16

a set of common political purposes.

On both sides of the Atlantic, we find ourselves
threatened by the dominance of domestic politics over
global political strategy. In Europe this leads in too
many countries to a faintly disguised neutralism. In
the United States it accelerates our already strong tendency
toward unilateralism and isolationism.

U.S. leaders have too often adjusted foreign policies
to political pressures, bureaucratic infighting, or changing
intellectual fashions. The history of the American attitude
toward intermediate range missiles in Europe is a case
in point. These were proposed to the Europeans in 1958,
installed in Italy and Turkey in 1960 and withdrawn in
1962. They then reappeared in 1963 as a part of a so-
called NATO multilateral force, and were abandoned once
again in 1965. They were put before NATO for the third
time in 1978 and then embodied in the current "double

17

track" decision in 1979. Not surprisingly, those Europeans
organizing to stop the current deployment are encouraged
by their knowledge that previous American decisions have
not proved immutable.

Similarly, in a matter of months, our allies have
had to adjust from passionate U.S. advocacy of SALT II
to its rejection, and then to the fact that we have chosen
to observe a treaty we refuse to ratify; from a strategic
doctrine of massive retaliation to one of flexible response;
from a policy of detente to a policy of confrontation
and back to conciliation--all in addition to the reassessments
that in the past decade have occurred automatically whenever
a new administration comes into office. Each change
of course leaves victims among European leaders who have
staked their domestic positions on policies which the
United States later abandons. Each lurch encourages
a kind of neutralism, as Europeans seek to avoid being

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18

made hostage to sudden swings in American policy.

A continuation of existing trends is bound to lead first to stagnation and in time to the disintegration of the Western Alliance. An explicit act of statesmanship is needed to give new meaning to Western unity and a new vitality to NATO. In my view such an effort must have three components: (a) a more significant role for Europe within NATO, (b) a reform of the NATO organization and (c) a reassessment of current NATO deployment.

I shall discuss these in turn.

## A New Role for Europe

During the entire post-World War II period it has been an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential component of the Atlantic partnership.

We have applied that principle with dedication and imagination-- in so far as it depended on American actions--in all

areas except security. With respect to defense, however,
the United States has been indifferent at best--at least
since the failure of the European Defense Community--
to any sort of Europeanization. Many in this country
seemed to fear that a militarily unified Europe might
give less emphasis to transatlantic relations or that
it might botch its defense effort and thus weaken the
common security.

The opposite is almost certainly the case.

In the economic field, integration was bound to
lead to transatlantic competition, even to some discrimination.
What defines a Common Market, after all, is that its
external barriers are higher than its internal ones.
In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European
responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation
with the United States. A Europe analyzing its security
needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find

20

association with the United States essential. Greater
European unity in defense would also help to overcome
the looming logistical nightmare caused by the attempt
of every European nation to stretch its already inadequate
defense effort across the whole panoply of modern weapons.
For example, there are five kinds of battle tanks within
NATO, different types of artillery and different standards
for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. In
case of a major conflict it will be nearly impossible
to keep this hodge-podge of forces supplied.

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic
Alliance requires Europe to develop a greater identity
and a more distinctly European coherence in the field
of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burdensharing,"
of paying more for the existing effort. I have in mind
something more structural--a more rational balance of
responsibilities between the two sides of the Atlantic.

21

My basic reason for proposing this is not that the financial
burdens are unfairly distributed--although they are.

Rather the present allocation of responsibilities simply
makes no sense. It fails to bring the allies to reflect
naturally about either security or political objectives.
Neither side of the Atlantic has by itself sufficient
incentive for a long-range objective study of the choices
posed by the new situation. Everyone has been afraid
to take the initiative in changing the present arrangement,
lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since
drift will surely lead to unraveling--if more imperceptibly--
statesmanship impels a new approach.

Structural Reform

Structural reform cannot substitute for a sense
of purpose and clear doctrine. But if pursued with care
and sensitivity it can help catalyze the development
of shared political purposes. In my view these common
objectives require that European judgments on security

22

and East-West diplomacy (and other matters) emerge from Europe's own analysis. Mere acquiescence in American decisions, briefings, and pressures provides a facade of unity; shared purposes require a deeper sense of participation.

Specifically:

1. By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for the conventional ground defense. This is well within the capability of a continent with nearly one and one half times the population and twice the GNP of the Soviet Union, which moreover has to divide its forces on at least two fronts.

2. To reflect the new responsibilities, a European officer should by then take the traditionally American place as "Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe" (SACEUR), probably with a U.S. deputy. Such a change is also likely to give a new perspective to Allied strategic

23

planning. The United States has generally achieved its military successes by the weight of the equipment which our superior industrial potential made available. This has tempted our military leaders to equate strategy with logistics. European nations have rarely enjoyed such a material margin; they have had to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics--precisely what NATO needs in an age of nuclear parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

3. Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary General--the official responsible for running the political machinery of NATO--has been European. In the new structure it would make more sense for the Secretary General to be American--whenever the new Secretary General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. This would reflect the need for political coordination on both sides of the Atlantic. In the meantime, there is no Western leader better qualified for guiding

24

NATO's transition than the wise and able new Secretary
General.

4. Europe should take over those arms control negotiations that deal with weapons stationed on European soil. The INF negotiations with the Soviets (involving intermediate range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (concerning conventional ground forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a European chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly European, delegation.

The structure I propose would enable Europeans to confront--on their own initiative and in their own context--a whole series of issues that have been evaded for at least two decades: the precise definition of an adequate conventional defense; the nature of the so-called nuclear threshold--the point where there is no choice except conventional defeat or nuclear escalation; the relationship

25

between strategy and arms control. A European SACEUR
will minimize the temptation of European leaders to justify
sacrifices as a response to American pressure. Since
nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional
defense fails, Europe would bear the responsibility for
setting the nuclear threshold by its own efforts; it
could relieve its nuclear anxieties by the simple expedient
of augmenting its conventional defenses. And if it did
not, increased reliance on American nuclear guarantees
and deployments would clearly be Europe's own choice.

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR
and INF negotiations would place the final responsibility
for both conventional force levels and the intermediate
range missile deployment in Europe with the leaders whose
countries will have to bear the brunt--for good or ill--
of the outcome of these negotiations. This is especially
important with respect to the American intermediate range

26

missiles in Europe. That deployment makes sense only if the allies genuinely believe that the prospect of a nuclear blow from Europe on Soviet territory contributes significantly to deterring a Soviet conventional attack.

If our principal allies do not share this conviction-- if they indulge the absurd suspicion that American missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union are a subterfuge to confine such a war to Europe or if they agree to these missiles only as a kind of favor in response to American entreaties--the psychological basis for the deployment will evaporate.

European chairmanship of the INF negotiations would oblige European leaders to face the issue head-on: they would be in a position to abandon the missiles through negotiation; if they did not--as in terms of their security interests they should not--their domestic critics would no longer be able to argue--as they do now--that American

27

intransigence is the principal obstacle to arms control.

As for the United States it would of course
participate in these deliberations--in a less dominant
position--through its continued membership in the integrated
command, its responsibility for nuclear defense, and its
ground, naval and air force in Europe.

Redeployment
---

The issue of redeploying American forces touches
raw European nerves like no other. The slightest hint
of altering present arrangements jangles sensibilities;
it evokes fears of American withdrawal and prospects of
European neutralism. But if present trends continue it
is certain to become a central issue in the Alliance
relationship. Before dealing with it in the context of
a program of NATO reform, a few generally recognized
facts must be noted:

28

A. The present NATO deployment of five American divisions and supporting air and naval forces evolved in the 1950s when NATO's doctrine was massive retaliation-- to react to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear blow against Soviet territory. Massive retaliation, paradoxically required that the total forces on the Continent be kept below the level required for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet conventional aggression by doing anything to suggest that a Western response would be limited to non-nuclear means. Hence the American conventional deployment in Europe reflected political, not military, criteria: it was intended to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave no doubt in the Soviet mind that this would be the consequence of even a conventional war. The parallel European conventional forces represented a similar political decision: thus they, too, were conceived as a trip wire for our nuclear

29

riposte. From the birth of NATO a full conventional
defense has been part neither of its strategy nor of
its efforts.

