# After the Millennium...

## Mountains will be higher, Americans will be older and someone else will be cleaning your house

busy at Sega Gameworks, a chain of 21st-century arcades backed by Sega, Universal Studios and DreamWorks SKG. President Michael Montgomery describes it as "an alternative to discos for the young adult," which can be loosely translated as "save your quarters, bring a credit card." When the first branch opens in Seattle in March—there are 40 planned by the year 2000—its centerpiece will be Vertical Reality, an interactive game designed by Steven Spielberg in which the player's chair rises with each new skill level to a maximum height of 24 feet ... and then drops in free fall if he loses. Is it just coincidence that DreamWorks, intended to represent the future of Hollywood, is producing an arcade game before it has a movie in the theaters?

When not playing futuristic videogames, the sub-boomers can wile away their idle weekends jouncing down hills on a MountainBoard, an all-terrain oversize skateboard equipped with a suspension and balloon tires. "It's the closest thing to Snowboarding without snow, way more fun than skating and much saner than road luge," raves Steve Casimiro, editor of the hip ski magazine Powder. It's part of a trend toward "hybrids and mutations" in sports, according to Joanne DeLuca, a partner in Sputnik, a youth-oriented marketing-research firm. Snowboarding, a cross between surfing and skiing, grew out of this trend and gave rise to wakeboarding, in which a short board takes the place of water skis. Ice hockey's offspring, in-line skating, gave rise in turn to in-line basketball, a very hip-hop thing to do in Manhattan's East Village. Youthful energy, when channeled into golf, has produced radical golf, a sport in which players strap one or two clubs to a backpack and set off on a quest to see who can finish a course in the fewest number of strokes and the shortest time, running from stroke to stroke and dodging their opponents' balls as they go. It's already been played a couple of times in Palo Alto, and it could be very hot sometime in the next century.

Which is about as far into the unknown as the imagination of man can extend, although it's certainly possible to conceive of a microbrewery featuring radical-golf virtual-reality simulators and 65 giant video-walls showing an interactive version of "The Prisoner of Second Avenue." In fact, someone's probably planning one right now, as part of a $12 billion, 10,000-room resort that will re-create the entire topography of Dante's Divine Comedy and feature daily re-creations of the Normandy landings and a simulated solar eclipse every hour.

And you can guess where it will be built.

With CORIE BROWN in Los Angeles, JOHN MCCORMICK in Chicago and SUSAN MILLER in New York

**ENVIRONMENTAL MESS:** A day of reckoning for Mexico City

**CLIMBING HIGHER:** The peaks of the Himalayas will rise

By 2000, your chance of contracting malignant melanoma will increase to 1 in 75. In 1935, the risk was 1 in 1,500.

The annual number of births in America, which dipped below 4 million in 1994, is expected to climb again after 2000, breaking 4 million in 2008 and 4.5 million in 2018.

By 2005, there will be more than 100,000 Americans aged 100 years or older.

**SAFETY NET:** More Social Security recipients

By 2000, Mexico City will be perilously short of clean air and water.

Shortly after the year 2030, the number of Americans who have died since the founding of the nation will surpass the number of living Americans.

**ONE NATION, UNDERGROUND:** The dead outnumber the living

The number of U.S. scheduled air passengers will increase 59 percent by 2007, to more than 900 million a year.

**THE NEW BOOB TUBE:** Out-selling televisions by 2000?

In 2000, IBM predicts hard-disk drives (in PCs) will outsell television sets.

Shortly after 2020, there will be more Americans over age 65 than under age 13.

FROM TOP TO BOTTOM: ALAN KEARNEY—TONY STONE IMAGES, ROY GUMPEL—GAMMA-LIAISON, DON SMETZER—TONY STONE IMAGES, STEPHEN JOHNSON—TONY STONE IMAGES, STEPHEN FERRY—GAMMA-LIAISON

JANUARY 27, 1997 NEWSWEEK

73

WORLD AFFAIRS

PETER BLAKELY—SABA

RUSSIA: Early in the new century, it will have restored its central authority—but the new structure will be far freer than communism

skillful and determined leaders, provide a vehicle for growing political influence.

But that does not mean that China will necessarily aim for hegemony. Or that American policy will lose its capacity to affect the evolution of Asia. For one thing, China's growth will not take place in a vacuum. The end of the bipolar world and the rise of other power centers—in India, Vietnam, China and South Korea—will bring about a more nationalist course in Japan. Less and less convinced that its interests inevitably parallel those of the United States, Japan will emphasize foreign and defense policy more geared to its own national perceptions.

INDIA IS EMERGING AS A MAJOR POWER, ESPECIALLY IN South and Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asian nations, from Vietnam to Myanmar (Burma) and Indonesia, will increase their cohesion. In these conditions, hegemony by any one nation can occur only if all others collapse internally or as a result of a military effort on a scale for which there is as yet no evidence and which, if it occurred, would evoke strong countervailing reactions.

There is a school of thought that proposes trying to anticipate challenges which have not yet occurred by confronting China with human-rights pressures and economic warfare. The theory is that democratization will lead to a more peaceful policy and that economic shortfalls will cut down on China's military options. Under present circumstances such a policy is certain to fail, while evoking the very dangers with which it seeks to deal. Human-rights pressures against China have failed for the past six years, partly because they reflect a number of misconceptions. China's foreign policy is not so much driven by communist ideology as by growing nationalism, which can be inflamed only by a confrontational American policy, particularly if we isolate ourselves further by bringing similar pressures on friendly countries like Indonesia. The Chinese economy is not a Stalinist planned system but a self-styled socialist market economy, with the word "market" operationally far more significant than the word "socialist." Its biggest danger is that it will overheat, not stagnate, as was the case in the

> The nations bordering the Atlantic will have to get used to a far more assertive Russia. They will have to ensure that its traditional nationalism does not spill across its borders.

Soviet Union. Moreover, Chinese society is already being transformed by indigenous factors, especially the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping. By decentralizing decision making, they have created a kind of pluralism, if not necessarily democracy. Similarly, the impact of the one-child family on historical Chinese social patterns is likely to be profound.

