The Secretary
of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

[LC]

Statement

LATIN AMERICA AND THE UNITED STATES

Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the House International Relations Committee.

The Western Hemisphere is, for us, a region of special ties and special interests. We have always felt a bond of intimacy and of collaboration in this hemisphere. We share a common origin in the struggle against foreign tyranny, a common tradition in the heritage of Western civilization, and common purposes in our mutual security and in our cooperative efforts to improve the lot of the people of this part of the world.

Latin America is changing. The nations of Latin America are experiencing, each in its own particular way, the stress of transition-internally from the rigid to the dynamic, internationally from dependence to interdependence.

The quality of their ties to our country is changing in the process. The United States is experiencing a more open relationship with the nations of Latin America-a relationship which now turns not on the memories of an earlier age of tutelage, on pretensions by us to hegemony, or on national inequality but on mutual respect, common interests, and cooperative problem-solving.

Yet though our ties with them may be changing, the nations of Latin America have a new meaning and importance for us, for they are emerging in their own right on the global scene. This is so because:

* They are increasingly important factors in world commodity, mineral, and energy markets;

March 4, 1976

Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

* They hold the potential to become a region for increased agricultural output to feed the world's hungry; and perhaps most noteworthy,

* They are playing a more significant role in the political councils of the world, not merely because of their enhanced economic strength but also because of their growing solidarity with the other developing countries of Africa and Asia and their juridical traditions of personal respect, national dignity, and international collaboration which counts for so much in the arenas of world politics.

Our policy in the Americas in the years ahead must recognize these new realities-of change in Latin America and of the fundamental importance of Latin America to the world interests of the United States. We cannot take the nations of this hemisphere for granted. We should put aside earlier temptations to crusade. We must create a new, healthier relationship. We can accept and, indeed, welcome the emergence of the nations of Latin America into global importance. And we must preserve our special hemispheric ties, without slogans, so that our cooperation as equals in this hemisphere can be a model for cooperation in the world arena.

The inter-American experience of the recent past has helped illuminate these imperatives of our future relationships with Latin America. In the 1960's the Alliance for Progress rallied the energies and enthusiasms of people throughout the Americas. By 1969 its promises had begun to fade, and the nations of Latin America gathered together at Vina del Mar [Chile] to stake out a new agenda of issues between us. In [October] 1973, shortly after

PR 111

2

I became Secretary of State, I called for a new dialogue between the United States and Latin America. At the meetings in Mexico City and Washington the Foreign Ministers of the Americas met to discuss the Vina del Mar issues. Those meetings, however, were interrupted almost exactly a year ago by the enactment of the Trade Act and the exclusion of Venezuela and Ecuador from the generalized system of preferences [GSP].

Yet if the new dialogue did not yield final results, it did teach some lessons about our future efforts to perfect the undeniable community which exists in this part of the world. For it demonstrated:

* On the one hand, the difficulties which await both the United States and Latin America when the two sides attempt to reduce the complexity of their relationships to a series of demands for quick and categorical response and,

* On the other, that the regular, recurring non-rhetorical examination of our common problems together is a constructive mode of dealing with them.

## Impressions from Latin American Trip

My trip to Latin America was an effort to do just that.* It had been unfortunately delayed by other problems which were urgent as well as important, but circumstances combined, in the end, to make the timing rather more propitious than might otherwise have been the case.

* In Venezuela I saw a country not content to husband its own affluence but determined to promote the common destiny of Latin America. I made clear that we welcomed this and that we were confident that as long as they served higher purposes than confrontation, we were prepared to cooperate with regional organizations and institutions which expressed the increased sense of solidarity and common purpose within Latin America.

* Brazil is an emerging world power, with broadened international interests and responsibilities,

not by virtue of our granting them that rank but by the reality of what Brazil has accomplished. The Memorandum of Agreement which I signed with the Brazilian Foreign Minister establishing procedures for consultation between our two Governments on issues of common substantive concern, was a recognition of that plain fact. The bilateral relationship between the United States and Brazil is becoming more important and more complex all the time; at the same time Brazil's voice and influence in world councils is also growing. It was in recognition of Brazil's new world role that we institutionalized the increased consultations which will be required, just as we have with the nations of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan. The Brazilian consultative agreement is bilateral. It touches only our relations with Brazil. While it reflects the reality of Brazil's international status, it does not affect our relations with any other country or represent an attempt to manage Latin America by proxy. I explained to the Presidents of the other countries which I visited that we are prepared to enter into similar arrangements with other nations in the Western Hemisphere, if they so desire. In enhancing bilateral relationships in this way with specific nations of the Americas, we will not diminish the sense of solidarity within Latin America or our willingness to work with Latin American institutions.

