Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Meg Osmer
10/5/70; 9:50 p.m.

Miss Osmer asked Mr. Kissinger if she could get some pictures showing him at social functions and with women or men and women. She said she would check with Ollie Atkins but first she wanted to get Mr. Kissinger's permission. Mr. Kissinger said it was okay for her to ask him but he wanted to see them them before she got them. He said his predisposition was to let her use them. Miss Osmer said she had some things -- changes, etc. -- that she wanted to go over with Mr. Kissinger. Mr. Kissinger asked if she was coming down and she said she could do it over the telephone. However, she did say if she had to come down to get the pictures she would discuss the changes with him when she came down. They talked about the story and Miss Osmer thought it was good and it showed Mr. Kissinger in the best light. Miss Osmer said with regard to the pictures that a picture of Mr. Kissinger with Mrs. Nixon would also be good. She said she would call in the morning and bother one of Mr. Kissinger's girls concerning the pictures. She said she would not bother Mr. Kissinger again since she knew how busy he was and she would wait for a call from him.

feg

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/13/04

Telecon
Bill Safire

10/6/70 ca. 8:30a.m.

S: For the ending, is the government of Cambodia offering a standstill cease-fire?

K: Yes, but don't mention that, because they may fall off. They are aboard, but I wouldn't stand on that.

S: I was going to say that four nations are offering a cease-fire and we're just waiting for a fourth fifth, which is pretty powerful.

K: That's okay to say.

S: I want to say we've got an offer from these countries . . .

K: Only don't name the countries.

S: Okay.

By KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Robert McNamara
10/6/70 ca. 9:15 a.m.

M: Marvelous trip--I am very impressed. Particularly the Yugoslavia thing.

K: That one is what really made the trip worthwhile.

M: And all of the long run implications.

K: And the fact that Tito gave an additional afternoon to ride around in Air Force One.

M: It was magnificent. I am going to Yugoslavia; will be there a week from Friday.

K: Are you going to see Tito?

M: Yes.

K: You ought to talk to their foreign Minister; he is a very intelligent man.

M: Okay, I'll see him. I try to stay away from foreign ministers; don't like to get into those things.

K: No, but he is just a very intelligent man. Before you go away let me give you a rundown.

M: Good. I'll call your office. There were two other things I wanted to talk with you about. One, on the UN Development Program and Paul Hoffman, if the U.S. wants to influence the appointment of Hoffman's successor it's got to act at the appropriate time. He is old and about to retire. I have been trying to stimulate action but so far as I can tell there has been none. The countries are getting together to appoint a non-U.S. successor. Maybe that doesn't matter to you.

K: No, the only non-U.S. person we would accept is a British.

M: They are pushing for Narasimhan.

K: No.

M: Why don't you drop a note to State saying you understand that Hoffman will be retiring and we have an interest in his successor.

K: I've dropped about three notes to State like that and thought

By KLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon

Robert McNamara

10/6/70 9:15 a.m. page 2

that something was being done.

M: Well, maybe something is. Perhaps you know better than I.

K: No, I'm sure you're right. I'll check.

M: One other thing--and I'm a little embarrassed to say this to you. I have a son-in-law at Defense who is a very bright guy. He's in Systems Analysis. I never mentioned this to you but he would have been a good man to work under Larry Lynn.

K: I wish you had.

M: Well, the reason I mention this to you now is that apparently the man who has replaced Lynn . . . I don't know his name.

K: Wayne Smith.

M: Wayne Smith seems to have taken an interest in him.

K: What is his name?

M: His name is Carter. Anyway I am told he is being considered for a position there and I want you to know why I haven't mentioned this to you before. It's not that I have any doubts about him. He's a very bright articulate individual. I think he would do a good job.

K: Let me talk to Smith. KCMAX

M: No, I didn't want to interfere before, but I thought now it might look curious that I haven't.

K: I'll talk to Wayne about it.

M: No, I would appreciate it if you didn't. They may not even know that he's my son-in-law. They probably don't. But I just wanted you to understand why I haven't mentioned him before.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCORN

Cong. Mendel Rivers/Kissinger

10:00 a.m. 10/6/70

R: I wanted to ask you -- it's been notable that we haven't been getting information on Gorbachev Cuba. I made a speech on the Soviet threat and I have run into some deadends in following this up. I understand it came from the White House. I am on the same team too and I am behind the President. I don't mind if the President has some -- if he has a reason he knows best. We have an appropriation bill coming up on Thurs.

K: I will talk with the President.

R: I am behind the President.

K: We know that.

R: I have a high regard for you too and I want you to know. I meant to come to your meeting the other day but I couldn't get out of the office. I would like the CIA to come over and give us some information. We are in the same business. I would like to intelligently discuss this thing.

K: We just want to get our ducks in a row before we move.

R: I know what he goes through. I recognize this. I would like the information as much as I can as soon as I can. I will respect his judgment.

K: No one will know it before you and the Congress and secondly, I will talk to him today to see when we can get it to you.

TELCON
Safire/Kissinger
10:10 a.m. 10/6/70

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: The end statement doesn't come off the way we want it. It's too wailing and influenced by the NYTimes. "(quotes from speech)" This won't be accepted in all probability and we don't want him in a position that ? ? ? . There's not strong position in there.

S: That's the section he didn't mark off.

K: (quotes from speech). We haven't seen anything yet (re war in this century.) We are in great turmoil.

S: On page 12 the part that the President started to cross out began after the second paragraph.

K: There isn't the one or two strong paragraphs that we wanted.

S: I thought that was in "(quote from speech)".

K: That's part of the ______. My peacenik friends will love it but they will leave us two weeks later. We have to keep our friends. Who wants his son killed in the <u>last</u> two weeks of a miserable war? We don't want to be morally disarming ourselves.

S: You are going back --

K: I have never liked the end. I am worried about the impact on the North Vietnamese. The North Vietnamese think we are down, we are finished. They have fought for 50 years and they don't think war is horrible.

