NEW YORK TIMES

3 FEBRUARY 1972

The Negotiation Way

As a result of President Nixon's disclosure of the secret peace talks and the publication of Hanoi's nine-point plan and Washington's counter-proposal, Americans and the world for the first time can examine the real negotiating postures taken by both sides in secret, rather than public proposals framed with an eye to propaganda advantage.

The full price asked by Hanoi for the release of American prisoners is shown to include not only withdrawal of American troops but also large-scale American payment of reparations, plus American cooperation in replacing the Saigon regime with one amenable to a coalition government controlled by the Communists. Hanoi's asking price, however, is not necessarily its fallback position, which could only be expected to emerge toward the end of a long, intensive negotiation. In this sense, the six meetings last year between Henry Kissinger and North Vietnamese Politburo member Le Duc Tho were little more than an opening round.

Why Hanoi failed to continue the talks at this very high level can only be a matter of speculation. The most likely reason is that the approach of dry weather and a new fighting season, with American ground combat capability much reduced, has tempted the Communists to revive military action in hope of shaking Saigon's grip on South Vietnam before negotiations resume. Similarly, the probability of large-scale American air retaliation for the expected offensive may well have been the reason why the President chose this particular moment to publicize his most recent peace proposal.

For its part, the United States has taken a more flexible position than previously. Hanoi's nine points have been accepted as the basis of negotiations. In its eight-point plan and separate reconstruction offer, the United States has responded to Hanoi's proposals point by point, making it evident that seven of the nine points are clearly negotiable. On one of the two remaining sticking points—Hanoi's demand for an American aid cut-off to Saigon along with troop withdrawals—the United States has proposed to limit its economic and military aid to Saigon by agreement with Hanoi if North Vietnam would accept similar limitations.

Even on the most difficult of Hanoi's nine points, the future government of South Vietnam, American concessions have also been offered. The proposal of a coalition electoral commission, along with President Thieu's pledge to resign five months after a final agreement and one month before elections, suggests the possibility of further movement through negotiation. Apart from the timing of Thieu's resignation, Washington appears to be flexible on the powers of the electoral commission, which could in fact approach those of an interim coalition government.

Re-escalation of the ground war, followed by the almost certain step-up in the American air war, will neither end the conflict nor advance a settlement. But imaginative new proposals from Hanoi and a resumption of high-level secret talks might accomplish both.

WASHINGTON POST 9 FEBRUARY 1972

# "Composing the Domestic Disharmony"

According to the Constitution, treason consists of, among other things, "adhering to (this country's) enemies, giving aid and comfort to them." So when H. R. Haldeman of the White House staff acts unidentified war critics of "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States" and of being "in favor of putting a Communist government in South Vietnam, and insisting that it be done," he is coming as close as you can to accusing Democratic presidential candidates of treason. This would be an ugly business, coming from any source, but it becomes the more so when you put it into perspective, as Mr. Nixon might say, because what we are witnessing is not just one intemperate outburst from one official who could not be expected to know much in particular about the war in Vietnam but a pattern of public statements in the best tradition of high-road-low-road Presidential politics. The way this game is played, the President stands above the battle in a great show of non-partisanship. Thus Mr. Nixon's eloquent State of the Union appeal for unity:

"1972 is before us. It holds precious time in which to accomplish good for this nation. We must not waste it. I know the political pressures in this session of the Congress will be great. There are more candidates for the Presidency in this chamber today than there probably have been at any one time in the whole history of the republic. There is an honest division of opinion, not only between the parties but within the parties, on some issues of foreign policy and domestic policy as well. However, there are great national problems that are so vital they transcend partisanship. Let us have our debates. Let us have our honest differences. But let us not in keeping the national interest first ..."

What was the high road, on January 20, and since then it has been all downhill. By January 26, our irrepressible Vice President was expressing his sense of bi-partisanship with this trenchant observation on the war:

"Let's not forget which party put the men in Vietnam and which party is bringing them out."

Then the President made his dramatic, televised revelation of Dr. Kissinger's 30-month secret effort to negotiate a settlement, and explained that he was doing so to unify the country behind his efforts, to show how far he had gone, to damp down what he considered to be unfair criticism

of his policy, to let people judge for themselves. Whereupon Senator Muskie (among others) judged, and found the plan wanting, and submitted one of his own, at which point the President's surrogates in Congress, the official White House spokesman, and even the Secretary of State set up a loud howl.

"This is the worst kind of gutter politics," said Senator Brock. Congressman Ford charged "blatant misrepresentation." Senator Dole said Mr. Muskie "lacks the wisdom, the maturity and the sense of responsibility" to be president, and Senator Dominic accused his colleague from Maine of trying to "undermine" the President's peace efforts "for the most blatant partisan purposes." At the White House, Mr. Ronald Ziegler, spokesman, said the views of Senator Muskie were "not worthy of comment" and then proceeded to tear into them. A day or so later, Secretary of State Rogers, who up until now has shown an admirable sensitivity to the perils of plunging his high office into the partisan rough and tumble, said he was "dismayed." and that Mr. Muskie's critique would be "very harmful to the prospects for successful negotiations to end this war." Finally, at the far end of the low road, there came Mr. Haldeman, followed by Mr. Ziegler with the observation that what Mr. Haldeman said did not "necessarily" reflect the thinking of the President.

So much for letting us "have our debate (and) our honest differences." And so much for the President's supposed high purpose in publicizing his secret peace talks; as it was explained by Dr. Kissinger the day after Mr. Nixon's speech, "composing the domestic disharmony is a very major objective of our entire policy." So it well may be, for a number of reasons including the intensely practical one that disunity at home is no doubt a factor in stiffening the will of Hanoi. This has been a dilemma for Mr. Nixon, as it was for President Johnson before him; it is inherent to the conduct of this sort of war in our kind of society. But one could sympathize more with the President if the men around him gave somewhat greater evidence of trying to resolve the dilemma themselves. The imputation of treason to prominent members of the political opposition is a curious way to go about "composing the domestic disharmony."

NEW YORK TIMES 9 FEBRUARY 1972

## The Haldeman Smear

The charge by White House "chief of staff" H. R. Haldeman that unnamed critics of President Nixon's latest peace proposals are "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy" is, in the context in which it was made a vicious smear. It strikingly recalls the hysterical, irresponsible cry of treason that paralyzed public debate and policy-making in the dark days of the late Senator Joseph R. McCarthy.

The White House says that Mr. Haldeman was merely expressing "his own personal point of view" in his pre-taped television interview the other morning. The President cannot so easily isolate himself, however, from the public comments of a man who has been a close personal associate for many years and who currently serves as coordinator of White House affairs.

This newspaper, along with many other long-time critics of Vietnam policy, have found considerable merit in the Administration's latest peace proposals, and we have said so. But the proposals are not beyond legitimate criticism. Honest debate on the critical issue of how to end the war is an essential part of the American democratic system. It should not—and we believe will not—be smothered by a resort to calumny and invective, even when induced in the highest degree.

CYD

57

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 9 FEBRUARY 1972

Haldeman Beyond the Bounds.

"Politics ain't beanbag," said Mr. Dooley. It gets rough, and, as these quadrennial presidential election years progress—or retrogress, we're afraid—it gets rougher.

People say a lot of things they don't mean. People say a lot of things they do mean, in the heat of passion, but are sorry later that they said. The Constitution protects the right of every citizen to speak his mind, or his mindlessness. This is as it must be and we would not have it otherwise.

Still, there are bounds beyond which men in public life ought not to go, certain decencies to observe no matter how passionately they may feel about the issues involved. In our judgment H. R. Haldeman, the White House "chief of staff," went beyond those bounds in his remarks in an NBC television interview the other day.

Replying to a question on how President Nixon feels about criticism, Mr. Haldeman said that before the President had announced his previously secret eight-point Vietnam peace plan, "You could say that his critics — people who were opposing what he was doing — were unconsciously echoing the line that the enemy wanted echoed."

That, in itself, is a serious and, we believe, warranted charge, but Mr. Haldeman then needed to enlarge upon it.

"Now," he said, "after this explanation — after the whole activity is on the record and is known, the only conclusion you can draw is that the critics now are consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States."

A moment later, with specific reference to Mr. Nixon's Senate critics, Mr. Haldeman repeated the charge: "In this particular posture, I think they are consciously aiding and abetting the enemy."

It simply is not good enough for the White House, through press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler, to explain that Mr. Haldeman was only expressing his personal views and did not mean to impugn the patriotism of Mr. Nixon's critics.

Like Vice President Agnew, like Dr. Henry Kissinger, like other top members of the Nixon team, Mr. Haldeman speaks in public as a member of the team, whatever he may say in private. And what other construal can anyone who knows plain English place upon the words, "Consciously aiding and abetting the enemy"?

The charge evokes painful memories of the "soft on communism" charges of 20 years ago. It provokes the very divisiveness and bitterness which Mr. Nixon says he seeks to avoid.

BALTIMORE SUN

9 FEBRUARY 1972

The Implication of Treason

An American who is "consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States" is, by common definition, a traitor. "Treason against the United States," as defined in Article III, Section 3 of the United States Constitution, "shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort." Hence no one can mistake the implication of the language used by H. R. Haldeman, a leading member of President Nixon's White House staff, in discussing, during a televised interview, criticism in this country of the Vietnam peace proposal made by President Nixon. The man against whom the Nixon administration has been concentrating its own criticism is Senator Muskie, a prominent candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Mr. Haldeman said that before Mr. Nixon announced his eight-point proposal last month it could be said that the President's critics "were unconsciously echoing the line that the enemy wanted echoed." "Now," he continued, "after this explanation—after the whole activity is on the record and is known, the only conclusion you can draw is that the critics are consciously aiding and abetting the enemy of the United States, and I think that kind of criticism is deeply disturbing to him (Mr. Nixon), because it gets in the way of getting done what he so deeply believed must be done in trying

to bring this war to an end through the negotiation route."

It is clear that Mr. Haldeman was not speaking idly. It seems clear, further, that the escalation of political language by the White House, up to and including that of Secretary Rogers and Mr. Haldeman, has been done deliberately and in concert with the Republican National Committee. In our view, neither Mr. Nixon's proposal nor Mr. Muskie's criticism of it warrants such extremes. The President's proposal was a reasonable one, within the context of the long debate over the war, and so was Mr. Muskie's comment on it and his own proposal.

