interdependence, no country's national programs for recovery can succeed fully in isolation. The economic summit springs from the conviction of all of the leaders of the industrial democracies that only by cooperative decisions can the trade and monetary system be adapted to changing conditions and yet be kept stable enough to stimulate the international flow of goods, services, and investment. Cooperation among the industrial nations is also essential if we are to achieve greater self-sufficiency and less vulnerability in energy; if we are to maintain and expand the world's markets and supplies of food; and if we are to insure adequate supplies and market stability for other vital raw materials. Our relations with the developing world and the centrally planned economies are becoming increasingly important in the international system. We can meet this challenge effectively, and turn it into opportunity, only if we are conscious of our own common interests and move boldly and jointly in these new areas.

A special responsibility falls on the United States. We are the world's largest and most dynamic economy. We produce fully two-fifths of all the goods and services of the industrial democracies. Our leadership is essential in the trade and monetary negotiations. Our example is vital in the field of energy, food, and raw materials. The recovery of the other industrialized states depends importantly on our own. As President Ford said in his State of the Union message last January: "A resurgent American economy would do more to restore the confidence of the world in its own future than anything else we can do."

The United States intends to discharge its responsibility.

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## The Program Before Us

At the economic summit this weekend the leaders of the industrial democracies will concentrate on these specific tasks:

* First, to cooperate more closely on policies for recovery;

* Second, to look beyond this to common action to strengthen the basic structure of the international economic system for long-term stability, expansion, and prosperity; and

* Third, to review their policies on trade negotiations, monetary questions, and our dialogue with the developing countries.

The first task, economic recovery without inflation, is of immediate concern to every American. The industrial democracies are already on the road to recovery, partly as a result of cooperative actions over the recent period. At the beginning of the recession and the oil crisis, the United States joined other industrial countries in a pledge not to resort to restrictive trade practices to deal with payments deficits caused by excessive oil prices. We set up institutions and mechanisms to cope with financial emergencies and to guarantee emergency sharing in the case of any new oil embargo. Last winter, in a fresh departure in allied collaboration, President Ford held a series of bilateral meetings with heads of government of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Japan, to review the state of our economies and to determine whether new action was required. After these meetings, expansionary measures were adopted in several of the major industrial countries, including most decisively our own.

A strong recovery is well underway in the United States, as shown by the 11 percent increase [annual rate] in our national product in the third quarter of this year. Other nations—while our efforts cannot substitute for theirs—will feel their recovery reinforced by ours.

We intend at the economic summit to consolidate the cooperation of the industrial democracies. We plan to discuss common goals and agree on cooperative means to achieve them. The heads of government can assess the current situation, identify needs, and discuss measures that they should take in common.

In the U.S. view the summit should set as our goal generalizing the recovery during 1976 among

the major industrial countries. We should seek to restore vigorous, sustained expansion and high employment by 1977. We should aim to reduce inflation in our economy as a whole, as well as disparities in our national inflation rates. And we should seek to restore vigorous growth in world trade as our domestic recovery proceeds.

The United States will propose that ministers of our countries responsible for economic policy meet periodically to follow up on policy directions set at the summit and to review what further decisions may be needed. The U.S. representative would be Treasury Secretary [William E.] Simon.

In a climate of recovery and renewed confidence, the United States and its major allies must then lift their sights beyond the business cycle to the fundamental challenge of improving the structure of the international economy in order to foster stable growth and cooperation over the long term. Let me suggest some of the areas that the United States will submit for consideration.

**World Trade.** World trade has been a major stimulus to our economic growth. Encouraged by progressive reductions in tariffs, it has increased at a rate twice that of domestic economic activity. The United States and over 100 other countries have therefore undertaken a new round of multilateral trade negotiations to continue trade expansion by reducing barriers. Congressional passage of the Trade Act in December of 1974—an impressive example of executive-legislative cooperation—gave the President the authority to participate and lead in this important process.

The present recession, with its high unemployment and large trade deficits in some countries, is now subjecting governments to domestic pressures to impose trade restrictions. Such restraints invite retaliation. Without a determined international effort, they could set off a cycle of barriers that would choke off trade generally. Protectionism raises prices to consumers; it jeopardizes jobs and incomes; it creates political frictions among allies; and it undermines our efforts to achieve other American objectives in the trade negotiations. It would weaken recovery.

The economic summit should therefore seek explicitly to expand world trade through joint efforts in economic policy. The President intends to propose that we reaffirm our common determination to avoid new barriers to trade as well as actions which provoke countries to erect them. We

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plan also to put forth specific goals for the trade negotiations. The industrial democracies should use the summit to renew their resolve to pursue the multilateral trade negotiations to an early conclusion and to develop a forward-looking program.

**International Monetary System.** The industrial countries have been moving toward a broad understanding on the contemporary requirements of the international monetary system. The summit should add to our progress. The United States believes that the system should foster, not restrict, policies for domestic growth and price stability. We believe that to achieve this goal each country should be free to choose the exchange rate regime that best suits it, provided it respects international obligations to avoid trade and capital restrictions and competitive devaluations. By implementing policies for noninflationary growth at home, we can promote more stable exchange rates and more orderly foreign exchange markets.

**Energy.** Because energy is at the heart of our industrial system, the recent dramatic changes in the price of oil are a direct challenge to all the industrial democracies. They affect the price level in all our economies, the standard of living in all our societies, and our freedom to determine our foreign policies according to our own objectives. We must not let our economic future remain indefinitely subject to decisions made by countries which cannot be expected to have our best interests at heart. We can end our vulnerability to outside pressures and transform the conditions of the international oil market only by determined joint actions that give the industrial democracies a greater voice in economic decisions affecting their future.

In order to reduce their dependence on imported oil, the industrial democracies since 1973 have launched substantial conservation programs. We have undertaken to develop alternative sources of energy by removing legal obstacles to exploration and production, by measures to sustain or guarantee return on investment, and by research and development on a large scale. The 18 countries in the International Energy Agency are now developing a detailed program of conservation and alternative sources for adoption by December 1.

The United States will urge the summit to recommit the industrial democracies to an even more forceful pursuit of the fundamental long-

term goal of depriving the oil cartel of the power to set the oil price unilaterally. The U.S. effort would be powerfully reinforced by agreement on an energetic and far-reaching American program. Since all industrial democracies are profoundly affected by the energy crisis, joint action toward greater self-sufficiency will be a vital test of their ability to act and to cooperate.

**Food.** The significant rises in food prices in the last few years have taught every American consumer that the international market in food now affects our economy directly and pervasively. The world faces the specter of chronic shortages of food. This means severe price fluctuations everywhere, and the scourge of famine in the poorer countries.

Because of our central position in the world food economy—and because this crisis requires the contribution of all countries—the United States in 1974 proposed the World Food Conference which met in Rome a year ago. We set forth a plan for international collaboration, based on the proposition that foreign assistance could only alleviate, but not resolve, the long-term problem of shortages. However important our food aid, any lasting solution requires an expansion of food production in the developing countries themselves. Much of our plan is now becoming reality:

* A higher target for food aid programs by all the food-producing nations;

* A new fund to develop agricultural production in poor countries; and

* An international system of grain reserves to build stocks* in good crop years and to alleviate shortages, mitigate price rises, and meet famine emergencies in poorer crop years.

The economic summit can spur joint action in each of these areas.

**Commodities.** In the field of commodities, the industrial countries as a group already largely enjoy self-sufficiency. But many developing countries are critically dependent on earnings from their commodity exports to finance their development and feed their peoples. This instability of export earnings is one of the principal concerns of the developing nations who comprise most of the world's 4 billion people and who seek responsible participation in the global economic system. At the

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Seventh Special Session of the United Nations this past September, the United States proposed a new development security facility which would provide international loans, and in some cases grants, to offset such sudden shortfalls in export earnings.

The economic summit provides an opportunity to advance this proposal and to review other proposals to fashion mutually beneficial and durable long-term relationships with developing countries. The dialogue between the industrial and the developing nations is of crucial importance to the building of international order. The industrial countries have common interests and a conciliatory attitude. We shall resist tactics of bloc confrontation. But fruitful cooperation requires that both developed and developing countries—and especially the moderate developing countries—see a prospect for achieving some real progress. The forthcoming Conference on International Economic Cooperation between consumer and producer countries is a crucial stage of this dialogue. The United States intends to ask its partners at the summit to consider what programs and positions the industrial countries can take together in these efforts.

## Common Heritage and Common Purpose

Ladies and gentlemen: For more than three decades America has been the dynamic force in the building of a just international economic and political system. We can take pride in what we have done. But our very accomplishments have produced new challenges. The institutions of the post-war international order depended upon the wisdom and vision of the United States; the course of the last quarter of this century depends upon American imagination and dedication even more. Thirty years ago we were predominant; we could overwhelm our problems with our resources. Today we

know our limits, perhaps too well. After a decade of war, 2 years of constitutional crisis, and an uncertain period of domestic recession, there are those who have come to doubt either the wisdom of further involvement abroad or even our moral right to lead.

But this cannot be the view of the great majority of the American people. Moral timidity never characterized America in the 200 years of its history; it does not characterize America today. We have not lost our perception of our interest or our humane concern for the fate of our fellow men. We have expended great effort, and given lives, in the 30 years of our leadership, because we knew that the cost of abdication—for ourselves, our children, and mankind—was far greater. Certainly we have made our share of mistakes, but we know that we have done great things and we have great things to do now.

All of us want to pass on to our children a more prosperous nation and a more peaceful world. And this means that we and the other industrial democracies must dedicate ourselves to the agenda before us. This is not a goal that can be achieved by an America torn by self-punishment or by an impulse to escape from reality or to shrink from challenges. Today the world needs most of all the optimism and confidence that America has always embodied. It needs our strong faith as a source of hope to others that the world can solve its problems.

America and her fellow democracies are called upon again to demonstrate our cohesion, our confidence, and our readiness for tomorrow. The belief in man, and in freedom, is the common heritage we hold in trust and the common promise we hold out to the world. This faith defines our duty and assures that we will be equal to it.

The Secretary
of State

## Press Conference

### MAJOR TOPICS: U.N. Vote on Zionism; Middle East; European Economic Summit

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Before I go to your questions, I want to make a brief comment about an announcement that we have handed out here. I know all of you have read my doctoral dissertation—which is more than I can say—and so you know that I have always been concerned with the relationship between public support and the conduct of foreign policy.

I have myself been in 11 cities in the last 10 months. And we have now started a program by which my colleagues will be going to various cities to discuss a variety of topics. The reason I mention it is because the first city that they will visit is Pittsburgh, next February. They will be discussing such issues as the future of East-West relations, the United States and the Third World, the role of values in American foreign policy, and the interests which Americans would like their foreign policy to pursue abroad. This will be done in a series of workshops in which senior State Department officials will be meeting with interested citizens, at first in five cities throughout the United States, starting in Pittsburgh next February.

Now I will be glad to take some questions.

THE PRESS: Mr. Secretary, the Senate is going to reevaluate the U.S. participation in the United Nations as a result of the resolution equating Zionism with racism. The President, although condemning the action, has made no such statement. You have said we will ignore it, pay no attention to it. Is verbal repudiation of the U.N. resolution the bittersweet extent of any reprisals you would advocate to the President and the

November 12, 1975

Pittsburgh, Pa.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

Senate, or would you recommend reduced U.S. funding to the United Nations or economic sanction of the countries voting for the resolution?

A: It was a very large number of countries voting for the resolution, so that the decision to apply economic sanctions to them would be a major decision in our foreign policy.

We have to see the United Nations in some perspective. We went through a period in which the United Nations was described as the best hope of humanity. That was exaggerated. And last July I called attention, in a speech in Milwaukee, to some of the trends in the United Nations which we explored, like bloc voting and arbitrary majorities.

But we must not now swing to the other extreme of not realizing some of the benefits that the United Nations—with all its failings—still has for the United States. Therefore, we will assess this situation. We have not made any final decisions, but I think we have to keep the American reaction in some balance.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is it the position of the present Administration that criticism of Zionism is equal to anti-Semitism?

A: The position of the Administration is that the vote in the United Nations was really a form of moral condemnation of the State of Israel and not simply an abstract vote on Zionism, and that the linkage of Zionism and racism smacked of some practices that it would be better for mankind to forget.

Q: Mr. Secretary, as a result of the so-called Sunday massacre, do you feel that you have in any

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way been diminished in your role as Secretary of State by your removal as adviser for the National Security Council?

A: I said last week before the House International Relations Committee that a Secretary of State who cannot have his views heard has only himself to blame. There is a great tendency to discuss these issues in terms of who has influence and who is up and who is down. But we all ought to remember: We are all in Washington not to have influence but to do the Nation's business. We will be judged after we have left office by whether a sound foreign policy was conducted and not by these vagaries which form the gossip of the day.

But to answer your question specifically, I do not feel that I have been diminished.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what is the impact of the U.N. vote likely to be on the diplomatic situation in the Middle East?

A: Well, I think the U.N. vote has certainly added to the tensions, to the rifts, and to the distrust. The U.N. vote was extremely unhelpful and highly irresponsible.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you associate yourself with the remarks made by Ambassador Moynihan about General Amin [Gen. Idi Amin Dada, President of Uganda] and can you tell us what the reaction to that has been?

A: Ambassador Moynihan makes so many remarks in the course of a day that it is not easy to keep up with all of them. [Laughter.] This one I kept up with.

I would share his displeasure with General Amin, though I might express myself in a more restrained manner, given the differences in our temperaments. I do not associate myself with identifying Amin with the Organization of African Unity. I believe the Organization of African Unity contains states that are attempting to pursue a responsible role, and therefore—his chairmanship reached Uganda by rotation—I would not consider him a typical representative of the organization.

Q: Mr. Secretary, speaking of Ambassador Moynihan, he said on television this morning that the countries which pushed through this Zionism resolution would suffer for it. Was he speaking of the afterlife, or do you—or did he—have anything concrete in mind?

