Extract from Andrew Hamilton, "The Arms Race: Too Much of a Bad Thing," *The New York Times Magazine*, October 6, 1968.

Looking beyond the currently planned forces, the United States is conducting research and development on new weapons and means for protecting the deterrent--as a hedge against a future growth in Soviet forces, or for engaging in an all-out arms race should the brakes be taken off by some subsequent Administration. Testifying last April before the Senate Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made it clear that the military would like to proceed now with the final development and deployment of several new strategic systems, which could cost more than $100 billion over the next 10 to 15 years.

Listing projects not approved by McNamara for inclusion in the current (fiscal year 1969) budget, Wheeler said that the Joint Chiefs recommended that steps be taken to provide the Air Force with a supersonic, swing-wing heavy bomber as a replacement for the subsonic B-52, beginning in 1976. Known as the advanced manned strategic aircraft (AMSA) it would also eventually replace the bomber version of the F-111. AMSA would have a payload of 100,000 pounds--twice that of the B-52 and four times that of the /F-111--but because of improvements in jet-engine technology and the development of movable wings it would be slightly

-2-

smaller than the B-52 and would be able to take off from and
land on far smaller airfields, so that it could be more
effectively dispersed as a precaution against surprise attack.

The Joint Chiefs also recommended the rapid develop-
ment of a new large land-based ICBM with several times the
payload of Minuteman III, in order to have it ready for
deployment by the mid-nineteen-seventies. This weapon is
known as the improved capability missile (ICM). Both AMSA
and the ICM are urged by the Air Force to offset projected
improvements in Soviet antibomber and antimissile defenses.
(To offset potential improvements in the accuracy and numbers
of Soviet offensive missiles, including the possible deploy-
ment of Soviet MIRV's, McNamara this year ordered the design
of a new "superhard" silo which could accommodate either the
Minuteman III or the ICM. The Defense Department is also con-
sidering as an alternative the possible defense of Minuteman
missile sites with short-range Sprint antiballistic missiles
which could be incorporated into the Sentinel system).

The Joint Chiefs recommended, in addition, the con-
struction of a prototype of a ballistic missile surface ship,
which would have the mobility of the Polaris submarine but
could carry far larger missiles. And they urged that the
experimental F-12, a 2,000-m.p.h. interceptor, be placed in
production for use in continental air defense. (The Defense

-3-

Department recommended, instead, that the Air Force buy an improved model of the current F-106 interceptor). Finally the Joint Chiefs recommended expansion of the Sentinel anti-China missile defense into a full-scale, anti-Soviet defense, involving local protection for 25 to 50 cities as well as a more dense nationwide area coverage.

Wheeler said the Defense Department had approved military recommendations for studies of Air Force and Navy antimissile proposals. The Air Force study, known as ABMIS, for "airborne ballistic missile intercept system," would use antiballistic missiles carried by large aircraft. The Navy study, known as SABMIS (a "seabased" ABMIS), would use ships stationed where their missiles could intercept ICBM's in mid-course. Wheeler indicated that the Joint Chiefs viewed SABMIS as a "desirable" program, but had some doubts about the cost-effectiveness of the Air Force proposal.

In addition, the Defense Department this year ordered studies of a new long-range sea-launched ballistic missile and of a new model of missile submarine which could operate at greater depths than the Polaris, to offset potential improvements in Soviet antisubmarine techniques; it would carry only one-fifth the crew, to reduce operating costs, now estimated at $1 billion a year for the Polaris fleet.

The Defense Department also is constantly looking at

-4-

longer-range, more exotic uses of technology. To name a few: ballistic re-entry vehicles that maneuver like aircraft to dodge antimissiles; space-based antimissile systems that spread debris in the path of an ICBM; manned weapons platforms in space; nuclear-powered missiles and aircraft; planes which fly at hypersonic speeds (4,000-6,000 m.p.h.); lasers and chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction. But nothing presently on the horizon seems clearly destined to replace the intercontinental missile armed with nuclear warheads.

On the Soviet side, the possibilities for the near future include the development of mobile, solid-fueled ICBM's to offset the improved accuracy of U.S. missiles; expansion of the missile-carrying nuclear submarine fleet; deployment of more missiles or better missiles armed with MIRV's, or both; improvement, expansion and extension of the Moscow antimissile system; introduction of a new bomber or at least of longer-range, bomber-borne missiles and the deployment of a force of intercontinental missiles equipped with the "fractional-orbit bombardment system" (FOBS). FOBS is fired into a low, 100-mile high orbit, then brought down on target before it completes one trip around the globe. Its prominent feature is the ability to avoid the American early-warning system, cutting the warning time before it strikes to only three minutes. Thus it could be used as a weapon against missile sites and

-5-

bomber bases. To preclude the successful use of FOBS in a first strike, McNamara two years ago ordered an acceleration in the development and deployment of "over-the-horizon" radar techniques for monitoring Soviet launch sites in order, he said, to "recapture the warning time" at present available to U.S. bombers in the alert force.

Looking beyond the immediate future, the Soviet Union also undoubtedly has a military research and development program that is seeking new means of attack and defense. Soviet leaders probably experience the same dilemma in this area that afflicts American Presidents. The only way to anticipate what the other side may discover, and to try to learn to cope with the new potential threats, is to operate an aggressive research and development program. But the people who conduct such programs constitute an important lobby for deployment of their projects--another in the list of pressures which give the arms race its built-in momentum. The U.S. and Soviet arms negotiators have their task cut out for them if they can ever get together.

[LC]

PAUL DOTY
4 KIRKLAND PLACE
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

January 30, 1969

Dear Henry,

Just a note to express appreciation for
the fortnight's accomplishments. RNs press conference
with the sufficiency theme, the withdrawal proposals
in Paris and your talent sweep are all great. Even
the new ACDA head is good if the background I heard
is right. So, A+ so far.

You must be up to your neck in work.
But when you do relax, call. I hope the Middle
East doesn't blow and muck up all the other things.
I know others have written you about the risks of
combining the bilateral missile talks with the
middle east and I fear I am with them. So many un-
predictable events can upset either, that to com-
bine them makes the product very much less likely.
For example, their willingness to go ahead with
the bilaterals will probably vanish if K. leaves
the picture via ill health or otherwise.

Helga is still in the infirmary -- another
week -- so I must tend to the little ones now. I'll
call or write after our Sat. meeting here.

Cheers,

[LC]

March 1, 1969

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington D. C.

Dear Henry,

The memo you asked for is enclosed. It is terribly rough but it does contain the best assessment that I can make from this vantage point. I am sure it contain some errors of a quantitative kind, but the general conclusions are solid. I am sure Mort could develop any of the points further and I would be glad to talk with you on any of them.

I do hope that this will be useful to you for the moment. If you want a better written one addressed more specifically to particular points I would be glad to prepare it. I do apologize for the poor writing in this version. It had to be prepared in great haste.

Judging from the outside, you must be pleased with the trip. I shall be going to London in a week, March 9 - 15. I should like to talk on the phone or come for a short visit before then if you have time.

I shall send you a memo on the suggestion about North Vietnamese representation at a WHO Assembly to be held in Boston in July within a few days.

All the best.

## Sentinel Conversion Memorandum continued

The removal from urban areas would eliminate its intrusiveness there. The abandonment of urban protection leaves the Soviet deterrent undiminished and therefore avoids the need of a response on their part, unless in kind. Hence its effect on the arms race would be minimal and this should end much of the protest from the technical community. But it would only do this in part. Many of these opposing Sentinel would continue on the basis that this is a foot-in-the-door, the production lines would be hard to stop, and the deterrent could be strengthened equally by cheaper means.

