TelCon

Mr. Wasserman/Mr. Kissinger

9:30 pm, Jan. 2, 1973

K: Hello.

W: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you.

W: Oh, I'm feeling better, thank you. Sorry I didn't get to see
you but I've been in bed with this terrible flu that's running
around California.

K: Oh, I didn't realize that.

W: I never got down to Palm Springs at all.

K: I'm sorry to hear that. Are you feeling better?

W: Yeah, I think I'll go to work tomorrow for a couple of hours
to see if I can get caught up. I imagine you are pretty busy
and then you're away some place.

K: Well, I'm back in Washington now and I going off to Paris on
Sunday. So--

W: Well, I'll have to wait and see you when you get back.

K: Well why don't we have a talk when I come to the West Coast.

W: Right.

K: I mean I can't do anything until we get this mess wound up anyway.

W: Right.

K: Good, well I look forward to having a change to talk to you.

W: Right Henry. I'm terribly sorry I got the flu. I would have much
rater been in Palm Springs than in bed with a germ.

K: I can well imagine.

W: And have a safe and successful journey.

K: Thank you.

W: And a healthy New Year.

K: Thank you and the same to you. Bye.

TELCONE

U. Alexis Johnson/Kissinger

approx. 9:00 a.m. - 1/3/73

K: Hello.

J: Henry, you're in great shape, are you now?

K: (Laugs)

J: Henry, Bill Porter is seeing Messmer in 30 minutes - 9:30. He's
coming in with the message asking whether or not we want him to
cancel his appointment because of Pompidou's statement yesterday.
Personally the press I've seen and the summary I've seen is not
all that bad.

K: No, and we don't want - goddamn that Porter, he's the most
individual I've ever seen.

J: He's asking - it's his suggestion that he cancel his call on _________

K: On Mitterand (?) ?

J: Yeh, and my inclination is . . .

K: Listen, if you want to keep your job you recommend that to him.

J: Well, I wanted to be sure that you had no contrary reaction over
there.

K: Listen, you let the President catch him seeing Mitterand for any
reason and he'll never get back to Washington.

J: OK.

K: And I don't think that what Pompidou said was too bad.

J: I don't either.

K: There was an exchange of letters between the two gentlemen last
week.

J: I see Pompidou said that too.

K: So they better not take him on.

J: Yeh. Yeh. That's all I need to know.

TELCONE

Scotty Reston/Kissinger

9:03 a.m. - 1/3/72

K: Hello.

R: Happy New Year!

K: Happy New Year to you, Scotty. Scotty, you were nice enough to invite me to dinner tonight and I have to go to a reception for General Haig who's being sworn in as Vice Chief of Staff and he was my Deputy. But could I join you later.

R: Sure, Henry.

K: Are you going to return to your house. It would be easier for me to
tell you the truth.

R: Yes.

K: That isn't the reason why I'm not doing it.

R: Why don't we - we'll come back here, Henry, and then you come on in.

K: I'd like to do that.

R: What time roughly do you think?

K: Ten. Nine thirty - ten.

R: Nine thirty that'll be fine.

K: I'll make it at 9:30.

R: That's great. Good, Henry.

K: See you then, Scotty.

BREASTFIELD
Autograph E012958-
BY A.D. 9/10/91

TELCOM

Stu Alsop/Kissinger

9:12 a.m. - 1/3/73

K: Stu.

A: Hello, Henry.

K: You're knocking me this week.

A: (Laugs) Well, I'm writing about our old familiar subject.

K: Which is that? Making me Secretary of State or negotiations?

A: What's that?

K: Making me Secretary of State or negotiations?

A: Negotiations.

K: Good, thank God.

A: And I need a little smidgen of guidance on two points.

K: Right.

A: First, I'm told that the President's purpose in breaking off the talks and starting the bombing was to make sure that the negotiations were serious and to know that the other side really wanted to negotiate and wanted to negotiate quickly. But perhaps above all he wanted to make sure that the return of the prisoners should not be conditioned on the release of the VC in the Saigon jail - that sort of thing and he is insistent that it be tied to the prisoners in South Vietnam. I believe you mentioned this in your last press conference that the other side attempted to tie in the release of the prisoners.

K: Well, go ahead.

A: And second, and also on what I take to be reasonably good authority...

K: There is no reasonably good authority.

A: What's that?

DRAFTED
AUG 12 1973
JONES
BROOKLYN
NEW YORK
1005

2

A: Not even you or Mr. Nixon?

K: He, too, yes.

A: At any rate I'm told that the President essentially now has the assurances that he wanted and this is partly as a result of direct exchanges at, of course, the highest level.

K: You've been talking to John Scali.

A: Not only - others. Between Washington and Hanoi and therefore the prospects of the settlement are reasonably bright. Are these two points within the ball park?

K: Well, I can always tell Scali's leaks by their melodrama.

A: (Laughs) I don't see any great melodrama there.

K: He makes a five act Italian opera out of it.

A: Well naturally with his background. No, actually I did talk to John Scali but I also talked to others.

K: No that's all right. As far as the last point is concerned, it is correct that there has been exchanges between Washington and Hanoi. The highest level is pure balderdash. I mean - they've been through the same channel that's always been used in the same form.

A: Oh.

K: You know it's a high level channel but it's the same channel that we've always used.

A: Is it Pham Van Dong?

K: It is melodrama to personalize it. It doesn't work that way. There are no Presidential messages to Pham Van Dong.

A: Despite the *Times* story to that effect?

K: Is there a *Times* story?

3

A: There was a *Times* story that there was a direct exchange between Pham Van Dong and the President before your October 20 session.

K: Yes, that was the only time that there was one.

A: There hasn't been one since?

K: Look, the way that channel operates it's unnecessary.

A: Because they know that it'll get to the highest level.

K: That's right. It's the channel we have always used for every communication except on one occasion when a particular point wanted to be made. But it also went the same way then.

A: In any case it is true that there have been some exchanges during the bombing.

K: Oh yes.

A: And that these exchanges

K: But can you write that saying it must be surmised.

A: Sure. Actually Dick Wilson said add a piece saying there were exchanges.

K: Yeh, there were exchanges.

A: Yeh, and I believe there have been other pieces to that effect. There was another piece from Saigon in the *Star*.

K: Well, they wouldn't know anything.

A: Of course the prisoner thing.

K: So, it is correct that there were about 10 days worth of exchanges. Whenever a meeting is announced you can assume that there have been at least, usually two weeks of exchanges preceding it.

A: Therefore, the exchanges must have gone on while the bombing was going on.

4

K: Oh yes. Can I give you a fact that you cannot use?

A: All right.

K: I mean just to give you a feel.

A: Yeh.

K: This meeting was set 72 hours before the bombing stopped. I mean this is just so that you can evaluate whether pressures had anything to do with it.

A: Of course they said they would never negotiate while the bombing was

K: They said that when they knew what would happen. It was not that we said we will stop the bombing, what will you do; it was the other way around.

A: Oh. When they knew already that the bombing would stop they said we will never negotiate while the bombing is going on.

K: Exactly.

