Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
8:57 a.m., 12-19-69

L said Good Morning Henry. I didn't hear from you as to whether
you wanted only General Abrams. K said we will do it the way you
suggested, just General Abrams. L said I think the President will get more
out of it. You know there is a conflict between Westmoreland and Wheeler
and Abrams will talk freer about it if Wheeler is not there. L said
yesterday, I spent two hours with him and I think it would be helpful if
the President got that flavor. K said we will proceed as you recommend.

L said Henry have you got a minute? K said yes. L said maybe I am
overly concerned. I think we should look at things that are going on in
Helsinki. Did you see the cable that came in. Looks as though there is
a bit of a dispute going on between Smith and Nitze. They are drifting
a little bit apart. K said I think we should settle the problem when they
get back here. L said I think Nitze feels we have given the Russians the
idea that everything they are doing now just does not count. He believes
that this date business is pretty important. L said I think we can settle
it here. K said if you have a suggestion, I will be glad to do what I can.
L said we will have to get them together when they get back here, and
sit down in a room with them. K said that is my feeling and we must do that
when they get back. L reiterated that he thought they were drifting apart
and that they must get together on it when they return. L said Paul is a
helluva good guy and when he takes an exception like this, he really feels
that he has good reason to do so. K said when I saw that cable I was
going to see the President on it but decided to wait until they get back.
L said it is hard to do it long distance.

L said next point - remember I talked to you about a young man in Paris
named Salans. I arrived in Paris last week and he was back and sitting
in on briefings - he was just out for three months. L said first I got into
an argument with him about the legality of our position on POWs. Then
I got into a little hassle with him because he believes there should be
more private discussions initiated by us over dinners, luncheons, etc.
L said I told him the President did not want to do that. Yesterday, L said,
he showed up negotiating on Wheelus AFB. L said I don't want to be a
pain in the neck but I want him out of this. K said the President ordered
that he be moved. K said I thought he was to be sent to some University
for a year. L said I thought I ought to tell you he is there and he is
Chief Legal Adviser to Delegation.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/13/04

-2-

L said next item regarding the hearings going on in the House of Representatives on Geneva Convention. L said I think they are making a big issue up there about toxins. L said the Committee said they could care less but it continues to be brought up. I told Clem we are not producing any of those and have not since last delivery from an order placed some time ago. L said I don't think we should go out and make a big denouncement now. They are trying to get them into the bacteriological field. L said I don't think we should spill all of our guts before we get into this tear gas thing. K said when you called me the other day about toxins, I thought you were talking about contingency plan. I have tracked down what happened. McCarthy called Richardson. Richardson told him this was being studied in the NSC system. Someone from McCarthy's office must have leaked it. K said I did not know anything was being done on it until you called me. L said I don't see any point unless you think I should come out and announce that we are not producing them right now. K said no, Mel, I think we should study it. L said then we can give a little on something like that. We are not being pressed in this area right now and at some future date we might need it. K said you are not being pressed from here and I am having a staff paper prepared for me so that I will understand it. L said very good. I will not announce it.

K said while I have you on the phone, have you seen the intercepts on Pranger? K said he is really spouting off. L said I have just seen one of them. I will look into it. L said which one are you talking about. K said I will send you a copy of the last wire. L said fine Henry. That is fine. I don't have anything else for the moment.

mlh

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Senator Scott

12/19/69 9:10 a.m.

K: I wanted to tell you we are announcing today three measures vis-a-vis communist China. They're of no great significance except symbolic: (1) alleviation of that $100 tourist import thing; now it can be unaccompanied; (2) American-owned subsidiaries abroad can now deal with communist China; (3) a technical discretion thing. They don't make any huge difference, but show our basic attitude.

S: One thing which bugs the hell out of the artistic and cultural community; currently Internal Revenue doesn't allow importation of Chinese works of art unless you can . . .

K: Yes, that's the third we are eliminating. We are shifting the burden of proof--somebody has to prove that it isn't. I thought that was so abstruse I didn't want to bother you with it.

S: No, I know it intimately. You know George Yea(? )? It will mean a great deal to him and to museums, like Rockefeller's and the DeYoung museum. That's good news.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Telecon
Director Mayo
12/19/69 9:48 a.m.

K: I have two problems...

M: Only two?

K: One, the NSC budget which I had not focused on adequately. We asked for 6 hundred thousand for research; then I knocked it to 5; then it was made 4, then Schlesinger took 25 out (which I think was a gratuitous, cheap move). The 25 is so close, I don't know whether we need twenty-five more or less. Our problem is on the 500; for instance we had to pay for Sir Robert Thompson--that's 100.

M: He came out of the research budget?

K: Yes--we have program studies financed out of the research budget. I'm not in a powerful position, as I said in the previous request of 6 hundred, I knocked out one, then another hundred, then 25.

M: I don't know about this 25. It hasn't come to my attention yet.

K: We're meeting today at 2:30.

M: Not today. I think it comes with the Defense budget. . . . No, you're right; it's in the book, for today. I'll check on this 25.

K: The 25 frankly is not the biggest matter to me. I'd be ridiculous if I could tell you this 25 is going to break us.

M: You'll be there today?

K: Yes.

M: It puts us in a position of pleading one's own case.

K: And I don't think 2 Presidential assistante ought to argue with him about their budget. Let me give away my bargaining position completely. Whatever you say I'll accept.

M: You and I are in the awkward position of being the only two agency heads in on it when our budgets are reviewed.

K: I'd like to research the thing. If you can restors some of the 125 I'd appreciate it. On the Defense budget I can't get the book.

M: It's not available yet. Anything Mel gets you should get.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/64

*

Telecon

Mayo
12/19/69

page 2

K: Mel is screaming about 15 items Schlesinger wanted to discuss with him.

M: I'll check on that. I plead ignorance on that.

K: Hexagon is one of them.

M: That's not in the marks I gave to Mel.

K: Then I don't know what he's talking about. I plead ignorance.

M: The review is on Monday.

K: Mel will be there?

M: No we'll do the same with him as with Finch and Blount. In the Presidential appeals section on Tuesday. It's 3:00 Monday on the Defense budget. I'll try to get the material to you soon.

K: I might be of help if the disputed issue comes up.

M: Some we have talked about in terms of stretch-outs... every agency is entitled to do this in terms of adjustments. They get close to one billion below and then put ______ back in, etc. I will be back to you with the military stuff as soon as it's put together.

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/12/64

Telecon

Gerald Ford

12/19/69 11:37 a.m.

K: I wanted to call you and let you know we are going to announce today lifting of some marginal restrictions on communist Chinese. They're not major or of substantive significance: (1) $100 tourist purchases can now come in unaccompanied; (2) American-owned subsidiaries in foreign countries can now deal; (3) shifts burden of proof on what is real Chinese communist manufactured. We are timeing it so the Russians think it is the result of what happened last week. It is strictly a ploy, given the Russian paranoia, the last one worked out well. Also Hanoi will have to worry about what's going on. I wanted to give you advance warning. It will be released this afternoon and we wanted to give you this reasoning. Of course you are not to use this language.

