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Whatever the "Grand Design" for NATO [Seyom Brown's preceding seminar] -- informal hierarchy, two-pillar partnership between the U.S. and Europe, Atlantic confederation, or even more pragmatically, an Atlantic Concert -- American policy-makers will find that design incompatible with a sizeable proliferation of national nuclear capabilities. Such a proliferation is divisive within the alliance, as expressed arguments for it bring American guarantees into question for those members that cannot or do not aspire to national capabilities, as well as for those that do; as weapons come under the control of others still less trusted; and as resources committed to proliferation reduce capabilities for collective rather than national self defense.

Yet American policy-makers sympathize with European aspirations for greater status and participation in nuclear affairs. More sharing in alliance nuclear policy, and in collective nuclear forces, are favored where nuclear separatism is not. Meaningful policy sharing, which need not raise such sharp "whose finger on what trigger, and what safety-catch?" issues, exists, is growing, and can be extended. Operations can be coordinated and information shared, despite security problems, about capabilities, plans, and likely outcomes of nuclear exchanges as a result of current and alternative NATO nuclear policies. Such information is greatly needed; for example, the ABC's of the new strategic options for

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American strategic forces (including "city-sparing") possibilities are still little understood in Europe. European officers have long participated actively at SHAPE in nuclear planning for Allied Command Europe, influencing what would be hit by SACEUR's forces and how; and now their participation is extending to Omaha and SAC. Our allies will be in a much better position to understand key strategic planning decisions -- what options for possible use by existing forces; which additions, and how many, to future forces -- and hence to argue intelligently about and influence them.

Numerous schemes for collective nuclear forces within the alliance were proposed in the late 1950's. It was argued that nuclear policy sharing would not go far enough toward meeting legitimate European aspirations, and that American resistance to even a collective force would stimulate a worse alternative in national forces. Hence, the MLF was a compromise between those Americans who wanted no help to allied nuclear forces and those who wanted more help to national forces, and gained its political force as a compromise. Its proponents were more idealistic, desiring a deeper NATO association that would clearly extend beyond 1969 and/or a supranational European force. Whether America positively desires a European force as an ultimate outcome can be hedged, as the European nations reluctant to yield a purely national veto in such a force (e.g., Great Britain) are more likely to face this concession soon within an MLF grouping that

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includes the United States. Hence the MLF can further a European force if that evolution is desired, as well as an Atlantic one.

The valuable negative function of the MLF is to demonstrate that America is not the key obstacle to supranationalism in strategic systems. This function was met from end-1960 to late-1962 by proclaimed American willingness, with remaining responsive initiatives left to Europeans. This permissiveness changed, however, to salesmanship, which to this observer was a mistake. Two penalties have been serious: (1) an undue concentration within the Administration of scarce creative energies upon the one goal to the neglect of others; and (2) excessive claims for the MLF that redound upon other goals. For example, to make MLF membership seem the road to influence over nuclear planning is to undermine broader policy sharing programs that would give such influence to all cooperative allies; and to make an MRBM in the MLF seem an answer to Soviet MRBM's, unlike an American ICBM, is to strengthen military arguments for NATO MRBM's that would not be multi-manned.

It seems desirable now to push the MLF less and make appropriately modest claims for it, while trying to work out specific implementations, including those for firing control, that might resolve divergent interests among participants. An Atlantic aspiration for the MLF seems appropriate, although its compatibility with a European force can be noted. Broadened nuclear policy sharing measures should be developed independently of the MLF. At the same time a broader goal for the MLF,

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foreign to its original purpose, has become more relevant. If
the alliance as a whole reverts still more to traditional
peacetime coalition patterns, an inner-core grouping collected
around the MLF may be able to preserve and extend peacetime
military command arrangements and other forms of interdependence
that are not possible for NATO as a whole. In this sense the
MLF can be a foundation for contingency planning against a disruption
of the alliance.