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## Hellmut BECKER

Born in Hamburg on May 17, 1913; son of Carl Heinrich Becker, Islamicist and later Prussian Minister of Education. He studied law in Freiburg, Berlin, and Kiel. Following brief employment in industry, he established a legal practice immediately after the war.

He was defense counsel in cases tried in French and American courts after the war, and defended, among others, Freiherr von Weizsäcker, State Secretary in the German Foreign Office, at the Nuremberg trials.

For about 14 years now, his work as an attorney has been devoted almost exclusively to advising private schools, research institutes, scientific societies, and cultural organizations of all kinds on matters of law and of educational and cultural policy. His offices include those of manager of the Union of Non-profit making Private School Associations, president of the German University Extension Association, and member of the boards of trustees of a large number of educational and cultural institutions. He is the author of many articles on matters of educational policy and educational sociology. His publications include the following: "Kulturpolitik und Schule" (Educational policy and school), Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1956. "Bildung zwischen Plan und Freiheit" (Education between planning and liberty), Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1957. With Professor Wolfgang Clemen: "Elternhaus, Schule und Universität" (Home, school, and university), Werkbund-Verlag, 1957. With Alexander Kluge: "Kulturpolitik und Ausgabenkontrolle" (The theory and practice of auditing) (Educational policy and expenditure auditing), 1961. "Quantität und Qualität, Grundfragen der Bildungspolitik" (Quantity and quality, basic questions of educational policy), Rombach Verlag, 1962.

## Dr. Walther BECKER

Ambassador retd. Born on May 30, 1894, in Weidenau-on-Sieg. Married; wife: Hildegard, née Dorenberg. Studied public administration and economics at the universities of Jena, Munich, and Tübingen, and took the degree of Doctor of Political Science in 1920.

From 1921 to 1945 and 1951 to 1959, in German Foreign Service in New York, Washington, Rio de Janeiro, and Madrid, serving as Ambassador to Cairo from 1955 to 1959. In interim period, legal adviser in Hamburg. Managing vice president of the German Foreign Policy Society (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik), Bonn. Received Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic in 1957.

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## Prof. Dr. Arnold BERGSTRAESSER

Professor-in-Ordinary of Politics and Sociology at the University of Freiburg (Breisgau). Born in 1896. Professor of Political Science and Knowledge of Foreign Countries at the University of Heidelberg until 1935. Professor of the history of German civilization and European history at Claremont College and the University of Chicago from 1937 to 1954. Professor of the history of American civilization at the University of Erlangen from 1952 to 1953. In Freiburg since 1954. Director of the Department of Political Science at the University of Freiburg and of the Research Center for the Science of Civilization, Freiburg.

President of the German UNESCO Commission. President of the Working Committee "Der Bürger im Staat." President of the Working Committee "Wissenschaft und Politik." Member of the Cultural Advisory Board of the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Author of: "Staat und Wirtschaft Frankreichs", 1930; "Sinn und Grenzen der Verständigung zwischen Nationen", 1930; "Germany, A Short History" (with G.N. Shuster), 1944; "Goethe's Image of Man and Society", 1949; "Die weltpolitische Dynamik der Gegenwart" in: Internationale Politik, 1958; "Politik in Wissenschaft und Bildung", 1961; "Führung in der modernen Welt, 1961; "Klassiker der Staatsphilosophie" (with Dieter Oberndörfer as co-editor), 1962.

Editor of the series "Politik" and "Soziologie" of the "Freiburger Studien zu Politik und Soziologie" (Verlag Rombach, Freiburg, Breisgau).

## Dr. Kurt BIRRENBACH

Born on July 2, 1907, at Arnsberg. Attended grammar school in Münster and studied law and public administration in Geneva, Paris, Munich, Berlin, and Münster. Passed assistant counsel's examination in 1930. Took doctorate of law in Tübingen in 1933 and passed assistant judges' examination in 1934.

From 1935 to 1939, counsel on foreign exchange, financial and export matters in Berlin. From then on to 1954, employed in the import and export trade of the iron-making industry in South America and Germany. Since 1954, trustee, and in this capacity chairman of the board, of the Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen, Düsseldorf. Deputy chairman of the board of the August Thyssen-Hütte AG and the Handelsunion AG. Member of the following boards of directors: Niederrheinische Hütte AG, Deutsche Edelstahlwerke AG, and Thyssen & Co. AG. Vice president of the Fritz Thyssen Foundation. Member of the central advisory board of the Dresdner Bank AG. Member of the Bundestag, vice president of the Atlantic Institute, Paris, the International Movement for Atlantic Union, Washington, the Europa-Union, and the American-German Society. Dr. Birrenbach lives in Düsseldorf.

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## Erik BLUMENFELD

Born on March 27, 1915 in Hamburg. Graduated from the Salem Castle School (Secondary School), Lake Constance, early in 1933. Thereafter, commercial and linguistic training in England, France, and Scandinavia from 1933 to 1935. From the end of 1935 to mid-1939, studied at the Technical University in Berlin-Charlottenburg, passing a pre-graduation examination. Studies interrupted by being drafted into the German armed forces. Served in World War II in France. Discharged from the German armed forces as a corporal in 1941. Arrested by the Gestapo in 1942 and put into concentration camp in Auschwitz and later in Buchenwald.

After liberation in 1945, took over and supervised the reconstruction of the family businesses (fuel trade and production, and shipping). Now sole proprietor of the firm of Blumenfeld & Co., chairman of the board of directors of the family-owned Norddeutsche Kohlen- und Cokes-Werke A.-G., and chairman of the board of directors of the Gesellschaft für Wohnungseigentum und Familienheime mbH. GEWOFA, which was founded early in 1954 with the housing policy goal of creating property and in which the Blumenfeld group has a material share.

Without interruption since 1945 member of the plenary assembly of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce, serving as vice president of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce from 1946 - 1954. From 1949 to 1957, member of the executive committee of the Kohlengroßhändler-Verband Nord e.V. (Association of Wholesale Coal Dealers for North Germany), and member of the administrative board of the Verband Deutscher Reeder (German Merchant Marine Association) from 1949 to 1952.

Elected member of the Hamburg House of Burgesses in 1946, chairman of the CDU caucus beginning in 1949 and chairman of the caucus of the Hamburg Bloc government coalition (CDU, FDP and DP) beginning 1953. In mid-1955 relinquished his parliamentary mandate because of pressure of professional and business tasks. In 1958, elected chairman of the Hamburg CDU. In his capacity, member of the working executive committee of the German CDU.

## Klaus BOELLING

Born on August 29, 1928. Until 1956 political affairs editor of the "Tagesspiegel" and Free Berlin Radio. Belgrade correspondent of the German radio networks for three years, and then a commentator for the "Westdeutscher Rundfunk". Now deputy editor on the central political affairs desk of the "Norddeutscher Rundfunk".

Dr. Hans Karl von BORRIES

Born in 1898. Studied law and public administration in Göttingen and Kiel, and had an extensive period of studies in Finland. Degree of Doctor of Political Science in 1922, followed by employment in business administration with banks and commercial firms in Hamburg, Berlin, Frankfurt, and New York.

Has held senior positions in Ruhr industries since 1930 (Benzol Verband and Ammoniak Verband). From 1952 to 1956 he was president of the Ruhr Nitrogen Corporation in Bochum, member of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Bochum, and German delegate on the Chemical Industry Committee of OEEC in Paris, and made extensive trips to the USA., Africa, and the Far East.

Retired at the end of 1956 for reasons of health and has lived in Switzerland (Montagnola, Ticino) since 1957, pursuing private studies in the fields of politics and economic policy.

Publications: "Probleme der Weltwirtschaft" (Problems of world economics), vol. 36, Institut für Weltwirtschaft, Kiel; and articles in trade periodicals. Co-founder of "Atlantik-Brücke" (1952).

Max BRAUER, Burgomaster rtd.

Max Brauer was born on September 3, 1887, as one of a large number of children of a working class family in Altona and attended elementary school in that city. At the age of 14 he entered apprenticeship as a glass-blower and continued his education through evening courses after completing school.

He joined the SPD (Social Democratic Party) at the age of 17, and in 1908 became an employee at the Consumers' Production Cooperative. Beginning in 1919 he was Burgomaster of Altona, and from 1923 on, Chief Burgomaster of that city. Mr. Brauer was a member of the Prussian Council of State for 10 years. In 1933 he had to go into exile because of persecution by the Nazi régime, and he was expatriated by Adolf Hitler in the same year. In the summer of 1933 he became a League of Nations adviser to the Chinese National Government, and from 1936 to 1946 he taught at American colleges and universities. In 1946 he returned to Hamburg, and in the same year he became Chief Burgomaster of Hamburg until 1953. From 1953 to 1957 he was director of the Volksfürsorge Lebensversicherung AG, and from 1957 on, he was again Chief Burgomaster of Hamburg. At the end of 1960 he retired from this office, and he is now a member of the German Bundestag.

Mr. Brauer is married and has two children, who live in America.

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Dr. Heinrich von BRENTANO

Born on June 20, 1904, in Offenbach-on-Main. After attending school for 12 years (graduating from grammar school), studied law at the universities of Munich, Frankfurt-on-Main, and Giessen. Passed the first state examination in 1925 and the second in 1929. Took doctorate in Giessen with a thesis on "The Legal Position of the President of Parliament". After practical training in the judiciary and administration, attorney at the bar of the Regional Appeal Court in Darmstadt beginning in 1932, and notary public there starting in 1945.

Co-founder of the Christian Democratic Union in Hesse in 1945. Member of the drafting commission for the Hessian constitution, of the Land consultative committee, of the Land constituent assembly, and of the Hessian Parliament. Member of the executive committee of the CDU in Hesse until September, 1949, chairman of the CDU caucus in the Hessian Parliament, chairman of the constitution committee of the German CDU-CSU, and member of the working committee of the German CDU-CSU. Member of the Parliamentary Council (constituent assembly of the Federal Republic of Germany) from 1948 to 1949.

Beginning in September, 1949, member of the German Bundestag and from September 30, 1949, to June 15, 1955, chairman of the CDU-CSU caucus.

From January, 1954, to May, 1956, president of the Parliamentary Section, German Council of the European Movement. From August, 1950, to June, 1955, member and vice president of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. From September 1952, to June, 1955, member of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. From September 22, 1952, to the end of 1954, chairman of the Ad Hoc Assembly's Committee on the European Constitution.

From June 7, 1955, to October 16, 1961, Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs. On March 7, 1957, received an honorary doctorate of law from Georgetown University, Washington, DC.

Since November 24, 1961, chairman of the CDU-CSU caucus in the German Bundestag.

Dr. Hendrik George van DAM

Born 1906 in Berlin, serves as Secretary General of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. He writes editorials for the Allgemeine Wochenzeitung der Juden in Deutschland and has published various articles and books on the question of damages and reparation, as well as publishing in other fields.

Dr. van Dam, the son of the Hofantiquar of Kaiser Wilhelm II., studied law and history in Heidelberg, Munich, Berlin and Basel. He was suspended from law practice in 1933 as a result of National-Socialist persecution, left Germany for Holland and Switzerland and

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was deprived of German citizenship in 1934. He received his doc-
torate in Basel with a thesis on problems of the misuse of econ-
omic power. Later he worked as a journalist in Holland. With the
invasion of Holland by German troops, he fled to England in 1940,
where he was at first interned. In May 1945, Dr. van Dam served
in the reorganization of the German law system in Oldenburg. From
1946 to 1950 he was justice and department director in Hamburg and
Bremen for the Jewish Relief Unit.

He prepared, in 1950, a memorandum for the Israeli Government
advocating direct reparations negotiations with the Federal Re-
public. Also, in that year, he was elected secretary general of
the Central Council of Jews in Germany, which had been founded
shortly before.

Dr. van Dam has concerned himself since 1946 with problems
of reparation laws and practice. In 1947 he lectured on "Law pro-
tection against Incitement of Racial Hatred" at the first Jewish
Lawyers Congress in Detmold. He took part in the reparations
negotiations between the Federal Republic, Israel and Jewish organ-
izations.

Prof. Constantin von DIETZE

Doctor of Political Science, Honorary Doctor of Agricultural
Science, emeritus professor of economic science. Head of the
Department of Agricultural Science, University of Freiburg in the
Breisgau. Married, 6 children. Born on August 9, 1891, in Got-
tesgnaden, district of Colbe-on-Saale.

Father: farmer. 1903-09 - "Landesschule Pforta" (Pforta State School). 1909-12 - Universities of Cambridge, England, Tübingen and Halle. 1913 - Law Graduate. 1913-18 - Military service: prisoner of war in Siberia from February, 1915 to February, 1918. 1919 - Doctorate of political science from the University of Breslau. 1922 - Lecturer at the University of Berlin. From 1924 on - Professor of Economics in Rostock, Jena, Berlin, and Freiburg.

1946-49: President of the University of Freiburg. 1937 and
1944-45: Arrested by the Gestapo. 1948 - Honorary doctorate of
theology from the University of Heidelberg. 1951-1952 - Carl
Schurz Memorial Professor, University of Wisconsin. 1955-61 - Head
of the Synod of the Protestant Church in Germany. 1961: Honorary
Doctor of Agricultural Science, University of Bonn.

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Marion, Countess DÖNHOFF

Born in East Prussia. Studied economics at first in Frankfurt, went to Switzerland after the initiation of the Third Reich, and took her doctorate in 1935 at Basle. Traveled in Europe, America, and Africa for two years. From 1937 until the coming of the Russians, managed two large estates in East Prussia. Has written for *Die Zeit* since its establishment in March, 1946. Head of the foreign and domestic policy desk since 1955.

Wolfgang DÖRING

Aged 43, born in Leipzig. Attended private school and classical grammar school. Became officer in the regular army. After the war, plant manager. From 1954 to 1958, member of the Parliament of North Rhine-Westphalia, serving as chairman of his party's caucus during the latter part of his term. Since 1957, member of the German Bundestag. Deputy chairman of the caucus and deputy chairman of the Free Democratic Party. Member of the Council of Europe and the Assembly of the Western European Union. In the Bundestag, member of the Defense Committee and the Committee on All-German and Berlin Affairs.

Fritz ERLER

Member of the Bundestag (SPD) since 1949. Born 14 July 1913 in Berlin; married, 3 children. Education: high school, School of administration. Member of Socialist Workers' Youth Organization since 1928, of Social-Democratic Party since 1931. On the Staff of City Administration, Berlin. Contributor to scholarly reviews in government, taxes etc. After 1933 illegal work for underground social-democratic organisations; retired for political reasons, then commercial manager of chemical factory in Berlin. Arrested in November 1938, condemned to 10 years of penal serv.; escaped from prison in April 1945. District president (Landrat) in Biberach, arrested for a short period by the occupation forces. From 1946 to 1947 on the staff of the Land Government of Württemberg-Hohenzollern in Tübingen. Member of the Constitutional Assembly of Württemberg-Hohenzollern and later of the Diet. District President in Tuttlingen. Vice-President of the German Council of the European Movement and the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. Member of both the Board and the Presidium of SPD. Member of the Advisory Assembly of the European Council and the Assembly of the West-European Union.

Bernhard, Freiherr von FALKENHAUSEN

Attorney at Law, Manager Bankhaus Burkhardt & Co., Essen. Born May 10, 1927, in Königsberg, East Prussia. Pre-university education: At public and private schools in Germany.

1943 to 1945: Military Service. 1946 to 1950: Law studies at the universities at Freiburg i. Breisgau and Bonn. First legal State Examination. 1950 to 1952: Study at the Cornell Law School, Ithaca/ New York. Member of the editorial staff of the Cornell Law Quarterly. Member Order of the Coif. LL.B 1952. 1952 to 1954: Associated with the law firm of Davis, Polk, Wardwell, Sunderland and Kiendl, New York. 1957: Second German legal State Examination. 1958: Trainee with Messrs. Brown Brothers, Harriman & Co., private Bankers, New York, and the New York Hanseatic Corporation, New York.

Since 1958: Associated with Bankhaus Burkhardt & Co., Essen. Member of the German Bar.

Gotthard Freiherr von FALKENHAUSEN, D.L.

Banker, born on January 20, 1899, in Steinkirchen, district of Lübben. Town Councillor of the city of Essen. Studied law and public administration at the universities of Berlin, Göttingen, and Halle, and passed the assistant judge's examination. Was an attorney in Königsberg, East Prussia, from 1926 to 1928.

From 1929 to 1934, legal adviser and later deputy director of the Disconto-Gesellschaft (later Deutsche Bank) in Berlin. From 1935 to 1938, director of the Essen branch of the Deutsche Bank. In October, 1938, left the Deutsche Bank to become a co-proprietor of the banking firm of Burkhardt & Co., Essen.

