Department of State

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 040000

SECRETARY: NO, IT WOULD BE AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE.

Q: NOW, ISN'T THE PROBLEM THAT THE ISRAELIS LOOKING AT THEIR OWN HISTORY, JUST SIMPLY DON'T TRUST THIS, THAT THEY'VE HAD THESE PROMISES AND GUARANTEES BEFORE AND THEY'VE EVAPORATED UNDER PRESSURE. ISN'T -- HOW DO YOU GET AROUND THAT PROBLEM?

SECRETARY: WELL, THE UNITED STATES HAS NEVER TAKEN PART IN THAT KIND OF A GUARANTEE BEFORE.

MISS DREW: I THOUGHT WE DID ON SUEZ.

SECRETARY: NO, WE HAVEN'T TAKEN PART IN THAT KIND OF A PEACE-KEEPING ROLE --

Q: NOT A PEACEKEEPING ROLE. YES.

SECRETARY. AND I DON'T KNOW OF ANY MORE ADEQUATE GUARANTEE THAN A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES TO PLAY A ROLE MILITARILY, TOGETHER WITH OTHER NATIONS IN THE AREA.

Q. WHAT WOULD WE -- SINCE WE DO HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE THERE, AND WE DO SUPPLY A LOT OF AID, WHAT DO WE DO IF THIS JUST GOES ON AND THE SIDES DON'T MOVE TOGETHER?

SECRETARY: WELL, THAT'S A DIFFICULT QUESTION TO ANSWER. WE HOPE THAT THEY DO. WHEN I SAY -- I WANT TO BE SURE I'M NOT MISUNDERSTOOD WHEN I SAY "PLAY A ROLE MILITARILY." I MEAN IN A PEACEKEEPING FORCE.

Q: YES.

SECRETARY: WE WOULD BE WILLING TO PARTICIPATE WITH OTHER NATIONS IN A -- IN GUARANTEES BY USING SOME MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE AREA.

Q. ARE YOU CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE BE REMOVED -- IN EGYPT?

SECRETARY: WELL, I THINK IT WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IF WE COULD WORK OUT A PEACEKEEPING OPERATION, UNDER UNITED NATIONS AUSPICES,

UNCLASSIFIED

NEWS CONFERENCE

This Copy For
#952

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 12:05 P.M. EST

TUESDAY

MARCH 9, 1971

MR. ZIEGLER: I think you are already aware of the President's schedule for this morning. There was a leadership meeting. We have had a briefing on that. Then the President met with the astronauts who went to the colleges around the country.

I think Bruce has posted that list of colleges which they visited.

This afternoon at 3:30 the President will meet with several Members of Congress. That information is also posted; specifically, Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and then later Congressman Conte of Massachusetts and Congressman Lujan of New Mexico.

Q Will we get to see them?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I don't believe so. There will be a picture, I believe, of one of the meetings. Beyond that, we have no other announcements today, except to say that tomorrow we will have the special revenue sharing message on rural development. The leadership talked to you about that a little bit this morning.

We will have that available here at 9:30 together with a factsheet and we will brief at 10 o'clock. Secretary Hardin and members of his staff will be here to brief on that.

There is a possibility, also, of the President scheduling a regular meeting of the NSC tomorrow. That is not firm yet. I will give that to you now and will confirm that at 4 o'clock. He mentioned this morning that he may have a meeting.

Q Why a second meeting of the NSC within a few days?

MR. ZIEGLER: Apparently there is a subject he wants to cover with the NSC. It would be a regular meeting.

Q Is it something of crisis nature?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. That is why I am mentioning it now and the possibility, so that, if it does go on the schedule, you will be aware that the President is thinking of it.

Q He had a meeting Friday as well as Monday?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is right.

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voluntary offer by the industry?

MR. ZIEGLER: I really don't want to characterize
it from our standpoint before we take a better look at it.

Q Ron, do you mean that while the White House
was having negotiations with these people that they made an
offer to Congress and bypassed the White House?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q Are you objecting to that, that tactic on
their part?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think the tone of my response has
indicated that we feel the better way to have approached
the problem would have been the course which we were following.

Now this new element exists. We will take a look
at it. We will let you know our view on it after we look at
it a little while.

Q Would you characterize the atmosphere
during that little session that the Ambassador had here at the
White House when you were advised that he was putting forth
the voluntary proposal?

MR. ZIEGLER: The Ambassador did not put that
forth. He simply came in to talk about it. The voluntary
proposal was put forth by the textile industry.

Q This is another Pearl Harbor talk? (Laughter)

Q I didn't hear your reply. (Laughter)

MR. ZIEGLER: Just to wrap this up, we are taking
a look at the proposal. We will give you our comments after
we have had a chance to assess it, and look it over, and
see how far it goes in meeting what we think should be done.

Q Do you physically have a copy of the proposal?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q Does the President have any reaction to the
release of the four airmen in Turkey?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, the President, as I am sure all
Americans are, is very pleased that the four airmen have
been released unharmed.

As you know, the President was very concerned
about this matter. The State Department and our Embassy
in Turkey had been working very closely with the Turkish
Government to obtain the release of the four airmen.

We are heartened and pleased and gratified
that they have been released unharmed and released in a way,
incidentally, that was not the result of a payment of any

MORE #952

NEWS CONFERENCE

#954

This Copy For

AT THE WHITE HOUSE
WITH RON ZIEGLER
AT 11:30 A.M. EST
WEDNESDAY
MARCH 10, 1971

MR. ZIEGLER: You have one announcement today. The President has issued a proclamation regarding Loyalty Day 1971. This proclamation has been issued since 1958.

Those are all the announcements we have today.

I would like to tell you that tomorrow the President will depart the South Lawn of the White House on board Marine One en route to Williamsburg, Virginia at 12:40. He will arrive in Williamsburg, Virginia at about 1:45.

He will then go to the Williamsburg conference center and he will deliver his remarks at the Williamsburg conference center at about 2 o'clock tomorrow.

The President will return immediately following that to the White House. The President will be back at the White House at about 3:45.

The Press will depart by helicopters from the Pentagon Helipad at 11:50 tomorrow. We will have a press bus, which will depart the Southwest Gate for the Pentagon at 11:30 in the morning. You will arrive in Williamsburg at about 1 o'clock.

You will have filing time in Williamsburg before returning to the Pentagon Helipad.

So that is the schedule for tomorrow. We hope to have available for you the text of the President's address. I will let you know this, or Bruce will this afternoon, in the morning. We will let you know the precise time. You will have an advanced text of the President's remarks.

Q What time will the text be available in Williamsburg? Will that also be early morning?

MR. ZIEGLER: When Bruce lands there with the press choppers.

Q Will this be for a 2 o'clock release?

MR. ZIEGLER: It will be for release on delivery, yes, Ma'am.

Q Can you characterize the remarks? Is this a major speech? I am asking for planning purposes, whether I am going to need a jet or a prop plane.

MR. ZIEGLER: It is an important address. I think you will be reporting on it.

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#954

Q Can we say in the future writing a story that the President said, colon, quote, and then quote from that text?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me take a look at it.

Q While you are looking at that, the President makes some remarks there about relative Soviet-U. S. missile capabilities. The Pentagon put out some report on that recently and according to our desk there is a difference in the two evaluations. Could you check into that?

MR. ZIEGLER: What difference does your desk say exists? (Laughter.)

Q The way I got it sketchily was that the President talked in terms of the Soviets -- I guess the best thing, really, is to look at the text. But as I understand it, the President said something about the Soviets at a certain point being three times ahead of us ---

Q He said the Soviets now have three times the missile strength, ICBM, of ours. By 1974 they will pass us in submarines carrying nuclear missiles.

Q I believe that the Pentagon said something of a narrower gap between the two, I think 1,500 to 1,000 or something like that. Could you check into that?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q Ron, BBC is supposed to be reporting an interview with Dr. Kissinger in which he expresses some information of Chinese ground force intervention should Saigon invade North Vietnam. Can you tell us that is that accurate and is that the feeling of the Administration, too?

MR. ZIEGLER: I will have to talk to him about that.

I wasn't aware of that.

Q Ron, is the situation in East Pakistan such that it is advisable for Americans to be removed from where there has been increasing violence?

MR. ZIEGLER: What is your question?

Q Is it advisable for Americans to leave East Pakistan at this time?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. We are, of course, aware of the developments there, but we do not feel it is advisable for the Americans to leave.

Q Ron, UPI has a story this morning saying that the President is preparing a statement on textiles. Is he?

MR. ZIEGLER: We have not determined that we will issue a statement. We are still looking at the matter. I have nothing new to give you today.

MORE

#954

U Thant Helps Cairo

It seems incongruous for Secretary General U Thant to be demanding Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula. For this is the same U Thant who, in May 1967, swiftly capitulated to President Nasser's demands and summarily withdrew UN forces from Sinai and the Gaza strip.

It was that dismal surrender which enabled Nasser to reoccupy Sharm el-Sheikh and to close the Straits of Tiran to Israel shipping. That touched off the six-day war.

In the light of his 1967 role, it surely comes with poor grace for U Thant to be criticizing Israel for her determination to hold fast at Sharm el-Sheikh, which guards her shipping lanes and is vital to her survival.

In his report on the Jarring mission last Friday, U Thant went out of his way to pour new fuel on propaganda fires which put the heat on Israel. It is all part of a Great Power effort to accuse Israel of blocking progress on the Jarring talks by refusing to withdraw completely from Sinai to the old international frontier—the unfortunate proposal made by Secretary of State Rogers in 1969, which was finally endorsed by Egypt and the Soviet Union early this year and adopted by Envoy Gunnar Jarring.

In his report, U Thant said that Egypt had given a "positive reply" to Jarring but that Israel had so far not responded to the "crucial question of withdrawal."

That brought an angry rejoinder from Israel's Foreign Minister Abba Eban on Sunday. He released Israel's reply. (See *Highlights*.)

Stressing that Egypt was demanding total withdrawal as a condition for entering into a peace treaty and that Israel wanted to enter into detailed and concrete negotiations without prior conditions, Eban said: "Why Israel's opposition should be regarded as less positive than the UAR's rigid and ultimative demands escapes our understanding."

He went on: "There is no foundation whatever for saying the UAR is more positive. It is simply not true that Israel has not reacted to Ambassador Jarring's approaches." Eban said that Israel is now awaiting Egypt's reply.

Assistant Secretary of State Sisco has replied to our last editorial.
See Page 40.

Eban was critical of Egypt's refusal to extend the UN cease-fire. He attacked the Egyptian statement as "negative" and "parsimonious."

The 30-day extension of the cease-fire expired on Sunday. The United States, Britain and France were willing to join in a statement calling on the parties to extend the cease-fire. The Soviet Union, which wanted a Big Four statement attacking Israel's attitude on withdrawal, refused to join a call for a cease-fire on the ground that this would focus pressure on Egypt; Russia did not want to make it appear that Egypt was in any way responsible. As a result, the United States declined to participate in a statement critical of Israel's stand.

In refusing to extend the cease-fire, Sadat asserted that he wanted a political solution. He made it clear that Egypt had no intention of resuming hostilities at this time.

Sadat confirmed that he had been in the USSR on March 1-2 at the request of its leaders: "I came back feeling completely satisfied with what has been achieved, fully confident that the Soviet Union supported our just rights absolutely and positively."

Sadat also insisted that he had a commitment from the United States: "The U.S. promised us directly, especially in the last month, that it objects and will continue to object to the principle of seizing land by force of arms."

It is reported that early this year the Egyptians secured a commitment by the United States that it would stand by the Rogers plan in the negotiations.

Reinforced by the United States, the Soviet Union, France and England, as well as by U Thant and Jarring, Sadat evidently now believes that the map will be made in Cairo. He claimed:

"We have achieved results of great importance. The most important thing is the complete isolation of Israel from the international community and from world opinion."

NEAR EAST
report
Washington letter on
American policy in the Near East

Vol. XV, No. 10, Mar. 10, 1971

Nixon Press Conference

President Nixon told the press March 4 that the United States will not impose a settlement but added that guarantees rather than geographic acquisition would give Israel border security.

The question was put by Robert Semple of *The New York Times*.

Q: *The Arabs have reportedly agreed to sign a peace treaty with Israel in exchange for certain withdrawals by Israel from the territory occupied in 1967. Is it not now time for the Israelis to make some concessions of their own and will you be asking them publicly or privately to do so?*

A: Mr. Semple, as you well know, because you are sophisticated in this area, the question there is whether or not the United States will impose a settlement in the Mideast, and the answer is no. We will do everything that we can to urge the parties to talk. And, incidentally, when we talk about the problems in the Mideast, let it not go unnoted that we have made some progress. There was four years of fighting up until August of last year, and for seven months no guns have fired in the Mideast. That is progress of a kind.

We hope that the cease-fire either by agreement or de facto will be extended. We hope the Israelis and the Egyptians and, for that matter the Jordanians, will continue some kind of discussion. As far as imposing a settlement, however, we can only say that we can make suggestions, but we are going to have to depend upon the parties concerned to reach an agreement.

We, of course, will be there to see that the balance of power is maintained in the Mideast. We will continue to do so, because if that balance changes that could bring on war, and also we are prepared, as I have indicated, to join other major powers including the Soviet Union in guaranteeing any settlement that is made, which would give Israel the security of its borders that it might not get through any geographical acquisition.

37

# It's The Russians Who Should Withdraw—Jackson

While the Great Powers have been calling for Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai peninsula as a pre-condition to peace negotiations with Egypt, Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) turned it around last week.

In a speech in San Francisco and again on last Sunday's *Face the Nation*, Jackson called not for Israel's withdrawal but for the "phased withdrawal of Soviet forces from Egypt."

On CBS, Jackson was challenged by Columnist Robert Novak, who asked: "Aren't you just playing into Israeli hands and trying to make this a U.S.-Soviet question rather than an Israeli-Egyptian question?"

To which the Washington Senator replied: "Well, the larger part of it is a U.S.-Soviet situation. . . . I think we've missed the boat here in thinking that this is primarily just an Israeli dispute. It's not; the Russians

would be in the Middle East even if Israel did not exist. All I can say is thank God we've got an ally that can take care of herself vis-a-vis the Egyptians and the Arabs."

Jackson cited the hard facts of Soviet involvement in the area: 15,000 Russians with 60 Generals in Egypt; three secret air bases running reconnaissance missions; a Mediterranean fleet of from 40 to 60 ships; a major naval base at Alexandria, where Russian ships discharge military cargo "at the rate of one every four days"; Soviet ports-of-call at Algiers, Latakia, Port Said, Tarsus, Port Sudan, Aden and Berbera.

Warning against concessions to Soviet-Arab pressures, Jackson declared that Israel's borders were insecure even before the Soviet military deployment: "A settlement based on Israeli withdrawal to inherently indefensible borders offers at best a temporary respite

almost certain to yield, in time, to new and far more dangerous hostilities."

Israel's withdrawal must be to "defensible borders," Jackson stressed, "accompanied by Soviet withdrawal from Egypt."

It would be short-sighted and irresponsible to conclude an Israel-Egyptian agreement which ignored the chief source of instability, the large and uncontrolled Russian military presence, Jackson said.

In a similar warning, Sen. Bill Brock (R-Tenn.) told the Senate last Friday that Israel "simply cannot afford total withdrawal." He declared that "this nation must understand that "Soviet leadership is obviously bent on ultimate domination of the entire Middle East," and he concluded that the United States "should exert no undue pressures for unwarranted compromises."

Israel replied to UN Envoy Gunnar Jarring, on Feb. 26.

Israel welcomed the UAR's response. She said:

> Israel views favorably the expression by the U.A.R. of its readiness to enter into peace agreements with Israel and reiterates that it is prepared for meaningful negotiations on all subjects relevant to a peace agreement between the two countries.

She urged that the UAR and Israel "enter into a peace agreement with each other to be expressed in a binding treaty in accordance with normal international law and precedent."

She declared:

The Government of Israel believes that now that the U.A.R. has through Ambassador Jarring expressed its willingness to enter into a peace agreement with Israel, and both parties have presented their basic positions, they should now pursue their negotiations in a detailed and concrete manner without prior conditions so as to cover all the points listed in their respective documents with a view to concluding a peace agreement.

Israel's note went on to list the undertakings to which both Israel and Egypt should agree:

Declared and explicit decision to retard the conflict between Israel and the U.A.R. as finally ended, and termination of all claims and states of war

and acts of hostility or belligerency between Israel and the U.A.R.

Respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of the U.A.R.

The responsibility for insuring that no warlike act, or act of violence by any organization, group or individual originates from or is committed in the territory of Israel against the population, armed forces or property of the U.A.R.

Noninterference in the domestic affairs of the U.A.R.

Nonparticipation by Israel in hostile alliances against the U.A.R. and the prohibition of stationing of troops of other parties which maintain a state of belligerency against the U.A.R.

Israel asked that Egypt offer similar undertakings to her.

On the issue of *boundaries*, Israel offered:

Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of the U.A.R. to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries.

She requested that the UAR agree to:

Respect for and acknowledgement of the right of Israel to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries to be determined in the peace agreement.

Israel also made these commitments: On withdrawal:

Withdrawal of Israel armed forces

from the Israel-U.A.R. cease-fire line to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to be established in the peace agreement. Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines.

On the question of *refugees*, and noting that "both parties had claims," Israel proposed:

In the matter of the refugees and the claims of both parties in this connection, Israel is prepared to negotiate with the governments directly involved on: A. The payment of compensation for abandoned lands and property. B. Participation in the planning of the rehabilitation of the refugees in the region.

Once the obligations of the parties toward the settlement of the refugee issue have been agreed, neither party shall be under claims from the other inconsistent with its sovereignty.

Israel requested that the UAR agree to the following:

An explicit undertaking to guarantee free passage for Israel ships and cargoes through the Suez Canal.

Termination of economic warfare in all its manifestations, including boycott, and of interference in the normal international relations of Israel.

While Israel asked for free passage through the Suez Canal, she did not make the same request with respect to the Straits of Tiran, apparently in view of her determination to continue to hold that vantage point.

# Israel's Reply to Jarring

38

The Map of Russian Naval Imperialism

A major Soviet objective is to extend its military influence throughout the Middle East, Asia and Africa.

The Soviet Union hopes to open the Suez Canal, gaining immediate access to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

In addition, the proposal that the Great Powers guarantee navigation through the Straits of Tiran would mean an ominous Soviet presence at Sharm el-Sheikh, the gate to Aqaba.

The map on this page shows how far the Soviet Union has advanced in its drive for friendly harbors and bases.

Alexandria is the main supply port through which the Soviet Union has been delivering military hardware to the Egyptians. To the west, the Soviets are building a modern port and naval base at Mersa Matruth (formerly British). Farther west, along the North African coast, they have refueling privileges at the Libyan ports of Tripoli and Ben-ghazi. In Algeria, they use Mers El Kebir, a former French naval base. North of Suez, they have established a submarine base and supply port at

Latakia in Syria. The secure position of the Soviet Navy in the Mediterranean now challenges the U.S. Sixth Fleet.

The Soviets are constructing an air and naval base at Ras Banas on the Red Sea coast of Egypt. Farther down the Red Sea, they are established in Port Sudan and in Hodida in Yemen.

In southern Yemen, they have taken over the former British naval base at Aden, and across the Gulf of Aden, in Somalia, they have port privileges in Berbera—a potential military base. Moreover, they recently took over Socotra, an uninhabited 100-mile long island at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden, formerly a minor British military base. Here the Russians are reported to be building a major submarine, refueling and communications base. Between Socotra, Aden and Berbera the Soviets now have complete control of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

The Soviet Union is attempting to penetrate Oman by supporting rebellious tribesmen in the Dhofar region. This would menace the strategically important Trucial States and eventually

the oil-rich Persian Gulf, which the British are leaving this year.

The Indian Ocean is not immune from Russian influence. In India, the Russians have available ports-of-call privileges (refueling and repairs) at Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. They have helped develop a port at Visk-hapatnam and are adapting it for submarine use. Ceylon has made Colombo and Trincomalee available as ports-of-call. In the southwestern Indian Ocean the Soviets have arranged access to Mogadishu in Somalia, Mombasa in Kenya, Zanzibar and Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania, and refueling facilities in Mauritius.

There is one vital missing link in Soviet strategy and that is the Suez Canal. As long as the Canal is closed, Soviet strategy is frustrated. What is unquestionably galling to the Russians is that Israel forces border the Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba.

Thus, Russia's political and diplomatic offensive endangers vital communication lines, the future flow of oil and the economic and military defenses of many nations in Europe and Asia.

Published Weekly. Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C. Printed at 1341 G St., N. W. 20005. Subscription: $7 per year

Editorial Staff: I. L. Kenen, Editor; Charles Fenyvesi, Associate Editor; Esther Chesney, Bettina Silber, Caroline Bernstein

39

Mr. Sisco Disagrees
With Our Last Editorial

To the Editor:

While we have had honest differ-
ences at times over aspects of U.S.
Middle East policy, I have always had
the greatest respect for the integrity
with which you have portrayed what
that policy is. I think it important,
therefore, that I correct the character-
ization of U.S. policy in the lead ar-
ticle of the March 3 issue of Near East
Report ("The 1957 Script — Take
Two"), which is seriously misleading
in two respects.

The implication that the U.S. is seek-
ing a 1957-type solution of the Arab-
Israeli dispute could not be more wrong.
The essence of that solution was that
it largely re-established the status quo
ante the 1956 Sinai War—a return to
basing relations between Israel and
Egypt on the Armistice Agreement and
a continuing state of belligerency—and
created a United Nations Force whose
effectiveness proved tragically fragile
in the critical days of May 1967. It
has been fundamental to our policy
since June 1967, that there should be
no return to the conditions of the past;
that there must this time be a settle-
ment which replaces armistice with
peace based on direct and reciprocal
commitments of the parties to each
other, a settlement that recognizes Is-
rael's borders and its sovereignty, that
terminates all claims of belligerency
and that includes security arrangements
that are inherently durable.

Secondly, the article is misleading in its portrayal of the U.S. position on Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories. It has never been our interpretation that the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967, requires total Israeli withdrawal in all cases to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines. In our judgment, the Security Council Resolution neither endorsed nor barred the 1967 lines as the "secure and recognized" final borders called for in that resolution. We recognize that in some instances the possibility must be kept open for changes in the pre-June 1967 armistice lines, where a return to those lines would leave elements of the conflict unresolved. We have said, however, as your article subsequently notes, that such changes should be insubstantial. since in our judgment peace is not attainable on the basis of substantial alterations in the map of the area as it existed before the June 1967 War.

I hope the foregoing will serve to
clarify U.S. policy on these important
points. . . .

JOSEPH J. SISCO, Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs,
March 8, 1971

Ed. Note: Our comment next week.

The Pressures

The campaign to persuade Israel to withdraw from Sharm el-Sheikh is taking many forms, including declarations by the UN Secretary General, threatened declarations by the Big Four, inspired dispatches from the UN and Washington—which invariably describe Egypt as flexible and Israel as anything but—and editorials.

But perhaps the most bizarre per-
formance — astonishing correspondents
and Congressmen — was a briefing for
the foreign press under the aegis of
the USIA in Washington on Mar. 2.

A former U.S. ambassador and Mid-
dle East specialist, who took refuge in
anonymity, accused Israel of stalling
in the hope that the 1972 elections
might replace President Nixon with a
Democrat. The Israelis have always
done better with the Democrats, he con-
tended, because the latter derive their
main financial support from sources
which support the former.

In addition, he presented a blueprint
calling for total Israel withdrawal, com-
ing even closer to the Arab position
than the Rogers plan.

Correspondents wondered: Was this
a trial balloon to float propositions
which the U.S. government was not yet
willing to advance on its own?

Marilyn Berger of *The Washington Post* asked why the ex-diplomat had selected this time to expound his views. He replied that he had done so at the invitation of the USIA. But is it appropriate for the USIA to be sponsoring statements which reflect on the good faith of a country friendly to the United States and which also impugn the motives of Israel's friends?

arthur david greenberg

photography

for all occasions

PM

120 west 86th street

newyork, newyork 10024

212 / 873-5855

NEAR EAST
report

Vol. XV, No. 10

Mar. 10, 1971

Established 1957

Near East Report, Inc.
1341 G Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20005

Subscription: $7 per year

Newspaper — Timely Value

Mr. Harold H. Saunders AIPAC-12/70
National Security Council, #368
Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

40

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#964

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:25 A.M. EST

MARCH 18, 1971

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: We have issued this morning the special revenue sharing Message on transportation and a briefing has been held here this morning on that.