A: Am I right that the prisoners is an important point? In fact it seems to me and has for a long time, that the prisoners is absolutely central.

K: It is clear that the prisoners are central. That's a very complex way. It's not as simple-minded as it was given to you. They were completely separated at the end of October as I said before.

A: I know. You said so in your October 26 press conference.

K: That is right and that was correct. Then there have been several runs made at linking them but in a very complex way.

A: In any case it seems to me clear that you cannot afford to

K: We will under no circumstances link the two.

A: That's right.

K: Now thirdly it is not true that we broke off the talks. It was almost a mutual decision.

A: Really?

DAILY NEWSPAPER

Published: 01/26/88 - 01/09/88

5

K: Yes.

A: At least we were the first to announce their breaking off.

K: You mean on December 16th in my press conference?

A: Yes.

K: Well, but the decision to - I don't know what your definition of breaking off the talks is but it was done by mutual decision early on about --- it was decided that I'd go home and he'd go home. Now then to go public that was our decision, of course.

A: And it was theirs on October 25th.

K: That's right.

A: But the result - let me put it this way: The result of your ten days of exchanges - one of the results; a key result - is that you have assurances that the prisoner issue will not be linked.

K: I wouldn't say that but we have reason to believe that there will be serious talks. And they know what our definition of serious talks is.

A: What is your definition of serious talks?

K: Well, I can't give it to you but I mean to stick to the few remaining issues that have been left and not keep raising new ones.

A: How hopeful are you, Henry? I'm a little suspicious of the poor-mouthing that's going on all over the place. It would seem to me logical to assume that the President wouldn't send you back unless it was a pretty damn good bet that you could pull it off.

K: Well that may be slightly exaggerated but I think your suspicions are probably well founded.

A: Good.

K: You know this bombing with all the breast-beating that's going on first of all, some day when this is over I'll show you pictures of the bomb damage. And while I don't doubt that some civilian targets were hit the overwhelming majority and every target was a military target.

CITIZENS' REPORT

6

A: Every target at which we aimed was a military target.

K: It was a military target. The campaign was not a - our objective was not to terrorize the population. Our objective was to do the greatest amount of damage in the shortest possible time. That is true. Through military targets.

A: It's surprising to me the way my colleagues seized on the phrase "terror bombing".

K: And I am certain that when one can get in there one will find that probably a few outlying districts were hit, but that there was no terror-bombing. I'm not saying that they didn't miss occasionally. But I'm talking about the fact that every target that was approved was a clear, well-defined, military target. Secondly, this has to be evaluated *if the war ends* relatively quickly - The loss of life as against the loss of life that would have occurred through a protracted diddling operation that was going on before.

A: No one was certainly about using the B-52s.

K: Of course not, it was anguishing. No one has been happy about any part of this war.

A: Yeh, that's true.

K: The main agony we had was we could have played this thing along through inauguration, kept going back there, making just enough progress to kid everyone including ourselves. Or we could try to introduce a new element into the equation that would precipitate it one way or the other.

A: You think that you have precipitated it.

K: I think that there is a better than even chance.

A: A better chance than it looked a few weeks ago.

K: That is correct.

A: Well, fingers crossed and good luck.

K: Thank you, Stu. How are you? I know you got a medical report this week.

A: Well, I'm just pulling along - no great change either way.

CLASSIFIED

TELCONE

Herb Schlosser/Kissinger

9:28 a.m. - 1/3/73

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Henry.

K: Herb, how are you?

S: How are you? Did you have a good rest?

K: Yes, I had a good time.

S: You're off and away now. I just thought I'd give you a call because
we'd spoken about getting together on the evening of the 16th.

K: Right. Are you still free?

S: I know you're going to be quite busy. I was wondering whether it
might be better for you if we made it the 18th or 19th? I will be
in Washington from the 17th on through all the Inaugural festivities.

K: I think it will probably be easier for me on the 16th, but you know
would that bring you down especially early?

S: It might bring me down early but to see you that wouldn't be a problem.
Whatever is most convenient for you that wouldn't be a problem.
Whatever is most convenient for you is most convenient for me.

K: Well, you know later in the week I guess some activities start.

S: That's right there will be some activities. Why don't we then leave
it as is.

K: OK. Now you never told me whether you wanted me to get - what did
Judy think - should I get some people.

S: Sure, if that would be easy for you but I know how incredibly jammed
your schedule's going to be, but if you'd like to do that that would be fun.

K: Good. I'll plan on seeing you on the 16th then.

S: That will be fine and I'll give you a call or your office a call the day before or that morning or something. I'm off to the West right now in about an hour. I'll say hello to Joyce and everybody out there.

K: Good. Give my love to all our mutual friends.

S: Take care now and God bless you.

K: Thank you.

TELCONE

Ziegler/Kissinger

12:50 p.m. - 1/3/73

K: Hello.

Z: Henry, are you going to meet with a group of Republican Congressmen on Friday and talk about Vietnam?

K: Probably not.

Z: Because there's a UPI wire service moving and I saw a story moving on that. I said that you had no plans to do that.

K: Well, there is a plan to do it but I will turn it off.

Z: Yeh, do. Now I was pressed on Congressional consultation today and I said that you had talked to members of the Congress by phone and in person repeatedly since May regarding our policy. Right?

K: That's right.

Z: And the President had. But I said I knew of no direct discussion with members of Congress prior to the listing of ________ Berlin on the May 8 thing. That's correct, isn't it?

K: Right.

Z: I'm glad we worked this out this morning because I think I toned them down a little bit. I said you know, when they tried to get in the Congressional battle, I said I'm not going to address that - that's not our interest.

K: Look, I've got a call. I'll call you back.

DEC 26 1973 9:00AM

8527103

Byron B. Kissinger 5/1/73

I*

TELCONE

Prof. Bator/Kissinger

1:00 p.m. - 1/3/72

K: Hello.

B: Henry.

K: Hello, Francis.

B: You're nice to call back.

K: You called me last week.

B: I did. Haven't you gotten my letter?

K: Not yet.

B: Oh dear. I called only on an impulse and what I called about was
really what I wrote in the letter. I've been thinking of you and
I know something about what it's like in that place and this is before
Friday, I guess, or before Saturday. It looks awfully dark but I
know a little bit about what it's like in that place and what can go
wrong and I also know that the President of the United States - the
press doesn't, but I know that the President of the United States is
the President of the United States and Happy New Year and be of
good cheer.

K: Well, Francis, I appreciate that very much. It's a very generous
letter.

B: It's not generous - it's you know.

K: It's not the usual thing I hear from Harvard these days.

B: Well you'll get my letter and I've decided that there's really no
need to bother you on the telephone; that I can put it in five lines
and if the mail service works you will get it. I hope you had a good
rest.

K: Yes, I feel a lot better and when you come down here sometime why
don't you give me a call.

B: OK. I don't come down much but I shall and in the meanwhile don't
let the people with long knives bother you. That's rule I I remember
from. . .

95CLASSROOM

301/2/55

B: HELLO, MARGI, FROM NEW YORK.

5/1/72

TELCONE

Nicholas vonHoffman/Mr. Kissinger

1:05 p.m., January 3, 1972

K: Hello.

