A word about
Special Olympics

An international sports
and recreation program
for the mentally retarded,
Special Olympics is the
largest organization of its
kind in the world.

Reaching out to retarded
youth in every state of
the union, Canada,
France, and Switzerland,
Special Olympics
welcomes more than four
hundred thousand
children annually to its
training programs and
meets. Activities range
from the traditional track
and field events to
swimming, basketball,
ice-skating, and even a
specially adapted form
of hockey.

Through Special
Olympics we are given
a clearer concept of what
it is to be human. The
courage, perseverance,
grace, and good sports-
manship of the mentally

retarded help us to recall
the ancient definition
of excellence — "grace
under pressure." They
remind us of simpler
values we seem to have
forgotten, and in their
joyous response to our
love and caring, they
yield bright illumination
for the spirit and deep
revelations of the heart.

Modeled on the original
Greek Olympic Games,
the Fourth International
Special Olympics will
take place August 7-11,
1975, in Michigan.

Distinguished Honorary Patrons

International
Special Olympics
Games

Mrs. Gerald Ford

Mrs. Pierre Trudeau

Madame Giscard d'Estaing

Benefit

Barbra Streisand

Muhammed Ali

Frank Gifford

President,
Special Olympics

Eunice Kennedy Shriver

Committee

Mrs. Sargent Shriver

Mrs. Wynant D. Vanderpool, Jr.

Mrs. Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.

Mrs. Albert C. Beveridge III

Mrs. William McC. Blair, Jr.

Mrs. A. Pierce Campbell

Mrs. Eugene C. Carusi

Mrs. Roland Evans

Mrs. Lee Fentress

Mrs. William W. Funderburk

Mrs. C. Leslie Glenn

Mrs. Katherine Gorham

Mrs. Charles Guggenheim

Mrs. Arthur P. Hendrick

Mrs. Townsend W. Hoopes

Mrs. Amanda MacKenzie

Mrs. Edward M. Kennedy

Mrs. Robert F. Kennedy

Miss Carmela La Spada

Mrs. Patricia Lawford

Mrs. LaSalle D. Leffall, Jr.

Mrs. Daniel P. Mayers

Mrs. Robert M. Montague, Jr.

Mrs. Walter Pincus

Mrs. John T. Reilly

Mrs. Arthur J. Rothkopf

Mrs. Barbara Sloat

Mrs. Stephen Smith

Mrs. George Stevens

Mrs. T. Douglas Tuomey

Mrs. John Carl Warnecke

Mrs. George Will

Mrs. Edward Bennet Williams

Mrs. Winston Churchill

Willoughby

Mrs. Frank G. Wisner

Friends of
International Special Olympics

Mr. and Mrs. George H. Allen
Lauren Bacall

Mr. and Mrs. Charles Barlett

Mr. and Mrs. Herbert Becker
The Honorable and
Mrs. Robert O. Blake

Elizabeth M. Boggs

Mr. Michael Burke
Mr. and

Mrs. Clarence S. Campbell

Rene Carpenter

Carol Channing

Mr. Justice and
Mrs. Thomas C. Clark

Mr. and Mrs. Walter Cronkite

Mr. and Mrs. John W. Douglas

Mr. Justice and
Mrs. William O. Douglas

Mr. and Mrs. Gunnar Dybwad

Mr. Myer Feldman

Elyce Zenoff Ferster

Mr. and Mrs. Lee M. Folger

Katherine Graham

Beverly Sills Greenough

Mr. Peter Greenough

Lily Polk Guest

Sister Suzanne Hall, S.N.D.

Mr. Philip Handler

Governor and
Mrs. W. Averell Harriman

David Hartman

Dr. and
Mrs. Robert H. A. Haslam

Mr. and
Mrs. John W. Hechinger

R. J. Henle, S.J.

Harry R. Hinton

The Honorable and
Mrs. Linwood Holton

Mr. and Mrs. Arte Johnson

Mr. Vernon E. Jordan, Jr.

Mr. John B. Kelly, Jr.

Mr. and Mrs. Walter Kennedy

Mr. Douglas Kiker

Alan King
The Honorable and
Mrs. Henry A. Kissinger

Dr. John H. Knowles

Mr. and
Mrs. David Lloyd Kreeger

The Honorable and
Mrs. Melvin R. Laird

Mrs. Albert D. Lasker

Cloris Leachman

Mrs. Ettie Lederer
(Ann Landers)

George "Goober" Lindsey

The Honorable and
Mrs. Sol Linowitz

Alice Roosevelt Longworth

Mr. Christopher Lydon

Mr. and
Mrs. Colman McCarthy

Dr. and
Mrs. Matthew F. McNulty, Jr.

Mr. Andre Meyer

The Reverend John F. Meyers

Mr. and Mrs. Edward P. Morgan

Bill Movers

Dr. and Mrs. Steven Muller

Dr. Marshall Nirenberg

Mr. and Mrs. Abe Pollin

Mr. Geraldo Rivera

Mr. and Mrs. Pete Rozelle

Mr. and Mrs. Tom Sarnoff

Mr. and Mrs. Benno C. Schmidt

Mr. and Mrs. Daniel Schorr

Mr. and Mrs. Marion P. Smith

General and
Mrs. Maxwell D. Taylor

Mr. and Mrs. Jack Valenti

Sander Vanocur

Jill Wine Volner

Barbara Walters

Mr. and
Mrs. Edward Bennett Williams

Admiral E. R. Zumwalt, Jr.

