9/15/74

STATEMENT
by
SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER
BEFORE
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of holo-
caust and hopes for a stable peace have turned on the relationship
between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Throughout recorded history men have striven for peace and
yet suffered war; all too often leaders have by deliberate decisions
or miscalculations brought the world to violence and destruction.
As a consequence, there may have been in the past, the issue of peace and
war take on unprecedented urgency when, for the first time in
history, two nations have the capacity to destroy mankind. In our
today's miscalculation risks not a limited number of lives, but civiliza-
tion as we know it. No society, no matter what its ideology, would
recover from the shock of such a cataclysm. In the nuclear age,
as President Eisenhower pointed out two decades ago, "there is no
longer any alternative to peace."

The destructiveness of modern weapons defines the urgency
of the quest for peace; the deep differences in philosophy and
perspectives between the United States and the Soviet Union spell
out the magnitude of the problem. There differences do not spring
from misunderstanding, or personalities, or transitory factors:

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-- They are rooted in history, and in the way the two countries have developed.

-- They are nourished by conflicting values and clashing ideologies.

-- They are expressed in sometimes clashing national interests that produce political and military competition.

-- They are affected by allies and friends whose association we value and whose interests we will not sacrifice.

This series of paradoxes is at the heart of the problem of peaceful coexistence: if peace is pursued to the exclusion of any other values, it leads to the compromise and perhaps loss of all other values; but if unconstrained rivalry leads to nuclear conflict, these values will be destroyed in the resulting holocaust. The striving for peace is a moral necessity, but it must be given a content other than acquiescence in unilateral demands. The challenge of our time is to reconcile the reality of competition with the imperative of coexistence.

There can be no peaceful international order without constructive American-Soviet relations. There will be no international stability unless both the Soviet Union and the United States conduct themselves with restraint and unless they use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind.

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moment when the nation was confused and uncertain about the nature
of US-Soviet relations, were stegmann.

It was tempting, by reflex, to infer from the Czech invasion
that antagonism was the central feature of the relationship and
that US policy had to be geared to this grim reality. This would
have been incorrect, even if the Vietnam agony had not been at the
same time raising questions about our people's readiness to sustain
a policy of antagonism.

Some, on the other hand, saw the solution in great leaps of
policy: The Administration was barraged with demands to hold
an immediate summit to establish a better atmosphere, to launch
the SALT talks immediately for the sake of pursuing them, and to
end the decades-old trade discrimination against the Soviet Union
which was universally criticized as anachronistic, futile, and
counterproduction.

These two opposite approaches reflected the discussion of
most of the postwar period. They reflected deep-seated American
reactions to the very process of international relations.

For many Americans, tensions and enmity in international
relations are abnormalities. Thus their cause is attributed either
to deliberate malice to be destroyed or to a misunderstanding, to
be combatted by force or at least dissipation while misunderstanding
is to be removed by the strenuous exercise of good will.

For Communist states, tensions, are regarded as the
stegmann.

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inevitable by-product of a struggle between irreconcilable world systems.

For Americans, relations between states are perceived as either friendship or hostility, either to be embraced or renounced in absolute terms.

For the Soviet Union, foreign policy operates in a grey area heavily influenced by the correlation of forces. Its diplomacy is therefore never free of tactical pressures and never conceived independently from the prevailing military balance.

The Soviet Union tends to see international or regional stability at least partially as an instrument to serve other large purposes and an environment in which these purposes can be pursued. For Moscow, East-West contacts and negotiations are in part designed to promote Soviet influence abroad especially in Western Europe and to gain formal acceptance of those elements of the status quo most agreeable to Moscow, the division of Europe and continuing Soviet dominance in Eastern Europe. The "recognition of existing realities" is a Soviet euphemism for these durable consequences of the last world war. We understand that in the Soviet conception, improved contacts between East and West should not collide with any of Moscow's "existing realities."

But peace and stability also serves our purposes. To the extent that our attention focusses largely on Soviet intentions we intend

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the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people
for a relaxation of tensions, and their expectation that any responsible
government will ~~seriously~~ strive for peace. No aspect of our policies,
domestic or foreign, enjoys more consistent bipartisan support.
No aspect is more in the interest of mankind.

While the aspiration for détente is not new, the conditions
~~which shape Soviet-American relations have profoundly changed.~~

It was clear to many factors, including their challenge on the
international environment, that the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies represent
~~the time was propitious for a ploughing up S-soviet relations~~
in many ways a watershed - whatever administration was in office

~~Various contradicting tendencies contested for~~

in the United States. Several events would tip the scales

~~preeminence in Soviet policy; several events would tip the scales~~

in either direction of increased aggressiveness or of enhanced
~~conciliation.~~

~~The fragmentation in the Communist world in the 1960s challenged the leading position of the USSR and its claim to be the sole arbiter of orthodoxy. This might have forced the USSR into a more~~

challenged the leading position of the USSR and its claim to be the
sole arbiter of orthodoxy. This might have forced the USSR into a more
by adopting a more aggressive attitude toward it in order to lessen
aggressive onslaught against the capitalist world to prove its
its militancy, or it might have suggested to the Soviet leaders the
prudence of at least a temporary lowering of tension with the West.
& cooperate in

The prospect of achieving a strategic position of near parity
with the US could tempt Moscow to conduct an even more strenuous
~~expansion in fact if sanguine to stabilize~~
effort for a basic advantage, or satisfy its latent insecurity and

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be menaced as must be
In short mankind may face nearly as serious a challenge
from international economic and political chaos as it does from
of war, Avoiding although it remains
international destruction. Both prospects underline the imperative
of a cooperative world structure in which improved East-West
are essential,
relations is an indispensable element.

### C. The Public Dimension

For any policy to be effective, it must be sustained by the
American people over the longer term. To prevent preoccupation
with the problem of the moment from overwhelming the potential
of the future, Americans must have confidence in the overall
direction of our policy.

After two decades of global burdens, Cold War tensions,
agonizing conflict abroad and turmoil at home, we can no longer
American well know
take for granted the/people's continual readiness to support a
major American role in the world, unless it believes that its
is exploring
government spares no effort to explain all reasonable avenues
toward a more hopeful environment. We owe it to our people to
see whether tensions can be reduced and more positive aspirations
realized.

The Administration's approach to detente is designed to
navigate between the Scylla of euphoria and the Charybdis of
disillusionment. For perpetual oscillation between conciliation
and rigidity will lose the benefits of both. Given the nature of
our relationship, we know that there will inevitably be at least

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ceasefire of August 1970, during the Syrian invasion of Jordan
in September 1970, on the question of a possible Soviet submarine
base in Cuba, in actions around Berlin, and during the Indo-
Pakistani war. The main thrust of Soviet diplomacy seemed
directed toward creating detente in bilateral relations with our
allies in Western Europe, while challenging the US.

We demonstrated then, and stand ready to do so again,
that America will not yield to pressure tactics. Firmness
emphasized the risks of continuing hostility, and provided the
incentive for a subsequent Soviet turn towards conciliation. We
made clear then -- as we do today -- detente is indivisible, that
it cannot be pursued selectively in one area or towards one group
of countries only. Detente, like peace, is indivisible.

As a result, a breakthrough was made in 1971 on several
fronts -- in the Berlin settlement, in the SALT talks, in other
arms control matters -- that led to what is now considered the
period of detente. It consists of these elements: the elaboration
of principles; political dimensions including the solution of out-
standing issues as well as agreements involving bilateral co-
operation; economic relations; arms control negotiations especially
concerning
in the field of strategic arms.

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A. The Elaboration of Principles

A period of cooperation must be more than a series of isolated agreements. It must reflect a commitment to a pattern of conduct, an acceptance of mutual obligations, an acknowledgment of necessity for accommodation and restraint.

Setting forth principles of behavior in formal documents is no assurance that they will be observed. But such documents can provide a framework within which to judge actions and set future goals.