H: How are you?

K: Nick, you're trying to destroy me.

H: What did I do to you today?

K: Call me, what else made you do this?

H: [Laughter]

K: In the White House.

H: You want me to use a code name?

K: Don't you notice the power going out?

H: I'll have a code name -- next time I call, I'll leave a message and say "Xuan Thuy". [Laughter]

K: All I can tell you is that the lights out that leads to the microphone in Haldeman's office just went out ......

H: Well, it would have been better if you'd have just dripped.

K: Yeah, it would have been less obvious.

H: [Laughter] How are you?

K: Okay.

H: I'm glad you stopped the bombing. Congratulations!

K: It's a pretty nightmarish period.

H: It certainly is. Listen, I assume you're going to go off to negotiate so we should postpone dinner. In the event you ever get back.

K: Probably. But can we have dinner as soon as I come back.

H: Sure. If you ever do.

K: [Laughter] Wishful thinking, Nick.

05/26/72 9:00

P.O. Box 226

NAPLES, FLORIDA 33107

I*

TELCONE

- 2 -

Nicholas von Hoffman/Mr. Kissinger

H: I'll be waiting. [Laughter]

K: Wishful thinking. I may see Fallaci in Paris and have dinner with her.

H: [Laughter] I've never met the lady.

K: Well, she did a great job on me.

H: [Laughter]

K: The only part of horses that I've ever seen here, you can't ride on.

H: Did they give you a ten-gallon hat for Christmas?

K: Not yet. No one has enough imagination for that.

H: Now, now; let's not have any of that treasonable talk, Henry.
[Laughter]

K: Okay, I'll call you when I get back next week.

H: All right.

K: And then we'll get together. I think it would be appropriate if we
met on Inauguration Week.

H: that would be a good week. [Laughter] Okay, I'll look for your call.

K: thank you for calling.

H: Have a good trip.

K: I appreciate it very much.

H: All right. Thank you. Bye, bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

CLASSIFIED

BOSTON
MARIA DATE 5/1/64

TelCon
Sec. Laird/Mr. Kissinger

4:00pm, Jan. 3, 1973

K: Hello.

L: Hello.

K: Mr. Secretary.

L: How are you.

K: Okay. Happy New Year to you.

L: Happy New Year to you. I've seen pictures of you on the beach, and--

K: But you couldn't have, I was on the desert.

L: Well, I didn't see anything with you with any girls, so I can't--

K: Well, they told me not to be photographed with girls, so I got myself photographed with a man, now we can a new list of stories now.

L: Henry, what I want to talk to you about is the -- all these God damned stories on the bombing that are coming out are all negative. Now I think we should let Saigon brief positively on our targeting. That doesn't affect your negotiations, does it?

K: No, but it just gets the stories straight.

L: We can't do it here. All these people running back in the United States, all they are talking about is hospitals and we kept getting pressures about hospitals and schools, now that isn't what our targets were and we've got a good story we can tell on military targets that were hit.

K: Let me raise it with the President.

L: You know, I just hate to be on the defensive all the time about all these lousy stories about these left wing Joan Baez and the rest of them. Down there and the press over here is just hitting us all the time on lousy targets, we can't talk about good ones.

K: Let me talk about it to the President.

L: You follow me though don't you Henry.

K: Very well.

2

L: And it would be out of Saigon in a positive story on the use of air power rather than all this negative crap.

K: I'll talk to the President this afternoon.

L: All right.

K: How have you been?

L: I'm fine.

K: You know, we have a meeting at 10:00 tomorrow with the President.

L: What's that meeting about, Henry.

K: Oh, just to bring us all up to date on Vietnam prior to the negotiations starting up. No big decisions, just a general discussion.

L: Very good.

K: You might in fact talk for a few minutes on the bombing targets.

L: Well I really think that we are going to get--

K: I think he might like to hear that, why don't I suggest it to him.

L: All right. But I do think that we can't be on the defensive all the time on this thing right now because they are running with us on TV every night and it's because we don't put out anything of a positive nature.

K: Let me talk to the President, I think it can be done.

L: All right.

K: Good, Mel, Nice to talk.

L: Fine.

TelCon
Vice President/Mr. Kissinger

4:13 pm, Jan. 3, 1973

VP: Hello Henry.

K: Mr. Vice President, how are you.

VP: I'm doing all right. I wanted to press a very grave fear that Freedheim over at DOD is making a very serious mistake in the attitude he's taking about any accidental or incidental bombing damage in Hanoi. His attitude is - in his press briefings -- is he was asked if action being taken to punish the pilots for accidentally bombing the hospital and air field. His response was: no, no punitive action is being taken because we are not certain if that the damage resulted from U.S. actions.

K: Oh, that just his reply.

VP: Yeah. That leads to a conclusion that if you were certain that the damage resulted from U.S. actions, we'd punish the pilots which to me is a crummy unconscionable chance to take in a war.

K: Absolutely.

VP: It just worries the hell out of me to see us get twisted in this dam Ramsey Clark posture.

K: I will do something about as soon as we get off the telephone. When did he say that, today or yesterday?

VP: This was in the news clips of January 3rd, Tuesday nets wires and columns and major stories, but this was reported to me also by someone who heard the news cast so I got it from two places. It must be accurate and--

K: I will do something--

VP: News summary -- we are not certain the bomb damage occurred from U.S. action. What the hell difference does it make, we're not going to punish any pilots I hope for bombing--if it did result you know, they didn't do it intentionally.

K: I will do something about it immediately.

95CLASSIFIED

Aubrey 3012958

B. MARRI Dated 5/1/73

["TELCONE", "Dobrynin/Kissinger", "4:50 p.m. - 1/3/73", "(First part was missed.)", "K: I conclude you are well informed.", "D: Well, I am trying to keep an eye on you because when you are vacationing I feel much more at ease. But not always when you are vacationing; sometimes it is more dangerous than when you are working. Henry, I am calling because I know Mr. Bahr should be with you today.", "K: He is here now but he is not listening in on this conversation.", "D: I received a telegram from Gromyko and he said to discuss with you a question about Germany but now I know that Bahr is here so I decided to tell you.", "K: What is the issue?", "D: The issue is like this one: Now in West Germany there is an ______ in the Parliament of West Germany. Up to now they had only ______ members of the Parliament. Now there is a lot of commotion and now there is a force in West Germany to give West Berl in full rights to speak to the members of the Parliament. ______ a four-party agreement which was reached with your government, France and Great Britain.", "K: That is our position also.", "D: I made a formal representation to the State Department today. . . to the one in charge of West Germany. I got him today on the phone but at the same time I received a separate one saying. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

D: Could I tell this to Mr. Gromyko?

K: As my personal opinion but I will talk in this sense to Bahr.

I
D: But he didn't tell me to tell Mr. Bahr. He used this occasion
because I knew Bahr was here. He doesn't know that Bahr is here.

K: This is our attitude. I will want to talk to you but I am unbelievably busy. I want to talk to you about European Security Conference and MBFR tomorrow. Where will you be?

D: It is entirely up to you.

