Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KH V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Jim Cannon

9:55 p.m., October 22, 1970 -- page 2

K: The one group I hate to talk to is a Jewish group.

C: It would help if you would say that the Governor has been a friend but from a political point of view it is of limited value if only 200 know how it ...

K: They don't have to say how.

C: I am concerned it might leak.

K: There are two problems, the only evening I am free conceivably next week is Wednesday and I would want to see a list of those to be invited.

C: Could set something up in that time, would this be in any way awkward for you to do?

K: Depends where, what and what you have in mind.

C: 200 opinion leaders where no more than one-half will be Jewish.

K: Who would invite them?

C: Could get some distinguished New Yorker to sponsor. This could be arranged without any problem.

K: For an evening.

C: Yes, could be done.

K: At somebody's house?

C: Probably have to go to some kind of private dining room some place in the city.

K: My disposition is to help the Governor but he has to shutup about Vietnam. I will not do it if he pretends he is a Dove. He is making a goddamm fool of himself.

C: He said he would see you Saturday.

K: Who told him that! Nancy, goddammit!

C: Nancy did not tell me.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Jim Cannon

9:55 p.m., October 22, 1970 -- page 3

K: Don't lie to me, the Governor is in one of his orbital moods and he never thinks to come to me.

C: I swear Nancy didn't tell me, Al Marshall told me this afternoon. Nancy didn't tell me.

K: But Nancy told Al Marshall and Al Marshall told you. Nancy is one of the finest human beings I know but he did not think of that himself. Okay, I will see him Saturday. I will give him hell if he tries to out-Dove Goldberg on Vietnam. He should just shut up, he should only say that _________ the only presidential contender who was specific, the others talked in generalities.

C: I agree that he doesn't know where to go when he needs help.

K: No, no, I am not offended. I have too much work to [do here].
????. Let me think about it, I will call you tomorrow.

C: The essential point is that it could help the Governor if people ????.

K: You prepare a list and what would be your excuse for having one?

C: On such short notice, it would be damn difficult.

K: I mentioned this to the President and he said I could do anything I wanted but give a public speech.

C: If David Rockefeller sponsored it?

K: Yes, if he would invite me. In that case I would want you to send your plane down, I don't want to use a government plane and they won't let me fly commercial.

C: Okay. David would be a suitable sponsor.

K: It would not strictly parallel but I could speak in generalities if I were invited and asked to speak.

C: If you could say the Governor is a good friend or the best friend the Jewish people have in New York and you are authoritative on that matter.

By KHLU NARA, Dale 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Jim Cannon

9:55 p.m., October 22, 1970 -- page 4

K: Sure. I have to do it in my low ______ sell way -- I might put it on the basis of attacking Goldberg but endorse Rockefeller.

C: Could it be ???

K: Jesus, I am going to ask you and this group to skim 10% off from now on.

C: You can have 100% if he is elected.

K: No, he can just give me one of his Toulouse-Lautrecs he keeps in his closet.

C: It is a better arrangement to have this as a fund raiser than to have David Rockefeller get 200 people together.

K: I will talk to the President.

C: I understand.

K: I will talk to the President and I will let you know first thing in the morning. Let me look at the list of people invited. I will consider it as my North Vietnamese friends say with a goodwill and serious attitude and I hope you will get more out of me than we get out of them.

C: I know the Governor would stop this minute if he thought it would ...

K: I believe in supporting my friends. After all, I must speak to the two people I can call that. My disposition is to support the Governor.

C: I knew that. That is why I rode out with the Governor today to talk with him.

K: Make sure that it is done with some class consistent with that of the President's assistant.

C: Okay.

K: Bye.

By: KHU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

10:35 p.m., October 22, 1970

Y: Will you please tell me the situation now.

K: Don't know what to say. Mr. Flanigan and I saw the gentleman today and explained to him what is needed.

Y: Yes.

K: He seemed to indicate that he would support.

Y: Support you?

K: That he would support an agreement but quite frankly we have heard this about an agreement before. I don't know what to conclude from that. I tell you what ____ your Ambassador is coming to see us tomorrow.

Y: What time tomorrow?

K: 11:00 a.m. If he is given clear instructions that you are prepared to accept categories then we will make a specific proposal to name what categories. Then if it is accepted in principle, then we can go ahead but I don't know if it can be done this fast.

