Israel Klabin

Rio de Janeiro, May 25, 1993

Dear Henry,

This book of prints and engravings is perhaps the best known document on how life looked like in the 19th Century in Lisbon and in Rio de Janeiro. The art work was conceived by an Englishman; a captain of a ship that started his trip in Europe and fell in love with his final destination: Rio de Janeiro.

In your case the "saga" even being somehow different: you started your trip instead of Lisbon, in New York. You flew instead of sailing; you talked instead of painting; you have charmed Rio instead of Rio charming you.....(or couldn't it be, that you both charmed each other).

Henry, you are a precious human being: you learned in depth; you lived in complete fulfilment; you experienced life without fear but with humility (even not liking it), and finally you reached and is entitled to the position of "The elder statesman of the 20th Century". Not even Churchill merited this.

For you I raise my glass and wish you more and more

Your old and permanent friend

means life !!!

Marshall Kline Buying Service

213-689-1269
FAX 213-689-9170

JAN 19 1993

14th January 1993

Mr Henry Kissinger
26th Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022

Dear Mr Kissinger:

I was extremely upset to see the political cartoon in yesterday's L.A. Times, attached.

You may not be aware, but Mr Conrad is under arrest pending trial for drunk driving. The man shows diminished capacity not only in his driving but his choice of targets, also.

I cannot believe that by even the most obtuse stretching of imagination that you could leave one stone unturned if you even suspected that an American was being held in IndoChina.

While I am an exponent of Freedom of The Press, I see this cartoon as a slanderous play for the limelight. The report suggesting soldiers were left is unproven, and until you have had an opportunity to respond, I think these sort of items compromise your right to a fair hearing.

The Los Angeles Times is a better news vehicle by virtue of your articles which appear from time to time. I am sure that Mr Coffee has said, by way of boasting, that you are "part of the team," or words to that effect.

Were I Henry Kissinger, I would tell him to go stick his paper. If the editor does not have the sensitivity to pull a cartoon such as this one, they have given good evidence of their lack of objectivity. I wouldn't want my efforts supporting such a rag.

I would value your thoughts and any thoughts as to why at this late date they are rehashing the IndoChina matter. Is it just an attempt to embarrass, or could they have found records that our government could/did not know of?

110 E. 9th Street Suite B-489 • Los Angeles, California 90079-2025

Paramount Pictures

January 21, 1993

Please welcome Ernest J. Koeppen who has joined us as Manager, Production Finance on THE MAURY POVICH SHOW. He will also be working on DEEP SPACE 9 and THE UNTOUCHABLES.

Previously Ernest worked for Jack Haley Jr. Productions were he was a production coordinator on Funny Woman of Television and The Mary Tyler Moore 20th Anniversary Show and on a variety of specials. He also was a freelance production manager on two, as yet unreleased, feature films.

Ernest joined the entertainment business as an engineer at ESPN where his duties included all technical aspects of television production. Before that he spent two years at Warsaw, Schwartz & Kleinknecht CPAs.

5555 Melrose Avenue, Hollywood, CA 90038-3197 (213) 956-5000

A Paramount Communications Company

Thirteen · wnet

356 West 58th Street
New York NY 10019

212.560.2000
FAX: 212.582.3297

MAY 10 RECD

May 6, 1993

Henry A. Kissinger
Chairman
William S. Paley Foundation
350 Park Avenue
26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I am writing to seek support from William S. Paley Foundation for a program on the news media that I am developing for public television. In this effort, I am working with Thirteen/WNET to produce a weekly series called "Newswatch." The mission of this program is to address the lack of accountability of the press.

The program will examine critical areas of public concern with regard to the role of the news media in the criminal justice system, health, science, and the environment, business and government and public affairs. The enclosed proposal describes the series.

This program will enable the public to talk back to the news media. To facilitate this, we will utilize various interactive media, including call-in features. Outreach to schools and colleges is planned.

A program of this kind cannot exist without the support of foundations interested in media literacy, telecommunications policy, and improving citizen access to diverse sources of news and information.

At this stage, we are seeking to raise $1.5 million to underwrite the first 13 weekly half-hour shows. Half of this amount will be sought from foundations; the balance will be raised from corporations.

