11/26/86

Dear HAK:

I am sorry to bother you with this but I was asked
by the party involved.

Sammie Newman was one of the oldtime single ladies
on the NSC who worked in about every office during
your tenure, including the weekend detail.

She spent 44 years in government, 30 of them on
the NSC staff as a secretary. Her retirement
party - including a session with the President -
was on April 25, 1985 and the staff orchestrated
a letter from every previous NSC advisor, as well
as multitudes of others.

Through some glitch, we never asked for a letter
from you. Sammie tells me it is of utmost personal
value to her - and her memory book (you should
see it!) that you be included, as you were her
"real favorite." She wonders if you would sign
a letter to her (back-dated) so that you are shown
along with everyone else (Reagan, Carter, Ford,
Nixon, Clarke, Brez, McFarlane, et al).

She is leaving town (home to Tennessee) on Dec.
11 and would "adore" a letter from you.

Might you sign the attached?

Rosemary

Return to RN for transmission to Ms. Newman

A TRIBUTE TO MISS SAMMIE LOIS NEWMAN

On April 30, 1985, Miss Sammie Lois Newman, Executive Assistant to the Honorable Robert M. Kimmitt, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, will conclude her distinguished career of 44 years with the Federal Government. Thirty years have been with the White House-National Security Council Staff.

Miss Newman began her career with the Department of the Interior, where she was selected as a U.S. Government intern to attend the American University School of Business Administration and Public Relations. She was later selected as an agency detailee to the International Secretariat at State Department and assigned to the historic United Nations International Organization Conference in San Francisco. It was an exciting experience assisting in the work of the first UN Charter and meeting Mr. Molotov of the USSR.

After World War II, she became legal and administrative secretary to Assistant Attorney General John F. Sonnet, Department of Justice, where she assisted in the Taft-Hartley/John L. Lewis AFL-CIO labor cases argued before the Supreme Court. During the Korean War, she returned to the Department of the Interior as Administrative Assistant to the Director of Foreign Supply and Transportation. Additional assignments to the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and United States Information Agency followed.

During the Presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, Sammie joined the White House Staff as an Administrative Assistant to the Armed Services Presidential Task Force headed by General Jimmie Doolittle in the Office of the Assistant to the President for Disarmament. She later worked at the Disarmament Hearings at the UN.

She subsequently joined the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities and worked with such renowned personages as Dr. James R. Killian, Chairman; Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett; Ambassadors Joseph Kennedy and David K. E. Bruce; and Dr. William O. Baker. This assignment carried her into the John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson Administrations in which she continued liaison work with the Board and the National Security Council Office of Internal Security and Intelligence Liaison headed by A. Russell Ash. From this position, she was selected to work on the Presidential Transition Team for President Richard M. Nixon with Mr. Ash and General Alexander Haig.

During the Nixon Administration, she served under Dr. Robert Hormats, Special Assistant to the President and Director of International Economics, assisting him in numerous international summits. Under President Gerald R. Ford, she assisted the President's Commission on CIA Activities within the United States chaired by Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, and among its illustrious members was then California Governor Ronald Reagan. She established and organized its control system of operation, arranging Presidential meetings and preparing the final report to the President. She was also appointed by the Commission as its notary public. In this role she administered oaths to witnesses at the Commission hearings and executed depositions and affidavits.

Sammie continued her broad experience by working for the NSC Office of Freedom of Information in its early years of development. Once again she was chosen to support a Presidential Transition team assisting in the preparation of briefing books for President Jimmy Carter and Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Miss Newman has served with Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt for the past seven years, beginning with his appointment as General Counsel to the National Security Council and continuing with his appointments as Director of Legislative Affairs and Security Assistance, Executive Secretary, and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. She organized the security assistance control system, assisting in the preparation for the hearings on the AWACS legislation and, as Mr. Kimmitt's Executive Assistant, has been his scheduling and public relations officer.

Due to her deep appreciation of the history of the White House, Sammie has conducted many tours for special groups and friends. She is an active member of the National Presbyterian Church and is proud to be a member of their choir. She enjoys photography and plans to take back to her native state of Tennessee photographic slides of many official State ceremonies.

For: Ms. Chris Vick

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Sept 2, 1985

Dear Chris:

Although I haven't met you, Ollie North of our White House/NSC Staff has told me so much about you that I feel I might have talked with you by 'phone sometime in my boss, Bob Kimmitt's, contact with your office from time to time.

