CHAPTER X

Diplomacy and the Limitation of Armaments

To ask diplomacy that it rescue mankind from the horrors of a thermonuclear holocaust, by defining its limits, may seem like a paradox. Is not the situation revolutionary precisely because the Soviet bloc considers the gulf between different social systems as irreconcilable? How can there be an agreement on the limitation of war when all negotiations with the Soviet Soviets have proved that the two sides have rarely been able to agree even on what constituted a reasonable demand?

Diplomacy has never faced a more fearful challenge. For almost everything conspires against the subtle negotiation, the artful compromise, the ability to formulate without opening unnecessary wounds of classical diplomacy. Diplomacy, the art of settling disputes by negotiation rather than through force, presupposes that all the major powers which establishes a subtle balance between the requirement of change and the imperative of continued harmony.

Negotiations are made necessary by the dissatisfaction of some Power with the existing status quo, for were all Powers perfectly satisfied there would be nothing to negotiate about. But negotiations can lead to a conclusion only if the parties to the dispute accept some common standard transcending the dispute:

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they must either agree that the continued maintenance of the international
system is more important than any dispute within it; or else XXX there must
be a general understanding that the consequences of not making concessions will
be more serious than those of doing so. Historically settlements have come
about through a combination of these two factors: there has been an
awareness

of the beneficial consequences of continued harmony, combined with a fear of
The瓜分危机 international relations is depended on relative
enferosis from which the world is free, as well as of the two factors as been
taken away.

The smaller the interest in harmony, the less employed
the greater has been the requirement of fear produced by force or the threat
of force. The greater the interest of the major Powers in continued good relations,
the less necessary has been the recourse to force.

The parado mechanical result has been that diplomacy has proved most effica-
cious in periods when the conception of the various Powers of their vital interests
were most in accord, in short, in a "legitimate" international order.

Diplomacy has been least able to settle disputes when there was a conflict in
the notions of "vital" interests. For there is a limiting condition to all
diplomatic negotiations: that no nation can negotiate about its own survival
and that no nation will give up what it considers its "vital" interests for the
sake of continued harmony. An international order that does not protect a

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Power's conception of its vital interests will not seem worth preserving to this Power: its relations with the remainder of the international community will therefore be revolutionary. Whenever there appears a revolutionary Power or group of Powers the emphasis of the conduct of international relations changes. Because a revolutionary Power is distinguished precisely by its attack on the existing order the requirement of continued harmony will no longer supply an impetus for the settlement of disputes. Because vital interests in such a situation seem constantly in conflict, negotiations becomes increasingly futile. Henceforth, disagreements tend to be pushed to their logical extreme and relations based on force or the threat of force.

The contemporary revolution is taking place in an unprecedented manner, however. Rarely has there been less common ground among the major Powers, but never has recourse to force been more inhibited. This brings about a dual frustration with respect to power and with respect to diplomacy. Were weapons technology stable, an equilibrium might be established between the antagonism of a revolutionary period and the fear of a nuclear war. But weapons systems are changing at an ever-accelerating rate so that every major Power is living with the consciousness that its survival is at the mercy of a technological breakthrough by its opponent. The inhibitions with respect to the use of force therefore do not abolish the revolutionary contest; they transform it into an armament race and into a struggle for the allegiance of those areas of the world as yet uncommitted. And because of the reluctance of the non-Soviet world to resort to force, the Soviet bloc is able to exacerbate all tensions among the secondary Powers. Encouraged to give vent to all their resentments many of the newly independent states are tempted to play an international role out of proportion to their

attempted to play a role on the international arena out of proportion to their
strength and their willingness to assume responsibilities. The sense of impotence
of formerly powerful states and the aspirations to greatness of still weak and
often immature Powers have contributed to the demoralization of the international
system.

On the other hand,
the more absolute the sanctions of modern war, however, the more absolute
have been the demands made on diplomacy. Before Total war has had as its counterpart

the call for
total diplomacy. Diplomacy is asked to solve by negotiation two major concurrent
far-right revolutions, that of the Soviet bloc and that of the newly independent
states, and at a moment when many of the pressures traditionally available to it,
even in "legitimate" international orders, have lost their potency. As a result
there has been about diplomacy the same abstracteness as about military policy.
As our military policy tends to emphasize the most absolute use of power, so our
diplomacy tends to rely on "pure" negotiation without either being able to profit
from the other. This "absolute" diplomacy takes two contradictory forms: a
belief that with "good-will" an over-all settlement is possible and awaits perhaps
a few more conferences at the highest level; and, at the same time, a denial of the utility
of high level meetings and a call for the step-by-step approach of traditional
diplomacy. But as long as Soviet foreign policy defines different social

negotiations with impunity and break them off without penalty, conferences become a tool of Soviet propaganda. The incommensurability between the tensions produced by the revolutionary international situation and the pressures available to each diplomacy may be inherent in the present state of weapons technology. If so, it will not make for stability; rather it will depreciate the seriousness of diplomatic intercourse. It is therefore asking too much of diplomacy that it should resolve present-day conflicts. It can provide a forum for the settlement of disputes which have become unprofitable for both sides. It can keep open channels of information. Most importantly it can enable each side to convey its intentions to the other.