B. This situation became anomalous when the growth
of Soviet strategic forces deprived general nuclear war
of much of its credibility. Yet NATO deployment has
been essentially unaffected by the change of NATO doctrine
to one of flexible response. NATO has improved its conventional
defenses but has not closed the gap in conventional forces.
As the current NATO commander has made clear recently,
NATO is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet
ground attack for more than a few days, even counting
the five American divisions which have remained in Europe
for a generation. European ambivalence continues thirty-
five years after NATO's creation. Our allies remain
unwilling to develop forces strong enough to provide
an alternative to nuclear weapons--and yet much of their

30

public opinion shies away from even thinking about the
concept of nuclear deterrence.

C. Were we to start all over again, we would therefore
hardly repeat the decision of the Fifites in today's
circumstances. Let us assume a group of wise men from
both sides of the Atlantic were called together to plan
a global strategy unconstrained by the past. Assume
further that it started from the premise that ultimately
the defense of the West is indivisible and that European
security should be viewed under the aspect of the defense
of the West in Europe--as a thoughtful French observer,
Francoise de Rose put it. Such a group would almost
surely conclude that the sensible division of responsi-
bilities would be for Europe, possessing economic resources
and manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to
concentrate on the conventional defense of their continent.
To maintain the global balance of power--by definition,
as essential for Europe as for America--the United States

31

would emphasize highly mobile conventional forces capable
both of backing up Europe and contributing to the defense
of, for example, the Middle East, or Asia or the Western
Hemisphere.

Such a division of responsibility would also
enable our military establishment to shift some of its
intellectual energies and scientific research from a
hypothetical esoteric war in an area where we have
major allies to the defense of regions where conflict
is much more likely, our allies are less prone to see
their interests immediately engaged, and the countries
being threatened are in a worse position to assist in
the defense effort.

Even in the hypothetical case of starting all over
again, an irrefutable case would exist for maintaining
<u>some</u> considerable American ground forces in Europe. This
would be essential to keep our allies from feeling abandoned
and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the

32

defense of Europe no longer reflects a vital American
interest. In a new division of responsibilities we should
also at least preserve and preferably strengthen the
existing U.S. landbased airpower on the continent. And
we should continue our responsibility for both strategic
and tactical nuclear defense, assuming that we and the
Europeans could agree on a strategy for the latter. American
intermediate range missiles should remain in Europe to
"couple" the nuclear defenses of both sides of the Atlantic
so long as European leaders desired them. No change
in naval deployments would be involved.

Why then is such a division of responsibilities
not realized? Why is not a group of wise men assembled
to tell us what is right? The principle obstacle is
psychological. For all their criticisms of American
policy, Europeans dread a return to isolationism. Americans
fear that any tinkering with deployment would drive Europe
into explicit neutralism. And some in the Pentagon prefer

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33

to maintain our divisions in Europe in a less than rational
deployment rather than return some of them to the United
States where they are more exposed to Congressional budget
cutters.

The question remains whether an existing, historically
based deployment that is losing any current rationale
arrests or accelerates these attitudes. In my view, it
will accelerate them. After all, pacifism and neutralism
are on the march in Europe even under the present set-
up; isolationism in America is not yet so vocal but is
being powerfully encouraged by endless Allied disputes.
An Alliance that cannot agree on strategic doctrine and
arms control positions; an Alliance rent by increasingly
frequent controversies over East-West and North-South
relations cannot sustain itself by rigidly clinging to
military arrangements decided a generation ago in totally
different circumstances. With current trends the issue
of the rationale for the NATO deployment will become

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34

unavoidable. If it arises not as an integral component
in a comprehensive design of modernizing and strengthening
the Alliance, but as a single question of whether to
continue stationing American troops in Europe, unilateral
changes will be arbitrarily imposed by the potentially
most destructive means--the American budgetary process.

Then indeed we might see in America a psychological wrench
away from Europe and in Europe a panicky resentment against
the United States. Withdrawal without a positive political
and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own sake, might
indeed shock our allies into neutralism; it could mislead
our adversary and tempt aggression. It is precisely
my conviction that current trends make this outcome ultimately
probably, that has impelled me to write this article.

There is an urgent need for a serious, frank and
rapid reexamination of NATO doctrine, deployment and
policies. It should be conducted by a high level group

35

composed of men and women known for their dedication
to Western unity. Obviously the group must begin with
one of the most divisive issues before the Alliance:
an agreement on the nature and the scope of the threat.
In offering solutions it must learn from experience and
avoid the pedantry that has marked previous such efforts
when mountains of unread-memoranda overwhelmed clear
thought and abstract percentage goals were set which
being either irrelevant or unachievable magnified the
problem. A deadline for completion should be set--certainly
no longer than two years.

Theoretically, such a study could lead to one of
three outcomes: (a) the group could come to the same
conclusions about the optimum division of responsibilities
outlined above involving a strengthening of the European
conventional component of NATO and a withdrawal of some
American ground forces in the context of an agreed Alliance

36

strategy. Given the disagreements about the nature of
the interests involved in regions outside of Europe and
the domestic priorities of most European countries such
a conclusion however rational is extremely improbable.

(b) The group could argue that the strategic interests
of the West require a full conventional defense but that
for practical and psychological reasons Europe can undertake
the required effort only if the present American ground
deployment in Europe is maintained intact. (c) The group
could decide that the realities of European domestic
politics preclude more than the current gradualistic,
marginal improvement of European defense efforts.

If Europe should in fact agree to build a full
conventional defense and if it were prepared to express
that commitment in unambiguous, agreed yearly obligations
to increase its forces, the United States should accept
the judgment that its present ground forces in Europe
are an indispensable component--whatever contrary

37

conclusions systems analysis might dictate. But if Europe
should opt for a perpetuation of the present ambivalence
and confusion--or for only a marginal improvement at
its fringes--the United States will owe it to the sustainability
of its strategy before our public and to the overall
requirements of global defense to draw certain conclusions.

When deployments reflect political, not security considerations,
we will have no choice but to opt for a European deployment
explicable to the American people. If nuclear weapons
remain the ultimate deterrent to even conventional attack,
a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion (perhaps
up to half) of our present ground forces would be a logical
result. To provide time for necessary adjustments that
withdrawal could be extended over a period of five years.

To ease the transition further we could, if Europe agreed,
keep the excess ground forces in Europe for an interim
period afterward in a new status analogous to that of

38

the French forces, prepared for use in Europe in support of
European defense but also available for use in emergencies
outside of Europe. Of course any withdrawal would make
sense only if the redeployed forces were added to our
strategic reserve; if they were disbanded the effect would
be to weaken the overall defense.

The proposed redeployment would leave intact the air
and naval forces as well as the deployment of intermediate
range missiles so long as Europe wants them. A useful
byproduct of the process would be a systematic reevaluation
of the existing highly miscellaneous inventory of the very
short-range tactical nuclear weapons--a legacy of three
decades of ad hoc decisions--which now represent at one and
the same time an increment to deterrence and the greatest
danger of unintended nuclear war--because of the unpredictability
of weapons deployed so far forward that they are unusually
subject to the exigencies of battle.

In this scheme withdrawal would be not an
end in itself--as it will if frustrations on both sides of

39

the Atlantic go much further--but one component of a
process extending over eight years that rededicates the
United States to the Alliance for the indefinite future.
It does so by putting before the American people a rational,
hence sustainable strategy which takes account of changing
circumstances.

Psychology is immensely important in international
relations, especially when policies turn not only on
cold, professional assessments of the national interest by
trained political leaders, but crucially on public opinion
and public attitudes. I would like to believe that
once the initial shock inseparable from breaking with
the familiar has worn off it would be seen that restructuring
the alliance to place greater responsibility for European
defense on Europeans is, not an abandonment of Europe;
it is an embrace of Europe. It is a means of enlisting
Europeans as full partners in the process of decision
on which their safety as well as ours depends. It is

40

a move to take Europe and Europeans seriously, confident
that together we will then approach jointly and constructively
the requirements of our common defense. And we will
be fulfilling the obligations of leadership by putting
forward as an initiative what otherwise may well be imposed
by necessity in much worse circumstances.