Mr. Nixon made public his proposal, it should be remembered, as part of his explanation that the secret talks with the North Vietnamese engaged in by Mr. Kissinger had failed. In disclosing the secret talks and announcing the administration's proposal, Mr. Nixon signaled the end of those negotiations and thus, in the usual American practice, left his proposal open to public discussion. It has since become clear that North Vietnam rejected his plan, and an examination of the proposal, particularly its provision as to an election in South Vietnam, compels a conclusion that the rejection must have been anticipated by the White House. A political settlement affecting the Thieu government in South Vietnam that would be acceptable to the White House would plainly not be acceptable to North Vietnam, and vice versa; there has

never been any doubt about this nor should there be now.

The North Vietnamese government has been single-minded in its objective for many years. Let it be recognized that it is Communist and authoritarian, that it seeks political control in South Vietnam, that it is ruthless in its methods and determined in its goal, and that it has no intention of conceding defeat to the United States.

There is little argument about these facts. The argument is about the best way for the United States to disengage itself, preferably by a negotiated settlement in which peace would be established for the people of Indochina. This has been an intense political issue in the United States for a decade or so. It still is, and will continue to last during this election year.

The more or less open Paris meetings and the secret Kissinger meetings have failed thus far to bring about a negotiated settlement. There is a wide gap between the standing proposals of the United States and North Vietnam. Effort should be made to narrow this gap in renewed negotiations, and it is reasonable to think that Mr. Nixon would have the support of leading Democrats if he would make such an effort now. He will not, of course, receive this kind of support if his top assistants impugn the motives and even the loyalty of responsible senators who differ with him or make their own suggestions. Cries of treason heat the air and settle nothing.

Mr. Nixon nor his critics can expect to be immune from criticism, but the country should be able to expect that no matter how rough the arguments get, the contenders will at least grant each other's loyalty and good faith.

BOSTON GLOBE

3 FEB 72 (6)

The road to Vietnam peace

The government of North Viet-
nam has now made public the text
of the nine-point peace plan it
offered secretly to the United States
last June. This is the plan men-
tioned Jan. 25 by President Nixon
on nationwide television and subse-
quently discussed in some depth by
Presidential Assistant Henry A. Kis-
singer at a press conference the fol-
lowing day.

Examination of the text, and
commentaries upon it by leaders of
both sides, makes it painfully clear
that the United States and Hanoi are
still a long way apart in at least two
major respects.

First, there is the issue of a time-
table for the withdrawal of US mili-
tary forces from Indochina.

Hanoi's position was, and remains,
that the United States withdraw un-
conditionally from all of Indochina
within approximately six months.

The United States's position is
that withdrawal should take place
only after agreement has been
reached in principle on a final settle-
ment of the differences between the
US and its enemies.

Thus Hanoi demands withdrawal
by a date certain. We propose a date
uncertain — since we set no date for
the final settlement.

The second major divergence of
aims lies in the contending proposals
over the political future of South
Vietnam.

Here, Hanoi wants us to abandon
the Thieu government forthwith and
agree to replace it with a "new ad-
ministration standing for 'peace, in-
dependence, neutrality and democra-
cy.'" This administration would ne-
gotiate a political settlement with the
Viet Cong.

For our part, we would have an
election carried out by a commission
with Communist participation. One
month before this election. President
Thieu and Vice President Huong
would resign. Thereafter, a caretaker
government headed by the chairman
of Thieu's Senate would reign until
a new president was elected.

The chances of the United States
achieving significant modification of
Hanoi's demands through further ne-
gotiations are plainly slim and get-
ting slimmer as we continue the uni-
lateral withdrawal of our ground
forces from South Vietnam.

There is virtually no incentive for
Hanoi to agree to a compromise po-
litical settlement just to get a date
certain for our final withdrawal,
since we are withdrawing our

ground forces anyway and since the
escalation of bombing from the air,
as a means of bringing the North
Vietnamese to heel has already been
tried by former President Johnson
and proved a failure.

As for President Nixon's proposal for a new election, it seems calculated to perpetuate the present governmental system and certainly it regarded as such by the North Vietnamese.

As the Times of London has observed, "this would leave the South Vietnamese army and administration, right down to the village level, still in effect answerable to President Thieu. Thus the independent body supervising the elections on which Communists and others would be represented would have little direct power."

To expect that Hanoi would accede to Mr. Nixon's proposal is unrealistic. Their object is to see that the Thieu government is supplanted, not perpetuated in power.

Thus, barring major new initiatives on Mr. Nixon's part, the prospect is for prolongation of the war through continued arming of the South Vietnamese and, perhaps, stepped-up retaliatory bombing of the kind already begun late last year. In short, perpetuation of a limited war. And so long as this is the case, the problem of freeing our prisoners of war will remain unsolved.

Is there then a way out of the di-
lemma?

The Globe believes that there is
one way, and only one. Simply, it is
for the United States to offer the
enemy a firm and early date for our
withdrawal from Indochina — lock,
stock and barrel — in exchange only
for the simultaneous release of the
prisoners of war.

This is not unconditional sur-
render. It is only recognition of the
realities of a situation which has
gone on far too long from the stand-
point of all the combatants.

As former chief US representa-
tive to the United Nations, Charles
W. Yost, has pointed out, the time is
long since past when we had the ca-
pability of playing a decisive role ei-
ther in propping up the South Viet-
namese government or changing it.

"The future of Vietnam," says Mr. Yost, "will eventually be settled between the two Vietnamese governments, either by negotiation or continued fighting. . . . Vietnamese politics is no longer our business. That should be the ultimate meaning of 'Vietnamization.'"

CJD

59

By Stanley Karnow
Washington Post Staff Writer

If he is having trouble perceiving the North Vietnamese to accept his peace offers, President Nixon is also being badgered by an array of proposals coming from Democratic contenders for the White House.

Many of these proposals differ only in nuance from the plan revealed by the President last week. But the sensitivity of the administration to its Democratic critics suggests that the President believes that the Indo-China question is going to be a hot political issue this year.

The latest program put forth as a challenge to the President's plan was publicized Wednesday by the leading candidate for the Democratic nomination, Sen. Edmund S. Muskie of Maine. In contrast to the President's eight points and the Communists' nine points, Muskie's proposal comprised only two points.

The President's plan proposed a total withdrawal from Vietnam of U.S. troops within six months of an agreement, in exchange for the release of all prisoners by Hanoi. It also proposed that a general cease-fire begin when the agreement is signed.

The administration package additionally held that a "free, democratic presidential election" take place in Vietnam with the participation of all South Vietcong.

The Muskie plan makes no mention either of a cease-fire or a political settlement involving the United States.

"Our task," Muskie said Wednesday, "is to leave Indochina, to leave it to the Vietnamese to work out their own peace, not to determine their destiny according to a plan written in Washington."

He therefore proposed, first that the United States set a date for the withdrawal of its troops in return for the release of American prisoners and the safety of U.S. forces as they leave.

Second, Muskie urged that the South Vietnamese government seek a political accommodation with the Communists, or be deprived of U.S. military support after American forces withdraw.

Muskie's real innovation is his assertion that the United States should exert pressure on the Saigon re-

time even to the extent of cutting off aid--to compel it to work out a settlement with the Communists.

This apparently means, in Muskie's view, that the United States should cease using its assistance to bolster South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and utilize aid as a lever to force him to negotiate directly with the enemy.

Such a move, Muskie evidently believes, would create a climate in which Thieu would have no choice but to compromise with the Communists. The senator seems to be persuaded that any kind of a deal between the South Vietnamese and the Communists should be acceptable to the United States.

Except for that element, which some observers regard as rather fuzzy, the Muskie plan appears to be similar in its essentials to both the President's proposals and to the ideas expounded by other Democrats.

The most outspoken of the Democratic doves, Sen. George McGovern of South Dakota, has repeatedly argued that the Communists would release the U.S. prisoners if the President set a firm withdrawal date. McGovern claims to have gained this information from direct talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris.

Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.) has introduced amendments to three different bills also proposing that the administration fix a withdrawal date in return for the release of American prisoners of war. Mansfield ambiguously adorned his amendments with the proposal that the President "negotiate" an immediate cease-fire after setting the withdrawal date.

The Mansfield amendments have consistently won large majorities in the Senate, and represent the position supported by such prominent Democrats as Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.) The only Democratic presidential contender who opposes the substance of the amendment is Sen. Henry Jackson of Washington.

But even though the differences between the Democrats and the President now appear to have narrowed down to details, the administration is clearly mounting a strong counter-offensive against what it considers to

be a major assault by its rivals on the Indochina issue.

The counter-offensive was triggered Wednesday by Sen. Bob Dole, the Republican National Committee chairman. Employing election campaign rhetoric, Dole asserted that Muskie "leaks the wisdom, maturity and the sense of responsibility"

to lead the nation, adding: "A man needs more than ambition to be President."

Echoing Dole yesterday, Secretary of State William Rogers said he was divided by the Muskie speech. "I think it will be harmful to the prospects for successful negotiations to end (the war) this year," Rogers said.

7-F

CJD

WASHINGTON POST 4 FEBRUARY 1972

# Everybody Offers A Plan for Peace

NEW YORK TIMES
17 March 1972 P7

NIXON BARS DATA
SOUGHT BY HOUSE

Panel Asked Information on
Aid to Cambodia

By MARJORIE HUNTER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 16 — President Nixon has refused to supply Congress with information about the United States aid programs in Cambodia.

The President's decision to withhold the documents was disclosed today by Representative William S. Moorhead, Democrat of Pennsylvania, chairman of the House Government Information Subcommittee.

Mr. Moorhead said he learned of the decision shortly before last midnight when a State Department courier appeared at the door of his Georgetown home with a formal notification that the President had invoked "executive privilege" in refusing to supply the information.

The President's action foreclosed an abrupt halt in foreign aid funds to Cambodia at midnight.

In seeking the information on Cambodia, Mr. Moorhead and his subcommittee had invoked a 1961 law that stipulates that spending for a foreign aid program will be suspended unless, within 35 days, the executive branch has either supplied the requested information or the President has expressly forbidden release of the documents.

3d Such Action by Nixon

The request for the information was made 35 days ago, with the deadline falling at midnight.

The White House said today that this was the third time that President Nixon had invoked executive privilege since taking office in 1969.

The doctrine of executive privilege has been used, but only sparingly, by most Presidents since the founding of the country.

The Constitution nowhere expressly refers either to the powers of Congress to obtain information or to the power of the executive to withhold information. However, both rights are rooted in history and precedent.

In refusing last night to divulge the Cambodian information, Mr. Nixon described the

papers as "internal documents" that did not represent official policy.

