overriding American goal of ridding Chile of Allende makes any separation between
missions entirely artificial. Examination of the two missions does show them to be
linked—but not by any desire for violence. Rather, the link between the collection
mission and the political action mission was that they both conscientiously sought
weaken Allende's hold on power while avoiding the provocation of a coup or a repeat
of the Viaux assassination plot.

The bulk of the CIA's efforts from November 1970 onwards would be
dedicated to opposing Allende in the political sphere. Keyed to NSDM 93, the CIA's
political action program was "directed at the Allende government, the non-Marxist
opposition, the Chilean public... in an effort to maximize pressure on the Allende
government to prevent its consolidation and to limit its ability to implement policies
contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests."⁵⁷ The first aspect of the programme
described by the document is to take "political action to divide and weaken the
Allende coalition... to create splits within and between coalition parties."⁵⁸ Also
detailed in the document is the plan to provide financial support to the opposition
parties, the PDC and the PN. Concurrent with this political party funding was the
support for opposition media outlets "which can speak out against the Allende
government."⁵⁹ The main focus of American activities remained on the two items
mentioned in the initial plan of 9 January 1971, namely efforts to support the Chilean
opposition and its media, and to encourage dissention in the UP coalition.⁶⁰ In his
memoirs, Kissinger stated: "we agreed with our Democratic predecessors that groups
standing for democratic values needed our help against those who openly threatened

⁵⁷ Memorandum, "Covert Action Program for Chile", 17 November 1970. [CIA]

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Following is Covert Action Proposal", 09 January 1971. [CIA]

19

them.”⁶¹ While perhaps the decision to support these parties was not drafted with such lofty language or unpartisan goals, the intent was similar. Through poor organization and lack of private sector funding (made very difficult due to UP control of banking and their nationalization of many companies), the main centrist and rightist parties were having difficulty mounting an effective opposition to the UP.⁶² Likewise, there was a threat that the UP would use the PDC’s leadership review in early 1971 to attempt to gain control of the PDC by supporting the Party’s left wing.⁶³ The central aim of this CIA effort, however, was “to keep the current political set in Chile from becoming irreversible.”⁶⁴ To achieve this aim, the CIA would assist the opposition parties, almost entirely by funding, in order that they might maintain their domination of the Congress, the main obstacle to Allende’s goal of a fully Marxist economy and government. At best, they hoped the opposition might achieve a two-thirds majority necessary in the Senate to impeach Allende.⁶⁵ There would be no attempt to rig elections, bribe candidates, or conduct any other ‘black’ operation to ensure the success of these parties; merely the passage of funds.⁶⁶ Ambassador Korry approved of this limited plan with some reluctance.⁶⁷

Central to the political action programme was the belief that Allende and the UP government would not allow democratic opposition against the government continue for very long. While the government had been elected, they made it clear from the beginning that they had no interest in maintaining the political status quo and if necessary would seek methods to circumvent the intransigent, opposition-controlled

⁶¹ Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval*, p. 377.

⁶² Memorandum, Talking Paper, 07 December 1970. See also Memorandum, “ARA/CIA Meeting 30 May 73”, 31 May 1973. [State]

⁶³ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, “Resume of Country Director and INR Comments”, 13 December 1970. [CIA]

⁶⁴ Memorandum, “ARA/CIA Meeting 30 May 73”, 31 May 1973. [CIA]

⁶⁵ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, “It is station’s View”, 08 February 1973. [CIA]

⁶⁶ Cable, “In Ref Station Forwarded”, 09 Jan 1971. [CIA]

⁶⁷ Ibid

20

congress. As Dr. Kissinger has said, "I was convinced that he was trying to lead Chile into a Castro-like situation and I think all the evidence shows that. Was he strong enough to do this? That I cannot judge. But I was convinced that this is where he was heading."⁶⁸ Indeed, he may not have been strong enough, for the UP's lack of seats in the congress (the UP had 20 Senators out of 50 in the upper house and 60 deputies out of 150 in the Chamber of Deputies) made it nearly impossible for them to implement the legislation required to change the constitution of the congress or the judiciary, and in many cases to even enact budget legislation. Allende manoeuvred around these difficulties—and around the Charter of Democratic Guarantees that he had signed to secure congressional approval—by a series of legal loopholes he cleverly termed *resquicios legales*. These allowed him to *requisition* (for nationalisation without a congressional vote violated the constitutional right to property) many private companies, banks and estates. Meanwhile, he tried to pass a new constitution to create a unicameral 'Assembly of the People' subordinate to the President and political appointment of the judiciary. In the view of CIA agent Jack Devine the UP

Were basically trying to undermine democratic institutions. In the case of media they were cutting off access to print. They were intimidating the segment of the public that did not support them. I was on the Carrera Hotel looking down on the plaza during the March of the Women when the *MIRistas* arrived by truckloads, throwing rocks and bottles. This was not New York, Bloomberg and Ferrer, this was serious strategy: seizing of land, workers taking over factories. There was reason, a vivid reason to support the opposition, to fight this thing without a coup, to support the parties, to support their capacity for receiving funds

Without this support, the opposition to the UP would be starved of funds and intimidated out of conducting any coherent opposition to the UP in the congress, despite the PDC and PN majority, and so allow the dismantling of Chilean democracy. Once the U.S. Government had approved the policy of supporting the

⁶⁸ Interview, Dr. H.A. Kissinger.

21

political and media opposition to Allende the CIA set out—after a short period of assuring themselves of the secrecy and security of their plan⁶⁹—to move very large sums of money to the PDC and PN. The first attempt at this programme was made in time for the Chilean municipal elections of April 1971, on the basis that those elections “will be viewed as a plebiscite for the UP.”⁷⁰ The 40 Committee, on 28 January 1971, approved $1,240,000 “to cover ongoing administrative support to bolster Party infrastructure.”⁷¹ Additionally, the money was to be used to purchase radio stations and newspapers to assist in publicizing the efforts of the party.⁷² Subsequent funds were voted to the PDC and PN for the Congressional elections, by-elections and ad-hoc needs as requested. In total, $2.6 million was spent supporting the Christian Democrats, National Party, and Radical Party splinters. Two thirds of this went to finance opposition campaigns in the 1972 by-elections and the congressional elections of March 1973.⁷³ Unlike CIA campaign efforts during the presidential election, no one criticised the direct support of non-UP parties.

A further sum, under a separate appropriation, went to subsidise the main opposition paper, *El Mercurio*, Chile's largest and most important newspaper.⁷⁴ As the major conservative paper and media crusader against Allende, it was one of his first targets. The initial UP effort took the form of attempted labour disputes to seize editorial control, followed by a forced increase in wages with a freeze on prices.⁷⁵ In October 1971, the UP government tried to seize effective control over *Papelera*, the

⁶⁹ Memorandum, Arnold Nachmanoff to Kissinger, "Proposals for Covert Support of Chilean Opposition", 28 January 1971. [NSC]

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷¹ Memorandum, for Deputy Director of Plans, "Request for Approval of Project", 12 February 1971. [CIA]

⁷² Davis, p. 21.

⁷³ *Covert Action in Chile*, p.60

⁷⁴ See Jerry W. Knudson, "Allende to Pinochet: Crucible of the Chilean Press 1970-1984," *Studies in Latin American Popular Culture*, Vol 6, 1987, for a review of the history and impact of *El Mercurio*, the world's oldest Spanish language newspaper.

⁷⁵ Davis, p. 308.

22

only private paper and pulp company, in the hope of driving up *El Mercurio*'s prices intolerably. The Americans, as Devine's quotation above outlines, perceived all of this as a major threat to freedom of the press by forcing the newspaper into UP control.⁷⁶ Even then, a discussion paper in the NSC had cast doubt on the wisdom or effectiveness of supporting *El Mercurio*. "I reluctantly conclude that we should go along with this,"⁷⁷ argued one NSC functionary, citing the poor democratic precedent of buying the press. According to the Church Committee Report, a total of $1.7 million was given to *El Mercurio* in order to keep the paper afloat.⁷⁸

Meanwhile, the CIA worked to implement the second aspect of the political action programme: creating dissent within the UP coalition. Noting severe friction between the Communists (PCCh) and Socialists (PS)—the two main parties in the UP—the CIA hoped to “continue programs designed to exacerbate mutual suspicions and frictions between PCCh/PS and PCCh/MIR, including both propaganda as well as [deleted] attribution pieces....”⁷⁹ The CIA hoped that the Radical Party of the Left (PIR), then part of the governing UP coalition, might act as a ‘dissident element’ within the UP and could be used “to heighten tensions within the government coalition.”⁸⁰ Though the methods they used to create this split are deleted from the files (as is most information dealing with ‘tradecraft’), it is clear that the plan succeeded. In April of 1972 the PIR left the UP coalition to work with the opposition. Though they were only a small party, and the loss of their seats did not adversely affect the power of the UP, it was a definite blow to the morale of the government and some proof to the U.S. that their covert aid was working. Following their split from

⁷⁶ Memorandum, John Crimmins to the Under Secretary, "Chilean Media under a Marxist Regime", 23 December 1970. [State] See also Faúndez, p. 218.

⁷⁷ Memorandum, Jorden to Kissinger, "40 Committee Meeting - Chile", 10 April 1972. [NSC]

⁷⁸ *Covert Action in Chile*, p. 60.

⁷⁹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "On Morning 14 Dec", 19 December 1970. [CIA]

⁸⁰ Memorandum, William McAfee to the Under Secretary, "Status of Covert Support", 1 February 1972. [State]

23

the UP, the PIR began to receive support funds along the same model as the Christian Democrats and National Party.⁸¹

The success of this support, despite such clear successes as the PIR split, was debated by the differing agencies and individuals involved. The CIA and some parts of the State Department felt the support was a success throughout the full period of the programme.⁸² In 1972, the CIA issued a report stating that the funding helped the opposition to "maintain its vigour". The report went on to state:

> The continued vitality of the congressional and popular opposition to the UP testifies to the effectiveness with which the three parties have maintained their independence and their appeal. While the precise extent to which our assistance has contributed to this situation is of course unknowable, it seems clear that it has helped.⁸³

However, after an abortive coup by a single army regiment on 29 June, 1973, the CIA became sceptical of continuing support for the opposition parties. The Santiago station based their opinion against this support on political reality. First of all, the military had remained loyal to the government through the attempted coup, and this had not done anything to encourage the political opposition.⁸⁴ Furthermore, the opposition did not make any gains in the March Congressional elections (though they had not lost ground) and there was a poor outlook for gains in future elections. Even if the opposition did win, it was believed that a Frei presidency would not be that beneficial to the U.S. They needed to pursue a new tactic.

⁸¹ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Ambassador Johnson, "Status Report on Covert Assistance to Chilean Opposition", 5 July 1972. [State]

⁸² Memorandum, William McAfee to the Under Secretary, "Status of Covert Support", 1 February 1972. [State]

⁸³ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Under Secretary Johnson, "Sitrep on Covert Assistance to Chilean Opposition", 13 April 1972. [State]

⁸⁴ Memorandum, Unknown (Santiago COS?) to C/WHD, "Chile: What Now", 30 June 1973. [CIA]

24

## The Private Sector

Beginning some time in the (northern hemisphere) summer of 1972, members of the State Department and the Administration began to suggest cautiously that the CIA support non-party or non-governmental civic organisations in their campaigns against Allende. The impetus for this new tactic likely came from reporting about the civil opposition to the Allende government that became more and more effective through 1971. The greatest example of this was the aforementioned December 1971 'March of the Empty Pots', when 30,000 women (some say less) marched through Santiago shouting slogans such as "listen to us Allende", "Chilean Women—Save Chile From Marxism" and "There is no Meat, There is no Nothing."⁸⁵ This provoked a surprisingly strong reaction from the government, which had the *Carabineros* prevent the protest from reaching the Presidential Palace, while UP-party MIR mobilised bus-loads of supporters, mostly young males, to attack the march with clubs and bottles. In the NIE of June 1972, titled "Chile: The Alternatives Facing the Allende Regime", the analysts remarked "unrelenting economic problems and sporadic outbursts of political violence have cut into the UP's popular support, provoked discontent among the traditionally apolitical security forces, and strengthened the hand of the political opposition generally."⁸⁶ In short, the actions of civil society and private sector organisations had a definite impact on the ability of the UP to govern, and yet were not violent or coup-minded. It was becoming clear that a selection of private sector organisations could also be supported as part of the political action program.

⁸⁵ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "A Massive Demonstration", 1 December 1971. Sigmund cites a low figure of 5,000 women. Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, p. 163.

⁸⁶ NIE 72-342, "Chile: The Alternatives Facing the Allende Regime", 29 June 1972, p. 1. [CIA]

25

Beginning some time around the issuing of this NIE, State Department and CIA officials began meeting to discuss the feasibility of private sector funding. The main justification for support, as far as the State Department saw it, was "to strengthen the ability of the named private sector organisations to contribute to the general opposition effort against the UP government."⁸⁷ Simultaneously, it would prevent the total destruction of the private sector by the UP's nationalisation drive, and so maintain the private sector as a source of funds for the opposition political parties. Yet there were potential problems. The PDC was philosophically dedicated to "Christian Communitarianism" and being not entirely friendly to the private sector might end up being a target of their activities, drawing force away from the desired attacks on Allende.⁸⁸ The other fear was the funded organisations would 'go off the reservation' and begin working towards violence or plotting. On this count State and the Agency agreed that any 'adventurist' tendencies would be watched for and if found, funding would be terminated. With this assured as possible by the agency, Foggy Bottom passed on the recommendation to the NSC to begin a three-month trial period of funding to the private sector from August to September of 1972.

When this joint Agency-State Department proposal for private sector funding was made to the 40 Committee, the justification was clear and had little to do with coup plotting. Selected organisations included labour groups, professional unions, and private-interests groups whose sympathies were with the opposition. The private sector had become politicised by the growing economic crisis in Chile, and were becoming increasingly supportive of the political opposition to Allende. It was stated exclusively "support and encouragement of the politically-oriented activities of the private sector would represent an operational adjunct to the main effort of direct

⁸⁷ Memorandum, Meyer/Crimmins to Ambassador Davies, "As You Know", 18 August 1972. [State]

⁸⁸ Ibid.

26

support to the opposition political parties.”⁸⁹ The proposal stalled in the 40
Committee due to opposition from State.

John Crimmins and Charles Meyer argued against the proposal in a letter to
the new US Ambassador in Santiago, Nathanial Davis, who had taken post on 30
September 1971. They thought that the security of the current operation would be
weakened, and that leaks to certain groups would have far-reaching consequences.
Concerned about the same 'adventurist' tendencies, the two ARA men argued that all
the caution in the world would not prevent some elements from using the belief of US
support as "the final determinant in a decision to go for a coup (e.g: 'the Americans
know what we're about and, despite their pro forma cautions, are giving us the green
light. They're putting up the money, aren't they?')."⁹⁰ A coup was not in the US
interest at the time as much because it was unlikely to be successful as the fact that if
it did succeed the new government would have no international legitimacy. Davis—a
much more reasonable character than Korry—responded that very day, noting that he
shared those same concerns but that the CIA station had convinced him the fears were
unfounded. He supported the programme with the significant caveat that funding
would be disbursed with CIA and State clearance "only when local conditions make
further delay critical to survival."⁹¹ A coup was the furthest thing from their desires,
and with assurances of this ARA's Charles Meyer gave his support.

