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destined to have a disproportionate influence on public opinion because no
counterveiling compass exists. Indeed, public policy is doomed to be
shaped by public opinion, rather than the other way around, because there
is no prevailing public policy. Or if it exists, it is not widely understood.
We process information in this country the way we eat; on the run, without
adequate time for digestion. McThought! Fast food and fast thought fulfill
a need for instant gratification; but neither is quite as nourishing as when
the product is prepared with care and consumed in a more leisurely
fashion. And yet, all the elements are conspiring against taking time and
care in both industries. The one is as damaging to the body politic as the
other can be to body.

Without delving into too much detail, those of us who are in the business
of communicating information are being pressured by a combination of
time, money, and technology. Journalism has always been driven by
competition; by deadlines. But, to give just one example, when I began
broadcasting for ABC News more than thirty years ago, we had just one
deadline a day. The evening news broadcast at 6:30 was it.

A truly major event might warrant a bulletin -- that is, the interruption of
regular programming -- but bulletins were few and far between in those
days. What that afforded those of us who had reports to prepare, was
time. These days, we have an overnight news program, news segments
that appear on Good Morning America, several news magazines, World
News Tonight and Nightline. For a single reporter covering a breaking
news story -- especially one overseas-- there is simply less time available

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to gather material for each of the two or three or more stories a day that he or she may now be required to deliver.

Next category - money! It's probably fair to say that each of the network news divisions now spends several hundred times a year more than it did when I first joined ABC News. But, whereas 30 years ago news was considered a loss leader -- the network meeting its public obligation, but doing so at a financial loss -- these days, news divisions make...and are expected to make money. That has meant, among other things, a cutback in the number and size of foreign bureaus operated by the three major networks. Foreign correspondents, as a category, are simply shrinking.

This is not to say that major events overseas aren't covered, or that enormous resources aren't marshalled and dispatched. But, for that to happen, the event must not only be important, it must be the kind of event that engages the interest of a huge American audience. Coverage, in other words, (as in the recent cases of Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia and, to a lesser degree, Bosnia) coverage tends to be intense, but relatively short-lived. And to the degree that administrations here in Washington are reactive to public pressure, the intense focus on particular crises is developing an unfortunate tendency to reflect that sporadic coverage.

I mentioned three factors that are exerting pressure on the communications industry: time, money and technology. In some respects, it is the technology, our capacity to report "live" on events as they are happening, that is having the most serious impact on journalism and on the conduct of foreign policy. In both cases, the time for reflection and careful

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thought has been reduced. When we report on events, even as they're
occuring, we have little or no time to apply the most important tools of
journalism: editing, analysis, and context. Simply focussing a camera on
an event is no substitute for journalism. But our ability to do that, to
broadcast something that is happening, in real time...places enormous
pressure on us...and, more importantly, on those of you who actually
conduct foreign policy. Call it "the satellite imperative." When the
American public becomes accustomed to seeing an event or hearing from a
foreign leader in real time, the expectation arises for an immediate
response. To refrain from doing so requires a greater discipline than
recent administrations have shown. To say nothing suggests an inability to
respond; but to respond immediately, frequently exposes a half-baked
policy that must later be amended. Rather than conveying decisiveness,
the impression is one of incompetence.

The "chaos theory," as some of you have applied it to world events, should
also be applied to the world of mass communication. The greater
accessibility to its tools have placed the flow of information in the hands of
all too many inexperienced and untrained practitioners. The ravenous
public appetite for new and more dramatic stories every day has resulted
in an explosion of programs, spiralling downwards in the never-ending
search for an even larger lowest common denominator. The ability to
communicate instantaneously -- from anywhere, to anywhere -- has
injected a damaging element into the natural tendency towards
competitiveness.

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Certainly we have an obligation to avoid sensationalism and to maintain
the traditional standards of good journalism; but if we are to avoid sliding
into information anarchy, the executive branch of government in
particular, will have to exercise genuine leadership. That means a clear
definition of national interest whenever a foreign crisis erupts, coupled
with a steady determination to keep the focus on that national interest.

We in the media tend, for the most part, to be willows in the wind; shifting
direction with each passing breeze; focusing, not on the national interest,
but rather on what appears to interest the nation at any given moment.
You cannot and should not expect the media to take the lead in
determining how or whether the national interest is served by the
continued existence of NATO, or by unilateral U.S. intervention in Bosnia.

