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Mr. Chairman:

It is a pleasure to have an opportunity to speak to you today. To save time I would like to submit for the record the following adaptation of articles published in *The Washington Post* on August 19th, September 30th and November 11th as a basis for discussion.

## Objectives

American objectives have included fulfillment of stated UN goals of restoration of the status quo ante in Kuwait as well as the unconditional release of all hostages. But to contribute to President Bush's objective of stability in the Gulf, any solution to the crisis must also provide for a reduction of Iraq's offensive capability which now overshadows its neighbors. Without addressing this fundamental imbalance, a solution will only postpone, and probably exacerbate, an eventual resolution of Gulf instability.

Were Saddam suddenly to accept the UN terms, he would in fact preserve the essence of his power, although it would represent a huge loss of prestige for him. Iraq would still retain its chemical and nuclear capabilities. Its large standing army would still preserve the capacity to overwhelm the area. Many nations in the Middle East might adjust to the perception that the mobilization of forces from all over the world cannot be repeated every few years.

Reducing Iraq's military potential is especially important if US forces are to be substantially withdrawn from the Gulf as I believe they should be. At the same time, it would be undesirable to reduce Iraq's armed forces below what is needed for equilibrium with its neighbors, especially in light of their past records, which attest to a low threshold of resistance to the temptations of a military vacuum.

## Early Choices

The United States had three choices in dealing with the crisis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: it could passively endorse whatever consensus emerged in the United Nations; it could support whatever the industrial democracies--all of which

[i]

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are more dependent on Mideast oil than the United States is--
were prepared to do in concert; or it could take the lead in
opposing Saddam Hussein and try to organize international support
for an effort in which the United States would bear the principal
burden.

The Administration concluded that anything other than a
leadership role for the United States would have ended with
making Iraqi domination of Kuwait permanent and would lead to the
collapse of the moderate governments in the region including
Egypt. Having committed the United States to a leadership role,
President Bush made another crucial decision. The American
military role could have been confined to interdiction at sea and
a token force on the ground to make clear that an attack on Saudi
oil fields would lead to war with the United States. President
Bush and his advisers opted for a massive deployment. They
concluded that once they committed military forces, the best hope
of ending the crisis quickly was to assemble an overwhelming
force to overawe such a threat and to be able to go further if
necessary.

In short, early in America's involvement there was some
argument as to whether American vital interests justified a
massive deployment in the Gulf. That debate has since been
overtaken by the scale of our deployment and the number of
countries that have followed America's leadership in the Gulf.

The perception of American failure would shake international
stability. Every moderate country in the Middle East would be
gravely weakened by a debacle. Several Gulf states could not
survive it. Egypt, Morocco and even Turkey would face a tide of
radicalism and fundamentalism.

Sanctions or Military Action?

The United States is approaching the point in the Middle
East crisis where a choice must be made between a course relying
on sanctions or, as a last resort, on a military course.

The two approaches have been presented as if they were
successive phases of the same policy. In fact, they will prove
mutually exclusive because by the time it is evident that
sanctions alone cannot succeed, a credible military option will
probably no longer exist.

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To achieve the proclaimed objectives by sanctions, at least five hurdles must be overcome:

* The sanctions must bite.

* They must be maintained throughout any negotiations.

* Once the UN terms are achieved, arms control objectives must be addressed.

* The military option must remain intact psychologically, technically and diplomatically during the entire course of the negotiations.

* There must be no other upheavals to deflect the United States or to rend allied cohesion.

To state these hurdles is to set forth the practical obstacles to clearing them.

For one thing, upheavals in the Middle East are a way of life. In one recent week, the second highest ranking official in Egypt was assassinated, Syria battled Christian forces in Beirut, and 21 Palestinians died in Jerusalem.

If the sanctions do bite within a time frame relevant to political processes, Iraq is more likely to offer to negotiate than to yield.

In that case, pressures to ease the sanctions will be difficult to resist. Which democracy will want to be responsible for starvation in Iraq and Kuwait once negotiations are under way?

The fundamental dilemma is that the UN terms leave no real room for negotiation--except perhaps the staging of the Iraqi withdrawal. Thus all so-called diplomatic solutions effectively dilute the UN objectives while maintaining Iraq's war-making potential and thus confirming Iraq as the supreme military power of the Middle East.

