INTERNATIONAL

LC

# A Memo to the Next President

By HENRY A. KISSINGER

The postwar era in international relations is coming to an end. Such periods of transition have always presented opportunities, but also involved turmoil and struggle. That is not how many Western leaders view today's realities, however. They paint an idyllic picture in which change will occur thanks to a new breed of communist leader.

Gorbachev is described as singlehandedly altering the course of Soviet history. Glasnost and perestroika are seen as the key to ending international tensions—even though most people do not know exactly what the words mean. Soviet leaders are expected to lose their ideological fervor and become preoccupied with domestic affairs.

To be sure, this refrain is punctuated by frequent protestations of wariness about Soviet intentions. But this is ritual; the dominant theme is one of incipient friendship between the West and the Soviet Union, and between Western leaders and Mikhail Gorbachev.

Progress has clearly been made on several fronts in East-West negotiations. But a new era cannot be based on ephemeral personalities. To be lasting, it must reflect a number of new, underlying realities:

* Gorbachev has started a process within the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe whose consequences not even he can foretell. The current turmoil in Poland and the ferment in several Soviet republics show that change, once started, generates its own momentum.

* In the West a comparable momentum will bring about major changes in the political and security relations of the Atlantic Alliance. The political structure of Europe—East and West—will thus emerge as the central issue of the '90s.

* The declining appeal of communist ideology does not eliminate—and could increase—the threat of historic Russian expansionism.

* Japan, China and India, as well as Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, will grow in importance, and must be integrated into a new international order.

* The recent progress on regional conflicts—Afghanistan, Cambodia, southern

Africa—has resulted in part from the changed priorities of the superpowers. But it would be naive to believe that the Soviet Union has abdicated its interest in these regions, and it would be wrong for the United States to pull back from them.

Rarely are so many factors in flux simultaneously. There is an extraordinary opportunity to shape a better future with imagi-

crisis by encouraging centrifugal tendencies in both East and West.

If the democracies persist in relying on only the most optimistic assumptions about the future, the present tranquillity will be just the calm before the storm. The overwhelming need is to create a political framework for dealing with the consequences of foreseeable change.

## The Riddle of Mikhail Gorbachev

Gorbachev's success in overcoming the Soviet Union's isolation has been astonishing. Many Western leaders, President Reagan included, now emphasize their personal relationship with the General Secretary. They imply that Gorbachev alone is responsible for the domestic changes taking place in the Soviet Union, and that these changes will bring about a new era of peace. But it defies all reason to believe that a man who has never held any post outside the Soviet Communist Party (with its doctrine that history is governed by "objective factors") would approach his colleagues on the Politburo with the proposition that his personal ties to democratic leaders justified changes in Soviet policy.

For all his panache, Gorbachev is to some degree responding to circumstance. The struggle in Moscow is not over democracy but how to achieve a more competitive Soviet Union. This goal requires the weakening of the feudal baronies that have become entrenched within the centrally planned Stalinist economy. Presumably, another Soviet leader would pursue similar policies, if with less verve and psychological skill. After all, the current phase of Soviet policy was inaugurated in 1984 during the era of the decrepit Chernenko when Gromyko called on President Reagan at the White House.

Even were Gorbachev committed to peace in the Western sense, there is little in the history of either czars or commissars to supply comfort to the Soviet Union's neighbors. The question of whether Soviet foreign policy is shaped by communist ideology or historic Russian expansionism has been debated ever since the Bolshevik revolution. It is impossible to answer. The demands that Molotov made to Hitler in 1940

ORBAN—SYGMA

Incipient friendship: Gorbachev on a street in Prague, 1987

## A new era cannot be based on ephemeral personalities

native statesmanship. For the first time since World War I, it is possible to envisage a plan to reunite Europe with the consent of all its peoples. This could be coupled with the creation of a new security arrangement that would sharply reduce the armed camps that now confront each other in the center of Europe. In Asia, too, a new equilibrium is emerging. And regional disputes could become more a matter of diplomatic and economic competition than military conflict.

But a more desirable international order will not appear automatically. Gorbachev will not solve our problems for us. Nor is arms control the sole, or even the principal, key to meeting these challenges. No agreement so far negotiated—including those in which I participated—has made a strategic difference. Indeed, they are justified domestically on the ground that they leave the military situation unchanged. They are a response to domestic pressures, and valued for their political symbolism. In fact the symbolism accelerates the potential for

34 NEWSWEEK: SEPTEMBER 19, 1988

INTERNATIONAL

as a price for Soviet support, that Stalin pursued after the war and that Brezhnev carried out in Afghanistan date back to imperial Russia: Soviet domination of the Balkans and the Dardanelles; a major voice in Poland; and Soviet hegemony over Iran.

