American Diplomacy and the New Asia

Since 1947, the United States has been engaged in the tremendous task of strengthening critical areas of Eurasia against a further expansion of the Soviet Union. The objective of American policy has been the creation of a series of interlocking security agreements in an arc from the North Atlantic through the Middle East to Japan. In pursuing this objective, the United States, and to a lesser extent it's allies, has spent large sums to achieve the greatest possible political and economic stability in all areas on the periphery of the Soviet bloc. While the greatest aid has gone to states within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, substantial assistance of one kind or another has been given to Japan, Korea, Formosa, the Philippines and to other states in South Asia and the Middle East, outside of West-Europe.

The search for free world stability has been pursued in a setting in which great changes were taking place. The virtual collapse of Western empires in Asia, the loss of China to the Soviet bloc and growing unrest in the Middle East and North Africa have complicated enormously the task of erecting effective defense barriers. On numerous occasions, because of the priority given West European defense, and because of the rapidly expanding interests of the United States in certain areas and resources, such as Middle Eastern oil, the United States has felt it necessary to support the interests of Western states in the remnants of their empires. Many Americans, forced to choose between European interests and those of North Africans, Indonesians, or Indo-Chinese, felt the security requirements of the immediate post-war situation justified their support of the former.

At the same time, those who knew of the nationalist revolt already well under way in Asia, the Middle East and Africa had many misgivings about these decisions. At best, they were regarded as attempts to temporize with

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complex and pressing issues which would sooner or later compel the United
States to re-study its policies and priorities in the light of the national-
ism which was sweeping the one-time colonial belt of the world: a number of
independent states of strategic and political importance to the United States
and the Soviet Union, were rising from the wreckage of Western empires in
Asia and the <u>disintegration</u> of French and British spheres of influence in the
Middle East. In the past few years, it has become increasingly difficult for
the United States to maintain what has been described as a posture of "in-
active vigilance", while allies, important to <u>us</u> in Europe, pursued policies
which have proven awkward or dangerous to American interests elsewhere.
American inability to side either with Britain, France, and Holland or with
colonial nationalism has had its own tragic cost in terms of a very definite
worsening in its relationships both with new states and with old allies. The
urgent need for a more explicit stand on "colonialism" is now very great in-
deed, because of the accelerating drive of nationalism, the speed with which
remaining European interests overseas are being challenged, and the renewed
interest of the Soviet Union in the former colonial belt of Eurasia.

It is worth emphasizing, however, that even if there had been no such
shift in Soviet tactics or no Soviet problems at all, the time was coming when
the United States would have had to look more closely at the growing influence
of peoples in this great belt of Eurasia and give greater attention to their
views and interests than <u>we</u> have in the past. With a few outstanding exceptions,
such as the timely British withdrawal from the Indian sub-continent and the
American withdrawal from the Philippines, the Western world has consistently
and tragically misinterpreted and underestimated the strength of the nationalist
movements. Out of this great belt of over seven hundreds of millions of peoples

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who control some of the world's vital resources, new powers are emerging with whom the West must have the closest contact and to whom a full measure of ~~respect~~ must be given.

From 1946 to 1951, Communist tactics were such as to permit the United States to give its greatest attention to military matters and the economic assistance necessary to sustain adequate defense programs amongst its allies. By the end of 1950, the foundation of Western defense had been laid in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the United States had substantially re-armed itself and, along with other states, given clear evidence in Korea of its determination to respond to Communist military aggression. Partly in response to these developments, and two years before the death of Stalin, a clear shift in Communist tactics got slowly underway, particularly in India, Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaya, and Korea. In Korea, the shift took the form of a cessation of large-scale military actions and the beginning of the "stalemate". But in other areas the general direction of the shift was towards a gradual political re-alignment with nationalist forces now in control, or through greater emphasis on political warfare in the remaining colonial areas of South Asia. The renewed use of this familiar Communist tactic — the "United Front" was announced at the 1952 meeting of the CPSU and its full application was ordered at the Twentieth Congress, concluded in February of this year.

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There can hardly be any question now that the Communists are beginning a vigorous, skillful campaign to subvert Western positions in the Middle East and South Asia and to expand their own role and influence in these strategic areas. It is not yet clear whether this is being done primarily to distract

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Western attention from the key NATO area's defense requirements, to weaken the system of American overseas strategic air bases on the periphery of the Soviet bloc or to strike out anew for a direct Soviet stake in an area of unquestioned geopolitical importance. In any case, the shift in Soviet tactics has certainly focussed attention on American policies in the region and forced the United States to make a thoughtful re-appraisal of the priorities assigned hitherto to West Europe, the Middle East and free Asia. If there is no agreement on the courses of action which the United States should follow, there is full agreement that the West is facing a new and critical crisis in which its whole relationship and future with the former colonial world is at stake.

