PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Report of conversation with Jean de la Grandville, Ministre Plenipotentiaire
on May 16, 1965 in Paris, France

On May 16th I had a long conversation with Jean de la Grandville,
Ministre Plenipotentiaire at the Quai D'Orsay at the country home of Paul
Stehlin.

De La Grandville began the conversation by pointing out that he was
in despair about trends in the West, especially about the policy of his country.
De Gaulle was determined to reduce American domination of NATO, perhaps even
to change NATO into an old-style traditional Alliance. He would spend most
of this year laying the ground-work for what De La Grandville feared would be
an ever more insistent attack. De La Grandville said that the instructions
which De Gaulle had issued for the projected strategy review of NATO Defense
ministers illustrated this. These instructions were three-fold: (1) The
inadequacy of NATO as it exists to meet the security needs of Europe was
evident. France must use every opportunity to articulate this inadequacy.
(2) France could not agree to any further integration--indeed the maximum
reduction of existing integration should be pursued. (3) France should attend
the strategic review but remain silent arguing that its target date of 1970
is one year beyond the expiration of NATO and therefore no decisions could be
binding.

I replied that the last point seemed to me factually wrong. In 1969,
any country could withdraw from NATO by giving one year's notice. This would
not automatically mean the end of NATO. De La Grandville agreed. But, he said,
he was trying to convey a mood not a state of facts.

not automatically mean the end of NATO. De La Grandville agreed. But, he said, any country could withdraw from NATO by giving one year's notice. This would I replied that the last point seemed to me tactually wrong. In 1969, funding.

is one year beyond the expiration of NATO and therefore no decision could be the strategic review put remain silent arguing that its target date of 1970 reduction of existing integration should be pursued. (3) France should attend (3) France could not agree to any further integration--indeed the maximum said. France must see every opportunity to articulate this inadvisability. Inadvisability of NATO as it exists to meet the security needs of Europe was minuscule illustrated this. These instructions were three-fold: (1) The which De Gensle had issued for the projected strategy review of NATO Defense an ever more inattentive attack. De La Grandville said that the instructions of this year taking the ground-work for what De La Grandville tested would be to change NATO into an old-style traditional Village. He would send most De Gensle was determined to reduce American domination of NATO, perhaps even in debate, spontanea in the West, especially about the policy of his country.

De La Grandville began the conversation by pointing out that he was Stefflin.

Ministre Bénipotentaire at the Quai D'Orsay at the country home of Paul On May 16th I had a long conversation with team de la Grandville,

on May 16, 1962 in Paris, France
Report of conversation with team de la Grandville, Ministre Bénipotentaire

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Another example of De Gaulle's frame of mind as described by De La
Grandville was an incident which occurred early in March. Then General
Fourquet had sent a note to De Gaulle that the latest defense review by
Secretary McNamara had abandoned the more unacceptable aspects of "flexible
response" and furnished a basis for serious Franco-American talks. De Gaulle
had replied sharply that this was not the time to propose of Franco-American
talks. The opportunity existed and had to be used to "reduce the American
occupation of Europe."

I told De La Grandville that De Gaulle could not possibly want to see
the withdrawal of all American forces from Europe. De La Grandville agreed.
But it was his impression that De Gaulle thought that he could harass the
American presence in Europe until we had reduced it to those forces that were
required for immediate security rather than an establishment that in De Gaulle's
eyes was intended to give us political domination. I said that this was a fine
distinction which might not be appreciated in the passions aroused by De Gaulle's
tactics. As a result, Europe could easily wind up defenseless. De La Grandville
agreed stating that this was his nightmare too.

An example of the drift of things was the desire of De Gaulle to close
down some American bases in France. De La Grandville--in private consultation
with some American officials--had put together a list of three bases which
only had American custodial units and which were not being actively used. When
he took this list to Couve, the latter had said: "You don't understand. We
want to make the Americans bleed. Moreover if I take this list to De Gaulle he
will accuse us of trying to hoodwink him and he will then order much more
drastic cuts." De La Grandville was now in the process of preparing a more

gratetic cuts." De La Grandville was now in the process of preparing a more
will accuse us of trying to hoodwink him and he will then order much more
want to make the Americans bleed. Moreover, if I take this flat to De Gaulle be
he took this flat to Come, the latter had said: "You don't understand. We
only had Americanatorial units and which were not being actively used. When
with some American officials--had but together a flat of three passes which
down some American passes in France. De La Grandville--in private conversation
An example of the drift of things was the desire of De Gaulle to close
agreed stating that this was the nightmare too.

tactics. As a result, Europe could easily wind up detenteless. De La Grandville
distinction which might not be appreciated in the basements aroused by De Gaulle's
eyes was intended to give us political domination. I said that this was a fine
required for immediate security rather than an establishment that in De Gaulle's
American presence in Europe until we had reduced it to those forces that were
But it was his impression that De Gaulle thought that he could parse the
the withdrawal of all American forces from Europe. De La Grandville agreed.

