MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Huang Chen, Chinese Ambassador to France
Tsao Kuei Sheng, First Secretary of Chinese Embassy
Wei Tung - Secretary to the Chinese Ambassador
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Major General Vernon Walters, Defense Attache,
U.S. Embassy, Paris
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

PLACE: Chinese Embassy, Paris
TIME: Monday, July 26, 1971 4:35 - 5:15 p.m.

Dr. Kissinger apologized for being late for the meeting, but he had been delayed at another appointment. Ambassador Huang welcomed Dr. Kissinger on Chinese soil and commented that he foresaw that Dr. Kissinger would be late. He noted that he had seen Dr. Kissinger at General DeGaulle's funeral and had almost said hello. Dr. Kissinger responded that he in turn had seen the Ambassador, but refrained from introducing himself because of the excitement it would have caused, particularly for the Soviet Ambassador. He said that he had pleasant memories of his trip to Peking.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that he had wanted to meet the Chinese Ambassador while in Paris so as to make arrangements for future contacts.

Ambassador Huang then presented a verbal message from his government which read as follows: "The Chinese Government agrees to an interim visit to China by Dr. Kissinger for the latter part of October. Owing to understandable reasons, it would not be appropriate for Mr. Bruce to come to China."

Ambassador Huang then said that he had another verbal message which stated that when Dr. Kissinger comes to China in the latter part of October, the special U.S. aircraft should take off directly from Alaska to land at the Shanghai airport. For further details, the Chinese would advise the U.S. concerning further contacts.

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In response to Dr. Kissinger's query about why Shanghai was suggested Ambassador Huang replied that he could only transmit the message as he received it, and that this was what he had to say.

Dr. Kissinger said that he was sure that Prime Minister Chou En-lai remembered that it was his suggestion that there be an interim visit, and thus the United States had accepted his proposal. Dr. Kissinger had told the Prime Minister that Ambassador Bruce was the one man of our ambassadorial group in whom we had total confidence, and if Dr. Kissinger was not able to go to China, Ambassador Bruce would be able to speak for the President. He had explained to the Prime Minister at the time that Ambassador Bruce would have left the negotiations in Paris. In fact, he was leaving the next week. Dr. Kissinger understood the view of the Chinese government concerning this occasion, but it would be in the two countries' mutual interest if this were not a permanent view. For the United States hoped Ambassador Bruce could be used to maintain contact with the Chinese government on the occasions that Dr. Kissinger couldn't do so himself.

As for the technical side of the interim visit, General Walters would be in touch with Ambassador Huang, Dr. Kissinger continued. The U.S. would require specific information as to where the meetings would take place, who would participate, and the approximate size of the delegations on both sides, as well as the length of the visit. However, Dr. Kissinger added, there was plenty of time for these matters and they didn't have to be settled for several weeks. He did wish that Prime Minister Chou En-lai would read what he had told him about Ambassador Bruce, since it was important that the two sides keep contacts that don't become public.

Dr. Kissinger said that he had a couple of other matters to discuss. First, the U.S. was aware of the fact that the Chinese Nationalists were organizing and would intensify a campaign, together with other countries, against the meeting that has taken place in Peking and against the meeting that has been planned between the President and Chinese leaders. Part of this campaign was to describe Dr. Kissinger as a communist agent. Dr. Kissinger remarked that he could only say that the communists were not paying him very well. Ambassador Huang laughed and said that was ridiculous. Dr. Kissinger responded that it was of no concern to the Chinese and that it was his problem.

Dr. Kissinger stated that there was a second problem that could concern both countries. There was a systematic campaign to tell the press things that were

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allegedly discussed between Prime Minister Chou En-lai and himself
in order to embarrass both sides. He wanted the Chinese to know that
the only things which the U.S. had told the press were in his backgrounder,
a copy of which he had given the Chinese, and anything else they read did
not come from the United States Government.

Secondly, Dr. Kissinger said, the U.S. would continue to inform the
Chinese of any conversations in which the PRC is mentioned that the
U.S. might have with any other socialist country. And if anything should
be said to the contrary, the Chinese could be sure that it was not true.

