MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PLACE: Time-Life Building, New York
TIME AND DATE: Time-Life Dinner - Thursday, May 4, 1972
PARTICIPANTS: List Attached

Mr. Stanton and gentlemen. I appreciate the introduction. I feel I must
point out how Time-Life got me into this. First, I was invited to a movie.
I of course accepted as I thought I ought to see Patton again (laughter).
Then they told me that if I didn't come, Hugh Sidey would back me up.
After due consideration, I was ordered to come by the President (applause).
Third, there is a deeper reason. I am about to become one of the big men
in Washington on China, but every time I show up some place, Schecter
and Sidey are always there first.

I want to talk about two things. First, the Soviet summit and second,
where we are going with our relationships. I would like to examine our
relationships with the Soviets by comparing what we are trying with them
with what we are doing in China. On our trip to China, we started inroads
which were small. What we would pursue would be the consideration of
the division from the organizational past with respect to China. There
are only a few areas where our policy impinged and most were psychologi-
cal. There is very little the U.S. can do for the Peoples Republic of China
and conversely there is very little they can do for us. Most of the problem
was dealing with the cultural dominance of their leaders.

With the Soviet Union the problem was different. Both the U.S. and Soviet
Union are great world powers. We impinge in many parts of the word. In
many areas concrete and precise negotiations can be decisive and in some
instances essential. While the China trip will have great historical signifi-
cance, the negotiations with the Soviets will have great political significance.
I will mention some of the areas later.

The framework of our expectations is quite different with the Soviets. The
Soviet Union has a different type of leadership in that she has a different
kind of communism -- a more mature communism. In China, the leaders
are all in the generation of the revolution -- they still remember being

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impotent. At the Soviet Union, there is a third or fourth generation of government. The leaders have survived bitter internal strife involving purges. When you confront Brezhnev you must keep a few things in mind. While our President must stand for election in November, which occasionally crosses his mind (laughter), Brezhnev seems to be running every day. He is very aware of what is going on in the Politburo.

The Soviet bureaucracy is so great the conduct of foreign policy is conducted much differently than with the Chinese. With the Chinese it is possible to address theory and quite possible to make a basic position and defend it. With the USSR theoretical bases are never made and every discussion is an exchange of position. For every position which is offered, a counterposition results. So a position becomes something upon which a counterposition is drawn.

The machinery for foreign relations is more orderly in the USSR and therefore the day-to-day tactics tend to take on a very grave role. If we accomplish anything with the Chinese, we get an understanding of what the other might do in the future. With the Soviets, our experience has been that statement like "if you do this, we will do that sometime in the future" never happens. Always short-term considerations are most important.

I am going into these differences at great length because the real question is whether it is possible to develop confidence in long-term policy enough to feel that they are constantly warded from violence. This gains three things: it avoids confrontations, it limits any confrontations that exist, and it generates constructive relationships. As superpowers, we risk being trapped by a situation. Because of the great dominance of nuclear weaponry, you must never crowd your opponent into the corner.

Presently, I see hopeful tendencies in diverse areas. Present policy is looking for an extended detente. Their motives are not clear. Some say they seek the talks for its own sake. Others see it as a way to wreck the United States' other foreign alliances. Still others see it as an attempt to isolate China. In my mind the USSR is looking for a medium period detente.

The Soviets were not helpful in preventing the Vietnam war. The manner with which they equipped the North Vietnamese was irresponsible. If the U.S. had poured the amount and type of arms into a country like North Vietnam we would be condemned for having an incendiary foreign policy. Did they do it to fire the offensive or because of the structure of the

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Politburo which does not call its members hard enough to preclude some marginally controversial items? Whatever the motivation, there is a tendency to pick up loose change and in the process lose a million dollars worth of goodwill. It would be encouraging if they took a more restraining and long run appraisal.

With regard to the summit, we are trying to involve the Soviets in discussions on broad areas in an attempt to set up vested interests in many areas so that when crises occur, there will be a group within the Soviet Union with a vested interest wanting a steady course resulting in negotiation.

