III - III - 21

most of it was stationed in France and not "integrated" into NATO.

The reason was not only de Gaulle's objection to the concept of integration but a reason less flattering to the often proclaimed image of a powerful, cohesive France:

> ...it is absolutely necessary, morally and politically, for us to make our army a more integral part of the nation. Therefore, it is necessary for us to restation it, for the most part, on our soil; for us to give it once again a direct responsibility in the external security of the country; in short, for our defense to become once again a national defense.¹

After twenty-five years of humiliating conflict and several military coups against legitimate authority, it was in de Gaulle's judgment, more important to integrate the French army into French society than into NATO.

De Gaulle's views on nuclear policy are the natural outgrowth of his attitude toward NATO integration:

¹ __________, Press Conference on May 15, 1962, *ibid.*, pp. 180-181.

III - III - 22

We are in the atomic age and we are a country that can be destroyed at any moment unless the aggressor is deterred from the undertaking by the certainty that he too will suffer frightful destruction. This justifies both alliance and independence. The Americans, our allies and our friends, have for a long time, alone, possessed a nuclear arsenal. So long as they alone had such an arsenal and so long as they showed their will to use it immediately if Europe were attacked--for at that time Europe alone could be attacked--the Americans acted in such a way that for France the question of an invasion hardly arose, since an attack was beyond all probability.... It is impossible to overestimate the extent of the service, most fortunately passive, that the Americans at that time, in that way, rendered to the freedom of the world.

Since then the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear arsenal, and that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger the very life of America. Naturally, I am not making an evaluation--if indeed it is possible to find a relation between the degree of one death and the degree of another--but the new and gigantic fact is there. From then on, the Americans found and are finding themselves confronted with the possibility of direct destruction....

Few of de Gaulle's policies have so embroiled him with America as his insistence on an autonomous nuclear strike force. He is charged with fomenting distrust of the United States and lectured on his ignorance of the technical requirements of nuclear strategy. Actually, de Gaulle's analysis of the situation does not differ radically from Secretary McNamara's. Both agree that the growing Soviet nuclear arsenal confronts the United States with an unprecedented challenge. Both insist that NATO strategy must be adapted to new realities. They disagree less in their analysis than in the conclusions to be drawn from it. Looking at NATO from

1

______, Press Conference on January 14, 1963, *ibid.*, pp. 216-217

III - III - 23

the point of view of division of labor, Secretary McNamara considers French resources better spent on conventional forces than on nuclear arms. From 16 the perspective of vindicating France's identity, de Gaulle is not concerned with the technical aspects of strategy so much as with the political problem of choice. McNamara strives for strategic options; de Gaulle seeks political ones.¹

American Franco-United States relations have been further irritated by conflicting views of East-West relations. As in most other controversies, each side has accused the other of the same charge: of planning a settlement, if not at the expense, at least to the exclusion of the other. In the United States, de Gaulle's comment that Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Urals is often cited as proof of a thinly veiled desire to deal directly with Moscow. In France, United States bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union are taken as an indication that the United States is seeking a separate accommodation with the U.S.S.R., perhaps as detrimental to Europe as the Yalta agreement is said to have been.

At times both sides seem primarily concerned with scoring debating

¹ For a fuller discussion of the strategic problems see Chapters II and IV and V.

[Y]

III - III - 24

points. De Gaulle's statement that one day Europe would again extend from
the Atlantic to the Urals did not imply a deal with the Soviet Union:

The reorganization of Europe to which de Gaulle refers is to take place
after Communist ideology no longer dominates in the Soviet Union, in other
words, when Russia is once more a national, and not an ideological, state
pursuing a policy dictated by its national interests. By the same token,
our French critics do us an injustice when they read a complicated master
plan into groping efforts to adjust to complex situations. United States
policy towards the Soviet Union does not reflect a devious desire to settle
all issues unilaterally. Basically, it seeks to implement one minimum
interest which the two great nuclear powers have in common: to prevent a
general holocaust.

Indeed, French and American analyses of Soviet trends are not so
different as the controversy sometimes suggests. Both are of the view that

1

Press Conference May 31, 1960

[ ] III - III - 25

at some point the Soviet system will be transformed. Both believe that
this transformation will mark the starting point for fruitful negotiations.
They disagree not over the fact of evolution but its nature, not over the
ultimate desirability of a diplomatic settlement but about who will be the
spokesman for the West when it takes place.

United States policy towards the Soviet Union has oscillated between
two opposite approaches: (During periods of tension, the United States
attitude has been that Soviet policy is conducted by highly purposeful,
ideologically inspired men operating according to careful, long-range
plans.) During periods of détente, American leaders have often acted as if
a settlement could be achieved by good personal relations with their Communist
opposite numbers. Great stress is placed on creating a proper atmosphere.
One result is an avoidance of concreteness during periods of tension because
negotiations are believed to be useless and during periods of relaxation of
tension because of reluctance to disturb the atmosphere of détente.

De Gaulle's attitude towards Moscow is less geared to reacting to
Soviet policy. To him, the chief characteristic of the Soviet leadership
group is that it lacks legitimacy.

III - III - 26

During my lifetime Communist ideology has been personified by
many people.... Each of these holders in turn condemns,
excommunicates, crushes and at times kills the other. In any
event, he firmly fights against the personality cult of the
others.¹

Having erected an unnatural system, the Soviet system becomes a prisoner
of the pressures it has generated.²

...there is in this uproar of imprecations and demands organized
by the Soviets something so arbitrary and so artificial that one
is led to attribute it either to the premeditated unleashing of
frantic ambitions, or to the desire of drawing attention away from
great difficulties: this second hypothesis seems all the more
plausible to me since, despite the coercions, isolation and acts
of force in which the Communist system encloses the countries which
are under its yoke, and despite certain collective successes which
it has achieved by drawing upon the substance of its subjects,
actually its gaps, its shortages, its internal failures, and above
that its character of inhuman oppression, are felt more and more
to deceive and to subjugate.³

Since Soviet pressures do not reflect a real grievance but domestic
instability, they must be resisted by the West. To yield to Soviet blackmail
would only aggravate the internal Soviet instabilities which caused Soviet
aggressiveness in the first place. Thus during the Berlin crisis, de Gaulle spoke as follows:

1. __________, Press Conference on July 29, 1963, *ibid.*, p. 236

2. __________, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 84

3. __________, Press Conference on September 5, 1961, *ibid.*, p. 140

III - III - 27

...we do not allow ourselves to be moved by all the tumult, all the flow of invective, of formal notifications, of threats launched by certain countries against other lands and especially against ours. This is all the more true in that we realize the tactical element that enters into all this staging by those who, so to speak, make their job to upset others.