K: Because I have to go to Camp David in the morning.

D: When will you be back?

K: About 12 or 12:30. Let's aim for 12 or 12:30 for a half an hour.

D: 12:30 the usual place and please keep in mind these developments.

K: I will mention it to Bahr. You can tell Gromyko I will mention it.

D: But he doesn't know he's here. He appeals to you to take care of it within the administration.

K: I will take care of it. Also within the Administration.

D: He wants it to be kept within the Administration.

K: Yes, so I will see you tomorrow at 12:30.

D: All right.

TelCon
Bob McNamara/Mr. Kissinger

5:45, Jan. 3, 1973

K: Hello.

McN: Henry, it's Bob. Happy New Year.

K: Happy New Year to you too.

McN: I'm leaving for Africa in a few days before you return to Paris or about when you do, and before I leave, Henry, I just wanted to call you and say "don't worry about what's happening".

K: You're a good guy.

McN: I really do. Christ this is a time of trouble for you, I know that, and I am reminded of a remark you made to me about four years ago when you were beginning on this. I had been a year out of it, and I think you said that you thought that everyone that came close to Vietnam was in danger of being destroyed. Well, it isn't that bad, Henry, it surely isn't going to be that way for you, and you are going to go down in hi story as the man who finally got us out of there. You will come through it all right.

K: Bob, I really appreciate that.

McN: I really mean this Henry. I was in Aston last week skiing and we had a perfect glorious time, but during the time three or four people called me about the bombing and all this stuff and I get back into town and I read all this--I had my secretary clip all the columns while I was gone--and I read all that stuff and I hear all these rumors, I heard it before I left and I hear it now Henry, and I know just exactly what must be on our mind and what's going on in that building over there. Just let it get you down, that's all. All this crap about the task being loose and ambiguous--look, Henry, you know and I know there is only one way to resolve this and that's to have a conscious ambiguity in the damn thing.

K: Exactly.

McN: And don't give up on that, that's the way to handle it.

K: No, no. And you know it's--a lot of this is put out by jealous bureaucrats.

McN: I know it, I can tell you--I don't have to tell you, you know where it's coming from as well as I do, it's coming from two different

95000000000000000000000000000000

855271003

BOMA Date 5/1/73

buildings in this city and both of them are pretty damn close
at hand, but anyhow, what you're doing is the right thing,
Henry, and if it weren't for you I'd be deeply pessimistic
about getting out of there.

K: I appreciate that very much.

McN: And I think, Henry, this is not just my view, I should say all
also it's the view of some others of you friends and well
McBundy for example and a lot of others that I know, so don't
feel that everything's dark and bad. There is a time of trouble
that's perfectly clear but--

K: That means a lot to me.

McN: Not everybody is as critical as some of these damn columnists
and others.

K: Well, I hope when you get back we'll have made a breakthrough.

McN: Okay, good luck to you, Henry.

K: Thank you, bye.

McN: Bye, bye.

95CLASSIFIED

Auction
30172958
B. MARRI DRec 5/1/01

2

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

5:56 pm, January 3, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: Well I asked you the question but now I referring--it's about Tricia. I receive some information. According to information everything up to now is quite all right and because the Secretary General mention to me that his children is going to meet. But I was not so sure, under the circumstances, but now I have some information they met, the daughter and his son met Tricia.

K: Oh, I asked the President and he hadn't heard a word, so I--

D: I am telling you.

K: So I am going to mention this to him and he'll be very pleased.

D: The same, and Brezhnev was in Moscow. He really sort of maybe put idea -- I think he has daughter a little bit older than Tricia but still (laughter) a daughter, and son.

K: Well, I'm going to mention it to the President right away.

D: And they met Tricia.

K: I'll mention that right away.

D: Okay.

K: I know it will be very much appreciated.

D: Well I think it good thing really, and on a children's basis they have to develop--

K: Well, they'll take over after the fifth summit meeting.

D: Yes, it is good point. Okay, Henry.

K: Thank you, Anatol.

D: Bye, bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012057
By: N.W. Dye - 03-01-73

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

5:56 pm, January 3, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: Anatol, how are you?

D: I am telling you.

D: The same, and Breshnov was in Moscow. He really sort of maybe put idea -- I think he has daughter a little bit older than Tricia but still (laughter) a daughter, and son.

D: And they met Tricia.

D: Okay.

D: Yes, it is good paint. Okay, Henry.

K: Thank you, Anatol.

D: Bye, bye.

TelCon
Alex Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

6:15, January 3, 1973

K: Hello.

J: Henry?

K: Yes Alex.

J: Very brief, our great and good friend Minthoff - my own feeling is that we really should play brinksmanship on this. Not let him squeeze us again. The British are going to be terribly unhappy letting him squeeze us because this weakens their hand on this other issues they have with him. But, one very simple question: Is the President prepared to play brinksmanship, if not I have my answer and we can play it accordingly.

K: Well, when do we have to decide?

J: I'd hope that we could decide--we have this NATO meeting tomorrow - we can -- the Italians have now folded a little bit I just got a message on this and we can get for some time tomorrow at the NATO meeting, 

K: Could you wait until Noon tomorrow?

J: Yes and we'll just turn out a stalling action and then act tomorrow morning.

K: Good. I can do that and I'll let you know then.

J: All right. You know the argument?

K: I know the argument. I lean towards your position.

J: Yeah, yeah. New subject--CKN--the President sees Romney ? By all means has to see CKN and it save him agitation for a trip here by CCK and people of that kind, and you know they behave pretty damn well when we ask them for half the air force.

K: No, no, we should do it.

J: Yeah.

K: And we'll arrange it.

J: Okay. That's all I got.

K: Good. Bye.

TelCon

Sen. Mansfield/Mr. Kissinger

3:13 pm, January 4, 1973

K: I was wondering whether you prefer it before I go or whether it can wait until I return. What is your preference?

M: What is yours?

K: Well, I will do what is best for you, I'm a little tight but I can always find the time.

M: You are a little pressed for time now.

K: Yes, but I'll find the time particularly if you are willing to do it on Saturday.

M: Saturday, what time?

K: Could we do, oh, say for breakfast?

M: Okay. Where do you want me to meet you?

K: Well, I'll come wherever you want. I'd be delighted to do it here.

M: Well, you set the place now, and agree to the time.

K: 8:15 am my office?

M: Okay, Saturday.

K: Yes, Saturday.

M: 8:15 Saturday in your office.

K: Right.

M: Okay, Henry.

K: Good, I look forward to seeing you and that will be just between you and me.

M: Fair enough.

K: Good.

M: Bye, Henry.

K: Bye.

BECOME FAMILIAR WITH

AND
BY
B. MARSILIA DA

DATE 3/12/58
SUNDAY 5:10AM

TelCon

Dean Rusk/Mr. Kissinger

4:22 pm, January 4, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Henry, Dean Rusk.

K: Dean, how nice to hear from you.

R: How are you.

K: I was hoping to see you sometime soon.

R: Well, I'm--the way I've been charging I won't be there for almost another month now. But good luck next Monday.

K: Thank you.

