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in Europe. The original build-up of those capabilities was based, in part, on the expectation that they could be used in tactical combat to effect a favorable outcome for the West without necessarily leading to a strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers.

For the last decade, however, this possibility has been discounted. Today, one of the major effects of these tactical nuclear weapons, whether we like it or not, is to create something approaching a continuum in the scale of violence between conventional combat on the one hand, and a full-scale thermonuclear exchange on the other. Thus, the transition from the one to the other is made more probable, and the credibility of the deterrent thereby enhanced. The other role they serve, or at least the rationale for their deployment, is to buttress the confidence of some of our allies in our commitment to their defense.

There are other possible mechanisms for making escalation more likely. British and French possession of nuclear capabilities may serve that purpose, as would further proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities or relaxation of U.S. control over its nuclear weapons in Europe.

When one looks beyond Europe, it is occasionally argued that strategic forces may be of value in compelling non-nuclear or weaker nuclear powers to behave as we wish.

At best, this concept is of limited utility. Against nuclear powers it would be useful only if we had something approaching a damage-*denial* capability against the country in question.

Against nuclear and non-nuclear powers it would be useful only if the risks of uncontrolable escalation were practically non-existent. In fact, nuclear strength has repeatedly proven irrelevant to problems that have arisen on the periphery of Asia and Africa.

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The hard reality is that we cannot minimize the probability of escalation while at-
tempting to rely on it as a mechanism for deterring a broad range of conventional or lim-
ited nuclear attacks. Nor can we rely on the threat of limited use of our strategic nuclear
capabilities as an effective instrument for exerting our political power.

Despite the cost and the opposition from some of our allies, it seems wise to continue
to move, as we have since the days of Dulles' massive retaliation doctrine, further away
from reliance on the likelihood of escalation, and toward increased reliance on conventional
strength as a deterrent to conventional threats.

The second policy dilemma--the incompatibility of a "damage-limiting" policy with
other U.S. objectives--is more difficult to deal with. It has two facets. First, there is
the possibility that certain actions taken by the superpowers to reduce damage, should
deterrence fail, may lead to an increase in the probability that it will fail, particularly
if the adversary should fail to modify his force posture in response to those actions. This
point is illustrated in Table 2, taken from Secretary McNamara's posture statement for
fiscal 1967.23 This shows that U.S. fatalities (in 1975) would be only about one-third as
great in the event of a U.S. first strike as in the case of a Soviet first strike, assuming
a greatly expanded threat, extensive damage-limiting efforts by the United States, and
failure of the Soviet Union to react to our damage-limiting efforts by improving its retaliatory
capabilities. Obviously, if war seemed imminent, with the strategic balance as hypothesized
in the Table, there would be tremendous pressure on the United States to strike first.
There would be corresponding pressure on the Soviet Union to do likewise if a Soviet first
strike could result, not only in a much higher level of damage to the United States, but also
in a diminution in damage to the U.S.S.R. And the incentives would be mutually reenforcing.

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To minimize the chance of deterrence failure, it seems important for both sides to develop strategic postures such that preemptive attack would have as small an effect as possible on the anticipated outcome of a thermonuclear exchange.

Table 2

<table><thead><tr><th rowspan="2"></th><th colspan="2">Soviet damage potential<br>in terms of millions of<br>U.S. fatalities <sup>1</sup></th></tr><tr><th>Soviet<br>first<br>strike</th><th>U.S.<br>first<br>strike</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>U.S.S.R. threat I: <sup>2</sup></strong></td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture A</td><td>80-95</td><td>25-40</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture B</td><td>50-80</td><td>20-30</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>U.S.S.R. threat II:</strong></td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture C</td><td>105-110</td><td>35-55</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture D</td><td>75-100</td><td>25-40</td></tr></tbody></table>

¹Rounded to the nearest 5,000,000.

²DL is damage-limiting. Both the Soviet threats and the U.S. damage-limiting postures are hypothetical.

Threat I is basically an extrapolation of current Soviet forces reflecting some future growth in both offensive and defensive forces. Threat II is a major Soviet response to our deployment of a ballistic missile defense.

Two of the four U.S. damage-limiting programs, postures A and B, are tailored against threat I; and the other two, C and D, against threat II. Postures B and D include more anti-ballistic missile defense forces and SAM-D batteries than postures A and C. Postures C and D include more F-12 interceptors than postures A and B.

In short, there is an inherent inconsistency in the objectives spelled out in our basic military policy, namely, "to deter aggression at any level and, should deterrence fail, to terminate hostilities in concert with our allies under conditions of relative advantage while limiting damage to the United States and allied interests."²⁴ Our planners and policy-makers constantly face hard choices between minimizing the chance of escalation and minimizing the consequences if it does occur.

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The second facet of this dilemma is: to what extent will any measure to limit damage to the United States in the event of a nuclear war stimulate a compensating or over-compensating reaction in the structuring of Soviet forces? This is especially troublesome, for while the United States generally reacts by anticipating possible Soviet moves, we cannot be sure of the extent to which the Soviets do likewise.

Recognizing this uncertainty, many responsible Americans, including senior military officers, assign high priority to capabilities to limit damage to the United States in the event of war. Whether they are right in advocating such capabilities depends on the extent to which the action-reaction hypothesis applies to the Soviet decision-making process, as well as on the impact of such actions on the probability of a failure of deterrence.

The decisions that the U. S. has taken in recent years with respect to new weapons development and deployment reflect a middle ground philosophy. We have generally avoided actions whose primary rationale was to limit damage the Soviet Union might inflict upon us and those to which the Soviets would probably respond. Thus, we have not deployed an anti-Soviet ABM system, and have given air defense low priority.

On the other hand, where there were reasons other than a desire to improve our damage-limiting capability vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, we have proceeded with programs despite their probable escalatory effect on the arms race or their effect on first-strike incentives. This was true in the case of MIRV's and Sentinel.

We will face more such decisions. For example, we may feel it necessary to change our strategic offensive posture in order to make our forces less vulnerable to possible Soviet MIRV attack. The nature of our decisions will depend on the importance we attach

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to the action-reaction phenomenon and to the effect of improved counterforce capabilities on the probability of war. Emphasis on these two factors implies discounting options that would increase our counterforce capability against Soviet strategic forces and that might therefore provoke an expansion of Soviet offensive forces. Options requiring long lead-times would also be discounted, since decisions regarding them might have to be taken while we were still uncertain whether the Soviet Union was developing MIRV's.

Should we in the future give more weight to developing damage-limiting capabilities? Or should we give more weight to minimizing the probability of a thermonuclear exchange and to curtailing the strategic arms race? Again, as in the case of the escalation phenomenon, it is hard to see how we can have it both ways.

Despite some changes in technology, there is little to indicate we could get very far with damage-limiting efforts, considering the determination of the Soviets and the options available to them for denying us the attainment of such capabilities.

The emergence of new nuclear powers, the rapid pace of technological advance, and the other important demands on our resources suggest we give more emphasis to moderating the action-reaction cycle, than when the MIRV and Sentinel decisions were made. Moving toward greater emphasis on "damage-limitation" would seem justified only if we can persuade ourselves that the Soviet Union will not react to our moves as we would to theirs, and if we can focus on means that will not increase the probability of war.

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Negotiations with the Soviet Union to Curtail the Arms Race

In considering negotiations on the strategic arms problem, the first factor to be borne in mind is the objectives to be sought. It is a mistake to expect too much or to aspire to too little.

One obvious aim is to reduce strategic armaments in order to lessen significantly the damage that would be sustained by the U.S. (and the U.S.S.R.) in the event of a nuclear exchange. Regrettably, this goal is not likely to be realized in the near future. In the first place, any initial understandings will probably not involve reductions in strategic forces. But even if they did, these reductions would be limited. We cannot expect damage levels to be lowered by more than a few per cent, even with fairly substantial cuts in strategic forces, because the capabilities of the superpowers are already so great.

Other objectives have been considered: reduction in the incentives to strike pre-emptively in time of crisis; reduction of the probability of accident or miscalculation; and increasing the time available for decision-making in the hope that the increased opportunity for communication might prevent a nuclear exchange from running its full course. Last but not least, one might also hope to change the international political climate so as to lessen tension, to reduce the incentive for powers that presently do not have nuclear weapons to acquire them, and to increase the possibility for agreement by the superpowers on other meaningful arms control measures.

It is reasonable to expect that successful negotiations might achieve all these objectives to some degree, except the first--reduction of potential damage. However, to

[10]

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focus on any one, or a combination of them, is to obscure the immediate problem with which we are confronted. Despite the United States' restraint in its choices regarding strategic weapons development and deployment during the first two-thirds of this decade, it now appears that in the absence of some understanding with the Soviet Union, we will be unable to break the action-reaction sequence which propels the arms race. Thus, the immediate objective of any negotiations must be to bring that sequence to a halt, or to moderate its pace, so that there will be a better chance of ending the arms race than is offered by continuing the policies of the last two decades.

In retrospect, controlling or reversing the growth of strategic capabilities could have been accomplished more easily a few years ago, when the possibility of ABM deployment seemed to be the factor that would be likely to drive us to another round in the arms race.

Now the ABM prospect is more troublesome because of technological advances. In addition, there are the two other stimuli that we have discussed: the possibility of effective counterforce capabilities as a result of the development of MIRV's; and the possibility that the Chinese nuclear capability may serve as a catalyst to the Soviet-American action-reaction phenomenon.

Obviously, short of destroying them by nuclear attack, there is little we can do about Chinese capabilities except to make sure that we do not give them more weight in our thinking than they deserve. Thus, we are left with the options of trying to break the ABM-MIRV chain by focusing on control of MIRV's or ABM defenses.

While one might hope to limit both, if a choice must be made, the focus should clearly be on the latter. Verification of compliance would be relatively simple and could

-46-

probably be accomplished without intrusive inspection. Moreover, the incentive to acquire MIRV's for penetrating defenses would be eliminated--although the incentive to acquire them for counterforce purposes would remain.

The problems of verifying compliance with an agreement to control MIRV's would be very difficult. Also, if ABM deployment occurred, there would be great pressure to abrogate or violate any agreement prohibiting MIRV deployment simply because MIRV's offer high assurance for penetrating defenses. While reversing our MIRV decision would be difficult, doing so in the case of Sentinel would present less of a problem. In fact, there may well be sufficient reason for doing this, aside from possible impact on Soviet-American negotiations.

To be attractive to the Soviet Union, any proposal to limit defenses would almost certainly have to be coupled with an agreement to limit, if not reduce, inventories of deployed strategic offensive forces. In principle, that should not be difficult, since it need not involve serious verification problems.

Complicating any attempt to reach understanding with the Soviet Union on the strategic balance is the fact that there are asymmetries in the U.S. and Soviet positions. The United States has both allies and bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union, whereas the latter has neither near the United States, unless one counts Cuba. It is clear that a Pandora's box of complications could be opened by any attempt in the context of negotiations on the strategic balance to deal with the threat to our allies posed by short-range Soviet delivery systems, and with the potential threat to the U.S.S.R. of systems in Europe that could reach the Soviet Union, even though they are primarily tactical in nature. Hopefully initial understandings will not have to include specific agreements on such thorny issues as foreign bases and dual purpose systems.

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Virtually all of the above is based on the premise that for a long time each side will probably insist on maintaining substantial deterrent capabilities. In the short run there is little basis for expecting negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to result in a strategic balance with each side relying on a few dozen weapons as a deterrent. The difficulties and importance of verification of compliance at such low levels, the problem of China, the existence of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons on both sides, and the general political climate all militate against this. Negotiations would almost necessarily be doomed to failure if either party based its negotiating position on the expectation that it might achieve a significant damage-limiting capability vis-a-vis the other.

The range of possible agreement is quite narrow. There is a basis for hope (a) if both sides can accept the fact that for some time the most we can expect to achieve is a strategic balance at quite high, but less rapidly escalating, force levels; and (b) if both recognize that breaking the action-reaction cycle should be given first priority in any negotiations.

There will be risks in negotiating arms limitation. They must be weighed not against the risks that might characterize the peaceful world in which we would like to live, or even against the risks that confront us now. Rather, the risks implicit in any agreement must be weighed against the risks and costs with which we are likely to be confronted in the seventies in the absence of agreement.

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A Final Note

Whether we strive to curtail the strategic arms race through agreement between the superpowers, or through a combination of unilateral restraint and improved dialogue, we should not do so in the mistaken belief that we will rapidly eliminate the bases for the Soviet-American confrontation of the last two decades. Many of the sources of tension have their origins deep in the social structures and political institutions of the two countries. Resolution of those differences will not be accomplished overnight.

However, by restraining the arms race we may shorten the time required for resolution of the conflicts; we may increase our chances of survival during that period; and we may, despite political differences, enable the Soviet Union and the United States to work more effectively, both individually and in concert, on the other great problems that confront the two societies.

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# APPENDIX

## ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

### Kinds of ABM Systems

Anti-ballistic missile defenses fall into two categories: one type employs exoatmospheric interception, in principle providing protection for large areas; the other is designed for interception late in the trajectory of the incoming warhead, so that a single interceptor site can defend only a very limited area. The latter category may be further subdivided into systems designed to defend cities, and so-called "hard-point defenses," designed to defend ICBM sites or other "hardened" key facilities. The problems of hard-point defense and city defense are somewhat different. Hard-point defense is technically easier as missile sites or other hard points can be designed to withstand close-in nuclear bursts that would destroy cities; thus interception can be deferred until relatively late in the trajectory of the incoming missile. Also, a lower degree of effectiveness may be acceptable.

The implications of hard-point and urban defenses for the arms race are also very different. The former serve to enhance "assured destruction" capabilities and the latter, "damage-limiting" capabilities.

### The Effectiveness of ABM Systems

ABM systems are often evaluated by comparing their cost with what the other side would have to spend on improving offensive capabilities to offset their effect. The comparison

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has generally proved favorable to the offense. This is particularly true if the objective is to reduce expected damage from a nuclear attack to very low levels. Modest reductions in damage can, however, be achieved with relatively light defenses, and then the costs to the adversary of offsetting the effect may be relatively large.

To some, prospects for the defense appear somewhat better than they did a few years ago. While at that time it was generally thought that the offense would have perhaps a ten to fifty-fold cost-effectiveness advantage over the defense (assuming intermediate levels of damage reduction), it is probably fair to say that now a more acceptable estimate would be about one to five. The reasons underlying this change in assessment are:

(1) the development of phased array radars and their associated computers enhances the possibility of discriminating between incoming warheads and decoys and other penetration aids;

(2) the development of interceptors capable of very high accelerations may permit a deferral of decision to intercept an incoming ICBM until fairly late in its trajectory; and

(3) there is a realization that area-type defenses may be somewhat more attractive than was thought a few years ago--in part because of technological changes in interceptor warheads.

## The Sentinel Decision and the Performance of the System

The ABM deployment (Sentinel) planned by the United States is to be of the area-defense type, although some terminal interceptors are planned for the defense of radars, and more may be added for "hard-point" defense of ICBM sites.

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In announcing the Sentinel decision, Secretary McNamara made it clear that he regarded the system as marginal.²⁵ He also indicated that despite the possibility of some Chinese ICBM's leaking through it, Sentinel might save up to 15 million American lives in the event of a Chinese first strike with ICBM's during the 1970's.²⁶ Subsequently, other Administration spokesmen claimed the system could *deny* damage to the United States from a Chinese nuclear attack.²⁷ However, to have high confidence in the system one must allay doubts of three kinds. First, there is the question of whether such a complicated system will work at all when called upon to do so. It must be recognized that while component tests will be possible, it will never be feasible to test the full system against a satisfactory simulation of an operational environment. This fact, together with the history of initial failures of far less complicated systems, leads many experts to believe that the probability of a catastrophic failure of Sentinel, or any other ABM system, is high (and much higher than for strategic offensive systems which are, by comparison, simple and more adequately tested).

Second, there is the possibility that the Chinese may develop penetration aids that could defeat the system. This possibility is discussed at some length by Drs. Richard Garwin and Hans Bethe.²⁸ The author is aware of no convincing rebuttal of their thesis. General A.W. Betts, Chief of Research and Development for the Army, in replying to the Garwin-Bethe argument, disputes the contention that development of effective penetration aids would be as easy as claimed. To make his point, he cites American difficulties in developing *high confidence* penetration aids.²⁹ There are, however, two considerations that make our experience largely irrelevant:

(1) Our programs aim at the development of penetration aids effective against terminal interception, exoatmospheric defenses being a secondary consideration.

