attack or incident not involving nuclear weapons with
of a series of deterrents, a capacity to meet any type of
better to replace the concept of "the deterrent" with that
But this is a highly dangerous situation. It is much
outweigh the advantages.

attack to deal with non-nuclear aggression, the risks may
when it would be prepared to authorize a nuclear counter-
must always go, so to the "attacking-point" of the West, i.e.
are very great and as long as uncertainty continues, as it
nuclear war. The risks to the aggressor in any such action
the aggressor believes he can safely go without invoking a
that present themselves still remains up to the limit that
in all circumstances. Temptation to match any easy gains
is no longer by itself a sufficient deterrent to an aggressor
deterrent." Possession of nuclear strategic strike force
In a sort of nuclear stalemate means the end of "the
androgen.

automatic nuclear detonation a few hours later of New York
similar circumstances today, when it carries with it the
monopoly. Certainly no-one can imagine such a decision in
fact have taken place in the period of American atomic
It is doubtful whether such a massive retaliation would in
porder of the Iron Curtain or a limited conventional attack.

R/R

[c]

1/20

[LC]

sufficient conventional force to create a 'pause'.

In such a pause there would be an opportunity for political action to clear up a mistake, and the decision to 'raise the stakes' or start a nuclear war would thus be forced upon the aggressor. Above all, the provision of adequate conventional NATO forces (which do not at present exist) would remove the temptation and risk of a sudden, swift pounce on an inadequately defended area of NATO territory, for example the Danish Islands, which the Soviet Union may one day believe it could get away with, without invoking nuclear war.

The substitution of this 'balance of terror' for the previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European members of NATO. Hitherto European countries could with good reason consider themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any defence efforts themselves. But now that both the United States and Soviet Russia possess sufficient strategic nuclear weapons to annihilate each other, it becomes unreasonable for any European country to expect the United States to expose itself to nuclear retaliation automatically in response to any and every attack in Europe.

["in response to any and every attack in Europe.", "States to expose itself to nuclear retaliation automatically unless someone for any European country to expect the United nuclear weapons to annihilate each other, it becomes states and Soviet Russia possess sufficient strategic defence efforts themselves. But now that both the United States and U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, whether or not they made any country could with good reason consider themselves covered by the European members of NATO. Hitherto Europe previous American atomic monopoly has particular significance for the European themselves covered

1/21

[LC]

This obvious consequence from the development of nuclear stalemate is reinforced by the advent of the intercontinental missiles which reduce the strategic value of European territory to American defence policy. America will soon no longer need to be defended from European soil alone, as she did when the bomber squadrons and missiles could only reach the Soviet mainland from European bases. Thus the certainty of American strategic nuclear retaliation recedes in the case of a limited attack on parts of Europe.

This is not to suggest that the United States will not honour its treaty obligations or that American policy in the foreseeable future will change so much as to mean a withdrawal of her forces from Europe. But it must be remembered that the North Atlantic Treaty does not require other members to give automatic military assistance to a member who is attacked; moreover there is no undertaking, and there cannot be, that nuclear retaliation is to be invoked under any circumstances. The American Strategic Air Command and the British Bomber Command are subject only to their respective national commands and do not come under NATO at all. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that an armed attack against one member shall be considered an attack against them all and that each member shall assist the member attacked "by taking forthwith ... such action as it deems

attacked "by taking forthwith ... and action as it seems
against them all and that each member shall assist the member
attack against one member shall be considered an attack
Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that an armed
respective national commands and do not come under NATO at all.
the British Bomber Command are subject only to their
only circumstances. The American Strategic Air Command and
cannot be, that nuclear retaliation is to be invoked under
who is attacked; moreover there is no undertaking, and there
members to give automatic military assistance to a member
that the North Atlantic Treaty does not require other

grawal of her forces from Europe. But it must be remembered
foreseeable future will change so much as to mean a with-
honour its treaty obligations or that American policy in the
This is not to suggest that the United States will not
of a limited attack on parts of Europe.

of American strategic nuclear retaliation received in the case
the Soviet mainland from European zones. Thus the certainty
gid when the pomper adjectives and missiles could only reach
fonger need to be defended from European soil alone, as the
territory to American defence policy. America will soon no
missiles which reduce the strategic value of European

statements is reinforced by the advent of the intercontinental
This opinions consequence from the development of nuclear

1/51

[c]

1/22

[LC]

necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area".

The chief danger of war breaking out seems to me to arise from the possibility of a mistake or a miscalculation, not from a clear and unequivocal decision on the part of the Soviet Union or any other nation to begin a nuclear war. Frontier incidents in Europe, Berlin, another Hungary-type revolution or the involvement of great powers in a peripheral dispute in the Middle East, Africa or Asia seem more likely causes of friction than the global all-out aggression against which NATO strategy has for so long been directed. The possibility of American nuclear intervention in Indo-China in 1954 and the Soviet rocket threat during the Suez campaign in 1956 demonstrate the reality of the danger that any conflict involving NATO members, even outside NATO territory, may lead to the whole alliance becoming involved.

NATO should not only be prepared to deal with a localised or limited incident by conventional means; it should also have sufficient non-nuclear strength to meet any situation without immediate recourse to nuclear weapons in the hope that hostilities can be kept limited and the catastrophe of nuclear war averted. Indeed it is essential to have this conventional capacity to deny any prospect of easy gains,

["conventional capacity to gen and prospect of easy gains,\n\nnuclear war averted. Indicated it is essential to have this\n\nthat hostilities can be kept limited and the outburst of\n\nwithout immediate recourse to nuclear weapons in the hope\n\nhave sufficient non-nuclear strength to meet any situation\n\nor limited incident by conventional means; it should also\n\nNATO should not only be prepared to deal with a focussed\n\nmay lead to the whole alliance becoming involved.", "", "conflict involving NATO members, even outside NATO territory,\n\nin 1926 demonstrate the reality of the danger that any\n\nin 1924 and the Soviet rocket threat during the Suez campaign\n\nbeability of American nuclear intervention in Indo-China\n\nwhich NATO strategy has for so long been directed. The\n\ncauses of friction than the global all-out aggression against\n\ndispute in the Middle East, Africa or Asia seem morefigh\ndispute in the Middle East, Africa or Asia seem more figh\ndispute in the Middle East, Africa

1/23

[LC]

otherwise we run the risk of being forced by diplomatic
blackmail into having to make the impossible choice of
accepting as a fait accompli the occupation of some part
of NATO territory or of starting a nuclear war.

The possibility of a surprise attack, a pre-emptive
strike aimed at destroying the other side's nuclear arsenal
to eliminate nuclear retaliation, cannot be ruled out,
although personally I consider it the least likely contingency.
It is quite unthinkable that the West would under any
circumstances start a nuclear war by such a surprise attack.
Indeed it is an impossible concept for any democratic
government and particularly for an alliance of democratic
states. And while under a totalitarian regime it is a more
practicable proposition, I do not think it likely that the
Soviet Union will take a cold-blooded decision to plunge the
world into the immeasurable horrors of nuclear war. It is
impossible to believe that even under the most favourable
circumstances her own citizens would not suffer acutely.
Surely the fruits of any world conquest harvested by such a
strategem would be very sour.

Any surprise all-out nuclear attack would have to aim
at nothing less than the total destruction of the other side's
power of retaliation. On military grounds it seems impossible

power of retaliation. On military ground it seems improbable
at nothing less than the total destruction of the other side's
And surprise all-out nuclear attack would have to aim
strategem would be very som.

Surely the fruits of any world component harvested by such a
circumstance her own citizens would not suffer severely.
Improbable to believe that even under the most favourable
world into the improbable futures of nuclear war. It is
Soviet Union will take a cold-blooded decision to bungee the
practicable proposition, I do not think it likely that the
states. And while under a totalitarian regime it is a more
Government and particularly for an alliance of democratic
Indeed it is an improbable concept for any democratic
circumstance to start a nuclear war by and a surprise attack.