The role of communist ideology has been threefold: it has given Soviet leaders an assurance that the czars lacked; it supplied them with a global cadre of supporters; and it tempted them into distant conflicts in such places as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and Indochina. Gorbachev is willing to trim commitments that traditional Russian rulers might have given a lower priority. But that does not mean the historical Russian arena in Eurasia has been abandoned. Ever since the 17th century, the frontiers of

what was once the Duchy of Muscovy have moved inexorably outward, until the present national frontiers now encompass 11 time zones.

Twice before the West deluded itself by basing its policies on favorable assessments of Soviet leaders: with Stalin in 1944 and Khrushchev in 1956. I am not making any predictions with respect to Gorbachev. But it is dangerous to base East-West relations on the personality of one Soviet leader for several reasons: first, it makes the relationship unstable, since every new Soviet leader has disavowed the policies of his predecessor. Second, it strengthens neutralist elements that have claimed all along that the Cold War is frivolous. Third, it creates the risk that if Gorbachev leaves office, even for internal reasons, the democrac

ies will blame and flagellate themselves.

Most importantly, the psychiatric approach could lead to more Soviet adventurism. In the present circumstances Moscow's restraint is not a concession but a counsel of prudence. But Western escapism may tempt a Soviet leader to achieve unilateral gains rather than fight the domestic battle that genuine reciprocity would require.

The increasingly fashionable notion that we should help Gorbachev is devoid of meaning unless "help" is properly defined. Does it imply that we should make agreements not justifiable on their merits? Should we side with Gorbachev in his internal disputes? (Do we understand them well enough to do so?) In my view, we help him—or other moderate elements—best by putting forward a careful assessment of the legitimate interests of both sides, and undertaking a serious effort to determine whether and how they can be reconciled. Any other course invites a subtle form of blackmail.

### The Challenge for NATO

Unlike Brezhnev, who was above all concerned with safeguarding the status quo in Europe, Gorbachev seems intent on weakening the Western Alliance. Soviet theoretical journals justify peace not so much for its own sake as to deprive the United States of the Soviet menace as a rallying cry. Taking their cue from the General Secretary's book, "Perestroika," Soviet emissaries are promoting the vision of a "European House" that will extend from the Urals to the Atlantic, providing for European security and safeguarding European civilization against American materialism. The thrust of the Soviet policy is to diminish American influence, if not to expel us from Europe altogether.

HIRGHI KUHOTA—MAGNUM

Moral complexity: Vietnamese troops leaving Cambodia

## It will be tricky to sustain advances on regional issues

Gorbachev has already made significant progress in undermining the existing NATO strategy of nuclear deterrence. How often can the phrase "a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought" be repeated in U.S.-Soviet communiqués before the deterrent loses its credibility? How many reductions of nuclear weapons are possible before the strategy of flexible response becomes unfeasible? Step-by-patient-step, the Soviets are gaining a de facto veto over NATO nuclear defense policy. For example, the modernization of short-range weapons, which 10 years ago the allies accepted without comment, has become highly controversial.

Traditionally pro-American groups, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, are beginning to respond to the siren calls from the East. More and more European political candidates journey to Moscow, sometimes even in preference to Washington. In a prescient 1982 lecture, the distinguished American historian Gordon

A. Craig warned that historically Germany has felt tied to Central Europe or the East. The German attitude toward the West is ambivalent, he argued, and vulnerable to "gusts of nostalgia" for a return to tradition. I believe that is now happening.

I do not expect anything so dramatic as a German swing to overt neutralism. But efforts to augment and modernize NATO forces and to strengthen the cohesion of the alliance are already meeting growing resistance. Even increased European military cooperation may face opposition. We may soon witness a repetition of the '50s debate about whether German unity should take precedence over Western ties.

According to current conventional wisdom, none of this makes any difference

because the Soviets will become so economically dependent on Western Europe as to preclude a return to Cold War tensions. Dependence is double-edged, however. It is equally possible that some Western leaders will grow so politically and psychologically dependent on Moscow that they will do anything to avoid the Kremlin's displeasure.

### The Future of Eastern Europe

These trends are being exploited by the Soviets with a daring inconceivable in the Brezhnev period. But it remains to be seen whether Soviet foreign policy is as farsighted as it is daring.

For one thing, the Soviet Union is operating from a position of domestic weakness. Over two decades ago, de Gaulle said, "During my lifetime Communist ideology has been personi

fied by many people... Each of these holders in his turn condemns, excommunicates, crushes and at times kills the others. In any event he fights firmly against the personality cult of the others." At this point, it is impossible to predict whether Gorbachev will prove an exception. Clearly he has started a process with an uncertain outcome. The established bureaucracies will not give up their power and their privileges easily. In an empire of many peoples, decentralization inevitably raises the nationality question. The Soviets have no entrepreneurial tradition to act as a counterweight to central planning, or to play the role the middle class did vis-à-vis the aristocracy during the struggle to build a modern state in Europe. The secret police and the military may not have spoken their last word.