That is the proper function of the executive branch of government; and
when it fails to exercise that reponsibility with firmness and with clarity,
the inevitable consequence is chaos. It has always been so; but now, more
than ever.

11

Challenges to the U.S. Military in Post-Cold War Peacekeeping and
Humanitarian Interventions

Les Aspin

Thank you for letting me come and talk today a little bit about using the military
as a means of managing chaos. It's an important topic, because if we are
managing chaos—coping with international conflict into the 21st century (which
is the topic that we are talking about over these next couple of days)—sooner or
later, somebody, immediately or eventually, will come around to the view that
we ought to do something with the military to manage the chaos.

All that you have to do is look at the debates over the issues that have been in the headlines--Bosnia, Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda. Bosnia, of course, coming up and disappearing, Haiti, Rwanda, Somalia coming up and disappearing. They interchange and they reappear. And no doubt there are others. I mean, this happens to be the issue that we're dealing with right now but that we're going to be dealing with more in the future. So the question—an important, important question for this conference, I think—is to try to help the country think through the issue of where we *do* use U.S. military assets and where we *do not* use U.S. military assets. I'd like to try and make a stab at that today.

Let me begin by saying that in the post-Cold War world, as it has developed, we
have a new set of circumstances that might call for military intervention.
Previously, I think we had two such sets; now we have three. The three things

that we might use military force to protect are, first of all, to protect security;
second, to protect our interests; and third, to protect our values.

Protecting our security has, of course, always been there during the Cold War
and is there now: it is the primary reason why any country maintains armed
forces. Protecting the security means protecting the United States from attack.
That job, of course, is a lot less onerous now that the Soviet Union has
disappeared. But there are still people who could potentially threaten the
security of the United States. Proliferation developments, nuclear proliferation
or other proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, could bring damage the
United States via inter-continental ballistic missiles or via unconventional
delivery systems. So, there is a threat to U.S. security, but it is much diminished.
There are, of course, a number of people in this country who take a little broader
look at threats to American security, and they would include terrorism and
drugs. They see them as direct threats to the United States, and they would also
include them as national security interests that we would deploy our military to
protect us against, to protect us against terrorism, to protect us against drug
trafficking. But any way you define it, category number one is to protect the
security of the United States, to assure the physical security of the land and its
people.

The second thing that we have a military to protect is our interests. We have
interests around the world that we want to protect. I would say that Desert
Storm was conducted to protect American interests. It is in America's interest
that oil in the Middle East not fall totally under the domination of Saddam
Hussein; it's in the interest of the United States that we punish the invasion of
one country by another; it's in the interest of the United States that countries that

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are involved in developing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass
destruction be prevented and stopped from doing that. Protecting the interests
of the United States is a second reason why we have a military force. And as I
say, Desert Storm was an example of using U.S. military force to protect the
interests of the United States.

What is developing now, and what is new on the scene, ("new" meaning different
from the Cold War, not necessarily new in terms of history) is the interest in
using U.S. military forces to protect the values of the United States. The values of
the United States are that we should not stand aside while people starve, that
ethnic cleansing should not be allowed to happen, that democratic governments
should not be thrown out of office and replaced by dictatorships. Those sorts of
things are part of the values of the United States. What is interesting is that we
have now in debate in this country on a rather consistent and continuous scale
regarding the issue of using U.S. military assets to protect American values.
This, I think, is new and different from the Cold War period.

During the Cold War, American military forces were seldom used to protect
American values. First, because the world—in particular the world as embodied
in the United Nations—did not want the United States to go into a part of the
world to further its values. There was a Cold War going on, and if the United
States went in to further its values, the other side would maybe go in to further
its values. You would end up with countries getting involved in the conflict of
the Cold War. Basically what happened was that, when there was peacekeeping
to be done or ethnic cleansing to be stopped or starvation to be alleviated, people
looked to the militaries of neutral countries not the United States and the Soviet
Union, not to NATO and not to the Warsaw Pact. The Swedes were somebody

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who were genuinely neutral and could do the job without engulfing an area in
the Cold War. So reason number one was that the world really wasn't very
anxious for us to get involved in furthering or protecting U.S. values during the
Cold War.

