29

B. If the Soviets refused such a scheme we would proceed unilaterally towards our objective. The final size of a single-warhead force would depend on the number of warheads in the Soviet force and on what is needed to assure our invulnerability.

C. The United States would begin deploying MXs starting in 1986; but would be prepared to postpone deployment, if before 1986, the Soviet Union agreed to a schedule by which its SS-18s would be destroyed over a three year period starting in 1986.

D. Both sides would also agree to dismantle the remaining land-based MIRV forces starting in 1990.

E. In that case both sides would agree not to increase the number of warheads on existing MIRVs while they remain in the force.

This approach would be a serious test of Soviet intentions. It would put a conclusive end to the danger

30

of a first strike. It would establish clear equivalence.

It would transcend the SALT and START debate and put
both strategy and arms control in a coherent context.

If refused, it would be a clear signal of a Soviet bid
for superiority; we would draw the appropriate conclusions.

If we proceeded unilaterally, nevertheless, it would
be a major contribution to strategic stability and American
security.

No program can end our defense problems at a stroke.

Indeed, even the achievement of strategic stability only
brings to the fore the pressing need to build up conventional
forces to deter non-nuclear challenges. But examination
of that problem would take place in a new environment.

For all parties would know that they have taken--at last--
the big step towards avoiding nuclear catastrophe. This
is an imperative that humanity demands and reality imposes.

MAR.08 '83 13:04 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

The nomination of a new director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has evoked a major debate in the Senate over whether the Administration is seriously committed to arms control. The controversy misses the real question facing our country: What is the arms control to which the Administration should be committed? Most of the public debate has concerned the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe.

With the German elections behind us that issue is likely to move to a resolution along the lines of the informal discussions between the Soviet and American negotiators last summer.

But even a successful negotiation over European missiles will make only a modest contribution to the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. And here we are trapped in a conceptual crisis: For too long arms control and strategy have been proceeding on separate tracks of increasing incompatible positions. Technology has driven weapons procurement at the same time that it has made

MAR.08 '83 13:05 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.02

irrelevant the traditional doctrines of arms control. The
result has been a stalemate in negotiations, but even more
worrisome, drift and confusion in the public debate.

This article seeks to sketch an approach by which strategy
and arms control can be reconciled and strategic stability
achieved by ending the disproportion between warheads and
launchers which is at the heart of the current strategic
instability.

The Origins of Strategic Arms Control

The very concept of arms control is a legacy of a different
age, the Fifties, when a growing Soviet nuclear arsenal suddenly
threw into doubt the comfortable premises of the age of our
atomic monopoly. For a decade after World War II it had
been complacently assumed that, by means of the "balance of
terror," technology supplied a shortcut to security. We
lost our atomic monopoly only to continue to enjoy an overwhelming
strategic superiority; this led to the Dulles policy of

MAR.08 '83 13:06 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.03

massive retaliation which proposed to counter aggression
by the threat to devastate the Soviet Union. Our margin
was so crushing that the risks of such a course seemed acceptable.
What later became the subject of esoteric controversy was
rarely discussed: What were rational targets for the
apocalyptic arsenal we were assembling? Was it sufficient
to threaten civilian populations or would it eventually become
necessary to destroy military objectives as well, lest the
Soviet Union deliver a devastating counterattack?

The Soviet explosion of hydrogen weapons and the launching
of Sputnik in 1957 ended our complacency. It drove scientists
and students of military affairs to reflect on the implica-
tions of an incipient nuclear stalemate. The prediction
that a stalemate was imminent proved premature; its approach
was nonetheless inexorable. Once it was understood that
general nuclear war threatened both sides with tens of millions
of casualties in a matter of hours, defense policy grew

MAR.08 '83 13:07 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

4

passionately controversial and the very existence of nuclear weapons came to be perceived as a menace. Traditional wars had been sustained by the conviction that the consequences of defeat or surrender were worse than the costs of resistance. For an increasing number the nuclear age undermined that judgment. It became increasingly difficult to imagine consequences more horrendous than the devastation of an all-out nuclear war. At a minimum, fewer and fewer objectives seemed worth the cost or the risk.

One result has been the growing determination to stabilize and ideally to reverse the arms race by reciprocal agreement. To be sure history has offered little cause for optimism, all previous disarmament efforts having failed disastrously. But there were at least two unprecedented aspects to the nuclear arms race. The destructiveness of the weapons sets an upper limit beyond which additions to destructiveness become more and more marginal. At the same time, the complex

MAR.08 '83 13:08 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.05

5

technology of the nuclear age raises specters of automaticity
that might elude rational control. For if one side should
succeed in destroying the retaliatory force of its adversary,
it would then be in a position to impose its terms. That
danger in turn might tempt a first "preemptive" strike--
or to launch its weapons on warning. Proponents of arms
control thus saw the elimination of the possibility of surprise
attack as their preeminent objective.

The focus of the then new-fangled theory was to reduce
vulnerability by an agreement to a formula of symmetrical
numbers of strategic forces. If neither side could hope
to destroy its opponent the incentive for surprise attack
on military targets would disappear; and there would be no
point in striking at civilian targets in the face of the
certainty of intolerable retribution. This was the intellectual
basis of the strategic arms limitation talks proposed first
by President Johnson and implemented by President Nixon.

P.06

So long as missiles had single warheads and airplanes needed hours to reach their targets this approach was in fact valid. A surprise attack would require a huge numerical preponderance--an advantage of at least two to one in numbers of missiles. (Even with highly accurate missiles it is generally assumed that an attacker would not risk a first strike unless he had available two warheads for each target to allow for malfunctioning, hardening of the target or errors in accuracy.) Long-range bombers, so the theory went, would not affect that ratio because they would take so long to reach their target that the victim would have plenty of time to launch his missiles.

In these circumstances numerically equal retaliatory forces were rightly conceived to provide an adequate insurance against surprise attack. The precise total seemed almost a mathematical problem. It should be large enough so that it could be overcome only by a violation of the

MAR.08 '83 13:09 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

7

agreement too large to be hidden from each side's intelligence
capability. Yet it should involve a ceiling that would stop
the accumulation of weapons of mass distribution. The two
goals would in fact be closely linked. During 1969 and 1970
the Nixon Administration in fact undertook painstaking studies
in pursuit of this concept. They sought to determine the
level--weapon by weapon--at which a strategically significant
violation could not be concealed from our intelligence
capabilities. (There was no illusion that we could detect
every last violation no matter how small; we sought to make
sure to have a foolproof system to find violations that might
threaten the survival of our retaliatory forces.)