Gorbachev's policies are likely to prove particularly unsettling in Eastern Europe. His reforms, which advertise the corruption and inefficiency of the Soviet system, are bound to increase challenges to the

36 NEWSWEEK: SEPTEMBER 19, 1988

legitimacy of ruling groups in Eastern Europe. No wonder that some of the East European communist parties—in East Germany explicitly, and to a lesser extent in Czechoslovakia—are openly dissociating themselves from the Soviet pattern. The Polish Communist Party was in trouble even without changes in the Kremlin. But glasnost has clearly helped revive the Solidarity trade-union movement.

The new Soviet policy may have created a Frankenstein. To weaken the Atlantic Alliance, Moscow must appear to invite greater ties between East and West. But as the Federal Republic and other countries of West Europe increase their activities and investments in Eastern Europe, the centrifugal tendencies in the Soviet empire will accelerate. Bonn's slogan that it seeks to ease the lives of ordinary East Europeans is no doubt sincere. To the extent that policy succeeds, it may lead to a re-emergence of the competition between Teuton and Slav that produced two world wars. Confronted with a growing erosion of its position in Eastern Europe, Moscow may decide to intervene militarily. A new crisis over Berlin may seem far-fetched today, but is conceivable if the Soviets feel pressed to demonstrate the limits of Western power behind the Iron Curtain. If that should happen—even as an act of desperation—Western euphoria will switch to hysteria.

Soviet policy, whether by design or inadvertence, has returned the diplomatic focal point to Europe—a situation that requires more far-reaching decisions by Moscow than Washington. The time has come for the first comprehensive discussion about the political future of Europe since the outbreak of World War I. The Soviet formula of a European House is too clever by half. After all, it was the projection of Soviet power into the center of Europe that led to the Cold War. For America to leave a European House that includes Russia would bring about the very kind of hegemony that we fought two wars to prevent.

But there is another approach that could dramatically alter the frozen landscape. It would be based on the realization that there are only two solutions for Europe: either both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are present in force, or they both substantially reduce their presence. In that concept, the European House would extend from the Polish-Soviet frontier to the Atlantic, and its core would be a united Western Europe.

A thoughtful exploration of this subject would seek to bring home to Soviet leaders that identifying their security with unpop-

ular regimes only mortgages their policy to the repression of periodic upheavals. In the long run, aren't arrangements in Finland more useful to Soviet security than those in Eastern Europe? Is it possible to devise arrangements that would give the Soviets security guarantees (widely defined) while permitting the peoples of Eastern Europe to choose their own political future? Under such a system, it would be possible to conceive a drastic reduction of all outside forces in Europe—including those of the U.S.—that might revolutionize present concepts of security.

This is not a negotiation that would lend itself to formal diplomacy conducted by coveys of diplomats and technicians. Its initial phase must be highly confidential. It

can only succeed if Europe is an active participant. But it cannot succeed if each European nation acts on its own. Thus it requires rapid progress toward West European integration.

### Asian Perspectives

Gorbachev has made essentially the same appeal in Asia as in Europe: that the United States is dispensable to Asian security. But the impact has been different.

The Asian nations are preoccupied in a manner no longer conceivable in Europe by their relations with each other. They do not look for a transcendent end to international tensions. They will try to assess the trade-off between a decline in Soviet ideological dynamism and a potential increase in Soviet power should perestroika succeed. They will seek to evaluate whether American actions reflect a long-range strategy, a decline in American strength or domestic incoherence. Compared with the Western democracies, the Asian nations have never felt so dependent for security on the United

States, nor as afraid of the Soviet Union. They are therefore not as emotionally absorbed with Gorbachev's personality.

At least since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, China has feared that it could become a victim of the Brezhnev Doctrine—Moscow's claim to maintain doctrinal orthodoxy in the communist world. Now that Moscow is itself preaching reform, the Soviet incentive to impose ideological conformity on China has surely diminished. China will always be wary of the possibility that the Soviets might try to set back Chinese modernization. But that temptation is limited by Moscow's need to maintain its standing elsewhere—at least while it is absorbed in domestic struggles. Too much overt pressure on China would

weaken the Soviet appeal in Western Europe and the United States. The careful calculators in Beijing understand that the Soviets are unlikely to make a direct grab for hegemony. Thus, the price Beijing will be willing to pay for Washington's support will decline. At the same time, it will take care not to be isolated by a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement. It will not want to be the last to man the barricades of the Cold War.