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES
350 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK NY 10022-6022
(212) 759-7919
FACSIMILE: (212) 759-0042

FACSIMILE COVER SHEET

NO. OF PAGES: 4 DATE: March 10, 1993
(Including this one)

RECIPIENT:

NAME: George J. Gillespie, Esq.

LOCATION:

FAX NO.:

SENDER:

NAME: Suzanne S. McFarlane

MESSAGE:

Herewith the letter about which HAK spoke.

Dun & Bradstreet has no listing for the Applied Science
& Technology Corp. in the state of Pennsylvania (they can
only check by state) nor under Koontz' telephone number.

DR. ROBERT W. KOONTZ, PH.D.

1018 Washington Street Huntingdon, PA 16652 (814) 643-5458

MAR 08 1993

3 March 1993

Dr. Henry Kissinger

Attn: Ms. Susane McFarlane, Press Spokesperson

Re: Gravely Serious Scandal Involving Dr. Kissinger

Kissinger and Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I am writing to you concerning a very serious matter that may very deleteriously affect or even ruin your international reputation, possibly embroil you in what may turn out to be the most serious scandal in the history of the United States and concurrently require your appearance before a Congressional investigating committee.

The matter in question involves your actions as Secretary of State within the Nixon Administration during the nuclear alert of Israeli forces on the 8th, 9th and 10th of October, 1973; this being the initial time period for the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. In this regard several highly placed national security personnel have indicated (in writing) that there was a special NSC meeting concerning the possible imminent use (by Israel) of some of her nuclear weapons against Egyptian cities as an invasion of Israel seemed possible. It has been reported (also in writing) by these same personnel that in response there was an NSC-endorsed decision for President Nixon to call Soviet Premier Brezhnev on the hot-line and indicate to Brezhnev that he (Nixon) would "not object" if the Soviets would provide Egypt with nuclear weapons to arm their SCUD missiles so that they could respond (in kind) to an Israeli nuclear attack; the reasoning apparently being that otherwise a unilateral nuclear attack by Israel might lead to eventual confrontation between the superpowers. This call on the hot-line, from Nixon to Brezhnev, was then reportedly made.

In terms of your involvement in this matter, I have learned from a person who was at the time a CIA Deputy Director that you were urging the aforementioned actions; namely that you were urging the arming of Egypt with Soviet nuclear weapons so that the situation would essentially correspond to nuclear "mutual assured destruction." Concerning this matter I am certain that you will recognize that many, many Americans, all Israelis and many people throughout the world would interpret your apparent actions as representative of total betrayal of Israel and possibly pathological thinking.

I am also certain that you will recognize the gravity of this matter as I am certain that you may be assured that the American people (in general) and Jewish Americans (in particular) will be outraged by this once it becomes public save the possibility that counterweighting evidence or arguments can be produced to inhibit publication of what has been put forth above.

In terms of the above, I am investigating this matter further but very soon will submit for publication (in a national magazine) an article which documents what I have summarized above and will name and document all of my sources. Moreover, I have already sent some documentation to leading Senators and Congressmen seeking an investigation. In addition, I am circulating my preliminary findings among leading members of the Jewish community to seek their support in seeing to it that this matter is indeed investigated by Congress.

Concerning your possible response it is my hope that you will provide me with a statement that will elucidate your position prior to the publication of the aforementioned article. I am willing to accept the possibility that you may have a differing view concerning what happened during the early weeks of October 1973 and would be willing to see to it that at least part of your response is given voice.

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M.D.C. 23RD FL.

P.02.

SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT
A PARTNERSHIP WHICH INCLUDES PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS

January 19, 1993

MEMORANDUM TO STEPHANIE KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

Following are certain details of my trip to Prague:

1. The request came from Prime Minister Klaus to our Ambassador, Adrian Basora, on January 14 and thence to Financial Services Volunteer Corps.

2. I will apparently be working principally with Jiri Weigl described as one of the Prime Minister's "key advisors".

3. I will arrive in Prague on Thursday afternoon and will be staying at the Diplomat Hotel, Europska 15 (tel. 011-42-2-331-4111 and fax 011-42-2-341-731).

Please thank Dr. Kissinger again for his kindness.

Lillian E. Kraemer
425 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10017

Tel: (212) 455-7160

Fax: (212) 455-3321

Charles Krauthammer

APR 12 1993

April 9, 1993

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
26th Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10022

Dear Henry:

If, as you say, "a nation can change fundamentally" and if, in the case of Russia, a fundamental change would create a fundamental change in the geopolitical structure of Eurasia, then should not the overriding aim of our foreign policy be to try to assist that change?