F: No. I won't give a statement unless I am asked, and then I would simply say I approve. Are things going as you expect in Vietnam?

K: We're at a point where we've given them something to think about.

F: Is anything materializing in a substantive way? I was at home; gave a couple of speeches.

K: How is their mood?

F: Good.

K: If we can keep our nerve, we can make it.

F: I took a strong stand endorsing the President.

K: There was a poll of college students. Wasn't that fantastic!

F: Yes, the only ones against were the students in the North East.

K: Yes, I'm in a much safer position here than at Harvard. They want to lose there. They can't stand to have it work. I talked with a French editor about Vietnamization: at first he said it wouldn't work. I said it would and then he said, but that would be wrong--it means you would win a colonial war.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Ambassador Gerard Smith
Helsinki
19 December 1969, 4:15 p. m.

(Missed first part)

Smith: They are insisting on Helsinki and it seems today that possibly --
this is an open wire by the way --

K: I know. S: Possibly getting some sort of signal from some place
in Washington that this is possible and I have put my reputation on the
line that this is not. This would be putting up something that is quite
contrary to the view the U. S. government expressed last September.

K: I don't know where they would have got the signal.

S: I asked Farley a few minutes ago to talk to Rogers and ask him to
contact Dobrynin and tell him that this is not true. It just seems
incredible - this is the third session I have had now. They keep saying
this is the place; also they are talking about a period of time - two
months - after we have proposed to talk again. So it seems today a
little leverage on both these points will be useful.

K: Everything will be done from here. You can count on it. Your
letters have been read with a deal of interest and we all think you have
done a superb job. S: The other people are working on assumptions.
I think are contrary to facts. K: If you can get Farley to do what you
have asked I will take care of my end by the end of business Monday.

S: It will have to be done sooner. K: OK, I will call it. Will you
get Farley to call me after he has talked to Bill and I will get to the
President as soon as he gets to it, but it won't be until 6:00 now. I will make
the appropriate phone call before the end of the day.

ms

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Ambassador Smith

12/19/69 4:25 p.m.

S: I was reading all about you in the news magazines. I just had a session with ________. They insist on Helsinki. It seems to me it is possible they are getting signals from some place in Washington that it's possible. I've put my resignation on the line that it's not. They think they're conducting a serious negotiation and putting up a way quite different from what the US can tolerate. I called Farley and asked him to tell Rogers to tell Dobrynin it is important.

K: I know the P's view on this. It's the same as you have just expressed and it has been said to Dobrynin.

S: It seems that they keep thinking this is the only place in the world from which you can negotiate.

K: Your letters are being read with the greatest interest. We all think you are doing a superb job.

K: I'll take care of it by the end of business on Monday.

S: It'll have to be sooner than that.

K: Well, you get Farley to call me after he's talked to Bill and I will get it to the P and make the appropriate moves.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Phil Farley

12/X 19/69 6:55 p.m.

F: I gether you have had a communication from Jerry.

K: Right.

F: Fine, he tild me.

K: I know; he called you after he talked to me. I thought it
would be good if you and I conserted before I go to the President.

F: I think you know his concern and what he hopes. I talked
with Rogers; he is not interested in getting Dobrynin in on this.
Tge hope of changing to Vienna is one thing, but the mixture of reasons
for not wanting Vienna and the other thing . . . it's not that much better
than Helsinki. When Rogers says it's a personal thing . . . I was the
first to say Helsinki.

K: What if the P asks me to call Dobrynin to remind him of his
conversation with him.

F: No objection to that.

K: I don't care. I just want to do what people want.

F: Jerry wants Washington reinforcement to . . .

K: You gave him the answe r I wanted.

F: Tomorrow he is going to say if there's any doubt in the Soviet mind
that he reflects Washington instructions he can remove that because he talked
with you. I hope you are giving second thoughts to the V rification
meeting next week: 1) We won't have some people back, 2) the Soviets said
the earliest date would be April 16, so we will have some time.

K: The only thing I want to discuss on Tuesday is procedures.
Wouldn't go into substance.

F: We could do it if you want to, but maybe it would be better to
wait till at least one major principle has been on the firing line.

K: I'll see.

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/12/04

Telecon
The President
19 Dec 69, 7:15 p.m.

(Missed few sentences)

K: The SALT talks. N: They are going to change it? K: This is the problem. You remember our problems with Dobrynin. Bill was reluctant to raise the issue. You had given Smith the instructions and now the Russians had backed off. I thought just as a matter of discipline I ought to call Dobrynin and remind him of this conversation before. N: Tell him we gave in on Helsinki and why not Vienna. We don't have to be anxious but the point is that it ought to be either Geneva or Vienna.

Then K said, second, the MBT deposit of ratification ceremony.
N: Keep me out of it if you can. K: State is trying to get it arranged so that 40 countries would have signed it. They are trying to say the end of January, but Wilson will be here then and will try to make a big affair on it and try to get in on it himself, so I suggest the middle of February. N: Why don't we say the middle of February. K: OK.

K continued, I have looked into this infiltration figures. I have a group that meets every Friday on this infiltration. The evidence is not absolutely clear because one of the things happening is that they are sending more by truck rather than by foot and we don't know whether they have only materiel in the trucks rather than personnel.

N: Have you seen General Abrams? K: Yes, I spent an hour with him.
N: Abrams told me that he hadn't changed a damn thing. We may have a military commander that is beating these bastards. I think he is going to beat hell out of them. I said take the casualties -- they can go to 500 a week. Now the thing we ought to do is to win the war.

K: Either it's down to zero... or they may not be infiltrating enough for a huge offensive. N: What our goal must be now is to bang them and don't take any... I couldn't agree more on the infiltration thing.
K: If he continues what he is doing then time may be on our side.
N: That is what I told him. I think he is doing better than we all realized.

K: I must say I had a good session before. When he came back I said to Haig, has this guy been taken over too, and he said no. He is a cold-eyed guy, just as you said. Haig is going over the middle of January.

By: KHLW NARA, Dato 5/13/04

N: I have this thing now incidentally. Have you ever seen this Oberemko thing? K: Yes. N: I would like to let Habib handle it. Don't let Blake handle it -- so that Habib could say to Oberemko, what did you mean? Bill Rogers said he agrees. We don't want it done through Blake. K: Blake doesn't know enough about this. N: Maybe he leans too much the other way, but Habib is our man now.

N continued - Have you had a chance to talk to Dr. Rush? What do you think? He could be a big man in our future, don't you think? K: I agree. N: He was a top guy at Harvard Law School. This guy could be what we really want for something else -- you know what I mean. K: I was very impressed with him.

N: OK, you will go ahead on both these things? K: Right, Mr. President.

ms

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

*

Telecon

Dobrynin

12/19/69 7:26 p.m.

D: Happy New Year to you.

K: I'm seeing you Monday night? I'm already starving myself. We're going to solve all the problems on Monday. But I have a problem before that--that Helsinki conversation. I have been praising the Soviet Delegation for its constructive tone and attitude. But the issue has come up--I just talked with the President--that of the site of the conference.