Finally, there is no objective basis in Asia for military containment on the model of the Cold War. The Soviet Union's European neighbors felt threatened and were eager for visible American military support. By contrast, none of China's neighbors will be prepared to ground their policy or join an alliance based on the assumption of Chinese aggression. To be sure, they want an American presence, especially in the diplomatic and economic fields, to establish the idea that America is not indifferent to their fate. But, knowing that China is a permanent part of Asia while American commitments are likely to be episodic, they will refuse, short of a direct challenge, to base their policy on hostility to China. A confrontational American policy that is perceived as unprovoked will drive the countries of Asia away from the United

JANUARY 27, 1997 NEWSWEEK 77

WORLD AFFAIRS

States and toward both nationalism and neutralism. Of course, we must not shrink from confrontation if vital American interests or the global equilibrium are challenged. But the stakes are sufficiently high not to prompt a crisis. Chinese diplomacy is more skillful than was that of the Soviet Union; Chinese society is more cohesive, and the neighboring countries are more ambivalent about where the threat to their security lies. For the first time in its history, China is tied to the world economy and a global international system. Before turning to confrontation, a cooperative relationship must be given a chance.

For all these reasons, American policy toward Asia in the

gression and to develop common positions on unification. A new century will not be very far along before the issue of K. unification becomes pressing, if indeed it does not happen early. The United States will be torn between support of the principle of self-determination and reluctance to face the implications of Northeast Asian instability. Moreover, the views of the area's neighbors—especially China and Japan—will be highly bivalent. These conflicting motivations are not irreconcilable. But they require a serious dialogue with all the countries concerned; to improvise a resolution after the Korean peninsular has exploded would be far too dangerous.

## dispatches from the future...disp

### A CHINESE LAND GRAB

**APRIL 2, 2005** Beijing sent lightly armed police units into the Russian Far East today to protect Chinese residents whose ownership of huge tracts of Russian land made them targets of angry mobs. "China will protect its citizens, wherever they are," said President Li Peng.

Russia reacted furiously. President Aleksandr Lebed called China's police action "a creeping annexation of Russian land." He ordered his army to expel the 2 million Chinese who live in the rich but undeveloped region south of Khabarovsk (map). But it wasn't clear whether Russian troops would carry out the order. Many units of Russia's demoralized army earn most of their income by working for Chinese industries in the area.

Most of the Chinese settlers are undocumented aliens who settled in Russia's Maritime Territory to exploit its timber, fish and minerals. Local officials have been complaining for years about the growth of "Chinatowns" in the Russian Far East. And the Chinese have begun to refer to the area, only half jokingly, as "Beihai Sheng" (North Coast province).

With Asia facing its most dangerous crisis since the Second Korean War six years ago, United Nations Secretary-General Mary Robinson

urged the Security Council to intervene. But diplomats said any action would be vetoed by three permanent members of the council: Brazil, India and China itself. In Washington, President Kasich discussed the crisis at a midnight meeting with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Sources said Washington would try to mediate the dispute through a special envoy, probably the U.S. ambassador to Japan, Al Gore.

No one knows what will happen if the Russians decide to fight. Li's control of his government is still wobbly, after last year's unpopular overthrow of former president Jiang Zemin. Li may not have enough authority, on his own, to launch an all-out war against another nuclear power. Such decisions are still approved, in private, by China's paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping, 102, who has not been seen in public in the last 11 years.

4. Establishing a genuine strategic dialogue with China, American policy must not be derelict with Beijing. Two countries have a parallel interest in avoiding war in the near future, while China's disagreement with several of its neighbors is likely to be greater than the one it has with the United States. Nor will China, for the foreseeable future, have the military strength to undertake a hegemonic policy. All this makes it worth trying to reconcile policy where possible, and to take stิง out of disagreements when it is not.

The Clinton administration new emphasis on strategic dialogue with Beijing is to be welcomed. What is lacking is a rationale for this policy. Is it a rationale for labeling the policy of alternating Chinese institutions, or does it mark a genuine shift toward attempting to reconcile perceptions on international affairs? The sudden reversal last March from near-military confrontation to the announcement of three high-level visits runs the risks of being construed as a largely tactical maneuver in China and of confusing the other capitals of Asia. The effectiveness of the dialogue will depend on its content. It needs to be based on a precise and detailed analysis of Asian trends and policies.

next century will need to be based on the following ingredients:

1. Maintaining good relations with all the countries of the region, to give our diplomacy the greatest possible flexibility. We have no unbridgeable schisms with any of the key countries of Asia; in general, our differences with them are less than each has with its neighbors. We have no interest in dividing Asia into friendly and hostile blocs. Paradoxically, this is the best method of ensuring that we have allies in unavoidable crises.

2. Continuing the alliance with Japan as the keystone of our Asian security policy. Were it to end or even to weaken, the Japanese trend toward nationalism would be greatly accelerated. At the same time, we must be sensitive to the historic fears of the other Asian nations and conduct the alliance with Japan, in both words and actions, so that it cannot be perceived as a cover for a new wave of Japanese expansionism.

3. Strengthening the alliance with South Korea to prevent aggression and to develop common positions on unification.

The means to distill parallel approaches or to soften the impact of these policies on the balance of power.

DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE MIDDLE EAST TEND TO focus almost exclusively on the Arab-Israeli issue. While it is demonstrably explosive, there exists an established and tested framework for dealing with it. Below the surface of the Gulf, however, lurk even more dangerous structural issues. There are states of very limited power that possess the capacity to cause nearly infinite international damage. When, in 1973, the Gulf state found themselves in a position to raise oil prices by 387 percent, it was in a three-month period, they triggered a 10-year financial and economic crisis that threatened the global economic and financial systems and undermined the governability of the industrial democracies.

Today the consequences of a crisis in the Gulf are no less onerous than they were a generation ago.

78 NEWSWEEK JANUARY 27, 1997

WORLD AFFAIRS

PETERSON-GAMMA-LIAISON

The new Clinton
team has no more
urgent a task
than to devise a
response to an
explosion in
the Gulf or an
upheaval in
Saudi Arabia

PARADE IN TEHRAN: Our problem is that the
Gulf's two strongest nations are outlaws

nous. But the structure on which its stability depends is even more
brittle. The two strongest nations—Iran and Iraq—are outlaw
states. The United States has imposed sanctions on Iran; the inter-
national community, on Iraq. The immediate area contains only
two friendly Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. But Saudi
Arabia is going through the torments of adapting an essentially feu-
dal society to the modernization wrought by oil resources, global
communications and the spread of education. Jordan, bordering
Iraq, Syria and Israel, has its hands full with its own immediate
security concerns.

Turkey, though somewhat removed geographically, is central to Gulf strategy. Looking toward Iran and Iraq on one set of frontiers and toward Europe on another, Turkey has been the anchor of our Mediterranean policy. But it feels rejected by decades of American and European pressure over its policies on Cyprus and the Kurds. And there is a real danger that its fundamentalists might win a democratic election, reversing the Ataturk reforms and reorienting Turkey toward the Islamic world.

IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO SUSTAIN THE STABILITY OF the Gulf indefinitely without the effective support of Turkey. Nor will it be possible to maintain international support for the Iraqi sanctions very far into the new millennium, if indeed until then. A policy of keeping Iraq united as a potential obstacle to Iran conflicts with the goal of fostering the autonomy of the Kurds in the north and of the Shiites around Basra by means of no-fly zones and similar measures. U.S. policy has already suffered a shipwreck in the Kurdish area, and with the passage of time the inconsistencies in our position will become even more apparent.

To seek stability in the Gulf against both Iran and Iraq simulta-
neously, with vulnerable Saudi Arabia our only ally, is a high-risk
policy. But breaking out of this dilemma is not easy. Dealing with
Saddam Hussein presents insuperable problems; Iran would be
the logical candidate for a rapprochement, but so far there has not
been a shred of evidence that Iran is prepared to abandon its sup-
port for terrorism.

Fortunately, there are no comparable obstacles in dealing con-
structively with Turkey. It is high time to treat Turkey in a manner
compatible with its strategic importance. There is an urgent need

for such a new emphasis before a fundamentalist victory in Turkey
removes the option.

But if we can find no way to modify the building blocks in the
Persian Gulf, we had better prepare ourselves for an inevitable
blow-up. The new Clinton foreign-policy team has no more ur-
gent task than to assemble the best minds it can find to devise an
appropriate response to an explosion in the Gulf or an upheaval in
Saudi Arabia. These are crises that cannot possibly be dealt with
by improvisation.

Three events will shape transatlantic relations in the next centu-
ry: the success or failure of the attempt by the European Union to
constitute itself as a political entity; the rise of Russia, and the At-
lantic policy of the United States.

By the beginning of the new millennium, the European cur-
rency—the Euro—will have come into existence for France, Ger-
many, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, with Italy and
Spain joining either from the beginning or within two years. The
question is less whether the founders can meet the agreed criteria
for fiscal discipline than whether they will be able to maintain it
afterward. There are two possibilities: that the inability to main-
tain fiscal discipline will set off an inflationary spiral, or that the
effort to impose austerity by means of a European Central Bank
will trigger a political backlash. Either of these contingencies will
condemn Europe to years of discord and division and will reduce
its international role.

The more favorable prospect is that the Euro succeeds and
that, despite all doubts, a common fiscal and monetary policy
will help overcome Europe's economic sclerosis. In that case,
Europe, with its competitiveness restored, will transform the
Euro into a new reserve currency as bond managers around the
world use it to hedge their dollar investments. For America,
this will be an unprecedented situation, which could set off
economic warfare unless statesmanship on both sides of the
Atlantic manages to devise new attitudes and institutions for
cooperation.

The return of Russia to a major international role will be an-
other seminal event. Early in the new century, after many ups
and downs, Russia is likely to have restored its central authority.
It may well be closer to the political structures favored by Pi-
nochet or Salazar than to a Western pluralistic system—though it

80 NEWSWEEK JANUARY 27, 1997

will be freer than Communism. Once a le-
gal system is established and a measure of
predictability introduced, the economy
should recover as well.

At that point, the nations bordering the
Atlantic will have to get used to a far more
assertive Russia. The task of the Atlantic
Alliance will become to give Russia an op-
portunity to participate fully in the political
constructions of the new millennium, while
ensuring that its traditional nationalism
does not spill across its borders.

The enlargement of NATO to include the
former Soviet satellites in Central Europe
can provide the essential safety net for this
task. At the same time a body for political co-
operation embracing the key members of
the Atlantic Alliance plus Russia must also
be created. The appropriate forum for this is
the Organization for Security and Coopera-
tion in Europe. Charging NATO with both
tasks waters down the Alliance and invites
long-term Russian pressure.

Key members of the Clinton administra-
tion—whose formative experience was the
Vietnam protest—consider the Cold War to
have been at least partially provoked by the
United States. Treating Russia as a psycho-
logical problem, they have tried to placate
Moscow by enlarging NATO in a way that
transforms it from military alliance into a
political forum which, for all practical pur-
poses, includes Russia. This would destroy
NATO as a safety net and invite permanent
Russian intrusion into the heart of Alliance
decision-making.

Whatever my doubts about the suitabili-
ty of economic sanctions for spreading
democracy in Asia, I consider it essential to
promote the democratic ideal by fostering
close cooperation where it already exists,
especially among the nations bordering the
Atlantic and within the Western Hemi-
sphere. Military conflict among these na-
tions is nearly inconceivable. It is among
the established democracies that we should
reinforce the values and institutions we
treasure. The Western Hemisphere Eco-
nomic Free Trade Area proposed by Presi-
dent Clinton and its ultimate merging into
an Atlantic Free Trade Area are crucial
steps toward realizing these goals.

The American foreign policy challenge
for the next millennium is different from
anything in our previous experience.
Heretofore we engaged ourselves interna-
tionally by dealing with problems that were
seen as having a terminal date. In the period
ahead our biggest challenge will be to help
construct a system in which the rewards and
penalties are conducive to a broader sense
of global well-being. But one imperative has
not changed since the days of the Cold War:
a peaceful and humane international order
in the next century requires firm and en-
lightened American leadership buttressed
by bipartisan support.

More people got their direct-to-home satellite
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People who wanted the viewing variety, digital picture
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tem, made us America's #1 retailer of direct-to-home in 1996.
Why? RadioShack had the best products, the best offers—
and answers! For our store near you, call 1-800-THE-SHACK.

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You've got questions.
We've got answers.²

Truism #6

Your building
may have a health club you
don't even know about.

Opportunities to get a little exercise
are everywhere.
To learn more, call ACE at 800-529-8227.

A Public Service Message From The
**American Council on Exercise**®

MATCH POINT

When building a campfire,
clear a 5-foot area around
the pit down to the soil.

REMEMBER, ONLY YOU CAN
PREVENT FOREST FIRES.

A Public Service of the USDA Forest
Service and Your State Forester.

Ad
Council

Jane Bryant Quinn
opens the door to the
often inaccessible
world of finance

**On Social Security:**

"Whatever we do, our retirement is going to cost us more. It's not a big deal to fix the present system and improve its investment return. But we have to decide what that system should be: a better investment for those who can afford the risk or a tax-supported minimum income, keeping us socially secure."

**On pensions:**

"If you suspect that your payment is wrong, query the plan administrator. Don't do it by phone. If you haven't asked in writing, you haven't asked ... It's a pain to have to keep checking on whether your company got your pension right. But there's too much at stake to let it go."