The task of leaving no doubt about a Power's intentions is perhaps the most important function of diplomacy in the nuclear age. For the present bridge between the two sides at present is a common fear. They may not agree on any positive goals, but both the Soviet bloc and the Free World have at least one interest in common: that neither side can be interested in an all-out war. In the past, the greater the revolutionary schism, the more protracted and violent the resulting war as is demonstrated both by the Thirty Year's War and the wars of the French Revolution. This was because given the status of technology, the fanaticism of revolution could assume that at the end

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of a war, no matter how violent, the victor would retain sufficient resources to impose his will. Wars have almost inevitably accompanied revolutionary periods because either the revolutionary Power hoped that it might reshape reality to accord with its notion of justice or else the Powers which represented legitimacy and the status quo thought that they might put an end to the prevailing insecurity once and for all. Wars occurred in a sense because of faulty intelligence, because with conventional technology it was never possible to calculate the relation of forces precisely. Mark II tanks and because both sides could manage that the victor would obtain sufficient reserves to impose his will.

But in the face of the horrors of nuclear warfare, it does not require special precision of calculation to determine the consequences of all-out war. Despite the strenuous Soviet efforts to define their risks as smaller than these of their opponents, it would take an extraordinary degree of fanaticism to believe that all-out war could be used to achieve any positive goals. For while modern technology tends to paralyze the will to use force in the period prior to the outbreak of a war, it leaves little room for psychology once an attack has been launched. Nor could an aggressor hope to break the will to resist of only in very special circumstances. Unless a surprise attack eliminates the retaliatory force itself, it will not be able to prevent a devastating counterblow even if it should inflict catastrophic losses to the enemy society. For

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But the same factors which make it difficult to settle disputes will also inhibit the acceptance of a framework of war-limitation. The same suspicion which causes our arguments to be unpersuasive in diplomatic conferences (with respect to military strategy) may lead the Soviets to mistrust a declaration of our intentions. Nevertheless, the interest in avoiding an all-out war is so unambiguous (that it should provide a powerful incentive at least to test the possibility of limiting war. And the catastrophe of thermo-nuclear bombardment of cities is so frightful that the other side may be sorely tempted to test the sincerity of American professions.) Moreover, a diplomatic program designed to convey our understanding of the nature of limited war might overcome the danger of all-out war produced by a form of bureaucratic inertia: the existence of Soviet war plans which interpret any American resistance and particularly any use of nuclear weapons as a prelude to a final showdown. Our diplomacy may have to xxx substitute for any lack of imagination on the part of the Soviet staffs; by patience and persistance it may force the other side to consider alternatives to a thermo-nuclear holocaust. If diplomacy cannot give effect to the one interest both sides have so overpoweringly in common, the avoidance of all-out war, and the creation of a framework which may set limits to any war that does break out, it is futile to ask of it to settle the more fundamental issues of ideological conflict and revolutionary upheaval.

II.

It is unfortunate that the major emphasis in the negotiations regarding nuclear weapons has been on problems of disarmament. It is unfortunate not because the effort to eliminate war by reducing the level of armaments lacks merit but because it may address itself to the most insoluble problems. Instead of bridging the gap between TO CREATES A NEW strategy and diplomacy it reinforces it. The predominant concern with disarmament schemes may prevent the achievement of goals which are possible: a general understanding regarding some principles of war limitation which may not avoid war but which may be a factor in mitigating its horrors.

Disarmament negotiations have taken two forms: attempts to reduce the level of armaments or to eliminate the most destructive weapons, from the armaments of the Powers and schemes of control and inspection to supervise whatever agreements might be reached on the first point. In the later stages of disarmament negotiations, control and inspection schemes have played a prominent role even in the absence of any agreement regarding the reduction of forces. It has been assumed that any system of

of control that reduced the possibility of surprise attack would
also ease international tensions.

The notion that armaments are the cause and not the
reflection of conflict is not new. It has been the basis of
schemes of disarmament plans throughout history; it was the
rationale for all the disarmament conferences in the Twenties
and Thirties. Nevertheless it is open to serious doubt. The
level of armaments has been lowest in periods which have been
least vocal about the problem of disarmament; it has been highest

during
~~at~~ periods when

least vocal about the problem of disarmament; it has been highest
level of armaments has been lowest in periods which have been
and Turcopie. Nevertheless it is open to serious doubt. The
rationale for all the disarmament conferences in the UN Twenties
schemes of disarmament plans throughout history; it was the
reflection of conflict is not new. It has been the basis of
The motion that armaments are the cause and not the
also ease international tensions.