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This problem could well be accentuated by the manner in which European
unity is achieved. History teaches that the more abrupt political transitions,
the more drastic have to be the efforts to re-establish some sort of cohesion.
A Europe which grows out of the collapse of all traditional loyalties must
have as its primary problem the discovery of some specific purpose for its
existence. Too doctrinaire an approach to European unity could produce either
a collapse of political will or, more likely, a new and virulent form of
nationalism, perhaps even more intense than the nationalism of *patries*.
A Europe constructed largely on theoretical models might be forced

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be elected by a vote of the NATO Council from which the permanent members are excluded thus protecting the rights of the smaller countries. The allies would agree to accept a two-thirds vote as binding with escape clauses to be described.

The Executive Committee should formulate common Atlantic purposes and define the limits of autonomous action where interests diverge. It could give political guidance for the military arrangements described in the previous chapters. It should be the political authority for the proposed Allied Nuclear Force. It should be charged with developing a common strategic doctrine.

As long as the Alliance is composed of sovereign states there will be clear limitations to the delegation of authority which are possible. Thus each ally, whether or not a member of the Executive Committee, would be given the right to appeal its decisions to the NATO Council where a two-thirds majority would carry. Each ally could be given the right, for an interim period at least, to refuse to be bound by such a vote. However, it should be required to make a formal declaration to that effect within a given time. A negative vote either in the Executive Committee or in the NATO Council would not be enough. Instead, a formal notification that a country refuses to carry out the common decision would be required. The purpose of separating the two stages would be to enable allies to record their disagreement and yet to carry out the majority's decision for the sake of unity.

Within this framework, the European countries could, if they wished, form a closer association. For example, the Western European Union might well

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A Final Word

When the Atlantic Alliance was founded in 1949, no one would have thought it possible that within fifteen years its pervasive problem would turn out to be the growing strength and self-confidence of Europe. In the face of what was believed to be the imminent threat of Soviet aggression, it would have seemed absurd to predict that fissures would open because the fear of Communist invasion had largely vanished. When Europe dreaded the return of America's traditional isolationism, it would have been incredible that someday our allies would feel so confident of our support that they would consider it safe to disagree with our policies or even to oppose them.

In a way, then, many of the difficulties in the Atlantic Alliance could be a source of pride for the United States. They are the result of the success of policies ushered in by the Marshall Plan and consistently pursued through four post-war administrations. The West today is less imperiled by outside pressures than by a tendency to consume its own substance.

Yet it is easy to draw too much comfort from this. History is the tale of civilizations which sought their future in their past. There are no plateaus in international affairs; what is not a stepping stone soon becomes the beginning of a decline. Succeeding generations will not be able to draw comfort from the fact that a challenge which was not met had been produced by great achievement.

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In the life of societies and international systems a point
is reached where the question arises whether all the possibilities of
innovation inherent in a given structure have been exhausted. At this
point, symptoms are taken for causes; immediate problems absorb the
energies which should be devoted to determining their significance. Events
are not shaped by a concept of the future; the present becomes all-intrusive.
However impressive such a structure may still appear to outsiders, it has
passed its zenith. It will grow ever more rigid and, in time, irrelevant.

The West today confronts such a challenge. It has had centuries
of great achievements punctuated by catastrophic upheaval. Its propensity
for disaster has been high; but, heretofore each tragedy was followed by
a new burst of creativity. Are the stresses of today a sign of consolidation
or the first symptoms of decay? Will they lead to renewal or to disintegration?

For a while longer the West can continue along familiar routes. The
traditional machinery of the Atlantic Alliance is well designed to produce
the appearance of amity. But if the Alliance continues to confuse form and
substance, energy will increasingly have to be spent in reconciling illusion
with reality. Each nation will be thrown on its own resources and will
emphasize policies which magnify divisions. At each previous critical
juncture the West--though with much travail--found political forms adequate
for its needs. It made the transition from feudalism to the nation-state.
Its challenge now is whether it can move from the nation-state to a larger
community and draw from this effort the strength for another period of
innovation.

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Its ability to master this problem will largely determine whether the West can remain relevant to the rest of the world. Confronted by turmoil and hatred in the former colonial areas, the West desperately searches for means to demonstrate its good faith to its erstwhile subjects. But every demand which is satisfied spawns new pressures. The inward insecurity produced by centuries of subordination is not allayed by dealing with its manifestations any more than a tidal wave is understood by studying the surface of the ocean. In many of the new nations, popularity is unattainable partly because of the memory of colonial rule, partly because these nations often do not know what they really want. Their greatest need is a sense of purpose. But this can only be conveyed by example not by preachments or by efforts to ingratiate which compound the new nations' sense of insecurity with our own.

What the West can mean to others depends therefore in great part on what it means to itself. In the heyday of colonialism,

Western political forms were widely imitated. The leaders of independence movements fought their oppressors in the name of principles they had acquired from them. The reason was that for all the wrongs it committed, the West appeared dynamic, creative and vital. If the West is to contribute to the rest of the world, it will have to begin by demonstrating that its well-springs of creativity have not run dry in its internal relationships.

The opportunity is great. The dynamic periods of Western history occurred when unity was forged from diversity. This is the task once again. The struggles for prestige and influence can be salutary if at some point they

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lead to a heightened sense of community. Conversely fifty years from now no one will care who was "right" with respect to the issues which form the headlines of the day if in the process the West has torn itself to pieces.

The challenge is whether the difference in perspective between the two sides of the Atlantic, which is at the heart of many disagreements, can be turned into a source of strength. Our idealism and impetuosity would gain depth if leavened by the European sense of tragedy. And the European consciousness of history could recover dynamism if bolstered by our hopefulness.

The deepest question before the West may thus be what kind of vision it has of its future. With the growth of bureaucracy and expertise on both sides of the Atlantic, there is a danger of becoming mired by the prudent, the tactical or the expedient. Problems that are recognized are treated with considerable adeptness. But many problems are not recognized. The solution of the immediate has priority over the shaping of the future. The expert has a vested interest in the existing framework; doing the familiar very well has, after all, made him an expert. His weakness is that he may confuse creativity with a projection forward of the present. He respects "facts" and considers them something to be adjusted to, perhaps to be manipulated, but not to be transcended.

In the decades ahead, the West will have to lift its sights. When technique becomes exalted over purpose, men become the victims of their complexities. They forget that every great achievement in every field was a vision before it became reality. Both sides of the Atlantic would do well

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to keep in mind that there are two kinds of realists: those who use
facts and those who create them. The West requires nothing so much as
men able to create their own reality.

It has become fashionable to compare the disagreements of the
West with rifts in the Communist world. But this comparison fails to
do justice to the possibilities of the Atlantic area. In the Communist
world schisms are inevitable and unbridgeable. Western societies have
been more fortunate. Their evolution has been richer: because at their
best they have managed to relate diversity to community. Free from the
shackles of a doctrine of historical inevitability, the nations of the
West can render a great service by demonstrating that if history has
a meaning it is up to us to give it that meaning.