The prospect is for a steady improvement in Sino-Soviet relations—especially as the Soviets meet Chinese conditions, such as encouraging Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. But Chinese planners are not sentimental. They will keep in mind that rapprochement with Moscow cannot shorten the more than 4,000-mile Sino-Soviet frontier. They know that professions of good will are not binding. They will try to improve relations with Moscow without weakening the confidence of the United States, which Beijing will continue to see as necessary to blocking Soviet hegemonial aspirations in Asia or any other attempt to pressure China. China will also continue to be interested in a Europe capable of keeping Soviet attention and resources focused on the West.

The next test for Sino-U.S. relations will be whether the United States can understand and accept Beijing's complex diplomacy. Conservative ideologues frustrated by the waning of the Cold War may be tempted to turn on China. Liberals may resist the idea that helping to preserve China's territorial integrity and assisting in its modernization are essential to maintaining a balance of power. Beijing may compound the problem by misunderstanding American psychology or domestic politics. But wise leaders in China and the United States must act on the premise that both

PHANNAK-SIPA

Careful calculators: Chinese steel complex in Anshan

## Steady progress is likely in Sino-Soviet relations

NEWSWEEK: SEPTEMBER 19, 1988 37

INTERNATIONAL

countries have parallel interests in frustrating hegemonial aspirations from any quarter.

Japan, already an economic superpower, is becoming a major political factor. Though less than 2 percent of its Gross National Product, Japan's military budget is already the third largest in the world. Japan is not likely to be much influenced by the domestic changes in the Soviet Union. Its policy toward Moscow has always been shaped less by the ideological threat of communism than by the Soviet occupation of Japan's four northern islands and by Soviet military power in the Far East. As Japan's military capacity grows, and as America emphasizes burden-sharing, the price Tokyo is prepared to pay for U.S. military protection is bound to decline.

The economic rivalry between the two allies is likely to increase. Japan is certain to conduct a more assertive foreign policy, especially in Asia. The U.S.-Japanese relationship will need careful tending to allow for greater mutual respect and reciprocity.

At the same time, India will play an increasing international role. Its goals are analogous to those of Britain east of Suez in the 19th century—a policy essentially shaped by the Vice-roy's office in New Delhi. It will seek to be the strongest country in the subcontinent, and will attempt to prevent the emergence of a major power in the Indian Ocean or Southeast Asia. Whatever the day-to-day irritations between New Delhi and Washington, India's geopolitical interests will impel it

over the next decade to assume some of the security functions now exercised by the United States. The politicians in New Delhi will not like this, but they are condemned to rivalry with Moscow in the Indian Ocean, and with China and Japan in Southeast Asia, much more than with the target of their rhetoric, the U.S.

In fact, the balance of power in Asia involves the United States less directly than in Europe. For the foreseeable future, the U.S. must be part of the European balance. In Asia, Korea excepted, no American troops are in the front line. In the '90s two balances of power will exist in Asia: between China, Japan and the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia; and between Japan, India and (to some extent) the Soviet Union in Southeast Asia. The American role with respect to these two balances should be similar to Britain's historical stance vis-à-vis the European continent: we are the guarantors of the equilibrium. To maintain these balances, the U.S. must support

the weak against the strong and potential victims against potential aggressors. Such a policy has to be carried out despite the fact that we may not be able to count on our Philippine bases over the next decade, and that we will need to restructure our forces and command arrangements in Korea.

### Regional Issues

Recently the Soviet Union has agreed to withdraw its armed forces from Afghanistan, Vietnam has indicated that it would leave Cambodia by 1989, and Angola has agreed in principle to send home Cuban troops. At a minimum, all this indicates that the Soviet Union has found itself over extended in areas that (with the exception of Afghanistan) were not traditionally identified with Soviet national security. It is

in Afghanistan against each other and exploiting America's short attention span.

Afghanistan is difficult politically: Cambodia is complex morally. The challenge there is not only to block Hanoi's ambitions but to thwart the unspeakable Khmer Rouge from taking over the country. So far, the trauma of Indochina has prevented us and other democracies from translating moral outrage over genocidal practices into adequate support for non-communist forces such as those of Prince Sihanouk. In the absence of such support, the Khmer Rouge are bound to prevail. Or else the anti-Vietnamese coalitions will have to rely on the puppet Vietnamese military force as a counterweight—an absurd situation.

The basic challenge to U.S. foreign policy

is thus conceptual. The emergence of a multipolar world does not diminish America's importance. But it requires us to change the nature of our involvement, at least in some areas. We can no longer do everything simultaneously. We remain the world's hope for freedom, but we must learn to establish priorities and allow other nations to take over some of our present security functions. Hence the need for a new appraisal of the balance of power.