* Peru's unique experiment of internal development and social change demonstrates the creative worth of the diversity in this hemisphere. We accept the sovereignty of each Latin American state. Our policy, I said, is to support the aspirations and objectives of their program of social change, to conciliate differences before they become conflicts, and to cooperate with the authentic development efforts of each of the nations of the hemisphere.

* In Colombia I saw at first hand another of the hemisphere's practicing democracies, a nation with whom we have the warmest of relations and with whom we can discuss world political and security issues without complexes and with considerable profit. The single serious matter on our mutual agenda is trade, for improved access to our markets and to those of the other developed countries is vital to the success of that democracy. The Colombian Foreign Minister has put forward an imaginative suggestion for expanding commerce

*The texts of the Secretary's major statements made during his visit to Latin America in February 1976 are available from the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

3

within the hemisphere, and we are considering it
with care. I might also add that we discussed Co-
lombia's cooperation in the effort to control the
illegal traffic of dangerous drugs.

* In Costa Rica I saw another example of Latin American democracy at work. Addressing the Foreign Ministers of all the Central American states, I said that basic human rights within the Americas must be preserved, cherished, and defended if peace and prosperity are to be more than hollow achievements. I also observed that the problems we confront require, more than ever, the full and free dedication of the talent, energy, creative thought, and action of men and women, free from fear and repression.

* Though I had not taken the initiative on the matter, I had found in each of my previous stops concern over what the dispatch of the Cuban force to Angola might signify for the nations of this hemisphere. Accordingly in Costa Rica I also emphasized that no nation can hope to advance if it is not secure. And I restated our own firm commitment to the Rio Treaty and to the principle of collective security in the hemisphere.

* Finally, in Guatemala, I had the opportunity to see at first hand the tragic effects of the earthquakes of February 4 and 6—a few of 80,000 Guatemalans who were maimed and injured; some of the 1,000,000 now without homes, who are living in tents and makeshift shelters; and something of the heroic efforts of our own countrymen to help that stricken land. I pledged to Guatemala our support, not only in the moment of tragedy but for the long-term as well, and I cited the $25 million emergency package now before the Congress as an expression of this intent of the American people.

## U.S. Pledges

Throughout my trip, I emphasized that the United States regards our hemispheric ties and responsibilities with a special seriousness and special hope. In a spirit of solidarity, I pledged that we should:

* Respond to the development needs of the more industrialized nations of the hemisphere, and to the region as a whole, in the areas of trade and international finance;

* Assist on concessional terms the efforts of the neediest nations to advance themselves;

* Support and work with Latin American regional efforts to organize for cooperation and integration;

* Negotiate our differences with any nation or nations on the basis of mutual respect and sovereign equality;

* Maintain our firm commitment to mutual security against any who would undermine our common effort, threaten independence, or export violence and terror; and

* Modernize and strengthen the inter-American system by working with the other member states to develop new structures and processes in the OAS [Organization of American States] itself, and with other organizations, to meet the new realities of our hemisphere.

These six points met with a positive response throughout my visit. It was apparent to me that:

* There is a strong regard and special respect for the United States in the countries I visited, upon which we can build;

* While the United States has assumed security responsibilities, the nations of Latin America are determined for their part to concentrate on meeting the imperatives of rapid growth. Our interests and views intersect over a wide range of issues;

* Our common heritage and our shared aspirations and values of human respect and dignity make it possible for us to cooperate for the common good;

* For this purpose the essential political requirement for progress in these areas of common concern is the readiness of nations to consult and cooperate with each other on the basis of sovereign equality; and

* With consultation and cooperation, mankind's hope of meeting the challenges of economic and social progress, and of remaking relations between developed and developing countries, is brightest and most promising here, in this hemisphere.

