TELCOM

Pres. Sanford, Duke Univ. /Kissinger

12:30 p.m. - 4/14/73

K: Hello.

S: Hello, Dr. Kissinger.

K: I have held up calling you because I wasn't clear about my schedule but now there's a good chance that I'll be out of the country on the 13th so that I very regretfully have to pass up the opportunity.

S: Well, I certainly am sorry. I'm sorry not to get you here for this occasion and this breakfast, but I'm also anxious to get you down here and look around anyhow.

K: I appreciate that very much. Won't you come to Washington some time?

S: Yes, in the next couple of weeks I should be up there.

K: Well, I'll be here in the next couple of weeks and I'll certainly. . .

S: Let me call you the next time I'm coming to Washington and I'll see if that's convenient because I get up there two or three times a month.

K: Right. Well I would certainly find the time to see you.

S: Well, thank you so much and thank you so much for calling. I'm really sorry you can't come because I was surely hoping so but I certainly understand.

K: Well basically I'm not accepting any honorary degrees this year but I was very tempted by this one.

S: I'm awfully sorry we can't work it out.

K: I'm sorry but it's just too uncertain. I might possibly be back on the 13th but I don't think it'd be fair to you to do it on this basis.

S: Well, I don't want to ask you any questions of any of that because you got so very many as it is but I am anxious to talk with you so I'll call then.

K: Good. Excellent.

S: Thank you so much.

K: Right. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz
E012957
Date Dec 6/14/73
BY NARA

TELCONE

Bill Kintner/Kissinger

1:35 p.m. - 4/14/73

HK: Hello, Bill, how are you?

BK: Pretty good.

HK: Bill, I'm calling you because we wondered whether you would be willing
to consider being Ambassador to Cambodia. We've got a mess there
and we need a strong man to help pull it together. We've got to get
rid of the Foreign Service bastard we've got there.

BK: That's a hard nut, Henry, I'd have to think about it.

HK: I know it's a hard nut. Of course, if things go bad there we'd obviously
give you another post after that.

BK: Well let me think about it and get back to you.

HK: Will you let me know by first thing Monday morning?

BK: I'll try to by first thing Monday morning, yes.

HK: What we would do just so that you have the picture complete, we would
send General Stillwell out with you. In fact we might send him out
ahead of time as the right hand military guy.

BK: That would be excellent. Well let me think about it. It's very interesting.
It's a very tough proposition.

HK: It's a very tough proposition but you've never run away from those before.

BK: No I haven't, but I'll call you on Monday morning.

HK: Good. Thank you Bill.

BK: Bye.

TELCONE

Sec. Richardson/Kissinger

1:43 p.m. - 4/14/73

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Eliot.

R: How are you?

K: OK. The President just met with Haig again and after this he's ordered that General Stillwell be sent to Cambodia to replace whoever our senior military man is and to see what he can help contribute to the situation. And again to let me make clear to the Department that he did not make this settlement in order to bug out of Indochina and that the Department must understand that.

R: OK. Well, he hasn't found any. . .

K: No, no, I'm just transmitting literally the orders I received. This is not said as a complaint.

R: Yeh, ok. I don't know much about Stillwell I take it he does. He feels as if he's the right guy for this?

K: That's apparently what he thinks.

R: Do you know anything about him yourself?

K: I've met him when he was in charge in Thailand, but that was 8 years ago. And I would not myself base a judgment on that.

R: OK. Well, I have no reason to second guess it at all. OK. So the only immediate operative thing is sending Stillwell there, right?

K: Right.

R: I think . . .

K: And to replace the other military guy. I don't even know who he is.

R: I don't either.

K: Now you can talk to Haig who will know a little more about Stillwell and - he's also replacing the Ambassador there.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorit
E01295C

By: AARA Date: 6/13/73

2

R: Yeh, has there been a decision on who it is yet?

K: Not yet. But that will be made on Monday.

R: OK. Well in the meanwhile we're reviewing the potential courses of action.

K: Well, we have a WSAG meeting on Monday which will deal partly with the subject both in Cambodia and Vietnam violations and what we should do.

R: What time is it?

K: At ten. And the President also wants to suspend mine clearing operations Tuesday morning. Local time.

R: That means that the orders would need to go out tomorrow, huh?

K: But they shouldn't leak out before Monday afternoon. In fact they shouldn't leak out at all.

R: I don't suppose there's anything necessary except to get word to them before...