In April, our Director of Information Security, Brenda Reger, contacted your office inviting Dr. Kissinger and staff to a Retirement Reception in the Indian Treaty Room in tribute of my 44 years Career Service, 30 years of which was on the White House Staff. She asked if Dr. Kissinger would be so kind to send a letter of tribute, along with the other former Assistants to the Presidents for National Security Affairs. In perusing my book of tributes, everyone is asking, where is Dr. Kissinger's letter? They all seem to know he was one of my most favorite people, since I enjoyed so much working with General Haig on the Nixon Transition Team bringing all on board, then later assigned to Dr. Robert Hormats, and from time to time working over with Jon Howe, Peter Rodman and Winston Lord in the downstairs office, and the great China breakthrough, such great years!

I would be most appreciative to have a letter from Dr. Kissinger. For your information I am attaching a copy of my invitation-program, and letters from President Reagan, former President Nixon, and Bud McFarlane who hosted the reception. President Reagan received my two sisters and their young people in the Oval Office for a photo session which was exciting and made the Tennessee papers! Thanks for your help Chris.

My address is:

Miss Sammie Lois Newman
Apartment #410
2124 Eye Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20037
(Telephone: 785-4356)

ELC]

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY

School of Foreign Service
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

Hon. Ellsworth Bunker
Chairman (1978-1984)
Hon. Martin F. Herz
Director of Studies (1978-1983)

Board of Directors
Hon. Edmund S. Muskie
Chairman

Hon. John P. Humes
Dr. Peter F. Krogh
Hon. George C. McGhee
Vice-Chairmen
Hon. Lucius D. Battle
Hon. Maurice M. Bernbaum
Hon. Winthrop G. Brown
Mrs. John Moors Cabot
Marshall B. Coyne
Hon. Joseph S. Farland
Hon. Kenneth Franzheim II
Hon. Parker T. Hart
Hon. Ulric Haynes, Jr.
Dr. Elisabeth K. Herz
Jim Hoagland
R. Michael Huffington
Hon. Carol C. Laise
Gloria Elliott Lemos
Hon. Alonzo L. McDonald
Hon. Robert S. McNamara

Robert R. Nathan
Dr. Edmund D. Pellegrino
Jane G. Pisano
Hon. John E. Reinhardt
Hon. Abraham Ribicoff
Hon. Kenneth Rush
Smith Simpson
Hon. Gerard C. Smith
Hon. John Wills Tuthill
Hon. Charles S. Whitehouse

Hon. David D. Newsom
Director
(202) 625-3321

Hon. Harold E. Horan
Director of Programs

Margery R. Boichel
Editor

December 5, 1985

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Center for Strategic
and International Studies
1800 K Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

DEC 9 1985

Dear Henry:

At the beginning of this year the Institute for the
Study of Diplomacy commissioned a study focusing on the
preparations for East-West summit meetings held from 1955
in Geneva to 1979 in Vienna. The author, Gordon R.
Weihmiller, is a doctoral candidate in the Government
Department.

While the study was still in progress, the Reagan-
Gorbachev meeting suddenly materialized. We were unable
to publish our study in final form prior to the November
19-20 meeting, but hope to bring it out within the next
2-3 months. It will be co-published by arrangement with
University Press of America.

Following some preliminary observations of my own,
the author reviews the preparatory phases of the ten mostly
U.S.-Soviet summit meetings since World War II and briefly
summarizes the outcome of each. He begins by recounting
the preliminary maneuvering leading to the Reagan-Gorbachev
agreement to meet. Dusko Doder has agreed to write an
epilogue commenting on their meeting. An appendix will
contain a brief chronology of the eleven summits since
1955, a synopsis of each, and the documentation--notes,
communiques, presidential statements, and the like--for
each summit, reprinted from the Department of State
Bulletin. A copy of the table of contents is enclosed.

It will not surprise you to learn that Mr. Weihmiller
has drawn upon your own books in his research on the Nixon-
Brezhnev and Ford-Brezhnev summits. In his manuscript he
has quoted verbatim at several points from your books, The
White House Years and Years of Upheaval, roughly 412 words
from the former, 211 words from the latter. The specific
citations are attached to this letter. Full credit will,
of course, be given in footnotes and bibliography.

Washington DC 20057
202-625-3784/6647

December 11, 1985

MEMO FOR HAK

FROM: Rosemary

SUBJECT: David Newsom Seeks your Permission to Use Quotes from Your Memoirs

In the attached, Dave Newsom asks for your written permission to use some verbatim quotes from both your memoirs in a study on summitry since 1955; it will soon be copublished by his Institute and the University Press of America.

