REMARKS FOR YOUR BREAKFAST HONORING
DOC MORGAN

Doc, and my friends from both Houses of
Congress:

The other evening in New York, I almost
made it to the fight between Mohammad Ali and
Ken Norton. And the first thing that comes to my
mind on this occasion, Doc, is that I wish you would
imitate the champion.

Not, of course, by taking on Ken Norton --
but by withdrawing your announcement that you are
going to retire.

-2-

Assuming there is little hope of that, I am
privileged to have a chance to say a few words
about Doc Morgan's contribution to his country. And
it is especially appropriate to do so amongst a small
group of his friends and colleagues.

Because, while Doc has never been accused
of being a publicity hound, I have occasionally been
thought to have an unnatural affection for seeing my
own words in print.

That is a totally erroneous impression, of
course. I have never so much as thought, for example,

- 3 -

of giving an interview to *Playboy*.

Much less have I ever thought of speaking so frankly as people apparently do in such interviews.

There is something particularly appropriate in this bipartisan gathering to honor you today, Doc, coming as it does in the midst of our quadrennial talkathon -- when bipartisanship, whatever one may say about it at other times, is certainly *not* at hand.

For your contribution to the foreign policy of this nation is in the greatest tradition of bipartisan-ship. I am not suggesting that you were continuously

- 4 -

re-elected by such smashing margins by being
bipartisan. What I am saying is, that when the
chips were down, when your country's interests
overseas were at stake, when danger was near,
you always knew where the water's edge was.

Over the past thirty years, unprecedented
burdens have fallen upon America's shoulders at an
accelerating rate. The chaos and devastation
of the postwar period evolved into a series of
critical international flash-points and the constant
tensions of the Cold War. Through those years the

- 5 -

United States was able to summon the national unity
and sense of purpose needed to rebuild Europe,
preserve global peace, to help promote prosperity
in every quarter of the world, and to offer its unique
vision to a devastated world.

At the start of this decade, we began to
realize that the objective conditions of international
affairs were changing. The end of the Cold War;
the rivalry between the Communist powers; the
urgent need to contain the race in strategic arms;
strains in our alliances; the growing imperative of
economic interdependence; the need for a new

relationship between North and South: these were
only some of a vast array of challenges which required
heightened international cooperation at the very time
that nationalism was on the rise.

And while this evolution was taking place in the
world, we in the United States were passing through
one of the most convulsive and strained periods in our
history -- a disastrously divisive war was followed
quickly by our worst Constitutional crisis.

During the great days of the '50s and '60s,
we were sustained in our foreign policy role by the

quality of leadership which those turbulent times
brought forth. Harry Truman, George Marshall,
Dean Acheson, Dwight Eisenhower, Arthur
Vandenburg, and Sam Rayburn were among the
giants of that era.

In like fashion, Doc Morgan's name will go
down on the list -- high on the list -- of those
who epitomized leadership in foreign policy during
the late '60s and early '70s. Doc's steady hand
never wavered, despite the passions of those times,
and despite the occasional temptation to exploit our
domestic differences for partisan or personal gain.

- 8 -

As Chairman of the Committee, Doc had
a keen perception of the fact that our foreign policy
must be guided by our permanent interests in the
world -- as well as by the great principles on which
this nation was founded. Few have been able to
balance those two occasionally divergent elements
as well as he. His hardworking and pragmatic
support of our foreign policy is nowhere better
symbolized than in the programs of economic
and security assistance which have been so central
to our efforts, and which owe so much to Doc's
leadership and parliamentary craftsmanship.

So it is an honor for me this morning to salute a great American. The Presidents with whom he worked, and I and my predecessors as Secretary of State, would I think, had we the opportunity to do so, find it difficult to adequately measure Doc's contribution to his nation. Very few men could have done what he has done -- and even fewer still could have done it while finding the time to attend the birth of over half the electorate of Pennsylvania's 22nd District.

I only hope that Doc won't become so obsessed with his medical practice that he won't have time to

- 10 -

allow me -- excuse me, to allow the Secretary of
State, whoever he may be -- to consult with him
from time to time in the years ahead.

And I hope, Doc, that you will hang this
small token of our appreciation prominently on
the walls of your office. If you do, and if it occa-
sionally inspires you to reminiscent with your
patients and friends about your days in Washington,
they may perhaps learn something about greatness
and leadership.

The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## Interview

The following is excerpted from a panel discussion with Secretary Henry A. Kissinger at the National Conference of Editorial Writers.

### Panelists

* Robert Barnard, Louisville Courier-Journal
* Sig Gissler, Milwaukee Journal
* Paul Greenberg, Pine Bluff Commercial
* Joseph Stroud, Detroit Free Press

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought I could perhaps lead things off by making a few general observations about the conduct of foreign policy.

The basic foreign policy of the United States is determined by the objective conditions in which the United States finds itself, by the values of our people, and only to some extent by the views of the leaders. The foreign policy of a great nation cannot change every four or eight years. It must reflect some permanent characteristics. To the extent that other nations believe that the United States changes its fundamental policy at regular intervals—to that extent, we become a factor of instability and insecurity.

Of course, there are practical differences. And, of course, it can be that mistakes are made of such magnitude that a radical shift is necessary. But, sooner or later, we must develop a consensus about our fundamental direction and our basic interests that is not in itself subject to partisan debate. I am not saying it isn't subject to debate, but not to partisan debate.

The basic goals that any Administration has to pursue concern the problem of peace, the problem of world order, and the problem of the relationship of our values to the values of other societies.

October 2, 1976
Hilton Head, S.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Media Services

The problem of peace has, in our age, an unprecedented character. Throughout history it would have been inconceivable that any nation could accumulate too much power for effective political use. As late as the end of World War II, every increment of additional power would have been militarily useful.

Today, we live in a period in which a nuclear war would mean destruction for all parties and in which the relative advantage of one side against the other pales compared to the destruction that is involved, which could well be the end of civilized life as we understand it.

Therefore, the traditional power politics, the accumulation of marginal advantages, the posturing vis-a-vis opponents has to be carried out today, if at all, with a sense of responsibility and a degree of circumspection that is unparalleled. And every President will, sooner or later, be driven to the conviction which was first enunciated by President Eisenhower: "There is no alternative to peace."

Therefore, the problem of how to control nuclear arms, how to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, must be a paramount concern of American policy. And tough rhetoric is no substitute for the perception of this overriding necessity.

To be sure, we have to make certain that the desire for peace does not lead other countries to try to seek unilateral advantages. And we have to be able to combine a concern with our values and our interests, and those of our allies, with a readiness to seek honorable solutions with adversaries.

Where to strike this balance is one of the problems with which policymakers have to deal and which will no doubt come up in our discussions.

The second problem is the problem of world order. If it is true that conflicts cannot be settled by tests of strength, then we need an international

PR 492

2

system, most of whose participants feel that they
have a stake in it and are, therefore, not prepared
to test it by military means.

This presents us with the problem of how to
relate ourselves to our friends and allies; how to
deal with opposing ideologies committed to rev-
olutionary theories, if not always practice; and
how to find a place in such a world for the hun-
dred or so new nations that have come into being
since World War II, with experiences quite differ-
ent and problems quite different from those of the
older states.

And thirdly, there is the problem of the rela-
tionship of our values to the other goals of our
foreign policy.

Without security, there can be no peace. But
pure pragmatism leads to paralysis. It makes every
problem insoluble.

Moral issues appear in absolute form. But in
foreign policy, at any one time, only partial solu-
tions are possible. And if every nation of the world
insists on the immediate implementation of all of
its principles, eternal conflict is inevitable.

Therefore, the difficult aspect of foreign poli-
cy is that one constantly has to strike balances
between conciliation and security, between order
and progress, between values and what can be
attained at any period. This is where the act of
judgment comes in—an act that is compounded by
the fact that when the scope for action is greatest,
the knowledge on which to base such action in
foreign policy is at a minimum. When the know-
ledge is greatest, the scope for action has often
disappeared. Nobody can ever prove that an
assessment is true until it is too late to effect it.

In 1936, when the Germans occupied the
Rhineland, it would have been very easy for France
to stop the advance of Hitler. But if they had done
it, if France had done this, the world would still be
debating today whether Hitler was a maniac bent
on world domination or a misunderstood national-
ist.

By 1941 everybody knew that he was a
maniac bent on world domination. It was a know-
ledge acquired at the cost of 20 million lives.

So, the policymaker is always faced with the
dilemma that when he can act, he cannot prove
that he is right. And by the time he can prove that
he is right, then he can no longer very often be
creative.

Of course, not everything you cannot prove is

right. And this is where the uncertainties in our
debates arise and, frankly, where the credibility
gap that our newspapers are so fond of empha-
sizing very often develops.

But I think I have explained enough perplexi-
ties to turn this over to the panel.

MR. BARNARD: This is a rather general
[inaudible], typical of American editorial writers.
You have just returned from your first African
safari, I believe, and I wonder if Rhodesia's black-
ruled neighbors agreed to the terms for a transi-
tional government announced by Ian Smith. And
there is still a question of funds for members of the
white minority who choose to sell out and leave
the country. What share of those funds—which I
think we have seen estimated at perhaps $2 bil-
lion—would the United States, in your view, be
expected to pay? And would you anticipate any
difficulty in persuading Congress to put out the
money?

A: Let me perhaps first make clear one point.
The terms that Mr. Smith announced were not
terms he had originated and was putting to his
neighbors. They represented a U.S.-U.K. distilla-
tion of months of consultations, of five missions—
three American, two British, and two African—of
what we thought the best available compromise
might be that would move matters toward majority
rule under conditions in which the rights of the
minorities would be protected and under condi-
tions in which the transition would occur with
moderation and yet with all possible speed. So, it is
not something that was originated by Mr. Smith.
On the whole, I believe that the program that is
now being discussed has in many of its main ele-
ments been acceptable as a basis for negotiation.
Of course, there are many elements that were left
open—the composition of most parts of the govern-
ment. And, of course, every party at a negotiation
is free to raise whatever issue it wishes. But much
of what one reads today should be seen as a
process by which the various parties establish their
negotiating position.

Now, with respect to the fund: The fund we
are discussing is not designed to buy out the white
population. The fund is more designed to enable
the white population to stay by developing the
Rhodesian economy and as only its second func-
tion is a sort of insurance scheme for those who
want relief.

The fewer people, of course, the less has to be

3

paid out of this fund for the purpose of the settlers.

Now, we are attempting to do this as an international project. The United Kingdom, France, and other European countries have already agreed in principle. We are discussing it also with Canada and Australia, and we hope to have a very wide base of support for it.

As far as the U.S. contribution is concerned, we think that perhaps part of it can be contributed from private sources. Discussions as to the amount, of the total amount, will begin next week in Washington, and we don't have a figure to put before the public yet. When we do, of course, the part of it that has to come from public funds will have to go to the Congress.

Will we get support for it? I believe that the American public will understand that the cost of a moderate evolution in southern Africa is much less than the ultimate cost of an escalation of violence there. And, therefore, we hope that we can get support. We have briefed many Congressional committees. And so far we haven't been able to give them any figures, but we have briefed them on the concept before we left and since we returned, and we have had very good and, I must say, bipartisan reaction on it.

*MR. BARNARD: And what is your best guess-timate? The current uncertainty over whether black leaders will accept the terms announced [inaudible]?*

A: You see, some of the things that the black leaders have rejected are not central to the issue. For example, whether the conference should take place inside Rhodesia, which Ian Smith proposed that was not part of the five-point program we recommended. And I think that this will have to find a solution by mutual agreement, because obviously a conference should take place at a place that is mutually acceptable.

I believe that, secondly, a lot depends on how some of the African nations sort out the relationship between the more moderate and the more radical elements.

Our impression is that, as of now, progress is being made toward assembling the conference and that the basic framework that they accepted in Lusaka—which is to say a conference which creates a transitional government which leads to a constitutional conference, which drafts a constitution for full independence—that that framework is going to

be implemented. It will take a few weeks to sort all of this out, but it is going about as we expected.

*MR. GISSLER: I have a perhaps personal question. Fatigue can often lead to slips in judgment. If your style of diplomacy is marked by hectic activity, shuttling, jet lag, hop-scotching, always with a briefcase full of explosive questions, I wonder, how do you deal with the inevitable stress and guard against diplomatic blunders occurring perhaps just through sheer exhaustion?*

A: I don't know how you can guard against blunder. One problem may be that there is a gap between the public perception of how diplomacy is conducted and how it is actually conducted.

Before I go on one of these trips, there are months of very careful preparation. I do not go on one of these trips unless I and my colleagues have made the judgment that we have carried matters to the maximum point they can be carried through the exchange of diplomatic notes.

The shuttle that concluded last week was started in April with the speech in Lusaka, was carried forward through a series of meetings and a series of missions to Africa. And what we have to balance is the stress of this type of diplomacy against the problem that we might not be able to carry it off at all if one circulated notes.

But I am not saying that this style of diplomacy is the way it must be conducted by every Secretary of State and every President.

We have faced a number of issues that tended to crystalize in a dramatic way and that required some intermediary to bring them to a point of decision in Africa, for example.

Now, I would think that in the negotiation on the constitution that is now started, the role of high-level diplomacy would be very minimum.

So I would say one cannot make a general judgment as to how foreign policy should be conducted. And any style of diplomacy has its risk of failures, and ultimately it has to be judged by its record.

*MR. GREENBERG: You come out for majority rule in Rhodesia. Would you also be in favor of majority rule in South Africa?*

A: Yes, I am in favor of the principle of majority rule in South Africa, but I think one also has to understand that the situation in South Africa is infinitely more complicated than it is in Rhodesia, in the sense that the settlers have been there for hundreds of years, that a system has developed

4

that is repugnant to us, but that it will take some
time to change. And, therefore, while I believe
strongly that the system must be changed—I have
emphasized this in a number of public speeches—I
also believe that it would be in the interests of all
the people, black and white, if it occurs in an evo-
lutionary manner and without violence.

MR. GREENBERG: *How would you envision this process? Would one day you be making a similar shuttle for South Africa, say?*

A: I have to tell you quite candidly that I have no blueprint for the future of South Africa. I believe that the first, the major, steps must be taken by the Government of South Africa, and that to the degree that it can be handled in the South African context, to that extent it would be to everybody's benefit.

If the problem becomes internationalized, it
means it has almost certainly already got out of
control. They now have some little time to con-
sider the consequences of the internal situation in
South Africa. And we hope that it will move in
a—that they will take advantage of this period.

MR. STROUD: *What reason do you have now to believe that the reconvening of the Geneva conference on the Middle East would be productive? And isn't there the danger now that the critics who said that the step-by-step process would deal away some of your trump cards too early may be proven right?*

A: You always have to compare the alternatives that were, in fact, available. In 1973 the United States had no diplomatic relations with any of the key Arab countries. The Soviet Union was acting as the lawyer of the Arab countries. Israeli armies were confronting the Arabs along dividing lines that were extremely unstable.

To attempt a comprehensive solution under
those circumstances involved—if an oil embargo
was still in force, to attempt a comprehensive
solution under those circumstances involved a high
risk of an explosion. And a step-by-step approach
enabled the parties to get used to the process of
negotiation, to gain confidence that progress could
be made.

It was always envisaged that the step-by-step
approach would sooner or later lead to a more
comprehensive approach. It was never conceived as
an alternative to a comprehensive solution, but as a
step toward a comprehensive solution.

I think now the conditions are approaching

where comprehensive solutions can result. Whether
it has to be one grand solution or whether a series
of stages within a larger framework, that will have
to be seen as the negotiations begin.

I do not believe that we have given away any
key bargaining chips that will be needed later. On
the contrary, I think we created conditions from
which comprehensive solutions can now be at-
tempted, without the risk of an explosion and
without the risk of an alienation of some of the
major countries involved.

