# NATO's Place within the Global Context

Partial Text of SHAPE Lecture

(may add some comments on Palestine and China extemporaneously)

November 4, 2005 - Brussels

Henry A. Kissinger

On April 23, 1973 – 32 years ago – while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon – I addressed an Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: "There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their

2

[Y]

independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name
of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our
independent policies – also in the name of Atlantic unity.”

I recall these quotes to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic
relations is not as unique as it appears in the aftermath of the tensions
of 2003. The circumstances that caused the debate were, however,
quite different.

Then the disputes arose because of a perception of growing
Soviet strength, especially in the nuclear strategic field. Today it is
fostered by the collapse of Soviet military power and hence the
disappearance of an agreed military threat.

Then European integration was just beginning. Today it is far
advanced and, with all its recent setbacks, approaching a point of
culmination.

3

Then European nations - whatever their differences with the United States - were anxious to sustain America's continued commitment to their defense. Today many allies are anxious lest they are drawn into conflicts that involve American interests but not necessarily their own.

Then the center of gravity of world affairs was the Atlantic. Today the seminal fact is that the center of gravity is shifting to the Pacific basin.

Then the Atlantic nations thought they needed a nuclear strategy to resist their adversaries' presumed superiority in conventional weapons. Today many nations seek nuclear weapons to offset America's presumed superiority in advanced precise conventional weapons.

4

[Y]

These changed policy perspectives reflect changes in the political evolution on both sides of the Atlantic.

The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the Treaty of Westphalia in the 17th century. European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not so much traditional diplomacy as esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European allies tend to apply their new approach to the international arena.

This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be

5

[4]

legitimized by the UN Security Council – in other words, an
international consensus separate from the alliance structure. The
proposition that the alliance involves no special obligations would have
sent shivers down the spines of European statesmen had America
applied it to the Berlin crisis during the Cold War and subjected its
actions to a Soviet veto. In short, on issues of war and peace, Europe
finds itself suspended between its past based on the erosion of historic
convictions about a national foreign policy and its future integrated
institutions without being as yet sufficiently cohesive for a strategic
foreign policy. With an overall European interest yet to be defined,
these non-state attitudes toward international relations are becoming
deeply embedded in European public opinion.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent
on the sovereign right to define the ultimate threats to its security.

6

How to reconcile the non-state aspect of European unification with the
experience of a country driven by state concepts or with the notion of
alliance as traditionally conceived is the challenge of the next phase of
Atlantic relations.

Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan, and India
still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European
states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema;
it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The
concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion.
The balance of power still affects their calculations.

Therefore, in the controversy between unilateralism and
multilateralism, the real issue is not procedural. No serious leader
prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available.
The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps

7

[Y]

incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the requirements of security. The challenge before the alliance, therefore, is whether it is possible to reachieve a common purpose in designing a global order and how to implement it.

I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not only a strategic but a moral and psychological imperative. The conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a partnership freed of many of the calculations that had led to two world wars. Disputes – as described in my opening paragraphs – occasionally occurred, but they generally concerned disagreements about agreed goals, rarely the goals themselves.

The generations that followed us, having experienced neither the war nor the beginning of the Cold War, were more shaped by the controversies surrounding Vietnam and missile deployment. Thus a

8

[Y]

shared interpretation of the new international environment has been
more difficult and disputes more intense.

The question before the Atlantic Alliance is whether it is possible
to achieve a common purpose and by what methods.

This is not the occasion to put forward a detailed blueprint for
the next phase of foreign policy. Rather, let me stress, as a believer in
Atlantic cooperation based on parallel histories and shared values, two
tasks among many that are before us and how they need, in my
opinion, to be addressed.

## Iraq

I have been warned not to talk about Iraq to a predominantly
European audience. Fatigue has set in, I am told, and there is a
growing desire to end the conflict. I have rejected that advice because

9

M

the bitterness of the controversy must not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of the original decision to intervene – which I supported – or the arguments of the controversies of 2003, current thinking must deal with the impact of possible outcomes, especially catastrophic ones. Because of the long reach of the Islamist challenge, American abdication in Iraq will have global consequences.

