I - 38

is not whether the United States would make a "deal" contrary to the
interests of its allies. It is rather that in an alliance of sovereign
states, each ally will think that it is a better judge of its interests
than any partner, however close. No country will be prepared to let
another settle what it considers its vital interests. As the detente
develops, only wise and restrained statesmanship can mitigate its
corrosive impact on North Atlantic unity.

Thus major structural changes have occurred in U.S.-European
relations which perhaps are exploited by President de Gaulle but which
have not been caused by him. On both sides of the Atlantic this has
led to ambivalence caused by a persistence of old attitudes in new
circumstances. It is always difficult for a country which has enjoyed
a hegemonial position to adjust to a loss of pre-eminence. Grown ac-
customed to finding its views unchallenged, it tends to identify its
policies with the general interest. A network of connections with
people accustomed to the relationships of dominance reinforces the

I - 39

conviction. The quest for autonomy appears as distrust; independance
seems indistinguishable from self-will. Why should a country want
freedom of action when its interests cannot diverge from those of the
dominant partner?

By the same token, countries striving to alter a relationship
of tutelage will be tempted to emphasize the burdensome aspects of the
existing relationship and to neglect its benefits. They will not credit
the motives of the senior partner and look for hegemonial designs in
sincere efforts to achieve a consensus. This process makes it difficult
to confront the central issue. Which Atlantic structure is more vital
in the long run: one that deprives all partners (except the United States)
of the capacity of autonomous action or one that grants the capacity for
autonomous action but seeks to reduce the desire for it? The answer
to this question will determine the shape of Atlantic relationships for
decades to come.

[N]

I - 40

V. Differences in Historical Perspective

Perhaps the deepest cause of transatlantic misunderstandings
is a difference in historical perspective. Americans live in an
environment uniquely suited to an engineering approach to policymaking.
As a result, our society has been characterized by a conviction that any
problem will yield if subjected to a sufficient dose of expertise. With
such an approach, problems tend to appear as discrete issues without any
inner relationship. It is thought that they can be solved "on their
merits" as they arise. It is rarely understood that a "solution" to a
problem may mortgage the future--especially as there is sufficient optimism
to assume that even should this prove to be the case, it will still be
possible to overcome the new problem when it materializes. When applied
to foreign policy, such an approach tends to consider division of labor
its own justification. Allies are considered factors in a security ar-
rangement; their utility is measured in terms of their contribution to
a common effort, whose criteria are often determined abstractly with

I - 41

each nation assigned a specific role with little regard to its history
or domestic structure.

But, Europeans live on a continent covered with ruins testifying
to the fallibility of human foresight. In European history, the re-
cognition of a problem has often defined a dilemma rather than pointed
to an answer. The margin of survival of European countries has been
more precarious than that of the United States. Each country—with the
possible exception of Great Britain—has known national catastrophe as
America has not. European reasoning is thus likely to be more com-
plicated and less confident than ours. Our European allies think of
themselves not simply as components of security schemes but as expressions
of an historical experience. Policies that neglect their sense of
identity may destroy the psychological basis of whatever common effort
is attempted to be organized.

This explains some of the strains in Atlantic relationships.

Americans tend to be impatient with what seems to them Europe's almost

I - 42

morbid obsession with the past, while Europeans sometimes complain about
a lack of sensitivity and compassion on the part of Americans. In the
fall of 1963, our newspapers were filled with derisory comments about
French maneuvers then taking place. The scenario of these maneuvers
supposed that an aggressor force was attacking France through Germany.
France's allies had surrendered. As the aggressor's armies were approaching
her borders, France resorted to her nuclear weapons.

It is, of course, easy to ridicule this scenario by contrasting
the small size of the French bomber force with the magnitude of the
disaster envisaged. But the crucial issue is not technical. It arises
from the fact that France has undergone shattering historical experiences
with which Americans find it difficult to identify. The scenario of the
French maneuvers recalled importantly--perhaps too rigidly--France's
traumatic experience of 1940, when foreign armies attacked all along
the Western front and France's allies collapsed. The British Fighter
Command remained in England; the fact that this critical decision was wise

I - 43

does not affect the basic psychological point. Moreover, the French
disaster came at the end of two decades in which France almost single-
hanedly shouldered the responsibility for the defense of Europe while
her erstwhile allies withdrew into isolation or offered strictures about
France's obsession with security. The nightmare that some day France
might again stand alone goes far deeper than the obstinate ill-will of
a single individual.

A comparable problem exists in Germany. Washington has at times
shown signs of impatience toward the German leaders and their constant
need for reassurance. Secretary Rusk has been reported more than once
to be restless with what he has called the "pledging sessions" which the
Germans seem so often to demand. However, insecurity is endemic in the
German situation. A divided country with frontiers that correspond to
no historical experience, a society which has lived through two disastrous
defeats and four domestic upheavals in 40 years cannot know inward
stability. The need to belong to something, to rescue some predictability
out of chaos, is overwhelming. The memories of our allies should be factors

I - 44

as real in the discussions of our policy-makers as the analysis of weapons
systems.

The importance of this difference in historical perspective is compounded by the continuing disparity in strength between the two sides of the Atlantic. While it has become fashionable to speak of Europe's new-found equality, it is important not to take it too literally. Europe has gained in strength over the past decade and a half. It can and should play an increasingly responsible role. But for the foreseeable future we are likely to be by far the stronger partner.

It is important to be clear about this because it requires that the United States show unusual tact and steadiness. Many of our allies have been guilty of unilateral actions far more flagrant than ours. But when we act unilaterally, disarray in the Alliance is almost inevitable. Sudden, drastic, and, above all, unilateral changes in U.S. strategic doctrine--whatever their merit--create a sense of impotence and are resisted as much for symbolic as for substantive reasons. Actions without adequate consultation--such as the removal of IRBM's from Italy and Turkey

I - 45

or the withdrawal of troops from Germany--increase the pressure for more autonomy. Bilateral dealings with the Soviets, from which our allies are excluded or about which they are informed only at the last moment, are bound to magnify Third Force tendencies. When our allies oppose such practices, it is not necessarily because they disagree with our view but because they are afraid of creating a precedent for unilateral changes in other policies. (Even statements of substantive disagreement may be a smoke screen for deeper concerns.)

Moreover, many allied leaders who have staked their prestige on U.S. policies can suffer serious domestic consequences if we change them drastically. This causes the voice of Europe to reach us in extremely distorted form. President de Gaulle sharpens all disputes and even creates them in pursuit of his policy of independence. But some other leaders do not give full expression to their disquiet because they do not want to undermine further the solidarity on which their security is thought to depend. Whereas France exaggerates her disagreements, some other countries obscure theirs. Thus the dialogue with Europe is often conducted on false

I - 46

issues, while real issues--like the future of Germany, or arms control,
or the role of tactical nuclear weapons--are swept under the rug in order
not to magnify the existing discord.

We, in turn, are faced with the problem that technology and
political conditions are changing so rapidly that no policy can be
maintained over an indefinite period of time. How to shape policies
that are responsive to change while maintaining the confidence of our
allies? How to develop a sense of unity from the diverse conceptions
of so many proud peoples?

I - 47

VI. Whither the Atlantic Alliance?

Nothing is more dangerous than the fashionable theory that all problems in the Atlantic Alliance have been caused by one man and that the major problem is to await his disappearance from the scene so that the traditional patterns can be resumed. No doubt President de Gaulle's style of diplomacy, which is not really compatible with the requirements of coalition, has exacerbated tensions. The United States shares the responsibility through too much insistence on technical solutions and too little allowance for intangibles of political judgment and will.

However, it would be a mistake to confuse these symptoms with the causes. Regardless of the personalities of the leading statesmen, a redefinition of Allied relationships would have been inevitable. Any new act of construction, moreover, would involve stress. The danger is that an attempt may be made to solve new problems by applying traditional concepts. There is a great deal of talk about "unity," "community," or "indivisible interests." But the issue before the West is precisely to give these terms a new meaning. Invoking the need for unity will not change

I - 48

the fact that American and European interests are not identical outside
of Europe. Inveighing against exalting national sovereignty only
emphasizes the contradiction of United States policy which has nationalism
as the most reliable bulwark against Communist domination everywhere
except in Western Europe. Proclaiming indivisible interests does not
solve the problem of how allied cohesion can be maintained in negotiations
with a suddenly multifaceted Communism. Slogans of integration do not
answer the question of how in the era of nuclear weapons sovereignty
can be related to community. Above all, the United States will not for
long be able to evade this issue of how much of its own sovereignty it
is prepared to give up.

Under the impact of the strong personality of President de Gaulle,
it has become commonplace to speak of the recovery of Europe's strength
and self-confidence. American spokesmen never tire of emphasizing the
folly of an excessive estimate of Europe's power while many U.S. policies
seem based on the assumption that European vitality will be permanent
and that the only obstacle to Atlantic cohesion is the traditional form of

I - 49

European nationalism.

However, de Gaulle's policy may have produced an illusion of European strength and self-confidence which is more a reflection of his personality than of underlying factors. If one moves from Europe in the abstract to an examination of the individual European countries, it becomes apparent how precarious Europe's recovery really is. On the Iberian peninsula, stability may not survive two aged dictators. Italy's center-left coalition is tenuous; its capacity for major policy initiatives is limited. Its policy tends to confuse maneuvering with statesmanship and in times of crisis may verge on neutralism.

A post-de Gaulle France may be rent by internal schisms. Germany suffers from the absence of traditions and the pressures produced by a divided country. The vigor so noticeable in Europe today is very close in time to nihilism; European self-confidence is still precarious. Little would be gained by replacing a nationalism of insufficient strength by a neutralism which exalts impotence. To avoid both dangers and to create a new and more vital structure is the challenge before the Atlantic Alliance.

I - 50

Justifiable irritation with de Gaulle's tactics should not obscure the fact that he has asked an important question which the West has yet to answer. There is merit in his contention that before a political unit can mean something to others, it must first mean something to itself. Though de Gaulle has often acted as if he achieved identity by opposing our purposes, our definition of unity has occasionally carried overtones of tutelage.

Every great act of construction was an idea before it became a reality. Immediate crises must not become an obsession. The nations bordering the North Atlantic require above all a vision of their future. Only then will discussions of specific remedies prove meaningful.

CHAPTER II

THE STRATEGIC DEBATE

I. Background: The Change in United States Strategic Doctrine.

Structural problems inevitably emerge as policy issues. Debates, which really concern political evolution, can easily appear as a strategic challenge to strategic doctrine.

So it has been with the debate about strategy within the Atlantic Alliance. To be sure, disagreements about strategy have been real enough. But their urgency is due to the fact that something deeper than the analysis of weapons systems is involved. Disputes have grown particularly intractable because the United States and its European critics have rarely talked about the same thing.

The United States has stressed the technical adequacy of its strategic views and the analytic accuracy of its strategic assessments. Our European critics have emphasized the political and psychological framework within which these decisions had to be implemented. The United States has reiterated its legal and moral commitment to the defense of Europe. Our European allies have less confidence in even the most solemn undertakings; too many of them have betrayed allies of their own not to be concerned that the stress of events might

[N]

II - 2

override obligations incurred years previously under completely different circumstances.

The sense of insecurity of most of our European allies reflected the one-sided relationship which had grown up with the Atlantic Alliance. In no other area was the dependence of Europe on the United States so great or so prolonged as in the military field. The pattern of United States-European relationships differed importantly between the economic and the military field.