It is quite unthinkable that the West would under any
situation personally I consider it the least likely contingency.
to eliminate nuclear retaliation, cannot be ruled out,
strike aimed at destroying the other side's nuclear armament
The credibility of a surprise attack, a pre-emptive
of NATO territory or of starting a nuclear war.

accepting as a fait accompli the occupation of some part
of the map into having to make the improbable choice of
otherwise we run the risk of being forced by diplomatic

1/53

[f]

1/24

[LC]

to envisage that such an attack could destroy with certainty
a sufficiently high proportion of the diverse means of
launching a nuclear counter-attack to be worthwhile, in
existing circumstances or in the foreseeable future. It is
always just possible, however, that rash leadership, internal
political considerations or sheer lunacy might be allowed to
override rational political and military calculations, and
we must be prepared for this contingency.

The best defence and guarantee against such an attack,
since there is no means as yet of arresting missiles on their
course, is to demonstrate beyond doubt our capacity to strike
the 'second blow': that is, the capacity to strike a second
blow of a crippling character after being subjected to an all-
out surprise nuclear attack, no matter how thoroughly and
efficiently planned and executed. This is the essence of
the theory of nuclear deterrence now that nuclear stalemate
has been reached. It demands nuclear strike capability
together with the capacity to survive with sufficient means
of counter-attack from the surprise pre-emptive blow. The
third element in the policy is credibility - that any
potential enemy should know of and believe in our capacity
to strike the second blow. The consequences of this policy
in terms of weapons and organisation are examined in later
chapters.

chapters.

in terms of weapons and organization are examined in later
to strike the second blow. The consequences of this policy
potential enemy should know of and believe in our capacity
thirst element in the policy is credibility - that any
of counter-attack from the surprise pre-emptive blow. The
together with the capacity to survive with sufficient means
has been reached. It demands nuclear strike capability
the theory of nuclear deterrence now that nuclear stalemate
efficiently planned and executed. This is the essence of
out surprise nuclear attack, no matter how thoroughly and
flow of acribbling character after being subjected to an all-
the 'second blow': that is, the capacity to strike a second
conline, is to demonstrate beyond doubt our capacity to strike
since there is no means as yet of arresting massives on their
The best defence and guarantee against such an attack,
we must be prepared for this contingency.

overcome national political and military calculations, and
political considerations or sheer inertia might be allowed to
always that possible, however, that read leadership, internal
existing circumstances or in the foreseeable future. It is
influencing a nuclear counter-attack to be worthwhile, in
a sufficiently high proportion of the diverse means of
to evaluate that such an attack could destroy with certainty

154

[[C]

1/25

[LC]

The fact that our nuclear strategic strike policy is planned to survive a first attack and the emphasis on second strike potential have another great advantage. If we can persuade the Soviet Union - and deeds are more eloquent than words - that we are concerned only with a second strike, we may dispel the fear which is the real danger - fear that we are preparing to attack them and that they must strike a pre-emptive blow to forestall our intentions. By improved methods of early warning, by concentrating on means of delivering our nuclear strike which could credibly survive attack, such as Polaris, and by eliminating those, as for example the Thor missile, which obviously could not, we fulfil two vital objectives. We prepare ourselves to counter a surprise attack. At the same time we demonstrate the defensive character of our preparations, thus reducing the fears and suspicions which are the most likely motivations for such an attack.

A deliberate and planned surprise attack by conventional forces, for example on the Central Front, seems even less likely than a surprise all-out nuclear aggression. The massing of the necessary divisions is hardly possible without alerting NATO and thus robbing the operation of the essential element of surprise. (A co-ordinated pressing of buttons for a strategic nuclear attack is obviously more likely to be

a strategic nuclear attack is obviously more likely to be
an element of an surprise. (V co-ordinated pressing of buttons for
alerting NATO and thus dropping the operation of the essential
massing of the necessary divisions in largely feasible without
likely than a surprise all-out nuclear aggression. The
forces, for example on the Central Front, seems even less

for such an attack.

fears and anxieties which are the most likely motivations
defensive character of our preparations, thus requiring the
a surprise attack. At this same time we demonstrate the
fulfil two vital objectives. We prepare ourselves to counter

example the Thor missile, which obviously could not, we
attack, and as Boleria, and by eliminating those, as for

delivering our nuclear strike which could credibly survive
methods of early warning, by concentrating on means of

bre-emptive blow to forestall our intentions. By improved
we are preparing to attack them and that they must strike a
we may gavel the fear which is the real danger - fear that
than worse - that we are concerned only with a second strike,
can bemane the Soviet Union - and deeds are more element
second strike potential have another great advantage. If we
banned to survive a first attack and the umbrella on

1/52

[fc]

1/26

[LC]

accomplished in secrecy.) But the over-riding reason against a surprise all-out conventional attack, assuming that the West does not abandon its nuclear weapons, is the danger of starting a nuclear war. If the Soviet Union is prepared to run the risk of a nuclear war, it is hardly likely that she would surrender the great advantage of striking the first nuclear blow.

The only danger of a deliberate surprise attack seems to be a limited attack on a small scale, for example in the Baltic where NATO defences are very vulnerable, in circumstances where the Soviet Union believed a nuclear counter-attack to be impossible because the speed of the operation would face NATO with a fait accompli. The way to prevent such a limited surprise attack is to strengthen the NATO shield so that no temptation of easy small-scale gains exists. At the same time by providing an adequate NATO shield of conventional forces, sufficient to hold any conventional attack brought against it at any point for several days, we greatly reduce and perhaps even eliminate the danger of a Soviet miscalculation - a miscalculation which could trigger off a nuclear war which they were as anxious as we to avoid.

1/27

[LC]

In parenthesis, I would make it clear, for reasons more fully discussed in later chapters, that in my view forces equipped with tactical atomic weapons are not a substitute for non-nuclear ground forces with conventional capability. In present conditions I cannot see how a limited nuclear war is possible: I believe that once nuclear explosives are used by ground forces, it will be extremely difficult to avert a global nuclear war.

Mistake remains as the most probable source of war, as inevitably it must in a world subject to the vagaries of human judgment and emotions. Mistakes which lead to limited clashes of conventional arms need not be catadysmic if we in the West have sufficient conventional strength to contain an aggression resulting from a frontier incident or similar situation discussed above, for long enough to establish the mistake. The dangerous and immensely difficult decision in such circumstances is deciding when and how to 'raise the stakes' by the first use of nuclear weapons. This underlines the paramount importance of political supremacy and the retention of this decision in political hands. In my judgment the outstanding problem for the NATO Alliance today is to provide a means of joint political control over the initial use of nuclear weapons of all types. The problem is analysed and some suggestions are made for its solution in later chapters.

are made for its adoption in later chapters.

of all types. The problem is analyzed and some suggestions

political debate. In my judgment the outstanding problem

political ambiguity and the retention of this decision in

and how to 'raise the tone' by the first use of nuclear

eventually the mistake. The dangerous and imminent

limited classes of conventional arms need not be ceded to

as inevitably it must in a world subject to the pressures

mistakes remain as the most probable source of war, be

apportionment for non-nuclear ground forces with conventional

In hypothesis, I would make it clear, for reasons

r\51

[fc]

1/28

[LC]

Effective political control is also essential to minimise the danger that someone may inadvertently set off a missile and thus start a nuclear conflagration as a result of an unclear signal or a misreading of a radar early-warning screen. I believe this danger to be very slight, but it comes soon to the surface in any discussion of these problems and can never be discounted completely. There cannot be a foolproof guarantee against human error. This worry doubtless pre-occupies the Russian leaders as much as it does the West. But until both sides can agree to rid the world of weapons of mass destruction, all we can do is to reduce this risk as far as is humanly possible.

In essence NATO policy remains unchanged. It is to prevent war by deterring an aggressor from starting a war because it would not be worth while to do so. But there is no longer a single deterrent. The Dulles threat of massive retaliation is no longer valid. It has to be replaced by a series of deterrents. The capacity of the West to strike a second nuclear blow is the deterrent against a surprise all-out nuclear attack. But the deterrent against anything less than a total global attack is the provision of equivalent means of counter-attack; tanks against tanks, and tactical atomic weapons against tactical atomic weapons. It does not require that we have equivalent strength in every field and

["require that we have equivalent strength in every field and\natomic weapons against tactical atomic weapons. It does not\nrequire a total global attack is the provision of equivalent\nmeans of counter-attack; tanks against tanks, and tactical\nwarfare against tanks, and tactical warfare.", "But the deterrent against anything less\nsecond nuclear blow is the deterrent against a surprise all-\nseries of deterrents. The capacity of the West to strike a\nretaliation is no longer valid. It has to be replaced by a\nno longer a single deterrent. The Bulle threat of massive\nbecause it would not be worth while to do so. But there is\nno longer a single deterrent. The Bulle threat of massive\nbecause it would

1/29

at every point which the Soviet Union and her allies can muster. It does demand that we have sufficient defences to prevent any easy spoils being offered and the ability to hold an attack for long enough to force the aggressor to raise the stakes.