Y: My friend is waiting, can you clarify it more in respect to categories.

K: A total ceiling, then within each ceiling [categories?]. Shift from one production to another so we need an agreement in principle that you will accept by category, then we will [make the proposal] what categories we want included, then if you accept that we would have an agreement.

Y: What is the period of duration of this agreement.

K: Think we can come to an agreement on that.

Y: Think it can be solved.

K: Yes.

Y: This situation of categories, repeat -- you know the trouble with enemy understandings. Ceiling for entire items which selected all items ...

K: And we want a ceiling by categories.

By: KHL NARA, Dalo: 5/13/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

10:35 p.m., October 22, 1970 -- page 2

Y: By categories, are there many categories?

K: Two formulas for that, one which includes many categories, the second categories I can not explain that to you, I don't understand it myself.

Y: I see. The point to ask right now, did you make it quite clear to the gentleman today?

K: Made it quite clear. Not a chance that we would change our position after the election.

Y: Mr. Flanigan explained on the question of categories?

K: Not yet because you have not accepted the principal of categories. He was not in the position to accept. If your ambassador accepts tomorrow, then we can make a proposal. My people have prohibited Flanigan to ______. Otherwise we are negotiating with ourselves.

Y: The last and only question is the question of categories and if we accept your proposal on this question of categories in principle, then there will be some room for negotiations in formulating these arrangements.

K: Not too much room because we have already given.

Y: As soon as we, would you mind repeating again the two formulas, the two ways of doing it?

K: I don't like to do it because I don't have it in front of me but will give it to the ambassador but will not do it unless you will do it in categories.

Y: Repeat, you can not accept our proposal that the overall ceiling of selected or certain items and within that framework ...

K: You are able to shift, this would not be acceptable to us.

Y: It would not be. We have to accept your basic principal, all right.

K: Right.

Y: This decision has to be made or modified tomorrow morning. Could you tell me the time is very short when our prominent representative

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/94

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

10:35 p.m., October 22, 1970 -- page 3

Y: meets you, does he have to say yes or no on the spot or can he (contd) take again ____ if you didn't tell Mr. Wick today.

K: He has to say yes or no to categories.

Y: Which was made when?

K: Not made yet, will not make until he accepts the principal of categories.

Y: You haven't done it.

K: We won't.

Y: Say yes or no by 11:00 when he meets with you tomorrow morning.

K: I think he will say yes.

Y: This is ____ before hand.

K: But another thing, even if he says yes and starts hackling about categories we will not commit my friend to engage in a discussion with your friend until we have reached an agreement.

Y: Has to be done very quickly.

K: Yes or we don't discuss between our two friends.

Y: Then when he accepts your basic ...

K: That will only give you the proposal, this will not enable you to discuss with my friend.

Y: Then you will give us your proposal. Yes I understand what you mean.

K: Then you have to decide when to accept the proposal. If you were to accept our proposal by Saturday, we would be prepared to make a very friendly statement on viable policies.

Y: Yes. As you know it is still the occasion of my friend to raise it with your friend.

By: K.L. NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

10:35 p.m., October 22, 1970 -- page 4

K: It will not be possible unless there is an understanding.

Y: Before?

K: Yes.

Y: Tomorrow morning at 11:00.

K: Will make the proposal if you accept the principal of categories.

Y: Clearly understood by the gentleman today?

K: Don't know whether he understood the timing but he understood the ______. Unfortunately, I have to ______ go.

Y: I would like to get in touch with my friend and possibly before
try to let you know ______ tomorrow morning before 11:00 if
possible.

K: Goodbye.

Y: Goodbye.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Haldeman/Kissinger

late afternoon 10/22/70

H: Shall we invite the Shah's sister?

K: Al checked it and got back to someone and said yes.

H: I thought that was from before.

K: He checked with Sisco and Protocol at State.

H: We should do it?

K: Yes and blame it on Protocol. Lovestone called and complained bitterly that he asked that no labor leader be invited with communists and 3 leaders were invited with Ceausescu.

H: I checked with the President and he said invite them.

K: He forgot what he promised.

H: Can we disinvite them?

K: They have already refused.

H: Tell Lovestone we are sorry.

K: I told him it was a Protocol mistake.