The United States must necessarily consider the challenge in terms of the certain extension of Soviet influence and, in a larger and more vital sense, as perhaps a final opportunity to help lay the foundation of a new relationship between the West and an important segment of Asia just recently released from European control. It is a particularly difficult and pressing challenge: the United States must preserve in the interest of the West European economy, as far as is politically possible, the free Europe stake in Asian resources and yet modify and adjust the forms of that dependence in the light of Asian national-alism. At the same time, the United States must find ways of combatting the new Soviet effect which will exploit any European-Asian relationship reminiscent of the imperial past. The United States must accept also, and learn to live with the fact, that many states in the area, exploiting our apprehension of Soviet expansion, will play on that concern to blackmail us, as has Libya, for more aid or arms and still others will try, like Egypt, to play along with the Soviet Union in order to enlarge their own influence at the expense of the West's policies, unmindful or unconvinced of the certain danger to themselves of such tactics. American diplomacy is thus faced with complex problems inextricably

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bound up with the history of Western expansion, the unwillingness of former
imperial states to face up to reality, a certain irresponsibility on the part
of a few Asian leaders, the implications of Soviet expansion and the United
States' own general record of indecision and insensitivity to modern Asia.
Since it is now painfully clear that no course we select will satisfy all in-
terests, and that we cannot hope even to offend equally, our first effort should
be to define American interests in the Middle East and Asia, and then establish
a pattern of action which we have reason to believe will help foster a new
Western relationship with Asia, based not on desperate attempts to preserve the
remnants of empire, but on the promise of a future in which mutual respect and
need lead to a new and profitable interdependence. If this could be an ultimate
American objective, then certain harsh realities must be faced at once.

Americans like to regard themselves as anti-colonial and refer frequent-
ly to what they believe to have been a fairly full and constant opposition to
Western imperialism. While part of the West and a former colonial power in its
own right, the American record is better among the new Asian states, if it is
not perfect. From the point of view of Asians, however, the record is distinctly
spotty, when they check American deeds against declarations.

While Americans like to consider themselves as friends of Indonesian
independence there was an early period, critical for the nationalists, when it
was by no means certain where the United States stood and its indecision, if it
did not aid the Dutch, did not aid the Indonesians either. American policy with
respect to Indochina, has also been confusing and vacillating to Asians who could
find no firm, consistent American resolve to use their influence to end the French
empire in Southeast Asia and hasten the independence of a new Asian state. Simi-
larly, in the cases of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria, the American position has

been unclear and, to Asians, devious. If in many of these cases Asians have not
known or ignored the dilemmas confronting the United States as a global power,
it is also a valid observation that there has been no convincing public evidence
that the United States, confronted by problems of colonialism, has not chosen
invariably what seemed at that time to be the easier course: moralizing for the
record but preserving for as long as possible as much of the Western interest at
stake as appeared feasible without thoughtful regard for the consequences of
American acts on the thinking of leaders of the new Asia. No American policy
which attempts to shore up the old order will succeed; no attempt to preserve
British or French interests will be useful unless it is based upon a clear under-
standing that those interests are secure only to the extent they are acceptable
to the new states. The re-defining of Western interests, including those of the
United States, will be possible only if generous and imaginative leadership shows
the way.

No one would deny that in this great arc of peoples from the Atlantic to
the Pacific there are no simple problems; each people and political unit have a
host of complex problems and interests which are varied and often conflict. Despite
this, there is one common denominator in the region which is of overwhelming im-
portance and which has given it a kind of unity and power of dramatic consequence:
the Asians share one historical experience — their domination at one time or
another by the West. Their experiences in rejecting this control have given their
leaders a sense of personal and common destiny which is proving to be of increasing
importance in international affairs. Compounding the problem is an aspect of
Western rule which must be recognized as one of the prime legacies of imperialism:
the widespread belief among Asians that many Westerners came to believe they were
innately superior to those whom they controlled. As long as Western power derived
from more effective Western political institutions and modern military power it

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could be understood and accepted for a time by Asians. However, when ideas of racial superiority appeared as a justification of rule, a sense of bitterness and personal indignity was injected into the relationship which will haunt the West for generations to come. It has become fashionable in the West to minimize this problem and point to other results of their colonial policies such as the introduction of health measures, education, parliamentary institutions and improved communications, but the inescapable fact is that for many Asians it has been the social snobbery and racial experiences which are remembered most vividly and which play a crucial part in their reactions to us and to what we propose.

