CONVOCATION

St. John's Church
Church of the Presidents
Lafayette Square
Washington, D.C.

Wednesday, October 15, 1969, 1:00 p.m.

Invocation:
Dr. John C. Harper
Rector, St. John's Church

Introductory Remarks:
Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.
Master of Ceremonies

Statement:
Robert A. Gerard
Law Clerk, United States
Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit

Address: "The Pursuit of Peace in Vietnam"
Justice Arthur J. Goldberg

Closing Remarks:
Clifford L. Alexander, Jr.

Welcoming Committee for Justice Goldberg:

Mortimer M. Caplin

Ramsey Clark

Benjamin V. Cohen

Manuel F. Cohen

Thomas D. Finney, Jr.

Senator Thomas H. Kuchel

John G. Laylin

Edward A. McDermott

Daniel H. Margolis

Seymour S. Mintz

John E. Nolan, Jr.

John H. Pickering

Paul A. Porter

E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr.

Joseph L. Rauh, Jr.

Sidney S. Sachs

Paul S. Warnke

NOT FOR RELEASE BEFORE 1:00 P.M.

# The Pursuit of Peace in Vietnam

by

The Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg

Mr. Alexander, Ladies and Gentlemen:

Before I turn to the subject which has brought us
together in this historic church, I want to say a few
words about the Moratorium itself.

I have always thought that one of the most over-
looked and underrated treasures in our common religious
heritage is the Sabbath, the setting aside of one day
in seven so that man might restore his soul. The Vietnam
Moratorium is similarly conceived, and has a considerable
potential to restore our moral and spiritual well-being.
We owe a great debt to the young men and women who have
worked so hard and imaginatively to bring concerned citizens
together in a peaceful setting to discuss the most pressing
problem facing the Nation.

Although today's Moratorium is without recent
political precedent, it is profoundly American in spirit.

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We believe, after all, that in our country government requires the consent of the governed, whose right to assemble and to petition is enshrined in the First Amendment. It is not enough that public opinion be sampled in the voting booth every four years, or that the task be delegated to the professional pollsters. As citizens we have a duty to inform ourselves, to discuss the issues, and to make our considered views known to those who govern.

It is incumbent upon lawyers, who are an important part of the body politic, to make themselves heard. The Bar in this country has a great tradition of involvement in public affairs, and its skills in analyzing issues, in negotiation, and in translating private wants into public policy are sorely needed. Peaceful convocations such as this provide a useful vehicle for lawyers to bring their talents to bear on public issues.

I also want to note that "other moratorium." I refer to the suggestion which has been advanced that, in the days immediately ahead, there should be a general moratorium on popular discussions of the war in Vietnam,

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a moratorium of silence. If we were given information
which would lead me to believe that a brief postponement
of discussion would advance the cause of peace, of course
I would endorse it. And I believe the American public
would do so. But, frankly, we have not been furnished
with such information. One sad aspect of this war has
been the fact that too often we have been asked to take
important matters on faith. Our past experience in this
regard has not been encouraging.

There is an even more compelling reason why the
Vietnam Moratorium is to be preferred to a moratorium of
silence. The President has said that it is his purpose
to end the war, and I believe him. From my own experience,
I can assure you that some advisers will caution that the
American people are hawkish, and will punish any adminis-
tration which moves boldly and quickly to terminate the war.
I think now, as I thought in the past, that this is a mis-
reading of public opinion and that the people will support
an administration which brings peace in Vietnam. Recent
polls justify my view, as does the warm response of the

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public to the Moratorium. Peaceful meetings like this underscore the fact that the American people want peace in Vietnam, and will support the President in taking those measures which are necessary to attain it.

Each of us comes here motivated by love of country and concern for its problems. None of us, I am convinced, harbors any desire to hamper the Paris negotiations in any way or to undermine the President in the conduct of his office. As Americans, after all, we have an enormous stake in the President's being able successfully to end the war in Vietnam and turn the Nation's attention and energies to its pressing domestic problems.

I accepted the invitation to speak to you today because I am convinced that the Moratorium can be useful in accelerating the process toward peace, that it strengthens the President's hand in achieving peace rather than weakens it.