R: Henry, you remember I talked to you last year about the possibility of your going on educational television in connection with this late decision series of the foreign policy association.

K: Yes.

R: You think there's be any change in that situation.

K: When would it have to take place?

R: Pardon!

K: When would it have to be done?

R: Any time that it's convenient to you and in Washington.

K: Yes, but when, in what time period?

R: Oh, any time in the next six weeks.

K: I don't want to do it as long as the negotiations are going on.

R: One thing we had in mind this time was that the first topic they have this year is the Sino-Soviet/American triangle, and what we had in mind is if you could make some comments on that, say, as completely away from Vietnam as far as you are concerned.

K: Well, if they could check with me in about three weeks.

R: Uh huh.

2

K: It's almost impossible for me to say something that doesn't get into headlines.

R: I understand. You think you'll be home in three weeks, huh?

K: Oh, I'll be home, I may have failed. (Laughter)

R: Well, don't let them drag you down, and--

K: Dean, I'm in a position that must be familiar to you. Liberal community is giving me the choice of betraying the President or getting ground down.

R: Well, I know.

K: They are still hoping that I might be disloyal.

R: I heard your latest discussion of the ___________ situation. I had a sort of sinking feeling that this was where I came in in 1961. The same old problems.

K: Exactly.

R: Well, All the best my friend and we'll be in touch with you later.

K: And Dean really I would love to have lunch with you when you come up here. Will you do it.

R: All right, the next time I'm up that way I'll give you a ring.

K: Good.

R: Thank you a lot, bye.

CLASSROOM

BY: E012958
DATE: 5/1/61

TelCon

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

4:25 pm, January 4, 1973

K: Hello.

T: Hi, Henry, thank you for calling back.

K: I've got to run off to the President.

T: I was just wondering--shall I talk to you later or should I do it now.

K: Well, do it quickly--what do you have on your mind.

T: Well, I was just wondering just how the technical talks were going in Paris.

K: You know--

T: When we talked once before you said that they could change the whole scheme by new instructions to the technical people in Paris as well as the decision that they could communicate to you by cable on going ahead on the fundamental issues.

K: I just don't want to go into the talks.

T: Oh, but there's no reason to assume that they are not going well? Well it's curious that the emphasis that Ziegler put on, we expect--we assume serious talks will begin in Paris on January 8th, that was yesterday, when in fact the technical talks began on Monday.

K: Yeah, but that--you know if you people would just calm down a little bit, that had no significance.

T: None.

K: No. That was not a reflection on the talks.

T: Well how do you think things are going to go.

K: I'm just not going to speculate. I, you know, we said we expect serious talks and we obviously have some reason to believe that they will be serious but we aren't going to speculate on this.

T: There's some reason beyond the--

K: I'm just not going to speculate. We'll take the heat now and we'll take it later if they fail but we are not going to get into the position again of negotiating with the press. It was a very unhealthy situation in which we all made mistakes.

CLASSIFIED
E012958
Authentic
B. NARA DATE 5/1/73

T: Yeah. What do you think was the big mistake back there? Is that going to take a long time to go into it.

K: It'll take a long time but certainly everyone in the bureaucracy and every where talked as if it was already done and merrily started putting out their line and the press got into it, and you know, inevitably how could you not.

T: Yeah. But right now, looking forward in the future, when you resume the talks on Monday, is it possible that things will go very, very fast?

K: I just don't want to speculate. I just wouldn't know.

T: Uh huh. Would there be any chance of talking to you over there, Henry, if I went over.

K: Well, if I talk to anybody I'm more apt to talk to you than almost anyone else.

T: Well that's kind of you, but I'm serious.

K: But I just can't predict that.

T: Uh huh. You just don't know how it would go.

K: I don't know how it will go, how useful it will be at that point at all.

T: Will you still have to, or will someone still have to go to Saigon.

K: Oh, certainly.

T: So, one can't see this as a very, very fast operation, I mean it's still the time table that was at--

K: Look, what I said before the last meeting, it's still true.

T: It's still true.

K: In the sense that if it works, no one is going to give a damn if it took three weeks or even a month more or less.

T: Uh huh. Well you did say to me one time when we spoke after your December 16 press conference, that if it were going to go at all, it would go fairly quickly.

90 CLASSROOMS

2

TelCon

Secy. Johnson/Mr. Kissinger

5:25 pm, January 4, 1973

J: I hope to leave in about 30 minutes. Before I leave tonight to harass you on Malta. The Italians came up with a proposal today that those countries which were buying pounds would contribute to Malta the amount they save because of the pound devaluation.

K: What do you think?

J: I think that we should go along with the Italian proposal within the con-
text of our previous offer of increasing our aid, you know. This wouldn't
mark any change.

K: Okay, well--

J: And say that this is--what I would like to do is say that this is it.

K: Okay.

J: We are surrounded by the problem---

K: Why don't you do that. I'm sure the President will go along with that.

J: You are. All right, well I'll -- I have something drafted, I'll send over to be cleared which will say that this is it, that we go along with this but we go no further.

K: Okay, good.

J: And I'll send it over.

K: Thank you. Okay.

J: Okay, Henry.

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger
5:30 pm, January 4, 1973

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, I'd like for you, and I'm going to leave here in about 10 minutes, if you could save 5 minutes for Colson, he's got one idea he'd like to talk over with you, okay.

K: Right, can he come right over or will he have to--

P: He can come--he'll be there at a quarter till, how's that.

K: I have the Japanese Ambassador coming, I'll call him just as soon as the Ambassador has left.

P: You'll call as soon as the Ambassador has left, fine. He's free, he'll wait for whenever you're ready.

K: It will be no later than 6:15.

P: Around 6:15. 6:15 is fine.

K: Good, Mr. President.

P: Fine, and you'll call him as soon as you're ready.

K: Right.

DECEMBER 3, 1973

BRIEFING

BY MARS DATE 5/1/73

TELCORN

Prof. Doty, Kissinger

6:26 p.m. - 1/4/73

K: Hello.

D: Henry, I wrote you a letter with about 8 different things in it so when you get back you'll have them all in front of you.

K: OK. Good.

D: But about two or three of them I ought to touch base with you before you go. One, of course is

K: Hold on half a second. (Pause) Hello. Yeh, go ahead.

D: I do hope somebody or you is keeping an eye on ACTA and keeping it alive.

K: ACTA?

D: Yeh.

K: There's no question.

D: Keeping on everybody's. . .

K: There's no questions about that. You know my problem is that I've been away so much that I haven't been able to attend some of the things that I normally would handle.

D: Um-hmm. And anyway I'm going down tomorrow just to read up on things.

K: Oh, you going to be down tomorrow?

D: Yeh.

K: Tomorrow is an impossible day for me.

D: Yeh, I'm sure.

K: But after this - you know it has to break one way or the other fairly soon, why don't you let me know the next time you come.

D: Yeh, very good. To go from the immediate to the way out, the people up here are pressing me to ask you about the most unlikely situation in the world, but I'd like to spruce up the commencement

9501-1003

B.A.M.A. Degree 5/1/73

B.A.M.A. Degree 5/1/73

2

exercises and are thinking all the way out and are wondering if
there would be by any miracle a chance that an invitation to
Chou En-lai would coincide with anything in your circuit. It seems
to me a millionth of a chance but I

K: I'm sure he won't accept it.