S: I thought it was tougher than it was.

K: That's my gut reaction and I haven't written anything to change it.

S: The last draft had tricky language.

K: I have no trouble with anything but the last 3 pages.

S: The President started changing from 12 down.

K: The North Vietnamese don't give a damn on their human and physical resources.

S: <u>Maybe</u> Here's a thought -- Page 11 "let us consider a ______"; cut next 3 paragraphs and pick up with " as long as anyone can remember." It saves time and doesn't lose the zip.

Safire/Kissinger

10:10 a.m. 10/6/70

By KHW

NARA, Date 5/12/04

-2-

K: I would like a manly paragraph in this speech. One paragraph that the NYTimes -- if we tell them we agree with their philosophy, they will jockey us unmercifully. It's dangerous to say that a ceasefire in VN will end war in this century. We will have the Soviets reading this. We will have the Soviets coming into Europe. Why do you think we have the Soviets hardlining?

S: Because they think we are weak kneed?

K: Exactly. We cannot have the President being a pacifist. He can say precisely what he wants but we will give him two choices. I will give him this and work on him to change the ending. I don't like it. Taking out those three paragraphs helps. Peace built on restraint. We will **have** be restrained but they must too.

TELCON
Secy. Rogers/Kissinger
***
11:15 a.m. 10/6/70

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: The President has decided 5 minutes ago that he was going to announce the speech on VN tomorrow and he will step into Zeigler's press briefing.

R: 9:00 tomorrow Xmas night?

K: Yes. I am sending the latest version to you now.

R: I have USIA people here. We are going to have world-wide coverage in English, Vietnamese, Russian and Chinese.

K: And consultation xxx schedule that Ted Eliot went over is fine. The President would prefer not to have the text of the speech sent abroad. Brief them on the subject of it.

R: I am going to touch base with the French. They would be helpful if they would shut up.

K: With Pompidou travelling, they will not give us support.

R: Just keep them quiet. Are you tied up?

K: No.

R: On the Congressional leaders, I think it's irritating to hold them.

K: No. Hewill have the 5:00 Cabinet meeting and 6:00 Cong. leaders.

R: By that time leaks aren't important. You gain by treating them as adults.

K: I made that point to him. It's not a good way to start.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Flanigan/Kissinger

1:45 p.m.

10/6/70

K: I won't have time to see you before Kichi meeting but I amx may have you stand by to come in.

F: Does the President know where we stand?

K: No. The thing is he wants Stans to be aboard.

F: He is. I haven't talked with him today on the latest. Mitox Mitchell must have gotten to you.

K: He called me. [was in fact in for lunch]

F: We will downgrade the level of negotiations and the signing will be upgraded to his level.

K: Maury agrees with what you are doing?

F: Yes. We are using his guy Rex Reid. He doesn't agree that he is persona non grata and shouldn't carry on the negotiations. ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: I agree with that.

F: But he is not persona non grata.

K: I don't think we should have a foreign government telling us who are negotiator should be. The Japs haven't been that gentle with us.

F: Yes but Miazawa thinks Maury was insulting to the Prime Minister.

K: I will see if I can get you 10 mins. with the President.

F: Only if he feels he needs it.

*

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
4:17 p.m. 10/6/60

K: I just phoned you that the President had run along the same line and he made the same changes.

R: He left out the sentence on the M. E.?

K: I took it out. He said OK.

R: I think the first part is good.

K: Every other change you suggested is made.

R: One thing I wondered about is that he gave a hell of a build up in the press statement. What he meant to say is most important and far-reaching but it's not as comprehensive as other statements.

K: He said he was only going to say what he was going to do.

R: In our discussions we will say it was a far reaching proposal. He sort of indicated it covered all of Indochina and not just VN.

K: That's what he meant. He noticed you had Dobrynin on the consultation list. If we could do it light.

R: I am just going to talk to him. I don't want to consult with him or have people seeing him coming in. Just going to call and say that the President is making a statement and it's very serious; and hope they will do all they can. I won't do it if he doesn't want to.

K: That way it shows -- gives them a chance to redeem themselves.

R: I won't tell them what's in it. I think we are covering every base. On U Thant, the same thing.

K: He is so vain that your instinct is right. He told the Japanese Ambassador that they will be given advance information. That's on your schedule. That's no problem.

R: Looks as if it's on the track.

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Bill Safire
10/6/70 5:15 p.m.

S: Is there anything further you need from me?

K: No, he hasn't seen the latest draft. I knocked out your adjectives about this "terrible War" that we are trying to put to an end.

S: I don't have any terrible wars in there.

K: On the last page.

S: [Safire reads last page out loud.]

K: Okay, it was the giant step I objected to. I'm just doing this to keep you honest, and I accepted all your changes on the first page.

S: Then I'll be home tonight waiting tremulously.

K: You really are calling just to tell me that you are leaving at 5:00 this afternoon.

S: No, I'll be lying here on my cot.

K: I don't think much will happen tonight. I agree with you on sound of peace;" but he likes "voices of peace."

S: It's a screwed up metaphor but that's okay.

K: No, actually it's in good shape.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Shultz

7:10 p.m., October 6, 1970

K: A little bit harassed and tired, have got to get going on the speech. What did you want to talk to me about?

S: I am very troubled about the budget and what is happening to it and the process of which it's happening in which we don't seem to be involved at all.

K: Who is we?

S: The budget people, the last example is the military aid program.

K: The supplemental, nothing has happened.

S: I know but the process is so ________ from our standpoint that the budget is going to cascade without our understanding what is happening. Don't want the 1967-1968 situation again, it ran away with us and we have been paying the price ever since. Have a rundown of the procedures we have to get established so that the budget people get involved which they are not right now. Your staff has been giving us the courtesy of a bootleg.

K: From my staff on a bootleg basis on the theory I don't want them in?

S: I don't know about the theory but I have got this material and would like to go over it with you.