...in their camps the struggle between political trends, the intrigues of clans, the rivalries of individuals periodically lead to implacable crises, whose sequels--or even whose premonitory symptoms--cannot help but unsettle them. Moreover, we know that in those countries there are conflicting national grievances in spite of the absolutism of their ideology. We realize therefore only too well that they readily indulge in virulent utterances and sensational outbursts in order to lead people astray--within their own country and outside--without, however, overstepping certain bounds.¹

It follows that de Gaulle has rejected the diplomatic method of "exploratory" conversations urged by the United States and Britain to determine Soviet intentions. He refused to join the "exploratory" talks on Berlin because:

> ...so long as the Soviet Union does not put a stop to its threats and its injunctions and bring about an actual easing of the international situation, we believe that we have spared our allies and ourselves the catastrophic retreat, dramatic rupture or tragically engulfment in which the conference would obviously have ended.²

And he did not participate in the Geneva disarmament conference, predicting that it would do nothing except present irreconcilable plans.³

The disagreement over tactics towards the East involves perhaps above all a question of style of leadership. United States leaders have taken the

1. __________, Press Conference on September 5, 1960, *ibid.*, pp. 84-85

2. __________, Address on February 5, 1962, *ibid.*, p. 160

3. __________, Press Conference on May 15, 1962, *ibid.*, p. 181

III - III - 28

view that the outcome of a conference could not be known until an effort
had been made to probe Soviet intentions. De Gaulle saw no point in
making the effort because he thought he knew the outcome. American
leaders are pragmatic and experimental; de Gaulle bases his claim to
leadership on the assumption that a statesman's greatness depends on his
understanding the course of history. Experiments are unnecessary or
dangerous. If Soviet leaders are responsible they will make their inten-
tions plain; if they are not, divining these intentions is not very help-
ful. In either case, the duty of the statesman is to become clear about
his own purposes rather than make himself dependent on the purposes of
others. The fact that events have often proved de Gaulle's maxims correct
does not make this attitude easier to bear for those who must deal with him.

The central issue here, as in other Franco-United States controversies,
is whether Europe is to constitute an autonomous center of decision or
whether its primary role is to influence essentially American decisions.

De Gaulle is all the more insistent on his autonomous role in negotiations
because his view of the nature of a settlement differs importantly from that
prevalent in the United States. Many American statements depict a

III - III - 29

settlement in terms of a final, general reconciliation as if it were
possible to define a definite point from which peace can be said to have
broken out. The goal is said to be a permanent end of conflict and a world
living under what is often described as "the rule of law."

De Gaulle's view is more historical and less legal. Peace to him
is not a final settlement but a new, perhaps more stable balance of forces.
"Now, in the last analysis and as always, it is only in equilibrium that the
world will find peace."¹ No equilibrium can ever be permanent but must be
adjusted in constant struggles. But however temporary a balance, France
and Europe must find their proper place in it, not as objects of policy
but as its author. De Gaulle is concerned not only with the fact of a
settlement but also with its nature. De Gaulle would therefore object to
any settlement which France did not help to formulate--regardless of what
view he took of its substance.

For this reason the nuclear test ban treaty has been a constant
source of friction between the United States and France. To De Gaulle it is

¹ __________, Address on May 31, 1960, *ibid.*, p. 78

III - III - 30

an example of an American decision to ignore, and even jeopardize, a major French interest in order to promote an American conception of the general interest. The inevitable corollary is that a similar situation could arise in other fields as well. The major thrust of de Gaulle's policy is to put France, and perhaps Europe, into a position where settlements against its wishes are impossible.

In short, whatever the area of policy, de Gaulle's conclusions are similar: Unity whether in Alliance with the United States or in association with European countries depends on the vitality of the components of the international system. Only those capable of taking responsible action can form meaningful associations. There is no inconsistency between the affirmation of the Atlantic Alliance and the insistence on the peculiarity of France or the identity of Europe. The two notions are complementary--distinguimus or non? though this may seem cynical or Machiavellian to many Americans.

For centuries, one of the chief problems of Western political thought has been how to build unity while respecting diversity. One does not have to agree with the methods or policies of President de Gaulle to recognize that he has posed an important question which the West has yet to answer.

III - III - 31

[Y]

There is merit in his contention that a political unit must mean something to itself before it can have meaning to others. To American spokesmen the French insistence on autonomy is a prima facie proof of distrust of American intentions. To France's President, the United States reluctance to concede this autonomy appears to be a device to perpetuate our hegemony.

While de Gaulle's tactics have often been brutal, the United States has shown extremely little understanding for the special psychological situation of France. In the best of circumstances, a country which has been ravaged by two world wars, and which barely avoided civil war in 1958, in 1960 and again in 1962, could not be expected to find its fulfillment in the Grand Design of others. No matter who governed in France, he would have had to face the problem of restoring France's faith in herself. To argue the technical aspects of de Gaulle's policy is to miss his central purpose. Many of his actions are designed to rediscover a sense of purpose for France--a goal that transcends any specific policy issues. How well de Gaulle has succeeded in this task is proved by the fact that two years after the end of the Algerian war France, far from being torn to pieces by internal schisms--as it well might have been--is the most active European country on a global scale.

III - III - 32

Although de Gaulle has often exaggerated this essentially psychological mission, there is merit in his view that no theoretical conception of European or Atlantic unity can become a reality if all the diverse loyalties and convictions which have formed historical Europe must be destroyed in order to achieve it. The tendency of his opponents to refuse to take his challenge seriously and instead to treat de Gaulle as a relic to be outwaited, has prevented a meaningful discussion from which a new common conception of Atlantic relations might have emerged. Difficult as it may be to deal with de Gaulle's France, we would do well to remember that it is more in the interest of the West than a France wracked by dissension or abdicating from the international stage.

