[L.C.]

Henry Kissinger
Cyrus Vance

BIPARTISAN OBJECTIVES FOR
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

We have decided to write this article together because of our deep belief that the security of free peoples and the growth of freedom both demand a restoration of bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy. We disagree on some policy choices. But we are convinced that the American national purpose must at some point be fixed. If it is redefined—or even subject to redefinition—with every change of administration in Washington, the United States risks becoming a factor of inconstancy in the world. The national tendency to oscillate between exaggerated belligerence and unrealistic expectation will be magnified. Other nations—friends or adversaries—unable to gear their policies to American steadiness will go their own way, dooming the United States to growing irrelevance.

We hope the next president will appreciate the value of continuity in American foreign policy. He should know that the country has been well served by maintaining principles which have kept us strong and prosperous for almost half a century under Republican and Democratic presidents alike.

In this year of political transition, and in a foreign policy setting where major roles are changing at home and abroad, we believe it vital to identify several crucial bipartisan objectives for the next administration, whether it be Republican or Democratic. In this year's political campaign, differences of opinion will exist between the candidates about the best ways to achieve these goals, and debate will continue past election day over specific policies and methods of implementation. However, if broad agreement on central foreign policy objectives can be achieved, the 41st president of the United States will be able to start his term with a strong popular mandate for leadership at home and abroad.

Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance are former secretaries of state.

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II

By the end of this century a number of the pillars on which the global order was rebuilt after World War II will have changed significantly. For the United States, our nuclear monopoly will have disappeared and our relative share of the world economy will be less than half of what it was forty years ago. Other countries, playing a variety of roles, already have had a major impact on U.S. interests: the economies of Japan, Western Europe and the "newly industrializing countries" are obvious examples; several countries have nuclear weapons capability and others are able to acquire it quickly. Old East-West security issues persist, but new issues such as state-sponsored terrorism and international drug trafficking have become urgent. At the same time, long-standing problems cannot be ignored: there will be a continuing need of the poorest countries and peoples for humanitarian assistance.

A growing list of constraints on American actions also must be considered: despite our vast military power, our ability to shape the world unilaterally is increasingly limited. Even with strong domestic support, we can no longer afford financially to do as much internationally by ourselves as was the case in the immediate postwar period. For many of our staunchest friends, the Soviet threat to the free world seems diminished, especially with the accession to power of a reform-minded leadership in the U.S.S.R. This perception tends to reduce Western dependence on America's dominant role. Thus the United States is called upon to exercise new, subtler and more comprehensive forms of leadership, and especially to play a major role in defining the threats to the alliance.

Since 1941, successive generations of Americans have accepted the global responsibilities thrust on the United States. It now appears that a growing number of Americans want the United States to be less active internationally than before. They urge that other nations assume greater risks, responsibilities and financial burdens for the maintenance of world order and international prosperity. We understand the frustration underlying this national mood, and agree that it must be dealt with constructively in the decades ahead. But we are also convinced that it is the duty of our national leadership to prevent international burdens from jeopardizing important American interests and the cause of freedom.

Our nation is on the eve of a new international era. At a

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 901

time of political transition it is important to have a national debate on how and where the United States should spend its diplomatic, military and economic resources in the decades ahead. These discussions should involve Americans from a broad range of occupations, because citizens in all walks of life are vitally concerned not only about their survival, but about the shape of the world in which they will live.

At the highest level of our political system, the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates should describe, not specific tactical moves, but their visions of America's role in the world. We hope that they will explain which international commitments they would reinforce, reduce or reallocate to others. And we hope that they will recognize that the United States has undertaken certain commitments in pursuit of vital interests which cannot be redefined on the basis of transitory fashions.

There are other constraints that have evolved in the past twenty years: the legislative branch of the government and the news media have both become increasingly powerful players in the making and implementation of American foreign policy; their roles are appropriate subjects for public discussion.

The legislative branch has clearly defined constitutional responsibilities in overseeing and funding U.S. foreign and defense policies. Congress must be well informed about the plans and actions of the executive branch, and no foreign policy is sustainable if a majority of the Congress, reflecting public opinion, is adamantly opposed. At the same time, Congress should not manage the tactics of American foreign policy nor should it overburden high administration officials with demands for redundant testimony. Surely there are better ways for the executive and legislative branches to consult than having the secretaries of state and defense spend more than a quarter of their time on repetitive congressional testimony.

A relationship of trust between the Congress and the White House is essential, even with policy differences. However, such a relationship does not operate automatically. When there is a vacuum in executive branch leadership, or when the Congress overreaches, the result is an attempt to legislate day-to-day foreign policy, thereby subjecting our national interest to the vicissitudes of short-term swings in the public mood and shifting congressional coalitions.

It is equally desirable to have a better appreciation of the considerable impact of the media on U.S. foreign policy deci-

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sion-making. Some tension will always exist between govern-
ment, which seeks to use the press to make its case, and the
media, which seeks to obtain more information. A more mature
relationship is needed on both sides. Most clashes between the
media and the government occur when journalists confuse
their role with that of governing, or when officials consider
favorable press coverage more important than policy results.
A measure of restraint and understanding by both sides is
essential.

As we define our choices we must consult with our closest
allies and friends about the course of our deliberations, urge
them to do likewise, and then share our findings. It is essential
that we explore with our principal partners the pace and shape
of the changes we envisage. Once common decisions are
reached—as we believe it is possible to do—we should collec-
tively manage change so as to enhance our long-term relations
and our publics' confidence in our determination to remain
close.

Over time we would anticipate that the American role in
some areas of the world may become less conspicuous. For the
foreseeable future, however, the United States must continue
to play a major and often vital role. Far into the future, the
United States will have the world's largest and most innovative
economy, and will remain a nuclear superpower, a cultural and
intellectual leader, a model democracy and a society that pro-
vides exceptionally well for the needs of its citizens. These are
considerable strengths.

A United States that adjusts to new international realities
and develops a broad consensus on its primary interests in the
world will give cause for optimism. Only a combination of
domestic ideological extremism, confusion between past and
present, internal economic failings, xenophobia or loss of con-
fidence can weaken the central role of the United States in
world affairs.

III

For purposes of illustration we shall apply the principles we
have discussed to some of the major foreign policy issues,
beginning with the core issue of relations with the Soviet
Union.

*U.S.-Soviet relations.* The possession of vast nuclear arsenals imposes on the two superpowers a special obligation to maintain world peace. Both have a moral and practical duty to prevent

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 903

a nuclear holocaust. But this common interest occurs in the context of ideological differences and geopolitical rivalry. America also has an obligation to ensure that the willingness to defend freedom and justice is not impaired by negotiations with the Soviet Union that raise unrealistic expectations.

Today the emergence of a rejuvenated Soviet leadership has raised new hopes for Soviet-American relations. We have both met several times with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and have spent considerable time with some of his close advisers. We found Gorbachev highly intelligent and determined to remedy the failures of the Soviet economy with socialist solutions. He is eloquent in arguing that he prefers to live in peace with the West and that he wants to reduce Soviet defense spending so as to transfer resources into the civilian economy. At the same time, we have no doubt that Gorbachev is also firmly committed to defend Soviet international aims.

What then is the practical consequence of these observations? What, for example, does Gorbachev mean when he speaks of a "balance of interests"? And how, precisely, would he define legitimate Soviet aims?

Our Soviet policy should not be determined by partisan politics in the United States, nor by the internal politics of the Kremlin. Our ultimate concerns must be Soviet foreign policy and our concept of U.S. national interests.

No American president can base his policies for dealing with the U.S.S.R. on the presumed intentions of a Soviet general secretary. We cannot predict whether his intentions may radically change under domestic political pressure. A successor may change policies, as has happened before. Nor can we pretend to understand the inner workings of the Kremlin well enough to know whether Gorbachev will succeed or survive. Even *glasnost* and *perestroika*, which are intrinsically appealing to the West, should not by themselves fundamentally alter how we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union.

There is a significant struggle going on in the Soviet Union between reformers and conservatives in the party and government. But what divides them is, above all, the method of strengthening the Soviet Union. Of course we welcome evidence of greater internal freedom in the U.S.S.R. and the increased emigration of minorities. Quite naturally we favor the forces of change, but ultimately the West can only marginally affect the outcome of a struggle that derives from the

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internal failures and contradictions of the Soviet system and
that is over issues not necessarily of direct concern to us.

Up to now the major—almost exclusive—object of East-West negotiations has been arms control. The purpose of these negotiations has been to contribute to the lessening of East-West tensions, to improve political relations and to ease communications between Washington and Moscow.

Each of us has participated at earlier periods in these negotiations. We agree with the motives underlying them. We continue strongly to support the concept of strategic arms control. At the same time, we would warn against putting too much of a burden on arms control and turning it into the sole barometer of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty will be the first arms agreement ratified by both countries in more than 15 years. Because it covered the simplest and most easily separable elements in the arms control agenda and presented manageable verification problems, the agreement was reached while maintaining the essential elements of Atlantic cooperation.

Future agreements with the Soviet Union, however, will be much more difficult to conclude. The Strategic Defense Initiative has helped soften Soviet negotiating positions, but the place of space defenses in a future arms treaty or in future Western defense planning is far from clear. While still of concern to the Soviets, the value of SDI as a bargaining chip for the United States has declined as domestic opposition and budgetary objections to the project have grown. This is a good example of the need to work out a domestic consensus. Though we differ on deployment, research and development in SDI should be continued and gains that have come out of our SDI programs should be preserved.¹

It is imperative that the next phase of arms control concentrate on conventional forces and weapons in Europe. The place of conventional arms and force reductions in any future arms control agreement will be of overriding concern to the West.

¹ Kissinger believes that defensive forces should be limited primarily in relation to the limits on offensive forces. He believes we must continue to develop SDI actively and ultimately deploy it, because of Soviet research in the field and because of SDI's potential future value to Western defenses. Vance also believes that we should continue research and development, but at a measured pace; he is highly doubtful that it will ever prove to be cost-effective militarily or advantageous politically for the United States to deploy even elements of an SDI system.

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 905

We believe that NATO must examine its force structure and arms control plans in light of potential negotiations. Neither of us advocates further reductions in the "short-short" (battlefield) nuclear weapons in Europe without reductions in Soviet conventional forces and weapons.²

Unfortunately, the West has not yet done adequate homework on the key aspects of conventional arms control. There is no agreement on goals, on accurate data or the means of reliable verification of conventional forces and equipment. Even before a new administration takes office, the American government should concentrate its best intellectual and scientific resources on the issues surrounding the limitation or reduction of conventional forces. It is clear that any reductions will have to be highly asymmetrical in order to create a stable balance. This factor alone means that conventional arms negotiations are certain to become the most difficult arms control problem for the NATO alliance in the 1990s.

We also believe that the time has come to give much greater emphasis to the political dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. At this writing the Soviets have agreed to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. If carried out in a manner that permits the Afghan people to determine their own fate we consider this a significant development. The Soviets now rhetorically embrace "mutual" and "collective" security rather than unilateral advantage. In discussions with Western officials, they emphasize that their military strategies and doctrines are "defensive," and they seem to be more flexible in some discussions on arms control.

Nonetheless, the ultimate test of any government's intentions is not its rhetoric, but the concrete positions it adopts at the negotiating table and the specific actions it takes. Thus some of the issues that require a Soviet response are: international cooperation against state-sponsored terrorism; willingness to accept asymmetrical reductions in Soviet conventional forces

² While placing great importance on conventional arms control negotiations, Vance would not make the signing of an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, along the lines now being discussed, or the conclusion of treaties covering nuclear testing and biological or chemical warfare, conditional on the convening of a conventional arms control negotiation, or on its outcome. Kissinger believes further strategic arms control treaties should be negotiated side by side with conventional arms control; he believes that, at a minimum, the United States should have a clear idea of how the Soviets define conventional arms control in Europe, before proceeding with the conclusion of a strategic arms control treaty; moreover, he believes that the agreement for a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms needs to be linked to a joint executive and legislative examination of the impact of the agreement on the structure of American strategic forces.

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so as to eliminate their military advantage in Europe; and steps
to help end regional conflicts.

Our overall conclusion is that there is a strategic opportunity
for a significant improvement in Soviet-American relations.
The issue is how to take advantage of what may be a favorable
correlation of forces. This requires a concrete American and
Western political program.

The West should explore, with an open mind, what steps
can prudently be taken to reconcile vital U.S. and Soviet
interests. In this context, there will be an opportunity for an
unprecedented kind of conversation between the next Ameri-
can president and the Soviet general secretary early next year.
A new chief executive will be in the White House, and Mikhail
Gorbachev will have completed his first four years in office.
He will be preoccupied with drafting his country's 12th five-
year plan, which will guide the Soviet economy during the
early 1990s. Given the internal problems, and in light of the
new balance of international forces, it is likely that the Soviet
leadership may conclude that a serious and continuing dialogue
with the United States is in its interest.

Thus, at the outset of their relationship, the new American
president and the Soviet general secretary should initiate a
wide-ranging discussion of where they want U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions to be at the beginning of the next century and how they
propose to contribute to a climate of international restraint.
The modalities of the contacts will have to be decided by the
new administration, of course. The process could be started by
trusted representatives of the new president and the general
secretary charged with exploring what opportunities and limits
each of their principals foresees in the relationship during the
period they will both be in office. A dialogue could set the
agenda and tone for further, more formal meetings of the
leaders themselves devoted primarily to political issues.

Beyond this initial phase, we would favor regular U.S.-Soviet
summits, so that meetings between the two leaders are not seen
as rewards for good behavior or reasons for concessions or
pretexts for signing agreements.

With the accession to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, interest
has revived in the prospects for Soviet-American economic
relations. There are probably more opportunities for American
commerce with the U.S.S.R., although trade with the West is
not likely to alter significantly the pace and direction of the
Gorbachev reforms. The American business community is al-

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BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 907

ready exploring what it sees as a potentially growing and more
open Soviet market. We are not worried that expanded eco-
nomic ties with the U.S.S.R. may aid in the creation of a serious
economic threat. There seems to be no prospect that the
volume of Western trade and finance could reach proportions
that would radically improve Soviet economic prospects. The
modernization goals that Gorbachev has set will not be fulfilled
for decades, by which time the Western economies will have
grown by even greater rates.

