Feb. 2 76

T

Joseph Kraft

# The Ford Stamp On Arms Control

While Henry Kissinger was in Moscow last month, President Ford convoked at the White House a secret—and I believe until now unpublicized—meeting of the National Security Council. At that meeting there were raised by Pentagon representatives a host of questions about arms control at variance with the line being followed by Dr. Kissinger in Moscow.

The immediate upshot was that the Moscow talks were adjourned pending further discussion of the U.S. position in Washington. But underlying the whole episode is a fight which President Ford has yet to resolve between Dr. Kissinger, who desperately wants an accord, and the military chiefs, who have their doubts.

Until recently arms control negotiations in the Ford administration had been largely a two-man show. Secretary of State Kissinger and former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger blocked out various alternatives and compromises. These were presented to the President who made his choices—sometimes, judging by one discussion I had with Mr. Ford on SALT, without detailed knowledge.

That system did not work badly at all. For example, before the Vladivostok meeting with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in December 1974, Mr. Ford selected a Schlesinger position and elicited from the Russians a concession Dr. Kissinger had long maintained would never be granted.

Specifically, the Russians abandoned the view that they needed more nuclear weapons than the United States because of the threat from China and the support the United States received from French and British nuclear forces. The Russians agreed that each superpower would have “equal aggregates” of strategic nuclear weapons and that the British and French forces would not be counted. The limit was at 2,400 launchers apiece. Each side could be allowed to equip 1,320 launchers with missiles bearing multiple warheads, for MIRVs.

Subsequent negotiations have involved the details left ambiguous at Vladivostok. One of the thorniest problems was over two weapon systems not covered by the Vladivostok agreement—the American cruise missile, a pilotless drone which has, thanks to new technology, the capacity to fly long distances with great accuracy; and Russia's Backfire bomber, a plane originally designed for medium-range operations but capable in certain cases of delivering bombs on the United States.

The Russians, who have cruise missiles with a 375-mile range on submarines, wanted that range applied to all cruise missiles. American military men demanded the right to have longer-range cruise missiles and insisted that the Backfire be covered in the agreement.

In his Moscow talks with Mr. Brezhnev last month, Dr. Kissinger came up with what he thought were answers to both problems. The Russians agreed that the cruise missiles fired from aircraft could have a range of 1,500 miles—thus making it possible for the United States to put such missiles on bombers and hit central Russia from its periphery. The Russians insisted, however, that any bomber armed with 10 or more cruise missiles should be accounted against the MIRV total of 1,320. Since the United States has already plans for something like 1,280 multiple-headed nuclear weapons, that would in effect discourage any big development of the cruise missile.

With respect to the Backfire bomber, the Russians agreed to deploy it in a way inconsistent with use against the United States. They also agreed to lower the number of total launchers from 2,400 to between 2,100 and 2,200. Since they already have some 2,400 launchers, the lower total would be another disincentive for building Backfire into an intercontinental weapon.

Dr. Kissinger was apparently elated by these understandings. But at the NSC meeting the President called, serious questions were raised by Pentagon officials about whether the constraints against Backfire were insufficient and how one could verify Soviet compliance with the limits on cruise missiles.

In these chaotic conditions it was decided that Dr. Kissinger should come back for consultation before proceeding further with the Russians. That decision is now being seen as a victory for the hawks and a setback for Dr. Kissinger.

But good arguments can be made against all the questions raised by the hawks. The important thing is that these serious questions be debated fully before the President without any end runs or sleight-of-hand tricks. For my part, I am confident that Mr. Ford, once he fully understands the issues, will move this year to conclude an arms agreement with Moscow and present it to the Congress and the American people as another step toward making the world a safer place.

Field Enterprises

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

Tuesday, September 7, 1976

25¢

ous campaign

By Barth J. Falkenberg, staff photographer

Jimmy Carter: barnstorming the U.S.

# U.S.-Soviet arms pact by Nov. 2?

## Moscow hints at talks on 10% cutback of offensive weapons

By David K. Willis
Staff correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor

Moscow

The shape of a possible new strategic-arms limitation agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States is beginning to emerge.

And it is at least conceivable that such an agreement could come in the third or fourth week of October, just before the Nov. 2 election.

Based on soundings by this newspaper in both Moscow and Washington, elements of a possible pact begin to look like this:

1. The Soviets have raised the possibility of committing themselves in any new agreement to quick, subsequent talks aimed at reducing by 10 percent the overall offensive-weapons limit for both sides which was provisionally set at 2,400 at the Ford-Brezhnev summit in 1974 in Vladivostok.

It is not known publicly whether the Soviet idea includes a 10 percent reduction in the number of missiles capable of launching from land and sea multiple warheads, each able to split off in flight and speed to separate targets. That Vladivostok figure was 1,320 (included in the overall 2,400).

A 10 percent cut in the 2,400 figure would bring it down to 2,160. Although the strategic-arms numbers game is extremely complex, it could be argued that such a reduction might cost Moscow more than it would Washington in the short run. Under the first strategic-arms limitation talks (SALT) pact of 1972, Moscow is allowed 2,358 launchers consisting of 1,618 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and 740 submarine-launched missiles. Washington is allowed 1,710 consisting of 1,054 ICBMs and 656 submarine-launched missiles.

The United States compensates for the numerical difference by possessing thousands more multiple independently targeted re-entry warheads (known as MIRV warheads), which sit atop the launchers.

While the mix between ICBMs and submarine-launched missiles can be varied (within limits), the overall totals are constant. Add in the 140 Soviet long-range bombers and about 500 U.S. bombers (all heavy bombers were excluded from SALT I) and the Soviets have a total of 2,498 launchers on land, sea, and air, and the United States 2,210.

