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This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
(President's Trip to Asia and Romania)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH HON. HENRY KISSINGER, SPECIAL
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS; AND
RON ZIEGLER, PRESS SECRETARY TO
THE PRESIDENT

2:10 P.M. EDT

JULY 18, 1969

FRIDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: As has been the case in the past, the ground rules for the backgrounder are that you can attribute what Dr. Kissinger says to "White House Sources." This is for Sunday A.M. release.

Q Can I ask you one question, please? It is about the itinerary. You are not in a position to release that yet or to add to it?

MR. ZIEGLER: We are working on that now. Following Dr. Kissinger's presentation, if you see Tim Elbourne walk through that door, we may be able to give you additional information.

DR. KISSINGER: I would like to follow my usual practice of not making an opening statement, but let me make a very few remarks and then I will answer questions either about the general theme of the trip or about problems we may foresee in several countries.

We thought that the trip was necessary at this time because relations between the United States and many parts of the world, but particularly Asia, are at a turning point in this sense: There is a great deal of domestic discussion about the nature of American commitments abroad. There is an inevitable concern in many of the countries, especially in Asia, with which we have had relationships extending over the postwar period, as to what the American post-Vietnam role in their part of the world would look like.

For this reason, what we are attempting to do in Asia is not simply to be on a good-will tour, but to attempt to discuss with the leaders of the countries that we are visiting their notion of what an arrangement for the future of Asia would look like.

The issue of the nature of commitments in the United States often takes the form of a discussion of legal obligations. But on a deeper level, and on the level that has to concern the President, the relationship of the United States to other countries depends in part, of course, on the legal relationships but more fundamentally on the conception the United States has of its role in the world and on the intrinsic significance of the countries in relationship to overall security and overall progress.

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When India was invaded in 1962, for example, Ameri-
can responses occurred that were not necessarily defined by treaty
commitments, but by the inherent importance of a country with a
population of 400 million, with democratic forms, attempting to
achieve development, cohesion and progress. Therefore, it is
extremely important for the President at the beginning of his
Administration, at the moment when we are attempting to end a war
honorably, not to be submerged in the tactics of the immediate,
and to try to define the longer term relationship of the United
States to that part of the world.

As the President has often stated, he considers Asia
as an area of enormous dynamism where, without much question,
many of the events of greatest significance for the next decade
will occur; an area, moreover, with which he has had a long,
personal involvement.

In addition, of course, there is the problem of Viet-
nam, a war which we are attempting to end on honorable terms by
making reasonable proposals.

We are not traveling through Asia in order to drum
up support for particular tactics we may pursue. We have charted
our course. We think it is a reasonable one. We will be prepared
to discuss it with those countries that wish to discuss it with
us. We are not there to enlist any additional support for the
day-to-day activities in Vietnam.

What we do want to discuss is, as I pointed out, how
these countries visualize their own future because, as one looks
ahead to the next decade, it is self-evident that the future of
Asia, Southeast Asia, which we will be visiting, will have to
depend not on prescriptions made in Washington, but on the dyna-
mism and creativity and cooperation of the region.

We remain willing to participate, but we cannot supply
all the conceptions and all the resources. The initiative has
to move increasingly into that region. For that reason, it is
important that we consider our views of their future. Therefore,
we have scheduled intensive periods of consultation privately
between the President and his counterpart in each country, and
simultaneous meetings between advisory staffs. These will be the
focal point of this trip. Public functions have been cut to a
minimum.

Of course, there are differences in the national
attitudes of the different countries we will visit. Some are
allies and some are non-aligned. Each of these conceptions
toward the problem of Asian progress and security will have to
be related to any overall approach. We will wind up our trip
in Romania.

I have read a great deal of the analysis that some of
you gentlemen have written about this trip and about its purposes.
I don't know that I can add a great deal to what I said in the
backgrounder I gave in New York on the day that the trip was
announced.

We are committed to a period of negotiation. We are
willing to have friendly relations and open relations with any
Communist country that is willing to deal on the basis of mutual
respect with us. We do not consider that friendly relations
with one Communist country are incompatible with friendly rela-
tions with another Communist country.