With respect to European economic recovery, the United States, in effect, asked its allies to develop a common program and a method for dividing up the total available aid. Though United States representatives played an active and important advisory role, the basic scheme was European. This encouraged the emergence of a responsible group of European leaders, dedicated to Atlantic partnership and experienced in working without complexes with the United States.

In the military field the situation has always been different. Through-out the existence of NATO, strategy has been based on more or less unilateral American conceptions. The consultative role of our European allies has been

[4]

II - 3

confined in effect to the technical implementation of American views. In
contrast to the economic field, no specifically European concept of defense--
and no real sense of responsibility--developed. The West European Union,
which originally had been expected to play a role similar to that of the OEEC,
remained inactive.

There were many reasons for this state of affairs. Initially, our
European allies actively encouraged a predominant United States role.

America's hegemonial position seemed the best guarantee of our commitment to
the defense of Europe. We, in turn, were psychologically more heavily engaged
in the military than in the economic field. Heavy as the material sacrifices
required by Europe's economic chaos were, they could not compare to the con-
sequences of an eventual military occupation of Europe, which was rightly
considered a challenge to our survival. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the United States possessed a monopoly of the weapons on which by consensus of
the Alliance the common safety depended.

However valid the reasons, they brought about a relationship, which for
the long term could not be healthy. It was unprecedented that the defense of

II - 4

an area so rich and potentially so powerful as Europe should be the primary
responsibility of a country three thousand miles away and with a recent
history of isolation. On the part of our European allies this produced a
tendency to cling to the familiar as a guarantee of American constancy. It
undermined the European sense of responsibility. Our allies saw their role
as that of lobbyists trying to sway a decision not their own. The rigidity of
our European allies was inevitably a source of tensions because in the face of
a rapidly changing technology it was impossible for any strategic doctrine to
remain static. Had our allies considered the problem of strategy as a technical
issue, they would have been concerned not when we changed our views but if we
had rigidly clung to them in new circumstances. It has been a measure of
Europe's sense of dependence that the opposite has been the case.

The United States, in turn, fell into the habit of dealing with its
European allies, except Great Britain, almost psychotherapeutically. It
tended to confuse periodic briefings and reassurance with consultation and
to muffle expressions of concern, rather than deal with the underlying causes.
This is the psychological background for the strategic debate which has been
raging since 1961.

II - 5

The impact of the change of United States strategic doctrine in 1961 makes it necessary to sketch the views being replaced. When the Korean War first raised the specter of a Soviet attack on Europe, NATO developed the Lisbon goals which envisaged a largely conventional defense of Europe. These envisaged some 35 - 40 regular and some 55 - 60 reserve divisions for a total of ninety-six. It soon became apparent, however, that no European ally was prepared to make the sacrifices necessary to raise these forces.

At the same time, the advent of the Eisenhower Administration in 1953 led to a new defense policy--called the New Look--which placed much greater emphasis on nuclear forces. In 1957 the United States submitted to NATO--initially to the dismay of the Europeans--what came to be known as the Radford Plan. According to it, NATO was permanently inferior in conventional strength to the hordes of easily mobilizable Soviet manpower. To try to resist a Soviet attack with conventional weapons was to adopt a strategy that emphasized Communist superiority. The defense of NATO depended on nuclear weapons. Any attack on Europe would involve general nuclear war. The purpose of local defense was primarily to delay a Soviet advance long enough for the

[Y]

II - 6

effects of strategic nuclear war to make itself felt. Tactical nuclear weapons would be an integral part of whatever local defense might be attempted.

As a result, large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons were shipped into Europe under the so-called double-veto system which required the consent of both the United States and the host country for a nuclear weapon to be used. Moreover, the definition of "tactical" was such that SACEUR (The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) was to be able to destroy all Soviet weapons capable of attacking Europe. The nuclear arsenal in Europe thus included weapons of a range and destructiveness indistinguishable from some of those in the arsenal of the Strategic Air Command (SAC). They could be called "tactical" only in the sense that they were stationed in Europe and not in the United States and that they were commanded by SACEUR and not by the commanding general of SAC.

According to this strategic concept, conventional weapons played a minor role. Their function was to deal with minor incursions or to determine that a full-scale Soviet attack was taking place. Though there was some talk of a "pause" before nuclear weapons might be used, the logistic system of NATO made clearer than any public declarations where the real emphasis of

[Y]

II - 7

NATO strategy was. None of the conventional forces had supplies for more
than two weeks, and several national contingents had supplies for considerably
less than a week. In case of large-scale Soviet attack, nuclear weapons
would have to be used practically from the outset. "The pause," General
Norstad was reported to have observed, "will probably take place before the
outbreak of hostilities." In NATO doctrine, conventional weapons were the
"shield", nuclear weapons the "sword" of the Alliance.

Almost concurrently with the revelation of the Radford Plan in 1957,
the United States came to believe that it was inferior in long-range missiles.
In order to close this "missile gap," the United States pressed its NATO
allies to permit the installation of intermediate-range ballistic missiles on
their territory. It was argued that these were essential to the over-all
strategic posture of the West. The vulnerability of the sites was not con-
sidered decisive because the Soviets would not be able to launch a blow against
our European bases without an unacceptable risk of an all-out United States
counterblow and because a coordinated Soviet attack against U.S. overseas and
domestic bases might prove difficult to stage.

II - 8

These policies were drastically and suddenly changed with the advent
of a new United States Administration in 1961. Starting early in 1961 and
continuing with increasing insistence, the Kennedy Administration developed
a four-pronged strategic theory which has remained essentially unchanged under
President Johnson.

a. **Flexible Response:** When it took office, the Kennedy Administration found itself confronted by a strategy for general war which emphasized a single all-out response. The goal of general nuclear war, if it was forced on us, was to destroy the opposing society essentially in one blow.

The Kennedy Administration sought to replace this conception with a
more differentiated approach. It attempted to develop the maximum number of
options even for the contingency of general nuclear war--a strategy summed up
in the phrase "flexible response." This strategy was summed up as follows by
Secretary McNamara in 1962:

...our forces can be used in several different ways. We may have to retali ate with a single massive attack. Or, we may be able to use our retaliatory forces to limit damage done to ourselves, and our allies, by knocking out the enemy's bases before he has had time to launch his second salvos. We may seek to terminate a war on favorable terms by using our forces as a bargaining weapon--by threatening further attack. In any case, our large reserve of protected firepower would give

II - 9

an enemy an incentive to avoid our cities and to stop a war. Our new policy gives us the flexibility to choose among several operational plans, but does not require that we make any advance commitment with respect to doctrine or targets. We shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way, so as best to pursue the interests of the United States, our Allies, and the rest of the Free World. ¹

Administration statements about the purpose of this capability for flexible response have fluctuated and have not always been consistent. When criticizing the nuclear forces of Britain and France, Secretary McNamara has argued that the United States proposed to rely on a counterforce strategy confining its attacks to military targets:

> The United States has come to the conclusion that to the extent feasible, basic military strategy in a general nuclear war should be approached in much the same way that more conventional military operations have been regarded in the past. That is to say, principal military objectives should be the destruction of the enemy's military forces, not of his civilian population.²

Throughout 1962 Secretary McNamara insisted that the United States would be able to destroy the entire Soviet military target system even after

¹ Robert S. McNamara, Address before the Fellows of the American Bar Association, Chicago, Illinois, February 17, 1962. Quoted in

² Robert S. McNamara, Address at the Commencement Exercises, University of of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, June 16, 1962.
See also statement on RS-70, *The New York Times*, March 16, 1962.

II - 10

absorbing a first blow. Coupled with his stated preference for a counter-force strategy, this had to mean that the United States, even if it was the victim of a surprise attack, would still be able to destroy the entire Soviet strategic striking force. The corollary was, of course, that the U.S. would be able to overwhelm Soviet strategic forces, if it struck first for instance in a response to an attack on Europe. But if this assessment was correct, the purpose of a conventional build-up was far from obvious. If Soviet strategic forces were so vulnerable in relation to ours, a Soviet conventional attack on Europe was bound to be too risky. United States strategic striking power would continue to be the chief reliance of NATO strategy.

However, on other occasions, particularly when stressing the need for a build-up of conventional forces, Secretary McNamara has been less sanguine about the prospects for a counterforce strategy. He has argued that the growing size of strategic forces on both sides forced us to define more modest objectives than the original counterforce doctrine seemed to imply.

Thus in January 1964 Secretary McNamara testified as follows:

II - 11

... A damage-limiting strategy appears to be the most practical and effective course for us to follow. While there are still some differences of judgment on just how large such a force should be, there is general agreement that it should be large enough to ensure the destruction, singly or in combination of the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the Communist satellites as national societies, under the worst possible circumstances of war outbreak that can reasonably be postulated, and, in addition, to destroy their warmaking capability so as to limit, to the extent practicable, damage to this country and to our allies.¹

b. **Hostility to National Nuclear Forces:** Whatever interpretation of flexible response was dominant, the minimum requirement for it was a highly centralized system of command and control. This, in effect, was inconsistent with the existence within the Alliance of strategic nuclear forces not under United States control. Thus a great deal of the opposition to the British and French nuclear forces--especially within the Pentagon--was based on considerations of strategic doctrine rather than the political concerns of nuclear proliferation. Said Secretary McNamara:

> We are convinced that a general nuclear war target system is indivisible, and if, despite all our efforts, nuclear war should occur, our best hope lies in conducting a centrally controlled campaign against all of the enemy's vital nuclear capabilities, while retaining reserve forces, all centrally controlled. We know that the same forces which

House Appropriations Subcommittee, Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, 88th Congress, 2nd Sess., Part 4, pp. 25-28.

II - 12

are targeted on ourselves are also targeted on our allies.
Our own strategic retaliatory forces are prepared to respond
against these forces, wherever they are and whatever their
targets. This mission is assigned not only in fulfillment of
our treaty commitments but also because the character of
nuclear war compels it. More specifically, the U.S. is as
much concerned with that portion of Soviet nuclear striking
power that can reach Western Europe as with that portion
that also can reach the United States. In short, we have
undertaken the nuclear defense of NATO on a global basis.
This will continue to be our objective. In the execution
of this mission, the weapons in the European theater are
only one resource among many.¹

President Kennedy described the French nuclear program as "inimical" to NATO. Secretary McNamara called European nuclear forces "dangerous," "expensive," "prone to obsolescence" and "lacking in credibility." Under Secretary Ball has criticized these nuclear forces because "the road towards nuclear proliferation has no logical ending."

At first, these attacks were directed against the French nuclear
program alone. However, they logically apply also to the British strategic
forces which have been in existence for over a decade. Robert Bowie, one of
the most eloquent defenders of official nuclear policy, has made this

¹ Robert S. McNamara, University of Michigan, June 16, 1962, op.cit.

²
George Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility,"
*Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Summer 1964, p. 211.

II - 13

1. explicit. The provision of the Nassau Agreement, which permits Britain to use its nuclear forces at its discretion if "supreme national interests are at stake," has been strongly criticized. In short, the requirement of central control is interpreted to mean that strategic nuclear forces should be "integrated" in a way that forecloses the technical possibility of independent use: if the nuclear forces of our allies are to exist at all--and the clear United States preference is that they be abolished--they must be an adjunct to United States strategic forces and under what amounts to American control.

c. **Tactical Nuclear Weapons:** United States strategic doctrine has shown considerable ambivalence about tactical nuclear weapons--previously considered the key element of the military establishment on the Continent. On the one hand, the tactical nuclear weapons on the Continent have been increased--according to official Pentagon estimates by some sixty per cent.