If a Taliban-type government or a fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta, Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul,

10

[Y]

Madrid, London, and New Delhi demonstrate the worldwide scope of
the *jihad* challenge.

Much will depend on whether the reasonably stable institutions
can emerge in Iraq after the parliamentary elections scheduled for
December 15. The mechanical part of success is relatively easy to
define: establishment of a government considered sufficiently
legitimate by the Iraqi people to permit recruitment of an army willing
and able to defend its institutions.

What is such a government? And what are the obstacles that
need to be overcome? Western democracy developed in homogeneous
societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a
prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the
exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially
enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate

11

where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation
and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal
dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an
alternative version of the oppression of the weak by the powerful. In
multiethnic societies, minority rights must be protected by structural
and constitutional safeguards.

Political progress in Iraq can be defined in terms of four
objectives: (1) to prevent any group from using the political process
to establish the kind of dominance previously enjoyed by the Sunnis;
(2) to prevent any areas from slipping into Taliban conditions as
havens and recruitment centers for terrorists; (3) to keep Shiite
government from turning into a theocracy, Iranian or indigenous; (4)
to leave scope for regional autonomy within the Iraqi democratic
process.

12

I have gone into Iraq at such length despite the reservations
some in this audience have expressed in the past because there is no
escaping the dilemma: a catastrophic outcome in Iraq would affect
directly or indirectly all the members of the Atlantic Alliance as well as
countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The
belief that accommodation to the *jihad* agenda provides immunity
confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. This is why the next
phase of the Iraq conflict requires some degree of internationalization.
As the electoral process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about
the direction of Iraq's evolution should be attempted. Whether to do
this in the NATO Council or via some more restricted contact group
goes beyond the scope of this speech. Whatever the approach, the
consultative process should then lead to a degree of
internationalization of the political process. Security will increasingly

13

shift into Iraqi responsibility backed by American forces. But the
political stability of emerging institutions depends ultimately on
international acceptance. The United States should be prepared to
share defined responsibilities in political reconstruction with its allies
and the international community. Atlantic consultations could lead to
an international contact group under UN auspices to advise on Iraq's
political evolution. Logical members would include countries that have
experience with militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization
of Iraq - such as India, Turkey, and Russia - together with key NATO
countries.

[Palestine - will be done extemporaneously]

Proliferation

14

As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold
War, the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a permanent
nightmare. In a speech here in Brussels in 1979, I pointed out the
nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved casualties
incompatible with any sense of moral responsibility, but abdication
from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most ruthless
and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the dilemma
was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made approximately
the same calculations regarding risks and because neither of them
pushed confrontations to points that could no longer be controlled.

But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation, deterrence will
lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-to-state
relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer be clear
who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means. Second-

3

Today, the seminal fact of our time is that the center of gravity is shifting to the Pacific basin.

Then the Atlantic nations thought they could resist their adversaries' presumed superiority in conventional weapons by a nuclear strategy. Today many nations seek nuclear weapons to offset America's presumed superiority in advanced precise conventional weapons.

4

These changed policy perspectives reflect changes in the political evolution on both sides of the Atlantic, which are quite different.

The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the 17th century—when the Treaty of Westphalia created an international system based on the principle of European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not traditional diplomacy but esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European diplomats seek to apply their new experience to the international arena. This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be made in other words, based on an international consensus that the use of force can be used to legitimize by the UN Security Council. The proposition that the

[y]

alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down
the spines of European statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin
and subjected its actions to almost total vetoes.
crisis during the Cold War. In short, on issues of war and peace,
it's past and not its future delivery.
Europe finds itself suspended between institutions not yet sufficiently
cohesive for a strategic foreign policy, and domestic pressures based
on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy.

By contrast, America remains a traditional nation-state, insistent
on the sovereign right to define the ultimate threats to its security.
With a European national interest yet to be defined, these non-state
attitudes toward international relations are becoming deeply
embedded in European public opinion. Confirmed Atlanticists are
increasingly troubled [over] how to reconcile the non-state aspect of
European unification with the experience of a country driven by state
concepts or with the notion of alliance as traditionally conceived.