Nonetheless, the United States should reflect carefully and
act cautiously in shaping its trade policy. First, great care must
be taken with respect to technology transfers that would
strengthen Soviet military capabilities. The Soviets continue to
place the highest priority on acquiring, by whatever means,
commercial and militarily sensitive information from the West.

We also hope that Western executives will understand that
economic reform in the U.S.S.R. does not automatically mean
new business opportunities. Indeed, there will continue to be
legal, moral and political constraints imposed by each side on
economic intercourse. Both of us have had serious doubts about
the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments, which made
granting most-favored-nation status and financing facilities for
the U.S.S.R. dependent on Soviet emigration procedures. So-
viet emigration policy seems to be under review, but we have
yet to see whether the changes will be sufficient to consider a
modification of the U.S. position.

*Atlantic relations.* Early in his term, the next president will preside over the 40th anniversary of the founding of the Atlantic alliance. NATO is one of the most successful treaty arrangements in history. It has preserved the peace in Europe for four decades—the longest such period since the European state system came into being. It connects America with countries of similar cultural heritage. It must remain the keystone of U.S. policy.

But conditions have changed vastly since the early days of
NATO. The U.S. atomic monopoly of 1945 has given way to
nuclear parity with the U.S.S.R.; this situation, as well as other
aspects of East-West relations, has aroused doubts in some
quarters about America's continued commitment to the de-
fense of Europe. A second important change since the 1940s
has been Europe's economic recovery and the growing impor-
tance of the European Community as an economic and political
entity; this tempts more intense economic competition with the

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United States and raises some broader issues in European-
American relations. On both sides of the Atlantic a new gen-
eration has matured which shares neither the sense of danger
nor the emotional commitment to cooperation that character-
ized NATO's early years. Moreover, the era of more active
diplomacy with the East that involves both U.S. and allied
efforts creates new challenges and risks of competitive, separate
approaches to Moscow.

In sum, the state of the Atlantic alliance encourages a new
impetus in strategy, diplomacy and internal relations.

It is time for NATO to redefine its goals and rededicate itself to new missions. Immediately following the U.S. elections, the Atlantic partners should begin a broad reassessment of their mission and plans for the next decade—perhaps by appointing a distinguished group of private citizens to submit a report; such a reassessment should be completed in no more than 12 months. A revised alliance structure and force posture should emerge from this review, as well as clear parameters for conducting the next round of arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

The United States must make unequivocally clear that NATO
cannot be defended without sufficient quantities and types of
both nuclear and conventional weapons, so as to deter a nuclear
adversary that continues to enjoy a conventional superiority in
some significant categories and to possess nuclear weapons
stationed inside its territory capable of reaching all of Europe.
It is no service to the alliance to engage in speculation about
extreme proposals or fanciful notions—such as the complete
denuclearization of Europe, the total elimination of all ballistic
missiles, pledges against the first use of nuclear weapons or
exaggerated claims that SDI will provide an impenetrable shield.
Such utopian visions undermine serious discussions of a com-
mon Atlantic strategy and stigmatize the very weapons on
which a credible deterrence and effective defense must be
based for the foreseeable future.

Europe will inevitably play a greater part and have a larger
voice in the defense of its own territory. This reflects the reality
of Europe's strength. Accordingly, the relative role of the
United States is likely to decline, although not its commitment
to defend Europe by all necessary means. Growing intra-Eu-
ropean defense cooperation, possibly in the form of a European
defense entity, should be endorsed. With the European Com-

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 909

munity moving toward virtual economic integration by 1992, it is especially important that a revised structure for the defense of Western Europe also be in place by then.

As the European component in Atlantic defenses continues to develop, the United States will face an alliance whose partners will feel a greater sense of identity. The members of the alliance have often had contrasting views. Differences of views within NATO may not be limited to alliance strategies toward the Warsaw Pact countries. Distinctive West European approaches to crises in the Third World could become more common. We believe, nevertheless, that NATO leaders must understand that if divisions within the Atlantic community over issues outside NATO are permitted to fester, they will threaten the capacity of the alliance for cooperation and mutual defense within the NATO area, and hence the vital interests of each member.

We should not be apologetic about discussing openly the need to reform the Atlantic alliance. On the contrary, we should be proud that Europe has gained in strength and that this free association of democratic nations has served our common objectives so well. The alliance can manage change constructively by anticipating and adjusting in ways that are deliberate, rational and supported by public opinion. If NATO waits for a crisis—such as differences over how to respond to major Soviet diplomatic or military moves, or a severe economic recession in the West—the Atlantic framework will change for the worse under the pressure of unfavorable external events.

There is no significant political force in the West opposed to the existence of NATO. Political parties sometimes differ on how or when, but not on whether, NATO should be strong and vigilant. Politicians may disagree in their assessments of Mikhail Gorbachev, but the Atlantic alliance cannot base its policies on his fate. Finally, recent events in Poland serve to remind us that a stable relationship between Eastern and Western Europe remains on the agenda.

The strengths of the Western alliance derive from its common democratic values and its ability to respond, often in concert, when circumstances change or public attitudes evolve. The West is fully capable of reorganizing itself and thus emerging better prepared to continue to defend its freedoms and prosperity.

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IV

*The world economy.* America's role in the world has become directly dependent on the strength and performance of the U.S. economy. Foreign policy and economic policy have become increasingly interdependent.

When we served as secretaries of state, only a relatively small portion of our time was spent on international economic issues. Our successors do not have this luxury. Economic strength is today even more central to the way America is perceived by its friends and potential adversaries. U.S. political leadership in the world cannot be sustained if confidence in the American economy continues to be undermined by substantial trade and budget deficits.

For these reasons, the weaknesses of the U.S. economy may be among the most serious and urgent foreign policy challenges to the next president. Convincing economic discipline, clear and publicly supported long-term economic strategies, as well as equitable budget reductions, must be applied quickly if we are to halt the erosion of our international position.

It is increasingly obvious that our military prowess and even our nuclear capabilities do not by themselves contribute to the struggle for international markets; in this realm competitiveness, education, judicious government intervention, as well as price, wage and currency levels, determine success. The impact of the international economy on the daily lives of all Americans has drawn many more citizens, special interest groups, public and private institutions, businesses and elected representatives into seeking to influence U.S. foreign policy. The persistence of the American budget deficit has become a source of international as well as domestic concern. Great emotion is now attached to discussions of international trade and financial questions in our political debates—especially how we can restore our competitive position. Moreover, our citizens worry that the American standard of living is directly affected by economic decisions taken in foreign capitals that are less politically and militarily powerful than our own. This is not an argument against maintaining adequate defenses; it is to stress that this objective must go hand in hand with reducing our budgetary and trade deficits.

The primary responsibility of every president is to defend our national security. Given the range of American commit-

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BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 911

ments and responsibilities, and given a continuing challenge to
those interests, defense spending must remain a major budget-
ary outlay for the indefinite future. But the weaknesses of the
American economy threaten to limit the resources available
for maintaining our defense, foreign affairs and assistance
budgets at adequate levels. Of course, changes in military
posture and strategy should be made if assessments of the
threat change, negotiations succeed or technological break-
throughs occur. However, too many major modifications of
the American force structure now primarily occur not for these
reasons but as a result of budgetary pressures. Even when
reductions will not produce an abrupt deterioration in our
strategic position, in the long run they could well weaken us.

The budget contraction is already beginning to complicate
vital bilateral political relations and call into question whether
the United States will be able to maintain some of its foreign
military commitments, including those installations which give
U.S. forces the ability to defend our interests, and those of our
friends, throughout the world. Dramatic cuts in funds available
to assist friends in the developing world are provoking serious
political and humanitarian aftershocks in many of the poorer
countries as well.

These reductions, including those in the civilian foreign
affairs budget, also weaken the morale and performance of
those Americans whose task it is to serve our country overseas.
In the State Department, posts and positions are being elimi-
nated not because they are redundant but because we cannot
afford them. It is absurd that when the national interest dictates
the need for emergency assistance of $200 million for the
Philippines, we are hard pressed to find the money somewhere
in our $4.5-trillion economy.

To sum up: America's ability to influence events abroad and
ensure prosperity at home will be determined in large part by
how rapidly we get our economic house in order. Fortunately
we can still make these decisions ourselves. We must face the
fact that our economy and consumption have become so over-
extended in recent years that the remedies will involve sacrifice
and slower growth in our standard of living. If, however, we
ignore these economic realities, American influence abroad
will decline significantly and our children will pay the price of
our inattention and excesses in weakened security and declining
competitiveness.

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V

*Japan.* The stunning economic success and political stability that Japan has achieved have placed it in a privileged, but also precarious, position. Tokyo is experiencing what can be fairly described as the "problems of success." Its major trading partners want Japan to modify its practices of emphasizing its national efforts above all other priorities. This approach may well have been necessary for Japan during the period of postwar reconstruction, but now it is inappropriate for an economic superpower with global reach and impact. Many Japanese would prefer to leave their international economic and security practices intact; some political and business leaders in Tokyo, however, understand the need for changes.

There are many shrill and contradictory voices in this country proffering advice on how Japan should change. Some regard Japan's $60-billion trade surplus with the United States as the most urgent problem, and they insist that Japan modify its trading rules to reduce that imbalance substantially. Some believe that Japan should concentrate on providing massive economic and financial assistance to the developing world out of its substantial foreign exchange surpluses. Still others are convinced that Japan, which is fast becoming the most proficient non-nuclear military power in the world, should relieve the United States of some of its Asian defense burdens and increase defense spending substantially above the present level of one percent of GNP.

There can be no debate over the importance of Japanese-American ties. They are based on strong common interests—strategic and political, as well as economic. Preserving this relationship is vital to both countries. What is at issue is how best to proceed, not the value of the relationship itself. The United States needs a national strategy for dealing with our Japanese allies before we can ask our friends in Tokyo to work with us on strengthening our partnership.

We should start by recognizing that a root cause of the trade imbalance is the current superior productivity and long-range planning of Japanese industry. The so-called Japan problem is partly a result of superior Japanese competitiveness. The falling dollar has not yet curbed the American taste for Japanese imports, because they are presumed to be of superior quality. In the end, market forces more than governmental intervention will affect the trade deficit. At the same time, Japan needs

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BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 913

to accelerate its efforts to stimulate domestic demand and to eliminate unfair discrimination against foreign imports.

We warn against any attempt to deal with the deficit by pressing Japan to step up its defense efforts. Of course, Japan has the right to determine its appropriate security requirements. The United States can have no interest in urging Japan to go beyond that. Such a course would generate the gravest doubts all over Asia. It might deflect Japan from a greater economic contribution to international stability, through a cooperative effort by all developed countries to infuse capital into the developing world.

We consider it essential that the dialogue with Japan be lifted to a more comprehensive level. Japan will be one of the major powers of the 21st century. We are becoming more and more interdependent. The issue is how to deal with the consequences of interdependency, not how to reverse or change the relationship.

The American-Japanese dialogue must not be confined to mutual harassment and recrimination on an industry-by-industry basis. The two countries should seek to establish overall goals and work toward them. One step would be to establish an overall trade balance the United States would find tolerable; within that balance, Japan would have the choice of either reducing its exports or increasing its imports, thus removing the need for sector-by-sector industrial negotiations.

Even more important is a broad strategy for contributing to the growth of developing areas. Japanese capital, funneled through international institutions, could play a seminal role in this regard. This is also important, especially in Latin America, as a means of alleviating the debt problem. A Japanese commitment to recycle a percentage of its trade surplus toward aid and assistance in the underdeveloped world would be a major achievement. For only in adopting a common course can we sustain the global economic growth without which economic competition between Japan and the United States could degenerate into a disastrous political conflict.

*China.* No relationship has changed more dramatically over the past four administrations, of both parties, than America's relations with the People's Republic of China. Sino-U.S. friendship is one of few uncontested achievements of American policy in the past two decades of bitter debates. We are concerned that it not be neglected as we become more involved in a new

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phase of East-West negotiations. There is a strong bipartisan
consensus in favor of developing the relationship further.

The broad improvement in Sino-American relations remains
grounded in common strategic concerns, supported by a polit-
ical dialogue. A new element, however, is China's economic
modernization program, inspired by the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping. China's economic reforms offer an avenue for de-
veloping stronger and mutually advantageous ties. Given our
technological prowess, the United States can play a special role
in the development of the Chinese economy without generating
fears of U.S. domination. We believe that we should play such
a role, for a strong and independent China is in the American
interest in sustaining an Asian balance of power and in collab-
orating on broader global issues.

China has already taken decisions that offer opportunities to American economic interests. American business no longer expects profits on the scale originally contemplated during the initial stages of normalizing relations with China. Nevertheless, the existence of a market of over one billion people and an increasingly open economy are reasons for optimism over the long run about the future of our trade and investment in the P.R.C. It is short-sighted and unfair, however, to continue to include the P.R.C. in less favorable categories for the purposes of technology transfer and financing, especially when we encourage China to maintain adequate defenses because of the strong Soviet military presence nearby. Thus we favor the use of discretionary powers to encourage the transfer of technology to China, to assist economic growth.

Americans should take the long view, as the Chinese always
do. China's position is changing. Its relations with its northern
neighbor in particular, may be improving; this should not be
disconcerting for us. We are confident that the Chinese leaders,
now and in the future, will have a keen appreciation for China's
geopolitical interests, which we believe will continue to be
consistent with our own.

VI

We turn now to two regions where the United States has
special interests.