1. Robert Bowie, "Tensions Within the Alliance: Atlantic Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1963, pp. 66.

______, "Strategy & Atlantic Alliance," *International Organization*, Special issue on the *Atlantic Community*, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Summer 1963), pp. 722-726.

II - 14

On the other hand, tactical nuclear weapons do not really fit into the
Administration's strategic concept. In the spring of 1961, Secretary
McNamara said that limited war in effect excluded the use of nuclear
weapons. "I think by 'limited war' we simply mean war that is carried on,
for the most part, with non-nuclear weapons. . . " The same theme was
repeated by Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric: "I, for one, have never
believed in a so-called limited nuclear war. I just don't know how you
build a limit into it once you start using any kind of nuclear bang."

If any nuclear war was likely to be general, it followed that the
strictures applied to national nuclear forces also applied to the tactical
nuclear weapons on the continent of Europe. Tactical nuclear weapons in the
hands of front-line units are extremely difficult to subject to the central
command and control envisaged by Pentagon doctrine. Moreover, they are too
vulnerable to serve as reliable second-strike weapons.

Robert S. McNamara, U.S. House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Department of Defense, Appropriations for 1962, Hearings 87th Congress, 1st Session 1962. (Part 3), p. 136.

New York Times, June 7, 1961, p. 9.

II - 16

future, it must be expected to be bilateral in any
theater which engaged the Soviet Union.

d. **Conventional Defense:** If European national forces were irrelevant or worse and tactical nuclear weapons overvalued, the major contribution of Europe has to be in the field of conventional defense. This argument has been pressed insistently. "The decision to employ tactical nuclear weapons," testified Secretary McNamara before the House Armed Services Committee in January 1963, "should not be forced upon us simply because we have no other way to cope with a particular situation."

The corollary was that the most desirable objective would be to resist a Soviet conventional attack with purely conventional means. Secretary McNamara added that existing NATO conventional capabilities were adequate to deal with any "major incursion." Nevertheless, he urged that they be strengthened to give us "capabilities for dealing with even larger Soviet attacks"-- in other words a massive, sustained Soviet offensive. This view was made explicit by Alain C. Enthoven a little later that year:

¹Department of State Bulletin, 9 December, 1963, XLIX, 1276, p. 917.

²Robert S. McNamara, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, January 30, 1963

II - 17

> We will have no sensible alternative to building up our conventional forces to the point at which they can safely resist all forms of non-nuclear aggression. Our forces will be adequate if we can never be forced because of weakness to be the first to resort to nuclear weapons.¹

The shift in emphasis of United States strategic doctrine was symbolized most strongly by the Nassau Communique which reversed the traditional concepts of "shield" and "sword" in NATO doctrine. In this unilateral change, the nuclear weapons became the "shield" and the conventional weapons the "sword" of the Alliance--implying that the United States envisaged an essentially conventional defense for Europe.

1

Alain C. Enthoven, Address to the Loyola University Forum for National Affairs, Los Angeles, February 10, 1963.

[N]

II - 18

## II. The Nature of the Strategic Debate.

The debate produced by this new doctrine was at first given a slightly unreal quality by the desire of all parties to maintain an appearance of unity. Thus when the Kennedy Administration early in 1961 sought to induce NATO to strengthen its conventional forces up to the thirty divisions agreed upon in 1957, our allies inquired whether the United States was reducing its reliance on nuclear weapons. We replied that the proposed build-up did not involve any reduced reliance on what had come to be called The Deterrent. On the contrary, the strategic striking force was being expanded and made more invulnerable. The non-nuclear build-up, far from diminishing the credibility of our nuclear power, would actually enhance it. According to official American statements, the NATO policy being promulgated was not news. We were simply asking our allies to live up to their previous commitment. The goal was flexibility of response.

1. Speech by Secretary of the Army Stahr to the NATO Parliamentarians Conference, November 13, 1961. Cited in *New York Times*, November 14, 1961.

2. Secretary of Defense McNamara, February 17, 1962, Speech to the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago. Cited in *New York Times*, February 18, 1962 and Department of State Bulletin

II - 19

This curious dialogue, in which a change of emphasis in United States policy was defended in terms of traditional doctrines of NATO, in many ways increased the uneasiness of our allies. The question was inescapable why conventional forces had to be strengthened if the reliance on nuclear deterrence remained unimpaired. If NATO doctrine continued to envision the use of nuclear weapons almost from the outset, did not the American effort to build up conventional strength involve a dual risk: Even thirty divisions would probably not be enough to stop a full scale Soviet attack. And such a build-up might raise doubts about the American nuclear commitment and thus might make aggression more likely. The result was a paradoxical argument about whether an increase in NATO's strength would weaken its over-all defensive posture.

Some thoughtful observers have argued that this was due to the over-emphasis on nuclear weapons in United States strategic doctrine prior to 1961. To the degree that the United States reduced its reliance on nuclear weapons our European allies would soon take a more balanced view of the strategic problem.

II - 20

The opposite is likely to be more nearly correct. As long as NATO
strategy was nuclear and the United States had no obvious alternative to
nuclear retaliation, the Europeans were ready to acquiesce in the hegemonial
position of the United States. They reasoned that this was the price to be
paid for the automaticity of the American response. However, one of the
essential characteristics of the doctrine of flexible response was that
American nuclear reaction would occur--if at all--deliberately and in stages.

The very qualities that made the new doctrine desirable for Americans were
bound for Europeans to raise issues of sovereignty and questions of how the
American commitment would be interpreted under the stress of nuclear war.

This, in turn, brought to a head a difference in perspective between the
American and the European conception of NATO which had existed since its
beginning. What gave the dispute its particular urgency was that the advent
of a new, highly analytical American Administration coincided with the growing
strength and self-confidence of Europe and the deliberate policy of President
de Gaulle to assert a more independent role.

The basic psychological problem was that throughout the existence
of NATO the military establishment on the Continent was seen in symbolic terms

II - 21

by the Europeans and in military terms by the United States. When the Korean
War seemed to indicate that Soviet aggression might be imminent, both sides
of the Atlantic made a serious effort to turn NATO into a more effective
military instrument. However, given the enormous disparity in military and
economic strength between the United States and Europe, the primary concern
of the European countries was to commit the United States to their defense.
They saw in NATO above all a means to obtain American protection, by which was
meant American nuclear protection.

However, the Europeans had too much experience with the tenuousness
of formal commitments not to strive for more tangible guarantees. This led to
pressures for the stationing of American troops in Europe. European reasoning
was similar to that ascribed to a French marshal in 1912 when he was asked how
many British troops he wanted for the outbreak of a European war. He is re-
ported to have replied: "We need only one, who we will make sure is killed
on the first day of the war." In the nuclear age, the price of a guarantee
has risen to something like five divisions.

II - 22

With so many American troops permanently stationed in Europe, it was
only sensible to try to give them some meaningful military mission. Even
during the period of the doctrine of massive retaliation, NATO forces were
larger than the prevailing strategic concept seemed to demand. Indeed, the
number was somewhat inconsistent with it. Dispite the United States commit-
ment to a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation, we constantly pressed for
a European contribution of ground forces. The Europeans, though they agreed
to a succession of NATO force goals, never really believed in the doctrines
used to rationalize them. Rather they considered their military contribution
a form of fee paid for United States nuclear protection. The Europeans agreed
to our requests. But they tried to see to it that their actual contributions
would be large enough to induce us to keep a substantial military establish-
ment in Europe, yet not so high as to provide a real alternative to nuclear
retaliation. They were opposed to giving the conventional forces a central
military mission; but they also resisted any hint of American withdrawal.

This ambivalence was brought into the open by the shift in United
States strategic doctrine in 1961. The American attempt to strengthen

II - 23

conventional forces had the paradoxical consequence of bringing to the fore
the issue of nuclear control which for many Europeans had always been the
crux of the matter. For the first time, U.S. strategic views were publicly
challenged, at first hesitantly, then ever more explicitly. Europe had now
gained sufficient strength and confidence so that the mere enunciation of an
American policy no longer guaranteed its acceptance. The pre-emptory way in
which the United States proceeded added ruffled feelings to substantive con-
cerns. And France added fuel to the flames by giving European misgivings
their most extreme formulation.

But, if French policy has deliberately sharpened conflicts, the United
States tendency to turn an essentially psychological issue into a technical
one has unintentionally exacerbated disagreements beyond their intrinsic
significance. United States spokesmen often leave the impression that dis-
agreement is due to the ignorance of our allies and that it is destined to
yield ultimately before extensive briefings and insistent reiteration.

But the real issue is not that the Europeans fail to understand the
notion of flexible response. They simply reject it for themselves. When

II - 24

the issue is Asia or Latin America, Europeans favor an even more flexible
response than the United States. With respect to the defense of Europe,
their attitude is more rigid. Europeans are likely to agree with the premise
about Soviet intentions which was offered by Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze
(then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs):

Communists demonstrate both a proclivity for bold political actions against a background of impressive military force and also careful calculation of risks and a staunch desire to keep events under their own control. Because they can be expected sensibly to avoid high risks of nuclear war or events leading to it, their military actions against the West at any one moment are likely to be controlled in size and aimed at limited objectives. *Emphasis added.* In such circumstances, NATO will surely wish to have the choice of avoiding immediate use of nuclear weapons; it would be neither wise nor credible for us to build our doctrine and our forces on the premise that every pinprick must be met by nuclear war.¹

The problem is that most Europeans refuse to consider an attack in Europe as
confined to limited objectives. If Secretary Nitze is correct in his view that
the Soviets recoil before a high risk of nuclear war, then a limited attack
in Europe is likely only if the American nuclear guarantee has lost some of
its credibility. The European reaction to this state of affairs is more likely

1. Paul H. Nitze, Address before the Cleveland Council on World Affairs, Cleveland, Ohio, March 2, 1963, Department of State Bulletin

II - 25

to be to provide themselves with nuclear forces of their own than to build
up conventional strength.

The American response has been to argue that a build-up of conventional
forces, far from weakening the resolve to use nuclear weapons, in fact demon-
strated an increased readiness to resort to nuclear weapons. Said Secretary
McNamara:

> If we have shown ourselves able and ready to engage in
> large-scale non-nuclear warfare in response to a Communist
> provocation, the Soviets can hardly misconstrue two
> things: first, that we regard this provocation as a chal-
> lenge to our vital interests; and second, that we will
> use nuclear weapons to prevail if this becomes necessary.¹

This estimate has left many Europeans unconvinced. There is no
question that increasing the reserve of conventional divisions in the United
States by three or four divisions does enhance the credibility of nuclear
threats for the defense of, say, South East Asia because it gives us the
means to commit our prestige. In Europe, however, where the United States is
already physically committed, a few additional divisions may appear as too

Robert A. McNamara, *Address before the Fellows of the American Bar Foundation, Chicago, Illinois, February 17, 1962.*

II - 26

little to affect the conventional balance and increase the concern about
possible American reluctance to face nuclear war in the defense of Europe.