Two areas of negotiation in which I am encouraged are Maritime and Strategic Arms. In the latter field, the Soviets have been very constructive. They do not have the integrating mechanism that we have (State should look at this) [laughter]. As a result, their position cannot be challenged militarily, only on the basis of a foreign policy. When I was in Moscow, we had extensive talks in strategic arms, and managed to establish a framework for talks. I am very hopeful for an agreement, but I won't go into the technicalities. What is important is that major nations are putting their major weapons systems under legal restraints. This will put a lid on the arms race.

Commercial relations are also being addressed. Ideologically, the Soviet system is impeccably hostile. Because of this conflict, we must regulate ourselves for consistency and allow cooperation to govern the relationship. The results should be a generation of peace with intense competition. Conflicts of interest will always exist. It is the profound hostilities that hopefully can be resolved peacefully. We go to Moscow hoping for major progress, even though it may not be as colorful as the Chinese trip. (applause)

**Question:** You talk about the future, what about the present?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) You must be referring to the Middle East (laughter). What is the situation in Vietnam? The North Vietnamese have done what nobody expected. They put their whole field army outside their own country. They seem to be doing what they did at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. As described in *Khruschev Remembers*, they had expended all of their effort. This great risk did not make a difference then, because they won the war. They are attempting the same thing now. They are facing the South Vietnamese now with superior artillery and tanks, and have met with some

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success. The problem is not whether this or that city falls. The problem is, can the ARVN sustain the total onslaught? It is too early yet to predict the outcome. There have been heavy casualties on both sides. Some South Vietnamese units have fought well and some have not. This is the first time the South Vietnamese have come under heavy artillery fire and they are having adjustment problems. The North Vietnamese have also suffered heavy casualties, but it is too early to tell how badly they have been hurt. We do not think that they can keep up this scale of attack for longer than six to eight weeks. For us there is no end to the urgency to find a way to end the war. In accordance with our great American masochism we think we must have done something wrong. We are amenable to negotiation. There is only one thing that we must have refused to do: end the war by imposing a communist government. We refuse to join our enemies to defeat our allies. The impact of this on the American psyche would be so severe and so traumatic to our foreign policy it would be calamitous. We are prepared to negotiate. They are inflexible. We will not leave it open for an NVA military victory. They are asking us to overthrow the existing structure. If they would give up this demand, the war would be negotiated quickly.

**Question:** I would like to support Dr. Kissinger on one point -- his analogy to the Battle of Dien Bien Phu. He mentioned Khruschev in this connection and I thoroughly agree that it was the last roll of the dice. I think that is what is happening now. Is this not a test of nerves?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The objectives of North Vietnam are not clear. They could be attempting a military collapse of South Vietnam. Another possibility is that they are trying to collapse the United States by depleting the will of the people or third they could be jockeying for the best possible for negotiation after the offensive.

**Question:** When peace talks resumed, we thought we had an agreement. Could you comment?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) When peace talks resumed, we were hopeful for a proposition for flexibility on both sides. They just read two points from their public position. (1) Overthrow the government, and (2) instate them as the legal government. They will not discuss any of our points. Perhaps the offensive has gone slower than they had planned. If they have something to add, or if they were prepared to talk, we would not back off. It is a question of time and the time is not right.

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**Question:** Are our relations with the Soviet Union influenced by the German situation. Do you have a preference?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) First, I will not answer the second question. If the treaty is completely rejected, it will be a great blow to Brezhnev. The result would be he would have to move to a tougher position in order to counter the argument that you can't trust western governments.

**Question:** One of the three objectives was to create an onslaught on the South Vietnamese troops. If this happens, what are our options?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) It depends heavily on whether the onslaught is fast or slow. We cannot win the war for the South Vietnamese. If they cannot do it with all our air power, we will confront a serious situation. The war has become something of a nightmare. You don't think of the result if an effort fails so disastrously. We therefore will stress our intention to prevail.

