NAME: HIR130000

1728 engaged in tactical discussions with my successors on issues

1729 like this.

1730 Mr. Cavanaugh. Then, would you say you did not believe

1731 you engaged in commitments to the Saudis with regard to the

1732 supplying of F-15's to which you would have considered

1733 personally the Carter Administration to be bound?

1734 Dr. Kissinger. I would have thought there was no legal

1735 commitment. I would have thought there was a moral

1736 presumption that the discussions would at least continue.

1737 Mr. Cavanaugh. Would you have criticized the Carter

1738 Administration had they not proposed to sell F15's to Saudi

1739 Arabia?

1740 Dr. Kissinger. Probably not, but partly also I do not

1741 look for opportunities to make tactical criticisms. I have

1742 stated at the beginning that I thought the timing of this

1743 particular proposal was not the ideal one.

1744 Mr. Cavanaugh. When, Mr. Secretary, would you have

1745 proposed making the proposal to Saudi Arabia?

1746 Dr. Kissinger. I would have tried...

I said I tried.

If

NAME: HIR130000

1747 you have once conducted foreign policy yourself you know
1748 that the people who are conducting it are under complex
1749 pressures which it is not always easy to assess from the
1750 outside, and I have really extraordinarily high regard for
1751 Secretary Vance.

1752 I share the views that the committee expressed yesterday.

1753 And so I don't want to [he can] tell you what I would have
1754 tried to do.

1755 Mr. Cavanaugh. I understand that.

1756 Dr. Kissinger. Whether I would have succeeded in it, I
1757 don't know. I would have thought it would have been better
1758 on the whole to tie it more integrally to the peace process
1759 and to surface it in connection with some accomplishment in
1760 the peace process, because then the atmosphere would have
1761 been different.

1762 Mr. Cavanaugh. You feel there should be linkage between
1763 our arms policy and sales to the Arabs? Do you feel there
1764 should be linkage between progress towards peace and sales
1765 to Israel?

NAME: HIR130000

PAGE 388

1766 Dr. Kissinger. I would have thought that to put forward
1767 this package would have been on the whole better, involving
1768 as it did a new departure in arms sales with respect to the
1769 Arab countries, in connection with some advance in the peace
1770 process.
1771 Mr. Cavanaugh. On the part of the Arab participants?
1772 Dr. Kissinger. That is right.
1773 Mr. Cavanaugh. You would not, Mr. Secretary, attach any
1774 such requirements to progress on the part of the Israeli
1775 participants?
1776 Dr. Kissinger. I would have thought in the case of Israel
1777 there are two separate issues. One is we have had this
1778 historic relationship with Israel that I pointed out before
1779 you were here. And that I think is relatively independent
1780 of the peace process.
1781 Both Administrations, the one in which I served and
1782 President Carter, have repeatedly stated that we would not
1783 use the arms supply as a pressure.
1784 Then, in connection with changes that Israel might make in

NAME: HIR130000

1785 its territories as a result of peace, which might jeopardize
1786 its security in the absence of some additional requirements,
1787 ~~additional deliveries~~ in this sense, there could be some
1788 in
1789 connection that some additional deliveries are made as a
result of sacrifices Israel might make as a result of peace.
1790 So I would talk about two separate issues,
1791 Mr. Cavanaugh. I think I share some of our concern with
1792 regards to progress towards peace and our arms policy in the
1793 region. What specifically did you have in mind at the
1794 termination of your period in office and the time you were
1795 extending these moral obligations to the Saudis as far as
1796 what role they should play prior to receiving such a
1797 commitment for F-15's as the Carter Administration has made,
1798 specifically what would you have expected from them?
1799 Dr. Kissinger. First of all, most of the discussions with
1800 respect to these planes took place at the Defense Department
1801 level. It had not yet reached the political level. I don't
1802 think I had any----
1803 Mr. Cavanaugh. Let me phrase it another way. As I

NAME: HIR130000

1804 understand it, you are criticizing the Administration for

1805 not having placed some prior expectations of performance

1806 towards peace---

1807 Dr. Kissinger. No, no.

1808 Mr. Cavanaugh. ---on the partners. As an Administration,

1809 what are those expectations?