Since the Soviets are not regarded by most Middle East and South Asian leaders as imperialists, the Communists have a critical and sometimes decisive advantage over the West in establishing close relationships with the new states.

There is no racial problem between them; actually there is a distinction between them; however, it is not the West. None of these lasting effects of colonial experiences will be erased quickly; no Asian is able, much less willing, to forget the past and associate himself at this early date with his one-time imperial ruler however urgently the West states the threat of a new Soviet imperialism. With few exceptions, an Asian will agree, and do so cheerfully, that the Soviets threaten the West but that he should for that reason join the latter's security groups appears preposterous.

The past American emphasis on Asian collective security agreements has proven for this reason to be less useful than some had hoped. The original concept of a defensible "Northern Tier" in the Middle East, in which the United States would be the silent supporter of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey, was a more sophisticated approach at least than the outright American sponsorship, with British and French support, of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Some observers have

past anti-Westernism and anti-colonialism have been attitudes which Americans thought could be overcome or by-passed by a plethora of speeches and joint declarations with some of the Western allies, in the future the driving forces behind New Asian political and social revolutions must be respected in the most fundamental manner. The United States must now regard Asian nationalism as a prime, positive force in international affairs of increasing importance, not for any tactical purpose to achieve an immediate goal, but with the ultimate objective in mind of helping to create an Asian relationship with West Europe on which the latter's progress and perhaps survival will depend.

A fundamental appreciation of Asian nationalism requires a deeper understanding of the psychology of Asian leaders and a far greater sensitivity to the issues which concern them. Basic to the American approach must be a concerted effort to demonstrate ~~respect for those leaders and their very considerable achievements, not through superficial "public relations" statements, but in forthright moves which will make clear the heightened American appreciation of them and the role they play. Specifically, the United States should take a strong and leading position in the United Nations to insist, at every opportunity, that leading Asian states be included in every program from the outset. The political blunder which saw no Asian state included among the original sponsors of the significant United Nations international atomic energy plan was an appalling example of what should never happen. The original exclusion of India and the crude, frank domination of the plan by ~~only~~ Western states, including the Union of South Africa, was regarded by Asians as an insult and a threat. It was thought by Asian leaders to be a particularly revealing example, appropriate to the coming nuclear age, of a continuing effort by the West to regain control. ~~A~~ The United States will have to urge additional and permanent Asian membership in the Security Council to correct the imbalance which exists. It would be wise also, for ~~example~~, for the United States to include prominent Asian participation in

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disarmament talks to forestall Soviet moves in that direction. There are cer-
tain risks in inviting greater Asian participation in matters which do not
affect their direct interests; the temptation to orate and moralize would be
irresistible, particularly when no immediate responsibility is involved. Two
precautions will lessen the danger: first, the United States will have to
formulate and explain its proposals more carefully, with greater regard both
for the way in which Asians may react to them and the ways in which Communists
will exploit them for their propaganda purposes. Secondly, we should seek
opportunities to offer Asians positions of responsibility where the requirements
of the job will help more of them develop a greater appreciation of the complex-
ity of East-West issues and the realities of power.

Closely related to these approaches is one which Americans might adopt
from the experiences of the Commonwealth of Nations. The Commonwealth practice
of informing member states in advance and privately of certain decisions by
London and other capitals which bear on the interests of the others is a parti-
cularly useful, courteous and complimentary way of conducting diplomacy. The
United States might well consider this practice in terms of its relations with
Asia, whenever that is possible. This is not a suggestion that we should consult
Asians regularly on policy decisions which we must regard as our responsibility.
It is the thought that by making a practice of informing them in advance of im-
portant statements, the United States would be courteously indicating our ap-
preciation of their position and influence.