We have no further announcements from here today.

The President is working this morning in his EOB office and meeting with members of his staff. He has no schedule beyond the staff meetings, which he is having this morning and will continue to have most of the day.

Q Ron, what about the Dewey funeral? Will he go?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not prepared to announce that yet. But for your guidance, which we will put on DEEP BACKGROUND, I think the President expects to attend the funeral. We will have a firm announcement later in the day when we work out the details.

Q Will these plans include whether he will speak?

MR. ZIEGLER: They would not include that, no.

You are asking me questions now which we don't have worked out. For your guidance and on DEEP BACKGROUND, you can say the President is expected to attend the funeral in New York City tomorrow afternoon, which I believe is at 4:30. I will have details relating to your questions this afternoon.

Q Will the President see Abba Eban tomorrow?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, there are no plans set for the President to see the Foreign Minister.

Q Or later?

MR. ZIEGLER: He will meet with the Secretary of State. But there are no plans to see the President.

Q Still ON BACKGROUND, would you expect an up and back?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q I think you answered Cliff's question. I didn't hear the question. Was it that he was going to speak?

MORE #964

This Copy For __________

NEWS CONFERENCE #987

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

11:43 A.M. EST

APRIL 8, 1971

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President is still in the meeting with the Council on International Economic Policy, which is meeting in the Cabinet Room today.

Following his remarks to the Administration wives who are in the East Room today to receive a briefing on domestic policy, he went directly to the meeting of the Council on International Economic Policy.

Pete Peterson, who is an Assistant to the President, will be available to brief you gentlemen later on the CIEP meeting.

Q: Later meaning when?

MR. ZIEGLER: About 12:30.

The Council, as many of you may recall, was announced on January 19. And we have available the announcement from that date for those of you who want to refer back to it. This is the first formal meeting of the Council.

Q: Does it say who chairs it?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President will chair the Council on International Economic Policy.

Q: This is a Governmental body?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. I will post, John, the membership and the purposes of the International Economic Policy Council.

Also today at 12 o'clock, the President will meet, as we announced yesterday, with Franco Malfatti, who is the President of the European Communities.

Then, later today, at 3:30, the President will meet with Ambassador MacArthur.

And, at 4 o'clock, he will meet with Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zealand, who will pay a courtesy call on the President. We will have a picture on that.

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#987

Q Ron, there is a report that the Russians are
moving new men into Egypt, sophisticated anti-aircraft batteries
and so forth. Do you have any comment on this?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I don't have any comment.

Q Ron, the State Department has finished its report on China policy. Does the President have it, or do you know the status of it?

MR. ZIEGLER: The matter of U.S. policy toward China
is a matter which has been reviewed in the White House with the
State Department.

I believe that the elements contained in the State
Department report would be those which have obviously been
discussed within the councils here, which the State Department
is, of course, a part of.

But we have been going through, as we have said
before, an evaluation of our policy toward China, the Peoples
Republic of China.

Q Ron, there is a report that Governor Whitcomb of Indiana may get an appointment to the Commission on Prisoners of War Repatriation.

Is there any truth in that?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. To my knowledge there has been
no discussion of the appointment of Governor Whitcomb to
that post.

Q Or any other?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not aware of any discussions
with the Governor on that.

Q Is there a commission being formed on this?

MR. ZIEGLER: There is no discussion under way here
on that.

Q Ron, last night in the East Room it was
said that among those the President consulted in making his
decision on troop withdrawals was General Abrams, the Vietnam
Commander,

How did he consult him?

MR. ZIEGLER: In the normal process. Also, and I
am sure it was inadvertent, the backgrounder did not mention
Ambassador Bunker.

Q By cable, do you mean?

MR. ZIEGLER: Through the cable process, normal
communications, not by phone, but as in the case of all withdrawal
decisions, the President consults with General Abrams, Ambassador
Bunker, the South Vietnamese Government, Secretary Laird, Secretary
Rogers, Admiral Moorer and Dr. Kissinger.

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United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970:
A Report of the Secretary of State

"United States Foreign Policy 1969-1970: A
Report of the Secretary of State" was trans-
mitted to the Congress on March 26. Reprinted
here are the letter of transmittal and introduc-
tory comment by the Secretary of State.¹

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

MARCH 26, 1971

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This report on the course of our foreign affairs surveys the policies we are following and reviews the manner in which we are carrying them out. It supplements the two reports on "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's" which the President has already presented.

The first section covers our relations with in-
dividual states and regions in 1969 and 1970.
Succeeding sections cover the broad sweep of
security affairs, economic affairs, international
organizations and law, social, cultural, and sci-
entific matters, the Peace Corps, and manage-
ment.

A documentary annex includes principal pol-
icy speeches and statements, important mes-
sages, and treaties and agreements signed or rat-
ified in the past two years.

I hope that this detailed report will be helpful
to the members of the Committee on Foreign

Relations and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs, to the Congress as a whole, and to the
public.

Sincerely yours,

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

The Honorable
J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate.

and

The Honorable
THOMAS E. MORGAN, Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
House of Representatives.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY:
A NEW UNITY AND PURPOSE

INTRODUCTORY COMMENT BY THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

Two years ago the Administration took office
in the midst of a searching national debate on
foreign affairs. Assumptions that had deter-
mined our policies for more than two decades
were open to challenge and reexamination.
America needed a new perception of its place
in the world, a new unity and sense of purpose
in its foreign affairs. That is what we are un-
dertaking to achieve.

We were bound, of course, to concern our-
selves with the legacies of the past. A quarter-
century of international insecurity had resulted

¹ Copies of the 644-page volume are for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Department of State publication 8575; $2.75).

April 5, 1971

465

of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future without outside interference. However, at no point during the past two years has North Vietnam demonstrated an interest in serious negotiations. The progress we have made has been accomplished entirely through the Vietnamization program, under which we are well on the way toward ending our ground combat role.

Vietnamization, the parallel course on which we embarked in recognition that a negotiated settlement might not ensue, has proceeded on schedule and with good results. South Vietnam's military forces are larger, better trained, better armed, and better led than they were two years ago. We are turning over to the South Vietnamese steadily increasing responsibility for ground combat. Warfare in South Vietnam has been less intense; security is improved; and our casualties are down.

We are aware that our policy entails certain risks, in particular that North Vietnam might be tempted to intensify the war as U.S. troops are withdrawn. But the President has made clear that we are prepared to act with all the determination necessary to protect our forces. He has also reiterated our determination to secure the humane treatment and release of all our prisoners of war. Certainly it is past time for North Vietnam to apply the Geneva convention to their care.

Even while the situation in Vietnam was improving, however, developments in Cambodia posed a new problem. North Vietnam's attempt to expand its territorial control in Cambodia last spring raised the prospect of a larger, contiguous base area from which Hanoi would have uninterrupted access to ports and supply routes and a major sanctuary from which to attack South Vietnam. Such a prospect presented a threat to the long-range success of our Vietnamization program.

The subsequent two-month operation of American and South Vietnamese troops against North Vietnamese border-area sanctuaries in Cambodia destroyed substantial supplies, disrupted deployments, and left North Vietnamese forces in a weaker tactical and strategic situation.

One of the most remarkable developments of the past year has been the Cambodian people's expression of nationalism and unity. Though poorly armed and poorly trained in military matters, they rallied in firm support of their government's resistance to North Vietnam. Congressional approval in December 1970 of the President's request for ammunition, arms, and other supplies for Cambodia is making a major contribution to its ability to defend itself.

It is clear that an independent and neutral Cambodia serves American as well as Cambodian interests. Our basic objective in Cambodia will remain the protection of the Vietnamization and troop withdrawal programs.

This objective also governs our policy in providing full air, fire, and transport support to the South Vietnamese attack on North Vietnam's supply lines in Laos which started in February 1971. Consonant with statutory restrictions we will not use U.S. ground combat troops in either Laos or Cambodia.

*The Middle East.* The Middle East has known three wars, with attendant risk of Great-Power confrontation, in little more than two decades. We have important interests—political, economic, and strategic—in the area. When the Administration took office, we were determined to do all we could to help achieve a stable peace.

In early 1969 the efforts of U.N. Representative Gunnar Jarring to promote agreement among the parties on a Middle East peace based on the U.N. Security Council resolution of November 22, 1967, were stalemated. In those circumstances we felt that the United States could not evade a responsibility to play a more active role in encouraging the parties to negotiate their differences.

With the situation frozen diplomatically, the continuation of hostilities and the danger of escalation offered too dark a prospect to accept without a major effort to reverse the trend. For this reason, despite inevitable frustrations and criticisms, one of the President's first foreign policy decisions was to begin discussions with other major powers concerned, including the U.S.S.R., in an effort to open new paths toward useful negotiations.

In December 1969 I made public the position

April 5, 1971

471

we had taken in the course of these discussions. Its essence was that the Arab governments concerned should accept a permanent peace based on a binding agreement with Israel, and that the Israelis should withdraw from territories occupied in 1967 when their own territorial integrity and security and their right to exist as a nation were assured as envisaged in the Security Council resolution. That position called for agreement on secure and recognized boundaries in which any alterations from the 1967 lines should be insubstantial. That policy statement of 1969 and the President's recent report on foreign policy represent our judgment of what would constitute the basis of a just peace.

Unhappily, the security situation, already touchy, began to deteriorate sharply in the first few months of 1970. As fighting increased along the Suez Canal and the air war spread more deeply into the U.A.R., new Soviet SA-2 missile sites appeared in the Nile Valley, followed by two military measures hitherto unknown outside the communist world—SA-3 sites manned by Soviet personnel and Soviet pilots flying operational missions. The air war continued to escalate throughout the spring. In June we decided to put forward a further major peace initiative. That initiative was designed to persuade the parties to "stop shooting and start talking": to reinstitute a cease-fire, together with a military standstill within 50 kilometers of the Canal, and to bring about negotiations under Ambassador Jarring.

The acceptance of our proposal by all concerned led to a cease-fire standstill agreement on August 8. It also led to a commitment by the Arab states to the principle of a binding peace with Israel, and by Israel to the principle of withdrawal, both in accordance with the Security Council resolution.

The subsequent violation of the standstill aspect of the cease-fire resulted in early disruption of the resumed negotiations. The cease-fire, however, held. Our subsequent efforts in 1970 were thus devoted to reinstituting the negotiating process under Ambassador Jarring, the only process through which we can see prospects for reaching a peace settlement, and to taking steps to maintain the balance of power in the area. At

the end of 1970 the Israeli Government's decision to return to the talks reopened the road to negotiations.

As negotiations approached, both sides have restated their policy positions in firm terms, and both have expressed profound skepticism about the outcome. However, when the parties reopened their talks under Ambassador Jarring in January they began to engage in detailed substantive issues for the first time.

The reinstitution of talks under Ambassador Jarring has thus brought the Middle East to another important juncture. The fateful question is whether a process has been started which will lead, through advances and despite setbacks, to genuine peace, or whether the process will again be frustrated. We are convinced that an agreed settlement, not an imposed one, is the way to bring peace to the Middle East. We shall do everything we can do to help bring it about. To achieve this objective we will seek to preserve a relationship of confidence with Israel, to continue to improve our relationship with the new government of the U.A.R., and to maintain our moral and material support to the governments in Jordan and Lebanon.

*The Western Hemisphere.* Unlike Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, Latin America has been spared the ravages of major wars and the vicissitudes which followed them. Still, it has not been free of internal disruption, political ferment, and the instabilities inherent in accelerated economic and social change. This hemisphere, too, offers new opportunities and new prospects.

In Latin America the United States has been involved by reason of common historical associations, geographical proximity, shared security concerns, close economic ties, and our own ability to provide economic and technical aid. Those bonds and our associations with Latin America will persist. But our close ties with the countries of this hemisphere give us neither a special privilege nor the primary responsibility for internal developments in Latin America.

During the 19th century and into the 20th our policy in the hemisphere was looked at by some as an effort to exclude the interests of others, to create an inward-looking Western

472

Department of State Bulletin

ADDITIONAL REMARKS

Ladies and gentlemen: The delegate of the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam has just recalled his Government's proposal for agreement on the direct repatriation or internment in a neutral country of able-bodied prisoners of war who have undergone a long period of captivity. I wish to endorse his remarks and reiterate our strong support for this proposal. Although short of the release of prisoners of war which is our goal, this would be a reasonable and responsible way of alleviating the plight of prisoners of war on both sides. I hope you will respond positively to this initiative.

Third-country internment of prisoners of war is specifically envisaged by the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention of 1949, by which both sides in the Indochina conflict are bound. There can be no constructive purpose in the continued long detention of prisoners of war. They and their families have suffered too much already. Agreement to intern prisoners of war in a third country would mean that the prisoners would no longer serve as hostages for political or military purposes.

United States Presents $1 Million
to U.N. Drug Abuse Control Fund

Following are a statement by George Bush,
U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and
remarks by John E. Ingersoll, Director of the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs,
made at a ceremony at U.N. Headquarters on
April 1.

U.S./U.N. press release 34 dated April 1

AMBASSADOR BUSH

Let me first make a brief statement. It is a
great pleasure on behalf of the President and
our Government to present to the Secretary
General the $1 million installment on a $2 mil-
lion commitment for the United Nations fight
against drugs.

With me today representing the United
States Government is Mr. John Ingersoll, who
is the head of our department of narcotics and
dangerous drugs. Not only is he active on the
domestic scene, but he was our prime participant
in Vienna recently, Mr. Secretary General, at
which I know that certainly your leadership
there expressed the whole interest of the world
in this; and I think this was one of the real
recent accomplishments of the United Nations.

But without further ado I simply want to
say that this infusion of funds at this time I
think expresses certainly the interest of our
President and of our State Department. Mr.
Kotschnig [Walter M. Kotschnig, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for International Organi-
zation Affairs] is representing the State Depart-
ment here today, a friend of all of ours at the
United Nations. But it certainly expresses also
the determination of the American people to do
what we can in the field of helping in the inter-
national control of narcotics. I have a prepared
statement, but let me simply stop by handing
you this with our congratulations for the leader-
ship that you have taken in this, and we want to
stand behind you every inch of the way on this
wonderful work.

There is no dirtier or deadlier bullet than the
illegal drug capsule.

Mankind today is being increasingly as-
saulted, across international frontiers and
within our homelands, by a growing traffic in
illegal narcotics. Young, old, workers, stu-
dents—all classes are being attacked and de-
stroied by this evil, with uncounted loss to
themselves, their families, and their nations.

The United Nations, created "for the benefit
of all mankind," has taken cognizance of this
danger. The 25th General Assembly and
ECOSOC have called for collective action in the
creation of the United Nations Fund for Drug
Abuse Control.

I am proud to inform you that the United
States has pledged a contribution of $2 million
for the year 1971. Today, within 3 days of your
appeal for support of this Drug Abuse Fund, I
present our letter of credit for $1 million, an
initial installment, in confidence that it will
spur immediate and effective international
action against the drug traffic.

574

Department of State Bulletin

President Nixon told the General Assembly on October 23:¹

It is in the world interest that the narcotics traffic be curbed.

Drugs pollute the minds and bodies of our young people, bringing misery, violence, and human and economic waste. This scourge of drugs can be eliminated through international cooperation.

Creation of this United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control has provided a mechanism for concerted and simultaneous action in the fight against drug addiction in all its aspects. We hope all will support and assist its program. We are confident it provides the means for augmenting the roles already played by the U.N. family of specialized agencies, the Commission on Narcotic Drugs, the International Narcotics Control Board, and those dedicated experts in Geneva who I am told can trace illegal opium almost to the field on which it grew.

There has been international effort against the drug traffic since 1909. We, in the United States, are waging a vigorous and relentless fight against drug abuse. Mr. John E. Ingersoll, Director of our Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, is in the forefront of that struggle, and I am happy to have him here with me today.

Addiction and drug traffic affects developed and developing nations. The problem is clearly international. It calls for concerted international action. My Government is determined to support the United Nations leadership in this vital struggle.

The fight, we believe, must be relentless, in our own country and internationally, together. The Fund and the resolutions establishing it call for action on many fronts. These include:

- Control of the illicit traffic which stimulates use and channels production to demand.

- Control of the illicit production of narcotic raw materials.

- Replacement of narcotic crops with other

activities which will prove more profitable for the farmer and will aid development in these often least developed areas.

- Treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration of addicts into productive membership in their societies.

- Education, particularly of the young, in the dangers of drug addiction.

- Training of the experts to carry on these difficult and often technical tasks of collective enforcement.

No country can defend itself, alone, against drugs. We must act together, quickly, effectively, and on a truly international level. This new United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control gives us the means to take action. Its effectiveness will depend on the support of all. My Government pledges its unstinting support. We hope all others will join us.

## MR. INGERSOLL

Unlike Caesar I did not come to speak, but, Mr. Secretary General, I do want on behalf of the Government of the United States to offer my congratulations to you for your foresight and your encouragement in establishing the Fund, more importantly, in selecting the people who will administer it and setting up the mechanism. I think that this problem, which knows no national boundaries, transcends the world, and affects all economic and social classes, must be dealt with from a worldwide international basis. For this reason I have been very happy to participate in the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drug sessions which have led to the establishment of this Fund. Again, I thank you and congratulate you, sir, for your encouragement and participation. Mr. Ambassador, I also appreciate your interest and help. Thank you very much.

¹BULLETIN of Nov. 16, 1970, p. 601.

May 3, 1971

575

where letting things simmered resulted only in
continued simmering.

If all other things were equal, we obviously
would favor countries with institutions as free
as our own over those where such institutions
were more authoritarian. Obviously, things are
not always equal. Also, since many less devel-
oped countries seem to put less stress on free
institutions than do we, it can be argued that
our insistence on our image is a type of patron-
izing not acceptable to others. We have tried to
be pragmatic, keeping in mind these different
aspects of our preferences, in dealing with real-
ity. It is never an easy problem for us to judge
the institutions of others and how these institu-
tions interact with our own.

I have raised as many questions as I have an-
swered. What I have wished to say is that our
policy does seek to differentiate among our vary-
ing national interests. It does seek to be relevant
to the primary interests and the mores of Latin
America itself. We have sought to change our
style, and we think this is welcome even though
at times it has concerned the Latin Americans
that our lower voice may also mean a lower in-
terest. We are trying to reshape our own policies
in the economic field to take account of the joint
interests we and Latin America have. We have
tried not to overreact, even when provocation
has been great; but at the same time we try not
to make a low profile and a low voice mean no
reaction at all. We wish to be more flexible in
how we deal with issues and face problems.
These issues can be economic, dealing with such
things as trade, investment, aid, fishing rights.
They can be political in how we interact with
different types of governments. They can be mil-
itary. They usually are a mix of all of these.

We have not yet fully defined what this neces-
sarily means in individual cases. Perhaps we
never will be able to do this in advance. We
need more study of this, and we welcome
guidance.

Has the United States Government changed
enough to cope with the change in Latin Amer-
ica? Are we even asking ourselves the right

questions, such as those I have noted? We obvi-
ously are trying to adapt. We have our own
national interests in mind—enlightened inter-\ests, we hope—and we seek to make these dove-
tail as much as possible with the interests of
the various Latin American countries. We have
learned to listen a lot more.

We are trying. And so, I am certain, is Latin
America.

U.S. Hopes for End of Conflict
in East Pakistan

Following is a statement read to news corre-
spondents on April 7 by Charles W. Bray III,
Director, Office of Press Relations.

Since the beginning of the present crisis, we
have on several occasions expressed concern over
the loss of life and damage which have occurred
in East Pakistan, and we have expressed the
hope that peaceful conditions will be restored.

While we have pointed out the difficulty of
obtaining reliable information on the situation,
it is increasingly clear that there have been sub-
stantial casualties and damage, although we
still have no way of estimating the extent of the
casualties and damage with any precision.

Our sympathy goes out to the victims of re-
cent events. Normal life in East Pakistan has
been seriously disrupted. We continue to be-
lieve it is important that every feasible step
be taken to end the conflict and achieve a peace-
ful accommodation.

We hope that it will be possible soon to alle-
viate the suffering caused by recent events. In
this connection, we also hope the Government
of Pakistan will avail itself of offers of as-
sistance from the international community. The
United States is prepared to assist in any in-
ternational humanitarian effort of this kind.

We have discussed these matters with the
Government of Pakistan, and we will continue
to do so.

554

Department of State Bulletin

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #988

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

4:33 P.M. EST

APRIL 8, 1971

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: This is an informational opportunity.
I will give you the schedule.

Tomorrow at 10 o'clock, Paul McCracken will meet with the President. He is the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, as you know.

We will very likely have an inflation alert the first of next week. Some of you asked if we would have an inflation alert today. But we obviously did not and will not. But we will the first of next week.

Then at 10:30, the President will meet with Ambassador David Kennedy. He will report on his recent trip to the Far East.

Then tomorrow at 3:30, the President will receive representatives from the American Cancer Society and from the Boys Clubs of America.

That is the President's schedule for tomorrow.

You have one proclamation that is self-explanatory.

There is a lid.

Q Ron, to get back to Senator Scott, he indicated that the President told him that he had a definite timetable.

MR. ZIEGLER: I sat in the meeting yesterday evening. Let me tell you what I told you this morning. Anchor what you write and what you say on what the President of the United States said last night to the American people. It is as simple as I can be about it.

I responded to the questions regarding what Senator Scott said this morning. I would just suggest to you that the President set forth his policy very clearly and completely last night and anchor what you say and write on what he said, because that is precisely what he said to the leaders last night.

Q Do you think he misunderstood Scott. That is, did Scott misunderstand?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know.

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#988

Q That is not the question I asked. I asked you if you have ever heard him say he has a definite withdrawal date in mind.

MR. ZIEGLER: Bob, I am hesitating to respond to your question because if I say that the President has a fixed date in mind that is going to lead to misinterpretations of the President's policy.

So I am going to answer your question this way: The President last night -- let me repeat this to make my point -- said that he would withdraw 100,000 troops by December of this year; that he is proceeding against the goal for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from South Vietnam.

He said that. That is what he is doing. That is the objective of his plan. He said we would accomplish that by Vietnamization, but the quicker way would be through negotiations.

The President has said -- and he said to the leaders last night, "I have a plan in mind. I am not going to announce a fixed date. I am not going to announce a fixed timetable", for the reasons he expressed last night in his speech.

That is what I have heard him say. That is what I have heard him talk about. I can't amplify on that at all.

If you want to clearly articulate the President's view in what he is saying, and what he is expressing in terms of his policy in Southeast Asia, that is the way you should do it, because that is what he said last night publicly and he said it in other meetings.

Q Why don't you answer the question by saying, "No, I have never heard the President say, 'I have a date in mind on which we will get all American troops out'?"

MR. ZIEGLER: I prefer to state it the way I have.

Q I interpret what you say to indicate that the President does have a particular date in mind.

MR. ZIEGLER: The President will, as he has done in the past, continue to reassess the plan which he is working against.

Let me put it this way: I think it would be incorrect to say that the President has at this time a specific date which he feels his plan will be completed by.

Q What was the purpose of the visit with Ambassador MacArthur this afternoon?

MR. ZIEGLER: He is here for consultations and is paying a courtesy call on the President.

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#988

NEWS CONFERENCE

This Copy For

#989

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 12:02 P.M. EST

APRIL 9, 1971

FRIDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President this morning, as the schedule states, met with Dr. Paul McCracken, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. As I mentioned yesterday, we expect to have an Inflation Alert the first of next week. I don't know which day yet, but it will be the first of next week.

Q: Is that what the meeting was about, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President discussed the Inflation Alert with Dr. McCracken. It was not what the meeting was about. It was one of the things they talked about. They also generally reviewed the economic picture in the country.

Following that meeting, the President met with Ambassador David Kennedy, who has just returned from his trip. He recently visited South Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Micronesia. He reported to the President on the impressions that he gained from each of these visits.

