[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 14, 1975

No. 412

PC 67

PRESS CONFERENCE OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
HYATT HOUSE, BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA

AUGUST 14, 1975

**MR. AL FOX OF BIRMINGHAM NEWS:** Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the newspaper media of Alabama we welcome you and Mrs. Kissinger to our state.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Thank you.

**QUESTION:** And we appreciate that you have taken the time to grant us this news conference.

Last month it was announced that negotiations, which had been initiated by Senator Sparkman apparently, had resulted in the return of some $2 million to Southern Airways from a plane hijacked from Birmingham. Just how big a step is that toward renewing diplomatic relations with Cuba?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we consider it a positive step and a sign of goodwill. We have indicated on our side that we are prepared to begin discussions with Cuba to see whether the outstanding issues can be settled. As these discussions proceed, we will be able to make a decision on when the time has come to resume diplomatic relations. That is premature now.

Of course, there is one other point that I made before, which is that I do not know whether we will count concessions that are made to Senators when the negotiations start with our Government. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, it has been reported that the Soviet Union has resorted to the Helsinki Agreement to protest the delayed decisions of the Common Market on economic or financial assistance to Portugal and has designs to interfere with that country's internal affairs. Does this concept of the Helsinki Agreement agree with yours? And is there any other Communist action to which we might apply the same standard and use the same appeal?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We do not agree with this interpretation of the Helsinki document, and we support the attitude of the Common Market, which was that they would be prepared to give economic assistance to a democratic Portugal. That is what I expressed this morning in my speech. So we do not agree with this interpretation, and our policy was stated this morning.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, following up on the question, since the question of Portugal has been raised, it has been my understanding that you consider the problems in Portugal arising from their history and that -- to use one of your phrases -- the wounds have been self-inflicted from our point of view. Now you seem to be warning the Soviet Union to stay out. But haven't you raised a straw man? What has the Soviet Union done to interfere in Portuguese domestic affairs?

For further information contact:

- 2 -

PR 412

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As I said in answer to a question earlier, what I said this morning -- what I have said in my prepared remarks -- was addressed primarily to what might be done in the future and to some authoritative press comments that have been made in the Soviet Union in the last few days. Basically the trends in Portugal result from internal Portuguese developments, but the situation is reaching a point where temptation for outside intervention seems to be arising.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, we received a report that a Colonel-General Michael Goleniewski, who was a Polish Army intelligence officer in World War II, had identified a list of KGB and GRU agents and officers which have since been arrested, tried and convicted. The General, according to our source, also identified you, Mr. Kissinger, as having worked for a Soviet intelligence network -- code name ODRA, headquartered in West Germany during World War II -- at the same time you were a U. S. Army counterintelligence interrogator and instructor in a military intelligence school in West Germany.

Now, is this true? And if not, how do you explain your name being on General Goleniewski's list?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't know who Colonel Goleniewski is, but I think he should be given the Pulitzer Prize for fiction. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, is the United States working to encourage a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Northern Ireland?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have not judged that this was the most fruitful area for our diplomatic activity, nor has there been any demand for our services. So we wish the parties well in efforts to settle it, but we have not been ourselves directly engaged.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said in your speech that the United States will oppose the efforts of the minority that appears to be subverting revolution for its own purposes in Portugal. What precisely do you mean?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have indicated that we will support a democratic Portugal, and that we have made clear our preferences. Beyond that there is not an enormous amount we can do.

I have also pointed out there is also the question which we have put to the other NATO allies; namely, for how long a government, should it become dominated by Communists, can remain in the NATO Alliance.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, may I follow that up, please? In your speech you also spoke about the Soviet Union having an option to influence, either directly or indirectly, the course of events there. What do you have in mind by influencing the course of events directly or indirectly, their sending in military advisers or what?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Direct activities by its citizens, or by people under its direct control.

**QUESTION:** Can you tell us in a practical way what benefit does the average American get from detente?

- 3 -

PR 412

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, the benefit to the average American from detente is: first of all, a condition of absence of tension and reduced risk of war; secondly, the settlement of a number of outstanding political issues, such as, for example, the issue of Berlin; third, restraint in other areas such as the Middle East; fourth, an easing of the arms race. And in return, we have given up no American interests.

So the question of relaxation of tension is -- we should not delude ourselves -- an issue that will be faced by any administration at any period. The objectives that I have described are the interests of all Americans as well as all other people, and that is what we get out of it.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I understand that you have a meeting this afternoon with President of the International Longshoremen's Local 1410 of the Port of Mobile. What is the purpose of this meeting, specifically in relation to the ILA's national position on loading grain?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not have a separate meeting with --

**QUESTION:** He's involved in a meeting.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Whenever I make these visits around the country, I ask the local sponsors to organize meetings of local leaders. I do not select these leaders; I leave that to the sponsors, except that I ask them to be widely representative. It gives me an opportunity to find out what is on the minds of these leadership groups around the country -- this plus the question periods at the end of my speeches. The purpose of these meetings is as much to inform me as to give me an opportunity to express our views. So I do not expect to have a separate conversation with this gentleman or to get into the question of grain loading or any such -- this is being handled in Washington.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Kissinger, except for the Super K cartoons you have not been in political cartoons until recently, and you have been depicted as giving away the store in Helsinki. How do you feel personally about cartoons?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I like the first set of cartoons better. The second set of cartoons, I wish each newspaper would bring this to the attention of their cartoonists. (Laughter)

As I keep pointing out around the country -- my father, who clips the newspaper articles, does not clip the second type.

Now, with respect to giving away the store in Helsinki, I think it is important to get Helsinki in perspective. These negotiations have been going on for over three years. For at least a year and a half it has been known that in all probability that meeting would end with a summit. The conclusions were perfectly well-known. The United States was not in the lead of this negotiation, but it went along with its West European allies and the other 34 countries present there.