There is a special obligation on those who have served in government and have dealt with some aspects of the war to come forward and offer their views, free of the restraints

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which necessarily inhibited their freedom to speak while
they were in government.

Based on my own experience in this area, I would
say there are at least three dangerous illusions which
must be avoided by anyone attempting to solve the problem
of this tragic war.

First, there is the recurring notion that there
is "light at the end of the tunnel," that the enemy will
crumble if only we persevere. From my vantage point the
evidence that present policies are about to succeed in
a military sense is no stronger now than it was in the
past.

A second illusion is that we can succeed if we step
up the military pressure. As you know, between 1965 and
1968 we did increase the pressure, and drew no closer
to success. The evidence adduced for military escalation
is no stronger now than it was then.

Third is the increasingly popular illusion that we
need only to hold on until we succeed in "Vietnamizing"

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the war. This, too, was a fond hope of the past. And
I see no evidence today that the South Vietnamese are
any more ready to take our place, within tolerable time
limits, than they were then. Moreover, I want to see
the war which has torn Vietnam for a quarter of a century
come to an end. It is not enough to "Vietnamize" the war.
It is vastly more important that we "Vietnamize" the peace.

That having been said, I should like to sketch for
you some suggestions of mine which might be useful in
extricating us from the war. I do so in great humility
and with full awareness of the difficulties. I do believe,
however, that a course of action along these lines is worth
trying.

The *first* point is for the President publicly to
order all American forces to cease offensive military
operations. In short, I am suggesting an *American* cease-
fire. Our troops would be instructed to fire back when
fired upon, but no more. We should urge the South Viet-
namese to do likewise, but our own tactics should not
depend upon their decision. Although we would assist our

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allies when they come under attack, we would not support
their offensive operations -- should any occur.

Such an American ceasefire would have the major
advantage of sharply and immediately curtailing American
casualties. Furthermore, it might be regarded by the
North Vietnamese and by world opinion as a suitable
American response to the recent reduction in the infil-
tration of North Vietnamese soldiers into the South, and
to the present battle lull, now in its seventh week. The
ceasefire I propose would be a significant response to
these signals, if they are signals, and might break the
impasse in the Paris negotiations. If they are not signals,
we would have reduced our losses.

Such a ceasefire should be given a real opportunity
to succeed. Indeed, in my judgment, we should impose no
time limitation on it, but simply announce that we have
adopted a purely defensive posture and will maintain it.

<u>Second</u>, I suggest a straightforward statement by
the President that we accept the principle that there should
be a prompt withdrawal of <u>all</u> American forces, and that we

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are prepared to discuss in Paris a timetable for their
prompt and systematic withdrawal.

The Presidential statement should renounce any
intention of keeping a substantial American military
force in Vietnam either indefinitely or for a period
of years, in order to support and protect the South Viet-
namese Government. As our military leaders have properly pointed
out, we cannot station air or artillery units in Vietnam
without providing the ground units to protect them. We
simply cannot disentangle ourselves from Vietnam by under-
taking indefinitely to station there hundreds of thousands
of Americans-- whether volunteers or draftees.

The *third* step is to renounce any idea of imposing
conditions of our own upon any political settlement reached
by the South Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. It is not our
place to impose such a settlement. Yet we speak of the
need for free elections, and of other conditions which,
however well motivated and compatible with our own political
concepts, may or may not have a role in the resolution of
the Vietnamese political situation. The details of a Viet-
namese settlement should be left to the Vietnamese.

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Let me be frank. I realize that a plan such as I
have outlined poses difficult choices, and carries con-
siderable risks. I offer you no assurance that it will
work, that it will break the current logjam in Paris.
In my judgment, however, something like it should be tried,
for our present policy is even riskier and has almost no
potential for success.

I suggest that my plan does have a number of sub-
stantial advantages, both over present policy and over the
alternatives which have been proposed by others.

First, it promises to get us out of Vietnam.

Second, it offers the best hope of minimizing our
casualties during the process of disentanglement. I see
no merit in setting a withdrawal deadline in 1970 or 1971,
and doing little or nothing to reduce our losses in the
interim. Such a policy needlessly consigns thousands of
American servicemen to death.

