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I never thought it would work. Yamani may be important in the United States, but not in Saudi Arabia. I've never seen him near the palace when I am there. Saqqaf is fifty times more important. Yamani is the technician who runs the oil industry, that's all. If Simon had gotten away with the auction, it would have been nothing more than pocket money. We moved into the second phase last week following agreement on the IEP. Once we had agreement on emergency sharing to cope with disruptions such as future embargoes, the time had come to develop a strategy to deal with the impact of energy costs on the Western economy. The timing of my speech at the United Nations was an accident. It happened to occur right after agreement on the IEP which was the time we planned to move into the next stage of dealing with the energy problem.

KLEIN: When will the IEP go into effect?

SECRETARY: All it needs is ratification by governments. Norway is the only problem. If it doesn't join, it will be associated with the program. The Norwegians have a primarily theological problem as they are reluctant to have decisions made by multilateral organizations. Norwegian oil is not the main reason for their hesitation.

ELLIOTT: What are the pieces of the strategy that must be put into place?

SECRETARY: Consumers must get themselves organized to deal with consumer restraint and financial questions, including a system of handling the massive flows of Arab investments.

BERGER: Healey and Schmidt have made suggestions on recycling. Do you prefer Healey's?

SECRETARY: The problem here is to solve this problem with consumers acting together, or with OPEC. I prefer the latter.

ELLIOTT: What has been your concentration on the oil problem?

SECRETARY: I have been focussing on this in depth since November first of last year. I have chaired an oil group meeting once a week since then. The group consists of Simon, Burns, Enders and Lord with technical experts such as George Schultz participating from time to time.

VAN VOORST: Will Robinson handle this subject when he comes aboard, or will Enders continue to deal with the problem?

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SECRETARY: Enders will continue his work here, but Robinson will be the 7th floor principal following the problem.

QUESTION: When will oil prices come down? Can they?

SECRETARY: They may be reduced sometime in the first several months of next year. If prices are not reduced, we still need to organize ourselves to deal with the problem. Many issues need to be considered before meeting with producers - contraction of demand, alternate sources of energy, financial arrangements and conservation.

BERGER: What do you think of Senator Jackson's suggestion to reduce prices?

SECRETARY: I am against piecemeal approaches.

VAN VOORST: Can Saudi Arabia take the lead in reducing prices?

SECRETARY: I would be astonished if they could.

CHESNOFF: Who could then?

SECRETARY: Algeria can do a lot here.

KLEIN: If prices are not reduced, then what?

SECRETARY: Then we will have to do more, and by this I do not mean necessarily something against the Arabs.

BERGER: You said in your UN speech that prices went up by a political decision, and that they could come down by a political decision.

SECRETARY: We are trying to create a political condition so they can lower prices. There must be motion on the Arab-Israeli front to create this political climate, and also to prevent the Europeans and Japan from competing with us. If this crisis had come three or four years later with expanded consumption, it would have been a disaster. I tried to get an energy program started a year before the October war, but there was not much interest. This subject was put under Ehrlichman in April 1973, as it was considered as a domestic problem with no foreign policy implications. I wanted at the time to take steps to reduce our dependence on Arab oil.

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ELLIOTT: Has your role as an effective negotiator been affected by recent events?

SECRETARY: Your Periscope item on Dinitz is unfair and wrong. The Israeli press is ridiculous; Dinitz should be close to the Secretary of State. Dinitz's role in the October war in persuading Washington to unleash its military air transport in support of Israel was a key to saving Israel. He should have received a medal for this.

VAN VOORST: Does Rabin want to change Dinitz?

SECRETARY: Rabin did not say this to us. It's up to them to decide. I like Dinitz. He is very fair, makes a serious effort to explain the realities of U. S. politics to Israel and tries to play a useful role. The main criticism of him is that he doesn't produce enough confrontation between the Jewish community and the Administration.

KOSNER: How often do you see the President?

SECRETARY: Much more often than I saw President Nixon. I see him every day for one or one and a half hours. I have been talking with him daily while in New York.

KOSNER: What is Ford's mood and attitude?

