-6-

of them. No less important, however, are the increasingly
acute structural problems that plague our Atlantic partnership.

Since the early postwar years, the alliance has tended
increasingly to operate under three different organizational
structures at once. Economically, Europe has moved toward
closer and closer unity, with the United States encouraging
this trend but standing apart from it. Militarily, on the other
hand, all 15 NATO partners on both sides of the Atlantic have
for the most part maintained a single, integrated defense policy.
Diplomatically, still another principle has prevailed, with
individual states assuming fairly uninhibited independence of
action in their relations with members of the Communist bloc.

In effect, we have been building the structure of Atlantic
relations according to three fundamentally incompatible sets
of plans. At first this did not work badly. But with the passage
of time the various parts of the construction have begun to
get in each other's way, and now we are discovering to our
dismay that policies which ought to dovetail and reinforce one

-7-

another are having just the opposite effect. No wonder the
whole structure seems shaky at times. No wonder there is
so much intramural bickering and squabbling.

The lines of controversy are familiar to everyone by now.
The Europeans still want American protection and American
leadership, but they also want the right to pursue their own interests.
On the one hand they appeal to the United States to tolerate
their independence in the name of Atlantic unity, while on the
all other they ask for a veto on our independent action in the
name of Atlantic unity.

On the American side there are complaints that Europe
is taking economic advantage of us and shirking its fair share
of the defense burden. On the European side there are complaints
that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert
Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically.

The only way to cut through this fog of suspicion, mistrust,
and resentment is by reaffirming the shared interests and common
ideals that unite the peoples of the West. Such a reaffirmation
of mutual ties is within our reach in 1973, and it stands at the
very top of the President's agenda in this year of Europe.

-8-

Second on his agenda, and a natural consequence of the first step, is the practical work of redesigning the structure of relationships among the United States and our Atlantic and Pacific partners. Let me now dwell briefly on our conception of what specifically must take place in three major fields of concern: the economic, the military, and the diplomatic.

Economically, we must start with the realistic recognition that Europe's transformation from a client of this country into one of our strongest competitors makes some frictions between us inevitable. Thus some Americans see the enlarged European Economic Community as building its prosperity at our expense behind a protective shield; they fear that Europe's policies will hinder the development of a stable international economic system. Meanwhile there are some in Europe who see the United States as hostile to European integration, and as trying to prevent its further strengthening.

While understandable, this fear among our European friends is totally unfounded. The President is especially anxious to lay

-9-

it to rest once and for all. No element of postwar American
policy has been more consistent and more basic than our support
for European unity. We have encouraged it at every turn.
Now that it has come so far toward realization we have no inten-
tion of setting about destroying what we worked so hard to
help build. Our goal remains a strengthening of the West,
and we shall continue to support European unity as a bridge to
Atlantic unity.

Yet there is no denying that Europe's economic success
has produced certain new problems and unforeseen consequences.
The United States long assumed that political unity would follow
economic integration. We also expected that a unified Europe
would ease many of our own international burdens. Neither
of these things has happened quite as we anticipated. As a
result, and for numerous other reasons, we face a growing
conflict over trade policy and currency relationships. Compre-
hensive trade negotiations among the United States, Europe,
and Japan aimed at resolving these differences are to begin
in the fall.

-10-

We cannot approach the issues in these talks solely on the
d basis of narrow national self-interest. The result of such an
approach would be deadlock or constant conflict.

It is therefore the responsibility of national leaders to raise
these historic trade talks to a higher plane of international
responsibility. Technical questions must be resolved in the
context of America's transcendent common interests with both
Europe and Japan. Only on this basis can we justify the mutual
concessions that are essential to the success of these talks.

This spirit of compromise is reflected in the trade bill the
President sent to Congress earlier this month, and it will
continue to guide American policy in the negotiations this fall.
We believe it can produce an historically important achievement
in economic diplomacy whereby no one loses and all sides
genuinely benefit.

1973 is also a year of major negotiations on the subject of
Atlantic defense policy.

Defense is the field in which transatlantic unity has always
come most naturally. For many years the military threats
to Europe were unambiguous, the requirements to meet them were

-11-

generally agreed on both sides of the Atlantic, and America's
responsibility was preeminent and obvious. Today we remain
united in military relations, but we face the new challenge
of maintaining our mutual defense under changed strategic
conditions and the new opportunity of enhancing our security
through negotiated reductions of forces.

The West no longer holds the nuclear predominance that
permitted us the luxury of relative weakness in conventional
forces during the 1950's and '60's. Our collective ability to
defend Western Europe against <u>conventional</u> attack has now
become crucial to the maintenance of peace. Accordingly,
our NATO allies have been embarked since 1970 on a significant
effort to take up a larger share of the defense burden by upgrading
their own conventional forces.

The President has asked me to state <u>tonight</u> that America
remains <u>equally</u> committed to doing its fair share in Atlantic
defense. He is adamantly opposed to any unilateral withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Europe, and I believe the Congress will
<u>his</u> support <u>stand</u>.

-12-

Each member of the alliance must recognize, however, that the progress of the past two years in strengthening our common defense will not simply continue automatically.

On the contrary, that progress is encountering a stiffening political and economic resistance not only in the United States but in Western Europe as well. Each ally faces rising military budgets for manpower and equipment. The lessening of tensions in Europe has accentuated the standard emotional and ideological arguments that it is safe to begin reducing our forces unilaterally.

The governments of the various Western powers have a major job to do in educating their peoples to the strategic realities and requirements of the 1970's, and before we can proceed convincingly with that task we must make certain that we ourselves clearly understand those considerations.

We owe to the Alliance a credible defense doctrine, an agreed strategy, and modern military force sufficient to back them up.

We owe to our peoples a rational defense posture, at the safest minimum size and cost, with burdens equitably shared. This is what the President feels must result from the dialogue with our allies in 1973.

Andrew
-13-

Once this is achieved, the United States will be able
to maintain the necessary American forces in
Europe, and to regard them not simply as a hostage to trigger
our nuclear weapons, but as an essential contribution to an agreed
and intelligent structure of Western defense.