Detente with the Soviet Union is based on a framework of documents obligations for conducting relations. The first of these is a Statement of Principles signed in Moscow in 1972. It affirms: (1) the necessity of avoiding confrontation; (2) the imperative of mutual restraint; (3) the rejection of attempts to gain advantages at each other's expense; (4) the renunciation of claims of special influence in the world; and (5) the willingness, on this new basis, to coexist peacefully and build a firm long-term relationship.

Based on these general principles, an agreement for the state Prevention of Nuclear War was signed in 1973. It provided that the objective of the policies of the US and the USSR is to remove the danger of nuclear conflict and of the use of nuclear weapons. But it emphasizes as well that this objective presupposes the

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guarantee that policies will be compatible, but it does provide
a mechanism for resolving differences before they escalate
to the point of public confrontation, committing the prestige of
both sides. This channel between the highest leaders has
proved its worth in many crises. It has continued without
interruption under President Ford.

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This approach has, since 1972, produced agreements on a common effort against cancer, on research to protect the environment, on studying the use of the ocean's resources, on using atomic energy for peaceful purposes, on studying methods for conserving energy, on examining construction techniques for regions subject to earthquakes, on devising new transportation methods, all areas of great concern to the world at large. Other bilateral areas for cooperation include an agreement on preventing incidents at sea, an agreement to exchange information and research methods in agriculture, and, of course, the training of astronauts for the rendezvous and docking mission planned for our spacecrafts in 1975.

These agreements provide practical benefits and serve the larger purposes of fostering contact between our societies:

-- exchange of information and experience breaks down long-standing barriers and establishes a mutually useful flow of data and ideas.

-- exchange of individuals engages increasingly wide groups of individuals of improving relations.

-- institutions for planning, managing and supervising programs help the orderly implementation of agreements and institutionalize the practice of contact and cooperation.

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Each project must of course be finally judged by the concrete benefits that result. But taken together they also constitute a commitment to work together across a broad spectrum of the institutions of both countries. The areas of dialogue for discussion and active collaboration between our two governments has been vastly expanded, thus creating an increasing commitment to a constructive relationship.

### C. The Economic Component

During the period which we now know as the Cold War economic contact between ourselves and the USSR was virtually non-existent. At that time many argued that improved economic relations might mitigate tensions; in fact there were Congressional resolutions to that effect. But given crises prevented any sustained progress. Thus the wheat sales of 1963, following the test ban treaty, remained an isolated transaction.

The period of confrontation could leave little doubt however that economic boycott would not break the Soviet system or impose upon it a conciliatory posture. Moscow was quite willing and able to maintain heavy military outlays and to concentrate on capital growth by using the resources of the Communist world alone. Moreover, in practice, it proved impossible to mount an airtight boycott, since over time, most if not all the other major industrial countries became involved in the Eastern trade with the West.

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(N)

and will remain increasingly available to the USSR from other non-Communist sources. Boycott denies us a means of + possible commercial fun! influence, it does not deprive the USSR of technology.

-- The actual and potential flow of credits from the US represents a tiny fraction of capital available to the USSR domestically and elsewhere, including Western Europe and Japan. But it does provide us with a flexible instrumentality ~~through our ability to control the scope of~~ or influencing diplomacy by adjusting the intensity of trade.

-- Over time, trade and investment provide a means for *diluting* the autarchic tendencies of the Soviet system, stimulating a gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and fostering a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to political relations.

-- To be precise, a carefully and conscientiously conducted economic strategy will involve the flow of goods, services and funds into as well as out of the Soviet Union and a network of obligations running in both directions.

In the overall political context, the trading relationship *will* stand on its own feet on the basis of the advantages it *provides both sides*. The potential for growing benefits will *implement* act as an inducement for further normalization of relations, *dangle* the possibility of losing them as a deterrent to intransigence.

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Economic rationality is the thrust of economic reform, and economic reform has been a central element of political and institutional reform in the Soviet Union and Soviet-bloc countries. Our boycott, and Soviet autarchy, were the pillars of Stalinism.

Thus it is indeed true that our economic policy toward the Soviet Union should serve American purposes, as well as mutual purposes. But it is a multi-faceted instrument, and we believe we are using it correctly.

### The Strategic Relationship

Perhaps the most important component of our policy toward the Soviet Union is the effort to limit strategic weapons competition. We cannot expect to achieve a more stable international system, if the two strongest nuclear powers are conducting an unrestrained strategic arms race. Since the purpose of such an arms race can only be to threaten the survival of the opponent, it is in the long term inconsistent with ameliorating political tensions and normalizing economic relations. Strategic arms control is thus integral to the relaxation of tensions. Further progress in the SALT negotiations is crucial becomes a prerequisite to the continued movement toward a more normal relationship with the USSR.

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Our approach to strategic competition has reflected an
effort to cope with the realities of the present era.

We confront, first of all, the inherent dynamism of a
strategic competition which is historically unique:

-- Each side has the capacity to destroy mankind.

-- The penalties for failing to maintain at least equality
can be to risk national survival.

-- The pace of technological change is so rapid that
competition and strategic policy are in danger of being driven
by technical considerations.

-- When nuclear arsenals reach levels involving thousands
of launchers and over ten thousand warheads, changes in the
strategic balance can be achieved only by increments so large
that the quest for them is highly destabilizing.

-- The prospect of a decisive military advantage, even
if technically possible, is politically intolerable and neither
side will passively permit a massive shift in the nuclear
balance. In this sense each side chooses the deployment of
its opponent.

probable
Thus, the outcome of each succeeding round of competition
is almost bound to be the restoration of a strategic
equilibrium, but at increasingly higher force levels.

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Indeed, we face the prospect in the next decade of a strategic environment in which each side will have literally tens of thousands of missile warheads and bomber armaments.

The United States will sustain this competition if it is forced upon us. Indeed, it is likely that the United States would ~~could~~ emerge from such a new era of competition with larger numbers than the Soviet Union in most significant categories ~~through the strategy + political ~~benefit~~ strategy~~.

The issue remains what political or military gain will result. The enormous destructiveness of weapons, their ~uncertainties~ in absence of operational experience will then combine to make their use increasingly ~and~~ incredible ~and~~ military advantage ~more and more difficult to calculate. Numbers alone no longer spell measurable advantage.

-- In the name of what principle or for what purpose can the President ask the American people to bear the constantly increasing costs and dangers of such a race unless he can demonstrate that he has made every effort to arrest it?

-- Can we justify competition in the pursuit of a strategic superiority that can no longer be defined - unless it is absolutely forced on us?

Our Strategic Purposes

Our supreme strategic purpose is the prevention of nuclear
war through maintenance of sufficient political and strategic
power. There is no argument really on how best to avoid nuclear
war. Long ago, we decided that a sufficiency of balanced
nuclear forces was the main protection, or assurance, against
this remote possibility. On the other hand, judgments of what
constitutes "sufficiency" -- what forces we need for the purpose --
have been subject to change. Our judgments have changed, for
example, as our experience in deploying these weapons and
thinking about them has altered our perceptions. And our
judgments, of course, have changed as the Soviet Union began
first deploying and then expanding its own nuclear forces.
Briefly, the doctrinal underpinning of our strategic posture
was in a process of almost constant change and adjustment until
the late 1960's, when it became apparent that the Soviet Union,
for practical purposes, had achieved a kind of rough parity
with the United States in nuclear forces.

At that time, we determined that the strategic forces of
both sides should not be vulnerable to attack, thus removing
the incentive on either side to strike first. At the same time
it became apparent that neither side could realistically expect
to develop a credible disarming capability against the other.
The term "disarming capability" means a force of nuclear weapons
whose number, destructive power and accuracy could reliably

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destroy all or nearly all of the nuclear forces of the other side. To pin down this point and to avoid misunderstandings, we concluded, however, that neither side should risk arousing suspicions and fears on the other by creating forces that might even appear to be designed for a disarming role.