MR. STROUD: *What is the leverage from this point on?*

A: Well, what was the leverage in 1973? In 1973 we were all subject to an oil embargo. We had no diplomatic relations with any of the key countries. And it is an illusion to believe that we had a leverage in 1973 that we have lost in 1976. The leverage that we have now is that we are the only country that is in friendly relations with all of the chief actors in this process.

We are the only country without whose help
progress simply is not possible. And that leverage is
the chief contribution we can make to the process.
The basic leverage as to the Israelis and the Arabs is
about what it was in 1973; that is to say, the
Israelis have territory which the Arabs want, and
the Arabs have legitimacy which the Israelis want.

Now, how to balance off the tangible return
of territories, which has to be part of the settle-
ment, against the Arab commitment to peace,
which is certainly more revocable than is the giving
up of territories—that has been the essence of the
negotiations all along. And the Israelis have not
given up so much territory that this problem has
changed.

This is the essential issue in the negotiation.
What has improved is the readiness of the Arab
countries to accept the existence of Israel. What
has improved also is the greater confidence Israel
has acquired in the process of negotiation. What
has fundamentally changed is the diplomatic posi-
tion of the United States in the Middle East, which
is a dramatic reversal of what it was in 1973. And
this is why the conditions now, either for a Geneva
conference or some other diplomatic process,
seemed to us better now than they have been at
any period since the end of the war.

MR. BARNARD: *While we are on the Middle East, enormous supplies of arms seem to have poured into Lebanon and complicated the problem*

5

there. Can you tell us whether the United States or
Israel has given either overt or covert support to
any faction there, particularly the Christians? And,
of not, where do you think all those arms have
been coming from?

A: The United States has not given any arms to any of the factions. We have no official knowledge of what Israel may have done. But the majority of arms—the overwhelming majority of arms—in Lebanon come from the Soviet Union, one way or the other, either through Libya or through Syria.

The chief conflict is between the Syrians and the Palestinians, both of whom are armed by the Soviet Union and come directly from Soviet sources.

MR. GREENBERG: There would seem to be at least one part of the Middle East where American policy would seem to have been very ineffectual and that would be in Lebanon where we seem to have adopted a policy of just waiting for the blood to settle. I wonder if that doesn't raise the larger question of morality in foreign policy. A recent poll by the State Department indicates that Americans feel—to quote one of its findings—that Washington simply has not appeared to be animated in the last decade or so by the same root sense of right and wrong as the American people. How would you respond to that kind of feeling?

A: First of all, let me make clear what the poll is.

The State Department—we have started in the last year, in order to find out what the public is concerned about, to hold a series of town meetings around the country in which we have invited concerned citizens to state their criticism. And we are sending senior officials to sessions which are entirely devoted to the public expressing their concerns. Our officials then write reports to me about what they consider to be these concerns, and we distribute these reports also to the newspapers in the towns where the town meetings were held. So this is not a very secret operation.

Now somebody leaked one of these reports in Washington that had already been distributed to the hometown newspapers of the people concerned.

I just want to make clear all of these reports are going to be critical, because the town meetings are organized to elicit concerns and not elicit approvals.

Now, let me get to your question of morality last, and deal with Lebanon first.

Whatever our moral convictions may be, we cannot carry them to the point where the United States must settle every conflict in every part of the world in order to be cured. We have in Lebanon passions that have been built up over centuries. We have armies that have been built up over decades.

For the United States to attempt to impose peace by our own forces would make us the policemen of the world. We have attempted to do our best to prevent outside intervention. We have sent a special envoy there. We have lost an Ambassador who was murdered there on a peace mission.

We have stopped short of military intervention, because that would require a massive degree of an American commitment that we do not feel is warranted in these circumstances. But we also believe that the evolution in Lebanon, painful as it is, could lead to a situation in which the overall peace process can be resumed under conditions where all of the parties have learned how tenuous and fragile the situation is.

This does not mean that we would not want to have the war ended as quickly as possible. And we have offered repeatedly our good offices. The only thing we have refrained from doing is to send in American military forces.

Now, on the basic question of the roots of American morality and its relationship to American foreign policy.

The United States, for the greatest part of our history—or at least for the greatest part of our modern history—could live with the conviction that we could dip in and out of foreign policy as we chose. And we could be both isolationists and interventionists on the principle that we were morally superior to the rest of the world, partly caused by the fact that we never had to make the hard choices of security that countries that did not have two great oceans had to confront.

Now, in the 1960's and the 1970's—the late 1960's and 1970's—we have suddenly come up against the limitations of our power, and we now have to conduct foreign policy the way most other nations have had to conduct it throughout their history: where we cannot do everything we want, where we cannot implement all our preferences, and where we cannot impose all our values. And this produces a certain resentment, and it produces

6

the illusion that somehow or other, we could go
back to an earlier pattern if only those in power
were more morally committed.

Now, I am not saying that security considera-
tions have to be dominant. In fact, I believe that
without moral convictions to serve as a compass
point, foreign policy becomes entirely practical
and entirely irrelevant. But the role of our moral
values in foreign policy is to give us the strength to
approach our goals in stages and to set a general
direction which we hope is compatible with the
values of our society.

But what the American people will be learn-
ing in the years ahead, as we have already learned
in Vietnam and elsewhere, is how to reconcile our
needs with our limits and how to be moral without
being able to be absolutists. That is a very tough
problem, and it is one of the uncertainties in our
foreign policy.

MR. GREENBERG: Earlier you quoted Presi-
dent Eisenhower approvingly. Would you consider
his intervention in Lebanon to have been a failure?

A: No, I think that President Eisenhower,
under the conditions that then existed, with the
forces that were then at work in Lebanon, con-
ducted an operation that was a marginal success. A
similar [inaudible] the United States today would
require many divisions, would involve us in all the
inter-Arab disputes that you now see in Lebanon,
and could not be justified to the American people
by American purposes that we could explain after-
ward.

After all, what is the conflict of Lebanon?
You have the Christian community and the
Moslem community that have coexisted side by
side for many decades, but not always.

You have within the Moslem community the
splits between the radical factions and the
moderate factions.

And you have the presence of the Palestinians
who constitute almost a state within a state. All of
this overlaid by Arab rivalries in which the Libyans
and the Iraqis back the radicals, the Syrians have
backed the moderate Arabs, and have cooperated
with the Christians.

For the United States to inject American mili-
tary power into such a situation, under present
circumstances, would lead us into a morass.

I think there are certain situations which,
tragic as they are, we cannot overcome with

military power. And that is the only thing that we
have not done in Lebanon.

MR. GISSLER: Your remarks about the moral core of American foreign policy suggest that certain widespread public understanding or an agreement on certain objectives is essential, yet some very thoughtful critics say that you have done relatively little-especially after the collapse in Vietnam-to stimulate the kind of great debate necessary in this country to achieve that kind of understanding. I wonder if the hard truth is that top policymakers, even in a democracy, are fearful of taking really tough questions to the people for thorough free-swinging discussion?

A: There are two problems. Did I try to
explain American foreign policy to the American
people?

I think I have made a major effort. I have
gone to 28 cities in the last 18 months. Wherever I
have gone, I have given a speech. I have subjected
myself to a question period from the audience. I
have met with leaders of the community. I have
met with the newspaper editors and publishers. I
have spent the whole day in order to explain some
aspect of foreign policy, as I understood it, and to
respond to questions. And we have had these town
meetings which I described.

There is, however, inherent in high office, the
problem that almost all of the problems one deals
with are imposed on one and that the time for
reflection with the best will in the world is limited.
And obviously-and I think this panel and this dis-
cussion prove it-it stands to reason that I have to
believe that what we did was right or we wouldn't
have done it.

Now, obviously, in retrospect, one can change
one's mind about something. But, on the whole, if
one has been serious and thoughtful, one will tend
to believe that one was right.

So, as we go through eight years, you tend to
accumulate a certain vested interest in the policies
that have been carried out inevitably; and as you
go through eight years, the times available for re-
flection are limited. This will be true of any
possible successors as well as of any possible
incumbent.

So, in the process of government, it may not
always be possible, even with the best intentions,
to put everything before the public. But, I have
attempted to make a serious effort, and I think-I
have spent a lot of time on the speeches that I have

7

given publicly, but I am sure that there is always a
lot more that could be done.

MR. GISSLER: Do you have any suggestions
as to how we can raise the level of serious public
discussions on questions like for whom and for
what we might be prepared to fight in the world, if
necessary?

A: I am not sure that that is a question that
can be answered in a serious public discussion by
senior officials in this way.

I think we can ask, in a serious public dis-
cussion, what we take to be our basic purposes in
the world; what kind of a world we are trying to
bring about; what our overall conception is of the
nature of the security, of the nature of peace.
Those are questions, I think, that we can and
should debate.

I think to ask a question in the abstract—are
we prepared to fight, say, for Korea—without hav-
ing answered these other questions first, is going to
lead to a rather bitter debate that may not be very
meaningful.

MR. STROUD: Speaking of the debate about
foreign policy issues, there is still great concern
among many Americans about the Americans
missing-in-action in Vietnam. And I am curious, is
this a real impediment now to the normalization of
relations with Vietnam? Or is the election the real
impediment to the normalization of the relations
with Vietnam?

A: I think that the missing-in-action are a real impediment to the normalization of relations with Vietnam.

Basically, we have no conflict with Vietnam
now. After our experience in Vietnam, we are the
one great power that can be guaranteed not to have
any national objectives to achieve in Indochina. So,
eventually, the normalization of relations between
us and Vietnam will come.

On the other hand, we believe that the be-
havior of the North Vietnamese in not turning over
to us lists, which we are confident they must have,
is a cruel and heartless act and one for which we
are not prepared to pay any price. If that is ac-
complished, normalization will follow very rapidly.

MR. STROUD: Can you define what sort of
response would be considered adequate?

A: We would feel that there is no reason for
the North Vietnamese not to turn over all the in-
formation they have on the missing-in-action. It
would be a humane gesture. It is not something

that does us any good as a nation, but it will help
ease the minds of many hundreds of people.

We, therefore, believe that it should be done.
It would wipe the slate clean. And we will certainly
be prepared to normalize relations rapidly after
that.

MR. GREENBERG: There is one area of the
foreign policy in which you might have a special
knowledge or interest and that is the arms sales
abroad. The Democratic candidate for President
has not been alone in deploring the size of Ameri-
can arms shipments abroad on the theory that they
will actually ignite wars, and we will be drawn into
them. Do you see any of that sort of danger in the
amount of armaments this country is shipping to
various nations abroad?

A: One has to analyze where the arms are
going before one can judge whether they will ignite
wars; and, secondly, whether the United States will
be drawn into those wars, if they are ignited.

Many of the figures that are being used are
vastly inflated. I see references, for example, to
$7.5 billion of arms to Saudi Arabia. Of that $7.5
billion, the overwhelming part of it is going for
construction by the Corps of Engineers, and it is
not going for weapons. And it is technically in the
military budget, but it is to build cantonments for
the Saudi Army and has nothing to do as such with
the arms race.

Another percentage goes to Iran. Now, Iran
has pursued a policy that has been very parallel to
ours in the Middle East. It has not joined the em-
bargo. It has declared that it wouldn't join the
embargo. It has sold oil even to Israel during this
period.

Countries that threaten it are countries like
the Soviet Union and countries armed by the
Soviet Union, such as Iraq. And, therefore, I can-
not foresee—nor has Iran ever transferred arms to
another country. So, it is difficult to foresee any
war that Iran would start that would draw us in.

And to the extent that Iran is capable to pro-
tect itself, we are less likely to be drawn in than we
would be if it were defenseless.

On the other hand, I do agree that we should
look at the question of arms sales more systematic-
ally, and we have created now a new group to
make sure that the question you put is being dealt
with in a responsible manner.

It is my judgment that the arms sales have
contributed much more to stability than to the

8

opposite. But we are not pushing arms sales. We are responding to needs that countries feel—and most of which they would be in a position to get anyway from other sources.

**MR. GREENBERG:** But, Mr. Secretary, those figures on Saudi Arabia include something like 600-700 Sidewinder missiles. Now, what possible defense justification could there be for a country like Saudi Arabia to have that many missiles, except perhaps to defend its interests against Iran, which we have also supplied with—

**A:** Much more to defend its interests against some neighbors it has that are armed by the Soviet Union. And, of the Sidewinders, a large—a significant percentage is going to have to be used for training purposes. So that what will be left is a minimum defensive package. And if you look at the countries surrounding Saudi Arabia, you would not pick Iran as the most likely one to attack it.

**MR. GISSLER:** Your remarks addressed toward Iran as a potential policy quagmire bring to mind our tragedy in Vietnam. It is often said that one thing we can salvage from Vietnam is a lesson. Yet there seems to be continuing disagreement over precisely what that lesson is. Some say it shows the limits of American imperialism. Others, including, I think, the Republican platform writers, indicate that the lesson is that we should never again fight such a war unless we intend to fight it all out and win. I wonder if you could tell us what you feel the fundamental lesson of Vietnam is?

**A:** I think that a fundamental lesson of Vietnam is that before the United States gets itself militarily engaged in any war, it must make an assessment of what its fundamental interest is, and, secondly, whether it can serve this interest by military means.

I do agree that when the United States becomes militarily engaged, it should prevail, and if it cannot prevail, it should not engage itself.

But before the United States engages itself, it must have the perception, not in abstract slogans but through the best analysis that can be made of what the fundamental American interest is, what the nature of its engagement is and what limits we want to set to that engagement.

Otherwise, we are going to be drawn from one commitment to another in order to make good the previous commitment. But it is important also to

understand what involves a commitment. I do not believe that selling arms to a country commits us then to the series of events that led to Vietnam.

**MR. GISSLER:** What about South Korea? We are not just selling arms. We also have combat troops stationed there.

**A:** South Korea—our interest in South Korea is produced by the confluence there of many power centers, by our historical relationship, and, above all, by the fact that Japan considers that its security is closely affected by what happens on the Korean Peninsula.

And, therefore, for the United States to suddenly disengage from Korea would have drastic consequences in Japan and in all of northeast Asia.

**MR. STROUD:** In the wake of the fall of Saigon, you were quoted a number of times with a fairly pessimistic appraisal of the world perception of the United States after Vietnam, and the feeling we had a great need to reestablish the authority of the United States in the world, the credibility of the United States in the world. Do you feel that that perception has changed significantly?

**A:** We have to face the fact that it is a combination of the tragedies of the last four years. Many countries around the world were asking what the role of the United States—or to what extent it could rely on the United States as a stabilizing factor, or as a factor for progress.

I believe that since the collapse of Vietnam, we have conducted a policy that has restored some of our credibility and resolved some of the doubts, but it continues to be, for several reasons including some of our domestic debates, one of the challenges of American foreign policy.

[The remaining questions were asked by other members of the National Conference from the floor.]

**SMITH HEMPSTONE (Syndicated Columnist):** Your were described, I believe, in the Oriana Fallaci interview several years ago as a historian having a tragic sense of destiny. In Admiral Zumwalt's book, while he may have confused Athens with the Theban League, he puts across the impression, in his view, that you feel that your role has been one of trying to get the best deal possible in a declining power situation. I wonder if you could tell us precisely how you do view your role in the past seven and a half years, and how you

9

foresee the shape of the world evolving in the next few years, and America's role in it?

I have served in Washington during a period of fundamental transition when the United States had to liquidate a war which we found when we got there. The first such experiences in our history when we had to adjust our relations with our allies, when we had to find new ways of dealing with our adversaries, and when the revolution that is inherent in the process by which these new nations came into being is beginning to gather momentum.

It has been my conviction that we could not continue to operate by managing crises or by abstract declarations of political intent, but that we had to develop some perception of the national interest that could be maintained over an indefinite period.

Now, this is a difficult thing to put across in America, because we have almost no strand in our foreign policy thinking that is geared to this.

We have an idealistic tradition. We have a pragmatic tradition. We have an international law tradition. But we do not have a tradition of thinking of the world as a political process with no terminal date in which whatever you do only buys you an entrance price to another problem.