Americans of all persuasions have historically believed that the concept of balance of power is immoral and contributes to international tensions. This is strange, because our domestic political system is based on a balance between the three branches of government. And it is unrealistic, if "burden-shar-

ing" is to progress from a slogan to a policy. Until very recently, America could base its foreign policy on geographic isolation. economic self-sufficiency and military superiority. But modern technology has made distance irrelevant, and nuclear weapons turn superiority into an elusive goal. As for economic power, in 1950 the United States produced 52 percent of all the world's goods and services. Today it produces around 22 percent. That still makes us the world's strongest nation. But we can no longer maintain the balance of power all by ourselves; we must learn to rely on coalitions and equilibrium.

The recent progress on so-called regional conflicts resulted from a favorable local balance of power and the ability to articulate clear objectives. We now need to set comparably realistic objectives and assemble the local power to attain them, or all that has been achieved can again be lost.

Many Americans are restless with foreign policy because it no longer seems to

important, however, to put these successes in perspective. There is a tendency to compare the various agreements to the American experience in Indochina. But in Vietnam the United States not only withdrew, it abdicated. The Soviets will not do that in Afghanistan; nor will Vietnam wash its hands of Cambodia. Neither nation will abandon historic designs on neighboring countries; they will pursue their objectives by more indirect means.

To sustain progress on regional issues will be tricky. Once Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan, Congressional and public support for the resistance will surely decline. The Soviets will increase pressure on Pakistan to adhere to its agreement not to supply arms, and after the death of President Zia Pakistan will be preoccupied with domestic affairs for many months. It will thus be difficult to prevent the Soviet Union from implementing Lenin's dictum of "one step backwards...two steps forward" by playing the various forces

ZINS—BMVG

‘Gusts of nostalgia’: NATO tanks on maneuvers

## The Soviets are promoting a vision of a 'European House'

38 NEWSWEEK: SEPTEMBER 19, 1988

INTERNATIONAL

permit the direct application of our moral
principles. But to meet today's more ambig-
uous, drawn-out challenges requires an
even greater moral commitment than any
effort in our past. This is why America
must work to elaborate a strategic and geo-
political concept. Today, defense policy too
often focuses on procuring weapons for
their own sake, not because they meet a
strategic need. Arms control has become a
liturgical exercise for experts. Alliance
strategy is frozen in patterns developed
during the period of overwhelming West-
ern nuclear superiority. But now all-out
nuclear war risks hundreds of millions of
casualties. Attempts to develop more dis-
criminating, less potentially cataclysmic
options—such as strategic defense or more
precise targeting—are resisted on the one
hand by pacifist groups and on the other by
allies eager to move the theater of devasta-
tion from their own territory to ours. Ulti-
mately, continuation of these trends may
confront the democracies with a choice be-
tween Armageddon and surrender.

In arms control, all experts agree that if
existing arsenals are cut by 50 percent, the
remaining forces will become more vulner-
able—especially on the U.S. side. There is
wide consensus in the Administration that
this vulnerability could be eased by such
measures as developing mobile missiles, re-
ducing the number of warheads on existing
missiles, deploying fewer missiles on each
submarine, or some sort of strategic de-
fense. In the name of arms control, the
Democratic candidate for President op-
poses all these programs needed for arms
control. Nor has the Administration ex-
plained that a responsible arms control pro-
gram will cost more, not less.

Attention is turning to conventional de-
fense, but without a conceptual frame-
work. That makes the democracies vulner-
able to Gorbachev's favorite tactic of
accepting a vague Western idea based more
on domestic politics than long-range strate-
gy. There is a real danger that with a sym-
bolic reduction of their forces in Eastern
Europe, the Soviets could paralyze a seri-
ous Western buildup or a realistic arms
control scheme. What will be NATO's de-
fense strategy after nuclear weapons have
been stigmatized and conventional weap-
ons have been frozen or reduced in a strate-
gically irrelevant manner?

Any catalog of contemporary problems is
bound to look formidable, especially in a
period of dramatic change. But it is impor-
tant to maintain perspective. The chal-
lenges outlined here can almost without
exception be met by changes in policy.
Those of the communist world are structur-
al—a much more difficult predicament.
The United States and its friends are still in
a position to shape their own future. The
challenge is less to divine Gorbachev's pur-
poses than to define our own.

NEWSWEEK: SEPTEMBER 19, 1988 41

31

the unspeakable Khmer Rouge from taking over the country. But so far the trauma of Indochina has prevented us and other democracies from translating moral outrage over the genocidal practices of the Khmer Rouge into adequate support for the non-Communist forces such as those of Prince Sihanouk. In the absence of such a balance of power, the Khmer Rouge are bound to take over. Or else the absurd situation will develop that the anti-Vietnamese coalitions will have to rely on the puppet Vietnamese military force as a counterweight to the Khmer Rouge, --an absurd situation.