He gave an assessment of economic development and stabilization in South Vietnam since last fall's economic reforms, and also indicated that he had discussed, in Thailand, with the Thai leaders, the Nixon Doctrine.

In Singapore, he met with Prime Minister Lee and discussed future trends in the region.

In Indonesia, he signed an agreement with the Indonesians on debt rescheduling.

So the Ambassador reported to the President on the details of those visits.

Then today also, the President, as the schedule shows, is meeting with Miss Nancy Hanks, who is the head of the National Council of Arts. They will talk about the National Endowment for Arts and the grass roots efforts which have taken place in the past year where, for example, the National Endowment of Arts and Nancy Hanks, working with the Office of Education, have brought some 300 artists, dancers, musicians, poets, theater artists, painters and sculptors to elementary schools and secondary schools throughout 31 States to present programs to underprivileged children; and also the fact that the President is fully funding the National Endowment for Arts, as indicated in his recent budget message.

Q: How much, Ron?

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#989

I am not quite sure of the exact phrase. But that the
South Vietnamese casualties were lower now.

MR. ZIEGLER: I believe the President indicated
in his speech that the casualties of the South Vietnamese
forces have dropped significantly in the past two years.
That is a simple fact. You can check the figures with
Defense.

Q Ron, can you tell us whether the President
has written to the Egyptian President assuring him of American
support for the Israeli proposal about the withdrawal?

MR. ZIEGLER: I can confirm that there has been a
recent exchange of correspondence between President Nixon
and President Sadat. I have confirmed that to others who
have asked previously. I would not, however, have any comment
on the substance of those private exchanges.

As you know, the President is cautiously optimistic
that the cease-fire conditions will continue in the area, and
is hopeful that the dialogue between the parties will continue
under Ambassador Jarring's auspices.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END

(AT 12:18 P.M. EST)

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#990

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 4:30 PM EST

APRIL 9, 1971

FRIDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: I was asked this morning whether or not Secretary Stans planned a trip. I checked, and he does. So let me tell you about that.

It was announced today that Secretary Stans will be making an official visit to six different countries from April 17 to May 4. He will go to Ireland, Spain, Greece, Roumania, Iran and Austria.

Q This was put out at Commerce, I assume?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, but I wanted you all to know it because I was asked about it this morning.

His discussions, of course, will be with officials there, directed at strengthening our ties and for a healthy climate for American investment in these countries.

That clears up the record on that particular point.

Also, in relation to the President's plans, we were somewhat uncertain this morning -- and still are -- but I can tell you on the record, and in a firm way, that the President will be going to Camp David to spend Easter weekend. The President, Mrs. Nixon, David and Julie are going there today. Tricia is going to Camp David tomorrow. This morning I said Ed would be going, but he will not be.

Q He is not going?

MR. ZIEGLER: Apparently, as it stands now, he is not going.

Q When is the chopper leaving?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President plans to leave at about 5:30 at the earliest.

Also, there have been several speculative stories as to where the President is going to church. Mrs. Eisenhower -- and the President mentioned this to me just a while ago -- will join them at Camp David for Easter dinner Sunday. It is still uncertain where the First Family will attend church services. There had been a story earlier about their driving over to Gettysburg.

Bruce Whelihan will be at Camp David over the weekend.

Frank, are you going up there?

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#990

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#992

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN, DEPUTY
PRESS SECRETARY TO THE
PRESIDENT

AT 4:10 P.M.

APRIL 12, 1971

MONDAY

MR. WARREN: Good afternoon.

Ron is in a meeting this afternoon and asked me to give you the schedule for tomorrow and the announcements that we have.

The President is in his office this afternoon. He is meeting now with Secretary Stans who leaves at the end of this week for a trip to Europe. The itinerary, I think, has been posted. If it isn't, we will get it up right after this meeting.

Q Is Mrs. Stans going with him?

MR. WARREN: I am not sure about that.

Q How long a trip is it?

MR. WARREN: About two weeks, I think. This was announced, Helen, at Commerce last week.

Q What is the purpose of the trip, Jerry?

MR. WARREN: The Commerce Department announced last week that Secretary Stans will make an official visit to six countries to discuss matters of international trade and investment in each of the countries.

Q Do you have the dates?

MR. WARREN: He departs Friday, April 17, and returns on the 4th of May.

Q I mean the dates for each country?

MR. WARREN: We can get that for you. We will post that.

Q Jerry, is there any connection between this trip and the one Ambassador Kennedy will make?

MR. WARREN: I think the Secretary's trip is one of a series of trips that he has made and will make to Europe and other areas of the world to discuss the economic conditions with officials in these countries, and also to promote U.S. exports, obviously, in his role as Secretary of Commerce.

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Ambassador Kennedy, of course, is going on his trip at the request of the President to examine specific trade problems, as Mr. Peterson told you last week.

Also, the President today has announced his intention to nominate Charles R. Richey, of Potomac, Maryland, to be a United States District Judge for the District of Columbia. We will post additional information on that.

He will succeed Edward M. Curran, who retired from active service and has assumed the status of Senior Judge.

We have two District Judges for the Eastern District of Louisiana and a District Judge for the Southern District of New York, which we also will post.

Those are all the announcements we have this afternoon.

Tomorrow's schedule:

There will be a Cabinet meeting tomorrow at 8:00 a.m.

At 10:30 a.m., the President will meet with Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, who has returned from another visit to the Vatican. Ambassador Lodge will be reporting on his visit, which took place in March. This was the Ambassador's first visit to the Vatican this year. He met with the Pope on March 27. This was the third visit that Ambassador Lodge has made to the Vatican since he was designated to continue the contacts which this Administration has made with the Vatican since early in 1969. Ambassador Lodge assumed that role in June, 1970.

At 11:00 a.m., the President will meet with Dr. Paul McCracken, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers. They will be discussing the Inflation Alert, which will be presented to you here tomorrow shortly after that meeting, soon after 11 o'clock.

Q Who will present it?

MR. WARREN: Dr. McCracken will be there.

Q For full coverage?

MR. WARREN: Yes.

At 12:15 p.m., the President will meet with Carl Yastrzemski, who, as you all know, is a left fielder for the Boston Red Sox. The Boston Red Sox will be in town playing the Washington Senators. Yastrzemski will visit the President at 12:15 to pay his respects. Yastrzemski is a member of the President's Council on Physical Fitness and Sports.

Q What is the purpose of that?

MR. WARREN: It is a courtesy call.

You have one release: The President today is announcing his intention to nominate Nathaniel Pryor Reed, of Hobe Sound, Florida, to be Assistant Secretary of Interior

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This Copy For

#991

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 12:18 P.M. EST

APRIL 12, 1971

MONDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The schedule for today has been posted. I believe you have seen that.

The President is meeting with the Chinese Ambassador, Chow Shu-kai, who is returning to Taiwan to assume the post of Foreign Minister.

He has also, as was posted, received Mrs. Anna Chennault, who just returned from a visit in Southeast Asia and has reported on her visit to the President.

Q Did she go as any kind of a special emissary?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Why did she report to the President? When private citizens go to Southeast Asia they don't customarily come back and report to the President of the United States.

MR. ZIEGLER: From time to time they do, and she did on this occasion in her capacity as Mrs. Anna Chennault.

At 3:30 this afternoon, the President will meet with Secretary Stans.

We have one announcement: The President today has announced the designation of Ambassador Joseph Jova to be the United States Representative to the 14th Session of the Economic Commission for Latin America of the Economic and Social Council of the United States. The session is scheduled to convene in Santiago, Chile, on April 27, and continue through May 8; we will post that information for you.

Q Do you have the names of these GIs who have appeared?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. We will post the complete list of those who participated in the meeting. I believe that is already on the board. It should be. If it is not, it will be there shortly.

Q Do you have the countries that Mrs. Chennault visited?

MR. ZIEGLER: She visited Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

Q What are Mrs. Chennault's special credentials that makes her views interesting to the President?

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[L]

MR. ZIEGLER: She is a private citizen and the
President wanted to get her views on the trip.

Those are all the announcements that we have.

Q What is Stans coming in for, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: He is going to make a trip to Southern Europe very soon. That was announced by the Commerce Department the other day. They will be talking about that, and also matters relating to the Commerce Department. We will list the countries that he is going to visit.

Q Are we going to see him after that?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Are we going to see her?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, not here.

Q When is the Inflation Alert coming?

MR. ZIEGLER: Tomorrow.

Q What time?

MR. ZIEGLER: Eleven o'clock.

Q Here?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q Did the Taiwanese Ambassador express misgivings about the visit by the U. S. ping-pong team and the press men?

MR. ZIEGLER: I wasn't in the meeting so I don't know what the content of the discussion was.

Q What involvement does the U. S. have or what are we doing about a possible Indian-Pakistani confrontation, if any?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think both of those governments have spoken to that. I don't think there is anything I could say

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This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #993

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

12:05 P.M. EST

APRIL 13, 1971

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President's schedule for today has been posted.

The President met this morning with the Cabinet. The meeting lasted a little over an hour.

As, I believe, the posting of those who attended the Cabinet meeting has already indicated to you, the leadership of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of the Congress attended the Cabinet meeting this morning. Senator Pastore was in attendance and also Congressman Holifield from California. Senator Baker, who is on the Joint Committee, and also John Anderson of Illinois, who is on the Committee, also attended the meeting. Senator Aiken is the Ranking Republican on the Committee. He was in Vermont and could not attend. Also Senator Bennett from Utah is second ranking on the Committee, but he also was in Utah. Both Senator Aiken and Senator Bennett felt that Senator Baker should sit in the meeting. He did.

John Anderson sat in from the House side, as Craig Hosmer could not be in attendance this morning.

For some time the Domestic Council has had a sub-committee studying the matter of energy supply and energy sources to the United States. And as a part of this, the President wanted to get the thinking of the leadership of the Joint Committee and also to hear a report or presentation from Glenn Seaborg on the development of nuclear energy supply to the United States, the technological development, and the steps that have been taken up to this point in the development of this source of energy supply.

In the study that the sub-committee of the Domestic Council is undertaking, they are looking at the full range of possibilities to deal with matters of energy supply. And, as I said, the President asked the Senate leaders to express their views on the matter and heard a presentation from Glenn Seaborg on the subject.

The President also this morning met with Ambassador Lodge. Ambassador Lodge has returned from a recent visit to the Vatican which took place in March of this year. This is the first visit of the Ambassador to the Vatican this year. He met with the Pope on March 27.

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As you may recall, Ambassador Lodge was named by the President in June of 1970 to continue informal contacts with the Vatican and the Pope which the President initiated early in his term of office.

The Ambassador's visit to the Vatican in March is the third visit which Ambassador Lodge has made to the Vatican. He first went to Rome in July of 1970 and the second visit was in November and December of 1970. Each of these visits was from four to six weeks in duration.

The Ambassador this morning discussed with the President his impressions, impressions he gathered during his recent visit to the Vatican on a number of subjects including Indochina, the Middle East, and the problems of developing countries.

The President also met briefly with Paul McCracken, as you know, and then will meet with Carl Yastrzemski of the Red Sox here briefly. If the briefing is interrupted, that is why.

He is a member of the President's Council on Physical Fitness.

This afternoon, the President will be meeting with members of his staff, Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Shultz, Dr. Kissinger, and others.

Then, at 4 o'clock, he will have a meeting with Secretary Connally.

Q What is the purpose of the Connally meeting?

MR. ZIEGLER: There is no agenda. The President asked him to come in.

Those are all the announcements we have, except for the announcement that we have given you. The President today is announcing his appointment of John Scali, chief diplomatic correspondent for ABC, who will take the post as Special Consultant to the President. I believe the biographical information and the release you have gives you the information on that.

Q How much money is he going to make?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know what his salary will be. As you know, we don't give specific salary levels of staff members. But he would be at the high range. The President is able to pay the highest level of $42.500. I do not know what the salary Mr. Scali will receive will be. But it will not be more than that.

Q Why don't you give the salary levels?

MR. ZIEGLER: I will talk to you about that afterwards.

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Q This was not a job before this, was it? Scali
is getting a new job?

MR. ZIEGLER: This is a new position. As we
have indicated before, as we have talked privately and
I think most of you know, Mr. Scali is coming in as a
Special Consultant, and we expect the Administration to
benefit a great deal from his experience, both as a diplomatic
correspondent and a man who has been in the news business
virtually all of his life. He will be consulting with the
President and members of the Administration to a great extent
on foreign policy, because that is where he has devoted a good
deal of his time in his career as a newspaperman and a television
reporter. And we hope to benefit substantially from his
counsel.

Q Why was this job set up?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think any Administration, as it moves
along, has to remain healthy and to progress the way that
an Administration should or, for that matter, any organization,
and cannot remain static. I think changes such as this,
additions of very competent individuals to the President's
staff, will continue.

Q Is it supposed to benefit a specific need?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think the need is really contained
in what I said before. I think that Mr. Scali's contribution
would be most significant in terms of our evaluating our
communications efforts, as I said earlier, in the area of
foreign policy and to attempt, as we move along, to do an
even more effective job in communicating our policies
throughout the Administration to the American people, which
indeed is the objective we have.

Q Do you think you have not been communicating
very well in that field?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think it would be a very bad attitude
to state that we have done everything perfectly in the
last two years. I think we must, as an Administration, look
for better ways to do things, areas to improve, and we will
continue to do that throughout the President's term.

Q Is this connected with the polls that have
indicated that there is a lack of credibility about the Nixon
Administration in foreign affairs and Vietnam?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. The discussions with Mr. Scali
were underway before the poll you refer to came out. I think
Mr. Klein the other day on CBS addressed that question, I thought,
very well. But the discussions with John were underway before
that poll occurred and were undertaken based upon the point
of view which I expressed earlier.

Q When did those discussions begin?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know an exact date. But it
seems to me it has been well over a month and a half or so.

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Q Has he resigned?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, he has. I think the release indicates that he has resigned his post with ABC.

Q Will he report directly to the President or will he be responsible to any other staff?

MR. ZIEGLER: As a Special Consultant, he will report directly to the President.

Q Are there other Special Consultants right now?

MR. ZIEGLER: Len Garment has the title of Special Consultant.

Q Where will Mr. Scali's office be?

MR. ZIEGLER: In the EOB.

Q Will he be in Mr. Klein's organization, a part of it?

MR. ZIEGLER: He will work closely with Herb Klein in his operation. I intend to work very closely with John. But he will report directly to the President, as Len Garment does, Bob Finch, and others here in the White House do.

Q Will he have any direct contacts with the press, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: His responsibilities will not be as a spokesman, no. But I assume he will take your phone calls.

Q Are you planning a foreign trip?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, there is no plan for a foreign trip.

Q How about a Rochester trip?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, nothing set now.

Q Buffalo?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Is Scali planning a foreign trip?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Ron, is the Administration planning to hire a domestic counterpart of Mr. Scali? Is it seeking to hire a domestic counterpart?

MR. ZIEGLER: Not a domestic counterpart of Mr. Scali, no.

Q Who is it you are trying to hire? (Laughter.)

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MR. ZIEGLER: I think I pointed out earlier that an Administration has to continue to examine itself. And the President has been insistent on this from the very outset. I think, as I said earlier, that you will see additional people coming on the staff in various responsibilities.

But in answer to your question, we do not intend to seek, as you suggested, a domestic counterpart to Mr. Scali, no, because John will not only involve himself in foreign policy -- I think the release indicates -- but because of his background he will concentrate primarily on foreign policy and will be involved in discussions of overall Administration policy also.

Q Will he work with Dr. Kissinger?

MR. ZIEGLER: Sure, he will. But he won't work on Dr. Kissinger's staff, But, of course, he will work closely with Dr. Kissinger.

Q When do you expect you will be announcing the addition to your staff?

MR. ZIEGLER: The first of next week.

Q It will be an addition?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q This morning at the Cabinet meeting, was there any discussion of a plan by the Atomic Energy Commission to have a five-megaton test in October?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, that was not discussed this morning.

Q Is there a plan by the Atomic Energy Commission to have a five-megaton test in October?

MR. ZIEGLER: You would have to talk to the Atomic Energy Commission about that.

Q Is there any indication of when this energy policy will be ready?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, there is no date set. They are going through the process now of an examination of source of energy supply to the United States, both fossil supply and other sources of supply, both for the present and long range.

And the Cabinet meeting was held this morning to get additional thinking on that.

Q Ron, does that study include the possibility of sharing certain information with other countries, such as Japan, which a couple of months ago said it was seeking such technical know-how in atomic energy? Will this study address that?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know if this study will address that or not. I don't believe it will in those terms. The

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This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #996

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 12:50 P.M. EST

APRIL 14, 1971

WEDNESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: I think the schedule for today has already been posted.

The President met with Senator Smith and Senator Stennis this morning for about an hour, and then met with Dr. Barzel of Germany, who is the Chairman of the Opposition Party in Germany.

I think the ceremony for Mr. Casey was open for pool coverage.

There is an addition to the schedule. The President is meeting now with Dr. Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board at one of their periodic meetings.

Q When was the last meeting?

MR. ZIEGLER: March 19, 1971.

Q How long did Dr. Barzel meet with the President?

MR. ZIEGLER: About 40 minutes.

The President is transmitting to the Congress today the Fifth Annual Report of the National Endowment for Arts, which outlines the programs conducted by the Endowment during the fiscal year 1970. The National Endowment for Arts is part of the National Foundation on the Arts and Humanities. It carries out programs of grants-in-aid to art agencies of the State, non-profit, tax-exempt organizations and individuals of exceptional talent.

The Chairman of the Endowment for Arts is Miss Nancy Hanks. We have given you a release on that.

One other point-- and I think the President's statement refers to this -- President Nixon is requesting full funding of the 1972 budget request totalling some $60 million. And, in addition, the President has requested $3.4 million for administrative purposes.

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Q How about the fact, Ron, that the House bill
was $1.7 billion?

MR. ZIEGLER: We have said that we would continue to
express our view to the committee on that. However, there
are many positive aspects in the particular House version
which are very compatible with the President's thinking on
the matter.

Q Ron, is the President's Committee on Relief
of the Earthquake Victims in East Pakistan still operating,
and, if so, how?

MR. ZIEGLER: I believe there have been
circumstances in terms of ability to provide relief to the area
that have required that activities be curtailed to some degree.

END (AT 1:07 P.M. EST)

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#997

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:45 A.M. EST

APRIL 15, 1971

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President's schedule for today:

The Prime Minister of Morocco, I think, is just now concluding his meeting with the President.

At 12 noon, the President will receive the members of the President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped. The President's Committee on Employment of the Handicapped is holding its annual meeting at the Washington Hilton Hotel today, and at the opening session the President's trophy award will be pressneted to Richard and Robert Santin, who are twins from Fullerton, Nebraska, both of whom are nearly completely paralyzed by muscular dystrophy.

The President will receive the Santins and members of the Committee in his office about 12 noon.

The Prime Minister of Morocco, as I said, is meeting with the President for about 45 minutes. They will be discussing matters relating to the planned visit of King Hassan to Washington. The President last met with the Prime Minister in October 1970 when he attended the White House dinner honoring the 25th anniversary of the United Nations.

Q When is Hassan coming? The 22nd?

MR. ZIEGLER: April 22nd.

The President today is transmitting to the Senate for advice and consent the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft signed at the Hague on December 16, 1970. You have copies of the President's letter of transmittal.

We will post the letter of the Secretary of State outlining the provisions of the Convention. The Convention requires a signing state to either extradite a hijacker or, if it does not do so, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution. I believe there are some 48 other countries who have signed the treaty. We will post the list of those other countries.

Q Is Cuba among the signers?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, it is not.

Q The Soviet Union?

MR. ZIEGLER: The USSR is a signer, yes.

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Q Have they ratified as well as signed, or just
signed?

MR. ZIEGLER: There are 48 signers now. The USSR
have not yet ratified.

You have the two other releases.

One, you have a copy of the President's Message
to Congress transmitting the World Weather Program Plan
for Fiscal Year 1972, and you have a Proclamation on World
Trade Week.

I have one other announcement: At President Nixon's
request, Counsellor to the President Robert Finch and
Counsellor to the President Donald Rumsfeld will visit several
countries in Europe and Africa, departing on April 18 and
returning in early May.

The Counsellors, both of whom are members of the
Cabinet, will attend, as observers, the opening session of
the World Health Assembly in Geneva, and will meet with
officials in England, Italy, France, Spain, Yugoslavia,
Roumania, Germany and Morocco to discuss current developments
in several domestic subject areas of common interest to the
United States and these various countries, including drug
abuse, prevention and control, including the problems of
American citizens living and travelling abroad; problems
of racial discrimination and drug usage as they relate to
military personnel stationed abroad; prisoner rehabilitation,
and health care delivery and medical education.

Q Is that the complete list of countries, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, that is the complete list of
countries. We will have a more complete itinerary for you.

Q These are American military personnel stationed
abroad?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes.

Q What do you mean by prisoner rehabilitation?
How the foreign countries handle the prisoners?

MR. ZIEGLER: To discuss the matter of prisoner
rehabilitation relating to prisoners convicted of a crime or
other such offenses, not prisoners of war.

Q Ron, how will they travel?

MR. ZIEGLER: I would think that they would fly
over in a military aircraft. I will have to check that for
you.

Q Ron, is this strictly business? Are their
wives going along?

MR. ZIEGLER: It is strictly business. They will
have a small amount of staff assistance for the trip.

They will be representing the President of the
United States and will have their wives with them.

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THE CONGRESS

# Reform of the U.S. Foreign Assistance Program

## Message From President Nixon to the Congress ¹

To the Congress of the United States:

On September 15, 1970 I proposed a major transformation in the foreign assistance program of the United States.² My purpose was to renew and revitalize the commitment of this Nation to support the security and development objectives of the lower income countries, and thereby to promote some of the most fundamental objectives of U.S. foreign policy.

Today, I report to you on the progress of the last seven months in effecting that transformation and ask the Congress to join me in taking the next creative step in our new approach—the reform of the United States bilateral assistance program.

To achieve such reform, I am transmitting two bills—the proposed International Security Assistance Act and International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act—and announcing a number of actions which I intend to take administratively. Taken together, they would:

- Distinguish clearly between our security, development and humanitarian assistance programs and create separate organizational structures for each. This would enable us to define our own objectives more clearly, fix responsibility for each program, and assess the progress of each in meeting its particular objectives.

- Combine our various security assistance efforts (except for those in Southeast Asia which

are now funded in the Defense budget) into one coherent program, under the policy direction of the Department of State. This would enable security assistance to play more effectively its critical role in supporting the Nixon Doctrine and overall U.S. national security and foreign policy in the 1970s.

- Create a U.S. International Development Corporation and a U.S. International Development Institute to replace the Agency for International Development. They would enable us to reform our bilateral development assistance program to meet the changed conditions of the 1970s.

- Provide adequate funding for these new programs to support essential U.S. foreign policy objectives in the years ahead.

## THE IMPORTANCE OF FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

U.S. foreign assistance is central to U.S. foreign policy in the 1970s in three ways:

First, we must help to strengthen the defense capabilities and economies of our friends and allies. This is necessary so that they can increasingly shoulder their own responsibilities, so that we can reduce our direct involvement abroad, and so that together we can create a workable structure for world peace. This is an essential feature of the Nixon Doctrine.

Second, we must assist the lower income countries in their efforts to achieve economic and social development. Such development is the overriding objective of these countries themselves and essential to the peaceful world order which

¹ Transmitted on Apr. 21 (White House press release); also printed as H. Doc. 92-94, 92d Cong., 1st sess.

² For President Nixon's message to the Congress on Sept. 15, 1970, see BULLETIN of Oct. 5, 1970, p. 369.

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we seek. The prospects for a peaceful world will
be greatly enhanced if the two-thirds of hu-
manity who live in these countries see hope for
adequate food, shelter, education and employ-
ment in peaceful progress rather than in
revolution.

Third, we must be able to provide prompt
and effective assistance to countries struck by
natural disaster or the human consequences of
political upheaval. Our humanitarian concerns
for mankind require that we be prepared to
help in times of acute human distress.

THE NEED FOR REFORM

We cannot effectively pursue these objectives
in the 1970s with programs devised for an ear-
lier period. The world has changed dramatical-
ly. Our foreign assistance programs—like our
overall foreign policy—must change to meet
these new conditions.