Numerous honorary offices, including those of: President of the Board of Management of Federal Association of Private Banks, Cologne; President of the Chamber of Industry and Commerce for the Municipal Districts of Essen, Mülheim-on-Ruhr, and Oberhausen, Essen; Vice-president of the Official Franco-German Chamber of Commerce, Paris; member of the managing board of the Rheinisch-Westphalian Stock Exchange, Düsseldorf; and member of the board of directors of the Reconstruction Credit Institute, Frankfurt-on-Main.

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Otto A. FRIEDRICH

Born on July 3, 1902, in Leipzig (son of Dr. Paul Leopold Friedrich, professor of surgery at the University, and his wife, Charlotte, née Freiin von Bülow).

Graduated from grammar school in Marburg-on-Lahn in 1920. From 1921 to 1924 pursued studies of medicine and economics at the universities of Marburg, Königsberg (East Prussia), Frankfurt-on-Main, Heidelberg, Berlin, and Vienna. From 1925 to 1926, commercial apprenticeship in Berlin. From 1927 to 1930, employed by B.F. Goodrich, Akron, Ohio, at first as a workman and later as a clerk and as representative for Germany.

From 1930 to 1932, director of the Deutsche Goodrich Compagnie GmbH., Berlin. From 1932 to 1939, managing director of various central associations of the German rubber industry and member of the consumer advisory board of the International Rubber Regulation Committee, London. In October, 1939, became member of board of directors of Phoenix Gummiwerke AG, and in April, 1949, president of the firm. From 1939 to 1942, industrial expert of the Reich Rubber Office, Berlin, and from 1943 to 1945, its executive director.

In 1951 was adviser to the German government on raw material problems and managing director of the Federal Agency for Goods Traffic, in conjunction with the Korean crisis.

His honorary offices include those of executive chairman of the Rubber Industry Association (British Zone), Hanover (1945-48); chairman of the German Rubber Industry Association (area of the Federal Republic), Frankfurt-on-Main (1948-50); member of the presiding board of the Federal Association of German Industry, Cologne, since 1949, and its vice president and treasurer since 1960; member of the executive committee of the Sponsors' Association for German Science since 1950; member of the executive committee of the Educational and Cultural Council of the Federal Association of German Industry since 1955; member of the presiding board of the Federal Union of German Employers' Associations, Cologne, since 1957; vice president of the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce since 1957; and chairman of the presiding council of the German Museum, Munich, since 1960. His decorations and honors include the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit of the Federal Republic (1951), the Freiherr Vom Stein Prize (1956), the Silver Johann Friedrich Schär Plagne (1961), and the honorary degree of Doctor of Economic Sciences from the University of Göttingen (1962).

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Dr. Johann Baptist GRADL

Newspaper publisher. Born on March 25, 1904, in Berlin. Catholic; married, four children. Graduated from Secondary School, and entered apprenticeship in banking. Studied economics and public administration at the universities of Berlin and Halle. Diploma in economics in 1926; Doctor of Political Science in 1930. From 1926 to 1930, worked on editorial staff of "Germania", Berlin. From 1931 to 1938, member of management department of German Association of Savings Banks and Giro Institutions, and from 1938 on, of the Reich Bank Group, Berlin. After 1945, at first self-employed. Since 1948, co-publisher of the West Berlin newspaper *Der Tag*. Up to 1933, member of Zentrum Party. Since 1945, member of CDU, member of executive committee of CDU for Soviet Zone and Berlin until deposed by Soviets at the end of 1947. Since that time, managing member of executive committee of exile CDU. Since 1953 member of federal executive committee of CDU. Member of the *Bundestag* since 1957. Deputy chairman of the *Bundestag* Committee on All-German and Berlin Affairs. President of the Research Advisory Council for Questions of the Reunification of Germany, which assists the Federal Ministry for All-German Questions.

Address: Berlin-Lichterfelde 2, Zerbster Straße 28.

Karl-Theodor, Freiherr von und zu GUTTENBERG

Born on May 23, 1921, in Weisendorf, rural district of
Höchstadt-on-Aisch. Catholic; married, four children.

Grammar School, General Certificate of Education, Advanced Level. Entered active military service in 1938; on wartime service from 1939 to 1945. Final rank: first lieutenant. Was prisoner-of-war. After release managed family properties (forestry, agriculture, viticulture, and health resorts). Since 1945 member of the CSU; chairman of its Stadtsteinach district organization, member of executive committee for department of Upper Franconia, member of executive committee and steering committee of Bavaria and of local government associations of CSU. District Administrator from 1952 to 1957. Member of the Bavarian Farmer's Association. Member of various associations in the fields of agriculture, forestry, viticulture, and tourism. Member of the Bundestag since 1957.

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Kai-Uwe von HASSEL

Minister-President of Schleswig-Holstein, Kiel.

Born 21.4. 1913 in Gare, Tanganyika, formerly German East Africa, Protestant, married, has 2 children. His private residence is in Glücksburg of which he is still alderman.

After his parents had been expelled from German East Africa he attended school from 1919 onwards, matriculating in Flensburg in 1933. From 1933 till 1935 he attended the Higher Commercial School and trained as a commercial nurseryman and farmer. From 1935 till 1939 he was plantation assistant, plantation manger and manager of the commercial department of plantations in Tanganyika. In 1939 he was interned by the British and expelled to Germany in 1940. From 1940 till 1945 he was in the German forces and was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant of the Reserve. In 1945 he was taken prisoner by the British in North Italy. After his release from captivity he was Head of the Department for Settlement of Disputes in Housing Matters at the Area Administration in Flensburg from 1945 till 1947. In 1947 he was elected Burgo-meister and in 1948 Alderman of Glücksburg. In 1946 he joined the CDU and became Chairman of the party in Glücksburg in 1947, Managing Chairman of the party in the Flensburg State District in 1949 and in 1951 he was elected Second Deputy Chairman of the Schleswig-Holstein State Association of the CDU.

From 1947 onwards he was a member of the Town Council of Flensburg and from 1948, member of the District Council for the Flensburg State District. In 1950 and 1954 he was elected to the Schleswig-Holstein State Parliament. In the second period of office he was a member of a number of committees in the State Parliament, those of Finance, Internal Administration, Constitutional and Standing Orders. He was Parliamentary Representative of the Minister of the Interior. On 6. 9. 1953 he was elected to the Bundestag. On 11. 10. 1954 he laid down his mandate as he was elected on that date Minister-President of the State of Schleswig-Holstein. He was confirmed in this office at the State Parliament election in autumn 1958 also. (CDU, 33 votes, FDP 3, out of a total of 69).

From 7.9. 1955 till 6.9. 1956 he was President of the Federal Council. He is one of the four deputies of the Federal Chairman of the CDU.

## Karl Friedrich Wilhelm HAUS

Born on April 21, 1900 in Frankfurt-on-Main.

After taking the General Certificate of Education, Advanced Level, underwent training in the insurance business. Employed in the insurance business from 1919 to 1953, being a member of boards of directors from 1930 on. From 1939 to 1953, chairman of the boards of directors of the Colonia Kölnische Versicherungs-AG., and the Rückversicherungs-AG., Colonia, Cologne.

From 1951 to 1953, president of the General Association of Insurance Enterprises. In 1953 became a full partner in the banking firm of Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie. in Cologne. Chairman of the Credit Committee of the Central Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

Chairman, deputy chairman or member of the boards of directors of a number of important insurance and industrial concerns.

Honorary citizen of the University of Cologne.

## Dr. Konrad HENKEL

Born on October 25, 1915, in Düsseldorf. Graduated from grammar school. Studied chemistry in Munich, Freiburg, and Heidelberg. In 1947 became a chemist for the firm of Henkel & Cie. GmbH.

Now a member of various boards of directors and chairman of the board of directors and advisory board of the firm of Henkel & Cie. GmbH.

Dr. Henkel is married, has four children, and lives in Düsseldorf.

## Prof. Dr. Max HORKHEIMER

Born in Stuttgart in 1895. Lecturer in philosophy at the University of Frankfurt beginning in 1925. Professor in-ordinary at the same University in 1930. Head of the department of social research there in 1931. From 1934 to 1937, head of the Institute of Social Research, Columbia University, New York. Organized and published research on prejudice (Studies in Prejudice, 5 volumes, Harper Brothers, New York) as Chief Consultant of the American Jewish Committee, 1943-49. Beginning in 1949, once more professor of philosophy and sociology at the University of Frankfurt. At the same time held a chair of sociology at the University of Chicago from 1954 to 1960. President of the University of Frankfurt from 1951 to 1953.

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Since 1951, head of the reestablished Department of Social
Research at the University of Frankfurt. Publisher of the
*Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung* and *Studies in Philosophy and
Social Science* from 1934 to 1942. Publications include: as
editor and author of the general section, "Autorität und Familie",
1936; "Eclipse of Reason", 1947; "Dialektik der Aufklärung" (to-
gether with Th.W. Adorno), 1948; "Sociologica II - Frankfurter
Beiträge zur Soziologie" (together with Th. W. Adorno), 1962;
and "Um die Freiheit", 1962.

Dr. Richard JAEGER

Dr. Jaeger is a vice president of the German *Bundestag* and a
retired chief burgomaster, and lives in Diessen on the Ammersee.

Born on February 16, 1913, in Berlin; married, six children;
Roman-Catholic.

Took General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level) in
Munich. Studied law and public administration in Munich, Berlin,
and Bonn. Following the assistant judges' examination sat on the
district court of Weilheim as an assistant judge and later as a
councillor.

Served during World War II from 1939 to 1945. In 1947 became a Regierungsrat in the Bavarian State Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs. In 1948 became a first burgomaster and in 1949 chief burgomaster of the city of Eichstätt. Member of the CSU since 1946. Member of the German Bundestag since 1949. Beginning with the second session (October, 1953), vice president of the German Bundestag. Since 1953 chairman of the Bundestag Defense Committee and member of the Foreign Relations Committee, member of the Parliament of the Western European Union and of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

President of the German Atlantic Association. Vice president
of the Atlantic Treaty Association.

Dr. Hellmut JAESRICH

Co-editor of "Der Monat", Berlin.

Born 17.9.08 in Berlin. Married, 4 children. Education: high
school, University of Berlin, Grenoble, Paris, Heidelberg and Bonn.
Dr. phil. Army Service between 1940 and 45. Free lance work as
writer and translator. Advisor to the American Editor of "Der Monat"
since 1948. Co-Editor and Co-Publisher of "Der Monat" since 1954.

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## Wenzel JAKSCH

Born on September 25, 1896. Attended elementary school (6 forms) in the Bohemian Forest district of the Sudeten area. He joined the Social Democratic youth movement in Vienna as a young construction worker already before World-War I. After the establishment of Czechoslovakia, he acted as a secretary for small landholders' affairs, and was a journalist, and member of parliament for the Sudeten German labor movement. He belonged to the parliament in Prague from 1929 to 1938. Last chairman of the Sudeten German Social Democratic Party and adversary of Konrad Henlein in efforts for Czech-German understanding.

Emigré in England from 1939 to 1949. Invited to the Federal Republic by Kurt Schumacher, Mr. Jaksch functioned from 1949 to 1954 as head of the Land Refugee Office in Hesse and was the initiator of the "Hessian Plan".

Since 1953 member of the German Bundestag. Fields of activity: foreign policy, expellee affairs, and Eastern European problems. Since 1958 vice president of the Union of Expellees.

## Dr. Hermann JANNSEN

He underwent an apprenticeship in banking from 1919 to 1922, studying economics at the same time. He completed his studies by taking the degree of Doctor of Political Science, and was then employed by the banking firm of Goldschmidt-Rothschild & Co., Berlin, until 1932. In that year, he went to the Reichs-Kredit-Gesellschaft Aktiengesellschaft, Berlin, as a departmental head, and was appointed to its board of directors in 1937. In 1948 Dr. Jannsen joined the board of directors of the Frankfurter Bank. He is a member of the boards of directors of a number of industrial corporations, and holds the following offices, among others:

- Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Exchange, Trade and Relations of the Federal Association of Private Banks, Cologne.

- Member of the executive committee of the Foreign Trade Association of German Industry, Cologne. Chairman of the Working Group on the Developing Countries, Cologne.

- Member of the Foreign Trade Advisory Board, which assists the Federal Minister of Economic Affairs, Bonn. Member of the Advisory Board of the Federal Ministry of the Treasury, Bad Godesberg.

## Hermann-Dietrich von JORDANS

Born on January 16, 1926; married, three children.

1932-1934 elementary school; 1934-1943 Grammar School. 1934-1945: Labour Service and armed forces. 1945-1946: Chief interpreter of the British First Grenadier Guards Battalion. 1946-1950: Studied law and public administration, history and sociology at the University of Bonn. 1950 - 1952 Federal Ministry of Bundesrat Affairs (political counsel, and for a time personal counsel, of the State Secretary pro tem.).

1952: Transferred to the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government; delegated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as its representative to the U.S. Congressional Committee to Investigate the Katyn Forest Massacre. 1952-1957: Deputy head of the Press and Information Office's "British Commonwealth and Scandinavian desk". 1957-1960 Deputy head of the same office's USA, Canada, and English Bulletin desk. 1960-1962 Head of the North American desk. Since July 15, 1962 Head of the North American desk of Radio Deutsche Welle.

Several stays in the USA and Canada. Member of the working party of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Press and Information Office of the Federal Government for the establishment of the German Information Center in New York.

Member of the German Foreign Policy Association. Member of the American Public Relations Association (APRA).

## Kurt Georg KIESINGER

Prime Minister.

Born on April 6, 1904, in Ebingen, Württemberg. Catholic; married. Studied philosophy and law in Tübingen and Berlin. In 1935, admitted as an attorney to the Supreme Court in Berlin. Attorney in Tübingen from 1947 onwards. Member of the managing committee of the CDU.

Member of the Bundestag since 1949. Chairman of the Conference Committee. In 1954, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. Member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe; vice president beginning in 1955, and chairman of the Christian Democratic group in 1957. Member of the Assembly of the Western European Union. Member of the Joint Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community.

Since December, 1958, Prime Minister of the Land of Baden-Württemberg. Member of the Baden-Württemberg Parliament and of the Bundesrat since May, 1960.

- 16 -

Dr. Hermann KOPF

Born on May 29, 1901, in Freiburg, Breisgau. Catholic; married. Studied law at the universities of Freiburg, Kiel, and Munich. Attorney in Freiburg since 1930.

Vice-president of the Baden Bar Association.

Member of the Bundestag since 1949. Member of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community. Member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the Assembly of the Western European Union.

Dr. Helmut KRAUSNICK

Director of the Institute of Contemporary History (since 1959) and managing editor of the "Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte" (since 1953). Born on February 19, 1905, in Wendel district of Brunswick. Attended school from 1911 to 1923 in Bad Harzburg. Studied history, philosophy, and public administration in Breslau, Heidelberg, and Berlin. From 1938 to 1944, at the Central Office for the History of the Postwar Period. From 1948 to 1951, freelance collaborator of the International School Textbook Institute in Brunswick. In 1951, joined the Institute for Contemporary History (Munich 27, Möhlstraße 26). Special fields: the Bismarck period and the historical background of the two World Wars.

Publications: *Neue Bismarckgespräche, 1940; Holsteins Geheimpolitik in der Ära Bismarck, 1942; Deutsche Geschichte der jüngsten Vergangenheit* in collaboration (with Hermann Mau), 1953; "Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes gegen Hitler" in *Die Vollmacht des Gewissens, 1956*; and numerous essays in anthologies and periodicals dealing with the subjects mentioned.

Professor Helmut KUHN

Born in 1899 in Lüben, Silesia. Became a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Berlin in 1930. After lecturing for six years in Berlin, was appointed professor of philosophy at the University of North Carolina in the USA. In 1949, accepted an appointment to the University of Erlangen, and in 1953 moved to the University of Munich. Authored the following books in English:

[cc]

- 17 -

"A History of Esthetics" (with K.E. Gilbert), New York, 1939; "Freedom Forgotten and Remembered", Chapel Hill, 1943; and "En-counter with Nothingness", Hinsdale, Ill., 1949.

Professor of philosophy at the University of Munich, Chancellor of the College of Political Science, co-editor of the "Philosophische Rundschau" and the "Zeitschrift für Politik", and President of the General Society for Philosophy in Germany.

Address: Munich 8, Maria Theresia Straße 7.

## Annedore LEBER

### Publisher.

Born 18. 3. 04, married to Dr. Julius Leber, a fighter in the resistance, who was sentenced to death and executed for his participation in the events of 20th of July 1944; two children.

After the war in the Central Committee of the Social-Democratic Party, Member of the Berlin City Assembly. Member of German UNESCO Commission; co-author (with Freya Countess Moltke) of "Für und Wider, Entscheidung für Deutschland" and publisher of several books about German resistance fighters.