D: The only thing I want to do is put it in your mind if anything should
develop your cooperation up here would be helpful.

K: Good. If anything like that develops I'd let you know.

D: Yeh. And they say the same thing about Solzhenitsyn but it seems
to me that's also completely outside the mind.

K: I think that probably would be taken as an insult in the Soviet Union.

D: Yeh. And then on the third front __________ and I are having
our honeymoon and it's just about consummated and it looks like
they're going to give about $300 for the first seven year period of
the Center for Arms Control and Related Studies up here.

K: Oh, are you having a Center? I didn't realize that.

D: Yeh, the architects are moving right along.

K: Are you going to be head of it?

D: Yeh.

K: Oh, marvelous!

D: I'll offer you a consultantship as soon as you get out.

K: Well, any help I can give from this end you can count on.

D: Yes, and you know I think it would be awfully good for the long pull.
This isn't going to be concerned with immediate problems but it's
just the idea of whether we can serve a new generation of people
and get some interest in it.

K: No, no you can count on that.

D: That's good, Henry, I knew I could.

*

TELCOM

Ray Price/Mr. Kissinger

2:20 p.m., January 19, 1973

P: Ray Price.

K: Yeah, what was the outcome?

P: Fine. He bought the paragraph just as you okayed it and he took out
the "peace in our time."

K: Oh, aren't you reliable.

P: [Laughter]

K: You have more conscience than I would have.

P: [Laughter] Good.

K: It's a banquet speech. Did you tell him I thought so?

P: Yeah, I did. I told him. I think he was quite pleased.

K: Good. No, I think it's -- is my impression correct, we don't mention
Vietnam?

P: Right. He deliberately does not mention the word.

K: Right. Do we say anything about peace in Indochina?

P: In the beginning -- Right in the beginning, not peace in Indochina, but
he says: As we meet here today, we stand on the threshold of a new era
of peace in the world.

K: Yeah, but otherwise nothing. We're not saying the war is about to end?

P: No, we talk about --

K: That's good, I like that. The less, the better.

P: We had a thing about "the peace we shall soon conclude" but that is out.

K: Good. I think you are right.

P: Good.

K: It's just an unnecessary mortgage.

P: Um-humm.

K: And it shows great strength. P: Good. K: Thank you.

*

TELCORN

Amb. Porter/Mr. Kissinger

2:40 p. m., January 19, 1973

K: Hello.

P: Henry!

K: Who is it?

P: Bill.

K: Oh, Bill. They said Under Secretary Johnson.

P: Oh, never mind, I'll do my best for you.

K: [Laughter]

P: Did you want me?

K: No, no; I wanted you.

P: Oh, good, all right.

K: Bill, we've slightly changed that note that I gave you which you should
get Tuesday. And we'll send it over to you in a double sealed envelope.

P: Very good, Henry.

K: Second, could you give some thought on a private basis -- how many
people do you have on the phone?

P: Nobody.

K: Could you give some thought on a private basis to what we do if our
friend in Saigon should develop suicidal impulses?

P: Yes, I will think about that.

K: And can you give me your preliminary views by tomorrow morning?

P: Yes, I will do that.

K: I mean, we're committed to go through the Tuesday exercise anyway.

P: Yes.

K: But what do we do if he doesn't then doesn't take the next step?

P: Yes.

*

- 2 -

K: How do we present it?

P: Yes. If he backs up or becomes maverick.

K: Exactly.

P: All right. I'll give you some thoughts -- I'll give it thought and I'll give you a comment tomorrow.

K: Good.

P: If you need it sooner, you'll have to let me know but I'll do my best.

K: Well, if I could have it by 10 o'clock by tomorrow morning.

P: All right, certainly.

K: Good. But that's on a personal -- that's not institutional.

P: One thing, Henry, with regard to the first matter you mentioned on this note -- when was that to be delivered? I know what I am to do at this end.

K: Well, there are two separate things. One is to put the Canadians and Indonesians on standby. That does not involve a note.

P: That's another matter. That's different.

K: That's to be done Tuesday morning.

P: That's to be done, that definitely is taken care of. But the note itself --

K: The note itself is to be delivered Wednesday morning to all four parties.

P: All right, Wednesday to all four. Unless I hear from you to the contrary.

K: No, that won't change. By that time I'll be probably back anyway.

P: Okay. All right, fine.

K: Right.

P: I will take care of that.

K: Good.

P: Very good.

wgh

*

TELCORN

Amb. Porter/Mr. Kissinger

2:45 p. m., January 19, 1973

K: Hello.

P: Henry, there was a thing in from Bangkok I'm not sure you're going to like. It proposes certain actions in connection with -- recurrent to the operation we were discussing this morning and while it is adequately or it's highly classified, I think somebody over -- you might want to look at it yourself.

K: Who is it from Unger?

P: Yes. And it's asking for advance parties and so forth on the basis of the present --

K: There are to be no advance parties; there is to be no movement of anything. I've told the idiots now --

P: Ask them to let you see this, will you?

K: What number?

P: I'm a little alarmed about the amount of stuff in it.

K: There is to be no movement towards implementing this agreement until it's agreed to.

P: All right.

K: And there are to be no military dispositions until it's signed.

P: All right, I'll get this out.

K: Don't you agree?

P: Oh, certainly. That's what he's talking about.

K: Absolutely out of the question. After it's signed, we'll do it.

P: Well, I'll draft on this and tell them also to keep quiet and not send further messages.

K: Exactly.

P: But if you have any further thoughts on it, let me know.

K: I have no further thoughts. I've told the military not to make any dispositions until after it's signed.

*

TELCORN

Amb. Porter/Mr. Kissinger

2:45 p. m., January 19, 1973

K: Hello.

K: Who is it from Unger?

K: What number?

P: All right.

K: Don't you agree?

K: Exactly.

*

TELCOM

Amb. Rabin (Israel)/Mr. Kissinger

3:45 p.m., January 19, 1973

K: Mr. Ambassador.

R: How are you?

K: It was good to see you the other evening.

R: Well, thank you very much. You remember, you mentioned and we talk about the possibility of seeing you before I leave.

K: Yes.

R: It is considerably more complicated now.

K: Well, you are leaving when?

R: 25th in the evening.

K: Well, there may be a chance this weekend. Are you available Saturday or Sunday?

R: Saturday it's impossible.

K: Why?

R: The next weekend.

K: This weekend.

R: Saturday is the Inauguration.

K: Well, but when the parade is over in the afternoon, we might get together.

R: Fine. Either Saturday or Sunday.

K: Okay, I'll call you this weekend.

R: All right. I don't want to ask too much --

K: No, you will definitely meet the President on Thursday.

R: I see. And then it will advisable to talk to you before that.

K: Good.

R: Thank you, bye.

wgh

*

TELCOM

Bob Hope/Mr. Kissinger

4:30 p.m., January 19, 1973

K: Bob, how are you?