K: This is something that concerns me now, does it come bootleg because my staff doesn't think your people are supposed to be in it. What makes it bootleg?

S: Well, for example, the September 21 package that Laird got out which OMB still doesn't have a copy of, we sent you a memo about it.

K: It is SOP.

S: It isn't SOP, it isn't official.

K: What do you mean it isn't official, who do you think is the villain, Laird or I?

S: I think Laird is -- the system is, the process is at fault.

K: It is axiomatic that no budget matter can go forward which you are not involved. I am assuming that a combined staff position from my

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Shultz

7:10 p.m., October 6, 1970

By KMLV NARA, Date 5/12/04

office includes you. If that is not being done, then it will be settled
right away. You won't have any trouble with me on this, I want you
people involved.

S: [We worked on <u>or</u> we talked about it] in San Clemente.

K: The only time I might want to take a strong hand and recommend that you get overruled would be for an overpowering political reason over the budget reasons. On the supplemental, my primary concern is Cambodia.

S: The matter of economic aid is overstated.

K: I believe State is trying to kill it. On Greece, Turkey and all this other stuff I have no interest in that. It is a stalking horse for the others but that is neither here nor there. The basic issue is why you people were not involved.

S: I would like to get together on how we think things ought to proceed. We have talked about it enough that you and I have no disagreement about it.

K: I don't know how the impression could get around that we don't want you involved.

S: I don't know about an impression getting around but we haven't been involved in some important things.

K: Things other than military aid?

S: Probably has been, I can dig one up but this is the one I have in front of me.

K: ???? operated on the assumption that it would not go out. Then I asked people to get up a package and then we were in the middle of constant crisis. You tell me how you want it to work. I want Schlesinger involved, Schlesinger is substantively good. If you didn't have him, I would put him on my staff.

S: I will try to provide other examples.

I*

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Shultz

7:10 p.m., October 6, 1970

By KHC

NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: I don't tell my people who they should bring in. I don't give a specific order everytime something comes in. It is SOP, maybe it is my fault.

S: You shouldn't have to give a directive every time something comes along but a process where some things are SOP.

K: I look at you as an ally, would be cutting off my nose -- No, really the problem to get under control is Laird. DPRC has enabled you to do things on the military side that you couldn't have done on the outside.

S: I will give you a couple of proposals.

K: Give me a couple of proposals on that and give me your preferred proposal.

S: I am concerned about Vietnam economy.

K: Are you depressed?

S: We have a couple of ideas, I will buzz you on Thursday or Friday.

K: Yes and let me see the case history on the military aid.

wgh

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telcon
Secretary Rogers
10/6/70;7:25 pm

K: Sorry to bother you. Al told me about your conversation. Let me tell you some of the problems. The President gave an observation about him. When Swank was out in San Clemente he told Swank he would appreciate it if he could get rid of him and Swank said he would do it in due time, which wasn't the ideal response but was better than. When Ehrlichman and Shultz were out in Saigon Swank sent Rives to brief them and they mentioned to the President that they weren't impressed with him. So he has been bugging me all afternoon. He has had a lot of complaints, not only with Agnew but a lot of people. In defense of Rives I know what he has been under.

R: It is unfair for Ehrlichman and Shultz to go out and not knowing what he has done and what he has been under.

K: If it had been anyone else there wouldn't have been any problem but since the President had already told Swank to get rid of him this sort of triggered the thing. He has written on a Daily Brief that he wants Rives to be gotten rid of.

R: I must get to him. In the first place you can't get rid of him. His is a Foreign Service job and the President told Swank he would like to make a change in due course. I propose to send a message out asking Swank when do you recommend a change be made. It isn't fair to send an Ambassador to a post and take his DCM out from under him, without asking him what his recommendation is.

K: I am not giving you instructions. I think that is the right way of proceeding.

R: Tell the President rather than sending a message saying get rid of him, I am sure Swank will get the drift.

K: I think that is the way of doing it, rather than sending anything to Swank. Do it in any other channel.

R: Good. When things come that way he doesn't analyze what Rives next assignment should be. He looks around and sees what is vacant and pushes him in that.

K: He wrote on the Daily Brief "I want Rives to be gotten rid of" and Al caught up with that when he was away. I will tell him that and everyone will be.

R: Good. How does he feel about the speech?

["Reproduced from the open files\nof the Nixon Presidential\nMaterials Staff", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By K.L. W.", "NARA, Dato 5/12/04", "TELECON", "Mr. Kissinger/Bill Safire", "7:45 p.m., October 6, 1970", "S: ... felt that speech getting up false hopes. The nation is expecting peace -- talked about the most comprehensive speech ever. They know it has to go beyond ceasefire.", "K: Just tell them devious subtlety. In case you send a message to Hanoi, please bait your breath and they can't find bait in the dictionary.", (?)", "S: As a former newsman wanted to take my hat off to you. He would not have done it without your urging.", "K: Wouldn't it have been better to promise less and deliver more. Cleared with the Government of Laos and Saigon, they are going to beat the doors down there.", "S: Everybody knows on television that it will be ceasefire -- they have been saying it.", "K: I think he should have done it very low key.", "S: Wondering in view of it, will it raise the intensity of the ending of it?", "K: Will probably do it anyway. Tightrope walk, the more our gyrations, the worse off we are. For success, we have to impress them that we are calm and not frantic. I would not have promised anything and delivered the ceasefire.", "S: Deliberately underplayed this tomorrow. Take a good line -- we are quite serious about this and we think there is a good chance of having it.", "K: Now they are going to think it is a terrible disappointment. Two weeks ago it would have been [great].", "S: Don't raise false hopes.", "K: I knew he was stepping out there but didn't know what he was going to say.", "S: Sounds like what Herb Kline said in ________. Have a nice evening."]

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
10/6/70; 10:00 p.m.

L: You did a hell of a good job on the briefing tonight. The commentaries on the networks were great.