A: Well, I am seeing Ambassador Moynihan later today, and I will find out exactly what he had in mind.

It is true that the countries that voted for the resolution have contributed to an international environment that will be less helpful, that will be less able to settle especially the differences in the Middle East. Therefore, there are inherent consequences in the vote. We will have to consider the votes on an individual basis before deciding what specific action we will take toward various countries.

Q: Well, he mentioned one specific thing, though—a universal amnesty position—that the United States would now ask for universal amnesty for political prisoners everywhere. I don't know if that is a surprise to you—I don't imagine it is. But it sounds like the beginning of a program at the United Nations.

A: No. That is a program that we have been discussing and that we have been planning to put forward at the United Nations for the last 2 weeks. The timing of putting it forward has absolutely nothing to do with the Zionism vote. We do not put forward fundamental programs in a fit of pique and to punish other countries. So this is quite independent.

Q: Dr. Kissinger-loaded with power now that I have read the current issues of Time and Newsweek—there is indicated in the current issues that the relationship between you and Donald Rumsfeld [Assistant to the President and Secretary of Defense-designate] is of a questionable nature. Maybe that is a little strong. My question would be, would you size up for us your feelings about Donald Rumsfeld and his qualifications for his new position, and what you think is now going to be the working relationship between State and Defense?

A: First of all, I think it is inappropriate for me to give the impression that I am appointing Secretaries of Defense. The appointments of other Cabinet members are made by the President.

I have known Donald Rumsfeld for many years. He is highly intelligent. He knows the political process extremely well. He did a distinguished job as Ambassador to NATO, where he worked for me directly. We have had a good relationship over all these years. It is our obligation, as Secretary of State and Defense respectively, to conduct the Nation's business and not to carry out feuds. I have every intention—and I am positive he has every intention—to work closely together.

We have very important national decisions before us, and they cannot be constantly evaluated.

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Terms of personalities. The victories that are celebrated should not be personal victories but victories of our national purpose. I feel very strongly that if there is one thing we cannot now afford it is this constant public bickering between senior officials.

Insofar as it is in my power, and I am confident insofar as it is in Mr. Rumsfeld's power, we are going to work together so that our people can feel that we are thinking of the national purpose and not of the Department of State or the Department of Defense. That will be my attitude.

Q: Obviously it is not possible to be specific, Mr. Secretary, but obviously your attitude toward the countries in the United Nations who have brought forth this resolution is cold, or cool.

A: That is correct.

Q: How is that going to affect the kind of proposals that you outlined last night in the way of economic cooperation between countries around the world?

A: I believe that it is important in the present world situation to keep our eye on the fundamental issues that must be solved, and those issues will not go away. One of these issues is the relationship between the developed and the developing countries. We put forward at the special session of the General Assembly in September a sweeping program of how this relationship might develop.

We cannot have the world divided between those who have advanced industrial know-how and those who are living at the edge of poverty—and have all the conflicts of the world take on this form—because 10, 15 years from now we will find ourselves in a situation of chronic international civil war. Therefore, we have to conduct our policy today, whatever the immediate irritations are, in such a manner that the possibility of a cooperative world remains open. The objectives that were put forward at the special session of the General Assembly will be maintained. A serious effort will be made to work with all of the countries of the developing world but particularly with the moderate countries of the developing world. We will make every effort not to have an irreconcilable difference develop between ourselves and that part of the world.

We are disappointed by their votes. We ask them to keep in mind that a continuation of these votes must have an impact on our bilateral and multilateral relationships. But we also will keep in

mind that we have long-term obligations and that we will not be driven by the emotions of the day.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you said last night in your question-and-answer period that you were beginning to wish you had never heard the word "detente," evidently because it is so widely misunderstood. What English word would you propose as a substitute for "detente" that we would understand better?

A: I was afraid you would ask me what German word. [Laughter.] I think the best words to describe what we are trying to do is: To ease conflicts or to relax tensions but continuing to recognize that there is ideological hostility, continuing to recognize that we are going to have geopolitical differences in many parts of the world. Nevertheless, given the nuclear realities, we will attempt to ease conflicts, to settle those disputes that are amenable to negotiation. I think the words "relaxation of tensions" or "easing of conflicts" are more meaningful. But I do not know one word.

Q: How about "coexistence?"

A: "Coexistence." That is another good word for it, yes.

Q: Mr. Secretary, along those lines—

A: I hope the local press realizes that the Washington press here not only asks the questions but gives the answers. [Laughter.]

What they really do at our press conferences in Washington is not so much elicit information but give me a grade, about how well I do. [Laughter.]

Q: Mr. Secretary, there are reports that Chairman Mao Tse-tung's speech is impaired, if not totally gone. How is this affecting diplomatic relations with mainland China?

A: Well, there have been many reports in the newspapers about the medical condition of Chairman Mao, about which it would not be appropriate for me to comment. I must say I saw him for an hour and 45 minutes a few weeks ago, and he managed to communicate his thinking with considerable precision, great vigor, and, I must say, considerable profundity. So I do not think his medical situation affects the nature of our relationship.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you think if the United Nations were to continue actions such as the recent one that the United States must deplore, that the day could ever come when the United States would withdraw from the United Nations?

A: Well, I do not know what the United

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States would do. But if the United Nations continues this sort of action--this sort of arbitrary action--it is bound to have serious consequences for the relationship of the United States to the United Nations and for its viability as a world organization.

**Q:** Mr. Kissinger, looking ahead a year from now, if a Democratic Administration is elected into office, what foreign policy changes do you see as being effected with that change, and do you see yourself as being adaptable to a Democratic Administration?

**A:** Some of the questions seem to imply that I may not survive to such an event. [Laughter.]

I believe very strongly that the foreign policy of the United States is and should be essentially a nonpartisan foreign policy. In my conduct of foreign policy, I do my utmost to work closely with the Democratic leadership of the Senate and the House. And I have received, on most of the policies, very substantial support from the Democratic leadership in the Senate and the House.

I would hope that if our basic policies are correct, they would be carried out also by a Democratic Administration in their main lines. I would certainly do my utmost, if there were a change of Administration, to support the foreign policy of the United States from the outside.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, do you regard Ronald Reagan as a threat to this country's foreign policy; and if so, would you campaign actively for the President?

**A:** First, I consider the office of Secretary of State to be a nonpolitical office. I believe that the foreign policy of the United States, involving our national security, our permanent interests and values, cannot be tied to a political party or to specific individuals. I will therefore not participate in the political campaign in any form. During the political campaign, I will conduct myself in such a way that so far as it depends on me, foreign policy will not be a partisan issue. Even less will I get involved in any primary campaigns.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, if I can pursue that. In your series of "town meetings" set for the spring of next year--it is about the same time that many Presidential candidates will be stumping the country making policy. Might these town meetings then turn into expressions of you defending the Ford Administration, not only on foreign policy, but other matters?

**A:** I am not going to participate in these town meetings. These town meetings will be conducted by my junior associates, and they will be conducted as workshops. I do not believe that they will be seen in any relationship to the political process. To the best of my knowledge, nobody in the White House even knows that we have set these workshops up. These are a natural evolution. But I do not personally plan to be present at them, and I will cut down my own speaking program as soon as the political process becomes more active.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, what is the next step in the Middle East?

**A:** The next step in the Middle East depends, of course, importantly on the parties concerned. We have had a proposal from the Soviet Union to reconvene the Geneva conference, which we are now studying and about which we will consult with all of the interested parties.

The major difficulty in the Soviet proposal involves the proposal that the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] participate. This enlarges the original membership of the Geneva conference and proposes to introduce an organization which is in favor of abolishing one of the states that is a charter member of the Geneva conference. So a convening of the Geneva conference, with its original membership, is one way of proceeding.

Another way of proceeding would be negotiations between, for example, Syria and Israel, or any other negotiations that can be started on a bilateral or multilateral basis. We are openminded on this subject.

We are engaged in diplomatic exchanges with all of the parties. We have invited Prime Minister Rabin [of Israel] to visit the United States, and we hope he will do so at an early opportunity for a further exchange of views. We are also in close touch with the leaders of Arab countries to see what diplomatic process can be generated.

**Q:** Mr. Secretary, may I follow up on that?

**A:** Yes.

**Q:** Could you give some indication why you thought it necessary to give a pledge to Israel, in that eight-point memorandum of agreement, that the United States would not talk to the Palestine Liberation Organization until it recognized Israel? Doesn't that ask the PLO to give up presumably its chief bargaining tool for winning itself an independent nation on the West Bank, say, and/or the Gaza Strip before the bargaining begins?

5

A: The publication of these documents has created many misleading impressions, partly because, separated from the general context of our overall relationship, they have acquired an impression of novelty and formality which, seen in context, they would not have necessarily had.

With respect to the Palestinians, we have said nothing to Israel that we have not said innumerable times publicly. We have said publicly on many occasions, and I repeat it here: The United States cannot ask any country to negotiate with an organization that is dedicated to its destruction. If the PLO accepted Security Council Resolution 242, for example, that would still leave as much room for bargaining as there is between the Arab states that have accepted 242 and Israel.

But to ask Israel to negotiate with an organization that has a program incompatible with the existence of Israel is extremely difficult.

Q: I'm sorry, Mr. Secretary, but that is not my question. My question is why did you feel it necessary apparently to commit the United States not to talking, to not discuss—having any negotiations?

A: What I said is in the document to which *c* referred. We have said nothing to Israel that we have not already said publicly. That is our position. That has always been our position.

Q: That we will not talk with the PLO-

A: Until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel.

Q: You have been talking about increased economic cooperation between industrial countries. I want to know what you think is the prospect for success in that endeavor and what do you think the industrial countries can do now that they couldn't do to make it successful—that we were not able to do at the height of the oil embargo in 1973.

A: Well, the oil embargo caught all of the industrial countries by surprise and produced an extremely difficult situation which led to panicky reaction on the part of some of the countries concerned.

Now since then, actually, cooperation among the industrialized countries with respect to energy has been one of the success stories of the recent period. Eighteen nations have formed the International Energy Agency, which has developed.com- programs of conservation and which has developed an emergency sharing program by which

countries, in case of an embargo, will share the available oil according to particular formulas and follow specific conservation procedures, so that an embargo now would have a much less sweeping effect than previously.

At any rate, the means of self defense exist. There has been created a financial facility to protect countries against rapid transfers of funds. Around December 1, we plan to have a complete program among these 18 countries for a rapid development of alternative sources of energy. So that the cooperation among the industrial countries in the field of energy has progressed very well.

With respect to coordinating policies on economic recovery, on trade, on relations to the developing countries, we are at an earlier stage of our cooperation. Two years ago, when the United States first proposed this, some of our industrial allies in fact rejected the proposition that economic cooperation should form part of our natural relationship. Today that is considered axiomatic, and every industrialized country agrees that isolated economic policies are no longer possible.

So I expect that the economic summit will not have any sweeping programs to announce but that it will begin the process by which cooperative economic policies are pursued with respect to recovery, with respect to trade, with the respect to relations to developing countries; and that it will create a framework within which these programs can be jointly fostered.

Q: In your days at Harvard, did you ever dream that you would be Secretary of State; and also, what is there about your personality in this position that lends itself to this office? In other words, what does it take to become Secretary of State? Are there undue pressures and burdens, or are you at ease in the job?

A: When I was at Harvard, I did not think that I would become Secretary of State. And having supported Governor Rockefeller in three unsuccessful attempts to gain the Republican nomination, I thought it extraordinarily unlikely in 1968 that the newly elected President would look upon me for any role in his Administration. [Laughter.]

Now, with respect to my qualification for Secretary of State, you have to remember that I am surrounded by individuals in the Foreign Service who hold the view that the only way I could ever have participated in the foreign policymaking

6

of the United States was by what they call lateral entry—by getting in at my present position—that I probably would not have been qualified to be a Foreign Service Officer. [Laughter.]

So I face the normal obstacles that Secretaries of State confront in making their views felt among a strong-willed group of technical subordinates, whose relationship to the Secretary is something like that of the feudal rulers at the time the Magna Carta was signed. [Laughter.]

Now, what the qualifications are for a Secretary of State—I think it is a very personal matter. I believe that the basic qualification of the Secretary of State ought to be that he has some conception of where he wants the foreign policy of the United States to go; that he should not permit himself to be put into the position where he is simply rati-

fying the technical advice of his associates, but it is his job to ask the difficult questions and to have some sense of direction and to impart the sense of direction to his colleagues. I think this is his major need in relation to the Department of State.

In relation to the President, it is his obligation to give the President the best judgment which he can generate and to help the President to the full—est extent possible in making the difficult decisions.

How well any Secretary fits these requirements is not for him to judge.

I can say I am at peace with myself; but this may reflect many things, but not necessarily that I am well-fitted for the job.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

I come before you today to present and explain the
Administration's request for new appropriations of
$4.7 billion for Fiscal Year 1976 under the Foreign Assistance
Act.

These appropriations are vital to our nation's well-being.

For it is through such resources that we are able to work

for the kind of world in which America's interests can flourish.

Our foreign policy is designed to help shape an inter-
national structure of relations which promotes cooperation
rather than force; negotiation rather than confrontation; and
which permits peoples to pursue their positive aspirations
in a world environment of stability and security.

To do so, we must pursue a strategy far more complicated
than in the past. In the rigid bipolar world of the 1950's and

- 2 -

60's our overriding goal was the containment of Communist
aggression. Congress and the Executive were in general
accord that security assistance was central to our nation's
safety and to our other most important foreign policy
objectives.

Today we face a challenge no less serious but far more
complex. The growth of nuclear-arsenals and the proliferation
of nuclear weapons bring new perils to peace. New centers
of power and influence have sprung up in both the industrial
and developing worlds, vying with and among each other in
unexpected patterns of confrontation; regional conflicts fester,
threatening global stability. And the realities of economic
interdependence impel us to new levels of cooperation and
efficiency of effort.