Two weeks later the agreed-upon proposal for funding found its way to the 40
Committee in an amended annex to the original proposal of 24 August. It was stated
that the elevated political temperature of strikes and street demonstrations made it
advisable to delay implementation of the programme until the crisis had subsided,

⁸⁹ Memorandum, State to 40 Committee, "Financial Support to the Chilean Private Sector", 24 August 1972. [NSC]

⁹⁰ Memorandum, Meyer/Crimmins to Ambassador Davis, "Washington is at the Point", 30 August 1972. [State]

⁹¹ Cable, Ambassador Davis to Meyer and Crimmins, "When I Read", 31 August 1972. [State]

27

likely by mid October. This last point was viewed as a major concession to the State Department's sense of caution.⁹² Lobbying of various State Department officials, as well as Kissinger, continued for some time, repeating the arguments for and against the funding. Authorisation for the private-sector funding finally approved some four months after it was initially proposed, on 26 October 1972, on a trial basis from end-October until the 4 March 1973 congressional election, and was only actually released for use at the beginning January.⁹³ It was "designed fundamentally to strengthen the ability of these organizations...to contribute to the political strength of the opposition" in the forthcoming congressional election⁹⁴ As briefed to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, a significant side benefit to this support included "an improvement in the ability of these organizations to resist the government drive to weaken further the private sector, and the maintenance of private business, industry, and agriculture as a broad source of funds for the opposition political parties."⁹⁵ As it turned out, most of this funding went towards 'get out the vote' campaigns in support of the opposition.⁹⁶

As the political instability in Chile grew in 1973, the State Department once again raised the proposition of supporting the private sector, heeding the CIA's observation that "the private sector is becoming desperate."⁹⁷ There was significant unwillingness for such support and it was reported, "Ambassador Davis and Assistant Secretary Kubisch are reluctant to authorize support to the private sector because this sector is working to promote military intervention."⁹⁸ Ambassador Davis in Santiago was particularly fervent in his opposition. In a memorandum from NSC staffer

⁹² Memorandum, to the 40 Committee, "Annex to 24 August 1972 Memorandum Entitled 'Financial Support to Chilean Private Sector'", 14 September 1972. [NSC]

⁹³ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Ambassador Johnson, "Release of Funds to Private Sector", 15 January 1973. [State]

⁹⁴ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Ambassador Johnson, "Covert Aid to Chilean Private Sector", 15 September 1972. [State]

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Request Approval on Text", 21 February 1973. [CIA]

⁹⁷ Memorandum, "Covert Action Options for Chile", 31 March 1973. [CIA]

⁹⁸ Memorandum, Unknown (Santiago COS?) to C/WHD, "Chile: What Now", 30 June 1973. [CIA]

28

(c)

William Jorden to Kissinger, the former argued that the Ambassador did not support the proposal because

He believes this course of action could lead to de facto US commitment to a coup. He thinks the chances of exposure are significant and that those Chileans who learn of what is happening, or even suspect it, will take it as a signal that we want a coup... [and] some military elements with whom they have contacts [may] be tempted into rash actions on the assumption that they would have quick and effective US support.

The Ambassador believes (correctly) that present US policy is to keep the pressure on, but not to take action in overthrowing Allende. He believes the new proposal would move us toward the latter.⁹⁹

The rest of the argument was as direct. Current operations The 40 Committee approved the proposal for funding for the private sector, in the last half of August, but made all disbursements contingent on "the Ambassador's approval."¹⁰⁰ Amongst other authors, Gabriel Kolko has suggested that these funds were used in "generously aiding the militant opposition."¹⁰¹ Luis Vitale quotes a contemporary source who stated "se puede afirmar categóricamente que las huelgas...fueron financiadas por la CIA."¹⁰² CIA documents refute this allegation. As CIA director William Colby noted in a report to Kissinger a week after the coup, the short time-span and reluctance of the Ambassador prevented the provision of this support to any civilian organisation that they thought was supporting a coup or insurrection:

> ...no support was provided to the private sector, whose initiative in launching and maintaining a series of crippling strikes was instrumental in provoking the military coup of 11 September 1973. Thus, while the Agency was instrumental in enabling opposition parties and media to survive and to maintain their dynamic resistance to the Allende regime, the CIA played no direct role in the events that led to the establishment of the new military government.¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Memorandum, William J. Jorden to Henry Kissinger, "Covert Support for Chilean Private Sector", 29 August 1973. [NSC]

¹⁰⁰ Cable, DCIA to Santiago Station, "Have Just Been Advised", 21 August 1973. [CIA]

¹⁰¹ Kolko, p. 221.

¹⁰² Vitale, p. 222. Translated as "I can state categorically that the strikes...were financed by the CIA."

¹⁰³ Memorandum, William Colby to Kissinger, "CIA's Covert Action Programme Chile", 13 September 1973. [CIA]

29

After much discussion, and despite large amounts of funds being approved, apparently no money of any significance was passed to the component organizations of the Chilean private sector in 1973. This may not be entirely accurate, however, as revealed by Jack Devine in 2004. "They were, I think, funded," he said, recalling that modest financial support went to some private sector organisations assisting in the strikes. But large sums were not involved: "Money went a long way there. A couple of copy machines, etc, and a few thousand dollars did things." Devine carried on with the argument that Agency funding was not a *sine quo non* of the strikes: "Would [the strikes] have gone forward without the agency? Of course! There was spontaneity about the truckers."¹⁰⁴ Another document shows that while some limited funding did go to organisations associated with the truckers' strike, the CIA viewed the whole situation with caution. While they wished to encourage disobedience to the Allende government, they did not want to encourage a situation where public order was so threatened that it forced the military to support the government. "We would not encourage any large scale confrontations, such as a general strike" wrote a Chile desk officer.¹⁰⁵ So, while there is some conflict about what specific amount of money went to which private sector organisations at any given point in time, it is clear that the Agency was not the main motivator or financier behind the crippling strikes of 1973.

## Intelligence on the Armed Forces

American contact with the Chilean military is one of the main focus points for those who believe the US Government encouraged or even planned the 1993 coup. It is true that the CIA maintained contact with the Chilean military throughout the

¹⁰⁴ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

¹⁰⁵ Memorandum, unknown to C/WHD, "Policy Objectives for Chile", 17 April 1973. [CIA]

30

Allende administration, but the degree of contact and influence is heavily
overestimated. The military surely was one of the main topics of discussion in US
government circles when they were determining their policy to deal with a Marxist
government in Chile. Tucked into the text between the options on NSDM-93 was the
topic 'The Armed Forces.' Though heavily excised, the first paragraph of the section
does not call for the assassination or a coup against Allende. Simply, it states that
"we are maintaining and where possible enlarging our contacts in the military" and
that "we continue to provide intelligence [to key military officials] such as the
background of the Cuban intelligence personnel who are arriving in Chile."¹⁰⁶ The
role stated here is that of intelligence gathering and dissemination.

The CIA country-team initially sought, perhaps due to residual impressions
from the Track II period, to produce a coup in Chile. This was not in the plan for the
post-inauguration period, however, and this was made clear in a series of cables
exchanged in November of 1971. A cable of 12 November discussed the CIA Chief-
of-Station's plans to gather intelligence on coup plotting within Chile. The three
pages of the memo discussed the mechanics of making relations with coup plotters,
learning of their plans, and perhaps influencing them by giving advice or suggesting
techniques they had not considered. While the COS stated that the CIA should not
lead or participate in any of these coups, he concluded that the CIA's mission was to
"work consciously and deliberately in the direction of a coup" with fresh contacts in
the Chilean military.¹⁰⁷ The Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA,
then William Broe, responded to this cable with absolute clarity: "We cannot accept
your conclusion.... nor can we authorize you to 'talk frankly about the mechanics of a
coup' with key commanders, because the implications of that amount to the same."

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ Cable, Chief of Station Santiago to Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, 12 November 1971.
[CIA]

31

Clearly, the COS had overestimated the belligerency of the USG in its posture
towards Allende. Broe, a man on very good terms with his homologues in Foggy
Bottom, set him straight:¹⁰⁸

The essential fact which must be kept in mind by all officers connected
with the [deleted] program is that we do not have any authority to state,
or even to imply, that [USG] favours a coup as a solution to the
Chilean dilemma. If and when Station reporting indicates a favourable
political atmosphere and a serious military intent to take action against
the Allende government, it will become the responsibility of other
[USG] authorities to use this intelligence in reaching a policy decision.
[deleted. USG?] might or might not at that time request such a decision
from [deleted. CIA?]. We just cannot say at this stage or seek advance
advice on the basis of hypothesis. Policy does not work that way...in
sum, stay with history as it unfolds, don't make it.¹⁰⁹

The CIA was going to operate strictly within the bounds of the inter-
departmental framework of covert operations, and this quotation puts to rest the
Church committee assertion, when referring to these same cables, that the CIA
"realised that the US government's desire to be in clandestine contact with military
plotters...might well imply U.S. support for their future plans" and continued these
contacts regardless. ¹¹⁰ It is amply clear that the CIA, in active consultation with the
other interested branches of government, was expressly staying away from any coup
plotting. As one officer stated, "The military was a collection task, a foreign
intelligence collection task. Not 'how do you work with the military on developing a
new government', or 'how do organise a coup there tomorrow.'"¹¹¹ Responding to a
proposal from the Santiago Station in October of 1972, CIA HQ said:

> While HQs prepared [to] consider any specific detailed proposal, even if we believe it has merit would still have to consult with other interested agencies and secure their concurrence. FYI only, our present reading of other agency thinking is that any proposition that smacks of adventurism will be most difficult to sell.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Interview, Ambassador J.H. Crimmins.

¹⁰⁹ Cable, C/WHD to COS Santiago, 1 December 1971. [CIA]

¹¹⁰ *Covert Action in Chile*, p. 37.

¹¹¹ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

¹¹² Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "While HQs Prepared", 23 October 1972. [CIA]

32

One particular incident in June of 1973 demonstrates that the CIA did not cross the boundary from intelligence gathering to coup plotting, due perhaps to the fractured nature of the conspiring that was ongoing in the Chilean military. By 1973, inflation, breakdown of the UP coalition and massive civic unrest of a strike by truckers and miners markedly increased the anti-Allende sentiment in Chile. The greatest symptom of this tension, as manifested within the military, was an attempted coup by low-level army officers on 29 June, 1973. On this day, Colonel Roberto Souper and his junior officers led the 2nd Armoured Battalion in surrounding *La Moneda*, the Presidential palace in the centre of Santiago. The battalion attempted the revolt in the apparent hope that the rest of the military and the police would join. Instead, the bulk of the armed services came to the defence of the government.113 Ironically, it was the *Tacnazo* regiment that succeeded, after only three hours, in putting down the rebellion. This rebellion was quickly and sarcastically referred to as the Day of the Tanks or *El Tankazo*.

There is no evidence that the U.S. had advance knowledge of this failed coup attempt. Indeed, a CIA report of the same day states: "At this time there is no available information to indicate that the attack by the Armoured Regiment on the presidential palace was more than an isolated and uncoordinated effort by that unit."114 Another document, designed to answer potential White House questions about CIA involvement in the abortive coup, confirms that the CIA had nothing to do with the events of 29 June. The first question, "did the Agency play any role whatever in supporting or encouraging the coup" is answered with a terse "none."115 While admitting that the CIA had been in contact with some coup plotters, they

113 Memorandum, "CIA Bulletin", 30 June 1973. [CIA]

114 Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "as of 1040 Hours", 29 June 1973. [CIA]

115 Memorandum, "Questions Which May Be Raised Concerning Chile", 'Circa' July 1973 [State] (listed as 1 July 73 in State Department pages)

33

affirmed that they were not sure if anyone in *El Tankazo* was connected with them. Furthermore, the CIA document says that they did nothing to support or encourage the attempted coup, and when their contact asked for help in developing arrest lists or names of potential co-conspirators, the CIA responded by telling the Chilean officer "...that neither the Agency nor the U.S. Government was stimulating, encouraging or favouring a coup and that no information could be given to him."¹¹⁶ The UP press accused the US government of sponsoring the attempted coup and went so far as to name Mr. Keith Wheelock as the CIA agent charged with fomenting this anti-Allende action through a Chilean intermediary, Manuel Fuentes, a member of the *Patria y Libertad*. The internal CIA discussion over this accusation discovered the following information: "Wheelock left Chile in late 1969. He had contact with Fuentes...and passed him onto another embassy contact...but apparently dropped him as a contact in April 1970 when Fuentes became insistent in asking for USG financial support for anti-Allende purposes."¹¹⁷ The U.S. had had nothing to do with the 29 June revolt. In its own review, the CIA concluded that the revolt, "an almost futile gesture of frustration by the action-oriented military officers...was doomed to failure."¹¹⁸ So confusing was this action to the CIA that their assessment of its implications were that it had fostered a greater degree of unpredictability and instability in an already chaotic environment. The CIA, in this case, did not approve of chaos: it made events tricky to forecast and made the results of their work more difficult to define.¹¹⁹

And their work was becoming ever more difficult as the Allende government progressed. On coming to power Allende had renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba: Castro toured Chile for a full month, and despite his misgivings about the *via*

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Cable, American Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State, "UP Press ties CIA to Coup Attempt", 12 July 1973. [State]

¹¹⁸ Memorandum, "Situation Report on Uprising by Military Unit", 25 July 1973. [CIA]

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

34

Chilena offered significant support to Allende. One of the main methods of this support was aimed at constructing an efficient internal security agency for Chile. Work by Chilean researcher Cristián Pérez shows that significant Cuban assistance was directed at the *Grupo de Amigos Personales*, or GAP, Allende's private security force, which was under the direction of Beatriz (aka 'Taty') Allende, soon-to-be wife of Cuban agent Fernández Oña. The GAP underwent lengthy security and weapons training in Cuba, and on top of their guard duties undertook certain security tasks for the UP.¹²⁰ Likewise, as time progressed the Chilean equivalent of Scotland Yard, the *Investigaciones*, were turned into a very effective counter-espionage force with the training and direct assistance from the Cubans. A substantial number of Cuban intelligence officers began operating in Chile as well, both under diplomatic cover and as 'illegals'. In a very short time after Allende's inauguration the CIA found it very difficult to gather intelligence in Chile. Jack Devine explained:

> [In] Chile and most other Latin American countries we owned the territory. By that I mean we were friendly with the host government, we worked together on anti-Communist, anti-Cuban operations. Here we were on the defensive, it was almost a denied-area environment, in the sense that the security system was more concerned about us than the Cubans. I believe there was something like a thousand Cubans in Chile, I could be wrong, but they had a substantial presence. I have a lot of respect for the Cuban Intelligence, they were a lot more effective than the Russians, in the sense that they still had revolutionary fervour, they were prepared to make sacrifices, they spoke the languages, and they were prepared to mix it up with the *campesinos*. The Russians, well, it did not come as easy to them in dealing with the Chileans.¹²¹

Thus CIA operations, both supporting the opposition and gathering intelligence on the Chilean military were far more difficult than in any other operating environment in the hemisphere. But more importantly, the increased Cuban presence only enforced the American distrust of the Allende regime, and strengthened the more hawkish

¹²⁰ Cristián Pérez, "Salvadore Allende, Apuntes Sobre Su Dispositivo de Seguridad: El Grupo de Amigos Personales", in *Estudios Públicos*, No. 79, 2000, p. 51.

¹²¹ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

35

members of the Nixon administration. Former Assistant Secretary of State for ARA, William Rogers, described the changed opinion of Allende as the awareness of Cuban intelligence activities grew:

> My initial view [in 1970] was Allende was Allende, he was not Fidel redux, and we had to come to grips with him in his own terms... I was proven wrong in the event, because the Cubans got into Chile after the inauguration, in hordes. And it became much more if you will an extension of—with Allende, in the Chilean context—of Fidel, than I had thought would be the case. I think I was surprised then I am surprised now, looking at the record again, what remarkable influence the Cubans had in a sector of the coalition that supported Allende and on Allende himself.¹²²

The natural question unanswered by Mr. Rogers comment is if this more negative impression of Cuban influence on Allende made the US administration more aggressive in their outlook on Allende. Especially with the same CIA officers running both the political action programme and the intelligence-gathering mission against the military was there, perhaps, difficulty in maintaining the rule barring discussion of a coup? Was this rule blurred by the increasing instability and violence in Santiago in the spring of 1973? Ambassador John Crimmins spoke of the trouble the State Department perceived with one particular CIA officer, Ted Shackley, when it came to staying away from coup plotting:

> We wanted the proper safeguards to be maintained. I had a real problem with Shackley, who I did not trust really. He had an interest in getting a Chilean involved who was, we were convinced, an extreme rightist and a dangerous activist. And we said 'under no circumstances'. Shackley was a bad actor, and I felt I had to keep careful tabs on him when he kept raising this *Patria Y Libertad* group. I said to him, and the department agreed, "Under no circumstances are you to get involved with [*Patria y Libertad*]. Is there anything you do not understand about that?" There were times when we had to be more blunt.

Shackley made us uneasy, and I think in this sort of situation where there were lots of subtle, or maybe, hedged-about circumstances, things that were not easy to deal with where we had to be careful, well,

¹²² Interview, Mr. William D. Rogers.

36

we were concerned that the Agency might be a little aggressive, especially during the Shackley period¹²³

Perhaps because of strong State Department pressure, it seems that Shackley did not succeed in his attempts to link the US with the ultra-right *Patria Y Libertad*.¹²⁴ But with the increasing difficulty in operating in Chile as Cuban counter-intelligence strengthened, as Crimmins suggested, there was perhaps a tendency to take the 'easy route' and encourage the army into a coup. As Crimmins noted, however, men like Ted Shackley were an exception to the otherwise reasonable men at Langley, William Broe being a frequently cited example of a quality officer. Not unusually, then, the CIA agreed with the State Department's restrictions, and Jack Devine refuted that there were ever coup scenarios, describing in no uncertain terms:

> You had an aggressive covert action designed to support the political dimension, then you had a collection task, as opposed to a covert action. There was no authority [to talk of a coup], and it was *gospel*. People can and do argue this, but from my vantage point, we had clear instructions not to foment or start coup planning with the military. Yes we supported truckers and other groups, but would that somehow lead to a clash, a coup, and so on? That is a question, but that is different than planning a coup. And it overestimates what you can do. It was more of a defensive game than an offensive game, trying to keep these institutions alive until the next election.¹²⁵

Much of Devine's arguments centre on the presumption that it was necessary to support the opposition, though many historians since have disputed this severely. Yet, all former US government officers interviewed agreed that the outlook for continued democracy in Chile was grave and that support to the opposition was required, and that coup plotting with the Army was rejected. "Yes, that is what I was convinced of," said Dr. Kissinger, adding, "It is absolutely absurd going around apologising and defending your actions... I am convinced it was necessary. All ideas

¹²³ Interview, Ambassador J.H. Crimmins.