*The Arab-Israeli conflict.* For the past forty years the United
States has been the only major country able to engage all of
the belligerents in peaceful efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli
disputes. No progress toward peace has ever been achieved

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between warring Israelis, Egyptians, Jordanians, Syrians, Palestinians—and now Lebanese—without the personal involvement of an American president and secretary of state, not only in the procedure but also in the substance of the issues. American influence has led to important diplomatic achievements by the administrations we served. Separating the adversaries geographically, negotiating an effective cease-fire between the major armies and then brokering the peace treaty and diplomatic recognition between Israel and Egypt were important steps in the direction of a lasting solution.

Unfortunately, the peace process has been stalled for the past decade, and the forces of conciliation and compromise in the area have been weakened. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 contributed to the rise of religious extremism, violence and foreign influence in that beleaguered nation. The tolerance of terrorism and the political intransigence of some radical Arab states have inflamed the atmosphere. The economies of the non-oil-producing Arab states—which are among the most moderate—are suffering. A deep political division in Israel over the peace process paralyzes diplomacy. The Palestinians are also divided and have not yet brought themselves to recognize Israel. Moreover, the long-festering, and deeply felt, Arab protests against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza fuel both Arab demands and Israeli reprisals, particularly as a new generation appears on the scene.

In the midst of this turmoil and within months of elections in both the United States and Israel, Washington has put forward a new initiative. At the center of this American proposal is the convocation of an international conference. Whatever the structure of the negotiations, we agree with the Administration that Israel should not be asked to negotiate with groups that are unwilling to renounce Israel's destruction, or that justify acts of terrorism against its population. We believe that Palestinians ready to abjure these goals should have an opportunity to participate fully in any peace process. We differ on the question of an international peace conference, but we agree that the ultimate issue is not procedure but substance.³

³ Kissinger has serious reservations about an international conference on the Middle East; he believes that it would legitimize a formal Soviet presence in the peace process for the first time and that it would lead to a stalemate. Vance considers that an international conference could at least provide an umbrella for the first direct negotiations between Israel, Jordan and the Palestinians, and is therefore desirable.

916 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Whatever the negotiating forum, America needs to develop a substantive position on the principal question in addressing the Palestinian issue. This can be summed up in three principles:

- Israel should not and cannot stay where it is in the occupied territories. The demographic trends there are running against Israel; the militancy of a hostile population will increase; radicalism will grow in the rest of the Arab world.

- At the same time, Israel has a right to secure and recognized frontiers. This elementary right was recognized more than twenty years ago in U.N. Resolution 242. Admittedly, in the missile age security cannot be absolute. We believe that a return to Israel's pre-1967 borders would not be compatible with Israel's survival. We believe, however, that Gaza and parts of the West Bank, including major Arab population centers, should be put under Arab control.

- The Palestinians have legitimate rights which should be recognized, provided they in turn unambiguously recognize the right of Israel to live within secure and recognized boundaries.

We are in no position to suggest a precise line on the West Bank. But we believe either the current American administration or its successor should develop a concept for a solution, in close consultation with all of the interested parties; coordination with Israel is obviously essential. The objective would be to develop a consensus on the basis for negotiations; if a consensus can be obtained then procedure will become secondary; if not, a stalemate is certain. The choice between the two outcomes will depend importantly on the creativity and purposefulness of whatever administration in Washington does the principal negotiation—almost surely the next one.

*The western hemisphere.* It is no longer possible for the United States to pretend that it alone can determine events from within or deter hostile forces from without in the western hemisphere. Since its own independence, the United States has felt a special concern for developments in the New World, although there has often been too much ignorance and arrogance in our policies and attitudes. The past presence of our missionaries, corporations and, on some occasions, U.S. gunboats and troops, in many of these countries are all part of a difficult heritage for Latin and North Americans. Recent troubles in these

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 917

relations have made it clear that we must deal with the problems of our region differently than before, and also differently from the way we defend our interests on other continents. While it may be necessary to retrench American commitments in more distant places, it is unthinkable that we should now pay less attention to the western hemisphere.

*Canada.* Canada is a close ally, a friend and an important neighbor. It is often said that Americans pay attention to Canada only when there is a problem between us, e.g., the question of acid rain. Regrettably, the United States does too often take its friendship with Canada for granted, and fails to nurture this crucial relationship. Fortunately, despite this neglect, for more than a century relations between the two countries have been exemplary. Our common border is the most open in the world. The recently concluded U.S.-Canadian trade agreement is a historic achievement and a model way for close trading partners to regularize their commerce. We hope that it will be ratified soon. Some observers believe that this bilateral settlement of our trading problems could serve as a broader international model, especially in the western hemisphere. It is symbolic of our special relationship with Canada that President Reagan recently agreed to transfer to Canada sensitive military technology which heretofore had only been available to Great Britain.

*Mexico.* Mexico may well present the most challenging problems for the United States in the western hemisphere. Most Americans appreciate the importance of Mexico to the United States. However, it is very difficult to know how to deal with the complex relationship.

Traditional foreign policy approaches are of little use: the usual levers of diplomacy, military power and international economic policies do not apply to a close and friendly neighbor, with which we are connected by so many intangible ties. The issues that we face in Mexico are almost all domestic in character: the flow of people, cross-border trade, energy, culture, education, financial and fiscal matters, drugs. Organizationally, it is important to have a central and high-level coordinator for U.S. policy toward Mexico with good access to the president.

The United States has led public and private efforts to provide new financing for Mexico's debt servicing, and the presidents of both countries have given high visibility to the special ties between the two countries. Mexico has liberalized

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918 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

significantly its trading practices and joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

It would be unrealistic to assume that there is a simple, global solution for all of the issues in such a complex problem. We believe, however, that Mexican-American relations deserve high priority. Of particular importance is the handling of the Mexican external debt. How the United States and Mexico deal with the issue will strongly influence the broader question of Latin American debt.

The new presidents of the United States and Mexico should meet early and often. Relations with Mexico always will be delicate, and we must provide constant attention to maintaining a high degree of trust in a relationship that is enormously important and interdependent. The two leaders can try to anticipate key issues and particular problems on which they must focus, while encouraging active cabinet-level discussions of all outstanding differences.

*Central America.* The most immediate political concerns that we have in the western hemisphere relate to ending the wars in Central America while strengthening democratic forces and reducing Soviet and Cuban influence in the area. Central America provides a conspicuous example of an area where U.S. policy has suffered because of a lack of clear-cut national objectives that could be publicly debated and congressionally mandated. Confusion remains over whether our principal aim should have been to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, halt Nicaraguan support for insurrections elsewhere in Central America, eliminate the Soviet-Cuban presence and military assistance in Nicaragua or democratize the Sandinista regime. Now the presidents of five Central American nations have taken on the responsibility for making peace.

Is there anything left for the United States to do to promote an acceptable peace in the region?

First, it remains very much in the U.S. interest to obtain the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet military advisers from Nicaragua, significant reductions in the armies and armaments in the region (especially in Nicaragua), a total ban on Sandinista help to guerrillas elsewhere, and the internal democratization of Nicaragua.

Second, the situation in Central America can be one measure of U.S.-Soviet relations: whether the Soviet Union is willing to suspend arms shipments into this area of our most traditional relationships.

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BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 919

Also outstanding is the issue of the level and scope of our
assistance to the area. Four years ago a bipartisan commission
appointed by the president unanimously recommended sub-
stantial economic assistance to Central America. That recom-
mendation is even more important today and will gain in
relevance if the Arias plan succeeds. Such aid should go pri-
marily to regional development rather than to individual coun-
tries. The task of the United States should be to reinforce
those institutions that give the Central Americans good reason
to live productively and peacefully together.

Finally, the United States should also continue to support
democracy within Nicaragua. Our diplomatic and material aid
to those who work for a pluralistic economy and representative
political process should be done openly.

Preventive diplomacy and preemptive reform can reduce the
risks of extremist political infection and radical contamination.
When confronted with such situations, the United States must
define its interests early on and then develop strategies in
cooperation with regional friends that will promote the likeli-
hood of peaceful change and successor governments compati-
ble with our own.

*Latin American debt.* One clear aim of the United States is to
increase the likelihood that stable and democratic governments
will survive in the region. To this end we must help them
resolve critical problems of debt and development.

Most of the democratic governments that replaced military
regimes in South America in recent years are fragile. Extreme
leftist guerrilla movements, sometimes encouraged by powerful
drug traffickers, pose serious threats to law and order. Violence
and urban terrorism have increased while some in the military
covet a return to power. Moreover, their massive external
debts reduce significantly the capital available for growth and
development.

At present, the principal Latin American debtors—Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela—
owe foreign creditors about $350 billion. Interest payments
alone on these debts range between 19 percent of export
earnings, in the case of Colombia, and 46 percent of export
earnings, as with Argentina. These governments cannot ex-
pend a major part of their export earnings on servicing their
external debts; the key issue is to stimulate economic growth.

Western commercial banks alone cannot resolve debt prob-
lems of this magnitude. Their governments must become more

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fully involved, together with international financial institutions. Some new public and private monies must be provided so that Latin America can begin to grow again—which would also make it possible for the region again to absorb significant quantities of U.S. exports.

At the same time, the Latin Americans should restructure their economies to promote expansion of investments in the private sector from both domestic and foreign sources. Western nations other than the United States should make a major effort to buy more from these developing countries. For example, over the past several years, the United States has been taking over 60 percent of the manufactured exports from the developing world while Japan—with an economy more than half our size—has been taking only ten percent.

We cannot have a single policy for all of the region. We can, however, demonstrate concern and sensitivity for the Latin countries and tailor our strategy to meet individual cases. Many problems of the region can be solved with foresight and resources. If neglected, they will produce dangers to American interests that are much more serious than what has preoccupied us in Central America for the past decade.

## VII

As is apparent from the foregoing, our next president will be severely challenged to guide us through a period of international transition and to secure a firm place for the United States in a changing configuration of nations. He must focus American resources and energies on areas where precisely defined U.S. national interests are at stake. He must not be reluctant to admit that there are important issues, even conflicts, in which the United States has no special role to play because our vital interests are not engaged. But he must not shrink from defending our interests.

It is true that this is a more restrictive approach to the defense of American objectives than that in the immediate postwar period. We believe, however, that America's international standing and national security need not be diminished because we adopt more selective and collaborative international strategies based on new realities. Our position can be strengthened by taking into account the growing strength of other regions.

We believe profoundly in the resiliency of the American people. They bring qualities to our foreign and national secu-

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 921

rity policies that should reassure our allies and ourselves. Often
in the past we have overcome great international challenges
thanks to our adaptability and resourcefulness. The dynamic
heterogeneity and individualism inherent in our society, which
could cause chaos and confusion, have produced an array of
talents—social, scientific and moral—that remain a formidable
source of national energy. Imaginatively analyzing the new
realities affecting America’s role in the world should provide
the next administration with prescriptions for its foreign poli-
cies. Through such understanding and discipline, our leaders
can guarantee that the future security and well-being of the
American people will be at least as well defended in the future
as they have been in the past.

SUMMIT IN MOSCOW

# An Agenda for 1989

BY HENRY KISSINGER AND CYRUS VANCE

We have decided to write this article together because of our deep belief that the security of free peoples and the growth of freedom both demand a restoration of bipartisan con-

sensus in American foreign policy. We disagree on some policy choices. But we are convinced that the American national purpose must at some point be fixed. If it is redefined—or even subject to redefinition—with every change of administration in Washington, the United States risks becoming a factor of inconstancy in the world. The national tendency to oscillate between exaggerated belligerence and unrealistic expectation will be magnified. Other nations—friends or adversaries—unable to gear their policies to American steadiness, will go their own way, dooming the United States to growing irrelevance. If broad agreement on central foreign-policy objectives can be reached, the 41st president of the United States will be able to start his term with a strong mandate for leadership at home and abroad.

has long since disappeared and our relative share of the world economy will be less than half of what it was 40 years ago. Other countries already have had a major impact on U.S. interests: the economies of Japan, Western Europe and the "newly industrializing countries" are obvious examples; several countries have nuclear weapons capability and others can acquire it quickly. Old East-West security issues persist, but new issues such as state-sponsored terrorism and international drug trafficking have become urgent. At the same time, the poorest countries will continue to need

humanitarian assistance.

A growing list of constraints on American actions also must be considered: despite our vast military power, our ability to shape the world unilaterally is increasingly limited. We can no longer

afford financially to do as much internationally by ourselves as was the case in the immediate postwar period. For many of our staunchest friends, the Soviet threat to the free world seems diminished, especially with the accession to power of a reform-minded leadership in the U.S.S.R. This perception tends to reduce Western dependence on America's role. Thus the United States is called upon to exercise new, subtler and more comprehensive forms of leadership.

Since 1941, successive generations of Americans have accepted the global responsibilities thrust on the United States. It now appears that a growing number of Americans wants the United States to be less active internationally. They want other nations to assume greater risks, responsibilities and financial burdens for

the maintenance of world order and prosperity. We understand the frustration underlying this national mood, but it is the duty of our national leadership to keep it from jeopardizing important American interests and the defense of freedom.

At the highest level of our politics, the presidential candidates of both parties should describe, not specific tactical moves, but their visions of America's world role. They should explain which international commitments they would reinforce, reduce or reallocate to others. And we hope they recognize that the United States has made certain commitments in pursuit of vital interests which cannot be redefined on the basis of transitory fashions.

To illustrate, we shall apply these principles to some major foreign-policy issues, beginning with the core issue of policy toward the Soviet Union.

**U.S.-Soviet relations:** The superpowers' possession of vast nuclear arsenals imposes on them a special obligation to maintain peace. But this occurs in the context of ideological differences and geopolitical rivalry. America also has an obligation to ensure that willingness to defend freedom and justice is not impaired by U.S.-Soviet negotiations that raise unrealistic expectations.

Today the emergence of a rejuvenated Soviet leadership has raised new hopes for Soviet-American relations. We have both met several times with Mikhail Gorbachev and found him highly intelligent and determined to remedy the failures of the Soviet economy with socialist solutions. He is eloquent in arguing that he prefers to live in peace with the West and to reduce Soviet defense spending so as to transfer resources to the civilian economy. At the same time, we have no doubt that Gorbachev is also firmly committed to defend Soviet international aims. What then does he mean when he speaks of a "balance of interests"? And how, precisely, would he define legitimate Soviet aims?