## Political Objectives

By themselves, neither organizational nor doctrinal
adaptations can remedy the political incoherence rending
NATO. This article has emphasized security issues. However,
a few general observations on the Alliances' political
problems are necessary to place the security recommendations
into perspective:

A. Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic
who value the Alliance, with all its failings, as the
ultimate guardian of Western freedom, must seek urgently
to end the political disputes over East-West relations

and general North-South policy and especially Western
conduct in the flashpoints of conflict in the Third World.

The tendency to grandstand before domestic audiences,
the growing self-righteousness will in time make a mockery
of the key assumption of the Atlantic Alliance: that
we share a common approach to the problem of security.

Defense requires after *all* _some_ agreed political purpose
in the name of which it is conducted--at a minimum an
agreement on the nature of the threat.

B. The United States can not lead the Western alliance
or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore
bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the
Vietnam war shattered our bipartisan unity in foreign
policy we have disquieted our friends and confused, where
we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic wide
swings with respect to essential elements of our policies.

As a nation we must accept the reality that the national
interest does not change every four or eight years. At

42

some point the national interest must be accepted by
our public as clearly recognizable and constant. Otherwise,
we shall become a source of dangerous instability, still
relevant for our power but irrelevant for our ideas.

A Presidential election year is probably not an ideal
time to forge a bipartisan consensus. But whoever wins
the Presidential election faces no more important and
urgent challenge than to restore bipartisanship to our
foreign policy.

C. European governments must meet head-on the distrubing
trends toward pacifism and neutralism in their countries.
These movements are led by men of conviction; they cannot
be defused by accommodation. They can only be resisted
with a compelling vision of a new future and not by insisting
on the immutability of every existing arrangement, alternating
with assaults on the transatlantic partner. If European
governments feel obliged to defend what are perceived
as largely American decisions; if they continue to humor

43

those who profess to see the danger to the peace in a
bellicose America, not an intransigent Soviet Union,
they will not be able to avoid being engulfed by a wave
of abdication; they will make concession after concession,
progressively becoming hostages of their critics.

The current condition of the Alliance cries out
for a rethinking of its structure, its doctrine and its
unifying purposes. The creativity and courage with which
we approach this challenge will depend whether the Alliance
enters a new and dynamic period or gradually withers.

I have outlined proposals to reinvigorate allied
cohesion by defining a clear set of responsibilities
for each side of the Atlantic to be implemented gradually
over a period of seven years. On that basis European
leaders could defend cooperativeness with the United States
as something they sought as a matter of their own conviction
and in their nation's interest. American leaders would

(N)

44

have a rational, understandable policy to defend and
they would benefit from dealing with a more equal partner.

If the new arrangements are developed gradually and with
sensitivity, mutual confidence can grow with each step.

A new era of allied creativity and American dedication
could give inspiration to the generation that has come
to maturity since World War II, and since the postwar
crises that gave birth to NATO and inspired its creators'
generation with their sense of common purpose.

I have given long and careful thought to whether
it is appropriate for a former Secretary of State to
put forward such far-reaching proposals for the Alliance.

In the end--appalled by the tone and nature of the transatlantic
controversy--I came to the view that it would be better
if the initiative were taken by a son of Europe clearly
and deeply committed to Western unity rather than letting
it pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and

45

neo-isolationists who systematiclaly seek to undermine
all joint efforts.

The nations bordering the North Atlantic need above
all faith in themselves and the will to resist the siren
calls of those who use fear and panic as instruments
of policy or of domestic debate. In the end we must
fulfill our trust: to preserve and strengthen that North
Atlantic Alliance which represents the hope of human
dignity and decency in our world.

1/30/84

TIME ARTICLE

Just as storms recur in nature, crises recur in the Atlantic Alliance. Nearly every Administration for a generation has been involved in them.

However, the present turmoil in NATO has one crucial aspect which is both unprecedented and unsettling: in essence, disputes about policies are surrogates for a widening incompatibility of prevailing <u>attitudes</u> on the two sides of the Atlantic. This bodes ill for the future unless those attitudes can be changed.

Ironically, this comes at a time when the governments themselves are philosophically more compatible than they have been for a long while. NATO's day-to-day business is being conducted efficiently, without undue friction.

Despite vocal protest demonstrations, American missiles are being deployed on schedule. Yet tensions are building beneath the surface.

2

A well-organized and financed "peace" movement in Europe has been pulling governments in the general direction of its policies despite the fact that those governments disagree with its premises. Because of this "peace" movement's sway over key segments of public opinion, European leaders--even conservative ones--have frequently yielded to the temptation to demonstrate their peaceful intentions the easy way, by pretending to be reining in a bellicose and insensitive United States. As a result among those who shape public attitudes--and thereby set what become the limits of the politically possible--there is less intellectual or philosophical agreement than in any previous period.

This creates an exceedingly dangerous situation. An alliance cannot endure without some basic agreement on the political aims which justify and give direction to the common effort. It cannot live by arms alone.

3

If military arrangements provide its only bond, it will sooner or later disintegrate--especially if there is also disagreement about the nature of the military threat. That is the central issue before the Atlantic Alliance today. It requires a fundamental, even radical--in the literal sense, of going to the root--remedy.

* * * *

Among the problems now gnawing at the Alliance, four in particular stand out:

1. Lack of an agreed, credible strategy. The gap between NATO's formal strategy and what the public will support has widened dangerously. The so-called "flexible response" remains NATO's official doctrine. Devised in the 1960s, this contemplates a response to Soviet aggression that begins with conventional weapons and then goes up the ladder of nuclear escalation--reaching whatever level is necessary to halt Soviet

4

aggression. The fatal weakness of this flexible response
doctrine, in today's circumstances, derives from the
fact that neither the existing nor the projected NATO
conventional forces are adequate to repel a major Soviet
conventional attack. Therefore, the doctrine would
require a nuclear response at an early stage of a major
conventional attack. Yet the present conditions of
strategic nuclear parity deprive even the threat of
strategic nuclear war of much of its credibility; mutual
suicide cannot be made to appear as a rational option.
Thus public opinion, essentially unopposed by the NATO
governments, is moving powerfully against any use of
nuclear weapons--even tactical nuclear weapons.

The Alliance is thereby trapped in a precarious
combination of (a) inadequate conventional forces, leading
to (b) reliance on nuclear weapons, in (c) a strategic
environment that makes the threat of their use, and

5

therefore their deterrent value, less credible, and
(d) a public climate of growing nuclear pacifism that
undermines what credibility otherwise remains. Like
the Soviet Union, the NATO countries have a huge stockpile
of enormously destructive weapons. But the lack of
a coherent defense policy leaves the Alliance, despite
those weapons, disarming itself psychologically.

2. Intermediate range weapons and arms control.

When the first American intermediate range weapons arrived
in Europe a few weeks ago, many in the Alliance celebrated
the event as a great success. If the combination of
public demonstrations and Soviet pressure had succeeded
in blocking that deployment it would indeed have been
a huge defeat. But without clarity about their purpose,
the mere stationing of a small number of missiles is
scarcely a victory.

For the basic European attitude toward the missiles
remains that of a host toward a now unwanted guest

6

whose previous invitation to dinner it would be too
awkward to withdraw. Some prominent Europeans purport
to see in the missiles' presence a hidden American design
to confine a nuclear war to Europe. Others treat them
as one of those peculiar American aberrations that periodically
upset the Alliance's equilibrium. Too few recognize
that in fact the missiles link the strategic nuclear
defense of Europe and the United States, and even fewer
are willing to admit it; they are a way of staking America's
commitment, not a way to escape it.

In the prevailing atmosphere one popular recourse
is to treat arms control negotiations as a way out,
pressing these as a framework for the missiles' withdrawal,
and thereby eroding the linkage between Europe's nuclear
defense and ours. This inherent ambivalence makes it
excruciatingly difficult to define "progress" toward
an acceptable arms control agreement, while the nearly

7

desperate eagerness with which "progress" is pursued
makes its achievement less likely. The Soviets have
refused even to discuss any proposal that would balance
American intermediate range missiles in Europe against
the existing much larger Soviet arsenal. The Soviet
goal of leaving Europe vulnerable to Soviet blackmail
is obvious. Yet significant segments of European opinion
persist in blaming the United States for the deadlock.
Both in Europe and in the United States, this attitude
must erode the public support needed for both the missile
deployment, and for coherent arms control.