H.E. The Ambassador of
Argentina

H.E. The Ambassador of
Belgium and
Mrs. van Cauwenberg

H.E. The Ambassador of
Brazil and
Mrs. Araujo Castro

H.E. The Ambassador of
Canada and
Mrs. Cadieux

H.E. The Ambassador of
France and
Mrs. Kosciusko-Morizet

H.E. The Ambassador of The
Federal Republic of Germany
and Mrs. von Staden

H.E. The Ambassador of Great
Britain and Lady Ramsbotham

H.E. The Ambassador of India
and Mrs. Kaul

H.E. The Ambassador of Iran

H.E. The Ambassador of Ireland

H.E. The Ambassador of Israel
and Mrs. Dinitz

H.E. The Ambassador of Italy
and Mrs. Ortona

H.E. The Ambassador of The
Ivory Coast and Mrs. Ahoua

H.E. The Ambassador of Jordan
and Mrs. Salah

H.E. The Ambassador of The
Netherlands and

Mrs. Tammenoms Bakker

H.E. The Ambassador of
Switzerland and Mrs. Schnyder

H.E. The Ambassador of The
Union of Soviet Socialist

Republics and Mrs. Dobrynin

H.E. The Ambassador of The
United Arab Emirates

H.E. The Ambassador of
Venezuela and

Mrs. Burelli-Rivas

Sen. & Mrs. James Abourezk

Sen. & Mrs. Birch Bayh

Sen. & Mrs. Edward W. Brooke

Sen. & Mrs. James L. Buckley

Sen. & Mrs. Robert C. Byrd

Sen. & Mrs. Frank Church

Sen. & Mrs. Alan Cranston

Sen. & Mrs. John Culver

Sen. & Mrs. Carl T. Curtis

Sen. & Mrs. Thomas F. Eagleton

Sen. & Mrs. John Glenn

Sen. & Mrs. Gary Hart

Sen. & Mrs. Philip A. Hart

Sen. & Mrs. Vance Hartke

Sen. & Mrs. William D. Hathaway

Sen. & Mrs. Ernest F. Hollings

Sen. & Mrs. Hubert H. Humphrey

Sen. & Mrs. Henry M. Jackson

Sen. & Mrs. Jacob K. Javits

Sen. & Mrs. Edward M. Kennedy

Sen. & Mrs. Mike Mansfield

Sen. & Mrs. Gale McGee

Sen. & Mrs. George S. McGovern

Sen. & Mrs. Charles McC.
Mathias

Sen. & Mrs. Gaylord Nelson

Sen. & Mrs. Claiborne Pell

Sen. & Mrs. Charles Percy

Sen. & Mrs. William Proxmire

Sen. & Mrs. Jennings Randolph

Sen. & Mrs. Abraham A. Ribicoff

Sen. & Mrs. Richard S. Schweiker

Sen. & Mrs. Hugh Scott

Sen. & Mrs. Robert T. Stafford

Sen. John V. Tunney

The Honorable and
Mrs. Carl Albert

The Honorable Bella Abzug
and Mr. Martin Abzug

The Honorable and
Mrs. Jack Brooks

The Honorable and
Mrs. Clair W. Burgener

The Honorable and
Mrs. Tim Lee Carter

The Honorable Shirley Chisholm
and Mr. Conrad Chisholm

The Honorable and
Mrs. William L. Clay

The Honorable and
Mrs. Daniel J. Flood

The Honorable and
Mrs. Sam M. Gibbons

The Honorable and
Mrs. Gilbert Gude

The Honorable Barbara Jordan

The Honorable and
Mrs. Thomas Morgan

The Honorable and
Mrs. Ralph H. Metcalfe

The Honorable and
Mrs. Thomas P. O'Neill

The Honorable and
Mrs. Richard L. Ottinger

The Honorable and
Mrs. Carl D. Perkins

The Honorable and
Mrs. John J. Rhodes

The Honorable and
Mrs. Paul Rogers

The Honorable and
Mrs. Teno Roncalio

The Governors of
the States

Hank Aaron

Bob Addie

Arthur Ashe

"Red" Auerbach

Mary Bacon

Mike Bass

Larry Brown

Bill Brundige

Buck Buchanan

Suzy Chaffee

Wilt Chamberlain

Dave Condon

Howard Cosell

David Cowens

Bill Curry

Wayne Embry

Carl Erskine

Gary Erwin

Bob Ferry

George Foreman

Althea Gibson

Frank Gifford

Rosie Grier

Bob Griese

Ken Hodge

Rafer Johnson

Lee Roy Jordan

Sonny Jurgensen

Evil Knieval

Archie Manning

Hugh McElhenny

Don Meredith

Stan Mikita

Johnny Miller

Don Nelson

Dick Nemelka

Bobby Orr

Ara Parseghian

Brooks Robinson

Kyle Rote, Jr.

Bill Russell

Morris Siegel

Ray Schoenke

Larry Smith

Jo Jo Starbuck

Jan Stenerud

Fran Tarkenton

Bill Toomey

Ed Westfall

(List incomplete)

The Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation

1701 K STREET, NORTHWEST, SUITE 205
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 337-1731

December 12, 1974

The Honorable and Mrs. Henry Kissinger
The Department of State
2201 C Street
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry and Nancy,

On March 9, 1975, a most extraordinary event will take place at the Kennedy Center in Washington, D.C. It will be the World Premiere of Barbra Streisand's new film "Funny Lady," perhaps the most exciting motion picture event of the year. Before the film, ABC will televise a live, one-hour show from the Center, starring Barbra Streisand, Omar Sharif, James Caan, Ben Vereen and many others. This program will be broadcast on the network and transmitted on closed circuit television to Premieres which will be held simultaneously in several major cities in the U.S.

All the wonderful activities of the evening will honor the Special Olympics Program and the 350,000 mentally retarded young men and women who are growing stronger in mind and body through this year-round sports program.

Because of your interest in sports and concern for the less fortunate, we would like to number you among the many International Friends of Special Olympics who will be listed on the invitation and in the program. This will be our way of demonstrating that Special Olympics is the product of many minds and hearts united in a great venture to bring joy to the mentally retarded.

I sincerely hope that you will be able to attend one of the Premieres, either in Washington or a city near you. We will give you further details as plans become more definite.

Please let me know as soon as possible if we may place your name among our honored Friends of Special Olympics.

1701 K STREET, NORTHWEST, SUITE 205
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006
(202) 331-1731

December 12, 1974

The Honorable Henry Kissinger and
Mrs. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger:

On March 9, 1975, a most extraordinary event will take place at the Kennedy Center in Washington, D. C. It will be the World Premiere of Barbra Streisand's new film "Funny Lady," perhaps the most exciting motion picture event of the year. Before the film, ABC will televise a live, one-hour show from the Center, starring Barbra Streisand, Omar Sharif, James Caan, Ben Vereen, and many others. This program will be broadcast on the network and transmitted on closed circuit television to Premieres which will be held simultaneously in several major cities in the United States.

All the wonderful activities of the evening will honor the Special Olympics program and the 350,000 mentally retarded young men and women who are growing stronger in mind and body through this year-round sports program.

Because of your great interest in Special Olympics, we would like to number you among the many International Friends of Special Olympics who will be listed on the invitation and in the program. This will be our way of demonstrating that Special Olympics is the product of many minds and hearts united in a great venture to bring joy to the mentally retarded.

I sincerely hope that you will be able to attend the Premiere. We will give you further details as plans become more definite.