The President's decision was in the form of a memorandum to Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Frank Shakespeare, director of the United States Information Agency, instructing them "not to make available to Congress any internal documents concerning the foreign assistance program or international information activities which would disclose tentative planning data."

Used to Receive Reports

The information sought by the subcommittee is known as the annual country field submission, assembled by United States Embassy officials in Cambodia on information from the political and economics sections. It also contains data from the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency.

A subcommittee spokesman said that such reports had routinely been sent to the subcommittee by the last four Administrations. Such reports are not ordinarily read by subcommittee members, but the staff reviews the material and brings items of interest to the attention of the members.

Mr. Nixon first invoked executive privilege by refusing to supply a House subcommittee with information from files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. His second confrontation came last August, when he refused to disclose to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee the Administration's long-range plans for foreign military aid.

There have been numerous other instances in which the executive branch has denied information to Congress by refusing to allow key officials to testify.

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE ENEMY DRIVE IN VIETNAM: NOBODY IS CERTAIN, BUT EVERYONE HAS A THEORY

WILLIAM R. KANN
The Wall Street Journal, March 15, 1972

SAIGON, the South Vietnamese city offensive of 1972 than
may well be more to the character of the enemy than it has been to
what less than already has assailed theVN

Since late last fall the North Vietnamese
have been reinforcing their military presence
in South Vietnamese border regions and, to a
lesser extent, in base areas within South Viet-
nam. Enemy infiltration from North Vietnam
is running about double the level of last year
and—rather incredibly—the U.S. Command es-
timates that by May there will be as many
enemy troops in or immediately adjacent to
South Vietnam as there were in December
1968. The reinforcements include elements
of four divisions from North Vietnam's strategic
reserve. U.S. spokesmen say. Communist docu-
ments have spoken of a 1972 winter offensive.

And for several months now, American offi-
cials here and in Washington have been calling
attention to the enemy buildup and have been
issuing ominous predictions of an enemy offen-
sive. "A major multiphase offensive," said
Gen. William Westmoreland on Jan. 31. "A
major offensive . . . a spectacular," said Sec-
retary of State William Rogers on Feb. 4.

A score of senior officials here and in Wash-
gton joined the chorus, with a number of
them predicting a mid-February offensive
into the Vietnamese Tet, or lunar new
year, and President Nixon's visit to China.

Still No Ground Offensive

Tet has come and gone, of course, and Pres-
dent Nixon has gone and returned to the U.S.,
and still no enemy offensive has materialized.
Indeed, the only offensive so far this year has
been in the air, with the U.S. sharply increas-
ing its level of bombing in South Vietnam and
launching several "limited-duration protec-
tive-reaction" bombing campaigns against the
North.

In recent days some officials have been
hedging the more ominous predictions. "They
cannot wage a major countrywide effort," said
Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on Feb. 24,
whereas three weeks earlier Secretary of State
Rogers had said, "It may be a countrywide of-
ensive." Officials now are stressing the differ-
ence between enemy capabilities and enemy
intentions. And some are suggesting that U.S.
power may have forced the Communists to
postpone and replan whatever it was they were
going to do.

Thus, offensive-watchers—or rather, watch-
ers of potential offensives—are left with a kind
of bouillabaisse of military analysis. There's
talk of "multipronged" and "multiphased" of-
enses; of scattered "high points" and pro-
tracted "mini-high points"; of March offen-
ives as well as May, July and September of-
enses; of nationally coordinated offensives
indefinite option offensives; and of "spectac-
ular maximum tests" and "continuing im-
ages of the enemy.

One official here whose predecessor some
weeks back was predicting an offensive timed
to Mr. Nixon's February visit to China
now is suggesting an offensive timed to Mr.
Nixon's May visit to the Soviet Union
another senior official explains that an often-

live logically must be launched before the
spring rains, which inhibit enemy troop move-
ments and resupply. He considers a moment
and then adds: "Of course, they could wait for
the rains, because rain inhibits our air power."

One of the currently favored theories, based
on captured "high-level" documents, has the
enemy embarking on a five-phase offensive:
terrorist attacks, assaults on isolated South
Vietnamese government outposts, mortar and
sapper attacks on population centers, assaults
by main-force units and a general offensive.
But if this is the enemy's game plan, the kick-
off has yet to take place: incidents of terror-
ism are still about the same as the 1971 aver-
age.

Some responsible officials even suggest that
there may not be any offensive this year, that
the enemy is only seeking to increase its capa-
bility and maintain options, that—in effect—the
capability is the intention.

Indeed, if there is anything that the various,
and varying, analysts agree on, it is that the
Communists neither hope nor plan to launch an
offensive on the scale of the 1968 Tet drive,
which carried the war into almost every popu-
lation center in the South. This is because now
the Communists have been deprived of most of
their secure base areas within the South, lack
the basic installations and facilities of several
years ago, are heavily dependent on North
Vietnamese regulars and are less naive about
the revolutionary inclinations of most South
Vietnamese.

Most observers agree, too, that whatever
the enemy does this year will be intended for
psychological impact, especially in the U.S.,
and not aimed at winning a real military vic-
tory for the Vietcong. The 1968 Tet offensive
was a psychological victory for the Vietcong,
but it was also intended as a military win as
well.

If all this year's preparations and predic-
tions prove anything, it may simply be that
both sides are edgy and uncertain. The Com-
munists may well be worried about their abil-
ity to launch a powerful enough offensive to
have any impact, and the allies seem worried
that an offensive, even if unspectacular, might
have serious psychological fallout.

One-Upmanship

Thus, there is the paradox of the enemy
building up for an offensive that might never
be launched and the Americans pre-advertising
such an offensive so that if it is launched, it
will almost look as if it hasn't been. "There's
an element of gamesmanship on both sides,"
one analyst says.

Also, both North and South Vietnam remain
apprehensive that their backers may try to sell
them out in some secret deal contracted in Pe-
king, Moscow or Paris. The concern may be
unrealistic, if only because Hanoi is far from a
puppet of Moscow or Peking and President
Nguyen Van Thieu isn't likely to retire gra-
ciously even if President Nixon asked him to.
But the concern is nonetheless present.

The U.S. now has fewer than 120,000 troops
in Vietnam (by May there are to be only 69-
000), and not many are involved in the fighting.
A handful of Americans die every week in com-
but; sometimes more die from overdoses of
dangerous drugs. But in a so-called normal, of-
fensiveless week of the war, 250 to 400 South
Vietnamese are killed and twice that number
are wounded. (An estimated 1,000 Communists
die in that same time.)

Indeed, in 1971 casualties of South Vietnam-
ese government forces were as high as in 1969,
and casualties this year have roughly been
keeping pace with 1971. (Statisticians—but r-

Vietnamese families can take some comfort
from the fact that the expanded South Viet-
nese armed forces now have about twice as
many soldiers to suffer casualties as they did
four years ago.)

Casualties of South Vietnamese forces, of
course, don't prove failure of the South Viet-
nese government. Indeed, many indicat-
of progress can be found compared with
eral years ago. The Vietnamese are should-
ing a greater war burden and are fighting
more effectively. The countryside is largely
under government military control, at least in
the daytime. And local Vietcong units have
been decimated in many areas.

Critics continue to debate the degree of
progress, and some analysts argue that there
have been signs of slippage in the past 12
months. But few observers would deny that the
military situation is better than it was three
years ago.

And yet one can travel 10 miles southwest of
Saigon, pick at random a mud-walled outpost
on the fringe of a secure district town called
Cai Le and ask the solidier about the political
proclivities of the local villagers living near the
outpost. About 50% support the government
and 50% back the Vietcong, the platoon leader
says. No, says another of the soldiers. In the
daytime 90% support the government, but at
night the ratio is reversed. Or chat with Viet-
nese bus drivers in the marketplace of the
major Mekong Delta town of My Tho. How is
road security? they are asked. Good in the day-
time, but no one drives after dark, they say.

There is probably a fair degree of exaggera-
tion to this, but the significant thing is that to
common Vietnamese the Vietcong are still a
presence and the war is still a reality.

The conversations are related to a s
American official in Saigon, who is as
whether such talk doesn't indicate an endless
war. "But it is an endless war," he replies.
Adds a Vietnamese cabinet minister, "The
virus of liberation (war) will always be with
us." A highly placed American says, "The war
boils down to a question of wills." But is either
side losing its will to carry on the conflict? he
is asked. "No, not really," is the reply.

NEW YORK TIMES 6 APRIL 1972

Vietnam 'Options'

The spreading Communist offensive in South Vietnam
finally brings to a head the inherent contradictions in
the Indochina policy followed by the Nixon Adminis-
tration for the last three years.

The Administration has on the one hand progressively
reduced the direct American military manpower commit-
ment to South Vietnam, responding to the growing con-
sensus that United States objectives in the conflict were
not worth the requisite expenditure in manpower, mate-
rial and national prestige, if indeed those objectives were
obtainable at all.

The President has on the other hand, persistently
refused to modify the fundamental goal that has domi-
nated United States policy for two decades—retention
of a friendly non-Communist government in Saigon.
Since the Communists predictably have refused to accept
on Administration terms the settlement of a war they
have not lost—that is, a settlement that would assure
survival of the Thieu regime—peace based on a political
compromise has been impossible to obtain.

With the United States clinging to its political objec-
tives while steadily reducing its military commitment, it
was inevitable that at some point the other side would
find conditions favorable for another attempt to achieve
its own goals by military action. That moment of truth
may have now arrived.

The President and his aides gambled that when the
showdown occurred—if it occurred—a foe believed to
have been gravely weakened by earlier battles and by
American air interdiction would prove no match for an
expanded and strengthened South Vietnamese Army,
backed by unspecified American air power. This is the
rationale for the so-called Vietnamization program that
now has been sharply challenged by the strength and
early successes of the Communist offensive. The agoniz-
ing question for the President, for Congress and for the
American people is to what extent should the United
States intervene if the tide of battle should begin to
swing decisively against Saigon?

Administration spokesmen have asserted that the
President is keeping "all options" open. In fact, Mr.
Nixon's options are severely limited. Having committed
himself to disengagement from Vietnam, having repeat-
edly stressed South Vietnam's ability to fight its own
battles, the President has a moral and constitutional
obligation to consult with Congress before recommitting
American forces—ground, sea or air—to expanded
battles in an undeclared war that lost its vestige of
legislative sanction when Congress repealed the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution.