Secondly, it is essential for the United States to appreciate the power
and attraction of the idea of neutralism to Asian states. It is not a matter of
"neutrality" between right and wrong; it is a firm and spreading conviction that

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neither the Soviet Union nor the United States are wholly right, that since no
other power can exert appreciable influence on the conduct of either giant, a
more intelligent course is to remain apart from formal alliances not so much in
the belief that noninvolvement will permit a nation to escape nuclear war if the
titans wage it. It is a belief that by judging each issue on its merits the
weight of a number of lesser, but independent powers may prove more useful in
maintaining peace than if they were locked into opposing ranks without, as they
see it, real power to maneuver. Most Asian states would add the observation
that their internal difficulties are such that they cannot give the necessary
attention to foreign affairs and must, perforce, remain aside. While
the conduct of all the Asian states may be found to these general statements,
but they are Asian opencious which the United States should reconsider with
care. It is obvious that Asian states do not share the American enthusiasm for
security agreements and in the case of the Baghdad Pact, the Pakistan-United
States agreement, and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, the political
brouhaha which erupted destroyed much of their potential effectiveness. Some
Asian observers would like the United States to be more sophisticated in some
of its security efforts; it was clear from the outset that the agreement with
Pakistan, heralded in Washington as a major step forward, was in fact regarded
by Pakistanis and other Asians, notably Indians, as a quick and profitable way
of acquiring substantial economic and military assistance, not with the Soviet
Union in mind as Kashmir. Furthermore, unless the United States does
examine its existing security agreements more carefully, situations may arise
where American-supplied arms may be used in intra-Asian conflicts (Afghanistan
vs Pakistan; Pakistan vs India; Cambodia vs Thailand or Vietnam; Korea vs
Japan, not to speak of Arab rivalries). While the possibility may seem remote
because of Washington's pre-occupation with the Soviet bloc, the dangers seem

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Fourthly, in the field of American programs of economic and technical
assistance, there should be more general acceptance of the idea that large-scale
aid programs, intelligently conducted, will not result in stability but change.
Change in many Asian societies is already underway and a striking improvement in
the welfare of a number of Asians will accelerate the process. Political in-
stability is almost certain to result. These changes may be welcome, but in
terms of the reasons advanced most frequently for Congressional support--greater
stability in areas flanking the Soviet bloc--that end is not likely to be achiev-
ed. This is not a reason to discontinue aid; on the contrary, because a major
goal of all new Asian states is the material advancement of their peoples,
American efforts must be continued. However, greater care should be taken to
inform Americans of the value of this assistance to the United States not only
in terms of the Soviet threat but in the larger setting of better Western rela-
tions with Asia. It will be easier for Asians to accept American aid with this
shift in emphasis.

Since Western aid, however badly it is needed, does raise the spectra of
an Asia dependent still upon the West, it is all the more essential to divorce
assistance from political objectives unacceptable to Asian leaders. Burma, Indo-
nesia, and India have each refused at various times to accept certain assistance
because of the political conditions they believed were attached to the agreements.
They will be even less willing to accept political terms now that the Soviet bloc
is ready and willing to extend help without apparent reference to political ob-
jectives beyond agreeable references to the already popular ideas of neutrality
and co-existence. Since American interests are served if Asian states raise their
living standards and remain independent, every possible political impediment to
their acceptance of American aid should be removed with no further suggestive re-
marks that those states who sign security agreements will get more than others;

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given the present Asian temper, such remarks seem almost illicit. Finally, far greater use of international agencies, such as the World Bank, as the channels for American aid merits full consideration and would be doubly welcome in Asia.

However, none of these propositions or guides will be useful unless and until the United States is prepared to undergo the acid test which comes in its relationship with NATO states. As long as American interests remain identified, in the last analysis, with those of Great Britain and France, then the United States will not be able to play a leading, much less independent role, in improving East-West relations. To date, Americans have been unwilling to take an independent position for which they might properly ask for British or French support; in far too many instances it has appeared to Asians as if the United States supported too long established European interests thereby doing grave injury to American ones. In line with these comments, it is a great mistake for the United States to associate itself with failing British and French influence in the Middle East in such statements as the "Declaration of Washington". Such tripartite agreements are anathema to Asians and wholly unacceptable because of their sponsorship. A clear American decision would be given far more respect. In the same area, the United States is now urged to work closely with British policy and help preserve British interests. Assuming that Middle Eastern oil is necessary to West Europe, the United States should ask whether it's interests lie in West Europe's continued access to the oil or in the continuation of a British monopoly position in certain areas. If the former is correct then the United States, with imaginative leadership, conscious of the challenge and opportunity to help establish a new relationship between Europe and the new Asia, could use its considerable influence and power to take a big step forward and, in the critical area, attempt the transformation of an outmoded, unacceptable relationship into some new association more useful in the setting of powerful Asian nationalism. While this is only one

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possible example of many, it is an important one and could establish a precedent.

In conclusion, it is worth noting that such opportunities to foster a new relationship will not always present themselves; there is a limited time in which the United States may act to place itself more firmly in support of the new Asian states.