Finally, I believe that my plan provides powerful
incentives for the Vietnamese to resolve their own prob-
lems. A major defect of our present policy is that it

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encourages both the South Vietnamese and their enemies
to stand fast. So long as we remain in Vietnam in sub-
stantial numbers, the present South Vietnamese government
has little incentive to negotiate with their enemies as
to the future.

An American ceasefire, accompanied by systematic
withdrawal of our troops, will force the South Vietnamese
to negotiate their own future. And the Viet Cong and
North Vietnamese, who will have a serious problem main-
taining the morale of their troops once the American phase
of the war appears to be over, will have the incentive of
being able to accelerate our withdrawal by making conces-
sions of their own. This is what I mean when I say we
must "Vietnamize" the peace.

In setting out my three points and explaining their
advantages, I think that I have anticipated the principal
arguments which might be advanced against them.

There is, for example, the contention that we cannot
conduct negotiations in Paris if we announce in advance
that we are going to withdraw anyway. As I have indicated,

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and I am no novice to the art of negotiation, that argu-
ment both overrates our ability to negotiate under present
circumstances and underestimates the effect a ceasefire
and troop withdrawal would have on spurring negotiations
among the Vietnamese themselves. In any event, the enemy
knows from the President's statements that we have no
intention of staying forever.

The argument about our holding on until the war
has been "Vietnamized" is little more than a mirage. Care-
ful observers have detected no substantial improvement in
the ability of the South Vietnamese forces to take our
place. They remain totally reliant on American artillery
and air power, and show no reasonable likelihood of being
able to assume these functions in the foreseeable future.
To base American policy on the "Vietnamization" of the war
is to tie substantial American forces down in Vietnam for
years to come.

The fact of the matter is, as the Administration
has said, we no longer seek a military solution in Vietnam.
We are now in pursuit of a diplomatic settlement of the

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conflict. Everyone agrees that we will get out of
Vietnam. The only question is one of timing. In these
matters, it is my considered judgment that once the
decision to withdraw is made and announced, sooner is
better than later.

We serve our Nation well by letting the President
know, in this orderly, peaceful fashion, that we under-
stand this was not his war; that we will support bold,
innovative measures designed quickly and cleanly to extri-
cate us from it; and that we are a great enough Nation
to do the right thing without fear that we might lose
"face" thereby. I recall in this context the wise words
of a Danish poet:

"The noble art of losing face
Will someday save the human race."

The President has declared that there are to be
"no more Vietnams." The place to begin implementing that
policy is in Vietnam itself, and the time is now. That
is the message of the Vietnam Moratorium.

ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

MARCH 28, 1973

It is indeed appropriate that on the eve of the
complete withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam
that this ceremony be held honoring Dr. Henry Kissinger
as an architect of peace.

I am glad to join in this tribute to him which,
in my view, is well deserved.

This is not to say that I have always agreed
with his policy and that of President Nixon in relation
to Vietnam. On the contrary, I have spoken out on
many occasions in criticism of various aspects of
this policy.

It also needs saying that many others in public
and private life, who during the past several years
have dissented from our government's policy in Vietnam
and advocated withdrawal and a cease-fire settlement, are
also architects of the peace. Indeed they are. The
ultimate fact is that the Vietnam war ceased to command
the support of the American people and, since we are a
society which depends upon the consent of the governed,

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the continuation of this unpopular war became completely
untenable.

The fact remains, however, that American troops,
as of tomorrow morning, will be completely withdrawn
from Vietnam and that a cease-fire of a sort exists
in that beleaguered country. Perhaps the most appropriate
comment this evening, under all the given circumstances,
is to say: "Thank God American intervention in Vietnam
is over;" and, in saying this, to pay appropriate
tribute to a principal architect and chief negotiator
of the cease-fire and withdrawal, Dr. Kissinger.

The winding down of the war in Vietnam is a
major, but not the only, contribution of Dr. Kissinger
to peace in the world. It is universally acknowledged
that his advice to the President has been a most
significant factor in President Nixon's new China policy.