D: I got a telegram--still in the same position.

K: When you talked to the P he understood you to say that the site is no huge problem; you said it could start in Helsinki and move someplace else. On this basis he agreed to start in Helsinki. Now Jerry Smith is under the impression that your man says it has to be Helsinki.

D: You want Geneva?

K: Yes, the P prefers Vienna, with which we know you have problems. The P's basic attitudes stays the same. We would consider your attitude very constructive if you could reach a compromise.

D: I will send to Moscow and see.

K: The final session is Monday (?) and we would like to end up without too many disagreements.

D: The only problem is that tomorrow is Saturday--it will be hard to [reach them------ I couldn't understand exactly what would be hard, but I think that's what he meant]. But I'll try.

K: I'll appreciate it and I'll see you Monday.

1*

By: K.L. V. NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

Secretary Laird

7:40 p.m., December 19, 1969

K told Laird it was a good thing they saw Abrams alone. Abrams had gone down the line 100 per cent for Laird. K had asked Abrams to tell them everything, even the worst. And he was good. Laird said he has communications with Abrams no one knows about...
K said it had been a damn good meeting; he could see now why Laird had wanted it the way he did. L asked whether the President knew. K said yes; the President now understands it. Wheeler has always been so pessimistic. L said this guy Abrams is great -- he has 5 of the top Generals and one top Admiral. They are all with us. Abrams is proud to be part of this. We have problems with the Joint Chiefs. Westmoreland and Wheeler always each take a different position. K said Abrams described in great detail how he operated and his tactics.

K said the second item he wanted to mention was the meeting on Saturday, Dec 20, on Safeguard. K said he had been told that Dave Packard had decided to eliminate Phase II. K said the President wants K&X Phase II started to get the controversy out of the way. Now what level of Phase II should be discussed -- the President doesn't care about the size. In the preliminary meeting, it didn't amount to more than $100 million. If Phase II isn't discussed now, it will never get off the ground. L said the only problem is that Phase I has slipped for a year. Everybody thought we couldn't start the contracts and construction until the bill passed. This caused problems in Montana and North Dakota where it is the middle of winter, and Dave is concerned. We have lost a whole year. If we move forward now, where we are just starting contracts and construction in March -- when it should have started last summer -- you will run into trouble in Congress; and you can't win in Congress. It has to be slipped a little bit. Area defense can be started and DOD can go to another site or another two sites. K said that is what we want -- to get another two sites. L said the money doesn't mean anything in the budget. K said the President is trying to avoid getting so frozen in that he can't come back to area defense. L asked K if he had seen his paper. K said yes, and it was a damn good paper. L said Dave's only problem is the fact that this has slipped by a whole year -- by not getting the appropriation bill through Congress by January.

K said we should get another principle of area defense going, have it put forward, and perhaps get another two sites. There are a number of options

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

to be discussed at the Saturday meeting. If the Defense people come
in with no Phase II, ACDA would play it into a proposal to the other
side -- that we should stop everything. In response to a query by L,
K said ACDA would be represented at the Saturday meeting. L said
Gardner was going to the meeting from Defense, but then remembered
he was on leave -- Resor and Foster will attend. L said he would take
care of Foster. Foster will be able to move ahead of Resor. L said
he would talk to him tonight.

They discussed the list of exceptions from BOB, and Laird said he would
give K a paragraph on each item. L said he had been glad to look over
that list. K said BOB wants to knock $1.8 billion off the DOD budget.
K said he had told the President about it. L said he had tried to prepare
the whole Cabinet on it tonight. It has great consequence to go this
far at one time. He repeated that he would get to K a paragraph on
each of the items and that he would talk to Foster before he attends the
Saturday meeting.

lds

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

telecon

Mr. Kissinger
Hubert Humphrey
12/19/69; 9:00 p.m.

H said Marshall Wright did an excellent job. H said he had good press and wide radio and TV coverage -- he came through just excellent. H said he had a feeling that things were moving out quite well -- policy. K was delighted about Wright and he just one is verified said when one is terrified you believe any reports. K said if we can believe 1/2 of what we hear we may be on our way. H said I have a feeling -- I think things are moving. H said I think the reporters are putting on protective coverings. K said I have created a group here of top flight people analyzing every report. K said Ben Read was in and for your information I agree with you. K said the funny thing is the military people bleed more for their logistic units. H said it is like wanting servants. H said you know you have the strong protestors on the defensive side for the first time -- because of the President's November 3 speech. K said actually they don't know what to do. H said I always have a press conference where ever I go and I always say the position the government is taking is essentially and basically strong -- there has been solid support. The protest movement has lost its zip. K said the hysteria has gone. K asked if H was in town today. H said he was for only a short while and then he is going to Minnesota for Christmas and then he would be back in Washington after the holidays. K said he would like to see H. H said he would call the next time he is in town. H said I like to work with you -- you are a gentleman.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

HAK/Secy Laird

22 Dec 69/9:22 a.m.

L: I thought I should talk to you before the meeting today to be sure you had no questions. Al talked to Capt Moore - he was concerned about budgeting for end strength in Vietnam - end strength FY of 260.

K: End strength of 260 is fine. My worry is the end strength of 205 slipped in there somewhere. L said: This is another matter. In our budget we don't have it that way. K: The President has never seen other than 260. You first had 284, then you said you could do better than that going down to 260. The figure in the President's mind has never focused on 205. L: We don't want the 260 figure used. I want to cover the whole thing up. K: We don't want any figure used. We don't preclude a lower figure than 260. We think the worst way to get it out is through a budget hearing. L: We don't want to get 260 out if we can help it. Did you get my memo? K: Yes. L: The reason for the memo was that I want to be sure how we are going to handle it.

K: What is the 205? L: Where *you* will be on the 24-month plan.

K: Which happens to coincide with the 71. L: Right. That is the manner in which the plan goes, Henry, but we are budgeting all 260. I wanted you to know we had not abandoned the plan. For planning purposes we are going 205 -- for budget, 260. My figure was 205 - the State Department's is 180. The President never made a decision between State's recommendation and Defense's recommendation. We are budgeting on 260.

K: Why is it that the uncertainty goes from 174 to 260? Why not on both sides of 260? In your memo - somebody looking at this could come to the conclusion anywhere from 175 to 260, why not 324 to 220?

L: Because one plan was sent by State and one by us. Figures in those two plans went lower than 260 in decision memo we are using for budget purposes. K: Your analysis showed that an outsider looking at these figures could deduce these figures spread anywhere from 174 to 260. I don't understand why this was. L: I don't think they can too well, but that was a very sensitive memo I sent to you because I thought you should have it based upon all of the things that could be anticipated. Did you see the table on page 3 of the memo? K: Yes. It was very interesting, very intelligently done. L: I think personally we can cover that up. K: Right. OK, Mel, I understand. L: I can show a reduction in the budget if you will let us use those other figures. K: No, we don't want that.

By: KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

*

L: We can bring the expenditure a bit lower but we wouldn't say they are lower. K: The thing that should be done is to show the figures in such a way that an outsider studying the budget could come to the conclusion that we may not be down in a spread rather than from 174 to 260 but in a spread from 220 to 300.