## Executive and Legislative Responsibilities

The executive branch is directing itself in a serious way to these goals. We have already held a series of interagency meetings—involving Treasury, Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Defense, and Commerce—at the State

4

Department. We have compiled an inventory of each of the issues discussed in all my talks. And we are tasking specific offices, bureaus, and departments with the responsibility for the concrete steps necessary to respond with action programs.

Within the week the Brazil-U.S. trade sub-group, established by the new consultative mechanism, will hold a two-day meeting here in Washington and will focus on the question of export subsidies and countervailing duties. Beyond that the Foreign Ministers of all the member states will have an opportunity to discuss these issues collectively at the General Assembly of the OAS in June. We intend to take full advantage of that occasion to insure that the U.S. position on the hemisphere's problems be defined well before that meeting in order that its deliberations shall be as productive and specific as possible.

We will be consulting the Congress in the weeks ahead as these plans take concrete shape. Some of the outlines of what should be done are already clear, as are the important role and responsibility of the Congress for the success of our Latin American policies in the years ahead.

* The legislative threat of political retaliation—by cutting off the U.S. market or stopping multilateral aid projects, directed to states which do not follow our principles in nationalizing property within their borders—are still matters of concern in Latin America. I have suggested that if Latin America and the United States could develop a multinational code regulating both national and corporate behavior in investments and investment disputes, this would enhance the confidence in the Congress that compensation issues, at least, could be settled without the need for automatic statutory retaliation.

* As to trade policy, the system of generalized preferences in the Trade Act was an important advance in our relationship with Latin America, for their development aspirations depend on improved access to world markets including our own. The exclusion of Venezuela and Ecuador from GSP did serious damage to the United States in the eyes of Latin America. We hope that Congress can give early and sympathetic consideration to repealing this legislation.

* I found considerable fear that our trade policies are becoming generally more protectionist as reflected by new countervailing duty actions, escape clause cases, and other restrictive measures taken with regard to imports from Latin America in the past year under the Trade Act. I also found new evidence of a willingness to conciliate and compromise some of the outstanding trade disputes, if the United States is in a position to respond reciprocally in a spirit of mutual accommodation. We will be examining these Latin American concerns and ideas and consulting with the Congress about the general policy issues and about specific legislative remedies if we determine that further legislation is essential.

* Latin America is still intensely interested in solving the problem of fluctuating commodity export earnings. The fact that the Administration will be requesting that the Congress approve U.S. participation in the new International Coffee Agreement and the International Tin Agreement has been widely applauded in the hemisphere. I am confident that congressional consent will be forthcoming for these agreements are of vital importance to Colombia, Brazil, and Central America in the case of the coffee agreement and to Bolivia in the case of the tin accord and will be seen throughout the hemisphere as earnest of our sincere desire to cooperate in their development efforts. Beyond that I pointed out that the United States is prepared to work with other countries on a case-by-case approach to other commodities and that in selecting commodities for such consideration, we would pay particular attention to those items of interest to the nations of Latin America.

* Exports take time. Meanwhile, the nations of Latin America continue to need considerable development assistance, on nonconcessional terms in the case of most, to finance essential imports and capital investments. This session Congress has before it the legislation to authorize and appropriate funds for our development assistance efforts through the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] complex, and the Agency for International Development. The legislation providing for replenishment of the ordinary capital and the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank is of particular

5

importance to our Latin American policy, for that
bank is now the single most important source of
official development capital for the nations of the
hemisphere.

* And, as I mentioned earlier, there is also be-
fore you the President's special request for legisla-
tion to provide $25 million for the relief of the
suffering and homeless in Guatemala. I cannot
stress the urgency of this legislation too much, for
the wet season in the highlands is fast approaching
and, unless the 1,000,000 homeless get roofs over
their heads, the rains will add new stores of human
misery and suffering in that stricken land. Later
today a subcommittee of your committee will be
hearing testimony on behalf of the proposal. I urge
your full support for this first effort to bring time-
ly assistance to the victims of this disaster. We will
report to you at a later date about the need for
U.S. assistance in the subsequent rehabilitation and
reconstruction phases of the disaster.