But if his critics have shown little compassion for his special circumstances, de Gaulle has often thwarted his own aims by his abrupt tactics and his imperious style. Not comfortable with the give and take of negotiations, the French President has moved through a series of faits accomplis to force his allies to accept his objectives. A rationalist, he has acted as if his views had to prevail by their inner logic and that the feelings of other statesmen were therefore irrelevant. A profound

[y]

III - III - 33

believer in historical necessity, he has acted as if the inevitability of
events was bound to be stronger than the sensibilities of others.

No doubt, this is a heroic posture. However, man is not governed
by reason alone. And history, however inevitable it may appear in retrospect,
is created by men, most of whom lack the vision of the French President--
though they do not lack his power. The paradox of de Gaulle's position is
that he claims to speak for Europe, but he has not found it possible to
create a following outside of France that sees him as a European statesman.
He has alienated many potential supporters by his excessive rationalism and
abrupt unilateral tactics. Many individuals who share his dedication to
developing a European identity have been driven into opposition by de Gaulle's wounding insistence on scoring what often amounts to debating points.
De Gaulle's rigid defense of an extreme conception of sovereignty has
antagonized even those who do not see the choice between a federal and confederated Europe as an issue of principle. Though the French proposals
for European political unity actually offer a better guarantee against the
hegemony of a single European state than the dominant American schemes,
De Gaulle's methods suggest that he will cooperate only if others accept

[Y]

III - III - 34

his unilateral pronouncements. Although France and the United States seem
to agree on the principle of a strong and autonomous Europe, de Gaulle's
tactics give rise to the impression that he desires autonomy not to
enhance the unity of the West but to be free to pursue policies contradictory,
if not hostile, to those of the United States.

Ironically, de Gaulle has become a symbol on both sides of the
Atlantic of principles contrary to his pronouncements and probably to his
intentions. He has enabled many in Europe not heretofore noted for their
devotion either to European unity or to Atlantic partnership to use some
ideal model of either relationship in order to avoid making whatever
progress is possible. By evoking so many memories of authoritarian rule,
de Gaulle has polarized the discussion within Europe in a manner that makes
it next to impossible to come to grips with the substance of his thought.
A strong Europe was bound to present a challenge to American leadership.
But by couching this challenge so woundingly, de Gaulle has spurred American
self-righteousness rather than the objective re-examination of Atlantic
relationships which the situation demands.

History will probably demonstrate that de Gaulle's conceptions--

[Y]

III - III - 35

as distinct from his style--were greater than those of most of his critics. But a statesman must work with the material at hand. If the sweep of his conceptions exceeds the capacity of his environment to absorb them, he will fail regardless of the validity of his insights. If his style makes him unassimilable, it becomes irrelevant whether he is "right" or "wrong."

In the meantime, there is something of a Greek tragedy about the dispute between the United States and France. Each chief actor following the laws of his nature is bringing about consequences quite different from those intended. Either the "American" or the "French" concept of Atlantic relationship might have succeeded. Competing as they do--with no by either comprehension of the real intention of the other--they may bring on what each side professes to fear most: a divided, suspicious Europe engaged in once again the working out its ancient rivalries. This has already been shown by the manner in which both Germany and Great Britain have been drawn into this rivalry. We must now turn to their roles prior to the fateful January 14, 1963, when France excluded Great Britain from the Common Market.

III - IV - I

A. **IV. The Problem of Germany:** Events leading up to the French-German treaty

Arrangements in Germany have been the key to the stability of Europe for at least three centuries. In the twentieth century the peace of Europe has been violated twice by a powerful and unified Germany. But prior to 1871, when Germany was composed of a group of competing states, it was the arena of conflict for other European powers which sought to perpetuate its divisions, thwart its national aspirations and prevent one another from gaining a preponderant influence.

Considering this history it was inevitable that Germany, when it was finally unified in 1871, should identify security with sufficient strength to defend itself against all of its neighbors simultaneously. But this effort, however understandable, proved fatal to the stability of Europe. Germany's strength coupled with its central position produced a vicious circle. A country sufficiently powerful to defend itself against all its neighbors simultaneously would also be strong enough to defeat each of them singly. Moreover, the effort to develop such strength required a mobilization of resources and an exaltation of national feelings certain to disquiet all other European countries. Bismarck,

III - IV - 2

the last great German statesman before Adenauer, spoke of "the nightmare of hostile coalitions." It was Germany's tragedy that the effort to prevent these coalitions made them inevitable. Germany has been either too weak or too powerful for the peace of Europe.

Ideally Germany should be strong enough to defend itself but not to attack; it should be united so that its frustrations do not erupt into conflict and its divisions do not encourage the rivalries of other countries, but not so national-istic that it disquiets its neighbors. To bring about such a Germany has been a major goal of Western policy since the end of World War II.

The effort to define Germany's role faces major psychological problems. Every German above fifty today--and influence in Germany is related to age-- has experienced three revolutions. He has lived under four different regimes, each claiming to be morally antithetical to its predecessor. He has experienced two lost world wars and two catastrophic inflations. Every German above thirty-five has lived through the trauma of the Nazi period, of World War II and of the post-war collapse. The Nazi experience has been so completely suppressed in public consciousness or sublimated into a vague feeling of generalized guilt

III - IV - 3

that it is no longer a problem as such. But the rootlessness produced by blot-
ting out twelve years of history is important. There have been too many breaks
in historical continuity and too many shocks. Great national prosperity has
developed at the same time that national, political and territorial integrity
has been lost. The incongruity of this situation contributes to the insecurity
of German leadership groups, the stridency and legalism of whose disputes often
hides a lack of inner assurance.