So suddenly there has started a debate on what? The recognition of frontiers? You ask yourself what frontiers? The frontiers in the Balkans were established by the peace treaties of 1946 and 1947, in which we participated. The eastern frontiers of Poland were established in Yalta, in which we participated. The western frontiers of Poland were established provisionally in Potsdam, in which we participated. They were finally settled between the Federal Republic and Poland in 1971. There are no unrecognized frontiers in Europe today. We did not recognize anything that has not long since been recognized by other countries or by previous American administrations. I think

- 5 -

PR 412

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Turkey has not yet ousted our forces. Turkey has prohibited our bases from operating. The Administration has repeatedly stated that the decision to embargo aid to Turkey and the consequent closing of our bases have a very serious effect on our national security--first, because these bases are the source of irreplaceable intelligence; secondly, because Turkey is one of the key countries in NATO: and thirdly, because the decision does not help the countries it is designed to help.

We have opposed this decision. We have appealed to the Congress to reverse it. We do so not to win an argument with the House of Representatives, the Senate having voted on the basis of our recommendations; but we think this is a matter of overwhelming national interest, and we hope that the House will reverse itself when it returns.

**QUESTION:** I would like to ask you a question concerning Turkey. There are about 3,000 Greeks in the Birmingham area, and recently they became very enraged about what happened and they wrote Congressmen and Senators. They are similar to other ethnic groups around the United States with a lot of influence. Regarding Turkey, what do you think of the influence or pressure put by such ethnic minorities?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I have been at the receiving end of this from various groups, so I have had direct exposure to it. I think it is inevitable that various ethnic groups will feel passionately about the interests of their ancestral countries. At the same time, it is also clear that the overwhelming majority of the representatives of these ethnic groups think of the interests of the United States. Even if we differ occasionally with their conception of these interests, their motivation without any question is the same as those of any other group that is concerned with American foreign policy.

On certain issues, it can happen that ethnic groups feel passionately beyond what would be our assessment of even the best interests of the country or group that they represent. This has been our view of some of the pressures from the Greek constituents. We believe that the best means of producing a settlement on Cyprus and of helping Greece as well as Cyprus would be to follow our recommendations with respect to the embargo because it would enhance our influence in Turkey. They have another judgment. But I think, in the nature of our system of a country composed of so many different ethnic groups that it is inevitable that these pressures exist, and I would not criticize them.

**QUESTION:** Just to follow up, if I may, to your answer to Mr. Kalb's question. If you do go to the Middle East and the issue of American presence in the Sinai is raised, are you suggesting now that you wouldn't be able to reach an interim agreement without coming back and getting Congressional approval first?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, we are not party to the agreement. But the parties would have to understand that it would require Congressional approval. And since there would be some period of time before such an agreement could be implemented anyway, we believe the Congress would act -- we would certainly ask the Congress to act expeditiously, but we will ask for Congressional approval before we actually encourage Americans to go there -- encourage, because we will not send anybody; it would have to be volunteers.

- 6 -

PR 412

**QUESTION:** Is it possible then that Congress could effectively veto an interim agreement in the Middle East?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** On the basis of the consultations that we have had, we do not expect that.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the Food for Peace program has not been labeled a magnificent success. How is it that agricultural sales to other nations are going to help our foreign policy?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, first of all, I would not agree that the Food for Peace program has not been a success. I think it has on the whole been a very substantial success. Agricultural sales to other countries in a world in which the disposition of commodities becomes one of the principal international issues can set an example for the manner in which other international commodities should be handled, secondly, if conducted on a long basis, can lead to a set of arrangements that would be of mutual benefit to the United States as well as to other countries.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, back to the technicians again. Just a month ago in Milwaukee you were considering either military or civilian technicians. What has happened to make you rule out military?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not remember that I -- I think you must have misunderstood what I said then. But whatever I may have said then, our policy is clearly the one that I have stated now. We are talking about civilians, volunteers, approved by Congress.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you spoke of the security and survival of the State of Israel. Is there any geographical configuration which you envision within which Israel's security and survival is in doubt?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We have not thought it wise for the United States to put forward a proposal on a final settlement, which we believe should be negotiated between the parties concerned and which must have elements of final frontiers matched by complete peace commitments on the other side. But I do not think the United States should draw these lines.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, thirty years after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki there is still criticism. Do you think it was necessary that we explode the nuclear bombs in populated areas to bring a quicker end to the war?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have learned in my time in Washington that, in making complex decisions, it is very easy in retrospect to draw certain conclusions when one does not know all the pressures that operated on the people concerned, and when the facts are clearer now than they were then. Therefore, I would be very hesitant to second guess a group of serious and concerned people with thirty years hindsight.

**SENATOR SPARKMAN:** Mr. Secretary, may I say just a word on that?

The Secretary was not there when that happened. That was 1946. I was there. I was in the House of Representatives. I was on the Military Affairs Committee. General Marshall, who was then Chief of Staff, as I recall, testified before the House Military Affairs Committee that dropping that bomb on Hiroshima, as much as it may have shocked us, saved probably a million American lives that it would have cost us had we invaded Japan. It prevented the invasion.

- 7 -

PR 412

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, sir, in your speech you spoke of those who use tough rhetoric and urge policies of deliberate confrontation. Since we are in Alabama in a political year now, would you include Governor Wallace in that group of folks?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have not read any of his recent speeches, but I would include anybody who uses tough rhetoric. I leave it to you to determine who that might be. But I think that anybody who attacks the basic policy should not only attack it but should spell out an alternative and indicate the precise implications of his alternative. I am not talking about individuals; I am talking about policy directions.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, I would like to return to the question of the Cuban return of ransom for a moment. It is apparent from the reports we have received down here that the State Department had only a marginal part in Senator Sparkman's negotiations. I was wondering if a possible explanation for this could be that there are recurring reports that the State Department, unless a matter has your personal attention, doesn't know what to do.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** First of all, this matter has my personal attention, so it is not a good example. Secondly, I am delighted by the result of this negotiation and by Senator Sparkman's role in it. Thirdly, with respect to the State Department, there are certain myths that are going to be repeated no matter what I may say or do. It will be repeated that I am secretive even though I am sure I have given more public speeches, held more press conferences and met with more Congressional committees than any Secretary of State before me.

It will be said that the State Department has no authority, even though I think most observers will have to agree that we have now the best group of Assistant Secretaries that has been assembled in decades, that they are known for their strong personalities, and that the best way to work with me in the State Department is to have strong views of your own. So I think it is absolutely incorrect. The thing that I hope will last longest of the organizational changes that have been made at the State Department is the quality, in a policy sense, of the people that are now in key positions.

Though the matter of Cuba happens to have my personal attention on top of it, I can operate as I do only because the Assistant Secretaries and the Under Secretaries are men of initiative and imagination.

**MR. JOHN W. BLOOMER, MANAGING EDITOR, BIRMINGHAM NEWS:** Mr. Secretary, I think it is time for me to speak. And I wish to express on behalf of the Alabama press our appreciation for your being with us, and particularly for your candid answers to our questions. I would also like to express appreciation to Senator Sparkman for being with us.

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. (Applause)

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

August 21, 1975

NO. 424

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLON
UPON SECRETARY KISSINGER'S ARRIVAL
JERUSALEM
AUGUST 21, 1975

Foreign Minister Allon:

I would like to welcome Secretary of State and Madame Kissinger, Mr. Sisco and their team upon their arrival after a long interval. It is self-understood that the time which passed since March to this day was not wasted. All parties concerned did their best to contribute their share in getting the political momentum revived. Everyone who is interested to avoid stagnation and to achieve progress towards peace - just and lasting peace - based on mutual interests of our neighboring countries and Israel, and since we are concentrating on a possible interim agreement between Israel and Egypt, everyone who is interested in that should really do his best to find out whether such an agreement is possible or not. Well, I was never good in mathematics, not good in mathematics, not to be too modest, and I cannot judge what are the prospects percentage-wise. I am afraid that my American friends are better in mathematics than I am, but somehow I have the feeling, and I think that I can safely (say) that progress has been achieved more than ever before. Nevertheless there is a lot of work to be done through the shuttle. We shall do our best to see to it that the shuttle will be crowned with success, because if such an agreement can hold and will serve the interests of Egypt and Israel and the rest of the world in which the United States of America is occupying a leading position, so welcome again and all the very best.

Secretary Kissinger:

Mr. Foreign Minister, thank you for your warm and generous comments.

I am very pleased to be back in Israel and at the renewed prospects for peace which have brought me here.

I left Israel last March with a heavy heart, fearing that still another horrible tragedy was in store for the people of Israel and the Middle East.

I return today with the same concerns but with renewed hope that a strong desire for peace will prevail over tendencies toward war. All parties have had an opportunity to reconsider their attitudes; sufficient progress has been made in the discussions during the interim to warrant a more intensive diplomatic effort in the days ahead.

(LC)

PR #424

- 2 -

President Ford has sent me here to provide the strongest possible United States support for progress towards peace and to consult with Israeli leaders on how best to do this in a manner which will protect Israel's security and maintain the closeness of U.S.-Israeli relations. Americans know first hand from five years in Washington Prime Minister Rabin's commitment to peace and his vigilance in protecting Israeli's security. Joined by Foreign Minister Allon and Defense Minister Peres, I can recall the conviction and firmness with which they conducted discussions last March. Now five months later, the gap in the negotiations has been substantially narrowed, by concessions on both sides. Israel's contribution reflects not a weakened resolve, but the conviction that Israel's strength, to which we have contributed and to which we shall continue to contribute gives it the possibility to dedicate itself to peace without fear.

There are still issues to be resolved, but with goodwill, patience and understanding on both sides it should be possible to bring to a close this phase of diplomacy in the Middle East with positive results serving the interests of both sides and the cause of peace in the area.

I know these are not easy times for Israel. The striving for peace carries with it exertions and responsibilities no less awesome than sacrifices for war. Every course has risks. Together with our friends, the Government of Israel, we believe that the risks of inaction are the gravest of all.

I know also that relations between Israel and the United States have gone through a difficult period. This has ended and we have emerged from our dialogue, strengthened in our friendship and determined to pursue common policies. Israel and the United States are bound together in common purposes -- a world envisaged in the charter of the United Nations -- a world in which the resort to force becomes unnecessary and disputes are resolved by peaceful means. Such a world is unthinkable without a secure Israel.

Peace in the Middle East depends on many factors and both sides must make a contribution. At the same time we know very well that one of the principal ingredients of peace must be the steadfastness of the American-Israeli relationship - a steadfastness that contributed decisively to the creation of the State of Israel -- a steadfastness which has helped protect Israel's security for over a quarter of a century -- a steadfastness on which Israel can rely in the future.

It is in the spirit that we will be conducting our discussions with your Governmental leaders, as equals joined in the common objective of achieving practical progress towards peace in the Middle East, as friends who only want the best for each other, as partners towards the goal which no people want more and deserve more than the people of Israel whose heroism and suffering have created and preserved their state through all vicissitudes.