-3-

Thus we now must simultaneously maintain a strong
defense and seek more constructive international relations.

In this time of greater moral complexity foreign policy still
begins with security; it is the only sure basis for building
more rational and reliable relations with those whose values
and objectives are inimical to our own.

Security assistance is vital to nearly all our foreign
policy goals:

We seek to revitalize our bond to allies who share our
values, institutions and interests. America's safety requires
a strong national defense bolstered by mutual security ties with
allies who share our objectives. The persistent threat of
nuclear devastation makes it imperative for the United States
and its allies to maintain the global strategic balance.

We seek to reduce the perils of nuclear war and build
more rational relationships with potential adversaries. We
have taken several historic steps toward this objective in the
last few years. Would-be aggressors will not feel the need for
peaceful cooperation unless they perceive that efforts at
intimidation will be met by a strong, broad-based resistance.

We seek to help resolve regional conflicts that threaten
global peace. This traditional objective is all the more
urgent in today's world of increasing nuclear proliferation. As
always our assistance is designed to further peace in areas
where it is threatened. Increasingly, regional stability is
dependent upon stable balances of power maintained through
carefully considered transfers of defense equipment.

And we seek to build a new era of cooperation between
all nations on the vast new global problems of our time. It
is of substantial political importance to our country that we
be able to respond to the felt security needs of nations with
which we seek constructive economic and political relations.
We cannot expect to retain influence with nations whose
perceived defense needs we disregard -- especially in an
age when an increasing number of countries are becoming arms
suppliers at the same time that nations without arms production
industries have the cash and the inclination to buy defense
equipment from any source they choose.

Thus a well-reasoned security assistance policy is a
part of our foreign policy in the same sense as are our political
and economic support for others.

When we consider whether our nation's policy
objectives can be furthered by the transfer of American defense
services and equipment, there are a number of criteria we
consider.

First, we look at the nature of the threat to those who
seek our help; to their role in their region and in the world;
and to their ability and desire to help themselves.

Second, we look to our own interest in helping preserve
the security of the recipient country; and we examine what
potential influence for positive conduct we would gain should
our assistance be given.

Third, we ask what other sources are available. The
denial of our help might only force a turn toward another,

-7-

undesirable, source of supply; a relationship favorable to
us might be altered and new sources of regional instability
created.

And fourth, we assess the consequences for the United
States. Will our own defense readiness or efficiency be
affected? Will the central strategic balance by altered?

All these factors and others are considered by a well-
structured review process. The Security Assistance Review
Committee consists of representatives from State, Defense,
Treasury, OMB, NSC, AID and ACDA. The Committee
reviews both the level and content of each country program.

The views of the Defense Department are given the highest level
attention with regard to the potential effect which security

assistance transfers may have on our own defense
preparedness. The final decisions of course are made
by the President.

I would like to review with you the key elements
of our proposal for Fiscal Year 1976, region by region.

The Middle East

The Middle East portion of our security assistance
request makes up about 70 per cent of the program. But
it is matched in magnitude by the United States' national
interests that are involved.

- 9 -

-- It is designed to provide Israel with the
assistance needed to maintain its security and consequently
its confidence in its own strength and in our support
to persevere in negotiations. Israel, to which we have
an historical and moral obligation, requires assistance
to maintain both defensive strength and economic health.
Our program is aimed at these objectives.

-- It is designed to give tangible expression to our
important relations with Arab countries, and to encourage Egypt's

- 10 -

courageous and constructive efforts to move from confrontation to negotiation. Egypt faces massive tasks of rebuilding and economic development; we seek to help Egypt in this endeavor.

Our assistance also helps Jordan remain an area of moderation in the Middle East. It helps us consolidate our cooperation with Syria, which is central to the negotiating process.

-- And it is designed to support our overall effort in the Middle East to avert another upheaval which could dash our own hopes for economic recovery and growth, strain our relations with our allies in Europe and Japan, and pose the dangers of a U. S. -Soviet confrontation.

Our policy of furthering all constructive forces in the Middle East is the surest path through which we can help

-11-

the parties attain a durable settlement which meets the
principal concerns and interests of all in the area -- including
the survival of Israel as a state.

In sum, the stakes in the Middle East are big, no less
than war and peace; our national interests in the area are
vitally important. The responsibilities we have assumed are
substantial, but they are warranted.

Our assistance is not, as some have suggested, the price
of the recently concluded Sinai agreement. If there had been
no agreement, the needs of the countries concerned, and the
imperatives of our interests and of our relations with them,
would still have required an ongoing program of comparable
magnitude -- in conditions of continuing stalemate rather than

- 12 -

as is now the case, in the context of hopeful forward movement.

The additional burden of U. S. assistance is modest -- and
infinitely less than the demonstrated costs of another war.

In preparing our Middle East program, we have been
mindful of the economic problems facing us here at home and
the budgetary restraints they require. We have therefore
tried to strike a balance between what we could do to assist
constructively in the area and what we should ask the Congress
and the American people to provide. Our program reflects
this balance. We hope it will receive the support that it
requires and deserves.

## Security Assistance to Other Regions

After the Middle East, the balance of our security

within it. The Congress is well aware of the extraordinary
complications which the Cyprus dispute has created for our
relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the impact on
the overall NATO structure. By resuming well-conceived
grant and credit assistance programs for these two key nations,
the United States can meet legitimate military procurement
needs that will strengthen our allies and at the same time enable
us to play a more effective role in helping find a mutually
satisfactory solution to the Cyprus conflict.

## East Asia

Our security assistance proposals for East Asia are
designed to demonstrate that America will sustain a constructive
role in the area. It is clear that throughout the region states

eager to preserve their independence are anxious to see the
United States remain politically engaged in Asia. They
recognize -- as we must -- that no equilibrium can long
be maintained there without our active participation. And
many countries of consequence to us will measure our will
and capacity to perpetuate a constructive involvement in the
Asian balance by our efforts to help others develop a more
self-reliant defense position. Already perceptible progress
in the direction of self-reliance is evident in the fact that
our request for Foreign Military Sales credits for East Asian
countries exceeds -- in fact, is twice as large, as -- our request
for grant aid funds.

In Korea we are requesting $76 million in grant aid and

- 16 -

$126 million in credits, repayable in full at current market interest rates. The South Koreans have made substantial progress in their own military modernization effort. In the face of heightened tension on the peninsula, they have imposed on themselves a heavy defense tax to finance improved defenses. We have put forward proposals in the United Nations to break the diplomatic impasse on Korea. We intend to provide the necessary muscle with which to support these initiatives.

We consider it important to pay special attention to allied and friendly nations in Southeast Asia, whose concern for their security is understandable in the light of recent developments. The Philippines has internal security problems.

- 17 -

Thailand wants to preserve the security of its border regions
and counter an increased potential for subversion in three
parts of the country. Likewise, Indonesia seeks to strengthen
its ability to patrol and protect its far-flung archipelago.

Our grant programs in these countries are matched by credit
proposals that attest to the increasing abilities of these
countries to meet much of their defense burden.

## Latin America

Four months ago in the spirit of mutual confidence and
respect that has increasingly characterized hemispheric
relations, we joined with our neighbors in successfully
modernizing the Rio Treaty, the world's oldest mutual security
instrument. In keeping with this continuing cooperation, and

- 18 -

in an effort to take into account the growing self-sufficiency
and economic development priorities of the Latin America
countries, we have focused our programs primarily on
the fostering of professional skills and relationships rather
than on the support of military inventories or maneuvers.

Training is accordingly the common denominator, while
our grant materiel programs are being phased out.

Excepting only the $2 million program for Bolivia, grant
materiel assistance is limited to less than $500,000 for
each of only eight countries. In addition, in proportion to
the military budgets of the Latin American nations which
remain low by international standards, our proposed FMS
credits are also modest. On the whole, our programs reflect

- 19 -

our interest in remaining responsive to Latin America's
reasonable military needs within a framework of cooperation
and growing economic self-sufficiency.

## Africa

There are two significant programs proposed for Africa. Stability in the Horn of Africa has wider geopolitical meaning. To help maintain that stability we proposed $12.6 million in grant aid and $10 million in credits for Ethiopia, a strategically located nation.

Zaire would receive $19 million in credits to help modernize its forces and meet its legitimate defense needs in view of increased threats to its security -- particularly that posed by the instability in Angola. Our aid would help

- 20 -

meet a defensive force need recommended by a U. S. military
study team after careful observation and consultation with
the Zaire military.

* * * * * * *

Mr. Chairman, I have addressed my remarks to the
central aspects of our security assistance program -- its
place in our overall foreign policy design, the basic
criteria under which it is employed, and the process through
which our decisions on it are reached. I have focused on
the area of greatest present urgency, the Middle East, and
have reviewed our proposals for other regions. I am now
ready to respond to your questions on these or other matters
pertaining to our security assistance program as planned for
fiscal year 1976.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOR
THE SECRETARY'S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, Nov., 19, 1975

Q. What is the Executive Branch doing about the depletion of U.S. coastal fish stocks by foreign fishermen?

A. We are moving on several fronts to protect the coastal fish stocks off the United States. The best way in the long run to conserve and manage fish stocks throughout the world is by a global oceans agreement. Considerable progress towards a comprehensive treaty has been made and I hope that a treaty will be signed next year. If it is, the treaty will provide internationally recognized authority to control all fishing for coastal stocks within 200 miles of the U.S.

Independent of the Law of the Sea effort, we are negotiating a series of bilateral and regional fisheries arrangements to bring about the functional equivalent of a 200-mile fisheries zone as soon as feasible. We have at least 11 bilateral fisheries agreements due for renegotiation next year as well as regular meetings of six fisheries commissions. The recently concluded International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (ICNAF) was quite successful. The ICNAF catch quotas will allow the recovery of the principal coastal stocks from Maine to North Carolina. In sum,

- 2 -

we believe that the negotiated route will lead to the
establishment of the fisheries conservation and
management regime that is needed as quickly or more
quickly than unilateral legislation.

Q. If we made S.961 effective on December 31, 1976 or July 1, 1977, would you still object to it?

A. Yes. The unilateral character of the action is not removed simply by deferring the time of application. But even if one were not opposed in principle, why pass S.961 now to be effective in 1977? A delayed date would not immediately help to protect coastal fisheries off our shores. In any case, we shall know the results of the Law of the Sea Conference as well as the Presidential fisheries initiative in 1976. It is wise from all points of view to wait. We have too many interests at stake, in addition to fisheries, to jeopardize the Law of the Sea Conference.

Q. Don't you agree that passage of S.961 will help bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion?

A. No. The threat of passage of unilateral legislation may have been helpful in some of our bilateral fisheries negotiations. However, the situation is markedly different in the multilateral law of the sea negotiations. By and large, the nations fishing off our coast do not want a 200-mile zone. But most states want a 200-mile economic zone at the Law of the Sea Conference. If S.961 becomes

- 3 -

law, these states will have been given one of their
principal goals in the negotiations with no corres-
ponding advantage to the U.S. The incentive to con-
clude a multilateral agreement protecting a wide
variety of vital U.S. interests will decrease as
foreign nations see their objectives being realized
by unilateral action. An additional problem is that
as nations enact unilateral legislation (or embody
it in their Constitutions as Mexico plans to do), they
lose the ability to consider the full range of treaty
solutions to various problems. We are at a stage in
the Law of the Sea negotiations where we must have
flexibility to make accommodations. I would like to
emphasize that there is no risk of the United States
<u>not</u> acquiring management jurisdiction over coastal
stocks within 200 miles of our shores in a Law of the
Sea Treaty.

Q. How would S.961 violate U.S. treaty obligations?

A. The U.S. is a party to the 1958 Convention on the
High Seas, which states that freedom of fishing is one
of the fundamental freedoms of the high seas. The U.S.
is also a party to the 1958 Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
which requires that conservation measures be non-
discriminatory. S.961 would establish a 200-mile

exclusive fishing zone on the high seas that would eliminate freedom of fishing and discriminate against foreign fishermen.

Q. If that is the case, did we not violate that provision of the High Seas Convention by the establishment of an exclusive fishing of 12 miles in 1965?

A. The area up to 12 miles from the coast has long been recognized as being subject to special coastal state rights. The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, recognizes the right to establish a 12-mile zone for customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary purposes. The only significant objection to including a fisheries zone of 12 miles came from states that preferred a full 12-mile territorial sea. The International Court of Justice said in its 1974 judgment in the Iceland Fisheries Case that a 12-mile fishery zone "appears now to be generally accepted".

Q. What would enforcement cost in monetary terms? Realistically, what risk of confrontation is posed by enforcement of a 200-mile exclusive fishing zone?

A. There are no figures available on how much the financial cost would be to enforce a 200-mile zone against states that refuse to recognize our jurisdiction.

Obviously, it could be very expensive. I believe
the Coast Guard has provided the Committee with some
preliminary estimates on increased enforcement costs
against consenting states if S.961 were enacted.

We know there is a risk of confrontation on the
high seas or economic retaliation against U.S. interests
if foreign nations do not agree to accept our right to
board or seize their vessels within 200 miles. It
is difficult to assess the degree of risk. Clearly,
we would vastly prefer not to have any risk at all.
That is why we support a negotiated approach.

Drafted: D/LOS:MHNordquist:ps
x22658 11/18/75

Clearance:

D/LOS - Amb. Moore
L - Mr. Oxman
T - Mr. Craft
OES - Mr. Dalton
H - Mr. MacKenzie

I am pleased to be here to testify on our security
assistance proposals for fiscal year 1976.

Throughout the post World War II era the United States
and our allies kept the peace and promoted the prosperity
of the world. We sought to preserve our democratic
institutions and our heritage of values in the context of
a rigid bipolar international structure in which we
confronted a relentless adversary.