Chancellor Adenauer's great achievement--just as de Gaulle's--was that he understood the psychological needs of his country. He was aided by wise and far-sighted American statesmen, among whom Secretaries Acheson and Dulles, General Clay and Mr. John McCloy have an honored place. In order to prevent the latent nihilism in Germany from again menacing the peace, Adenauer sought to give the Federal Republic a stake in something larger than itself. The so-called rigidity decried by many of his critics was in fact the reverse side of his attempt to teach his people habits of reliability in international affairs. He realized that Germany was too exposed geographically and to vulnerable psychologically and politically to be able to sustain a very active policy. He understood that

[Y]

III - IV - 4

Germany divided, viewed with suspicion and rootless, would be excessively
tempted by either nationalism or neutralism, or both, if forced to shoulder
independent & autononny
primary responsibility for an essentially national foreign policy. The fabric
of German political life might not withstand the temptations and pressures of
influenced
such an exposed position.

Adenauer, therefore, sought to submerge narrowly German interests in a
wider community. First he developed a close association with the United States
which earned him the opposition's epithet that he was Chancellor of the Allies.
Later, when United States policy on Berlin seemed to threaten minimum German in-
terests, he renewed his always strong tendency for close association with France.
This culminated in the Franco-German treaty of friendship of January 1963. In
both cases his major concern was to assure for the Federal Republic the moral
and physical backing
protection of a senior partner. Perhaps Chancellor Adenauer's most
notable achievement was to bring about the optical illusion that conditions in
the Federal Republic were as firm and stable as his own policy.

This is not the case, however. For the first twenty years after the
collapse of the Third Reich, German energies were absorbed in reconstruction

III - IV - 5

and German politics were dominated by a man whose formative experience was in the last century. But Germany's uncertain sense of identity could take surprising forms. This is all the more true because, since 1961, the German situation has become more fluid under the impact of four events: (a) the Berlin crisis and Anglo-American negotiating tactics until 1962; (b) the Berlin Wall; (c) de Gaulle's European policy and the United States reaction to it; and (d) United States pressures for diplomatic flexibility.

The Berlin crisis was crucial because it emphasized a serious potential for tension within the Alliance: the difference between the inevitable German quest for national unity and the equally understandable concern of the rest of the allies for stability. As a result, NATO, an Alliance designed to preserve the status quo powers, has as a principal partner a country one of whose principal goals has to be a drastic alteration of the status quo. Of course, no alliance can perfectly reconcile the goals of all of its members. But the minimum condition for effectiveness is that the requirements of the alliance should not clash with the deepest aspirations of one or more of the partners.

The Berlin issue has proved so sensitive not so much because the city

III - IV - 6

is physically vulnerable, but because all of Germany is psychologically vulnerable. Not all of Germany's allies accept the division of Germany, and some might prefer a unified Germany; but none makes reunification a major goal.

Thus during the Berlin crises of 1959-60 and 1961-62 many in the West argued that the logical solution was to negotiate new access procedures to Berlin in return for accepting the "fact" of a divided Germany. To many influential Americans and Britishers the continuation of a status quo which had persisted for a decade and a half appeared a small price to pay for a promise of stability.

However, acceptance of the division of Germany as permanent would upset the domestic equilibrium of the Federal Republic; this is one of the reasons why the Soviets are so eager to secure Western recognition of the status quo in Germany. The division of Germany may be unavoidable; but the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance requires that there is no ambiguity about the reason. If the West tacitly or explicitly abandoned the principle of German national unity--collaborating with the Soviets in keeping Germany divided--Germans would consider it a sacrifice of their basic interests. No German political leader can accept as permanent the subjugation of seventeen million of his compatriots,

[Y]

III - IV - 7

~~Communist~~ guns. His minimum goal must be to ameliorate conditions in East Germany--a goal which he will be under increasing pressure to pursue independently if his allies prove indifferent to it.

This is why the building of the Wall in Berlin and the hesitant Western response to it gave such a shock to the German public. Many in the West looked on the Wall primarily as another unilateral abrogation of a treaty obligation by the Soviets and an act of inhumanity to the people of Berlin. In Germany, the Wall symbolized the end of the previous hopes for unification. For better or worse, the policy of the Federal Republic had been based on the premise that there was no inconsistency between Germany's national aspirations and its Western orientation. In fact, the Western Alliance had been sold to the German public with the argument that it represented the best method to achieve these aspirations.

This belief was badly shaken by the Wall. It marked the end of the belief that there was an automatic relationship between German unification and a strong Atlantic Alliance. The policy of the Federal Republic has affirmed *so much* increasing expatriation, its commitment to German unity and ever more explicitly that German unity or at least the alleviation of conditions *Oblus in Germany arguethat these objectives must be* in Eastern Germany, had to be consciously sought if necessary, by unilateral

III - IV - 8

if necessary, the West is increasingly confronted with the choice whether these goals are to be pursued by the Alliance as a whole or by Germany as a separate national policy.

Many in the West find either prospect disquieting. Remembering two world wars and the atrocities of the Nazi period, they are uneasy that international tensions should focus on Germany for the third time in fifty years. But the West must rise above its memories, keeping in mind that the disasters of this century arose in part because Germany strove to assert its own narrowly conceived interests against both East and West. Ten years after the decision to rearm Germany, it is too late to invoke Germany's past transgressions in discussions of policy alternatives. It is possible to argue that other choices should have been made a decade ago. Today, the sole hope for having Germany be a responsible member of the Atlantic Community is to treat her like one.

The fate of the seventeen million people in Eastern Germany is one of those intangible issues that can remain quiescent for many years, only to erupt suddenly and dramatically. Although few West Germans expect to achieve unity rapidly, fewer still are prepared to accept as permanent their country's division.

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III - IV - 10

policies are interdependent; to pursue one without the other is to defeat both.

This is why the Franco-United States rivalry has had such an unfortunate impact on Germany. When the Federal Republic becomes the balance wheel between competing nations of Atlantic organization, the practical consequence is to emphasize the national aspect of German policy—if only because constant wooing causes the suitors to marshal the arguments which they believe to be most seductive.¹ As Germany's policy becomes less anonymous, it also grows more vulnerable. A Germany wooed on all sides and simultaneously urged to deal directly with the East, which controls the future of seventeen million Germans, is subject to extraordinary blackmail or exceptional temptations. The challenge to Western policy is to prevent the Alliance from seeming an obstacle to legitimate German aspirations, while being careful to keep German national aspirations from transcending all other imperatives.

