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peace-keeping agency, set up under conditions in which peace is under
the least possible strain. Creation of such a situation must be the steady
objective of American policy, and unremitting effort toward that end is thus
indicated. This should be the real goal of "disarmament" negotiations.
Plainly the proposed 82 member committee on disarmament suggested by
the Soviet Union for the United Nations is not serious: the Soviet Union
will not be bound by the vote of Honduras, nor the United States by the
vote of Outer Mongolia, and speeches for home political consumption are
not likely to be helpful. Nevertheless contact on the subject of disarma-
ment should be maintained.

It is our impression that disarmament can not be divorced from
major political questions; progressive control of armament probably will
accompany progressive solution of major problems. The road is long.
Our feeling nevertheless is that it should be pursued in a constructive
spirit.

(c) Social structure and the "uncommitted areas."

We are clear that the interests of the United States, and indeed
of the West, are not vitally affected by the form of social organization
which any country may have or may adopt. The United States has little
interest in whether the Soviet Union or China adopt a "capitalist" form of
government and economic structure, or a "socialist" structure. The
theoretical battle between "capitalism" and "Communism" is essentially

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a sham. The United States and the Western World do have a vital interest
in a non-adventurist, non-imperialist, non-military and friendly Soviet
Union or China. It is quite conceivable that entirely normal, friendly,
or cooperative relations might be had between Communist States like the
Soviet Union and capitalist States like the United States. The presently
insoluble differences lie in two areas neither of which is necessarily
implicit in forms of economic or social organization.

First, and most important, there can be no accommodation between
the United States and a State which proposes to extend its economic
system by force of any kind over areas which do not want it. The greatest
objection to Stalinist Communism is not that it is socialist, but that it is
militarist-imperialist.

Second almost equally important is an attitude which can not be
ignored. The Western World will never achieve relations of full friendliness
with a country engaged in any system which involves and practices
continuous inhumanity to substantial parts of its population. No
accommodation of American national interest with, say, the Nazi Govern-
ment of Germany could have been possible as long as that government made
oppression and murder of Jews a part of its policy. Accommodation with
any Communist State, part of whose policy is to carry on a continuous
internal war, slaughtering, imprisonment or systematically oppressing masses
of individuals, is a psychological impossibility for nations like our own

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devoted to humanism. Genocide and other mass inhumanities set in motion powerful countervailing psychological forces common to the whole human race. These can not be confined by diplomacy.

These matters aside, the form of economic and social organization arrived at by any nation is not primarily an American affair, though Americans will naturally have their own opinions. Performance by any form of social organization and the condition of the people under it will eventually determine the outcome.

This observation has particular force in the so-called "uncommitted areas." These, covering vast populations in Southeastern Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, have widely varying cultural backgrounds, folkways, experiences of life. Within their respective countries peoples will work towards and presumably will eventually find forms of organization, political and economic, which fit their needs. The point of view of the United States is essentially not dogmatic but humanist. Our own way of life will be adopted by the rest of the world to the extent that, by its achievements, it commands imitation.

No part of the world does not desire some of the achievements of American civilization, particularly its productivity. To some extent this may involve political and social construction following American lines; but not necessarily so, and in some parts of the world, not possibly.

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The American position regarding the social systems of other countries should consequently be one of courteous detachment. It is peculiarly the business of the people involved. Obviously we cease to be disinterested if the social system of any country involves likewise a premise that the country holding it must at once become an enemy of the United States, giving it right to abuse American citizens, enter military combinations against American safety, and form part of an avowedly hostile world machine.

Broadly speaking, the American attitude towards the uncommitted areas should be one of friendly reciprocity. America desires to be friendly, she will be as friendly as her friendship is desired. At the moment, the United States and indeed the Free World has no interest in endeavoring to control the uncommitted areas. Certainly she has no interest in endeavoring to force help on areas which do not want it.

