BANQUE INDOSUEZ

URGENT !

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION

SUCCURSALE DE GENÈVE

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

TO : Peter Rodman

FROM : Pascal Delvaque

FAX : 001-202-887 5222

DATE : Geneva, October 10th, 1995

TEL : 41-22-319 94 26

1 page incl. this page

Dear Peter,

We have just been contacted by a Taiwanese (?) businessman (??) proposing to discount with us "Japanese Government Bonds" in exceedingly high amounts. One of these bonds is in our safe for a face value of Yen 300'000'000'000 (three hundred billion) ... a little under $ 3 billion today.

This person tells us he represents the "Special Secret International Funds G. Syndicom K.". (Quite a mouthful).

Syndicom K. is supposed to be a trust (or Foundation) under an umbrella Trust (or Foundation) named, simply, "Syndicom", of which Dr. Kissinger would be the Chairman.

Is there any relation, which could be divulged to us, in confidence, between Dr. Kissinger and any such organisation ?

If not, we can discuss with you and/or Dr. Kissinger's advisors how to proceed.

Warmest regards,

BANQUE INDOSUEZ

SUCCURSALES DE SUISSE

LAUSANNE

1, AVENUE DE LA GARF
CASE POSTALE 2260
CH-1002 LAUSANNE

■ 24 361 INDO CH

■ (021) 313 81 11

♦ INDOSUEZ LAUSANNE
SWIFT BSUICH22
FAX (091) 300 03 74

LUGANO

VIA MONTE GENERI 3
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GENFVE

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D10

NO. 649

15:02

12/10/95

Nixon Center for Peace and
Freedom

1620 Eye Street, NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20006
202-887-1000
Fax: 202-887-5222

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

Date: October 12, 1995

To: Amb. L. Paul Bremer

Fax: 212-759-0042

Re: Bogus Bonds

Sender: Peter W. Rodman

YOU SHOULD RECEIVE 2 PAGE(S), INCLUDING THIS COVER SHEET. IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL THE PAGES, PLEASE CALL 202-887-1000.

Attached is the fax from my banker friend in Geneva concerning the bonds being peddled in HAK's name. If you can reconfirm that it's bogus, I can pass word on to him. Or, alternatively, if you think it necessary, you may contact him directly.

JAN-30-1996 16:31

EOSG

P.02

To the Editor, Wall Street Journal

Stephen B. Young (letter to the Editor January 23, 1996) says that Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, "misled" by Henry Kissinger, told President Thieu that Kissinger's proposals would require all North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units to leave South Vietnam as part of a peace agreement. Young's presentation ignores the realities of that time and obscures the real source of the "betrayal" of South Vietnam.

I was an aide to Ambassador Bunker during the period in question. Bunker never wavered from his view that the United States should require the departure of all NVA forces. The fact was, however, that this simply could not be achieved through a negotiated agreement. American domestic political pressures made this simply impossible. No one, Bunker and Thieu included, could have thought otherwise throughout the critical months leading up to the agreement signed on January 27, 1972.

By producing an agreement to which the Government of the Republic of Vietnam was a full legal party, the basis was laid for insisting that Hanoi's troops had no right to be in the South. Intelligence analysis at the time clearly concluded that the communist forces in the south "were on their last legs". The analysts were correct; the Thieu-Bunker-Abrams effort had won the war and sealed it with the defeat of the Communist's Easter offensive of 1972. The Paris agreement provided for continued U.S. supply of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. That army, the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, and the U.S. mission all were ready, willing and able at the time of the agreement to make it work, and that was entirely possible had the U.S. continued to supply our allies as promised.

But when Minister of Foreign Affairs Tran Van Lam, who had signed the Paris Agreement for the Republic of Vietnam, visited Washington shortly afterward to discuss continued U.S. supply he round that not one single member of Congress was willing to meet with him. This was the real moment of betrayal. Even then, with our allies utterly cut off, it took over two more years before Hanoi's forces were able to gain sufficient strength to conduct their final conventional military assault across the demilitarized zone and international borders to take Saigon in April 1975.

Charles Hill

244 Bradley Street
New Haven, CT 06510
(203) 777 6625

TOTAL P.02

The Washington Post

1150 15TH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20071
(202) 334-6000

MEG GREENFIELD
EDITORIAL PAGE EDITOR
Cl 306-3473

At home

Kay:

I got your note three days late (the snow) but we are committed to printing Henry's piece on *Nixon* pretty much as is on the 24th no matter how long and turgid.

