Special Section

# A Plan to Reshape NATO

By HENRY KISSINGER

After 35 years of preserving peace in Western Europe, the Atlantic Alliance confronts new military, political and social realities. In this article, a former Secretary of State proposes dramatic—and in his view, vital—steps to help the alliance meet the challenges ahead. Among them: NATO's Supreme Allied Commander should be a European, not an American, as is now the case; Europe should have a decisive voice in certain nuclear arms-control talks and greater responsibility for its ground defense. If Europe refuses to accept that responsibility, the U.S. should withdraw up to half of its ground forces from Europe.

Lebanon and the Soviet succession have preoccupied us in recent weeks, but the Atlantic Alliance must remain the pivot of American policy. On its unity depends the security of free peoples. From its cohesion will flow whatever hopes the Soviet succession offers for a new dialogue. Unfortunately, just as storms recur in nature, crises recur in the Atlantic Alliance. Nearly every Administration for a generation has been involved in them. However, the present controversies in NATO are both unprecedented and unsettling.

In West Germany, Scandinavia, the Low Countries and even in Britain (though to a lesser extent), "peace" movements have been pulling governments in the general direction of their policies, even though those governments disagree with their premises. In addition, the main opposition parties in West Germany and Great Britain—which, in the nature of democratic politics, can be expected to get into office eventually—are advocating policies that amount to unilateral nuclear disarmament for their countries. Because these groups hold sway over key segments of public opinion, too many European leaders—even conservative ones—have yielded to the temptation to demonstrate their peaceful intentions the easy way, by pretending to be reining in a bellicose and insensitive U.S. through their ministrations. As a result, among those who shape public attitudes—and thereby set what become the limits of the politically possible—there is less intellectual or philosophical agreement than in any previous period.

This creates an exceedingly dangerous situation. An alliance cannot live by arms alone. To endure it requires some basic agreement on political aims that justify and give direction to the common defense. If military arrangements provide its only bond, it will sooner or later stagnate. It will surely prove unable to take advantage of diplomatic opportunities for an easing of tensions. That is the central issue before the Atlantic Alliance today. It requires a remedy that is fundamental, even radical—in the literal sense of going to the root.

Four problems in particular are gnawing at the alliance:

1. Lack of an agreed, credible strategy. The gap between NATO's formal strategy and what the public will support has widened dangerously. The so-called flexible response devised in the 1960s remains NATO's official doctrine. It contemplates a defense of Europe that begins with conventional weapons and then goes up the ladder of nuclear escalation—until it reaches whatever level is necessary to halt Soviet-aggression. In today's circumstances this doctrine has a fatal weakness: neither existing nor projected NATO conventional ground forces are adequate to

repel a major Soviet conventional attack. Therefore, the doctrine would require a nuclear response at an early stage. Yet strategic nuclear parity deprives the threat of strategic nuclear war of much of its credibility; mutual suicide cannot be made to appear as a rational option. And no alternative nuclear strategy has been developed. Partly for this reason, public opinion, essentially unopposed by most NATO governments, is moving powerfully against any reliance on nuclear weapons—even tactical ones.

The alliance is thereby trapped in a precarious combination of (a) inadequate conventional forces, leading to (b) reliance on nuclear weapons in (c) a strategic environment that makes the threat of their use, and therefore their deterrent value, less and less credible, and (d) a public climate of growing nuclear pacifism that undermines what credibility remains. Lack of a coherent defense policy leaves the alliance, possessing a huge stockpile of enormously destructive weapons, disarming itself psychologically.

2. Intermediate-range weapons and arms control. The arrival of the new U.S. intermediate-range weapons in Europe late last year was properly hailed as a major success. For if public demonstrations and Soviet pressure had succeeded in blocking that deployment, the Soviet Union would in effect have achieved a veto over NATO's military dispositions. But unless the alliance clarifies the purpose of these missiles, the accomplishment is likely to be transitory, since the basic European attitude toward the missiles is that of a host toward a now unwanted guest whose invitation to dinner it would be too awkward to withdraw. Some prominent Europeans purport to see in the missiles' presence a hidden American design to confine a nuclear war to Europe. Others treat them as one of those peculiar American aberrations that periodically upset the alliance's equilibrium. Too few recognize, and even fewer are willing to admit, that in fact the missiles link the strategic nuclear defense of Europe and the U.S. Weapons capable of reaching Soviet territory stake the American homeland to the defense of Europe; they do not enable America to remain immune.

European ambivalence makes it excruciatingly difficult to define "progress" toward arms control, while the nearly desperate eagerness with which progress is pursued makes its attainment less likely. The Soviets have refused even to discuss any proposal balancing U.S. intermediate-range missiles in Europe against the Soviet arsenal at a lower level. They insist on total withdrawal of American missiles while retaining a large number of their own. The goal of leaving Europe vulnerable to Soviet nuclear blackmail is obvious. Yet significant segments of European opinion persist in blaming the U.S. for the deadlock. In Europe

Illustrations for TIME by David Suter

TIME, MARCH 5, 1984

and in the U.S., this attitude must in
time erode the public support needed
not only for missile deployment but
also for coherent arms control.

3) *East-West relations.* Behind the sharp differences over defense strategy and arms control lies a parallel dispute over the alliance's posture toward the Soviet Union. Too many Europeans accept the caricature of a U.S. run by trigger-happy cowboys whose belligerence has provoked Soviet intransigence. Many Americans, on the other hand,

consider such European notions naive and believe that together
with the pacifist and neutralist demonstrations, they reflect a
trend toward appeasement that encourages Soviet intransigence.

4) *Relations with the Third World.* Most European leaders believe that they have a special opportunity to establish prefer-ential relationships with Third World countries. In the flash points of the Middle East, Africa and Central America, they see U.S. approaches as hopelessly tainted by an obsession with Sovi-et ambitions; some hope to win favor in the Third World by an ostentatious dissociation from the U.S. More than a few Ameri-cans view such behavior as a free ride paid for by U.S. sacrifices or as a positive incitement to Third World radicalism.

These differences could be healthy if they led to compatible and constructive policies for the 1980s and '90s. So far this has not happened. Mutual recriminations have created opportunities for Soviet political warfare even during this period of stagnation in the Kremlin leadership. The Politburo is obviously convinced that the West has become so paralyzed concerning nuclear weap-ons that there is no urgency about nuclear arms control; the Sovi-ets can simply wait for a while to harvest the fruits of Western anxieties. By contrast, there may be concern in Moscow that NATO will move to close the gap in conventional forces; hence the willingness to resume the talks, moribund for ten years, about limiting conventional arms. Does this reflect a genuine interest in arms control, or is it a means to thwart the desperately needed Western conventional buildup by creating the same conditions by which public opinion was mobilized on the missile question? And what is one to make of the almost deferential pleas by all major NATO countries for the resumption of a dialogue that the Soviets have interrupted? Or of the upgrading of all major European dele-gations except the French to the Andropov funeral, compared with the Brezhnev rites 15 months ago—especially as Andropov’s rule was marked by the flagrant attempt to influence the German election, the walkout from arms-control talks and the shooting down of the Korean airliner, not to speak of Andropov’s 15-year stewardship of the KGB?

Will the Soviets see Western pleas for dialogue as a demon-
stration of good will, or will they learn from the compulsion to
demonstrate good intentions after months of harassment that in-
transigence pays because the West has weak nerves? Will we fail
to relax tensions because the Soviets conclude that atmospherics
can substitute for dealing with the real causes dividing the world?
Europe is not moderating the U.S., and the U.S. is not stiffening
Europe's spine, as the folklore on each side would have it. More
likely, each is in danger of paralyzing and demoralizing the other.
Western disunity is perhaps the principal obstacle to progress in
East-West negotiations.

This state of affairs has deeper causes than particular poli-

cies on either side. The present NATO
structure is simply not working, either
in defining the threat or in finding
methods to meet it.

Existing arrangements are unbal-
anced. When one country dominates
the alliance on all major issues—when
that one country chooses weapons and
decides deployments, conducts the
arms-control negotiations, sets the tone
for East-West diplomacy and creates
the framework for relations with the
Third World—little incentive remains

> A European officer should take the traditionally American place as Supreme Allied Commander Europe, probably with a U.S. deputy.