## Ernst MAJONICA

Born on October 29, 1920, in Soest; Catholic, married. Attended elementary school and "Aldegräver Gymnasium" (Public School) in Soest. Studied public administration and history at the universities of Münster and Freiburg (Breisgau). In March, 1942, First State Examination in Law at the Court of Appeals in Karlsruhe. From 1942 to 1945, military service. Until 1946, prisoner of war in Belgian and American camps. In May, 1950, Second State Examination in Law in Düsseldorf. Member of the CDU since 1946. Active in, and from October 1950 to May 1955 Federal Chairman of, the "Junge Union Deutschlands". Member of the CDU's executive committee for Westphalia.

Member of the Bundestag since November, 1950. Chairman of the working committee on foreign policy of the CDU-CSU caucus in the German Bundestag.

- 18 -

## Dr. Erich MENDE

Lecturer.

Born October 28th, 1916 at Groß-Strehlitz (Upper Silesia);
catholic; married.

Humane College at Groß-Strehlitz; 1936 examination of mat-
urity. Military service in infantry regiment 84 at Gleiwitz;
1939/45 participation in the war as active officer, since 1944
major and commander of a regiment, twice wounded, prisoner of war.

Afterwards until 1948 student of law at the universities of
Cologne and Bonn; government examination and graduation as Dr. jur.;
1948/49 studies of political science at the University of Cologne.

At the end of 1945 co-founder of the FDP (Free Democratic
Party), 1947 member of the executive committee of the FDP for the
British Occupied Zone, since June 1949 member of the executive com-
mittee of the federal organisation of the FDP, since March 1953
deputy chairman of the FDP in North Rhine Westphalia, since April
1956 deputy chairman of the executive committee of the federal
organisation of the FDP. Member of the executive committee of
the German Council and the Parliamentary Section of the European
Movement.

Member of the German Bundestag since 1949, from 1950 until
1953 whip of the parliamentary group of the FDP and member of the
executive committee of the group, 1953 deputy chairman of the par-
liamentary group of the FDP, November 1957 chairman of the perla-
mentary group, January 1960 chairman of the Free Democratic Party.

## W. Alexander MENNE

Born on June 20, 1904 in Dortmund. After graduating from
"Realgymnasium" (Secondary School) trained in banking. From 1929
to 1939, president of a chemical firm in London. Returned to
Germany in 1939 and was president of a chemical work in Westphalia
and Hamburg from 1940 to 1951. Since 1952, member of the managing
board of the Farbwerke Hoechst AG.

Honorary Doctor of Political Science; member of the Bundestag.
Executive positions in commerce and industry associations:

Deputy Chairman, Federation of German Industries; Honorary
President, Federation of German Chemical Industry; Member of the
German Atomic Energy Commission and Chairman of its Economic and
Financial Committee; Chairman of Atomic Energy Committee and of
European Economic Integration Committee of Federation of German
Industries; Member, Foreign Trade Advisory Board of German Ministry
of Economics; President, German-American Society and Steuben-
Schurz-Society; Board of Sponsors, German American Chamber of Com-
merce, New York; Board of Sponsors, German-French Chamber of Com-

- 19 -

merce, Paris; Chairman of Board, German Council of Trade Fairs and Exhibitions, and member of various boards of companies in Germany, Brazil and Spain.

## Dr. Felix MESSERSCHMIDT

Born in Württemberg in 1904. Graduated from classical grammar school in Ulm. Studied history, Germanic languages, Romance languages, education, and music in Tübingen and Munich, taking a doctorate in philosophy. Taught at secondary schools and in adult education. In 1947, became an Oberstudiendirektor (secondary school principal) and in 1948, director of the Academy of Education and Instruction in Calw. Since 1958, director of the Academy for Political Education in Tutzing. Member, inter alia, of the German Association of Teachers of History.

**Publications:** in the fields of educational science and pedagogy; in the periodicals "Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht" and "Gesellschaft, Staat, Erziehung"; and in political pedagogy.

## Dr. Karl MOMMER

Born on March 13, 1910 in Wevelinghoven, Rhineland; married. Studied philosophy, economics, and history in Cologne, Berlin, Graz, and Vienna. Took doctorate in social sciences in Brussels. In 1933, engaged in illegal activities against Nazism, was arrested, and was sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment. After serving out the sentence, fled to Belgium. Interned in southern France from 1940 to 1941. Independent farmer there from 1942 to 1944. Returned to Germany in 1946. Counsel on social policy and refugee affairs on the Länder Council of the American zone of occupation in Stuttgart. From 1947 to 1949, counsel to the German Office for Questions of Peace. From 1948 to 1949, member of the economic council for the United Economic Area.

Member of the Bundestag since 1949. Since November, 1957, floor leader in the Bundestag. From 1950 to 1958, member of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and of the Assembly of the Western European Union.

- 20 -

### Erich OLLENHAUER

Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party, Head of the SPD in the Bundestag.

Born 27. March 1901 in Magdeburg; married. Education: grammar school, apprenticeship in business. From 1919-20 contributor to "Volksstimme", Magdeburg, from 1921-28 on the editorial staff of "Arbeiterjugend". From 1928-33 Chairman of the Socialist Youth Organization. In 1933 member of the Board of the Social-Democratic Party and later of the emigrant Party Organization in Prague, Paris and London. Loss of German Citizenship in 1935. Return to Germany in 1946. Deputy Chairman of SPD since 1946, Chairman since 1952. Member of the Bundestag since 1949.

### Dr. h.c. Friedrich Carl Freiherr von OPPENHEIM

Born on October 5, 1900. Senior partner of the banking firm of Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie., established in 1789.

After training in the family business and at banks in Sao Paulo and New York, he returned to Cologne in 1929, the year in which the worldwide economic crisis broke out, and became a partner in his father's firm. Following upon difficult assignments in connection with the economic emergency up to 1933, there was constantly increasing interference in his business activities under Hitler and he was arrested.

Since 1945, his chief fields of business and private activity have been: engagement of the firm in the recovery of the West German economy (he is a member of the executive committee of the Association of Banks and Bankers in the Rhineland and Westphalia), and encouragement of the political and economic unification of Europe - he is president of the Europa Union.

In 1952 the Technical University of Berlin conferred the honorary degree of Doctor of Political Science on him in "recognition of his great contributions to the German economy through genuinely enterprising, venturesome, successful financing of German industry and through establishment of new contacts with foreign countries."

### Consul Herbert PAVEL

Proprietor of the Rheinnadel-Gruppe. Member of the executive committee of the Manufacturers' Group of the Iron, Plate and Metal Industry. Member of the executive committee of the Foreign Trade

- 21 -

Committee of the Federal Association of German Industry. Member of the board of directors of the Association for Economic Co-operation.

Former capacities: member of the managing board of the Rheinmetall-Borsig AG, Berlin, and member of the board of directors of the J.R.F. Matarazzo, Sao Paulo, Brazil.

### Dr. Wolfgang POHLE

Born on November 28, 1903, in Erfurt. Studied economics and law in Göttingen, Leipzig, and Heidelberg. Passed law examinations in 1925 and 1929.

Beginning in 1929, member of the administration of the As-sociation for mining Interests and the Mining Association in Essen. In 1938, chief counsel of the latter institution. During 1939, active service with the armed forces. In 1940 became director of the Mannesmannröhren-Werke, and in 1942, simultaneously member of the managing board of the Kronprinz AG., Solingen-Ohligs. Begin-ning in 1944, general manager of the Mannesmannröhren-Werke, and in 1952, with the Mannesmann AG., in the same capacity.

In 1955, became member of the board of directors of the Man-nesmann AG. Since 1960, general manager of the Friedrich Flick KG., and chairman of the concern's managing company.

From 1947 to 1948, defense counsel at the Nuremberg industry trials.

From 1953 to 1957, member of the German Bundestag in Bonn and of the Parliament of the European Coal and Steel Community in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. From 1958 to 1962, member of the European Economic and Social Committee in Brussels.

Member or chairman of a large number of boards of directors, committees, and associations. Since 1956, member of the executive board of the Düsseldorf Chamber of Industry and Commerce.

Frequent missions in the USA.

### Dr. Hans REIMERS

Leitender Regierungsdirektor (Hamburg); born 1908. Chairman of Education Committee of the Permanent Conference of Ministers of Education; Member of the Council of Europe Committee for General and Technical Education; Member of Executive Committee of the German UNESCO Commission; Chairman of Committee for German Schools in Foreign Countries.

- 22 -

Klaus H. SCHEUFELEN

Dipl. Ing. Scheufelen Paper Mills, Oberlenningen.

Born 30 October 1913 in Oberlenningen. Chairman of the Christian Democratic Party of Nord-Württemberg; Deputy Chairman of the Federal CDU-Commission on Economic Policy; member of the Federal Party Committee of the CDU; member of the Board of several companies.

Professor Karl SCHILLER

Professor; Doctor of Political Science. Born on April 24, 1911, in Breslau. Professor of economics at the University of Hamburg, where he is also head of the Department of Social Economics and the School of Foreign Trade and Overseas Economic Studies. President of the University of Hamburg from 1956 to 1958.

From 1948 to 1953, Minister of Economic Affairs and Transport, Hamburg. From 1949 to 1953, member of the Bundesrat. Minister of Economic Affairs and Credit, Berlin, since 1961.

Member of the scientific advisory board which assists the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Fabian von SCHLABRENDORFF

Attorney and notary, Wiesbaden.

Born 1 July 1907 in Halle/Saale as son of career officer.
Education: High School, University of Halle and Berlin. Lawyer in Berlin. After outbreak of war first serving as soldier, then condemned as member of the resistance and sent to the concentration camp Sachsenhausen, later Flossenburg and Dachau. Liberated by the American troops. Since 1946 attorney and notary in Wiesbaden; married, 6 children.

Helmut SCHMIDT

Born on December 23, 1918, in Hamburg; married, one daughter.

Graduated from secondary school in 1937. From 1937 to 1939, Reich Labor Service and military service. From 1939 to 1945, active wartime duty, becoming reserve first lieutenant and battery commander. After being prisoner of war, became member of the SPD in 1946.

- 23 -

Studied public administration in Hamburg from 1946 to 1949, taking diploma in economics. From 1949 to 1953, employed by the Economic Affairs and Transport Authority in Hamburg, becoming a department head for transport in 1952. From 1953 to 1962, member of the Bundestag. Reserve Captain of the Federal Defense Forces. Since November 1961 Minister of the Interior in Hamburg.

Publication: "Verteidigung oder Vergeltung", Seewaldverlag, Stuttgart, 1961 (Defence or Retaliation, Oliver and Boyd, Edinburgh and London, 1962; Defense or Retaliation, Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, New York).

Address: Hamburg 36, Karl-Muck-Platz 1.

## Dr. Wilhelm Wolfgang SCHÜTZ

Studied at the universities of Munich and Heidelberg. Took the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in public administration at the latter in 1934.

Until 1951 correspondent of the "Neue Zürcher Zeitung" in London.

From 1951 to 1957 political adviser to Mr. Jakob Kaiser, Federal Minister for All-German Questions. In December, 1957, elected executive chairman of the Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland.

In recent years he has spoken on questions of German reunification on a number of trips abroad: at Harvard University and to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, Chicago, San Francisco, etc., in the summer of 1957; at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, in January, 1958 and January, 1959; and at the Europa Union in Basle and Zurich in March, 1958. In 1959 and 1961, Dr. Schütz made trips around the world in the interest of German reunification: lectures in India, Burma, Indonesia, Hong-Kong, and the United States; a large number of conversations with leading statesmen, including Prime Minister Nehru and Prime Minister U Nu. In May, 1960, lecture to the Foreign Policy Studies Center, Paris. In February, 1961, delegate to the German-American Conference in Washington. Head of the delegation of the Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland, which includes representatives of all parties, to the United Nations, New York, in September, 1962.

### Books published:

1942 - "German Home Front" (London, V. Gollancz). 1945 - "Pens under the Swastica" (London, Students' Christian Movement Press). 1951 - "Organische Außenpolitik (Organic foreign policy); 1952 - "Deutschland am Rande zweier Welten" (Germany on the edge of two worlds). 1953 - "Das neue England" (The new Britain). 1956 - "Die Stunde Deutschlands" (Germany's Hour), second printing. 1957 - "Wir wollen überleben - Außenpolitik im Atomzeitalter" (We want to survive: foreign policy in the atomic age). 1958 - "Das Gesetz des Handels - Zerrissenheit und Einheit in unserer Welt" (The law of dynamics: disunity and unity in our world), second printing. 1959 - "Schritte zur Wiedervereinigung" (Steps to reunification).

- 24 -

Curt E. SCHWAB

Banker, Stuttgart.

Born 14 December 1903 in Stuttgart. Education: High School, two years of bank apprenticeship. Studies in America from 1924/26. Free lance work as publicity councillor for industrial firms from 1928-32. Founded a publishing house in Stuttgart in 1946. Publisher of "Wirtschaftszeitung", later called "Deutsche Zeitung und Wirtschaftszeitung". Sold publishing firm in 1960 and became partner of the banking firm Ott KG in Stuttgart.

Dr. Kurt SIEVEKING

Born on February 21, 1897, in Hamburg; married to Ellen Sieveking, née Ruperti; two children.

Attended the Grammar School of the Johanneum from 1906 to 1914. Served in World War I from 1914 to 1918. Studied in Heidelberg, Munich, and Marburg from 1918 to 1922, taking doctorate of law in 1922. Attorney in Hamburg from 1925 to 1935. From 1935 to 1945 at first legal counsel and later general manager of the banking firm of Brinckmann, Wirtz & Co. (formerly M.M. Warburg & Co.). From 1945 to 1951, legal counsel to the Hamburg government. From 1951 to 1953, Consul General and later Minister of the Federal Republic in Stockholm. From 1953 to 1957, chief burgomaster of the Free Hansa City of Hamburg. From 1956 to 1957, president of the Bundesrat. Since 1958, attorney in Hamburg.

Dr. Karl SILEX

Editor-in-chief "Der Tagesspiegel"

Born 6. 7. 96 in Stettin as son of a protestant minister, married to Rose Marie v. Arnim. Education: High School, training as naval officer, Universities Kiel and Berlin. Dr. phil. Journalist since 1921; London correspondent, then editor-in-chief of "Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung", Berlin. Served in the Navy again from 1943. After the war on the staff of Evangelisches Hilfswerk, started in 1949 the weekly review *Deutsche Kommentare* and the quarterly *Bücherkommentare*. Since 1955 Editor-in-chief of the Berlin daily "Der Tagesspiegel".

Author of "John Bull zu House"; (1929), "Patriot MacDonald" (1932).

- 25 -

Dr. jur. Hans Christoph Freiherr von TUCHER

was born on September 24, 1904. In 1933 he joined Bayerische Vereinsbank and was appointed to its Executive Board in 1947. He is a member of the Executive Committee of the German private banking association and chairman of its European Common Market committee, as well as chairman of the association of private banks in Bavaria.

He is a member of the Board of Directors of four other German banks and several German industrial companies.

Since 1950 he has repeatedly, and sometimes for prolonged periods, stayed in the United States, where both his sons live.

Dr. Richard Freiherr von WEIZSÄCKER

Born 1920. Lawyer and partner of C.H. Boehringer Sohn, Ingelheim, Rhein.

Joachim WILLMANN

Born on March 4, 1925, in Oels, Silesia.

Studied legal and economic science at the universities of Berlin, Münster, and Bonn, and at the School of European Studies in Bruges, Belgium.

Since 1953 executive secretary of the German Group of the European Committee for Economic Social Progress. Member of the editorial staff of "Europa Archiv" magazine.

On the Occasion of the Third American-German Conference

Buffet Supper - American Embassy Club

Friday, November 16, 1962

7:30 p. m.

GUEST LIST

German Delegation

Herr Hellmut Becker
- Lawyer
President of German
Volkshochschulverband

Dr. and Frau Kurt Birrenbach
- Chairman of the Board,
Thyssen AG für Beteiligungen
CDU/CSU Bundestag Deputy
(Christian Democrats)

Herr Erik B. Blumenfeld
- Member of the Board,
Atlantik-Brücke
CDU/CSU Bundestag Deputy
(Christian Democrats)

Dr. Hans Karl von Borries
- Montagnola/Tessin
Switzerland

Dr. h.c. Max Brauer
- Former Mayor of Hamburg
SPD Bundestag Deputy
(Social Democrats)

Dr. Heinrich von Brentano
- Former German Foreign Minister
Chairman, CDU/CSU Bundestag
Faction (Christian Democrats)

Dr. and Frau Hendrik George van Dam
- Secretary General, Central
Jewish Council in Germany

Dr. Marion Countess Dönhoff
- Deputy Chief Editor
"Die Zeit", Hamburg

Herr and Frau Wolfgang Döring
- Deputy Chairman, FDP Bundestag
Faction (Free Democrats)

Herr Fritz Erler
- Deputy Chairman, SPD Bundestag
Faction (Social Democrats)

Dr. Gotthard Baron von Falkenhausen
- First Chairman,
Atlantik-Brücke

Dr. h.c. Otto A. Friedrich
- Chairman of the Management Board
Phönix-Gummiwerke A.G.