I fervently hope that when I leave Israel we can both say with pride that our talks have contributed to the security of Israel, to the strengthening of U.S.-Israeli relations, and to peace in the Middle East.

* * * * *

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 22, 1975

No. 426

STATEMENTS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLON
FOLLOWING MEETINGS, JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

AUGUST 22, 1975

**FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON:** Well, it's too early to sum up the results of our talks but I can safely say that the talks were conducted in a friendly atmosphere typical to the atmosphere which used to characterize our frank and open friendly talks in the good old days. Secondly, during the conversations we had managed to achieve some progress clarifying certain important points which make me more hopeful. But still, as I said before, it's too early to draw any judgement about the final conclusions because the Secretary of State is just going to Egypt and I hope that when he comes back, we will be able to talk again about the same points and some others. We should be in a better position than even today. And so, the floor is yours, Mr. Secretary.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I agree with the remarks of the Foreign Minister. We spoke as friends in detail about all aspects of the agreement and all aspects of our bilateral relations and from the attitude that a close friendship between Israel and the U.S. is essential for the preservation of peace and progress towards peace. We clarified some outstanding points. I am now going to Egypt and plan to return tomorrow night to continue the discussions with an attitude of hope.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, Mr. Kissinger, how do you feel about the anti-Kissinger demonstrations?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, you forget that I come from Harvard and I am used to them.

**QUESTION:** Why aren't you going to Syria?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** (Unintelligible)

**QUESTION:** Why aren't you going to wrap up this agreement this week?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't want to speculate on this; I think both the Israeli negotiating team and we agree to move with all appropriate speed but I don't want to set any artificial deadlines. As for going to Syria, I definitely plan on going to Syria while I'm in this area. As of now we haven't fixed any precise time but I haven't seen any of the latest cables.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, will the clarification be made essentially by one diplomat in the US, or between Israel and Egypt?

-2-

PR#426

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They covered all aspects of all issues -- Egypt, Israel and Israel-US.

FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON: With your permission, I'll say something in Hebrew now but don't disturb me, please.

(Embassy translation):

We conducted today continued talks with Secretary of State Kissinger and members of his party. We had an opportunity to request clarifications and to examine chances and a number of significant subjects. I have to say that the talks were held in the friendly atmosphere which characterized the best period in our relations. At this stage, it is of course too early to predict what the final outcome of his mediation will be. However, I can say with confidence that today's conversation undoubtedly advanced us in the desirable direction. We have to wait patiently until Dr. Kissinger returns from his trip to Egypt and we can continue to examine points which we discussed today as well as additional points. For us and for the Americans, and I suppose the Egyptians, too, have an interest that the negotiations will not extend for an unnecessarily long period and efforts will be made to clarify whatever needs clarification and reach agreement to the extent possible within the shortest possible time.

* * * * *

U 221553Z AUG 75
FM USDEL SECRETA Y IN ALEXANDRIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 538
INFO RUQAD/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
NJEHLE/AMEMBASSY JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE
SUZHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
RUQMA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AT

LIMITES INPECIAL USE SECTO 10040

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: OVIP, KISSINGER, HENRY

SUBJ: SECVISIT: PRESS COMMENT BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR GENERAL SCAWCROFT AND NESSEN

1. DURING TEL AVIV-ALEXANDRIA' FLIGHT ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 22
SRAVELLING PRESS ASKED SECRETARY, IN CONTEXT OF DEMONSTRATIONS
IN ISRAEL, IF WE BELIEVED AGREEMENT WOULD APPEAR A BETTER ONE
TO ISRAELIS AFTER IT HAS

BEEN MADE PUBLIC THAN IT LOOKS NOW. SECRETARY AUTHORIZED
FOLLOWING ON-THE-RECORD RESPONSE:

QUOTE: IT IS AN UNDERSTANDABLE DILZXMA FOR ISRAELIS.

BUT WHEN SOME ISRAELIS LOOK AT THE WHOLE CONTEXT OF EVENTS
THEY WILL SEE THEM IN PERSPECTIVE. WHAT OBSCURES THE
DISCUSSION IS THAT AFTER THE BREAKUP IN MARCH, MUCH OF
WHAT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED IN MARCH WAS DOWN GRADED AND A
GENERALLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE DEVELOPED. BUT ONCE THEY LOOK AT
THE WHOLE CONTEXT AND THE ALTERNATIVES AND AT THE CONSEQUENCES OF
EACH COURSE OF ACTION, I THINK MOST ISRAELIS INCLUDING I THINK
SOME OF THE DEMONSTRATORS WILL REALIZE THAT AN AGREEMENT
IS IN THE LONG-TERM INTEREST OF ISRAEL."

THAT ISRAELI'S
STRATTEGIC SECURITY IS NOT WEAKENED, THAT ITS POLITICAL
POSITION IS IMPROVED AND THAT PROGRESS TOWARDS PEACE
HAS WBEEN MADE.

THAT IS MY CONVICTION AND I BELIEVE THE CONVICTION OF THE
ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM WITH WHOM WE HAVE WORKED
CLOSELY AND IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF FRIENDSHIP. UNQUOTE.

KISSINGER

SS-15

For public statements

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

August 22, 1975

NO. 428

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT
MAAMURA REST HOUSE, ALEXANDRIA
AUGUST 22, 1975

**QUESTION:** Are you going to have an agreement this week?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I don't know, I have just received the Secretary, I don't know, really.

**QUESTION:** What are the prospects?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, as I told you I am always optimistic, whatever happens, I am always optimistic.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, are you more optimistic this time than last time?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Up till this moment, I am optimistic like the last time. I don't have any conservation with my friend Henry, yet.

**QUESTION:** Can we ask the same question to Dr. Kissinger, are you hopeful again?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes, I am hopeful.