Second, the United States government was not anxious to get involved in
protecting values during the Cold War. We needed to save our military--keep
our powder dry--for the "Big Show". The "Big Show" was, of course, World War
III against the Soviet Union. It could happen anytime, and we didn't want to
have our military forces dispersed around the world and involved in things that
were not aimed at the main event. So, basically, during the Cold War this issue
didn't arise very much.

What has happened now is that, after the Cold War, it arises all the time. The
world *does* want us involved, and, in fact, in many cases ours is the only military
that is capable of doing what is necessary. It is the only military that has the lift
capacity or the communications or the intelligence or the reach to do the job. So
the world, more and more, would rather like the United States military to get
involved.

Of course, the excuse or the reason not to do it, that is, the need to keep our
powder dry for the big showdown against the Soviet Union, has receded
considerably. So the debates over protecting values happen, and they're going to
happen, and they're going to be with us. We are going to be asked to go in and
stop ethnic cleansing in places like Bosnia; to do peacekeeping or peacemaking in
places like Somalia; to feed people in Rwanda; to make sure that governments
that are democratically elected and booted out get returned in places like Haiti.

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It's going to happen, it's happened now much more frequently, and it's going to happen a lot more as we look into the future. But of the three uses of military force—protecting American security, protecting American interests, and protecting American values—the new one is protecting American values. This one is different and scrambles up the calculations a lot.

Let me list six particulars in which using U.S. military assets to protect American values is a different ballgame from using it to protect security or to protect interests.

Number One: Value cases usually mean getting involved in the internal affairs of a country. Not always—but very often—they involve us in the internal fights within a country as opposed to dealing with aggression of one country on another. That's different. It's a new world and it's a very, very much more complicated world. As the United States military will tell you, it's a much more complicated job dealing with fights within a country than dealing with good old-fashioned aggression across borders.

Number Two: The second thing about this values agenda that the U.S. military is now being asked to undertake is that it scrambles the hawks and doves. In the good old days when we dealt with security or dealt with interests, you could tell the hawks and you could tell the doves. If a new issue came up on security, or if a new issue came up in which we were talking about protecting American interests, the old crowd appeared pretty much the same. The values agenda scrambles things unmercifully. You can't tell a hawk and a dove without a scorecard. Doves on Bosnia are hawks on Somalia; doves on Bosnia are hawks on Haiti. It's a scramble. People who were hawkish generally about the U.S.

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military forces and use of force in security and interest agendas turn out to be dovish on the values agenda. People who are dovish on the use of military assets to protect our security and our interests turn out to be very hawkish on the values agenda. It's a scrambled world, and if you don't believe it just ask the Catholic Church or the Black Caucus.

**Number Three:** When you get into the business of protecting American values there's a whole lot of cases, there's a huge agenda—a much bigger agenda than if you're using American forces to protect security or to protect interests. Because there's such a huge agenda, you get into ugly questions like "If we are fighting starvation in X, why don't we do it in Y?" And let me tell you there's often no good answer as to why we're doing it in X and we aren't doing it in Y, except to say we haven't got the assets to do it in both and somehow we've decided on X and we've decided against Y. It's a huge problem, because the number of cases that come up when you have a values agenda is very, very large.

**Number Four:** The values agenda is driven by the CNN factor. Values are stirred up when people get upset by what they see on CNN: they say, "We have to do something, we must do something about this ethnic cleansing, we must do something about this starvation, we must do something to bring peace here, we've got to do something." And "something" means using U.S. military forces. But it's driven by what is on television in a way that interests and security protection are not driven by what is on television.

**Number Five:** My fifth point is that people change their mind about values cases. This makes these cases very hard to deal with. People get stirred up because they see something on CNN that they want to do something about, and so we

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send the U.S. military in there to do something about it. Then it turns out that it's hard, that Americans lose their lives, that it costs money; and the American public changes its mind. I would contend that is, of course, what happened in Somalia. When we sent forces in, of course the public thought they were there to feed people. We saw people were starving in Somalia, wanted Americans to do something about it, and applauded the sending of American troops into Somalia to help feed people. That lasted just as long, it turned out, as no Americans got killed. When Americans got killed, in particular on that one bloody Sunday in the beginning of October when 18 Americans got killed, the public changed its mind: the public said, not too irrationally, "We're sending people in there to feed people: if the people they're trying to feed are killing us, why are we doing this? Let's not stay." And so they changed their minds.

