De-Bunking the Myth

The Coup Against Allende and Events to September 11, 1973

Kristian C. Gustafson

A regime, an established order, is rarely overthrown by a revolutionary movement; usually a regime collapses of its own weakness and corruption and then a revolutionary movement enters among the ruins and takes over the powers that have become vacant.

--Walter Lippmann to Charles de Gaulle

When Allende's government was overthrown on September 11, 1973, there was widespread belief that the Americans had been the crucial ingredient, and perhaps the actual instigators, of the coup. Authors such as William Robinson in his book *Promoting Polyarchy* and co-authors James Petras and Morris H. Morley in their book *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government* espouse the belief that the U.S. "guided Pinochet and his cohorts in their takeover" or were responsible for "orchestrating the 1973 overthrow."¹ Many other authors contend that the U.S. 'destabilised' the Chilean government through an 'invisible blockade' which made the coup inevitable.² Very little has been done by the U.S. government to attempt to dispel this belief, which is still widespread today. Indeed, the main source for these books is the partisan and purposefully ambiguous Church Committee report (*Covert Action in Chile*), from which many authors have taken the few facts known about the 1973 coup and merely insinuated or extrapolated American complicity and responsibility for Allende's ouster. One needs to look no further then Christopher Hitchens' "The Case Against Henry Kissinger II" to see the weakness of the argument. Hitchens uses a quotation of an American Naval Attaché—who stated that "Chile's coup d'état was nearly perfect"—to somehow demonstrate an un-referenced "thesaurus of hard information" proving American involvement in the coup.³ Why was this quotation relevant? Does this observation of the smoothness of the coup somehow prove American complicity? The truth, backed by 'hard information' more solid then an out-of-context observation, points to a less sensational conclusion.

The simple fact is that the U.S. government had no significant input into the coup that killed Allende on September 11, 1973. The uncontrolled disasters of Track I and Track II had forced the Americans into a more circumspect appreciation of their ability to

¹ William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy* (Cambridge, 1996), pp 161-162. See also Robinson, "Capitalist Polyarchy in Latin America" in Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, p. 315. Also: Petras and Morley, *The United States and Chile*, (New York, 1975), p. 82.
² Ibid. See also
³ Hitchens, Part II, March 2001, p. 49.

72

affect affairs in Chile. Moreover, the mistakes of 1970 facilitated a return to the relatively harmonious inter-departmental planning of the NSC, State Department, CIA and embassy staff, which in turn contributed to a more 'hands-off' approach to Allende. Beginning with another presidential directive, the behaviour of the U.S. government towards Chile after November 3, 1970 was less then bloody-minded. American CIA agents, with the full knowledge of their government, supported opposition parties and media outlets, attempted to sow dissent in the UP coalition, and gathered intelligence from the military. For its part, the U.S. government refused to extend further credit to a bankrupt Chilean government that had already defaulted on most of its loans. From Allende's election to his ouster in 1973, no branch of the U.S. government engaged in coup plotting with the Chilean armed forces or any other domestic political body. Not only were the Americans not involved in the coup, but they also so studiously avoided the appearance of promoting one that they failed, due to the subsequent lack of contacts with the military, to accurately predict its occurrence. Likewise, they were not clear on the nature of the new military government, nor had they had any contact with Augusto Pinochet, Chilean general and erstwhile Junta president.

The lessons learned from the pre-inauguration period remained in the awareness of the U.S. Government and specifically the CIA throughout the three years of Allende's presidency. The evidence shows that the CIA operated well within the limits of their authority and firmly under the orders of the policy-making branches of the government from November 1970, to September 1973. Furthermore, one sees throughout this period an acknowledgement, by the U.S. government, of the limits of the power they were able to project in Chile and the limited facility they had to even predict coup attempts.

## Debates and Discussions

After Allende's inauguration on November 3, the U.S. government moved quickly to implement a new policy towards Chile. Little time was wasted in taking the NSC discussion paper on Chile—NSSM 97—and adjusting it towards the new situation of a Marxist government in that country. An executive order on October 29 had the NSC revising NSSM 97 in anticipation of a meeting with the President scheduled for November 5, 1970.⁴ There were no major changes to the structure of the document—it still set out four options for American policy towards Chile. The new and improved NSSM 97, however, had changed the options to reflect the fact of an Allende government. The first two options could be reviewed as one, and essentially suggested that the U.S. to maintain an outwardly correct posture while refraining from initiatives that Allende could use to his advantage, while at the same time quietly limiting Allende's freedom of action.⁵ Option 'C' called for the U.S. to act correctly in a diplomatic sense but make clear their opposition to the emergence of a communist government in South

⁴ Memorandum, Theodore Eliot to Kissinger, "NSC Meeting on Chile", 3 November 1970.

⁵ Memorandum, Robert Hurwitch to Secretary of State, "NSC Meeting on Chile", 05 November 1970. It is the State Department's interpretation that options 'A' and 'B' were essentially identical.

73

America and act outwardly to restrain Chilean diplomatic and political freedom.⁶ The last option called for an openly hostile posture towards Chile. In order to appreciate the choice of these options requires one to understand the assessment the U.S. government had made of the Allende regime. The preamble to this options paper outlined their beliefs, and in it they (accurately) predicted the course that the Allende government would follow. Allende's goals, the paper stated, would be: "(a) To bring all significant economic activity under state operation.... (b) to gain control over the security and armed forces; and (c) to dominate public information media."⁷ The initial plan of operations against Chile would be predicated on this estimate of Allende's actions. Overall, NSSM 97 is a remarkably lucid and well-argued assessment of the policy options for Chile and it served as the basis for the Presidential decision that was to follow it on November 5.

The discussion of NSSM 97 in the White House cabinet office was lively and direct. Present were all the major cabinet officers, as well as Kissinger, Vice President Ford and President Nixon. The minutes of this meeting show the definite concern about Chile already broached before Allende's election. It is clear that there was a definite perception of threat to the national security of the U.S. For instance, there is a clear indication from the Vice-President of concern for the Communist-bloc reaction to the American stance in Chile and Latin America as a whole. Vice-President Ford points out that Allende in Chile forced the Americans to move more carefully in the sale of military equipment to, for instance, Argentina, "which could trigger massive support to Chile from the USSR and China."⁸ This, in turn, might destabilize Latin America as a whole. Nixon was concerned about the implications of Allende on American interests in Latin America and the hemisphere in general. He opined that events in Chile, and the decisions being made in that very meeting, were going to be a watershed for American policy in Latin America.

> If Chile moves as we expect and is able to get away with it—our public posture is important here—it gives courage to others who are sitting on the fence in Latin America. Let's not think about what the really democratic countries in Latin America say: the game is in Brazil and Argentina. We could have moves under the surface which bring over time the same thing.⁹

These discussions of the threat to national interest and security led, as during Track II, to discussion of how to bring about Allende's downfall. Examining the options from NSSM 97, Kissinger noted that the four options listed "basically...amounts to two choices: (1) seek a *modus vivendi* with the Allende Government, or (2) adopt a posture of overt and frank hostility."¹⁰ He said that the first choice offered a chance for Allende to consolidate his position and then operate against U.S. interests directly, while the second choice would strengthen Allende's appeal to anti-U.S. nationalism. Kissinger then went on to

⁶ Memorandum, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)", 03 November 1970.

⁷ Memorandum, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)", 03 November 1970.

⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, "NSC Meeting - Chile (NSSM 97)", 6 November 1970.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

74

offer a third 'in-between' option: "adopt what is in fact a hostile posture but not from an overt stance, that is, to move in hostility from a low-key posture."¹¹ Nixon went on, integrating the themes of threat to American interests and the proper course to pursue.

No impression should be permitted in Latin America that they can get away with this, that it's safe to go this way. All over the world it's too much the fashion to kick us around. We are not sensitive but our reactions must be coldly proper. We cannot fail to show our displeasure. We can't put up with 'Give Americans hell but pray they don't go away'...We must be proper on the surface with Allende, but otherwise we will be tough. He is not going to change; only self-interest will affect him.¹²

On November 9, 1970, the instructions of this cabinet discussion were incorporated into National Security Decision Memorandum 93 (NSDM 93) titled "Policy Towards Chile." It ordered that "within the context of a publicly cool and correct posture toward Chile" various courses of action were to be pursued. First was to ensure that the surrounding nations of Latin America were aware of U.S. opposition to a communist state on the continent. Furthermore, the U.S. was to exclude additional financing guarantees to U.S. firms operating in Chile, and to "bring maximum feasible influence to bear in international financial institutions to limit credit ...to Chile."¹³ Additionally, NSDM 93 stressed that no new bilateral aid commitments were to be made with Chile, and those that existed should be delayed or reduced. Nothing is mentioned of any covert action plan to overthrow or assassinate Allende, though there is direction for the various agencies to "consider specific policy issues within the framework of this general posture."¹⁴

The choice of this option was predicated on the belief, as the paper stated: "that (a) while the Allende government will vigorously pursue its Marxist goals, the economic and political difficulties facing it will place significant obstacles in its path...and (b) overt hostile actions initiated by the United States would work to [Allende's] political advantage."¹⁵ Furthermore, as the State Department urged, there needed to be "a realistic assessment of U.S. capability to influence the situation there...U.S. overt and covert capabilities to force the course of events positively in our favour, short of the use of armed force, are marginal at best...and could be seriously counter-productive."¹⁶ This was not an overly aggressive, thoughtless posture, but rather one designed to maximize American input on the fate of their economic assets and political position in the region.

An accurate summation of what the American's believed they could achieve in Chile is made in a subsequent NSC options paper later in the same month. "Although events in Chile will be determined principally by internal Chilean forces and therefore

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ NSDM 93.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Memorandum, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)", 03 November 1970

¹⁶ Memorandum, Hurtwitch to Secretary of State, "NSC Meeting on Chile", 5 November 1970.

75

US influence can have only a marginal effect, the skilful exercise of our influence could be an important factor in complicating Allende's task..."¹⁷ Furthermore, many in the U.S. government did not view the President's choice of option 'C,' and the CIA's subsequent action plan, to be final. "The program appears in general to be well-conceived," noted Charles Meyer, "but raises certain questions that should be kept under continuing review. The effect of in inter-action between the various elements of the proposed program is particularly important."¹⁸ Unlike the period of Track II, the tone was set for meaningful inter-agency cooperation on Chile.

## A New Mandate

Before dealing with the development of the CIA's operations plans in Chile, it is helpful to first analyse the State Department's role as outlined in NSDM 93, namely that of financial action against Allende's government. With NSDM 93, the U.S. government had decided to throw its economic weight against Allende. There has been much made of this fact and the U.S. has been fiercely attacked for this economic policy, commonly viewed as economic imperialism.¹⁹ Regardless, not every aspect of the American economic policy towards Allende was aimed at his ouster. The reason for this is clear: the Americans maintained large economic interests in Chile and sought favourable concessions out of the UP government for their protection. As far as the State Department was concerned, the best US-Chilean relations were not predatory, but rather ones that saw the UP-government remaining within the strictures of international financial and banking law. A cable from the Santiago Embassy to the State Department with regard to debt payments (named after the chief US negotiator) outlines this belief.

> We should not assume that Allende's realization of his dependence on the West means that there is no limit to our ability to push GOC toward more reasonable and forthcoming positions...Our pressures for concessions will be effective only as long as GOC believes there is a chance for at least marginally beneficial relations with USG. Fact we have not closed off that hope and have kept relations in low key correctness probably contributed to decision to pay Braden instalment.²⁰

Very little needs to be written here about the economic 'destabilization' of the Allende government, as this subject has been adequately covered in several articles on the subject of U.S. economic pressure.²¹ Likewise, there has been extensive testimony by both the World Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as other private banks, to various U.S. legislative bodies about American economic

¹⁷ Memorandum, "Options Paper for NSC: Chile", 31 November 1970.

¹⁸ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Ambassador Johnson, "Covert Action Program for Chile", 18 November 1970.

¹⁹ Kolko, p. 217.

²⁰ Cable, Santiago to Secretary of State (00953), 28 February 1972.

²¹ See Ann Helwege "Three Socialist Experiences in Latin America: Surviving U.S. Economic Pressure" in *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1989. See also: Morris Morley and Steven Smith "Imperial Reach: U.S. Policy and the CIA in Chile" in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 105, 1990.

76

‘destabilization’ in Chile.²² The Church Committee report, for its part, alleges that the collapse of the Chilean economy was caused entirely by U.S. government.²³

The basic question is this: what had a greater effect, U.S. government policy or Chile's credit rating? Many of the major banks continued their credits to Chile until that country declared a unilateral moratorium on debt payments at the end of 1971.²⁴ Furthermore, many banks cut off service to Chile after that state nationalized their Chilean branches without compensation. To make matters worse for Chile, the price of copper dropped by 23% in 1971 affecting the ability to import goods, while at the same time domestic food production dropped necessitating increased imports of foodstuffs.²⁵ Where American credit dried up, however, Allende's Chile actually received more credits from Latin America, Australia, Canada, Japan, Europe and the Eastern block. Indeed, by 1973 Chile had more available credits, with $574 million, then when Allende came to power ($310 million).²⁶ The UP was discouraged to find, however, that much of this credit was tied to purchases in the creditor countries, and unfortunately there was no economically viable substitute for U.S. machinery, replacement parts and technology. Much of the credits from the Eastern Block subsequently went unused.²⁷ Furthermore, many of the European creditors, like the U.S., withdrew their credits once the UP government set out to nationalize their Chilean business ventures.²⁸

Simply, there is nothing in the U.S. economic behaviour affecting Chile that was not covered by American law. The U.S. 'Hickenlooper Amendment' stipulates that any state that nationalizes American property without a fair process of compensation is no longer eligible for US government aid. Even under the presidency of Juan Velasco Alvarado of Peru the amendment was invoked, though the State Department softened the blow in favour of this pro-American 'reformist' government.²⁹ Chile, on the other hand, not only expropriated American assets without compensation but also based their entire campaign on the deconstruction of foreign investment in Chile. Allende himself wrote: "The central objective of the UP is to replace the present economic structure and to end the power of monopoly capitalism...in order to begin the construction of socialism."³⁰ As taxing as the Chilean debt payment schedule was, the decision to stop repayments could only have served to assure the reduction of Chile's private-sector credit rating. As one set of authors has stated: "Surely, the UP, given its ideology, could not have been surprised that the Nixon administration was determined to use its economic strength to

²² World Bank, "Chile and The World Bank" in *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. XXX, No. 2, 1976. See also IBRD "Notes Relating to Chile's Creditworthiness during the Administration of Presidents Allende and Pinochet", in *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, 1977. These are published versions of text submitted to separate hearings of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance.

²³ *Covert Action in Chile*, p. 29.

²⁴ Helwege, p. 220.

²⁵ Goldberg, p. 109.

²⁶ Nogee and Sloan, p. 349.

²⁷ *The United States and Chile* (Testimony of Crimmins), p. 69.

²⁸ Davis, pp. 125-127.

²⁹ Lineberry, p. 193.

³⁰ Allende, p. 37.

77

cut off bilateral and multilateral aid."³¹ One is presented with a question that cuts to the core of the modern world economic system. Can the U.S. be criticised for not continuing loans to a nation that not only defaulted on existing loans, but also actively and publicly opposed American involvement in their economy? Ultimately, it may not have mattered. One particularly detailed account of Allende's economic policies, by economist Ann Helwege, came to the following conclusion:

> ...the economic roots of Allende's problems also lay in the impossibility of a general increase in consumption without sustained copper earnings and commercial lending. Given the inherent instability of Allende's economic agenda, [American] sanctions added an important destabilizing element. Intervention through CIA covert operations, which hurt US relations elsewhere in Latin America, was probably unnecessary to secure Allende's demise.³²

Though the final sentence overestimates the U.S. complicity in the coup, the point is an important one in light of the popular perception of American efforts. Indeed, Helwege even overstates the level of American sanctions, for the U.S. continued, through 1970-1973, to disburse bilateral loans already agreed upon, and U.S. private banks even continued to extend some credit to Chile.³³ Likewise, the U.S. never imposed an embargo of spare parts or equipment to Chile, and never prevented the shipping companies from carrying them.³⁴ The simple fact is that under the Allende government the economic situation deteriorated so dramatically that no Chilean company (of which there were fewer and fewer as Allende nationalized) could afford further loans to finance imports. As Mark Falcoff stated, the Chilean economy was so linked to that of the U.S. that the withdrawal of support on any level was bound to have a significant impact. Having failed to prevent the triumph of Marxism in Chile at the cost of billions in aid and lost U.S. investments, there is little reason to justify why the U.S. "should have ratified its error by throwing good money after bad."³⁵

Given this information on U.S. government and private lending, some commentators have pointed out continued U.S. military aid to the Chilean military throughout Allende's presidency as a violation by the U.S. of their own policies.³⁶ Likewise, it is possible to assert that the continuation of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) was a policy meant to promote military intervention by the Chilean Armed Forces.³⁷ A review of the cable and memorandum traffic about MAP casts some doubt on these assertions.

³¹ Nogee and Sloan, p. 348.

³² Helwege, p. 222.

³³ Vicuña, ed., *The Balanced View*, pp. 142-145. This is a table of IMF, IDB, and IBRD loans and decisions concerning Chile from 1971 through to 1974.

³⁴ Falcoff, p. 229.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 240.

³⁶ Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende" in Vicuña, ed., *The Balanced View*, p. 118. This summarises the criticism of U.S. military aid to Chile.

³⁷ *Covert Action in Chile*, pp. 41-42.

78

MAP was one of the first topics broached by the Nixon administration subsequent to Allende's victory at the polls. In the initial frenzy after Allende's plurality, it was tentatively decided to cancel MAP to Chile in order to prompt the Chilean Army to act against Allende. ³⁸ For the very reason of the transparency of this move, it was decided that "such action by the U.S....would probably become known publicly and interpreted by many both in and out of Chile as overt U.S. pressure upon the Chilean military to take the political situation into their own hands,"³⁹ and the decision was consequently reversed. But the public image was only part of the problem. Politically, the U.S. was dealing with a Marxist government, but the military, the branch of the Chilean government that could pose a threat to American national security, was still anti-communist and American-oriented. Accordingly: "the elimination of grant military aid, the low limits of MAP sales and the slashing of training funds...could only lead to the elimination of meaningful U.S. influence on the military."⁴⁰ Likewise, Viron Vaky wrote to Kissinger asking him to continue MAP, for "if we continue to suspend military aid it will appear we are punishing the military which is the last group in Chile we ought to punish."⁴¹ At the urging of the relatively dovish Ambassador Korry, it was decided to maintain MAP and associated military aid regardless of Allende's inauguration. After the Schneider assassination, however, the Ambassador was ordered to hold off telling the Chilean army about the restoration of MAP, as "it could be construed as [a] bonus for a job well done."⁴² The U.S. remained very aware of the 'optics' of arms sales to a country where American interests were so publicly challenged.

The change in U.S. posture after the inauguration inevitably affected MAP and FMS. On November 6, during the NSDM 93 planning process, the Santiago station urged CIA HQ to support continued MAP sales and training. The cable stated:

> Now more than ever, [the] Chilean army needs [the] friendly open hand of U.S.. The Army has U.S. equipment and doctrine. Supply system U.S. oriented. [the Chilean] Army now feels it is alone without friends except for U.S....If U.S. turns its back, Chilean Army will be 'forced' to look elsewhere which it does not want to do.⁴³

The U.S. government seems to have followed this advice. Adhering to NSDM-93, the U.S. would continue to maintain the pre-election status of the US Military Group (milgroup) of advisors in Chile, would continue MAP, and would not raise the topic of military support with the Allende government unless they did. Furthermore, it was decided that the sale of tanks, air transports and fighter jets to Chile would be delayed as long as possible but that no announcement would be made that these items would be embargoed.⁴⁴ This was a cautious first step in continued military support.

³⁸ Cable, Kissinger and Johnson to Ambassador Korry, "Highest Levels Here", 07 October 1970.

³⁹ Memorandum, Johnson and Meyer to Korry, 23 September 1970.

⁴⁰ Cable, Korry to Under Secretary Johnson, 16 September 1970.

⁴¹ Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, "Chile", 18 October 1970.

⁴² Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Strongly Urge that U.S.G", 22 October 1970.

⁴³ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "There is more confidence", 06 November 1970.

⁴⁴ Cable, Secretary of State to US Embassy Santiago, "MilGroup and Military Equipment for Chile", 03 December 1970.

79

Over the course of the subsequent three years, the U.S. extended over $30 million in credits for the purchase of military equipment, including $5 million in 1971, $10 million in 1972 and $12.4 million in 1973.⁴⁵ These credits were furnished after “agreement in principle with the GOC on the terms of the rescheduling of the amounts due...” and were integrated into the U.S. debt negotiations with Chile.⁴⁶ An extensive ‘action memorandum’ of February 1973 goes to some length to justify these FMS credits to Chile:

> The current Chilean Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs have so far successfully maintained the Chilean military's crucial non-partisan stance and its resistance to the governing leftist coalition's efforts to shift their source of military supplies and doctrinal orientation away from the U.S. The Chilean military leaders have resisted offers of Soviet military credits—reportedly up to $300 million...—and other forms of assistance including training....⁴⁷

When reviewing the course of MAP in Chile, one sees not an attempt by the U.S. to use MAP as a tool to provoke a coup, but rather as a delicate programme which might keep the Chilean military from becoming a Soviet client. For the latter to happen would mean an intolerable Soviet encroachment into the American sphere and so pose a direct threat to American national security in the hemisphere.

## The CIA in Action

With a new mandate from NSDM 93, the CIA set about, in early November of 1970, to produce a covert action plan for implementation in Chile. By November 17, the CIA had submitted for approval its 'covert action program for Chile'. Keyed to NSDM 93, the program was "directed at the Allende government, the Chilean Armed Forces, the non-Marxist opposition, the Chilean public....in an effort to maximize pressure on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and to limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests."⁴⁸ The first aspect of the programme described by the document is to take "political action to divide and weaken the Allende coalition....to create splits within and between coalition parties."⁴⁹ Also detailed in the document is the plan to provide financial support to the opposition parties, the PDC and the PN. Concurrent with this political party funding was the support for opposition media outlets "which can speak out against the Allende government."⁵⁰ Tucked into the text between these options was the topic 'The Armed Forces.' Though heavily excised,

⁴⁵ Memorandum, "Our Public Response to Congressional Inquiries" [unclassified], 22 Feb 1973. The Church Committee report provides slightly different figures: $5.7 million for 1971; $12.3 million for 1972; and, $15 million for 1973. See *Covert Action in Chile*, p. 39.