K: I tried my best. I have learned from the master.

L: You were very good. I think you can tell the backgrounder went over in great shape. I called the President and told him he did a hell of a job. I told him I could see your good hand was in it.

K: That's very kind. MKS

L: He suggested you might call Westy. Westy came through with the Congressional...

K: I think Westy showed he was a great man. I think he did very well. He was very generous.

L: I think you did a hell of a job.

feg

By KLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
late morning 10/6/70

R: I think it's good. I don't like the way it starts. I don't think it sounds as if he want to see Habib and Bruce and decided this.

K: A wrong thought. Good point. Essential. I agree.

R: Instructions in Paris but it's something we have recommended for months.

K: In the NSC system for 6 months.

R: It sounds as if he saw Bruce and Habib and decided to do something. After discussion with principle advisors I have decided on a new initiative for peace. On page 3 -- I don't think we should have ? ? ? ?

K: We had the Middle East and I took that out.

R: The ceasefire will be supervised.

K: I will check with him.

R: It looks as if no possibility before.

K: It wouldn't fail for a lack of supervision.

R: A negative point and it sounds like we would change if we had it to do over again. We wouldn't. Did you see Eden in the London Times? Very perceptive. It isn't necessary. It's a difficult picture.

K: If the President should feel differently, I will make sure you can talk to him. I don't think it's one people should fall on their swords on. Whatever went wrong on the M.E. ceasefire wasn't for lack of supervision.

R: It's damn complex and has to be supervised. Page 7, I don't like "two years ago this week."

K: The casualties?

R: I think the figure this week is good.

K: We were thinking of dropping the whole paragraph.

R: Could say two years ago _X_ number and the last couple of weeks it's X and this week it's X.

K: That's better.

By KHL

NARA, Date 5/12/04

Rogers/Kissinger

late morning

10/6/70

-2-

R: I would average out for a month or two months.

K: The averages will be better than a one week total.

R: Take a period of a month or two and averages for last couple of weeks is 55 and last is 38. Page 9, it's about there's a world left out. I think the last word should be "choice."

K: Unless I call before 4:00, you can be sure there's a change every change has been made. I will check on the precise language in the beginning. The rest is up to me for deletions.

Further conversation: within minutes afterwards

R: Appropos of the introduction. I see it's repeated anyway. The one which says it will be presented on table tomorrow and page 11 it says the same.

K: What should be featured is the work in the Administration in the beginning. Their intellectual contribution has been little. They are for it.

R: We have been working on it before Bruce went over there.

K: Since March.

R: Principal advisors after careful study. Leave it on page 11 and don't take it out on the first part.

K: We will redraft it and let you know.

Telecon

Hewitt (Sec. to Aust. P.M., and Gorton
10/6/70 8:30 a.m.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

H: The Prime Minister has got two queries about the summary which came to him earlier today from Ambassador Rice(?). As it will be necessary for him to say something tomorrow it's necessary for me to clarify it. First, the phrase about the essential elements of the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords remaining." This came up in May of 1969 with us. Does this sentence mean that you contemplate an overall votes, or do you mean that the South Vietnamese must be able to vote separately on what they do.

K: We anticipate that the South Vietnamese must be able to vote separately. We envision two steps: first, the South Vietnamese will vote on their own political institutions. And after that government is established, then it can be done on a national basis for unification. But our understanding is that the second step won't take place for several years. We will not make arrangements in which North Vietnam can swamp the South in establishing a political regime.

H: Okay, we may come back to that one but for the moment, the second question: "a fair political solution should reflect the existing relationship of forces." Do you mean the representatives of the forces should decide or that the government must contain an even percentage of both.

K: We mean that they can stand for election and afterward claim whatever position their strength entitles them to, if any. But we will not pre-determine that

H: Then it is dependent on the ______.

K: Exactly.

H: On the second point, supposing you had 10 communist candidates and they didn't succeed in any electorate in which they stood, therefore none were elected to the assembly. But say they got 9 percent of the vote-- they would not be able to claim any share of the power?

K: That is correct, dependent on how the law is framed.

H: Then the power depends on the number of seats they win?

K: Correct. Now you will get different views from different people, but the view that counts is the one I am giving to you.

H: Okay, coming back to the first point on unification, ... I think I understood correctly what you said on the first part, that the

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon

Hewitt/Gorton/Kissinger:

10/7/70 8:30 a.m. page 2

South Vietnamese would vote on their own for their own political institutions. Then after two or three years time there would be a national unification.

K: What we say is that this will be dealt with by the governments in negotiations between the two sides. This sentence was put in because the Cambodians wanted the 1954 Accords reaffirmed. But it is not too late for us to change that, and I will fix it so it is clear. It applies to Cambodia primarily.

H: The Prime Minister will have to say that we regard the South as entitled to vote as the South on the question as to whether they are going to unify.

K: We would go along with that and I will fix the sentence about the 1954 accords.

H: Hold on... have a work with the Prime Minister.

G: I just wanted to make clear... we were confused on whether the '54 accords would apply. It seemed to us one of the essential elements was that there should be an election for the whole of Vietnam.

K: On political institutions for the country we are perfectly clear. The reference to the '54 accords was put in for the Cambodians, and was not intended to apply to Vietnam. Cambodia wanted neutrality understandings on the '54 reaffirmed. We will rephrase that sentence to make it clear that is what we're talking about. I will fix it to say the essential principles of the Accords for 54 and 62 for Cambodia will continue to apply. Unless you hear from me in the next couple of hours, assume that that will be changed.

G MM: Thank you.

H: One last thing. Please make sure that we get a text before the President speaks. K

K: I will get a text to your Ambassador on a personal basis this morning.

H: How will you do it?

K: I will call in your Ambassador, but let's keep this between ourselves.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
The President
10/7/70 8:45 a.m.

P: Rogers and Laird will be at the cabinet briefing--I also want Moorer there. I want Moorer, Rogers, Laird. I will handle that and you will be off to the press, and that will be good too.