He attached only the selected pages on which your quotes appear - Tab A. The quotes are highlighted in yellow.

Technically (I double-checked with Betsy Pitha) for use of quotes in this range of numbers of words, permission must come from the publisher - a caveat noted on the inside flap of your books.

Attached is a suggested reply to Newsom pointing him in the right direction.

____ Approve (sign) attached

____ Just call Newsom (RN to call) and tell him what to do with Little Brown. No letter necessary.

Note: Directing him to Little Brown has the added virtue of distance from the text. I read over the selected pages and the author - a doctoral candidate at Georgetown - made a reasonable effort to summarize your and RN's views on the summits. I see possibly a couple of overdrawn points and some other efforts. But, unless you want to get drawn in to debating the merits of the chapter, this is not your problem.

[Lc]

Contents

Foreword, David D. Newsom................................................................

1. Arranging U.S.-Soviet Summits

Getting to Geneva, November 1985........................................

Elements of the Process....................................................

2. The Eisenhower-Khrushchev Summits

The Geneva Conference of Heads of Government,
July 18-23, 1955....................................................

Khrushchev's State Visit and Camp David Meeting,
September 15-27, 1959....................................................

The Paris Heads of Government Conference,
May 16-17, 1960....................................................

3. The Vienna and Glassboro Summit Meetings

Kennedy and Khrushchev at Vienna, June 3-4, 1961....................

Johnson and Kosygin at Glassboro, June 23-25, 1967................

4. The Nixon-Brezhnev Summits

The Moscow Summit, May 22-30, 1972..................................

Brezhnev's Visit to the U.S., June 18-25, 1973....................

The Moscow Summit and State Visit
June 27-July 3, 1974..................................................

5. The Vladivostok and Vienna Summits

Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok,
November 23-24, 1974..................................................

Carter and Brezhnev at Vienna, June 15-18, 1979..................

6. Conclusions................................................................

["[LC]", "Afterword, Dusko Doder............................

REACHING THE TOP: U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY SINCE 1955
(c) 1985, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

## Chapter Four

# The Nixon-Brezhnev Summits

In terms of their sheer complexity and scope, the three Nixon-Brezhnev summit meetings vastly exceeded the previous five encounters between U.S. and Soviet leaders in the postwar years and produced a host of agreements, the most notable of which embodied accords on strategic arms limitations for the first time in the history of the strained relations between the two countries. The interrelationship between these summits and developments in strategic weapons, the war in Vietnam, and the onset of a period of détente has been addressed in copious volumes and intense debates ever since. For the far more limited purposes of this study, only the main currents of these events will be addressed as they relate to the circumstances and motivations leading to the summit.

### The Moscow Summit, May 22-30, 1972

President Richard M. Nixon had campaigned on the promise of ending U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war. The mechanism for our extrication became as much a part of the summit process as did developments in the strategic arms limitation talks that convened in Helsinki in November 1969. In the broadest sense, President Nixon and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger sought to enlist Soviet interest in assisting the United States in finding an acceptable way to terminate the war in exchange for improved relations between Moscow and Washington. Because of increasingly visible strains in Soviet relations with the People's Republic of China, better relations with Washington were judged to be every bit as important to Soviet interests as finding an end to U.S. intervention in Vietnam was to our own. Both countries would come to find strong motivations for improving their relations, but for fundamentally different reasons.

According to his national security adviser, President Nixon entered the White House convinced like his predecessors, particularly Eisenhower, that a summit meeting with the Soviets could only succeed if it was well-prepared. "His original intention was to use the prospect of a summit only when it could be a means to extract important Soviet concessions."

The first Soviet "feeler" about the prospects for a summit meeting was raised by Ambassador Dobrynin in talks with Kissinger on January 20, 1970,

1 Henry A. Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), p. 552.

[LC]

but Kissinger demurred, (stating) that the timing was not yet right. The two met again in April, and Dobrynin floated the possibility of a meeting when Premier Kosygin attended the opening session of the United Nations in New York; but this was again rejected. Other exchanges continued and on June 23 Dobrynin suggested that the two leaders might want to discuss developments in the Middle East, China and Southeast Asia, as well as European security. It appeared to Kissinger that the Soviets were toying with Nixon's known desires for a summit by proposing a long shopping list of subjects to test the president's eagerness:

> They wanted to be paid in advance for agreeing to the summit and then be paid again at the summit. They tried to obtain a de facto alliance against China, a European Security Conference, and a SALT agreement on their own terms--all as an entrance price into the summit.