⁴⁶ Memorandum, "Our Public Response to Congressional Inquiries" [unclassified], 22 Feb 1973.

⁴⁷ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Curtis Tarr, "FMS Credits for Chile", 22 February 1973.

⁴⁸ Memorandum, "Covert Action Program for Chile", 17 November 1970.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

80

the first paragraph of the section does not call for the assassination or a coup against Allende. Simply, it states that "we are maintaining and where possible enlarging our contacts in the military" and that "we continue to provide intelligence [to key military officials] such as the background of the Cuban intelligence personnel who are arriving in Chile...."⁵¹ The role stated here is that of intelligence gathering and dissemination.

The CIA country-team still sought, perhaps due to residual impressions from the Track II period, to produce a coup in Chile. This was not in the plan for the post-inauguration period, however, and this is made clear in a series of cables exchanged in November of 1971. A cable of November 12, discusses the CIA Chief-of-Station's plans to gather intelligence on coup plotting within Chile. The three pages of the memo discuss the mechanics of making relations with coup plotters, learning of their plans, and perhaps influencing them by giving advice or suggesting techniques they had not considered. While the COS states that the CIA should not lead or participate in any of these coups, he concludes that the CIA's mission was to "work consciously and deliberately in the direction of a coup" with fresh contacts in the Chilean military.⁵²

The Chief of the Western Hemisphere division of the CIA responded to this cable with absolute clarity: "We cannot accept your conclusion.... nor can we authorize you to 'talk frankly about the mechanics of a coup' with key commanders, because the implications of that amount to the same." Clearly, the COS had overestimated the belligerency of the USG in its posture towards Allende. The Chief of Western Hemisphere Division set him straight.

> The essential fact which must be kept in mind by all officers connected with the [deleted] program is that we do not have any authority to state, or even to imply, that [USG] favours a coup as a solution to the Chilean dilemma. If and when Station reporting indicates a favorable political atmosphere and a serious military intent to take action against the Allende government, it will become the responsibility of other [USG] authorities to use this intelligence in reaching a policy decision. [deleted. USG?] might or might not at that time request such a decision from [deleted. CIA?]. We just cannot say at this stage or seek advance advice on the basis of hypothesis. Policy does not work that way...in sum, stay with history as it unfolds, don't make it.⁵³

The CIA was going to operate strictly within the bounds of the inter-departmental framework of covert operations, and this quotation puts to rest the Church committee assertion, when referring to these same cables, that the CIA "realised that the US government's desire to be in clandestine contact with military plotters...might well imply U.S. support for their future plans" and continued these contacts regardless.⁵⁴ It is amply clear that the CIA, in active consultation with the other interested branches of

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Cable, Chief of Station Santiago to Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, 12 November 1971.

⁵³ Cable, C/WHD to COS Santiago, 1 December 1971.

⁵⁴ *Covert Action in Chile*, p. 37.

81

government, was expressly staying away from any coup plotting. Responding to a proposal from the Santiago Station in October of 1972, CIA HQ said:

> While HQs prepared consider any specific detailed proposal, even if we believe it has merit would still have to consult with other interested agencies and secure their concurrence. FYI only, our present reading of other agency thinking is that any proposition which smacks of adventurism will be most difficult to sell.⁵⁵

One particular incident in June of 1973 demonstrates that the CIA did not cross the boundary from intelligence gathering to coup plotting, due perhaps to the fractured nature of the conspiring that was ongoing in the Chilean military. By 1973, inflation, breakdown of the UP coalition and massive civic unrest of a strike by truckers and miners markedly increased the anti-Allende sentiment in Chile. The greatest symptom of this tension, as manifested within the military, was an attempted coup by low-level army officers on June 29, 1973. On this day, junior officers led the 2nd Armoured Battalion as it surrounded *La Moneda*, the Presidential palace in the centre of Santiago. The battalion attempted the revolt in the apparent hope that the rest of the military and the police would join. Instead, the bulk of the armed services came to the defence of the government.⁵⁶ Ironically, it was the *Tacnazo* regiment that succeeded, after only three hours, in putting down the rebellion.

There is no evidence that the U.S. had advance knowledge of this failed coup attempt. Indeed, a CIA report of the same day states: "At this time there is no available information to indicate that the attack by the Armoured Regiment on the presidential palace was more than an isolated and uncoordinated effort by that unit."⁵⁷ Another document, designed to answer potential White House questions about CIA involvement in the abortive coup, confirms that the CIA had nothing to do with the events of June 29. The first question, "did the Agency play any role whatever in supporting or encouraging the coup" is answered with a terse "none."⁵⁸ While admitting that the CIA had been in contact with some coup plotters, they affirmed that they were not sure if anyone in the June 29 events was connected with them. Furthermore, the CIA document says that they did nothing to support or encourage the attempted coup, and when their contact asked for help in developing arrest lists or names of potential co-conspirators, the CIA responded by telling the Chilean officer "...that neither the Agency nor the U.S. Government was stimulating, encouraging or favoring a coup and that no information could be given to him."⁵⁹ The UP press accused the US government of sponsoring the attempted coup and went so far as to name Mr. Keith Wheelock as the CIA agent charged with fomenting this anti-Allende action through a Chilean intermediary, Manuel Fuentes, a member of the *Patria y Libertad*. The internal CIA discussion over this accusation discovered the

⁵⁵ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "While HQs Prepared", 23 October 1972.
⁵⁶ Memorandum, "CIA Bulletin", 30 June 1973.
⁵⁷ Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "as of 1040 Hours", 29 June 1973.
⁵⁸ Memorandum, "Questions Which May Be Raised Concerning Chile", 'Circa' July 1973 (listed as 1 July 73 in State Department pages)
⁵⁹ Ibid.

82

following information: "Wheelock left Chile in late 1969. He had contact with Fuentes...and passed him onto another embassy contact...but apparently dropped him as a contact in April 1970 when Fuentes became insistent in asking for USG financial support for anti-Allende purposes."⁶⁰ The U.S. had had nothing to do with the June 29 revolt. In its own review, the CIA concluded that the revolt, "an almost futile gesture of frustration by the action-oriented military officers...was doomed to failure."⁶¹ So confusing was this action to the CIA that their assessment of its implications were that it had fostered a greater degree of unpredictability and instability in an already chaotic environment. The CIA, in this case, did not approve of chaos: it made events tricky to forecast and made the results of their work more difficult to predict.⁶²

If from 1971 onwards it was clear that the CIA were forbidden from actively or tacitly promoting a coup, what activities did they pursue in Chile? The main focus of American activities remained on the two items mentioned in the initial plan of January 9, 1971, namely efforts to support the Chilean opposition and its media, and to encourage dissention in the UP coalition.⁶³ In his memoirs, Kissinger stated: "we agreed with our Democratic predecessors that groups standing for democratic values needed our help against those who openly threatened them."⁶⁴ While perhaps the decision to support these parties was not drafted with such lofty language or unpartisan goals, the intent was similar. Through poor organization and lack of private sector funding (made very difficult due to UP control of banking and their nationalization of many companies), the main centrist and rightist parties were having difficulty mounting an effective opposition to the UP.⁶⁵ Likewise, there was a threat that the UP would use the PDC's leadership review in early 1971 to attempt to gain control of the PDC by supporting the Party's left wing.⁶⁶ The central aim of this CIA effort, however, was "to keep the current political set in Chile from becoming irreversible."⁶⁷ To achieve this aim, the CIA would assist the opposition parties, almost entirely by funding, in order that they might maintain their domination of the Congress, the main obstacle to Allende's goal of a fully Marxist economy and government. At best, they hoped the opposition might achieve a two-thirds majority necessary in the Senate to impeach Allende.⁶⁸ There would be no attempt to rig elections, bribe candidates, or conduct any other 'black' operation to ensure the success of these parties; merely the passage of funds.⁶⁹ Ambassador Korry approved of this limited plan with some reluctance.⁷⁰

⁶⁰ Cable, American Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State, "UP Press ties CIA to Coup Attempt", 12 July 1973.

⁶¹ Memorandum, "Situation Report on Uprising by Military Unit", 25 July 1973.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Following is Covert Action Proposal", 09 January 1971.

⁶⁴ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 377.

⁶⁵ Memorandum, Talking Paper, 07 December 1970. See also Memorandum, "ARA/CIA Meeting 30 May 73", 31 May 1973.

⁶⁶ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Resume of Country Director and INR Comments", 13 December 1970.

⁶⁷ Memorandum, "ARA/CIA Meeting 30 May 73", 31 May 1973.

⁶⁸ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "It is station's View", 08 February 1973.

⁶⁹ Cable, "In Ref Station Forwarded", 09 Jan 1971.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

83

Once the U.S. Government had approved of this policy the CIA set out—after a short period of assuring themselves of the secrecy and security of their plan<sup>71</sup>—to move very large sums of money to the PDC and PN. The first attempt at this programme was made in time for the Chilean municipal elections of April 1971, on the basis that those elections “will be viewed as a plebiscite for the UP.”<sup>72</sup> The 40 Committee, on January 28, 1971, approved $1,240,000 “to cover ongoing administrative support to bolster Party infrastructure.”<sup>73</sup> Additionally, the money was to be used to purchase radio stations and newspapers to assist in publicizing the efforts of the party.<sup>74</sup> Subsequent funds were voted to the PDC and PN for the Congressional elections, by-elections and ad-hoc needs as requested. In total, $2.6 million was spent supporting the Christian Democrats, National Party, and Radical Party splinters. Two thirds of this went to finance opposition campaigns in the 1972 by-elections and the congressional elections of March 1973.<sup>75</sup> Unlike CIA campaign efforts during the presidential election, no one criticised the direct support of non-UP parties.

A further sum, under a separate appropriation, went to subsidise the main opposition paper, *El Mercurio*, Chile's largest and most important newspaper.<sup>76</sup> As the major conservative paper and media crusader against Allende, it was one of his first targets. The initial UP effort took the form of attempted labour disputes to seize editorial control, followed by a forced increase in wages with a freeze on prices.<sup>77</sup> In October 1971, the UP government tried to seize effective control over *Papelera*, the paper and pulp company that had a monopoly over the production of newsprint, in the hope of driving *El Mercurio*'s prices up intolerably. The Americans perceived all of this as a major threat to freedom of the press by forcing the newspaper into UP control.<sup>78</sup> Even then, a discussion paper in the NSC had cast doubt on the wisdom or effectiveness of supporting *El Mercurio*. “I reluctantly conclude that we should go along with this,”<sup>79</sup> argued one NSC functionary. According to the Church Committee Report, a total of $1.7 million was given to *El Mercurio* in order to keep the paper afloat.<sup>80</sup>

Meanwhile, the CIA worked to implement the second aspect of the political action programme: creating dissent within the UP coalition. Noting severe friction between the Communists (PCCh) and Socialists (PS)—the two main parties in the UP— the CIA hoped to “continue programs designed to exacerbate mutual suspicions and frictions between PCCh/PS and PCCh/MIR, including both propaganda as well as

<sup>71</sup> Memorandum, Arnold Nachmanoff to Kissinger, "Proposals for Covert Support of Chilean Opposition", 28 January 1971.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid

<sup>73</sup> Memorandum, for Deputy Director of Plans, "Request for Approval of Project", 12 February 1971.

<sup>74</sup> Davis, p. 21.

<sup>75</sup> *Covert Action in Chile*, p.60

<sup>76</sup> See Jerry W. Knudson, "Allende to Pinochet: Crucible of the Chilean Press 1970-1984," *Studies in Latin American Popular Culture*, Vol 6, 1987, for a review of the history and impact of *El Mercurio*, the world's oldest Spanish language newspaper.

<sup>77</sup> Davis, p. 308.

<sup>78</sup> Memorandum, John Crimmins to the Under Secretary, "Chilean Media under a Marxist Regime", 23 December 1970. See also Faundez, p. 218.

<sup>79</sup> Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, "40 Committee Meeting - Chile", 10 April 1972.

<sup>80</sup> *Covert Action in Chile*, p. 60.

[deleted] attribution pieces...."⁸¹ The CIA hoped that the Radical Party of the left (PIR), then part of the governing UP coalition, might act as a 'dissident element' within the UP and could be used "to heighten tensions within the government coalition."⁸² Though the methods they used to create this split are deleted from the files (as is most information dealing with 'tradecraft'), it is clear that the plan succeeded. In April of 1972 the PIR left the UP coalition to work with the opposition. Though they were only a small party, and the loss of their seats did not adversely affect the power of the UP, it was a definite blow to the morale of the government and some proof to the U.S. that their covert aid was working. Following their split from the UP, the PIR began to receive support funds along the same model as the Christian Democrats and National Party.⁸³

The success of this support, despite such clear successes as the PIR split, was debated by the differing agencies and individuals involved. The CIA and some parts of the State Department felt the support was a success throughout the full period of the programme.⁸⁴ In 1972, the CIA issued a report stating that the funding helped the opposition to "maintain its vigor". The report went on to state that:

> ...the continued vitality of the congressional and popular opposition to the UP testifies to the effectiveness with which the three parties have maintained their independence and their appeal. While the precise extent to which our assistance has contributed to this situation is of course unknowable, it seems clear that it has helped.⁸⁵

However, after the abortive coup of June 29, 1973, the CIA became sceptical of continuing the support for the opposition parties. The Santiago station based their opinion against this support on political reality. First of all, the military had remained loyal to the government through the attempted coup, and this had not done anything to encourage the political opposition.⁸⁶ Furthermore, the opposition did not make any gains in the March Congressional elections (though they had not lost ground) and there was a poor outlook for gains in future elections. Even if the opposition did win, it was believed that a Frei presidency would not be that beneficial to the U.S. As the CIA COS reported:

> We do not know what may happen during the next few months: it is just possible that heightened political tensions could lead to a dramatic breakdown in public order which would prompt the military to act. If our objective is still to overthrow Allende then we should be prepared to take advantage of these circumstances and to assist the private sector...but if the US government is not prepared to take the risks involved in such action (and such a refusal seems amply justified by armed forces support of

⁸¹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "On Morning 14 Dec", 19 December 1970.
⁸² Memorandum, William McAfee to the Under Secretary, "Status of Covert Support", 1 February 1972.
⁸³ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Ambassador Johnson, "Status Report on Covert Assistance to Chilean Opposition", 5 July 1972.
⁸⁴ Memorandum, William McAfee to the Under Secretary, "Status of Covert Support", 1 February 1972.
⁸⁵ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Under Secretary Johnson, "Sitrep on Covert Assistance to Chilean Opposition", 13 April 1972.
⁸⁶ Memorandum, Unknown (Santiago COS?) to C/WHD, "Chile: What Now", 30 June 1973.

85

Allende on 29 June) then the continuance of large-scale financial
assistance to the political parties will not be productive.⁸⁷

The dubious productivity of supporting the official political parties prompted some in the CIA and State department to consider support for various groups in the private sector. This included labour organizations, professional unions, and private-interests groups whose sympathies were with the opposition. Funding for these groups was authorised on a trial basis in September of 1972, as was "designed fundamentally to strengthen the ability of these organizations...to contribute to the political strength of the opposition."⁸⁸ As briefed to Ambassador Johnson, a significant side benefit to this support included "an improvement in the ability of these organizations to resist the government drive to weaken further the private sector, and the maintenance of private business, industry, and agriculture as a broad source of funds for the opposition political parties."⁸⁹ As it turned out, most of this funding went towards 'get out the vote' campaigns in support of the opposition.⁹⁰

As the political instability in Chile grew in 1973, the State Department once again raised the proposition of supporting the private sector, noting the CIA's observation that "the private sector is becoming desperate."⁹¹ There was significant unwillingness for such support, however, and it was reported that "Ambassador Davis and Assistant Secretary Kubisch are reluctant to authorize support to the private sector because this sector is working to promote military intervention."⁹² The 40 Committee approved the proposal for funding for the private sector, in the last half of August, but made all disbursements contingent on "the Ambassador's approval."⁹³ Amongst other authors, Gabriel Kolko has suggested that these funds were used in "generously aiding the militant opposition."⁹⁴ Luis Vitale quotes a contemporary source who stated "se puede afirmar categóricamente que las huelgas...fueron financiadas por la CIA."⁹⁵ CIA documents refute this allegation. As CIA director William Colby noted in a report to Kissinger a week after the coup, the short time-span and reluctance of the Ambassador prevented the provision of this support to any civilian organisation:

> ...no support was provided to the private sector, whose initiative in launching and maintaining a series of crippling strikes was instrumental in provoking the military coup of 11 September 1973. Thus, while the Agency was instrumental in enabling opposition parties and media to survive and to maintain their dynamic resistance to the Allende regime,

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Ambassador Johnson, "Covert Aid to Chilean Private Sector", 15 September 1972.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Request Approval on Text", 21 February 1973.

⁹¹ Memorandum, "Covert Action Options for Chile", 31 March 1973.

⁹² Memorandum, Unknown (Santiago COS?) to C/WHD, "Chile: What Now", 30 June 1973.

⁹³ Cable, DCIA to Santiago Station, "Have Just Been Advised", 21 August 1973.

⁹⁴ Kolko, p. 221.

⁹⁵ Vitale, p. 222. Translated as "I can state categorically that the strikes...were financed by the CIA."

86

the CIA played no direct role in the events which led to the establishment
of the new military government.⁹⁶

After much discussion, and despite large amounts of funds being approved, no money of
any significance was passed to the component organizations of the Chilean private sector.

## Civil Unrest

The American operations and policies outlined above did not, of course, occur in a vacuum. While the U.S. government and its agencies prepared and executed their plans for covert operations in Chile, conditions there began to unfold as predicted by many in the U.S. If one is to summarise the domestic problems of Allende's government, it is easiest to say that due to infighting and incoherency in the UP coalition, rudderless economic policy, a drop in copper prices and agricultural production, massive inflation, and a vigourous opposition, Chile's social fabric and its economy disintegrated almost simultaneously. By 1973, for instance, inflation was running at 300%, and was projected to hit 400%.⁹⁷ These symptoms of economic collapse clearly affected the Chilean population, and especially the middle class. By mid-1972 there began in Chile a series of violent and protracted strikes that slowly destabilized the UP government. The first of these began on August 21, led by the nation's independent shopkeepers.⁹⁸ Several weeks of wildcat strikes and street violence followed, going on until the police closed off downtown Santiago after a two-day running street fight between the youth arms of the rival political parties.

While this violence was ended by efficient *Carabinero* action, they were unable to control subsequent events.⁹⁹ Sparked by a government initiative to nationalize transport in the Southern Provinces, the nation's truckers (mostly small owners of two or three trucks) went on strike beginning October 9, 1972. A wide range of professional and small labour unions soon joined the truckers. The strike went on for three weeks, ending on November 5, and was estimated to have cost Chile as much as $200 million in lost production. More importantly, it forced Allende's cabinet to resign and brought military officers into the cabinet on November 2, 1972. These strikes, however, were taken only as a last resort by a Chilean population that was generally quite tolerant of its politicians, for as one Chilean commentator has commented "after only twelve months in office and despite its electoral success, the UP was weak and divided...the government had virtually lost its capacity for taking decisions."¹⁰⁰ There were increasing indications of Cuban security agents in the country, and some positive intelligence on Chilean-based support for the insurgency in Bolivia.¹⁰¹ Internally, the CIA had collected ample evidence of large 'street brigades' of pro-UP youth armed with Cuban weapons, and knew of right-

⁹⁶ Memorandum, William Colby to Kissinger, "CIA's Covert Action Programme Chile", 13 September 1973.
⁹⁷ Pierre Kalfon, p. 198.
⁹⁸ Faundez, p. 237.
⁹⁹ Cable, US Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State, "Finale if Aug 21 Violence", 22 August 1973.
¹⁰⁰ Faundez, p. 222.
¹⁰¹ Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "The Presidential Security Guard", 1 Nov 1971.

87

wing groups doing the same.¹⁰² Political deterioration mirrored the deterioration in internal security: another set of strikes began in late July of 1973, this time encompassing groups from as diverse backgrounds as engineers and doctors to peasant and labour groups.¹⁰³ Matters became so unstable in Chile that on August 9, Allende formed his second emergency military cabinet, bringing the C-in-Cs of the four services into key portfolios. Generals and Ministers were resigning as fast as they could be brought into government. Street violence was an everyday fact.¹⁰⁴ As CIA director William Colby reported to the White House, it was “increasingly apparent that three years of political polarization had strained the fabric of Chilean society to the breaking point.”¹⁰⁵ Allende was facing a grave situation.

## The Coup

The end to the Allende government began on August 23, 1973, when General Carlos Prats, C-in-C of the Army, resigned from Allende's Military Cabinet. A Defence Information Agency (DIA) report written after the coup reported this as the most important contributing factor to the success of the coup "because [it] effectively freed Army plotters to join with the other two services and the Carabineros."¹⁰⁶ Ignited by a crisis in the Naval chain-of-command, coup plotting rapidly spread through all the services, achieving on September 9, 1973 the inter-service coordination that had been lacking in previous coup plots or attempts. On the morning of September 11, all services moved to secure the main population centres in Chile. Before noon *La Moneda* was surrounded by tanks and strafed by attack jets. By the two in the afternoon Allende was dead—either by murder or by suicide¹⁰⁷—and the Junta was in charge of Chile. The question that has driven critics since is: what did the U.S. know or contribute to the coup that killed Allende?

As matters grew more serious for the Allende government by the end of 1972, representatives of the different American agencies gathered to discuss what the U.S. reaction would be if they were asked to support a coup. One of the first points raised, as noted in the minutes of the meeting, is that "it is unlikely that the United States will be asked to help in preparing or delivering a coup." Discussing this at length, the minutes indicate that U.S. 'positive involvement' in a coup would have only the barest support within the U.S. and would not suit the international image the nation wished to project at the time. Moreover, "it would at most have only marginal influence on the course of events."¹⁰⁸ The memo goes

¹⁰² Memorandum, "CIA Bulletin", 30 June 1973. See Also Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "During the Second Week of August", 25 August 1973.