EKS:jfw

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1974 DEC 18 PM 3 20

FADRC
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

ACTION
is assigned to
PA/PP

SARGENT AND I AND THE TRUSTEES OF THE

JOSEPH P. KENNEDY, JR. FOUNDATION WOULD LIKE

TO EXTEND A PERSONAL INVITATION TO ATTEND THE

SPECIAL OLYMPICS RECEPTION, LIVE TELEVISION

SPECTACULAR, AND MOVIE PREMIERE AS OUR GUEST.

COME, YOU WILL HAVE A GREAT EVENING!

Athletes can help you bring peace to the world also. We will be fun and inspiring. See you later.

R.S.V.P. FOR TICKETS

BY FEBRUARY 7TH

(202) 362-8541

2921 44TH PLACE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 30, 1974

Dear Kurt:

Thank you for your recent note
of congratulations. Your kind words
are greatly appreciated.

I too hope that we shall be able
to get together soon as it is always
good to talk to my friends from Furth.

Mr. Kurt E. Shuler,
P. O. Box 1504,
Rancho Santa Fe, California.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO

BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY
REVELLE COLLEGE

POST OFFICE BOX 109
LA JOLLA, CALIFORNIA 92037

March 15, 1976

C

Dr. Phillip Handler
President
National Academy of Science
Washington, D. C.

O

P

Y

Dear Dr. Handler:

I have for a number of years disagreed with the position of the National Academy as regards their policy of cooperation and exchange with the USSR Academy of Science and Russian science in general. I have read the reasons you have set forth to explain and justify this policy, but I still disagree. I do not see where it has helped dissident Russian scientists in their quest for freedom of speech and opinion or where it has helped the emigration of those who want to leave the USSR.

I am enclosing a clipping from the L.A. Times regarding the Hollywood Actors Association. It is my belief that their stand of halting all professional cooperation with the Soviet Union until freedom of emigration has been accepted by the USSR is a proper one. I am not saying that it will be a successful one but at least they are standing up for what they think are principles and maybe the Russians will understand that.

We are scientists and we are used to doing experiments. Why not do the experiment of complete non-cooperation with the USSR as regards exchange of scientists, attendance at meetings, etc. to see whether this might have the desired effect of stopping the harassment by the USSR of its own scientists. It may not work - but if we don't try it we'll never know. All I know is that our present policy does not seem to be very successful - and I don't think it is very principled either.

KES:sb

Enclosure

Euclidville
KE2:ap

Sincerely yours,

Y
O
P
O
C

I think are principles and maybe the Russians will understand that.
will be a successful one but at least they are standing up for what they
has been accepted by the U22R is a proper one. I am not saying that it
protestational cooperation with the Soviet Union until freedom of emigration
Actors Association. It is my belief that their stand of halting all
I am enclosing a clipping from the L.V. Times regarding the Hollywood

it has helped the emigration of those who want to leave the U22R.
scientists in their quest for freedom of speech and opinion or where
I still disagree. I do not see where it has helped dissident Russian
the reasons you have set forth to explain and justify this policy, but
U22R Academy of Science and Russian science in general. I have read
Academy as regards their policy of cooperation and exchange with the
I have for a number of years disagreed with the position of the National

Dear Dr. Handler:

Washington, D. C.
National Academy of Science
President
Dr. Phillip Handler

March 12, 1976

REAGLEITE COLLEGE
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

IV JOLLY' CATHORIN 25032
POST OFFICE BOX 109

BERKELEY • DAVIS • INDIAN • LOS ANGELES • RIVERIDE • SANTA FEAGO • SANTA FEVICO

SYLVIA BURBYAH • SYLVIA CRUZ

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA • SANTA FEAGO

MARSHALL D. SHULMAN
450 RIVERSIDE DRIVE
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10027

February 24, 1975

Dr. Henry Kissinger,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

Many thanks for your letter. I don't believe it is worth taking your time to report orally my impressions from the Moscow trip, Feb. 17-21, with the Doty Academy group, because there is nothing particularly new or startling, and we did check in with Walt Stoessel, but I am at your disposal if you would like any further discussion of these or other matters. Here is a brief summary:

1. On US-Soviet relations generally: We found the Soviet group particularly solicitous to give reassurances that the fall of the trade agreement would not affect SALT or the general tone of US-Soviet relations. On trade issue, the Soviet feeling seemed to be that they had made a tactical error in appearing over-anxious for trade and technology, and are now trying to correct for it by striking a posture of elaborate casualness, developing relations with the British and others in the hope of stirring a little competitive interest on our part. Despite the casualness, however, they were surprised and downcast to learn that it was unlikely that there would be any change in the US legislation in the near future. On technology transfer, it seemed to me that there is somewhat more recognition on their part that this will require more than shipments from abroad; that institutional developments in the SU will be needed to make use of imported technology.

2. On arms control matters: There was widespread puzzlement and concern about the criticism of Vladivostok in the US; some difficulty in sorting out the pro- and anti-arms control positions, and a fear that the US was backing off from the agreement and from SALT generally. The one subject on which some movement seems possible is peaceful nuclear explosions. It is apparent that the negotiations are in the hands of PNE enthusiasts, and that others are only beginning to become aware of the implications and to express themselves. May be some hope there.

3. On Soviet political situation: no apparent nervousness about a possible leadership change, at the levels at which we were. Appeared to be a somewhat erratic pattern in treatment of dissidents, some tightening, but not uniform. Dissidents seemed substantially weakened by exodus and earlier repression. In a private conversation with Arbatov, I expressed my personal feeling that it would complicate things if they were to tighten up on Jewish emigration; he said he did not believe this would change, but he thought numbers of applications would decline.

4. On US political situation: widespread concern in SU about your relations with the Congress, and how it will affect their relations with you, whether negotiations with you will stand up. Of course some apprehensions about the 1976 elections.

15 August 1975

Dear Henry:

Sometime when you come back from the Middle East,
I'd like to come down and chat with you about the
current state of US-Soviet relations. Let me know
whenever you might have some time, either in Washington
or NY. I'll be away Sept. 12-23 (Iran); otherwise
could make it at your convenience.

Telephone:

NY apt. 663-3212

NY ofc. 280-4623

Conn. weekends:

203-354-0333

Statement by Marshall D. Shulman

Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations
Former Director, Russian Institute
Columbia University

Before Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs

February 3, 1976

Mr. Chairman:

I appreciate your invitation to testify before the Subcommittee on the significance of the Angolan issue in the present state of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In my prepared statement, I address myself to two questions:

I. Why has the Soviet Union, in its recently increased intervention in Angola, shown less restraint than before, and than it has shown elsewhere?