The upshot was the SALT agreements of 1972. These severely
limited antiballistic missile defenses on both sides to remove
any temptation on the part of an aggressor that a surprise
attack could reduce a counterblow to levels manageable by
his defenses. The agreements also froze the number of

MAR.08 '83 13:10 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

8

offensive missiles for five years at the levels reached by
the unilateral building programs of both sides. This gave
the Soviets a numerical edge in missiles--though not nearly
enough for a surprise attack with single warheads. More
important, the Soviet advantage in missile launchers was
counterbalanced by two factors. First, we had a very large
and growing advantage in warheads since only we possessed
MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles).
And, second, there was no limitation on long-range bombers
of which we had an insurmountable lead.

The SALT agreements of 1972 might well have achieved
the objective of strategic stability but for three factors
which made the accords increasingly controversial and in
time technologically irrelevant. The first two were political.
The Vietnam war and Watergate disintegrated the political
consensus behind our defense and arms control policy at the
precise moment when technology was undermining its strategic

MAR.08 '83 13:11 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.09

premises. Almost every new weapons system proposed in the Seventies had to run a gauntlet of increasingly bitter criticisms. The objections were usually given a technical cast on two major, somewhat contradictory grounds; that existing weapons were adequate or else that we should wait for newer and better weapons coming along years hence. The real objection was philosophical and grew out of the climate of collapsing confidence. It was the fear that the only way to keep our government from using nuclear weapons was to deprive it of all alternatives to the most devastating and suicidal strategy. Paradoxically, groups usually associated with humane views came to advocate strategies geared solely to the destruction of the Soviet population. Any additional capacity beyond this level was ridiculed as overkill--never mind that the targeting of civilians guaranteed mutual annihilation.

The other end of the spectrum disdained the proposition that we lived in a new world. It insisted that a significant

MAR.08 '83 13:12 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

10

strategic superiority was still attainable, that any arms
control was both a trap and a delusion. At the least, it
was argued, an unconstrained arms race would bankrupt the
Soviet Union.

The resulting debate overwhelmed the pressing need to
formulate an appropriate strategy in arguments about individual
weapons systems, each of which was passionately attacked
or defended as a surrogate for larger concerns. SALT I, at
first widely acclaimed, was drawn into that vortex. SALT
II never emerged from it. Advocates of arms control oversold
its significance and sometimes belittled the extent to which
it was being overtaken by technology. Opponents focussed
on whatever debating point proved handy. The numerical "advantage"
that SALT I allegedly gave the Soviets became a war cry for
critics who overlooked that it was self-imposed; the agreed
totals reflected exactly the level the Pentagon had chosen
long before there was any thought of arms control. Also

MAR.08 '83 13:13 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

11

overlooked was that the alleged "inequality" applied only
to launchers not to warheads or bombers in which our advantage
remained substantial and indeed grew during the SALT I period.

The debate over the number of delivery vehicles obscured
the reality that multiple warheads were making the traditional
SALT approach obsolete. In SALT I a balance between the
delivery vehicles of the two sides reduced substantially
the possibility of surprise attack. But multiple warheads
restored the advantage of the attacker. As the Seventies
progressed and the MIRV arsenals multiplied the number of
delivery vehicles, compared to the number of warheads aimed
at it, grew smaller and smaller. An arms race with MIRVs
classified by the attacker.

Fairness compels me to point out that the decision to
proceed with MIRVs was taken by President Johnson and was
made irrevocable in the Nixon Administration. We proceeded
because in the climate of the Vietnam period we were reluctant

MAR.08 '83 13:14 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

12

to give up the one strategic program with which to counter
the rapid build-up of the Soviet missile force with no prospect
of an alternative; because we doubted that the Soviets could
achieve accuracies to threaten our missile force in the foreseeable
future and because the Soviets turned a cold shoulder to
our half hearted efforts to open the subject in the SALT
talks. Whatever our reasons, there can be no doubt that
the age of MIRVs has doomed the SALT approach.

The controversy over whether arms control was a boon
or a trap left defense policy increasingly at the mercy of
the exploding public concern about the dangers of nuclear
war. No democratic leader can govern any longer without
demonstrating to his public his devotion to peace. The Reagan
Administration learned soon after coming into office that
the assault on what it called the "fatally flawed" SALT II
treaty made for better campaign rhetoric than foreign policy.
It compromised on the strange course of observing but not

MAR.08 '83 13:15 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

ratifying SALT II. In recent months Administration rhetoric
has been brought in line with public and alliance realities.
It has been extravagant in proclaiming its devotion to seeking
arms control and there is no reason to doubt its sincerity.
The challenge it faces is to resolve the intellectual problem
of the nature of strategic stability in a world of thousands
of multiple warheads--a revolution which stymied both of
its immediate predecessors.

The Present Dilemma

The real "flaw" of the SALT approach has been to express
limitations in terms of numbers of delivery vehicles at the
precise moment that the increase in the accuracy and number
of 'warheads increasingly caused numerical "equivalence" to
be beside the point. With each side possessing the capability
(the Soviets' actual, ours latent) of making its opponent
vulnerable, arms control after a decade of negotiations had
returned to its starting point.

P.14

14

This problem cannot be solved by the deep reductions
in delivery vehicles which many critics in the Seventies
urged as an alternative to SALT. So long as the disproportion
between warheads and launchers remained unimpaired reductions
were either irrelevant to the danger of surprise attack or
perversely increased it. The greater the reductions the
fewer would be the targets that had to be destroyed in a
first strike; the simpler became the calculations of an attacker.

This is well illustrated by President Reagan's Eureka
College speech of May 9, 1982, which contains the basic American
proposal for the strategic arms reduction talk. (START)
It was an advance over an uncontrolled arms race because
it set a ceiling. It was an advance over SALT in relating
the ceiling to warheads rather than launchers. And it stressed
significant mutual reductions of strategic forces rather
than a balance near the existing levels. It was a brave
first attempt that unfortunately avoided the root issue of

MAR.08 '83 13:16 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

15

multiple warheads. Even were the Soviets to accept our proposal (a contingency the design of their forces makes highly improbable) the Eureka scheme would worsen rather than ease our dangers. A quick glance at the numbers involved--tedious but perhaps necessary--illustrates the problem:

Under the provisions of SALT II about 5000 Soviet landbased warheads would be aimed at 1054 American launchers--a ratio of a little less than 5 to 1. The Eureka proposal would worsen this ratio even as it reduces the permitted warheads to 2500 on at most 400 launchers. Even were it technically feasible to distribute warheads in this manner (and the Soviets would have to redesign their entire strategic force to do so) this would give the side striking first an advantage of warheads of a little better than 6 to 1. And at these lower numbers of launchers an attack would be far more calculable.