L: You would like to be in a spread between 220 and 300.

K: Without changing any of your internal plans. Could you fuzz it up in that direction, then any concern we have disappears.

L: Yes, we will have to raise a little of the expenditure base we show for Vietnam. If we add this breakout to Vietnam we would have to show a little bit higher figure. If we show 300 we will have to add a little more money because the end strength will have to show an increase of about...I can figure it out here...Let me see. Let me put the ammunition in there too -- 680 million dollars we would have to show.

K: More? L: Yes. K: On top of what you have got? L: Yes.

K: That's impossible.

L: We budgeted for 260; if we put another 40,000 in we would have to show that in the budget figures of the upper range. We are trying to budget this thing so no one will know we have 260 in there.

K: So an outsider would know that the worst that could happen to them is 260. L: I think we can fuzz that so they don't know it.

K: My only worry is what an outsider thinks. L: I think we can if we go above 260, we have got to go for a supplemental so I have got to tell a few key members on both sides of the Appropriations Committee -- about May. You think we had better go ahead and put in the money? I want Hanoi to worry we may have more in there.

L: I wanted to make the calculation because based on the budget we are submitting the Russians could make this kind of a calculation, but I don't anticipate they are doing it. K: I am not challenging your plan at all.

L: But you think I should put the money back in? K: I think we should find some other way of fixing it up.

L: They have to take these figures and figure it out by themselves and it is not very difficult for them. K: I think the higher the figure we can show that they get hold of the more political advantage we can get by going below it.

L: The Johnson budget planning for FY 71 was $83 billion not including a pay increase. Really this budget is scrubbed. A carrier for 71 is only $5 million expenditure. K: I am going to support you this afternoon on most of those items. L: I don't know how you can put in another $600 million. K: See whether you can figure out a way of screwing up

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

the figures. L: I will get going on a way to screw up the figures.

K: I will check in the meantime again with the President.

L: Maybe I should talk to him again. When will he be coming down?

K: Not until tomorrow. This issue will not come up until after the meeting. L: I hope he doesn't decide k you can go down because that will make a hell of a mess. K: I assure you, before it goes down he will talk to you.

L: I think we are dropping this thing too fast. There is nothing in it for new strategic systems. We have already cut out over a million jobs this year by the 30th of June. This budget will take it down another 400-500 thousand. I don't think we have planned economically well enough to absorb any of those jobs. I may just call the President and talk to him briefly. We have 260 in the budget now.

K: We don't want you to change your plan - just show a spread so an outsider can see a spread on both sides of 260. L: OK.

ms

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
12/22/69 10:26 a.m.

R: I don't know whether you saw the Habib cable #19142 regarding Beaumarche's conversation with the DRV. It indicates that we've turned the French around a little bit now.

K: There is one Beaumarche cable that I saw...

R: He talked to My Van Bo--his attitude has changed since I was over there.

K: Yes, I have seen that cable; it's in the President's reading for today and I talked to him about it on Saturday. But I didn't make the point that is was a change in the French attitude. I said that for the first time I see the North Vietnamese a little uncertain. Beaumarche seems to be talking more our line.

R: Which should help.

K: Enormously.

R: They have been looking to the French for support, now if the French keep pushing them it should help.

K: I haven't made the point, but will. The conversation you had with Schumann . . . The French seem to be taking a more balanced line.

R: I talked to the P about the conversation with Oberenko had. I agree with Habib. But I don't want it to look like we've missed an opportunity. I think Habib should have running room on that.

K: Habib should do it in low key fashion; check to see if they have anything particular in mind. We shouldn't let it sit.

R: I think we've changed the French attitude a little and I'm glad to see that Beaumarche thinks my comments were consistent with the conversation with Schumann.

K: I think it was.

By: KHC NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Telecon

David Landes

12/22/69 11:00 a.m.

L: Did you get my letter?

K: Yes, I got your letter; I was going to answer it today. I won't be in town at that time, but would love to see you. Why don't you come down some other day?

L: Would love to. An

K: Any day?

L: Well, I'll be in New York beginning the 24th.

K: I'll probably be going to the West Coast on Friday and won't be back until the 6th.

L: Can we set it for sometime shortly after that? I'm going into the hospital to have my gall bladder removed on the 14th.

K: Ugh. Let's say the 9th, unless I am in touch with you, around 12:30 or 1:00. Let us know what plane you'll be coming in on and we'll pick you up.

L: Shall I be there and we'll have lunch at 1:00.

K: No let's eat any time between 12:30 and 100. We'll eat in my office; it's the best place to talk. The food is lousy, but as good as the faculty club.

L: I don't come for the food. Friday is the 9th; lunch at 12:30?

K: Yes.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Governor Rockefeller
12/22/69 11:10 a.m.

R: You looked good on the cover of Newsweek. It is an excellent picture. I'm bothering you...

K: You never bother me.

R: ... because you are my friend and you will take my calls.

K: The P isn't there--he won't return my call, I've tried to reach him today.

R: I am worried about the tax bill. I'm going to call and wire all the governors asking them to get their Senators to vote against it. Jacob Javits says if we can get 30 against, it would give the President courage to veto it. But I can't find out from the administration how it feels about the bill.

K: Try Ehrlichman.

R: I called him; I called Mitchell--they're all at a meeting.

K: There's a meeting with Congressional leaders this morning, and I don't doubt that this is the subject.

R: No comment on what I'm doing?

K: They may like it. I don't know the issue.

R: Taken the growth in revenue from 15 billion ______ in 76 reduced to 2.5 this year and 3.5 in 76...

K: My recommendation is that you talk to Ehrlichman and Mitchell to tell them what you're going to do. They may welcome it, but if they don't, they may question it. The P isn't in the office--I knew you called him but thought that if you wanted to talk with me you would call. I know he'll be back before lunch, but I'll leave word all over that Ehrlichman and Mitchell should return your call.

R: I think this is a disaster and it's going to destroy his administration. It just feeds the fires of inflation.

K: Well, I think you should put this to him, and you obviously will do what you believe in.

R: It removes his power to do what Gardner and Milton Eisenhower

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Rockefeller

12/22/69 11:10 a.m.

and Scotty Reston have suggested.

K: I don't know what he's planning to do. I haven't even a clue.

R: I'll go ahead and wire these governors.

K: I recommend that you hold off till you've talked with them.

R: What I'm trying to do is get enough Senators to vote against this...

K: ... so they can uphold the veto. I'll leave word with Ehrlichman and Mitchell.

R: Good. How are you?

K: Pretty busy. How are you?

R: Fine. I went away for 10 days. Now I'm ready to buckle down

By KHC NARA, Dale 5/12/64

Telecon
Attorney General
12/22/69 3:00 p.m.

K: I understand you're calling about Rockefeller's problem.

M: Right.