II. What is the relationship between the Angolan issue to broader aspects of present and future U.S.-Soviet relations?

I. Why less Soviet restraint now than before?

In its earlier interventions in Africa, during the Congo crisis of 1960, in Guinea, Ghana and Mali, the level of Soviet economic and military assistance was relatively modest, and was withdrawn when conditions turned unfavorable to the Soviet Union. Even in Somalia, where the Soviet presence remains, the Soviet Union has clearly sought to avoid so direct a provocation as to risk its own involvement in military conflict in Africa. From the beginning of the Angolan independence struggle in 1961, Soviet and later Cuban involvement was kept at modest levels, increasing somewhat in the last quarter of 1974, but rising steeply in the spring and summer of 1975, when Cuban soldiers began to make their appearance in large numbers. Even that minimum degree of restraint which had marked Soviet military support to Egypt and Syria before and after the Middle East war of October, 1973, has been lacking in the large-scale flow of weapons, military advisers and

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[LC]

Cuban soldiers which has made possible the savage civil war among the three Angolan independence factions.

In seeking an explanation for this change in Soviet behavior, we are obliged to take account of the following factors:

1. Some have argued that the Soviet increased intervention was responsive to intervention by the United States and South Africa, but information available on the timing of the respective interventions is not sufficiently clear to sustain this argument. It appears that the U.S. assistance to the FNLA/UNITA forces began in January, 1975, and was increased in July, 1975. The introduction of South African troops through Namibia apparently began in September, 1975. While some increase in the Soviet level of military assistance was noted toward the end of 1974, the steep rise of March, 1975, may conceivably have been related to the American moves which began in January, but even if this were the case, the scale of Soviet-Cuban flow of weapons, advisors and soldiers was clearly disproportionate to the U.S. assistance program.

2. Somewhat more persuasive is the possibility of an anti-Chinese motivation for the Soviet increase. During the previous period, Chinese influence in Africa had been steadily increasing where Soviet influence had been diminishing. During 1974, Chinese forces had been supplying and training FNLA soldiers in Zaire, at a modest level. Here was a clear opportunity to demonstrate to the African states the relative strength of Soviet versus Chinese support, to weaken Chinese influence by creating an identification with South Africa, and to refute Chinese charges of Soviet lack of militant support for revolutionary "wars of national liberation." More importantly, in view of the intensified Sino-Soviet rivalry following the withdrawal of the United States from I$_{n}$, dochina, here was an opportunity to show Peking that the Chinese reliance on the United States to offer effective opposition to the Soviet Union is a weak reed to lean upon.

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[LC]

3. Internal pressures within the Soviet Union suggest another plausible explanation. Contrary to the claim sometimes advanced in this country that the Soviet "peaceful coexistence" policy has resulted in unequal advantages to the Soviet Union, the Soviet leadership has been under pressure domestically from those who charge that the Soviet Union has suffered a diplomatic set-back in the Middle East and a political defeat in Portugal. Further, it is argued that opportunities to exploit the economic and political troubles of the West have been neglected, that the detente policy has not produced economic benefits on the scale that had been promised and has not prevented the United States from lengthening its lead in military technology. In Angola, the Soviet leadership has an opportunity to demonstrate its activism in answer to these charges during the critical months preceding the XXV Party Congress, and to do so with only moderate risks and costs. Moreover, militant activism in Angola signals abroad that serious shortcomings in the Soviet economy will not result in a more submissive foreign policy.

4. One reason why the risks and costs of this scale of intervention in Angola may appear moderate stems from the Soviet perception of the present state of United States foreign policy. The combined effect of the internal conflict between the Congress and the Executive branch in the United States and the political climate generated by the Vietnam and Watergate experiences may be seen by the Soviet Union as preventing any effective United States response, either locally in Angola or generally. Since it appears unlikely in any case that the Congress would have moved before the election to revise the restrictive provisions of the Trade Reform Act of 1974, no deprivation of economic benefits would be anticipated.

5. A possible contributory factor was the rise and fall of Soviet hopes for Portugal. When the left wing was ascendant in Portugal, the Soviet Union may have felt that it had a free hand in supporting the MPLA, with which it had previously been linked through the Portuguese Communist Party. As hopes for a left-wing government in Portugal diminished, the

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[LC]

need for a political victory elsewhere may have stimulated Soviet efforts.

6. Weighed against this assessment of moderate risks and costs, the advantages of a decisive Soviet intervention in Angola would appear substantial. Whether or not the Soviet Union can anticipate future economic and military benefits from a continuing strong presence in Angola, the Soviet leadership can reasonably expect that its influence in Black Africa generally will be strengthened by this demonstration of its continuing support for "national liberation" and "anti-imperialist" forces, in anticipation of the coming struggles in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, while the United States can be identified with Portuguese imperialism and South Africa.

One can only speculate what weight the Soviet leadership has given to these various factors, but given the balance of moderate costs and substantial potential gains, it is apparent why the Soviet Union has not been dissuaded by/diplomatic representations from increasing its military intervention in Angola.

## II. This brings us to the question: *How does the Angolan issue affect broader aspects of present and future relations between the United States and the Soviet Union?*

The Soviet intervention in Angola should not have occasioned as much surprise as it has in the United States. The Soviet leadership has made it abundantly clear that a relationship of "peaceful coexistence" does not preclude an active prosecution of politically competitive interests, particularly in situations defined by the Soviet Union as "wars of national liberation." If the American political leadership had not so indiscriminately oversold the ambiguous word, "detente," the American people would have been better prepared to sustain a relationship which involves a mixture of some competing and some overlapping interests. Perhaps with more realism and less rhetoric, we will be able to distinguish these interests more clearly.

There have also been misconceptions on the Soviet side. The political

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[LC]

compromises that led the Soviet leadership to assert that a relationship of reduced tension and business-like cooperation could be consistent with a heightening of the ideological struggle, support for "wars of national liberation," and an indifference to humanitarian considerations have clearly involved unforeseen costs to the Soviet Union.

Although there has been a multiplication of contacts between the Soviet Union and the United States over the past five years, the two most important aspects of the relationship -- the reduction in the military competition and the expansion of economic relations -- have not fared well.

Although one hopes that the next round of SALT will be productive, to this point it must be acknowledged that despite six and a half years of negotiation, the strategic military competition continues to drift toward more unstable and less controllable weapons systems. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union have yet shown an adequate understanding of their real security interests in a stabilization of the military competition at moderate levels. This objective remains valid and urgent, despite Angola and all other differences between the two powers.