K: We're notifying the North Vietnamese of it Monday morning, Paris time, so maybe you can delay the orders until Monday noon.

R: OK. Are the Soviets being any help to us?

K: We don't know.

R: The thing that concerns me about this situation is that doing the best we can we may simply have enabled the situation to continue in its present separative state. Kind of a chronic abscess that doesn't deteriorate to the point of infecting the whole body but doesn't heal either.

K: Yeh, but still if we're ever going to let it deteriorate it's better if there's some separation between the agreement and it's happening immediately afterwards.

R: Right. And well so this would be the reasons why my own mind is running in the direction of what are the things that the others can do and that we can help them do to deal with the threat to their own position that would result from the exploitation of Cambodian territories for DRV logistical purposes. And I have asked for an assessment of ARVN naval capabilities to blockade the coast in case it should come to that.

3

K: I don't think the President's present inclination is to throw everything on the ARVN at this early stage of the game.

R: No, no, no, I agree, but even so it is a modulation that you could move towards that focusing attention on the importance of the situation in terms of ARVN survival to distinguish from Lon Nol's survival.

K: That is right.

R: And the naval aspect of it is at least one, that we ought to know in advance what naval units are required and whether the ARVN could do it alone.

K: I think it's essential and useful.

R: Yeh,

K: I think it's very important to do it.

R: Yeh, well I've asked to have that done.

K: Good, Eliot. OK.

R: Thank you.

K: Bye.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authoritz</td></tr><tr><td>E01295J</td></tr><tr><td>MARA Del: 6/1/04</td></tr><tr><td>B:</td></tr></table>

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

1:55 p.m. - 4/14/73

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: Oh yes, hello Henry, how are you?

K: How are you?

D: Thank you. I heard you were quite a hit yesterday.

K: Oh, you had your man there.

D: Of course I have to watch you.

K: Polyakov was there.

D: Yes, how you behave, that's why he came to me and said what was the case and I said just dinner - why don't you go because he's a new man and he came and he doesn't know what kind of society it is.

K: I think it was a good idea.

D: Yeh, yeh, he like it very much.

K: Did he tell you what I did?

D: Yes, he told me about some of the things you said.

K: Did he tell you about the intelligence report I read?

D: No, no, he didn't mention it. Because I was rather busy.

K: I made a parody of an intelligence report - I'll let you read it.

D: All right, I would like it. Do you have a text of your remarks?

K: Yeh, just for you. I mean I don't want to have it circulating.

D: No, no, no, definitely just with me only. You have sometimes quite a points.

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MWAPD 00304

2

K: Anatol, two things. First, when are you leaving?

D: I have not yet quite idea, quite frankly, because Gromyko mentioned to me that you have to be prepared to go within next day but up to now I didn't receive

K: Well, I just wondered whether you and your wife want to come over, if you're still here Monday, to get your picture taken in the garden.

D: Oh, Monday would be very nice. What time?

K: Oh, let's say 11:30.

D: But I do not want to interfere with the President sitting there and so.

K: No.

D: I do not really in any way.

K: No, it's just a friendly visit.

D: Oh, I think that is right, but I mean with my girls.

K: Of course, everybody.

D: There will be three of us, really, and you.

K: Yes.

D: OK, I will call you on Monday morning.

K: We may change it by half an hour or so.

D: I understand. Now on the ________ that day, I will give them tomorrow, but in this hour let's stick to the month, OK.

K: Good. Now the next thing is on Article II of the thing we discussed, that reference to not encouraging third countries - if this causes you any great difficulty we can discuss it in the same category as Article V.

D: About the third countries, yes?

K: Not in Article I.

3

D: No, I understand, where it says about encouragement in connection with the regional forces.

K: Right.

D: You see in that second paragraph when you remember Gromyko said it was taken exactly from our principles, I really didn't know why he said it because it was just from point of view of editing.

K: We can handle - no, I'm not talking about the second paragraph, I'm talking about Article II.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: Not the second paragraph of Article I.

D: No, no, I understand you are speaking about Article II in connection with the forces. Not to use force.

K: Yeh, that's right.

D: In this connection. I remember this but I think that there was a ______ in Article I but you just, you remember, he just picked up the word from the principles. But you mixed it up in the translation it looks a bit different. It was really nothing at all.

K: That's right.

D: So this way I am rather surprised why you change it. And then when you add something new, there is a kind of meaning, but you change half a paragraph in a way this is definitely only interesting so to speak. So probably for doing it one way or another.