A detailed analysis of the regional issues is beyond the scope of this article. They show, however, that the basic challenge to US foreign policy is conceptual. The evolution in Moscow, the change in weapons technology and the emergence of new power centers, whether in power or in potential, have combined to hasten the end of the world war. It has existed in the forty years since the end of the second World War.

The emergence of a multipolar world does not diminish America's importance but requires us to change the nature of our involvement in

34

Many Americans are restless with foreign policy because it no longer seems to permit the direct application of our moral principles. But to shape situations more ambiguous than challenge, even any in our past over a longer period of time requires greater moral commitment than any effort in our past.

This is why America must work systematically on the elaboration of a strategic and geopolitical concept. Today defense policy too often focuses on procuring weapons because own sake, not because they are feasible but which lack a strategic rationale. And arms control has become a liturgical exercise for experts applying abstruse theories which they have elaborated for as many years as the hours available to political leaders who are asked to act on them.

Alliance strategy has been frozen in patterns developed during the period of overwhelming Western nuclear superiority. But new all-out nuclear war risks hundreds of millions of

35

casualties. Attempts to develop more discriminating, hence less cataclysmic options--such as strategic defense or more precise targeting--are resisted on the one hand by pacifist groups and on the other by allies eager to move devastation from their own territories to ours. That must be remedied if we are to avoid the choice between Armageddon and surrender.

In arms control all experts agree that if existing arsenals are cut by 50% the vulnerability of the remaining forces will increase--especially on the US side. There is wide consensus too that this vulnerability could be eased by such measures as developing mobile missiles, reducing the number of warheads on existing missiles, deploying fewer missiles on each submarine and strategic defense. Thus a responsible arms control program will cost more, not less, a fact not yet explained to the public by the Administration. And the Democratic candidate for President opposes every known program

37

departments that specialize in solving day-to-day operational problems. There is no locus for the elaboration of long-range strategy especially since the National Security Council staff degenerated into conducting short-term operations. This overwhelms the Presidency with the favorite schemes of strong-willed Cabinet members who would not put forward their proposals if they lacked plausibility. It has been fashionable to deprecate the role of the national security advisor. But without some focal point in the White House to make sure that all the choices are before him, a new President will be swamped by pet projects without the means to evaluate them. This all the more true because the various departments and agencies are in turn inevitably more focused on day-to-day operations than long-range strategy.

Finally nothing can work unless the Congress and the Executive Branch define their respective functions more clearly.

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ritual; the dominant theme is one of incipient friendship between the West and the Soviet Union, and even of personal friendship between Western leaders and Mikhail Gorbachev. +

[8]

□ Progress has clearly been made on several fronts in East-West negotiations. But a new era cannot be based on ephemeral personalities. To be lasting, it must reflect a number of new, underlying realities: +

[5]

□ dbtGorbachev has started a process within the Soviet Union and across Eastern Europe whose consequences not even he can foretell. The current turmoil is Poland and the ferment in several Soviet republics show that change, once started, generates its own momentum. +

[7]

□ dbtIn the West a comparable momentum will bring about major changes in the political and security relations of the Atlantic Alliance during the next decade. The political structure of Europe-East and West will thus emerge as the central political issue of the '90s. +

[7]

□ dbtThe declining appeal of Communist ide-

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["KISS1", "DEPT.", "PAGE-3", "ology does not eliminate-and may well\nincrease-the threat of historic Russian\nexpansionism.→", "[4]", "□dbtJapan, China and India will grow in\n‘‘‘‘\nstrength and importance, and will have to\nbe integrated into a new international\norder.→", "[4]", "□dbtThe recent progress in regional con-\nflicts-Afghanistan, Cambodia, Southern\nAfrica-has resulted in part from the\nchanged priorities of the superpowers. But\nit would be naive to believe that the Soviet\nUnion has abdicated its interest in these\nregions, and it would be wrong for the Unit-\ned States to pull back from them.→", "[8]", " Rarely are so many factors in flux simul-\ntaneously. There is an extraordinary op-\nportunity to shape a better future with\nimaginative statesmanship. For the first\ntime since World War I, it is possible to\nenvisage a plan to reunite Europe that\nwould have the consent of all its peoples.\nThis would permit the creation of a new\nsecurity arrangement that would sharply\nreduce the armed camps that now confront\neach other in the center of Europe. In Asia,", (((MORE)))))"]

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too, a new equilibrium is emerging. Regional conflicts could become more of a matter of diplomatic and economic competition than military conflict.→

[15]

But a more desirable international order will not appear automatically. Gorbachev will not solve our problems for us; nor is arms control the sole, or even the principal, key to meeting these challenges. If the democracies persist in relying on the most optimistic assumptions about the future, the present tranquility will be just the calm before the storm. The overwhelming need is to create a political framework for dealing with the consequences of foreseeable change.→

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/

Gorbachev's success in overcoming the
Soviet Union's isolation has been astonish-
ing. Many Western leaders, President Rea-
gan included, now emphasize their person-
al relationship with Gorbachev. They
imply that Gorbachev alone is responsible
for the domestic changes apparently tak-
ing place in the Soviet Union, and that
these changes in turn will bring about a
new era of peace.

