NOV 24 19871

Henry Kissinger
Twenty-sixth Floor
350 Park Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022
USA

November 16, 1987

Dear Henry,

Please find enclosed the text of your interview to our
journal. As agreed, I reproduced the exact text of our
oral exchange, and added a few important points from your
speech at the Aspen conference.

I would appreciate if you give me your comments and
corrections at your earliest convenience. Please call me in
Prague at (422)-335-339 (office) or (422)-271-790 (home).

I enjoyed very much talking to you in Berlin and I
hope that we shall have further fruitful encounters in the
not too distant future. After Berlin I went to Moscow for
the October Revolution celebrations at the Kremlin and the
International Communist meeting immediately afterward. It
was quite a memorable occasion, since many Socialists,
Greens and other left-wing parties were represented for the
first time. Their speeches were published in full in
'Pravda' and no answer was made to their criticism of
Soviet policy.

Hoping to hear from you soon,

World Marxist Review
Thakurova 3
Prague 6
Czechoslovakia

INTERVIEW
with
HENRY KISSINGER
former Secretary of State, USA

Q: How do you see the geopolitical future of the world, the constellation of powers at the beginning of the 21st century?

A: We are living in a period in which the traditional relationships among powers are changing crucially. The United States represented 52 per cent of the world's gross product in 1950; at that time we did not have to worry about the balance of power because we were the balance of power. The fundamental American foreign policy problem at that time was to identify a difficulty and overwhelm it with resources. Today the United States represents maybe 20 to 23 per cent of the world's gross product. It is still the largest single economic unit in the world, but confronted now with a totally different set of foreign policy challenges.

At the moment the Soviet Union and the United States are by far the most powerful countries. By the beginning of the 21st century they will still be probably the most powerful countries. But at that point there will be several other countries of growing strength. Japan is clearly moving towards devoting at least 2 per cent of its GNP to military affairs. And since its GNP is growing and since its technology is advanced, by the turn of the century that will give it a considerable military force. From that base they can rapidly expand.

As to China, it depends on how one assesses its reform programme. Chances are that it will make progress, so that by the 21st century China will become a more powerful country. India will also be growing in strength, and it is possible that Western Europe will unite. In fact, I believe that it is imperative that Western Europe unite now in the military field in addition to the political and economic field. The real issue is, will Western Europe seek its unity in neutralism or in some sense of self-reliance. That the Europeans have to decide.

So by the 21st century we will have 5 or 6 power centers in the world, each of them attempting to assert a greater role, at least in their immediate area. If that happens, the kind of global competition that the United States and the Soviet Union have had, where we have been

competing in every part of the world, will not make any
sense any more, and if, indeed, in the immediate period
ahead, the Soviet Union and the United States were to
slide, by mistake or by design, into a conflict, they would
be exhausting themselves over issues, that the evolution
of history and of geopolitics, may make irrelevant. If
present trends in the world continue, if each side keeps
encouraging every crisis everywhere and settles none, we
run the huge danger that sooner or later something happens
like World War 1, in which none of the leaders had the
slightest intention of producing the consequences that came
about.

Q: What is your conclusion so far as the relations
between the US and the USSR are concerned?

A: I believe that the United States and the Soviet Union need to have a fundamental dialogue. I think that some arms control measures can be taken, but the issue of arms limitation is so complicated and creates so many temptations for the negotiators to achieve a unilateral advantage based on special technological knowledge, that in the end it will not greatly improve the situation. Sooner or later the USSR and the US must have a political dialogue in which they will try to limit their competition, at least, in areas distant from their borders.

Q: You do not mean an agreement to divide spheres of
influence?

A: No, I do not say that we should divide the world
spheres of influence. But if we could all agree, for
example, that neither of us will ship arms into Africa, and
neither of us will engage in certain intelligence
activities, which will have to be defined precisely, then we
would have taken one continent out of the military
competition. We will still believe in our own ideology and,
presumably, we will each make whatever propaganda we think
is necessary. You cannot stop the spread of human
intelligence, but though I do not think we should divide
the world into spheres of interest, we should have
sensitivity to special concerns. Close to the borders of
each country we should be very careful not to engage in
those actions that give the impression one is trying to
gain a military advantage or that one is trying to
undermine other than by one's convictions.

Q: I do not want to get into a dispute, but the Middle
East is not further from the Soviet Union than Nicaragua
is from the US borders. So there must be some measure of

closeness.

A: Yes, but there are also many historical circumstances. In the Middle East the United States have had a historical relationship with Israel and also with a particular group of other countries. But even there I would agree that we should try not to turn the Middle East into an area from which the Soviet Union should feel threatened.