The hope for expanded economic relations between the two countries was, in my judgment, an important element in the Soviet turn toward a reduction of tensions with the United States in 1971. I believe that the Congress of the United States made an error of judgment in attaching to the Trade Reform Act of 1974 and the Export-Import Bank renewal restrictive provisions which could only be fulfilled at the price of public capitulation, and which therefore inevitably frustrated the purposes they were intended to serve. If the Trade Agreement were in force, the government of the United States would not be as devoid as it now is of instruments to encourage Soviet restraint in Angola and in other crisis situations. With this instrument in hand, it would not be necessary to wield it so publicly and so explicitly as to negate its effect. It is not too late for us to learn this lesson.

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[L.C]

It may be that it is not now in our power to rectify the situation in Angola, so that the Angolans with the help of their African neighbors but without outside military intervention can arrive at a peaceful political solution without further loss of lives. Our tangled and tortuous experience in Angola and our period of confusion of purpose make it difficult for us to know how to use our power helpfully in this situation. But in the shadow of Angola, a more dread conflict threatens to engulf the continent, and the elements that might moderate it are being weakened, and will need our support.

The lesson which is underlined by the Angolan experience is that the central problem of our foreign policy is not the Soviet Union, but the threatening disintegration of international relations into widespread violence and anarchy. Since no nation can be secure in such a world, we must learn to use our power -- moral, economic and military -- to reverse these trends and to strengthen the international system. To do this, we need to get our second wind in a realistic detente relationship with the Soviet Union, for the risks and instabilities of such problems as Africa presents will be infinitely greater if the United States and the Soviet Union are locked into a high-tension relationship instead of the imperfectly moderated competition called detente.

And finally in order to bring this about, we urgently need to dispel the mood of recrimination which now prevents the Congress and the Executive branch from acting toward a common purpose.

* * * *

[LC]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

JANUARY 1977

Storm over the Multinationals: Problems and Prospects

<table><tr><td>Raymond Vernon</td><td>243</td></tr><tr><td>Lawrence A. Veit</td><td>263</td></tr><tr><td>Jean Kanapa</td><td>280</td></tr><tr><td>Ross Terrill</td><td>295</td></tr></table>

The Congress, the Executive and Intermestic Affairs:

<table><tr><td>Three Proposals</td><td>Bayless Manning</td><td>306</td></tr><tr><td>On Learning to Live with Authoritarian Regimes</td><td>Marshall D. Shulman</td><td>325</td></tr></table>

The Naval Balance: Not Just a Numbers Game

<table><tr><td>Admiral Stansfield Turner</td><td>339</td></tr><tr><td>Michael Krepon</td><td>355</td></tr><tr><td>John Paton Davies</td><td>368</td></tr><tr><td>Charles P. Kindleberger</td><td>395</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>Comment and Correspondence</td><td>418</td></tr><tr><td>Recent Books on International Relations</td><td>425</td></tr><tr><td>Source Material</td><td>Janet Rigney</td><td>444</td></tr></table>

WILLIAM P. BUNDY
Editor

JENNIFER SEYMOUR WHITAKER
Associate Editor

JAMES CHACE

Managing Editor

LUCY EDWARDS DESFARD
Book Editor

BARBARA GIBSON SCHWARZ
Assistant to the Editor

EVELYN G. MOREL
Assistant to the Managing Editor

BORIS ELIZABETH FORREST
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Vol. 55, No. 2. Copyright 1976, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. Printed in the U.S.A.

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Marshall D. Shulman

ON LEARNING
TO LIVE WITH
AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

Among the problems experienced by democratic societies in managing their foreign affairs, none have been more beset with dilemmas both moral and practical, nor accompanied by more dispute and self-doubt concerning fundamental aspects of the democratic faith, than those arising as a consequence of relations with authoritarian regimes.

In the aftermath of recent revelations of unlawful practices in high places in the United States and of other traumas both here and abroad, a riptide of conflicting reactions has set in. Some have been moved to view the differences between democracy and authoritarianism as a matter of degree. As an antidote to an earlier self-righteousness and the inclination to regard our actions in the world with excessive self-indulgence, this reaction to the American fall from virtue has definite therapeutic benefits. But in extreme measure, it has reinforced the loss of confidence in democratic societies as the chosen people of human progress, and in the capacity of self-government to cope with the growing complexities of national and international life.

In reaction against this perceived loss of democratic morale, there has emerged a militant support for a more "moral" foreign policy, for different and sometimes incompatible reasons. Some assert the primacy of moral, and particularly of human rights, considerations in foreign policy as a matter of principle—against what is felt to have been the recent excessive preoccupation with strategic power considerations. Others evoke support for human rights issues (along with an increased mobilization of military power) as an element in a renewed ideological offensive against the Soviet Union.

The result of these conflicting reactions has been a period of disorientation on a score of issues confronting the United States and

Marshall D. Shulman is the Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Relations and Director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University. He is the author of *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised* and *Beyond the Cold War*. This article was adapted from a lecture delivered on June 23, 1976, at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva.

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326 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

other democratic societies. Some of these issues are transient and
tactical; others now temporarily obscured involve more fundamental
adjustments as part of a longer term process of learning to live with
authoritarian regimes. As a step toward sorting out some of the
moral and practical elements involved in these adjustments, there are
set forth below four classes of problems requiring discrimination:
the first three primarily concern aspects of U.S. relations with the
Soviet Union; the fourth concerns relations with some less powerful
but significantly placed authoritarian regimes.

For our present purpose, the term *authoritarian regimes* is used here in its broadest sense to include totalitarian states, dictatorships, and regimes in which opposition is suppressed. There are of course significant differences between those regimes in which the power of the state controls all aspects of the society and those in which primarily political opposition is prevented from operating, with varying degrees of repressiveness. Some problems are common to this entire category of states and some, as we are coming to learn, are reflected according to the degree of repression exercised.

*Democratic societies* is used here to distinguish those societies that are committed, with varying degrees of imperfection in practice, to the principle of government by the freely expressed consent of the governed, and to the conditions of free civil discourse necessary to the expression of that consent. Of the many attributes that might be selected to characterize the essential qualities of democracy, this principle most clearly distinguishes between form and essence.

II

The most obvious and perhaps the simplest of the classes of prob-
lems that have arisen are those that might be called *structural*. They
involve the meshing of pluralistic institutions on the one side with
highly centralized institutions on the other, involving a variety of
encounters characteristic of contemporary international relations, in-
cluding economic and cultural relations, contacts in international or-
ganizations and between nongovernmental groups. Even conven-
tional diplomatic relations are affected by the asymmetry in the
foreign policy-making processes of the two systems. Although these
structural problems have not attracted much attention from the gen-
eral public, they may have considerable ultimate importance.

