Column by James Reston in New York Times, June 29, 1969

"President Nixon's Avoidable Blunders"

"President Nixon seems to be developing a weakness for the avoidable blunder. Not satisfied with the agonies of unavoidable problems, he somehow manages to depart periodically from his normal caution and not only create but plan unnecessary trouble.

"He didn't have to appoint Walter Annenberg, of all people, to be his Ambassador to London, of all places. He didn't have to choose to visit the Rumanians, who are the principal critics of Moscow within the Communist alliance, just before trying to reach a disarmament accommodation with the Soviet Union.

"He didn't have to reject the advice of the most liberal member of his Cabinet on the appointment of Dr. John Knowles as the nation's top health officer under pressure from Senator John Tower of Texas and Representative Bob Wilson of California and the other conservative members of the Congress and the American Medical Association.

"He could have avoided his silly personal quarrel with Clark Clifford, the divisive battle over the antiballistic missile system, his provocative lectures to the university radicals, and the unnecessary journeys of Governor Rockefeller in Latin America, but for some mysterious or capricious reason he took on all these avoidable mistakes, and he has clearly hurt himself in the process.

"The Republic will undoubtedly survive all these decisions. The British expect us to be clumsy and Annenberg merely seems to confirm all their prejudices about our political immaturity. The Russians will not change their disarmament policy because of Mr. Nixon's mistimed visit to Bucharest. The Latin-Americans will take over our properties and vilify Uncle Sam, with or without visits from Rockefeller. The rebuke to Secretary Finch and to Dr. Knowles, who was a Nixon Republican, won't change H.E.W. policy by the substitution of Dr. Roger Egenberg, the Dean of the University of Southern California's medical school, who is a liberal Democrat.

"But this only raises the main point about President Nixon's judgment. What makes him dig his own boobytrap? Why irritate the British with Annenberg, the Russians by going to Rumania? Why stir up the anti-Yankee sentiments of the Latin-Americans

Column by James Reston in NYT, June 29, 1969 cont.

by sending Rockefeller, who is needed at home, in any event,
to mind the store?

"On the great questions of public policy -- winding up the war
in Vietnam, trying to control and reduce the colossal expen-
ditures for military arms, and defuse the alarming undeclared
war in the Middle East -- Mr. Nixon has been thoughtful and
prudent. But on the small questions, like President Truman,
he has been willful, political and capricious.

"It is very odd and puzzling in a man who is normally so canny
and concerned with his own past reputation and his own present
place as the political and moral leader of the nation. He is
a minority President, representing a minority party in the
Congress. He needs to widen his political base to govern the
country and be reelected. He needs the help of the Russians
to end the war and cut the military budget in order to finance
the programs of economic and social reconstruction at home.
Yet, on the side, he creates barriers to the objectives he
seeks.

"President Johnson was destroyed by his own willfulness and
emphasis on political maneuver. Nobody knows this better than
Mr. Nixon, who had a reputation for the same kind of political
and personal bias before he was elected to the Presidency.
Accordingly, he started out to dramatize the difference
between his style and Johnson's. He eliminated the dramatics.
He lowered his voice. He decentralized and depersonalized
the Government, and emphasized the integrity and responsibility
of the individual Cabinet members.

"I believe,' he said on Sept. 18 last year, 'in a system in
which the appropriate Cabinet officer gets credit for what is
right and the President takes the blame for what is wrong.
Officials of a new Administration will not have to check their
consciences at the door, or leave their powers of independent
judgment at home.'

"This was obviously a campaign slap at President Johnson, but
though Mr. Nixon said publicly that he would support Secretary
Finch's recommendation of the man to guard the nation's health,
he buckled under political pressure from the right, and abandoned
not only his most liberal Cabinet colleague but his closest poli-
tical friend.

"If the political forces had really been against him on this
one, if he had been overwhelmed by unavoidable realities, as
he is on Vietnam, his decision would have been understandable.
But this was not the case in the conflict between Finch and the
campaign fundraisers and the most conservative element in the
American Medical Association. He didn't have to decide as he did.

New York Times, Dec. 16, 1968

CLIFFORD DECRIES
MISSILE TALKS LAG

Criticism Appears Directed
at Soviet and Nixon Aides

By PETER GROSE

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 15 - Defense Secretary Clark M. Clifford today scored "foot-dragging" on the opening of missile talks with the Soviet Union, urging that meetings be started promptly even if at a level lower than the summit.

Though he carefully avoided
ascribing responsibility, his re-
marks were apparently ad-
dressed to both the Soviet
leadership and the incoming
Nixon Administration.

Other sources confirmed that neither the Russians nor the policymakers who will take office in Washington Jan. 20 are indicating any eagerness to have the long-awaited talks be-

Mr. Clifford attempted to
answer the arguments of both
sides during an interview on
the Columbia Broadcasting
System's "Face the Nation"
radio and television program.

The Defense Secretary said
he "will not foreclose the pos-
sibility" of a meeting between
President Johnson and Premier
Aleksei N. Kosygin, although
"with each passing day that it
does not take place, there is
less possibility that it will take
place."

"As this administration
nears the end, there seems to
be a good deal of foot-dragging
going on about getting the talks
started," he added. "I might
say the foot-dragging is not
taking place as far as Presi-
dent Johnson is concerned."

The proposal for talks to
limit the two superpowers'
stocks of offensive and defen-
sive nuclear missiles, first an-
nounced last summer, quickly
became linked with President
Johnson's desire to meet Pre-
mier Kosygin again to follow
up on the progress made in
their first meeting at Glass-
boro, N.J., in June last year.

A meeting was finally ar-
ranged on the eve of the So-
viet invasion of Czechoslovakia
Aug. 20 and 21. But that crisis
shelved the whole project.

Economic Benefit Cited

Mr. Clifford reminded the
Russians of the economic bene-
fits to both countries that a
new disamament agreement
would bring.

"Mr. Kosygin has indicated
very clearly that there are cer-
tain economic pressures in the
Soviet Union, now, that are
placing the hierarchy there
under considerable restraint and
pressure" the Defense Secre-
tary said.

Then, apparently addressing
himself to both the Russians
and the Nixon Administration.
Mr. Clifford asserted:

"We have gone through the
most excellent and outstanding
period of preparation for these
talks I think I have ever seen
in my experience in Govern-
ment. We have an excellent
team that could begin the talks
within a general framework.

"It would not bind or re-
strict the subsequent adminis-
tration in any way.

"If they are not started now
and the new administration
comes in, I believe the new
administration naturally is go-
ing to be faced with a great
many day-by-day problems.

and I fear there will be a sub-
stantial delay in getting the
talks started."

Officials of the Johnson Ad-
ministration are disappointed,
that the Soviet Union has not
responded to the veiled offer
to start the talks reported to
have been made by Secretary
of State Dean Rusk on Nov.
25 in a meeting with the Soviet
Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dob-
rynin.

While not averse to the prin-
ciple of the missile talks, Presi-
dent-elect Richard M. Nixon is
understood to have declined to
send an observer or otherwise
give his endorsement to a John-
son-Kosygin meeting.

Mr. Clifford said he did not
know what the attitude of the
next administration would be
toward opening the talks prior
to Jan. 20 at a level lower than
the heads of government. So
far as could be determined, the
United States has not made a
formal proposal of a lower level
meeting.

Associated Press

Clark M. Clifford, Secretary
of Defense, at a news con-
ference held in Washington.

gin in the closing weeks of the
Johnson Administration. The
negotiations on limitation and
reduction of strategic missiles
are intended to ease interna-
tional tensions by slowing the
arms race.

INTRODUCTION

Criticism from liberal quarters in 1969 of President Nixon's policies toward the Soviet Union, flowed entirely in one direction: the Administration was viewed as not acting fast enough or forcefully enough to lessen tensions with the Soviets and reduce the prospect of nuclear war.

Time and again, US-Soviet relations were characterized as being at a unique, fortuitous point. Detente was clearly on the horizon, and it could be realized sooner if only the United States would take the initiative, act the part of the magnanimous party and assume the best possible Soviet intentions, overlooking, or at least downplaying evidence that those good intentions did not exist.

For its part, the Nixon Administration was frequently characterized as being hard-line, retaining the ossified Cold War posture inherited from four previous Administrations. This view coexisted with faint sighs of pleasure at President Nixon's mention in his inaugural address of the "era of negotiation" succeeding the "era of confrontation." The inaugural speech was frequently referred to by critics when charging the Administration was not moving fast enough toward accommodation.

There were three significant issues in 1969 between the liberal opposition and the Administration: (a) ABM (b) MIRV and (c) US-Soviet trade.

-- ABM and MIRV together evoked the liberal perception of the Soviet Union as quite eager to limit strategic weapons. The Soviets were believed to be content with the unique, delicate strategic balance of 1969 -- if only the US would desist in its ABM deployment and MIRV testing. Both ABM and MIRV were seen as threatening the prospects of an early SALT treaty.

-- The trade issue in 1969 was concerned exclusively with the export side: US laws restricting exports to Communist countries were seen as prolonging the Cold War. Greater trade with Russia would supposedly have a rippling effect, providing an economic side to the political detente.

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But perhaps the most interesting common thread in the three issues was the rejection of linkage: the Soviets supposedly would negotiate with us on arms, temper their aggressive behavior in the Mideast, and eventually loosen their grip on Eastern Europe and their own population, without the various issues being linked together. Although no evidence exists, one can only wonder if the liberals were perhaps apprehensive that all their rosy predictions about good Soviet intentions would be disproven. For if the Soviets were truly as interested in an overall accommodation with the West as some liberals believed, then they would move in that direction whether the issues were linked or not.

A

The anti-ballistic missile system was the most widely discussed issue in US-Soviet relations during 1969. A chronology of key events pertaining to ABM would be fairly brief, including the following:

**February 6** - President Nixon announces at news conference decision to review Sentinel ABM system; also changes position on US-Soviet strategic balance from favoring superiority to "sufficiency."

**March 6, 11, 13** - International Organization and Disarmament Affairs Subcommittee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator Albert Gore of Tennessee, holds hearings on strategic and foreign policy implications of ABM system; hears testimony from Gerard C. Smith, Daniel J. Fink, J.P. Ruina, Hans A. Bethe (March 6), Herbert York, George Kistiakowsky, James Killian (March 11), Marshall Shulman, Allan Whiting, Carl Kaysen (March 13).

**March 14** - President Nixon announces at news conference adoption of Safeguard ABM system in replacement of Sentinel.

**March 20** - Defense Secretary Melvin Laird appears before Senate Armed Services Committee.

**March 21** - Defense Secretary Laird appears before Senator Gore's subcommittee.

**March 26** - Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard appears before Gore subcommittee.

**March 28** - Wolfgang Panofsky, Donald Brennan, George Rathjens appear before Gore subcommittee.

**May 14** - Gore subcommittee hears testimony of Jerome Wiesner, Edward Teller.

**May 21** - Gore subcommittee hears Gordon Mac Donald, Donald Hornig, Eugene Wigner.

**July 8** - Senate begins consideration of Military Procurement Bill for Fiscal 1970, containing funds for beginning of Safeguard deployment.

**July 9** - Senators Cooper & Hart submit amendment to Military Procurement Bill barring use of funds for deployment of ABM, continuing research and dev-

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President Nixon announced at a press conference March 14 his Administration's intention to begin deployment of the Safeguard ABM system in Fiscal 1970. The Military Procurement Bill for the Department of Defense contained funds for that purpose. Hence public interest in the ABM and much of the public opposition was closely tied to the appropriations process in Congress, in particular the Senate. However, it is important to note that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on International Organization and Disarmament Affairs began hearings on the impact of ABM before March 14 - in the hope that it could somehow influence the President's decision

Criticism of and opposition to the ABM outside Congress occurred primarily in the printed media. Liberal journals such as the *New Republic* and *The Nation* ran numerous articles criticizing *Sentinel/Safeguard* on various grounds other critical articles appeared in *Commentary*, *Foreign Affairs*, *Scientific American* and the *New York Review of Books*. The *New York Times* ran a barrage of editorials from the beginning of the year through August, opposing *Sentinel/Safeguard* on various grounds.