★Please turn to Page 9

# Singer reports some gains on Africa

By Takashi Oka

Staff correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor

London

ent Rhodesian problem remains unout prospects for a multiracial solution, resource-rich Namibia look more like the outlook as Secretary of State Kissinger briefed British Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary

Power

ts
Africa

Prime Minister Ian Smith of a government representing 4 percent of Rhodesia's total population, still apparently believes he is in the front line of the world-wide fight against Communist subversion and that South Africa will continue to support him in this struggle. Mr. Vorster's foreign minister has made a cautiously worded statement indicating that South Africa now supports the Anglo-American initiative for black majority rule in Rhodesia in two years' time. But until now, South Africa has avoided the kind of brutal economic and military pressure that might convince the Smith regime that it means business.

In his meeting with Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Vorster apparently gave no ironclad commitment to pressure Mr. Smith. And indeed in his public press conference in Zurich Sunday, Mr. Vorster took care to give the opposite impression.

On no recent effort has there been such close coordination between the United States and Britain, officials of both countries say, than in their patient attempt to prevent a racial catastrophe in southern Africa. It is too soon to predict success, but despite mountainous obstacles, the forward momentum continues.

On Namibia, vast southwestern African territory originally mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations after World War I, there has apparently been progress.

Mr. Vorster took a first step before the Zurich meeting, agreeing in effect to what he would never accept for his own country: an independent multiracial state by the end of 1978.

This date is still too distant for Namibia's black representatives. Mr. Vorster, however, seems to have shown flexibility both over the timing of independence and the participation in pre-independence negotiations of

★U.S.-Soviet arms pact by Nov. 2?

The Vladivostok provisional accord, if finalized by an official Salt II, would force Moscow to come down to a maximum of 2,400 (which it could do by scrapping 100 of its older TU-95 bombers known to NATO as the Bear). A 10 percent cut below that would mean cutting into some sea or land launchers.

Washington on the other hand would need only to come down from 2,210 to 2,160 under a new 10 percent reduction. This could be achieved by eliminating some older bombers. The swingwing FB-111 aricraft based abroad would be unaffected since it was excluded in Vladivostok, although the controversial B-1 bomber was included.

And according to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the United States still leads the Soviets in MIRV warheads by 8,900 compared with 3,500.

The Soviets are closing the gap, however. Their current figure is 1,000 more than last year.

A proposed 10 percent trim in this area could affect the United States initially while reducing the ultimate ceiling for the Soviets.

2. The 10 percent possibility apparently is intended to balance Moscow's continued insistence on limits on testing and deployment of the U.S. cruise missile - the unmanned, low-flying, remote-controlled rocket that, when fully developed, could be launched from bombers and nuclear submarines.

Soviet officials repeatedly have made it clear that they are worried by the cruise. They want its range curtailed. Soviet versions of the cruise can fly only relatively short distances.

The U.S. air-launched missile now being developed has a potential range of about 7,000 miles, some experts have estimated. The sea-launched variety could fly about 1,800 miles, it has been said.

The Soviets are believed not to be unhappy with a resolution introduced into the Senate earlier this year by Sens. Jacob K. Javits, Edward M. Kennedy, and Hubert H. Humphrey that would limit the air-launched cruise to 1,550 miles and the sea-launched to 372 miles.

3. The Soviets want their Backfire bomber excluded from any new arms agreement on the grounds that its range is too short to qualify it as an intercontinental launcher. Medium-range launchers were not covered by SALT I nor by Vladivostok.

There has been speculation in Washington that President Ford may be about to accept that contention - which would mean directly overruling some Pentagon generals and risking the ire of such hard-liners as Republican Ronald Reagan and Democratic Sen. Henry M. Jackson. The White House last week refused comment.

If Mr. Ford does agree to limitations on the cruise (thus accepting the State Department contention that such limitations are essential to prevent Moscow developing its own long-

range cruises and thus another turn in the arms race) the limits could be included in SALT II documents or, perhaps more likely, in a separate memorandum.

The National Security Council met recently in Washington to debate the U.S. response to the latest Soviet message in March. And now that Mr. Ford has defeated Mr. Reagan for the Republican presidential nomination, a long-time Ford associate and adviser has told this newspaper that a last-minute arms agreement is possible before Nov. 2.

"I know where the negotiations are," the adviser told Monitor Washington-bureau chief Godfrey Sperling Jr. Mr. Ford would have to get reductions in nuclear arms to make any agreement acceptable to the U.S. public, the adviser said, but he insisted this could be done in a way that would satisfy even the Reagan hard-liners.

Whether this is in fact possible remains unknown. Democratic presidential candidate Jimmy Carter would be quick to criticize any terms that seem unduly favorable to Moscow. But informed comment in Washington and Moscow considers a new agreement definitely possible before Nov. 2.

Any subsequent talks on the 10 percent issue might find the Soviets dealing with a brand new president Carter, and this would mean delay, it is thought. Congress next year may also be somewhat different, though Democratic majorities are thought certain to continue.

On the other hand the Soviets prefer to negotiate with faces they know rather than waiting for faces they do not. They know Mr. Ford. And equally as important, they know Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

Those Soviet officials who see advantages in replacing the current uneasy state of U.S.-Soviet relations with new momentum on a range of issues argue that a fresh SALT pact would provide the necessary impetus.

For Mr. Ford, the decision is whether to overrule the generals and the conservatives on both cruises and Backfire and announce an agreement that he would present as the historic act of a world statesman.

As for the timing, speculation in Washington on an Oct. 1 date seems too soon to allow Dr. Kissinger to meet with Soviet leaders. Usually Leonid I. Brezhnev handles such crucial talks as he did in Moscow last January.

Then SALT negotiators in Geneva would have to pass on the terms. Then presumably Mr. Ford and Mr. Brezhnev would need to meet.

