5-17-1999 4:37AM

FROM HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2026751758

FAX

TO: The Hon. Henry Kissinger

FAX #: (212) 759-0042

PAGES: Cover sheet & (18) pages

FROM: Jira Phillips
The Heritage Foundation

Fax: (202) 675-1758

Phone: (202) 608-6119

Here are five documents to assist your preparation for the upcoming Senate Foreign Relations Committee testimony. In addition to the 4 documents mentioned by Dr. Holmes in the cover letter, Document #5 is a draft of testimony based on your speech at our March 23 conference on missile defense, quotes from your memoir *White House Years*, and suggested additions from our staff. We hope that you find this useful.

6-10-1999 2:40AM

Richard Odermatt
Senior Editor

MEMORANDUM

June 10, 1999

**To:** Suzanne McFarlane
Kissinger and Associates

**Subject:** Dr. Kissinger's remarks at Heritage Foundation conference

My initial edit of the transcript of Dr. Kissinger's remarks follows. It runs to 14 pages.

If Dr. Kissinger agrees, I'd be happy to with you or one of your colleagues to finalize it for publication in the Heritage Lecture series.

Many thanks for your help.

FAX 202 / 608-6233

214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Washington, DC 20002-4999

202 / 608-6090

6-10-1999 2:40AM

FROM HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2026/51/58

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# WHY THE ABM TREATY SHOULD NOT PREVENT MISSILE DEFENSE

Remarks by Dr. Henry Kissinger at The Heritage Foundation conference, Defending America: Meeting the Urgent Missile Threat, March 23, 1999.

DR. KIM HOLMES: A few years ago, we at the Heritage Foundation invited Henry Kissinger to a dinner with some of America's most prominent conservative leaders and intellectuals. It was a remarkable evening. There was much discussion of the Vietnam War, relations with the Soviets, and the impact of Watergate on the making of foreign policy. You might have expected fireworks and disagreements; that's what I had expected. After all, we conservatives had not always been very kind to Henry Kissinger, and he had been known to return the favor. But something much more interesting happened: We found ourselves agreeing far more than we disagreed. As the evening progressed, misunderstandings and suspicions faded and a feeling of mutual understanding and respect emerged. We did not—and still do not—agree on everything, but we know for certain that our differences are honorable, and that they are really more about tactics than principles.

I learned that night what I probably should have known all along: that Henry Kissinger has always considered himself to be a conservative. By this, I mean not only the respect for tradition, order, and stability for which he is famous, I mean also a conservatism grounded in a deep and abiding patriotism and love for this country. This patriotism is, I think, the motivating force behind Henry Kissinger's idea of the American national interest. He has always held an unapologetic belief in American strength. He

6-10-1999 2:41AM

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believes in America as a force for good in the world. If we understand the American interest in this way, as a common concern of the American people that needs defending, we should have no doubt of the basic conservative nature of Dr. Kissinger's ideas and his view of America.

We should not be surprised, then, that Henry Kissinger has spoken out in favor of missile defense and against the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. These views are not really new. In the first volume of his memoirs, *The White House Years*, he stated that he supported missile defense and opposed the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. As he said, "I did not see the moral or political value of turning our people into hostages by deliberate choice."

The opposition to ABM systems in the 1970s was no less fierce than it was against Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in the 1980s. Some of the same people who lambasted Reagan, like Senator Edward Kennedy, led the charge against Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in the 1970s. The SDI controversy was really Act II in a long play that began years before. This play continues to this day, only the script is different. The opposition to missile defense has lost the moral high ground and the strategic arguments against it have become much weaker since the Soviet Union disappeared. To help us better understand the strategic dimension of missile defense, we have invited Dr. Kissinger to speak to us today. We look forward not only to his historical observations on missile defense and the ABM treaty, but to his analysis of where we should be heading in the future.

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3

Few people are more qualified to speak on this and other strategic issues than Dr. Henry Kissinger. He is one of the best known American diplomats of this century. He has not only shaped the history of our country, but has played a major role in world events. Through his writings and speaking, Henry Kissinger still exercises significant influence on American foreign policy. And he's still one of the best minds in the business. Shrewd and ever-articulate. Dr. Kissinger never fails to inform, to surprise, and to deepen our understanding.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER: Dr. Holmes, ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate this introduction very much. As I pointed out in the book and I've said on many occasions, one of the saddestes of my public life was the apparent conflict between the conservatives and the policies that we were obliged by the circumstances of the period to conduct. And it was always my conviction that it was, unfortunately, a civil war between people who substantially shared the same objectives, and that it gave a free pass to those in many respects who were preventing resistance in Angola and Indo-China and in those areas with where the actual conflict was taking place. But that was 25 years ago.

I hadn't planned to give a formal presentation. In fact, I really had accepted The Heritage Foundation's invitation in order to learn something about the contemporary debate and, above all, about the contemporary technical issues. However, I will make a few general remarks.

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As Dr. Holmes mentioned, I was an opponent of the ABM treaty. This may sound strange in that the ABM treaty was negotiated in the administration which I served and under my aegis. Therefore, let me explain my general view about missile defense, how the ABM treaty came to be negotiated, and where, in my view, we are now in a general, philosophical sense.

I have always believed that it was morally indefensible for any administration, as a deliberate act of policy, to make the American people hostage to the Soviet Union or to any other potential attacker. I have never believed in the doctrine of mutual vulnerability. I have never believed that you reassure another country by making yourself defenseless. I cannot accept the proposition that we reassure people by remaining vulnerable. And I cannot imagine what an American President would say to the American people if there were an attack and he had to admit that he had done nothing to prevent it or to defeat it. I think the legitimacy of government would be threatened if that were to happen. So, for all these reasons, I have been an advocate of missile defense.

Then how did the ABM treaty come about? When President Nixon came into office, one of his first acts was to propose an ABM treaty. It was based on much more elementary technology than now exists, but it provided for 12 defense sites circling the United States. It was put forward with the argument—which happened to be our strong conviction—that such a system would discourage light attacks, prevent third country attacks, and set a threshold for attacks on the United States.

6-10-1999 2:43AM

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This threshold question is something that should not be lightly ignored. When President Reagan put forward his SDI proposal, a group of concerned scientists came to see me in order to get my signature on a statement in opposition to it. They made the traditional arguments: that it was destabilizing and that it wouldn't work. (It's hard to see how it can be both.) So I asked them to explain to me the mechanics of how it would not work and what would happen at various levels of attack. I don't remember their precise numbers, but it was plain that in the face of a fairly low level of attack—say, several hundred missiles—the Reagan SDI system, according to these scientists, worked fairly well. It became degraded only as more and more warheads were added to the attack.

If you can get an opponent into a position without a defense, the penetration becomes a simple question of mathematics. It's absolutely predictable. But as the threshold rises, and the aggressor does not know which of his missiles will get through, the inhibitions to an attack must also rise. Take the case of the Soviets. I always felt that if the Soviets knew that they would have to launch 200 missiles or 100 missiles in order to get any significant number through, that situation was a lot safer for America than in which they knew that they could launch three missiles that were bound to reach their targets. So, that was my conviction, which I have never changed.

But at that time we faced the usual coalition. One group said missile defense would not work. Another group said it was destabilizing. And in every congressional session, the number of defense sites was reduced. By 1971, we were down to two defense

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sites—which made no strategic sense. (There was none for Washington because the Congress was violently opposed to protecting Washington.) It was guaranteed that the funding request for [OK?] the two sites would go in the next budgetary cycle.

By that point, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want to spend scarce resources on what they considered an essentially useless enterprise. Under those conditions, therefore, we thought that we would put a ceiling on ABM systems in order to limit the Soviet ABM system. They had begun their system several years before we began ours, and they continued to build even though their technology was not very good.

I never felt comfortable with the ABM treaty, but there was nothing we could do about it because defense budgets were being cut. It wasn't really until President Reagan came in that a plausible basis for strategic defense existed. And as soon as Reagan put forward the SDI, as some of you know, I supported it. And I continue to support it for the same reasons. I support also missile defense for allies. I do not support every application that is being made to this principle because I don't see any sense in starting a tremendous confrontation on something that is yet theoretical. But I totally support the principle that the United States should build missile defense for itself and its allies, and that this program should continue.

As to how to handle the ABM Treaty, I have no clear view, but I would not let it stand in the way. First, it is possible to argue that the ABM Treaty was made with an

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entity that no longer exists. It is possible to use the abrogation clause in the ABM Treaty,
but I think that is not the key issue.

The key issue is: Is it a national policy to build a missile defense? Are we serious about it? Are we going to fight the battles that have been going on now for 20 years? The battle lines are always forming along the same issue: Some say that the system won't work. Others say that a tremendous system will be coming along in five years—at which point, those same people will argue that an even better one will be coming along five years after that, so there never will be a right time for deployment.

I have not followed the technology enough to make a good judgment on it. But on the philosophical point of missile defense, I agree. On the philosophical point of defending allies, I also agree. We part company on one issue which I do not think should be raised now. That is the issue of Taiwan. It inflames the political atmosphere for no purpose. The fundamental principles that I have mentioned give us plenty to do for the next five to ten years. And that's an issue that I would face down the road.