In addition to regularly printed publications, a number of individual books were published containing the views of members of Congress (Kennedy, McGovern), scientists (George Rathjens, Jerome Wiesner), other well-known academics, (Marshall Shulman, Adam Yarmolinsky, Allan Whiting), and other prominent citizens (former vice-president Hubert Humphrey, Arthur Golberg).

Opposition to *Sentinel/Safeguard* rested on basically nine distinct, if interrelated, arguments; with variations occurring in many. Inasmuch as several of the arguments rested on common doctrinal notions and assumptions, they often seemed to overlap. In those cases an attempt will be made to identify distinguishing criteria in the text (Tab B).

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This great lack of confidence in the military which focused on
AMB, was undoubtedly a direct offshoot of the anti-war sentiment.
This was pointed out in a perceptive article by Aaron Wildavsky
in *Commentary*. One of the frequently heard claims was the
need to take a broad view of ABM's impact on the politico-mili-
tary-strategic environment. This was expressed in the criticism,
"a technical solution to a strategic problem," which implied
that the system had been developed in isolation from political
realities.

Yet taking a holistic view of ABM's impact led one down a rocky
road of logic. Although each of the nine arguments presented
could stand on its own, certain ones either contradicted or ran
at variance with each other. This was partly a result of the
way debate in the Senate evolved.

Opponents of Safeguard sought to win more support by moderating
their stance. Instead of eliminating funds for the Safeguard
system completely from the Fiscal 1970 budget, they attempted
to defer deployment, yet continue research and development.
The assumption in this, whether implicit or explicit, was that
the system's technical intricacy could be perfected. Yet a
more reliable system would not, in the eyes of several leading
scientists, ensure effectiveness against an oncoming Soviet
attack - no ABM could, they held. Nor would a more reliable
ABM be less injurious to the prospects for arms talks; if one
held that Safeguard in its current state hindered the prospects
for negotiations, then a better system would be more of a
hindrance. By the same reasoning, a more reliable system would
be more de-stabilizing in the deadly arms race.

A deferred deployment of Safeguard would also be at variance
with the open-ended cost argument. For if any technical improve-
ments were to be worked out, they obviously would carry an addi-
tional price tag in both R&D and possible production; and delay
inevitably added an inflationary cost to the whole program.

Some of the arguments against Safeguard were empirical -- the
claims of unreliability and cost. Others were doctrinal or
philosophical -- destabilizing, disrupting SALT, misreading
Soviet intentions, reordering priorities, military-industrial
complex, etc. As such, they were implacable.

-1-

Argument I: The ABM was not reliable; it was too technologically complex to function at a high enough accuracy.

The argument against ABM's reliability was fairly straightforward; that the system, in its current technological state, was unlikely to perform as expected, or that the probability of a system failure was too high to justify the beginning of deployment.

Because of its technological nature, primary sources for the reliability argument were scientists. Senator Gore's subcommittee heard testimony from several prominent scientists with experience in nuclear weaponry. Although some of the scientists who were called to testify did support deployment of the ABM, a greater number did not, and their views found a much warmer reception among the Senators on the subcommittee.

Five scientists opposed to the ABM who testified to its inaccuracy or unreliability were Herbert York, George Kistiakowsky, Wolfgang Panofsky, and George Rathjens; they all appeared March 11.

York, who was a professor at the University of California at San Diego, had been Director of Defense, Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense, 1953 - 61. York's concerns about the system's technology were twofold: 1) that the system would have to sit in readiness for two or four or eight years and then fire at precisely the correct second; and 2) the actual decision to fire did not allow much room for human decision making.
(see Tab C, page 31)

Dr. Kistiakowsky was a professor of chemistry at Harvard and had been special assistant to President Eisenhower for science and technology from 1959 to 1961. He noted that general performance of complex military systems was frequently not up to the expectations of either the government or the contractors. He also held that it was extremely difficult to anticipate the future tactics of an enemy, whether they be in conventional warfare or strategic warfare. (Tab C, page 29)

Wolfgang Panofsky was a respected professor of physics at Stanford University, with experience going back to the development of the atomic bomb during World War II. His criticism was of the basic engineering concept of the Safeguard system, which was very similar to that of its predecessor, Sentinel. Panofsky maintained that the radar system and numbers of anti-ballistic missiles for the two systems should be considerably different, and that since Safeguard was designed to protect missiles, as opposed to cities, a major reconfiguration was needed. (Tab C, page 27)

Harvard Law Professor Abram Chayes and MIT Professor Jerome Wiesner, under Senator Edward Kennedy's sponsorship, edited a collection of 17 arguments against the ABM, *ABM: An Evaluation of the Decision to Deploy an Anti-Ballistic Missile System*, published in May 1969.

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Professors Chayes, and Wiesner along with Dr. George Rathjens and Steven Weinberg offered an overview encompassing all of the major arguments against deployment, including reliability.

The professors concluded that there was no basis for confidence in the Safeguard because a) there was no possibility for testing the system; b) past experiences with similar sophisticated systems were unfavorable; c) the system could possible experience missile failure, programming failures, electromagnetic pulses and the pitfall of false assumptions - the fact that we could never know what a real attack would actually be like.

Senator Kennedy, who wrote the introduction to the book, said that the United States stood on the "crossroads of the arms race". He also argued that the United States had accepted far too easily recommendations of the Defense Department on major weapons systems. In questioning the system's reliability he used a phrase which was often quoted and requoted in the Senate debate and in critical newspaper and magazine articles: "(The ABM is) the single most complex undertaking man has yet set for himself in his time on earth..."

Reliability was a major premise in Kennedy's argument for deferral of deployment:

"The material in this report indicates that a wise choice would be a deferral of a decision to deploy Safeguard at this particular time. Such a decision would not lay us open, defenseless, to an attack by an enemy. Our nuclear forces are so large and so unsophisticated that they would deter an enemy from attacking us while we sought an arms limitation agreement with the Soviets over some predetermined period, just as they have deterred our enemies over all the years of the nuclear age. If we determine, after some serious and candid attempts, that our adversaries were simply not interested in an arms limitation agreement, then we would perhaps know more about ABM systems effectiveness and would still have ample time and opportunity to react appropriately."

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Argument II: Even if the ABM functioned as planned, it would be ineffective in the face of various Soviet countermeasures.

The effectiveness argument assumed a priori the ABM system's reliability. It held, however, that even at perfect or near perfect accuracy, the Safeguard system was incapable of protecting its missile sites against an oncoming attack of Soviet offensive missiles. This general proposition subsumed the following:

a. All the Soviets had to do was to increase their number of offensive missiles;

b. A number of sophisticated countermeasures were available to the Soviets - decoys, anti-radar devices, etc.;

c. "Same hardware, different mission"; although this argument was used by Dr. Panofsky with respect to the system's reliability, it was used by others (see Kaysen, page 4) to suggest that because of the difference in missions between Safeguard and Sentinel, even if the hardware functioned at reasonable accuracy, it would not prevent unacceptable damage to the missile sites.

**Increase in number of Soviet offensive missiles.** "Any ABM system can be overwhelmed simply by attacking the target with more offensive missiles than there are defensive missiles available to respond. This approach may be more expensive than those already discussed, but we believe that it is still considerably cheaper than the deployment of the defensive system itself", wrote Chayes, Wiesner, Rathjens, and Weinberg in the overview of Chayes and Wiesner's book. In "What Does Safeguard Safeguard?" Weinberg held that by increasing their offensive force by only 10 percent, the Soviets could saturate our ABM defense. Weinberg reasoned that, given the number of United States ICBM's, and Secretary of Defense Laird's claim that the Soviets were approaching first strike capability, the Soviets possessed approximately 2,100 reentry vehicles. In Phase I of the Safeguard deployment, the U.S. would defend 2 Minuteman bases with 150 Sprints and 65 Spartans; a total of 215 ABM's. According to his standard of effectiveness, Weinberg argued that the USSR would have to simply match the number of U.S. ABM's with extra reentry vehicles, the extra 215 reentry vehicles would only be an increase of 10 percent over a total force of 2,100.

**Penetration Aids.** A number of penetration aids were suggested by opponents of the ABM.

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Dr. Hans Bethe, Professor of Physics at Cornell University testified on March 6 before the Subcommittee that five penetration aids were available to the enemy in offsetting the effectiveness of an ABM system: 1) Balloons. Manufactured very thin, and weighing only a few pounds, balloons could be inserted inside the warheads of the attacking missiles, and made to appear on the ABM radar as an incoming reentry vehicle; 2) Decoys. Essentially a more sophisticated version of the balloon, consisting of a sturdy frame, with wires carefully arranged to give the radar the same picture as a reentry vehicle; 3) Chaff. A system of extremely thin wires, cut to a length of about one half the wave length of the radar, they could be carried by an attacking ICBM, conceivably generating a cloud on the radar screen of approximately 100 miles in length 4) Electronic Countermeasures. Some attacking missiles could carry vehicles emitting radio waves the same frequency as the ABM radar, which would then be jammed and rendered inoperative; 5) Blackout. The explosion of a nuclear device at a high altitude - e.g., 100 miles - would ionize the atmosphere, rendering the ABM radar system inoperative. Some of the attacking missiles could be designed to explode 100 miles above the earth creating a blackout for a considerable area.

Bethe mentioned that the last penetration aid - blackout - could also be caused by a nuclear explosion eminating from an exploding ABM missile. Bethe offered a section in the Chayes-Wiesner book, "Countermeasures to ABM Systems", which reiterated in greater detail the arguments presented to Senator Gore's subcommittee. Professors Chayes and Wiesner also mentioned Bethe's argument in their overview to the book.

The "same hardware, different system" argument which had been used in criticizing ABM's reliability (see Panofsky, page 1) presented by Carl Kaysen as an argument against ADM's effectiveness. In "Defense of the Deterrent," in the Chayes-Wiesner book, Kaysen said "the present system was conceived and designed for a quite different test than the defense of missile sites and airfields. It is unlikely that, given the task set out for Safeguard, our weapons designers would prescribe the present system as a solution. It is, therefore, quite likely that "a more effective and a cheaper system for performing the task could be created." Kaysen's argument was obviously also applicable to the cost argument.

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**Argument III:** Deployment of ABM would contribute nothing to the US deterrent capability, and might do it harm.

The 'deterrent' argument subsumed the generally accepted belief that US strategic forces, in their current state, were large enough in numbers and sufficiently well-protected to ensure a firm second-strike capability, and that this functioned as a deterrent to a Soviet nuclear attack.

With respect to ABM, the period in question was four or five
years hence and beyond - 1973 and onward - and how deployment
would affect the physical and psychological balance of strategic
forces. The argument had two variants:

a. Our deterrence capability would remain the same;

b. We would, in fact, be left with a less credible deterrent.

Both variants rested on a priori on Soviet acceptance of the doctrine of mutual assured destruction. Both assumed adjunctly that the number of Soviet offensive missiles and warheads did not really affect the US second-strike capability. And more importantly, both also assumed ABM's unreliability; (a) postulated that because it would not work, its effect would be the same as adding a battalion of bow-and-arrow men to protect the Minute-man missiles; yet (b) argued that the psychological effect of deployment on the Russians would lead them to believe that we would not respond to an attack of theirs with a massive rain of destruction on the Soviet Union (see comments of Senator Church, Tab C, page 38).

Senator Percy's speech on the floor of the Senate July 9 con-
tained an illustration of (a). Percy argued that the US missile
force would be strong enough to maintain its second-strike
capability, and said "it would be sheer lunacy for the Russians
to attack the United States with nuclear weapons even without
us having an ABM." He also held that "in order for the ABM to
make sense, the Soviets would have to believe: first they could
with a sudden attack, wipe out all our nuclear forces if we did
not have it; and second, our ABM would preserve enough of our
nuclear forces intact to make any such Soviet attack suicidal.
However, the present ABM system is too vulnerable to provide
such protection, and our overall missile forces are sufficiently
protected to maintain a devastating second strike capability
without ABM."