> Europe should take over those arms-control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil.

for a serious joint effort to redefine the
requirements of security or to coordi-
nate foreign policies. Such joint efforts
entail sacrifices and carry political
costs. Leaders are not likely to make the
sacrifice or pay the cost unless they feel
responsible for the results.

An imbalance such as the one now
existing cannot be corrected by "con-
sultation," however meticulous. In the
long run, consultation works only when
those being consulted have a capacity
for independent action. Then each side

takes the other seriously; then each side knows that the other's
consent has to be won. Otherwise consultation becomes "brief-
ing." Agreement reflects not conviction but acquiescence for
want of an alternative.

The present imbalance is not new. It has existed ever since World War II. But military dependence on another nation has a cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under conditions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt, self-hatred and a compulsion to display *independence* of the U.S. wherever doing so is safe, especially with regard to some Third World issues and certain aspects of East-West relations.

The problem has become even more acute because the gen-
eration of leaders that built NATO has virtually disappeared.
Those who governed Europe during the early postwar years were
still psychologically of the era when Europe bestrode the world.
Global thinking came naturally. European leaders assumed re-
sponsibility for their own security policies and gave it up only re-
luctantly because of special circumstances. But nearly 40 years
have passed since the end of World War II. The new leaders
were reared in an era when the U.S. was pre-eminent; they find
it politically convenient to delegate Europe's military defense to
us. Too many seek to position themselves somewhere between
the superpowers—the first step toward psychological neutral-
ism. Thus Europe's schizophrenia: a fear that the U.S. might not
be prepared to risk its own population on a nuclear defense of
Europe, coupled with the anxiety that America might drag Eu-
rope into an unwanted conflict by clumsy handling of Third
World issues or East-West relations.

The rush to condemn our actions in Grenada by so many of
our European allies is a case in point. What could have been
in the minds of their leaders? Even making allowance—especially
in the case of Britain—for totally inadequate consultation, they
could hardly have wanted us to fail. That would surely have af-
fected our willingness to run risks in defense of other areas, ulti-
mately including even Europe. Rather, they must have assumed
that their actions were irrelevant and costless: that we would not
be deterred, that we would exact no penalty and that therefore it
was safe to use the incident to score points with “progressives” at
home and with Third World radicals abroad.

The change in the nature of European leadership has been paralleled in the U.S. Our new elites do not reject NATO any more than do their European counterparts. But for them, too, the alliance is more a practical than an emotional necessity, more a military arrangement than a set of common political purposes.

On both sides of the Atlantic, we find ourselves threatened
by the dominance of domestic politics over global political strat-

egy. In Europe this leads in too many
countries to a faintly disguised neutral-
ism. In the U.S. it accelerates our al-
ready strong tendency toward unilat-
eralism and isolationism.

U.S. leaders have too often adjust-
ed foreign policies to political pres-
sures, bureaucratic infighting or
changing intellectual fashions. The
history of the American attitude to-
ward intermediate-range missiles in
Europe is an example. These were pro-
posed to the Europeans in 1957-58, in-

TIME, MARCH 5, 1984

21

Special Section

stalled in Britain, Italy and Turkey by 1960 and withdrawn in 1963. They reappeared later in 1963 as part of a NATO multilateral force, and were abandoned once again by 1965. They were put before NATO for the third time in 1978 and accepted once again in 1979. Not surprisingly, Europeans organizing to stop the current deployment are encouraged by the knowledge that previous American decisions have not proved immutable.

Similarly, our allies have had to adjust from passionate U.S. advocacy of SALT II to its rejection, and then to the fact that we have chosen to observe a treaty we refuse to ratify; from a strategic doctrine of massive retaliation to one of flexible response; from a policy of détente to one of confrontation and back to reconciliation, not to speak of the gyrations in our Middle East policy—all in addition to the reassessments that occur whenever a new Administration comes into office. Each change of course leaves victims among European leaders who have staked their domestic positions on policies that the U.S. later abandons. Each lurch encourages a kind of neutralism, as Europeans seek to avoid being made hostage to sudden swings in American policy.

A continuation of existing trends is bound to lead to the demoralization of the Western alliance. An explicit act of statesmanship is needed to give new meaning to Western unity and a new vitality to NATO. In my view such an effort must have three components: (a) a more significant role for Europe within NATO, (b) a reform of the NATO organization and (c) a reassessment of current NATO deployment.

## A NEW ROLE FOR EUROPE

During the entire post-World War II period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership. We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination, insofar as it depended on American actions, in all areas except security. With respect to defense, the U.S. has been indifferent at best—at least since the failure of the European Defense Community—to any sort of Europeanization. Many in this country seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might give less emphasis to transatlantic relations or might botch its defense effort and thus weaken the common security. The opposite is almost certainly the case.

In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination. What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its external barriers are higher than its internal ones. In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation with the U.S. A Europe analyzing its security needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find association with the U.S. essential. Greater unity in defense would also help to overcome the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt of every European nation to stretch already inadequate defense efforts across the whole panoply of weapons. For example, there are at least five kinds of battle tanks within NATO, different types of artillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In a major conflict it would be nearly impossible to keep this hodgepodge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop greater identity and coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional “burden sharing,” paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind something more structural—a more rational balance of responsibilities. The present allocation of responsibilities fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally about either security or political objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since drift will surely lead to unraveling—if more imperceptibly—statesmanship impels a new approach.

## STRUCTURAL REFORM

Structural reform cannot substitute for a sense of purpose and clear doctrine. But if pursued with care and sensitivity, it can help catalyze the development of shared political purposes. These common objectives require that European judgments on security, East-West diplomacy and other matters emerge from Europe's own analysis. Mere acquiescence in American decisions, briefings and pressures provides a façade of unity; shared purposes require a deeper sense of participation. Specifically:

1. By 1990 NATO should assume the major responsibility for conventional ground defense. This is well within the capability of a group of countries with nearly one and one-half times the population and twice the G.N.P. of the Soviet Union. The Soviets, moreover, have to divide their forces on at least two fronts.

2. This requires that planning for Europe's defense become a more explicitly European task. Heretofore, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has been American. In the new arrangement a European officer should take that traditionally American place, probably with a U.S. deputy. Such a change is also likely to give a new perspective to allied strategic planning. The U.S. has generally achieved its military successes by the weight of the equipment that our vast industrial potential has made available. This has tended to tempt our military leaders to equate strategy with logistics. European nations have rarely

enjoyed such a material margin; rather, they have had to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics—precisely what NATO needs in an age of nuclear parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

3. Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary-General, who is responsible for running the alliance's political machinery, has been European. In the new structure, with its greater emphasis on political coordination, it would make more sense for this official to be American—whenever the new Secretary-General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. Meantime, no Western leader is better qualified for guiding NATO's transition than the wise and thoughtful Carrington.

4. Europe should take over those arms-control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil. The INF negotiations with the Soviets (for intermediate-range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations

(on conventional forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be “Europeanized” as quickly as possible, with a European chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly European, delegation.

The structure that I am proposing would enable Europeans to confront—on their own initiative and in their own context—issues that have been evaded for at least two decades: the precise definition of an adequate conventional defense; the nature of the so-called nuclear threshold—the point where there is no choice except conventional defeat or nuclear escalation; the relationship between strategy and arms control. Since nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional defense failed, Europe would be responsible for setting the nuclear threshold by its own efforts; it could relieve its nuclear anxieties by the simple expedient of augmenting its conventional defenses.

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR and INF negotiations would place final responsibility for both conventional force levels and intermediate-range missile deployment in Europe with the leaders whose countries will have to bear the brunt—for good or ill—of the outcome of these negotiations. This is especially important with respect to the American intermediate-range missiles in Europe. That deployment makes sense only if the allies genuinely believe that the prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe

22

TIME, MARCH 5, 1984

on Soviet territory will help deter a Soviet conventional attack or nuclear blackmail. If our principal allies do not share this conviction, the psychological basis for the deployment will evaporate.