Since Mr. Ford went to Vladivostok in 1974 perhaps it is his turn to play host to the Soviet leader either in Washington or on neutral ground somewhere - with all the ceremony and television coverage and domestic political impact such a summit would entail.

From page 1

★Carter sets vigorous campaign

This was Mr. Carter's theme in the primary election.

Weekend Edition--19 September 1976

BOSTON GLOBE 19 SEPTEMBER 1976 Pg.57

New strategic arms pact with
Soviets is stalled by campaign

By William Beecher
Globe Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON — Unless Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko brings a new Russian strategic arms limitation proposal with him when he comes to the United Nations later this month, ranking Administration sources say, it is unlikely there will be a SALT 2 agreement before the November election.

This contrasts with an expectation, expressed by
several senior officials as recently as July, that the
United States would attempt to break the SALT negoti-
ations deadlock this fall in hopes of getting an early
agreement.

But any such notions appear to have fallen victim
to what the Administration views as a close presidential
face and the preoccupation of Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger with Africa and other issues.

While the State Department, the Pentagon and the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency have made pro-
posals on different negotiating approaches, qualified
sources say no effort has been made to call a high-level
meeting to try to iron out a consensus position within
the Ford Administration.

Such a consensus would be necessary for a new
American initiative, the sources stressed. They added
that the United States owes the Russians an answer
from their last communication on the subject in March.

Trying to explain the lack of movement, officials
say the White House is chary about letting the process
be aired at the Verification Panel of the National Secu-
rity Council for fear it would quickly leak and generate
politically damaging criticism, from hard-line Demo-
crats and Republican supporters of Ronald Reagan, dur-
ing the crucial stages of an uphill campaign.

"We haven't had a Verification Panel meeting on SALT in months," one senior official said, "even though we were told we would have." The panel did meet as recently as last Thursday, but that session dealt with the Mutual Balanced Force Reduction Talks which will soon resume in Vienna.

As pieced together for a number of knowledgeable
sources, this is the status of SALT:

Following Kissinger's unsuccessful negotiations in Moscow in January, the United States passed through Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin in Washington a proposal that a limited treaty be drafted that would fix an overall level for strategic missiles and bombers, a ceiling for multiple warhead missiles, a definition on what constitutes large missiles and agreement on how to verify the development of multiple warhead weapons, while deferring negotiations over the more difficult issues of how to treat Soviet Backfire bombers and American cruise missiles.

In March, the Russians sent word that any agree-
ment that did not constrain US cruise missiles would
not be acceptable. They asked for new proposals on that
score. No such proposals have yet been transmitted, of-
ficials concede.

The Russians displayed their displeasure when, in
early July, Soviet party chairman Leond Brezhnev
publicly criticized the United States for dragging its feet
on SALT.

And later that month, before technical SALT talks
in Geneva recessed for the summer, well placed sources
say the Russians seemed to draw back from an earlier
concession by insisting that the mere fact multiple war-
heads had been test-fired from a particular type of silo
did not mean the United States could count all missiles
deployed in such silos against the 1320 ceiling for mul-
tiple warhead missiles. American officials are still not
sure whether that was merely a bargaining tactic or a
toughened Soviet position.

Some US planners, particularly at the State De-
partment, might be willing to allow the Soviet Backfire
bomber to escape being counted against the overall stra-
tegic missile-bomber ceiling, if the Russians would re-
duce that level from the 2400 provisionally agreed to at
Vladivostok to about 2000. This would have the effect of
forcing the Soviets, who now have more than 2500 stra-
tegic missiles and bombers in their arsenal, to dismantle
several hundred strategic weapons in order to be allow-
ed to build up their Backfire fleet.

But Pentagon planners insist that numerous ex-
haustive studies conclude the Backfire has a range of
close to 6000 miles and must be counted as a strategic
system. The debate is complicated by a recent, contro-
versial, CIA-sponsored analysis by McDonnell-Douglas
that suggests the Backfire has a range of only about
3500 miles. The limited nature of intelligence data ex-
amined in this study is challenged by critics as fore-
daining the new conclusion.

On the equally thorny matter of cruise missiles, sources say the Russians appear to be less concerned about the air-launched version, which has a range of only about 700 miles, than naval models carried by surface ships and submarines which are being designed to fly 1500 to 2000 miles, dip below the view of early warning radar, and strike within 400 feet of target.

The Russians are trying to restrict the naval ver-
sions to 375 miles; at which range they could not attack
many targets deep within the Soviet Union. Some offi-
cials in the Pentagon and the Arms Control and Disar-
mament Agency, however, are very much opposed to
such limitations.

Unless Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin, who
will return to the United States after a long absence,
have a new Soviet proposal, officials say, SALT will
have to await the outcome of the November election be-
fore serious negotiations may resume.

AVIATION WEEK 13 SEPTEMBER 1976 (19)

Cost Growth

Defense Dept. selected acquisition reports on the costs of 44 major weapon programs total $175.8 billion, an increase of $4.8 billion over the previous SARs submitted to Congress on Mar. 31. The latest reports, based on June 30 estimates, reflect the addition of a fourth Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier and a major escalation in program estimates for the Air Force/McDonnell Douglas F-15 air-superiority fighter (AW&ST Aug. 2, p. 38). The June estimate for the F-15 acquisition program totals $12.2 billion, up by $734.7 million from the March report. The growth includes a $3.8-million cost overrun in prior year funding and a projected cost growth of $730.9 million from Fiscal 1978 through Fiscal 1980.

Other major cost growths since March include the Navy/Grumman F-14 air-superiority fighter, $162.9 million; the Navy/Lockheed S-3A carrier-based ASW patrol aircraft, $111.1 million; the Navy/Lockheed Trident fleet ballistic missile, $358.6 million, and the USAF/Boeing Minuteman 3 ICBM, $257.6 million, largely reflecting an add-on buy of 60 missiles in Fiscal 1977.