In my September special message to the Con-
gress I spelled out the major changes in the
world which require new responses. Let me
summarize them here:

—Today the lower income countries are in-
creasingly able to shoulder the major responsi-
bility for their own security and development
and they clearly wish to do so. We share their
belief that they must take the lead in charting
their own security and development. Our new
foreign assistance programs must therefore en-
courage the lower income countries to set their
own priorities and develop their own programs,
and enable us to respond as our talents and re-
sources permit.

—Today the United States is but one of many
industrialized nations which contribute to the
security and development of the lower income
countries. We used to furnish the bulk of inter-
national development assistance; we now pro-
vide less than half. The aid programs of other
countries have grown because they recognize
that they too have a major stake in the orderly
progress which foreign assistance promotes,
and because their capabilities to provide such
assistance have grown enormously since the
earlier postwar period.

—Today the international institutions can
effectively mesh the initiatives and efforts of the

lower income countries and the aid efforts of all
of the industrialized countries. We can thus
place greater reliance on such institutions and
encourage them to play an increasing leadership
role in the world development process.

Our ideas on the reforms needed in the world
of the 1970s have evolved significantly since I
received the Report of my Task Force on Inter-
national Development, chaired by Mr. Rudolph
Peterson,³ and since my special message of last
September, as the result of our own delibera-
tions and our further consultations with the
Congress, the business community and many
other sectors of the American public, and our
friends abroad. Before spelling out a new blue-
print for our bilateral assistance program, how-
ever, I wish to report to you on the gratifying
progress achieved since last September in re-
orienting our assistance policies.

PROGRESS TOWARD REFORM

First, the Congress in December passed sup-
plemental assistance legislation for FY 1971
which represented a major step in implementing
the security assistance component of the Nixon
Doctrine. This legislation authorized additional
funds for military assistance and supporting
economic assistance for countries in which the
U.S. has major interests and which have con-
vincingly demonstrated the will and ability to
help themselves—including Israel and Jordan
in the Middle East and Cambodia, Vietnam
and Korea in East Asia.

Such support is necessary to carry out one
of the central thrusts of the Nixon Doctrine—
moving us from bearing the major responsi-
bility for the defense of our friends and allies to
helping them achieve an increasing capability
to maintain their own defense. This increase in
security assistance enables us to continue to re-
duce our direct presence abroad, and helps to
reduce the likelihood of direct U.S. military
involvement in the future.

Second, the international development insti-
tutions have continued their progress toward

³ For text of the report, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1970, p. 447.

May 10, 1971

615

leadership in the international development
process. For example:

—The World Bank continues to increase the size and improve the effectiveness of its operations. It also has decided to broaden the scope of its lending beyond the traditional financing of projects to the provision of funds to support overall development programs in appropriate circumstances, and it is developing an improved internal evaluation and audit system.

—The United Nations Development Program has initiated a reorganization to improve its administration. In time this will enable it to assume a leading role in coordinating the international technical assistance effort.

—The World Health Organization has effectively guided and coordinated the worldwide effort to cope with the present cholera epidemic in Africa.

Third, the industrialized countries have now agreed on comparable systems of tariff preferences for imports from the lower income countries. The preferences plan is a major step in the crucial international effort to expand the export earnings of these countries, and hence to reduce their reliance on external aid. The European Community has indicated that it plans to put its tariff preferences into effect on July 1, and Japan has announced that it will do so before October 1.

Fourth, there has been satisfying progress toward achieving the untying of bilateral development loans on a fully reciprocal basis. This action will enhance the value of economic assistance to recipient countries, and eliminate the political frictions which tied aid now causes. Virtually all of the industrialized countries have agreed to the principle of untying. Details of a system offering suppliers of all participating countries a fair and equitable basis for competition are now being worked out in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Fifth, I have established a Council on International Economic Policy, which I chair, to coordinate all aspects of U.S. foreign economic policy, including development assistance. It will provide top-level focus for our policies in this area, and accord them the high priority which

they require in our foreign policy for the 1970s.

I am heartened by this progress, but much more remains to be done:

—I again urge the Congress to vote the additional funds which I have requested for the Inter-American Development Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

—We will shortly transmit legislation to authorize the U.S. contribution to the doubling of the resources of the International Development Association, the soft-loan affiliate of the World Bank, which stands at the center of the network of international financial institutions, and I urge the Congress to approve it.

—We are working with others to help establish a soft-loan window for the African Development Bank.

—We will shortly transmit legislation to authorize U.S. participation in the system of generalized tariff preferences for developing countries, and I urge Congress to approve it.

## THE NEW U.S. BILATERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

The next major step is the reform of the U.S. bilateral assistance program, incorporated in the proposed International Security Assistance Act and International Development and Humanitarian Assistance Act.

Our new bilateral assistance program must achieve several objectives. It must:

—Clearly identify our distinct aid objectives: security assistance, development assistance and humanitarian assistance.

—Be truly responsive to the initiatives of the lower income countries themselves and encourage them to play the central role in solving their own security and development problems. In the area of development assistance, this means working within a framework set by the international institutions to the maximum extent possible.

—Be concentrated in countries of special interest to the United States, and in projects and programs in which the United States has a special ability to be of help.

—Recognize the improved economic capacity of many of the lower income countries in establishing the terms of our assistance.

—Assure improved management.

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—Reduce substantially the number of U.S. Government officials operating our assistance program overseas.

Let me now spell out the details of our new approach, based on these principles.

## Security Assistance

I have repeatedly stressed the essential role played by our military and related forms of assistance in supporting the foreign policy of the United States and our own security interests. The primary purposes of this assistance have been, and will continue to be, the preservation of peace through the deterrence of war, and the support of efforts by allied and friendly countries to move toward self-sustaining economic growth and social progress. To abandon our responsibilities would risk magnifying the world's instability in the short run, and impairing its peaceful development for the longer run, and therefore increase the threat to our own security both now and in the future.

The new course on which we are set, however, encourages others to take on greater responsibilities themselves. Our new security assistance program will seek to strengthen local defense capabilities by providing that mix of military and supporting economic assistance which is needed to permit friendly foreign countries to assume additional defense burdens themselves without causing them undue political or economic costs. If we are to move toward reducing our own physical presence, the effectiveness of our security assistance program will become of ever more crucial importance.

In Asia, this new strategy has already encouraged the nations of the area to assume greater responsibility for their own defense and provided a basis for a major reduction in our military presence. The funds which have been provided to assist the Government of South Vietnam have been essential to the progress of Vietnamization, and helped insure continued U.S. troop withdrawals. We have helped Cambodia to mobilize its manpower and other resources in defense of its independence and neutrality. We are providing Korea with equipment to improve and modernize its defenses and we are withdrawing some of our own troops.

Our friends and allies know that it is no longer possible nor desirable for the United States to bear the principal burden of their defense. A clear lesson of the 1960s is that deterrence against local aggression, or against subversion supported from outside a country's borders, cannot be achieved without a strong contribution by the threatened country itself. We can meet our security assistance objectives effectively only if we link our efforts closely with those of our friends and thereby build the foundations for peace in partnership with them.

To help do so, and also in recognition of the improved economic capability of many of the countries receiving security assistance, I propose today significant changes in our authorities to provide military assistance to our friends and allies.

Our military assistance programs have suffered from undesirable rigidity. The only choice has been between grant assistance and sales on hard credit terms. Many of those nations that need our assistance are unable to meet the hard credit terms—so grant assistance has been the only course open for us to help meet their essential security needs. But as the lower income nations begin to develop an ability to shoulder the costs of their defense, we need to be able to assist them in doing so even though they cannot immediately assume the entire burden. Sales on concessional credit terms would permit earlier participation by some recipient countries in the financing of their essential defense needs and would thus engage their own assessment of priorities for the allocation of their resources at an earlier stage of development than is now possible.

To fill the existing gap between grant assistance and sales on relatively firm commercial terms, the International Security Assistance Act that I propose today includes authorization to finance sales of military equipment on concessional terms. Grant assistance will remain necessary for some nations whose financial resources are simply not adequate to meet their defense needs. But our objective is to move countries, as quickly as possible within the context of international security requirements and their own economic capabilities, along the spectrum from grants to concessional sales to the

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harder terms we have required for sales under the present act and finally to outright cash arrangements. We will also stress the transition from Government sales to those made directly by private industry to the extent feasible. By making these changes we would help countries move from dependence on the United States to independence in the creation and financing of their own security programs. We would not intend to provide concessional credits to countries able to meet the terms of the present program.

I am also asking, under the new act, greater flexibility to transfer funds among the various security assistance programs. Such flexibility is particularly important, for example, in this period of transition in Southeast Asia, where our troop withdrawals are freeing up substantial amounts of military equipment formerly used by our troops. I am asking that the ceiling on the amount of surplus equipment which can be granted to our friends and allies be increased; this will save us money as well as permit us to better help those of our friends who need it. In the long run, sound management of security assistance demands that there be enough flexibility to transfer funds among various programs in order to insure that the proper mix is used to meet our specific objectives in each instance.

For these international security assistance programs, I request authorization of $1,993 million for FY 1972: $778 million for supporting economic assistance, $705 million for grant military assistance, and $510 million for military credit sales.

These security assistance programs are at the core of our relations with certain key friendly countries. They critically affect our ability to meet our bilateral and collective security commitments. They are central to the achievement of major objectives of U.S. national security and foreign policy.

I therefore intend to direct by administrative action a reorganization of our security assistance program to meet more effectively the objectives of the Nixon Doctrine. Various components of security assistance—military assistance, military credit sales, grants of excess

military stocks, supporting economic assistance, and the public safety program—have been fragmented in different pieces of legislation and managed through a series of different administrative arrangements. My proposals would bring these programs under one legislative act to assure that each is viewed as part of a coherent overall program. Military assistance for Vietnam, Laos and Thailand will continue to be funded in the Defense budget because these country programs are subject to the uncertainties of active hostilities and are intimately linked to the logistical support systems of our own forces in Southeast Asia.

To assure effective policy control and management of this new security assistance effort, I would direct that a Coordinator for Security Assistance be established at a high level in the Department of State. I would also direct that the supporting economic assistance program be administered by the Department of State. The Department of Defense will continue to have primary responsibility for administering our military assistance and sales programs, and for relating these programs to overall U.S. national defense planning.

These new arrangements would be a significant step in the direction of improving the management of our security assistance program. They would therefore represent a significant step toward achieving greater accountability to the Congress and the public as well.

This new security assistance program would, I am confident, serve our national interest in the 1970s in a number of important ways. It would:

- enable us to meet U.S. commitments more effectively and at lower cost;

- strengthen the self-defense capabilities of nations to whose security the U.S. is committed by treaty, by special political ties, or by essential U.S. interests;

- help to reduce the need for, and likelihood of, U.S. military involvement overseas;

- foster increased local initiative and self-sufficiency;

- promote constructive political relations with foreign governments;

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- support U.N. peacekeeping operations;

- reduce potential frictions by lowering the U.S. profile abroad.

I am also requesting in the International Security Assistance Act authority for $100 million for the President's Foreign Assistance Contingency Fund for FY 1972. This would permit the administration, with due notification to the Congress, to meet worldwide contingencies-in the security, development and humanitarian areas-in ways compatible with our national interests. It is particularly important to have available uncommitted funds which can be used on short notice, when sudden crises in the international community require us to act promptly and decisively.

## Development Assistance

The United States continues to have special national interests in particular lower income countries. We continue to have special capabilities in particular functional areas. We continue to need an effective bilateral development assistance program.

In order to advance such a program, I therefore propose legislation which would authorize the creation of two new development assistance institutions. Together with the two created by the last Congress, they would replace the Agency for International Development and enable us to develop a new approach based on the principles outlined above.

The two I now propose to create are:

- An International Development Corporation (IDC) to provide loans to finance development projects and programs in the lower income countries.

- An International Development Institute (IDI) to seek research breakthroughs on the key problems of development and to administer our technical assistance programs.

These would join two created by the last Congress:

- The Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) to promote the role of private investment in the development process.

- The Inter-American Social Development Institute (ISDI) to provide special attention to the social development needs of Latin America.

## The U.S. International Development Corporation

The new IDC would administer our bilateral lending program. The authorities which I seek for it, and the operating style which I would direct it to pursue, would mark a major change in the U.S. approach to development assistance.

The IDC would make loans in response to initiatives from the lower income countries, rather than develop projects or programs on its own. It would have flexibility to tailor its loan terms to the needs of particular lower income countries, requiring harder terms from the more advanced and extending easier terms to the less advanced. Today's program has limited flexibility in this regard. Its lending volume to any particular country would be based on demonstrated self-help performance, and the quality of the projects and programs which that country presented to it. It would not seek to determine annual country lending levels in advance as is done at present.

The IDC would operate to the maximum extent feasible within a framework set by the international financial institutions. It would look to them to provide evaluations of the overall development prospects of particular countries, which would be a major consideration in its decisions to lend, rather than itself carrying out the extensive "country programming" which is now done. Within that context it would participate in non-project lending and international efforts to alleviate the debt burdens of particular lower income countries. It would participate for the United States in the international consultation and consultative groups, managed in most cases by the international financial institutions, through which the bulk of our bilateral assistance will flow.

The IDC would concentrate its activities in countries and regions where the U.S. has a major foreign policy interest in long-term development. For example, it would establish

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guidelines to assure that an equitable share of its resources is provided to the countries of the Western Hemisphere. But precisely because our interest is in the long-term development of these nations, the IDC would use its funds to pursue such interests rather than to seek merely short-term political gains.

The IDC would provide loans on the basis of both sound business standards and the pursuit of sound development purposes. The terms of its loans would be determined in large part by the financial situation of the borrowing country, rather than on the standard terms now offered to all borrowers. It would avoid loans to countries where the analysis of international financial institutions, and its own views, suggest an inadequate policy framework in which the loans could effectively promote development. The IDC would not be solely a lender of last resort as AID is required to be today, often financing the riskiest projects and programs.

The Corporation would work with and through the private sector to the maximum extent possible. It would give high priority to projects and programs which promote private initiative in the lower income countries, and to this end would seek to increase U.S. lending to local development banks and other financial intermediaries. I recommend that it also have authority to lend directly to private entities in the lower income countries.

The IDC would be governed by a Board of Directors consisting of outstanding private citizens as well as government officials, thus bringing the private sector directly into its decision-making process.

With this clear identification of specific instruments and programs with the specific objectives they are designed to achieve, we should not need to tie the hands of our managers—of the Corporation or any of our other new institutions—with the kinds of foreign policy and administrative restrictions which apply to the present program. Administrators should be held accountable for achieving program objectives. This is a central requirement of the businesslike approach which the new structure is designed to foster.

To insure the necessary continuity and stability of operations to permit this businesslike approach, and building on the initiative of the Congress in 1969 to provide a 2-year authorization for foreign assistance, I request that the Corporation be given a 3-year authorization. I recommend an authorization of $1.5 billion of directly appropriated funds. I propose also that the IDC be provided with authority to borrow, in the private capital market or from the U.S. Treasury, up to a total of $1 billion during its initial 3-year period. This would help channel private capital more directly into the development process and bring private sector judgments directly to bear on the performance of the IDC. I recommend that it be authorized to use repayments of capital and interest on past U.S. development loans, which are now running at about $250 million annually.

A Corporation based on these principles would enable us to reduce substantially the number of U.S. government personnel involved in development lending overseas. By responding primarily to initiatives from the lower income countries, we would reduce the need for Americans to chart foreign programs and priorities. By relying increasingly on the international institutions for information and analytical work, we would reduce our own requirement for staff in both Washington and the field. By reducing the statutory restrictions on the program, we would be able to concentrate available staff on effective program management.

I am confident that a U.S. International Development Corporation based on these principles would regenerate our development lending program. It would provide major support to the development objectives of the lower income countries. It would enable us to play our full role effectively among the industrialized countries in promoting the development process. It would thereby provide major support for important U.S. national objectives in the 1970s.

### The U.S. International Development Institute

The new IDI would administer a reformed bilateral technical assistance program and en-

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able us to focus U.S. scientific, technological and managerial know-how on the problems of development.

The Institute would engage in four major types of activities:

- It would apply U.S. research competence in the physical and social sciences to the critical problems of development, and help raise the research competence of the lower income countries themselves.

- It would help build institutions in the lower income countries to improve their own research capabilities and to carry out a full range of developmental functions on a self-sustaining basis. I would expect it to place particular emphasis on strengthening agricultural and educational institutions.

- It would help train manpower in the lower income countries to enable them to carry out new activities on their own.

- It would help lower income countries, particularly the least developed among them, to finance advisers on development problems.

Like the Corporation, the Institute would finance projects in response to proposals made by the lower income countries themselves. It would not budget funds in advance by country, since it could not know in advance how many acceptable projects would be proposed by each. It would look to these countries to select candidates to be trained under its program. Its research activities would be located in the lower income countries, rather than in the United States, to the greatest extent feasible. With its stress on institution building, it would seek to ensure that each program could be carried on after U.S. assistance is ended.

Most importantly, the Institute would seek to assure that all projects which it helps finance are considered essential by the lower income country itself. To do so, the Institute would require that the recipient country make a significant contribution to each as evidence that it attaches high priority to the project and is prepared to support it financially after U.S. assistance ends. We would finance a project for only a definite and limited period of time, and

would want assurance that the host country would then carry it on. In the past, all too many technical assistance projects have been undertaken which were of more interest to Americans than to the recipient countries, and had little or no lasting impact. Our new program is designed to ensure that this does not happen in the future.

The international organizations are less advanced in research and technical assistance than in development lending. The Institute would thus be unable to function as fully within an international framework at this time as would the Corporation. However, it would work to help improve the capabilities of these organizations, especially the United Nations Development Program, and would seek to cooperate with them whenever possible. In fact, one of its objectives would be to help create an international framework for technical assistance comparable to the framework which has developed over the past decade for development lending.

By the very virtue of its separate existence, the Institute would be free to concentrate its efforts on the application of research and technology to the problems of development—a key feature of our new bilateral program which would distinguish it markedly from the present approach. The Institute would also concentrate its resources on the few most critical problem areas of development. Such concentration is necessary if it is to achieve the “critical mass” necessary to make real breakthroughs where they are most needed, and to attract the top cadre of experts and managers who can achieve such breakthroughs.

The areas of concentration would evolve in response to the requests of the lower income countries and management's assessment of where we can contribute most. They would undoubtedly shift over time. Experience suggests that limiting population growth, increasing agricultural production and training manpower would be among the concentration areas at first. Unemployment and urbanization problems could be early additions to the list.

While the Institute would provide grant financing, it would vary the effective terms of

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its assistance by varying the shares of the total cost of particular projects that the recipient must finance itself—ranging from a small percentage in the least advanced countries to most of the cost in the most advanced. In addition, the Institute should have authority to provide advisers on a completely reimbursable basis to countries which no longer need concessional aid at all. At the other end of the development spectrum, the IDI would be conscious of the special problems of the least developed countries—most of which are in Africa—which will continue to need the more traditional types of technical assistance since they have traveled less distance along the road to economic self-sufficiency.

The Institute would be managed on a businesslike basis, and it would carry out its projects largely through the private sector. I propose that it be governed by a Board of Trustees including outstanding citizens from the private sector. It would stress evaluation of past projects to determine their payoff and to help guide future project development; there has been too little followup in these programs in the past. We would seek top flight technical managers, development specialists and scientists for the small staff of the Institute. This new approach would permit a major reduction in the number of U.S. government personnel operating abroad.

To achieve these goals, the IDI should have financial continuity. I therefore propose that the Congress authorize an appropriation of $1.275 million for a 3-year period.

In short, the International Development Institute would provide a new dimension to our foreign assistance effort. It would enable us to focus some of our finest national resources—our capabilities in management, research and technology—on the critical bottleneck problems of development. Its style of operation should enable us to forge a new and more mature partnership with the lower income countries, with the rest of the industrialized world, and with our own private sector. It holds promise of becoming one of the most significant additions to our national capability to engage meaningfully in the world of the 1970s.

Overseas Private Investment Corporation and Inter-American Social Development Institute

The new International Development Corporation and International Development Institute would join two development assistance institutions already created by the Congress: the Overseas Private Investment Corporation and the Inter-American Social Development Institute.

OPIC is already at work promoting the role of private investment in the international development process. The record of economic development shows that successful growth is usually associated with a dynamic private sector, and we therefore look to private investment—primarily domestic but foreign as well—to play an increasing role in the development process. It must do so, since no government or public agency has the resources or technical skills which are necessary to meet the vast needs of the lower income countries.

OPIC's guarantees and insurance of U.S. private investment in lower income countries which seek such investment are already serving effectively the interests of both the U.S. investor and the host countries. Its early activities suggest that an independent corporation, directed by a joint public-private Board of Directors, can effectively manage a development assistance program; it thus augurs well for the structures which I propose today for the Development Corporation and Development Institute.

OPIC is operating within one of the most sensitive areas—private foreign investment—of the inherently sensitive overall relationship between aid donors and aid recipients. It is therefore essential that OPIC assist only sound projects which are responsive to the particular development needs of each country.

And it is clearly for each country to decide the conditions under which it will accept private foreign investment, just as it is for each investor to decide what conditions are adequate to attract his investments. We as a Government ask only that the investments of our citizens be treated fairly and in accordance with international law. In nearly all cases they have been. However, unjust acts by a country toward an American firm cannot help but adversely affect

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our relationship with that country. As President, I must and will take such acts into account in determining our future assistance and overall policy toward such a country.

The Inter-American Social Development Institute has also begun to develop its programs, which seek to promote the social development of the Latin American and Caribbean people. Working mainly through private organizations and international institutions, it represents a new innovative channel in seeking to promote solutions to basic economic and social problems in these areas. I propose that it be renamed the Inter-American Foundation, to characterize more accurately its proposed style of operation.

## Humanitarian Assistance

U.S. humanitarian assistance programs cover a wide spectrum of human needs: disaster relief and rehabilitation; famine; refugee and migration relief and assistance. They aim to help people around the world recover from unfortunate situations by which they have been victimized. In the past year alone, such help has been extended to refugees from civil war in Nigeria and Jordan, earthquake victims in Peru, flood victims in Romania and Tunisia, and cyclone victims in Pakistan.

These activities rely heavily for program implementation on private voluntary agencies. In the past year alone, U.S. voluntary agencies registered with the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid contributed $370 million of their own resources in over 100 countries.

At present, humanitarian assistance programs are carried out through numerous offices in the U.S. Government. I propose to centralize the responsibility for coordinating all humanitarian assistance programs under a new Assistant Secretary of State. We would thereby assure a coherent effort to carry out this vital and literally life-saving aspect of our foreign assistance policy. This new approach would also improve our capability to respond quickly and effectively through better contingency planning, additional stockpiling and training, and the maintenance of closer and better coordinated relationships with the United Nations, other donor countries, and the private voluntary agencies.

## COORDINATION

I have outlined the overriding need to separate our overall foreign assistance program into its three component parts: security assistance, development assistance, and humanitarian assistance. I have indicated that we would pull together all parts of our security assistance and humanitarian assistance under central management, so that each can function effectively as a total program within the context of U.S. foreign policy. And I have also proposed the creation of two new institutions, to go along with the two created by the last Congress, to carry forward our development assistance program in the 1970s.

There is thus a need for new mechanisms to assure effective coordination of our new foreign assistance program.

First, there must be effective coordination among the several components of the new development assistance program. This would be done through my appointing a single Coordinator of Development Assistance, responsible directly to the President, as Chairman of the Boards of the IDC, IDI, and OPIC.

The Coordinator would also chair an executive coordinating committee composed of the chief executive officers of each of these institutions and ISDI. He would be available for congressional testimony on our overall bilateral development assistance policy and the operations of the several institutions. Both the Congress and I could look to him as the administration's chief spokesman on bilateral development assistance policy and programs.

Second, the Secretary of State will provide foreign policy guidance for all components of our new foreign assistance program. His representatives would be members of the boards of each of the development institutions, and he would have direct responsibility for both security and humanitarian assistance. In each country our Ambassador, as my personal representative, will of course be responsible for coordination of all of our assistance programs.