> Nixon was not that eager. Nor was he incompetent. He agreed to none of these demands, and the Soviets achieved nothing.

Further exchanges about the possibilities of a meeting later in the year continued until September 25, when the Soviets suggested postponing further talk on summit prospects until the following year. The delay upset Nixon, for it meant that our involvement in Vietnam would continue without the prospect of gaining Soviet assistance at a summit for its termination. A month later, on October 22, Dobrynin and Foreign Minister Gromyko met with Nixon, Kissinger, and Secretary of State Rogers, who had not previously been involved in the summit discussions.

Gromyko appeared amenable to the idea of a summit but wanted to see a settlement on the Berlin problem first. A Soviet-FRG agreement had been signed on August 12, 1970, recognizing existing borders, but formal agreement among the wartime allies was still required for settlement. Efforts to resolve that lingering problem were undertaken in January 1971 in talks between Kissinger and Dobrynin in Washington and were directly linked to the prospects for a summit that year by the Soviet ambassador.3 (Those talks eventually led to the Quadripartite Agreement on Germany of September 3, 1971.) Also in January, President Nixon initiated "back channel" communications with Moscow in an effort to resolve differences and break deadlocks in the strategic arms limitation talks.

Throughout the spring of 1971 summit prospects were alternately connected with progress on SALT, the Berlin situation, and Vietnam. It appeared that both sides were now trying the carrot-and-stick routine, with the summit in the balance. Another effort was made on June 8 to come to agreement on a date for the summit as Kissinger and Dobrynin met at Camp David, but again the details of timing were put off. Shortly after, in early July, Kissinger was off on his "secret trip" to China that resulted in

2 Ibid., p. 557.

3 Ibid., p. 833: "Clearly, if I linked Berlin to SALT, the Soviets linked Berlin to a summit."

41

stem the current offensive. Discussion then turned to other subjects on the summit's proposed agenda, a development evidently at variance with Nixon's desires. Whereas the president wanted to use the threat of cancelling the summit in order to gain Soviet cooperation on Vietnam, Kissinger judged it wiser to "shift the risks and the onus for cancellation to the Soviets and to use Moscow's eagerness for the summit as a device for separating Moscow from Hanoi."⁶ Communication delays and the difference in time zones between Washington and Moscow further aggravated this divergence, as later recounted by Kissinger, but the talks did result in an agenda that was acceptable to both sides.

To minimize the potential for "leaks" from these discussions, Kissinger used a Soviet interpreter. It was only after their completion that he made known his presence in Moscow to U.S. Ambassador Jacob Beam and provided him with a "back-briefing" of the results. After the trip, Secretary of State Rogers sent a memorandum to the president on March 14 stating that he intended to "take personal charge" of the summit preparations; but Nixon responded to the effect that all major preparations would be supervised by the national security adviser.⁷

With the subsequent failure of Kissinger's secret meeting with Le Duc Tho in Paris on May 2 to make any progress on the mounting hostilities in Vietnam, the president was facing the predicament of negotiating with the Soviets in Moscow at the same time they were supporting the Vietnamese offensive. The prospects for a summit failure of the type Eisenhower experienced in Paris in 1960 obviously came to mind. If there was to be any cancellation of the Moscow summit, he wanted to initiate it.⁸ Caught in the bind, Nixon decided on May 8 on a resumption of the bombing of Hanoi and mining of Haiphong Harbor. As recalled in his memoirs, the president stated: "The summit isn't worth a damn if the price for it is losing in Vietnam. My instinct tells me that the country can take losing the summit,

⁶ Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1154. President Nixon's account is as follows: "We were...completely agreed on our overall strategy and goals as he prepared for his trip to Moscow. However, his opinion on the tactics he should follow in his talks was somewhat different than mine....[He] continued to feel that flexibility must be the cornerstone of any successful negotiation, and he urged me to let him feel out the situation rather than risk everything by imposing any rigid preconditions." Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 587-88.

⁷ Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1128.

⁸ In a memorandum to Kissinger, the President wrote: "...I intend to cancel the Summit unless the situation militarily and diplomatically substantially improves by May 15 at the latest or unless we get a firm commitment from the Russians to announce a joint agreement at the summit to use our influence to end the war." Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 593-94.