* Beyond these issues are a series of important
hemispheric political considerations. Not the least
of these is the extent to which Cuba's action in
Angola may constitute an ominous precedent for
intervention in this hemisphere and thus invoke
our solemn treaty responsibilities.

On this and on other matters, we propose to
meet regularly with the Congress.

No policy in this region of the world or else-
where can succeed without the understanding, sup-
port, and cooperation of this body. Legislation,
whether for good or ill, is a vital--indeed often a
decisive-instrument of the foreign policy of the
United States. We know that nurturing the under-
standing and support of the House and the Senate
falls in major part to us in the executive. We con-
sider it a basic responsibility to continue to work
with you on hemispheric issues.

For there is much the United States can do,
of tangible benefit for the people of Latin America
and for the common global good, without massive
sacrifice to ourselves. In this hemisphere there is a
promise, an emergent power, and a moral force.
The United States and Latin America share
precious common bonds of history and outlook.
Our task is not an onerous task for it is one which
serves the mutual interests of this country and
Latin America. Our task is to forge those common
bonds into a sense of shared purpose and endeavor
so that this hemisphere can truly be a model for,
and a contribution to, the general order, harmony,
and prosperity to which the peoples of all the
world aspire.

(LC)

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Netherlands (pub. 7967)
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(c)

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TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Thursday, March 4, 1976

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

> I am happy to be able to report to this Committee about my recent trip to Latin America. I am prepared to answer questions on other subjects as well -- some, perhaps in executive session -- but I have concentrated my prepared remarks on our Hemispheric relations.

The Western Hemisphere is, for us, a region of special ties and special interests. We have always felt a bond of intimacy and of collaboration in this Hemisphere. We share a common origin in the struggle against foreign tyranny, a common tradition in the heritage of Western civilization, and common purposes in our mutual security and in our cooperative efforts

-2-

Latin America is changing. The nations of Latin America are experiencing, each in its own particular way, the stress of transition, internally from the rigid to the dynamic, internationally from dependence to interdependence.

The quality of their ties to our country is changing in the process. The United States is experiencing a more open relationship with the nations of Latin America, a relationship which now turns, not on the memories of an earlier age of tutelage, on pretensions by us to hegemony or on national inequality, but on mutual respect, common interests and cooperative problem-solving.

Yet, though our ties with them may be changing, the nations of Latin America have a new meaning and importance for

-3-

- They are increasingly important factors in world
commodity, mineral and energy markets;

- They hold the potential to become a region for
increased agricultural output, to feed the world's
hungry;

- And, perhaps most noteworthy, they are playing a
more significant role in the political councils of the
world, not merely because of their enhanced economic
strength, but also because of their growing solidarity with
the other developing countries of Africa and Asia and
their juridical traditions of personal respect, national
dignity and international collaboration which counts for

-4-

Our policy in the Americas in the years ahead must
recognize these new realities -- of change in Latin America,
and of the fundamental importance of Latin America to the world
interests of the United States. We cannot take the nations of
this Hemisphere for granted. We should put aside earlier
temptations to crusade. We must create a new, healthier
relationship. We can accept and indeed welcome the emergence of
the nations of Latin America into global importance. And we must
preserve our special Hemispheric ties, without slogans, so
that our cooperation as equals in this Hemisphere can be a model
for cooperation in the world arena.

-5-

with Latin America. In the 1960's, the Alliance for Progress rallied the energies and enthusiasms of people throughout the Americas. By 1969, its promises had begun to fade, and the nations of Latin America gathered together at Vina del Mar to stake out a new agenda of issues between us. In 1973, shortly after I became Secretary of State, I called for a new dialogue between the United States and Latin America. At the meetings in Mexico City and Washington, the Foreign Ministers of the Americas met to discuss the Vina del Mar issues. Those meetings, however, were interrupted almost exactly a year ago, by the enactment of the Trade Act and the exclusion of Venezuela and Ecuador from the generalized system of preferences.

Yet, if the new dialogue did not yield final results, it did teach some lessons about our future efforts to perfect the undeniable

-6-

-- On the one hand, the difficulties which await both the
United States and Latin America when the two sides
attempt to reduce the complexity of their relationships
to a series of demands for quick and categorical response
and,

-- On the other, that the regular, recurring non-rhetorical
examination of our common problems together is a
constructive mode of dealing with them.