It was evident then that security was the indispensable
foundation of all else we sought to accomplish in the world. Our
freedoms and interests could only be preserved, we felt, if
we remained vigilant to any attempt at encroachment in any
corner of the globe. To contain our adversaries we sold or gave
defense equipment and services to those who shared our opposition
to Communism. The American people and their government
agreed that the concept of security assistance was crucial to
our nation's foreign policy objectives.

With the end of the last decade it became evident that
the postwar international structure was passing into history,
impelled by vast new changes. The bipolar Cold War era was
fading. American military predominance was replaced by
strategic balance. The global colonial structure had ended.

- 3 -

New centers of power and influence were springing up around
the globe, in old nations and new. Major alterations in
international structures were called for. An unprecedented and
vast range of global problems brought by interdependence
imposed new imperatives for cooperation and efficiency.

We had entered an uncertain and unpredictable era, even for this
most turbulent century in history. The success and even the
survival of the community of nations is by no means assured.

In this changed context, one element remains fundamental:
all foreign policy still begins with security. A well-reasoned
and carefully monitored policy of security assistance is a
fundamental tool of our foreign policy in every major area.

--To maintain our nation's safety there is no substitute
for a strong national defense supported by a web of defense

ties with nations who share our commitment to peace and self-determination. The United States and our allies have been the cornerstone of world peace for decades. We must maintain the strategic balance in today's more uncertain world or we risk losing the anchor of world stability.

-- But there can be no enduringly peaceful international order unless relations between the nations with the power to destroy mankind are placed on a more rational footing. The moral antagonism between democracy and Communism cannot be ignored; it remains the heart of the problem. Nevertheless, we have begun to reduce tensions and lay the basis for a more reliable and cooperative future. The indispensable element in these positive achievements has been our strength and

allied unity. Our progress rests ultimately on ensuring that potential adversaries have no choice but to exercise restraint.

The task is complex, but it must be understood: we must maintain security even while striving to ease tensions; these are two sides of the single objective of peace.

-- The range of issues we face with the new and developing nations has a security dimension as well. No nation wants to entrust its fate to the whim of others. No country, rich or poor, is indifferent to its security. In a world where the number of arms suppliers is increasing, nations will not tolerate indifference or attitudes of moral superiority from those to whom they turn for help. But our defense supply links to other countries can significantly strengthen our influence and our efforts to achieve cooperation across the broad range of issues of interdependence.

- 6 -

Security assistance underlies our efforts to help resolve regional conflicts as well. In a world of heightened nuclear peril we have no choice but to try to contain disputes which hold the seeds of wider, global confrontation. While it is still possible in some areas of the world to try to keep the peace through denying the external supply of military materiel, the possibilities of success through this approach are very difficult. Meanwhile, conflicts must be contained through upholding stable balances of power in volatile regions through the carefully considered transfer of defense equipment.

## Security Assistance to the Middle East

The most immediate and urgent regional conflict facing the United States and the world is, of course, the Middle

East. Our security assistance to the Middle East includes
both military and economic elements.

The Middle East portion of our security assistance
request is large, fully 70 percent of the program. But it
is matched in magnitude by the U. S. national interests that
it is designed to protect and further.

Our Middle East security assistance program directly
affects matters of vital national importance. It is a
central part of our efforts to help achieve progress toward
peace. We have a historical and moral commitment to
Israel. We have important concerns in the Arab world.

Perpetual crisis in the Middle East would severely strain our relations with our most important allies. And upheaval in the Middle East jeopardizes the world's hopes for economic recovery and increases the prospect of direct U. S. -Soviet confrontation. For all these reasons, our aid request is a prudent investment in peace.

One important aspect of our policy in the Middle East has long been helping to preserve the ability of Israel to persevere in its own defense. Despite Israel's having taken what we here in the United States would consider to be extremely stringent domestic austerity measures, it is clear that Israel must have substantial assistance.

The $1.5 billion funding level proposed by the Administration

-9-

for FY 1976 reflects this. Our recommendation is based on Israeli thinking about its military requirements over the next several years and our analysis of Israel's force modernization plans. We are reviewing these requirements in the same spirit as we have reviewed previous Israeli requests. We know that a substantial U. S. response will be necessary, even though decisions on specific items of equipment are still under discussion.

Our new friendship with Egypt does not in any way undermine our traditional commitment to the security and survival of Israel. Indeed, our policy of furthering all constructive forces in the Middle East is the surest path through which we can help the parties attain a durable settlement which meets the principal concerns and interests of all in the area -- including the survival of Israel as a state.

-10-

We must also find the means to demonstrate and nurture
our growing friendship for Egypt. The case for Egypt is also
strong. Egypt has courageously embarked on the road to
peace and moved from confrontation to negotiation as a means
to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute. At the same time Egypt's
leaders must take on the massive tasks of rebuilding the
Suez area, rehabilitating the economy, and carrying forward
the development of their country. The United States can
and should assist Egypt in overcoming these major economic
problems and encourage Egypt's efforts toward closer relations
with the West.

- 11 -

Our security assistance also helps Jordan to remain an
area of stability and moderation in a strategic area of the
Arab-Israeli conflict. We must also consolidate our
cooperation with Syria in this area as part of our overall
relationship which will remain central to the negotiating process
in the coming year.

In sum, the stakes in the Middle East are big, no
less than war and peace; our national interests in the area
have become vitally important. The responsibilities we
have assumed are substantial but they are warranted.

-12-

comparable magnitude -- but in conditions of continuing
stalemate rather than, as is now the case, in the context
of hopeful forward movement. The burden of U. S. assistance
is modest -- and infinitely less than the demonstrated costs
of another war.

In the last two years we have worked closely with
the nations of this area in the search for peace. One of the
consequences of working together in one sphere of vital
interest is that those with whom we work come to trust us and
look to us for help in other spheres of vital concern --
strengthening their own countries and improving the conditions
of life for their own peoples.

-13-

After the Middle East, the balance of our security
assistance requests is allocated to other regional areas in the
following portions:

- Europe 11% $534.0 million
- East Asia 10% $448.4 million
- Latin America 4% $196.0 million
- Africa 1.5% $68.5 million
- Near East 1% $55.0 million
(exclusive of the
Middle East)

Europe

-14-

Europe

Our European proposals are focused primarily on Turkey and Greece. The strength of these two countries and their association with us in NATO is critical to the stability of the Mediterranean region and the solidity of our position within it. The Congress is well aware of the extraordinary complications which the Cyprus dispute has created for our relations in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the impact on the overall NATO structure. By resuming well-conceived grant and credit assistance programs for these two key nations, the United States can meet legitimate military procurement needs that will strengthen our allies and at the same time enable us to play a more effective role in helping find a mutually satisfactory solution to the Cyprus conflict.

-15-

## East Asia

fact that our request for Foreign Military Sales credits for East Asian countries exceeds -- in fact, is twice as large -- as our request for grant aid funds.

In Korea we are requesting $76 million in grant aid and $126 million in credits, repayable in full at current market interest rates. The South Koreans have made substantial progress in their own military modernization effort. In the face of heightened tension on the peninsula, they have imposed on themselves a heavy defense tax to finance improved defenses. We have put forward proposals in the United Nations to break the diplomatic impasse on Korea.

We consider it important to pay special attention to allied and friendly nations in Southeast Asia, whose concern for their security is understandable in the light of recent developments. The Philippines has internal security problems. Thailand wants to preserve the security of its border regions

-17-

## Latin America

Four months ago in the spirit of mutual confidence and
respect that has increasingly characterized hemispheric
relations, we joined with our neighbors in successfully
modernizing the Rio Treaty, the world's oldest mutual
security instrument. In keeping with this continuing coopera-
tion, and in an effort to take into account the growing self-
sufficiency and economic development priorities of the
Latin American countries, we have focused our programs

-18-

primarily on the fostering of professional skills and relation-
ships rather than on the support of military inventories or
maneuvers. Training is accordingly the common
denominator, while our grant materiel programs are being
phased out. Excepting only the $2 million program for Bolivia,
grant materiel assistance is limited to less than $500,000
for each of only eight countries. In addition, in proportion to
the military budgets of the Latin American nations which
remain low by international standards, our proposed FMS
credits are also modest. On the whole, our programs reflect
our interest in remaining responsive to Latin America's
reasonable military needs within a framework of cooperation
and growing economic self-sufficiency.

Africa

-19-

To help maintain that stability we propose $12.6 million in

strategically located nation.

Zaire would receive $19 million in credits to help modernize its forces and meet its legitimate defense needs in view of increased threats to its security -- particularly that posed by the instability in Angola. Our aid would help meet a defensive force need recommended by a U.S. military study team after careful observation and consultation with the Zaire military. In addition, a $20 million Security Supporting Assistance Loan to Zaire would help meet a temporary balance of payments problem which threatens stability and U.S. financial interests in this key country.

* * * * * * *

Mr. Chairman, I have addressed my remarks to the
central aspects of our security assistance program -- its
place in our overall foreign policy design; the basic criteria
under which it is employed; and the process through which
our decisions on it are reached. I have focused on the area
of greatest present urgency, the Middle East, and have
reviewed our proposals for other regions. I am now ready
to respond to your questions on these or other matters
pertaining to our security assistance program as planned
for fiscal year 1976.

In the Cold War era we saw clearly that security assistance
was integral to our nation's most important objectives. Today we
face a more complex challenge: we now must simultaneously
maintain a strong defense and seek more constructive international
relations. Yet foreign policy still begins with security; it is
the only sure basis for building more rational and reliable relations
with those whose values and objectives are inimical to our own.

-4-

can be furthered by the transfer of American defense services
and equipment, <u>there are a number of criteria we consider.</u>

<u>First</u>, we look at the nature of the threat to those who
<u>seek our help</u>; to their role in their region and in the world; and
to their ability and desire to help themselves.

<u>Second</u>, we look to our own interest in helping preserve the
<u>security of the recipient country</u>; and we examine what potential
influence for positive conduct we would gain should our assistance
be given.

<u>Third</u>, we ask what other sources are available. The
denial of our help might only force a turn toward another, undesirable,
source of supply; a relationship favorable to us might be altered
and new sources of regional instability created.

<u>And fourth</u>, we assess the consequences for the United
**States**. Will our own defense readiness or efficiency be affected?

Will the central strategic balance be altered?

With these considerations in mind, I would like to review
with you our proposals for security assistance region by region.

The largest and most urgent portion of our request is the

Middle East, which makes up 70 per cent of our program.

Our security assistance request for the Middle East:

-- is designed to provide Israel with the assistance needed to
maintain its security and consequently its confidence in its
own strength and in our support to persevere in negotiations.

Israel, to which we have an historical and moral obligation,
requires assistance to maintain both defensive strength and
economic health. The $1.5 billion funding level proposed

by the Administration for FY 1976 reflects this. Our
request is based on Israeli thinking about its military

(ic)

-7-

-- Our program for the Middle East also is designed to give tangible expression to our important relations with Arab countries, and to encourage Egypt's courageous and constructive efforts to move from confrontation to negotiation. Egypt faces massive tasks of rebuilding and economic development; we seek to help Egypt in this endeavor. Our assistance also helps Jordan remain an area of moderation in the Middle East. It helps us consolidate our cooperation with Syria, which is central to the negotiating process.

but they are warranted.

Our assistance is not, as some have suggested, the price
of the recently concluded Sinai agreement. If there had been no
agreement, the needs of the countries concerned, and the imperatives
of our interests and of our relations with them, would still have
required an ongoing program of comparable magnitude -- in conditions
of continuing stalemate rather than as is now the case, in the context
of hopeful forward movement. The additional burden of U.S.
assistance is modest -- and infinitely less than the demonstrated
costs of another war.

-10-

<table><tr><td>- Europe</td><td>11%</td><td>$534.0 million</td></tr><tr><td>- East Asia</td><td>10%</td><td>$448.4 million</td></tr><tr><td>- Latin America</td><td>4%</td><td>$196.0 million</td></tr><tr><td>- Africa</td><td>1.5%</td><td>$ 68.5 million</td></tr><tr><td>- Near East<br>(exclusive of the<br>Middle East)</td><td>1%</td><td>$ 55.0 million</td></tr></table>

## Europe

-11-

region and the solidity of our position within it. The Congress
is well aware of the extraordinary complications which the Cyprus
dispute has created for our relations in the Eastern Mediterranean,
and the impact on the overall NATO structure. By resuming well-
conceived grant and credit assistance programs for these two key
nations, the United States can meet legitimate military procurement
needs that will strengthen our allies and at the same time enable
us to play a more effective role in helping find a mutually
satisfactory solution to the Cyprus conflict.

## East Asia

recognize -- as we must -- that no equilibrium can long be
maintained there without our active participation. And many
countries of consequence to us will measure our will and
capacity to perpetuate a constructive involvement in the Asian
balance by our efforts to help others develop a more self-reliant
defense position. Already perceptible progress in the direction
of self-reliance is evident in the fact that our request for
Foreign Military Sales credits for East Asian countries exceeds --
in fact, is twice as large as--our request for grant aid funds.

-13-

The Philippines has internal security problems. Thailand wants to preserve the security of its border regions and counter an increased potential for subversion in three parts of the country.

-14-

Latin America

In keeping with this continuing cooperation, and in an effort to
take into account the growing self-sufficiency and economic
development priorities of the Latin American countries, we have
focused our programs primarily on the fostering of professional
skills and relationships rather than on the support of military
inventories or maneuvers. Training is accordingly the common
denominator, while our grant materiel programs are being
phased out. Excepting only the $2 million program for Bolivia,
grant materiel assistance is limited to less than $500,000 for
each of only eight countries. In addition, in proportion to the

-15-

## Africa

To help maintain that stability we propose $12.6 million in grant aid and $10 million in credits for Ethiopia, a strategically located nation.