6

[y]

Paradoxically, countries such as Russia, China, Japan and India
still view the nation-state as the United States does and as European
states did before World War II. To them, geopolitics is not anathema;
it is the basis of their internal analysis and their external actions. The
concept of national interest still rallies public and leadership opinion.

The balance of power [still] affects their calculations.

America

This is at the heart of the controversy between unilateralism and
multilateralism. The real issue is not procedural. No serious leader
prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available.

The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps
incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the
requirements of security. The issue before the alliance, therefore, is

in beginning a global order
whether it is possible to reachieve a common purpose and how to
implement it.

7

[4]

I belong to the generation to which Atlantic cooperation was not only a strategic but a moral and psychological imperative. Having experienced dictatorship, we considered Atlantic cooperation an essential building bloc for a new system of international relations. The conduct toward each other of the Atlantic nations was to be a partnership freed of many of the pressures of traditional diplomacy. Disputes - as described in my opening paragraphs - occasionally occurred, but they generally concerned disagreements about agreed goals, rarely the goals themselves.

The generations that followed us, having experienced neither the war nor the beginning of the Cold War, were more shaped by the controversies surrounding Vietnam and missile deployment. Thus a shared interpretation of the new international environment has been more difficult and disputes more intense.

8

[Y]

what tasks are before us and how they need, in my opinion, to be

addressed. You can draw your own conclusions about the feasibility of

the enterprise.

## Iraq

Iraq has increasingly become a flashpoint of the domestic debate
in most allied countries. But the bitterness of the controversy must

the arguments of the controversies of 1963, what should dominate?

must deal with ______ especially catastrophic

current thinking is the impact of a catastrophic outcome. Because of ______

the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have

Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and New Delhi

demonstrate the scope of this challenge.

[M]

10

What is such a government? Western democracy developed in homogeneous societies; minorities found majority rule acceptable because they had a prospect of becoming majorities, and majorities were restrained in the exercise of their power by their temporary status and by judicially enforced minority guarantees. Such an equation does not operate where minority status is permanently established by religious affiliation and compounded by ethnic differences and decades of brutal dictatorship. Majority rule in such circumstances is perceived as an alternative version of the oppression

11

13

[Y]

militant Islam and much to lose by the radicalization of Iraq – [such as] India, Turkey, and Russia – together with key NATO countries.

[Palestine – will be done extemporaneously]

Proliferation

As someone who was involved in the nuclear strategy of the Cold
War, [I believe] the prospect of nuclear proliferation involves a
permanent nightmare. In a speech [here] in Brussels in 1979, I
pointed out the nuclear dilemma: general nuclear war involved
casualties incompatible with any sense of moral obligation, but
abdication from the threat of it would turn the world over to the most
ruthless and perhaps most genocidal rulers. For some 40 years, the
dilemma was evaded because both nuclear superpowers made

14

[Y]

approximately the same calculations regarding risks and because
neither of them pushed confrontations to points that could no longer
be controlled. But in a world of essentially unrestrained proliferation,
deterrence will lose its traditional meaning even with respect to state-
to-state relations. With a variety of nuclear powers, it will no longer
be clear who is responsible for deterring whom and by what means.

Second-order issues can escalate into nuclear conflict. The
possibilities of miscalculation grow. Even if the new nuclear countries
do not use their weapons, they can become a shield behind which to
step up terrorist challenges. Finally, the experience with the so-called
"private" distribution of Pakistan's nuclear technology to other
countries shows that this may be the last moment to keep proliferation
from spinning out of control. North Korea is so short of foreign
exchange that its diplomats often revert to counterfeit currency; it

15

[Y]

might find the temptation to trade nuclear material for foreign
exchange irresistible. In Iran, extremist elements have frequently
demonstrated their ability to find specious Islamic justification for
unconscionable acts in support of terrorism.

The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by
the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects
for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks
in Beijing - composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the
US, and China - seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination
of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to
abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.