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If one has to cope only with the latter type, which is comparable to Sentinel, the problem is much less complex.

(2) Although the Chinese would probably prefer to have a _high confidence_ system as a deterrent vis-à-vis the United States, one with a moderate probability of penetrating the Sentinel defenses might be almost as useful to them.

Third, there is the fact, mentioned earlier, that damage _denial_ is a _much_ more demanding task than simply reducing damage by small amounts. The extreme difficulties involved can be illustrated by a simple calculation. Let it be assumed that a given target is defended by 50 interceptors, that the Chinese have 25 ICBM's with a reliability of 80 per cent, and that each interceptor has an 80 per cent chance of destroying an ICBM. According to this scenario, there is no more than about a 50 per cent probability that Sentinel would succeed in preventing at least one ICBM from hitting its target. It must be borne in mind that the offense can choose any target on which to concentrate its attack; the defense must defend all. The range of the Spartan interceptor, which is used with the Sentinel system, implies that not 50 interceptors, but about 500 would have to be deployed throughout the United States if every important target were to be within the effective defensive range of 50 Spartan missiles. Thus, even with a twenty to one superiority in numbers of interceptors over the number of Chinese missiles, the picture is far from comforting.

When one considers that a single one-megaton warhead detonated over one of the larger U.S. cities would produce about one million fatalities, it is clear that those who claim a damage-denial or near damage-denial capability for Sentinel are assuming an extraordinarily high level of effectiveness for it.

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As Chinese capabilities grow, the defense problem will become even more difficult. This is illustrated by an extension of the sample calculation: if the numbers of Chinese ICBM's and United States interceptors are *both* doubled, the chance of at least 1 Chinese missile getting to its target rises to over 70 per cent, to over 90 per cent if the numbers of ICBM's and interceptors are quadrupled, and so on. In the long run then (and it may not be too long a run) defense clearly becomes a losing game even against a relatively weak adversary. Costs of defense required to maintain any given level of protection will rise much more sharply than the costs of improving the offense.

References

1. See, respectively, U.S. Department of State Bulletin (9 July 1962) pp. 64-69, and discussion between James T. Kendall and General Earle G. Wheeler in U.S. Senate (90th Cong., 2d Sess.) Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on Status of U.S. Strategic Power (27 Sept. 1968), pp. 5-8. (Cited hereafter as Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power.)

2. See former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's "Approach to the Fiscal Year 1969-73" Program and Fiscal Year 1969 Budget in U.S. House of Representatives (90th Cong., 2d Sess.) Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, Part I (14 Feb. 1969) p. 147; (Cited hereafter as Posture Statement 1969-73.) Some of the figures are based on a statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, 25 Oct. 1968; see New York Times, 26 Oct. 1968.

3. Posture Statement 1969-73, p. 152.

4. General J. P. McConnell, statement at Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power, op. cit., (30 Apr. 1968), p. 222.

5. Congressional Record (90th Cong., 2d Sess.) (1 Nov. 1968), p. E9644.

6. Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," Scientific American (Mar. 1968), pp. 21-31.

7. House of Representatives (90th Cong., 2d Sess.) Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, Part II, (24 Apr. 1968), p. 455; emphasis added. (Cited hereafter as House Hearings on Defense Appropriations.)

8. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Statement for Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (6 Nov. 1967), p. 2.

9. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense McNamara, "Approach to the Fiscal Year 1968-72," Program on the Fiscal Year 1967-68 Budgets (Cited hereafter as Posture Statement 1968-72), p. 42.

10. McNamara, The Essence of Security (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 164.

11. General McConnell, statement at Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power, op. cit., p. 205.

12. Secretary of Defense McNamara, Address before the United Press International Editors and Publishers, San Francisco, 18 Sept. 1967.

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13. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke, *Address before the Advocates Club*, Detroit, 6 Oct. 1967.

14. See *Posture Statement 1968-72* and *Posture Statement 1969-73*, as well as Secretary of Defense McNamara, *Address before the United Press International Editors and Publishers, op. cit.*

15. See letter by Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford to Senator Russell, *Congressional Record*, *op. cit.*, p. E9641.

16. Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke, *Address before the Advocates Club*, *op. cit.*

17. See article on former Secretary of Defense McNamara, *Life Magazine*, (29 Sept. 1967), p. 28c.

18. See *House Hearings on Defense Appropriations, Part I*, p. 266.

19. See *Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, respectively, p. 11 and pp. 346 and 366.

20. *Congressional Record*, *op. cit.*, p. E9640; see also *Congressional Record*, respectively, (18, 19, 21 June, 29 July, 2 Oct., and 1 Nov. 1968).

21. *Posture Statement 1969-73*, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

22. See discussion between General Wheeler and Senator Henry M. Jackson, *Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

23. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense McNamara, "Approach to the Fiscal Year 1967-71" Program and the Fiscal Year 1966-67 Budgets, in U.S. House of Representatives (89th Cong., 2d Sess.), *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1967, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, Part I*, (June 1966), pp. 46-47.

24. General Wheeler, statement at *House Hearings on Defense Appropriations*, p. 2.

25. Secretary of Defense McNamara, *Address before the United Press International Editors and Publishers*, *op. cit.*

26. *Posture Statement 1969-73*, *op. cit.*, p. 152.

27. See Dr. Foster, statement at *House Hearings on Defense Appropriations*, *op. cit.*, p. 455; and Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze, *Statement for Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Defense Appropriations*, *op. cit.*

28. Garwin and Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," *op. cit.*

29. General A.W. Betts, Letter to the Editor, *Scientific American*, (May 1968), pp. 6-7.

The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was established in 1910 to seek practical paths to peace. Income from the original endowment has been devoted to research and education in this field. The Endowment's range of interests covers international organization, international law, the changing role of military force, advancement of international relations research, and education and training for diplomacy, and includes an active program of publications. In this connection, the Endowment assumes full responsibility for its decision to publish or sponsor the publication of works that appear with its imprint. However, the decision to publish a work does not necessarily imply endorsement of statements of fact or opinion that appear in it.

©Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 1969

PREFACE

The strategic arms race, which began with Hiroshima, remains today a major threat to world peace. All efforts to control it effectively have failed. The Carnegie Endowment's concern with the issue dates from the beginning of the nuclear age, when the first non-governmental Committee on Atomic Energy was set up under its auspices. In recent years the Endowment has sponsored studies in the arms control field and conferences on nuclear non-proliferation.

Convinced that in the months ahead the United States and other governments must make hard decisions about strategic policy that will profoundly affect the course of international life in the next decades, the Endowment's Trustees in May 1968 authorized an examination of the implications of strategic missile delivery systems for what the United Nations Charter calls "international peace and security." This examination began in June at a meeting of some 25 persons knowledgeable about these issues, who shared my concern about the impact of recent technological developments in weaponry on the prospects for peace. This group urged better public understanding, not only of strategic offensive and defensive missile systems, but of other new strategic weapons systems that now appear feasible, and expressed its collective belief that the Endowment could perform a useful service by helping to develop an informed public constituency both here and abroad on these matters.

As the first step in this effort, the Endowment asked Dr. George Rathjens to prepare the present essay. The author, now visiting professor of political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was until June 1968 Director of the Systems Evaluation Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and before that, Special Assistant to the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

The study was reviewed at two subsequent meetings at Endowment headquarters. Responsibility for the content of the paper remains, of course, with the author. However, the following persons, who have read the paper and participated in all or part of the discussions, were generally agreed that it presents fairly the facts and the options now open. No one was asked

iii

# INTRODUCTION

As the end of the decade draws near, the United States and the Soviet Union must face major decisions regarding strategic forces and policies that will set the pattern for the 1970's. These decisions must be taken in the light of the inescapable fact that the United States and the Soviet Union bear responsibility for the fate of the whole world; for a thermonuclear exchange would imperil the survival of mankind.

Specifically, both countries must consider:

(1) whether to procure major systems such as new manned bombers, new strategic missiles, and ballistic missile defenses;

(2) what strategic force levels are appropriate—a problem of particular immediacy for the U.S.S.R. because of the current rapid growth of its missile force;

(3) what positions they should adopt regarding negotiations to end the arms race.

Unfortunately, there has been much confusion about these points. Thus, there is:

(1) dispute about the appropriate measure of adequacy for strategic forces—in particular, about the relationship between quantities of strategic weapons and their possible political utility;

(2) a serious problem in weighing short-term advantages of decisions regarding strategic weapons against consequences that, in the longer run, may be harmful, considering probable adversary responses;

(3) an unresolved conflict between the desire to minimize the probability of nuclear war and the desire to minimize damage should it occur;

(4) the question of what should be the response to the emergence of Communist China as a nuclear power.

The author does not claim to treat these issues with complete impartiality. The paper will serve its purpose if it alerts the reader to the fact that this is a critical time of decision regarding the strategic arms race, and if it persuades him that de-

· 1

# I. THE PRESENT STRATEGIC BALANCE

To a large extent the present strategic capabilities of the United
States represent the realization of plans developed during the
last years of the Eisenhower Administration and at the begin-
ning of the Kennedy Administration.

In part this is a consequence of the long lead-time required
for the translation of a concept for a new strategic weapons
system into an operational cabability. But it is also due to the
fact that the broad directions in which the United States and
the Soviet Union were headed became apparent during the
Eisenhower Administration. The development of the hydrogen
bomb and ballistic missiles made it almost inevitable that the
1960's would be a period of mutual deterrence during which
neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could derive any
winning advantage in a nuclear war. They could easily destroy
each other regardless of who struck first, even if they had de-
fenses. Recognition of those facts set the pattern at the begin-
ning of the 1960's for the strategic forces that the United States
has since deployed; and the size of those forces was all but
established by the end of the first year of the Kennedy Admin-
istration. Thus, by the time of the presentation of the budget
for fiscal 1963 (late 1961), it was clear that: the Titan II force
would be limited to 6 squadrons; there would not be an ex-
pansion of the B-52 force beyond 14 wings nor an operational
B-70 force; and the size of the Polaris fleet would be set at 41
boats. The number of Minutemen was set at 800, raised to
950 the following year, and still later to the present level of
1,000.

This rapid growth of American strategic forces was in large
measure due to concern that the Soviet Union might have a
significant superiority in strategic systems during the early
1960's—a concern that arose at the time of the election of
1960 but which was rapidly dissipated by improved intelligence
indicating that the "missile gap," if any, would be in favor of
the United States.

.3

The projected size of the U.S. strategic force was set as large as it was—at 1,054 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 41 Polaris boats each with 16 missiles, and about 650 intercontinental bombers—in part because of uncertainty about possible Soviet actions and the importance given to hedging against the worst possible contingencies. There was, however, another factor that made a large force attractive—a desire to have a capability to limit damage to the United States by destroying Soviet offensive capabilities. Indeed, there was pressure, particularly from the Air Force, to expand “counterforce” or “damage-limiting” capabilities by enlarging the strategic offensive forces beyond the levels finally decided on.

This pressure was resisted because of: (a) the probability of a compensating or over-compensating expansion in Soviet offensive forces; (b) the unlikelihood of a war developing in a way that would permit a U.S. attack to catch a significant fraction of the Soviet bomber and missile force on the ground; (c) the relatively small diminution in damage to the United States that would result from additional American counterforce capability, even if circumstances should develop under which the United States would attack before all of the Soviet strategic offensive force had been launched. With time, the last of these arguments became increasingly persuasive as it became apparent that the Soviet Union would emulate the United States in making its forces relatively invulnerable by dispersing its ICBM's in “hardened” underground protective sites, and by building a submarine-based missile force. Thus damage-limiting arguments played a diminishing role in the rationalization of the United States strategic force posture, as shown, for example, by a comparison of former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara's Ann Arbor speech of 1962 and his more recent statements.¹

The demand by the Army to improve American “damage-limiting” capability by deploying an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defense system was also resisted simply because its performance seemed inadequate. To those with decision-making responsibility it seemed clear that any ABM deployment by the United States would easily be offset by modest improvements in Soviet strategic offensive capabilities.

· 4

Thus, the line against further expansion of U.S. strategic forces was held during the early and mid-1960's. Up to 1966, nearly all of the important procurement, as distinct from research and development, decisions regarding major new strategic systems were negative: the decision not to deploy a rail-mobile Minuteman; the decision not to proceed with the B-70 bomber force; the cancellation of Skybolt; and deferrals of decisions to go ahead with a full-scale ABM system and a new advanced manned strategic aircraft. Consequently, the budget for strategic forces dropped from over $11 billion in 1962 to less than $7 billion for fiscal 1966, as the major strategic weapons programs came to fruition without any major new procurement decisions.*

While the size of the U.S. strategic force approached the levels specified at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, Soviet strategic forces were growing rapidly, and they continue to do so. However, this growth has lagged several years behind that of the United States, and still lags far behind in intercontinental bombers and especially in Polaris-type submarines (see Table I). In numbers of ICBM's the Soviets are rapidly approaching the United States; but some of theirs are still "soft," or unprotected against the effects of a nuclear explosion, while in the case of the United States all the soft missiles were phased out several years ago.

* These figures, and others that appear later, do not reflect the total cost of the U.S. strategic program since certain research and development and other costs are not included. Also, the figures may be slightly deceptive in another respect since they are not converted to constant dollars. However, relative to the year-to-year budget changes, the correction for inflation would be small.

5

TABLE I

UNITED STATES VERSUS SOVIET
INTERCONTINENTAL STRATEGIC
NUCLEAR FORCES

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>United States<sup>a</sup><br>Oct. 1968</th><th colspan="2">U.S.S.R.</th></tr><tr><th></th><th></th><th>Oct. 67</th><th>Oct. 68</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ICBM launchers<sup>b</sup></td><td>1054</td><td>720</td><td>900</td></tr><tr><td>SLBM (Sea launched bal-<br>listic missiles) launchers<sup>c</sup></td><td>656</td><td>30</td><td>75-80</td></tr><tr><td>Total intercontinental missile<br>launchers</td><td>1710</td><td>750</td><td>975-980</td></tr><tr><td>Intercontinental bombers<sup>d</sup></td><td>646</td><td>155</td><td>150-155</td></tr><tr><td>Total force loadings, approxi-<br>imate number of deliver-<br>able warheads</td><td>4206</td><td>1000</td><td>1200</td></tr></tbody></table>

<sup>(a)</sup> The size of the U.S. strategic force has not changed significantly since mid-1967.

<sup>(b)</sup> Excludes ICBM test range launchers which could have some operational capability against the United States. The Soviets also have Medium Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBM's) and Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM's) which are capable of striking Eurasian targets.

<sup>(c)</sup> In addition to the SLBM's on nuclear-powered submarines, the Soviets also have SLBM's on diesel-powered submarines, whose primary targets are believed to be strategic land targets in Eurasia. The Soviets also have submarine-launched cruise missiles, whose primary targets are believed to be naval and merchant vessels.

<sup>(d)</sup> In addition to the intercontinental bombers, the Soviets also have a force of medium bomber/tankers capable of striking Eurasian targets.

SOURCE: Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, "Approach to the Fiscal Year 1969-73," Program and Fiscal Year 1969 Budget, in U.S. House of Representatives (90th Cong., 2d Sess.), *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, Part I* (14 Feb. 1968), p. 147; some of the figures are based on a statement by Secretary of Defense Clark M. Clifford, 25 Oct. 1968; see *New York Times*, 26 Oct. 1968.

6

## Measuring Strategic Strength

The rapid growth in Soviet capabilities, coupled with the fact that the number of U.S. launchers and strategic aircraft have been constant and are expected to remain the same for some time, has naturally led to questioning, particularly in Congressional hearings, about whether the United States continues to have "superiority" in strategic capabilities vis-à-vis the Soviet Union; about whether the loss in "superiority," if it has occurred, could have been prevented; about future trends; and indeed about the whole range of questions regarding feasible and desirable objectives for strategic forces.

Until recently the most common measure of strategic strength was the number of delivery vehicles possessed by each side, that is, the numbers of bombers and deployed missiles. By this measure the United States has maintained superiority over the Soviet Union for several years—superiority in numbers of intercontinental bombers, in numbers of Polaris-type submarines, and in numbers of ICBM's (or at least ICBM launchers). The measure was not entirely satisfactory, however, in that it did not take into account qualitative differences in the various missile and bomber systems. American bombers and submarines were generally believed to have superior performance capabilities. In addition, some bombers and missiles carried substantially larger payloads than others.