Karl Theodor Baron zu Guttenberg
- CDU/CSU Bundestag Deputy
(Christian Democrats)

The Minister President of Schleswig/Holstein
Kai Uwe von Hassel (CDU)

Herr Wenzel Jaksch
- SPD Bundestag Deputy
(Social Democrats)

- 2 -

German Delegation (cont'd)

Herr and Frau Hermann Dietrich von Jordans - Chief, North America Section
Deutsche Welle, Köln

Dr. Helmut Krausnick - Secretary General
Institut für Zeitgeschichte
München

Herr and Frau Ernst Majonica - CDU/CSU Bundestag Deputy
(Christian Democrats)

Dr. h.c. W. Alexander Menne - Member of the Board,
Farbwerke Höchst AG
FDP Bundestag Deputy
(Free Democrats)

Dr. Felix Messerschmidt - Director, Akademie für
Politische Bildung
Tutzing/Bavaria

Dr. and Frau Karl Mommer - SPD Bundestag Deputy
Parliamentary Secretary
(Social Democrats)

Herr Herbert Pavel and Frau Pavel - Owner, Rheinnadel Gruppe
Aachen

Herr Klaus H. Scheufelen - Scheufelen Papierfabriken
Oberlenningen/Württemberg

Professor Dr. Karl Schiller - Senator for Economics and
Credit, Berlin Senate

Senator Helmut Schmidt (SPD) - Senator of the Interior
Hamburg Senate

Herr and Frau Kurt E. Schwab - Bankhaus Ott K.G.
Stuttgart

Dr. and Frau Wilhelm Wolfgang Schütz - Chairman, Kuratorium
"Unteilbares Deutschland"

Dr. Kurt Sieveking (CDU) - Lawyer
Former Mayor of Hamburg

Dr. and Frau Walter Stahl - Executive Secretary,
Atlantik-Brücke

Dr. Richard Baron von Weizsäcker - Partner, Boehringer Sohn
Ingelheim

- 4 -

American Delegation

Mr. Jacob Blaustein - Director, Standard Oil of Indiana

Professor Robert R. Bowie - Director, Harvard Center for International Affairs

Representative John Brademas - Democrat/Indiana

Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski - Director, Research Institute on Communist Affairs
Columbia University

Mr. John S. Bugas - Vice President, Ford Motor Company

Mr. Leo Cherne - Executive Director, Research Institute of America, Inc.

General Lucius D. Clay - Advisor to President Kennedy on Berlin

Dr. James B. Conant - former U.S. Ambassador to Germany

Mr. William Diebold, Jr. - Senior Research Fellow
Council on Foreign Relations

Mr. Roscoe Drummond - Syndicated Columnist
New York Herald Tribune

Mr. Christopher Emmet - Executive Vice President,
American Council on Germany, Inc.

Mr. Irving M. Engel - Past President, American
Jewish Committee

Senator Clair Engle - Democrat/California

Dr. Harry D. Gideonse - President, Brooklyn College

The Reverend Robert Graham, S.J. - European Correspondent of
AMERICA-Magazine

Mr. Christian A. Herter - former U.S. Secretary of State

Mr. John K. Jessup - Life Magazine

Mr. Saul E. Jeftes - Secretary, B'nai B'rith

Mr. Herman George Kaiser - Oil Producer
Tulsa, Oklahoma

Mr. Joseph Kaskell - Counsel, American Council
on Germany, Inc.

Senator Kenneth B. Keating - Republican/New York

- 5 -

American Delegation (cont'd)

Professor Henry A. Kissinger - Executive Director, Harvard International Seminar

Senator Eugene McCarthy
Mrs. McCarthy - Democrat/Minnesota

Mr. Walden Moore - Director, Declaration of Atlantic Unity

Professor Philip E. Mosely - Principal Research Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations

Mr. Norbert Muhlen
Mrs. Muhlen - Correspondent, North Atlantic Newspaper Alliance (NANA)

Professor Steven Muller - Director, Corne'll Center for International Studies

Professor James K. Pollock - Chairman, Department of Political Science
University of Michigan

Dr. Joachim Prinz - President, American Jewish Congress

Representative Henry S. Reuss - Democrat/Wisconsin

Mr. John Richardson, Jr. - President, The Free Europe Committee, Inc.

Representative Herman T. Schneebeli - Republican/Pennsylvania
Mrs. Schneebeli

Dr. George N. Shuster - U.S. Representative to UNESCO

Mr. Hans Christian Sonne - Committee for Economic Development, National Planning Association

Mr. Shepard Stone - The Ford Foundation

Mr. J. E. Trainer - Executive Vice President, Firestone Tire & Rubber Company
Akron, Ohio

Professor Henry Wallich - Yale University
former Economic Advisor to
President Eisenhower

Mr. Eric M. Warburg - Banker
Treasurer, American Council
on Germany, Inc.

- 7 -

Other Guests

The President of Deutscher Bundestag
and Frau Eugen Gerstenmaier

Frau Dr. Karl Carstens
- wife of the State Secretary
for Foreign Affairs

Dr. Josef Jansen
- Ministerialdirektor
Chief, Division West I
Foreign Office

Dr. Helmut Allardt
- Ministerialdirektor
Chief, Economic Policy Division
Foreign Office

Dr. and Frau Herbert Müller-Roschach
- Ministerialdirektor
Chief, Division West II
Foreign Office

Dr. Gerhard Ritzel
- Legationsrat
America Desk, Division West II
Foreign Office

Herr Thomas Schmitt
- Legationsrat
Office of the Federal Chancellor

Dr. Hans Bernhard Count and
Countess Schweinitz
- Federal Press & Information Office

Herr Wilfried Bonse
- Federal Press & Information Office

Herr and Frau Emil Constantin Privat
- Federal Press & Information Office

Herr and Frau Reinhold von Eichborn
- Director,
Mannesmann AG, Düsseldorf

Dr. and Frau Günther Grunwald
- Secretary General
Friedrich Ebert Foundation

Hans Baron and Baroness von Kittlitz
und Ottendorf
- Executive Vice President
Steuben Schurz Gesellschaft

Herr and Frau Heinrich Geissler
- Inter Nationes e. V.

Dr. and Frau Richard Moennig
- Chairman, Executive Board
Inter Nationes e. V.

Herr and Frau J. W. Funke
- Carl Duisberg Gesellschaft

Herr and Frau Karlheinz Koppe
- Deputy Secretary General
German Council of European
Movement

Frau Marieliese Lenz
- widow of former State Secretary

Frau Helga Krapf
- wife of Ministerialdirektor
Chief, East Division, Foreign Office

Mr. and Mrs. William W. Schott

General and Mrs. Richard Steinbach
- Lockheed Corporation

- 8 -

American Embassy Staff

<table><tr><td>Mrs. Brewster H. Morris</td><td>- wife of the Chargé d'Affaires a.i.</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. and Mrs. Coburn B. Kidd</td><td>- Counselor for Political Affairs</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. and Mrs. James E. Hoofnagle</td><td>- Counselor for Public Affairs</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. and Mrs. Basil Capella</td><td>- Counselor for Administration</td></tr><tr><td>General and Mrs. Victor R. Haugen</td><td>- Chief, Military Assistance Advisory Group</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. and Mrs. Francis T. Williamson</td><td>- First Secretary</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. and Mrs. Henry Pleasants</td><td>- Attaché</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. and Mrs. Howard H. Russell</td><td>- Attaché (USIS)</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. and Mrs. Paul R. Sweet</td><td>- First Secretary</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. and Mrs. Paul K. Morris</td><td>- Attaché (USIS)</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. E. Lewis Revey</td><td>- Public Affairs Officer American Consulate General Hamburg</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Arthur H. Moehlman</td><td>- Attaché (USIS)</td></tr><tr><td>Miss Elisabeth A. Brown</td><td>- First Secretary</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. and Mrs. Frederick Haupt III</td><td>- Press Attaché (USIS)</td></tr><tr><td>Mr. and Mrs. Alan F. Lee</td><td>- Second Secretary Staff Aide to the Ambassador</td></tr><tr><td>Frau Ursula A. Bodenburg</td><td>- Cultural Assistant</td></tr></table>

Mrs. Walter Dowling

The Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the United States of America, Minister Brewster H. Morris

TOTAL: 163

- 1 -

1. The German group of the European Committee for Economic and Social Development (CEPES) welcomes the latest proposals made by the US Government to intensify the economic relations among the countries in the Free World by extensively removing present trade barriers. The main task of Atlantic partnership is seen by the German CEPES group to be the protection of freedom and peace as well as the attainment of a balanced economic and social development which will promote prosperity of the Atlantic peoples. The lowering of the level of national customs duties in all Atlantic states - such as suggested by the American President in his message on trade policy of January 25, 1962, directed, first of all, to the European Economic Community (EEC) - can substantially contribute to achieving this goal. A substantial cut in customs duties would signify a consistent continuation of the policy of economic cooperation started after the war, initiated by the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and further developed by the attainment of free convertibility of the European currencies and the creation of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).

2. The German CEPES group is of the opinion that the following common goals of economic policy in the Atlantic World would be assisted by a considerable reduction in customs duties and the resulting compulsion for better utilization of production potentials:

a) Extension of the area in which the principles of market economy prevail;

b) Utilization through increased trade of the comparative production advantages of the various national economies;

c) Promotion of technical progress and, thus, creation of more favourable factors for strong economic growth in the Western World;

d) Reduction of the danger of an inflationary trend.

Substantial cuts in customs duties within the Atlantic region will probably be a major prerequisite for the attainment of the goal of a 50 % increase of the gross national product in all member states set for the OECD.

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3. As a guide line for the extent of customs duty cuts between the United States and Western Europe the 50% reduction called for by the American proposal should be accepted.

Furthermore, the German CEPES group concurs in the opinion of the American Government that for certain commodities even greater reductions in customs duties could be considered. Within CEPES, proposals for such selective customs duty cuts among the USA, Canada, the EEC and EFTA member countries were drafted as early as June, 1960. For more far-reaching customs duty reductions those heavily expanding sectors whose products presently account for a substantial share of the volume of European-North American trade can especially be considered now. The extent of such reductions, as well as the principles under which the positions concerned shall be selected from the customs tariffs, still require detailed examination.

4. The German CEPES group believes that the principle of equality of rights and obligations must apply in all agreements between the USA and the European countries. This means that all states involved will reduce their customs duties to the same extent. At the same time, it must be ensured that the removal of customs duty barriers is not compensated for by other trade policy measures, such as, for example, the wider introduction of quantitative quota restrictions. The German CEPES group, moreover, supports the American proposal to carry out the project of customs duty reductions in several stages. Such a timetable ought to be coordinated, however, with the schedule for the internal reduction of customs duties within the EEC and with the step-by-step adjustment of national customs duties to the common external customs tariff of the EEC.

5. Experience gained within the scope of GATT has shown that the present practice of negotiating customs duties position by position is less and less suitable to bring about far-reaching successes. This procedure has proved inefficient, especially in those cases where particularly high protective duties were to be substantially reduced.

In principle, the German CEPES group therefore prefers general and across-the-board customs duty reductions for all commo-

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[L]

dities, rather than agreements which offer wide leeway for varying reductions concerning the various positions of the customs tariff. At least, it is regarded necessary to agree on flat customs duty reductions for whole groups of commodities. Otherwise, there is the danger that the very categories which are a particular obstacle to international trade will be excepted from, or will hardly be touched by, the general reduction of customs duties.

6. In this regard, it would be objectionable should the present Escape Clause and Peril Point procedure be retained in principle. Based on experience gained within the EEC, the German CEPES group is of the opinion that all customs duty reductions once agreed upon must be definite and must not be reversed under any circumstances.

In this connection the German CEPES group points out the difference in nature of customs' legislation in the USA and in the EEC. While the external customs duty tariff of the EEC is a definite customs tariff which can be revised only by legislation, the US Government may vary the customs tariff at short notice under both the present Foreign Trade Act and the pending bill. The German CEPES group believes that the non-uniform implementation of customs duty reductions and the cancellation of customs duty reductions already agreed upon resulting from this difference in legal situations, must be prevented.

The German CEPES group has noted with disappointment the recently introduced increases in American customs duties for several commodities made on the basis of the Escape Clause. Such measures which are in gross contrast to the policy of customs duty reductions suggested by the American Government, provoke corresponding countermeasures in Europe. In this manner they might endanger the execution of the trade policy plans of the US Government. In the interest of Atlantic partnership such measures should, therefore, not be taken.

Future exceptions, which in each instance must be preceded by joint decisions, ought to be kept at a minimum and limited to a definite period of time. This is the only way in which everyone engaged in international trade will be given a guarantee for long-term planning. When exceptions and/or special privileges are

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[cc]

granted too generously they may result in the preservation of
production capacities regardless of whether or not such production
is able to compete internationally. The meaning and the purpose of
mutual customs duty reductions, however, can only be to bring
about a better international distribution of work determined by
genuine production advantages.

7. As the consequence of the abolition of customs tariff obstacles it may become necessary for specific manufacturers and employees to shift to other, more promising, sectors of production and employment. The difficulties which might arise are not the consequence of incorrect planning on the part of the manufacturers concerned, but of a change in the official trade policy adopted by the state. Following the example set by the EEC, the US President has, therefore, visualized the possibility of granting in such instances adjustment and/or conversion grants to American manufacturers and employees.

However, direct or indirect privileges should in all countries
be granted only to such manufacturers who can prove that they
cannot change their line of production within their own means.
Such measures should in no way contribute to artificially sustain-
ing production facilities which under the worldwide competition of
the free market economy prove unable to survive. They should
rather be non-recurring privileges granted only for a fixed length
of time.

Such measures granted by individual states to help factories
shift to other types of production and/or to train employees
for other jobs must be governed by uniform rules, however, which
would have to be agreed upon by the governments concerned. Such
uniform rules ought to govern the criteria for such privileges
as well as their nature, extent, and duration.

8. Special problems result for the agricultural sector in which the main barrier to free international exchange is not found in the existence of customs duties but rather in the different agricultural policies adopted by the various states. Because of internal political and social reasons, almost no country today has a free market for agricultural products. Direct or indirect subsidies as well as price manipulations of the greatest diversity,

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particularly protection against foreign competition by means of quota restrictions, have until now interfered with the application of the principles of the free market economy to this sector. A major liberalization for agricultural products will, therefore, apparently only become feasible when it is possible to work successfully toward the gradual and determined abolition in the various states of those factors which falsify competition.

9. The German CEPES group thinks that the elimination of trade obstacles requires successive supplementation in other economic policy sectors in order to attain the extent of cooperation in the Atlantic region which is required under its political and economic aspects. Undoubtedly, some of the factors which falsify competition will be eliminated by the removal of customs barriers. But such progress will not be sufficient to allow the exchange of goods to orient itself along the lines of natural geographical advantages and thus ensure the Atlantic countries the maximum increase in their economic potential. The German CEPES group considers it necessary, in the course of the progressive reductions in customs duties, to strive for harmonization of economic policy in the partner countries insofar as it will serve to avoid distortions of competition. Furthermore, a liberalization of the exchange of goods should be accompanied by greater mobility of labor and capital as well as by a more intense exchange of technical experience.

10. Within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) the beginnings of the cooperation demanded in Section 9, above, already exist. The German CEPES group considers the OECD to be the suitable instrument to ensure the necessary coordination of economic policy among the United States and Canada as well as the states of Free Europe. The services of the OECD should also be utilized by the Atlantic states to come to an agreement on the extent of, and timetable for, flat customs duty reductions. When the treaties on customs duty reductions are signed, the OECD could develop a common policy regarding the application of possible exceptions and special privileges which shall temporarily be granted to individual partners.

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[ec]

In order to meet these tasks it may be found necessary to vest additional authority in the OECD. For this purpose the question of whether the present structure and procedural rules of the OECD require modification should be studied.

11. In the interest of the division of work within the world economy, the German CEPES group welcomes the American proposal to let third countries which are parties to the GATT also benefit under the most-favoured-nation principle of the customs duty reductions agreed upon among the Atlantic countries. However, the close cooperation demanded in the field of economic policy will be possible within the Atlantic scope only because only these countries enjoy a state of economic development which permits such close cooperation. The Atlantic states should nonetheless intensify economic cooperation within the scope of the GATT with the other nations of the Free World and should use all possibilities to ensure for these countries the retention and defense of their political independence as well as an appropriate and harmonious economic and social development. In fact, the concept of equality of rights and obligations should, on principle, also apply here. During the initial period of economic development it will be necessary, however, to grant the right to developing countries of continuing to charge special protective customs duties.

Such measures could be supplemented by having the industrialized countries remove generally the trade policy restrictions (customs duties, quotas, excises, etc.) on tropical agricultural and forest products. The German CEPES group regards such measures to be a suitable instrument to make possible the increase by the developing countries of their income from exports and, thus, to earn more for the self-financing of their economic development.