We suggest therefore a rather less anxious attitude towards foreign aid than has thus far characterized American policy. Aid given under threat that the country desiring it will otherwise go Communist is not "friendly assistance," but tribute. History suggests no instance in which the payment of tribute worked toward permanent solutions. Nor does this Panel see that, because the United States has done well with its own affairs, this entitles countries, avowing enmity to America, to insist that they somehow have a right to share in American assets. There is no such right.

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The policy of the "Good Neighbor," first announced by President Roosevelt, was not intended to be solely an inter-American doctrine. It was designed as guide for policy toward the entire world. The attitude thus projected was that America as a member of the family of nations respected herself and by consequence respected the rights of her neighbors, and as a good neighbor assisted where assistance could be productive in a community of friends.

This should be the American attitude towards the Soviet Union, the Communist countries and the uncommitted areas alike. One result should be disengagement from a contest between social systems, apart from their implications in international friendship and internal humanity.

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5. Possible Changes in Method: The "Collective Approach."

Analysis and support studies indicate that much wider use may be made of the new groupings so conspicuous on the international scene. These represent new instruments of political, economic and, to some extent, military power. They stem, as noted, from the fact that no nation-state is sufficient unto itself intellectually (because it needs the scientific and cultural resources of the entire world to keep abreast of twentieth century life); economically (since that wide element of international exchange is needed); and military (since, at a minimum, geography of other countries is required to defend any one). But it is clear that the precondition of using these new instruments effectively is a solid understanding of the needs and attitudes of the grouping within which the United States operates, and that much wider use must be made of a collective approach in the name of the group, in substitution for measures taken by the United States alone in the expectation that other countries will associate themselves with American action.

(a) Consolidation of "positions"

We are of opinion that immediate and continued attention to consolidation of groups to which the United States is permanently committed is a present essential.

Deterioration in the solidarity of such groups is apparent. The Suez crisis in 1956 made apparent, rather than caused, growing tension in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Successive votes in United Nations Assemblies

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indicate a like deterioration in the Organization of American States. These
are the two political groups to which the United States is most firmly com-
mitted, and to which attention is here directed. The principle involved is
equally applicable to the newer, less firmly established groups, such as the
SEATO and, to some extent, the Baghdad Pact countries.

Historically, the United States has been committed to an inter-
American group for nearly seventy years. The Treaty of Rio de Janeiro and the
Charter of Bogota are the two primary instruments presently operating though
there are a number of others. NATO is essentially a carry-forward alliance
from World War II, but built into a post-war system by the North Atlantic
Treaty of April 4, 1949. Within both there are sub-groups. Thus the Caribbean
Commission overlaps the hemisphere defense area though the United States is
the only member of the Organization of American States which likewise partici-
pates in the Caribbean Commission. Again NATO includes the Council of
Europe (created May 5, 1949) though the United States and a number of other
NATO members (for example, Turkey and Greece) are not members of it.

We do not here discuss the relative priority of American interest in
these two principal groups, the European (the Atlantic system) and the inter-
American (the hemispheric system). Both are essential to the safety and well-
being of the United States as a nation and to the realization of its objectives.
Neither without the other would really be safe. Conversely, no State within
either group under present conditions has any real chance of maintaining itself
as an independent nation except as member of one or other of these groups.

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The high degree of interdependence of these two groups appears not to be generally recognized. Yet the fact was that the inter-American group of nations from the days of the Monroe Doctrine was held together not merely by the power of the United States in conjunction with the lesser power of the other American republics, but also because British policy moved with American policy in maintaining the integrity of the hemisphere. Conversely, the Western European complex has been restored twice by the strength of the American hemisphere; but in order to do it the United States had to be able, and was able, to draw on the resources of all the nations of the hemisphere. These resources are more necessary for European defense and economy today than they were during World War II. Without South American oil, copper, rubber and manganese, for example, Western Europe and the United States (lacking adequate oil) would be at the mercy of the unsolved Middle Eastern situation and (lacking uranium and copper) of the slowly deteriorating African complex.
Maintenance of both groups in first-rate working order is thus a prime political interest of the United States and of every member of both groups.