K: I can't tell you any more. As I understand it he is opposed to the whole notion of the bill. I didn't discuss it with him. He thinks it knocks down the 15 billion dollar tax increase to 3 billion dollars tax increase. He thinks it will kill the P's ability to do what he wants to do in foreign policy. He thinks it would be a disaster. He wants to send a telegram to all the governors urging against it. I said he shouldn't do it before talking with somebody who knows about it, you or Ehrlichman, or both.

M: Well thank you, I've been trying to reach him. I have no problem with me I think it strengthens the P's hand. Good, Henry. Thanks.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
12/22/69 4:57 p.m.

R: On the Cyrus Eaton thing, he wants to see the President, me, or you. I think we should coordinate it; no more than one should. I am willing to do it if you want.

K: You're welcome to it.

R: He's a senile old windbag, but having him in the White House bothers me.

K: He's . . . It's . . . If you think this doesn't escalate him to too high a level. The P shouldn't see him and I don't want to.

R: Then only trouble with your seeing him is it gets him in the White Hosue. He says he's got a secret message from the other side. I don't want to see him, but I don't want anybody to say we didn't give a chance to someone who had a message.

K: I can't see why they should give him a message when they've got Xuan Thuy in Paris.

R: I think I should tell him if he's got a message I'll see him and give it to the President.

K: Would you call me and tell me what his message is?

R: Yes, but don't hang by your toes.

K: I just don't want you and Eaton ending the war without my knowing about it.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

Telecon

Joe Sisco

12/22/69 5:00 p.m.

S: I missed you on Friday. I took my daughter to the sub-cabinet meeting party. She said she'd like to meet the President, but the one she really wanted to meet wasn't there--Henry Kissinger.

K: How old is she?

S: 17.

K: Between 20 and above 60 they find me irresistible.

S: I've done a memo from [illegible] me to you. I'm having it hand-carried as personal. After you've read it, you may throw it away if you like.

K: May I show it to the President?

S: If you like. But it's personal--just for you.

K: To me and not to Saunders?

S: Yes, right to you.

K: I'd love to see it.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

12/22/69 7:26 p.m.

K: I'm leaving in a few minutes for the Dobrynin dinner. Is there any last minute word?

P: No, I read your memo. I think it's just right.

K: I just wanted to make sure that nothing else occurred to you.

P: Say, the promise is great, but conditions are the same. On Vietnam, play it cool. Say well, maybe we don't need your help. If it is raised say we are really pressing across the bridge on that. Now anything we do, we don't want you to take affront at it.

K: If these people are right, then we really are in a strong position.

P: If they are right, things can be moved faster than we think. Vann said 20... They say fish in the sea--gotta have fish to feed on. Now the water's going dry.

K: Right.

P: Well good luck, luck, repart to me.

K: Right, Mr. President.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
12/23/69 9:11 a.m.

P: I noticed in the News Summary today about 2 F-111s...

K: Yes, there are two.

P: Don't you think this is a good time... The Air Force ought to move on that thing. It's been plain politics.

K: The Navy has stopped buying.

P: Not only to stop buying, but to ground them.

K: You are right.

P: Okay, I'll see you later today.

12/23/69 9:25 a.m.

P: 16 of these F-111s have crashed in 2 years. Two yesterday one in South Dakota and one in Nevada. It's really ridiculous.

K: There were put together for some abstract notions of cost effectiveness and so forth. They're supposed to be interchangeable between the Air Force and the Navy. And now they don't work for both. They don't fly them from the same place; one from an aircraft carrier, the other from the ground. I'll talk to Mel to see what he would think about cancelling them.

P: We have a problem.

K: I have a call in to Mel right now.

P: See you later, then we'll talk about last evening. It was quite a night, wasn't it?

K: Fascinating. He didn't try to see me in October or November. Didn't make any efforts to better me up. Last night he was all charm. He said you were the one who could do it in the Middle East and no one else. He said we gave you Vienna on 24 hours notice. He said if there's another round they may ask for Helsinki. But there's no time limit on Vienna. He said what do you think of 3 months. But they did what you wanted on the next round and we can stretch that out.

By KHL NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON
Governor Rockefeller
Mr. Kissinger
1:35 p.m., 12-23-69

R said Henry, how are you today? I was not very successful today. K said I gathered that. I talked to the Attorney General today and I got that impression.

R said Henry, I had two things. I talked to Joe Carlino yesterday. I have his report and will send you a copy. Interestingly enough, his brother, who went with them, warned them that Silvera was going to cause them trouble. K said that is amazing. This fellow must have the popular support or he could never have come back. R said anyhow, he is doing a good job. I think that thing is going to roll.

K said certainly your instinct about this fellow has been borne out. There are a number of people saying, what is your friend Rockefeller going to do now. R said I have wanted to send a wire to Meyer saying, "he who laughs last laughs longest". I think they are going to go ahead alright. R said Mr. Torrejos would like to initiate renegotiations on the treaty with Anderson.

K said we are putting the whole Panama thing in NSC in January. I sent you a letter on Nicaragua that your recommendation has been accepted. We are beginning to negotiate on that. I want you to know that while I don't operate with the flair, I don't forget you. R said you are great Henry.

K said on Vietnam, I think if we keep our nerve now, we have them. K said I am sending my three best men out in January. I am sending Haig and Lynn whom you have not met for three weeks. We really have their attention now. It looks as if they are beginning to roll up their guerrilla organization. R said isn't that fascinating. This is really great.

friends in the
R said, one thing Henry, a lot of our/Jewish Community were worried about the Israel situation. I have a statement that it was suggested that I make - that I hope nothing will be done to undermine our security on the Israeli situation. K said that will not hurt. You are not attacking the President when you do this. R said, oh marvelous Henry. R said one other thing Henry - the Brazilians are going to buy jets from the British and Italians. Dick Aldridge, who knows Vaky, State people, etc. would like to come down and talk to these people. K said fine. K said, "and I think the President will welcome your statement on Israel."

By KHL NARA, Dated 5/12/64

TELECON

Professor Doty

1:50 p.m., December 23, 1969

Professor Doty said he had several things. Drell said he had a good discussion about how things are going to be handled between K and him. D said there eventually would be a report of the meetings they had the rest of the day. Drell told Doty he thought they reached conclusive agreement with DOD. In a reanalysis of hard point defense, they found the cost per surviving silo for Safeguard to be 25-30 per cent. K said he found this very interesting. D said they would have something, on the paper K wanted, to send by January 7; and D said he would come to see K on the 14th or 15th of January.

D said K might want to be thinking over Christmas whether there was anything to be gained by any of that group seeing the Russians. There is a rumor Bartov might be coming to the States in February. K said it would be good and that he would be glad to see Bartov or Milienchov(?).

K told D that we had a general discussion here yesterday with some of our friends. D said ______ was quietly pleased. K said except for Vietnam where he thought we will either make it or not make it, if we make it, Doty would forgive us. If we don't make it, K would need his indulgence. K said the group did not give him a hard time. We are all heading in the same direction. The big test is whether we can end the war. D said Eaton had called last night and said he was going to see Rogers today. K said he had shifted Eaton there. He asked Doty if he thought Eaton had anything. Doty replied that he didn't think so. K said Eaton claims he has a secret message; but K said if they gave him such a message, his feelings for them are way down. K said he may have made a mistake in not seeing him, but after Starobin he is very leery. Why should Xuan Thuy communicate through him? Why should K communicate through him? We have a hundred channels -- K could have used Aubrac. They know him and they know he knows K. K doesn't have to use a fellow who walks in off the street. All of these channels are still usable.