Finally, in any contact the U.S. Government would have with the press,
it would reserve with the greatest restraint any commentary upon the PRC.
The U.S. would consider it helpful, given the delicacy of the U.S.-Chinese
relationship, if this were done on a reciprocal basis, but in any event the
U.S. will do it. Ambassador Huang said this presented no problem on his side
it remained to be seen how the U.S. was able to do it. The Chinese would take
care of their side.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that the American press was beside itself at this
moment, particularly Mr. Joseph Alsop who was writing endless speculation
on what happened in Peking. Ambassador Huang commented the Chinese had
already read some of his articles. Dr. Kissinger said that none of the U.S.
side had talked to Mr. Alsop, and that's what makes him angry, that and the
fact that Dr. Kissinger had gone to Peking without his permission. It doesn't
matter what the United States did, Mr. Alsop did not recognize the PRC.
Ambassador Huang commented that other Americans have attitudes like him.
Dr. Kissinger replied that this was a problem, that the U.S. had major
opposition from right-wing groups. Ambassador Huang noted that this was
one of the difficult problems for the U.S. Curiously enough, Dr. Kissinger
said, it was best if the left wing were not encouraged to say too much by the
Chinese. The best way to keep the right-wing groups under control was
if the U.S. Government could assure them that its policy was an independent
one. Ambassador Huang responded that he was prepared to report to his
government what Dr. Kissinger had told him. Dr. Kissinger said he was
very grateful.

During some tea and pleasantries, Dr. Kissinger said that he would let
Ambassador Huang know through General Walters when he was coming to
town secretly. If Ambassador Huang had any messages for him, he could
then let him know, and they could meet. Ambassador Huang agreed with
this procedure, and the meeting then concluded.

1. The U.S. side wanted the Chinese side to be aware of the following developments. In light of the deteriorating situation in South Asia, the United States has told Pakistan that it is prepared to take this issue to the U.N. Security Council. Assuming the Pakistani Government favors this step, the U.S. would plan to work toward a Security Council resolution along the lines of the current tentative draft attached. Based on consultations with the Pakistani Government, this draft is strengthened over the U.S. draft discussed on November 23.

In view of the urgency of this situation, the U.S. wishes to inform the Chinese through this channel of the measures it is currently taking. The State Department announced today, December 3, the U.S. decision of December 2 to cancel all remaining valid licenses for military equipment for India. This is in addition to the December 1 announcement that all such future licenses for India were suspended, existing licenses would not be renewed, and some current licenses relating to ammunition were canceled.

The U.S. is now reviewing all economic assistance programs to South Asia to determine what further measures might be appropriate. It is in the meantime holding up new disbursements.

The U.S. side proposes that as the situation in the United Nations evolves, the U.S. and Chinese sides maintain contact through Pakistani diplomats. If the Chinese side wishes to contact the U.S. side directly, the U.S. side suggests that it first call Washington, using the procedure agreed upon on November 23. If any American official, no matter what level, seeks to arrange a meeting with the Chinese side, this should not be considered official unless it has been previously confirmed in this channel.

2. In light of the pressure building up on the issue of a successor to Secretary General U Thant, the question arises as to how the People's Republic of China wishes to proceed. For example, there have been informal discussions in New York looking toward a possible informal meeting of the five permanent members of the Secretary Council.

Dr. Kissinger plans to be in New York on other business Friday, December 10, 1971 and could arrange to see Ambassador Huang Hua secretly if the Chinese side would like to discuss this matter as well as any other pertinent U. N. topics, including the South Asian situation.

If the Chinese side considers an earlier meeting desirable, Dr. Kissinger is prepared to rearrange his schedule.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

The Security Council,

Noting the memoranda of the Secretary General dated July 10, 1971 and October 20, 1971 to the President of the Security Council;

Having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan,

Deeply concerned that hostilities along the India-Pakistan border could constitute an immediate threat to international peace and security,

1) Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all steps required for an immediate cessation of hostilities;

2) Calls for an immediate withdrawal of any foreign forces on the territory of the other to their own sides of the India-Pakistan border;

3) Calls upon the Governments of India and Pakistan and others concerned to exert their best efforts toward the creation of a political climate conducive to the voluntary return of refugees to East Pakistan;

4) Calls upon all states to refrain from any action that would endanger the peace in the area;

5) Invites the Governments of Pakistan and India to respond affirmatively to the proposal of the Secretary General offering good offices looking towards a peaceful resolution of the situation in the area;

6) Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council as soon as possible on the implementation of this resolution.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

The U.S. GOVERNMENT has heard from
the GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN. THEY HAVE
LEFT WHETHER TO GO TO THE U.N.
SECURITY COUNCIL UP TO THE JUDGMENT
OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT THEREFORE INTENDS TO
PROCEED ALONG THESE LINES IN
CO-ORDINATION WITH OTHER INTERESTED
POWERS,

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 2, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM: Marshall Wright
SUBJECT: Public Announcements on Chirep Policy

I think we will be all right on this matter. I talked with Ted Eliot. He did not resist the idea of an announcement deferred to the latter half of July and pointed out that Secretary Rogers had mentioned London in late July as one of the possible platforms.

Eliot got off a message to Pedersen with the Secretary's party stating White House preference for deferring the announcement until late July and suggesting the Secretary handle his consultations with NATO allies accordingly.