For example, even if Saddam accepts the principle of withdrawal from Kuwait, he has already hinted--and Soviet presidential aide Yevgeny M. Primakov has confirmed--that he would define Kuwait as excluding a strip of land containing a major oil field as well as two islands controlling access to the Shatt el-Arab. And President Mitterrand has stated that only agreement in principle to withdrawal is needed to bring about a negotiation.

[x]

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Saddam's Arab neighbors will surely note that none of the proposals in the public discussion would reduce Iraq's military pre-eminence or restore Kuwait completely.

If they conclude that they will be condemned to live with a dominant Iraq, they will begin their own negotiations. Recent remarks by Saudi Defense Minister Sultan suggest that the haggling may already have begun.

But will the psychological basis for a military option still exist after months of such inconclusive maneuvering? And without a realistic military threat, how can the US/UN objectives be achieved?

And having faced down the combined might of UN forces and of the United States, Iraq would have little incentive to make concessions to the fears of its neighbors in any subsequent arms control negotiation.

## A Regional Security System?

Many who opt for sanctions-induced negotiations recognize that sanctions will not be able to achieve a balance of power in the Gulf. They propose to protect a settlement by a new regional security system based on a significant American military presence in Saudi Arabia.

I consider this a dangerous mirage. If, after the adamant pronouncements from Washington and the deployment of a large expeditionary force, a regional balance of power could not be reached, no Gulf state would easily entrust its fate to a long-term American presence.

The often-heard argument that America proved its staying power in Korea and Europe misses the point. The issue in Arabia is not American staying power but the host country's domestic stability.

Conditions in the Gulf are not even remotely comparable to Europe or Northeast Asia. There, American forces contributed to domestic stability; in Saudi Arabia they would threaten it.

A substantial American ground establishment would soon become the target of radical and nationalist agitation. Once Iraq has faced down US and UN terms, such a force would sooner or later become hostage to revolutionary Iraq, fundamentalist Iran and events substantially out of our control.

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Nor can the restoration of the military balance in the Gulf be left to subsequent arms control negotiations. For having faced down the combined might of UN forces and of the United States, Iraq would have little incentive to make concessions to the fears of its neighbors in any subsequent arms control negotiation.

In short, the route of sanctions and the military option can be pursued up to a certain point simultaneously. At some point, however, trying to pursue both courses will turn into an evasion incompatible with reaching what should be our objectives. At that point the US must choose a strategy appropriate to its objectives or else choose objectives achievable by whatever policy we are willing to implement.

## What Military Strategy?

If war proved unavoidable it is to be hoped that military strategy remains related to realistic political objectives.

Outsiders should not play field marshal. But America has no national interest in weakening Iraq to a point where it becomes a tempting target for covetous neighbors.

If war does prove unavoidable, our objective should be not to destroy Iraq, but rather to raise the cost of occupying Kuwait to unacceptable levels while reducing Iraq's capacity to threaten its neighbors.

The destruction of the Iraqi military complex, especially its chemical and nuclear facilities as well as its air and missile forces, would improve the military balance in the Gulf and would speed up the effect of sanctions.

Such a strategy would rely on air and naval power and use ground forces primarily to overawe a response. As the government of Iraq, which is after all a military dictatorship, sees its principal source of power erode, a negotiation more compatible with stated US objectives could result.

Even if one of the compromises sketched above came eventually to be adopted--a contingency I would regret--the setback would be eased by the reduction in the Iraqi military threat. I am extremely skeptical about a full-scale ground assault.

6

## Conclusion

In the process of overcoming the current crisis, the United States must not emerge as the permanent defender of every status quo. But the path to peace and progress resides in success in the Gulf.

Afterwards the United States, together with its Arab partners, can demonstrate the benefits of cooperative action in promoting the well-being of the Arab peoples.

Too, the United States should then seek energetically to make progress toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially now that looming disaster might have brought all sides second thoughts about both the nature of a peace and suitable participants in peace negotiations. But such a move cannot be linked to the resolution of the current crisis for to do so would turn Saddam into a hero in the Arab world.