I contend, however, that this skittishness is not a phenomenon that holds across the whole spectrum of cases of U.S. military use of force. If the American people believe that the military assets are in there to protect the security of the United States or to protect the interests of the United States, in those cases—even if Americans get killed—they will hang in there: I think they will stay with it. I think that because something is in the interests of the United States it meets the "parents factor." You can look the parents in the eye and explain to them why their son or daughter gave his or her life. And so Americans, I believe, will not be spooked automatically by loss of life purely and simply. (The contrary conclusion is one that some people have drawn from Somalia.) The conclusion that I draw is that they *will* be spooked by the loss of life in pursuing values cases. Now, we haven't got any proof of that so we will see as these examples play out; but I believe that even in the post-Cold War world Americans will stand firm with loss of life if it's interests and security that we're protecting. I

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believe they will not if it's a case where what we're doing is going in there to protect American values.

Number Six: My final point has to do with my job now, which is looking at the intelligence world. This business of dealing with values drives the intelligence community absolutely crazy. They don't know where a values case is going to crop up. If they know that the United States is interested in protecting its security and protecting its interests, that involves a defined set of problems; you have to look out after certain countries and you have to look out after certain activities like drugs and terrorism and other things. But it's a defined set and that set doesn't change very much. If the interest of the country is to protect American values, the values will be constant but the problems can crop up anywhere. Starvation might jump up anywhere; democratic governments are being thrown out. Ethnic cleansing, peacekeeping, peacemaking, all of the things that come under the values rubric, could happen anywhere. What that means is that the intelligence agency will suddenly be asked questions about a country into which they have not put their assets or developed the long-term database or long-term trend-line which they can use to advise policy-makers. In January Rwanda was on nobody's list of priorities; in July, it was right in the top two or three; and then in January again, it was on nobody's list. It went from below one hundred, to top two or three, to below one hundred again all in one year. It's the kind of thing that would make Jim Woolsey's hair grow gray—if he had any.

All right, so that's the issue we're dealing with, I think, in managing chaos, in coping with these international conflicts into the 21st century. It's the issue of these values.

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Now, there's one other point to make here—and it's an important one—which is that the military, frankly, isn't anxious to protect values. The military thinks its job is to protect the security of the United States and to protect the interests of the United States. It is generally uncomfortable with this agenda of protecting the values of the United States. In particular, there are three concerns that the United States military has; let me try and explain them to you a little bit.

First, the military thinks and believes that values protection is costly—and I believe that it is costly—in terms of readiness. Second, they believe it's costly in terms of manpower and third, that it can be costly in terms of the signal sent. Let me talk about each of these in turn. Essentially what we are talking about when we are talking about American values—feeding starving people, peacekeeping, peace-enforcing, stopping ethnic cleansing—are really things that are closer to police work than to military work. There is a fundamental point that the American public should not misunderstand here. Police work is very, very different from military work. You can take an eighteen-year-old and train him or her to be a very good soldier: you can take an eighteen-year-old and train him or her to be a very good policeman. What is very difficult, and very dangerous, is to take an eighteen-year-old and cross-train him or her so that he or she gets police training and military training. What is even more dangerous, is if you cross-train him and then leave it up to the eighteen-year-old to decide whether he or she is a policeman or he or she is a soldier. These are fundamentally different cultures. If you're kicking down a door and rushing into a room, do you go in there with guns blazing or do you go in there and read them their rights? That's the fundamental philosophical difference between police work and military work. They are different cultures.

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In the military setting everybody who is wearing a different uniform is a bad guy. In a police setting people are innocent until proven guilty. If you act like a policeman when you should act like a soldier, you're going to get yourself killed. If you act like a soldier when you should act like a policeman, you're going to cause a huge international incident--somebody's going to get killed who shouldn't get killed. This is a fundamental dilemma and a fundamental problem that should not be ignored by the American people when they want their military to go out and do these kinds of jobs. It is a huge dilemma. It leads into the second dilemma for the military, which is costliness in terms of manpower.