With the beginning of the era of multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's), the measure is even less satisfactory, since some missiles can carry several warheads, while others carry only one. Thus, in the last few years, when discussing the question of force strength, Administration spokesmen have argued that the number of warheads is a more meaningful measure than numbers of missiles and bombers.

Critics of Johnson Administration policy have claimed that the Soviet Union has, or soon may have, greater strategic strength than the United States because its missiles, while fewer in number, could in the aggregate carry more "megatons" since more of their missiles are large.

If any of these measures—number of delivery vehicles, number of warheads, or number of megatons—is to be meaningful, it is necessary to take into account the expected interactions

7

during a nuclear exchange. To do that, survivability and penetrability factors have been introduced. Thus, the Johnson Administration has spoken of the number of warheads that could be delivered on target as the most appropriate measure of strength. But even that is not entirely satisfactory.

To get the ultimate measures, that is, the capability to inflict damage on the adversary and to limit damage to oneself, one must also take into account the match of the weapons with the targets. When this is done, the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States are not significant. Even if there were a preemptive attack by the Soviet Union weighted heavily toward attempting to destroy American strategic offensive capabilities, the United States could with high confidence inflict over 50 per cent fatalities in retaliation. And the situation is symmetric. In former Secretary of Defense McNamara's posture statement for fiscal 1969,² it is estimated that in an all-out nuclear exchange in the mid-1970's each country could inflict 120 million fatalities on the other in retaliation. This is probably a lower limit on the actual expected damage, in that indirect and delayed effects of a nuclear attack, such as fatalities from fire storms, maldistribution of resources and fall-out are generally not fully considered in making such estimates.

Despite some uncertainty about the absolute levels of damage that each side might experience and about the recuperative ability of such heavily damaged societies, there seems little reason to doubt that in a full-scale nuclear exchange at this time, the United States and the Soviet Union would suffer equally and grievously. The foundations of society in each country would certainly be destroyed.

In view of the damage-inflicting capabilities of the two sides, the present situation is one of considerable stability. Even, and perhaps particularly, in the event of extreme crisis where attack seemed imminent, there would be a powerful moderating effect on both sides. Preemptive attack would be unlikely, since neither could hope to reduce damage to itself to a degree that would make such an attack seem rational if there were any possibility of avoiding the holocaust.

Yet despite the stability that does exist, there remains concern about instability and the consequences of escalation. Thus,

· 8

the very existence of strategic forces may also serve to deter or at least inhibit the superpowers from commitments of conventional forces or even political commitments, if there is a significant risk of a superpower confrontation that could lead to uncontrollable escalation.

## Conflicts About Objectives

There would be little disagreement with the foregoing assessment of the present strategic balance. Yet there is disagreement about the objectives that have been and might be served by our present strategic forces.

First, there is dispute about two closely related issues: whether during the last few years the numerical superiority that the United States has had in strategic forces has conferred on it some advantage in dealing with the Soviet Union; and whether strategic "superiority" would be meaningful in the future. The figures in Table I do indicate a continued large U.S. superiority in numbers of bombers, sea-launched ballistic missiles, and deliverable warheads. For all practical purposes, however, the present situation can be characterized as one of strategic "parity" in the sense that both the U.S.S.R. and the United States can wreak unacceptable damage on each other.

But, in fact, neither "superiority" nor "parity" is at this point a very useful concept, and is not likely to be in the foreseeable future. Even large changes in capabilities could not be translated into useful political power. In the view of many this was already true by the early 1960's. They would hold, for example, that the Cuban missile crisis was resolved as it was because the United States was prepared to intervene with conventional strength that the Soviet Union could not match; and that the existence of strategic forces for both sides served simply to deter escalation. Others argue, however, that it was not just the strategic strength on both sides and the fear of escalation, but rather actual U.S. superiority in strategic strength that served to deter the Soviet Union from moving on Berlin or elsewhere as a response to the "quarantine" of Cuba.

While there may have been a basis for this distinction in the early 1960's, it would be difficult to make such a case under present circumstances. The strategic forces of both sides are

9

too large. Thus, as far as deterrence is concerned, the point has certainly been passed by now where both sides have "sufficiency"—probably a more useful concept for describing the present strategic balance than either "superiority" or "parity."

If the Soviet strategic retaliatory force were either doubled or halved, while that of the United States remained constant, there would very likely be no discernible effect on U.S. resolve to stand up to the Soviet Union in a crisis. Yet many Americans continue to feel that the United States should still strive for "superiority." This feeling is grounded not in the expectation that numerical superiority in strategic strength could be translated with confidence into any politically useful option, but rather in a desire for a return to an earlier era when it seemed that the wealth of the United States could almost guarantee superiority in any contest the country chose to enter. During the last decade the United States has become aware that it cannot count on wealth or industrial capacity to provide it with the kind of superiority in exploitable strategic strength that it had vis-à-vis the U.S.S.R. in the 1950's; nor does it solve other problems such as Vietnam and the cities. This has been a disillusioning and frustrating experience, and it is not surprising that many Americans should wistfully seek to recapture the past and look for scapegoats who can be blamed for letting it escape.

Second, despite recognition that both societies would be destroyed by an all-out nuclear exchange, it is argued that American forces should be structured so that we can, in the event of war, "come out a little better than they do."³ Or, as Senator Richard Russell put it, "If we have to start over again with another Adam and Eve, then I want them to be Americans and not Russians—I want them on this continent and not in Europe."⁴ Whatever their reaction to Senator Russell's apocalyptic remark, most Americans would probably agree that the first quotation expresses a desirable objective. But many believe it could only be pursued at the expense of an increase in the absolute level of damage to the United States or in the risk of war, or both, and doubt whether it is worth the price.

Third, there exists a difference of opinion regarding the

• 10

extent to which the United States can or should rely on the
possibility of escalation as a deterrent to actions by the Soviet
Union other than direct attack against the United States. This
controversial point has been one of the critical considerations
in NATO policy during the last few years (others being the
closely related question of the relative capabilities of NATO
and Warsaw Pact forces to fight a conventional war and the
question of Soviet intent).

Finally, there is dispute about whether strategic weapons
could serve as a deterrent or a response to Soviet or other non-
nuclear attacks of limited objectives. The possibilities seem
unrealistic or remote. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned,
the risks of escalation are too large. As regards other adver-
saries, including Communist China, it is difficult to imagine a
realistic provocation that could not be dealt with by other
means, and to which a limited strategic nuclear attack would
be judged an appropriate response.*

That there is as much consensus in the United States as there
is, both about the consequences of a nuclear exchange and
about the present roles and limitations of strategic forces, is in
part due to the fact that the Soviet-American strategic balance
has not changed qualitatively in several years. Although the
budgets submitted for strategic weapons have increased dra-
matically—some 40 per cent from the fiscal 1967 budget to
that for fiscal 1969—because of the time lag between the
obligation of money and the impact on operational capabilities,
the present U.S. posture does not yet reflect this recent escala-
tion in strategic budgets. In fact, the present operational force
is probably changing less rapidly than at any time since 1945—
a reflection of the low strategic budgets of fiscal 1965 through
1967. Thus, there has been time for argument, and at least
some resolution of differences and maturation of opinion about
the present situation, if not about future prospects and
objectives.

But unless the United States modifies its present plans, its

* The problems of objectives will continue to be serious ones as the United States develops policies and postures for the 1970's. They are discussed further below.

• 11

posture will soon begin to change qualitatively and rapidly as its operational forces begin to reflect decisions made during the last two years regarding such new systems as Sentinel, Poseidon, Minuteman III, and the FB-111 bomber. Soviet operational forces, in addition to growing rapidly, may also change in new qualitative ways if the U.S.S.R. deploys some systems it apparently has in development, such as fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) and land-mobile ICBM's.

We are in effect at a crossroad. The United States and the Soviet Union now have a better chance than they are likely to have in the foreseeable future to make decisions that may enable them to avoid or at least moderate another spiral in the strategic arms race. Such a race will not only be expensive and dangerous for both countries, but may also produce more disagreement in the United States about realistic and desirable strategic force objectives.

12

## II. FACTORS AFFECTING STRATEGIC DECISIONS

During the early 1960's there was hope, albeit without real encouragement from the Soviet Union, that even if one could not see an end to the Soviet-American competition in the strategic area, there might at least be a period of stability commencing in the late 1960's and carrying on into the 1970's —a perpetuation of the kind of qualitative balance that actually obtains today. This would imply the willingness of each side to rely on the capability of its strategic forces to deter any attack by the other, and an acceptance of the fact that with "sufficiency" in strategic offensive forces, little would be gained either by further growth in those forces or by deploying active defenses against them. Three considerations now make the realization of that hope questionable.

First, there is no evidence of a levelling off in the growth of Soviet strategic offensive capabilities, despite the fact that, at least as regards ICBM's, the Soviet force is now about equal in numbers to that of the United States.

Second, the development of some sort of nuclear capability is becoming easier for the lesser powers as the technology and the use of nuclear power become more widespread. Of particular concern is the fact that the Chinese nuclear program has moved ahead more rapidly than expected at the beginning of the decade.

Third, technological developments have led some to believe that there may be an increased possibility that in the event of a nuclear exchange, the superpowers might be able to limit damage to themselves to levels substantially below those that would result with present capabilities. Implied here is the belief that preemptive attack, the use of active defenses, or a combination of the two might be highly effective in destroying adversary defensive forces.

The chances of continuing the present stable situation into the 1970's may be enhanced if some restraint can soon be placed on these developments. It may be possible to buy time

• 13

through the implementation of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and by reaching agreement with the Soviet Union to constrain the deployment, and possibly the development, of new strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. Realistically, however, it must be recognized that, even if implemented, such agreements may not suffice. For example, the fact that Communist China will not be a party is a serious defect.

On the other hand, it is probable that without such agreements, or at least reciprocal unilateral restraint, a new spiral in the arms race will be one of the burdens of the 1970's. In the United States the beginnings are already reflected in the sharp rise in the budget for strategic systems.

## The Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense Possibility*

With the possible exception of the $n^{th}$ country problem, it has long seemed that the most serious threat to stability is the possibility of an offense-defense race: deployment of ABM systems; followed by compensating or over-compensating expansion of adversary offensive capabilities; followed in turn by further improvements in defenses, and so on. In the United States the prevalent view has been that such a cycle of action and reaction would be a futile exercise leading to no improvement in either American or Soviet security and to greatly increased expenditures for both nations. This conclusion, which contributed to the refusal of the U.S. Administrations of the last decade to deploy an anti-Soviet ABM system, was based on two considerations:

(1) no technology appeared in sight that would permit deployment of a defense that could not be offset by less expensive improvements in adversary capabilities;

(2) the Soviet Union would, it was believed, react to any U.S. defensive deployment by making just such improvements in its offensive capabilities.

On the first point there has been little dispute, certainly little in the American technical community. The second is more

* Unless otherwise specified, references to ABM are to systems designed exclusively or primarily to defend population and industry. For further discussion of the ABM problem, see Appendix.

• 14

contentious. It has been argued by ABM proponents that one
cannot be sure the Soviets would react to a U.S. defensive de-
ployment as former Defense Secretary McNamara and others
have postulated they would. Although they might continue to
expand their offensive capabilities, it is conceivable that this
would not compensate fully for the effects of a U.S. active
defense.

On the Soviet side, there was no evidence during the early
1960's that decision-makers were prepared to accept the pre-
vailing American views about the action-reaction phenomenon,
or about the intrinsic advantage of the offense and the futility
of defensive deployment.

Within the last few years there have been changes that might
indicate some convergence of Soviet and American views. It
has been noted that the Soviet ABM program is not proceeding
as rapidly as the Americans had expected. Indeed, there is no
evidence of deployment of any system other than that around
Moscow. This, plus the professed Soviet willingness to enter
into negotiations to control both offensive and defensive sys-
tems, may be indicative of some disillusionment regarding the
feasibility of deploying really effective defense systems; of
concern about the very large costs; or of concern about the
action-reaction arms race implications of ABM deployment.

On the U.S. side there has been increased interest in ABM
defense, in part triggered by concern about the more rapid
than expected development of nuclear capabilities by Com-
munist China, but also based on a somewhat changed view
regarding the technical problems and possibilities of defense.

Although most of the American technical community would
agree that the offense continues to have an advantage over the
defense, there is an enormous range of views held by experts
regarding the difficulties of penetrating defenses. In recent
months this has been brought out especially in discussions
about the probable effectiveness of a defense (Sentinel) to
cope with a possible Chinese offensive threat (see Appendix).
At one extreme, Richard Garwin and Hans Bethe have argued
that overcoming a defense such as Sentinel would be relatively
easy, and that even the Chinese could, and quite likely would,
incorporate in their first generation of ICBM's the necessary

.15

penetration aids to enable them to do so.⁵ At the other end of the spectrum, Johnson Administration spokesmen have maintained that it is within U.S. capability, at a cost of only $3 billion to $5 billion, to limit damage to the United States from a Chinese ICBM attack in the 1970's to a very low level.

The most extreme claims have been made by John Foster, the Pentagon's Director of Defense Research and Engineering —“I have reasonably high confidence that the Sentinel system, when first deployed, will provide damage *denial* against the Communist Chinese”⁶—and by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze who stated, “We are confident that this sophisticated defense can provide us with high assurance of denying damage to the United States from the type of attack the CPR [Chinese People's Republic] will be able to launch in the mid-70's. With further foreseeable improvements we believe we can maintain such protection at least until the 1980's.”⁷

The difference in judgment regarding the effectiveness of Sentinel is in part due to a difference in opinion about Chinese capabilities; but beyond that, there is a great range of opinion in the technical community regarding how well Sentinel could be expected to perform against Communist China or the Soviet Union. Some skeptics argue that the defense may fail catastrophically, considering its great complexity and the fact that it will never be possible to test the system adequately in peacetime.

## MIRV'S

One of the few comforting things about the present strategic balance was noted earlier: even if a nuclear holocaust seemed imminent, there would be little incentive for either of the superpowers to initiate a preemptive counterforce attack, because their strategic forces, particularly those of the United States, have been developed and deployed so that they can “ride out” an attack against them. The U.S. bomber force is in a sufficient state of alert so that, given the warning of missile attack which one can reasonably expect, a large fraction could be airborne before the arrival of Soviet missiles. The part of the Polaris force that is at sea—and it is the larger part—is believed to be almost invulnerable, considering present Soviet anti-submarine

16

warfare capabilities. And American ICBM's have been deployed with sufficient spacing between them, so that it is unlikely that more than one could be destroyed by a single Soviet warhead. Furthermore, the underground silos are believed to provide considerable protection against the blast effects of a nuclear explosion. Consequently, given the combination of yield and accuracy which, it is believed, characterize the present Soviet ICBM force, several Soviet missiles would be required on the average to destroy a single Minuteman or Titan.

The most serious threat to the present stability is the possibility of the development of systems for delivering several warheads from a single booster, each against a separate target, all with greater accuracies than have been realized so far. Such multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) now appear technically feasible, and the United States has announced its intention to equip both some of its land-based missiles (Minuteman III) and its sea-based missiles (Poseidon) with such reentry vehicles. This raises the at least theoretical possibility that with a preemptive attack the United States could destroy all of the Soviet fixed missiles, and other targets as well, with an American missile force smaller than the force it was attacking. Conversely, the Soviets could in principle destroy the American Minuteman and Titan force with a few hundred ICBM's, if each had several warheads that could be delivered with high accuracy.

The MIRV threat is not an immediate one to either side. It will take a major effort to develop the concept and the accuracies required for an effective counterforce capability. But there is no doubt that it is technically feasible. It is just a matter of time, engineering effort, and money—probably lots of all three.

The American decision to go ahead with the Minuteman III and Poseidon programs was taken only partly because of desire to have a greater "damage-limiting" capability than would otherwise be available in a missile force with a fixed number of launchers. The decision to procure systems employing MIRV's was specifically keyed to concern about Soviet ABM developments,⁸ and to the view that the United States must have a capability with a high degree of assurance of inflicting some

17

specified level of damage on the Soviet Union. A number of
other options could have been relied on as the prime means of
defeating a possible Soviet ABM defense, for example, pre-
cursor nuclear bursts to produce radar blackout; electronic
jamming; decoys and chaff; saturation of radar discrimination
capability; targeting of ABM radars; or combinations of these.
Certainly, with a heavy emphasis on such penetration tech-
niques, there would be a high probability of getting through
any defenses. Such options do not offer quite the assurance of
success that exhaustion through the use of MIRV's might offer
(assuming that the number of adversary interceptor missiles is
known). But neither is any of these other measures, or com-
binations of them, quite so likely to produce an expansion in
Soviet offensive forces, for they do not pose a threat to those
forces. MIRV's must pose such a threat in Soviet eyes, just as
Soviet MIRV's would to the United States.