**Question:** How can we feel that our relationships with the Soviet Union are not at stake, with them supplying the North Vietnamese and you claiming we still get along with them?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) Let me give you my personal judgment. How did the Soviet Union get themselves into this situation. They didn't plan on such a big offensive. They are worried about the relationship, emerging between the United States and China and wanted to take maximum advantage. No one thought they would launch an all out offensive. You must assume it was an accident and not a Soviet plan. If either side wins a tremendous victory, U.S. /Soviet relations will be severely changed. Unless all of this is a deception to a major victory in a little part of Southeast Asia, one must assume that it was an accident. We want an honorable exit. We want no permanent interests, we want out. Both the U.S. and Soviet Union have an interest in breaking it off.

**Question:** When dealing with the Soviet Union are we dealing with Brezhnev or Kosygin?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) The only member I dealt with was Brezhnev. The Politburo can be a forum for all against all. With a five-year advantage, Kosygin was supposed to be the easiest to get along with. The situation is now reversed. My impression is that Brezhnev can have a meeting alone

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-- something no Soviet leader has done since Khruschev. He is not in
total control like Chou En-lai -- he must listen and come back the next
day. He must consult with his colleagues. He does not mean to be a
good guy -- he has much riding on free relations with the West. He has
shown enormous patience in pursuing his goals no matter what.

**Question:** Was the North Vietnamese invasion a complete surprise? This
seems like a complete lack of U.S. intelligence.

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) No doubt that in the Washington office of Time-Life, one could find many who knew it all along. (laughter) But they sure weren't talking to me. We were expecting a significant attack in the Central Highlands and a secondary attack in I Corps. But we had no indications of a massive attack across the DMZ. I asked myself why they would want to attack in the Central Highlands from where they can't go anywhere. No one thought it would be such a massive attack across the DMZ.

**Question:** There is an implication to the timing of the offensive. You say six to eight weeks. Could one infer that the Soviets want to unseat the Administration?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I don't believe the Soviets knew of the magnitude of the offensive. There are several alternatives. The North Vietnamese could have launched an attack on their own, second the attack could have been designed by the Soviets to embarrass the United States, thinking that even if the North Vietnamese lost, they would be more dependent on Moscow. To get from us what they want, continuity is important. Look at what would happen if the onslaught is successful -- 60,000 Americans could potentially be captives of the North Vietnamese.

**Question:** But wouldn't the Soviets prefer a different President?

**Answer:** (Dr. Kissinger) I can only judge from my experience. When the President was elected, he made an enormous effort to negotiate the war. This was no sentimental move. We were after concrete negotiations. The first year of the Administration saw a great effort to change the policy of the United States. The second year saw a European detente, the Cien Fuegos Base and the Mid-East. The third year saw the base stopped, a Mid-East confrontation and a Polish uprising. All of this led the Soviet Union to consider including the United States in detente. They certainly would be better off to continue their efforts with the same Administration than to go

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through all the start up negotiations with a different administration. In
January 1971 our dialogue got very serious on substantive matters and
not ideological ones. This dragged on with SALT breaking in May 1971
and negotiations continuing through the spring and summer, and then we
went to Peking. U.S. /Soviet relationships advanced significantly after
the first Chinese visit. That is why they are not interested in cashing
it all in for the North Vietnamese. [Applause standing]

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

BIOGRAPHIES

HEADTABLE - DINNER May 4, 1972

**Gabriel Hauge** - Chairman & Chief Executive Officer,
Manufacturer's Trust Company

Graduate of Concordia College, Moorehead, Minn. (B.A. 1935). MA Harvard 1938.
PH. D. Harvard 1947. His early career was spent teaching economics. He was
an editor of *Business Week* magazine and served as assistant chairman of the
executive committee of McGraw-Hill between 1950-52. In 1953 he was named
administrative assistant to President Eisenhower for economic affairs. He joined
Manufacturer's Trust in 1956.

**Ralph Lazurus** - Chairman of the Board,
Federated Department Stores, Inc.

Graduate of Dartmouth College (B.A. 1935). Has spent his entire career in
retailing.

**T. Vincent Learson** - Chairman of the Board,
IBM

Graduate of Harvard (B.A. 1935). Member Board of Overseers, Harvard College.
Has spent his entire business career with IBM.