K: Right.

D: It appears - you see I don't know whether Gromyko will give me an assignment or not because now it's still tomorrow and he say to be ready on the 4th - he may even delay my visit until the end of month in order to come before you. I don't know but you see the telegram I have he says to prepare to go on a short notice immediately to Moscow for consultation. Until now he don't mention when I go. So, Henry, I just wanted you to know I receive telegram from him but ______ to Monday. He raised a rather ______ question to the President to note - it's about his State visit. It was signed in Moscow. You know a signed letter, it was signed and several documents were signed - so Brezhnev ask the President in a sense, but there is a question of Most Favored Nation - Brezhnev understands it has some kind of problems and he asks what the President is doing. From the other side

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01207
By: N.A. Dage
Date: 10/20/80

4

D: (con't) we gave you what you want ______. What he is asking now - he is asking to you and the President if you could give him his ideas or his thoughts on this question -- what does he think about the timing of all this things to happen. You ask him - what he thinks this question of Most Favored Nation will be discussed in Congress and will be finalized. The opinion of the President, of course it's not a firm obligation but if you could find out from the President for Brezhnev's own private information. And a second - what kind of an agreements does the President think can be done during Brezhnev's visit in the economic fields.

K: I agree with you.

D: So this is questions he ask me.

K: I will have to let you know on Monday or Tuesday. Monday.

D: Monday, ok?

K: I'll let you know on Monday the answer to both of these questions.

D: Yes, this is all just personal - his ideas what a general timetable could be and second what other documents or agreements could be on trade during his (Brezhnev's) visit. You are pressured very much, the President of course is under no obligation but his personal ideas about this.

K: We are prepared to proceed on something.

D: Yes, you ask his own ideas - what is it because he doesn't know exactly

K: I will let you know definitely. Right. Now finally, Anatol, as long as I have you on the phone. I'm sure you've already reported the extreme gravity with which we look at the Indochina situation.

D: Of course you made it be.

K: But I really want your leadership not to be surprised - I mean we're not doing anything this weekend.

D: What do you surprised?

K: I'm not - but we are very seriously concerned and we are not going to let an agreement be broken. . . within three months of signing it in such a brutal flagrant way.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E01205
By: N.M. Deaton

5

D: Do you mean Vietnam or Cambodia?

K: Both.

D: Have you ever received a reply from _________

K: No, we've never received a reply.

D: About anything from Le Duc Tho?

K: No, never received a reply.

D: He hasn't answered yet?

K: NO.

D: Well, I've already mentioned to you - to the President your concern

K: But I've just had a meeting with the President. He is really - it doesn't mean he will do something in the next three days.

D: No, I understand. This is really - I understand but you have to understand one point because you know in this case do you really feel it's necessary to help. I would propose it _________ for us to convey anything because we understand the situation but they know that you can transmit to Moscow.

K: That's all that needs to be done. I wouldn't make a separate demarche on it. I wouldn't make a separate message. It's more urgent than it was Thursday.

D: I already made it very clear.

K: In that case, that can stay at that. There's nothing new since Thursday. I wouldn't allow them another weekend. Also there may be some wild boars that may survive if you did.

D: (Laugs) Well, it's a consideration. I never thought of it this way but probably you're right. Monday I will be in touch with you. Please check with the President about his ideas. OK, Henry, thank you very much. Bye. Bye.

HOT
CLASSIFIED
DECEMBER 3, 1969
AMERICAN
BUREAU
OF
MARKET
INFORMATION

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12654
By: NARA Doc: 6117.101

TELECOM

Debryna/Kissinger

1:55 p. m. - 4/14/73

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

K: How are you?

K: Polyakov was there.

2

K: Oh, let's say 11:30.

K: No.

K: Of course, everybody.

K: Yes.

K: Not in Article I.

DECLASSIFIED

J55

Authority EO12957

BY MIRA DATE 6/1/1967

K: Right.

D: Yes, I understand.

K: Yeah, that's right.

D: In this connection, I remember this but I think that there was a ______ in Article I but you just, you remember, he just picked up the word from the principles. But you mixed it up in the translation it looks a bit different. It was really nothing at all.

K: That's right.

K: Right.