My trip to Latin America was an effort to do just that. It
had been unfortunately delayed by other problems which were
urgent as well as important, but circumstances combined, in the
end, to make the timing rather more propitious than might
otherwise have been the case.

-7-

-- In Venezuela, I saw a country, not content to husband its own affluence, but determined to promote the common destiny of Latin America. I made clear that we welcomed this and that we were confident that as long as they served higher purposes than confrontation we were prepared to cooperate with regional organizations and institutions which expressed the increased sense of solidarity and common purpose within Latin America.

-- Brazil is an emerging world power, with broadened international interests and responsibilities, not by virtue of our granting them that rank, but by the reality of what Brazil has accomplished. The Memorandum of Agreement which I signed with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, establishing procedures for consultation

-8-

between our two governments on issues of common
substantive concern, was a recognition of that plain
fact. The bilateral relationship between the United States
and Brazil is becoming more important and more
complex all the time; at the same time Brazil's voice
and influence in world councils is also growing. It was
in recognition of Brazil's new world role that we
institutionalized the increased consultations which will
be required, just as we have with the nations of Western
Europe, Canada and Japan. The Brazilian consultative
agreement is bilateral. It touches only our relations with
Brazil. While it reflects the reality of Brazil's inter-
national status, it does not affect our relations with any
other country or represent an attempt to manage Latin

-9-

America by proxy. I explained to the Presidents of
the other countries which I visited that we are prepared
to enter into similar arrangements with other nations
in the Western Hemisphere, if they so desire. In
enhancing bilateral relationships in this way with
specific nations of the Americas, we will not diminish
the sense of solidarity within Latin America, or our
willingness to work with Latin American institutions.

- Peru's unique experiment of internal development and
social change demonstrates the creative worth of the
diversity in this Hemisphere. We accept the sovereignty
of each Latin American state. Our policy, I said, is to
support the aspirations and objectives of their program
of social change, to conciliate differences before they

-10-

become conflicts and to cooperate with the authentic
development efforts of each of the nations of the
Hemisphere.

-- In Colombia, I saw at first hand another of the
Hemisphere's practicing democracies, a nation with
whom we have the warmest of relations and with whom
we can discuss world political and security issues
without complexes and with considerable profit. The
single serious matter on our mutual agenda is trade, for
improved access to our markets and to those of the
other developed countries is vital to the success of that
democracy. The Colombian Foreign Minister has put
forward an imaginative suggestion for expanding commerce
within the Hemisphere, and we are considering it with care.

(i)

-11-

I might also add that we discussed Colombia's cooperation in the effort to control the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs.

-- In Costa Rica, I saw another example of Latin American democracy at work. Addressing the Foreign Ministers of all the Central American states, I said that basic human rights within the Americas must be preserved, cherished and defended, if peace and prosperity are to be more than hollow achievements. I also observed that the problems we confront require, more than ever, the full and free dedication of the talent, energy, creative thought and action of men and women, free from fear and repression.

-12-

-- Though I had not taken the initiative on the matter, I had found in each of my previous stops concern over what the dispatch of the Cuban force to Angola might signify for the nations of this Hemisphere. Accordingly, in Costa Rica I also emphasized that no nation can hope to advance if it is not secure. And I restated our own firm commitment to the Rio Treaty and to the principle of collective security in the Hemisphere.

-- Finally, in Guatemala, I had the opportunity to see at first hand the tragic effects of the earthquakes of February 4 and 6:

- a few of 80,000 Guatemalans who were maimed and injured;

- some of the one million now without homes, who are

-13-

- and something of the heroic efforts of our own country-
men to help that stricken land. I pledged to Guatemala
our support, not only in the moment of tragedy but
for the long-term as well, and I cited the $25 million
emergency package now before the Congress as an
expression of this intent of the American people.