In short, after more than two decades of possessing a clear superiority in nuclear weapons, we reconciled ourselves to a condition of strategic sufficiency based on invulnerable second strike U.S. and Soviet nuclear forces, each of which, if attacked, could inflict unacceptable retaliatory damage on the other's society. For ourselves, we also determined that in the unlikely event of some nuclear attack, the President of the United States should have a wide range of options in deciding at what level and against what targets to respond. Thus, we built into our strategic forces a substantial measure of flexibility, meaning that the United States response need not include an attack on the aggressor's cities, thus inviting the destruction of our own, but could instead avoid population centers or heavy collateral damage to society and thus try to avoid rapid escalation. Translating this capability of our strategic forces into a coherent system of planning became a novel, as yet uncompleted, task of great complexity; but progress has been made. And more will be made.

(N)

The foregoing are the main elements of a strategic doctrine which we arrived at only after perceiving that the time had passed when either great nuclear power would permit the other to gain any significant or appreciable advantage in nuclear weapons. SALT, as noted, became the means by which we and the Soviet Union could enhance stability by setting mutual constraints on our respective forces and by gradually reaching an understanding on these doctrinal considerations that underlie the deployment of nuclear weapons. In short, we intended that SALT might establish, or help to establish, an alternative to every more elusive quest for the chimera of strategic superiority.

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-- Can we justify an arms race in terms of the political objectives we achieve, when history demonstrates the increasing difficulty of correlating strategic power with political gains?

In short, while we can and must maintain, ~~by our own~~ efficiency efforts, a position of equality, it does not necessarily follow that the overall relationship with the Soviet Union will ~~equally, equally many votes~~ be more stable or the threat of conflict reduced if the nuclear balance is sustained through competitive programs. The almost certainly well ~~Soviet Union~~ (Insert A) opposite is likely to be the case. It seems likely that restrained behavior will be jeopardized by the alarms about each other's intentions that are inevitably invoked to justify each new strategic program.

This is why every President since the early 1960's has pursued negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms simultaneously with the programs necessary to maintain a strategic balance.

Our SALTs objectives are:

(1) to break the momentum of ever increasing levels of armaments;

(2) to circumscribe the qualitative characteristics of weapons systems;

(3) to moderate the pace of new deployments; and

(4) to achieve reductions in force levels.

If the SALT agreements are judged in terms of the actual programs at the time, in terms of their contribution to strategic stability, and in terms of the enhanced possibilities for a more permanent agreement, it will be apparent that they represented a major advance.

The strategic situation in 1972, when the first agreements were signed, had the following characteristics:

- the Soviet Union was engaged in a dynamic program to close the numerical gap in ballistic missiles; they were deploying three types of ICBMs, at a rate of over 200 annually, and launching about 8 submarines annually with 16 ballistic missiles each.

- the United States had ended its numerical build up in the late 1960s at a level of 1054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs; we were pursuing technological improvements, particularly in MIRVs for the Poseidon and Minuteman missiles; our replacement systems were intended for the late 1970s and early 1980s;

- by most reasonable measures of strategic power, we held an important advantage, which still exists;

- but it was also clear that over time the Soviet Union would be able, first, to exceed our numerical levels by a considerable margin, and then develop the same technologies that we had already obtained.

The SALT Record

The agreements already reached in SALT and our further goals must be judged in the light of our need for strategic sufficiency and a less volatile strategic environment. By formally restricting anti-ballistic missiles (ABM's) to very low levels of deployment, the United States and the Soviet Union have removed a potential source of instability; for one side to build an extensive defense of its cities against missile attack would inevitably be interpreted by the other as a step toward a strike by earning merely against annihilation capability, since before moving in that direction a potential aggressor would want to protect his population centers from surviving nuclear weapons on the other side.

With the five-year SALT interim agreement freezing the numbers of offensive strategic missile launchers, the two governments took the essential first step toward setting longer-term limits on these and other offensive weapons. Some have

alleged that the interim agreement, which expires in October, 1977, penalizes the United States by permitting the Soviet Union to deploy more strategic missile launchers, both land-based and sea-based. Such a view is narrow and misleading. When the agreement was signed in May, 1972, the Soviet Union, already possessed more land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM's) than the United States and, given the pace of its submarine construction program, could have reached the point over the next few years of having virtually twice as many nuclear submarines with ballistic missiles. The effect of this interim agreement was: to halt a dynamic Soviet ICBM program at the then existing level; to put a ceiling on the heaviest Soviet ICBM's, the weapons that most concern us; and to set an upper limit on the Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program. Since the United States was not in a position to add to its own arsenal of offensive missile launchers during the five-year period of the agreement, we were conceding nothing in terms of Soviet advantages in numbers of missile launchers; that advantage already existed and the agreement, if anything, has served to contain it.

Other important distinctions between the offensive missile forces of the two sides were not affected by the interim agreement. The most notable of these is our numerical advantage in nuclear warheads. It is nearly 3 to 1. Moreover, our analysis suggests that this advantage will not be

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appreciably altered during the life of the interim agreement;
by October, 1977, when the agreement expires, our lead very
likely will be somewhat less -- nearly twice as many missile
warheads as the Soviets, thus still appreciable. And when
bomber weapons are added to missile re-entry vehicles, the
immediate U.S. advantage in warheads and bombs over the Soviet
Union is considerably better than 3 to 1; our estimates suggest
that our overall advantage will remain close to this ratio
when the agreement expires. Put simply, if today we stopped
where we were and deployed no new systems, added no new MIRV's
(Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles) to our
inventory, by 1980 we would still be ahead of the Soviet Union
in the number of deliverable nuclear weapons.

It is equally true that a Soviet advantage in the size of
warheads their land-based missile launchers can deliver -- the
"throw-weight" advantage -- is also unaffected by the interim
agreement. In short, the Soviet Union has more and larger ICBM's
that the United States. The authorized numbers are 1,618 on the
Soviet side, 1,054 on the American -- fewer if the two sides wish
to build up to authorized ceilings on submarine missile launchers.
These ceilings are 950 for the Soviet Union and 710 for the United
States, although we on our side had no intention of increasing
our present force of 656 SLBM's to the authorized number within
the five-year life of the agreement. We are, however, designing
a new and larger submarine, the Trident. It will carry 24 MIRV'd
missiles, as compared with 16, the number presently deployed on
our submarines. These missiles will be of intercontinental range,

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Our aim, therefore, was to achieve some breakthrough and to halt the momentum of the Soviet programs. This was achieved in the five year Interim Agreement which froze the level of ballistic missile forces on both sides. No American program was abandoned or curtailed because of this agreement, no advantages were foregone. We remained free to deploy multiple warheads. No restraints were placed on bombers. Indeed, the US lead in missile warheads may be somewhat greater at the end of this agreement than at the time of its signature.

Most important, in the SALT I agreements a measure of strategic stability was introduced for the first time.

Neither side can build a heavy ABM system; this was the strategic nightmare of the 1960s when strategic planners speculated that with the introduction of highly accurate MIRV weapons and the creation of a heavy defensive system, one side might strike first at the offensive forces of the other, and hope to contain the damage of a retaliatory strike. The fact is now that there is no conceivable way to avoid enormous damage in retaliation.

Yet, the notion of responding to any conceivable attack with massive destruction is increasingly implausible. That is why along with the SALT agreements we have introduced

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In order to achieve the stability that we deem so essential, it will be necessary not only to limit numbers of strategic weapons but to restrain the process of increasing the destructive potential of these weapons. Thus, we are dealing not only with disparate levels of forces but with the kind of disparate capabilities that MIRV technology, to take the most conspicuous example, can supply.

Some appear to regard SALT as a kind of snare and delusion, because reductions have not been achieved and because our immediate goals are not reductions but limitations. I would point out that the problems flowing from abundant and growing arsenals of strategic weapons can not all be solved at once. Obviously, we want reductions. At the appropriate time we will seek reductions. It also seems to us obvious that to seek reductions while overall numbers of deliverable weapons on both sides are growing and on the verge of multiplying is neither feasible nor realistic. Apart from the non-negotiability of such an approach, a reduction in the number of ICBM's, for example, at a time when the number of warheads was rising would be destabilizing, since the perceived vulnerability of the diminished silo ICBM forces would be clearly greater. In any case, we simply can not expect to achieve reductions of strategic forces before completing the onerous task of setting equivalent limits on them.

