Henry A. Kieinger

Sincerely yours,

Kind regards.

find it useful.
I said it would be. I hope you will
Mr. Schwartz's book which is being as
I am enclosing the preface for

Dear Mrs. Schenker:

New York, New York 10017
211 Park Avenue
Dolplesby & Company, Inc.
Mrs. Kay Schenker

October 1, 1962

October 1, 1965

Preface to Urs Schwarz's Book

by Henry A. Kissinger

What Americans think about their power determines the security of their friends and sets the framework for the calculations of their opponents. While American power is no guarantee for a constructive foreign policy, no constructive foreign policy is possible without it.

It has always been true that until power is used, it is what people think it is. Throughout history, strategic doctrine has determined which of the available choices in weapons, tactics or policy a state would, in fact, follow. Doctrine as used here should not be considered as something abstract and esoteric: Rather it defines the likely challenges and how to deal with them; it specifies the possible goals and how to attain them. Its test is whether what it defines as probable is in fact the most frequent occurrence and whether its prescribed mode of action turns out to be relevant to the problems at hand.

This historic role of strategic doctrine has been magnified in the nuclear age. Weapons are novel and untested. A technology of unprecedented destructiveness is allied with a rate of change which produces obsolescence every five years. Many of our critics in Western Europe cite the changes American strategic doctrine has undergone in the last two decades as proof of the fickleness of American policy. However, given the rate of technological change they should be more concerned were the United States to cling to

change they should be more concerned were the United States to cling to
of the tickleness of American policy. However, given the rate of technological
American strategic doctrine has undergone in the last two decades as proof
every five years. Many of our critics in Western Europe cite the changes
destructiveness as allied with a rate of change which produces opaceness
unclear age. Weapons are novel and untested. A technology of unprecedented
This historic role of strategic doctrine has been magnified in the
to the problems at hand.

occurrence and whether its prescribed mode of action turns out to be relevant
Its test is whether what it defines as belligerent is in fact the most potent
to deal with them; it abjects the belligerent states and how to attain them.
abstract and aeternical: Rather it defines the likely challenges and how
tact, follow. Doctrine as used here should not be considered as something
of the available choices in weapons, tactics or policy a state would, in
think it is. Through Out history, strategic doctrine has determined which
It has always been true that until power is used, it is what people
policy, no constructive foreign policy is feasible without it.

While American power is no guarantee for a constructive foreign
engagement. While Americans think about their power determines the security
of their friends and sets the framework for the calculations of their
What Americans think about their power determines the security

Preface to Ute Schwarz's Book

by Henry V. Kissinger

October 1, 1962

obsolescent conceptions rather than when it seeks to adapt them to new
realities.

Because of the enormous destructiveness of modern weapons, their
most important function is deterrence: to prevent an undesirable action
by a threat. But the deterrent relationship is largely psychological. Its
effectiveness depends on the calculations of the side being threatened, not
of the side which makes the threat. For purposes of deterrence a threat
which is meant as a bluff but is taken seriously is more useful than a
serious threat which is interpreted as a bluff. Psychology, policy, technology
and strategy therefore merge.

Moreover, deterrence is tested negatively by actions or events which
do not take place. It is impossible, however, to demonstrate why something
has not occurred. It can never be proved whether peace has been maintained
because the existing strategic doctrine is the best possible or whether
it is only marginally effective. Indeed it cannot even be demonstrated
conclusively whether there was any danger of attack in the first place.
Thus side-by-side with the elaboration of strategic doctrine there has
developed a school of thought challenging its value and necessity.

Despite the central importance of strategic doctrine, it has emerged
only recently as a theoretical discipline in the United States. To be sure,
the United States has developed strategic plans ever since the early days
of the Republic. And writers in military affairs have had a major influence

of the Republican. And writers in military affairs have had a major influence
the United States has developed strategic plans ever since the early days
only recently as a theoretical discipline in the United States. To be sure,
Despite the central importance of strategic doctrine, it has emerged
developed a school of thought challenging its value and necessity.