In its attachment to "assured destruction" as a measure of
deterrent adequacy, and in focusing on MIRV's to maintain it,
the United States may end up paying a price that in the long
term could be a heavy one. Such high assurance was not always
an American requirement. In the pre-missile era there was con-
siderable uncertainty, probably more than many liked to admit,
about how well bombers could penetrate defenses. The United
States had an adequate deterrent because there was a reason-
ably high probability that it could inflict a very high level of
damage on the Soviet Union. It may be that with the uncer-
tainties that ABM defenses will introduce, the United States
will want or be forced to rely again on a reasonably high prob-
ability, rather than on near certainty, of being able to inflict a
high level of damage on our adversaries as a deterrent. This
will be particularly true if in striving for near certainty, the
arms race is fueled in ways that may result in a net diminution
of United States security. The "assured destruction" concept
probably served to limit expansion of American strategic forces
in the past few years. But in the years just ahead, as the un-
certainties now implicit in ABM's and MIRV's become ex-
plicit, this concept could be used to justify almost unlimited
expansion of strategic forces.

There are, of course, possible threats to strategic retaliatory

.18

forces besides MIRV's and ABM's. But none of the others
seems quite as serious. The development of fractional orbital
bombardment systems (FOBS) could enhance Soviet capa-
bility to attack American aircraft on the ground by surprise.
But that development is being countered by improved warning
systems. Advances in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) could
lead to some increase in the vulnerability of the Polaris fleet
if the United States did nothing to counter the development.
But ASW is likely to be a losing game for some time, since any
improvements will be offset, or more than offset, by improve-
ments in the missile-launching submarines or, if need be, by
extension of the range of the missiles they carry.

Concurrent Development of MIRV and ABM

While the possibility of either ABM or MIRV development
provides a stimulus to the arms race, in their combination
there is a more serious threat. It is conceivable that one of the
superpowers, with an ABM system, might develop MIRV's
to the point where it could use them to destroy the bulk of its
adversary's ICBM force in a preemptive attack. Its air and
ABM defenses would then have to deal with a much degraded
retaliatory blow, consisting only of the sea-launched forces and
any ICBM's and aircraft that might have survived the pre-
emptive attack. Problems of defense in such a contingency
would be formidable; however, they would be significantly
less difficult than if the adversary's ICBM force had not been
seriously depleted. The defense problem would be relatively
simple, particularly if the bulk of the adversary's retaliatory
capability were, as is true for the United States and to a far
greater degree for the Soviet Union, in its ICBM's, most of
which would presumably have been destroyed.

It may seem unlikely that either superpower would initiate
such a preemptive attack, in view of the hypothesized capa-
bilities, the great uncertainties in effectiveness, particularly as
regards defenses, and the disastrous consequences, should even
a relatively small fraction of the adversary's retaliatory force
get through. But with both MIRV's and ABM's such a pre-
emptive attack would not seem as unlikely as it does now. It
would not necessarily be irrational if an uncontrollable nuclear

.19

exchange appeared almost certain and if by striking first one
could limit damage to a significantly lower level than if the
adversary were to strike the first blow.* In short, if one or
both of the two superpowers had such capabilities, the world
would be a much more unstable place than it is now.

Obviously, neither superpower would permit its adversary
to develop such capabilities without responding, if it could,
by strengthening its retaliatory forces. But the response prob-
lem becomes more difficult if the adversary develops both
MIRV's and ABM's than if he develops only one.

Against a MIRV threat alone there are such obvious re-
sponses as greater reliance on sea-launched or other mobile
systems. Such responses are likely to be acceptable because,
while the costs of highly survivable systems are large (perhaps
larger by an order of magnitude than the costs of simple
ICBM's), only relatively small numbers of such secure re-
taliatory weapons would be required to provide an adequate
"assured destruction capability." Indeed, a force the size of
the present Polaris fleet might be adequate.

The response to ABM alone might also be kept within
acceptable limits because the expenditures required to offset
the effects of defense are, as indicated earlier, likely to be small
compared to the costs of the defense.

But if it is necessary to acquire retaliatory capabilities, which
are costly on a unit basis because of the MIRV threat, in
sufficient numbers to saturate or exhaust ABM defenses, the
total cost could be very great. Indeed, if one continued to rely
heavily on exhaustion of defenses as the preferred technique
for penetration, the offense might no longer have a significant
cost-effectiveness advantage over the defense.

Thus, the concurrent development of MIRV's and ABM's
raises the specter of a more precarious balance of terror a few
years hence, a rapidly escalating arms race in an attempt to
prevent the instabilities from getting out of hand, or quite
possibly both.

*This point is discussed further below.

• 20

## Communist China and the Sentinel Decision

It is difficult to grasp the implications of new technological factors for a rational strategic force policy for the 1970's. This would be so even if one had only bilateral U.S.-U.S.S.R. relationships to consider, but the emergence of China and possibly other states as nuclear powers compounds the difficulties. The problems have begun to come into focus as policy-makers have been forced to ponder:

(1) whether it is desirable to try to inhibit the spread of nuclear capabilities to other countries;

(2) what price the United States might be willing to pay to do so;

(3) what the chances of success of inhibiting nuclear spread might be;

(4) what the response should be to developments that the United States cannot prevent.

The first three questions have been at the heart of the debate on such issues as the NATO multilateral force (MLF), U.S. policy regarding control of fissionable materials and technology relevant to nuclear weapons development, and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

The first question—whether it is desirable to inhibit the spread of nuclear weapons—has been answered in the affirmative, at least by the United States and most other countries. The United States has not only decided that the spread is undesirable, but has also applied fairly stringent controls on its exports of nuclear fuel and equipment, despite some political and economic costs. And, in agreeing on a formulation of the non-proliferation treaty acceptable to the Soviet Union, the United States has incurred criticism, whether justified or not, from some quarters in Europe.

Nevertheless, the prospects for limiting the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities are not good. The technology for building both warheads and delivery systems is now within the reach of perhaps a dozen powers that do not have nuclear weapons; and with the growing use of nuclear reactors, an even larger number of nations will soon have quantities of plutonium adequate for limited stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The de-

• 21

velopment of capabilities that would be significant against one
of the superpowers could be an expensive proposition, par-
ticularly if one of them deployed limited ABM defense sys-
tems and if the emergent nuclear power desired high con-
fidence of penetrating that defense. But nuclear capabilities
that Israel might consider adequate against the Arab states, or
India against Pakistan, could be acquired at costs that are not
large compared to the present defense budgets of those nations.

There is some hope that these developments can be pre-
vented or at least delayed by the nuclear non-proliferation
treaty. But even if that treaty comes into effect, accession by
India, for one, appears unlikely. In any case there is the par-
ticularly worrisome problem of China.

Whether our strategic offensive forces would alone be ade-
quate to deter a Chinese nuclear attack requires judgments
about the vulnerability of China and the rationality of its
leadership.

Because a relatively small fraction of it is urban, China's
population is far less vulnerable than that of the United States
or the Soviet Union to nuclear attack (except to an attack with
large yield weapons relying heavily on fall-out). However,
China's modern industry is heavily concentrated and could be
destroyed with a small number of nuclear weapons. These
could be delivered without significantly compromising Ameri-
can capabilities against the U.S.S.R. This is true not only be-
cause U.S. strategic offensive capabilities are so large relative
to actual requirements for retaliation against either country,
but also because Chinese air defenses are so poor that the
United States could use bombers with great flexibility, and with
only moderate losses, to deliver an attack of almost any weight
against China.

Thus, the only impediment to relying on strategic offensive
capabilities as a deterrent to Chinese nuclear attack is possible
irrationality of the Chinese leadership. On this point there is
an extraordinary divergence of opinion. Some, for example,
Air Force Chief of Staff General J. P. McConnell, argue that
the Chinese are highly irrational, but the record hardly sug-
gests that. On the contrary, despite a notorious record of
vituperation, the Chinese have been rather careful in the actual

.22

use of force, particularly when there was any likelihood of open conflict with the United States or the Soviet Union.

However, one does not have to subscribe to the McConnell view to admit the possibility of Chinese nuclear attack, particularly in response to great provocation. As long as there is any possibility, possession by China of an intercontinental nuclear capability will serve to some degree as an effective deterrent to large-scale U.S. actions against China. This is particularly true considering that the interests in the Far East over which the United States and China might come into conflict are not likely to be vital to the Americans, and the damage the United States might suffer, should the Chinese retaliate, could be very great.

Indeed, the desire to have a deterrent with regard to the United States may well have been one of the major motivations for the extraordinary effort China has made to develop a nuclear weapons capability. (Other reasons are prestige, and possible use to coerce its neighbors in Asia.)

Recognizing that a Chinese nuclear attack, however irrational, could not be discounted completely, the United States made the decision to deploy Sentinel. But one must wonder about its effectiveness in coping with China's nuclear capability. The Johnson Administration made it clear that Sentinel was to be bought largely because of its anticipated effectiveness in reducing damage to the United States in the event of a Chinese ICBM attack in the 1970's.¹⁰ This is an objective it may well accomplish. Will it have any other value? It will hardly diminish the prestige that China has acquired through possession of a nuclear capability; on the contrary, the decision to deploy Sentinel will tend to magnify the importance of the Chinese achievement. And Sentinel is hardly a direct response to the possibility that China might threaten its neighbors with nuclear attack, although it was claimed by the Johnson Administration that Sentinel would reinforce confidence in Asian states that the United States would come to their aid if they were threatened by China.¹¹

Sentinel could conceivably do that by restoring whatever freedom of action the United States might have felt it had to intervene in Asia before the Chinese acquisition of an inter-

• 23

continental nuclear capability, but only if there was extra-
ordinarily high confidence in the system's effectiveness; other-
wise, the Chinese nuclear capability would still be able to serve
what may have been its primary purpose—deterrence of the
United States. Can one have that high confidence? Probably
not, considering the many uncertainties involved in the effec-
tiveness of ABM systems (see Appendix).* But that is only
one side of the coin. The other in some ways more worrisome
possibility is that the United States might base vital decisions
on misplaced confidence in Sentinel.

Another aspect of the decision to deploy Sentinel is its possi-
ble impact on the Soviet-American strategic relationship. In
short, it would appear that the Sentinel decision has very seri-
ous implications. The issue is whether the possible utility of
Sentinel in saving lives in the unlikely event of a Chinese nu-
clear attack is sufficient to justify the costs, the risks that the
United States might act on the basis of misplaced confidence in
its effectiveness, and the undesirable impact of the decision on
the Soviet-American strategic balance. Any conceivable flexi-
bility Sentinel may give in dealing with Chinese aggressiveness
or with the accidental launch of missiles against the United
States is probably negligible compared to these considerations.

The Role of Uncertainty in the Dynamics of the Arms Race

As the foregoing discussion indicates, uncertainty about adver-
sary intentions and capabilities may well be the most powerful
stimulant of the arms race. Its pernicious effects can be illus-
trated by several examples:

(1) American reaction, indeed over-reaction, to uncer-
tainty in the case of the "missile gap";

(2) the Soviet decision to deploy the so-called Tallinn air defense system, possibly made in the expectation

* This argument seems sound to the extent that one is concerned about most kinds of action one might take against China. In a contingency where the United States would be prepared to use nuclear weapons in the numbers required for an effective attack against Chinese ICBM capabilities, it might have some confidence that Sentinel could actually intercept whatever, if any, Chinese ICBM's had survived an American preemptive attack. That is the one option that might be significantly more acceptable if the United States had Sentinel than if it did not.

.24

that the United States would go ahead with deploy-
ment of B-70 bombers or SR-71 strike reconnais-
sance aircraft;

(3) the Sentinel decision.

An even better illustration is the United States response to the
Tallinn system (which until recently was thought to be an ABM
system) and to the possible extension of the Moscow ABM
system into a country-wide system. In order to have high as-
surance of its ability to get through possible Soviet ABM de-
fenses, the United States has embarked on the development of
various penetration aids and even of new missiles—Minuteman
III and Poseidon.

All these examples have in common the fact that if doubt
exists about adversary capabilities or intentions, prudence
requires that one respond, not on the basis of what one expects,
but on a considerably more pessimistic projection. The United
States generally bases its plans—and makes much of the fact—
on what has become known as the “greater-than-expected
threat.” In so doing, the Americans—and presumably the
Russians—have often over-reacted. The extent of the over-
reaction is directly dependent on the degree of uncertainty
about adversary intentions and capabilities.

The problem is compounded by lead-time requirements for
response. According to the Johnson Administration, the de-
cisions to go ahead with Minuteman III, Poseidon, and Sentinel
had to be made when they were because of the possibility that
in the mid-1970's the Soviets might have a reasonably effective
ABM, and the Chinese an ICBM, capability.¹² And the Soviets
had to make a decision to develop the Tallinn system (if the
decision was made because of the B-70 program), long before
the Americans themselves knew whether they would deploy
an operational B-70 force.

Once the decisions to respond to ambiguous indications of
adversary activity were made, it proved impossible to modify
the response, even when new intelligence became available.
For example, between the time of announcement of the Senti-
nel decision and the Congressional debate on the appropriation
for it, evidence became available that the Chinese threat was
not developing as rapidly as had been feared. Yet despite this

.25

[10]

information, those in the Congress who attempted to defer the appropriation for Sentinel failed. Similarly, at this writing, as the Poseidon and Minuteman III programs begin to move forward with momentum, it seems much less likely than it did at the time of their conception that the Soviet Union will deploy the kind of ABM system that was the Johnson Administration's main rationale for these programs. On the Soviet side, the Tallinn deployment continued long after it became clear that no operational B-70 force would ever be built.

Of the kinds of weapons development that can stimulate over-response on the part of one's adversary, it is hard to imagine one more troublesome than anti-ballistic missile defenses. Besides uncertainty about adversary intentions, and the need, because of lead-time requirements, for early response to what the adversary might do, there is the added fact that the uncertainties about how well an ABM system might perform are far larger than in the case of strategic offensive systems. The conservative defense planner will design his ABM system on the assumption that it may not work as well as he hopes—that is, he will over-design it to take into account as fully as he can all imaginable modes of failure and enemy offensive threats. But the offensive planner will assume that the defense might perform much better than he expects and will over-design his response. Thus, there is over-reaction on both sides. These uncertainties result in a divergent process: an arms race with no apparent limits other than financial, each round more expensive than the last. Also, because of over-reaction on the part of the offense, there may be an increase in the ability of each side to inflict damage on the other.

All one needs to make this depressing possibility a bleak reality is a triggering mechanism. The Soviet ABM program, by stimulating the Minuteman III and Poseidon programs, may have served that purpose. And, perhaps unintentionally, the Chinese nuclear program also may have triggered an action-reaction chain, of which the Sentinel response is the second link.

It can be assumed that there will be considerable pressure and effort to make Sentinel highly effective against a "greater-than-expected" Chinese threat. But such a system will un-

26

doubtedly have some capability against Soviet ICBM's. Soviet
decision-makers, who must assume that Sentinel might perform
better than they expect, will at least have to consider this
possibility as they plan their offensive capabilities. More im-
portant, they will have to respond on the assumption that the
Sentinel decision may foreshadow a decision to build an anti-
Soviet ABM system. Although the Johnson Administration
has argued that there need be no such response, * several facts
seem to contradict this:

(1) there has been support for the Sentinel decision as a first step toward an anti-Soviet ABM deployment, particularly by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and such influential Senators as Richard Russell of Georgia.†

(2) Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford has acknowledged that Sentinel will complicate the Soviet attack problem;**13

(3) Sentinel will include components that could easily be integrated into an anti-Soviet system;

(4) because of the Sentinel program, production lines will have been established that will shorten the lead-time for an anti-Soviet ABM deployment.

* Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke has argued that "because our proposed deployment poses no possible threat to the Soviet deterrent, it need lead to no acceleration of the Soviet-American strategic arms race."¹⁴ And former Secretary of Defense McNamara has stated, "There will not be any misunderstanding by the Russians because they are sophisticated enough to see, in the development plans that will be made public, the distinction between Chinese-oriented and Soviet-oriented population protection systems."¹⁵

† General Earle Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that he was satisfied with the Sentinel decision because "everything is being done that will contribute to the type of defense which the Joint Chiefs have been advocating [i.e., a full-scale ABM]."¹⁶ He and General Harold K. Johnson also alluded to the possible expansion of Sentinel to a Nike X (i.e., anti-Soviet) type system.¹⁷ Senator Russell has stated "I consider it [Sentinel] primarily the beginning of a system to protect the people of this country against a Soviet missile atomic attack."¹⁸

** This is also apparent from former Secretary of Defense McNamara's last posture statement, which included an estimate that, should the Soviets fail to respond to the Sentinel deployment by providing penetration aids for their missiles, U.S. fatalities would be reduced from 120 million to about 100 million in the event of an all-out war in the mid-1970's.¹⁹

· 27

Thus, it is probably not a question of whether the Soviet Union will respond to Sentinel. One must consider instead whether the U.S.S.R. will limit its response to one that does not require a U.S. counter-response, and whether it is too late to stop the Sentinel deployment.

With such examples in mind, it is apparent that reduction in uncertainty about adversary intentions and capabilities is a sine qua non to curtailing the strategic arms race. There are a number of ways of accomplishing this (in addition to intelligence collection, which obviously makes a great contribution).

First, there is unilateral disclosure. In the case of the United States there has been a conscious effort to inform both the American public and the Soviet leadership of the rationale for many American decisions regarding strategic systems and, to the extent consistent with security, of U. S. capabilities. This has been done particularly through the release by the Secretary of Defense of an annual posture statement—a practice which, it is hoped, will be continued by the United States and emulated some day by the Soviet Union. This would be in the interest of both countries. Because there has been no corresponding effort by the Russians, the United States probably over-reacts to Soviet decisions more than they do to American decisions. (At least, it is easier to trace a causal relationship between Russian decisions and U. S. reactions than vice versa.)

Second, negotiations to curtail the arms race, even if abortive, or any other dialogue may be very useful if such efforts result in any reduction of uncertainty about the policies, capabilities, or intentions of the parties.

Finally, some weapons systems may be less productive of uncertainty than others that might be chosen instead. For example, it is likely to be less difficult to measure the size of a force of submarine-launched or fixed missiles than that of a land-mobile force. Similarly, it would be easier to persuade an adversary that a small missile carried only a single warhead than would be the case with a large vehicle. Such considerations must be borne in mind in evaluating alternative weapons systems.

In short, while uncertainty about adversary capabilities and intentions may not always be bad—in some cases, the existence

· 28

of uncertainty contributes to deterrence—the U.S. and the
Soviet Union would seem well advised to make great efforts
to avoid giving each other cause to over-react to decisions be-
cause of inadequate understanding of their meaning.

Economic Considerations

It has been pointed out that in terms of total obligatory
authority, the annual American budget for strategic forces has
risen about 40 per cent in the last three years: from some $6.7
billion for fiscal 1966 to $9.6 billion for fiscal 1969. A major
part of this increase arises from the three new strategic pro-
grams—Poseidon, Minuteman III, and Sentinel. The estimated
total cost of the three amounts to about $10 billion over
several years.

If no other new strategic programs are begun before these
are completed, it might be possible to get through the next few
years without the budget for strategic forces growing much
beyond that proposed for fiscal 1969. However, that seems
unlikely. Aside from the probability that the actual costs of the
aforementioned programs will exceed the estimates, other
developments are in sight.

Johnson Administration spokesmen have made it clear that
Sentinel will have to be upgraded to take into account im-
provements in Chinese capabilities. This could be very costly
since it would probably require the addition of terminal de-
fenses for cities and a comprehensive fall-out shelter program.
Thus, upgrading Sentinel could easily cost an additional $1
billion to $3 billion per year starting in the early 1970's, with
costs increasing rapidly thereafter.

Second, there is the possibility of expanding the Sentinel
system into a full-scale anti-Soviet ABM system. In that case
the costs would probably be at least $5 billion a year shortly
after the expansion began.

Third, there is a proposal to develop an improved air de-
fense system involving an air-borne warning and control system
(AWACS) with a ten-year cost of $10 billion to $12 billion.

Fourth, there is pressure for a new advanced manned stra-
tegic aircraft (AMSA) to replace the B-52's, a program that
may cost $10 billion spread over several years.

.29

Finally, there is a possibility, already under consideration, of new U.S. strategic missile programs. The possible vulnerability of American strategic forces to a Soviet MIRV threat would provide one impetus for such programs. A massive Soviet ABM program would be another. The character and magnitude of the American response would depend on which of these Soviet developments was of concern to the United States. If both were, the U.S. response could well cost $3 billion to $5 billion per year.

Thus, if one considers only the programs now under way and under serious consideration, during the early 1970's, the U.S. can expect annual budgets for strategic forces of between $12 billion and $25 billion. By the late 1970's, costs could be even higher.

The impact of these high levels of expenditure, particularly over a long period of time, on economic growth and on the ability to meet other demands of society, cannot be dismissed lightly. If one makes the assumption that the United States could otherwise maintain a high level of unemployment, the social costs of allocating 2 per cent of GNP in the early part of the next decade to a strategic weapons program, and possibly a larger fraction during the latter half, are glaring. On the other hand, if the American economy would otherwise be operating with substantial unemployment, the effect might be relatively small, even at a level of $25 billion per year. Even then, however, a large fraction of the country's advanced engineering talent would be committed to endeavors that produce little spin-off relevant to major social problems. If full employment is achieved as a consequence of large military programs, short-term economic problems may be avoided. However, in so doing, the country is denied the long-term benefits of investing the same resources in its capital plant, in education, and in the other foundations on which society is built.

The direct costs inherent in high levels of defense expenditure are not the only drawbacks. Military programs and the fortunes and influence of the military-industrial complex, of which President Eisenhower spoke in his farewell address, are dependent on the maintenance of conflict or at least on a high level of international tension. It would be a mistake to claim

30

that armaments are the sole, or even the primary, cause of
such tensions. But it would also be wrong to deny that arma-
ments cause tensions—witness the Cuban missile crisis. In a
very real sense the arms race feeds on itself with adverse effects
on international relations.

In this connection the impact of an expensive arms race on
Soviet society should also be of concern. Some Johnson Admin-
istration witnesses have testified that they are not particularly
unhappy about the prospect of Soviet expenditures on defenses.
Therefore, they argue for AMSA on the grounds that it would
divert to air defenses Soviet resources that would otherwise be
available for improving Soviet offensive capabilities, which
would cause more concern.²⁰ This argument is open to serious
question. In the Soviet Union, probably to an even greater
degree than in the United States, demands for new weapons
systems, whether defensive or offensive, will almost certainly
be met largely at the expense of the civil economy. And there
is little basis for doubting the capacity of the Soviet economy
to meet these demands.

It would be a mistake to believe that by spending enough on
arms the U.S. can force the Soviet Union to accept second
class status simply because of its smaller economic and in-
dustrial capacity. Long before that point is reached America's
own growth will have been stunted and its society badly dis-
torted by the military demands placed on it.

The effect of the arms race on Soviet decision-making must
also be considered. A rapid growth rate and increased con-
sumption and consumer influence in the Soviet Union are
almost certainly in the long-term U.S. interest. Conversely,
the greater the Soviet defense budget, the stronger will be the
hand and the longer the tenure of those elements in Moscow
most inimical to the United States.

Thus, increased allocation of Soviet resources to the arms
race is triply disadvantageous: in increasing the threat to the
United States; in requiring that the country devote its own
resources to responding; and in delaying changes in Soviet
society which are the long-term hope for a more stable, peace-
ful world.

.31

### III. OPTIONS FOR THE SEVENTIES

Looking to the future, the United States is confronted with two broad dilemmas: that of minimizing the likelihood of escalation while relying on it as a deterrent; and that of reconciling the desire to minimize damage to the U.S. in the event of war with the desire to escape the adverse consequences that may flow from developing damage-limiting capabilities.

The first seems the easier to deal with. Escalation to an all-out nuclear war is properly seen as such a disaster that extraordinary efforts seem justified in order to minimize this risk. Yet American interests have sometimes been served by the possibility of escalation, because it deterred the superpowers from involvement in political or military confrontations.

Relying on escalation is the cheap defense for Western Europe and particularly for Berlin. But unless damage that the Soviet Union can inflict on the United States can be limited to low levels—which seems unlikely—it is an extremely risky option. Relying on the threat of escalation may lack credibility, and if it is put to the test the United States loses either way, whether escalation results or whether it does not.

It is within the power of the United States to increase the likelihood of escalation and hence its credibility as a deterrent. This has happened as a result of American deployment of large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons and delivery systems in Europe. The original build-up of those capabilities was based, in part, on the expectation that they could be used in tactical combat to effect a favorable outcome for the West without necessarily leading to a strategic nuclear exchange between the superpowers. For the last decade, however, this possibility has been discounted. Today, one of the major effects of these tactical nuclear weapons is to create something approaching a continuum in the scale of violence between conventional combat on the one hand, and a full-scale thermonuclear exchange on the other. Thus, the transition from the one to the other is made more probable, and the credibility of

32

the deterrent thereby enhanced. (The additional role they
serve, or at least the rationale for their deployment, is to
buttress the confidence of some of the Western allies in the
American commitment to their defense.)

There are other possible mechanisms for making escalation
more likely. British and French possession of nuclear capa-
bilities may serve that purpose, as would further proliferation
of nuclear weapons capabilities or relaxation of American
control over U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.

When one looks beyond Europe, it is occasionally argued
that strategic forces may be of value in compelling non-nuclear
or weaker nuclear powers to behave as the United States would
like. At best, this concept is of limited utility. Against nuclear
powers it would be useful only if the United States had some-
thing approaching a damage-denial capability against the
country in question. Against nuclear and non-nuclear powers
it would be useful only if the risks of uncontrollable escalation
were practically non-existent. In fact, nuclear strength has re-
peatedly proven irrelevant to problems that have arisen on the
periphery of Asia and Africa.

The hard reality is that the United States cannot minimize
the probability of escalation while attempting to rely on it as
a mechanism for deterring a broad range of conventional or
limited nuclear attacks. Nor can the threat of limited use of
strategic nuclear capabilities be relied on as an effective in-
strument for exerting American political power.

Despite the cost and the opposition from some Western
allies, it seems wise to continue to move, as has been done since
the days of John Foster Dulles' massive retaliation doctrine,
further away from reliance on the likelihood of escalation, and
toward increased reliance on conventional strength as a deter-
rent to conventional threats.

The second policy dilemma—the incompatability of a
“damage-limiting” policy with other U.S. objectives—is more
difficult to deal with. It has two facets. First, there is the
possibility that certain actions taken by the superpowers to
reduce damage, should deterrence fail, may lead to an increase
in the probability that it will fail, particularly if the adversary
should fail to modify his force posture in response to those

.33

actions. This point is illustrated in Table II, taken from former Secretary of Defense McNamara's posture statement for fiscal 1967. This shows that American fatalities (in 1975) would be only about one-third as great in the event of a U.S. first strike as in the case of a Soviet first strike, assuming a greatly expanded threat, extensive damage-limiting efforts by the United States, and failure of the Soviet Union to react to U.S. damage-limiting efforts by improving its retaliatory capabilities. Obviously, if war seemed imminent, with the strategic balance as hypothesized in the Table, there would be tremendous pressure on the United States to strike first. There would be corresponding pressure on the Soviet Union to do likewise if a Soviet first strike could result, not only in a much higher level of damage to the United States, but also in a diminution in damage to the U.S.S.R. And the incentives would be mutually reinforcing.

In short, there is an inherent inconsistency in the objectives spelled out in our basic military policy, namely, "to deter aggression at any level and, should deterrence fail, to terminate hostilities in concert with our allies under conditions of relative advantage while limiting damage to the United States and allied interests."²¹ Hard choices must be made between attempting to minimize the chance of escalation and attempting to minimize the consequences if it does occur.

Actually, the United States may have only limited freedom of action in trying to achieve the latter objective even if it tries to do so. For example, it is unlikely that the Soviets would passively watch the United States develop the damage-limiting postures hypothesized in Table II; rather they would probably react by modifying their force posture so that the advantage to the United States of attacking preemptively would be less than indicated in the Table.

This is the second facet of the dilemma: to what extent will any measure to limit damage to the United States in the event of a nuclear war stimulate a compensating or over-compensating

34

ing reaction in the structuring of Soviet forces? This is especially troublesome, for while the United States generally reacts by anticipating possible Soviet moves, one cannot be sure of the extent to which the Soviets do likewise.

TABLE II

DAMAGE TO THE UNITED STATES
ASSUMING MAJOR
DAMAGE-LIMITING EFFORTS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th colspan="2">Soviet damage potential<br>in terms of millions of<br>U.S. fatalities<sup>a</sup></th></tr><tr><th></th><th>Soviet<br>first<br>strike</th><th>U. S.<br>first<br>strike</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>U.S.S.R. threat I:<sup>b</sup></strong></td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture A</td><td>80-95</td><td>25-40</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture B</td><td>50-80</td><td>20-30</td></tr><tr><td colspan="3"><strong>U.S.S.R. threat II:</strong></td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture C</td><td>105-110</td><td>35-55</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. DL posture D</td><td>75-100</td><td>25-40</td></tr></tbody></table>

<sup>(a)</sup> Rounded to the nearest 5,000,000.

<sup>(b)</sup> DL is damage-limiting. Both the Soviet threats and the U.S. damage-limiting postures are hypothetical.

SOURCE: Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, "Approach to the Fiscal Year 1967-71," Program and Fiscal Year 1966-67 Budget, in U.S. House of Representatives (89th Cong., 2d Sess.), *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1967, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, Part I* (June 1966), pp. 46-47.

35

Recognizing this uncertainty, many responsible Americans, including senior military officers, assign high priority to capabilities to limit damage to the United States in the event of war. Whether they are right in advocating such capabilities depends upon the extent to which the action-reaction hypothesis applies to the Soviet decision-making process, as well as the impact of such actions on the probability of a failure of deterrence.

The decisions taken in recent years with respect to new weapons development and deployment reflect a middle ground philosophy. The United States has generally avoided actions whose primary rationale was to limit damage which the Soviet Union might inflict upon it, and to which the Soviets would probably respond. Thus, the United States has not deployed an anti-Soviet ABM system, and has given air defense low priority.

On the other hand, where there were reasons other than a desire to improve American damage-limiting capability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the United States has proceeded with programs despite their probable escalatory effect on the arms race or their effect on first-strike incentives. This was true in the case of MIRV's and Sentinel.

The United States will face more such decisions. For example, it may appear necessary to change the U. S. strategic offensive posture in order to make American forces less vulnerable to possible Soviet MIRV attack. The nature of these decisions will depend on the importance attached to the action-reaction phenomenon and to the effect of improved counterforce capabilities on the probability of war. Emphasis on these two factors implies discounting options that would increase U.S. counterforce capability against Soviet strategic forces, which in turn might provoke an expansion of Soviet offensive forces. Options requiring long lead-times would also be discounted, since decisions regarding them might have to be taken while there was still uncertainty about whether the Soviet Union was developing MIRV's.

Should more weight be given in the future to developing damage-limiting capabilities? Or should more weight be given to minimizing the probability of a thermonuclear exchange and curtailing the strategic arms race? Again, as in the case of

36

the escalation phenomenon, it is hard to see how one can have
it both ways.

Despite some changes in technology, there is little to indicate
that the United States could get very far with damage-limiting
efforts, considering the determination of the Soviets and the
options available to them for denying the attainment of such
U.S. capabilities.

The emergence of new nuclear powers, the rapid pace of
technological advance, and the other important demands on
American resources suggest that a clear first priority should be
assigned to moderating the action-reaction cycle. Moving to-
ward greater emphasis on "damage-limitation" would seem
justified only if the United States can persuade itself that the
Soviets will not react to American moves as the United States
would to theirs, and if means can be chosen that will not in-
crease the probability of war.

Negotiations to Curtail the Arms Race

In considering negotiations with the Soviet Union on the stra-
tegic arms problem, the first factor to be borne in mind is the
objectives to be sought. It would be a mistake to expect too
much or to aspire to too little.