You say we should put down markers now supporting the independence of the ex-Soviet republics vis-a-vis Russia. Given what our markers in former Yugoslavia are worth, how much more worthless would they be in, say, Ukraine. And if we are worried about Ukraine, we might note its reaction to Yeltsin's troubles: Kravchuk rallied to Yeltsin's support (as did the governments of Latvia and Lithuania). Yeltsin's survival will do far more for Ukrainian and Baltic independence than American markers.

It is indisputable that of all the major players vying for power in Moscow, Yeltsin remains the least imperialist. (Dmytro Pavlychko, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Ukrainian parliament: "Yeltsin isn't free of imperial, purely Russian ideas. But...he takes our freedom calmly. Rutskoi frightens us. This is a general with the brain of a sergeant.") While Yeltsin is in a struggle for power, it seems to me needlessly clumsy and indeed provocative to initiate, however subtly, a new policy of containment. I don't see how such a signal of American distrust in a Russia under even Yeltsin can do anything but undermine the more pro-Western forces at precisely a time when they are fighting for their lives.

Perhaps our disagreement then is one of timing. If and when Yeltsin departs there will be time enough to accommodate his successors, set down markers, and renew containment. But while pro-Western elements are still in contention, such a, yes, pessimistic policy would be not just counterproductive but self-fulfilling.

1225 19th Street, NW Suite 620 Washington, DC 20036

HENRY A. KISSINGER

March 30, 1993

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Dear Charles:

I find it difficult to understand why the
Russian evolution needs to be discussed in terms
of optimists against pessimists. I favor aid to
Russia; I question justifying it entirely by the
personality and program of Yeltsin. I wonder also
to whom the frequent reiterations of support are
supposed to be addressed and in what way "in for a
dime, in for a dollar" is an operational concept.

If Yeltsin loses or dies, we should at least
keep open the option of dealing with a successor
and to judge him by his actions rather than
preconceptions. And we should not set ourselves
up for disillusionment if Yeltsin emerges as more
autocratic and nationalistic than we now believe,
as I think is likely.

Of course a nation can change fundamentally,
though it is generally not wise to bet the store
on it. True, I am convinced that Russia will try
to restore its domination over the former
republics. I know no leader in Eastern Europe and
the republics of the former Soviet Union who does
not share this view even if Yeltsin wins. I do
not see why putting down a marker now supporting
the independence of these republics should be
inconsistent with a hope that Russia has indeed
reformed, or with aid to Russia. Incidentally, I
base my view not on an extrapolation from history
but on meetings and conversations with many
Russian leaders, including many friends and
supporters of Yeltsin. Most Russians I know
accept and welcome the collapse of Communism; the

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR • 350 PARK AVENUE • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 • (212) 759-7919

HENRY A. KISSINGER

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

Dear Charles:

If Yeltsin loses or dies, we should at least
keep open the option of dealing with a successor
and to judge him by his actions rather than our
perceptions. And we should not set ourselves up
for disillusionment if Yeltsin emerges as more
autocratic and nationalistic than we now believe—
as I think
is likely.

Of course a nation can change fundamentally,
though it is generally not wise to bet the store
on it. True, I am convinced that Russia will try
to restore its domination over the former
republics. I know no leader in Eastern Europe and
the republics of the former Soviet Union who does
not share this view even if Yeltsin wins. I do
not see why putting down a marker now supporting
the independence of these republics should be
inconsistent with a hope that Russia has indeed
reformed, or aid to Russia. Incidentally, I base
my view not on an extrapolation from history but
on meetings and conversations with many Russian
leaders, including many friends and supporters of
Yeltsin. Most Russians I know accept and welcome
the collapse of Communism; the fewest are
reconciled to the collapse of the Soviet Empire.

with

TWENTY-SIXTH FLOOR · 350 PARK AVENUE · NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 · (212) 759-7919
TELEFAX (212) 759-0042

Dear Charles:

If Yeltsin loses or dies, we should at least keep open the option of dealing with a successor and to judge him by his actions rather than our perceptions. And we should not set ourselves up for disillusionment if Yeltsin emerges as more autocratic and nationalistic than we now believe.

