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## Some Forms of Limitation

### A. The Prerequisites of Limitation.

Limitation of war has three prerequisites: (a) The capability for limited war must be sufficiently powerful so that the potential aggressor cannot count on creating a fait accompli; (b) it must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that its use, while involving an increased risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to it; (c) it must be coupled with a diplomacy which succeeds in conveying that all-out war is not our sole response to aggression and which is flexible enough to negotiate a settlement during pauses in military operations.

If the free world's limited war forces can be overrun easily, aggression may be encouraged and the dilemmas of massive retaliation will then confront us in even sharper form. If we resist by measures which we intend to be limited but which an opponent interprets as the prelude to all-out war, he may launch a pre-emptive attack. If our diplomacy cannot take advantage of pauses in military operations

diplomacy cannot take advantage of belligerents in military operations
belligerent to all-out war, he may launch a pre-emptive attack. If our
which we intend to be limited but which an obdurate enemy interprets as the
will then confront us in even harsher form. If we resist by measures
aggression may be encouraged and the diffusion of massive retaliation
It is the tree world's a limited war forces can be overruled easily.

a settlement during belligerent in military operations.
reasons to aggression and which is flexible enough to negotiate
much which succeeds in conveying that all-out war is not our sole
an inevitable belligerent to it; (c) it must be coupled with a qib-o-
nane, while involving an increased risk of all-out war, is nor
(p) it must be of a nature to convince the aggressor that its
the beneficial aggressor cannot count on creating a cult acolyt;
capability for limited war must be sufficiently powerful so that
limitation of war has three precedents: (a) the
V. The precedents of limitation.

VI. The precedents of limitation.

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to negotiate a settlement, if we make the issue depend on
"purely" military considerations, any conflict will expand by
stages into a conflagration.

Considered in the abstract, these requirements can be
met in a number of ways. Some argue that the retaliatory force
is also suitable for limited war because of its ability to
engage in graduated retaliation or limited strategic war-
fare. Others advocate a strategy designed to punish an aggressor
though not necessarily at the place where aggression occurs.
Still others would rely on guerilla activity to make the
position of the aggressor untenable. Finally, there is the
school of thought which considers it essential that the free
world achieve a capability for local defense.

All of these measures afford opportunities for resisting
aggression short of all-out war. Each of them has uses in
deterring aggression. Each can afford some alternative to
world-wide conflagration. Yet their consequences for diplomacy,
deterrence and strategy vary. They will be discussed in turn.

deterrence and strategy vary. They will be discussed in turn.
world-wide configuration. Let their consequences for diplomacy.

determing aggression. Each can afford some alternatives to
aggression short of all-out war. Each of them has use in

All of these measures afford opportunities for reletting
world achieve a capability for local defense.

school of thought which considers it essential that the free
position of the aggressor unexample. Finally, there is the
Still order would rely on guerrilla activity to make the
tough not necessarily at the place where aggression occurs.

Oprize advocate a strategy designed to benefit an aggressor
engage in graduated km retaliation or limited strategic war-
its also acceptable for limited war because of its agility to
win in a number of ways. Some argue that the retaliatory force

Considered in the abstract, these requirements can be
stages into a configuration.

"purely" military considerations, any conflict will expose ph
to negotiate a settlement, if we make the issue depend on

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B. Limited Strategic War and Graduated Retaliation.

The concept of a "limited" strategic war and graduated retaliation is based on the premise that our retaliatory force can be used for limited objectives. Limited strategic war would rely on measures which are normally a prelude to all-out war.

Such a strategy would strive for a military advantage but in a manner that does not dommit us to a final showdown. For example, in response to Soviet occupation of West Berlin we could destroy part of the Soviet radar warning net or part of the Soviet retaliatory force.

This would increase Soviet vulnerability to an all-out attack.

It could serve as a warning of the consequences of persisting in the aggressive course. If taken sufficiently seriously, it might lead to a settlement.

Graduated retaliation would not seek to achieve military objectives as such. Rather it would attempt to inflict sufficient damage on the aggressor to cause him to desist from his course. For example, in case of an attack on Iran we would announce that we would destroy certain specified Soviet installations or cities each week until the Soviet army had again withdrawn behind its borders.

quarrel certain isolated Soviet installations or cities each year

example, in case of an attack on Iran we would announce that we would
damage on the aggressor to cause him to defeat from pie course. For
objectives as such. Further it would attempt to inflict sufficient
GRACUATED RETALIATION would not seek to achieve military
lead to a settlement.

the aggressive source. It taken sufficiently seriously, it might

It could serve as a warning of the consequences of violating in

This would increase Soviet vulnerability to any all-out attack.

Soviet regard warning net or net of the Soviet retaliatory force.

that does not commit us to a final settlement. For example, in response

Such a strategy would active for a military advantage put in a manner

 rely on measures which are normally a blemage to all-out war.

retaliation is passed on the blemage that our retaliatory force

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According to the theory of limited retaliation, this point will be reached when the cost of the retaliation exceed the value of the objective.

There are major difficulties, however, with using the retaliatory force in this manner in relation to strategy as well as to deterrent policy. Even if we esorted to our declared strategy, we would still be at a fundamental psychological disadvantage. We would be forced to engage in actions each of which almost guarantees at least similar destruction in the free world and run the constant risk of all-out war while the issue which produced the conflict has already been settled in the aggressor's favor. Every passing day would strengthen the Soviet hold on its prize and bring home to us the futility of our course. The Communist leaders may well calculate that skillful peace offensives would cause us to weary of so unrequarding a strategy, unless complete frustration were to induce us to launch an all-out war.