It is to be hoped that a united America can find a way that avoids both a military strategy of total destructiveness and a diplomatic strategy committed to amassing UN resolutions--the progressive disregard of which will at some point demonstrate the UN's impotence rather than an international consensus.

But whatever our destination, we must arrive at it by design rather than as captives of circumstances.

1

Mr. Chairman:

## Objectives

[4]

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## Early Choices

The United States had three choices in dealing with the crisis of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: it could passively endorse whatever consensus emerged in the United Nations; it could support whatever the industrial democracies--all of which are more dependent on Mideast oil than the United States is--were prepared to do in concert; or it could take the lead in opposing Saddam Hussein and try to organize international support for an effort in which the United States would bear the principal burden.

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Sanctions or Military Action?

* The sanctions must bite.

[y]

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What Military Strategy?

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Conclusion

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SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE TRANSCRIPT INSTRUCTIONS

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CONTENTS

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2 STATEMENT OF: PAGE

3 HON. SAM NUNN, U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 3

4 DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, PRESIDENT, KISSINGER ASSOCIATES 4

5 AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

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HEARING TO

CONTINUE TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON

U.S. PERSIAN GULF POLICY

Wednesday, November 28, 1990

U. S. Senate

Committee on Armed Services

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:05 p.m., in Room SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Sam Nunn, (Chairman of the committee), presiding.

Present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Kennedy, Bingaman, Dixon, Glenn, Gore, Wirth, Shelby, Byrd, Warner, Thurmond, Cohen, Wilson, McCain, Wallop, Gorton, Lott, and Coats.

Also Present: Senator Dodd.

Armed Services Committee Staff Members Present: Arnold L. Punaro, Staff Director; Andrew S. Effron, General Counsel; and Richard DeBobes, Counsel.

Professional Staff Members Present: Richard E. Combs, Jr., Creighton Greene, John J. Hamre, David S. Lyles, Michael J. McCord, Frederick F. Y. Pang, and William H. Smith.

Minority Staff Members Present: Patrick A. Tucker, Minority Staff Director and Counsel; Romie L. Brownlee, Deputy Staff Director for the Minority; Brian D. Dailey, Professional

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1 Staff Member; George W. Lauffer, Professional Staff Member;

2 Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., Professional Staff Member; and Ann

3 Elise Sauer, Professional Staff Member.

4 Staff Assistants Present: Kelli J. Corts, Mary J. Kampo,

5 Melissa A. Ramsey, and Debra A. Rice.

6 Committee Members' Assistants Present: Andrew W.

7 Johnson, Assistant to Senator Exon; Kenneth N. Luongo,

8 Assistant to Senator Levin; William J. Lynn, Assistant to

9 Senator Kennedy; Nancy E. Soderberg, Assistant to Senator

10 Kennedy, John Gerhart, Assistant to Senator Bingaman; Charles

11 C. Smith, Assistant to Senator Dixon; Milton D. Beach,

12 Assistant to Senator Glenn; Jefferson B. Seabright, Assistant

13 to Senator Wirth; Terrence M. Lynch, Assistant to Senator

14 Shelby; C. Richard D'Amato, Assistant to Senator Byrd;

15 Christopher K. Mellon, Assistant to Senator Cohen; Anthony H.

16 Cordesman, Assistant to Senator McCain; Lee E. Whittaker,

17 Assistant to Senator Wallop; Robert M. Soofer, Assistant to

18 Senator Gorton; Charles G. Pearcy, Assistant to Senator Lott;

19 and Eric H. Thoemmes, Assistant to Senator Coats.

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1 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, U.S. SENATOR FROM

2 GEORGIA

3 The Chairman: The Armed Services Committee meets this
4 afternoon to receive testimony from Dr. Henry Kissinger, whose
5 credentials as a thoughtful and informed student of
6 international affairs, as a former national security advisor
7 and a former Secretary of State are impeccable and well known
8 to all of us..

9 Dr. Kissinger, we greatly appreciate your willingness to
10 appear before us today as you have in the past. I know that
11 you have a very busy schedule, and we impose on you. But you
12 are always a reservoir of good, sound advice and we are
13 looking forward to your testimony here today.