So, it is inevitable that there is a lot of debate. And it is inevitable that people who think that there should be neat and final solutions would believe that one preferred contingent solutions.

It is, indeed, my conviction that we cannot define a terminal date at which we can say all our problems have disappeared. We are now part of an international process which is unending insofar as I can foresee, which we can manage, which we can direct, and in which our purposes have to be clearly defined, but in which we can no longer sell our programs the way we did in the immediate postwar period by promising the American people an end to exertion and an end to problems, if only one more program were carried out. And I think this explains some of the sort of criticism that Admiral Zumwalt makes.

STUART LOORY (Chicago Sun Times): Coming back to your quotation from President Eisenhower about there being no alternative to peace, the Congress, within the past couple of weeks, appropriated $104 billion for defense spending in the next year. There are reports that the Pentagon is going to request $130 billion in the

authorization for next year. Are you satisfied that the United States is spending the least amount of money necessary for defense to further American foreign policy aims?

A: I am satisfied that we need, under present conditions, the amounts that have been requested. I am not satisfied that we can continue international relations indefinitely on the basis of an arms race. And therefore, I have believed strongly that limitations of strategic arms and negotiations on the limitations of other arms are necessary.

I believe that the constant accumulation of armaments on both sides is going to lead to a situation that could have some of the characteristics that led to World War I, in which the political leadership at some point lost control over events.

But I do not believe that we can achieve this unilaterally. Until we can negotiate an agreed limitation of arms, I am afraid we have to match what the other side is doing.

GIL CRANBERG (Des Moines Register and Tribune): The Church committee reported that the United States has an extensive covert propaganda operation abroad. This involves having hundreds of foreign journalists on the U.S. payroll and the planting of false and misleading information, some of which unavoidably is picked up and published in this country. The Church committee complained about it. This organization is complaining about it. Our complaint was directed to the CIA. Since this activity presumably is in the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives, perhaps the complaint should have been directed to you.

In any case, would you tell us why you think such covert propaganda activity is desirable, and whether you would consider having it discontinued?

A: Well, I don't believe that putting misleading information out as news is ever justifiable.

The problem arises that in many parts of the world, the media are dominated by, or heavily influenced by, foreign powers that are hostile to us and where some attempt is made to get our point of view across.

But I would not accept this as saying that it is ever justified to put out misleading information. I would think that any information that is placed through any American governmental organization should be such that it could be published here without misleading the American public.

Q: So you disagree with the practice?

10

A: I disagree with the practice of placing mis-
leading information into foreign newspapers.

*Q: Do you have the power to order that?*

A: I am not sure I have. If it was done in the past, I doubt very seriously that it is being done today.

FRED SHERMAN (Miami Herald): You achieved great success in the Middle East in getting the Israelis to talk to the Arabs. You pulled off an apparent miracle in Africa getting the white minority and the blacks to talk. Do you think there is any Foreign Minister anywhere in the world with the same measure of genius that could get Havana and Washington off the same way? [Laughter]

A: Well, as to the first part of your question, the answer is obviously no. [Laughter] But as far as Havana and Washington are concerned, we were beginning to move toward normalizing relations when Cuba placed 15,000 troops into Angola. This cannot be justified on any Cuban grounds. That made clear that either Cuba is acting as a surrogate for the Soviet Union or it is pursuing a revolutionary foreign policy in distant parts of the globe, or what is more likely, it was a combination of the two.

That, plus the extremely aggressive Cuban policy vis-a-vis Puerto Rico, has made it very difficult for us to get into a sensible dialogue.

*Q: In your concern over the Rhodesian situation, did you have any fear that the Cubans might move into Rhodesia?*

A: I believe that there is a danger that if the evolution in Africa is not channeled into a moderate direction, that foreign intervention, whether Cuban or otherwise, would become more and more probable. As this accelerates, a race war becomes more and more inevitable. And if a major race war starts, it is bound to radicalize all of Africa and have serious consequences in other parts of the world.

And, therefore, we are trying very hard to return African—the evolution in Africa into African hands, and to keep all foreign powers out, including ourselves.

TOM CAULFIELD (Savannah Morning News): Partly, you—I don't think anyone at all has had much to say about the Soviet Union, so I will ask a question about that.

*And this is a local question, because in Savan-
ah, which is located 40 miles from here across the*

Savannah River, we had last week develop a situation in which an American company has announced intention to set up a redistribution headquarters in Savannah for the distribution of Russian-made automobiles. And this will employ about 150 people at the outset, and 300 people ultimately.

We have an anomalous situation, therefore, of a communistic government being involved in a capitalistic society. And some people at home have expressed misgivings because Savannah was captured by the British and captured by the Yankees [laughter], and here perhaps is a good case for us to get captured again. [Laughter]

But, my question is, this is an obvious product of detente. And in such a trade-off of American jobs for dollars going to Russia, who is the net winner—the United States or the Soviet Union?

A: Well, I don't believe that Savannah is going to be captured by Russian automobiles, unless they have developed a new one in the last few weeks. [Laughter]

But, to answer your question: Who is the net winner in trade between the Soviet Union and the United States? It is a difficult question to answer in the abstract. I would think that an economy of the size of ours can afford to trade with the Soviet Union without any danger of our economy being in any way significantly influenced by the Soviet Union.

The second question is whether our trade with the Soviet Union strengthens the Soviet Union in any competition they may engage in with the United States. Well, this depends on what sort of trade we engage in, and also what moderation the Soviet Union shows in the conduct of its foreign policy.

If the Soviet Union conducts itself in an extremely hostile and aggressive manner, then I would think the possibilities for normal trade between our two countries would be very small.

If relations over a period of years become calm, if the Soviet Union shows restraint in other parts of the world, then I think trade—especially in nonstrategic items—might contribute to—giving an additional incentive for this moderation.

We have always believed that trade should follow political accommodation. And, therefore, a great deal depends on the basic state of our relations with the Soviet Union as to whether it is beneficial or not.

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
FOREIGN MINISTER JOAQUIM CHISSANO
OF MOZAMBIQUE

FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING
WALDORF TOWERS, OCTOBER 7, 1976

Q: Mr. Chissano, I wonder if you would tell us what you and the Secretary of State discussed?

FM CHISSANO: We reviewed the present situation in southern Africa and we discussed bilateral cooperation. These are the two points:

Q: Which aspects of the southern Africa situation?

FM CHISSANO: You know about Rhodesia and Namibia and the convening of the conference by Great Britain, which we both welcome. And the need of convening the conference by the United Nations on Namibia, and on what concerns Zimbabwe; we see if the conference can be convened as soon as possible.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think that is a fair statement. We had a good talk; we agreed that moving the Rhodesian situation to a conference rapidly, which we understand is the British intention, would speed up the process and would be in everybody's interest.

Very nice to see you, Mr. Foreign Minister.

(Secretary Kissinger leaves.)

Q: Do you think the Rhodesian problem can be resolved only by force?

FM CHISSANO: I have said today it is to falsify the problem to speak about a peaceful solution because the war is there; the war is on. Now, what we are looking for are means for bringing back peace into Rhodesia and to get the transfer of power. I don't think that in Mozambique we have reached a peaceful solution. What we did is that after our struggle had succeeded the Portuguese government said, it decided to commence it with us. We call for a cease fire and we see the modalities of the transfer of power, but the solution was brought in by force, unfortunately. And the same is happening in Zimbabwe.

Q: Do you think the Smith regime will be willing to negotiate away power in quick enough time for you? In other words do you think you are going to have to continue to use force to achieve a black government?

FM CHISSANO: As I have said to you, the war is on and the war has started to reach definite objectives. Until those objectives are attained it would be impossible to end -- to tell those who are fighting, to stop fighting. Because you have to give them reasons why they should stop fighting. This will be obtained at the conference, or the struggle will continue, as we experienced in Mozambique, we will continue to support them until the results are achieved.

Q: Would you stop fighting when an interim government was formed? Or would you continue until the final solution?

FM CHISSANO: We will continue fighting until those who are going to participate in the conference decide that the liberation movements will tell us that they are satisfied with the results and then the war should stop.

Q: Do you think the conference will succeed? Are you optimistic?

FM CHISSANO: It depends on Smith, and somehow on the British too to take the full responsibility. They still may make a pressure on Smith to take reasonable positions, and most reasonable to me would be for Smith to resign and leave the way for others to represent the real interests of the true Rhodesian whites because as it concerns Smith, who is a British rebel who used to represent the British Government and who rebelled in the talks for attainment of independence of Rhodesia, so he can't be both; he should chose one.

Q: Who would you say are the true Rhodesian whites for whom Smith should make way?

FM CHISSANO: I don't know; the Rhodesians know it. We have whites who are truly Mozambicans in our government, our party, and everywhere. We know who they are. There are plenty of Portuguese who after the coup in Portugal, who are claiming they should have independence for Mozambique under their rule, but when they come in they cease to be Mozambicans and they are Portuguese, so this is the thing.

Q: Thank you, Mr. Foreign Minister.

++++++

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY
SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A KISSINGER
AND FOREIGN MINISTER HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING, WALDORF TOWERS,
OCTOBER 7, 1976

Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, what was your feeling about the debate last night?

A: (Response in German)

Q: Mr. Secretary, what was your feeling about the debate last night? A lot of things were said about you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, but they were all favorable, so I --

Q: Are you going to ask for equal time?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: As I was told -- I was mentioned fifteen times, so I need about a half an hour to make appropriate comments.

Q: Secretary Kissinger, you indicated earlier you could live with Jimmy Carter's foreign policy. Do you still think so after hearing him last night?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I hadn't used exactly the words that you had indicated, but since he's developed the full complexity of his thought I would make my statement a little more qualified than I had earlier.

Q: Were you caught by surprise when the Secretary -- when the President said that Poland was not under Soviet domination?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, as I understand it what he said was that the United States didn't accept such a domination.

Q: He said flatly "Poland is not under the domination of the Soviet Union," along with Yugoslavia and Romania.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can only give you the interpretation that I gave to these remarks.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 7, 1976

No. 498

EMBARGOED UNTIL DELIVERY ESTIMATED FOR 2:30 PM EDT
OCTOBER 7, 1976

TOAST BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR LATIN AMERICAN HEADS OF DELEGATIONS AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO THE UNITED NATIONS
AT THE
CENTER OF INTER-AMERICAN RELATIONS
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
OCTOBER 7, 1976

In this decade the cardinal objective of United States foreign policy--over all the world--has been to create a tradition of cooperative international relations based on equality, mutual respect, and shared benefit. We have done so in the recognition that the world would not operate according to an American design and that the world's problems would not be solved by prescription. But more importantly, we have done so in the firm conviction that the community of nations has before it now an opportunity for unprecedented progress toward building a better world. And that a new structure of peace and progress could be constructed in which other nations felt a sense of participation, so that in forming it they could make it their own.

Nothing has been more central to our hopes than the relationships of the nations of this Hemisphere. It is a priceless foundation of past achievement; a vital and progressing process of present cooperation; and our brightest vision for the future of what like-minded nations can accomplish by working together.

We have sustained an awareness that our destinies are linked: by geography, culture, history and shared ideals.

For further information contact:

PR # 498

- 2 -

We have achieved the crucial elements of successful cooperative effort: ours is a hemisphere of peace, in which problems are solved not by resort to international conflict or rhetorical confrontation, but by responsible discussion and negotiation conducted with a unique spirit of mutual regard and respect.

Our achievement is all the more durable and impressive because it has not been easily won. The United States, in its relationship with its sister republics in the Western Hemisphere, has gone through many cycles. There was a time when we unilaterally declared what foreign nations could do in the Western Hemisphere. Two generations ago we centered our relations around a good-neighbor policy based upon the principle of non-intervention in the internal or external affairs of another. The 1960's brought the Alliance for Progress in which, on the whole, the United States sought to develop a program for all of the Western Hemisphere.

In recent years we have, I believe, entered a new and exciting era in our relationships--bringing wider scope for diversity and openness. We are achieving a new and productive balance of responsibility and effort within the Americas. It is a time increasingly marked by consultation, cooperation, and brighter prospects for building stronger and more mutually beneficial relations in our hemisphere--and of making our advancement a model for the wider international progress among nations that our times so clearly demand.

It is to these ends that the President and his Administration vent our best efforts to intensify and strengthen the cooperation between Latin America and the United States.

That is why I have attended every session of the General Assembly of the OAS held since I became Secretary of State and that is why I have travelled twice to Latin America this year, and that is why I have held meetings with the Presidents and Chiefs of State of most nations of the hemisphere, and with virtually all the Foreign Ministers.

I have done so out of the conviction that the long and close ties among the countries of the New World now provide an unprecedentedly sound foundation upon which our nation can come together to work to solve the most compelling issues of our time.

My visits to ten of your countries this year have reaffirmed my conviction that we share that recognition; that we are moving ahead to adapt and advance our ties to meet the needs of our era.

PR # 498

- 3 -

We have done much in the last three years:

— Bilaterally, we have made special efforts to accommodate differences, to find areas of common interest rather than attempt to dictate to each other's policies. We have shown through practice that trade and investment can be promoted to mutual benefit. Our commitment to conciliation has led us to unprecedented negotiations, with Panama, and, on particular bilateral concerns, with Peru.

These intensified bilateral contacts, both formal and informal, are laying the groundwork for important multilateral progress on pressing international problems, from corporate conduct to cooperation for development, from narcotics to Law of the Sea.

— Regionally, we have reaffirmed our commitment to the Organization of American States and to efforts to make it responsive to the concerns of all its members.

In Costa Rica 15 months ago, we ratified our support for the Rio Treaty as an instrument of collective security. At the OAS General Assembly last June, we confirmed the important role of the OAS in protecting human rights in maintaining regional peace--and we began to develop positive new forms of cooperation on trade and technology.

— Globally, our countries have shown growing awareness of the need for a new era of economic relations between the nations of North and South. We have brought more than our individual perspectives on commodities, trade, debt and technology to the United Nations, UNCTAD and CIEC. By drawing on our special experience with the complexities of interdependence, we of the Americas are helping to define new and workable approaches to these vital issues, which require the best of our private as well as our public talents and energies. The United States is dedicated to cooperate in development throughout the world. But as we seek progress on a wider scale, we recognize our close and special ties to the nations of the Americas. We regard the concerns of this hemisphere as our first priority.

In all these areas, the record is one of practical case-by-case progress. We seek no sweeping solutions, we will not force our relations into a single mold or formula. It is a good record. It needs no flowery rhetoric to embellish it. The days of inflated claims and goals are over. Today, ours is a hemisphere of mutual confidence and growing cooperation for peace and progress.

PR # 498

- 4 -

Yet it is in the nature of the unending challenge of
foreign affairs that we can never solve all problems. And
in this present era new issues constantly arise. We must,
therefore, do all we can to ensure that problems we face
are dealt with constructively, and that we work together to
determine the future directions of our cooperation. This is
why the processes of consultation we have recently emphasized
among us are particularly important. Yet consultations
without the broader framework of a shared vision could well
become little more than sterile recountings of our respective
limitations and problems.

We in this hemisphere have that shared vision.

Far more than any like region of the world, we are bound
together by a common heritage. And yet we are not European.
Our traditions and institutions have something new in them.
Men were searching for it before they were sure there was
an America. Columbus wrote to Ferdinand and Isabella that:

"Your Highnesses ordained that I should not
go eastward by land in the usual manner but
by the western way which no one about whom
we have positive information has ever followed."

Columbus found his new western way. We who now inhabit
the lands he discovered 484 years ago next week similarly
are finding ways to the future that are both new and
western.

Thus our hemisphere has for centuries symbolized man's
readiness to grasp his own destiny, to set out upon uncharted
ways in search of a better world.

Today that spirit is more alive--and more important
than ever. But the challenges of our time require even more
than boldness and readiness for tomorrow.