For basic political and economic considerations it must also be the goal to include the so-called low-price countries in the division of work in the Western World. The gradual opening of markets to the products of these countries within an interim period still to be fixed should be made possible. On the other hand, these countries must be expected to be ready right from the beginning to grant corresponding counter-concessions to GATT members at the same time.

With the further growth of world trade, foreseen as a result of
the suggested reductions in customs duties, and in view of the
special problems which exist for the developing countries in
connection with the development of their economies, the question
of whether GATT in its present form is still suitable to meet
all present and future requirements would have to be studied.

Atlantic partnership should not be limited only to trade policy
agreements. Within the OECD all efforts must be coordinated to
grant more capital and technical assistance to the developing
countries, and to supervise their most appropriate use. This
assistance, however, should be restricted to those states which
are ready to permit private business operations and to guarantee
foreign assets.

12. These proposals aim at making the economy of the Free World still more efficient through better organization. In achieving this end care must be taken to ensure that degree of integration and/or cooperation which guarantees the best possible utilization of existing possibilities. For this reason it is necessary

a) to further consolidate the European Economic Community in its substance and, if possible, to extend it to the other states of Free Europe;

b) to strengthen and develop the Atlantic partnership among the West European and North American states within the scope of the OECD;

c) to continue working for the goal of a world economy in which work is apportioned, and within GATT to make full use for its members of the possibility of a further removal of trade obstacles.

13. As a starting point for such a development the German CEPES group welcomes the American initiative. The German CEPES group asks the governments of the EEC member countries and the EEC Commission to enter into negotiations for the realization of the proposals at the earliest possible date.

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[LC]

## Board of CEPES:

**President:** Professor Dr. Vittorio Valletta,
President of FIAT SpA., Turin

**Vice Presidents:** Dr. Walter Bauer, chairman of the board of management of Val. Mehler AG, Fulda
Jean Edouard Senn, President of Compagnie Cotonnière, Paris

## Board of the German CEPES Group:

Dr. Walter Bauer, Fulda, Chairman

Dr. h.c. W. A. Menne, Frankfurt/M.-Hoechst, Deputy Chairman

Fritz Berg, Altena, Westphalia

Dr. Paul Binder, Stuttgart

Dr. Hans C. Boden, Frankfurt-on-Main

Professor Dr. Ludwig Erhard, Bonn

Otto A. Friedrich, Hamburg-Harburg

Dr. Dr. Christian Krull, Frankfurt-on-Main

Ottmar von Loessl, Cologne

Carl Neumann, Wuppertal-Barmen

Leonhard Freiherr von Richter, Frankfurt-on-Main

Theodor Steltzer, Ascona

## What is CEPES?

The European Committee for Economic and Social Development (CEPES) is an international organization whose membership consists of industrialists, businessmen, bankers, and farmers as well as scientists from various European countries. The association was formed in 1952. CEPES gives its members a chance to cooperate on the international and supranational basis in the shaping of European economic policy.

Friendly contacts with the Committee for Economic Development (CED), New York; the Political and Economic Planning (PEP) organization, London; the Studieförbundet Näringsliv och Samhälle (SNS), Stockholm; the Committee for Economic Development of Japan (Keizai Doyukai), Tokyo; and the Committee for Economic Development of Australia (CEDA), Melbourne, permit discussion of acute world economic problems with influential economic circles in other countries of the Free World.

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CEPES considers its task to be to promote an economic development which is based on respect for man and social justice, and aims at the increase of economic productivity and, thus, a raise of the general standard of living. It is the opinion of CEPES that this goal can be reached only in a socially minded market economy which ensures the freedom of all sectors of the economic life.

Within the field of European and international policy CEPES strives for the following goals:

a) Extension of the European Economic Community by the admission of Great Britain and the admission or association of the other West European countries;

b) Economic consolidation and further political development of the European community;

c) Further development of the Atlantic community in the political and economic sectors;

d) The most efficacious apportionment of work in the world economy. This also includes a liberal policy to be followed by the traditional industrialized countries in their dealings with the developing countries;

e) Coordination of the economic policy vis-a-vis the East Bloc.

-----

German Working Document for the
Third American-German Conference
---------------------------------
WESTERN DEFENSE IN EUROPE

I. <u>An Effective Strategy for the Defense of Western Europe</u>

Since the time when the new American Administration
headed by President Kennedy carried out a re-examination of
its military strategy, the discussion on the possibilities
for an effective defense of Western Europe in view of the
shift in the respective nuclear strength of the Western and
Eastern Blocs has taken the forefront among the Western
European NATO powers.

In American quarters it is thought that the credibili-
ty of the former doctrine of massive retaliation has been
subject to doubt since the time when the Soviet Union suc-
ceeded in making up for its initial inferiority to the
Western powers in atomic armament. Since each side would
now be able to inflict severe damage on the other in an
atomic conflict, it is considered impossible to risk a
major atomic war on account of every single conflict,
regardless of its nature. It is thought that the former
"massive retaliation" must therefore be supplanted by a
more flexible defense graduated in accordance with the
nature of any aggression. The present Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff of the American armed forces,
General Maxwell D. Taylor, called this new strategy the
"flexible response" in his book "The Uncertain Trumpet",
which was published in 1959. According to this strategy,
the West should employ atomic weapons only if the aggressor
himself begins an attack with atomic weapons or launches
such a massive large-scale attack on the West that the
vital interests of the U.S.A. are affected and it is no

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longer possible to counter the aggression with conventional weapons alone. In case of smaller conflicts, on the other hand, this strategy envisages the application of the principle of graduated defense: that is, attacks using conventional arms would be repelled by conventional armed forces, and atomic weapons would be employed only in an extreme emergency, - if, for example, the NATO forces in Europe are in danger of being overwhelmed by the opponent's superior force. The intention of such a strategy is to raise the "atomic threshold." Between the outbreak of the war and the employment of atomic weapons, it would create a "pause" during which combat would be carried on only with conventional weapons, giving the aggressor a chance to consider the situation and both sides a chance for negotiations. It is necessary for the purpose of this strategy to increase the present conventional forces of NATO in corresponding measure, in order to attain a might equal to the armed forces of the Eastern Bloc.

In German quarters there is agreement with the principle of flexible response. There is a certain diversity in views only in reference to the practical implementation of graduated defense. The *German Federal Government* is in agreement with the demand for larger conventional armed forces in Europe, but is of the view that the implementation of this demand should be borne by all members of NATO on the basis of equal shares. As Defense Minister Strauss has stated repeatedly on recent occasions, the Federal Republic is not able to organize armed forces in addition to the projected 12 divisions with 500,000 men, because it lacks the money and manpower to do so.

However, with NATO troops at their present strength in Central Europe (22 divisions), it is impossible to repel an aggression with conventional armed forces alone. According to the latest estimates by the Federal Defense Ministry, the Soviet Union has 125 army divisions with a total strength of 2,200,000 men under arms at the present time. About 100 of these divisions are believed to be

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[L.C]

stationed in the European portion of Russia and in the countries of the Eastern Bloc (20 divisions in the East Zone alone). The other states of the Warsaw Pact are believed to have about 65 divisions with 930,000 men.

At a study conference of the Foreign Policy Study Center in Paris, General Beaufre (France) pointed out that it would not be possible to conduct a defense with conventional weapons against an attack on the Central European sector with the present number of NATO divisions. He said that each division has to cover a front sector about 30 miles wide. He added that in order to be able to resist an attack, it would be necessary to have a front sector not exceeding a maximum width of about 10 miles.

In an interview with the Italian newspaper "La Nazione" early in February, 1962, General Norstad also stated that even with 30 divisions, NATO would be able to hold the Central European front against enemy attack only for a short time without employing atomic weapons.

The fact that there is a gap between the planned goals of the joint armament effort and the actual armament is considered by the German Federal Government to entail a great danger to NATO's deterrent effect. It is necessary to prevent NATO's armament planning from bogging down in theory while the practical armament policies of the NATO members take a different course.

In the view of the German Federal Government, a conventional defense is conceivable at the present time only in case of boundary incidents and limited military probing actions. In case of large-scale aggression, on the other hand, Western Europe cannot be defended with conventional weapons alone. It is, however, very doubtful on the whole whether it is possible to conduct a conventional war, since it must be assumed that the side which is losing in such a conflict would employ atomic weapons as a last resort.

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Conventional weapons must be employed at those points where
atomic deterrence is not credible. It is not possible to
determine in advance where the boundary of this credibility
is likely to be. This can be determined only at the actual
moment when a conflict occurs. There must be no graduations
of defenseworthiness and no graduation in the risks assumed
by an aggressor according to his choice of objectives. Other-
wise Western Europe, and particularly the Federal Republic,
is subject to the danger that portions of its territory will
be overrun before the West initiates the atomic counterblow
or that the negotiations will simply be carried on without
proceeding to the atomic counterblow.

The opposite side should not be made aware of the manner
in which the defense would be conducted (e.g. with or without
atomic weapons) in various cases. Otherwise there would be a
risk of decreasing the effectiveness of deterrence. The atom
cannot be excluded from considerations of military policy.
The potential aggressor must always face an incalculable
risk making it impossible for him to detect any chance of
escaping risk while using limited military actions to probe
his way up to the threshold which he cannot cross without
provoking the annihilating counterblow. For this reason,
terms like "pause" and "threshold" should not be discussed
publicly in Western quarters. Otherwise there is the danger
that the opponent is given outright encouragement to begin
a conventional war.

According to the view of the *opposition* (S.P.D.), a
conventional defense is possible on a larger scale than in
the view of the Government. The opposition rejects the
idea of developing defense from the outset on an exclusively
atomic basis. It says that in view of the present nuclear
equilibrium, the West can no longer launch nuclear retali-
ation, for example, on account of the seizure of Suez, Hungary,
Korea, or Lebanon, unless it wanted to expose itself to anni-
hilation. It adds that this situation makes it necessary to
have increased conventional armament. It believes that the
West's present inferiority in conventional armed forces in

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[LC]

Europe can no longer be balanced by atomic weapons. Western Europe must get out of this predicament by supplying NATO with conventional troops on a larger scale than in the past. Conversely, nuclear weapons should be employed only in case of extreme emergency.

The opposition says that in view of the danger of "spiraling up" to larger and larger calibers even in case of a defense conducted only with tactical weapons, the danger of a large-scale atomic war is great. The employment of tactical atomic weapons must therefore be avoided if possible. A tactical atomic war would destroy large parts of Germany. For this reason the West must be in a position to defend itself by conventional means unless the aggressor himself attacks with nuclear weapons.

## II. The Question of Nuclear Control Within NATO

At the last NATO Conference early in May of this year in Athens, the American Administration stated its willingness to do the following:

1. Inform its NATO allies of the number and location of nuclear weapons it has stationed in Eurasia.

2. Refrain from changing the number or location of said weapons without previous consultation with the other members of NATO.

3. Work out, together with its allies, directives on when and in what cases nuclear weapons are to be employed.

In addition, the American Administration transferred to NATO command five American atomic submarines armed with Polaris rockets (whose employment can be decided on only by American authorities), in keeping with a pledge made on an earlier occasion by President Kennedy.

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The German Federal Government is of the view that these decisions by the Athens Conference can be a fruitful beginning for a further development into a genuine nuclear partnership. The German Federal Government has stressed repeatedly in statements by the Defense Minister and other representatives that it has no interest in developing a national atomic force of its own, but that it does desire a right of consultation and joint control in the matter of atomic armament and the employment of atomic weapons. If such a right of consultation were established, the responsibility of the United States in regard to the employment of the atomic weapons would be preserved in every respect. Defense Minister Strauss has repeatedly defined the purport of such a *multilateral* solution in the following terms:

1. Information concerning the atomic warheads located on German soil.

2. A guarantee that these warheads will not be decreased in number or withdrawn without the knowledge and agreement of the German Federal Government.

3. Some entitlement to consultation on the part of the country concerned in regard to the employment of nuclear weapons on its territory.

According to the view of the German Federal Government there can, however, be no division within NATO into nations with only conventional armaments and others with only atomic ones. There can be no horizontal organization among the armed forces of the individual members of NATO, but only a vertical one in which the atomic warheads as a matter of course remain under American control. The Federal Government does not consider the development of national atomic forces to be the solution, but sees the solution either in a European arrangement fully coordinated with NATO or in an atomic partnership between NATO and Washington, the final decision resting in each case with the American President, but a right of consultation for the other NATO members being necessarily assured.

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The European solution could be arranged in such a
way that an European atomic force is developed on the basis
of the atomic weapons potential of Great Britain and France,
which would be in close contact and strategic coordination
with the United States, and thus as the core of an European
contribution to Atlantic partnership with the United States.
Such an Atlantic partnership would also provide the guarantee
of precluding any idea of a "Third force".

In a statement early in April of this year, the
<u>opposition (S.P.D.)</u> said that it was agreeable to the Govern-
ment's "minimum program" (information, guarantee, and code-
termination), outlined by Defense Minister Strauss during
the <u>Bundestag</u> debate on the defense budget on April 6, 1962.

The opposition denies the expediency of either national
atomic forces or the establishment of a NATO atomic force
or of a European atomic force with autonomous nuclear con-
trol. In its view, a national atomic force is an "expensive
detour" and its effect is moreover doubtful: It would be
too vulnerable vis-à-vis such a great nuclear power as the
Soviet Union and therefore could not be a genuine deterrent.
It says that a NATO atomic force would be of no benefit
either, since in practice the decision on employment of
atomic weapons would still depend on the U.S.A., which is
a member of NATO. The opposition says further that, if a
nuclear war should break out, it is inconceivable for NATO
to wage it alone with its atomic forces. Consequently,
America's nuclear potential would be the deciding factor
in any case. An autonomous NATO atomic force would give
rise to the danger that tendencies to isolationism might
gain ground again in American quarters.

The opposition is hence of the view that the best
course is the creation of a genuine cooperation within
NATO. Such a reform of NATO could take place, for example,
in the form proposed by Alastair Buchan (Director of the
Institute for Strategic Studies in London): For this
purpose, the NATO secretariat should be developed into an
institution in which civilian and military representatives

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of the 15 NATO countries would carry on joint planning of
both a military and political nature. In this way, the se-
paration between NATO's political and military affairs now
obtaining in practice would be eliminated and the European
NATO members could automatically be kept up to date on
America's political and military planning. Under this
system, America's atomic secrets would not have to be di-
vulged.

It is further believed by the opposition that the tac-
tical atomic weapons should be withdrawn from the front-
line troops and combined under into a separate armed force
under a separate military command. It says that this is
the only way in which it would be at all possible to con-
duct a conventional defense.

FREITAG, DEN 16. NOVEMBER

13.00 Mittagessen für die amerikanischen Delegierten, gegeben von Herrn Vizekanzler Professor Ludwig Erhard

16.00 Rheinhotel Dreesen
Eröffnungssitzung der Vollversammlung,
Begrüßungsansprachen: Dr. Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen, Vorsitzender der Atlantik-Brücke, und Dr. George N. Shuster, Vorsitzender des American Council on Germany, Walter Scheel, amtierender Bundesaußenminister, General Lucius D. Clay, Leiter der amerikanischen Delegation

17.00—17.30 Ansprache des Herrn Bundestagspräsidenten
D. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier

19.30 Empfang (Kaltes Buffet) für die Delegierten und Beobachter im Embassy Club, Bad Godesberg-Plittersdorf, gegeben von S.E. Botschafter Walter C. Dowling

SONNABEND, DEN 17. NOVEMBER

vormittags Abflug der Konferenz-Teilnehmer vom Flughafen Köln-Bonn nach Berlin

12.30 Mittagessen für die Delegierten und Beobachter im Rathaus Schöneberg, gegeben vom Herrn Regierenden Bürgermeister Willy Brandt

14.30 Sektoren-Grenzfahrt (Abfahrt vom Rathaus)

16.00 Kongreß-Halle (Ende der Rundfahrt)

16.00—18.15 Ausschuß-Sitzungen

20.00 Empfang (Kaltes Buffet) im Charlottenburger Schloß, gegeben vom Herrn Bundestagspräsidenten D. Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 16

1.00 p. m. Luncheon for American delegates,
given by Vice Chancellor Dr. Ludwig Erhard

4.00 p. m. Rheinhotel Dreesen
Opening Session,
Addresses of Welcome: Dr. Gotthard Freiherr von Falkenhausen,
Chairman of the Atlantik-Brücke, and Dr. George N. Shuster,
Chairman of the American Council on Germany, Walter Scheel,
acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, General Lucius D. Clay,
head of the American delegation

5.00-5.30 p. m. Address of Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, President of the Bundestag

7.30 p. m. Reception (buffet dinner) for delegates and observers at the
Embassy Club, Bad Godesberg-Plittersdorf,
given by H.E. Ambassador Walter C. Dowling

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 17

morning Departure for Berlin from the airport Köln-Bonn

12.30 p. m. Luncheon for delegates and observers at Rathaus Schöneberg,
given by Governing Mayor Willy Brandt

2.30 p. m. Tour along The Wall (departure from the Rathaus)

4.00 p. m. Kongress-Halle (end of the tour)

4.00-6.15 p. m. Panel discussions

8.00 p. m. Reception (buffet dinner) at Charlottenburger Schloss,
given by Dr. Eugen Gerstenmaier, President of the Bundestag

Germany and the Developing Countries

By Guenter Grunwald and Johannes Reinhold

A presentation of the relationship between the Federal Republic of Germany and the developing countries must be directed mainly at the structure and means of German aid activities. In this respect, it is less important to give statistical data than to make clear what determines the impulses and ideas governing German development aid and what kind of practical expression they find. For that reason, in addition to an account of the existing situation, a few preliminary remarks are in order. These remarks are even more indispensable due to the fact that Germany has had to clarify, to itself as to the rest of the world, its attitude towards its own past.