3. East-West relations. Behind the sharp differences over defense strategy and arms control lies a parallel dispute over the posture the alliance should take toward the Soviet Union--a dispute which reflects sharp differences in assessments of the United States, as well as in attitudes toward the Soviet Union. Too many Europeans are convinced

8

that the United States is run by belligerent cowboys
of the sort depicted in so many European (and Soviet)
political cartoons, and that U.S. belligerence has provoked
Soviet intransigence. Even the more conciliatory tone
adopted recently by the United States has not changed
this attitude. In short, Europeans on the whole consider
the Soviet Union as tractable and somewhat misunderstood.
Many Americans, on the other hand, are convinced that
such European attitudes, together with the waves of
pacifist and neutralist demonstrations, are naive and
reflect a policy of appeasement. In this view European
attitudes have encouraged a Soviet political offensive
designed to manipulate Western public opinion and to
exploit the divisions within the Alliance.

4. **Relations with the Third World.** Most Europeans believe that they now have a special opportunity to establish preferred relationships with countries in the Third

9

World. In the flashpoints of the Middle East, Africa and Central America, they consider U.S. approaches as hopelessly tainted by an obsession with Soviet ambitions; and some, whatever their own views, perceive an opening they can exploit in the Third World to their own advantage.

In either case, they see gains for themselves in ostentatious dissociation from the United States. More than a few Americans view such European behavior either as a free ride paid for by U.S. sacrifices or as a positive incitement to Third World radicalism.

* * * * *

These differences could be harmless and even healthy if eventually they produced compatible and constructive policies for the 1980s and '90s. So far this has not happened. Mutual recriminations have mounted, creating opportunities for Soviet political warfare even during this period of stagnation in the Kremlin leadership.

10

The Politburo is obviously convinced that the West has become so paralyzed with respect to nuclear weapons that there is no urgency about nuclear arms control; it can simply wait for a while to harvest the fruits of Western anxieties. By contrast, there may be some concern in Moscow that NATO will move to close the gap in conventional forces; hence the willingness to talk about limiting conventional arms, which could place obstacles in the way of the desperately needed Western conventional build-up with the argument that a conventional build-up weakens prospects for arms control. Meanwhile Soviet arms continue streaming into Third World trouble spots everywhere from the Middle East to the Caribbean.

The present psychological weakness of the West was symbolized dramatically at the current European Security Conference in Stockholm. Less than six months after the shooting-down of the Korean airliner, a little more than two

11

years after the imposition of martial law in Poland,

/exactly

almost four years after Afghanistan and at a meeting

where the Soviet foreign minister viciously attacked

the U.S., every single NATO foreign minister who could

get an appointment called on Mr. Gromyko holding court

at the Soviet embassy. In short, Europe is not moderating

the United States, and the United States is not stiffening

Europe's spine, as the folklore would have it. Each

side of the Atlantic paralyzes and demoralizes the other.

This state of NATO affairs has proceeded too far
to be blamed on particular policies or specific actions
on either side. The trouble lies deeper. With respect
to some issues, the fact seems to be--to put it delicately--
that a community of interests can no longer be taken
for granted. And even where the common interest is
evident, as it is in the defense field, the existing
structure is simply not working, either in achieving
a definition of the threat or of methods to meet it.

12

Existing arrangements are unbalanced; they encourage
a sort of de facto neutralism in Europe and unilateralism
in the United States.

When one country dominates the alliance on all
major issues--when that one country chooses weapons
and decides deployments, when it conducts the arms control
negotiations, sets the tone for East-West diplomacy
and creates the framework for relations with the Third
World--little incentive remains for a serious joint
effort at defining the terms for European security or
even for coordinating a serious set of foreign policies.
Such joint efforts entail sacrifices and carry political
costs. Leaders are not likely to make the sacrifice
or pay the cost unless they feel responsible for the
results. An imbalance such as the one now existing
cannot be made up for by "consultation," however meticulous.
In the long run, consultation works only when those

13

being consulted have an alternative and a capacity for
independent action. Then each side takes the other
seriously; then each side knows that the other's consent
has to be won. Then each has an incentive to be responsible.
Otherwise consultation becomes "briefing". Agreement
reflects not conviction but acquiescence for want of
an alternative.

The present imbalance is not new. It has existed
ever since World War II. But dependence on another
nation has a cumulative impact. When the feeling of
impotence no longer results from an unavoidable necessity
but from a policy choice, it becomes destructive. In
Europe's case, the harm is compounded by European prosperity:
against that economic background, continued military
dependence on the United States breeds a combination
of guilt, self-hatred, and a compulsion to display
independence of the United States wherever doing so

14

is possible and safe, especially with regard to some
Third World issues and certain aspects of East-West relations.

The problem has become even more acute because
the generation of leaders that built NATO has virtually
disappeared. Those who led Europe during those early
postwar years were still psychologically of the era
when Europe bestrode the world. Global thinking came
naturally. European leaders assumed responsibility
for their own nations' security policies as a matter
of tradition, and gave it up only reluctantly because
of special postwar circumstances. But nearly forty
years have passed now since the end of World War II.
The new generation of leaders was reared in an era
when the United States was preeminent. Sheltered by
the same alliance which is under assault by their publics,
they take it for granted that they can delegate the
military defense of Europe to us. For the rest, too

15

many of them seek to position themselves somewhere between
the superpowers--the first step toward psychological
neutralism. Thus the European schizophrenia: a fear
that the United States might not be prepared to risk
its own population on a nuclear defense of Europe, coupled
simultaneously with the anxiety that America might drag
Europe into an unwanted conflict by its clumsy handling
of Third World issues or East-West relations.

The rush to condemn our actions in Grenada by so many
of our European allies is a case in point. What could
have been in the minds of those leaders who authorized
the UN votes or pronounced themselves on the subject?
Even making allowance--especially in the case of Britain--
for totally inadequate consultation, and whatever their
view of the wisdom or necessity of our actions, they
could hardly have wanted us to fail. That would surely
have affected our willingness to run risks in defense

16

of other areas--ultimately including even Europe. Rather, they must have assumed that their actions were irrelevant and costless: that we would not be deterred, that we would exact no penalty, and that therefore it was safe to use the incident to score a few points with "progressive" constituencies at home and with Third World radicals abroad. Needless to say this attitude was deeply resented in the United States.

The change in the nature of European leadership has been paralleled in the United States. Our new elites do not reject NATO any more than do their European counterparts. But for them, too, the alliance is more a practical than an emotional necessity.

On both sides of the Atlantic, we thus find ourselves threatened by the dominance of considerations of domestic politics over global political strategy. In Europe this leads to a faintly disguised neutralism. In the United States it accelerates our already strong tendency

17

U.S. leaders have too often adjusted foreign policies to political pressures, bureaucratic infighting, or changing intellectual fashions. The history of the American attitude toward intermediate range missiles in Europe is a case in point. These were proposed to the Europeans in 1958, installed in Italy and Turkey in 1960 and withdrawn in 1962. They then reappeared in 1963 as part of a so-called NATO multilateral force, and were abandoned once again in 1965. They were put before NATO for the third time in 1978 and then embodied in the current "double track" decision in 1979. Not surprisingly, those Europeans organizing to stop the current deployment are encouraged by their knowledge that previous American decisions have not proved immutable.

18

to its rejection, and then to the fact that we are
observing a treaty we refuse to ratify, from a strategic
doctrine of massive retaliation to flexible response,
from a policy of detente to a policy of confrontation
and back again to a policy of conciliation--all in addition
to the reassessments that in the past decade have occurred
automatically whenever a new administration comes into
office. Each change of course leaves victims among
European leaders who have staked their domestic positions
on policies which the United States later abandons.
Each lurch encourages a kind of neutralism, as Europeans
seek to avoid being made hostage to sudden swings in
American policy.

19

new vitality to NATO. In my view this must have three
components: (a) a more significant role for Europe
within NATO, (b) a reform of the NATO organization and
(c) a reassessment of current NATO deployment.

## A New Role for Europe

20

give less emphasis to transatlantic relations.