European chairmanship of the INF talks would oblige Europe's leaders to face the issue head-on; their domestic critics would no longer be able to argue (as they do now) that U.S. intransigence is the principal obstacle to arms control.

As for the U.S., it would of course participate in these deliberations—in a less dominant position—through its continued membership in the integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear defense, and its ground, naval and air forces in Europe.

## REDEPLOYMENT

The issue of redeploying American forces touches raw European nerves like no other. The slightest hint of altering present arrangements jangles sensibilities; it evokes fears of American withdrawal and prospects of European neutralism. But if present trends continue, it is certain to become a central issue in the alliance relationship. Before dealing with it in the context of a program of NATO reform, a few facts must be noted:

1) The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s, when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation—to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. Massive retaliation paradoxically required that the total forces on the Continent be kept below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to nonnuclear means. Hence the American conventional deployment in Europe reflected political, not military, criteria: it was intended to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave the Soviets no doubt that this would be the consequence of even a conventional war. European conventional forces represented a similar political decision: they too were conceived as a trip wire for our nuclear riposte. From the birth of NATO a full conventional defense has been part neither of its strategy nor of its efforts.

2) This situation became anomalous when the growth of Soviet strategic forces deprived general nuclear war of much of its credibility. Yet NATO deployment has been essentially unaffected by the change. NATO has improved its conventional defenses but has not closed the gap in such forces. As the current NATO commander made clear recently, even counting the five American divisions that have remained in Europe, the alliance is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more than a few days. European ambivalence continues 35 years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide an alternative to nuclear weapons—and yet much of their public opinion shies away from even thinking about nuclear deterrence.

3) Were we to start all over again, we would therefore hardly repeat the decision of the '50s in today's circumstances. Let us assume a group of wise men and women from both sides of the Atlantic came together to plan a global strategy unconstrained by the past. Assume further that it started from the premise that ultimately the defense of the West is indivisible and that Europe-

an security should be viewed under the aspect of the defense of the West in Europe—as a thoughtful French observer, Francois de Rose, put it. Such a group would almost surely conclude that the sensible division of responsibilities would be for Europe, with economic resources and manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to concentrate on the conventional defense of the Continent. To maintain the global balance of power—by definition as essential for Europe as for

> We must not let our future pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and neoisolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts.

> If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate determinant to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of up to half of our ground forces would be logical.

America—the U.S. would emphasize highly mobile conventional forces capable of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense of, for example, the Middle East, Asia or the Western Hemisphere.

Such a division of responsibilities would also enable our military establishment to shift some of its intellectual energies and scientific research from a hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have major allies to the defense of regions where conflict is much

more likely. In such regions our allies are less prone to see their interests immediately engaged, and the countries being threatened are in a worse position to assist in the defense effort.

Even if we were to start all over again, an irrefutable case would exist for maintaining considerable American ground forces in Europe. This would be essential to keep our allies from feeling abandoned and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the defense of Europe no longer reflects a vital American interest. In a new division of responsibilities we should also preserve and preferably strengthen existing U.S. land-based airpower on the Continent. And we should continue our responsibility for both strategic and tactical nuclear defense, assuming that we and the Europeans could agree on a strategy for the latter. American intermediate-range missiles should remain in Europe to "couple" the nuclear defenses of both sides of the Atlantic so long as European leaders desired them. No change in naval deployments would be involved.

Why then is such a division of responsibilities not realized? The principal obstacle is psychological. For all their criticisms of American policy, Europeans dread a return to isolationism in the U.S. Americans fear that any tinkering with deployment would drive Europe into explicit neutralism. And some in the Pentagon would rather maintain our troops in Europe in a less than rational deployment than return a portion to the U.S., where they are more exposed to congressional budget cutters.

In my view, persisting in a deployment that is losing its rationale accelerates these attitudes. Pacifism and neutralism are on the march in Europe even under the present setup; isolationism in America is not yet so vocal but is being powerfully encouraged by endless allied disputes. An alliance that cannot agree on its political premises cannot sustain itself by clinging to military arrangements decided a generation ago in totally different circumstances. With current trends the issue of the rationale for the NATO deployment will become unavoidable. If it arises not as an integral component in a comprehensive design but as a single question of whether to continue stationing American troops in Europe, unilateral changes will be arbitrarily imposed by the potentially most destructive means—the American budgetary process. Then indeed we might see in America a psychological wrench away from Europe and in Europe a panicky resentment against the U.S. A change in deployment without a positive political and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own sake, might shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead our adversary and tempt aggression.

There is an urgent need for a serious and rapid re-examination of NATO doctrine, deployment and policies, conducted by men and women known for their dedication to Western unity. The group— to be formed immediately after our elections—must begin with one of the most divisive issues before the alliance: an agreement

on the nature and scope of the threat. The group must avoid the tendency of previous such efforts, which set unrealistic goals and thereby magnified the problem. A deadline for completion should be set—certainly no longer than two years.

Theoretically, such a study could lead to one of three outcomes: 1) The group could come to the same conclusions about the optimum division of responsibilities in an agreed global strategy outlined above. Given the dis-

TIME, MARCH 5, 1984

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agreements about the nature of the interests involved in regions outside of Europe and the domestic priorities of most European countries, such a conclusion, however rational, is extremely improbable. 2) The group could agree that the strategic interests of the West require a full conventional defense, but that for practical and psychological reasons, Europe can undertake the required effort only if the present American ground deployment in Europe is maintained intact. 3) The group could decide that the realities of European domestic politics preclude more than the current dualistic, marginal improvement of defense efforts.

I hope very much that Europe would choose the second option. If Europe should agree to build a full conventional defense and were prepared to express that commitment in unambiguous yearly obligations to increase its forces, the U.S. should accept the judgment that its present ground forces in Europe are an indispensable component. Such a decision might in fact invigorate the conventional arms-reduction talks and in time lead to stability at a lower level. But if Europe should opt for a perpetuation of the present ambivalence or for only a token improvement, then the U.S. will owe it to the overall requirements of global defense to draw certain conclusions. If Europe by its own decision condemns itself to permanent conventional inferiority, we will have no choice but to opt for a deployment of U.S. forces in Europe that makes strate-

gic and political sense. If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion, perhaps up to half, of our present ground forces would be a logical result. To provide time for necessary adjustments, that withdrawal could be extended over five years. To ease the transition further, we could, if Europe agreed, keep the excess ground forces in Europe for a time afterward in a new status analogous to that of the French forces, prepared for use in Europe but also available for use in emergencies outside it. Any withdrawal would make sense only if the redeployed forces were added to our strategic reserve; if they were disbanded, the effect would be to weaken the overall defense.

The proposed redeployment would leave intact air and naval forces, as well as intermediate-range missiles, so long as Europe wants them. A useful byproduct of the process would be a systematic re-evaluation

of the existing inventory of very short-range tactical nuclear weapons, a legacy of three decades of ad hoc decisions; these weapons now represent at one and the same time an increment to deterrence and the greatest danger of unintended nuclear war because, being deployed so far forward, they are unusually subject to the exigencies of battle.

In this scheme, withdrawal would be not an end in itself—as it will if frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic go much further—but one component of an adaptation to new circumstances extending over some eight years that rededicates the U.S. to the alliance for the indefinite future.

Psychology is immensely important in international relations, especially when policies turn not only on cold, professional assessments of the national interest by trained political leaders, but on public opinion. I would like to believe that restructuring the alliance to give Europeans greater responsibility for their own defense, while important American forces remain in Europe, will be seen not as an abandonment but as an embrace of Europe. It is a means of enlisting Europeans as full partners in the process of decision on which their safety as well as ours depends. For a son of Europe reared on the existing NATO orthodoxy, the very idea of even a partial redeployment is painful—all the more so after Lebanon. But we will not be fulfilling our obligations to the West if we fail to put forward an initiative to forestall the crisis that will otherwise confront us in much worse circumstances.

POLITICAL OBJECTIVES

By themselves, neither organizational nor doctrinal adaptations can remedy the political incoherence rending NATO. This article has emphasized security issues. However, a few general observations on the alliance's political problems are necessary.

1) Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic who value the alliance, with all its failings, as the ultimate guardian of Western freedom must seek urgently to end political disputes over East-West relations and North-South policy, especially Western conduct in the flash points of conflict in the Third World. The tendency to grandstand before domestic audiences, the growing self-righteousness, will in time make a mockery of the key assumption of the Atlantic Alliance: that we share a common approach to security. Defense requires after all some agreed political purpose in the name of which it is conducted. The Atlantic Alliance must urgently develop a grand strategy for East-West problems and Third World relations applicable for the rest of this century. Otherwise, it will tempt constant pressures and crises.

2) The U.S. cannot lead the alliance or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the Viet Nam War, we have disquieted our friends and confused, where we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic wide swings on essential elements of our policies. But the national interest does not change every four or eight years. At

some point the national interest must be accepted by our public as clearly recognizable and constant. Otherwise, we shall become a source of dangerous instability, still relevant for our power but irrelevant for our ideas. A presidential election year is probably not an ideal time to forge a bipartisan consensus. But whoever wins the presidential election faces no more important and urgent challenge than to restore the element of bipartisanship to our foreign policy.

3) European governments must meet head-on the disturbing trends toward pacifism and neutralism in their countries. These movements are led by people of conviction; they cannot be defused by accommodation. They can only be resisted with a compelling vision of a new future. If European governments continue to humor those who profess to see the danger to the peace in a bellicose America, not an intransigent Soviet Union, they will find themselves making concession after concession and will be-

come hostages of their critics.

The current condition of the alliance cries out for a rethinking of its structure, its doctrine and its unifying purposes. The creativity and courage with which we approach this challenge will determine whether the alliance enters a new and dynamic period or gradually withers.

I have outlined proposals to reinvigorate allied cohesion by defining clear responsibilities for each side of the Atlantic, to be implemented over a period of years. On that basis European leaders could defend cooperation with the U.S. as something they sought as a matter of their own conviction and in their own national interest. American leaders would have a rational, understandable policy to defend and would benefit from dealing with a more equal partner. A new era of allied creativity and American dedication could give inspiration to the generation that has come to maturity since World War II and since the postwar crises that infused NATO's founders with their sense of common purpose.

We must not let our future pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and neoisolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts. The nations bordering the North Atlantic need above all faith in themselves and the will to resist the siren calls of those who use fear and panic as instruments of policy or domestic debate. In the end we must fulfill our trust: to preserve and strengthen a North Atlantic alliance that represents the hope of human dignity and decency in our world. ■

TIME, MARCH 5, 1984

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0006

tactical ones.

2 0079 «The Alliance is thereby trapped in a precarious combination of (a) inadequate
2 0080
1 0081 conventional forces, leading to (b) reliance
0 0082 on nuclear weapons, in (c) a strategic envi-
0 0083 ronment that makes the threat of their use,
- M 0084 and therefore their deterrent
1 0085 value, less and less credible, and (d) a pub-
0 0086 lic climate of growing nuclear pacifism that
0 0087 undermines what credibility remains. Lack
0 0088 of a coherent defense policy leaves the Alli-
1 0089 ance, possessing a huge stockpile of enor-
1 0090 mously destructive weapons, disarming it-
M 0091 self
L 0092 psychologically.

0079 (vb.2)

b-

0 0093 «2. «Intermediate range weapons and arms
2 0094 control. «The arrival of the (first) American
0 0095 intermediate range weapons in Europe late
0 0096 last year was properly hailed as a consider-
1 0097 able success. For if public demonstrations
5 0098 and Soviet pressure had succeeded in
0 0099 blocking that deployment the Soviet Union
1 0100 would in effect have achieved a veto over
0 0101 «nato»'s military dispositions. But unless the
2 0102 Alliance clarifies the purpose these missiles are supposed to
0 0103 serve, the accomplishment is likely to be transitory, since the ba-
0 0104 sic European attitude toward the missiles remains that of a host

0093

0094

0101 (cf3)(cf1)

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0007

2 0105 toward a now unwanted guest whose invitation to dinner it

0 0106 would be too awkward to withdraw. Some prominent Europeans

1 0107 purport to see in the missiles' presence a hidden American de-

0 0108 design to confine a nuclear war to Europe. Others treat them as one

1 0109 of those peculiar American aberrations that periodically upset

1 0110 the Alliance's equilibrium. Too few recognize, and even fewer

0 0111 are willing to admit, that in fact the missiles link the strategic nu-

0 0112 clear defense of Europe and the U.S. Weapons capable of reach-

0 0113 ing Soviet territory are a means of emphasizing America's com-

L 0114 commitment to the defense of Europe, not a way to escape it.

1 0115 European ambivalence makes it excruciatingly difficult to

0 0116 define ``progress'' toward an acceptable arms control agreement,

1 0117 while the nearly desperate eagerness with which ``progress'' is

1 0118 pursued makes its achievement less likely. The Soviets have re-

0 0119 fused even to discuss any proposal that would balance U.S. Inter-

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0012

each side would have

0 0185 It. More likely, each is in danger of paralyzing and demoralizing

L 0186 the other.

0 0187 «This state of affairs has proceeded too far to assign blame to 0187 (vb.18)

0 0188 particular policies or specific actions on either side. The trouble

0 0189 lies deeper. The present structure is simply not working, either in

0 0190 defining the threat or finding methods

L 0191 to meet it.

1 0192 Existing arrangements are unbalanced.

2 0193 When one country dominates

0 0194 the alliance on all major issues<--->when

0 0195 that one country chooses weapons and

0 0196 decides deployments, when it conducts

1 0197 the arms control negotiations, sets the

0 0198 tone for East-West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with

1 0199 the Third World<--->little incentive remains for a serious joint effort to redefine the requirements of security or to

2 0200

0 0201

1 0202

END OF LEG PAGE 2 COLUMN 1

PAGE 2 COLUMN 2 75 LINES DEFINED

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0014

X 0225 is safe, especially with regard to some Third World issues and certain aspects of East-West relations.

L 0226

0 0227 «The problem has become even more acute because the generation of leaders that built «nato «has virtually disappeared.

0227 (vb.18)

2 0228

0228 (cf3)(cf1)

1 0229 Those who governed Europe during those early postwar years

1 0230 were still psychologically of the era when Europe bestrode the

2 0231 world. Global thinking came naturally. European leaders assumed responsibility for their own security policies and gave it

1 0232 up only reluctantly because of special circumstances. But nearly

0 0233

1 0234 40 years have passed since the end of World War II. The new

1 0235 leaders were reared in an era when the U.S. was pre-eminent;

1 0236 they take it for granted that they can delegate the military defense of Europe to us. Too many of them seek to position them-

0 0237

2 0238 themselves somewhere between the superpowers<--->the first step toward psychological neutralism. Thus the European

- 0239

0 0240 schizophrenia: a fear that the U.S. might not be prepared to risk

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0016

radicals

L 0257 abroad.

L 0258

0 0259 «The change in the nature of European leadership has been 0259 (gfdiT44)

1 0260 paralleled in the U.S. Our new elites do not reject «nato 0260 (cf3)

1 0261 «any more than do their European counterparts. But for 0261 (cf1)

1 0262 them, too, the alliance is more a practical than an emo-

0 0263 tional necessity, more a military arrangement than a set of com-

L 0264 mon political purposes.

1 0265 On both sides of the Atlantic, we

0 0266 find ourselves threatened by the domi-

1 0267 nance of domestic politics over global

1 0268 political strategy. In Europe this leads

1 0269 in too many countries to a faintly dis-

0 0270 guised neutralism. In the U.S. it accel-

1 0271 erates our already strong tendency to-

L 0272 ward unilateralism and isolationism.