SECRETARY: I am impressed with his serenity. Anyone coming from the House of Representatives to a top level job must feel a great change. There is the constant pressure, the demand for high level performance and for leadership, and the fact you must know what you are doing. In the House you can make one decision and then relax. As President, this is not the case. He has twenty decisions a day to make.

QUESTION: Will Ford run in 1976?

SECRETARY: Until his wife's illness, I would have thought there was a 100% chance of this. This may no longer be the case. In any event I haven't talked to the President about this. If I had, I couldn't say this.

QUESTION: Are you beleagured? By the press?

SECRETARY: I felt it coming last April and May. It was inevitable. It will take six months to get the pecking order established, and I am in the middle of it. I am the major

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survivor of the Nixon Administration. Take the Vietnam
episode - this group is against me. There is also the
uneasiness of some regarding the Middle East. There is a
confluence of things to produce criticism. I prefer this
if only to avoid expecting a miracle in the Middle East.

ELLIOTT: Will there be any Cabinet changes?

SECRETARY: There will be changes by January, but I do not
know what they will be.

QUESTION: State, Defense and Treasury seem safe?

SECRETARY: You may be right. I just don't know as I have
had no discussion with the President regarding others in the
Cabinet. I think he should make some changes.

ELLIOTT: How long will you remain in office?

SECRETARY: But for Watergate, I had planned to leave govern-
ment in the summer of 1973. Ideally one should leave before
it becomes an issue of personality and not what he is trying
to achieve. It would be damaging to a number of things if
I left right now. If I were thinking only from a personal
standpoint, I would probably leave now.

VAN VOORST: Will you give up the NSC job?

SECRETARY: This is a phony issue. There is a general alloca-
tion of power in government. I have never discussed it with
the President and will not engage in this debate.

QUESTION: What can we do to develop an energy program?

SECRETARY: To be serious, we must do something about consumer
restraint.

BERGER: You mentioned earlier that Algeria could do a lot on
oil prices? Is this what you discussed in New York?

SECRETARY: I never raised the question of oil prices with
Bouteflika.

KOSNER: As an historian, how do you see the world 15 years
from now?

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SECRETARY: I am worried about the problem of leadership and the lack of long term perception. I am also concerned about the structure of Western industrialized nations. You know these top level jobs such as I have now are really athletes' jobs where you have to react instinctively. One must be out of the job for two years in order to reflect. In the United States we have not had a normal Presidency since Eisenhower. In the United Kingdom and Italy you have a major crisis of confidence. Germany has done better, but I don't know how many crises they can stand. Leadership is very thin in Germany. There are, for example, only three outstanding men in the CDU. Schmidt, the Finance and Foreign Affairs Ministers are strong, but this is about all. Our own system became screwed up with Truman's election. If, as would have normally been expected at the time, Dewey had been elected, the Republicans would have become a governing party which they never have been. We would have then seen a more normal evolution of our political process. Look at the insecurity of our political leaders. All have been candidates since 1960; all have been surrounded by advisors; all have leaned on the public opinion polls. They are not real leaders such as de Gaulle who had a perception of the future. As for me, if you are not involved in operations, you can't think. I have tried to think in long range terms and have been prepared to act where others aren't prepared.

VAN VOORST: What about Cyprus?

SECRETARY: We are trying to be helpful.

BERGER: The law says to cut off military aid to Turkey. Why didn't we?

SECRETARY: We are in technical compliance with the law, but we do not want to stress this for diplomatic reasons. If we cut off aid, the Soviet role in the area will be enhanced, and our influence will be nil. How do you handle this? What does it mean? Do you cut the pipeline right away? If you cut off aid, then restart it again and continue this process all the time, we will lose our influence. Congress cannot make these tactical decisions. Nothing was hidden from the President and we are not in violation of the law. This is an example of something where all will suffer, Greece included.

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Karamanlis is the only hope for Greece. An anti-American attitude helps him attract support from the left and the right. This does not represent his private view of the United States.

BERGER: Why such a large vote in Congress?

SECRETARY: This is the result of pressures of a small minority acting against its own interests. Watergate, the pardon and the sentiment of anti-Foreign involvement also have something to do with this unfortunate mood. We were within sight of a diplomatic process after many meetings with Mavros, Tzounis and Gunes. Now I doubt we can do anything here.