**QUESTION:** And the gap, is it still narrowing?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have the impression that there is still a gap, but that it is narrowing.

**QUESTION:** Is it a matter of procedure, Mr. Secretary, or a matter of substance in which there is still a gap?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think both, but, as I said, I have the impression some progress has been made.

**QUESTION:** Will you stay in the area until you finish this agreement?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That's my intention.

**QUESTION:** How long do you expect it will take, Mr. Secretary?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Why don't you let me talk to the President, or ask me after I talk to the President?

PR #428

- 2 -

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, please, what do you see more encouraging this time compared to last time? What's the new factor?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I think that this time we are starting with the gap much narrower than it turned out to be last time, and, therefore, while one can never be sure, I think the chances look to me hopeful.

**QUESTION:** Is it a technical gap or a kind of confidence gap?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I think there are a number of concrete issues which we have to talk over, but we have come some distance in the last three weeks and we'll try to come the remainder.

**QUESTION:** We can say the chances of peace are more than before?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I'd say the chances of peace are more than they were several weeks ago, but there is still work to be done.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you.

* * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 24, 1975

No. 432

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS WITH
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
HIS EXCELLENCY YIGAL ALLON
FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL
KING DAVID HOTEL
JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

AUGUST 24, 1975

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, are you making progress now would you say?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I had useful talks in Egypt and I reported about those talks as well as about my conversations in Syria to the Israeli negotiating team. We had a very constructive discussion this evening. As you know, the Israeli cabinet is meeting tomorrow, and after that we will meet again with the Israeli negotiating team. We will leave for Egypt probably first thing Monday morning.

**QUESTION:** How close are you to an agreement?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not want to measure distances, but we are continuing to make progress and the difficulties continue to be removed. We have encountered no unexpected obstacles up to now.

**QUESTION:** Did you wrap up some additional points tonight?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We went over some additional points tonight, yes. After the Israeli negotiating team has studied them, they will give us their answer tomorrow.

**QUESTION:** Where were the talks held this evening? Were they in Tel Aviv?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I tell you the truth I do not know exactly where they were held. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Would you please pursue your talks with President Asad?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think no, except we reviewed the whole context of negotiations and the problems of an overall peace settlement. I think you better take over (to Foreign Minister Allon).

**FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON:** The Israeli negotiating team and Dr. Kissinger and his colleagues managed to combine pleasure and business tonight. We had a good dinner and we talked. After listening to the report which

PR#432

-2-

Dr. Kissinger gave us about his impressions from Alexandria and Damascus, we could clarify further the problems that are connected with the possible interim agreement. And I couldn't but support what Dr. Kissinger told you just now that we are making progress, and every additional meeting brings us closer to hopeful results. But we had a brief meeting tonight and tomorrow after the weekly cabinet session we will meet again with the American team. We asked Dr. Kissinger to postpone his visit to other countries until we have had sufficient time to discuss previous points as well as the new ones. By tomorrow afternoon we will be able to continue our talks.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Allon, are you still talking about a three-year agreement? I mean is that still out in the open?

**FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON:** Well, I think this is a basic mistake using this terminology. I believe that the agreement will be valid until it is superseded by another agreement. These limitations of years are connected more to the problems of the renewal of the mandates but not of the length of the agreement. The duration is unlimited, namely that we shall make the effort to achieve a better agreement later on, so this will remain in power until its being superseded by another one.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did you raise the possibility of an interim as settlement with Mr. Asad in Syria?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We discussed the general context of negotiations, -- of various possibilities. But one interim negotiation is all that my colleagues and I are capable of handling.

**QUESTION:** Did you have the feeling that your talks with Mr. Asad would have any effect on the negotiations for an interim settlement in Sinai?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I had useful talks with President Asad. And I continue to believe that we can make progress towards a Sinai settlement.

**QUESTION:** Do you have agreement on American presence in Sinai?

**FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON:** We are still discussing it with America. It is an important item. There are a few remaining important items. We will tell you about them.

* * * * * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 24, 1975

No. 433

STATEMENTS TO THE PRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
HIS EXCELLENCY YIGAL ALLON, FOREIGN MINISTER OF ISRAEL
FOLLOWING MEETING AT PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
JERUSALEM, ISRAEL, AUGUST 24, 1975

**FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON:** Ladies and gentlemen, we had a very long and fruitful session today. I think a great deal of agreement has been reached between us and the mediators on the American team. I do not think we can go into details for the time being, but we did discuss tangible problems related to the possible agreement. I think the Secretary of State can take with him important information to Egypt, and we shall be looking forward to his return to this country as soon as possible.

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We reviewed those elements of the agreement on which there is not yet accord between the two sides, and the Israeli negotiating team gave us some important clarifications and ideas which we shall be taking to Egypt now. We will have talks in Egypt tomorrow, and I will return here either tomorrow night or Tuesday morning. We are continuing to make progress, and we have not encountered any unexpected difficulties.

**QUESTION:** Would you say there has been a substantial narrowing of the gap between the two sides within the past twenty-four hours?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Since we came into the area the gap has continued to narrow.

**QUESTION:** Do you think it is possible to reach an agreement within the coming days or by the end of this week?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I still do not want to speculate on the basis of a deadline.

**QUESTION:** Are you convinced that you can arrange an agreement between the two countries?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I said I am hopeful, and I continue to be hopeful.

**QUESTION:** Is the question of the early warning sites now agreed upon by both sides?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are making progress in that direction, too.

**QUESTION:** Do you expect to get the question of the American presence in the passes through the Congress?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** On the basis of consultation that we had before I came out here, we think that we will get it through the Congress, yes.

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

AUGUST 25, 1975

No. 435

COMMENTS TO THE PRESS BY
SECRETARY KISSINGER
ON ARRIVAL AT KING DAVID HOTEL
FOLLOWING MEETING WITH ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM
JERUSALEM, ISRAEL, AUGUST 24, 1975

**QUESTION:** Will you please tell us the results of the meeting tonight?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We had an extensive meeting going over the various areas that remain to be settled. We made further progress in narrowing the differences, and I will take the Israeli ideas on a number of issues to Egypt. We will continue our exploration --

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, do you think you have a deal at this point? Do you think it is all wrapped up?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I can not be sure because we have not actually started drafting anything yet. That will become clearer in a number of days, but we are making progress.

**QUESTION:** What are your expectations as of now?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I am hopeful.

**QUESTION:** That there will be a deal?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That there will be an agreement.

**QUESTION:** How many shuttles do you think it might take?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have no idea, maybe three or four more.

**QUESTION:** (Inaudible -- dealt with the problem of Umm Hashiba.)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not want to go through every problem. This was one of the problems that remain to be dealt with. Since I came out here we have made good progress in relation to it.

**QUESTION:** Have the Egyptians agreed to have American technicians man these listening posts?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** That is another issue on which we have made progress.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you.

********

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

August 25, 1975

No. 436

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
HIS EXCELLENCY ANWAR AL-SADAT
PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
AND
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE MEETING AT MAAMURA
ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT

AUGUST 25, 1975

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, are you satisfied with the progress of the negotiations?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** We have not yet started the negotiations with Dr. Kissinger, he has just returned this morning.

**QUESTION:** But he was here before.

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Yes, yes of course he was here before and we discussed a lot, and we surveyed the whole thing. I am waiting to hear, especially after the Cabinet meeting in Israel.

**QUESTION:** We understand there have been some exchanges while Dr. Kissinger was away. Do you say the substantial issues have been solved?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** There are still issues to be discussed.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, there was a report from Israel yesterday, that Egypt has pledged not to join in a war if it is launched by another Arab country. Can you tell us anything about that, sir?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well the Israelis have always been saying lots of things, and I am not ready to answer anything the Israelis say.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, what is your reaction to the demonstrations against Secretary Kissinger in Israel?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** It is purely an internal problem for Israel, but it is not for me to comment on this.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, do you see any problem in making public some of the things that both Egypt and Israel agree to privately?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, we cannot say privately, because the whole thing is in the hands of Dr. Kissinger, and I don't think like last March, if we

(LC)

PR #436

-2-

could have done the same now and then we come with nothing after that, it
is not in the benefit of both of us, the United States and us. We should
wait until we reach a certain point and then after that everything can be
said quite openly.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, is Egypt ready for an extended period of peace with Israel?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I don't know what you mean by "extended period of peace?"

**QUESTION:** Period lasting more than one year?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, this is something the Israelis say from their point of view, and we have our point of view, and as I told you it is not time yet to disclose all this detail.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, will Egypt make any secret promises to either the United States or Israel, or will all the agreement be made public?

**PRESIDENT SADAT AND SECRETARY KISSINGER:** (Laughter)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** -- [Inaudible]

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Nothing will be secret.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, how do you feel about the presence of American technicians in the passes to man early warning systems?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, I am discussing this with Dr. Kissinger.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, if you say that nothing will be secret, do you mean whatever Egypt might do politically, economically and diplomatically, will be publicly?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Quite right.

**QUESTION:** Can we ask Dr. Kissinger about his reaction to his talks, in both Syria and Israel?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** As your President has said, we are exploring all aspects of an agreement. We are making progress, but issues remain to be settled. In respect to Syria, I have stated publicly that the United States believes that overall settlement must include all the countries and all of the issues and I have also expressed the willingness of the United States to help any parties, including Syria, to reach any interim agreements that can be negotiated. I have expressed that same view to President Asad, with whom I had a very constructive talk.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, is it correct that you have agreed in the course of negotiations, to the retention of two early warning posts, one to be manned jointly by Israel and some American civilian technicians, and the other to be built, to be manned by Egyptian and some American civilian technicians?

PR #436

-3-

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** (Laughter) -- are you asking the question or are you doing the negotiation? (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** You have the choice of roles.

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** All this must wait until we [interrupted]

**QUESTION:** President, do you accept an invitation to visit the United States this fall?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Welcome, sure, sure, welcome.

**QUESTION:** Thank you Mr. President.

* * * * * * *

[LC]

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 25, 1975

No. 437

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
HIS EXCELLENCY ANWAR AL-SADAT
PRESIDENT OF THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
AND
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
PRIOR TO DEPARTURE
ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT

AUGUST 25, 1975

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, are we closer to an agreement this afternoon than we were before?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** We are working together with Dr. Kissinger. There have been as I told you in the morning, there have been some points to discuss, and we shall continue discussing them now before he leaves.

**QUESTION:** Did you say there is still a gap, Dr. Kissinger?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Until the agreement is finally signed, by definition there is a gap. My assessment is that the President and his associates, and my associates and I this morning, and then the Foreign Minister, the Minister of Defense and I and my associates this afternoon did good work and made progress towards removing some of the difficulties.

**QUESTION:** Have you determined the exact troop lines now in the Sinai Desert where the Egyptian advancement will be?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** If it is determined why should Dr. Kissinger return again?

**QUESTION:** Surely there are other points to resolve as well.

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Not yet.

**QUESTION:** Has anything unexpected come up, Mr. Secretary?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I don't find up to now any unexpected difficulties and I am satisfied with the talks we had here today.

**QUESTION:** How much longer do you think it will take, Mr. Secretary?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't want to speculate. We will move as fast as we can.