K: I will be there for a little while and then I'll go off.

P: Tell them I want them both to be present at it and be sure Bill knows too.

K: I will tell them immediately.

By: KHLV NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
10/7/70 8:45 a.m.

K: How was your trip?

L: Very very good. I have got a report I'll be sending over on the meetings we had. I think it went along well.

K: Two things: one, the President wanted to have over here a few who worked on the Jordan crisis to thank them personally--men on the working level. Can you send two people over at 11:30?

L: Sure, and we've got two who've been working at State.

K: Well, we can only take two. You name them, but let us know who they are. Bill will be sending some State people; I don't know who.

L: I think I also ought to send one military man and one civilian. We should have someone from the Joint Staff.

K: Two from your staff and two from the Joint Staff.

L: Okay, that's fine.

K: And one CIA guy and whomever in State. I guess Vogt ought to come.

L: Yes, but he might want to designate someone for recognition. I'll talk to him and let you know.

K: Okay, and the President wants to get together with you and Rogers and Moorer to hear from you about your trip. I understand that Moorer is still abroad.

L: That's right. He's with the NATO commanders until Monday.

K: How about Zumwalt?

L: He's here.

K: Good. Bring him along. It will be you Zumwalt, Rogers, myself, and maybe one CIA guy.

L: What time?

K: Noon. And at 5:00, the cabinet meeting and at 6:00 the President

By KHC NARA, Dale S/12/04

Telecon
Laird

10/7/70 8:57 a.m. page 2

briefs the Congressional leaders. He thought it would be good for you
to stay and who's the acting Chairman in Moorer's absence?

L: Westmoreland.

K: Okay, he can sit there and look dignified.

L: That's about all he can do.

K: Well, he'll support it won't he?

L: XXXX Yes. Henry, I've got a problem with my Congressional
thing. They are saying that the President rejected the German offer on
burden sharing. We always said that we would rather have them burden
share by increasing their military contribution, but Schmidt says they
can't increase the military contribution. I've been putting a certain
amount of heat on them. They've gone down each year. So ______
says we put $14 billion into overall NATO. We have got to be careful that
we don't give the impression that they don't have to share militarily.
They somehow have the impression that we are turning down their offer
to contribute in the infra-structure.

K: When the President talked to Brozio he said we also wanted
an increased military contribution.

L: But then we get the work from Bonn that they are saying the
President turned down the burden sharing. . . . . We've got to be
careful not to shut off everything. Schmidt says he can't give anything
further militarily. Now he thinks he's home free.

K: No, we're not doing that.

L: If a country can't come in with military burden sharing then
we don't object to great contributions in the infra-structure.

K: No, we would rather take the other than nothing.

L: Right, and that's the way we should look at it. We've given
them the impression that the President wants no burden sharing in the
infra-structure account. I'm going to send you a memo on this.

K: Good. Send me a draft memo and send me some proposed
guidance for our ambassador.

By: KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Laird

10/7/70 8:47 a.m. page 3

L: Okay. One other thing I wanted to mention. That military
assistance package. It's now turned off till the Congress goes back?

K: Isn't it too late to go forward with it now? There's never been
a consensus on this thing.

L: We've got it and something Alex is for, but Bill Rogers won't
sign it because he says the President doesn't want to do it till after the
election.

K: Let me check on it. But isn't it too late now?

L: Maybe, but we should inform them that we'll be asking for this
in November. I would like at least to tell my senior committee people.

K: I think you are right and should do so.

L: I've got to let these people know we've got this big request
hanging fire here.

K: I will take it up with the President. But with all these private
deals between Johnson and Packard I can never get on top of the problem. But
I think you should tell your committees.

L: I think should tall the appropriation and armed services committees.
These people are for us. This budget is driving me nuts.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
10/7/70 9:15 a.m.

K: The version the President worked on last night is either on the way over there or it has already arrived. It's practically unchanged except he put a little rhetoric at the end.

R: Okay.

K: Second, the Australian Prime Minister called the President about one point in the speech which I think we can fix. He wants to make sure that this part about the Accords can't be twisted to let the North Vietnamese say that there has to be a vote of both North and South and thereby impose a government on the South Vietnamese. If we said that this was said in regard to the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia.

R: I have a feeling that it makes it look as if...

K: It isn't the best way...

R: The principles are so confused by this time. The only reason he put this in it is to satisfy Lon Nol. The Australians are always teed off when they don't think they've been given enough time.

K: No, this was a friendly conversation.

R: Oh was it? Well, Gorton always gets annoyed when he is not told early enough. I would leave it alone. It's more important to have Lon Nol with us.

K: Okay.

R: One other thing. It seems to me that this backgrounder today is going to be awkward for you because it's not really a backgrounder. Secondly I don't see why, when we have so carefully prepared a speech the President feels it necessary for an interpretation to be given before the speech. I would like to have it stand on its own feet for at least a few days.

K: Well, he had wanted to tell Habib and then he forgot to say it, so he wanted no misunderstandings; the proposal that we should offer a unilateral withdrawal in return for a cease-fire. He wants to separate these two issues. But this is not something I'd go into in the backgrounder.

R: What will you gwt into?

K: It depends on the questions, but I take your admonition very seriously.

By KHLNARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

10/7/70 9:15 a.m. page 2

R: My only view is that it is hazy and we don't know whether he is going to accept it, and if they should we can interpret it the way we want to later on. It's a speech that we can use the way we want to.

K: What I would say about withdrawal is that we are doing
willing to give them a schedule as part of the settlement.

R: That's okay. If all we are talking about is military withdrawal then we haven't made a new proposal at all. I don't think he would exclude a unilateral withdrawal under certain xixx circumstandes. But there's quite an advantage to leaving it indefinite.

K: Right.

R: That's why I think the speech should stand on its own feel. It is deliberately indefinite in some places. If we want to be specific let's the President be, and if not, leave it unclear. We can say, if rejected, that we made this far-reaching proposal and it was rejected out of hand. But this isn't even a backgrounder now because he's announced it. Every word you say they'll be looking for inconsistencies and measuring what he says by it. It seems to me that it's not a bad idea just to say that the speech speaks for itself. Say "I'll take a few questions but not add too much."

K: It will only be about 20 minutes, I would guess.

R: And emphasize the new proposal and how important it is.

K: Okay. One other thing. The President wanted to meet at noon today with people who worked on Jordan. It's at 11:30 and then he wondered whether you and Laird and Zumwalt could stay afterward and talk about the Greec, Turkey trip.

R: Okay.

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM
Richardson/Kissinger
10:21 p. a. m. 10/7/70

K: I watched your conversation with great interest.

R: Interesting trip.

K: It reminded me of the greatest mistake I made here. To acquiesce to your promotion.

R: It's going all right. I enjoy both.

K: I will never ? ? ? ? ?

R: I am flattered.

K: The President expressed the view that you were really in your natural element in foreign affairs. Not said invidiously on what you are doing now.

R: Maybe I will be Ambassador to Iceland some day.

K: Let's get our assistants together to arrange lunch next week and the President would like to see you and the others who were in Cairo next week sometime.

R: The whole delegation?

K: Yes. I will arrange it. You will be the spokesman. However it would be a nice gesture.

R: I think so. McCloy is a good old pro.

K: I will convey that thought to Rumsfeld.

R: Alluding to the fact that I singled him out?

K: Not even his wife could call him a pro. in foreign policy.

R: He is smart.

K: He is. He will not fail to reach the top by taking too much risk.

R: He is shrewd. You will contact people

K: Yes, in your name and the President's.

R: I am looking forward to tonight.

By: K.L. NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Richardson/Kissinger

10:21 a.m.

10/7/70

-2-

K: It's what you and I were working on. The WSAG showed ceasefire with regroupment was best but ~~they~~xwars that wasn't the gut feeling and the gut feeling prevailed.

R: I look forward to hearing it. You have lost weight. I saw you getting off the plane.

K: I have gained some back. I was even more attractive when I went on the trip.

R: I find that hard to believe.

By KHLN NARA, Dale S/12/04

TELCON
Sidey/Kissinger

10:45 a.m.

10/7/70

S: You have more surprises and plans going.

K: I detected there was a sneaking admiration for LBJ in one of your columns. We had to take you by surprise.

S: I am fascinated about tonight. He was trying to do something on the trip that wouldn't be boring and repetitive as analysis. I thought about how the men get along and anecdotal. Is there enough to do something on?

K: I can't judge that.

S: Could I chat with you?

K: Tomorrow?

S: Let's.

K: I am so far behind in my work so I can't go to Florida.

S: You are holding up the world. One week away kills you.

K: I will have my assistant call you and give you a time.

S: We can avoid secrets. The Pope, Tito, Franco.

K: I talked with Haldeman yesterday and wex said that the information will be dated in a week few months but the personal relationships are what endure.

TELCON
Laird/Kissinger

2:15 p. m. 10/7/70

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

I didn't bring this matter up with the President because he seemed to be clear on it when he said about making progress in VN. I am concerned about the speech tonight -- to get something in early in the speech that this new initiative was made possible by Vietnamization program. You have to make some reference to this or they will say why didn't you do this a year ago. That sentence we have Al is important.

K: Let me see where we can put it in.

L: It's important because some people would say why didn't we do it a year ago.

K: A good point. I will look at the speech.

L: I sent it over -- I put it in one place. I think we can do it today and couldn't a year ago.

K: Thank you.

L: KKKK If you have any problem I will talk with him.

K: Let me see if I can work it out.

By: KHW NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

Telecon
Bob Haldeman
10/7/70 ca. 2:30

H: ... Key Biscayne?

K: No, I'm not planning to. Why, should I?

H: We've got a beautiful oceas-front villa overflowing with
bloodes and brunettes waiting for you.

K: You talk a good game but you never deliver.

H: Just like *that* you.

K: Can you give me a few hours to reflect? What's the schedule
for Monday?

H: Briefing in Hartford.

K: Hartford or Bridgport?

H: Hartford and then the President goes to Stanford and then
comes back.

K: Are we staying with the President?

H: No, you'll have to go up ahead of the President. If you go
to KeyBiscayne you'll have to come back Sunday night.

K: I would have to anyway because of the birthday party for
Joe Alsop. Could you let me know what the schedule is for Monday?
Am I safe in making a dinner engagement for Monday?

H: Yes.

K: At any rate we'll do it like we did it in Chicago. That worked
very well. And we take Siscy with us?

H: Yes.

K: Even though the Middle East is on the back burner now. But
it's still good.

H: The question now is are you going to Key Biscayne?

K: I don't know. I'll let you know in a few hours. I definitely
can't go tomorrow. If at all it will be Friday

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Alsop
October 7, 1970 3:05 p.m.

jlj

K: Hi Joe. How are you.

A: I am just calling to find out if I am going to be please with this speech or not.

K: [long pause]

A: You mean I am not.

K: I don't mean that. I do not think you will be pleased but not displeased either. This speech has been way over built. We are already almost sure that it would not be accepted. However, it might shut up some in this country with what is needed. Thieu is very satisfied with it. We did not have to browbeat him.

A: Not positive?

K: Anything that rallies support is positive.

A: I am coming down in a little while . . .

K: [Important thing in there is the need for international supervision and they cannot accept that.] That is really the only thing in it of any consequence. . . . statements of what we have already said. [something about dissent within the Government.]

A: You mean inside the Government?

K: Do I mean inside the Government. At what you would call the highest levels. . . . unilateral withdrawal which we cannot accept.

A: Well, I'll be down . . .

K: The President is calling.