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Senator Stephen Young of Ohio made remarks to the same effect on July 14:

"It is incredible to assert that the Soviet Union or any other nuclear power could with one blow destroy all our Minuteman missiles, all our SAC bombers, all' our Polaris and Poseidon submarines, all our intermediate missiles based in Europe. This is unthinkable, unsupportable and impossible.

"Furthermore, for years Defense Department officials have assured Americans that if the Russians should strike first we possess a second-strike capability with our Minuteman missiles in underground sites that would inflict unacceptable damage upon the Soviet Union. We were assured that the hardened sites were adequate and that we would not need additional protection for our intercontinental ballistic missiles.

"Were we being misled then, or now ? The argument that we need more protection of our land-based ICBM's completely ignores the fact that we have at this time 41 Polaris submarines with more than 656 ICBM's which cannot be destroyed by a first strike ... These missiles have a maximum range of 2,875 miles and no area in the vast land mass of the Soviet Union or Communist China is safe from devastation from missiles fired from these submarines..."

Professor Steven Weinberg of MIT wrote in "What Does Safeguard Safeguard," that as a deterrent-defense system, ABM "would have to protect our deterrent sufficiently well so that the cost to the attacker of destroying our deterrent rises to an unacceptable level." Because Safeguard was ineffective (see page 3), that cost would not rise appreciably, and hence deterrence would not be increased.

The proposition that deployment of Safeguard would, in the end, leave the US with a less credible deterrent, was made at length by Senator Church (see Tab C, page 38). Church argued that because ABM was unreliable (in his opinion and the Soviets'), the Soviets might be more tempted to launch a nuclear attack in the belief that the US would attempt to defend its missiles with a non-workable system, rather than if the Soviets knew that an attack on the US would bring a rain of destruction on their country.

The same point was made by Senator Gore in more abbreviated form, on March 21 during his subcommittee's hearings:

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"I cannot find practical your (Defense Secretary Laird's) hypothesis, that under set of circumstances imaginable to me, that the Soviet Union would launch a limited nuclear attack on the United States. If you want to give credibility to your deterrent, let the enemy know that if they launch a nuclear attack upon us that we are not pushing a ABM button, we are making a massive retaliation. This the real deterrence we have."

Dr. George Rathjens also approached the deterrence question indirectly in "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," in *Scientific American*, April issue. Rathjens argued ABM was essentially a damage-reducing system, rather than one designed to prevent the outbreak of war itself; one system could not do both:

"Should more weight be given in the future to developing damage-limiting capabilities? Or should more weight be given to minimizing the probability of a thermonuclear exchange and curtailing the strategic arms race? It is hard to see how one can have it both ways."

The potentially "destabilizing" effect of the Safeguard system was held to be its potential of evolving into a population-defense system. An integral part of American nuclear strategic doctrine held that any significant attempt to protect population centers against nuclear attack was destabilizing, because of the possible incentive in a crisis to go for

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a first strike, in the belief that the damage from an enemy retaliatory attack could be limited. And although President Nixon at his March 14 press conference denied that Safeguard was so oriented, the belief persisted in some quarters that, as Stephen Weinberg wrote in the Chayes-Wiesner book, Safeguard could be misinterpreted by the Soviets as, and could in fact be, " a first step towards the construction of a heavy system of defense of our cities." Arguments such as this were bolstered by the contentions of some scientists that the hardware of the Safeguard system was the same as Sentinel's (Panofsky, page 1).

The remarks of Senator John S. Cooper during a Disarmament Affairs Subcommittee hearing March 6, prior to the unveling of Safeguard March 14, are also apropos in this regard:

"President Nixon said in one of his recent press conferences that he did not consider the ABM ... more than a thin system against China.

Now, what is it? We have all these conflicting statements. Is it a thin system or is it a thick system? Is it considered to be a stepping stone, a building block for a thick system? With the experience you (Gerard Smith) have, can you tell us what it is? These are the questions - the contradictions which keep the Congress uninformed, and keep the country uninformed.

I would suggest, myself, that the answer may be that the kind of system justified is whatever the Pentagon believes it can get through Congress."

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Argument IV: The need for ABM was based on faulty intelligence; Soviet capabilities would not be as great as maintained by the Administration.

The argument was frequently heard that the ABM was due in a large part to a misreading of intelligence on future Soviet strategic capabilities. Skepticism was plainly evident among Senators on the Disarmament Affairs Subcommittee; one frequently heard contention was that Secretary of Defense Laird was coming up with a substantially different conclusion based on the same data that had been available to his predecessor, Clark Clifford.

One interesting feature of the debate over Soviet intentions/capabilities was that the two were rarely differentiated. The inference one draws from Secretary Laird's comments to Senator Gore's Subcommittee, is that because the Soviet's were projected as achieving a first strike capability in the mid-1970's they intended to use it; critics and skeptics, on the other hand, argued not that although the Soviets might have a first strike capability in that period, they did not intend to use it, but the obverse of Secretary Laird's position - that they would not have a first strike capability, and hence could not intend to strike first. Of course, one is always on shaky ground in assessing an adversary's intentions, whether it be at the present time, or at some period in the future. So in that respect, one can understand Secretary Laird's statement on grounds of prudence; likewise, it would have been a very tenuous argument for the Senators to grant that although the Soviets might have a first strike capability in the mid-1970's, they would not intend to use it. Yet, it is interesting that the distinction between intentions and capabilities remains blurred to this very day in the minds of many.

A benign view of Soviet intentions and capabilities, present and future, was implicit in the following excerpt from George Rathjens' article in *Scientific American*, April issue:

"With the rapid growth in its strategic offensive forces during the past few years, the USSR can at long last enter negotiations without conceding inferiority or (which is worse from the Russian point of view) exposing itself to the possibility of being frozen in such a position. Moreover the USSR may at long last be prepared to accept the prevailing American view about the action-reaction phenomenon and about the intrinsic advantage of the offense and the futility of defense. The apparent decision of the Russians not to proceed with a nationwide ABM system at the present time, and their professed willingness to enter into negotiations to control both offensive and defensive systems, may be evidence of this convergence of viewpoints."

-9-

Going even further, Robert Rothstein rationalized any alleged Soviet offensive behavior in "Nixon's ABM: very thin indeed", in the *New Republic*:

"The Soviets are still considerably weaker than we are in strategic terms. Understanding that, one understands their reliance on terror weapons, their desperate gamble in Cuba, their phonetic rhetoric and persistant fear of inspection. They must react to our actions, because it has been so difficult for them to maintain even the appearance of near equality. It is a grave risk for them to gamble that our purposes are wholly defensive, for their margin has been very, very narrow. They are, inevitable, more concerned with problems of defense. Finally, they are beset on all sides by problems and conflicts which must appear increasingly ominous to them. The prospect for reaching some serious arms controls agreement with them are said to be substantial. If that is so any development that appears potentially threatening to them could be very foolish. It would be especially foolish to overreact to defensive measures on their part, for their response to yet another challenge could be destabilized.

"A plea for underreaction at this time is also justified, because Soviet ABM system has done nothing beyond "complicating our effort" (according to our own officials). We should resist the desire to complicate their effort, in turn. We can stand the marginal complications without undue strain. If we are ever going to achieve some control over these dangerous cycles of invasion, exploitation and obsolescence, it is by taking the short run risks of foregoing developing something well within our means."

Professor Marshall Shulman of Columbia University took a somewhat equivocal view of Soviet intentions (see Tab C, page 33), but definitely leaned towards a favorable view. Shulman held that the U.S. had often mistaken a Soviet reaction for an initiative; that the Kremlin's basic attitude towards the new Nixon Administration was hopeful; but moreover, that their Chinese threat necessitated greater defense needs, and unfortunately these defense needs posed an implicit threat to the U.S.

Skepticism towards the Administration's conclusions and perceived threats, Chinese and Russian, was apparent in Senator Gore's statement to Secretary Laird, March 21:

-10-

"Mr. Secretary, is your case a mere rationalization?

"It has been well said that this ABM system is a defense in search of a mission. We have heard every possible kind of argument for it and many of these are contradictory. We were told at first that we had to have an ABM because of the Chinese threat. The Chinese do not even have an ICBM. And yesterday, Mr. Packard said the Chinese were no further along with one than they were 3 years ago. They can't even hit the Pacific Ocean, let alone a missile silo in Montana.

"Next it was said that we had to have an ABM because the Russians had an ABM of their own around Moscow. But now it is clear that this system is mostly of the kind that we considered obsolete years ago, and that it has only 67 inceptors to stop our thousands of warheads.

"We were told next that we had to have an ABM because the Russians were building a missile defense throughout Russia. But now it is clear that this Tallinn system has no significant capability against missiles.

"Until a few weeks ago, or maybe it was a few days ago, we were told by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that our security required deployment of ABMs around 25 or 50 cities to protect our people. Now all of a sudden we are told that defense of the people in our cities is impractical and impossible. Apparently because of a commotion in Boston and Seattle, it is no longer necessary to the security of this country that we protect the people of our cities.

"We are told that we must begin to deploy the ABM so that we can test its operational capability, something that can better be done at Kwajalein, where our test facilities are.

"Finally, we are told that we have to protect our deterrents, but this proposal, as I have pointed out, would at the very best, or very most, involve only a very small fraction of our nuclear weapons.

"Mr. Secretary, if, in fact, this is a weapons system searching for a mission, it surely has not yet found it."

-11-

Another illustrative example is the exchange between Senator Fulbright and Secretary of Defense Laird on the same day as the previous quotation from Senator Gore:

"In your statement there is a great deal made about declassifying information. We have had experience about this before, and I only wish to observe that the mere fact that information has been classified does not make it necessarily true.

"We had this same question in our hearings on the Tonkin Gulf.

Secretary LAIRD. Mr. Chairman, can I respond to that?

Senator FULBRIGHT. Yes indeed.

Secretary LAIRD. I hope that the intelligence estimates that go out to the 1975 time period turn out not to be true, Senator Fulbright. I would hope and pray that they would not be true, but I cannot assume that the intelligence community estimates are untrue today, because as you know, they are our best projections of the capabilities and of the probable position of the Soviet Union in the mid-1970s.

Senator FULBRIGHT. This prompts a further observation.

In discussing the Russian military capabity, they suddenly become men 10 feet tall. They can do all sorts of things: their skill and talents are almost unbelievable. Yet when we discuss them as a society, they are inadequate in practically every respect. The military always depicts the Russians as about to overwhelm us.

"This, of course, I suppose, is part of the technique of salesmanship.

"But it gets a little old. Time after time in the so-called posture statements by Secretaries McNamara and Clifford it is clear that in numbers and deliverability of our weapons we are so far ahead of the Soviets. Of course, they are trying to catch up, I don't see how anybody can assert they are either equal or ahead of us.

"But this is a kind of fear technique that is supposed to precipitate congressional acceptance of these great programs.

-12-

Secretary Laird's comments also came under criticism in an
editorial by the _New Republic_, "ABM Counterattack":

"Secrecry Laird would like to live in a world in
which no one takes no risks. Who would not? But the
best one can hope for is some rational control over
levels and kinds of risks that are inevitable. The
greatest danger in Mr. Laird's provocative pronounce-
ments is that if he has misinterpreted Soviet intentions
(as many responsible people believe), the Russians
may read his warnings as a prelude to an American
effort to achieve a true first strike capability. They
could no more accept that complacently than we could.
Mr. Laird would then have the dubious pleasure of seeing
his projections confirmed, but as a response to his own
incendiary interpretation."

