AMBASSADE DE FRANCE
SERVICE DE PRESSE ET D'INFORMATION

972 FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK 21, N. Y.

Speeches and Press Conferences
No. 185

January 14, 1963

PRESIDENT DE GAULLE HOLDS SEVENTH PRESS CONFERENCE

Full Text of President de Gaulle's Press Conference
Held in Paris at the Elysée Palace
On January 14, 1963

<table><tr><td>French Domestic Policy</td><td>p. 2</td></tr><tr><td>The Common Market</td><td>p. 4</td></tr><tr><td>The Nassau Agreements</td><td>p. 8</td></tr><tr><td>French-German Relations</td><td>p. 12</td></tr><tr><td>German Armament</td><td>p. 14</td></tr><tr><td>Nuclear Disarmament</td><td>p. 14</td></tr></table>

Ladies and gentlemen:

I am very happy to see you. I hope that our meeting may contribute to throwing some light on the views concerning some of the main questions at present facing France. Everyone will understand of course that, in order to answer your questions, I shall proceed so that my remarks will be of an overall nature rather than a discussion of details. Moreover, France is now in a position to consider and deal with the problems, not in a more or less breathless and changeable way but as a continuous design and a long-range decision. This said, I ask those of you who wish to put questions to me to formulate them now and I shall group them together when I reply.

I am grouping the following questions. They concern first, and quite naturally, the direction to be taken by the country after the recent popular consultations from the constitutional, political and, at the same time, social and economic points of view. Here we have a kind of family of questions that have been put to me. There is one, naturally, just suited to the times and, moreover, of vital importance concerning the Common Market and Britain's application for entry into this Market.

Another question is also vitally important concerning France's position with regard to the Nassau talks. I understand it correctly, I believe?

There are then questions that have been put concerning the relations between France and Germany. Finally, someone suddenly asked me if we had anything to say about disarmament. Then some topical questions on one African State or another.

Well, here I am informed. I shall now endeavor to see that you are informed in your turn.

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French Domestic Policy

**Question:** Everyone here is waiting for your foreign policy statement, but we believe that it would be interesting to know your present view of French domestic policy, especially from the economic and social standpoints.

After the recent popular consultations in France, the referendum and the elections, could you please tell us how you envisage French political prospects and the prospects for the Administration?

**Answer:** We shall take first the question of our domestic situation and prospects after the country has indeed confirmed the institutions that it voted in 1958. By our deciding that the Head of State will be elected by universal suffrage, by approving, after four years of experience, the way in which the powers of the President of the Republic are exercised, by concescrating the principle and the conditions of the use of the referendum, everyone thinks that our country has settled the controversies that were raised with regard to the character, sense and scope of the constitutional reform that we have accomplished.

The striking thing about this constitutional reform is, it seems to me, that it succeeded because it corresponds above all to a truly absolute necessity of modern times. It is commonplace to observe that current developments always make the role of the State more and more vital and already there is no national activity which can take place today without its consent, often its intervention and sometimes its direction. Everything, and even the fate of each and every person, is thus more or less directly bound up with the action of the State, action which is expressed by a national trend, by regulations and by laws. In this action, as in all action, a head is needed and, as this head is a person, it is fitting that this person receive the personal expression of the confidence of all those concerned. We must also take into account the overwhelming factor that, in the political and strategic position in which the world finds itself, there are countries, in particular our own, which are at any moment, one can say it, in danger of sudden death; hence the necessity for these countries to have at the summit a permanent authority who is in a position to take charge of their destiny and, if need be, instantly to take decisions of vast consequence. It is these very conditions which have henceforth excluded the former system of parties--unstable, uncertain, inconstant--and it is these same conditions which led the country, following its instinct and its reason, to answer as it did, first by confirming once again the existing institutions, then by choosing its Deputies.

For the first time since its birth, the Republic is established in continuity. Undoubtedly, the problems that confront us mean that free debate remains open, from which can and must emerge a host of ideas, proposals and improvements from those who are not biased. We must not of course expect the old hands at repining, disparagement and bitterness

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to cease, at least for the moment, to vent their spleen, spit out their bile and distill their vinegar. Only, it is a fact that the old game, the game of continuous intrigues, contrivances, falls, ascents, that was practiced by the specialists, this game cannot be resumed. The mere application of the provisions of the Constitution checks this and, if it were necessary, recourse to the judgment of the country would be there to prevent it.