In the field of defense, by contrast, increased European
responsibility and unity would promote closer cooperation
with the United States. A Europe analyzing its security
needs in a responsible manner would be bound to find
association with the United States advantageous. Greater
European unity in defense would also help to overcome
the looming logistical nightmare in which every European
nation seeks to stretch its already inadequate defense
effort across the whole panoply of modern weapons. For
example, there are five kinds of battle tanks within
NATO, different types of artillery and different standards

21

Rather the present allocation of responsibilities makes no sense. It fails to bring the allies to reflect naturally about the nature of security and the purposes of Allied diplomacy. Neither side of the Atlantic has by itself sufficient incentive for a long-range objective study of the real choices posed by the new situation. Everyone has been afraid to take the initiative in changing it

22

lest doing so unravel the whole enterprise. But since
drift will surely lead to unraveling--if more
imperceptibly --statesmanship impels a new approach.

Structural Reform

To be sure, structural reform cannot substitute
for a sense of purpose and clear doctrine. All reorganization
can do is to provide an incentive for shared political
purposes. That incentive in my view exists only if
European judgments on security and East-West diplomacy
(and other matters) emerge from Europe's own analysis,
rather than as acquiescence in American decisions, briefings,
and pressures.

Specifically:

23

Soviet Union, which moreover has to divide its forces
on two fronts.

2. To reflect the new responsibilities, a European officer should by then take the traditionally American place as "Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe" (SACEUR), probably with a U.S. deputy. Such a change is also likely to give a new perspective to Allied strategic planning. The United States has generally achieved its military successes by the weight of equipment which our superior industrial potential made available. This has tempted our military leaders to equate strategy with logistics. European nations have rarely enjoyed such a margin of material superiority; they have had to rely on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics--precisely what NATO needs in an age of nuclear parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

24

3. Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary General--the official responsible for running the political machinery of NATO--has been European. In the new structure it would make more sense for the Secretary General to be American--whenever the new Secretary General, Lord Carrington, decides to retire. This would reflect the new emphasis on political coordination on both sides of the Atlantic. In the meantime, there is no Western leader better qualified for guiding NATO's transition than the wise and able new Secretary General.

4. Europe should take over those arms control negotiations that directly affect its security. The INF negotiations with the Soviets (dealing with intermediate range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (dealing with ground forces) have heretofore been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a European chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly

European, delegation.

The structure I propose would create an incentive
for Europeans on their own initiative and on their own
terms to confront a whole series of issues that have
been evaded for at least two decades: the precise definition
of conventional defense; the nature of the so-called
nuclear threshold--the point where this is no choice
except conventional defeat or nuclear escalation; the
relationship between strategy and arms control. Under
a European SACEUR the temptation of European leaders
to justify sacrifices as a response to American pressure
will be reduced. Since nuclear weapons would presumably
be used only if conventional defense fails, Europe would
bear the responsibility for setting the nuclear threshold
by its own efforts; it could relieve its nuclear anxieties
by the simple expedient of increasing its conventional
defenses. And if it did not, increased reliance on

26

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR
and INF negotiations would place the final responsibility
for both conventional force levels and the intermediate
range missile deployment with the leaders whose countries
will have to bear the brunt--for good or ill--of the
outcome of these negotiations. That is particularly
true with respect to the stationing of American intermediate
range missiles in Europe. That move makes sense only
if it is perceived as linking the nuclear defenses of
Europe and the United States; if in other words it is
believed that they help deter a Soviet conventional
attack by increasing the prospect of a nuclear blow
from Europe on Soviet territory. If our principal allies
do not share this conviction--if they indulge the absurd
suspicion that American missiles capable of reaching

27

the Soviet Union are a subterfuge to confine such a
war to Europe or if they agree to these missiles only
as a price paid for our general commitment to European
defense, then sooner or later the psychological basis
for the current deployment will evaporate.

European chairmanship of the INF negotiations
would oblige European leaders to face the issue head-
on: they could abandon the missiles through negotiation;
if they did not--as they should not--their domestic
critics would no longer be able to argue--as they do
now--that American intransigence is the principal obstacle
to arms control. As for the United States it would
of course participate in these deliberations--in a less
dominant position--through its continued membership
in the integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear
defense, and its ground, naval and air force in Europe.

28

Redployment

Nothing touches raw European nerves like the slightest
hint of altering the present American deployment in
Europe. But it is a central issue in the Alliance relationship.
Before dealing with it in the context of this program
of NATO reform, a few recognized facts must be noted:

29

political, not military, criteria: it was intended to be large enough to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation and to leave no doubt in the Soviet mind that this would be the consequence of even a conventional war. And the European conventional forces in turn were originally designed as a trip wire. From the birth of NATO a full conventional defense has been neither part of its strategy nor of its efforts.

B. This situation became anomalous when the huge growth of Soviet strategic forces brought about parity and deprived general nuclear war of credibility. Yet NATO deployment has not fundamentally changed even when NATO doctrine was changed to flexible response. NATO has improved its conventional defenses without closing the gap in conventional forces. As the current NATO commander has made clear recently, NATO is still unprepared to withstand a major Soviet ground attack for more than

30

a few days, even counting the five American divisions
which have remained in Europe for a generation. European
ambivalence continues thirty-five years after NATO's
creation. Our allies remain unwilling to develop forces
strong enough to provide an ultimate alternative to
the American nuclear deterrent (while much of their
public opinion shies away from even thinking about
the concept of nuclear deterrence.)

C. Were we to start all over again, we would therefore
in today's circumstances.
hardly repeat the decision of the Fifties, Were a group
of wise men on both sides of the Atlantic to plan a
global strategy unconstrained by the past it would almost
surely conclude that the sensible division of responsibilities
would be for Europe, possessing economic resources and
manpower exceeding those of the Soviet Union, to concentrate
on the conventional defense of their continent. To
maintain the global balance of power--as essential for
Europe as for America--the United States would emphasize

31

Such a division of responsibility would also enable our
military establishment to shift some of its intellectual
energies and scientific research from a hypothetical
esoteric war in an area where we have major allies to
the defense of regions where conflict is much more likely,
our allies are less prone to see their interests as
ours, and the countries being threatened are in a worse
position to assist in the defense effort.

In such a rearrangement we would maintain our present
European deployment if and only if these precise numbers
made the difference that enabled Europe to have a truly
adequate conventional defense against any foreseeable
level of Soviet aggression.

32

Even in the hypothetical case of starting all over again, an irrefutable case would exist for maintaining _some_ considerable American ground forces in Europe.

This would be essential to keep our allies from feeling abandoned and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the defense or Europe no longer reflects a vital

33

Why then is such a division of responsibilities
not realized? Why not a group of wise men to tell
us what is right? The principal obstacle is psychological.
For all their criticisms of American policy, Europeans
dread a return to isolationism. Americans fear that
any tinkering with deployment will drive Europe into
explicit neutralism. The question remains whether a
deployment that is losing any rationale arrests or accelerates
these attitudes. In my view, it will accelerate them.
After all pacifism and neutralism are on the march in
Europe even under the present set-up; isolationism
in America is not yet so vocal but is being powerfully
provoked by endless Allied disputes. An Alliance that
cannot agree on strategic doctrine and arms control
positions; an Alliance rent by increasingly frequent
controversies over East-West and North-South relations
cannot sustain itself by rigidly clinging to military

34

arrangements decided a generation ago in totally different
circumstances. Sooner rather than later the issue will
be unavoidable. If it arises not as an integral part
in an over-all design of modernizing the Alliance, but
as a single question of whether to continue stationing
American troops in Europe, unilateral changes will be
arbitrarily imposed by the potentially most destructive
means--the American budgetary process. Then indeed
we might see in America a psychological wrench away
from Europe and a panicky resentment in Europe against
the United States. Withdrawal without a positive political
and strategic purpose, withdrawal for its own sake,
might indeed shock our allies into neutralism; it could
mislead our adversary and tempt aggression. It is precisely
my conviction that current trends make this outcome
nearly inevitable, that has impelled me to write this article.