H: Good.

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authorit

By NARA Date 6/9/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

Approx. 12:10 a.m., October 23, 1970

K: Hello

Y: Hello

K: Yes, how are you?

Y: I am very sorry to disturb you.

K: That's okay.

Y: I managed to speak to my friend.

K: Yes.

Y: And he would like you to put forth your proposals from the very beginning to his representative at 11:00 tomorrow morning.

K: Right but not unless your representative agrees to categories.

Y: That's right. What I understand from my conversation with the friend, my friend.

K: Yeah, he's already agreed to it.

Y: He implies that the and his representative accept your principle.

K: Okay, well if he says that, if he says our...

Y: He says in a very specific word, but by implication, he says we must have concrete terms from you and would like to discuss, we would like to have a really productive conversation based on that.

K: Well, we won't give it until we know whether you accept the idea, the principle.

Y: I emphasized this and made it very clear to my friend which I am sure he understood what I was talking.

K: Okay.

Y: Based on that he said again to start with this question of principle between these two experts, the visit tomorrow to your office is really an expert's on the subject.

K: Excuse me a moment, there's another call, excuse me.

MFD EO 12958
DECLASSIFIED

Author
By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

12:10 a.m., October 23, 1970 -- page 2

K: Hello

Y: Yes, so this man, __________, is an expert from our side and you have your expert there so my friend does hope that from the very beginning our man would like to have your proposals and that our conversation in a productive way without wasting time which is very short now.

K: Right, okay.

Y: Of course I made it quite clear to my friend and he did not say, of course we are talking about it over the phone so if you are mindful of that fact, but my implication, what I understood, from him is he accepts this principle.

K: Okay, good. Well I think that's correct.

Y: Otherwise I am sure that he wouldn't say that, to ask you to put forward your proposal.

K: I'm sure this is true, okay.

Y: I made it quite clear to him.

K: Well I appreciate your interest and I want you to know however these things come out I appreciate how you have conducted yourself.

Y: Yes I am trying my very best because I am certain it is possible of the entire matter of the beginning ...

K: Well we've both wanted to do the best and it doesn't always work out but if we bring it to a conclusion now we still will have done something useful.

Y: Yes, yes and I should like to keep in touch with you until the last moment that means even in the morning on Saturday.

K: All right.

Y: And I would be, I don't want to disturb you, do you have any assistant with you at your home right now?

K: No.

Y: You don't.

DECLASSIFIED

By NARA Date 6/1/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

12:10 a.m., October 23, 1970 -- page 3

K: No but you can give me the number where...

Y: Can you return this call to Mr. Young?

K: No I can't do that.

Y: Oh, you can't do that. I see. Then I will get in touch with you sometime tomorrow afternoon or tomorrow evening and I would like to have your reaction on your side. My friend said to me that he would consider your proposal within a most serious way with his two top aids who are now with him.

K: All right, well...

Y: So, see I was hoping to let you know about his reaction and our feeling on your proposal but at the same time I should like to have yours as well. Could I get in touch with you sometime tomorrow afternoon of your time?

K: Well I will be in New York, I will call you.

Y: Oh, I see. Fine.

K: At your office or at your home?

Y: Yes, I will be at my office. What time, exactly what time could you call me.

K: Well that's what I don't know but about this time maybe.

Y: About this time, of your time?

K: Yes

Y: All right, then could you kindly make it this time, at the latest this time

K: Well I can't promise it because I will be in New York with the President. It will be somewhere around this time, maybe an hour later.

Y: Oh, I see. Then would it be possible for me to get in touch with you the following morning, early in the morning?

K: Early in the morning, Sunday morning my time?

Y: Saturday morning of your time.

*

By: KML NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

K: Hello

Y: Hello

K: Yes, how are you?

K: That's okay.

K: Yes.

K: Okay.

Y: Based on that he said again to start with this question of principle between these two experts, the visit tomorrow to your office is really a expert's on the subject.

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

K: Hello

K: Right, okay.

Y: Yes, yes and I should like to keep in touch with you until the last moment that means even in the morning or Saturday.

K: All right.

K: No.

Y: You don't.

By KHLW NARA, Dale

5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

K: No I can't do that.