5. This conversion of Sentinel would require the abandonment of the Chinese arguments and orientation of the original system. This cuts both ways. In favor, it withdraws a part of our posture that must surely raise profound suspicions of our long range intent with respect to China. The atmosphere for resuming some relation there would be improved, but no one can say how much.

## Points against Conversion

1. The profound shift in strategy implicit in such a conversion would risk the credibility of the rationale for making it. This would apply to the abandonment of the Chinese orientation as well as to the shift from population to missile site defense.

2. Many would argue that for the expenditure of a billion or more the deterrent could be better strengthened by other means. More Polaris or more ICBM or a few ICBM's in very hard silos would be suggested. These alternatives could be defended in a cost-analysis argument. But they would deny gaining experience with an actual ABM and hence might be countered on this ground.

3. Likewise it would be argued that a new system for minute-man defense, with very hardnose intercept, could be designed that would be much cheaper than a Sprint based system.

4. Many would argue that this would whet the appetite of the "military-industrial" complex who would edge to consider this only a first step.

5. In circles knowledgable of Pentagon interests it is claimed that missile defense is not now given a high priority. Hence would not satisfy the strongest pressures there for new expenditures in the strategic area.

General Comment

Ideally, the decision on a Chinese oriented ABM
should be made only in the context of our Asian policy
for the period of 1975-80. If our policy is to be one
of containing China at the risk of an Asian war such a
system may fit into such a picture although it would be
only a small part of the expenditures that we should be
prepared to make. And, the deployment of such an ABM
will signal this attitude to the Chinese thereby making
it a part of a self-fulfilling prophesy. Alternatively,
if we move toward a policy of withdrawal of active
forces back to the island chain and accept the China
will and her land neighbors will have to work out
there own accommodation then such a system has no purpose
and its deployment would be counter to that policy.

Despite high opinion to the contrary (e.g. McNamara)
the deployment of an ABM that is 7 times that which the
Soviets appear to have underway would be escalatory.
And thru the expense required to compensate for it the
arms race would be increased on their side.

The Administration has much to gain and little to
lose if its review of Sentinel leads to an abandonment of
the present planned deployment, whether thru conversion
to Minuteman defense or otherwise. Its defeat in Congress
is more likely than not if present trends are taken into
account. Even if it should be sustained it would be a
costly victory and probably eliminate any other major
weapons investment in this Congress. It is not clear
that this is really what the majority in the Pentagon
wants most. A memorandum left behind by Harold Brown
apparently testifies to this.

A really adequate defense of Minuteman would correspond
to the first configuration mentioned. This would cont about
the same as either our whole Minuteman force or our whole
Polaris program. Judged against the effectiveness of
these requires a case of comparable solidity to be really
convincing. Such is not possible. The standards of what
one should get for this much money are already set. With
the publicity that would be attached to the program
it would be ultimately judged in this light.

On balance, therefore, the conversion of Sentinel to
a partial or full Minuteman defense is preferable to its
continuation. But the conversion itself is difficult to
defend against different arguments. While these will not
be pressed with as much vigor as those against the Sentinel
it would seem unwise to go forward with this unless there is
nearly unanimous agreement in the Pentagon that this is the
most wanted item in the next two years.

March 1, 1969

Paul Doty

April 5, 1969

Dear Henry,

I enclose a memo on the possibil-
ity of North Vietnamese attending
the World Health Assembly here in
Boston in July. You might find it
useful in your larger purposes to
introduce this modest level of con-
tact. I think the medical area offers
one of the most useful means of recon-
ciliation after the war, so this
might be borne in mind.

Unfortunately the ABM business
has gone sour since my last visit.
In retrospect I'm sorry that I didn't
make my memo on that more detailed.
But I simply did not imagine that
Laird and Packard would not put what
they were planning to the test of
those scientists who are consultants
in good standing. I know there are
important considerations other than
technical, but it need not have been
so shoddy at that level.

Do you know if Solly is coming
over? I'll be in Washington April
29 - May 2, if I don't see you before.

SUBJECT: Participation of North Vietnamese Representatives at the World Health Assembly in Boston, July 8-24, 1969

TO: Henry A. Kissinger
FROM: Paul Doty

North Vietnam is considered a de facto member of the World Health Organization and is therefore entitled to send representatives to meetings such as the Annual World Health Assembly being held this summer in Boston. (The last Assembly held in the U. S. was in 1958 in Minneapolis with Humphrey participating. A couple of Congressmen usually attend a few sessions.) Thus far North Vietnamese representatives have not attended World Assemblies. They may or may not choose to do so this time. In view of the increasing involvement of WHO in the epidemiological situation in Vietnam, on which an intensive report was made at the last World Health Assembly, the participation of representatives from both Vietnams is reasonable, functional and potentially helpful in view of the world health problems that may be affected by conditions in Vietnam particularly in the immediate post war situation.

However, it is understood that the Director General will not take any steps to initiate North Vietnamese participation unless the United States Government wants him to do so and assures him that there will be no difficulty in their obtaining visas.

A determination should be made if there is any U.S. interest in encouraging this kind of contact. If there is, this should be communicated in some way to the Director-General before April 30.

Even if no initiative is taken North Vietnamese representatives may wish to participate but no indication of this has been seen yet.

The arrangements for the Assembly are being handled by William O. Boswell, Director, Office of International Conferences, State Department.

Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Cuba

The tides of peace were at their crest when a new President took office in 1961; yet within two years a series of mistakes had brought Washington and Moscow to the edge of nuclear war. A distinguished columnist reveals these errors and specifies some lessons for the Nixon Administration.

By DREW PEARSON

"FELT," said the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy, "that we were on the edge of a precipice with no way off." He was describing the "Thirteen Days" in October 1962 during which the United States almost went to war with Soviet Russia over the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy's book is being cited by various experts as a lesson for President Nixon, and it is. David Schoenbrun, who covered the crisis for CBS, warns that Mr. Nixon should be aware of hawkish advisers. John Kenneth Galbraith, who was then Ambassador to India, points out that President Kennedy's political neck-and for that matter the United States-was saved by men of moral courage. Dean Acheson, who participated in the talks, is convinced President Kennedy was "phenomenally lucky."

While all of the above are true, I would like to make the very important point that the Cuban missile crisis didn't have to happen. And that is the chief lesson for President Nixon. It was not necessary for Kennedy to depend on the advice of either hawkish generals or men of moral courage. For it was not necessary to bring the two most powerful nuclear nations to the brink of war, and it was not necessary to risk a challenge to Soviet vessels on the high seas. For the express duty and function of diplomacy are to prevent these crises. When they happen it is because diplomacy has been neglectful, irresponsible, inefficient.

Some of the events in the early days of the Kennedy Administration which led to the Cuban missile crisis were so

juvenile, so overconfident, that they amounted to a travesty of diplomacy. A case in point is the inexcusable failure of Secretary of State Dean Rusk to carry out the President's orders to remove American missiles from Turkey-one of Khrushchev's main reasons for placing Russian missiles in Cuba. Twice the President gave orders to remove American missiles from a country that is not 90 miles distant, as Cuba is from the United States, but only 100 yards from the Soviet Union. Yet these orders were never carried out.

This error is passed over very lightly in Senator Kennedy's book. But it was one of the many mistakes of American diplomacy which led to the most serious danger of major war the United States has faced since December 7, 1941.

There were other serious mistakes, and they began on the day John F. Kennedy took the oath of office, January 20, 1961. They were related to me by such men as the late Adlai Stevenson, former Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles, Senator William Fulbright of Arkansas, and Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, both members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I relate them here in the hope that President Nixon, who faces the same opportunities as John F. Kennedy, may not repeat his mistakes.