I agree about his overuse of "responsibility" (to whom?) and "our" as applied to "country". He has even taken to talking about "our traditions" -- as you say, arriviste, but what can you do?

You probably know that Oliver Stone is thinking of doing the hostage crisis next -- Kissinger and David Rockefeller pressuring Carter into admitting the Shah as payoff for steering Iran's oil revenues into the Chase, etc. He's getting help from two of the FSC hostages. Sally seems to know something about his but so far we have no real leads.

Best,

Peter-

Retrieved from a waste basket and a bit wrinkled; which accounts for the wavy paint on the photocopy.
Have fun!

A FORUM FOR
AMERICAN INTERESTS

January 25, 1996

HONORARY CHAIRMAN
WALTER H. ANNENBERG

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

FOUNDING CHAIRMAN
GEORGE L. ARGYROS

VICE CHAIRS
TRICIA NIXON COX
JULIE NIXON EISENHOWER

DWAYNE O. ANDREAS
ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
MAURICE R. GREENBERG
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EUGENE K. LAWSON
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN
C. WILLIAM MAYNES
JOHN MCCAIN
ANN MCLAUGHLIN
LIONEL H. OLMER
JAMES E. PERRELLA
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
DIMITRI K. SIMES, ESQ.
ROBERT S. STRAUSS
JOHN H. TAYLOR, SECRETARY

ADVISORY COUNCIL

CHAIRMAN
HENRY A. KISSINGER

JONATHAN AITKEN
GRAHAM ALLISON
ROBERT W. BLACKWILL
EDWARD F. COX
ROBERT W. DEAN
ALTON FRYE
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
LEE H. HAMILTON
ARIANNA HUFFINGTON
JOSEF JOFFE
CHALMERS JOHNSON
NANCY A. LIEBERMAN
ROBERT C. McFARLANE
PETER R. ROSENBLATT
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR.
BRENT SCOWCROFT

PRESIDENT
DIMITRI K. SIMES

SENIOR STAFF
GEOFFREY KEMP
PETER W. RODMAN
PAUL J. SAUNDERS

The Editor
Wall Street Journal
200 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10281

To the editor:

As a participant in the U.S. negotiations on Vietnam during the Nixon Administration, I am completely befuddled by the version of events in Stephen B. Young's letter published January 23.

In particular, the idea that the Nixon-Kissinger policy on Vietnam over four years was foisted on an absent-minded President by his devious national security advisor is one of the wackier ideas in recent circulation -- even more cartoonish a version of history than the Turner Television broadcast that Mr. Young was commenting upon. Nixon's reputation does not gain by having defenders like this.

Every negotiating trip by Kissinger to Paris followed the same procedure -- intensive private conversations with the President beforehand in the Oval Office and by phone; strategy memoranda submitted to the President, which came back peppered with detailed Nixon marginal comments and instructions; detailed reports to the President afterwards. This procedure was most emphatically followed in the case of the May 31, 1971, Paris meeting that Mr. Young is so exercised about.

On the issue of whether North Vietnamese troops could remain in the South, U.S. policy evolved in a manner that is no secret now and was not a secret to the South Vietnamese. Nixon formally proposed a ceasefire-in-place in a televised speech of October 7, 1970 -- with South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu's concurrence. A more elaborated U.S. proposal was presented to the North Vietnamese in the secret talks on May 31, 1971, including a ceasefire-in-place, U.S. withdrawal, and return of prisoners, leaving the political issues to be negotiated subsequently by the North and South Vietnamese. Amb. Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon, who knew all the details, briefed Thieu in general terms (and correctly) that it was along the lines of the October 7, 1970, proposal. On January 25, 1972, President Nixon made the May 31

NIXON CENTER FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

1620 EYE STREET, N.W., SUITE 900 ★ WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006
(202) 887-1000 ★ (202) 887-5222 FAX

2

proposal public in another televised speech, and made a revised offer
based on it -- all with Thieu's explicit concurrence.

When in October 1972 Hanoi dropped all its political demands for
dismantling the South Vietnamese government, the joint U.S.-South
Vietnamese proposals on the table became the basis of the Paris
Agreement. Thieu's fundamental unease at that point lay not so much in
the terms or the negotiating tactics as in the stark fact that paper
proposals for compromise which he had endorsed (which he may well
have thought would never be accepted) were about to become reality.