(b) The inter-American Group

Rifts appearing in the inter-American group are due partly to failure of political communication (here considered) and partly to unsolved economic problems (dealt with in a later section of this chapter).

Failure of political communication appears to result from two observ-
able factors, though unquestionably other elements enter. The first is that

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there has been too little advance consultation with members of the inter-American group in respect of American policy, and this despite the fact that in the event of discussion in the United Nations, the votes of the inter-American States are essential, and their acquiescence in policy decisions unilaterally taken by the United States may have much to do with the success or failure of such decisions. In part, the familiar Latin American complaints stem from wounded pride; but in greater part they are based on our realization that in situations like the dispute over Algeria or reorganization of the Middle East their safety is at hazard while their views are not sought and not considered. Thus, though the Organization of American States which includes the United States presumably acts together, there is now a "Latin American bloc" which caucuses without the United States. Failure here is not mechanical: inter-American agreements for consultation in matters of common interest are probably the most complete in existence. What can not be covered through normal diplomatic channels (the State Department to Embassy, or Embassy to Latin American government) could be covered by the informal consultation through the Secretary of State or his Undersecretary and the equivalent officials in Latin American countries either in formal meetings or informally by telephone. The agreements contemplate an intimate and continuous discussion of intention of policy. These arrangements are not used. What has actually occurred is a relegation of communication with this group to a sub-office of the Department of State which has trouble enough in communicating with top policy makers. The result is a general impression that when major

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matters are decided the Latin American republics will later receive their orders at an appropriate time. This has made it easy for anti-American political elements in the hemisphere either to use Communist "anti-imperialist" slogans, against the United States or to develop equally dangerous national-ist attitudes whose absolutes are thus given some color of justification.

Breakdown of communication appears not to be due to lack of personnel in the respective countries. If anything, there are too many to be really useful. Twenty men in an Embassy who do live in the country rather than in the diplomatic and governmental world, who do speak the language, who do know the personalities, institutions and thought-currents of the country are far more effective than ten times that number engaged in specialized tasks but with little general acquaintance.

Many decisions of policy and presentation of them in the United Nations or elsewhere would be strengthened if presentation were made not merely in the name of the United States, but in the name of a solid hemispheric group. For example, the whole issue of colonialism in respect to which Latin American feelings are lively should be frankly discussed with the other American Republics and a common approach agreed on.

Taken as a whole, over the past quarter century the American policy towards the hemisphere group has probably been intrinsically cooperative and its actions factually generous. Failure to maintain actual intellectual and political contact, and to achieve common understanding, failure to think with our American associates has nullified much of the solidarity which should have

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resulted. Yet this solidarity is an essential interest of the United States and
of all concerned.

(c) The NATO Group

Deterioration of the NATO group is a more complex problem. It must
be considered along with the growing movement toward West European union.

NATO came into existence primarily as an agreement for mutual defense. The treaty actually can be reviewed on the motion of any member in 1959. Its solidarity has increased or deteriorated as the direct Russian threat waxed or waned. In addition to its primary defensive aim, Art. 2 proposes that the parties shall promote conditions of stability and well-being, eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and encourage collaboration between any or all of them.

Underlying, and necessarily affecting NATO now is the powerful
drive towards a substantial union of Western Europe.

Vague political outline for a union of Western Europe was given by
the Statute of the Council of Europe, (May 5, 1949) and the setting up of a
Committee of Ministers and of a Consultative Assembly with an appropriate
secretariat. For some years the government of the United States virtually
ignored this group. More recently, this has been rectified to some extent.
It would appear that American policy could and should give greater emphasis
to the Council of Europe, using its organization in many of its efforts for
collaboration. Increasingly the Council of Europe becomes a nucleus around

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which other trans-national groups such as the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom, and the recent arrangement for a European common market build their institutions. These sub-groups seem destined for greater importance as the effort to create a common European economy grows in strength. It is not extreme to say that the coherence of NATO as a defense group will depend primarily on the ability of Western Europe to organize itself politically and economically, and an American ability to work with that organization.