¹⁰³ Cable, Santiago Station to CWH/D, "Strike in Chile", 22 August 1973.

¹⁰⁴ Davis, Chapter 8 *in passim*.

¹⁰⁵ Memorandum, Colby to Kissinger, "CIA's Covert Action Program", 19 September 1973.

¹⁰⁶ Department of Defense Intelligence Information Report, "Events leading up to the 11 September Military Coup", 29 October 1973.

¹⁰⁷ For a further discussion, see Ignacio Gonzalez Camus, *El Dia En Que Murio Allende* (Santiago, 1988).

¹⁰⁸ Memorandum for the Record, "U.S. Reaction to Possible Approach by Chilean Coup Plotters", 30 October 1970.

88

on to discuss the nature of the requests they might receive, the nature of the coups potentially plotted, and sums up the core problem succinctly.

On the basis of presently available evidence it would...seem that we would be well advised to hold ourselves back from specific commitments to Chileans who seek assurances on our attitude toward a new regime produced by a coup. If such commitments were to contribute to a decision to attempt a coup they would be too dangerous to give; if they would not contribute to such a decision they would be superfluous.¹⁰⁹

Perhaps as a reflection of the requests for assistance by men such as Valenzuela and, especially, Viaux, the U.S. realised that only an indigenous coup would be potentially desirable to American interests. Furthermore, the memo concludes that the UP government was inexorably sliding towards defeat in subsequent elections, and that the U.S. interests would be much better served by an elected successor regime than a regime produced by an armed coup.

It is often erroneously supposed that because of the U.S. support of Pinochet after he became dictator of Chile that the U.S. supported his coup planning from the start. Gabriel Kolko, for one, asserts that the CIA "did everything from maintaining constant contact with the coup plotters, whom it encouraged in every way...to drawing up arrest lists and the key targets to take when the coup began."¹¹⁰ The Church Committee was more equivocal, but maintained the same spirit, when it wrote that "U.S. officials in the years before 1973 may not have always succeeded in walking the thin line between monitoring indigenous coup plotting and actually stimulating it."¹¹¹ It appears, however, that until the very day of the coup, neither the CIA nor any other U.S. government agency had a clear idea of the scope of contemporary coup plotting.

On May 2, 1973, Santiago reported to CIA headquarters some coup plotting information that they had recently received. The CIA contact in the Chilean army had reported that coup plotting was well advanced, that these plans had the input or support of most of the influential generals, and that "Allende would not last another 30 days in office." More importantly, however, is what the Chilean contact says about Augusto Pinochet, army general and would-be Junta President: "Pinochet will not be a stumbling block to the coup plans"¹¹²; another general, Manuel Torres, would lead the coup. Simply, no one knew the intentions of the famously inscrutable General Pinochet. In their intelligence gathering after the inauguration of Allende, the CIA had identified Pinochet (who replaced Valenzuela as *Jefe del Plaza* in early 1971) as an important figure within the Chilean military. It was noted then that he was a "narrow-gauge military man...who clearly enjoyed feeling of being important."¹¹³ Nevertheless, the report noted that Pinochet avoided making any provocative statements and that he "is

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Kolko, p. 220.

¹¹¹ "Covert Action in Chile", p. 33.

¹¹² Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Was sent to the Case Officer", 02 May 73.

¹¹³ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Pinochet at Dinner 5 August 1971", 6 August 1971

89

cautious and quiet on political matters." Overall, the assessment in 1971 was very similar to the one reached two years earlier: "[assess] subject as person who could possibly be neutralized by conspiratorial group but who would not lead any coup."¹¹⁴

The next step in the evolution of Pinochet from unknown army general to integral anti-Allendista happened in late 1972, undoubtedly mirroring the worsening of the domestic situation. It had come to the CIA's attention that there was increased coup plotting going on amongst the junior officers of the Chilean forces, prompted by the high command's 'compliance' with Allende policies. Pinochet, it was noted, though "previously the strict constitutionalist" was now "harboring second thoughts."¹¹⁵ Allende would have to be forced to step down or be 'eliminated.' One may still note, however, that Pinochet is still not touted as the leader of this coup, merely 'Prats Man' and a loyal soldier. This impression was reinforced when Pinochet, along with Prats, led the soldiers that put down the abortive uprising of June 29, 1973.¹¹⁶

As they was no foreknowledge of the Junta general's involvement in the coup, there was also precious little intelligence on when and where the coup was going to happen. That a coup was going to take place was about the only sure knowledge—and one did not need to be a CIA operative to surmise this much.¹¹⁷ On August 3, 1973, the CIA received intelligence that the PCCh had received warning of a coup attempt that would be carried out "this week" by "unnamed military leaders."¹¹⁸ It is interesting to note that this intelligence came not from CIA contacts in the military but through informants in the UP. The CIA 'comment' at the end of this memorandum is deleted, unfortunately, denying the reader any hint if the CIA knew of these plans from other quarters. Regardless, there is no other CIA intelligence report about this erstwhile-coup. Likewise, on September 7, 1973, only four days before the fatal coup, an inter-departmental meeting could not achieve a consensus on what was going to happen in Chile. While the CIA representative believed that a 'creeping coup' might occur (where Allende's military cabinet slowly took control), the State department representative "felt that if circumstances continued to deteriorate an armed coup might be more likely."¹¹⁹ In retrospect, the initial indications of a solid coup climate emerged September 8, when it was reported by the CIA that the Chilean Navy planned to overthrow Allende on the early morning of September 10. It was thought by the CIA that the Navy would initiate the revolt by seizing control of a province, and would then be joined by the Air Force and perhaps even the Army: the Air Force C-in-C contacted General Pinochet, the new Army C-in-C, and reported that Pinochet would "not oppose the navy's action."¹²⁰ The Army, it was said, might join the coup after the Air Force did, but their generals might not: this was hardly hard evidence of a coordinated coup. Nonetheless, the CIA was sure that

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Gave Following Impression", 27 September 1972.

¹¹⁶ Faundez, p. 245.

¹¹⁷ See *Le Monde*, 25 August 1973. As printed in Kalfon, p. 239.

¹¹⁸ Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "PS Leader Clodomiro Almayda Informed", 03 August 1973.

¹¹⁹ Memorandum, "ARA/CIA Meeting", 11 September 1970.

¹²⁰ Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "According to the Navy", 8 September 1973.

90

"President Allende is unquestionably confronted with the most serious threat from the Armed Forces to his continuance in office since his election...."¹²¹

This report of September 8 notwithstanding, the first hard intelligence about the September 11 coup arrived only the day before. A CIA intelligence report of September 10 indicated that intelligence had been received and "that a coup attempt will be initiated on September 11. All three branches of the armed forces and the Carabineros are involved in this action."¹²² The CIA was, however, still sceptical, noting that this attempt was apparently supposed to have been undertaken on September 10 but had been delayed to improve the tactical situation. It was thought that Allende's planned national address on the afternoon of September 10 might be used "to announce some dramatic proposal such as the calling of a plebiscite which could again cause the plotters to hesitate."¹²³ Indeed, this was Allende's plan, though the speech, which was to be read on the 11th, was never given the chance to be heard.

While there is a small chance that these sceptical messages are plotted dissembling, it is more likely that U.S. intelligence on the coup plotters was minimal. It also seems that the earliest *direct* contact with the coup plotters came as late as September 10, 1973, probably only hours after the message mentioned above, when it was reported to Kissinger by the CIA that a contact in the Chilean military met with a CIA agent to advise the U.S. that: "early 11 September 1973 a significant part of the Chilean military planned to move to overthrow President Allende."¹²⁴ The Chilean officer then asked if the US would provide support to the coup if the situation became 'difficult.' The agent, it is reported, responded by telling the Chilean officer that "the planned action against President Allende was a Chilean operation, and he [CIA agent] could only promise that [security deletion] question would promptly be made known to Washington."¹²⁵

Even though the CIA learned of these coup efforts too late to affect them, there was continued interest in the CIA, especially amongst the Chilean country-team, to foster a coup in the national chaos of late August, 1973. On the resignation of General Prats from Cabinet, the CIA in Chile believed that the Allende government was in such a shaky position that "significant events or pressures could effect its future."¹²⁶ The time was ripe, the station urged, for the CIA to support a major move by the opposition (including the private sector) to force on the government an emergency military cabinet that would administer the country until stability was restored. There was a danger: "While this is probably the most realistic objective, it should be borne in mind that events may carry the

¹²¹ Ibid.

¹²² Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "That a coup attempt will be initiated", 10 September 1973.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Memorandum, CIA (via Mr. William Jorden, NSC) to Kissinger, "Possible Request for U.S. Government Aid", 10 September 1970. This is a direct telegram that would have gone directly from Santiago to Washington and Langley. The 'intelligence report' in note 49 would have been prepared in Langley from intelligence sent from Santiago the previous day.

¹²⁵ Ibid.

¹²⁶ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Opposition Parties Are Maintaining", 24 August 1973.

91

armed forces beyond this point to that of a full military takeover.”¹²⁷ Despite all the pressure to avoid direct connection to any coup plotter, the CIA would still have been happy if a coup had occurred. Reporting the station plan Colby assured Kissinger that “the Santiago station would not be working directly with the armed forces in an attempt to bring about a coup nor would its support to the overall opposition forces have this as its objective.”¹²⁸ There is no response to this memorandum, though it is doubtful that there was sufficient time for a new directive before the coup was executed. Regardless, the memorandum from Colby shows that the CIA, up to the last moments of the Allende regime, were not involved in coup plotting, and indeed were avoiding any move that might indicate to the Chileans that they favoured one.

## The Demise of Allende

Despite a continuing desire to see the collapse of the Allende government, in the three years from his election to his death the, U.S. government carried out no action against the Chilean government that could not be justified within the norms of international banking or trade law, and produced no policy with the direct intent of promoting a coup. More specifically, the CIA did nothing to promote a coup against the Allende government. Indeed, so careful were the CIA in avoiding the appearance of favouring a coup that they had trouble predicting the timing and nature of the coup that did occur. Ultimately, the CIA played the central role in a U.S. policy designed to prevent the extinction of Chile's unique democracy, which was under a clear attack by Allende's aggressively Marxist government. The Americans did operate against the Allende government, but not to engineer his death. William Colby described the American efforts best, in a secret post-coup cable to Henry Kissinger: "While the agency was instrumental in enabling opposition political parties and media to survive and to maintain their dynamic resistance to the Allende regime, the CIA played no direct role in the events which led to the establishment of the new military government."¹²⁹

In his book *The Night Watch*, former CIA CWH/D David Phillips recounts the difficulty in managing the CIA effort in Chile. On the one hand the CIA agents were expected to 'ring the bell', or to ensure proper warning to the U.S. government of any attempted coup in Chile. On the other hand, it had been pointed out that in the inevitable event of a coup in Chile, the CIA would be accused of complicity. It was ultimately ordered that discretion was to trump forewarning: the CIA wanted to keep its hands clean in a time when the agency was under increased scrutiny.¹³⁰ The result of this policy is what is described above; an attempt to gather information from the margins, on very secret coup plots, without leaving any impressions of favouring a coup.

¹²⁷ Ibid.

¹²⁸ Memorandum, William Colby to Kissinger, "Proposed Covert Financial Support of Chilean Private Sector", 25 August 1973.

¹²⁹ Memorandum, Colby to Kissinger, "CIA's Covert Action Program", 19 September 1973.

¹³⁰ Phillips, p. 238.

92

The discretion by the CIA did not pay off. As Mark Falcoff has pointed out in his book on the subject, the Church Committee report imputes, without supporting logic or evidence, that the CIA supported and perhaps even helped plot the coup. Falcoff has attempted to refute these claims and does so with remarkable skill. Like many others writing on the topic, Falcoff was limited by not having access to the full range of documents quoted, or more importantly *not* quoted by the Church Committee Report. Access to these documents sheds much needed light on the topic, and subsequently reveals the partisan nature of that report and vindicates Falcoff's rejection of its rhetoric. Moreover, by looking at these documents one is able to determine the exact nature of the U.S. relation with those who launched the coup in September of 1973 in detail not achievable until the declassification of the CIA, NSC and State Department archives. They remove any doubt—a doubt exploited by such works as Hersh's *The Price of Power*¹³¹—to the CIA and Kissinger's assertion that they had no connection, and barely any knowledge, of the coup that ousted Allende.

¹³¹ Hersh, p. 295. Here one reads of the famous arrest lists and 'almost daily reports of coups.' Reporting the plots, the CIA's function, is imputed by Hersh to directly correlate with their plotting.

Reexamining the Record

CIA Machinations in Chile in 1970

Kristian C. Gustafson

"Kristian C. Gustafson is a Ph. D. candidate at Cambridge University, UK, where he is a Commonwealth/Overseas Trust Scholar."

Editor's Note: Mr. Gustafson received the Studies in Intelligence Walter L. Pforzheimer Award for this article in 2002. The prize is given to the graduate or undergraduate student who has submitted the best paper on an intelligence-related subject during the preceding year.

From 1970 to 1973, the United States government was involved in overt and covert actions against the elected government of Chile led by Marxist Salvador Allende. Unfolding events during these politically tumultuous years included the assassination of Chilean Minister of Defense René Schneider in October 1970. Ultimately, Allende was overthrown and replaced by Gen. Augusto Pinochet. The initial history of this period, recorded in the 1970s and early 1980s, told of a US government that abused its power and betrayed its principles. Public reaction was universally negative. This interpretation of events has affected the execution of American covert activities ever since.¹

A generation has now passed and it is time to reexamine this "accepted" version of events. Recently, the US government posted thousands of declassified documents to its on-line "Chile Collection."² These newly available resources allow a more candid—and realistic—look into the actions and thoughts of the CIA agents and officers involved in those controversial operations. This study focuses on CIA covert action during the six weeks following Allende's victory at the polls in mid-September 1970. While the activities of the CIA may not always be excused, they can at least be better understood.

Genesis

¹ It is arguable that the Church Committee Report ("The Staff Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities") was spawned by public allegations of CIA wrongdoing in Chile, mainly regarding their relationship with the ITT corporation. Regardless of the report's wide-ranging content—which dealt only partially with Chile—in its aftermath the CIA's powers were more forcefully delineated by President Ford's Executive Order (E.O. 11905) which amongst other things banned assassinations and increased executive and congressional oversight of the CIA. Additionally, after the Church Committee Report, the CIA was subject to an unprecedented amount of *public* suspicion and distrust. Taken together, the CIA's actions in Chile in 1970 and the subsequent Church Committee Report mark the nadir of the independence and freedom from scrutiny that the public and government had previously allowed the CIA.

² For this study, these documents were accessed at <www.foia.state.gov> between May and June 2002, using a "list all" function through all tranches of material. Specific URLs for CIA, State Department, and NSC documents are listed in subsequent footnotes.

So sure were senior US officials that Salvador Allende and his coalition would be defeated in the September 1970 election, as he had been three times previously, that, despite CIA warnings, they were caught off-guard when he won a plurality. Undeterred by the voters' preference, President Richard Nixon delivered a clear and forceful Directive calling for expanded CIA operations in Chile. In the weeks between Allende's election and his inauguration planned for 3 November, the CIA actively sought to foment a coup in Chile. Washington was unequivocal about its desire to keep Allende from power.

American actions against the Allende government occurred in what Nixon's National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, called the "Autumn of Crises."³ The Soviet Union was actively threatening American national security in several different arenas. Soviet missiles and technicians had been moved into Egypt. The rest of the Middle East was in chaos—Israeli attacks against its Arab neighbors increased daily, and Syria had attacked its supposed ally, Jordan. At the beginning of September, a large Soviet flotilla had arrived in Cienfuegos, Cuba: There was suspicion that the Soviets had designs on this harbour as a new submarine base in the Western Hemisphere. At a more global level, Washington was struggling to maintain momentum in the negotiations for the first Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

It was in this framework of global power plays between the Soviet Union and the United States that the White House had to deal with the election of a Marxist-oriented government in Chile. On 15 September 1970, President Nixon called Kissinger, Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell into the Oval Office to provide executive guidance for US policy towards Chile and Allende. William Colby—then Deputy Director, later Director, of the CIA—noted that "Nixon was furious" and was convinced that an Allende presidency would assure the spread of Cuban President Fidel Castro's communist revolution to Chile and the rest of Latin America.⁴ He wanted to prevent Allende from being inaugurated. The message he delivered at the meeting reflected his anger. The hand-written minutes taken by DCI Helms are revealing:

> One in 10 chance, perhaps, but save Chile:
> Worth Spending
> Not concerned risks involved
> No involvement of Embassy
> $10,000,000 available, more if necessary
> full-time job—best men we have
> game plan
> make the economy scream
> 48 hours plan of action.⁵

³ Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little & Brown, 1979), particularly chapters XV and XVI.

⁴ William Colby and Peter Forbath, *Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1978), p. 303.

⁵ U.S. Congress, Senate, *Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders*, Interim Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. 94th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 20 November 1975, p. 227. Henceforward "Alleged Plots."

2

Helms, understanding the import of the President's statements, commented: "If I ever carried a marshal's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day."⁶ The administration moved quickly to implement the Presidential Directive. Henry Kissinger was to oversee the project, which was to be called "Track II" to differentiate it from the ongoing diplomatic efforts to thwart communist influence in Chile, known as "Track I."

When Allende's candidacy was announced in early 1970, the State Department had developed a policy to try to dampen Marxist electoral prospects. This approach—Track I—primarily involved efforts by the US Ambassador and his diplomatic staff to hinder Allende through the manipulation of Chilean congressmen and senators within the framework of the Chilean constitution. At the time, the State Department made a conscious decision to exclude the CIA from the planning and execution of the policy, because it believed that the CIA's warnings of impending electoral defeat for Chile's centrist parties were exaggerated. The CIA, for its part, thought that the State Department did not have a clear understanding of Chilean politics and the nature of the Eastern Bloc threat posed by a Marxist state in the Americas. Such disagreements between the CIA and State Department would be a hallmark of American operations in Chile, and would continue until Allende was overthrown in 1973.

As time went on, Track I expanded to encompass a wide range of political, diplomatic, psychological, and economic policies, as well as covert operations designed to bring about the conditions that would encourage Chileans to stage a coup. The parallel secret approach of Track II involved more direct efforts to prompt Chileans to stage an immediate coup. Both paths aimed at the same policy objective—the removal of Allende—but they differed in their approach, means, and timing.

On the day following the Oval Office meeting, William V. Broe, chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, circulated the first internal memo related to the new Directive. It recapped the President's orders, indicated that the Departments of State and Defense were to be excluded from the planning (removing the US ambassador to Chile and his defense attaché from the loop), and appointed the CIA's director of covert operations, Thomas Karamessines, to head the project.⁷ While the removal of the other government agencies seems extreme, it was viewed as necessary to the secrecy of the operation and was within the President's authority with regard to covert activities.⁸ The first Track II situation report, issued on 17 September, confirmed that the command structure for the Chile project had been established and that units would "operate under the cover of the [deletion] 40 Committee approval of 14 September for political action and the probing for military possibilities to thwart Allende."⁹

The Presidential Directive had made it clear that the CIA was to do what it needed to do to prevent an Allende administration. The precise parameters of such action are not yet in the public domain. Helms later commented to a Senate committee that he did not believe that

⁶ "Alleged Plots," p. 228.

⁷ Memorandum for the Record, "Genesis of Project Fubelt," 16 September 1970. All CIA cables and memoranda used in this study were accessed at <www.foia.state.gov/vSearchPCIA.asp>. Unless otherwise noted, all documents cited are from the CIA.

⁸ Colby, p. 303.

⁹ Memorandum, "[Deletion] Situation Report #1," 17 September 1970.

3

assassination was within the guidelines given to him by the President, "and I had made that clear to my fellows."¹⁰

With marching orders from the White House, the CIA sent four "false-flag" officers to Chile, starting on 27 September.¹¹ They were to get in touch with Chilean military personnel, a task considered too hot for locally based CIA personnel.¹² With the assistance of these false-flag officers, the CIA made 21 contacts with officers in both the military and the Carabineros (the Chilean national police) from 5 to 20 October 1970. When contacted, "Those Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the US government..."¹³ According to available records, the wisdom and legality of this action, questionable today, was not disputed at the time.

## The Chilean Military

Finding Chilean officers in favor of a coup was not an easy task. The officers of the Chilean armed forces were largely drawn from the middle class and, as such, were conservative and anti-Allende. Nonetheless, as an institution, the military was strongly "constitutionalist," a stand championed by Gen. René Schneider Chereau, who had become the commander-in-chief of the Chilean armed forces in October 1969.¹⁴ Underscoring the a-political nature of the institution, the Chilean constitution describes the Army as a "non deliberative body."¹⁵ In May 1970, during the election campaign, Schneider had told the newspaper *El Mercurio* that the Army would respect the constitutional process and make no move at intervention.¹⁶ Although this "Schneider Doctrine" of non-intervention angered many in the staunchly conservative military because of Allende's socialist platform, that anger did not necessarily equate to readiness to take action.¹⁷

A sobering consideration was the possibility that a coup attempt could trigger mass protests, street violence, or even civil war, given Allende's strong base of support. To thwart such violence and secure a post-coup government, incipient plotters assessed that the military would need to act as a whole to rally behind the new leaders. Potential plotters who were contacted by US operatives reported that their commander-in-chief, Gen. Schneider, "will only agree to

¹⁰ "Alleged Plots," p. 228.

¹¹ Ibid, p. 238.

¹² Cable, CIA HQs to Santiago Station, "As you will be advised," 27 September 1970. A "false-flag officer" or "false-flagger" is an officer who operates under a forged third-party passport. False-flaggers are used to increase the "plausible deniability" of an operation should it be compromised.

¹³ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Highest Levels Here Continue," 7 October 1970.

¹⁴ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Effort to Contact and Influence Chilean Military Figures," 2 October 1970. Biographical information on Schneider can be found at: *Grandes Biographías de la Historia de Chile*, "Defensor del constitucionalismo de las Fuerzas Armadas René Schneider Chereau: 1913-1970", http://icarito.tercera.cl/biografias/1958-1999/bios/schneider.htm.

¹⁵ Luis Vitale, *et. al.*, *Para Recuperar La Memoria Histórica: Frei, Allende Y Pinochet* (Santiago, Chile: Ediciones ChileAmerica-CESOC, 1999), p. 181. The Spanish of the constitution reads: "La fuerza pública es esencialmente obediente. Ningun cuerpo armado puede deliberer."