Ours is a time of complex uncertainty. We are called
upon to reconcile fundamental philosophical dilemmas.

-- We must pursue our commitment to great human
equality without removing the incentives for
individual initiative;

-- We must preserve the security and independence of
our nations without sacrificing the resources
needed for economic development; and,

-- We must learn to balance our need for social order
with our responsibility to individual freedom.
We must vindicate our own commitment to human
rights.

PR # 498

- 5 -

The tension between equality and initiative lies at the heart of our desires for a fair yet dynamic global system. In the United States, we emphasize the importance of a market economy based on an open play of economic forces. We believe growth depends importantly on individual entrepreneurship. Other nations emphasize the need for greater state intervention in their economies to ensure more equitable distribution of the fruits of growth.

These differing emphases in economic policy can frequently be significant, but they are not a cause for ponderous ideological confrontation. Each of our countries, to be successful, will have to find a route to special progress that does not end individual incentive. Not to strive for equality is to risk violent revolution; not to provide incentives is to risk decay.

Our mutual dependence, furthermore, requires us to extend our economic cooperation beyond our national borders. That is why we have held intensive bilateral consultations on the Geneva trade negotiations. That is why the United States has ratified its participation in commodity agreements for wheat, coffee and tin; why we have joined in producer-consumer consultations on copper in the past two weeks, and why we look forward to hemisphere consultations on sugar prior to the negotiations to take place next April.

Recent events have taught us all that global prosperity is indivisible; no nation can prosper alone. The challenge we face is to reconcile our often distinct but interacting dimensions of concern on the basis of respect and an open-minded assessment that differing approaches can offer common benefits.

There is a tension well between the demands of security and development. We in the Americas have done far better than most regions of the world in avoiding armed conflict. In Latin America as a whole, defensive expenditures as a percentage of national income are the lowest of any regional in the world. These records are enviable. To maintain them in the face of the spiralling costs and offensive potential of modern military technology will require increased cooperation among potential antagonists as well as friends.

This is easier said than done. The need to cooperate with perceived adversaries in the restraint of defense expenditures provides no emotional satisfaction. But vast domestic expenditures are needed if we are to hope to fulfill the positive aspirations of our peoples. None of us in this room will see a time when there are enough resources to enable us to forego the necessity for choice.

PR # 498

- 6 -

And finally, the balance between freedom and order is inherently tenuous and constantly changing. It will vary for each of us, in accordance with national traditions and historical circumstances.

But all of our nations were founded to protect human freedom and dignity. Man is the measure of all our effort. This Hemisphere is the world's laboratory of human freedom, the just and ultimate refuge of the rights of man. We must not turn away from what is best in our own tradition. If we deny these principles in the search for growth and stability, we hazard the very foundations of our national existence, and what is most precious to our common experience.

There are tensions that no nation or group of nations can ever fully resolve, of course, tensions which are inherent in the conduct of public affairs. In our time, they pose special challenges. Each nation must find its own equilibrium. But there is much we must do together to enhance, protect and further respect for human rights in the Americas.

And as we cooperate to resolve these discrepancies of the human relationship, we must also engage together the immediate material needs before us. Our concrete, common problems are real enough, and our cooperative response can do as much as anything to forward all our hopes for a dynamic, secure and just future for all our peoples.

Several proposals made in the last General Assembly of the OAS in Santiago provide a basis for new forms of cooperation. These proposals establish our regional agenda for the coming year. The include mechanisms for:

- financing basic resource development;

- increasing agricultural productivity;

- facilitating social and infrastructural projects in middle as well as low income developing countries; and,

- improving the development, adaptation and transfer of technology.

Our best effort will be needed to develop these proposals in a manner worthy of our common potential in the next half year. We must insure that the Special General Assembly on Development and the companion Special General Assembly on the Structure of the OAS are the culmination of our common efforts.

PR # 498

- 7 -

The international scene today is marked by shifting con-
stellations of problems, tensions, and opportunities. We
in our hemisphere experience them in as great a range and
intensity as any group of nations on earth.

In the last few years we have, I believe, astutely per-
ceived the problems, the opportunities, and the foundations
upon which we can build. And we have begun to go forward--
not on the wings of inflated rhetoric and unrealistic goals,
but maturely, responsibly and practically.

The world is aware of our work. In a time when inter-
national cooperation is an imperative for each nation, we can
be assured that all will closely monitor those from whom the
most progress can be expected--those whose shared experience,
values and outlook are the moral origin of a unique intimacy
and a unique potential for progress.

Let us resolve to continue to go forward. Not just for
this year and next--but to make our work together a model
for the world for the rest of this century.

Gentlemen, I offer a toast to the future of inter-
American cooperation.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[12]

October 8, 1976

No. 501

TOAST BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT HIS LUNCHEON FOR AFRICAN FOREIGN MINISTERS
AND PERM REPS TO THE UNITED NATIONS
AT THE U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
OCTOBER 8, 1976

Ladies and gentlemen, friends:

I've been so much in Africa in the past year that I am filing an application to be an honorary member of the OAU. Then you will have to sit through even more of my speeches.

When we met here a year ago, I said that America's policy toward Africa was founded upon three principles:

- that self-determination, racial justice, and human rights spread to all of Africa;

- that Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a strong participant in the international economic order;

- and that the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict.

I think none of us could then have foretold the dramatic events which have taken place this past year in pursuit of each of these goals.

## Political Progress

A year ago, events in Rhodesia seemed to be moving inexorably and swiftly toward war -- a war that would have had devastating consequences for that country and its neighbors. There was every prospect of conflict that would leave a legacy of bitterness, division and confrontation that could well set back the progress of southern Africa for generations.

Today, as a result of the resolute determination of the African people and the responsible and far-seeing decisions of their leaders, the situation has changed dramatically. A breakthrough has been achieved. A negotiation is about to begin; the framework of a settlement exists. An opportunity is now before us for a peaceful transition to a majority-ruled multiracial society in Zimbabwe.

-2-

PR#501

A year ago the prospects were dim that the Namibian problem could be rapidly or satisfactorily resolved.

Today, the inevitability of Namibian independence is accepted by all parties concerned. More important, a way toward agreement among Namibia, South Africa, and the United Nations now appears open. Determined efforts are now underway to bring about a constitutional conference at a neutral location under United Nations aegis -- in which all authentic national forces, specifically including SWAPO, will be able to fashion a design for the new state of Namibia.

And in the course of the year past, the forces of change have asserted themselves dramatically in South Africa. It is manifest that the internal political, economic, and social structure of that country must change. A system based on institutionalized injustice, and that brings periodic violence and upheaval, cannot last. The leaders of South Africa have taken responsible steps to help facilitate a process of change in Rhodesia. The world now looks to them to exercise the same wisdom to bring racial justice to South Africa.

## Economic Progress

The past year also has brought the beginnings of what could be a new economic era for Africa. And it is clear that, ultimately, it is economic development which will determine whether the aspirations of the African people for progress and human dignity will be fulfilled.

Africa's great natural wealth and considerable potential for agricultural and industrial development have long been impeded by an array of problems:

- recurrent drought and natural disaster;

- heavy reliance by many nations on the production of a single commodity and, as a result, extraordinary dependence on the vagaries of the world economy; and

- a crushing historical burden of poverty.

In the past year the international community has laid the groundwork for an attack on all these problems. It is increasingly recognized that in place of sporadic relief efforts to ease the after-effects of natural disasters, what is needed is comprehensive international programs to address fundamental conditions. Last May in Dakar I outlined one such program -- a program for international cooperation to help the nations of the Sahel develop additional water resources, increase crop acreage through modern agricultural techniques, and improve food storage -- all aimed at making the Sahel less vulnerable to crisis in the future.

Broad-based multinational cooperation has been accelerated to reform the global economic system for the benefit of the developing nations. In the past year -- since the Seventh Special Session -- major steps proposed at that Session have been implemented and promising new measures discussed. Steps have not only been proposed but carried out --

-3-

PR# 501

to expand agricultural production worldwide, to improve the earnings potential and market stability of key raw materials, to reduce trade barriers to tropical product exports into the United States, to help those hard hit by increasing energy costs, and to stimulate the flow of modern technology so as to promote growth and diversify economies now excessively dependent on a single commodity. Africa is a principal beneficiary of these reforms in the international economy.

Africa's trade with and investment from the United States and the industrial nations of the West are crucial, and expanding. Africa wants to earn its way. But for some, particularly the poorest and least developed, trade and investment are not enough to overcome the legacy of pervasive poverty. United States bilateral assistance programs will therefore concentrate increasingly on these countries, and in sectors where the need is greatest.

The United States also believes that closer cooperation among the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe and Japan can mean a much greater contribution to the economic development of Africa. Therefore we welcome the proposal of President Giscard of France for a fund to organize and coordinate Western assistance efforts to Africa. We hope to move ahead on this proposal. And we are seeking to further strengthen coordination through the OECD to ensure that the collective efforts of the industrial nations are efficiently organized to bring the maximum benefit to Africa.

Economic development is a painful and long-term process which depends most of all on the sustained and substantial efforts of the developing countries themselves. But this has been an historic year in the effort of the community of nations to narrow the gulf between North and South both economically and politically. All those who seek either order or progress are beginning to recognize that we can have neither unless the last quarter of this century is an era of international cooperation.

## Independence

The advances made toward racial justice and economic progress -- if they are maintained and built upon -- can strengthen the basis of African unity and self-determination, and thereby serve as a bulwark against unwanted outside intervention in the affairs of the African people.

The United States is firmly committed to the concept of Africa for Africans. That is why, for example, we have agreed with the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia that non-African nations should not deal directly with the liberation movements of southern Africa. The United States seeks no bloc, and plays no favorites among groups or leaders; we will not oppose any African faction or group, regardless of its ideology, if it is truly independent and African. We will continue our firm opposition to the extension of great power rivalry or conflict to the African continent.

- 4 -

PR # 501

The Need to Maintain Momentum

Thus, in the course of the past year, Africa's drive for justice, for progress, for true independence has been severely tested in every dimension. Africa has survived those tests, and finds itself at a possible turning point in its history.

The statesmanship of Africa's leaders has won widespread recognition. The resilience of Africa's economies, and the determination of its peoples to achieve racial justice, have been amply demonstrated to the world.

But progress achieved will not continue automatically. Difficult decisions must be made, additional statesmanship must be shown, if just solutions are to be achieved.

Yet continued progress is crucial: For we are all aware that the important steps toward peace and justice in Rhodesia, steps to avert bloodshed and widening war, can easily be undone. And, there are those who, for their own purposes, do not want to see a peaceful settlement in either Rhodesia or Namibia.

Together, African states, the United Kingdom, and the United States have fashioned an opportunity for peace and foundation for progress in southern Africa. Essential elements of a negotiated settlement have been achieved.

-- The authorities in Rhodesia have accepted the principle of majority rule within two years.

-- The parties have agreed that an interim government will be established immediately.

-- Agreement has been reached on the time and place for a conference.

-- A number of Western governments have agreed to participate in a fund to facilitate the transition to majority rule and to enhance the economic future of an independent Zimbabwe.

For the first time in eleven years, a rapid, satisfactory and peaceful end to the Rhodesian crisis is within reach. To lose this opportunity would be monumental tragedy. To seize it can mean a new day of hope to southern Africa. History will not forgive a failure to seize the moment. Whether by neglect or design, such a failure will be tantamount to a decision to choose violence, chaos and widening destruction over a rapid and peaceful solution. No country in Southern Africa will be spared either the pain of warfare or the judgment of history.

Continued movement toward an accord for Namibia is also crucial. My talks with leaders of black African states, the South African Prime

-5-

PR # 501

Minister, and Mr. Sam Nujoma of the Southwest African People's Organization lead me to believe that those involved want a peaceful solution and are willing to modify their positions in order to achieve it. As in Rhodesia, success is not assured. Nevertheless, with determination and a readiness to compromise, the parties are now in a position to end the dispute that has been a source of serious international discord for almost three decades.

The focus of the moment is on the southern part of the continent, but the United States' commitment applies to all of Africa, and to all the great issues I have mentioned -- justice, progress, and independence.

Last year I said to the Permanent Members of the OAU who met with me that strengthening the relationship between the United States and Africa is a major objective of American policy. It was then, it is now, and shall continue to be so in the future. Africa can count on us.

There can no longer be any question that America is committed to Africa's goals and to working with the nations of Africa to solve the continent's problems. In return, we expect to find respect for our concerns and perspectives.

Let us set aside the suspicions of the past and work for our common future. Together we can reconstitute the community of man on the basis of mutual benefit and shared endeavor. We can show that races can live together -- that there is an alternative to hatred.

If Africa succeeds, it will have much to teach the world, and so much to contribute to it.

I therefore ask you to join me in a toast:

-- to the well being of the peoples of Africa,

-- to friendship and cooperation between the United States and Africa, and

-- to peace, prosperity and justice for peoples everywhere.

* * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[L]

October 8, 1976

NO. 504

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH
SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM
AT THE UNITED NATIONS
OCTOBER 8, 1976

**SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM:** Ladies and gentlemen: I had a very helpful and interesting exchange of views with the Secretary of State. I am most grateful to him for coming here to give me the opportunity to discuss a number of important questions. We discussed, as you can imagine, the situation in southern Africa, and the efforts of the Secretary of State in this regard in connection with the dealings here in the United Nations and the Security Council. We discussed the situation in the Middle East and the possibilities for resuming the negotiating process. We also discussed the Cyprus question and the North-South battle. As I said before, this exchange of views was very useful and very helpful, and I think it best now that I give the floor to the Secretary of State.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We always value the opportunity to exchange views with the Secretary General, who has played such an important and distinguished role in all of the issues we have discussed. And I found the talk very, very helpful.

**QUESTION:** The Soviet Union has proposed that the Geneva Conference be held this month and next and the PLO participate in the meeting with (inaudible) status. Is that a (inaudible) proposal?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we are studying the annual Soviet proposal on the Geneva Conference and we will give a formal reply in due course. There are many aspects of it that have proved difficult in the past and we will be studying it and give our replies in due course.

**QUESTION:** Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., said that our initiative in southern Africa is too late; had it been started earlier many lives would have been saved.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I don't know -- it is always easy after the event to make judgments. We thought we started it at the time when progress was likely. But I don't want to engage in a debate about what might have been possible earlier.

-2-

PR#504

**QUESTION:** Ian Smith said again that the terms of the pertetual peace plan for Rhodesia that you gave him (inaudible) you told him that the plans were approved by the front-line presidents. Could you clarify that for me?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I gave Ian Smith my best judgment of what would provide a framework for negotiation, and what might be acceptable. I don't think that any useful purpose is served now in doing anything other than to assemble a conference to give each side an opportunity to state their positions and then see how, under the guidance of the chairman, a solution can be found.

**QUESTION:** Are both sides going to the conference with the understanding that the terms Smith outlined are negotiable?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I believe that each side should now go to the conference. Obviously, a conference is called in order to have a negotiation, and my impression -- being in touch with all of the parties -- is that everybody understands the framework that is being developed.

**QUESTION:** The Foreign Minister of Nigeria said yesterday that he had the feeling that there was a package deal by which you had arranged with Vorster to cooperate in Rhodesia and in return you would not interfere with South African affairs in Namibia or in South Africa itself.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** His feeling is totally incorrect. There is no package deal. We are working, for example, on a program to get a conference assembled on Namibia. And I believe that progress is being made and that a conference can be assembled in the near future and that a firm date for Namibian independence can be established.

**QUESTION:** In the aftermath of the Ford-Carter debates and the Eastern European issue, the President has said that his policy is to support the aspirations of the people for independence in Eastern Europe. Does this apply also to the Ukraine?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the President has stated our position clearly and I won't go into all the interpretations that can be given to it. My understanding is that he spoke of the nations of Eastern Europe.