1 0273 U.S. leaders have too often adjust-

3 0274 ed foreign policies to political pres-

9 0275 sures, bureaucratic infighting or

5 0276 changing intellectual fashions. The

2 0277 history of the American attitude to-

END OF LEG PAGE 2 COLUMN 2

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0019
0311 TK)

2 0312 «During the entire post<->World War II

1 0313 period it has been an axiom of American

0 0314 policy that for all the temporary irritation it

0 0315 might cause us, a strong, united Europe was

4 0316 an essential component of the Atlantic

1 0317 partnership. We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination, insofar as it depended on American actions, In

1 0318 with dedication and imagination, insofar as it depended on American actions, In

1 0319 far as it depended on American actions, In

2 0320 all areas except security. With respect to

1 0321 defense, however, the U.S. has been indifferent at best<--->at least since the failure of

1 0322 the European Defense Community<--->to any

0 0323 the European Defense Community<--->to any

0 0324 sort of Europeanization. Many in this country seemed to fear that a militarily unified

0 0325 Europe might give less

0 0326 emphasis to transatlantic relations or that it

L 0327 The opposite is almost certainly the case.

L 0328 The opposite is almost certainly the case.

0 0329 In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to trans-

0 0330 atlantic competition, even to some

discrimination. What defines

2 0331 a Common Market, after all, is that its external barriers are

0 0332 higher than its internal ones. In the field of defense, by contrast,

3 0333 increased European responsibility and unity would promote

0 0334 closer cooperation with the U.S. A Europe

0312 (cf1)

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0023

1 0381 logistics. European nations have rarely enjoyed such a material margin; they have had

0 0382
0 0383
0 0383
0 0384
0 0385
0 0386
0 0387
0 0388
0 0389
0 0390
0 0391
0 0392
0 0393
0 0394
0 0395
L 0396
1 0397
1 0398
-M 0399
0 0400
0 0401
1 0402
0 0403
2 0404

0 0384 (cf3)
0 0385 (cf1)
newed emphasis on conventional defense.
3. Since the beginning of «nato, «the Secretary General, who is responsible for running the alliance's political machinery, has been European. In the new structure it would make more sense for this official to be American<--->whenever the new Secretary General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. Meantime, no Western leader is better qualified for guiding «nato»'s transition than the wise and thoughtful Carrington.
4. Europe should take over those arms control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil. The «inf »negotiations with the Soviets (for intermediate-range missiles) and the «m.b.f.r. «negotiations (on conventional ground forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a Europe-an chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though pre-

0387 (cf3)(cf1)
retary General, who is responsible for running the alliance's political machinery, has been European. In the new structure it would make more sense for this official to be American<--->whenever the new Secretary General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. Meantime, no Western leader is better qualified for guiding «nato»'s transition than the wise and thoughtful Carrington.
*4. Europe should take over those arms control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil. The «inf »negotiations with the Soviets (for intermediate-range missiles) and the «m.b.f.r. «negotiations (on conventional ground forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a Europe-an chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though pre-

0397 (vb.2)
control negotiations that deal with weapons
stationed on Euro-

0399 (cf3)(cf1)
the Soviets (for intermediate-range missiles) and
0400 (cf3)(cf1)
the «m.b.f.r. «negotiations (on conventional ground forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a Europe-an chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though pre-

LINE 0401

WOULD LIKE TO STRIKE "GROUND" AS MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS ALSO DEALING WITH AIR, SO
PARENS WOULD READ ("ON CONVENTIONAL
FORCES")

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0025

1 0421 ment in Europe with the leaders whose countries will have to

0 0422 bear the brunt<--->for good or ill<--->of the outcome of these negotiations.

0 0423 This is especially important with respect to the American

END OF LEG PAGE 3 COLUMN 2

PAGE 4 COLUMN 1 75 LINES DEFINED

0 0424 intermediate-range missiles in Europe.

1 0425 That deployment makes sense only if

3 0426 the allies genuinely believe that the

2 0427 prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe on Soviet territory will help deter

0 0428 a

0 0430 Soviet conventional attack. If our principal allies do not share this conviction,

2 0431 the psychological basis for the deployment will

0 0432 tion, the psychological basis for the deployment will

- M 0433 evaporate.

L 0434 evaporate.

0 0435 European chairmanship of the «inf 0435 (cf3)

1 0436 «talks would oblige Europe's leaders to 0436 (cf1)

1 0437 face the issue head-on: they would be able to abandon the missiles through negotiation; if they did not (as in terms of their se-

0 0438 siles through negotiation; if they did not (as in terms of their se-

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0029

0488 decision of the '50s in today's circum-
0 0489 stances. Let us assume a group of wise
0 0490 men and women from both sides of the
0 0491 Atlantic were called together to plan a
2 0492 global strategy unconstrained by the
3 0493 past. Assume further that it started
2 0494 from the premise that ultimately the
1 0495 defense of the West is indivisible and
6 0496 that European security should be
0 0497 viewed under the aspect of the defense
0 0498 of the West in Europe<--->as a thoughtful

END OF LEG PAGE 4 COLUMN 1

PAGE 4 COLUMN 2 75 LINES DEFINED

2 0499 French observer, Françoise de Rose,
0 0500 put it. Such a group would almost sure-
0 0501 ly conclude that the sensible division of
2 0502 responsibilities would be for Europe,
4 0503 with economic resources and man-
2 0504 power exceeding those of the Soviet
1 0505 Union, to concentrate on the conven-
3 0506 tional defense of the Continent. To
2 0507 maintain the global balance of pow-
2 0508 er<--->by definition as essential for Eu-
1 0509 rope as for America<--->the U.S. would
0 0510 emphasize highly mobile conventional

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0033

0558 getary process. Then indeed we might see in
America a psycho-

1 0559 logical wrench away from Europe and in Europe a
panicky re-

1 0560 sentiment against the U.S. A change in
deployment without a

0 0561 positive political and strategic purpose,

3 0562 withdrawal for its own sake, might

0 0563 well shock our allies into neutralism; it

0 0564 could mislead our adversary and tempt
aggression.

1 0566 There is an urgent need for a seri-
ous and rapid re-examination of «nato

6 0568 «doctrine, deployment and policies, 0567 (cf3)

1 0569 conducted by men and women known

1 0570 for their dedication to Western unity.

1 0571 The group must begin with one of the

3 0572 most divisive issues before the Alli-

1 0573 ance: an agreement on the nature and

0568 (cf1)

END OF LEG PAGE 4 COLUMN 2

PAGE 5 COLUMN 1 73 LINES DEFINED

2 0574 the scope of the threat. In offering solutions,
the group must

1 0575 avoid the tendency of previous such efforts,
which established

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0035

decide that the

1 0592 realities of European domestic politics preclude more than the

2 0593 current gradualistic, marginal improvement of European defense efforts. I hope very much that Europe would choose the

1 0594

L 0595 second option.

L 0596

0 0597 «If Europe should in fact agree to build a full conventional defense and were prepared to express that

0 0598 commitment in unambiguous, agreed

3 0599 yearly obligations to increase its forces,

X 0600 the U.S. should accept the judgment that its

0 0601 present ground forces in Europe are an in-
dispensable component. But if Europe

1 0602

5 0603

0 0604 should opt for a perpetuation of the present

1 0605

1 0606

1 0607

1 0608

2 0609

0 0610

1 0611

2 0612

1 0613

1 0614

2 0615

0 0616

0 0610

1 0611

2 0612

1 0613

1 0614

2 0615

0 0616

0609 (co Pls see

0609 copy)

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0036

0617 substantial portion, perhaps up to half, of

1 0618 our present ground forces would be a logical result. To provide time for necessary adjustments, that withdrawal could be extended over five years. To ease the transition further we could, if

0 0619 cal result. To provide time for necessary adjustments, that withdrawal could be extended over five years. To ease the transition further we could, if

3 0620

0 0621

1 0622 Europe agreed, keep the excess ground forces in Europe for a time afterward in a new status analogous to that of the French

1 0623

1 0624 forces, prepared for use in Europe but also available for use in emergencies outside it. Any withdrawal would make sense only

0 0625

1 0626 if the redeployed forces were added to our strategic reserve; if

1 0627 they were disbanded the effect would be to weaken the overall defense.