The Paris Agreement of January 1973 essentially froze the status
quo on the ground -- a military balance that had been much improved
during 1972 by U.S. mining and bombing of North Vietnam and by the
South Vietnamese army's performance. The Agreement included a ban
on infiltration of arms or personnel to reinforce North Vietnamese troops
in the South, as well as a ban on the use of Laotian or Cambodian
territory for that purpose. The U.S. calculation was that illegal North
Vietnamese resupply in the South after the Paris Agreement could be
blocked or deterred by U.S. bombing if necessary, while the U.S. was
permitted to continue to arm and train the South Vietnamese. But soon,
Watergate and the Democratic Congress removed these instruments from
our hands, and the balance of forces then tilted inexorably against the
South Vietnamese.

When Mr. Young accosted President Nixon in retirement 20 years
later with his mysterious question about "Bunker's two-step approach to
ending the war," no wonder he was met by a glassy stare. The reference
and the description would have been unrecognizable to any of us.

The final outcome of 1975 was never foreordained -- least of all in
the negotiating positions that the U.S. (and South Vietnam) had been
putting forward themselves in 1970-72.

Peter W. Rodman
Washington, D.C.

January 25, 1996

To the editor:

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

DWAYNE O. ANDREAS
ROBERT F. ELLSWORTH
MAURICE R. GREENBERG
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EUGENE K. LAWSON
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN
C. WILLIAM MAYNES
JOHN MCCAIN
ANN MCLAUGHLIN
LIONEL H. OLMER
JAMES E. PERRELLA
JAMES R. SCHLESINGER
DMITRI K. SIMES, EX OFFICIO
ROBERT S. STRAUSS
JOHN H. TAYLOR, SECRETARY

ADVISORY COUNCIL

CHAIRMAN
HENRY A. KISSINGER

JONATHAN AITKEN
GRAHAM ALLISON
ROBERT W. BLACKWILL
EDWARD F. COX
ROBERT W. DEAN
ALTON FRYE
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN
LEE H. HAMILTON
ARIANNA HUFFINGTON
JOSEF JOFFE
CHALMERS JOHNSON
NANCY A. LIEBERMAN
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
PETER R. ROSENBLATT
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR.
BRENT SCOWCROFT

PRESIDENT
DIMITRI K. SIMES

2

01/26/1996 12:38 15403641277

CHARLES WHITEHOUSE

CHARLES S. WHITEHOUSE
RT. 2, BOX 176
MARSHALL, VA 22115

I am disturbed by Stephen Young's polemic against Dr. Kissinger which appeared in the Journal on January 23rd. As John Paul Vann's successor in Military Region III in 1969 and 1970 and later as Deputy Chief of Mission under Ambassador Bunker in 1972 - 1973 I was deeply involved in US/Vietnamese relations during the period to which Stephen Young alludes. I worked closely with Dr. Kissinger and General Haig during their frequent visits and was privy to, indeed drafted some of, the "secret correspondence" between Ambassador Bunker and the White House.

I believe that there are two points which I should clarify.

1) Relations Between Kissinger and Bunker were close and friendly and I never heard Bunker say that he had been lured by Kissinger into misleading Thieu with regard to the very important issue of U.S. policy on the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from South Vietnam. All of us in Saigon, including the South Vietnamese leadership, knew that leaving the issue of the North Vietnamese presence to the Indo Chinese countries meant that South Vietnam would have to cope with dangerous North Vietnamese "leopard spots", but we Americans, agreed with the pungent statement of either Bunker or Kissinger that one could not do with a pencil what we had failed to do with over a million armed men.

2) It is very misleading for Mr. Young to state that Kissinger did not believe in "Nixon's policy of Vietnamization". None of us in Saigon; Bunker, Abrams, Weyand or I ever saw any sign of that and we agreed with the White House that this policy was rational, moral and appropriate and did our damndest to make it work.

It is absurd to affirm that it was Dr. Kissinger's deviousness that brought about the "betrayal of South Vietnam". It was North Vietnamese non-compliance with the Paris Agreement and the refusal of the U.S. Congress to permit retaliatory action or to provide the promised support which led to the defeat of our ally.