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

27 SEPTEMBER 1976 (19)

James R. Schlesinger, former Defense Secretary traveling in Red China, had to reverse charges when he phoned his wife back home. His traveler's checks would not be honored because the company that issues them has business ties with Taiwan.

Although Moscow still officially
frowns on the "cult of personality,"
100,000 special color portraits of party
Chairman Brezhnev will go on sale in
October to mark his 70th birthday.

5-F

September 10, 1976 (19)

Aerospace Daily

XM-1 TANK SEEN MORE THAN MATCH FOR SOVIET COUNTERPART

The Army's XM-1 tank program manager told Congress yesterday that he believes the new main battle tank will be a match for at least two of the recently deployed Soviet T72 tanks--"perhaps three or four."

Appearing before a House Armed Services Committee "XM-1 panel," Maj. Gen. Robert J. Baer also testified that he "personally" did not believe that there were any potential "techni-cal" gains to be made by delaying selection of a prime U.S. contractor for the program from this July, when the choice had been scheduled, until November--a change in plans recently announced by the Pentagon. He said he could not speak as to political advantages.

At the same time, Baer said under questioning, the Army is "confident" that the competing contractors, General Motors and Chrysler, can produce within 90 days the essential data on what the added cost would be for incorporating in their present designs a capability for accommodating turbine as well as diesel engines and a "hybrid" turret suitable for 120 millimeter as well as 105 mm guns.

"Our preliminary estimate is that the turret study will cause only about a one-month delay," he said.

"We don't believe we're throwing out the baby with the bath" in accepting the four-month delay, he said in response to a question from Rep. Samuel S. Stratton (D-N.Y.), chairman of the ad hoc panel. He later told Rep. Elwood Hills (R-Ind.) that he believes both GM and Chrysler "are still anxious to win" the XM-1 award.

At the end of his prepared testimony, Baer noted that the Army yesterday afternoon was formally accepting the West German Leopard 2 AV tank at Aberdeen (Md.) Proving Ground for comparative testing, and that actual testing would begin today and is scheduled to be completed by Dec. 20.

Baer, like other recent DOD and Army witnesses on the tank program, gave no indication that there was more than a theoretical possibility that the U.S. would buy the German vehicle, or vice versa. The engine and turbine studies GM and Chrysler have been asked to make are aimed merely at achieving some degree of standardization between components of the two nations' tanks.

The project manager testified that XM-1 validation contracts, performed by both companies under "very strict" cost schedule control systems criteria, were completed this spring "on schedule and below costs." He was praised for his stewardship of the program by Stratton and other committee members, and responded that he was "proud for the contractors and the Army staff."

In the hearing, however, Stratton said he was concerned as to whether the executive branch had carried out the "mandates" of Congress. He said that tank development was an area in which Congress "has spoken with particular concern and precision over an extended period of years," and mentioned that "ever since the Armed Services subcommittee which I had the honor to chair went to Israel during the (1973) Yom Kippur war, we have sought...both to beef up our tank production and to get a newer and more modern tank into our inventory at the earliest possible time."

Following DOD "scrapping" of two earlier main battle tank development programs, one another joint effort with West Germany, Congress had voiced with "particular clarity..just what it wanted and what it was directing" for the XM-1, Stratton declared.

"The willingness of (DOD) to change that program so very radically and the unwillingness of the Department to consult with the Congress on what it was up to until after the changes were made, calls into serious question the professed willingness of Defense officials to work in real partnership with the Congress on defense matters."

The chairman also said that although Congress recognizes that the military situation is "constantly changing...we cannot endlessly develop new modifications and endlessly delay on-going programs until the latest exotic change has been incorporated. That kind of management is what led to all the costly problems of the (Air Force/Lockheed) C-5A and other systems. At some point we need to stop and go into production and get new systems into the inventory and off the drawing board."

During questioning, Baer said that the new tank program would differ from the earlier (MBT70) joint U.S.-German effort in that the 1960s program fell victim to "various international management problems and a continuing conflict of national priorities," whereas it is expected that the XM-1 program, while "accepting certain (German) components" will remain under single (U.S.) control."

He stressed that the program objective "was and is to develop and field a tank for use in the 1980s and beyond with significant improvements in armor protection, mobility, firepower and the logistics factors of reliability, availability, maintainability and durability...and to accomplish this within a specified design-to-unit cost ceiling, i.e., at a price we can afford."

6-F

VERIFICATION AND SALT

Verification -- the fear on the part of the U.S.
that the Russians will cheat and the suspicion on the part
of the Soviets that the West wants to use arms agreements as
a cover operation for spying -- has haunted arms control dis-
cussions from the beginning of the Cold War. When the 1972
SALT I agreements were negotiated and debated there was a
brief respite from the fixation on cheating, and the debate
was conducted largely on the premise that the agreements
would be adhered to and that, in any case, the newly acknow-
ledged "spy satellites" of the U.S. intelligence system
could ferret out any violations. The controversies of 1972
were primarily over the merits of the agreements themselves
-- whether they imposed real limits, whether they froze a
U.S. inferiority, whether they contained loopholes -- not
over whether they would be complied with.

That assumption did not prevail long. By mid-1974
within the executive branch, and by later in that year in
the press, reports were appearing charging that the Soviets
were not merely exercising all their rights under the agree-
ments, but actually violating the limits. The controversy
has grown until it is now a major element in public discus-
sion, not only of SALT and the prospects for further agree-
ment, but of the general state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

- 2 -

Conceptual Preliminary: The
Role of Verification in Arms Control

Asymmetries in U.S.-Soviet
Verification Concerns

The purpose of this paper is to review the record since 1972 of the verification and enforcement of the SALT I agreements reached in Moscow in May of that year and to suggest the lessons of that experience for negotiating further SALT measures and compliance procedures. However, before considering the details of the SALT record, it is useful to examine the place of verification in major arms control agreements like SALT.