One obvious aim is to reduce strategic armaments in order
to lessen significantly the damage that would be sustained by
the United States (and the U.S.S.R.) in the event of a nuclear
exchange. Regrettably, this goal is not likely to be realized in
the near future. In the first place, any initial understandings
will probably not involve reductions in strategic forces. Even
if they did, these reductions would be limited. One cannot
expect damage levels to be lowered by more than a few per
cent, even with fairly substantial cuts in strategic forces, be-
cause the capabilities of the superpowers are already so great.

Other objectives have been considered: reducing the in-
centives to strike preemptively in time of crisis; reducing the
probability of accident or miscalculation; and increasing the
time available for decision-making in the hope that the in-
creased opportunity for communication might prevent a nu-
clear exchange from running its full course. Last but not least,
one might also hope to change the international political cli-

.37

mate so as to lessen tension, to reduce the incentive for powers that presently do not have nuclear weapons to acquire them, and to increase the possibility for agreement by the super-powers on other meaningful arms control measures.

It is reasonable to expect that successful negotiations might achieve all these objectives to some degree, except the first—reduction of potential damage. However, to focus on any one, or a combination of them, is to obscure the immediate problem. Despite the United States' restraint in its choices regarding strategic weapons development and deployment during the first two-thirds of this decade, it now appears that in the absence of some understanding with the Soviet Union, the United States will be unable to break the action-reaction sequence which propels the arms race. Thus, the immediate objective of any negotiations must be to bring that sequence to a halt or to moderate its pace, so that there will be a better chance of ending the arms race than is offered by continuing the policies of the last two decades.

In retrospect, controlling or reversing the growth of strategic capabilities could have been accomplished more easily a few years ago, when the possibility of ABM deployment seemed to be the factor that would be likely to drive the United States to another round in the arms race. Now the ABM prospect is more troublesome because of technological advances. In addition, there are the two other stimuli already discussed: the possibility of effective counterforce capabilities as a result of the development of MIRV's; and the possibility that the Chinese nuclear capability may serve as a catalyst to the Soviet-American action-reaction phenomenon.

Obviously, short of destroying them by nuclear attack, there is little the United States can do about Chinese capabilities except to make sure that it does not give them more weight in its thinking than they deserve. This leaves the option of trying to break the ABM-MIRV chain by focusing on control of MIRV's or ABM defenses.

While one might hope to limit both, if a choice must be made, the focus should clearly be on the latter. Verification of compliance would be relatively simple and could probably be accomplished without intrusive inspection. Moreover, the in-

38

centive to acquire MIRV's for penetrating defenses would be eliminated—although the incentive to acquire them for counterforce purposes would remain.

The problems of verifying compliance with an agreement to control MIRV's would be very difficult. Also if ABM deployment occurred, there would be great pressure to abrogate or violate any agreement prohibiting MIRV deployment because MIRV's offer high assurance for penetrating defenses. While reversing the MIRV decision would be difficult, doing so in the case of Sentinel would present less of a problem. In fact, there may well be sufficient reason for doing this, aside from the possible impact on Soviet-American negotiations on arms limitation.

To be attractive to the Soviet Union, any proposal to limit defenses would almost certainly have to be coupled with an agreement to limit, if not reduce, inventories of deployed strategic offensive forces. In principle, this should not be difficult, since it need not involve serious verification problems.

Complicating any attempt to reach understanding with the Soviet Union on the strategic balance is the fact that there are asymmetries in the American and Soviet positions. The United States has allies and bases around the periphery of the Soviet Union, whereas the latter has neither near the United States, unless one counts Cuba. It is clear that a Pandora's box of complications could be opened by any attempt in the context of negotiations on the strategic balance to deal with the threat to America's allies posed by short-range Soviet delivery systems, and with the potential threat to the U.S.S.R. of systems in Europe that could reach the Soviet Union, even though they are primarily tactical in nature. Hopefully initial understandings will not have to include specific agreements on such thorny issues as foreign bases and dual purpose systems.

Virtually all of the above is based on the premise that for the foreseeable future each side will probably insist on maintaining substantial deterrent capabilities. For some time to come there will be little basis for expecting negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to result in a strategic balance with each side relying on a few dozen weapons as a deterrent. The difficulties and importance of verification of compliance at such low levels,

39

the problem of Communist China, the existence of large num-
bers of tactical nuclear weapons on both sides, and the general
political climate all militate against this. At the other extreme,
negotiations would almost necessarily be doomed to failure if
either party based its negotiating position on the expectation
that it might achieve a significant damage-limiting capability
vis-à-vis the other.

Thus, the range of possible agreement is quite narrow. There
is a basis for hope (a) if both sides can accept the fact that for
some time the most they can expect to achieve is a strategic
balance at quite high, but less rapidly escalating, force levels;
and (b) if both recognize that breaking the action-reaction
cycle should be given first priority in any negotiations.

There will be risks in negotiating arms limitation. These
must be weighed not against the risks that might characterize
the peaceful world in which everyone would like to live, or
even against the risks of the present. Rather, the risks implicit
in any agreement must be weighed against the risks and costs
which in the absence of agreement one will probably have
to confront in the 1970's.

A Final Note

Whether the superpowers strive to curtail the strategic arms
race through mutual agreement or through a combination of
unilateral restraint and improved dialogue, they should not do
so in the mistaken belief that the bases for the Soviet-American
confrontation of the last two decades will soon be eliminated.
Many of the sources of tension have their origins deep in the
social structures and political institutions of the two countries.
Resolution of those differences will not be accomplished over-
night.

However, restraining the arms race may shorten the time
required for resolution of the conflicts; may increase the
chances of survival during that period; and, may enable the
Soviet Union and the United States, despite political differ-
ences, to work more effectively, both individually and in con-
cert, on the other great problems that confront the two
societies.

. 40

# APPENDIX: ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES

## Kinds of ABM Systems

Anti-ballistic missile defenses fall into two categories: one type employs exoatmospheric interception, in principle providing protection for large areas; the other is designed to intercept the incoming warhead late in its trajectory, so that a single interceptor site can defend only a very limited area. The latter category may be subdivided into systems designed to defend cities, and so-called "hard-point defenses," designed to defend ICBM sites or other "hardened" key facilities. The problems of hard-point defense and city defense are somewhat different. Hard-point defense is technically easier, as missile sites or other hard points can be designed to withstand close-in nuclear bursts that would destroy cities; thus interception can be deferred until relatively late in the trajectory of the incoming missile. Also, a lower degree of effectiveness may be acceptable.

ABM systems are often evaluated by comparing their cost with what the other side would have to spend on improving offensive capabilities to offset their effect. The comparison has generally proved favorable to the offense. This is particularly true if the objective of the defense is to reduce expected damage from a nuclear attack to very low levels—less so if the objective of the defense is limited to reducing damage only slightly.

To some, prospects for the defense appear somewhat better than they did a few years ago. While at that time it was generally thought that the offense would have perhaps a ten- to fifty-fold cost-effectiveness advantage over the defense (assuming intermediate levels of damage reduction), it is probably

41

(3) there is a realization that area-type defenses may be somewhat more attractive than was thought a few years ago—in part because of technological changes in interceptor warheads.

## Sentinel

In announcing the Sentinel decision, former Secretary of Defense McNamara made it clear that he regarded the decision as marginal.²² He also indicated that despite the possibility of some Chinese ICBM's leaking through it, Sentinel might save up to 14 million American lives in the event of a Chinese first strike with ICBM's during the 1970's.²³ Subsequently, other Johnson Administration spokesmen claimed the system could deny damage to the United States from a Chinese nuclear attack.²⁴ However, to have high confidence in the system one must allay doubts of three kinds. First, there is the question of whether such a complicated system will work at all when called upon to do so. It must be recognized that while component tests will be possible, it will never be feasible to test the full system against a satisfactory simulation of an operational environment. This fact, together with the history of initial failures of far less complicated systems, leads many experts to believe that the probability of a catastrophic failure of Sentinel, or any other ABM system, is high (and much higher than for strategic

• 42

offensive systems which are, by comparison, simpler and more
susceptible to adequate testing).

Second, there is the possibility that the Chinese may develop
penetration aids that could defeat the system. This possibility
is discussed at some length by Richard Garwin and Hans
Bethe.²⁵ The author is not aware of any convincing rebuttal of
their thesis. General A. W. Betts, Chief of Research and De-
velopment for the Army, in replying to the Garwin-Bethe ar-
gument, disputes the contention that development of effective
penetration aids would be as easy as claimed. To make his
point, he cites American difficulties in developing high con-
fidence penetration aids.²⁶ There are, however, two considera-
tions that make this experience largely irrelevant:

(1) Our programs aim at the development of penetration aids effective not only against exoatmospheric defenses but also against terminal interception. If one has to cope only with the former, which is all that is required in the case of Sentinel, the problem is much less complex.

(2) Although the Chinese would probably prefer to have a high confidence system as a deterrent against the United States, one with a moderate probability of penetrating the Sentinel defenses might be almost as useful to them.

Third, there is the fact, mentioned earlier, that damage de-
nial is a much more demanding task than simply reducing dam-
age by small amounts. The extreme difficulties involved can
be illustrated by a simple calculation. Let it be assumed that
a given target is defended by 50 interceptors, that the Chinese
have 25 ICBM's with a reliability of 80 per cent, and that each
interceptor has an 80 per cent chance of destroying an ICBM.
According to this scenario, there is no more than about a 50
per cent probability that Sentinel would succeed in preventing
all 25 ICBM's from hitting their target. It must be borne in
mind that the offense can choose any target on which to con-
centrate its attack; the defense must defend all. The range of
the Spartan interceptor, which is used with the Sentinel sys-
tem, implies that not 50 interceptors, but about 500 would
have to be deployed throughout the United States if every

. 43

When one considers that a single one-megaton warhead detonated over one of the larger U. S. cities would produce about one million fatalities, it is clear that those who claim a damage-denial or near damage-denial capability for Sentinel are assuming an extraordinarily high level of effectiveness.

As Chinese capabilities grow, the defense problem will become even more difficult. This is illustrated by an extension of the sample calculation: if the numbers of Chinese ICBM's and the United States interceptors are both doubled, the chance of at least one Chinese missile getting to its target rises to over 70 per cent, to over 90 per cent if the numbers of ICBM's and interceptors are both quadrupled, and so on. In the long run then (and it may not be too long a run), defense clearly becomes a losing game even against a relatively weak adversary. The costs of defense required to maintain any given level of protection will rise much more sharply than the costs of improving the offense.

· 44

REFERENCES

1. See U.S. Department of State *Bulletin* (9 July 1962), pp. 64-69, and, for example, U.S. Senate (90th Cong., 2d Sess.), *Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services* (2 Feb. 1968), pp. 144, 150-153. See also, discussion between James T. Kendall and General Earle G. Wheeler in U.S. Senate (90th Cong., 2nd Sess.), *Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on Status of U.S. Strategic Power* (27 Sept. 1968), pp. 5-8. (Cited hereafter as *Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power*.)

2. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, "Approach to the Fiscal Year 1969-73," Program and Fiscal Year 1969 Budget, in U.S. House of Representatives (90th Cong., 2d Sess.), *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, Part I* (14 Feb. 1968), p. 152.

3. General J. P. McConnell, statement at *Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power, op. cit.* (30 Apr. 1968), p. 222.

4. *Congressional Record* (90th Cong., 2d Sess.), 1 Nov. 1968, p. E9644.

5. Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," *Scientific American* (Mar. 1968), pp. 21-31.

6. House of Representatives (90th Cong., 2d Sess.), *Department of Defense Appropriations for 1969, Hearings before a Subcommittee on Appropriations, Part II* (24 Apr. 1968), p. 455. Emphasis added. (Cited hereafter as *House Hearings on Defense Appropriations*.)

7. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, *Statement for Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy* (6 Nov. 1967), p. 2. Emphasis added.

8. Department of Defense, Secretary of Defense McNamara, "Approach to the Fiscal Year 1968-72," Program on the Fiscal Year 1967-68 Budgets, p. 42. (Cited hereafter as *Posture Statement 1968-72*.)

9. General McConnell, statement at *Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power, op. cit.*, p. 205.

45

10. See Secretary of Defense McNamara, *Address before the United Press International Editors and Publishers*, San Francisco, 18 Sept. 1967, and Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke, *Address before the Advocates Club*, Detroit, 6 Oct. 1967.

11. Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke, *Address before the Advocates Club, op cit.*

12. See *Posture Statement 1968-72* and *Posture Statement 1969-73*, as well as Secretary of Defense McNamara, *Address before the United Press International Editors and Publishers, op. cit.*

13. See letter by Secretary of Defense Clifford to Senator Richard Russell, *Congressional Record, op. cit.*, p. E9641.

14. Assistant Secretary of Defense Warnke, *Address before the Advocates Club, op. cit.*

15. R. B. Stolley, ed., "Defense Fantasy Now Come True," interview of former Secretary of Defense McNamara, *Life Magazine* (29 Sept. 1967), p. 28c.

16. See *House Hearings on Defense Appropriations, Part I*, p. 266.

17. See *Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, respectively, p. 11 and pp. 346, 366.

18. *Congressional Record, op. cit.*, p. E9640; see also *Congressional Record*, respectively, 18, 19, 21 June, 29 July, 2 Oct., and 1 Nov. 1968.

19. *Posture Statement 1969-73*, p. 152.

20. See discussion between General Wheeler and Senator Henry M. Jackson, *Senate Hearings on Status of U.S. Strategic Power*, p. 19.

21. General Wheeler, statement at *House Hearings on Defense Appropriations*, p. 2.

22. Secretary of Defense McNamara, *Address before the United Press International Editors and Publishers, op. cit.*

23. *Posture Statement 1969-73*, p. 152.

24. See Dr. John Foster, statement at *House Hearings on Defense Appropriations*, p. 455; and Deputy Secretary of Defense Nitze, *Statement for Subcommittee on Military Applications of the Joint Committee on Defense Appropriations, op. cit.*

25. Garwin and Bethe, "Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems," *op. cit.*

26. General A.W. Betts, Letter to the Editor, *Scientific American* (May 1968), pp. 6-7.

46

GLOSSARY

*Active Defense*-Defense involving interception of attacking enemy aircraft or missiles by using either aircraft or missiles.

*Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS)*-System involving the use of large aircraft, carrying radars, computers, and communication facilities to control the engagement between interceptor aircraft and incoming adversary bombers. The system has been proposed as a replacement for the more conventional ground-based warning and control system because of the vulnerability of the latter to attack by adversary missiles.

*Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA)*-Proposed replacement for the B-52 bomber force. AMSA would be a large bomber with a capability for penetrating adversary defenses at low altitudes. It would carry sophisticated penetration aids. Some money has been spent on AMSA development, but even if a decision is made to go ahead with a full-scale program, the aircraft will not be available for operational purposes until about 1976. The cost of the program would probably range from $6 billion to $10 billion.

*Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System (ABM)*-See Appendix.

*Area Type Defense*-Defense system permitting the defense of any of a number of targets within fairly large areas. The feasibility of such defense is dependent on use of aircraft or interceptor missiles that are effective over fairly long ranges. See Appendix for a further discussion of area ABM defenses.

*Assured Destruction Capability*-Ability to inflict some specific level of damage on an adversary with a very high degree of confidence. This is generally equated with the ability to destroy adversary population and industry, but does not include the ability to destroy enemy military forces. For the past few years maintenance of a high level of assured destruction capability has been held to be the sine qua non for deterrence of thermonuclear war.

47

**B-52**-Large intercontinental subsonic bomber. The U. S. Operational Inventory now includes about 600 such aircraft. Several models have been produced and some have already been phased out. It is expected that the latest models will continue to be part of the operational force of the 1970's.

**B-70**-Large intercontinental bomber. The aircraft was designed to fly at Mach-3 (three times the speed of sound) at high altitudes, but the program was terminated when it was realized that penetration of defenses at high altitudes would be much more difficult than low altitude penetration. Only two B-70 aircraft were built.

**Counterforce Capability**-Ability to destroy the adversary's strategic offensive forces. Generally this implies a preemptive attack on the enemy's missiles and bombers before these can be launched—as opposed to an attack on industry and population. Sometimes the term is also used to describe an attack against enemy forces at any time during a nuclear exchange.

**Damage Denial**-Capability to prevent any damage whatsoever from an adversary nuclear attack. Damage denial might be accomplished by preemptive attack against the adversary's forces, by active and passive defense, or by a combination of such actions.