All the nations of Western Europe in the past were, and several of them still are, "colonial" powers -- they administer remnants of the former imperial system, notably in Africa. The attitude of the United States on the "colonial question," conditioned largely by American dislike of colonialism as a principle, cuts across four centuries of European history and assumptions of national interest built on the memories of the imperial system. Mere "anti-colonialism" resolves no problem. As a generality, it is almost meaningless. Essentially each case must depend on its merits. An intelligent attitude by the United States can only be based on a forecast of what will happen to any particular area when it leaves an existing colonial system. An India can become a great and free country. A Laos, detached from the French colonial system, could readily become a Chinese communist dependency. It is not the business of the United States to defend other peoples' empires; but neither is it the business of the United States to assist in creating nominal States which will promptly be submerged by the prehensile Communist imperialists of

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China or Russia, or fall to the attractive and bloody amusement of seeking other peoples' territory.

For example. A recent application to buy arms by Indonesia was rather plainly motivated by an Indonesian desire to use armed force in seizing the present Netherlands colony of New Guinea. Sale of such arms was agreed to by one branch of the United States government; application for export license was then made to the Department of State. The license was held up at the insistence of the government of the Netherlands which had discovered it. From the point of view of the Netherlands (which is important though other considerations would enter American decision-making) this was the United States undertaking to consider whether it was (or was not) within its policy to assist Indonesia in an armed attack on Netherlands territory. The illustration, relatively unimportant, sufficiently indicates the necessity of coming to grips with one of the questions which plagues NATO solidarity.

It would seem that the time had come for a quiet, careful and thorough examination of all the questions at issue between the United States and the other members of NATO, and so far as possible between the members of NATO themselves and to reach understandings ending, if possible, but in any case reducing, all such differences so far as presently possible. The intent should be to seek understanding and solution before the issues become pressing, rather than later when they may cripple the NATO bloc through internal suspicions and fears.

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It would also seem that a greater attempt for collective approach
through the combined NATO powers, or through the Council of Europe, or such
other sub-group as might be logical, could be a far more effective method of
proposing political solutions as problems present themselves.

Consolidation of position within the two principal political groups of
which the United States is a member -- the inter-American community and the
European community -- should in and of itself strengthen the position of the
United States, as it would reciprocally strengthen the position of every member
of both groups. It should, consequently, strengthen the entire position in
the event of conflict, hot or cold, and in the struggle for an ultimate and
legitimate order in world affairs.

(d) <u>Approach to economic problems.</u>

Review of the economic material suggests the probability that the free
world will be presented with vast and pressing economic problems within the
next few years, though their precise incidence cannot be forecast.

Nominally, the free world is endeavoring to resume the pattern of the
nineteenth century. That is, it expects to provide more or less free access to
supplies and markets and to achieve the necessary exchange through process
of trade and investment, the whole reaching a workable balance.

We are not certain that these hopes will be realized.

Factually, the unifying factor in most of the free world economic pattern
has been the immense buying power of the United States. Access to the American

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market was and still is the most valuable single asset of most free nations
or their businessmen. Conversely, access to American supplies, or to
supplies which could be bought with hard currency, chiefly American, was the
chief essential in satisfying need.

As balance was not achieved, American "foreign aid" in one form or
another has been thrown in as the balancing item, in a total of some 45 (?)
billions of dollars, in the decade from 1947 to 1957. In all cases the assump-
tion was made that this particular loan, or program of aid, or that particular
group of financed enterprises, or the like, would be sufficient to place the
country benefitted in a position thereafter to achieve the level of production
desired and to balance its necessary foreign trade. But the balance has not
come about. We are likely to be faced with the problems of a number of
countries in serious difficulties. Further, diminution in our own foreign
purchases almost automatically entails unbalance if not distress overseas.
In the case of the American hemisphere, the result could be disastrous for
some countries in whose safety and well-being we have a powerful interest.