A rational strategy is also a prerequisite for developing an
Allied negotiating position in this year's talks on mutual re-
duction of forces in Central Europe. In the next few weeks,
the United States will present to NATO the product of our own
preparations for the mutual force reduction talks. This will
be our contribution to a dialogue on security. Our position
will reflect the President's view that these negotiations are
not a device to withdraw a maximum number of U.S. forces,
but a means of enhancing security in Europe. This is the
purpose of the MBFR talks -- and indeed the purpose of the
alliance itself.

The problem we face in developing a coherent, unified
allied position on force reductions is but one example of a
deeper challenge to alliance diplomacy. The past four years
have witnessed major progress in moving toward an era of

-14-

negotiations between East and West. The Berlin and SALT agreements alone are significant advances. But the coming of detente makes it especially important for us to maintain our cohesion as allies in the period just ahead to make certain that the momentum of detente carries us closer to our common objectives rather than onto the shoals of dissension and complacency.

The United States has always respected the right of our Allies to act as independent states and to conduct their own national diplomacy. But in the past year, apparently frightened by President Nixon's effort to build a new bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union, some of our friends in Europe have seemed unwilling to accord America the same trust of motives and autonomy of action which we have faithfully granted to them.

This erosion of confidence is both needless and ominous. The Western alliance simply cannot survive a chronic suspicion of one another's motives or an irrational fear among some partners that another partner may sell out vital allied interests in its desire to reduce tension with an adversary.

Americans can understand and appreciate our allies'

-15-

reliance on us. We can understand the importance to
their sense of security of being assured of our commitment.
We can sympathize with their anxiety over some of the
sweeping changes taking place in the old patterns of
international relations.

But I believe it is fair for us in turn to ask that
relaxation of international tensions is a goal on which
we all agree, and that American-Soviet relations are
vital to the achievement of this goal. Reviewing the
record of recent U.S. relations with the Soviet Union,
those in Europe who are fearful or suspicious will find
scant grounds for their misgivings. Wherever allied interests
have been affected, as in SALT, America's record of scrupu-
lous consultation with our European partners is undisputed.
Wherever allied interests are directly involved, as in the
MBFR negotiations or the European Security Conference,
the United States has based its policy firmly on a mutually
agreed allied position.

The real danger is not that one ally will deliberately
sacrifice the interests of the others, but that 15 allies
may drift inadvertently into conflicts and quarrels that
will tear the fabric of Atlantic unity. The way to avoid
this danger is to renew our commitment to certain common
goals and policies for reaching those goals.

-16-

(4)

There is no substitute for addressing the problem positively in this way. If we cannot articulate our common purposes, we will lose our way in irrelevant tactics and procedures. We will expose our differences to exploitation by the other side, do permanent damage to mutual confidence, and accomplish neither our joint nor our individual objectives.

We cannot achieve a wider confidence and unity in Europe between East and West if we cannot maintain it among ourselves.

If we can agree on the principles of our external diplomacy, then whether it is carried out in this or that forum or bilaterally or multilaterally becomes a technical question. We will have an understanding of the possibilities and limits of our autonomous action. Then those allies who seek our allies' seek reassurance of America's commitment, they will find it not in the tip service to the shibboleth implicit mutual trust of affirimations of loyalty, but in the certain knowledge of the common purposes toward which all our policies are directed.

## The Year's Agenda

My remarks tonight are not an American prescription. They are an appeal for collective action.

We in the West know that the flourishing of our institutions, the safety and wellbeing of our peoples, the prospects for all international stability and peace have been made secure by our partnership. We know that if we permit that partnership to atrophy or erode through carelessness or petty suspicions, if we let differences accumulate unaddressed, the consequences could be disastrous. We will pay an enormous price and awaken dangers anew.

-17-

Let us, therefore, in this Year of Europe, draw up a new Atlantic Charter of our common goals.

Our priority this year is to rededicate ourselves to basic ideals and principles, and chart a new conception of the role the Atlantic nations can play in a new and promising era of international relations.

Let us reaffirm the principle of cooperation in our economic relations.

-- An equitable system of trade and monetary relations can only be built cooperatively, and can only survive if it reconciles national interests, regional interests, and the common responsibility toward the international system.

-- Just as Europe's autonomy is not an end in itself, so the Atlantic Community cannot be an exclusive club. Japan is a principal partner in our common enterprise.

Let us cooperate in solving the energy crisis that faces all advanced industrial societies. The expansion and distribution of the world's energy resources is a problem of overriding concern. It could be an area of fierce competition; it should be an area of our international cooperation.

In collective defense, we must understand with precision what peace and security require in new conditions.

-- We must define the requirements of the common effort, and a fair allocation of responsibilities.

-18-

-- Our negotiation with our adversary must serve the purpose of security, not undermine it. We must have a consensus on what this means, if we are to pursue it.

In diplomacy *detente* will remain a central objective of the Alliance.
But we share a responsibility to pursue it wisely and seriously.

-- We must continue to pursue a relaxation of tensions in precise solutions to concrete problems.

-- The Alliance must act in concert when that is required. But there must be a basic confidence in common aims, to permit independent initiatives by individual allies, including the United States.

The President has authorized me to say that the United States will be guided by the following principles:

-- We will support European unity. We will make concessions to its further growth. We will expect to be met in a spirit of reciprocity.

-- We will not disengage from our solemn commitments to our allies.
We will maintain our forces and not withdraw from Europe. We expect in turn from each ally its fair share of the common effort.

-- We will never consciously sacrifice the interests of our allies, in Europe or in Asia. We expect in return that their policies will not oppose our interests or our responsibilities.

We have begun a trans-Altantic dialogue on these issues and principles.

These are the aims that will guide our policy.

This is the meaning of the Year of Europe.

2

But we cannot ignore the fact that there is a growing conflict over trade policy. This year we begin comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe and Japan. We believe these negotiations are an historic opportunity for a positive achievement.

In these talks we must deal with the outstanding issues farsightly. In trade and monetary matters we must keep in mind the imperative of allied unity.