Our new relations with China may not warrant the
pejorative adjectives used by President Nixon in
describing them during his stay in Peking, but, neverthe-
less, they constitute a foreign policy achievement of
great magnitude.

The same conclusion can be drawn from the recent
steps to establish a detente with the Soviet Union. Here,
too, Dr. Kissinger played a most significant role.

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It is interesting to note that in the steps taken to re-establish peace in Indo-China and to improve United States relations with the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, Dr. Kissinger, as the President's foreign policy adviser, was following, whether he was aware of it or not, advice tendered by President George Washington to his countrymen in his famous farewell address.

In this address, President Washington warned that "...permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others should be excluded."

We would do well to remember this truth as we contemplate the changes in the antagonisms and alliances to which we have grown accustomed in the past twenty-five years. Rather than indulge in passionate attachments or antipathies, we would be wisest to stick to President Washington's wise counsel: "Observe good faith and justice towards all nations."

I express the hope that the next steps in our nation's foreign policy would implement this latter remark of President Washington as well as the preceding one which I have quoted.

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There is a feeling in a considerable part of the world--including old friends and allies in Western Europe, allies and friends in Southeast Asia, particularly Japan, India and Australia, our close neighbors in Latin America and a considerable part of new nations in Africa recently emancipated from colonial rule--that the United States has been practicing "benign neglect" toward them.

It is a challenge and opportunity to Dr. Kissinger, in advising the President, now to correct this widespread belief and to convince them that American policy, as Washington advised, is to "observe good faith and justice towards all nations," including them.

I would also express the hope that the United States would reverse its present policy of down-grading the United Nations as an important component of its foreign policy. Instead of down-grading the U. N., President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger should, in my view, address themselves to the real problem involved: namely, how to put the power of the U. N.'s member nations, and particularly the power of the great nations, including the United States, to the service of the law of the Charter--to the service of world peace and security. If the law of the Charter

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is, in many instances, a delusion, as it has been, it
is because of the unwillingness of the great powers,
including ourselves, to put their power to serve the
law which they agreed should govern the international
community.

As a nation committed to the rule of law here and
abroad, we should take the lead role in advancing and
supporting proposals to this end. It is neither
seemly nor in our national interest for the United
States, a principal architect of the United Nations, to
undermine its foundations, and this we have been doing.

Perhaps all that I have mentioned is on the future
agenda of the President and Dr. Kissinger. I trust so.

I should like to conclude by a brief analysis of
Dr. Kissinger's qualities as a diplomat. Sir Harold
Nicolson, in his work on Diplomacy, gives the classic
definition:

"These then, are the qualities of my ideal
diplomatist: trust, accuracy, calm, patience,
good temper, modesty, and loyalty. They are
also the qualities of an ideal diplomacy."

Sir Harold then went on to say, "but, the
reader may object, you have forgotten intelligence,
knowledge, discernment, prudence, hospitality,

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charm, industry, courage and even tact. I
have not forgotten them. I have taken them
for granted."

I would not gild the lily and assert that Dr.
Kissinger possesses all of these qualities. Certainly,
modesty is not one of his outstanding attributes. But,
Dr. Kissinger possesses as many of these qualities as
any diplomatist I know.

Dr. Kissinger would be the first to acknowledge
the paramount role of President Nixon in the foreign
policy achievements I have mentioned. Nevertheless,
Dr. Kissinger's personal contributions to peace in the
world cannot and should not be gainsaid.

It is in recognition of his qualities as an
outstanding diplomatist and his achievements that warrants
the tribute being paid to Dr. Kissinger tonight at
American University--a tribute which is much deserved.

Mission Improbable

M.C.: Our hero is widely known for his strange appearances and disappearances. We take you now to the White House press room where reporters are asking the traditional question, "Where's Henry?"

Scene: (The White House. Two reporters (one male, one female) are harassing a harassed press aide.)

Joe: Come on, Ron, give us a break. We know he's been gone a long time.

Helen: If you can't tell us where he is, at least tell us the name of the girl.

Ron: I'm sorry, but you know I'm under orders not to violate Rule Number One.