14 Dr. Kissinger's agreement with the chairman here was that
15 we would have him out of here by 3:00, and that was the
16 condition under which he was able to come. He has already had
17 a lot of commitments that he has rearranged.

18 So we will proceed now with his testimony after Senator
19 Warner has a word of greeting, and then we will take a
20 5-minute break at 2:00, after which we will come right back
21 and we will go until approximately 3:00. Senator Warner?

22 Senator Warner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We welcome
23 you, Mr. Secretary. Let us get underway.

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1 STATEMENT OF DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, PRESIDENT,

2 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATE

3 Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, in order to

4 leave the maximum amount of time for questions, I will not

5 read the statement that I have submitted, or even summarize

6 it. But I would like to raise a number of questions, as the

7 chairman did yesterday in his opening statement, that seems to
8 me to be at the heart of the problem of the Gulf.

9 And it seems to me as follows: ~~One~~ Will sanctions work?

10 Secondly, what do we mean by "sanctions working"? That is, by

11 what process will we know that they are working? Three, how

12 much time will it take? Four, is that time frame compatible with

13 the deployment that we have in the area?

14 Five, if we find out that sanctions are not working, does

15 the military option still exist? Six, if a decision is made

16 to resort to military operations, what strategy should we

17 pursue? Seven, what are the consequences of an American

18 withdrawal from the area without having achieved the stated

19 objectives that were said? And finally, of course, what are

20 the objectives?

21 These are the issues with which I have tried to deal in

22 the various articles that I have written and in the statement

23 that I have submitted. And they seem to me to be influenced

24 heavily by the decisions that have already been taken, by the

25 deployment that already exists, and by the consequences of an

6

1 The Chairman: Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger. We
2 appreciate your being here. I would like to address some of
3 those questions that you have posed yourself.

4 One question that comes from your previous writings on
5 the subject, and I think I have read most of what you have
6 written, is that, your point that you reiterated just a moment
7 ago, is that by the time we discover that sanctions are not
8 likely to work, it will be too late to use the military
9 option. Could you elaborate on that and give us your reasons
10 for that?

11 Dr. Kissinger: It may be too late. I am not saying that it
12 is so
13 (absolutely, certainly)
14 late. First of all, to understand my view, one has to understand
15 would like to state, what do we mean by (sanctions working")?
16 the
17 I do not believe that we will see a day when
18 leader will send us a letter saying he has now accepted our
19 terms. The much more likely result is an offer to negotiate,
20 which in itself will lead to a past experience is any guide,
21 to a protracted effort.

22 a variety of
23 Then we have to be prepared to meet the following hurdles
during a negotiation. These are as follows: First, is that
24 be effective. Secondly, they must be maintained throughout
25 the negotiations. And, once the U.N. terms are achieved, I think
we have, in addition, to address the military balance in the
area. The military option must remain intact during all the
Third

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entirely fair and there should be no other upheavals that deflect the period, and there should be no other upheavals that deflect the U.S. or to undermine allied cohesion.

I believe it will be very difficult to meet all these conditions in anything less than an extremely extended period. There will be pressures to lift the sanctions and to ease the sanctions. There will be negotiating proposals that will ease our terms. And, finally, there will be pressures to withdraw our forces, both in the U.S. and finally in the region.

I have the most serious doubt whether it will be possible to maintain the present military deployment in Saudi Arabia for an extended period of time. And I would be interested to see an intelligence estimate as to which I have no access to whether we believe that the present level of deployment can be maintained during the pilgrimage and much beyond Ramadan.

I believe that as this large American deployment in the area is maintained, the pressures against it will multiply.

The Chairman: Do you believe, Dr. Kissinger, that we have deployed too many forces, that we are working against our own interests by having that large a force in the area in terms of being able to have a patient policy?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, as Secretary Schlesinger pointed out yesterday, the presence of a large force puts a pressure on Saddam Hussein. But it also makes it more difficult to sustain it for an indefinite period of time.

And this is why we will come to a point of decision, in

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1 my view, some time in the next few months, where we will have
2 to choose between the military option and the sanctions
3 option. I would prefer for the sanctions to work. But I do not
4 believe it is likely that the two can be kept in harness.