Although economic relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union have developed under government-to-government
agreements, their implementation involves largely autonomous indi-
vidual firms on one hand and, on the other, the Ministry for Foreign

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AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 327

Trade and its subordinate departments, with the participation of the particular Ministries involved, as well as State Banks, the State Planning Commission and in some cases the State Committee for Science and Technology. A process of adjustment has begun on both sides to facilitate the meshing of these dissimilar institutions, and the long-term consequences may be substantial for each.¹

From the Western side, efforts have been made to compensate for the bargaining advantage which accrues to the centralized Soviet institutions, and to meet the more fundamental problem of the differences between the national interest and the interests of individual firms. The concern of individual firms is quite naturally with whether or not a particular deal is profitable; from the national point of view, policy questions arise as to the advantages of developing economic relations as a means of stabilizing political relations, as against the possible risks of strengthening militarily or economically a state that remains committed to some incompatible international objectives.

As a consequence, a trend toward centralized political control over trade with the East has been set in motion, although the question remains unresolved whether democratic societies are able and willing to exert the degree of centralized coordination or control of national economic policy necessary to administer a coherently regulated trade policy, let alone to achieve the degree of coordination necessary with their allies.

Among the adjustments that have been set in motion in the United States to compensate for the institutional asymmetries are wider interpretations of antitrust legislation to allow firms engaged in foreign trade a degree of coordination normally prohibited in domestic trade; mandatory coordination of information among firms engaged in grain sales abroad; closer congressional supervision of export-import credit practices in East-West trade; stronger Department of Defense involvement in permission for transfer of advanced technology; and a proliferation of government advisory and licensing procedures to recommend or to impose a degree of centralization upon transactions normally not subject to such regulation. The most extreme measure of control was contained in the Trade Reform Act of 1974, and accompanying legislation on the Export-Import Bank, in which the Congress prohibited the extension of Export-Import Bank credits or the granting of most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union unless changes were made in restrictive Soviet emigration practices. As a result of this, the Trade Agreement Act of

¹ See Raymond Vernon, "Apparatchiks and Entrepreneurs: U.S.-Soviet Economic Ratio-of-Sides," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1973, pp. 249-262.

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328 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

1972 remains unconsummated. If and when a new effort is made to draft legislation for the regulation of East-West economic relations, agreement will be required between the executive and congressional branches of government and the business community upon more effective guidelines and measures of coordination than now exist.

The Soviet side has also made adjustments to facilitate East-West trade. For example, the U.S.S.R. has eased bureaucratic obstacles to direct access by Western firms to the various State enterprises, and it has coordinated the various foreign trade organizations to make compensation agreements with Western firms easier to negotiate. In an effort to make transfers of advanced technology more attractive to Western firms, the Soviet Union has been moving warily and with evident reluctance toward forms of joint ventures. While the Soviets do not permit foreign equity holdings, they do accept Western participation in management functions affecting quality control, though not in personnel matters. Whether the acceptance of Western management practices will result in a wider diffusion of initiative and responsibility in the presently highly centralized Soviet economy is a matter of contention within the Soviet leadership.

The asymmetry of institutions involved in cultural relations has also led to greater coordination in the United States among universities, scientific and other academic and cultural institutions, although here a certain ingenuity has permitted effective coordination without undue loss of independence. For example, under the umbrella cultural exchange agreements negotiated between the governments, implementing academic exchanges is handled by the International Research and Exchanges Board; this enables the universities, on the basis of voluntary cooperation, to speak with one voice to the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education and the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

In the natural sciences, scholarly exchanges are administered by the quasi-governmental National Academy of Sciences, and through participation in the Joint Commissions on various aspects of science and technology by the different U.S. departments of government. These are only loosely coordinated, however, and troublesome questions over the possible asymmetry of benefits to the two sides and the repugnant but apparently necessary invocation of the principle of reciprocity in response to Soviet limitations on unfettered scientific exchanges remain unresolved. A self-study by the National Academy now under way may result in a further codification of exchange practices.

Contacts between nongovernmental organizations, such as the

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Pugwash and Dartmouth groups, the United Nations Associations, and inter-academy arms control study groups, have also involved efforts to compensate for the difference between autonomous institutions on the American side and their quasi-governmental opposite numbers. Thus, there has developed through experience an ethic of responsible independence among the American groups, which seeks to make clear the distinction between the official governmental position on issues under discussion and the sometimes critical and independent positions of the participants. As a consequence, exploratory channels of communication have developed whose utility has been greatest when government-to-government channels have been impaired by political tensions.

While the range of independence among Soviet participants in nongovernmental contacts is obviously more restricted, it has nevertheless been widening with experience and the growth of confidence. An important consequence of this is that American participants are able to go beyond the limited printed sources of information on Soviet positions and to become aware of the richer and more complex oral levels of discussion of policy issues.

As for U.S.-Soviet relations in various international organizations, the structural differences between the two systems appear to be less important than differences in policy, except in certain of the specialized agencies. Perhaps the most striking illustration of structural differences in the two systems is to be found in the case of the International Labour Organisation. There the issue of the differences in the function of trade unions in the two societies, which had been subject to a certain accommodation over the years, has become more acute recently. However, even this tension has had policy roots, specifically the critical attitude of American trade union leadership toward elements of the détente relationship.

Finally in the class of structural problems must be noted the institutional differences affecting foreign policy-making. The familiar problem of the role of public opinion in American foreign policy—and of the Congress as the most direct expression of this—has become more acute as a result of a combination of factors, including the Vietnam War, the prices of bread and grain, ethnic sympathies, the lines at gas stations during the oil embargo, and the technological advances that have created a greater popular awareness and sense of immediacy about international developments. The effect of these developments upon U.S.-Soviet relations has been to make for greater volatility and unpredictability, imposing severe limitations on the ability of the executive branch to guarantee the implementation of

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330 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

policies and agreements. To what extent this represents a cyclical phenomenon remains to be seen.

Soviet specialists in international relations have been learning to take into account the pluralism of the American foreign-policy process. They have become more fully conscious of the power of public opinion and its reactions to such developments as Angola, the Middle East, Cyprus, and issues involving the military balance and human rights. While they still suspect that the government has some degree of manipulative power over public opinion and the press, they have turned greater attention to the role of Congress, and deploy a substantial effort to study and influence congressional opinion.

