Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Ambassador Rabin

8/4/70 10:10 a.m.

R: Can I see you some time this afternoon or tomorrow morning?

K: The afternoon is impossible today. This morning is not possible?

R: This morning is fine.

K: Or tomorrow morning. How much notice do you need?

R: One or two hours. It doesn't matter--just to be able to come.

K: How much time will we need?

R: No more than 30 minutes.

K: Let's aim for noon tomorrow and if I can make it at noon today that's what it will be.

R: Thank you very much.

*

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCOM

Veep/Kissinger

2:40 pm

8/4/70

V: I don't want to pester you.

K: We were tied up with Mobutu all day. My suggestion is to chuck the last paragraph because that gives Mansfield ? ? ? ? ?

V: Bryce said what do you mean he can't make the decision a year ahead because the President has already said how many will be out by Oct. Include that rather than let them say it.

K: It's actually two years before its execution. Its 2 years ahead. Originally in '65.

K: Some of it was said that way.

K: I would hit a little harder that national security depends on the elections. He should work steadily on it if ? ? ? ? ? or how can he justify American lives for the election.

V: In your judgment -- I don't want the President unhappy with this.

K: I haven't gotten to the President with this yet. From HAK, I would like to see it out. I hold the view of unleashing the Vice President. We get accused of polarization if we talk back. Do you want me to check with the President?

V: I wish you would. I want to be able to say I didn't. I am confused on the coalition government. That Mankowitz article this morning --

K: Totally wrong. We will say the President has said everything he will say. Our position is accept those that come from out of election. We would accept Thieu acceptance with NLF but we are not saying that because Thieu probably won't say it and it puts pressure on him to say it.

V: So we will accept only a coalition government that the SVN people can ballot on.

By: KHC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

2:50 pm

8/4/70

S: First, we have gotten which I have had LDX'd to you the official response. It's highly qualified even though we are playing it as an acceptance. I don't know if the other side will accept our decision. The Israelis have made it public. I suppose she had to. It says "I have the honor to ______ you that the position of my Government is as follows: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? the Government of Israel has decided to reply affirmatively." It would have been better to say accept. "? ? ? ? to Amb. Jarring." And they interpret our plan. It would have been all right if they read it like the Egyptians. It means they are ready to talk, to designate a representative to discussions to be held under Jarring's auspices according to what he recommends. His position in favor of a cease-fire is what the Government resolution said the other day. The cease-fire on Maxx Jordan front has never been null and they buy it where Egypt is concerned. Their proposal on the Jordan side is more positive than ours. If you are for full cease-fire then surely they are for a 90-day one. It goes on to say it has to be a binding peace agreement. It's all fine as long as it were a separate letter. In the end they say Israel will not have prior conditions. They go on to say that Egypt must regret (?) all belligerency. One positive thing, they state the principle of withdrawal.

K: From the territories?

S: No "the". From the conflict. The problem is -- when we saw Jarring yesterday he said he wanted each party to say that they agree to the statement he is putting out. The Israeli reply doesn't subscribe. The statement is the American proposal. Tekoah is seeing Jarring. I told Yost to tell Tekoah to see that he conveys to Jarring the affirmative reply agreement to Jarring issuing the statement in the U.S. proposal. They say they are for the UN putting out the statement. The Egyptian statement is much more categoric.

K: Much more clever.

S: We may be at a major hurdle. When the other side reads it they may say they haven't accepted it. If they are smart they will play it in positive terms.

K: Is that what Rogers wants to talk to the President about?

S: I doubt it because he hasn't read it. I talked to Packard today about arms. We are okay on 95% on NSSM 46 (?). Secondly, the Israelis have come in with a priority package of 4 items. The Pentagon is going on various studies. The Pentagon is cooperating. He said the Israeli thing you have isn't a perfect package. They are not interested in perfection. They want something now because Egypt is helping it's position before the cease-fire. So he said they would work positively and give us an answer. If there's a problem I will let you know. The fundamental difference may be that my estimate of the Pentagon view is that they are not keen on supplying the Israelis with suppresive weapons. That is not the case.

By: KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Sisco/Kissinger
2:50 pm 8/4/70

-2-

S: (cont) will suppress SAM. Our view is that they must. Anything to relate and make their measures effective. On Shrike, they say they cannot send that without the other elements because they will have the ______. I accept that but they say the other things are being studied. I will get word tomorrow. If it doesn't go I want you to call an NSC Review meeting on Thurs on the last 4 items Israel has asked for. I will get you a telegram today through Saunders. ? ? ? ? If I get this before ? ? ? ? I want you to get that before the other procedure.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Sen. Javits/Kissinger
3:05 pm 8/4/70

K: The only thing I called about was to tell you kxx the President has appreciated your efforts and he would like to see you just to catch up with you in the next few days. They will call you to suggest a date.

J: That's very kind and I greatly appreciate it.

K: That might also be a chance to talk about us and the Foreign Relations Committee.

J: I will. Aslo, if he will listen I will talk about staffing the opic (?).

K: kxwill He will listen.

J: I will wait that word and afterwards I will come and see you.

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Director Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

3:16 p.m., August 4, 1970

S: I had called you about the budget. As you know, there is a Cabinet meeting tomorrow to discuss the FY 71 budget. We will be talking about the overall picture and general planning objectives. We will say when the people get back to their offices they will have our translation of this as an initial planning target awaiting them. The question is what to do about Defense.

K: The trouble is Laird is engaged in one of his operations again. On the one hand, he is putting out the word at the Pentagon that he has authority from the President that there shouldn't be any cuts. On the other hand, he is trying to stick us with every reduction he makes. He is sort of thwarting the DPRC and putting out fiscal guidance which has no standing. It is one of his psychedelic operations again. I am eager to keep us going on the track we have been on. Could you use the budget to get a doctrinal clarification? Once it is settled, they will start working no matter how low it is.

S: I understand Laird has put out a number of "76."

K: He has; but that is wrong. He knows it is wrong and he has a complicated reason for doing it. He thinks the present budget is not going to be passed, and he doesn't want his new figures to get out.

S: When did he have his meeting with the President on this?

K: The day before we had our meeting. Nothing like he says happened at the meeting. I was there. There were no figures mentioned.

XX S: Why not hit him with a figure then?

K: Once you hit him with a figure, he will stop working on the various levels we are trying to get clarified.

S: You are speaking of the basic issues we talked about in California? Isn't that a question of (a) getting up a program between your group and whatever Schlesinger can contribute, and (b) then getting Presidential input to make them take that seriously -- as distinct from the straight budget issue.