This report is not the time or place to indicate solutions. We do
state our feeling that the entire system must come up for review. It may well
be that an era is approaching in which cooperation instead of competitive
solutions covering the major areas of international economic exchange must
replace the older theory that competition would result in balance.

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In the Western Hemisphere, for example, exchange of goods and services has to be carried on against a background of twenty-two distinct currency systems which are presently wholly uncoordinated. Balance between them is frequently achieved at the expense of serious interruption of economic interchange. In Western Europe, due to greater maturity, there is usually less interruption; but there the separate currency systems are ballasted by the European Payments Union and other arrangements. Even so, interchange of goods and services frequently follows the line, not of economic need but of "hard" or "soft" currencies as the case may be, and even today crises are threatening in one or more country. Solutions envisaged by the International Monetary Fund under the Bretton Woods agreement, while they were of great use in the immediate post-war period, appear insufficient to deal with long-range, and more permanent problems. Broader solutions have to be sought, perhaps on broader and more fundamental lines.

Certain major commodities, notably agricultural, pose the same problem from a different angle. Some countries including the United States and Canada have large surpluses. Others have need but no buying power or goods capable of export in exchange. It seems clear that no nation, perhaps least of all the United States, can handle this problem alone, and that a purely nationalist solution would place intolerable strain on relations within groups which must work together in common interest.

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In respect of certain other commodities, notably oil and metals, the problem of supply has become an international necessity which must be taken into account both by the country in which the production takes place (for example, production of oil in Venezuela) and by the country which may have supplied capital for the production of such oil (the American and British oil companies). Conversely, barriers erected to the flow of commodities may produce violent results. Even "revolutionary" solutions such as nationalizing the plants or properties of producing companies have proved illusory in international commerce. It is possible for a country to nationalize an oil field, but not possible to nationalize the market for that oil in another country.

The problem may be pithly illustrated by assuming that the United States, instead of being a single economic area, were cut up into seventeen countries the size of France, disparate in resources, production, climate and so forth. It is inconceivable that the level of any of these seventeen hypothetical sovereign states could approach the level of the United States of today. But it is equally inconceivable that the United States of today could have reached its present level without a highly organized central credit and currency system, and free flow of investment capital from one part of the country to the other, and a not inconsiderable mobility of population movement; not to mention a more or less uniform system of transport, communication and so forth. Some of the elements which made the organization of economy in large areas possible must, in some fashion, be introduced into the larger international groups (if they can not be made world-wide) in the next generation or two.

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American policy will, we think, be constrained to take account of this fact, to project solutions in general terms, and to move towards them as events require. The Communist world claims to have solved these precise problems, it has in fact achieved a degree of solution greater than theorists considered possible a few years ago; and its entire claim to economic superiority is primarily based on this fact. American policy must come up with better answers.

(e) New instruments of economic policy.

In a previous chapter the surprising proliferation of new forms of cooperative international action has been noted. Most of them arose from the sheer necessities of the European nations as they emerged from World War II. The line of solution proceeded from realization by European statesmen that no European State was or could be self-contained and still provide an acceptable standard of living for its people.

Cutting through the nineteenth and early twentieth century nationalism came, first, the Coal and Steel Committee in the closing days of World War II, which proved to be the forerunner of the Coal and Steel Community of today -- the prototype of new economic instrumentalities. Such a model could be adopted by other commodities whose continued supply and distribution is necessary to the life of many States where existing operation prove impractical.