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Joe: Would we be wrong to speculate that he is not on
a mission of less than world-shaking significance
not unrelated to peace?

Ron: Could you repeat that question, Joe?

Joe: I doubt it.

Helen: What Joe meant was, wouldn't it be inaccurate not
to contradict the rumor that this mission is not
inconsequential?

Ron: I'd rather not comment on that.

Joe: Ron, you're just not being cooperative.

Ron: How can you say that, Joe? You know this is an
open Administration. It's just that divulging
anything we do might compromise the national
security.

Helen: Then we can assume that Dr. Kissinger's mission
is related to the national security?

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Ron: I didn't say that, Helen.

Joe: If this is an open Administration, Ron, prove it.
Produce Kissinger.

Ron: Kissinger? We gave you a two-hour interview with
the President last night.

Joe: Big deal. Anybody can see the President. Only
Chairman Mao gets to see Henry.

Helen: Yes, and the Playboy bunnies. What have they got
that I haven't got?

Kissinger: (entering, with Kapitol Kutie on his arm) Nothing,
Liebchen, but in my line of work you've got to be
quick and avoid page one. (To Kutie) Sit right
here, honey, I'll only be a few minutes.

Joe: Where have you been this time, Dr. Kissinger?

Helen: Were you successful?

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Kissinger: (beaming) Very successful. Successful beyond
my wildest dreams. (goes over to Kutie, strokes
her hand)

Helen: I mean, your mission.

Kissinger: Oh, that. That was excellent too.

Ron: (nervous) Dr. Kissinger, shouldn't you report to
the President before you meet with the press?

Kissinger: Don't be so uptight, Ron baby. After what I've
been through, I can certainly handle these people.

Helen: What you've been through, Dr. Kissinger? It sounds
like your mission was very demanding.

Kissinger: All my missions are demanding, but this one was
particularly delicate. You see, these people
perceive things differently. They have different
standards and values. They are impassive, difficult
to reach.

Joe: You mean they're inscrutable?

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Kissinger: To Kissinger, they are never inscrutable.
They were very polite, but there was an
undercurrent of coolness--even of suspicion.
I was ushered into a huge, ornate conference room,
lined with flags. Through the windows you could
catch a glimpse of the river that flows through,
the heart of the city. (the two reporters and
Ron were captured now) Along both sides of the
long table were minor functionaries--each a big
man, of course, in his own little orbit. There
were two vacant chairs, one at each end of the
table. I was ushered to one of them. I sat
politely. The minor officials were speaking in
hushed tones--I was able to pick up a few of those
strange phrases common to bureaucrats of every
nation. And then, without any fanfare, their
Number One entered.

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Helen: (breathless) Number One?

Kissinger: Of course, Liebchen. I never deal with anyone less than Number one. He nodded to me and took his place at the far end of the table.

Joe: And then the negotiations began?

Kissinger: I was conciliatory, but firm. I offered the olive branch, but they were aware of the sheaf of arrows. I simply laid out before them, as clearly as I could, the President's demands and expectations.

Helen: Did they resist?

Kissinger: At first, of course. First they blustered. Then, when they saw that I was negotiating from strength, they pleaded. And in the end...

Ron: Yes, Dr. Kissinger?

Kissinger: In the end, they came over to our side. They decided to play the game by our rules.

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Helen: Dr. Kissinger, you haven't even told us where this meeting took place. Can we infer from your remarks that you were dealing with an Eastern culture?

Kissinger: Yes, a very effete Eastern culture.

Joe: Your security was remarkable this time. You slipped away without a trace. The President's plane never left the hanger at Andrews.

Helen: How _did_ you travel, Dr. Kissinger?

Kissinger: I took the K-4 bus.

All: The bus?

Helen: I thought this administration was against busing.

Kissinger: We are, but who can get a taxi in rush hour?

Joe: Wait a minute. Just where did you disappear to, for God's sake?

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Kissinger: To Foggy Bottom, of course.

Helen: You mean that's where all those mysterious negotiations took place?

Kissinger: Precisely. Ladies and gentlemen, I am proud to announce that we have reached a detente. The State Department is now on our side.

BLACKOUT