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We, therefore, do not believe that this visit can or should be considered as directed against any particular country, or have any motive in disturbing our relationships with any particular country, specifically the Soviet Union. It should be seen in its own light in terms of an overall philosophy of how East-West relationships should be conducted, as an example of the great attention we pay to East-West relationships, and to our attempt to establish a new dialogue which does not necessarily follow all traditional forms, but which is open to new approaches.

Of course, on the way back we will stop briefly in Great Britain and have a very brief talk with the British Prime Minister. This is primarily a refueling stop.

I will stop at this point and answer your questions.

Q Doctor, can you at least correct what you said to include that the President has sent no new initiatives to Asia and is not seeking any new or revised arrangements from what we already have?

DR. KISSINGER? I would not conclude the first part of your statement. The President is trying to discuss with the Asian leaders what the relationship of Asia to its own future, and of the United States to Asia's future, should be over the medium term, and in that sense he is bringing his approach. I always shy away from slogans like "new initiatives" and "new approaches" because they have a gimmicky connotation.

On the second part of your question, are we going to make new commitments or new legal obligations --

Q Or revise the present ones.

DR. KISSINGER: Revise?

Q I am thinking of SEATO.

DR. KISSINGER: We are not going there in terms of redefining existing legal obligations. This is why at the beginning of my impromptu remarks I tried to point out to you that commitments are to be seen in two categories: the legal commitments and the commitments that grow out of the realities of the situation and the mutual relationships that develop from a shared approach. We believe that the latter is the area to which we will put particular attention on this trip. So you should not look for any revisions or any changes in legal commitments. This is not our purpose in going there.

Q Doctor, when you spoke about our willingness to have friendly and open relationships with any Communist country on the basis of mutual respect, I assume you include Communist China?

DR. KISSINGER: The President indicated at an earlier press conference that this applied to Communist China. He also indicated that he did not expect Communist China to be very receptive at this point. But if you ask me as a general proposition, yes.

Q Doctor, is there any chance at all that the President will either go to Russia or meet with any Soviet leaders during this trip?

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DR. KISSINGER: No, there is no such chance.

Q No chance at all?

DR. KISSINGER: No, unless one of them should show up
at Lahore unexpectedly.

I have learned at these press conferences that I must
not make flippant remarks. Let the record be clear that we do
not expect or plan any conceivable way to see any Soviet leaders.
The remark about Lahore was made flippantly and referred to the
difficulty of air schedules.

Q What kind of contingency planning has been
done for the possibility of any disaster on Apollo 11? Will he
continue his trip under those circumstances?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it is a problem that one prefers
not to speculate about at this particular moment. Obviously,
though, it is one that one cannot avoid thinking about.

Q Do you see any possibility of the President
visiting Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: There are no plans to visit Vietnam
on the President's schedule.

Q Doctor, how do you fit in Romania's rather more
independent course to Moscow than most other European bloc nations,
and also its close relations with Red China?

DR. KISSINGER: The visit to Romania should be seen on
its own merit. Romania extended an invitation to the President
early in the term. It indicated a willingness to talk to us on the
level that we have indicated -- that we consider desirable for
relations with any Communist country. We are prepared to have
similar relations with any Communist country.

Incidentally, we do not make a requirement that this
country be hostile to the Soviet Union, we do not judge their
openness by their relationship to the Soviet Union, but by
their relationship to us. We would like to believe that there is
no inconsistency between open relations with us and friendly re-
lations with the Soviet Union.

Q What about the Red Chinese side of it?

DR. KISSINGER: What about the Red Chinese?

Q You said, I believe, in New York, that if they
bring it up, we would be willing to discuss it.

DR. KISSINGER: We have the following approach in dealing
with any of the countries that we are visiting, or that we have
visited: That is, we tell them what topics are on our mind, and
we tell them that we will be prepared to discuss any topic that
is on their mind. Therefore, if Romania wishes to discuss Com-
munist China with us, we will be glad to discuss it. But that is
not the purpose of the visit.