The most pressing need is to furnish SACEUR with the 30 divisions regarded as an indispensable minimum to defend Central Europe. This is the special responsibility of the European members of NATO, including Great Britain. The paradox of this age of electronics and nuclear science is that as more and more complex and expensive means of delivering weapons of vast destruction are developed, the ordinary soldier becomes more important than ever. It is also a hard fact that the most costly item of a defence budget is the provision of adequate conventional forces. If we destroy the possibility of easy gains, then no aggression can be undertaken without risks, the double risk of starting a nuclear war and of losing the nuclear initiative in so doing. Equally such a policy minimises the danger of a nuclear war resulting from a mischance or miscalculation.

misconduct.

the danger of a nuclear war resulting from a misjudgment or
initiative in so going. Equally and a hollow mistake
of starting a nuclear war and of forcing the nuclear
aggression can be undertaken without risk, the double risk

It we destroy the possibility of easy gains, then no
pursuit is the provision of adequate conventional forces.

also a hard fact that the most costly item of a defence
ordinarily soldier becomes more important than ever. If it
is delivering weapons of vast destruction are developed, the
that as more and more complex and expensive means of
barrier of this age of electronics and nuclear science is
European members of NATO, including Great Britain. The
Central Europe. This is the special responsibility of the
30 divisions recharged as an independent minimum to defend

The most pressing need is to turn off BACKUP with the
to twice the taxes.
to hold an attack for long enough to force the aggressor
to prevent any easy wins being offered and the agility
muster. It does demand that we have sufficient defences
at every point which the Soviet Union and her allies can

1/53

[rd]

1/30

[Lc]

I believe such a policy is likely to keep the peace. But clearly there can be no proof positive and in the last analysis any policy based on deterrence is an act of faith. Yet I doubt if the atomic bomb would have been dropped upon Japan if it had been thought that she could retaliate in similar measure. While the stakes are higher than for any previous policy of deterrence or balance of power in history, this perhaps is our best guarantee. The terrible consequences to himself and the world are so great, that an aggressor is unlikely to take any risk of being wrong in his calculations. He will only strike if he is doubly certain that he can achieve his purpose without meeting full retaliation.

There is no alternative to this policy, short of capitulation, until multilateral disarmament makes it no longer necessary. The only alternative to the West's maintaining nuclear parity with the Soviet Union coupled with an adequate conventional capability would be to submit, under the duress of Soviet nuclear threats, to each and every demand the Soviet Union cared to make. There seems even less scope for passive resistance in the nuclear world than there was before, and it had no conspicuous successes even then.

Of course no policy can remain constant for ever, and it is essential that we have flexibility to react to new circumstances. Developments in space exploration may

circumstances. Developments in space exploration may
be essential that we have flexibility to react to new

Of course no policy can remain constant for ever, and it
before, and it had no consequences even then.

for passive resistance in the nuclear world than there was
the Soviet Union cared to make. There seems even less scope
the desire of Soviet nuclear threats, to each and every demand
an adequate conventional capability would be to admit, under
maintaining nuclear parity with the Soviet Union coupled with
longer necessarily.

The only alternative to the West's
capitulation, until multilateral disarmament makes it no
short of
alternative to this policy, short of
achieve his purpose without meeting full retaliation.

He will only strike if he is doubly certain that he can
unavoidably to take any risk of being wrong in his calculations.
Himself and the world are so great, that an aggressor in
belligerence is our best guarantee. The terrible consequences to
policy of deterrence or balance of power in history, this
meantime. While the stakes are higher than for any previous
it it had been thought that she could retellate in similar
good if the atomic bomb would have been dropped upon Japan
and policy based on deterrence is an act of faith. Yet I
clearly there can be no proof positive and in the last analysis
I believe such a policy is likely to keep the peace. But

130

[L]

1/31

[lc]

provide a reconnaissance satellite which will further
remove the dangers of surprise attack. The production of
an anti-missile missile capable of shooting down ballistic
missiles on their way to their targets would again
radically transform our whole strategic thinking. The
consequences for us of the Russians producing this first
are obviously very serious since the basis of our second
strike capability would be undermined.

Both in the present and in the foreseeable future,
Western security and also, paradoxically, any hope of
effective disarmament, depend on the strength and adhesion
of the NATO alliance. Only by collective effort can we
provide the balanced forces that a policy of deterrence
requires, and this will not be achieved unless the principle
of political interdependence is accepted as well as common
defence arrangements. National defence programmes and
independent foreign policies are both anachronistic in
the 1960's. The test of a NATO country's policies should
be their contribution to the Alliance.

1/32

[LC]

## Chapter 3: The Evolution of NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington on 4th April 1949. While serious criticisms can be levelled at the present state of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) from both the political and military angles it is indisputable that in the twelve years of its existence much progress has been made towards the objectives set out in the Treaty. To realise how much has been achieved, one has only to compare the present unified defence system (despite its weaknesses) and the forces at General Norstad's disposal (despite their inadequacies) with the 12 divisions, most of them organised for occupation duties only, 400 aircraft and 400 ships at the disposal of General Eisenhower when he was appointed as the first Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) at the end of 1950.

NATO has succeeded in its main purpose of preserving peace. Of course it is impossible to furnish objective proof that the existence and development of a collective security system such as NATO has been a major factor in avoiding war. I do believe however that this may fairly be assumed. In my opinion a strong NATO is essential if peace is to be preserved. It is also essential to the successful outcome of arms control negotiations.

1/33

[LC]

I feel it necessary to make this clear, since the emphasis in this book is on NATO's shortcomings in political and military organisation and strategic thinking rather than on its achievements. These achievements are solid and not to be underestimated. But we cannot rest content with the present state of the Alliance. No organisation can stand still: it must move either forward or backward. Events have made the present time a turning point in NATO's history and the early 1960's will determine the direction it is to take. I believe it is essential for NATO to move forward, and it is this that prompts me to point to the shortcomings and weaknesses in organisation and policy which must be put right if the alliance is to play its true role in world affairs.

## The Background

When the Second World War ended in 1945 and our minds were on problems of demobilisation and the painful process of rebuilding our war-shattered economies, few people anticipated that within five years rearment would again be a major issue. Most, and I confess I was among them, believed that the co-operation which had led to the overthrow of Hitler and Japan would continue for the mutual benefit of the whole world. There was great confidence that the new United Nations Organisation would succeed where the League of Nations had failed.

Nations had failed.

United Nations Organization would succeed where the League of
the whole world. There was great confidence that the new
ofHitler and Japan would continue for the mutual benefit of
believed that the co-operation which had led to the intervention
be a major issue. Most, and I confess, I was among them,
anticipated that within five years rearmament would again
of rebuilding our war-shattered economies, few people
were on problems of demobilization and the painful process
when the Second World War ended in 1945 and our minds

The Background

and policy which must be but right if the alliance is to
point to the shortcoming and weakness in organization
NATO to move forward, and it is this that prompts me to
the direction it is to take. I believe it is essential for
point in NATO's history and the early 1960's will determine
or packward. Events have made the present time a turning
organization can stand still: it must move either forward
content with the present state of the Alliance. No
solid and not to be underestimated. But we cannot rest
rather than on its achievements. These achievements are
political and military organization and strategic thinking
emphasize in this book is on NATO's shortcoming in

f/33

1/34

[LC]

Events, however, soon dispelled our optimism and shattered the East-West Alliance developed during the war. It gradually became clear that the creation of the United Nations did not mean an end of international tensions and the risk of war. After a brief spring of faith in the power of the United Nations we passed, without an intervening summer, to the bleak winter of the Cold War.