L 0628

0 0629 The proposed redeployment would leave intact air and naval

0 0630 forces, as well as intermediate-range missiles, so long as Europe

1 0631 wants them. A useful byproduct of the process would be a systematic re-evaluation of the existing inventory of very short-

2 0632

1 0633 range tactical nuclear weapons, a legacy of three decades of ad hoc decisions; these weapons now represent at one

0 0634

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0039

0657 confront us in much worse circumstances.

L 0658

L 0659 «Political Objectives

0659 (cf2)

0 0660 «By themselves, neither organizational nor doctrinal adapta-

0659 (coSpecs TK)

0660 (cf1)

1 0661 tions can remedy the political incoherence rending «nato. «This

0661 (cf3)(cf1)

1 0662 article has emphasized security issues. However, a few general

0 0663 observations on the alliance's political problems are necessary to

L 0664 place the security recommendations in perspective.

0 0665 A. Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic who value the

0 0666 Alliance, with all its failings, as the ultimate guardian of Western

0 0667 freedom, must seek urgently to end political disputes over East-

0 0668 West relations and North-South policy, especially Western con-

1 0669 duct in the flashpoints of conflict in the Third World. The ten-

2 0670 dency to grandstand before domestic audiences, the growing

4 0671 self-righteousness, will in time make a

1 0672 mockery of the key assumption of the At-

2 0673 lantic Alliance: that we share a common

0 0674 approach to security. Defense requires after

3 0675 all «some «agreed political purpose in the

0675 (cf2)(cf1)

0 0676 name of which it is conducted. The Atlantic

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0040 CD

0677

0 0678

2 0679

L 0680

this century.

0 0681

*B. The U.S. cannot lead the Western al-

0681

(vb.14)

1 0682

0 0683

we do not restore bipartisanship to our for-

1 0684

3 0685

shattered our bipartisan unity in foreign

1 0686

policy we have disquieted our friends and

1 0687

3 0688

0 0689

with respect to essential elements of our pol-

0 0690

icies. As a nation we must accept the reality

1 0691

that the national interest does not change

0 0692

1 0693

0 0694

Otherwise, we shall

1 0695

0 0696

presidential election year is

1 0697

0 0698

0 0699

and urgent challenge than to restore
bipartisanship to our foreign

L 0700

policy.

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0043

0729 mine all joint efforts. The nations bordering the
North Atlantic

0 0730 need above all faith in themselves and the will
to resist the siren

0 0731 calls of those who use fear and panic as
instruments of policy or of

0 0732 domestic debate. In the end we must fulfill our
trust: to preserve

X 0733 and strengthen a North Atlantic alliance that
represents the hope

L 0734 of human dignity and decency in our world.

(END)

2/24

SSM:

I phoned Peggy Berman at TIME and advised her of HAK's oks to four items projecting.

She raised two additional points which I have entered onto blue index cards at appropriate spots.

We should let her know this afternoon.

Jody

February 23, 1984 P.M.

MEMO FOR HAK

FROM: Rosemary

SUBJECT: Your TIME Magazine Article

As I told you, Ron Kriss was sending you the clean copy of your TIME magazine article separately by his pouch. It closed before you and I discussed their subsequent suggestions for changes so his copy will not reflect these.

Attached is my copy. At the white tabs are the changes which you and I discussed after the Time researcher talked to me. All of your approved changes at these tabs have been phoned in.

HOWEVER, Time has added several new proposed changes. These are at the yellow tabs.

--Could you look at the yellow tabs and make your decision.

--You could phone SSM with your answers. Suzanne has an identical package to this one, and can convey your decisions to Time.

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0002

C 0013 giving Europe greater voice in some arms control
negotiations and greater
responsibility for its

C 0014 ground defense, enabling the U.S. to withdraw up
to half of its ground forces.

L 0015 <<<
(cbp1,c1,156,c2,156)

0015 (xr)(cf1,10,
0015 9.5,20p9)

PAGE 1 COLUMN 1 56 LINES DEFINED

(cbp2,c1,175,c2,175)

(cbp3,c1,173,c2,173)

(cbp4,c1,175,c2,175)

(cbp5,c1,173,c2,173)

0 0016 <<<Lebanon and the Soviet succession have
preoccupied us in
0016 (il631,0,231,
0016 6p9,1011,0,

1 0017 recent weeks, but the Atlantic Alliance must
remain the
0016 131,8p3,491,
0016 0,131,8p3,

0 0018 pivot of American policy. On its unity depends
the securi-
0016 971,0,231,
0016 6p9,1011,0,

1 0019 ty of free peoples. From Its cohesion will flow
whatever
0016 131,8p3,491,
0016 0,131,8p3,

L 0020 hopes the Soviet succession offers for a new
dialogue.
0016 971,0,231,
0016 6p9)(ir71,0,

2 0021 Unfortunately the Atlantic Alliance is not in
good repair.
0016 231,6p9,821,
0016 0,131,8p3,

1 0022 Just as storms recur in nature, crises recur in
the Atlantic Alli-
0016 491,0,131,
0016 8p3,991,0,

2 0023 ance.* Nearly every Administration for a
0016 231,6p9,991,
0016 0,131,8p3,

4 0024 generation has been involved in them.
0016 0,131,8p3,

2 0025 However, the present turmoil in «nato «is
L 0026 both unprecedented and unsettling.

3 0027 In West Germany, Scandinavia, the

0 0028 Low Countries and recently even in Britain

1 0029 (though to a lesser extent), well-organized

4 0030 and financed "peace" movements have

0 0031 been pulling governments in the general di-

1 0032 rection of their policies, even though those

1 0033 governments disagree with their premises.

1 0034 In addition, the main opposition parties in

1 0035 the Federal Republic and Great Britain<-->

0 0036 which, in the nature of democratic politics,

0 0037 can be expected to get into office sometime

0 0038 in the next decade<--->are advocating policies

0 0039 that amount to unilateral nuclear disarma-

3 0040 ment for their countries. Because of the

1 0041 sway these groups hold over key segments

0 0042 of public opinion, too many European lead-

0 0043 ers<--->even conservative ones<--->have yielded

4 0044 to the temptation to demonstrate their

2 0045 peaceful intentions the easy way, by pre-

0 0046 tending to be reining in a bellicose and

2 0047 insensitive U.S. through

0 0048 shape public attitudes<--->and thereby set what
become the limits

0 0049 of the politically possible<--->there is less
intellectual or philosoph-

L 0050 ical agreement than in any previous period.

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0003

0016 491,0,131,

0016 8p3,991,0,

0016 231,6p9)

0016 (ufdiL44)

0023 TYPE SPECS,

0023 STYLE TK

0025 (cf3)(cf1)

0 0031 been pulling governments in the general direction of their policies, even though those governments disagree with their premises.

1 0034 In addition, the main opposition parties in the Federal Republic and Great Britain<-->

0 0039 that amount to unilateral nuclear disarmament for their countries. Because of the

3 0040 sway these groups hold over key segments

0 0042 of public opinion, too many European leaders<--->even conservative ones<--->have yielded

2 0045 peaceful intentions the easy way, by preferring to be reining in a bellicose and

0 0046 insensitive U.S. through their balancing ministrations. As a result, among those who

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0003

0016 491,0,131,

0016 8p3,991,0,

0016 231,6p9)

0016 (ufdiL44)

0023 TYPE SPECS,

0023 STYLE TK

0025 (cf3)(cf1)

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0004

0 0051 This creates an exceedingly dangerous situation.

An alliance

2 0052 cannot live by arms alone. To endure it requires
some basic

0 0053 agreement on the political aims that justify and
give direction to

1 0054 the common defense. If military arrangements
provide its only

0 0055 bond, it will sooner or later disintegrate. It
will surely prove un-

0 0056 able to take advantage of diplomatic
opportunities for an easing

0 0057 of tensions. That is the central issue before the
Atlantic Alliance

0 0058 today. It requires a remedy that is fundamental,
even radical<--->in

L 0059 the literal sense, of going to the root.