In weighing the options, the President and Congress
must coolly consider the national interest—whether the
goal of saying the present regime in Saigon is worth
the heavy costs and risks of re-escalating the conflict.
In our view it is not. It is at last time that Saigon
fought its own battles. It is time that the President put
his repeatedly stated faith in Vietnamization to the test.

64

WASHINGTON POST 9 APRIL 1972 (10)

The Bombing

In his three years in the White House, Mr. Nixon has dropped more bombs by ton in Indochina, some three million tons, than Lyndon Johnson did in his five years. If you count the 500-pounders and the white phosphorous and the 7½-ton "Cheeseburgers" and all the rest, Mr. Nixon has dropped more than one ton of bombs per minute during every single minute of his administration. He has become—here's a "first" for you—the man who has assembled and let loose more devastation from the sky than anyone else in the history of creation; all this, mind you, while "winding down" the war.

Yet in the past week North Vietnam has been able to send some tens of thousands of troops, with heavy artillery and armor and antiaircraft and even SAMs, across the demilitarized zone into South Vietnam; it has an estimated 20,000 troops pushing off from the Cambodian border near Saigon; it is conducting other military operations in the Mekong Delta and elsewhere. Leaving aside the civilian and environmental damages, one is surely entitled to ask just what military purpose has been served by this torrentuous rain of explosives from the sky?

An obvious reply is, of course, that political constraints have prevented Mr. Nixon from bomb-ing North Vietnam proper in the style to which his predecessor had become accustomed. Instead he has had to do most of his bombing elsewhere in Indochina, and he could not focus the daily devastation on the buildup above the DMZ. Yet the whole Johnson record indicates that although bomb-ing raises Hanoi's costs, Hanoi is prepared to pay those costs. Even the heavy unconstrained bombing on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos has not kept North Vietnam from mustering the threat it now poses in Cambodia opposite Saigon and in the Delta.

Moreover, Mr. Nixon has done much bombing in North Vietnam. Though Mr. Johnson ended regular daily attacks on the North in 1968, sorties by the thousands have been authorized by Mr. Nixon in the name of "protective reaction" against Vietnamese efforts to track or down American planes

flying reconnaissance missions over the North and interdiction missions over Laos. Some of these "limited-duration protective-reaction strikes" have gone on for a week or more.

President Nixon's general bombing rationale, as restated by the American command in Saigon just the other day, has been "to help protect the lives of the diminishing United States forces in South Vietnam." Yet virtually none of the remaining Americans are in a combat role (except in the air) or in a combat zone: their lives are not threatened. Asked on Thursday about the current raids, Ad-miral Moorer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, can-didly avoided the customary misleading bows to "protective reaction" and "protecting American boys." The bombing will continue, he said, "so long as the battle that is currently going is sup-ported with resources from North Vietnam . . . as long as there are valid military targets support-ing this operation." Defense Secretary Laird con-firmed the point on Friday. For at least the span of "this operation," then, we are back essentially to the Johnson policy of regular daily attacks on North Vietnam. A record 500 tactical aircraft and a record 100 B-52s are on the job; a record fifth carrier is being readied to steam into the waters off Vietnam. The ranks of American POWs are again being increased.

In sum, having established himself as the great-est bomber of all time, having surpassed Lyndon Johnson in havoc wrought to the land if not also to the people of Indochina, having failed nonethe-less to break the will of Hanoi or to deter its largest offensive since Dienbienphu, and having addicted Saigon more than ever to a reliance on American air power even while proclaiming ever greater success for "Vietnamization"—having done all this, Mr. Nixon is bombing still more, while the Russians, undeterred, are providing ever heavier firepower, in the form of artillery and SAM mis-siles, to their North Vietnamese allies. In what conceivable sense can this be described as "wind-ing down"—let alone ending—the war?

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR 5 APRIL 72

The decision is
on the ground

so often in modern warfare the impulse at the White House on hearing of the first success of the enemy offensive in Vietnam was to consider a counteroffensive from the air with bombs. Such a major air attack on North Vietnam may be ordered at any moment. The rationale for it has been prepared by the State Department with a declaration that this new enemy offensive is an "invasion" different in kind from previous movements of North Vietnam troops into South Vietnam.

But if the bombing comes, or has already started by the time this is in print, even if it wipes out every building in Hanoi and takes out every port and harbor facility in Haiphon, it will still not affect the enemy offensive now unrolling in South Vietnam.

The enemy has been preparing this offensive for over six months and the troops for it over six years. The men, ammunition and supplies have been moved down to the takeoff points long ago. They have enough of everything at the front to carry out their assignments even if no more were to move in the supply trails for another six hrs. They are as independent as a man was when he headed out from "Atlanta to the sea."

So bombing North Vietnam would express resentment. It might provide a small amount of morale boosting to high officials of the Saigon government. But it would not affect the outcome of the battle in Quang Tri province.

The last chapter in this long story of war in Vietnam is being written as most last chapters in wars are written by the infantrymen slogging through the mud on the ground. Bombs may be dramatic, the damage they do even more so (when seen at a safe distance), but they are no substitute at the end for the infantry.

Besides, bombing North Vietnam will be a very different thing now than it was back in 1956. In those early days there were little or no effective defenses against bombing. Now North Vietnam ranks with the Egyptian side of the Suez Canal as one of the most heavily defended places in the world. Antiaircraft weapons of the most sophisticated modern type are deployed around all strategic targets. If an offensive is attempted the probable losses will far outweigh any results.

So it's very well to threaten a bombing counteroffensive but the threat cannot stop or even slow down the ground offensive. Execution of the threat would not the South Vietnam infantry on the advancing lines. The issue is in the hands of the foot soldiers of South Vietnam. Either they stand up to the challenge or they don't. The decision is on the ground.

WASHINGTON POST

5 APRIL 1972

The North Vietnamese Offensive

North Vietnam's offensive across the "demilitarized zone" confirms two facts. First, as Richard Holbrooke notes elsewhere on this page, it reminds us that Hanoi retains the will and means to fight for power in the South, despite losses which to Americans would be intolerable. Second, it tells us that Saigon remains unprepared to cope alone with such attacks—massive air support from the United States is still required. Mr. Nixon may have "Vietnamized" the ground fighting in South Vietnam. But he has thoroughly "Americanized"—or failed to "de-Americanize"—the air war throughout Indochina. In the fourth year of his administration it turns out that an American combat role remains essential in order to sustain the government in Saigon; this is so regardless of how the current fighting is scored. Mr. Nixon is, in brief, a double hostage: to Hanoi's determination and to Saigon's frailty. He is hooked—by the military facts, and still more by his own excessive and outdated rhetoric.

Against all imperatives of discretion and common sense, his administration keeps offering rationales designed to justify, if not compel, continued American participation in the war. At a time when it should be conditioning the American people to the fact that the American reach in Vietnam is limited and the American responsibility has been more than amply honored, the administration hauls out language and logic of a kind best employed to gird the nation for another decade of war. Thus officials, all but openly abandoning their past-stated confidence in Saigon, claim there has been a North Vietnamese "invasion" and a "flagrant violation" of the DMZ. Washington is "leaving all options open." spokesmen declare.

The reality is that "all options" are distinctly not open: is Mr. Nixon contemplating reintroduction of a half-million troops, or a nuclear strike on Hanoi? It is reckless to indicate such to Hanoi, Saigon and the American people alike. What the President ought be saying is the truth; that few options

are open; that—as we have said before—the United States has done just about all that it could reasonably and fairly be expected to do to carry South Vietnam to the point of self-sufficiency; and that it is possibly though far from certain that the particular Vietnamese who may some day end up with the power in Saigon may not be those selected Washington, though they may have their own reason to want a close or businesslike relationship with Washington all the same. Doubtless some Americans would find this outcome hard to stomach; others would not. To rule out that possibility as a matter of policy, however, is to commit the country to a continuance of the war in Indochina whose end only the administration's stoutest fans can pretend to foresee.

All of us are too prone to measure the war its visibility on television or in the headlines, by the weekly listings of American casualties (miserably diminished), or by its ebb and flow as political issue. But meanwhile for the Vietnamese and for Laotians and Cambodians as well, the goes on more or less ferociously and we are rapidly losing what capacity we ever had to bring it to end by force of arms. Nobody could promise the it would not go on, one way or another, or perhaps end badly, even if the United States decided that it had done what it appropriately could; that could not halt its own air and ground combat participation and offer to bargain troop withdrawals for POW release; that it would offer to Saigon the same option of soliciting external aid which Han reserves for itself; and that the question of power in Saigon had best be left to the Vietnamese themselves. We are not, in short, confronted by a particularly happy or easy choice. But that is the essential nature of a limited war effort, conduct with limited means and for limited ends. And, in turn, is the hard lesson of Vietnam which sooner or later the American public is going to have to be encouraged to accept—with or without Presidential leadership.

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER 5 APRIL 1972

# As the Big Battle Commences: What Is the U.S. Commitment?

"We are confident that the South Vietnamese Army can cope with the enemy threat," Gerald Warren, a White House spokesman, said Saturday. "We are definitely not pressing the panic button," joined in an unnamed "senior administration official" on Sunday.

Sanquinity, perhaps, is the only option available to the Nixon Administration in the face of the early rounds of the long-anticipated North Vietnamese drive into the South. Certainly, it is too soon to conclude whether Vietnamization has failed, or whether Hanoi is embarked on a do-or-die campaign to defeat and humiliate the vestige of U. S. presence in South Vietnam, a new Dienbienphu.

It is not too early, however, to note an increasingly worrisome vagueness in the U. S. position, dramatized by the incursion.

What is the extent of America's commitment? What is the doctrine of "a reasonable chance"—President Nixon's promise to the South Vietnamese government?

It was possible, even prudent perhaps, to allow wide interpretation of that promise while the withdrawal of U. S. forces went through its heavy loading. But today, more than 80 percent of the U. S. forces who were on the Indochina peninsula when Mr. Nixon took office have returned home. In the process, the Vietcong and the North Vietnamese have done relatively little—until the present campaign—to disturb the atmosphere.

Thus as a practical matter, the depth or rigidity of the "reasonable chance" doctrine has gone untested and undefined.

The cost the U. S. now may face is clear: Is America willing to guarantee

the survival of the Thieu regime at any cost? Or, if faced with a military onslaught by forces directed by Hanoi, is the U. S. willing to abandon that regime? Or, at a more likely middle ground, is the U. S. willing to re-open major war against North Vietnam, with maximum-effort strategic bombing, and its inevitable increase in Americans lost to death and North Vietnamese prisons?