It is necessary to recall only a few items in the long list of examples of Soviet aggressive diplomacy and determination to provoke international tension to paint the backcloth against which the NATO Treaty was signed. Large Soviet forces were maintained in Eastern Europe and the 'satellite' forces were built up. Pressures were exerted in Persia and Turkey whilst guerilla war was encouraged in Greece. Communist control was established throughout Eastern Europe and was dramatically revealed by the seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in 1948. Russia and the other Communist countries refused to co-operate in the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe. Peace treaties with former enemy countries were blocked and the Soviet veto in the United Nations was frequently invoked. Finally, and perhaps most significant, there was the blockade for a year of Berlin, after consistent breaches of the Potsdam Agreement.

1/35

[LC]

Already before the NATO Treaty there had been a renewal of some old alliances. In March 1947 Britain and France signed the Dunkirk Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance. A year later this had been extended to include Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands as well as the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed on 17th March 1948. This grouping of the five nations was known as Western Union. In many ways this Treaty provided a pattern for the North Atlantic Treaty. Three months later, on 11th June 1948, the United States Senate passed by a big majority a resolution sponsored by the late Senator Vandenberg, affirming American determination to exercise the right of individual or collective self-defence allowed by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter and recommending the "association of the United States ... with such other regional and collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid." The way was being prepared for the transformation of the original Brussels Treaty, as the late Mr. Ernest Bevin, the then British Foreign Secretary, had hoped and planned, into the wider Atlantic Alliance.

In the meantime there had been a most significant development in economic co-operation. In June 1947 General Marshall, the United States Secretary of State, announced, in a speech at Harvard, a plan for the economic

1/36

[LC]

rehabilitation of Europe with generous assistance from the United States. Mr. Bevin responded with great vigour and imagination to this American initiative and together with M. Georges Bidault, the then French Foreign Minister, organised Europe to accept the Marshall Plan. This meant that not only was European economic recovery attained much faster than would otherwise have been the case, but that in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation there was a machinery for inter-governmental co-operation which proved of tremendous value in all the complex economic problems involved in the years of post-war recovery. There was also an undeniable commitment of the United States to Europe which was further strengthened and given formal shape in the NATO Treaty.

## The Treaty

The original signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Greece and Turkey acceded to it in 1952 and the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1955. The Treaty itself was a model of clarity and brevity. Its purpose is well expressed in the Preamble:

Burboae is well expressed in the example:

The Treaty itself was a model of clarity and brevity. It
was to it in 1925 and the Federal Republic of Germany in May 1926.
Kingdom and the United States. Greece and Turkey accepted
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United
were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy,
The original signatories to the North Atlantic Treaty

The Treaty

NATO Treaty.

was further strengthened and given formal shape in the
an undeniable commitment of the United States to Europe which
involved in the years of host-war recovery. There was also
of tremendous value in all the complex economic problems
a machinery for inter-governmental co-operation which prevents
the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation there was
further than would otherwise have been the case, but that in
that not only was European economic recovery attained much
organised Europe to accept the Marshall Plan. This meant
M. Georges Bidault, the then French Foreign Minister,
imagined to this American initiative and together with
United States. Mr. Bevin responded with great alacrity and
reapportionment of Europe with generous assistance from the

1/32

[r]

1/37

[LC]

"The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all Governments.

"They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.

"They seek to promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

"They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security."

In particular the Parties undertook to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack" and agreed "that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all". NATO territory was defined as "the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, or the Algerian Departments of France, or the occupation forces of any Party in Europe, or the islands under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the Parties." (see map P. 1)

The unique task of establishing an Alliance for collective defence in time of peace between sovereign states without any direct surrender of national independence and thus without supranational institutions posed many problems.

time without subjugating institutions to meet many problems. Without any direct surrender of national independence and collective defence in time of peace between sovereign states the unique task of establishing an Alliance for

in this area of any of the Parties." (see p. 113)

North of the Tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft under the jurisdiction of any Party in the North Atlantic area occupation forces of any Party in Europe, or the islands North America, or the Algerian Departments of France, or the defined as "the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or considered an attack against them all". NATO territory was or more of them in Europe or North America itself be armed attack" and agreed "that an armed attack against one develop their individual and collective capacity to resist

In particular the Parties undertook to "maintain and
behave and neighbourhood".

in the North Atlantic area.

liberty and the rule of law.

Founded on the principles of democracy, individual
common heritage and civilization of their peoples,
"They are determined to safeguard the freedom,

"The Parties to this Treaty shall fulfil their

1/31

[LC]

1/38

[LC]

Gradually the political and military organisation, described below, was evolved, all agencies created by the Alliance being subordinate to the North Atlantic Council, composed of the Foreign Ministers of the member countries. Parallel to the work of organisation, the Council was concerned to establish a common defence policy in the fields of armaments production and military strategy.

In April 1950 a four year defence plan was approved. Shortly afterwards additional point was given to the need for the Alliance by the Communist attack upon South Korea on 25th June 1950. The following meeting of the Council was centred upon the problem of defending the NATO area against an aggression similar to that launched in Korea. A "forward strategy" was adopted with the intention of resisting an aggression as far to the East as possible. But to this would require far greater resources than those available to NATO at the time. Accordingly it was necessary to build up military strength, revise defence plans and create "an integrated force under a centralised command, adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe." German Rearmament and the European Defence Community

The "forward strategy" adopted by the Council necessitated the defence of Europe on German soil, which clearly meant that the military and political participation

clearly meant that the military and political participation
necessitated the defence of Europe on German soil, which
The "forward strategy" adopted by the Council

German Rearmament and the European Defence Community
deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe.¹⁴

NATO at the time. Accordingly it was necessary to build up
stronger forces for greater reasons than those available to
aggression as far as the East as possible. But this
attractively was adopted with the intention of relating an
aggression similar to that launched in Korea. A "forward
upon the problem of defending the NATO area against an
June 1920". The following meeting of the Council was centred
the Alliance by the Communist attack upon South Korea on 52nd
Shortly afterwards additional point was given to the need for
In April 1920 a four year defence plan was approved.

production and military strategy.
established a common defence policy in the fields of armaments
to the work of organisation; the Council was concerned to
of the foreign Ministers of the member countries. Parallel
being subordinate to the North Atlantic Council, composed
below, was evolved, all agencies created by the Alliance
gradually the political and military organisation described

1/38

[fc]

1/39

[LC]

of the Federal Republic of Germany was necessary. In addition an assessment of the forces likely to be available to NATO led to the military conclusion that a substantial German contribution was essential if an adequate number of divisions was to be provided in Europe. The political problems of rearming Germany were, however, plain for all to see. There was controversy and reluctance in Germany itself and a bitter argument developed in the British Labour Party as plans to effect it were formulated. There were, understandably, also strong objections in France.

At the Council of Europe Assembly in Strasbourg in August 1950, Sir (then Mr.) Winston Churchill had proposed "the immediate creation of a European army under a united command in which we should all bear a worthy and honourable part" and which should be "subject to proper European democratic control" and should act in co-operation with the United States and Canada. H. Robert Schuman had just published his plan which was to become the Coal and Steel Community. Thus it seemed both practicable and desirable that German rearmament should take place within a European framework, avoiding in this way the re-creation of German national forces. Such a solution would have served the dual objectives of strengthening the defences of Europe and at the same time moving nearer the goal of European federation.

attracting the defences of Europe and at the same time

such a solution would have served the dual objectives of

avoiding in this way the re-creation of German national forces,

rearmament should take place within a European framework.

United States and Canada. Robert Boman had just published

democratic control, and should act in co-operation with the

bart" and which should be "subject to broader European

command in which we should all bear a worthy and reasonable

"the immediate creation of a European army under a统一miteg

August 1920, Sir (then Mr.) Winston Churchill had proposed

At the Conference of Europe Assembly in Strasbourg in

effect it was formulated. There were, understandingably,

argument developed in the British Parliament as plans to

be controversial and reluctant in Germany itself and a bitter

fighting Germany were, however, plain for all to see. There

was to be provided in Europe. The political problems of re-

fed to the military conclusion that a substantial German

1/39

[fc]

1/40

[LC]

On 25th October 1950 René Plessé, the French Prime Minister, presented an outline plan for a European Defence Community to the National Assembly and secured a vote in its favour of 343 to 225. He proposed "the creation, for the purpose of common defence, of a European Army linked to the political institution of a united Europe" which would be "a complete merger of men and equipment under a single European political and military authority".