1810 Dr. Kissinger. No, no. I would have thought a better

1811 movement for putting forward this package would have been

1812 one in which some progress had already been made towards

1813 peace. Now, Saudi Arabia does not itself participate in

1814 these peace negotiations, and it is my impression, certainly

1815 when I was in office, Saudi Arabia was helpful in the

1816 negotiations that went on.

1817 I understand from my successor, but he can obviously be

1818 more precise than I, that Saudi Arabia has been helpful to

1819 his efforts.

1820 I would have thought, however, for the general atmosphere

1821 in the area, if a movement could be found in which progress

1822 had already been registered, especially considering the fact

NAME: HIR130000

1823 these planes won't be delivered for three years anyway, that

1824 would have been a timing I would have preferred. I, however,

1825 also make the proviso---

1826 Mr. Cavanaugh. Mr. Secretary, are you saying the Saudis

1827 have not been sufficiently helpful to this point in time in

1828 the peace process to justify this?

1829 Dr. Kissinger. No. I am saying the debate we now have in

1830 this country might have been eased if this proposal had been

1831 put forward at a different time. But I have also said this

1832 is what I would have tried to do, but I didn't always

1833 succeed in what I tried to do when I was in office, and I

1834 have great understanding for the complexities of the people

1835 who now have responsibility.

1836 And, as your Chairman knows, I did not exactly look for an

1837 opportunity to come up here and testify.

1838 Mr. Cavanaugh. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

1839 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

1840 The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, it took a little arm

1841 twisting to get out here. We are very pleased you did come,

NAME: HIR130000

PAGE 392

1842 and to sort of wrap up the hearing today, as I understand

1843 it, your testimony will be uppermost in our minds, as

1844 Members of Congress, and we must take into consideration

1845 what is our country's, what is the United States' national

1846 security interest.

1847 Despite your reservations, you feel that the approval of

1848 the sales to each of the countries is in our national

1849 security interest.

1850 Dr. Kissinger. I feel that the approval is in the

1851 national interest of the United States, and I hope very much

1852 that in addition the Congress and the Administration, in

1853 order to avoid a confrontation and a divisive debate, will

1854 work out this additional arrangement which I have proposed.

1855 The Chairman. And, of course, we could add that the sales

1856 to each of the countries is not only in our United States'

1857 national security interests but also in the long range

1858 security interests of Israel.

1859 Dr. Kissinger. That is my belief.

1860 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

NAME: HIR130000

1861 As always, you have been an excellent witness, and you

1862 have enlightened us in many respects, and we certainly thank

1863 you for acceding to my pressures and coming before us this

1864 afternoon.

1865 The committee stands in recess until 1:30 this afternoon

1866 when we will meet again to continue the hearing on the

1867 Middle East arms sales with testimony from public witnesses.

1868 The meeting will begin with Congressman Carr.

1869 The committee stands in recess.

1870 (Whereupon, the committee recessed at 12:15 p.m., to

1871 reconvene at 1:30 p.m.)

1872 **************

NAME: HIR130000

1873 RPTR HANBACK
1874 1:30 p.m.
1875
1876 AFTERNOON SESSION
1877
1878 The Chair. The committee will please come to order.
1879 The Chair understands there are other Members on the way,
1880 so we will begin.
1881 We meet this afternoon for the continuation of the
1882 hearings on the Administration's proposed sales of aircraft
1883 to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.
1884 Our first witness will be Representative Carr.
1885 Happy to have you here, Congressman Carr.
1886 We will be pleased to hear the afternoon witnesses
1887 representing various private organizations and universities.
1888 Representative Carr, if you have a prepared statement,
1889 would you care to summarize it?
1890
1891 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BOB CARR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN