TELCOM
Sec. Gen. Waldheim/HAK
October 23, 1973/9:32a.m.

K: Hello.

W: Good morning Dr. Kissinger.

K: Hello Mr. Secretary General

W: Welcome back.

K: Thank you.

W: I am sorry to disturb you so early I know you must be very tired.

K: No, that's alright.

W: Well, we are very happy and grateful for what you did in Moscow and I only hope it will now help us to achieve real peace in the area...

K: I agree.

W: In this connection I have only to tell you that I talked about an hour ago to the Ambassador of Egypt and he is informing me that Israel has broken the ceasefire. He bitterly complained about it and he said that...

K: Well, I have the same call from the Israelis.

W: Yes, exactly. The Morning News also published the fact that on both sides the fighting is going on and Egypt is requesting a Security Council meeting for 12 noon. I discussed this with the President of the Security Council and he says well, of course, he has no choice. He will convene the Council for 12 noon. But, Dr. Kissinger, I wanted to tell you this. We have been informed by the Nordic countries and also by the Canadians and Austrians. They have sent 5 forces, we heard between about 4,000 to 5,000 soldiers of those Nordic countries plus Canada and Austria standing by so if you feel that we can help in this regard - because my conviction is that as long as we don't have people, soldiers there, as observers but even better at least keeping forces in a buffer zone or whatever you want to call it as long as we don't have this I think this fighting in one way or the other will continue as...

K: We are in favor of some United Nations force there. Let me get some of my colleagues together and call you back.

W: Yes. You see, I just wanted to let you know that I have inquired and we have the possibility if this is agreeable to you and the Russians. If you think that this can be helpful we have these soldiers ready in the Nordic countries as well as in Canada and Austria and I think within the shortest possible time they could be flown there.

K: OK. Let me consult my colleagues and the Soviets and see what they think.

W: Fine. I will then wait.

K: You will hear from me very shortly.

W: Thank you very much. Goodbye.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Amendment</td></tr><tr><td>By: OHARA, Date 6/16/64</td></tr></table>

TELCON
David Popper/HAK

October 23, 1973/9:39 a.m.

K: Hello. David I need you over here but before I see you. I'm at the White House. I'd like your judgment that ____**** Waldheim says he has some U.N. forces lying around in Scandinavia.

P: What he has is a statement by Scandinavian countries... call and bring you up to date their long standing offer to furnish forces.

K: Let's not waste time on that. The Egyptians have called for a Security Council meeting at noon or 12:15.

P: Right. Can I tell you what I think the situation in New York looks like.

K: I don't give a damn what the situation looks like. I want to know what we and the Soviets can propose.

P: Well, the quickest thing would be to see if we can get the President of the Security Council after hearing the parties, to appeal to both sides to observe the ceasefire. After that it is possible to get a resolution passed as in 1967 demanding that the parties comply in violation cease. The latter will be more difficult because there will be considerable tendency to ask for a one sided resolution in which the Israelis will be found to have violated the ceasefire etc. In fact Scali has just told me I was just on the phone with him, that Mollok has not yet received instructions but of course wants to blame the Israelis for what has happened. And this is the thing we want to avoid.

K: Right.

P: So that I would suggest that if it works that way that the President's appeal is the way to wind up this meeting quickly if we can and then we should see in the hours and days to come where we go from there.

K: How about the U.N. observers.
are

P: The U.N. observers/on the spot. They've been pushed out of their old observation posts. We know their headquarters is intact in Jerusalem there are some in Cairo ....

K: I know that. Can we tell them that we favor that they be activated as a first step.

P: That's exactly what I think we should do and so I've told Scali.

K: I want to confer with the Russians. How about getting a force in there.

P: Well, we can certainly do that.

K: Well, are we in favor or not. I know we can do it. My question is what do you think.

P: Yes. I think we should get it in there soon.

K: You mean, accept the Scandinavian proposal?

P: I think we have to find out what is involved. Who they are and how many? But Scandinavian and Canadian troops I think....

K: OK. Let me get to Vorontsov so that he can get to Moscow.

P: Good.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Originately</td><td>06 Mar 1957</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>OO</td><td>Date</td><td>01 Mar 1957</td></tr></table>

Telcon
Amb. Scali/Kissinger
9:44 a.m. - Oct. 23, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: Yes, John.

S: The latest development is that we've been in touch with Malek who says he has no information, but perhaps the need to condemn the Israelis on this would appear that it be important to make sure that he gets instructions or has an even-handed... deploring of any violations and call on all parties to observe the cease-fire. It is also important, I think, to control as best we can Mr. Altheim who is talking about sending 2,000 stand-by troops from the northern countries and Canada __________ with the ability to have them there within 24 hours.

K: Why are we against sending forces there?

S: We're not against it, I'm just informing you. We have 268 observers standing by....

K: Those are the ones. I talked to David Popper and he thinks we should call on the Security Council, the President of the Security Council should call on the parties.

S: That's my suggestion.

K: O.K. __________ to cease-fire.

S: That's right. __________ And let's try to avoid a hassle on a new resolution, which would just get everybody involved in the act.

K: O.K. Let me talk to the Russians and see whether they are willing to play.

S: Alright.

K: Good.

Telcon
Minister Vorontsov

9:45 a.m. - October 23, 1973

V: Hello.

K: Yuly?

V: Yes, Henry. Good morning.

K: How are you? First of all, many thanks for the great kindness with which we were treated.

V: Oh, that's wonderful.

K: And we think, and I've just come from the President, we think we did a historic work.

V: That's exactly the case.

K: And now we have to build on it.

V: Right.

K: Now I have two problems. One, I'm sending you a note which you can play with, which you can weigh, which I inform you as I have already done your Ambassador in London

V: Yes.

K: That the Israelis have agreed in principle to the guarantee that's used, subject to a few modifications.

V: Right.

K: So I hope by the end of this week we will have that on the way.

V: Yes, yes, that's good.

K: Also, for your information, I mean your leaderships' information, we have told the British that the only sponsorship we are interested in is joint sponsorship with the Soviet Union. And that we don't want any larger group, which I understand is our understanding.

V: Right.

-2-

K: Now, we have the immediate problem of the allegations by both sides that the other side has broken the cease-fire.

V: Yes.

K: And I recommend that at the Security Council we do our utmost to act together, if that's possible. Our judgment, but we're willing to listen to you, it's just our best judgment, is that we have the Security Council ask the Secretary General to call on all parties to observe the cease-fire immediately.

V: Yep, right.

K: And, if you are willing to have the Security Council call on the UN observers to make their services available to the two parties. You know, the observers that are there. We are also willing to consider the proposal of the Scandinavian countries to send a force there, but we're not proposing it, we're telling you what we are willing to consider. But I think the meeting today at 12:15, the easiest is, rather than a new resolution, to have the President of the Security Council be asked to appeal to both parties, and to all parties, and to offer the services of the UN observers. I want to tell you that we are urgently in touch with the Israelis. Above all, I think we should not have controversy between our two delegations today.

V: Right.

K: And I have instructed Scali not to say anything critical or attacking the Soviet Union.

V: Yeah, that's good. Yeah, I'm just writing down all this to report immediately to Moscow.

K: Now if you have problems getting through to Moscow we can get you a phone line opened up.

V: No, no. It's o.k., we can manage it. I'll do it in no time.

K: Good. Will you call me back?

V: Yes, I'll call you back whenever I have something from them.

K: When is the Ambassador coming back?

V: Well, he's ______ down somewhere in Frankfurt to get here on time and something happened to the plane. So he took another plane and will be here around 4:00.

K: O.K. Good. Fine. Many thanks. Bye.

V: Thank you. Bye.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Vorontsov
10/23/73; 9:47 a.m.

V: (missed first part) message from Brezhnev and reads like that and they haven't received your message yet. They crossed each other.

K: Right.

V: So it reads like that: First, President Sadat has informed us that in the morning on the 23 of October Israeli forces in violation of the decision of the Security Council renewed firing on the West Coast of the Suez Canal and are moving into the southern direction. We would like to underline that Moscow has its own reliable information which proves that this is the fact and that the Israelis apparently decided to widen their bridgehead on the West coast of the Canal. Thus Israel once again challenges the decision of the Security Council. This is absolutely unacceptable. All this looks like as a flagrant deceit on the part of the Israelis. We will express the confidence that the United States will use all the possibilities they have and its authority to bring the Israelis to order.

K: Well, you have our answer before we got your message.

V: That's right.

K: And you can be sure we are in the most urgent contact -- of course, we get the opposite claim from the Israelis.

V: Well, but . . .

K: I just want you to know we do not have independent means of checking it. I think frankly today's order of business should be to stop it whoever started it.

V: Exactly. Henry, and that's the way it goes later on in the statement. I will continue reading, okay?

K: Oh, I am sorry. I thought you were finished.

V: No, no. No, no.

K: How the hell can I win an argument if I let you finish.

V: You won this argument already but I think you will like what I will say further on. So, it goes without saying that Israeli forces in this case should be withdrawn to the positions where they stayed during the acceptance of the ceasefire decision.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F-012058
By W.W. Date 00304

10/23/73; 9:47 a.m.

Second, President Sadat suggests that the Soviet Union and the United States agree among themselves about measures which would insure physical parting of Egyptian and Israeli forces with the help of the observers of the United Nations.

Three, Sadat suggests in particular immediate use of the United Nations observers and first of all the personnel of the United Nations which was placed previously along side the Suez Canal and which is now in Cairo. That is our point of view, Brezhnev says, that it would be really wise to do so since the personnel of the United Nations, which is in Cairo now, need only appropriate orders and they could be immediately dispatched to the place of conflict.

K: All right.

V: Quickly we suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States urgently submit to the Security Council a draft of appropriate resolution to this effect. If the United States side agrees to that, the draft could look like that and follows the text of the draft:

K: What is it?

V: I am getting to it: The Security Council referring to its resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, (1) Confirms its decision about immediate cessation of all fire and all military activity and demands that the forces of the sides should be withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on ceasefire. (2) Suggest to the Secretary General of the United Nations to immediately take steps for immediate dispatch of the UN observers to supervise the observation of ceasefire between the forces of Israel and Egypt, using for that purpose first of all the personnel of the United Nations which is at present in Cairo.

K: All right.

V: Period. And the last line says that Mr. Brezhnev would like to underline to Secretary Kissinger the urgency of these matters. . .

K: Yuly, I don't have to check this with the President because I know he agrees. The only suggestion I have -- I have two suggestions.

V: Okay.

K: One, could we delay the start of the Security Council meeting until 2:00?

V: Easy.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012055
By: W.N.aga Page 337

- 3 -

K: So that we could get our delegates together.

V: Okay.

K: Second, I would recommend deleting from the instructions "withdraw to the line they occupied" because it will lead to endless debate. I don't think anybody gained a hell of a lot. What could they have gained in a few hours?

V: Well, obviously they have gained something. Otherwise our side wouldn't raise this question.

K: I don't know the situation and I have no basic objection to it.

V: It would be better, of course, to keep this. There will be arguments, exactly of a half a mile or something like that but politically that will be expedient of course to urge that everybody would return where they were last night.

K: Of course they will never agree on where they were last night so it doesn't make any difference.

V: Well, let them argue -- not fight at least.

K: Look, I agree and I will instruct Scali immediately. You can inform Moscow.

V: Good.

K: That we agree -- that I urge that the meeting be put off at least until 2:00. We will inform the Israelis if you will inform the Arabs.

V: Okay.

K: I will instruct Scali in this sense and we will agree to this resolution.

V: You will agree to this resolution.

K: We may have a word about "withdraw to the Line" but as long as we both understand this that is not going to be easy to enforce. I am not going to quarrel about it.

V: I think in Moscow they gave some attention to this phrase so we better keep it here.

DECLASSIFIED

Telecom
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Vorontsov
10/23/73; 9:47 a.m.

V: (missed first part) message from Breshnov and reads like that and they haven't received your message yet. They crossed each other.

K: Right.

K: Well, you have our answer before we get your message.

V: That's right.

V: Well, but...

V: No, no. No, no.

DECLASSIFIED

Date 6/1/73
By OHR

Telecon
Secretary Kissinger
Minister Vorontsov
10/23/73; 9:47 a.m.

Three, Sadat suggests in particular immediate use of the United Nations observers and first of all the personnel of the United Nations which was placed previously along side the Suez Canal and which is now in Cairo. That is our point of view, Breshnev says, that it would be really wise to do so since the personnel of the United Nations, which is in Cairo now, need only appropriate orders and they could be immediately dispatched to the place of conflict.

K: All right.

K: What is it?

K: All right.

V: Period. And the last line says that Mr. Breshnev would like to underline to Secretary Kissinger the urgency of these matters. . .

V: Okay.

V: Easy.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Amendment 58/83</td></tr><tr><td>By OJ MRA; Date 6/1/83</td></tr></table>

- 3 -

V: Okay.

V: Good.

V: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED
Date 6/16/73
By ORA Date

Telcon
McCloskey/Kissinger

9:59 a.m. - Oct. 23, 1973

K: Bob.

M: Morning, Henry.

K: Bob, we've cancelled the press conference for today.

M: Oh, you have?

K: Yes.

M. O.K. I'm trying to make my way from Chevy Chase into the Department now; that's good for me to know; I'll be there very shortly.

K: What do you mean you're trying to make it? Don't give me that drama. In other words, you're going to come from Chevy Chase to the Department.

M: If the Department will send a care out to get me.

K: I'll just talk to the Deputy Secretary sitting here with me saying that everyone of the Assistant Secretaries then should get his own car.

M: Yes, well, I raised that with you on the plane last night. I'll be interested to know why, when I get a chance to speak with you, they cancelled.

K: I'll tell you now. Because Elliott Richardson is giving a press conference at 11:00, and they didn't think I could compete with him.

M: ______ later.

K: And I didn't think I could compete with him.

M: I understand. They had referred to that in one message yesterday, last night. I agree, Mr. Secretary, I ....

K: Bob, it is largely my own fault. I do not believe that foreign policy should be used, even by implication, as something that is used to take the heat off domestic politics, and I just think it looks bad if 3 hours after Richardson has done whatever he's going to do, I trot out foreign policy. The second reason why I thought it was a bad

-2-

idea was we're meeting with the Congressional leaders at 9:30
tomorrow morning. I don't it's proper for me to give a press
conference before we've even talked to the Congressional leaders.
Don't you?

M: Indeed. I couldn't agree more. But they knew all of that yesterday and still wanted to do it.

K: Yeah, but I wasn't here to explain it to them.

M: Alright then, we'll probably have to go ahead with our regular
little thing.

K: Yeah. Make it as uninformative as possible.

M: I took care of the prisoners' matter last night at the airport.

K: Good.

M: O.K., sir.

K: You have that great drive for purity. You don't accept surrender.
It's got to be done for the right reasons, too.

M: Yeah, it's an old Irish tradition.

K: That is actually true. It enabled 2 million to dominate a nation of
200.

M: Well, I tell you, and you know that has to be some kind of an
achievement.

K: It is an achievement. Good, Bob. Thank you. I'll see you when I get to the Department.

M: Thank you, sir.

K: Right.

Telcon
Minister Vorontsov/Kissinger

10:12 a.m. - Oct. 23, 1973

V: Hello.

K: Yuly?

V: Yes, Henry.

K: Yuly, I recommend also we have made urgent representations in Jerusalem or Tel Aviv, whichever place you don't recognize, in Israel, to observe the cease-fire meticulously. We have also replied to, I'm just keeping you informed so that we both know what are you doing. We've also replied to the Egyptians who sent us a note in the same sense. And we think it would be very helpful if you did it to all the parties with which you are in contact.

V: Right. I'll do that. Did you receive our information ...

K: Yes, I did. I appreciated it very much and I really think that if we now hold this together for the next two or three days and then move from there to the guarantees question and the auspices then we will have done good work. Again, for your information and you should work together with us if you agree. We are telling every country that offers their auspices to us that the only joint auspices we're interested in is with the Soviet Union.

V: Yeah, we agree with that and you know that we...

K: We haven't yet committed ourselves to it but we're not entertaining any other proposition.

V: Right.

K: So if you could do that, too, I think we can bring it up as I told the General Secretary last Friday.

V: Good, Henry, thank you for this information.

K: Good, Yuly. Thank you. Bye.

10:37 a.m. - Oct. 23, 1973

V: Hello.

K: Yuly.

V: Yes, Henry.

K: I understand that you feel you cannot postpone the Council meeting.

V: Yeah, I had a talk with Malek and Malek said the Egyptians are absolutely mad and insisted ______ 12:00. And since we have agreed generally on the draft resolution....

K: Well, wait a minute, that's what I wanted to talk to you about. We of course have to talk to Jerusalem about it, too. But there are two things wrong with the draft resolution: one, I have never been happy about that phrase, "demands that the forces should be withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment."

V: Yeah, but if the Israelis are really attacking and taking ....

K: But wait a moment, there's another thing wrong with it. It says, "of the adoption of the decision on the cease-fire."

V: Yeah.

K: Now, that means moving further back than they were at the time the cease-fire went into effect.

V: You mean moving at the time when the decision was adopted? That is to 12 o'clock, 50 minutes, in the night, and after that they were moving or they were standing, I'm....

K: That's right. The cease-fire didn't go into effect until last night.

V: ______. .... they were occupying at the moment... or adoption of a cease-fire decision. At the moment of adoption a cease-fire decision. That's positive.

K: And that we cannot possibly go along with. That doesn't make any sense because we specifically said 12 hours after the decision.

-2-

V: Yeah, not later than 12 hours. That's right. Well, ______ you have a point, but actually about the withdrawal to the positions I don't think you have a good point at all.

K: But only it is impossible to enforce.

V: Yeah, well, that....

K: Because no one will know where they were.

V: But, otherwise Henry, that will be something for those violators of the cease-fire later on to capitalize on. Everybody would like to violate cease-fire and get some more territory without withdrawing to...... On both sides.

K: But what about that point on the decision on the cease-fire?

V: Well, here you might have a point. I can conceive that here you might have a point. But the phrase about the withdrawal is a monster, an absolute monster. Otherwise that will be meaningless. The whole thing. And every time each side will be tempted to take some more territory and will use it. There will be no cease-fire. They will be violating every.....

K: I understand that. Let me talk to the President.

V: Yeah. O.K.

K: O.K.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Annual</td></tr><tr><td>By: CHA. Date 6/16/65</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

Amb. Dinitz (Israel)/Secy Kissinger

11:04 a.m., October 23, 1973

D: Dr. Kissinger, welcome back.

K: Thank you.

D: How are you?

K: I'm fine, a little exhausted.

D: I can imagine. I got very good regards of your visit. The Prime Minister is very thankful for your stop. Dr. Kissinger, I got a message from her this morning to convey to you, the essence of which I conveyed to the General, but in one sentence she wants to assure you personally, confidentially and sincerely that none of the actions taken on the Egyptian front were initiated by us.

K: Okay. Now, listen, let me ask you something.

D: Right.

K: The Russians have just come in and proposed a Resolution in which they ask for an immediate cessation of all fire and activity. You have no problem with that?

D: No, no.

K: And demands that forces should be withdrawn to the position -- you have an ambiguous statement there -- where they were at the time of the adoption of the ceasefire. Now we certainly can't say at the adoption of the ceasefire. We could say where they were at the time the ceasefire went into effect.

D: This I don't know, the second part, because I don't know what the situation this minute is in the field. Since they have initiated fighting, we have returned fighting.

K: All right. And then the rest is to get UN observers that are in Cairo into the field. That's no problem.

D: That I have to check but I understand that Tekohoah has asked the same question. He didn't get a reply yet.

K: Well, would you call?

D: I will call the Prime Minister and I will let you know on the three points.

TELCORN

Joe Sisco/David Popper/Secy Kissinger
[Conference Call]

11:10 a.m., October 23, 1973

K: David, I just talked to Yuri Vorontsov. They have a Resolution that they want to submit jointly with us.

P: I see.

K: Which I'm going to send over to you in the next 5 minutes.

P: Right.

K: I have told them to do the following: (1) To get a deferral of the meeting until at least 2:00 but better till 3:00, and he's agreed.

P: Good.

K: (2) I have agreed to the Resolution, which in effect just calls on --

P: Calls on the m to observe the ceasefire?

K: To use the UN observers in Cairo. And the only other thing it has is that they should return to the positions where the ceasefire line was. I said I don't like that because no one will ever know it. He said it's better to have it in there with the understanding that no one will ever know what that line was.

S: Except that it will give both sides the opportunity to begin to charge one another with violations. They're foolish to put that in.

P: Take that paragraph out, I agree.

K: Well, then let's tell him that is the one line we want out. Otherwise, we'll accept it.

S: Why do they go the Resolution route? Have you put to them the alternative --

K: Well, what's wrong with a Resolution?

S: It's all right except it will give all sorts of people the opportunity to amend it.

K: Yeah, if they and we will agree that there will be no amendments accepted.

Sisco/Popper/Secy Kissinger

P: I don't think it will make an order of magnitude difference. It is a little quicker and easier if everybody agrees the President should speak. But I am sure this will work if we both stand behind it.

S: But you ought to press them hard on the deletion of this paragraph in my opinion.

K: Okay. Well, let me get the text. But will you instruct Scali accordingly?

P: We will keep him informed, yes.

K: And tell him to get a deferral together with Malik.

P: Right.

K: Good.

P: Thank you.

K: Bye.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: Eo 1285+</td></tr><tr><td>By: OJ MARIA Cate 6/16/87</td></tr></table>

TELCONE

Minister Vorontsov/Secy Kissinger

11:25 a.m., October 23, 1973

V: Hello.

K: Yuri.

V: Yes, Henry.

K: I just talked to the President. Two things, (1) we would really like a delay if at all possible.

V: Oh, oh, that doesn't mean that the Israelis will take some more 50 miles of territory during the delay.

K: No, no; I don't believe -- I don't know how fast they are moving --

V: I don't know either but --

K: At least an hour.

V: Well, the Security Council never meets on the dot but still maybe just to have it started at 12:00 but then the time for agreement on the Resolution and everything like that and you will have your time. But to postpone the meeting is not very good in the eyes of the Arab countries.

K: Can you see whether Malik and Scali can't get some delay?

V: Malik said he has already engaged himself on the 12 o'clock with the Arabs and with the First Chairman or President of the Security Council.

K: You can then get a delay in the vote or something?

V: But later on they can do it. Yes, I know it for sure.

K: Okay. Well, do that then. Secondly, we definitely cannot accept your phrase "withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on the ceasefire."

V: How are you suggesting to change it?

K: Well, we have not yet decided. I have just talked to the President. What we could consider is "where they were at the moment the ceasefire went into effect."

DECLASSIFIED
Authority FA12058
By: N.M.aba 53-00304

TELCORN
Minister Vorontsev/Secy Kissinger

11:25a.m., October 23, 1973

V: Hello.

K: Yuri.

V: Yes, Henry.

V: I don't know either but --

K: At least an hour.

K: Okay. Well, do that then. Secondly, we definitely cannot accept your phase "withdrawn to the position where they were at the moment of the adoption of the decision on the ceasefire."

TELCOM

David Popper/ Joe Sisco/Secy Kissinger
[Conference Call]

11:30 a.m., October 23, 1973

S: Henry, I spoke with Vorontsov.

K: Well, you were not supposed to talk to Vorontsov.

S: Well, I though you said you wanted us to call Vorontsov.

K: Well, but not to negotiate things I'm negotiating with them!

S: We're not negotiating. I'm just reporting something to you and we're
going to ask you what you want us to tell John on this. They say that
as far as the 12:00 meeting -- No, I have not touched anything; we
haven't talked about this Resolution or anything -- They are under
very strict instructions to go to the 12:00 meeting. Apparently
they feel themselves to be under very considerable pressure from
the Egyptians. So my own feeling is we ought not to make any
major issue of the timing. If John has a word with Malik, if they
can kind of delay it to 1:00, 1:30 or so, fine. But I don't think we
ought to make an issue with the Russians on the timing because they
feel themselves to be under very considerable pressure from the
Egyptians.

K: Okay.

S: Do you agree? Okay. Now, we have said nothing about the Resolution, that's in your hands.

K: Well, now on the Resolution, I have just talked to Dinitz. He's calling Israel.

S: Right.

K: Now, actually, you've got the text of the Resolution.

S: Yes, we've got it but we're not going to do a thing.

K: Well, actually, there's something else wrong with that Resolution.

S: Well, I've just seen it now.

K: Because it's at the time of the adoption of the ceasefire.

S: Sure, sure. I've just read this and my advice again is to even
re-enforce to you more ....

2

K: Yeah, but I can't go into an endless nitpick.

S: Well, I know that but I don't think that phrase is good, Henry.

K: I agree that phrase is no good.

S: All right. We're not doing a thing on the ...

K: I will wait until I hear from Israel.

S: That's right.

K: I will tell Vorontsov now we can accept it without that phrase.

S: Well, okay. I'm not going to tell John anything until you tell us what to tell John.

K: Right.

S: Okay. I have your permission to tell John what I just said on the timing, that's all?

K: Right. But I will tell Vorontsov that they should both delay as much as possible.

S: Yeah, he told us that he was under strict orders at 12:00 o'clock. Frankly, he made it very plain that it was Egyptian pressure.

K: Right.

S: And so if you tell Vorontsov that you have asked Scali to try to work out with Malik a little delay to 1:00, 1:30 or so, he'll understand.

K: Good.

S: Okay.

TELCONE

11:32 a.m., October 23, 1973

V: Yes, Henry.

K: Yuri, I will let you know within half an hour, 45 minutes, but it must be where at the line established when the ceasefire went into effect.

V: It's firm now.

K: It's not yet firm but only one we're now considering.

V: Went into effect. Right, I've got it.

K: On the other one, now, there's only one other point we have, which I know is no problem -- where you say you think for that purpose, first of all, the personnel of the United Nations which is at present in Cairo.

V: Right.

K: What we would like to say is "using for that purpose UN personnel now in the Middle East but first of all --

V: Now in the Middle East.

K: And first of all --

V: By this line, you mean --

The ones that

K: Are in Jerusalem, for example.

V: Un-huh. Not Syrian situation you have in mind?

K: No.

V: Since we are talking about Egypt and --

K: No, no. What we have in mind is the Egyptian situation.

V: Yeah.

K: It applies specifically only to Egypt.

V: Yeah, I see. So you mean from that line, from the Israeli side, yes, to engage --

K: Just to have more personnel available.

V: Yeah, all the personnel available there. First of all which is in Cairo. Well, I don't think there will be any problem here. But, Henry, there is a problem about postponement. Scali suggested to Malik 3 o'clock. It's terrible of course.

K: No, no; I have just instructed that they should start the meeting and delay the vote.

V: Yeah. Okay.

K: Okay?

V: Yeah, it's okay so far as I'm concerned. I don't have time to consult with the government in Moscow, you understand.

K: But tell Malik what I suggested.

V: I'll tell Malik. I'm just contacting him now.

K: Good. Thank you.

V: Okay.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12958

By: M.W. Spada, Jr., C-50407

TELCONE

Minister Vorentsev/Secy Klessinger

11:32 a.m., October 23, 1973

V: Yes, Henry.

V: It's firm now.

V: Right.

V: Now in the Middle East.

K: And first of all --

K: No.

V: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED

Annex to E 0953
Date 6/1/73

By AHRA

2

V: Yeah. Okay.

K: Okay?

K: Good. Thank you.

V: Okay.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Amendment</td></tr><tr><td>By: AH</td><td>PARA. Date: 6/16/65</td></tr></table>

TELCONE

Dinitz/HAK

October 23, 1973/12:00 noon

K: Hello.

D: Dr. Kissinger. I just got a reply from the Foreign Minister. With regard to the first paragraph we have no difficulty. With regard to the third paragraph, that of the U.N. observers, we are prepared that they should appoint a liaison officer and we discuss the thing on the spot we have no objection. With regard to the second paragraph the return to the original place. The Prime Minister wants you to know that we have intelligence document which we can pass to you as well as signs in the field that they have opened an attack, which all of this they have communicated to their forces to improve their position. They have inflicted on us ______ this both in tanks and personnel. And only then we have reacted and we can document it to you.

K: I understand that but that doesn't change the situation.

D: No, and therefore, as a result of this battle have developed, there has been no marching in the field of what the situation was when the ceasefire initiated. And therefore it is totally impossible for us or for anyone to accept that paragraph two because it is completely absolute. It is no possibility, speaking in terms of responsibility, and it is in terms of fixing it. So that is why we would--not only we -- nobody would be able to reascertain it.

K: That I agree with but supposing such a paragraph passes. What difference does it make?

D: It makes only a difference in the sense that it would allow the Russians and the Egyptians to demand withdrawal of our forces on some of the positions that they are right now as a result of the Egyptian violation. That is the point.

K: Because quite frankly, the President feels that if we don't agree. I mean, what they are proposing we will not agree to which is in a position...

D: That of course is ridiculous because that wasn't even asked by the resolution

K: Since nobody will be able to tell where that was to begin with it cannot be given practical effect.

D: That is why it shouldn't be adopted this paragraph.

K: But it is important for any future attempt by the Egyptian side to try to grab some territory that we did not insist that the fait accompli is still...

D: That is why we accept the idea of observers. Because only when you have observers in the ____ mouth can you effectively tell whether movements have taken place so I think if I made the argument for the Russians in the discussions should be that now that there are observers a fixed position can be attained.

K: You know what will happen? There will be a majority for that position.

D: For the position of their attempt.

K: We have two choices. If we say withdraw to the position where they were at the moment of adoption of the decision on the ceasefire that's ridiculous. That's inconsistent with the resolution.

D: That shows that...

K: I know, let's not argue about it. The second point is supposing they amend it to say at the time of the ceasefire.

D: That is what we were discussing because the first one I dismissed right away and on this the Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense have a very documented development.

K: My problem is what do we do at the U. N.

D: That's what I said...

K: We can veto the fourth Russian draft. That we can do. We can abstain from when it says at the time of the decision of the ceasefire but we can't veto that.

D: I think the thing is very--if I may, I don't see what difficulty there is to say that before the Security Council can determine who was at fault they cannot demand of any side that we acted through the XXIX fighting.

K: Yes, but they could take the position, it doesn't make any difference who was at fault. The easy way to settle it is to go back to the line.

D: But who will determine this?

K: I think it is indeterminable.

- 2 -

TELCON"
Sisco/HAK

October 23, 1973/12:12 p.m.

K: I just want to keep the lines of communication straight.

S: I'll pass along whatever you want me to pass along to him.

K: But I don't want to break Popper's morale. The Israelis of course will not accept the one even as edited. We turned to the decisions at the time that the ceasefire. Now, what I think we should tell the Russians is that if they want to make a joint resolution we can make it confirms the immediate cessation of all activities and have a second paragraph on the observer personnel. That part we can make joint. We cannot make it a joint resolution that demands that they return to the prime, at the moment of the adoption of the ceasefire because that's inconsistent with the original resolution. If they ammend it to make it at the time that the ceasefire went into effect we will abstain from it.

S: Right.

K: Don't you think?

S: Well, let me reflect on that. I think myself, if you, if the Russians go ahead on this and we end up abstaining, I think now the Russians and others begin to beat us over the head in the area. I think myself that if you press them hard enough you can get the deletion of that portion and that's what I think we ought to do in order to stay together. Because, if then, they come out on the side of God, we then put ourselves in the position...

K: OK, why don't you call Voronstov and tell him I'm in a meeting and say this is our decision and I will call him in half an hour. That way I don't get into a shouting match with him.

S: I will not say anything about the abstention because they'll bite at that.

K: Just tell him ...

S: What we need deleted.

K: And tell him that once the observers are in the field we give them our assurance we will vote for any resolution censuring people crossing the line. See what I mean.

S: Sure. Give them that kind of assurance. Also you can use the ___ argument.

K: But that right now it's impossible to determine what the original line was.

S: Of course. That's a practical fact.

K: OK. And that this is the way to get a speedly resolution.

S: I'll take it at this level and you follow up and you're the one that has to do it. You can do it.

K: But tell him you got that from me but I'm in a meeting with the President which is continuing.

S: Thank you very much.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date 6/15/65</td></tr><tr><td>By: OJ</td></tr></table>

TELCONE

XXXXXXXX Popper/HAK

October 23, 1973/XXXXXXXX 12:55 p.m.

K: Hello.

P: Mr. Secretary. I just wanted to report to you that Malick is not being cooperative in New York. They are arguing in the office of the Security Council President now. He says he has instructions and he is instructed to go with his resolution alone if we won't go with him which is of course not the understanding on our side and I've urged them to advise him strongly not to do that. It is not our understanding of the script and this argument is now proceeding up in New York.

K: With the line at the time the decision was taken?

P: Yes, with the line at the time the decision was taken without any change. We do not have an exact text of his language but it is with the provision.

K: Then Scali has to take him on and say that's absurd because that is contrary to the Security Council resolution.

P: Contrary to?

K: It's obviously contrary to the resolution because the decision meant there was a 12 hour period.

P: Yes, of course. Well, alright but the point I'm making is this...

K: I'm trying to get it turned off. I understand the point.

P: Alright.

K: Now, I've asked for a meeting and I'm coming over.

TELCORN

Vorontsov/HAK

October 23, 1973/12:56 p.m.

K: Ury, we are having urgent meetings here but there is one thing we will certainly not accept and will certainly veto.

V: Which one?

K: The draft that says it has to be the line at the time the decision was taken. That's absured.

V: That one ...

K: I understand now that Malick is being very difficult in New York and insisted on introducing his own resolution.

V: No, I don't think he will do that. It's a pressure tactic. But, I hope I'll get on that point, instruction from Moscow any minute now but what worried me ....

K: I understand you are to worry and we're meeting urgently on that but could you get Malick quieted down in the meantime?

V: Yes, I'll try to do that if you promise to go back to the formula in whatever about the timing.

K: That's what we are meeting on now and it will take me another 45 minutes.

V: And Henry, I am afraid if you just do what Sisco said that could mean a terrible trouble for and General Secretary and between you and General Secretary because....that's absolutely terrible.

K: I must tell you he has lost his voice thank God so he can't yell at me.

V: Who did that?

K: The General Secretary has a cold. Now look.

V: He won't do it through my voice and that's the trouble.

K: We have done some historic things this weekend and we should both try to preserve it.

V: Henry, its very important.

K: Will you get Malick quieted down in the meantime until we ...

V: I'll try on the assumption you are thinking about some kind of language about withdrawal.

TELECON

Major General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

October 23, 1973

1:10

S: I told him to hold off from.. but I can't keep off the line.

K: Yes, but he can't go with the other resolution.

This resolution is to do it at the time the cease-fire was voted. that is
out of the question.

S: That's right

K: The only possible solution is to .. it at the time the cease-fire went into effect.

S: That's right. He said he would have him hold off.

K: good.

TELECON
Ambassador Scali/Secretary Kissinger

October 23, 1973

1:15

S: Hello Henry.

K: Hi, John.

S: I am meeting with the President in his office and with Malik and Al Zayyat.
And Malik is threatening to invoke the resolution on his own.

K: I have just talked with Vorontsov who is in touch with Moscow. You tell Malik to stop his god damn pressure tactics and give us the time to do it.

S: I will tell him that. He says...(rapid talking)

K: Will you stop a minute. stop. stop. Stop your speech and I will tell you what we are for. We are for observers. We are for the cease-fire. The Soviet is contrary. because it goes back to the line when the cease-fire was passed. What we would most like is a cease-fire with immediate establishment of observers. Afterwards we will support any condemnation of a crossing of that line.

S: I will tell Malik.

K: You tell him. Will you call me back?

S: I will call you back.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>10/24/73</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 6/10/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Doornynin/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

1:35

K: I should have known with you in town we are in deep trouble.
Let me tell you what we have.... Confirm decision about immediate
cessation of all military action. . and urges that the forces of the two sides
be returned to the positions they occupied at the time the cease-fire
became effective.

D: Yep.

K: And say the same thing. . We are willing to accept this and make it a
joint resolution if you will.

D: Good, yes.

K: In the second paragraph. . Using for this purpose. . personnel in Middle
East... and personnel on Cairo now, between you and me, I would hold
up deliberations on that.

D: Not understand.

K: It should be included in. . I think it is a reasonable proposal.
Don't you?

D: I do too. I will talk to Malik and I will confirm.

K: It is better to argue about where the line is. . the principle of withdrawal.
We want you and us to slow about that debate.

D: Let them argue but just not fight.

K: Secondly, we attach great importance to the understanding between the
Secretary -General and me about the exchange of ..

D: I repeat this to Moscow.

K: Emphasize it again. Let me know.

D: I need 5 minutes.

K: We will make it a joint resolution.

DECLASSIFIED

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

1:35

D: Yep.

D: Good, yes.

D: Not understand..

K: It should be included in.. I think it is a reasonable proposal.
Don't you?

D: Let them argue but just not fight..

K: Secondly, we attach great importance to the understanding between the
Secretary-General and me about the exchange of ..

D: I repeat this to Moscow.

D: I need 5 minutes.

October 23, 1973

1:36

S: Malik is acting like a god damn idiot.

K: You tell Malik to calm down. We are in the process of working it out.

S: Tell him right now?

K: Yes. Tell him right now. Vorontsov is now in the process of getting instructions from Moscow.

S: He claims that he has talked to Vorontsov and has gotten.

K: I have just talked to Vorontsov and given him our proposal. You tell Malik to hold his water or I will send him to Siberia. I know Breshnev better that he does. Ask him if he has ever been kissed on the mouth by Breshnev as I have. Tell him to go to Vorontsov. We have made a new proposal and we think we will.

S: OK, I'll tell him.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 10-23-73</td></tr><tr><td>STATUS FULFILLED</td></tr><tr><td>BY: O.H. KARAT, Date 10/23/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

October 23, 1973

1:40

D: We accept the changes you wanted in the first case and second.
So we are accepting it together.

K: Give me ten minutes to let those maniacs in New York know.

D: I have contacted Malik and he has told Scali, so Scali knows.

K: Good.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>EO 1983</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>OH</td><td>Date</td><td>10/1/83</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Mr. Laird/Secretary Kissinger

October 23, 1973

2:55

K: Hello Bryce.

L: This is Mel. Bryce and I were making

K: Oh, Mel. I asked for Bryce and.

L: We were both making calls to the members of the Cabinet from here.

K: I know what you are going to tell me. You are a politician. Will you tell me the political significance.

L: Heh, Heh. It is difficult to interpret. Sometime we will have to talk about it. There really wasn't much else they could do after the press conference... when he said it was up to the American people.. we were lost.

K: What is your view.

L: I'll talk to you about it sometime. It hasn't been handled well.

K: It is a god damn disaster. Everything was quiet and now this.. is this going to quiet things any?

L: No. They will say we did this only to get rid of Cox.

K: Next they'll demand the papers.

L: Oh, Christ, yes.

K: I just want you to remember that I am number three in line.

L: I know. I have worried about this.

K: I might be you know. You might keep your office.

L: I may be fired next.

K: No, it takes loyalty. No sense firing a patriot.

L: Well, that's what we are calling about. Morton came on the phone and said tell me one thing. Will there be anything left of the government after you finish talking.

K: Well... Oh, Mel, we joint with the Soviet Union in another cease-fire

TELECON
Mr. Schlesinger/Secretary Kissinger

October 23, 1973

3:02

S: How are you?

K: A little tired but I think we made it.

S: We now have the problem of post-cease-fire.

K: We are settling that. We are introducing a joint resolution at 4:00 with the Soviet Union.

S: My query is what about the airlift.

K: We have to keep it going til we get a hand on the others.

S: So, when they cut it off, we cut it off,

K: We have made a proposal and I think we should play it hard. .. we cut it unilaterally and it will be bad.

S: No question. ... the Egyptians were pretty shaky.

K: I don't think so.

S: Make it harder in same way.

K: Do you think we made a mistake joining a resolution calling for a new cease-fire?

S: I don't know enough at this stage.

K: Well, supposed the Soviets introduced a resolution on alone, do we then veto it?

S: Yes, I mean no we can't

K: If we do it we will be in trouble with the Arabs.

S: The name of the game is to keep the airlift going.

K: We will have a WSAG at 5:00. I may move it to tomorrow.

S: Well, we have had a bit of excitement here.

K: Yes, and now they have given in to giving up the tapes.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E. B. Stetson</td></tr><tr><td>By: O.A.R. Date: 6/2/73</td></tr></table>

- 2 -

K: I think we are coming along in the Middle East..

S: How is it going with the Saudis?

K: Well if we made a mistake....

S: Is it. reparable?

K: Yes.

S: What about Bahrain?

K: That is certainly reparable. The Saudis we have to see about.

S: Well, we only have one facility and I am not sure we shouldn't
move in and...

K: We are going to move on that thing. We will tell him if they want
to support, they..

S: OK

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: Eo 1983</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>ARA: Date 6/10/83</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Leonard Garment/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

4:10 p.m.

G. ...and the question is whether you want to see them tonight.
Generally tell them they have to support the President on MFN....

K. They cannot do it.

G. I would stay away from the business of support. We don't need
that.

K. You are crazy. That other thing will just open the flood gate.

G. Could be sufficient unto today's decision.

K. You never win my losing.

G. I don't have a strong...about that. Dow Jones is up 6 points.

K. That is nothing. I have a meeting here at 4:00. How about
between 5:00 and 6:00.

G. Sure. I will bring them over at 5:30. Max, of course, you know
and Stein are with us all the way. Moss is a Democrat. You stand
on the choice....I will need to turn that around. I will deal with
them directly on the thing with the President. 5:30 at your place.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority: E0 12/83</td></tr><tr><td>By: CHARA. Date: 6/10/83</td></tr></table>

TELECON

October 23, 1973

4:15

K: I sent you two messages on Sunday night. Number 14 and asked you to tell the Israelis that since we delayed fourteen hours they could go on for a few more hours. ... They say it was never transmitted.

S: That is not correct. I told Dinnitz and Shalev.

K: They said they did not receive..

S: God damn it. I told them...

K: We want them to try it on to the twelve hours.

S: I told them that they said what we want is move them before we have to go..

K: Ok, that's all. Thank you.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original</td></tr><tr><td>By: OSA, Date 6/26/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON

October 23, 1973

4:20

K: I think we should have the WSAG tomorrow morning. Anything they can do tonight.

S: The natives will be restless.

K: What do you mean.

S: I understand you talked to Schlesinger. Everyone wants to cut back on supplies.

K: I will talk to them.

S: They need quieting down.

K: Why?

S: They have no idea of what is going on and now we have a cease-fire we should stop supplies.

K: At least tell them to stand by till I call. Why should we cut back on the Israelis when the Russians don't cut back on the Arabs?

S: This is another hand-holder. So we don't.

K: You don't slap them around enough.

S: True. They feel out of touch and know you had a big trip.

K: Tell them I am tied up with the Security Council and it will take place tomorrow at 10:00 without fail., if not tonight. I am sending over another hot line message.

S: OK'

END

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>CLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>DATE 10/23/73</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>RECEIVED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>By: CHA. Date 10/23/73</td>
  </tr>
</table>

TELECON
Schlesinger/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

5:09 p.m.

K. I just saw a news ticker that Pentagon sources said because of Soviet slow down on supplies we were slowing down. Will you keep your people quiet! We need the Israelis on a... They need an open supply line during.... You will keep it going full blast. We will meet at WSAG tomorrow at 10:00.

S. Maybe Bill will be there. Unless you want me there?

K. No, I told you everything today. Anyway, we are having lunch tomorrow.

S. We are? How is the ceasefire going? Are we going to crack down immediately? Or will we tolerate....down.

K. It is...is tremendous victories for us. The big pressures will have to come when we get into peace negotiations.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Originator</td><td>USDA</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>OHARA, Date 6/23/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Secretary Lynn/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

5:15 p.m.

L. Can you use some good news. Saturday morning I met with the presidents (he named off several Jewish organizations including the Jewish National...and Cleveland Jewish Federation). I sold them.

K. Terrific.

L. Then went to New York the following Friday night and met with 25-man...conference. They agreed unanimously to try to turn the thing around.

K. Marvelous.

L. You have to be very careful with this information.

K. It is just between you and me.

L. G______ called me and told me the conference bought it completely. Part of it is the way you have come through to Israel. This is a man that can be trusted. If he feels we have to keep the detente....our ears should be to the ground.

K. We should see what Vanick will do.

L. You should not go to him. They will convince Vanick.

K. Thanks for everything.

L. I hope it works, Henry. They said they will try their very best. It just shows I cannot possibly get out of the international arena.

TELECON
Ambassador Kaul (India)/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

5:20 p.m.

Kl. Welcome back.

K. Thank you.

Kl. Are you going to Peking or have you postponed it.

K. We have postponed the trip for a month.

Kl. Our Foreign Minister is in New York with Mr..... He would like to pay a call on you. Is that convenient?

K. The Foreign Minister and the Permanent Head. What day?

Kl. Either the 31st of October or the 1st of November.

K. I will have Mr. Eagleburger call you tomorrow.

Kl. Thank you. If it is possible for you to have a quiet lunch or dinner, we will do our best.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authorized</td><td>5.25</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>OM</td><td>Date</td><td>11/1/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Katherine Graham/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

5:30 p.m.

K. Kay.

G. Heavens, where are you?

K. I am back in Washington.

G. Congratulations. I don't know what has happened today. Is it
starting?

K. The Israelis grabbed another hunk of territory so we will have to place another resolution tonight. The major reason I am calling is about your letter. I have postponed my trip to China. I am going to go about the end of November.

G. We will hold off until then. I am so sorry to bother you.

K. I want you to understand I didn't make that selection and as McCloskey explains, he can only take one person from the weeklies. What I have --- If he takes only one of the weeklies I want him to put the three names in a hat and draw for the one that should go.

G. What is this nonsense? This has not ever happened before.

K. He says if he takes one he will have to take News and World Report.
I will get this thing equitably settled. I am not going for four weeks.....

G. That has no use to News Week. They probably resent us for having two seats when they only had 14.

K. The fact of the matter is when you have 14 seats there is no paper
you exclude that doesn't have a grievance.

G. The point is when you are taking any there is a basic sort of
six that get attacked for getting it: networks, UP, AP, the Post,
Time and Newsweek, all of whom do a job of foreign reporting.

K. I will get it straightened out by the next time we meet. I will
get McClosky to change his mind.

G. It is just being near you. It is a great advantage.

-2-

K. I just want you to know I am third in line to the Presidency so you better not antagonize me.

G. Not really, how about the Speaker?

K. First Carl Albert, the President Pro-Tem and me. I want you to know that the Constitution only prohibits me from being elected and doesn't say anything about....

G. Henry, I'm going to call them up. I am so excited for you and I am so glad I will know a President and will you remember I am a friend.

K. That I have never doubted. You were right. The first time I had heard of it was when you called me. Then when you wrote--by the time we meet I will have it settled. Let me worry about it.

G. By your good cheer it is a hideous, terrible moment.

K. We can't survive crises like this. We survived a major war by the skin of our teeth. Now we have to settle it. It we have no authority in this country, we are in desperate shape. I am not excusing anything that happened. I wasn't in the country....

G. I feel so sorry for you trying to settle the war with this....

K. This is between you and me, I called Haig on Sunday about midnight in Moscow and said will you get this done right away. He said "no, I have to get a few other things settled." I asked him like what? He said firing Richardson, Cox and Rucklehaus. So I am sitting there and I am dying.

G. Henry, that was the first you heard!

K. That is the very first I heard of it on an open line to Moscow.

G. Well, listen, all I can say is you pulled off the only thing that made us all feel we were....

K. Don't worry about.... I will fix it.

G. I will just shut up about it. I won't say anything to the fellows.

K. You can tell them. We will try to do something between next time. I understand Ed Cline thinks this is retaliation for the shitty thing they did to me last summer.

-3-

G. The paranoids think that Henry. You are too professional and wouldn't do anything like that.

K. McCloskey feels on very good reasons on his part he could only take one weekly. Why he settled on *Time* instead of *Newsweek* I don't know. I don't want them to carry a grudge. Tell them enough to quiet them down. How is Helmut?

G. He is on his honeymoon. He just got remarried.

K. I know, I met his fiance.

G. I will take care of this. I am just at the publishers meeting down here. I will be back in New York.... I have a serious problem with Joe that I might talk to you sometime when things are calmer. I think he has to write less often. He is just no good any more.

K. It is none of my business but if you could....

G. ...No, I can handle it I am sure. I just sort of put it off.

K. I will take care of the other thing. Looking forward to seeing you when you get back.

G. Bless you.

TELECON
The President/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

6:50 p.m.

K. Mr. President.

N. Were you able to make any sales on that line we had
talking about this morning?

K. Yes, I can't tell how they did. I talked to Dinitz for one
thing. I talked to a group of Jewish leaders. I call Mansfield.

N. Is he in town?

K. I don't know where they reached him.

N. I know, you never can tell with the White House switchboard.
You got Eban. He was all right. How about Congress?

K. I called a number of them. Most of the ones we discussed.
I stressed the point of the decision you made. They were all
very complimentary. Nobody raised the current issue.

N. Not even Mansfield? He is probably embarrassed. Ted
Kennedy is pushing him.

K. Ted Kennedy called.......and said you had settled it all this
afternoon.

N. You mean about Sirica? They will want it all for the Committee.

K. They will want everything.

N. No more!

K. I am not sure you.... You cannot possibly do more without
impairing the Presidency.

N. I told Haig, "Now Al, there can't be any more." It is not
possible. The next thing they will go into India, Pakistan,
Cambodia, everything we have done. The Foreign Relations
Committee will want everything. We are going to stand firm.

-2-

This is a hell of a concession. There is stuff in there that is embarrassing....I think it is good Sirica has to give it to a Grand Jury.

K. I don't know if he is out to get the President....

N. Cox was out to get the President.

K. Cox couldn't have it.

N. Sirica will be more responsible. He is in the Grand Jury.... There has never been a leak on the Grand Jury.

K. Absolutely. A lot of newsmen have sent notes and called in on the Middle East and realize what a role you have played. I think that is an asset.

N. In terms of....compare this with the Cuban confrontation. The Russians would never have called Kennedy. With a twelve to one advantage. But in the Middle East they might have... We have no ships. Moving the aircraft they had no choice...

K. That is my key point.

N. They realize it took some nerve to do this.

K. No question. It was a tremendous victory.

N. The thing you negotiated was fantastic. To change the wording to urging was good. Very good. Well, anyway you need a good nights sleep. Tomorrow you knock them dead.

K. Day after tomorrow. The leadership meeting is tomorrow.

N. No leadership meeting tomorrow. They go Thursday morning at 9:00 and you go in the afternoon, no 11:00. If you give leaders tomorrow they will give it all away, everything is for Thursday. You can sleep in tomorrow.

K. Fine, Mr. President. Good night.

TELECON

Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

7:10 p. m.

D. What are you doing here with Voronsov?

K. The moment he is alone here there is a crisis.

D. When I left Moscow...all the members of the Politburo... Now it looks really rather negative after your trip to Israel all these developments.

K. We had another joint resolution this afternoon.... You agree with the Egyptians on something.

D. The only point which I was surprised you refused to accept was paragraph 2 about the ceasefire line.

K. What paragraph 2?

D. Of the resolution calling for them to return to the position previously agreed upon.

K. First of all that isn't true. The extraordinary difficulty its deciding where the line started. We didn't want to get into a hassle about where the line had been. Finally we joined you. I had to talk to the President.

D. It looks fine again. Were you surprised?

K. I had absolutely no knowledge of this.

D. I think nothing really.

K. Voronsov called me at 10:00 this morning. By 1:00 we had agreed to it. That is not an undue delay.

D. What is the situation in the field?....

K. The Israelis swear that the Egyptians attacked them first. We have no separate information.

D. What is the situation? The fighting continues or stops?

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: A.W. Plan Date: 06/04/81

K. I think it stops. We have urged the Israelis in the strongest terms to stop it.

D. Did they begin to...the position as they issued on Sunday.

K. They say they would agree to it. But who knows what that position was. They will never agree.

D. Don't you know through your reconnaissance.

K. We haven't done any air reconnaissance. Lets say we do not know what the actual situation is frankly.

D. You don't know yet.

K. We have sent two urgent messages today to stop and I have had the Israeli Ambassador in here to stop.

D. Brezhnev, when I left....

K. It isn't right for Voronsov to say he had to complain to the Politburo. You can't give us a resolution and expect an answer in ten minutes. It is amazing. We....

D. It was agreed upon by you and Brezhnev that there would be a ceasefire in 12 hours.

K. Your resolution said they should return to the position at the time the ceasefire was agreed upon.... We made another not to determine whether we could agree to something that nobody could enforce. The Egyptians say one thing, the Israelis another, you don't know and we don't know.

D. He had to call again to Moscow. He agreed on the second line. Then in a few moments Sisco called.

K. He had no right to do that. I straightened that out. It wasn't easy to get a winning side to accept a ceasefire. From that point on Israel was winning and we nevertheless agreed to it.

D. We didn't make any definition in Moscow as to who was winning.

K. We made a great effort to make the agreement.

D. I am more worried about our understanding than the Arabs....

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012052
By: M.S.аг.00341

K. We have spent all day today to get the Israelis to stop and I think they have now stopped.

D. I would like to see you tomorrow. If you don't mind.

K. I think we have the...in principal of the Israelis in our joint auspices.

D. They agreed to this one.

K. Not yet 100 percent. If we can get the prisoner thing settled they will agree to it. I had along talk with the Prime Minister. I have already sent a message to Brezhnev to that effect.

D. Do you think we should talk tomorrow. You are having a press conference tomorrow?

K. No, on Thursday. I also wanted to talk to you. There will be a few ups and downs within the next few weeks. We have settled this in a very diplomatic way....

D. This is exactly the point. All right, Henry. The most important thing is the agreement between you and Brezhnev and the whole situation in the Middle East. If we hold that firm it doesn't matter what happens, we will survive. If we drag this anchor through the winds...

K. You have known me long enough. I will not trick Brezhnev. That is the stupidest thing I could do. Even if we win this one we could never have a trusting relationship again. We cannot control everything the Israelis do. They swear that Egyptians started it.

D. The question is to stop and continue discussions politically with the Secretary General.

K. That we are prepared to do. I had a meeting with the Jewish community on the MFN issue. We are making progress now. We are going to drop Title 4 from the House bill.