Charles S. Whitehouse

Alfred Nobel and the Peace Prize

Remarks on the Occasion of the 75th Anniversary of the
presentation of the Nobel Peace Prize to
President Woodrow Wilson

by
Dr. Francis Sejersted

Chairman, Norwegian Nobel Committee
Oslo Norway

made at the
Woodrow Wilson House
Washington DC
on
November 9, 1995

Woodrow Wilson House
A National Trust Historic Site
2340 S Street NW, Washington DC 20008
(202) 387-4062

Francis Sejersted

November, 1995

ALFRED NOBEL AND THE PEACE PRIZE

Alfred Bernhard Nobel, the wealthy Swedish scientist, inventor of dynamite and entrepreneur, declared in his will of 1895 that his fortune was to be used to award five prizes "to those, who, during the preceding year shall have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind". The fact that three of the five prizes were scientific prizes reflects not only Nobel's own scientific interest, but also a belief, not uncommon at that time, that scientific inquiry and scientific development would be of unqualified benefit to mankind. The prize in literature reflects Nobel's own deep interest, right from his boyhood, in literature. The most surprising element in his will was, without doubt, the decision that one of the prizes was to be awarded for peace activities. This of course reflects Nobel's own interest in politics and in the peace cause. But it also reflects the influence of his friend, the author and peace activist Bertha von Suttner, who got the Peace Prize herself in 1905, long after Nobel died.

There is, however, also some evidence of a sort of compensation mechanism. Although the greater part of Nobel's fortune resulted from the sale of explosives manufactured for civil use, his inventions also led to great improvements in military weapons. This was discussed at the time, and Nobel himself, being a man of high moral standards, was deeply concerned. As a justification for himself and his environment he developed a "deterrence doctrine", holding that his explosives might bring an end to war as war became more terrible. Whether he really believed in deterrence based on his own explosives is uncertain. The establishment of the Peace Prize can be interpreted as a sign that deterrence at least had to be combined with active peace work.

The will contained not only the unexpected decision to establish a peace prize but also
the stipulation that the prize was to be awarded in Norway by a committee of five
appointed by the Norwegian national assembly, the Storting. The other four prizes
were to be awarded in Sweden, Nobel's native country. Why Norway? We have no
definite answer to that question, as Nobel himself gave no explanation for his decision.
We must keep in mind however that Sweden and Norway were in a union at that time,
and that Nobel must have envisaged Sweden and Norway as an entity, which is
somewhat difficult to understand for Norwegians, who at that time were engaged in
a struggle for full national independence. Looking upon Norway and Sweden as an
entity, the choice of the Norwegian Storting as a peace prize awarding institution was
not unnatural. The Norwegian Storting was known to be liberal and had been deeply
engaged in the question of arbitration in international conflicts and in the activities of
the Interparliamantary Union, which was a forerunner of organizations like the League
of Nations and the United Nations.

Throughout the more than 90 years' history of the Nobel Peace Prize, the relationship
between the Nobel Committee and the Norwegian Storting has been a matter of
discussion. The wording of the will only says that the Committee shall be appointed
by the Storting. It doesn't say anything about who should be chosen or how close or
how distant the relationship between the Committee and the Storting should be. To-day
distance is emphasised. As soon as the members have been appointed, the committee
works totally independently of Storting and Government. This is however a result of
a historical development.

To begin with the Committee wanted to emphasise its close connection with the
Storting. In accordance with this view the first award was both announced and
presented in the Storting, and it continued to be so until 1907. Again in 1920, the
award ceremony took place in the Storting, but that was the last time, and the last
occasion on which expressions were used which indicated that the Norwegian Storting
was the real awardee of the prize. It nevertheless remained a common practice for

2

some time to combine membership in the Committee with important political positions. Jørgen Løvland, who chaired the Committee from 1901, when the first prize was awarded, to 1922, is a typical example. He was President of the Storting when elected to the Committee, a government minister when appointed to the chairmanship, and subsequently, while serving as chairman, Prime and Foreign Minister.

In 1937 the Storting passed a resolution forbidding government members from also sitting on the Nobel Committee. The immediate reason for this was events in connection with the Peace Prize to the pacifist and concentration camp prisoner in Hitler's Germany, Carl von Ossietzky, in the preceding year. Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht, who was also a Committee member, wrote to the Committee and requested that he be replaced by a deputy. Ossietzky's candidature was supported by an extensive campaign led by, among others, a later laureate, Willy Brandt, and supported by extremely many influential people both in Europe and in the USA. Koht was himself a strong opponent of fascism, but as Foreign Minister of a small, neutral country close to Germany, he anticipated problems should he sit on a committee which might give the prize to Ossietzky.