¹⁶ Andrea Ruiz-Esquide Figueroa, *Las Fuerzas Armadas Durante Los Gobiernos de Eduardo Frei Y Salvador Allende* (Santiago, Chile: Centro de Estudios del Desarrollo, 1993), p. 51 (note 1).

¹⁷ Vitale, p. 187. See also Paul E. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende and the Politics of Chile 1964-1976* (Pittsburgh, PA: Pittsburgh University Press, 1977), p. 99.

military intervention if forced to do so.”¹⁸ They concluded, therefore, that Schneider had to be convinced to join the pro-interventionist camp soon. If he persisted in his constitutionalist stance, he would have to be removed from his position, in order to allow the military to intervene against the installation of an Allende government.

## The Ambassador's Perspective

The US Ambassador, Edward Korry, was aware of a long history of mini-plotting in the Chilean military and did not put much stock in the chances for effective action against Allende. The outgoing Chilean president, Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei, had tried the patience of many conservative army officers, and plotting had been rife within the military during his tenure.¹⁹ Mutinies and small revolts had become a subject of concern, made more pressing by the revolt of the “Tacna” tank regiment—ostensibly over soldiers’ pay—in October 1969. During the “Tacnazo” rebellion, several generals had fled the country or had been removed from command after being accused of coup plotting, among them Gen. Roberto Viaux, the alleged leader, who was forced into retirement.²⁰ After Allende’s election, scheming continued. A CIA report of 26 September 1970 noted that a number of former Chilean army officers were attempting to infiltrate leftist groups in the hopes of conducting terrorist acts that would compel an anti-communist crackdown by Frei and the Army. Others were working in primarily civilian rightist groups that had the same aim. The CIA observed: “President Frei taking no direct part in planning but close supporters such as Perez [Zujovic] said to be acting in his name.”²¹

Was everyone plotting against Allende? Amb. Korry, doubted it. The Ambassador concurred that the Chilean military would need to act as a whole if military intervention were to succeed; simultaneously, however, he doubted that such coordinated action was possible. He reported to Washington, a full month before the beginning of Track II: “An attempt to rob Allende of his triumph by, say, a General Viaux, who has a certain mystique within the army, would, in all likelihood, fail in a post-congressional decision period and be almost impossible post-inauguration . . .”²² By mentioning a specific name, Korry was trying to exorcise the influence of this particular individual, at the center of coup speculation, from the plans of many in Washington.

Within weeks of Allende's success at the polls, Korry sent a message to the Under Secretary of State about coup plotting within the Chilean Army. He outlined one particular plan unwittingly related by a young Chilean officer to a CIA co-optee, and concluded by saying:

¹⁸ Memorandum, Chile Station to CIA HQ, “Intelligence,” 26 September 1970.

¹⁹ Albert L. Michaels, “Background to a Coup,” paper presented at the State University of New York, 18-19 October 1974. (Buffalo, NY: State University of New York, 1975) p. 9.

²⁰ Memorandum, Chile Station to CIA HQ, “Intelligence,” 26 September 1970.

²¹ Memorandum, CIA Intelligence Note to File, 23 September 1970.

²² Memorandum, Korry to Crimmins, 11 August, 1970. State Department cables accessed at: <http://www.foia.state.gov/SearchColls/CollsSearch.asp> using a “list all” function for all three tranches of “State Chile Collection.” All cables/memoranda accessed May/June 2002. Subsequent State Department documents marked “State” in parentheses following the citation.

5

... less precise but equally lurid information has been reaching us from many quarters and it usually proves to be nothing more than wishful thinking. This report must be considered in the same vein. ... I would prefer that we ceased to check out all such reports and to be totally surprised by whatever might develop in the armed forces. In the present circumstances it is a waste activity for all concerned. Hence I am instructing [CIA station] to desist from the normal efforts to learn of possible military moves.²³

Ignorant of the Track II initiative, Korry warned both the in-country CIA team and the State Department that to promote a coup with the climate and personnel at hand was to court a failure as massive and damaging to American interests as the Bay of Pigs.²⁴ This warning was ignored in Washington. Korry soon was demanding "Washington consultations, noting that all elements in the mission accept Allende's presidency as assured."²⁵

## Launching Track II

The six weeks between Allende's election and his inauguration was not a long time to begin with, and given the need to ensure secrecy while attempting to infiltrate operatives and promote a coup, it became incredibly short. With almost no contacts at the beginning of the operation and little knowledge of the key players, the CIA officers in the field considered "Operation Fubelt," as Track II was officially titled, to be a "crash endeavour."²⁶

With the Ambassador's influence sidelined by the Presidential Directive, the CIA's William Broe was now directing the planning against Allende. Pressure for success came from Kissinger and the President. With time short, CIA officers in Santiago went against their better judgment and opened communications with retired Gen. Viaux, as well as two serving officers, Gen. Camilo Valenzuela, who commanded the Santiago Garrison, and Gen. Vicente Huerta, a senior officer in the Carabinero.²⁷ These latter two did not have anything close to definite plans and so for the time being were kept on the side.

Viaux took the spotlight. Though viewed by many as an unstable fool, and though he was no longer in the military, a CIA assessment concluded that he had "extensive support among non-coms and junior officers."²⁸ Another memorandum pointed out that since the Chilean military was led by a man who respected the constitutionality of the Allende government, the servicemen lacked a serving general officer to centralize the plotting and "look to Gen. Viaux for inspiration."²⁹ As early as 23 September, the CIA was reporting that Viaux "was in touch with

²³ Memorandum, Ambassador Korry to Under-Secretary Johnson, 6 October 1970. (State)

²⁴ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Ambassador called in Defense Attaché and DCOS," 08 October 1970.

²⁵ Cable, "Track I Propaganda Placements," 10 October 1970. Emphasis in original. At the time, Korry's assessment was accurate. Even local CIA officers considered the task of thwarting Allende to be a "mission impossible." As one CIA officer later said, "the idea of a military overthrow had not occurred to us as a feasible solution." See Seymour Hersh, *The Price of Power* (New York, NY: Summit Books, 1983), p. 277.

²⁶ Cable, [CIA] Situation Report #1, 17 September 1970.

²⁷ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Puro Chile on 5 December", 14 December, 1970.

²⁸ Memorandum for the Record, CIA, 23 September 1970.

²⁹ Memorandum, Chile Station to CIA HQ, "Intelligence," 26 September 1970.

active duty army officers who may or may not decide to move."³⁰ They noted, however, that as a retired officer, no plan by Viaux could succeed without the help of the regular army.

With the false-flaggers now established and operating in Chile, and with the secret assistance of the US defense attaché, the CIA in Santiago set out to determine what real support Viaux had within the army. The answer came back within a few days: "COS [Chief of Station] met with [a false flag officer] who said he had talked with Gen. Viaux, and as a consequence is convinced that Viaux has no military support."³¹ This was troubling to the CIA officers, who passed to their Headquarters the opinion that Viaux was not only dangerously unstable, but likely to lead whatever forces he could muster into a premature action that would do the anti-Allende forces more harm than good. They decided to stop working with Viaux for the time being: "Santiago station was advised to use whatever channel available to persuade Viaux to hold off his action until a more opportune moment . . . Since a mini-coup (which is what Viaux is most likely to produce) would be counterproductive to our objective [name deleted] has been advised to do everything possible to prevent a Viaux move, at least for the time being."³²

## Frustration Builds

The CIA in Chile turned its attention to Gen. Valenzuela. While his plans were not solid, as a serving officer he was at least in a position to command troops in a coordinated action, and he was deemed psychologically stable.³³ Direct contact was arranged:

2. [CIA agent] will see Genl Camilo Valenzuela, if possible, on [date deleted] Oct and brief him along these lines [CIA agent] will take opportunity to caution Valenzuela about precipitate moves by Genl Viaux (of which Valenzuela possibly cognizant).

3. [CIA false-flagger] who briefed COS evening [date del] Oct, promised attempt to contact Valenzuela [deleted] . . . will ask aforementioned to dissuade Viaux, without RPT without promising Viaux USG support for any later move. (FYI: [COS] relieved to learn [CIA asset] not goading on Viaux, which [we] would view as height of folly).

4. Urge you do not covey impression that STA has sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering coup attempts.³⁴

The fourth paragraph of this message makes a point repeated often by the CIA agents on the ground: They were not puppet masters, capable of fully controlling the Chilean officers they contacted. The message had already been passed that the United States favored military intervention, but the Santiago CIA operatives did not want to bear responsibility for unfortunate results should a coup be led by a man such as Viaux:

³⁰ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "There is a possibility that coup attempt," 23 September 1970.
³¹ Memorandum Intelligence Note to File, "Track II," 10 October 1970.
³² Memorandum, "Track II," 7 October 1970.
³³ Memorandum, "Track II," 5 October 1970.
³⁴ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, 7 October 1970. Emphasis in original.

> If Viaux moves on his own and succeeds (which is a distinct possibility) then we face the unpleasant prospect that Viaux's junta will be an autocratic, nationalistic military government, which may not necessarily be pro-US. Accordingly, Viaux should still be considered only as an opportunity of last resort... A Viaux Government, though preferable to Allende, would be a tragedy for Chile and for the free world. A Viaux coup would only produce a massive bloodbath.³⁵

A bloodbath led by an uncontrollable and mentally unstable officer was not the aim of the mission, as the CIA understood it. In short, a right-wing government was not attractive to the CIA or to the US government, for it would ultimately be counter-productive. Associating themselves with dictatorial and bloodthirsty regimes would do little to forward American efforts for increased influence in the region.

The US personnel writing cables at the time did not assume that thwarting Allende had to be violent. To the modern reader, "military intervention" implies violence. In the case of Chile, however, what the CIA officers were looking for was, in the first instance, *not* actually a coup. Rather, they sought some type of parliamentary subterfuge, where the military would declare a state of emergency and seize power temporarily, justifying the dissolution of the government in order to call new elections. Chileans called this a "white coup."³⁶ The obstacle to this preferred outcome was "that army not as yet set to move and that Schneider Doctrine still conditions ITS reflexes."³⁷

Moreover, the United States was not going to run a coup for the Chileans. On 6 October, Viaux approached the CIA and asked for weapons to start an uprising—bizarrely, he wanted "paralyzing gas grenades."³⁸ The CIA in Santiago "turned down the proposal categorically," with the reason given that "[USG] would not provide arms if the *golpe* (coup) were to be made contingent on a favorable [US] reaction. [USG] insists that the decision to move must be a [Chilean] decision."³⁹ This does not mean that a forceful coup was entirely out of the minds of the CIA at this point, for there were routine exhortations on the "seriousness of USG intent to attempt deny [the] presidency to Allende."⁴⁰ The CIA wanted the Chileans to do it on their own, but found Viaux's plans "to be totally inadequate."⁴¹

Another problem with Viaux was his high profile as an anti-communist agitator. Having already led one military revolt, he was under constant scrutiny by the state security apparatus, which made clandestine contact by the Americans dangerous. "It station's firm opinion that further

³⁵ Memorandum, "Long Range Solution," 9 October 1970. Emphasis in original.

³⁶ William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 161. Also Gabriel Smirnow, *The Revolution Disarmed, Chile 1970-1973* (New York, NY: Monthly Review Press, 1979), p. 111.

³⁷ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "It Reported," 13 October 1970.

³⁸ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Viaux Recontacted ASAP," 13 October 1970.

³⁹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Arms to Start Uprising," 06 October 1970. While the terms CIA, USG and Chilean are all blanked from the document, a reading of the 2 full pages makes any other insertion inconsistent and unlikely.

⁴⁰ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "As Dialogue with Viaux Grows," 13 October 1970.

⁴¹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "In Fast Moving Situation," 10 October 1970.

8

contact with [name deleted] presents too great a risk potential and offers very little in return. Considering the way the [defense attaché]-Viaux relationship is unfolding we feel [attaché] contact not worth maintaining... as we approach the 24th of October [Viaux] will just be too hot to handle."⁴² To make matters worse, the CIA knew that the Chilean Communist Party(PCCh) had agents infiltrated close to Viaux and his associates. It would be foolish of Washington to offer Viaux continued support if the PCCh would later be able to disclose American activities.⁴³ Viaux was a disaster waiting to happen and had to be kept at a distance.

While the CIA wanted to keep Viaux at arms-length, the pressure on Agency officers in Santiago to come up with a "solution" to the Allende problem was massive, as attested by many of the men who worked in and around the project.⁴⁴ The problem was that there was no viable candidate to take the lead. Viaux, clearly, was compulsive and uncontrollable, probably even anti-American.⁴⁵ Valenzuela and Huerta had no plans, no forces assembled, and were perhaps a bit scared of moving. But the White House (the "highest levels"⁴⁶) was demanding a solution, a military solution, and "all other considerations are secondary."⁴⁷ The Santiago CIA station sent back what can only be called a cynical reply. It is worth quoting at length:

1. Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination:

a. Alto Mando (high command) solution cannot be achieved...

b. [Frei Solution] cannot be achieved...

c. Regimental commander solution: Station... lacks requisite leverage to pry loose most commanders from their instinctive obedience to Alto Mando directives...

2. What can Viaux accomplish under optimum conditions? He can split armed forces... fencesitters will watch tide of battle before engaging themselves on either side. Carnage would be considerable and prolonged, i.e., civil war. Under best of circumstances, armed forces will break up and create unpredictable situation...

5. Above not intended to be exhaustive enumeration of some of key factors that ought to have hearing on your final determination. You have asked us to provoke chaos in Chile. Thru Viaux solution we provide you with formula for chaos which unlikely to be bloodless. To dissimulate US involvement will clearly be impossible. Station [CIA] team, as you know, has given most serious consideration to all plans suggested by HQs counterparts. We conclude that none

⁴² Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "It Station's Firm Opinion," 10 October 1970. That this communication referred to the attaché can be determined by comparison of this cable with one cited in the Senate report "Alleged Plots."

⁴³ Memorandum, "Track II," 12 October 1970.

⁴⁴ Hersh, p. 286.

⁴⁵ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Fact May Not Be Able," 03 October 1970.

⁴⁶ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Highest Levels Here Continue," 07 October 1970.

⁴⁷ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Instructs You Contact Military," 07 October 1970.

of them stand even a remote chance of achieving [USG] objective. Hence, Viaux
gamble, despite high risk factors, may commend itself to you."⁴⁸

In three pages, the CIA COS in Santiago made dramatically clear the problems he was facing in trying to carry out a near impossible task. Constructing a coup in a country where no one was willing to start the action was possible, but not if the United States wanted its involvement to remain secret, and certainly not if it wanted the action to be bloodless. As far as the Santiago station was concerned, Viaux was a no-win on all counts. Some days later, Santiago sent another message to Langley: "Station would appreciate firm and realistic guidelines from headquarters on what objectives to pursue in further dealings with General Viaux."⁴⁹

Reality Sinks In

Following this cable, CIA Headquarters initiated a series of study papers looking more deeply into the implications of supporting Viaux. The conclusions were not optimistic—one paper was titled "The Coup that Failed: The Effects on Allende and his Political Posture."⁵⁰ Reality was slowly sinking in at Langley and the White House:

> In summary, there is little climate in Chile to encourage or sustain a military move at this time, but Gen. Viaux continues to try with his major problems apparently being: (a) a sure way of containing the high command, especially Gen. Schneider in the early hours of a coup attempt, and (b) a method of controlling the pro-Allende mobs which very probably would swarm through downtown Santiago in the event of a coup attempt.⁵¹

The bottom line was that a Viaux coup would almost certainly result in American embarrassment and a strengthening of Allende's position. Inputs from both the CIA COS in Santiago and Amb. Korry made it clear that "Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty—perhaps less—to launch a successful coup." The point had been made, and the Track II staff, Kissinger included, came to the conclusion that "... a coup climate does not presently exist. [Karamessines] noted that the highly unpredictable Gen. Viaux is the only individual seemingly ready to attempt a coup and expressed the view that his chances of mounting a successful one were slight.... [Kissinger] observed that there presently appeared to be little the US can do to influence the Chilean situation one way or another. Those present concurred."⁵² This was acted upon the same day, and a directive was issued to the CIA in Santiago to cut off plotting with Viaux:

> It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. In essence our message was to state:

⁴⁸ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Station has arrived at Viaux Solution," 10 October 1970.

⁴⁹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "After Debriefing," 12 October 1970.

⁵⁰ Memorandum, "The Coup That Failed," 15 October 1970.

⁵¹ Memorandum, "Situation Report for Military Move," 13 October 1970.

⁵² Memorandum for the Record, "Minutes of the 40 Committee Meeting, 14 October 1970," 16 October 1970. (State)

10

‘We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets . . . the time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support.⁵³

Many commentators have pointed out that this message does not truly “turn off” the Viaux plotting or, as Kissinger has stated, end Track II plotting entirely. Subsequent messages, however, shed some light on this controversial issue. One particular piece of evidence is a memorandum Kissinger wrote to the President on 18 October 1970. This lengthy memorandum starts by stating: “It now appears certain that Allende will be elected president of Chile in the October 24 congressional run-off elections. He will be inaugurated November 3.”⁵⁴ It is clear that Kissinger accepted the reality—that no coup could occur in time—briefed to him by Amb. Korry and many other individuals involved in Chile. The next step, Kissinger stated, was “the formulation of a specific strategy to deal with an Allende government.” Further statements in the same memo indicate that this step should be taken because: “Our capacity to engineer Allende’s overthrow quickly has been demonstrated to be sharply limited.”⁵⁵ Having ordered the end to US involvement over the short term with the only individual actively plotting a coup, the executive took the next logical step of planning for a coherent policy towards an Allende government.

## Best Laid Plans...

While the White House was developing a new strategy for Chile, Viaux was continuing to solidify his plans. By 14 October, the CIA had learned that the Viaux group had decided that the best way for them to trigger a coup was to kidnap Gen. Schneider and remove him from Chile.⁵⁶ This would convince the Chilean military that chaos was just around the corner and, therefore, they should prevent Allende from taking power. By assuming power themselves to quell the “chaos,” they could open the way—under Chilean constitutional law—for new elections, which, it was assumed, Eduardo Frei would win. The kidnapping, the CIA learned, was set for 17 October “between 0200–0700.”⁵⁷

Coincident with the White House's decision to put Viaux on hold, a Chilean officer approached the United States requesting funds for a similar “kidnap Schneider” plan. Although it initially seemed possible that he was “fronting” for Viaux, the CIA concluded that he was not and decided to provide the individual with some funds to purchase weapons.⁵⁸ This was a last-ditch effort, and the Agency was told by another contact on the same day that “[Name deleted] believes that Viaux’s attempt to kidnap Schneider will *not be made* and now sees no possibility

⁵³ Memorandum of Conversation, “Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House,” 15 October 1970.

⁵⁴ Memorandum for the President, “Chile—Immediate Operational Issues,” 18 October, 1970. NSC cable accessed May/June 2002 at: <http://www.foia.state.gov/SearchColls/NSC.asp> using a “list all” function for both tranches.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, “Viaux Group Will Meet,” 14 October 1970.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*

⁵⁸ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, “Summoned Morning,” 16 October 1970.

11

for anything to happen prior 24 October. ... [CIA agent] reminded [Chilean contact] that US
stands ready to help with anything plotting elements may need." the Chilean contact replied with
an honesty that may have been the best summary to date of the Chilean situation. "what we
need", he said, "is not money but a general with b***s."⁵⁹

The appropriately equipped general was not far away, as it turned out. A memorandum of 16
October noted that "coup rumblings within and outside the military have increased in recent
days."⁶⁰ Gen. Valenzuela, still unsure of the necessity for a coup, arranged for a meeting with
Gen. Schneider on the evening of 16 October to attempt to convince the commander-in-chief of
the need for the military to intervene in the political process. The "meeting . . . turned out [to be
a] complete fiasco."⁶¹ The following night, Valenzuela, now finally convinced of the necessity
of direct action, sent a representative to meet with the US defense attaché in a dark corner of
Santiago. The contact requested three submachine-guns and tear-gas grenades. Despite
puzzlement over the need for these items, CIA Headquarters authorized Santiago fill the
request—they were delivered at 0200 hours on 22 October.⁶²

Officers in Washington were not fully aware of the provenance of the Valenzuela plot. CIA
Headquarters had several questions:

a. What happened between morning 17 October and evening 17 October to
change [deleted] from despondency to measured optimism?

b. Who, exactly, is involved in coup attempt?⁶³

As it turned out, the Valenzuela plot was almost the same as Viaux's plan, which had been
disclosed to the CIA on 14 October. Schneider would be kidnapped when leaving a stag party
that evening on the 19th. Once abducted, he would be flown to Argentina. Simultaneously, Frei
would resign and leave the country. The cabinet would also resign, and a junta led by an
unnamed general would dissolve the congress. The CIA learned that Valenzuela was at pains to
state to his fellow plotters that the dissolution of the congress would be their only
"unconstitutional act."⁶⁴ Gen. Viaux, although aware of the Valenzuela plot, was not involved, it
turned out. And Viaux, himself, may even have been a target for arrest by the Carabinieros in
the aftermath of a Valenzuela coup, since they planned to use the kidnapping to "justify a move
against leftist and rightist extremists."⁶⁵

The first attempt by the Valenzuela group to kidnap Schneider failed because his team "became
nervous due to inexperience."⁶⁶ A second attempt on the following night also failed, and the

⁵⁹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Meeting Disaster Concerning Schneider," 16 October 1970. Italics added.

⁶⁰ Memorandum, "Intelligence Note," 16 October 1970. See also "Track II," 14 October 1970.

⁶¹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Meeting Requested," 16 October 1970.

⁶² Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago, "Depending How Conversation Goes," 18 October 1970.

⁶³ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Realize this Message," 19 October 1970.

⁶⁴ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Chronology of Events 18 October," 19 October 1970. Although listed under "chronology of events 12 October," the date is clearly 18 October both in context and when examined with a magnifying glass. Cf. "Alleged Plots," p. 244.

⁶⁵ Memorandum, "Special Report," 22 October 1970.

⁶⁶ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Sent to Visit," 20 October 1970.