**On index investing:**

"Tired of feeling like a loser? Frustrated by your low returns from mutual funds you thought were hot? Maybe you're ripe for a grown-up investment: a plain-vanilla index fund. Favored by professional investors, these funds have been so

little praised that amateurs tend to pass them by. But the secret to wealth is that a secret doesn't exist. For success you need only a simple investment with profits compounded over time."

**On investment porn:**

"Financial magazines have a lot of investment smarts. They're wonderful teachers. You'll find new ideas and good suggestions for correcting your course. But readers who keep buying the hot funds that are profiled each month are showing more fund envy than common sense."

**On wage inequality:**

"Maybe I've read too much Jane Austen, but attitudes seem to be taking a 19th-century turn. In Austen's time, the well-to-do were tended by a servant class. Today they're tended by hired services that they also keep in check. It's not just businesses that object to a higher minimum wage. The 'overclass' doesn't want to pay more to its day-care workers and household help."

More and more businesses are not
only getting Fridays Free this year...

$50 monthly minimum required. Maximum of $1,000 in free long distance calling per month. Domestic calls and commercial use only.
Not valid with any other offer. Limited time offer. Certain restrictions apply. ©1997 Sprint Communications Company L.P.

SR0604 kissinger
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CREATOR: BSLATE; 01/14/97, 17:08

PRINTED BY: MWHITA; 01/16/97, 4:15 PM

WRITER: DDZOLA
FROM: MWHITA; 01/16/97
FILE: SR0604-SR-NWK
REVISOR: KAUCH; 01/16/97, 16:07

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----- End of column -----

TO SUGGEST THAT A NEWLY
elected administration raise
its sights to the kind of world the next millennium
will bring may appear as a rude interruption to the
near blissful tranquility that tends to settle in after
our national elections. «suggested cut: During the transition, the victor relishes his success; the losers
reflect about the cause of their failure. It is too early to raise new issues and too late to review old ones;
the invocation of bipartisanship often reflectws an equilibrium between conviction and exhaustion. For
the reelected administration, the temptation to prolong this state of affairs is nearly
overwhelming. Events, however, develop their own momentum,

which, if not mastered, becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to manage. This is a particular challenge for in-
herently lame ducks second term administrations,
which are always in danger of losing the capacity
for implementing long-range decisions well before
the end of their tenure. The key choices must be
made early in the administration, especially since the period of in-

----- End of column -----

ternational calm that characterized the first
Clinton term is drawing to a close.

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Never before have so many structural changes in the international system occurred simultaneously. Some elements are now global—for example, economics and communications—while politics remains confined to the nation state or reduced to ethnic units. To make a long-term difference, the reelect ed Clinton Administration must envision the world it seeks to achieve. Only in that way will it be able to establish criteria for judging where it is heading.

For the purposes of this overview, I will focus on three areas that are likely to present the most pressing challenges in the next century: Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the trans-Atlantic region en-compassing the NATO countries and the territory of the former Soviet Bloc.

End of column

IN ASIA, CHINA WILL EMERGE AS AN INCIPIENT SUPERPOW-ER. When it reaches the per capita income of South Korea (about a third of ours), its GNP will be double that of the United States. Such an economic colossus is bound to have a major impact. China's vast market, reinforced by its growing military power, will, in the hands of skilful and determined leaders, provide a vehicle for growing political influence.

«ka» But that does not «ka» mean that China will necessarily aim for hegemony. Or that American policy will lose its capacity to affect the evolution of Asia. For one thing, China's growth will not take place in a vacuum. The end of the bipolar world and the rise of other power centers—in India, Vietnam, China and South Korea—will

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India is emerging as a major power, especially in South and Southeast Asia. The Southeast Asian nations, from Vietnam to Myanmar and Indonesia, will increase their cohesion. In these conditions, hegemony by any one nation can occur only if all others collapse internally or as a result of a military effort on a scale for which there is as yet no evidence and which, if it occurred, would evoke strong countervailing reactions.

«ka» People who pine «ka» for the simple verities of the Cold War propose trying to anticipate challenges which have not yet occurred by confronting China with human-rights pressures and economic warfare. The theory is that democratization will lead to a more peaceful policy and that economic shortfalls will cut down on China's military options.

«ok to delete "Yet" ka» Under present circumstances such a policy is certain to fail, while evoking the very dangers with which it seeks to deal. Human-rights pressures against China have failed for the past six years, partly because they reflect a number of misconceptions. China's foreign policy is not so much driven by Communist ideology as by growing nationalism, which can only be enforced «enflamed? mark» by a confrontational American policy, «mW» particularly if we isolate ourselves «mW» further by bringing similar pressures on friendly countries like Indonesia.

----- End of column -----

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styled socialist market economy, with the word "market" opera-
tionally far more significant than the word "socialist." Its biggest
danger is that it will overheat, not stagnate as was the case in the
Soviet Union. Moreover, Chinese society is already being trans-
formed by indigenous factors, especially the reforms introduced by
Deng Xiao Ping. By decentralizing decision-making, they have cre-
ated a kind of pluralism, if not necessarily democracy. Similarly,
the impact of the one-child family on historic Chinese social pat-
terns is likely to be profound.

Finally, there is no objective basis in Asia for military
containment on the model of the Cold War. The Soviet Union's Eu-
ropean neighbors felt militarily threatened and were eager for visi-
ble American support. By contrast, none of China's neighbors will
be prepared to ground their policy or join an alliance based on that
assumption of Chinese military aggression. To be sure, they want
an American presence, especially in the diplomatic and economic
fields, to establish the idea that America is not indifferent to their
fate. But, knowing that China is a permanent part of Asia while

End of column

American commitments are likely to be episodic, they will refuse,
short of an extremity <ins>better word? mark</ins>, to base their policy on hostility to China. A
confrontational American policy <ins>«mw»</ins> that is <ins>«mw»</ins> perceived as unprovoked will dri-
ve the countries of Asia <ins>«away from? mark</ins> into dissociation from the United States by
fostering both nationalism and neutralism.

Of course, we must not shrink from confrontation if vital Ameri-
can interests or the global equilibrium are challenged. But the
stakes are sufficiently high for us not to prompt a crisis. Chinese

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PG:

diplomacy is far more skilful than was that of the Soviet Union;
Chinese society is more cohesive; and the neighboring countries
are far more ambivalent about where the threat to their security ul-
timately lies. For the first time in its history, China is tied to the
world economy and a global international system. Before turning
to confrontation, a cooperative relationship must be given a
chance.