The resolution of 1937 demonstrates that political problems could arise if the presentation of the prize was interpreted as an official Norwegian act. The practice of electing distinguished members of the Storting to the Committee continued, however, until the dramatic year 1973 when Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were awarded the prize. Le Duc Tho declined the prize, which has never happened before or since, and the choice of Kissinger is perhaps the most severely critizised decision in the history of the Peace Prize. The criticism must be seen as a criticism of the US war in Vietnam. Two of the members left the Committee, not so much because they had voted against the choice of Kissinger and Duc Tho as because of the way in which the chairman had handled the issue. Furthermore, from that year, there has been an unwritten rule that, as a demonstration of the full autonomy of the Committee, not even members of the Storting should be appointed members.

3

There has always been a majority of distinguished politicians on the Committee. This is still the case. Because of the rules just mentioned, the present politicians have however all left politics. To-day a former Prime Minister and a former government minister from the Labour Party are on the Committee. There is further a former leader of the parliamentary group of the Socialist Party and a former party leader of the Center (Agricultural) Party. In addition there have usually been some members from outside politics, mainly from academia, (like myself). Whereas the members of the Committee are nominated by the different party groups in the Storting according to the relative strength of the different groups, the chairman is elected by the Committee itself. Committee members are appointed for six years at a time. There is a tradition that they serve for two or more terms, which gives a very high degree of continuity in the work of the Committee.

The dominance of the political community is to a certain degree balanced by the academic community if we take a closer look at the procedures of the Committee. The right to nominate for the Peace Prize is inter alia enjoyed by members of national assemblies and governments and by university professors of political science, jurisprudence, history and philosophy. Furthermore, the basis for the deliberations of the committee is prepared by a permanent secretary. He is also Director of the Nobel Institute in Oslo. In preparing the reports for the Committee he can draw upon the staff of the Institute, a group of permanent consultants consisting of three Professors at Oslo University, in addition to ad hoc consultants from an extensive international network.

The financing of the Nobel Prizes and of all the activities in connection with the prize awarding system is taken care of by the Nobel Foundation in Stockholm. The Nobel Prizes this year will amount to 7.2 million Swedish kroner each or about one million dollars. The funds total 2.3 billion Swedish kroner, or between 300 and 400 million dollars. In real values this is about equivalent to what Nobel left in 1897.

I have cited the general clause in Nobel's will saying that the prizes should be given to those who "in the preceding year have conferred the greatest benefit on mankind". With regard to the Peace Prize he specified this to mean - to those "who shall have done the most or the best work for fraternity between nations, for the abolition or reduction of standing armies and for the holding and promotion of peace congresses". The most difficult part to live up to is undoubtedly the one saying "in the preceding year". This is generally taken to mean - "the most recent achievements in the fields of culture referred to in the will". In relation to the Peace Prize it has also been taken to open up the possibility to go into processes which are not concluded but where there has been obvious progress, like the democratization process in South Africa or the peace process in the Middle East for which awards were made in 1993 and 1994. This implies that the prize is not only an award for past achievements even if that is the most important criterion. Possible positive effects of the choices are also taken into consideration. This is moreover based on the obvious point that Nobel wanted the prize to have political effects. The awarding of the prize is, in short, a political act, and that is the reason why it so often stirs up controversy.

The specific mentioning in the will of "reduction of standing armies" and "the holding and promotion of peace congresses" reflects the period in which the will was written. It can however be interpreted as "disarmament" and a general communication of the idea of peace. The most important clause is the one which mentions work for fraternity between nations. This is a very general and open clause which constitutes the basis for the wide definition of peace activities which has characterized the choices of the Committee right from the beginning. The first prize, awarded in 1901, was for instance shared between the founder of the Red Cross, the Swiss Henry Dunant, and the peace activist and cofounder of the Interparliamentary Union, the Frenchman Frederic Passy. To include humanitarian activities among the criteria used by the Committee was immediately criticised inter alia by representatives of the peace movement, but has remained an important criterion ever since.

5

To say that there has been a wide range of criteria from the beginning, is not to say
that there haven't been changes over time. The period up to World War I was the
period dominated by prizes to the organized peace movement, and the tradition has
been kept up if not on the same scale. The decision this year to award the Peace Prize
to Joseph Rotblat and the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs is
indeed very much in line with this tradition, and, I would add, with the spirit of
Nobel's will. What characterizes this year's prize winners is a combination of work
to promote disarmament, and nuclear disarmament in particular, and the striving to
find other solutions to international disputes than war. They combine idealism with
practical solutions. Another aspect which establishes a close connection between this
year's decision and the origin of the Nobel Peace Prize, is the fact that Pugwash is
mainly an organization of scientists whose activities in the organization are based on
a deep commitment to the idea of the social and moral responsibilities of scientists.
Joseph Rotblat is himself an outstanding example of this, which is parallel to Nobel's
own commitments and ideals.