Thus, for four years, the stability and the effectiveness of the State have made possible the accomplishment of a task which, and I have no reason for hiding this, appears to me to be considerable. I do not wish to fail to mention here the truly outstanding merits of the man whom I had then placed at my side as my Premier, M. Michel Debré, and also of the merits of his colleagues in the Government. Now we must continue the task on a basis of more assured national unity. For this task I called on M. Georges Pompidou and also the other Ministers. The country has given the undertaking its approval and the new National Assembly has expressed its confidence in the men.

What is this undertaking? It is quite simply the transformation of our country in accordance with the dictates of modern civilization. A transformation which applies first to man's condition; all those material and spiritual attributes which each man wishes to attain--it is a matter of making them more and more accessible, first by adding to their number, then by procuring increased resources to obtain them. This transformation also affects our life as a collectivity, a life which we must attempt to make easier and easier and increasingly fruitful--for families, cities, rural areas, occupations--hence the need for those social investments called education, housing, hospitalization, urban and agricultural development and sports. It is a transformation that embraces the entire nation, either through the adaptation of its activity and its administration on its own territory, or through the strengthening of its ties with the other States, in particular with its neighbors, then with those States which are carried by their needs or by their inclinations to cooperate by preference with it.

Finally, this transformation is aimed at setting up the means of defending ourselves. It goes without saying that all this must be rigorously linked with the development of our economy; failing this, payments and expenditures will spiral unchecked and we shall very quickly have inflation again. But, however necessary, just and desirable this progress may be, France knows itself well enough to be aware that there is no theory which can make it abound, suddenly, with the wealth of an El Dorado. All that we desire to have in addition to that which we have already will come only from the regular increase in our national product. There is not a single human society in the world, whatever may be its political, economic and social system, which can nourish progress in any way other than by expansion.

Our own expansion is, on the whole, progressing well. To witness this, even apart from the statistics, one has only to look at the growing amount of goods which are purchased, the increasing number of schools,

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homes and hospitals that have been built, the development in the distribu-
tion of water, gas, electricity and petroleum and the growing throng of
automobiles on all our roads. Naturally, the distribution of everything
that is produced, taking into account that due to the spirit of enterprise,
to the assets invested, to professional value and position, this distribution
should be fairer than it is. Although the distribution of our national in-
come has certainly improved, we must continue on this road, but at all
events, in order to become more prosperous, there are conditions to
fulfill, all of which demand work and imply progress.

We must multiply and develop the resources we possess,
which task falls to scientific and technical research and which requires
constant and vigorous investments taken out of the profits gained. It is
a question of obtaining from these resources an improved output, which
can result only from the labor provided and the improvement in the oc-
cupational capacities deployed. It is a question of seeing that those who
carry out the economic task are better informed of these realities and
participate more effectively in these responsibilities; which means at
the foundations a broader association of workers in the conduct of busi-
ness, and at the top, that the representatives of national, economic, social,
administrative and cultural activity collaborate more closely in the work
of the councils in which the development of our regions and of our country
is formulated and supervised. It is a question finally of maintaining our
effort under the conditions imposed on us for some years yet. The destruc-
tion and losses that we suffered during the two world wars and the unfor-
tunate drop in the birth rate in the past, mean that our working population
must carry out the task of national development while assuming the burden
and the duty of assisting a relatively large number of old persons to live
the rest of their lives in a dignified manner, of assuring the existence,
growth and education of a generation of young people that is now more
numerous but which has not yet taken its place in the economic task. On
that depends the prosperity and power of France.

Well, we have, in this regard, set ourselves the goals to be
attained and the means of attaining them. We have set these goals through
the Plan, all the elements of which are closely linked, which extends over
a period of four years and which measures for this period a set rate of
growth and prepares a new and rational advance to follow. This Plan, our
Plan--the essential feature of our economic and social policy is to apply it
clearly and firmly.

Our solidity permits us to do this now, unless some external
crisis, provoked by the ambition of others -- for it would not be provoked by
our ambition -- occurs to jeopardize everything. Outside of this dramatic
eventuality, the good of France and that of the French people depends quite
simply on long-tried factors -- work, order, and peace.