What protection of values has meant for the United States military is that, in order to deal with this policeman-soldier dichotomy, what the U.S. military does is to take a unit that is about to go onto a police detail and pull it out, train it as a police unit and send it out to do its police work—and then retrain it back to soldiery when it comes off of the police duty. What that means is that there is a three-to-one manpower ratio involved in doing a peacekeeping job. If you want to send a unit out on a peacekeeping detail, for let's say six months (and that's about the extent to which the military wants to assign any particular set of people to a peacekeeping work), six months before they go they get trained to do peacekeeping. Then they go for six months and they do the peacekeeping, and then they come back and for six months they're trained to be soldiers again. It's a three-to-one ratio. If you have a battalion doing peacekeeping in the Sinai, you have one battalion out there doing the peacekeeping, you have one preparing to go out, and you have another battalion that has just come back and is now preparing to become soldiers again. So, to put a battalion on the Sinai you need a brigade. Three battalions is a brigade; one battalion on the Sinai needs a brigade devoted to the issue. If you want to put a brigade on the Golan Heights, that's

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three brigades, that's a division that needs to be devoted to peacekeeping in order to keep a brigade continuously on the Golan Heights. That's one army division. We've only got ten army divisions in the bottom-up review, so that's one tenth of the United States Army involved in protecting the Golan Heights. It would be even worse if you had a peace in Bosnia in which the United States was committed to sending 20-25,000 troops. That's a full division. That's a three-division commitment to keep a division permanently in Bosnia. That's three divisions out of ten divisions in the United States Army. That's getting to be a serious number. This is the second problem that the military sees with these kind of jobs: they are very expensive in terms of manpower.

The third problem is that values protection is expensive in terms of the signal sent. The military is very conscious of the CNN factor and very conscious of the point that the public will change its mind if things go badly, and will want to pull American troops out. They see that it is a dangerous circumstance in international relations to have a superpower send their troops in and then change their mind and pull them out. What it means is that it emboldens bad guys. People get brave and they think that the United States is a paper tiger, they think they can get away with things, they will take risks. They will do things that they shouldn't do, and the people who pay for it if the United States is misjudged are, of course, the people in uniform. They know that this is very dangerous—they know that this is playing with fire—this business of getting upset at what is seen on television and rushing troops into a situation and then getting upset when people get killed and pulling them out. What signal does that send to Saddam Hussein, what signal does that sent to North Korea, to Iran, to other countries where we would hope the signal that they get would be something different?

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Basically, the problem, from the military's standpoint, is three-fold: the problem in terms of readiness, the problem in terms of manpower, and the problem in terms of the signal sent. There is a battle going on in this country between two schools of thought: those that argue that we should send people into value agenda situations and people who argue that we should not. Essentially, the two sides are the realists and isolationists versus the internationalists and moralists. The realists and isolationists would argue that we really ought to use our military for national security interests only. They contend that we have problems here at home and that all of these value agenda conflicts are potential quagmires. There are dangers in the wrong signals sent—there are dangers across the board. They cost money, they gets us no friends, they makes a lot of enemies. Their basic claim is that we ought to stay away from value agenda crises.

The internationalists and moralists make a different argument. They insist that we cannot ignore these value cases, and that ignoring the value cases is the kind of thing that brought us the Holocaust. America stands for certain values and we cannot just walk away from value agenda conflicts. We would be a poorer country, a weaker country, a less admirable country, if we walked away from value cases. Using the U.S. military only for interests and for security means that it is not going to be very useful because most of the problems arising today are value agenda cases. If you use the U.S. military only for security and only for interests, the whole U.S. military will turn out to be like nuclear weapons were during the Cold War—they were important, but they were expensive and they weren't really very useful for solving any current problems. The moralists and internationalists will say that if the U.S. military is only going to be used for security issues and for interest issues, we are not willing to spend 200-250-225

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billion dollars a year for something that is not going to be useful for solving current problems that the American public sees on the television and wants to do something about. Finally, the internationalists and moralists argue that the United States must threaten the use of force if we going to have any leverage in diplomacy to resolve these value cases. If the United States is going to threaten force, then it had better be ready to use force.

This debate of realists and isolationists versus internationalists and moralists is going to go on every time one of these things comes up. We saw it in Haiti. We saw it in Somalia. We see it daily in Bosnia. We saw it in Rwanda, and we're going to see it again and again.

I think, first of all, that we have to recognize that neither extreme position is going to win this argument. The United States is not going to get involved in *no* value agenda cases and we're certainly not going to get involved in *all* value agenda cases. The extreme positions are not going to win. There is no chance that you can get involved in all of them, because even if we had a United States military the size of the United States military in World War II, we would not have enough to deal with the values agenda cases which exist in the world today. So there is no chance that we are going to do all of them. The American public is not going to allow its money to be spent on that kind of an agenda; so, obviously, we are not going to do all of them.