The Soviet foreign policy-making process, on the other hand, is in the hands of professionals and speaks with one voice, free from the complications of a separation of powers or an unruly public opinion or press. The policy-makers do have some problems of coordination—both between the Party, the diplomatic branch and the KGB, and between the national interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of foreign communist parties. Moreover, the absence of checks and balances can make for monumental errors on occasion. And the effect of ideological preconceptions makes for problems in the perception and accurate reporting of developments abroad. This is most acute precisely when it involves pluralistic institutions, for it is difficult to grasp the workings of pluralistic power hierarchies if one has only experienced, and if the history of one's country has only known, autocracy.

III

Another class of problems experienced by democracies in their relations with authoritarian regimes might be called the *induction effect*—these relations generate within democratic societies. More specifically, this concerns the degradation of democratic norms of behavior domestically and internationally resulting from the perceived necessity of competing with the methods of totalitarian states.

It is worth recalling that the American people found themselves plunged into the Second World War without having resolved many feelings derived from their experience in the First World War concerning the role of force in international relations or their own role in world affairs. The precipitate release from these uncertainties by the attack on Pearl Harbor, the inevitable brutalization entailed in what came to be called "total war," and the fact that in Hitler's Nazism was found an adversary as close to absolute evil as could be imagined—all contributed to the acceptance and justification of any

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and all means believed useful to defeat, indeed to destroy, the enemy.

In contrast to Churchill's acceptance of an alliance with the Soviet Union as a necessity which in no way contradicted his earlier judgment of the regime, the Americans, with characteristic indiscriminate enthusiasm for their "gallant Soviet ally," chose to ignore the darker side of Stalin's Russia and the portents of future problems. Consequently, as the inevitable conflicts arose concerning postwar arrangements, the Americans—in their self-induced disillusionment and sudden rediscovery of Soviet totalitarianism—carried over into the cold war many of the same attitudes of mind earlier applied with abandon to the war against Nazism.

Under the best of circumstances, it would have been difficult to expect a measured response to the novel problems presented by modern totalitarianism: its capacity for large-scale espionage, subversion, misinformation, propaganda, front organizations, and covert operations on a hitherto unimagined scale, all of which created a new shadow-world of violence and deceit in international relations. Given the emotional circumstances of our entry into this competition, it was perhaps inevitable that the logic of "fighting fire with fire" should have overcome any moral squeamishness about where, and to what degree, the means employed, however incompatible with previous democratic precepts, were justified by the perceived necessities. Like sheltered innocents discovering the pleasures of sin, Americans found a certain zest in their release from earlier inhibitions.

Two other factors contributed to the disorientation of democratic values in this period. One was the emergence of the age of nuclear weapons and missiles. This brought with it a sense of vulnerability to attack, if not to annihilation; an enormous increase in the militarization of the economy and military influences in the society; and finally the anomaly of mutual deterrence—which involves holding populations hostage to mass destruction—as the best hope of maintaining the peace under the circumstances. The other factor was the profound social upheaval in all industrial countries resulting from the continuing revolution in advanced technology—calling into question traditional values and sources of moral authority.

As recent hearings before the U.S. Congress have confirmed, the response to the need to match Soviet espionage, counterespionage and covert activities led to such excesses as attempts at assassination of foreign leaders, extensive covert interference in the internal politics of other countries, and extensive operations within the United States, involving domestic surveillance and wiretapping, burglaries, forgeries, and penetration of political dissidents in the name of national

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security. The earlier ravages of the McCarthy period also must be counted among the excessive reactions to these security apprehensions. Thus, in the United States, the security apparatus administering intelligence and covert operations developed into a semiautonomous bureaucratic force commanding an estimated $7 billion annually.² To some degree at least, the United States had indeed "taken on the face of its adversary," as the French proverb expresses it, with, however, the saving grace that the force of public opinion and the separation of powers have made it possible to take corrective action against these excesses.³

Still, the difficulty remains of finding a measured reaction to a true dilemma of how democratic societies can learn to respond effectively to the large-scale covert techniques employed by totalitarian states, without sacrificing the distinctive attributes of democracy. But it has certainly become evident that the blanket justification of "fighting fire with fire" can lead to pernicious consequences, and that the indiscriminate acceptance of totalitarian methods in the belief that the ends justify the means undermines the essence of the democratic spirit, which is inherent in the process rather than in the particular ends sought.

IV

Among the most difficult problems in these relationships are those that stem from the question: To what extent is it legitimate, desirable, necessary—or even possible—for democratic societies to seek to modify the practices or the character of authoritarian regimes in a humane and pluralist direction? Illustrations of these problems include the recent debates about the "Basket 3" provisions concerning human rights at the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation; the Jackson Amendment linking trade relations with Soviet emigration practices; and Solzhenitsyn's strictures concerning the immorality of dealing with the Soviet leadership on any basis other than a liberalization of Soviet totalitarianism.

The issue is heightened by the workings of an inverse mechanism in the Soviet Union, by which the movement toward a policy of reduced tension abroad is accompanied by a tightening of internal controls.⁴ This results from the efforts of the Soviet ideological and police bu-

² See Harry Rositzke, "America's Secret Operations: A Perspective," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1975, pp. 334-351.

³ See Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, "Foreign Policy, Public Opinion and Secrecy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1973, pp. 1-19.

⁴ See Wolfgang Leonhard, "The Domestic Politics of the New Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1973, pp. 59-74.

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reauracies to protect their system of control from being undermined by the widening of contacts with the outside world under the conditions of détente. The effect has been to sharpen the apparent conflict between the détente process and support for human rights, and to appear to identify détente with a callous and cynical indifference to egregious acts of the Soviet security apparatus.

Both moral and pragmatic considerations are involved. On moral grounds, it is argued that democratic societies accept a complicity in the repressive practices of the Soviet Union if they maintain conventional diplomatic relations with its leadership without requiring Soviet observance of human rights as a prior condition, particularly in a time of détente.

But the objective of the United States and other democratic governments to seek to reduce the danger of nuclear war by negotiations with the Soviet leaders is also a moral obligation. Indeed, given the scale of destructiveness of nuclear war, this should be a priority for all governments. With the advent of new and destabilizing forms of military technology, the prospect of widespread nuclear proliferation, and the absence of rational political control over the military policies of both democratic and authoritarian states, to believe that the risks of nuclear war are self-regulating and are automatically reduced by the balance of terror is a profound error.