44

[LC]

In contrast, the American approach was pragmatic. It began with the specifics. It offered a fairly complete, complex, and detailed package proposal. It focused on concrete, militarily meaningful measures for arms control. It stressed specific measures reflecting "fine tuning" adjustments in the military balance in order to enhance strategic stability and mutual deterrence.14

The joint announcement in Moscow and Washington on October 12, 1971 of agreement to hold the summit meeting in May 1972 put additional pressures on the SALT negotiators to come to terms with remaining issues. By the time the summit convened, there were three such outstanding problems: 1) the distance permitted between the two ABM systems that would be allowed; 2) what increases in size or volume, if any, would be permitted for ICBMs and their silos; and 3) what submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to count (i.e., the SLBMs on new versus older submarines).15 Resolution of these matters became the principal task of President Nixon and Kissinger at the summit meeting. The president would negotiate directly with General Secretary Brezhnev on these details, a task that he felt was befitting the leaders of the two countries.16

Kissinger, with assistance by NSC staff members Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William Hyland (both Soviet experts), coordinated developments with Gromyko and his aides and with the U.S. SALT delegation that remained stationed in Helsinki. Efforts at the latter were "astonishingly cumbersome," as recalled by Kissinger later, and he judged that it would have been better to have the SALT teams in Moscow to work in synchronization with the summit proceedings.17 In addition to coordinating problems on issues of substance, particularly on SLBM matters, communications with Helsinki were awkward at best. Messages from Helsinki went through State Department channels with a copy to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, which was then delivered to the administrative headquarters set up in the Hotel Rossiya, and finally taken to the Kremlin where Nixon and Kissinger stayed during the summit. Evidently

14 U.S. Congress, *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy*, op. cit., p. 459. See also Garthoff, "Negotiating SALT," pp. 81-82, and his "Negotiating with the Russians," p. 5.

15 Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 1217-19.

16 Nixon, *Memoirs*, p. 592, states the following: "Having reached this impasse, Kissinger proceeded to move on to further discussion of the summit agenda items. He was able to arrange the entire agenda except for the most sensitive elements of SALT, which would require direct negotiation between Brezhnev and me."

17 Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1229-30.

some "bugging" problems there necessitated the use of a "scrambler," further compounding the difficulties. 18

Among the various meetings between Nixon and Brezhnev, which often shifted in composition depending on subject matter, there were a number of private sessions in which the only other person present was a Soviet interpreter, Viktor Sukhodrev. That procedure was subsequently questioned, since it deprived the U.S. of transcripts of the discussions and later gave rise to suspicions of "secret agreements" being reached between the two leaders. Based on other meetings in which he participated, Kissinger later concluded:

> The meetings demonstrated that heads of government should not negotiate complex subjects. Neither Brezhnev nor Nixon had mastered the technical issues; both were lagging hours behind the delegations in Helsinki, who were going merrily ahead on the very same points. 19

The summit put pressures on the negotiations to finalize agreements in time for signature by the principals, which resulted in some hastily concluded SALT documents. The SLBM portion of the Interim Agreement, contained in the Protocol to that agreement, has been cited most often as an example: It apparently had to be done over after signature and signed again by the leaders a day or two later.

Among the other agreements signed, which covered such matters as environmental protection, medical science and public health, cooperation in space, science and technology, and prevention of incidents at sea, the one entitled *Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics* was of special significance to Moscow. Soviet interest in such an agreement was initially raised by Ambassador Dobrynin in his talks with Kissinger in Washington, and its consummation at the summit was construed in Moscow as symbolizing U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union as a co-equal superpower. Although this agreement was generally devoid of operative content, Kissinger observed that

> ...the fundamental achievement was to sketch the outline on which coexistence between the democracies and the Soviet system must be based. SALT embodied our conviction that a wildly spiraling nuclear arms race was in no country's interest and enhanced no one's security; the "Basic Principles" gave at least verbal expression to the necessity of responsible political conduct. The two elements reinforced each other; they symbolized our conviction that a relaxation of tensions could not be based exclus-

18 The "scrambler" was used in an attempt to thwart Soviet "bugging" of their rooms in the Kremlin. On sensitive matters, Nixon and Kissinger would take refuge in their official car or go for a walk. Source: 7

19 Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 1220.