Y: Oh, you can't do that. I see. Then I will get in touch with you sometime tomorrow afternoon or tomorrow evening and I would like to have your reaction on your side. My friend said to me that he would consider your proposal in a most serious way with his two top aids who are now with him.

K: All right, well...

Y: So, so I was hoping to let you know about his reaction and our feeling on your proposal but at the same time I should like to have yours as well. Could I get in touch with you sometime tomorrow afternoon of your time?

Y: Oh, I see. Fine.

K: Yes

Y: All right, then could you kindly make it this time, at the latest this time?

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

Approx. 12:20 a.m., October 23, 1970

K: Joe, how are you?

S: How did it go?

K: I think it went very well.

S: Oh, good.

K: It went very well, in fact all that was really different from what he had already said to you was he said it in a slightly friendlier way.

S: Oh, sure.

K: And more constructive.

S: Sure.

K: Tone. The President asked me to call you to see whether we could make one of our little arrangements again and be candid with you. The Secretary kept making references that he was cooking up a proposal to get things moving again in the Middle East.

S: Right.

K: And we don't question that this may be the best thing that has come down the pike, but what we do not want under any circumstances is a blow-up of the Jewish community.

S: Yeah, well my advice ...

K: and um.

S: to the Secretary will be as follows ...

K: and I frankly don't see what he can come up with that is going to lead to talks that isn't going to lead to a blow up.

S: Well, I have the impression that he had, from what he said to me tonight that he had talked it out with you and the President.

K: Well, you know he did it in his normal way, he said he had a plan but he wouldn't tell us what it was which made it awfully hard to respond, he said something about a 6-month ceasefire.

S: Yeah.

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

Approx. 12:20 a.m., October 23, 1970 -- page 2

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/13/04

K: You know that's like saying are you for free love which ~~may~~ a man of Italian blood ~~will~~ will of course say yes to.

S: Of course he would.

K: No but seriously, what is he up to, we don't even know what he is trying to do.

S: I see, well let me tell you what he has in mind and let me tell you how I think you can be helpful to be sure that it remains on the track. He has in mind a proposal which in effect would say to the Israelis, if you would be willing to resume talks without rectification we will try to get you in return a 6-month ceasefire, in other words...

K: Yeah, I understand.

S: the feeling that the longer ceasefire as leverage with the Israelis...

K: Yeah, he did tell us that.

S: Right, that is essentially the proposal based on the ...

K: But when would he make that proposal.

S: Well, this is the point I am making. I had a very private chat with Rabin today...

K: They will never accept it will they?

S: We didn't talk about the proposal, Christ, I wouldn't put it off. I would forward even a suggestion to Rabin at this point. What I am reporting to you is I said to him, now look Yitzhak this is an off-the-record conversation which I know will be on the record. I said have you given thought that this may well be the best time in the world for you people to really start these negotiations. Cairo is reasonably weak, the situation in Jordan is settling down, Nassar is gone, you've got a chance in circumstances where the power struggle in Egypt has not been resolved, the appointment of Fawzi is a compromise appointment between the more pro-Westerner elements and the more pro-Soviet elements in the country, in the leadership

K: Yeah.

S: Rabin agreed to all of this and he said Joe, let's let things ride and let's see what the situation is in a couple of weeks, he gave

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

12:20 a.m., october 23, 1970 -- page 3

S: me every impression in the world that they are obviously analyzing what they consider to be a very positive developments from their point of view and our own.

K: Yeah.

S: The developments in Syria, the developments in Iraq, these are all pluses with the possible withdrawal of the Iraqi forces. It just illustrates what a little power in the Mediterranean and a little power in Jordan's supply can do. Here's what I would suggest to the Secretary

K: Yeah, but what is he going to do?

S: Yeah, well listen...

K: You know it is one thing for you to talk privately with Rabin...

S: Yeah, but listen for one more minute Henry. I just tried to give you the full, then I will tell you what I think can be done. I'm sorry to be this lengthy.

K: No, No.

S: My suggestion to the Secretary would be don't make any formal proposal to the Israelis at this time.

K: Right.

S: As he talks to Golda and if we have a very, he set up a private meeting at 9:00 Saturday morning. It's going to be off-the-record and nobody is going to know about it and he will fill her in obviously on the Presidential talk with Gromyko as he should like a good ally.

K: Yeah.