For all these reasons, American policy toward Asia for the next
century will need to be based on these ingredients:

1. «ka»Maintaining for parallel structure, ka good relations with all the countries of the region, to give our diplomacy the greatest possible flexibility. We have no unbridgeable schisms with any of the key countries of Asia; in general, our differences with them are less than each has with its neighbors. We have no interest in dividing Asia into friendly and hostile blocs.
Paradoxically, this is the best method of «mw»ensuring that we have«mw» allies for«in? mark» unavoidable crises.

2. Continuing«ditto, ka» the alliance with Japan as the keystone of our Asian security policy. Were it to end or even to weaken, the Japanese trend toward nationalism would be greatly accelerated. At the same time, we must be sensitive to the historic fears of the other Asian nations and conduct the alliance with Japan, in both words and actions, so that it cannot be perceived as a cover for a new wave of Japanese expansionism.

3. Strengthening the alliance with «mw»South«mw» Korea to prevent aggression

----- End of column -----*

and to develop common positions on unification. The new

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century will not be very far
along before the issue of Kore-
an unification becomes press-
ing, if indeed it does not happen
<u>«ka»</u>earlier<u>«ka»</u>. The United States will
be torn between its support of
the principle of self-determina-
tion and its reluctance to face
the implications of Northeast
Asian instability. Moreover,
the views of Korea's neigh-
bors—especially China and
Japan—will be highly ambiva-
lent. These conflicting motiva-
tions are not irreconcilable. But
they require a serious dialogue
with all the countries con-
cerned; to improvise a resolu-
tion after the Korean peninsula
has already exploded <u>«ka»</u>would be<u>«ka»</u> far too
dangerous.

(4) Establishing a genuine
strategic dialogue with China.

American policy must not forego the possibility of political under-
standings with Beijing. For the first half of the next century, the two countries' «to avoid ambiguity of "our", ka»
interests in the stability of Asia should be parallel«not clear what this means, mark», while China's
disagreements with several of its neighbors are likely to be greater

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than the ones it has with the United States. Nor will China, for the
foreseeable future, have the military strength to undertake a hege-
monic policy. Thus China and the United States have enough com-
--- End of column ---

mon interests to make it worth trying to reconcile our policies
where possible, or at least to take the sting out of disagreements.

The «Clinton administration's? mark» recent change in emphasis in administration policy toward seeking a strategic dialogue with Beijing is to be welcomed. What is lacking is a rationale for this policy. Is it a relabeling of the policy of altering Chinese institutions, or does it mark a genuine shift «toward attempting? mark» in an attempt to reconcile perceptions on international affairs? The sudden reversal from near-military confrontation in March to the
--- End of column ---

announcement of three
high-level visits runs the
risks of being construed as a
largely tactical maneuver in
China and of confusing the
other capitals of Asia. The
effectiveness of the dialogue
will depend on its content.
It needs to be based on a
precise and detailed
analysis of Asian trends and
of the means to distill paral-
lel approaches or to soften

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the impact of disagree-
ments.

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DISCUSSIONS
about the
Middle East
tend to fo-
cus almost
exclusively
on the Arab-Israeli issue.
While it is demonstrably
explosive, there exists an es-
tablished and tested frame-
work for dealing with it. Below the surface of the Gulf, however,
lurk even more dangerous structural issues. There, states of very
limited power possess the capacity to cause nearly infinite interna-
tional damage. When, in 1973, the Gulf states found themselves in
a position to raise oil prices by 387 percent in a three-month period,
they triggered a ten-year financial and economic crisis which
threatened the global economic and financial systems and under-
mined the governability of the industrial democracies.
End of column

Today the consequences of a crisis in the Gulf are no less omi-
nous. But the structure on which its stability depends is even more
brittle. The two strongest nations—Iran and Iraq—are outlaw
states. The United States has imposed sanctions on Iran; the inter-
national community, on Iraq. The immediate area contains only

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two friendly Islamic countries—Saudi Arabia and Jordan. But Saudi Arabia is going through the torments of adapting an essentially feudal society to the modernization wrought by oil resources, global communications and the spread of education. Jordan, bordering Iraq, Syria and Israel, has its hands so full with threatening neighbors that it is not able to bear the brunt of shaping a peaceful order in the Gulf.

End of column

It will not be possible to sustain the stability of the Gulf indefinitely without the effective support of Turkey. Nor will it be possible to maintain international support for the Iraqi sanctions very far into the new millennium, if indeed until then. A policy of keeping Iraq united as a potential obstacle to Iran conflicts with the goal of fostering the autonomy of the Kurds in the north and of the Shiʿite around Basra by means of no-flight no-fly zones and similar measures. U.S. policy has already suffered a shipwreck in the Kurdish area, and with the passage of time the inconsistencies in our position will become even more apparent.

End of column

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The problem is that to seek stability in the Gulf against both Iran and Iraq simultaneously, particularly with Saudi Arabia so vulnerable, and based largely on vulnerable Saudi Arabia is a high risk policy. But breaking out of this dilemma is not easy. Dealing with Saddam Hussein presents insuperable problems; Iran would be the logical candidate for a rapprochment, but so far there has not been a shred of evidence that Iran is prepared to abandon its support for terrorism.

Fortunately, there are no comparable obstacles in dealing constructively with Turkey. It is high time to treat Turkey in a manner compatible with its strategic importance and to meet Greek concerns in some other way. There is an urgent need for such a new emphasis before a fundamentalist victory in Turkey removes the option.

But if we can find no way to modify the building blocs in the Persian Gulf, we better prepare ourselves for an inevitable blow-up. The new Clinton foreign policy team has no more urgent task than to assemble the best minds it can find to devise an appropriate re-

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The more favorable prospect is that the Euro succeeds and that, despite all doubts, a common fiscal and monetary policy will help overcome Europe's economic sclerosis. In that case, Europe, with its competitiveness restored, will transform the Euro into a new reserve currency, as bond managers around the world use it to hedge their dollar investments. For America, this will be an unprecedented situation, which could set economic warfare unless

----- End of layout -----

## OVERSET

statesmanship on both sides of the Atlantic manages to devise new attitudes and institutions for of **Atlantic** cooperation.

2. The recovery of Russia will be another seminal event. Early in the new century «moved, ka», after many ups and downs, Russia will have restored its central authority. It is likely to be closer to the political structures favored by Pinochet or Salazar than to a western pluralistic system—though it will be freer than Communism.

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JE

It is likely to be closer to the political structures favored by Pinocet or Salazar than to a western pluralistic system—though it will be freer than Communism. Once a legal system is established and a measure of predictability introduced, the economy should recover as well.

At that point, the nations bordering the Atlantic will have to get used to a far more assertive Russia. The task of the Atlantic Alliance will become to give Russia an opportunity to participate fully in the political constructions of the new millennium, while ensuring that its traditional nationalism does not spill across its borders.