Throughout my trip, I emphasized that the United States
regards our Hemispheric ties and responsibilities with a special
seriousness and special hope. In a spirit of solidarity, I pledged
that we should:

-- Respond to the development needs of the more industrialized nations of the Hemisphere, and to the region as a whole

-14-

-- Assist on concessional terms the efforts of the neediest nations to advance themselves;

-- Support and work with Latin American regional efforts to organize for cooperation and integration;

-- Negotiate our differences with any nation or nations on the basis of mutual respect and sovereign equality;

- 15 -

- maintain our firm commitment to mutual security
  against any who would undermine our common effort,
  threaten independence or export violence and terror;
  and

- modernize and strengthen the inter-American system,
  by working with the other member states to develop
  new structures and processes in the OAS itself
  and with other organizations, to meet the new
  realities of our Hemisphere.

It was apparent to me:

- that there is a strong regard and special respect for
  the United States in the countries I visited, upon which

- 16 -

we can build;

-- that while the United States has assumed security
responsibilities the nations of Latin America are
determined for their part to concentrate on meeting
the imperatives of rapid growth. Our interests and views
intersect over a wide range of issues;

-- that our common heritage and our shared aspirations
and values of human respect and dignity make it
possible for us to cooperate for the common good;

-- that, for this purpose, the essential political
requirement for progress in these areas of common
concern is the readiness of nations to consult and
cooperate, with each other, on the basis of sovereign
equality;

- 17 -

-- and that, with consultation and cooperation, mankind's hope of meeting the challenges of economic and social progress, and of remaking relations between developed and developing countries, is brightest and most promising here, in this Hemisphere.

The Executive Branch is directing itself in a serious way to these goals. We have already held a series of inter-agency meetings, involving Treasury, STR, Defense and Commerce, at the State Department. We have compiled an inventory of each of the issues discussed in all my talks. And we are tasking specific offices, bureaus and departments with the responsibility for the concrete steps necessary to respond with action programs.

- 18 -

Within the week, the Brazil-U. S. trade sub-group, established by the new consultative mechanism, will hold a two-day meeting here in Washington, and will focus on the question of export subsidies and countervailing duties. Beyond that, the Foreign Ministers of all the member states will have an opportunity to discuss these issues collegiately at the General Assembly of the OAS in June. We intend to take full advantage of that occasion to insure that the United States position on the Hemisphere's problems be defined well before that meeting, in order that its deliberations shall be as productive and specific as possible.

We will be consulting the Congress in the weeks ahead, as these plans take concrete shape. Some of the outlines of

- 19 -

what should be done are already clear, as are the important
role and responsibility of the Congress for the success of our
Latin American policies in the years ahead:

-- The legislative threat of political retaliation, by
cutting off the United States market or stopping multi-
lateral aid projects, directed to states which do not
follow our principles in nationalizing property within
their borders are still matters of concern in Latin
America. I have suggested that if Latin America and
the United States could develop a multinational code
regulating both national and corporate behavior in
investments and investment disputes, this would
enhance the confidence in the Congress that compensation

- 20 -

-- As to trade policy, the system of generalized preferences
in the Trade Act was an important advance in our
relationship with Latin America, for their development
aspirations depend on improved access to world markets,
including our own. The exclusion of Venezuela and
Ecuador from GSP did serious damage to the United
States in the eyes of Latin America. We hope that
Congress can give early and sympathetic
consideration to repealing this legislation.

-- I found considerable fear that our trade policies are
becoming generally more protectionist, as reflected

- 21 -

by new countervailing duty actions, escape clause cases
and other restrictive measures taken with regard to
imports from Latin America in the past year under the
Trade Act. I also found new evidence of a willingness
to conciliate and compromise some of the outstanding
trade disputes, if the United States is in a position
to respond reciprocally in a spirit of mutual accommo-
dation. We will be examining these Latin American
concerns and ideas, and consulting with the Congress
about the general policy issues, and about specific
legislative remedies if we determine that further
legislation is essential.

-- Latin America is still intensely interested in solving
the problem of fluctuating commodity export earnings.

- 22 -

The fact that the Administration will be requesting
that the Congress approve United States participation
in the new International Coffee Agreement and the
International Tin Agreement has been widely applauded
in the Hemisphere. I am confident that Congressional
consent will be forthcoming, for these agreements are
of vital importance to Colombia, Brazil and Central
America in the case of the Coffee Agreement, and to
Bolivia, in the case of the tin accord, and will be seen
throughout the Hemisphere as earnest of our sincere
desire to cooperate in their development efforts.