The Common Market

**Question:** Can you explicitly define France's position concern-
ing the entry of Britain in the Common Market and the politi-
cal evolution of Europe?

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**Answer:** That is a clear question which I am going to try to answer clearly.

When we talk about economic matters, and even more when we are dealing with them, it is essential for what is said and what is done to conform to reality, for otherwise we end up in deadlocks and sometimes even ruined.

Concerning this very important question of the European Economic Community and also that of the possible membership of Great Britain, it is the facts which must be considered first. Sentiments, as favorable as they might be and as they are, cannot be put forward in opposition to the real factors of the problem. What are these factors?

The Treaty of Rome was concluded between six continental States, States which economically speaking are, in short, of the same nature. Whether in terms of their industrial or agricultural production, of their foreign trade, of their commercial customs and clients, or of their living and working conditions, there are many more similarities than differences between them. Moreover, they are adjacent, they interpenetrate, they are extensions of each other through their communications. The very fact of grouping them and linking them together in such a way that what they produce, buy, sell and consume, they produce, buy sell and consume by preference within their own grouping thus conforms to reality.

It must be added, moreover, that from the standpoint of their economic development, their social progress and their technological capability they are, in short, in stride with each other and they are moving forward at more or less the same pace. Furthermore, it happens that there exists between them no kind of political grievance, no border disputes, no rivalry for domination or power. To the contrary, there is a feeling of solidarity between them, firstly owing to the awareness they have of together possessing an important part of the origins of our civilization, and also with regard to their security, because they are continental countries and they are confronted by the same single threat from one end of their territorial grouping to the other. Finally, they have a feeling of solidarity because not one of them is linked on the outside by any special political or military agreement.

Thus it has been psychologically and materially possible to organize an economic community of the Six. Moreover, this was not without difficulty. When the Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, it was after long discussions, and once concluded, so that something could be accomplished, it was necessary for us French to straighten ourselves out in the economic, financial and monetary domain. And this was done in 1959.

From that time on, the Community was workable in principle, but it was then necessary to implement the Treaty. Now this Treaty, which was quite specific and complete on the subject of industry, was not at all specific and complete on the subject of agriculture. And yet, it was essential for our country that this be settled.

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For it is indeed quite obvious that agriculture is an essential
element of our national activity as a whole. We cannot conceive of a Common
Market in which French agriculture would not find outlets commensurate
with its production, and we agree, moreover, that, among the Six, we are
the country for which this necessity is the most imperative.

That is why last January, when consideration was being given
to implementing the second stage of the Treaty, in other words, to a prac-
tical beginning of application, we were led to set the entry of agriculture
into the Common Market as a formal condition.

This was finally accepted by our partners, but very complex
and difficult arrangements were needed. And some of these arrangements
are still being worked out. I will note in passing that, in this vast undertak-
ing, all the decisions taken were taken by the Governments, for nowhere
else is there any authority or responsibility. But I should say that, in order
to prepare and clarify matters, the Brussels Commission worked in a
highly objective and pertinent fashion.

Then Great Britain applied for membership in the Common Market. It did so after refusing earlier to participate in the community that was being built, and after then having created a free trade area with six other States, and finally--I can say this, the negotiations conducted for so long on this subject can be recalled--after having put some pressure on the Six in order to prevent the application of the Common Market from really getting started. Britain thus in its turn requested membership, but on its own conditions.

This undoubtedly raises for each of the six States and for
England problems of a very great dimension.

England is, in effect, insular, maritime, linked through its trade,
markets and food supply to very diverse and often very distant countries.
Its activities are essentially industrial and commercial, and only slightly
agricultural. It has, throughout its work, very marked and original customs
and traditions. In short, the nature, structure and economic context of
England differ profoundly from those of the other States of the Continent.

What is to be done so that Britain, such as it lives, such as it
produces and such as it trades, be incorporated into the Common Market
such as it has been conceived and such as it functions?

For example, the means by which the people of Great Britain
nourish themselves is in fact by importing foodstuffs purchased at low
prices in the two Americas or in the former dominions, while still grant-
ing large subsidies to British farmers. This means is obviously incom-
patible with the system the Six have quite naturally set up for themselves.

The system of the Six consists of making a pool of the agri-
cultural products of the entire Community, of strictly determining their
prices, of forbidding subsidizing, of organizing their consumption between
all the members and of making its obligatory for each of these members

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to pay to the Community any savings they might make by having foodstuffs brought in from outside instead of consuming those offered by the Common Market.