¹²⁴ For a better study of Ted Shackley, see David Corn *Blond Ghost*.

¹²⁵ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

37

of organising a coup were rejected.”<sup>126</sup> Mr. Devine chorused this answer, saying, “The mission was to support and resist Allende’s attempt to destroy the democratic institutions, the parties. I was comfortable with it and I remain comfortable with it today.”<sup>127</sup> Despite these statements rejecting a coup as a plan, in a memorandum to the State Department, William Colby, Director of Plans and later Director of the CIA, described the situation with pragmatic clarity:

> The Santiago Station would not be working directly with the armed forces in an attempt to bring about a coup, nor would its support to the overall opposition forces have this as its objective. Realistically, of course, a coup could result from increased opposition pressure on the Allende government... [as] the broad consensus of the opposition appears to have the massive entrance of the military into the Allende government with real power as its present objective.<sup>128</sup>

No coup was going to be planned by the US Government, but that does not necessarily mean that a coup would not result from the plan.

## Civil Unrest, Part II

While the concerned US Government officers seemed sure of their programme of action in Chile, the situation in that country was becoming less and less predictable as 1973 proceeded. In order to break the truckers' strike, Allende had been forced to make a controversial decision and on 25 October 1972 brought senior armed forces officers into an emergency cabinet, led by Army Chief-of-Staff, General Carlos Prats. The truckers returned to work in November, and the atmosphere in Chile cooled significantly. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of a military cabinet were negative, as described by Paul Sigmund, who wrote, "It accelerated the politicisation of the

<sup>126</sup> Interview. Dr. H.A. Kissinger.

<sup>127</sup> Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

<sup>128</sup> Memorandum, William Colby to Kissinger and Kubisch, "Proposed Covert Financial Support to Chilean Private Sector", 25 August 1973. [CIA] *Emphasis Added*.

38

military and undermined the position of those like Prats who favoured the
maintenance of constitutionalism and civilian rule.”<sup>129</sup> Allende’s government was
spiralling out of control.

This loss of control was evident on the streets of Santiago and even on Chile's
neighbours. There were increasing indications of Cuban security agents in the
country, and some positive intelligence on Chilean-based support for the insurgency
in Bolivia.<sup>130</sup> Internally, the CIA had collected ample evidence of large 'street
brigades' of pro-UP youth armed with Cuban weapons (brought in via the GAP<sup>131</sup>),
and knew of right-wing groups doing the same.<sup>132</sup> Political deterioration mirrored the
deterioration in internal security: another set of strikes began in late July of 1973, this
time encompassing groups from as diverse backgrounds as engineers and doctors to
peasant and labour groups.<sup>133</sup> Matters became so unstable in Chile that on 9 August
Allende formed his second emergency military cabinet, bringing the C-in-Cs of the
four services into key portfolios. Generals and Ministers were resigning as fast as
they could be brought into government. Street violence was an everyday fact.<sup>134</sup> As
CIA director William Colby reported to the White House, it was "increasingly
apparent that three years of political polarization had strained the fabric of Chilean
society to the breaking point."<sup>135</sup> Allende was facing a grave situation.

<sup>129</sup> Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, p. 188.

<sup>130</sup> Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "The Presidential Security Guard", 1 Nov 1971. [CIA]

<sup>131</sup> Pérez, "El Grupo de Amigos Personales", p. 51.

<sup>132</sup> Memorandum, "CIA Bulletin", 30 June 1973. [CIA] See Also Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "During the Second Week of August", 25 August 1973. [CIA]

<sup>133</sup> Cable, Santiago Station to CWH/D, "Strike in Chile", 22 August 1973. [CIA]

<sup>134</sup> Davis, Chapter 8 in *passim*.

<sup>135</sup> Memorandum, Colby to Kissinger, "CIA's Covert Action Program", 19 September 1973. [CIA]

39

APR 18 2005

Bill Rogers

Jessee Incao

From: William_Rogers@aporter.com
Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2005 4:57 PM
To: jincao@kmaglobal.com
Subject: For Dr. Kissinger

Herewith Gustafson's latest chapter.

Anent that subject:

I spent the last two days at the Johnson Library at a conference run by the Office of the Historian of the State Department. The subject was the Historian's publication of the volume on Johnson's 1963-1968 foreign policy in Latin America -- or rather South America. (The volume on the Caribbean -- Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Intervention, etc. -- is gong to see the light of day very shortly.). Kristian relied heavily on it in his chapter on the 1964 Chilean election as demonstrating support from Washington directly into the pockets of Frei's party.

Except for two or three walking artifacts like me and Harry Shlaudeman, the participants were all archivists, foreign affairs professional academics and historians. I took away from it several things of interest:

1. The volume of Foreign Relations of the United States dealing with Chile -- and I gather it will be a single volume -- from 1969 to 1973 -- will be published in a couple of years. I had a talk with the archivist in the Historian's office working on it. He confirmed to me that there were no surprises for us. Nothing of consequence that would be new in the State Department publication. He confirmed that the files had, as one would suspect, been pretty well emptied on Chile. There will be some additional material declassifed but it will not change the picture.

I pointed out several lacunae in the existing public record -- particularly the document cited by Church that stated that after the station told the Schneider plotters that the operation was to be turned off, they said they were going ahead anyway, without the support and participation of the US. I also urged that they dust out all the corners for evidence that your August 23 1976 Operation Condor instructions were carried out, pointing out that the critics were filing in the blank pages on the record with the assumption that nothing was done. And I made clear to them the implication that had in the Dinges book for Harry's responsibility for Letelier. So perhaps we can improve the record through the Department's publication.

2. There was considerable interest in Kristian's Gustafson's work and a willingness to accept it as the best interpretation of the Chilean policy and the best account of the facts. I mentioned, without being too explicit given the lack of security clearance so far by the UK, that Kristian's chapter on the 1964 Chilean election and the US support for Frei, would have the clearest evidence yet that the Soviets were at least equally generous with Allende, and had been for years before the 1964 election.

3. The attitude of the group toward that US effort to alter the course of Chilean politics == and by implication the efforts or non-efforts in the 1970's -- was not unfriendly. There was only one Kornbluh fan. That was John Coatsworth. Coatsworth, you will recall, is the avuncular and rather charming chief of the David Rockefeller Center of Latin American Studies at Harvard. To which Maxwell flew when he left the Council.

A few of the highlights of Coatsworth's intervention. This is what he said:

US policy makers were deeply involved in the local politics all over Latin America in the 1960's and beyond. It is the historians' job to fill in the blanks in the documents. Under FDR, there was a consistency between his liberal domestic policy and his foreign policy. But this fell part during the Johnson Administration; liberal domestic policy (human rights, voting rights) and a foreign policy distinctly otherwise. Interventions. Beginning with Johnson, there has been a consistent effort to prevent the accession to power of the Communists and others of liberal

4/18/2005

[Lc]

# Watching History Unfold

Kristian Gustafson
Downing College
Cambridge

With the failure of efforts to prevent Allende's election and inauguration, the US government as a whole began planning for something that they had always thought as unlikely as it was undesirable: a Marxist government brought to power by electoral means within the western hemisphere. As CIA officer Jack Devine stated in an interview, everyone in the CIA understood Allende's victory and his government to be a significant challenge to US authority in the hemisphere and a defeat in the overall East-West confrontation:

> Everyone saw it as menacing, how menacing might have been the issue. Nobody was looking and saying "oh, this is just another friendly democratic party and nothing is going to happen here." I do not remember too many people in responsible positions being unconcerned. How concerned and what they were prepared to do about it, well, honest people could disagree. But there were not a lot of people running around saying "God Bless Allende! This is a new democratic reform movement just the type they need in Latin America!" This simply did not happen.¹

Precisely what they were going to do about this new government, however, was unclear, for at no point had any contingency plans been prepared for the unlikely eventuality of an Allende government. Yet Chile was not, as various parts of the US government now realised, 'another Cuba,' at least so far. The impetus to this dawning recognition was international opinion. Internationally, the jubilation at Allende's victory was vocal and public throughout much of the populations of the western allies, and even amongst large segments of the US population. To openly threaten Allende was therefore politically risky. The fact that Allende had been elected fairly trumped

¹ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

US high-level opinion, shared by Allende himself, that the ballot-box was merely a tactical ploy on the route to a scientific Marxist state. To openly and aggressively undermine a popular, apparently reformist, and *elected* leader would court a diplomatic debacle for the US on par, if not worse, than the Dominican intervention or the Bay of Pigs. This was fully realised by the decision-making organs of the US government, and the policy of how to deal with Allende's government took this understanding as its baseline on the production of its detailed foreign policy plan.

Several other factors reinforced the US inclination to tread softly with Allende. First was the conviction that Allende's economic policies would lead to the destruction of the Chilean economy, and so would either unintentionally invite a reaction by the Chilean army or, if the army would not move, that Allende would at least suffer defeat in the next presidential election. Suddenly, the US realised that Allende was constrained by the same democratic structures of the Chilean constitution that had so frustrated their earlier coup attempts. That Allende could convert Chile into a Marxist state before the next election was a possibility, but one for which they had time to plan. In the mean time the US need only refrain from openly aggressive actions that might bolster Allende's position. 'Cool and Correct' became the new watchwords, and supporting Chilean democratic institutions, not circumventing them, became the main tactic. The uncontrolled disasters of Track I and Track II had forced the US Government—Kissinger, Nixon, and most of the Cabinet—into a more circumspect appreciation of their ability to affect affairs in Chile.

Accordingly, CIA operations during the subsequent Allende government—well planned, quietly executed—were to prove much more effective than the comic-opera of Operation FUBELT. The mistakes of 1970 facilitated a return to the relatively harmonious inter-departmental planning of the NSC, State Department, CIA

2

and embassy staff, which in turn contributed to the more 'hands-off' approach to Allende. Beginning with a new presidential directive, the behaviour of the U.S. government towards Chile after 3 November 1970 was less than the bloody-minded conspiracy often assumed by historians and commentators since Allende's ouster in 1973. American agents, with the full knowledge of their government, supported opposition parties and media outlets, attempted to sow dissent in the UP coalition, and gathered intelligence from the military. For its part, the U.S. government refused to extend further credit to a bankrupt Chilean government that had already defaulted on most of its loans. From Allende's election to his downfall in 1973, no branch of the U.S. government engaged in coup plotting with the Chilean armed forces or any other domestic political body. The lessons learned from the pre-inauguration period remained in the awareness of the U.S. Government and specifically the CIA throughout the three years of Allende's presidency. Evidence shows that the CIA operated well within the limits of their authority and firmly under the orders of the policy-making branches of the government from November 1970 to September 1973.

## Debates and Discussions

After Allende's inauguration on 3 November, the U.S. government moved quickly to implement a new policy towards Chile. Little time was wasted in taking the pre-inauguration NSC discussion paper on Chile—NSSM 97—and adjusting it towards the new situation of a Marxist government in that country. An executive order on 29 October had the NSC revising NSSM 97 in anticipation of a meeting with the President scheduled for 5 November, 1970.² There were no major changes to the

² Memorandum, Theodore Eliot to Kissinger, "NSC Meeting on Chile", 3 November 1970. [NSC]

3

structure of the document—it still set out four options for American policy towards Chile. The new and improved NSSM 97, however, had changed the options to reflect the fact of an Allende government. The first two options could be reviewed as one, and essentially suggested that the U.S. to maintain an outwardly correct posture while refraining from initiatives that Allende could use to his advantage, while at the same time quietly limiting Allende's freedom of action.³ Option 'C' called for the U.S. to act correctly in a diplomatic sense but make clear their opposition to the emergence of a communist government in South America and act outwardly to restrain Chilean diplomatic and political freedom.⁴ The last option called for an openly hostile posture towards Chile. In order to appreciate the choice of these options requires one to understand the assessment the U.S. government had made of the Allende regime. The preamble to this options paper outlined their beliefs, and in it they (accurately) predicted the course that the Allende government would follow. Allende's goals, the paper stated, would be: "(a) To bring all significant economic activity under state operation.... (b) to gain control over the security and armed forces; and (c) to dominate public information media."⁵ The initial plan of operations against Chile would be predicated on this estimate of Allende's actions. Overall, NSSM 97 is a remarkably lucid and well-argued assessment of the policy options for Chile and it served as the basis for the Presidential decision that was to follow it on 5 November.

The discussion of NSSM 97 in the White House cabinet office was lively and direct. Present were all the major cabinet officers, as well as Kissinger, Vice President Ford and President Nixon. The minutes of this meeting show the definite concern about Chile already broached before Allende's election. It is clear that there

³ Memorandum, Robert Hurwitch to Secretary of State, "NSC Meeting on Chile", 05 November 1970. [CDP] It is the State Department's interpretation that options 'A' and 'B' were essentially identical.

⁴ Memorandum, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)", 03 November 1970. [NSC]

⁵ Memorandum, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)", 03 November 1970. [NSC]

(u)

4

was a definite perception of threat to the national security of the U.S. For instance, there is a clear indication from the Vice-President of concern for the Communist-bloc reaction to the American stance in Chile and Latin America as a whole. Vice-President Ford points out that Allende in Chile forced the Americans to move more carefully in the sale of military equipment to, for instance, Argentina, "which could trigger massive support to Chile from the USSR and China."⁶ This, in turn, might start an arms race and destabilize Latin America as a whole. Nixon was concerned about the implications of Allende on American interests in Latin America and the hemisphere in general. He opined that events in Chile, and the decisions being made in that very meeting, were going to be a watershed for American policy in Latin America.

> If Chile moves as we expect and is able to get away with it—our public posture is important here—it gives courage to others who are sitting on the fence in Latin America. Let's not think about what the really democratic countries in Latin America say: the game is in Brazil and Argentina. We could have moves under the surface which bring over time the same thing.⁷

These discussions of the threat to national interest and security led, as during Track II, to discussion of how to bring about Allende's downfall. Examining the options from NSSM 97, Kissinger noted that the four options listed "basically...amounts to two choices: (1) seek a *modus vivendi* with the Allende Government, or (2) adopt a posture of overt and frank hostility."⁸ He said that the first choice offered a chance for Allende to consolidate his position and then operate against U.S. interests directly, while the second choice would strengthen Allende's appeal to anti-U.S. nationalism. Kissinger then went on to offer a third 'in-between' option: "adopt what is in fact a hostile posture but not from an overt stance, that is, to move in hostility from a low-

⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, "NSC Meeting - Chile (NSSM 97)", 6 November 1970. [CIA]

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

5

key posture.”⁹ Nixon went on, integrating the themes of threat to American interests and the proper course to pursue.

No impression should be permitted in Latin America that they can get away with this, that it's safe to go this way. All over the world it's too much the fashion to kick us around. We are not sensitive but our reactions must be coldly proper. We cannot fail to show our displeasure. We can't put up with 'Give Americans hell but pray they don't go away'...We must be proper on the surface with Allende, but otherwise we will be tough. He is not going to change; only self-interest will affect him.¹⁰

At the same time, an openly hostile position was seen as being counter-productive. As Kissinger told the author, "Once Allende was in office, and once the coup efforts had failed, I thought it was a better strategy to prepare for the next election. Anything else might make it easier for Allende to consolidate himself."¹¹ Nixon's displeasure, tempered by Kissinger's astute 'reality check', produced the guidance for the new US policy that emerged from the 5 November cabinet meeting. On 9 November, 1970, the instructions of this cabinet discussion were incorporated into National Security Decision Memorandum 93 (NSDM 93) titled "Policy Towards Chile." It ordered that "within the context of a publicly cool and correct posture toward Chile" various courses of action were to be pursued. First was to ensure that the surrounding nations of Latin America were aware of U.S. opposition to a communist state on the continent. Furthermore, the U.S. was to exclude additional financing guarantees to U.S. firms operating in Chile, and to "bring maximum feasible influence to bear in international financial institutions to limit credit ...to Chile."¹² Additionally, NSDM 93 stressed that no new bilateral aid commitments were to be made with Chile, and those that existed should be delayed or reduced. Nothing is mentioned of any covert action plan to overthrow or assassinate Allende, though there

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Kissinger, Interview.