The British Labour Government in 1951 made it clear that Britain could not become a member of the Defence Community, although undertaking to be associated with it as closely as possible. When Sir Winston Churchill became Prime Minister after the General Election in October 1951 a change in British policy was widely anticipated, since, apart from Sir Winston's own commitments to the 'European idea', his Government was packed with members who had been enthusiastic supporters of British leadership in Europe and critics of the Labour Government's refusal to join the Coal and Steel Community.

Europe, however, was in for a bitter disappointment. The new Government followed the policy of the old. After protracted negotiations¹, complicated by Governmental crises in France

I See Anthony Nutting: "Europe will not Wait" for an account of these negotiations

of these negotiations

See Anthony Cutting: "Europe will not wait" for an account
of the negotiations, complicated by Governmental chaos in France

negotiations¹, complicated by Governmental chaos in France
Government followed the policy of the old. After protracted
Europe, however, was in for a bitter disappointment. The new
Community.

British Government's refusal to join the Coal and Steel
anporters of British leadership in Europe and criticism of the
Government was backed with members who had been enthusiastic
Sir Winston's own commitments to the 'Europe 1968', his
British policy was widely anticipated, since, apart from
after the General Election in October 1961 a change in
bassique. When Sir Winston Churchill became Prime Minister
although undertaking to be associated with it as closely as
Britain could not become a member of the Defence Community.
The British London Government in 1961 made it clear that
political and military authority."

complete merger of men and equipment under a single European
political institution of a united Europe, which would be "a
burden of common defence" of a European Army linked to the
favour of 343 to 552. He proposed "the creation" for the
Community to the National Assembly and secured a vote in its
Minister, presented an outline plan for a European Defence
On 25th October 1960 (Geneva Eleven, the French Prime

140

[[c]]

1/41

[LC]

on 30th August 1954 the European Defence Community was finally strangled by the French National Assembly who had given birth to the idea four years before. However, it must also be said that the British Government, whose Prime Minister had planted the seed from which E.D.C. grew, must take a large measure of responsibility. Sir Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, had steadfastly refused to give the French the assurances of British commitment which they felt necessary for their own participation. Ironically it was soon to be revealed that Britain was to pay as big a price, in terms of a European commitment, for the less satisfactory framework of Western European Union in order to permit German rearmament, as she would have needed to pay to secure the coming into operation of the European Defence Community. The failure of E.D.C. also meant that Britain had irrevocably discarded the opportunity of playing a leading role in the political evolution of a United Europe.

Paradoxically the failure of E.D.C. prompted Sir Anthony Eden to take the initiative. With exceptional speed agreement was reached on an alternative plan to repair much of the damage to NATO strength which threatened to follow the rejection of the Defence Community and with it the provisions for German rearmament. In less than two months on 23rd October 1954, the Paris Agreements were signed. These

1/42

[LC]

provided for the following modifications in the Brussels
Treaty of 1948:-

(1) The termination of the occupation regime in Western Germany, the Federal Government agreeing to the maintenance on its territory of foreign forces at least equivalent in strength to those stationed there at the time of the signature of the Agreements.

(2) The accession of Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany to the Brussels Treaty, whose signatories were henceforth to constitute a 'Western European Union'.

(3) Within the framework of this Union, agreement on the maximum level of forces to be maintained by each member on the mainland of Europe, and the institution of a system of control over force levels and armaments.

(4) An undertaking by the United Kingdom to maintain on the continent forces equivalent to those assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force). The United Kingdom stipulated, however, that

The United Kingdom attested, however, that
givatones and the Second Tactical Air Force).
to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (tou
on the continent forces equivalent to those assigned
(4) An undertaking by the United Kingdom to maintain
forces and armaments.

institution of a system of control over force
een member on the maining of Europe, and the
on the maximum level of forces to be maintained by
(3) Within the framework of this Union, agreement
"Western European Union".

signatories were henceforth to constitute a
Republic of Germany to the Brussels Treaty, whose
(5) The accession of Italy and the Federal
treaties.

atuated there at the time of the signature of
forces at least equivalent in strength to those
to the maintenance on its territory of foreign
Western Germany, the Federal Government agreeing
(1) The termination of the occupation regime in
Treaty of 1948:-

1/45

[rC]

1/43

[LC]

it would not be bound by this obligation in the
event of a serious overseas emergency. It also
reserved the right to ask the Council of the
Review to reconsider the financial arrangements for the
maintenance of these forces if the drain on its
foreign exchange proved too great.

(5) The accession of the Federal Republic of
Germany to the North Atlantic Treaty.

(6) The establishment of a unified military
formation by assigning to the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe all forces of member countries
stationed within the area of his command, with
the exception of certain forces needed for the
for the defence of overseas territories, for
internal protection and for police duties.

On 6th May 1955, all the necessary ratifications
having been deposited, the modified Brussels Treaty came
into force and on 9th May the Federal Republic of Germany
became the fifteenth member of NATO.

1/44

[LC]

Western European Union

Western European Union as established under the modified Brussels Treaty consists of a Council of Ministers (with Headquarters in London) and an Assembly (with its Headquarters in Paris). The Council consists of the Foreign Ministers of the seven countries and the Assembly of the Members of Parliament of those countries who are elected or appointed as their country's representatives to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

The modified Brussels Treaty provides a greater degree of commitment for its members and a greater guarantee of military aid is provided for a member attacked than that contained in the NATO Treaty. But following the precedent of the original Brussels Treaty Organisation which delegated all its defence and military functions to NATO shortly after the formation of NATO in 1949, the Council of Western European Union has likewise delegated these responsibilities to NATO. Similarly although a Standing Armaments Committee exists to further the common production and standardisation of weapons in W.E.U., it is over-shadowed by the work of NATO in the same field. The procedures established in W.E.U., however, serve as a pattern for the NATO work.

pattern for the NATO work.

procedures established in W.E.U., however, serve as a
emphasized by the work of NATO in the same field. The
and standardization of weapons in W.E.U., it is over-
VArmaments Committee exists to further the common production
reasonabilities to NATO. Similarly although a Standing
of Western European Union has likewise delegated these
efforts after the formation of NATO in 1949, the Council
delegated all its defence and military functions to NATO
of the original Brussels Treaty Organization which
contained in the NATO Treaty. But following the precedent
military aid it is provided for a member attached than that
of commitment for its members and a greater guarantee of
The modified Brussels Treaty provides a greater degree
to the Constitutive Assembly of the Council of Europe.
elected or appointed as their country's representatives
of the Members of Parliament of those countries who are
Foreign Ministers of the seven countries and the Assembly
Headquarters in Paris). The Council consists of the
(with Headquarters in London) and an Assembly (with its
modified Brussels Treaty consists of a Council of Ministers
Western European Union as established under the

Western European Union as established under the
modified Brussels Treaty consists of a Council of Ministers
(With Headquarters in London) and an Assembly (with its
Foreign Ministers of the seven countries and the Assembly
Headquarters in Paris). The Council consists of the
of the Members of Parliament of those countries who are
The modified Brussels Treaty provides a greater degree
to the Constitutive Assembly of the Council of Europe.
elected or appointed as their country's representatives
of the Members of Parliament of those countries who are
Foreign Ministers of the seven countries and the Assembly
Headquarters in Paris). The Council consists of the


Western European Union

1/44

[rC]

1/45

[LC]

The main responsibility in defence matters exercised by the Council is in respect of the work of its Agency for the Control of Armaments. Its duties are to inspect and report on the level of stocks on the mainland of Europe and to ensure that prohibited weapons are not being manufactured. It has also to determine the level of stocks of atomic weapons produced on the mainland of Europe that its members may maintain there. This has not so far been applied, but it will presumably have to be done once French production of nuclear weapons passes the experimental stage. In all these matters the Council acts by a simple majority, in contrast to NATO unanimity.