Going a little further left on the political spectrum,
Richard F. Kaufmann scoffed at the Administration's position
that the Soviet SS-9 missile was a potential first-strike
weapon in "The Phoenix of Obsolescence", in *The Nation*, May 26:

"Much of the opposition to the anti-ballistic missile
system is based on the evidence that it probably won't
work, is unnecessary, will intensify the arms race,
and will divert resources from areas of higher national
priority. Unless disproved, these are good reasons for
not spending $6 or $7 billion of public money. But
rather than respond to the serious arguments, the
Pentagon has attempted to cut off debate by revealing
one of its "secrets" of the Red Menace - the assertion
that Russia's SS-9 missile is intended to be part of a
first strike offensive threat against the United States.
Yet, according to Senator Stuart Symington, the Senate
Armed Services Committee was advised last year that the
SS-9 had been built for a second strike defensive
purpose. The distinction is essential. Unless it can
show that the Soviet Union is poised for a first strike
sneak attack, the Pentagon will continue to have a hard
time convincing Congress that national security requires
an investment in the ABM.

"The $890 million request for the ABM Safeguard was announced as a reduction from the earlier Sentinel request of $1.8 billion for fiscal year 1970. However, the overall cost of the new Safeguard plan is now

-13-

estimated from $6 to $7 billion, a sizable increase
from the $5 billion price placed on the Sentinel.
This is called "stretching out" the program. You pay
less in a given year, but more in the long run. Indeed,
since Safeguard was announced, it has been disclosed that
the $6 billion or $7 billion does not include $2 billion
for additional research and development, nor $1.2 billion
for the nuclear warheads."

In a similar vein, I. F. Stone wrote in the *New York Review of Books*, March 27, that the warnings of Melvin Laird bore a striking similarity to the late President Kennedy's contention during his campaign is 1960, that there was a "missile gap":

"A new numbers game is being played similar to the one which accompanied the bomber and missile gap campaigns. Its principal spokesman is the man Nixon picked to be Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird. Through him and its multifarious lesser mouthpieces, the military-industrial complex is trying to make it appear that new gaps are developing, one in strategic offensive power, the other in anti-ballistic missiles, and that these threaten to change the balance of power, and to create what Nixon in the campaign melodramatically called a "survival gap", a phrase he may regret if he should now seek to hold the military budget down."

Senator Abraham Ribicoff, in remarks on the Senate floor, July 22, even questioned whether the Russians had the economic capability necessary to develop a first strike capability:

"The threat we are now told to focus upon is the potential first strike capability being developed by the Soviet Union. It is generally conceded that this threat does not presently exist. There are few facts even supporting any movement on the part of the Russians to create such a threat.

The Soviet Union does appear to be increasing the number of missiles and warheads in its stockpile, but they are still hundreds of missiles and thousands of warheads from equaling our own present supplies. And no one has yet proposed that we, even with our superiority, have anything like a first-strike capability.

-14-

"Equally important is the serious question whether the Russians have the economic capability necessary to develop a first-strike capability. This is highlighted by the enormous difficulty of neutralizing our Polaris submarines. This may be accomplished someday, but that day certainly is not upon us."

In his lengthy speech on the Senate floor August 5, the last day of debate on the ABM, Senator Kennedy doubted the Administration's claims of Soviet claims and intentions, flatly maintaining that there was no "convincing evidence that they will have the ability to (destroy or seriously damage U.S. strategic forces) in the reasonably foreseeable future."
(see Tab C, page 39)

Carl Kaysen in "Defense of the Deterrent", expressed a great deal of skepticism about Administration estimates and projections of current and immediate future Soviet strength. Although he did not reject the Administration's arguments completely, he saw no great danger in delaying deployment of the ABM.

"To be sure, we cannot say with assurance that a buildup in the Soviet offensive forces at the rate projected cannot or will not take place. But what we can say with assurance is that we can safely wait to find out whether it is occurring, before deploying a defensive system to protect our missiles against its possibility.

"Our safety in waiting rests on two factors. First is our fleet of nuclear submarines. Second is our general ability to react in a variety of ways in the next several years, should the alleged Soviet buildup persist and give quantitative and qualitative evidence that a response to it is indeed required, these include increased hardening of our existing missile sites; increased use of airborne alerts for our bomber forces; beginning deployments of defensive missiles on a larger scale and at a faster pace; and if necessary increasing our offensive force. None of these is offered as a presently desirable course of action but only as a response that could be made in a timely way to an increased Soviet threat and so avoid a dangerous situation for us should it develop. It points up to the fact that ABM is not necessarily the best - or the cheapest - response the U.S. could make."

-15-

The *New York Times* addressed the questionability of intelligence in editorials March 21, 22 and 28.

On March 21 it expressed skepticism over Laird's and Packard's projections of Soviet SS-9 capabilities, but held that even if they were accurate the ABM was irrelevant (see Tab C, page 8).

On March 22 it again voiced the same skepticism, and suspected that the Pentagon was "up to a familiar game of declassifying only the military information" that supports its demand." (see Tab C, page 9).

And on March 28, even though the *Times* distinguished between Soviet capabilities and intentions, noted that Secretary Laird had reached his "horrendous" conclusions about future Soviet strength from the same intelligence available to his predessor, Clark Clifford. But whatever projected Soviet capabilities, even though the Russians had been terribly ruthless in Eastern Europe, they still had "no taste for playing nuclear roulette." (see Tab C, page 10).

-16-

Argument V: The ABM would possibly touch off a new round in the nuclear arms race, ending with more dangerous weapons on both sides and greater instability.

The argument that deployment of the ABM would set off a deadly new, and possibly uncontrollable round of the nuclear arms race was appealing, and was espoused by many of ABM's critics.

One of this position's major underpinnings was the fact that
Soviet and US strategic forces in 1969 stood at approximate
numerical parity. The Soviet Union was hoped, even assumed
to be content with this relationship, having reached that
point after several years of intensive production of ICBM's.
Hence this position reinforced the argument that the Adminis-
tration was misreading Soviet intentions and erring in its
projections of future Soviet capabilities.

Many critics noted the nuclear standoff with satisfaction.
Future marginal strategic gains for either superpower were held
to be a) irrational, b) expensive, and c) meaningless. As
long as one superpower possessed a firm second-strike capa-
bility, no change in the numberical balance could be of any
significant benefit to the other. This was the conceptual
base upon which rested such expressions as "ABM is a technical
solution to the nuclear dilemma." Of course, the Soviet Union,
or rather its strategic planners, were assumed to share the
widely accepted doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction.

The successful testing of MIRV was frequently cited as proof
that ABM was the first step in a new arms race. For although
MIRV might have originally been conceived, researched and devel-
oped as a countermeasure to an ABM system, its inherent offen-
sive capabilities and the advantages conferred thereby were
soon realized and became equally attractive, if not more so,
to its backers. Many of the above positions were embodied in
a *New York Times* editorial March 17 (see Tab C, page 7).

In his contribution to the Chayes-Wiesner book, "The Effect of
ABM on US-Soviet Relations," Professor Marshall Shulman voiced
the classic refrain of the opposition, that the present moment
offered an "unusual opportunity for stabilizing the strategic
balance between the Soviet Union and the United States."
(see Tab C, page 33).

The potentially "destabilizing" effect of the Safeguard sys-
tem was held to be its potential of evolving into a popula-
tion-defense system. An integral part of American nuclear
strategic doctrine held that any significant attempt to pro-
tect population centers against nuclear attack was destabil-
izing, because of the possible incentive in a crisis to go for

-17-

During his testimony March 11 to Senator Gore's subcommittee, Dr. Herbert York addressed the effect of ABM on the arms race. York referred to the "fallacy of the last move," whereby ABM would not be the last move ever made in the arms race. Rather, MIRV was originally conceived of as a penetration against an ABM; additional justification for MIRV as an offensive weapon developed and now, York said, ABM was being recommended for the defense against and attack of MIRVed missiles. (See Tab C, page 31)

In the October issue of *Foreign Affairs*, in "To Cap the Volcano," McGeorge Bundy wrote that even with the pending deployment of Safeguard, the prospects for "capping the volcano" were still good, or rather, the best that they would ever be. Perhaps more interesting, Bundy evinced the argument that the nuclear arms race had become "almost completely irrelevant to international politics:

-18-

"The next year or two offer to the United States and the Soviet Union what may be the best chance to limit their extravagant contests in strategic weapons. We Americans may not understand this opportunity very well, and our friends (sic) in Russia may not understand it either. That weakness of understanding, together with the transcendant importance of the subject, is an excuse for one more effort to put some light on it.

"The neglected truth about the present strategic arms race ... is that in terms of international political behavior, that race has now become almost completely irrelevant. The new weapons systems which are being developed by each of the two great powers will provide neither protection nor opportunity in any serious political sense. Politically the strategic arms race is in a stalemate."

In an interesting speech on the Senate floor August 4, Senator Charles Mathias called the Safeguard system "technologically advanced and strategically retarded," and saw an actual advantage in lagging behind in the arms race. (see Tab C, page ___).

Senator Walter Mondale saw the uncertainties of the ABM - with respect to our intentions, and the new weapons which he saw looming on the horizon - as reasons for turning down Safeguard, in a speech on the Senate floor July 28:

"This uneasy deterrent balance is threatened by deployment of the ... Safeguard ... system. This threat comes from uncertainties - the uncertainties as to whether an antiballistic missile system can work ... the uncertainlys which come with the inevitable introduction of offensive weapons to negate the effectiveness of an ABM defense, the uncertainties about our intentions in the deployment of more weapons, indicates a decision to spend on military materials rather than peaceful and domestic needs."

-19-

Argument VI: ABM would dampen the prospects for arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The position that deployment of the ABM would be injurious to the prospects for arms negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, was the most frequently voiced ground for opposition in the Senate. Inasmuch as a date for the opening of the negotiations had not yet been announced, the most the opposition could argue was that deployment would injure the prospects, or the environment, or the climate for those talks, whenever they began.

This constituted an almost direct rejection of the Administration position that deployment of the Safeguard system would enhance the U.S. position in the talks as a "bargaining chip".

A parallel to the negotiations argument, voiced frequently in conjunction, was that the Administration was delaying, for no valid reason, the opening of the arms talks themselves. The Soviet Union was thought to be ready and willing to sit down at a table the following day, and if not willing to come to an agreement immediately, at least ready to negotiate in good faith.

Professor Marshall Shulman, as noted previously (see page 9) believed "The Soviet leadership has a present interest in exploratory arms negotiations"; that although deployment of Safeguard would not automatically deter the Soviets from entering into arms talks with us, it would make it more difficult for those talks to be productive. A not altogether different conclusion was drawn by Aaron Wildavsky in the November issue of *Commentary*, that deployment of Safeguard would complicate arms control negotiations in some ways, while admittedly making them easier in others, and that is was not easy to "draw the balance." (see Tab C, page 36)

The *New York Times* addressed a number of editorials to what it saw as the negative effect on Soviet-American arms talks.

On February 7, the Times rejected the "bargaining chip" position of the Administration, claiming whatever slight worth ABM had as such would not be wiped out by suspending deployment; moreover, suspension would yield the "best of both possible worlds." (see Tab C, page 1)

-20-

On February 24, the *Times* criticized ABM as jeopardizing the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. (see Tab C, page 3).

On March 3 it came out with one of its pet editorial themes: the nation's best interest lay in prompt arms negotiations with the Russians. ABM lacked military, and hence diplomatic credibility, and deployment might make the Russians more reluctant to enter negotiations. (see Tab C, page 4).

On March 7 the *Times* apparently saw the possibility of an early freeze on both offensive and defensive nuclear weapons resulting from negotiations. If an early freeze was possible, said the newspaper, deploying ABM was a waste of money, whether deployed to defend cities or missiles and bomber bases. (see Tab C, page 5).

In its March 17 editorial the *Times* noted "the urgency of embarking on strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union ... every month of delay makes the disastrous arms race more difficult to halt." (see Tab C, page 7).

By March 21 the *Times'* editorial position had evolved to one of perplexity as to why the Administration was reluctant to commence arms talks with the Soviets; Secretary Laird's testimony raised "new questions." (see Tab C, page 8).

On March 28 the *Times* asked for more assurances of the Administrations commitment to negotiations; it showed no great eagerness in even getting the talks started. (see Tab C, page 10).