¹² NSDM 93.

6

is direction for the various agencies to "consider specific policy issues within the
framework of this general posture."¹³

The choice of these options was predicated on the belief, as the paper stated, "that while the Allende government will vigorously pursue its Marxist goals, the economic and political difficulties facing it will place significant obstacles in its path...and overt hostile actions initiated by the United States would work to [Allende's] political advantage."¹⁴ Furthermore, as the State Department urged, there needed to be "a realistic assessment of U.S. capability to influence the situation there...US overt and covert capabilities to force the course of events positively in our favour, short of the use of armed force, are marginal at best...and could be seriously counter-productive."¹⁵ Ambassador John Crimmins gave a more direct definition of the State Department's view of Allende's likelihood of success, and the best posture for the US to take:

> We said, in effect, this is not going to be nice for us but it is not the end of the world. We should not take heroic measures in response to an Allende victory, because that will only reinforce him. We would not do him any favours, we would certainly not approve new OPIC guarantees, or EXIM bank lending, nor would we do anything but oppose IDB and World Bank lending to him. We always thought we would make it to the next election. We thought that in NSSM-97 and throughout, that Allende would fall flat on his face one way or the other, that he could not rule, the economy would run out of control. If he were able to stay until the end of his term, Frei—who we looked to again—would come in as his successor.¹⁶

This was not an overly aggressive, thoughtless posture, but rather one designed to maximize American input on the fate of their economic assets and political position in the region.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Memorandum, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)", 03 November 1970. [NSC]

¹⁵ Memorandum, Hurtwitch to Secretary of State, "NSC Meeting on Chile", 5 November 1970. [NSC]

¹⁶ Interview, Ambassador J.H. Crimmins.

7

An accurate summation of what the Americans believed they could achieve in Chile is made in a subsequent NSC options paper later in the same month. "Although events in Chile will be determined principally by internal Chilean forces and therefore US influence can have only a marginal effect, the skilful exercise of our influence could be an important factor in complicating Allende's task."¹⁷ Furthermore, many in the U.S. government did not view the President's choice of option 'C,' and the CIA's subsequent action plan, to be final. "The program appears in general to be well-conceived," noted Charles Meyer, "but raises certain questions that should be kept under continuing review. The effect of inter-action between the various elements of the proposed program is particularly important."¹⁸ Unlike the period of Track II, the tone was set for meaningful inter-agency cooperation on Chile.

## Civil Unrest, Part I

The planning and execution of U.S. government operations in Chile happened within the deteriorating social and economic conditions of Chile under the Allende government, whose reign can only be described as ineffective. As predicted by many in the U.S. and in Chile, the various Marxist parties that made up the UP engaged in endless internecine struggles, which rendered the management of government unsuccessful due to inattention and disagreement. Various political components of the UP—most notably *MIR*—began illegal land seizures against the wishes of the UP government. Indeed, as Paul Sigmund has explained, while most of the extreme right had either fled or been imprisoned after the Schneider assassination, 'dissident sectors

¹⁷ Memorandum, "Options Paper for NSC: Chile", 31 November 1970. [NSC]

¹⁸ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Ambassador Johnson, "Covert Action Program for Chile", 18 November 1970. [State]

8

of the extreme left continued to insist that only violence could overthrow bourgeois institutions.¹⁹ One such party, the Organised Vanguard of the People (VOP) assassinated Edmundo Perez Zujovic, President Frei's former Interior Minister, in June of 1971. Such actions by dissident leftist groups contributed to a growing sense of physical insecurity in the country. In terms of economic security, after an initial 'honeymoon' period with Allende, when large amounts of foreign reserve were spent boosting wages of public employees (of whom there were more and more due to a rapid nationalisation process) the population began to grow dissatisfied with the UP's management of the economy, and the first major protests began on 1 December 1971 with the 30,000-women 'March of the Empty Pots.'²⁰ As a direct consequence of the march, the opposition-controlled congress successfully impeached the first of many UP ministers, Interior Minister José Tohá. But other factors of luck and policy added to the troubles. Infighting and incoherency in the UP coalition, rudderless economic policy, a drop in copper prices and agricultural production, massive inflation, and a vigorous opposition became an escalating feedback cycle, causing Chile's social fabric and its economy to disintegrated almost simultaneously. By 1973, for instance, inflation was running at 300%, and was projected to hit 400%.²¹ Even the early, less severe symptoms of economic collapse clearly affected the Chilean population, and especially the middle class. In mid-1972 there began in Chile a series of violent and protracted strikes that slowly destabilized the UP government. The first of these began on 21 August, led by the nation's independent shopkeepers.²² Several weeks of wildcat strikes and street violence followed, going on until the police closed off downtown Santiago after a two-day running street fight between the youth arms of the

¹⁹ Paul Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, p. 149.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 163.

²¹ Pierre Kalfon, p. 198.

²² Faúndez, p. 237.

9

(u)

rival political parties *MIR* and *Patria y Libertad*, and even between UP coalition partners. While this violence was ended by efficient *Carabinero* action, they were unable to control subsequent events.²³ Sparked by a government initiative to nationalize transport in the Southern Provinces, the nation's truckers (mostly small owners of two or three trucks) went on strike beginning 9 October 1972. A wide range of professional and small labour unions soon joined the truckers. The strike went on for three weeks, ending on 5 November, and was estimated to have cost Chile as much as $200 million in lost production. More importantly, it forced Allende's cabinet to resign and brought military officers into the cabinet on 2 November 1972. These strikes, however, were taken only as a last resort by a Chilean population that was generally quite tolerant of its politicians, for as one Chilean commentator has commented "after only twelve months in office and despite its electoral success, the UP was weak and divided...the government had virtually lost its capacity for taking decisions."²⁴ As covert action works best when it is reinforcing existing trends, the US government's operations in Chile found warm seas in which to swim.

## A New Mandate

Before dealing with the development of the CIA's operations plans in Chile, it is helpful to first analyse the State Department's role as outlined in NSDM 93, namely that of financial action against Allende's government. With NSDM 93, the U.S. government had decided to throw its economic weight against Allende. There has been much made of this fact and the U.S. has been fiercely attacked for this economic

²³ Cable, US Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State, "Finale if Aug 21 Violence", 22 August 1973.
[State]

²⁴ Faúndez, p. 222.

10

policy, dubbed the 'invisible blockade' and commonly viewed as economic imperialism.²⁵ Regardless, not every aspect of the American economic policy towards Allende was aimed at his ouster. The reason for this is clear: the Americans maintained large economic interests in Chile and sought favourable concessions out of the UP government for their protection. As far as the State Department was concerned, the best US-Chilean relations were not predatory, but rather ones that saw the UP-government remaining within the strictures of international financial and banking law. A cable from the Santiago Embassy to the State Department with regard to debt payments (named after the chief US negotiator) outlines this belief.

> We should not assume that Allende's realization of his dependence on the West means that there is no limit to our ability to push GOC toward more reasonable and forthcoming positions...Our pressures for concessions will be effective only as long as GOC believes there is a chance for at least marginally beneficial relations with USG. Fact we have not closed off that hope and have kept relations in low key correctness probably contributed to decision to pay Braden instalment.²⁶

Very little needs to be written here about the economic 'destabilization' of the Allende government, as this subject has been adequately covered in several articles on the subject of U.S. economic pressure.²⁷ Likewise, there has been extensive testimony by the World Bank and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, as well as other private banks, to various U.S. legislative bodies about American economic 'destabilization' in Chile.²⁸ The Church Committee report, for

²⁵ Kolko, p. 217.

²⁶ Cable, Santiago to Secretary of State (00953), 28 February 1972. [State]

²⁷ See Ann Helwege "Three Socialist Experiences in Latin America: Surviving U.S. Economic Pressure" in *Bulletin of Latin American Research*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1989. See also: Morris Morley and Steven Smith "Imperial Reach: U.S. Policy and the CIA in Chile" in *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 105, 1990.

²⁸ World Bank, "Chile and The World Bank" in *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. XXX, No. 2, 1976. See also IBRD "Notes Relating to Chile's Creditworthiness during the Administration of Presidents Allende and Pinochet", in *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. XXXI, No. 2, 1977. These are published versions of text submitted to separate hearings of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance.

11

its part, alleges that the collapse of the Chilean economy was caused entirely by U.S.
government.²⁹ This is a dramatic overstatement.

The basic question is this: what had a greater effect, U.S. government policy
or Chile's credit rating? Many of the major banks continued their credits to Chile until
that country declared a unilateral moratorium on debt payments at the end of 1971.³⁰
Furthermore, many banks cut off service to Chile after that state nationalized their
Chilean branches without compensation. To make matters worse for Chile, the price
of copper dropped by 23% in 1971 affecting the ability to import goods, while at the
same time domestic food production dropped necessitating increased imports of
foodstuffs.³¹ When American credit dried up Allende's Chile actually received more
credits from Latin America, Australia, Canada, Japan, Europe and the Eastern block.
Indeed, by 1973 Chile had more available credits, with $574 million, then when
Allende came to power ($310 million).³² The UP was discouraged to find, though,
that much of this credit was tied to purchases in the creditor countries, and
unfortunately there was no economically viable substitute for U.S. machinery,
replacement parts and technology. Much of the credits from the Eastern Block
subsequently went unused.³³ Furthermore, many of the European creditors, like the
U.S., withdrew their credits once the UP government set out to nationalize their
Chilean business ventures.³⁴ Ambassador John Crimmins spoke of the prevailing
State Department view of the evolving relationship with Allende's Chile on economic
matters:

> By the time I left in 1973 we had come to the point where we were
talking to the Chilean government about getting some of the specific

²⁹ *Covert Action in Chile*, p. 29.

³⁰ *Helwege*, p. 220.

³¹ *Goldberg*, p. 109.

³² *Nogee and Sloan*, p. 349.

³³ *The United States and Chile* (Testimony of Crimmins), p. 69.

³⁴ *Davis*, pp. 125-127.

12

bilateral agreements like compensation for expropriation out of the way. We did not vote them any more new credits—we kept humanitarian stuff, as I remember—but no one had any problem opposing new IDB or World Bank lending, that kind of thing.³⁵

Simply, there is nothing in the U.S. economic behaviour affecting Chile that was not covered by American law. The U.S. 'Hickenlooper Amendment' stipulates that any state that nationalizes American property without a fair process of compensation is no longer eligible for US government aid. Even under the presidency of Juan Velasco Alvarado of Peru the amendment was invoked on the nationalisation of the International Petroleum Company, though the State Department softened the blow in favour of this pro-American 'reformist' government.³⁶ Chile, on the other hand, not only expropriated American assets without compensation but also based their entire campaign on the deconstruction of foreign investment in Chile. Allende himself wrote: "The central objective of the UP is to replace the present economic structure and to end the power of monopoly capitalism...in order to begin the construction of socialism."³⁷ Yet the US even then *did not* invoke Hickenlooper, viewing it as too aggressive for their 'cool and correct' approach. As taxing as the Chilean debt payment schedule was, the decision to stop repayments could only have served to assure the reduction of Chile's private-sector credit rating. As one set of authors has stated: "Surely, the UP, given its ideology, could not have been surprised that the Nixon administration was determined to use its economic strength to cut off bilateral and multilateral aid."³⁸ One is presented with a question that cuts to the core of the modern world economic system: Can the U.S. be criticised for not continuing loans to a nation that not only defaulted on existing loans, but also actively and publicly opposed American involvement in their economy? Ultimately, it may not

³⁵ Interview, Ambassador J. H. Crimmins.

³⁶ Lineberry, p. 193.

³⁷ Allende, p. 37.

³⁸ Nogee and Sloan, p. 348.

13

have mattered. One particularly detailed account of Allende's economic policies, by economist Ann Helwege, came to the following conclusion:

> ...the economic roots of Allende's problems also lay in the impossibility of a general increase in consumption without sustained copper earnings and commercial lending. Given the inherent instability of Allende's economic agenda, [American] sanctions added an important destabilizing element. Intervention through CIA covert operations, which hurt US relations elsewhere in Latin America, was probably unnecessary to secure Allende's demise.³⁹

Though the final sentence overestimates the U.S. complicity in the coup, the point is an important one in light of the popular perception of American efforts. Indeed, Helwege even overstates the level of American sanctions, for the U.S. continued, through 1970-1973, to disburse bilateral loans already agreed upon, and U.S. private banks even continued to extend some credit to Chile.⁴⁰ Likewise, the U.S. never imposed an embargo of spare parts or equipment to Chile, and never prevented the shipping companies from carrying them. The Hickenlooper amendment, the only provision that might realistically be viewed as an 'embargo' or 'blockade' was never implemented.⁴¹ The simple fact is that under the Allende government the economic situation deteriorated so dramatically that no Chilean company (of which there were fewer and fewer as Allende nationalized) could afford further loans to finance imports. As Mark Falcoff stated, the Chilean economy was so linked to that of the U.S. that the withdrawal of support on any level was bound to have a significant impact. Having failed to prevent the triumph of Marxism in Chile at the cost of billions in aid and lost U.S. investments, there is little reason to justify why the U.S. "should have ratified its error by throwing good money after bad."⁴²

³⁹ Helwege, p. 222

⁴⁰ Vicuña, ed., *The Balanced View*, pp 142-145. This is a table of IMF, IDB, and IBRD loans and decisions concerning Chile from 1971 through to 1974.

⁴¹ Falcoff, *Modern* Chile, p. 229.

⁴² Ibid, p. 240.

14

Military Assistance

Given this information on U.S. government and private lending, some
commentators have pointed out continued U.S. military aid to the Chilean military
throughout Allende's presidency as a violation by the U.S. of their own policies.⁴³
Likewise, it is possible to assert that the continuation of the Military Assistance
Program (MAP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) was a policy meant to promote
military intervention by the Chilean Armed Forces.⁴⁴ A review of the cable and
memorandum traffic about MAP casts some doubt on these assertions.

MAP was one of the first topics broached by the Nixon administration subsequent to Allende's victory at the polls. In the initial frenzy after Allende's plurality, it was tentatively decided to cancel MAP to Chile in order to prompt the Chilean Army to act against Allende.⁴⁵ For the very reason of the transparency of this move, it was decided that "such action by the U.S....would probably become known publicly and interpreted by many both in and out of Chile as overt U.S. pressure upon the Chilean military to take the political situation into their own hands,"⁴⁶ and the decision was consequently reversed. But the public image was only part of the problem. Politically, the U.S. was dealing with a Marxist government, but the military, the branch of the Chilean government that could pose a threat to American national security, was still anti-communist and Western-oriented.⁴⁷ Accordingly: "the elimination of grant military aid, the low limits of MAP sales and the slashing of

⁴³ Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende" in Vicuña, ed. *The Balanced View*, p. 118. This summarises the criticism of U.S. military aid to Chile.

⁴⁴ *Covert Action in Chile*, pp. 41-42.

⁴⁵ Cable, Kissinger and Johnson to Ambassador Korry, "Highest Levels Here", 07 October 1970.
[State]

⁴⁶ Memorandum, Johnson and Meyer to Korry, 23 September 1970. [State]

⁴⁷ The Air force, notably, was the only service with a notable American influence. The Chilean Navy was a proudly 'British' service and the Army had a Prussian influence dating back to the mid-19th century.

15

training funds...could only lead to the elimination of meaningful U.S. influence on the military."⁴⁸ The NSC's Viron Vaky wrote to Kissinger and asked him to continue MAP, for "if we continue to suspend military aid it will appear we are punishing the military which is the last group in Chile we ought to punish."⁴⁹ At the urging of the relatively dovish Ambassador Korry, it was decided to maintain MAP and associated military aid regardless of Allende's inauguration. After the Schneider assassination, however, the Ambassador was ordered to hold off telling the Chilean army about the restoration of MAP, as "it could be construed as [a] bonus for a job well done."⁵⁰ The U.S. remained very aware of the 'optics' of arms sales to a country where American interests were so publicly challenged.

The change in U.S. posture after the inauguration inevitably affected MAP and FMS. On 6 November, during the NSDM 93 planning process, the Santiago station urged CIA HQ to support continued MAP sales and training. The cable stated:

> Now more than ever, [the] Chilean army needs [the] friendly open hand of U.S.. The Army has U.S. equipment and doctrine. Supply system U.S. oriented. [the Chilean] Army now feels it is alone without friends except for U.S....If U.S. turns its back, Chilean Army will be 'forced' to look elsewhere which it does not want to do.⁵¹

The U.S. government seems to have followed this advice. Adhering to NSDM-93, the U.S. would continue to maintain the pre-election status of the US Military Group (milgroup) of advisors in Chile, would continue MAP, and would not raise the topic of military support with the Allende government unless they did. Furthermore, it was decided that the sale of tanks, air transports and fighter jets to Chile would be

⁴⁸ Cable, Korry to Under Secretary Johnson, 16 September 1970. [State]

⁴⁹ Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, "Chile", 18 October 1970. [NSC]

⁵⁰ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Strongly Urge that U.S.G", 22 October 1970. [CIA]

⁵¹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "There is more confidence", 06 November 1970. [CIA]

16

delayed as long as possible but that no announcement would be made that these items
would be embargoed.⁵² This was a cautious first step in continued military support.