Beyond that, I pointed out that the United States is
prepared to work with other countries on a case-by-case

- 23 -

approach to other commodities, and that in selecting
commodities for such consideration, we would pay
particular attention to those items of interest to the
nations of Latin America.

-- Exports take time. Meanwhile, the nations of Latin America continue to need considerable development assistance, on non-concessional terms in the case of most, to finance essential imports and capital investments. This session, Congress has before it the legislation to authorize and appropriate funds for our development assistance efforts through the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank complex and the Agency for International Development. The legislation

- 24 -

providing for replenishment of the ordinary capital and
the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American
Development Bank is of particular importance to our
Latin American policy, for that Bank is now the
single most important source of official development capital
for the nations of the Hemisphere.

-- And, as I mentioned earlier, there is also before you
the President's special request for legislation to provide
$25 million for the relief of the suffering and homeless
in Guatemala. I cannot stress the urgency of this
legislation too much, for the wet season in the highlands
is fast approaching and, unless the 1,000,000 homeless
get roofs over their heads, the rains will add new

- 25 -

stores of human misery and suffering in that stricken
land. Later today, a Subcommittee of your Committee
will be hearing testimony on behalf of the proposal.

I urge your full support for this first effort to bring timely
assistance to the victims of this disaster. We will
report to you at a later date about the need for
United States assistance in the subsequent rehabilitation
and reconstruction phases of the disaster.

-- Beyond these issues are a series of important Hemispheric
political considerations. Not the least of these is the
extent to which Cuba's action in Angola may constitute an
ominous precedent for intervention in this Hemisphere
and thus invoke our solemn treaty responsibilities.

- 26 -

No policy, in this region of the world or elsewhere,
can succeed without the understanding, support and coopera-
tion of this body. Legislation, whether for good or ill is a
vital -- indeed, often a decisive -- instrument of the foreign
policy of the United States. We know that nurturing the under-
standing and support of the House and the Senate falls in major
part to us in the Executive. We consider it a basic responsibility
to continue to work with you on Hemispheric issues.

- 27 -

In this Hemisphere, there is a promise, an emergent power and
a moral force. The United States and Latin America share
precious common bonds of history and outlook. Our task is
not an onerous task, for it is one which serves the mutual
interests of this country and Latin America. Our task is
to forge those common bonds into a sense of shared purpose
and endeavor, so that this Hemisphere can truly be a model for,
and a contribution to, the general order, harmony and
prosperity to which the peoples of all the world aspire.

The Secretary
of State

[LC]

## Statement

March 9, 1976

Washington, D.C.

Bureau of Public Affairs

Office of Media Services

## NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Senate Committee on Government Operations.*

I welcome this opportunity to speak to you on the subject of nuclear proliferation—one of the most urgent problems facing the United States and the world community and one which will vitally affect the security of all nations for the rest of this century.

As the committee is aware, your concerns over the dangers posed by further nuclear proliferation are widely and deeply shared throughout the U.S. Government.

To convey to you both the seriousness with which we view this issue and the steps we are taking to deal with the proliferation problem, I propose to address the following questions in my statement:

* First, how does nonproliferation fit into the framework of our overall foreign policy?

* Second, what multilateral efforts to deter proliferation have already been initiated and what further measures do we contemplate?

* Third, what actions are we taking as a matter of U.S. national policy to reinforce and extend our international nonproliferation activities?

* Fourth, how do we assess the longer term prospects for containing further nuclear spread through an evolving diplomatic and technical strategy?

Before turning to these broader aspects of nonproliferation, I should note that I fully approve

of the position on Senate Bill 1439 [Export Reorganization Act of 1976] set forth by Deputy Secretary [of State Robert S.] Ingersoll before the committee. For the reasons outlined during his January 30 appearance, we cannot support this bill.

## Nonproliferation Perspectives

Nonproliferation has been a primary foreign policy goal of the United States through six Administrations, with major accomplishments stemming from U.S. initiatives demonstrating the seriousness with which this policy has been pursued. I cite, for example, the adoption of bilateral safeguards and controls in our government-to-government cooperative agreements, the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] in Vienna, and the entering into force of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [NPT]. As a result of these steps, the number of nuclear weapons states has been substantially limited.