MAR.08 '83 13:17 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

At the same time, the Eureka proposal would establish
limits of 2500-3000 seabased warheads. This would force a
reduction of our submarine force from the 42 permitted under
SALT to 15 or less (depending on what type of boat we use).
In those conditions we could keep at most 10 boats at sea
as against the current 25-30. If there are any advances
in anti-submarine warfare technology--as is probable--arms
control will have increased the vulnerability of both our
underwater and our landbased strategic forces; the supreme
irony.

The Soviet proposal of a flat 25 percent reduction in
launchers while simpler suffers from the identical disability
of failing to come to grips with the problem of vulnerability.

In short, a negotiation begun over a decade ago in quest
of stability is in danger of achieving the opposite and heading
for an intellectual dead end.

MAR.08 '83 13:18 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

17

Where Do We Go From Here?

We thus face two related tasks: First, arms control requires not so much a new proposal as a fresh concept. Second, arms control must become an organic part of defense policy.

This requires that we return to first principles. The principal cause of instability of current weapons systems is the disproportion between warheads and launchers. All the remedies that have been tried are vulnerable to technology; hardening to accuracy, seabased systems to advances in anti-submarine technology. The only intellectually adequate solution is to seek to eliminate multiple warheads within a fixed time period, say ten years.

Obviously, this requires both sides to be prepared to redesign their strategic forces within that time span. Given the inertia of military bureaucracies--especially on the Soviet side--this may seem an unattainable objective. But

MAR.08 '83 13:19 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

18

sometimes an impasse can be broken only by a daring departure;
surely the seven years of nitpicking SALT negotiations and
controversy offers little hope for the traditional approach.
And there is a strong incentive to proceed for without it
the landbased forces of both sides will soon be totally vulnerable.

Fortunately, technology is compatible with the objective.
According to published literature it is possible to develop
a mobile missile that could be significantly protected in
a heavily armored cannister. Its mobility alone could complicate
the task of the attacker. Moreover, the new missile could--
and should--be equipped with a single warhead. With strategic
forces of such design numerical limits would be both simple
to establish and far more significant than under SALT II
or START.

Once we decided on such an approach we could proceed
with it either as part of an arms control agreement with
the Soviet Union or we could implement it unilaterally as

MAR.08 '83 13:20 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

19

part of our defense policy.

For example, the United States could propose to the
Soviet Union to reduce and transform the strategic arsenals
of both sides to a low number of single warhead missiles
over a ten year period. The totals should be set at the
lowest number that could be monitored by existing intelligence
capabilities; that is, at a level where a violation significant
enough to overturn it could not be hidden. This number may
well be as low as 500; at any rate, the number of warheads
in this scheme would be only a small fraction of current
totals. The permitted missiles could be mobile or fixed in
silos; the choice would be left to each side. Mobility would
reduce the incentive of surprise attack even further; but
equivalence at low numbers of single warhead missiles would
in any event, assure considerable stability.

This course does not depend on Soviet agreement. It
should be pursued--and would contribute to arms control--
whatever the Soviet reaction. If the Soviets refused our

MAR.08 '83 13:21 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

LY

20

proposal, the United States could announce that after a date,
for example 1990--or earlier if the new missile can be
developed by then--it would deploy no more MIRVed landbased
intercontinental missiles but would emphasize single warhead
launchers; the majority of them mobile. The size of that
force would be an automatic function of the number of warheads
deployed by the Soviets; we would reserve the right to match
each Soviet warhead with single warhead missiles; in practice,
we would probably choose a number that could survive the
maximum Soviet attack that could be launched against it.
As our MIRVed missiles grow obsolescent we would gradually
phase them out. If the Soviets agreed to a formal arms control
proposal, schedules for the destruction of existing MIRVs
would be negotiated. If they refused, we should stop the
charade that stability can be achieved by negotiation; we
would then rely on the unilateral build-up of single warhead
missiles to a level consummate with the security of our forces.

MAR.08 '83 13:22 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

21

The Soviets could always put a ceiling on our deployment
by cutting down the number of their warheads.

This scheme should pose no insurmountable verification
problems. Fixed launchers can be detected through national
technical means; existing Soviet MIRVed ICBMs could not be
made mobile; development of a new mobile MIRVed ICBM would
require extensive testing, which could be detected and would
therefore be proscribed. Mobile single warhead missiles
would be more difficult to detect; this is why agreed numbers
would have to be sufficiently large so that they could be
overcome only by a violation we are confident our means of
detection would not miss. The "counting rule" for the new
missiles would be straightforward. Only missiles tested
with newer MIRV warheads would count towards the agreed ceiling.

No one can predict how the rigid bureaucratic Soviet
leadership would react to such an approach. It may run counter
to too many vested interests. And the new leadership may

MAR.08 '83 13:23 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

22

be too dependent on military support to challenge its military/
industrial complex. But, if the Soviets are interested in
stability and in easing the economic burden of the arms race
they should--probably only on second thought--study this
scheme with great care. Like the Eureka approach it requires
them to reduce their forces; but unlike the Eureka approach
it reduces their vulnerability. And upon reflection, the
Soviets must realize that over a historical period, one
way or another, we will cure the invulnerability of our
forces and in the process will almost surely enhance the
vulnerability of their own.

If the Soviets refuse any discussion of such a proposal
one of three conclusions are inescapable:

a) that the momentum of their arms program is an inherent
threat to strategic superiority.

b) that their leadership believes strategic edges can
be translated into political advantages.

MAR.08 '83 13:24 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.23

C) that arms control to the Soviets is an aspect of political warfare whose aim is not reciprocal stability but a unilateral advantage for the Soviet Union.

Where does this leave the MX? A Presidential Commission soon to report is studying the technical and military aspects of that issue. I will confine myself to the arms control aspects. There are two. Whether the United States should have a counterforce capability or confine its forces to civilian and industrial targets. Secondly, whether mutual invulnerability is advanced by unilateral American renunciation of any counter-force capability.

With respect to the issue of whether we should confine our targeting to civilian or industrial targets no serious government can possibly sustain so nihilistic an approach. A policy of undiscriminating civilian slaughter is not a national tool but the route to unilateral disarmament; no responsible advocate of such a policy would be prepared to

MAR.08 '83 13:25 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

24

implement it in practice, nor should he be.