So, that is my fundamental position, although I would not make an issue of
Taiwan at this moment because it is totally premature and unnecessary to the basic case.
But, if China objects to missile defense for the U.S. or missile defense for Japan, there is
no reason not to proceed. So, now you know the limited area in which I disagree. I think
we're together on philosophy and may differ on some very limited diplomatic
application.

6-10-1999 2:45AM

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QUESTION: With Prime Minister Primakov, and the Russians generally, making unpleasant noises about future arms control, would you agree that with this set of strategic circumstances the Russians—any more than the Chinese—should not be able to exercise a veto over a national missile defense program for the United States.

DR. KISSINGER: I believe that it is strategically and morally necessary to build a missile defense. Strategically, because of the facts of nuclear proliferation: There are more and more countries that will have a missile capability. And the doctrine of mutual vulnerability and assured destruction is one that I have opposed in my writings for at least 30 years. It was never attractive, but at least it made limited theoretical sense in a two-power nuclear world. In a multi-nuclear world, however, it is reckless. Therefore, we cannot give *any nation* a veto over missile defense. We can talk to them about a world in which there will be a missile defense and how to manage it, but we cannot give any nation a veto. I don't really know what Mr. Primakov and the Russians could do. With what economy are they going to undertake an arms race?

QUESTION: What if China forces the issue on Taiwan? I understand they have 200 missiles directed at Taiwan.

DR. KISSINGER: It is my view that a wise American policy can prevent China from forcing the issue. American Presidents, from President Nixon's opening to China to this day—without exception—have expressed America's concern about a peaceful

06-10-1999 2:46AM

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resolution of the Taiwan issue. I believe that President Clinton had wide support in his actions in the crisis a few years ago. I believe that we should not inflame the Taiwan debate. Here is where I part company with some of the conservative groups. We should not inflame it; we should not challenge them. But there is a long record of the American position if the issue should be forced. It would be very dangerous for China to do that.

QUESTION: What would be the response by Russia if the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty? Would it make any difference if we offered to share some of the technology with them?

DR. KISSINGER: I have never been an enthusiast for the sharing of technology. That sounds like a great arms control seminar proposal. It doesn't bother me for the United States to have an advantage in technology.

I wouldn't tackle the problem on that basis. I don't think we've had a sensible policy toward Russia. If our policy toward Russia were based on some reciprocity, in which they had something to gain in other areas, then they would have something to lose if they challenged us. But we have conducted our Russian policy as if it were a psychiatric exercise, not a diplomatic exercise.

I would not go that route of saying that we would build their defense system because then they can actually get a veto over our actions. If, however, Iran developed a missile capability on its own, for example, and if we could achieve serious political understandings with Russia about the future of central Asia, then we might look at it. But it has to be in a political context and not for its own sake.

6-10-1999 2:46AM

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QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, you wrote a letter to Senator Strom Thurmond in 1995 which contained a startling sentence. The letter is public, so I'd like to read from it. One line says, "Our experience with the ABM Treaty has shown that a lack of defense neither promotes offensive reductions nor otherwise enhances stability." And therefore, you recommended in the letter that we built a missile defense.

DR. KISSINGER: Correct.

QUESTION: And yet the treaty in 1972 was defended as enhancing stability and as promoting reductions. Nevertheless, the Russians went into the biggest arms build up in history—when we had four modernization programs, they had 28—and the hope that the treaty would lead to reductions was never fulfilled. What you would recommend telling the Russians at this point?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think you ever heard me or President Nixon use those arguments. Any administration is composed of many individuals, and there's no doubt that those who work on arms control have passionate views along those lines. I can only speak for President Nixon and myself. We made the ABM Treaty because we wanted to get something for what the Congress was going to do anyway. And we didn't want to lose our two sites for nothing. That was the essential reason. On the buildup, we were in a very difficult period at that time. The Soviet Union was building and our Congress was cutting. I think if you look at the record, you will not find one defense budget coming from the Pentagon that was cut in the White House. On the contrary, whatever pressures we exercised were in the direction of stronger rather than weaker defense. I have never believed that unilateral reductions are the way to stability. I do believe that we owe it to

6-10-1999 2:48AM

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our people to demonstrate that we are making a serious effort to stabilize the situation.

But that is what President Reagan did as well in the middle of a buildup.

QUESTION: The SALT I Accords provided for about 2,000 warheads on each side. At that time, we had the notion of two 100-interceptor sites—a ratio of about 10 to 1 interceptors to incoming missiles. That was considered by the Soviet Union and us to be stabilizing. Today's program, the so-called National Missile Defense, is a 100-interceptor site in the face of 6,000 or so START accountable weapons. This suggests to me that if we went to a 10 to 1 ratio, we could have easily 600 interceptors out there instead of the pathetic 100 and there's no way of saying that that would de-stabilize anything. So, in addition to dumbing down the technology of our systems, we are even cutting the numbers. It doesn't seem to make sense at all. Could you comment on that?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not believe that in the present balance of forces in the world, balancing offensive capabilities is the way to produce stability. It seems to me very logical that we should have a very effective defense against third-country attacks, and against any conceivable new country or even existing countries. I think we could raise the threshold against the Russian attack very considerably. I'm not familiar with the numbers that you are mentioning, but they make sense to me.

QUESTION: My question has to do with sea-based defenses. According to Article V of the ABM Treaty, such defenses are banned if they work against the United

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States or are able to defend the United States. Not just the deployment is banned, but also the R&D, the development and the testing as well. On the one hand, we can develop sea-based defenses to protect our troops abroad. On the other, we can't let those defenses also work to protect Americans at home, according to this treaty. If we did so, we would have to cancel the program because the treaty says you can't develop, test, or deploy such defenses.

This had led to a situation in which the argument about sea-based national missile defense is going to be corrupted during the political debate in this country. On the one hand, some of us argue for making the Navy theater defense system all it can be. That was the conclusion of the new Heritage Foundation report, *Defending America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat*. And in fact, if you make the Navy theater defense all it can be, it can defend the United States as well. On the other hand, the bureaucracy is producing a report for a dedicated national missile defense which ends up with a cost associated with dedicated assets that are not already paid for because they're products of an Aegis system that tax payers have paid $50 billion for already: the command and control system being developed for the Aegis air defense and a whole host of other things. And I'm concerned about the Congress, with limited time, being able to ferret out these details.

So, I would like to know what your prescription would be for dealing with this subtlety in the political context. I'm afraid we're going to commit ourselves to a program that will cost a lot of money, that will not be very effective, and which our budgetary processes

6-10-1999 2:49AM

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would kill. In other words we would be saddled with a dead-ended program while a better
alternative did not get a fair hearing.

DR. KISSINGER: I think that I will work at educating myself on the technology.
If there are any military people here, I would genuinely appreciate briefings that bring me
up to speed. But as a general proposition, I would say that we need a Rumsfeld
Commission on what is the most effective technology to defend the United States and to
achieve our objectives in theater defense. I would start from that point of view. The only
permissible question for that commission would be what is the best system or
combination of systems. I would try to compose it of people who are not fanatics on
either side, but who are technically competent and whose opinion would carry weight.

I do not believe the ABM Treaty, which was negotiated in a two-power world, should be
the principal guide to missile defense in this period. And I in fact, believe that Russia
should be introduced into the international system, and that we have an interest in good
relations with Russia. I believe also that it cannot happen until we treat them as adults
that have their national interests, just as we have our national interests. And then let's see
how we can bring them together. But we can answer this question, I would try to create a
Rumsfeld Commission of scientists to come up with the best technical proposal. My
strong inclination would be to back such a proposal and adjust the ABM treaty to it.

DR. HOLMES: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. Thank you very much. This idea of a
commission is something that The Heritage Foundation has already undertaken. We

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assembled a commission of some of the best minds and scientists and technologists in the
country and asked them to propose a missile defense system that will be most affordable,
most effective, and most quickly deployable. The commission's report, *Defending
America: A Plan to Meet the Urgent Missile Threat*, was released today. So, we've got a
good start. Perhaps we can talk about expanding on that commission's work. Congress
may want to convene another commission to look into the issue in more depth.

MS. : He became a partner in an international law firm, Lathan and Watkins. And with his Harvard degrees and his business experience and his partnership, his life was made. Comfort and riches were his. But the story did not end. He is not the sort of soul to do what is ordinary, so he took the job as associate senior counsel to the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, and there he wrote the budget [tape fades out totally]

CONGRESSMAN CHRIS COX: If these circumstances arose today, everybody in this room knows we have no defense. We have no options. Our governments in the teeth of such blackmail threats would not have even minimally acceptable options. And although the Dangers that I've talked about just now, spring from the ancient problem of tyranny, they're posed by uniquely modern weapons, missile delivery systems capable of delivering evermore dangerous payloads -- chemical/biological as well as nuclear. So as many speakers have said today, a large portion of the American public needs to know. Our public opinion polls show that Americans believe already that we possess at least a defense against a single missile, but we do not have the capability to detect, to disarm, to destroy or to deflect an incoming warhead. In 1983 when President Reagan challenged the scientific community to develop ways of rendering nuclear ballistic missiles impotent and obsolete, the technology was very different and in fact, the threats that we faced were very, very different than today they are. In some ways because of the build-downs that have occurred, the arsenals of weapons that we face are slightly less threatening than what existed in 1983. But the risk of use of these weapons is now greater than ever. And the source of the threat is different than what it used to be before. We still face problems with Russia having inherited substantially the arsenal that the Soviet Union possessed. We face a growing ICBM threat from the People's Republic of China and it's true that in 1996, General Shan implied that the People's Republic of China would destroy Los Angeles if the U.S. intervened to defend Taiwan from an attack.