Regional "common markets," without modifying political nationality, began their post-war history in 1944 when the so-called "Benelux" agreement

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which frankly proposes "the eventual establishment of an economic union***
through the medium of a customs convention." This proved a prototype for
the nascent "European common market" in process of gestation today. Follow-
ing this example, a "common market" agreement has already been entered into
between the five Central American States in the Western Hemisphere, and a
like agreement has been seriously proposed for South America. In somewhat
different fashion, the British Commonwealth is slowly endeavoring to erect
an impartial market. The policy of the United States thus far has been on the
whole antagonistic to such groups on the ground that they unduly sectionalize
world commerce and with an eye to the fact that they might exclude or inter-
rupt currents of American commerce by protective tariff barriers, analogous
to those which the United States has steadily maintained to preserve the
American market. It is fair to say that we are half-way along towards a new
phase. It is questionable whether the next phase can be met merely by
seeking a general lowering of trade barriers unless such lowering is coupled
with reasonable assurance that the needs of other areas will be supplied and
the products of other areas marketed.

To give such assurance, indeed, was the object of certain inter-
governmental commodity agreements like those covering wheat and sugar.
Private arrangements seeking to accomplish the same end had earlier been
made (the Achnacarry agreement of 1928 in oil, and the European agreements
relating to copper, sulphur, etc.)

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We are therefore persuaded that a full exploration of the possibilities and necessities of international economics on a broader scale than any heretofore conducted is now necessary. It appears possible, if not probable, that new solutions on broader lines will have to be worked out. A free community of nations can be jeopardized by continuing economic insecurity or recurrent crisis; and it is no answer to say that some sort of balance may eventually be reached. The past thirty years of revolution and war represent in considerable part the revolt of nations against economic insecurity or the miseries of crisis (Italy, 1924; Germany, 1933 and so forth). Sporadic foreign aid, emergency loans, gifts by the United States, and the necessarily fluctuating demand of the American market have not proved sufficient by themselves, to bring the free world into predictable equilibrium.

(f) Economic systems and political policy.

It is nevertheless our view that differences in social and economic systems are not the primary source of the conflicts evident in the present world. It would not be worth a single American life to impose the present American economic system on any other country; the United States, indeed, has enjoyed the closest relations with countries of quite different economic organization and habit. Anglo-American friendship was not interrupted during the Socialist regime of the Atlee ministry, nor would she find Britain an enemy should the Labor Party take over at the next General Election (as it well may). Even a Communist regime, per se, would not cause conflict if Communism did not

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imply imperialism, and consider itself committed to carry on a class war in
and with non-Communist countries. Different cultures will differently organize
their economic systems; it is probably not within American capacity to change
their patterns save as American example may demonstrate its desirability to
other peoples.

The real direction of economic policy and the criteria for decision
appear to us to be these:

(1) Will the policy adopted assist in bettering the condition of the people of other countries without imposing undue burdens on the people of the United States?

(2) Will the economic policy or measure adopted strengthen or weaken the avowed enemies of the United States, or, conversely, strengthen or weaken elements friendly or likely to be friendly to the United States?

(3) Will the economic policy adopted tend towards maintaining
equilibrium?

As exploration of the problem of world economic balance continues,
a fourth criterion can be added:

(4) Will the economic policy or measure adopted forward or detract from the process of achieving economic equilibrium?

In distant view, it is by no means impossible that certain economic
functions may become tied to substantial processes of world peace-keeping.
Roads and communications are essentially economic in their functioning; yet

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internal "peace" and equilibrium in most nations from the Roman Empire to the present day was first achieved by a central guarantee that peace and order would prevail along the chief road systems. Not inconceivably in the twenty first century a powerful instrument for world peace may be precisely centralized agencies guaranteeing orderly and uninterrupted continuance of a few major economic functions. Major deterrent to peace-breaking might be the fact that the peace-breaker automatically cuts himself off from these essential services. In distant view, development of economic groups moving towards a world economic system may conjoin with the development of political institutions, regional or world-wide as the case may be, designed to bring a measure of freedom under order in world affairs.

The United States has honorably shouldered a vast part of this burden in the past decade. Clearly she cannot carry the entire burden alone, and it would probably be undesirable for her to do so even if she could. Unless a new imperial system like that of the nineteenth century is to be evolved, the only substitute is working through groups, and with new instruments which permit group action without sacrifice of nationhood by the participants.