Similarly, it would be a dangerous abdication to identify stability with a so-called balance whereby the Soviets are able to destroy our landbased forces and we renounce the acquisition of a much smaller comparable capacity. If the United States guarantees the invulnerability of Soviet missile forces unilaterally even while the Soviets insist on keeping ours exposed, any Soviet incentive for serious negotiation on strategic stability will vanish. A secure Soviet first strike capability will involve the risk of its use in as yet unforeseeable circumstances--the even greater danger of an increased Soviet willingness to run risks in crisis situations.

What level of MX deployment would be appropriate and in what basing mode is beyond the scope of this article. Obviously, it should be as unprovocative as possible. But in picking a level we should keep in mind that the 100 MX missiles

MAR.08 '83 13:26 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

proposed by President Reagan in the ill-fated dense pack
proposal represented a 50% cut of the Carter program which,
in turn, represented a reduction of what the Ford Administration
envisaged--clearly not an end in itself.

The MX, like the new single warhead missile, should
be an organic part of an arms control strategy. To this
end we should offer to postpone the MX deployment if the
Soviets agreed to destroy their MIRVed SS-18s (the Soviet
heavy missile) according to an agreed schedule over a three
year period starting in 1986, and to abandon the missile
altogether once the dismantling of the SS-18 is completed.

This analysis has been confined to landbased missiles.
Were the Soviets to show interest in such a scheme, account
would have to be taken of seabased forces. Just as we cannot
be asked to ratify our own vulnerability in landbased force,
the Soviets should not be expected to accept submarine launched
missiles as an escape hatch for surprise attack. The problem

MAR.08 '83 13:27 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

26

is less acute because seabased forces are not aimed at each other as landbased forces are; nor are the weapons as yet sufficiently accurate. Still, we should be prepared to apply the same principles to seabased forces. We should be prepared to go to single warheads as part of an agreement, though over a longer period of time. In that case, the submarines would have to be redesigned, becoming smaller and less expensive.

It would be too risky to put so many eggs in one basket, as is the case with the current Trident class, each of which carries 24 missiles. And a new regimen would be required as well for heavy bombers.

The deployment/arms control scheme would then look as follows:

A. US would make a strategic decision to shift to single warhead missiles as soon as possible. Ideally, this decision would be reflected in an agreed ceiling at a very low number-- perhaps 500, negotiated with the Soviets. In case of agreement,

MAR.08 '83 13:28 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.27

there should be a limit on throwweight to prevent the
development of huge single warhead weapons.

B. If the Soviets refused such a scheme we would proceed unilaterally towards our objective. The final size of a single warhead force would depend on the number of warheads in the Soviet force.

D. Both sides would also agree to dismantle the remaining
landbased MIRV forces starting in 1990.

E. The United States would commit itself not to deploy
any further landbased MIRVs after 1990.

This approach would be a serious test of Soviet intentions.
It would put a conclusive end to the danger of a first strike.

MAR.08 '83 13:32 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES, WASH. DC

P.01

28

It would establish clear equivalence. It would transcend
the SALT and START debate and put both strategy and arms
control in a new and for once coherent context. If refused,
it would be a clear signal of Soviet aggressive intentions.
If we proceed unilaterally, nevertheless, it would be a major
contribution to strategic stability.

No program can end our defense problems at a stroke.
Indeed, a more coherent answer to the nuclear issue would
force us to face up to the implications of strategic stalemate
for regional defense and, in particular, on the pressing
need to build up conventional forces to deter non-nuclear
challenges. But that examination would take place in a new
environment. For all parties would know that they have taken--
at last--the big step towards avoiding nuclear catastrophe
that humanity demands and reality imposes.

[y]

20

whatever the Soviets did. If the Soviets agreed to that
perpetual approach, schedules for the destruction of existing MIRVs
would be negotiated. If they refused, we would stop the
pretense that stability can be achieved by arms control; we
would then rely on the unilateral build-up of single warhead
missiles to a level consumant with the security of our
forces. The Soviets could always put a ceiling on our deployment
by cutting down the number of our warheads. This scheme
Should pose no insurmountable verification problems.

Fixed launchers can be detected through national technical
means; existing Soviet MIRVed ICBMs could not be made
mobile, development of a new mobile MIRVed IBCM would
require extensive testing, which could be detected.

Where does this leave the MX? The arguments against
it have become familiar: that it is unnecessary since we
already possess "overkill" capacity that it is destabilizing
since it gives us a "counterforce" capability to destroy Soviet
landbased missiles. The claim of overkill is the application
of the apocalyptic view that nuclear weapons must

10

Paradoxically, devastating and suicidal strategy. Groups usually associated with more progressive and humane views came to advocate the most bloodthirsty strategies geared solely to the destruction of a large percentage of the Soviet population. Any addition beyond this level was ridiculed as overkill. Discriminating targeting was either ridiculed or vilified, never mind that the targeting of civilians guaranteed mutual annihilation.

On the other side of the spectrum many weapons technologists and conservative spokesmen disdained the proposition that we lived in a new world. In an unprecedented era. They insisted that strategic superiority was still attainable, although we both a trip + an addition. and assumed that additions to the nuclear arsenal could be translated more or less automatically into political advantage. At the least, some of them argued, an unconstrained arms race would bankrupt the Soviet Union.

whatever the Soviets did. If the Soviets agreed to arms control a final proposal, schedules for the destruction of existing MIRVs would be negotiated. If they refused, we would stop the pretense that negotiation stability can be achieved by arms control; we would then rely on the unilateral build-up of single warhead missiles to a level consumant with the security of our forces. The Soviets could always put a ceiling on our deployment by cutting down the number of their warheads. They would have an incentive, however, to adopt single warhead missiles. For, if the insisted on MIRVs at equal number of warheads, their force would be far more vulnerable than ours.

The "country mile" for the new problems. Fixed launchers can be detected through national technical means; existing Soviet MIRVed ICBMs could not be made mobile, nor could they be detected by radar. Development of a new mobile MIRVed ICBM would require extensive testing, which could be detected and would therefore be proscribed.

Testing, which could be detected and would therefore be proscribed, is not agreed upon. It is agreed that a number of missiles would be sufficiently large to take any chance strike.

Where does this leave the MX? The arguments against it have been studied and considered. It is believed that the technical and military experts are familiar with the technical aspects of this matter. I will now state my own views on the "overkill" capacity that it is destabilizing since it gives us a "counterforce" capability to destroy Soviet landbased missiles. It is advanced by the intellectual American military that the claim of overkill is the application of the apocalyptic view if any counterforce capability.

If any counterforce capability, it is argued, the issue of whether we should unfire our targeting aircraft or industrial targets.