D: It appears - you see I don't know whether Gromyko will give me an assignment or not because now it's still tomorrow and he say to be ready on the 4th - he may even delay my visit until the end of month in order to come before you. I don't know but you see the telegram I have he says to prepare to go on a short notice immediately to Moscow for consultation. Until now he don't mention when I go. So, Henry, I just wanted you to know I receive telegram from him but ______ to Monday. He raised a rather ______ question to the President to note - it's about his State visit. It was signed in Moscow. You know a signed letter, it was signed and several documents were signed - so Breshnev ask the President in a sense, but there is a question of Most Preferred Nation - Breshnev understands it has some kind of problems and he asks what the President is doing. From the other side

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295F
By: NARA Dct. 6/13/1919

D: (can't) we gave you what you want ________. What he is asking now -
he is asking to you and the President if you could give him his ideas
or his thoughts on this question -- what does he think about the
timing of all this things to happen. You ask him - what he thinks
this question of Most Favored Nation will be discussed in Congress
and will be finalized. The opinion of the President, of course it's
not a firm obligation but if you could find out from the President
for Brezhnev's own private information. And a second - what kind
of an agreement does the President think can be done during
Brezhnev's visit in the economic fields.

K: I agree with you.

D: Monday, ok?

D: Of course you made it be.

K: But I really want your leadership not to be surprised - I mean you
not doing anything this weekend.

D: What do you surprised?

K: I'm not - but we are very seriously concerned and we are not going to
lot an agreement be broken. Within three months of signing it in
such a brutal flagrant way.

DECLASSIFIED

Author:

E012954

D: 6/13/67

BY: SARA DAU:

D: Do you mean [illegible] or Cambodia?

K: Both.

D: About anything from Le Due The?

D: He hasn't answered yet?

K: NO.

D: No, I understand. This is really - I understand but you have to understand one point because you know in this case do you really feel it's necessary to help. I would propose it ________ for us to convey anything because we understand the situation but they know that you can transmit to Moscow.

K: In that case, that can stay at that. There's nothing new since Thursday. I wouldn't allow them another weekend. Also there may be some wild board that may survive if you did.

D: (Langhe) Well, it's a consideration. I never thought of it this way but probably you're right. Monday I will be in touch with you. Please check with the President about his ideas. OK, Henry, thank you very much. Bye. Bye.

XARA DA: 6/13/01

TELCOM

Amb. Volpe/Kissinger

8:50 a.m. - 4/16/73

K: Hello.

V: Henry, just two or three quickies. First of all, I have not been advised of any appointment as yet with the President which I feel that, in the light of our conversations and you received my memorandum on the two gentlemen of ______ that I had received recommendations on of Polish background - do you remember that?

K: Oh yes, yes.

V: You did receive the names?

K: Yes, indeed.

V: Have you had a chance to check them out at all.

K: We're still looking into it.

V: Yeh. Well, I thought that - you know I have some first observations after six weeks over there and State asked for an appointment with him either today or Wednesday, I've heard nothing - I just wanted to see if there was anything at all.

K: No, I haven't.

V: What would you suggest I do?

K: Let me look into it. I'll let you know tomorrow.

V: All right. I'll be there of course tomorrow. Now secondly, Henry, you know how much the Italians are attached to symbolic gestures and what have you. I know what the usual protocol is - the President sits with the Head of Government - normally just he and etc. etc. I would just like to suggest and you tell me just forget it if it's not in the cards. I know it would set a precedence in a sense but I'm a former member of the Cabinet and hell over there they have been really giving me a lot of attention because of the fact that well as a former Cabinet minister and a friend of the President's, etc., if you think it's in the cards at all that I might sit in with the President. I realize the protocol with the Ambassador from Italy and our own Secretary of State, etc., but if you think that there's any value to the fact that these people go back - well, you know Volpe really is pretty close there and so forth.

K: Our problem is that we've never done it before and this would - but let me raise it with the President.

V: Yeh, well as I say I realize the precedent, I realize the implications with the other Ambassador from their side and also our own Secretary, but our circumstance over there is frankly a touch and go situation. I've just made visits to every damn one of the Ministers before I came here. I thought I better do it because if I left a few out they would say well he thinks that we're less important. But I think it's had its effect and as you know, the Government on its vote of confidence four times - you know, three votes, four votes, five votes - it's been very, very close. If you can, Henry, particularly with regard to this would not be anything too, too wrong, either today or Wednesday as far as that goes because I'll be here all day Wednesday, I'd certainly appreciate it very much.

K: Good.