This balance would be difficult to establish even in a cohesive Alliance. It has proved impossible to achieve in the face of the competition between the United States and France. President Kennedy had been in office less than six

¹ See below, Chapter V

III - IV - 11

months when Khrushchev's Berlin ultimatum confronted his Administration with a direct challenge. The Kennedy Administration thereupon coupled a drastic build-up of American military strength with a diplomacy based on the unexceptionable proposition that a show-down could not be faced until all honorable means of compromise had been exhausted. It was widely assumed that the primary Soviet goal was to stabilize conditions in Central Europe. The United States was, therefore, inclined to seek some way to deal with the immediate irritant--the problem of access to Berlin--by making concessions which might enhance the status of the East German authorities without impairing the physical means of access. American policy assumed that progress on the national question would be achieved by increasing technical contacts between the two parts of Germany. In these contacts, it was supposed, the superior moral strength of Western Germany could not fail to make itself felt.

All of these elements were contained in the United States plan which the Germans leaked to the press in April 1962 in order to torpedo it. It provided for an International Access Authority in which East Germany would enjoy the same status as the Federal Republic; a number of East-West German commissions to deal

III - IV - 12

with technical problems; a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw
Pact; and an agreement to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries

The position of the Federal Republic in the face of this initiative was
extremely / ambivalent. Conscious of the danger of being accused of bellicosity,
it accepted the need for negotiations. But Chancellor Adenauer and his associates
were extremely uneasy about the way the issue had been posed. They held that
Soviet "salami tactics" had already curtailed West Berlin's margin of safety so
sharply that any further concessions were likely to undermine its viability. They
were torn between the desire for progress on the German question and a suspicion
that any proposal would only mask further concessions on Berlin. They remembered
that at the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Geneva in 1959 the Western powers
first coupled a proposal on German unification with some concessions on Berlin.
When the Soviets refused even to discuss unification, the West refrained from
pushing the German plan, but still kept possible modifications of Berlin's status
on the agenda.

The German Government, having based its entire postwar policy on close
ties with the West and especially with the United States, chose not to make public

III - IV - 13

the full extent of its disquiet. Similarly, the United States Administration preferred to stress German agreement to specific formulas in order to maintain the appearance of allied unity. However, nominal German agreement was frequently depended on Chancellor Adenauer's knowledge that President de Gaulle would exercise his veto in allied councils.

One result was that much of the polemic between Washington and Bonn was conducted by means of inspired leaks to the press. During the summer and fall of 1961, many American newspapers pointed out that Germany's bills for World War II would be coming due. The United States was said to be delaying proposals until after the German elections scheduled for that fall so that a new government would be able to bear the brunt of the unpleasant decisions which were required. There were demands for "initiatives" and "imagination" from the Germans. According to a prevalentley it was safe to press the Germans for concessions because as the saying went, "where are the Germans going to go?"

On the German side, the suspicion was frequently voiced that sooner or later the United States would confront Germany with a *fait accompli*. Planted stories expressed doubt about the validity of the United States nuclear guarantee.

III - IV - 15

rejecting--sometimes brutally--the American efforts to devise negotiating formulas, de Gaulle came to express the true convictions of the German government better than it dared to do itself. In his press conference of March 25, 1959, de Gaulle strongly advocated German unification. Later he was the only Western head of state to accept the present German-Polish frontier as final--thus opening a tentative option towards the East European states and accepting what will surely be the minimum price that Germany will have to pay for a European settlement.

The conflicting policies of the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Federal Republic created a diplomacy which combined the disadvantage of allied disunity with the inability to gain any real benefit from negotiations with the Soviets. France refused to negotiate. The Federal Republic approved diplomatic contacts with the Soviets only with great misgivings. The "exploratory talks" were first conducted by Secretary Rusk and later by Ambassador Thompson with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Thus, the Federal Republic, on an issue affecting it most immediately, stood on the sidelines, in a position to criticize the unfavorable features of specific proposals without having to weigh them against alternative courses. By assuming the role of chief negotiator, the

III - IV - 16

United States played into the hands of de Gaulle and disquieted the Germans, and all without being able to bring about a settlement. Since we could not commit the West as a whole, the Soviets were in a position to treat our offers as fishing expeditions or to engage in fishing expeditions of their own. If they considered allied discord a feint, this gave them an incentive to be rigid. If they took it seriously, they could, in effect, bank every concession and use it as the starting point for the next round of talks.

The longer negotiations were conducted in this matter, the more relations between Bonn and Washington suffered. The mere fact of bilateral negotiations raised the specter of a U.S.-Soviet accommodation at the expense of our allies. Our tactics thus encouraged the Franco-German entente. The French inclination to create a Third Force would probably have been pursued in any case; but it was given impetus and opportunity by German uneasiness about our course.

This was the situation when Chancellor Adenauer finally put an end to the "exploratory talks" by publicly expressing his dissatisfaction with them. Throughout 1962, American-German relations remained wary, while the Federal Republic moved ever closer to an intimate association with France.

III - IV - 17

Thus, by the end of 1962, while NATO was still going through the liturgy of unity, serious fissures had appeared. France had formulated an explicit challenge to American pre-eminence within NATO. The Federal Republic was torn between disquiet over American policy and the knowledge that its security required American support. Great Britain's application for membership in the Common Market was stalled.

Matters were brought to a head by de Gaulle's press conference of January 14, 1963, excluding Britain from the Common Market. This was followed within two weeks by the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation.

The first United States reaction was stunned outrage at what was seen as an embryo European organization based on de Gaulle's conceptions. This was succeeded by a deliberate policy of wooing the Federal Republic from its French ties. More and more the focus of America's European policy shifted towards Germany. In the military, diplomatic and economic fields strenuous efforts were made to forge new United States-German links. Their practical consequence--whatever the intention--was to reduce the significance of the French alliance in German eyes. Where the previous policy ran the risk of a German estrangement

III - IV - 18

from the Alliance, the current policy, by giving the impression a special United
States-German relationship, is in danger of eventually producing an estrangement
of the other allies. Before dealing with this problem, it is important to exa-
mine the role of Great Britain, another ally, which in the entire post-war
period has prided itself on its special relationship to the United States
during the entire post-war period.