REACHING THE TOP: U.S.-SOVIET SUMMITRY SINCE 1955
(с) 1985, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

[Lc]

ively on arms control; the ultimate test would be restrained
international behavior.20

One final aspect of the Moscow summit proceedings concerns what has
since been called the "shock tactics" employed by Soviet leaders in their
informal talks with Nixon and Kissinger.21 After Brezhnev somewhat
impulsively spirited the president away from the Kremlin for a hydrofoil
ride on the Moscow River, the principals regrouped at his dacha for
discussions and dinner. But the festive mood suddenly changed into a
confrontation over Vietnam and the recent round of B-52 bombings of Hanoi
and Haiphong the president had ordered just before the summit. Brezhnev
lambasted Nixon for the "barbaric act" of mining the North Vietnamese harbors
and this was followed with similar attacks by President Podgorny and Premier
Kosygin. And, just as suddenly as the mood had turned sour, the tirade
abruptly ended when the leaders went to a later-than-expected dinner, where
Soviet hospitality and conviviality returned. The Vietnam session was,
apparently, a pro forma performance for the Soviets. Nixon later remarked
that it reminded him of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde.22

A joint communique was released on May 29. It was all but complete
before the summit took place, as Kissinger and Dobrynin had started work on
it in Washington. There was only one major area of disagreement to be settled
and that concerned the Middle East. The Soviets wanted a strong statement
on joint efforts to achieve peace in the region; but, unwilling to open the
door to further Soviet involvement and influence in the Middle East, Kissinger
would agree only to a bland statement on the matter. He later attributed
President Sadat's expulsion of Soviet advisers in July of that year to
Moscow's inability to achieve more for its Arab client state at the summit.23

Upon the president's return to Washington on June 1, he immediately
reported to Congress that "the foundation has been laid for a new relationship
between the two most powerful nations in the world."24 Kissinger's assessment
was as follows:

> The context as well as the content of the summit made it a major success for American foreign policy. The fact that we had faced down Hanoi and yet completed major negotiations with Moscow... evoked the prospect of a more hopeful future and thus put Vietnam into perspective. The summits helped us complete the isolation

20 *Ibid.*, pp. 1253-54. (why)

21 See, for example, Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 611-14.

22 *Ibid.*, p. 613.

23 Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1248.

24 President Nixon's *Address to Congress* on June 1, 1972, "The Moscow
Summit: New Opportunities in U.S.-Soviet Relations," reprinted in
U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol. 66, No. 1722 (June 26, 1972), p. 855.

of Hanoi by giving Moscow and Peking a stake in their ties with us. What was even more novel, we were freed for the better part of the year from the domestic turmoil on which thus far Hanoi had always been able to count. This, together with the military defeat of the North Vietnamese offensive, led to a breakthrough in the peace negotiations within months. The summit was equally significant for the evolution of the Middle East....[I]t marked a turning point at which moderate Arab leaders began to move toward Washington....25

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems Treaty was approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and endorsed 88-2 by the full Senate on August 3. The Interim Agreement passed both houses of Congress in September, and on the 30th of that month the president signed the joint resolution authorizing approval of the Interim Agreement and Protocol thereto. Both accords then became effective on October 3rd with the exchange of ratifications.26

## Brezhnev's Visit to the U.S., June 18-25, 1973

Negotiations for a SALT II agreement commenced six months after the Moscow summit. In October 1972 a trade agreement was signed in Washington at the same time that the old Lend-Lease debt problem was finally resolved by compromise on both the U.S. and Soviet sides.27 But some misgivings began to surface on the SALT agreements, particularly about whether the U.S. had accepted a "second-best" position with regard to the SLBM figures. Instructions to the U.S. SALT negotiating team in Geneva became confused because of the controversy and represented "a melange" of differing positions from the departments and agencies.28 As the talks resumed in early 1973, Kissinger prepared to undertake another trip to Moscow to arrange the details for Brezhnev's return visit to the United States in June, as had been approved at the Moscow summit. Prior to doing so, however, he made further progress with the Chinese on a visit to Peking in February 1973, which resulted in agreement to set up liaison offices in the two capitals to further efforts at a normalization in Sino-American relations. Earlier, in late January 1973, the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam had been signed. The combination of improved relations with China and an end

25 Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1253.

26 U.S. Congress, *Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior: Emerging New Context for U.S. Diplomacy*, pp. 484.

27 Beam, *Multiple Exposure*, pp. 287-88, states that the Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) status was conditioned on settlement of the Lend-Lease account and that in the 1950s the U.S. demanded $10 billion to settle that but compromised at $722 million when both agreements were signed in Washington, D.C. on October 18, 1972.

28 Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), p. 271.