V: Thanks, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority

E01255

By:

NARA Doc. No. 1/3/1947

TELCONE (Secure Phone)

Moorer/Kissinger

8:55 a.m. - 4/16/73

M: We got the plan and everyone is ready to go. I will be able to describe what we have in mind at 10 o'clock. I want to assure you there is no one over here that I know of that will slow this down.

K: On the civilian side. I am not worried about the military.

M: I talked to ______.

K: Good. And you're putting in a maximum effort in whatever that area is?

M: I will tell you what is happening. We have already put in 20 B-52s and 23 F-111s. Vogt says stop; Godley says hold up. The friendlies have pulled to the West and they don't know where the targets are. They want to hold up until they give us some more targets. I just got a message from Godley. ______ to all the forces involved to stand by for standard operation and let me have their ______. Godley's reaction to that was Souvanna Phouma would not like it.

K: I know. That is what I wanted done - to check with Souvanna.

M: He wants time to check with him. I didn't know what your reaction would be to that. Godley said if we struck case on case Souvanna may agree.

K: Exactly, that's what the plan is.

M: We got plenty of targets up the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

K: Bunker has always come in recommending it. He has on the basis of the ceasefire.

M: Yes, I just want to tell you no one is dragging their feet.

K: Good.

TELCONE

Amb. Bogdan/Kissinger

9:15 a.m. - 4/16/73

K: Hello.

B: Hello, good morning, Dr. Kissinger.

K: How are you?

B: I am fine. Yourself?

K: OK.

B: I apologize for bothering you but in relation with the meeting which is
supposedly to take place this week, I think very well

K: Of the Special Envoy?

B: Yes.

K: Has a date been fixed for that?

B: Well, I am waiting from you a reply. But in relation with the organization I like to have a - there is something I cannot discuss over telephone. If you are too busy perhaps you can designate somebody to speak with me.

K: All right. Can you tell him what this is all about?

B: The subject matter?

K: Yes.

B: No, unfortunately not. Well, I would like to keep it as private as possible
and this is why I would like to have your advice about the organization.
About the date.

K: See General Scowcroft this afternoon.

B: Ok.

K: He's my Deputy, I'll be out of town. And we will arrange a meeting for you.
We will call you within the next hour suggesting the place.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951

DEPT. A

By: MARA DATE: 6/13/73

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:50 am, April 16, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello Henry. How are you. Thank you very much for your speech. Do you mind if I send it to Brezhnev?

K: If he doesn't take it seriously.

D: No, he'll understand jokes. Because I like it very much. It's a different kind of approach. (Laughter) This I think is one of your best. He has a sense of humor.

K: By all means, send it to him with my personal compliments.

D: Okay. Now I would like to tell you several things right now which I received from answers for you. First about your trip, Brezhnev said it's quite right -- not fourth but sixth.

K: Good, thankyou.

arms, implications, limitations

D: Then of course we are prepared to discuss "on request" and for this purpose if necessary to add one or two days.

K: Good.

D: Then of course here Brezhnev mentions - this time you and he will keep mutual promise that you will go definitely to Leningrad.

K: I will go to Leningrad?

D: Yes. He thought you should go there.

K: Good.

D: So please keep in mind about this one. This is everything about your trip on the sixth. Now about articles we discuss, the text.

K: Yeah.

D: This is Gromyko--in the second, he have two remarks as of now-- one is about article--now why we discuss with you, but he feels its better to delete it.

K: All right, I'll take that up with the President.

D: Okay, this is one. And the second part he mention is Article 1.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012058
By: WW. A. Spada

2

Of course he doesn't like what you add, but for the time being I
can understand, he is thinking -- maybe he will accept it.

K: Good.

D: But he says not -- he asked me to raise with you one question only in that--in connection with Article 1. You remember in the second paragraph in this Article 1, he says--accordingly they will do their utmost to prevent the development of situations.

K: Yes.

D: It is English, not Russian, He prefers to say: "Accordingly they will do everything to prevent" not "their utmost".

K: Will you tell him I will accept his English change if he will accept a few Russian changes for me.

D: What Russian changes?

K: I have a few Russian words that I'd like in the text.

D: What Russian words. (Laughter) I prefer the English best really.

K: No, I'm just kidding. Look Anatol, I think that's possible. Let me just look at it.

D: If you could please look at it, and call me back then, would you please.

K: Cause my first reaction is not negative. I think you won't understand this but tell Gromyko my first reaction is not negative, he will understand. It's a double negative.