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Mr. President/Mr. Kissinger
October 7, 1970 3:15 p.m.

jlj

P: On the question of the ceasefire in your backgrounder. How will you handle it? Ceasefire in part... Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam in part.

K: We cannot agree to a ceasefire that does not include Cambodia.

P: Suppose you are asked the question of what the ceasefire includes.

K: Laos is separable...

P: It is a matter for negotiation. With the Congressional leaders I guess you would say...

K: With the Congressional leaders I would say Vietnam and Cambodia are integrally...

P: Basically should have one in the whole place.

K: Ceasefire in Laos only...

P: OK, I got it.

K: I have taken the liberty of adding one sentence to the speech. Secretary Laird wanted one sentence in that... "This proposal is made possible by the success of the Vietnamization policy."

P: OK

K: He wants to have some of the credit and would answer the critics who said why in the hell did you not offer 18 months ago.

P: By the success of our Vietnamization program and our operations in Cambodia. The destruction of enemy concentrations in Cambodia.

K: We will put it in and get it to you.

P: Where are you going to put it. On the first page?

K: We'll put it in and get it to you.

P: Let's put Cambodia in it too.

K: We will have it right over to you.

By: KHU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Vice President/Kissinger
4:21 p.m. 10/7/70

K: They should never put you on the line first.

VP: I know you are busier than I. What's going on? I talked to Al and got the text as it was developing and points I brought with me. I wanted to be sure I didn't wouldn't be surprised.

K: You will get them but there will be no time except a few nitpicking changes.

VP: Very good and should respond to the N. Vietnamese initiative.

K: Will swamp it awhile. Will you be here Thurs. and Friday?

VP: On the road until Tues. I am in Pittsburgh now.

K: Oh. When you get back I will get you up to date.

VP: What I got from Al I assume is up to date.

K: It's exactly us to date. The rest is nitpicks. You haven't become so bureaucratic with yet that you will notice the differences. Forx Protecting everyone's position. Essentially the same.

VP: I thought when I looked at it I recognized some of it. I think it's very important.

K: It's better to ____ them do it this way but we haven't had much choice. They will probably not accept it.

VP: I don't think so. But if I have found out around the country you have to keep re-stating and eventually people will understand that we are being fair.

TELCON
Dobrynin/Kissinger
5:55 p.m. 10/7/70

send
K: If you want someone over here around 9:30 I will give you what we discussed.

D: Tomorrow morning?

K: Yes. With the understanding it's strictly personal.

D: Where should I apply?

K: I will have Young greet your man at the diplomatic entrance. He will give him the envelope there. Secondly, on the next item on the appointment. We can handle that in a way that you let us know formally that he wants to do it.

D: What we discussed in the garden.

K: Ixxx Not a formal request. Whichever way he wants. If you tell me we can arrange it. On the other piece of business he will have one or two questions. I have talked with the President and he will clarify it.

D: On the first plan?

K: Yes.

D: I will ask them.

K: You will have someone here at 9:30. You will have a call later in the day from State but don't refer to our conversation.

D: Who will call?

K: Have him call David Young. What's his name?

D: Ereskovsky.

K: OK. He knows where and Mr. Young will be waiting.

D: As I am coming.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E101258
By CNARA Date 05/01/84

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

send

K: If you have someone over here around 9:30 I will give you what we discussed.

D: Tomorrow morning?

D: Where should I apply?

K: I don't know. Not a formal request. Whichever way he wants. If you tell me we can arrange it. On the other piece of business he will have one or two questions. I have talked with the President and he will clarify it.

D: On the first plan?

K: Yes.

D: I will ask them.

D: Who will call?

D: Ereskovsky.

D: As I am coming.

By KMLN

NARA, Dato

5/13/04

TELCON
Kraslow/Kissinger
6:00 p.m. 10/7/70

K: I hope you had a good travel.

HAK: yes.

K: I am in such pain. I have to have guidance on this thing. The VN thing.

HAK: Why?

K: My experience is that everytime the South Vietnamese Government and the Laotian Government know, it doesn't hold until the President gets on the air. There's been a lot of speculation.

HAK: I can't do it.

K: Let me put a question to you.

HAK: You wouldn't respect me. I amx cannot do it.

K: Wait until you hear the question. On the basis of what the President said today would we be out on a limb if we said x flat out that the President will have a message beyond the ceasefire and troop withdrawal which everyone has gone through anyway.

HAK: I don't want to go into it. I haven't read tx what the President has said. Given my position I cannot afford to do this.

K: I don't want to put you in an awkward position.

HAK: If I did it for anyone I would for you. But I have to be one place in government that doesn't kixx leak. I have not read the President's words.

K: He said that it will go beyond what people have speculated on. They have speculated on troop withdrawal and ceasefire. I wanted to be sure that I don't understate. I want to be able to know if it goes beyond this.

HAKL: I would curb speculation if I were you. I don't want to go into it.

K: Is it important?

HAK: It's our basic negotiating position.

K: A new one?

HAK: It's our position. You can argue what's new and what isn't.

By K.H. U NARA, Date 5/12/04

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger
October 7, 1970 8:10 p.m.
jlj

Z: Henry, were you going to Key Biscayne with the President tomorrow?

K: No

Z: You will be around the office tomorrow? Could you talk with Sim Fentress?

K: My favorite fiction writer?

Z: Fentress is standing here. Will you see him tomorrow?

K: When he wins the Pulitzer Prize for fiction I will see him. Besides, he doesn't even mention my name.

Z: He doesn't mention mine either.

K: What does he have in mind? If he brings a pretty researcher with him.

Z: He will bring Cassy Thompson with him.

K: Who is she?

Z: She can get me anytime she wants. She has great legs.

K: That is the kind he keeps to himself. Do you know what he wants?

Z: (Harry ?) of that study with you a little bit.

K: Oh, OK.

Z: I thought you did very well tonight.

K: Thanks. Coming from you that means a lot to me. No really, it does. Those questions you gave me were very good. They were all asked.