Without question, American casualties, and the American commitment, have diminished dramatically under the present administration. But the bombing, now with vast reinforcements being sent in for possible punitive raids on the North, has gone on.

In Washington, officials responded to the new offensive with allusions to the "agreement" on battle-line ground-rules made in 1968, when the U. S. was committed to something like military victory.

It is observed that Hanoi is playing to Moscow, in preparation for Mr. Nixon's trip there. And everybody is playing, in some degree, to the November U. S. election, with potential Democratic candidates holding open every conceivable option for making Vietnam a major campaign issue again.

The traditions of diplomacy and politics dictate that the administration continue to maintain a doctrinal flexibility—in a word, to fudge. Perhaps that is inevitable, perhaps prudent.

But what is being played finally in Indochina is neither diplomacy nor politics—but history. History has demonstrated, we believe, beyond reasonable doubt that the U. S. involvement there is folly. America's job now is to get out of the war, not to stumble or be drawn into an expanded one.

WASHINGTON POST

5 APRIL 1972 P-1

# Foe Shifts
To Frontal
War Tactic

By Murrey Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

United States officials said yesterday that Communist forces are shifting from guerrilla tactics to frontal warfare in South Vietnam by introducing "massive" quantities of heavy battle equipment, including tanks, artillery and anti-aircraft guns.

"These units are supported in a very large way by heavy military equipment from the Soviet Union," said State Department press spokesman Robert J. McCloskey.

When newsmen asked if the raising of that issue carried the implication that the input of Soviet weaponry might jeopardize President Nixon's May 22 summit trip to Moscow, the spokesman disclaimed any such intention. "No, no," he replied. Until yesterday, however, U.S. officials had avoided statements that would raise such questions.

For the second straight day, spokesmen for the White House, the State Department and the Pentagon engaged in a coordinated escalation of the official level of U.S. concern about the North Vietnamese about the offensive.

"The North Vietnamese are blatantly moving in equipment in a sophisticated way through the DMZ (Demilitarized Zone) into the south," said White House press secretary Ronald L. Ziegler.

What appears to be shaping up, said Defense Department press officer Jerry W. Friedheim, is "a more conventional-type battle effort on the part of the enemy than we have known for years."

Said McCloskey, "What we see on the ground ... is a divergence from the more traditional pattern of guerrilla warfare into conventional warfare."

Missing from all these characterizations, however, was any comprehensive report on the actual state of battle, the prospects ahead, or any projection of the consequences. To all these questions officials respond that the situation is still too "fluid" to make any durable assessments.

By labeling what has occurred as an "invasion," a blatant invasion," or a "naked attack" by North Vietnam, the administration already has laid out a justification for greatly intensified U.S. air attacks on North Vietnam. The continuing expansion of the official denunciations of the Communist assault suggests, in addition, that the Nixon administration, as bracing American publication for more adverse news about the military capacity of the Communist forces.

In claiming that the nature of the warfare is shifting fundamentally, the administration, in effect, was throwing a question mark over its own repeatedly expressed confidence that the Communists cannot sustain a prolonged major offensive in South Vietnam.

"If the Communist offensive should succeed in seizing the northern provinces of South Vietnam, which some officials privately fear, that would not only batter the Nixon administration's claims of success for Vietnamization. A Communist advance of that scope would also impose a heavy burden of the administration to carry through the current presidential election campaign."

For the second day in a row, he the Washington Special Action Group of the National Security Council, the administration's top task force for international emergencies, met at the White House under presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger. Participants included high officials of State, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the NSC. Another meeting is scheduled for today.

Senate Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield of Montana told newsmen it is "time to fish or cut bait" in the Vietnamization program for turning the war over to South Vietnam. "We ought to get out Jack, stock and barrel," he said.

"Another round of U.S. bombing North Vietnam, said Mansfield, will mean that "we will lose more planes, the number of POWs will increase and the possibility of negotiations will evaporate."

Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), however, advocated exactly the opposite.

President Nixon "must make up his mind whether to continue dilly-dilly bombing or go into the northern part of North Vietnam to the source of supply," he said. This is a long-standing Goldwater theme, and he said he has been advising the President privately to take that course.

Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird met with Mr. Nixon for an hour yesterday and spoke. Mr. Ziegler said the President continues to follow war developments closely, which Ziegler emphasized are still in their "early stages."

State Department spokesman McCloskey said North Vietnam has moved into the South far more Soviet-supplied tanks and other weapons than ever before. In addition, he said, Soviet-supplied surface-to-air missile sited in the Demilitarized Zone "add an important factor."

Defense and state officials said the unusually heavy flow of this equipment through the DMZ continues.

Despite the heavy Communist attacks just below the supposed buffer zone between North and South Vietnam, many officials believe that another and possibly larger assault is in the offing in the Central Highlands area around Kontum. This is where the heaviest thrust initially was expected.

North Vietnamese strategists openly boasted last week that since South Vietnamese forces "have lost their shield" through the withdrawal of about 400,000 U.S. troops, Saigon's forces are too weak to meet challenges from multiple directions. This is the critical test that is now under way.

U.S. officials said South Vietnamese commanders have moved 10,000 to 15,000 airborne troops, marines, and some portions of their highly rated First Division further north, to reinforce South Vietnam's Third Division at the main point of contact, just north and west of the city of Quangtri.

However, the bulk of the First Division, which is rated one of the best in South Vietnam, reportedly remains deployed around the coastal city of Hue, about 35 miles south of Quangtri. Some military analysts believe that the Communists, probably after an assault on Quangtri, may thrust at Hue, depending upon how much of the First Division is drawn off by the battle further north.

One of the paradoxes in the U.S. claim that Communist forces are now reverting to conventional warfare is that this is the kind of warfare the American troops, which are now largely withdrawn, were best equipped to fight. The South Vietnamese First Division is rated as a prime example of this American training. U.S. officials say it will signify "serious trouble" for the Vietnamization program if this division fails to meet expectations.

Pentagon spokesman Friedman said South Vietnam's battle force in the northern provinces of South Vietnam is now above 30,000, with the infusion continuing. The United States now has four aircraft carriers in the Tonkin Gulf, plus the U.S.S. Tripoli, a helicopter carrier used in amphibious assaults.

CY3

61

WASHINGTON POST 5 APRIL 1972

‘One Clear Message’ From Hanoi...

The War Will Go On, and On ...

By Richard Holbrooke

THE WAR just won't go away. Vietnamize it, pacify it, democratize it, pull troops out, pour aid in, visit China, send Kissinger to Paris, change our rhetoric, drive it off the front pages for a while—it still won't go away.

You can try to forget it—if you can. U.S. deaths are less than 5 per cent of what they were four years ago; force levels are down,

The writer is the new managing editor of Foreign Policy. He worked on Vietnamese affairs in Vietnam, Washington and Paris from 1963 to 1969, including an 18-month tour as an AID provincial representative in the Mekong Delta.

down, down; dollar costs are dropping; days go by sometimes and the story is not on the front page.

But it always comes back. Every day there is still death and destruction in that bleak place. The North Vietnamese are not going to let anyone forget for long that they will fight on until they get what they want.

So now the war is back on Page One with a vengeance. The North Vietnamese are driving south across the DMZ, and they threaten the province capital of Quangtri. This is where we came in: Four years ago

at this time the same area was the scene of some of the heaviest fighting of the war, and the old imperial capital of Hue was badly damaged during a brutal battle to drive the North Vietnamese out of their entrenched positions.

THE ANALYSTS are busy explaining what the offensive means. It will be described as a failure by some, as a success by others. It will be interpreted as North Vietnam's way of showing the world that it is not going to let the Chinese sell them out, or as a way to influence the U.S. presidential elections; it will be seen as Hanoi's means of bolstering the resolve of the nome front. Some will warn that it will roll up the pacification effort, others that it won't hurt the pacification effort at all, that it is their last gasp—which expert do you listen to?

But to me, nine years after I first went to Vietnam, almost three since I last worked in the problem, the importance of the offensive lies elsewhere. I would caution those people who still read stories about the war that the significance of the offensive does not lie in the strategic effect of the North Vietnamese effort. It will be a long time before anyone can tell who "won" this offensive, just as it took a long time to put Tet 1968 into perspective (Don Oberdorfer did finally do it in his splendid book, "Tet"). But even if there does emerge out of the verbiage on the fighting some consensus,

that will not be the most important thing about the fighting.

What matters most about this offensive is that it shows again the awesome determination and ruthlessness of the North Vietnamese. They simply will not stop fighting, after all these years, until they get what they want. That is, they will not stop fighting unless we can make them stop fighting: That was patently beyond our military ability when we had over 500,000 men in Vietnam. It is even less likely when we have less than 100,000.

The North Vietnamese and their friends in the south have always been ready to sacrifice men at alarming rates to get what they want. Meanwhile, we have turned to the South Vietnamese in a burst of rediscovery and returned the war to them.

But even if our allies in Saigon are now as good as MACV says they are—which is a large If—they won't be able to end the war on the battlefield. It is possible that they are now strong enough to avoid outright defeat themselves, but victory is remote and unlikely.

That brings us back to the starting point, countless lives later. Only a political deal can stop the war in Indochina—but the only deal that Hanoi seems interested in is one still unacceptable to "our side." It still appears that the North Vietnamese will fight on until they get what they want—they are not looking for a "reasonable settlement," but for the things that they have fought for since 1946.

As the fighting once again rises in intensity, one who has seen it happen many times before has only a vast sense of deja vu, a weariness with this particularly awful war and all that it has done to both Indochina and our own country. That, and an anguished wish that it would go away.

But it won't, not for a long time, not until Hanoi either gets what it wants, or fundamental changes take place in the Hanoi leadership. Neither event seems likely in the foreseeable future. So the war will go on, and on. That is the one clear message from the ongoing North Vietnamese assault down through the DMZ. It has nothing to do with violations of agreements or understandings or the 1954 accords or with the outcome of this particular engagement. It tells us, simply, that the Other Side wants to carry on, with their usual determination, and that there is little we can do about it in the air or on the ground.

ABC EVENING NEWS, APRIL 4, 1972

# Senator Mansfield Calls For US
Get Out Of VN

HOWARD SMITH: Senator MANSFIELD leading Congress back to this city from Easter recess today called on the President to get out of VN lock, stock and barrel and meanwhile to use neither US troops nor air power to aid Saigon.

VNization, he said, must now
fish or cut bait.

The Pentagon seemed to agree in
part with that last statement.
Asked for battle details, a spokes-
man said, that is now Saigon's job.