Perhaps the most intriguing of these conversations took place high in the Montenegrin mountains in August 1962, two months before the Cuban missile crisis. Adlai Stevenson and I were the guests of Mrs. Eugene Meyer on a yachting cruise along the Adriatic coast and

had traveled with Chief Justice Earl Warren into the interior of Montenegro, partly to give "the chief" some fishing. Our Montenegrin hosts had taken us to a secluded mountain lake where Warren set out in a rowboat to test its potentialities. Stevenson and I, meanwhile, walked among the pine trees along the shore. Perhaps it was the isolation of the spot, but he began talking of his trials and tribulations as Ambassador to the United Nations. The State Department in Washington gave him little authority. He was a diplomatic puppet, dancing to the tune of the career men in Washington, Dean Rusk was slow, sometimes to the point of exasperation.

Stevenson's chief hope had been that he could contribute something toward peace by improving relations with Soviet Russia. To that end he urged Kennedy, in December 1960, shortly after he was elected and before his Inauguration, to take the initiative with the Soviet government. Khrushchev, he said, was ripe for friendly overtures. Averell Harriman had reported, even before the election, that Khrushchev was throwing whatever indirect influence the Soviets had against Nixon. Specifically, he had refused to release the RB-47 Naval fliers before the election for fear it would help Nixon.

After Kennedy's victory, Khrushchev suggested through Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin in Washington that the Soviets might send a special ambassador of Cabinet rank to the Inauguration. Kennedy turned this down. On Inauguration day, Khrushchev sent an effusive telegram, overflowing with friendship, to the new President, Ken-

12

SR/March 29, 1969

## Chess Corner—No. 133

ONE might suppose that the curious score below is the initial effort of two Mallorca Island fishermen or goat-herds (the game was played in Palma), who had absorbed flimsy and foul guidance in the rules of play.

Clearly, the opponents know how to move the pieces. And during the play—all twenty-nine moves of it—all is legal. But capturing is evidently beyond their ken. Not a Pawn or a piece is taken during the session.

Finally, White, whose turn it is, makes his thirtieth move and quits. The score reads: "Resigns." Readers may imagine that White, bored with it all, shoves all the wood off the board and walks away. The hell with chess!

What actually happened, we have been informed by our on-the-scene correspondent, was that international master Antonio Medina of Spain (White), a former United States open champion, formally resigned to his opponent, the veteran grandmaster Svetozar Gligoric of Yugoslavia. The reason: Gligoric was threatening 30 ... B-K1. And White loses his Queen.

The set-to is from the recent Palma de Mallorca International, oozing with talent—from minor to grandmaster.

### RUY LOPEZ

<table><thead><tr><th>Medina White</th><th>Gligoric Black</th><th>Medina White</th><th>Gligoric Black</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>1 P-K4</td><td>P-K4</td><td>16 B-Q2</td><td>P-B4</td></tr><tr><td>2 N-KB3</td><td>N-QB3</td><td>17 P-Q5</td><td>B-B1</td></tr><tr><td>3 B-N5</td><td>P-QR3</td><td>18 P-N3</td><td>P-B5</td></tr><tr><td>4 B-R4</td><td>N-B3</td><td>19 B-KB1</td><td>B-Q2</td></tr><tr><td>5 O-O</td><td>B-K2</td><td>20 N-R2</td><td>R-B1</td></tr><tr><td>6 R-K1</td><td>P-QN4</td><td>21 P-N4</td><td>N-R5</td></tr><tr><td>7 B-N3</td><td>P-Q3</td><td>22 Q-B3</td><td>P-N3</td></tr><tr><td>8 P-B3</td><td>O-O</td><td>23 B-K2</td><td>B-N2</td></tr><tr><td>9 P-KR3</td><td>P-KR3</td><td>24 P-R4</td><td>N-R2</td></tr><tr><td>10 P-Q4</td><td>R-K1</td><td>25 P-R5</td><td>N-N4</td></tr><tr><td>11 QN-Q2</td><td>B-B1</td><td>26 Q-K3</td><td>P-B4</td></tr><tr><td>12 N-B1</td><td>B-N2</td><td>27 Q-R7</td><td>P-B5</td></tr><tr><td>13 N-N3</td><td>N-QR4</td><td>28 N/3-B1</td><td>R-R1</td></tr><tr><td>14 B-B2</td><td>N-B5</td><td>29 Q-N7</td><td>R-K2</td></tr><tr><td>15 B-Q3</td><td>N-N3</td><td>Resigns</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>

—AL HOROWITZ.

SR/March 29, 1969

## Our Sherries are strictly social.

You have the party—we have the Sherries! From a classic California Cocktail Sherry, to medium Golden, to rich Cream—one to match every taste. Each is well bred. Mature. And mellowed in oaken casks by our patient cellarmaster, Brother Timothy. Pick your favorite—or offer a choice. Pass them straight, chilled, or on the rocks. And any time of day. Our Sherries don't have rules about when to enjoy them. They're sociable every time.

Entertaining wines by
The Christian Brothers

Wines of California since 1882

11

Saturday Review

March 29, 1969

Kennedy replied with a curt three-line message.

After the Inauguration, following a conference with the new President, Stevenson was asked by newsmen whether Kennedy would confer with Khrushchev if the Soviet leader came to New York for a special U.N. Assembly meeting. Stevenson had answered in the affirmative. Whereupon the White House issued a blunt denial. Later, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson in Moscow was ordered to track down Chairman Khrushchev in Siberia where he was traveling and inform him that the new President of the United States preferred to postpone any early meeting. Khrushchev is reported to have hit the ceiling.

The American Embassy in Moscow reported early in 1961 that Khrushchev had been given six months in which to demonstrate to the Red Chinese that his policy of coexistence with the West would work. At the Communist Conference in Moscow in November 1960, the Chinese had vehemently opposed Khrushchev's so-called policy of appeasing the West. In a four-hour speech, the Chinese delegate had excoriated Khrushchev. This was followed by a Russo-Chinese compromise, which, according to the American Embassy, consisted of a six-month grace period during which Khrushchev would have to prove to the Red Chinese that his policy would work.

For this reason then, Kennedy's rebuff of Khrushchev's suggestion that they meet together in New York made the Soviet leader see red. Almost immediately, he turned off his policy of cooperation and began to haze Mr. Kennedy. The Kremlin delivered a brutal note regarding the Congo, undercutting the United Nations and everything the United States stood for there. Simultaneously the Soviet delegation of the Geneva nuclear testing conference stufened its position. And there was stepped-up Communist activity in Laos.

Simultaneously, Kennedy made a saber-rattling speech threatening military intervention in Laos, appropriated more money for missiles, upped expenditures for B-52s, the long-range bombers. All Stevenson had advised was thrown overboard.

To cap it all, four months after Kennedy had taken office, Stevenson had stood up in the United Nations to defend—and lie about—the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, only to discover that Washington had not told him the truth. Yes, Adlai Stevenson was indeed discouraged.

It began to get cold high up in those Montenegrin mountains. The Chief Justice had exhausted his patience and rowed back to shore. He had caught two bluegills, too small to keep. Stevenson had finished his discourse, a confession of failure delivered two months before

foreign Minister Gromyko, Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, and others. He came back to dine with Kennedy and tell him this was the time for the United States to take the initiative regarding Berlin; otherwise the Russians would. They were in a friendly frame of mind toward the new Administration, but would not wait. European opinion, Cooper told Kennedy, generally agreed that sixteen years was long enough to delay signing a peace treaty with Germany.

Chester Bowles, who served as Under Secretary until he ran afoul of Robert

Drew Pearson, at left, with Mr. Khrushchev—"If the United States and Russia stand together, no country in the world can start war."

the Cuban missile crisis, a confession in which he saw Russian-American relations drifting from days of hope to days of danger.