L 0060

L 0061 Four problems in particular are gnawing at the
Alliance:

0 0062 1. «Lack of an agreed, credible strategy. «The gap between «na= 0062 (cf2)(cf1)

1 0063 to«'s formal strategy and what the public will 0063 (cf1)
support has wid-

1 0064 ened dangerously. The so-called "flexible
response" devised in

0 0065 the 1960s remains «nato«'s official doctrine. It 0065 (cf3)(cf1)
contemplates a de-

0 0066 fense of Europe that begins with conventional
weapons and then

tactical ones.

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0006

2 0079 «The Alliance is thereby trapped in a precarious combination of (a) inadequate conventional forces, leading to (b) reliance on nuclear weapons, in (c) a strategic environment that makes the threat of their use, and therefore their deterrent value, less and less credible, and (d) a public climate of growing nuclear pacifism that undermines what credibility remains. Lack of a coherent defense policy leaves the Alliance, possessing a huge stockpile of enormously destructive weapons, disarming itself»

0079 (vb.2)

0 0093 «2. «Intermediate range weapons and arms control. «The arrival of the first American intermediate range weapons in Europe late last year was properly hailed as a considerable success. For if public demonstrations and Soviet pressure had succeeded in blocking that deployment the Soviet Union would in effect have achieved a veto over «nato»'s military dispositions. But unless the Alliance clarifies the purpose these missiles are supposed to serve, the accomplishment is likely to be transitory, since the ba-

0093 (vb.18)(cf2)

0094 (cf1)

0 0103
0 0104

0 0103 serve, the accomplishment is likely to be transitory, since the ba-
sic European attitude toward the missiles remains that of a host

0101 (cf3)(cf1)

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0012

each side would have

L 0186 the other.

L 0191 to meet it.

1 0199 the Third World<--->little incentive remains for a serious joint effort to redeem the requirements of security or to

2 0200

0 0201

1 0202

END OF LEG PAGE 2 COLUMN 1

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0013

1 0203 coordinate foreign policies. Such joint

0 0204 efforts entail sacrifices and carry polit-

3 0205 ical costs. Leaders are not likely to

1 0206 make the sacrifice or pay the cost un-

2 0207 less they feel responsible for the re-

L 0208 sults.

0 0209 «An imbalance such as the one now

0209 (vb.14)

X 0210 existing cannot be made up for by ``con-

1 0211 sultation,'' however meticulous. In the

X 0212 long run, consultation works only when

1 0213 those being consulted have a capacity

0 0214 for independent action. Then each side

X 0215 takes the other seriously; then each side

X 0216 knows that the other's consent has to be won.

Otherwise consulta-

1 0217 tion becomes ``briefing.'' Agreement reflects not conviction but

L 0218 acquiescence for want of an alternative.

1 0219 The present imbalance is not new. It has existed ever since

0 0220 World War II. But military dependence on another nation has a

2 0221 cumulative impact. When dependence no longer results from

0 0222 wartime destruction but from a policy choice, made under condi-

1 0223 tions of relative prosperity, it can breed guilt, self-hatred and a

X 0224 compulsion to display ``independence ''of the U.S. wherever doing so

0224 (cf2)(cf1)

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0014

L 0226

2 0228

0 0233

0 0237

2 0238 selves somewhere between the superpowers<--->the first step to-

- 0239 ward psychological neutralism. Thus the European

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0016

radicals

L 0257 abroad.

L 0258

0 0259 "The change in the nature of European leadership has been

1 0260 paralleled in the U.S. Our new elites do not reject "nato

1 0261 "any more than do their European counterparts. But for

L 0272 ward unilaterallism and isolationism.

END OF LEG PAGE 2 COLUMN 2

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0018

0 0292 from a policy of détente to one of confrontation and back to con-

1 0293 ciliation, not to speak of the gyrations in our Middle East poli-

1 0294 cy<--->all in addition to the reassessments that occur whenever a

2 0295 new administration comes into office. Each change of course

1 0296 leaves victims among European leaders who have staked their

0 0297 domestic positions on policies that the U.S. later abandons. Each

2 0298 lurch encourages a kind of neutralism, as Europeans seek to

L 0299 avoid being made hostage to sudden swings in American policy.

2 0300 A continuation of existing trends is bound to lead first to

0 0301 stagnation and in time to the demoralization of the Western Alli-

2 0302 ance. An explicit act of statesmanship is

2 0303 needed to give new meaning to Western

2 0304 unity and a new vitality to «nato. «In my 0304 (cf3)(cf1)

0 0305 view such an effort must have three compo-

0 0306 nents: (a) a more significant role for Europe

1 0307 within «nato», (b) a reform of the «nato «or- 0307 (cf3)(cf1)

0 0308 ganization and (c) a reassessment of current 0307 (cf3)(cf1)

L 0309 «nato «deployment. 0309 (cf3)(cf1)

L 0310

L 0311 «A New Role for Europe 0311 (cf2)(coSPEC)

1 0317 partnership. We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination, inso-

1 0318 ple with dedication and imagination, inso-

1 0319 far as it depended on American actions, in

1 0321 defense, however, the U.S. has been indif-

1 0322 ferent at best<--->at least since the failure of

0 0324 sort of Europeanization. Many in this coun-

0 0325 try seemed to fear that a militarily unified

Europe might give less

0 0326 emphasis to transatlantic relations or that it
might botch its de-

L 0327 defense effort and thus weaken the common security.

0311
0312
(cf1)

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0020

analyzing its security

1 0335 needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find associa-

0 0336 tion with the U.S. essential. Greater unity in defense would also

0 0337 help to overcome the logistical nightmare caused by the attempt

1 0338 of every European nation to stretch already inadequate defense

0 0339 efforts across the whole panoply of weapons. For example, there

0 0340 are five kinds of battle tanks within «nato, «different types of ar-

0 0341 tillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consum-

0 0342 ing ammunition. In a major conflict it would be nearly impossi-

0340 (cf3)(cf1)

L 0343 ble to keep this hodge-podge of forces supplied.

1 0344 Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance re-

1 0345 requires Europe to develop greater identity and coherence in the

0 0346 field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burden shar-

0 0347 ing," of paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind some-

1 0348 thing more structural<--->a more rational balance of responsibil-

4 0349 ities between the two sides of the Atlantic. The present

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0021

1 0350 allocation of responsibilities simply makes no sense. It fails to

END OF LEG PAGE 3 COLUMN 1

PAGE 3 COLUMN 2 73 LINES DEFINED

0 0351 bring the allies to reflect naturally about either security or political objectives. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in

0 0352 changing the present arrangement, lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since drift will surely lead to unraveling<-->

0 0353 if more imperceptibly<--->statesmanship impels a new approach.

0 0354 clear doctrine. But if pursued with care and sensitivity it can help

L 0355 ««Structural Reform

L 0356

L 0357 «Structural Reform

0357 (vb.14)(cf2)

0 0358 of purpose and

0357 (coSpec TK)
0358 (cf1)

0 0359 clear doctrine. But if pursued with care and sensitivity it can help

2 0360 catalyze the development of shared political purposes. These

0 0361 common objectives require that European judgments on security,

1 0362 East-West diplomacy and other matters emerge from

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0022

Europe's

1 0363 own analysis. Mere acquiescence in American decisions, brief-

0 0364 ings and pressures provides a façade of unity;
shared purposes re-

L 0365 quire a deeper sense of participation.

Specifically:

0 0366 1. By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for

0 0367 conventional ground defense. This is well within
the capability of

X 0368 a continent with nearly one and one half times
the population and

X 0369 twice the G.N.P. of the Soviet Union. The
Soviets, moreover, have

L 0370 to divide their forces on at least two fronts.