Dr. Kissinger, I acknowledged your presence even before you arrived, and thanked you for your briefing on Kosovo. I had one this morning from the President with a slightly different spin. [laughter]

Within the last several weeks, as you know, it's been reported that the PRC has been engaged in a significant missile build-up opposite Taiwan. In an effort -- it's now known because they have been so up front about it -- to pre-empt United States efforts at arranging a theater

missile defense in East Asia even though these efforts of
ours are only in the planning stage. So, in addition to
those traditional threats from the PRC, from Russia and from
others, we know have the growing and much more difficult to
deal with threat from such states as North Korea and Iraq.

Now, all of you know that their systems are not as
sophisticated, certainly, as ours, as Russia's but it
doesn't much matter because even their weapons of some
decades old vintage are capable of inflicting incalculable
destruction. It was only four years ago, when the CIA told
us that a direct ballistic missile threat to the United
States beyond what we knew already existed from the PRC in
Russia would not exist prior to the 2010. This past July,
the Rumsfeld Commission first reported to us that that --
they reported to us quite explicitly on the floor of the
House of Representatives in the last few days and in other
classified briefings, but they have reported publicly and
generally that that estimate was in error and that there is
in fact a broader, more mature and rapidly evolving threat
than the intelligence community has acknowledged. And
compounding the problem, the Rumsfeld Commission pointed
out, there are new weapons in the arsenals of these nations
of deception and denial. Concealment is now a much greater
problem than it used to be. There is an increasing capacity
of nations to hide their development programs and their
proliferation. So the warning times for us to anticipate
what is going to happen to us are reduced compounding our
lack of intelligence.

The Rumsfeld Commission told us that virtually any
hostile nation -- and I've stressed how poor these nations
might be -- could develop and deploy missiles capable of
carrying weapons of mass destruction that could reach us
within of about five years of a decision to do so. The fact
that American intelligence didn't anticipate India's nuclear
test last May demonstrates the way that deception and denial
can be employed by any country.

When Iran tested on July 21st, its Shahab missile it's
fair to say, essentially, we missed it. Pakistan's April
6th test of its Gari, the same thing. And both of those
were derived from North Korean technology. What's more -- I
can cite an open source here, Janes -- Janes Defense Reports
asserted that both of these governments, Iran and Pakistan,
then provided North Korea with the test data from their
launches. There's one last problem -- virtual testing, the
increasing availability of high performance computers for
this purpose along with the increasing proliferation of
stolen test codes makes it increasingly likely that our

intelligence will be denied the most obvious way to detect
and have advance warning of what's going on -- test
launches. We won't know about these to the extent that
people are relying upon virtual testing.

This brings us to a conclusion that I'm quite certain
everyone in this room shares, that we haven't any other
choice but swiftly to move forward on a deployment of a
defense that actually defends us. I welcome the fact that
President Clinton has retreated from his February veto
threat of legislation announcing that it is the policy of
the United States of America to deploy a national missile
defense. He did so because of the votes that occurred in
the House and in the Senate. And as you know, they were
both veto proof and significantly so. It's very important
that we put the Star Wars era behind us because the world
has changed so dramatically since that 1983 challenge. I
think we are on the threshold of doing so. I'm quite
confident that Congress will be there. I'm heartened by the
fact that increasingly it appears that the administration
can be gotten to go there. Let us hope that it is in the
nick of time. Thank you very much. [applause]

MR. : Thank you, Chris, most warmly. And the
Congressman has got time to answer a few questions if you
have some.

CONGRESSMAN COX: That was sufficiently comprehensive.
I cannot imagine that there are any questions.

MR. : You can even ask the delicate ones.

MR. : When will we see the fruits of your
report?

CONGRESSMAN COX: Frank Dafney has asked when our
report, the report of -- I'm the only one in town that I
know that can actually say the full name of my committee,
the Select Committee on National Security and Military
Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China will
issue its final report in unclassified form as quickly as
possibly we can. We're hoping by the end of this month.
That's the expiration of the ninety days that we gave
ourselves to negotiate declassification with the Clinton
Administration. But I'm much more bent on producing a real
report than getting a sanitized version out before it's
ready.

I'm concerned about two things -- first that the report
will be rendered misleading because of the deletion of our

findings. And second, that it will be rendered misleading
because of the deletion of the examples supporting those
findings or the alternation of the findings. And we've been
asked to do both. To use a hypothetical case, let us say
we've got a finding supported by eighteen specific examples.
We've been asked to suppress the examples and then,
furthermore, to change the finding from this did happen to
this could happen. Now, protecting sources and methods is
vitally important. And that is particularly important when
it comes to the PRC because we need to hang on to the
sources that we've got. But we're going to make sure that
we don't do anything more than is necessary to protect
sources and methods by way of suppressing information that
is necessary for policy discussion.

Much of what has been said publicly about the espionage
direction against the United States by the People's Republic
of China over the last several years has been tendentious
and misleading. And it's very important to set the record
straight. Those of you here who have helped us prepare this
report, who have clearances and who have read it know that
there's a great deal that hasn't met the eye yet that needs
to at least in a policy way so that we can do what's
necessary to fix this problem. And I agree with not only
Norm Dix, but all the other members of my committee that
here, partisanship is peril because is the Administration
responds by saying, "This is not a problem. It didn't
happen on our watch," or what have you, we won't be able to
fix it. We've got to fix this problem and it's a very
serious problem that's going to take us years to fix. We've
got to start right away. So, getting that information on
the table, so we can change behavior, break the mold and set
out in the right direction is our mission and I hope that
it's a matter of days and not weeks that we can accomplish
that result. Thank you very much. [applause]

MR. : Thank you very much, Congressman Cox,
for that view of the world. It was quite a tour and we
thank you very much for your insights and for being here
with us today.

A few years ago, we at the Heritage Foundation invited
Henry Kissinger to a dinner with some of our friends.
Present were the nations most prominent conservative leaders
and intellectuals. It was a remarkable evening. There was
much discussion of the Vietnam War, the relations with the
Soviets and the impact of Watergate on the making of foreign
policy. You might have expected fireworks and
disagreements. To be honest, that's what I had expected.
After all, we conservatives had not always been very kind to

[LC]

Henry Kissinger. And he had been known to return the favor. But something much more interesting happened. We found ourselves agreeing far more than we disagreed. As the evening progressed, misunderstandings and suspicions faded and a feeling of mutual understanding and respect emerged. We did not and still don't agree on everything, but we know for certain that our differences are honorable, and they're really more about tactics than principles.

I learned that night probably what I should have known all along in that Henry Kissinger has always considered himself to be a conservative. By this, I mean not only the respect for tradition, order and stability for which he is famous, I mean also a conservatism grounded in a deep and abiding patriotism and love for this country. This patriotism is, I think, the motivating force behind Henry Kissinger's idea of the American national interest. He has always held an unapologetic belief in American strength. He believes in America as a force for good in the world. If we understand the American interest in this way, as a common concern of the American people that needs defending, we should have no doubt of the basic conservative nature of his idea and of Dr. Kissinger's view of America.

We should not be surprised, then, that Henry Kissinger holds the views he does on missile defense. We will hear from him soon on the topic, so I don't want to say too much about it, but we know he has spoken out in favor of missile defense and against the ABM treaty. Now, these views are not really new. I the first volume of his memoirs, the White House years, he stated that he supported missile defense and opposed the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. As he said, and I quote, "I did not see the moral or political value of turning our people into hostages by deliberate choice," end quote. Now, the opposition to ABM systems in the 1970s was no less fierce than it was against Ronald Reagan's SDI in the 1980s. Some of the same people who lambasted Reagan like Senator Kennedy, led the charge against Nixon and Kissinger in the 1970s. The SDI controversy was really Act II in a long play that began years before. Now, this play continues to this day, only today, the script is different. The opposition to missile defense has lost the moral high ground and the strategic arguments against it have become much weaker now that the Soviet Union has disappeared. To help us better understand the strategic dimension of missile defense, we have invited Dr. Kissinger to speak to us today. We look forward not only to his historical observations on missile defense and the ABM treaty, but to his analysis of where we should be heading in the future.