No American president can base his policies for dealing with the U.S.S.R. on the presumed intentions of a Soviet gener-

SIPA

**Bipartisans:** Kissinger, Vance in Moscow in 1987

## The United States risks becoming a factor of inconstancy in the world

The authors are former secretaries of state. Henry Kissinger served under Presidents Nixon and Ford, Cyrus Vance under President Carter. This article is condensed from a longer article in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, © the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1988.

NEWSWEEK: JUNE 6, 1988 31

SUMMIT IN MOSCOW

al secretary. We cannot predict whether his intentions may radically change under domestic political pressure. A successor may change policies, as has happened before. Even *glasnost* and *perestroika*, which are intrinsically appealing to the West, should not by themselves fundamentally alter how we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union. Of course we welcome evidence of greater internal freedom in the U.S.S.R. and the increased emigration of minorities. But ultimately the West can only marginally affect the outcome of a struggle that derives from

the internal failures and contradictions of the Soviet system and that is over issues not necessarily of direct concern to us.

Up to now the major—almost exclusive—object of East-West negotiations has been arms control. The purpose of these negotiations has been to contribute to the lessening of East-West tensions, to improve political relations and to ease communications between Washington and Moscow. The intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty is the first arms agreement to be ratified by both countries in more than 15 years. Because it covered the simplest elements in the arms-control agenda and presented manageable verification problems, the agreement was reached within the essential requirements of Atlantic cooperation.

defense planning is far from clear. While still of concern to the Soviets, the value of SDI as a bargaining chip for the United States has declined as domestic opposition and budgetary objections to the project have grown. This is a good example of the need for domestic consensus. Though we differ on deployment, research and development in SDI should be continued and gains that have come out of our SDI programs should be preserved.*

It is imperative that the next phase of arms control concentrate on conventional forces and weapons in Europe. The place of conventional arms and force reductions in any future arms-control agreement will be of overriding concern to the West. We believe that NATO must examine its force structure and arms-control plans in light of potential negotiations. Neither of us advocates further reductions in the battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe without reductions in Soviet conventional forces and weapons. Unfortunately, the West has not yet done

We also believe that the time has come to give much greater emphasis to the political dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets have begun to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. If carried out in a manner that permits the Afghan people to determine their own fate, this is a significant development. In discussions with Western officials, the Soviets emphasize that their military strategies and doctrines are "defensive," and they seem to be more flexible in some discussions on arms control.

Nonetheless, the ultimate test of any government's intentions is not its rhetoric, but the specific actions it takes. Some of the issues requiring a Soviet response:

international cooperation against state-sponsored terrorism; willingness to accept asymmetrical reductions in Soviet conventional forces so as to eliminate their military advantage in Europe, and steps to help end regional conflicts. Overall, we conclude that there is now an opportunity for significant improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. The issue is how to take advantage of this occasion. This requires a concrete American and Western political program.

In this context there will be an opening for an unprecedented conversation be-

tween the next American president and the Soviet general secretary early next year. By then Mikhail Gorbachev will have completed four years in office. He will be preoccupied with drafting his country's 13th five-year plan, which will guide the Soviet economy during the early 1990s. Given the internal problems, and in light of the new balance of international forces, the Soviet leadership may well conclude that a serious and continuing dialogue with the United States is in its interest.

Thus, at the outset of their relationship, the new American president and the Soviet general secretary should initiate a wide-ranging discussion of where U.S.-Soviet relations should be at the beginning of the next century and how they propose to contribute to a climate of international restraint. We would favor regular U.S.-Soviet summits, so that meetings between the two leaders are not seen as rewards for good behavior or reasons for concessions or pretexts for signing agreements.

**Atlantic relations:** NATO has preserved the peace in Europe for four decades—the longest such period since the European state system came into being. It connects America with countries of similar cultural heritage. It must remain the keystone of U.S. policy.

But conditions have changed vastly since the early days of NATO. There is nuclear parity with the U.S.S.R.; this has aroused doubts in some quarters about America's continued commitment to the defense of Europe. A second important change since the 1940s has been Europe's economic recovery and the growing importance of the European Community as an economic and political entity; this tempts more intense economic competition with the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic a new generation has ma-

Kremlin aims? Missile crew in Leningrad exercises

## Future arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union will be more difficult to conclude

*Kissinger believes that defensive forces should be limited in relation to the limits on offensive forces. He believes we must continue to develop SDI actively and ultimately deploy it, because of Soviet research in the field and because of SDI's potential future value to Western defenses. Vance also believes that we should continue research and development, but at a measured pace; he is highly doubtful that it will prove to be cost-effective militarily or advantageous politically for the United States to deploy even elements of an SDI system.

32 NEWSWEEK: JUNE 6, 1988

SUMMIT IN MOSCOW

tured which shares neither the sense of danger nor the emotional commitment to cooperation of NATO's early years. Moreover, the era of more active diplomacy with the East creates new challenges and risks of competitive, separate approaches to Moscow.

It is time for NATO to redefine its goals. Immediately following the U.S. elections, the Atlantic partners should begin a broad reassessment of their mission and plans for the next decade—perhaps by appointing a distinguished group of private citizens to submit a report within 12

months. A revised alliance structure and force posture should emerge from this review, as well as clear parameters for the next round of arms-control negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

The United States must make unequivocally clear that NATO cannot be defended without sufficient quantities and types of both nuclear and conventional weapons, so as to deter a nuclear adversary that continues to enjoy a conventional superiority in some significant categories and to possess nuclear weapons stationed inside its territory capable of reaching all of Europe. It is no service to the alliance to indulge in extreme proposals or fanciful notions—such as the complete de-nuclearization of Europe, pledges against the first use of nuclear weapons or claims that SDI will provide an impenetrable shield. Such utopian visions undermine serious discussions of a common Atlantic strategy and stigmatize the very weapons on which a credible deterrence must be based for the foreseeable future.

Europe will inevitably play a greater part and have a larger voice in the defense of its own territory. Growing intra-European defense cooperation, possibly in the form of a European defense entity, should be endorsed. With the European Community moving toward virtual economic integration by 1992, it is especially important that a revised structure for the defense of Western Europe also be in place by then.

The strengths of the Western Alliance derive from its common democratic values and its ability to respond when circumstances change. The West is fully capable of reorganizing itself and thus emerging better prepared to continue to defend its freedoms and prosperity. We believe, nevertheless, that NATO leaders must understand that if divisions within the Atlantic community over issues out-

**The world economy:** America's role in the world has become directly dependent on the strength and performance of the U.S. economy. Foreign policy and economic policy have become increasingly interdependent.

whether the United States will be able to maintain some of its foreign military commitments. Too many major modifications of the American force structure now occur primarily as a result of budgetary pressures; in the long run they could well weaken us. Dramatic cuts in funds available to assist friends in the developing world are provoking serious political aftershocks in many of the poorer countries as well.

America's ability to influence events abroad and ensure prosperity at home will be determined in large part by how rapidly we get our economic house in order. Fortunately we can still make these decisions ourselves. We must face the fact that our economy and consumption have become so overextended that the remedies will involve sacrifice and slower

growth in our standard of living. If, however, we ignore these economic realities, American influence abroad will decline significantly and our children will pay the price of our inattention.

**Japan:** There are many shrill and contradictory voices in this country proffering advice on how Japan should change. Some regard Japan's $60 billion trade surplus with the United States as the most urgent problem, and they insist that Japan modify its trading rules to reduce that imbalance substantially. Some believe that Japan should concentrate on

providing massive economic and financial assistance to the developing world out of its substantial foreign-exchange surplus. Others are convinced that Japan should relieve the United States of some of its Asian defense burdens and increase defense spending substantially above the present level of 1 percent of GNP.

There can be no debate over the importance of Japanese-American ties. Preserving this relationship is vital to both countries. We should start by recognizing that a root cause of the trade imbalance is Japan's currently superior productivity and long-range planning. In the end, market forces more than governmental intervention will affect the trade deficit.

The American-Japanese dialogue must not be confined to mutual harassment. The two countries should seek to establish overall goals and work toward them. One step would be to establish an overall trade balance the United States would find tolerable; within that balance, Japan would have the choice of either

We warn against any attempt to deal with the deficit by pressing Japan to step up its defense efforts. Such a course would generate the gravest doubts all over Asia. It might deflect Japan from a greater economic contribution to the growth of developing areas. Only in adopting a common course can we sustain the global economic growth without which economic competition between Japan and the United States could degenerate into a disastrous political conflict.

**China:** No relationship has changed more dramatically over the past four administrations, of both parties, than America's relations with the People's Republic of China. Sino-U.S. friendship is

ANDY HERNANDEZ FOR NEWSWEEK

More flexibility: Soviet troops leave Afghanistan

## What does Gorbachev mean when he speaks of a 'balance of interests'?

NEWSWEEK: JUNE 6, 1988 33

SUMMIT IN MOSCOW

one of few uncontested achievements of American policy during two decades of bitter debates. We are concerned that it not be neglected as East-West negotiations enter a new phase.

China has already taken decisions that offer opportunities to American economic interests. American business no longer expects profits on the scale originally contemplated during the initial stages of normalizing relations with China. Nevertheless, the existence of a market of more than 1 billion people and an increasingly open economy are reasons for long-run

optimism about trade and investment in the P.R.C. It is shortsighted and unfair, however, to continue to include the P.R.C. in less favorable categories for the purposes of technology transfer and financing. Thus we favor the use of discretionary powers to encourage the transfer of technology to China, to assist growth.

**The Arab-Israeli conflict:** For the past 40 years the United States has been the only major country able to engage all of the belligerents in peaceful efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli disputes. Unfortunately, the peace process has been stalled for the past decade, and the forces of conciliation and compromise in the area have been weakened.

Whatever the structure of the negotiations, America needs to develop a substantive position on the Palestinian issue. This can be summed up in three principles:

Israel should not and cannot stay where it is in the occupied territories. The demographic trends there are running against Israel; the militancy of the Arab population will in

crease; Arab radicalism outside the territories will grow.

At the same time, Israel has a right to secure and recognized frontiers. Admittedly, in the missile age security cannot be absolute. We believe that a return to Israel's pre-1967 borders would not be compatible with Israel's survival. We believe, however, that Gaza and parts of the West Bank, including major Arab cities, should be put under Arab control.

The Palestinians have legitimate rights which should be recognized, provided they in turn unambiguously recognize the right of Israel to live within secure and recognized boundaries. Israel should not be asked to negotiate with groups that are unwilling to renounce Israel's destruction or that justify acts of terrorism against its population.

**The Western Hemisphere:** Since its own independence, the United States has felt a special concern for developments in the New World, although there has often been too much ignorance and arrogance in our policies. Recent troubles in the region have made it clear that we must deal with the problems differently than before, and also differently from the way we defend our interests on other continents. In Mexico, for example, traditional foreign-policy approaches are of little use: the usual levers of diplomacy, military power and international economic

PETER TURNLEY FOR NEWSWEEK

Increasing militancy: *Young West Bank protester*

policies do not apply to a close and friendly neighbor, with which we are connected by so many intangible ties. The issues that we face in Mexico are almost all domestic in character: the flow of people, cross-border trade, drugs and Mexico's huge external debt. The United States has led public and private efforts to find new financing to service that debt.

Central America provides a conspicuous example of an area where U.S. policy has suffered because of a lack of clear-cut national objectives that could be publicly debated and congressionally mandated. One clear aim of the United States is to increase the likelihood that stable and democratic governments will survive in the region. But confusion remains over whether our principal tactic should have been to overthrow the Nicaraguan gov-

Is there anything left for the United States to do? First, it remains very much in the U.S. interest to obtain the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet military advisers from Nicaragua, significant reductions in the armies and armaments

in the region (especially in Nicaragua), a total ban on Sandinista help to guerrillas elsewhere and the internal democratization of Nicaragua. Second, Central America is a measure of U.S.-Soviet relations: whether the Soviet Union is willing to suspend arms shipments into this area of our most traditional relationships. Thirdly, we favor substantial economic assistance to Central America.

As is apparent from the foregoing, our next president will be severely challenged to guide us through a period of international transition and to secure a firm place for the United States in a changing configuration of nations. He must focus American resources and energies on areas where precisely defined U.S. national interests are at stake. He must not be reluctant to admit that there are important issues, even conflicts, in which the United States has no special role to play. But he must not shrink from defending our interests.

We believe that America's international standing and national security need not be diminished because we adopt more selective and collaborative international strategies based on new realities. Our position can be strengthened by taking into account the growing strength of other regions. We believe profoundly in the resiliency of the American people; we have often overcome great international challenges. Imaginatively analyzing the new realities affecting America's role in the world should provide the next administration with prescriptions for its foreign policies. Through such understanding and discipline, our leaders can guarantee that the future security and well-being of the American people will be at least as well defended in the future as they have been in the past.

34 NEWSWEEK: JUNE 6, 1988

[L]

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Summer 1988

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

The following are highlights from
the Summer 1988 issue of
*Foreign Affairs*:

KISSINGER AND VANCE OFFER JOINT POLICY PROGRAM

"Bipartisan Objectives for American Foreign Policy"
Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance

Writing together, Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance call for a restoration of bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy. Although they differ on some policy choices, they agree that the American national purpose "must at some point be fixed.... If it is redefined -- or even subject to redefinition -- with every change of administration in Washington, the United States risks becoming a factor of inconstancy in the world."

In their analysis, the two former secretaries of state note
the changes in the global order since the end of World War II:
"our ability to shape the world unilaterally is increasingly
limited.... The United States is called upon to exercise new,
subtler and more comprehensive forms of leadership, and
especially to play a major role in defining threats to the
alliance."