to Russia. Incidentally, I base my view not on an extrapolation
from history but on meetings and conversations with many Russian
leaders, including many friends and supporters of Yeltsin. Most
Russians I know accept and welcome the collapse of Communism; the
fewest are reconciled to the collapse of the Soviet Empire. This
in my view will be a foreign policy crisis in the years ahead
whether or not Yeltsin wins. For he will try to obtain the
support of at least some of the nationalists.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY A. KISSINGER

July 26, 1993

Dear Henry:

United Cerebral Palsy's Humanitarian Award will be presented to General H. Norman Schwarzkopf at a gala dinner to be held on December 8, 1993 at the New York Hilton.

I am sure you are aware of the important work that UCP does, both to prevent cerebral palsy and to provide vital lifetime services to children and adults in need of help. Your support would not only assist UCP but would also be a fitting tribute to General Schwarzkopf.

As last year's honoree, I can assure you that this is a wonderful event. If your schedule permits, I hope that you will be able to attend as a Dais guest.

An invitation with the details is enclosed, and I very much hope you will be able to accept.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

Mr. Henry Kravis
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company
9 West 57th Street
New York, NY 10019

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

UCLA

BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO

SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY
405 HILGARD AVENUE
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90024-1473

April 26, 1993

The Honorable
Bill Clinton,
President of the United States,
Executive Office of the President,
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue,
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President,

Although I am not at all sure that you will ever read this letter, after listening to your press conference on April 23, 1993, I feel it is my duty to write to you. As a man born in Dubrovnik, Croatia, educated at the University of Belgrade, Serbia, with relatives and close friends living in Dubrovnik, Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, as an American citizen since 1979, and as a longtime historian of the Balkans, I hope I might be able to contribute a few ideas concerning the enormously difficult problems that confront you in Bosnia and in the Balkans in general. With my personal and professional background and with the perspective that life in the United States for the last twenty six years has given me, I hope that I have been able to develop a balanced view of events and understanding of long-term developments in that tragic part of the world.

1. First, I would like to dispel the often-repeated assertion in the media and among some public figures, that the Serbo-Croatian conflict is "a thousand years old conflict" and that those two peoples have been slaughtering each other "for centuries." That is simply *Not true*. Serbs and Croats not only did *not* kill each other "a thousand years" or "for centuries," but they collaborated and had lots of personal, family and political links, from the Middle Ages to the modern times. Examples of this are abundant, but I shall leave them out here. The sad fact is that the Serbs and the Croats started killing each other only in 1941, after having lived together since 1918, in the same state, a hastily put together and poorly conceived Yugoslavia. It was between 1941 and 1945 that those peoples became embroiled in a terrible blood feud, the consequences of which were never cleared up under Tito's Communist regime.

2. Religion has played and plays a very important role in the Serb-Croat, Serb-Muslim and Croat-Muslim conflicts. All of these conflicts - no matter what some "specialists" say - are, in reality, part of one and the same civil war, heavily permeated and motivated by religious animosities. Indeed, because of historical circumstances,

One hundred twenty-five years of service.

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[w]

religion was and is an identifying factor of greatest importance in the Balkans and, especially, in former Yugoslav areas. The dominant assumption was, even under Communism, that, if one speaks Serbo-Croatian and is a Roman Catholic, one *has* to be Croatian; if the speaker of Serbo-Croatian is Eastern Orthodox, he/she *must* be Serb or Montenegro; and if such a speaker is of Islamic religion, he/she *must* be Muslim (Catholic Slovenians and Orthodox Macedonians speak different Slavic languages). During the Second World War people were murdered simply because they belonged to one or another religious group. Tragically, the same is happening now. It seems, therefore, that the churches could and should play a major role in calming hatreds and passions and in gradually lowering the level of hostilities. Our Administration, together with our European allies and the United Nations, should exercise strong pressure on all three religious establishments in former Yugoslavia - the Roman Catholic, the Eastern Orthodox and the Muslim one - to work much more energetically and visibly for peace and reconciliation.