Over the course of the subsequent three years, the U.S. extended over $30
million in credits for the purchase of military equipment, including $5 million in
1971, $10 million in 1972 and $12.4 million in 1973.⁵³ These credits were furnished
after “agreement in principle with the GOC on the terms of the rescheduling of the
amounts due...” and were integrated into the U.S. debt negotiations with Chile.⁵⁴ An
extensive ‘action memorandum’ of February 1973 goes to some length to justify these
FMS credits to Chile:

> The current Chilean Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs have so far successfully maintained the Chilean military's crucial non-partisan stance and its resistance to the governing leftist coalition's efforts to shift their source of military supplies and doctrinal orientation away from the U.S. The Chilean military leaders have resisted offers of Soviet military credits—reportedly up to $300 million...—and other forms of assistance including training....⁵⁵

The planned visit of a US aircraft carrier and its supporting naval group in
September of 1973 is viewed by many as sure proof that the US had, at the very least,
contingency plans to support the Pinochet coup with direct, armed force. While it did
have some connection with American desires to bolster the opposition to Allende, it
had nothing to do with coup plotting and in any case was never actually deployed to
Valparaiso. Ambassador Crimmins described how his office at the State
Department—normally cautious about such things—actually endorsed the naval visit,
to the shock of the NSC:

⁵² Cable, Secretary of State to US Embassy Santiago, "MilGroup and Military Equipment for Chile", 03 December 1970. [State]

⁵³ Memorandum, "Our Public Response to Congressional Inquiries" [unclassified], 22 Feb 1973. [CDP] The Church Committee report provides slightly different figures: $5.7 million for 1971; $12.3 million for 1972; and, $15 million for 1973. See *Covert Action in Chile*, p. 39.

⁵⁴ Memorandum, "Our Public Response to Congressional Inquiries" [unclassified], 22 Feb 1973. [State]

⁵⁵ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Curtis Tarr, "FMS Credits for Chile", 22 February 1973. [State]

17

The Navy was keen to have an aircraft carrier visit [in 1973] and this
was intended to maintain "military to military ties" as they said. As I
remember, the embassy thought it would be all right for that purpose,
and I thought it was alright, but Al Haig went ape, called me and was
very upset that we were even contemplating this. I thought that [the
carrier visit] would be a reassurance to the opposition of a US
presence, but Al Haig thought it would be a terrible mistake.⁵⁶

When reviewing the course of MAP in Chile, one sees not an attempt by the
US to use MAP as a tool to provoke a coup, but rather as a delicate programme which
might keep the Chilean military from becoming a Soviet client. For the latter to
happen would mean an intolerable Soviet encroachment into the American sphere and
so pose a direct threat to American national security in the hemisphere. The
programme, from the American perspective, was a passive attempt to prevent the
disarming or politicisation of the army by the UP. While the MAP programme was
ongoing, the CIA was simultaneously engaging in the active part of the programme,
political action directly against the UP.

## Political Action

With a new mandate from NSDM 93, the CIA set about, in early November of
1970, to produce a covert action plan for implementation in Chile. By 17 November,
the CIA had submitted for approval its 'covert action program for Chile' As described
by Jack Devine and the text of documents, there were two distinct operations involved
in the post-election period: a covert action programme designed to bolster the political
and media opposition to Allende, and a parallel intelligence gathering operation aimed
at the group most likely to stage a coup, the Chilean military. Though discreet from
one another in operational terms, they were of course pursued by the same CIA agents
in the Santiago embassy. It has been argued by contemporary historians that the

⁵⁶ Interview, Ambassador J. H. Crimmins.

(CO)

18

The bulk of the CIA's efforts from November 1970 onwards would be
dedicated to opposing Allende in the political sphere. Keyed to NSDM 93, the CIA's
political action program was "directed at the Allende government, the non-Marxist
opposition, the Chilean public.... in an effort to maximize pressure on the Allende
government to prevent its consolidation and to limit its ability to implement policies
contrary to U.S. and hemispheric interests."⁵⁷ The first aspect of the programme
described by the document is to take "political action to divide and weaken the
Allende coalition... to create splits within and between coalition parties."⁵⁸ Also
detailed in the document is the plan to provide financial support to the opposition
parties, the PDC and the PN. Concurrent with this political party funding was the
support for opposition media outlets "which can speak out against the Allende
government."⁵⁹ The main focus of American activities remained on the two items
mentioned in the initial plan of 9 January 1971, namely efforts to support the Chilean
opposition and its media, and to encourage dissention in the UP coalition.⁶⁰ In his
memoirs, Kissinger stated: "we agreed with our Democratic predecessors that groups
standing for democratic values needed our help against those who openly threatened

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

(L)

⁶⁷ Ibid

20

> Were basically trying to undermine democratic institutions. In the case of media they were cutting off access to print. They were intimidating the segment of the public that did not support them. I was on the Carrera Hotel looking down on the plaza during the March of the Women when the *MIRistas* arrived by truckloads, throwing rocks and bottles. This was not New York, Bloomberg and Ferrer, this was serious strategy: seizing of land, workers taking over factories. There was reason, a vivid reason to support the opposition, to fight this thing without a coup, to support the parties, to support their capacity for receiving funds

(c)

⁷⁰ Ibid

⁷² Davis, p. 21.

⁷⁵ Davis, p. 308.

22

only private paper and pulp company, in the hope of driving up *El Mercurio's* prices intolerably. The Americans, as Devine's quotation above outlines, perceived all of this as a major threat to freedom of the press by forcing the newspaper into UP control.⁷⁶ Even then, a discussion paper in the NSC had cast doubt on the wisdom or effectiveness of supporting *El Mercurio*. "I reluctantly conclude that we should go along with this,"⁷⁷ argued one NSC functionary, citing the poor democratic precedent of buying the press. According to the Church Committee Report, a total of $1.7 million was given to *El Mercurio* in order to keep the paper afloat.⁷⁸

23

24

## The Private Sector

25

Beginning some time around the issuing of this NIE, State Department and CIA officials began meeting to discuss the feasibility of private sector funding. The main justification for support, as far as the State Department saw it, was "to strengthen the ability of the named private sector organisations to contribute to the general opposition effort against the UP government."⁸⁷ Simultaneously, it would prevent the total destruction of the private sector by the UP's nationalisation drive, and so maintain the private sector as a source of funds for the opposition political parties. Yet there were potential problems. The PDC was philosophically dedicated to "Christian Communitarianism" and being not entirely friendly to the private sector might end up being a target of their activities, drawing force away from the desired attacks on Allende.⁸⁸ The other fear was the funded organisations would "go off the reservation" and begin working towards violence or plotting. On this count State and the Agency agreed that any "adventurist" tendencies would be watched for and if found, funding would be terminated. With this assured as possible by the agency, Foggy Bottom passed on the recommendation to the NSC to begin a three-month trial period of funding to the private sector from August to September of 1972.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

26

27

⁹⁵ Ibid.

28

¹⁰¹ Kolko, p. 221.

29

30

The CIA country-team initially sought, perhaps due to residual impressions from the Track II period, to produce a coup in Chile. This was not in the plan for the post-inauguration period, however, and this was made clear in a series of cables exchanged in November of 1971. A cable of 12 November discussed the CIA Chief-of-Station's plans to gather intelligence on coup plotting within Chile. The three pages of the memo discussed the mechanics of making relations with coup plotters, learning of their plans, and perhaps influencing them by giving advice or suggesting techniques they had not considered. While the COS stated that the CIA should not lead or participate in any of these coups, he concluded that the CIA's mission was to "work consciously and deliberately in the direction of a coup" with fresh contacts in the Chilean military.¹⁰⁷ The Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, then William Broe, responded to this cable with absolute clarity: "We cannot accept your conclusion.... nor can we authorize you to 'talk frankly about the mechanics of a coup' with key commanders, because the implications of that amount to the same."

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

31

The CIA was going to operate strictly within the bounds of the inter-
departmental framework of covert operations, and this quotation puts to rest the
Church committee assertion, when referring to these same cables, that the CIA
"realised that the US government's desire to be in clandestine contact with military
plotters...might well imply U.S. support for their future plans" and continued these
contacts regardless.¹¹⁰ It is amply clear that the CIA, in active consultation with the
other interested branches of government, was expressly staying away from any coup
plotting. As one officer stated, "The military was a collection task, a foreign
intelligence collection task. Not 'how do you work with the military on developing a
new government', or 'how do organise a coup there tomorrow.'"¹¹¹ Responding to a
proposal from the Santiago Station in October of 1972, CIA HQ said:

32

33

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Ibid.

34

120 Cristián Pérez, "Salvadore Allende, Apuntes Sobre Su Dispositivo de Seguridad: El Grupo de Amigos Personales", in *Estudios Públicos*, No. 79, 2000, p. 51.

121 Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

35

36

37

## Civil Unrest, Part II

38

This loss of control was evident on the streets of Santiago and even on Chile's
neighbours. There were increasing indications of Cuban security agents in the
country, and some positive intelligence on Chilean-based support for the insurgency
in Bolivia.<sup>130</sup> Internally, the CIA had collected ample evidence of large 'street
brigades' of pro-UP youth armed with Cuban weapons (brought in via the *GAP*<sup>131</sup>),
and knew of right-wing groups doing the same.<sup>132</sup> Political deterioration mirrored the
deterioration in internal security: another set of strikes began in late July of 1973, this
time encompassing groups from as diverse backgrounds as engineers and doctors to
peasant and labour groups.<sup>133</sup> Matters became so unstable in Chile that on 9 August
Allende formed his second emergency military cabinet, bringing the C-in-Cs of the
four services into key portfolios. Generals and Ministers were resigning as fast as
they could be brought into government. Street violence was an everyday fact.<sup>134</sup> As
CIA director William Colby reported to the White House, it was "increasingly
apparent that three years of political polarization had strained the fabric of Chilean
society to the breaking point."<sup>135</sup> Allende was facing a grave situation.

39

[LC]

# "The CIA and the 1964 Chilean Presidential Election"

Kristian Gustafson
Downing College
Cambridge
(kcg23@cam.ac.uk)

US Involvement in Chile is certainly most famous for its most recent period: the CIA's role in the fall of Salvador Allende Gossens and the rise of General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte. The extremes of this period unfortunately eclipse more than a decade of preamble, a string of covert actions under three successive presidents before the fateful actions under President Nixon. The CIA's behaviour during the presidency of Allende did not occur in isolation from other policy, nor was the US government unaware, in 1970, of the threat posed by Allende or the political forces pushing him. Prior to his victory in 1970, as Senator Allende he had stood in three successive elections as a candidate of various leftist front parties. In each of those elections the US undertook some form of action against the Marxist front parties and so Salvador Allende. In order to place later and more elaborate operations of 1970-1973 into perspective, the US perspective on Allende's political career must be understood. These operations are not the attempted assassinations and plotted coups of the popular conception, but rather much subtler affairs of money and influence. They mark, nonetheless, a serious meddling in the affairs of a friendly democracy. Meddling, one should note, that was not without its darker side and menacing consequences. The planning and execution of covert operations in the 1964 Chilean Presidential election was a point of no return for US interests in Chile, a precursor to the events of the Nixon/Allende administrations, a waypoint on the long road to the coup. It was, moreover, an independently important

18

event in the history of US state behaviour in Chile and Latin America, for it was a large-
scale involvement in the political process of a democratic state.

***

"From the viewpoint of US interest, it would be better if any of the candidates other than Allende won the Chilean elections. Were Allende to win we could be faced with a pro-Soviet, anti-US administration in one of the most important countries in the hemisphere."¹ So wrote the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (ARA) in June of 1958, presaging a sentiment that would dominate US thinking about Latin America for the next two decades. Before the Cuban Revolution, the US was presented with a challenge in its own back yard, the threat of a pro-Soviet government in *the Americas*. The shock was doubly sharp because it was unexpected (at least to the Americans: most Chilean observers saw it coming). For the US, Chile represented one of the *good* Latin-American states, a true democracy with a strong record of civilian governance and peaceful handovers of presidential power only twice broken since independence from Spain in 1818. After a revision in 1925, the Chilean constitution remained unchanged until after the 1973 coup.² Overall, Chile's history is one remarkably free of the *golpe de estado* (coup d'etat) that fit within the North American

¹ Memo, Ast. Sec. State ARA to Dep Und Sec Economic Affairs, 18 June 1958. [FRUS 58-60, Vol. V Micorfiche Supplement, CI-6]

² The President was elected for a term of six years and was not able to succeed himself. Deputies were elected for four-year terms and senators for terms of eight years. J. Biehl Del Rio and Gonzalo Fernandez R., "The Political Pre-requisites for a Chilean Way," in *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 7, No.3, 1972, p. 308.

19

stereotype of Latin America.³ As US Ambassador Edward M. Korry described it, Chile was:

> The most stable, tested, freest democracy in South America... Democracy in Chile meant exactly what it meant in the United States. Even more: it meant an unfettered press. It meant a multi-partied Congress. It meant an independent judiciary. It meant an apolitical army, an army that had never participated in politics.⁴

For the US, it was the one Latin-American country that could be depended upon, due to its strong middle-class (something entirely absent in most of the rest of the region) and burgeoning industrial/consumer economy.⁵ Yet in the 1958 election campaign the US, for the first time since the Pacific War of 1879-1884, had to pay close attention to Chile, for from seemingly out of nowhere the Communist-Socialist Front under Senator Salvador Allende, was now poised—perhaps—for a win.⁶ What was going on?

Chile had changed. While the nation had grown wealthy through the two world wars by sales of copper and foodstuffs to the belligerents, its population had stratified. There was a notably sophisticated upper and middle-class, upwardly mobile and educated, comprising about one third of the population, with the remaining population existing in several distinct layers of working class and urban poor.⁷ In fact, historian Mark Falcoff argues that the Chilean socio-economic stratification almost perfectly

³ Harold Eugene Davis, "The Presidency in Chile," In *Presidential Studies Quarterly*, Vol. X, No. X, 19XX, p. 707.

⁴ F. Orrego Vicuna, ed., *Chile; The Balanced View* (Santiago, 1975), p. 292.

⁵ An economy, though, almost entirely fuelled by copper exports. As with any resource-based economy, Chile's GDP mirrored the rise and fall of copper prices on the global commodities market: it just so happened, though, that wars tended to drive up prices of such strategic metals. Ergo, Chile had done quite well for itself in the period of 1914-1945, though much of the profit still went to the largely foreign owners of the mines.

⁶ In the period surrounding the War of the Pacific, Chile successfully challenged the US as the dominant naval power in the South Pacific littoral with its defeat of Peru and Bolivia. American political and commercial dominance of the southern cone was thwarted for several decades and was instead traded between Chile and Argentina. See William F. Sater, *Chile and the United States: Empires in Conflict* (Athens, USA, 1990).

⁷ Sigmund, 21. Cf. Mark Falcoff, *Modern Chile 1970-1989: A Critical History* (Pittsburgh, 1989), p. 18.

20

replicated the European and North American societies of the era. It was later noted by US government officials that despite this wealth, for half the population real wages had been declining since 1950.⁸ This social stratification and inequitable wealth distribution contributed to a Communist party that was one of the strongest in the west,⁹ and all parties "are well aware that it is controlled by Moscow."¹⁰ The Socialist party could claim a thirty-seven year history with impressive results both in and out of government, as the Chilean social-welfare system—and concomitant debt—indicates. Consciously copying the European model, Chile's socialists began, in the 30's, to form into 'Popular Fronts', the first of which, the "*Frente Popular*," brought President Pedro Aguirre Cerdo (himself a low-key socialist) to power in 1938. This party, a mix of communists and socialists, was one of the most loyal to Moscow in the entire world.¹¹ Indeed, the decision to form this front was taken at the 7th Congress of the International Communist Movement, held in Moscow in 1935.¹² Suffice to say that Chile had a strong political strain of Socialism/Communism pre-dating US interest in the domestic politics of the state.

This movement of leftist parties Chile ran in opposition to the long established political culture. On the right were, at various times, the Conservative and Liberal parties (who would run together initially in 1958 under the banner of 'Democratic Front') and the National Party and in the centre was the Radical Party (which, in 1962, also joined the

⁸ NIE 94-63, "The Chilean Situation and Prospects," 3 October 1963. [JFK FRUS, Vol. XII Microfiche supplement, Doc 45.]

⁹ Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende* (Ithaca, 1989), p. 3.