5

Few people are more qualified to speak on this and other strategic issues than Dr. Henry Kissinger. He is one of the best known American diplomats of this century. He has not only shaped the history of the country, but has played a major role in world events. Through his writings and speaking, Henry Kissinger still exercises significant influence on American foreign policy. And he's still one of the best minds in the business. He's shrewd, ever articulate. Dr. Kissinger never fails to inform, to surprise and to deepen our understanding. And before I ask him to come to the podium, I would like to say a word about his new book, the concluding volume of his memoirs, The Years of Renewal is out, of course. It's truly a rare -- for a book on history and foreign policy, it's not analytically engaging, but it's a great read. I'm not quite finished with it yet. It's over a thousand pages, only got it a couple of days ago, but is one of the few books whose jacket notes are right on the mark. The jacket notes say it's, and I quote, "A brilliantly told narrative of almost Shakespearean intensity." And that is absolutely true and I urge all of you to read it. So, ladies and gentlemen, without further ado, please welcome Dr. Henry Kissinger. [applause]

DR. HENRY KISSINGER: Kim and ladies and gentlemen, I appreciate this introduction very much. I really do. Because as I pointed out in the book and I've said on many occasions, one of the sadnesses of my public life was the apparent conflict between the conservatives and the policies that we were obliged by the circumstances of the period to conduct. And it was always my conviction, that it was unfortunately, a civil war between people who more or less shared -- substantially shared the same objectives, and that it gave a free pass to those in many respects who were preventing resistance in Angola and Indo-China and in those areas with where the actual conflict was taking place. But that was twenty-five years ago. Now, I'm here.

Kim has given me an extravagant introduction, but you ought to understand how I came to be here. I received an invitation from the Heritage Foundation to come to a seminar on missile defense that would take place all day. I was coming here, basically, I hate to say, to promote my book. [laughter] And I told Kim which he helped me -- not here to this place to promote my book, but to Washington to promote my book. Of course, I've been preempted by Kosovo, so on every program on which I signed up to promote my book, I've been asked about Kosovo and the Administration undoubtedly thinks I came down here to agitate against them on this

[LC]

6

date. So, then I said -- told the Heritage Foundation, I'll
drop in here in the gaps I have in my schedule. So, Kim
came to see me. Next thing you know, I'm speaking here. I
really had accepted in order to learn something about the
contemporary debate and above all about the contemporary
technical issues, so I don't have a prepared text. And I'll
just make a few general remarks.

As it -- Kim mentioned, I was an opponent of the ABM
treaty. Now, this may sound strange since the ABM treaty
was negotiated in the administration which I served and
under my aegis, and therefore let me explain my view, my
general view about missile defense, how the ABM treaty came
to be negotiated and where in my view we are now in a
general philosophical sense. Kim has really said everything
I have to say about missile defense by reading from my book.
I have always believed that it was morally indefensible for
any administration to make the American population hostage
to the Soviet or to any other potential attacker as a
deliberate act of policy. I have never believed in the
doctrine of mutual vulnerability. I have never believed
that you reassure another country by making yourself
defenseless. I cannot accept the proposition that we
reassure people by remaining vulnerable. And I cannot
imagine what an American president will say to the American
public if there should be an attack and if he would have to
say that he did nothing to prevent it or to defeat it. I
think the legitimacy of government would be threatened if
such a condition existed. So, for all these reasons, I have
been an advocate of missile defense.

Then how did the ABM treaty come about? When President
Nixon came into office, one of his first acts was to propose
an ABM agree -- treaty. It was based on much more
elementary technology than now exists, but it provided for
twelve defense sites circling the United States, and was put
forward with the argument which happened to be our strong
conviction, that it would discourage light attacks, prevent
third country attacks and set a threshold for attacks on the
United States. And this is not something that should be
lightly -- this threshold question is not a question that
should be lightly ignored. When President Reagan put
forward his Star Wars proposal, his SDI proposal, a group of
concerned scientists came to see me in order to get my
signature on opposition to it. And they made the
traditional argument -- one, that it was destabilizing and
secondly it wouldn't work. It's hard to see how it can be
both. So, I said, explain to me the mechanics of how it
will not work. What will happen at various levels of
attack. And I don't remember what their precise numbers

were, but it was plain that a fairly low level of attack,
say, several hundred missiles it worked even the Reagan, the
SDI system, according to these scientists worked fairly well
and that it became degraded only as more and more warheads
were added to the attack.

Now, if you can get a major opponent into a position
where he -- oh, my God, am I dramatic. [laughter] What do
I do, go on or --

MR. : No. Go on.

DR. KISSINGER: Well, I tell you, can't say I'm not
eloquent. [laughter] If you can get an opponent into a
position without a defense, the penetration becomes a simple
question of mathematics. It's absolutely predictable.
Since the aggressor does not know which of his missiles will
not get through, if the threshold -- as the threshold is
obliged -- rises, the inhibitions to an attack must also
rise. And take the Soviet case. I always felt that if they
knew that they would have to launch two hundred missiles or
a hundred missiles, whatever the number is, in order to get
any through, any significant number through, that was a lot
safer for America than if they knew if they could launch
three they were bound to get there. So, that was my
conviction which I have never changed.

But then we face the usual coalition. One group said
this won't work. Another group said it's destabilizing.
And in every congressional session, the number of defense
sites was reduced. By 1971, we were down to two defense
sites -- in North Dakota and I forget -- maybe they were
both -- they were in the north. Now, Washington was only
added later. There were two -- we had none in Washington.
We then traded one of them in under the ABM treaty for
Washington because the Congress was violently opposed to
protecting Washington. And we never built one near
Washington. We kept the right to build one in Washington
which we never exercised. We were down to two defense
sites. And it was guaranteed that they would go in the next
budgetary cycle and they didn't make any sense anyway where
they were or made any strategic sense. Two sites didn't
make any sense. And by that point, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff didn't want to spend scarce resources on what they
considered an essentially useless enterprise. And it was
under those conditions that we thought we would trade in the
-- we would put a ceiling on the ABM in order to limit the
Soviet ABM system which had been built -- which had been
started to be built several years before we did and which
they continue to build even though their technology was very

8

[L.C.]

good. So, this was our reasoning. We used ABM, the ABM treaty and I'll tell you frankly, I had a lot of grief from the conservatives about Salt I which I think in retrospect will not stand up because we limited unilaterally agreed programs. But I don't want to fight that battle again. I thought we did the right thing with Salt I. I never felt comfortable with the ABM treaty. And -- but there was nothing we could do about it because there no -- there was - the defense budgets were falling, were being cut and it wasn't really until Reagan came in that a plausible basis for strategic defense existed. And as soon as Reagan put forward the SDI as some of you know, I supported it. And I continue to support it for the same reasons. And I support also missile defense for allies. I do not support every application that is being made to this principle because I don't see any sense in starting a tremendous confrontation on something that is yet theoretical. But the principle that the United States should build missile defense for itself and its allies, I totally support and that this program should continue.

How to handle the ABM Treaty, I have no clear view on except that I wouldn't let it stand in the way. First, it is possible to argue that the ABM Treaty was made with an entity that no longer exists. It is possible to use the clause -- the abrogation clause in the ABM Treaty, but I think that is not the key issue.

The key issue is, is it a national policy to build a missile defense? Are we serious about it? Are we going to fight the battles that have been going on now for twenty years? And the battle lines are always forming along the same issue -- system won't work. It's a tremendous system coming along five years from now at which point, those people who argue that, will argue that it's an even better one coming along five years after that, so there'll never be a right time for deployment. I frankly have not followed the technology enough to make a good judgement of what one should start with and I honestly came here originally, in order to hear some technical discussions. But on the philosophical point of missile defense, I agree. On the philosophical point of defending allies, I also agree. And we part company on one issue which I've explained to Kim I do not think should be raised now.

Give us plenty to do for the next five to ten years. And that's an issue that I would face down the road. But I would -- so therefore -- and I mention it only not in order to have a big argument here, but so that if you ever hear me speak on this subject, you don't think that I have said one

q

thing to one group and other things to another group. But, if China objects to missile defense for the U.S. or missile defense for Japan, there is no reason not to proceed.

So, that is my fundamental position even though I would make an issue of Taiwan at this moment because it's totally premature and it's not necessary to the basic case. So, now you know where I agree, limited area where I disagree. And I think we're together on philosophy and may differ on some of the diplomatic -- on some very limited diplomatic application. That's really all I wanted to say. And remember, this is not a prepared speech which is why you're lucky, if it were prepared, probably be [inaudible].

But, should I answer a few questions? Be glad to take a few questions. I have to get Frank who gave me a hard time for so many years.

MR. : At the risk of giving you a hard time again -- because the lights were off and the camera might not have got the memorable things that you have just said, I'd like you to address, specifically in the context of the concern with Primakov here today and the Russians generally making unpleasant noises about future arms control [inaudible]. If you will say again for posterity as well as for this audience, would you agree that the Russians ought, at this point in time, with this set of strategic circumstances any more than the Chinese be able to exercise a veto over a national defense [inaudible] program [inaudible].

DR. KISSINGER: I believe that it is strategically and morally necessary to build a missile defense. Strategically, because of the facts of nuclear proliferation so that there are more and more countries that will have a missile defense -- a missile capability, that -- while the doctrine of mutual vulnerability and assured destruction was one that I have opposed in my writings forever -- for thirty years at least. But it had a limited theoretical sense in a two-power nuclear world. Never attractive, but at least conceivable. In a multi-nuclear world, it is reckless. Therefore we cannot give any nation -- any nation -- a veto over missile defense. We can talk to them about the world in which there will be a missile defense and how to manage it, but we cannot give any nation a veto and I would apply that very much to Mr. Primakov and I don't really know what they could do. What are they going to do? With what economy are they going to do an arms race?