It is a commonplace that the asymmetries among
the perspectives and interests of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.,
their strategic situations, their political and diplomatic
problems and purposes, and their military doctrines and
force structures present the greatest difficulties in reach-
ing and implementing arms control agreements. Nowhere
perhaps is this more the case than for verification.

In addition to the Soviet investment in both tech-
nical and covert intelligence, which seems likely to be at
least as extensive as our own, the relative openness of the
American society and its defense policies gives the Soviets
a variety of devices for monitoring the U.S. defense pro-
grams for which the U.S. has no counterparts for learning
about Soviet programs. The Soviets would no doubt be

- 3 -

unwilling to agree with American claims that, because of
U.S. devoting to abiding by international agreements and the
extensive officially announced and unofficially leaked
information about U.S. programs, verification of U.S. com-
pliance is automatic. Nonetheless, the differences between
the secrecy practices of the two societies mean that for all
practical purposes, verification is not a mutual matter but
chiefly a question of how the U.S. is to monitor Soviet
compliance. Secrecy is a much stronger and more pervasive
general policy within the Soviet Union than in the United
States. A regime that does not publish meaningful crime or
wage statistics cannot be expected to take well to U.S.
requests that it open its defense secrets.

This asymmetry in secrecy has led to an asymmetry
in the basic concept of what verification of an arms control
agreement entails. The Soviet position is that the only
verification that is justifiable as a part of an agreement
is verification of what is directly limited by that agree-
ment. The Soviets have, throughout the arms control process,
been highly suspicious of any U.S. position they view as an
effort to use limited arms control agreements as a device
for monitoring Soviet defense activity in general.

This Soviet concern reflects the fact that, for
limited and specific, as well as for comprehensive, agree-
ments, the United States takes the position that verifica-
tion is required not only as to compliance with the provi-

- 4 -

sions of the agreements alone, but also as embracing an
ability to keep track of the unconstrained parts of the arms
relationship. The U.S. argument is, of course, that the con-
tinued acceptability and viability of the restraints accepted
in the agreement is conditioned to some degree at least on
knowing that Soviet actions in unconstrained areas are not
destroying the context in which the agreements were made.
This U.S. concern responds not so much to an acceptance of
the charge that the Soviets notoriously break treaties, as
to a recognition that the principal danger against which
verification must guard is not direct cheating -- e.g., build-
ing 200 ABMs where only 100 are allowed -- but actions in
unconstrained areas that vitiate the premises of the agree-
ment -- e.g., a MIRV and accuracy program for ICBMs posing a
threat to our Minuteman ICBMs that would make ABM site
defense imperative. This imbalance in verification concerns
is ineradicable, reflecting as it does fundamental differ-
ences in the two nations, and it underlies all negotiation
and operation of verification and enforcement procedures in
1/
SALT.

1/ The case can be made, indeed, that the principal un-
stability in the strategic nuclear relationship arises not
from amassing more of already familiar weapons, either
overtly or covertly, but from a widely and rapidly applied
technological breakthrough. To the extent this is the case,
focusing on actual deployments during the life of an agree-
ment may be misconceived. For the problem may not lie in
such deployments, but in the general reluctance to constrain
(footnote continued)

- 5 -

The Political or Confidence-Building
Function of Verification

Accepting the asymmetry, it is relevant to consider why verification of an agreement is important to the United States. At minimum, of course, lies the judgment that it is unacceptable in international relations if agreements are -- or even are such that they could be -- violated without detection. This position amounts to the view that there is an independent value to adherence to the maxim, *pacta sunt servanda* -- agreements are to be lived up to. Indeed, this general principle -- not being cheated on -- rather than the substantive military dangers of Soviet cheating appears to be the principal importance of verification in the SALT context.

More specifically, the perceived verifiability of
an agreement plays a political role in the United States.
A widespread consensus in the United States that existing
agreements are being adhered to is an essential precondition
to their continuing political acceptability and to the

(footnote continued)

research and development. This reluctance is shared by both
sides, by no means chiefly because of the difficulties of
verifying prohibitions or limitations on R & D. The result-
ing potential for instability arises from the possibility
that, without cheating, a country could pursue a vigorous
search for a technological boost, to be followed by denunci-
ation of the agreement and a rapid overt development, test
and deployment program. It seems likely that it is against
this, somewhat neglected, scenerio, not massive deployment
cheating, that the sensitivity of agreements to rapid and
unexpected changes in the strategic situation should be
tested.

- 6 -

continuation of the arms control process. The perception
that the U.S. can confirm Soviet compliance is, as a practi-
cal matter, the precondition of public support for U.S.
acceptance of restraints on our own choices.

To be sure, the need for an agreement to be
thought of as verifiable rests ultimately on a judgment that
there are substantive risks to the U.S. strategic position,
an upsetting of the strategic balance, if arms agreements
are violated. On the whole, however, the United States has
sought to insure against the possibility that substantial
violations could endanger our military security, not by be-
ing sure of verification, but by insisting that an arms
agreement cannot be such that the military security of the
U.S. would be significantly weakened even by successful
Soviet cheating. ¹/ At least in principle, the analysis
applied to determine the acceptability of an agreement
assumes the possibility of significant violations. Such a
policy has, it should be noted, a compliance-enhancing effect:
If an agreement is designed to be relatively sensitive to
cheating, the practical chances of compliance increase, for
the incentive to cheat is reduced, since even successful
cheating, by definition, gives the cheater little advantage.

1/ This does not, of course, mean that the U.S. operates
on the assumption that no violations will be detectable;
only that the U.S. is unlikely to agree to provisions (like
a MIRV test ban) that are thought to be acceptably only if
difficult verification techniques work excellently.