3/2/83

The nomination of a new director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency is likely to evoke a major debate
in the Senate over the Administration's commitment
to arms control. The inquiry into the seriousness of the
Administration seems to me to beg the real question:
What is the arms control to which the Administration
should be committed? A case can be made for the proposition
that in the end the crisis in arms control is conceptual and
that neither side in the debate has come close to resolving it.
The old purposes and slogans have been made nearly irrelevant
by revolutions in technology and new ones have yet to
take their place.

The Origin and Theory of Strategic Arms Control

The concept of arms control is a legacy of that
period of the Fifties when a growing Soviet nuclear
arsenal suddenly threw into doubt the comfortable premises

2

of the postwar period. Until then matters followed
a course compatible with our predisposition to believe
that technology would supply a shortcut to security.
Our atomic monopoly was succeeded by overwhelming strategic
superiority; but the policy of massive retaliation
proposed to counter aggression by the threat to devastate
the Soviet Union at acceptable risk to ourselves. Our
margin seemed to crushing that what later became the
subject of esoteric controversy was rarely discussed:
What were rational targets for the apocalyptic arsenal we
were assembling? Was it sufficient to threaten civilian
populations or was it necessary as well to destroy
military objectives?

The Soviet explosion of hydrogen weapons and
the launching of Sputnik ended this particular
complacency. By the late Fifties, many scientists
and students of military affairs, including myself,
began to reflect on the implications of an incipient

nuclear stalemate. We were premature in our
prediction of its imminence but not in our judgement
about what ultimately lay ahead. When nuclear war
threatened tens of millions of casualties on both sides
in a matter of hours, defense policy was bound to become
controversial and weapons technology itself would
inevitably be perceived as a menace. Traditional
wars had been sustained by the conviction that the
consequences of defeat or surrender were worse than
the costs of resistance. For many the nuclear age
destroyed that equation. It has become increasingly
difficult to imagine consequences more horrendous than
the devastation of an all-out nuclear war. At a
minimum fewer and fewer objectives seemed worth
the cost or the risk.

The most novel result has been the growing determination
to stabilize and hopefully to reverse the arms race

4

by the deliberate decision of the governments engaged
in it. For there are at least two unprecedented aspects
to the nuclear arms race. The destructiveness of the
weapons sets an upper limit beyond which additions to
destructiveness grow more and more marginal; the nature
of superiority has become elusive. At the same time
nuclear arms have raised the danger of an automaticity
of response possibly eluding rational control. For if
one side should succeed in destroying the retaliatory
force of its adversary it would then be in a position to
impose its terms. That danger in turn might induce the
opponent to strike first--to preempt--or to launch its
weapons on warning-when it suspected an attack was
about to be launched. It followed that proponents of the
new theory of arms control saw in the elimination of the
possibility of surprise attack as their preeminent
objective.

5

At first this concept developed in universities and think tanks. The government paid little attention. But since it supplied no alternative it found itself pressed by public clamor and the desire to avoid a stalemate into embracing first the principle of arms control and then the only conceptual scheme in existence. The work of think tanks and universities in the Fifties provided the intellectual basis of the strategic arms limitation talks proposed first by President Johnson and implemented by President Nixon. The purpose was to make strategic forces less vulnerable by agreeing in symmetrical numbers. This would eliminate the incentive for surprise attack on military targets; and there would be no point in striking at civilian targets in the face of the certainty of intolerable retribution.

fact valid. A surprise attack would require a huge
numerical preponderance--an advantage of at least two
to one in numbers of missiles. (Even with highly
accurate missiles it is generally assumed that an
attacker would not risk a first strike unless he had
available two warheads for each target to allow for
malfunctioning, hardening of the target or errors
in accuracy.) Bombers would not improve that ratio
because they would take so long to reach the target that
the intended victim would have plenty of time to launch
his missiles.

In these circumstances roughly equal retaliatory
forces were rightly conceived to provide an adequate
insurance against surprise attack. The precise level
seemed almost a mathematical problem. It should be
large enough so that it could be overcome only by a
violation too large to be hidden. Yet it should involve

7

a ceiling that would stop the accumulation of armaments.

The two goals would in fact be closely linked. If the level of arms was correctly chosen there would be no incentive for violation and no benefit from spiraling totals.

During 1969 and 1970 the Nixon Administration undertook painstaking studies to implement this concept.

An attempt was made to determine the level--weapon by weapon--at which a strategically significant violation could not be hidden from our intelligence capabilities.

(The goal was not the impossible one of preventing *any* violation; only those that could threaten the survival of our retaliatory forces).

The upshot was the SALT agreements of 1972. The accords severely limited anti ballistic missile defenses on both sides to remove the temptation that a surprise attack could reduce a counterblow to levels containable

by defensive weapons. They froze the number of offensive missiles for five years at the levels reached by the unilateral building programs of both sides. This gave the Soviets a numerical edge of some three hundred missiles--not enough for a surprise attack with single warheads especially at the then-existing accuracy. More important, the Soviet edge in delivery vehicles was counterbalanced by a very large and growing United States advantage in warheads since only we possessed MIRV's Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicles at the time; nor were the Soviets expected to deploy a significant number of them before the expiration date of the agreement in 1977. And there were no limitations on heavy long-range bombers of which we had an insurmountable lead.

The SALT agreements of 1972 would in fact have achieved the objective of strategic stability but for

[y]

9

three factors which made them both controversial and in
time technologically irrelevant. The first two were
political. The Vietnam war and Watergate disintegrated
the political consensus behind our defense policy
at the precise moment when technology was undermining
its strategic premises. A vocal group of critics
adopted the view that America could be kept from over-
extending itself only if it were deprived of the military
capacity to do so. Almost every new weapons system
proposed in the Seventies had to run a gauntlet
of increasingly bitter criticisms. All were attacked
on two major, peculiarly contradictory grounds; that
existing weapons were adequate for the job or else that we
should wait for some newer and better weapons years hence.
The climate of collapsing confidence produced the fear
that our government could be kept from using nuclear
weapons only by giving it no alternative to the most

10

On the other side of the spectrum many weapons technologists and conservative spokesmen disdained the proposition that we lived in an unprecedented era. They insisted that strategic superiority was still attainable and assumed that additions to the nuclear arsenal could be translated more or less automatically into political advantage. At the least, some of them argued, an unconstrained arms race would bankrupt the Soviet Union.

11

In the resulting debate symbolism overwhelmed substance. The pressing need to formulate an appropriate strategy was submerged by arguments about individual weapons systems, each of which was passionately attacked or defended as a surrogate for larger concerns. SALT I hailed at first with widespread relief was drawn into that vortex. SALT II never emerged from it. Advocates of arms control oversold its significance and sometimes belittled the extent to which it was being overtaken by technology. Opponents focussed on whatever debating point proved handy. The numerical "advantage" SALT I allegedly gave the Soviets became a whipping boy for critics who conveniently overlooked that the agreed totals reflected exactly the level we had considered appropriate *before* there was an agreement. And that it applied only to numbers of launchers not to warheads in which our advantage remained substantial and indeed good.