On the other hand, I do not think the United States can afford *not* to do *any* of them either. I can't believe the President of the United States is going to totally turn his back on all of the value agenda issues that come up. I am persuaded by the point that you would need to threaten the use of force at least if diplomacy

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has any kind of a chance of solving these kinds of problems, and that if we
threaten the use of force, we should have the capability and the willingness to
use it. So I think that we are going to be involved somehow in these value cases
with military assets. The argument, then, isn't about the extreme positions, it's
about a more limited range of possibilities. Do we do relatively more of them or
do we do relatively fewer of them? That is the debate that is going to take place
in the American body politic.

Given that reality, the United States needs three things, and I hope that this
conference will make some moves towards developing knowledge on these three
things. The first thing the United States needs is to develop some kind of an
overall philosophy about the use of U.S. military forces in the post-Cold War
world. We need some kind of a philosophy about when we're going to go into
these value cases and when we're not. The public now believes the United States
government has no philosophy in the conduct of its foreign policy. The public
believes the government is driven solely by CNN and that if the clamor gets high
enough, they will send the troops in. That is how the public looks at it, and the
public has no confidence when it sees that kind of policy being made in that way.
What we need is some kind of a framework for doing this. I do not think,
though, that you can be precise about that framework. You cannot, I think, lay
out—like Cap Weinberger did and Gary Hart did several years ago—a checklist
that will tell you whether to use force in these value cases. You cannot do that
because, just as soon as you write up that checklist, something will come up that
doesn't fit the checklist and you'll want to send forces in anyway, or something
will fit all the checks and you don't want to go in despite that. But we need some
kind of more general framework to use in deciding which of these cases are

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important enough to do and which ones we just won't do. And we need to have
that to apply before we get into the particulars.

Second, I think we need to develop in the military better ways for intervening in
values cases. Simply accepting the three-to-one ratio we discussed earlier is
unacceptable. I think we have to ask if there is better way to do this. We now
have a required three-to-one ratio of troops in training to troops on the ground in
every values agenda case, and we understand why you have a three-to-one ratio,
and we understand why you have to teach people to be policemen and teach
them back to be soldiers. But somehow we need to figure out a better way to do
that. Do we need to develop a foreign legion concept where a certain unit does
this kind of thing? Or maybe some units in the United States military do police
work and others do soldiering. Now the problem is that this course has been
considered and rejected by a number of militaries in the world—the British
among them. The British worried a long time about doing police work in
Northern Ireland. They rejected dividing their forces on the grounds that by
dividing the army between soldiers and policemen, you create an army of first-
class citizens and second-class citizens—the soldiers will be the first-class citizens
and the policemen will be second-class citizens. So maybe this particular idea is
impractical, but we do need some new ideas.

We might figure out a way to use the reserves in peacekeeping missions. You
might have seen some things in the paper that Secretary of Defense Bill Perry and
Army Chief of Staff General Gordon Sullivan have been working on in this
regard, and that I worked on when I was in the Congress and in the Defense
Secretary's office. We might try to train the reserves to do some of this
peacekeeping.

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Or maybe we divide up the work among countries according to their expertise. Maybe the United States forces would do the intelligence and the logistics and communications and we get other countries to provide some of the manpower on these peacekeeping missions. There are a number of ideas brewing, and we ought to work on them, figure them out, and do them. Because if we are going to stick with the three-to-one ratio, and if we are going to get involved in the values agenda, we are not going to end up doing very many just because of that three-to-one ratio.

Third, I think, we need to examine consistently, systematically, and regularly the past examples of the use of U.S. military force for this values agenda and learn from our mistakes. I have been doing a little bit of work on it, and, frankly, in spite of the daunting task that it sounds like, the instances that we have used U.S. military forces for the values agenda are successful about two-thirds of the time. They are successful most of the time—success being defined as going in, doing the job, and being able to leave. We cannot call it a success if we go in and do the job and end up with troops there on a more or less permanent basis. But if we go in, do the job, and can pull the troops out, that's a success. We need to have a systematic look at all the examples that have happened in the past. We need to look at them and ask: "If they failed, why did they fail?" We need to try to isolate the variables that are important to look at before we start to send American troops in.