We recognize that if we were to add little or nothing to our own forces -- and if SALT failed to produce a comprehensive

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restraint, and that the basis has been created for the present
effort to reach a broader agreement.

The problem of numbers has been expressed in the goal
we have defined our goal as
of essential equivalence in strategic capabilities. What
constitutes equivalence involves subjective judgment. Because
US and Soviet forces are different from each other - in type,
in technological advance, in composition - they are difficult to
compare

For example, in the negotiations we shall have to
compare heavy bombers in which the United States is ahead to
heavy missiles which the USSR has emphasized. We shall
have to decide whether to insist on equivalence in every
category or whether to permit trade-offs in which an advantage
in one category compensates for a disadvantage in another.
we are confident
This is a difficult process but one that can be solved with
dedication and good will. Indeed it must be solved for
otherwise the world will face a constant accumulation of
destructiveness increasingly difficult to relate to political or
military purposes.

Our second task is to limit the scope of technological
change in such areas as missile throw weight, multiple
reentry vehicles and missile accuracy. (The rate of increase
will be much slower than

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warheads is lagging far behind the increase in delivery vehicles. This numerical limitation in launchers do not deal with the key issue, the ever accelerating increase in warheads. This is why the United States considers the restriction on the number of multiple warheads an essential component of the next phase of the SALT negotiations.

Technological advance is inevitable. The problem is to channel it in the least destabilizing direction. For the past two years we have pursued these themes in the SALT negotiations, and have arrived at a point where it is possible to consider qualitative limitations such as restricting the number of MIRVed missiles on each side, freezing the technology of MIRV systems, and neutralizing the use of large missile throw weights.

NoP This is all the more urgent because we face the problem that as the yield of missile warheads is coupled with refinements of accuracy, the next generation of missiles could acquire capability for striking at ICBM silos. It is almost inconceivable that an attack against ICBMs could be executed without provoking a retaliation from the large remaining bomber and submarine forces, and the gravest risks of all out nuclear war.

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Yet such a vulnerability could have a psychological impact on policy and confidence and thus it could produce an excessive risk of war - especially during crises.

In short, quantitative limits in the next phase of SALT are essential, but they must be linked to qualitative limitations, lest technological advances undermine the stability achieved through numerical limits.

The third area for negotiations is the pace of deployments of new or more modern systems.

Neither side is likely to be content for a decade with their present strategic arsenal. The Soviets are already embarked on the testing and initial deployment of a third generation of ICBMs and a third modification of submarine launched missiles. [Drawn to scale, show rate of deployment so far as been for short of the maximum pace if the lateintended planning is followed]

--, We intend to introduce the Trident system, and to replace the B-52 force with the B-1; we also have the capability of improving our Minuteman ICBM system, adding to the level of MIRV missiles, and, if we choose, of deploying mobile systems, [drawn or implied].

Thus, the problem in SALT is whether a degree of two sides can agree on a rate of constraint can be introduced that will permit those changes in strategy which, if each side considers essential to security, but at a rate that does not threaten the overall balance or trigger an

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Our age has fostered an historic irony: The inhibitions arising from nuclear arms have probably discouraged crises which, in the absence of such weapons, might have set off another world war. It is too late to rid ourselves of these weapons.

Detente is admittedly far from representing a modern equivalent to the kind of stable peace that characterized most of the 19th century. Detente is, however, a long step away from the bitter and aggressive spirit that has characterized so much of the post-war period. When linked to such broad and unprecedented projects as SALT, detente takes on added meaning and opens prospects of a lasting peace. SALT agreements should be seen as a step towards a link in a process that should lead to progressively greater stability. It is in that light that SALT and related projects will be judged by history.

### III. An Assessment of Detente

Where has the process of detente taken us so far? What are the principles that must continue to guide our course?

By definition, the course of improving relations with another nuclear superpower basing itself on profoundly

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unchecked would threaten the survival of each other's retaliatory capability, (3) to slow down the deployment of new systems in an effort to create a stable and orderly evolution of strategic forces so that neither side will perceive the balance is changing to its disadvantage (4) to bring about reductions of strategic forces from an agreed base line.

Detente is admittedly far from representing a modern equivalent to the kind of stable peace that characterized most of the 19th century. Detente is, however, a long step away from the bitter and aggressive spirit that has characterized so much of the post-war period. When linked to such broad and unpre- cedented projects as SALT, detente takes on added meaning and opens prospects of a more stable peace. SALT agreements should be seen as a step in a process that should lead to progressively greater stability. It is in that light that SALT and related projects will be judged by history.

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-- At the same time NATO and the Warsaw Pact are ~~negotiating~~ seeking to bring about the reduction of opposing forces in Central Europe.

-- The honorable termination of America's direct military involvement in Indochina and the substantial lowering of regional conflict was due to many factors. But this progress would have been much more difficult - if not impossible - in an era of Soviet and Chinese hostility toward the United States.

-- The recent diplomatic progress in the Middle East could have been complicated by Soviet bellicosity. Instead it was eased by Soviet acquiescence. To be sure, the October war was made possible by Soviet arms. But it is also true that the belief by some Arab countries that the USSR was sacrificing their interests to detente contributed to Soviet difficulties in the Middle East.

-- America's principal alliances have proved their durability in a new era. They have undergone a series of strains by inevitable adjustments to new conditions. But detente has also helped to place

- 42 -

-- We have achieved unprecedented agreements in arms limitation and measures to avoid accidental war as well as war by miscalculation.

-- There is no responsible alternative to the relaxation of tensions in a world that is increasingly inter-dependent in resources and technology and human aspirations.

These accomplishments do not guarantee peace. But they have served to break down the rigidities of the past, to ~~and efface unprecedented hope for a better era~~ temper-hostility with the recognition that there are interests ~~on both sides that must be respected, and to demonstrate~~ that dialogue and communication can prevent inevitable ~~conflicts of interest from becoming extended confrontations.~~

Moreover, the level of relations achieved so far establishes incentives for further progress and underlines the penalties that will be incurred if the process were reversed. ~~Despite~~ Fluctuations in the rate of progress are inevitable. But a trend exists, ~~and the character of international politics has~~ been markedly changed.

It is too early to judge conclusively whether this change should be described as tactical, ~~in a sense, however,~~ the issue is immaterial. For whether the change is ~~tactical~~
~~temporary + tactical, or see listing + lease~~
and lack is essentially the same: it guides it how
~~the purpose of a sense, phase + man's planning for~~

- 44 -

I accept the fact, however, that detente raised serious issues. Some of these are: the gains the USSR derives from detente; the implications of detente for our alliances; the impact of detente on the psychological and military preparedness of the non-communist world; and the degree of moral acquiescence the Soviet system implicit in detente.

We believe that certain principles should guide our course in light of these concerns.

First, if detente is to endure, both sides must benefit, from it.

There is no question that the Soviet Union obtains benefits from detente. On what other grounds would the tough minded members of the Politburo sustain it? The essential point is that detente also serves American and world interests. If these coincide with some Soviet interests, this will only strengthen the durability of the process.

On the global scale, in terms of the conventional measures of power, influence and position, our interests have not suffered. Indeed as I have indicated, there are areas in the world where American influence and the respect we enjoy are greater than for many years. We have not sought this at the expense of the Soviet Union but we have not shunned it if it developed.

- 46 -

hostility ~~is tempered~~ and the compatibility of certain interests to
acknowledged, the more cooperative programs can be made to
serve our larger purposes. Americans surely are the last
who need fear hard bargaining or lack confidence in competition.

Second, building a new relationship with the Soviet
Union does not entail any devaluation of traditional Alliance
relations.