12

In the process it proved impossible to settle the
crucial debate over what our strategic forces were supposed
to achieve and what alternatives we would create as massive
retaliation lost its credibility. It was logical to
favor arms control as a solution, it was at least at first
much less obvious that the age of multiple warheads was making
the traditional SALT approach obsolete. Delivery vehicles
mattered in SALT I because they were allied to single
warheads, hence a balance between them reduced substantially
the possibility of surprise attack. But multiple warheads
restored the advantage of the attacker. As the Seventies
progressed and MIRV arsenals grew on both sides each
side acquired many more warheads than it had missiles;
each delivery vehicle had a growing number of
warheads aimed at it. A first strike became again
possible. SALT II became divisively controversial.

The debate between those who did not think this
change altered the premises of either our strategy or our

13

SALT approach and opponents who questioned both was fueled
within a few years by a growing public concern about the
dangers of nuclear war. Political campaigns--especially
in the primaries--might be hospitable to tough sounding
rhetoric at least in the United States. But no democratic
leader can govern any longer without demonstrating his
devotion to peace to his public. The Reagan Administration
learned soon after coming into office that the assault
on what it called the "basically flawed" SALT II treaty
made for better campaign rhetoric than foreign policy. It
adopted the strange course of observing but not ratifying
SALT II, thereby giving the Soviets three hundred extra
delivery vehicles which would have to be destroyed if the
treaty were ratified. In recent months Administration
rhetoric has been brought in line with public realities. It
has been fulsome in proclaiming its devotion to seeking
arms control. There is no reason to doubt its sincerity.

14

What is open to question is whether the Administration
has yet solved the intellecutal problem of a world of
multiple warheads and fewer missiles which stymied
both of its immediate predecessors.

The Present Dilemma

Arms control negotiations since 1972 have continued
along traditional lines. Limitations have been expressed
in terms of numbers of delivery vehicles. But the increase
in the accuracy and number of warheads would soon make
numerical "equivalence" beside the point. Within the
near future the US landbased force of Minuteman Intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles would be vulnerable; the
Soviet force would be in the same condition as soon as
we deployed an adequate number of the new MX missiles.
After a decade of arms control negotiations, we were
nearly back at the starting point; that and not the
esoteric exagesis of the text-was the real "flaw" of
SALT II.

15

Nor was this problem solved by the deep reductions
in delivery vehicles which had been urged by many critics
of SALT in the Seventies as an alternative. So long as
the disproportion between warheads and launchers remained
unimpaired reductions were either irrelevant to the danger
of surprise attack or else _increased_ it. The greater
the reductions the fewer would be the targets that had
to be destroyed in a first strike; the simpler became
the calculations of an attacker.

This is well illustrated by President Reagan's Eureka
College speech of May 9, 1982, which contains the basic American
proposal for the strategic arms reduction talks (START).
For the first time it stressed significant mutual reductions
of strategic forces rather than a balance near the
existing levels. Unfortunately even were the Soviets
to accept our proposal (a contingency the design of their
forces makes highly improbable) the Eureka scheme would
worsen rather than ease our dangers. A quick glance at

16

the numbers involved--however tedious this may seem--
illustrates the problem:

Under SALT II about 5000 Soviet warheads would be
aimed at 1054 American launchers--a ratio of little less than
5 to 1. In addition the United States could keep its
existing force of 42 missile-launching submarines.

Under the Eureaka proposal each side would be limited
to a maximum of 2500 warheads on at most 400 landbased
missiles. Even were it technically feasible to distribute
warheads in this manner ( and the Soviets would have to
redesign their entire strategic force to do so) this would
give the side striking first an advantage of warheads of
a little better than 6 to 1. In other words the Soviet
ratio against us would improve by 20% and the US ratio
against the Soviet force by some 400% (from 1.5 to 1 to
6 to 1). And at lower numbers of launchers the attack
would be more calculable. At the same time, the limit

17

of 2500 seabased warheads would force a reduction of our
submarine force from 42 to 15 or so (depending on what type of
boat we use). In those conditions we could keep at most
10 boats as sea as against the current 25-30. If there
are any advances in anti-submarine technology--as is probable--
arms control will have increased the vulnerability of both
our sea-based _and_ landbased strategic forces.

The Soviet proposal of flat 25 percent reduction in
launchers while simpler suffers from identical disabilities.

In short, strategic arms control ______ designed to
increase security is achieving the opposite result, it is
in fact heading for an intellectual dead end.

Where Do We Go From Here?

We thus face two related tasks: First of all, arms
control requires not so much a new proposal as a fresh
concept. Second, strategy must be related to arms control;
indeed it should be the reverse side of it.

It is essential to return to first principles.

18

The chief element of instability with the current weapons system is the disproportion between warheads and launcher. The objective of arms control negotiations with the Soviets should therefore be to eliminate MIRV's within a fixed time period say ten years.

This requires a willingness to redesign the strategic forces of both sides in that time span. Fortunately, technology favors this objective, for without such a new approach both sides will become increasingly vulnerable. The published literature has revealed that it is possible to develop a mobile single warhead missile that could be significantly protected (that is hardened). And its mobility alone could complicate the task of the attacker.

With single warhead missiles numerical limits would be both simple to establish and far more significant than under SALT II or START. The United States would, for example, propose that the strategic arsenals of both sides be reduced over a ten year period to a low number of single warhead missiles.

19

missiles (say 3-500) or a reduction by 75-80 percent of
existing warheads. The permitted missiles could be
mobile or fixed; the choice would be left to each side.
Mobility would reduce the incentive of surprise attack
even further; but equivalence at low numbers of single-
warhead missiles would in any event assure considerable
stability.

Nor does this course require Soviet approval. In
fact it should be pursued--and would contribute to
arms control--whatever the Soviet reaction. The United
States could announce that after 1990--or at an
earlier date if mutually agreed--it would deploy no more
MIRVed landbased intercontinental missiles but would
emphasize single warhead launchers; the majority of them
mobile. The size of that force would depend on the number
of warheads deployed by the Soviets; we would reserve the right
to match Soviet warheads with launchers. As we built up our
mobile missile force, we would begin phasing out the MIRVs

20

whatever the Soviets did. If the Soviets agreed to arms control proposal, schedules for the destruction of existing MIRVs would be negotiated. If they refused, we would stop the pretense that stability can be achieved by arms control; we would then rely on the unilateral build-up of single warhead missiles to a level consonant with the security of our forces. The Soviets could always put a ceiling on our deployment by cutting down the number of their warheads. They would have an incentive, however, to adopt single warhead missiles. For, if they insisted on MIRVs at equal number of warheads, their force would be far more vulnerable than ours.