This is why we believe the negotiations must be raised above the level of experts. If they are left to the technicians the inevitable competition will dominate the debate, and special interests will be maximized. The influence of pressure groups will distort it. However, there will be no framework for a generous solution on either side of the Atlantic.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to ensure that economics serve greater political purposes. We intend to adopt a broad political approach that recognizes our overwhelming common interest with both Europe and Japan. Only on this basis can we justify the mutual concessions that are essential to the success of these talks.

Our challenge is not to be a test of strength, but of statesmanship.

## Defense and Arms Control

An agreement between the United States and other powers is always most naturally in military policy because the threats to Europe were unambiguous, the requirements to meet them

3

were generally agreed on both sides of the Atlantic, and America's responsibility was preeminent and obvious. Still a major June dialogue is essential.

All Western governments face paradoxical challenges. At the very moment when a strong conventional defense is most crucial to Western strategy, our ability to maintain an adequate military posture is under attack. Each ally faces rising military budgets to pay for sophisticated and expensive equipment, including costs not incurred for volunteer armies. The lessening of tensions in Europe has stimulated economic arguments that we can safely begin reducing forces unilaterally and relax the momentum of the past two years.

The only answer that will command the support of our peoples and legislatures is to ensure that we have a sound and agreed defense doctrine.

We must establish a consensus, with our people and our allies, on the precise requirements of our security.

- We need a sound doctrine and rationale for our forces.

- We need a fair allocation of responsibilities.

- We need an efficient and "modern force structure."

4

-- On this basis -- and on this basis alone -- the President can ask the American people to maintain the necessary U.S. forces in Europe, not as a hostage to trigger our nuclear weapons, but as an essential contribution to an agreed and intelligent structure of Western defense.

Some of this work has already been done. We must complete the task.

This year we will begin negotiating on a mutual balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe. A rational strategy is a prerequisite for developing an Allied negotiating position. No formula for reductions is defensible -- whatever its domestic appeal or political rationale -- if it is to be实现 undermines the security that underpins detente.

In the next few weeks, the United States will present to NATO the product of our own preparations for mutual force reductions. It will be our contribution to a dialogue on security. It was designed not from the point of special American, but of general Alliance interests. The President

(4)

Diplomacy

-- In diplomacy we have witnessed a truly remarkable period.

just entered

Two years have produced

In the last

There is an agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West Germany and the
USSR, a SALT agreement, the beginning of negotiations on a European

Security Conference and on mutual force reductions. These were not

aspects of a collective effort began
a series of isolated actions, but part of a general strategy worked out

in 1969 to start the process of relaxing tensions with the Berlin problem
by addressing concrete

issues dividing East & West.
and the SALT talks.

of detente

The American contribution to the process has been particularly striking
in developing a new relationship with the USSR.

Yet this very success has created its own problems. There is an
increasing uneasiness -- all the more insidious for being rarely admitted --
that superpower diplomacy might sacrifice the interests of traditional
allies and other friends. We are taken to task for our
Some of these concerns about excessive

flexibility come from the same groups that used to deny excessive US
rigidity. It is worth recalling that in 1969 when the President visited

Europe immediately after taking office, he was besieged with ideas on how

2

to begin an "era of negotiations." Some allies wanted to start with a
European Security Conference; others talked of negotiating force reductions;
some suggested a summit meeting. All of them urged us to begin the
SALT talks.

The President has asked me to stress that we did not come all
this way to buy an illusory tranquillity at the expense of our friends.

The United States will never knowingly sacrifice the interests of its
friends. But the perception of common interests is not automatic.

It requires constant rearticulation. Unity cannot be used to justify the independence

sole efforts of our allies and also to veto independent actions by us. Common efforts.

world views will differ. But we do require an understanding of our
common objectives.

3

becomes a technical question. We will have an understanding of the
possibilities and limits of our autonomous action. If our Allies seek a
reassurance of America's commitment, they will find it not in verbal
reaffirmations of loyalty, but in the knowledge of the common purposes
toward which agreed policies are directed.

If we cannot articulate our common purposes, we will lose ourselves
in irrelevant tactics and procedures. We will expose our differences to
exploitation, do permanent damage to mutual confidence, and accomplish
neither our joint nor our individual objectives.

* * *

This agenda is not an American prescription but an appeal for a
joint effort of creativity. We have a rare opportunity to build a structure
of peace that may last for decades. But we can do so only if we build can maintain,

4

and buildopen,

on the vitality of the Atlantic partnership. We are prepared to make our
contribution.

-- We will not disengage from our solemn commitments to our allies.
We will maintain major forces and not withdraw from Europe.
We expect in turn from each ally its fair share of the common effort.

We hope that our friends in Europe will meet us in this spirit. For
this will be the basis for progress that may dwarf the great achievements
of the past decade. And then the Atlantic nations, together with Japan,
will have served their peoples as well as the cause of peace.

Our economic goals are to reform the world monetary system and to create a new framework for international trade. The two are organically linked. Trade will not flourish if the major currencies are subjected to periodic crises. Nor can there be a stable monetary order if some countries are doomed to permanent deficits while some enjoy perpetual surpluses.

Just as a stable international political order must be based on self restraint among the great powers, to achieve an international economic equilibrium the same principle must apply.

No major country or geographic region can expect to protect parochial interests without damaging the larger international interest.

The result will be confrontation. Our challenge is not to a test of strength, but to an art of statemenship.

THE YEAR OF EUROPE

This year has been widely called the Year of Europe.

I am supposed to be the originator of the phrase.

I am not sure that I was.

If all goes well, I shall find where and when I said it.

If not, I can always blame it on the Associated Press.

Our present focus on relations with Europe did not begin in January, 1973. The Alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of all our postwar policies. It marked the end of US isolationism. It provided the essential political and security framework for American engagements in Europe. It created the political confidence that allowed the countries of Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. It was the preëquisite for the realization of an unprecedented endeavor in European unity. And it was the principal means to forge the common policies that were the source of Western strength in an era of prolonged tension and confrontation.

[ Our connections are more diverse and more intimate with our European friends than with any other countries. ]

[ Our consultations have been franker and more intensive with our European allies than with others. The President has seen European leaders more frequently than of any other part of the world. ]

Our values, our goals and our basic interests have been, and are,

2

more closely identified with those of Europe than with any other region.