**Damage-Limiting**-Term describing a number of measures that might be taken to reduce or limit damage to a country from a nuclear attack by an adversary. Damage-limiting measures include counterforce attack against adversary forces, active defense, and passive defense.

**Exoatmospheric Interception**-Interception of adversary missiles before they reenter the earth's atmosphere. For further discussion, see Appendix.

**F-12**-Proposed advanced supersonic interceptor aircraft that might be used with the AWACS system.

**FB-111**-Bomber version of the F-111 aircraft. It was anticipated that the FB-111 would enter the operational inventory of the Strategic Air Command beginning in fiscal 1969, and that approximately 250 such aircraft would be procured. There

48

now appears to be some question whether the Department of
Defense will proceed with the FB-111 program.

*Fire Storm*—Phenomenon occurring in very large fires. The updraft produced by the fire is so great that it serves as a chimney, causing winds to blow in toward the fire from all directions. Such storms have been produced in large forest fires, in some of the large bombing raids in World War II, and in the bombing of Hiroshima with a nuclear weapon. In a fire storm, virtually all the combustible material within the area covered by the fire is burned.

*First Strike Capability*—Ability to destroy adversary offensive weapons by delivering a preemptive attack, using either missiles or aircraft.

*Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)*—System involving the delivery of nuclear weapons from low altitude orbital trajectories. Unlike intercontinental ballistic missiles, FOBS requires the use of reverse thrust to bring the warhead down on target. Because the apogee of the trajectory is lower than in the case of ICBM's, detection using conventional long-range radars is more difficult. For that reason, and because FOBS can be used to deliver weapons on trajectories that do not pass through the area of coverage of large warning radars, FOBS may have some attraction as a surprise attack weapon. However, the payload that can be delivered with a given propulsion system is smaller than with an ICBM, and the accuracy is generally poorer.

*Hardening*—Protection of military facilities by making them resistant to the blast effects of a nuclear weapon. In the case of missiles, this is generally accomplished by installing them in underground silos with protective covers.

*Hard-Point Defense*—Defense designed to protect hardened facilities from nuclear attack. For further discussion, see Appendix.

*Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)*—Ballistic missile with a range of between 5,500 and 8,000 nautical miles.

*Interceptor Missile*—Surface-based missile used as part of either

49

an air or an anti-ballistic missile defense system. In the case of ABM systems, interceptor missiles can be divided into two classes: those designed for exoatmospheric interception, such as the Spartan; and those designed for terminal interception, such as the Sprint. For further discussion, see Appendix.

*Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)*-Ballistic missile with a range of roughly 2,000-4,000 nautical miles. The Soviet Union has deployed some missiles in this class, which might be used to attack targets in Europe or Asia.

*Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)*-Ballistic missile with a range of about 1,500 nautical miles. The Soviet Union has deployed such missiles which might attack targets in Europe or Asia, and also attempted in 1962 to deploy MRBM's and IRBM's in Cuba. The United States and the United Kingdom formerly had such missiles (Jupiter and Thor) deployed in Europe.

*Minuteman*-Class of solid fueled ICBM's. Two versions, totalling 1,000 missiles, each carrying a warhead of around one megaton, have been deployed. A third version, Minuteman III, will carry multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV). Like Minuteman I and II, Minuteman III will be deployed in underground silos for protection against the effects of possible nearby nuclear explosions. In addition to these three versions, there was at one time a proposal to have a mobile Minuteman to be moved by rail.

*Multiple Individually Targetable Reentry Vehicle (MIRV)*-System, now in development, which can carry several separate warheads on a single booster. Included is a guidance system which permits each of the warheads to be delivered against a separate target. MIRV's will be incorporated in Minuteman III and Poseidon missiles.

*Multilateral Force (MLF)*-Proposal made by the United States several years ago to provide NATO with a sea-based nuclear missile force. The ships were to be manned by a mixed crew from several NATO nations. The plan was strongly criticized by the Soviet Union because it feared that the scheme would give the NATO countries, especially the Federal Republic of

• 50

Germany, access to nuclear weapons. The ships were never deployed and the proposal was shelved.

*Nth Country Problem*—Refers to the possibility of diffusion of nuclear weapons to an indeterminate or "N" number of countries through the development of independent capabilities or the acquisition of nuclear weapons from existing nuclear powers.

*Nike X*—Plan for large-scale anti-ballistic missile defense deployment for the protection of the United States against a massive Soviet attack. It has been estimated that such a deployment would cost about $13 billion to $50 billion. Despite pressure to go ahead with such a program and considerable research to develop the necessary components, no decision for actual deployment has yet been made.

*Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)*—Treaty approved by the United Nations in 1968. Each non-nuclear signatory would undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons; each nuclear power would agree not to assist non-nuclear powers in acquiring nuclear weapons. The treaty is not yet in force. While 82 nations have signed, only six have ratified the treaty as of January 1969.

*Passive Defense*—Defense of population or military facilities by protective shelters, hardening, etc.

*Penetration Aids*—Devices facilitating the entry of aircraft or missiles through enemy active defenses. Penetration aids for missiles include decoys which simulate warheads and the use of chaff (pieces of wire that act as dipoles) and electronic jammers to interfere with radar detection and tracking of incoming warheads. Other techniques used to facilitate penetration of ABM defenses are delivery of large numbers of warheads and decoys almost simultaneously in order to saturate radar and computer capabilities; targeting of radars rather than primary targets; and the use of nuclear explosions at high altitudes to produce ionization to interfere with radar detection and tracking.

*Phased Array Radars*—Radars in which the beam is steered

51

electronically and which, therefore, do not involve moving parts. These radars have an advantage over the older mechanically steered radars in that they can handle many tracks simultaneously and can be steered quickly from one track to another.

*Polaris*—U.S. nuclear powered missile launching submarine carrying 16 missiles. The term is also used to refer to the missiles, of which there have been three versions. The first two, Polaris A-1 and A-2, each carried single warheads with a yield of around one megaton. Polaris A-3 carries three smaller warheads which are not individually targetable. 41 Polaris submarines have been built.

*Poseidon*—A successor to the Polaris submarine program involving larger missiles, each carrying MIRV's.

*Preemptive Attack*—First strike designed to knock out the adversary's offensive forces, population, or industry in anticipation of a possible strike by him.

*SAM-D*—Advanced surface-to-air missile defense system for use against bomber aircraft.

*Soft Facilities*—Missile sites, command and control centers, or other facilities that have not been provided with protective shielding against the effects of nearby nuclear explosions.

*Strategic Forces*—Generally includes offensive forces capable of delivering nuclear weapons against industrial or population targets and defensive forces designed to defend against such attacks. In the Soviet-American context the strategic forces have intercontinental capabilities and include long-range bombers, ICBM's, missile-launching submarines, and the defenses against these delivery systems.

*Tallinn Defense*—Defensive system deployed by the Soviet Union and referred to in the United States as the Tallinn Defense because some of the facilities were located near Tallinn, Estonia. The prevailing view in the U.S. intelligence community today is that the Tallinn system is an anti-aircraft system with no significant anti-ballistic defense capability. However, some years ago it was believed that the Tallinn was

52

primarily an ABM system, and that view may still be held in
some quarters.

*Terminal Defenses*—Defenses designed to intercept a missile during the final part of its trajectory. Such defenses make use of the differential decelerating effect of the atmosphere to facilitate discrimination between warheads and less dense penetration aids. Because such defenses involve interception late in the trajectory of the incoming missile, they are relatively inflexible. Thus, the missiles deployed to defend one point cannot defend other points some distance away.

*Titan II*—Liquid fueled ICBM carrying a warhead of several megatons. The missile is deployed in underground silos for protection against the effects of possible nearby nuclear explosion. The United States has deployed 54 such missiles.

• 53

CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

345 EAST 46TH STREET, NEW YORK, N. Y. 10017

ROBERT C. RICHTER

OXFORD 7-3131

NEWS RELEASE

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Washington DC January 29

The United States and the Soviet Union are "at a crossroads...of major decisions regarding strategic forces and policies that will set the pattern for the 1970's...and (affect) the fate of the whole world," according to a study published today by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Professor George W. Rathjens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, author of *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's*, argues that early negotiations between the US and the USSR offer the only possibility for breaking the "action-reaction sequence which propels the arms race. The immediate objective of negotiations," he says, "must be to bring that sequence to a halt or to moderate its pace so that there will be a better chance of ending the arms race."

Dr. Rathjens, formerly with the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Institute for Defense Analyses believes that despite the US "superiority" in terms of number of missiles, warheads and megatons, the present situation can be characterized as one of strategic "parity" in the sense that both the US and the USSR can wreak unacceptable damage on each other.

He contends, however, that "sufficiency" is probably a more useful concept for describing the present strategic balance than either "superiority" or "parity." "Even large changes in capabilities," he says, "could not be translated into useful political power...Thus as far as deterrence is concerned, the point has now been passed where both sides have 'sufficiency'".

The study was reviewed by a group under Joseph E. Johnson, president of the Carnegie Endowment, which included former Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and General Matthew B. Ridgway. Those in the review group (listed below) generally agreed that the study presents fairly the facts and the options now open.

Dr. Rathjens analyzes the problems of the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) defense system, Multiple Individually Targetable Reentry Vehicles, (MIRV's) and the increasing Chinese nuclear capability -- as these are beginning to interact to stimulate greater expenditures for counter-force weapons systems that increase the likelihood of escalation to a thermo-nuclear war.

The defense expert proposes that the focus of US - USSR negotiations should be on ABM defenses because "verification of compliance would be relatively simple...and the incentive to acquire MIRV's for penetrating defenses would be eliminated, although the incentive to acquire them for counterforce purposes would remain...To be attractive to the Soviet Union, any proposal to limit defenses would almost certainly have to be coupled with an agreement to limit, if not reduce, inventories of deployed strategic offensive forces."

The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's was commissioned by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as part of its program on arms control which dates from the beginning of the nuclear age when the first non-governmental Committee on Atomic Energy was set up under its auspices. The Rathjens essay was prepared, on the authorization of the Endowment's Trustees, to examine the implications of strategic missile delivery systems for what the United Nations Charter calls "international peace and security."

-3-

The persons identified on the attached list read the paper and participated in all or
part of the discussions.

The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970's is available for $.60
from Taplinger Publishing Company, 29 East 10th Street, New York, New York 10003.

(affiliations for identification purposes only)

Harding F. Bancroft

Executive Vice President, New York Times

Edward W. Barrett

Director, Communications Institute, Academy for Educational
Development

Lincoln P. Bloomfield

Professor of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology

Charles G. Bolté

Vice President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Harrison S. Brown

Professor of Geochemistry, California Institute of Technology

John Cowles

Chairman, The Minneapolis Star and Tribune

Hedley W. Donovan

Editor-in-Chief, Time, Inc.

Paul M. Doty

Professor of Chemistry, Harvard University

Bernard T. Feld

Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Richard L. Garwin

Director of Applied Research, Thomas J. Watson Research Center,
International Business Machines Corporation

Joseph E. Johnson

Carl Kaysen

Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton University

George B. Kistiakowsky

Franklin A. Long

Vice President for Research and Advanced Studies, Cornell University

Major General James McCormack, U.S.A.F. ret.

Chairman, Communications Satellite Corporation

Robert S. McNamara

Former Secretary of Defense; President, International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development

I.I. Rabi

University Professor Emeritus, Columbia University and
Visiting Professor of Physics, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology

General Matthew B. Ridgway, U.S.A. ret.

Oscar M. Ruebhausen

Partner, Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons & Gates

Marshall D. Shulman

Director, Russian Institute, Columbia University

Jeremy J. Stone

Professor, Department of Economics, Stanford University,
California

Richard H. Ullman

Associate Professor of Politics and International Affairs
and Acting Director of the Graduate Program,
Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University

January 28

5:15 PM

HAK:

Joseph Johnson asked me to give you the
following message:

"The press interest in President Nixon's
reference yesterday to 'sufficiency' has
upset our plan to release the Rathjeans
paper next week under embargo until
9 February. Now planning distribution
in Washington and New York tomorrow
for immediate release."

If you want to reach Mr. Johnson, he will
be at home after 8:15 this evening

609/924-5836

jm

Jim

206\954-2836

be at home after 8:12 this evening
If you want to reach Mr. Johnson, he will

for immediate release."
in Washington and New York tomorrow
6 February. Now planning distribution
paper next week under embargo until
upset our plan to release the Ratjesane
reference yesterday to 'inefficiency,' has
"The press interest in President Nixon's
following message:

HAK:

2:12 PM

January 58

Confidential

REPORT ON SOVIET-AMERICAN MEETINGS ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS

October, 1969

(Based on notes by P. Doty, R. Garwin, G. Rathjens, J. Ruina, and M. Shulman)

The following notes are based primarily on discussions held on October thirtieth at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, but reflect the discussions that occurred during the preceding week at the Pugwash Meeting at Sochi as well as private talks between members of the American group and their Soviet counterparts, particularly Georgy Arbatov. The Report of Working Group No. 3 at Sochi is appended together with lists of the Soviet and American participants in both meetings.

The meeting in Moscow opened with the observation by the chairman (Millionshikov) that our previous meeting in December of 1967 had been of great value in bringing about the decision to proceed with the forthcoming strategic arms limitation talks.

He then expressed optimism about SALT and went on to state unhesitatingly that it was our purpose to try to identify the sources of difficulty and misunderstanding that might arise in connection with the forthcoming negotiations and in that way to do what we could to

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facilitate progress. He reiterated these sentiments
several times during the course of the meeting.

## Objectives to be Served by Strategic Forces

Members of the U.S. group, introducing the I.S.S. Military Balance (1969) Report and other publications, indicated the great concern developing in the United States about the present build-up in Soviet military strength, particularly in the strategic area, pointing out that there now exists a higher level of activity across the board than had ever been observed before. In contrast, it was pointed out that the United States had for several years been holding the line on strategic force levels and that with the completion of the recent review of the military budget it was expected that in many other areas there would be a reduction in the scale of U.S. programs.

We raised the question then as to whether or not
the Soviet Union and the United States were operating
from the same assumptions regarding the purposes to be
served by strategic forces pointing out that there was widespread
belief in the United States that the Soviet Union would not be con-
tent simply to have a deterrent posture or one of near equality

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with that of the United States, but that perhaps it would
continue to build up its forces in an effort to achieve
superiority. Further, we pointed out that if this trend
continued, clearly the U.S. administration would be unable
to hold the line and that new U.S. strategic programs would
then have to be expected.

The Soviet participants did not note that U.S.
capabilities were about to be expanded greatly with the
implementation of MIRV programs, but rather defended their
present build-up by pointing out that the United States
had built up its strategic forces during a period of
relative tranquility in US/SU relationship during the early
sixties to the point where the U.S. had a three- or four-
fold superiority, and that the US at that time was surrounding
the SU with strategic bases. They also argued that the
SS-9 threat had been exaggerated, citing the American press
to support that argument. It was recognized that in many
respects the American build-up had proceeded to unnecessarily
high levels. The U.S. group made that point and further
suggested that the present was a rare opportunity in that
agreement to limit strategic forces was probably possible
only when force levels were roughly comparable.

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We indicated that exact symmetry in forces would of
course be impossible to achieve and that for deterrent
purposes it did not matter very much if one side had
somewhat larger forces than the other in that both already
had several times more than was required. But we went on
to point out that any substantial disparity would be
totally unacceptable, and in particular that any disparity
in those forces which would be useful in a counterforce or
a preemptive attack would be particularly destabilizing.

## Problems in Strategic Analysis

Members of the Soviet group asked us directly whether
it would be possible to negotiate agreements to limit
strategic armaments without reference to other conflicts
between the United States and the Soviet Union. We replied
that that now was the U.S. position, and in discussion it
became apparent that our Soviet counterparts felt that
this was also acceptable to the Soviet Union.

There was an extensive discussion of "worst case"
analysis -- that is, analysis of strategic problems on the
assumption that one's adversary's weapons would perform
at the upper limits of the range of uncertainty that

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characterizes them, and that one's own weapons would
perform at the lower limit -- analysis which would therefore,
of course, lead to over-reaction. There seemed to be
widespread agreement on both sides that this was an important
factor in the arms race. Soviet members were prepared to
concede that secrecy had a role in widening the range of
uncertainty regarding capabilities and therefore an adverse
effect on the arms race. They went on, however, particularly
in private meetings, to warn us in the strongest of terms
about the adverse effect of our approaching the SALT
negotiations in any way that might suggest that we were
on a fishing expedition to acquire information regarding
Soviet capabilities or plans.