Our allies themselves seek, as a common objective,
an easing of international tensions. Our approach to relations
with the USSR has always been, and will continue to be,
rooted in the belief that the cohesion of our alliances, and
particularly of the trans-Atlantic *Alliance*, is a precondition
for establishing a more constructive relationship with the USSR.
Before even the most tentative initiative was taken toward the
USSR we concentrated on our ties with Europe and Japan.

We do not assume that as crucial, indeed unique, as may
be our concern with Soviet power, we are able to deal with
it alone. When we speak of Europe and Japan as representing
centers of power and influence in the last third of our century,
we describe not merely an observable fact but an indispensable
element in the equilibrium we consider essential to keep the
world at peace. Our conception of international relationships
postulates a community of interest between ourselves and our

- 48 -

contradiction between vigorous, organic alliance relations and
a more positive relationship with adversaries, but that they are
mutually reinforcing. It is precisely a period of relative
tranquility that inspires confidence in American purposes and
thereby contributes to the long-term vigor of our Alliances.

Third, the emergence of more normal relations with the
Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to maintain the
defense, needed to balance its power.

Unquestionably, we have the dilemma that while some deny
that any progress has been made in achieving a more stable
relationship with the Soviet Union, others believe that the goal
has already been reached and stability will be self-enforcing.
The tendency in democratic societies to relax as dangers seem
to recede is all too real. There is an inclination to view the
maintenance of strength as incompatible with relaxation of
tensions, rather than its precondition. They see strength
as being required only in periods of crisis, not in "normal"
times.

But this is primarily a question of leadership. A people
can be lulled only if its leaders - in the executive, the
legislative and the non-governmental domains - do not explain
real dangers to it. A society that needs artificial crises to
do what is needed for survival will soon find itself in mortal
danger.

- 51 -

Both as a government + as a people we can make
Publicly and privately the attitude of the American
clear
people has been made clear on countless occasions, in ways
I believe that both the Government and the lengthened playing
that have produced effective results. With respect to the
specific issue of emigration:

This government has
been effective

-- The education exit tax of 1971 is no longer being
collected. We have been assured that it will not be
reapplied.

The government has

-- Hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government
have been given increased attention, and remedies
in many well-known instances.

The government has

-- The volume of Jewish emigration has increased
recent years from a trickle to tens of thousands.

The government has

-- And we are now moving toward an understanding that
should significantly diminish the obstacles to emigration
and ease the hardships of prospective emigrants.

The government has

Thus, we have accomplished much. But we cannot
demand that the Soviet Union, in effect, suddenly reverse
five decades of Soviet, and centuries of Russian history.
Such an attempt would be futile and at the same time it would
hazard all that has already been achieved. Changes
in Soviet society have already occurred, and more will come.
But they are most likely to develop through an evolution that
can only go forward in an environment of decreasing

- 53 -

CD

there will be a special meetings. Crises are bound to occur; but there is no requirement on the United States and the Soviet Union simply because for the superpowers to be lined up on opposite sides of each other the cataclysmic military power that we hold and represent. such crisis. The contrary should immediately be the case. Exploitation of crisis situations for unilateral gain can no longer be an accepted feature of superpower conduct. Even when historical or other reasons leave the US and the USSR associated with opposing participants in a crisis situation, there is, on the contrary, a special superpower responsibility. it must be clear that gains that might conceivably be achieved to encourage peaceful settlement of disputes. by one at the expense of the other cannot possibly outweigh the risks of confrontation.

Thus

-- Restraint in crises must be augmented by cooperation in removing the causes of crises. The old notion that political advantage can be derived from keeping crises below the boiling point is an anachronism. There have been too many instances, notably in the Middle East, which demonstrate that policies of unilateral advantage through efforts to manipulate tensions sooner or later run out of control and lead to the brink of war, if not beyond. There is no room for positive cooperation, in an ameliorative or supportive capacity, to encourage peaceful settlement of disputes.

-- The process of negotiations and consultation must be continuous and intense. While it must take into account the need to be durable over the heads of other nations who have a stake in the outcome. We cannot impose peace; we can, however, see provide other nations concerned with a stake in the outcome. But our own actions and conduct are conducive to peace.

-- Bilateral cooperative agreements and ventures must be carried out to the benefit of both sides; but strict adherence

- 54 -

to the letter of agreements must be seen as a starting point
in the normalization of bilateral relations. Formal agreements
must be broadened into a habit of contact and collaboration;
they should not merely be isolated passageways through
a wall of isolation.

-- Condominium can never be the goal of U.S.-Soviet
relations.

In the coming months and years we must thus bring to
fruition: ~~completion of~~

-- the negotiations for comprehensive and equitable
limitations on strategic arms beyond the expiration date of the
present agreement in 1977, at least until 1985;
completion of

-- the multilateral negotiations on mutual force reductions
in Central Europe, so that security will be equally strengthened
~~by the countries of Europe~~, + agitation
for all concerned;

-- the Conference of European security must be concluded
in a manner that ensures both security and human aspirations.
continuation of

-- the efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to
additional countries without depriving those countries of the
peaceful benefits of atomic energy;
ratification of

-- the recently negotiated treaty banning underground
nuclear testing by the US and USSR above a certain threshold;
beginning ~~negotiations~~ or

-- the recently agreed effort to overcome the possible
dangers of environmental modification techniques for military
purposes;

- 55 -

The long-standing attempts to cope with the dangers of chemical weaponry.

Even this brief listing of impending or continuing negotiations shows the scope of arms control endeavors. It demonstrates that these endeavors must encompass all aspects of the military relationship so that progress in one or a few will not merely have the effect of driving competition into others.

But beyond the formal agreements that might be reached, we must also seek a more general attitude of restraint in the procurement of arms. Obviously, this depends on reciprocity. It illustrates again that the process of detente will not depend ultimately on formal agreements alone but on habits and modes of conduct that extend the letters of agreements to the spirit of relations as a whole. Even if each of the negotiations now in progress or envisaged were to succeed, the level and diversity of arms remaining will be so great that there would be no guarantee against their use if other interests came into conflict.

The agenda of arms control negotiations, impressive though it is, can therefore only be an element in a broader pattern of negotiations and practices that make up the total detente process. The many other areas of cooperation and joint undertakings must be carried forward. The overall fabric must be strengthened. Thus must be recognized in Moscow as well as in Washington.

- 56 -

## Conclusion

The legitimate issues and questions in detente are important. In compiling competing catalogues of the desirable, we must take care not to jeopardize what is attainable, or hazard the entire process. We must consider what alternative policies are available, and what their consequences would be. And, the implications of alternatives must be examined, not merely in terms of a single issue, but for the entire range of Soviet-American relations and for the prospects for world peace.

We must assess not only individual challenges to the present course, but also their cumulative impact:

* If we justify each agreement with Moscow only when we can show unilateral gain;

* If we strive for an elusive strategic "superiority";

* If we systematically block benefits to the Soviet Union in this relationship;

* If we bring pressure on the Soviet system to the point of trying to transform it;

* If, in short, we look for final results before we agree to any results;

* Then we are inviting or provoking a return to a posture of confrontation.

-58-

25 years, or even a decade ago. It is an opportunity that, when taken advantage of, will not be lost. But it must be pursued quickly and not be abandoned.

We may not come back at all.

We have profound differences with the Soviet Union -- in our values, our methods, our vision of the future. But it is these very differences which compel any responsible administration to make a major effort to create a more constructive relationship.

We are challenged:

- To ensure that a history in which brief moments of improved Soviet-American relations gave way to prolonged periods of confrontation is replaced by an irreversible process of growing contact and restraint.

- To place limits on the acquisition and deployment of arms so that military technology is not the sole determinant of policy.

- To create an international environment in which global problems ranging from energy to peace can be addressed outside the rigidities of stark confrontation.

- To build a network of East-West cooperation that by reducing international tensions may gradually ameliorate conditions for all of humanity.