**QUESTION:** You said some time ago that you thought a Namibian conference would be held in two weeks to a month. Is that still the timetable?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, it isn't for the United States to decide when such a conference could meet. We are in the process of discussing with all the interested parties the framework, which seems to us at this moment, to be attainable. I think if a consensus developes, a conference can be assembled within two or three weeks after that and I believe that progress is being made in creating such a consensus. I believe that it is possible to get a firm date for independence and an early date for a conference.

* * * * *

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
FOREIGN MINISTER SITEKE MWALE
OF ZAMBIA

FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING
WALDORF TOWERS, OCTOBER 8, 1976

Q: How did it go?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We had a full review of the situation in a very constructive atmosphere. We reviewed particularly the situation of Rhodesia and Namibia, and a little bit about our bilateral relations.

Q: Do you have any clear idea of whether any or all of the liberation groups in Rhodesia are going to attend the Geneva Conference?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think we should leave it to the British, who are now composing the -onference. I think we all agree it's in everybody's interest to have the widest possible representation. And what we want is what everybody wants, that's to make sure a settlement gets the full support of all the parties that have to implement it.

Q: Can I take from that that you don't know yet whether they're all coming, or who's coming?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: We have a pretty good idea of who's expressed a readiness to come, but I think the announcement should come from those who are convening the conference.

Q: Are you optimistic, Mr. Minister?

MINISTER MWALE: Well, in a situation like this, one has to be optimistic. We have to, this is what the conference is all about, and when it comes to human relations you just have to be hopeful, provided you keep owing at it positively.

Q: Have you had any indication, Mr. Secretary, whether South Africa would sit down with SWAPO at the same table?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we are trying to work out modalities of that conference, too. But I don't want to go into bits and pieces: of it. We are in touch with SWAPO. SWAPO is now consulting its own leadership and when Mr. Nujoma returns we will have another conversation with him

Q: When will that be, Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, whenever he comes back. He's on his way back to Africa now, I understand.

Q: What does Pretoria think?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we are discussing what we know
with our African friends. And, until an opinion has crystal-
ized, I don't want to talk about it.

MINISTER MWALE: Thank you very much indeed.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It's always good to see. Good to
see you.

*********************

REMARKS TO THE PRESS
THE HONORABLE HENRY A KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND

FOREIGN MINISTER F. L. MUNYUA WAIYAKI
OF KENYA

Q: Can you give us an idea how your discussions went?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, we had a very good talk, discussing southern Africa, the relations between Kenya and the United States, which are excellent, and general world affairs.

Q: What about the discussions on southern Africa? What did you have to say?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I brought the Foreign Minister up-to-date on my understanding of where things stood, and he gave me his assessment from his talks with his colleagues, of where matters stood. It is my impression that a conference on Rhodesia is going to be assembled in the near future?

Q: In Geneva, in the next two weeks?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The British are the conveners of the conference and I think they ought to make the announcement. My impression is that it is moving in that direction -- I don't want to give a time frame. But in the near future.

Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, what is your assessment right now --

FM WAIYAKI: I think we are moving in the right direction. I said that to the Secretary of State. We have to keep an open mind.

Q: What about the call by some African leaders that majority rule come within 4 to 6 weeks?

FM WAIYAKI: We want majority rule now; they are putting it too far, aren't they?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Nice to see you. See you at lunch.

FM WAIYAKI: Good bye.

Q: (Inaudible)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My understanding is he will either make it today or early next week. It was his suggestion.

Q: But it is going to be in Geneva?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It looks to me as if it is going to be outside of Africa.

Thank you.

REMARKS TO THE PRESS
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
FOREIGN MINISTER Y. B. CHAVAN
OF INDIA
FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING AT
WALDORF TOWERS, OCTOBER 8, 1976

FM CHAVAN: We took a review of our relationships in our areas, particularly economic (inaudible) Joint Commissions.

Q: How would you describe the talks?

FM CHAVAN: I think they were very fruitful and constructive.

Q: What was accomplished, if anything?

FM CHAVAN: I think I have said what I want to stay?

Q: What are the state of relations between your government and the United States? How would you describe them?

FM CHAVAN: I would say they are in a good state. We are making an effort to further improve it.

* * * * *

3

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That was at a time when it was encompassed in one speech Governor Carter gave earlier in the campaign, even before the campaign when he was still a candidate. As he has elaborated his thinking, I have many things that I strongly disagree with and other aspects in which I don't think he has been correctly briefed. But I really would rather not get into a partisan debate.

MISS WALTERS: Well, can you give us any aspect of how foreign policy might differ in a different administration?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I'm not very clear from what has been said what is in mind. Take the issue of secrecy. I believe that the American public must know the major direction of American foreign policy. And for this reason I have testified before Congressional committees over eighty times; I have given fifty public speeches; I've held nearly a hundred press conferences since I am in office.

On the other hand, in a detailed negotiation it is impossible to put forward all the details because sometimes it is difficult for a leader, for a foreign leader, to live with the concessions he is making after they are accepted, but if he puts them forward during the negotiations he will pay a heavy price before it even gets

4

implemented.

The final results must be fully explained to the public. In the negotiating process there has to be some latitude while the negotiations are going on.

So all of us are in favor of telling the American people where we are going, what we are doing, and what they can expect.

MISS WALTERS: Mr. Secretary, in looking at the situation in Africa most Americans know that you shuttled back and forth in Africa, that you seemed to have made an agreement to guarantee the black majority rule in Rhodesia and peace in that part of the world. Now, many in Africa on both sides seem to be waffling. In short, Mr. Secretary, are the agreements you made going to stick?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is a very complicated process in which the several factions on the European side, there are five African Presidents, four liberation movements, all of which have constituencies to appease. So inevitably you are going to get a lot of public statements. But the process is moving forward. The conference, in my view, will be assembled, and there will be a result that will bring about majority rule, minority rights, and peace in Rhodesia.

It is going to be difficult. And if the radicals get control of the process, it may fail. But right now I would

5

say good progress is being made.

MISS WALTERS: Mrs. Secretary, turning to the Middle East, it seems that the PLO at this time is being wiped out in Lebanon. Will they in the end, and will this help at all in the underlying problems in the Middle East?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think the PLO is being wiped out. But I think all of the countries in the Middle East are seeing in better perspective what the function of various groups is. I think that conditions are coming about in which progress towards peace in the Middle East can again be made. I believe that after the Lebanon crisis is either resolved or reduced in intensity that we can turn towards the process of peacemaking in the Middle East with some of the best prospects that have existed in decades.

MISS WALTERS: Do you think you will have to go to Lebanon? Will the United States be more involved in the settlement than they have been?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't think the United States can settle the Lebanon crisis. We will be helpful; we will be glad to give advice; but this is an issue that concerns the Arab nations and Arab groups, and they have to settle it among themselves.

6

MISS WALTERS: China is under new leadership, and we've been talking since the Shanghai Agreement in 1972 about normalization, which really comes down to coming to some agreement about Taiwan. Specifically, are we going to do anything more about Taiwan than continue to talk about it? If we are, when?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are two aspects to our relationship with China. One is the overall international situation, in which both the Chinese leaders and we have said there are certain comparable interests.

The second is the problem of normalization. On Normalization with China, we have stated that we are ready to move forward. We have also stated an approach which up to now the Chinese Government has not been prepared to accept. So we are prepared to continue to negotiate on the subject. We are prepared to make serious effort. But when it will finally be realized I cannot say at this moment. But even before the normalization, China and we can carry out parallel policies on many issues. And we have.

MISS WALTERS: Does this new leadership in China affect our relationship with them, as far as you know, right now?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The truth is we really don't know too much about the new leadership in China. We believe

7

that the foreign policy of a country depends on its basic
interests, and we think that those have many (influenced by),

MISS WALTERS: Do you know yourself Hua Kuo Feng?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I never met him. I understand
he was at some banquet that I attended when the two
Presidents were there, but at that time he was not in a
position that would draw him to our attention.

MISS WALTERS: And you have no recollection of
him?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have no recollection. I
don't believe I have ever talked to him.

MISS WALTERS: Mr. Secretary, after eight
years of working on foreign policy, can you imagine four
years more in the Government?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can imagine it, but my
staff can't.

MISS WALTERS: Is it something that you would
look forward to?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have not made any decision.
After the election I owe it to the President, if he wants to
talk to me about it, as he indicated he would, to talk to
him about it. But my view has been that eight years ought
to be enough, but I don't want to make a final decision

8

until the President has talked to me.

MISS WALTERS: Mr. Secretary, the Russians delivered a sharp attack before the UN General Assembly and the diplomatic efforts you responded equally. Are we still trying to take that again?

Mr. Secretary, the Russians delivered a sharp attack before the UN General Assembly on diplomatic relations with China, and you responded equally sharply. Are the relations now between those two countries chilly?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The problem of peace remains the paramount concern. That affects importantly the United States and the Soviet Union since we have the capacity to blow up the world. On the other hand, you cannot have peace if one nation reserves to itself the right to exacerbate disputes all over the world and encourage the most violent solutions.

In Africa what we are attempting to do should not be contrary to anybody's interest. We have nothing to gain there except peace, which ought to be to everybody's benefit. If the Soviet Union insists on thwarting this, it must have an effect on our relationship, and it will have. But we must also keep in mind that sooner or later the problem of peace among the nuclear powers must be solved, and it must remain one of our basic objectives.

9

MISS WALTERS: Has it been on the
relationship yet between the two countries?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It has certainly made us ask ourselves some questions, because we will not accept the proposition that one country can all over the world increase tensions and at the same time talk about peaceful coexistence. They have got to do one or the other. If they want peaceful coexistence, they must be responsive in helping us settle disputes.

MISS WALTERS: Does that mean the principle of détente (inaudible) is dead?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The principle of détente is important, but détente must be reciprocal.

MISS WALTERS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

RETAKE OF QUESTIONS

MISS WALTERS: Mr. Secretary, in your view, what are the differences between Ford and Carter on foreign policy?

MISS WALTERS: Mr. Secretary, in your view, what are the differences between President Ford and Governor Carter in foreign policy?

How would foreign policy be different under a new administration?

PR 514

**MS. WALTERS:** In this presidential campaign, Jimmy Carter has made Secretary of State Henry Kissinger a personal target for criticism of American foreign policy. Much of Kissinger's reputation is based on his efforts to bring peace to the Middle East and, more recently, to Africa. This morning, we met with the Secretary in the State Department in Washington and began our interview about asking him about prospects for peace in those areas of the world.

Mr. Secretary, in looking at the situation in Africa most Americans know that you shuttled back and forth in Africa, that you seem to have made an agreement to guarantee black majority rule in Rhodesia and peace in that part of the world. Now, many in Africa on both sides seem to be waffling. In short, Mr. Secretary, are the agreements you made going to stick?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It is a very complicated process in which there are several factions on the European side, there are five African Presidents, four liberation movements, all of which have constituencies to appeal. So inevitably you are going to get a lot of public statements. But the process is moving forward. The conference, in my view, will be assembled, and there will be a result that will bring about majority rule, minority rights, and peace in Rhodesia.

It is going to be difficult. And if the radicals get control of the process, it may fail. But right now, I would think that progress is being made.

**MS. WALTERS:** Mr. Secretary, turning to the Middle East, it seems that the PLO at this time is being wiped out in Lebanon. Will their influence end, and will this help resolve the underlying problem in the Middle East?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I don't think the PLO is being wiped out. But I think all of the countries in the Middle East are seeing in better perspective what the function of various groups is. I think that conditions are coming about in which progress towards peace in the Middle East can again be made, and I believe that after the Lebanon crisis is either resolved or reduced in intensity that we can turn towards the process of peacemaking in the Middle East with some of the best prospects that have existed in decades.

PR 514

-2-

**MS. WALTERS:** China now has new leadership. Does this new leadership in China affect our relationship with them, as far as you know, right now?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The truth is we really don't know too much about the new leadership in China. We believe that the foreign policy of a country depends on its basic interests, and we think that those have many comparable interests.

**MS. WALTERS:** Do you know yourself Hua Kuo-feng? I hope I'm pronouncing it right.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I never met him. I understand he was at some banquet that I attended when the two Presidents were there, but at that time he was not in a position that would have brought him to our attention.

**MS. WALTERS:** And you have no recollection of him?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have no recollection. I don't believe I have ever talked to him.

**MS. WALTERS:** Mr. Secretary, the Russians delivered a sharp attack before the UN General Assembly on your diplomatic efforts in Africa, and you responded equally sharply. Are the relations now between those two countries chilly?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The problem of peace remains a paramount concern, and that affects importantly the United States and the Soviet Union since we have the capacity to blow up the world. On the other hand, you cannot have peace if one nation reserves itself the right to exacerbate disputes all over the world and encourage the most violent solutions.

**MS. WALTERS:** Has it had a relationship yet between the two countries?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It has certainly made us ask ourselves

-3-

PR 514

some questions, because we will not accept the proposition that one country can, all over the world, increase tensions and at the same time talk about peaceful coexistence. They have got to do one or the other. If they want peaceful coexistence, they must be responsive in helping us settle disputes.

**MS. WALTERS:** Does that mean that the principle of detente - whether we use that word or not - that the principle is dead?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The principle of detente is important, but detente must be reciprocal.

**MS. WALTERS:** Mr. Secretary, after eight years of working on foreign policy, can you imagine four years more in the Government?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I can imagine it, but my staff can't.

**MS. WALTERS:** Secretary Kissinger went on to say that he has not made any decision, that he will talk to the President if he wins about it after the election, but that, quote, his own view is that eight years ought to be enough.

* * * * *

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
THE HONORABLE DONALD JAMEISON
CANADIAN SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
FOLLOWING THE MEETING OF
OCTOBER 15, 1976

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would like to express our appreciation to the Foreign Minister for visiting us so soon after assuming his responsibilities. We already had a good talk in New York. This continued the close exchange of views between Canadian and American officials. We reviewed bilateral relations and the world situation. I briefed Mr. Jameison on African developments and we exchanged views especially on Soviet affairs because Mr. Jameison is paying a visit there within the week. The talks were very cordial, very helpful and will be continued regularly -- for several years. Do you have anything you want to say?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMEISON:** I just want to reiterate the fact that the talks were very productive and helpful and, in the tradition of Canada and U.S. relations, were frank. Among some of the more specific subjects on which, of course, there will have to be continuing

(2)

discussions is our mutual decision to extend the
territorial seas 200 miles and the boundary questions
that that raises. We also talked, as the Secretary said,
about a number of other matters relating strictly to
Canada and to the U.S., but I was very helped by his
advice and his judgment with regard to international
matters as well. And I look forward to continuing
these meetings.

**QUESTION:** Could you indicate what the other subjects were that you discussed; energy, oil, gas, and so on?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMEISON:** Yes, most of those were
touched upon, as well as the present situation with
regard to beef quotas and such matters of a bilateral
nature.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, on February 6, you registered
two gifts from General Barzani with the State Department
gift unit. Six days later you told us you never
received the gifts. If you never received the gifts,
why did you register them? Why did you register them
if you never received them?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That's a very -- that's a question
which you have asked repeatedly.

**QUESTION:** Excuse me sir, but I have not asked the
question before. The only other time I ever asked you,
you said you never received the gifts, but the documentary

(3)

records testify otherwise.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have never possessed these gifts, and the bookkeeping that was done with respect to them is not a matter of (inaudible).

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did you raise the subject of Canada's participation in the fund on Rhodesia -- of Rhodesia?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I discussed it, and I explained the general outline, but it was not a -- but it is not yet at the point where a decision by the Canadian Government is required.

**QUESTION:** Is Canada going to participate in that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we would appreciate any country that can make a contribution, but we have not yet made a formal request.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, Fidel Castro has announced that he will renounce the anti-hijacking agreement. What is your reaction to that and what effect do you think it will have?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I can say two things: First, the United States condemns terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy and will not itself engage in it. Secondly, the United States had absolutely nothing to do with any of its organs in the explosion

(4)

of the Cuban airliner which triggered this Cuban
action. Thirdly, we will hold the Government of Cuba
strictly accountable for any encouragement of hijacking,
and any encouragement of terrorism that may flow from
its renunciation of the treaty.