12

CIA assured Valenzuela that "USG support for anti-Allende action continues."<sup>67</sup> Valenzuela, for his part, assured the Americans that the Chilean military was still set to move. While assurances were being traded, the CIA concluded that "since Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospect for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appears remote."<sup>68</sup> There would be no kidnapping, no coup.

## Unexpected Turn

But, suddenly, events deviated from the anticipated script: Only five hours after the machine-guns were delivered to the Valenzuela group on 22 October, armed men ambushed Gen. Schneider on his way to work. Drawing his sidearm, Schneider was shot by the attackers, who were part of Viaux's gang. He died on the operating table on 25 October. The shooting occurred just 48-hours before Allende was to be confirmed in a congressional vote.

After the assassination, there was confusion among the CIA officers in Santiago, as well as a degree of hope. They were not entirely sure who had launched the attack, and whether it was a kidnapping attempt or an assassination attempt. They hoped that the assassination was the beginning of a move against Allende, but there was no evidence that this was going to occur.<sup>69</sup>

No coup immediately followed the shooting. On the morning of 24 October, an intelligence summary produced at Langley stated: "Yesterday Gen. Viaux informed some of his followers that a military coup would be attempted during the early hours of 24 October . . . [but] there has been thus far no indication that the conspirators intend to push on with their plans to overthrow the government."<sup>70</sup> The cable concluded: "It was agreed that given the short time span and the circumstances prevailing in Chile, a maximum effort has been achieved, and that now only Chileans themselves can manage a successful coup."

In Santiago, a state of emergency was imposed after the shooting. Viaux and his gang surrendered, fled, or were arrested. The military and the Carabineros were confined to barracks. Valenzuela was appointed "Jefe del Plaza for Law and Order," and one Gen. Prats filled the spot of the then still gravely injured Schneider. Allende's Unidad Popular (or up, the Communist front party) reacted immediately with public appeals to block any 'counter-revolutionary' actions and the resulting tension seemed to favor a coup. But the CIA still reported "Santiago is quiet."<sup>71</sup>

Whatever the intended outcome from the kidnapping/assassination, it ultimately increased the desire of the politicians and most of the military to ensure that the constitutional process was followed. Although Valenzuela was in a powerful position and could have taken over, the mood had changed so dramatically that he did not make a move. On Saturday, 24 October, Allende's

<sup>67</sup> Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Request Contact General Valenzuela," 22 October 1970.

<sup>68</sup> "Alleged Plots," p. 245.

<sup>69</sup> Memorandum, "Special Report," 22 October 1970.

<sup>70</sup> Memorandum, "Track II," 24 October 1970.

<sup>71</sup> Memorandum, "Intelligence Note," 23 October 1970. See also Memorandum, "Track II," 24 October 1970.

13

election as president was duly confirmed by the Chilean congress—with 153 votes in favor and only 42 votes either against or abstaining.⁷² Attempts to prevent Allende from taking power had failed.

## Examining the American Role

Although a successful military move against Allende had been unlikely from the start, the death of Gen. Schneider guaranteed the collapse of American hopes. Clearly Schneider's assassination was not in the interests of the American government. Could they have prevented it, and, if so, did they make any efforts to do so?

What the Americans did and did not know about the assassination becomes clear in the message traffic immediately following the murder. A cable of 22 October relates intelligence to the effect that Viaux's gang had been told that their coup attempt was to be carried out that day, and that it would be initiated by "something big" that would take place in the early morning hours. The cable continued by speculating, after the fact, that "the assassination attempt on General Schneider, Commander-in-Chief of the Army . . . was very likely the 'something big' which the plotters hoped to use to initiate their coup efforts."⁷³

The uncertainty of the CIA can be ascribed both to lack of contact with Viaux and a reduction in intelligence-gathering assets. The CIA had started to pull out its false-flag officers from Chile a week before the assassination, a move one would think unlikely if it was aware of a specific coup attempt. A memo dated 19 October 1970 states: "[Co-optee] not at all sanguine re chances preventing (sic) Allende from taking office and stressed fact that abortive coup now could spell end to any chance of success in future . . . [CIA agent] has done his work well and there are no further tasks for the false-flaggers at this time he will be instructed depart Santiago [del] October . . ."⁷⁴ Moreover, as of 21 October, the COS in Santiago was developing post-inauguration asset-management plans.⁷⁵

The record shows that the assassination took the station by surprise and that the CIA did not have absolute knowledge of Schneider's assassins. A cable, written on 3 November 1970, discussed a review of the assassination by the COS in Santiago, which stated that a particular Chilean contact "confirmed neither he nor [name sec del] involved in Schneider assassination."⁷⁶ If the CIA station was still discussing who may or may not have been involved in the assassination, and was seeking confirmation from its Chilean contacts, that indicates they did not have firm knowledge to begin with. If they had planned the attack, as some accounts maintain, would they not have known who executed the plan? Another cable discusses their lack of knowledge:

> Station unaware if assassination was premeditated or whether it constituted bungled abduction attempt . . . We know that Gen. Valenzuela was involved [sec

⁷² Sigmund, p. 123. See also Memorandum, Intelligence, "Recent Developments in Chile," 2 November 1970.

⁷³ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Supporters of General Viaux," 22 October 1970.

⁷⁴ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Suggested Retired Captain," 19 October 1970.

⁷⁵ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Reflect Realistic Assessment," 21 October 1970.

⁷⁶ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "On 2 Nov COS Reviewed," 3 November 1970.

del] we have reason for believing that Gen Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in, but cannot prove or disprove that execution of attempt against Schneider was entrusted to elements linked with Viaux. Important factor to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme rightists, set Schneider up for execution or abduction . . . Before trying to anticipate further course of events station would like to await events of 23rd Oct which will obviously be decisive.⁷⁷

Uncertain who had carried out the assassination, the CIA worried that the weapons it had provided to Valenzuela's group might have been responsible for Schneider's death. Were the American weapons in fact used in the kidnapping attempt that turned into murder? The answer appears to be no. One CIA cable from Chile, sent on 29 October, hints at the confusion in Santiago in the aftermath of the assassination, and the trouble it caused station officers in determining what was going on. The message says that marshal law made their work difficult, but that on 28 October they were "able to make first contact with [name deleted] . . . [deletion] stated that when first heard of Schneider's assassination on radio he was quite upset but has since been informed by [name deleted] that three machine guns and ammunition are still in [name deleted]'s home and never given to anybody. . . . Also [name deleted] still has three tear-gas canisters and three masks."⁷⁸

A CIA review of its own actions, undertaken in 1973, states that "three submachine-guns were provided to three military officers who planned to use them in instigating an uprising by the Armed Forces. This program was conducted at the request of President Nixon with the understanding that it was not to become known to the State Department or other members of the 40 Committee."⁷⁹ This is all true, but were the weapons given purposefully to assassinate Schneider? The CIA and the White House did not want Schneider assassinated. Documents from early October reveal that Washington understood that his death would benefit Allende more than it would his opposition by rallying "the army fully behind the flag of constitutionalism."⁸⁰ They trusted Valenzuela to carry out a kidnapping, but not Viaux, and to the last minute they attempted to keep Viaux from moving on his own.⁸¹ The CIA and Washington specifically did not want their weapons in the hands of the unstable and dangerous Viaux. Indeed, one message directly discounts Viaux's exhortations that his group "did not like killing."⁸²

Did Kissinger actually order an end to contact with Viaux? The evidence shows that he ordered Viaux to stand down at least over the short term. Did Kissinger intend Track II to end, as he has testified? Probably, but that was at a time when the White House, 40 Committee, Track II staff, and the CIA thought that Viaux was the only available option. Kissinger ended the Viaux operation while urging that pressure be kept on Allende "until such time as new marching orders are given."⁸³ What Kissinger wanted was Viaux stopped for the time being without an end to all domestic plotting, which might pay off in the long run. Essentially, he did not want to

⁷⁷ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Headquarters Will Have Noted," 22 October 1970.

⁷⁸ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Although Security Still Tight," 29 October 1970.

⁷⁹ Memorandum, "Overview Statements on CIA involvement in Chile in 1970," 20 February 1973.

⁸⁰ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Review of Significant Developments," 9 October 1970.

⁸¹ Memorandum, "Track II," 19 October 1970.

⁸² Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Reports that meeting of Viaux Group," 16 October 1970.

⁸³ "Alleged Plots," p. 242.

discourage any anti-Allende faction, but sought to reduce the US connection to the most extreme elements.

Perhaps Kissinger need not have worried about issues of control. As the Chilean situation underscored, foreign army officers are not light switches that can simply be "turned off." The CIA had spread the message that it was interested in a coup against Allende and "by now . . . all interested military parties know our position."⁸⁴ Whether the US position made a tremendous difference is a matter of dispute, and depends on how one views the autonomy of the Chilean officers who, even once American support for a coup apparently was toned down, continued to plot. This was clear from the moment that the CIA tried to "switch off" the plotters: "Station false-flag officer met with [Chilean] on [del] October and attempted to dissuade Viaux group from undertaking a coup. The group, however, had met on 16 October and decided to attempt a coup on 21 or 22 October." This was not restricted to Viaux's group; reporting indicated that everywhere "Coup plotting continues to flourish."⁸⁵

A cable from Santiago bears out US efforts to increase the distance between local officers and the plotters, saying that there was no one from the station sharing "in planning of professionally executed military coup, let alone to second guess ringleaders." Indeed it was "pointedly stated" that the onus for action belonged to the Chilean military from that time forward. On a wry note, the cable offers the observation that "this whole operation [was] so unprofessional and insecure that, in [the] Chilean setting, it could stand a chance of succeeding." All that was required of the station was to assure the plotters that they would not be left "high and dry" if their coup succeeded. "This we have done."⁸⁶ Kissinger, nonetheless, was most likely happy to hear that the opposition's plotting against Allende was going ahead, even if the reports he heard offered little chance of success.

Many have doubted the subsequent Hill testimony of Henry Kissinger and Gen. Alexander Haig, his deputy, who said that they knew nothing of the plots against Schneider.⁸⁷ Throughout the crucial weeks in October 1970, information continued to flow to Broe and Karamessines at CIA Headquarters, and both of these men testified that they met with Kissinger during this period. Attesting to connections at the most senior levels, a cable from his office to Santiago on 18 October demands details of coup plotting because "high level policy decisions in USG may become necessary..."⁸⁸ On 19 October, a message from CIA Headquarters informs Santiago that "[we] feel we must be prepared advise higher echelons of nature of new military leaders and their programs in event coup attempted or even succeeds."⁸⁹ Karemessines stated in the same Congressional investigation that he had kept the White House abreast of all developments. His statements appear plausible in light of currently available documentation.

The bottom line, in my view, is that Kissinger and the White House were aware of the coup plotting and were happy to see it go ahead, but at the same time had no control over events.

⁸⁴ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Agree [deleted] Should Cease," 20 October 1970.

⁸⁵ Memorandum, "Track II," 19 October, 1970.

⁸⁶ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Station Making No Attempt," 19 October 1970.

⁸⁷ "Alleged Plots," pp. 246-249.

⁸⁸ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Realize this Message," 18 October 1970.

⁸⁹ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Recognize it Much," 19 October, 1970.

Moreover, in light of the CIA's surprise over the death of Gen. Schneider, the White House neither planned nor desired the assassination. Moreover, they may have failed to realise the level of complicity between all the various factions involved in coup plotting. Ultimately, it may have been impossible to separate the plotting of one group from the next.

When did Track II officially end? There are no memoranda or cables under the title "Track II" after the inauguration of Allende on 3 November 1970. The last mention of Track II in the CIA's documents is a report of the CIA's summary of Track II activity being delivered to the Attorney General on 2 December 1970.⁹⁰ An enigmatic cable dated 26 May 1971, may hold the key. This one line message reads: "Project [deleted] termination approved effective 30 June 1971."⁹¹ Could the deleted word be "Fubelt"? Regardless, Track II, which aimed at precipitating a military takeover to prevent Allende's inauguration, effectively ended when that aim failed eight months earlier.

Despite the formal demise of Track II, American efforts to remove Allende continued throughout his administration. Karamessines, the CIA officer in charge of coordinating anti-Allende operations, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in 1975 that: "Track II was never really ended. What we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert, and do what we could to contribute to the eventual achievement and the objectives and purposes of Track II."⁹² In other words, covert operations to encourage a regime change by indirect means, which had always been a part of Track I, continued for several more years.

Nonetheless, the experience of 1970 carried its own lessons about the limits of American power. Through its machinations in Chile, Washington received a strong reminder that the power of the state operates on a significantly different level then that of individual actors. Though sincere in their fear of an irreversible Marxist regime in Chile, American leaders stopped short of promoting the use of outright force at all costs, a caution that sharply limited the exercise of American power. For all of America's banks and investments, nuclear missiles and aircraft carriers, it was not able to influence men such as Frei, Schneider, or Viaux to march to its tune.

⁹⁰ Memorandum, Helms to Kissinger, "Delivery of Chile Paper on Track II," 2 December 1970.

⁹¹ Cable, "Project Termination Approval," 26 May 1971.

⁹² "Alleged Plots," p. 248.

OCT 23 2003

OBSERVATIONS

Watching Christopher Hitchens

Mark Falcoff

IT IS a good two decades since the journalist Christopher Hitchens first burst upon the awareness of the American media and intellectual class. Almost from the moment of his arrival in this country from Great Britain, he has been a howling success—far more so, indeed, than another British leftist, Alexander Cockburn, who came more or less at the same time and with whom he was formerly much paired.

Hitchens's rapid advance is traceable to several factors. Unlike most journalists, a notoriously indolent race, he is remarkably industrious and prolific. In sharp contrast to his American counterparts, he is also widely read in literature, history, and politics. His polemical skills are considerable, and he wields a razor-sharp pen with dexterity.

And there are two other essential elements in Hitchens's baggage. In his frequent television appearances, Hitchens is able to deploy a plummy English accent of the kind that

MARK FALCOFF is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. His new book, Cuba the Morning After, will be out later this year.

causes garden-variety American liberals to swoon. Finally, he has been ready from the start to say perfectly outrageous, even obscene things about our society, our politics, and our foreign policy; this has earned him the bankable accolades "provocative" and "controversial," code words in mediaspeak for sentiments that can be extreme or perverse but still recognizably on the continuum of what everybody in enlightened circles already thinks.

Lately, however, Hitchens seems to have been shifting ideological gears. The first sign was the publication several years ago of *Nobody Left to Lie To*, a distinctly unadmiring book on Bill and Hillary Clinton. This little tome, whose title tells all, appeared at the very moment that the impeachment hearings and the Monica Lewinsky affair were approaching their climax in Washington. Not a few of Hitchens's admirers on the liberal Left felt that, all things considered, and regardless of whether he was right or wrong about the character of the President and Mrs. Clinton, this exercise was a bit, well, *unhelpful*. To compound the sin, Hitchens found

himself entangled, through no fault of his own, in the investigation of the President by the special prosecutor when he revealed some inconvenient facts about Clinton's hatchet-man Sidney Blumenthal. So deep was the hot water into which he fell among his leftist friends that the *Washington Post* was driven to query him about the effect of these events on his social life; was he, an interviewer wanted to know, still being invited to Georgetown dinner parties?

Since September 11, 2001, Hitchens has ventured into even more perilous territory. Thus, he supported the decision of the Bush administration to go into Afghanistan to uproot al Qaeda's hold on that country. In his regular column in the *Nation* and elsewhere, Hitchens also confronted head-on the Left's generally forgiving view of Islamic fundamentalism, coining the colorful term "Islamofascism" to characterize Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and other Islamist regimes and movements. More recently, in an article in the *Washington Post* ("So Long, Fellow Travelers"), he came out foursquare against the antiwar

[41]

COMMENTARY JANUARY 2003

Left and in favor of a preemptive strike on Iraq. (One sample: "[T]he same people . . . who don't think Saddam has any weapons of mass destruction will argue the next moment that if attacked he will unleash them with devastating effect. . . . Instead of internationalism, we find among the Left now a sort of affectless, neutralist, smirking isolationism.") Perhaps not surprisingly, he announced at the same time that he would no longer be writing his column for the *Nation*.

WHAT HAS happened to Hitchens, and why? He himself would maintain that he has not changed at all; it is *others*, his former comrades, who have strayed from the true principles of socialist internationalism. But this is at best only partly true.

Originally a Trotskyist, at some point in the 1980's Hitchens drifted toward a kind of pink-tinged European neutralism *cum* knee-jerk anti-Americanism. There he seems to have stayed mired until only a year or so ago. His brother Peter, another erstwhile Trotskyist but now an outspoken Tory, recalls arguing with him on the relative merits of the Western and Communist systems at about the moment the Reagan administration was deploying SS-20 missiles in Europe to counter the Soviet threat. On that occasion, according to Peter, Christopher avowed fraternally that it was all the same to *him* "if the Red Army wavered its horses in [the London sub-urb of] Hendon."

As if to underscore his enduring left-wing and *tiermoniste* credentials, Hitchens has been steadily in the forefront of the hard Left's crusade against Zionism and the state of Israel, working closely with the notorious Edward Said to give this low endeavor a patina of intellectual respectability (see their co-edited volume, *Blaming the Victim*, 1988). Over the years, as he himself recently put it, he has done "a good deal of marching and public speaking about Vietnam, Chile, South

Africa, Palestine, and East Timor (and would do it all again)."

Some of his current writings, moreover, remain very much in the old mold. *The Trial of Henry Kissinger* (2001) purports to reveal the criminal nature of the policies carried out by the American Secretary of State during the Nixon era. It includes two chapters on Chile—a subject on which I can claim some particular expertise—that are highly revealing of Hitchens's polemical method. This consists of seizing upon one particular document or set of documents that seems damning, while wholly neglecting or passing over every relevant historical and political context. In the case of Chile, the simple fact of the matter is that, Kissinger or no Kissinger, Chile's Marxist president Salvador Allende, who features as the martyred hero in Hitchens's tale of American perfidy, would have peacefully finished out his term of office if he had not pushed his country into triple-digit inflation, wrought havoc with the rule of law, attempted to manipulate the armed forces, and allowed a free hand to squadrons of sinister "security" operators from Cuba and East Germany. But one would never glean any of this from the skewed and reductive "history" offered up in *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*.

HITCHENS'S SLIPPERY way with facts and contexts can be seen to even clearer effect in his latest book, *Why Orwell Matters.* George Orwell is of course one of the seminal intellectual and political figures of the 20th century, and for many the most important precursor of neo-conservatism. He is best known for his novels *Animal Farm* and 1984, the first an evident satire on the Soviet Union, the second a chilling look at our possible future under a Soviet-style totalitarian state. But it is a lesser-known volume, *Homage to Catalonia* (1952), which most clearly charted his political journey.

As a man of the Left, Orwell had

gone to Spain in 1937 to fight against the fascist regime of General Franco. He joined the POUM militia, a socialist formation with political links to Britain's Independent Labor party. But his experiences in Spain afforded him a rare opportunity to observe Stalinism in action, as the Moscow-directed forces in the Spanish popular front were driven less to combat Franco than to liquidate other left-wing groups, often by means of the most brutal instrumentalities. Stunned by his near-inability, once he returned to Britain, to get a hearing in "progressive" circles for his account of events, Orwell became a major critic of leftist and, during World War II, pacifist humbug.

Thanks to his crystalline prose and his clear thinking about politics, Orwell's prestige has only risen since his premature death in 1949. But so has the bifurcation in left-wing views of his legacy. The serious pro-Communist Left, particularly in Britain, continues to regard him as a turncoat: an ex-socialist who sold out to the establishment. More artful (or more cynical) persons in the academic and literary worlds, especially in the United States, have preferred to reinterpret Orwell as a prophet of globalization and American "empire." I can recall a conference at Hofstra University several years ago at which a professor proclaimed with assurance that the totalitarian society depicted in 1984 was—the United States!

Which brings us back to *Why Orwell Matters*. The book amounts to a short tour through Orwell's writings, organized around several key themes, the evident purpose of which is to identify Hitchens himself with certain ideas that informed the master's work. There are in fact some broad similarities: Orwell was, and remained to his death, a self-avowed socialist and anti-Stalinist as well as an anti-imperialist and anti-Zionist. (The apparent anomaly of his anti-Zionism is a subject

* Basic Books, 208 pp., $24.00.

[42]

OBSERVATIONS

unto itself.) In each of these respects, Hitchens can be said to resemble him. What is far less clear, however, is whether Hitchens has ever been, like Orwell, an anti-Communist (as opposed to merely an anti-Stalinist), much less whether he was ever, again like Orwell, a firm opponent of the foreign policies of the Soviet Union and its various clients and satellites.

As for other points of contact: it is also true that Orwell harbored views on England, on feminism, and on the political culture of the literary Left that were then and would today be profoundly unacceptable to right-thinking (or rather left-thinking) people. Some of these, particularly Orwell's attitude toward women and homosexuals, Hitchens clearly does *not* share. Reflecting his own evident change of mind about the U.S. since September 11, Hitchens also now regrets that Orwell lacked any real curiosity about American culture, and himself goes so far as to entertain the thought that "the American Revolution, with its promise of cosmopolitan democracy, is the only 'model' revolution humanity has left to it."

But this exercise serves only to underline the difficulties that inevitably freight any attempt to compare the attitudes of two writers who are so far distant in time. Here again, context, Hitchens's weak point, is crucial. Orwell was indeed a firm anti-imperialist. But he died before the vast majority of the colonial world had been freed from European domination. If he were alive today, would he be so confident in his views? To what extent are the values of Orwell's (and Hitchens's) "anti-imperialist" Left—to what degree, for that matter, is ordinary human decency—respected and honored in such post-imperialist, post-colonial nirvanas as Vietnam, Cambodia, Cuba, Syria, Algeria, Pakistan, almost all of sub-Saharan Africa, or the precincts of the Palestinian Authority? How does the fate of their peoples today compare with

the earlier period of European administration? Although Hitchens does manage to record his own disillusionment with Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe, from this lone concession he does not draw any larger lesson about what has been wrought around the globe by a half-century of post-colonial praxis.

