Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Ambassador Rabin
9/10/70; 7:20 p.m.

R: How are you?

K: Okay. You called me?

R: I talked to Haig about the problem of when we can let the public know there would be a meeting.

K: Can I confirm it to you tomorrow morning. I think you can do it almost anytime. I have not been able to get to Haldeman who handles these things. I will have an answer to you by 9:30 tomorrow morning.

R: There are some preparations that have to be made.

K: You can be certain there are no problems. It is a pure courtesy problem at this point -- having President mentioned without his specific approval. I can assure you there is no possibility of a hitch.

R: I thought it would be helpful if I could have an informal talk with you about some of your views prior to the visit. Whenever it is possible -- the sooner, the better.

K: Let me see what my schedule is for the next few days and then we can get together.

R: The sooner I will be able to give them something, the better it will be for them.

K: I have to find some government that takes me seriously. (Laughter) I will get together with you and give you my views.

R: I think I would like to tell you in an informal way what we have in mind.

K: That I take it is for me, or to be passed on? Let's discuss that. You mean to be kept in this building?

R: I would not talk to anybody else.

K: I will try to do it on Saturday or tomorrow late in the afternoon.

R: The sooner, the better.

K: I had planned to go to New York but I don't think I can do that tomorrow. If I don't, we can talk tomorrow.

R: You will let me know on the other.

K: Let's say by 10:00 a.m. feg

By: KHL NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Telecon
Senator Javits
9/10/70 8:33 p.m.

J: I called because there has been some statement on the radio that interpreted the White House as not excluding the idea that they were treating the hostages differently by whether they were Jewish or not.

K: Out of the question. Not that we haven't had some advice to that effect, but it's out of the question.

J: I talked to Bill Rogers and Ziegler and they both said it was out of the question. But I wanted to talk to you about some other things too.

K: Can we do it for breakfast next week some time?

J: Yes. My office will work it out this week with yours.

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird

9/11/70 7:50 a.m.

K: I talked with the President last night, and you were at your dinner. He is going to go with the statement today, but he will limit military participation to 800 and only if needed and only for an interim period. And he will not put the number in the statement. So we're not talking about 5,000.

L: We can do it.

K: If you can play ball on that one. I told him as soon as Mel knows what you want, that's it. The President feels everyone in the government who has that capability should contribute to it.

L: Right. This may not end the hijacking, but it may be a deterrent. When I raise the question I do it because it's important I feel in the decision-making process. As soon as the decision is made, I guarantee everyone will be there.

K: Absolutely. It's never been otherwise.

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger

12:06 p.m.

9/12/70

R: On reflection, I don't think it's a good idea to send a threat. All the passengers are released and in a hotel. We have a cable. I think the idea is -- now that they are out of the plane the threat to their lives is lessened. The Jordanians also thought it bad to do a threat now because the moderates are fighting with the radicals in connection with the passengers. I don't see the point.

K: You don't think it would give the moderates ammunition?

R: When they take action they minimize the risk to the passengers is not the time to tell them "be careful." They have already let them out of the plane.

K: OK.

R: Secondly, the radicals are fearful about an invasion from Israel, not the U.S. They are there and it's a possibility. Anything that seems equivocal would be a bad. If we were conveying it directly, I would feel differently. We did that when I met with their representatives. I said this is serious but we know your government is not responsible but it reflects on the Arabs. All those things reflected on troops. The thing that frightened me about the planes was that they will explode them with passengers in them. Now they are under command of PFLP and the Jordanian Army and in different hotels. Now if we say we may invade it might cause these fanatics to react the wrong way.

K: It's just that we agreed to check this morning.

R: I haven't been I would have checked earlier but I was testifying.

K: I wasn't criticizing.

R: We will keep you advised.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12158
By: NARA Date 6/9/01

*

TELCOM

N. Rockefeller/Kissinger

1:50 p.m. 9/11/701

R: You are great to let me speak to you with the pressure you must be under.

K: It's hectic. But if I can't talk to you, I might as well quit.

R: I was campaigning in Brooklyn this morning and stopped in to see a doctor who has a sister and husband and 5 children. They had two suggestions: One of the sisters said that the President hasn't said anything personally about this.

K: We issued a statement yesterday.

R: In his name? Of concern.

K: Yes.

R: In the paper?

K: I don't know.