Thus side-by-side with the elaboration of strategic doctrine there has
conclusively whether there was any danger of attack in the first place.
It is only marginally effective. Indeed it cannot even be demonstrated
because the existing strategic doctrine is *principally* effective or whether
*theoretically possible* has not occurred. It can never be proved whether peace has been maintained
do not take place. It is impossible, however, to demonstrate why something
Moreover, deterrence is tested negatively by actions or events which
and strategy therefore merge.

Serious threat which is interpreted as *plutonium* psychology, policy, technology
which is meant as a *plutonium* put is taken seriously is more useful than a
of the side which makes the threat. For purposes of deterrence a threat
effectiveness depends on the calculations of the side being threatened, not
by a threat. But the deterrent relationship is largely psychological. Its
most important function is deterrence: to prevent an undesirable action
Because of the enormous destructiveness of modern weapons, their
realities.

Opalescent conceptions rather than when it seeks to adapt them to new

psychology to new

- 3 -

shaping particular military services--such as Mahan with respect to the
Navy. But strategic doctrine as the interplay of political and military
factors has been inhibited by an American tradition which viewed war and
peace as discrete phases of policy. In this concept, war was conducted
on the basis of purely military considerations; to intrude "politics"
into it was considered wrong, even immoral. Until victory was achieved
the diplomats had to stand aside. Unconditional surrender has therefore
been a traditional American war aim.

By the same token during periods of peace, American policy-makers
have often acted as if international relations were like a gigantic debate
in which victory went to the side presenting the most reasonable arguments.
The relationship of power and foreign policy was insufficiently recognized.
This separation of power and policy had the result that military policy
frequently took the form of simply amassing resources; while diplomacy
tended to confuse legal formulae with substantive achievement.

Only the last decade and a half has seen an attempt to merge these
two realms. But precisely because the field of strategic doctrine in its
widest sense was so new, those engaged in developing a theory for it sometimes
forget the wood for the trees. Conscious of disagreements over more or less
esoteric fine points, they have occasionally refined sophisticated elaborations
at the expense of an over-all approach.

It is the great merit of Urs Schwarz's splendid little book, that it
brings together all of the relevant thinking about American strategic doctrine.

princes together all of the relevant thinking about American strategic doctrine.

It is the great merit of Ura Schwarzschild's splendid little book, that it
at the expense of an over-all approach.

esoteric fine points, they have occasionally refined sophisticated elusions
forget the wood for the trees. Connections of disagreements over more or less
widest sense was so new, those engaged in developing a theory for it sometimes
two regimes. But precisely because the field of strategic doctrine in its
tended to confuse legal formulae with substantive achievement.

frequently took the form of simply amassing resources; while diplomacy
This separation of power and policy had the result that military policy
The relationship of power and foreign policy was insufficiently recognised.
in which victory went to the side presenting the most reasonable arguments.
pave often acted as its international relations were like a gigantic debate
By the same token during periods of peace, American policy-makers
been a traditional American war aim.

the diplomat had to stand alone. Unconditional surrender has therefore
into it was considered wrong, even immoral. Until victory was achieved
on the basis of purely military considerations: to intrude "politics"

beings as discrete phases of policy. In this concept, war was conducted
factors has been attributed by an American tradition which viewed war and
War. But strategic doctrine as the interplay of political and military
enabling particular military services--such as Mahan with respect to the

- 3 -

- 4 -

He traces the history of American strategic thought, showing the traditional sharp division between military affairs and foreign policy and its gradual erosion after World War II. He devotes over two-thirds of his book to significant trends in American strategic thought since the end of World War II. With extraordinary skill, he presents the various strands of American strategic thinking, both governmental and academic.

His success in this effort is no accident. As foreign editor of the most distinguished newspaper in the German language--the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*--Mr. Schwarz combines an acute power of observation with the ability to write tersely and precisely. As a Swiss, he is in the fortunate position of being able to maintain sufficient detachment to distinguish the essential from the peripheral. I know of no American who could have presented the American strategic debate so fairly. Those of us who have admired Mr. Schwarz's writings in the past can only be grateful that his thought on a subject of such vital importance for all free peoples is now available to an American audience.