- 7 -

When, If Ever, Is Verification Not Important

Recognizing the importance of verifiability for
confidence-building, and to some degree for substantive
purposes, it appears that there are nonetheless arms con-
trol situations in which verification is not particularly
important. As noted above, because of the inherent uncer-
tainty of verification, the general rule that the United
States seeks to follow is that arms control agreements not
be dependent on highly precise verification for acceptabil-
ity. To the extent that policy is successfully applied,
verification is by definition less important.

Even beyond this general rule, there are specific
situations in which even an apparently unverifiable agree-
ment may be useful. First, just as verification can never
be absolute, no agreement is totally unverifiable. There is
always a chance of detection of a violation even of an
agreement thought to be unverifiable, if only because of the
possibility of defectors. Moreover, arms control agreements
have some viability simply by the fact that they are entered
into. Even governments wholly indifferent to the sanctity
of treaties as an independent value as applied against
themselves -- i.e., most governments -- are less likely to
take a step if it means direct violation of an agreement.
Not only are there risks of detection, and costs of exposu-
re, but the elements in the bureaucracy that backed the

- 8 -

agreement initially are likely to regard themselves as
having an interest in its being adhered to.
1/

Moreover, there are situations in which there is
no possible or desirable specific U.S. response to a Soviet
action or in which it seems possible to secure an agreement
that permits all desirable U.S. responses. 2/
In such a case,
even if the likely payoff -- restraint on the other side --
is highly uncertain, the inhibition on our action is a low
enough price to pay for any decrease in the changes of the
undesirable Soviet actions.

There may also be situations in which a difficult-
to-verify agreement serves a useful purpose in restraining
arms races by emulation. To the extent that each side is
thought to have strategic forces in excess of its real
needs, the role of additional forces, is, by definition,
the ability to increase prestige and political influence,

1/ See Chayes, *An Inquiry Into the Workings of Arms Control Agreements*, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 905 (1972). Obviously, the bureaucratic interest argument would not apply if the government had entered into the agreement with a conscious and general intention to cheat.

2/ Arguably this is a case with respect to the possibility of Soviet development of a large scale counterforce capability: As long as the agreements do not constrain appropriate U.S. responses (like mobility, "shift to sea" or talk of launch-on-warning), it could be in the U.S. interest to make an agreement blocking only undesirable U.S. responses, even if all we received in exchange was a hard-to-verify Soviet assurance against building such a capability. (Obviously, those who believe a larger U.S. counterforce capability is the best answer to a similar Soviet force would reject the validity of this illustration.)

- 9 -

not to change the strategic balance. Whatever else may be
the limitations of the political influence of increased
strategic forces, such influences can hardly flow from
additional strategic forces if the outside world does not
know -- and cannot be told -- that they exist.

As to specific systems, nonverifiable agreements
may be useful devices to provide each side with any excuse
not to invest in a new system. Arguably, for example, the
outer space treaty serves this role.

Finally, a little explored issue is the question
of how good predictions of verifiability turn out to be,
that is, how good are we at telling whether an agreement
can be verified. It may be that agreements thought unveri-
fiable will prove enforcible and vice versa. For example,
because of the peculiarities of Soviet deployment patterns,
it seems that (provided the U.S. prevails on the rule it has
proposed for counting as a MIRV all systems ever tested as
such) there will be no substantial difficulties in identify-
ing which Soviet silos contain MIRV missiles -- they will be
the SS-18s and -19s. Yet when a MIRV ban was first dis-
cussed in the late 60's and early 70's, the debate about
verification was premised on a proposition that turned out
to be incorrect -- that the Soviets would install MIRVs
without modifying the silos, so that a MIRV test ban was
essential to a MIRV deployment ban. Conversely, a premise

- 10 -

of the ABM Treaty was the belief that construction of the
necessary radar support for a system would be a large-scale,
largely visible activity extending over a long period.
Development of smaller, more quickly built ABM radars would
undermine this premise. When there is significant uncer-
tainty about verification of a valuable limitation, the
possibility must be considered that estimates of verifi-
ability are mistaken, so that the agreement is not so mean-
ingless as feared -- or so meaningful as hoped.

Verification vs. Enforcement

Finally, in discussing SALT "compliance" -- the
broad issue of whether agreements are abided by -- it is
essential to keep in mind that there is a difference be-
tween verification -- *i.e.*, detection of a violation --
and enforcement -- *i.e.*, bringing detected violations to a
halt. International agreements are not enforced in courts;
the mere existence of a provable violation does not bring
it to an end. 1/ Whether a provable violation will be cor-
rected depends on the relative interests of the two sides in
the cooperative aspects of their relationship. This paper
is fundamentally about the ability to demonstrate that
violations in fact have or have not occurred; whether prov-
ability yields enforceability is another matter.

1/ A practicing lawyer may perhaps reindulged the obser-
vation that the same is true of other agreements and laws
which *are* enforceable in court.

- 11 -

THE STRUCTURE OF THE AGREEMENTS

An essential background to the question whether
the 1972 agreements have been abided by is appreciation of
the complex structure of the agreements themselves, for the
agreements comprise several kinds of statements of differing
degrees of dignity and precision. "SALT I", i.e., the agree-
ments signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972, consists, of course,
of two principal elements: the ABM Treaty and the Interim
Agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons. The Treaty
consists of sixteen articles, the Interim Agreement of eight.

These two most formal elements of SALT I are sup-
plemented by a variety of additional statements. The offen-
sive weapons agreement has associated with it a "Protocol"
with numerical and other rules specifying certain details of
the limits on submarine launched ballistic missiles contained
in Article III of the Agreement. Like the Treaty and Agree-
ment themselves, the submarine protocol was signed by both
President Nixon and Secretary Brezhnev.