3. Speaking of Muslims, I would like to dispel another myth, propagated by the media. Bosnian Muslims are *not* descendants of medieval dualistic Bogomil heretics who, allegedly, were islamized when the Ottoman Turks arrived in the area, in the early fifteenth century. The Bogomils were, indeed, influential in Bosnia between the thirteenth and the first half of the fifteenth century, but they died out before the Ottoman conquest of Bosnia, in 1463. The Bogomils' presence, however, did weaken the control of both the Roman Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox church in Bosnia, and that facilitated the islamization, which also brought economic advantages to new converts. The truth of the matter is, that Bosnian Muslims are islamized Serbs and Croats and that they were recognized as a separate, Muslim nationality only in 1968 by the Communist regime. Therefore, there is no major difference between them and the other ethnic groups living in Bosnia, except for religion. This means that, again, religious establishments could and should be used as tools for achieving peace in Bosnia.

4. Of course, the most important and the most vexing question confronting you now is: is there any solution to the carnage in Bosnia? What can the United States and our European allies do to achieve such a goal? It seems to me that there are three options in Bosnia:

a) Intervene militarily, together with the European allies, under the umbrella of the United Nations. Such an intervention, to be successful, would have to be massive (300-500.000 ground troops), long-lasting (at least ten years and probably much longer) and would entail considerable casualties. Lifting the arms embargo on the Muslims would only intensify the level of conflict as a whole, and the idea that bombardments of Serbian targets can solve the problem is simplistic and unrealistic. Such a measure would only strengthen the position of Slobodan Milošević and Radovan Karadjić among the Serbs and unite the vast majority of Serbs - even those who are opposed to the present government - against us and the West in general.

b) Let things go the way they are going. In addition to horrendous human suffering, such a "solution" would entail a very real danger of a vast spreading of the conflict (Kosovo, Macedonia), which we certainly do not wish to see happening.

-3-

c) "Land for peace:" divide Bosnia, giving most of the eastern area to the Serbs, most of the southwestern area to the Croats and creating a Muslim state in the central regions of Bosnia. It cannot be in Muslims' interest to suffer enormous losses to preserve a "uni-tary, multiethnic and multicultural" Bosnian state, which would be, in reality, a scaled-down replica of Yugoslavia, and would inevitably explode again in a short time. It is much better for the Muslims to have a smaller, but more homogeneous state (see the good luck of Slovenia). Naturally, partition would bring about migrations of members of all three ethnic/religious groups, who would not like to live under "foreign" rule. Such migrations, however, could be implemented in an organized, peaceful way, under United Nations con-trol, and the United States and the European Community should give economic assistance for the resettlement of the migrating populations. I am aware that some people (mostly those sitting in comfortable offices on university campuses, think tanks and bureaucratic institu-tions) will remark that such a solution rewards "ethnic cleansing" and is, in fact, itself a sort of "ethnic cleansing." To this it should be replied that "ethnic cleansing" is anyway going on in Bosnia in the worst and bloodiest possible way, not only between Serbs and Muslims and Serbs and Croats, but now also between Croats and Muslims. It is clear that these people, all of them, cannot and will not live together again. It seems, then, much better to separate them in a rational, civilized fashion and to help them rebuild their lives, rather than forcing them - for the sake of "principles" dear to us, Westerners, far removed from the killing fields - to live together, thus creating preconditions for an unavoidable new carnage. There remains, however, the question whether we, the United States and our European allies, are willing to admit the existence of a Muslim state in Europe, even though such a state most probably would not be a "fundamentalist" one.

5. As far as the Vance-Owen plan is concerned, no matter how well-intentioned it is, it is naive, unrealistic and unenforceable, especially now, after the bitter and brutal Muslim-Croat conflict. In fact, it should be considered dead, even if all sides accepted it. In the best case, it would only serve as a respite, a transition to the next round of fighting, two-three years hence. Similarly, the economic embargo/blockade of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) - while effective in creating economic difficulties for that state - will never be a decisive factor in the peace-making process, but, once we have started it, we have to keep it going.

6. One important element which is generally ignored, is the fact that, because of historical circumstances and influences, there are substantial differences of mentalities and opinions between the Serbs from Serbia itself and those from other areas (Croatia, Bosnia, Vojvodina). This has already provoked minor conflicts among them in the last year and a half. We should try to take advantage of these differences to convince the leaders of Serbs outside Serbia to desist from war and, even more importantly, to try to convince the leaders of Serbia itself to stop victimizing their own people for the sake of much more intransigent Serbs outside Serbia. It should be remembered that, in the Balkans, the periferal elements are always much more fanatical and militant than those from central areas: Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia are much more belligerent than those from Serbia itself; the worst Croatian Nazi-Ustashas during the Second World War were from Western Herzegovina, not from central parts of

-4-

Croatia; the most fanatical Muslims today come from Sandjak, not from Bosnia itself. It seems to me that we should at least try to use those differences of mentalities and attitudes to foster peace in the area.