The situation with respect to Iran is far more complex. Britain,
France, and Germany have been negotiating in effect also on behalf of
the United States without achieving the essential breakthrough. One

16

[Y]

problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating
parties do not always have available the combination of incentives and
pressures - especially as Iran is a more powerful country with a
greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a
challenge that brooks no delay. It is not a matter of devising a
formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the
ongoing diplomacy to UN action. The fundamental challenge to the
Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions:
How much time do we actually have before the process of proliferation
in Iran has become irreversible? What incentives and assurances are
we prepared to offer? What pressures are we prepared to undertake if
incentives do not work? And how do we prevent negotiation and
implementation from becoming a means to legitimize proliferation
rather than avert it?

17

[Y]

Failure to answer these questions will face the world community and the Atlantic Alliance with these questions: How does a society react to a nuclear explosion of undetermined origin? How should the world community react to such an event or a nuclear war between emerging nuclear countries or the use of nuclear weapons by emerging nuclear countries against non-nuclear adversaries?

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to elaborate a forum for negotiations with [Iran] that would include nations with an immediate interest in the subject, which - by analogy to the Beijing talks - could well include the United States, Russia, and perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the Beijing talks.

Conclusion

18

[Y]

The fundamental question remains whether the Atlantic Alliance
can develop the cohesion to address so vast an agenda. For in
addition to the topics discussed here are such issues as the rise of
Asia, the equitable distribution of energy, and the entry of billions of
new workers into the global economy.

Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They
have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a
generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. The
Atlantic Alliance needs to adapt its institutions to the task of shaping
the emerging world order. As Europe unifies, it may play a role within
the alliance in a more coherent form. Until then, various formulae
suggest themselves as interim solutions. Outgoing Chancellor Gerhard

Schröder suggested at this year's Wehrkunde conference that a panel
of senior former officials or other nongovernmental personnel might

19

address this task. There are two requirements for making it work.

Europe will, of course, gain greater scope as a result of its strength
and emerging cohesion. But while this includes occasional

disagreements with its allies, a challenge to America should not be its
unifying principle. As for America, it needs to continue the current
process of increased consultation, enhancing it by defining consultation
as something broader than implementing American designs. Room
must be left for the designs of others.

Amidst the turmoil attendant on an emerging world order, we
can take pride in a half-century of great achievement.

In undertaking this task,
we should remember a quote from Winston Churchill: "It is not
always enough to do our best; sometimes we have to do what is
required."

2497 WORDS

11/1/05

# NATO's Place within the Strategic Contemporary Context

On April 23, 1973 - 32 years ago - while serving as National Security Adviser to President Richard Nixon - I addressed [an] Associated Press luncheon in New York about strains in Atlantic relations in the following words: "There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidedly and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name

2

[Y]

I recall these quotes not to demonstrate my undiminished
eloquence but to show that the fact of crisis in Atlantic relations was
not as unique as it appears today. The circumstances that caused the
debate were, however, quite different.

3

[Y]

Then European nations – whatever their differences with the United States – were anxious to sustain America's continued commitment to their defense. Today many allies are anxious lest they are drawn into conflicts that involve American interests but not necessarily their own.

[Today] the seminal fact of our time is that the center of gravity is shifting to the Pacific basin.

4

[Y]

The most important event in Europe is the progressive erosion of the nation-state, which has been the foundation of international politics and the focus of political loyalties since the 17th century.

European leaders spend more time on issues of European unification than any other. And these issues involve not traditional diplomacy but esoteric constitutional arrangements. Because the historic rivalries of Europe have been civilized into a transnational consensus, European diplomats seek to apply their new experience to the international arena. This has changed the attitude to the use of military force by the alliance. Driven by domestic pressures, there is a growing view that the use of force cannot be left to an alliance decision but must be legitimized by the UN Security Council. The proposition that the

5

[y]

alliance involves no special obligations would have sent shivers down
the spines of European statesmen had America applied it to the Berlin
crisis during the Cold War. In short, on issues of war and peace,
Europe finds itself suspended between institutions not yet sufficiently
cohesive for a strategic foreign policy and domestic pressures based
on the erosion of historic convictions about a national foreign policy.