Further supplementing and amplifying the terms of
the two basic agreements are "Agreed Interpretations", seven

1/ At the 1974 summit Nixon and Brezhnev agreed on an
additional Protocol to the ABM Treaty, waiving the right of
each side to a second ABM site.

- 12 -

1/ in the case of the Treaty and five for the Agreement, setting forth supplemental understandings and interpretations of the specific articles. These "Agreed Interpretations" were initialed by the heads of the two delegations (Smith and Semyonov) on May 26, 1972, the date the Treaty and Agreement themselves were signed. It is only with respect to the Treaty, the Agreement and its Protocol, and the Agreed Interpretations that the two sides ever formally agreed to the same words as setting forth their obligations.

Nonetheless, in announcing the SALT Agreements to Congress, the United States listed a number of "common understandings", five for the treaty and three for the agreement. These took the form of excerpts from formal delegation statements made during the lengthy negotiations. In each instance a United States statement is set forth verbatim, followed by a summary of Soviet replies. Although these statements are called "common understandings," in many, indeed most, cases, the Soviet response falls short of direct agreement. The Soviet replies are described as varying from a flat statement that "this statement corresponded to

1/ A further Agreed Interpretation, dealing with missiles on diesel submarines was agreed to, but not published shortly after the public signatures; after further discussion and modification, it was embodied in two secret protocols signed at the 1974 Summit. See Szulc, *Covering SALT: Loopholes, Breakthroughs and Official Communiques*, 13 Col. J. Rev. 26 (Sept.-Oct. 1974).

- 13 -

the Soviet Union's understanding" (A:C:AU) 1/ to the highly equivocal and subsequently much controverted Soviet response on "current" ABM test ranges. (T:CU:D)

Also submitted with the agreements were other ex-
cerpts from the negotiation record that were denominated
"noteworthy unilateral statements," four in the case of the
Treaty, and five (counting a U.S. rejection of a Soviet uni-
lateral statement) for the Agreement. Many of these "Common
Understandings" and "Unilateral Statements" reflect state-
ments made in the course of the last few weeks of negotia-
tions, but several were made far earlier, including an
important unilateral statement dealing with early warning
radars, which was made on July 28, 1970, nearly two years
before the agreements were reached. (T:US:D).

The process by which the "Common Understandings"
and "Unilateral Statements" were selected is unclear. It
does not appear that, prior to the signature of the agree-
ments, special significance was attached to either. Rather,
they appear to have been chosen subsequent to the Moscow
summit for presentation to Congress.

1/ In relation to agreement provisions, the following abbreviations are used: T = ABM Treaty, A = Interim Agreement, AP = Agreement Protocol; Art = Article; AI = Agreed Interpretation; CU = Common Understanding; US = Unilateral Statement. Thus A:CU:A means the Interim Agreement's Common Understanding "A". The lettering corresponds to that in M. Willrich and J. Rhinelander, SALT: *The Moscow Agreements and Beyond*, App. 1 & 2 (1974).

- 14 -

The "Letter of Submittal" by the Secretary of
State formally requesting the submission of the agreements
also amplified their interpretation in certain aspects,
*e.g.*, by the statement that new ICBM launchers for test
purposes could be constructed at operational sites -- which
had not been the prior U.S. practice. Presumably these were
included as further authoritative statements of U.S. views.

Behind these selected parts of the negotiating
record that were highlighted in the presentation of the
agreements to Congress, there lay also, of course, a massive
record of formal and informal exchanges over the whole
course of the negotiations. Reference could presumably be
made to this "negotiating history" in arguing the meaning of
the agreements. So far, no part of that record has been
published by either side.

The process of presentation to Congress also con-
tributed several significant statements by the American
officials in hearings, briefings, or press conferences as
to the United States' interpretation of the meaning of the
agreements. These comments were not, so far as is known,
conveyed to the Soviets other than from their general aware-
ness of the debate.

1/ Reprinted in U.S. Sen., 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Comm. on
Armed Services, Hearing on Military Implications of the
Treaty. . . 78 (1972).

- 15 -

The complexity of the agreements is of importance, for it illustrates the varying degree of actual agreement there was on particular words of meaning in the various elements.

## ALLEGATIONS

A reasonably comprehensive review of the published literature concerning SALT I compliance indicates that the following are the allegations of Soviet violations of the agreement which have been seriously discussed within the Executive Branch:

### ABM-Related Charges:

1. Testing SA-5 air defense missiles and radars in the ABM mode.

2. Development, testing, and internetting of mobile ABM radar systems, including tests exceeding maximum power levels.

3. Construction of an ABM radar at a test range to Kamchatka not previously designated as an ABM test range.

### Offensive weapons-related allegations

1. Construction of holes, purportedly for command and control, which are, or are capable of being converted into, additional ICBM silos (the "III-X" issue).

1/ The Soviets have charged that a new U.S. radar in Alaska is an ABM-capable radar that violates the Treaty.

- 16 -

2. Testing of mobile ICBMS.

3. Deployment of a missile, the SS-19, in SS-11 silos, in violation of the ban on converting silos for "light" missiles to launch "heavy" missiles.

Alleged violations of the bans on interference with national verification means and on deliberate concealment

1. Jamming American monitoring of Soviet ABM-related radar activity.

2. Covering facilities for (a) mobile ICBMs, (b) submarine berthing and outfitting, and (c) ICBM facilities.

3. Use of plastic and rubber decoy submarines.

4. Encoding and encapsulating missile test telemetry.

5. Laser attacks on observation satellites.

1/ The Soviets have also charged that U.S. erection of aluminum canopies over Minuteman silos in the course of MIRV conversions is an improper concealment of ICBM silo modification work. Similar charges may have been made with respect to coverings over U.S. submarine pens.