I cannot remember the chronological order in which I talked to the others who had urged John F. Kennedy to take the initiative with Khrushchev early in his Administration for fresh new starts toward peace. Senator Cooper, a moderate Republican who had served with success as American Ambassador to India, had visited Moscow shortly before Kennedy's Inauguration and conferred with For-

Kennedy over the Bay of Pigs, advised likewise. So did Senator Fulbright, who had been on excellent relations with Kennedy until he heard Kennedy was about to undertake the Bay of Pigs invasion and passionately urged him, in his slow Arkansas drawl, not to do it. All told the new President, in those formative months in the winter of 1961, that he should take advantage of the Moscow thaw.

Perhaps it was Kennedy's caution. Perhaps it was the advice of old-line bureaucrats in the State Department,

SR/March 29, 1969

steeped in the Dulles policy of bowing daily before Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. But Kennedy did not move. And in April of that fateful year, there began a series of events that some diplomats said turned the luck of the Irish. In any event, they led to the Cuban missile crisis and the brink of war between Russia and the United States.

AFTER the United States invaded Cuba on April 18 in a poorly conceived, poorly prepared expedition masterminded by the CIA, Kennedy emerged as something of a hero to many Americans. His announcement that he was to blame aroused a sense of sympathy, even among those inclined to criticize. But it did not make him a hero abroad, especially in the Soviet Union.

Moreover, it did not make Mr. Kennedy a hero to himself. It gave him a definite inferiority complex. Here was a handsome young President, elected on the promise of giving the United States a new image in foreign affairs, yet he knew in his heart that he had failed. Prestige counts heavily with every human being, especially with men who represent nations; so the President of the United States sought to recoup his prestige and that of the United States. He invited Khrushchev to the meeting that only two months earlier he had vetoed.

Against this background, the Vienna

Conference took place in May 1961, a moment when Kennedy was suffering from the Bay of Pigs fiasco and when Khrushchev was growling both privately and publicly over having had his earlier overtures of friendship rebuffed. "I told young Mr. Kennedy that if he wants war, he can have war," Khrushchev later told me that summer during a very frank interview on the shores of the Black Sea.

"Mr. Kennedy told me," Khrushchev reported, "'Our forces are now equal. We can destroy each other.'

"Yes, Mr. President,' I replied, 'I agree, though in my heart I feel we are stronger. But I agree on the policy of equality. We regard the strength of the United States in a very serious light.'

"We have to judge governments by their actions,' I told him, 'and the United States has now increased its defense budget, you have ordered the mobilization of more men, and you have ordered more bombers. These are not toys. The United States has now dispatched 1,500 additional troops to Berlin. This is a clear threat.'

"I told Mr. Kennedy," Khrushchev continued, "that if he sent 50,000 troops to Berlin, it would offer us an opportunity to send even more troops; since we had more troops than he in closer to Berlin. 'If you introduce more troops to Berlin,' I told him, 'it will be a very unwise step.'"

Kennedy's Vienna Conference with Khrushchev got nowhere, and he returned to Washington a very shaken man. On the plane flying across the Atlantic, Kennedy advisers reported that he seemed more depressed than at any time in his life. He talked about the probability that his children might live under war. The first thing he did on arriving home was to get a military appraisal of the number of lives which would be lost in an atomic war.

I dined with President Kennedy three days after he had returned from Vienna. He was still in a very depressed mood. He said he did not see how the United States could get through the summer without war. Khrushchev, he said, was under obligation to the East Germans to sign a separate peace treaty. This, he said, would bring war. The next morning the President suffered a recurrence of his back injury and was confined to his bed for the next few weeks. Officially it resulted from planting a tree at a dedication. Some doctors, however, said it was psychosomatic; the result of his talk with Khrushchev.

TOWARD the end of the month, I was invited on a cruise down the Potomac by then Vice President Lyndon Johnson, in honor of the Premier of South Vietnam. On the yacht was Walt Rostow, Kennedy's national security adviser, who had been with him in Vienna, Rostow was glowing with pride over the results in Vienna. "Our President looked straight down the gun barrel of atomic war," Rostow said, "and he did not flinch."

I am sure this was true. But I am also sure that there was no necessity whatsoever for this confrontation. Had John F. Kennedy taken the advice of Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles, Senator Cooper, and others to meet Khrushchev halfway during the early months of 1961, he would never have had to look down that gun barrel.

By this time, however, Khrushchev had the bit in his teeth. He had been embarrassed by Kennedy's refusal to see him in New York in March. The Chinese and the big missile men in the Kremlin were taunting him over the increased military budget of the United States. At Vienna, Khrushchev, the son of a peasant and a shrewd trader, knew he had the upper hand with Kennedy. But back in Moscow, his hand was being called. He had argued that war with capitalism was not inevitable, that coexistence was the only substitute for atomic war and the end of civilization. But his gestures toward the United States had not been reciprocated.

I wrote at the time that Khrushchev and Kennedy were acting like "little boys with Halloween masks frightening each other into war."

A few weeks later, Khrushchev built

"I wish you'd at least have the common courtesy to keep quiet while we're discussing something."

14

SR/March 29, 1969

the Berlin Wall, and there followed a hue and cry from American right-wing-ers that we move in and tear it down.

On August 17, while the wall was still being perfected, I was conducting the aforementioned interview with Khrushchev on the shores of the Black Sea. The formal interview extended into a series of talks lasting two days, during which time we swam, breakfasted, and dined together. Khrushchev started off on a serious, formal note, but later relaxed and came forth with amazingly frank statements about his concern for the peace of the world and his problems with American leaders. It was at this time that he told of his hopes that Kennedy might be elected President over Richard Nixon.

"In October 1960," he said, "the American Ambassador came to see me and wanted to release the American RB-47 flyers as a gesture to show that our two countries could work together. 'No,' I replied, 'this would only help Nixon, and we're voting for Kennedy.' And insomuch as Kennedy was elected by a very narrow margin, I figure that we elected him."

AS Mrs. Pearson and I were saying good-by to Khrushchev two days later, he said: "Please tell Mr. Kennedy that if the United States and Russia stand together, no country in the world can start war."

I delivered this message to Kennedy four days later under very unfavorable circumstances. Twenty minutes before I saw the President in the upstairs living room of the White House, he had received word from the Atomic Energy Commission that the Soviet government had resumed nuclear testing. Khrushchev had hinted to me that this might take place, though I did not take him seriously. He was under great pressure from the generals in the Red Army, he said, to resume testing because of their belief that American nuclear production was far ahead of that of the Soviet Union. He was also under pressure, he said, because Kennedy had called up the Reserves, to continue the class of the Red Army about to be mustered for another tour of duty. President Kennedy was so upset over the news that the Soviet Union had resumed nuclear testing that I am quite sure my report on the interview with Khrushchev made scant impression,

My talk with Kennedy took place in the last days of August 1961, and the next month he sent Rostow and Gen. Maxwell Taylor to Saigon to make recommendations on what policy the Kennedy Administration should follow in South Vietnam, John Kenneth Galbraith heard about their trip from his post in India and flew back to Washington to try to influence its final result, or at least

negate it with Kennedy. He knew that Rostow, the hawk, was likely to recommend military intervention. That was exactly what he did. And it was at this crucial point that President Kennedy made the first major military commitment in South Vietnam. Hitherto, the level of troops had been kept to 1,000 so-called military advisers, sent by former President Eisenhower. But in September 1961, Kennedy sent 18,000 men and later upped this to 30,000.

George Ball, then Under Secretary of State, who opposed the escalation, is convinced that the President made it because he had suffered a series of defeats —first at the Bay of Pigs, later in Vienna, later with the Berlin Wall. By sending troops to Saigon, he was determined to recoup his prestige and that of the United States. Thus mistake built upon mistake; the early rebuff to Khrushchev, the Bay of Pigs, the failure to remove American missiles from Turkey, Khrushchev's nuclear rebuff to the United States—all pointed toward the showdown over Cuba when the United States and Soviet Russia stood eyeball-to-eyeball on the brink of war.