Kissinger and Vance express hope that the Republican and
Democratic presidential candidates "will explain which
international commitments they would reinforce, reduce or
reallocate to others. And we hope that they will recognize
that the United States has undertaken certain commitments in
pursuit of vital interests which cannot be redefined on the
basis of transitory fashions."

On Soviet-American relations, Kissinger and Vance argue
that "our Soviet policy should not be determined by partisan

2

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politics in the United States, nor by the internal politics of the Kremlin. Our ultimate concerns must be Soviet foreign policy and our concept of U.S. national interests."

"Thus," they continue, "at the outset of their relationship, the new American president and the Soviet general secretary should initiate a wide-ranging discussion of where they want U.S.-Soviet relations to be at the beginning of the next century." On arms control strategy, Kissinger and Vance assert that "it is imperative that the next phase of arms control concentrate on conventional forces and weapons in Europe."

Turning to Atlantic relations, the authors conclude that it is time for NATO to redefine its goals and rededicate itself to new missions. A high-level review should develop a revised alliance structure and force posture and "parameters for conducting the next round of arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R."

Particular attention must be paid to the U.S. economy, argue Kissinger and Vance, noting that "foreign policy and economic policy have become increasingly interdependent.... America's ability to influence events abroad and ensure prosperity at home will be determined in large part by how rapidly we get our economic house in order."

On the Middle East, the authors set forth three principles: (1) "Israel should not and cannot stay where it is in the occupied territories...." (2) "At the same time, Israel has a right to secure and recognized frontiers...." (3) "The Palestinians have legitimate rights which should be recognized, provided they in turn unambiguously recognize the right of Israel to live within secure and recognized boundaries."

Kissinger and Vance also discuss relations with Japan, China and Latin America.

In their summation, the authors stress that "[the] next president will be severely challenged to guide us through a period of international transition and to secure a firm place for the United States in a changing configuration of nations. He must focus American resources and energies on areas where precisely defined U.S. national interests are at stake. He must not be reluctant to admit that there are important issues, even conflicts, in which the United States has no special role to play because our vital interests are not engaged. But he must not shrink from defending our interests."

3

THE GREAT GAME CONTINUES

"Afghanistan: The Accords" -- Rosanne Klass

Soviet troops began withdrawing from Afghanistan on May 15, after eight years of shoring up the Kabul regime; the way was paved by accords signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan a month earlier. Rosanne Klass of Freedom House, who edited *Afghanistan -- The Great Game Revisited*, analyzes the accords and concludes that they will allow "the long-term Soviet consolidation of control in Afghanistan without the overt use of [Soviet] uniformed military forces."

Klass argues that even if the present leader, Najibullah, does not remain in power, the future probably offers either communist control or prolonged insurrection. One reason Klass adduces is that Soviet military advisers are permitted to stay in Afghanistan under the agreements (according to Najibullah); another is the full-scale Sovietization of the country that has occurred during the war. In these conditions, few Afghan refugees are likely to return, and the rebels have pledged to continue fighting.

The agreements' key flaw, says Klass, is that they implicitly accept the Soviet presence, because the Afghan government *invited* the Soviets in. The troop departure, she argues, was decided by the Afghan and Soviet governments -- the accords have no binding effect on it. Finally, the United States signed the accords as a guarantor of "nonintervention"; yet in a separate statement, it also reserved the right to aid the resistance if the Soviets continue to aid the regime. The Soviets have already accused the U.S. of violating the accords by aiding the rebels, and Klass foresees growing controversy as the accords' contradictions become clearer.

IRAQ MAY DEFEAT IRAN IN 18 MONTHS, EXPERT SUGGESTS

"The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis" -- David Segal

"Iraq has continued to make significant economic and diplomatic gains while holding its own militarily" in this eighth year of the Iran-Iraq War. David Segal, a writer who specializes in Middle Eastern military affairs, argues that Iraq may defeat Iran in economic warfare in less than a year and a half if the United States and the Soviet Union continue to find common interest in supporting Iraq while preventing Iran from achieving a military victory.

Segal examines the military strategies and capabilities of the two belligerents, as well as their economic and political vulnerabilities. He asserts that although Iran "is still

4

winning the ground war," Iraq "has already won the air war and
is now using its powerful air force to cripple Iran's economic
ability to keep fighting."

The superpowers, Segal suggests, have a critical role to
play in the war's outcome. The April confrontation between Iran
and the U.S. in the Persian Gulf, and Washington's decision to
extend its protection to neutral shipping, confirm the U.S. tilt
toward Iraq. Likewise, Segal asserts, not only are the Soviets
Iraq's main arms supplier, but there is evidence that Iraqi
fighter jets have refueled in the U.S.S.R. for attacks on Iran's
Caspian seacoast, and that Moscow has supplied Iraq with SS-12
missiles. Thus Segal argues that "it would be a mistaken
assumption" for Iran to count on the superpowers "to neutralize
each other in the Persian Gulf."

PALESTINIAN UPRISING TIGHTENS ARAB-ISRAELI DEADLOCK

"Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising" -- Don Peretz

This eyewitness report on the sudden Palestinian revolt in
the occupied West Bank and Gaza leads an experienced American
analyst to draw disturbing conclusions about future relations
between Israelis and Arabs in the Holy Land.

Professor Don Peretz, director of the Middle East Program at
the State University of New York, Binghamton, recently toured
the occupied territories, meeting with a broad range of
Palestinian residents and Israeli military and political
leaders. In this article, he assesses the immediate diplomatic
setbacks, as well as the long-term economic impact of the
uprising, on both Palestinian and Israeli societies.

Peretz asserts that the *intifadeh* (Arabic for "uprising")
has brought Palestinian-Israeli relations to a worse impasse
than ever before. "The minimum that the inhabitants of the
territories are now willing to accept is full self-determination
and total withdrawal by Israel, demands that no mainstream
Israeli party or political leader will concede," he concludes.

"Palestinians who see beyond the euphoria sparked by the *intifadeh*," writes Peretz, "acknowledge that much more difficult times are ahead, that December 1987 may have been a Palestinian version of the 1916 'Easter Rising,' a revolt which opened a struggle that lasted years before its goals were approached."

5

[L.C]

CAN THE SOVIETS CREATE NOW WHAT THEY CRUSHED IN '68?

"The Prague Spring: 20 Years Later" -- Milan Svec

Two decades after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia former Czech diplomat Milan Svec, now senior consultant at the National Defense University in Washington, notes that "reformers in Eastern Europe have started a debate about how Gorbachev's *perestroika* relates to the Prague Spring reforms." "The greater the similarity between the two," Svec observes, "the bolder the argument that could be made for new radical reforms in Eastern Europe."

The current "restructuring," Svec writes, is -- unlike the 1968 Czech reforms -- directed from the center of communist power, and Gorbachev, the reformer in 1988, is in a stronger position than was the insecure and indecisive Alexander Dubcek. But Svec contrasts the Prague Spring reforms (which stressed political pluralism and thus addressed "the very core of existing problems") with Moscow's current caution. Gorbachev, Svec notes, seeks "to have it both ways: democracy, but controlled and centralized; a free press, but one that serves the interests of the party."

Eastern Europe is experiencing economic crisis and popular recalcitrance; Svec argues that it is in what "Lenin used to describe as 'a revolutionary situation.'" Gorbachev, he writes, "wants to have the area under stable communist and Soviet control; at the same time he would like to transform it from a liability into an economic and political asset for the Soviets." Svec is skeptical whether Gorbachev can "meld these two contradictory elements into a coherent policy" for remedying what he calls "the core problem": that "the withering away of the old system of governance is already well in train."

REFORMER'S TASK: TAMING THE RED ARMY

"Gorbachev and the Soviet Military" -- F. Stephen Larrabee

F. Stephen Larrabee, director of studies at the Institute of East-West Security Studies, observes that "since the summer of 1985, Gorbachev has carried out a major reshuffling of the top leadership of the armed forces," allowed the military to come under increasing criticism in the press, and diminished the influence of the military on arms control policy by strengthening the Foreign Ministry and foreign-policy think tanks. Gorbachev has also changed the emphasis of Soviet military doctrine from "parity" with the West to the maintenance of "reasonable sufficiency" to deter an attack. "In short," writes Larrabee, "the days when the military [was] assured of receiving 'all it needed to defend the homeland' ... are over."

6

The military's support will be essential to the arms control agreements which underlie Gorbachev's foreign-policy goals, Larrabee argues. He writes that currents in arms control negotiations, Western improvements in high-tech conventional weapons, economic stringencies and a decreasing pool of potential conscripts may cause Gorbachev to seek reductions in the conventional forces of both blocs. To win military support for such reductions, Larrabee writes, Gorbachev would have to continue to staff the military with his supporters, show some evidence that his reforms are improving the Soviet economy, maintain stability in Eastern Europe and follow up the INF treaty with "an agreement on strategic arms and ... some meaningful constraints on SDI."

"One of the key factors determining the ultimate success ... of Gorbachev's [economic and social reform] efforts will be his ability to persuade the Soviet military to go along," writes Larrabee. The Soviet military, Larrabee argues, must lessen its demands on raw materials, industrial facilities and workers if economic reforms are to work.

HOW TO MAKE TECHNOLOGY AND POLITICS WORK TOGETHER

"Managing Strategic Weapons"

Sidney D. Drell and Thomas H. Johnson

Two eminent nuclear physicists analyze the present state of weapons technology, and what future trends imply for political decisions on the strategic balance. They propose a series of discrete Soviet-American agreements, combined with judicious unilateral actions by each superpower to enhance mutual security for the coming generation.

"We are suspicious of proposals that attempt to transform or eliminate the source of insecurity with bans on single types of weapons or on new technology," argue Sidney D. Drell and Thomas H. Johnson. (Drell is deputy director of the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center; Johnson is director of the Science Research Laboratory of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point.) Instead, they favor "adaptations and constraints on the applications of a variety of technologies," which they say can be more readily achieved, for their ramifications can be more confidently understood.

Drell and Johnson recommend bilateral agreements to limit mobile ICBMs to carrying single warheads (to enhance stability), increased reliance on cruise missiles and a shift from strategic bombers to air-launched cruise missiles. With these and other modifications in place, the two authors anticipate unilateral decisions by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union -- a "political evolution toward deeper numerical reductions as both sides develop operational confidence in cooperative measures of verification."

7

[L.C.]

## SUPERPOWERS STILL DOMINATE THE GLOBAL ARMS TRAFFIC

"Arms, Aid and the Superpowers" -- Stephanie G. Neuman

With armed conflict seemingly endemic in the Third World, and new arms industries developing in a dozen newly industrializing countries, the theory is widely heard that the two superpowers are losing their leadership roles in providing military assistance to other countries. Stephanie G. Neuman of Columbia University refutes this theory, arguing that the United States and the Soviet Union still dominate the international arms transfer system.

"Indeed," she argues, "the dependence of less-industrialized states upon the superpowers appears to be on the rise." Neuman analyzes a series of factors to demonstrate her thesis, including Third World economic constraints, human factors of training and expertise, licensing agreements, the growing importance of intelligence and satellite information, and continuing efficiencies of scale. All combine, she argues, to make security assistance undiminished as an effective tool of American and Soviet policies.

Neuman has written frequently on military assistance matters; she is director of Columbia's Comparative Defense Studies program.

## A NEW SOUTHERN AFRICA POLICY FOR THE POST-REAGAN ERA

"Southern Africa: Challenges and Choices" -- Michael Clough

Surveying the past failures of U.S. policy in southern Africa, Michael Clough, the senior fellow for Africa at the Council on Foreign Relations, calls for a new approach -- one that focuses on enhancing black empowerment rather than changing the nature of white rule, one that puts the problems of South Africa in a regional context, and one that realistically pursues attainable goals rather than "grand initiatives 'to bring the parties closer together.'"

According to Clough, "never before ... has U.S. policy toward southern Africa been in such disarray as it is today." He asserts that the 1986 congressional sanctions against South Africa, while necessary and useful at the time of their passage, do not "provide a basis for an effective long-term strategy." A policy of black empowerment, on the other hand, "would highlight the fact that the primary battleground in the struggle against apartheid is not in the halls of Congress or the meeting rooms of the U.N. Security Council, but inside South Africa."

8

[LC]

According to Clough, the next six months are critical. Citing recent signs of progress in talks with Angola, Clough writes: "It is not too late for the Reagan Administration to achieve the major goal it set for its southern Africa policy in 1981 -- a Namibian settlement and progress toward the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola -- nor is it too early to begin laying the groundwork for a credible and coherent regional policy by a new administration."

WHERE CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY MEET

"The End of America's Postwar Ethos" -- Michael Vlahos

In what ways does culture influence American foreign policy? Michael Vlahos, the newly appointed director of the State Department's Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, ponders this question. His answer: profoundly, and in contradictory ways. "There is an American mission, and it is composed of two apparently contradictory parts. It must preserve itself from the world at the same time it proselytizes to that world."

Vlahos asserts that one impulse in our culture is "to preserve the purity of the American ethos, to keep our society unsullied"; the other impulse commits us to "the progress of world reform." These two strains -- the "purifiers" and the "progressives," respectively -- have been in competition throughout American history, with the progressives ascendant in the postwar era of the cold war.

"Today, the stress between the two visions of American national purpose is greater than at any time since 1939," argues Vlahos. The progressives failed utterly in Vietnam. The Reagan era, first promoted as America's age of recovery from the progressives' miscalculations, is, according to Vlahos, a harkening back to the nativist tradition of the purifiers. "Reagan did not succeed in reasserting the postwar progressive mission.... If anything, Reagan's exertions served to exhume the mythology of the American postwar progressive mission for examination, only to have the people reject it."