The most controversial choices have been the choices of active politicians or
statesmen, often with reference to a specific action rather than life-long service to
peace. We have mentioned the controversy over the choice of Kissinger. The first
laureate of this kind was the US President, Theodor Roosevelt. He got the prize in
1906 for his "happy intervention to terminate the bloody war recently waged between
two Great Powers, Japan and Russia", to use the wording of the Committee. The
decision was highly controversial. It was an irony, as one newspaper wrote, that "the
wielder of the 'big stick' should be crowned as America's great pacificator". The
period dominated by statesmen as laureates was the interwar years, or the period
starting with the prize to the second US President to receive the prize, the great man
whom we commemorate to-day, Woodrow Wilson.

The choice of Woodrow Wilson was a strong choice, a choice which has stood the test
of time. His great achievement was, as we all know, the establishment of the League

6

of Nations. The League would probably not have been established had it not been for
the dedicated work of President Wilson. His great disappointment was that his own
country, the United States, did not join, which substantially weakened the
organization. It never became what Wilson had envisaged. The vision however
survived and was realized by the creation of the United Nations after World War II.
Wilson was an idealist, a man of high moral standards and a genuinely peace-loving
man, more so than for instance President Theodor Roosevelt. He represents what may
be called the moral element in the peace concept of the Nobel Peace Prize.
Nevertheless, the choice of Wilson was also highly controversial. He had been
nominated in 1918, before the end of the war, but the Committee decided there would
be no prize that year. In 1919, after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, his
candidacy was discussed, but the Committee decided to reserve the prize for the next
year. In 1920 he at last got the prize for 1919. But we know from the diaries of one
of the Committee members that there was strong opposition within the Committee.
The criticism was based on the so-called "treachery" in connection with the Versailles
Treaty. He had been forced into compromises with the consequence that his idealistic
vision of a "peace without victory" had been undermined.

Real world politics must be based on compromises. The Committee has always borne
that in mind, and has never been afraid of taking controversial decisions by honouring
good, practical work for the peace cause in a real world environment. In the case of
Wilson it is possible that a little more diplomatic skill would have saved more
elements of the original vision and perhaps have made the US join the League. We
don't know. What is clear is however that Wilson carried the vision through a troubled
period and achieved a great deal.

After World War II there has been one significant expansion in the range of criteria
used by the Committee, and that is the inclusion of human rights activities. The first
proper human rights prize was given to the South African chief Albert Lutuli in 1960.
Since then there has been a long list of outstanding human rights activists among the

7

laureates: Martin Luther King, Andrei Sacharov, Adolfo Perez Esquivel, Lech Walesa, Desmond Tutu, Eli Wiesel, Aung San Suu Chi, Rigoberta Menchu and others. Even these prizes have been controversial. In the first place they have often been met with disapproval in the prize winner's native country. In some cases it has not even been possible for the winner to come to Oslo to receive the prize. This was the case with Sacharov, Walesa and Suu Chi. But the human rights criteria have also been critizised for not being relevant to the peace cause. In his Nobel lecture in 1982 the Mexican laureate, the skillful diplomat and disarmament champion, Alfonso Garzia Robles made a proposal that the Nobel Foundation should establish a separate prize for human rights. The Committee has however been unwilling to pursue this idea. It feels that the wide definition of peace-relevant work has been generally approved of.

If one takes an overall look at the history of the peace prize, it is clear that the great majority of the laureates are white western males. A dynamic view will however reveal that the tendency during the last decades has been to make it a more global prize with regard both to geography and gender. This widening of the scope of the prize is parallel to its growth in prestige, and probably not unconnected to it and to a change in the general world view. One must keep in mind that even though Nobel had a great vision it was not unbounded. At that time the third world was more or less outside the field of vision of the white man in the developed countries. Nobel's own words in the will reveal the narrowness of the scope of vision of a cosmopolitan of that period. He writes that the most worthy shall receive the prize, "whether he be a Scandinavian or not". The world has indeed become smaller and the scope wider since then. The question remains however whether it is possible to free oneself from one's own cultural background in evaluating the achievements of candidates from all over the world. Do we share the same values with regard to peace all over the world? And if not, how far can a citizen of a small western country like Norway go in evaluating representatives of other countries on their own premises? Is it inevitable that the Nobel Peace Prize should to some degree reflect a western outlook? These are questions the Norwegian Nobel Committee has to struggle with. The global prestige of the prize

8

indicates, I think, that we have had at least some success in widening the scope and
making it a real global prize. Still the distribution of prizes with regard to gender and
geography is not good enough. The question has also been raised whether the
Committee should be changed into a real international committee. The success of the
prize so far is however an argument against changing the institutional basis.
Norwegians trying to think globally is perhaps not the worst solution after all.