But while European concerns were understandable and inherent in the
relationship which had grown up between Europe and the United States in the
strategic field, some reassessment of NATO doctrine had become inevitable by
1961. It was not in our power to avoid it. It would have been inexcusable not
to draw conclusions from the increasing nuclear forces on both sides. The
American failure was psychological obtuseness and the inability to realize that
this reassessment was bound to raise explicitly the issue of sovereignty which
had been muted as long as the United States possessed an effective monopoly over
the weapons considered relevant to the defense of Europe. The European
mistake was to attempt to ensure our constancy by freezing us into a posture
supervised by a new technology. The growth of Soviet retaliatory power and
improvements in its invulnerability made a reconsideration of NATO strategy
inevitable. The original NATO strategy was based on United States strategic
preponderance. Throughout the Fifties, the United States was in a position to
win a general war whether it struck first or second. It could destroy the

[N]

II - 27

Soviet means of retaliation at first at minimum, later at acceptable cost.

This superiority enabled us not only to prevent an attack on the United States but also to protect our allies by what amounted to a unilateral American guarantee. The Soviet Union did possess superior conventional strength.

But it could not use its ground forces because such an action might have triggered the Strategic Air Command. It could not attack the United States at the same time as Europe--even after it became technically feasible--because, while this would have increased American losses, a Soviet defeat would nevertheless have been inevitable. Throughout its history, the security of NATO thus depended essentially on the ability of the United States to destroy the Soviet retaliatory power--technically speaking, on the American capacity to conduct a counterforce strategy.

Any prudent planning for NATO in the 1960's was bound to start from the assumption that the utility of a counterforce strategy for the defense of Europe was bound to decline. Indeed, Secretary McNamara's statements in 1962 about the efficacy of a counterforce strategy, while technically correct, was misleading about the real state of affairs. It is possible to accept the

II - 28

statements of American defense leaders that the United States is superior in strategic striking power and intends to remain so. But the strategic and political significance of this superiority is certain to diminish. For the immediate future--as long as the Soviet missile force remains relatively small--a counterforce strategy may remain technically feasible. This situation should be treated, however, as a temporary respite permitting an adjustment to inevitable realities, not as an excuse for continuing to depend on traditional policies.

For one thing, if a counterforce strategy is to retain any chance of success, the location of the targets must be known in advance. This is particularly true of missiles, which cannot search for their objectives.

Given the nature of Soviet society and the vastness of Soviet territory, our knowledge of Soviet launching sites is likely to be incomplete. Moreover, the more sophisticated missile systems now in operation are dispersed, thus preventing one attacking missile from destroying more than one on the ground.

Also, many missiles are protected in hardened underground sites, thus requiring more than one attacking missile to destroy a defending one. Other missiles

[N]

II - 29

will be mobile or based at sea, creating the need for coordinating many dif-
ferent forms of attack. These factors will greatly magnify the force required
for a successful counterforce strike.

The constantly growing complexity of staging a missile attack is bound
to reduce the political utility of a counterforce strategy--perhaps even faster
than is warranted by purely military considerations. In the face of risks which
are certain to mount dramatically, it will grow ever more difficult to con-
vince political leaders that they should rely on a strategy based on intel-
ligence which is fragmentary and using large numbers of weapons for which there
is no operational experience in wartime. Even if the percentage of the opposing
strategic force, which we are able to destroy, remains constant throughout
the 1960's--an unwarrantedly optimistic assumption--the absolute number which
is left will rise. Thus, the Soviet capability to devastate NATO countries
in a counterblow will inevitably increase.

To pretend that these factors will not reduce any President's readiness
to initiate general war would be sheer irresponsibility on our part and a
convenient delusion for some of our allies. Even our best efforts will not

II - 30

prevent the credibility of a counterforce strategy from declining in the years
ahead. It will grow ever more difficult to convince the Soviets that such a
capability exists or that we are prepared to run the risks it involves. This
problem has been described by Secretary McNamara as follows:

> Fully hard ICBM sites can be destroyed but only at great
cost in terms of the numbers of offensive weapons required
to dig them out. Furthermore, in a second strike situation
we would be attacking, for the most part, empty sites from
which the missiles had already been fired.

> The value of trying to provide a capability to destroy a
very high proportion of Soviet hard ICBM sites becomes
even more questionable in view of the expected increase
in the Soviet missile launching submarine force. . . ¹

But if the United States was correct in insisting on the implications
of its new vulnerability, it was less sensitive to the political and
psychological implications of its new insight. When both sides possess
reasonably well-protected inter-continental missiles, the structure of NATO
as it has developed in the Fifties must alter. The traditional impetus to
alliance policy that the *immediate* risk of conflict was less than the ultimate
danger of facing a preponderant enemy alone is bound to erode to some extent.

Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearings, Military Procurement Authorization Fiscal Year 1964, 88th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 40-41.

II - 31

When nuclear war risks the lives of tens of millions, it is at least conceivable that the outbreak of a conflict will be considered the worst contingency by some allies. It is not necessary to agree with General Gallois that this condition ends _all_ possibility of the Alliance to recognize that it brings about a drastically changed situation. Ultimately, it should lead to a merging of sovereignty within the Atlantic area. But until this comes to pass, the age of mutual invulnerability of retaliatory forces and of mutual vulnerability of civilian populations is bound to require a serious readjustment of traditional Alliance patterns.

A gap has grown up between the technical requirements of the new strategy and the political realities of an alliance of sovereign states. The trend of the new United States military policy made the United States nuclear commitment depend less and less on the automaticity of military operations and more and more on a decision to be taken in the circumstances of the moment.

The United States tendency has been to try to escape this issue by maintaining that no difference of views between us and our European allies could possibly arise. But since the decision would have to be made under the unprecedented

II - 32

stress of nuclear war, the reassurance lacks persuasiveness. Instead, the
dilemma of sovereignty--of the unilateral right to change one's views--has
inevitably been emphasized.

The central command and control system which is the key feature of the
doctrine of flexible response is American. The United States would deter
mine--to the extent that the enemy cooperates--how and with what weapons the
war is to be fought and on what terms it will be concluded. The "hot line" is
in operation only between Washington and Moscow. To entrust the most fateful
decision any nation may have to make to another sovereign state creates
enormous insecurities side by side with pressures to change what must be
considered as an unnatural relationship according to traditional notions of
sovereignty.

The notion that this particular difficulty can be avoided by the build-
up of conventional forces has proved to be mistaken. This is well illustrated
by the concepts which have been used to justify the strengthening of NATO's
conventional forces each of which finally raised the nuclear issue simply in
another form. The purpose of the conventional forces was claimed to be to

II - 33

enforce a "pause" in military operations in order to permit the Soviets to "appreciate the wider risks involved." The ground forces, in other words, are supposed to define a "threshold" below which nuclear weapons would not have to be used.

These arguments inevitably raised questions about the continued validity of the American nuclear guarantee. If American nuclear superiority was unimpaired, a conventional build-up was unnecessary. If a conventional build-up did prove necessary, it must be because the nuclear balance had shifted against the United States at least relatively. The tendency by American spokesmen to try to carry water on both shoulders--to insist on the preponderant power of the American strategic arsenal and also on the need for a conventional build-up--added fuel to suspicions.

Moreover, it was at least questionable that at the end of a given period of conventional operations the Soviets would confront more clearly the wider risks of nuclear war--as official American spokesmen mentioned. If a full-scale conventional attack were to occur, the Soviets presumably would have discounted the threat of nuclear retaliation. A full-scale Soviet

II - 34

attack in Central Europe is hardly likely to occur inadvertently. But if the
attack did take place, why should our bargaining position be better at the
end of the period of 30 days (the usual target date for the build-up)--when
our forces would have presumably been decimated--than at the beginning? What
if at that point the Soviets offered to negotiate after having gained possession
of their prize? If nuclear war was too risky at the start of the conflict,
why should it not be even more risky when the local issue has in effect al-
ready been decided and when the devastation caused by a nuclear exchange may
make the local situation seem irrelevant?

If, on the other hand, it was argued that the Soviets would never dare
to defeat NATO's ground forces lest this trigger a nuclear exchange, what was
gained by increasing the number of NATO divisions? In other words, strength-
ening conventional forces does not avoid--and it may even sharpen--the political
aspect of nuclear control.

The same difficulty applies to the concept of a "threshold." This
was defined by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Roswell Gilpatric, as follows:
"The current doctrine is that if NATO forces were about to be overwhelmed by
non-nuclear attacks from the bloc countries, NATO would make use of nuclear

II - 35

arms.¹ This raised two questions: (a) Who determines whether the NATO conventional forces are being overwhelmed? (b) Assuming this determination is made, how are nuclear weapons then to be used?

With respect to the first of these issues, the question arose about situations in which NATO forces were simply pushed back without being overwhelmed. Was this then the threshold for nuclear war? What if the Soviets massed clearly overwhelming power in Eastern Europe but had not yet launched an attack? If nuclear weapons were useful to prevent this contingency why not others? Or it could be that in an otherwise successful defense, individual units of, say, division size would suffer setbacks. Given the dispersal of nuclear weapons in Europe to divisional levels and below, it was likely that the location of nuclear stockpiles and delivery vehicles would decide the question of using nuclear weapons. In short, the deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe has been inconsistent with the announced United States strategic preference. This raised doubts about what was a better key to United States

New York Times, June 7, 1961.

II - 36

intentions: the pronouncements of our highest defense officials or the
disposition of our forces?

Assuming, however, that it is possible to make a clear determination
that NATO's conventional forces are being overwhelmed, this only shifted
the concern back to the issue of nuclear control. If nuclear weapons were to
be used only when NATO forces were at the point of being defeated, what was
the sense in the nuclear establishment in Europe? If we assume that both sides
have tactical nuclear weapons in adequate numbers and sizes, it is far from
clear that the employment of these weapons would favor the defense at that
stage of a battle. After a breakthrough has been achieved, battlefield
employment of nuclear weapons may well favor the offense, whose units can by
then be dispersed while the defense has to move its units into predictable
areas. In short, if nuclear weapons are to be used tactically at all, it is
likely that the optimum, perhaps the only appropriate, moment is early in
military operations, or at least while the ground forces are reasonably intact
and Soviet reserve forces have not yet appeared on the battlefield. If
nuclear weapons are not to be used tactically, what is the sense of increasing

II - 37

their number in Europe? Failure to answer these questions--or to treat tactical nuclear weapons as merely a form of psychological reassurance for Europeans--guarantees a perpetuation of all insecurities.

Finally, in the debate over the level of conventional forces, Europeans were bound to be less restrained than they had been in discussions about nuclear strategy. With respect to nuclear weapons, the United States was recognized to possess superior technical knowledge and the advantage of more intensive studies. No such advantage is thought to exist with respect to conventional war. Rightly or wrongly, many Europeans have been convinced that American claims about the feasibility of conventional defense are exaggerated or at least too mechanical. For example, some United States analysts have argued that a sustained conventional defense is within reach, assuming that the offensive requires a superiority of about 3 : 1. This assumption, strangely reminiscent of certain French theories prior to World War II, cannot, even if valid, be applied so literally. The attacker does not require a three to one supriority all along the front. He can win by massing troops suddenly at a decisive point and overwhelming it. In conventional war, victories have very

II - 38

often been won when forces were roughly equal. (Germany, after all, achieved
its victories in World Wars I and II with numerically inferior forces.)

The stress on conventional defense also emphasized crucial political
factors. European history is replete with examples of the brittleness of
alliances. In too many wars—including World War II—the collapse of one
national contingent led to the defeat of all others. Europeans cannot forget
that an alliance can be no stronger than its weakest link. Whatever effort
individual countries may make in the conventional field, they will—if they
are serious about national defense—consider the consequences of the collapse
of one or more of their allies. This will turn their thoughts to obtaining
reinsurance, and, among the available means, some form of nuclear autonomy is
likely to suggest themselves.