S: But then he ought to say and he ought to put it just this way, you know that we would like to get these talks started, we are going ahead and we're doing everything that's required militarily to compensate with you, compensate the situation, I am not making any proposal Madame Prime Minister but there is an idea that I want you to toss around in your head, think about it for a while, you know a week or whatever, you know and then he would just throw out the idea as an idea and let them

By: KMLV NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

12:20 a.m., October 23, 1970 -- page 4

S: chew on it awhile. Now that I think he can get by with without any
difficulty whatsoever provided he presses it that this is no proposal.
Now the one point that I reported to the Secretary of Rabin's conversation
is that Rabin's feeling is that things ought to be left alone for a couple
more weeks. The Secretary's concern and I can understand this is that
you have the November 5th deadline in sofar as the ceasefire is concerned..

K: Yeah.

S: So my feeling is Henry that if you agree I will suggest this general line
to the Secretary tomorrow by ~~tomorrow~~ way of merely dropping this
as an idea but making no formal proposal. Then when I see you tomorrow
afternoon when you come to New York, I will tell you whether that has
washed or not.

K: Can you do that?

S: Yes. If it hasn't washed, then what we'd better do is to provoke a
few minutes meeting some way between you, me, the Secretary and
the President.

K: Let me suggest another thing, Joe.

S: Does this make sense to you?

K: Excellent, the President is sufficiently concerned so ~~yes~~ he is
prepared to talk to the Secretary.

S: Of course.

K: And the Secretary is going to meet him at the helicopter.

S: So could you call me before I leave New York, before I leave for
New York at 12:30.

S: I'll try my best, in other words if ~~possible~~ I've got a judgment, all
right, if I've got a judgment, that's right.

K: If I have your judgment, then I can tell the President how he should...

S: That's right, that would give them a half-hour to talk on the way ~~ip~~ from the heli-pad.

K: Exactly.

By KHLU

NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

12:20 a.m., October 23, 1970 -- page 5

S: All right, I'll try my best to get this few minutes in with him before then.

K: Excellent

S: If I haven't succeeded, I'll let you know, if I haven't been able to get at him but I'll make a major effort to get at him you see.

K: That would be terrific.

S: All right Henry, that's fine.

K: Joe, you are a good friend and this conversation stays between us.

S: Oh, God, Henry, look there was someone who saw the message that you were calling me, here's what I am going to say, you called me this evening, in fact is I would like to tell this to the Secretary to fill me in on the conversation, the Gromyko conversation.

K: Yes, tell him that we have had a lot of press queries and I just wanted to make sure we were all on the same wave length and that all I had told you was that he had repeated in effect what he had already told...

S: which is already what the Secretary told me.

K: Right.

S: So that all fits in.

K: And I just wanted to check with you that everything was all right.

S: We are squared away Henry.

K: Good, thank you Joe.

S: Okay, see you tomorrow.

K: Bye.

[tape]

By KCLW NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
10/23/70 8:50 a.m.

P: What's happening in Chile?

K: There's been a turn for the worse but it hasn't triggered anything else. The next move should have been a government takeover, but that hasn't happened.

P: You mean if something happened the people would get so disturbed that they would take over the government?

K: That was the theory but they're a pretty incompetent bunch.

P: They're out of practice.

K: The election is tomorrow and the inauguration is the third. What they could have done is prevent the Congress from meeting. But that hasn't been done. It's close, but it's probably too late.

P: The meeting with Gromyko got a lot of play.

K: In the news summary it said it was the leading item everywhere and reported positively.

P: A meeting like that once in a while, even though no one says very much helps. And anything has meaning when you talk that long about something.

K: Especially if you do it in an unsentimental way.

P: I talked with Rockefeller last night. He doesn't keep his cool very well.

K: That's what I was going to say. He really lost his cool; he did a bad job of debating Goldberg.

P: He's looking at the polls every week -- you should do that. He thought Lindsay hurt him on the city, but it might have helped upstate.

K: Did you see the Evans and Novak article today about a little poll of their own? They polled one hundred people. In New York Goodell is in a hopeless position. Of thirty-five who voted for you only one would vote for Goodell. Most of them had switched to Ottinger. According to Evans and Novak Goodell is through.

