4/20/73

# THE YEAR OF EUROPE

This has been called the Year of Europe.

I am supposed to be the originator of the phrase. I am not sure that I was. If all goes well, I am certain I can find where and when I said it. If not, I can always blame it on the Associated Press.

In any case, the Year of Europe is much more than a slogan. I want to speak to you today about what we mean by it and what we expect to emerge from it.

This is the Year of Europe for three reasons:

- First, the Western Alliance has accomplished its original objectives;

- Second, we face an agenda of new issues.

- Third, we are in a new international environment vastly different -- and far more promising -- than the period of the Alliance's birth.

We are challenged, as were the statesmen of the 40's, to shape our future. We are summoned in Dean Acheson's words to be present at a new creation.

The Alliance that had the vision and courage to shape its future in the period of danger can surely be as vital and creative a force for a new era of peace.

-2-

This is not a task for a single year. But if we succeed, the
Year of Europe will be remembered as the year we gave Atlantic
relations a new direction.

Our goal in 1973 is twofold: First, to frame an agenda of specific
problems in our relations that need to be resolved -- in economics,
in defense, and in our efforts to reduce international tensions. We
cannot address these as entirely separate, or purely technical problems,
if we are to give Atlantic relations a new momentum we must establish
a new set of agreed principles and common objectives. This will require
an extraordinary effort of political will.

This effort of will is the second challenge, and the more profound
one. In the 1940's, unity was forged in the face of urgent common
dangers. Today, it is not enough for us to concentrate on what we are
trying to prevent. We are challenged to develop a concept of the future
of the Atlantic Alliance and its role in the international order. We are
asked to reaffirm our common purposes, to give firm direction to our
common endeavor.

It is time for a new Charter for the Atlantic Community.

The United States is ready for this undertaking, and we appeal to
our Allies to join us as partners in the building of a new structure of
peace. This is what the President is seeking in his meetings with
European leaders this spring, and on his trip to Europe this fall.

-3-

For it cannot be accomplished by American leadership alone, or by
American prescriptions, but only by common statesmanship.

## Patterns of Change

It is no extravagance to call the North Atlantic Alliance history's
most successful peacetime coalition. It guaranteed Western Europe's
economic revival; it assured our collective security in an era of con-
frontation and crisis; it has created conditions of stability which now
offer us the promise of a wider structure of peace embracing East
and West.

Our deepest challenge today arises not from external danger but
from the evolution of the relationship between Europe and America,
and from the major transformation in international relations.

- The revival of Western Europe is an established fact, as is the
effort toward economic unification
historic success of its economic unification.

- Europe is a major center of power.

- The East-West stragegic balance has shifted away from the
American preponderance which Alliance defense posture and doctrine
long presupposed.

- We are in a period of relaxed tensions. The danger of war
has receded, and we face new vistas of detente. Each Ally shares
this goal, but pursues it in independent policy.

- A new generation in Western societies accepts a more stable
international environment as the norm but is less sensitive to the

-4-

-- In the United States there is reluctance to sustain our involve-
ment in the world on the basis of predominant American responsibility.
that

These are fundamentally new conditions. They were bound to
affect the nature of our Atlantic relations. A major result is that
three [increasingly incompatible modes of action] have developed within
the Atlantic world:
that

-- In our economic relations, the European Community is
dedicated to its regional [autonomy]; the United States, at the same time,
must act as part of, and be responsible for a wider international trade
and monetary system. We must reconcile the two.
that

-- In our collective security, we are still organized on the principle
of unity and integrated defense, but in radically different strategic
conditions, and without a full understanding of all its implications.
that

-- The US no longer speaks for acts for the Alliance as a whole;
East-West diplomacy has come increasingly to be conducted by
individual Allies, instead of ideological blocs. The US has global
interests and responsibilities. Europe has regional security interests.
The two are not necessarily in conflict, but neither are they by definition
identical. Yet detente remains a common goal.
short, paradox in inherent in the new situation. The Europeans

In short, paradox in inherent in the new situation. The Europeans
still want American protection and American leadership; they also want
the right to pursue their own interests. They appeal to the United States
to tolerate their [independence] in the name of Atlantic unity -- and we do.
that

-5-

But at the same time, in the name of that same unity, they impose
limits on _our_ independent action in pursuit of our international
responsibilities.