III - V - 1

Great Britain and Europe: The Nassau Agreement

Great Britain's relations to the Continent in the post-war period have been extraordinarily ambivalent. In the years immediately following the war, the countries of the Continent were on the verge of chaos. The quest for a modicum of stability overrode all other considerations. Great Britain alone seemed to possess a structure capable of sustaining a long-range, orderly policy. During this period, Britain could have had the leadership of Europe for the asking. It would have seemed inconceivable that Europe might exclude Britain from its community--assuming that it would ever be able to form one.

Yet it was precisely the memory of its recent isolation that prevented Britain from seizing its opportunity. Throughout Britain's history, the threats to its security had come from the Continent, which in Britain significantly is called Europe. Britain's historic policy had been to prevent the emergence of a powerful and united Continent. To promote a united Europe, to submerge Britain in such a structure, and to substitute European for American and Commonwealth connections, all this represented a wrench with tradition which many Britains were reluctant to make. The memory of the war reinforced this

III - V - 2

In the eyes of most Britain, hesitation, because the Continent contained the countries which had collapsed during the war and forced Britain to fight alone. In the late Forties, the continental countries were still wracked by internal dissension. Britain's geographic location might be close to Europe, but its emotional ties were to its recent ally across the sea and to the Commonwealth. The special relationship with the United States was not only an act of policy but also a psychological necessity. Long before anyone on the Continent could even imagine excluding Britain, Britain had made a tentative choice against the Continent.

The more the war needed, the more As the post-war period progressed, it became apparent that total defeat may be more conducive to making a new start than partial victory. For Great Britain, the tremendous exertions of the war did not lead to a well-deserved respite. On the contrary, Britain was obliged to undertake another major effort to adjust itself to a loss of international influence--a task which was made even more difficult by the memory of the recent heroic effort.

1

I am particularly indebted to Stephen Graubard for this point.

III - V - 3

By contrast, defeat enabled the Continent to free itself from the shackles of traditional nostalgia. In many countries, though with varying success—there emerged new leadership groups determined to shape the future. Courageous and steadfast during a difficult two decades, Britain's policy now began to turn stagnant. Its exertions had consumed so much energy that Britain never seemed able to decide which alternative to pursue: close relations with the United States, a new concept of Commonwealth, or an unreserved entry into Europe. By trying to combine all three, Britain ran the risk of losing each. The roots of Britain's exclusion from the Continent go deeper than an individual's arbitrary decision.

This ambivalence has been described by some as Britain's search for identity. But the real problem is not that Britain lacked an identity. Rather it is that the sense of identity it had was incompatible with an unreserved entry into Europe. Great Britain had always considered herself primarily a world power rather than a European power. Her sense of identity was bound up with her connections across the sea, more than with her relations across the Channel.

III - V - 4

Britain's ambivalence towards Europe was a consistent feature of the post-war period. She refused to join the Schuman Plan. She opposed the Common Market, applying for membership only after its success was assured. Even then, Britain's views on the organization of Europe were quite different from those of the European integrationists who so passionately championed her entry into Europe. They were in fact not easy to distinguish from those of de Gaulle except that they were stated in a more accommodating fashion. Thus in proposing that Britain enter the Common Market, Prime Minister Macmillan told the House of Commons:

> A number of years have passed since the movement began which culminated in the Treaty of Rome and I am bound to say that I do not see any signs of the members of the Community losing their national identity because they have delegated a measure of their sovereignty. This problem of sovereignty, to which we must, of course, attach the highest importance is, in the end, perhaps a matter of degree. I fully accept that there are some forces in Europe which would like a genuine federalist system.... They would like Europe to turn itself into a sort of United States, but I believe this to be a completely false analogy.

> ... The alternative concept, the only practical concept, would be a confederation, a commonwealth if Honorable Members would like to call it that--what I think General de Gaulle has called Europe des Patries--which would retain the great traditions and the pride of individual nations while working together in clearly defined spheres for their common interest. This seems to me a concept more in tune with the national traditions of European countries and, in particular, of our own.

1

Hangard, Fifth Series, Commons, Vol. 645 (July 24-August 4, 1961), cols. 1490-91.

III - V - 5

The same thought was expressed by Reginald Maudling, then President of the Board of Trade:

> ...we have seen in the last year or two the development of the European patrie of General de Gaulle and it is clear, I should have thought, that the Governments of the Six are not supporters of the conception of a political federation. Therefore, it is fair to say that neither by the terms of the Treaty itself nor by the expressed views of the Governments concerned in the Community would our membership commit ourselves in any way to ultimate political federation.¹

Britain's emotional ties were not with Europe but with the "special relationship" with the United States. This relationship is difficult to define, depending as it does on a series of intangibles. Unquestionably the enormous prestige gained by Britain during the war played a major role. Unique ties of language and culture encourage many informal connections. United States-British relations would therefore be "special" whatever the formal agreements.

British diplomacy skillfully exploited these assets. De Gaulle's tactics consist of submitting a proposal pre-emptorily and with a minimum of explanation. If the proposal is rejected, de Gaulle then proceeds to

¹
[Hansard, Fifth Series, Commons, Vol. 645, July 24-August 4, 1961, cols. 1597-98.

[N]

III - V - 7

they pressed Britain to seek its future in connection with Europe rather than in special ties across the Atlantic. To this school of thought, it seemed that Britain should not be permitted to claim a preferential voice on all issues while its capacity to assume international responsibilities grew constantly smaller. Diminishing

The two events which underlined the decline of Britain's influence in Washington most vividly were the Suez crisis and the cancellation of the Skybolt missile. The former demonstrated the end of Britain's capacity for major independent diplomatic action; the latter showed the hollowness of Britain's aspiration to military autonomy. In both instances, the wounds were to some extent self-inflicted--more in the case of Suez than in the case of Skybolt. In both cases, brutal and unfeeling American actions aggravated an already difficult situation. After Suez much of the previous assurance disappeared from British diplomacy. Britain increasingly tended to substitute maneuver for commitment and tried to increase Britain's influence while reducing its responsibilities--an impossible assignment. The long run.