MR. : What if China forces the issue on Taiwan? I understand they have two hundred missiles now directed at Taiwan.

DR. KISSINGER: And it's my view that China -- that a wise American policy can prevent China from forcing the issue. But American presidents now without exception from President Nixon's opening to China to this day have expressed America's concern about a peaceful resolution of that issue and I believe that President Clinton had wide support in his actions in the crisis a few years ago. So, I believe that we should not enflame the Taiwan debate which is where I part company with -- with some of the conservative groups. We should not enflame it. We should not challenge them. But there is a long record of the American position if the issue should be forced. It would be very dangerous for China to do that. Miss -- this young lady here. You had your hand up.

MS. : Well, actually, my question was very similar to Frank's which was what would be the response in Russia if the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty? And would it make any difference if we offered to share some of the technology with them?

DR. KISSINGER: You know, I have never been a wild enthusiast for sharing the technology. I mean this is -- there are -- [inaudible] these are great arms control seminar proposals. It doesn't bother me for the United States to have an advantage in technology. [applause] So, I didn't -- frankly, I didn't particu -- what's the one aspect of the Reagan plan, that I did not particularly appreciate. And I don't -- I wouldn't tackle the problem on that basis. I don't think we've had a sensible policy towards Russia. If we could get a policy towards Russia that is based on some reciprocity in which they have something to gain in other areas, then they'd have something to lose if they challenge us, but we have conducted our Russian policy as if it were a psychiatric exercise, not a diplomatic exercise. [laughter] And this has been -- [inaudible] I think it's the -- I would not go that route of saying we will build your defense system because then they can actually get a veto over our actions. I don't think that is the way to go. It could happen that if Iran develops a capability on their own and if we could get serious political understandings from -- with Russia about the future of central Asia, that then we might look at it, but it has to be in a political context and not for its own sake. Yes, sir.

11

MR. : I'm Sven Gramer, Dr. Kissinger. You wrote a letter to Senator Thurmond in 1995 which had a startling sentence. The letter is public, so I'd like to read it to you. It says, "Our experience with the ABM Treaty has shown that a lack of defense neither promotes offensive reductions nor otherwise enhances stability. It neither promotes offensive reductions, nor does it enhance stability." And therefore, you recommended in the letter that we go and built a missile defense.

DR. KISSINGER: Correct.

MR. : And yet the treaty in 1972 was defended as enhancing stability and as promoting reductions. And the Russians went into the biggest arms build up in history when we had four modernization programs, they had twenty-eight. And the hope of it leading to reductions was never fulfilled. And I wonder if in today's world, in dealing with the Russians who do not want to veto, what you would recommend telling them at this point.

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think you ever heard me or President Nixon use those arguments. Any administration is composed of many individuals. And there's no doubt that those who work on arms control have passionate views along those lines. I can only speak for President Nixon and myself. We made the ABM Treaty because we wanted to get something for what the Congress was going to do anyway. And we didn't want to lose our two sides for nothing. That was the essential, the essential reason. On the build up, we were in a very difficult period at that time. The Soviet Union was building and our Congress was cutting. I think if you look at the record, you will not find one defense budget coming from the Pentagon that was cut in the White House. And on the contrary, whatever pressures we exercised, were in the direction of stronger rather than weaker defense. I have never believed that unilateral reductions are the way to stability. I do believe that we owe it to our people to demonstrate that we are making a serious effort to stabilize the situation. But that's what Reagan did as well in the middle of a build up.

MR. : May I ask a following question?

DR. KISSINGER: Sure.

MR. : The Salt I Accords provided for about two thousand warheads on each side. At that time, we permitted -- we had the notion of two one hundred-interceptor sites -- a ratio of about ten to one

interceptors to incoming missiles. That was considered by
the Soviet Union and us to be stabilizing. Today -- today's
program, the so-called National Missile Defense, is a one
hundred-interceptor site in the face of six thousand or so
start accountable weapons which suggests to me that if we
went to a ten to one ratio, we could have easily six hundred
interceptors out there instead of the pathetic one hundred
and there's no way of saying that that would de-stabilize
anything. So, in addition to all of the other arguments, we
are dumbing down not only the technology of our systems, but
even the numbers. It doesn't seem to make sense at all.
Could you comment on that?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't believe that in the present
balance of forces in the world, balancing offensive
capabilities -- it's the way to produce stability. My
instinctive view -- and really one reason I accepted this
invitation will be unfulfilled, to get myself some technical
briefings on where we stand with missile defense. But it
seems to me very logical, that we should have a very
effective defense against third country attacks, and against
any conceivable new country or even existing countries that
[inaudible] the beginning of the program. And I think we
could raise the threshold against the Russian attack very
considerably. I just don't know the numbers that you --
that you are mentioning, but they make sense to me.

MR. : I don't know if you can hear me. Can
you?

DR. KISSINGER: Yeah.

MR. : I just want to clarify something. I
know there are disagreements on how we should handle the
Taiwan issue right now, but obviously [inaudible]. And I
was wondering whether you agree that in fact, that program
should move ahead regardless and that it just so happens
that something that might at one point be targeted against
[inaudible] moved out to Taiwan, that's not [inaudible].

DR. KISSINGER: And about all this talk that's going
on. I do not think of all the issues between us and China,
I think Taiwan is the most inflammatory. And therefore it
should -- it should be treated from my perspective with
great sensitivity and with some regard for how that issue is
perceived. You have pointed out some obvious facts, and I
didn't limit my [inaudible] -- when I speak of missile
defense, it can be as far as I'm concerned -- where -- on
what ships we put our missile defense. That's our problem.
So, it's not something on which I would want to go further,

13

but I think we can accomplish a lot of objectives without talking so much. Yes.

MR. : Dr. Kissinger, I don't know whether you'll be here when we have our session later on.

DR. KISSINGER: No. I have to leave after this.

MR. : I figured that. I'm Hank Cooper. The question I wanted to raise has to do with sea-based defenses. And a detail you may or may not remember about the ABM Treaty -- such defenses, if they work against the United States or they are able to defend the United States are banned by Article V. Not just the deployment, but also the R&D, the development and the testing as well. This fact and all this argument about moving ahead with theater defense is okay, but not being able to defend the United States has the United States Navy at this point a bit schizophrenic. On the one hand, we can develop sea-based defenses to protect our troops abroad as well as our lives. On the other, we can't let those defenses also work to protect Americans according to this treaty. If we permitted it to do that, then we'd have to cancel the program because the treaty says you can't develop tests or deploy such defenses. This had led to a situation now where in the political debate in this country that will be going on, the argument about sea-based national missile defense is going to be corrupted because on the one-hand some of us -- the Heritage Report says make the Navy theater defense all it can be. And in fact, if you make the Navy theater defense all it can be, it can defend the United States as well. On the other hand, the bureaucracy is producing a report for a dedicated national missile defense which ends up with a cost associated with dedicated assets that are not already paid for because they're products of an aegis system that tax payers have paid $50 billion for already. The command and control system that's being developed for the aegis air defense and a whole host of other things. And I'm concerned about the Congress whose time is limited being able to ferret out these details. So, I'd like to know what your prescription would be in the political context of dealing with this subtlety. It's fine to say go ahead with national missile defense and build the defense, but I'm afraid we're going to commit ourselves to a program which will cost a lot of money, which will not be very effective and which our budgetary processes would kills. In other words we would be on a dead-ended program -- when we have a better alternative that won't get a fair hearing.

[LC]

14

DR. KISSINGER: I think, again, I will work at educating myself on the technology and I'll -- if there are any military people here, I genuinely appreciate briefings that bring me up to speed. But as a general proposition, I would argue -- I would say, we need a Rumsfeld Commission on what is the most effective technology to defend the United States and to achieve our objectives in theater defense. I would start from that point of view. The only permissible question for that commission would be what is the best assistance or combination assistance and I would try to compose it of people who are not fanatics on either side, but who are technically competent and whose opinion would carry weight. And then my overwhelming inclination would be to proceed with this and see. I do not believe the ABM Treaty which was defined -- which was negotiated in a two-power world, should be the principal guide to missile defense in this period. And I in fact, believe Russia should be introduced into the international system, and that we have an interest in good relations with -- I mean, Russia. I do believe we have an interest in good relations with Russia. I believe also that it cannot happen until we treat them as adults that have their national interests, we have our national interests. And then let's see how we can bring them together. But what we need -- before we can answer this question, I would try to create a Rumsfeld Commission of scientists, come up with the best technical proposal and my strong inclination would be to back it and adjust the ABM treaty to it. One more and then [inaudible]. Good. Thank you very much. But please remember, this was not prepared. I did not come here to make waves.
[applause]

MR. : Thank you. Henry, thank you very much. I'll just hasten to add if I can make a bit of self promotion. This idea of a commission is something that we've already done, of course. The Heritage Foundation Report, "Defending America" that Frank has just given you has just been released today. That is a commission of some of the best minds and scientists and technologists the country has to try to propose a missile defense system that will be most affordable, most effective and most quickly deployable. So, we've got a good start. Perhaps we can talk about perhaps expanding that and having perhaps Congress maybe even convene another commission to look into it more deeply.