However, the Pentagon is not un-
informed.

ROGER PETERSON: With few Americans on the seen, definitive reports have been slow in coming from the battle field. But looking over the intelligence reports and the few reconnaissance photos available, Defense Department spokesman Jerry FRIEDHEIM has this assessment.

JERRY FRIEDHEIM: It appears
that what we are seeing is a clear,
unmistakable and continuing com-
munist invasion of SVN.

The attacks are coming across
the DMZ. These attacks are being
carried out with Soviet made tanks,
Soviet made guns, with Soviet
trucks and equipment and they are
a direct assault on SVN.

And we will of course, take
whatever actions are necessary to
protect the lives of the Americans
that remain in VN and we will as-
sist the SVNese to repell and re-
sist this communist invasion.

MAN: Now, those words have come
from here, from the State Depart-
ment, from the White House.

Exactly what do they mean?

FRIEDHEIM: They mean exactly
what they say.

MAN: The - the terms we will
do anything to protect American
lives were used extensively just
prior to the bombing of the north

in last December. It is now seen
as a prelude to the same sort of
action.

FRIEDHEIM: I think it would be
best for us to wait and see what
the SVNese do and what General
ABRAMS does to assist them in try-
ing to cope with this very sizeable
communist attack.

PETERSON: FRIEDHEIM says there
are indications the NVNese are
building a supply line through the
DMZ. A move that makes it look
like Hanoi's troops plan to stay
a while, disproving past comments
of military leaders here that the
NVNese wouldn't be able to hold
any territory for more than
twenty-four to forty-eight hours.

CBS EVENING NEWS, APRIL 4, 1972

## Sevareid Comments On NVNese Offensive

ERIC SEVAREID: When it comes to battle reports from VN, the rule of thumb in the Pentagon is to discount the first two cables, start believing with the third.

With the present enemy offensive even more postponement is in order.

The reason is that this is an entirely SVNese affair on the ground and most of the information now comes through them.

Enough is established, of course, to know that the attack is heavy with the SVNese Third Division retreating.

The weather is unpredictable, so we can't know whether American air power can stop the southward movement of the enemy's heavy equipment.

Therefore, we can't know the chances of the best Saigon division the First, halting this invasion when they come in contact.

What is very different about this Hanoi offensive is the amount of Russian built heavy tanks, heavy artillery, heavy bridging equipment and ground to air missiles which they now manage to move along with them.

The official cries of protest here in Washington aim at this Russian aid to Hanoi.

The assumption here is that Hanoi now possesses a long logistics tail, so-called.

And that they would not be risking this heavy stuff to our air power unless they had not only Russian assurance of replacement, but replacements already at hand behind their lines.

And there is some unofficial suspicion of Russian advisors on the scene because of the unusual mobility of these ground to air missiles.

Then comes the speculation as to the why of this attack.

Maybe it means Hanoi intends to negotiate seriously and wants to do so from a new position of strength - maybe.

We've been told often enough they would negotiate seriously when they were forced into the opposite condition.

Hanoi rarely does anything devoid of political purposes and there is general agreement on one thing - they want to pursuade the people of SVN that the Saigon regime not only cannot ever win this war, but cannot even protect them when and where Hanoi choses to strike.

American air power or no American air power.

So far, Hanoi has not quite made that demonstration. What it has done is pursuade more people in this country that we must get out of the war completely.

The time is long past when this government could even consider interrupting the schedule for withdrawing American ground troops or throwing them into these battles.

Which is why the President won't do either one.

NEW YORK TIMES

4 APRIL 1972

Vietnam Test

Two weeks after President Nixon suspended the Paris peace talks, Communist forces in Indochina have hurled a severe challenge against Mr. Nixon's alternate strategy for disengagement through "Vietnamization."

The initial results of a Communist offensive that is likely to become more intensive and widespread do not support the confidence that the President and other Administration officials have expressed in the ability of the South Vietnamese to fight their own battles. Deprived by bad weather—and not by Administration restraint—of American air support, South Vietnamese troops have retreated with haste from bases along their northern frontier that were long doggedly defended by American forces.

Washington betrayed its concern by convening a special foreign policy panel yesterday and by dispatching two additional aircraft carriers to join two carriers already on station off the Vietnamese coast. Charges that the North Vietnamese have violated a 1968 agreement which led to the suspension of American air attacks against the North—an unwritten understanding that the United States itself has repeatedly abused—appear to be laying the groundwork for punitive air strikes.

The resumption of large-scale aerial warfare against North Vietnam would not stabilize the perilous situation on the ground in the South. Such use of American power could generate fresh international sympathy and support for Hanoi, particularly in Moscow and Peking, further undercutting any lingering prospects for a negotiated settlement.

Massive air attacks in the ground combat areas, weather permitting, might still succeed in stemming the current Communist drive. This would not end the Communist threat or prove the "success" of Vietnamization. It would merely demonstrate the continuing deep United States involvement in a war that has not "wound down," against an enemy that will not "fade away."

It has done so. In the first three days that regular Army has pushed easily through the first line of South Vietnam defenses.

We on the other side cannot know how ambitious this offensive is. It may be intended only as a reach for a single quick and dramatic but limited victory. It may of course aim at a final and decisive victory. But whichever it is one small fact emerges. During the seven years of major American effort the men of Hanoi have kept and polished and conserved a striking force. They never wasted it prematurely. They saved it for the big chance.

And that is what strategy is all about.

CHR SCI MONITOR 4 APRIL 72

The new battle

There are two new things about the military offensive launched over the weekend by the North Vietnamese which make it a serious matter.

This is the first time that major units of the regular Army of North Vietnam have been used in a large-scale offensive. Heretofore, North Vietnam troops were used for the most part to stiffen Viet Cong units. This time, they have gone into action in their own organizations. In other words, the forces coming down through the DMZ are the best Hanoi has. This is their first team.

And this is the first time that North Vietnam has taken the offensive at the beginning of the rainy season which until now has been assumed to be an advantage to forces provided with American equipment. In previous campaign seasons American air transport was used to outflank the weather. American and South Vietnamese troops would fly over the rain. They had superior mobility.

But cloud cover is now working for the men from Hanoi. It puts a protective blanket over their troops as they slog southward. American planes can fly over the clouds but can't seriously interfere with the enemy offensive below.

Frequently overlooked in seasons of past Washington optimism about the Vietnam war has been the fact that Hanoi has, until now, always kept its best troops at home; partly (we presume) to guard against the possibility of an invasion from the south and partly to build them into a superior military instrument.

The big American build-up in Vietnam began precisely seven years ago. During those seven years Americans fought guerrillas, irregulars, Viet Cong units of various kinds, and a lot of men from North Vietnam who had been sent south to stiffen the local forces. But that first team of the regular Army of North Vietnam was always way up in the north getting ready for its big moment.

Now, most of the Americans have gone. The total is below 100,000. Few of these are in combat units. None of the combat units are near the present battlefield.

Four years ago the burden of the Tet offensive was carried by Viet Cong forces.

What is happening now is different. Hanoi has a finely honed instrument in its regular Army. That instrument no longer needs to be held in the north to ward against an invasion. So — for the first time in the war Hanoi can afford to commit its regular Army to battle in the south.

BALTIMORE SUN

1 APRIL 72 (3)

C.YJ

The Mathematics of Death in Indochina

Reports of scattered but increas-
ingly intense North Vietnamese at-
tacks, adding up to what some ac-
counts call the heaviest fighting
along the demilitarized zone in
four years, plus sharper action
against South Vietnamese bases in
the central highlands, seem to lend
some credence to the new intelli-
gence guess that a major enemy
effort—widely and inaccurately
predicted at the time of Tet in
February—may now be under way.

If the assessment happens to be
accurate in this instance, it is not
expected that the attacks can be
mounted in the force of the Tet
offensive of 1968, or that they have
any chance of substantial military
victory. They might, however, be
severely disruptive; enough so as
to damage South Vietnamese
morale, a dubious quality in any
case, and to cast new doubts on

the American claim that "Viet-
namization" is going well. And
such indeed might be their pur-
pose. As usual over the years, we
can only wait and see.

Meanwhile, any notion that the
recent fighting has amounted to
little, and that the Indochina war
can be considered virtually over,
is dispelled by the latest weekly
casualty figures. The American
casualties list four killed in com-
bat, and 13 wounded. This does not
count the 14 crewmen presumed
dead in the loss of a gunship shot
down over Laos last Wednesday.
The South Vietnamese figures tell
quite another story: 357 dead in the
last previously recorded week, and
445 in this one. (The total South
Vietnamese military casualties are
now up to 134,347 killed and
346,634 wounded. The American
figures are 45,669 dead in action,
plus 10,119 from nonhostile causes,

and 203,787 wounded. The estimate
of total North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong dead, for what it may be
worth, is 803,256. For the week
under consideration, 1,931 of the
enemy are claimed to have been
killed.)

In one highly special kind of
reading, that is, "Vietnamization"
may be said to be working. Fewer
Americans die, and the South Viet-
namese casualties mount. Another
aspect of "Vietnamization" also
continues—heavy American air
support, though the United States
command in Saigon has of late been
reluctant to issue a count of the
planes involved. What it amounts
to is that despite persistent at-
tempts to make it appear that the
Indochina war has gone away, and
can be forgotten, the Indochina
war has not gone away, and can
be forgotten only at the cost of later
pain.

NEW YORK POST 3 APRIL 1972 (4)

That War Is Here Again

The tragic fallacies—both moral and
military—of President Nixon's "Viet-
namization" policy are being cruelly ex-
posed in the ominous North Vietnamese
offensive. Whatever the outcome of the
present drive, it shatters the deadly
illusion that the war would quietly fade
away as the U. S. reduced its ground
troops and Saigon assumed the major
burden of land combat.

Now the Thieu regime once again
finds itself scanning the cloudy skies
and hopefully awaiting a massive new
demonstration of American air power
—aimed at North Vietnam as well as
against Hanoi's advancing troops. How
much escalation of the air war will be
needed to stem this thrust—if that can
in fact be accomplished? And where will
things be if major disaster is averted?

It has long been clear that Vietnam-
ization, in its most "successful" appli-
cation, would primarily mean changing
the color of the corpses on the Allied
side. It did not mean that an adversary
that had fought for more than a quar-
ter of a century would suddenly recon-
cile itself to survival of the Thieu cabal.