Indeed, it is precisely because of the enormous variety and intimacy of our connections that we are more sensitive to differences and more conscious of problems that arise.

If 1973 is the Year of Europe, it is not because 1972 or 1969 were not.

① -- It is because the era that was shaped by decisions a generation

ago is ending.

② -- The revival of Western Europe is an established fact, as is the historic success of its economic unification.

③ -- The East-West strategic balance has changed from American preponderance to near equality.

⑤ -- We are in a period of relaxation of tensions. Our common defense remains a vital interest, but it can no longer provide the only basis of our cohesion. Moreover, as each ally pursues detente independently, suspicions and uncertainty multiply.

⑨ -- Other areas of the world have grown in importance. Japan has emerged as a major power center. In many fields, Atlantic solutions must include Japan.

④ -- New problems have arisen requiring new types of cooperative action such as ensuring the supply of energy for industrialized nations.

3

-- A new generation in Western societies take stability and peace for granted. But they are less committed to the unity that made it possible and the effort which is required to maintain it.

-- The frustrations of the war in Southeast Asia have produced a reluctance in the United States to sustain our involvement in the world on the basis of predominant American responsibility.

Thus Europe and the US are challenged to a new act of creation, much as the post-war generation of leaders were.

Then the task was reconstruction and security against the danger of attack. Today the need is to make Atlantic relationships the dynamic element in building a new structure of peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious of opportunities, drawing its inspiration from its goals rather than its fears.

Inevitably a period of transition will be characterized by strains. There have been complaints on the American side that Europe is ignoring its wider responsibilities in overemphasizing its economic self-interest and not carrying its fair share of the defense burden. There have been complaints on the European side that America is out to wreck European unity, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically.

[Our debates will be fruitless if conducted by slogans or preoccupied with suspicions.]

The solutions will not be adequate to the opportunity if left to
technicians.

We know that if we permit <u>our</u> partnership to atrophy, or to erode
through neglect, or carelessness, or mistrust, all Atlantic nations
will suffer and world peace will be in danger.

This is why the President is now embarking on an approach at the
highest level to our <u>Europeans</u>. In his discussions with the heads
of government of Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
France, and the Secretary General of NATO, it is the President's
purpose to lay the basis for a new spirit of creativity in the West.

He will want to deal with Atlantic problems comprehensively. The
political, military and economic elements are linked not by our choice
but by reality. They must be addressed at the highest level.

In 1972 the President transformed relations with our adversaries.

In 1973 the President seeks a new foundation of cooperation with
our friends.

By the time he travels to Europe at the end of the year the President
hopes to have worked out with our allies a new Atlantic charter setting
the goals for the future -- a charter that

-- builds on the past without becoming its prisoner;

-- deals with the problems our success has created;

5

-- creates a new relationship for the nations bordering the Atlantic in whose progress Japan can share.

We ask our friends in Europe, Canada, and ultimately Japan to
join us in this effort.

This is what we mean by the Year of Europe.

Let me now turn to the problems with which we propose to deal.

## Problems in Atlantic Relationships

It would be idle to deny that the problems in Atlantic relationships are real. They can be summed up as follows:

In the economic field, Europe's phenomenal economic success has made an adjustment in our economic relationships inevitable.

During the entire post-war period, the revival of the European economies had been of great benefit to all the Atlantic countries. Mutual prosperity developed based on the principle of relatively free trade. But at the European Community evolved, it designed its policies to enhance its regional autonomy, especially in trade. Its growing economic strength has compelled third countries to seek special arrangements to protect their own access to a market of over 250 million. This prospect of a relatively closed trading systems internally within Europe, and in arrangements with third countries, has evolved at the very time when the United States is encountering an increasingly unfavorable balance of payments.

7

its implications for
must reexamine our doctrine and strategy. The local defense of
Europe becomes much more important.

-- The ebbing of the Cold War military confrontation now faces all of our governments with domestic pressures to reduce the defense establishments that have preserved our security.

-- At the precise moment when strategic conditions make them crucial to a rational posture of security.

-- The urgency of all these issues is underlined by the approaching negotiations for Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. These are hopeful for they may enable us to stabilize the defense of Europe at somewhat lower cost. But they could be disastrous unless the Alliance first agrees on what constitutes the elements of our security.

-- There are anomalies in our deployments and logistics structure. But our greatest challenge is in the political field. During the Fifties and Sixties a whole host of institutions were created to deal with specific problems. When these institutions were rudimentary, the potential incompatibility in their mode of operation was not apparent. But as they have become elaborated three different modes of action have developed:

-- In our economic relations, the European Community has increasingly developed a regional development and personality; the United States, at the same time, must act as part of, and be responsible for a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two approaches.

-- In our collective defense, we are still organized on the principle of unity and integrated defense, but in radically different strategic conditions, and without a full willingness to face all its implications.

8

Diplomacy is essentially being conducted by traditional nation states.

The U.S have global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical.

sum, the Atlantic states need above all a common view of the nature
their
of its unity and the limits of diversity. Europe's dependence on the United
States for security is no longer sufficient for an organic Atlantic relationship.

We must identify interests and values that unite us in order to engage the
commitment of peoples and parliaments. What is needed is a common
vision of the shape of the future in our relations and a common view of the
peaceful world that it is our common purpose to build.

Let me deal with each area in turn.

A. Economic

There has been no more consistent part of post-war American policy
than European unity. At every turn we supported it. We knew that a united
Europe would be more difficult to deal with. But we assumed, perhaps too
uncritically, that our own basic interests would be assured by our long
history of cooperation. We expected that unity would not be limited
to economic integration; that there would be an evolution toward political
unity and cooperative Atlantic partnership open to the rest of the world.

It is clear that this hope remains to be realized. Some Americans see the
enlarged Community as building its prosperity behind a protective shield
at our expense, and at the expense of a stable international system. Some
in Europe see the United States as hostile to European integration and trying
to prevent its further strengthening.