Several months later, on June 5, the *Times* commented on President Nixon's speech at the Air Force Academy, and directed its criticism toward the President's statement that arms control negotiations would be linked to Soviet acceptance of 'other specific moves to reduce tensions around the world.' The *Times* held this approach would threaten to "compromise the unique opportunity" which existed to halt the arms race." (see Tab C, page 12).

The injurious effect of ABM on the climate for negotiations was also noted in editorials in the Houston Chronicle, March 9 (see Tab C, page 16), and Boston Globe, March 15 (see Tab C, page 18). The Globe that the current Soviet willingness to negotiate rested on the strategic balance, which would be upset by deployment of ABM.

-21-

In his introduction to the Chayes-Wiesner book, Senator Kennedy maintained that the Soviets were quite ready to begin arms controls talks, and that not only a suspension of ABM deployment but also a moratorium on MIRV testing would be helpful:

"We must press to reach an agreement with the Soviets on restricting the arms race, specifically including ABM systems and MIRVs. Both the Soviets and the United States have satellite reconnaissance capacities such that violation of such an agreement, as it relates to ABMs, is easily detectable. Furthermore, both the Soviets and the United States must engage in further flight testing before MIRVs are fully developed and deployed. Once again, each side has the surveillance capacity to determine if MIRV flight testing, in violation of a hypothetical agreement, were carried out by the other. We have ample evidence that the Soviets are prepared to begin such arms control talks; the best service to world peace on our part would be to suspend ABM deployment, and MIRV flight testing, for some predetermined period of time while we actively explored the contours of such talks with the Soviets. It is important in the context of these suggestions, to recall just how overwhelming is the nuclear force we now possess, and that a suspension of ABM deployment and MIRV flight testing for some predetermined time would not in any way be disadvantageous to our deterrent."

-22-

Senator Fulbright on March 6 questioned whether deployment of Sentinel would be a violation of Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty. In remarks to Gerard C. Smith he said:

"Do you not think that the deployment of the Sentinel would violate the spirit of Article VI, assuming we are going to approve and ratify the Nonproliferation Treaty?

"The trouble is, from a psychological point of view, if we proceed it could well include the Soviets or anyone else to believe that we are not serious about Article VI, that it was just a little window dressing. I read in the morning paper in Mr. Kraft's column that the people in Paris are beginning to believe we are not serious about the negotiations in Paris. There are areas in which a psychological influence comes in, and I have a feeling that not everybody is quite as convinced of our righteouthness as we are, that there is some difference of opinion in other people's minds as to what the United States has in mind.

"I wish everyone thought us as good and kindly and peaceloving as we think we are, but they don't. And I think to proceed with this system is inconsistent with Article VI. Article VI was put in at the request of the small nations. One principal inducement to sign the treaty was to get the United States and Soviet Russia to slow in some way the arms race which the small nations can see they are going to be caught right in the middle of."

Senator Gore also referred to the Nonproliferation Treaty in comments at the Subcommittee's hearings March 21. Speaking to Defense Secretary Laird, he strongly implied that deployment of the ABM would put us in violation of the Nonproliferation Treaty and would not further negotiations:

"Former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford, in a speech a few days ago, said: "The hard fact is that we may never again expect to be in as favorable a position as we now enjoy for entry into talks about a freeze in strategic nuclear armaments. Technological developments may well make any arms limitation agreement more difficult to develop and enforce a year from now, or 6 months from now, than it is today."

-23-

"Now, we have just ratified a treaty, the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which obligates us to enter into good faith negotiations for a limitation of the nuclear armaments race. Ambassador Gerard Smith is now representing the United States at an 18-nation disarmament conference in Geneva. Yet here, another escalation in the nuclear armaments race is proposed.

"Therefore, gentlemen of the committee, I suggest that this is a matter of highest priority - the very epitome of our duty and jurisdiction.

"We want to know, and we should know why the negotiations have not started. Is it wise to make these talks about our very survival dependent upon a settlement in the Middle East and the solving of the difficult problems in Southeast Asia?

"Our real security, let me repeat, our real security rests in stopping the nuclear armaments race, not in promoting it."

During the same day's hearings Senator Jacob Javits expressed the opinion not that deployment would make negotiations with the Russians impossible, but would reduce the "level of possibilities":

"One of the things that has been said is that the existence of this system will be more likely to encourage the Russians to negotiate. Perhaps it will, but it will lead us and the Russians to negotiate, in my judgment on a very much reduced level of possibilities in terms of controlling the arms race. We are already almost putting ourselves beyond the reach of arms limitations. So I ask you this question. Did the deployment by the Russians of their anti-ballistic missile system around Moscow and Leningrad encourage us to negotiate or didn't it rather encourage us to retaliate to wit, by building an anti-ballistic missile system of our own?"

During the Senate's formal debate on the ABM, July 8 - August 6, a number of Senators who opposed deployment cited the effect on upcoming negotiations as the reason. Among those Senators were Percy (July 9), Young (July 14), Brooke (July 17), Cranston (July 18), Ribicoff (July 22), Gore (July 22), Hart (July 23), and McCarthy (July 29). The speeches were repetitive and redundant. For purposes of illustration the following is an excerpt from Senator Cranston's speech, July 18:

"To me the most important and most compelling consideration ... is the adverse impact which I am convinced ABM deployment would have on the prospects for

-25-

Argument VII: The current estimated cost ABM was high and the eventual cost uncertain; cheaper alternatives were available.

The seemingly uncertain nature of Safeguard's cost, and its cost in comparison with other systems designed to perform the objective, were arguments heard with comparatively little frequency. Safeguard's alleged open-ended cost and lack of cost-effectiveness were basically two variations of the same argument: that as a military weapons system it did not meet cost criteria. This is to be distinguished from the cost-priorities argument, to be addressed in the following section, which compared the cost of ABM with other national priorities.

The open-ended cost argument itself had two variations: (a) that although Safeguard was being sold as a "thin" system, the ultimate size of the system was in doubt; (b) cost estimates of military systems were unreliable, because of either poor Pentagon or unreliable contractors.

When the Administration in June revised the pricetag of the Safeguard system upward from $6.6 billion to $10.8 billion, it bolstered the open-ended cost argument. On June 18 the *New York Times* remarked in an editorial:

"The present $10.8 billion total is still a pre-production estimate, of course. The most recent experience in procurement of complex new weapons is that actual production and construction costs usually exceed original estimates by substantial amounts, apart from the normal effect of inflation. In the end, it would not be surprising if the cost of a 'thin' Safeguard defense proved to be substantially more than the heavy system under discussion during the Johnson administration, which was priced by the Pentagon as purchasable for $13 billion.

"Within reason, of course, cost should not be the determining factor in weapons decisions that could affect the life or death of a nation. But this is precisely what is wrong with going ahead on Safeguard: it is not a life or death matter. Even advocates of 'thin' ABM systems agree ... that it has only marginal value. The Pentagon's obviously unreliable and vastly escalating estimates - from $6.6 billion to $10.8 billion in about 2 months - make increasingly pertinent the question whether the possible marginal gain is worth the money, especially when urgent civilian needs are going begging."

-26-

Senator Muskie evinced a similar line of reasoning in
"Blocking the ABM," in the New Republic, :

"The Safeguard system is being sold as a 'thin
system' directed at a potential Soviet threat,
with secondary protection against the Chinese, but
the Administration's escalating justification for
the system raises real doubts as to the ultimate
size of the system. In his March 14 statement,
President Nixon stressed restraint in developing
the Safeguard program. He suggested the possi-
bility of cutting back at a later date. But Sec-
retary Laird and Deputy Secretary Packard have re-
peatedly implied a long-range goal of deployment."

Professors Chayes and Wiesner, along with Dr. George Rath-
jens and Steven Weinberg, addressed the issue of the system's
uncertain cost in Chayes' and Wiesner's book:

"We do not feel justified in predicting what the
final cost of Sentinel/Safeguard might finally to-
tal. In addition to cost overruns on the system as
originally designed, in the event of deployment there
will surely be very large and unpredictable expen-
ditures on modification needed to meet the system's
known shortcomings, technological developments and
changing nature of the offensive capability the sys-
tem will face."

In the same book, Carl Kaysen raised the cost-effectiveness ar-
gument, questioning not only how effectively the proposed sys-
tem would function on its own merits, but also in comparison
with alternative ways of protecting our offensive forces. In
that regard, Kaysen wrote:

"It is unlikely that, given the tasks set out for
Safeguard, our weapons designers would prescribe the
present system as a solution. It is, therefore,
quite likely that both a more effective and a cheaper
system for performing the task could be created."

In his speech on the Senate floor, July 14, Senator Stephen
Young said that the Safeguard system would "start the nation
down a multibillion dollar road, the end of which is not in
sight ... "

-27-

Richard Kaufmann, in "The Phoenix of Obsolescence," (see page 12), referred to "stretching out" programs like ABM. "You pay less in a given year, but more in the long run." Kaufmann claimed that the pricetag attached to Safeguard did not include money for additional research and development and the purchase of the nuclear warheads themselves.

Professors Chayes, Wiesner, Weinberg and Rathjens, in the overview to the Chayes-Wiesner book, addressed the issue of ABM's uncertain cost and found it lacking on two counts:

"We do not feel justified in predicting what the final cost of Sentinel/Safeguard might finally total. In addition to cost overruns on the system as originally designed, in the event of deployment there will surely be very large and unpredictable expenditures on modification needed to meet the system's known shortcomings, technological developments, and changing nature of the offensive capability the system will face."

In Weinberg's section to the book, "What Does Safeguard Safeguard?" he addressed the question of cost effectiveness, and said ABM would have to be reasonably economical in comparison with other equally effective expedients, such as hardening the Minuteman silos even further, or simply increasing the number of our ICBM's.

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## Argument VIII: Domestic needs claimed higher priority on the money earmarked for ABM.

The position was straightforward. The five or six or ten billion dollars - whatever the cost - for a Safeguard system, should be diverted toward programs aimed at curing America's domestic ills. The only variation - and a minor one - was when this argument was juxtaposed with allusion to the military-industrial complex.

Such an instance was Senator Edmund Muskie's speech on the Senate floor, August 1:

> "We are engaged in a debate, as we consider the Safeguard proposal over national security - our capacity to prevent or survive an enemy attack - and national vitality - our ability to create opportunities for a more meaningful, rewarding and healthy life for each of our citizens. The Safeguard system must be tested against each of these considerations if we are to make an intelligent decision on the deployment question.

> "We face this decision at a time when our instinct, both prudent and humane, point toward the need to stem the decay of American society and to reconcile differences among us ... public facilities are outmoded and over-run, the effort to help the poor and desperate has faltered, and patience is wearing thin.

> "The grim chain of urban sprawl and rural decline, of individual poverty and social disorganization, of wasted resources and hostile environments will not be broken by a government which is indifferent or a private sector which is inactive - or preoccupied with hunting the next arms contract."

Senator Eugene McCarthy, in his speech on the Senate floor July 29, saw the question of cost from a perspective with overtones of economics:

> "If we are going to spend 30 or 40 million dollars on wasteful military expenditures which contribute nothing to the balance in the economy between consumption and production ... then we are going to have inflation and we are going to have, along with it, a kind of depression."

References to pressing national needs were made by a number of other Senators, among them Mondale (see page 18), Kennedy

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(see Tab C, page 39), and Ribicoff (see page 14).

The cost-priorities argument was mentioned frequently in newspaper editorials. It was a relatively simple position compared with those challenging ABM's effectiveness and effects on deterrence; moreover, one could not challenge the fact that there were pressing domestic needs, and that the money spent on ABM could conceivably be applied toward solving those problems. In this respect, it is interesting to note that the cost-priorities argument seemed to rest on the assumption, still very fashionable in 1969, that money was the solution to crime, poverty, etc., and not how that money was spent.

The *New York Times* made references to domestic priorities and needs in its editorials June 18 (see Tab C, page 13) and July 17 (Tab C, page 14).