Once again, what is to be done to make Britain, such as it is, enter that system?

One was sometimes led to believe that our British friends, in applying for membership in the Common Market, agreed to change their own ways even to the point of applying all the conditions accepted and practiced by the Six, but, the question is to know if Great Britain can at present place itself, with the Continent and like it, within a tariff that is truly common, give up all preference with regard to the Commonwealth, cease to claim that its agriculture be privileged and, even more, consider as null and void the commitments it has made with the countries that are part of its free trade area. That question is the one at issue.

One cannot say that is has now been resolved. Will it be so one day? Obviously Britain alone can answer that.

The question is raised all the more since, following Britain, other States which are, I repeat, linked to it in the free trade area, for the same reasons as Great Britain, would or will want to enter the Common Market.

It must be agreed that the entry first of Great Britain and then that of those other States will completely change the series of adjustments, agreements, compensations and regulations already established between the Six, because all these States, like Britain, have very important traits of their own. We would then have to envisage the construction of another Common Market. But the 11-member, then 13-member and then perhaps 18-member Common Market that would be built would, without any doubt, hardly resemble the one the Six have built.

Moreover, this Community, growing in that way, would be confronted with all the problems of its economic relations with a crowd of other States, and first of all with the United States.

It is forseeable that the cohesion of all its members, who would be very numerous and very diverse, would not hold for long and that in the end there would appear a colossal Atlantic Community under American dependence and leadership which would soon completely swallow up the European Community.

This is an assumption that can be perfectly justified in the eyes of some, but it is not at all what France wanted to do and what France is doing, which is a strictly European construction.

Then, it is possible that Britain would one day come round to transforming itself enough to belong to the European Community without restriction and without reservation, and placing it ahead of anything else, and in that case the Six would open the door to it and France would place no obstacle in its path, although obviously the mere membership of Britain in the Community would completely change its nature and its volume.

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It is also possible that England is not yet prepared to do this, and that indeed appears to be the outcome of the long, long Brussels talks. But if this is the case, there is nothing there that can be dramatic.

First of all, whatever decision Britain finally makes in this regard, there is no reason, as far as we are concerned, for the relations we have with it to be changed in any way. The consideration and the respect due that great State and that great people will not be altered in the least.

What Britain has done over the centuries and throughout the world is recognized as gigantic, even though there have often been conflicts with France. The glorious participation of Great Britain in the victory that crowned the first World War, we French will always admire. As for the role played by Britain at the most dramatic and decisive moment of the second World War, no one has the right to forget it.

Truly, the fate of the free world, and first of all our own and even that of the United States and of Russia, has depended to a large extent on the resolution, the solidity and the courage of the British people such as Churchill gave them the will to be. This very day no one can dispute the fitness and the valor of the British.

Therefore, I repeat, if the Brussels negotiations were not to succeed at this time, nothing would prevent the conclusion of an agreement of association between the Common Market and Great Britain in such a way as to safeguard trade; neither would anything prevent the maintenance of the close relations between Britain and France and the continuation and development of their direct cooperation in all fields, especially those of science, technology and industry as, indeed, the two countries have just proven by deciding on the joint construction of the supersonic "Concorde" aircraft.

Lastly, it is highly possible that Great Britain's own evolution and the evolution of the world would lead the British to the Continent, whatever may be the delays before complete realization. For my part, this is what I am inclined to believe, and that is why, in my opinion, it will be in any case a great honor for the British Prime Minister, for my friend Harold Macmillan, and for his Government, to have perceived this so early, to have had enough political courage to proclaim it and to have had their country take the first steps along the path that, one day perhaps, will bring it to make fast to the Continent.

## The Nassau Agreements

**Question:** What is France's position concerning the Kennedy multilateral formula, that is to say, concerning the Nassau agreements?