**QUESTION:** But do you feel that you will be able to complete it before your due date in New York?

PR #437

-2-

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would like to. The possibilities still exist.

**QUESTION:** Were you going over the text of agreements or just talking in general principle, Mr. President?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I thought you were asking the Secretary. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Are we down to wording of texts?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Not quite that precisely yet. But we are beginning to work on more concrete terms and principles.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, have you seen a draft of the proposed agreement yet?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** (Laughter) Not yet. Perhaps you have seen me reading some papers today. You thought that this is the agreement. No, it is a message.

**QUESTION:** Have you made some calls, sir?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** No.

**QUESTION:** [Inaudible]

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I left a number of assistants in Israel today to discuss some bilateral issues.

**QUESTION:** Did you do the same here in Alexandria, too?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, our Ambassador here, of course, is in daily contact with your Foreign Minister and when it becomes necessary I will leave some people here.

**QUESTION:** Do you still expect to come back tomorrow, Mr. Secretary?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I hope to come back tomorrow afternoon or at the latest Wednesday morning.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, you said when you first arrived, that there were matters of substance and procedures still remaining. Is that still your assessment?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** When I arrived in the area several matters of substance have been... very good progress has been made in respect to them and I think that they are [inaudible] in the area.

**QUESTION:** Will you still be visiting Saudi Arabia and Jordan?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Yes, definitely but my primary responsibility now is to see that I speed up the conclusion of this agreement. And I will fit in those visits and I am sure that the host countries will understand that.

PR #437

-3-

**QUESTION:** With regards to paragraphing of the agreement before you return to New York, has it been decided which country will paragraph it first?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** (Laughter) I don't think so.

**QUESTION:** Is it one of the outstanding issues?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think that is one of the most soluble issues.

**QUESTION:** Is there a possibility that you postpone your departure to New York?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, if necessary I will go to New York, deliver the speech and return to this area. We have placed great stress on that special session, and I have done a lot of work on preparing a program. So, in any event, I will present it and then come back here, if that proves to be necessary.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, do you think the agreement will be acceptable in the rest of the Arab world?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, why not wait until we reach this agreement. I shall be putting it before my people and before the whole Arab world, if we reach it.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, will there be a substantial increase in American aid to Egypt?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** We haven't discussed this yet. Not yet.

**QUESTION:** Would you like a substantial increase in American aid?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Sure I would like it.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, what is in the envelope? (General Laughter)

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I don't know yet, I have not looked yet.

**QUESTION:** Thank you.

* * * * * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

August 25, 1975

NO. 438

COMMENTS TO THE PRESS
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AND
ISRAELI FOREIGN MINISTER YIGAL ALLON
FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING WITH
ISRAELI PRIME MINISTER RABIN
JERUSALEM

August 25, 1975

**QUESTION:** Secretary Kissinger, may I ask you a few words about tonight's meeting?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I reviewed with the Israeli negotiating team ideas that were developed in Egypt. I think we are making constructive and good progress on all of the issues before us, and we still have not run into any unusual difficulties.

**QUESTION:** Do you still estimate that an agreement might be reached by the end of this week?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think there is a possibility of doing it, yes.

**QUESTION:** Are the difficulties now military, territorial or diplomatic as far as an agreement is concerned?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would not want to characterize what they are. They are all problems that were foreseen, that are being worked on and on which steady progress is being made. There is no deadlock on any issues at this moment.

**QUESTION:** What are your travel plans now?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My travel plans are to return to Egypt tomorrow afternoon. We will meet again tomorrow morning at 9:30, work during the day here and then leave from here for Egypt.

**QUESTION:** What about Egyptian troop advances beyond the present Israeli lines?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I have taken the position throughout that it is not for me as the mediator to announce the position of the various parties. This is all I have ever said on this subject. I think this is not a major problem between the parties at this moment. In fact, it is not a significant problem.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, would you characterize, if you would, the Israeli reaction in general terms to what you brought back tonight from Egypt?

PR #438

- 2 -

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I think the Foreign Minister ought to do that.

**FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON:** Well, Dr. Kissinger brought back from Egypt some helpful propositions which we have to study during the night and maybe we shall be able to discuss them with the American team tomorrow before lunch. As far as the question that you asked the Secretary about the line, I think I can be explicit on this. The Egyptians will be allowed to advance into the existing buffer zone while their forces, the limited forces, will take over this strip of land. There may be on change in the buffer zone when they will be permitted to go south along the Gulf of Suez a certain distance within the zone which, according to the original plan, should be controlled by the UN and administered by a civil administration by the Egyptians.

**QUESTION:** Why did you agree to that, Mr. Allon? Why did you make that exception?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Look, excuse me, I really do not feel that I can be part of the discussion now. If any such discussion takes place it should be ...

**FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON:** No, we are not going to discuss it. We will have an opportunity to do that in detail. Secondly, I would like to say that in addition to the work we have to do on the bilateral agreement between us and Egypt, there is some work to do about certain other papers between us and the United States which will be clarified tomorrow.

* * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 29, 1975

No. 446

REMARKS OF
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
TO THE PRESS
FOLLOWING MEETING
IN PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

JERUSALEM, ISRAEL

AUGUST 28, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** We are continuing a very painstaking examination of the agreement, its annexes. As the distance to be narrowed gets smaller, the adjectives with which to describe progress are more difficult to find. But we are working with a good attitude. We are working in a positive direction.

**QUESTION:** Will you be back here tonight, sir?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** It depends on my work in Egypt. If possible, I would like to be back tonight because of Sabbath, so that we can work tomorrow during the day and leave then for Egypt some things to be done on Saturday.

**QUESTION:** Do you expect to be back with a final draft agreement of the basic contract?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not want to speculate on that. But we are making good progress on that.