James Reston worked the issue into his column March 16, wherein he saw President Nixon's decision on Safeguard as a signal that his Administration would duck the "really big questions of arms control, peace in Vietnam, and a new policy and new priorities for the American cities." (see Tab C, page 22).

Other mention of domestic needs occurred in editorials in the *Los Angeles Times*, March 11 (see Tab C, page 17), *Chicago Sun-Times*, March 16 (Tab C, page 24), and *Houston Chronicle*, March 18 (Tab C, page 25).

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Argument IX; ABM was a product of the military-industrial complex; a defeat for ABM would be a defeat for the complex.

The notion of a military-industrial complex in American society was quite acceptable in 1969. Bequeathed by former President Eisenhower in his farewell address in 1961, the concept firmly took root during the late 1960's, primarily as a consequence of the Vietnam War. It was popular not only in left wing circles and on college campuses, but in halls of Congress and on the editorial pages of some very respectable publications.

The belief was not so much that there was an organized conspiracy afoot in Washington and across the nation encompassing Pentagon brass, hawkish congressmen and greedy capitalists (although some probably did believe so), but more that a natural commonality of interests existed among senior military and naval officers advocating a hard line defense, their supporters in Congress, the numerous research corporations which existed across the country deriving most of their income from Department of Defense contract, and the major arms manufacturers themselves.

Harvard Professor John Kenneth Galbraith gave a fairly representative view of the military-industrial complex in his book, *How to Control the Military*, published in 1969:

> "It is an organization or a complex of organizations and not a conspiracy. Although Americans are probably the world's least competent conspirators - partly because no other country so handsomely rewards in cash and notoriety the man who blows the whistle on those with whom he is conspiring - we have a strong instinct for so explaining that of which we disapprove. In the conspiratorial view, the military power is a coalition of generals and conniving industrialists. Their goal is mutual enrichment; they arrange elaborately to feather each other's nests. The industrialists are the deus ex machina; their agents : make their way around Washington arranging the payoff; if money is too dangerous, then alcohol, compatible women, more prosaic forms of entertainment, or the promise of future jobs to generals and admirals will suffice."

Galbraith was quite clear in his belief that the military-industrial complex fared better under the current Republican Administration than its Democratic predecessor:

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"With Richard Nixon the prospect for increased arms spending would seem superficially to be better. During the election campaign he promised to establish a clear military superiority over the Soviets, an effort he could not believe could escape their attention. Their response would also be predictable and would require a yet larger effort here.

"Melvin Laird, the New Secretary of Defense, while in Congress was an ardent spokesman for the military viewpoint, which is to say, for military spending. Within weeks of being installed at the Pentagon, he was leading the political horse guards to the rescue of the ABM. His Under Secretary of Defense, David Packard, though the rare case of a defense contractor who had spoken for arms control was recruited the very heart of the military-industrial complex."

I.F. Stone's contention that a new numbers game was being played similar to the one in 1960 Presidential campaign has already been noted (see Tab B, page 13). The protagonist was the Secretary of Defense, who used his "multifarious lesser mouthpieces, the military-industrial complex" in trying to sell the idea of a new missile gap.

Professor Milton Rosenberg of the University of Chicago connected the military-industrial complex and the ABM in an article in *The Nation*, February 10:

"Ever since the Dulles doctrine of "massive retaliation" was first proclaimed the doomsday men (those who hold that peace can be maintained only by readiness to fight and win a full thermo-nuclear war) have occupied nearly all the top commands and planning posts in the Pentagon. Some civilian officials within the Department of Defense have tried at times to temper the prevailing doomsday spirit, but their own investment in the elegant delusions of strategic analysis has inhibited them.

"The main opposition to the forced march toward Armageddon has come from Congress, particularly from the Senate, where a few liberals have been willing to take on the military-industrial complex and cast doubt on its web of self-serving assumptions. But their efforts have usually only been delaying actions because they have not mustered legislative majorities. Resistance to military expansion - especially when the joint chiefs are urgently calling for new weapons systems - requires a bravery and intellectual effort that exceeds the grasp of most members of Congress."

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The Nation remarked in an editorial July 28 entitled "The ABM Debauch":

"Before much was said about the ABM in the Senate, the public debate was conducted on a fairly high level. It involved technical questions, such as the workability of the proposed systems, and questions of foreign policy: would deployment enhance or diminish the chances of reaching arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union? When the issue reached the Senate floor, the usual things happened - the debate plunged from intellectual responsibility into a political debauch, with the Nixon Administration and the military-industrial complex bidding for the votes of the uncommitted senators, and some of the latter holding out for the best price they could get in the way of tangible benefits for important interests in their respective States, and the promotion of their own political interests.

"It is a natural and perhaps inevitable descent. The technical questions are intricate, and few members of Congress possessed the background necessary to differentiate between heuristic arguments and those based on objective engineering analysis. Such matters are alien to their temperaments and remote from their experience."

Professor Robert Rothstein of Johns Hopkins University opposed the ABM in an article in the *New Republic*, . In a thoughtful and analytical article, Rothstein saw not so much the handiwork of a military-industrial complex at work on the ABM issue, but the efforts of a bureaucracy, naturally trying to reassert an authority which it once had and lost; he did, however, note who were ABM's principal supporters.

"I suppose it is something of a small victory that proponents of the ABM have been forced to scale down their demands. Still it may be a transitory victory, for the latest, more modest Pentagon proposals are pale reflections of what many ABM advocates really have in mind. In fact, the Sentinel system was not even designed to be used in a fashion implicit in the particular kind of deployment that Secretary Laird has been advocating.

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"Irrespective of the details of Mr. Nixon's decision, it is important to understand underlying themes of the debate, for the issue of missile defense is going to be with us for the foreseeable future. On defense policy involving as it does technical and secret matters, our political system can be manipulated by highly committed groups within the bureaucracy who push their points of view beyond the possibility of compromise. ABM shows this. So does the history of the plan for a multi-lateral nuclear force (MLF). Other elements of the bureaucracy may oppose the committed group, but they are frequently united only in opposition to it, and not in support of a reasonable alternative.

"The military, defense contractors and some technical experts in the national security field, plus a number of congressmen, have been the leading advocates behind the current ABM proposals. Some of their ostensible arguments will be discussed in what follows; a parallel effort will be made, however, to understand the reasons for their attachment to the ABM.

"When we think of the revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons, we usually think about the terrifying capacity for destruction. Yet for the military, something else may be more important; there has been no acceptable defense against nuclear attack. Whatever our military leaders might promise about our capacity to inflict damage on the Soviet Union, they could not promise simultaneously to protect the United States from grevious retaliation. Deterrence, therefore, has had to take precedence over defense.

"...The military has not found it easy adjusting to this new state of affairs...in such circumstances one can understand the frustration of the military men, especially those old enough to have been educated before these propositions became part of the conventional wisdom.

"Underlying all of this, I believe, is a strong psychological reaction on the part of the military. If the ABM works, or if we believe it works, it has the potential of restoring to the military some of the autonomy and independence they have lost. A successful ABM implies a wholly new ball game, because the danger of a destructive attack on the United States would have been at least sharply reduced.

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"Whether its proponents really believe in the virtues of ABM deployment on the basis of a considered strategic judgment, or whether it represents, as I think, a kind of reflex judgment on the potential of the ABM for restoring a more traditional strategic environment, the military and some technocrats believe there are technological solutions to strategic problems. Ultimately, however, there are only political solutions to the problems created by nuclear weapons.

"Our propensity to seek technological solutions to difficult political problems is well known. The strategy of massive retaliation, the emphasis on "more bang for the buck", on regaining the initiative by retaliating when we chose and on substituting nuclear technology for ground forces - all these are illustrative.

"...In the ABM debate, we can see the dialectic at work in the Defense Department's reaction to the ourburst against its decision; it has tried to obscure the issue by suggesting that all will be well if only the site for the missiles are redeployed away from urban areas.

"One might argue that in the last analysis debates about military hardware are not really very significant that what counts is not force structures and the like but rather the intentions and intelligence of the statesman of the great powers: if they are willing to accept restraints on their behavior and to assess their responsibilities at least in part in reference to a general concern for stability, then was it unlikely...

"I would...feel more confident about the argument that it is intention and will which are decisive, if it were not for the nature of the present leadership of the Department of Defense. Anyone who takes time to read the writings of Mr. Laird...is bound to come away troubled. The Duke of Wellington's comment as he looked over his troops before the Battle of Waterloo comes to mind, "I don't know whether they scare the enemy, but by God, they scare me."

Former Vice President Hubert Humphrey, in an introduction to a special report on the ABM debate, by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, referred directly to the military-industrial complex and its "offspring"; large R&D budgets:

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"We are living in an environment significantly affected by what President Eisenhower called the military-industrial complex and its principal offspring, the mammoth research and development budgets that sustain the defense establishment in the nuclear and missile gap. R&D is a catalyst; by its nature it leads to far greater investment in the production of the goods and systems it makes possible. Thus every dollar spent on R&D has produced an expenditure of at least five dollars in military procurement alone. This diversion of funds into the military complex is widely recognized. What often escapes notice is the massive diversion of brain power away from the civilian economy into the defense establishment. There inevitably arises among many of the individuals involved in a disposition to justify defense expenditures, rather than to think in terms of national limitations on the production and dissemination of arms."

Senator George McGovern in the same book argued against deployment of the ABM, alluding to the military-industrial complex, and the "political pressure" of "military-minded senators," arms manufacturers, generals, etc.:

"When the Administration yielded to the pressure of the military and agreed to deploy a thin ABM system supposedly oriented toward China, this would not, in my judgment, be accepted as a security decision based on a broad view of national and international priorities. It was rather a surrender to mounting political pressure from military-minded senators and congressmen and generals and arms manufacturers and their supporters. And all of this was fed by the mistaken impression that it is possible and reasonable to calculate national security in mathematical terms related almost exclusively to the capacity of our defensive and offensive armaments."

The editorial board of the New York Times apparently also believed in the presence and power of the military-industrial complex. In an editorial February 9, the Times rejoiced, somewhat prematurely, on President's Nixon's announcement that the Sentinel system would be subject to a thorough review. The Times saw this as the result of Congressional pressure, viewing it also as symbolic of a general reorientation on Capitol Hill and in the country (see Tab C, page 2).

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The hopeful tone in the *Times* February 9 editorial is to be
contrasted with the bitterness on March 15, the day follow-
ing the President's announcement of the Safeguard system.
Calling it the "best possible packaing on a bad decision,"
the newspaper noted:

"It is now up to the Senate to defend the national
interest. The ABM system is a project as wasteful
as the pyramids and not much more useful. It is
not necessary for a majority of the Senate to re-
main in bondage to the Pentagon pyramid-builders
in order to show that they care about the defense
of this country."

Indictment of the military-industrial complex was also a favorite them of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. On March 16 the paper said that Safeguard "will not safeguard anything except the vested interest of the Pentagon in keeping this military boondoggle alive, subject to expansion at the first convenient crisis." Calling the decision "an act of political brokerage," it said President Nixon "could not withstand the pressure of the military industrial complex." (see Tab C, page 19). Similar sentiment was voiced on August 3 (Tab C, page 26).

-1-

New York Times Editorial, February 7, 1969.

ABM was viewed as already obsolete because of MIRV, with only slight value as a "bargaining chip." Suspension of deployment would "provide a sounder setting for arms control talks with the Russians.

"The political ground swell that has led Secretary of Defense Laird to suspend acquisition and construction of Sentinel missile sites has provided the Nixon Administration with an invaluable opportunity to re-evaluate the whole ill-considered project for a "thin" antiballistic missile (ABM) system. That re-evaluation could be of great national benefit...

"The site issue has only added to the Congressional resistance to Sentinel; that resistance had already been growing rapidly for fundamental reasons. Congressional critics have argued that the ABM system would contribute little to American security, but would spur the nuclear missile race and divert billions of dollars needed for domestic programs ...