5 The Chairman: What would be your measuring points for
6 the use of military force, if you were advising the President?
7 When would you decide that and what would be the grounds for
8 it?

9 Dr. Kissinger: Well, I would hope that when the
10 President has to make that decision, he has access to more
11 intelligence information than I do, and that I would not be
12 asked that question.

13 But I would say, that at this point where it has
14 become apparent that American forces will have to be
15 withdrawn in increasing numbers, and where we then face the
16 problem that our moderate allies in the area will find their
17 position fundamentally undermined, which I believe would be
18 inevitable, following the result of an American withdrawal concluding an
19 unsuccessful action.

20 At that point, I think the President will have to make
21 the decision whether a military operation becomes less
22 dangerous than the consequences of an upheaval in all the
23 moderate governments or in many of the moderate governments in
24 the region. That will be the point of decision.

25 The Chairman: It sounds to me as if you are saying that

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1 the size of the deployment, the logistics, sustainability, and
2 the political fallout from the size of the deployment is a
3 major factor in pushing us toward that point of decision. Is
4 that a fair reading?

5 Dr. Kissinger: I have said from the beginning that the
6 size of the original deployment ~~would~~ is what most dictate the pace of
7 subsequent diplomacy. And I believe ~~that that deployment~~ was not
8 ~~being~~ challenged by anybody at the time, we ~~cannot~~ now go back
9 and debate what we might have done, otherwise.

10 The Chairman: Well, of course, it is not too late for
11 the President to decide, when January comes around, that we
12 would rotate some of those forces, some of the new forces.
13 There will be a period of overlap there for 2 or 3 weeks,
14 which gives us the old forces that have been there for a while
15 and the new forces that pose a substantial type offensive
16 threat, a ground threat.

17 I think we have had an air threat for a long time there,
18 in terms of offensive forces. I am not one of those that
19 believes we have to put 400,000 in to have an offensive
20 threat, because I have always thought that the air threat was
21 the best U.S. strength --

22 Dr. Kissinger: So do I. I do not favor a ground
23 strategy, no matter what decision the President makes.

24 The Chairman: Are you concerned about the size of the
25 ground forces we are building up, for all of these reasons?

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1 Do you think that the President might be wise to consider some

2 type of rotation, at least of some of the ground forces, to

3 expand our option and our flexibility?

4 Dr. Kissinger: From the beginning, it has been my

5 position that if military action becomes unavoidable, whenever

6 that is, that the preferable strategy would be to rely on our

7 air and naval power and to use our ground forces to prevent a

8 response, rather than to launch a large-scale attack.

9 But in response to your specific question, Mr. Chairman,

10 I would say that I am also profoundly concerned about the impact on

11 the countries with which we are associated in the area, of

12 something that begins to look like a substantial American

13 withdrawal, which might then start a rush towards

14 accommodation and undermine all moderate governments in the

15 region.

16 I am deeply concerned about this and I think that it has to

17 be weighed by everybody taking a position on this issue.

18 The Chairman: Are you saying you think it may be too

19 late for the President to announce a rotation policy?

20 Dr. Kissinger: I think it is too late for the President

21 to take a position that implies rotation, I mean that is,

22 if you say "rotation," it is a technical issue. (I do not want

23 to get into the technical issue of rotation.

24 But any Presidential statement that implies that we are,

25 in fact, reducing our forces and that this is a process that

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1 may continue, would then raise grave questions among the

2 countries with which we are associated.

3 The Chairman: Thank you. My time has expired. Of

4 course, if we have 230,000 there now and we announce a

5 rotation policy, and we end up with 250,000 and rotate some of

6 those back home instead of obligating 400,000 on the ground,
7 we are not reducing our forces. We are in effect, even could

8 be increasing them somewhat, could we not?

9 Dr. Kissinger: I have no fixed idea about the right
10 level of forces, since ~~from~~ the beginning, I was not wildly
11 enthusiastic about the original level. But I do not want to
12 leave you with the wrong idea. I was always in favor of
13 reinforcing the blockade with air action if it was necessary
14 to bring our enterprise to a conclusion, at whatever level of
15 ground forces we had.