Q Have they indicated that they do want to discuss
this?

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DR. KISSINGER: We have not worked out the agenda yet, and we may not work it out in this much detail. We tell them in general terms what issues we have on our mind.

Q Have they told us in general terms what they want to discuss?

DR. KISSINGER: Only in the most general terms.

May I, incidentally, take this opportunity to make clear one point: On the accounts that I have read of the Roman-ian visit, there was one account which said the announcement was set for July 9th, and we moved it up for domestic considerations. I think I should point out that there was never any other date considered for the announcement than July 2 (June 28) and there was never any disagreement between us and the Romanians about what the date should be.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you be more specific about what we want to talk with them about, the most-favored-nation item, and things like that?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. In each country that we visit there are essentially two categories of problems. There are problems of a general nature and problems of a bilateral nature; that is, in Asia there may really be three categories of problems: problems of a general nature, problems of a regional nature, and bilateral problems.

In Romania we will undoubtedly discuss the general international situation, and the problems of peace, which is one of the principal concerns of the President. We will no doubt discuss East-West relations as we see them, and era that we hope will be one of increasingly active negotiations, and we will also be prepared to discuss a number of bilateral issues that are of concern, including such issues as economic relationships. I obviously don't want to get into what the specifics of these will be.

Q Can you give us a rundown on the strictly bilateral problems you will discuss in each country?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. Let me say first of all that the President's approach on these trips is to concentrate on those issues that only heads of state can deal with, or that heads of state are peculiarly well suited to deal with, and to leave the technical issues either to the concurrent advisory meetings or to the later negotiations. So you should not expect to come out of these meetings any detailed announcement of specific, technical programs. I do not believe that this is a suitable subject for Presidential concern. His concern is with the more general issue.

In the Philippines, we face a situation where, on the one hand, it is a country with which, in many respects, we have been most intimately associated in Asia and toward which there is, on both sides, a particular sentimental bond produced by shared history. Yet on the other hand it would be foolish not to recognize that here is also a country which precisely because of this bond and because of this history has a need to express its nationalism in gestures of independence from the United States.

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It is both a country which is an ally and at the same time defining its own independent role for itself, and a country for which the general proposition I mentioned, of the relationship between legal commitments and factual commitments, is of great concern.

There are a number of bilateral issues, such as the PL-480 program, the sort of contribution the United States should make to internal security, the nature and future of the American presence in the Philippines. We expect that these issues will be discussed in some form either by the Presidents or by their advisers with, however, the proviso that I made before that what we want to do on the Presidential visit is to define a framework for the solution of these issues, and not a technical answer.

Q Could you tell us in all these countries what they have in mind?

DR. KISSINGER: There is a considerable confluence. Let me not say what we have in mind and what they have in mind and then have you make a checklist to see who imposed what on whom. You can assume that the items that I mention are items that both sides want to discuss.

In Indonesia, we are in a country that is one of the richest in resources in the world; that has gone through dramatic transformations in recent years; a country which has had enormous economic travail; that has recently mastered an enormous rate of inflation -- and maybe we will get some reverse technical assistance on this level. Of course, it is also a non-aligned country.

The subjects we will be discussing will deal with, in addition to the general problems I have already mentioned -- and you should always consider what I say now in addition to the general problems at the beginning -- such issues as the Indonesia's economic development plans and our relationship to them; some specific issues having to do with the Indonesian debt problem.

In relationship to Vietnam, any thought that Indonesia may have on the nature of international control machinery, and the contributions of other countries.

In Thailand we are, again, in an allied country, headquarters of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, a country for which the present phase of the Vietnamese negotiations presents some particular problems and with which we have dealt frankly and have kept fully informed in advance of all major moves.

Q What kind of problems, Doctor? Could you be a little more specific?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, the problem that was involved is the significance, for example, of the withdrawal of American troops, the increment that was announced in June at Midway. It is, of course, of particular concern to countries that have been closely associated with that war and that have troops in Vietnam.