-16-

* * * * *

Mr. Chairman, I have addressed my remarks to the
central aspects of our security assistance program -- its place
in our overall foreign policy design; the basic criteria under
which it is employed; and the process through which our decisions
on it are reached. I have focused on the area of greatest present
urgency, the Middle East, and have reviewed our proposals for
other regions. I am now ready to respond to your questions on

STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH THE
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE [INOUYE COMMITTEE]. ON SE-
CURITY ASSISTANCE, NOVEMBER 20, 1975

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you foresee any changes in the relations between the United States and Spain following Franco's death?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We believe that Spain is likely to move into a, perhaps a direction that makes its association with the Atlantic community and with the European Community easier. We of course attach great importance to that and will support such efforts.

**QUESTION:** You mean you anticipate a political evolution in Spain now?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, a political evolution is inevitable, and we hope that it will be in a direction that will make it easier for Spain to participate in larger organizations, such as the Atlantic alliance and the Western European Communities.

**QUESTION:** Will this have any effect on the negotiations for the American bases?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, of course, the new government has not even been formed yet. But this will be one of our top-priority objectives.

**QUESTION:** Thank you.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Nice to see you, again.

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE, FOLLOWING HIS TESTIMONY BEFORE THE CHURCH SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 1975

**Secretary Kissinger:** The Committee and I reviewed the general problem of the control of covert operations, their purpose and their relationship to national policy. There was some discussion of individual instances as they related to the general topic. But the primary concern of this hearing was to deal with the relationship of covert operations to national policy, and the relationship between Executive conduct and legislative oversight. I must say the Committee, as on my previous discussions, conducted the meeting in a very fair and very constructive atmosphere.

**Question:** Mr. Secretary, would you want to reconsider what you previously said about your connection with operations in Chile as a result of what appears in yesterday's report of the Senate Committee?

**Secretary Kissinger:** I have testified at great length before the Committee, and they have the full record of these operations, and I don't think it is appropriate for me to go into any more public discussion.

**Question:** What kind of ideas do you have to prevent some of the really wild things that were revealed in that report? What can be done, legislatively or otherwise?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, I think there can be a tighter control within the Executive branch. I think the --- I strongly favor the idea of a legislative oversight committee, and there should be a much closer relationship between such an oversight committee and the Executive branch as it develops covert operations.

**Question:** Do you think you can really stop that sort of stuff in the future? Make sure it just doesn't happen anymore?

**Secretary Kissinger:** I'm positive it can be stopped.

**Question:** What have you advised President Ford to do about tightening up the covert operations?

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, I don't think it's appropriate for me to discuss publicly whatever it was I may have given to President Ford. But we have not yet developed a formal

-2-

[LC]

proposal for President Ford. This will have to be done on
an inter-agency basis. But I believe that the Committee
and the Executive Branch can work out a mutually acceptable
arrangement.

**Question:** Should covert operations be taken out of the CIA?

**Secretary Kissinger:** I would think not.

**Question:** Mr. Secretary, there will be public hearings on covert operations. Can it be assumed you'll testify in public?

**Secretary Kissinger:** No, I do not believe that it's
appropriate for the Secretary of State to testify in public
about covert operations.

**Question:** In any form, even --

**Secretary Kissinger:** Well, I have testified now twice before
the committee at great length and in detail about covert
operations that I'm familiar with and the general philosophy
of them. I have agreed to return another time when the
Committee has crystalized its legislative proposals to give
the Committee my views about them. So, they will have a
rather full record of my views.

**Question:** Can I raise what appears to be one specific
contradiction that arises from yesterday's report: the
position both you and former President Nixon have generally
taken with regard to Chile was that there was no
involvement and no thought of a support or instigation of
a military coup. The record as it comes out now appears to
put that in a different light. Were you supporting a military
coup?

**Secretary Kissinger:** We have stated repeatedly that the
military coup in 1973 was in no way supported by the United
States. We had no contact with any of the people that
carried out the military coup. And therefore, the coup that
overthrew Allende was done without contact with the United States.

**Question:** Mr. Secretary, what about 1970? That was the issue
in the report, not 1973.

**Secretary Kissinger:** The report is another matter.

********

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

November 24, 1975

No. 578-A

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
TO THE
SPEECH BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF DETROIT
NOVEMBER 24, 1975

MR. RAY W. MACDONALD, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Burroughs Corporation: Good evening Ladies and Gentlemen. It gives me a great pleasure to welcome so many of you to tonight's dinner meeting of the Economic Club of Detroit. We have with us tonight an outstanding American diplomat, perhaps the most well-known and talked about world statesman who has ever occupied the office of United States Secretary of State. His popularity, I am sure, is well indicated by the large attendance we have this evening.

To begin our program, I would like to ask that you all rise for our invocation to be delivered by Father Malcolm Carron, President of the University of Detroit.

FATHER CARRON: Almighty God our Father, who is in heaven, in a week when Americans give thanks for your bountiful gifts we add another prayer of thanksgiving to you this evening for this food and this gathering; for the opportunity to hear one of our nation's leaders we give thanks.

We are grateful to our Secretary of State for his unwavering quest for peace in the world. We are thankful that you have blessed his efforts with so much success. Grant life; grant strength and patience and humility to all who work for peace, our national leaders young and old who strive for peace.

Grant prudence in proportion to our power, wisdom in proportion to our science, humaneness in proportion to our wealth and might, and bless our earnest will to help all races and peoples to travel in friendship with us along the road to justice, liberty and lasting peace.

We recognize that it is only when we are at peace with ourselves and with our neighbors that we can develop our humanity to its fullest and please you to the fullest.

We pray all this for ourselves, our families, and for a waiting and hopeful world.

Amen.

MR. MACDONALD: Thank you, Father Carron.

In addition to this historic event of the presence of Henry Kissinger, this evening is also historic for the small size of the head table of the Economic Club. (Laughter) (Applause). And because of its small size, I would like to present to you three of the special members at the head table.

For further information contact:

-2-

PR 578-A

On my far right is the Honorable Ira Kaufman, Judge of Wayne County Probate Court and Chairman of the Detroit Committee on Foreign Relations, one of our associate sponsoring organizations this evening. (Applause)

Next to him is John C. McCabe, President and Chief Administrative Officer of Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Michigan, and Chairman of the Board of the Greater Detroit Chamber of Commerce, our second associate sponsor. (Applause)

And I am sure you all know Russ Swaney, President of the Economic Club of Detroit. (Applause)

And to introduce our guest speaker this evening, it is my honor and pleasure to present to you Michigan's outstanding legislative leader -- a man who has assembled an enviable record in support of Michigan citizens as a member of the United States House of Representatives for more than nine years, and more recently as a member of the United States Senate for an equal length of time. His energetic leadership in the Senate has earned him election by his peers as Senate Minority Whip, a post he has held since 1969.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased to present to you also the Director of the Economic Club of Detroit, our esteemed Senator from Michigan, The Honorable Robert T. Griffin.

(Standing ovation)

SENATOR GRIFFIN: Thanks very much, Ray.

Chairman Ray has previously delegated to me the unique honor of introducing the man who undoubtedly has the most interesting garbage in Washington. (Laughter)

If genius is ten percent inspiration and ninety percent perspiration, as Edison said, then our guest tonight is a super genius. It is one thing to be a renowned and respected scholar in the field of international relations as Henry Kissinger is. Ten years ago this month he was still at Harvard at the peak of his academic career having just completed his fifth major book in less than a decade.

But it is something altogether different for a professor to leave the academic heights to test his inspiration and perspiration in the sometimes grubby, always uncertain, and inevitably frustrating real world of politics.

Of course, Henry goes to great lengths for the cause of peace. Have you ever noticed how much time he spends kissing important men who need a shave? (Laughter) But I suspect his staying power on those long journeys can be explained by his knowledge that Nancy will be waiting up for him at home when the journey is over.

Surely an impressive measure of perspiration Henry has expended since coming to Washington in 1969 is that he has logged more than 300,000 miles of international travel in his efforts for peace. But surely the most dramatic measure of success is the fact that we find ourselves today at a moment in history when not one nation anywhere in the world is engaged in hostilities with any other nation anywhere in the world.

As you know, Dr. Kissinger was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and I doubt that anyone in this country or in the world has ever been more deserving of the recognition. I think it is characteristic of this man who never had the opportunity to accumulate great wealth that he donated the $70,000

-3-

PR 578-A

which came with the prize to a scholarship fund for children of American servicemen killed or missing in Indochina.

As a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I am close to the sparks of conflict that have been flying between Secretary Kissinger and the Congress. Indeed, I might say that Henry's historic achievements are all the more remarkable because he has managed somehow to overcome not only the thorny and almost impossible problems of international relations, but the help that is continually being volunteered by the Congress. (Laughter)

Congress is so hostile and partisan that, if you want to know the truth, Henry flies over to the Middle East and to the Soviet Union and to China so he can enjoy being in a friendly capital. (Laughter) (Applause)

It is a tribute to President Ford and to Secretary Kissinger that both of them recognize the importance of communicating directly with the people on the subject of foreign policy. That is why Henry has traveled more than 50,000 miles inside the United States to bring the message of foreign policy to grassroots America. And it is particularly appropriate, I think, that this mission has brought him tonight to the home state of Arthur Vandenburg, who, like our distinguished guest, recognized not only the need for keeping the people informed, but also the vital importance of keeping political partisanship out of foreign policy.

It is a personal honor and privilege, on behalf of the Economic Club and the people of Michigan, to extend a warm welcome to an inspiring, valiant, brilliant, and tireless leader in the cause of peace throughout the world.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I present a great American, Secretary Henry Kissinger. (Standing ovation)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Mr. Chairman, Senator Griffin, Ladies and Gentlemen. I very much appreciate the very warm and friendly introduction of my friend Bob Griffin. I must say I have not heard as many such comments from the Congress in the last year. (Laughter) In fact, before we came in here Bob said to me, "I know why you are going to China -- because China doesn't have an extradition treaty with the United States." (Laughter)

Bob Griffin has been a strong leader in the Senate, the key member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. At a time when so many seem bent on perpetuating division, doubt and with the disparagement of the past decade, he has been a force for reason and responsibility in our nation's interest. He has been a staunch supporter of the President, a good friend, and a wise counsellor.

(Delivers prepared address)

* * * * *

The Secretary
of State

[LC]

Speech

November 24, 1975
Detroit, Michigan

Office of Media Services
Bureau of Public Affairs

BUILDING AN ENDURING FOREIGN POLICY

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Economic Club of Detroit.*

I come before you tonight to talk about what is right with America's foreign policy.

This nation, no matter how much some may cast doubt on it, is still seen as the land of hope by all the millions around the world who cherish freedom, the dignity of man, and peace. Without us there can be no security. Without us there can be no hope for progress. America has been true to its responsibility. And I am here to say that it will remain so.

Out of the ashes of World War II, we and our allies built a new world. We had learned from bitter experience that America's safety and world peace, America's prosperity and the world economy, were inextricably linked. In this spirit the United States promoted the economic and political recovery of Western Europe and Japan. We strengthened our defense and forged our first peacetime alliances; they have preserved the global balance of power for a generation. We pioneered in arms control, so that the specter of global cataclysm might never become a reality. We and our partners built a cooperative global economic system so that growth, prosperity, and development could be the common heritage of mankind. We have mediated conflicts and helped settle problems from the Middle East to Berlin.

The technological and managerial genius of this country has been the driving force of global change; our science and communications have circled the planet and stretched to the moon and beyond. The American people have reached out with generosity to their fellow men afflicted by

disease, hunger, deprivation, natural disaster, war, and oppression. More than any other nation, we have taken in immigrants and refugees, fed the starving, and educated the youth of other lands. We owe the world no apology for what we have done. We have much to be proud of.

And a generation after World War II, with conditions radically altered and the postwar period of international relations at an end—partially as a result of the success of previous policies—the United States successfully adapted its foreign policy to a new era. At the beginning of this decade we faced a number of urgent tasks:

* The military balance was being altered by the growth of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the acceleration of weapons technology.

* We were bogged down in a war that we would not win and seemingly could not end.

* For 20 years we had isolated ourselves from China—in other words, from one quarter of the human race.

* Our relations with the Soviet Union were characterized by constant tension and confrontation on the access routes to Berlin, in the Middle East, and in the Caribbean.

* Diplomatic relations with most Arab states were broken and progress toward peace in the Middle East was stalemated.

* The new strength and vitality of Europe and Japan required major adjustments in the practices and responsibilities of the previous two decades.

We have come a long way in the first half of this decade. American foreign policy has been transformed. We brought peace to our nation for

PR 578

2

the first time in over a decade and a half.

We have ended our isolation from China and opened a growing relationship with the world's most populous nation. U.S.-Soviet relations have entered a new period. In place of continual crises there are continuing negotiations-in arms control, economic relations, and international issues-which give both sides a stake in peace and have lessened the chances that great-power confrontation will lead to nuclear Armageddon.

In the Middle East we have restored diplomatic relations with all of the key countries of the Arab world. We have helped to move the area from stagnation to hope. Three major agreements between Israel and its Arab neighbors have opened the path to peace-a path on which we are determined to persevere.

Our relations with Europe and Japan have been given new balance and impetus. As the recent economic summit demonstrated, they have never been better.

Above all, not only our country, but the world, is at peace. For the first time since the end of World War II, no nation anywhere is engaged in military conflict with another.

This is the true record of our foreign policy-not the debates, the innuendos, and political wrangling that so often form the headlines of the day. It is the end result of the trips, the meetings, the summits, the agreements, the setbacks, and the achievements of the everyday conduct of foreign affairs. These are the building blocks of a dream all Americans share-the vision of a peaceful, just, humane, and progressive world.

We have had our disappointments, and we have made our mistakes. After the bitter experience of Viet-Nam, America has learned that it does not possess the power to right every wrong or to solve every problem. We know that our influence is finite, though the demands upon it and the injustices of the world often seem infinite. And we understand that America, like all human institutions, is fallible.

But the vast majority of Americans remain convinced-as your Government is-that if we do not resist aggression, if we do not work for a better world economy, if we do not promote liberty and justice, no nation will do it for us-at least no nation that shares our values.