The problem is so intractable because limited employment of the strategic force rather than preventing an aggressor from attaining his objective seeks to compel him to relinquish it once achieved. But

Prejudice seeks to compel him to refund it once achieved. But
the strategic force rather than preventing an aggressor from attaining
the problem is so intractable because limited employment of
an all-out war.

a strategy, unless complete attrition were to induce us to launch
that skillful defense alternative would cause us to worry of so unrelenting
tutility of our course. The Communist leaders may well calculate
strengthen the Soviet power on its brine and print home to us the
already been settled in the aggressor's favor. Every basing plan would
risk of all-out war while the issue which produced the conflict had
at least similar destruction in the tree world and run the constant
would be forced to engage in actions each of which almost guarantees
we would still be at a fundamental psychological disadvantage. We
as to deterrent policy. Even it was marked to our declared strategy,
recitatory force in this manner in relation to strategy as well
there are major difficulties, however, with using the
the objective.

be reached when the cost of the retaliation exceeds the value of
According to the theory of limited retaliation, this cost will
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to relinquish an objective once gained involves a loss of
prestige which an aggressor may consider intolerable. In-
ability to advance leaves a stalemate; retreat after a victory
is an admission of failure. Thus the limited employment of
retaliatory forces confronts us with a more complex psychological
problem than any other form of limited war, while at the same time
committing us to a strategy peculiarly unsusceptible to limitation.

From the strictly military point of view, a strategy which
relies on the limited employment of the retaliatory force is
extremely risky. The very purpose of limited strategic war--to
place the enemy at a strategic disadvantage--carries with it the
risk, indeed almost the certainty, that, if taken seriously it
will unleash a pre-emptive attack. Unless carried out with more
circumspection than would be warranted by the purpose of the
operation, a limited employment of the retaliatory forces would seem
almost inevitably to set in motion a series of constantly expanding
commitments--moving more rapidly than any conceivable diplomatic
negotiations. An enemy is unlikely to be able to distinguish between
a limited and an all-out strategic attack, whatever our intentions
or even our declarations. Unless, of course, our attack is so

or even our declarations. Unless, of course, our attack is so
a limited and an all-out strategic attack, whatever our intentions
negotiations. An enemy is unlikely to be able to distinguish between
commitments--moving more rapidly than any conceivable diplomatic
almost instantly to set in motion a series of constantly expanding
operation, a limited employment of the retaliatory forces would seem
circumjection than would be warranted by the purpose of the
will unless a pre-emptive attack. Unless carried out with more
risk, indeed almost the certainty, that, it taken seriously, it
place the enemy at a strategic disadvantage--carries with it the
extremely risky. The very purpose of limited strategic war--to
refers on the limited employment of the retaliatory force is
to an abatement of fatigue. Thus the limited employment of
apathy to advance leaves a statement: retreat after a victory
breastbone which an aggressor may consider inconsiderable. In-
to refund a limited objective once gained invoice a loss of
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negligible and our declarations so insistent that they will then fail
to bring our determination home to the aggressor. We may find ourselves
having to choose between ineffectualness or all-out war.

Graduated retaliation might furnish the aggressor less of a mili-
tary incentive to retali ate. As long as his retaliatory force remains
intact, he may be prepared to endure a measure of damage without retaliation, if only to demonstrate the futility of our military effort.

On the other hand, it would be reckless to count on this. While the military compulsion to retali ate may be smaller than in the case of limited strategic war, the psychological compulsion will be greater. It will be difficult not to respond when one's own civilian population is under attack. Moreover, the opponent may mistake what we intend as graduated retaliation for the prelude to an all-out attack--unless we behave with a self-defeating circumvention. Thus, whatever eventuality is considered, the most likely outcome of the limited employment of the retaliatory force is either defeat or all-out war.

To be effective the limited employment of retaliatory forces must
meet two requirements which in practice cancel each other out: The

The most two requirements which in practice cancel each other out: The

To be effective the limited employment of retaliatory force must
retaliatory force is either absent or all-out war.

be considered, the most likely outcome of the limited employment of the
penalty with a self-detecting circumvention. Thus, whatever eventually
graduated retaliation for the prelude to an all-out attack--unless we
attack. Moreover, the opponent may mistake what we intend as
criticism not to rebind us on one's own vital population is under
strategic war, the benevolent confluence will be greater. It will be
careful combustion to retallate may be smaller than in the case of limited
On the other hand, it would be reckless to count on this. While the will-
tention, it only to demonstrate the utility of our military efforts.
intact, he may be prepared to cause a measure of damage without retail-
cary incentive to retallate. As long as his retaliatory force remains
graduated retaliation might turn the aggressor less of a will-
ning to choose between intellectualness or all-out war.

to bring our determination home to the aggressor. We may find ourselves
negligible and our declarations to indicate that they will then fall

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aggressor must be convinced (a) that a strategy of limited strategic war or graduated retaliation, while it increases the risk of all-out war, is not an inevitable prelude to it, and (b) that we _are_ prepared to resort to all-out war rather than accept defeat. If we fail in meeting the first condition, the opponent will probably strike pre-emptively. If we fail in meeting the second condition, the aggressor may be encouraged to outwait us or to engage in a test of nerves with a built-in escalator to all-out war.

Of course, the very riskiness of such a course may make the aggressor recoil; the ease with which matters _could_ get out of hand might add to deterrence. It is doubtful, however, whether the democracies would impose on themselves so daring, indeed so reckless, a strategy. Once deterrence has failed they will be confronted at every turn by the alternative of defeat of all-out war. In most circumstances, limited strategic war will probably combine the disadvantages of limited and of all-out war.

From the point of view of deterrence it is not easy to imagine