Q: But how would you consider the spread of the socialist system in the case when a left government comes to power as a result of elections or even as a result of internal revolution. Would that be something that would be considered a menace to the US even if it were not supported by the Soviet Union directly?

A: No socialist system has come to power by elections, as we conceive them.

Q: Chile is an example of a left government which came to power through the parliamentary procedure, but was overthrown with the help of the US.

A: We did not like the government that came to power in Chile, any more than the USSR would like a capitalist country established in an area with which you had had a long historical relationship. In fact Alliende destroyed himself. We did not destroy Alliende no matter what the various...

Q: We are talking about the future. Suppose this happened again. Would you have to necessarily interfere?

A: In the future I would take a different view. If a left government in some country came to power not with the help of Soviet intelligence or indirect military support, in a free election, I would probably not like this, but it depends where it is. It is certainly a difficult issue. But in those situations we have two different problems. One is the existence of that government. The second is what does that government do. Let me take Nicaragua. If there were not 10 thousand Cubans and thousands of other advisers, and Nicaragua did not have received $500 million a year from the Soviet bloc, then I would have a different view of the Sandinistas, than I do in the present situation, where there is a Soviet involvement at the furthest distance in the world where the USSR can be from its borders.

But in more general terms, I think it is not proper or realistic to aim to change the internal order in foreign countries. For this reason I have always objected to tying human rights with the discussion of foreign policy issues. I do not believe either that it is proper or realistic to try to democratise the whole world by a programme of covert activities.

Q: Let us change the subject and talk about nuclear arms. The Soviet Union is committed to a non-nuclear world by the year 2000. Mr. Reagan has been speaking about a world free of nuclear arms, but presumably at a later date. What is your view?

A: I think it an impossible goal. And I hope the Soviet leaders know this, because I would hate to think that they are not realistic.

Q: It is a popular goal. Please, explain your view to our readers.

A: I will explain my point of view exactly. The Soviet Union has a huge territory with eleven time zones. It is impossible to have any assurance that you are not hiding a certain number of nuclear weapons. We would therefore have to analyse how many weapons the USSR can hide. If the Soviet government were prudent, it would realise that the same could be true in the United States. So for this reason only we would have to define the minimum number of weapons with which we would be secure as a hedge against violations. Second, there are Israel, India, China, France, Britain, all having nuclear weapons.

Q: Israel is a nuclear power?

A: It is generally said that they are a nuclear power. It is not official, but for purposes of arms control you have to assume the worst case. I think it would be reckless for the United States and the Soviet Union not to have enough nuclear weapons so that any other nation or group of nations could threaten them. We are therefore back again at what is the minimum number of nuclear weapons we can live with. And this is a discussion I am prepared to see happen.

Q: How do you see the agreement to eliminate intermediate and shorter-range nuclear weapons?

A: I do not like the INF agreement, but I am going to support its ratification because we cannot go on forever making agreements, not ratifying them, spending years of efforts analysing our problems. As to the INF agreement itself, from the very beginning I did not believe it was in our interest to propose 'double zero', because it was essential to have a link between the defense of Europe and the defense of the US. Also my view has always been that if we want to zero, it could only be in relation to a substantial conventional disarmament. This has been my invarying position since 1981. But the Western leaders for some time have a tendency to make proposals that appeal to their domestic public opinion, and not to any long-term strategy. Nevertheless this is now gone and there is no sense debating it.

Q: Helmut Schmidt said recently that he does not believe in the Soviet conventional threat, since the quality of arms and military personnel have to be taken into account, not only quantity, when there is a discussion of the balance of conventional forces. What is your view of this issue? Do you agree with Schmidt?

A: Obviously, the Soviet Union traditionally has reasons to feel insecure. But if it drives its sense of insecurity to the point where it feels safe only if everybody around it is impotent, than it becomes a danger for everybody. So the question is, can we define relative security between the Soviet Union and its neighbours. Some people say it does not matter how many tanks and soldiers the Soviet Union has, because their quality and morale may be no good. I think this a very reckless, nationalistic argument. Serious people should sit down and analyse how many tanks and soldiers have to be reduced on each side. And what the disproportionate number is which Gorbachov has agreed you have to reduce, and on that level we could have a serious discussion.

Q: Apart from of a mutual understanding of not interfering in third countries, what other political modus vivendi have you in mind between the Soviet Union and the United States?

A: Some issues like world energy, world climate, world environment, in which we certainly have a common interest to cooperate. The fundamental decision we have to make is whether we think that by the year 2000 none of us can