(g) **Exploration of the processes of international economic balance.**

There is, for example, no readily available analysis of the economic process by which great areas are maintained in substantial balance and economic stability. The United States, a single country, is the only large and heavily populated economic area which has achieved more or less a

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continuous balance. Three major categories of essentially uniform action are fairly well understood as necessary to such stability, while a fourth is still matter of economic dispute. The three are

(1) A common system of currency and credit (coordinated in the United States by the Federal Reserve Board);

(2) An unhindered flow of investment between sections of the area;

(3) A considerable mobility of population within the area.

A fourth, more controversial, method is that of stabilization of prices and activity in certain major lines, notably agricultural products, and a ready shifting of government orders and construction toward areas which show signs of slackening activity and employment.

All of these methods are being used in rudimentary form in various of the international groups now appearing. We are clear that the time has come for serious study looking towards drafting of plans for maintenance of reasonable economic balance within international groups of which the United States is a member, notably, the inter-American group. In such thinking, possibility of using private corporations whose operations are international and which are an integral part of the functioning groups (as was done in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community) should be considered.

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6. World Organization

The largest framework for grouping of nations is the world-group known
as United Nations. Save in the most rudimentary form, this has not emerged
as an economic factor. (The framers of the Charter of the United Nations hoped
that it would do so, and accordingly set up under Chapter X, Charter of the
United Nations, the Economic and Social Council for that purpose.) Its
relations are close with two specialized agencies of substantially world-wide
impact, the International Tele-communication Union and the International
Civil Aviation Organization.

So long as a vast portion of the world remains outside the area of
peaceful cooperation it is clear that the United Nations can not seriously
enter the economic field.

We are clear, nevertheless, that the present condition of affairs is
in vast transition. There is solid reason to believe that the world situation
twenty-five or thirty years from now will present a quite different picture
from that of today. The deep currents giving rise to the present unsystem-
atized groupings appear to be pressing for continuously wider arrangements.
Present regional, area and specialized groupings for economic purposes are
likely to be demonstrably too small to cope with the growing problems raised
by steadily increasing population pressure, and by growing popular insist-
ence on economic advance.

Preservation of a nucleus for world-wide arrangement is therefore
vitally important, even though it may not presently be an available

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instrument save in forwarding a few essential activities (communications, transport by sea and air, and so forth). The United Nations is the only practicable frame within which such a nucleus can be maintained and eventually utilized.

Projection of possible world arrangements providing planet-wide economic services at the moment seems chimerical. But it must be remembered that the old nineteenth century imperial system in crude fashion did effectively give such service. Freedom of navigation provided a more or less adequate, uninterrupted flow of transport. Anglo-European currency arrangements gave substantial convertibility of currency. Trade barriers were not an insuperable obstacle. Immigration restrictions were not such as to prevent mobility of peoples. The scale of economic operations by new twentieth century standards was of course small and the standard of living demanded by peoples of economics was low, so that relatively rudimentary arrangements sufficed.

To foreshadow economic arrangements on a world-wide scale, meeting twentieth century needs as nineteenth century arrangements more or less met the needs of that time is therefore not fantastic, though the task is vastly greater. Nor is it fantastic to suggest that the economic inter-relation between such areas as the present NATO inter-American bloc, the Communist bloc and the uncommitted areas, will ultimately become a necessity if all three are to meet the demands of their rapidly

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growing population. The United Nations at the moment is little more than
fragile projection of a present hope. Realistic possibility in devising and
making world-wide arrangements does not now exist. But the possibility
does exist and the future necessity is already looming ominously.

We conclude, therefore, that steady, continuous and imaginative
exploration of wider measures of economic services and stabilization shall
be encouraged to continue; and the United Nations framework be kept in
mind as the ultimate institution through which such arrangements may be
made effective.