I do not mean to say that mistakes were not also made by the Kremlin. I am sure they were. But I was not privy to conversations inside the Kremlin, as I was to conversations with American leaders. I can only report factually on American mistakes. There were enough of these to have precipitated the Cuban missile crisis by themselves, without those made by the Soviets. Undoubtedly Khrushchev's biggest mistake was to misjudge the United States by sending the missiles to Cuba in the first place.

The lesson to be learned from these mistakes is herewith spread out for Mr. Nixon. The tides of peace are like the tides of man. They must be ridden on the crest, not on the ebb. On the very day that Mr. Nixon was delivering his inspiring Inaugural speech pledging his all-out effort for peace in the world, the Soviet government was officially offering to begin talks with the United States on limiting offensive and defensive missiles just as soon as Mr. Nixon was ready. As I read the announcement, I couldn't help thinking that this is where I came in with another President's Inauguration on January 20, 1961.

SR/March 29, 1969

15

# UFOs AND THE EVIDENCE

> "We are in no position to assert what is or is not possible for some extraterrestrial technology . . ."

By FREDERICK J. HOOVEN

THE subject of UFOs is a vast one. At least 20,000 reports are on record of sightings of some kind of flying object not identified, and it has been estimated that from five to ten times as many observations have not been recorded. The reports come from all periods of history (the Old Testament book of Ezekiel is a typical flying saucer, or UFO, report) and from all parts of the world, the highest concentrations corresponding with the times and places of most effective communication.

Roughly 95 per cent of these reports can be readily attributed to misinterpretations of such common objects as planets, stars, satellites, meteorites, weather balloons, and aircraft. It is astonishing how many people have never studied the sky, and when their attention is called to it they become greatly excited by a sighting of Venus, Jupiter, Mars, or the star Sirius. An additional fraction of the reports turn out to be hoaxes, pranks, or psychopathic phenomena.

Frederick J. Hooven is a consultant to the Ford Motor Company and adjunct professor of engineering at Dartmouth College.

This leaves a residue of reports that have resisted any of these explanations, and that have originated with solidly credible witnesses, some of them professionally skilled. Of this residue a small proportion share common aspects that are difficult to attribute to anything but some kind of objective reality.

About 1950, it was suggested that UFOs were vehicles from another world that were observing Earth. There was something about this suggestion that tickled the fancy of almost everybody, even those who felt certain it was not true. Since that time people have taken positions on the subject, their beliefs varying along a spectrum, or scale of 100, with the absolute unbelievers at the zero end, the utterly faithful enthusiasts at the 100 end, and the majority somewhere between. Most scientists are clustered around the zero mark.

In October 1966, the U.S. Air Force commissioned the University of Colorado to conduct a thorough study of the UFO question. The study was conducted by a group directed by Dr. Edward U. Condon, a scientist and public figure of the first rank, and its official report, *Scientific Study of Unidentified Flying Objects*, was issued last January.

I served as a consultant to the Colorado group along with David F. Moyer; we were both working for the Ford Company. There had been a great number of reports that included accounts of automobiles malfunctioning in some way in the presence of UFOs, and, when the project was initiated, Dr. Condon requested assistance from the automobile industry in evaluating these reports. With the assistance of Ford engineers and scientists, a painstaking analysis was conducted of a car that had figured in a UFO report. In the process, techniques were developed and described for analyzing automobiles for possibilities of after-effects of radioactive and magnetic phenomena, neither of which was found in the car examined.

The report begins with an introduction by Walter Sullivan, science editor of *The New York Times*, and a fairly complete picture can be obtained by reading it along with the report's conclusions and recommendations, and a summary, written by Condon. The body of the report is voluminous, with detailed analyses of fifty-nine case studies, buttressed by extensive discussions of the physical and perceptual phenomena involved. Special attention is given to radar anomalies, visual illusions, and some of the aspects of common objects likely to be mistaken for UFOs. There is historical background, and extensive documentation. The quality of the writing and the editing is outstanding.

The report concludes that inasmuch as there is no positive evidence of extraordinary phenomena, it can safely be assumed that UFOs are not anything extraordinary, and that the subject does not warrant further scientific study. The logic of this particular approach is defended in the following passage, quoted from the report's summary:

> As a practical matter, we take the position that if an UFO report can be plausibly explained in ordinary terms, then we accept that explanation even though not enough evidence may be available to prove it beyond all doubt. This point is so important that perhaps an analogy is needed to make it clear. Several centuries ago, the most generally accepted theory of human disease was that it was caused by the patient's being possessed or inhabited by a devil or evil spirit. Different diseases were supposed to be caused by different devils. The guiding principle for medical research was then the study and classification of different kinds of devils, and progress in therapy was sought in the search for and discovery of means for exorcising each kind of devil.

Gradually medical research discovered bacteria, toxins and viruses, and their causative relation to various diseases. More and more diseases came to be described by their causes.

Suppose now that instead, medi-

"Howard, play me or trade me."

16

SR/March 29, 1969

Sally FYI [Y]

September 19, 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER

FROM: Jon Howe

SUBJECT: Doty Luncheons

1. Tentatively you are scheduled to have Professors Doty, Ruina, Yarmolinsky and Neustadt for lunch on September 29. Does this meet with your approval?

Yes ____

No ____

If so, do you desire any talking papers prepared for this luncheon?

Yes ____

No ____

2. Professor Doty would also like to schedule an additional luncheon on October 8, to include Professors Shulman, Kistiakowsky, Rathjens, Long, Garwin (?), Doty, Ruina and York. Do you desire this luncheon?

Yes ✓

No ____

Would you like substantive papers prepared for this meeting?

Yes ____

No ____

Yes ____ No ____

Yes ✓ No ____

Long, Carwin (?), Doty, Ritter and York. Do you desire this luncheon? on October 8, to include Professors Giffman, Klatzkowky, Rathlene, St. Professor Doty would also like to schedule an additional luncheon

Yes ____ No ____

Yes ____ No ____
meet with your approval?

Yarimolinsky and Neusoft for lunch on September 29. Does this 1. Tentatively you are scheduled to have Professors Doty, Ruins,

SUBJECT: Doty Luncheons

FROM: Jon Howe

MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KIRRINGER

September 19, 1969

Sally FYI [J]

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY

12 OXFORD STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

September 17, 1969

Mr. Henry Kissinger
White House
Washington D.C.

Attention: Secretary

Dear Sally:

As it stands now, the following
people will attend the 29th meeting at
12:45: Doty, Ruina, Yarmolinsky and
Neustadt.

The following people will attend
the October 8th meeting: Shulman,
Kistiakowsky, Doty, Rathjens, Long,
Garwin (possibly), Ruina and York.

On the agenda for the day will be
the following:

1) ACDA people

2) Dr. Kissinger

3) Swank (State Dept)

4) Nitse (Pentagon)

If there is anything new, I will
let you know at once.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1969

Mr. Kissinger:

You did obligate yourself to have
lunch with the Harvard Group (i.e.,
Doty, Weisner, Rathjen, Kistaikowsky,
Garwin, & Yarmolinsky) on Sept. 18
at 12:45 p.m.

We have a 1:00 p.m. lunch with
Ambassador Freeman on that same
day. Perhaps we could change
Ambassador Freeman to the next
day and let the lunch with the
Harvard Group stand.