**Dan Seymour** - President,
J. Walter Thompson Co.

Graduate of Amherst (B.A. 1935). Career in broadcasting as performer and
producer until 1950. (Presented first television commercial in history - 1939).
Joined J. Walter Thompson in 1955.

**Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr.** - Chairman,
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

Graduate of Brown University (Ph. B. 1932). LL. B. Columbia, 1935. Admitted to
New York Bar 1935. Deputy Assistant District Attorney, New York County 1938-40.
Was a partner in firm of Hubbard, Blair & Reed. From 1957 to 1961 was Vice Presi-
dent of the Bendix Corp. Joined TWA in 1961.

Rev. Michael P. Walsh - President,
Fordham University

Graduate of Boston College (B.A. 1934). M.S. Fordham College 1935. PH. D.
Fordham 1938. Joined Society of Jesus 1929. Ordained as a Roman Catholic
priest 1941. Has spent his entire career in education.

Roy Wilkins - Executive Director,
NAACP

Graduate University of Minnesota (B.A. 1923). Served as Managing Editor
Kansas City Call 1923-31. Joined staff of NAACP in 1931; became Executive
Director 1965.

LIST OF GUESTS

DINNER WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

May 4, 1972

Charles Barber Chairman of the Board,
American Smelting & Refining Co.

William M. Batten Chairman of the Board
J. C. Penney Company, Inc.

S. Heagan Bayles Chairman of the Board,
SSC & B Inc.

Henry P. Becton Chairman of the Executive Committee
Becton, Dickinson & Company

Eugene N. Beesley Chairman of the Board,
Eli Lilly and Company

William Bernbach Chairman of the Board,
Doyle, Dane, Bernbach Inc.

Professor Cyril Black Director, Center of International Studies
Princeton University

Elmer H. Bobst Honorary Chairman,
Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co.

Edgar M. Bronfman President,
Distillers Corp. - Seagrams Ltd.

Herbert Brownell Senior Partner
Lord, Day & Lord

Richard Campbell Assistant to Dr. Kissinger

Thomas S. Carroll President,
Lever Brothers Company

F. T. Cary President,
International Business Machines Corp.

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John Cooper
President,
Massachusetts Investors Trust

Edgar Cullman
President,
General Cigar Company

Hugh Cullman
President,
Philip Morris International

Tom Dillon
President,
Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, Inc.

John Elliott, Jr.
Chairman of the Board,
Ogilvy & Mather, Inc.

Gilbert W. Fitzhugh
Chairman of the Board
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

Archibald McG. Foster
Director & Chairman
Ted Bates & Company, Inc.

Richard L. Gelb
President & Chief Executive Officer
Bristol-Myers Company

Paul C. Harper, Jr.
Chairman of the Board
Needham, Harper & Steers, Inc.

F. Donald Hart
Managing Director,
American Gas Association

Gabriel Hauge
Chairman & Chief Executive Officer
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company

Jack B. Jackson
President,
J. C. Penney Company, Inc.

J. K. Jamieson
Chairman of the Board
Standard Oil Company

Dr. Antonie Knoppers
President,
Merck & Co., Inc.

Ralph Lazarus
Chairman of the Board
Federated Department Stores, Inc.

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<table>
  <tr>
    <td>T. Vincent Learson</td>
    <td>Chairman of the Board,<br>IBM</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>David J. Mahoney</td>
    <td>Chairman &amp; President,<br>Norton, Simon, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Robert S. Marker</td>
    <td>Chairman of the Board,<br>McCann-Erickson, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Leonard S. Matthews</td>
    <td>President,<br>Leo Burnett Company, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Harold Mayer</td>
    <td>President,<br>Harold Mayer Productions, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Howard W. McCall, Jr.</td>
    <td>President,<br>Chemical Bank New York Trust Company</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Joseph V. McKee</td>
    <td>Executive Vice President<br>National Union Electric Corp.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Andre Meyer</td>
    <td>Senior Partner,<br>Lazard Freres &amp; Co.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Edward H. Meyer</td>
    <td>President,<br>Grey Advertising Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Ross R. Millhiser</td>
    <td>President,<br>Philip Morris U.S.A.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>David W. Mitchell</td>
    <td>President,<br>Avon Products, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>George B. Munroe</td>
    <td>President, Chairman &amp; Chief Executive<br>Officer,<br>Phelps Dodge Industries, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>J. A. Neubauer</td>
    <td>President,<br>PPG Industries, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Edward N. Ney</td>
    <td>President,<br>Young &amp; Rubicam Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Andrall E. Pearson</td>
    <td>President,<br>PepsiCo, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
</table>