Third, foreign assistance issues which raise broader questions of foreign economic policy will be handled through my new Council on International Economic Policy.

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Finally, coordination among the three major components of our assistance program, and between them and our overall national security policy, would be handled through the National Security Council. We will thus establish strong management, coordination, and policy guidance over all of our foreign assistance programs.

## CONCLUSION

This Nation can no more ignore poverty, hunger and disease in other nations of the world than a man can ignore the suffering of his neighbors. The great challenge to Americans of this decade, be they private citizens or national leaders, is to work to improve the quality of life of our fellow men at home and abroad.

We have a unique and unprecedented opportunity. We do not have all the answers to the questions of poverty, nor adequate resources to meet the needs of all mankind. We do possess the greatest scientific and technological capacity, and the most prosperous and dynamic economy, of any nation in history. More importantly, we have, as a vital element of the American character, a humanitarian zeal to help improve the lives of our fellow men.

We are therefore a nation uniquely capable of assisting other peoples in preserving their security and promoting their development. By doing so, we accomplish three major objectives:

- We strengthen international cooperation for a peaceful world.

- We help to relieve the poverty and misery of others less fortunate than ourselves.

- We help to build firm foundations of friendship between this Nation and the peoples of other nations.

I have seen for myself just how important is our aid in helping nations preserve their independence, and in helping men achieve the dignity of productive labor instead of languishing on crowded streets. I have seen its importance to children whose chances for a rewarding life have been increased because they have adequate nutrition, schools and books. It is right that we, the richest nation in the world, should provide our share of such assistance.

And such help, in addition to being right for its own sake, also creates strong bonds.

I recognize that whenever an American firm is nationalized without prompt, fair, and effective compensation; whenever an anti-American demonstration takes place; or whenever a leader of a developing country criticizes the United States, many question the effectiveness of our aid.

But the headline reporting the occasional anti-American act overlooks the many countries which do thank us for providing them the means to preserve their own security; and it also overlooks the countless number of villages where farmers do appreciate our helping provide the know-how and the tools necessary to grow larger crops, the school children who cherish the education our assistance makes possible, and the people everywhere who recognize our help in eliminating disease.

For these people, our aid is a source of encouragement. And they, not those who demonstrate or destroy, are the real revolutionaries—for they, in quietly attempting to preserve their independence and improve their lives, are bringing about a quiet revolution of peaceful change and progress. They are working hard to build the foundations for a better tomorrow and they recognize that we have helped provide them with the tools to do the job.

But while such appreciation is gratifying, foreign assistance has a more basic purpose. Foreign assistance is quite clearly in our interest as a nation. We are a people whose sons have died, and whose great statesmen have worked, to build a world order which insures peace and prosperity for ourselves and for other nations. We are aware that this world order cannot be sustained if our friends cannot defend themselves against aggression, and if two-thirds of the world's people see the richer third as indifferent to their needs and insensitive to their aspirations for a better life. To these people it is critical that this be a generation of peace, and our foreign policy is directed at helping to make it so; and for the impoverished it is equally important that it be a generation in which their aspirations for a better life, improved health conditions, and adequate food

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supply can be realized—a generation of development, a generation of hope.

Foreign policy is not a one-way street. It requires that other nations understand our problems and concerns, but it also requires that we understand theirs. We cannot ask the lower income countries of the world to cooperate with us to solve the problems which affect our vital interests unless we cooperate with them to help solve the problems critical to their vital interests—the problems affecting their security and development, and thus affecting the quality of life of their people.

The legislation I propose today, along with the corollary administrative actions which I will take, will permit this Nation to carry out the major reforms which are necessary to improve the effectiveness of our foreign assistance program and to fit it to our new approach.

I believe that this new approach is of major importance in promoting the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States in this decade and beyond. I believe that it is sound, and will blend as effectively as possible our special strengths with those of other nations and institutions. It is an approach through which we can focus the energies and resources of this great Nation on the security and development problems of those peoples living in poorer nations who wish to improve their lives, but lack the resources and the expertise to do so. I believe that this program is worthy of your support.

I therefore reaffirm my commitment, and the commitment of this administration, to seek an effective U.S. foreign assistance program for the 1970s. It is our objective to work for peace, not only in our time but for future generations, and we can make no better investment toward that end than to participate fully in an international effort to build prosperity and hope for a better tomorrow among all nations. I urge the Congress to join with me in making the reforms I propose today so that together we can achieve these great goals.

RICHARD NIXON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
*April 21, 1971.*

May 10, 1971

# Annual Report on World Weather Program Transmitted to Congress

## President Nixon's Letter of Transmittal¹

### To the Congress of the United States:

Through the World Weather Program, the nations of the world are combining their efforts to gain new knowledge of the global atmosphere, provide better weather forecasts and warnings to all countries, and assess the damage man has inflicted upon the earth's atmosphere.

I am pleased to report that the program is making significant progress which will enhance the comfort, health, safety and economic well-being of men everywhere:

- Satellite technology is being used with increasing effectiveness to gather global information for earlier, more accurate predictions and warnings of hazardous weather.

- New stations are being established for long-term measurement of atmospheric change.

- Computers have been programmed to determine the effect of pollution upon the atmosphere.

- A major international experiment in the Atlantic Ocean is being prepared under the Global Atmospheric Research Program. During the past year many nations, including the United States, have indicated their support of this tropical experiment and have made tentative commitments to provide ships, aircraft, satellites, and other observing facilities. Linked with an increased computer capability to assess and integrate results, this experiment should be an important step toward attaining a true understanding of the global atmosphere.

The scientific understanding which will be developed by the World Weather Program is critical to the solution of environmental problems which are of immense concern to all nations.

Senate Concurrent Resolution 67 of the 90th Congress recognizes the importance of vigorous U.S. participation in the World Weather Pro-

¹Transmitted on Apr. 15 (White House press release).

[LC]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FOR THE PRESS

APRIL 23, 1971

NO. 80

SECRETARY ROGERS' NEWS CONFERENCE, APRIL 23, 1971

Following is the transcript of Secretary of State William P. Rogers'
News Conference, which is authorized for direct quotation:

SECRETARY ROGERS: Ladies and Gentlemen, as you know, I plan to leave Monday for London where I will head the United States delegation to the Sixteenth Annual Ministerial Meeting of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization on April 27 and 28. This will also afford me an opportunity to meet with Foreign Secretary Sir Douglas Home, and his colleagues for discussions on a number of matters of mutual interest.

I will leave London on **Thursday April 29 for Ankara, Turkey** to attend the Eighteenth Annual Council of Ministers Meeting of the Central Treaty Organization on April 30 and May 1. On the way to Ankara I plan **to stop in Paris on April 29** to consult with French Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann.

I am looking forward to both the SEATO and CENTO Meetings. In London, the SEATO meeting will provide an opportunity to discuss continued cooperation with our allies on mutual security in Southeast Asia and to reenforce our efforts to encourage other nations to assist in the economic development of Indo-China as the war comes to a close.

In Ankara the CENTO Meeting, which as you may remember was held last year in Washington, will provide an opportunity to share views on regional and international problems, and especially to get to know the new leaders of the Turkish Government.

-2-

PR 80

From Ankara, I plan to go to four Arab countries -- Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia, not necessarily in that order, that is alphabetically listed, -- and to Israel. On my return, I will make a stop in Italy for talks with officials of the Italian Government.

The last visit of an American Secretary of State to the Middle East -- an area of such rich and abiding historical and cultural significance -- was in 1953. As I embark on this trip, I am quite conscious of the ancient traditions that exist in the area and the profound spiritual and religious beliefs of the people who live there.

This is a visit I have long wanted to make as you know. It underscores the importance we attach in the United States to our relations with the Middle East countries. I look forward to meeting with the leaders of the countries that I will visit and for the opportunity to strengthen the ties between us.

I want to say at the outset that this trip should be viewed and understood in light of our expressed willingness to play a constructive and responsible role in continuing efforts to achieve peace in the area.

I do not anticipate any dramatic results or breakthroughs from this visit. But I do trust that it will provide an opportunity to explore ways in the evolving situation to maintain and hopefully accelerate the momentum toward peace.

I intend to reiterate our strong dedication to the objective of reaching a contractually binding and lasting peace settlement in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and our full and constant support for Ambassador Jarring's efforts to this end. We believe there is an exceptional opportunity -- and an opportunity that must not be missed -- to build on the progress that already has been made.

PR 80

For almost nine months the shooting has stopped. This has given people in the area some reason for hope where previously there was little or none. We believe that the negotiations which have been undertaken under Ambassador Jarring must succeed — the climate will never be better.

President Nixon believes that the United States should seek every opportunity, expend every effort, take every chance in playing a constructive and energetic role in the search for peace in the area. It is for these reasons -- or should I say in that spirit -- that President Nixon has asked me to take this trip.

4

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some confusion in various reports about American arms shipments to Israel. The question is whether some of the recent arms shipments have been specifically in reply to the reported increase in arms shipped by the Soviet Union to the UAR. Would you address yourself to that, please?

A. Yes, Mr. Hensley, I will be glad to. The answer to that, categorically, is no. We have not made any commitments in response to any recent action by the Soviet Union. As you know, we have had a relationship with Israel over the years. In a democracy we have to present all our requests to Congress, so it is understood that we have had this relationship. But I can say here today, so there can be no doubt about it, that we have made no new commitments this year for any shipments this year of equipment to Israel.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the conflicting statements from Israel and Egypt on reopening the Suez Canal, could you say what the United States regards as a reasonable basis for reopening the Canal?

A. No, I don't think that the United States would want to be in that position of saying what is a

reasonable basis. We think it is up to the parties to
decide that.

It is clear from the discussions that we have
had that all concerned feel that under proper conditions
opening the Suez Canal would be in the best interests of
those in the area.

Now, we plan to discuss this matter with the
leaders of the nations I visit, in the hopes that
eventually something can be worked out. But our purpose
on this trip is not to focus just on that proposal. As
I said in this statement, we have a much broader purpose.

Mr. Secretary, could you clarify for us
how the Suez Canal diplomatic effort fits in with the
implementation of Resolution 242 and the Jarring Mission?

Yes. The Jarring Mission is a mission
undertaken pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 242
that I have referred to, and it seeks a final contractual
peaceful settlement that is binding on all the nations
in the area.

Now, that is a very complex subject. A good
deal of progress has been made to date. As you know,
there is an impasse at the moment -- Ambassador Jarring
is not in New York. But that seeks a final settlement

6

based on the Security Council Resolution.

Now, the Suez proposal -- let me say, too, as I have indicated -- we give full support to Ambassador Jarring's efforts-- Our objective is to reach a final peaceful settlement based on a contract, including all issues involved, and nothing would occur until the contract is completed and signed, so no action would be taken until there was a final agreement. That is one objective. That is the principal objective.

Now, the Suez proposal is the proposal that has been mentioned by President Sadat, been referred to by Mrs. Meir and others in the Israeli Government as a possibility of an interim character that would provide a step in the direction towards a final peaceful settlement. And this consideration of the Suez at the moment is being undertaken by the parties concerned.

Now, we will be discussing that with Egypt, Jordan, and Israel, and others. But this, if it could be accomplished, would not be a substitute for the Jarring Mission, but it would be supplementary to and hopefully helpful to that Mission.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the

8

[L0]

I think that the press has presented the picture quite well. [Laughter.] And I think that you have pointed out pretty clearly where we stand now.

We have taken several steps since the beginning of this Administration, based on President Nixon's stated desire, going back to his *Foreign Affairs* article in 1967 to improve relations with Communist China.

As a result of those steps which we have taken, which we took unilaterally, in the hope that there would be some response from Communist China, the recent events developed. We presume--although we have no way of knowing for sure -- we presume that those events were somehow affected by the friendly steps that President Nixon took unilaterally.

Now, as a result of this program of the President's, of trying to improve relations, he announced recently some further steps that we are taking to improve trade, exchange of persons with Communist China, easing up on currency restrictions, and so forth.

So we would hope that Communist China will respond to those steps. We would hope that we can begin to

9

have some trade. We very much welcome exchanges of
persons between the two countries. We would hope that
this opening is not the last. We would hope it was
the beginning of new relations between our two countries.

I think it was the Prime Minister of the People's
Republic of China who said that it was a new page in
our relations. We would hope that it becomes a new
chapter, that there will be several pages to follow.

And I think what Ambassador Kennedy had in mind was that it
is up to the People's Republic of China. In other words,
we hope that there will be more trade. We hope that there
will be a freer exchange of people, newspapermen, athletes,
doctors and educators, and the like.

Mr. Lisagor?

-10-

Q Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why you felt compelled to praise the press role in accounts from China?

A Because I really don't think you get sufficient praise. I think you all need it. [Laughter]

Q Mr. Secretary, do you think it possible that an improved atmosphere of relations between the United States and Communist China might have some effect on your efforts to bring peace to Southeast Asia?

A I didn't hear quite the last.

Q Might have some effect on your efforts to bring peace in Southeast Asia.

A Well, we have no way of knowing, of course. We continue to hope that it is possible that we could work out a negotiated settlement. And I suppose it is possible that if relations between our two countries continue to improve, that they would be more inclined to encourage the North Vietnamese to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

Q Mr. Secretary, a two-part question. What is the current status of our review of policy towards China, and especially towards its admission to the United Nations?

[Lc]

-11-

A Well, it is actively under way. We are now discussing problems in this area with many other governments. We haven't come to any final conclusion. But we will, hopefully, in the foreseeable future.

Q And the second part of that question: there are some indications that the Soviet Union finds our improved relations with Peking somewhat disquieting. Do you think there is any justification in it, and have you made any analysis -- is the improvement in relations perhaps a Peking attempt to put pressure on Moscow?

A Well, if you remember -- I think one of my first press conferences I pointed out that we were going to attempt to improve our relations with Communist China, regardless of any other consideration; that we were going to do it not with the idea of offending the Soviet Union, or playing a political game with the Soviet Union, or for any other reason; we were going to do it because we thought it made sense to have a nation of more than seven hundred million have more contacts with the outside world; and we thought that a free society had more to benefit by that kind of a relationship than a closed society. So we have not done this with the idea of irritating the Soviet

-15-

Union, is not satisfied with parity and may want superiority
in nuclear weaponry?

A I think it is too early to tell, Mr. Roberts,
because, as I say, we are not sure exactly the magnitude
of the final program, or exactly the type of missile
system that they are deploying. But it certainly does
emphasize the importance of including offensive weapons as
well as defensive weapons in any agreement we have with
them.

Q Mr. Secretary, even allowing for the fact that
the settlement on the Suez Canal has to be worked out
between Israel and Egypt, it is fairly well known that part
of the Israeli view is that there should be neutralization
of the East Bank of the Suez Canal if they withdraw
partially. Would you favor American participation in any
kind of international force, either observer, police,
military, to make sure that there was neutralization and
that the Soviet/Egyptian forces did not cross the Canal?

A I will try to state this again--I have stated
it so many times I thought it was fairly clear. The
United States has indicated, and will continue to indicate,
a willingness to play a responsible role in a peacekeeping

-16-

force or an observer force. We have not gone beyond that.
Obviously, any such role would require the approval of all
the nations concerned. So that we have offered, and continue
to say, that assuming an agreement can be reached, we are
prepared to consider playing a role in an observer force or
any other force. We don't demand it. We are not sure that
is the best system. We are perfectly happy if the parties
could agree on some other kind of a force. But we do not
want to back away from what we consider responsibility to
try to bring about a peaceful settlement in the area.

Miss Berger.

Q Mr. Secretary, I had understood before that
your willingness -- the United States' willingness -- to
participate in such a force was in an overall settlement.
Does this mean that you are also willing to do this in an
interim settlement and that you would agree to this
idea to support a neutralization of that East Bank area
that is vacated by the Israelis?

A Well I don't want to get into the latter
part of your question. As I said, we aren't trying to tell
the parties what to neutralize, or whether it should be
neutralized, or whether it should be demilitarized, or what.

-17-

And when you say "this role," I want to make it clear that all I am saying is that we are prepared to assist in playing a responsible role if that will be helpful. Now, we can only do it if the parties are willing to have us. And we are only willing to do it if we think it would be helpful. And I have a little difficulty understanding why anybody could reject that idea, because we haven't insisted on it. All we say is that we are prepared, as a government, to play a responsible role if that would be helpful in bringing about a peaceful settlement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some of your thinking based on the history of international peacekeeping what would be an effective international force?

A. No. I think it depends a good deal on the agreement and what is involved. And I don't think it helps any to speculate, because it gets out of kilter when you start doing that. But it is clear that in some instances a peacekeeping force might succeed. Certainly an observer force might be helpful. The fact that one has failed in the past doesn't mean that another type of peacekeeping force under other circumstances would fail. If people were that pessimistic, we would never have had an airplane.

-18-

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you having any direct discussions with the Russians about the reopening of the Suez Canal, and have you discussed your trip with them, or do you plan to discuss your trip with them either before you leave or at any stage during the trip?

A. No, we have not. If Ambassador Dobrynin had been here, I might have mentioned it to him, but he hasn't been here, so we haven't.

(Continued on page C-1)

-19-

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the Soviet Union has introduced into Ceylon a number of jet aircraft and pilots and maintenance men. What is the view that the United States Government takes of this development?

A. Well, we are watching it, of course. As you know, the Government of Ceylon has said that they will fly the planes, that the Russians are not there to fly the planes. It is a new development, one that we have to watch. As you know, we are giving some assistance to the Government of Ceylon, too. We would hope that the situation there stabilizes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us some of the subjects you might discuss with Foreign Minister Schumann in Paris, and particularly whether you can anticipate from recent events any change in the French attitude and posture towards the Middle East.

A. Well, no -- I think the principal subject I will discuss with Mr. Schumann will be the Middle East, because they have taken a very active interest in it. As you know, they have been involved in the Four Power discussions. So the principal subject for discussion with him will be the Middle East.

-20-

We will, of course, discuss other matters.
We have several other bilateral matters that we will
discuss. But that will be the principal subject for
discussion.

Q Mr. Secretary, I just wondered whether
or not you could say if the Israeli proposal has been con-
sidered a basis for further negotiation on the Canal,
why hasn't it yet been passed on to Egypt for such
negotiations?

A Well, descriptions like "basis for
negotiation" are difficult phrases, because they sort of
suggest that we approve-or if we say it is not a basis,
we disapprove. So I have some hesitation in labeling it.

We are continuing to discuss the matter with the
Government of Israel and we will discuss the matter with
President Sadat and others when I get to Egypt. As I
said earlier, I want to try, if possible, to get away
from this idea of exchanging papers and have the negotiations
all conducted in the newspapers, because people get frozen
in their positions, or governments frozen in their position.
It becomes this country's proposal and the other country
says "We reject it." And obviously you reject it

-21-

unless you accept it.

But that doesn't mean that the parties may
not have many areas of agreement, and there may be areas
in the proposal that provide a basis for further negotiation.

So the answer to your question is we are not
going to exchange papers, and that is why we are not
submitting it as such. But we are going to discuss
different ideas about how this might be done with all
governments concerned.

Q Mr. Secretary, a Senate subcommittee has
been concerning itself this week with the problems of
refugees in Indochina and civilian war casualties. I
wonder if you could say whether you believe the United
States' bombing policy has contributed in any way to
exacerbating the refugee problem or the civilian war
casualty problem.

A I don't want to add anything to what
Ambassador Sullivan said yesterday. He carefully
spelled out the facts on the situation. I think his
testimony is very convincing. And I think any attempt to
give a general answer to that kind of question is not
useful. I recommend that you read his testimony.

-22-

Q Mr. Secretary, I wonder, sir, if our talks with Japan on the return of Okinawa are undergoing any kind of delay, and when will we sign the treaty with Japan?

A No, they are not encountering any delay. And we are pleased with the progress that has been made. I don't have any particular date in mind about signing an agreement.

Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe that there is at least tacit Soviet support for American moves to help towards the reopening of the Canal, and how important is it somewhere along the line and sometime in the near future that the Soviets be brought into what we are doing with both parties?

A I can't answer the first part of your question. I think that they will be brought in. They are probably brought in already. I think they are probably as up to date on it as we are.

END

Q Mr. Secretary, you have been a pretty good travelling man. Would you be interested and willing to go to the People's Republic of China?

A I am not much of an athlete. (Laughter)

Q Mr. Secretary, could you please give us your

-25-

[Lc]

are we approaching any time soon a deadline when we have
to make some counter move of our own. in building new
armaments here?

A Well, I think probably we will -- well,
we are giving it very serious consideration. I am not sure
there is any precise deadline. But we on a daily basis
watch what the other side does and make judgments based on
the assessment of what they are doing.

Q Mr. Secretary, after the President's last
speech on Viet-Nam, Senator Scott indicated that the
President had a much more specific timetable in mind on with-
drawing troops from Viet-Nam, that we would supposedly
have all our troops out by the end of 1972 or January of '73.
Is there a more specific timetable than has been publicly
acknowledged? Is Scott wrong?

A Which question do you want to ask me?

(Laughter)

Well -- I have a lot of respect for Senator Scott.
I don't want to get into that discussion. But it is clear,
and the President has indicated, that he has a time
schedule in his own mind. He hasn't disclosed that to
anybody, as far as I know. And I don't think he intends

-26-

to. But I don't know how he could have made it much
clearer than he did in his speech what his goal is and
why he is doing what he is doing. Now, people can disagree
with it, and they have every right to disagree with the
President. But the fact is, that is what we are going
to do, ... is the position of the government. And I think
that just as we have noticed in the past, there has been a
good deal of dissent, that as events develop and it is
clear that the President is going to get out of Viet-Nam
as he says he is--and he is on a pathway to peace--I think
the dissent will change.

Q Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE #1028

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

4:25 P.M. EDT

MAY 10, 1971

MONDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The schedule for tomorrow:

At 8:00 there will be a Cabinet meeting.

Then, at 11:45 a.m., the President will meet with
Secretary of HEW, Elliot Richardson.

The announcements for today: The White House
transmitted two proposed supplemental appropriations to the
Congress at noon today, one for the Defense Department,
$13 million to fund increased mandatory payments to retired
military personnel. That is due to the increase of
4.5 percent which is effective June 1, 1971. The other
is a $65 million supplemental for the Department of
Agriculture. The funds will go the emergency credit revolving
fund of the Farmers Home Administration. We will post
the details of that.

Also, we will post for you today the fact that the
President has announced the appointment of Richard M.
McCormick to be a member of the American Revolution Bicentennial
Commission. We will give you that information in the posting.

Q Where does Mr. McCormick come from?

MR. ZIEGLER: Mr. McCormick is a professor in the
Department of History at Rutgers University. He resides
in New Jersey.

You have a release announcing that the President
has declared eight counties in Kentucky a disaster area.

There is a disaster on that release we have given you.
It says Louis Nunn. It should be Louie Nunn. So, would you
correct that in your reports? (Laughter.)

It was the assessment of General Lincoln of the OEP,
Office of Emergency Preparedness, in consultation with
regional offices of OEP and State and local officials,
that because of the severity of damages in the area that
the region qualified as a major disaster area under Public
Law 91-106.

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#1028

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Q Is there any money allocation?

MR. ZIEGLER: The amount of money is not determined
yet.

Those are all of the announcements that we have,
except for the fact, of course, you know that the President
is meeting with Secretary Rogers this afternoon. That meeting
began at about 3:30. It is still underway.

Henry Kissinger joined the meeting about 15 minutes
after it started. The Secretary is giving the President
a personal report on his recent trip to Egypt and Israel.

Also, the Secretary, on his 12-day trip, went to the
SEATO meeting in London and the CENTO meeting in Ankara
and visited Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, Israel,
and had an audience with the Pope, as you know, in Rome. He
met with leaders of the Italian Government.

So the Secretary is giving the President a personal
report on his visit.

The Secretary, as he has stated and told members
of the news media who were covering him on the trip, and those
who met him at the airport yesterday evening, I believe,
feels that the trip was very worthwhile.

The President, of course, expressed his appreciation
to the Secretary for undertaking this trip.