R: I thought that was one point as a matter of sympathy. The doctor asked if it would be helpful to have the family of those go to Washington. I said I assumed everything is being done.

They

K: You have released 62 people today. We moved part of the 6th Fleet and let it break radio silence and it was noticed. But we can't mention it. Everyone who had to know knew it. We can't mention it.

R: These people knew it.

K: Good. I think they should hold off. If nothing happened by next week, they could come. We will be doing more next week.

R: It would be a mistake too if only members of the Jewish community came.

K: Absolutely.

R: I also find out those who are released are not Jewish.

K: I assume not.

R: Just those in the hotel?

K: Women and children. They could include Jewish women and children.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By NARA Date 6/9/70

N. Rockefeller/Kissinger

1:50 p.m. 9/11/80

-2

K: (cont) We have not gotten the list yet.

R: I will tell this doctor perhpas next week. What's happening is that which you predicted. It's coming to a head. I hope you are in it.

K: As ________ said, "when they are in trouble, the call for the sons of bitches." Not fully but more.

R: I hope there's some realization that we have had amateur week. This is perfect. The board of Rabbis have issued a circular letter denouncing Goldwater for saying I was condescending to the Jewish community because I mentioned the Israeli situation.

K: The more he talks, the better off you are.

Authority C.O. 12:58

By AB

NARA Date 6/9/80

TELCOM
Sisco/Kissinger

4:10 p. m.

9/11/701

K: The President has asked about 3 times for that message.

S: I drafted it 3 hours ago. It's been on the Secy's desk for 3 hours. After reading it he said he wanted to talk to you. FYI - he has reservations after he has seen the message. Please don't get angry.

K: What can the objections be?

S: I have drafted it and would like to see it go out. The President called me directly and I told him what I thought we should do. I made all the points to V.V. Vorontsov. About that time I was ready to give up my problem.

K: Don't you think moving the 6th Fleet was good?

S: I do. But I am in the minority. The Secy. will tell you I expressed this view again today. I thought it was all straightened out. It was set in front of the President. It's on the Secy's desk. It's up to you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12158
By: NARA Date 6/9/78

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOR
Sisco/Kissinger

4:10 p.m. 9/11/701

S: I have drafted it and would like to see it go out. The President called me directly and I told him what I thought we should do. I made all the points to Vorontsov. About that time I was ready to give up my problem (?).

S: I do. But I am in the minority. The Secy. will tell you I expressed this view again today. I thought it was all straighthened out. It was set in front of the President. It's on the Secy's desk. It's up to you.

TELECON

Mr. Kissing /Rabbi Rubin

9:15 p.m., September 11, 1970

K: Just wanted to tell you that we appreciated your helpfulness -- all your help [during this hijacking business]. I have a list of some of the 60 passengers that were released. A number of Jewish among them.

R: Are they out of Amman?

K: Out of Amman and in Cyprus. I have the list -- two Leckeys, Friedman, __________, __________

R: Is Rabbi Hutner on that list?

K: No, but that is the very first group to be released. Another plane on the way out. This is just the first 30.

R: No differential between Jewish and non-Jewish?

K: No. Hutner off the plane.

R: Off the airfield?

K: He is off the plane but [not or not sure he is off the airfield]

R: Then there is no chance they will blow the plane up?

K: Practically eliminated.

R: I was just sitting here .. The fact that you took the trouble to call yourself [means a great deal to me].

K: Knew how concerned you were.

R: You may have heard, I made a statement on behalf of Ron Zeigler saying that from the very beginning in the White House it was all or nothing. Regards from your Uncle in Sweden. I delivered a sermon there [saying Henry Kissinger, Advisor to the President was so great -- not knowing that he was in the audience]. He came up and practically hugged me after the sermon was over.

K: Thank you very much.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1258
NARA Date 6/9/70

TELCOM
Flanigan/Kissinger
evening 9/11/70

*

F: Apparently many airlines have recommended that their airplanes not land at Beirut and Damascus. PAA has one and they want to know what do. They think there's danger.

K: My recommendation is not to land there but talk to Rogers.

F: Why?

K: A) I don't think they are as tough as they pretend but the moderate Arab Govts need an excuse to attack them. If the moderate Arabs can prove it hurts them, then they can go to them in the name of the moderate Arabs and say you are hurting us more than them. I think it's ended soon.