By 1962 the only special tie which Britain had with the United States was in the nuclear field. An amendment of the United States Atomic Energy

III - V - 9

to exaggerate its special influence in Washington, the United States may have overestimated the extent of Britain's pliability. It came to be an axiom of United States policy that Britain's entry into a supra-national Europe would be a guarantee of Atlantic partnership. This is why Washington championed Britain's entry into the Common Market so passionately and why it was so outraged when this policy was thwarted.

It is possible, however, that the American view was over-optimistic.

To be sure, Britain's political maturity would have weighed heavily in Europe's councils. With Britain playing a leading role, the policy of a united Europe would have been more subtle, more skillful and at least in New Zealand, Australia and other Conservative governments, form less demanding. Still, the argument, made on behalf of Britain's entry into Europe always emphasized that only as part of a united Europe would Britain carry weight in the United States. One ironic result of Britain's entry into Europe might well have been that Europe would henceforth conduct her policies with British methods.

If Britain overestimated its special ties with the United States, de Gaulle took them at face value. He has never forgotten Churchill's statement that if Britain were forced to choose between Europe and the open sea, it would

III - V - 10

unhesitatingly opt for the latter. The tenacity with which Britain
agreed about its conditions contested the economic issues of its entry into Europe, while holding on to
it special relationship with the United States in the nuclear field, suggested
to de Gaulle that the Anglo-American condominium over Europe of the war-time
years might be re-established. Britain's special relation with the United
States in the nuclear field either could have been meaningless: it was either
challenged or a united Europe required its own defense or seemed designed to give Britain
a pre-eminent place in Europe. Neither contingency was too attractive
to de Gaulle.

Thus the Skybolt cancellation could not have been more ill-timed,
if Britain's entry into Europe was a prime United States objective. And the
situation was further complicated by the domestic pressures on the Macmillan
government. Throughout the spring and summer of 1960, the Conservative
government had been under constant attack by Labor on two grounds: (a)
by relying on a weapon to be developed by a foreign country, Britain admitted

1
Charles de Gaulle, *Memoirs*, Vol. III, p. ___.

III - V - 11

that an "independent" British deterrent was impossible and (b) if there really was a need for an independent deterrent, it was dangerous to rely on Skybolt since the weapon did not even exist and since, as George Brown, then Labor's spokesman on defense matters, said, "the Americans have not bought it." The Conservative government countered by referring to an "agreement" by the United States to supply Skybolt. This was never contradicted by either the Eisenhower or the Kennedy Administration.

This debate became more intense after the Kennedy Administration took office. President Kennedy and Secretary McNamara publicly deprecated the utility of independent nuclear forces within NATO. They were supported in this stand by the British Opposition. Harold Wilson, then foreign affairs spokesman for the Labor Party, claimed after a visit to Washington in 1962, that he had been told that the United States did not consider the British retaliatory force of strategic significance and that the British defense effort would make a greater contribution if channeled in other directions. This was denied by the Conservative government. Labor then challenged the Conservative government to produce a single official American United States

[Y] III - V - 14

agreed that NATO in addition to having a nuclear "shield" should have a non-nuclear
"sword," thus reversing the traditional NATO strategic concept.

This agreement was transmitted to President de Gaulle after it was
published. In an accompanying memorandum, the United States offered to sell
Polaris missiles to France on the same terms as to Great Britain.

The Nassau Agreement attempted a _tour de force_. It tried to reconcile
integration with independence, the American belief in the need for an
indivisible nuclear strategy with a British desire for autonomy.

The price was high, however, and in practice its various clauses
tended to cancel each other out. For example, what was the significance
of subscribing the British retaliatory force to NATO while at the same time
reserving the right of independent action when the supreme national interest
was at stake? As President Kennedy pointed out shortly after, the supreme
national interest is automatically involved when _nuclear weapons, are involved_.

Similarly, what was the meaning of the phrase that a unified strategy was
the best protection in "ordinary" circumstances? To what contingencies did

1 Text, DOSB, Vol. XLVIII, 1229 (January , 1963), p.

[Y]

III - V - 15

the escape clause refer? Finally what was the meaning of the reversal of
the traditional notions of "shield" and "sword" in NATO strategy? Did it
imply that the United States and Great Britain were proposing to resist
a conventional attack in Europe primarily with conventional means?

Thus even an individual less prone to exploit Allied discord than
President de Gaulle was likely to view the Nassau Agreement with suspicion.
Indeed, reaction to the Nassau Agreement all over Europe ranged from cool
to hostile. In Germany, the grouping of NATO's nuclear forces in a special
nuclear command revived fears of a possible nuclear disengagement. The
*interpreted the Nassau Agreement*
British opposition took it as proof of the validity of their previous
contention that British nuclear independence was a sham. It did not
satisfy those in the United States who had been pressing for an integrated
strategy. And it was, of course, rejected out of hand by President de Gaulle.

The debate about military integration demonstrated how abstract and
doctrinaire the strategic dispute had become. Many influential Americans
objected most strongly to the escape clauses regarding the disposition of
nuclear forces. They implied that without these clauses the "assignment"
of the British Polaris force to NATO would have been irrevocable. In fact,

[Y]

III - V - 16

"assignment" in NATO has never been irrevocable; it has always had a largely symbolic quality as all forces in NATO are normally under national in practise, command. NATO Headquarters are planning outfits that control the forces "assigned" to them only during specified maneuvers or in war. Each ally retains the right to go to war according to its own constitutional processes.

The right of withdrawal is inherent, and "assignment" does not significantly restrict the independent disposition of NATO forces. This has been proved abundantly by the United States withdrawal of forces from Germany for action in Lebanon, by French withdrawal of its fleet from NATO, by the use of NATO-assigned forces by both Greece and Turkey during the Cyprus crisis and by the withdrawal of British forces from Germany for use in Malaysia.