¹⁰ Memorandum, INR, "Salvador Allende, Chilean Presidential Candidate", 24 April 1964. [DDRS]

¹¹ James D. Theberge, *The Soviet Presence in Latin America* (New York, 1974), p. 51. See also testimony of Ambassador Korry, "The United States and Chile During the Allende Years", Hearings Before the House Sub-Committee of Foreign Affairs, July 1 1971, p. 11.

¹²Eusebio Mujal-León, *The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship* (Boston, 1989), p. 124-125. See also Biehl and Fernandez, "The Political Pre-requisites for a Chilean Way," p. 316.

21

Democratic Front) a collection of various socialists held together by a shared anti-clericalism, and divided on the subject of cooperating with the Marxist left.¹³ All of these orthodox parties were historically very important in Chilean politics but saw some measure of their support drawn away to the Communist/Marxist 'popular fronts' that emerged after 1938.¹⁴ Likewise drawing support away from the centre-right parties was the relatively new and left-leaning Christian Democratic Party (PDC), whose membership tended to support land reform, state influence in the economy, and the cause of "Christian communitarianism."¹⁵ Prior to 1964 the Christian Democrats had not been involved in any government. Their chosen leader was Eduardo Frei Montalva, a charismatic, frugal and hardworking Senator from a patrician family.

Despite all these active parties, INR was quick to note that no more than 15% of the Chilean electorate was a member of a political party. A large majority of the non-committed were 'a floating mass of lower-class voters' who supported the candidate offering the greatest promise of improving their lot.¹⁶ This was, potentially, ripe for harvest by a keen popular front. So, if numerous American and Western officials could celebrate Chile's openness and democratic liberalism there was reason for concern posed by the nation's highly ideological political culture and the active participation of two large and well led Marxist parties.¹⁷ As has been made clear by numerous historians and former CIA officers, this situation was somewhat analogous to Italy, and indeed US operations in Chile would be modelled after US covert action in Italy in the 1940's.

13 Julio Faúndez, *Marxism and Democracy in Chile* (New Haven, CT, 1988), pp. 31, 160-161.

14 Ibid.

15 Sigmund, p. 17.

16 Memorandum, INR to ARA, "Pressures for Change Dominate Chilean Presidential Campaign", 1 May 1964. [DDRS]

17 Falcoff, *Modern Chile*, p. 203.

22

There, as former DCI William Colby noted, the US made efforts to "strengthen the centre democratic forces—parties, cooperatives, women's groups, etc.—against the leftist challenge.¹⁸ This was to be the template for US action in Chile, though this only became the case after the scare of the 1958 election in Chile.

## Allende and the 1950's Elections

The election of 1958 was the second one in which Senator Allende competed. In 1952 he had been the candidate for a fringe Socialist party, where he received 5.5% of the vote. The poor showing of the Socialists in the 1952 Presidential race left the US apparently unimpressed by the threat of Communism in Chile, but this was to change in 1958. As head of the *Popular Action Front* (FRAP) Allende was one of four candidates but notably represented all the Marxist/Socialist parties, previously fractured; his principal opponents were Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez, of the conservative *Democratic Front*, and Eduardo Frei Montalva of the PDC.¹⁹ Allende lost to Alessandri by only 3.3%—fewer than 32,000 votes—and the Chilean Congress confirmed Alessandri as president in the required run-off vote.²⁰ For the first time—due to changing demographics and electoral laws—the bulk of the Chilean working poor had exerted their electoral clout, and the US paid attention.

The reaction was determined, if not yet panicked, within the US government.
Noting the narrowness of the conservative victory over the Socialist front party, US

¹⁸ Colby and Forbath, *Honorable Men*, p. 191.

¹⁹ Faúndez, p. 109.

²⁰ Falcoff, *Modern Chile*, p. 14. According to the Chilean constitution, if in an election no individual secures a majority, the two leading candidates are put to a combined session of congress for a run-off vote. Long standing tradition—but neither the letter nor spirit of the law—dictated that the candidate with the most votes in the general election be selected.

23

Ambassador Walter Howe noted in a despatch to Washington that things were likely to get worse, not better. "We must recognise", the ambassador wrote, "that the political pendulum has swung as far to the right in Chile as it is likely to go, and that the return swing is likely to be evidenced in... the presidential election of 1964." More than just a call for increased support for the conservatives, Howe was urging the US government to get ahead of the swing back and support "the non-communist parties of the Chilean centre and left."²¹ This was to become the chosen course for the subsequent Democratic administrations of Kennedy and Johnson, and stands apart from the popular contemporary assumption that the US would always support the conservatives as the main opposition to socialists. President Alessandri of Chile, while visiting Eisenhower in February of 1960, reiterated the suggestion of a broad-based anti-Communist approach in Chile, noting that the Communists had a sophisticated propaganda machine that attacked the US regularly to the detriment of all the non-communist parties. President Alessandri "urged that... the US conduct a vigorous campaign of counter-propaganda."²²

Eisenhower, while previously keen to overthrow several lesser governments, seems to have thought such low-threshold pro-capitalist propaganda was inappropriate for Chile.

According to the minutes, Eisenhower "said jokingly he assumed that president Alessandri was not suggesting that the US buy a newspaper in Santiago and turn it into an official US propaganda organ."²³ While this was the precise course of action the US

²¹ Despatch, Ambassador Walter Howe to State Department, 8 January 1960 [FRUS 58-60, Vol. V Microfiche Supplement, CI-27]

²² Memorandum of Conversation, President Alessandri with President Eisenhower, 29 February 1960 [FRUS 58-60, Vol. V Microfiche Supplement, CI-30]

²³ Ibid.

24

would eventually take with the *El Mercurio* in 1970, it was evidently unacceptable at the time, and president Alessandri "laughed, and said that of course was not his intention".²⁴

## The Alliance for Progress

While John F. Kennedy beat Richard M. Nixon to win the 1960 election by only a thin margin, his rhetoric on taking office showed the determination of a strong mandate. Latin America played an important part in his inaugural address, an address otherwise famous for the 'ask not what your country can do for you' statement. In a paragraph addressed to 'our sister republics south of our border,' Kennedy read,

> We offer a special pledge—to convert our good words into good deeds—in a new alliance for progress—to assist free men and free governments in casting off the chains of poverty. But this peaceful revolution of hope cannot become the prey of hostile powers. Let all our neighbours know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere intends to remain the master of its own house.²⁵

Like any political manifesto Kennedy's words are densely packed with significance and indications of future policies. The last three lines of this paragraph are familiar to any student of politics since 1823, for it is an unmistakable reiteration of the Monroe Doctrine, updated with a veiled threat against communism, those 'aggressors' who might try to 'subvert' the cause of freedom in the Americas. But whereas such a statement could have as easily come from the Eisenhower Whitehouse, the first part of the paragraph most certainly would not have, for it states an understanding of, and sympathy for, those segments of society left behind by the course of statist capitalism (or pure kleptocracy) in the region. The idea led to the creation, in March of 1961, of the

²⁴ Ibid.

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eponymous Alliance for Progress, an organisation destined to be one of the greatest US aid efforts ever conducted after the Marshall Plan. William D. Rogers, a Washington lawyer and later an Assistant Secretary of State under Nixon, served as Deputy U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress from 1961 until 1965. In a recent interview he noted, "There were a lot of people who were enthusiastic about it at the time, regarding it as an enlightened chapter in American foreign policy towards Latin America, which was to move beyond old Cold War antipathies and to move towards positive development of the hemisphere."²⁶ Despite the rhetoric of 'moving beyond Cold War antipathies', Rogers said the programme was "admittedly [designed] to counter the lure coming out of Havana." Nevertheless, Rogers believes that Kennedy was wise and statesmanlike enough to realise that "for the US to project that image [of positive development aid] was the best kind of antidote for the appeal of Fidel and Ché."²⁷

Chile was to feature in the new Alliance for Progress, for at the time democracy was a rare system in Latin America. Particularly after the 1964 coup in Brazil, Rogers noted,

> democracies you could count on one hand: Chile, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and that was it... in Latin America democracy was very much embattled at that time, so Chile was one of the few places where we felt that the concept of the Alliance for Progress had a chance of being realised in the near term. We ran a lot of programs in Chile for that very purpose, demonstratively.²⁸

The 1964 Chilean presidential election existed in this greater hemispheric context for the United States. To hold up a non-communist model for Latin America required a shining

²⁵ John F. Kennedy, "Inaugural Address" in *Inaugural Addresses of the presidents of the United States: from George Washington to George W. Bush* (2nd Ed.), US Congress, Senate, USGPO, 1989,

²⁶ Interview, Mr. William D. Rogers.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

26

example of democratic success. With the number of democracies in South America so sharply limited, if the Marxist-Communist front under a *Fidelista* like Allende won the election in Chile, there would be precious few chances for the President's Alliance to work its magic. Conversely, the Alliance might give the impetus required for the victory of the pro-democratic party. The 1964 Presidential election in Chile suddenly became a *very important* matter, being both a subject of, and requirement for, the success of the Alliance for Progress.

That Chile was increasingly important is reflected by the production, in October of 1963, of the first ever National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Chile. Obviously concerned with the potentially negative outcome of the election, American policy makers had initiated the study to better inform the determination of a coordinated US response, both overt and covert, to this threat of communism spreading out of isolated Cuba. The NIE echoed what many in the administration had said over the previous six years. The 1958 election results "raised apprehension that the 1964 presidential election might bring to power a government under strong communist influence, if not control."²⁹ This was taken seriously by policymakers, and responding to the NIE, a group of State Department officers agreed "we need to take the Allende campaign seriously."³⁰ Essentially, as historian Mark Falcoff has stated, in the context of immediately after the Cuban Revolution, Chile was burdened with being the most advantageous hemispheric battlefield on which the US could meet the Cuban challenge to Western Capitalist-Democratic ideals.³¹

²⁹ NIE 94-63, "The Chilean Situation and Prospects," 3 October 1963.

³⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Belcher, Thompson, Richardson and Carlisle, "Chile", 14 November 1963. [JFK FRUS Vol. XII Supplement, Doc 46.]

³¹ Falcoff, *Modern Chile*, p. 203.

27

Retrospective conceptions of Salvador Allende paint him as a pleasant and jovial 'Champagne Socialist' along European lines, more democrat that despot. Was the reaction to him in the early 1960's unjustified, viewed through the eyes of desperately and unreasonably anti-Communist Americans, made worse by Monroe Doctrine fears? It is likely that there something more to Allende's stance that spooked the Americans into action.

## Who's Afraid of Salvador Allende?

Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens was a recurring character in Chile's political dramas from the 1930's onwards.³² From a wealthy family, Allende had entered politics while still in medical school and had helped found the Chilean Socialist party in 1933, the year he graduated.³³ Elected as a federal deputy in 1937, Allende became Secretary-General of the Socialist Party in 1943, and by 1951 he was president of the Chilean Medical Society and vice-president of the Chilean Senate.³⁴ Revolutionary Cuba would emerge as his party's main model and Allende cultivated a close friendship with Castro. Allende was important in the forming of the Cuban-sponsored Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO), which was to serve as the political body behind Che Guevera's 1967 Bolivian adventure.³⁵ Indeed, Allende's daughter Beatriz would later marry the Cuban diplomat (and spy) Luiz Fernandez Oña, a former Guevaraista and intimate of

³² In Spanish speaking countries, two last names are officially used. However the latter name, called the matronymic, is not used in addressing an individual.

³³ Barry Goldwater, "On Covert Actions in Chile 1963-1973: A response to the Church Committee Report" in *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, Vol. XXX, No. 1, 1986, p. 86.

³⁴ Memorandum, INR, "Salvador Allende, Chilean Presidential Candidate", 24 April 1964. [DDRS]

³⁵ Barry Goldwater, "On Covert Actions in Chile 1963-1973: A response to the Church Committee Report", p. 87.

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Castro.³⁶ In the merger of the Socialists and Communists each entity remained intact, but there was enough cohesion in the party to retain Allende as the presidential candidate over the course of three consecutive elections.

As noted by former CIA officer David Atlee Phillips in his fascinating book *The Night Watch*, the CIA had penetrated both the Communists and the Socialists parties in the early fifties, and was thus capable of getting very detailed information about their leadership personalities and even finances.³⁷ Prior to the 1958 election, however, and despite accurate CIA reporting, few in the US government would have ever heard the name Allende, and those who had would not have been unduly worried by it. Allende was just another socialist politician in another Latin American country. In the run-up to the 1964 election, though, Allende finally appeared as a bright icon on the US government's anti-communist radar screen. This is not to say that perceptions of Allende were entirely conditioned by anti-communist obsession, nor was it entirely hysterical in tone. Asked in 1963, as part of the NIE procedure, to give a sketch of Allende, the US country-team in Santiago wrote:

> Allende is a chameleonic person... Personally he is vain, quick tempered, easily offended, socially as well as politically ambitious, able turn on or off at will a considerable social charm. He is sensitive to charges he would be dominated by Communists or that he would institute anti-democratic measures. Nevertheless were he to achieve power we think he could be led by events into being harsh and ruthless with his opponents but more likely use exile than prison or pardon. It is probable that he thinks in terms of a Marxist regime similar to the one in Cuba in its free-wheeling, relatively independent line but more sophisticated, cultured, without emotional excesses of a "tropical" country such as Cuba.³⁸

³⁶ Nathaniel Davis, p. 91.

³⁷ David Atlee Phillips, *The Night Watch: Twenty Five Years of Peculiar Service* (New York, 1977), pp. 14-28.

³⁸ Cable, Embassy Santiago to Department of State, "Assessment Socialist-Communist Candidate Salvador Allende", 22 April, 1964. [LBJ FRUS, 251]

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Allende himself (who in the CIA's view "does not possess unusual intelligence") consciously used the rhetoric of Marxism within his party, but nonetheless tried to portray the image of being a democrat. Despite his periodic statements (often to American press representatives) that he was not a Communist, as well as the wide-spread belief among Chileans, including many in opposition, that he was basically a democratic socialist as opposed to communist, the CIA believed the "record shows he has collaborated with Communists for more than 15 years with no apparent difficulty" and was likely fully in league with Communist Party leader Luis Corvalán.³⁹ INR added that Allende "has turned increasingly to the Communists as an instrument of victory and has risked becoming their tool."⁴⁰ Indeed, Allende may have believed himself to be a new breed of *Chilean Marxist-Socialist*, and he would become agitated when accused of wanting to do away with Chilean democratic institutions, saying that he would actually *save* democracy by the introduction of *People's Government*: "The new social order will require new institutions...we shall draft a new Constitution using the present Charter as a springboard."⁴¹ But if one was unsure about the precise meaning of this last sentence, Allende provided a more concise explanation in his party platform: "The objective is total, scientific Marxist socialism."⁴² Allende may have been a new-model Marxist, but in using such language he confirmed, to any but the most sophisticated political philosophers amongst American officials, that he was indeed a Marxist first and foremost.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Memorandum, INR, "Salvador Allende, Chilean Presidential Candidate", 24 April, 1964. [DDRS]

⁴¹ Airgram A-756, AMEmbassy to State, 10 April 1964. [NARA, RG 59, Stack 250, Box 2025, Pol 2-1 Joint Weekas Chile]

⁴² Régis Debray, *The Chilean Revolution* (New York, 1971) p. 118.

30

But 'Allende the threat' was not taken for granted by US officials. Many in the State Department and other parts of the government put significant thought into the question. One particularly noteworthy discussion of the matter came from the US Embassy First Secretary Robert Hurwitch, who produced a lengthy and thoughtful letter on the topic addressed directly to the NSA, McGeorge Bundy. While suggesting that the Soviets would be likely, but not certain, to take advantage of a communist Chile to expand their presence in America, Hurwitch was much clearer about the overall impact of an Allende victory:

"Dear Mac:

I have had very much in mind your request for another opinion as to whether an Allende victory would be seriously detrimental to US national security interests.... As a practical matter, whatever our assessment of the significance of an Allende victory, we may find our manoeuvrability the day after the election severely circumscribed. (I have often thought that the real tragedy for us of Castro's having embraced the Marxist, rather than our, world lay in the limitations now placed upon the flexibility of US policy toward situations which superficially resemble that of Cuba.) Another "Castro" in the Hemisphere, particularly one who achieved power through the democratic process in a country where we have invested the highest rate of per capita assistance, would be awfully tough to handle from both the international and domestic standpoints. This would clearly be a case where one and one totalled much more than two and the consequences throughout the Hemisphere of a second Castro would be serious."43

That the issue of Chile was tied to the issue of Cuba was inescapable, as Hurwitch notes regretfully, but the discussion here was much less hysterical than some historians have supposed. Hurwitch ultimately suggested quite simply, "An Allende victory would constitute a defeat for US policy."44 The practical examples of such a defeat were quickly identified: "If Allende wins and stays in power, we are in trouble" wrote Gordon Chase

43 Letter, "First Secretary of the Embassy in Chile (Hurwitch) to McGeorge Bundy", 19 June 1964. [FRUS 259]

31

of the State Department, for he would "probably nationalize the copper mines, which in turn, might end the aid program because of the Hickenlooper amendment; this, in turn, could lead Chile to ask the Bloc for economic aid."⁴⁵ For the US government in the 1960's all Communist roads led to Moscow.