In the eyes of the world Germany is the country with the most pronounced racial prejudices. This point of view was amply confirmed by the years of Nationalist Socialist rule and by the subsequent discovery of inhuman atrocities. We believe, however, that we can say that progress is being made in the direction of unprejudiced thinking in Germany and that this change is reflected in the attitude toward the developing countries. Other races and peoples with different skin colors have become respected as partners and have come to be regarded as nothing out of the ordinary. Terms such as "sub-human", "inferior race", "alien blood", are today considered serious violations of the moral code acceptable in the Federal Republic. Expressions of superiority over less developed countries have been banned from discussions. Significant is the fact that Germany was the first country to replace the term "under-developed countries" with "developing countries".

It can be argued, of course, that here and there there are relapses and that incorrigible elements exist; but any process of change takes time since the process concerns men whose roots go far back into the history of their people, men who must come to terms with their own past as well as with their own generation.

A struggle similar to race prejudice took place once before—although it did not go so deep—in another political sector: within the area of the cherished German dreams of an empire, and this concerned the overcoming of colonialism.

Germany's Attitude Towards Colonialism

During the past 400 years, European colonial politics has developed colonies for the purpose of settlement, for enconomic reasons, and for the show of power and military influence. In the 19th and 20th centuries, the continually increasing expenditures required for the development of co-

29

433

lonial areas, for their military protection, their administration, the ever-
increasing criticism of colonial exploitation from humanitarian groups,
growing trade competition and, in particular, the acquisition of technical
and economic knowledge by the inhabitants of the colonial areas them-
selves, forced a gradual modification of European colonial policy.

Up to the 20th century, the military and administrative superiority of the European powers made it possible for them to secure their hold on colonies mostly with naval forces and small land-troop contingents and to rule with small administrative staffs. The humanitarian criticism of colonial policies, however, necessitated more administrative activities within the field of education and public health and also in the administration of justice. The European colonial powers had to take into account the increasing political emancipation of the colonial populations by according them self-administration or self-government. As a result of the two world wars, the national consciousness of the colonial populations also increased. In addition, socialist critics used the argument that colonialism was a form of imperialist monopolistic capitalism and thus contributed to the overthrow of European colonial rule. The ideologies of National Socialism, Socialism and Communism—all deriving from Europe—provided the required spiritual and intellectual weapons for the colonial nations.

Throughout the entire world, an evolution began, the different aspects of which are today identified by the terms "decolonization" and "developing countries."

The German *Reich*, which attained its national unity only in 1870, entered the field of colonization later than the other European countries. The growth of the German economy and population caused Bismarck, after considerable hesitation, to obtain colonies for Germany also. In 1884-85, he acquired, by a series of quick actions, areas in East and Southeast Africa, in Cameroun and Togo, in addition to a part of New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, as well as the so-called Bismarck Archipelago and the Marshall Islands in the South Pacific. Later on, in 1897, the Chinese coastal area around Tsingtau with Kiaochow was obtained on lease; in 1899 the Mariana Islands, Caroline Islands, Palau Islands, and the main part of the Samoan Islands by treaty; and in 1911, also through treaty, part of the French Congo.

Up to World War I, German colonial possessions amounted to approximately 3 million square kilometers with approximately 12.3 million in inhabitants. The short dream of a German colonial empire was soon over, however. Through the Treaty of Versailles, Germany lost all her colonies to the West European victors of World War I. It was not willingly that Germany gave up all overseas territories but the military defeat of 1918 forced her to. Later on, especially during the Nazi era in Germany, thoughts of colonies once again came to the fore—incited by Hitler's plans to conquer the world.

When World War II ended with Germany's unconditional surrender, all thoughts of restoration of colonies ceased. There now came into being the conditions for unhampered cooperation with the young countries and the Federal Republic of Germany was provided with a good starting position, politically as well as psychologically, for its subsequent development

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policy. In those days, unfortunately, the idea of "aid to developing countries" was the hobby of a few idealists only. Nowadays, the necessity for such aid has become a basic theme of present political problems and plays a decisive role in the plans of even the most dispassionate statesmen.

## German Public Opinion and the Developing Countries

Also a change has begun to take place in public opinion in the Federal Republic. As a public opinion poll conducted among a representative cross-section of the population indicated in 1961, 70% of the people understand the term "development aid" correctly. That seems to indicate an above-average interest in the subject. But it is important to realize that proper understanding does not mean that the public is ready to support development aid, and that the phenomenon indicated by the public opinion poll has its basis in a number of sources.

In the first place, active public interest in developing countries is relatively new, dating back to approximately four years ago. After 1945, the Germans needed quite a while to consider their own problems and began, only after putting their own house in order, to consider world-wide problems and to grasp the idea of international responsibility. Because such shifts towards new historical-political concepts always take place with a display of emotion in Germany, it is no wonder that the developing countries had at the beginning, and to some extent still have today, the fascination of a new fashion. This fashion, however, takes various forms. To begin with, the lively interest in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America is a reaction to the years of isolation from 1933 to 1945; with that goes the feeling, of course, of once again being in the swing of things. In addition, half-forgotten or suppressed ideas going back to the golden age of Christian missionary work are being revived; those who heard in their Sunday School days about the poor little negro children can begin once again from the same concept. And lastly, the most important source of this emotional stream is the fact that the world has become smaller thanks to the rapid spread of television and other mass-communication means. For Mr. Average Man, sitting before his television set, Nehru is nearer than the mayor of his home town and Conakry more familiar than Bonn.

Nevertheless, those citizens who understand the meaning of development aid are not automatically in favor of it. With respect to support of developing aid there is even a noticeable lack of enthusiasm. The reason for this is mainly the way some illustrated papers, in their efforts to increase circulation with sensational stories, show pictures of the jewel-bedecked wives of sovereigns and presidents and describe the extravagance of some rulers, their systems of nepotism and existing corruption. Such stories are accepted uncritically and spread by the public, thus strengthening the general impression that German development aid is either entirely superfluous or being directed into the wrong channels.

In addition, after the Belgrade Conference of the Neutral Countries, the more reliable West German press voiced some rather severe and bitter remarks about those developing countries which accept aid from the Federal Republic while at the same time dealing political blows to it. This unfavorable trend can only be counteracted if it becomes possible to turn

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discussions away from the sphere of the exotic and sensational and back to the sober and realistic aspects of the situation.

That presupposes, of course, clarification concerning motives and aims of German development aid and the making of a uniform, binding policy as the basis of action. Progress is already visible to the majority of those concerned and interested.

## The Basic Motives of German Development Aid

It goes without saying that in view of the multitude of participating groups within a pluralist society, all working towards the same objective, one cannot speak of a uniform and rigidly defined motive. Various groups have different focal points. There do exist, however, several generally recognized basic motives. They stem from the principle of equality of mankind and the claim for the same social justice for all.

Naturally, these basic motives can be either partially or completely superceded by other considerations, or be governed by additional motives. Thus, within the field of government, the fact that Germany is divided and that there exists a Communist threat will necessarily add several tactical and pragmatic considerations to the basically recognized premise of equal dignity and rights. Within private and economic spheres, some modifications of the purely humanitarian motivation can also be observed; those for whom the just distribution of goods is intended will be the buyers of tomorrow. This thought is neither improper nor illegitimate, however, as long as it is not prompted exclusively by the greed for profit.

There is unanimity within the Federal Republic that in any inquiry into the motives of German development aid no attempt should be made to conceal the existing political and economic factors, because German development aid is not meant to be an "act of mercy" but, rather, a relationship among partners openly cooperating with each other under a system of mutual give and take. From this attitude there results the formulation of those principles valid for the development aid policy of the Federal Republic. They proceed from the realization that any development aid policy must be determined by the requirements of the developing countries themselves, i.e., aid can only be granted where it has been requested and is to be used in a way favorable to locally existing conditions. Since experience gained in an industrialized country cannot be transferred directly to developing countries, German aid can only provide the impulse for independent action or, according to the generally accepted idea, can only be aid to self-help. By its very nature, such assistance is against the setting up of conditions; due to basic principles it can neither be withheld from countries maintaining friendly relations with the "German Democratic Republic" regime nor from those countries whose economic, governmental, and constitutional setup do not correspond to the ideas of the Federal Republic. This fundamental idea will have to be adhered to within reasonable limits.

## German Development Aid Measures in the Governmental Realm

On the basis of these motives and principles, various forms of development aid and ways of dealing with questions concerning the developing coun-

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tries have come into existence in the Federal Republic. In accordance with the importance granted to all social groups within a democracy, development aid in the Federal Republic is being effected not only on the governmental level. Although the greatest part of funds required is being raised from official sources, sensible joint efforts between governmental and private agencies is gradually developing.

These two groups, however, definitely cannot be regarded as homogenous. To begin with, as far as the governmental level is concerned, it has to be divided into three groups: the Federal Government with its agencies, the West German states, and the communities. Of these, the most important partner is the Federal Government with its legislative and executive bodies. But here also there was no uniform picture during the first years of German development aid. Prior to the establishment of a special ministry for development aid, the Bundesministerium fuer wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation), twelve ministries had to deal with questions of development aid and will probably have to do so for some time to come. For this reason, all necessary measures are being coordinated in interministerial steering committees. This entails not only a considerable amount of administrative effort but these committees are also, to some extent, subject to the promotion of their own self-interest.

Nevertheless, the increasing commitments of the Federal Republic in the field of development aid, having risen to 5 billion DM for 1961 and 1962, constitute a remarkable achievement, particularly in view of the fact that this does not include the considerable expenditure of more than one billion DM for education and training of trainees, university students, etc., within Germany. Private efforts cannot be estimated to their full extent.

The grants of the Federal Government take various forms. On the multi-lateral level, they consist of contributions to international organizations such as the Technical Aid Program of the United Nations, special organizations of the United Nations, and the development fund of the EEC, etc. Moreover, they are provided in the form of credits to the World Bank and in the taking over of debenture bonds as well as capital shares and by further participation in projects of the World Bank, the International Development Agency (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the European Investment Bank (EIB). In addition, capital aid has been given in the following forms: direct financing of projects from public funds, governmental promotion of private measures by way of investment counseling, the assumption of sureties and guarantees, export credits, tax reductions, etc. In individual cases grants meant to stabilize budgets and balance sheets, such as various trade policy measures in the form of long-term purchase contracts, tariff reductions and consumer tax reductions will be considered.

Besides the measures of capital aid, specialized technical aid, granted within the framework of cultural cooperation, is gaining in significance in the Federal Republic. Its most important function is education and training, with programs for trainees, university students, and executive employees. This is meant for persons who already hold leading positions in their own countries and who can pass on to others the knowledge acquired abroad. This program also includes the preparation and sending out of German

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professional experts to developing countries, as well as research into basic conditions and projects under consideration. Mostly, however, governmental aid in this area is being granted in the form of promotion of nongovernmental agencies active in the various fields. This system will be described in detail later.

The Federal Government has implemented its measures by use of several institutions outside its direct executive setup. They must be mentioned, because they permit a glance into the organizational forms of German development aid policy. In the sphere of capital aid, the most important institution is the Kreditanstalt fuer Wiederaufbau und Entwicklung (Reconstruction and Development Loan Corporation) which operates as the development aid bank on behalf of the Federal Government and processes all credits from public funds. Sureties and guarantees for export credits, finance credits, and debt conversion credits have been taken over by the Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhand Ag. (German Revision and Trusteeship Joint-Stock Company) and the Hermes-Kreditversicherungs-Ag. (Hermes Credit Insurance Joint-Stock Company), the Federal Government assuming responsibility for losses.

Administrative duties in the field of cultural cooperation and specialized assistance have been assigned to the Bundesamt fuer gewerbliche Wirtschaft (Federal Agency for Industry and Trade) which is under supervision of the Federal Ministry for Economics and to the Deutsche Wirtschafts-foerderungs- und Treuhandgesellschaft (GAWI) (German Economy Promotion and Trusteeship Association) which, too, belongs to the Federation. The first-named agency cooperates in selecting German experts for the programs of the United Nations, while "GAWI" is concerned with the establishment of training shops and the sending of specialists to the developing countries as well as seeing to the carrying out of contracts.

A special role of the Federal Government in this field is played by the Deutsche Stiftung fuer Entwicklungslaender (German Foundation for Developing Countries). It was set up two years ago by deputies of all factions in the West German parliament and by the ministries concerned, and has to do with the organization of information courses for executives in various fields, preparatory courses for German experts, and documentation work. The special characteristic of this agency is seen in the fact that while it lies within the field of government, nongovernmental organizations are participating within the framework of an advisory council.

In addition to the activity of the Federal Government described so far, the various West German states also contribute to the carrying out of development aid. To begin with, everything having to do with cultural cooperation with the developing countries is part of the responsibility of the states because of the cultural stipulations of the constitution. Also, a large number of the German experts are state employees. In addition to this, at the present time several states are implementing the work with special development aid programs of their own with special emphasis on certain regions. These efforts, which are parallel to those of the Federal Government will, in the future, have to be improved through practical coordination.

The measures of the German cities on behalf of development aid must also be seen as part of governmental activities in this field. The city efforts are

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mostly concerned with training aid and the establishment of city partnerships.

Even after development aid is broken down into the main two categories of governmental and nongovernmental activity, there still exist two forms of organization which fall neither into one category nor the other: the political parties and the churches. It is true that the political parties determine indirectly the work of the legislative through their deputies and thus provide the framework for development policy and aid efforts. But the large parties of the Federal Republic have also founded working groups for development aid in which problems of the developing countries are considered from special political points of view. In this way, stimulating suggestions are offered on the governmental level as well as on the private one.

The two big churches also play an important part in development aid policy since, apart from their missionary activities, they have carried out exemplary educational and welfare aid projects in the developing countries. This was done long before the beginning of governmental work in this field. This work may be considered a model of its kind insofar as it has been carried out to the best advantage through the means of large monetary sums—both churches having made available more than 100 million DM—without any unnecessary bureaucratic interference. Quick aid in individual cases always presents a problem to the government but hardly ever to the churches.

A far more complex situation is to be found in the field of private endeavor with its various social groups.

## Private German Development Aid

In Germany, the view is often publicly expressed that there are too many organizations and institutions in the field of private endeavor which concern themselves with questions of development aid. It is urged, therefore, that these efforts be coordinated for it is believed that the multitude of different agencies and activities is bound to lead to the squandering of means and energy. This is a false argument. It has promoted psychological resistance because of the apparent confusion within the organizations but exists only for those who have a relatively superficial knowledge of the facts. Democracy, however, derives its strength from the multifarious diversity of the initiative of its citizens. Dictatorial regimes also have a large number of organizations at their disposal as instruments of internal supervision and infiltration into the outside world, and they are all "coordinated". This does not mean, though, that there does not exist in them competition, bureaucratic red tape, waste, and differences of opinion. However, the manifold participation of nongovernmental organizations in a field of such important official activity as that of relations with the developing countries is not only an advantage for the democratic system but is in itself necessary and useful for the solutions of the problems in question.

The objective of nongovernmental organizations must be to promote cooperation with the developing countries beyond the possible governmental and economic contacts for the purpose of integration, as far as possible, of the social elements.

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It is not possible in this article to enter details regarding all nongovern-
mental organizations concerned with the establishment of partnership
relations with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Conse-
quently, only the most important groups will be described.

The large business associations have created joint systems and committees for the preparation of policy regarding development aid questions for the different groups as well as for the dissemination of information for their members. While up to the present—according to the *Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie* (Federation of German Industries)—the German efforts have been centered mainly around the granting of long-term credits, private investments, contributions to the international financial institutions, and technical aid, it has now been realized that the main task lies in the drawing up of a plan for the utilization of bilateral financial aid from public funds within the framework of a carefully thought out development policy. With respect to the organizing of financial aid, technical aid, and application of trade policy—the three pillars of development aid—German industry tries to cooperate closely with the Federal Government. Only by supplementing each other and coordinating public and private development aid can the greatest possible success be achieved—this is the opinion of the "Developing Countries" section of the Federation of German Industries.