9

This is why the gradual accumulation of sometimes petty, sometimes major economic disputes must be ended and be replaced by a new cooperative spirit. The United States remains committed to European unity. We will continue to support it. We have no intention of pursuing a divide-and-rule policy.

But we cannot ignore the fact that there is a growing uneasiness over trade policy and that a new balance must be achieved. This year we begin comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe as well as with Japan. We believe these negotiations are an historic opportunity for a positive achievement.

We believe the negotiations must be raised above the level of experts. If they are left to the technicians inevitable competitiveness will be maximized. The influence of pressure groups will grow [pervasive]. There will be no framework for a generous solution on either side of the Atlantic.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to ensure that economics serve greater political purposes. We intend to adopt a broad political approach that recognizes our overwhelming common interest in an open balanced trading order with both Europe and Japan. Only on this basis can we justify the mutual concessions that are essential to the success of these talks.

Our challenge is not to a test of strength, but to an art of statesmanship.

10

Defense and Arms Control

Atlantic unity always came most naturally in military policy because the threats to Europe were unambiguous, the requirements to meet them were generally agreed on both sides of the Atlantic, and America's responsibility was preeminent and obvious. Still a major dialogue has become essential.

All Western governments face a paradoxical challenge. At the very moment when a strong conventional defense is most crucial to Western strategy, our ability to maintain an adequate military posture is under attack. Each ally faces rising military budgets to pay for sophisticated and expensive equipment. The lessening of tensions in Europe has accentuated domestic arguments that we can safely begin reducing forces unilaterally and relax the momentum of the past two years.

The only answer that will command the support of our peoples and legislature is to ensure that we have a sound and agreed defense doctrine and the means to implement it.

-- On this basis the President is prepared to ask the American people to maintain the necessary U. S. forces in Europe, not as a hostage to trigger our nuclear weapons, but as an essential contribution to an agreed and intelligent structure of Western defense.

Some of this work has already been done. But a great deal remains to be accomplished.

We owe to the Alliance a credible defense doctrine, an agreed strategy, and modern military force sufficient to back them up. We owe to our peoples a rational defense posture, at the safest minimum size and cost, with burdens equitably shared. This is what the President feels must result from the dialogue with our allies in 1973. We begin negotiating on a mutual balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe. A rational strategy is a prerequisite for developing an Allies negotiating position. (No formula for reductions is defensible -- whatever its domestic appeal or political rationale -- if it undermines the security that underpins detente.)

In the next few weeks, the United States will present to NATO the product of our own preparations for mutual force reductions. It will be our contribution to a dialogue on security. It was designed not from the point of special American, but of general Alliance interests. (Our position will reflect me and the President does not view these negotiations as a subterfuge to withdraw U.S. forces regardless of consequences.) What we do want is a common approach to security, serious enough to meet foreseeable changes and broad enough to take into account the possibility of effective arms control.)

## Diplomacy

-- In diplomacy we have witnessed a truly remarkable period. There is an agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West Germany and the USSR, a SALT agreement, the beginning of negotiations on a European

12

Security Conference and on mutual force reductions. These were not a series of isolated actions, but part of a general strategy worked out in 1969.

Yet this very success has created its own problems. There is an increasing uneasiness -- all the more insidious for being rarely admitted -- that superpower diplomacy might sacrifice the interests of traditional allies and other friends. Some of these concerns about excessive flexibility come from the same groups that used to decry excessive US rigidity. It is worth recalling that in 1969 when the President visited Europe immediately after taking office, he was besieged with ideas on how to begin an "era of negotiations." Some allies wanted to start with a European Security Conference; others talked of negotiating force reductions; some suggested a summit meeting. All of them urged us to begin the SALT talks.

The President has asked me to stress that we did not come all this way to buy an illusory tranquility at the expense of our friends. The United States will never knowingly sacrifice the interests of others. But the perception of common interests is not automatic. It requires constant rearticulation.

We do not need to agree on all policies. In many areas of the world emphasis will differ. But we do require an understanding of our common objectives.

(4)

13

If we agree on common principles of our external diplomacy it
will become a technical question whether it is carried out in a particular
forum or whether to proceed bilaterally or multilaterally. With such
a framework of common purpose, we will have an understanding of the
possibilities and limits of our autonomous action. Then, those who
If our Allies seek
reassurance of America's commitment, they will find it not in verbal
reaffirmations of loyalty, but in the knowledge of the common purposes
toward which agreed policies are directed.

* * *

This agenda is not an American prescription but an appeal for a
joint effort of creativity. We have a rare opportunity to build a structure
of peace that may last for decades. But we can do so only if we build
on the vitality of the Atlantic partnership. We are prepared to make our
contribution:

14

-- We will never consciously sacrifice the interests of our friends in Europe or in Asia. We expect in return that their policies will not oppose our interests or our responsibilities.

-- Just as Europe's autonomy is not an end in itself so the Atlantic Community cannot be an exclusive club. Japan must be a principal partner in our common enterprise.

We hope that our friends in Europe will meet us in this spirit. For this will be the basis for progress that may dwarf the great achievements of the past decades. And then the Atlantic nations, together with Japan, will have served their peoples as well as the cause of peace.

The Alliance has adopted the doctrine of flexible response to meet
threats across a broad spectrum of possibilities.

Our objective should be to insure that we have the forces that do,
in fact provide flexibility.

--We need to determine what each ally can and will do in contributing
to common defense.

--We need to close the gaps between avowed goals and actual
performance.

--We need to be clear in our own minds what an agreed strategy
means, notify for deterrence, but should deterrence fail.

April 20, 1973

Andrews Draft

HAK SPEECH TEXT: THE YEAR OF EUROPE

This has been called the Year of Europe.

It is not clear exactly who originated this phrase. But one thing is certain. If all goes well, we will give the President credit for the phrase. If not, the President will be only too glad to have it attributed to me. I in turn can then blame it on the Associated Press.

In any case, President Nixon does regard the Year of Europe as much more than just a slogan. He has asked me this evening to talk with you about what it means and what he hopes will emerge from it. As a European transplanted to America myself -- and incidentally, one who is only now finally beginning to master the language on this side of the Atlantic -- I take up the subject with pleasure.