The enlargement of NATO to <ka> include <ka> the former Soviet satellites in Central Europe can provide the essential safety net for this task. At the same time a body for political cooperation embracing the key members of the Atlantic Alliance plus Russia must also be created. The appropriate forum for this is the European Security Conference «proper name is now Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.sds». Charging NATO with both tasks waters down the Al-

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Key members of the Clinton administration—whose formative experience was the Vietnam protest—consider the Cold War to have been at least partially provoked by the United States. Treating Russia as a psychological problem, they have tried to placate Moscow by transforming NATO **even while enlarging its membership** into a political forum which, for all practical purposes, includes Russia. This would destroy NATO as a safety net and invite permanent Russian intrusion into the heart of Alliance decision-making.

Whatever my doubts about the suitability of economic sanctions for spreading democracy in Asia, I consider it essential to promote the democratic ideal by fostering close cooperation where it already exists, especially among the nations bordering the Atlantic and within the Western Hemisphere. Military conflict among these nations is nearly inconceivable. It is among the established democracies that we should foster **<u>reinforce? mark</u>** the values and institutions we treasure. The Western Hemisphere Economic Free Trade Area proposed by President

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<hnj Loose> The American foreign policy challenge for the next millennium is different from «anything in? mark»our previous experience. Heretofore we engaged ourselves internationally by dealing with problems«that were seen as having? mark», which implies a terminal date. In the period ahead our biggest challenge will be to help construct a system in which the rewards and penalties are conducive to «a broader sense of? mark»peace and human well-being.

But one imperative has not changed since the days of the Cold War: a creative, peaceful and humane international order in the next century requires firm and enlightened American leadership buttressed by bipartisan support. ■

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Dear Henry--

A terrific piece: just what the doctor ordered. As you predicted, I had to cut the Bosnia chapter, and also the long passage about Korea. In its stead, I've boiled down the main point about Korean unification in point 3 of your 4 point plan for dealing with Asia (page 9). All cuts are underlined; I've also added the word ``add'' or ``moved'' in the underlined typeface to indicate minor editing changes. But as you'll see, I've done very little.

The piece is probably fairly close to budget now, so if you want to make any additions please try to indicate commensurate cuts. I'll be in the office all day tomorrow, and have asked our art department to rush a final layout so that, with luck, we can finish fitting by the end of the day. I'll talk to you in the morning.

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By Henry A. Kissinger

To suggest that a newly elected administration raise its sights to the kind of world the next millennium will bring may appear as a rude *add* interruption to the *almost* blissful tranquility that tends to *follow* our national elections. During the transition, the victor relishes his success; *the loser is busy analyzing* the cause of *failure*. *Since* It is too early to raise new issues and too late to review old ones; the invocation of bipartisanship often reflects an equilibrium between conviction and exhaustion *and conviction*. For the reelected administration, the temptation to prolong this state of affairs is nearly overwhelming.

Events, however, *have* their own momentum, *if* not mastered, *they* *develop* their own *internal logic*, *with the* *passage of time*, becomes increasingly difficult to manage. This is a particular challenge for second term administrations, *which* are *inherently lame duck* and

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have the capacity for implementing long-range decisions well before the end of their tenure. The key choices must be made early in the administration, especially since the period of <add>international<add> calm that characterized the first Clinton term is <add>clearly coming to an end.</add>

Never before have so many

structural changes <moved>in the international system< moved> occurred simultaneously. : never before have. Some elements of the international system are now been global—for example, economics and <or> communications—

while <the scope of politics> has remained confined to <imprisoned in the nation state or reduced to shrunk to the scope of an ethnic units. To make a long-term difference, the reelected

Clinton Administration must envision <raise its sights of the> world it seeks to achieve. Only in that way will it be able to establish criteria for judging where it is heading.

<add>For the purposes of this overview, I will focus on three areas that are likely to present <add>the most pressing challenges in the next century: Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the trans-Atlantic region encompassing the NATO countries and the territory of the former Soviet Bloc:<add></add>

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Bosnia

A good example is the case of Bosnia, which can be summed up in this question: Will the American people support a substantial troop deployment in Bosnia into the next millennium? If the issue is posed in those terms, the answer is almost surely in the negative. But if the decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, two outcomes are nearly certain: either an attempt to impose the political provisions of the Dayton agreements by force, or a continuation of the status quo, which implies a de facto partition of Bosnia policed by NATO forces into the next century. Neither course can be reconciled with the national interest of the United States.

When, after three years of ambivalence, the Clinton administration finally committed itself to imposing peace on Bosnia, it did so more with an eye to calming the domestic storms the issue was raising in America than to bringing about a long-term solution. The Dayton agreement, which it brokered, did end the bloody massacres and ethnic cleansing that disgraced all the parties in the civil war. But the means chosen were not only inherently stop-gap but were inconsistent with each other. The military terms provided that the Croat, Muslim and Serb parties be separated; the political terms provided that they unite by means of the free movement of populations and the return of refugees, which, in the light of recent history, were achievable only by a resumption of the civil war.

The dilemma is that enforcing the political provisions will land us in an open-ended Balkan civil war in which American casualties will become unavoidable. The administration seems tempted to find a way out by seeking to manipulate the successions in Belgrade and Zagreb. Such a course will only ensnare us in the obscure passions of Balkan domestic politics; we will become a party to them without having criteria to find our way through them. The presumptive successors in Croatia and Belgrade are already resorting to an even more nationalist rhetoric than the leaders whose positions they are seeking to replace. Do we have the staying power into the next century for such a policy, either politically or militarily?

If, however, we rest on the military provisions, NATO forces will be needed to police politically illegitimate ceasefire lines into the next millennium. The dangers of such an arrangement are demonstrated in Cyprus, where international forces have been policing a ceasefire line not accepted as final by one of the parties for 20 years. And the unresolved issue threatens to boil up into a Greek-Turkish conflict at regular intervals. To steer clear of

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an open-ended military commitment and a permanent political crisis in Bosnia, the military and political provisions of the Dayton agreement must be reconciled, either by imposing the political provisions or by turning the armistice lines between the ethnic groups into political lines defended by the national forces of each side.

Since I can discern no American national interest in American participation in a war to impose a multi-ethnic state on populations which have been practicing genocide against each other. I prefer the option of internationally sanctioned partition. It would bring about an internationally recognized Muslim state with appropriate guarantees (NATO and/or UN) of its borders. The Croat and Serb populations of Bosnia could be given the choice of either joining their compatriots or constituting themselves as independent entities.