LOREN
VER # 02

DEPT. sr MWHITA

BU: HJ: LINES(INCL.HEAD)
PG: ISSUE: 6/6 ; 88A
LOREN -IN-NWK
SSEIBE ;05/27,00:08

ABOVE LINE READS BY HENRY KISSINGER AND CYRUS VANCE→

[1]

(((FOOTNOTE ON LEAD PAGE)))→

[1]

The authors are former secretaries of state. Henry Kissinger served under Presidents Nixon and Ford, Cyrus Vance under President Carter. This article is condensed from a longer article in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs, ® the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1988.ck copyright line style.→

[6]

(((FIRST FOOTNOTE IN RUNNING COPY)))→

[1]

*Kissinger believes that defensive forces should be limited in relation to the limits on offensive forces. He believes we must continue to develop SDI actively and ultimately deploy it, because of Soviet research in the field and because of SDI's potential future value to Western defenses. Vance also believes that we should continue research and development, but at a measured pace; he is highly doubtful that it will prove to be cost-effective militarily or advantageous politically for the United States to deploy even elements of an SDI system.→

[11]

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LOREN

DEPT. sr

(((SECOND FOOTNOTE IN RUNNING COPY))))

lpThe Foreign Affairs people cut the footnote that Kissinger had suggested we shorten to: [1]

†Kissinger favors linking nuclear and conventional arms negotiations; Vance does not. [2]

We have decided to write this article together because of our deep belief that the security of free peoples and the growth of freedom both demand a restoration of bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy. We disagree on some policy choices. But we are convinced that the American national purpose must at some point be fixed. If it is redefined-or even subject to redefinition-with every change of administration in Washington, the United States risks becoming a factor of inconsistency in the world. The national tendency to oscillate between exaggerated belligerence and unrealistic expectation will be magnified. Other nations-friends or

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["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "adversaries-unable to gear\ntheir policies to American steadi-\nness, will go their own way,\ndooming the United States to\ngrowing irrelevance. lpIf broad\nagreement on central foreign\npolicy objectives can be achieved,\nthe 41st president of the United\nStates will be able to start his\nterm with a strong popular man-\ndate for leadership at home and\nabroad.lp+", "[33]", "By the end of this century a\nnumber of the pillars on which\nthe global order was rebuilt after\nWorld War II will have changed\nsignificantly. For the United\nStates, our nuclear monopoly has long\nsince disappeared and our relative share\nof the world economy will be less than\nhalf of what it was forty years ago. Other\ncountries, playing a variety of roles, al-\nready have had a major impact on U.S.\ninterests: the economies of Japan, West-\nern Europe and the ``newly industrializ-\ning countries'' are obvious examples; sev-\neral countries have nuclear weapons", (((MORE)))))"]

LOREN

DEPT. sr

capability and others are able to acquire
it quickly. Old East-West security issues
persist, but new issues such as state-spon-
sored terrorism and international drug
trafficking have become urgent. At the
same time, long-standing problems can-
not be ignored: there will be a continuing
need of the poorest countries and peoples
for humanitarian assistance. +

□A growing list of constraints on Ameri-
can actions also must be considered: de-
spite our vast military power, our ability
to shape the world unilaterally is in-
creasingly limited. Even with strong do-
mestic support, we can no longer afford
financially to do as much internationally
by ourselves as was the case in the imme-
diate postwar period. For many of our
staunchest friends, the Soviet threat to
the free world seems diminished, espe-
cially with the accession to power of a
reform-minded leadership in the
U.S.S.R. This perception tends to reduce
Western dependence on America's domi-
nant role. Thus the United States is
called upon to exercise new, subtler and
more comprehensive forms of leader-

[24]

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["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "ship, ~~and especially to play a major role~~\nin defining the threats to the alliance. ~~J~~", "□ Since 1941, successive generations of Americans have accepted the global responsibilities thrust on the United States. It now appears that a growing number of Americans want the United States to be less active internationally than before. They urge that other nations assume greater risks, responsibilities and financial burdens for the maintenance of world order and international prosperity. We understand the frustration underlying this national mood, ~~and agree that it must be dealt with constructively.~~ J", "□ At the highest level of our political system, the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates should describe, not specific tactical moves, but their visions of America's role in the world. We hope that they will explain which international commitments they would rein-", "[20]", (((MORE))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "PAGE-6", "force, reduce or reallocate to oth-\ners. And we hope that they will\nrecognize that the United States\nhas undertaken certain commit-\nments in pursuit of vital inter-\nests which cannot be redefined\non the basis of transitory fash-\nions. +", "[17]", "For purposes of illustration we\nshall apply the principles we\nhave discussed to some of the ma-\njor foreign policy issues, begin-\nning with the core issue of rela-\ntions with the Soviet Union. +", "[6]", "U.S.-Soviet Relations: The posses-\nsion of vast nuclear arsenals im-\nposes on the two superpowers a special\nobligation to maintain peace. But this\ncommon interest occurs in the context of\nideological differences and geopolitical\nrivalry. America also has an obligation to\nensure that willingness to defend free-\ndom and justice is not impaired by negoti-\nations with the Soviet Union that raise\nunrealistic expectations. +", "[11]", "Today the emergence of a rejuvenated", (((MORE)))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "Soviet leadership has raised new hopes for Soviet-American relations. We have both met several times with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev and have spent considerable time with some of his close advisers. We found Gorbachev highly intelligent and determined to remedy the failures of the Soviet economy with socialist solutions. He is eloquent in arguing that he prefers to live in peace with the West and to reduce Soviet defense spending so as to transfer resources into the civilian economy. At the same time, we have no doubt that Gorbachev is also firmly committed to defend Soviet international aims. What then is the practical consequence of these observations? What, for example, does Gorbachev mean when he speaks of a \"balance of interests\"? And how, precisely, would he define legitimate Soviet aims?", "□ No American president can base his policies for dealing with the U.S.S.R. on the presumed intentions of a Soviet general secretary. We cannot predict whether his intentions may radically change under domestic", "[22]", (((MORE))))"]

LOREN

DEPT. sr

political pressure. A successor
may change policies, as has hap-
pened before. Nor can we pre-
tend to understand the inner
workings of the Kremlin well
enough to know whether Gorba-
chev will succeed or survive.
Even glasnost and perestroika,
which are intrinsically appeal-
ing to the West, should not by
themselves fundamentally alter
how we conduct our relations
with the Soviet Union. Of course
we welcome evidence of greater
internal freedom in the U.S.S.R.
and the increased emigration of
minorities. But ultimately the
West can only marginally affect
the outcome of a struggle that
derives from the internal fail-
ures and contradictions of the So-
viet system and that is over is-
sues not necessarily of direct
concern to us. +

Up to now the major-almost
exclusive-object of East-West
negotiations has been arms con-

[30]

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["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "trol. The purpose of these negoti-\nations has been to contribute to\nthe lessening of East-West tensions, to\nimprove political relations and to ease\ncommunications between Washington\nand Moscow. The Intermediate-range\nNuclear Forces (INF) Treaty will be the\nfirst arms agreement ratifiedwatch senate vote.pm by both\ncountries in more than 15 years. Because\nit covered the simplest elements in the\narms control agenda and presented man-\nageable verification problems, the agree-\nment was reached while maintaining the\nessential elements of Atlantic\ncooperation.→", "□Future agreements with the Soviet\nUnion, however, will be much more diffi-\ncult to conclude. The Strategic Defense\nInitiative has helped soften Soviet nego-\ntiating positions, but the place of space\ndefenses in a future arms treaty or in\nfuture Western defense planning is far\nfrom clear. While still of concern to the\nSoviets, the value of SDI as a bargaining\nchip for the United States has declined as\ndomestic opposition and budgetary ob-\njections to the project have grown. This is", "[18]", (((MORE)))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "a good example of the need to work out a\ndomestic consensus. Though we differ on\ndeployment, research and development\nin SDI should be continued and gains\nthat have come out of our SDI programs\nshould be preserved*.", "[18]", "□ It is imperative that the next phase of\narms control concentrate on convention-\nal forces and weapons in Europe. The\nplace of conventional arms and force re-\nductions in any future arms control\nagreement will be of overriding concern\nto the West. We believe that NATO must\nexamine its force structure and arms\ncontrol plans in light of potential negoti-\nations. Neither of us advocates further\nreductions in the [short] [short] (battle-\nfield) nuclear weapons in Europe with-\nout reductions in Soviet conventional\nforces and weapons† FTNOTE FTNOTE FTNOTE. Unfortunately, the\nWest has not yet done adequate home-\nwork on the key aspects of conventional\narms control. lp", "lp>", "[17]", "□ We also believe that the time has come\nto give much greater emphasis to the\npolitical dialogue between the United", (((MORE))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "States and the Soviet Union. The Soviets have begun to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan. If carried out in a manner that permits the Afghan people to determine their own fate, this is a significant development. The Soviets now rhetorically embrace ``mutual'' and ``collective'' security rather than unilateral advantage. In discussions with Western officials, they emphasize that their military strategies and doctrines are ``defensive,'' and they seem to be more flexible in some discussions on arms control. +", "Nonetheless, the ultimate test of any government's intentions is not its rhetoric, but the specific actions it takes. Thus some of the issues that require a Soviet response are: international cooperation against state-sponsored terrorism; willingness to accept asymmetrical reductions in Soviet conventional forces so as to eliminate their military advantage in Europe; and steps to help", "[18]", (((MORE))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "PAGE-12", "end regional conflicts. lpOur over-\nall conclusion is that there is a\nstrategic opportunity for a signif-\nicant improvement in Soviet-\nAmerican relations. The issue is\nhow to take advantage of what\nmay be a favorable correlation of\nforces. This requires a concrete\nAmerican and Western political\nprogram.lp+", "66", "[22]", "□In this context, there will be an\nopportunity for an unprecedented-\ned kind of conversation between\nthe next American president and the So-\nviet general secretary early next year. By\nthen, Mikhail Gorbachev will have com-\npleted his first four years in office. He\nwill be preoccupied with drafting his\ncountry's 12th five-year plan, which will\nguide the Soviet economy during the ear-\nly 1990s. Given the internal problems,\nand in light of the new balance of interna-\ntional forces, the Soviet leadership may\nwell conclude that a serious and continu-\ning dialogue with the United States is in\nits interest.+", "[16]", {"bbox": [763, 1381, 897, 1405], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "PAGE-13", "Thus, at the outset of their relation-\nship, the new American president and\nthe Soviet general secretary should initi-\nate a wide-ranging discussion of where\nthey want U.S.-Soviet relations to be at\nthe beginning of the next century and\nhow they propose to contribute to a cli-\nmate of international restraint. We\nwould favor regular U.S.-Soviet sum-\nmits, so that meetings between the two\nleaders are not seen as rewards for good\nbehavior or reasons for concessions or\npretexts for signing agreements. +", "[13]\n\n**Atlantic relations:** NATO is one of the most successful treaty arrangements in history. It has preserved the peace in Europe for four decades—the longest such period since the European state system came into being. It connects America with countries of similar cultural heritage. It must remain the keystone of U.S. policy. +", "[9]\n\nBut conditions have changed vastly since the early days of NATO. There is nuclear parity with the U.S.S.R.; this has", {"bbox": [765, 1381, 898, 1404], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "aroused doubts in some quarters\nabout America's continued com-\nmitment to the defense of Eu-\nrope. A second important change\nsince the 1940s has been Eu-\nrope's economic recovery and the\ngrowing importance of the Euro-\npean Community as an economic\nand political entity; this tempts\nmore intense economic competi-\ntion with the United States and\nraises some broader issues in Eu-\nropean-American relations. On\nboth sides of the Atlantic a new\ngeneration has matured which\nshares neither the sense of dan-\nger nor the emotional commit-\nment to cooperation that charac-\nterized NATO's early years.\nMoreover, the era of more active\ndiplomacy with the East that in-\nvolves both U.S. and allied ef-\nforts creates new challenges and\nrisks of competitive, separate ap-\nproaches to Moscow. +", "It is time for NATO to redefine\nits goals. Immediately following", "[29]", {"bbox": [765, 1404, 898, 1427], "category": "Page-footer", "text":(((MORE)))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "the U.S. elections, the Atlantic partners\nshould begin a broad reassessment of\ntheir mission and plans for the next de-\ncade—perhaps by appointing a distin-\nguished group of private citizens to sub-\nmit a report in no more than 12 months.\nA revised alliance structure and force\nposture should emerge from this review,\nas well as clear parameters for conduct-\ning the next round of arms control negoti-\nations with the U.S.S.R. +", "[13]", "The United States must make un-\nequivocally clear that NATO cannot be\ndefended without sufficient quantities\nand types of both nuclear and conven-\ntional weapons, so as to deter a nuclear\nadversary that continues to enjoy a con-\nventional superiority in some significant\ncategories and to possess nuclear weap-\nons stationed inside its territory capable\nof reaching all of Europe. It is no service\nto the alliance to engage in speculation\nabout extreme proposals or fanciful no-\ntions—such as the complete denuclear-\nization of Europe, pledges against the\nfirst use of nuclear weapons or exagger-\nated claims that SDI will provide an im-", (((MORE)))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "penetrable shield. Such utopian visions\nundermine serious discussions of a com-\nmon Atlantic strategy and stigmatize the\nvery weapons on which a credible deter-\nrence must be based for the foreseeable\nfuture.+", "[22]", "Europe will inevitably play a greater part and have a larger voice in the defense of its own territory. This reflects the reality of Europe's strength. Accordingly, the relative role of the United States is likely to decline, although not its commitment to defend Europe by all necessary means. Growing intra-European defense cooperation, possibly in the form of a European defense entity, should be endorsed. With the European Community moving toward virtual economic integration by 1992, it is especially important that a revised structure for the defense of Western Europe also be in place by then.+", "[16]", "The strengths of the Western alliance\nderive from its common democratic val-\nues and its ability to respond, _often in_\nconcern, _when circumstances change_ or", {"bbox": [763, 1380, 897, 1405], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

LOREN

DEPT. sr

public attitudes evolve. The West is fully capable of reorganizing itself and thus emerging better prepared to continue to defend its freedoms and prosperity. We believe, nevertheless, that NATO leaders must understand that if divisions within the Atlantic community over issues outside NATO are permitted toester, they will threaten the capacity of the alliance for cooperation and mutual defense within the NATO area, and hence the vital interests of each member.+

The world economy: America's role in the
1961-1965
world has become directly dependent on
the strength and performance of the U.S.
economy. Foreign policy and eco-
nomic policy have become in-
creasingly interdependent.