D: Well because I don't know really but it may be better, I don't know.

K: It's a little stronger to say do everything to the utmost, but let me look at it.

D: I think it basically means the same. But he likes to put it this way. He didn't mention any other changes in this Article 1.

K: No, no, Anatol, we don't have any real expectations that your Secretary General will let me off that easily when I get there.

(Laughter) As long as we are speaking.

D: Now it is only one question then, please look at it and I think we can get---

K: That would be great progress.

3

D: Yes. Could you give me answer on this?

K: Definitely.

D: Okay. I guess you remember about this trade business. I now have a telegram, you promised to look into it.

K: I'll have an answer I hope by the end of the day or the first thing in the morning.

D: This is fine. Because now I have his telegram. He mentions now that this Moscow meeting it has been done not a little in this area of present economy as well as many others, but it is a question now he is raising--you then naturally would like to look--not a great economic one--in this connection what is the status now of mutual grant... because about imports which are being in order to pass on his decision and from our side as has pointed this out himself he tried to get everything possible because... and now at the same time he would like to know when is that opinion of the President, the situation is going to be positively stopped. He wants to know what's in the mind of the President. When he gets expression of the President this question could be positively solved, and second it is important to know what the decision in trade and economic field could be take at the forthcoming meeting between him and President Nixon in order to make it on a high level so to speak.

K: Right.

D: So the questions One, what President thinking about time table of the Moscow session, and what other economic and business could be discussed.

K: Right.

D: So, I think we cover basically all, now about Photograph. Could they--

K: Yes, can we do it at a quarter to three.

D: Quarter to three, the sun will be in the right position because we would like to have the White House a little bit dark. All right.

K: Let me check it out and I'll call you right back, with the photographer.

D: Yes, he knows better. So you call me back then.

K: Right. Bye.

D: Byebye

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012055
By W.W. Parry 10-24-65

TelGen

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

9:50 am, April 16, 1973

K: Hello.

D: Hello Henry. How are you. Thank you very much for your speech. Do you mind if I send it to Breshnev?

D: Okay. Now I would like to tell you several things right now which I received/learned answers for you. First about your trip, Breshnev said it's quite right -- not fourth but sixth.

K: Good, thank you.

arms limitations

D: Then of course we are prepared to discuss this on/involuntarily and for this purpose if necessary to add one or two days.

K: Good.

D: Then of course here Breshnev mentions - this time you and he will keep mutual promise that you will go definitely to Leningrad.

K: I will go to Leningrad?

K: Good.

K: Yeah.

D: This is Gropnyko--in the second, he have two remarks as of now-- one is about article--now why we discuss with you, but he feels it's better to delete it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295

DE 6/17/73

MARA DUE 6/17/73

2

Of course he doesn't like what you add, but for the time being I
can understand, he is thinging -- maybe he will accept it.

Ks Good.

Ks Yes.

D: It is English, not Russian. He prefers to say: "Accordingly they will do everything to prevent" not "their utmost".

D: What Russian changes?

Ks Cause my first reaction demonstration is not negative. I think you won't understand this but tell Gromyko my first reaction is not negative, he will understand. It's a double negative.

K: That would be great, wouldn't it?

DECLASSIFIED
Author: EO 1295F
Date: 6/13/97

By: NARA DCS: 6/13/97

["D: Yes. Could you give me answer on this?", "K: Definitely.", "D: Okay. I guess you remember about this trade business. I now have a telegram, you promised to look into it.", "K: I'll have an answer I hope by the end of the day or the first thing in the morning.", "D: This is fine. Because now I have his telegram. He mentions now that this Moscow meeting it has been done not a little in this area of present economy as well as many others, but it is a question now he is raising--you then naturally would like to look--not a great economic one--in this connection what is the status now of mutual grant. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

TELCOM

Dr. Kissinger/Jo Kraft

4/16/73 11:52 a.m.

HK: Joe?

JK: Henry, how are you?

HK: I'm fine. My assistant is under the impression that you feel persecuted again?

JK: That's your word, Henry.

HK: What did we do now?

JK: I don't think you've done anything. I don't feel persecuted. I've been trying to see you for at least three weeks, but before you went to California and subsequently, and I've gotten nowhere. I don't feel persecuted.

HK: I'm not aware of the fact that you tried to see me last week. That never reached my attention. The first time I...