H: I forgot one joke last night. I should have said when I was talking about you, "He's the only Doctor who makes continent calls."

K: [Laughter]

H: They tell me to use it tonight. Are you going tonight?

K: Yeah, but I'm going to the wrong affair.

H: Which one are you going to?

K: I'm going to the stuff-shirt affair.

H: Oh-h-h-h-h. You mean, the --

K: I'm listening to the heavy --

H: The Eugene Ormandy thing.

K: Yeah.

H: Oh, isn't that something. That's great. Great.

K: No, no; I would much rather listen --

H: You'd much rather be over with the vaudeville folks.

K: That's right. Much more.

H: Well, you have to mix it up.

K: Well, I'll try to keep a serious expression.

H: [Laughter] Well, I don't want to bother you with that other.

K: You're not ever bothering me. If you let me keep it in mind --

H: Um-humm.

K: There's no way of pressuring these people. They now know we're interested in it.

*

- 2 -

H: Um-humm.

K: There is a possibility that I may have a chance to raise it personally at the right level and then it will go fast.

H: uh-huh.

K: But they do know we're interested in it.

H: Yeah.

K: I think, frankly, that once the war in Vietnam is over that a lot of things that they are sort of dragging their feet on, they will accelerate.

H: I see.

K: I think that's the biggest obstacle.

H: Right, right. You never did look at our Russian joke because you've been too busy and I know you never saw it. I sent it to your office you know.

K: They've probably sent it out for staffing.

H: Yeah, but --

K: [Laughter] I'm kidding.

H: No, but I know you never saw it the way you've been whipping around.

K: No, I haven't seen it. But I have every confidence that's it --

H: Yeah.

K: When I get these negotiations done, you know, sooner or later they've got to end.

H: Absolutely! Geez, I hope so.

K: Then I will really look at it.

H: How do you feel about it?

K: The negotiations?

H: Um-humm.

K: I think we are making progress, we are definitely making progress.

*

- 3 -

H: I hope so, I hope so. It would be a marvelous, marvelous thing I'll tell you.

K: But you can be sure that I have it in mind.

H: Um-humm.

K: And that I think really the Vietnam war is the biggest obstacle right now.

H: Yeah, I see. Oh, great. Well, if I don't see you anyway, I'll probably see you sometime on the Coast. I'm sorry I wasn't in the Springs when you were there. But we were editing our film. I heard you were there.

K: I would have loved to have seen you.

H: Yeah.

K: But you can be sure that I will keep it in mind and that I'll push it.

H: Oh, great. All right. Good. I wish you a lot of luck, our prayers are with you.

K: Thank you, I appreciate that.

H: Okay, Henry.

K: Nice to talk to you.

H: Right. Bye.

K: Bye.

wgh

*

TELCONE

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

5:47 p.m., January 19, 1973

K: Hello, Barbara.

W: Yes, Henry.

K: I just remembered that my children are going to be here tomorrow.

W: Ah-h-h. Okay.

K: And I can't leave them.

W: All right.

K: They came in just tonight. Now you're going to be here all week though.

W: Humm. But you're leaving, remember?

K: I'm leaving Monday.

W: I don't want you to forget that you're leaving Monday.

K: No, no; I'm not forgetting that I'm leaving Monday. We announced it. Would we lie to the press.

W: Heavens no.

K: Wouldn't it kill you all if after Inauguration, we said: All right ....
/Yes,

W: Wouldn't that be marvelous if on Monday, you got up in the morning and you said "You know what? "

K: It was just for Inauguration.

W: It was just for that. It was just for the Inauguration and I'm not going.

K: That's it.

W: Okay.

K: But what are you doing Sunday?

W: Depends on when on Sunday.

K: You see, I don't know when my family is going to leave. How about lunch, for example, on Sunday?

*

TELCONE

- 2 -

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

5:47 p.m., January 19, 1973

W: That's fine with me. You know, I have almost no plans while we have been here because we didn't know when we would have to work and when we didn't.

K: Nancy, you and I -- the three of us could have lunch.

W: Will Nancy be here Sunday?

K: Yeah.

W: That would be lovely, that's fine. Whatever is easiest for you. By the way, I'm not going to see you tomorrow night. I'm not going to be doing any interviews Sunday because the only way that we could do it at 10:30 was to bring you down to our camera position where you would be swamped with people and we just -- and you know, when I talked to them, I said: All I can ask Dr. Kissinger is hello, how are you and you know, let's say hello to Miss Maginnes. And I said, you know, to go through all of this --

K: I prefer not to do it.

W: I knew you would prefer not to. And it just meant for us a fantastic hassle and then all the other reporters would be at you so what would I be accomplishing?

K: No, --

W: So we're not going to go there at all.

K: Okay, good.

W: That's the only one you're going to be at, isn't it?

K: I would think so.

W: Yeah. We'll be at the Smithsonian and ...

K: Well, I just think these balls are total drags.

W: Yeah.

K: Aren't they? That's my recollection.

W: I wouldn't pay $1,000 for a box or $40.00 for a ticket. But for the people who are going, I guess it's a marvelous thing. And on television it will look interesting and colorful.

K: You know, I'm just going to show the flag.

*

TELCORN

-3-

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

W: Well, you really have to go. I mean -- you don't have to go but --

K: No, but if I don't go, it will be noticed.

W: If you don't go, it will be noticed. And if you find that you are going on to something -- you know, if you are going to be at the other one, then --

K: Where can I reach you tomorrow?

W: I will be here then pretty much all day until late afternoon. I may go to a reception that Ron Ziegler and Herb Klein are giving but at this point probably not. I'm afraid that with the traffic jams it will get me back too late and I have to be ready to go to work at 9:00 - 10:00, something like that. So I'm just going to be around. I'll watch television and see the parade from here. I was going to go because I was going to have my little girl but she has the flu.

K: Oh, what a pity.

W: So that's why I had Sunday free too. I thought I was going to go over and show her the pandas and, you know, I'd make no plans; I was just going to be with her and she was going back to New York on Monday. But the way things are now, she won't be here at all so my time is mine. I'm going to rest, take it easy and pretend I'm on vacation. So Sunday is fine whatever time you can do it. You know, if it's with Nancy at lunch, that's lovely. If it's later, you know, see what your life is like.

K: Good.

W: And I'd love to see her obviously.

K: Marvelous.

W: Okay. Then I'll look forward to hearing from you. And if you find that you can't, you know, you know me. I'd love to see you but I'm not going to be angry if we don't.

K: No, I'll do my damndest. You know, I really want to see --

W: I don't want you to worry about that, I'll be here again. You know, I know how you feel.

K: But you'll be here all week. Now I may be back by the end of the week.

W: Yeah, I'll be here until Friday.

K: Well, I may be back by then.

*

TELCOM

- 4 -

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

W: You think you're going to have that fast a trip, huh?

K: I just never know. No, no; you know, in December -- just to show you my state of mind, in December I thought I would be there three days and I stayed 10.

W: Now you think you'll be there 10 days and you'll be back Tuesday morning.

K: [Laughter]

W: Do you feel good?

K: Well, I think there's obvious progress.