The Council is also required to see that the maximum levels of forces laid down in the Treaty are not exceeded. This has not been any problem, nor does it appear likely to become one. On the contrary, the difficulty has been to persuade members to maintain their forces at the promised levels, although these are well below the permitted maxima. Only in the case of the United Kingdom is there an undertaking to keep a minimum number of forces in Europe and the Council's consent, by majority vote, is required to permit the withdrawal of forces below the four divisions and the Second Tactical Air Force committed in the Treaty,

and the Second Tactical Air Force committed in the Treaty,
permit the withdrawal of forces below the four divietoes
the Council's consent, by majority vote, is required to
taking to keep a minimum number of forces in Europe and
Only in the case of the United Kingdom if there is under-
levels, although these are well below the permitted maxima.
permane members to maintain their forces at the promised
become one. On the contrary, the difficulty has been to
This has not been any problem, nor does it appear likely to
levels of forces laid down in the Treaty are not exceeded.
The Council is also required to see that the maximum
in contrast to NATO unanimity.

In all these matters the Council acts by a simple majority,
production of nuclear weapons bases the experimental stage,
applied, but it will probably have to be done once French
its members may maintain there. This has not so far been
of atomic weapons produced on the mainland of Europe that
manufactured. It has also to determine the level of stocks
and to ensure that prohibited weapons are not being
reported on the level of stocks on the mainland of Europe
the Control of Armaments. Its duties are to inspect and
by the Council is in respect of the work of its Agency for
The main responsibility in defence matters exercised

1/42

[fr]

1/46

[LC]

except in the event of an acute overseas emergency. On two occasions the Council has agreed to withdrawals of British troops from Germany.

In general the Council has been loath to take any decisions in defence matters, or to take any initiatives in this field within the North Atlantic Council, for fear of creating the impression in NATO that the seven members are acting in consort or forming a Western European Union pressure group. However, because W.E.U. is the only body consisting of the six countries forming the European Economic Community plus the United Kingdom, it has been of great value as a framework for political consultation between 'the six' and the United Kingdom and for negotiations towards a solution of the problems posed by 'the Six' and 'the Seven'.

The Assembly owes its existence to the fact that the provisions of the European Defence Community for a parliamentary body were taken over in the Paris agreements. Unlike the European Parliamentary Assembly it has no executive powers but only consultative status. It has power in certain circumstances, however, formally to disagree with decisions of the Council. It also has control over its own Budget.

control over its own budget.

disagree with decisions of the Council. It also has
power in certain circumstances, however, formally to
executive powers put only consultative status. It has
Unlike the European Parliamentary Assembly it has no
mentary body were taken over in the Paris agreements.
provisions of the European Defence Community for a parlia-
The Assembly owes its existence to the fact that the
and 'the Seven'.

towards a solution of the problems posed by 'the Six',
'the six', and the United Kingdom and for negotiations
value as a framework for political consultation between
Community blue the United Kingdom, it has been of great
consisting of the six countries forming the European Economic
bureaux Group. However, because W.E.U. is the only body
are acting in concert or forming a Western European Union
of creating the impression in NATO that the seven members
in this field within the North Atlantic Council, for fear
decisions in defence matters, or to take any initiatives
In general the Council has been lost to take any
troops from Germany.

occasions the Council has agreed to withdrawals of British
except in the event of an acute overseas emergency. On two

1/46

[fc]

1/47

[LC]

In the defence field, through its Committee on Defence Questions and Armaments, it has devised procedures and opportunities to provide valuable information and experience for its members. In this way it can play a big part in assisting to develop an informed parliamentary and public opinion on the work and policies of the Alliance. In particular the Assembly has stressed consistently the obligation to re-think the strategy of NATO in the light of nuclear parity, the importance of providing more conventional forces and the need to establish joint political control within the Alliance over the use of nuclear weapons. In this way it has perhaps exerted an influence on the change of emphasis of NATO policy. It has certainly provided a unique official forum for discussion of these matters. The Assembly has also been concerned to suggest and to discuss ways of solving the deadlock between 'the Six' and 'the Seven'.

Western European Union had important responsibility for the administration of the Saar, but these ended when the Saar was incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany in 1957. It also had important responsibilities, inherited from the original Brussels Treaty Organisation, to develop co-operation in the social and cultural fields. After lengthy discussion and negotiation, and in the face of considerable opposition from the Assembly, the Council transferred its social and cultural activities to the Council of Europe in 1960.

social and cultural activities to the Council of Europe in 1920. Objection from the Assembly, the Council transferred its disapproval and negotiation, and in the face of considerable opposition in the social and cultural fields. After lengthy original Brussels Treaty Organization, to develop co-

It also had important responsibilities, inherited from the
was incorporated into the Federal Republic of Germany in 1924.
the administration of the State, put these ended when the State
Western European Union had important responsibility for
ways of solving the deadlock between 'the Six' and 'the Seven'.
Assembly has also been concerned to suggest and to discuss
unique official forum for discussion of these matters. The
of embassies of NATO policy. It has certainly provided a
this way it has been exerted an influence on the change
within the Alliance over the use of nuclear weapons. In
forces and the need to establish joint political control
nuclear parity, the importance of providing more conventional
opposition to re-think the strategy of NATO in the light of
particular the Assembly has stressed consistently the
opinion on the work and policies of the Alliance. In
assisting to develop an informed parliamentary and huipile
for its members. In this way it can play a pig part in
opportunities to provide valuable information and experience
Questions and Answers, it has devised procedures and
In the defence field, through its Committee on Defence

145

[f]

1/48

[LC]

This, incidentally, has been the only tangible achievement
of the many efforts made to produce a measure of
'rationalisation' of the various European institutions.

Present Organisation of NATO

The North Atlantic Council is the highest authority
in NATO and all its decisions require unanimity. It meets
at the level both of Ministers and of Permanent
Representatives. While the members are usually
represented at ministerial meetings by their Foreign
Ministers, it is possible for other Ministers to attend
if the agenda makes this desirable. In December 1957 the
Council met for the first time at the level of Heads of
Government.

The Secretary-General, Dr. Dirk Stikker (Netherlands),
who is also Chairman of the Council, is responsible to it
for organising its work and directing the Secretariat.

There is a Deputy Secretary-General and four Assistant
Secretaries-General, directing the Divisions of Political
Affairs, Economics and Finance, Production and Logistics
and the office of the Science Adviser. An Executive
Secretary acts as Secretary to the Council.

and the office of the Science Adviser. An Executive
Airlines, Economics and Finance, Production and Logistics
Secretaries-General, directing the Divisions of Political
There is a Deputy Secretary-General and four Assistant
for Organising its work and directing the Secretaries;
who is also Chairman of the Council, is responsible to it
The Secretary-General, Dr. Dirk Stikker (Netherlands).

Government.

Council met for the first time at the level of Heads of
it the agenda makes this desirable. In December 1951 the
Ministers, it is possible for other Ministers to attend
represented at ministerial meetings by their foreign
Representatives. While the members are normally
at the level of Prime of Minister and of Permanent
in NATO and all its decolonies require unanimity. It meets

Present Organization of NATO

ratification, of the various European institutions.
of the many efforts made to produce a measure of
This, incidentally, has been the only tangible achievement

148

[i]

1/49

[Lc]

The highest military organisation consists of the Military Committee, the Standing Group, the Commands and a Regional Planning Group.

The Military Committee, meeting in Washington, is composed of Chiefs of Staff of the member countries. At this level it meets at least twice a year. Between these meetings Permanent Military Representatives are appointed to enable the Committee to function in permanent session.

The Standing Group, also in Washington, is the executive agent of the Military Committee and is composed of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the United Kingdom and the United States. It is the body to which the NATO Commanders are responsible and has the task of co-ordinating defence plans originating in the Commands and of making recommendations to the Military Committee and the Council. The Standing Group is also responsible for the NATO Defence College in Paris and for a number of specialised military agencies.

The NATO area is divided into three Commands (Europe, Atlantic Ocean and Channel) and a Regional Planning Group (Canada-United States):-

(Canada—United States):—

Atlantic Ocean and Channel) and a Regional Planning Group
The NATO area is divided into three Commands (Europe,
specialized military agencies.

NATO Defence College in Paris and for a number of
the Council. The Standing Group is also reasonable for the
and of making recommendations to the Military Committee and
of co-ordinating defence plans originating in the Commanda
which the NATO Commanders are reasonable and pass the task
United Kingdom and the United States. It is the body to
of representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of France, the
executive agent of the Military Committee and is composed
The Standing Group, also in Washington, is the
to enable the Committee to function in permanent season.
meetings Permanent Military Representatives are appointed
this level it meets at least twice a year. Between these
composed of Chiefs of Staff of the member countries. At
The Military Committee, meeting in Washington, is
Regional Planning Group.