**QUESTION:** What does that mean: strictly accountable?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We will have to see what circumstances arise. We consider it an unfriendly and irresponsible act.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, have you received any notification whatsoever from the Russians expressing concern about the way Eastern Europe has figured so prominently in the Presidential campaign?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have received no official notification or communications from the Soviets.

**QUESTION:** How do you explain the intensified Soviet press attack on precisely this point -- about this article today, for example.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I assume, it is a sign of Soviet displeasure, but we have not received any formal communication from the Soviet Government.

**QUESTION:** Do you think that the Russians understand that this is a part of the way an American Presidential

(5)

campaign is enacted?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, they have seen many American campaigns. I don't want to speculate about how the Soviets interpret our actions.

**QUESTION:** Did you raise the subject of broadcasting with Mr. Jamieson, and did you discuss the deletion of commericals by leading private cable television companies and are you satisfied with that?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The subject of broadcasting is being discussed, including the issues of commericals. Negotiations are going on and it is my impression that a constructive solution is going to be found, in the relatively near future.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Jamieson, I wonder if you could give us some indication what the Canadian Government stand will be when a formal request is made to participate in the Rhodesia plan?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMEISON:** Well, I informed -- the question was what our position would be if and when we received a formal request from the Secretary with regard to the so-called South African Fund. I indicated to the Secretary this morning that Canada wishes to do everything possible to speed a satisfactory settlement of the southern African situation and this could quite

(6)

conceivably involve participation in a fund. As the Secretary himself has said, to date we have not had the details of the fund or its purposes spelled out for us, but the Secretary has undertaken to have that done in very short order, and we will look at it from a very sympathetic point of view, and, if, as I suspect, it makes a worthwhile contribution to the over-all objectives that the Secretary set up in southern Africa, then we will be looking at it very sympathetically indeed.

**QUESTION:** Would you be willing to take white settlers from Rhodesia who leave Rhodesia after it becomes independent?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMEISON:** We have no special policy with regard to Rhodesians, either white or black, on immigration. At the moment, we will deal with them in a normal fashion when they apply for immigrant status, and we will just simply see the evolvement of events before making any decisions along the line you asked. However, I should emphasize this, that I gathered from the Secretary and it is certainly a point with which I agree, that the objective would be to avoid any mass exodus of any Rhodesians as a result of the settlement.

**QUESTION:** Are you going to take any action now to

(7)

try to persuade Cuba to change its mind about the
agreement?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We plan to take no action. Cuba knows or should know that we had nothing to do with the explosion of its airliner. We will plan no action and I repeat, Cuba will be held accountable for its action.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, could you comment on the report by the Rhodesians, that if the black nationalists do not participate in the round table, that there have been assurances of sympathy on the part of the United States toward the Rhodesian Government.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** The United States policy towards the authorities now in power in Salisbury will not change.

**QUESTION:** There have been no extra assurances?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** There are no extra assurances.

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible on General Barzani)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** You'd better ask that sort of question at a press briefing.

**QUESTION:** How difficult will the discussions be between the United States and Canada on the boundary, the water boundary in the eastern part of the continent?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMEISON:** Well, they will be difficult in one sense, because of complexity of the geography. In

(8)

another sense, I don't believe that they will be difficult
in terms of the good will that each side is going to
bring to the discussions. We have indicated, of course,
as I believe is now public knowledge that we
will be moving to a unilateral action as of January 1
of next year. I think it is also generally agreed
that we cannot see a permanent resolution of the border
question by that time, but I am hopeful that in
the interim we can come up with some kind of an operational
plan that will give effect to both the United States'
objectives and goals and our own.

**QUESTION:** But won't that unilateral action be in conflict
with the action being contemplated by the United States
later on?

**FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMEISON:** Well, that, as I said, is
a technical point. We don't think that it is insurmountable.
We will be able, I believe, to find a method of both
patrolling and covering the area that is of interest
to both of us in four parts of the continent. We will
be able to do that in the absence of any long term or
final agreement while the talks are still going on.

**QUESTION:** One other area, Mr. Jameison --

**FOREIGN SECRETARY JAMEISON:** We resolved to agree

(9)

that we would meet frequently, and that most Canadian
issues with the United States are not ones that are
resolved or become problems in a single day.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said that Cuba knows that the United States was not involved in the airliner explosion. What do you suppose was Mr. Castro's motivation for wanting to abrogate?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't want to speculate on Mr. Castro's motivation. The United States opposes terrorism as an instrument of its national policy. We are not practicing it, and we believe also that any government that willfully encourages hijacking is behaving in a totally irresponsible and flagrant manner.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you think there will be an increase in hijacking as a result of Premier Castro's action?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We hope not.

* * * * *

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PROF. FAIRBANK: Ladies and gentlemen, I am
John Fairbank, representing Harvard University.

Harvard has called this press conference and
is extremely glad that Secretary Kissinger is able to
come here today, because we have an interest in East
Asia that we think is absolutely essential to develop in the
public interest. The Secretary is helping us in this way
at our request. We appreciate it very much. I hope each of you
will identify your paper as you ask questions.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is this Administration
doing at this moment to secure a final accounting of
American servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia, and
also a comment from you on the cooperation of the present
government in Viet-Nam on this matter?

A (Secretary Kissinger) We have made it clear to
the Government of Viet-Nam that progress towards normalization
and progress towards better relations with the United
States absolutely depends on an accounting for the missing
in action. We are prepared to discuss this with the
Vietnamese. We've had diplomatic exchanges in Paris,

518/116

2

and we expect to start some discussions with them in
the near future on that subject.

Now, so far, the Vietnamese Government has not
been particularly cooperative. They have been feeding
out just a few names to influence particular decisions, but we
think that as a question of principle we cannot let the
Vietnamese Government blackmail American families with an
anguish that has been going on for years, in order to
do something that they should have done under the Armistice
Agreement to begin with.

So we hope that in the future that we will get
a complete accounting for the Missing in Action and that
will then permit progress towards normalization.

Q Just a follow up on that: Is this
Administration prepared to veto the entrance of the Government
of Viet Nam into the United Nations until this matter
is resolved?

A Well, we have vetoed it before. We have
made it clear that we would veto it before, and the President
has stated that this is a precondition.

Q Mr. Secretary, how is the State Department
responding to Fidel Castro's

518/116

statement that his country is cancelling the 1973 Sky-
jacking Agreement with the United States?

A First, in my speech to the United Nations I condemned terrorism as an instrument of national policy pursued by any nation, for whatever cause. The United States is not engaged in any activity of this kind, and the charge by Fidel Castro that the United States or its government, or any agency of the government had anything to do with the explosion of that airliner is totally false.

Secondly, we think that it is an act of complete
irresponsibility to encourage hijacking at this moment
at a time when the -- when one of the biggest of human
problems is the taking of hostages that cannot possibly
influence political decisions or foreign policy decisions.

And we have stated today, and I repeat
again, that we will hold the Cuban Government accountable
for any actions that result from their decision.

Q Mr. Kissinger,

The Democratic Presidential nominee, Jimmy Carter, says
that when it comes to foreign policy that you, in fact, are
the President of the United States; in that particular
area that you really have the responsibility that President
Ford apparently has very little input in foreign policy

518/116

4

matters. Could you respond to that?

A I will respond to that question.

But could I ask you to ______ in your other questions to leave them out of the partisan areas. You can mention criticisms and ask me to comment on criticisms but don't get me into specific references to personalities.

In this particular case I think I would have to say that this shows that Mr. Carter has more experience as a Governor than at the Federal level.

There is no such thing -- Dean Acheson used to say that there can be a strong President and a strong Secretary of State as long as the Secretary of State knows who is President.

The final decisions are always made by the President. I see the President three or four times a week. I am on the telephone with him constantly. There is no major decision that is taken which is not made by the President.

In the day to day conduct of foreign policy every President has to delegate certain tactical decisions to somebody -- to his Security Advisor, to his Secretary of State -- and that, too, has happened with every

518/116

5

President in the post-war period. President Ford
and I have had a very close working relationship and it
is in the nature of such a relationship that the points
of view of the two partners merge.

But it is always clear who is the senior partner
and who is the junior partner.

Q Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that in a
sense when President Ford admittedly made a blunder
during the second debate with Jimmy Carter on the Eastern
European situation, that that indicated that he was not
on top of the situation -- that he wasn't aware fully
of certain foreign policy issues?

A No. That indicated that under the pressure
of a debate he did not make a point as felicitously as he
might have made it -- as he has since admitted.

Nobody who knows his record could believe
that on this particular issue he did not know exactly what
the facts were. He had one thing in mind and he
expressed it in a manner that created the wrong impression
and he has stated that publicly and has clarified it.

But there was no misapprehension in his mind
as to the presence of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe

A 6

And we have been negotiating for years to reduce
the number of those divisions; and he has personally
visited three East European countries.

Q Mr. President,

A I appreciate the promotion but -- [Laughter.]
there's a constitutional provision against it --

Q Mr. Secretary, what was your reaction to
Carter's remarks on the Panama Canal, and has that
affected the negotiations in any way?

A Could you leave names out of these questions?
[Laughter.]

It has not affected the negotiations which
are just on the verge of resuming.

We have stated repeatedly that with respect to
the Panama Canal it is not an issue between the United
States and Panama. It is an issue of the United States
position with respect to the Western Hemisphere and
ultimately with respect to all of the new nations in
the world.

If there is a consensus in the Western Hemisphere
on any point, it is that the existing arrangements in
Panama are to be changed. And if the United States

518/116

7

relies simply on the physical assertion of its power --
which we have, and of course we are stronger than Panama --
then we are going to mortgage the possibilities of a
more creative relationship in the Western Hemisphere.

So therefore, the problem is whether we can
assure access through the Canal -- free and unimpeded
access through the Canal -- by arrangements different from
those that now exist.

This is the essence of the negotiation and
I do not think it helps to make extreme statements in
this regard.

Any agreement that we make -- first of all, there's
no doubt -- not one line of an agreement exists at this
moment. Once a concept of an agreement is agreed
to, it will be discussed with the Congress.
Once the Treaty exists, it will have to be approved by
two thirds of the Senate.

So there is plenty of opportunity for a full
debate and it will take an overwhelming majority to pass
it. And we believe that the negotiations are in the

518/116

8

national interest and I believe that any President
will come to the same conclusion that every President has
come to since 1964, namely that these negotiations should
be continued and that all possibilities should be
explored.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you tell us a little
bit about the Southeast Asia Conference and why it is
important for you to be meeting with businessmen?
Will you give us a little bit of your concept of the role of
multinationals in East Asia?

A Well, first of all, I am meeting with this
Conference primarily because my friend John Fairbank has
asked me to meet with it. And I did not call the
Conference nor did I have anything to do with the
membership of the Conference.

As I understood it, Harvard is calling a conference
of Americans with interests in Asia and attempts to bring
that group together with faculty members that have been
studying the problems of Asia.

Now I believe that this is an excellent idea.
I think that Americans who are active in Asia ought
to understand the cultural, political and economic
conditions of the area. And I believe that professors

518/116

9

who are studying the area can benefit from some of the
practical experiences which some of these corporations
and others who are interested in the area have. I
have always believed that one of the problems in our
society is to bring together those who have an
opportunity to reflect about the problems with those
who have to be active in the area.

So I have welcomed this opportunity and, as
you know, I am speaking OFF THE RECORD. I am not using
it to make any public pronouncement. I am doing it to
help my former colleagues at Harvard and my old
institution to engage in a worthwhile program.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us
if you or President Ford have plans for visiting the
new Chinese leader at any time in the near future?
And could you also give us your assessment of the kind of
relations we are likely to have with the new government?

A There are no plans now for either President
Ford or myself to visit China, because while we have
no doubt about the election, there is a certain decorum
about making plans -- (Laughter) until the results are
clear.

518/116

10

It has been more or less an annual event that the Secretary of State would visit China at some point during the year -- and that could happen, although no plans exist now.

There are no plans whatever for the President to visit China. And there is something to be said for perhaps having a return visit at some point, or to meet at some other place.

But this, I think, has to be decided after the election.

As for the impact of changes in leadership on policy, the long term policy of any country, and especially of a country that moves with the care and thoughtfulness of the People's Republic of China doesn't depend so much on personalities as on a perception of their interests and of their values.

I think that the basic factors that brought the United States and China into contact with each other are still operating and are likely to continue.

Of course personalities affect the style of diplomacy and may affect how certain things are carried out,

518/116

11

but I do not expect a fundamental change in the
relationship and it is too early for us to
tell what differences of style might emerge.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in reference to South Africa,
why do you refuse so far to meet with key African
liberation organizations, particularly the African
National Congress and the Pan African Congress? And why
do you schedule meetings excluding these
legitimate organizations, spokespersons for the
African people in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and
South Africa?

A: Let's separate the liberation movements
in Rhodesia - Zimbabwe -- from those in Namibia, for a
moment.

When I visited Africa in April, I met with the
Presidents of the so-called "front line states". They
all felt at the time that the experience of Angola should
not be repeated. That is to say, they did not want any of the
outside powers to back one particular liberation movement and
thereby get a fight started among the liberation movements.

I then agreed with President Nyerere and President
Kaunda and President Khama that the United States would
not get in touch directly with the liberation movements

513/116

12

in order to permit the African problems to be dealt
with by Africans.

And we agreed to deal with these liberation
movements through the front line Presidents,
provided that all other countries did the same.

They have seen to it that these liberation move-
ments would not become the plaything of great power
rivalry and it is not failure to recognize these
movements -- it is, rather, our attempt to insulate the
problem from superpower rivalry.

Now that they are going to Geneva, we will
of course deal with them and our whole policy has been
to put these liberation movements into a position where they
could negotiate directly for the future of their own
country.

With respect to the liberation movement in
Namibia, which is to say SWAPO. I have met with Najumo
and my representatives have met with Najumo.
In that case, we do not have the special conditions of
many movements, since as one movement he deals also with
Communist countries. And we deal with him and we have
recognized him as an important factor -- as a key

518/116

13

factor in the negotiations. In fact we are
just now waiting for him to come back to New York from
Africa, before I have another meeting with him.

With respect to -- again to the Rhodesian movements--
I want to repeat, we recognize them. We
accept them. We do not want to choose among them.
That is to say, we want the African presidents and the
leaders, themselves, to determine their own relationships
but we will recognize them and we support them.

Q Well is it not a fact that the
State Department has had a preference for Joshua Nkomo
in Zimbabwe?

A That is not a fact.

Q That is not a fact.

A No. Nkomo was recognized by all of
the movements as the chief negotiator at the last
negotiation, in February, which broke down.

At this moment, we are meticulously staying away
from indicating any preference; and when Mr.

Schaufele visted Salisbury he was in touch with Muzorewa
as well as with Nkomo, as well as with representatives of
Muqabe.

518/116

14

Q Mr. Kissinger, on the hijacking question do you feel at this point that these incidents of skyjacking will increase?

And also what can the United States do about it now that Castro has cancelled the arrangement?

A I don't want to speculate what exactly Castro intends to do with this arrangement, and what it means with respect to his actual performance.

Theoretically he could carry out the same obligations, which is to say to return the skyjackers without having the formal obligation to do so.

If he, however, deliberately encourages skyjackings to Cuba, it would be an act of extraordinary irresponsibility, because I think whatever the disputes between countries may be, no country should use the suffering of innocent people who, I repeat, have absolutely no possibility of affecting events for the sort of rivalry that now exists.

518/116

15

Q What can the United States do about that?

A Well, I said we will hold them accountable.
What we will do we will have to study.

Q Dr. Kissinger, because you are returning to help Harvard for the East Asian Conference, would you give any thought to returning to Harvard in any capacity after you leave office?