[1]

True, major, perhaps historic, changes
are under way in the Soviet Union. But it
defies all reason to believe that a man who
has never held any post outside the Soviet
Communist Party (with its doctrine that
history is governed by ``objective factors``)
would approach his colleagues on the Polit-
buro with the proposition that his personal
ties to democratic leaders justified changes
in Soviet policy.

[10]

[10]
((((MORE))))

["KISS2", "DEPT.", "PAGE-2", "For all his panache and intelligence, Gorbachev is to some degree responding to circumstance. The struggle in Moscow is not over democracy, how to achieve a more competitive Soviet Union. This goal requires the weakening of the almost feudal baronies that have become entrenched within the centrally-planned Leninist economy. In all likelihood, another Soviet leader would pursue similar policies, if with less verve and psychological skill. After all, the present phase of Soviet policy was inaugurated during the era of the decrepit Chernenko when Gromyko called on President Reagan at the White House in 1984.", "Even were Gorbachev committed to peace in the Western sense, there is little in the history of either tsars or commissars to supply comfort to the Soviet Union's neighbors. The issue of whether Soviet foreign policy is shaped by Communist ideology or historic Russian expansionism has been debated ever since the Bolshevik revolution. It is impossible to answer. The demands that Molotov made to Hitler in 1940 as a price for Soviet support, that Stalin pursued after the war and that Brezhnev", "[15]", (((MORE)))"]

["KISS2", "DEPT.", "PAGE-3", "carried out in Afghanistan date back to\nimperialist Russia: Soviet domination of\nthe Balkans and the Dardanelles; a major\nvoice in Poland; and Soviet hegemony over\nIran.→", "[17]", "□The role of Communist ideology has been threefold: it has given Soviet leaders an assurance that the tsars lacked; it supplied them with a global cadre of supporters; and it tempted them into distant conflicts in such places as Angola, Cuba, Nicaragua and Indochina that traditional Russian rulers might have given a lower priority. Because it seems less committed to exporting ideology, the Gorbachev regime may be willing to trim distant commitments. But that does not mean the historical Russian agenda in Eurasia has been abandoned. And it is a historic fact that ever since the 17th Century, the frontiers of what was once the Duchy of Muscovy have moved inexorably outward, until the present national boundaries now encompass 11 time zones.→", "□Twice before the West deluded itself by basing its policies on favorable assess-", "[19]", (((MORE))))"]

KISS2

DEPT.

PAGE-4

ments of Soviet leaders: with Stalin in 1944 and with Khrushchev in 1956. I am not making any predictions with respect to Gorbachev. But I consider it dangerous to base East-West relations on the personality of one Soviet leader for several reasons: First, it makes the dialogue inherently unstable, since every new Soviet leader has disavowed the policies of his predecessor. Second, it strengthens neutralist elements that have claimed all along that the Cold War is frivolous and unnecessary. Third, it creates the risk that if Gorbachev leaves office, most likely for internal reasons, the democracies will blame and flagellate themselves.+

[18]

Most importantly, the psychiatric approach could lead to adventurism. In the present circumstances Soviet restraint is not a concession but a prudent course. But it is much easier for a Soviet leader to exploit Western escapism to achieve unilateral gains than to pay the domestic price that genuine reciprocity would exact.+

[8]

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["KISS2", "DEPT.", "PAGE-5", "meaning unless ``help'' is properly defined.\nDoes it imply that we should make agree-\nments that we would not make on their\nmerits? Does it mean that we must accept\nthe Soviet definition of the issues? Should\nwe side with Gorbachev in his internal dis-\nputes. Do we understand them well enough\nto do so? Or do we help him-or other mod-\nerate elements-simply by putting for-\nward a careful assessment of the legitimate\ninterests of both sides, and undertake a\nserious effort to determine whether and\nhow they can be reconciled?+", "It my view, it renders no service to Gorba-\nchev to ascribe Western liberal values to\nhim. The democracies must face the reality\nthat a lasting peace must not depend on\nSoviet leaders. Any other course invites a\nsubtle form of blackmail.", "[15]", (((END)))", "[6]"]