For governments, therefore, the first order of business must be to regulate the military competition, for there will be no opportunity to work for the strengthening of democratic values if this effort is not successful. This should not, however, prevent individuals and groups from expressing their repugnance for violations of human rights wherever they occur—whether in authoritarian regimes of the Right or of the Left or within democratic societies themselves.

On pragmatic grounds, it is argued that since totalitarian regimes can act aggressively in secret and without the checks and balances provided by autonomous institutions within the society, this in itself is a barrier to peaceful relations. As a practical necessity then, democratic societies should seek to encourage the growth of pluralistic trends within the Soviet Union if a substantial relaxation of tension is to be possible. Some go further to argue the need to seek an erosion of the Soviet ideological commitment to ultimate aims incompatible with peaceful and cooperative relations.

The objective is clearly desirable, but the question is how most effectively to move toward its realization. It should be clear that the effort to compel changes in Soviet institutions and practices by frontal demands on the part of other governments is likely to be counterpro-

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ductive. Yet external pressures may well be marginally effective, pro-
vided they take into account a scale of reasonable feasibility; for ex-
ample, demands for humane measures in reuniting families may be
feasible, whereas demands for measures which threaten to undermine
the system's monopoly of political authority are not.

We cannot predict which way the Soviet system will evolve in the
future. But it seems reasonable to believe that easing of repression
is more likely to result from evolutionary forces within the society
under prolonged conditions of reduced international tension than
from external demands for change and the siege mentality they would
reinforce.

What follows from this line of reasoning is that although the first
priority in government-to-government relations with the Soviet Union
must be given to efforts to regulate the military and political com-
petition to reduce the danger of nuclear war, this neither requires nor
should imply any condoning or accepting of Soviet violations of
human rights and human dignity. The ultimate interest of democratic
societies does require that they work for an international environment
in which democratic values can survive and flourish by a constant
projection and encouragement of democratic norms of behavior. What
can and should be projected, however, are not particular institutions,
such as the capitalist system or the two-party system, which, in any
case, individual nations will adopt according to their own prefer-
ences; rather, what is essential to promote are those common ethical
values such as the commitment to justice, liberty, equality, human
dignity and to civil and tolerant discourse, reflecting the emphasis in
democratic values on the process rather than on the realization of
particular ends. What this implies is that the effort to enlarge the
international sense of community be bound not to a particular form
of world order but to a process of peaceful change toward the fuller
realization of these values.

The faithful observance and projection of democratic precepts in
this sense can transcend the American experience and can give expres-
sion to the essence of the democratic faith to which democrats in all
societies—including authoritarian societies—can feel, even if they
cannot now express, their allegiance.

V

The problem of reconciling democratic principles with the ne-
cessities of power has also been sharply posed for the United States
by its relations with authoritarian regimes less powerful than the
Soviet Union. This is illustrated, for example, by the negotiations with

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Generalissimo Franco for bases in Spain, the alliance with the Republic of Korea and with Salazar's Portugal and with Portuguese imperialism in Africa, relations with Iran and Chile, and support for a host of dictatorships among the developing countries on all continents.

In retrospect, the dilemmas appear to have sharpened as the American outlook evolved toward a two-dimensional view of international politics. In the early postwar years, Marshall Plan support for the European democracies represented a constructive response to the challenge of Soviet expansionism; the nurturing of democratic forces in Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany as part of an enlightened occupation policy represents an achievement of the first magnitude. But after the mid-1950s, as Soviet operations in the Third World expanded and the People's Republic of China entered a militant phase, American efforts to contain the expansion of the two totalitarian states became more heavily military in their preoccupation and global in their application.

As a result, the United States tended to look upon local conflicts as abstract units in a global contest for military power, with little knowledge of or concern for local political factors; it became aligned with domestic forces defending and stabilizing existing systems, and against social protest movements which it saw only as instruments of world communism. In some cases, in its preoccupation with the military dimension of international politics and with the stability of strategically placed countries, the United States contributed to the spread of dictatorships.

The culmination of this 20-year period of misperception and faulty understanding of the problem was the tragic episode in Vietnam, and the plausibility given to the widespread reputation of the United States as an imperialist power, opposed to the forces of change and modernization in the Third World. The United States has had a series of expensive geography lessons as it has been emerging from parochialism and a hypnotic fascination with a two-color map of the world. Although many genuine dilemmas remain to be resolved in the inherent tension between considerations of power and the support for democratic principles, some painful lessons have been learned.

One of these lessons has been the need to give greater weight to local political factors rather than to strategic or local military considerations as possibly decisive determinants. This involves a recognition of the rise of political consciousness throughout the developing world as one of the major elements in contemporary international politics. Although the machinery of U.S. foreign policy-making worked uncertainly in the case of Angola, it did in time turn to the more funda-

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mental political elements of the African problems and has been seeking to address them constructively.

The issue is also illustrated by the conflicting considerations faced by the United States in its relations with the Republic of Korea. There can be no serious doubt that the protection of South Korea from attack by North Korea is a matter of genuine and legitimate concern to Japan and the United States. But there is also little doubt that the repressiveness of the regime of President Park aligns the United States with inhumane and anti-democratic practices and contributes to the potential instability of South Korea. While no simple resolution of this dilemma is possible, the United States has been seeking to manage these conflicting considerations with quiet gradations in its degree of diplomatic and military support, and at least to make known its preferences for the moderation of repressive practices.

Another lesson derives from the uncertainty regarding the viability of democratic solutions to the problems of developing countries. Clearly, the earlier expectations that the American experience could provide a model for developing countries to follow have proved naive. Thus the question has emerged as to whether some degree of concentration of political authority may not be a necessary concomitant of the development process. This is the problem posed most sharply by the movement of India in an authoritarian direction. Indeed, this question may be regarded as but one aspect of what has been called the crisis of liberal democracy in the present period, which has raised the more general problem of the governability of democratic societies in the face of the increasing complexity of the problems they face. A compelling example of this issue is presented by Iran, where a Western-educated elite has been consciously addressing and articulating the trade-offs between social control and freedom, between centralization and the stimulation of initiative through decentralization, between the preservation of traditional Persian values as against the introduction of new values associated with urbanization and industrialization. The choices in each case are not between absolutes but along a spectrum, involving a constant process of experimentation and adjustment. From the U.S. point of view, there remains the dilemma of weighing the strategic importance of Iran's position on the Persian Gulf and of Iran's supply of energy resources against the authoritarian character of the regime. But the experiment must be viewed with insight, in full consciousness of the degrees of repression involved and of the limited applicability of our own experience to the problems Iran is facing in charting its path toward modernization.

It is evident from these few illustrative examples that interna-