A Well, this won't be a problem before 1981, so we will have many opportunities to discuss this. (Laughter.)

Q Dr. Kissinger, last night the President said that Jimmy Carter had slandered the name of the United States when he criticized American foreign policy under yourself in the Ford Administration. How far can a Democratic candidate go in his criticism before the President has to go run and hide behind the American flag to defend against it.

A Well, I consider the office of the Secretary of State essentially a non-partisan office; and I think the candidates have to determine for themselves how far they should go and what they can say.

Q Mr. Secretary, in your answers you gave before about staying on until 1981 --

A That was a joke. (Laughter.) That was to

518/116

16

demoralize my staff.

Q Does that mean you are prepared to stay with
President Ford if he is re-elected?

A No. I've said repeatedly that eight years is a
long time -- especially eight years as turbulent as these have
been -- that I did not want to state before the election was over
what I would do before the President has talked to me,
but that on the whole I thought that eight years is a long
time. So I have not made my final decision. I want to wait
until the President has talked to me.

Q Mr. Kissinger, aren't you in fact saying you'd
prefer to leave, although you will serve at his request if he's
re-elected?

A I haven't really stated what I will do
because I want to look at it under the conditions that
then exist, and I owe the President
the opportunity to discuss it with me.

Q Is there any other job you prefer to take?

A No.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you:

Is it true that -- is it possible that recent arms sales by the
United States to Israel were motivated by political
considerations before the election?

518/116

17

A Well, I think the President has answered
this yesterday. These items have been before the
Administration for several months. They come up for
an almost monthly review. And the President decided to
act because he thought, as he pointed out yesterday, that
it was in the best interests of the United States.

Q Mr. Secretary, I'd like to follow up on
Mr. Krimer's question of before, since you said your answer
to that was a joke. Taking for granted that you
will at some point leave the State Department, would
you at that point consider returning to Harvard? And,
if so, have you at any time discussed that possibility
with any member of the Harvard administration?

A I haven't discussed it with any member
of the Harvard administration, and I have really not
given any systematic thought to what I'm going to do when
I leave this position. I have taken the view that after
I've announced my resignation, or after the voters announce
my resignation for me (laughter), I can then make the
decision on what I might want to do. But I think it's
inappropriate for somebody in my office to discuss his
future with anybody until he's resigned.

518/116

18

Q Mr. Kissinger, I understand the United States is investigating the cause of the crash of the Cuban plane off Barbados.

A Yes.

Q Can you tell me who is doing the investigating, what the investigation has learned so far?

A To the best of my information, we have asked the CIA to check into it. I don't know whether the FBI is making a formal investigation of it. We have offered the governments concerned any assistance that they might request since it did not occur on American soil. But I can state categorically that no official of the United States Government -- nobody paid by the American Government, nobody in contact with the American Government -- has had anything to do with this crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this totally reprehensible.

Q Mr. Secretary, speaking of the CIA, the CIA has been accused by some Southeast Asia observers of more or less manipulating the recent military takeover in Thailand. Now, have the United States interests gone so far as to try to emulate the type of military dictatorship

518/116

19

that was set up in Chile? Are we talking about that topic?

A "Emulate," you mean? We have had absolutely nothing to do with the upheaval in Thailand, and therefore there's no point comparing it with Chile. We had absolutely nothing to do with it. We didn't know about it beforehand.

Q Is Chile still an issue?

A That depends with whom.

Q With the United States, with the recent car blow-up in Washington, D. C.?

A Well, we of course totally condemn the murder of former Ambassador Letelier, whom I knew personally and respected, even when we had our differences. We have seen no evidence yet as to who was behind this assassination. But whoever was behind it, it is an absolutely outrageous act.

We also had nothing to do -- as the Church Committee said -- with the overthrow of the Chilean Government. We had nothing to do with the military junta that overthrew it.

Q Despite some of the evidence to the

518/116

20

contrary?

A The Church Committee made clear that we had nothing to do with the military junta. What we were attempting to do was to strengthen the democratic parties, who in turn had nothing to do with the overthrow, for the 1976 election. That was a different matter.

Q Can we say without a doubt that the United States had nothing to do with the recent bombing in Washington, D. C.?

A You mean of Letelier?

Q Exactly.

A Absolutely.

Q Thank you.

Q You mentioned earlier that you're going to consider your fate following the election, and perhaps that fate might be decided by the voters. How much of an impact do you, yourself, feel your performance during the last eight years will have on this election?

A Well, foreign policy is inevitably an issue in any election, and that's inevitable. These have been eight turbulent years. I believe that they were the period in which we had to make the change from a belief

518/116

21

in American omnipotence, in which we could overwhelm
every problem with our power, to a period in which we
have to conduct foreign policy the way other nations have
had to conduct it throughout history -- with a
consciousness of a national purpose, a choice of means --
where we have had to establish new relationships with
old allies, open new relationships with old adversaries,
liquidate vestiges of a war which we found, and deal
simultaneously with a revolution that is represented
by these new nations.

I don't want to judge myself how effectively
all of this has been done, and I don't frankly believe
that candidates are in the best position to judge that
either -- although, obviously, they must make their
cases.

We will leave to history what the ultimate
assessment is. But without doubt, an eight-year record in
foreign policy will be subject to discussion.

Q Will you be an asset to Gerald Ford
on Election Day or a liability?

A I don't go into the public opinion or
polling business, and I can't judge it. My obligation
is, under the direction of the President, to conduct foreign

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22

policy and to advise the President as to what I believe
to be in the best interests of the United States and
world peace.

Now, I understand that most polls show that I
have an adequate public support, but this is not the ultimate
test of a Secretary of State.

Q Secretary Kissinger, do you think that
at some point the United States should or might sell
arms to China -- provide any kind of defense
equipment to China?

A We have never had any request
for the sale of arms to China. We have never had any
discussions with China about the sale of arms. We believe
that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of
China is very important to the world equilibrium, and
we would consider it a grave matter if this were threatened
by an outside power. But we have never had any defense
discussions with China. I don't foresee any, but
I do have to state our general view that it would not be
taken lightly if there were a massive assault on China.

Q Is it correct, as former Secretary
Schlesinger has said, that the State Department withheld
invitations for him to visit China?

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23

A I don't believe that Secretary Schlesinger said this, and the only formal invitation to Secretary Schlesinger that was issued happened to coincide with his departure from the Government so that the problem of withholding it did not arise.

Q He said that two invitations were extended previously.

A Well, with respect to the first -- I don't think he said it. I think a member of his party must have misunderstood; there was no formal invitation the year before.

Q Mr. Secretary, if this does turn out to be your last year in office, could you look back and think about what might be the major disappointment and major accomplishment during your period as Secretary of State?

A You know, when you are in this sort of a position, you perform almost like an athlete, in the sense of reacting to the series of situations that develop very rapidly. I would think that I would be much more reflective about it after I'm out of office than while I'm in office. I would think that the major accomplishment would be the attempt to shift American foreign policy from a perception that we could do everything simultaneously

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24

to an attempt to relate our commitments to our means
and our purposes and to our possibilities.

This involved recasting our relationships
with allies, developing new relationships with adversaries,
and beginning new approaches to the new countries.

The disappointment has been that in the period
after 1973, the Executive authority of the United
States was so weakened by a series of crises that many
of the building blocks that were in place in 1973 could not
be used as rapidly as I would have hoped, and that
perhaps more energy had to be spent on preserving what
existed than on building what might have been possible.

I could list specific things that were dis-
appointing -- as you would expect in an eight-year-
period -- but if you want it on a general plane, these would
be what I consider the accomplishments and what I consider
the sadnesses.

Q More specifically, Mr. Kissinger, are
you disappointed that the United States did not establish
full diplomatic relations with mainland China before
Mao Tse-tung's death and that perhaps now this period is
going to be a longer period because of the transition that
mainland China is going through?

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A I think that the process of normalization is one to which we're committed and which we intend to carry out. I don't think it is tied, nor has it ever been tied by the Chinese, to a personality or to a specific leader. And I believe that that process can continue.

Q When will it be completed, or what's holding it up now?

A Well, what has held it up is to discuss the modalities about the future of Taiwan, which will have to be discussed with the new leadership.

Q Mr. Secretary --

PROF. FAIRBANK: We have a half hour.
Is there a last question or two?

Q This is the last, bringing you back to something else, Mr. Secretary -- if you don't mind.

A One more.

Q I'll give a scenario to you. Suppose that you do get your walking papers from the electorate in November. You say you don't know what job you're going to take. But most of us, I think, would concede in all probability you will receive an offer to write your memoirs or write a book on your eight years.

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On balance, given equal office space and background, would you rather write that on the banks of the Potomac or the banks of the Charles? (Laughter.)

A Almost certainly not on the banks of the Potomac. (Laughter.) Where else, I don't know, but almost certainly not on the banks of the Potomac.

Q Mr. Secretary,--

A You'll get the last question. Go ahead.

You ask a question and let this lady speak.

No -- you go ahead. You ask your question first.

Q O.K. Recently I have read that Mexico was going to Communism, quoting from one declaration of one of the Senators of the United States.

What is your point of view about that? Do you think Mexico is really going to the Communists?

A Absolutely not. I know Mexico a little, I know its leaders very well. I know its incumbent President well. I know the President-elect well.

Of course, Mexico is given to heroic rhetoric, which may not always be literally understood in the United States (laughter) -- but Mexico is not going towards Communism, and I know no leader in Mexico who has any Communist biases, though, of course, the Mexican revolution produces a certain sympathy for Third World causes

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and inevitably when a country has as powerful a neighbor
as the United States, there are going to be many points
of friction. But the fact is we usually solve our
points of friction. And we have repeatedly rejected this
accusation that has been made by several Congressmen
and Senators.

Q Thank you.

A Now this lady has the last question.

Q A few minutes ago you said that public
opinion polls are not the ultimate test for a Secretary
of State.

A Of a Secretary of State.

Q Yes. If they are not, what is the ultimate test?

A I think the ultimate test of a Secretary
of State -- the obligation of a Secretary of State is to
give his best judgment to the President as to what is in the
national interest. And if he is responsible, he'll understand
that the national interest cannot be separated from the
world interest. The President then has to make the political
decision as to how this judgment can be carried out within
the American political context. It's the President who
has to make that decision.

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I don't think a Secretary of State should
take his own public opinion polls as to his own
popularity. The Secretary of State ought to be expendable
and usually is expended (laughter), but he should
not worry about his own popularity primarily. He
should advise the President. Then the President has
to make the judgment. And eventually he'll be judged
by history and whether he's left the world somewhat
more peaceful and perhaps more progressive than he
found it.

A Thank you very much.

PROF. FAIRBANK: Thank you.

* * * * *

The Secretary
of State

Speech

October 19, 1976

New York, N.Y.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

MORAL PROMISE AND PRACTICAL NEEDS

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Synagogue*
*Council of America 50th Anniversary Jubilee*
*Dinner.*

Americans are today in the midst of the quadrennial debate about our past, our present, and the future we hope to create. It is a dramatic demonstration of the strength of our democracy and the greatness of our Nation. Whatever the outcome, Americans should take pride that they have once again shown the vigor of a free society which gives hope to the countless millions around the world who are dominated by oppressive regimes and intolerant ideologies.

It is also—let us be frank—a time of confusion and of exaggeration. Some tell us we are weak; others tell us we are strong. Some tell us that our prestige is declining; others assert that our global influence for peace and progress has never been greater. Some tell us we are in retreat around the world; others tell us we have never been more respected, more successful abroad than we are today.

As Secretary of State I am, of course, detached from partisan debate, although I seem to find my sympathies, for some reason, lying with "others" rather than the "some."

But no matter how strongly Americans may disagree on specific issues, the history of the postwar period has left no doubt about the nature of our global responsibility. Without America's commitment there can be no real security in the world. Without our dedication there can be no progress. Without our strength peoples all over the world will live in fear. Without our faith they will live in despair.

America's contribution to world affairs has derived from our conviction that while history is often cruel, fate can be shaped by human faith and courage. Our optimism has enabled us to understand that the greatest achievements were a dream before they became a reality. We have learned through experience, as few people have, that all that is creative is ultimately a moral affirmation—the faith that dares in the absence of certainty; the courage to go forward in the face of adversity.

All of us here are deeply concerned about the survival and security of Israel. But we also know that the fate of even our closest friends cannot be assured in a vacuum. Peace, progress, and justice will not be securely won for America or Israel unless they are embedded in a peaceful, progressive, and just international order. The task of building such an order is the fundamental challenge of our time.

No people has experienced more of man's exaltation—and man's depravity—than the Jewish people. The Jewish people know that survival requires unending struggle. But they know as well that peace, if it is to be more than a prophet's dream, must rest on the conscience of mankind made real by the concrete efforts of all peoples and all nations.

America, because of its own heritage, is perennially engaged in such a search of its conscience. How does our foreign policy serve moral ends? How can America carry forward its role as a humane example and champion of justice in a world in which power is still often the final arbiter? How do we secure both our existence and our

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values? How do we reconcile ends and means, principle and survival?

These questions have been asked throughout our history; they are being posed again today, as they should. But they require more than simple answers and easy slogans.

There is no doubt that policy without moral purpose is like a ship without a rudder, drifting aimlessly from crisis to crisis. A policy of pure calculation will be empty of both vision and humanity. It will lack not only direction but also roots and heart. Americans have always held the view that America stood for a moral purpose above and beyond its material achievements.

But we must recall as well that policy is the art of the possible, the science of the relative. We live in a world of 150 sovereign states, profound ideological differences, and nuclear weapons. Our power is enormous, but it is still finite. A truly moral policy must relate ends to means and commitments to capabilities. America, to be true to itself, must keep its eyes on distant horizons; we must also keep our feet planted firmly in reality. We must learn to distinguish morality from moralizing. We must remember that the invocation of lofty principles has led, in our history, as frequently to abdication as to overcommitment. Either tendency would be disastrous for international order and our well-being.

The challenge of American foreign policy is to live up to America's moral promise while fulfilling the practical needs of world order. How we meet it will determine the peace and progress of America and of the world.

This is the subject I would like to discuss with you today.

## Ideals and Foreign Policy

From its beginning, Americans have believed that this country had a moral significance that transcended its geographic, military, or economic power. Unique among the nations of the world, America was created as a conscious act by men dedicated to a set of political and ethical principles they believed to be of universal applicability. Small wonder, then, that Santayana concluded that: "Being an American is, of itself, almost a moral condition."

But this idealism has also been in constant tension with another deep-seated strain in our historical experience. Since De Tocqueville, it has

been frequently observed that we are a pragmatic people—common-sensical, undogmatic, and undoctrinaire—a nation of practical energy, ingenuity, and spirit. We have made tolerance and compromise the basis of our domestic political life. We have defined our basic goals—justice, liberty, equality, and progress—in open and libertarian terms, enlarging opportunity and freedom rather than coercing a uniform standard of conduct.

America has been most effective internationally when we have combined our idealistic and our pragmatic traditions. The Founding Fathers were idealists who launched a new experiment in human liberty. But they were also sophisticated men of the world; they understood the European balance of power and manipulated it brilliantly to secure their independence. For a century thereafter, we devoted our energies to the development of our continent, content to influence the world by moral example. Shielded by two oceans and the British Navy and blessed by a bountiful nature, we came to believe our special situation was universally valid, even for nations whose narrower margin of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited than our own. We disparaged power even as we grew strong; we tended to see our successes as the product not of fortunate circumstances but of virtue and purity of motive.

As our power grew we became uncomfortable with its uses and responsibilities and impatient with the compromises of day-to-day diplomacy. Our rise to the status of a great power was feared and resisted by many Americans who foresaw only a process of deepening involvement in a morally questionable world.