A preliminary analysis of this tells us that there are three reasons why things most often go wrong when we send American troops and American assets in to deal with the values agenda. Number one is a failure to understand the mission

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or the changing of the mission once the troops get in there. Somalia, the Beirut case, those are cases where the mission was changed, or we had mission creep, or something was different from when we started in.

The second reason why things have gone wrong in values agenda cases is that we have underestimated the enemy or underestimated the problem or the opposition or the difficulty. It's very hard to get the right estimation of these things, but I think we clearly underestimated the Vietnamese and we underestimated the Somalis. On the other hand, we probably overestimated the Iraqis and we probably overestimated the Panama defense forces of Noriega. So it's hard to get it right. But the second reason why things go wrong in the values agenda is that we underestimate the opposition.

The third thing that goes wrong is that we fail to think through at the outset what the exit strategy is, how we get out of it. How do you get home once you have gone in? Now we pull out either because we accomplished the mission, and we hand it off to somebody else, or we just set a timetable and we leave. But we ought to have thought that through ahead of time. When we do not, we've been stuck there for a long time, as we are in Korea, and as we are trying to feed the Kurds in northern Iraq.

This last part is the subject of another speech I might give when I have a chance to come and talk, maybe at one of the working groups that the Institute of Peace has when it deals this topic again. It's an important agenda. You're on to something here. There's a whole bunch of aspects to it, but one of the most important aspects—and one I hope you will give some thought to in your

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conference working groups—is the use of U.S. military assets in solving this chaos problem. Thank you all for letting me come and talk today.

Q: You touched briefly on the question of intelligence. When you have an intelligence organization or organizations looking at the whole community oriented toward one particular mission or a primary mission, how can we make the change? I think that some people would tend to feel that one can just change over and go to other things but I think it's rather more complicated than that. How are we to re-cast our intelligence following the Cold War?

A: I'll know better when we've had some chance to study it, but let me just briefly say that I think that the intelligence world of the future is going to be more complex and clearly will have a bigger agenda than the one that we had during the Cold War. The things that you want the intelligence community to be concerned about in the post Cold War world are the following kinds of categories:

First of all, countries that we want to keep our eyes on, which would include North Korea, and Iraq, and Iran, and others like that. These are countries that are a) dangerous, countries that are b) hostile, and countries which are c) secret. I mean they are excessively secretive. And that combination is a difficult combination, and that combination of three things is why you need intelligence. That trio, of course, describes the Soviet Union. Not to say that any of these countries are on the scale of the Soviet Union in terms of a threat: nevertheless they are a threat, so you need an intelligence capability to deal with that.

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Second, there are some activities that the United States needs an intelligence to keep track of: terrorism, drugs, and especially the proliferation of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction. The last one is an activity that threatens the United States, an activity that we need to know something about.

Third, there's then a fleeting group of changing countries that we want to know something about. Haiti, Somalia—these are countries that come up on the screen that drop down on the screen that are difficult for the intelligence community to deal with.

Then there is more: there's a brand new intelligence agenda, an agenda of some real opportunities—not threats, but opportunities for intelligence—that are important. These are in such areas as the economic field, the environmental field, and the health field. These are things that the intelligence community is gradually being drawn into more and more by various agencies of the United States government. So it's a different world, it's a bigger agenda, and it's more complicated.

Q: While accepting the three categories you mentioned for use of military forces, I suggest a part of the action that you place under the values category really might well belong under national interests. I think of selective actions expanding areas of no conflict like North America or Western Europe or other areas which have become areas of no conflict is a rather important contribution to national security. We do have favorable opportunities to go into that now, in a situation where no war is brewing among the major powers, and where we have quite a few new devices as a heritage of the Cold War at work on that kind of thing.
Would you comment on that?

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A: Yes, I think that's a point. Let me also say—and I should have said this during the speech—that situations rarely arise that fall neatly into just values or just interests. The case of Haiti clearly has values involved—in particular regarding the government, the elected government, which was thrown out. That's something that Americans hold very dearly; that people should decide who their rulers are by votes, rather than by force. But there were also some clear national interests—in particular the potential for a flood of refugees coming into the United States from Haiti—so it was a mixed case, Bosnia, I think, was also a mixed case. Bosnia is a values case of ethnic cleansing primarily, but there are some national security interests there. It would be contrary to our national security interests if the thing got out of hand and Greece ended up fighting with Turkey, for example. Or if the fighting produced a flood of refugees or the fighting produced a backlash in Muslim countries around the world against cooperating with the West on a whole range of issues because they thought the West was ignoring the plight of Muslims in Bosnia. So there are national security interests probably speckled throughout here. It's not always an easy case to put it into one category or the other. It's an important point.