But I suppose I should apologize to Henry. Not only did you not get your briefing on technology, you also did not get your lunch. So, I'm afraid we owe you a debt of gratitude on a number of counts. But, anyway, thank you

[LC]

15

THE ABM TREATY AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Document #5

I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to testify today on this very important subject. The ABM Treaty, which arguably served some strategic purpose when first negotiated, now increasingly has become an obstacle to the advancement of those interests. That treaty, negotiated a generation ago in a starkly different geopolitical environment with a state that no longer exists, has become historically and strategically outdated. The ABM Treaty has become a significant constraint on the ability of the United States government to fulfill its foremost responsibility -- to protect the people of the United States from external aggression.

I initially was an opponent of the ABM treaty. Now, this may sound strange since the ABM treaty was negotiated under my aegis during the Nixon Administration. Therefore let me explain my general view about missile defense, how the ABM treaty came to be negotiated, and where in my view we are now in a general philosophical sense.

I have always believed that it was morally indefensible for any administration to make the American population hostage to the Soviet Union or to any other potential attacker as a deliberate act of policy. As I wrote in my memoirs (White House Years, p. 208):

> "It seemed to me highly irresponsible simply to ignore the possibility of an accidental attack or the prospect of nuclear capabilities in the hands of yet more countries. China was only the first candidate. Others would follow. Without any defense an accidental launch could do enormous damage. Even a small nuclear power would be able to blackmail the United States. I did not see the moral or political value of turning our people into hostages by deliberate choice."

I have never believed in the doctrine of mutual vulnerability. I have never believed that you reassure another country by making yourself defenseless. I cannot accept the proposition that we reassure people by remaining vulnerable. And I cannot imagine what an American president will say to the American public if there should be an attack, and if he would have to say that he did nothing to prevent it or to defeat it. I think the legitimacy of government would be threatened if such a condition existed. So, for all these reasons, I have been an advocate of missile defense.

Then how did the ABM treaty come about? When President Nixon came into office, one of his first acts was to propose an ABM system. It was based on much more elementary technology than now exists, but it provided for twelve defense sites circling the United States and was put forward with the argument, which happened to be our strong conviction, that it would disabuse the Soviets of any temptations to risk a limited nuclear attack, prevent third country attacks, and protect against an accidental missile launch.

But then we faced opposition from the usual coalition. One group maintained that the ABM system would not work. Another group said that it would be destabilizing. And in every congressional session, the number of defense sites was reduced. By 1971, Congress had whittled the proposed ABM system down to two defense sites. And it was clear that these last two sites would be cut in the next budgetary cycle.

Limiting an ABM system to only two sites did not make any strategic sense. And by that point, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not want to spend scarce resources on what they considered to be an essentially useless enterprise. We negotiated the ABM Treaty because we wanted to get something for what the U.S. Congress was going to do anyway - kill the ABM program. We did not want to lose our two sites without getting something from Moscow in return. The Soviet Union was expanding its military strength and our Congress was cutting back U.S. military strength. And it was under those conditions that we thought we would put a ceiling on the ABM in order to limit the Soviet ABM system, which Moscow had already started to build. We also used the ABM treaty to extract concessions from the Soviet Union in the SALT talks.

I never felt comfortable with the ABM treaty. But there was nothing we could do about it because the defense budget was being cut deeper each year by Congress. It was not really until the advent of the Reagan Administration that a plausible basis for strategic defense existed. As soon as Reagan put forward his 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative, I supported it. And I continue to support it for the same reasons.

When President Reagan put forward his SDI proposal, a group of concerned scientists came to see me in order to get my signature on opposition to it. And they made the traditional arguments -- first, that it was destabilizing and secondly it wouldn't work. It is difficult to see how it can be both. When I asked them to explain to me the mechanics of how and why they believed it would not work at various levels of attack, it was plain that at a fairly low level of attack involving several hundred warheads, it worked. According to these scientists, it worked fairly well, but became degraded only as more and more warheads were added to the attack.

If you can get an opponent into a position without a defense, the penetration becomes a simple question of mathematics. It is predictable. Since the aggressor does not know which of his missiles will not get through, as the threshold rises the inhibitions to an attack must also rise. And take the Soviet case. I always felt that if they knew that they would have to launch two hundred missiles or a hundred missiles, whatever the number is, in order to get a significant number through the missile defenses, that was a lot safer for America than if they knew that any missile that they launched was bound to get there.

That was the situation in 1972. Since that time, the geopolitical situation and strategic environment have radically changed. The opposition to missile defense has lost the moral high ground and the strategic arguments against it have become much weaker now that the

Soviet Union has disappeared. Moreover, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology has greatly complicated the international situation.

The threat the U.S. faces from missile proliferation is real and growing. This was underscored last year by the Rumsfeld Commission, which stated that the threat posed by a number of hostile Third World states "is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence Community." Further, the Commission stated that "the U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment" of missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory by these same states.

Secretary of Defense Cohen confirmed the findings of the Rumsfeld Commission on January 20, 1999, when he stated, "... we are affirming that there is a threat, and the threat is growing and that we expect it will soon pose a danger not only to our troops overseas but also to Americans here at home."

All of us need to recognize that at some point, and admittedly some will differ on where this point is, the ABM Treaty constrains the nation's missile defense programs to an intolerable degree. Secretary Cohen, also on January 20, stated that the Administration recognizes this fact and will require modifications to the Treaty. He also suggested that if an agreement on this issue, presumably with the Russians or others, could not be obtained, then the U.S. would consider withdrawal.

There has been some suggestion that the administration may want two ground based sites that would require amending the treaty. There are two problems with this: 1) the Russians will never agree, which gives them an effective veto; and 2) It conflicts with the basic concept of the treaty. Article I of the Treaty prohibits the deployment of a defense that is capable of defending all U.S. territory against missile attack. Article I even prohibits construcing the base for such a defense

There seems to be no reconciling these two basic positions: why keep the treaty that prevents or limits a nationwide system if the purpose of the administration's plan, as evidenced by amending the treaty, is to defend the territory of the United States? If the threat is real, why limit the defensive response at all? This is an incoherent position that cannot be rationally sustained.

It makes little sense to argue that we must limit ourselves because of the need to continue strategic arms reductions with the Russians. First of all, the Russian Duma has not ratified START II and does not appear inclined to do so in the foreseeable future. Second, the Russians can ill afford another strategic arms race. Third, history shows that the Russians are more serious on arms reductions when we are serious about missile defense. This was the lesson of Ronald Reagan's SDI program, which was a factor in producing arms reductions in the 1980s. Finally, as a matter of principle, we should not let the Russians have a veto over whether we defend ourselves from Iraq, North Korea or other rogue states.

The problem with the ABM Treaty is not only that it prevents the deployment of a nationwide ballistic missile defense. It also prevents the testing and development of advanced systems and technologies in space, on the sea and in the air that could make a system more effective. In other words, it forces our scientists to artificially constrain themselves in developing missile defense-related technologies.

Opponents of missile defense often argue that the necessary technologies are not ready. But at the same time they defend the ABM Treaty, which prevents robust development and testing. They cannot have it both ways. The most important constraints hampering the development of missile defense technologies are not scientific or cost-related constraints, but those imposed by the Clinton Administration's policy of upholding the outdated ABM Treaty.

Another element of strategic irrationality imposed by the ABM Treaty is that it allows the United States to provide a measure of missile defense for its allies that it denies its own people. I understand that the Clinton Administration is emphasizing theater missile defense for U.S. allies. It is difficult to understand why the administration would place a higher emphasis on defending allies than on defending Americans. The reason can not be a lack of technologies, because as I understand it, the same technologies that can be used for defending allies overseas can be used to defend Americans at home. The problem seems to be, once again, the ABM Treaty, which the administration apparently believes can more easily accommodate theater missile defenses than national missile defenses.

I support missile defense for U.S. allies. I do not support every application that is being made to this principle because I don't see any sense in starting a tremendous confrontation on something that is still theoretical. But I totally support the principle that the United States should build missile defenses for itself and its allies.

Absent the ABM Treaty, a global missile defense system based on Navy ships at sea, specifically Aegis cruisers supported by a variety of off-board sensors, could be used to defend U.S. friends and allies around the world, in addition to U.S. territory, in a way that is not provocative. The Navy Theater Wide (NTW) missile defense system is being developed as a theater system for deployment in 2007, but it is being politically constrained from having a national missile defense capability because of ABM Treaty considerations. Some experts believe that this would be the most cost-effective option.

The ABM Treaty also imposes constraints that go beyond the deployment of missile defenses. Article V of the Treaty, for example, prohibits even the development and testing of the sea-based option. The same limitation pertains to air-based, space-based and mobile land-based options. In other words, some of the most promising technical options are completely precluded by the basic provisions of the ABM Treaty.

If the U.S. is going to have rigorous testing program for missile defense, these

limitations must be dropped. As I understand it, the Administration is even interpreting the ABM Treaty to mean that it prohibits the use of targeting data generated by satellite sensors by certain kinds of theater defense systems. I think that it is imperative that the U.S. removes these limitations and develops the most effective missile defense technologies.