Grateful that his thought on a subject of such vital importance for all of us who have admired Mr. Schwartz's writing in the past can only be

who could have presented the American strategic debate so fairly. Those to distinguish the essential from the peripheral. I know of no American the fortunate position of being able to maintain sufficient detachment with the ability to write tersely and precisely. As a Swiss, he is in *Schröder Zeitung*--Mr. Schwartz complies an acute power of observation of the most distinguished newspaper in the German language--the *Nazi* His success in this effort is no accident. As foreign editor governmental and academic.

presents the various strange of American strategic thinking, both
thought since the end of World War II. With extraordinary skill, he
two-thirds of his book to significant trends in American strategic
policy and its gradual erosion after World War II. He devotes over
traditional sharp division between military affairs and foreign
He traces the history of American strategic thought, showing the

- 4 -

DQUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC. Publishers

277 PARK AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 TEL: 212 TA 6-2000

Anchor Books

October 4, 1965

Professor Henry Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Professor Kissinger:

Thank you very much for the preface to Mr. Schwarz's
book. It is just the sort of thing I was hoping for,
and I am very grateful to you for getting it to us
so soon.

I am now very embarrassed to note that in the many
confusions of this summer, we have omitted to send
you any sort of formal agreement for it. This
became evident when I tried to order your check;
unfortunately until we have a signed letter of
contract we cannot pay you. I am having the letter
drawn up at once and it should reach you in a few
days. I apologize for the delay and for our forget-
fulness.

The manuscript you have is the one from which we
will set the book, so I would be very grateful if
you could put it in the mail sometime this week.

October 7, 1965

Mrs. Kay Scheuer
Doubleday & Company, Inc.
277 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10017

Dear Mrs. Scheuer:

Thank you for your letter of October 4th.

There are three matters to be taken up:

(1) Until I have seen your contract I cannot let you proceed with printing the Preface. I, therefore, suggest that you wait until I return on November 10th from a trip to the Far East.

(2) In the Anchor edition of THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP I would like the enclosed changes made in Chapter VI. It is to replace pages 161-177 up to the heading "Tactical Nuclear Weapons." I am also sending you xeroxed copies of two pages where I have crossed out certain sentences which I would like eliminated.

(3) I took violent objection to the cover design of McGraw-Hill. I would appreciate it very much if the cover design of the Anchor edition avoided any bomb symbolism.

.....

ATTENHOFERSTRASSE 16
8032 ZÜRICH

OCT 1 1 1965

LJ

7.10.65

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6, Divinity Ave.
Cambridge Mass.

Dear Henry,

Thank you very much for your letter of October 1 and the copy of the preface which you so kindly wrote for my book. It is splendid, though full and really puts my study in the right perspective. I am deeply grateful to you that you found time to do this for me before your departure for Vietnam.

I am sure that your work there with Ambassador Lodge will be of greatest interest to you and at the same time of enormous importance for your cause.

With my best wishes and repeated thanks,

Sincerely yours,

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC. Publishers

Anchor Books

November 22, 1965

Miss Joan Blanchard
Harvard University
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Miss Blanchard:

I have not yet had a response from Professor Kissinger to my letter of November 8th, and it occurs to me that perhaps he did not return to Cambridge at the time he was expected. If this is the case, I wonder whether you, or anyone else at the Center, are in a position to let us know what we ought to do about the copyright for THE TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP. We ought to turn this information over to our printer by the end of the month, so if anyone there knows Professor Kissinger's wishes, we would very much appreciate advice.

KS/we

Anchor Books

November 24, 1965

NOV 26 1965

Miss Joan Blanchard, Secretary
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Miss Blanchard:

Please ignore the letter I wrote to you on the 22nd. My question was answered in a letter from Professor Kissinger that arrived this morning. Sorry to have bothered you.