Even without reference to the Kremlin, the mere mention of the word 'Cuba' would have caused blood to boil, hackles to rise, and numerous alarms to sound in a White House still occupied—for just a few more days—by the brothers Kennedy. It is likely that the CIA station in Santiago had a good idea of Allende's connections with foreign and domestic communist parties, and with the Soviet Union itself.⁴⁶ While it is unclear what precisely the CIA knew about Allende in 1963, new work by Professor Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin shows that by this time Allende was indeed firmly in the Soviet camp.⁴⁷ First contact by the Soviets with Allende was made by a KGB 'Line PR' officer from Buenos Aires, Svyatoslav Fyodorovich Kuznetsov (LEONID) in 1953. Salvador Allende was issued the appropriate codename "LEADER" by the KGB, though he was not officially recruited as an agent. Systematic contact between Allende and the KGB was established in 1961 when relations were restored and the KGB set up a residency in new trade mission. To the KGB Allende had 'stated his willingness to co-operate on a confidential basis and provide any necessary assistance,

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Memorandum, Gordon Chase to McGeorge Bundy, "Chiefs of Mission Conference-Brazil and Chile", 19 March, 1964 [LBJ, NSF, Country File, Latin America, Vol. I, 11/63-6/64] The Hickenlooper Amendment stated that the US had to end all financial aid to any nation that expropriated US property without compensation or due legal process.

⁴⁶ That the CIA was operating within the FRAP constituent parties is clear by the security deletions in CIA documents about these parties. Detailed information about party strategies or personalities is followed by such deletions, likely obscuring the source within these organizations.

⁴⁷ This section waiting security clearance in the UK.

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since he considered himself a friend of the Soviet Union. He willingly shared political information..."⁴⁸

Like their American counterparts, the KGB carefully analysed the man with whom they placed a good degree of hope. Perhaps a comment on the judgement of both services, the similarities between the KGB and CIA assessment of Salvador Allende are perfectly eerie. The KGB noted, from contacts in Communist Party, that Allende's "characteristic traits were arrogance, vanity, desire for glorification and a longing to be in the spotlight at any price. He was easily influenced by stronger and more determined personalities." Illustrating a distinction that would have been lost on most Americans, they also thought him to be "dangerously Maoist", and to have very bourgeois connections with freemasonry. Making reference to not-so-secret information, he was further noted to be something of a womaniser.⁴⁹ That Allende was being supported by international communist elements was clear even outside the CIA, for Presidential candidate Eduardo Frei reported to the US Ambassador that "large quantities of funds [around $1 Million] for the Allende campaign had recently come in from Canada and that more were expected in the near future. [Political Attaché] Scott Fox had told him that he had not been able to track down the report but that the presumption was that the money had originated in Cuba". Work in Soviet archives by Chilean-based researcher Olga Ulianova does indeed show Soviet aid to the Chilean Communist party (PCCh) at a baseline of $50,000/annum in 1960 to 1969 with spikes of up to $400,000.⁵⁰ Eventually, the sums of money passed to the PCCh were the highest in Latin America after Cuba.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Andrew, Mitrokhin, Vol. 2, p. 8.

⁴⁹ Andrew, Mitrokhin, Vol. 2, p. 8-9

⁵⁰ Ulianova, p. 89.

⁵¹ Nikolai Leonov, *Likholetye*, (Moscow, 2000) p. 39.

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Even without this knowledge (Phillips does not tell us what information his agents actually produced) many commented that Allende was spending money at a rate far faster than he could possible be raising domestically.⁵²

The rise of Allende and the strength of the Chilean communist party helped prompt the Soviet Union to waive its normal aversion to operations in the American sphere of influence. After the sudden and unanticipated success in Cuba, the USSR no longer looked at Latin America as merely part of the American sphere, but rather as an independent zone: previously 'out of bounds,' Latin America now appeared as an enormous political arena which, if exploited properly, offered an opportunity to hurt the Americans. For the first time, Latin American branches opened in the KGB and Foreign Ministry. The former was placed under the direction of new KGB officer Nikolai Leonov, whose memoirs offer substantial comments on Chile. The strategic vision was less direct than many might perhaps think. Leonov proceeded on the assumption that the USSR was not interested in Chile because it would derive any necessary strategic or tactical benefit, but because *the US did*. The USSR itself gained no particular advantage out of winning *aside from winning*.⁵³ That such a victory might be achieved in the most capitalist of Latin American countries was a tangible plus. Reporting from the Embassy in 1964 described the chain of events resulting from a Communist government in Chile, and the impact they would have on the United States:

> Negative economic impact will be very great immediately and probably over short-term as well. Allende would probably try to expand activities and efforts of existing GOC institutions that directly involved in economy in effort compensate for lacks and lags in private sector. He will undoubtedly seek help from bloc and "unaligned" countries but

⁵² Telegram, Embassy Santiago to Sec State & Embassy Ottawa, "Allende's Funding", 5 May 1964. [LBJ, NSF, Country File, Chile, Vol. 1, Cables 1/64-8/64, doc 32]. See also David Atlee Phillips, p. 14-28.

⁵³ Leonov, pp. 37-40.

34

conceivably might make unreasonable request of USG (e.g. low interest
loan pay for expropriation copper companies and utilities) expecting turn
down which he could use as ostensible justification Chilean public for
turning [to] bloc. In general economic deterioration after Allende victory
would tend stimulate and be used justify extreme internal measures toward
full statist economic power as well as shift to excessive Chilean
dependence Communist bloc aid and trade.⁵⁴

American statements to the effect that having Chile 'go communist' would be a
blow to their prestige first and foremost showed the same basic understanding of the
great-power stakes shared by their Soviet counterparts. Both East and West were on the
same playing field. "In essence," said National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy to
President Johnson, "the problem we face is that a very popular and attractive candidate,
named Allende, who has thrown in his lot with the Communists, has more than a fighting
chance to win"⁵⁵ That the US had to do something to avert this was quite simply
assumed.

Initiation of the 1964 Operation

In overt terms the determination to work against Allende had begun with the
inauguration of President Kennedy in 1961, largely through the Alliance for Progress,
with the idea of assisting the Christian Democrats first mooted in March 1962 by
Ambassador Cole and the then Special Assistant to the President, Richard Goodwin. At
this time the '5412 Special Group' (a semi-official cabinet-level body tasked to review
and approve covert action proposals) approved a programme of 'non attributable'
assistance to Eduardo Frei's Christian Democrats in April 1962 and again on 30 August

⁵⁴ Cable, Embassy Santiago to Department of State, "Assessment Socialist-Communist Candidate Salvador Allende", 22 April, 1964. [LBJ FRUS, 251]

⁵⁵ Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64. Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IV [LBJ FRUS 252]

35

1963, with concurrent approval from States' Latin American Policy Committee in
January and June 1963. By the northern autumn of 1963, the US government had
effectively decided to actively prevent the election of Allende in Chile. In late 1963, a
subsidy of an unknown amount to the Democratic Front (under the leadership of Radical
Party boss Julio Durán Neumann), the coalition party of the right-leaning Conservative
and Liberal Parties and the centre-left Radicals. This one-time payment was not
connected to any well thought-out policy, though it was specifically requested by a
member of the party to make up their $500,000 campaign shortfall.⁵⁶

These payments, one might perceive from the tone of CIA discussions regarding them, were not party of a coordinated strategy, but rather stop-gap payments based on the recommendations of the Embassy country-team. The Assassination of Kennedy in November of 1963, brought a temporary halt to the measures to implement a high-level, coherent plan to be executed by the Agency. Despite the sad delay, the transition to President Johnson was relatively seamless and had little impact on the developing program in Chile—except in the attitudes behind the support to Chile. By mid-December of 1963, the West Wing had absorbed the new administration and the new staff got on with the business at hand.⁵⁷ McGeorge Bundy seems to have put Chile back on the agenda, writing to President Johnson on 24 January with the suggestion that the Special Group, the informal committee that considered covert actions, “might, at an early date, give consideration to the interests of the United States in the Chilean election which occurs in December 1964.”⁵⁸ No one familiar with Latin American affairs, noted

⁵⁶ Memorandum, C/WHD (J.C. King) to DCI McCone, Political Action Program in Chile, 3 January, 1964. [LBJ FRUS 245]

⁵⁷ LBJ Briefings, Ch. 3.

⁵⁸ Memorandum, Amb Dungan to McGeorge Bundy, untitled, 18 January, 1964. [LBJ FRUS 246]

36

Bundy, "has any doubt as to the importance of the outcome of this election, not only in Chile but throughout the hemisphere" and it should therefore be dealt with promptly.⁵⁹
Nothing further, however, was briefed to the President.⁶⁰

The major problem faced by the US government in early 1964 was precisely who they were going to support to prevent an Allende victory. While the Maxist-Socialist left parties were united under the banner of the Popular Action Front or FRAP, the centre and right-of-centre both represented viable alternatives to a communist government and were running separately: the Democratic Front (FD) and the Christian Democrats (PDC). The decision on which one to support was evidently the cause of much hand wringing. The CIA's initial support to the PDC was aimed at getting them into a broad-based non-communist coalition with the Radicals, previously Chile's largest single political party— and may have had prompting from President Kennedy directly, as former US Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry stated in an interview in Santiago in 1999: "It started probably in early '63 after President Kennedy met directly with [PDC Chairman Eduardo] Frei in the White House. It was a secret meeting. I believe it was in the [Northern] spring of '63... In that period."⁶¹ But with Kennedy gone this pro-PDC desire waned, exacerbated by the inability to tell Eduardo Frei that he was being supported by the US at all. The last reason for PDC funding had been to make the party unwittingly act as a third, or splitter, party, drawing votes away from elements of soft-socialist/pro-clerical supporters of the FRAP in a way that the FD could not. Asked by the administration to make a choice on which they should support, the CIA was firmly behind supporting just the FD despite Kennedy's pro-liberal and pro-Catholic sentiments.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

37

The reasoning was that the Christian Democratic Party would be less favourable and responsive to United States Government policies than the Democratic Front, and that they were likely to try to "establish relations with Iron Curtain countries... [and] will endeavour to increase its trade with the Soviet Bloc and will not follow the United States lead in foreign policy with the same willingness as the present government."⁶² The underlying reasoning of the CIA was echoed by the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (ARA) Thomas Mann, who suggested support should only go to the FD because Durán, being more pliable—from the American viewpoint—in economic matters than Frei, might be more ready to reinvest money into Chile and so improve the economy. Also, Durán's relatively left-leaning tendencies "might draw further votes away from Allende." But some small measure of "support to the [PDC] should be continued because they too offer strong competition to Allende."⁶³ Despite the Kennedy's drive for some kind of 'progressive development aid' in Latin America to back the Alliance, the Agency and State were aiming at the US-default of supporting the right-wing, the 'alliance for progress' instead relapsing to a mandate for stability. In February the CIA's Chief of Western Hemisphere Division (C/WHD) J.C. King submitted his recommendation to the Special Group to obtain approval for election support of the Democratic Front and a subsequent cutback in the subsidy to the Christian Democratic Party. Luckily for the PDC, however, the Special Group did not meet on 5 March, as planned, and failed to discuss Chile at its next meeting a week later.⁶⁴ As

⁶¹ *Estudios Públicos*, 72 (primavera 1998). "El Embajador Edward M. Korry en el CEP".

⁶² Memorandum, C/WHD (J.C. King) to DCI McCone, Political Action Program in Chile, 3 January, 1964. [LBJ FRUS 245]

⁶³ Memorandum for the Record, Chief and Deputy Chief, WHD with Assistant Secretary Mann, "Record of Conversation", 28 February 1964. [LBJ FRUS 247]

⁶⁴ Ibid. See also NARA Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, Meetings.

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would be repeated in 1970, the Special Group dithered over the decision on which party they should support. Before that decision could be made, however, local politics would force the American hand to a more progressive policy with long-lasting effects on US-Chilean interaction.

Chile, it was often noted by foreign political observers, seemed to be in a nearly constant election campaign. Between presidential, congressional, municipal, and by-elections there was always some sort of campaigning underway. In March 1964, as it happened, a deputy had died and there was to be a by-election in his riding of Curicó. Ralph W. Richardson, the State Department official in charge of Chilean affairs noted that it would serve as a major indicator of the relative strength of the parties into the presidential race. Pride, it is said, cometh before the fall, and Durán apparently set out to prove the point: he stated explicitly that the by-election would stand as a 'plebiscite' on the ruling party, the Democratic Front, as well as his leadership of it.⁶⁵ This seemed a safe bet at first, noted historian Paul Sigmund, as Curicó was traditionally a rural conservative bastion.⁶⁶ The FRAP candidate in the election, however, was the son of a late and lamented Socialist deputy with great clout in Curicó, and he played the familial link to his immense advantage. On 15 March, the FRAP candidate won the Curicó by-election with 39.5 percent of the vote; the next day, Durán resigned as the DF presidential candidate (though not from the Presidential race itself). As the Democratic Front was a fragile coalition, the loss of Durán was mortal, and the party dissolved within a short time. This was a high-impact event in the normally predictable Chilean political scene, and reaction in the US was sufficiently dramatic to prompt the CIA's Desmond

⁶⁵Memorandum, Richardson to Mann, "Curico By-Election", 6 March 1964. [NARA, RG 84, Santiago Embassy Files: FRC 69 A 6507, 1964, POL 14 Elections (Presidential) 1964.]

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FitzGerald to write in a memorandum that "the most important thing is to keep people from panicking" as a result of the by-election loss to FRAP.⁶⁷

While many in the US government were vexed by the FRAP victory, some at the State Department (generally of the pro-JFK persuasion) saw the silver lining. One of these was Ralph Richardson of the Chilean desk. Realising the difficulty in running two horses against a very strong FRAP, Richardson believed that the best bet lay with a single, reformist candidate. The socialist parties had never taken more than 40% in any election in Chile, so if the centre and rightist parties could be induced to support the PDC candidate, Frei, as the main non-Marxist candidate, then the election had a much better chance of producing the desired outcome. While noting that the race was far from theirs, Richardson commented on the positive impact Curicó had on the decision-making process: "I still cannot repress a feeling of satisfaction in seeing how quickly and cleanly our 'decision' to swing behind Frei was made for us. I really had wondered before Durán's disaster whether we were going to get any definite decision from the front office on which group we should help."⁶⁸ With State and CIA unable to force an executive decision on who should be supported—as would happen again in the 1970 election—the Americans nonetheless had a candidate thrust upon them.

While it is often assumed that the US had been behind the PDC from JFK's inauguration onwards, the record shows it not to be so. Kennedy's Democrats—liberal and Catholic, like Frei—did have an affinity to this analogous Latin-American party, but sympathy had not been enough to swing a notably right-leaning Democrat administration

⁶⁶ Sigmund, *The Overthrown of Allende*, p. 29.

⁶⁷ Memorandum, Carter to Hughes, "ARA-CIA Weekly Meetings, 1964-1965", 26 March 1964. [LBJ FRUS 248]

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into actually supporting them: the Alliance for Progress was to be run on political terms dictated from Washington, and those terms demanded a pliable, conservative government in *La Moneda*. This was especially so after Kennedy's death when the more pragmatic LBJ took office and delegated his even less Kennedy-inspired staff to run the show. It is only from the relatively late date of 15 March, less than six months before the election that the US government—because they had no choice—truly committed to supporting Eduardo Frei and his left-leaning, progressive Christian Democrats. Some still thought the loss of Durán was catastrophic and, as the embassy regretfully noted, "not without certain aptness has it been jested that the choice between Frei and Allende is between chaos and disaster."⁶⁹ Despite this occasional lack of conviction about their now-chosen man, whatever the US lost in time they made up with enthusiasm, and within a matter of days the situation changed dramatically: the proscription against 'witting' (or overt) contact with the PDC was partially broken, and at the party's request incredible sums of money were being sent from the US. With no other choice to avert a Marxist government, the PDC suddenly became the Great Hope.