In the nuclear era there is no rational alternative to a peaceful relationship between the two powers which have the capacity to destroy mankind.

9/16/74

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the nuclear age has focussed the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for a stable peace on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. This relationship must necessarily be one of preeminent concerns of United States foreign policy.

Throughout history, men have sought peace and yet suffered by war; all too often, deliberate decisions or miscalculations, have brought violence and destruction to the world. However tragic the consequences of violence may have been in the past, the issue of peace and war takes on unprecedented urgency when, for the first time in history, two nations have the capacity to destroy mankind. In the nuclear age, as President Eisenhower pointed out two decades ago, "there is no longer any alternative to peace."

The destructiveness of modern weapons creates the necessity of the quest for peace; the deep differences in philosophy and perspectives between the United States and the Soviet Union point both difficulty to the urgency of the task. These differences do not spring from misunderstanding, or personalities, or transitory factors:

It is and national experience, -- They are rooted in history, and in the way the two countries have developed.

- 2 -

It is deeply human
They are nourished by conflicting values and opposing
ideologies.

It is reflected in sometimes clashing national interests,
that produce political and military competition.

It is
They are influenced by allies and friends whose association
we value and whose interests we will not sacrifice.

In any such situation of conflict, the problem of peace contains an interrelated paradox: Paradox confuses our perception of the problem of peaceful coexistence. If peace is pursued to the exclusion of any other goal, other values would be compromised and perhaps lost; but if unconstrained rivalry leads to nuclear conflict, these values, along with everything else, would be destroyed in the resulting holocaust. The requirement and practical struggle for peace is a moral duty that confronts each of the nuclear powers quite impartially. However competitive they may be at some levels of their relationship, both must base their policies on the premise that neither can expect to impose its political decisions or will on the other at a tolerable risk. The challenge of our time is to reconcile the reality of competition with the imperative of coexistence.

There can be no peaceful international order without constructive American-Soviet relations. There will be no international stability unless both the Soviet Union and the United States conduct themselves with restraint and unless they use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind. This -- and not struggle for its own sake -- must be the objective of United States foreign policy.

Only one such use of the word in May 1973 Report.
Word was used a few times in Feb. 1972 Report ->
to characterize earlier phases of goodwill, or
other countries' approach.

- 3 -

For four years, the Administration did not even use
the word "detente" in its major foreign policy
statements -- the President's Foreign Policy Reports to the
Congress -- because the term was too simplistic for the
more complex policy + relationship it was meant to
describe.

Thus we must be clear at the outset on what the term 'detente'

But the term "detente," as it is popularly used, must mean
entails. It is the search for a more constructive relationship
with the Soviet Union reflecting the realities which I have just
outlined. It is a continuing process not a final condition that has
achieved stage or
been or can be advanced at any one point in time. And it has been
Sought Administrative, ...
promised by successive American leaders, though by various
means and in varying conditions.

Studies of
John Dean.

means and in varying conditions.
There are hearings that should be a discussion, not simply a debate. Therefore we should
recall of the outset some of the
Some fundamental principles guide this policy on which we all agree.

First, The United States cannot rely solely on Moscow's good intentions.

But neither can we insist that all forward movement must await a convergence of American and Soviet intentions. We shall seek to serve peace through systematic application of resistance to pressure and incentives for moderate behavior regardless of peace. Soviet intentions. The problem of maintaining is especially acute when the intentions of the two superpowers are not congruent.

Secondly, We must maintain a strong national defense, while recognizing that in the nuclear age the assessment of politically usable power is more complex than historically much

power is more complex than historically.
Thirdly, the American people
We are not neutral with respect to the age-old antagonism
between freedom and tyranny. But necessity imposes limits
-- as a government --
on our ability to produce internal changes in other countries. Consciousness of our
limits is consciousness of the necessity of peace, not moral callousness.

We have an obligation to recognize that the preservation of human
life and human society are moral values too.

- 4 -

We must resist aggressive actions and irresponsible behavior.

But we must not seek confrontations lightly. Our policy is to reduce the
dangers of conflict as well as make progress towards a more peaceful
positive possibilities and hopes
and cooperative world.

Finally,

We must be mature enough to recognize that to be stable a
relationship must provide advantages to both sides. Moscow will
benefit from certain measures, just as we will from others. The
balance cannot be struck on each issue every day, but only over
the whole range of relations and over a period of time. The most
constructive international relationships are those in which both
parties perceive an element of gain.

Let me apply these principles to the conduct of US policy.

I. The Course of Soviet-American Relations

In the first two decades of the post-war period, US-Soviet
relations were characterized by many fits and starts. For example,
new and
Some encouraging developments followed the Cuban missile crisis
Warsaw Pact
of 1962. But at the end of the decade, the invasion of Czechoslovakia
brought progress to a halt and threw a deepening shadow over
East-West relations. The Nixon Administration took office at a
moment when US-Soviet relations were stagnant, uncertain and
at an impasse.

-5-

It was tempting, by reflex, to infer that antagonism was the central feature of the relationship and that US policy had to be geared to this grim reality, even while the Vietnam agony not raised questions about our people's readiness to sustain a policy of confrontation. Others recommended a new breaking the impasse by a great leap change of policy: The Administration was barraged with demands to hold an immediate summit to establish a better atmosphere, to launch the SALT talks, and to end the decades-old trade discrimination against the Soviet Union which was universally criticized as anachronistic, futile, and counterproductive.

These two opposing approaches reflected the discussion that dominated most of the postwar period and revealed deep-seated ambivalence about American reactions to the very process of international relations.

A blessed by a history without struggle, class or international class or international struggle, For many Americans, tensions and enmity in international relations are anomalies. Thus the cause of tension is frequently of tension is frequently attributed either to deliberate malice, or to misunderstanding. Malice is to be combatted by force, or at least isolation, while misunderstanding is to be removed by the strenuous exercise of good will.

Communist states on the other hand, by conviction, regard tensions as the inevitable by-products of a global struggle between opposing social systems.

-6-

(Y)

For Americans, relations between states are perceived as either friendship or hostility, either to be embraced or repudiated or renounced in absolute terms. For the Soviet Union, foreign policy operates in a grey area, heavily influenced by the Soviet conception of the balance of forces. Its diplomacy is therefore determined or tactical adjustments, and it is never free of tactical pressures and never conceived independently of or from the prevailing military balance. For Moscow, East-West contacts and negotiations are in part designed to promote Soviet influence abroad, especially in Western Europe, and to gain formal acceptance of those elements of the status quo most agreeable to Moscow.

But the issue is not whether peace and stability serves some Soviet purposes, but whether it serves our own. Indeed, to the extent that our attention focusses largely on Soviet intentions we create a latent vulnerability. If detente can be justified only by a basic change in Soviet motivation, the temptation becomes overwhelming to base US-Soviet relations not on realistic appraisal but on tenuous hopes: a change in Soviet tone is taken as a sign of a basic change of philosophy. This is a dubious basis for policy. Atmosphere becomes confused with substance. Policy oscillates wildly between extremes of antagonism and of hope.

-7-

Neither extreme is realistic, and both are dangerous. The naive view ignores that we and the Soviets are bound to be ignored on a broad scale, whatever congruence of interests may occur in some instances. The antagonistic view that we have some congruent interests, and ignores that we are condemned to coexist. Detente seeks an environment in which competitors can regulate and restrain their differences and ultimately move from competition to cooperation. As President Kennedy stated it eloquently to the American University in June 1963: "For in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."

## A. American Goals

America's aspiration for the kind of political environment which we now call detente is not new.

The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union is not made in the name of any one administration, or one party, or for any one period of time. It expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for a relaxation of tensions, and their expectation that any responsible government will strive for peace. No aspect of our policies, domestic or foreign, enjoys more consistent bipartisan support. No aspect is more in the interest of mankind.