I want to speak tonight about the broader vision of a lasting peace, and how America is needed to turn that vision into a reality.

## America and Global Peace

The allied statesmen who built the postwar international order would not recognize the international landscape we see today. The evolution that has taken place over 30 years has transformed the environment in which America lives. The world of the last quarter of the 20th century will be vastly different from that to which we have grown accustomed-but it is a world that we must help to shape.

These are the broad tasks of our foreign policy:

In an age of continuing peril and exploding technology, we must maintain and improve our national defense. In the aftermath of Viet-Nam, we have strengthened and modernized our military forces. This process will continue. We know that peace requires an equilibrium of power-and this Government will maintain it. No nation can remain great if it leaves its safety to the mercy or the good will of others. Any realistic hope of better relations with the Communist powers-and there is such hope-dependes on a strong America which leaves other countries no realistic course except restraint and cooperation. So long as potential adversaries continue to expand and improve their forces, we will maintain a modern defense that cannot be challenged.

We will place our priority on our alliances with the great industrial democracies of the Atlantic community and Japan. In the new era, the industrial democracies have found that security involves more than common defense. We joined together out of fear; but we can stay united only if we find deeper and more positive common purposes. The moral unity of the democracies-in an era when their values are a minority in the world and buffeted by difficulties at home-is one of our greatest resources. A sense of solidarity in a turbulent world can help all of our peoples recover the confidence that their societies are vital, that they are the masters of their destinies, that they are not subject to blind forces beyond their control.

This is why the United States attaches so much importance to the economic summit just concluded in France. The agreement to cooperate in economic policy, energy, and development, the major progress made on monetary questions, could usher in a new era of unity and confidence among the industrial democracies. We will never forget that our most important relationships are with those nations which share our principles, our way

3

of life, and our future.

We strongly support the words of the Declaratio-
ion of Rambouillet signed by President Ford
together with the leaders of Britain, France, Italy,
Japan, and Germany: "We came together because
of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are
each responsible for the government of an open,
democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty
and social advancement. Our success will
strengthen, indeed is essential to democratic soci-
ties everywhere."

We will strive to transform the relationship
with the major Communist powers. Foreign policy
must be based on reality, not rhetoric. And today's
reality is that we live in a world of nuclear
equality. This has been imposed by technology. It
could not have been prevented; it cannot be
ignored or reversed by unilateral decision. It means
that we must manage a fundamental conflict of
values in the shadow of nuclear holocaust. We are
striving to preserve peace while defending our
essential principles and interest.

At the same time, the Communist monolith
of a generation ago has fragmented into bitter rival-
ries, and many Communist countries have turned
to the West for more constructive bilateral relation-
ships. This provides the opportunity for a careful
policy of relaxation of tensions. Future generations
would not understand it if partisan controversy
caused us to forget that in the nuclear age the
relaxation of tensions is a moral imperative as well
as a practical necessity. We will spare no effort in
building habits of restraint and moderation among
the superpowers.

But the easing of tensions cannot endure if we
relax our vigilance. We must understand the need
for both defense and relaxation of tension; both
firm action in crises and willingness to resolve
problems on a realistic and fair basis. We must be
prepared for either course; the choice rests with
our adversaries.

We cannot ignore, for example, the substan-
tial Soviet buildup of weapons in Angola which has
introduced great-power rivalry into Africa for the
first time in 15 years. This Soviet involvement is
resented by African nations most of all. But the
United States cannot be indifferent while an out-
side power embarks upon an interventionist
policy—so distant from its homeland and so
removed from traditional Russian interests. The
Soviet Union still has an opportunity for a policy
of restraint which permits Angolans to resolve their

own differences without outside interventions. We
would be glad to cooperate in such a course. But
time is running out; continuation of an interven-
tionist policy must inevitably threaten other
relationships.

Nor can we ignore the thousands of Cubans
sent into an African conflict. In recent months the
United States has demonstrated, by deed as well as
word, its readiness to improve relations with Cuba.
We have cooperated with steps to ease the inter-
American boycott against Cuba and to restore a
more normal relationship between the nations of
the Americas and Cuba. But let there be no illu-
sions: A policy of conciliation will not survive
Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico or Cuban armed
intervention in the affairs of other nations strug-
gling to decide their own fate.

To Cuba, as to other nations with whom our
relations have been strained, I say this: The United
States has no higher goal than to ease the conflicts
that have torn the globe for nearly a generation.
We will be flexible and cooperative in settling con-
flicts. But we will never permit detente to turn into
a subterfuge for unilateral advantage. The policy of
relaxation of tensions is designed to promote
peace, not surrender. We will be flexible, but we
shall insist on reciprocity and restraint.

We shall work to shape a prosperous and
equitable economy. The productivity and econo-
mic strength of this country is one of our greatest
assets. We have used it to help consolidate the vital-
ity of the industrial democracies, to stabilize politi-
cal relations with potential adversaries, and to
fashion new ties with the developing countries.

The division of the planet between North and
South—industrial and developing—is now becoming
as pressing an issue as the division between East
and West. Yet our economies are interdependent,
and neither North nor South can long accept grow-
ing division without paying a costly and unnec-
essary price. International order and a thriving
world economy can only be built on the basis of
cooperation. Economic warfare will mean decline
for everyone, but most of all for the developing
world. Therefore at the U.N. General Assembly
special session in September the United States put
forward a practical program of collaborative en-
deavor on energy, food, trade, raw materials, and
the needs of the poorest. We will continue our
efforts on all these fronts.

Cooperative solutions are our objective, but
we will not accept the proposition that any group

4

of nations, no matter what its temporary economic power, can exercise its strength arbitrarily to the detriment of the world economic system. The economies of the industrialized nations have been severely shaken by the rapid and exorbitant rise in energy prices. The balance of payments and development programs of the poorer countries have been undermined to a point that no conceivable aid program could compensate.

International peace and stability now clearly require an international economic system that embraces the aspirations and needs of all nations. The United States will come to next month's Conference on International Economic Cooperation—the consumer-producer conference—with every intention to help find cooperative arrangements just to all. But we cannot accept indefinitely placing our economy at the mercy of decisions made far away or being asked to redress hardships and meet deficits caused by the actions of others.

## The Asian Dimension

Let me now discuss in some detail one part of the world of particular interest to all Americans: the continent of Asia.

Next week President Ford will travel to Asia to reaffirm our stake in that vast region's future and to strengthen important bilateral ties.

The United States is a Pacific power. Our history has been inextricably linked to Asia. No region is of greater importance to us. None is more dynamic. None merits more America's enduring interest and purpose.

The security interests of all the great world powers intersect in Asia. Japan, China, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States have important stakes in the region. All would be affected by any major conflict there. It is an area vast in population, rich in culture, and abundant in resources. The United States has been involved in three long and costly Asian wars in the past generation. We have learned, at painful cost, that equilibrium in Asia is essential to our own peace and safety, and that no stable order in that region can be maintained without our active participation.

Through much of the postwar period, America engaged itself deeply in Asia to build up friendly nations and to contain Communist expansion. American policy achieved major and lasting successes—the emergence of a prosperous and democratic Japan in close alliance with us; the defeat of aggression in Korea; the continued independence and growing dynamism of the many

small friendly nations in the region.

But by the late 1960's our policies needed to adjust to new realities. We were too directly committed militarily. At times America acted as if its stake in its allies' security was greater than their own.

Thus, throughout the first half of this decade we have sought to fashion a new Asian policy—a policy that gradually reduced our military presence and aimed, instead, at augmenting the strength and vitality of our allies. We sought to stabilize the region by fashioning a balance among the major powers, bringing our commitments into line with our interests.

American policy has had several basic objectives:

* To preserve the sovereignty and independence of our friends in Asia;

* To consolidate our alliance with Japan, by giving our most important Asian ally a greater role and equal partnership;

* To open the door to constructive ties with the People's Republic of China;

* To reduce tensions and promote political solutions to Asian regional conflicts; and

* To encourage self-help and regional cooperation among smaller allies.

On all these fronts much progress has been made in the last few years. Our relations with both adversaries and friends have markedly improved. We have extended the range of our diplomacy without reneging on our commitments to our allies. We have adjusted our military posture to maintain a balance in Asia in the face of changing strategic requirements and political trends. We have expanded our economic relations in many countries.

Most importantly, the structure of Asian peace policy has proven strong enough to withstand the tragedy in Indochina. There was widespread initial apprehension that it might signal—or precipitate—a general American retreat from Asia and even from global responsibilities. Our policy since then has greatly eased those fears.

It is as clear as ever that no serious effort to resolve major problems in Asia can succeed without America's participation. The future of Japan and our other allies, the easing of tensions with potential adversaries, the problem of peace in Korea, the continuing independence of the nations of Southeast Asia all depend significantly on a strong and responsible American policy.

5

This is why President Ford visited Japan and Korea a year ago on his first overseas trip. This is why he will leave for Asia again at the end of this week to visit the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, and Indonesia.

For the future we have set ourselves the following tasks:

We will maintain a continuing strong role in Asia. We know that military power alone will not guarantee security. National cohesion and social justice are essential for effective resistance against subversion or external attack. We know, too, that nationalism and self-reliance are the dominant trends in the region. But foreign policy begins with security, and a military balance remains fundamental to peace and the easing of tension. Given Asia's importance to our security and well-being, we owe it to ourselves and to those whose future depends on us to preserve a firm and balanced military posture in the Pacific.

We will continue to strengthen our partnership with Japan. Japan is our principal Asian ally and largest overseas trading partner. Japan's participation is essential to international efforts to promote economic recovery. Our hopes for a peaceful and prosperous Asia depend in large part on Japan's creative collaboration on many international issues. Japan's experiment in political leadership without the attributes of military power is anchored in turn upon our security treaty—which threatens no one and is widely recognized as a pillar of regional stability. In short we regard Japan not as an occasional or temporary ally, but as a permanent friend.

In the early 1970's, in response to Japan's growing economic strength and some bilateral strains, we went through a period of adjustment in our relations. There were frictions—some avoidable by more thoughtful U.S. actions. But these tensions have been overcome by devoted effort on both sides. Today our relations are the best they have been in 30 years. We face no serious bilateral problems. We are collaborating on a vast agenda:

* To advance the prosperity of the industrial democracies;

* To ease tensions with the Communist countries;

* To extend the new era of cooperation to the members of the less developed world.

Our bilateral relationship—which depends so much upon intangibles of conduct and

understanding—has acquired a deeper quality. There have been important cultural exchanges, which have enhanced our sensitivity to each other's national style and values. The first visit by an American President to Japan last fall and the historic visit of the Emperor and the Empress to the United States—and the warm reception that each people extended to the other's leader—demonstrated the extraordinary depth and strength of this friendship.

We do not propose to rest on the accomplishments of the past.

* We will preserve the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security while continuing to adapt its practical arrangements to the changing military and political environment.

* We will strengthen our political consultation, in the full realization that we will not always pursue identical policies, but that we have it in our power to assure compatible approaches and full understanding of occasional disagreements.

* We will harmonize even more closely our national policies to combat recession and promote economic expansion.

* We will continue to deepen the cultural dimension of our ties, which strengthens the bonds between our peoples.

In all our dealings we intend to honor a higher standard of concern and consultation than normally obtains even between allies—one that reflects the profound quality of our partnership.

We shall continue to advance our relationship with the People's Republic of China. For a generation our two great countries were separated by a gulf of suspicion and hostility. The reestablishment of ties in recent years has had a significance far beyond its impact on our two countries: It has transformed the international landscape.

There have long existed attachments of sentiment and high regard between the Chinese and American peoples, which we have never ceased to value. But the United States and the People's Republic of China came together again after two decades because of necessity. It was mutual interests that impelled us both—without illusions—to launch a new beginning. These mutual interests continue. They can be the foundation of a durable, growing relationship.

We and the People's Republic of China have parallel concerns that the world be free from domination by military force or intimidation—what our

6

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many joint communiques have termed "hegemony." We have affirmed that neither of our two countries should seek hegemony, and that each would oppose the attempts of others to do so. Our commitment to this policy will not change. The United States will continue to resist expansionism as we have throughout the entire postwar period. But we will also avoid needless confrontations. We will not be swayed from our effort to improve relations with potential adversaries and to build a more stable international environment.

The United States and China have also agreed to pursue the normalization of our relations. The United States remains dedicated to the principles of the Shanghai communique. We do not challenge the principle of one China--a principle that is maintained by Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. While time may yet be required to resolve our remaining differences on this issue, the direction of our policy is clear.

Since we lack the full range of diplomatic links with the People's Republic of China, and since so much depends on our mutual perceptions of the world scene, exchanges of views on the international scene between the President and the leaders of China are essential and assume special significance.

President Ford's visit to China next week will be the first contact between a U.S. President and Chinese leaders in nearly 4 years. We can expect the talks to be marked by the scope and the directness which have marked our previous encounters and which best serve leaders whose societies are different but whose policies are rooted in realism.

Disagreements in ideology and national interests exist; there will be no attempt to hide them. It is inevitable, therefore, that each side will determine its own policies according to its own situation and perception of its national interest. These are not subject to the instruction of the other. Both of us are self-reliant; both of us understand the difference between rhetoric and action, between tactics and basic strategy.

This spirit of candor and mutual respect has infused our new relationship with the People's Republic of China from its beginnings over 4 years ago. On this basis we are prepared to make our relationship an enduring and constructive feature of the world scene.

**We shall continue to strive to reduce tensions and promote more durable arrangements for peace on the Korean peninsula. An atmosphere of confrontation regrettably persists on the Korean peninsula. The United States has a major stake in**

maintaining the peace and security of the Republic of Korea. American forces are still stationed there in keeping with our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of Korea. Our commitment to South Korea rests not only in our historic relationship with the Korean people--a bond forged by common sacrifice in war. It derives as well from the recognition that the security of Japan--our closest ally in the Pacific--is directly linked to the security of Korea. We will continue to work with our friends to preserve the balance. We will resist with determination any unilateral attempt to change or upset the equilibrium on the peninsula.