By: KHW NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

10/23/70 8:45 a.m. page 2

P: I think he is. All of the Nixon people have gone further away from him when he attacked the President.

K: It won't make Nixon people vote for him.

P: If he gets Democrats he'll get people from Ottinger. Rockefeller can't lose to this fellow; it's not there. I'll bet he's 15 points ahead. But that's KXXV Rockefeller can't lose to this fellow, and that's not there. the way the game is played.

K: I wouldn't have thought he had a chance of losing either. He wants me to do something similar to what I did in California; David Rockefeller is going to give a dinner for about 200.

P: Off the record?

K: Yes, but I'm afraid it might leak.

P: No problem, if it does California looks all right.

K: I wouldn't let them raise money while I'm there.

P: No. I told Nelson last night "we are not going to hurt you in the next week. I can't tell you anything specific we're going to do but we won't hurt you." I said he must not make the mistake of dragging away from us. He will be unpopular if he opposes the President on the peace issue.

K: Yes. The only people who would like it are the fanatics on that side anyway and 4/5 of them would be for Goodell.

P: When are you getting the speech out?

K: This morning. I think around 10:00 or 11:00.

P: Let me know when you get any reactions on it.

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/13/04

Telcon
Secy Sisco
10/23/70; 9:15 a.m.

(Missed opening remarks)

S: He seems to be well disposed to the manner in which the idea ought to be put forward. I can't absolutely guarantee it but I think if in the conversation two things were said from your end -- if the President were to say (1) explore it but be very careful to avoid making a formal proposal, and, secondly, that obviously the Secretary ought to find a way to make it clear to Golda that if they can go ahead on this basis without making any kind of a ____ and if they can explore quite positively within the framework we have under active consideration their active request for next year on the military side, which by the way is entirely reasonable, three of those kinds of planes per month the rest of that year and four of the other kind per month. If the President were to authorize him to use that any way he sees fit in the technical way that it can be done with no danger of confrontation. Let's think out loud together if we were able to produce such, and how could that be used -- that is a good way to put it without causing any kind of storm.

K: OK.

ms

By KML NARA, Dale S/13/04

TELCOM

Jim Cannon/Kissinger

10:40 am

10/23/70

K: I have talked to the President and thought about it and I am willing to do this. I tell you what I would do in Calif. They raised some money at lunch but I refused to be part of it. I left before that. I didn't ask for money and didn't say anything about that. I have given a speech on foreign policy. I prefer a testimonial thing for the Governor or anything else. Or a fund raiser.

C: I like the idea of a testimonial better. The time and mechanics of trying to do a fund raiser is impossible. For the sponsor I talked to Henman and I mentioned David.

K: He is poison.

C: He suggested Arther Gordon. I suggested Jock Whitney or Burdon.

K: I prefer a non-Jew. They are both dopes.

C: Whitney would be delighted to do it.

K: Anybody that's of that caliber.

C: We should consult the Governor. My idea is to do it in private dining room with no more than 200.

K: I will give a talk on where we stand on foreign policy and couple this with observations about the Governor and his influence. I would say if I were a NYorker I would vote for him because of his influence on us.

C: This is wonderful. I will get the message to him now. I would like a couple of top level names and clear it through you through David.

K: I have to do it in my style. I like Goldberg but you have the choice between a good man and a great man. I will not say anything against Goldberg.

C: That's fine. We have too much of that anyway.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1-12583
By CNARA Date 5/2/87

TELCOM

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:00 am

10/23/70

D: Are you calling from Washington?

K: Yes. You know. You have me followed.

D: That's why I am surprised some people said you were here.

K: I saw a truck in front of my house this morning with a revolving ______ and I thought to myself that (you were really outdoing yourself). I have an answer for you. We will have to do it in two parts. I wondered if the Indochina lobby is good. Everyone will see you. Where is your mission?

D: 67th St.

K: And Park Ave.?

D: Between 3rd and Lexington.

K: Let's meet there. I am meeting a friend at 63rd and Lexington.

D: What time?

K: 5:00 - 5:30?

D: 5:00 is all right.

K: It might be 5:30. It depends on when the President leaves.

D: Just a minute -- Maybe we could make it 6:00. At 5:30 there will be Mr. Schumann with Gromyko and some newspaper men --

K: I understand. How about 7:00?

D: That's fine.