**Answer:** I have already had occasion several times to indicate publicly France's policy from the standpoint of its defense and also on the

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means with which, consequently, it deemed it necessary to equip itself. This
time again I am going to try to clarify the subject. In any case I repeat, after
having said it often, that France intends to have its national defense. It is
obvious that one country, especially one such as ours, cannot in the present
day and age and could not conduct a major modern war all by itself. To have
allies goes without saying for us in the historic period we are in. But also
for a great people to have the free disposition of itself and the means to
struggle to preserve it is an absolute imperative, for alliances have no ab-
solute virtues, whatever may be the sentiments on which they are based. And
if one spontaneously loses, even for a while, the free disposition of oneself,
there is a strong risk of never regaining it. And then, the conditions in which
we presently find ourselves also make it imperative for us to act in this
manner.

We are in the atomic age and we are a country that can be de-
stroied at any moment unless the aggressor is deterred from the undertaking
by the certainty that he too will suffer frightful destruction. This justifies both
alliance and independence. The Americans, our allies and our friends, have for
a long time, alone, possessed a nuclear arsenal. So long as they alone had
such an arsenal and so long as they showed their will to use it immediately if
Europe were attacked--for at that time Europe alone could be attacked -- the
Americans acted in such a way that for France the question of an invasion
hardly arose, since an attack was beyond all probability. It was then a matter
for the Atlantic Alliance, that is to say, for the American command, of having
in Europe and America a tactical and strategic air force capable of using
atomic weapons --for at that time only airplanes could do that--and thus cap-
able of protecting Europe. It was also a matter of lining up in Europe itself
conventional land, naval and air forces which could ensure the deployment
and use of atomic weapons. It can be said that, during that period, the deter-
rent worked and that there existed a practically insuperable obstacle to an
invasion of Europe. It is impossible to overestimate the extent of the service,
most fortunately passive, that the Americans at that time, in that way,
rendered to the freedom of the world.

Since then, the Soviets have also acquired a nuclear arsenal, and
that arsenal is powerful enough to endanger the very life of America. Naturally,
I am not making an evaluation--if indeed it is possible to find a relation be-
tween the degree of one death and the degree of another--but the new and gigan-
tic fact is there. From then on, the Americans found and are finding themselves
confronted with the possibility of direct destruction. Thus the immediate de-
fense, and one can say privileged defense of Europe, and the military participa-
tion of the Europeans, which were once basic factors of their strategy, moved
by the force of circumstances into second place. We have just witnessed this
during the Cuban affair.

The Americans, finding themselves exposed to a direct atomic
attack from the Caribbean, acted in such a way as to rid themselves of that
menace and, if it had been necessary, to crush it without its having occurred
either to them or to anyone else that the game would necessarily be played in
Europe and without recourse to the direct assistance of the Europeans. More-
over, the means which they immediately decided to employ in order to counter
a direct attack, whether it came from Cuba only or was combined with another

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originating elsewhere, these means were automatically set aside for
something other than the defense of Europe, even if Europe had been
attacked in its turn.

And then, above and beyond everything, the deterrent is
now a fact for the Russians as for the Americans, which means that in
the case of a general atomic war, there would inevitably be frightful
and perhaps fatal destruction in both countries. In these conditions, no
one in the world--particularly no one in America--can say if, where,
when, how and to what extent the American nuclear weapons would be
employed to defend Europe. Moreover, this does not in the least pre-
vent the American nuclear weapons, which are the most powerful of all,
from remaining the essential guarantee of world peace. This fact, and
the determination with which President Kennedy used it, came in to full
light out of the Cuban affair. But it remains that the American nuclear
power does not necessarily and immediately meet all the eventualities
concerning Europe and France.

Thus principles and realities combine to lead France to equip
itself with an atomic force of its own. This does not all exclude, of
course, the combination of the action of this force with the action of the
similar forces of its allies. But, for us, in this specific case, integra-
tion is something that is unimaginable. Indeed, as you know, we have
begun with our own and only means to invent, test and construct atomic
bombs and the vehicles for launching them.

It is completely understandable that this French undertaking
does not appear to be highly satisfactory to certain American circles. In
politics and in strategy, as in the economy, monopoly quite naturally
appears to the person who holds it to be the best possible system. Then
we hear a multiple choir of Americans--unofficial persons, experts and
journalists--violently and strongly attacking our autonomous armament.
"The atomic force with which France intends to equip itself is and will
remain," they say, "insignificant in relation to those of the United
States and Russia. To build it up is thus to waste a lot of effort and money
for nothing. And then, within the Alliance, the United States has an over-
whelming superiority, therefore no one should run counter to its strategy
through any divergent action."