Military Committee, the Standing Group, the Command and a
The highest military organization consists of the

1/48

[c]

1/50

[LC]

## 1. European Command

This Command covers the land area extending from the North Cape to North Africa and from the Atlantic to the eastern border of Turkey but excludes the United Kingdom, Portugal and Algeria which are national responsibilities. It is under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and its headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) is located near Paris.

SACEUR is responsible, under the general direction of the Standing Group, for the defence of the Allied countries situated within the area of his Command against any attack. In peacetime he is responsible for the organisation, training and equipment of the forces assigned to him; for the preparation of plans and for making such recommendations on military matters as he thinks fit. He has direct access to Chiefs of Staff, Defence Ministers and Heads of Government of member countries.

He has a Deputy Supreme Commander as well as a Naval Deputy and an Air Deputy. There are four subordinate Commands directly responsible to him: (i) Northern Europe at Kalsasas in Norway (ii) Central Europe at Fontainebleau in France (iii) Southern Europe at Naples in Italy and (iv) Mediterranean at Malta.

Mediterranean at Malta.

France (fif) Southern Europe at Naples in Italy and (iv) at Kalausa in Norway (if) Central Europe at Montsleben in Commandes directly responsible to him (i) Northern Europe Deputy and an Air Deputy. There are four appendices

He has a Deputy Supreme Commander as well as a Naval
Government of member countries.

to Chiefs of Staff, Defence Ministers and Heads of
on military matters as he thinks fit. He has direct access
to the preparation of plans and for making such recommendations
training and equipment of the forces assigned to him; for
In peace time he is responsible for the organisation,

attacked within the area of his Command against any attack.
the Standing Group, for the defence of the Allied countries
SACHAUR is responsible, under the General direction of
En route (SHARE) is located near Paris.

and its headquarters, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
It is under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACHAUR)
Portugal and Algeria which are national responsible parties,
er eastern border of Turkey but excludes the United Kingdom,
North Cape to North Africa and from the Atlantic to the
This Command covers the land area extending from the
J. European Command

f/ 20

[f]

1/51

[LC]

## 2. The Atlantic Ocean Command

This Command extends from the North Pole to the Tropic of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North Africa to those of Europe and Africa, including Portugal, except for the Channel and the British Isles. It also has responsibility for islands in this area, such as Iceland and the Azores.

The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) has his headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia in the United States. Unlike SACEUR, SACLANT has no forces permanently assigned to his Command, although the forces earmarked to be assigned to him in war are available for exercises. SACLANT's responsibilities are thus almost entirely operational. He has a deputy Supreme Commander.

There are three Commands directly responsible to SACLANT: (i) The Western Atlantic Area with headquarters at Norfolk, U.S.A., (ii) the Eastern Atlantic Area with headquarters at Northwood, England, and (iii) the striking Fleet Atlantic Command with headquarters at Norfolk, U.S.A.

## 3. Channel Command

This Command covers the English Channel and the southern part of the North Sea. It is controlled by the Channel Committee, with headquarters in London, which consists of the Naval Chiefs of Staff (or their representatives) of

the Naval Staff (or their representatives) of
Committee, with headquarters in London, which consist of
part of the North Sea. It is controlled by the Channel

3. Channel Command

Northwood, England, and (iii) the striking fleet Atlantic
U.S.A., (ii) the Eastern Atlantic Area with headquarters at
(1) The Western Atlantic Area with headquarters at Norfolk,

There are three Commands directly responsible to SACHAINT:

reasonabilities are due almost entirely operational.
to him in war are available for exercise. SACHAINT's
to his Command, although the forces earmarked to be assigned
Unlike SACHAINT has no forces permanently assigned
headquarters at Norfolk, Virginia in the United States.

The Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACHAINT) has his
to islands in this area, such as Iceland and the Azores.

the Channel and the British Isles. It also has responsibility
those of Europe and Africa, including Portugal, except for
of Cancer and from the coastal waters of North Africa to

This Command extends from the North Pole to the Trope

5. The Atlantic Ocean Command

1/21

1/52

[lc]

Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Directly under the Channel Committee is the Allied Command Channel exercised jointly by the Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel (a British Admiral with headquarters at Portsmouth) and the Allied Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief Channel (a British Air Marshal with headquarters at Northwood, England).

4. Canada-United States Regional Planning Group

This Planning Group, which covers the North American area, develops and recommends to the Military Committee, through the Standing Group, plans for the defence of the Canada-United States region. It meets alternately in Washington and Ottawa.

A general view of the basic organisation of NATO is given in the chart on page ......

Given in the chart on page ......

A General view of the basic organization of NATO is
Washington and Ottawa.

Canada—United States region. It meets alternately in
through the Standing Group, plans for the defence of the
area, develops and recommends to the Military Committee,
This Planning Group, which covers the North American

4. Canada—United States Regional Planning Group

British Air Marshall with headquarters at Northwood, England,
and the Allied Maritime Air Commander-in-Chief Channel (a
Channel (a British Admiral with headquarters at Portsmouth))
Channel exercised jointly by the Allied Commander-in-Chief
Directly under the Channel Committee is the Allied Command
Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

1/25

[c]

2/4

[LC]

surprise attack, so that such an attack would in any circumstances succeed. It is impossible to disprove such an assertion. At the same time it is essential to take all possible measures to demonstrate to a potential aggressor the risks inherent in such an assumption. For this purpose the retaliatory forces must be made as invulnerable, and as efficient, as human ingenuity can devise.

Early-warning stations are essential in this regard and we must maintain as efficient a system as is technically possible. The early-warning network is also essential to underline the defensive character of our strategic strike capability - our concern to be able to strike the second rather than the first blow. It is highly important to make the existing deterrent, consisting of manned-bomber forces and fixed-site missiles, credible as a means of retaliation as opposed to an offensive force; otherwise the suspicion may well be held by the Soviet Union that, despite our assurances to the contrary, we have provided such weapons for the purpose of making a surprise attack on them.

Since in an open political society there is no prospect of keeping secret the location of fixed-site missile bases, mobility must be the keynote of the policy to maintain a retaliatory force which could survive the most thoroughly planned surprise attack. Mr. Watkinson, British Minister of Defence, has said that this requires "a wide dispersal of

2/7

(the 'counter-city' strike) or aimed at nuclear bases and installations to destroy the opponent's own strategic retaliatory capacity (the 'counter-force' strike) are, however, commonly taken to be "strategic" warheads.

The "Hiroshima" bomb had an explosive power of 20 kilotons (i.e. equivalent to 20,000 tons of conventional T.N.T.). The fusion bomb usually has a yield of 10 megatons (equal to 10,000 kilotons) or 500 times the power of the "Hiroshima" bomb. Theoretically there is no upper limit to the explosive power of a fusion bomb. I have used the term *nuclear weapon* to denote any weapon employing nuclear fission or fusion as a source of explosive power. A *fission* weapon denotes specifically an "atomic" weapon in the kiloton range and a *fusion* weapon a "hydrogen" or "thermonuclear" weapon in the megaton range.

While the invention of nuclear weapons twenty years ago made enormous explosive power available, the development of missiles in the last ten years allows the nuclear explosive to be transported over inter-continental distances within a period of minutes and marks a revolution as big as the advent of nuclear fission itself. It is therefore essential to distinguish between the nuclear warhead and the means of delivering it.

2/9

these estimates did not take account of smaller bombs or of
tactical weapons such as atomic cannon.¹

The real problem is to maintain means of delivery which
will satisfy the two tests (a) that a sufficiently high per-
centage of the bombs would reach their targets despite enemy
defence arrangements and (b) that sufficient means of delivery
would survive an enemy surprise attack. The West must always
be able and ready to strike "the second blow". If this
capacity is beyond question, it should never be put to the
test. By definition, if a nuclear deterrent has to be used
it has failed in its main purpose - it has failed to deter
the enemy.

STRATEGIC RETALIATORY FORCES

Whatever may be decided about the development of nuclear
weapons within the Alliance, there is no doubt that the
responsibility for maintaining a credible strategic nuclear
deterrent will rest in the foreseeable future with the United
States, and particularly the Strategic Air Command, as is
indicated in the following review of existing nuclear
retaliatory forces.