We plan to discuss Vietnam policy perhaps in greater detail there than in many other countries, and the evolution that we see in that area. We will, of course, be intensely interested in their views.

There are, in addition, the development projects for

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the Mekong River and for Southeast Asia.

There is the problem, again, in Thailand, as in
the Philippines, of the internal security of those countries.

I think this is, in essence, the nature of the
bilateral issues. This is a country where particularly the general
issues I raised earlier will be discussed.

Q Do you envision a discussion on the future of
American bases there?

DR. KISSINGER: I think we will certainly discuss
that there, as in the Philippines, their view of the nature of the
American presence and what type of presence would be most useful.

India, of course, is the largest country we are
visiting, a country with a great tradition, parliamentary insti-
tutions, and a country to which we have been committed through a
very large-scale economic program for much of the postwar period.
It is, of course, again, a non-aligned country.

We will plan to discuss, in addition to the general
issues which I have already mentioned, some of the plans for
regional cooperation that exist, some of the issues connected
with Indian economic development over a longer term period, and
their view of the evolution of the subcontinent and South Asia.

In addition, as you know, they are members of the
International Control Commission in South Vietnam. Whatever con-
clusions they have reached about the control problem of a peace
settlement that may be negotiated in Vietnam will be discussed.

Pakistan is a country to which the United States is
allied, with which we have had very close relations for a long time,
in which we have to be frank to say that in recent years relations
have been somewhat troubled. The President has visited Pakistan
on many occasions and has a very warm feeling for the people and
leader of Pakistan. He has visited Pakistan six times. We
expect this trip may mark the beginning of a more cordial relation-
ship.

One of the problems that we are certain will arise there,
as well as in India, is the problem of the military supply policy
to the subcontinent. It is a subject which is now under review
in the government. This review will not be completed by the time
we are in India and Pakistan, so there will be no announcements
of any decisions on that issue while we are there.

Of course, the views of the leaders of both of these
countries, which are not identical on that issue, as some of you
know, are going to be considered very seriously in making these
decisions.

Again, Pakistan has made substantial economic progress.
We will be prepared to discuss their economic development pro-
grams and their conception at the crossroads of many influences
from East and West, and their experiences in this respect.

I simply want to say that I am speaking to you without
notes, so do not consider this an exhaustive list. It is intended
as an illustrative list and should be seen in relation to the
general propositions that I advanced at the beginning.

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Q About Russian warships moving to Cuba, do you read this as a response or retaliation for the President deciding to go to Romania, and would you anticipate similar moves as the time for the Romanian visit draws closer?

DR. KISSINGER: First, the Soviet ships passed through the Dardanelles three days before the announcement of the trip to Romania and, therefore, must have left the Soviet Union five days before the announcement of the trip to Romania. I don't know what that proves because to be quite candid, they could have changed the orders to these ships after they had passed the Dardanelles.

But I am simply stating the fact that this particular flotilla left the Soviet Union before the announcement, well before the announcement. Therefore, its departure was certainly not related to our announcement.

Secondly, since we do not consider our visit to Romania an anti-Soviet move, I would like to believe that the Soviet Union feels no necessity to engage in anti-United States moves.

Thirdly, I think as great powers we should not engage in a policy of petty irritations that do not really make any difference.

Fourthly, the visit of the Soviet fleet to Havana is a matter of which we neither approve or disapprove. It is a matter which we regard with ~~un~~ relative indifference.

Q Doctor, having set your course in Vietnam, will the discussions with the leaders of Asia affect that course or change it in any way?

DR. KISSINGER: Not knowing what the leaders of Asia are going to say beyond what we know, this is, of course, a question that is very difficult to answer. We have given a great deal of thought to our course in Vietnam. We believe that we have put forward proposals that are very reasonable and that would permit any fair settlement that anybody might wish to put forward for consideration.

Therefore, we rather think that most leaders looking at the problem would come to somewhat similar views about the general framework, but we will certainly be openminded to listen to what the leaders of Asia are going to say to us.