D. It all?

K. Altogether. It is too complex to change overnight. They are going to work with me to work with Jackson to change his Senate bill and when it comes to the House we will change it once more and get an acceptable bill. It was by far the best meeting we have had.

D. Were my friends there.

K. Fisher, Stein and Moss were there.... I am telling it to you not to ask anything of the Soviet Union but to give you a sense of the mood. I think we had a marvelous meeting this week.

D. When Brezhnev spoke to you I was next to him by telephone. But he asked me once again to come. He was pleased with the meeting.

K. Tell me one thing.... I give you my word of honor I knew nothing about what happened today except....

D. Tomorrow you will call. We can go through what happened in these few days.

K. I have postponed my trip to China.

D. When are you going there?

K. At least a month. At the end of November.

D. What was the reaction of the Chinese? I think they will have more time to prepare.

K. Not very well. They know we introduced two joint resolutions. I will call you tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12587
By W. M. Stair, Jr.,

TELECON

Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

7:10 p. m.

K. What paragraph 2?

K. First of all that isn't true. The extraordinary difficulty is
deciding where the line started. We didn't want to get into a hassle
about where the line had been. Finally we joined you. I had to talk
to the President.

D. I think nothing really.

-2-

D. You don't know yet.

D. Brezhnev, when I left....

K. Your resolution said they should return to the position at the time the ceasefire was agreed upon....We made another not to determine whether we could agree to something that nobody could enforce. The Egyptians say one thing, the Israelis another, you don't know and we don't know.

D. They agreed to this one.

D. This is exactly the point. All right, Henry. The most important thing is the agreement between you and Brezhnev and the whole situation in the Middle East. If we hold that firm it doesn't matter what happens, we will survive. If we drag this anchor through the winds--

K. You have known me long enough. I will not trick Brezhnev. That is the stupidist thing I could do. Even if we win this one we could never have a trusting relationship again. We cannot control everything the Israelis do. They swear that Egyptians started it.

D. It all?

D. Were my friends there.

K. Fisher, Stein and Moss were there....I am telling it to you not to ask anything of the Soviet Union but to give you a sense of the mood. I think we had a marvelous meeting this week.

K. Tell me one thing....I give you my word of honor I knew nothing about what happened today except....

D. When are you going there?

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Originator</td><td>USDA</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>OHARA, Date 6/16/64</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

7:20 p.m.

K. Are you in Cairo yet or the Aswan Dam?

D. No. We are, to the best of my knowledge, just reacting to
Egyptian fighting which continues.

K. We have had a message from Sadat pleading with us to produce
a ceasefire. Dobrynin is back and they are...themselves.

D. Of course, I will pass this message on to the Prime Minister.

K. We have been assured by Israel it is purely a defensive decision...
Put that Jewish mind to work so that when the pressure starts you
can start withdrawing a few hundred yards....

D. I will ask the Prime Minister if she can find some sandpile.

K. Not right now. The time to make moves is just a little bit
before you are forced to and make them figure out what you just
did. Then they have to generate new pressures. If you withdraw
a few hundred yards.... Tomorrow stop the fighting. Somebody will
say announce that as of Thursday you are returning to the original
position. You see what I mean?

D. Yes.

K. What I mean is that is my strong tactical advice. The trouble
with your people is they have too much integrity.

D. That is the answer I got when I suggested it. How could we
possibly say this. We don't issue false communiques. I am with
you. I have trouble with my people in Israel.

K. Call me back in a half hour?

D. Yes, I will call you back.

TELECON
Ziegler/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

7:30 p.m.

K. There is a lot of... over here because I am holding my press
conference at the White House. Can we announce it here - the
new date for the China trip at the State Department?

Z. Yes, sir. What is your new date?

K. The 26th to 29th of November, and we will have to announce it
tomorrow.

Z. I may be able to go on that one....

K. The latest encounter... Listen, we had Cox all set up by Saturday. If you had followed my tactics I would have left him right where he was for three weeks. At that point no one knew who Cox was. I would have then maneuvered him into a....

Z. Even after turning the tapes over?

K. I wouldn't have turned the tapes over. If I had been willing, I
would have taken them into the Supreme Court. If I had gone the
Stenis route, I would have made Cox.... Are you going to run off
now and report that?

Z. I have to take a certain amount of the criticism myself.

K. Be that as it may. For today we came out passably well.

TELECON, 8:00 p.m., 10/23/73

Secretary/ Deputy SecDef Clements

C. Great job you're doing.

K. Thank you. Bill, I called Jim earlier. There was a Defense statement that says we have stood down the airlift in response to a stand down by the Soviets. The orders are to keep it going full blast.

C. I don't know anything about it.

K. There is to be no foot dragging. We need it for diplomacy with the Soviets. Later it has Jerry Friedheim taking the line we didn't do it in response to the Soviets.

C. I think I can tell you what may have happened...based on something like this. We are one airplane behind our schedule...

K. Look, I don't mind your...We're going to pull this thing off. But we're going to do it by our method. I have got the Soviets panicked. Can't Friedheim be brought under control?

C. Yes, I'll talk to him.

K. Whether you fly 14 or 15 doesn't matter. The average is important.

C. I understand. As always we're going to help you all we can if we know what it is we have to do.

K. We're going to have a WSAG meeting tomorrow.

C. I'll call you back.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Security</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>OH</td><td>Date</td><td>10/23/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Haig/Kissinger
October 23, 1973

8:00 p.m.

K. I just wanted to check how you felt.

H. I am pretty good. I went out and did the kind of thing I don't want to do. I went on a news briefing.

K. Don't do it again. I never did that.

H. Well, it worked out all right.

K. You are too valuable an asset. How are we going to resist giving up other documents now?

H. We will just take them case by case and see what they do.

K. That is the thing that worries me most.

H. We will handle it. Muck through as we do all the time. How is the Middle East thing?

K. The Israelis have now taken Suez City.

H. No kidding!

K. We have had a letter from Sadat, a letter and two messages from Ismail, three hot line messages from Brezhnev. We finally signed the Resolution to return from where they started from. We wrote to Brezhnev that we have no idea where they started from. We may have to push them back a little. That's all right, don't you think?

H. Yes, I do. It has been a hell of a day.

K. For you.

H. You can imagine.

K. How is his frame of mind?

H. Very down, very down. He is going to have the bipartisan meeting on Thursday, your press meeting, and then going to Key Biscayne. I think that is a good idea.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>APRIL 23, 1973</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>WAR. Date: 6/23/73</td></tr></table>

-2-

K. It has been a tough period.

H. Yes, it's tough.

K. I haven't fully analyzed yet where it leaves him to....Where do you think it leaves him.

H. It could be a disaster, but I don't think so.

K. You mean in the immediate?

H. No, in the short run we are in fine shape.

K. My immediate worry is where it will lead to.

H. That is the problem.

K. Have you listened to them?

H. No.

K. We are really all flying blind.

H. To a degree but not too big of a degree. I have a....

K. Win wants to hire on his staff someone who is now with Brookings Institute but not part of that, Jerome Kahan. Eagleburger knows him and says he is an o'k guy.

H. Just hire him. Just do it as long as Larry thinks that is all right.

K. Win thinks he is one of the ablest people....Is there anything I can do?

H. No, just tell those friends of ours to stop. They will be in Cairo tomorrow.

K. Their strategy is something else. They want to cut off all the roads of the Egyptian army on their side of the Canal and starve them to death.

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

8:28 p.m.

K. I called Dobrynin after you left in low key way and told him I had expected Kosygin to return soon and I just didn't want them to get impatient if they come up with any ideas...that it would take us a reasonable 36 to 48 hours to consider. I wanted his leader to know it so that they didn't think we were stalling. I asked his assessment of the military situation. He said his reports indicated a stalemate. I said ours did too. Three minutes ago he said in two hours they will come in with a message containing a proposal.

D. Even before Kosygin arrives?

K. He didn't say what the proposal was...what urgency it has. I can call you...I just wanted you to be aware.

D. I suppose the reports from the field are beginning to reach them.

K. He gave no indication. The President doesn't...I can call them and say the President is asleep.

D. I don't know about your President but my Prime Minister is definitely asleep now.

K. I just thought if the diplomacy starts acting up you'd better be informed. Now you know everything I know. I haven't been able to tell the President and you know more than he does.

D. I will be here in the office...

K. It will take about two hours.

D. I'm in no hurry.

K. I know. I'm not hurrying.

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

8:30 p.m.

D. I just talked to the Prime Minister and have the authority to pass on to Moscow that you can pass to Sadat our solemn pledge. If the Egyptians stop shooting we will not shoot either. Moreover, she gives you her personal pledge that if Egypt gives instructions to ceasefire and actually executes it, we will not shoot regardless of all the advantages we can get.

K. The second point is the same as the first.

D. No, she is giving you her personal pledge.

K. We can tell that to the Egyptians....

D. The Egyptians and Russians.....

K. That we have been given assurances.

D. If they give orders to stop firing and execute it, we will not shoot. She tells you that we will stop in spite of the fact that it will cause disadvantages in the field. She said to tell you that place you both talked about was under consideration last night. They decided to --it out to give the ceasefire a chance. It was absolutely the decision of the Egyptians to break the ceasefire.