F: You would recommend then that no American lines go into any Arab country?

K: That's my recommendation. We can wait.

F: There's a rumor that there will be an attack if planes land there.

K: That's nonsense. If they don't let prisoners go tomorrow, that's what I would do.

F: Transportation is brooking the question to State.

K: The State answer will be to land.

F: Then just let them make that recommendation and make them act on it.

K: I don't want to do it without consultation with the President. Wait until the deadline has passed. After Sunday we should do it.

F: I will tell them to take their instructions from State. We will move in when we have to go but we will stay out now.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.1258

NARA Date 6/9/70
By AL

TELCON
The President/Kissinger
afternoon 9/11/70

P: Anything new?

K: No.

P: Are you going to Camp David?

K: I thought I would keep in touch with the situation here. All the pass-
gers are off the planes. It's not clear if they are going to Amman. The
first Caravelle of passengers are in Nicosia. 40 of the passengers are
Americans.

P: Maybe I should have played that sooner. Dead or alive. We would have t
a terrible thing on our hands, I guess. We will not play a & soft game in the
future.

everytime
K: And everything we use the hard line, it works. We have a cable in from
ICRC fellow saying that they seem confused and worried at the top/ So they
are not world baiters.

P: They are afraid they will move on other things. The trip thing is working

K: We have heard from the Italans but not the Yugoslavs.

P: Do you think that's because he's on a trip?

K: Saragat has invited you to stay at the Quirinale.

P: All right.

K: He has also offered you his Villa near Naples.

P: They are very generous. I just wish Saragat were their Prime Minister.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1258
Authority
By: NARA Date 6/9/70

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

afternoon 9/11/70

S: I am hearing about an upcoming summit meeting in NY and I want to be consulted about anything that was said in my field.

K: I am not aware of it. From whom did you hear it?

S: One of my officers says it's general information in the State Dept. He says in Geneva they spoke of it.

K: I am totally ignorant of it. We have no word of that kind. If anything like this takes place, you will be consulted on the part that concerns you.

S: Give some thought to the open door message -- I am not at all sure that SecState is on the same beam. If he talks to Gromyko Gromyko ______ different signal be communicated.

K: He knows about it.

S: When Phil told him that on WH instructions he had said this, he felt Bill thought this was different from what he had in mind. It would be difficult to have a difference. We said the door was open.

K: I will be sure he gets it. I have a written document when I tell you things. Prior to his meeting with Gromyko I will send him as a matter of source all instructions that have come out of here. That's a good way of handling it.

S: First rate.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

September 12, 1970 8:45 a.m.

jlj

K: Mel, I have two questions. One, what is the Defense Management thing you want me to do?

L: It is a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice Chiefs, Assistant Secretaries, Service Secretaries. It is the top people in the Department of Defense. We go to Airlie and meet. Dave and I started this. Brings people together where they can talk things out.

K: Damn good idea. When do you want me there?

L: 4 p.m. Saturday.

K: Saturday. You are ruining my love life Mel. You don't care.
No, I am only joking.

L: It's the same weekend the President wanted us to go down with him.

K: You can not do it can you?

L: I just cannot do it. I have everyone in town reserved for this.
68 people who have reserved it for a long time. 42 Assistant Secretaries
over there. Henry, can I call you back in a little bit. My boy had an
accident last night and the Dr. is calling. He got his head cut up a
bit but he will be fine.

K: Oh yes, of course. You call me back. Is he going to be all right?

L: Yes, fine.

9:10 a.m. continued

K: How is your son?

L: He will be fine. Hit in the head and required a lot of stiches. But he was fortunate that he did not get hurt much worse.

K: Where is he?

L: At home. He went to Suburban Hospital last night but he came
home.

K: Did the car go out of control?

By NARA, Dato 5/26

L: He stepped on the gas rather than the break and hit another car. It ruined the car, but he is going to be all right. Henry, we were talking about this Defense Management thing.

K: I guess I would not go to Key Biscayne and go to Airlie.

L: We will have cocktails and dinner. We can get you out by helicopter by about 8 p.m. You would speak at 6 p.m. You could chopper out in the afternoon being there by 4 or 4:30 p.m.

K: Was I supposed to talk or just answer questions?

L: I thought you might want to make a few opening remarks about the National Security Council and then just answers.

K: OK, unless the President absolutely insists that I go with him.