This will be magnified by the fact that the choice between nuclear
and conventional war is no longer entirely up to the West. Whatever its
preference, NATO has to prepare for the introduction of nuclear weapons by

1. For a splendid analysis of this problem of the conventional defense of Europe see Bernard Brodie

II - 39

the opponent. Any war will be nuclear, whether or not nuclear weapons are used, in the sense that deployment--even of conventional forces--will have to take place in a nuclear environment. The risk of escalation can never be eliminated, and this, too, leads to pressures for independent nuclear forces.

The issue of conventional forces has been muted since 1964 because revised United States intelligence estimates indicated that Soviet ground forces had been vastly overestimated and that a conventional build-up was not necessary after all. (The fluctuations of U.S. intelligence estimates raised the question, however, whether they guided or followed American policy.) But it lasted long enough to make the issue of nuclear control one of the central unresolved problems of the Alliance.

In that debate, the United States made the error of treating the sovereignty of its partners as an unfortunate historical relic of no real significance for strategic planning. As long as the United States insists on central control over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance, as well as undiluted sovereignty, the European incentive is bound to be exactly the opposite of ours. Rather than permit a "pause" for "appreciating the wider risks

II - 40

involved," Europeans prefer to force us to make our response as automatic as
possible.

This problem has little to do with whether the United States could
afford to give up Europe. It is rooted in the nature of sovereignty and made
more acute by the destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Robert Bowie, one of
the most eloquent spokesmen of the dominant school of U.S. thought, criticized
British nuclear policy before the Assembly of the Western European Union as
follows: "Britain has retained its national command structure and the right
to withdraw them at its option. This means that they certainly could not be
counted on by any of the others to be available in case of need." (Emphasis
added.) If this concern is real regarding British nuclear forces, which are,
after all, assigned to NATO, it must be even stronger regarding U.S. strategic
forces which remain under exclusive American control.

At the same time, the rigid adherence to past doctrine on the part of
some European critics and the deliberate tendency of others--especially the

Proceedings of Western European Union Assembly, Ninth Ordinary Session,
December 3, 1963.

II - 41

French--to score debating points has not helped matters. The growing strength of Soviet retaliatory power was bound to affect a strategic doctrine based on the concept of Western nuclear hegemony. Whatever the validity of American strategic views, the tendency to treat established NATO doctrine as sacroscant is dangerous. European ambivalence is reflected in the demands for increased responsibility which are not coupled with an equivalent readiness to assume commensurate burdens. United States proposals for a strengthening of conventional forces have been treated with the same panic as later hints that some American troops might be withdrawn. Most Europeans do not want to give conventional force a larger role because they fear it will diminish the effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. But they also have resisted a reduction of United States forces because to many Europeans these represent the surest guarantee of American nuclear protection. It is just as difficult for Europeans to face the fact that, in the long run, these attitudes are incompatible as it has been for Americans to admit that increased emphasis on local defense is inconsistent either with United States hegemony on nuclear matters or with undiluted American sovereignty.

II - 42

The problem can then be summed up as follows: Exclusive U.S. control of nuclear strategy is politically and psychologically incompatible with a strategy of multiple choices or flexible response. The European refusal to assign a meaningful military mission to conventional forces in Europe is incompatible with the indefinite retention of large U.S. forces there. If the United States prizes a conventional response sufficiently, it will have to concede Europe autonomy in nuclear control. Or else it will have to move to an effective sharing of sovereignty. If the Europeans want to insist on an automatic nuclear response, a reconsideration of our conventional deployment on the Continent will become inevitable. Refusal to face these facts will guarantee a perpetuation of present disputes and increasing disarray within NATO.

II - 43

### III. National Nuclear Forces.

The already difficult issue of adapting NATO strategy has been further complicated by the United States onslaught on the national nuclear forces of its close allies, Great Britain and France. Great Britain, since 1951, and France since 1958 have been engaged in a program to develop nuclear capabilities under their own control. In 1954, an amendment to the McMahon Act made possible United States nuclear assistance to Great Britain. This corrected an inequity in the original law which, despite close war-time collaboration in nuclear research between Britain and the United States, prohibited cooperation with foreign countries. The provisions of the amended McMahon Act have never been extended to France. This discrimination has been a constant source of irritation in Franco-American relations--and would have been regardless of which government was in power in France.

1. Of course, the U.S. position was far from capricious. It was brought to a head by the proposal of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to replace his tactical aircraft with medium-range missiles. This seemed to many American officials to open the door another crack to nuclear proliferation. This problem will be discussed below. See Chapter IV, p.

II - 44

Starting in 1961 United States policy, which had been tolerant of the nuclear programs of its allies, grew increasingly hostile. The French nuclear program was described as irrelevant and harmful to the Alliance. The same criticisms, if more muted, were applied to the British nuclear program. The tension inherent in an attack on major defense programs of two close allies exacerbated the debate about other aspects of NATO strategic doctrine --particularly the role of conventional weapons.

United States opposition to the British and French nuclear programs took the form of the following major arguments: There was no strategic need for national nuclear forces other than those of the United States within NATO, since all significant targets were already covered by United States strategic forces. National nuclear forces were divisive because only distrust of United States intentions could induce a country to develop a nuclear arsenal of its own. They were wasteful and would divert resources from the conventional build-up which should be the primary NATO effort. They would promote nuclear proliferation. Just as France imitated the example of Britain, the argument ran, so Germany would follow the lead of France. Italy and other

II - 45

European countries would then not be far behind. Finally, it was argued that national nuclear forces would make impossible the flexible response which was the key to United States strategy for general war. National nuclear forces were too small and too vulnerable to concentrate on military targets. But if they struck population centers, the enemy in rage and frustration would retaliate against the civilian population of the United States.

Regardless of the merits of these arguments, they made a bitter, divisive debate inevitable. A full-scale theoretical onslaught on major programs of close allies impelled their governments to elaborate a doctrine to justify them, and this was bound to stress differences in perspective with the United States. The impact of United States views thus went far beyond the technical arguments in which they were couched. To ask a government to confess the bankruptcy of a policy which has been pursued for over a decade at heavy expense is to undermine its domestic position and to produce reactions of hostility. We might ask ourselves how we would react if an allied government publicly and repeatedly insisted that a major U.S. program is "divisive," "dangerous" and "useless."

II - 46

Thus United States strategic doctrine became involved in the domestic disputes of close allies. This led to a curious reversal of electoral positions within these countries. Groups, heretofore not noted for their interest in defense programs, began to use American arguments against governments which had until then been most responsible for close NATO ties. Those comfortable with United States views were often those who had in the past had neutralist leanings. They did not find it difficult to reconcile themselves to an American assumption of almost exclusive responsibility for their defense. Those taking the defense problem seriously were driven to one of two conclusions: ~~Either~~ the United States had to be prepared for a surrender of sovereignty similar to that it was urging on its allies. Failing this they were driven increasingly to demand some degree of autonomy in the nuclear field

Moreover, United States arguments, while presented against the background of great technical competence, suffered from a difference in perspective between us and some of our European allies. A capacity to conduct counterforce nuclear operations is likely to appear attractive to a country of

II - 47

continental extent like the United States. In densely populated Europe, the distinction between military and civilian targets grows more ephemeral. While not objecting to such a strategy as *one* possible option, our European nuclear allies see no compelling reasons to subordinate *all* considerations to what may well be a very remote contingency.

This is all the more true because United States pronouncements are postulating a scenario for general nuclear war that hardly appears as the most probable danger. In his presentation to the Armed Services Committee in 1963, as well as in 1964, Secretary McNamara described only *one* contingency for general nuclear war: a full-scale Soviet nuclear attack on the United States and (perhaps) Europe concentrating on military targets. The United States would then respond in kind.

But it is not clear what could possibly tempt even a rash Soviet planner into such a course or why the Soviets would pursue a counterforce strategy if they did. As long as the present disparity in numbers between Soviet and American strategic forces remains, there is no conceivable gain for the Soviets in launching a blow against the United States strategic

II - 48

forces. Even if every Soviet missile destroyed an American one, the Soviets
would have disarmed themselves while attacking and find themselves con-
fronted with a large residual American force.

If it is argued, however, that the United States would resort to a
counterforce strategy first in response to a major provocation, such as a
full-scale conventional attack on Europe, then it is far from evident that
the Soviets would have the incentive to spare United States cities on which
American doctrine seems to count. For the strategy outlined by Secretary
McNamara cannot be an optimum strategy for both sides. Soviet military

1

In fact, in his testimony before the Armed Services Committees in January
1964, Secretary McNamara has usually associated the defense of Europe
with tactical, not strategic, nuclear weapons should the conventional
forces prove inadequate. Thus, in his report to the Armed Services Com-
mittees in January 1964, Secretary McNamara said:

> "A large-scale Soviet attack on Western Europe . . . would be extremely dangerous to our own security and would compel us to respond immediately with whatever force was needed to halt the onslaught, even with tactical nuclear weapons, if necessary."

And a little further on, when discussing General Purpose Forces,
Secretary McNamara said:

> "(1) The forces envisioned in NATO plans for the end of 1966 . . . could hold an initial Soviet attack on the central front using non-nuclear means alone. (2) Until these requirements are met, the defense of Europe against an all-out Soviet attack, even if such an attack were limited to non-nuclear means, would require the use of tactical weapons on our part."

II - 49

theorists have consistently denied the possibility of the kind of war described by Pentagon officials. This would not be decisive were it not in accord with the realities of the strategic equation. For a war of attrition, even if it were technically feasible, cannot be in the interest of the weaker side. As the United States reduced the Soviet retaliatory force, the sensible strategy for the Soviets would be to begin attacking American cities, perhaps "controlling" their response by destroying some smaller towns first. To be sure, we could retaliate in kind. But whatever the significance of the notion of superiority in a war confined to military targets, there can be little doubt that a saturation point is reached relatively rapidly when civilian populations become the objective.

This is why the allies of the United States have been so unenthusiastic about the argument that national nuclear forces are dangerous because they are unsuitable for discriminating targeting. As has been frequently pointed out by Pentagon spokesmen, the Soviet delivery vehicles aimed at Europe far exceed in number those deployed against the United States. It has also been emphasized that even a "controlled" nuclear war would produce far greater

[Y]

II - 50

casualties exceeding the tens of millions estimated for North America. In
these conditions, the prospect of "controlling" general war cannot be an
incentive to the Europeans to give up their own nuclear programs; the
contrary is likely to be the case.

This is not to say that all United States arguments have been mistaken
and the attitudes of the defenders of European national forces have been
correct. The danger of nuclear proliferation is real though it may be doubted
that nuclear weapons would have spread to Germany simply by a kind of
logical extension of French arguments. Also, the French have not helped
matters by pressing their case with a Cartesian rationalism that sometimes
threatens to turn valid arguments into parodies. It is one thing to argue
the undeniable fact that in the age of nuclear plenty the old notions of
nuclear protection must be modified and that a redistribution of resporsnsi-
bilities on nuclear matters is required. It is quite another to insist that
this ends all possibility of one country's coming to the assistance of another.
Both sides have had a tendency to set up straw men for debating purposes: the
French, the bogy of our complete unreliability; the United States, the futility
of the French quest for complete self-sufficiency.