There have been complains on the American side that Europe is
ignoring its wider responsibilities in setting self-interest
taking advantage of us economically and not carrying its fair share
of the defense burden. There have been complaints on the European
xianex side that American is out to wreck European unity, or to desert
Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically.

It is time to end the preoccupation with our fears, and reassert
our positive goals. The problems and anxieties produced by change
must be overcome by a shared vision of the future.

This is the President's purpose in the Year of Europe.

Let me discuss in turn what this means in each dimension of our
policy.

## European Unity and the Economic Relationship

First, we need to understand what, exactly, are the problems
between America and the European Economic Community. The concept
of a European Community is emphatically not an issue.

No element of postwar American policy has been more consistent
and more basic than our support for European unity. At every turn,
we supported it. We still do.

-7-

In these talks we must address concretely the economic issues
that are before us. Yet if we approach these issues solely on the basis
of their technical merits, all parties will have no choice but to seek
to maximize their self interests in the narrow commercial sense.
The result will be a deadlock or constant conflict.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to raise these negotiations
to a higher plane of international responsibility. What we propose is
to adopt a broader political approach that recognizes our transcendent
in an open balance trading order
common interest with both Europe and Japan. Only on this basis can
we justify the mutual concessions that are essential to the success of
these talks.

common interest

This spirit of [reciprocity] is reflected in the President's trade bill.
This is the spirit in which the United States will enter the negotiations
this fall.

It is not a test of strength, but of statesmanship.

Telcon - Secy Shultz - General Scowcroft

April 20 - 4:00 p.m.

**Shultz:** It is an exciting speech and I'm glad to see Henry doing it. The main thrust is positive and its about time somebody cast things in that light.

In terms of suggestions, first as an overall reaction I think -- Japan is mentioned and it comes toward the end and it is almost as though somebody said at the last minute that we'd better say something about Japan. I think that there are a lot of inferences that suggest that Europe is concerned with Europe and we are concerned with the world. I think that it isn't quite fair to say that Europe is only concerned with Europe, although they probably are more inward than we would like but I think one of the creative tasks of the Atlantic Unionx Alliance -- what it is we are striving for is a new economic order which can't be conceived of in terms -- why not have Japan in at the beginning and make that one of the virtues of the speech -- that the Atlantic Alliance has to reach out and bring Japan into it.

Just to take a few specific things - on page 3 the first of the two dots -- points about the revival of Western Europe -- I think that is putting it too strongly. I don't think you can really say it has succeeded. I think you can say "as is the historic effort toward economic unification." They are having lots of problems.

On page 4 the notion of three increasingly incompatible modes of action in the 5th line -- I would be more inclined to say three challenges for development within the Atlantic world.

Then the next thing - the economic relations - instead of regional autonomy, perhaps you could say regional development and personality. Maybe down the line "the US no longer expects or acts" - how about "the US no longer can expect or act".

Toward the bottom is really isn't to tolerate their independence as it is to tolerate their right to pursue independent and regional objectives. I've tried to give a little more meaning to the word independence.

The first full paragraph of page 5 - "Europe is taking advantage of us economically" - I think that is sort of awkward. How about "Europe is ignoring its wider responsibilities in seeking self-interest" or something like that.

2

On page 6 - the bottom of the first paragraph - we saw Europe as the building
block -- maybe you could see cooperative Atlantic partnership, looking out to
the rest of the world. We need to get the notion of "looking out" in there.

Maybe rather than say we cannot ignore the fact that there is a growing
conflict of trade policy, something along the lines "we cannot ignore the
fact that the economic relationships may lead to potential conflict in trade
policy and we need to achieve a new balance in our trade policy or something
of that kind.

On page 7 where Japan is mentioned in the second paragraph, we need to say
what it is we have the interest in and it seems to me that we have an interest
in an open balance trading order.

In the penultimate paragraph the spirit of reciprocity is a bad word in the
trade area. We want reciprocal concessions on a tit-for-tat basis and we
are saying no, we're behind, and I would say the spirit of common interest
is reflected.

Then there is the point about energy policy -- you might want to put that in at the
earlier part on the economic stuff so that when you pick it up in the summary
it isn't quite so cold.

But on the broader thing about the Atlantic Alliance -- it should broaden itself
and strengthen relationship with other parts of the free world and especially
Japan.