Q: We're beginning to hear the notion that because of Bosnia, NATO is in a serious crisis and in its most difficult moment since Suez. Do you think there's a certain amount of press hype in this, and would you comment on the future of NATO?

A: I think that that is a serious problem. I don't think that there's press hype in it. I think that it is a serious, serious problem that the disagreement on former Yugoslavia could seriously damage NATO. And, of course, the problem is that

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there's a number of other questions that face NATO on which there is very little agreement—such as NATO's expanded membership (and if so how, and if so who), and all these kinds of questions. And then there is the fundamental question of "What is NATO in the post-Cold-War, post-Soviet, post-Warsaw-Pact world? That, I think, needs to be worked out. I don't pooh-pooh the claims that this is the biggest crisis since Suez '56.

Q: Thank you for very enlightening remarks in clarifying what I might call the view from the US military. The American Bar Association and others have recommended the creation of some form of international police force. In the case of the American Bar Association, they were talking, and are talking, in terms of a stand-by force under Article 43 and so forth. Others have talked in terms of a foreign legion, which you mentioned. But I would solicit your comments and observations on this subject.

A: Yes, I think there are a number of options, and I perhaps should have mentioned them in the speech when I mentioned the need to find new ways of doing this thing because the way we're doing it now is going to mean we're not going to do very many of them. There is, besides just reforming the U.S. military's approach to these things, the possibility of reforming international organizations' approach to them and various proposals connected with the United Nations and the possibility of using the United Nations in a more creative way or a more useful way to deal with values issues. I think we ought to look at it. I think we need to be able to try to see because I think that this is very much an important part of it, if only because I think that the way we are doing it now needs to be done better. The standard procedure is to have the U.S. military go in there and do it first to establish the kind of setting we want and establish

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who's the boss, and then hand it off to the UN. But if we're going to do more handing off of things to the UN, the UN has to figure out how to do these things a little more efficiently and a little better for the military. Could the UN go and do it from the outset? Could you have within the UN some kind of an organization that would, in effect, do this police work from the outset? Maybe, but the question is, who's going to pay for it? Militaries are not cheap: with military, you get what you pay for. The more you pay, the better it is. The UN has a tough time meeting its debts now. The question is, how would it pay for a standing military of some considerable size and capability? I think there are a lot of difficult questions to answer.

It's worth taking a look at. I mean the United States military has certain capabilities which no other military has in the world. They are three in number and the United States would have to do them for the UN or the UN would have to spend a large amount of money on its military to do these three things. One is logistics. I mean the ability to pick up big units, division-sized units, and fly them several thousand miles and put them down in a place in the world. That is a capability that very few militaries have. The United States military has it: the Soviet military *used* to have it, but they probably couldn't get the planes off the ground now. But it's not there in most militaries in the world. And the question would be, who's going to get the military of the UN to wherever it wants to go?

The second question is communications. The United States military spends huge amounts of money on communications. The ability to communicate back and forth and from air to ground, is part of the reason why the U.S. military is so good. Again, whenever the UN goes into those kinds of places, or even when

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some collection of countries goes into a place, they usually rely on the U.S. for communications and logistics.

The third thing is intelligence. What's going on over the hill? Again, one of the reasons why the United States military is so expensive is because it has to spend a lot of money on intelligence assets—capabilities and assets, drones, RPVs, satellites, things that look in, things that help the commanders, things that help give fair warning. The other thing is just readiness—making sure that the force is there and capable and ready. When you put together a UN force, or a conglomerate force, you must address questions like: "Who's in charge? What language do you speak? To what extent are the operations inter-operable?" We spent forty years working on those problems in NATO. In Desert Storm you saw a fairly efficient force of European allies fighting together—the Brits, the French, the Americans. But there had been a lot of inter-operability exercises over those years (of course, the French were only partially involved in those exercises). Inter-operability is something that takes years to develop, as we discovered NATO, and it's not going to be put together quickly in a UN force.

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