## The CIA Swings Into Action

With focus thrust upon them, and determination accidentally imbued to the White House, the CIA acted with appropriate decisiveness in Chile. Within a short time the implications of the Curicó defeat had been absorbed and processed by the Agency with the help of the State Department and the Santiago Embassy. On 1 April, two weeks after

⁶⁸ Letter, Ralph W. Richardson to Jova, 3 April 1964. [NARA, RG 84, Santiago Embassy Files: FRC 69 A 6507, 1964, POL 14 Elections (Presidential) 1964 (1)]

⁶⁹ Airgram A-45, Embassy to Dept State, "Semi-Annual Politico-Economic Assessment - Chile", 16 July 1964. [NARA: RG 59, Stack 250, Box 2025, Pol 2-1 Joint Weekas Chile]

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the defeat, a comprehensive and lengthy memorandum was submitted to the Special Group outlining the full plan for initial support to the PDC. The preamble to the memorandum is noteworthy, outlining the considerably different political scene in Chile after Curicó, and the way the PDC was now approaching American involvement. It tells us that at the end of March a member of Frei's campaign team visited the embassy (whether this is the political section or the CIA is not said) to present their campaign budget to the Americans. First they presented their current budget of US $100,000 per month, which they claimed to be meeting only with difficulty and which they did not think was sufficient anyway. Next, they presented their desired budget of over $300,000 per month. This, they said, was needed in order to beat Allende. The Chileans coolly suggested that the U.S. Government make up the difference "which amounts to one million dollars for the period from now to election time."⁷⁰ The Embassy and the CIA station reviewed the budgets, felt they did not seem unreasonable, and subsequently recommended that the Chilean's request for one million dollars be granted as soon as possible.⁷¹ Money to the Christian Democrats, though, was not the end of the proposed US program of covert support in Chile. "As a result of the [political] situation outlined above," the memorandum continued, "it becomes necessary to take all possible action to assist Frei in his campaign." A whole battery of tactics were proposed, which one can summarise as:

(1) Preventing the Radical Party from formally endorsing Allende; "In the event the Radical Party declares for Allende, financial assistance will have to be provided to individual Radical leaders or groups capable of bringing Radical voters into the Frei camp";

⁷⁰ Memorandum, CIA to Special Group, "Support for the Chilean Presidential Election of 4 September 1964", 1 April 1964. [FRUS 250]

⁷¹ Ibid.

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(2) Influencing the Conservative and Liberal parties to support Frei in a manner that would not damage his image as a reform candidate. (to be achieved by bribes);

(3) Complementing the subsidy directly to the PDC, influence on Frei to reach a private agreement with the Radicals for their support in exchange for post-election patronage;

(4) Preventing the declaration of a third candidate (the most likely was Jorgé Prat, a conservative from a powerful political family) by bribery and "pressure" to avert the splitting of the non-Marxist vote;

(5) Financial assistance to ancillary organizations, such as youth and student groups, peasant organizations, slum dwellers' associations, labour unions, and women's clubs, to bring their votes to Frei; and

(6) Initiating "specialized propaganda operations, some of which will be black, to denigrate Allende."⁷²

Altogether, this seems a fairly reasonable set of options considering the perceived problem, perhaps even standard political wrangling, whose only sinister terms are the vaguely described 'pressure' to be applied to keep other candidates from challenging Frei's dominance of the centre and right. Nor was it illegal under either Chilean or US law. It is, nonetheless, serious political interference with the electoral process in a democratic state. To the Americans, however, it was merely a gentle inoculation of prevent the far worse anti-democratic disease of Marxism, for this was contagious disease: there were serious consequences "if this major Latin American nation should become the first country in the hemisphere to freely choose an avowed Marxist as its elected president."⁷³ A further option listed at the end of the memo underlines the gravity with which the CIA and the Special Group viewed the situation. Realising that the first six options might not swing the required votes, the CIA should be prepared, in the latter stages of the campaign, "to buy some votes outright if required."⁷⁴

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Mann) to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Presidential Election in Chile", 1 May, 1964. [LBJ FRUS Doc 253]

⁷⁴ LBJ FRUS 250

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Despite the PDC's open and direct approach for campaign funding, there was still disagreement as to whether this funding should be provided to them in an overt fashion. While it was not yet stated explicitly, it was clear to both the PDC and the US government that the revelation of wholesale US funding to the Chilean party would be a disaster, likely to result in massive political gains for Allende and the FRAP. Yet, with the whole point of the campaign being to "obtain some essential leverage" over the PDC during their erstwhile Presidency, the CIA suggested that the money be passed in a manner which might "infer U.S. Government origin of the funds yet permit us plausible denial if necessary" by explicitly attributing the funds to US non-official sources.⁷⁵ The Embassy's political staff, however, believed that the important matter was merely for Frei to win, that the benefit of leverage over the PDC was dramatically outweighed by the risk of a leak from some nationalist in the PDC that would compromise the entire operation.

The PDC, though, was just a little too left wing for the Special Group to feel comfortable with them not under some American influence. Accordingly, the Special Group authorised $750,000 (of the requested $1 million) in immediate funding to go to the PDC, in the semi-covert fashion outlined by the CIA. This decision was made, however, with the understanding that it did not "reflect the Embassy's position." The difference was not too great, however, and it seems that the CIA was able to accommodate the slightly sceptical ambassador Cole. The following day the paper was approved, with new C/WHD Desmond FitzGerald announcing in an attached memo that a solution to the slight difference of opinion between Ambassador Cole and the Santiago CIA station had been reached: attribution of U.S. support would be inferred *but there should be no*

⁷⁵ Ibid.

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*evidence or proof.*<sup>76</sup> This was, FitzGerald apparently assured them, something the CIA could do. Whether it would actually be effective at deflecting realisation of American funding would remain to be seen.

After the Church Committee investigations of 1975, the manner in which covert actions were approved changed dramatically. Within a day of approval by the successor to the Special Group, the president would have to issue a 'finding' authorising the operation as necessary for the national security of the United States and then pass it to the congressional select committees on intelligence. This was not the case in 1964, a time when the covert-action decision-making infrastructure was still free of bureaucratic hurdles or legal checks, especially those later put in place by Congress. While the President may have been partially cognisant of the ongoing procedures regarding Chile (he did not choose to read the still-classified 'intelligence checklist' [latterly known as 'the President's Daily Brief'] from the DCI, as would later become customary, so this is not certain<sup>77</sup>) the first evidence of his being informed about the actual programme and the associated funding decision came on or about 13 May, 1964. At this time, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy forwarded to Johnson a memorandum, written by Assistant Secretary of State for ARA Thomas Mann to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, which outlined the entire US programme of action in Chile, both covert and overt. To this memorandum Bundy appended a short note for the President, which highlighted the salient points as he perceived them, indicating

> We have a coordinated Government-wide program of action to strengthen [Allende's] opponent and support actions in Chile which will work to the

<sup>76</sup> Memorandum, Minutes of Special Group Meeting of 2 April, INR/IL Historical Files, Special Group Files, 9 April 1964. [NARA]

<sup>77</sup> John L. Helgerson, "CIA Briefings of Presidential Candidates 1952-1992", (Washington, 1996) chapter 3 in passim. Henforth *Presidential Briefs*.

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advantage of those now in power. It is a highly fluid situation and one in
which there may have to be further action as we get into the summer. I
have been very much encouraged by the determination and unity which all
Departments of the Government are showing on this one, and we will be
watching it very closely, but I do think you ought to know about it
yourself.⁷⁸

The latter point—full cooperation of all the departments—is important, for it is possible
that the success of this programme hinged upon it, as would be proved in later US efforts
in Chile. It is notable, however, that this entire programme of covert actions (and tens of
millions in overt funding) was occurring possibly *without the knowledge or permission of
the President*. Certainly, the system of security management in the NSC as established
by the National Security Act of 1948 was designed to allow swift responses by
empowered staff acting within the conceptual framework previously established by the
President. The Chief Executive is, after all, a fairly busy individual. Initially, it may
seem surprising that such a delicate and seemingly important task, with so much money
being funnelled to a friendly democracy (an act, Loch Johnson notes, more serious than
operations in a repressive regime), without some small measure of control by the
President—but there is an explanation. Johnson, by April of 1964, had only been acting
as President for four months and before that he was kept—at the request of JFK—almost
totally in the dark about covert actions.⁷⁹ He had met on one occasion with DCI Allen
Dulles in July 1960 while a vice-presidential candidate, but neither Dulles nor his
successor, John McCone, had made much effort to keep Johnson informed during the
intervening years.⁸⁰ Compared with the concerns of the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe,
Cuba, and especially Vietnam, Chile was a relatively secondary matter, so the fact that

⁷⁸ Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64. Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. IV [LBJ FRUS Doc 253]

⁷⁹ Presidential Briefs, Ch. 3.

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LBJ had not been 'read-in' to the matter until April, when real action was being planned, was not implausible. Nonetheless, by this time Johnson had long stopped reading the Agency's *Intelligence Checklist*, preferring to let the agency or the NSC take care of matters. Accordingly, one can detect very little Presidential input into the matter of supporting Frei after Curicó both before and after this initial briefing.⁸¹ The operation was, essentially, still operating under the control of the deceased Kennedy. But what JFK had started was impressive, and it becomes clear in the rest of this memo to Johnson. In addition to the CIA's covert actions, the memorandum outlines the entire sweep of US overt operations:

2) Providing AID loans in CY 64 amounting to approximately $70 million...

5) Organizing a political action and propaganda campaign through CIA contacts in coordination with or parallel to Frei's campaign. This includes voter registration drives, propaganda, person-to-person campaigning... and arrangements to provide some Italian Christian Democratic organizers to Frei as advisers...

7) [Attempt]... to encourage their rising awareness of the subversion which would take place under an Allende government.

8) Continuing USIA placement in Chile of un-attributed material, giving special care to low-keyed efforts which do not expose U.S. Government involvement.

9) Encouraging, through covert ties and private U.S. organizations, effective anti-Allende efforts by Chilean organizations including the Roman Catholic Church, trade union groups, and other influential bodies, such as the anti-clerical Masons.⁸²

This was, indeed, a 'full court press', with all aspects of the US government directed to prevent the election of Allende. Indeed, some observers were so impressed by the anti-Allende efforts of other US government agencies that they assumed that they were CIA fronts. Popular Chilean author Eduardo Labarca, in his book *Chile Invadido*, states quite

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Presidential Briefs, Ch. 7.

⁸² LBJ FRUS 253.

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firmly that the United States Information Service (USIS) was a CIA front organisation,
though in its own records the CIA states that this was not the case. CIA Chief of Western
Hemisphere Division William V. Broe wrote to the Deputy Director of Plans, in
explanation of his own activities, that "the material disseminated [by us] does not
duplicate USIA efforts, which in Chile are centred mainly in propaganda areas other than
radio."⁸³ While Labarca may have been correct in noting that the USIA was spreading
pro-American propaganda, it was noted by the CIA that the "USIA effort does not
concentrate on disseminating a significant amount of anti-Communist material."⁸⁴ While
Labarca points to some fairly unlikely patterns to support his theory—he argues, for
example that any editorial from Santiago daily *El Mercurio* that finished with the letters
O, W, or S was a plant from the CIA—he is not incorrect to have spotted the American
hand behind the large pro-Frei propaganda drive in Chile, including (though his letter
pattern is nonsense) editorials in major conservative papers such as *El Mercurio*.⁸⁵ The
Americans, however, felt that the operation and all its millions were still entirely *sub
rosa*, with ARA assistant-secretary Mann telling his superior that they "are attempting to
insure that extraordinary caution is observed in this action campaign to conceal official
U.S. government interest, and we have rejected several ideas which have seemed to entail
undue risks or excessive American involvement."⁸⁶

⁸³ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval and Renewal", 12 March 1968.

⁸⁴ Memorandum, C/WHD to DDP, "Request for Approval and Renewal", 12 March 1968

⁸⁵ Eduardo Labarca, *Chile Invadido* (Santiago, 1968), pp. 307-317. On top of propaganda, USIS was also distributing bad movies, if one can judge from their film repertoire #286 'Danza Hacia la Libertad' [Dancing towards Freedom] about two Hungarian ballerinas who bravely flee to West Berlin.

⁸⁶ Memorandum, Mann to Rusk, "Presidential Election in Chile", 1 May, 1964. [FRUS 253] (or Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Chile, Vol. I, 1/64-8/64).

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## Corporate Funding

Though the Americans perhaps had an inflated sense of their own operational security in Chile, they did at least take security seriously. Perhaps the most frequent charge levelled against the US in Latin America is that they were subservient or reactive to corporate interest at the expense of sound policy. This certainly applies to Chile, where the large US investments in the copper mining industry, and in telecoms and infrastructure, were in the order of billions of US dollars. In Chile in 1964, however, the desire to work directly with or for the corporate sector was viewed as being too predictable and too likely to be compromised for there was a "lack of assurance on security before, during, and after the election" from interested corporations.⁸⁷ Part of this stemmed from admonishments directly from Frei. On more than one occasion when speaking to US Embassy officials, Frei emphatically stated that any linking of him to the US Government or—especially—to the U.S. private sector financial assistance would be "fatal."⁸⁸ To have his reformist and 'communitarian' party linked with foreign capital in such a highly nationalist country as Chile would be a political kiss of death—a fact he made explicitly clear to Joseph Jova, the Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d'Affairs.

Concerns about the political ramifications in Chile of a revelation about corporate funding (made manifest in the ITT scandal of 1972) were not the only concern on the minds of US politicians. While the common conception about US foreign policy is that it is totally amoral, especially when in pursuit of anti-Communist goals, in 1964 the State Department seems to have had great ethical concerns about corporate involvement as well. In a cable to his superiors at Foggy Bottom, Jova wrote:

⁸⁷ Airgram, Deputy Chief of Mission (Jova) to ARA (Mann), "76320", 5 May 1964. [Frus 254].

⁸⁸ LBJ FRUS 254.

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The concept of American commercial firms passing financial aid surreptitiously to the U.S. government raised so many questions of ethics, financial and interrelationships that Mr. McCone said he felt the matter should be discussed in the [Special] Group. A lengthy exchange of views ensued, but the conclusion was that the legal aspects were too labyrinthine and the questions of tax benefits, conflicts of interest and corporation behavior were too murky to make any clear determinations.⁸⁹

The security risks and questionable morality of acting as an agent, in effect, of U.S. capital led to the agreement that the CIA would refuse any offers of assistance from any US corporation invested in Chile: there was a "decision *not* to become a partner with business interests in covert political action but at the same time [the US would] assure [the corporations] that the U.S. was making every effort, on a priority basis, to prevent the election of Allende."⁹⁰ Nonetheless, the US-owned corporations in Chile, including the multi-national firm International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) did have resources or expertise that the CIA was often keen to use, and names such as that of Harold S. Geneen, CEO of ITT, appear in the context of such non-intelligence matters as how to move 3,500 metric tonnes of beef to Chile to prevent a price spike.⁹¹ Of course, private firms operating in Chile were not forbidden from making political contributions, and many sought to do so (apparently, sometimes in the form of on-the-hoof beef). In August of 1964 a request arrived at the embassy in Santiago from a private business woman, named Carroll Walters, of Pfizer, asking how to contribute money to the Frei campaign, as "most other American business firms are now making direct contributions to campaign both through local offices and...through a business committee in NY."⁹² The official

⁸⁹ LBJ FRUS 254.

⁹⁰ Memorandum for the Record, "Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group", 12 May 1964. [FRUS 257]

⁹¹ Telcon, DCI McCone and Under Secretary of State George Ball, 11:45AM, 7 May, 1964. [FRUS 256]

⁹² TELEGRAM, Embtel 264, Santiago Emb to Sec State, "Frei Campaign Officials", 15 Aug 1964. [NARA RG 59, Stack 250, Box 2026, Pol 5 & 12 Political Affairs and Relations/Political Parties]

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line was set, however, and when the embassy sought guidance on what to tell her to do
they received the formula reply:

> Inform Walters that [State] Dept...[discourages] private contributions since we feared charges of US involvement in the campaign as a result possible indiscretion. This is consistent with our long-standing policy to advise US citizens against interference or participation in the internal political affairs of any foreign country.

Despite a sincere corporate interest to help the PDC with either money or expertise, US corporations were deflected from doing at the combined request of Frei and the US Government.

## Playing Politics

Funding was not the sole course of action pursued by the US government in Chile, and a large part of the CIA's mission was to directly influence the decisions of certain political parties. It is clear that, to this end, the CIA was involved in the internal affairs of some parties. A memorandum from the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division to the Deputy Director for Plans in March of 1968 discusses the renewal of funding for certain (unnamed) projects. It notes that in one of these projects, the Agency had been providing funding to moderate elements within the Radical Party since 1963.⁹³ Though "we have worked with the same kind of collaborators within the party, the nature of our objectives, scope of involvement, and tactical use of such collaborators" changed along with the evolution in Chilean politics. When funding had started, the Radicals were part of the centre-right coalition in Congress that had supported Alessandri. This basis of support had evaporated when the Radical Julio Durán was defeated in a by-election. With Frei now established as the preferred candidate for the US, CIA support drifted