They exchanged greetings of the season, and K said he would see Doty in the New Year. He told Doty to have a good stay in Vermont.

lds

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

HAK/UnderSecState Richardson

23 Dec 69

4:45 PM

R: Henry, How are you? K: OK. We have had trouble getting
together. R: Yes. I have two things: follow-up of my brief
reference yesterday evening to Tran Ngoc Nguyen Chow (?).
He is a member of the Assembly. You know about it?
K: No.

R: In South Vietnam he has a brother who has been picked up in
Danang (?) with the Viet Cong. The fact that his brother is a member
of the VC has been known for a long time. He is one of the
assemblymen that President Thieu has wanted to have stripped of
their immunities as a member on various charges, including
contacts with his brother. He reported all of these to our people
... to Vann. K: Yes.

R: And Vann and Baumgardner, Cook, other people who know of
him, including Alex and Sullivan, all think he is a very good
fellow and are concerned that if Thieu pushes this it will have
very bad PR and political repercussions and we will be worried
by our own press. The question is whether or not to try to do
anything through the Embassy and to encourage them to lay off.
Have you any views on this?

K: I would think that in general the President's view is to leave
these things alone, but if it is a very flagrant case I suppose
we could point out to them what the price is.

R: All of us here -- it is strictly secondhand as far as I am concerned.
The people I have talked to are genuinely concerned. I should add
this in fairness to Vann. He had been told by Bunker not to have
any further contact with Chow, and he has not had. I asked him
about Chow but I was very clear on the point that it could do quite
a lot of political damage if this were pushed, but it is illustrative
of the sensitivity of it. K: Yes. Why don't we give our views to
Bunker and tell him at his discretion he can do it.

R: All right. I will ask Sullivan to write a cable which will be
cleared over there anyway.

R: [continuing]: Item 2 is a Christmas truce in Nigeria. I understand Morris has been interested in this. We have been trying to

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/94

see if there is any basis we could join with the people or other
countries for an appeal to both sides for a truce. We have been
in touch with the Hague group, with the Swiss. Hearing the
President was interested in it I asked for a check today to be
made through our Embassy in Rome with the Vatican. It is so
late now nobody could do anything unless the Pope were prepared
to do so and we could associate ourselves with his appeal.
Stabler (?) our Minister in Rome talked with Casarobli (?) an
authority on this subject in the Vatican. The Pope had considered
a truce appeal, had contacted the TMG (?) but had no reply.
A TMG response is very unlikely. We had got a negative on the
part of anybody else although there is a possibility the Italians
may want to make an approach to the Emperor and we are prepared
to say our Ambassador there would join with them. We would not
think under the circumstances we want to do anything unilaterally
especially since the TMG is engaged in a very broad offensive
and they would think if we did anything unilaterally we are
involving ourselves.

K: That sounds right. Why don't you have it written up as a
memo and I will pass it to the President and we can show that
State has acted on his preference.

R: All right.

K: Are you going to Boston for the Holidays. R: I am going up
for the New Year. Are you going away at all? K: I am going
with the President to the west coast. R: How long will you be away?

K: Until the 4th or 5th. R: Have a good time. K: Thank you.
I know we will be working together in the New Year.

R: Well, I count on it Henry. K: Even better next year. It has
been one of the good things that has happened to me here.

R: I feel the same way. Thank you very much, Henry.

ms

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

HAK/Gerard Smith

23 Dec 69

5:00 PM

S: Hello, Henry. I just wanted to tell you how much we appreciated your intervention. That changed the whole thing.

K: Important friends sometimes can be useful to you. We had an understanding on that, and I deliver on my understandings.

S: I think it was very good.

K: Incidentally, my impression in talking to Dobrynin was that they don't have a particular time in mind -- you said 3 months in your cable, but Dobrynin seemed willing to keep it in Vienna for an indefinite future.

S: Karjalainen (?) had been happy to keep it there as long as possible. K: Well, at any rate, we got it off. We moved it.

S: Our 33 members are beholden to you.

K: I will try to get something arranged for you to see the President before we go off. What is your schedule?

S: I will be here for as long as necessary. I will be here and available until at least after New Year's.

K: I think we ought to assemble the verification panel in the New Year's. We could have a meeting on Friday, but I think everyone will want to collect his thoughts. What do you think?

S: I think we will probably do better the following week.

K: The following week I will be on the west coast. Would you mind if we hold off until the first week in January?

S: Yes. K: Very good. S: We have a report I will be happy to bring to the President personally or send in.

K: It may be a good idea for you to send it in if you don't see him before we get away. But I definitely will want to see you.

S: I will be in the office tomorrow morning.

K: Good.

ms

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
HAK/Governor Rockefeller

Dec 23. 5:45 PM

R: I have now got a statement to put out for tomorrow PM. I did not know whether you would like me to read it to you or whether you would rather not hear it. It is very brief.

K: I think I had better not hear it, Nelson.

R: OK, it's very brief, but forget it. It is in response to the increase. K: No, the President has taken the position that the people who did it have to take the heat on this.

R: I have a little different problem because my brother somehow got involved in this thing. K: On the other side.

R: I don't know who got to meetings on this subject.

K: These oil executives put out stuff that is self-defeating because they are just teaching the Arabs how ... they are.

R: Right, this is just about what I was saying before. So you have got no problems on it. K: Yes, I have no problems on it.

R: Yes. I think some people are losing their perspective.

Take care, Henry. K: OK.

ms

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon

HAK: David Rockefeller

23 Dec 69: 6:40

R: First of all I had a talk today with Mr. Gorbow, the representative of the UAR. I think I sent you a brief conversation with him. There is no question that they were pleased and impressed with what happened, but I think it -- and he is going back to report everything to Nasser on 6 January, but there was one thing that clearly was a message he wanted me to deliver to you and that was that if this oil rig of the King people were to arrive and would be put down next to theirs -- they have sort of ... it all was going on so far -- but this really would be an explosive thing.

K: What can I do about it. It is a Canadian rig isn't it?

R: King isn't Canadian, is he? K: Do you know King? He has been told in the most unambiguous terms possible that we don't like what he is doing. It hasn't made an overwhelming impression on him. He has even been threatened with prosecution. We are not supporting it in any sense.

R: Do you think the rig is Canadian? K: My impression is that the rig is Canadian but have not followed it in great detail.

R: He said this would be an absolute disaster - there would be no way of stopping an explosion.

K: I will have to look into it and see if there is anything more we can do. What conceivable interest could the White House have in this? R: Well, the interest to the U.S. government.

K: No, I mean what interest in getting the rig in there. We have no interest in upsetting the status quo.

R: I don't think he thinks the White House is pushing it. He said if it goes in this would be very dangerous.