II - 51

The strategic debate between Europe and the United States on nuclear matters has thus had some of the attributes of what the French call "a dialogue of the deaf." Misunderstanding has been persistent because the two sides have spoken of different things. Frustration has mounted because within its framework both partners have been right. The United States has by far the better of the technical arguments. Efficiency is indeed promoted by a division of labor. On strictly strategic grounds, the United States doctrine is probably more nearly correct than the alternative of its European critics.

What the United States has overlooked is that NATO is not a single political unit, nor is it likely to be one in any foreseeable future.

The blind spot of the United States has been its unwillingness to face the political implications of its strategic views: an Atlantic area strategically integrated, as we propose, requires a merging of sovereignty far beyond anything proposed so far. It is impossible for the United States to demand that its allies give up what has, heretofore, been considered a chief attribute of sovereignty--the possibility of an autonomous defense--while the United States jealously guards its complete freedom of decision. The

II - 52

blind spot of America's European critics has been their reluctance to confront
the strategic consequences of their political views: that the present scale
of their national effort is inadequate for the role envisaged by them.

In this manner, the strategic debate is a symbol of a more central
problem: whether the United States is willing to move towards a real
merging of sovereignty. Or, failing that, whether the United States is
prepared to face an autonomous European center of decision in strategy and
policy and to rely on a political process to relate European purposes to our
own. If the United States is ready for either of these steps, much of the
frame-work of the current debate will be drastically altered. If not, the
dilemma outlined in this chapter is likely to continue. The United States
will be forced to suggest remedies which may temporarily obscure the issue,
only to have it reappear in more acute form later.

Of course, we may have no choice and Europe may become autonomous what-
ever our policy. Insofar as European developments depend on American
actions, however, it is important to realize that each choice has its problems
An autonomous Europe--whatever its internal structure--may become increasingly

II - 53

ready to differ with our views perhaps on a global scale. A Europe which
continues in the state of dependence of the Fifties may develop another form
of Third Force policy: based on the resentments of the impotent and the
manipulations of the irresponsible. The challenge to Atlantic policy then
is whether a responsible mode of cooperation, consistent with the self-respect
of all partners, can be devised. This is not primarily a problem of strategy;
it is, above all, a challenge to the political conceptions of the West.

CHAPTER V

THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

I. What Kind of Atlantic Partnership?

The fundamental solution to allied disunity must come from the political
field. Coordination of strategy cannot be effective without coordination of
policy. On too many issues where the vital interests of allies were at stake--
from Suez to the Congo, from Southeast Asia to negotiating tactics over Berlin--
the policies of the major allies have been unilateral or divergent. Unless
this condition is remedied, efforts to integrate military forces will only
emphasize the underlying problem of how to reconcile unity with respect for di-
versity, how to combine community with the need for flexibility.

Two solutions are usually given to these problems: (a) For the
immediate future an improvement in the process of consultation can ease strains
and revitalize the Alliance. (b) Ultimately a united Europe with federal in-
stitutions will make possible a true partnership among equals.

a. The Problem of Consultation

The inherently difficult problem of coalition diplomacy is magnified

V - 2

under present conditions by three factors:

(1) The firm commitment of the two superpowers to the existing balance provides allies with increasing scope for purely national actions.

(2) The internal workings of modern government are so complex that they create a variety of obstacles to meaningful consultation. Nations sometimes find it so difficult to achieve a domestic consensus that they are reluctant to jeopardize it afterwards in international forums. The United States tendency to confine consultation to elaborating its own blueprints reflects less a quest for hegemony--as our European critics occasionally assert--than a desire to avoid complicating still further its own increasingly complex decision-making process.

(3) As governments have found in their domestic experience, access to the same technical data does not guarantee unanimity. In an alliance of states very unequal in size and strength, and with widely varying histories, differences are almost inevitable. And they are likely to be made all the more intractable by a technology of unprecedented destructiveness and novelty.

V - 3

The American experience causes our policy-makers to be reluctant to admit that there may be objective obstacles to the process of consultation.

United States society, with its large area of consensus, encourages the belief that all problems are soluble through goodwill and a willingness to compromise.

A rationalistic streak produces a conviction that there are single, universally valid answers to most problems and that by getting the interested parties around a table, a consensus will emerge through the process of consultation.

Attitudes as these have their counterpart in Europe, particularly among those countries used to the leadership of a strong ally and content to confine their role to advice regarding the technical attainment of clear-cut goals.

They are especially common among individuals connected with the various European communities and commissions. Charged with the performance of tasks which are largely technical or the goals of which are very clear, they tend to believe that an intangible "community spirit" acts as the catalyst of agreement. This new, somewhat bureaucratized version of Rousseau's general will represents an attempt to conduct foreign policy by analogy to the domestic policy of stable societies. (i.e. within a commonly accepted framework.) Important

V - 4

However, when coalition diplomacy deals with political instead of
economic issues, it grows more complicated. Nations are interchangeable
units only to economists or to island powers. In any concrete situation, dif-
ferences in history, geography and domestic structure become relevant. Then
the analogy of coalition diplomacy to domestic policy breaks down.

In stable societies, domestic decisions tend to be accepted because
there is a consensus on legitimacy. Those who are overruled consider maintenance
of domestic order more important than any particular grievance; if that condition
is not fulfilled, violence erupts and domestic policy acquires some of the
characteristics and sanctions of foreign policy--in extreme cases it leads to
civil war. In stable societies those who are overruled retain the hope of winning
another round later or of influencing the implementation of the decision.
In democracies, there is always the possibility of changing the government.

In a coalition of sovereign states, these safety valves do not exist.
Legitimacy resides in the individual governments. Decisions require their con-
sent--this is the essence of sovereignty. Even when they agree to be bound by
majority vote--a rare occurrence in coalitions and not the case with NATO--

V - 5

their sovereignty implies the right to rename the treaty. In short, those who
dissent and are prepared to insist on their sovereignty cannot be bound inde-
finitely. Beyond a certain point the cohesiveness of an Alliance can be increased
only by a sharing of sovereignty and not by more intensive consultation among
sovereign units.

If fundamental differences occur among sovereign states which remain
allied, frustration is the inevitable consequence. Then partners are torn be-
tween the need to maintain an appearance of unity and the attempt to vindicate
their views. The difficulty of differing openly has the result that alliances
tend to regulate their internal affairs by means of a series of critical
confrontations.

The need to maintain an appearance of unity has at least three consequences: (a) It puts a limit on the pressure that can be applied to a recalcitrant ally. (b) Since agreement depends on the act of a sovereign government, its allies are tempted to mobilize domestic pressures on it, thus multiplying resentments. (c) It distorts the nature of the dialogue. Misgivings are sometimes subordinated to a facade of amity. Simultaneously--and somewhat contradictorily--a premium is placed on intransigence. Ruthless allies can use

V - 6

their partners' desire for harmony to impose a given course. But if this
happens too frequently, the result is that a dangerous build-up of frustration
occurs side by side with declarations of friendship. This has been happening in
the Atlantic Alliance.

Consultation, therefore, is far from a panacea. It is least effective
when it is most needed: when there exist basic differences of conception or of
assessment. It works best in *implementing* a consensus rather than in *creating* it.
Nevertheless, an improvement in the consultative process should be one of the
primary objectives of the Alliance.

In assessing the prospects, it is important to distinguish two types of
consultation: (a) functional consultation which concerns the implementation
of an agreed objective and (b) political consultation which concerns the defini-
tion of the objective or the reconciliation of conflicting interests.

The rationalistic bent of American policy-making and the dominant position
we have enjoyed in the Alliance cause many of our proposals for strengthening NATO
to amount to a form of functional consultation. The thrust of these proposals
is to create a structure which makes it physically impossible for any ally (except

V - 7

the United States) to act autonomously. The MLF is an example. Since its weapons
are American and since it can perform its mission only if used in conjunction with
American forces, consultation with respect to it must take place within the frame-
work of American strategic doctrine. Similar suggestions have been made in
Europe where it has been argued that some of our allies might give up some of
their national aspirations in return for a greater voice in Washington. For ex-
ample, some British Labor leaders have urged that Britain give up its independent
deterrent in return for more influence on American decisions.¹

In assessing these proposals, it is important to distinguish between the
situation of a political community involving an effective sharing of sovereignty
and consultation under conditions where each of the allies remains fully sovereign
but becomes an adviser to the dominant partner. If there is an effective sharing
of sovereignty, to include political as well as military decisions, a unitary
system of decision-making is inevitable and desirable. If the allies--and par-
ticularly the United States--insist on their sovereignty, however, it becomes
relevant to inquire whether a system of functional consultation is as useful for

¹ See Patrick Gordon Walker, "The Labor Party and Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, pp. 391-8.

V - 8

the long-term political vitality of the Alliance as it is for the conduct of
general war.

Any process of consultation must be responsive to the following questions:

Who has a right to be consulted? Whose voice carries weight? Who has enough competence?

These three levels are not necessarily identical. Many agencies in our
own government have a right to express their views, but not all carry the same
weight. When some of Britain's Labour leaders suggest that they want a greater
voice in our decisions in return for giving up British nuclear weapons, the answer
has to be: Like whose voice? Like that of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency? Or the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or the State Department? Or the Commerce
Department? In our interdepartmental disputes, clearly, the outcome often depends
on the constituency which the agency or department represents. The weight given
to advice is inevitably related to the competence that it reflects.

If the United States retains indefinitely an effective monopoly of nuclear
power, and freedom of decisions with respect to it, we would probably find in time
that Europe simply does not have sufficient technical competence for its views

V - 9

to carry weight. None of our allies would have an incentive to conduct the
studies required for effective consultation. This in turn is likely to breed
irresponsibility on both sides of the Atlantic. A right of consultation without
the ability to make a serious judgment may be the worst possible system. Over
a period of time it is bound to reduce Europe's voice in Washington; while within
Europe it must produce a sense of impotence or extreme nationalism.

In short, when the conceptions of national interest do not conflict or
when allies are prepared to accept a secondary role, functional consultation can
be useful. But in an Alliance in which each member--and especially the senior
member--jealously guards its sovereignty the crucial problem is to provide not
only a forum for the expression of a point of view, but also a focus for decision.
If that issue is evaded, coalition policy is reduced to the lowest common denom-
inator. Or else a vicious circle is set up with a sense of impotence on one side
and a "father-knows-best" attitude on the other. In such structures, difficult
decisions can be avoided or blamed on the short-sightedness, weakness or belli-
cosity of other allies. Tutelage, in other words, cannot be made a healthy rela-
tionship in the long run.

V - 10

American policy has been characterized by a profound ambivalence with
respect to this problem. In the field of strategy we have insisted on a unitary
system of command and control. With respect to East-West relations, the pre-
dominant tendency has been to deal bilaterally with the Soviet Union. For
example, American disarmament schemes have typically been discussed with our NATO
allies only when they were on the verge of being formally submitted. Finally,
the United States has enunciated a "grand design" of Atlantic partnership in
which the United States and Europe are to share equally in the burdens of world
responsibility.

This mixture of approaches is self-defeating. The emphasis placed on a
unitary strategic system for the Alliance has reversed the proper priorities. The
real challenge to the consultative process is less in the field of strategy than
in diplomacy. The ability to fight a centrally controlled general war is useful;
but the ability to devise common policies in the face of a whole spectrum of
eventualities is much more important. Most of our allies are less concerned
with nuclear operations than with their influence on diplomacy in peace time or
during periods of crisis. They consider joint planning and the conduct of day-to-day

V - 11

diplomacy important because major changes can occur through an accumulation of
seeming nuances. They are concerned with the development of diplomacy and crisis
management. They are interested in an agreed definition of what issues are to
be considered a _casus belli_. And they seek an opportunity to participate in
political control over any war which might break out.