This is the Year of Europe not because Europe was neglected before, but because today our partnership stands at an historic turning point.

We in the Western Alliance have accomplished our original objectives. Our very achievement has transformed the international order. We are in a new environment vastly different -- and far more promising -- than

the period of the Alliance's birth. There is no way all this could occur
without affecting our relations with each other.

Thus we now face a new agenda, of new issues, in a new period. We
are challenged, as were the statesmen of the 40's, to shape our future.

We are summoned to be present at a new creation.

Then the task was reconstruction and security against the danger
of attack. Today the need is to make Atlantic relationships the dynamic
element in building a new structure of peace, less geared to crisis and
technical challenges,
more conscious of opportunities, drawing its inspiration from its goals
rather than its fears.

But the trouble with success -- as all of you ladies and
gentlemen know, having met with success in your own careers --
is that it spawns new problems and challenges of its own.

But The Alliance that had the vision and courage to shape its future
in the period of danger can surely be, as vital and creative a force, for
a new era of peace: opportunity.

This is true no less in the Pacific than in the Atlantic
community. President Nixon's historic journey to Peking 14 months
-- was the fruit -- not the denial --\ ago in no sense represented a veering away from America's generation-
long relationship with Japan and our other Asian allies. Rather

-3-

it was the culminating success of everything the Pacific partner-
ship had stood for and worked for since the end of World War II.

By the same token, the President was able to undertake the
Moscow summit not in spite of America's partnership with
Europe but _because_ of that partnership. Let there be no mistake
about it -- without the four-letter word spelled NATO, that other
four-letter word spelled SALT would never have been possible.

But all of that was in 1972; now we must come to terms with
1973. The President is turning from his Year of Summits to
this new Year of Europe with the hope that the people of the
United States, the people of Western Europe, and the people
of Japan, can gain the same sense of historic achievement from
a strengthening of their ties with one another that they have gained
during the recent past from a lessening of tensions with our
longtime common adversaries.

The first Atlantic Charter was forged by the statesmen of
the early '40's to deal with external danger. It was broadened
and renewed by their successors of the latter '40's to serve

-4-

a similar purpose. Now that purpose has in large measure been
fulfilled, confronting the statesmen of the early '70's with a
new problem -- the happy and hopeful problem of success.

Ours is now the challenge, and ours is the opportunity,
to hammer out a new Atlantic Charter on the anvil of new realities,
a charter not so naive as to imagine that external danger no
longer exists, but at the same time not so preoccupied with
danger that it overlooks the vast new potential for an era of
lasting peace. To borrow the late Dean Acheson's phrase, we
are summoned to be present at the re-creation.

We have seen that negotiation with our adversaries can do
much to lighten the burdens of fear and suspicion that so many
nations have had to bear for so long. Now it is time to see that with
imagination, and courage, and an effort of will, we and our
creative cooperation with old and trusted friends can do infinitely
more -- it can actually build a new world.

We know that if we permit our partnership to atrophy, or to erode
through neglect, or carelessness, or mistrust, all Atlantic nations
and weaken the dangers we have so successfully averted,
will suffer and world peace will be in danger.

This is why the President is now embarking on an approach at the
highest level to our European allies. In his discussions with the heads
of government of Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and
France, and the Secretary General of NATO, it is the President's
purpose to lay the basis for a new spirit of creativity in the West.

-5-

We will have to find solutions cooperatively. For these are not the time he visits major European capitals in the fall. Tasks for American leadership -- but for common statesmanship.

But our debates will be fruitless if conducted by slogans or preoccupied with suspicions.

The solutions will not be adequate to the opportunity if left to the technicians.

Management on all sides, a sophisticated understanding of the internal and external forces operating on our alliance, and an imaginative

vision of what the future can hold. The dialogue emphatically
- must not be left only to the technicians, whose first instinct-
is to maximize national self-interest, or to the politicians,
who are often under so much popular pressure to deal with
superficial symptoms of disagreement that they leave the under-
lying causes untouched. )
of the current problems in the Alliance.

-6-

Since the early postwar years, the alliance has tended
increasingly to operate under three different organizational
structures at once. Economically, Europe has moved toward
closer and closer unity, with the United States encouraging
this trend but standing apart from it, Militarily, on the other
hand, all 15 NATO partners on both sides of the Atlantic have
for the most part maintained a single, integrated defense policy.
Diplomatically, still another principle has prevailed, with
individual states assuming fairly uninhibited independence of
action in their relations with members of the Communist bloc.

In effect, we have been building the structure of Atlantic
relations according to three fundamentally incompatible sets
of actm.¹

At first this did not work badly. But after a generation
of plans. with the passage
of time the various parts of the construction have begun to
get in each other's way, and now we are discovering to our
dismay that policies which ought to dovetail and reinforce one

-7-

another are having just the opposite effect. (No wonder the whole structure seems shaky at times. No wonder there is so much intramural bickering and squabbling.)

Paradox is inherent in the situation.
The lines of controversy are familiar to everyone by now.

On the other hand, they appeal to the United States to tolerate their independence in the name of Atlantic unity, while on the other they ask for a veto on our independent action, also in the name of Atlantic unity.

But our goals are still collective goals, and the
The only way to cut through this fog of suspicion, mistrust,
problems are not questions of motive. What we
and resentment is by reaffirming the shared interests and common
need in this year of Europe is a reaffirmation of
ideals that unite the peoples of the West. Such a reaffirmation
our common goals and an elaboration of common
of mutual ties is within our reach in 1973, and it stands at the
policies.
very top of the President's agenda in this year of Europe.

Now that it has come so far toward realization we have no intention of setting about destroying what we worked so hard to help build. Our goal remains a strengthening of the West, and we shall continue to support European unity as a bridge to Atlantic unity.

The United States long assumed that political unity would follow, and facilitate the solution of common problems.

economic integration. We also expected that a unified Europe would ease many of our own international burdens. Neither of these things has happened quite as we anticipated. As a result, and for numerous other reasons, we face a growing conflict over trade policy and currency relationships. Comprehensive trade negotiations among the United States, Europe, and Japan aimed at resolving these differences are to begin in the fall.