The budget contraction is al-
ready beginning to complicate vi-
tal bilateral political relations
and call into question whether
the United States will be able to
maintain some of its foreign mili-
tary commitments. Too many
major modifications of the Amer-

[16]

[6]

# (((MORE)))))

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "PAGE-19", "□Japan: There are many shrill and con-\ntradictory voices in this country proffer-\ning advice on how Japan should change.\nSome regard Japan's $60-billion trade\nsurplus with the United States as the\nmost urgent problem, and they insist\nthat Japan modify its trading rules to\nreduce that imbalance substantially.\nSome believe that Japan should concen-\ntrate on providing massive economic and\nfinancial assistance to the developing\nworld out of its substantial foreign ex-\nchange surpluses. Still others are con-\nvinced that Japan, which is fast becom-\ning the most proficient non-nuclear\nmilitary power in the world, should re-\nlieve the United States of some of its\nAsian defense burdens and increase de-\nfense spending substantially above the\npresent level of one percent of GNP. +", "□There can be no debate over the impor-\ntance of Japanese-American ties. They\nare based on strong common interests-\nstrategic and political, as well as econom-\nic. Preserving this relationship is vital to\nboth countries. We should start by recog-\nnizing that a root cause of the trade im-", "[20]", (((MORE)))))"]

["CYS", "LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "PAGE-20", "balance is the current superior produc-\ntivity and long-range planning of\nJapanese industry. In the end,\nmarket forces more than govern-\nmental intervention will affect\nthe trade deficit.+", "The American-Japanese dia-\nlogue must not be confined to mu-\ntual harassment. The two coun-\ntries should seek to establish\noverall goals and work toward\nthem. One step would be to estab-\nlish an overall trade balance the\nUnited States would find tolera-\nble; within that balance, Japan\nwould have the choice of either\nreducing its exports or increas-\ning its imports, thus removing\nthe need for sector-by-sector in-\ndustrial negotiations.+", "We warn against any attempt\nto deal with the deficit by press-\ning Japan to step up its defense\nefforts. Such a course would gen-\nerate the gravest doubts all over\nAsia. It might deflect Japan from", "[13]", "[14]", {"bbox": [763, 1383, 897, 1407], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "PAGE-21", "a greater economic contribution\nto the growth of developing ar-\neas. Only in adopting a common\ncourse can we sustain the global\neconomic growth without which\neconomic competition between\nJapan and the United States\ncould degenerate into a disastrous politi-\ncal conflict.→", "□lpChina: No relationship has changed\n66111111\nmore dramatically over the past four ad-\nministrations, of both parties, than\nAmerica's relations with the People's Re-\npublic of China. Sino-U.S. friendship is\none of few uncontested achievements of\nAmerican policy in the past two decades\nof bitter debates. We are concerned that\nit not be neglected as we become more\ninvolved in a new phase of East-West\nnegotiations.→", "[15]", "□China has already taken decisions that\noffer opportunities to American econom-\nic interests. American business no longer\nexpects profits on the scale originally\ncontemplated during the initial stages of\nnormalizing relations with China. Nev-", "[11]", (((MORE))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "PAGE-22", "ertheless, the existence of a market of\nover one billion people and and increas-\ningly open economy are reasons for opti-\nmism over the long run about the future\nof our trade and investment in the P.R.C.", "It is short-sighted and unfair, however, to\ncontinue to include the P.R.C. in less fa-\nvorable categories for the purposes of\ntechnology transfer and financing, ~~especially~~ when we encourage China to maintain adequate defenses because of the strong Soviet military presence nearby.\nThus we favor the use of discretionary\npowers to encourage the transfer of tech-\nnology to China, to assist growth.", "66", "[21]", "□The Arab-Israeli conflict: For the past forty\n11111111111111111111\nyears the United States has been the only\nmajor country able to engage all of the\nbelligerents in peaceful efforts to solve\nthe Arab-Israeli disputes. Unfortunate-\nly, the peace process has been stalled for\nthe past decade, and the forces of concili-\nation and compromise in the area have\nbeen weakened.→", "□Whatever the structure of the negotia-\ntions, America needs to develop a sub-", "[9]", {"bbox": [763, 1382, 896, 1405], "category": "Text", "text":(((MORE))))"]

LOREN

DEPT. sr

PAGE-23

stantive position on the Palestinian issue. This can be summed up in three principles:+

Israel should not and cannot stay where it is in the occupied territories. The demographic trends there are running against Israel; the militancy of a hostile population will increase; radicalism will grow in the rest of the Arab world.+

[5]

At the same time, Israel has a right to secure and recognized frontiers. Admittedly, in the missile age security cannot be absolute. We believe that a return to Israel's pre-1967 borders would not be compatible with Israel's survival. We believe, however, that Gaza and parts of the West Bank, including major Arab population centers, should be put under Arab control.+

[7]

[10]

(((MORE))))

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "PAGE-24", "asked to negotiate with groups\nthat are unwilling to renounce\nIsrael's destruction, or that justi-\nfy acts of terrorism against its\npopulation.+", "The Western hemisphere: It is no longer possible for the United States to pretend that it alone can determine events from within or deter hostile forces from without in the Western hemisphere. Since its own independence, the United States has felt a special concern for developments in the New World, although there has often been too much ignorance and arrogance in our policies. Recent troubles in the region have made it clear that we must deal with the problems differently than before, and also differently from the way we defend our interests on other continents. In Mexico, for example, traditional foreign policy approaches are of little use: the usual levers of diplomacy, military", "[11]", (((MORE)))))"]

CJD

LOREN

DEPT. sr

PAGE-25

power and international economic policies do not apply to a close and friendly neighbor, with which we are connected by so many intangible ties. The issues that we face in Mexico are almost all domestic in character: the flow of people, cross-border trade, drugs and Mexico's huge external debt. The United States has led public and private efforts to provide new financing for Mexico's debt servicing.

[33]

□Central America provides a conspicuous example of an area where U.S. policy has suffered because of a lack of clear-cut national objectives that could be publicly debated and congressionally mandated. One clear aim of the United States is to increase the likelihood that stable and democratic governments will survive in the region. But confusion remains over whether our principal tactic should have been to overthrow the Nicaraguan government, halt Nicaraguan support for insurrections elsewhere in Central America, eliminate the Soviet-Cuban presence and military assistance in Nicaragua or democratize the Sandinista re-

(((MORE))))

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "PAGE-26", "gime. Now the presidents of five Central American nations have taken on the responsibility for making peace.", "[19]", "□Is there anything left for the United States to do? First, it remains very much in the U.S. interest to obtain the withdrawal of Cuban and Soviet military advisers from Nicaragua, significant reductions in the armies and armaments in the region (especially in Nicaragua), a total ban on Sandinista help to guerrillas elsewhere, and the internal democratization of Nicaragua. Second, the situation in Central America can be one measure of U.S.-Soviet relations: whether the Soviet Union is willing to suspend arms shipments into this area of our most traditional relationships. Fluidly we favor an expanded economic and program", "[15]", "□+ to the area", "[1]", "□As is apparent from the foregoing, our next president will be severely challenged to guide us through a period of international transition and to secure a firm place for the United States in a changing configuration of nations. He must focus American resources and en-", (((MORE)))))"]

["LOREN", "DEPT. sr", "ergies on areas where precisely defined\nU.S. national interests are at stake. He\nmust not be reluctant to admit that there\nare important issues, even conflicts, in\nwhich the United States has no special\nrole to play. But he must not shrink from\ndefending our interests. +", "[14]\n\n> It is true that this is a more restrictive approach to the defense of American objectives than that in the immediate post-war period. We believe, however, that America's international standing and national security need not be diminished because we adopt more selective and collaborative international strategies based on new realities. Our position can be strengthened by taking into account the growing strength of other regions. +", "[11]\n\nWe believe profoundly in the resilience of the American people. Often in the past we have overcome great international challenges thanks to our adaptability and resourcefulness. Imaginatively analyzing the new realities affecting America's role in the world should provide the next administration", (((MORE))))"]

LOREN

DEPT. sr

Through such understanding and discipline, our leaders can guarantee that the future security and well-being of the American people will be at least as well defended in the future as they have been in the past.+

(((END))))

[15]

By Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance

The authors are former secretaries of state. Henry Kissinger served under Presidents Nixon and Ford, Cyrus Vance under President Carter. This article is condensed from a forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs,
© the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1988.

We have decided to write this article to-
gether because of our deep belief that the
security of free peoples and the growth of
freedom both demand a restoration of bi-
partisan consensus in American foreign
policy. We disagree on some policy choices.
But we are convinced that the American
national purpose must at some point be
fixed. If it is redefined-or even subject to
redefinition-with every change of admin-
istration in Washington, the United States
risks becoming a factor of inconstancy in
the world. The national tendency to oscil-
late between exaggerated belligerence and
unrealistic expectation will be magnified.
Other nations-friends or adversaries-
unable to gear their policies to American
steadiness, will go their own way, dooming
the United States to growing irrelevance.

By the end of this century a number of
the pillars on which the global order was
rebuilt after World War II will have
changed significantly. For the United
States, our nuclear monopoly has long
since disappeared and our relative share of
the world economy will be less than half of
what it was forty years ago. Other coun-
tries, playing a variety of roles, already
have had a major impact on U.S. interests:
the economies of Japan, Western Europe
and the ``newly industrializing countries''
are obvious examples; several countries
have nuclear weapons capability and oth-
ers are able to acquire it quickly. Old East-
West security issues persist, but new issues
such as state-sponsored terrorism and in-
ternational drug trafficking have become
urgent. At the same time, long-standing
problems cannot be ignored: there will be a
continuing need of the poorest countries
and peoples for humanitarian assistance.

A growing list of constraints on Ameri-
can actions also must be considered: de-
spite our vast military power, our ability to
shape the world unilaterally is increasing-
ly limited. Even with strong domestic sup-
port, we can no longer afford financially to
do as much internationally by ourselves as
was the case in the immediate postwar pe-
riod. For many of our staunchest friends,

2.

[Lc]

the Soviet threat to the free world seems
diminished, especially with the accession
to power of a reform-minded leadership in
the U.S.S.R. This perception tends to re-
duce Western dependence on America's
dominant role. Thus the United States is
called upon to exercise new, subtler and
more comprehensive forms of leadership,
and especially to play a major role in defin-
ing the threats to the alliance.

Since 1941, successive generations of
Americans have accepted the global re-
sponsibilities thrust on the United States.
It now appears that a growing number of
Americans want the United States to be
less active internationally than before.
They urge that other nations assume great-
er risks, responsibilities and financial bur-
dens for the maintenance of world order
and international prosperity. We under-
stand the frustration underlying this na-
tional mood, and agree that it must be dealt
with constructively.

At the highest level of our political sys-
tem, the Republican and Democratic presi-
dential candidates should describe, not spe-
cific tactical moves, but their visions of
America's role in the world. We hope that
they will explain which international com-
mitments they would reinforce, reduce or
reallocate to others. And we hope that they
will recognize that the United States has
undertaken certain commitments in pur-
suit of vital interests which cannot be rede-
fined on the basis of transitory fashions.

For purposes of illustration we shall ap-
ply the principles we have discussed to
some of the major foreign policy issues,
beginning with the core issue of relations
with the Soviet Union.

U.S.-Soviet Relations: The possession of vast
nuclear arsenals imposes on the two super-
powers a special obligation to maintain
peace. But this common interest occurs in
the context of ideological differences and
geopolitical rivalry. America also has an
obligation to ensure that willingness to de-
fend freedom and justice is not impaired by
negotiations with the Soviet Union that
raise unrealistic expectations.

Today the emergence of a rejuvenated
Soviet leadership has raised new hopes for
Soviet-American relations. We have both
met several times with General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev and have spent consid-
erable time with some of his close advisers.

3,

[LC]

No American president can base his policies for dealing with the U.S.S.R. on the presumed intentions of a Soviet general secretary. We cannot predict whether his intentions may radically change under domestic political pressure. A successor may change policies, as has happened before. Nor can we pretend to understand the inner workings of the Kremlin well enough to know whether Gorbachev will succeed or survive. Even glasnost and perestroika, which are intrinsically appealing to the West, should not by themselves fundamentally alter how we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union. Of course we welcome evidence of greater internal freedom in the U.S.S.R. and the increased emigration of minorities. But ultimately the West can only marginally affect the outcome of a struggle that derives from the internal failures and contradictions of the Soviet system and that is over issues not necessarily of direct concern to us.

Up to now the major-almost exclusive-object of East-West negotiations has been arms control. The purpose of these negotiations has been to contribute to the lessening of East-West tensions, to improve political relations and to ease communications between Washington and Moscow. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty will be the first arms agreement ratified by both countries in more than 15 years. Because it covered the simplest elements in the arms control agenda and presented manageable verification problems, the agreement was reached while maintaining the essential elements of Atlantic cooperation.

4.

[L](105)

still of concern to the Soviets, the value of
SDI as a bargaining chip for the United
States has declined as domestic opposition
and budgetary objections to the project
have grown. This is a good example of the
need to work out a domestic consensus.
Though we differ on deployment, research
and development in SDI should be contin-
ued and gains that have come out of our SDI
programs should be preserved.

(Note: Kissinger believes that defensive forces should be limited in relation to the limits on offensive forces. He believes we must continue to develop SDI actively and ultimately deploy it, because of Soviet research in the field and because of SDI's potential future value to Western defenses. Vance also believes that we should continue research and development, but at a measured pace; he is highly doubtful that it will prove to be cost-effective militarily or advantageous politically for the United States to deploy even elements of an SDI system.)