This scheme should pose no insurmountable verification problems. Fixed launchers can be detected through national technical means; existing Soviet MIRVs could not be made mobile, development of a new mobile MIRVed ICBM would require extensive testing, which could be detected.

21

that nuclear weapons **must**
be used against civilian targets. But no responsible
government can possibly live with such a nihilistic
approach. However low the danger of nuclear war no
leader has a right to doom his people to utter destruction
if the improbable and undesired in fact occurred. The course
of "minimum deterrence" based on civilian slaughter is not
strategy but the backdoor to unilateral nuclear disarmament;
no sane advocate of such a policy would be prepared to
implement it in practice, nor should he be.

Similarly, it is preposterous to argue that stability
resides in the Soviet capacity to destroy our landbased
forces and is threatened only by the American acquisition
of an equal capacity. The objective should be clearly **mutual**
invulnerability. This cannot be achieved by an American
abdication that guarantees Soviet invulnerability
unilaterally while the Soviets insist on keeping ours
exposed. Such a condition must remove any incentive for
serious negotiation. It will tempt the Soviets to
enhance a first strike capability with the attendant

22

risk of its use in as yet unforeseeable circumstances.

For all these reasons I favor the deployment of
the MX probably in existing Minuteman silos within
the framework already described. Specifically the United
States should commit itself to the deployment starting
in 1986 of a number of MX's (say 100). (A number
not so large as to threaten the Soviet retaliatory force
decisively.) It should offer to postpone this deployment
if the Soviets agreed to destroy their MIRVed SS-18s (the
Soviet heavy missile) according to an agreed schedule
over a three year period starting in 1986. In any event
the United States would undertake to deploy no additional
MIRVed landbased missiles after 1990. It would destroy
its remaining MIRVed landbased missiles between 1990-95
on a schedule agreed to with the Soviets. In the absence
of an agreement the United States would replace its
MIRVs over a longer period but build more single warhead

23

missiles.

The arms control/unilateral deployment scheme would
therefore look as follows:

a. The United States would deploy 100 MXs starting
in 1986.

b. We would be prepared to postpone deployment if
before 1986 the Soviet Union agreed to a schedule by which
its SS-18s would be destroyed over a three year period
starting in 1986.

c. The United States would commit itself not to
deploy any further landbased MIRVs after 1990.

d. The single warhead missiles to be deployed could
reflect a fixed agreed ceiling with the Soviets at a very
low number say 300 to 500. In that case there should be
a limit on throw weight to prevent the development of huge
single warhead weapons.

e. Both sides would also agree to dismantle the
remaining landbased MIRV forces starting in 1990.

f. If the Soviets refused such a scheme we would

24

reserve the right to build up single warhead missiles
to the number of warheads in the Soviet force. The
design would, one hopes, be simple and reasonably
cheap.

g. Eventually similar principles could be applied
to sea-based forces. The urgency is less because of the
greater invulnerability of submarines and the difficulty
of coordinating an attack from them. But should the
Soviets agree to abandon all their landbased MIRVs we
should look favorably on a scheme to ban accurate, large
seabased MIRVs (like the D-5 warhead of the Trident II
missile).

This approach would be a serious test of Soviet
intentions. It would put a conclusive end to the danger
of an all-out first strike. It would establish clear
equivalence. It would transcend the SALT and START
debate and put both strategy and arms control in a new
context. It would not end our defense problems for we
would then no longer be able to avoid facing the

25

implications of strategic stalemate for regional
defense in particular the need to build up conventional
forces to deter non-nuclear challenges. But that examination
would take place in a different environment. We would
have taken--at last--a big step towards avoiding nuclear
catastrophe.

5

in <u>striking at</u>, civilian targets in the face of the certainty
of an intolerable retribution.

So long as missiles had single warheads and airplanes
needed hours to reach their targets, this theory was in
fact valid. A surprise attack would require a huge
numerical preponderance--an advantage of at least two
in <u>numbers of minutes</u>.
to one (Even with highly accurate missiles it is generally
assumed that an attacker would not risk a first strike
unless he had available two warheads for each target
<u>to allow for</u>
because of malfunctioning, hardening of the target or
errors in accuracy.) <u>Bombes</u> would not improve that
ratio because they would take so long to reach the target
<u>intended</u>,
that the <u>victim</u> would have plenty of time to launch
its missiles.

9

Discriminating targeting was either ridiculed or vilified, never mind the targeting of civilians guaranteed instead annihilation. Every landbased strategic weapon developed in the Seventies has been the subject of bitter controversy.

On the other side of the spectrum many weapons technologists and conservative spokesman disdained the proposition that we lived in an unprecedented era. They insisted that strategic superiority was still attainable and that additions to the nuclear arsenal could be translated into political advantage. At the least, some of them argued, an unconstrained arms race would bankrupt the Soviet Union—unless it did not overmatch it.

In the resulting debate symbolism overwhelmed substance. The issue of the appropriate strategy was submerged

12

govern any longer without demonstrating to his public
his devotion to peace. The Reagan Administration learned
soon after coming into office that the assault on what
it called the "basically flawed" SALT II treaty made
for better campaign rhetoric than foreign policy. It
adopted the strange course of observing but not ratifying
SALT II, giving the Soviets three hundred extra delivery
vehicles which would have to be destroyed in case of
newly created ratification. And in recent months Administration rhetoric
has been put in place which has reflected public realities. It has been fulsome
in proclaiming its devotion to seeking arms control.
There is no reason to doubt its sincerity. What is
open to question is whether the Administration has yet
solved the intellectual problem of arms control in a
world of multiple warheads which stymied both of its
immediate predecessors.

14

else to the danger of surprise attack or they increased it.

The greater the reductions the fewer would be the targets
that had to be destroyed in a first strike; the relative
simpler became the calculations of an attacker.

This is well illustrated by President Reagan's
Eureka speech which contains the basic American proposal
for the strategic arms talks. For the first time it
stressed significant reductions of strategic forces
rather than a balance near the existing levels. Unfortunately
even were the Soviets to accept our proposal the Eureka
scheme (a contingency the design of their forces makes
highly improbable) it would worsen rather than improve-
the danger, it is supposed to solve. A quick glance
at the numbers involved--however tedious it may seem, it illustrates
the problem:

Under SALT II about 5000 Soviet warheads would
be aimed at 1054 American launchers--a ratio of a little

[y]

15

less than 5:1. In addition the United States could
keep its existing force of 42 missile-launching submarines.