Now, of course, fresh doubts have
stirred even about the heralded pro-
ress of Saigon in building its own mi-
tary forces. And an enemy so often
counted out — by official body-count
and other self-deceptions — once again
rises from the dead to inflict punishing
blows on Thieu's faltering legions.

Unnamed Washington officials are
described as believing that Hanoi is en-
gaged in a "show of strength" designed
to undermine the Vietnamization pro-
gram and embarrass Mr. Nixon's cam-
paign. They sound as if all this comes
under the heading of unsportsmanlike
conduct. Soon Mr. Nixon may be telling
us that all would have been different if
he had been spared any domestic criti-
cism. The true question is whether the
American (or Vietnamese) predicament
would be harsher if he had agreed —
early in his term—to creation of a coa-
ition government in Saigon.

And that question will become even
more acute in coming days, as the Pres-
ident faces pressure for desperate bomb-
ing measures to save the face of "Viet-
namization."

1-1-71

WASHINGTON STAR 3 April 1972 P1

# Indochina: U.S. Readies
## Huge Raids on North

73

SAIGON (AP)—The United States marshaled its biggest air strike force in more than three years today in preparation for massive raids on North Vietnam to counter the Communist offensive in South Vietnam's northernmost province.

"When the weather clears we're going to sock it to them," said one senior pilot.

The U.S. Command recalled the carriers Kitty Hawk and Constellation to join the Coral Sea and Hancock in the Gulf of Tonkin, giving the Navy about 275 warplanes for the attack. With 250 Air Force jets at bases in South Vietnam and Thailand, they formed the biggest U.S. attack force assembled since the 1968 bombing halt.

Forecasters said they did not expect fully clear skies until tomorrow or Wednesday. But the U.S. Command set the stage for the massive retaliatory attack with a statement that the North Vietnamese attack across the demilitarized zone threatened U.S. forces still in Vietnam, and that the command was utilizing its "remaining air and gun-fire assets as appropriate to jrotect our diminishing forces."

The North Vietnamese ground attack slowed down today, but the Communist pushed more heavy weapons across the demilitarized zone and U.S. fighter-bombers and destroyers pounded a column of 50 North Vietnamese tanks below the DMZ.

The invading North Vietnamese pushed 10 miles below the DMZ over the weekend, driving the South Vietnamese from two more bases and shooting down three U.S. helicopters and a small spotter plane. Eight American helicopter crewman were missing and believed dead.

Other Communist forces attacked Fire Base Anne, 8 miles west of Quang Tri City; overran an artillery base on the Cambodian border, Fire Base Pace; and kept up artillery attacks in the central highlands. But the North Vietnamese withdrew from Pace, and the South Vietnamese reoccupied it today, the Saigon command said.

Official field reports said 50 enemy tanks accompanied by infantrymen were sighted at a road junction a mile and a half north of Dong Ha. U.S. Navy destroyers offshore and warplanes began attacking them, but results were not immediately known.

The same reports said that self-propelled guns were observed crossing

the southern border of the DMZ.

The North Vietnamese also were reported moving antiaircraft missile launchers to the frontier to attack American and South Vietnamese planes below the DMZ.

A break in the heavy cloud cover allowed U.S. jets to make 128 strikes against enemy gun and troop positions below the buffer zone, the heaviest raids in South Vietnam since Feb. 18.

American jets also streaked into North Vietnam to blast antiaircraft missile sites 5 miles above the demilitarized zone, but it was not known what they hit. New attacks were expected after the clouds lifted.

The biggest Communist push since the 1968 Tet offensive is now in its fifth day. The South Vietnamese have retreated 10 miles from the DMZ and abandoned a dozen bases. At least 5,000 South Vietnamese reinforcements were ordered to the northern front.

Scores of North Vietnamese tanks were reported to have crossed the frontier, but their advance was blocked by a blown-out bridge at Dong Ha, 10 miles below the DMZ. South Vietnamese pilots reported destroying 10 tanks yesterday and another today.

Associated Press correspondent Holger Jensen reported from the northern front that the Dong Ha River had become the new front line.

He said the bulk of the North Vietnamese troops were on the north side of the river with tanks and heavy artillery, while the south side was held by more than 1,000 South Vietnamese marines with 120 tanks. A South Vietnamese tank column that retreated yesterday reversed itself and moved north again.

Jensen said there had been no serious attempts by the North Vietnamese to cross the river so far. A few small units tried it last night and suffered casualties.

While the line appeared to stabilize at Dong Ha, at least for the moment, other North Vietnamese troops moved east from the Laotian border toward Quang Tri City and maneuvered to the south of the provincial capital. They appeared to threaten Route 1, the main north-south highway leading to Hue and Phu Bai,

38 miles away.

### Convoy Ambushed

A South Vietnamese army convoy was ambushed on the highway south of Quang Tri yesterday and one truck was destroyed by a mortar shell. Ranger reinforcements took up positions along the road south of the city in an effort to keep it open.

Eighty American civilian advisers to the pacification program and some military logistics advisers were evacuated from Quang Tri City, the threatened provincial capital 19 miles south of the DMZ. About 150 Americans remained in Quang Tri Province, most of them were advisers to South Vietnamese field units, sources said.

"We're going to do everything we can to protect our people and keep our casualties down," said one U.S. military source. "Where a situation becomes untenable, we're going to pull our people out. The only assistance we're going to give the South Vietnamese is air."

Underlining this, the U.S. Command announced today that the withdrawal of American troops continued last week with the departure of 6,200 men, leaving 95,500 in the country as of Thursday. The current target is 69,000 by May 1.

### Seven U.S. Advisers

At least seven American advisers were reported on the front lines at Dong Ha. About 100 U.S. advisers and other troops were reported in a compound in Quang Tri City.

All U.S. troops were pulled out of the Quang Tri combat base 2 miles northwest of the city. Some South Vietnamese units also abandoned the base, but marine reinforcements were sent up, and the government forces hoped to maintain at least part of the base.

President Nguyen Van Thieu and Premier Tran Thien Khiem flew to Da Nang and Hue to confer with their military commanders. Thieu told leaders of the National Assembly's lower house that the situation was "very serious."

U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker was reported returning from Nepal tomorrow or Wednesday, cutting short an Easter visit to see his wife, the U.S. ambassador there.

The U.S. Command announced that conventional antiaircraft fire brought down the U.S. spotter plane and three helicopters yesterday as they were supporting South Vietnamese troops in the Dong Ha area.

The helicopters went down in rapid succession. A UH1 crashed first and its four crewmen were missing and believed dead. Ten minutes later, two more helicopters trying to assist the downed chopper were shot down. One four-man crew was rescued, but the second crew was missing and believed killed.

### Plane Pilot Rescued

The pilot of the spotter plane bailed out into the south China Sea and was rescued.

U.S. warplanes flying south of the DMZ evaded barrages of surface-to-air missiles fired

from sites in the zone and just to the north of it. The U.S. Command said no American jets were shot down, but an American adviser saw a South Vietnamese propeller-driven fighter downed by a SAM just north of the Dong Ra river yesterday. The pilot bailed out and was rescued.

The situation also worsened in the central highlands, where North Vietnamese forces have laid artillery siege to a string of seven South Vietnamese firebases.

One of them, Firebase 421, was declared in critical status after aerial observers reported it was surrounded by two batteries of North Vietnamese troops.

Firebase 421 and Firebases 5, 6, Yankee, Charlie, Oscar and Hotel all were being hampered by rockets, mortars

and recoilless rifle fire, field reports said. The bases occupy a series of hilltops between the Laotian and Cambodian borders and the towns of Kontum and Pleiku.

Kontum and Dak T miles to the north, shelled last night and D. C. airfield was hit by a ground attack before dawn today. It was repulsed with two enemy killed and 10 South Vietnamese wounded, field reports said.

South Vietnamese forces also moved to block a thrust by North Vietnamese troops on a third front, in Tay Ninh Province northwest of Saigon, where Firebase Pace and two other bases farther south along Highway 22 were hit hard. A South Vietnamese armed task force and infantrymen were sent in to reinforce the area.

NEW YORK TIMES 4 April 1972 P1

# U.S. SAYS HANOI 'INVADED' SOUTH, KEEPS ALL REPRISAL OPTIONS OPEN

75

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, April 3 — The United States accused Hanoi today of launching an "invasion" of South Vietnam and said Washington was leaving open all retaliatory options—including renewed American bombing of North Vietnam.

The justification for such strikes — if they are ordered —was provided by the State Department, which charged North Vietnam with "flagrant violations" both of the 1954 treaty ending the French Indo-china war and of the 1968 understanding that led to the end of systematic American bombing of North Vietnam and the start of what were to be substantive talks in Paris.

Spokesmen for the White House, the State Department and the Defense Department said, however, to predict that course of action might be taken in coming days.

## Some Bombing Foreseen

A senior Pentagon official said privately that he thought President Nixon would order American aircraft to bomb the supply lines and base camps in North Vietnam of those enemy units that have crossed the demilitarized zone in recent days into Quangtri, South Vietnam's northernmost province.

President Nixon spent most of the morning discussing the Vietnamese developments with his top aides. He met with Kenneth Rush, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He spoke by telephone with Secretary of State William P. Rogers and Secretary of Defense Melvin A. Laird.

Later in the morning, Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on national security, presided at a session of the Washington Special Action Group to discuss what tactics to follow. That panel, which includes representatives from the State and Defense Departments, the Central Intelligence Agency and

other concerned agencies, meets during periods of emergency. Mr. Kissinger met privately with Mr. Nixon after the session, Ronald L. Ziegler, the White House press secretary, said.

## Attack Expected, Ziegler Says

It was evident that despite the crisis in South Vietnam, the Administration was seeking to avoid giving an impression of undue concern. Mr. Ziegler referred several times to the current fighting as "the South Vietnamese operation" and said that the attack by North Vietnam had been expected. "Now that it is beginning, our position is to evaluate it day by day," he said.

He cautioned newsmen again making any "assumptions at this time" on what would be done, because, he said, the President wants "all options open."

Mr. Ziegler and the Defense Department spokesman, Jerry W. Friedheim, said that the American withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam was continuing on schedule despite the increased fighting. Mr. Nixon has said that troop strength would be reduced to 69,000 by May 1 and has promised a new troop reduction announcement before then. Mr. Ziegler said that this plan was unchanged.

The spokesman also said it was highly unlikely that any of the six United States combat battalions remaining in Vietnam would be engaged in the ground operations. They are committed to guarding United States installations.

In answer to questions, Mr. Ziegler also said that American air power would be used, as necessary to aid South Vietnamese forces in combating enemy forces within South Vietnam.