Asia

In Asia, China will emerge as an incipient superpower. When it reaches the per capita income of Korea (about a third of ours) its GNP will be double that of the United States. Such an economic colossus is bound to leave a major impact. All the countries will be conscious of the China's vast market which, reinforced by its China's growing military power, will, in the hands of skilful and determined leaders, provide a vehicle for growing political influence.

Does that mean that China will necessarily aim for hegemony? Or that American policy will lose its capacity to affect the evolution of Asia? For one thing, China's growth will not take place in a vacuum. The end of the bipolar world

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and the rise of other power centers—^ from ^ in ^ India to through Vietnam, China and Korea—will bring about a more nationalist course in Japan. Less and less convinced that its

-------- End of column --------

interests parallel and those of the United ^

^ inevitably

States are inevitably parallel, Japan will place a greater emphasis ^

^ emphasize

our foreign and defense policy more ^

^ policies

geared to its own specifically national Japanese interests.

^ national perceptions

India is emerging as a major ^

^ is emerging

power will be a major player, especially in South and Southeast Asia.

The Asian nations, from Vietnam to Myanmar and Indonesia, will increase

^ Southeast

their cohesion. In these conditions, hege-
mony by any one nation can occur only if
all others collapse internally or as a result
of *by a military effort on of a scale for which*
there is as yet no evidence and which, if it
occurred, would evoke *add strong and important*
*add counteracting reactions.*

^ a countervailing reactions.

Those pining for the
simple verities of the Cold War tend to propose
trying to anticipate resist challenges which have
not yet occurred by a policy of confronting China
with to and by means of human rights pressures on China (and for that matter other countries of Asia such as Indonesia) and

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ated **evoke** a kind of pluralism, if not a (though not necessarily
democracy. Similarly, **And** the impact of the
one-child family on historic Chinese
social patterns is likely to be profound.

As for military containment on
the model of the Cold War there is simply
no objective basis for it in Asia. The
Soviet Union's European neighbors felt
militarily threatened and were eager for
visible American support. By contrast,
none of China's neighbors **neighbor of China** will be pre-
pared to ground their **its policy on the postu-
lation of Chinese military aggression** or
join an alliance based on that assumption.
To be sure, they want an American pres-
ence, especially in the diplomatic and eco-
nomic fields, to establish the idea that
America is not **would not be** indifferent to their fate. But
knowing that China is a permanent part of
Asia while American commitments are
likely to be episodic, they will refuse,
short of **accreting an extremity**, to base their policy on
hostility to China. A confrontational American policy perceived as unprovoked will drive the countries of Asia into
dissociation from the United States, and to seek a middle position between us and China. Thus under present
circumstances, a containment policy will compound the Chinese hostility it endorses by fostering both
nationalism and neutralism in the rest of Asia.

*Stet all except for edits*

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Finally, the faccise revisionism
should not blind us to what would be
is involved in confrontation with China. The
Chinese economy is stronger than was

that of the Soviet Union; Chinese diplo-
macy far more skilful; Chinese society
more cohesive; and the neighboring coun-
tries far more ambivalent about where the
threat to their security ultimately lies«add».

∩ is ∩ is

∩ are

Of course, we must not shrink
from confrontation if vital American
interests are challenged. But the stakes are
sufficiently high for us not to prompt a cri-
sis. For the first time in its history, China
is tied to the world economy and a global
international system. It is not foreordained that it will protect its interests in interdependence by hegemony rather
than cooperation. Before turning to
confrontation, a cooperative relationship
must be given a chance.

∩ or the global equilibrium

(1) Good relations with all the
countries of the region, to give our diplo-
macy the greatest possible«add» flexibility for crisis situations. We
have no unbridgeable schisms with any of

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(4)

the key countries of Asia; in general, our
differences with them are less than each
has with its *those with their* neighbors. We have no inter-
est in dividing Asia into friendly and hos-
tile blocs. A

Paradoxically, this is the best
method of having allies for
unavoidable crises.

(2) Continuation of the alliance
with Japan as the keystone of our Asian
security policy. Were it to end or even to
weaken, the Japanese trend toward
nationalism to rely [increasingly] on a nationalist course would be greatly accelerated.

At the same time, we must be sensitive to
the historic fears of the other<add> Asian
nations and conduct the alliance with
Japan, in both words and actions, so that it
cannot be perceived as a cover for a new
wave of Japanese expansionism.

(3) Alliance with Korea to prevent aggression and to develop common positions on unification. The new century will not be very far along before the issue of Korean unification becomes pressing, if indeed it does not happen before. The United States will be torn between its support of the principle of self-determination and its reluctance to face the implications of Northeast Asian instability. These conflicting motivations are not irreconcilable.

A Strengthening the

Moreover, the views of Korea's
neighbors — especially China to
Japan — will be highly
ambiguous.

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But they require a serious dialogue with all
the countries concerned; improvising a
resolution of so many conflicting views after the Korean peninsula has
already exploded is far too dangerous. <<moved>>

(4) Strategic dialogue with
China. American policy must not forego
the possibility of political understandings
with Beijing. China For the first half of the next
century, our interests in the stability of Asia should be parallel: while China's disagreements with sever-
al of its neighbors are likely to be greater
than the ones it has with the United
States. Nor will China, for the foreseeable
future, have the military strength to under-
take a hegemonic policy. Thus China and
the United States have enough common
interests to make it worth trying to recon-
cile our concert their policies where possible, or at least
to take the sting out of their disagreements.

The recent <<add>> change in emphasis in
administration policy toward seeking a
strategic dialogue with Beijing <<add>> is to be
welcomed. What is lacking is a rationale
for this change of emphasis. The sudden
reversal from near-military confrontation
in March to the announcement of three
---------- End of column ----------
high-level visits runs the risks of being

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construed as a purely tactical maneuver in China and of confusing the other capitals of Asia. The effectiveness of the dialogue will therefore depend on its content. It needs to be based on an analysis of foreseeable changes in Asia and of the means either to soften their impact to distill common approaches to or

The future of Korea is a good example. The North Korean regime is clearly on the wane. While militarily strong, it has proved unable to take care of the most elementary needs of its population. And in the era of global communications, even the most repressive regime cannot indefinitely keep its people from noticing the disparity between its living standard and that of the rest of the world, especially of South Korea.

A crisis could erupt in any number of ways that include: a collapse of the regime followed by peaceful unification on the German model; a refutation in which the successor insists on continued independence; a North Korean military attack on the South to elicit international recognition of its continued existence, perhaps buttressed by some kind of international economic assistance.