We have emphasised the broad definition of peace activities, but what is there to say
about the peace concept itself? In his famous essay "On perpetual peace", written 200
years ago, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant has a prophetic vision of the
possibility of a war of extermination which allows for, as he says, "perpetual peace
only on the vast graveyard of the human race". This is obviously not the kind of peace
we want to honour, but it certainly highlights the problematic concept of peace.
"Peace" can be interpreted as a technical term meaning only - absence of war. The
problem arises in this connection with a technical peace based on threats and on fear, -
the deterrence doctrine (Is that the sort of peace we want to honour?) We mentioned
that Nobel himself had played with the idea, but that it was contrary to his idea of a
peace prize in connection with which he specifically mentioned the abolition of
standing armies. I don't know whether he had read Kant's famous essay or not, but
the wording is parallel. Kant reminds us that standing armies "constantly threaten
other states with war by the very fact that they are prepared for it". The message is
that technical peace based on deterrence is fragile. Perpetual peace must seek another
basis. Note also that the great period of deterrence is not usually referred to as a
period of peace, but as a period of "cold war", and it is very much at odds with
Nobel's notions of disarmament and fraternity. Many Committee members will
certainly countenance the idea that under certain circumstances deterrence is expedient
to guarantee peace in the short run. But that does not mean that this is the sort of
peace that is to honoured by a Nobel Prize. My point is that the peace concept which
forms the basis of the Norwegian Nobel Committee is what I will call a moral
concept. It is the sort of peace which is rooted in the hearts and in the minds that shall

9

be honoured, it is the striving towards fraternity, tolerance, trust, understanding. But
it is also the efforts to create institutional arrangements which allow man "to overcome
the evil principle within him", to cite Kant again, - or to realize his or her best
intentions. It is indeed very important that the prize winners not only are skillful
diplomats, but also can stand forth as symbols of good will and clean hearts. Only
then can the Peace Prize contribute to turning history into a moral endeavor, to use
a phrase coined by the Peace Prize laureate Eli Wiesel.

Why has the Nobel Peace Prize got its enormous prestige? There are many peace
prizes, some of them representing large sums of money. But so far none of them can
compete with the Nobel Prize with regard to prestige. There is an element of chance
in this, in combination with the fact that it is an old prize. There is also a precondition
in what I have discussed, a wide range of criteria, but always with what I have called
a strong moral element. That seems to be exactly the sort of prize which has the
potential to attract people's attention. There is also, I think, a self-reinforcing element:
the attention of many will lead to the attention of many more. In short, there is a need
in many people for symbols which can appeal to their best instincts, which can help
them to overcome the evil principle within themselves, to use Kant's phrase once
more. It looks as if the choices of Nobel Peace Prize laureates to a certain degree has
succeeded in creating symbols of this kind. I wonder whether this goes a long way
towards explaining the prestige of the prize. In the last instance this creating of
symbols of good will is perhaps also the most important effect of the Nobel Peace
Prize.

10

FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

Date: October 10, 1997

To: Ms. Suzanne McFarlane for Dr. Kissinger

Fax: 212/759-0042

Re: Blurb for Amos Perlmutter

Sender: Peter W. Rodman

HK:

Amos Perlmutter has sent you the galleys of his new book, *Making the World Safe for Democracy: A Century of Wilsonianism and Its Totalitarian Challengers*. (See copy of his cover letter attached.) He would like a blurb from you.

The book is a critique of Wilsonianism and of the ideological strain in American foreign policy. He argues that the present world environment shows not only the limits of ideological foreign policy, but even the limits of Wilsonianism as a way of mobilizing the American people's engagement in the world. He calls for a policy based on the national interest and a less exalted goal of maintaining a global balance.

I recommend that you give him a blurb. How about something like: "An original and perceptive contribution to our understanding of not only the century that is just past, but the new post-Cold War environment that we have entered."