KLEIN: This Congressional opposition to your efforts, the cut off of aid, and the Hersch stories against you -- does all this make it difficult for you to conduct foreign policy?

SECRETARY: I agree. This all makes it extremely difficult to move forward with our foreign policy which took five years to put together. Take the Popper cable that was leaked. There was the question of trying to obtain the release of 100 Mexican political prisoners. I worked this out. Popper shouldn't have raised this in a large forum. The timing was bad. But I cannot talk about this in public as it would have hurt the operation. Then there is the Gelb story on a leaked cable out of Cairo. At a meeting with the President, all Congressional leaders found the aid levels inadequate and the restrictions far too many. All except Mansfield urged a continuing resolution until after the elections. The middle level AID bureaucracy saw its bill so close and was willing to accept lower levels so it leaked the cable. Take the Moynihan cable. Pat is a most prolific writer and likes to blow off steam. There would have been no damage if the cable had not been leaked. I can tell you that many Foreign Ministers I have seen here in New York have been astonished by the almost daily leaks. How can foreigners be expected to deal with us in confidence? A fundamental problem for the conduct of foreign policy is that confidence must be built up over a six to ten year period. If this is to be a two-year Administration, the best thing to do is to hand over a functioning foreign policy. One can start domestic policy from scratch, but not foreign policy.

KOSNER: What are President Ford's foreign policy interests and knowledge?

SECRETARY: He knows defense best of all. He did not enter office with a coherent view of over-all foreign policy. But he is interested in the subject and involves himself daily in foreign policy problems.

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KOSNER: Have you talked to Nixon?

SECRETARY: I have talked to him since his resignation. He usually calls me, but I have telephoned him a few times.

KOSNER: What was your role in the resignation?

SECRETARY: On Wednesday night I was not certain he would resign, although it seemed probable. I do not want to discuss my talks with him. This was a tragic week. It was like a Greek tragedy. Even if he had been told on January 1, 1972 events would go that way, it would have happened as it did. Nixon will not be seen as a great President, but will be seen in more perspective later on.

AUCHINCLOSS: When can this extraordinary event be put on the record?

SECRETARY: While the wounds are still open, it shouldn't be. I may write about this one day, but I do not think anything should be published during the lifetime of the actors. President Nixon was a complex person. I did not know the Nixon one found on the tapes. I never remember him swearing, for example, and I never heard him use phrases like "do it immediately like in ten minutes". This jive talk was unknown to me. I wasn't surprised by his actions. He hated to confront people so much and would go through entire meetings to set something up, and you didn't know what he had in mind. You just didn't know what his game was.

KLEIN: What about Haig?

SECRETARY: He has a great sense of national service, is a devoted Catholic and is very ambitious. On the last point, I say this not at all as a criticism. I have a very high regard for Haig. His efforts to hold the country together in the last year were unbelievable with a President spending 95% of his time on his personal problems.

KLEIN: Will attacks on you get worse?

SECRETARY: You cannot be in a high post for a considerable period without having a moral conviction. If I fail, and this is statistically probable, all hell will probably break loose. Two years after I am out, people won't talk about the details of the period of criticism. I had to do Salzburg with daily leaking and the documents in the hands of the Judiciary Committee.

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If I had fallen then, it would have been a catastrophe. The situation now is different. At the time I was the only person foreign leaders had confidence in. The Middle East, our relations with China and the USSR, our whole foreign policy would have unravelled.

CHRISTOPHER: Didn't the oil embargo draw us back to our traditional allies?

SECRETARY: Yes, to a certain extent. But our relations with the Soviets and the Chinese are also very important although I would agree that they probably won't help us with the energy problem.

QUESTION: Would the USSR intervene militarily in the Middle East if we do?

SECRETARY: If we intervened militarily in Saudi Arabia, the Soviets would not intervene. But we have no plans to do so.

CHRISTOPHER: The Bush appointment to Peking is an odd choice. Does this indicate we attach less importance to our relations with China?

SECRETARY: This is not the case. Bush was a serious Vice Presidential candidate and very much wanted the job in Peking. I don't really know why as nine-tenths of the job is done on my annual trips, and one-tenth in Washington.

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