Since Korea is at the vortex of Northeast Asia, any transformation of the existing situation will have major implications for Korea's neighbors. Korean unification promises to be even more complicated than was Germany's. For Korea is surrounded by major powers in a far stronger position to thwart or delay unification than was the decrepit Soviet Union of 1989 with respect to Germany. While these countries will be at one about not wishing another Korean war, their perceptions of what is at stake will differ.

- In the light of its suspicions of Vietnam, China will be uneasy about the emergence of yet another significant military power along its border, especially one that may galvanize the Korean minorities in Manchuria and Northeast China. It will surely maneuver to prop up the North Korean regime as long as possible and to achieve some degree of demilitarization of the North if unification becomes unavoidable.

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Today the consequences of a cri-
sis in the Gulf are no less ominous «add». But the
structure on which its stability depends is
far more brittle. The two strongest even
nations—Iran and Iraq—are outlaw
states. The United States has imposed
sanctions on Iran; is under sanctions by the United States/Iraq by the international com-
munity, on Iraq. The immediate area con-
tains only two friendly countries—Saudi
Arabia and Jordan. But Saudi Arabia is
going through the torments of adapting an
essentially feudal society to the modern-
ization wrought by oil resources, global
communications and the spread of educa-
tion. Jordan, bordering Iraq, Syria and
Israel, has its hands so full with its restless
and threatening neighbors that it is not
able to contribute decisively to regional
stability. bear the brunt of shaping a
peaceful order in the Gulf.

Turkey and Egypt, though a little
removed geographically, are central to
Gulf strategy. Looking toward Iran and
Iraq on one set of frontiers and toward
Europe on another, Turkey has been the

a somewhat
is

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Fortunately, there are no compa-
rable obstacles in dealing constructively
with Turkey and Egypt. But it is high time
to treat *deal with* Turkey in a manner compatible
with its strategic importance and to meet
Greek concerns in some other way. There
is an urgent need for such a new emphasis
before a fundamentalist victory in Turkey
removes the *this* option.

But if we can find no way to
modifying the building blocs in the
Persian Gulf «add», we better prepare ourselves
for an <u>the inevitable blow-up which will occur early in the new</u>
<u>century, if not earlier.</u> The new Clinton
foreign policy team has no more urgent
task than to assemble the best minds it can
find to devise an appropriate response to
an explosion in the Gulf or an upheaval in
Saudi Arabia. These are crises which can-
not possibly be dealt with by improvisa-
tion.

The Trans-Atlantic Region

Three events will shape trans-
Atlantic relations in the next century: (1) the
<u>success emergence</u>, or <u>conversely the failure</u>, of the attempt by <u>of the</u>

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European Union to emerge as a political entity; (2) the rise of Russia; (3) and the Atlantic policy of the United States.

(1) By the beginning of the new millennium, <u>moved</u> the European currency—the Euro—will have come into existence for France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg <u>as founding members</u>, with Italy and Spain joining either from the beginning or within two years. The question is <u>its challenge will be</u> less whether the founders can meet the agreed criteria for fiscal discipline <u>when they establish the common currency</u> than whether they will be able to maintain it afterwards. There are two possibilities: that the inability to maintain fiscal discipline will set off an inflationary spiral, or that the effort to impose austerity by means of a European Central Bank will trigger a political backlash. Either of these contingencies will condemn Europe to <u>year of discord and division and will make it difficult for it to participate effectively in the world order described in this article.</u>

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policy will help overcome Europe's eco-
nomic sclerosis. In that case, Europe, with
restored competitiveness would turn the
Euro into a new «add» reserve currency next to the United States, as bond

managers around the world use it to hedge
their dollar investments. For America, this
will be an unprecedented situation setting
off either economic warfare or a new era
of cooperation, depending on the states-

manship on both sides of the Atlantic
Specifically, some vision backed by insti-

-------- End of column --------
tions of trans-Atlantic solidarity needs
to be can be devised..

2) The recovery of Russia will be
another seminal event. After many ups
and downs, Russia will, by early in the
next millenium, have restored its central
authority. It is likely to <u>This will be</u> far closer to the
political structures favored by Pinochet or
Salazar than to a western pluralistic sys-
tem—though it will be far freer than
Communism. Once a legal system is
established and a measure of predictabili-
ty is introduced, the economy should begin
to recover as well.

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A course. They have been tempted to turn

NATO into a political forum which, for all
practical purposes, includes Russia. This
would destroy NATO as a safety net and
invite constant Russian intrusion pressure into the
heart of Alliance decision-making.

A My doubts about attempts to
spread democracy around the globe by
pressure or persuasion notwithstanding, I
do believe in the importance of promoting

the democratic ideal by fostering close
cooperation where it already exists: espe-
cially among the nations bordering the
Atlantic and within the Western
Hemisphere. Military conflict among
these nations is nearly inconceivable. It is
among the established democracies that
we should cultivate cooperation and foster the values and institu-
tions we treasure. The Western
Hemisphere Economic Free Trade Area
proposed by President Clinton and its ulti-
mate merging into an Atlantic Free Trade
Area are crucial steps toward realizing
these goals.

[Concluding paragraph to come]

A Treating Russia as a psycholo-
gical problem, they have tried
to placate Moscow by trans-
forming NATO-even while
enlarging its membership into
a

A permanent

A Whatever

A the suitability of economic sanctions
for spreading democracy in Asia

A consider it essential to promote

Insert attached for here.

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(Concluding paragraph)

The American foreign policy challenge for the next millenium is different from our previous experience. Heretofore we engaged ourselves internationally by dealing with problems, which implies a terminal date. In the period ahead our biggest challenge will be to help construct a system in which the rewards and penalties are conducive to peace and human well-being. But one imperative has not changed since the days of the Cold War: A creative, peaceful and humane international order in the next century requires firm and enlightened American leadership butressed by bipartisan support.

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lose the capacity for implementing long-range decisions well before the end of their tenure. The key choices must be made early in the administration, especially since the period of «add»international«add» calm that characterized the first Clinton term is clearly coming to an end.

Never before have so many

structural changes «moved»in the international system«moved» occurred simultaneously. never before have Some elements of the international system are now been global—for example, economics and or communications—

while the scope of politics has remained confined to imprisoned in the nation state or reduced to shrunk to the scope of an ethnic units. To make a long-term difference, the reelected

Clinton Administration must envision raise its sights of the world it seeks to achieve. Only in that way will it be able to establish criteria for judging where it is heading.

«add»For the purposes of this overview, I will focus on three areas that are likely to present us with the most pressing challenges in the next century: Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the trans-Atlantic region encompassing the NATO countries and the territory of the former Soviet Bloc:«add»

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