In the early decades of this century we sought to reconcile the tension between ideals and interests by confining ourselves to humanitarian efforts and resort to our belief in the preeminence of law. We pioneered in relief programs; we championed free trade and the cause of foreign investment. We attempted to legislate solutions to international conflicts—we experimented with arbitration, conciliation, judicial arrangements, treaties to abolish war, neutrality legislation, collective security systems.

These efforts to banish the reality of power were aborted by our involvement in two World Wars. While we had a clear security interest in a Europe free from domination by any one power we clothed that interest in assertions that we

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would do battle for universal moral objectives—“a war to end all wars” or the unconditional surrender of the aggressor.

Disillusionment set in as the outcome of both World Wars necessarily fell short of expectations. After the first war, a tide of isolationist sentiment rose, in which moral proclamations were coupled with an unwillingness to undertake concrete commitments. We were loath to face a world of imperfect security, alliances of convenience, recurrent crises, and the need for a political structure that would secure the peace.

We undertook our first sustained period of peacetime world leadership in the decades after World War II, with a supreme self-assurance fortuitously matched by overwhelming material superiority. And we faced an antagonist whose political system and actions on the world scene explicitly threatened the very existence of our most cherished principles.

In a period of seemingly clear-cut, black-and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our traditional approach. We saw economic problems around the world—which we had solved successfully in our own country—and sought to overwhelm them with the sheer weight of resources, often with startling success. We projected our domestic experience overseas and assumed that economic progress automatically led to political stability. And in the process, without making a conscious decision to do so, we were trying to shape the world to our design.

## Complexities of the Contemporary World

Our postwar policy was marked by great achievements—the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, the resistance to aggression, the encouragement of decolonization. But we no longer live in so simple a world.

We remain the strongest nation and the largest single influence in international affairs. For 30 years our leadership has sustained world peace, progress, and justice. Our leadership is no less needed today, but it must be redefined to meet changing conditions. Ours is no longer a world of American nuclear monopoly but one of substantial nuclear equivalence. Ours is no longer a world of two solid blocs and clear-cut dividing lines but one of proliferating centers of power and influence. Ours is no longer a world amenable to national or

regional solutions but one of economic interdependence and common global challenges.

Thus for the first time in American experience, we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. Rather, we—like all other nations in history—must now conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, persistence, and imagination if we are to preserve and forward our national goals.

We can no longer impose our own solutions; yet our action or inaction will influence events, often decisively. We cannot banish power from international affairs, but we can use our vast power wisely and firmly to deter aggression and encourage restraint. We can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation. We can help construct more equitable relations between developed and developing nations and a wider community of interest among all nations. And we must continue to stand for freedom and human dignity in the world.

These are worthy goals. They can be achieved. But they summon a different dimension of moral conviction than that of a simpler past. They require the stamina to persevere amid ambiguity and endless exertion—the courage to hold fast to what we believe in while recognizing that at any one time our hopes are likely to be only partially fulfilled.

We must always keep in mind that it was precisely under the banners of universal moralistic slogans that a decade and a half ago we launched into adventures that divided our country and undermined our international position. It is only in the last few years that we have finally begun to bring our commitments into line with our capabilities.

Clearly we must maintain our values and our principles; but we risk disaster unless we relate them to concepts of the national interest and international order that are based not on impulse but on a sense of steady purpose that can be maintained by the American people for the long term.

This is not a choice between morality and pragmatism. We cannot escape either and still remain true to our national character or to the needs of the world community. Our cause must be just, but it must prosper in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills. We can achieve no positive ends unless we survive, and survival has its practical necessities. Neither moralistic rhetoric nor obsession with pure power politics will produce a

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foreign policy worthy of our opportunity—or adequate for our survival.

## Morality of Ends and Means

America—and the community of nations—today faces inescapable tasks.

* We must maintain a secure and just peace.

* We must create a cooperative and beneficial international order.

* We must defend the rights and the dignity of man.

Each of these challenges has both a moral and a practical dimension. Each involves important ends—but ends that are sometimes in conflict. When that is the case we face the real moral dilemma of foreign policy: the need to choose between valid ends and to relate our ends to means.

**Peace.** In an age when nuclear cataclysm threatens mankind's very survival, peace is a fundamental moral imperative. Without it nothing else we do or seek can ultimately have meaning. Let there be no mistake about it: Averting the danger of nuclear war and limiting and ultimately reducing destructive nuclear arsenals is a moral, as well as political, act.

In the nuclear age traditional power politics, the struggle for marginal advantages, the drive for prestige and unilateral gains must yield to an unprecedented sense of responsibility. History teaches us that balances based on constant tests of strength have always erupted into war. But common sense tells us that in the nuclear age history cannot be permitted to repeat itself. Every President, sooner or later, will conclude with President Eisenhower that "there is no alternative to peace."

But peace, however crucial, cannot be our *only* goal. To seek it at any price would render us morally defenseless and place the world at the mercy of the most ruthless. Mankind must do more, as Tacitus said, than make a desert and call it peace.

There will be no security in a world whose obsession with peace leads to appeasement; but neither will there be security in a world in which mock tough rhetoric and the accumulation of arms is the sole measure of competition. We owe our

people a convincing justification for their exertions; we can spare no effort to bequeath to future generations a peace more hopeful than an equilibrium of terror.

Barely four years ago demonstrations in the streets demanded "peace" as overriding all other considerations; today policies of conciliation are frequently denounced as unilateral concessions. Both extremes falsify our challenge. In the search for peace we are continually called upon to strike balances—between strength and conciliation, between the need to defend our values and our interests and the need to take into account the views of others, between partial and total settlements.

The task of foreign policy is to find that balance between competing ends and between ends and means. The problems of timing, method, feasibility impose themselves on any conscientious policy decision. There are certain experiments that cannot be tried, not because the goals are undesirable but because the consequences of failure would be so severe that not even the most elevated goal can justify the risk.

The Middle East provides a vivid example. No people yearn for comprehensive peace more than the people of Israel, whose existence has not been recognized by any of its neighbors throughout its history. There are those who argue that in the aftermath of the 1973 war the entire complex of Arab-Israeli issues—borders, peace obligations, refugees—should have been approached simultaneously at one conference. But the proponents of this course ignore the fact that at the time it would probably have proved disastrous—the United States had no diplomatic relations with several of the key Arab countries, the Soviet Union was in effect the lawyer for the Arab cause, an oil embargo was still in effect, and hostility between the Arab states and Israel remained at the flashpoint.

Under such conditions the chances for success of a comprehensive approach were slight and the penalties for failure were far-reaching—a continuation of the oil embargo, a prolonged freeze in U.S. relations with the Arab world, the corresponding growth of Soviet influence, strains with our allies in Europe and Japan, the increased isolation of Israel and the likelihood, therefore, of a resumption of the Middle East war in even more difficult circumstances.

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We chose to proceed step-by-step on those issues where room for agreement seemed to exist. We sought to establish a new relationship with the Arab world, to reduce the Soviet capacity for exploiting tensions, and to build a new sense of confidence in the parties directly involved so that overall solutions would someday be possible. We approached peace in stages but with the intention of ultimately merging individual steps into a comprehensive solution.

In the brief space of 18 months three agreements were reached—two between Egypt and Israel and one between Syria and Israel. As a result the possibilities of achieving a genuine peace are greater today than they have ever been.

Deep suspicions remain, but the first important steps have been taken. The beginnings of mutual trust—never before in evidence—are emerging. Some Arab states, for the first time, are openly speaking of peace and ending a generation of conflict. The capacity of outside countries to exacerbate tensions has been reduced. The step-by-step approach has thus brought us to a point where comprehensive approaches are the logical next step. The decision before us now is not whether but how the next phase of negotiations should be launched. And we will engage in it—together with our Israeli friends—with new hope and confidence.

**International Cooperation.** America's second moral imperative is the growing need for global cooperation.

We live in a world of more than 150 countries, each asserting sovereignty and claiming the right to realize its national aspirations. Clearly no nation can fulfill *all* its goals without infringing on the rights of others. Hence, compromise and common endeavors are inescapable on some issues, at least. The growing interdependence of states in the face of the polarizing tendencies of nationalism and ideologies makes imperative the building of world community.

We live in an age of division—division between East and West and between the advanced industrial nations and the developing nations. Clearly a world in which a few nations constitute islands of wealth in a sea of poverty, disease, and despair is fundamentally insecure and morally intolerable. Those nations that consider themselves dispossessed will

become the seedbed of upheaval. But the tactics of confrontation with which some of the developing nations have pursued their goals are also both intolerable and unsafe.

The challenge of world community will require realistic assumptions and actions by North and South alike. The industrial nations should not be obsessed with guilt or wedded to the status quo. The developing nations should not seek to gain their objectives through extortion or blackmail. What is required all around is a serious dedication to the requirements of cooperation without which neither group can achieve its goals.

The objectives of the developing nations are clear: They want economic development, a role in international decisions that affect them, and a fair share of global economic benefits. The goals of the industrial nations are equally clear: widening prosperity, an open world system of trade and investments with expanding markets for North and South, and reliable and equitable development of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw materials.

The goals of both sides can be achieved only if they are seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. The process of building a new era of international economic relationships will continue through the rest of this century. If those relationships are to be equitable and lasting, negotiation and compromise among diverse and contending interests will clearly be required. Above all a moral act will be necessary: on the part of the industrial nations, a willingness to make—while there is still time for conciliation—the sacrifices necessary to build a sense of community; and on the part of the developing nations, a readiness to forego blackmail and extortion—now, before the world is irrevocably split into contending camps—and to seek progress through cooperation.

For its part the United States is committed to the path of cooperation, to build a stable and creative world which all nations—new and old, weak and strong, rich and poor—have a stake in preserving because they had a part in its shaping.

**Human Values.** Our third moral imperative is the nurturing of human values. It is the tragedy of our times that the very tools of technology that have made ours the most productive century in the history of man have also served to subject millions

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to a new dimension of intimidation and suffering and fear.

Individual freedom of conscience and expression is the proudest heritage of our civilization. All we do in the search for peace, in the struggle for greater political cooperation, and for a fair and flourishing international economy is rooted in our belief that only liberty permits the fullest expression of mankind's creativity. We know that technological progress without justice mocks humanity, that national unity without freedom is a hollow triumph, and that nationalism without a consciousness of human community—including a concern for human rights—is likely to become an instrument of oppression and a force for evil.

It is our obligation, as the world's leading democracy, to dedicate ourselves to assuring freedom for the human spirit. But responsibility compels also a recognition of our limits. Our alliances—the political relationships built up between ourselves and other nations over the years—serve the cause of peace by strengthening regional and world security. If well conceived, they are not favors to others but a recognition of common interests. They should be withdrawn when those interests change; they should not, as a general rule, be used as levers to extort a standard of conduct or to punish acts with which we do not agree.

In many countries—whatever our differences with their internal structures—the people are unified in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries our foreign policy relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces of change. And in others the process of American disengagement has eroded the sense of security, creating a perceived need for greater internal discipline, while at the same time diminishing our ability to influence the domestic practices we criticize.

There is no simple answer to the dilemma a great democracy faces under such circumstances. We have a moral, as well as a practical, obligation to stand up for our values and to combat injustice. Those who speak out for freedom and expose the transgressions of repressive regimes do so in the best American tradition. They can have—and have had—a dramatic and heartening impact. But there are also times when an effort to teach another country a moral lesson can backfire on the values we seek to promote.

This Administration has believed that we must bend every effort to enhance respect for human rights but that a public crusade is frequently not the most effective method. Our objective has been results, not publicity. We were concerned—and with good reason—that when such sensitive issues are transformed into tests of strength between Governments, the impulse for national prestige will defeat the most worthy goals. We have generally opposed attempts to deal with sensitive international human rights issues through legislation—not because of the moral view expressed, which we share, but because legislation is almost always too inflexible, too public, and too heavyhanded a means to accomplish what it seeks.

Through quiet diplomacy, this Administration has brought about the release or parole of hundreds of prisoners throughout the world and mitigated repressive conditions in numerous countries. But we have seldom publicized specific successes.

The most striking example has been the case of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. The number of Soviet Jews who were permitted to emigrate in 1968 was 400; by 1973 that number had risen to 35,000. The reason for this quantum leap lies largely in persistent but private approaches to the Soviet Government and the parallel overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Hundreds of hardship cases were dealt with in quiet personal discussions by the President or his senior officials. No public announcement or confrontation ever took place. But the results were there for all to see. When even greater advances were sought by confrontation and legislation, the result was tragic. Today Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has dropped to approximately 10,000 a year.

I stress this not to score debating points against men whose seriousness of purpose and dedication to Jewish emigration I greatly respect. Rather it is to indicate that moral ends are often not enough in themselves. The means used also have a moral quality and moral consequences.

And whatever honest differences of opinion may have existed between concerned individuals about the problem of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, this Administration remains dedicated to the objective. It will spare no effort to increase the flow of emigrants once again and will

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cooperate with the relevant organizations in that
effort.

The issue of human rights is not—as I have
said—an easy one and it should be presented with a
full awareness of its complexity. The experience of
the last decade should have taught us that we
ought not to exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let
alone to shape, social and political change in other
societies. With this painful lesson in mind, let me
state the principles that guide the actions of the
Ford Administration.

* Human rights are a legitimate international concern and have been so defined in international agreements for more than a generation.

* The United States will further the cause of human rights in appropriate international forums and in exchanges with other Governments. We will use all our influence to encourage humane conduct within and between nations.

* We will be mindful of the limits of our reach; we will be conscious of the difference between public postures that satisfy our self-esteem and policies that bring positive results.

* We will never forget that the victims of our failures—of omission or commission—are human beings and thus the ultimate test of all we do.

We thus return to the central problem of ends and means. If every nation of the world presses for the immediate implementation of all of its values, hopes, and desires, eternal conflict is inevitable. If we insist that others accept all our moral preferences, are we then ready to use military force to protect those who do as we urge? And if those who refuse our prescriptions are deprived of our support, what will we do if the isolation of these Governments tempts external pressures or attack by other countries even more repressive? Will we have served moral ends if we thereby jeopardize our own security?

If we back up universal moral claims with power, we take upon ourselves the role of the world's policeman—a role which the American people have rejected in a decade of turmoil. But if we fail to back up these claims, we will lose relevance and credibility; we will be conducting a policy of self-gratification without effectiveness and ultimately without stature. Is it more moral to attempt what cannot be accomplished and fail than

to make only those commitments that we know we
can keep?

There is nothing more essential for Americans
today than the need to recognize the inevitable and
inescapable tension between our moral aims—
which of necessity are stated in universal terms—
and the constant imperative of choice that is
imposed upon us by competing goals and finite
resources. The making and implementing of foreign
policy is, like life, a constant effort to strike the
right balance between the best we want and the
best we can have, between the ends we seek and
the means we adopt. We need moral strength to
select among often agonizing choices and a sense of
ethical purpose to navigate between the shoals of
difficult decisions. But we need as well a mature
sense of means, lest we substitute wishful thinking
for the requirements of survival. The ultimate test
of morality in foreign policy is not only the values
we proclaim but what we are willing and able to
implement.

## Conclusion

I have discussed the dilemmas of moral choice
not to counsel resignation but as a message of
hope. Fond as we are of self-flagellation—especially
in years divisible by four—Americans can take
pride in the achievements of their foreign policy in
recent years, which have both a moral and a
practical foundation.

* We have ended the war we found and preserved the peace.

* We have restructured and strengthened our partnerships with the industrial democracies and our sister republics in this hemisphere.

* We have opened new relationships with adversaries.

* We have begun to curb the nuclear arms race.

* We have helped to sow the seeds of peace in the Middle East and begun the process of conciliation in southern Africa.

* We have put forth and begun to implement a comprehensive agenda for cooperation between the industrial and developing worlds to combat poverty, ignorance, disease, misery, and hunger.

* We have worked with others on new global challenges that transcend boundaries and ideologies—the problems of pollution, of sharing the resources of the sea, of the transfer of technology.