The
University
of
North
Carolina
Press

Post Office
Box 2288

Chapel Hill,
North
Carolina

27515-2288
919 966-3561
FAX
919 966-3829

NORTH CAROLINA

COPY

2 October 1997

Henry Kissinger
Henry Kissinger Associates
350 Park Ave., 26th floor
New York, NY 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

This fall we are publishing MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY: A CENTURY OF WILSONIANISM AND ITS TOTALITARIAN CHALLENGERS, by Amos Perlmutter. I am writing to inquire whether you would be willing to look at the page proof for this book and provide us with a one- or two-sentence endorsement that we could use for promotional purposes. An endorsement from you would be extremely helpful in our marketing efforts for this important book.

I am taking the liberty of enclosing a set of Crane proof with this letter. If you are interested in providing us with a blurb, could I possibly hear from you by 25 October? Even if you could not meet this deadline, an endorsement from you would be welcomed and much appreciated.

Thanks very much for considering this request. I have enclosed a business-reply envelope, or you could respond by phone, fax, or email (see below). I look forward to hearing from you.

Phone: 919-966-3561, ext. 233
Fax: 919-966-3829
Email: egray@email.unc.edu

cc: Mr. Peter Rodman

The

University

of

North

Carolina

Press

Post Office

Box 2288

Chapel Hill,

North

Carolina

27515-2288

919 966-3561

FAX

919 966-3829

NORTH CAROLINA

2 October 1997

Peter Rodman
The Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom
1620 I St. NW, Ste. 900
Washington, DC 20006

Dear Mr. Rodman:

Attached please find a copy of a letter I have sent to Dr. Kissinger about the possibility of his providing an endorsement for MAKING THE WORLD SAFE FOR DEMOCRACY: A CENTURY OF WILSONIANISM AND ITS TOTALITARIAN CHALLENGERS, by Amos Perlmutter. I enclose herewith a second copy of the Crane proof for you.

Thanks very much for your help in obtaining an endorsement from Dr. Kissinger. Please do not hesitate to contact me if there is anything else I can do to facilitate this process. (My phone and fax numbers and email address are all listed below.)

Again, many thanks for your help and consideration. I look forward to hearing from you.

encl.

Phone: 919-966-3561, ext. 233

Fax: 919-966-3829

Email: egray@email.unc.edu

STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP

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April 30, 1998

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10022

Dear Henry:

I ran into Peter Rodman yesterday at lunch and he gave me the welcome news that you are approaching the completion of your third volume, covering the Ford years in the White House.

In 1975 I gave you at least one, and perhaps two, classified legal opinions concluding that the Nixon-Thieu letters, contrary to what some columnists were saying, were not binding agreements under international law, but rather "declarations of political intent." This meant that they were not intended to be judged according to the standards of international law or by any international legal tribunal. Nor were they required to be reported to Congress under the Case Act.

It occurs to me that these opinions might be of some use to you in footnoting this final volume even though they are dated after the Nixon-Thieu letters were issued. I do not have copies because these opinions were classified at the time, but I am sure your researchers will be able to find them

The Hon. Henry A. Kissinger

April 30, 1998

somewhere in the State Department archives if they are
not in your files.

Needless to say, I am delighted that you are
completing this project. It will have great
importance to historians and will solidify your
reputation as a public servant who played a remarkable
role in holding the country together during the last
days of the Nixon Administration and the transition to
a less tumultuous period in our history.

I trust this finds you and Nancy well.

cc: Peter Rodman

Ivar-André Slengesol
1941 Calvert St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009
Phone: (202) 332-3860

March 25, 1999

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10022-6022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

A strategic studies student at Johns Hopkins University SAIS, I am currently working on an article on the U.S. role in the 1974 Cyprus crisis. My advisor and professor, Eliot A. Cohen, is overseeing the project.

My research so far includes interviews with former U.S. officials, including James Schlesinger, Joseph Sisco, Arthur Hartman and Thomas Boyatt. During a visit to Cyprus in January, I was able to discuss the matter with key players there.

While you provide an extensive personal account of the affair in *Years of Renewal*, a few specific questions remain unanswered. Some of those outstanding issues were raised by interviewees; others pertain to declassified documents from 1974.

You, as the principal actor, hold the key to these unresolved queries. I would thus greatly appreciate it if you could find the time to share some of your insight with me. If possible, I would like to meet with you in early April.

With your permission, I will follow up on this letter in the coming weeks. Please feel free to contact me should the need arise at (202) 332-3860. Thank you in advance for your time and consideration.

APR-09-1999 16:43

KISSINGER ASSOCIATES

212 759 0041

P.01/01

March 25, 1999

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

You, as the principal actor, hold the key to these unresolved queries. I would greatly appreciate it if you could find the time to share some of your insight with me. If possible, I would like to meet with you in early April.

TOTAL P.01