I told De La Grandville that De Gaulle could not possibly want to see
occupation of Europe."

talks. The opportunity existed and had to be used to "reduce the American
had replied sharply that this was not the time to broach of France-American
reasons", and formulated a past for serious Franco-American talks. De Gaulle
Secretary McNamara had abandoned the more unacceptable subheads of "flexible
Roundnet had sent a note to De Gaulle that the latest defense review by
Grandville was an incident which occurred early in March. Then General
Another example of De Gaulle's frame of mind as described by De La

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comprehensive list which he hoped would still spare the really vital installations.

In short, the major thrust of De Gaulle's policy at the moment was to reduce America's standing in the world. He had heard De Gaulle say "we will puncture the American balloon in Vietnam." Instructions had been received at the Quai d'Orsay from the Elysée to object to the American landings in Santo Domingo while the name of the rebel commander was not yet known and the Quai d'Orsay spent the better part of a day trying to find out the spelling.

De Gaulle was equally uncompromising on the future of Europe. He would go to Bonn in June and agree to a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss European political union. This would see Erhard through the election. When the negotiations would actually start, however, De Gaulle would make progress on political unity dependent on two conditions: (1) abolition of majority voting in the Common Market and (2) abandonment of the Commission initiative.

I said that De Gaulle could not possibly hope to fight on all front at once without disintegrating the West and overstraining France. In fact, as long as I had believed that De Gaulle was basically a man of the West, I had had sympathy for his efforts and even believed them to be in the long-term interests of all Allies. Now I had my doubts.

De La Grandville said that it was not easy to consider De Gaulle a man of the West after the recent Gromyko-De Gaulle conversations. Gromyko had been very friendly but had had no concrete proposals. De Gaulle tried hard to make France the USSR's negotiating partner in Europe. One exchange on the subject of Germany was symptomatic. On that occasion De Gaulle said: "Speaking of the two German states. . ." Then, as if correcting a slip of the tongue he added: "I beg your pardon. I mean the American-occupied zone of Germany and the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany." If the Germans hear of this remark, said De La

occupied zone of Germany." If the Germans had of this remark, said De La
"I beg your pardon. I mean the American-occupied zone of Germany and the Soviet-
two German states...
Then, as it correcting a siff of the confue he added:
of Germany waszymbostatic. On that occasion De Gaulle said: "Speaking of the
France the USSR's negotiating partner in Europe. One exchange on the subject
very friendly but had had no concrete proposals. De Gaulle tried hard to make
of the West after the recent Gromyk-De Gaulle conversations. Gromyk had been
De La Grandville said that it was not easy to consider De Gaulle a man
interests of all Villes. Now I had my doubts.

had sympathy for his efforts and even believed them to be in the long-term
long as I had believed that De Gaulle was basically a man of the West. I had
at once without disintegrating the West and overtraining France. In fact, an
I said that De Gaulle could not possibly do to fight on all front
in the Common Market and (2) abandonment of the Commission initiative.
political unity dependent on two conditions: (1) apportion of majority acting
negotiations would actually start, however, De Gaulle would make progress on
European political union. This would see Erhard through the election. When the
So to Bonn in June and agree to a meeting of foreign ministers to discuss

De Gaulle was equally uncombaining on the future of Europe. He would
d'Orsay abet the better part of a day trying to find out the abetting.

Domingo while the name of the rebel commander was not yet known and the (Gulf
the Gulf d'Orsay from the Elysee to opt to the American landing in Auto
bracket the American balloon in Vietnam." Instructions had been received at
reduce America's standing in the world. He had heard De Gaulle say "we will
In sport, the major thrust of De Gaulle's policy at the moment was to
comprehensive let which he paped would still share the really vital installations.

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