"The main argument made now is that it would be a useful bargaining counter in talks on missile curbs with the Soviet Union.

"But whatever slight worth Sentinel has for bargaining purposes would not be wiped out by suspending deployment. On the contrary, continuing the suspension indefinitely would give the Administration the best of both possible worlds.

"The Soviet Union has limited its ABM defenses to the Moscow area and has slowed deployment there of what is already an obsolete system. It is launched, as is the United States, on developing multiple warheads ... these would make even a heavy United States ABM system as useless against a massive Soviet attack as Sentinel is now...

"What the Packard study should now produce is the further step of suspending major Sentinel procurement, as well as construction, while reresearch and development ... go on. That would provide a sounder setting for missile control talks with Moscow.:

C

-2-

New York Times Editorial, February 9, 1969.

The Administration decision to re-evaluate the ABM was
due largely to Congressional pressure; this was the
signal of a "healthy new disposition" on the Hill. It
was high time Congress reasserted its constitutional
responsibilities to "raise armies and provide for the
navy;" also welcome was an upcoming inquiry into the
military-industrial complex.

"The Congressional pressure that spurred the Nixon Administration to halt deployment of the Sentinel antiballistic missile system signals a healthy new disposition on Capitol Hill to challenge the military-industrial complex, against which President Eisenhower warned eight years ago...

"It is past time for Congress, which has the constitutional
responsibility to raise armies and provide for the navy, to
reassert its right to independent judgment on the recommen-
dations and requests of the military. Now that the exercise
of that right has prompted an Administration reassessment of the
ABM system, there are encouraging signs that more such questions
will be asked on Capitol Hill...

"Senatorial skepticism (does not) stop with the Sentinel. An
examination is to be made by a special foreign relations sub-
committee headed by Stuart Symington of Missouri into the
power that has been built up by the military-industrial complex,
including its ties to the universities. The initiative Senator
J.W. Fulbright of Arkansas has taken in projecting that inquiry
could begin to erect the defenses General Eisenhower pleaded for
as he left the White House."

-3-

New York Times Editorial, February 24, 1969.

Proceding with Sentinel could jeopardize the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.

"In his questioning of Secretary of State Rogers on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, Senator Albert Gore has exposed a fundamental inconsistency in the Administration's apparent resolve to push ahead with some sort of Sentinel antiballistic missile system ... Mr. Gore noted that under Article VI of the treaty the nuclear powers undertake 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race ...'

"If the United States and the Soviet Union now indicate that they do not feel bound in any way by the article, then some of the more important non-nuclear states, such as Japan, Israel and India, can ask with good reason why they should take the treaty vow of complete nuclear abstinence.

"By proceding with Sentinel system, therefore, the United States can jeopardize the ... treaty. Even if the military utility of the system were much less dubious than it is, this would be a bad risk to tak. In the long run, the spread of nuclear weapons undoubtedly presents a far greater danger than the still non-existent nuclear missiles in Communist China or the unproved usefulness of Sentinel as a bargaining counter in arms talks with Moscow."

-4-

New York Times Editorial, March 3, 1969.

ABM had "no military credibility and therefore ... no diplomatic credibility." Yet deployment might make the Soviets reluctant to enter arms talks. President Nixon should defer deployment and "move promptly for arms control talks with Moscow."

"The President's keenest interest in the ABM up until now has not been in its strategic military merits but in its diplomatic potential. He has looked upon it as a useful throwaway item in bargaining with the Russians. But it is not at all certain that the ABM would have the diplomatic consequences which the President seeks. The Russians might become more reluctant rather than more eager to enter arms control discussions if they believe the United States is trying to bluff them or to trigger an extension of the arms race.

"The ABM has no military credibility and therefore it has no diplomatic credibility. President Nixon would strengthen his own prestige and the nation's security by deferring Sentinel deployment and moving promptly for arms control talks with Moscow."

-5-

New York Times Editorial, March 7, 1969.

There was a chance than arms talks with the Russians
might produce an early freeze on offensive weapons; if
this happened, ABM would be a waste. Until the talks
began there was no way of telling, though. The Soviet
Union was "nowhere near a first-strike capability."

"The development of MIRV warheads in both the United States and Soviet Union is fast moving toward a point of no return. Until the talks begin, no solid judgment can be made on whether an early freeze of offensive and defensive mi-sile systems is feasible. If feasible, deploying Sentinel is a waste of money - whether it is deployed to defend cities or also to defend Minuteman and bomber bases.

"Sentinel 'hard-point' defense of Minuteman and bomber bases is supported by some ... as a cheaper way than deeper underground dispersal to protect America's nuclear deterrent against a Soviet first strike. But the Soviet Union is nowhere near a first-strike capability. It would need a vast deployment of MIRV multiple warheads and other offensive weapons for that - and there is every reason to believe that strategic arms talks could head off even the hypothetical possibility of such an evolution in Soviet military power...."

-6-

New York Times Editorial, March 15, 1969.

Decision to proceed with Safeguard is "best possible
packaging on a bad decision;" the increased measure
of protection from Safeguard would be marginal; it
was now up to the Senate to "defend the national in-
terest" against "Pentagon pyramid-builders." The Pres-
ident should have proposed prompt arms control talks
with Russians; it is assumed they would have accepted.

"President Nixon has put the best possible packaging on a bad decision. It would have taken bold executive leadership to reverse the policy on the Sentinel antiballistic mi-sile system which Mr. Nixon inherited from the Johnson Administra-tion; to overrule Secretary of Defense Laird and the Pentagon planners, and to confront the military-minded Congressmen on Capitol Hill who automatically equate more weapons with more security.

"Instead, the President offers the nation a delusive compromise ... He promises a saving of $1 billion in next year's budget, but the ephemeral nature of that saving is made plain by his own estimate thatover the next several years the ABM system will cost $6 to $7 billion, or more than Sentinel would have in the Johnson version. Moreover, all experience with the spending habits of the Pentagon suggests that this project will wind up costing much more than any initial projection....

"To shift part of the ABM system into the role of protecting the American nuclear deterrent accents the most plausible - and least destabilizing - case for this project. But it is still a hollow case. The increased measure of protection is decid-edly marginal ... It is not necessary to add this Maginot Line in the sky when there are so many alternative uses for the money at home...

"President Nixon could have disposed of the entire issue more effectively if he had called upon the Soviet Government to begin arms control talks now and announced that he would with-hold a decision on the ABM system until he saw how those talks were progressing.

"It is now up to the Senate to defend the national interest. The ABM is a project as wasteful as the Pyramids and not much more useful. It is not necessary for a majority of the Senate to remain in bondage to the Pentagon pyramid-builders in order to show that they care about the defense of this country."

-7-

New York Times Editorial, March 17, 1969.

Pending debate over Safeguard was the beginning of a "great debate" over conflicting demands on resources of the arms race and domestic needs. Continued development of MIRV accented the urgency of starting arms talks with the Russians.

"President Nixon's decision to deploy a modified Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system is not the end of a great debate but the beginning. Its purpose will be to determine whether the United States intends to plunge ever deeper into an expensive and illusory security race or to turn actively toward the pursuit of peace and domestic progress ...

"For all the surface persuasiveness of the President's assurances that he seeks to follow the course of moderation, the rationale on which he bases his decision provides fresh evidence that the arms race feeds on itself in a cycle that can never stop short of world annihilation...

"The urgency of embarking on strategic arms talks with the Soviet Union is obviously made greater by the Nixon plan to go ahead with a scaled-down defensive system and by continued MIRV development on both sides. The President's desire to make progress at the same time on such political issues as the Middle East and Vietnam is laudable. But that desire implies starting the missile talks - or fixing an early date for their beginning - rather than delaying them. Every month of delay makes the disastrous arms race more difficult to halt."

-8-

New York Times Editorial, March 21, 1969.

Skepticism over Laird's and Packard's projections of Soviet capabilities; but even if they are correct, the ABM is irrelevant. "Net effect" is to raise questions about US reluctance to enter into arms talks.

"President Nixon's case for deploying a modified Sentinel anti-ballistic missile system become less credible with each elaboration by Administration spokesmen ...

"What is evident in the latest round of testimony is that the Pentagon, having been forced to lay a good many of the ghosts with which it tried in the past to frighten the country into escalation of the arms race, has come up with a whole new set of sepulchral horrors. Mr. Nixon, to his credit, nailed both 'thin' and 'thick' ABM projects as frauds for any effective defense of American cities ... Now a rationale of comparable dubiety is being put together to persuade the nation that it makes sense to build an ABM screen around Minuteman offensive missile ...

"If Soviet SS-9 capabilities are what Mr. Laird and Deputy Defense Secretary Packard claim they are, however, they make Mr. Nixon's modified ABM defense even more irrelevant than some experts have supposed. An SS-9 could knock out a Minuteman if it struck within even a mile of its hardened site. With multiple warheads under development by Moscow, what real chance would there be of interception by an acknowledgedly obsolete Sentinel defense? ...

"The net effect of Mr. Laird's testimony is to project the nightmare of an accelerated nuclear arms race, rather than an all-out effort with the Soviet Union to bring these terrible weapons under control. Its effect is to make even more dubious the "safeguard" label that President Nixon has tried to pin on his ill-conceived ABM project, and to raise new questions about the Administration's reluctance to move for arms control talks with the Russians."

-9-

New York Times Editorial, March 22, 1969.

Doubts Laird's projection of Soviet SS-9 capabilities. Although one cannot expect Laird to make public sensitive intelligence, it is strange that he has come to different conclusions than his predecessor, who had access to the same intelligence.

"Secretary of Defense Laird has delivered two shocking assessments that seem sharply at variance with those of his immediate predecessors, Clark M. Clifford and Robert S. McNamara.

"Mr. Laird says flatly that with deployment of its SS-9 missile the Soviet Union is adopting a "first-strike" nuclear strategy ... and he casts doubt on the invulnerability after 1972 of American nuclear submarine fleet ... Polaris missiles ...

"There is admittedly a difference between declassifying information about a weapons system already operational and information about a Soviet defense mechanism that may or may not prove feasible three or four years hence. No reasonable American will demand that Secretary Laird make public intelligence information that could damage this country's security.

"But Americans will be deeply disturbed at the hast with which a new Defense Secretary, in his zeal to promote a new nuclear weapons system, has departed from evaluations made by his predecessor only two months ago on largely the same information. They are bound to suspect that the Pentagon is up to a familiar game of declassifying only the military information that supports its demand for another round in the nuclear arms race..."

-10-

New York Times Editorial, March 28, 1969.

Again doubts conclusions of Defense chiefs on capabilities and intentions of Russians. Also would like to see 'greater eagerness' on the part of the US in getting arms talks started; says although the Soviets were rather ruthless in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, et al., they have no desire to play "nuclear roulette."

"The intelligence material on which the Defense Department chiefs are relying appears to be exactly the same material from which former Secretary Clark Clifford drew opposite conclusions only two months ago. The Laird-Packard statistics, though more horrendous than any that preceded them in the two decades of the cold war, differ only in degree from those that have been used time and again in Washington and Moscow to bring the atomic arsenals of both superpowers to their present point of ludicrous overkill ...

"The Kremlin rulers, for all the ruthlessness they have displayed against such weak nations as Poland, Finland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, are not insane. They have shown no taste for playing nuclear roulette with the future of their nation and the world. The right course now is to engage them in arms control talks looking toward a halt in this mad race.

"Secretary of State Rogers says the United States could abandon its ABM plans if the Russians discarded theirs. That assurance would be more convincing if the Administration was showing greater eagerness to get arms talks actually started."

-11-

New York Times Editorial, March 29, 1969.

Doubts reliability of the system.

"Many will argue that the flawless performance of Apollo spacecraft in the exacting flights they have made in preparation for the first landing on the moon erases any valid basis for doubt that the ABM system can fulfill its assigned mission. But quite apart from the fact that an Apollo rocket is simpler than the Safeguard complex, the project to put men on the moon benefits from a degree of care and checking that no long-lived ABM can expect to have...