At the same time we and the Republic of Korea are prepared to move to a more permanent solution. We have proposed a conference among North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China to discuss the dissolution of the United Nations Command while preserving the Korean armistice agreement. And in that context we are willing to consider other measures to reduce tensions, including a wider conference to negotiate more fundamental arrangements for peace in Korea. We will not acquiesce in any proposals which would exclude the Republic of Korea from discussions about its future. And we will not allow our military presence, which derives from bilateral agreements, to be dictated by third parties. But we are prepared now to transform the armistice arrangements to a permanent peace. And we are ready to talk to any interested country, including North Korea, about the future of Korea--provided only that South Korea is present.

**We shall seek a new structure of stability in Southeast Asia.** This Administration inherited the conflict in Indochina and brought our involvement to an end. That chapter in our history, which occasioned so much anguish, is now closed. As for our relations with the new governments in that region, these will not be determined by the past; we are prepared to look to a more hopeful future. The United States will respond to gestures of good will. If those governments show understanding of our concerns and those of their neighbors, they will find us ready to reciprocate. This will be especially the case if they deal constructively with the anguish of thousands of Americans who ask only an accounting for their loved ones missing in action and the return of the bodies of Americans who died in Indochina. We have no interest to continue the Indochina war on the diplomatic front; we envisage the eventual normalization of relations. In the interim we are prepared to consider practical arrangements of mutual benefit in such

7

fields as travel and trade.

One of the basic purposes of our original com-
mitment in Indochina was to provide a buffer of
security and time for the many nations of South-
east Asia to enable them to develop their own
strength and cohesion. In this regard our efforts
proved successful. These nations have preserved
their independence; they are assuming increasing
importance. We have a substantial stake in the
well-being of the Philippines and Indonesia, which
President Ford will visit next week. We have
important links with Thailand and strong ties of
friendship with Singapore and Malaysia. And we
have a longstanding association with our ANZUS
partners - Australia and New Zealand.

These nations are preserving their independ-
ence through economic development, a serious
effort to relax tensions, and institutions of regional
cooperation. All of them are examples of self-
reliance and national resilience. All of them also
seek to maintain and broaden their association
with us—and all of them wish the United States to
remain actively engaged in Asia.

In short the new Asia is an important pillar of
the structure of global peace. It is a central element
in the design of our foreign policy.

America's Responsibility

Thirty years ago, when we were first sum-
moned to leadership, we were the only country to
have survived World War II with its institutions and
economy intact. In that era we were overwhelm-
ingly predominant in nuclear weapons and in every
measure of military and economic strength. The
American people, with pride in their victory and
fresh memory of the folly of isolationism, con-
fidently assumed the responsibilities of world
leadership.

Inevitably, with time other nations-allies and
adversaries-recovered and developed their
strength. It was natural that decolonization and an
expanding economy would produce new centers of
economic power and political influence. And it was
understandable that the American people would
tire of the burdens of leadership and ask for
another balancing of America's interests and
commitments.

But history gives us no respite. To build
peace, other nations must do more—but we must
do our share. Today's foreign policy and today's
international environment pose for us a novel
psychological challenge. We can no longer over-
whelm our problems with resources; we must learn

foresight, tactical skill, and constancy. We can no
longer expect our moral preferences to hold sway
simply because of our power; we must possess
patience and understanding. We cannot shape a
new world by ourselves; we must elicit from
others, friend and foe alike, a contribution to the
arduous process of building a stable international
order. America's challenge today is to demonstrate
a new kind of leadership-guiding by our vision,
our example, and our energy, not by our
predominance.

Only rarely in history does a people have the
chance to shape the international environment in
which it lives. That opportunity is America's
today. But we can meet the opportunity only as a
united and confident nation.

In a world of thermonuclear weapons,
shrunken distances, and widely dispersed power, we
cannot afford disunity, disarray, or disruption in
the conduct of our foreign affairs. Foreign policy
requires authority. Our ability to maintain peace
fundamentally involves the belief of other nations
that our word counts, that we have a coherent
policy, that we possess steadiness and resolve.

It is time, therefore, to end the self-
flagellation that has done so much harm to this
nation's capacity to conduct foreign policy. It is
time that we outgrew some of the illusions that
characterized the long-past period of our
isolationism—the idea that we are always being
taken in by foreigners; the fear that military assist-
ance to allies leads to involvement rather than sub-
stitutes for it; the pretense that defense spending is
wasteful and generates conflict; the delusion that
American intelligence activities are immoral; the
suspicion that the confidentiality of diplomacy is a
plot to deceive the public; or the illusion that tran-
quillity can be achieved by an abstract purity of
motive for which history offers no example. In the
nation with the highest standard of living and one
of the richest cultures of the world, in the nation
which has come closest of all to the ideals of civil
liberty and democracy, it is long past time to put a
stop to self-doubt about our example and role in
the world.

We have already gone through a traumatic
period—with assassinations, resignations from our
two highest offices, and a political climate still
poisoned by the residue of the war and domestic
turbulence of the previous decade. And we are now
one year before our Presidential election.

But this country cannot have a moratorium
on a responsible foreign policy. Let us never forget
that there are many in the world who do not wish

8

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us well; that there are crises and challenges which will not wait for our elections. We must keep in mind that in a world where totalitarian government can manipulate friendly political parties, there is a grey area between foreign policy and overt intervention which we deny ourselves only at grave risk to our national security.

The bitterness that has marked so much of our national discourse for a decade no longer has reason or place. A great responsibility rests upon both the Congress and the Executive. Our foreign policy has been most effective when it reflected broad bipartisan support. This spirit of cooperation has never been more essential than today. Our free debate once again must find its ultimate restraint in the recognition that we are engaged in a common enterprise.

The decade-long debate over executive pre-dominance in foreign policy is now a thing of the past; Congress' reassertion of its role and prerogative is now a dominant and important fact in our political life. In recent years congressional investigations have served the country well in correcting many abuses. We must discover the excesses of the past, overcome the abuses that are uncovered and insure that they will never be repeated. This is the deepest strength of a free society. But it should be possible to cleanse our institutions without disrupting the conduct of our Nation's business abroad and buffeting all the instruments of our policy. When the most confidential documents are spread on the public record as a matter of routine there is a danger that rather than cleanse our government we will produce timidity and obfuscation in our bureaucracy and loss of confidence abroad.

We must resist the myth that government is a gigantic conspiracy. The truth is that the vast majority of public servants are serious, dedicated, and compassionate men and women who seek no other reward than the consciousness of having served their country well.

We need nothing so much as a restoration of confidence in ourselves. President Ford, a man of Congress, has conducted his Administration with

an unprecedented commitment to cooperation and conciliation with his colleagues of the House and Senate. But he has some fundamental obligations to the national interest.

* We cannot allow the intelligence services of this country to be dismantled.

* We must preserve our ability to maintain the confidentiality of other governments' dealings with us and our dealings with them.

* We must maintain our defenses and a prudent program of economic and military assistance to other countries with whom we have productive political relations.

* We must achieve a rational division of labor between Congress' defining of broad national commitments and the Executive's constitutional responsibility for tactics, the execution of policy, and the conduct of negotiations.

Ladies and gentlemen: It is the responsibility of Americans—of all political persuasions, in both branches of government, in the public and the press—to help shape a national policy in a positive and cooperative spirit. It is the responsibility of this Nation to exercise creative leadership in a moment of uncertainty, in a world that cries out for inspiration.

America is the only country whose destiny always seemed open, whose future always appeared more compelling than its past. We have been the hope of mankind, not only because we stood for freedom and offered a haven to the oppressed, but because we have demonstrated time and again the resiliency and indestructible spirit of free men. We have not lost our understanding of our true interests or our humane concern for the fate of our fellow men.

This country's foreign policy is not a burden; it is a success and a promise. We have done great things. There are great things yet to do. If the American people stand together, we will leave as our legacy a more secure, prosperous, and just world than the one that we inherited.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, U.S.A.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STA-501

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

November 25, 1975

No. 578-B

QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION FOLLOWING ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE ECONOMIC CLUB OF DETROIT
DETROIT, MICHIGAN
NOVEMBER 24, 1975

MR. MACDONALD: Thank you very much, Secretary Kissinger.

Your remarks, your accomplishments, clearly substantiate the excellent reputation you have earned as a great American statesman, not content to see accidental events shape our future but anxious to see the involvement of the United States in world affairs shaped by human reason.

You have made, and will continue to make, an indelible imprint for all of us on world history.

Mr. Kissinger has agreed to answer and comment on a number of questions from the floor. Because of the very large size of the audience, and as question cards at most of your tables have explained, we will ask for questions which have been determined to be representative of a number of similar ones submitted during the dinner. We hope your own question will be among those we have selected.

May I have the first question, please?

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, American investments in Spain are valued at more than $1.5 billion. We have major military bases there. What is our future there with the successors of General Franco?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The United States attaches very great importance to its relationship with Spain. We hope that Spain will join the Atlantic Community as well as the European Community. We will do our best to cooperate in an evolution in Spain that will make that possible, and we will do our utmost to strengthen our traditional friendly relations with Spain.

QUESTION: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, why is Russian oil being discussed as part of future economic agreement terms with the Russians? Is it wise for us at this time to make ourselves dependent on Russian oil in military strategic terms, especially in terms of what's happened since we've been dependent on Middle Eastern oil?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The amount of Russian oil that is being discussed will not create any substantial dependence. The basic problem with respect to energy is to increase the supply of energy available to the industrial nations. The high oil price is being maintained by cuts in

PR#578-B

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production. The more additional oil can be brought on the market, the deeper the cuts in production will have to go among the members of the oil cartel until a point is reached where they may no longer be willing to sustain it. We will not make ourselves dependent on Russian oil to any significant degree, and the amount that we are going to purchase from the Soviet Union is of primarily symbolic significance at this point.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what in your opinion is the most crucial problem facing America today? (Laughter.)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I can only speak about foreign policy because on domestic policy I am an arguer against universal suffrage. (Laughter.)

In foreign policy, our most complicated problem is to realize -- that is, to gear our policies so that they can be sustained over the long term. We have had a record of oscillating between extremes of intransigence and extremes of conciliation. We have had a tendency to believe that we can reward countries by friendly relations and punish them by cruel relations. But what we need is a perception of our long-term interests -- a realization that we can no longer impose our solutions on all parts of the world, but that we have to work together with some cooperative relationships.

We have to resist expansion of the Communist countries, but we have to do it by means that are more complicated, and that are more suited to the ability to gain public support than has been the case in the immediate post-war period when we were so enormously strong in relation to the rest of the world.

Our biggest problem is to make the American people understand this need for a long-term policy. And this, frankly, is one of the reasons why I make all these trips around the country.

**QUESTION:** Thank you.

(Applause.)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, recent news articles state that Canada is planning to cut their oil exports to the U.S. What is your reaction to this, and what effects do you think it will have on future U.S. oil requirements?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have not been happy with this Canadian decision, and we have attempted to delay its implementation for as long as possible -- above all, in relation to the refineries that have been built specifically to take care of Canadian oil. We are attempting to work out swap arrangements to reduce the impact of these cuts. Basically, there is no solution to the American energy problem, except a substantial program of conservation and a massive program of alternative sources of energy which we should develop together with other consuming countries. Otherwise, we will continue to be at the mercy of decisions that are not made in America.

(c) 1978-81

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**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask the following question: Can the effectiveness of the CIA be restored after the damage inflicted by the Senate Select Committee?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** If you give me a chance, I'll say something about the House Committee also. (Laughter and applause.)

I think that the events of the last year have had a serious effect on our intelligence agencies. I think it is high time that they be given the opportunity to go back to their business and not spend all their time defending themselves, explaining events that have happened five or ten years ago. (Applause.) And I believe that the new Director, George Bush, can do this.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I think I'm the token woman tonight, and I would like to ask you what function do you see summit conferences, such as the recent one held at Rambouillet, serving as far as foreign policy is concerned?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the summit conference at Rambouillet brought together the leaders of six industrial democracies, which between them control about 70 percent of the world trade. They met to discuss the recession that has come to all of their countries. But, beyond that, they met to discuss the future of democratic institutions in the world.

The biggest problem that is faced in the democracies today is to give the people there the sense that they are not subject to blind economic forces outside of their control. The recovery of none of these countries is possible without some cooperative action by the others. So the six leaders dedicated themselves to joint efforts at economic recovery. They made major progress in solving the monetary issue that had divided them. They had agreed to cooperate on questions of energy. It can well be that this summit meeting, which was conducted in one of the most constructive and harmonious atmospheres that I can recall at any international meeting, could mark a turning point not only in the economic recovery of these countries, but also in giving a new sense of vitality to the democratic institutions which are now under such heavy attack.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask the following question: What steps has the Secretary of State taken to stop the expulsion of Greek Cypriots and the colonization of many of the Turks to occupy the Turkish zone on Cyprus?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We believe very strongly that a just settlement of the Cyprus question is in the interest of Greece, in the interest of Turkey -- and, above all, in the interest of Greek Cypriots. We believe that such a settlement must respect the dignity of the Cypriot population and must enable refugees to return to territories from which they were expelled. At this particular moment, most of the movement of Greeks out of the Turkish area has already occurred. It occurred nearly a year ago. So we are putting all of our effort behind bringing about a negotiated solution as rapidly as we can. We are in close contact with the Governments of Greece and Turkey and with the Government of Cyprus and with the leaders of the various communities.

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Unfortunately, the domestic situations in various countries have been complicated. And some of our own decisions have also added to these complications. But we hope that we can bring about a just settlement in the foreseeable future.