L: Yes, I understand that perfectly.

K: The other thing. Do you have any problem with the fiscal guidelines I sent because it was drawn from DPRC.

L: No, I do not have any problems. ...... billion dollar expenditure. I have been talking with Schultz. He assured me ......

K: What I have worked out with him is that as a result of ..... some of the dollars can be used. Of course you can use some of it Schultz knows this .........

L: I just wanted to be sure ..... He wanted to be sure we were not taking it out of Southeast Asia. We are not taking a thing out of Southeast Asia.

K: President wants to go slower this year than you had recommended.

L: Problem you have is with manpower. Manpower problem is to go down to 260 [million?].

K: No, he does not object to .... Just this year he wants to go slower.

L: The Chiefs and everyone else feels that not January and February - there should be no big movement. ...... Cannot do in April - March and April. I am sending you the opinions of the Chiefs, MACV just so that you have those. I will send it over to you tomorrow today or tomorrow. I am sending a tough memorandum - strong memorandum in support of military assistance.

K: Good, I want that.

By [signature] NARA, Date 5/26

L: I want you to know what I did with that memorandum. I sent copies to Schultz, Rogers and Kennedy.

K: Dave? What does he have to do with it?

L: He is having a meeting with Israeli Finance Minister [meeting]. Coming over to see him this week about the financing of the Israeli thing. In connections with that meeting on finance I am sending him a copy.

K: Fine. I do not object.

L: It ends up that this is the time for action as far as going forward
....

K: I am for that. I hope your son has a good day. Probably painful for him today. Was Barbara very upset?

L: Yes, but everything is fine now. Thank you Henry.

By

NARA, Dato 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Admiral Moorer

September 12, 1970 9:40 a.m. jlj

K: I wanted to talk to you about the directive on fiscal guidelines that came out. DODXX It was supposed to codify what had been discussed in DPRC. I just wanted to check on your reaction to it. I heard Robbie had called and was unhappy about it.

M: Well, priority for reductions .... .... .... escorts .... amphibious .... This was not my understanding in the DPRC. The amount of money would be decided and then that the Defense Department would determine force levels. I did not understand that DPRC or NSC decided this. 16-1/3 active division..... Flexible with respect to Army and NAXXX leave all cuts in Air Force and Navy. I have not talked to Laird about this .... ....

K: Let's leave out the other priorities. DPRC - general purpose forces. Exception. President felt he would not want to cut general purpose.

M: All these are general forces.

K: No cut forces any further. Other forces and other cuts that can be made. Well, last thing we want NAXXX to do in here is set a defense budget line item by line item.

M: On the lump sum budget.

K: President wanted to determine the general categories, not line item by line item. Did not want to affect SALT, that was clear. Did not want to cut any of the DODXX forces except NAXXX ground forces any further but line items .... ....

M: .... out of balance. Ground forces OK but no way to get them to the battle and no equipment for them when you get them there.

K: We will not ram a thing like this through and we will have another discussion on it in that light - in light of the first line.

M: Paragraph 3.

K: Number of forces that he will want to maintain. How the cuts should be allocated .... .... ....

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Prof. Doty/Kissinger 9:50 a.m.

9/12/70

D: You are busy. Are you seeing Millionschikov today?

K: I am going to a lunch for him.

D: Let me say a word about that. We are having a full day meeting with
him and Abartov on Wed. in Cambridge.

Arbatov

K: He/has written a nasty article about the U.S.

D: I heard that.

K: He shouldn't be let off easy.

D: I will read it today and get a reaction. I find both of them discouraging. I think it'spartly their position they are making which is clear to George and myself that they have only a month to make up their minds on SALT and they are concerned aboutthe sincerity of the Nixon Administration and MIRV.

K: That's bull. They never mentioned MIRV.

D: I know it. They say that the hard ?????

K: Are they going into coolness again?

D: Yes. I think. There's confusion at the top. There's a misunderstanding we have to get g straightened out.

K: There's no misunderstanding. They know that we are more than willing to go very far.

D: Arbatov did ask me yesterday what they could say now on MIRV. So after two days, they are up to that.

K: They are killing negotiations now. They don't want to talk at Helsinki or Vienna. It doesn't make sense.

D: We haven't pushed them very hard on ceasefire but we are before the end.

K: We ended that in good faith and they have violated it from day one on.