"The whole intertwined program for building deterrents around the present grid of nuclear deterrents provides plentiful opportunity for the operation of what engineers call Murphy's Second Law: If anything can go wrong with a complex system, it will go wrong. An ABM system would be fired only once - on twenty minutes notice at the outbreak of nuclear war. The possibility of substantial, even catastrophic failure requires close examination by Congress before it decides on a project for which there is little discernible justification in any event."

-12-

New York Times Editorial, June 5, 1969.

Criticizes President Nixon's June 4 speech at Air Force Academy, in particular linkage of arms control issues to Soviet behavior in general.

"(President Nixon) indicated that American acceptance of arms limitations was linked to Soviet acceptance of 'other specific moves to reduce tensions around the world.' He criticized the pursuit of arms control 'as an end in itself' separate from political settlements.

"This approach threatens to compromise the unique opportunity that now exists to halt the nuclear missile race before it enters an expensive and dangerous new upward spiral. The fundamental question that Mr. Nixon's speech poses is whether he has adequately studied and grasped the real issues involved in the nuclear arms race. That he failed to probe deeply enough into the ABM issue before taking his Safeguard decision has been clearly revealed by the subsequent twisting and turning in defense of that decision.

"The bias in Mr. Nixon's remarks yesterday suggests that he may now be moving, with mind made up in advance, toward a similarly faulty decision on the far more critical issue of strategic arms talks with Russia.

-13-

New York Times Editorial, June 18, 1969.

Cost estimates of the Pentagon on Safeguard - which had been revised upward to $10.8 billion - were still not reliable, and made more pertinent the question of whether the possible marginal gain afforded by the system was worth the pricetag, especially when domestic needs were going unmet.

"Critics of antiballistic missile deployment have now been con-
firmed by Defense Secretary Laird in their prediction that the
so-called 'thin' system would prove far more expensive, if built,
than initial ... figures indicated. Mr. Laird's latest figures
... reveal that the ... system will cost $10.8 billion ...

"The present $10.8 billion total is still a preproduction es-
timate, of course. Most recent experience in procurement of
complex new weapons systems is that actual production and con-
struction costs usually exceed original estimates by substantial
amounts, apart from the normal affects of inflation. In the end,
it would not be surprising if the cost of a 'thin' Safeguard
defense proved to be substantially more than the heavy system
under discussion during the Johnson Administration, which was
priced by the Pentagon as purchasable for $13 billion...

"The Pentagon's obviously unreliable and vastly escalating cost estimates ... make increasingly pertinent the question whether the possible marginal gain is worth the money, especially at a time when urgent civilian needs are going begging."

-14-

New York Times Editorial, July 17, 1969.

Rehash of several arguments already made;
cites "deterrent power to destroy every important
center in the Communist bloc."

"Untested and incapable of being tested until it is built, Safeguard has been described by a Senate Armed Forces Committee minority report as 'the most complicated technological development ever planned for operation by man.' If in the hour of need it worked every bit as well as its designers hope - an extremely rash hypothesis - its effectivness would behigh only in the opinion of some experts, marginal or all but worthless in the equally authoritative opinion of others. Its cost would be astronomical and would put off indefinitely, even should the war in Vietnam soon be over, the desperately pressing work of rehabilitation that has to be done at home. And finally, there is more chance on the basis of experience, that it would provoke the Russians to try to outdo us in an arms race rather than to join with us in arms control.

"If there were anything clear-cut or definitive about the need for the Safeguard system, not to mention the even more ominous MIRV multiple warhead missiles, it is unthinkable that any Senator would withold his support. But there is the most serious doubt that either will do good and considerable chance that they will do grave harm. Moreover, we already have the deterrent power to destroy every important center in the Communist bloc - not once, but three or four times over. Half the Senate opposes Safeguard deployment prior to the strategic arms limitation talks with the Russians..."

-15-

New York Times Editorial, August 7, 1969.

Day following Senate vote, says President Nixon
still does not have to approve deployment.

"With authority in his pocket to initiate Safeguard deployment, the President will have little lose and much to gain by announcing a brief delay to await opening of the strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. Such a gesture would heal the wounds of the recent struggle, replace national division with national unity and do far more to impress Moscow than news that the first steps had been taken to deploy a system that will not be operational, in any event, for six years...

"There is little support in the Senate or the country for unilateral American disarmament. If Moscow is not prepared to freeze defensive and offensive missiles at present levels but insists on a further build-up, the Administration will face little opposition to a balancing American effort, wasteful and dangerous as such action would be for both sides. But for the United States, already in the lead, to launch a missile build-up of its own befor exploring the Soviet position not only prejudices the negotiations in advance but weakens American security by further dividing an already badly divided nation.

"There is no parallel with the situation in 1941, when a single House vote extended the draft. Then, war was under way in Europe and threatening in the Pacific; the draft was vital and urgent to permit expansion of the armed forces. No such urgency attaches to the present trend in the nuclear missile balance. A delay of a few weeks in initiating Safeguard deployment would be an act of statesmanship that would undoubtedly bring a favorable response in the Senate and might well stimulate a Soviet gesture of comparable importance."

-16-

Editorial in Houston, Texas, *Chronicle*, March 9, 1969.

Focuses primarily on open-ended cost and cost-priorities arguments in opposing system. Alludes to arms-race argument, implies ABM would injure prospects for negotiations.

"This week President Nixon will make a multi-billion decision which could determine the course of the missile race and influence the possibility of arms limitation talks with the Russians.

"What Mr. Nixon has promised to decide is whether the United States will go ahead with the deployment of a limited, or "thin" anti-ballistic missile system. For a number of reasons, the most logical course is to forget about ABM.

"The system under consideration was recommended in the Johnson administration as a partial defense for the United States against attack from intercontinental missiles that might be launched from Red China when such missiles are developed. The Pentagon has said that the Chinese might have such a missile by 1970.

"When former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara gave his blessing to ABM it was reported that the military was being given the thin system as a pacifier. The cost was estimated at $4 billion and now it has increased to $5.8 billion.

"Even if the military were to be appeased by the spending of those billions, it would not be worth the price. But it seems that the military will not be satisfied unless it gets a "thick" ABM system which might cost $50 billion.

"The purpose of the thick system would be to protect the United States from some of the missile which Russia would loft at this country in the event of war. If we were to build such a system, there is no reason why Russia could not do the same. Then we would be at about the same point we are now - that is, we can virtually destroy Russia, and they us, regardless of which nation fires the first missile.

"The building of an ABM system by both nations would not change the balance of power, but both would become poorer by billions of dollars. Both nations have plenty of peaceful areas in which these vast sums could be spent to accomplish more good for their peoples.

"Rather than start on another costly round in the missile race, the interests of the United States and Russia would be better served by an agreement limiting arms, including missiles."

-17-

Editorial in *Los Angeles Times*, March 11, 1969.

Equivocal; does not believe there is an unqualified
answer to question of whether to proceed with Sentinel;
but does note that there is "no overriding military
reason" for an irreversible decision now.

"The Times believes that the best answer (to whether the US should proceed with deployment) is neither an unqualified 'yes' or 'no,' but a course of action which will keep American options open until a better reading can be taken of Soviet interest in arms limitation measures.

"A moratorium by both countries on deployment of the ABM will presumably be a major topic of discussion at the summit meeting which Mr. Nixon hopes to arrange with his Kremlin counterparts later this year.

"If such an agreement can be reached, the United States and the
Soviet Union will have made a major start toward bringing the
arms race under control.

"They will also save billions of dollars which, at least in the
American case, can thereupon be spent for projects to ameliorate
the causes of dangerous tensions within our society.

"Fortunately, there seems to be no overriding military reason
that a final, irreversibl decision on deployment of a US mis-
sile defense system must be made now.

"A delaying action is, therefore, in order.

"It is unfortunate that congressional critics of the ABM have
seen fit to turn the current debate into a kind of morality play,
with the 'good-guy' opponents pitted against missile-happy
'bad guys' who are scheming to perpetuate the arms race...

"The case for the 'thin' system is less pressing now than it
appeared a year ago. Red China's missile program is behind
schedule, and the Russians have at least temporarily halted
work on their ABM.

"Mr. Nixon may find it diplomatically useful to find a quali-
fied go-ahead for the program. If so, however, he should make
it clear that the decision is still tentative - and still re-
versible."

-18-

Editorial in *Boston Globe*, March 15, 1969.

Questions value of Safeguard as a deterrent; fears it will increase the likelihood of continuation of the arms race; sees possibility of it upsetting the "balance of forces" upon which Soviet offer to negotiate was based.

"The essence of the Sentinel system still remains. It would be deployed, and this is what Secretary of Defense Laird and the Pentagon have wanted. It would be deployed, at least initially around two ... bases in the Far West, on the grounds that this is vital to our defense and it would be a deterrent since an enemy would know we had a second-strike capability.

"This entire question of whether the Sentinel system would in fact protect enough of our missiles to constitute a deterrent, will now be debated in Congress as it should be. The overwhelming weight of evidence from the scientific community is that the initially $7 billion system will not do the job intended for it...

"As for safeguards, none exists in the last analysis of this nuclear arms race. The President tacitly admitted this when he said both that his program would not provide for defense of our cities ...

"The basic trouble with President Nixon's first major decision is that it increases the likelihood that the nuclear arms race, already past tolerable limits, will continue. The President's promise of an annual review of the program does nothing to remove this threat from the world community...

"It may be questioned whether deployment of the ABM system will help in arranging those (arms) talks. For deployment is another step in the nuclear race. It can upset the current balance of forces on which the Russian offer was based, and strengthen the Soviet equivalent of our own hawks and the Pentagon...

"Someone must take a big risk for peace ..."

-19-

Editorial in St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 16, 1969.

Portray's Safeguard decision as protecting
the Pentagon and military-industrial com-
plex; also questions value of system to de-
terrence, and implies it could be expanded
to thick system at "first convenient crisis."

"President Nixon has elevated antiballistic missile policy to new heights of absurdity with his decision to deploy a tempor- arily limited version of the Sentinel system. His thinner- than-thin ABM program, to which he gives the name 'safeguard,' will not safeguard anything except the vested interest of the Pentagon in keeping this military boondoggle alive, subject to expansion at the first convenient crisis.

"The President deserves commendation for facing up to the fact that there is no feasible way to defend the population of our cities from a missile attack. In rejecting a 'thick' defense system, he thus rejects all the rubbish that has issued from the Pentagon about building an ABM system to reduct casualties in a nuclear exchange from 100 million to 40 million ...

"But while abandoning the 'damage limitation' rationale for the ABM, Mr. Nixon adopts an equally preposterous one of his own. The bases are going to be moved away from the cities ... and their alleged purpose will be to 'protect' our deterrent power to launch a retaliatory second strike. This protection is to be accomplished by 'safeguarding' only two of the Minuteman missile bases. What about all the others? ...

"There is, of course, very little probability that the 10% would in fact survive. The ABM system, whether thick or thin, whether based near the cities or on the great plains, depends upon delicate radar ... which many qualified scientists say would be rendered useless by a saturation attack. In knocking out the 90% of our bases left unsafeguarded the enemy could confidently count on knocking out the other 10%, by disrupting their controls as well.

"If Mr. Nixon's assumptions are accepted for the sake of argument, still his policy won't hold water. For if the strategy of deterrence is valid at all -- a question nobody seems to ask -- it is as valid without the ABM as with it... The highly questionable ability to protect a small share of our land-based missiles is not going to add credibility to our deterrent capacity.

(continued)

-20-

Editorial in *St. Louis Post-Dispatch*, March 16, 1969, continued.

"The President's decision, unfortunately, is the kind that had to be expected from him -- an act of political brokerage, giving everybody a little something, but in essence sustaining the military domination of foreign policy that has embroiled us in Vietnam and an insane arms race. In the pinch, although confronted with a unique opportunity to mobilize strong public support for a new and more promising policy, he could not withstand the pressure of the military industrial complex in the opposite direction. One can only hope that Congress will do better.