Let Harvard lunch stand ✓

Change Harvard lunch

Move Amb. Freeman lunch ✓

Let Amb. Freeman lunch stand

Muriel

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 5, 1969

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Prof. Doty had indicated to
Mr. Kissinger he would like to
bring in a group of Russians
on October 2. HAK agreed.
Details have to be worked
out but schedule is rather
full already on that day.

MEMBERS OF THE 19th PUGWASH CONFERENCE
SOCHI, 22nd to 27th October 1969

Professor V. Y. ABOLTIN, (U.S.S.R.)
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Mr. H. AFHELDT, (F.G.R.)
2, Hamburg-Blankenese, Strandweg 57, F.G.R.

* Dr. H. ALPERT, (UNESCO)
Department of Social Sciences, UNESCO, Place de Fontenoy, Paris VII, France.

Professor E. AMALDI, (Italy)
Viale Parioli 50, 00197 Rome, Italy.

** Mr. O. N. ANICHKEN, (U.S.S.R.)
Tverskey bulwar 10 (TASS), Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Professor G. A. ARBATOV, (U.S.S.R.)
Moscow Khlebni Per 2/3, Institute of USA, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Academician L. A. ARTSIMOVICH, (U.S.S.R.)
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

* Mr. R. AUBRAC, (FAO)
160, via Alessandria, Rome, Italy.

Professor O. AWE, (Nigeria)
University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Nigeria.

* Mr. S. O. AWOKOYA, (UNESCO)
UNESCO, Place de Fontenoy, Paris VII, France.

Professor N. G. BAPTIST, (Ceylon)
Department of Biochemistry, Faculty of Medicine, University of Ceylon, Peradeniya, Ceylon.

Dr. C. F. BARNABY, (Executive Secretary) (U.K.)
9, Great Russell Mansions, 60, Great Russell Street, London, W.C.1., U.K.

Mr. E. BAUER, (France)
61, rue de Varenne, Paris VII, France.

** Dr. I. S. BENGELSDORF, (U.S.A.)
Science Editor, Los Angeles Times, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

Professor V. BENKO, (Yugoslavia)
Titova 102, Ljubljana, Yugoslavia.

Mr. A. BOSERUP, (Denmark)
Institute for Peace and Conflict Research, Onsgaardsvej 13, Hellerup, Denmark.

* Observer

** Science Writer

- 2 -

Dr. F. BOSKMA, (Netherlands)

Polemologisch Instituut, Ubbo Emmiussingel 19, Groningen, Netherlands.

Academician K. BRATANOV, (Bulgaria)

Boulevard Rouski 17, Sofia, Bulgaria.

*** Mr. M. BRUK, (U.S.S.R.)

Editor-in-Chief, British and Irish Press Department, Novosty Press
Agency, 2, Pushkin Sq., Moscow, U.S.S.R.

* Dr. R. J. BUNCHE, (UN)

United Nations, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

Professor F.CALOGERO, (Italy)

Istituto di Fisica dell'Università, Piazzale delle Scienze 5, Rome, Italy.

** Mr. R. CLARKE, (U.K.)

2, Lambert Street, London, N.1., U.K.

Professor C. DJERASSI, (U.S.A.)

Department of Chemistry, Stanford University, Stanford, California 94305, U.S.A.

Mr. P. C. DOBELL, (Canada)

Parliamentary Centre, 90, Sparks Street (Suite 504), Ottawa, Canada.

✓ Professor P. DOTY, (U.S.A.)

4, Kirkland Place, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138, U.S.A.)

Academician M. M. DUBININ, (U.S.S.R.)

**** Mr. C. S. EATON, (U.S.A.)

Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Co., Terminal Tower, Cleveland, Ohio, U.S.A.

Dr. N. EISSA, (U.A.R.)

35, Farid Street - Flat 4, Cairo-Heliopolis, U.A.R.

Professor V. S. EMELYANOV, (U.S.S.R.)

Academician V. A. ENGELGARDT, (U.S.S.R.)

* Observer

** Science Writer

*** Interpreter

**** Guest

- 3 -

Professor F. EL-BEDEWI, (U.A.R.)

Physics Department, Faculty of Science, Ein Shams University, Cairo-Eygpt,
U.A.R.

Professor W. ERSIL, (G.D.R.)

Domstrasse 14, Babelsberg, G.D.R.

Professor J. O. C. EZEILO, (Nigeria (Biafra))

c/o 30, Collingham Gardens, London, S.W.5., U.K.

Professor B. T. FELD, (U.S.A.)

42, Arlington Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02140, U.S.A.

Professor C. I. FOIAS, (Rumania)

Institute of Mathematics, Str. Grivitei 21, Bucharest 12, Rumania.

Professor J. GALTUNG, (Norway)

PRIO, P.O. Box 5052, Oslo 3, Norway.

Professor R. L. GARWIN, (U.S.A.)

IBM Watson Laboratory, 612, W. 115 Street, New York, N.Y. 10025, U.S.A.

Professor D. A. GLASER, (U.S.A.)

Molecular Biology Department, University of California, Berkeley,
California, U.S.A.

Dr. H. GLUBRECHT, (F.G.R.)

Herrenhauserstrasse 2, Hannover, F.G.R.

Mr. 'W. GUTTERIDGE, (U.K.)

Department of Languages and Modern Studies, Lanchester College of
Technology, Coventry, U.K.

Dr. Ludmila A. GVISHIANI, (U.S.S.R.)

Institute of the United States of America, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences,
1 Khlební kříž 2/3 Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Professor V. HACIK, (Czechoslovakia)

Czechoslovak Pugwash Committee, Parizska 11, Prague 1, Czechoslovakia.

Professor K. HANSEN, (U.S.A.)

2470, El Camino Real, Palo Alto, California, U.S.A.

Professor N. HERLOFSON, (Sweden)

Royal Institute of Technology, S - 100 44 Stockholm 70, Sweden.

Mr. M. HOWARD, (U.K.)

All Souls College, Oxford, U.K.

Academician A. A. IMSHENETSKY, (U.S.S.R.)

[LC]

- 4 -

Dr. E. K. INALL, (Australia)
Culham Laboratory, U.K.A.E.A., Abingdon, Berks., U.K.

* Dr. M. KAPLAN, (WHO)
Chemin de Marly, Collonge-Bellerive, 1245 Geneva, Switzerland.

Professor R. V. KHOHLOV, (U.S.S.R.)
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Academician V. M. KHVOSTOV, (U.S.S.R.)
Academy of Pedagogical Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, U.S.S.R.

** Mr. R. KLEIMAN, (U.S.A.)
New York Times, 229, W. 43 Street, New York, N.Y. 10036, U.S.A.

Dr. A. KOLESNYK, (G.D.R.)
Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Otto-Nuschke-Strasse 22/23,
108 Berlin, G.D.R.

*** Professor V. M. KOUZNETSOV, (U.S.S.R.)
38, Metro destroyevskaya St., Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Professor H. KROGER, (G.D.R.)
1533 Stahnsdorf, Parkallee 38, G.D.R.

Dr. V. F. KULESHOV, (U.S.S.R.)
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

* Dr. E. Y. KUTOVOJ, (UN)
U.N. Secretariat Building, Room 3556, U.N. Plaza, New York, N.Y., U.S.A.

Mr. J. L. LEAL, (Spain)
Residence des Gemeaux A-3, Fresnes (94), France.

Professor W. LEONTIEF, (U.S.A.)
Harvard University, Littauer 309, Cambridge, Mass. 02138, U.S.A.

Professor S. Z. LIFSON, (Israel)
Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovoth, Israel.

Dr. Patricia J. LINDOP, (U.K.)
Radiobiology Department, Medical College of St. Bartholomew's Hospital,
Charterhouse Square, London, E.C.1., U.K.