**QUESTION:** Thank you.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, yesterday Mr. Schlesinger said that if the U.S. is not second to the Soviet Union in terms of its defense posture, it is very close to being second. Would you please comment?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Secretary Schlesinger was talking about trends that concerned him. He was talking about the trend that the Soviet Union is spending about 15 percent of its gross national product for defense, while we spend only about 5 percent of our gross national product on defense. And it is true that if these trends continue over an indefinite period inevitably the Soviet Union will gain militarily on us.

I think Secretary Schlesinger would agree that if we take the situation today in terms of strategic forces, in terms of high technology weapons, in terms of the Navy, we are still superior.

The great Soviet advantage is in ground forces that can be introduced into regional situations. I would agree with Secretary Schlesinger that if we look ahead over a period of five years, we must strengthen the forces that can resist local aggression, and that if we do not, then many opportunities for blackmail will arise.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I noted in your discussion tonight, in the structure of the global peace -- are South America, Mexico and Canada being overlooked in our foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not think you will ever find a Secretary of State who will admit that he has ever overlooked anything. (Laughter.)

**QUESTION:** Not even slightly? (Laughter.)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Not even slightly. (Laughter.)

When I was in private life, nothing used to infuriate me more than a government official who would arrive to tell me that all options had been considered and the best possible one had been chosen; and that if I only knew as much as he did, I wouldn't bother him with questions. (Laughter.)

Well, I am here to tell you that all options have been considered. (Laughter and applause.)

In fact, I do not think that Mexico and Canada have been neglected. As far as Canada is concerned, I make more news at a dinner party there than most people make with formal speeches. (Laughter.)

The problem in our relations with Latin America is that, on the one hand, there is a desire for some spectacular event; but, on the other hand, there is the reality that many of the Latin American countries see themselves pulled between their traditional relationships in the Western Hemisphere and their temptation to join some of the Third World activities. And there is a reward in many Latin American countries for taking a posture of

PR#578-B

confrontation with the United States. But, still, we have started what
is called a "new dialogue" with the countries of Latin America, which,
while it has not had spectacular results, has had the results which we
think are achievable.

If an announcement by me of a trip to Latin America did not alway produce
an international crisis, I would say that I am planning to go there fairly
soon. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask the following question: What
possible effect will the current investigations regarding the CIA have on
current American foreign policy?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think when calm returns to this country and people ask themselves what exactly it is that is alleged against the CIA -- leaving aside some spectacular events -- I think we will find that in a very complex situation -- in many gray areas of national policy -- it has served the country well. I think that there is no intelligence service in the world that could survive the public exposition of all of its activities and the publication of all of its documents -- or of so many of its documents -- which is the case today. The impact on many foreign countries is unfortunate. I know some of these investigations have been conducted seriously and in an attempt to get at the truth.

But we also have to be able to get back to the business of government at some point, and the intelligence community has to go back to the business of conducting intelligence. This is the balance that must now be struck.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, can you cite some specific areas of trade
between China and the United States that will be expanded as a result of
President Ford's impending visit?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The basic purpose of President Ford's visit to China is to bring about a better comprehension on both sides of the major policy directions of the other. Growing out of this, there may be an improvement in trade, as was the case in 1972, but we are not going to China in order to negotiate a specific trade agreement. That will be done at other levels and in another manner. In our experience the Chinese have preferred to do their business deals through private channels rather than through government-to-government deals.

QUESTION: Thank you, sir.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, do you see a comparison between
Prince Metternich leaving Vienna in 1848, ending the Metternich era, and
the pressure you are presently under for ending the Kissinger era?
(Laughter.)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I'll tell you: When he got under pressure --
he had been in office for 38 years (Laughter) -- so in the year of 1999
I will entertain this question. (Laughter and applause.)

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PR#578-B

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, what changes do you foresee in U.S. foreign policy In light of the recent appointment of the new Secretary of Defense?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, of course, if you do not tell it to the Pentagon, I will have to say that the foreign policy of the United States is not made at the Pentagon (Laughter and applause). But Secretary Rumsfeld is a long-term associate of mine and of course a close friend of the President, and I am convinced that this new team will work together harmoniously and effectively.

I do not believe that there will be any substantial changes in the conduct of foreign policy, because the basic decisions on foreign policy are made by the President and that he has not changed his views. But the method of making them will work very well.

**QUESTION:** Thank you, sir.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, in view of Cuba's continuing propensity for international trouble-making -- most recently in the U.N. on Puerto Rico, and the anti-Zionist resolution, and on Angola -- is it prudent to provide them with easier access to their Latin neighbors and the OAS agencies, and shouldn't we actively oppose their membership or expansion of their involvement in Latin American affairs?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States has been prepared to improve our relations with Cuba and not to stand in the way of those Latin American countries which for their own reasons have decided to improve their relations with Cuba. The OAS decision on July 16th really ratified what the Latin American countries had been doing anyway -- that is to say, it left each country free to establish whatever ties it wished to establish with Cuba -- which is exactly what had been happening before the Cuba decision. This is why these are the safest decisions to make (Laughter). But the United States, as I said in my prepared remarks, will not accept Cuban meddling in Puerto Rico, or Cuban intervention in the affairs of other countries. Therefore, the process of improving relations depends on Cuba conducting a responsible foreign policy. If it does not, we cannot continue the process we have started.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what do you believe the political implications to be in the unification of Viet-Nam?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, de facto, Viet-Nam has been administered as a single country ever since the Communist conquest of South Viet-Nam. There was a pretense of a separate administration in the South, but they never permitted foreign diplomats to be established there.

We expect that by next spring the unification of Viet-Nam is likely to be concluded. The impact on the neighboring countries of that step will not be so formidable. But the weight of Viet-Nam, a country with a population of over 40 million -- with the enormous amount of military equipment, both what they acquired themselves and what they captured -- is going to be very considerable. And the test, again, is whether it will use its weight with restraint or whether it will engage in adventurous policies, and the possibility of normalizing relations with us depends on the external conduct of this unified Viet-Nam.

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PR#578-B

**QUESTION:** Thank you, sir.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what good and bad effects do the multinational companies have on our foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First, to take the positive effects, the biggest problem in development is the transfer of capital and technology. This becomes increasingly difficult through governmental sources because of the growing resistance to the use of public funds for development purposes.

The multinational corporations are a much more flexible instrument for the transfer of capital and technology, and, curiously, less of a political mortgage on the countries concerned.

On the other hand, at least in the past, the multinational corporations have not always been fully sensitive to the political conditions of the countries in which they operated, and they have been under increasing pressure from the point of view of expropriation and from political pressure.

We are attempting to develop a code by which multinational corporations might operate in foreign countries and to which foreign countries would agree; so that they have some assurance against what they consider some of the abuses, and the multinational corporations have some assurance against some of the pressures to which they have been exposed. We are discussing this now with the heads of several of the multinational corporations to see whether we can come up with an agreed document that we then would put before the United Nations, or some other appropriate international forum, to get a code of action for multinational corporations.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you support Mr. Moynihan's position at the United Nations on the Zionist resolution and his statement on the President of Uganda?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Pat Moynihan is an old friend of mine. And when one has a friend of Harvard, one holds on to him (Laughter), as I did with him. I recommended that he be appointed to this position after I had read an article of his in which he laid out in some considerable detail what he thought the appropriate strategy of the United Nations should be.

He has my full confidence and support, and the full confidence and support of the President.

Pat Moynihan got a little bit upset last week because the British Ambassador to the United Nations attacked him. I must say that if I can ever reduce the attacks on me to foreigners, I'll celebrate (Laughter and applause). He is a distinguished public servant. The President and I met with him this morning. We assured him of our full support. I am delighted to say that he has agreed to stay on (applause), and that he will continue in his calm, measured and quiet way to do his job. (Laughter.)

**MR. MACDONALD:** Thank you once again, Mr. Kissinger. It was certainly nice to finish with a question which you could answer so graciously. (Laughter.) It has been a stimulating and thought-provoking evening for all of us this evening.

(Standing ovation)

* * * * *

FORTUNE MAGAZINE DINNER
F STREET CLUB

November 25, 1975

The United States in these weeks and months has been engaged in intensive diplomatic activity focusing on foreign economic policy.

At the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly in September we set forth comprehensive proposals aimed at fostering consensus on the new global economic issues. Two weeks ago President Ford conferred with leaders of the other great industrial democracies at the Economic Summit. And in the next few weeks the United States will meet with other major producer and consumer nations to discuss a range of crucial issues, most urgently that of energy.

But the issues go far beyond economics. A time of economic difficulty is also a time of political testing. International economic problems represent a serious challenge to our political as well as

social cohesiveness. Recession, inflation and unemployment weaken confidence in our democratic institutions. And they can bring growing conflict among nations.

The world's resources are abundant, mankind's talents and search for achievement is greater than ever. What is being tested is our ability to mobilize our efforts in the service of a broader vision, to summon the leadership the world requires if the potential for cooperative progress is not to become the reality of economic warfare and decline.

It was America that upheld global peace and prosperity through the postwar era. We did so not from ambition or charity, but because we saw our own interests as ultimately inseparable from those of the rest of humanity.

The same is true today -- more than ever. Our prospects for a stable world and for economic prosperity in the United States depend increasingly on economic cooperation with others as our global economic system becomes more integrated.

The world economy is increasingly important to America's standard of living. We now export 23 percent of our farm output and 8 percent of our manufactures. Our new dynamic industries often depend on global export markets for their success. We import much of our oil, and our dependence on imports of some key raw materials is likely to grow substantially in the future. Our money and financial markets are closely intertwined with those of other nations. America's prosperity could not continue in a chaotic world economy.

-4-

The United States has a special responsibility to help
build new modes of international economic cooperation.

What the United States does -- or fails to do -- has an
enormous impact on the rest of the world. With one-third
the output of the non-Communist world, America has and will
continue to have the greatest impact on world prosperity.

Our technology, our agriculture, our resources, our
managerial and financial expertise, our experience in leadership
are unsurpassed. Without our effort there is no prospect of
solving the world's economic problems.

But our responsibilities in the seventies are very unlike the
fifties, when American generosity and vision led to a Marshall
Plan to reconstruct Europe; or the sixties, when massive
American aid was focussed on the problems of the emerging

-5-

nations. Today, we can no longer respond to world problems through
massive resource transfers. Nor can we solve global problems by
ourselves; other nations must do more. Today America's
generosity is being tested not so much in terms of resources,
but in terms of our leadership, our commitment to international
cooperation, and our willingness to work with others in developing
our economic policies.

America's continuing efforts to help adapt the international
system to a changing world economy were undermined by a
series of economic events beginning with the oil crisis in the
fall of 1973. For years, we and other industrial countries built
our prosperity on ever-increasing imports of inexpensive
foreign oil. In 1950 we were self-sufficient in oil. In 1960 we
relied on foreign oil for 16% of our requirements. In 1973 it had
reached 35%. We were headed for 50% dependency by the 1980's.

-6-

Suddenly, we found the price and availability of our foreign
supplies were being determined by decisions over which we had
little, if any, influence. Our jobs, output and future prosperity
were at risk. The oil crisis accelerated inflation and recession,
and created an economic policy crisis in the industrial world.

In the wake of the oil crisis, the United States moved
swiftly to foster international energy cooperation. We helped
the industrial nations create the International Energy Agency
to pool the efforts of major consumers. We agreed on safe-
guards against new oil emergencies and on arrangements to
defend against oil-induced financial dislocations. We launched
cooperative programs on conservation and development of
alternative supplies.

-7-

To speed our economic recovery, we increased our
economic policy coordination to gain a greater common
understanding of our economic problems and their broader
political implications. We agreed among ourselves to oppose
protectionist forces in our countries in order to maintain the
growth of world trade and the stimulus to recovery it can
provide. Our efforts were advanced in the Economic Summit
held at Rambouillet, France, a week ago.

The immediate task of the Summit was to deal with
economic questions. But in a more fundamental and important
sense it confirmed and consolidated allied cooperation at a
crucial moment in history. It set goals for common policies
and charted a direction for common action. It began the
vital and continuing process of demonstrating that the
industrial democracies have the confidence and vision to
take their future into their own hands.

-8-

At the Summit, the leaders of the major industrialized nations recognized that continuing cooperation is also essential to reduce vulnerability in energy -- the resource on which industrialization, development and global economic growth must be based. Only by cooperation can we reduce our vulnerability to massive oil price increases and disruptions in supply.

But as we go forward in our effort to solve these questions, we must recognize that a major qualitative shift has taken place in international economic affairs.

The United States has been and will continue to be committed to an open and expanding world economy in which market forces and freely shifting patterns of supply and demand guide trade and investments. We believe in the ability of American private enterprise to contribute to world economic growth through its unsurpassed ability to bring together management, capital and technology.

-9-

But while you and I may agree on the advantages of a world
economy based on market forces, and on the efficiency of
private enterprise in furthering economic goals, I need not
tell you that we are a decreasing minority in the world.

The world economic system which has spread global prosperity
since its creation at Bretton Woods thirty years ago is under
attack on a new front.

The energy crisis added impetus to the challenge from
the developing world. Resentful of past inequities and sceptical
that the present world system is responsive to their concerns,
these nations called for greater control of their economic
affairs and a bigger share of world prosperity.

These so-called Third World nations are characterized
by great diversity in political and economic structure, in
levels of development and -- in many cases -- basic
economic interests. Nevertheless, for essentially tactical
reasons they have submerged their differences and banded

-10-

together in multilateral forums -- primarily the United
Nations -- to challenge the existing economic order and to
call for a new one.

The clamor of confrontation serves no one. We and they
both need a stable world order. An expanding world economy
benefits the advanced and the developing countries. We have
a stake in seeing the poor countries make economic, social and
political progress. They have a stake in the creation of a new
era of international economic cooperation which will provide
the environment for their progress -- which depends, in large
measure, on our own. Neither the poor nor the rich can achieve
their goals in isolation. None can thrive in a world of despair
and resentment.

In September at the Seventh Special Session of the UNGA,
we took a cooperative approach toward the key problems raised