The German trade union movement can justly claim that in the course of
its historical development it has always been against colonialism. As an
important partner in the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU), the *Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB)* (German Trade Union
Federation) developed useful focal points for trade union activities in Asia,
Africa, and Latin America, and cooperated in several countries in the
development of powerful and sovereign trade unions. In line with the old
trade union principle of international solidarity, the German trade unions
have for many years appropriated millions of DM for the solidarity fund of
the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in Brussels. This was
earmarked for educational and training aid in the developing countries.
Beyond this, the German trade unions have been making efforts to set up
workshops for apprentices, vocational training institutions and to give
technical aid in other ways, especially to the trade union organizations in
the developing countries.

The German cooperatives also began very early—through their program "Help India"—with direct efforts on behalf of development aid. The importance of the cooperatives and trade unions in the developing countries cannot be overestimated since free cooperatives and strong unions constitute in many cases the only alternatives to totalitarian developments in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The universities and the large economic and social science research insti-
tutes in the Federal Republic are devoting increasing attention to the
problems of developing countries. At the University of Heidelberg, for
example, a special institute for developing countries, especially for those
in the Indo-Asiatic area, was founded and another one at the University
of Freiburg to deal with cultural questions. Similar institutes are planned
as research projects at the Universities of Berlin, Hamburg, and Munich.

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The large German research institutes are combined in the Association of the Union of Economic and Social Science Research Institutes. Of this association the following institutes are especially concerned with problems of the developing countries:

1) Institut fuer Weltwirtschaft an der Universitaet Kiel (Institute of World Economics at the University of Kiel)

2) Hamburgisches Weltwirtschafts-Archiv (Hamburg World Economics Archive)

3) Deutsches Institut fuer Wirtschaftsforschung, Berlin (German Institute for Economic Research, Berlin)

4) Ifo-Institut Muenchen (Institute for Economic Research, Munich)

5) Forschungsstelle der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn (Research Center of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Bonn)

6) Bremer Ausschuss fuer Wirtschaftsforschung (Bremen Committee for Economic Research)

7) Institut fuer Entwicklungslaender, Bonn (Institute for Developing Countries, Bonn)

8) Forschungsinstitut fuer internationale technische Zusammenarbeit an der Technischen Hochschule Aachen (Research Institute for International Technical Cooperation at the Technical University, Aachen)

9) Institut fuer Selbsthilfe und Sozialforschung, Koeln (Institute for Self-Help and Social Research, Cologne)

The following—among others—are devoted to questions in the field of development aid:

1) Gesellschaft fuer Generalstudien, Bonn (Society for General Studies, Bonn)

2) Gemeinschaft unabhaengiger beratender Ingenieurbueros, Bonn (Association of Independent Consultant Engineers, Bonn)

3) Verein Beratender Ingenieure e. V., Essen (Union of Consultant Engineers, Essen)

The big scientific organizations such as the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (German Research Council), Deutscher Wissenschaftsrat (German Council for the Promotion of Science and Humanities), Westdeutsche Rektorenkonferenz (West German Rectors' Conference) and, on the side of industry, the Stifterverband fuer die deutsche Wissenschaft (Founders' Association for German Science), are also especially interested in the exchange of scientists with developing countries and in the granting of assistance to individuals and research projects.

Four years ago, the large cultural institutions in the Federal Republic formed the Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer internationalen Kulturaustausch (International Cultural Exchange Alliance). Its most important members are:

Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst e. V., Bonn (German Academic Exchange Service). The Federal Government put this institution in charge of a scholarship program for university students from the developing countries. At the same time, it is responsible for the entire student exchange program and grants a large number of scholarships to Germans who wish to go to developing countries.

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Goethe-Institut zur Pflege der deutschen Sprache (Goethe Institute for the Cultivation of the German Language). This institute maintains a large number of places abroad where German teachers give instruction in German. In the developing countries, this opportunity attracts more and more of those willing to learn, and the existing facilities, although already considerable, are sufficient to provide the required language instruction to only a fraction of the interested applicants. In addition, the Goethe Institute has, in the last two years, taken over the administration from the German Foreign Office of various cultural centers and cultural institutes, particularly in the developing countries.

Carl-Duisberg-Gesellschaft fuer Nachwuchsfoerderung e. V., Koeln (Carl Duisberg Society for the Support of Trainees). This is a society of the leading associations of German business and of the employers' and employees' groups. Its function is to assist in training students from the developing countries who hold university scholarships from the government in order to ensure the success of their studies. Help for other foreign trainees in German enterprises who do not have government scholarships for university studies is given by the 100 Foreigners' Circles of the Carl Duisberg Society.

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung e. V., Bonn (Friedrich Ebert Foundation). This foundation was founded in 1925 and is thus one of the oldest in Germany. Four years ago, it was instrumental in the establishment of the International Cultural Exchange Alliance. As far back as the Weimar Republic, the Friedrich Ebert Foundation was concerned with cooperation with the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. After 1945, these efforts were resumed and intensified. In its residential college for adult education at Bergneustadt (80 kilometers from Bonn), the foundation has at its disposal an excellent home for lectures and seminars on questions of developing aid. In addition, it has set up a very active research center which has already published results from work on problems in the field of development aid. The Friedrich Ebert Foundation also grants scholarships to especially gifted university students from the developing countries and, during their stay in the Federal Republic, provides contacts in human relations as well as in their scientific work. In addition, the foundation endeavors to promote the education and training of junior executives from the developing countries, particularly in the fields of trade unions and cooperatives, adult education and administration, and mass-media specialists.

Institut fuer Auslandsbeziehungen, Stuttgart (Institute for Relations with Foreign Countries). It devotes special interest to the providing of books to developing countries and to contacts with Germans throughout the world.

Internationaler Arbeitskreis Sonnenberg, Braunschweig (Sonnenberg International Committee, Braunschweig). This institute maintains a large conference center in the Harz mountains and arranges meetings between young Germans and Europeans with young citizens of the developing countries. Among other things, it is concerned with the training of teachers concerned with questions relative to the partnership with developing countries.

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Additional member organizations of the Cultural Exchange Alliance are:
**Verband Deutscher Studentenschaften, Bonn** (Association of German Student Organizations)

**Deutscher Kunstrat, Koeln** (German Arts' Council, Cologne)

**Deutscher Volkshochschulverband, Bonn** (German Adult Education Association)

**Deutsche Afrika-Gesellschaft, Bonn** (German Africa Society)

**Arbeitskreis der privaten Institutionen fuer internationale Begegnung und Bildungsarbeit, Koeln** (Association of Private Institutions for International Meetings and Education Work, Cologne)

**Deutscher Musikrat, Koeln** (German Music Council, Cologne)

**Deutsche Stiftung fuer Entwicklungslaender, Berlin** (German Foundation for the Developing Countries)

The following institutions are also cooperating with the International Cultural Alliance because some of their leading executives are members:

**Inter Nationes e. V., Bonn**

**Gemeinnuetzige Arbeitsgemeinschaft zur Foerderung der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen, Bonn** (Nonprofit Association for the Promotion of Intergovernmental Relations)

**Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947, Frankfurt/Main** (Society for Economic Politics of 1947, Frankfort)

**Deutsche Orientstiftung, Hamburg** (German Orient Foundation, Hamburg)

**Alexander-von-Humboldt-Stiftung, Bonn** (Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, Bonn)

**Haus Rissen, Institut fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik, bei Hamburg**
(House Rissen, Institute for Economic and Social Politics, near Hamburg)
Almost all German welfare institutions and agencies such as the German Caritas Association, the Inner Mission, the Workers' Welfare Association, the Jewish Welfare Committee, and the German Nondenominational Welfare Association deal with problems raised by developing aid. In part, organizations have been formed by Germans in developing countries, social work experts have been trained for development aid tasks, and these activities have been carried out in cooperation with private international organizations such as the international Catholic organizations, the Ecumenic Council in Geneva, and others.

The **Arbeitsgemeinschaft fuer Jugendpflege und Jugendfuersorge, Bonn** (Association for Youth Care and Youth Welfare, Bonn), which has as members the youth organizations as well as the welfare organizations and agencies of the West German states and communities, has made of itself—following a suggestion of its international association, the International Federation for Aid to Youth in Geneva—a clearing center for development aid projects dealing with the problems of hardships confronting juveniles in the developing countries.

Among the organizations on the state level a difference must be made between state associations—partly old foreign trade associations stemming from the traditional export trade and shipping companies—and the state societies whose activities are aimed at the promotion of cultural, political, and general human understanding.

Some of the state associations are:
**Afrika-Verein Hamburg-Bremen e. V.**
(Africa Association Hamburg-Bremen);
**Nah- und Mittelost-Verein, Ham-

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burg (Near and Middle East Association, Hamburg); Ostasiatischer Verein, Hamburg (East Asiatic Association, Hamburg); Ibero-Amerika-Verein, Hamburg (Ibero-American Association, Hamburg) with the affiliated Ibero-American Foundation and the Ibero-American Physicians' Academy.

The state societies whose interests extend beyond purely economic matters include, among others: Deutsche-Indische Gesellschaft e. V., Stuttgart (German-Indian Society, Stuttgart); Deutsche Afrika-Gesellschaft e. V., Bonn (German-Africa Society, Bonn); Deutsche-Tuerkische Gesellschaft e. V., Kiel (German-Turkish Society, Kiel); Deutsche Ghana Gesellschaft (German Ghana Society), and a German-Togo Society, a German-Chinese Society, a German-Tunisian Society, a German-Brazilian Society, as well as several Ibero-American clubs, and African and Asian circles in various towns which frequently cooperate with local foreign country societies.

Within the last few years almost all students' organizations and youth associations in the Federal Republic have realized the seriousness of their responsibility towards the students and youth in the developing countries and have implemented their aid projects and exchange programs. Through study tours and conferences or practical cooperation in international organizations, their participation in developing aid questions has been intensified. Particularly active in this field have been the Verband Deutscher Studentenschaften, Bonn (Association of German Student Organizations), the Internationale Studentenbund (ISSF), (International Students' League) the student groups, the political students' organizations and, above all, the World University Service (WUS), Bonn, which years ago had already made special efforts in the support of students' centers, particularly with regard to welfare assistance measures on behalf of students in the developing countries.

Schools, students' organizations, and large German teachers' organizations have been active in recent years, sponsoring groups in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

## More Recent Tendencies in German Development Aid

Since the beginning of cooperation with developing countries, the Federal Republic has made various mistakes both at home and abroad. Basic experience has been gained, however, and this will decisively influence future dealings.

On the domestic front, the most important fact is the realization that in spite of the manifold system of the Federal Republic its development aid policy must be made uniform. This necessitates coordination of all measures both in public and private spheres. These first steps towards cooperation have been made with the German Foreign Office, the agency showing most understanding. It has even gone so far as to delegate governmental tasks to private agencies and is a by-product of the development aid policy which provides a new aspect for Germany in the positive sense.

But new directions can be perceived in the measures themselves. For a long time, the public attitude toward development aid was that it was nothing more than the transferring of sufficient amounts of money to the developing countries. Only gradually has some understanding of how to further progress in the developing countries come about. Considerable time elapsed

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into a bottomless pit as long as there was not personnel in the developing countries capable of putting aid to the best possible use. With that realization, education moved into the foreground and brought about a noticeable modification in the structure of German development aid.

Since the most important factor of development aid—as argued today—is to be seen in the preparation of the partner countries for systematic self-help, the assistance aimed directly at the individual, i. e., educational and welfare aid, takes priority over all financial and economic help.

The recognition of this basic principle will have consequences for future German development aid programs. More intensive programs dealing with education projects and training of executives for public positions, for administrative posts, for places in the economic, cultural and social life, as leading representatives in the elementary and vocational training schools as well as of adult education, especially within communities and villages, will be required. Particular attention will have to be paid to the development of mass media as a means of education.

Moreover, with respect to German development activities having to do with education which are supported by intergovernmental or private investments, it has been urged that these projects contain a definite proportion of funds and effort directed toward social welfare. That is, private business projects should be compelled to include education in their planning.

Generally speaking, it is believed that the necessary amount to be allotted to training and social aid measures within German development aid grants should, in the coming years, amount to one third of the total.

In this connection, the example of the American Peace Corps has set off lively discussions in the Federal Republic and promoted new ideas. The organizations participating in the International Cultural Exchange Alliance intend to send observers to the United States to study the training methods of the Peace Corps. In addition, in the effort to stimulate the interest of young Germans to work in the developing countries, a *Gesprächkreis Entwicklungshellern* (Discussion Group of Development Helpers) was founded in which the important students' and youth organizations participate with large cultural organizations. The objective of this discussion group is to find, following the initiative set by the Americans, some method of action suited to German conditions.

Another change can also be seen. Thus far, the training of students and executives from the developing countries took place almost exclusively in the Federal Republic. In the future, the training of professional experts and executives through means of development aid will be done mainly within the developing countries themselves since the number of German instructors available for teaching posts in the developing countries is increasing. And the situation with regard to university students will probably change to some extent. At the present time, approximately 10% of all students at German universities are foreigners, most of them from developing countries. Apart from the fact that German universities are overcrowded, it must be taken into consideration that the developing countries are building up their own centers of instruction. Consequently, studies in

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Germany will be promoted only in special cases, for example, for highly qualified young scientists.

There appears to be yet another side to German aid activities: an awareness of the existence of European neighbors. This is a new thought, for despite the fact that there have been lively discussions and intensive cooperation in European institutions, the fact of belonging to the European family of nations was frequently somewhat shamefacedly left unmentioned by the Germans. They were afraid of gambling away the unique chance existing for a noncolonial power by a show of solidarity with former colonial powers. In the meantime, a cooler and more detached way of regarding the situation has come about. On the one hand, the pledge of allegiance to European partnership only makes more credible reservations on certain matters; on the other hand, the Africans and Asians have long ago realized that within a family there exist troubles for which not all members can be held simultaneously responsible. Thus, in the Federal Republic, the wish for European cooperation becomes more discernible in the field of development aid activities and extends also into the private domain. The somewhat one-sided bilateral development policy is supplemented by multilateral awareness. Within this increasing awareness, which regards development aid as a joint task, many promising contacts with American agencies are being strengthened, particularly with the big foundations.

## The Federal Republic in the East-West Struggle

There is, of course, a political fact which frequently enforces, despite all inclinations towards European and international cooperation in development aid, bilateral thinking and action: the division of Germany.

In developing countries everywhere representatives of the free Federal Republic meet Germans who paint another picture of Germany and who seek to arouse confidence in the Eastern bloc. For this purpose these functionaries have at their disposal all the means which a totalitarian state has for its propaganda and self-promotion. And frequently aid from the eastern side is so spectacular in some aspects that the actually far greater aid from the Federal Republic is completely unknown to the general public. Because of this, the Federal Republic is compelled to regard its partnership with the developing countries from the point of view of a divided Germany. Although no one in the Federal Republic will go so far as to consider development aid as a new aspect of the Cold War, or to use it as a means of preventing recognition of the Pankow regime, the realization of these facts makes the soliciting of friendship for free Germany a legitimate activity within the German development aid policy.

Moreover, in this respect the Federal Republic has a special task. Many visitors from the developing countries have understood for the first time in this country, divided by the Iron Curtain, what the difference between the free world and the so-called "Communist camp" is.

The wall in Berlin represents more than an unnatural national border. It separates two worlds from one another in a way which Africans, Asiatics and Latin Americans see clearly and raises the question of future freedom in the entire world for all those who see it.

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# Rapallo: Myth and Reality*)

By Fritz René Allemann

Forty years ago (on April 16, 1922) in a small seaside resort on the Gulf of Genoa, a treaty was concluded which—unlike most of the diplomatic instruments of that already remote era—is still capable of rousing strong emotions: the Treaty of Rapallo. For the first time since the end of World War I, the representatives of the Weimar Republic and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (which later developed into the Soviet Union) signed a formal agreement which caused a sensation at the time and, like a mythical force, has never ceased to haunt men's minds. Even today, forty years later, the words "Rapallo policy" still arouse secret hopes and uncanny fears; at this very moment, indeed, the catchword appears to have acquired a renewed topicality, attracting some, depressing others.

Hardly any other event in diplomatic history is capable, at such a distance of time, of arousing such contradictory feelings. For some, "Rapallo" represents an event as catastrophic as the fall of man, a disastrous aberration, an evil deed which was bound to bring forth evil, if not a downright pact with the Devil himself. Yet for others the document would appear in retrospect to have been a diplomatic masterpiece, the result of great constructive statesmanship, an example of *Realpolitik* which might well serve the politicians of today as a model and guide (and would do so if these men had not got themselves entangled in "doctrinaire" conceptions).

In the negative and hostile attitude to the Treaty, it is still possible to sense the shock which it produced at the time in the Western world, the depth of which may be measured by the intensity of the condemnation which it still arouses. On the other hand, it is possible to feel, even now, in the positive enthusiasm for the Treaty the pride felt at the time in the achievement of a brilliant coup and also the conviction that the coup was going to influence the whole future of mankind.