-4-

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>Frank Pace, Jr.</td>
    <td>President, International Executive Service Corps and Director, Time Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Rudolph A. Peterson</td>
    <td>Administrator, United National Development Program and Director, Time Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Charles Revson</td>
    <td>Chairman of the Board, Revlon, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>John J. Riccardo</td>
    <td>President, Chrysler Corporation</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Dan Seymour</td>
    <td>President, J. Walter Thompson Co.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Dr. Marshall Shulman</td>
    <td>Director of the Russian Institute, Columbia University</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Arthur E. Smith</td>
    <td>President, United Aircraft Corp.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Dr. Nolan Sommer</td>
    <td>Executive Vice President, American Cyanamid Company</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>J. Clayton Stephenson</td>
    <td>President, Mining & Metals Division Union Carbide Corporation</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Stanley Tannenbaum</td>
    <td>Chairman, Kenyon & Eckhardt Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Walter N. Thayer</td>
    <td>President, Whitcom, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Laurence A. Tisch</td>
    <td>Chairman, Loews Corporation</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Charles C. Tillinghast, Jr.</td>
    <td>Chairman, Trans World Airlines, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>George R. Vila</td>
    <td>Chairman & President, Uniroyal, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Reverend Michael P. Walsh, S.J.</td>
    <td>President, Fordham University</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>George Weissman</td>
    <td>President & Chief Operating Officer Philip Morris, Inc.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Edwin C. Whitehead</td>
    <td>Chairman of the Board Technicon Corp.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Thomas R. Wilcox</td>
    <td>Vice Chairman, Eastman Dillon, Union Securities & Co.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Roy Wilkins</td>
    <td>Executive Director, NAACP</td>
  </tr>
</table>

May 4, 1972

From Time Inc.

Bernhard M. Auer Executive Vice President
Rhett Austell Executive Vice President
Louis Banks Editorial Director
Robert C. Barr Associate Sales Director, Time
John Beck Executive Producer, Time-Life Films
Ned Bradford Senior Editor, Little, Brown and Company
Richard M. Clurman Chairman, Time-Life Broadcast
Ralph Davidson Acting Publisher, Time
Gedeon de Margitay Director, Time-Life Syndication
Hedley Donovan Editor-in-Chief
Richard Durrell Advertising Sales Director, Life
Gene Farmer Senior Editor, Life
Murray J. Gart Chief, Time-Life News Service
Thomas Griffith Editor, Life
Andrew Heiskell Chairman of the Board
George Hunt Editor, Time-Life Films
Edward Jamieson Assistant Managing Editor, Time
Arthur W. Keylor Executive Vice President
Robert Lubar Managing Editor, Fortune
David Maness Assistant Managing Editor, Life

-2-

From Time Inc.

Peter M. Robeck Managing Director, Time-Life Films

Jerrold Schecter Correspondent, Washington Bureau
Time-Life News Service

James R. Shepley President

Hugh Sidey Chief, Washington Bureau,
Time-Life News Service

Robert D. Sweeney Director, Corporate Public Affairs

Strobe Talbott Eastern Europe Correspondent,
Time-Life News Service

Arthur H. Thornhill, Jr. Chairman and President,
Little, Brown and Company, Inc.

John Vrba Associate Managing Director,
Time-Life Films

Putney Westerfield Publisher, Fortune

Donald M. Wilson Vice President, Corporate and Public
Affairs

Barry Zorthian President, Time-Life Broadcast