K: It won't take us long.

D: Or we could do it at 2:30.

K: I am arriving with the President and until he leaves I could not leave.

D: 7:00 is all right.

K: Or 4:45.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012357

By CHNARA Date 05/23/70

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:00 am

10/23/70

D: 4:45 is all right. We will have time to go from UN back here because I want to listen to the President's speech.

K: He is leaving at 4:15. His speech is 25 minutes. 3:30 -- Do they start on time

D: I think so. They have one speaker before him. Haile Selassie.

K: Allegedly he leaves at 4:20 and I am free then. If Schumann comes at 5:30 then 5:00 is dangerous. Will you be present?

D: I hope in this case I will get a leave. I am sure he will say all right. Would we make it 4:30?

K: That's too early. Let's say as close to 4:45 as we can. You have 15 minutes head start on me because the President is going to the UN Mission and he will go with him. You can leave then while he is at USUN. As soon as he leaves there I will come see you. What's your address again?

D: 67th between 3rd and Lexington. There's a police line and so you will see it. It's a one way street. There's a policy station, Jewish synagogue, and fire station.

K: You have a lot of protection for the synagogue.

D: This was unique. It was found out beforehand.

K: I will see you.

D: I will await you after 4:45.

K: And I will give you what we intend to do.

D: It will be very useful.

K: We have to work out some reasonable procedures for us.

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: I saw a truck in front of my house this morning with a revolving gun and I thought to myself that (you were really outdoing yourself). I have an answer for you. We will have to do it in two parts. I wondered if the Indochina lobby is good. Everyone will see you. Where is your mission?

D: 67th St.

K: And Park Ave.?

D: Between 3rd and Lexington.

D: What time?

K: 5:00 - 5:30?

D: 5:00 is all right.

D: That's fine.

K: It won't take us long.

D: Or we could do it at 2:30.

D: 7:00 is all right.

K: Or 4:45.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

-2-

K: He is leaving at 4:15. His speech is 25 minutes. 3:30 -- Do they start on time?

K: I will see you.

D: It will be very useful.

D: I will, await you after 4:45.

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Marty Schram

10/23/70 11:05 a.m.

S: We are running a series on the President that I have done. I have an anecdote in the last one that I wanted to check. I understand that after the Beecher in the New York Times last April ran a story on the Ek-47s to Cambodia and the President was unhappy and you as well. I understand that the State Department officials were required to sign an oath that they had not leaked it. But that Defense was not and your people were not.

K: To the best of my knowledge, everybody was. Not to sign an oath, but to sign a statement as to whom they had talked to. That's to the best of my knowledge.

S: How about the NSC staff. Were they?

K: I don't remember, but I doubt it. But I know the Pentagon and CIA was.

S: As well as State?

K: Yes.

S: I'm glad to get that clarified.

K: On my staff only one person would know about these things anyway.

S: Who is that, Haig?

K: Haig would know and Holdridge.

S: Was this done at the President's suggestion or yours?

K: I felt I had to put it to the departments. I felt I had to interface them so I did that.

S: ?

K: No, you don't think I could do that on my own do you?

S: I thought the people I talked to at the Pentagon were of a high enough level to know, but I will have to check it again. By the way, did you ever find out who the culprit was?

K: No.

TELECON
General Haig/Prof. Yoshida
8:37 p. m., October 23, 1970

H: Hello, this is Haig.

Y: Yes

H: I have talked to my associates and they confirm what I told you, that you must confirm....

Y: Yes

H: ... that we had been very explicit today in our position....

Y: Yes

H: Both with respect with respect to these aspects of our position which there was rigidity and those which there might be some flexibility.

Y: Absolute rigidity.

H: In some areas which was made quite clear to your representative and it was made very clear where there was some flexibility.

Y: On which subject?

H: On some other subject, basically what remains to be done is for your side to accept our plan.

Y: Yes

H: As it was given today or make specific recommendations for changes but that our position was very clear and was made very clear today and well known to the participants.

Y: I understand, what I would like to know, if this is the final proposal or some small flexibility on your side.

H: Very little room except on one or two issues which was made clear today.

Y: Absolute rigidity.

H: What was rigid and what was flexible.