In relation to the Middle East, as the Secretary
has expressed, his observation from the visit to the Middle
East is that it seems there is some basis to believe that
the differences between the parties have narrowed somewhat
and that, again, paraphrasing what the Secretary has said --
I am sure he is saying this to the President, and I know the
President feels this way -- that we don't underestimate the
great problems that remain unresolved between the parties
involved in the Middle East, but we believe the trip was
helpful in making progress to eventual solutions in the
area, and helpful in carrying on the momentum of the discussions.

Q: Was Joe Sisco back in time to take part?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, he was not. I believe Mr. Sisco
has just arrived back in Washington. He is due to arrive
about this time this afternoon.

Q He arrived at 2:30.

MR. ZIEGLER: Thank you.

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[L]

Q Do you have any reaction to the railroad signalmen's strike call for Monday?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I don't.

Q Ron, did the Secretary see Mr. Sisco before he saw the President?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know if he did or not.

Q Do you know if the President has any personal estimate of the chances of the Suez Canal being reopened?

MR. ZIEGLER: I wouldn't want to give a personal estimate from the President on that matter. Secretary Rogers, I believe, has given you his impressions of the situation in the Middle East. I have nothing to add to what he has told you.

Q Ron, with the Secretary back now and Sisco back from his visit to Egypt, can you say what the next step will be in keeping momentum going?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I would not be prepared to add anything to what Secretary Rogers has told you gentlemen.

Q Ron, do you expect the Secretary to have a statement after his meeting with the President?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I don't.

Q Will you have one?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I have given it to you.

Q Is there a briefing here in the morning on a health proposal of some kind?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Did you know the House Committee has turned down the subway funds for the District? There is going to be an effort tomorrow to restore that. Is the Administration backing this effort? Do you want to find out and let me know?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me check that question, Carroll. I really haven't looked into the subway funds for the District in a while.

Q There is going to be an attempt in the House tomorrow to revive the SST. They are going to try to take the money that was supposed to be used to terminate the project and change the wording to make it be used to continue the project. Does the White House support that move?

MR. ZIEGLER: We have supported the SST. A group of bipartisan Congressional supporters, I understand, in connection with the supplemental that we sent to the Congress on April 6, which was required to close out the SST project, have in mind submitting an amendment to that. We, of course, have supported the SST and would support such a move.

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#1028

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not familiar with all of the work that they are undertaking, but they are, I know, reviewing much, as we said we would do, of what the Congressional Black Caucus submitted.

I should say that the report and subsequent reports of the Civil Rights Commission will be reviewed and evaluated to determine future action that should be taken by the newly created Domestic Council Subcommittee on Civil Rights.

Q The black caucus set a deadline of May 17. Is that going to be met?

MR. ZIEGLER: We indicated to the black caucus and we have their suggestions and their thoughts under review, as we said we would, and we will be providing that material for them as we indicated the day they met. I don't know the date that will be available.

Q Has the President given any other specific assignments to this subcommittee?

MR. ZIEGLER: As I indicated, the President will be forwarding for evaluation the report of the Civil Rights Commission.

Q Ron, if I could take you back to the Middle East for a second, is it your judgment that the Soviet Union at this time is playing a helpful role in reopening the Canal?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not prepared to take that question or answer it, Marvin. Secretary Rogers has, I think, been responsive to the press on his trip. I am not prepared to give an assessment from here.

Q Ron, how about the Israeli request for $500 million in grants and loans?

MR. ZIEGLER: Mr. Bray at the State Department dealt with that. I have nothing to add to what he said.

Q Ron, going back to what you said that there was some basis to believe that the differences between the parties have narrowed, what basis are you talking about?

MR. ZIEGLER: The Secretary indicated that to me. So I would leave it to him to describe anything beyond that statement.

Q Ron, apart from the Civil Rights Commission report today, has the President told this Domestic Council Subcommittee on Civil Rights in general what he expected to accomplish and do, and, if so, what he told them?

MR. ZIEGLER: I know that he has asked them to evaluate, John, the Civil Rights Commission report, this one, the October one, and to see what further actions may be taken by the Administration.

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#1028

Q Ron, does the meeting with Secretary Richardson
tomorrow have anything to do with setting up guidelines
in connection with the Supreme Court?

MR. ZIEGLER: This was a meeting set, I believe
we announced last week, that had to be cancelled. The
Secretary was scheduled to talk about Departmental matters.
He has been meeting with Cabinet Members, as you know,
every week for that purpose. There is no specific agenda.

Q What is that meeting about?

MR. ZIEGLER: One of the things that will be
discussed there, I believe, is desalination, but that is
not the full agenda for the Cabinet meeting.

Q What else?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't have any additional agenda for
you.

Q What water?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will give that to you tomorrow.

Q Have the President, the Attorney General, and
Secretary Richardson, between them yet determined the
posture the Administration is going to take on, one,
suburban integration, housing; and, two, school desegregation
in the aftermath of the recent Supreme Court decision?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think I indicated to you gentlemen
the other day that the Justice Department and HEW were
reviewing the Supreme Court decision and have been meeting
on that. There has not been a meeting as yet with the
President to discuss their thinking on this, a detailed
meeting.

Q Which decision?

MR. ZIEGLER: The Supreme Court decision on schools.
And also on the second part of John's question, the matter
regarding housing is a matter still under review, as I said
two days ago.

Q Following that up, the President said some months
ago that he expected to have that report within a month.
Once again I ask, when is this report coming to the White House?

MR. ZIEGLER: I will give you the answer I do each
time you ask it, Jim, and that is that we have received a
report here. It has gone back for further discussion and
I don't have a date when it will be coming in its final form.

Q Was anybody present at the meeting this afternoon
besides the three men you mentioned, the President, the
Secretary, and Dr. Kissinger?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is it.

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#1028

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Q Do you feel you are getting more support in Congress itself?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think the support is beginning to build there in some quarters; not all.

Q Is there anything new from the Administration about the dollar?

MR. ZIEGLER: Secretary Connally, the Secretary of the Treasury, has issued a statement on that. I have nothing to add to it.

Q Ron, when you were talking about the Middle East before, were you speaking or saying that the President doesn't underestimate the great problems that remain? In other words, was it the President or was it the Secretary of State speaking?

MR. ZIEGLER: Speaking collectively from the Administration and the United States Government, we don't underestimate the problems that remain unresolved. We believe the Secretary's trip was helpful, as I said, in making progress towards eventual solutions and maintaining the momentum of the discussions.

Q Ron, can you give us any indication when we may get some appointments, say, like Judges in South Carolina or the Maritime Commission, any of those?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I don't have any date to give you.

Q Does the White House have any soundings that would indicate any Members of Congress who voted against the SST might support a revived move in the direction that we are talking about?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I don't have any soundings that I can give you.

Q Ron, is the President going to see an official of the Pakistan Government, a top economic official, about resumption of aid or other subjects? Mr. Ahmed, I believe, is his name.

MR. ZIEGLER: I believe there is a possibility that the President will see -- we will post this, if it takes place -- Mr. Ahmed, who is a senior economic adviser to President Yahya Khan of Pakistan. He is in the United States. He arrived here on Saturday and will be here until Friday to discuss economic problems and plans with senior U.S. officials, including John Hannah, Director of AID and Secretary of Agriculture Hardin, and also, of course, senior officials at the Department of State.

I believe there is a possibility that the President will receive him for a period after the meeting with the Secretary and, if that takes place, we will post that.

Q Have you anything new from Ambassador Kennedy about the textile talks in Japan?

MORE #1028

#1028

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I don't.

Q Ron, on the SST, you say you don't know anything about people changing their minds. What is the premise of your statement about people coming to the conclusion that they were only dealing with the prototype? That implies pretty strongly that you have evidence that some minds have or will be changed.

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I think the point I was making was that I think there is some who perhaps previously felt that the development of the SST prototype in some way would involve the problem of the environment.

We have said, and perhaps that message has gotten out, that we are talking only about the SST prototype development and that there are a number of studies under way which relate to the effect of the SST on the environment and that no development or production of the SST would proceed if there was a problem, if the SST would pose a problem on the ecology of the United States.

I think there are many who recognize that there have been extensive studies about the noise level of the SST and if production eventually occurred that the SST would not be produced and flown over the United States presenting a noise problem.

So I think the discussion on that apparently has resumed, at least to some degree as indicated by the wire service reports, that say that apparently there is going to be an attempt on Congress here very soon to reinstate some funds for the continuation of the prototype development of the SST.

But I can't predict what the reaction will be.

Q Ron, is the meeting with Mr. Amad today, if it occurs?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. We will post it, if it occurs.

Q Ron, has the Administration's submission of the Lockheed loan guarantee changed the picture on the SST and helped it by perhaps switching some votes?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know if it has or not.

Q How much was that termination figure?

MR. ZIEGLER: $85.3 million.

Q Ron, does the President share the assessment of the Attorney General that the May Day demonstrators were like Hitler's Brown Shirts?

MR. ZIEGLER: The Attorney General, I believe, gave a speech on the demonstrations today. I think he stated his point of view quite clearly.

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#1028

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1029

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 11:50 A.M. EDT

MAY 11, 1971

TUESDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: The President's schedule, I believe, has been posted.

The President met briefly with Elliot Richardson and the others who were here this morning, Dr. David and the Head of NIH, to discuss the announcements concerning the Cancer-Cure Program this morning.

The scheduled meeting with Secretary Richardson will now take place this Thursday. I mentioned that it would take place today, but the President will see him this Thursday.

This is the general meeting they were going to have.

Also, the President this morning is meeting briefly with Senator Saxbe, and that is still going on.

Then, OFF THE RECORD, until the President departs he will attend a lunch on the Hill today, hosted by Congressman Colmer of Mississippi.

This is the annual luncheon that Congressman Colmer gives for the House Leadership and the Rules Committee. The President attended this luncheon also in 1969 and 1970.

I believe when the President was talking with Congressman Colmer at the time he was recently in the hospital, Congressman Colmer invited the President to attend again this year and the President is going to do that.

We will take the two wire services and the network reel pool for protection.

Q. Will there be coverage?

MR. ZIEGLER: It will be just like it was last year, only a protective pool.

Q. Is any particular food featured in this, like some of the others?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, there is a food featured. It is seafood gumbo.

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- 2 -

Q You say this is <u>OFF THE RECORD</u>?

MR. ZIEGLER: The lunch is, until we depart.

Then, the schedule for the remainder of the day,
I believe, is posted.

The President will be meeting shortly with new
Presidential appointees. We will post that. It is just to greet
them and chat with them, briefly.

We will post the five gentlemen he will be meeting
with for that purpose.

Then, this afternoon, the President will have his
regular staff meetings.

Q What can you tell us about the Cabinet meeting?

MR. ZIEGLER: The Cabinet meeting lasted for about
an hour and forty-five minutes this morning. Secretary
Rogers gave a general overview to the Cabinet of his trip,
a 12-day trip, and then there was a presentation made by
Dr. David.

Dr. Glenn Seaborg was in the meeting and participated
in the discussion on water desalination. The major part
of the Cabinet meeting was devoted to a discussion of de-
salination of both salt water and brackish water
in the United States. The President requested that this
presentation be made and discussion be held in the Cabinet
on this matter.

We have under consideration now, as we referred to
before, energy source discussions relating to the breeder reactor
and other Atomic Energy proposals.

One of the keys to desalination is the low cost
of power supplies. The President wanted to have a general
discussion on this in the Cabinet meeting and to become further
acquainted with this matter.

The President, at the conclusion of the discussion,
was most insistent that the Federal Government and the research
activities going on in Federal Government regarding water
desalination continue, but also be enhanced.

The President feels that in the area of desalination,
the United States should take the lead in the development
of this particular area.

Q What does he mean by "being enhanced"? Is
that additional budget authority?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President wants them to examine
what is needed in terms of dollars, to further the progress
of research, and also application of research in the field of

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water desalinization.

The President today is transmitting to Congress a pro-
tocol to the 1949 International Convention for the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries. The protocol provides that the convention
may be amended by approval of three-fourths of the contracting
governments, unless an objection is registered within a specific
period of time.

We will post the details and the President's letter
of transmission.

Also, the President is transmitting to the Congress
the reports of the Pacific Northwest, the Southeast-Red-Rainy,
the Great Lakes and the New England River Basin Commissions for
the fiscal year 1970.

We will post the details on that, also.

Now, we can go to your questions.

Q Last night, the President saw a representative
from Pakistan. Could you tell us what came out of that
meeting?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I can not. I gave a general
run-down on the meeting at yesterday afternoon's briefing,
but I have nothing to add to that.

That was Mr. Ahmed, the Economic Minister.

Q Did he bring a letter from President Yahya Khan,
as reported, to the President?

MR. ZIEGLER: I will have to check that.

Q After Secretary Rogers' presentation to the
Cabinet, was there much discussion at all? Did the President
get involved in it?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, there was not.

Q How long did the presentation take?

MR. ZIEGLER: The Secretary's remarks took about 20
minutes. He discussed SEATO and his observations of this
trip.

Q Could I ask one more question on this Pakistan
matter?

There is the question of their debt which is up for
decision and our stand on this.

Did the President make a decision last night and trans-
mit a decision to the Pakistani representative as to what the
United States can do on this matter?

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- 4 -

MR. ZIEGLER: On what specific matter?

Q There is a question of the scheduling of collection of certain monies that is owed by Pakistan to us and to other countries.

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I was not in the meeting, Don, but I am quite sure there was no decision made on those matters.

Indeed, I don't know what was discussed but I will check to see if a personal greeting was brought to the President from Yahya Khan.

Q On water desalination, was there any indication by Dr. David or Dr. Seaborg that we are at or near a break-through on costs that would make water desalination economically feasible in this country?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think the dollars that have been available for research, in terms of research for desalination, have been fairly adequate.

One of the needs, as was pointed out in the Cabinet meeting, based on the discussion, was the need to have development of large prototype plants or indeed, large producing plants for desalinated water, and this would assist in moving the United States ahead at a greater pace in this field.

The discussion with Glenn Seaborg went again to the importance of the United States proceeding, perhaps at a more rapid pace, in the development of a nuclear energy supply.

For example, there has been a great deal of discussion focusing on the breeder reactor, as you know. That has been discussed in the Cabinet meeting.

Although the development of the technology relating to the breeder reactor is moving along under the current funding at a fairly good pace, there is some feeling that additional funding of that research and prototype development could speed along the development of that particular lower cost and cleaner type of energy supply.

So, there is an interconnection between energy supply and desalination because one of the key factors of desalinization is a low cost source of energy to be used in the desalination of water.

Q Did the President's statement that he wants U.S. efforts in this field to be enhanced, did that mean that he has ordered that additional funds be devoted to the fast breeder reactor project?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President has under study right now within the Administration the breeder reactor question. We don't have a decision on that yet. The President, as you know,

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in the Cabinet meeting several weeks ago, asked down the
members of the Joint Atomic Energy Commission to get their
views on this.

This is a matter being looked at now within the
Administration.

Q Doesn't he have a report on his desk?

MR. ZIEGLER: There is no report as such, but there
is a study underway now about a source of energy supply both
for the immediate future and the long-run future.

The President, at the end of the Cabinet meeting,
made it quite clear to those attending -- Dr. David and, of
course, the Department of the Interior is involved in this to
some extent -- that he wanted them to take a very close look at
what this country could do to speed along the development of
our capability to desalinate water.

Q Is the Administration's interest in the breeder
reactor primarily one that has to do with desalinization, or
has it primarily to do with the general power shortage?

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MR. ZIEGLER: It has to do with the development of an additional power source for the United States, which relates to the breeder reactor.

However, connected with that is the question of desalinization. That is not the only matter connected with further development of nuclear energy, but one of the things that is needed to have an effective desalinization plant is a low-cost energy source.

There are a number of energy sources that can be used for the desalinization of water that are used at this time.

One of the sources of energy and one of the very good sources of energy would be nuclear energy.

Q Continuing off the record about travel, what do you foresee of going to California for a protracted stay again?

MR. ZIEGLER: I can't say.

Q What role, if any, has the President played in this current congressional effort to bring back the SST?

MR. ZIEGLER: Well, there is no direct role, as such. I stated our point of view on that yesterday, I believe, Don, but, of course, the members of Congress are well aware of the President's position on that.

Q What kind of White House involvement, if any, has there been?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think the scope of the White House involvement has simply been discussions with the congressional liaison people and with members of the Congress.

Q Are you saying the White House did not originate the idea?

MR. ZIEGLER: It was originated on the Hill.

Q There was a story in the Sunday paper, in the Post, on the President's News Digest and all of the inaccuracies in it.

Has the President instituted any changes in his news summaries in order to accommodate that?

MR. ZIEGLER: I read the News Summary every day. I think the News Summary is a good summary of the news that is reported throughout the country. It is very complete. That is not the only source of the President's information regarding news. He reads the papers.

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FOLLOWING, FOR YOUR INFORMATION, ARE PORTIONS OF THE
TRANSCRIP FROM THE SECRETARY'S APPEARANCE ON MEET THE PRESS,
MAY 16.

MR. VALERIANI: MR. SECRETARY, YOU HAVE JUST RETURNED FROM A
TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND I'D LIKE TO ASK YOU ABOUT THAT.
IS THE GOVERNMENT CRISIS, THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT CRISIS IN
EGYPT GOING TO SET BACK THE PROSPECT FOR AN INTERIM PEACE SETTLEMENT
IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

SECRETARY ROGERS: WELL, WE CERTAINLY HOPE NOT. THERE IS NO WAY
OF KNOWING FOR SURE WHAT THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT
MAY BE, BUT WE ARE CONVINCED, AND I AM CONVINCED PERSONALLY,
BASED ON THE TRIP THAT I HAD, AND EXPERIENCES I HAD THERE,
THERE IS A DEEP LONGING FOR PEACE AMONG PEOPLE ALL OVER THE WORLD,
AND IT WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSIVE IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES, TO
ME, BECAUSE NO AMERICAN HAD BEEN IN SOME OF THOSE COUNTRIES FOR
LONG -- NO AMERICAN OFFICIAL HAD BEEN THERE FOR A LONG TIME,
I WAS THE FIRST SECRETARY OF STATE TO HAVE BEEN IN EGYPT SINCE
1953 AND I WAS TREMEMDOUSLY IMPRESSED BY THE RECEPTION WE GOT
ALL OVER. STREET CROWDS, FRIENDLY PEOPLE, PEOPLE WAVING AND
CHEERING, AND TO ME IT WAS AN INDICATION OF THE SUCCESS OF
PRESIDENT NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY. WE GET VERY PROVINCIAL IN
OUR ATTITUDES ABOUT IT. EVERYWHERE I GO, AND EVERY PLACE I
WENT ON THIS TRIP, I WAS IMPRESSED WITH THE FACT THAT PEOPLE
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD HAIL PRESIDENT NIXON AS AN OUTSTANDING
WORLD LEADER.

MR. LISAGOR: MR. SECRETARY, I AM SURE YOU DIDN'T MEAN TO
SUGGEST THAT STREET CROWDS SOLVE PROBLEMS LIKE THE MIDDLE EAST,
BUT I--

SECRETARY ROGERS: WELL, NO, WHAT I AM SUGGESTING THE STREET
CROWDS IN OTHER AREAS OF THE WORLD ARE SO FRIENDLY TO US.
WE GET BACK HERE AND WE SEE A LOT OF UNFRIENDLY DEMONSTRATIONS AND
I THINK WE HAVE SORT OF BECOME OBSESSIVE ABOUT VIETNAM.
THE FACT IS THE PROGRAM -- THE PROGRAM HAS STARTED, IS WORKING
AND PEOPLE IN EUROPE ARE QUITE SATISFIED.

I WASN'T ASKED ANY QUESTIONS IN MOST OF MY CONVERSATIONS AND

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CONFERENCES ABROAD ABOUT VIETNAM. IN FACT, I WAS TELLING MR. SPIVAK BEFORE THE PROGRAM I WAS -- I HAD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN ROME, I WAS ON A NATIONAL TELEVISION PROGRAM IN LONDON AND NO ONE ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT VIETNAM. THEY TAKE IT FOR GRANTED WE ARE GETTING OUT AND THEY ARE TALKING FOR GRANTED THAT THE PROGRAM IS A GOOD ONE.

MR. LISAGOR: IN CONCRETE TERMS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST, MR. SECRETARY, IF AN AGREEMENT ON A PULLBACK FROM THE SUEZ CANAL WERE REACHED, HAVE THE ISRAELIS ASKED THE UNITED STATES FOR GUARANTEES IN THE EVENT THAT THAT AGREEMENT WERE VIOLATED?

SECRETARY ROGERS: NO, THEY HAVE NOT.

MR. LISAGOR: WOULD THIS COUNTRY BE WILLING TO GIVE THEM GUARANTEES ON THAT?

SECRETARY ROGERS: WELL, I WOULDN'T WANT TO ANSWER HYPOTHETICALLY. IT WOULD DEPEND ON WHAT TYPE OF GUARANTEES THEY WERE TALKING ABOUT. I HAVE SAID, AND I REPEAT HERE TODAY, THAT WE THINK THAT THE NECESSITY FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS SO GREAT THAT THE UNITED STATES IS PREPARED TO PLAY ANY RESPONSIBLE ROLE THAT WE MIGHT BE REQUESTED TO PLAY IF THAT WOULD INSURE A PEACE AGREEMENT.

MR. TREWHITT: MR. SECRETARY, I THINK THOSE OF US WHO WERE ALONG ON THE TOUR OF THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD AGREE THERE WERE SOME SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY ON THE PART OF BOTH THE EGYPTIANS AND THE ISRAELIS WHILE YOU WERE THERE. HAS THE UPHEAVAL IN THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT PREVENTED ANY PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION OR PURSUIT OF THAT MOVEMENT?

SECRETARY ROGERS: I AM GLAD YOU ASKED THAT QUESTION, MR. TREWHITT. NO, NOT AT ALL. WE HAVE SEEN NO SIGN THAT THERE WILL BE ANY SLOWDOWN IN THE DISCUSSIONS THAT ARE UNDER WAY AND I WOULD HOPE THAT THERE WILL NOT BE ANY. I HAVE NO -- AS I SAID EARLIER -- ANY SURE WAY OF KNOWING WHAT THE FUTURE HOLDS IN EGYPT BUT TO DATE WE HAVE HAD NO INDICATION THAT WOULD SUFFEST THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS NOT IN COMPLETE CONTROL AND THAT THE CONVERSATIONS THAT WE HAD THERE COULD STILL BE VERY PRODUCTIVE.

MR. TREWHITT: WELL, NOW YOU ARE GOING TO NEW YORK TOMORROW, I BELIEVE.

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SECRETARY ROGERS: THAT IS CORRECT.

MR. TREWHITT: TO TALK TO THE SECRETARY GENERAL AND TO MR. JARRING. SHOULD ONE VIEW THIS AS AN UNDERTAKING ON YOUR PART TO TRANSFER BACK TO THE UNITED NATIONS FORUM THE PERSONAL INITIATIVE YOU UNDERTOOK IN THIS TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST?

SECRETARY ROGERS: NOT IN THE WAY YOU PUT IT, BECAUSE I HAVE MADE IT CLEAR FROM THE BEGINNING THAT WE BASED OUR HOPES ON AMBASSADOR JARRING AND HIS NEGOTIATIONS, AND WE THINK THAT THE PEACE AGREEMENT THAT HAS TO FINALLY COME ABOUT HAS TO COME ABOUT AS A RESULT OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242 AND THE NEGOTIATIONS UNDER AMBASSADOR JARRING'S AUSPICES.

MY TRIP THERE IS TO FILL HIM IN ON WHAT HAPPENED, TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT WE ARE NOT INTERFERING WITH HIS NEGOTIATIONS. I AM SURE HE KNOWS THAT, BECAUSE WE TALKED TO HIM BEFORE WE LEFT. WE HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH HIM SINCE. BUT I DO WANT TO KEEP THE FOCUS OF ATTENTION ON AMBASSADOR JARRING'S NEGOTIATIONS.

MR. SPIVAK: MR SECRETARY, I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE YOU BACK TO THE MIDDLE EAST. DO YOU THINK AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS POSSIBLE UNLESS ISRAEL IS ASSURED THAT HER SHIPS CAN GO THROUGH THE CANAL?

SECRETARY ROGERS: YOU ARE SPEAKING ABOUT THE SUEZ CANAL?