Unless there is something here of which I am unaware, I think we will have no problems.

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INFORMATION

April 20, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER
(Signed) HK

FROM: JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE

SUBJECT: Reaction to Relaxation of Restrictions on Trade with the People's Republic of China

State has sent you a preliminary report (Tab A) on reaction to the
President's relaxation of restrictions on trade with the PRC.
State's summary of its contents follows:

The President's announcement that restrictions on trade with the PRC will be relaxed has been treated as a major development by commentators around the world. The story received top play in the media in Western Europe, Asia, and Africa (we have no reaction reports as yet from Latin America). The reaction has been overwhelmingly favorable with the notable exceptions of nervousness in Moscow and Taipei and silence in Peking. The move has been welcomed as a step toward improved US-PRC relations; however, there is a general awareness that basic problems in US-PRC relations (such as Taiwan and Chirep) remain unresolved.

JHH:HL:vbs

4/20/71

22 September 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

Early on the morning of 21 September I called the Embassy of the People's Republic of China. Spoke to WEI TUNG and said I wished to see them. He replied that they were very busy in the morning and could see me only at 4 p.m. I asked if there was no chance of an earlier interview and WEI said it was impossible.

After the several calls received from Washington during the day, I went at 4. p. m. to the Chinese Ambassador's Residence near my home. As usual, I was received at the gate by WEI, at the front door by TSAO and escorted to the living room. Within 2 or 3 minutes the Ambassador came in.

Jasmine tea, preserved apples, lichee nuts and, this time, a
novelty -- dates!

After minor chit chat I produced the list of the aircraft crew with the names of General Hughes, Redman and Colonel Albertazzie added. I said that the 22nd and 23rd of September were overtaken by time but that 5, 6, or 7 October were acceptable. They nodded.

The Ambassador then asked what the Social Security Number represented and I told him. He then asked how Social Security operated in the U.S. I explained. Did unemployed workers receive assistance? I explained. He seemed impressed. He then asked me at what age one retired in the U.S. Army. I told him. He seemed surprised it was so young. He asked how many grades of Generals we had and was much interested in the 5-star rank, recalling that General Marshall had that rank when negotiating with the Chinese in 1945. He asked many other questions about the U.S. Armed Forces, mostly of a general nature. He then asked whether the government gave retired generals a car and chauffeur. I said almost all Americans had cars but very few had chauffeurs. The U.S. government did not give retired generals cars and chauffeurs. He seemed shocked. I said that in most cases the pension was adequate and at 65 we also had Social Security. He then asked whether people who worked for private firms also got pensions. I said they did. He again seemed impressed.

He then asked how old Dr. Kissinger was when he came to the U.S.
I said he was very young but the important thing to remember is that he
is an American working for the President of the United States.

The Ambassador then said that he enjoyed talking to Dr. Kissinger
He was always frank and direct and explained things well. He then said
he felt President Nixon would get a warm welcome in China, that the
Chinese people were hospitable like the American people. The trip was
for the good of all mankind.

He then asked me if Dr. Kissinger had ever been in the Army. I
said he had but only during WW II. He asked what was his rank. I
replied that I believed it was Captain. He grinned and said, "then he
has to salute you and me; we are generals." I said, "Mr. Ambassador,
maybe he'll salute you, but he doesn't salute me any more." He roared
with laughter and slapped me on the back.

All of the foregoing accompanied by the inevitable jasmine tea and
other so-called goodies. He said if Dr. Kissinger ever came at an
appropriate hour he would have him and me to lunch.

I then said I knew he was busy and if he had nothing for me I would
leave. He took me by the arm and said that he very much enjoyed his
talks with me. They were interesting and informative. We understood
one another. He hoped we would continue to see one another.

Thanking him, I left. As I did, he said, "All good military men
must have a strategic reserve"and gave me two handfuls of preserved
apples and lichee nuts. My gratitude overflowed and I left before he
gave me more.

As usual, only the three -- Ambassador, TSAO and WEI -- were
present. Neither incense, nor any sort of an answer to the questions
Dr. Kissinger had asked nor any mention of when an answer might be
forthcoming. I again gave them both my phone numbers in case they
wanted to reach me and left.

This time there was very warm cordiality, but neither
embarrassment nor answers. More cordial perhaps than any other
meeting. They had just seen someone from another planet -- America.

VERNON A. WALTERS
Major Genera, USA

Worship meeting in International Relations Scholars
June 12, 1972, Hotel Okura

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Why should the government that moved toward Peking and Moscow, that is battling the right wing in the US on SALT, be locked into a little corner of Asia unless we were given no choice?

**Prof. Seki:** But there is an asymmetry between US as a power and North Vietnam. Prime Minister Palme mentioned the ecocide the US was waging.