35

There is an urgent need for a serious, frank and
rapid reexamination of NATO doctrine as an integral
part of a comprehensive redesign of the NATO structure.
It should be conducted by a high level group known for
its dedication to Western unity. It must learn from
experience and avoid the pedantry that has marked
bureaucratic efforts when mountains of unread memoranda
overwhelmed clear thought and abstract percentage goals
were set which being either irrelevant or unachievable,
magnified the problem. A deadline for completion should
be set--certainly no longer than two years. That study
cannot draw meaningful conclusions unless there is a
prior agreement on the nature of the threat. If the
outcome should produce clear goals for a full conventional
defense, expressed in unambiguous yearly obligations
and if it should conclude that the present American
deployment is an indispensable component, we would have

36

no reason to alter it and a basis for defending it against
the inevitable critics.

But the political realities of European domestic
priorities make such a conclusion unlikely. Europe
is likely to opt for a low-confidence defense, relying
ultimately on the nuclear deterrent and it will justify
its view by downgrading the Soviet threat. In that
case a gradual withdrawal of a substantial portion (perhaps
up to half) of our present ground forces would become
inevitable. To provide time for necessary adjustments
that withdrawal should be gradual over a period of five
years and should not exceed more than half of the existing
units. It would leave intact the air and naval forces
as well as the deployment of intermediate range missiles.
A useful byproduct of the process would be a systematic
reevaluation of the existing highly miscellaneous inventory
of the very short-range tactical nuclear weapons--a

37

legacy of three decades of ad hoc decisions--which now represent both an increment to deterrence and the greatest danger of unintended nuclear war. Ideally, the levels of redeployment would not be unilateral decisions but emerge from the study proposed earlier.

In this scheme withdrawal would be not an end in itself--as it will if frustrations on both sides of the Atlantic go much further--but one component of a process that commits the United States for the indefinite future to a rational, hence sustainable, global strategy. To ease the transition we could, if Europe agreed, keep the excess ground forces in Europe for an interim period in a new status analogous to that of the French forces, prepared for use in Europe in support of European defense but also available for use in emergencies outside of Europe. At the same time we would commit ourselves to maintain all of the remaining forces under the NATO

38

command indefinitely.

## Political Objectives

A. Those leaders on either side of the Atlantic who, with all its failings, value the Alliance as the ultimate guardian of Western freedom, must seek urgently to end the political disputes over East-West relations and North-South policy. The tendency to grandstand before domestic audiences, the growing self-righteousness will in time undermine even the security element of substance. Defense requires after all some *common* political purpose in the name of which it is conducted--

39

B. The United States can not lead the Western alliance or even contribute to its cohesion if we do not restore bipartisanship to our foreign policy. Ever since the Vietnam war shattered our bipartisan unity in foreign policy we have disquieted our friends and confused, where we have not emboldened, our adversaries by periodic wide swings in the essential elements of our policies. We must accept the proposition that the national interest does not change every four or eight years. At some point the national interest must be accepted by our public as clearly recognizable and constant. Otherwise, we shall become a source of dangerous instability, still relevant for our power but irrelevant for our ideas. A Presidential election year is probably not an ideal time to forge a bipartisan consensus. But whoever wins the Presidential election faces no more

40

C. European governments must meet head-on the disturbing trends toward pacifism and neutralism in their countries. These movements are led by men of conviction; they cannot be defused by accommodation. They can only be resisted with a compelling vision of a new future and not by insisting on the momentum of existing institutions, alternating with assaults on the transatlantic partner. If European governments feel obliged to defend what are perceived as largely American decisions; if they continue to humor the apostles of a bellicose America allegedly in need of their balancing ministrations, they will sooner or later be engulfed by a wave of abdication; they will make concession after concession, progressively becoming hostages of their critics. If they are either unable or unwilling to

41

do so, the Western will will gradually wither.

## Conclusion

I have given long and careful thought to whether it is appropriate for a former Secretary of State to put forward such far-reaching proposals for the alliance.

In the end--appalled by the tone and nature of the transatlantic controversy--I came to the view that it would be better if the initiative were taken by a son of Europe clearly and deeply committed to Western unity rather than letting it pass by default to the neutralists, pacifists and neo-isolationists who systematically seek to undermine all joint efforts.

The current condition cries out for a rethinking of the Alliance. Our only choice is whether we bring it about through creative leadership or whether we are driven to it in response to a series of crises and defeats.

On this will depend whether the Alliance is revitalized

42

or withered. It seems to me far better to launch now
on a positive basis a debate which will become inevitable
as the decade proceeds.

I have outlined proposals to reinvigorate allied
cohesion by defining a clear set of responsibilities
for each side of the Atlantic. On that basis European
leaders could defend cooperation with the United States
as something they sought as a matter of their own
conviction and in their nation's interest. American
leaders would have a rational, understandable policy
to defend and they would benefit from dealing with a
more equal partner. If the new arrangements are developed
gradually and with sensitivity, mutual confidence can
grow with each step. A new era of allied creativity
and American dedication could give inspiration to a
new generation that has come to maturity since World
War II, and since the postwar crises that gave birth

43

1/24/94

TIME ARTICLE

In recent months it has become obvious that the Atlantic Alliance is going through one of its periodic crises. In itself that is not unusual. Transatlantic disputes have occurred in nearly every Administration--with the possible exception of that of President Ford--for a generation. There is however, this unprecedented aspect to the current malaise: Its essence is not a dispute between governments but a growing estrangement of peoples and attitudes on the two sides of the Atlantic. The governments in fact hold more compatible views than has been the case in a long time. The day-to-day business is being conducted in an efficient manner and without visible signs of friction. American missiles are being deployed despite large protest demonstrations.

Yet beneath the surface, tensions are building; there is less intellectual or philosophical agreement than at any previous period, A vocal and well organized "peace" movement in Europe pulls governments in the general direction of its policies even

2

while these governments privately disagree with the premises.

European leaders--especially in the Federal Republic, Scandinavia and the Low countries and lately even in Great Britain to a more limited extent--have felt obliged to demonstrate their peaceful intentions and been tempted to do this by pretending that they are moderating a bellicose and insensitive United States. Europe is confused about the function of American intermediate range weapons; it disagrees with what it chooses to consider the confrontational style of the Administration--a preconception, which recent changes of our tone have not yet altered; and it has missed few opportunities to dissociate from the American approach to the developing countries which is being criticized for its alleged obsession with the Soviet menace. An Alliance cannot survive indefinitely without some agreement on political aims; military arrangements cannot provide its only bond--especially when there is disagreement as well about the

nature of the threat. That is the issue before the Atlantic
Alliance today.

Four particular problems are gnawing at the Atlantic
Alliance.

The lack of an agreed strategy. The gap between formal
NATO strategy and what the public will support is becoming
dangerous. Official NATO doctrine remains the so-called
flexible response devised in the '60s which beginning with
conventional weapons requires going up the ladder of nuclear
escalation until Soviet aggression is halted. Since existing
and projected conventional forces are clearly inadequate
to repel a major Soviet conventional attack, strategic reality
makes the use of nuclear weapons in the defense of Europe
inevitable. But public opinion is moving powerfully against
nuclear weapons, essentially unopposed by governments. The
Alliance is thus left with a precarious and anomalous combination
of (a) reliance on nuclear weapons, (b) conditions of strategic

parity which deprives nuclear weapons of a rational objective,

(c) growing nuclear pacifism and (d) conventional forces,

which are inadequate in size and further weakened by the

lack of standardization. The absence of a coherent defense

policy produces the paradoxical combination of an Alliance

disarming itself psychologically at the very time it possesses

the most destructive stockpile of weapons the world has

ever seen.

Arms control and Intermediate Range Weapons. When

the first American intermediate range missiles arrived in

Europe a few weeks ago many in the Alliance celebrated a

great success. To be sure, if massive demonstrations and

it would have been a huge defeat. But in the absence of

clarity about their purpose the mere stationing of a small

number of missiles is far from a victory. For the basic

European attitude towards the missiles continues to be

(N)

that of a host toward an unwanted visitor whose invitation
to dinner it would be too embarrassing to withdraw. Some
emminent Europeans see in those weapons a hidden American
design to confine a nuclear war to Europe; others treat
them as one of those inexplicable American fads that upset
the Alliance's equilibrium at periodic intervals. Too few
recognize, and even fewer are willing to admit, that those
weapons link the strategic nuclear defense of Europe and
the United States. Arms control negotiations are seen as
a way out; they are pressed to provide a framework for withdrawal.
But the absence of an agreed doctrine for defense makes
it excruciatingly difficult to measure progress. And the
nearly desperate eagerness with which that progress is pursued
militates against success. The Soviets have refused even
to discuss any proposal that would balance American intermediate
range missiles in Europe against the comparable Soviet arsenal.
Even while the Soviet goal is transparent: to leave Europe

subject to nuclear blackmail, significant segments of European
opinion blame the United States for the deadlock. This
must sooner or later erode in Europe as well as in the United
States the basis both for coherent arms control and for
the missile deployment.