D: This is a good channel and it could have been more useful.

K: I am beginning to think they want a show down again like '62. We have really made some pretty sweeping private propositions to them.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

D: When I ask them for a move of insincerity, they have only the MIRV deployment and SS-9 ____.

K: They have been ? ? ? ? of 30 ____.

D: He means the Aug. 3 blows.

K: There was none. It was weather we didn't fly. We picked them up in June but it must have started in March. If they have only said it was halted (?) we would have fallen all over ourselves. What should we have done?

D: I would have said hold up MIRV in June.

K: If they said stop SS-9 if you stop MIRV, they would have had a case.

D: It's too much after the fact.

K: They refuse to discuss MIRV. In any context.

D: The most we can do is get these two simple things across.

K: The thing you have to get across is that we had a unique opportunity but they are on the verge of blowing it. We were willing to go very, very far.

D: They have one new fellow who is very much involved on nuclear things.

K: Your impression is that they are very tough.

D: At Pugwash, it is better than I expected. And we will have an agreed full day in Cambridge where we can talk more.

K: SALT is not a big problem. They made private approaches to us that were more restrictive than what you think thought was restrictive. Why couldn't Dobrynin come to me and say it was too restrictive?

D: They wanted technology and it took a decade in precedence. Was the text a month ago interesting?

K: I will look into it immediately.

D: You are going to be very busy next Wed. Mon. or Tues. we should talk about Millionschikov.

K: I will try to have a good talk with him. It's a big lunch. Since I trust him more than some of my own colleagues, it's not where I will talk.

By NARA, Dalo 5/26

Amb. Freeman (UK)/Mr. Kissinger

September 12, 1970 11:25 a.m.

jlj

F: About this visit. We have no objection to being mentioned in the announcement on Monday. Am I in position to talk about this yet? I would like to have my press people coordinate with Ziegler.

K: No. We do not know for sure if it will be announced on Monday. We would appreciate it if you would not talk about it yet. I will give you 24 hours warning so you can have a chance to comment.

F: It would be better if we did not work for such prima donnaish people. The Prime Minister would like to have the President for lunch at Chequers. It is going to be difficult if we cannot do it. It is about 8 or 10 minutes from a good airfield.

K: Leave that in my hands. I cannot speak for the President but I am better in this than in the Middle East.

F: I am sorry to have to ask you this. It would be difficult for me if I had to go back and tell him the President couldn't do it. Hospitality in his own house and all that.

K: Well, for your own planning purposes I think it can be arranged. It is inconceivable that he would not want to do it but I do want to check with him before I give you a firm answer.

F: You would have no problem if an unannounced source in London said we had invited the President for lunch at Chequers after the trip had been announced.

K: I will let you know that before the end of the day.

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger

11:00 a.m. 9/12/70

K: I was wondering if in the light of blowing up these 3 planes it might not be a good occasion to send that telegram.

R: How do we say it?

K: We just want to say --

R: Just get the & tone.

K: If any harm to the passengers, we would have to take an extremely serious view.

R: I see no objection. I just finished testifying. I will get back to you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1558
By AB NARA Date 6/9/70

*

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger

11:40 a.m. 9/12/70

R: How do we say it?

K: We just want to say --

R: Just get the tone.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Adm. Moorer/Kissinger
12:05 p.m. 9/12/70

K: On our conversation this morning I am putting out a new 3 paragraphs asking you and your colleagues for ways of coming up with basic directive. We will put it through the DPRC.

M: We have to keep force in balance.

K: I cannot set a precedent because my successor will be more a peace-nik than I.

M: We will work it out.

K: Will you take care of the other Chiefs?

M: I will. Thank you.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCON

Rogers/Kissinger

12:06 p.m.

9/12/70

R: On reflection, I don't think it's a good idea to send a threat. All the passengers are released and in a hotel. We have a cable. I think the idea that -- now that they are out of the plane the threat to their lives is lessened. The Jordanians also thought it bad to do a threat now because the moderates are fighting with the radicals in connection with the passengers. I don't see the point.

K: OK.

R: I haven't been. I would have checked earlier but I was testifying.

K: I wasn't criticizing.

R: We will keep you advised.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
President/Kissinger

ca 12:45 p. m. 9/12/70

P: I forgot to mention to you that in looking over the news summary the men-
tion of Yaya coming to the UN presents the problem of all -- get a message
P: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX to Farland saying I will meet with him
in UN but also another visit. I will not see Gandhi. I know Sisco wants it --
K: He has no views on the subcontinent.