**Dr. Kissinger:** I recognize we have a moral obligation to take bigger steps.

**Prof. Ishikawa:** May I change the . . .

**Prof. Seki:** American scholars criticize you for . . .

**Dr. Kissinger:** They criticized us in February 1971 during the Laos operation for risking war with China. We were negotiating with China at the time. I said there was no risk of war with China. They ridiculed me for saying that. Then they said we ruined SALT. So I am confident we may yet settle it.

**Prof. Ishikawa:** The pressure is stronger here now to improve Sino-Japanese relations, especially since your Peking Summit. The Japanese Government probably will be forced to normalize relations. But Japan cannot normalize relations with China at the expense of its friendly relations with the US and Korea. Unfortunately, there are the three principles which China asks of us as a prerequisite. What is the response of the United States Government to the three principles?

**Dr. Kissinger:** So far the Japanese Government has not accepted the three principles. I should not comment on a hypothetical question. But as a general proposition, it is a mistake for one of us to get ahead of the other. We faced a special problem last year. You already had many missions there. When I went there, we had had no high-level contact at all. We faced a very new situation for us. We had to do it secretly. It was regrettable, but we had to do it that way, because I literally did not know who I would meet there or what would be discussed. All our contacts were through third countries. It was extraordinary to me as a political scientist to see in 1969 how it took six months just to find a reliable method to communicate.

We should have more or less a common approach. Nobody can get ahead permanently. What our reactions will be to moves we cannot follow, I don't know. There can be tactical divergences.

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**Dr. Kissinger:** The US position on the Security Treaty is this: We have no intention of asking for its abrogation or revision. This will be true for this and the next administration as a factual matter.

Now it is also true that strategic conditions in the world change all the time -- 1972 is not 1957 or 1958. What we meant to say is that obviously the Japan of 1972 is not the Japan of 1959, and we are prepared to discuss with Japan any adjustment or apportionment of roles.

I am asked: Do we want Japan to organize expeditionary forces? No. We don't particularly favor it.

What we meant is that we are dealing with a mature ally and we are willing to consider it [the Treaty]. But the initiative will have to come from you.

**Prof. Nagai:** The "Nixon shocks" are said to be a deliberate Nixon-Kissinger policy to force Japan to become a more independent power. At the Shimoda conference, an America spokesman said there was a deliberate "conspiratorial" policy. I don't see this. There seems to be a gap of mutual communication. You could not understand the complicated Japanese politics and the over-reaction.

**Dr. Kissinger:** On the conspiratorial theory, whenever I go to Harvard I am impressed by how clever I am. They have the most complex theories of what we mean and what we are planning. But senior officias don't have the time to develop the devious plans attributed to them. I think that intelligence services are contributing to international tension by ascribing rational complicated purposes to what is usually confusion or bureaucratic mixup or inadvertence (laughter). Frankly, professors don't have the foggiest notion of how decisions are made.

1. In view of the fact that the U.S. Government will, around September 23, put forward to the United Nations General Assembly its draft resolutions designed to create "Two Chinas" which the Chinese Government firmly opposes, the Chinese side cannot agree to the issuance of the press releases on the interim visit at the said time. The Chinese side agrees that the two sides issue their respective press releases on the interim visit at 2200 on October 5 (Peking Time) in the text agreed upon by the two sides.

2. The agenda and arrangements for the talks during the interim visit can be discussed and decided upon after Dr. Kissinger's arrival. The purpose of the talks to be held during President Nixon's visit to China was already officially announced on July 16, namely, "to seek the normalizations of relations between the two countries and also to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides". It goes without saying that the talks should concentrate on the principal issues without diversion of attention to side issues.

3. The Chinese side will give a separate reply in regard to personnel arrangements and services for the special plane and other matters.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR:
HENRY A. KISSINGER

FROM:
JON M. HUNTSMAN

SUBJECT:
China Visit

It was requested that you note the following report which appeared in the July 27, 1971 News Summary:

"A Hong Kong newspaper which adheres closely to Peking's political line published a series of quotations by Mao hinting that Communist China may be prepared to resume negotiations with the regime of Chiang Kai-Shek. The major portion of the quotations came from a speech the Chairman made to party leaders in 1945 after he had participated in negotiations with Chiang. The reasoning Mao used then to explain his negotiations with Chiang is being used now to explain to Cadres the reasons for the surprise invitation to RN to visit China. Some analysts said the reference to the Chungking negotiations in a Hong Kong newspaper "probably" was a prelude to convert, and possibly overt, contacts with nationalist elements about new negotiations."

Thank you.

cc: H. R. Haldeman
Alexander P. Butterfield

CONFIDENTIAL