["KISS3\nVER # 00", "DEPT.", "BU:\nPG:", "MWHITA", "HJ: Y 00072 LINES(INCL.HEAD)\nISSUE: ; 88B\nKISS3 -BZ-NWK\nMWHITA ;09/09,11:00", "The Challenge for NATO+", "Unlike Brezhnev, who was above all concerned with safeguarding the status quo in Europe, Gorbachev seems intent on weakening the Western Alliance. Soviet theoretical journals justify peace not so much fro its own sake as to deprive the United States of the Soviet menace as a rallying cry. Taking their cue from their General Secretary's book, Perestroika, Soviet emissions are promoting the vision of a ``European House'' that will extend from the Urals to the Atlantic, providing for European security and safeguarding European civilization against American materialism. The thrust of the Soviet policy is to diminish American influence, if not to excpel us from Europe altogether.", "Gorbachev has already made significant progress in undermining the existing NATO strategy of nuclear deterrence. How", "[1]", "[17]", {"bbox": [761, 1385, 894, 1408], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["KISS3", "DEPT.", "PAGE-2", "often can the phrase ``a nuclear war cannot be won'' and must never be fought'' be repeated in U.S.-Soviet communiqués before the deterrent loses its credibility? How many reductions of nuclear weapons are possible before the strategy of flexible response becomes unfeasible? Step-by-patient-step, the Soviets are gaining a de facto veto over NATO nuclear defense policy. For example, they have already sowed doubts in Europe about the modernization of short-range weapons, which ten years ago the allies accepted without controversy or even comment.", "□Traditionally pro-American groups, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, are beginning to respond to the siren calls from the East. More and more European political candidates journey to Moscow, sometimes even in preference to Washington. Neutralist elements feel vindicated. In a prescient 1982 lecture, the distinguished American historian Gordon Craig warned that historically Germany has felt tied to Central Europe or the East. The German attitude toward the West is ambivalent, he argued, and vulnerable to ``gusts of nostal-", "[17]", (((MORE)))))"]

KISS3

DEPT.

PAGE-3

gia'' for a return to Mitteleuropacheck spelling. I believe
that is now happening.+

I do not expect anything so dramatic as a
German swing to overt neutralism. But
efforts to augment and modernize NATO
forces and to strengthen the cohesion of the
Alliance are already meeting increasing
resistance. Even increased European mili-
tary cooperation may face opposition. We
may soon witness a repetition of the '50s
debate about whether German unity
should take precedence over Western ties.+

According to the current conventional
wisdom, none of this makes any difference
because the Soviets will become so econom-
ically dependent on Western Europe as to
preclude a return to Cold War tensions. But
such dependence is double-edged. It is
equally possible-and more likely-that
some Western leaders will grow so politi-
cally and psychologically dependent on
good relations with Moscow that they will
do anything to avoid the Kremlin's
displeasure.+

(((END)))

[15]

[10]

[12]

KISS4
VER # 00

DEPT.

MWHITA

BU:
PG:

HJ: Y 00128 LINES(INCL.HEAD)
ISSUE: ; 88B
KISS4 -BZ-NWK
MWHITA ;09/09,11:11

/

The Future of Eastern Europe

11111111111111111111111111111111

[1]

For one thing, the Soviet Union is operating from a position of domestic weakness. Over two decades ago, de Gaulle said, "During my lifetime Communist ideology has been personified by many people. Each of these leaders in his turn condemns, excommunicates, crushes and at times kills the others. In any event he fights firmly against the personality cult of the others." At this point, it is impossible to predict whether Gorbachev will prove and exception. What is certain is that he has started a process with an uncertain outcome. The established bureaucracies will not give up their power and their privileges easily. In

[5]

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["KISS4", "DEPT.", "PAGE-2", "an empire of many peoples, decentralization is bound to raise the nationality question. The Soviets have no entrepreneurial tradition to act as a counterweight to central planning, to play the role the middle class did vis-a-vis the aristocracy during the struggle to build a modern state in Europe. The secret police and the military-two of the most potent bureaucracies-may not have spoken their last word.", "Gorbachev's policies are likely to prove particularly unsettling in Eastern Europe. Its ruling parties were imposed by a country that now advertises the corruption and inefficiency of its system. The Gorbachev reforms are thus bound to increase challenges to the legitimacy of the ruling groups in Eastern Europe. No wonder that some of the East European Communist parties-in East Germany particularly, and to a lesser extent in Czechoslovakia-are openly dissociating themselves from the Soviet pattern. The Polish Communist Party, of course, was in trouble even without changes in the Kremlin. But glasnost has clearly helped revive the Solidarity trade union movement.", "[25]", (((MORE))))", "[17]"]