In the postwar period repeated efforts were made to improve our relationship with Moscow. The spirits of Geneva,

-8-

Camp David and Glassboro were brief evanescent moments in a quarter century marked generally by tensions and by sporadic confrontation. What is new in the current period of relaxation of tensions is its duration, the scope of the relationship which has evolved, and the continuity of consultation which it has produced, and our more systematic approach to it.

This is due to many factors, including a basic change on the international environment. By the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies, the time was propitious for a major attempt to improve U.S.-Soviet relations -- whatever administration was in office in the United States. Various contradictory tendencies contested for preeminence in Soviet policy; several events could tip the scales either towards increased aggressiveness or towards conciliation.

-- The fragmentation in the Communist world in the 1960s challenged the leading position of the USSR and its claim to be the sole arbiter of orthodoxy. The USSR could have reacted by adopting a more aggressive attitude toward the capitalist world in order to reassert its militant vigilance; in fact the changing situation and U.S. policy seem to have encouraged the Soviet leaders to cooperate in at least a temporary lowering of tension with the West.

-9-

(ND)

reaching

-- The prospect of achieving a strategic position of near parity with the US could have tempted Moscow to conduct an *strive more* determinedly even more strenuous effort for expansion; in fact it sought to stabilize at least some aspects of the military competition through negotiated restraints, and *parity* some of its actions. *Strive more*

-- The very real economic problems of the USSR and Eastern Europe could have reinforced autarkic policies and economic warfare abroad; in actuality the Soviet Union and its allies came closer to seeking the reality of an interdependent world economy. *Acknowledging*

-- Finally, when faced with the hopes of its own people for greater well-being, the Soviet government could have continued to stimulate the suspicions of the Cold War to justify its domestic suppression; enhance a closed society; in fact it chose to seek to meet the risks of involvement to placate them instead by more production of consumer goods and them - however inadequately and gradually by pursuing a policy of reduction of external relaxation of tensions.

For the United States the choice was clear: to provide as many incentives as possible for those courses of action by the Soviet Union most likely to produce peace and individual well-being and to develop a relationship less subject to the swings between illusionary optimism and narrow antagonism that had characterized most of the postwar period. This

We could capitalize on the tentative beginnings made in the 1960's and the compelling new conditions of the 1970's. It was time to be entering the mature phase of US-Soviet relations.

Wordy

-10-

(N)

we sought to explore every avenue towards an honorable and just accommodation, while remaining determined not to settle for mere atmospherics. We have relied on a balance of mutual interests rather than Soviet intentions; when challenged in a crisis situation we have always responded firmly. When Soviet policy became more conciliatory, we sought to turn what may have started as a tactical maneuver into a durable new pattern of conduct.

Our approach proceeds from the conviction that in moving forward across a wide spectrum of negotiations, progress in one area adds momentum to progress in other areas. If we succeed, then no agreement would stand alone as an isolated accomplishment vulnerable to the next crisis. The interrelationship between issues was a reality, because of the range of problems and areas in which the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union impinge on each other. We looked for progress in a series of agreements settling specific issues, and we sought to relate these to a new standard of international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age. Our aim is that the Soviet Union by acquiring a stake in this spectrum of network of internships with the West will feel more conscious of what it loses by a return to the negotiations will see that its interests would be best served by Cold War, and will indeed feel a self-interest in preserving the political conditions which enable encouraging the entire process to go forward.

In short, we are attempting through the policy of detente to create vested and-durable permanent interests in mutual restraint. We have engaged ourselves in a process which

--11-

at any one time is by definition incomplete, but whose very incompleteness imparts the urgency for persevering.

## B. The Global Necessities

The importance of detente transcends U.S.-Soviet relations; it must be viewed also in its global context and in its implications for the broad design of American foreign policy.

In the 1940s this nation engaged in a great debate about the role it would play in the postwar world. We forged a bipartisan consensus on which our policies were built for over two decades. By the end of the 1960s, the international environment which molded that consensus had been transformed. What in the 1950s seemed a solid bloc of adversaries had fragmented into competing centers of power and doctrine; old allies had gained new strength and self-assurance; scores of new nations had emerged and formed blocs of their own; and all nations were being swept up in a technology that was compressing the planet and deepening our mutual dependence.

Then, as now, it was clear that the patterns formed in the immediate postwar period were in fundamental flux, and that a new international system was emerging. America's help in historic opportunity was to shape this new international relationship--a structure which would be, by necessity, more pluralistic, less dominated by military power, less susceptible to confrontation, more open to genuine cooperation among the free and diverse elements of the globe.

-12-

A new pluralistic international structure will prove viable
help create would be possible
and creative only if all the major powers anchor their policies
in
the principles of moderation and restraint.
It is first and
foremost the world's strongest nuclear powers
their relations with these principles.
The world's hopes for general
peace required
perhaps more
order demands more stable, and productive, Soviet-American
relations.

Thus US-Soviet détente is not a menace to a broader peace; it is its
Detente is all the more important because of what the
prerequisite.
It is all the more important because of what the
creation of a new set of international relations demands of us
with respect to other countries and areas. President Ford has
assigned the highest priority to maintaining the vitality of our
and Latin America.
partnerships in Europe, and Asia.
We consider security ties
essential, but we also believe that recognition of the interdependence
of the contemporary world requires cooperation in many other
fields.
This will be unnecessarily difficult if the United States
by its allies
is perceived as an obstacle to peace and if public debate in each
allied country is polarized on the issue of whether friendship
with the United States unnecessarily risks conflagration.
For years, the United States was
as inconsistent with its own quest for East-West
 reconciliation.

One area for new cooperative action with our friends
is economic policy. The international economic system has been

-13-

severely tested. The Middle East war demonstrated dramatically the integral relationship between economics and politics.

Clearly the international economic agenda must be addressed, whatever the state of our relations with the USSR. But the task would be infinitely more complex if we proceeded in a cold war environment.

International economic problems cut across political dividing lines. All nations, regardless of ideology, face the problems of energy and economic growth, feeding burgeoning populations, of to avoid anarchic competition, of preserving the environment as the heritage of future generations.

At a minimum, easing international tensions allows the West to devote more intellectual and material resources to the problems of growth and the quality of life. Eventually it may create prospects for broader collaboration on these issues between East and West. It is significant that some global cooperation in science and health, issues -- such as energy, and the protection of the environment, have already reached the US-Soviet agenda.

As security concerns recede, these humane concerns -- including human rights and the quest for justice -- came again to the fore. International organizations take on greater significance and responsibility, less obstructed by Cold War antagonism. The climate of lessened tension even opens

- 14 -

In the present period, short-term: may be menaced as much by international
economic and political chaos as by the danger of war. Avoiding
either hazard demands a more cooperative world structure for which
amelioration of the environment is
improved East-West relations are essential.

C. <u>The Public Dimension</u>

American

For any policy to be effective, it must be sustained by the American people over the longer term. After two decades of global burdens, Cold War tensions, agonizing conflict abroad and turmoil at home, we can no longer take for granted the American people's willingness to support a major American role in the world, unless it believes that its government is exploring all reasonable avenues toward peace.

We know that we cannot always avoid some frictions with
the Soviet Union. But by balancing the harsher aspects of the
relationship with cooperative efforts, and a clear vision of the kind of
world we seek, Sustained by our own
more peaceful world, we will be better able to call on
a call on
public
support for the necessary firmness in a crisis. And if we should
be faced against our wishes with a period of renewed Soviet
aggression the American people will be better prepared to make
the necessary sacrifice knowing that all other paths have been
seriously explored. If confrontation should once again be our
fate, it must be clear that we had no other choice.
 Alternative

*********************

- 15 -

## II. The Evolution of Detente - the Balance of Risks and Incentives

As I have already discussed, the course of detente has not been smooth or even. Even at the end of 1969, Soviet-American relations were ambiguous and uncertain.