K: I will do my best. R: OK. #2, Eugene Black has been out there a great deal. He had a great many dealings with Nasser and Nasser probably likes him as much as anyone and has written him to go out unless he is told that he shouldn't, toward the end of January. K: No, I think he should.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

R: He is going to be in Washington on the 5th and 6th of January. My own feeling is that it would be useful for you to see him.

K: I would like to see him, but I am going out to San Clemente and may not be back until the 6th. He should call Tony Lake.

R: OK, and will you just tell Tony? I think he is a fabulous person.

K: Everything I know about him is first class.

R: He really is. He has been feeling a little ill in that he has been advised by every other President and Nixon has not only not advised him but has vetoed him on a number of things. He hasn't been consulted.

K: I would like to see him. R: I think you should. My friend Violay has written a long letter to Crosby Kelly who came in to see me today and the letter will arrive to you via your? new appointment person Dave Young who is Crosby's son-in-law. He is going to bring it down. I read it today and frankly am quite embarrassed because he now says that he and Mr. Pinay (?) have the closest understanding of where M. Pompidou is going, but he has never said he is representing the President in an official way. He can give you the views of what M. Pompidou thinks..... It shows that you were so much smarter than we were and I am very embarrassed. You might want to see him. When you read the letter I wish you would let us know if you still want him to come, but it was not what he represented to me and I am very sore about it.

K: Well, it was a very understandable misunderstanding.

R: I am sorry because it just shows how right you were to insist that .... clarify it. Henry, can you say anything about the story that came out on our visit?

K: Well, it certainly did not come from us.

R: Well, it did not come from us.

K: Some of the group spoke to the Arabs and it may have come from them, but it certainly did not come from us.

R: It was strange because the article said a "high government official". I am sure it did not come from you, but I wonder if it did not come from some White House source. K: Not unless it came from the President hmmm and I am sure he wouldn't have. The only thing that happened that I remember, Flanigan is putting together a report on oil quotas - oil imports. There were some newsmen who had ..... these 5

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

companies and were trying to speed up because of your
oil imports.

R: On the other hand, the article did not mention any of the 3 oil company presidents. It mentioned Jack, Bob Anderson and myself.

K: Conceivable it could have come from Anderson.

R: The Arabs are pleased. But our Jewish friends are anything but.

K: But that bullet had to be bitten sooner or later.

R: Thank you very much. Later on when you have seen the letter you might let me know what you think, but I think you should read the letter.

K: I will read the letter and I will call you then.

R: And Gene Black will get in touch with you.

K: All right. Goodby.

ms

I*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON
Mr. Kissinger
The President
12/23/69; 7:10 p.m.

P said we are going to meet at 9:00 a.m. but they are trying to push us to get the budget finished by tomorrow afternoon. P said I think it is too soon. P said it seems to me these decisions are so important -- Defense, AEC, domestic issues. P said Schlesinger is too abrasive and dogmatic and I can't make decisions on just pushing. K said it was unfair to you to be confronted with decisions on the basis of one person. P said I should not decide some of these issues. P said I think they should be decided in a group and then brought up. P said in all agencies they need an outsider. P further said we are pushing some of these too fast. K said on the two bombs -- there has not been a new tactical weapon in several years. K said you have to consider the impact on the military service. P said yes, I know the problem but on the other hand I sympathize with Mayo. P said I don't like Schlesinger -- they know I don't want to go into every tax item. P said I should deal only with the big issues of doctrine, morale of services, etc. K said right. P said Mayo should not have brought in piddly things. K said either it should be decided or put in writing. K said one should not put the President in a position of arbitrator with decisions that can be settled by lower levels. P said Mayo probably talked to budget directors and they said get the President's ear. P said they are trying to rush us to get the budget to print. I am not going to let them do that. If they have to wait a week -- let them wait. P said if we delay all we need is a good excuse -- Congress has delayed its appropriations. P said what I want to do is get strategy with Mel and then follow from there. I don't think Mel and Schlesinger will hit it off. K said No, Mel dislikes him immensely. K said I think after you look at these items you decide if you want to cut any items and how much and then Mel and I will do it from there.

P said let's have talk about Dobrynin and rest on plane to California

fg

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Telecon

Ambassador McCloy/HAK

24 Dec 69; 2:40 pm

Mc: The reason I am calling is John Oakes got hold of me about getting a terrific beating from the Jewish elements for this affair. He said... I tried to tell him I thought his account of my meeting was a little tortured and distorted because we were talking primarily about the strategic importance of the area. It wasn't a group of people trying to save an investment.

K: Absolutely. The investment issue never came up. It was mentioned as a symptom... we did not put this out.

Mc: He said somebody in the Administration did it. I said who was it and he said it wasn't from the White House -- maybe from the State Department. He said it did come from Administration sources as the article said. John has written two good articles. He asked whether I thought it would be helpful to either write an article on this thing or be interviewed, or something for the editorial page, as to the general tone of the thing. I said I don't want to do that without thinking it over and I wanted to talk to you about it. I wonder how or what to respond to that. Maybe with all the hubbub over it and the news conference it might be just fanning a flame. But my mail is just overwhelmed with it. What do you think about it?

K: We did not particularly want anything about what was discussed with the President because we just don't do that. But if you want to write your own views we would have no objections to that.

Mc: They are bound to associate it with my visit with all the publicity there. I wanted to do it sometime the first of the year. I don't know what effect this will have on the progress of peace in the area.

K: I don't think there is any harm to show we have been collecting views other than the Jewish views.

Mc: I don't either. I was talking to Jerry Warburg the other day. He is collecting money for Israel. He balled me out: what do you mean lining up with the oil men and demanding Israel withdraw without any provisions for security? I told him that was entirely contrary to my view of the State Department position. Furthermore I thought that there were some viable solution here that could be discussed. He said well he was not trying to impose a position. He said he couldn't impose any solution saying take it or leave it. He was suggesting something as a basis for discussion. Jerry finally

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

ended up, "can't these things be brought out?" I didn't want to talk
any more with Oakes about it until I talked to you.

K: I certainly think that Harold should present a balanced view.
Anything you want to do under your own name we have no objection to.
This reflects our policy -- what you have just said. You should see
what I get -- they had a few additional twists in mind.

McCloy: Who do you think could have put out that distortion?

K: It has really infuriated us here because you behaved very delicately.
Some of the people there may have talked to the Arabs and the Arabs
may have put it out.

McCloy: John said we got it from a high-up Administration official.
I said it couldn't come from the White House. He paused a little and
said, it did n't come from the White House.

K: We did tell Rogers and Sisco about it. Mc: Maybe it came from
somewhere in that area. He said it looked as if we are doing one thing
with one hand and something else with the other. I will have a talk
with him late this afternoon.

ms

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon

HAK/Governor Rockefeller

24 Dec; 2:55 pm

K: I just wanted to thank you and I am heppy for that very nice
lithograph you sent me. R: Weren't you nice. It is just a little
souvenir of one of our Latin friends. K: It is lovely - very nice.
I am hanging it in my office because I am spending more time there
than I do at home and I am very graeful to you. R: You know how
we feel about you. You are a dear friend and someone we love and
admire.