The Issue of East-West Relations. The division over
strategy and arms control is replicated--indeed caused by--
differences over the attitude towards the Soviet Union.
Too many Europeans are convinced that America is run by
belligerent cowboys who have provoked a Soviet intransigence
that even a recently more conciliatory tone has proved incapable
of moderating. Too many Americans are convinced that such
attitudes coupled with pacifist and neutralist demonstrations
have encouraged the current Soviet political offensive to
manipulate Western public opinion and to exploit the divisions
within the Alliance.

7

The Issue of Relations with the Developing World. Most Europeans are convinced that they have a special opportunity to establish a preferred relationship in the so-called Third World. They see in dissociation from the United States a positive advantage; they consider our attitudes hopelessly blighted by anti-Soviet obsessions. Quite a few Americans treat the European behavior as a free ride on our sacrifices or as an incitement to radical conduct.

These disputes might be beneficial if somewhere along the line they led to some agreement. So far this has not happened; recriminations mount and create opportunities for Soviet diplomacy even during a period of stagnation in the Kremlin leadership. The Politburo obviously is convinced that Western paralysis with respect to nuclear weapons has reached a point where there is no urgency about nuclear arms control; it can wait for a while to harvest Western anxieties. At the same time there may be some concern

in Moscow that we might move to close the gap in conventional
forces; hence the willingness to talk about conventional
arms limits which provide an obstacle to a conventional
build-up. The debate about who is to blame for the East-
West impasse ended at Stockholm with all NATO delegations
that could get an appointment calling on Mr. Gromyko at
the Soviet embassy--less than six months after the shootingdown
of the Korean airliner, a little more than two years after
martial law in Poland. And all the while Soviets arms are
streaming into Third World trouble spots from the Middle
East to the Caribbean. Europe is not moderating America
and America is not stiffening Europe's spine, as the folklore
has it. The debate paralyses each side of the Atlantic.

This state of affairs has gone on for too long to be
ascribed to particular policies or specific errors--on
on either side of the Atlantic. The fact seems to be that
with respect to some issues a community of interests can

no longer be taken for granted, to put it mildly. And where
the common interest is fairly evident as in the defense
field, the existing structure is simply not working adequately.
Existing arrangements are unbalanced; they encourage unilateralism
in America and a kind of de facto neutralism in Europe.

When all major issues are thoroughly dominated by one
country, which chooses weapons and decides deployments,
conducts arms control negotiations, sets the tone for East-
West diplomacy and creates the framework for relations with
the Third World, little incentive remains for a serious
European security or even foreign policy. This imbalance
cannot be made up by "consultation," however meticulous.
For that nostrom which is so frequently invoked can amount
to a veto only if one is willing to face paralysis and if
a veto is not granted, bad feelings are inevitable. In
any event, consultations function in the long run only if
the interlocutor is thought to have an alternative and a

10

capacity for independent action. That will cause each side
to take the other seriously. It avoids the sense of impotence
which results when advice is ignored. If there is no capacity
for autonomous action, there is little incentive for responsibility
on either side. Consultation, thus, too often amounts to
little more than briefings and our allies' agreement reflects
acquiescence for want of an alternative more than real
conviction.

This state of affairs is not new; it has persisted
throughout the postwar period. But the impact of dependence
on another country is cumulative. The sense of impotence
becomes destructive when it turns from a necessity into
a policy choice. Incongruous as it is with Europe's economic
recovery, it breeds a combination of guilty feelings, self-
hatred and a need to vindicate one's independence towards
America on non-central issues--a declaration of independence
verging on neutralism with respect to Third World issues
and some aspects of East-West relations.

The problem has become the more acute because the
generation of leaders who built NATO has virtually disappeared.
The postwar leaders of Europe were more secure than the
present crop; more used to conducting global foreign policies.
Brought up when Europe was still at the center of world
affairs they considered it natural to assume responsibility
for their own foreign policies, and they felt less need
to prove their status either to themselves or to their publics.
The new leaders nurtured in an era when America was
preeminent and sheltered by an Alliance under assault by
much of their public, delegate their security problems to
us; for the rest they seek to position themselves somewhere
between the superpowers--the first step towards psychological
neutralism. Thus the European schizophrenia: a simultaneous
fear that the United States might not be prepared to risk
its population on a nuclear defense of Europe, coupled with
the anxiety that America might drag Europe into an unwanted
conflict by its clumsy handling of Third World issues or

12

East-West relations.

The condemnation of our actions in Grenada by so many of our European allies is a case in point. What could have been in the minds of the leaders who authorized the UN votes or pronounced themselves on the subject, have been thinking? Whatever their view of the wisdom and necessity of our actions and even making allowance, especially in the case of Britain for totally inadequate consultation, they could hardly have wanted us to fail because this would have surely affected our willingness to run risks in defense of other areas-- including ultimately even Europe. They must have assumed that their actions were irrelevant and costless; that we would not be deterred; that we would exact no penalty and that therefore it was safe to use the incident to score a few points with "progressive" constituencies at home and. Third World radicals abroad.

has been paralleled in the United States by a transfer of
power from the Eastern establishment to new elites in the
West and Southwest. They do not reject NATO any more than
do their European colleagues. But for them it is more a
practical reality than an emotional necessity. In short,
we are in danger of a growing provincialism on <u>both</u> sides
of the Atlantic. Where in Europe this involves a slightly
disguised neutralism, in America it accelerates trends towards
unilateralism--the tendency to act without adequate con-
sideration of the intangibles of the views of our allies.
Accustomed for thirty years to getting their way, our leaders
too often have adjusted foreign policies to domestic con-
siderations, bureaucratic infighting, or changing intellectual
fashions. The history of the American attitude towards
intermediate range missiles in Europe is a case in point.
They were proposed to the Europeans in 1958, installed in
Italy and Turkey in 1960 and withdrawn in 1962; they reappeared

abandoned; each lurch encourages a kind of neutralism that
seeks to avoid being made hostage to sudden lurches in American
policy.

Ironically, both European neutralism and American
unilateralism are nourished by the same conviction: that
the Alliance will survive these tendencies. Deep down Europeans
count on being defended by us, and Americans would not change
policies and doctrines so readily were we not convinced
that in the end our allies will have no choice except to
go along. And both in the end will prove to be wrong if
there is not a deliberate and systematic effort to reverse
these trends.

The time has come for the Alliance to return to first
principles. During the entire postwar period it has been
an axiom of American policy that for all the temporary irritation
it might cause us, a strong, united Europe was an essential
component of Atlantic partnership. We have applied that

16

principle with dedication and imagination--in so far as
it depended on American actions--in all areas except security.
With respect to defense the United States has on the whole
been at best indifferent to any Europeanization of the defense
effort--at least after the failure of the European defense
community--apparently on the theory that a militarily unified
Europe might give less emphasis to Atlantic relations.

It is a mistake of potentially historic consequence.
In the economic field, integration was bound to lead to
competition and a degree of discrimination. What defines
a Common Market after all is that its external barriers
are higher than its internal ones. In the field of defense,
by contrast, greater increased European responsibility and
unity would promote closer cooperation with the United States.
It is almost impossible to conceive circumstances in which
a Europe looking after its own security in a rational manner
would not find association with the United States advantageous.

(1)

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Indeed, I would argue that the perpetuation of the current imbalanced relationship is far more likely to accelerate European naturalism.

Moreover, the present fragmentation of Europe makes a coherent defense strategy nearly impossible within the existing framework--especially in the conventional field. There are five battletanks within NATO; different types of artillery and different standards for calculating the rate of consuming ammunition. Any extended conventional battle in Europe would turn into a logistical nightmare.