16 The Chairman: All right. Senator Warner.

17 Senator Warner: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Kissinger,
18 it is nice to see you again. I appreciate your appearing.

19 Dr. Kissinger, later this week, perhaps as early as Thursday,
20 the United Nations will provide another in a very long and
21 historic series of resolutions, which will address the use of
22 force and possibly designating some time frame in January as
23 to when that resolution will become effective.

24 Now, we have received a great deal of testimony with
25 regard to the President should exercise patience, patience

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1 within which time hopefully the sanctions can be successful.

2 Yet, the resolution which is to be adopted on Thursday will

3 incorporate the original resolution, which is 660. And that

4 says that, number 2, demands that Iraq withdraw immediately

5 and unconditionally all of its forces to the positions in

6 which they were located on 1 August 1990.

7 Is there any conflict, in your judgment, between the

8 exercise of patience and the deliberate and repeated use of

9 the word "immediate" in these resolutions?

10 Dr. Kissinger: There is no doubt that the U.N.

11 resolutions call for the immediate withdrawal, if I understand

12 the cultural patience, they address what we should do about

13 it. My experience with U.N. resolutions would seem to

14 indicate that when the deadline approaches, unless Saddam

15 Hussein is very unskillful, we will be faced with further another

16 decision of whether some progress has been made.

17 I find it hard to believe that they will simply let that

18 deadline go by without some maneuver. That then gets us back

19 to the question we are debating: has time run out? Is he

20 fulfilling the demand? I do not believe he will accept the

21 resolution unconditionally, and I do not think he will reject

22 it entirely, either.

23 Senator Warner: Dr. Kissinger, I happen to believe that

24 the President has enunciated the goals for which we have

25 deployed our forces very clearly and consistently.

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And after a meeting with him and other leadership, members of the Congress, at the White House, I made the statement to the effect that, upon his return, he will report to the people from his Gulf, on his Gulf trip, and then we will have the action in the United Nations, which we are expecting later this week.

And then after that, the leadership of the Congress should determine, together with the President, hopefully, the advisability of bringing Congress back or not bringing Congress back to address this issue. In my judgment, it seems that we should, as a legislative body, try and enunciate our goals. Hopefully, they will be consistent with those of the President.

But in any event, we should, at some point and at some time, and I think the earlier the better now, make ever so clear to the President, to the American people, what our goals are. Do you agree that we should first decide on goals and then begin to decide on the methods to achieve those goals?

Dr. Kissinger: My impression is that there is substantial agreement as to goals. I noted that the Chairman, in his opening statement yesterday, endorsed the objectives of the President. It seems to me that the disagreement concerns the means to achieve these goals.

If there is no disagreement, I do not know whether it or not we should run along party lines, which one or the other should do.

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1 add to the U.N. goal the requirement that the Iraqi military
2 capacity be brought into some balance to that of the
3 neighborhood states.

4 I believe, after all that has happened, that is a clear
5 necessity. But there is no answer to a bipartisan answer that is a clear
6 answer to a bipartisan answer to both objectives and that is a clear
7 think it would be highly desirable.

8 Senator Warner: Well, the chairman, of course, said we
9 will address that perhaps later in this hearing. But in his
10 statement yesterday, I think he made the allegation that there
11 has been a fundamental shift in policy by the President. To
12 me, that provides some inconsistency and we should address
13 that at an appropriate time.

14 The Chairman: I wonder if I could just clarify that. I
15 think I made it clear what I said was not policy, but the
16 military mission. As we heard this morning from both
17 chairmen, the military mission is separate from the overall
18 policy.

19 The policy includes economic, political and other goals.
20 The military mission is specific. What I have said is, the
21 President changed the military mission, but I have not said he
22 changed the overall policy or objectives.

23 Senator Warner: Dr. Kissinger, in reviewing your
24 statement, is it fair to say that you believe that U.S. goals
25 in this present situation must include not only the withdrawal

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## Conclusion

Too, it should then seek energetically to make progress
toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially now
that looming disaster might have brought all sides second
thoughts about both the nature of a peace and suitable
participants in peace negotiations.

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