** Mr. V. F. LIUSTIBERG, (U.S.S.R.)
Maily Putinkovskii per. 2 (APN), Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Professor O. MAALOE, (Denmark)
University Institute of Microbiology, Farimagsgade 24,
Copenhagen K, Denmark.

* Observer

** Science Writer

*** Interpreter

- 5 -

[Lc]

Professor M. MAGAT, (France)

Laboratoire de Physico-chimie des Rayonnements, Faculte des Sciences,
91-Orsay, France.

Professor I. MALECKI, (Poland)

Nowowierjska 22 m. 12, Warsaw, Poland.

Professor H. MARCOVICH, (France)

24, Avenue Foch, St. Cloud 92, France.

Dr. W. MENDL, (U.K.)

112, Langley Way, Watford, Herts., U.K.

Professor E. MENZEL, (F.G.R.)

2301 Kiel-Schulensee, Am Sec 8, F.G.R.

Academician M. D. MILLIONSHCHIKOV, (President of the Conference) (U.S.S.R.)

Mr. J. MOCH, (France)

45, Allee de la Foret, 78 La Celle St. Cloud, France.

Dr. J. MORAVEC, (Czechoslovakia)

Pugwash, Parizska 11, Prague 1, Czechoslovakia.

Professor H. MORGANTHAU, (U.S.A.)

19, E. 80 Street, New York, N.Y. 10021, U.S.A.

*** Mr. I. V. MOZHEIKO, (U.S.S.R.)

Institute of Oriental Studies, Armyansky 2, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Academician G. NADJAKOV, (Bulgaria)

T. Strashimirov 1 St., Sofia 4, Bulgaria.

Mr. T. NEMEC, (Czechoslovakia)

SIPRI, Sveavagen 166, Stockholm 113461, Sweden.

* Mr. R. NEILD, (SIPRI)

Rt. Hon. P. NOEL-BAKER, M.P., (U.K.)

16, South Eaton Place, London, S.W.1., U.K.

Professor D. P. NOVIKOV, (U.S.S.R.)

Professor C. A. ONWUMECHILLI, (Nigeria (Biafra))

* Observer

*** Interpreter

- 6 -

Mr. A. PARTHASARATHI, (India)
Program Analysis Group (PAG), Department of Atomic Energy, Shivaji
Maharaj Marg, Bombay-1, India.

Professor R. E. PEIERLS, (U.K.)
Department of Theoretical Physics, 12, Parks Road, Oxford OX 3PQ, U.K.

Professor C. PENESCU, (Rumania)
Association of Scientists in Romania, Strada Progresului No. 10,
P.O. Box 90, Bucharest 1, Rumania.

Professor F. PERRIN, (France)
College de France, Place M. Berthelot, Paris V, France.

* Mr. J. PERRY ROBINSON, (SIPRI)
SIPRI, Sveavagen 166, 11346 Stockholm, Sweden.

Mr. N. W. PIRIE, (U.K.)
Rothamsted Experimental Station, Harpenden, Herts.

Mr. I. G. POCHITALIN, (U.S.S.R.)
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Professor K. POPIOLEK, (Poland)
Bankowa 12, Katowice, Poland.

Mr. J. PRAWITZ, (Sweden)
Research Institute of National Defence, Dept. P, S-10450 Stockholm 80,
Sweden.

Professor E. RABINOWITCH, (U.S.A.)
State University of New York at Albany, 1400, Washington Avenue,
Albany, N.Y. 12203, U.S.A.

Professor G. RATHJENS, (U.S.A.)
E 53-417, Mass. Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, U.S.A.

Academician O. REUTOV, (U.S.S.R.)
Division of General and Technical Chemistry, U.S.S.R. Academy of
Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow B-71, U.S.S.R.

Professor R. REVELLE, (U.S.A.)
Center for Population Studies, Harvard University, 9, Bow Street,
Cambridge, Mass. 02138, U.S.A.

Professor A. RICH, (U.S.A.)
Department of Biology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, Mass. 02139, U.S.A.

* Observer

[Lc]

- 7 -

Professor J. ROTBLAT, (Secretary-General) (U.K.)
Department of Physics, Medical College of St. Bartholomew's Hospital,
Charterhouse Square, London, E.C.1., U.K.

Professor J. RUINA, (U.S.A.)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass. 02139, U.S.A.

Professor C. SCHAERF, (Italy)
Laboratori Nazionali di Frascati, Casella Postale 70, Frascati 00044
(Rome), Italy.

*** Professor A. D. SCHWEITZER, (U.S.S.R.)
Institute of Foreign Languages, 38, Metrostroyeuskaya St., Moscow,
U.S.S.R.

Professor M. D. SHULMAN, (U.S.A.)
450, Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10027, U.S.A.

Dr. V. A. SHUSTOV, (U.S.S.R.)
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

* Dr. K. SINYAK, (SIPRI)
Wenner-Gren Center N. 23, Sveavagen 166, Stockholm, Sweden.

Professor P. B. SMITH, (Netherlands)
Verlengde Hereweg 102, Groningen, Netherlands.

Professor N. SODNOM, (Mongolia)
c/o Mr. Adilbish, Committee of Mongolian Peace and Friendship
Societies, Ulan-Bator, Mongolia.

Dr. I. A. SOKOLOV, (U.S.S.R.)
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Professor V. G. SOLODOVNIKOV, (U.S.S.R.)
Institute of Africa, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Professor G. STEIN, (Israel)
Department of Physical Chemistry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem,
Israel.

** Mr. W. S. SULLIVAN, (U.S.A.)
66, Indian Head Road, Riverside, Conn. 06878, U.S.A.

**** Mr. W. SWARTZ, (U.S.A.)
Embosograf, 1430 Wrightwood, Chicago 60614, Illinois, U.S.A.

* Observer

** Science Writer

*** Interpreter

**** Guest

- 8 -

Academician M. SZABOLESI, (Hungary)
Budapest XI., Menesi Ut 11-13, Mta Irodalomtorteneti int, Hungary.

Professor A. TANOVIC, (Yugoslavia)
Filozofski Fakultet, ul. Rackos 1, Sarajevo, Yugoslavia.

Dr. C. M. VARSAVSKY, (Argentina)
Instituto Argentino de Radioastronomia, Casilla de Correo 5, Villa Elisa, Prov. Buenos Aires, Argentina.

Academician K. VAS, (Hungary)
Budapest V, Szalay-U. 5/B, Hungary.

** Mr. O. S. VASILIEV, (U.S.S.R.)
Izvestia, Pushkin Square 5, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

** Mr. N. VICHNEY, (France)
Le Monde, 5, rue des Italiens, Paris, France.

Academician A. P. VINOGRADOV, (U.S.S.R.)
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Professor M. S. VOSLENSKY, (U.S.S.R.)
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Professor B. M. VUL, (U.S.S.R.)
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Leninsky Prospekt 14, Moscow, U.S.S.R.

Dr. C. J. H. WATSON, (U.K.)
15, Hurst Rise Road, Oxford, U.K.

Professor P. WEINZIERL, (Austria)
Ist Physics Institute, University of Vienna, Boltzmanngasse 5,
Vienna 1090, Austria.

Dr. W. WIECZOREK, (Poland)
Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warecka Street, Warsaw,
Poland.

Dr. E. WOJTASZEK, (Poland)
ul. Wilcza 51 m 21, Warsaw, Poland.

Dr. A. VAN DER WOUDE, (Netherlands)
de Savernin Lohmanlaan 1, Groningen, Netherlands.

Dr. H. YORK, (U.S.A.)
University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, California 92037, U.S.A.

Dr. S. H. ZAHEER, (India)
Regional Research Laboratory, Hyderabad 9, India.