K. I will tell you what I would do if I was Israeli National Security Advisor--

D. She asked me to tell you she does not believe the question of the business of 200 or 300 will work. The Egyptians and Russians know where they were. She suggested this tactic. We are honestly and sincerely willing to accept the ceasefire and right now. The Egyptians resumed the war and as a result of this new territory was claimed. She asked me to tell you she honestly does not believe that 200-300 yards would work.

K. Well, she is in charge of Israel.

D. I suggest let us start with this and we will be in touch again.

K. We are in a tough position on this one. We are not saying who started it. As you are in Suez City some people will be starving in the next day or two.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date</td></tr><tr><td>By: O.J. CHARTER</td></tr></table>

D. We have not entered the city proper. We have gone around it.

K. You have cut the road. Some people on the East Bank will not have any water.

D. They had no business being there anyway.

K. I have raised holy cane here and the airlift is continuing.

D. Mr. Eagleburger has told me. They are really doing stupid things--what they are putting in the press.

K. I have talked to each person here and they.....

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>EO 1383</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CHARA. Date</td><td>6/1/64</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 23, 1973

8:35 p.m.

K. You really didn't want to sleep tonight.

D. I didn't know it myself but I was flying from Frankfurt on a plane that was going from Israel to New York. It was quite a coincidence.

K. After our call I called the Israelis and said the fighting must stop and I have their pledge that if the Egyptians stop firing they will in any event stop any advance now and if the Egyptians obey the ceasefire they will obey the ceasefire. I now have the impression they will stop. Lets get it stopped. They are now in defensive position. They are not advancing. If you could get the Egyptians to give another order to stop firing---

D. The next step should be coming back to the resolution line.

K. That is the next question. All Sadat has asked us to do is stop the fighting.

D. To stop and go back where they were.

K. The first step is to get the fighting stopped.

D. There is nothing else I want.

K. Right now they will still advance as I understand it.

D. I will get to Moscow about this.

K. Then we will see about the next step.

D. All right, Henry. Good night.

TELECON, 8:35 p.m. 10/23/73

Secretary/Senator Fulbright

F. I just got back. I'm unpacked and everything.

K. I just got back and I have not unpacked anything.

F. Well, you had a rough time. I'm delighted you're making progress.

K. Well.

F. Have they started again?

K. We passed another resolution -- joining the Soviet Union -- asking for a ceasefire immediately and return to the lines which existed when they started and finally the introduction of UN observers. Frankly, I think we can make the lines stick but we are not sure where they were.. it will be difficult.

F. From what I read about your agreement with the Russians I was very encouraged.

K. Actually, you played a role...

F. Oh, I would hope I did.

K. I'm not saying decisively but Dobrynin referred to it a couple of
time. It came out better ...we got it down to negotiations between
the Arabs and Israelis -- and they say under appropriate auspices.
For your information what Brezhnev and I decided was that the U.S.
and the Soviets should provide the auspices under the general super-
vision of the Security Council.

F. That's real progress and it gets detente back on the road.

K. It couldn't be done without it. I talked to some Jewish leaders today and said knock it off on MFN. They weren't so difficult this time.

F. Sounds like you are making progress.

K. Are you free for lunch Thursday or Friday?

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date 5/23/73</td></tr><tr><td>By: Oh,ARA Date 6/1/73</td></tr></table>

2'

F. I think so unless they made something I don't know about.

K. Would you like to come back over here?

F. Whatever you like.

K. It's easier for me here.

F. That's perfect with me. Which day?

K. Thursday.

F. That's OK. I'm delighted you are making some progress.
Everybody is.

K. Now we are facing a unique opportunity to move toward a
settlement.

F. Will it take?

K. Yes. The Israelis have suffered over 6,000 casualties. That's
like 500,000 for us. They have learned they are totally dependent on
us for supply ... and it depends on whether we think the war is worth
it the next time. The Arabs have learned they have to deal with us.
I've had one message from Sadat and two from one of his aides --
Ismail. We are in very active contact.

F. That's real progress.

K. I would be glad to meet with your Committee early next week.

F. You're not going off to China.

K. I have had to postpone it.

F. I think that's wise.

K. I think if I sat in Peking while this thing boils along it would not be wise.

F. I agree.

K. It's up to you. We'll discuss it on Thursday. I can do it Tuesday or Wednesday.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 6/1/69</td></tr><tr><td>TO A/AR: Date 6/1/69</td></tr><tr><td>BY CH</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Mr. Sisco/Ambassador Dinnitz

October 23, 1973

S: Let me tell you where we are and what we have decided. I hope your government understand the difficult... we are faced with a situation where, one, if we don't go along with the proposition we will be faced with vetoing or abstaining. You can well imagine the impact of what this would be. A very difficult situation. Here is what we have done.

We have suggested some changes to the Soviets and they have accepted and we will submit this jointly. The changes in the key paragraph are...

D: Wait a minute.

S: Don't you have it in front of you?

D: No. If you will read it a little slower.

S: The text that we present... confirm its desire about immediate cessation of all kinds of firing and of all military actions and demands that the forces of the sides be withdrawn to the positions they occupied at the moment of adoption of the cease-fire position.

D: It just shows they don't understand anything.

S: They have accepted the two changes. They are: .. the word demands, they have suggested the word urges. Next, on the forces of the.. instead of withdrawn, it should be returned to the position that they occupied at the time the cease-fire became effective. The Secretary wants you to know that he has linked it to two other things.. The first thing is it will be difficult to ... their rationale. It is better to argue in the next 48 hours about it than something more fundamental.

D: The Russians argue this.

S: Yes, they recognize the ambiguities in terms of the line but they prefer the.. to be in that rather than the key question of the resolution. What we said is because the line is ambiguous, we want it to be understood.. if someone begins to argue about what line, we say let's be clear that the line is not clear. Then, secondly, he said that the thing that will make this cease-fire in effect, is for you to carry-out the POW issue. Thirdly, the President has sent a letter to Breshnev on this POW issue. It is being submitted now, and very soon..

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original</td></tr><tr><td>By: O.H. CHAIR, Date 6/16/73</td></tr></table>

- 2 -

D: I want you to understand and tell it to the Soviets. All during the night they have shelled the bridgeheads and caused us casualties in human being and in tanks. They started moving infantry on the bridges in an attempt to cut us out. So when we saw this we pushed them back. And we improved our position. We are not moving back no matter what resolution. I have tried to explain this to the Secretary, but he has been with the President. I am urging you not to. we beg you that we don't put into position something that rewards the Egyptians.

S: I understand. The first point is because of these ambiguities. When this argument comes up and this argument will occur in circumstances when there are ambiguities.

D: You must be with us on this. The Russians are leading. They pass the resolution with you. Then you will say you can't fight this as it is something you passed with the Russians.

S: This point, we made to the Russians.

D: So why don't you make this point to the Russians in the proposal.

S: Touche.

D: I will pass this on to the Prime Minister. She is holding on another line.

S: Fine.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>On: 6/1/64</td><td>Date</td><td>6/1/64</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

David Popper/Secy Kissinger

11:

K: David, I've talked to the President and I don't want any cute stuff now on what should or shouldn't be done because we've got a reality. (1) Scali should get in touch with Malik to try to delay the vote if he can't delay the meeting.

P: Delay the vote?

K: Yeah.

P: All right.

K: Secondly, we cannot consider as it's phrased "at the time of the adoption of the decision on the ceasefire."

P: Yes, I understand.

K: What we could consider is "at the time the ceasefire went into effect."

P: Yes.

K: And I don't see that we have a strong moral ground to refuse this, do you?

P: No, we do not I think. I can't see why.

K: And who will know where that was anyway?

P: Of course, there will always be disputation about it. But we do need to insist that we're talking about the moment when the ceasefire went into effect.

K: Yeah, but don't tell Scali yet that we've agreed to that!

P: All right.

K: Tell him that nothing more than that can be even considered; the President is still studying that, which is exactly the position.

P: His only action at the moment is as to timing.

K: Right.

P: Okay, yes, sir.

David Popper/Sisco/Secy Kissinger

2

K: And I've got word to Dinitz and I think we may go as far as "at the time the decision went into effect."

P: Right. You're awaiting a reply from Dinitz?

K: Right. What is your view on it?

P: I think it's absolutely right.

K: Are you sure?

P: I'm sure that the time the ceasefire went into effect is the moment we should consider; not the time the decision was adopted, yes.

K: Because I really have trouble understanding how we can not take this position now and then insist on it when the Egyptians grab a piece of territory.

P: Absolutely, absolutely. This is the only firm line we have, whether we know it is.

K: Right.

S: For example, Mr. Secretary, one other thing, but we should not raise it at this point. Really now that I've looked at this second paragraph, it says: "To supervise the observation of the ceasefire between the forces of Israel and the Arab Republic of Egypt." We really think for this purpose, first of all, the personnel of the United Nations which is present in Cairo -- Why, you've got personnel in Jerusalem, you've got personnel all over the place. But you know this is not an issue. They ought to be using personnel from both places. That's a mere technicality.

K: No, I wouldn't mind saying the United Nations personnel in the Middle East and first of all from Cairo.

P: That's better because there are relatively few in Cairo, quite a few in Jerusalem who could come down quite quickly.

K: Well, why don't we say that?

P: We will.

S: You want us to do this or you're going to do it because we don't want it done in two places, you see.