- 17 -

## HAVE THERE BEEN VIOLATIONS?

The range of allegations exemplify the variety of kinds of behavior which can lead to concern about violations of an international agreement. The appendix to this paper will contain a detailed analysis of each allegation, the applicable agreement provisions, U.S. charges, Soviet responses, and the eventual resolution of the problem. The results of that analysis can be summarized as follows:

### Substantive Restrictions

1. **SA-5 Tests.** On the substantive issues, that is, those having to do with violations of the limitations of the agreements on the nuclear arsenals of the two sides, the record is mixed. Perhaps the strongest case of a substantive violation is the charge that SA-5 air defense missiles have been tested "in an ABM mode" by testing against high altitude targets and by other tests of SA-5 missile and radars in circumstances suggesting experimentation on using those missiles for ABM purposes.

Despite Soviet protestations, these test programs seem likely to represent a Soviet effort to test the limits of U.S. ability and willingness to enforce the ban on "SAM upgrade". The Treaty bans the testing of non-ABM systems "in an ABM mode." (T:Art:VI(a)) The Soviets never accepted the detailed list presented by the United States of actions which we would regard as instances of prohibited testing of

- 18 -

air defense missiles in an ABM mode. (T:US:B) However, it
also appears that they never explicitly rejected the list
either. The "ABM mode" test can therefore be taken as an
instance of a true "unilateral statement" -- statement of
how one side intends to interpret a provision that is nei-
ther contradicted nor expressly accepted.

It seems reasonably clear that beginning soon
after the agreements had been ratified, the Soviets began a
program of SA-5 tests, whose effect, whatever its purpose,
was to probe U.S. willingness to insist on Soviet compliance
with our unilateral specifications of what constituted a
test "in an ABM mode." This testing continued for at least
18 months after its initiation.

However, the long continuance was *not* the result
of Soviet persistence in the face of U.S. objections, for
the U.S. reaction to the SA-5 test program was surprisingly
slow. The tests first aroused concern in 1973, expressed by
DIA, Paul Nitze, and others. During 1974, as the tests went
on, they were the subject of several Verification Panel
meetings. Finally, in December 1974, according to Secretary
Kissinger's retrospective account, the CIA and the Depart-
ment of Defense recommended that the issue not be raised
formally with the Soviets, to avoid disclosing information

- 19 -

about how we monitored tests. 1/ In January 1975, according to Kissinger, the Defense Department reversed its recommendation and indicated that it preferred that the SA-5 issue be raised with the Soviet Union. Shortly thereafter, in February 1975, a protest against the tests was lodged through the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC). The grounds for the protest was that the tests violated specific elements of the unilateral United States list of criterion of ABM-mode tests. Seventeen days after the U.S. raised the issue with the Soviets in the SCC, the "activity stopped and has not since been resumed." 2/

Contrary to the general impression that U.S. uni-
lateral statements attempting to establish parameters for
enforcement of the agreements have been a failure, the SA-5
testing case seems to mark a significant success for their
use. It is, of course, possible that the Soviets stopped
their tests in early 1975 not because of U.S. protests but
because the program had been completed. However, it would
be an extraordinary coincidence for completion of an eighteen

1/ K. 15. The exact date the SA-5 test issue was raised with the USSR is in dispute. According to one press report [Wald], the matter was discussed with the Soviets at the Vladivostok talks in November of 1974. Adm. Zumwalt contradicted Kissinger's claims that DOD objected to raising the issue saying it "on balance favored raising the issue." Z1975.

2/ K15. Zumwalt in oral testimony contended that tests continued in the "ABM radar mode," Z1629, but he did not repeat the point in his detailed written rebuttal. Z1975.

- 20 -

month long program to coincide so closely with the long de-
ferred and heavily debated U.S. decision to reveal the data
necessary to substantiate the charge. It seems far more
likely that the Soviets decided to continue the tests until
protested, and stopped when it became clear the U.S. would
take the "ABM mode" guidelines seriously.

It is of course unknown whether the Soviets had
actually decided to cheat and stopped only when caught, or,
as some argue, they to intended only to test up to the bor-
derline but stopped rather than perpetuate a controversy.
On either theory, the unilateral statement seems to have
been helpful to the U.S. position, and the SA-5 episode
suggests an important potential use of unilateral state-
ments.

The ban on testing air defense missiles "in an
ABM mode" was, from the beginning, a provision the U.S.
was pressing. The Soviets argued that all provisions deal-
ing with "SAM upgrade" were superfluous. The logic of their
position was that if a weapon was an ABM, it would be
counted as such; what else it was, or what it was developed
from, made no difference. The United States, however,
asserted that the numerical ABM limit had to be reinforced
by an explicit ban on giving air defense missiles an ABM
capability and this limit must in turn be buttressed by a
ban on even testing such missiles "in an ABM mode."

- 21 -

"ABM mode" is scarcely a self-defining phrase, but the Soviets, who had been reluctant to be even as specific as they had been on the point, were evidently unwilling to agree to any interpretation of its meaning. There is, however, no published indication of any affirmative objection to the U.S. view expressed in the unilateral statement. Thus, the unilateral statement served to detail in advance a United States position on a complex and technical matter, and did not -- at least so far as is known -- involve any contradiction of a stated Soviet position.

## 2. Kamchatka Radar

The Kamchatka radar and the SS-19 issues are the other two major instances in which Soviet action after the agreements were signed was alleged to be inconsistent with the U.S. unilateral statements. These too, however, involve quite a different sort of unilateral statement. They do not, it appears, present situations in which -- as was arguably the case with respect to the SA-5 tests -- the Soviets were violating an expressed U.S. understanding which the Soviets had not clearly rejected in the negotiations. Rather, these two cases represent situations in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. simply disagreed in negotiating on issues. The issues were never resolved, and the U.S. unilateral statements were simply reassertions of rejected U.S. positions. In each instance, the U.S.S.R. position was