Bilateral East-West diplomacy is inconsistent with the insistence on uni-
cary strategic control. Over a period of time such diplomacy will enable the
Soviets to appeal to each ally on the basis of the unreliability of the other.
Sooner or later our allies will protect themselves by initiating direct negotia-
tions of their own. When NATO has proved unable to develop even a common trade
policy toward the Communist world, it is not surprising that countries are reluc-
tant to entrust their survival to a NATO ally, however close. Policies on a
whole range of issues such as Suez, the Congo, negotiating tactics over Berlin
or the defense of Southeast Asia have been unilateral or divergent. The United
States is now in the curious situation of staking a great deal of its prestige
on establishing the NATO Multilateral Force and a system of unitary strategic

[Y]

V - 12

control while East-West negotiations for arms control are dealt with more or less unilaterally.

These inconsistencies are all the more disruptive because the United States finds its concept of consultation challenged within the Alliance for the first time. According to the American concept, influence in the Alliance is apportioned as in a stock company with the partner holding the largest number of shares having the greatest influence. Influence is an intangible quality, of course. However, to measure it entirely in terms of contribution to a common effort is much too mechanical. President de Gaulle with his disconcerting habit of cutting through slogans to the underlying reality has put his finger on the fact that among sovereign states influence is related importantly to the availability of options. To the degree that a country is known to be committed, other nations have a reduced incentive to pay a price for its cooperation. American influence within NATO decreased in part because our allies are convinced that they do not hazard our support to the defense of Europe if they disagree with our policy. And the influence of many new nations--weak, disorganized and confused as they are--depends almost entirely on the belief that they are still free to choose their side.

In short, a contribution, no matter how large, that is known to reflect
no significant range of options may not increase the influence of the contributor
significantly. A country can gain a major voice in an alliance of sovereign
states only if its effort is considered essential and if its partners do not take
it for granted--in other words, if the partners believe that there exists a
possibility that the contribution could be withdrawn. In determining an ally's
real--as opposed to its formal--role, one can do worse than inquire what its
choices are in case of disagreement.

Thus one of the points at issue between the United States and President
de Gaulle concerns conflicting conceptions of what constitutes influence. The
United States takes the view that since the interests of the Alliance are indi-
visible, each ally should play his role on the basis of a division of labor
within a plan developed by the United States. De Gaulle tries to demonstrate
that alternatives to United States leadership are possible because he considers
that this will enhance the bargaining position of France and of Europe. He relies
not on a legal right of being consulted, which in his view may not be honored in
a crisis, but on bringing about a situation where he must be consulted because
no settlement is possible without him.

Thus rather than discuss the mechanics of consultation, the United
States will have to address itself to the kind of future it envisages for the
Atlantic area. It will prove impossible in the long run to combine our pre-
ferred strategic doctrine with an unimpaired insistence on our sovereignty. If
we insist on our freedom of action while depriving our allies of theirs, either
NATO will fall apart or we will break the political will of our allies.

If it is impossible to envisage a true political community of the nations
bordering the North Atlantic, it becomes important to ask how unitary a system
of control for strategy and diplomacy is desirable. What kind of structure is
more vital in the long run: An Atlantic system that automatically involves all
its sovereign partners in every crisis around the world? Or one that permits some
autonomy? On many issues--particularly East-West relations--united action is
essential. With respect to others, some degree of flexibility may be useful.

Over the next decades the United States is likely to find itself increasingly en-
gaged in the Far East, in Southeast Asia and in Latin America. Our European allies
will probably not consider their vital interests at stake in these areas.

President de Gaulle's views on this subject are far from unique in Europe, even
if his methods are.

If the Atlantic system is absolutely centralized, policy may be reduced to the lowest common denominator. The Soviets may use our involvements elsewhere to blackmail Europe. This, combined with the lack of interest among Europeans in the issues involved, may strain the Alliance beyond the breaking point. On the other hand, if Europe is accorded some capacity for autonomous action--military and political--its concern would be no greater, but the temptation for Soviet adventures might be reduced. Put positively, a structure which permits a variety of coordinated approaches towards the new nations could enhance the vigor of our policies, the self-confidence of our allies and the long-term vitality of the Alliance. Paradoxically, the unity of the Atlantic area may well be furthered by a structure which grants the possibility of autonomous action while reducing the desire for it.

V - b - 1

B. <u>The Grand Design and European Integration.</u>

Since the war and with increasing emphasis since 1961, the United States
had argued that the most effective structure for Atlantic cooperation is a
partnership between the United States and a united Europe. Heretofore, coopera-
tion has been inhibited by the weakness and division of Europe. "When one
partner possesses over fifty percent of the resources of an enterprise and the
balance is distributed among 16 or 17 others, the relationship is unlikely to
work very well." Real partnership was possible only among equals.

As a result, American policy has often equated the building of an Atlantic
Community with the progress of European integration. This concept of Atlantic
partnership, strongly urged also by such wise Europeans as Jean Monnet, has
been described by the image of "twin pillars" or "dumbbell." Former Secretary
of State Herter wrote:

I believe the present Administration holds the view which
has come to be termed the dumbbell concept--meaning that an
economic and political alliance is stronger if it has been
agreed to by partners of equal weight on both sides.²

¹ Christian Herter, "Atlantica," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 41, No. 2, January 1963, p. 301.

² George W. Ball, "Toward an Atlantic Partnership," speech to the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia on February 6, 1962, DOSB, XLVI, March 5, 1962, pp. 366-67.

V - b - 2

The European side of this partnership is to be a United States of Europe organized on federal lines with supra-national institutions.

There is no doubt that the dumbbell concept represents one form of Atlantic partnership. The drawback of an excessive, almost doctrinaire commitment to it is that we run the risk of accepting the symbol as a reality. This may cause us to beg the key questions by the very terms in which we state them.

The single-mindedness with which the dumbbell concept is pursued obscures four fundamental questions which the United States must answer for itself if it is to make progress towards building an Atlantic Community: Is it true that partnership is possible only among equals? If it is true, what has been the real progress towards European political integration? To what extent is it in the American interest to promote one form of European unity to the exclusion of other possible plans? Will a Europe unified along federal lines inevitably see its world responsibilities in the same light as we?

Given the nature of America's relations with the rest of the world, it seems strange that partnership is possible only among equals. In the Western

V - b - 3

Hemisphere alone, we are trying to construct a viable system composed of nearly a score of countries very unequal in size and strength. And in every other part of the globe the precept that we can deal effectively only with countries of equal power is unlikely to inspire confidence in the prospect of cooperation with the United States.

Aside from its psychological impact, the proposition is open to substantive doubt. History would seem to indicate that the most difficult partnerships are those among equals. The advantage of shared burdens must be weighed against possible disadvantages created by the improved bargaining position of the equal partner. The increased difficulty of negotiating with a strong partner may well be a price worth paying; but we should recognize that it is a price we would have to pay.

But granting that a strong Europe is on balance in our best interest, it becomes important to inquire whether it is wise--both from the point of view of Europe and even more from that of the United States--to insist that there is only one reliable method of bringing about unity: that of federal, supra-national institutions. In the aftermath of de Gaulle's abrupt rejection of Britain's membership in the Common Market, a myth has grown up to the effect that the willful

V - b - 4

act of a single individual interrupted what would have been a uninterrupted
advance towards political integration. Britain would have entered the Common
Market, an "outward looking" Europe would have been constructed and progress
towards European supra-national institutions would have been constant.

However, no man could have single-handedly brought about the consequences
ascribed to de Gaulle. For de Gaulle's policy to prove so disruptive, signifi-
cant underlying factors must have been operating.

It was always somewhat unrealistic to imagine that the methods by which
economic integration had been achieved could be transferred automatically to
the political area. To question the automaticity of the development Jean Monnet
and his disciples have envisaged is not to deny their great contribution to
European unity and to the concept of Atlantic partnership. The fact remains that
their exaltation of what they call "community spirit" may have been excessively
mechanical. In their view, European integration will grow out of a "community
spirit" which in turn is being fostered by joint efforts. Expert judgment
undiluted by the blinders of national interest will move European political
integration forward, step-by-step, towards a final culmination where the
supra-national authorities are dominant.

[N]

V - b - 5

But this "community" approach--which equates method and purpose--works best when the objective is clear. It answers the question of how a common objective can be realized. It is much less useful in defining this common objective.

Immediately after the war, this problem was not apparent. Europe had been so shattered by the war that its immediate necessities seemed to exhaust the range of options open to it. Most countries on the continent had governments so weak or a past they were so eager to overcome--or both--that an abdication of some of their sovereignty came as a respite from uncertainties and insecurities. For many in Europe, an absorption in economic activity was a device to avoid facing seemingly insoluble moral or political issues. And the economic imperatives were so urgent that it seemed sensible to turn them over to supra-national experts.

As Europe recovered economically, political confidence returned as well. Inevitably this strengthened the traditional repository of European loyalties: the national state. This process took place with varying intensity in different countries. Germany and Italy, partly to escape the temptations of their past, were more ready to submerge themselves in a united Europe than

V - b - 6

Britain and France. Smaller countries, accustomed to being within the orbit of some major power, had less difficulty with a federal concept than those states which had been major powers themselves. France and Great Britain--whose sense of national identity was least damaged by the war--have consistently opted for a confederal, rather than a federal, solution. Four years before de Gaulle came into power, the abortive European Defense Community demonstrated that political integration was much more difficult to achieve than economic integration and was unlikely to be reached by the same methods.

Ironically, the success of the Monnet method in the economic field has complicated its applicability in the political realm.

Moreover, the European integrationists have advocated incompatible goals. They passionately wanted Britain in the Common Market; they were equally passionate in their advocacy of federal institutions. They have never explained how they propose to reconcile these two objectives.

But if de Gaulle cannot fairly be charged with being the sole obstacle to European integration on the federal model, he is responsible for completely confusing the debate within Europe in at least three ways: a) The debate between

[Y]

V - b - 7

the federalists and the confederalists has become a test of attitudes
towards de Gaulle, and the line-up is not a reliable guide to the state
of mind of Europe. b) Many who strongly oppose de Gaulle's style and domestic
policy are in agreement with him about the shape of Europe and, indeed, about
the tactics to pursue towards the United States. c) Many of the most ardent
advocates of Britain's entry into the Common Market are also dedicated proponents
of a federal Europe. Thus, opponents of European integration can combine with
dedicated advocates to advance sweeping schemes certain to be vetoed by the
French President. The result is to stifle the attainable in visions of the
desirable.

This confusion is compounded by the role of the United States. Though
American policy has ardently supported a federal Europe, its impact has often
been the contrary of what was intended. While affirming the need for European
unity, we have unintentionally tended to undermine a European sense of identity.

This is partly due to the fact that to some Europeans an Atlantic com-
munity based on the existing NATO states seems preferable to the dumbbell
concept. The smaller countries in particular see in European integration the
threat of the hegemony of powerful neighbors. If they have to choose between

V - b - 8

hegemonies, they prefer the leadership of a country three thousand miles away
and with a tradition of using its power with restraint.

Moreover, during the long period of American predominance, there has
come into being on both sides of the Atlantic a group of experts comfortable
with the existing relationship. Having worked well together for many years
they tend to see problems from the same perspective. Committed to the notion
that all problems are soluble through pragmatic, cooperative analysis, they
resist the implication that the capacity for pressure may be inseparable from
the political process. Thus, both in Europe and the United States many who
urge European integration balk at the prospect of an autonomous European policy
--which in turn is one of the likely consequences of European integration.