Y: I see, I got it, our man, our gentleman, has a clear understanding of where rigidity is and where flexibility is possible. I am not an

DECLASSIFIED
MJD FO 12958
Author
By NARA Date 6/10/19

8:37 p.m., October 23, 1970 -- page 2

Y: expert on the subject, my point and my role would be the question of timing and how to proceed from now on. Our response to the 4 p.m. appointment tomorrow afternoon, by what time do you have to know our response?

H: The earlier in the morning Washington time, the better. If it goes very late it will be very difficult to do anything. As you know our principals must have an opportunity, whether or not there will be any discussion and if there is, what the nature of it will be. It is important for your side to inform our side as soon as possible, even tonight, if they want to have a further discussion tomorrow morning.

Y: Yes, it would be possible to have it arranged for a discussion between these two experts.

H: Yes, early tomorrow morning.

Y: In the most quiet manner.

H: It should be done only if your side is prepared to discuss the plan that was furnished to them, there is little use in going on unless ...

Y: What would happen if our side would not accept your plan?

H: Then we will have to proceed as we have been required to do by circumstances here and that requires legislation.

Y: The entire subject would be dropped, the subject would be dropped as far as your side is concerned.

H: Right, that is what Dr. Jones has already said to you.

Y: One other thing, my own friend is concerned about in the forthcoming election of yours, would this have any relevance to this discussion?

H: None whatsoever.

Y: Won't be any change after the election?

H: None whatsoever.

Y: That's what Dr. Jones told me the other day.

H: Yes.

MJD FEO 12958
DECLASSIFIED
Authorized
By NARA Date 6/1/04

DECLASSIFIED
MJD F.O. 12958
Authorship of the text of this document cannot be established
By NARA Date 6/1/67

TELECON

General Haig/Prof. Yoshida

8:37 p.m., October 23, 1970 -- page 3

Y: I should like to get in touch with my friend right now, would like to talk to him about this. I have strong personal, I hope there will be a productive discussion tomorrow afternoon.

H: Yes, I would hope so, that it would be possible. I hope it would be possible but I must tell you our side today while they noted a change in the acceptance of categories, they noted no other change.

Y: I see, what was your associate's feeling, was he feeling pessimistic?

H: A better understanding of what was required but he was not optimistic that anything would come to pass, he saw no reason for optimism.

Y: I see, in any case you have to have our response from our side by tomorrow morning.

H: I think so, don't see how we could do otherwise.

Y: Fine, that is all right. And also my friend would like to have a conversation with Dr. Jones at 7:30 or 8:00 in the morning, will he be in his office?

H: He will not be here but they will, the switchboard here will get him for you.

Y: I have a tentative appointment for 7:30.

H: Yes and the switchboard will get him for you. The number is 456-1414.

Y: Fine, I would like to call between 7:30 and 8:00. If you talk to Dr. Jones please tell him I will do my very best.

H: I would hope that we would arrive at a very satisfactory solution.

Y: Indeed, indeed. I would like to confirm that if during discussion and examination on our side, if him it is required to have brief meeting between these two experts could be arranged tomorrow morning?

H: It would be helpful if we could know as soon as possible tonight.

Y: Indeed, our man who is in charge knows how to get in touch with you?

H: Yes but if he wants to, he can call me directly and I could put him in touch with the two people.

8:37 p. m., October 23, 1970 -- page 4

Y: The trouble is absolutely only my own friend knows so probably he will let my friend know, our gentleman in charge will probably get in touch with you at your office direct. The number you just gave me, probably tonight to make the physical arrangements.

H: That's fine.

Y: So if there should be a call from this gentleman through the switchboard I hope you can do something. I couldn't give them your name, they have no idea of this channel. I have to be extremely careful and discreet.

H: I understand.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED
MJD EO 12958
Authentic
By NARA Date 6/9/04

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Ron Ziegler
10/23/70 p.m.

Z: I've been worrying about something I said. Cuba was not discussed today, is that right?

K: That's right.

Z: But the President said it was discussed though.

K: But not in the big meeting.

Z: That's what I said. It was not brought up in the big meeting?

K: No.

Z: But the summit was?

K: Yes, but don't even mention that word.

Z: I won't, even to you. But it was?

K: Yes it was.

Z: I was just worried about the Cuban thing, about Rogers leaking it.

K: He can't leak it; he didn't hear it discussed.