It is quite true that the number of nuclear weapons with
which we can equip ourselves will not equal, far from it, the mass of
those of the two giants of today. But since when has it been proved that
a people should remain deprived of the most effective weapon for the
reason that its chief possible adversary and its chief friend have means
far superior to its own?

France, when formerly it was its turn to be a world colossus,
often experienced the worth of either the resistence of a less powerful
but well-equipped adversary, or the support of an ally lining up inferior
but well-tempered and well-employed weapons.

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Moreover, the atomic force has a feature of its own, in that it has an efficacy that is certain and to an extent that is frightening even if it does not approach the conceivable maximum. In 1945 two bombs, then elementary, led Japan, who was not able to answer back, to capitulate. I do not want to evoke here the possibilities in which Europe could suffer nuclear actions that would be localized, but whose political and psychological consequences would be immense, unless there is a certainty that retaliation to that extent would be immediately unleashed. I only want to say that the French atomic force, from the very beginning of its establishment, will have the sombre and terrible capability of destroying in a few seconds millions and millions of men. This fact cannot fail to have at least some bearing on the intents of any possible aggressor.

Then, in the Bahamas, America and Britain concluded an agreement and we were asked to subscribe to it ourselves. Of course, I am only speaking of this proposal and agreement because they have been published and because their content is known. It is a question of constituting a so-called multilateral atomic force, in which Britain would turn over the weapons it has and will have and in which the Americans would place a few of their own. This multilateral force is assigned to the defense of Europe and is under the American NATO command. It is nevertheless understood that the British retain the possibility of withdrawing their atomic weapons for their own use should supreme national interest seem to them to demand it.

As for the bulk of American nuclear weapons, it remains outside the multilateral force and under the direct orders of the President of the United States. Furthermore and in a way by compensation, Britain may purchase from America, if it so desires, Polaris missiles which are, as you know, launched from submarines specially built for that purpose and which carry the thermonuclear warheads adapted to them for a distance of 1,100-2,000 miles. To build these submarines and warheads, the British receive privileged assistance from the Americans. You know-- I say this in passing--that this assistance was never offered to us and you should know, despite what some report, that we have never asked for it.

France has taken note of the Anglo-American Nassau agreement. As it was conceived, undoubtedly no one will be surprised that we cannot subscribe to it. It truly would not be useful for us to buy Polaris missiles when we have neither the submarines to launch them nor the thermonuclear warheads to arm them. Doubtless the day will come when we will have these submarines and these warheads. But that day will be long in coming. For the World War, the invasion and their consequences have slowed us down a great deal in our atomic development. When we will one day have these submarines and these warheads, what will the Polaris missiles then be worth? At that time we will probably have missiles of our own invention. In other words, for us, in terms of technology, this affair is not the question of the moment.

But also, it does not meet with the principle about which I just spoke and which consists of disposing in our own right of our deterrent

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force. To turn over our weapons to a multilateral force, under a foreign command, would be to act contrary to that principle of our defense and our policy. It is true that we too can theoretically retain the ability to take back in our hands, in the supreme hypothesis, our atomic weapons incorporated in the multilateral force. But how could we do it in practice during the unheard of moments of the atomic apocalypse? And then, this multilateral force necessarily entails a web of liaisons, transmissions and interferences within itself, and on the outside a ring of obligations such that, if an integral part were suddenly snatched from it, there would be a strong risk of paralyzing it just at the moment, perhaps, when it should act.

In sum, we will adhere to the decision we have made: to construct and, if necessary, to employ our atomic force ourselves. And that without refusing, of course, cooperation, be it technological or strategic, if this cooperation is, on the other hand, desired by our allies.

## French-German Relations

Several questions were put to me on the subject of Germany. These are of current interest since we shall be having the great honor and great pleasure of receiving the Chancellor and a number of his Ministers here in a few weeks time.

**Question:** On the eve of your talks with the Chancellor, how do you envisage the evolution of French-German cooperation?

**Answer:** I hope that this question more or less covers all the others on the subject and to which I shall reply together.

Among the new elements that are in the process of shaping the world at present, I believe that there is none more striking and more fruitful than the French-German fact. Two great peoples, which have for so long and so terribly opposed and fought each other, are now turning toward each other with the same impulse of sympathy and understanding. It is not only a question of a reconciliation demanded by circumstances. What is happening in reality is a kind of mutual discovery of two neighbors, each noticing the extent to which the other is valid, worthy and attractive.