I would favor the deployment of a nationwide missile defense system as soon as technologically possible. A lack of technology does not seem to be the problem. From what I have seen, there seems to be an impressive array of technical options that could be explored to protect against missile attacks. In any event, they cannot be adequately explored until we solve the problem of ABM Treaty restrictions on development and testing. I believe we need to find a way to end the restrictions the ABM Treaty impose on the research, development, testing and deployment of missile defense systems as soon as possible.

I believe that is strategically and morally necessary to build a missile defense. Strategically, because of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missile technology to deliver them. Morally, the doctrine of mutual assured destruction, which I have opposed in many writings for at least thirty years, is bankrupt. It may have had a limited theoretical sense in a two-power nuclear world, but in a multinuclear world, it is reckless.

Therefore we cannot give any nation a veto over missile defense. We can talk to other nations about the world in which there will be a missile defense and how to manage it, but we cannot give any nation a veto.

I have no clear view how to handle the ABM Treaty, except that I would not let it stand in the way. First, it is possible to argue that the ABM Treaty was made with an entity that no longer exists. It is also possible to use the abrogation clause in the ABM Treaty, but I think that is not the key issue.

The key issue is whether it should be a national policy to build a missile defense. Are we serious about it? Are we going to fight the battles that have been going on now for twenty years? And the battle lines are always forming along the same issue - whether the missile defense system will work. There always will be those who make the claim that a tremendous system is coming along five years down the road, at which point, those same people will argue that there is an even better one coming along five years after that. So there will never be a "right time" for deployment. I frankly have not followed the technology enough to make a good judgment about which technology should be deployed. But on the philosophical point of missile defense, I agree.

I do not want to get into a legal debate on the treaty, for I am not a lawyer. I understand that this committee has already heard from lawyers and legal scholars stating that in their view the ABM Treaty is no longer legally valid. I am sympathetic to that

view, but I will leave it to them to explain the current legal status of the treaty.

However, I will say this: in my view, the collapse of the Soviet Union fundamentally changed the strategic context in which the ABM Treaty was both negotiated and implemented. Thus, from a strategic perspective, the treaty is no longer relevant. It seems logical to me that the fundamental change in circumstances brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union would have legal as well as policy implications. The political collapse of the Soviet Union and the impact of that collapse on strategic policy and the collapse of the ABM Treaty as a legally binding agreement, if that is deemed to be the case, should not be seen as merely coincidental events.

In conclusion, the U.S. needs to fashion a strategic defense policy that is realistic and strategically coherent. Either the missile threat is real, or it is not. If it is real, then the only strategically responsible policy is to find the quickest and most effective way to protect the American people against missile attack. There is no reason to pursue a missile defense program by attempting to amend the treaty, when the likely outcome of that process is the deployment of ineffective systems.

05-17-1999 4:57AM

FROM HERITAGE FOUNDATION. 2026751758

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# Memo

**To:** Henry Kissinger
**From:** Kim Holmes
**Date:** 05/17/99
**Re:** Follow-up to May 12th Missile Defense Briefing

As a follow up to our May 12th meeting on missile defense and the ABM Treaty, I am attaching four documents to help clarify some ABM and missile defense issues.

## Document #1: The New ABM Agreements

Document #1 gives the basic facts and implications of the three new ABM Treaty related agreements signed on September 26, 1997. The United States, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus signed the agreements.

## Document #2: Navy's Potential Contribution to National Missile Defense

The Navy's advanced air defense system has an exceptional national missile defense potential. Document #2 outlines some of the developments surrounding this capability.

## Document #3: Missile Defense Deployment Options: Pros and Cons

Document #3 provides some of the pros and cons to the sea- and ground-based options for missile defense.

## Document #4: Frequently Asked Questions and Answers About Missile Defense

This document provides answers to some of the most frequently asked questions on missile defense.

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0 17 1999 4:50AM

Document #1

New ABM Agreements

A set of agreements were signed on September 26, 1997 in New York related to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and theater ballistic missile defenses (TMD). These agreements ensure the viability of the ABM Treaty by attempting to clarify the line between strategic and theater ballistic missile defenses and by settling the ABM Treaty succession issue following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The administration was forced to submit the agreements to the Senate for ratification. To date the President has refused to do so, which has caused much debate.

I. Agreement to Multilateralize the ABM Treaty

The multilateralization agreement is purported to be a succession arrangement to replace the Soviet Union as the treaty partner of the United States with Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. It is officially known as the Memorandum of Understanding on Succession (MOUS).

Implications of the Multilateralization Agreement:

* It applies: ABM Treaty-style restrictions to four of the 15 states now occupying the territory of the former Soviet Union. The remaining 11 countries would be free to develop, test or deploy ABM systems; the United States would not.

* It leaves the U.S. open to being outvoted by the other four treaty partners during the process of interpretation and implementation.

* It technically defines Moscow as the capital of all four states. This sends a message to Russia's leaders that they have a free hand to establish hegemony over the neighboring countries that they call the "near abroad."

II. Demarcation Agreements

The so-called "Agreed Statements" demarcate between strategic and theater missile defense systems. They significantly broaden the ABM Treaty by applying restrictions to theater systems, which previously were not subjected to ABM Treaty limitations. There are two such agreements. One restricts theater missile defense systems that utilize lower-velocity interceptor missiles and the other restricts theater missile defense systems that utilize higher-velocity interceptor missiles.

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Document #1

## Lower Velocity Theater Missile Defense Systems

* This agreement defines lower-velocity theater defense systems as systems with interceptor missiles¹ whose maximum demonstrated velocities do not exceed, and have not exceeded 3.0 kilometers/second. These systems shall not be subject to ABM-type restriction as long as two conditions are met:

  (1) They may not be tested against a target missile² with speeds in excess of 5 kilometers per second or with ranges in excess of 3,500 kilometers.

  (2) They may not be deployed in space.

The major implication of this agreement is that it imposes restrictions on theater defense systems that were not included in the original ABM Treaty. The effect is that U.S. forces will be further denied the best defense against theater range ballistic missiles, such as the Scuds launched by Iraq in the Gulf War.

## Higher-Velocity Theater Missile Defense Systems

* The Agreed Statement on higher-velocity theater defense systems places restrictions on theater defense systems with interceptor missiles in excess of 3 kilometers per second. These restrictions include:

  (1) Limiting the number and geographic scope of the deployment of such systems.³

  (2) They may not be tested against target missile with speeds in excess of 5 kilometers per second or with ranges in excess or 3,500 kilometers.

  (3) They may not be deployed in space.

  (4) They may not pose a "realistic threat" to strategic nuclear forces and may not be tested to give these theater missile defense systems such a capability.⁴

  (5) They may not be deployed in a way appropriate for use against the theater missiles deployed by the other parties to this agreement.

  (6) They may not have interceptor missiles with speeds in excess of 5.5 kilometers per second for land-based and air-based systems and 4.5 kilometers per second for sea-based systems.

  (7) They may not be tested against multiple warhead missiles and reentry vehicles deployed on strategic ballistic missiles.⁵

¹ Interceptor missiles are the missiles that are used to intercept hostile target missiles.

² A target missile is the hostile missile that the interceptor missile seeks to destroy.

³ The exact limitations on the number of high-velocity theater defense systems that may be deployed and the geographic scope of their deployment are not defined.

⁴ The agreement does not provide a definition of the term "realistic threat."

07-17-1999 4:39AM

Document #1

The implications of the higher-velocity demarcation agreement fall into two categories: capability and cost.

**Capability.** The agreement “dumbs down” existing technology and impedes further advancement by restricting development, testing and deployment options of affected systems. For example, the Navy’s Aegis advanced air defense system will be denied the use of external sensors, thus crippling its effectiveness as a missile defense system. Furthermore, the U.S. would be barred from deploying a defense against Russian theater missiles.

**Cost.** The inevitable result of the reduced capabilities of these systems is increased overall cost. For example, a system's operational costs include its interceptors and launchers. If a missile defense system has access to all available sensor data, it can intercept hostile missiles farther away from the target than it can with artificially limited sensor data. Thus, unrestricted data enables it to defend the same area with fewer launchers and interceptors, thereby significantly reducing overall costs.

⁵ Restrictions 6 and 7 are imposed unilaterally as part of the "Unilateral Statements on Plans and Programs." Although each successor state to the ABM Treaty issued virtually identical unilateral statements, they are not legally binding. The unilateral statements were signed on September 26, 1997 in New York.