2 0371 2. To reflect the new responsibilities, a
European officer

2 0372 should by then take the traditionally American
place as "Su-

1 0373 preme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe" 0373 (cf3)(cf1)
("saceur"),

0 0374 probably with a U.S. deputy. Such a change is
also likely to give a

2 0375 new perspective to Allied strategic plan-

2 0376 ning. The U.S. has generally achieved its

3 0377 military successes by the weight of the

X 0378 equipment which our superior industrial po-

2 0379 tential made available. This has tempted

0 0380 our military leaders to equate strategy with

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0023

0 0382 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

0 0383 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

3 0384 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

2 0385 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

L 0386 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

0 0387 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

1 0388 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

0 0389 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

3 0390 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

X 0391 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

3 0392 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

0 0393 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

0 0394 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

0 0395 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

L 0396 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

1 0397 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

1 0398 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

-M 0399 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

0 0400 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

0 0401 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

1 0402 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

0 0403 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

2 0404 to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics<--->precisely what «nato

0384 (cf3)

0385 (cf1)

0387 (cf3)(cf1)

0395 (cf3)(cf1)

0397 (vb.2)

0399 (cf3)(cf1)

0400 (cf3)(cf1)

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0025

END OF LEG PAGE 3 COLUMN 2

0 0428 a

M 0429 a

0 0430 Soviet conventional attack. If our principal allies do not share this conviction, the psychological basis for the deployment will

2 0431

- M 0433

L 0434 evaporate.

0 0435 European chairmanship of the "inf 0435 (cf3)

1 0436 "talks would oblige Europe's leaders to 0436 (cf1)

0 0438

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0028

L 0471 neither of its strategy nor of its efforts.

0 0472 B. This situation became anomalous when the
growth of So-

0 0473 viet strategic forces deprived general nuclear
war of much of its

0 0474 credibility. Yet «nato »deployment has been
essentially unaffect-

1 0475 ed by the change of «nato «doctrine to one of
flexible response.

0 0476 «nato »has improved its conventional defenses but
has not closed

1 0477 the gap in such forces. As the current «nato
«commander made

1 0478 clear recently, even counting the five American
divisions that

2 0479 have remained in Europe, the Alliance is still
unprepared to

2 0480 withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more
than a few

2 0481 days. European ambivalence continues 35 years
after «nato»'s

2 0482 creation. Our allies remain unwilling to develop
forces strong

1 0483 enough to provide an alternative to nuclear
weapons<--and yet

2 0484 much of their public opinion shies away from even
thinking

L 0485 about nuclear deterrence.

1 0486 C. Were we to start all over again,

1 0487 we would therefore hardly repeat the

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0029

END OF LEG PAGE 4 COLUMN 1

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0030

0511 forces capable both of backing up Eu-

0512 rope and contributing to the defense of, for
example, the Middle

0513 East, Asia or the Western Hemisphere.

0514 «Such a division of responsibilities would also 0514 (vb.1) enable our military

0515 tary establishment to shift some of its
intellectual energies and sci-

0516 entific research from a hypothetical esoteric war
in an area where

0517 we have major allies to the defense of regions
where conflict is

0518 much more likely. In such regions our allies are
less prone to see

0519 their interests immediately engaged, and the
countries being

0520 threatened are in a worse position to assist in
the defense effort.

0521 ««Even if we were to start all over again, an 0522 (vb.18)
irrefutable case 0522 (gfdiE44)

0523 would exist for maintaining «some «considerable 0523 (cf2)(cf1)
American

0524 ground forces in Europe. This would be essential
to keep

0525 our allies from feeling abandoned and to
eliminate any

0526 Soviet misunderstanding that the defense of
Europe no longer

0527 reflects a vital American interest. In a new

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0031

division of responsi-

0 0528 billities we should also preserve and preferably
strengthen exist-

0 0529 ing U.S. land-based air power on the Continent.
And we should

0 0530 continue our responsibility for both strategic
and tactical nuclear

1 0531 defense, assuming that we and the Europeans could
agree on a

2 0532 strategy for the latter. American intermediate-
range missiles

2 0533 should remain in Europe to "couple" the nuclear
defenses of

1 0534 both sides of the Atlantic so long as European
leaders desired

L 0535 them. No change in naval deployments would be
involved.

1 0536 Why then is such a division of responsibilities
not realized?

0 0537 The principal obstacle is psychological. For all
their criticisms of

1 0538 American policy, Europeans dread a return to
isolationism in

2 0539 the U.S. Americans fear that any tinkering with
deployment

1 0540 would drive Europe into explicit neutralism. And
some in the

1 0541 Pentagon prefer to maintain our divisions in
Europe in a less

1 0542 than rational deployment, rather than return some

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0032

of them to

1 0543 the U.S. where they are more exposed to congressional budget cutters.

L 0544 cutters.

0 0545 In my view, persisting in a deployment that is losing its ratio-

1 0546 nale accelerates these attitudes. After all, pacifism and neutral-

1 0547 ism are on the march in Europe even under the present setup;

0 0548 isolationism in America is not yet so vocal but is being powerful-

0 0549 ly encouraged by endless allied disputes. An alliance that cannot

0 0550 agree on its political premises cannot sustain itself by clinging to

0 0551 military arrangements decided a generation ago in totally differ-

0 0552 ent circumstances. With current trends the issue of the rationale

1 0553 for the «nato «deployment will become unavoidable. If it arises

0 0554 not as an integral component in a comprehensive design but as a

3 0555 single question of whether to continue stationing American

0 0556 troops in Europe, unilateral changes will be arbitrarily imposed

1 0557 by the potentially most destructive means<->the American bud-

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0033

L

0567 (cf3)

0568 (cf1)

END OF LEG PAGE 4 COLUMN 2

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0035

decide that the

1 0594

L 0595 second option.

L 0596

1 0602 dispensable component. But if Europe

5 0603 should opt for a perpetuation of the present

0 0604 ambivalence and confusion<--->or for only a

1 0605 marginal improvement<->the U.S. will owe

1 0606 it to the sustainability of its strategy before our public and to the overall requirements of global defense to draw certain conclusions. When deployments reflect political<-->

2 0609 not security<--->considerations, we will have

0 0610 no choice but to opt for a deployment of U.S. forces in Europe that makes strategic and political sense. If nuclear weapons remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack, a gradual withdrawal of a

1 0613

1 0614

2 0615

0 0616

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0039

L 0658

L 0659 «Political Objectives

0659 (cf2)

0659 (coSpecs TK)

0660 (cf1)

0661 (cf3)(cf1)

0675 (cf2)(cf1)

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0040

0 0677 Alliance must urgently develop a grand strategy for East-West problems and Third World relations applicable for the rest of this century.

0 0681 *B. The U.S. cannot lead the Western alliance or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the Viet Nam War shattered our bipartisan unity in foreign policy we have disquieted our friends and confused, where we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic wide swings with respect to essential elements of our policies. As a nation we must accept the reality that the national interest does not change every four or eight years. At some point the national interest must be accepted by our public as clearly recognizable and constant.

Otherwise, we shall become a source of dangerous instability, still relevant for our power but irrelevant for our ideas. A presidential election year is probably not an ideal time to forge a bipartisan consensus. But whoever wins the presidential election faces no more important and urgent challenge than to restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy.

KALLIANCE V:07 PAGE: 0043

(END)

2/6/84

Wither the Atlantic Alliance? - A Program of Reform

Just as storms recur in nature, crises recur in the Atlantic Alliance. Nearly every Administration for a generation has been involved in them.

However, the present turmoil in NATO has one crucial aspect which is both unprecedented and unsettling: At a time when the governments themselves are philosophically more compatible than they have been for a long while tensions are building beneath the surface. The visible disputes about policies are surrogates for a widening incompatibility of prevailing *attitudes* on the two sides of the Atlantic. This bodes ill for the future unless those attitudes can be changed.

In the Federal Republic of Germany, Scandinavia, the Low Countries and recently even in Great Britain, though to a lesser extent, well-organized and financed "peace" movements have been pulling governments in the general direction of their policies despite the fact

2

that those governments disagree with their premises.
Because of the "peace" movements' sway over key segments
of public opinion, too many European leaders--even conservative
ones--have yielded to the temptation to demonstrate their
peaceful intentions the easy way, by pretending to be
reining in a bellicose and insensitive United States
through their balancing ministrations. As a result
among those who shape public attitudes--and thereby set
what become the limits of the politically possible--
there is less intellectual or philosophical agreement
than in any previous period.

This creates an exceedingly dangerous situation.
An alliance cannot live by arms alone. To endure it
requires some basic agreement on the political aims which
justify and give direction to the common defense. If
military arrangements provide its only bond, it will
sooner or later disintegrate--especially if there is