W: I had lunch at Sans Souci, of course -- where else does one go? And sat and talked with Art Buchwald about you.

K: What did he have to say?

W: Well, you know how he feels. Yes, and I should let him tell you himself.

K: About me personally or about --

W: About you personally.

K: I think he's a friend, isn't he?

W: I think he's a friend. I think he was -- Ask him one day; I don't want to discuss what somebody feels. Ask him. When it's all over and -- yes, he's a friend but there were some things he didn't understand.

K: What, the bombing?

W: Humm.

K: Yeah, yeah.

W: And I think because he's a friend, it was more difficult for him to understand. But he'll tell you himself.

K: Yeah. Of course, first of all, one has to ask what it is about the bombing that they so violently object to.

W: To the bombing?

K: Yeah, but what is worse, the bombing or a prolongation of the war?

*

TELCONE

- 5 -

Barbara Walters/Mr. Kissinger

W: Well -- you know, he said he was sure when it's all over, there will be a very reasonable explanation but at the time he was just --

K: Yeah, I respect him for that.

W: I said, have you talked to him recently? But when he came in, he said, are you having lunch with Henry? I said, no, as a matter of fact, I'm not. You know, he's not seeing any of the press and he's been very quiet. And I had heard how he felt, and we talked. You know, he wasn't saying it with bitterness. He said, I just don't understand it. I thought he should have at that point resigned and if he threatened to resign, the President would not have done the bombing cause he wouldn't have taken the chance on losing Henry. But, you know, he said I'm sure when it's over, we'll talk. And I did respect him too because --

K: Because he's a man of integrity who has been a good friend.

W: Um-humm. And he will be. It is not that he is not now and he will be again, but I guess at those moments -- or those days -- he couldn't understand it and didn't feel that he wanted to call you up and be hypocritical.

K: Oh, no; I understand that. I understand it very well.

W: Okay.

K: Barbara, let's aim for Sunday.

W: If you can, it will be fine.

K: Good.

W: Bye, bye.

wgh

*

TELCOM

Howard K. Smith/Mr. Kissinger

6:15 p. m., January 19, 1973

S: Dare I ask you whether it would be useful for us to send an extra man to Paris next week?

K: Well, I just don't know how to answer that.

S: Once you told me it would be useless to send one.

K: Well, you have Chiappe (sp?) there anyway.

S: Yes. But we wanted to send someone -- they wanted to send me.

K: Well, what would an extra man do?

S: Cover something of -- an initialling or something.

K: Oh, I wouldn't recommend sending anyone.

S: That's really all I want to know. I thank you very much.

K: Right. But I'd keep that recommendation to yourself.

S: I sure will.

K: Good.

S: Thank you very much.

K: Thank you, Howard.

S: Bye.

wgh

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Laird

1/5/72 9:33 a.m.

HK: Mel, how are you?

ML: Say Henry, I didn't hear from this--I haven't gone ahead --

HK: I don't think we better do this.

ML: All right--because the time was getting so damn short--I had to go at 9:00 to announce it if I was going answer Kennedy.

HK: Okay, let me just check with the President.

ML: Well, I think I'd have to do it this afternoon now, because you got to give them--to get over here with their equipment and everything.

HK: What exactly did Kennedy say?

ML: He just took it on last night--did you see the tv show? About the bombing and so forth and how there was no rationale for it--it was fairly tough the stuff last night, but I think it was really too late for me to do it. this morning.

HK: You could do it early this afternoon

ML: Yeh, could do it this afternoon.

HK: Well, what is your instinct?

ML: I don't know, I think maybe, god if it screwed up the negotiation track I just would feel so damn badly about it. I hate to be in a position though where they can say that always before I came out and defended things, and now because I'm not defending it, they think that i'm sitting on my hands.

K: Well let me check. I'll call you back.

L: You know what I mean, don't you, Henry?

K: I'll call you. The trouble is I haven't been able to reach the President, he's been at a Congressional--well it doesn't make any difference now for an hour does it?

L: No, no. It doesn't make any difference for an hour. Thank you Henry.

K: Good.

TelCon

Amb. Shen/Mr. Kissinger

9:43 am, January 5, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Happy New Year.

K: Mr. Ambassador, how are you?

S: It very kind of President Nixon to consent to receive my wife's present. At four o'clock this afternoon.

K: Of course.

S: You will be present, I hope.

K: I probably will not be able to be present because I have to see some other visitors.

S: Oh. I heard that only my wife present will receive, I won't be there, is that a usual practice?

K: No, no, you can be there. Of course you can be there.

S: Uh huh. I would like very much to, I mean.

K: I don't understand -- you know we have more bureaucrats here by the bushel.

(Laughter)

S: Anyway, I'm accompanying my wife.

K: Of course you can come in.

S: And I would like to be present.

K: Of course you can be present, it's rediculous.

S: Will I not be able to see you this afternoon at all. You won't be there?

K: I probably will not have a chance to be there, but I'll come out and say hello.

S: Will you?

TELCOM

Secy. Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

10:07 am, January 5, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Henry, I just saw that Mahler was going to testify in open session on Monday.

K: Not if I can help it.

R: That's was the picture says. Did you see that?

K: No, I did not see it and it's impossible.

R: Yeah, I thought that was already decided that he would not do.

K: It is absolutely impossible that he should do it. Well, he's got to cancel it, he can't testify on the first day of the negotiations.

R: Not only that but if I turn down--you know, I said no, and I'll do it as long as the President wants me to, but Christ you can't go up until the Armed Services Committee is happening and not until the Foreign Affairs Committee--

K: It is out of the question, and I don't believe it's true.

R: Well, maybe it isn't true, but I just--

K: No, no, and I'm sure the President will stop it.

R: Okay, well I thought there was a change of signal or something, but hell it was clearly understood that that was not going to happen.

K: There is absolutely no question about it. It was even raised with respect to him.

R: No, I know that.

K: The only thing that was raised is whether he should have a press conference, and the President had sort of decided not to have it. Now he's appealed it this morning, what do you think?

R: I don't think we should. It seems to me if we are going to keep quiet until the negotiations start and we've taken that position, I mean, we've taken a lot of heat from the Congress saying no.

K: We won't take any less heat. If he goes up n;ow--

R: No, no, what I mean is once you've taken a stand, stick to it. We get the worse of both possible worlds if we go up and tell the public and won't tell the Congress anything.

K: But don't you think if he goes up and testifies about targets, you get other guys making counter charges?

R: Oh, sure. Not only that but how can we refuse two Committees and go up and testify in public session in another one.

K: That's out of the question, that will not happen, I promise you.

R: But I don't think he should have a press conference either on this.

K: That is my view, and I trust one--I was going to call you anyway because we turned it down yesterday, and he's appealed it this morning. I think the President is at a Congressional breakfast and that's why I--

R: I'm against it. I don't think he should have any public sessions of any kind, press or Congressional public sessions, I don't think he should have an executive session. If he wants to talk to Stennis privately or talk to George Mayhem privately that's sort of something else again.

K: I couldn't agree more.

R: Okay, fine Henry, thanks, bye.

K: Bye.