**QUESTION:** Would you say that the Egyptians now have to make an important decision on the bilateral agreement?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I do not think it is fair for me that always, when I go to the other place, that the other side has to make a decision by definition. I do not want to put pressure on either side by saying: now, it is somebody's turn to make a decision. There is a normal set of decisions to be made by Egypt, not unimportant ones.

**QUESTION:** Would you like to have all the aspects of the agreement initialed as one unit or could you possibly break it up into sections?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I would think that all the essential elements could be initialed together so that there cannot be a hold up later.

**QUESTION:** Did you have a chance today, sir, to discuss the tripartite agreement and these American-Israeli -- is that what you are basically dealing with?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Well, I do not like the word tripartite agreement if you are talking about the warning system idea that was discussed at great length.

**QUESTION:** Do you view the American presence in the passes as final yet?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Nothing is final until it is initialed.

* * * * *

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 29, 1975

No. 447

PRESS COMMENTS OF
PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT
AND
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE MEETING AT MAMOURA
ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT
AUGUST 28, 1975

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Life is going to be dull when this is over, Mr. President.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, do you expect this will be your last visit to Egypt in this shuttle?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I am certain I will be back in Egypt because in any event I will be visiting Egypt on my way out of the area.

**QUESTION:** President Sadat, the story as we understand it now is that there is a very good possibility that the agreement will be initialed either Sunday or Monday, more likely Sunday. Could you share with us please, Sir, your views on when you think the agreement will be initialed?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, as you said exactly, there is'a great possibility, but as to the date, I cannot say anything before I talk with Dr. Kissinger.

**QUESTION:** What are the hesitations on your part now, Sir?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** From our part?

**QUESTION:** Yes

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** There is no hesitation at all.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, could you tell us what effect you think this agreement will have on American-Egyptian relations?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** The significance of this agreement has many dimensions. It is not only on the relations between Egypt and the United States, but mainly it is paving the way towards peace. Its repercussions on the relations between Egypt and the United States will be very positive. But I assure you that our relations now are in the best shape.

**QUESTION:** Would you eventually like to get military aid from the United States?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I have told the Congressmen this quite frankly, that I shall be asking America to sell me (arms), yes.

-2-

PR 447

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, did you mean to imply in your response to the first question that this was your last negotiating visit to the area?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, I expect to be back in Egypt on a negotiation again.

**QUESTION:** President Sadat, are you getting any word or any vibrations out of Moscow as to how they see the negotiations proceeding?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Not at all.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, do you see anything in the remaining details which could halt the completion of the agreement?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** From my side?

**QUESTION:** Yes.

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** No. I do not see anything at all.

**QUESTION:** So then it is just a matter of time and detail?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** That is right, that is right.

**QUESTION:** Dr. Kissinger, are you going to Moscow after your trip to the Middle East?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, after this trip I am going home to deliver a speech at the Special Session of the General Assembly.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, can you envisage in your lifetime a direct meeting between high-level Egyptian and high-level Israeli officials?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, let us first reach this agreement, and end the state of belligerency at the end of the next peace process. And then, after that, we can discuss this, but not before that.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, what is the next peace process? Is that another interim step or will that be a final step?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I hope it will be Geneva.

**QUESTION:** Which will mean final?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** For the final solution.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, do you see any problems for the agreement, if there should be reservations in Congress to go along with the proposal for the one hundred or so civilian technicans to be stationed in the Sinai passes?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, it is a purely internal problem for you. It is not my problem. We must wait and see what will happen.

**QUESTION:** Would you have reservations with going ahead with the agreement if Congress did not approve?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Well, as I told you before, let us wait until we reach the bridge.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, can you tell us too whether you will be going to the United States to pay an official visit and when?

-3-

PR 447

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** If this agreement is completed, sure I shall be planning to visit the United States--soon.

**QUESTION:** Have you settled on the date?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Not yet.

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, if there is an accord do you envisage a date for when the Geneva Conference could pursue towards an overall settlement in the region?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** Not yet, we have not discussed this yet.

**QUESTION:** Will there be any American commitment, military commitment to Israel?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** No, there will be no military commitment by the United States as part of this agreement or related to this agreement.

**QUESTION:** (In Arabic) Mr. President, what are your views about the false news carried in the Arab paid press about the agreement?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** (In Arabic) This happened before during the first disengagement agreement, and this is not unexpected from those newspapers.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, there have been hopes in Egypt that this time when you come back you will in fact have brought word from Israel that the agreement is wrapped up. We are not quite at that stage yet. Is that correct?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** I will have to have a discussion with the President. It is an agreement. It will have several annexes and we are not yet at that stage where we can say the whole thing is wrapped up.

**QUESTION:** Mr. Secretary, the pace has obviously quickened, I understand you are going back to Israel tonight. Does this indicate that you are getting down to the wire on the agreement?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** Oh, it definitely indicates we are getting down to the wire.

**QUESTION:** Who will sign the agreement, Dr. Kissinger?

**SECRETARY KISSINGER:** My understanding is that it will be signed -- well why don't we wait and see (laughter) who will sign it.

**QUESTION:** Would the President know who will sign it, Sir?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** If Dr. Kissinger cannot tell you, how can I tell you. We did not talk. We did not have any discussions.

**QUESTION:** Yes, but you are a President and he is a Secretary. (Laughter)

**QUESTION:** Mr. President, do you believe that Israel has negotiated honestly and in good faith in this process?

**PRESIDENT SADAT:** I did not negotiate with Israel. I negotiated with Dr. Kissinger. And I can only say that Dr. Kissinger has been like he has always been before; has always been honest and tireless--really.

**THE PRESS:** Thank you, Mr. President.

* * * * *