1 "Times" 29 December 1960

2/17 q anoberq mor I etonjoq

[LC]

to lift its broiler s ebsm eliaaim (footnote overleaf) in a range of 6,000 km (9,860 miles) with a speed of 1,000 miles an hour, is the two-stage liquid-fuelled Titan, larger than Atlas but lighter, and with the same range and speed. It is also suitable for underground launching sites to provide maximum protection against attack. The first Titan missiles are expected to be ready for service in 1961. Eventually it is planned to have a total of 13 squadrons of Atlas missiles and 12 squadrons of Titans (a total of 264 missiles).

These missiles are to be followed by the Minuteman I.C.B.M., which is a three-stage solid fuelled missile. Because of its solid fuel Minuteman has three main advantages over its predecessors. Since solid fuel can be stored ready within the missile, it can be launched in a fraction of the time needed to prepare liquid-fuelled missiles for firing; simplicity of storage and maintenance makes it easy to "harden" so that it can be protected underground to withstand all explosive attack short of a direct hit; most important of all, the solid fuel development also makes it mobile. Indeed it is planned to have a proportion of Minuteman missiles always on the move round the United States mounted on railway wagons while others will be positioned in small hardened sites. The development of this missile has been particularly swift and it is anticipated that the first Minuteman missiles will be operational in the middle of 1962, two years ahead of the original schedule.²

² The first successful test firing of Minuteman was on 1 February 1961.

2/22

[LC]

war plan which is continually being adapted in the light of fresh information. The plan provides for all possible contingencies which are evaluated during the continuous war games undertaken at headquarters. These consist of drawing up war plans for the present and the future up to 1965, taking into account such technological evolution as is foreseeable. The crews know the predetermined targets and the mission routes they must follow to reach them. The Positive Control Procedure guarantees that the aircraft, should they be launched on an actual alert, will not spark off war on a false alarm. Under this procedure they will fly to certain points well off the Soviet borders and will then return unless they receive special instructions to proceed.

Being at the head of such a centralised instrument for global war, it is logical that the Commander-in-Chief of S.A.C. should have requested that the Polaris I.R.B.M. missile-launching submarines of the U.S. Navy be also placed under his command, on the grounds that such an integration would eliminate duplication and increase the effectiveness of a nuclear counter-blow. The U.S. Navy has opposed this request.

A central agency has been established to direct strategic target planning for an integrated missile-bomber force; this has been preferred to the concept of a separate force comprising all land- and sea-based strategic nuclear weapons independent;

2/36

[LC]

Most students of defence strategy, especially in America, feared that the early sixties would prove a period of extreme instability and weakness because the Soviet Union was expected to have a considerable lead in long- and medium-range missiles whilst the American deterrent would still depend upon manned bombers and fixed-site missiles such as Thor, both vulnerable to nuclear surprise attack. It can fairly be said that the picture today is much more encouraging than at one time seemed likely. On the other hand the West has no grounds whatever for complacency.

The "missile gap" to Soviet advantage, allied to the "intelligence gap" (due to the fact that it is impossible to conceal Western missile sites whereas the Russians are able to keep the details of their secret), could produce a situation, it was feared, where it would be at least rational for the Soviet Union to think they could destroy a very high percentage of American retaliatory power by surprise attack and thus make the risks worth while. Even if they did not take this step, at least the knowledge of their superiority in the missile field would encourage Russian aggressive diplomatic exploitation of every Western weakness and difficulty.

Indeed the gap between Soviet and American rocket development carries the most serious implications for the West. The shock which the launching of the first Sputnik four years ago caused to public opinion will still be remembered. The NATO

2/39

[Lc]

undoubtedly tilt the balance sharply in their favour, and the Western allies will need to use all their talents, energies and resources to the full if we are not to be left hopelessly behind.

An immediate and urgent task for the West is to attain the highest possible degree of mobility for our deterrent forces. The "hardening" of missile bases has minimised the danger of surprise attack, but this does not provide sufficient protection in view of the accuracy attained by Soviet missiles. Of our existing forces, only the submarines are invulnerable to surprise attack. The I.C.B.M.s and I.R.B.M.s, even if "hardened" in underground silos, can be destroyed if the accuracy of the missile is not less than the error of 1¼ miles reported by the Soviet Union in the Pacific tests of I.C.B.M.s early in 1960.¹

1 Tass announced on 21 January and 1 February 1960 that Russia had successfully test-fired missiles on 20 January and 31 January, the nose-cones of which had landed in a previously-announced target area of some 125,000 sq. km. (44,800 sq. m.) in the Pacific about 1,000 miles south-west of Hawaii. The Agency claimed that the first missile travelled 12,500 km. (7,750 m.) and landed within 2 km. (1¼ m.) of the selected target. The United States Department of Defence, which had Navy aircraft and ships in the area observing Russian vessels present there, announced the firings before Tass, and confirmed that the missiles had been observed to strike within the target area. They were believed to have been fired from a base at Tyura Ten on the Aral Sea, but no independent confirmation of the accuracy claimed was possible. President Eisenhower in his State of the Union message in early January 1960 claimed that in 10 firings the United States Atlas I.C.B.M. had averaged a range of 5,000 miles and an error of two miles off target. ("New York Times" 23 January, 2 February; "Le Mondo" 23 January; "Figaro" 2 February 1960)

agreement.

difficult as, and less worthwhile than, an same control
propensity of matbine, would seem unobjealable - on at least an
is a tactical use of a nuclear weapon, and so avoid the
past countries to make clean what is a tactical weapon or what
size of弹head. An agreement between NATO and the Warsaw
the level of nuclear exchange beyond the kind of use and thus
and that it is not desired, for the moment at least, to raise
but a label on a weapon to declare that its use is a tactical
comprehensive to the enemy. Uniquely if it is unobjealable to
seems necessarily that an attraction drawn must also be
inconveniency as a result of matning our intentions, then it
saves an enemy a record to the strategic weapons thoroughly
marger development and conventional improvements. If we are to
essential between the use of even the mildest atomic weapon
nuclear weapons. Via, in my judgment, a clear distinction is
to be drawn between the strategic and the tactical use of
strategic use of nuclear weapons, then a clear distinction may
be an attempt to be made to limit hostilities to the
on the Contract Front.

It is an attempt to do so, and to limit hostilities to the
on the Contract Front.

Tactical now being introduced in greater numbers to the forces
the Western annuity and in particular of the Thompson-to-Canada
and reserves the role of a co-called tactical nuclear weapons in
ritual of Soviet nuclear capability if the need to re-think
A further and much consequent of the boat-1965 recor-

tactical use of nuclear weapons, then a clear distinction may
be an attempt to do so, and to limit hostilities to the
on the Contract Front.

5/44

[f]

2/51

[lc]

Little John, suitable for air transport, has reached an early production stage. The 280 mm. atomic cannon has a range of about 14 miles but is extremely heavy and immobile, and it is likely soon to be taken out of service. The Corporal, the most modern of the missiles in service, has a range of about 70 miles and is the weapon of the two British missile regiments in North Germany. The Sergeant is designed as the successor to the Corporal. Although of similar range, Sergeant has the great advantage of a solid fuel propellant and an internal guidance system. This means that it is a much more mobile and efficient missile. Successful test firings of the Sergeant have already taken place and it is expected to be operational in 1961. There is also the Redstone, an improved version of the German V2 of World War II and the largest guided missile outside the Soviet Union until 1959. It has a range of 200 miles. The Pershing, a two-stage, solid-fuelled improved version of Redstone, had successful test firings during 1960 and has a range of 300 miles.

In addition to the above missiles, which are all of American origin, the British Government is producing Blue Water. This is a solid-fuelled missile which will be highly mobile and transportable by air and will have a range of 100 miles. It was hoped that this would be adopted as the NATO standard Army support guided missile and it was reported that the West German Government was interested in it. However, it seems certain that the Sergeant will become the NATO weapon.

2/54

[LC]

It is equally important to establish clearly at the highest level that in no circumstances can any atomic weapon be regarded as equivalent to conventional artillery or be subject to the same rules as to command and control. Whatever the problems of distinguishing between the various types of nuclear weapons and between their strategic and tactical uses, it seems to me essential that a clear distinction be drawn between the use of any weapon employing nuclear explosives and those using conventional T.N.T. shells.