To be sure, negotiations had begun on, for example, Berlin and SALT. But the tendency towards confrontation seemed dominant. Then in 1970, and 1971,

We were challenged by Soviet conduct in the Middle East ceasefire of August 1970, during the Syrian invasion of Jordan, in September 1970, on the question of a possible Soviet submarine base in Cuba, in actions around Berlin, and during the Indo-Pakistani war. Soviet policy seemed directed toward creating detente in bilateral relations with our allies in Western Europe, while challenging the US United States.

The United States, in those crises, demonstrated then, and stand ready to do so again, that America will not yield to pressure or the threat of force. We made clear then -- as we do today -- that detente cannot be pursued selectively in one area or towards one group of countries only.

Then, a breakthrough was made in 1971 on several fronts -- in the Berlin settlement, in the SALT talks, in other arms control matters -- that led to what is now considered the process of detente. It consists of these elements: first, of principles; political discussions to solve outstanding issues and to reach cooperative agreements, for example, in economic relations; and third, arms control negotiations, especially those concerning strategic arms.

- 16 -

A. <u>The Elaboration of Principles</u>

Cooperative relations, in our view, must be more than a series
of isolated agreements. They must reflect an acceptance of mutual
obligations, and of the need for accommodation and restraint.

Setting forth principles of behavior in formal documents is
hardly a guarantee that they will be observed. But they can provide
reference points against which to judge actions and set goals.

The first of these documents is the Statement of Principles signed in Moscow in 1972. It affirms: (1) the necessity of avoiding confrontation; (2) the imperative of mutual restraint; (3) the rejection of attempts to gain advantages at each other's expense; (4) the renunciation of claims of special influence in the world; and (5) the willingness, on this new basis, to coexist peacefully and build a firm long-term relationship.

Reflecting these principles, an *Agreement on* the Prevention of Nuclear War was signed in 1973. It states that the objective of the policies of the US and the USSR is to remove the danger of nuclear conflict and of the use of nuclear weapons. But it emphasizes that this objective presupposes the renunciation of *any* war or threat of war not only by the two nuclear superpowers against each other, but also against allies or third countries. In

- 17 -

short the principle of restraint is not confined to relations between
the US and the USSR, it is implicitly extended to include all
countries.

statements of not been affirming Item unilaterally the contrary we had affirmed them for two decades. -- nor a political legal contract; rather they were (an aspiration and a yardstick by which we would assess Soviet behavior. We were not intending to "rely" on Soviet compliance with every principle; we did seek to elaborate standards of conduct which the Soviet Union could violate only to its cost. And if over the long term, the more durable relationship took hold, these basic principles would give it its definition, structure and hope.

## B. Political Dialogue and Cooperative Agreements

One of the characteristics of the current phase of US-Soviet relations is regular consultation between the leaders either face-to-face or through diplomatic channels. This permits the defusing of crisis situations as well as the elaboration of co-operative projects.

The dangerous aspect of crises is that either side might feel driven to act or to react on the basis of incomplete or confusing information. Although our consultation has reached a level of candor and frequency without precedent, we know that consultation by itself does not guarantee that policies will be compatible. It

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does provide a mechanism to resolve differences before they escalate to the point of public confrontation and commit the prestige of both sides. This channel between the highest leaders has proved its worth in many crises. It has continued without interruption under President Ford.

However, crisis management is not an end in itself. The more fundamental goal is the elaboration of a political relationship which in time will make crises less likely to arise and prevent crises from arising.

In the past, it was difficult to speak of a US-Soviet bilateral relationship in any normal sense of the phrase. Trade was negligible. Contacts between various institutions and between the peoples of the two countries were at best sporadic. There were no cooperative efforts in science and technology. Cultural exchange was modest. As a result, there was no penalty for aggressive behavior other than confrontation, but it was there much tangible inducement towards cooperation. The current policy seeks to use the common interests the US and the Soviet Union share as major industrial countries to provide incentives for collaboration. By joining efforts in such fields as medical research or environmental protection we and the Soviets can benefit not only our two peoples but all of mankind.

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Since 1972 we have concluded agreements on a common
effort against cancer, on research to protect the environment,
on studying the use of the ocean's resources, on using atomic
energy for peaceful purposes, on studying methods for conserving
energy, on examining construction techniques for regions subject
to earthquakes, on devising new transportation methods. Other
bilateral areas for cooperation include an agreement on preventing
incidents at sea, an agreement to exchange information and
research methods in agriculture, and the training of astronauts
for the rendezvous and docking mission planned for our spacecrafts
in 1975.

Each project must, of course, be judged by the concrete
benefits that result. But in their sum they also constitute a
commitment to work together across a broad spectrum of the
institutions of both countries. The areas for dialogue and
active collaboration between our two governments has been vastly
expanded, thus creating a growing commitment on both sides to
a constructive relationship.

C. The Economic Component

During the period of the Cold War economic contact
between ourselves and the USSR was virtually non-existent.

-20-

Even then many argued that improved economic relations might mitigate international tensions; in fact there were Congressional resolutions to that effect. But recurrent crises prevented any sustained progress. Thus the wheat sales of 1963, following the test ban treaty, remained an isolated transaction.

The period of confrontation should have left little doubt, however, that economic boycott would not transform the Soviet system or impose upon it a conciliatory foreign policy. The USSR was quite prepared to maintain heavy military outlays and to concentrate on capital growth by using the resources of the Communist world alone. Moreover, it proved impossible to mount an airtight boycott in practice, since over time, most if not all the other major industrial countries became involved in trade with the East.

The question then became how trade and economic contact -- in which the Soviet Union is obviously interested -- can serve the purposes of peace. On the one hand, economic relations can not be separated from the political context. Clearly, we cannot be asked to reward hostile conduct with economic benefits even if in the process we deny ourselves some commercially profitable opportunities. On the other hand, when political relations begin to normalize, it would be wrong not to normalize should not also begin to be normalized economic relations to keep pace with the overall process.

-21-

As political relations have improved on a broad basis, economic issues have been dealt with on a comparably broad front. A series of interlocking economic agreements with the USSR were negotiated, side by side with the political progress already noted. The 25-year-old lend-lease debt was settled; the reciprocal extension of most favored nation treatment was negotiated, together with safeguards against the possible disruption of our markets and a series of practical arrangements to facilitate the conduct of business with the USSR, by American firms. Our government credit facilities were made available for trade with the USSR; a maritime agreement regulated the carriage of goods. These were all primarily regulatory agreements conferring no immediate benefits on the Soviet Union but serving as blueprints for an expanded economic relationship if the political improvement continued.

This approach commanded widespread approval. It was considered a natural outgrowth of political progress. At no time were issues regarding Soviet domestic political practices raised-- issues which have been obvious and understood since 1917. Not until later was the Soviet domestic order invoked as a reason for arresting or reversing the progress so painstakingly achieved, and agreed. This sudden, ex post facto, form of linkage raises serious questions:

-- For the Soviet Union, it casts doubt on our reliability as a negotiating partner;

-- It assumes that by denying the benefits of trade we will induce the Soviet Union to dismantle a political system that is the product of its entire history;

-- The significance of trade, originally envisaged as only one ingredient of a complex and evolving relationship, is inflated out of all proportion;

-- The hoped-for results of policy become transformed into pre-conditions for any policy at all.

The moral concerns are valid. But it is important to maintain a sense of proportion about our economic relations with the USSR:

-- Denial of economic relations cannot by itself achieve what it failed to do when it was part of a determined policy of political and military confrontation.

-- The bargaining effect of MFN is marginal. MFN grants no special privilege to the USSR; in fact it is a misnomer since we have such agreements with over 100 countries. Thus we would merely be removing discrimination. In present circumstances denial of MFN is more of a political than an economic but denial of MFN would be a political act of no small importance. gesture.

-- Trade benefits are not a one-way street; the laws of mutual advantage operate or there will be no trade.

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D. <u>The Strategic Relationship</u>

Perhaps the single most important component of our policy
toward the Soviet Union is the effort to limit strategic weapons
competition. We cannot expect to achieve ~~a more~~ any stable inter-
national system, if the two strongest nuclear powers are con-
ducting an unrestrained strategic arms race.