7. There exists in Serbia a democratic opposition. Disunited, poorly organized and miserably financed as it is, it should not be ignored by us as a possible alternative to Milošević's regime. Many leading Serbian intellectuals are bitterly opposed to Milošević's policies. We should try to help - through various legal channels, but without fanfare - the opposition parties and groups to organize themselves better, to unite their efforts and, especially, we should give them the means to counter regime's powerful propaganda and to establish a much more efficient propaganda effort of their own.

8. There is, of course, the very serious problem of the Serbs in Croatia (about 11% of the population), especially in the region of Krajina. Krajina must remain part of Croatia, as it always was, but the United States, the United Nations and the European Community should insist most categorically that the Croatian state firmly guarantee full human rights and cultural autonomy to the Serbs in Croatia, under United Nations supervision. President Franjo Tudjman and the Croatian leadership, who are very eager to be accepted as part of the Western world, should be unequivocally told that we shall not extend them that acceptance, nor grant them economic support, cultural collaboration, etc., unless they fully implement such guarantees. We *must* do this, if we want to avoid in the future another bloody conflict in the area. On the other hand, the Serbs in Croatia should be given the option to leave, under the same conditions I spelled out in item 4c, and those who choose to remain in Croatia should be clearly told that, while enjoying cultural autonomy and civil rights, they should behave as loyal citizens of Croatia.

9. Yet another very thorny and very dangerous problem is the situation in Kosovo and in Macedonia. From a practical point of view, we cannot send troops in Kosovo, because - for historical reasons - it is a very sensitive part of Serbia, and any outside intervention there would mean war and would have the effect of uniting most Serbs against us. However, I believe that *now*, before things have started happening, we should send troops, ships and planes under the United Nations umbrella to Albania and Macedonia, so as to prevent the Serbs from destabilizing that area, and to prevent the Albanians from moving against the Serbs. Both situations could provoke equally big trouble, which could spread *very* rapidly far beyond the borders of Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. One should not forget, that fully one third of the population of Macedonia are ethnic Albanians. By positioning American and European forces, under the United Nations aegis, in the region, we might be able to prevent a major explosion from occuring.

10. Last, but by no means least, we should stop blaming whole peoples for atrocities and political stupidities committed by individuals and groups. While we cannot dictate to the media and tell them what to say and write, we can and should expect our politicians not to follow the media in making erroneous statements and attributing blame to entire peoples. By doing so, we alienate those populations and weaken our chance to influence their attitudes. This has been until now mostly the case of our journalists reporting and our politicians discussing the policies and behavior of the Serbs (e.g. absurd

numbers of rapes which, then, are presented as "tools of ethnic clean-
sing" in the interpretation of journalists and some politicians;
attributing indiscriminately the guilt for atrocities exclusively
to the "Serbs," etc.). The Serbs are, certainly, most, but not exclusi-
vely to blame. Being a resilient, stubborn and emotional people,
they react by stiffening their attitudes, backing their unworthy
leaders and leaning increasingly on Russian support, while we loose
influence with them. This is certainly not in our interest. A similar
treatment by media and politicians will now be probably extended also
to Croatians and, maybe, Muslims, after their recent conflicts and
atrocities in central Bosnia. This will be equally unjust and counter-
productive. If we really want to help achieve peace in the Balkans,
we absolutely must make a clear distinction in our statements, propa-
ganda and public pronouncement between the peoples and the leaderships.
At this time, it is of particular importance that you, Mr. President,
unequivocally enunciate such a distinction, as far as America goes,
between the way we look at the Serbian people, and the way we view
such leaders as Milošević, Karadjić and others.

I sincerely hope and trust, Mr. President, that you will be
able to find a way to prompt the Balkan peoples to move towards peace,
for ultimately only they can bring peace and stability to the area,
and I wish you the best of luck in your noble and difficult endeavor.

Very respectfully,

Dr Barisa Krekic,
Professor of Southeastern
European History, UCLA