6

[y]

This is at the heart of the controversy between unilateralism and
multilateralism. The real issue is not procedural. No serious leader
prefers to act alone consistently if cooperative support is available.
The issue arises primarily when there are different – perhaps
incompatible – definitions of the national interest and of the
requirements of security. The issue before the alliance, therefore, is
whether it is possible to reachieve a common purpose and how to
implement it.

8

This is not the occasion to put forward a detailed blueprint for
the next phase of foreign policy. Rather, let me stress, as a believer in
Atlantic cooperation based on parallel histories and shared values,
what tasks are before us and how they need, in my opinion, to be
addressed. You can draw your own conclusions about the feasibility of
the enterprise.

Iraq

Iraq has increasingly become a flashpoint of the domestic debate
in most allied countries. But the bitterness of the controversy must
not blind us to the fundamental geopolitical and political realities
affecting every nation assembled in this room. Whatever the merit of

9

[y]

the arguments of the controversies of 1963, what should dominate
current thinking is the impact of a catastrophic outcome. Because of
the long reach of the Islamist challenge, the outcome in Iraq will have
global consequences. If a Taliban-type government or a
fundamentalist radical state were to emerge in Baghdad or any part of
Iraq, shock waves would ripple through the Islamic world. Radical
forces in Islamic countries or Islamic minorities in non-Islamic states
would be emboldened in their attacks on existing governments. The
safety and internal stability of all societies within reach of militant
Islam would be imperiled. The terrorist bombs in Bali, Jakarta,
Riyadh, Tunisia, Casablanca, Istanbul, Madrid, London, and New Delhi
demonstrate the scope of this challenge.

10

[y]

11

12

countries from Southeast Asia through the Northern Hemisphere. The
belief that accommodation to the *jihad* agenda provides immunity
confuses a brief respite with long-range safety. As the electoral
process evolves in Iraq, intensive consultation about the direction of
Iraq's evolution should be attempted. Whether to do this in the NATO
Council or via some contact group goes beyond the scope of this
speech. The consultative process could then lead to a degree of
internationalization of the political process. Security will increasingly
shift into Iraqi responsibility backed by American forces. But the
stability of emerging institutions depends ultimately on international
acceptance. Some degree of internationalization should be part of the
next phase. Atlantic consultations could lead to an international
contact group under UN auspices to advise on Iraq's political evolution.
Logical members would include countries that have experience with

13

[Y]

## Proliferation

14

15

[y]

The stakes could not be higher, and they will be determined by
the outcome of negotiations with North Korea and Iran. The prospects
for the North Korean negotiations are promising. The six-power talks
in Beijing – composed of North and South Korea, Japan, Russia, the
US, and China – seem to have succeeded in assembling a combination
of incentives and pressures to elicit a perhaps fragile commitment to
abandoning the nuclear weapons establishment.

16

problem is that, unlike the six-power forum in Beijing, the negotiating
parties do not alone have available the combination of incentives and
pressures – especially as Iran is a more powerful country with a
greater ability to offer incentives. Nevertheless, proliferation is a
challenge that brooks no delay. It is not a matter of devising a
formula for the next round of negotiations or of how to relate the
ongoing diplomacy to UN action. The fundamental challenge to the
Atlantic nations and the world can be expressed in four questions:

17

[Y]

The first requirement for the inter-allied consultation will be to elaborate a forum for negotiations with [Iran] that would include nations with an immediate interest in the subject, which – by analogy to the Beijing talks – could well include the United States, Russia, and perhaps India, together with Iran. This would follow the model of the Beijing talks.

## Conclusion

18

[Y]

Can America and Europe still define a common destiny? They
have shown an extraordinary ability to work together for over a
generation. They must now adjust their vision to a world order. The
Atlantic Alliance needs to adapt its institutions to the task of shaping
the emerging world order. As Europe unifies, it may play a role within
the alliance in a more coherent form. Until then, various formulae
suggest themselves as interim solutions. Outgoing Chancellor Gerhard
Schröder suggested at this year's *Wehrkunde* conference that a panel
of senior former officials or other nongovernmental personnel might

19

Amidst the turmoil attendant on an emerging world order, we can take pride in a half-century of great achievement. In undertaking it, we should remember a quote from Winston Churchill: "It is not always enough to do our best; sometimes we have to do what is required."