P: I have and I don't want the Indians.

K: We should give him a choice.

P: I will not see people up there.

K: A State dinner down here?

P: I will give a dinner down here and give the speech up there. I want
to get out of NY. No dinner up there -- this is final -- the Al Smith
thing I am considering and VN the next morning and anyone who wants to see
me can come here. Kosygin too.

K: And if they pick up the summit.

P: They That will be before. We will have handled Heath. Pompidou
won't come. We have had Brandt. I really feel of receiving these
people in my own office rather than in a hotel in NY.

K: And no problem of demonstrations.

P: And control over it.

K: And you can stretch it out. Two a day.

P: We might give a lunch -- no, one State dinner. All the Heads of State
that are here. At the WH in style. Let U Thant be one of many. Let's
arrange that.

K: I think it's much better. You don't get much news coverage.

P: The other thing is that it gets me out of seeing Heads of Delegations.
Rogers can see Foreign Ministers. I will see only Heads of State or
Heads of Government. We will arrange it here. We can do 4 a day
here. I don't think we should see those. If they are/important, I don't
think we should see them.

K: You can select them. If you saw the President of Gabon, it would be
a bore.

P: Or Bolivia. Just those that request. If they know I am going to be

By NARA, Date 5/26

President/Kissinger
ca 12:45 p.m. 9/12/70

-2-

P: (cont.) there they will all want it. Yaya and those that ask, here in Washington. No feelers.

K: Unless we want to see them but not in general terms.

P: The Grk. thing has gone forward?

K: No question.

P: We could do a little more. I think we can give the Greeks a good push. When will it be announced?

K: We will tell them next week. That's the important thing.

P: Next week?

K: That's a good time because it is time we are announcing our visit to the Mediterranean. We haven't heard from Yugo.

P: We won't go there if we don't hear. It doesn't bother me to go to Spain and England.

K: It will feature the 6th Fleet more.

P: And Rome. I think they will have notified Nito right away.

K: The communications are bad and they are probably having problems.

P: Emphasize the 6th Fleet/ After that is difficult. He isn't afraid of the Russians. --

K: It's his relationship with the Arabs.

P: He is afraid of his own people.

K: That they might give you a warm reception.

By NARA, Dale 5/26

TELCORN

Haldeman/Kissinger

2:45 pm

9/12/70

K: I don't think we can launch the advance party before the announcement and we haven't heard from the Yugoslavs yet.

H: Just don't announce Yugoslavia. We have a problem if we hold much longer.

K: Could they hold until Tues. Then we will let them off if we don't hear.

H: We don't have to announce a schedule. Just say these pack places.

K: It would help the Italians enormously if we could announce Belgrade. Otherwise, they will be accused of being fascists.

H: Leave out Spain. Then just announce Italy and the 6th Fleet. That's better from the PR side.

K: We also haven't heard from the Pope yet.

H: We will just announce Rome and the 6th Fleet. They don't get to Rome until Monday night and stay through Tues. We have until Wed.

K: I am reluctant to turn loose the schedules. No foreign government knows. The advance says to them.

H: I need them but I think they should discuss it with Dwight.

K: You should have them and I should talk to you. But there's a problem with them, timing it, until we discuss it with the foreign governments.

H: If we can give them the stuff, saying they can't use it.

K: Yugoslavia we are flying blind. We have to get their views.

H: They won't get to the Yugoslavias until the weekend. I don't think there's any -- tell them not to use anything.

K: I will get the recommendations up to you this afternoon. I have them. I want to know that the Italian part is okay. I am goosy about Yugo.

H: I don't think it would be better if they could take it with them. Tell Dwight to tell them not to use them until we say then can.

K: I will tell the Italians we are making an announcement on Monday and the advance is arriving Monday night. The 6th Fleet we can work out.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Haldeman/Kissinger

2:45 pm

9/12/70

-2-

K: (cont.) Gerard Smith said yesterday that in State it's common knowledge
that there will be a meeting with Kosygin. He want to be included on
ACDA brought up. Do you know about a game they are playing?

H: I don't know about the game but they maybe playing it. Rogers is probably trying to work something out.