It is from this then that springs the desire for a rapprochement manifest everywhere in the two countries which conforms with reality and which commands politics, because for the first time in many generations, the Germans and Gauls realize their solidarity. This solidarity exists obviously from the standpoint of their security, since the same threat of foreign domination confronts them and because their territories constitute a single strategic area. It exists from the economic standpoint because, for each of them, mutual trade is an essential and preponderant element. It exists from the standpoint of their cultural influence and development, for in thought, philosophy, science, the arts and technology they are complementary.

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And now the voice of the peoples makes it heard that these
currents deeply reflect something decisive and, without a doubt, some-
thing historic. Already, when President Luebke, in our capital, and later
when Chancellor Adenauer, officially in Paris and in the Provinces,
visited France, there arose from our people such homage and such testi-
mony that there could be no doubt about the completely new course--to
say the least--that feelings in our country had taken. When I myself, last
September, had the honor of bearing the greetings of the French people to
Germany, when I was received in Bonn, Cologne, Düsseldorf, Duisburg,
Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart and other cities, all those who were able to
see and hear were overwhelmed by the elemental and extraordinary out-
burst of enthusiasm displayed then in favor of the friendship of Germany
and France, of the union of Europe as they both wish it and of their
common action in the world. I for my part--I must admit--I was touched
by it to the very depths of my soul and strengthened in my conviction that
the new policy of French-German relations is based on an incomparable
popular basis.

Now, all along this policy has been--we must pay him this tribute--
that of Chancellor Adenauer. This great statesman has never ceased to
think and to proclaim that French-German cooperation was an absolute
necessity for the life and modern development of the two countries; that it
was also the condition and the very basis of the construction of Europe;
and finally that it was at present the most basic factor in the security of
our continent and perhaps, in the future, a factor of balance and peace
among the nations that people our continent from East to West. Since we
think in exactly the same way, the Governments in Bonn and Paris did
not have much difficulty in reaching an agreement to draw closer together
in practice their relations in the political, economic, cultural and defense
sectors.

The French-German meeting that will shortly be held here will
permit us, we most sincerely hope, to organize our cooperation better than
it is organized already. It goes without saying that there is nothing there
that either resembles or tends toward the building up between Germany
and France of some kind of exclusive community. The two countries have
decided and are committed to being an integral part of Europe, such as it is
built on the basis of the Rome Treaty. Moreover, it is absolutely impossible
to see how the more effective rapprochement between the French and
German peoples would in any way whatsoever harm the fraternity of Italy
and France, a fraternity that is two thousand years old and which is today
more alive than ever, or harm the close links that the centuries have forged
between us and Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.

But it is true that by tightening their cooperation, Germany
and France are setting an example which may be useful to the cooperation
of everyone.

- 14 -

German Armament

**Question:** I had asked you if the army of the German Federal Republic, deployed where it is and commanded as it is, could be equipped with and dispose of nuclear arms?

**Answer:** Sir, in this case it is up to Federal Germany to say what it wishes and to conduct its own policy. You have seen that in the matter of defense France conducts its own. It is evident that there is close solidarity between the defense of Germany and that of France, but each country is master in its own house and I shall not answer for the German Government.

Nuclear Disarmament

**Question:** Since you have stated many times, in your previous speeches, that when the time came France would say what contribution it intended to make toward disarmament, do you not believe, sir, that the time has come to discuss this?

**Answer:** I do not see how disarmament is being enforced. Periodically the question arises between the United States and Soviet Russia, both of which have enormous nuclear arsenals, of suspending their tests. That happens generally when they have both just completed a big series.

We have no objection to these two great States suspending their nuclear tests; but the fact that they might suspend them would in no way change their arsenals such as they are and would in no way be a disarmament measure. We have very frequently said that so long as nuclear forces exist in the world as they do, nothing can prevent France from acquiring one itself; but that if the day came when those arms would be really destroyed, France would wholeheartedly give up making them on its own account.

Well, ladies and gentlemen, I believe that I have satisfied your curiosity as far as I was able to do. I thank you for the kind attention you accorded me and bid you good-bye.

Litho in U.S.A. by Ardlee Service Inc., New York 10, N. Y.