IN HIS attempt to rescue Orwell from both the strictures of the Stalinoid Left and the tendency of American neoconservatives to claim him as a precursor, Hitchens is likewise only partially successful. It is perhaps telling that the chapter on the depredations of the Left is more than twice the size of the one on the alleged misappropriations of the Right. In the former, Hitchens takes on and dispatches such intellectual frauds as Raymond Williams ("the overrated doyen of cultural studies") and the French Nobel laureate Claude Simon, as well as more recent leftist revisionists who have invented a "McCarthyite" Orwell based very loosely on the latter's distaste for British fellow travelers of Soviet Communism. In the chapter on the Right, Hitchens's entire argument against those who in his opinion have illegitimately drailed Orwell into the ranks of conservatism may be summarized in this rather lame sentence: "George Orwell was conservative about many things, but not about politics."

Well, yes, up to a point. But (context once more) "politics" itself is not about the same things—power, wealth, authority—it was about in the 1930's and 40's. Today, at least in the advanced industrial countries, politics has devolved into a competition over status, culture, and "lifestyle choices." Where would Orwell, a "conservative about many things," find himself in an America where key Senate races have been determined by candidates' positions not on Social Security or tort reform or trade policy but on abortion? Where would Orwell, a firm English patriot, place himself in the

controversy over the dissolution of the United Kingdom and its seemingly inevitable submergence into the European Union, a fictitious entity run by faceless, corrupt, overpaid, and unaccountable bureaucrats in Brussels? As an outspoken defender of self-determination for colored peoples, what attitude would he take up on the subject of multiculturalism—which is to say, the abdication by European or American societies of the right to have newcomers respect their values, their languages, their civil and social pacts?

Evidently, Christopher Hitchens still believes in politics in the old sense. This may hint at the root of his current problem with so many former friends and allies with whose general orientation he still tends to identify himself. On the subject of the Democrats, for example, Hitchens could not help noticing, as a leftist of the older sort, that the President and his wife were impostors—opportuneists who mouthed progressive slogans while striking whatever deals were necessary to advance their careers. The reason this argument fell flat in liberal circles is easy to explain. Since the Democrats were on the right side of a "woman's right to choose," on the right side of affirmative action, on the right side of bilingual education, and so forth down the line, the rest—including Clinton's cozy relationship with shadier elements in the business and financial communities—simply did not matter.

Something similar could be said about the failure of Hitchens's current position on Afghanistan and Iraq to resonate with the community of Nation readers. Here he is again in the *Washington Post*:

> You might think that the Left could have a regime-change perspective of its own, based on solidarity with its comrades abroad. . . . When I first became a socialist, the imperative of international solidarity was the essential if not the defining thing, whether the cause was popular or

[43]

COMMENTARY JANUARY 2003

risky or not. I haven't seen an anti-war meeting all this year at which you could even guess at the existence of the Iraqi or Kurdish opposition to Saddam, an opposition that was fighting for "regime change" when both Republicans and Democrats were fawning over Baghdad as a profitable client and geopolitical ally. Not only does the "peace" movement ignore the anti-Saddam civilian opposition, it sends missions to console the Baathists in their isolation, and speaks of the invader of Kuwait and Iran and the butcher of Kurdistan as if he were a victim of George W. Bush the aggressor.

Very well said, indeed. To judge by the slogans and statements of the

antiwar Left, however, this line is unlikely to take Hitchens very far, and that is because none of his former comrades and admirers seems particularly interested in Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, or even, when push comes to shove, the fate of the Palestinian people. All they know, and all they need to know, is that they hate America and its supposed surrogate Israel. In such a situation, there is precious little dialogue to be teased out; not even an incendiary tract on Henry Kissinger is likely to redress the weights.

So where does that leave the "controversial" and "provocative" Hitchens? As George Orwell discovered, and many former leftists after him, the worst possible thing one can do is to speak the truth to

one's comrades. That is how many people ended up becoming neoconservatives in the first place—that, plus the hard work of thinking through the implications of each of their wonted attitudes and allegiances. But hard work of this kind is what still lies ahead of Hitchens, who himself has yet to face the truly troublesome points of consanguinity between the leftism he still espouses and the causes he now deplores—including the phenomenon he identifies by the ideologically slanted term Islamofascism—and who has sought to cover his confusion by piggybacking on the reputation of a much greater man. It will be interesting to watch the further unfolding, if there is to be one, of this work in progress.

[44]

COMMENTARY APRIL 2003

technologies played a key role. And that is not to mention the thousands of construction engineers who erected radio towers across the country, or the millions of investors who provided the necessary capital.

Mr. Hundt attributes the rise of the Internet to "technological talent, coupled with FCC policy." Online "information services" were in fact completely deregulated in the 1970's and have not been touched since—hence that quaintly dated catch-all label, "information services," which regulators still attach to everything from Amazon to Google to your bank's automated teller machine. Mr. Hundt's FCC did vote in 1997 to continue the policy, adopted a decade earlier, of permitting Internet service providers to use the local telephone network without paying for it, and that policy undoubtedly did temporarily help depress prices for dial-up Internet access. But it simultaneously slowed deployment of high-speed services by forcing them to compete against the "free" alternative. Mr. Hundt's hand-picked successor, William Kennard, also voted to require local phone companies to provide a free high-speed conduit on their lines to competing providers like Covad. The FCC has now repudiated that policy.

Mr. Hundt says that in 1996 Congress instructed him "to create" wireline competition. It did nothing of the sort. Instead, it instructed him to open markets and let competition run its course. Mr. Hundt now urges Congress to subsidize additional investment in broadband facilities. But with the unqualified support of the very companies

that stand to benefit from this investment—equipment and computer suppliers like Intel, Corning, and Lucent—a unanimous Commission found recently that the best way to promote additional broadband investment is through less government intrusion, not more.

Finally, Mr. Hundt asserts that court challenges to his rules "resulted in major victories for the FCC." The unbundling rules, from which everything else followed, were rejected twice: once, soundly, by the Supreme Court in 1999 and then—after the FCC ignored the Supreme Court and reinstated them—re soundingly by a federal appellate court in 2002. In February of this year, one maverick Republican on the Commission joined two Democrats in an attempt to impose Mr. Hundt's rules a third time, by delegating to state regulators the authority to keep them in place.

What will be the result? As Harold Furchtgott-Roth notes, the Commission has been handed a remarkably broad range of powers. But as he also cogently demonstrates in his forthcoming book, judges are now reviewing the Commission's handiwork more critically than they used to. Three current commissioners continue to act much as Mr. Furchtgott-Roth describes, proceeding on the assumption that the FCC can get away with anything by simply being more patient and persistent than the courts. When Mr. Hundt's rules make their third trip back to court some time later this year, those commissioners are likely to be proved wrong.

Left to Right

TO THE EDITOR:

Mark Falcoff's rather generous review of my work is too kind in one respect, misinformed in another, and misleading in still another ["Watching Christopher Hitchens," January].

I cannot claim credit for coining the now-current term "Islamofascism," though I did write in September 2001 that American society had just been assaulted by "fascism with an Islamic face." I slightly prefer the nuance of the latter.

As for the preposterous, vulgar remark maliciously attributed to me by my younger brother, Peter, to the effect that I would not mind seeing the Red Army watering its horses in the Thames, I never made it. Nor, while I am on the subject, did I ever make the statement attributed to me by Martin Amis—and cited in *COMMENTARY* by David Pryce-Jones [Books in Review, October 2002]—to the effect that Stalin only created food "shortages" in the Ukraine.

This is more than a matter of my word against theirs. In the first place, one can be either a Trotskyist or a Stalinist but not both: I was a member of one of the most intransigently anti-Stalinist "groupuscules." Moreover, if those were my views, they would have shown up somewhere in my more than three decades of writing and public speaking, and of course no such trace will be found or has ever been sourced.

It could be established, however, that I helped to organize a small protest in Cuba against the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, that I was present at one of the founding

meetings of the Polish KOR (Workers Defense Committee) in 1975, that I wrote a pamphlet highlighting the work of the prescient East German dissident Rudolf Bahro in 1979, and that I was arrested and briefly detained at a meeting of Charter 77 in Prague in 1988. It is not my fault if my brother is a fanatic and a fool (Mr. Falcoff might have mentioned that Peter's slur was part of a high-pitched attack on Tony Blair's support for the war against the Taliban), or if for once in his life the brilliant but apolitical Amis failed to get the point of an admittedly ar-cane Marxist joke.

Finally, in criticizing *The Trial of Henry Kissinger*, my little book on Kissinger's many offenses, Mr. Falcoff asserts that I distort the record with respect to the Nixon administration's involvement in Chile, and states that Salvador Allende would have been allowed to serve out his term as president if not for the many deformities of his regime. In my book, however, I produce documents that plainly show the orchestration of a plot to murder General Rene Schneider, a constitutional officer and political conservative who was opposed to a coup, *before* Allende had even been confirmed by the Chilean congress in 1970. If Mr. Falcoff, who cites his own "particular expertise" in Chilean matters, can refute this charge, he had better make haste. The general's family has brought suit against Kissinger in a federal court in Washington, D.C., and every paper for the prosecution is a declassified document of the U.S. government.

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS

*Washington, D.C.*

[6]

COMMENTARY APRIL 2003

TO THE EDITOR:

Mark Falcoff writes that, in the early 1970's, Chile's Marxist president Salvador Allende "allowed a free hand to squadrons of sinister 'security' operatives from Cuba and East Germany."

I had never heard this before. I have always considered the overthrow of Allende an after-the-fact example of "Eisenhowerism." Eisenhower failed to grasp that you cannot fight Communism by fighting democracy. In 1953, he helped to overthrow the legally elected government of Iranian premier Mohammad Mossadegh, and in similar fashion, he canceled elections in Vietnam in 1956 that were intended to unify the country after the French departed.

I sincerely hope that Mark Falcoff, who claims "particular expertise" on Chile, can tell us more about East German and Cuban activities there. I would be happy to learn that what happened in Chile was not another case of this failed policy.

GEORGE JOCHNOWITZ
College of Staten Island
Staten Island, New York

TO THE EDITOR:

Mark Falcoff writes that Christopher Hitchens and his brother argued about the merits of Communism "at about the moment the Reagan administration was deploying SS-20 missiles in Europe to counter the Soviet threat." But it was the Soviet Union—not the U.S.—that deployed SS-20 missiles. They were stationed in Warsaw Pact countries in the 1970's to intimidate Western Europe and to cause a split in NATO. The Reagan administration countered by

installing Pershing II missiles in Western Europe in November 1983.

STEPHEN H. CHOPEK
Westland, Michigan

MARK FALCOFF writes:

I had better start by warning Christopher Hitchens that I may be forced to be even more generous to him in the future. Quite apart from the fact that he has been facing down the enemy at its epicenter in Berkeley, California, his recent articles have been superb. For example, in the *London Daily Mirror* (February 20) he ardently prayed for rain to dampen the "peace demonstration" there, which he characterized as driven by "clapped-out pseudo-Marxists who in their hearts have a nostalgia for the days of the one-party state and secretly regard Saddam as an anti-imperialist... assisted by an impressive number of fundamentalist Muslims who mouth the gibberish slogans of holy war but who don't give a damn for the suffering inflicted by Saddam on their co-religionists. A more gruesome political alliance," he concluded, "I have never seen."

Well, actually one has. During the period of the Hitler-Stalin pact (1939-41), many, many "Marxists," Trotskyists, and "leftists" of varying hues (among them the late Irving Howe, now a cult figure for the democratic Left in this country) subscribed to the notion that the true "imperialists" of the day were not the Nazis or the Soviets but the British, the French, and the Poles. One leftist who did not share that view was George Orwell. In that sense, Mr. Hitchens is in tandem with his hero.

Let me now turn to his specific comments. If Mr. Hitchens never made the remark attributed to him by his brother, his quarrel is not with me but with his sibling. But at no point did I suggest that Mr. Hitchens had ever been both a Trotskyist and a Stalinist. Not at all. What I would indeed say is that it is by definition impossible to be both a Trotskyist and an anti-Communist.

I can see that Christopher Hitchens has not read my book, *Modern Chile, 1970-89: A Critical History* (1989), so let me summarize its findings in connection with General Schneider. There was never a CIA plot—or, as far as I know, a plot by anyone else—to murder General Schneider, the commander-in-chief of the Chilean army. There *was* a CIA plot to kidnap him and send him off to Argentina for a season because he opposed the idea of a "legalistic" military coup that—in place of respecting the razor-thin electoral victory of the Marxist Salvador Allende—would have given Chile a provisional government for, say, a week. This would then have allowed new elections, in which the outgoing Christian Democratic president Eduardo Frei (1964-70) would suddenly have become freed of the technicality forbidding any president in Chile from running for two consecutive terms. Most people believed at the time (and still believe today) that in a two-man race between Frei and Allende, Allende would have lost.

As I point out in my book, General Schneider's murder was an accident. He pulled his pistol to defend himself from his kidnapi

pers; they, mostly young amateurs, panicked, shot him, and fled. He died in a military hospital several days later. As it happens, the kidnappers were one of two groups the CIA was working with, although not the one selected for the kidnapping. They had gone ahead and acted on their own, as often happens in such cases.

But there is more. "The effect of the Schneider debacle," I write in *Modern Chile*, "was precisely the opposite of what was desired" by the CIA and the Nixon administration: "it transformed the victim into a martyr of the 'constitutionalist' traditions of the Chilean army; it encouraged other constitutionalist officers to support an orderly transfer of power to the new [Allende] administration; and it discredited right-wing cabals both in the army and outside of it." This happy situation would have continued right on to the end of Allende's term in 1976 had he followed a more moderate and sensible course instead of the one I described in my article.

I am well aware that there has been a massive declassification of documents relating to the U.S. role in Chile in the Allende period. As a matter of fact, I was invited several years ago by a State Department/CIA task force to brief the personnel who had been assigned to plow through the several boxcar loads of documents. I have followed their progress with interest. Nothing has come to light about the U.S. role in the Schneider affair that was not already known as a result of the Senate's Church-committee investigations as far back as 1972 and 1973,

[8]

COMMENTARY APRIL 2003

and nothing establishes the
facts beyond what I have
recited above. I would rec-
ommend that the Schnei-
der family find a better use
for their money than spend-
ing it on pricey Washing-
ton lawyers.

Which brings me to
George Jochnowitz. If this
is the first time Mr. Joch-
nowitz has heard about
East-bloc and Cuban in-
volvement in Allende's Chi-
le, he, too, needs to do some
reading. The Cuban "diplo-
matic pouch" to Chile of-
ten took the form of huge
crates containing weapon-
ry, and Allende's personal
security was handled by
Cuban intelligence people.
(His daughter, who ended
up marrying one of them,
later committed suicide in
Cuba when she discovered
he was already married.)
The Cuban embassy in San-
tiago consisted of more than
200 people—roughly ten
times the size one would
normally expect. These and
other details are available in
my book.

I would also suggest that
Mr. Jochnowitz look at the
memoirs of Jorge Edwards,
*Persona Non Grata* (1993);
Edwards was the Chilean
chargé d'affaires in Havana
at the beginning of Allende's
administration. He might
also find edifying the recol-
lections of Jorge Masetti, a
former Cuban intelligence
officer, titled *In the Pirate's
Den: My Life as a Secret
Agent for Castro* (2001). Nor
would it hurt to consult
Markus Wolf's *Man With-
out a Face* (1999), the mem-
oirs of the former head of
the East German secret po-
lice. Needless to say, these
titles do not exhaust the
possibilities.

I thank Stephen H. Cho-
pek for correcting my slip
of the pen.

Bioethics

TO THE EDITOR:

Gary Rosen focuses on
the political opposition to
Leon Kass, but the real
issue is Kass's arguments
themselves, not how they
have been spun ["Who's
Afraid of Leon Kass?,""
January]. Kass holds that
cloning, some stem-cell re-
search, and other new bio-
technologies offend cer-
tain values, but he has no
rational basis for elevating
those values, except, ulti-
mately, faith.

That is a problem, espe-
cially for public-policy rec-
ommendations whose justi-
fication is supposed to be
accessible to citizens as such,
not just to a select group of
the faithful. In a country as
highly diverse as the U.S.,
sectarian public policies
generate hostilities; they im-
pose elements of a faith on
many who do not share the
faith. That is when political
nastiness comes into play.
What is one to do about a
faith one does not share ex-
cept try to stop it from gain-
ing political backing?

Perhaps Kass—and Mr.
Rosen—would claim that
there is no viewpoint or phi-
losophy that is free of pre-
suppositions whose truth
cannot be demonstrated.
But that is not so when it
comes to chemistry or
physics or even cosmology,
where one can show the
premises on which the dis-
cipline is based to be true at
least beyond a reasonable
doubt. Wherever premises
rest on faith, consensus is
not well-founded but acci-
dental.

TIBOR R. MACHAN

Silverado, California

TO THE EDITOR:

As Gary Rosen rightly
points out in his clear, fair,

and insightful essay, human
dignity is not as obviously
threatened by biotechnolo-
gy as Leon Kass believes.
But Mr. Rosen is also right
that liberals should not por-
tray Kass as the bête noire
of bioethics. Indeed, if any-
thing, Mr. Rosen under-
states the attraction that
Kass's moral views should
exert for liberals like myself.

Though the boosters of
biotechnology have ridi-
culed Kass's notion of the
"wisdom of repugnance"—
the visceral distaste on
which he supposedly bases
all of his moral views—they
make similar emotional ap-
peals, Mr. Rosen argues,
when they invoke what he
calls the "wisdom of com-
passion." I would add that
liberals have feelings of re-
pugnance, too. Many feel a
visceral disgust about de-
spoiling the environment,
to take a leading example,
and they are quite ready to
base policy on these feel-
ings. Yet it is rare to hear
calls for rational explana-
tions of these feelings.

Mr. Rosen's essay shows
that Kass is ahead of liber-
als in this respect. Kass rec-
ognizes that inarticulate re-
pugnance alone does not
ground a moral view, and he
turns to the concept of hu-
man dignity to articulate and
justify his feelings. For Kass,
human dignity is rooted in
physical human nature—it
is bound up with the terms
of our "embodied" existence,
with "our natural origins
and attachments." Kass tries
to evoke in his readers a kind
of reverence (albeit quali-
fied and limited) for what
nature has ordained.

Those who identify them-
selves as environmentalists
should at least be willing to
listen to this plea. In many
cases, concerns about envi-
ronmental destruction can-

not really be justified in
terms of anything except
reverence for nature—
broadened from Kass's fo-
cus on human nature to in-
clude nature more broadly.
Why else save the snail
darter from sure extinction?

Kass's critics charge that
appeals to human dignity
stand in the same need of de-
fense as feelings of repug-
nance. If so, the same must
be said about the environ-
mentalists' stance toward na-
ture. Arguably, it can also be
said about any of our funda-
mental moral commitments;
at some point in our justifi-
cations we just plunk for what
we care about. As the
philosophers say these days,
none of our moral views can
be rationally justified "all the
way down."

GREGORY E. KAEBNICK

The Hastings Center
Garrison, New York

GARY ROSEN writes:

Tibor R. Machan is cer-
tainly right that we should
focus on Leon Kass's actu-
al arguments rather than on
how they have been pre-
sented—and distorted—by
his critics. Having said as
much, however, Mr. Machan
proceeds to pluck from the
shelf the most shopworn
and hysterical of the charges
against Kass: that his objec-
tions to various biotech-
nologies are nothing more
than the expression of some
deep-seated "faith," thus
supposedly rendering him
unfit for rational public dis-
course.

Mr. Machan does not say
which of Kass's views he has
in mind. In my own readings
of Kass's work in bioethics, I
have yet to come across an
argument whose force de-
pends on assumptions shared
only by what Mr. Machan
calls "a select group of the
faithful." Kass does draw

[10]

09/04/03 03:25 PM

Subject: Kissinger article

Attached is the article to which Dr. Kissinger referred to in his recent conversation with
you. I have sent a hard copy by ordinary mail. Mark Falcoff, American Enterprise Institute
(See attached file: Kissinger and Chile.doc)

This communication may contain information that is legally privileged, confidential or
exempt from disclosure. If you are not the intended recipient, please note that any
dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited.
Anyone who receives this message in error should notify the sender immediately by
telephone or by return e-mail and delete it from his or her computer.

William Rogers
Arnold & Porter
555 Twelfth Street, NW
Washington, DC 20004-1202

William_Rogers@aporter.com

Telephone: 202-942-5915
Fax: 202-942-5999

For more information about Arnold & Porter, click here:
http://www.arnoldporter.com

Mark Falcoff
American Enterprise Institute
[202] 862-5902 or
[202] 234-1661
email: [markfalcoff@aol.com](mailto:markfalcoff@aol.com)

KISSINGER AND CHILE: THE MYTH THAT WILL NOT DIE

By Mark Falcoff¹

On the morning of October 22, 1970, General René Schneider, commander-in-chief of the Chilean army, was being driven to work at the Defense Ministry near the Presidential Palace in downtown Santiago. As his Mercedes neared a major intersection, five cars suddenly appeared out of nowhere to block its progress—four in front, one from behind. As Schneider's vehicle came to a halt eight men leaped from the obstructing cars and began smashing the windows of the general's vehicle. Schneider reached into his briefcase for a pistol, which apparently provoked one or more of the attackers into firing several shots, four of which struck vital areas of the general's body. Suddenly seized by panic, the assailants took flight, some discarding the arms they had used near the scene of the crime. The general was rushed to the capital's Military Hospital, where he died three days later.

¹ Mark Falcoff is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. His books include *Modern Chile, 1970-1989: A Critical History*; *Small Countries, Large Issues*; and most recently, *Cuba the Morning After: Confronting Castro's Legacy*.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 2

This homicide was no casual act of delinquency, but a crime of high
political and even international consequence. More than thirty years later, it
remains the first and most sensational article on a long charge sheet against
U.S. policy in Chile during the 1970s, and very specifically, of former Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger, who was then serving as national security adviser in
the Nixon administration in Washington. The supposed connection between the
murder of General Schneider and an exceptionally bloody coup in Chile three
years later also forms the basis of a stinging moral indictment brandished by
Christopher Hitchens in his book *The Trials of Henry Kissinger* as well as of a
BBC "documentary" of the same name in which Hitchens appears in the role of
prosecutor-in-chief. There is even a campaign afoot to bring the Schneider case
before U.S. courts. The sons of the general, egged on by political sympathizers
in Europe and the United States, have filed suit in hopes of recovering very
substantial damages from Kissinger for the murder itself.