You recognize we are not totally ignorant of what they think. We took their general views into account in shaping our policy to begin with.

Q While we may not be seeking to round up any additional support for the tactics that we are pursuing in our Vietnam policy, is it likely that in speaking, President Nixon will be further refining the policy and spelling out new details, perhaps even talking about the withdrawal rate?

DR. KISSINGER: The basic American policy and the basic American negotiating framework have now been set and one should not expect that we will constantly modify our proposals simply because the other side has rejected them. We are not engaged on a quest of seeing what else can be conceded, because

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we believe we have made reasonable proposals, and we deserve at least a discussion of what it is that is unreasonable about them. Therefore, you should not expect changes in our negotiating position. You should also not expect any withdrawal announcements on this trip. The withdrawal issue will be considered, as the President announced, in August in relation to the three criteria he mentioned. When a decision has been made, it will be announced. Until it is announced, you can be sure no decision has been made.

Q Doctor, how much importance do you think will be given in the general discussions to the whole problem of growing Soviet presence in South and Southeast Asia? The Soviets have, of course, increased commercially and diplomatically during the Vietnam war. Do you think it will play an important part in the discussions?

DR. KISSINGER: Our view is that the future of that region will have to be defined by the positive purposes of the countries of the region and not by any great power conflict that may exist. In other words, an anti-Soviet or anti-anything orientation is not going to supply, over a historic period, or even a 10- to 15-year period, the framework for a cooperative effort.

We assume that the nations of South Asia, being independent and growing in confidence, can judge for themselves what is in their own interest. We assume that the Soviets are active in that area for their concerns and, therefore, we are not there to thwart any particular country. We are there to see what conception these countries have of their future, and what our relationship in terms of that conception can or should be.

Q Doctor, how important do you feel bilateral trade issues might be in the talks, and in what particular countries are they most likely to figure?

DR. KISSINGER: I really better pass that question because I have a general view of it.

Well, the two countries where it obviously will be most important are the Philippines and Romania. The only reason why I am not being specific about the others is because there are some issues in each of them and I find it difficult to give you a hierarchy of in which countries they are going to be most important. But the Philippines and Romania are the two countries where those issues --

Q I am thinking in a sense of the growing feeling of protectionism in this country. Will there be some fear in countries like India and Pakistan, for example? Will this be raised there?

DR. KISSINGER: The problem of an open, international trading system is one that is of concern to all these countries and it is, of course, of concern to the President, too. As he often expressed on his European trip, he is committed to as open a trading system as possible. We don't expect it, except for those two countries I mentioned, to be of more than a general concern. But the President has articulated a rather clear philosophy with respect to this.

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Q Doctor, could you give us the benefit of your thinking on this rather prolonged lull that has prevailed in Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: The problem of the so-called lull is one that has arisen before.

First, of course, our casualties have still been on the average of about 150 a week, which is considerably less than they were at the high point of the offensive but still at a rate that one doesn't usually associate with lulls.

We are talking of a relative lull.

Secondly, what we want to determine is the extent to which whatever has been happening there is the result of the inevitable, cyclical pattern that occurs after an offensive and is due to the regroupment of forces for a new push, or whether it results in a conscious policy decision.

There is always a fall-off of infiltration during the rainy season, and we are now very actively studying whether this is significantly greater than in previous similar periods.

I want to emphasize that we have made clear, that the President has made clear, that the other side does not have to announce that it is withdrawing its forces, as long as their forces are, in fact, reduced, and as long as we have some reasonable assurance that this reduction is intended to be a permanent feature.

We are very conscious of the possibilities of this sort of conscious reduction of the nature of the war, and we are studying it very carefully.

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Q Would you say something about the informal talks with Mr. Wilson?

DR. KISSINGER: These are mostly of a courtesy nature. The President and Mr. Wilson established a very good personal relationship. The Prime Minister very generously offered to see the President while the President's plane was refueling in Great Britain. The President was delighted by the opportunity to exchange views with a colleague he esteems. There is no fixed agenda for these talks.