MR. SPIVAK: YES, THE SUEZ CANAL.

SECRETARY ROGERS: WELL, I THINK IF AN INTERIM AGREEMENT IS WORKED OUT THAT THE SUEZ CANAL SHOULD BE OPENED TO INTERNATIONAL TRAFFIC OF ALL NATIONS.

NOW, THIS IS ONE OF THE ISSUES, OF COURSE, THAT IS UNDER CONSIDERATION AT THE MOMENT. I THINK THERE IS A POSSIBILITY OF WORKING OUT AN INTERIM AGREEMENT. IF THAT COULD BE DONE, I THINK IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE VERY MUCH TO THE POSSIBILITIES OF A FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT, AND CERTAINLY THE THING THAT IMPRESSES ONE WHEN HE TRAVELS IN THAT AREA IS THE TREMENDOUS POTENTIAL THAT EXISTS IF PEACE COULD BE ACHIEVED, AND THE TERRIBLE PROSPECTS THAT EXIST FOR EVERYONE IN THE AREA IF YOU CAN'T ACHIEVE A PEACE AGREEMENT. SO I AM HOPEFUL THAT COMMON SENSE AND GOOD JUDGMENT,

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81

ORIGIN EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 JUS-02 BNDD-05 CIAE-00 INR-08 IO-16 NSAE-00
RSC-01 SNM-01 SY-03 TRSE-00 TRSY-11 SS-20 NSC-10 P-03
PRS-01 USIA-12 /119 R

66611

DRAFTED BY: EUR/BMI: J. C. GRIFFITH
APPROVED BY: BMI: M. D. GOLDSTEIN
JUSTICE: MR. HUSHEN

047318

P 192152Z MAY 71
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

UNCLASS STATE 087523

SUBJ: ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REMARKS ON UK HANDLING OF DRUGS

REFS: A. LONDON 4559
B. LONDON 4572

1. TEXT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL'S SPEECH AT ATLANTA POLICE APPRECIATION DINNER, ATLANTA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, ATLANTA, MAY 18, 1971
IS TRANSMITTED BELOW. EMBASSY MAY TRANSMIT COPY TO BEEDLE OF HOME OFFICE.

2. DEPARTMENT WOULD APPRECIATE REPORT BY CABLE OF ANY REMARKS BY BEEDLE.

QUOTE: A WEEK AGO I SPOKE BEFORE THE CALIFORNIA PEACE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION MEETING IN SAN FRANCISCO. I DISCUSSED THE DANGER OF PERMITTING VIOLENT MOBS TO ROB THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF OTHERS, AND I APPLAUDED THE WASHINGTON, D.C. POLICE FOR THEIR PROFESSIONAL HANDLING OF SUCH DISRUPTIONS EARLY THIS MONTH. I POINTED OUT THAT THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES SHARED THIS APPROVAL OF THE WASHINGTON POLICE, AND THAT HE SUPPORTED THE ROLE OF PEACE OFFICERS ACROSS THE NATION IN PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF LAW-ABIDING CITIZENS AGAINST THE INROADS OF LAWLESS MOBS. IT WAS, IN EFFECT, A "POLICE

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APPRECIATION" SPEECH, AND I CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO IT BY WAY OF REAFFIRMING MY SUPPORT OF THE POLICE AND THEIR ESSENTIAL ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY. AS PRESIDENT NIXON HAS SAID, "UNLESS WE HAVE NOT ONLY RESPECT FOR OUR LAWS, BUT FOR THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ARE DOING THEIR VERY BEST TO CARRY THEM OUT FAIRLY AND EQUITABLY, WE ARE NOT GOING TO SURVIVE AS A FREE COUNTRY."

SO BECAUSE I THINK YOU KNOW WHERE I STAND AND WHERE THE PRESIDENT STANDS IN APPRECIATION OF THE POLICE AND THEIR FUNCTION, I AM NOT GOING TO GIVE ANOTHER SPEECH ON THIS SUBJECT TONIGHT. INSTEAD I WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS A PARTICULAR AREA OF ENFORCEMENT IN WHICH FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES HAVE PARALLEL DUTIES--THE CONTROL OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS.

ONE OF SEVERAL REASONS THIS IS A MUTUAL PROBLEM AMONG ALL JURISDICTIONS IF THE RELATIONSHIP BELIEVED TO EXIST BETWEEN DRUGS AND CRIME. THE HIGH COST OF HARD DRUGS CREATES IN THE ADDICT A DAILY NEED FOR MONEY BY ANY POSSIBLE MEANS. IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS OF 26 MALE ADDICTS WHO WERE TREATED IN NEW YORK CITY INDICATED THAT THEY HAD BEEN COLLECTIVELY RESPONSIBLE FOR AN AVERAGE OF 22 MAJOR CRIMES A DAY--SOMEWHAT LESS THAN ONE CRIME PER ADDICT PER DAY. IN A SAMPLING OF MEN ADMITTED TO THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JAIL, 45 PERCENT GAVE EVIDENCE OF DRUG USE JUST BEFORE ARREST. OTHER STUDIES SHOW SMALLER PERCENTAGES. MORE RESEARCH IS NEEDED ON THIS SUBJECT, BUT THERE IS REASON TO BELIEVE THAT, AS WE SOLVE THE DRUG PROBLEM, WE WILL ALSO SOLVE AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE CRIME PROBLEM.

FOR MANY YEARS, EFFORTS IN THIS FIELD (DRUGS) HAVE BEEN UNDER FIRE FROM THE "CAN'T DO IT" PEOPLE. THEY'VE SAID YOU CAN'T END THE NARCOTICS EVIL BY TRYING TO STOP THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC. SOME HAVE SAID, "LET'S LEGALIZE THE POSSESSION OF DRUGS AND PROVIDE THEM FREE UNDER A DOCTOR'S CARE". ACCORDING TO THIS ARGUMENT THE ADDICTS WON'T HAVE TO STEAL TO GET MONEY FOR DOPE. AND BY TAKING THE PROFIT OUT OF THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC THE PUSHERS WOULD GO OUT OF BUSINESS.

THIS IS THE APPROACH TAKEN IN GREAT BRITAIN, AND IN THE OPINION OF OUR OBSERVERS IT IS PROVING TO BE WRONG. THE DOPE PUSHERS HAVE MOVED INTO BRITAIN IN A BIG WAY, AND ARE PROVIDING NARCOTICS TO THE ADDICT OVER AND ABOVE WHAT HE RECEIVES THROUGH MEDICAL CARE. AND THERE IS A TENDENCY OF PUSHERS AND ADDICTS ALIKE TO SPREAD

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THE DISEASE.

SO WHAT I WOULD CALL THE "SURRENDER" APPROACH HASN'T PROVEN ITSELF. THIS LEAVES THE ALTERNATIVE OF TRYING TO IMPROVE THE ENFORCEMENT APPROACH--IMPROVE IT TO THE POINT WHERE WE DO DRIVE THE DRUG PEDDLERS OUT OF BUSINESS.

THIS IS THE APPROACH THAT RICHARD NIXON TOOK WHEN HE BECAME PRESIDENT IN 1969. ONE OF HIS EARLIEST STEPS WAS TO OUTLINE A 10-POINT PROGRAM TO BOBILIZE ALL THE RESOURCES OF GOVERNMENT AGAINST THIS PROBLEM. HIS BELIEF WAS THAT IN PAST EFFORTS, THE GOVERNMENT'S LEFT HAND SOMETIMES DIDN'T KNOW WHAT THE RIGHT HAND WAS DOING. IF WE COULD MARSHAL ALL OUR FEDERAL EFFORTS IN A CAMPAIGN COORDINATED WITH THE STATES AND LOCALITIES, WE COULD WIN THIS BATTLE. HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT IN THIS FIELD, AS IN OTHERS, IF AMERICA REALLY FOCUSES ITS ENERGIES AND ITS SKILLS, THERE IS NO PROBLEM IT CAN'T SOLVE. AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE "YOU CAN'T DO IT" ATTITUDE, I CALL THIS THE "CAN DO" APPROACH.

WHAT PRESIDENT NIXON OUTLINED WAS, IN ESSENCE, A MASSIVE SQUEEZE PLAY ON THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM, AND THIS SQUEEZE PLAY HAS BEEN PUT IN MOTION.

ON THE ONE HAND, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS LEADING A BROAD PROGRAM OF DRUG EDUCATION, TREATMENT AND RESEARCH. THIS IS BEING SPEARHEADED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, AND IN PARTICULAR BY THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH. THE PURPOSE IS, FIRST, TO EDUCATE ALL AMERICANS TO THE DANGERS OF DRUG ABUSE AND THUS HELP PREVENT THE CREATION OF NEW ADDICTS; SECOND, TO REHABILITATE EXISTING ADDICTS AND RETURN THEM TO USEFUL LIVES; AND THIRD, TO LEARN MORE ABOUT THE CAUSES OF ADDICTION AND THE EFFECTS OF DRUGS, SO WE CAN IMPROVE OUR PREVENTION AND TREATMENT PROGRAMS. I'M PROUD THAT AMONG THE OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THIS PROGRAM ARE THREE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AGENCIES--THE BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, AND THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PROGRAM OF DRUG EDUCATION, TREATMENT, AND RESEARCH IS UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW AND WE CAN EXPECT NEW INITIATIVES IN THIS AREA.

ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THIS SQUEEZE PLAY, WE HAVE MARSHALED ALL ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN A COORDINATED DRIVE. AND WE ARE GOING AFTER ALL OUR ADVERSARIES--THE FOREIGN GROWERS AND MANUFACTURERS, THE

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SMUGGLERS WHO CROSS OUR BORDERS, THE ORGANIZED CRIME DISTRIBUTORS WITHIN OUR COUNTRY, THE MANUFACTURERS OF DANGEROUS DRUGS HERE AT HOME, AND FINALLY, THE PUSHERS ON OUR STREETS.

THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THE UNITED STATES HAS BROUGHT TO BEAR ALL ITS GUNS ON THIS TARGET. AND ALTHOUGH WE HAVE HELPED PROMOTE NARCOTICS TREATIES BEFORE, THIS IS THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION THAT HAS MADE NARCOTICS CONTROL A CONTINUING AND INTEGRAL PART OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY.

THE MAIN FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT ARM AGAINST THE DOPE TRAFFIC IS THE BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS, OR AS WE CALL IT, THE BNDD. IT IS RESPONSIBLE FOR FIGHTING THE NARCOTICS TRADE BOTH OVERSEAS AND HERE AT HOME.

OF COURSE, WHEN BNDD STARTED TO CARRY OUT PRESIDENT NIXON'S PROGRAM IT ENCOUNTERED THE "YOU CAN'T DO THAT" PEOPLE. THEY SAID "YOU'LL NEVER GET THE FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED TO GIVE YOU ANY MORE THAN LIP SERVICE".

IT SO HAPPENS WE HAVE A "CAN DO" PRESIDENT, AND A "CAN DO" DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AND A "CAN DO" BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS. AND STARTING WITH THE TOP OFFICIALS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AS WELL AS OUR AMBASSADORS OVERSEAS, OUR DIPLOMATIC CORPS HAS JOINED IN THE BATTLE. AS A RESULT OF EFFORTS BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES, THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS CREATED A SPECIAL FUND FOR ANTI-NARCOTICS PROGRAMS, AND THE UNITED STATES HAS LED THE WAY IN PLEDGING DOLS. 2 MILLION TO THIS FUND. LAST FEBRUARY, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES, AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY WAS SIGNED IN VIENNA BY 20 NATIONS TO CONTROL THE TRAFFIC OF DANGEROUS DRUGS.

BESIDES THIS INTERNATIONAL APPROACH, WE ARE ALSO WORKING DIRECTLY WITH INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES THAT ARE THE SOURCE OF ILLICIT DRUGS.

BNDD REPRESENTATIVES ARE IN TURKEY, THE PRESENT SOURCE OF MOST OPIUM-TYPE NARCOTICS COMING INTO THE UNITED STATES. THEY ARE WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH THE TURKISH NATIONAL POLICE AND FEDERAL NARCOTICS OFFICERS TO COMBAT THE ILLICIT TRADE. WE HAVE LOANED DOLS. 3 MILLION TO TURKEY FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER PURPOSES, AND TURKEY IS ALSO APPLYING CONSIDERABLE FINANCIAL RE-

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SOURCES OF ITS OWN. THE NEW TURKISH PREMIER, DR. NIHAT ERIM, HAS PUBLICLY COMMITTED HIMSELF VERY STRONGLY TO STOPPING THE ILLICIT OPIUM TRAFFIC. LESS THAN THREE WEEKS AGO HE PROMISED THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO BRING OPIUM PRODUCTION UNDER STRICT CONTROL BY LICENSING THE FARMERS, BUYING THE ENTIRE ANNUAL CROP, AND HELPING THE FARMERS TO CONVERT TO OTHER TYPES OF CROPS. IN THE TURKISH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, THE OPIUM LICENSING AND CONTROL BILL WAS RECENTLY REPORTED FAVORABLY OUT OF COMMITTEE AND NOW GOES TO THE WHOLE ASSEMBLY FOR CONSIDERATION. WE'RE PLEASED WITH THE COOPERATION OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. THE PROBLEM ISN'T LICKED YET, BUT TURKEY HAS JOINED US IN SAYING, "CAN DO!"

TURNING TO FRANCE, WHERE THE ILLICIT TURKISH PRODUCT HAS BEEN CONVERTED TO HEROIN IN LABORATORIES AROUND MARSEILLES, WE ARE ALSO GIVING AN ANSWER TO THE "CAN'T DO IT" PEOPLE. FOR MANY MONTHS WE HAVE DEVELOPED A COOPERATIVE PROGRAM WITH THE FRENCH AUTHORITIES, FROM THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR TO THE NATIONAL POLICE. AT OUR URGING THE FRENCH HAVE EXPANDED THEIR ANTI-NARCOTICS FORCE IN THE MARSEILLES AND PARIS AREAS FROM 18 TO ABOUT 100. THEY ARE TRAINING ALL OF THE 60,000 NATIONAL POLICE IN NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT, AND BNDD AGENTS ARE HELPING TO INSTRUCT THEM. LAST FEBRUARY THE FRENCH MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR AND I SIGNED AN AGREEMENT ENABLING ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES OF THE TWO COUNTRIES TO WORK TOGETHER IN COMBATTING THE DRUG TRAFFIC. THIS IS THE FIRST SUCH FORMAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES FOR COOPERATION AT THE WORKING LEVEL.

WHAT ABOUT MEXICO, WHICH IS A SMALLER SOURCE OF OPIUM BUT THE PRINCIPAL SOURCE OF MARIHUANA? FOR NEARLY A YEAR AND A HALF OUR DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS HAVE WORKED WITH MEXICO IN A JOINT PROGRAM, OPERATION COOPERATION, TO DESTROY POPPY AND MARIHUANA PRODUCTION IN MEXICO AND INTERCEPT SMUGGLERS. THIS PROGRAM HAS THE SUPPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF MEXICO, AND THE MEXICAN ATTORNEY GENERAL HAS MET WITH ME ON THREE OCCASIONS TO FURTHER THIS EFFORT. THE UNITED STATES HAS PROVIDED HELICOPTERS AND OTHER EQUIPMENT FOR HUNTING OUT AND DESTROYING POPPY AND MARIHUANA PRODUCTION, AND THEY HAVE BEEN USED EFFECTIVELY BY THE MEXICAN FORCES. THE FEDERAL POLICE HAVE ESTABLISHED A NARCOTICS UNIT, AND MANY TRAFFICKERS HAVE BEEN ARRESTED--OFTEN ON INFORMATION DEVELOPED JOINTLY BY U.S. AND MEXICAN NARCOTICS AUTHORITIES. FAR FROM BEING A FLOP, AS THE SKEPTICS PREDICTED, OPERATION COOPERATION HAS BECOME A MODEL FOR OTHER NATIONS IN THEIR JOINT ANTI-NARCOTICS PROGRAMS.

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THE COUNTRIES I MENTIONED (TURKEY) ARE AMONG THE PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF ILLICIT DRUGS COMING TO THIS COUNTRY, BUT WHEN WE CHOKE OFF THESE SOURCES, OTHERS WILL TRY TO TAKE THEIR PLACES. WE ARE ALERT TO THIS, AND WILL BE READY FOR THEM. MEANWHILE, TWO OTHER NATIONS CONCERNED OVER THEIR OWN RISING DRUG ABUSE PROBLEM-- GREAT BRITAIN AND WEST GERMANY--ARE ALSO JOINING US IN APPLYING PRESSURE AT THE DRUG SOURCES.

SO IN THE INTERNATIONAL AREA WE'RE MAKING CLEAR HEADWAY, WHERE VERY LITTLE WAS DONE BEFORE. TO THOSE WHO SAID IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE WE ARE ANSWERING WITH THAT FAMILIAR AMERICAN SAYING, "THE DIFFICULT WE DO IMMEDIATELY; THE IMPOSSIBLE TAKES A LITTLE LONGER".

LET'S TURN TO THE NEXT LINE OF DEFENSE--OUR NATION'S 20,000 MILES OF BORDERS AND COASTLINES. THE U.S. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS IN THE TREASURY DEPARTMENT IS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS, AND IT ALSO HAS SOME SPECIALISTS ASSIGNED WITH OUR BNDD PEOPLE OVERSEAS. IN ITS BORDER NARCOTICS WORK IT IS ASSISTED BY THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION--PART OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT. TO STEP UP THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST NARCOTICS AS OUTLINED BY PRESIDENT NIXON, CUSTOMS HAS GREATLY INCREASED ITS FORCE, ITS TRAINING, AND ITS KNOWHOW. IT HAS ADOPTED NEW METHODS, SUCH AS THE TRAINING OF DOGS TO SNIFF OUT THE PRESENCE OF DRUGS IN LUGGAGE AT PORTS OF ENTRY OR PACKAGES MAILED INTO THE COUNTRY. DUE TO THESE EFFORTS I CAN ANNOUNCE TONIGHT THAT IN THE FIRST TEN MONTHS OF FISCAL 1971--UP TO APRIL 30--CUSTOMS SEIZED NEARLY NINE TIMES THE HARD DRUGS SEIZED IN THE SAME PERIOD IN 1970, AND NEARLY DOUBLE THE AMOUNT OF MARIHUANA. IN THE SAME PERIODS OF TIME THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE SEIZED THREE TIMES AS MUCH HARD NARCOTICS AND SOMEWHAT LESS THAN DOUBLE THE AMOUNT OF MARIHUANA. ANOTHER PART OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT, THE U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE, HAS SEIZED 1-1/2 MILLION DOLLARS' WORTH OF NARCOTICS AS AN INCI-DENTAL PART OF ITS ANTI-SKYJACKING PROGRAM SINCE OCTOBER 1969.

SO WE ARE WITNESSING WHAT CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WHEN YOU COORDINATE THE EFFORTS OF THESE DEDICATED AGENCIES AND THEIR "CAN DO" PEOPLE--WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM SOME "CAN DO" GERMAN SHEPHERDS AND LAB-RADOR RETRIEVERS.

THE ILLICIT DRUGS THAT RUN THE GAMUT OF THE FIRST TWO DEFENSES MUST NEXT GET PAST THE ALERT EYES OF BNDD'S SPECIAL AGENTS IN

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THIS COUNTRY WHO CONCENTRATE ON INTERSTATE DISTRIBUTION RINGS.
IN RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S PROGRAM, THE NUMBER OF AGENTS
HAS BEEN GREATLY INCREASED AND NEW LEGISLATION HAS GIVEN THEM
BETTER TOOLS.

ONE SUCH TOOL IS THE USE OF COURT-AUTHORIZED WIRETAPPING TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE AGAINST ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES DEALING IN NARCOTICS.
HERE AGAIN THE NAY-SAYERS HAVE TOLD US, "YOU CAN'T DO THAT--ITS UNCONSTITUTIONAL". BUT THE LAW PROVIDES FOR A COURT ORDER FOR SUCH WIRETAPPING--SIMILAR TO THE WARRANT FOR A HOUSE SEARCH.
THE SUPREME COURT INDICATED THIS KIND OF COURT-AUTHORIZED WIRE-TAPPING IS CONSTITUTIONAL. AND WE ARE CERTAINLY USING IT TO GET EVIDENCE AGAINST THOSE WHO MAKE A LIVING DESTROYING THE LIVES OF OTHERS WITH DOPE.

BECAUSE OF WIRETAPPING WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE NUMEROUS RAIDS ON BEG-TIME NARCOTICS RINGS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE BEEN IMPOSSIBLE. IN JUNE 1970 WIRETAPPING EVIDENCE ENABLED US TO CONDUCT OPERATION EAGLE, IN WHICH BNDD MADE SIMULTANEOUS RAIDS IN TEN U.S. CITIES AND BROKE UP THE LARGEST COCAINE SMUGGLING RING EVER UNCOVERED IN THE UNITED STATES. SO FAR, 178 ARRESTS HAVE BEEN MADE IN THIS OPERATION. MANY HAVE NOT YET BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL, BUT 75 HAVE ALREADY BEEN CONVICTED, AND MOST OF THESE PLEADED GUILTY. LAST FEBRUARY, AGAIN USING WIRETAP EVIDENCE IN AN EFFORT KNOWN AS OPERATION FLANKER, BNDD MADE SIMULTANEOUS RAIDS WHICH BROKE UP THE LARGEST HEROIN SMUGGLING RING SO FAR UNEARTHED IN THE UNITED STATES, FOR A TOTAL TO DATE OF 162 PERSONS ARRESTED.

I CAN PROMISE YOU THAT INVESTIGATIONS ARE UNDER WAY WHICH WILL RESULT IN MORE OF THE SAME, AND IF THE ORGANIZED CRIMINALS ENGAGED IN DRUG DISTRIBUTION GET SO THEY'RE AFRAID TO USE THE TELEPHONE, THAT'S ALL THE BETTER. THEN THEY'LL HAVE TO COME OUT IN THE OPEN, WHERE THEY'LL BE EASIER TO CATCH.

I COME NOW TO THE ASPECT OF ENFORCEMENT IN WHICH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS NEITHER THE MANPOWER NOR THE GRASS ROOTS ORGANIZATION TO DO THE JOB RIGHT. I REFER TO THE CONTINUING BATTLE AGAINST YOUR LOCAL NEIGHBORHOOD DOPE PUSHER--A BATTLE EQUALLY AS IMPORTANT AS THE OTHERS I HAVE DESCRIBED. THIS SHOULD BE AND IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, BUT EVEN IN THIS FIELD, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS PROVIDED ASSISTANCE, AND I WOULD LIKE TO TOUCH BRIEFLY ON SOME OF THESE AIDS.

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[L.C]

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FIRST, AS A RESULT OF MEETINGS BETWEEN JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND STATE ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS, WE HAVE AGREED UPON AREAS OF SEPARATE RESPONSIBILITY, ELIMINATED AREAS OF DUPLICATION, AND ESTABLISHED MODES OF COOPERATION. SO FAR, THIS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN SIGNED BY 28 STATES, INCLUDING GEORGIA.

SECOND, IN COOPERATION WITH STATE EXPERTS, A UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT WAS APPROVED IN 1970 BY THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS. THIS IS A SUGGESTED MODEL STATE LAW FOR DEALING WITH THE NARCOTICS PROBLEM, AND IT HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN ITS ESSENTIAL FORM BY 16 STATES AND TWO TERRITORIES. I MIGHT TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO POINT OUT IN THIS DISTINGUISHED AND INFLUENTIAL COMPANY THAT THE GEORGIA LEGISLATURE HAS YET TAKEN UP THIS SUGGESTED LEGISLATION. NATURALLY I HOPE THAT THE STATES ALREADY OPERATING UNDER THIS VERY EFFECTIVE LEGISLATION WILL SOON BE JOINED BY THE GREAT STATE OF GEORGIA.