** Science Writer

APPENDIX A

19th PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS
"World Security, Disarmament and Development"

SOCHI, 22-27th October, 1969

REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 3

"Reduction and elimination of Nuclear Weapons and delivery systems"

Problems of Strategic Arms Limitations

The discussion relating to problems of limiting
the strategic arms race was an extension of that which
developed in the plenary session on the ABM. It
included an elaboration of views expressed in several
of the papers presented to the Conference.

The prevention of further escalation of the
strategic arms race is a task of the greatest urgency.
All participants welcomed the fact that a date and place
for the beginning of negotiations between the Soviet
Union and the United States on strategic arms limitations
has been announced.

Several developments, notably the further develop-
ment of Multiple Independently Targetable Re-Entry
Vehicles (MIRV's) and ABM defences, unless stopped, will
almost certainly lead to a new spiral in the arms race
with adverse consequences for the US, the USSR, and the
world as a whole. If that were to happen, at best,
we might expect strategic forces ultimately to level
off at a much higher level with the dangers of nuclear
war increased, the problems of reducing strategic
armaments made vastly more difficult, and with substan-
tial resources having been wasted. At worst, a nuclear
war might occur because one or other of the major
nuclear powers might conclude that there are advantages
to be gained by striking first rather than accept the
risk of a first blow by its adversary.

- 2 -

The majority of the Group felt that continuing
growth in Soviet and American strategic armaments would
have an adverse effect on the policies of other nations.
They might be less willing to refrain from the develop-
ment of their own independent nuclear weapons capabilities,
Efforts to reach early agreement in the SALT talks would
be the most important evidence of the willingness of
the Soviet Union and the United States to comply with
the obligations accepted by them in Article 6 of the
Non-proliferation Treaty.

The Group felt that a limitation of the present
strategic forces would be of the greatest importance in
developing momentum towards reductions in strategic arms
levels and other disarmament and arms control measures.

The task of halting the arms race is a political
problem in its own right, not simply a problem for
technicians, and its solution would contribute to the
alleviation of other political difficulties. However,
political conflicts, which must be resolved, should not
be permitted to interfere with efforts to halt the
strategic arms race, which has become to a large degree
a self-generating phenomenon with a life of its own.

Attention was drawn to the negative consequences
of employing worst-case analysis methods to military
problems: i.e. the combining of assumptions that
adversary capabilities will be of the extreme upper
limits of their possible range with assumptions that
one's own capabilities will be at the minimum level of
the range of uncertainty. Application of these
principles has been used as a pretext to justify very
great arms increases to establish a reliable "level of
security". Experience shows that the use of this method
has not in fact made the world more safe, but rather
has resulted in a diminution in security for all nations.

- 3 -

[1c]

Development of MIRV's and deployment of ABM systems are particularly likely to introduce large uncertainties into the determination of force requirements, and so are likely to lead to extreme examples of "worst case" analysis, and hence to a considerable escalation in force levels.

The deployment of ABM defence testing and deployment of MIRV's needs to be stopped urgently. This could be accomplished in one of several ways: as the first order of business for SALT, by tacit agreement, by simultaneous declarations, or by an initiative to halt such activities on the assumption that reciprocal action by the other side will follow. Inmediacy is indicated because once a MIRV-ABM era begins it would be extremely difficult to limit strategic arms, and because the difficulties of monitoring a MIRV ban would increase rapidly with additional tests. An early moratorium of limited duration on MIRV testing and ABM deployment could be of great value for this reason and also because it would provide time to negotiate comprehensive agreements in the SALT talks.

In recent public discussion attention has been focussed primarily on measures to stop deployment of strategic weapons. But each step in the arms race starts with research, development and testing. In principle, action should be imposed to constrain these processes as well. However, in research and development, it is hard to distinguish between military and non-military programmes and between those that are desirable and those that are not. Moreover, it is also difficult if not impossible to impose effective monitoring and control. But field testing, which in most cases can be monitored unilaterally, seems a particularly effective point at which to take action-

- 4 -

action which could have a major effect in slowing down
the arms race.

A comprehensive ban, discussed later, on the testing
on nuclear warheads would be one constraint of this kind.

Members of the Group have arrived at the conclusion
that the existing level of strategic armaments, tens of
thousands of megatons, cannot be justified by consider-
ations of deterrence, security or by any other rational
motives. It was estimated that a full scale nuclear
war would kill a large percentage of the population of
the Northern hemisphere, a region representing more than
90% of mankind. Furthermore, it is likely that this
havoc would set in motion abnormal psychological and
physiological events that could take the lives of most
of the survivors.

Effective deterrence can be obtained with a
drastically reduced nuclear stockpile level. Movement
toward such levels would provide opportunities for making
progress toward general and complete disarmament.
Ultimately, substantial progress towards general and
complete disarmament will require the participation of
all of the nuclear powers and other large nations as
well. However, the Group felt that the development of
nuclear capabilities by other nations and the fact that
some have not yet been participants in discussions of
arms control and disarmament need not be serious
impediments to progress on partial arms control and
disarmament measures affecting the strategic forces of
the major powers.

## Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation

Recognizing the danger of further proliferation of
nuclear weapons capabilities, the Group believes that
the early entry of the Non-proliferation Treaty into
force with the participation of the greatest number of
states, including all the nuclear and potential nuclear
weapon states, is a matter of great urgency.

- 6 -

## Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Concern was expressed about the extent of present
underground nuclear testing and about the possibility
that some tests have apparently been conducted in such
a way as to result in venting of radioactive materials
in possible violation of the present treaty.

It was urged that countries that have not subscribed
to the present Treaty do so.

There was a consensus that difficulties in detection
and identification of underground tests using unilateral
systems have been reduced to the point where this need
no longer be a serious impediment to extending the test
ban treaty to prohibit underground testing for weapons
development.

Some members suggested that extension of the test
ban to cover underground testing would be desirable as
a part of SALT or as a parallel measure. Indeed, it
was suggested that a comprehensive test ban might be
politically feasible only in the context of SALT - or
if there were otherwise an agreement on ABM deployment.
Others argued that an effort to achieve a comprehensive
test ban would be desirable in any case.

## Nuclear Accidents and Unauthorized Launch of Nuclear
Weapons

It was concluded that in view of the very large
number of nuclear weapons and delivery systems deployed
throughout the world, there is a very real prospect of
an accident occurring which might have catastrophic
consequences. The risks will probably increase if
MIRV's and ABM are developed and deployed. In reaching
this conclusion we are mindful of the argument that ABM
systems may be useful in coping with missiles launched
accidentally or without authorization. However, we
are sceptical about ABM systems being effective in this

- 7 -

role because of the difficulties of obtaining authoriz-
ation to launch interceptor missiles at the time
required. Moreover, we feel that the adverse effects
on the arms race and the disadvantages of ABM missiles
themselves being launched accidentally will more than
offset whatever utility ABM deployment may have in
dealing with accidentally launched offensive missiles.

The Social Responsibility of Scientists

It was felt that there is considerable and
unwarranted complacency on the part of the general
public and among many officials about the seriousness
of the present military situation, a complacency which
is in part the result of our having had certain limited
successes in arms control such as the Partial Test Ban
Treaty, but which is primarily the result of our having
lived with nuclear weapons without their having been
used for over two decades. The ... enormity of the
destruction that would result from a full scale nuclear
war with present stockpiles of nuclear weapons is
simply not comprehended by the general public.
Scientists have a great responsibility to help educate
the public about this.

The Group was concerned that the credibility of
scientists could be severely damaged by scientifically
irresponsible statements by individuals even if those
statements are motivated by the highest moral consider-
ations.

There was a discussion about whether ethical
standards among scientists with respect to particular
areas of scientific investigation are the responsibility
of the social and professional communities of which
scientists are a part, or exclusively that of the
individuals. The problem arose particularly in the
context of consideration of whether scientists should