How did a Chilean general—a man virtually unknown outside his own
country, and probably not precisely a household word within it—fall to
assassins’ bullets? The starting point was a presidential election which had
taken place almost six weeks before his death. As was usual in Chile, there
were several candidates. One—Salvador Allende, a Socialist and avowed
Marxist, running in coalition with the Communist party—came in first with
36.3 percent of the vote. But within a razor’s edge behind him was former
President Jorge Alessandri, the candidate of the right, who received 34.9
percent. Radomiro Tomic, representing the ruling Christian Democrats, came in
third with 27.8 percent.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 3

Presidential elections in which no candidate received an absolute majority were common in Chile, and the constitutional procedures of the day specifically mandated that in such cases, instead of a runoff between the two leading candidates, the winner was to be selected by the Congress, which would meet several weeks hence. Although there was no strict requirement that the legislature opt for the candidate of the first plurality, it was a firm custom that it do so. What raised the stakes in the 1970 race was the presence of Allende himself, a man of the left with strong Soviet-bloc and Cuban connections, and even more sinister associations within Chile's far-left organizations. Consequently, between the election on September 4, and the congressional vote October 24, Chile was awash with rumors and plots, most of them related to efforts to block Allende's accession to power.

2.

For nearly thirty years it has been a matter of public record in the United States that President Richard Nixon did not view the prospect of an Allende presidency with equanimity, and took steps to prevent that eventuality. The primary sources are two reports by a Senate committee led by the late Frank Church (D.-Idaho), one entitled *Alleged Assassination Plots of Foreign Leaders*; the other *Covert Action in Chile, 1963-1973* (both published in 1975). The findings of this committee must be regarded as unusually credible in light of the fact that its chairman and the majority of its members (and even more, their staffs) were unremittingly hostile to the Nixon White House and anxious, if possible, to find embarrassing linkages between it and events in Chile. In 1998 the Clinton administration was moved by the arrest of former dictator Augusto Pinochet in

Kissinger and Chile - Page 4

London to order the heavily-redacted declassification of U.S. official documents relating to the period—some 17,000 in all. The most important of these have been placed on the website of the National Security Archive in Washington, D. C.—a left-wing organization not to be confused with the U.S. National Archives. They form the basis of a book by the Archive's Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, to be published in late 2003. An additional source not yet in the public domain but made available to the author of this article, are the telephone transcripts of Henry Kissinger himself.

Great things were expected to flow from—indeed, great things have been claimed for—the Clinton declassifications. As Christopher Hitchens himself has boasted, “In my book...I produce documents that plainly show the orchestration of a plot to murder General René Schneider, a constitutional officer and a political conservative who was opposed to a coup, *before* Allende had even been confirmed by the Chilean congress in 1970....The general’s family has brought suit against Kissinger in a federal court in Washington, D. C., and every paper for the prosecution is a declassified document of the U.S. government.” In fact, however, the Clinton declassifications are actually less rich in information than the findings of the Church committee, which was able to examine the documentary record in its unexpurgated form. Moreover, it enjoyed the additional advantage of being able to interrogate the participants under oath. Nor do the Clinton declassifications contribute anything particularly useful to the case against Dr. Kissinger. In fact, some of them actually corroborate the findings of the Church committee, and what is perhaps even more ironic, support Kissinger’s own version of events as laid out in the relevant volumes of his memoirs.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 5

The telephone transcripts establish to a remarkable degree that Chile was not an important part of the National Security Adviser's daily diet of policy ruminations. This point is important, because in the BBC film we are continually told that Kissinger micromanaged every detail of American foreign policy. This may have been true for subjects of high geopolitical import; Chile, however, was not one of them. In fact, during the period September-October 1970 his telephone conversations reveal a Kissinger preoccupied with many, many other subjects—a full-blown Middle East crisis, Vietnam, a Soviet submarine base in Cuba, the Black September plane hijacking, President Nixon's planned visit to Europe and to the Sixth Fleet, the defense budget, and the Pugwash conference on U.S.-Soviet relations. Kissinger was traveling out of Washington in late September and there are only a handful of conversations concerning Chile in the period September-October, 1970—which is to say, between the Chilean election and the congressional vote there—then nothing at all until June, 1973, when he and President Nixon discuss a failed military revolt against Allende. Then there are no other references to Chile until after Pinochet's assumption of power on September 11.

Again, this is not surprising. During much of the Allende presidency Kissinger was in Paris, Moscow, Peking, or other locales of far greater moment and importance to U.S. foreign policy than Santiago. Even where the subject is once again broached, which is to say, in September-October, 1973—during which time Allende was deposed and a military government installed—Kissinger is principally concerned with the possibility of the resignation of Vice-President Spiro Agnew and preparations for his confirmation hearings to be Secretary of State.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 7

than a third of the electorate would naturally (and perhaps violently) object. Once elected by the Congress, Alessandri--a party to the plot through intermediaries--was prepared to resign his presidency within a matter of days so that new elections could be held. The particular utility of this ploy was that an Alessandri presidency--even one that lasted a mere 24 hours--would suddenly render outgoing Christian Democratic president Eduardo Frei eligible to run again, this time in a two-headed race against Allende. (Chile's constitution, then as now, prohibited consecutive presidential terms.) Under those circumstances, Frei--still the most popular of modern Chilean presidents--could be reasonably expected to defeat Allende fair and square.

This plot, known colloquially as the "Alessandri" or "Rube Goldberg" gambit, required two things to work. Frei had to agree to play the role assigned to him, and would have to persuade his own followers in Congress to cast their votes for Alessandri. Both proved insurmountable obstacles. As Ambassador Edward Korry's cables from Santiago show, though Frei was deeply troubled by the prospect of an Allende presidency—he predicted, quite accurately, that it would end in "blood and horror"—Chile's president was also extremely reluctant to besmirch his position in history by being a party to a perversion of Chile's peculiar electoral traditions. Even had he been more of a mind to do so, he would have been unable to persuade most Christian Democrats in Congress to vote for a conservative like Alessandri, even one pledged to rule only for a day or a month. By 1970 Frei's party was leaning considerably further to the left than the president himself; characteristically, its official candidate, Radomiro Tomic, had precipitously recognized Allende as president-elect on election night, September 4.

(LX)

Kissinger and Chile - Page 6

This is not to say that there is no information in these documents relating to the U.S. role in Chile; far from it. President Nixon was deeply distressed at the prospect of an Allende presidency there, and on September 15, 1970, he summoned Kissinger, Attorney-General John Mitchell, and CIA director Richard Helms for a meeting in the Oval Office to discuss the subject. Nixon was determined—as Helms' notes of the meeting record—to “save Chile” from Allende, “even if the chances are one in ten”. There was loose talk about spending $10 million to provoke a coup, “more if necessary”. In vain did Helms repeat to the President what four days after the Chilean elections he had told the 40 Committee—the body charged with overseeing covert actions overseas—namely, that Allende would in all likelihood be confirmed, and that there was only a “slight possibility” that senior elements of the Chilean military would move to block his confirmation. “Moreover,” Helms recalls in his posthumous memoirs, *A Look Over My Shoulder* (2003), “I noted that the Agency lacked the means of motivating the military to intervene.” The President was unmoved. “I tried to give [Nixon] some idea of the problems and risks involved [in promoting a military coup]. Standing mid-track and shouting at an oncoming locomotive might have been more effective.”

Building on its conviction that a conventional military uprising was not possible in Chile, the CIA, with the approval of the 40 Committee, devised what in effect was a constitutional coup. The most expeditious—and the simplest—way to prevent Allende from assuming office would be to convince the Chilean congress to confirm Alessandri as the winner of the election. There was nothing technically illegal about this procedure though it did pose serious risks to Chile's political stability, since Allende's followers, who comprised slightly more

Kissinger and Chile - Page 8

While the U.S. Embassy in Santiago—on instructions from the 40 Committee in Washington—was vigorously pursuing the “Alessandri gambit”, unbeknownst to it, another line of activity was being pursued by the CIA station in Chile. In effect, if President Frei and the Christian Democrats would not play the role assigned to them in the scenario, then the military would do it for them. This policy, later labeled Track II (to distinguish it from the constitutional coup), involved finding a general or generals who would overthrow the outgoing government, dissolve the congress, and send the president into temporary exile. Instead of Alessandri, the military would provide the necessary constitutional lapse between administrations. The junta would call elections (at an unspecified but presumably early date) in which President Frei could return and run again against Allende. Or possibly not. President Nixon’s instructions to the CIA were simply to forestall Allende’s inauguration; he was not interested in the details, or apparently even in the kind of government that would emerge there.²

3.

The search for a general to bring about this eventuality initially brought the CIA Station into contact with General Roberto Viaux, who had been cashiered from the Chilean army in 1969 for leading a revolt against the Christian Democratic government, ostensibly to protest its neglect of military salaries and benefits. Since his dismissal Viaux continued to conspire, this time

² Helms recalls that “except for George Bush the elder...no American president in a hundred years has had but a slight idea of how clandestine operations are conceived and run...the dreary routines and the vast amount of time in establishing a sound covert action or espionage operation.” He adds that “Nixon had no notion of the maneuvering and caution involved in *secretly* organizing and building cover for the operation he demanded, nor was he disposed to consider any of the pitfalls involved in attempting to establish this activity overnight.” *A Look Over My Shoulder*, pp. 401-402.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 9

with larger ideological and political objectives. In fact, in the period after September 4 Santiago was awash in plots to prevent Allende from taking office, and Viaux was only one of a number of personalities working toward this end, albeit an important one.

In early October, by which time Track I had run out of gas by virtue of Frei's reluctance to go along with it, Viaux informed his CIA contacts that he was planning another coup and asked for a sizeable drop of arms and ammunition. Apart from the fact that—according to Helms—the Agency thought Viaux a bit “far out”, the notion that a group of senior army officers would require foreign arms to stage a coup did not inspire much confidence at the CIA station in Santiago. After subsequent discussion the CIA decided Viaux was not a good bet, though—characteristic of the way it operated in the fluid environment of the time—it kept him on a long leash, disbursing some cash and even taking out a life insurance policy on him. Another group of generals were eventually selected for the task at hand. Before it could act, however, a fragment of Viaux's group had gone ahead on its own.

The chief obstacle to Track II was General René Schneider, commander-in-chief of the Chilean Army. His view, simply stated, was that since the politicians had gotten the country into the mess in which it found itself, it was the task of the politicians to find a way out of it. This position he maintained sturdily throughout September and October, in spite of the fact that he was subject to almost daily representations by retired officers, politicians, and businessmen, begging him to “save the country”, either by supporting a constitutional coup or some other means. As Schneider told General Carlos Prats, his second in command, “the politicians are maneuvering to push the

Kissinger and Chile - Page 10

army into an adventure. They should understand that we are not so stupid as to not realize that they want to 'use' us, some to preserve their political unity, others as a 'trampoline' for Viaux." (Prats, *Memorias* [1985]). When Schneider proved intransigent, the intermediaries tried to persuade Prats, equally without effect. Schneider therefore had to be circumvented in some way.

Track II therefore focused on kidnapping General Schneider, with a view to sending him to neighboring Argentina for a season while the political situation was adjusted to fit the objectives of Track I. As far as Kissinger (and for that matter, the Nixon administration were concerned), Viaux had been told to stand down, and that was presumably the end of it. As the former told President Nixon on October 15, "I saw Karamassines [of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division] today. This looks hopeless. I turned it off. Nothing would be worse than an abortive coup." The President responded, "Just tell him to do nothing." (Telephone transcripts). The next day Agency headquarters cabled its station in Santiago that although "we are to continue to generate maximum pressure" towards a coup, "a Viaux coup...would fail". For this purpose, the Station was instructed to "get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action." (Cable 802, Hq. to Station, 10/16/70). Though the "defuse order" was delivered through an intermediary, the Viaux representative—as the Church committee concluded—told the latter that his group had decided to go ahead anyway on October 21 or 22. The Agency was left with the pious hope that once its wishes were known, Viaux would respect them. Unfortunately for it, the cashiered Chilean general was pursuing agendas of his own.

4.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 11

Much has been made of the fact that between October 15, when Kissinger ordered the Viaux coup "turned off", and the death of General Schneider, the CIA station in Santiago continued to make preparations for a Track II-type coup. For example, sometime in mid-October three submachine guns, some tear gas canisters and gas masks were shipped to the Chilean capital through the U.S. diplomatic pouch and passed to Colonel Paul Wimert, military attaché, who in turn passed them on to officers representing General Camilo Valenzuela, head of the Santiago garrison. This was the group that intended to kidnap General Schneider. The exchange occurred at 2 a.m. on October 22. Several hours later, however, Viaux's people went ahead on their own, mortally wounding General Schneider in the process. Eventually the machine guns were returned to Wimert unused; he discarded them in the Pacific Ocean. A Chilean military court subsequently found that General Schneider had been killed by handguns. The Church Committee concluded that these "were, in all probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators." The Committee also noted that an unloaded machine gun had been found at the site of the killing, but professed itself "unable to determine whether [it] was one of the three supplied by the CIA." Schneider was therefore killed by conspirators who, while in contact with the CIA, were acting against its specific instructions and apparently without its logistical assistance.

Just why a Chilean civil-military kidnapping plot went forward after Kissinger issued orders that General Viaux be "turned off" is not clear, possibly because President Nixon's direct instructions to the CIA to prevent Allende's accession to power—regardless of the consequences—were so emphatic that Colonel Wimert and the other operatives in the Santiago station the agency

Kissinger and Chile - Page 12

people went ahead on their own without consulting the political authorities in Washington as to details. However, it was not something ordered by Dr. Kissinger, who seems not to have been aware of it at the time. As Thomas Karamassines, former deputy director of the CIA for plans and the principal agency contact for Track II told Dr. Kissinger after testifying before the Church committee in 1975, he was "asked...if I cleared everything in advance with you. I said no, you were too busy." In the same telephone conversation Kissinger remarked that he didn't even know of the second plot—that is, the one for which the three machine guns were sent down—"not that I wouldn't have approved it [the Valenzuela plot]." "I thought," he adds, "that after we turned off that one thing [the Viaux plot] nothing more had happened and in fact that other thing [the Schneider kidnapping] had happened." (Telephone transcripts). One can regret—or even deplore—the interventionist intentions of Nixon, Kissinger and the CIA; the fact remains that General Schneider was murdered as the result of a botched kidnapping attempt which—as far as the White House was concerned—had been disavowed and ordered shut down a full week before it happened.

Even more has been made of the CIA cable to the Santiago station dated October 16 instructing it to tell Viaux that although he was to stand down, he should "preserve [his] assets", during which time he would "continue to have our support". He was advised, however, to curb his appetite for precipitous action; join forces with others either before or after Allende's inauguration; and to amplify his planning. In fact, however, Viaux played no future role whatever in Chilean politics. He was almost immediately arrested and sentenced to a long prison term by a military court. In August, 1973, the month before the coup

(w)

Kissinger and Chile - Page 13

that deposed President Allende, he was released and sent to Paraguay, where the dictator Alfredo Stroessner agreed to accept him. He remained in Paraguay for six or seven years. When he finally returned to Chile, the Pinochet government offered him no special considerations. Neither he nor any of the officers involved in his plot (or for that matter, the Valenzuela group that never had an opportunity to act) were involved in the coup which eventually deposed Allende on September 11, 1973.

Strange to say--or perhaps not, given their biases--neither Hitchens' book nor the film upon which it is based take notice of a crucial fact, namely, that the Schneider debacle had precisely the opposite effect of what was desired by the CIA and the Nixon administration. It transformed the victim into a martyr of the "constitutionalist" traditions of the Chilean army; it encouraged other constitutionalist officers to support an orderly transfer of power to the new Allende administration; and it discredited right-wing cabals both in the army and outside of it. It also brought to the head of the army General Carlos Prats, another officer of equally firm constitutionalist leanings--so much so, in fact, that at one point Viaux had seriously considered kidnapping Prats as well. (Cable 529, Santiago Station to HQ, 10/13/70).

5.

Another passage of the CIA's October 16 cable, quoted with much relish in the film *The Trials of Henry Kissinger*—though in fact there is no indication that Kissinger ever saw the document in question—reads that it is the “firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup...efforts in this regard will continue vigorously...We are to continue to generate maximum pressure

Kissinger and Chile - Page 14

toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource." After highlighting these words, the screen is suddenly filled with horrific images of the events of September 11, 1973, which included the bombing of the Moneda Palace, the arrest and torture of hundreds of dissidents, and the accession to power of an unusually cruel military junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet. Kissinger is therefore charged with criminal responsibility not just for Schneider's assassination, but Allende's overthrow and death three years later. However, the quotation and the events depicted on the screen collapse two completely different moments in U.S. policy, and even more, in the history of Chile.

As far as the United States is concerned, Nixon certainly talked tough, at least in private. On October 15 he told Kissinger that if Allende takes office "I am not going to do a thing for them." If in fact the Chilean congress nonetheless decided to confirm him some ten days hence, and Allende went for the nationalization of U.S. property, "then we cut him off. [The] Hickenlooper [amendment] applies." (Telephone Transcripts) Not surprisingly, then, NSCM 93 (November 9, 1970), drafted several days after Allende's inauguration and now released in the Clinton declassifications, called for a "correct but cool" public posture towards Chile, but at the same time "maximiz[ing] pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests." Specifically, it advocated eliminating financial guarantees for U.S. private investment in Chile; terminating existing guarantees where possible; bringing "feasible influence" to bear at the multilateral lending institutions; and no new bilateral aid commitments

(humanitarian aid was to be considered on a case-to-case basis).

Kissinger and Chile - Page 15

Meanwhile, however, an Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97) dated November 3, 1970, sketched out how these policies were to be implemented. Of particular interest in this context are two provisions not mentioned in NSCM 93—one, "to give articulate support, publicly and privately, to democratic elements in Chile opposed to the Allende regime by all appropriate means"; the other, to "maintain effective relations with the Chilean military, letting them know that we want to cooperate but that our ability to do so depends on Chilean government actions." (Clinton declassifications) The first of these laid the groundwork for the transfer of at least $6 million in covert support to non-Marxist political parties, newspapers, radio stations and other groups during the Allende period, without which subventions a pluralistic political system in Chile would in all probability have disappeared long before General Pinochet and his associates had overthrown the government and installed a dictatorship of their own. These transfers made it impossible for Allende to eliminate his political competition by confiscating the sources of their funding or by intentionally bankrupting independent newspapers or radio stations by politically-inspired strikes. They were of trivial significance, however, in triggering the coup itself, which was ignited by the chaotic domestic economic situation. The second sketches out merely a "business-as-usual" relationship with the Chilean military, but with no provision for encouraging (or for that matter, discouraging) involvement in politics.

The most serious charge that can be levied against the Nixon administration—the documentary evidence is now unambiguous—is that it chose to contemplate economic sanctions against Chile at a time when Allende had yet to lay a hand on American investments in the country and was still

Kissinger and Chile - Page 16

rigorously paying on Chile's debts. However the fact is that even after the
country defaulted in November 1971, the embargo was far from absolute. "Old"
U.S. loans continued to be disbursed, amounting (according to one U.S.
Treasury estimate) to $200 million for 1971 and 1972. Humanitarian aid (Peace
Corps and surplus foods) was not withdrawn. And in spite of President Nixon's
decision to end all bilateral assistance not already committed at the time of
Allende's election, new appropriations—however token in proportion—were
nonetheless authorized during every year of the Popular Unity government.
Though Chile nationalized American holdings in the copper industry in 1971
without making a satisfactory arrangement for compensation—pushing the
U.S. government-funded Overseas Private Investment Corporation to the brink
of bankruptcy—the notorious Hickenlooper Amendment was never invoked.

Moreover, Chile's failure to service its debts to the United States during
these years constituted a de facto relief of $243 million for 1972 alone, an
effective transfer of resources greater by many orders of magnitude than that
tendered to the previous Frei administration at a time when the latter was
supposed to be Washington's "showcase" in Latin America. In addition, Allende
was able to tap new sources of credit in Western and Eastern Europe—for 1972
alone somewhere between $600 and $950 million. As a key functionary of his
finance ministry later recalled, by mid-1973 "Chile had rebuilt and diversified
its system of external finance", and by June of that year had obtained short-
term credits amounting to $547 million. To which should be added the fact that
between November 1970 and September 1973 Chile was able to draw slightly
more than $100 million from the International Monetary Fund, presumably
over the protests of U.S. representatives there.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 17

The one area where U.S. aid increased three-fold during the Allende period was military assistance. This fact loses some of its sinister edge, however, in light of two crucial facts. The first is that such aid relieved pressures on the Chilean budget, allowing money that would have been used for weaponry and training to be diverted to improved housing allowances, providing tax breaks on imported foreign automobiles, and arranging other amenities for the uniformed services. The second -which followed from this--is that Allende himself welcomed such assistance because it allowed him to demonstrate to the armed forces that they were better off under a Socialist-Communist government than under its Christian Democratic predecessor (which fact was indisputable). Both were grist for his political mill. To the end of his regime, President Allende saw the armed forces as an element on the chessboard to be used and manipulated for political purposes; as General Prats recalls in his memoirs, at one point between the 1970 election and the vote of the Congress he himself was approached by an intermediary of the apparent president-elect, tantalizing him with the appointment which fell to him by the accident of his chief's assassination a few days later.

6.

The real causes of the 1973 coup must be sought in the economic collapse which took place during the Allende presidency, as well as Chile's increasingly polarized political environment. Vast changes occurred on the economic and political scene of that country over a remarkably brief period of time. On November 4, 1970 Salvador Allende assumed the presidency in an

Kissinger and Chile - Page 18

atmosphere of euphoria and even good will almost unimaginable in retrospect. Apart from his own four-party coalition (Popular Unity) headed by the Socialist and Communist parties, the new president could count on the "critical support" of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), which had historically questioned the possibility of social change in Chile through peaceful electoral means. More important still, he took office at a time when the leading opposition party, Chile's Christian Democrats, was in thrall to a leadership anxious to compete with Allende for the labels "progressive" and even "revolutionary". Characteristically, during the 1970 campaign its presidential candidate Radomiro Tomic ran on a program even more radical than that of Popular Unity, and spent most of his time attacking Alessandri. After his inauguration, Allende met with the Christian Democratic leadership in an atmosphere of good humor and camaraderie; the chief of the delegation, Senator Narciso Irieta emphasized common political and economic goals, even urging the president to "help us be good allendistas."³

Instead, intoxicated by ideological triumphalism, Allende's people did all they could to split the Christian Democrats and lure its left wing over the Popular Unity coalition, to which end it was partially successful when a faction which styled itself the Christian Left joined the government in 1971. As Allende supporters seized factories and farms throughout Chile, Christian Democratic workers were dismissed and their union leaders refused access to the premises.