Robert J. McCloskey, the State Department spokesman— who had attended the meeting of the Special Action Group—was the Administration's sharpest voice during the day.

## 'Flagrant Violation' Charged

He said that what had happened in South Vietnam was "a flagrant violation by North Vietnam" of the 1954 Geneva agreement on Indochina and the 1968 understanding between the United States and North Vietnam.

"And by any definition, what has occurred is an invasion of South Vietnam," he said.

Both the 1954 and 1968 accounts have been sources of semantic contention between supporters and critics of American involvement in Vietnam.

In essence, the United States has charged North Vietnam with violating the 1954 treaty by infiltrating men and supplies into South Vietnam. Critics, however, have charged that South Vietnam broke the treaty in the middle nineteen-fifteenies by refusing to hold elections that might have led to Communist control of all Vietnam.

The 1968 "understanding," as made known by the Johnson Administration on Oct. 31, 1968, provided for an end of American bombing of North Vietnam in return for the start of substantive talks on Vietnam, with Saigon and the Vietcong represented at the table in Paris along with Hanoi and Washington. The United States also asserted that it had an "understanding" from Hanoi that the North Vietnamese would not violate the demilitarized zone and would not shirk cities in South Vietnam.

The United States also claimed the right to fly reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam. Hanoi has never acknowledged that it agreed to any restraint, and began in 1970 to shoot at these planes. This in turn led to American air strikes against antiaircraft emplacements and other military targets in north Vietnam.

Theoretically, under the Americans' interpretation, the abrogation of the 1968 understanding could justify a resumption by the United States of systematic bombing of North Vietnam.

## Time Limit Suggested

Such a course would lead to increased tensions with Hanoi's allies, such as the Soviet Union and China, and might even endanger the chances for success of Mr. Nixon's trip to Moscow set for May 22.

It could also lead to unforeseen political problems in this country, with Vietnam again becoming a major divisive issue.

For these reasons, it seemed likely that, barring very large North Vietnamese incursions, American bombing of territory north of the border would be directly linked to the invasion

of South Vietnam by the 308th and other North Vietnamese divisions.

A Pentagon official said he expected that, if the decision was made to bomb north of the DMZ, the raids would be limited in time to as long as necessary to get the North Vietnamese units out of South Vietnam—or to destroy their ability to fight.

The Paris talks on Vietnam have been indefinitely suspended, and the chief American negotiator, William J. Porter, has returned to the United States. Mr. McCloskey said there were no plans for Mr. Porter to return soon to Paris. He will confer with Mr. Nixon later this week.

Mr. McCloskey also said that one factor in the United States decision to suspend the talks had been the build-up of enemy forces for the expected attack against South Vietnamese forces. He said that the United States would not negotiate under the gun of the current offensive.

When he was asked what led him to call the latest offensive an "invasion," Mr. McCloskey said that this was the most serious violation of the 1968 understanding. He said there was a "qualitative" difference as well, because of the heavy artillery, tanks and antiaircraft weapons used by the attacking forces. It is also the first time that an attacking force has come directly across the demilitarized zone, he noted.

Derailment in Paris

For several months, it had been ap-
parent that the Paris peace talks were
in serious trouble. Repeatedly, U.S. ne-
gotiators complained about the refusal of
the North Vietnamese and their Viet
Cong allies to enter into substantive
negotiations to end the war. And last
December the Americans decided to do
something about that. Three times in
four months the U.S. team canceled
scheduled meetings with the Commu-
nists, but these snubs were ignored and
the talks continued to get nowhere. Last
week, Washington finally seemed to
have had its fill of the charade in Paris.
After 147 fruitless negotiating sessions
stretching over more than three years,
chief U.S. delegate William J. Porter sus-
pended the talks indefinitely.

When he arrived at the meeting site
at the Hotel Majestic on Avenue Kléber,
it was clear that the tough-talking Porter
had something important to say. "You
have raised every possible doubt as to
the usefulness of continuing these dis-
cussions," he told the Communists seated
across from him at the green leather-
topped conference table. "You have ob-
structed understanding and progress in
every way." Noting that President Nixon
had declared this week a week of na-
tional concern for American prisoners of
war in Vietnam, Porter came to the
point: "It would be a mockery of our
concern for them [the POW's] were we
to sit in this room with you and listen to
more of your blackmail and distortions."
And with that, Porter announced that
there would be no further sessions until
the other side showed a willingness for
"serious discussions" by signaling the
U.S. that it was ready to talk about
concrete issues.

Tone: Though it came as a surprise, Porter's move was, in a way, a telegraphed blow. As soon as he took over his Paris assignment late last year, the former U.S. ambassador to South Korea set a new tone for the American delegation. Adopting a tough, no-nonsense stand, he repeatedly tried to force the Communists to talk about substantive issues. On more than one occasion, his two-fisted style brought the talks to the verge of collapse. But that, it now appears, may have been part of an over-all strategy. For, early this year, in a move clearly designed to seize the propaganda initiative, Mr. Nixon revealed that Presidential aide Henry Kissinger had held no fewer than twelve secret talks with the North Vietnamese in Paris—and that Hanoi had scuttled the clandestine meetings last fall, just when they had begun to look promising.

Despite all these signals, the Commu-
nists were clearly caught off-guard by the
suspension of the talks. Xuan Thuy, the
usually serene North Vietnamese chief
delegate, showed anger as he declared
at a curbside press conference that the
U.S. had interrupted the negotiations
"without a valid reason." And arriving in
Paris the day after Porter's bombshell,
Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the head of
the Viet Cong delegation, seemed at a
loss on how to handle the situation. Step-
ping from an Aeroflot jet, she began by
declaring that the only valid basis for
ending the Vietnam war was the seven-

her ear to fill her in on the latest develop-
ments and she promptly accused the U.S.
of "sabotaging" the peace talks.

Filibuster: This charge was rejected
by President Nixon. At his press confer-
ence last week, the President revealed
that he had ordered Porter to suspend
the talks. "What we are trying to do," he
explained, "is to break the filibuster.
There has been a three-and-a-half-year
filibuster of the peace talks on the part of
the North Vietnamese." Mr. Nixon assert-
ed that the U.S. was ready to resume ne-
gotiations with the Communists openly or
in secret at any time, but "we are not
going to allow them to use this forum for
the purpose of bullying the U.S." Behind
this new, hard line, the President indi-
cated, lay a conviction that the military
situation in Vietnam has improved (fol-
lowing story), that the Vietnamization
program-under which South Vietnamese
forces are taking over the U.S. combat
role-"has succeeded" and that, as Amer-
ican troop withdrawals continue, there is
less and less to bargain about around the
table in Paris:

If this is, in fact, the primary reason
for last week's suspension of the Paris
talks, it would seem to bode ill for their
resumption. For it appears to signal a de-
parture from the President's past strate-
gy of seeking to wind down the war
through Vietnamization while simultane-
ously working toward a negotiated set-
tlement. Now, it seems, Mr. Nixon has, at
least temporarily, abandoned his "two-
track" approach and is relying entirely
on Vietnamization. The shortcoming of
such an approach is that while it may ul-
timately extricate the U.S. from a direct
role in the fighting, it will fail to achieve

NEWSWEEK 3 April 1972 (28M)

THE WAR IN INDOCHINA

11

tvd

C Y J

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

2 APRIL 1972

79

# The President's War Powers

Barring a successful move by the Nixon administration to sidetrack the matter, the Senate this week is expected to come to grips with one of the most controversial issues in American government: the war powers of the President —any President.

Who has the right to commit the nation or its armed forces to war, Congress or the President? In modern times, most notably in Viet Nam and Korea, the President has acted without a Constitutional declaration of war by Congress. A bill now before the Senate would compel the President to share this war-making authority with Congress.

The bill defines the Presidential war powers for the first time. It specifies under what conditions, in the absence of a formal declaration of war (a formality rarely observed in recent years), he may commit American forces or weapons at home or abroad—to forestall an attack, repel an actual attack, or retaliate. Congress would then have 30 days in which to approve the President's action. If it didn't do so, he would have to recall the troops.

Presidents have traditionally been jealous of their prerogatives in foreign policy and have resented intrusion by the legislative branch. Mr. Nixon has made clear his opposition to the bill. His aides say it "really boxes in the President in some dangerous ways" and is of "doubtful constitutionality." They hope to have it shunted to the Senate Judiciary Committee, where it presumably would receive a decent burial.

Such a move is unlikely in view of the attitude of Sen. John C. Stennis [D., Miss.], chairman of the Armed Services Committee, and Sen. Mike Mansfield [D., Mont.], the majority leader. They want the Senate to meet the issue head on. If this happens, the Nixon forces may not have the votes to defeat the war powers measure.

For one thing, the bill is supported by a wide assortment of Republicans and Democrats, both liberal and conservative, both hawks and doves. Stennis, himself, a loyal supporter of the military, is a co-sponsor. So is Sen. Robert A. Taft Jr. [R., Ohio], whose father led the Senate attack on President Truman's war powers.

In the "great debate" of 1951, the late Sen. Taft said that Truman had "no authority whatever to commit American troops to Korea without Congressional approval" and "no power to agree to send American troops to fight in Europe in a war between the members of the Atlantic Pact and Soviet Russia." Nothing came of that argument then.

Today Sen. Stennis refers to Korea and Viet Nam as evidence that Congressional authority in deciding to go to war must be restored. "The last decade has taught us," Stennis told the Senate, "if it has taught us anything, that this country must never again go to war without the full moral sanction of the American people. The only practical way for all parts of the nation to participate in such legislation is thru the Congress."

Granted that this goal is desirable—the last six years leave little doubt of that. The question is whether the Senate bill offers the best solution in a nuclear age when decisions have to be made in a split second. Sen. Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.), another military expert like Stennis, but one who supports the Nixon administration's position, says the bill is "as shot full with holes as a limburger cheese."

What may emerge as an alternative to the Senate bill is a war powers resolution adopted last August by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, which had rejected earlier Senate bills similar to the present one.

The House resolution recognized the President's authority to act without specific legislative approval in extraordinary and emergency circumstances which were left undefined. It urged the President to consult Congress in such matters, if possible, and required him to submit a written explanation to Congress when he committed troops to combat—but it set no time limit.

Understandably, members of the Nixon administration say they "can live with" the House measure. Indeed, it would not alter the President's present authority. And this underscores the basic dilemma. In a nuclear age when the launching of a missile cannot be undone, how can legislative control be imposed upon the executive? It will be a difficult question to solve.