Z: Of course. There is just one guy Henry. I will have Fentress call David Young about something tomorrow.

K: OK

*

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Senator Percy

8:35 p.m., October 7, 1970

P: Brilliant speech tonight. Finest ever, got everything in it. Couldn't be more pleased.

K: Isn't that wonderful.

P: The fact that it coincides a little bit with the telephone call I made last week makes it that much more wonderful.

K: I told you we were taking it most seriously.

P: Absolutely stupendous! I met at least 1 1/2 hours with the networks and praised it to the sky.

K: In the panels?

P: They are not having panels tonight, nine radio stations have asked for my home telephone number. They even asked about doing a tape embargo. Couldn't go stronger on it. Ortona was in and told me how very pleased with the President's trip, he was impressed with the whole visit. Nothing but laudatory comments from everybody. There were a few awkward problems along the way [but overall very well]. It will pay off on the Tito part.

K: You are a very good friend.

P: The talks on the communist _____. In Illinois, a little flak but 99% acclaim.

K: If you could get some of your colleagues to speak in the same vein as you it would be a tremendous help.

P: I have nine radio and television stations that have asked for comments already. On the NATO thing, there is a lot of interest. ???
The Chancery Minister spent an hour with me asking how much we must pay. I [figured] eight times their $300 million. ???
Another subject that I will take it up another day. I look forward to seeing you at lunch tomorrow.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Cyrus Vance/Adam Walinsky

9:50 p.m., October 7, 1970

K: I couldn't call you earlier, I've been going crazy all day getting things together but I hope very much that it will be possible to get some support -- I know you would probably put it differently with a unilateral withdrawal. [We want to get] serious negotiations off the ground with a show of unity.

V: Let me tell you what I have written down here. I welcome and support the President's proposal to end the killing and move toward a truly representative South Vietnamese Government. This is the right policy, I hope everyone will get behind it and give it a chance. I've been trying to get hold of the New York Times and can't reach them.

K: Do you want me to --

V: You can put it out down there.

K: Would you read it to me again.

V: Read the text again.

K: This is very generous of you.

V: You have gone a long, long way and I want to help.

K: We have worked on so many things, trying to stay in gear. Would you read that last part again?

V: I hope everyone will get behind it and give it a chance.

K: Excellent. That will help tremendously.

V: Adam Walinsky is here and wants to speak to you.

W: Henry.

K: Hello Adam.

W: I am trying to get a hold of some friends in Cambridge to try and get up some kind of statement. Moved an enormous way. If I don't get through to Neustadt and ______ this evening, you can certainly use me as a help.

*

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Page 2 --

TELECON

9:50 p.m., October 7, 1970

K: [Wonderful.]

W: Not sure I can get through, their lines are busy. In the Mayor's office, their lines being what they are, not sure I can do anything. Let me do this Henry, you know we've moved to New York --

K: Yes, I heard that.

W: Let me give you my home telephone number. I will respond with a statement if anyone wants to take a sampling. Would like to drum up something as a group.

K: It would help in order to make some confidences -- I don't need it but there are others here that do.

Y: Can you use me?

K: ???? moves in the humane and liberal direction. What is your telephone number?

W: There are two telephone numbers, the telephone system being what it is. 596-2110 and 237-9404.

K: Why don't you come down?

Y: I will and I will let you know. Cy is here and wants to talk to you again.

V: Will you give this to the press down there and I will try to get through to the *Times*. This is what I want to say.

K: I'll try to get it out.

V: If it doesn't get out and you want it tomorrow --

K: Even if it doesn't get out, I'll let you know.

V: Great move.

K: If they nibble at it, we can take others.

V: ???? a waffle that will get to a conversation.

K: No one would expect that they would accept every word of it.

V: I may be down next week, I'll let you know.

By KMLN NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
The President
10/7/70; 10:05 p.m.

K: I think it went extremely well. I think it was a most effective speech. I thought network commentaries went very well. NBC and ABC were good -- CBS I just caught pieces of it, but Collengwood. . .

P: Collengwood, what was he doing?

K: He said Hanoi said there must be a political settlement before cease-fire.

P: Collengwood is Communist. He is married to that pretty wife - very left. He is no damn good. What did you think of my doing low-key delivery?

K: Very good, Mr. President. Cy Vance called up -- he said he is releasing a statement saying this is the right policy and he hopes everyone will get behind it.

P: That means not that he is for it but that politics is for it.

K: You know Yarmolinsky is trying (I had to get off the call for a minute). I thought it was very good. Laird called me. He thinks we made all our points in the press briefing. Percy called -- that son of a bitch -- he said it was greatest speech -- he is proud to be in same Party. He is making 9 TV statements tonight.

P: Maybe I ought to call him.

K: I hate to see an opportunist rewarded. George Schultz called a number of people and found almost complete support. He found only one who was opposed -- extreme leftist.

P: I am glad we put a strong statement on that -- nobody is going to be replaced. You noticed I changed the script. I used parties rather than forces. People in this country understand parties.

K: I think it was an effective speech. It was not a speech to be delivered with flourish.

P: I asked Julie about it. She said she liked the last few minutes.

K: That's what lifted it up. Incidentally, George Schultz said, coming back from Vietnam, he has learned without Cambodia we would be dead.

P: Right. He and Ehrlichman both. Ehrlichman said Cambodia was the big thing. Listen, Henry, Cambodia won the war.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

- 2 -

K: I think we have them on the defensive.

P: What did Dobrynin say?

K: I did not talk to him. I just sent it to him in an envelope.

P: I was playing a little dumb on that today. You ought to call Dobrynin on it -- say, look don't be foolish, this is a great step forward. Generation of peace, don't you think that is a goodline?

K: Right. It made all headlines each time you used it. You made a major step forward again.

P: As you know, I don't think ceasefire is worth a damn but now that we have done it we are looking down their throats. Henry, get a hold of the operators and have Percy call me.

feg