I: I want you to know that I feel very much the same about you and I
want you to know that everything I may do here I do because of what
I learned from you.

R: We know that you are doing a tremendous job there with the ground
constantly slipping from under you. K: It was slipping there for awhile
but I think we are bringing it back. R: You do? K: I thing it is going
to be rough. We have got a tough opponent there. R: That's right.

K: And they are not going to get easy. But I think we have a fair chance
now and you know a few months ago it looked as though the whole thing
was going to come unraveled.

R: Henry, did you ever talk to Buckley? K: No because he has been in
Jamaica. R: William White had a very good column. I don't know
whether you saw it, the other day, on my support of Nixon and our
working together.

K: The President told me I could talk to Buckley on your behalf and
he would be behind it too. R: There is one angle I think you ought to
know and that is they have to have more than 50,000 people on the
top line in order to keep their position. They are in third spot; they
don't want to go to fourth and they feel they have to run somebody on
that line. I think we will change the law so that they can gather their
500 or anyone of the top line which means they can do it in the Senate.

K: Right after the first I am going to have a talk with Bill and urge that
you two get together or maybe that I join you. It might be better if
I were not physically present but I will have a long time with him.
He is on your side. You are his candidate for Secretary of State so

By: KHL NARA, Dalo: 5/12/04

he is well disposed. He told me his problem was that their question
is they don't know what the alternatives are.

K: If you think next fall that I can give a speech in one or two places I will certainly be delighted to do that. But we don't have to talk about that now. I will talk to Buckley in early January.

R: I am terribly depressed about that tax bill. I got our two senators to vote against it. They both voted against it. K: I don't know how you do it. R: I told them it was the responsible thing and they are responsible leaders. I think the thing is going to be rough.

K: It is going to be with the present trimmed budget it is going to be murder. And in terms of new programs you know we are ...
The way you handled it Nelson created no bad feelings. I have talked to Ehrlichman and Mitchell. R: You may say to him how much I appreciate what he has been doing. K: Who, Mitchell or Ehrlichman?
R: No, Ehrlichman, and Mitchell too. Tell Ehrlichman I am playing it straight with him. K: He has a lot of respect for you.
R: Well, we will keep it that way.

ms

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/64

TELCON
Secretary Laird
Mr. Kissinger
9:40 a.m., 12-26-69

L said hello Henry. Did you have a good Christmas? Are you going to that meeting at 10:00 a.m. this morning? K said I don't think so - it is straight economics, isn't it? L said yes. K said I don't think I will go.

that

L said how was K the other day? K said you were fine. K said the President has come out on your side completely on the Poseidon stretchout. K said I think he would like one sentence in on the bomber - that he wants it studied. K said $50 million on the bomber. K said P wants to keep the Command Ship after hearing Wheeler's pleas. L said oh he does. K said P wanted me to check as to whether you could make the $485 or whether that would make a great strain on you. L said we will be going down almost $500 million in expenditures in 1971. I have to go now with about 40 major base closings in March. We cut back on 135 bases in November. I went on that because I know his pressures. L said I hope they don't start raising hell with me too much on these closures.

K said let me see if we can come down a little more. $50 m will be put back in by Congress. L said only 40% of that was expenditure. I want you to understand that is not all expenditure - it is only about half expenditure. Expenditure and authorization is the same on all but that one item (lead time items on two submarines) and that is not all expenditure. K said when are you leaving Mel? I will get this rewritten and send it over to you on Monday. L said you can send it over today if you are ready. K said, well, we may not be ready. Let me talk to you later today. L said I will drop by your office when I am finished with 10 o'clock meeting. The people have to understand when you look at the appropriation level, it is another $8B. What happens here - you are contracting what you can do in the out years all the time.

K said I may not be ready to get it to you this afternoon because I should run it by Mayo. I will try to get it down a little more and I don't think we should fool with Defense too much. L said we can come up with a balanced budget by fudging the revenue figures. I don't want to get into a position where a balanced budget is the only target.

L said I am sending you a memorandum today which I prepared after meeting with the Council of Economic Advisers - the talking points I used. These points are important points when you talk about national security planning.

mlh

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/69

TELCORN
Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
Mr. Kissinger
12:00 Noon, 12-26-69

J said Henry did you see the proposed message to Taipei I sent over
to you. I sent it to Mel Laird and sent you a copy to try to get them
to call off the dogs on the F-4 thing. At any rate, Mel and I have
reached an agreement on this thing. It is a copy of a letter I sent
to Mel Laird - I sent you a copy.

K asked what the upshot of it was because the President is restive
about it. J said the upshot is we want to get down to cases on air
defenses. We want to get McConaughy not to talk to them before the
Vice President arrives. And we want to try to calm them down. What
we are saying is what has happened in the last few weeks is not helpful
to anyone. J said we are working on plans for other aircraft but we
have not thought of the F-4. We have been working on plans for them.

K said I have it in front of me now and it is OK. I think it is in the
spirit of the President and you can go ahead on it.

J said alright Henry - thank you.

mlh

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
12/26/69 12:20p.m.

P: Are you here?

K: Yes.

P: Could you come over to talk to Mel and me? Are you with somebody.

K: The Israeli ambassador is with me. Could I come over in 5 minutes . . . Actually, it would only take me 3 minutes.

P: Yes, and why don't you bring him along? It might help just to shake hands.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon

Stweart Loory

12/26/69 3:37 p.m.

L: Can you give me any background to our government's reaction to the Israeli raids yesterday?

K: Not particularly--we are watching it. I talked to Kraslow about it yesterday evening.

L: He said you talked about whether they had anything to do with the postponement of the West Coast trip. What's happening there?

K: Israelis want to put an end to the raids. They mya have de-ciede Nasser is the inspriation for them.

L: Are they building up for a new war?

K: I don't think so; it's highly unlikely.

L: Does it warrant any reaction from Washington?

K: I don't think so.

L: What would have to happen to get a reaction?

K: I don't want to put a limit on it, but we're not there now. Soviet intervention might lead us to it.

L: And that hasn't happened yet?

K: No. It may happen in the next ½ hour, but to the best of my knowledge it hasn't happened yet.

L: Well, I'll be in my office for the next half hour.

K: Don't take me wrong; I'm not saying it's going to happen.

L: Are you going to California?

K: Yes. I'm going to have my kids with me again.

L: Good. Do your kids like to sail?

K: Yes, I guess so.

L: I'm gringing my kids along; lets go sailing.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Ambassador Dobrynin

12/26/69 4:09 p.m.

K: Where are you?

D: At home.

K: I'm still here. I had an opportunity to tell the P about our conversation. I was wondering if you could come in briefly on Monday to hear our reactions.

D: That's all right with me about Monday.

K: It's not of world-shaking importance. I just wanted to tell you how we will proceed. About 11:30?

D: At your office?

K: Right. And also let me thank you for that package. It was very nice.

D: I hope it will last you until . . .

K: It certainly will and I thank you very much.