K: That will be a disaster. I don't understand -- they don't reply to the
President for 4 weeks. That's rude and dangerous.

H: I will raise it with the President on the basis of what you said. I will
ask him what we should do and I will see if anything is going on other
than what I know.

K: It will be dangerous if 2 channels are being worked. Do you think I
can go to NY?

H: Sure.

K: The blew up the 3 planes. They said it's a first step in the warning if
we delay. I have tried to get State to send a tough message. They won't.

H: I wouldn't make a fuss about it.

K: I was going to the tennis finals.

H: That's okay. Just try not to take Jill St. John.

K: How about Nancy Maginnes.

H: That's not quite as visible.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Dr. Paine/Kissinger
3:30 pm 9/12/70

P: Reuters has just announced that the Soviets have launched a moonxbox probe
Luna 16. Unmanned. If you wanted to, you could suggest to Millionschikov that if
they piece is going to impact, it would be nice of them to tell us so we can learn
where and when so we can pick it up and learn something about the interior of the
moon. You can say you heard it on the news.

K: He may not have heard about it.

P: He may not but it's not classified any longer.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger
late morning 9/12/70

S: I wanted to check if you have that cable.

K: I have and I will get it back this afternoon. I made a number of changes. I cannot let withdrawal stand because it's something that the President has rejected. However said we would withdraw in terms of a ceasefire.

S: I thought that was discussed July 21.

K: If the other side withdraws. Nothing unilateral.

S: The basic thing is return of prisoners.

K: Sometimes I feel we are shoveling sand against the wind. He won't consider it and won't do it.

S: How do you expect it?

K: The principle is part of the settlement.

S: How is he going to make the settlement.

K: He isn't going to say we will expect withdrawal as part of ceasefire. We will expect withdrawal as part of total settlement.

S: This will lead them to wish to discuss --

K: Your associates to discuss that way.

S: Withdrawal.

K: Not I in a unilateral fashion.

S: It is what? ? ? ?

K: You remember when you and I talked I thought it had interesting features. We will withdraw unilaterally as part of Vietnamization. He thinks it's silly to say in return for ceasefire we will withdraw. We should say we will withdraw if we have ceasefire.

S: There's more to it than that. The aspect of security.

K: I unfortunately don't have it in front of me. Can I call you this afternoon? I have just given it to Smyser.

S: I could call him.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

K: Let me look at it and call you this afternoon.

S: I have to go to a wedding tax early this afternoon. The other thing was in terms of any views of the timing. The Secy. added the phrase of possibly next month.

K: I think that's all right. We will get a group together next week to discuss consultation processes. The President thinks it's too complex.

S: You will bring Bruce back?

K: I am not sure. But in terms of two other capitals. Saigon.

S: Ramesh and Phenom Penh and Vietniane.

K: I meant Indonesia.

S: In terms of informing them. Not in terms of cables.

K: The addressees are ok. I will be back in touch in an hour or so.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Amb. Sullivan/Kissinger
afternoon 9/12/70

S: I talked to Smyser, and he gave the concept of what you have.

K: He is supposed to have given them to you.

S: He said he made them and gave the papers to you.

K: To whom shall I get them directed? I gave it to an assistant to dictate to one of yours. The changes are as explained to you. It was never raised.

S: What I am really interested in now -- the way you describe my approach is not the way I intended. Perpahs the wording as it is.

K: Beyond that it's the only significant change. You know, the way we rewrote paragraph 9? I don't see any problem with it.

S: I don't see any problem. That's only significant.

K: We would consult with Bruce if talks are smooth. I don't want to say where. I don't think we should commit ourselves. I don't think we should suggest the ICC.

S: I only worry about our credibility with Thieu. I agree with you on the other.

K: The next point is not overwhelming. On withdrawal, I know without a doubt what the President wants.

K: I am only concerned about positions with Thieu that say we misrepresent ourselves.

K: I have eliminated that all together. "(quotes from document)" and I took out the next sentence which gives the impression it is from the original.

S: Ted Eliot and then we will judge whether it must go through the Secy. again.

K: This is not just my view. I can't tell you how to run your internal administration.

S: If you have it over there, I will be in touch.

K: I would welcome that.

S: Addressed only to Bunker with a copy to Bruce. In Cherokee. I have deliberately not given it to JCS or Defense. After it's on paper the chances of leakage are multiplied.