Q Doctor, when we responded to a Romanian invitation for heads of state meeting, what other countries made similar invitations, or are we contacting them on our own initiative?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think it would be fair to indicate which countries may have extended invitations that we were not able to fit into this particuaar visit. Of course, as you know, all visits by heads of state have to be in response to an invitation.

Q To pick up an earlier question about Soviet interest in Asia, Mr. Brezhnev has talked somewhat vaguely about collective security arrangements in Asia, and Gromyko expressed a Soviet interest in collective security arrangements in Asia and in Europe. Do you have any knowledge of what sort of thing they are intending and what relationship there might be between what they are thinking about and what we are planning to discuss with our friends?

DR. KISSINGER: They have been very unspecific about what they have in mind by collective security arrangements in Asia. We would assume in any event that whatever collective security arrangements they have in mind they will propose for their own reasons. We have no intention of participating in any such collective security arrangements on any great power basis.

Our general attitude toward security in Asia is what I have described it to be, that it will depend on the arrangements that the countries of the area concerned wish to make, plus whatever contribution we may decide to make in the light of our assessing the particular circumstances.

We do not foresee a great power condominium here working for a specific arrangement directed against any one particular group of countries. If what the Soviets are doing for their reasons happens to coincide with what we are doing for our own reasons, this will not be any reason for us to stop doing what we are doing.

Q Doctor, in Europe the Soviets have been more specific about security arrangements. In that connection, I am wondering whether the President in his talks in Romania, which you said would discuss the international situation, peace and such things -- whether he will be inhibited by the agreed NATO position from discussing the Warsaw Pact proposal for collective security arrangements with NATO; whether he will be inhibited in discussing it in any but the most vague, philosophical vein.

DR. KISSINGER: The Warsaw proposal is for a European

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security conference. I know that we subscribe to the NATO
communique with respect to the European security conference.
Our attitude will be guided by these general principles which
are, in effect, that if there is something to be discussed,
we are prepared to discuss it in any forum. But our attitude
towards the European conference is as it is towards all
conferences: We do not think it helps peace to talk just for
the sake of talking. We are more than open for conferences
whenever anyone has a concrete proposal. Then we will be
happy to talk in the most suitable forum.

We apply this to any subject and to any group of
countries. But our general attitude is that we will not talk
just for the sake of talking, because this creates the wrong
impressions, and it misleads people, and makes the following
state of tension all the more difficult.

Q You have pretty firmly ruled out the possi-
bility of any troop withdrawal announcement during this trip.
Would you similarly rule out the possibility of any further
de-escalation decision during this trip which might result
in a continuation of the so-called lull?

DR. KISSINGER: I am not saying that no decisions
will be taken during the trip. Clearly, any visit to Southeast
Asia must affect one's thinking of this.

Q I meant an announcement.

DR. KISSINGER: I would not expect any dramatic
announcements of this nature on the trip.

Q Doctor, when will General Wheeler be expected to report? Before the President leaves on this trip?

DR. KISSINGER: The recommendations of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff aren't generally made public, but
General Wheeler, as I recall, is returning on Tuesday. In that
case, he will certainly report to the President before he leaves.
If his return should be delayed, the communications are very
good between the plane and the Pentagon. We will have the full
benefit of General Wheeler's views before we reach South Asia.

Q Dr. Kissinger, is it our hope that the South-
east Asia leaders recognize that the Nixon Administration policy
towards their region is perhaps less paternalistic and less
deeply involved in all their activities than the Johnson
Administration was regarded by some?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me say two things. I don't want
to make any comparisons with any other administration. Secondly,
when the President visits Southeast Asia, and, indeed, when
he is visiting Romania, he is going to countries in which he
has been many times before. He has been six or seven times,
I think, in every country, and no less than four times in
any of the countries of the Asian part of the trip.

This will be his second visit to Romania.

So he is meeting leaders again with whom he has
established a working relationship and a personal relationship
going back, in many cases, over a decade or more.