We cannot approach the issues in these talks solely on the
basis of narrow national self-interest. The result of such an
inevitable
~~be~~
approach would deadlock or constant conflict.

It is therefore the responsibility of national leaders to raise
these historic trade talks to a higher plane of international
responsibility. Technical questions must be resolved in the
context of ~~our~~ America's transcendent common interests with both
~~Europe and Japan.~~ Only on this basis can we justify the mutual
concessions that are essential to the success of these talks.

-11-

The West no longer holds the nuclear predominance that
permitted us the luxury of relative weakness in conventional
forces during the 1950's and '60's. Our collective ability to
defend Western Europe against conventional attack has now
become crucial to the maintenance of peace. Accordingly,
our NATO allies have been embarked since 1970 on a significant
effort to take up a larger share of the defense burden by upgrading
their own conventional forces.

The President has asked me to state tonight that America
remains equally committed to doing its fair share in Atlantic
defense. He is adamantly opposed to any unilateral withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Europe, (and I believe the Congress will
support this stand.)

-12-

Each member of the alliance must recognize, however, that the progress of the past two years in strengthening our conventional defense will not simply continue automatically. On the contrary, that progress is encountering a stiffening political and economic resistance not only in the United States but in Western Europe as well. Each ally faces rising military budgets for manpower and equipment. The lessening of tensions in Europe has accentuated the standard emotional and ideological arguments that it is safe to begin reducing our forces unilaterally.

The governments of the various Western powers have a major job to do in educating their peoples to the strategic realities and requirements of the 1970's, and before we can proceed convincingly with that task we must make certain that we ourselves clearly undertand those considerations.

-13-

A rational strategy is also a prerequisite for developing an Allied negotiating position in this year's talks on mutual reduction of forces in Central Europe. In the next few weeks, the United States will present to NATO the product of our own preparations for the mutual force reduction talks. This will be our contribution to a dialogue on security. Our position will reflect the President's view that these negotiations are not a device to withdraw a maximum number of U.S. forces, but a means of enhancing security in Europe. This is the purpose of the MBFR talks -- and indeed the purpose of the alliance itself.

-14-

negotiations between East and West. The Berlin and SALT agreements alone are significant advances. But the coming of detente makes it especially important for us to maintain our cohesion as allies in the period just ahead, in order to make certain that the momentum of detente continues to be directed at our common objectives, rather than onto the shoals of dissension and complacency.

-15-

reliance on us. We can understand the importance to
their sense of security of being assured of our commitment.
we can recognize the natural uncertainties about
sweeping changes taking place in the old patterns of
international relations.

But I believe it is fair for us in turn to ask that
relaxation of international tensions is a goal on which
we all agree, and that American-Soviet relations have an
important role to play in their achievement of this goal.
the record of recent U.S. relations with the Soviet Union,
those in Europe who are fearful or suspicious will find
specific grounds for their misgivings. Wherever allied interests
have been affected, as in SALT, America's record of scrupu-
lous consultation with our European partners is undisputed.
Wherever allied interests are directly involved, as in the
MBFR negotiations or the European Security Conference,
the United States has based its policy on a mutually
agreed allied positions.

-16-

(4)

If we can agree on the principles of our external diplomacy, then whether it is carried out in this or that forum or bilaterally or multilaterally becomes a technical question. We will have an understanding of the possibilities and limits of our autonomous action. Then those allies who seek our allies' help will find it not in tip service to the shibboleth of loyalty, but in the certain knowledge of the common

reassurance of America's commitment to the implicit mutual trust of affir-rmations of loyalty, but in the certain knowledge of the common purposes toward which all our policies are directed.

## The Year's Agenda

We in the West know that the flourishing of our institutions, the safety and wellbeing of our peoples, the prospects for international stability and peace have been made secure by our partnership. We know that if we permit that partnership to atrophy or erode through carelessness or petty suspicions, if we let differences accumulate unaddressed, we will pay an enormous price. The consequences could be disastrous, as will be the consequences of not paying enough moral and political price to avert dangers that are now and will be

-17-

Our priority this year is to set a new direction for the Atlantic Redeposit ourselves to basic ideals and principles, and chart a new conception of the role the Atlantic nations can play in a new and promising era of international relations.

- 18 -

(4)

April 20, 1973

Andrews Draft

We can begin with a simple proposition: 1973 is the Year of Europe in U.S. foreign policy/because the past several decades have been the Age of Europe in world affairs. In the past

-2-

quarter century particularly -- through the North Atlantic
Alliance -- a grave threat to our survival has been faced down,
an almost miraculous economic resurrection has taken place,
and a new climate of compromise has been created between
once implacably hostile blocs.

The whole history of international relations offers us few
stories of spectacular success under pressure and against
high odds to parallel this one.

It is imperative that we recognize these problems clearly
as consequences of success, not symptoms of failure, or we
shall miss the great opportunity they afford.

This is true no less in the Pacific than in the Atlantic
community. President Nixon's historic journey to Peking 14 months
ago in no sense represented a veering away from America's generation-
long relationship with Japan and our other Asian allies. Rather

-3-

But all of that was in 1972; now we must come to terms with
1973. The President is turning from his Year of Summits to
this new Year of Europe with the hope that the people of the
United States, the people of Western Europe, and the people
of Japan, can gain the same sense of historic achievement from
a strengthening of ties with one another that they have gained
during the recent past from a lessening of tensions with our
longtime common adversaries.

-4-

We have seen that negotiation with our adversaries can do
much to lighten the burdens of fear and suspicion that so many
nations have had to bear for so long. Now it is time to see that
creative cooperation with old and trusted friends can do infinitely
more -- it can actually build a new world.

The blueprint for such a transformation is what President
Nixon, Secretary Rogers, and I hope will emerge from this
year's intensive dialogue within the Atlantic community.

-5-

The President has sought to begin this process in his series of meetings with leaders of the alliance this winter and spring, so that it can advance to the stage of concrete achievement by the time he visits major European capitals in the fall.