["5-17-1999 4:39AM", "FROM HERITAGE FOUNDATION 2026751758", "Document #2", "NAVY'S POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION TO NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE\n(NMD)", "1. THE RUMSFELD COMMISSION V["2. THE CURRENTLY PROPOSED LAND BASED NMD SYSTEM WILL BE REVIEWED FOR DEPLOYEMNT READINESS IN 2001 FOR POSSIBLE DEPLOYMENT IN 2005.", "3. THERE IS MARGINAL 50 STATE COVERAGE FROM THE PROPOSED SINGLE LAND-BASED SITE AND ESSENTIALLY NO COVERAGE AGAINST A SEA-BASED LAUNCH.", "4. THE ABM TREATY WILL REQUIRE MODIFICATION EVEN FOR THE PROPOSED SINGLE LAND-BASED SITE.", "5. A PENTAGON STUDY DONE FOR CONGRESS CONCLUDED THAT THE NAVY THEATER WIDE (NTW) BLOCK II INTERCEPTOR, WHEN EMPLOYED WITH THE SAME SENSORS AS PLANNED FOR THE LAND-BASED NMD ARCHITECTURE, COULD PROVIDE PROTECTION TO THE US AGAINS ATTACKS BY UNSOPHISTICATED THIRD WORLD THREATS.", "6. THE NAVY THEATER WIDE (NTW) BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM IS BEING DEVELOPED AS A THEATER SYSTEM FOR DEPLOYMENT IN 2007, BUT IS BEING POLITICALLY CONSTRAINED FROM HAVING A NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF THE ABM TREATY.", "RECOMMENDATION", "DEPLOY THE NAVY THEATER WIDE SYSTEM AS A NATIONA MISSILE\nDEFENSE SYSTEM IN 2003 BY ASSIGNING IT A NATIONA PRORITY AND\nCONNECTING IT TO THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE COMMAND AND\nCONTROL SYSTEM.", "JD Williams\nVice Admiral, USN, (RET)\n703-914-3977"]

5-17-1999 4:40AM

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Document #3

# Missile Defense Deployment Options: Pros and Cons

## I. Ground Based Options: Pros and Cons

* **Argument #1:** The United States must start with the deployment of a ground-based system while there is broad-based support; otherwise traditional opposition to national missile defense (NMD) may reemerge and halt the entire process.

**Response:** Support for an ABM Treaty compliant ground-based system has always been a political dead end. The effort to deploy always founders on the contradiction of trying to deploy a missile defense system within the framework and constraints of a treaty that was fundamentally designed to stop such a deployment.

The United States should be defended by the most effective and cost efficient systems available. The Defense Department has already invested in the Aegis air defense system, which when upgraded and deployed forward, could be effective as a near-term national missile defense. This sea-based option will enjoy broad-based support when people are made aware of its technological capabilities and cost efficiency.

* **Argument #2:** (Once the ground-based system is established, the United States will be in a better position to go ahead with other, more promising NMD architectures, such as space- and sea-based systems.

**Response:** The United States should not artificially constrain itself to conform with a treaty that is strategically, historically, and legally outdated. The U.S. should deploy the most effective national missile defense available, especially in light of the current proliferation crisis. Aegis-type vessels provide an existing platform for an effective missile defense that could be deployed within 3 to 4 years. The United States should also go forward with other advanced technologies, such as space-based technologies, to ensure that America is defended against ballistic missile attack.

* **Argument #3:** Technological development (funding for research) has been geared toward the ground-based option and is therefore more advanced than other options.

**Response:** Most funds ear-marked for national missile defense research and development have been geared toward the possibility of an eventual deployment of a ground based system, but that does not make it the more advanced system. The fact is that the Department of Defense has invested substantial amounts of money ($50 billion) in a hi-tech, sea-based air defense system. This deployed system needs only to be upgraded to provide an effective national missile defense.

* **Argument #4:** The ABM Treaty still has an important role to play in strategic stability between the United States and Russia. Therefore, the much-needed defense

5-17-1999 4:40AM

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Document #3

against rogue state missile attack should respect the ABM Treaty. Rather than getting rid of the Treaty, it should be amended to recognize the security implications of today.

**Response:** The ABM Treaty is a relic of the Cold War that prevents the United States from employing a national missile defense. Today there are very real ballistic missile threats to Americans. These threats include the increased prospect of an accidental or unauthorized launch of a Chinese or Russian missile or a deliberate attack by a hostile rogue nation. Furthermore, the treaty constrains the technological development of anti-ballistic missile systems, meaning that the American people will not be protected by the best defense possible. The ABM treaty should not be allowed to perpetuate this policy of vulnerability.

## II. The Sea-Based Option: Pros and Cons

* **Argument #1:** Current Navy air defense standard missiles are incapable of engaging long-range ballistic missiles.

**Response:** Technologically feasible advanced missiles can successfully engage long-range ballistic missiles. The problem is that there is no Navy national missile defense program in place that effectively utilizes the best technology available to achieve a sea-based national missile defense.

* **Argument #2:** On-board Navy Aegis radar is incapable of tracking long-range missiles and are therefore ineffective for a national missile defense.

**Response:** The on-board radar is incapable on its own of intercepting intercontinental range ballistic missiles, but when interneted with external sensors, including space-based sensors, the Navy Aegis system would have very effective national missile defense capabilities.

* **Argument #3:** Navy national missile defense is incapable of providing complete coverage of the United States, specifically for targets at the center of the continental United States.

**Response:** This is true, assuming that the hostile missile is on a polar trajectory and the interceptors are only based along the eastern and western coasts of North America. However, the problem is overcome by deploying an interceptor platform in the Great Lakes region.

* **Argument #4:** Navy national missile defense has uncertain acquisition costs. According to some estimates, the Navy system could cost as much as $20 billion. This is in direct opposition to Heritage estimates, which claim that total development costs over the next four years for the system and space-based external sensor programs will be less than $8 billion.

5-17-1999 4:41AM

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Document #4

# FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT MISSILE DEFENSE

## QUESTION: What would a national missile defense system look like?

A national missile defense requires three parts: 1) sensors capable of detecting enemy missile launches and tracking their trajectory through space; 2) interceptors capable of destroying the enemy missiles in flight and discriminating between real and dummy warheads; and 3) an integrated command and control network capable of managing the entire system. Thanks to the money already spent on researching missile defense technologies, we are capable of building a system capable of protecting us from rogue missile attacks is both practical and affordable.

## QUESTION: Won't the deployment of a national missile defense bust the budget?

No. The best estimates indicate that developing a system capable of protecting our territory is readily affordable. The projected costs of even the most ambitious deployment plans are measured in the tens of billions of dollars. Given current budget projections, it is unlikely that any of these plans will consume more than 2 percent of the defense expenditures annually. However, the potential costs in lives and property of failing to protect our country from hostile missiles are staggering. Even in the absence of an actual attack, the our leader risks paying a heavy political cost for remaining defenseless by leaving themselves open to potential nuclear blackmail.

## QUESTION: Wouldn't building a national missile defense prompt a new arms race?

No, the deployment of a national missile defense would not commit us to another arms race. That charge is yet another scare tactic propagated by diehard opponents of national missile defense. Because of dramatic technological advances, deploying a national missile defense would not require the United States to build any additional nuclear weapons. Not one. That is because the defensive technologies being developed are non-nuclear. Asserting that such a system is "offensive" is akin to arguing that police officer's donning is bullet proof vest is "provocative" to criminals. Nor would deployment of a national missile defense ruin arms control, as opponents often claim. In fact, the deployment of a national missile defense would likely enhance the prospects for substantive nuclear arms reductions without compromising our security. President Reagan made significant progress in actually reducing the level of offensive nuclear weapons at the same time he championed strategic defenses.¹

¹ Reagan signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) agreement in December 1988, thus eliminating an entire class of weapons. Reagan also negotiated the START I agreement, which, unlike previous arms control agreements, called for the actual reduction of nuclear weapons.

5-17-1999 4:42AM

Document #4

**QUESTION: Wouldn't deploying a national missile defense militarize space?**

This objection overlooks the fact that space is already militarized. We are one of several countries that have satellites in space. These satellites help us keep a watchful eye on our adversaries. They can provide warning when a dictator like Saddam Hussein masses tanks on the Kuwaiti border and allow us communicate instantaneously with our military forces overseas. Satellites are not the only objects that travel through space. Yet opponents of missile defense rarely express outrage about the potential for offensive missiles to "militarize" space. Their silence on this crucial point betrays a bias against missile defense. While earth is populated with people, space remains largely uninhabited, aside from occasional Space Shuttle flights. Protecting human life, not empty space, is a moral imperative.

**QUESTION: Shouldn't we wait for technology to "mature" before deploying defenses against enemy missiles?**

This canard has long been one of the Clinton Administration's favorite rationales for postponing deployment of a national missile defense. It has the advantage of allowing them to appear "concerned" about the missile threat without actually doing anything about it. Imagine if a police chief decided to withhold bulletproof vests from his patrol officers because more technologically advanced vests were being researched. He would not last five minutes in office. Or imagine that your local hospital refused to operate on you simply because a more sophisticated scalpels were being developed. You would find another hospital mighty quick! Yet critics have embraced this very logic to justify postponing deployment of a national missile shield. This rationale is a convenient excuse for inaction since technology is always maturing. By this reasoning, the time for deployment will never be ripe!

**QUESTION: The United States still has thousands of nuclear weapons. Why isn't the threat of nuclear retaliation enough to deter rogue states from launching missiles at the United States?**

It is imperative to build defenses against enemy missiles because some foreign leaders may not be deterred by the threat of reprisal. It is difficult to fathom the mindset of a leader like North Korea's Kim Jong-Il, who spends millions of dollars developing ballistic missiles while many of his countrymen are starving. A threat to inflict widespread destruction on North Korea may not dissuade that country's leader from launching missiles against us. Foreign despots do not always behave predictably, as Saddam Hussein has demonstrated repeatedly. A policy of deterrence presumes that heads of foreign government will be deterred by the threat of retaliation. But history has demonstrated that many such leaders are neither rational nor predictable.