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This naturally creates an attitude of respect and equality with many of these leaders who he met when he was simply a private citizen, exchanging views, and not as a leader pressing a particular program. The style and convictions of this Administration are hostile to paternalism. We believe that the future of peace in the world depends on the increasing assumption of responsibility for their own future by countries and regions, with the United States contributing where it can make a difference but not automatically everywhere in the first instance, except, of course, where we have specific treaty obligations to that effect.

You can be certain that the attitude of this Administration towards the countries we visit will be anything but paternalistic.

Q Since the increased fighting in Laos is going to be a source of major concern, particularly to the Thais, could you tell us before we start out how you see what the increased fighting means, what the other side appears to be up to, and whether it looks like the line can be held there?

DR. KISSINGER: What makes any assessment of peace in Vietnam so complex is that one is always looking at so many contradictory facts. On the one hand there is this decline in certain categories of enemy activity in certain parts of Vietnam. On the other hand, there is clearly the step-up of communist activity in Laos in violation of the Accords of 1962.

This is bound to have a profound impact on the sense of security of Thailand and, for that matter, it is bound to have a profound impact on the confidence one can have in any agreements that are made or in the guarantees of some of the supervisory powers, including the Soviet Union.

I have to say frankly that we do not consider that the Soviet Union has done all it can to bring the war in Vietnam to a conclusion, and we do not consider that it has done all it can, as co-chairman of the Laos Armistice Control Commission, to keep the conflict confined there.

I don't say this with any recrimination but as a fact of the current situation which one has to weigh in assessing the prospects for the future.

I cannot give you a precise answer. We believe that to maintain the essential elements of the 1962 Laos Accords and to observe the 1962 Laos Accords in 1962 is very important for the prospect of a meaningful peace in Vietnam, both from the point of view of the confidence one can have in any agreements or understandings that may be reached, and from the point of view of the impact of an expansion of the war in Laos and the situation within Vietnam and within Thailand.

We are observing it very carefully and we hope that the offensive stays within the bounds of previous summer offensives, but it seems to be of somewhat greater extent this time.

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Q Do you still expect, as you told us recently, a summer offensive in Vietnam? If so, when do you expect that to begin?

DR. KISSINGER: In Vietnam, when one says one expects something, one isn't speaking with any degree of certainty. We would expect that there will be other high points, certainly, high points of offensive activity, sometime in the summer. Whether it will take the form of a concerted offensive or whether it will take the form of a harassing move, it is hard to say. The better answer would be that the other side has the capability to do it.

It is, again, one of the facts we will observe. If there is an offensive, then, really, the present reduction of certain categories of activity will have been merely tactical as a buildup to another surge, such as has happened on innumerable occasions before.

If there should be a prolonged period without a major offensive action, this is a fact we would take into account, as I have said, because we are very carefully observing the possibilities of the sort of action that the President referred to in his speech of May 14, where the other side acts without formal acknowledgement in a substantial way to change the situation.

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, we have just a few more minutes. I think we may be straying somewhat off of the objective of the backgrounder, also.

Q Dr. Kissinger, we made it very clear that we were determined to Vietnam-ize this war out there. To what degree has this alarmed our troop-contributing allies and to what degree do they feel as we do, that the South Vietnamese have the capacity to take over the burden? I am thinking of the Philippines, Thailand, Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

DR. KISSINGER: I would be less than candid if I were to deny that any change in the framework of the existing situation requires some mental adjustment for everybody, and, therefore, the decision to move in the direction different from what had been the previously established pattern required some rather intensive consultation.

The Secretary of State on his visit to the meeting of the troop-contributing countries in Bangkok prepared the ground by explaining our general approach. So did the President in his conversations with the Australian Prime Minister when he was here. All of these countries were informed ahead of time of the decision, and, of course, of the concurrence in the decision by President Thieu.

Therefore, let me separate the immediate tactical issue in which there was full understanding from the longer term issue in which, necessarily, the fact that the American presence in Southeast Asia is being reduced at least by these increments is creating a new factor for many of these countries, one which requires discussion, which will be discussed by the President on the trip, but which we are confident will lay the basis for a more vital, long term relationship.

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