ABM

Although they have clearly had some difficulty in
doing so, it seemed from these meetings that Soviet
representatives were now prepared by and large to accept
the American view regarding ABM--that is, that neither
superpower could expect to build a defense of population
and industry that could not be easily overwhelmed by the
other and that as regards arms limitations, it would be

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infeasible to try to limit offensive forces without constraining the defense as well. In this connection they asked explicitly about the U.S. view on linking limitations on offense and defense. We replied that it would be impossible to negotiate significant limitations on the offense if defenses were permitted to grow in an unconstrained way, and that as far as we were aware, there was no significant interest in the United States in any agreement to limit either the offense or the defense without linking the two.

We had some difficulty in persuading some of our Soviet counterparts that a hard point defense of missiles that was unambiguously that and nothing more should not be as provocative as a defense of population. Some of the Soviets are obviously still having a problem in rejecting the view that defending people is natural and not provocative while defending missile sites is military activity perhaps for the purpose of improving war fighting capability.

We were questioned specifically about the possibility of stopping Safeguard deployment, particularly if there were limitations on offensive missile deployment. To this we replied that the program could be stopped either by the Congress through withholding of money, or by presidential

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decision at any time. We conceded that there would be no
need for Safeguard if the offense were sufficiently
constrained, but pointed out that nevertheless the Administra-
tion would probably have some difficulty in scrapping
Safeguard entirely in view of the fight that it had made,
particularly if the Soviet Union were unwilling to give up
its Moscow defenses. In our discussions with the Soviet
members regarding limitations on Soviet ABM, we got the
impression that limitations would be feasible but that it
would be totally unrealistic to expect them to scrap the
Moscow defenses. We were asked specifically what would be
the most effective way of influencing the Administration
to give up on Safeguard and to this we replied that we
thought it could come only from an early agreement in SALT
that would, along with other items, freeze ABM's at their
present state or after the completion of our Phase I. We
also pointed out that Phase I, which is all that is authorized
so far, will be a very limited system that should be easy
to live with, and that it should not be confused with a
heavy deployment that is often described in the U.S. press.

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MIRV

Some of us had met with Arbatov some six weeks ago at the I.S.S. meeting in the Hague, and at that time MIRV's were discussed. Considering that meeting and these meetings as well, we believe we discerned some change in the Soviet view, or at least in Arbatov's view, regarding the seriousness of the MIRV problem. This probably derived largely from reading the American press, Congressional Hearings, etc. By the time the Sochi meetings were completed, we had the feeling that he and other members of the Soviet group were fully persuaded of the importance of a very early termination of MIRV test programs.

On several occasions Arbatov raised the question of asymmetry between the American and the Soviet multiple warhead programs, indicating that based on his reading of American papers, he understood that technically the United States was ahead of the Soviet Union. He suggested that there might be difficulty in terminating MIRV test programs with one side having a substantial advantage.

In our reply we stressed the following points. First, that the lead time required for deployment of a MIRV system

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adequate to penetrate an ABM system was short compared to
the time for the ABM deployment, and that this applied to
both sides. Thus a termination of test programs at this
time would still allow the United States to deploy a MIRV
system at a later date that would be adequate for penetrating
a large-scale Soviet ABM well before the latter could be
completed. And we argued that the same logic would apply
in the inverse situation, i.e. that the US could not deploy
a really large scale ABM until perhaps 1977, and that the
Soviet could deploy MIRV's adequate to penetrate it long
before then even if it stopped multiple warhead tests now
and did not resume them until there was evidence that the
U.S. was proceeding with a large ABM program. We then
pointed out that there is an enormous difference in
confidence required for the two purposes which MIRV's might
serve--that is, for penetrating ABM defenses and for use
in a counterforce role--and that much more extensive tests,
and indeed continued confidence firing programs, would be
required if one were to have confidence in the reliability
of MIRV systems for the latter purpose. We also pointed out
that while the United States might be ahead in some respects
as regards MIRV, the Soviet multiple warheads were fifty

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to one hundred times as large as ours in yield, and that
therefore they could be effective as counterforce weapons
even if they were very substantially less accurate than
the American weapons. Further, we pointed out that the
Soviet Union already had an ABM system of sorts against
which American MIRV's might be required, whereas we have
no ABM at all now, nor will we for several years.

Parenthetically, we should point out that we did not
in our discussions distinguish between MRV's and MIRV's.

A question was asked about the implications for
agreement if MIRV programs were allowed to go to the point
where MIRV's had to be accepted as operational weapons. We
indicated that that would not necessarily preclude agreement
to limit strategic armaments but that it would make a
meaningful agreement vastly more difficult. We suggested
that in the United States we had come to accept the idea
that we required a multiplicity of deterrents of different
vulnerabilities, and that therefore if MIRV programs were
permitted to continue to the point where they might lead to
serious questioning of the vulnerability of ICBM systems,
there would have to be compensating measures. We suggested
that there might be efforts to build a really effective

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hard-point defense for missiles and that there would almost certainly be pressures to build a new manned bomber. And we went on then to speculate about the reactions to the construction of new bombers, etc. There was no dispute from the Soviet side about our dire prognostications.

There was an extensive discussion about the possibility of a moratorium on testing of MIRV's and on the deployment of ABM systems. There was a lack of precision in the discussion here. In some cases we were referring to a moratorium that would cover both; in other cases primarily to a moratorium that would affect MIRV testing. The following formulations were suggested.

First, that a moratorium be the first order of business for SALT. Second, that it might come about as a result of tacit agreement to stop testing on both sides. Third, that it might come about as a result of joint declarations; or, finally, that it might result simply from unilateral decision by one side in the expectation that there would be reciprocity from the other.*

*These particular formulations had been put into the report of Working Group No. 3 at the Pugwash Meeting but in preparing the summary for the press Arbatov asked that this be deleted suggesting that such prominence would make selling it more difficult for him and his colleagues.

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No objection was voiced by members from either side to any
of these alternatives.

We suggested that any moratorium would necessarily have
to be of limited duration, and at one point suggested that
a reasonable time limit might be one year. Soviet members
asked us why we felt this way and to that we offered the
following replies. First, that a moratorium obviously
would be limited to testing or deployment of specific
systems, and that could have the result--particularly if
extended over a very long period of time--of channelling
efforts into other areas of technology not necessarily with
any intent to cheat on the moratorium, but rather to take
advantage of the loopholes and technological opportunities.
It was interesting that at this point Kapitsa suggested
that obviously no agreement was possible unless we were
prepared to trust each other, but at that Millionshikov
cut him off, pointing out that we were not talking about
a marriage, and that agreements between nations could not
be built solely on trust. He further observed that if one
were to misuse a moratorium period it could have an adverse
effect on reaching a more formal agreement later on.

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We observed that a stricter limitation on the length
of a moratorium might also be necessary if it were to
prohibit the testing of certain kinds of weapons on which
we were dependent and for which the military would demand
confidence firings.

Following this, a question was raised as to whether
similar arguments would not apply to more formal agreements
that might be reached. We replied that that was certainly
true to a substantial degree, and that it was probably
useful to look on SALT as a dynamic process involving
agreements of changing scope rather than an effort to
reach a single immutable agreement. Millionshikov
indicated concurrence with this view.

We had an extensive discussion of the problems of
verifying compliance with a moratorium and there were
repeated Soviet questions on this, and for that matter,
on other aspects of verification. We suggested that
a prohibition on MIRV testing would have to be accompanied
by limitations on other missile tests as well, possibly
including pre-announcement of tests, specification of the
impact areas for the reentering vehicles, and possibly a
quota on the number of total missile firings that might

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occur each year for each side.

In response to questioning it was suggested that twenty to fifty full scale missile tests of all kinds might be a reasonable quota. The argument was made from the American side that if there were such limits it would be very difficult in a short period of time to complete both research and development on new systems and also the regular firing of operational systems that would be required to maintain confidence in them. The Soviets questioned us particularly about the possibility of developing MIRV's through space programs and/or with less than full-scale tests. We replied that we did not see this as a serious problem; that one could not get the confidence required for the use of MIRV's, particularly in a counterforce role, from such tests; that one would really have to test the system and do so repeatedly in a configuration that was essentially that of the operational weapons. We suggested that we thought means could be worked out so that there need be no significant interference with the carrying out of space programs.

The Soviets also asked us about other problems of

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verifying a freeze, for example, in counting the numbers of
missiles that each side had, and our reply to this was
that we could probably rely on the same kinds of techniques
that were now being used to determine what each other had.
It should be pointed out that the Soviet members pressed
us very hard on the questions of verification, and we
spelled out several times what we thought would be required.
They seemed determined to find out if in fact we would impose
still other requirements.

It is interesting to note that in the drafting sessions
of Working Group No. 3, Arbatov insisted that Shukov and
Sokolov be present at all times. With these persons
present there was very little substantive disagreement on
what appears in the Working Group Report. In particular,
there was no opposition to the recommendation of a MIRV-
ABM freeze.

## Cut-off Problems with a Freeze

The question arose as to whether in the context of a
freeze it would be possible to complete certain systems
that were already partially constructed. Depending on the
resolution of this question the date of the freeze could be
of considerable importance.

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Kapitsa suggested that a freeze should be absolute and that even if a system was very near completion that it should be stopped. The results of the discussion were inconclusive, but perhaps we suggested to our Soviet counterparts that the definition of a cut-off would be a problem.

## Expectations from SALT

The Soviets asked us to outline as specifically as we could what our maximum expectations from SALT would be. The following were the major points of the American suggestions.

First, that land-based missile forces be limited to their present levels or even cut back. Second, that there be a termination of MIRV tests and no MIRV deployment. Third, that the Soviet Union not build any more of an ABM system than it now has, and that the U.S. build none at all, or perhaps only Phase I of Safeguard; and in this connection we reiterated that there might be a political problem in our having no ABM while the USSR had some. Fourth, that there be no new long-range bombers on either side. And fifth, that there be a freeze on submarines, though we pointed out that this was not particularly sensitive,

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and that allowance for completion of several might be
possible.

We pointed out that there were some particularly
sensitive points as regards a freeze, and we identified them
as being the following. First, there was the problem of
MIRV verification, which we felt could be dealt with largely
by limitations on all full scale missile tests. Second,
substantial improvement in ASW capability could pose a
difficulty. Third, significant new activity in air defenses
could be a problem because of the difficulty of discriminating
in some cases between systems designed for air defense and
those that also might have ABM capability. There was a
discussion of the asymmetry implicit in such a freeze,
the Soviet members pointing out that it would leave them
with a substantial inferiority in bombers and in SLBM's,
and the Americans pointing out that Soviet ICBM's would
have on the average about five times as large a yield as
those that the United States had. We were specifically
asked about the control provisions that would be required
with such a freeze, and replied that we thought very little
would be required other than that that could be exercised
by unilateral techniques.

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The Problem of American Sincerity

We were repeatedly asked about whether or not President
Nixon was sincere in his approach to SALT. This, along
with questions relating to verification, seemed to be the
major concerns of our Soviet counterparts. With respect
to the question of sincerity, they indicated that they
had considerable doubt, and pointed to a number of actions
by the United States as having been troublesome, for example,
the President's visit to Rumania, his speech in Colorado
Springs, and relaxation on trade with China, while maintaining
our previous position with respect to trade with the Soviet
Union.

We replied that there had been very intensive pre-
parations on the U.S. side for SALT, and that with those
preparations we felt there was the possibility on our side
of great flexibility and of a readiness to respond promptly
to various Soviet proposals. We further indicated that
the lack of a linkage between SALT and Soviet-American
differences outside the strategic arms area had to some
extent represented a change in position that made agreement
more likely. And we pointed out that SALT was probably
the most important opportunity that the Nixon administration

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would have for a major advance in international affairs.

The Moscow meeting concluded with a suggestion by the chairman of the importance of our continuing or resuming our meeting to further try to help in the talks beginning in Helsinki.

As a footnote it is perhaps worth adding that we came away from our meetings with the feeling that some of the Soviet members, particularly Arbatov, were searching for the arguments that would be useful in the internal debate that must take place within the Soviet decision-making circles.

The Soviet participants also pointed out that military, foreign officers, and intellectuals interacted only at the top. Our private feeling is that it is therefore important that not just the military but others in the Soviet Union be informed about strategic issues.

[LC]

# THE FUTURE OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE: OPTIONS FOR THE 1970'S

George W. Rathjens

Visiting Professor of Political Science

(Prepared for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace)

## Summary

Although American strategic forces were built up rapidly during the early 1960's, their level has been almost constant during the last two years. In contrast, Soviet strategic forces have recently been growing at a fast rate, although according to most measures of strategic strength, the United States continues to have "superiority." In the present context, the concept of "superiority" may have outlived its usefulness. The present strategic balance might be more meaningfully characterized as one of "sufficiency" in strategic forces in the sense that each side can inflict unacceptable damage on the other, regardless of the conditions under which nuclear war might develop. Thus, further increases in strategic force levels are not likely to offer either country new political options. Yet on both sides there have been vigorous research and development programs that now make probable the deployment of new strategic systems.

There was hope a few years ago that during the early 1970's the strategic balance might become stabilized, with both the Soviet Union and the United States willing to base the planning of their strategic forces on the view that they could serve little purpose other than to deter a Soviet-American thermonuclear war. It now seems possible that this hope of stability based on mutual deterrence may not be realized; there is no evidence that the expansion in Soviet strategic forces is tapering off;

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technological advances have made possible new strategic weapons that are likely to be deployed; and the emergence of China as a nuclear power may be a stimulus to the expansion of strategic forces.

At the heart of the difficulty in moderating the arms race is the fact that the United States is likely to react to any deployment of new strategic forces by the adversary by making compensating or over-compensating improvements in its own capabilities; the same is probably true of the Soviet Union. Indeed, because of the time required to translate decisions into operational capability, both sides often react in anticipation of possible adversary deployments. The problem is exacerbated by the great uncertainty of each side about its adversary's capabilities and intentions. These factors must be taken into account in any attempt to control the arms race by agreement--and in unilateral decisions regarding new weapons choices.

Some of the weapons systems that now appear on the horizon, particularly anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses and multiple individually targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's), are likely to introduce large uncertainties into the calculus of the strategic balance, and thus are especially likely to stimulate adversary reaction or over-reaction.

Despite the lateness of the hour, it may still be possible to head off a new escalation of the arms race. However, this may require a reversal of some decisions already made. The most promising approach would be through negotiations between the superpowers, although the importance of reciprocal unilateral restraint regarding new weapons choices should not be discounted. It should be added that strategic arms talks, even if they do not result in a formal treaty, may still serve a useful purpose if they help dispel some of the uncertainties that fuel the arms race.

In any case, fundamental clarification of U.S. objectives is required as a basis for making specific decisions regarding weapons choices and negotiating positions. In this connection

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we are confronted with two difficult dilemmas: that of reconciling our desire to minimize damage to ourselves in the event of war with our desire to escape the adverse consequences that may flow from developing damage-limiting capabilities; and that of minimizing the likelihood of escalation while relying on it as a deterrent.

There is a desire on the part of both Americans and Russians to try to limit to very low levels damage to their own countries in the event of war, and a desire on each side to ensure that it will emerge from a nuclear war less damaged than its opponents. Yet attempts to develop and deploy forces that might contribute to the attainment of these specific objectives are likely to have two adverse effects: an increase in the probability of thermonuclear war; and a build-up in strategic forces leading not only to greater expense for both sides, but probably even to an increase in the total damage that each might expect in the event of war.

As for the second dilemma, the consequences of thermonuclear war are rightly judged so horrible that major efforts to avoid it are justified. Yet there is a tendency in the United States and elsewhere to rely on the danger of escalation as a deterrent to limited aggression, particularly in Europe--a tendency that is incompatible with minimizing the possibility of a thermonuclear war occurring.

It is suggested that it is in the interest of the United States to resolve this second dilemma by moving away from reliance on the likelihood of escalation as a deterrent to limited aggression.

As regards the first dilemma, we should give greater weight than we have in the past to curtailing the action-reaction cycle that drives the arms race, even at the expense of our deep-seated desires for "superiority" and for development of effective "damage-limiting"