Structural Reform

Thus the paradox: the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance requires Europe to develop a greater identity and coherence in the field of defense. I am not talking about traditional "burdensharing," of paying more for the existing effort.

I have in mind something more structural--a rational division of labor between the two sides of the Atlantic. My basic

18

reason for proposing this is not that the financial burdens
are unfairly distributed--although they are. Rather the
present allocation of responsibilities makes no sense and
yet it cannot change under present conditions because everyone
is afraid to take the initiative in doing so, lest it unravel
the whole enterprise. The existing structure fails to bring
the allies to reflect naturally and responsibly about the
nature of security and the purposes of Allied diplomacy.
Neither side of the Atlantic has sufficient incentive for
a long-range objective study of the real choices.

To be sure, structural reform cannot substitute for
a sense of purpose and clear doctrine. The NATO allies
should not delude themselves that they will be able to sustain
unity in the field of defense if they continue to drift
apart on the key political issues in the name of which any
common defense will after all have to be conducted.
Shared political purposes will be likelier if European views

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on security and East-West diplomacy (and other matters)
emerge from its own analysis, rather than as a response
to American decisions and pressures. The result may be
a more difficult diplomatic process; it will certainly provide
a more solid foundation for security cooperation and policy
coordination than exists today.

Specifically:

1. By 1990 Europe should assume the major responsibility for the conventional ground defense. There is no reason why a continent with nearly one and one half times the population and twice the GNP of the Soviet Union should not be able to do so.

2. To reflect the new responsibilities, a distinguished European officer should by then replace the traditional American Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in Europe, probably with an American deputy. That would not only reflect the new relationship; it would give a new perspective to Allied strategic planning. In the past, the United States

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has generally achieved military success by attrition; we
wore down our opponents by the weight of equipment which
our superior industrial potential made available. Inevitably
this has tempted our military leaders to equate strategy
with logistics. European nations have rarely enjoyed such
a margin of superiority; their strategy has had to rely
on superior leadership, training, initiative and tactics.
That is precisely the emphasis NATO needs in an age of nuclear
parity and renewed emphasis on conventional defense.

3. Since the beginning of NATO, the Secretary General--
the official responsible for running the political machinery
of NATO and its coordination--has been European. In the
proposed allocation of responsibilities it would make more
sense for the Secretary General to be American--after the
term of the new Secretary General, Lord Carrington, expires
in 1989. This would reflect the new emphasis on political
coordination on both sides of the Atlantic.

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4. As the new arrangement goes into effect, Europe should take over the arms control negotiations that directly affect its security. Until now the INF negotiations with the Soviets (dealing with intermediate range missiles) and the MBFR negotiations (dealing with ground forces) have been conducted by American delegations. Both of these negotiations should be "Europeanized" as quickly as possible, with a European Chairman, an American deputy and a mixed, though predominantly European, delegation.

The structure I propose would create an incentive for Europeans on their own initiative and on their own terms to confront a whole series of issues that have defied resolution for at least two decades: the precise definition of conventional defense; the nature of the nuclear threshold; the relationship between strategy and arms control. Under a European SACEUR the temptation of European leaders to justify sacrifices as a response to American pressure will be reduced. Since

nuclear weapons would presumably be used only if conventional
defense fails, Europe would bear the responsibility for
setting the nuclear threshold by its own choices and its
own efforts; it could relieve its nuclear anxieties by the
simple expedient of increasing its conventional defenses.
And if it did not, increased reliance on American nuclear
deployment would clearly be Europe's own choice.

By the same token, European leadership in the MBFR
and INF negotiations would place the final responsibility
for both conventional force levels and the intermediate
range missile deployment with the leaders whose countries
will have to bear the brunt--for good or bad--of the outcome
of these negotiations. That is particularly true with respect
to the stationing of American intermediate range missiles
in Europe. That move makes sense only if it is perceived
as linking the nuclear defenses of Europe and the United
States; if in other words it is believed that they help

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deter a Soviet conventional attack by raising the prospect
of a nuclear blow from Europe on Soviet territory.

If our principal allies do not share this conviction--if
they indulge the absurd suspicion that American missiles
capable of reaching the Soviet Union confine such a war to
Europe or if they agree to these missiles only as a price
paid for our commitment to European defense, the psychological
basis for the current deployment will evaporate sooner or
later. European chairmanship of the INF negotiations would
oblige European leaders to face the issue head-on: they
could abandon the missiles through negotiation; if they
did not--as they should not--their opponents would no longer
argue that American intransigence is the principal obstacle
to arms control. As for the United States it would of
course participate in these deliberations--albeit in a less
dominant position--through its continued membership in the
integrated command, its responsibility for nuclear defense,

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and the ground and airforces it will continue to maintain
in Europe.

## The Issue of Redeployment

No issue in the Alliance touches raw European nerves
more than any hint regarding an alteration in the present
Americana deployment in Europe. Before dealing with it in
the context of NATO reform it may be appropriate to state
a few undisputed facts:

A. The present NATO deployment of five American divisions
and supporting air and naval forces was decided in the 1950's
when in fact NATO doctrine was massive retaliation--to respond
to aggression with an immediate and overwhelming nuclear
blow against Soviet territory. Since no conventional
defense was envisaged, the American force levels in Europe
reflected political criteria: they were intended to be
large enough to give us no choice about nuclear retaliation
and to leave no doubt in the Soviet mind that this would

25

be the consequence of even a conventional war. Paradoxically
the deployment was arbitrary from a military point of view
and created incentives to keep the overall military
establishment on the Continent below the level required
for conventional defense. NATO did not wish to tempt Soviet
conventional aggression by implying that the level of conflict
would be limited to the non-nuclear field.

B. This anomalous situation has not fundamentally
changed under the existing doctrine of flexible response.
Five American divisions remain in Europe--an area which
is surely not short of manpower or resources to defend itself
against a Soviet Union that must divide its forces on two
major fronts. Even though NATO has improved its conventional
defenses, it has not really closed the gap in conventional
forces; it is still unable to withstand a major Soviet ground
attack for more than a few days. European ambivalence continues
thirty-five years after NATO's creation. Our allies still

want forces strong enough to withstand anything short of
a major Soviet attack but not so powerful as to provide
an ultimate alternative to the American nuclear deterrent
(even while much of their public opinion flees from the
concept of nuclear deterrence)

C. Were we to start all over again we would therefore
hardly repeat the decision of the Fifties. With a Europe
that has recovered economically and possessing adequate
resources of manpower, we would conclude that the sensible
division of responsibilities would be for Europe to concentrate
on the conventional defense of the Continent. Reflecting
our global strategy--in whose success our European allies
should also have a stake--we should concentrate on creating
and maintaining highly mobile power in the conventional
field capable both of backing up Europe and contributing
to the defense against aggression, for example, in the Middle
East, or Asia or the Western Hemisphere.

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In such a consideration we could justify the present
deployment if and _only_ if these precise numbers made the
difference between a truly adequate conventional defense
against any foreseeable level of Soviet aggression. Of
course, there would remain an overwhelming case to maintain
<u>some</u> American divisions in Europe both to reassure our allies
and to eliminate any Soviet misunderstanding that the defense
of Europe no longer reflects a vital American interest.
We would also at least maintain and probably strengthen
the existing levels of landbased airpower on the Continent.
We would continue to make ourselves responsible for both
strategic and tactical nuclear defense, assuming that we
and the Europeans could agree on a strategy for the latter.
American intermediate range missiles would remain in Europe
to "couple" the nuclear defenses of both sides of the Atlantic
so long as European leaders desire them.

We would be reinforced in our view of the ideal solution

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by the realization that an American overemphasis on a European
ground mission not only is wasteful of limited resources
from a global point of view; it also skews the thinking
of our military establishment. It causes us to concentrate
intellectual energeis on an esoteric war of complicated
equipment in an area where allies could assume the major
responsibility at the expense of building the highly mobile,
perhaps simpler forces needed for the defense of regions
where conflict is much more probable and other countries
are in a much worse position to contribute.

The principal obstacle to what I have described as
the "ideal" solution from the point of view of global
strategy is psychological. Americans fear that any tinkering
with deployment will drive Europe over the precipice into
explicit neutralism. Europeans, for all the criticisms
of America policy, dread a return to isolationism. But
it is also true that pacifism and neutralism are on the