Under the Eureka proposal each side would be limited
to at most 2500 warheads on at most 400 landbased missiles.

Even were it technically feasible to distribute warheads
in this manner (and the Soviets would have to redesign
their entire strategic force to do so) this would give
the side striking first an advantage of warheads of
a little better than 6:1. In other words the Soviet
ratio against us would improve by 20% and the US ratio
against the Soviet force by some 400% (from 1.5 to 1

to 6:1). And at lower numbers of launchers the attack
would be more calculable. At the same time 2500 seabased
warheads would force a reduction of our submarine force
from 42 to 15 (depending on what type of boat we use).

In those conditions we could then keep at most 10 boats on station as against
the current 25-30. If there are any advances in anti-

17

the problem untouched; at worst it compounds the danger of a first strike. The chief factor of instability exists between the large number of warheads of current weapons systems and the large number of warheads and compared to launchers, in other words the so-called Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle or MIRV as the acronym has it.

This requires a willingness to redesign the strategic forces of both sides in that time span. Fortunately, with the help of new technology favors this objective, for without a new approach both sides will become increasingly vulnerable. The published literature has revealed that it is possible to develop a mobile single warhead missile that could be significantly protected (that is hardened). In any event, the mobility would complicate the task of the attacker.

[y]

18

propose that the strategic arsenals of both sides be
over a ten year period
reduced/to a low number of single warhead missiles (say
3-500) or a reduction by 75-80% of existing warheads. The
permitted missiles could be mobile or fixed; the choice
would be left to each side. Mobility would reduce the
incentive of surprise attack even further; but equivalence
at low numbers of single-warhead missiles would in any
event assure considerable stability.

Nor does this course require Soviet approval, as it
could be pursued--and would contribute to arms control --
whatever the Soviet reaction. The United States could
announce that after 1990--or at whatever earlier date
it is mutually agreed--it would deploy no more MIRVed landbased
intercontinental missiles but would emphasize single warhead launchers;

This concept requires the abandonment of the SALT
limits would be both simpler & establish a more meaningful
and START approach. Instead, the United States would,
then under SALT II or START, if
propose that the strategic arsenals of both sides be
over a ten year period
reduced/to a low number of single warhead missiles (say
3-500) or a reduction by 75-80% of existing warheads. The
permitted missiles could be mobile or fixed; the choice
would be left to each side. Mobility would reduce the
incentive of surprise attack even further; but equivalence
at low numbers of single-warhead missiles would in any
event assure considerable stability.

20

live with such a nihilistic approach. However low the
danger of nuclear war no leader has a right to doom
his people to utter destruction if the improbable and
undesired in fact occurred. The course of "minimum
deterrence" based on civilian slaughter is not strategy
but the backdoor to unilateral nuclear disarmament;
no sane advocate of such a policy would be prepared
to implement it in practice, nor should he be. At the
same time it is preposterous to argue that stability
resides in the Soviet capacity to destroy our landbased
forces and is threatened only by the American acquisition
of an equal capacity.

The objective should clearly be mutual invulnerability.
But this cannot be achieved by an American abdication
that guarantees Soviet invulnerability unilaterally
while the Soviets insist on keeping us exposed. Such a
condition must remove any incentive for serious negotiation.
It will tempt the Soviets to enlance a first strike capability
with the attendant risk that if they in any event manage
to invulnlarize.

21

For all these reasons I favor the deployment of
the MX probably in existing Minuteman silos within the
framework already described. Specifically the United
States should commit itself to the deployment of a reasonable
number of MX's (say 100) starting in 1986. (A number
not so large as to threaten the Soviet retaliatory force
decisively.) It should offer to postpone this deployment
if the Soviets agreed to destroy the MIRVed SS-18s
(the Soviet heavy missile) according to an agreed schedule
over a three year period starting in 1986. In any event
the United States would deploy no additional MIRVed
landbased missiles after 1990. It would destroy its
remaining MIRVed landbased missiles between 1990-95
on a schedule agreed to with the Soviets. In the absence
of an agreement the United States would replace its
MIRVs over a longer period

while building more missiles,

[y]

22

d. The single warhead missiles to be deployed could
reflect an agreed fixed ceiling with the Soviets at a
very low number say three to five hundred. In that
case there should be a limit on throwweight to prevent
the use of huge single warhead weapons.

TIME
THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE

TIME & LIFE BUILDING
ROCKEFELLER CENTER
NEW YORK 10020
212 JUDSON 6-1212

March 4, 1983

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 1100
55 East 52nd Street
New York, N. Y. 10022

Dear Henry:

Attached are a copy of your original manuscript and a version on yellow paper in our format (to facilitate layouts and so forth). I think we've caught all the typos now. My corrections of those typos and other comments are in red ink on the yellow version. I don't think my suggested cuts will quite get us to a fit, so if you can find another 150 or so words, that would help a great deal.

Right now we're thinking of a format identical to the one we used for Hedley Donovan's essay on "Job Specs for the Oval Office," a copy of which is also attached. As you can see, there is a main headline, the byline and then a flexible number of lines in italic type that serve as both a sub-head and a precede. I would like to try something along these lines but would like any comments you have on the substance:

To avoid nuclear catastrophe, the former Secretary of State suggests that the U.S. adopt a stunningly novel approach: scrap MIRVs starting in, say, 1990 and rely instead on a mix of mobile, single-warhead missiles. What if the U.S.S.R. refuses to go along? Then build enough such missiles to equal the number of warheads in the Soviet force.

Set in 14 pt. type, this would add up to about three or four lines of a subhead, so it won't look quite so horsy. But please do let me know whether there are any elements you feel ought to be mentioned as well in this passage.

On the syndication question, there are two approaches we might take. One is for you to have Marvin Josephson handle it. The other is for us to take it on (though, sadly, I don't think we're terribly good at it). In either case, our principal concern is that nobody appear in print before us, or in the case of magazines, the same day. That would effectively rule out the London Sunday Times (day before) and Der Spiegel (same day), unless they were willing to use the full text the following week. Stern (Thursday) would be possible, though it's not in Spiegel's league. I'm not sure of the publication date of L'Express.

As for other coverage, Brian Brown, our publicity manager, will be in touch with you toward the latter part of the week to discuss possible TV appearances and a press release. I think the piece will get very good, very wide newspaper and TV coverage, apart from whatever is