THIRD, BNDD HAS MET WITH STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO PROMOTE AN IMPROVED CONCEPT KNOWN AS A METROPOLITAN ENFORCEMENT GROUP. THIS ENABLES NEIGHBORING COMMUNITIES TO SHARE UNDERCOVER PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT, AND THUS UPGRADE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS AT MINIMUM COST. I AM HAPPY TO SAY THAT THREE SUCH METROPOLITAN ENFORCEMENT GROUPS ARE OPERATING IN GEORGIA--IN ATLANTA, IN SAVANNAH, AND IN CHATHAM COUNTY AS A WHOLE.

FOURTH, OUR BNDD IS PURSUING A VIGOROUS TRAINING PROGRAM IN NARCOTICS ENFORCEMENT FOR STATE AND LOCAL PEACE OFFICERS. LAST DECEMBER OUR 10-WEEK NATIONAL TRAINING INSTITUTE GRADUATED THE FIRST CLASS, CONSISTING OF 34 OFFICERS FROM 22 STATES, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND THE ARMED FORCES. WE WANT THESE CLASSES TO GROW IN NUMBER, AND WE INVITE REPRESENTATIVES FROM THOSE POLICE DEPARTMENTS WHO HAVE NOT YET SENT THEM. BNDD IS ALSO SPONSORING DRUG EDUCATION AND PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN LOCAL COMMUNITIES.

FIFTH, WE ARE GIVING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES FOR DRUG EDUCATION, REHABILITATION AND SPECIAL NARCOTICS POLICE UNITS. OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION PROVIDED MORE THAN DOLS. 7 MILLION FOR THESE PURPOSES IN 1970 AND ABOUT DOLS. 12 MILLION SO FAR IN FISCAL 1971. THESE FUNDS ARE GROWING, AND ARE AVAILABLE TO STATES AND LOCALITIES SUBMITTING A REASONABLE PLAN OF ACTION. I MIGHT ADD THAT GEORGIA'S SHARE

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GREW FROM DOLS. 34,000 IN 1970 TO NEARLY HALF A MILLION IN 1971.

NOW, WITH ALL OF THE FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL EFFORTS COMBINED, AS PRESIDENT NIXON OUTLINED IN HIS PROGRAM, WE ARE IN A POSITION TO CLOSE THE TRAP ON THE DRUG EVIL. I DON'T MEAN TO CLAIM WE CAN ACHIEVE AN IMMEDIATE VICTORY. AS I TOLD YOU, THE "IMPOSSIBLE" TAKES A LITTLE WHILE. BUT I DO SAY THAT THE FAILURE OF THE PREVIOUS HIT-AND-MISS APPROACH IS NO REASON FOR US TO LISTEN TO THE "CAN'T DO IT" PEOPLE. WE HAVE MOUNTED THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAR ON NARCOTICS OF ANY ADMINISTRATION IN THE NATION'S HISTORY. INSTEAD OF THROWING UP OUR HANDS, WE HAVE JOINED HANDS IN A WORLDWIDE OFFENSIVE. I CAN'T TELL YOU HOW LONG IT WILL TAKE, BUT I WILL TELL YOU THAT IF WE KEEP UP THE PRESSURE WE CAN CRUSH THE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC.

MOREOVER, AS OUR COMBINED EFFORTS SUCCEED, WE WILL ALSO REMOVE A SIGNIFICANT PERCENTAGE OF CRIME. COOPERATIVE WORK AGAINST DRUGS AT ALL LEVELS WILL HELP LAW ENFORCEMENT AT ALL LEVELS.

AND FINALLY, LET ME SAY THAT WORDS OF APPRECIATION TO THE POLICE FORCES OF AMERICA FROM THE U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ARE ALL WELL AND GOOD, BUT WE LIKE TO THINK THEY ARE MATCHED BY DEEDS. THE FEDERAL PROGRAMS TO ASsist STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN COMBATING NARCOTICS ARE THE KIND OF DEEDS I MEAN. THEY SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS TANGIBLE EVIDENCE OF OUR CONFIDENCE IN, AND APPRECIATION OF, AMERICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, INCLUDING THE POLICE OF METROPOLITAN ATLANTA. ROGERS

UNCLASSIFIED

President Nixon Briefs Editors and Publishers
From 12 Southern States

Following are excerpts from the transcript of remarks made by President Nixon at Birmingham, Ala., on May 25 before editors and publishers from 12 Southern States attending a background briefing on domestic policy initiatives.¹

Gentlemen: I do know that from the schedule that I have read that you have been exposed to a great amount of material already with regard to some of our domestic programs.

What I would like to do is to try to put these domestic programs in this period of the seventies in a broader perspective. In order to do so, it will be necessary for me to talk about foreign policy first, not in precise details, as would be the case in a foreign policy briefing, but in more general terms, so that we can see why domestic programs of the types you have been hearing about today, programs that normally just don't make the first lead on television or a front page today in the newspapers due to the overwhelming interest in foreign policy, why that domestic policy is so important for the future.

I begin with the developments in foreign policy with which you are all familiar. While it must seem at times that the more things change in foreign policy, the more they remain the same, I think that a sophisticated observer would have to agree that historians in the future will look to this period, and they will probably write that the American people, and through the American people, through their relations with other people in the world, were going through a very historic change insofar as our

relations with other nations in the world were concerned.

The word “new era” is overused. I will only say that if there was ever a new era in the field of foreign policy, we are now in the middle of it. We are on the threshold of it.

I think the most significant changes in American foreign policy and the most significant changes in the relations between major nations in the world are taking place now than at any period since World War II.

Now, this is not because we made it so. I speak of “we” in terms of this administration. We played a role, but what has happened here is that we see a number of developments coming together contemporaneously. The one that of course is first and foremost in your minds, and should be, is the war in Viet-Nam.

There is argument about how that war should be ended, when it should be ended. There is no argument, however, among any sophisticated observers on the point that the war in Viet-Nam, after a long period—5 years—in which no end was in sight, in which more and more Americans went to Viet-Nam, and in which more and more casualties occurred in Viet-Nam, that now the situation is changed. Americans are coming home, casualties are going down, and we can say confidently today that the war in Viet-Nam will be ended.

You know the arguments, and I will not go into them now, why we cannot, in our national interest, accept the proposition of setting a deadline as far as our own withdrawal is concerned. I will only say that there is no question but that this administration's policy is succeeding and bringing the war to an end and bringing it to an end in a way which I believe will contribute to our goal of discouraging that

¹ For the complete transcript, see White House press release (Birmingham, Ala.) dated May 25.

June 14, 1971

757

kind of war, that kind of aggression that brought this war on, in the future and thereby bringing it to an end in a way that will not guarantee—we can never guarantee anything in world events—but that will give us a chance to have a more peaceful Southeast Asia, a more peaceful Pacific.

Now, if we are able to accomplish this goal—and I am confident that we are accomplishing it and that we can see it now in sight—this is in itself, by itself, although by itself not the major development which we are presently seeing, but this by itself has enormous significance, because both World War II and the Korean war, as far as the United States was concerned, did come from the Pacific and so did Viet-Nam.

So a peaceful Pacific and an end to this conflict in a way that will maintain the position of confidence of the United States in the Pacific is enormously important in terms of achieving our broader goal of peace in the world.

## Relations With the Soviet Union

The second point that of course has been much in the news this past week is our relations with the Soviet Union. The announcement that I made last week deliberately was brief.² I will not expand on it now, because that would not be in the interest of achieving the goal that the announcement set forth. Suffice it to say that now at the highest level of the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, the leaders have committed themselves to taking a first, very significant step toward limiting both defensive and offensive nuclear weapons.

That commitment, having been taken publicly, thereby gives us at this period, since it was committed publicly in terms of attempting to achieve it and hoping to achieve it this year, it gives us an idea as to what could develop from now on out between the two superpowers.

Again, it does not guarantee that because the two superpowers may agree that their mutual interest will be served by a limitation on the one hand on our part of defensive weapons and a limitation on the part of the Soviet Union as far as offensive weapons are concerned, that

the two powers are not going to have other differences.

It does not guarantee that they will agree on everything else, that they will agree on the Mideast, that they will agree on East-West relations as far as Europe is concerned, and so forth. But the fact that this step is being taken in the field of negotiation is enormously significant simply because it has happened.

The announcement is significant, the commitment on the part of the leaders is significant; but even more important, if that commitment can become a reality—and it will take hard negotiating on the part of both sides to bring that reality into being—but if that can become a reality, then the two superpowers, not by rhetoric—and we have had cool rhetoric ever since this administration came into Washington—but indeed the two superpowers will have entered into a new period of better relations.

You can see what that would mean in contributing to the peace of the world, because wherever the two superpowers rub against each other, whether it is in the Mideast or whether it is in the Caribbean or whether it happens to be tangentially in a place like Viet-Nam, where it is tangential as far as the Soviet is concerned but nevertheless real, or whether it is the blue chips involved in Europe—all of this, of course, potentially carries within it the danger of conflict at the very highest level. And so making a movement toward reducing or limiting arms, making this kind of step indicates and gives us at least some hope that a different relationship between the two powers will, on a step-by-step basis, develop in the years ahead.

## Developments With Regard to Mainland China

A few weeks ago you all, of course, covered in your newspapers, on your television and radio programs, the developments with regard to China, mainland China.

In a recent press conference,³ you may recall that I said that, when asked about what this meant, I said we must realize that what happened was significant, not simply the visit of the table tennis team—that had some significance and of course great interest because of its rather

³For text, see BULLETIN of June 6, 1971, p. 741.

³For excerpts from President Nixon's news conference of Apr. 29, see BULLETIN of May 17, 1971, p. 629.

758

Department of State Bulletin

bizarre character as far as we were concerned—but because in the field of travel and in the field of trade, in the field of exchange of persons and in the field of trade, to put it more precisely, we see a very significant change occurring for the first time since the Government which presently is in power in mainland China, the People's Republic of China, that Government and the Government of the United States have found two areas, exchange of persons and travel, where, again on a precise step-by-step basis, they are beginning to have a different relationship than they had previously. As I put it, what we have done really is broken the ice, now we have to test the water to see how deep it is. More steps will be taken on our part and on their part when it is to the reciprocal interest of both to do so.

I do not suggest that any steps are presently being contemplated on either side. That would not be in the interest of having that come about. But I do say that the very fact that the United States and the Government of mainland China, the People's Republic of China, have finally moved in these limited areas toward a relation of normalcy gives us hope that not immediately, not within a year, for example, but looking to the future, that 800 million Chinese will not be isolated from the rest of the world.

Let me just say parenthetically that when we think of the dangers to peace of the world, I can think of none that would quite exceed the fact that 800 million, and then perhaps in 25 years a billion, of the most capable and able people in the world would be isolated from the rest of the world, living there, not knowing the rest of the world, and with a growing and very dangerous nuclear capability.

I do not suggest that the steps that we have taken have dealt with that problem conclusively up to this point; but again we have made movement and more movement will take place as we, on either side, find that it is in our best interest.

We look to another area of conflict, the East. Here the Secretary of State has just completed a very significant trip. It did not, and none of the reporters who went with him expected it to happen—and they, incidentally, wrote it very objectively and, it seems to me, in a highly professional way—it did not settle the

differences. We did not expect that to happen.

But when we look at that troubled area of the world, it can be said now that we have had a truce for 9 months and that is some progress. It can be seen that while the two parties are still, it seems, very, very far apart with an irreconcilable difference—that is what it seems on the surface—there is still the fact of discussion going on through third parties, but nevertheless going on, which will not resolve those differences completely. And no one suggests that they may be resolved completely at any time in the future, but that may resolve them in part, again on a step-by-step basis.

## An Era of Peace

Now let me put all of this together in terms of what it means in foreign policy and then why our own policies in the United States and in the domestic field are so important as they relate to this.

Let's look to the future, what could happen. Here we must put our hopes high. As I said at Mobile earlier today, every President in this century, and I suppose every President long before this century, has spoken in terms of peace, not only for America but for the world.

Woodrow Wilson, I think, honestly felt that the war that he was involved in, World War I, would be a war that would end wars.

Franklin D. Roosevelt felt very strongly that World War II, particularly with the United Nations following it, could be the war that, as far as major powers were concerned, that would be the last great war.

And certainly my predecessors, President Eisenhower, President Truman, President Kennedy, President Johnson, were all dedicated to that proposition, as I am.

At this time I think we could say that because of these significant developments:

- First, the end of the American involvement in Viet-Nam, which we know is coming and on a basis which, in my view, will contribute to a more peaceful rather than a less peaceful era in the Pacific.

- Second, a significant change in the relation between the Soviet Union and the United States—still a long way to go, but still a sig-

June 14, 1971

759

nificant change at the highest level with the
leaders involved.

—Third, a change, not as significant, as far
as our relations with the mainland Govern-
ment are concerned in China, but nevertheless,
looking down the road, with great historical
possibilities.

—Fourth, the situation in the Mideast that
I have just referred to.

With all of these developments occurring,
what we in the United States may be facing
and may be confronted with—and this is some-
thing I guess we would all like to be confronted
with—is an era in which we could have peace
for a generation.

Now, having said that, that will also carry
with it enormous problems for this country—
enormous problems, because once you have
peace, what do you do with it? How do you
maintain it? How do you keep it?

Here I think that we have to be—as opinion
leaders in the South, I would commend these
thoughts to you as they have been commended
to me by my advisers—here we must recognize
that there will be no instant peace in any part of
the world. Once these different relationships
occur, if they do, if progress is made with the
Soviet Union, later with China, the People's
Republic, in the Mideast and in Viet-Nam and
the rest, this does not mean that as a result of
these developments that the differences between
nations end, that their interests will be the
same, and that the need for a continued strong
American presence in the world and strong de-
fense will have evaporated.

On the contrary, we must recognize the fact
that we are going to continue to have differences,
very significant and deep differences, with other
nations in the world.

And looking again at a very difficult and
explosive part of the world, the Mideast, no
matter what kind of arrangement is made
there—no matter what kind of an agreement is
agreed to—because of the historical differences
that have existed there for centuries, there is not
going to be a period when people are going to
have a relationship that can be a completely
comfortable one.

But on the other hand, we are entering that

period when there is a chance to have a live-
and-let-live attitude, a settlement of differences
by peaceful means, peaceful competition, and
so on, down the road.

Now, what must the United States do in this
period? First, it is almost a cliche to say that
we must maintain our strength. That does not
mean we maintain our strength out of any sense
of jingoism, but it does mean we only reduce
our strength on a mutual basis.

Now, there are many well-intentioned people
who constantly—whether in the Senate or some-
times in columns in the press or on radio and
television—suggest that the way that the
United States can demonstrate its interest in
disarmament, and thereby in peace, is to dis-
continue our ABM [antiballistic missile] sys-
tem, reduce our offensive capabilities in the
nuclear area, and that that demonstration will
lead others to do likewise.

That is not the way it will happen. In my
view, wherever you have two nations—as you
have in the Soviet Union and the United
States—wherever you have two nations that are
competitive, whose interests are different, where
both mutually reduce their forces, that contrib-
utes to peace.

But where one or the other unilaterally re-
duces its forces and becomes very significantly
weaker than the other, that enormously in-
creases the danger of war. Therefore, the United
States—and I would say the same if I were a
leader of the Soviet Union—the United States
does not serve the cause of peace by unilaterally
reducing its forces without at the same time
mutually negotiating a reduction on the part
of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union leaders, I think, under-
stand that. That has certainly been the way they
have approached the problem. We understand
their position. We do not expect them to reduce
their forces unilaterally. We will not ours. So
whether it is our forces of a conventional type
in Europe or whether it is our nuclear forces,
offensive or defensive, the United States, it
seems to me, serves the cause of peace by main-
taining its strength and reducing that strength
only as others who may have different interests
reduce theirs.

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Department of State Bulletin

U.S. Economic Leadership

The second point that I would make is on the
economic field. We enter a period when it is
enormously important that the United States
not lose the position of economic leadership
which it presently has in the world. I say "pres-
ently." That position is being jeopardized. It is
being jeopardized perhaps not so much because
of our failings, although that may be partially
the reason, but it is being jeopardized because
the whole situation is changed—and we should
be gratified, in a sense, that it has changed—
since World War II.

Take the two defeated nations of World War
II, the two major ones, the Japanese and the
Germans. At the present time they are our
major competitors in the world; and as they
compete and as they become more efficient, the
United States finds that as far as its world mar-
kets are concerned and as far as its markets in
the United States are concerned, that Japanese
competition, German, and as Britain enters the
Common Market, European competition is
going to be a continuingly more difficult
problem.

So let me put that in perspective. As far as
our economic policy is concerned, first, a strong
American economy is essential if we are going
to be able to maintain the military strength that
we need to maintain in order to create the
processes that will lead to a peaceful balance
in the world, and that is what we seek. Secondly,
it is going to be essential in order for the United
States to maintain the movement forward and
upward of greater opportunity, more jobs,
higher wages, a higher standard of living, to
which Americans have become accustomed for
190 years. It is a remarkable program of prog-
ress—a few ups and downs, depressions, reces-
sions, and the rest, but the trend line is up, and
it must continue to go up or we will have prob-
lems not only abroad, we will have enormous
problems at home, where these rising expecta-
tions will be bitterly disappointed.

So that brings us to our economy. Looking at
the economy, I am sure Herb Stein [Herbert
Stein, member of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers] has indicated to you that what we find

is that there is argument at the present time
not about whether the economy is moving up;
there is argument—and this is fortunately a
good subject to have the argument on—on how
fast it is moving up.

It is moving up. It will continue to move up.
The question is whether we can have upward
movement in the economy and have it with two
major factors that are quite different from up-
ward movements in some periods of growth in
the past.

First, it will be an upward movement without
war and with a decreasing military budget. I do
not suggest that that will happen now, but
looking to the future, in the event that some of
these relationships that I have indicated do come
together, that could be the prospect in the
future.

But in any event, our goal is a peacetime
economy, an economy without war and with the
military commitment dependent upon whether
we are able to work out concomitant arrange-
ments with other competing powers in the world
for mutual reduction of forces.

If that happens, on the one hand we are most
gratified. All Americans would rather they have
their energies and their creative ability devoted
to the works of peace rather than to weapons
of war. On the other hand, when you consider
the fact that since this administration came into
office, as a result of the winding down of the
war in Viet-Nam and the reduction of our forces
in places like Korea and Thailand and the
Philippines and in other parts of the world, as
well as in the continental United States, 2.1 mil-
lion Americans have been added to the labor
force, let out of the Armed Forces, and let out
of defense plants.

This has a traumatic effect, we believe tem-
porary; but it certainly is very difficult, par-
ticularly while it goes on in the Pacific
Northwest, southern California, areas like that,
with which you are familiar. We will survive it.
We will see it through, but it means that we
have got to develop, within this basic economy
of ours, new activities that will take up that lag
that the military expenditures no longer is
filling.

June 14, 1971

761

... at the present time, it is vitally important that this Nation attain a sense of unity which can only come from sharing our concerns about our common ideals. Let me not cover it in detail, that would take too much time, but simply to touch upon three or four points very briefly.

I referred a moment ago to Woodrow Wilson's remarks when he came to Mobile in 1913, the year I was born, and he spoke of the end of imperialism—he said, American imperialism in the world. I am sure he believed that. We think of what has happened since that time, four wars, and America was in all of them. World War II, World War I, Korea, and then Viet-Nam. Then we look at those wars and what do we say to our young people about all of them? We can argue about whether it was a mistake to go into any.

My mother and grandmother and my grandmother on my mother's side would have said, "Yes, it was a mistake," because they were pacifists and they did not even agree when I was in World War II. Many others would say that.

But when we look at the U.S. role in the world in those four wars, whatever our mistakes may have been, we at least can be proud of the fact that we did not start any of them, we gained nothing from them and asked nothing from them in the way of domination over any other people, and third, we came to the aid of people whose freedom was threatened.

Now, I will not go into a rather meaningless debate at this point, because we all have our views—and we are probably pretty concrete about them—about the war in which we are presently engaged. But as far as the motivation of America, why we are doing what we are doing, its motivation has no imperialistic overtones, its motivation, as the case in Korea, World War I, and World War II, is to help another nation whose freedom, independence—call it what you will—is threatened and also to build a more peaceful world. That is a record that we can be proud of.

Second, as far as America's strength in the world is concerned, we need not be apologetic about it. At the present time, is there any other nation in the world that you would rather have this strength? I have been to 70 countries. I talked to the leaders of countries—leaders of

countries with very different philosophies. I have yet to find the leader that feared the United States of America, that feared that we would use our armed strength for the purpose of invading it, of conquest, or for any other purpose except to help them maintain their independence.

We made our mistakes. We make them now, but we in America, as we play our world role, perhaps we are naive, but we are basically idealistic, we maintain our strength for purposes of peace and not for other purposes.

I simply close with a last thought. There is another point of view. I recognize it, I respect it—I totally disagree with it. It is that at this time America should turn away from the problems of the world and turn inward. It is a point of view which rejects new ventures, whether it is an SST [supersonic transport] or an exploration in space or whatever the case might be, because we have such terrible problems at home.

It is one in which every time we see a chance for progress we consult our fears rather than our hopes. And I would simply say that I am convinced that as opinion leaders in this country, you and me, we all have an obligation to see that America, after 190 years now, that we are the strongest nation in the world, still the richest, with more freedom, more opportunity here than anyplace in the world, that we do not at this point, because of internal differences, differences between races, between religions, between regions, between ages, turn inward to attempt to solve those problems at the exclusion of moving forward, whether it is playing our role in the world or exploring the unknown.

I don't agree with everything General de Gaulle said, because he said many things about this country that were very uncomplimentary and other things that he may have been wrong about. But he was a great judge of the spirit of the peoples—that was his contribution to France. He restored the French spirit, and he said France is her true self only when she is engaged in a great enterprise.

And America, in my view, will cease to be her true self when we cease to be engaged in an enterprise greater than ourselves, whether it is

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in playing our role in the world to bring peace with freedom wherever we can, whether it is exploring the unknown, whether it is moving forward in these problems, very difficult ones, human problems that we have between racism, religions, and generations in this country.

I simply want to say that one of the reasons that these regional briefings, I think, are important to me as an individual, it gives me an opportunity to meet the opinion leaders, to share with you my concerns and to tell you that I will, of course, do everything that I can to end the war that we are in, to have better relations to build a lasting peace, to keep the Nation strong militarily, to get this economy moving so that we can get at unemployment and resist the high inflation.

But in this other field we desperately need your help to restore America's sense of confidence and sense of faith. Don't gloss over our failures. They are many. But recognize that this is a great country; that we are very fortunate to live here.

## King Faisal of Saudi Arabia Visits the United States

Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, visited the United States May 24-30. He met with President Nixon and other Government officials in Washington May 27-30. Following is an exchange of greetings between President Nixon and King Faisal at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on May 27.

White House press release dated May 27

### PRESIDENT NIXON

Your Majesty: You have visited our country many times, but it is a very great honor for me to welcome you on this occasion officially as the head of state and head of government of the great nation you represent.

I know that the talks that we shall have and

the talks that year advisers will have with members of our administration will contribute to the already excellent relations we have between our two countries.

And I am particularly looking forward to the opportunity of having the benefit of your wise counsel as one of the senior statesmen of the world on how our two nations can work together for a just and secure peace in the Mideast and in all parts of the world.

I know that this visit will be of great benefit to the representatives of our Government, and we hope that you and all the members of your royal party will enjoy your stay in our Nation's Capital.

### KING FAISAL ¹

In the name of God the Merciful, Mr. President, it is a great pleasure for me to get with Your Excellency in this great country. Undoubtedly I am no stranger to this country. But I do believe that our meeting under these circumstances will prove fruitful, particularly as a result of Your Excellency's contribution to them.

The good relations between our two countries and the close and friendly relations between us do not need a great effort for them to remain the way they are.

We hope that this good relationship which exists between our countries will be in the interest of all and in the interest of the world at large. And I hope that the friendship of the United States will not be restricted only to our country and that relations, good relations, will not exist only between our two countries.

We hope that these good relations and this friendship will exist not only between this great country and this great President and its great people and ours, but also between you and the Arab and Islamic countries of the Middle East.

If certain factors, power, and circumstances have succeeded in disrupting the relations at times between your great country and ours and between your country and the Arab and Islamic countries of the world, we hope that through your efforts, Mr. President, these good relations

¹ King Faisal spoke in Arabic.

June 14, 1971

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