On both sides, there was and is the conviction that Rapallo was more than the answer to the challenge of a particular passing moment, that it was rather the fulfillment of a constant possibility in German-Soviet relations which may become topical again at any time—the possibility of German-Soviet cooperation beyond the differences of social systems and political attitudes.

There is, in fact, nothing in the treaty itself to justify either the bitterness of its enemies or the enthusiasm of its champions. When the effect it had

*) From *Encounter*, published in London

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is measured against its actual content, the misunderstanding must seem quite grotesque. On closer examination and viewed from the distance of forty years, the document which agitated so many minds, sowed so many suspicions, and aroused so many hopes turns out to have been quite unsensational. Indeed, it might be called strikingly harmless. On the surface, at least, it was merely an attempt to settle the "conflict between Germany and Russia" by mutual agreement. Since the defeat of the *Reich* in World War I had rendered the separate Russo-German Peace of Brest-Litovsk meaningless, and since the Soviet Government had never signed the Treaty of Versailles, it was not surprising that the two powers should have decided to come to an understanding. They achieved it by a mutual renunciation of their claims for war damage and war costs. Germany even went further and waived all claims for compensation for damages by German citizens arising from the Revolution, provided that the Russian Government did not "satisfy similar claims of other States." At the same time, it was agreed to resume diplomatic and consular relationships and, finally, the two governments affirmed their desire to meet the economic needs of the other party "with mutual feelings of goodwill"—a deliberately vague formulation of a readiness to cooperate in the economic sphere.

That was all—and there was quite certainly nothing world-shattering about it. Neither of the two powers had made a one-sided or irrevocable political choice. Rapallo did not establish an alliance or a political bloc. Fundamentally, it was a straightforward "normalization" of the relationship between the German *Reich* and the Soviet Republic. Only the financial clauses went any further than that and they, too, were simply intended to make a clean sweep by the mutual cancellation of all claims (which were in any case problematical and would have been difficult to fulfill). Since Germany had not the slightest hope of collecting war compensation from the Soviets, while, according to the Versailles Treaty, Russia was able to claim German reparations, it was the *Reich* that benefited most from Article I (renunciation of claims for war damage and war costs). It made up for this advantage by acknowledging the Soviets' right to expropriate German nationals without compensation. Since the Russians were only able to collect German reparations in agreement with the Allied Powers (and such agreement was dependent on a Russian acknowledgment of Tsarist pre-war debts), the Western powers and not the Russians would have been the real beneficiaries of any German "reparations" paid to the Soviet Republic; for this, if for no other reason, it was not difficult for the Russians to waive their legal claims on the Germans. They also thereby gained the assurance that Berlin would keep out of any international association which attempted to enforce claims for compensation for foreign capital that had been "socialized" by the Russians. Each of the contracting parties, therefore, gave to some extent a guarantee that it would not participate in a "united front of creditors" directed against the other State. This in itself shows how advantageous the arrangement was for the two parties. It banished the German nightmare of having to pay the costs of an understanding between the Soviets and the victors of World War I; at the same time, it dispersed Soviet fears that victors and vanquished might unite in an imperialistic phalanx against the young and isolated Soviet power which was still rather uncertain of itself.

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As one looks back on Rapallo, however, it is impossible to dispute that, leaving all the ulterior motives on one side, the content of the agreement was eminently reasonable. It was certainly more in accord with the realities of the situation than most of the schemes put up by the diplomats and financiers at that time. It is now generally agreed that the demand for reparations, in accordance with the wartime slogan *le boche payera*, was not only politically unwise but also economically senseless and disastrous and impeded the recovery of economic life throughout the world. Even in 1922, it must have been clear to any alert observer that the elemental event of the Russian Revolution could no longer be revoked by external pressure. It was not the actual text of the treaty which caused the "Rapallo shock". "The fact of the signing was more important than the formal content," as has been said by one of the historians of German-Soviet relationships.¹) What excited world opinion was the political pattern traced out by this attempt at a *rapprochement* between Berlin and Moscow: the beginning of cooperation between the Outsiders. The Allied Powers had entirely failed to reckon with the possibility that Germany and Russia, who were both excluded from the "family of nations", treated as outcasts, and deliberately isolated by the victors, might come together despite all the differences in their social and political organizations. That this event took place on the periphery of the first great post-war international conference to which the two hitherto ostracised powers had, by way of exception, been invited, was regarded as a manifestation of base ingratitude and malevolent cunning, the more so as no one had been prepared for the explosion of this diplomatic bomb.

The Western Powers had only themselves to blame for thus being caught entirely unawares. It is a well-known fact that all the efforts of the German delegation in Genoa to make contact with the leading British representatives before the conclusion of the treaty had been in vain. It is also a fact that the German Foreign Minister, Walter Rathenau, had hesitated for a long time before signing the document. This was not because he had any misgivings about one or other of the clauses, but because he was afraid that a sudden coup of this nature might break up the Genoa Conference (his fears turned out to be perfectly justified), and because he saw that it might endanger the chances of at any rate a partial understanding with the victors (though, in view of Poincaré's rigidly hostile attitude, he doubted whether such chances in fact existed at all). Rathenau only yielded reluctantly to the pressure of Chicherin, who claimed that the Soviet negotiations with the Western Powers had been far more successful than was actually the case, and who was eagerly supported by the "Eastern politicians" in the German delegation (who, in addition to *Reichskanzler* Wirth, included the later Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ago von Maltzan). It may well be argued that the undoubted concrete results of the agreement were largely invalidated by the unprecedented psychological effect which the "bomb" caused in the West. Unexceptionable though the treaty itself may appear to have been, the diplomatic *coup de main* with which it was presented to an angry and astonished world may well be regarded as highly

1) Edward Hallett Carr,
1952.

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questionable. Be that as it may, it does not alter the fact that a certain measure of German-Soviet cooperation was inherent in the logic of the current international situation. Forgetting all the side issues, it does seem almost inevitable that two isolated powers, which were practically excluded from all international communications, should have tended to seek for a mutual understanding and even to enter into a close union with one another. When a nation has a large number of enemies, it naturally tries to make contact with others in a similar position. There is no sense in applying abstract ideological criteria to the politics of a State which is forced to operate under such unusual and oppressive conditions, or to get morally worked up about it; and it would be equally absurd to project the utterly different world pattern of today into the past and blame the statesmen of that age for only following "narrow national interests". Since the victors of World War I had neglected to create any common interests with the vanquished, there was nothing for the latter to do but exploit to the utmost the modest opportunities of independent action which still remained open to them.

Let us be quite frank about it—Rapallo was the receipt for Versailles: the spirit that ruled in the Versailles Treaty (the spirit of unrestrained national egoism, with no commitment to any international ideas) was bound to produce the "spirit of Rapallo". One cannot defend Versailles and also condemn Rapallo. The fruit plucked on the Gulf of Genoa had grown on the tree which the victors planted three years before. This is not an excuse for the treaty but it is a judgment on the policy which made a German-Soviet rapprochement unavoidable.

By thus recalling the circumstances surrounding the Rapallo treaty, we should be saved from the temptation of distilling from this event and from the widespread collaboration between the Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union which followed a supratemporal principle of German diplomacy to be applied in all circumstances and in every situation. The positive Rapallo myth is just as contrary to historical fact as the negative one and infinitely more dangerous in the present situation. The agreements of 1922 were quite definitely not a *Suendenfall* which it was necessary subsequently to disown. Still less, however, were they a model to be followed at will in the future. They were rather the product of a unique political situation which, as far as it is humanly possible to judge, will never recur and which has meanwhile become part of history. It is quite possible to believe that they accorded with this unique situation, that they were realistic and to that extent justifiable and right from the standpoint of the parties concerned. But this has no bearing whatsoever on the question whether a new Rapallo would be equally justifiable or even feasible in the radically different world of today, that is, within a completely different set of international relationships.

On the contrary: when one recalls what was really behind the German-Soviet rapprochement of 40 years ago, what caused the two parties to make this move, what they hoped or were entitled to hope from it, and then compares the picture with the situation as it is in 1962, the irrelevance of any model derived from the situation of that time to the current problems of German politics leaps to the eye at once.

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The decisive factor is the radical displacement of political power and influence which has taken place since 1922. At that period the *Reich* and the Soviet Republic, albeit for different reasons, were not only in a similar state of international isolation; their acting in unison was also facilitated by the fact that they were completely equal partners. Potentially, they were both still great powers, but for the time being both were weakened and strictly limited in their freedom of maneuver. Germany and Russia were both suffering from the consequences of an exhausting war and a heavy defeat which had thrown them, for the moment, into a position of inferiority. The advantageous geographical situation of the Soviet Republic, in the "heartland of the Euro-Asiatic land mass", its incomparably greater area and larger population, were offset by its technical backwardness and by the devastations caused by the Revolution and civil war and by the German partner's incomparably greater industrial power. Furthermore, the *cordon sanitaire* of young national states which the victors had drawn right across Central Europe from the Baltic to the Black Sea separated the two states from one another and spared them the problems which arise from immediate proximity. Both states were equally interested in preventing the political consolidation of this mid-European Zone. Both were pursuing, in particular towards Poland, a "revisionist" policy (or what the Soviets now call "revanchist"). This, too, brought Berlin and Moscow closer together, though it was obvious that they would not need to be afraid of one another only so long as the situation created in Eastern Europe by Versailles and Trianon persisted—a situation which they were jointly endeavoring to undermine. As soon as the barrier between them was removed, their friendship would also threaten to fall to pieces, since they would then meet as rivals in the intervening zone. (This inevitably happened in the new phase of the German-Russian entente at the time of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.)

Their relationship was, therefore, by no means free of mistrust (and even mutually justified mistrust). There was altogether a piquantly paradoxical element in the friendship which began in Rapallo. The *Reichsregierung* knew perfectly well that the Kremlin was planning to carry the "proletarian revolution" into Germany and secretly promoting with all the means at its disposal the German Communists' plans for a *putsch*. For its part, the Soviet Government had no illusions about the ulterior motives which were behind the flirtation of the German middle classes with Communist Russia: it was perfectly aware that the supreme concern of the Germans was to secure for themselves a modicum of independence in foreign policy. It also realized that, with increasing stabilization, German capitalism was bound to succumb to almost irresistible pressure from the West. This, in fact, happened only a few years later with the Locarno Pact and the entry of the German *Reich* into the League of Nations, though Stresemann took the precaution of offsetting these westward moves by concluding the German-Soviet "Berlin Treaty" of 1926.

For these reasons, if for no others, it was impossible for the relationships which had been created in Rapallo and which were subsequently intensified by trade agreements and secret military cooperation between the *Reichswehr* and the Red Army, ever to be crystallized in the policy of a real bloc.

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Even at the time of the Versailles Treaty, Germany's economic and political connections with the West were too close for it to be able to enter an intimate association with the Russians. Thus, the friendship of Rapallo was always a very partial one, hemmed in by various reservations, and, despite the secret military agreements, it really boiled down more to a mutual neutralization (with an admittedly, for a time, very benevolent interpretation of neutrality) than even a potential alliance. Each of the parties knew that the long-term interests and intentions of the other ran counter to his own. There was no reason why this should necessarily prevent them traveling for some part of the way together, and so long as their respective forces were more or less equally balanced, they were able to afford a temporary association.

Today, none of these presuppositions exists any longer. On the contrary, not merely the long-term but also the intermediate interests of the Rapallo partners are so utterly antithetical that an understanding between them is well-nigh inconceivable. Since the Soviet Union has used its victory in World War II to advance its military perimeter to the very gates of Lübeck, into the Harz mountains and as far as the Werra, and also to incorporate a third of Germany politically and socially into its own domain, there is simply no longer any basis for a Rapallo type of agreement. If in the early twenties the Versailles policy of the Western Powers drove the Reich almost irresistibly (at any rate, for a time and with certain reservations) into the arms of Russia, Soviet policy since 1945 has led even more inevitably to the Federal Republic being driven into the arms of the Western Powers. As long as Moscow insists on the *status quo*, this situation is unalterable, because it is inherent in the logic of the distribution of power in Europe even more than was the Rapallo Treaty.

Now it may be asked—and this seems to be at the bottom of the recently revived talk about "Rapallo"—whether their possession of the Eastern Zone of Germany as a mortgage does not offer the Soviets an opportunity of drawing the Germans as a whole on to their side. If one day they were to be weary of the everlasting crises in the Russian Zone of Germany, and the pressure on Berlin seemed too risky, might it not occur to them to take the opposite direction and by making concessions at the expense of the "German Democratic Republic" entice the Federal Republic to leave the Atlantic Alliance since they are unable to compel her to do so? Is it really impossible that some Government in Bonn might be tempted by such an offer to change course and turn Eastwards?

It may, of course, be objected that the argument is entirely speculative, since there is at present not the slightest indication that a *reversal* of this kind is even under consideration in Moscow. The much disputed memorandum of 27 December can certainly not be construed in this sense; however unwonted its tone of studious wooing and however interesting some of the hints in the text might seem, it did not contain the remotest suggestion that Moscow might be envisaging the surrender of her Zone. On the contrary, the whole document was a skillful, though unsubstantial, attempt to render a German-Russian reconciliation on the basis of the *status quo* palatable to the recipient. The memorandum was concerned not with offering a deal on the basis of common interests, but with sweetening the prospect of capitulation to a superior power.

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It is, however, still an open, albeit for the time being, purely hypothetical question, what the reaction would be if Moscow were one day to decide on tangible and more concrete offers. The hypothesis may be thought extremely improbable—and in my own opinion, it quite definitely is so—on practical grounds alone (since Moscow cannot "write off" the Eastern Zone of Germany without seriously endangering the whole cohesion of the Eastern bloc) and, above all, on ideological grounds. But this does not absolve us from envisaging such an eventuality.

In so doing, we must try to visualize the nature of a possible Russo-German partnership under present conditions. In Rapallo, the powers that met were of equal standing. In the meantime, however, the then Soviet Republic which territorially had been cast back almost to its eighteenth century condition, has become a world power, whereas the German *Reich* is now reduced, geographically, to the Federal Republic and, politically, to the condition of a third-class power. Under these circumstances a "new Rapallo" would be an agreement between extremely unequal parties.

Even in 1939, it was still possible for Germany and the Soviet Union to meet as equals (in the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact) and divide up central Europe (Zwischeneuropa) between themselves. But today (and tomorrow and the day after tomorrow) any cooperation between them would be determined from the outset by Russia's obvious and unchangeable preponderance.

There may well be something attractive for the Soviets in the idea that the Federal Republic might one day turn its back on the Western camp and join with Moscow in a tete-à-tete. But what on earth would ever induce Bonn—no matter who happened to be in power—to meddle in such a dangerous enterprise? The prospect of German reunification? Ten years ago, most of the Germans shrank even from the adventure (likewise hypothetical) of making an international agreement on the neutralization of Germany as a whole the subject of negotiations! Their reasons for resisting such a move were doubtlessly good and compelling ones (though that is an arguable question). But compared with a "new Rapallo" which, under present conditions, would mean Germany's leaning for support on Russia's superior forces, an acceptance of the Stalin proposals of March, 1952, would have been a perfectly harmless venture. (Whether the proposals were meant to be taken seriously or were merely a tactical maneuver is immaterial in the present context.) At that time, the idea of keeping a united Germany out of all one-sided military commitments was still based on the conception of a European system of security and of a Four-Power guarantee. However problematical such a project may have appeared, it cannot be denied that, compared with an isolated German-Soviet arrangement which would be attainable only by a wanton breach of the Western Alliance, it was bound to seem infinitely more "realistic". No German politician in his right mind will ever be prepared to play the part of junior partner (and suicide candidate) in a *societas leonina* with Moscow.

Of course, there are people—and not only Dr. Dehler and Ambassador Kroll—who regard an agreement with Moscow as quite feasible, even at the price of heavy sacrifices. But the important thing is that, unlike the open and secret adherents of the German *Friedensunion*, they would not

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dream of undertaking such an operation on their own responsibility and
behind the Allies' back. An arrangement reached without the consent of
the Western Powers could be anything at all, but it could certainly not be
another Rapallo. And there is really no sense, from the German or from
the Western point of view, in burdening one's thoughts about all this with
historical parallels which are not real parallels at all, or to summon up
ghosts which are resting peacefully in their graves.

There is, however, one quite different and very topical question: whether,
under what conditions, on what basis and with what ultimate purpose a
bilateral German-Soviet conversation or even, maybe, a German "initia-
tive" (nach Osten) might be possible and meaningful, what might be hoped
from it in the most favorable circumstances, and what dangers might lurk
therein. One cannot, however, discuss this question rationally without first
clearing away the rubble of a past which has nothing whatever to do with
the problems, opportunities, and dangers of the present and which can
only distort one's vision of the future.

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