JK: When I asked to see you the last time; twice I have myself when it was difficult said, OK. Forget about it but on each occasion I've indicated that there was a standing request. I don't think I should have to batter down the doors every time I want to see you.

HK: No, but the fact is the first time I heard that you were trying to see me was last, was this morning.

JK: I see.

HK: And I asked Campbell to call you and set up an appointment with you, which is not an undue delay.

JK: It certainly isn't. Look, I don't want to go into the history of it but it's been a sad...

HK: I mean from before I went to California. Frankly, I don't remember that. I certainly, it certainly didn't come to my attention last week. I'm not saying you didn't ask for it but it didn't come to my attention.

JK: I had asked for it a long time ago. When I spoke to Dick on Saturday, I said where does it stand and he knew it was a continuing request and said he was picky as though he had already discussed it.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295
By: XARA Data: 6/13/97

-2-

HK: He hadn't discussed it.

JK: What?

HK: It hadn't come to my attention.

JK: Well, Dr., I know you're very busy. I just would like to come in.

HK: I have been extraordinarily busy. You know, but I think they set something up for Thursday.

JK: Do we have a Thursday appointment?

HK: Yes. I'll get Dick to call you. At any rate I've suggested a Thursday appointment.

JK: Fine. That will be very good.

HK: Incidentally, I don't know where you got that article from but it was, in fact, one reason I didn't call you last week was because I meant to call you to correct that article. There simply is a question of fact. George Shultz and I exchanged messages every day while he was in Europe and talked on the phone every day he was in Western Europe. I was personally dealing with Helmut Schmidt (?) and in the first round, it is true. The first 10 percent evaluation occurred when I was in Hanoi and I was not involved in that. But in the second round, I was massively involved.

JK: I'm delighted to hear it.

HK: And Sonnenfeldt's appointment over there was my idea it may have the result you think it will have, but if so, it was based on a misjudgment on my part.

JK: I didn't say it wasn't your idea.

HK: You know, it could well have ...

JK: I was really just reacting against articles which thought he was a dual of yours.

HK: Now that he isn't.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295R

BY XARA Data 6/13/94

*

-3-

JK: They're certainly wrong.

HK: No. You know, he's a strong man, an extremely able man and I don't know what differences... Your basic point of getting out in time is one which we discussed before and that is a valid point. Because if this set of facts isn't true, some other set of facts will be true.

JK: All right.

HK: And not everything, you know, in that article --I would disagree with.

JK: Oh, that's good. I was very struck by that speech you gave, when was it, Friday?

HK: Yes.

JK: Who were you talking to? Who were all these people that have sounded as though it was an internal address.

HK: It was, as far I'm concerned, addressed to both sides. And I didn't single anybody out.

JK: No, I noticed. I hope you can generate some excitement about, you know, the trade bill read like a bill of lading to me. No, I can imagine the pace is quickening and it will get interesting.

HK: You mean on Europe?

JK: Yeah. No, no...

HK: No, I understand what you are saying. Well, let's talk on Thursday.

JK: Fine. I'll see you then.

DECLASSIFIED

DE12951

Authority

By: XARA Date: 6/14/04

TELCOM

Dr. Kissinger/Peter Malesta

4/16/73

11:59 a.m.

HK: Hello?

PM: Henry?

HK: Yes.

PM: Peter. How are you today?

HK: Peter, how are you?

PM: Oh, I'm fine, in good shape but our friend is not in such good shape. I just talked and they just called about three minutes ago and apparently woke up early this morning, 6 o'clock this morning just heaving, whatever and he's gotten over it now but he's just going to relax here in bed and he said he just feels lousy to his stomach. And without making a federal case out of it, he said he would hope that you would understand.

HK: Of course.

PM: So he said he'd talk to you a little on in the day, but I think under the circumstances, he's just going to stay there in the sack for awhile and I'm holding all calls until he feels a little better. He went to bed early and I guess something must--it must have been something we ate, although we ate very light and ungreasy food last night--nothing too rich.

HK: I'm sorry to hear that. Will I see him while I'm here?

PM: Oh, definitely. I'm sure you will and I'm sure he'll call you this afternoon but he just asked me if I'd call you now and he said he's sure you would understand.

HK: Yes, well, I'm going to New York this afternoon.

PM: Well, you might as well. Why don't you give him a call at the house. Give him a couple of more hours in the sack and give him call around 2 - 2:30. Before you take off.

HK: OK. Good, fine.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorit
E01295

By: SARA Dae 6/12/91