On both sides of the Atlantic many consider the quest for European autonomy
inherently divisive. They tend to put the issue in terms of trust of the United
States. They argue that they have more confidence in the United States than
in any of their neighbors. If United States policy is wise, European unity
will be unnecessary. If it is mistaken, an autonomous European policy would
only magnify the disaster.

V - b - 9

This attitude in particularly noticeable in the field of defense.

Were Europe thrown on itself, it would undoubtedly unite sufficiently to assure its security. It clearly has the potential to do so. But, having been sheltered for nearly two decades by American power, many Europeans are concerned lest the emergence of a European identity in the area of defense undermine the American guarantee. In times of crisis, Europeans are conscious, above all, of the need of American protection; in periods of calm, they have no incentive to undertake a joint European enterprise.

American pronouncements sometimes encourage these tendencies. The threat of the withdrawal of American forces has been used to obtain European support for American strategic views and even to sway our allies on essentially economic issues such as tariffs against American poultry. These threats have, on the one hand, inhibited a European quest for autonomy; on the other hand, they have encouraged some advocates of European unity to give their case an anti-American cast.

In short, there have been many reasons--besides the arbitrary decision of an individual--which have contributed to the slow progress towards European

V - b - 10

political unity, and it is a reckless policy which overlooks them. When Europe
was economically shattered and in fear of Soviet invasion, it was united by
common necessities and perils. But economic recovery has removed some
imperatives and the periods of detente have diminished the fear of foreign
dangers. Finally, American policy has been extremely ambivalent: it has urged
European unity while recoiling before its probable consequences. We have
sought to combine a politically integrated Europe with a closely integrated
Atlantic Community under American leadership. It is unlikely that these objec-
tives can be reconciled.

Official American doctrine assumes that the only reason Europe has not
accepted a greater share of world responsibility is that the scale of the nation-
state is inadequate for the requirements of the modern age. Once Europe is
politically integrated and commands adequate resources for a global role, it
will, so the argument goes, be prepared to assume world-wide responsibilities.
Indeed, one of the motives for European integration is often said to be the pos-
sibility it provides for assuming world responsibilities. Under Secretary of
State Ball has expressed the American view as follows:

V - b - 11

The problem will never be fully solved until Europe gets on further with the achievement of its own unity--until it organizes itself on a scale commensurate with the requirements of the age.

There are quite obvious reasons for this. The undertaking of world responsibility requires a world view. The discharge of such responsibility under post-colonial conditions must be based on the command of vast resources for defense and foreign aid--and on the will to use them. Western Europe collectively has more than enough resources, but a fragmented Europe cannot efficiently mobilize them in support of a common effort and a common view.

The implication is sometimes strong that the nature of world responsibility is self-evident. Thus, United States Ambassador to Germany, George McGhee spoke on July 16, 1964 as follows:

> This Atlantic Partnership entails increasing contributions in formerly remote areas like Vietnam and Central Africa from countries which, like Germany, have only recently acquired the ability to contribute.

American policy clearly considers that its goals in these areas are in the common interest and, therefore, beyond challenge; what it desired was a sharing of the cost.

1. George W. Ball, "NATO and World Responsibility," The Atlantic Community Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 2, (Summer 1964), p. 216.

2. George C. McGhee, "Some American Thoughts on Current Issues," speech on July 16, 1964 to DOSB, LI, 1310, August 3, 1964, p. 138.

[Y]

V - b - 12

But is it really true that adequate resources always produce a willingness to assume global responsibilities? The American national experience would seem to contradict it. Through the greatest part of its history, the United States possessed the resources but not the inclination to play a global role. Conversely, many European states maintained overseas interests when their resources were much smaller than they are today.

For many European countries the process of decolonization following two World Wars has been traumatic. These countries have been transformed from world powers into purely European states. Having shed their overseas interests, they no longer consider that their security is _directly_ affected by what happens in, for example, Southeast Asia. Rather than run the risk of nuclear destruction for a conjectural danger, they prefer to wait until the _actual_ danger materializes. In other words, they treat America's extra-European concerns in much the same way that the United States treated Europe's quarrels until 1941. Not so committed to the notion of ideological conflict as the United States, they are more likely to seek a measure of protection in equilibrium. To many of them, Communist China

[Y]

V - b - 13

is not a threat; it may even be seen as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

This problem is not eliminated by drawing distinctions--often moralistic in tone--between "responsibility" and "interest." Under Secretary Ball echoing many similar statements by others, including Secretary Rusk, has argued that:

> ...we Americans have few national interests--in the narrow sense--outside our own territory but we have assumed vast world responsibility...The willingness to accept world responsibility--as distinct from the preservation of national interests--is, in our observation and experience not universal among the NATO membership.¹

This distinction says a great deal about the American conception of foreign policy. By disavowing interest, our policy-makers try to demonstrate the moral foundation of our actions and indicate a commitment deeper than "mere" interest. For other nations, such assertions may cause uneasiness. A responsibility not butressed by interest may appear to them as subject to revision. It is conceivable to grow tired of a responsibility but an interest cannot be shed. To our allies, a "disinterested" foreign policy is an unreliable foreign policy; nothing in their tradition leads them to think in such categories.

Above all, the distinction misses the central point. The chief

1 George W. Ball, *op. cit.*, p. 215.

V - b - 14

reason for the reluctance of most of our allies to assume world responsibility
is precisely because in the past decade they have been obliged to give up
their global interests.

In other words, it is not likely that even a united Europe would
be prepared to assume a greater share of world responsibility in the
American sense. Nor is burden sharing likely to provide an impetus to
European integration. For burden sharing to become an incentive for
integration, the Europeans would have to agree with us about what is at
issue in most areas and they would have to believe that but for their
assistance the United States would curtail its commitments. Neither
condition obtains. The very commitment of the "United States to a global
role reduces the incentive of other countries to assume its burdens, much
as the commitment of Britain and France to the European balance of power
permitted the United States in the period prior to 1941 to evade the
problems of the international equilibrium. In any event, should our
European allies wish to carry a greater part of a common load, they may feel
that they can do so within the framework of the nation-state or of a

[N]

V - b - 15

fairly loose Atlantic community.

If partnership in burden sharing does not provide the incentive
some of our policy-makers expect, there is another impetus to European
unity: that of being able to vindicate an autonomous policy in a world
where only superpowers carry weight. This was the most usual argument
advanced by the Conservatives to justify Britain's entry into the Common
Market.

The old established European states are not likely to make
the wrench of breaking with their past for the primary purpose of
acting as junior partner in assuming burdens defined elsewhere. The
stronger Europe becomes, the less content it is likely to be with so
subordinate a role. This is not to say that a united Europe will
inevitably be hostile or even competitive; it does mean that one of
the motives for European unity is to acquire an *option* for an independent
policy. And the more Europe acquires the characteristics of a unitary
state the more this will be true.

V - b - 16

History teaches that the more abrupt the transitions, the more drastic have to be the efforts to re-establish some sort of cohesion.

A Europe which grows out of the collapse of all traditional loyalties would have as its primary problem the discovery of some specific purpose for its existence. There is a grave danger that too doctrinaire an approach to European unity will produce either a collapse of political will or, more likely, a new and virulent form of nationalism, perhaps even more intense than the nationalism of *patries*. A Europe constructed largely on theoretical models might be forced into an anti-American mold because its only sense of identity is what distinguished it from America.

It is hard to understand why many European federalists believe that a European Parliament would mitigate this danger. The decline in the role of the national European parliaments has been notorious. In no European country--not even in Great Britain--does parliament exercise an effective control over the formulation or the conduct of foreign policy. The party system has become so powerful that in European parliaments the majority almost invariably ratifies the decisions of the

[N]

V - b - 17

Cabinet. But where the party system is ineffective--either because the parties are weak or because there are too many of them--the result is paralysis of government rather than parliamentary control.

These conditions are likely to be magnified by all-European elections. The need to establish a consensus comprising Schleswig-Holstein and Sicily, Scotland and Bavaria will surely tempt demagogic appeals.

A parliament emerging from such a process of direct elections may be completely correlated to the calm deliberative body envisaged by so many European federalists.

This suggests the need to re-examine the passionate commitment of so many American policy-makers to one particular formula of European integration, that of supra-nationality. Jean Monnet's career has been a testimony to his devotion to Atlantic partnership. De Gaulle's career is filled with examples of abrupt tactics designed to exalt the status of France above all else. It would be one of history's frequent ironies if the structure for Europe proposed by Monnet would generate the greatest pressures for the kind of policy generally described as Gaullist, while

V - b - 18

the structure advocated by de Gaulle turned out to be best suited for
flexible Atlantic arrangements. Our bent for structural remedies sometimes
blinds us to the fact that institutions produce their own momentum which
cannot necessarily be foreseen from the intentions of their founders.

While the United States should welcome any structure that
reflects the desires of Europeans, it is not easy to discover the
specifically American or Atlantic interest behind our passionate commitment
to the "twin pillar" concept of Atlantic partnership. A very schematic
and rigid conception of Atlantic partnership can easily fail to do
justice to the richness and variety of relationships possible within the
Atlantic context. Is it really possible or useful to group the countries
of Europe on all issues? Is each always inherently closer to its European
neighbor than to the United States? If we separate the question into
political, military or economic components, is the answer always uniform
and does it always point in the same direction? Would it not be wiser to
retain some flexibility? The more rigid the structure within Europe, the
more complicated will be the problem of American influence.

[Y]

V - b - 19

There may be various roads to Atlantic partnership and European cooperation. The one traced by the Fouchet Plan--calling for institutionalized meetings of foreign ministers and sub-cabinet officials-- is not the least plausible, and indeed it is the one most consistent with British participation. It has the advantage that it would produce some immediate progress without foreclosing the future and thus put an end to the process of demanding the desirable in order to defeat the attainable. It would also permit a more flexible arrangement of Atlantic relations than the "twin pillar" concept. A confederal Europe would enable the United States to maintain an influence at many centers of decision.

In reassessing our Atlantic policy, it seems high time that we cut through slogans to such questions as: Is it wise to insist that the only road to European unity is by institutions unacceptable to both France and Britain? Is the best way to promote Atlantic cohesion by staking our prestige on a device--the Multilateral Force--which compels us to oppose the existing nuclear programs in Europe while bringing a host of presently non-nuclear countries (among them Germany, Italy, Greece and

[Y]

V - b - 20

Turkey) into the nuclear business, occasionally with only their
reluctant assent? Can it be in the interest of NATO, of the Federal
Republic or of the United States to make Germany the senior European
nuclear partner in NATO and to create an institution which can rally
all anti-U.S., anti-German and anti-nuclear sentiments against us?

Every European state was formed through some process of integration
during the past four centuries; and Germany and Italy achieved unity
less than one hundred years ago. European history suggests that there
is more than one way to achieve integration. In Italy, it came by way
of plebiscite and annexation abolishing the individual states. In Germany,
unification occurred under the aegis of one state but as the act of
sovereign governments which remained in existence after unity was
achieved. The resulting structure clearly did not lack cohesiveness.
History is rarely so linear and simple a process as some of the
enthusiasts for a particular form of European integration suggest.

European history demonstrates further that stability in Europe is
unattainable except through the cooperation of Britain, France and Germany.