The escape clauses gave Britain no additional rights; they were significant in the event of a war in which Britain were the vanquished power.

If integration did not go far enough for some Americans, it was much too sweeping for President de Gaulle. The debate having taken on its scholastic tone, President de Gaulle was likely to object to the term "assignment" whatever its actual significance. He said that the proposed

III - V - 17

assignment of nuclear forces to NATO involved:

...a web of liaisons, transmissions and interferences within itself ... such that, if an integral part were suddenly snatched from it, there would be a strong risk of paralyzing it just at the moment, perhaps, when it should act.¹

And he asked how in practice integration could be reconciled with independent disposition, putting his finger on the key evasion of the Nassau Agreement. At the same time, he agreed that cooperation between the national nuclear forces within NATO was both possible and desirable.

It is symptomatic that, while arguing, sometimes vituperatively, the relative merits of integration and coordination, neither side has defined what concrete meaning these phrases would have in practical terms or said specifically —

what common action might be possible under a different label?

The timing of the Nassau Agreement and the way it was negotiated created still greater problems than its content. Its impact on Britain's application to enter the Common Market was disastrous. Given de Gaulle's wartime experiences and his view of France's role in the world, it was against all probability that he would accept a proposal negotiated by

¹ Charles de Gaulle, Press Conference on January 14, 1963, *Major Addresses*, p. 219.

III - V - 18

the "Anglo-Saxons" without consultation with him and transmitted to Paris
only after it had been released to the press. It should have come as no
surprise that de Gaulle acidly commented at a press conference: "Of course,
I am only speaking of this proposal and agreement because it has been
published and because their content is known."

Moreover, the actual terms of the agreement must have appeared to
de Gaulle to perpetuate the discriminatory treatment which he had opposed
throughout his public career. Since France possessed neither submarines nor
warheads for the Polaris missiles, the Nassau Agreement could bring benefits
to France only after many years. And Britain's experience with the
Skybolt program reduced the already small incentive of France to make
itself dependent on the promise of future delivery of United States missiles
all the less so as France was not offered the privileged information about
the construction of nuclear warheads for these missiles which had been
available to Britain since 1954.

1, Press Conference on January 14, 1963, *ibid*., p. 218.

III - V - 19

But the most profound impact of the Nassau Agreement was on Britain's application for membership in the Common Market. There have been endless debates whether the Nassau Agreement precipitated de Gaulle's decision to veto British membership, whether it was a pretext or--as is most likely--whether it was simply a contributory cause. Without deciding this issue, it is clear that the Nassau Agreement exacerbated an already difficult situation and posed the issue of British membership in Europe under the most adverse conditions imaginable.

Whatever their other differences, de Gaulle and the European integrationists were agreed that Europe, to be properly organized, must have its own defense program. Britain's application for membership in the Common Market inevitably raises the issue whether it was consistent with the aspirations of a united Europe for one of its members to have an exclusive relationship with the United States on so vital a subject as nuclear strategy or whether it should share its nuclear competence with its new partners.

The Nassau Agreement brought this issue to a head while Britain was still negotiating its entry into Europe. Britain had received an abrupt

III - V - 20

rebuff on the Skybolt issue. Yet it never seems seriously to have considered
using this opportunity for closer cooperation with its European partners
in the military field. Instead, it concluded an agreement with the United
States without even consulting France, the other European nuclear power,
and it developed a nuclear plan for NATO without the participation of its
prospective partners in the Common Market. It agreed to reverse the
traditional significance of "sword" and "shield" in NATO doctrine without
consulting any other NATO ally. Perhaps de Gaulle had decided on a veto
in any event. But if he still hesitated, the Nassau Agreement was likely
to tip the scales.

In retrospect, the failure of Britain to consult with France and its
other European allies before committing itself to the Nassau Agreement seems
an historic missed opportunity. It will never be known what the reaction
would have been if Britain had made such an overture before the Bahamas
meeting. Even had it failed, it would have placed the subsequent debate in
a far better context.

As it was, de Gaulle, in his press conference of January 14, 1963,
abruptly and brutally vetoed British membership in the Common Market and rejected
the Nassau offer. The shape of Atlantic relations will never be the same

III - V - 21

as it was before that date. De Gaulle's action exploded the premises on which much of previous thinking had been based. The belief in an automatic progression from economic to political integration suddenly stood in need of re-examination. The concept of an Atlantic partnership between the United States and a united Europe, including Great Britain, was seriously challenged. It was now clear that conflicting approaches to Atlantic relationships were confronting each other.

The debate was confused by the way the lines were drawn, which made it dangerous to take either criticism or support of United States positions at face value. The French claim to speak for Europe was belied by the fact that on economic issues Germany and the Netherlands tended to side with Great Britain and in the field of strategy the Federal Republic leaned towards the United States. Many in Europe were disquieted by de Gaulle's tactics even when they basically agreed with his policies--as in the case of the recognition of Communist China and the neutralization of South East Asia.

At the same time, opposition to de Gaulle does not guarantee support of United States policies. British policy often differs from that of

III - V - 22

de Gaulle only in the greater suppleness of British methods. Much
internal French criticism is due to the frustration that the Opposition's
policy is carried out by the incumbent. The major difference on defense
matters seems to be a question of timing: when the French nuclear force
is to be turned into a European one. All over Europe left-wing groups
violently oppose de Gaulle's imperious style, seeing in him a direct
descendent of the dictators of the Thirties. But this does not mean
that they object to Third Force policies as such or that their alternative
is close ties with the United States. The Federal Republic maneuvers
uneasily between relying on the military protection of the United States
and the diplomatic cover of France.

The press conference of January 14, 1963, ushered in a period of
frantic diplomatic activity in which the United States strove hard to
vindicate its previous conception and France aloofly pursued its own
course. The result may well be contrary to the intentions of each of the
rivals. What started out as a dispute about the internal structure of
Europe and its role runs the risk of fragmenting Europe or of shifting the
balance within Europe in unexpected directions. Both the United States