³ Some years later President Eduardo Frei told me that shortly after Allende's inauguration he had invited a group of Christian Democratic senators to his house. Discussing the prospects of the new government, Frei warned that Allende harbored a "totalitarian project" for Chile, not just radical social reform. "I was told by one of the senators later that after they left they house they gathered around their parked cars to discuss what I had said. Few of them agreed with me at the time. Later they had occasion to remind me, ruefully, of my warnings."

Kissinger and Chile - Page 19

Political discrimination even extended to non-political individuals for family reasons; thus the son of President Frei, Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, an engineer, found himself in difficulty at his place of work after it passed into the hands of government "interventors". The net effect of these actions over time was to discredit the "collaborationist" leadership of the party and bring about its replacement with more conservative figures. By 1973, in fact, the Christian Democrats had been pushed into a tactical electoral alliance with the parties of the right, an eventuality which would have been unthinkable on Allende's inauguration day three years before. In the last election held during the Popular Unity period—March, 1973—the combined Christian Democratic-Conservative list won a thumping 56 percent of the vote.

These changes in party alliances were also the product of domestic economic policies that polarized opinion in Chile—harassment of small businesses, dislocations in the country's system of food supplies, and the uninhibited printing of unbacked currency, which produced runaway inflation. The constant threat to independent operators led to a major trucker's strike in 1972, which eventually spread to other sectors of the economy. As a result, Allende found himself relying heavily on the military just to remain in power. Several times he was forced to ask flag officers to serve in key ministries; in the final phase of the regime, General Prats was even functioning as his minister of interior. These innovations introduced enormous stresses within the armed forces; as in the period surrounding Allende's election, the service chiefs saw no particular reason why they should carry the water for a political class which seemed unable to resolve its differences. Prats' growing closeness to President Allende—it amounted to a kind of ideological seduction—undermined his own

Kissinger and Chile - Page 20

position in the military, and in August, 1973 he was forced to retire and go into
voluntary exile in neighboring Argentina.

7.

By that time Allende's problems had become so acute as to finally merit
notice by the President of the United States. The occasion was a failed military
plot which was squashed mid-year by loyalist troops. Ni xon and Kissinger
discussed the matter of the telephone on July 4, 1973. Not surprisingly, Nixon
expressed regret that the coup had failed ("if only the Army could get a few
people behind them!"); for his part, Kissinger told the President "we had nothing
to do with it." Both agreed, however, that the prospect of flag officers leaving the
cabinet was bound to deepen the crisis and put Allende in an even more
disadvantageous position. (Telephone transcripts).

For next three months there was complete radio silence in the subject of
Chile between Kissinger and the Nixon White House. Logically, the next
discussions concerned the events surrounding the coup that deposed Allende
on September 11, 1973. Within hours after that event the prestige press was
circulating dark rumors about the supposed prior knowledge that the United
States might have possessed of the plot itself. For example, on September 13,
the *New York Times* carried the headline "US HAD WARNING OF COUP, AIDES
SAY". Newspaper readers were left to presume that this information—withheld
from the Allende government—deprived it of a vital, perhaps even crucial
resource which would have otherwise assured its survival. In fact, however, as
Ken Rush of the Nixon White House told Dr. Kissinger on the same day the *New
York Times* story appeared, "What [Assistant Secretary Jack] Kubish told me

Kissinger and Chile - Page 21

was that we knew nothing about it; that we had not been told about it and it
came as a complete surprise to us." He added, "I didn't know that a coup was
coming at any particular date. We'd been hearing coup rumors for about a
year." (Telephone transcripts).

Kissinger was somewhat better informed than the West Wing of the
Nixon White House, since a few days before the coup Ambassador Nathaniel
Davis had been recalled to Washington, not to discuss Chile as such, but to be
looked at as a possible candidate to be undersecretary for political affairs.
However, given the circumstances unfolding in Chile, it cannot be surprising
that as he walked into Dr. Kissinger's office, he was asked immediately about
the possibilities of a coup. "In Chile you can never count on anything," the
ambassador replied, "but the odds are in favor of a coup, though I can't give
you any time frame." Kissinger said, "We are going to stay out of that, I
assume." Davis replied, "Yes. My firm instructions to everybody on the staff are
that we are not to involve ourselves in anyway... Our biggest problem is to keep
from getting caught in the middle." (Transcript in Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*,
pp. 1244-1245).

This information was by no means restricted to the National Security
Adviser or the U.S. Embassy in Santiago. The truth is that every cat and dog in
Chile knew a coup was coming sometime in September, 1973, and that very
specifically included President Allende himself. The only thing that was unclear
was who would lead it, who would replace Allende, and what ideological
tendency would prevail once the Communist-Socialist government was
dissolved. Specifically, during a private lunch with the Chilean president a few
days before his departure into Argentine exile, General Prats warned him that

Kissinger and Chile - Page 22

he would be overthrown by a coup within the next ten days. When President Allende asked whether Prats' replacement, General Augusto Pinochet, would remain loyal, Prats said he thought so, but that it was irrelevant. "Even the most constitutionalist of officers," he recalled telling the president, "will understand that a division within the armed forces would mean civil war." In effect, they would either respect the decision or be swept aside⁴.

Contrary, then, to what the film *The Trials of Henry Kissinger* suggests, there was no straight and direct line between the events of 1970 and the coup of 1973. Rather, conscious choices by Allende and his own people drove the military into actions with which they would normally be disinclined to carry out. This was the impression, for example, of the U.S. Naval attaché who cabled from Valparaíso, home of the Chilean fleet, a few days after the coup that the "decision to remove the Allende government was made with extreme reluctance and only after the deepest-soul-searching by all concerned."

Unfortunately [he continued], there were no other avenues of solution. Chile was on a dead end street. The rate of inflation was the worst in the history of the world, terrorists and weapons were being illegally introduced into Chile by the Cubans for use against Chileans, food resources were near total exhaustion, a national transportation strike had paralyzed the country, numerous other professions were striking in sympathy with the transportation workers, the armed forces had been systematically infiltrated by saboteurs...Chile's children had not been to school for over two months...

⁴ Prats' memoirs are of particular interest because they were written in exile at a time when he had become, *post hoc*, a virtual partisan of the Allende regime and was seen by many as a potential challenger to the military government. They were completed just before he and his wife were killed by a car bomb in Buenos Aires planted by Pinochet's secret police, though not published until 1985 when book censorship was ended in Chile.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 23

What perhaps history will ask in retrospect is not "Why the overthrow of
the Allende government by the armed forces", but rather, "Why the
armed forces waited so long." (Clinton declassifications)

Evidently, President Nixon himself was pleased at the outcome; it would
be surprising if he had not been. After all, he regarded Allende's government as
basically hostile to U.S. interests and goals, and its disappearance a net
geopolitical gain. But there was no sense of complicity with the coup-makers
themselves. As the President told Secretary Kissinger on September 16, "Well,
we didn't—as you know—our hand doesn't show on this one though." To which
Kissinger replied, "We didn't do it." (Telephone transcripts).

8.

Nonetheless, accusations of U.S. responsibility for the coup continue to
hang in the air thirty years after the event, partly because of ideologically driven
journalism such as that practiced by Christopher Hitchens, partly because of
the need for Allende apologists to circumvent any discussion of the domestic
political factors which led to the president's downfall. Admittedly, the United
States did play a role in Chile, though not precisely the one ascribed to it. It did
attempt—unsuccessfully—to prevent Allende's confirmation by the Congress.
Once he was in office, however, as Kissinger has repeatedly stated in his
memoirs and which both the Church committee report and the Clinton
declassifications verify, the thrust of U. S. policy shifted to sustaining the
democratic opposition and an independent press until Allende's coalition could
be defeated in the presidential elections of 1976. To the extent that this

Kissinger and Chile - Page 24

opposition was able to survive under extraordinarily difficult economic circumstances--winning control of the Chilean congress in March, 1973--one can say that the Nixon administration prevented Allende from consolidating a totalitarian political project.

What followed—a right-wing dictatorship which crushed not merely the Allende regime but Chilean democracy itself—could not be and was not foreseen, partly because of the military's own apolitical traditions, partly because by mid-1973 the opposition was dominated by forces of proven democratic provenance. Washington's presumption—that in the 1976 elections, if in fact they took place, the opposition would win decisively—was amply supported by the facts. By mid-1973 a majority of Chileans had repudiated both Socialist and Communist parties and the end of the Allende era was welcomed by a broad spectrum of Chilean personalities, including former President Frei himself. It was only the savagery of the subsequent Pinochet dictatorship which altered matters by hindsight. As the years passed, the discredit into which Allende and his associates had fallen at the time of their overthrow was neutralized, then cancelled out, by martyrdom. In addition, the undifferentiated contempt with which the military subsequently treated all political forces except those on the far right threw people together who, in August and September 1973, were facing off for civil war. In that sense, General Pinochet—in spite of himself—is the unique progenitor of the Socialist-Christian Democratic coalition governments which have governed Chile from 1989 to the present.

The Allende regime also benefited retrospectively from its evident association with the old democratic order; it had, after all, been elected. How

Kissinger and Chile - Page 25

much longer it would have remained part of that order, which it was busily
undermining, must remain a matter of controversy. But to the day of its
demise, it enjoyed a marginal legitimacy which (logically) eluded its successor.⁵
There, too, General Pinochet and his associates have played an unexpected
role—rescuing for Allende and his government a place in Chilean history which
they did not earn and to which they could not otherwise have looked forward.
These are the pesky details which “revisionists” like Hitchens and the makers of
*The Trials of Henry Kissinger* seem at pains to avoid—if indeed they were ever
aware of them in the first place.

In the longer perspective, any reasonable reading of history might well
have anticipated a regime similar to Allende's coming to power in Chile sooner
or later. After all, it had the largest public sector of any government in Latin
America except Cuba; significant segments of the population, including
organized labor, were accustomed to government-sponsored entitlements, and
expected these to increase over time; it had two large, well-organized and
imaginatively led Marxist parties; the principal party of the center, the Christian
Democrats, had adopted a pseudo-leftist discourse which by 1970 rendered
impossible a joint presidential ticket, such as had defeated Allende in 1964. But
what might have been inevitable was not necessarily desirable—for Chile or for
the United States. Those who regret the consolidation of a Marxist regime in
that country are, of course, free to condemn the efforts of Nixon, Kissinger, and
the CIA, and they cannot be faulted on their own terms. But those with a more

⁵ We say “marginal” here because by mid-1973 the Allende administration had been found “outside the law” by the Chilean Congress, and many of its actions declared unconstitutional by the Chilean courts.

SEP 0 2 2003

Jessee Incao

From: William_Rogers@aporter.com
Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2003 11:51 AM
To: jincao@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Messagae for Dr. Kissinger

Re: Falcoff/Kornbluh

1. We may have run into a snag with respect to Foreign Affairs' consideration of Falcoff's article. I had always thought Ken Maxwell, the CFR specialist on Latin America, was a pretty balanced, but he has reviewed Mark's book on Cuba in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs and called it "right-wing." This is nonsense. I have read the book. It is an admirable, non-ideological review of the prsent state of Cuba, politically and economically. It does not embrace the romantic view of Fidel or refuse to acknowledge his democratic and human rights failings, but that scarecely makes it "right-wing." I only hope that Maxwell did not read the book, and that he entertains no prejudices about Mark when he considers the draft piece on Chile. I thought you should know this when you talk to Jim Hoge about the article.

2. On the good side, the Post may mark the thirtieth anniversay of the coup in Chile by printing a wonderfully sober view by a former Chilean Communis, to the effect that it was the extreme left in Chilte that highjacked the Allende regime and is responsible for its failure, its loss of popular support and its overthrow. It's a strong article in Spanish, which should not suffer from translation. I think this would be more powerful even than a Chile coup Outlook article by Mark .,

William_Rogers@aporter.com

AUG 14 2003

Amanda Henry

From: Jessee Incao [jincao@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 13, 2003 11:07 AM
To: ahenry@kmaglobal.com
Subject: FW: Message for Dr. Kissinger

For the mail

-----Original Message-----

From: William_Rogers@aporter.com [mailto:William_Rogers@aporter.com]
Sent: Wednesday, August 13, 2003 10:30 AM
To: jincao@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Message for Dr. Kissinger

Mark and I met yesterday for some extensive editing of his paper. He will polish it today and have the manuscript ready in final by the end of the week. It is, as I said, powerful. In my view, his marshalling of the evidence closes the case, both as to Schneider and the 1973 coup, and he handles the bits of contrary circumstantial evidence which the critics seize on candidly and effectively.

He is, as I mentioned, persuaded that the piece is appropriate for Foreign Affairs. We think, unless you suggest a better channel, that he should make the proposal through Ken Maxwell, who is the Latin Americanist at the Council and regularly does the Latin America book reviews and articles for the magazine.

I told him I would not -- unless I heard otherwise from you -- be sending you the draft beforehand. Thus we can all say that the appropriate niceties of authorial independence were strictly observed. He may, however, wish to have a word with you, perhaps by phone, on one or two points before he puts it to bed.

He is also working on the piece for the Post. He talked to his pal on the op op ed editorial team, who said that the Post had no plan for publishing a Kornbluh article on the anniversary of the Chilean coup. This, in the face of the information that I had received from a mutual

friend that Kornbluh was writing just such a piece. All the more reason,

I think, to raise the issue with Lally. Even if Kornbluh does not submit something, I would think a Falcoff article would be worth printing -- or Lally herself might want to write the piece -- on the thirtieth anniversary of the event which gave birth to the powerful and pernicious myth of US responsibility for Allende's overthrow and the human rights offenses of the Pinochet era that ensued.

william_Rogers@aporter.com

Telephone: 202-942-5915

Fax: 202-942-5999

http://www.arnoldporter.com

1

Theresa Cimino

From: Jessee Incao [jincao@kmaglobal.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 11:15 AM
To: 'Theresa Cimino'
Subject: FW: Message for Dr. Kissinger

JUL 29 2003

From: William_Rogers@aporter.com [mailto:William_Rogers@aporter.com]
Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 11:15 AM
To: jincao@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Message for Dr. Kissinger

1. I have learned that Kornbluh is preparing an op ed or Outlook piece for the Post to appear sometime in early September, targeting the Chile coup and US responsibility therefor. Mark Falcoff and I are urging the Post that a balancing point of view deserves equal time and ink, in the same edition as Kornbluh's piece. Preemption has its virtues.

2. Much work on the Falcoff article. He will have a draft in a day or two for me to look at.

3. Falcoff and I have been invited to debate the 1973 coup and US responsibility at the New America Foundation, around the anniversary date. He will use the debate to tout his book. We should be able to put a spoke or two in the wheel. I

William Rogers William_Rogers@aporter.com
Arnold & Porter Telephone: 202-942-5915
555 Twelfth Street, NW Fax: 202-942-5999
Washington, DC 20004-1202

http://www.arnoldporter.com

JUN 0 3 2003

Jessee Incao

From: William_Rogers@aporter.com
Sent: Tuesday, June 03, 2003 1:33 PM
To: jincao@kmaglobal.com
Subject: Message for Dr. Kissinger

Re: Falcoff/Chile

Mark Falcoff is hard at it.

We have organized the substantial trove of material here -- reorganized in fact -- to
make it accessible to him. He and I have talked at length. I have steered him to the
crucial documents and I am heartened by the evidence that he has got his mind around them.
He is looking, of course, at your memoirs, at the Church and Hinchey's reports, at
Hichins, at my extensive exchanges with Kornbluh, at the new Helms book and the equally
new Colby book. Also the foreign court inquiries and the State Department responses, the
three cases (Schneider, Gonzalez and Horman in the DC District Court -- though he is not
tempted to see the issue through the legal lens.

I am trying (again) to get him some of the buried transcripts of the Church hearings,
including your testimony which was redacted in the published report.

We are fortunate that he has a running start on the material, having written the
earlier book which has a chapter on the events of the 1970;s in Chile, but there is still
a great deal he now has to inform himself about.

When he finishes his researches here, I intend to expose him to the phone notes for
the September-October periods of 1970 and 1973, as well as your several references to
Church and Chile in the phone notes in 1975.

He is quite excited about the project. He hopes to finish the manuscript for a magazine
piece --his agent is promoting US News -- for the September issue. That is when Kornbluh
is hoping for a publicity blast for his own book, using the gimmick that he is exposing
another 9/11 -- the date also of the 1973 coup in Chile. Mark is aiming squarely at that
canard, as the perpetuation of a legend of US responsibility without basis in fact.

What about a word to Mort). He then thinks he will expand the material
to book length.

Jesee Incao

From: William_Rogers@aporter.com
Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2003 10:11 AM
To: mfalcoff@aei.org
Cc: jincao@kmaglobal.com; Carole_Guffey@aporter.com
Subject: Kissinger

Mark:

I am having copied and carried to you, presumably today, a stack of documents which
you will want to consider prior to our meeting on Monday at
11 AM in New York, 350 Park, 26th Floor. The documents include the
Hitchens chapter on Chile. This is but a soupcon. I have a wealth of additional material
which, if we go forward with the project, you will want to see and which I will be glad to
make available to you. The effort to perpetuate the myth of US responsibility for Chile
involves a legion of myth-makers. It has in the past few years taken many forms, all of
which you will wish to take into account and as to which I can provide documentation.

I am not sending you any of the cables released by the State Department relating to
Chile. These re available on the State Department's Chile Archive website. Nor am I
sending you Church or Hinchey, which are, I assume, similarly available to you..

Our library is chasing downs the transcript of Dr. Kissinger's testimony to Church from
the cite you sent me, and I will, I hope, have that available shortly.

The manifestations of the -- if you please -- conspiracy are:

-- Hitchens book and article. The article leads with Schneider and the coup. Chile
is the centerpiece of Hitchens' outlandish international criminal accusations.

-- A new lawsuit by Joyce Horman in the District Court here against Dr. Kissinger.
You will recall that her lawsuit decades ago charging US complicity and responsibility for
her husband's killing was dismissed.

-- A suit in the District Court here by Schneider's son naming Dr. Kissinger a
defendant along with the United States;

-- A similar suit in the District Court by several alleged victims of torture by the
Chilean military post-Allende, alleging that Dr. Kissinger is responsible in damages for
the torture;

-- A host of demands by the courts of Chile, France, Italy, Spain and Argentina
arising out of their several investigations of one or another aspect of the military epoch
in Latin America -- Operation Condor, centrally -- seeking Dr. Kissinger's testimony, and
which have found their way into the press in garbled stories which imply that Dr Kissinger
is actually the accused.

All these and more are among the recent devices to perpetuate and spread the myth.
They feed on one another. And if memory serves, they are recycled rather regularly in
some website somewhere, though I confess I have not monitored it lately.

I am also sending you some of exchanges with Kornbluh. As you will see, I have not
been strikingly successful in persuading him into the path of truth.

1

By Mark Falcoff¹

¹ Mark Falcoff is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. His books include *Modern Chile, 1970-1989: A Critical History; Small Countries, Large Issues;* and most recently, *Cuba the Morning After: Confronting Castro's Legacy.*

Kissinger and Chile - Page 2

Kissinger and Chile - Page 3

2.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 4

Kissinger and Chile - Page 5

Kissinger and Chile - Page 6

This is not to say that there is no information in these documents relating to the U.S. role in Chile; far from it. President Nixon was deeply distressed at the prospect of an Allende presidency there, and on September 15, 1970, he summoned Kissinger, Attorney-General John Mitchell, and CIA director Richard Helms for a meeting in the Oval Office to discuss the subject. Nixon was determined—as Helms’ notes of the meeting record—to “save Chile” from Allende, “even if the chances are one in ten”. There was loose talk about spending $10 million to provoke a coup, “more if necessary”. In vain did Helms repeat to the President what four days after the Chilean elections he had told the 40 Committee—the body charged with overseeing covert actions overseas—namely, that Allende would in all likelihood be confirmed, and that there was only a “slight possibility” that senior elements of the Chilean military would move to block his confirmation. “Moreover,” Helms recalls in his posthumous memoirs, *A Look Over My Shoulder* (2003), “I noted that the Agency lacked the means of motivating the military to intervene.” The President was unmoved. “I tried to give [Nixon] some idea of the problems and risks involved [in promoting a military coup]. Standing mid-track and shouting at an oncoming locomotive might have been more effective.”

Building on its conviction that a conventional military uprising was not possible in Chile, the CIA, with the approval of the 40 Committee, devised what in effect was a constitutional coup. The most expeditious—and the simplest—way to prevent Allende from assuming office would be to convince the Chilean congress to confirm Alessandri as the winner of the election. There was nothing technically illegal about this procedure though it did pose serious risks to Chile’s political stability, since Allende’s followers, who comprised slightly more

Kissinger and Chile - Page 7

Kissinger and Chile - Page 8

3.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 9

Kissinger and Chile - Page 10

4.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 11

Kissinger and Chile - Page 12

Kissinger and Chile - Page 13

5.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 14

Kissinger and Chile - Page 15

Kissinger and Chile - Page 16

Kissinger and Chile - Page 17

6.

Kissinger and Chile - Page 18

Kissinger and Chile - Page 19

Kissinger and Chile - Page 20

7.

By that time Allende's problems had become so acute as to finally merit
notice by the President of the United States. The occasion was a failed military
plot which was squashed mid-year by loyalist troops. Nixon and Kissinger
discussed the matter of the telephone on July 4, 1973. Not surprisingly, Nixon
expressed regret that the coup had failed ("if only the Army could get a few
people behind them!"); for his part, Kissinger told the President "we had nothing
to do with it." Both agreed, however, that the prospect of flag officers leaving the
cabinet was bound to deepen the crisis and put Allende in an even more
disadvantageous position. (Telephone transcripts).

Kissinger and Chile - Page 21

Kissinger and Chile - Page 22

Kissinger and Chile - Page 23

8.