The United States invites, and indeed appeals for, the whole-hearted cooperation of our European friends in this undertaking. High-level commitment by all governments concerned is the sine qua non of success. There must be a high order of statesmanship on all sides, a sophisticated understanding of the internal and external forces operating on our alliance, and an imaginative vision of what the future can hold. The dialogue emphatically must not be left only to the technicians, whose first instinct is to maximize national self-interest, or to the politicians, who are often under so much popular pressure to deal with superficial symptoms of disagreement that they leave the underlying causes untouched.

Let's look more closely at those causes. The accelerating momentum of detente between East and West is obviously one

-6-

-7-

The lines of controversy are familiar to everyone by now.
The Europeans still want American protection and American
leadership, but they also want the right to pursue their own interests.
On the one hand they appeal to the United States to tolerate
their independence in the name of Atlantic unity, while on the
other they ask for a veto on our independent action, also in the
name of Atlantic unity.

-8-

-9-

The United States long assumed that political unity would follow economic integration. We also expected that a unified Europe would ease many of our own international burdens. Neither of these things has happened quite as we anticipated. As a result, and for numerous other reasons, we face a growing conflict over trade policy and currency relationships. Comprehensive trade negotiations among the United States, Europe, and Japan aimed at resolving these differences are to begin in the fall.

-10-

-11-

The President has asked me to state tonight that America
remains equally committed to doing its fair share in Atlantic
defense. He is adamantly opposed to any unilateral withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Europe, and I believe the Congress will
support his stand.

-12-

-13-

-14-

-15-

-16-

(4)

But if we can agree on the principles of our external diplomacy, then whether it is carried out in this or that forum or bilaterally or multilaterally becomes a technical question. We will have an understanding of the possibilities and limits of our autonomous action. Then those allies who seek reassurance of America's commitment to the shibboleths of loyalty, but in the certain knowledge of the common purposes toward which all our policies are directed.

## The Year's Agenda

We in the West know that the flourishing of our institutions, the safety and wellbeing of our peoples, the prospects for international stability and peace have been made secure by our partnership. We know that if we permit that partnership to atrophy or erode through carelessness or petty suspicions, if we let differences accumulate unaddressed, the consequences could be disastrous. We will pay an enormous price and awaken dangers anew.

-17-

Our priority this year is to set a new direction for the Atlantic
rededicate ourselves to basic ideals and
let us state our common principles, and chart a new conception of the role
the Atlantic nations can play in a new and promising era of international
relations.

-18-

Diplomacy

There is an agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West Germany and the USSR, a SALT agreement, the beginning of negotiations on a European Security Conference and on mutual force reductions. These were not a series of isolated actions, but part of a general strategy worked out in 1969 to start the process of relaxing tensions with the Berlin problem and the SALT talks.

Yet this very success has created its own problems. There is an increasing uneasiness -- all the more insidious for being rarely admitted -- that superpower diplomacy might sacrifice the interests of traditional allies and other friends. Some of these concerns about excessive flexibility come from the same groups that used to deny excessive US rigidity. It is worth recalling that in 1969 when the President visited Europe immediately after taking office, he was besieged with ideas on how

2

The United States will never knowingly sacrifice the interests of its
allies,
friends.
But the perception of common interests is not automatic.

It requires constant rearticulation. Unity cannot be used to justify the
sole efforts of our allies and also to veto independent action by us.

If we agree on common principles of our external diplomacy, whether

in a particular
it is carried out in this or that forum or bilaterally or multilaterally,

3

becomes a technical question. We will have an understanding of the possibilities and limits of our autonomous action. If our Allies seek reassurance of America's commitment, they will find it not in verbal reaffirmations of loyalty, but in the knowledge of the common purposes toward which agreed policies are directed.

* * *

4

We hope that our friends in Europe will meet us in this spirit. For
this will be the basis for progress that may dwarf the great achievements
of the past decades, And then the Atlantic nations, together with Japan
will have served their peoples as well as the cause of peace.

12

The President has asked me to stress that we did not come all this way to buy an illusory tranquility at the expense of our friends in Europe in Asia. The United States will never knowingly sacrifice the interests of others. But the perception of common interests is not automatic. It requires constant rearticulation.

13

If we agree on common principles of our external diplomacy it
will become a technical question whether it is carried out in a particular
forum or whether to proceed bilaterally or multilaterally. With such
a framework of common purpose, we will have an understanding of the
possibilities and limits of our autonomous action. If our Allies seek
reassurance of America's commitment, they will find it not in verbal
reaffirmations of loyalty, but in the knowledge of the common purposes
toward which agreed policies are directed.

* * *

9

We believe the negotiations must be raised above the level of experts. If they are left to the technicians inevitable competitiveness will be maximized. The influence of pressure groups will grow pervasive. There will be no framework for a generous solution on either side of the Atlantic.

Our challenge is not to a test of strength, but to an act of statesmanship.

April 20, 1973

Andrews Draft

-2-

-3-

-4-

-5-

Let's look more closely at those causes. The accelerating momentum of détente between East and West is obviously one

-6-

The lines of controversy are familiar to everyone by now.
The Europeans still want American protection and American
leadership, but they also want the right to pursue their own interests.
On the other hand they appeal to the United States to tolerate
their independence in the name of Atlantic unity, while on the
other they ask for a veto on our independent action, also in the
name of Atlantic unity.

-8-

-9-

-10-

We cannot approach the issues in these talks solely on the
debate
basis of narrow national self-interest. The result of such an
approach would be deadlock or constant conflict.

-11-

-12-

-13-

-14-

-16-

But if we can agree on the principles of our external diplomacy, then whether it is carried out in this or that forum or bilaterally or multilaterally becomes a technical question. We will have an understanding of the possibilities and limits of our autonomous action. Then those allies who seek reassurance of America's commitment to the shibboleth of loyalty, but in the certain knowledge of the common purposes toward which all our policies are directed.

The Year's Agenda

The Year's Agenda

We in the West know that the flourishing of our institutions, the safety and wellbeing of our peoples, the prospects for international stability and peace have been made secure by our partnership. We know that if we permit that partnership to atrophy or erode through carelessness or petty suspicions, if we let differences accumulate unaddressed, we will pay an enormous price and awaken dangers anew.

-17-

-18-