It is imperative that the next phase of
arms control concentrate on conventional
forces and weapons in Europe. The place of
conventional arms and force reductions in
any future arms control agreement will be
of overriding concern to the West. We be-
lieve that NATO must examine its force
structure and arms control plans in light of
potential negotiations. Neither of us advo-
cates further reductions in the ``short-
short'' (battlefield) nuclear weapons in Eu-
rope without reductions in Soviet L
conventional forces and weapons.

(Note: While placing great importance on conventional arms control negotiations, Vance would not make the signing of an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, along the lines now being discussed, or the conclusion of treaties covering nuclear testing and biological or chemical warfare, conditional on the convening of a conventional arms control negotiation, or on its outcome. Kissinger believes further strategic arms control treaties should be negotiated side by side with conventional arms control; he believes that, at a minimum, the United States should have a clear idea of how the Soviets define conventional arms control in Europe before proceeding with the conclusion of a strategic arms control treaty; moreover, he believes that the agreement for a 50-percent reduction in strategic arms needs to be

linked to an executive-legislative examina-
tion of the impact of the agreement on U.S.
strategic force structure.)

Unfortunately, the West has not yet
done adequate homework on the key as-
pects of conventional arms control. There
is no agreement on goals, on accurate data
or the means of reliable verification of con-
ventional forces. It is clear that any reduc-
tions will have to be highly asymmetrical.
This factor alone means that conventional
arms negotiations are certain to become
the most difficult arms control problem for
the NATO alliance in the 1990s.

We also believe that the time has come to
give much greater emphasis to the political
dialogue between the United States and
the Soviet Union. The Soviets have begun
to withdraw their forces from Afghanistan.
If carried out in a manner that permits the
Afghan people to determine their own fate,
this is a significant development. The Sovi-
ets now rhetorically embrace ``mutual''
and ``collective'' security rather than uni-
lateral advantage. In discussions with
Western officials, they emphasize that
their military strategies and doctrines are
``defensive,'' and they seem to be more flex-
ible in some discussions on arms control.

Nonetheless, the ultimate test of any
government's intentions is not its rhetoric,
but the specific actions it takes. Thus some
of the issues that require a Soviet response
are: international cooperation against
state-sponsored terrorism; willingness to
accept asymmetrical reductions in Soviet
conventional forces so as to eliminate their
military advantage in Europe; and steps to
help end regional conflicts.

In this context, there will be an opportu-
nity for an unprecedented kind of conver-
sation between the next American presi-
dent and the Soviet general secretary early
next year. By then, Mikhail Gorbachev will
have completed his first four years in office.
He will be preoccupied with drafting his
country's 12th five-year plan, which will
guide the Soviet economy during the early
1990s. Given the internal problems, and in
light of the new balance of international
forces, the Soviet leadership may well con-
clude that a serious and continuing dia-
logue with the United States is in its inter-
est. We would favor regular U.S.-Soviet
summits, so that meetings between the two
leaders are not seen as rewards for good

behavior or reasons for concessions or pre-
texts for signing agreements.

Atlantic relations: NATO is one of the most successful treaty arrangements in history. It has preserved the peace in Europe for four decades—the longest such period since the European state system came into being. It connects America with countries of similar cultural heritage. It must remain the keystone of U.S. policy.

But conditions have changed vastly since the early days of NATO. There is nuclear parity with the U.S.S.R.; this has aroused doubts in some quarters about America's continued commitment to the defense of Europe. A second important change since the 1940s has been Europe's economic recovery and the growing importance of the European Community as an economic and political entity; this tempts more intense economic competition with the United States and raises some broader issues in European-American relations. On both sides of the Atlantic a new generation has matured which shares neither the sense of danger nor the emotional commitment to cooperation that characterized NATO's early years. Moreover, the era of more active diplomacy with the East that involves both U.S. and allied efforts creates new challenges and risks of competitive, separate approaches to Moscow.

It is time for NATO to redefine its goals. Immediately following the U.S. elections, the Atlantic partners should begin a broad reassessment of their mission and plans for the next decade—perhaps by appointing a distinguished group of private citizens to submit a report in no more than 12 months. A revised alliance structure and force posture should emerge from this review, as well as clear parameters for conducting the next round of arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R.

The United States must make unequivocally clear that NATO cannot be defended without sufficient quantities and types of both nuclear and conventional weapons, so as to deter a nuclear adversary that continues to enjoy a conventional superiority in some significant categories and to possess nuclear weapons stationed inside its territory capable of reaching all of Europe. It is no service to the alliance to engage in speculation about extreme proposals or fanciful notions—such as the complete denucle-

[L]

arization of Europe, pledges against the
first use of nuclear weapons or exaggerated
claims that SDI will provide an impenetrable
shield. Such utopian visions undermine
serious discussions of a common Atlantic
strategy and stigmatize the very weapons
on which a credible deterrence must be
based for the foreseeable future.

As the European component in Atlantic
defenses continues to develop, the United
States will face an alliance whose partners
will feel a greater sense of identity. Differences
of views within NATO may not be
limited to alliance strategies toward the
Warsaw Pact countries. Distinctive West
European approaches to crises in the Third
World could become more common. We
believe, nevertheless, that NATO leaders
must understand that if divisions within
the Atlantic community over issues outside
NATO are permitted to fester, they
will threaten the capacity of the alliance
for cooperation and mutual defense within
the NATO area, and hence the vital interests
of each member.

Japan: There are many shrill and contradictory voices in this country proffering advice on how Japan should change. Some regard Japan's $60-billion trade surplus with the United States as the most urgent problem, and they insist that Japan modify its trading rules to reduce that imbalance substantially. Some believe that Japan should concentrate on providing massive economic and financial assistance to the developing world out of its substantial foreign exchange surpluses. Still others are convinced that Japan, which is fast becoming the most proficient non-nuclear military power in the world, should relieve the United States of some of its Asian defense

There can be no debate over the importance of Japanese-American ties. They are based on strong common interests-strategic and political, as well as economic. Preserving this relationship is vital to both countries. We should start by recognizing that a root cause of the trade imbalance is the current superior productivity and long-range planning of Japanese industry. In the end, market forces more than governmental intervention will affect the trade deficit.

The American-Japanese dialogue must not be confined to mutual harassment. The two countries should seek to establish overall goals and work toward them. One step would be to establish an overall trade balance the United States would find tolerable; within that balance, Japan would have the choice of either reducing its exports or increasing its imports, thus removing the need for sector-by-sector industrial L negotiations.

**The Arab-Israeli conflict:** For the past forty years the United States has been the only major country able to engage all of the belligerents in peaceful efforts to solve the Arab-Israeli disputes. Unfortunately, the peace process has been stalled for the past decade, and the forces of conciliation and compromise in the area have been weakened. Now, Washington has put forward a new initiative. At the center of this proposal is the convocation of an international conference.

(Note: Kissinger has serious reservations about such a conference; he believes that it would legitimize a formal Soviet presence in the peace process for the first time and that it would lead to a stalemate. Vance considers that an international conference

[L]

could at least provide an umbrella for the
first direct negotiations between Israel, Jor-
dan and the Palestinians, and is therefore
desirable.)

Whatever the structure of the negotia-
tions, America needs to develop a substan-
tive position on the Palestinian issue. This
can be summed up in three principles:

Israel should not and cannot stay where
it is in the occupied territories. The demo-
graphic trends there are running against
Israel; the militancy of a hostile population
will increase; radicalism will grow in the
rest of the Arab world.

At the same time, Israel has a right to
secure and recognized frontiers. Admittedly,
in the missile age security cannot be
absolute. We believe that a return to Isra-
el's pre-1967 borders would not be compati-
ble with Israel's survival. We believe, how-
ever, that Gaza and parts of the West Bank,
including major Arab population centers,
should be put under Arab control.

The Palestinians have legitimate rights
which should be recognized, provided they
in turn unambiguously recognize the right
of Israel to live within secure and recog-
nized boundaries. Israel should not be
asked to negotiate with groups that are
unwilling to renounce Israel's destruction,
or that justify acts of terrorism against its
population.

The Western hemisphere: It is no longer pos-
sible for the United States to pretend that it
alone can determine events from within or
deter hostile forces from without in the
Western hemisphere. Since its own inde-
pendence, the United States has felt a spe-
cial concern for developments in the New
World, although there has often been too
much ignorance and arrogance in our poli-
cies. Recent troubles in the region have
made it clear that we must deal with the
problems differently than before, and also
differently from the way we defend our
interests on other continents. In Mexico,
for example, traditional foreign policy ap-
proaches are of little use: the usual levers of
diplomacy, military power and interna-
tional economic policies do not apply to a
close and friendly neighbor, with which we
are connected by so many intangible ties.
The issues that we face in Mexico are al-
most all domestic in character: the flow of
people, cross-border trade, drugs and Mexi-
co's huge external debt. The United States

10

(L)

Central America provides a conspicuous
example of an area where U.S. policy has
suffered because of a lack of clear-cut na-
tional objectives that could be publicly de-
bated and congressionally mandated. One
clear aim of the United States is to increase
the likelihood that stable and democratic
governments will survive in the region. But
confusion remains over whether our prin-
cipal tactic should have been to overthrow
the Nicaraguan government, halt Nicara-
guan support for insurrections elsewhere
in Central America, eliminate the Soviet-
Cuban presence and military assistance in
Nicaragua or democratize the Sandinista
regime. Now the presidents of five Central
American nations have taken on the re-
sponsibility for making peace.

Is there anything left for the United
States to do? First, it remains very much in
the U.S. interest to obtain the withdrawal
of Cuban and Soviet military advisers from
Nicaragua, significant reductions in the
armies and armaments in the region (espe-
cially in Nicaragua), a total ban on Sandi-
nista help to guerrillas elsewhere, and the
internal democratization of Nicaragua.
Second, the situation in Central America
can be one measure of U.S.-Soviet rela-
tions: whether the Soviet Union is willing
to suspend arms shipments into this area of
our most traditional relationships.

Also outstanding is the issue of the level
and scope of our assistance to the area.
Four years ago a bipartisan commission
appointed by the president unanimously
recommended substantial economic assist-
ance to Central America. That recommen-
dation is even more important today and
will gain in relevance if the Arias plan
succeeds. Such aid should go primarily to
regional development rather than to indi-
vidual countries.

As is apparent from the foregoing, our
next president will be severely challenged
to guide us through a period of internation-
al transition and to secure a firm place for
the United States in a changing configura-
tion of nations. He must focus American
resources and energies on areas where pre-
cisely defined U.S. national interests are at
stake. He must not be reluctant to admit
that there are important issues, even con-

It is true that this is a more restrictive
approach to the defense of American objec-
tives than that in the immediate postwar
period. We believe, however, that Ameri-
ca's international standing and national
security need not be diminished because we
adopt more selective and collaborative in-
ternational strategies based on new reali-
ties. Our position can be strengthened by
taking into account the growing strength of
other regions.

We believe profoundly in the resiliency
of the American people. Often in the past
we have overcome great international
challenges thanks to our adaptability and
resourcefulness. Imaginatively analyzing
the new realities affecting America's role
in the world should provide the next ad-
ministration with prescriptions for its for-
eign policies. Through such understanding
and discipline, our leaders can guarantee
that the future security and well-being of
the American people will be at least as well
defended in the future as they have been in
the past.

MAY 24 1988.

Henry Kissinger
Cyrus Vance

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900 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

II

By the end of this century a number of the pillars on which
the global order was rebuilt after World War II will have
changed significantly. For the United States, our nuclear mo-
nopoly will have disappeared and our relative share of the
world economy will be less than half of what it was forty years
ago. Other countries, playing a variety of roles, already have
had a major impact on U.S. interests: the economies of Japan,
Western Europe and the "newly industrializing countries" are
obvious examples; several countries have nuclear weapons ca-
pability and others are able to acquire it quickly. Old East-West
security issues persist, but new issues such as state-sponsored
terrorism and international drug trafficking have become ur-
gent. At the same time, long-standing problems cannot be
ignored: there will be a continuing need of the poorest coun-
tries and peoples for humanitarian assistance.

Since 1941, successive generations of Americans have ac-
cepted the global responsibilities thrust on the United States.
It now appears that a growing number of Americans want the
United States to be less active internationally than before. They
urge that other nations assume greater risks, responsibilities
and financial burdens for the maintenance of world order and
international prosperity. We understand the frustration under-
lying this national mood, and agree that it must be dealt with
constructively in the decades ahead. But we are also convinced
that it is the duty of our national leadership to prevent inter-
national burdens from jeopardizing important American inter-
est and the cause of freedom.

©AP BZQ1 FAS$$$1412 Art 1412 fa-sum 11412 5/12-230Ax Kissinger/Vance 05-20-88 16-38-58 ap

[L]

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 901

The legislative branch has clearly defined constitutional re-
sponsibilities in overseeing and funding U.S. foreign and de-
fense policies. Congress must be well informed about the plans
and actions of the executive branch, and no foreign policy is
sustainable if a majority of the Congress, reflecting public
opinion, is adamantly opposed. At the same time, Congress
should not manage the tactics of American foreign policy nor
should it overburden high administration officials with de-
mands for redundant testimony. Surely there are better ways
for the executive and legislative branches to consult than
having the secretaries of state and defense spend more than a
quarter of their time on repetitive congressional testimony.

[LC]

902 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

III

©AP BZQ1 FAS$$$1412 Art 1412 fa-sum 11412 5/12-230Ax Kissinger/Vance 05-20-88 16-38-58 aps

[Lc]

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 903

No American president can base his policies for dealing with the U.S.S.R. on the presumed intentions of a Soviet general secretary. We cannot predict whether his intentions may radiatively change under domestic political pressure. A successor may change policies, as has happened before. Nor can we pretend to understand the inner workings of the Kremlin well enough to know whether Gorbachev will succeed or survive. Even glasnost and perestroika, which are intrinsically appealing to the West, should not by themselves fundamentally alter how we conduct our relations with the Soviet Union.

[LC]

904 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 905

[L.C.]

906 FOREIGN AFFAIRS

BIPARTISAN FOREIGN POLICY 907

908 FOREIGN AFFAIRS