After I assumed the office of the Secretary of State, however, it became apparent that changing circumstances warranted a new look at our nonproliferation strategy.

* Other industrialized states were entering the international nuclear market, thereby challenging our long-standing dominance as a commercial nuclear exporter and threatening to diminish the ultimate effect of our national safeguards and control policies.

* The oil crisis has stimulated many developing as well as developed states to accelerate their peaceful nuclear power programs, both as a means

PR 119

2

of lowering the cost of generating electric energy and reducing their reliance on imported petroleum products.

* The nuclear test by India underscored the fact that additional states, even those not part of the highly industrialized world, were capable of using nuclear technology to construct explosives.

In my speech to the U.N. General Assembly in September of 1974, I underscored our concerns over the rapid spread of nuclear technology with potential explosive implications. I chose this forum to address the pressing problem of proliferation, since it is clear that the danger of the further spread of nuclear explosives is a problem vital to every nation on this planet.

At that time I warned against complacency by observing that the world has grown so accustomed to the existence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they will never be used. But today technology is rapidly expanding the number of nuclear weapons in the hands of major powers and threatens to put nuclear explosive technology at the disposal of an increasing number of other countries.

Let me emphasize that pursuit of a vigorous nonproliferation strategy remains a fundamental dimension of this Administration's overall foreign policy.

* We see the need to reduce the danger of nuclear war as the centerpiece of our policy. If additional states acquire nuclear weapons, global stability would be endangered and regional conflicts would run the risk of leading to nuclear war, with potentially catastrophic consequences not only for the nations involved but for all major powers.

* We view the peaceful settlement of regional conflicts and a more stable world order as crucial U.S. objectives. Yet a world of many nuclear powers would result in heightened political tensions and increased instabilities flowing from fears that nuclear weapons might be used, whether deliberately or through miscalculation.

* We support the worldwide goal of finding alternative sources of energy to reduce reliance on oil. Yet a progressive pattern of proliferation could set back—if not cripple entirely—the continued growth of peaceful nuclear energy to service man-

kind's needs, as exporters and importers alike came to lose confidence in the ability of the international system to find effective techniques for realizing the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy while eliminating its inherent security risk.

To meet these new dangers I emphasized in my 1974 UNGA speech—and again a year later before the same forum—the importance the United States attaches to nonproliferation. In both addresses I outlined practical steps we saw as necessary to move forward effectively and comprehensively in this vital field. These included:

* Proposals for the major suppliers to strengthen nuclear safeguards;

* Efforts to gain the widest possible support for the international safeguard system and the Nonproliferation Treaty;

* Physical security measures to protect nuclear material against theft or diversion; and

* Steps to prevent the unrestrained spread of sensitive nuclear facilities, such as national reproducing plants.

I am pleased to take this opportunity to report to this committee on the progress we have made and the problems we still face. There have been solid accomplishments to date, and I will go into the details of these successes in a few moments. But we are far from complacent, and even as we consolidate our gains, we seek to strengthen our nonproliferation strategy.

I do not have to tell this committee how difficult it is to devise a strategy that can guarantee success in preventing the number of nuclear weapons states from increasing during the coming decades. But I cannot emphasize too strongly our belief that the effort can and must be made to contain nuclear spread, even it we cannot be certain of completely and effectively blocking additional nuclear proliferation.

It is within the foregoing framework that we have mounted a major effort during the past two years to strengthen the worldwide nonproliferation regime. This strategy has had two reinforcing elements:

* Multilateral actions to move forward with

3

other states in meeting the nonproliferation challenge and

* National nuclear export policies to insure that the United States continues to exert responsible leadership in nonproliferation.

Let me now describe in some detail the key elements of our nonproliferation strategy, what has been accomplished during the past two years, and what needs to be done to further advance our position.

## Multilateral Strategy

**Suppliers Consultation.** I have noted earlier that the United States, practically speaking, does not have complete, unilateral freedom of action with respect to its nuclear export policy. Other major industrial powers have the capacity and desire to contribute to the world's needs for peaceful nuclear energy, and they fully recognize the need to safeguard their assistance.

It is important, however, that safeguards not become an element of commercial competition. U.S. constraints by themselves will have little effect if other nuclear suppliers decline to exercise the same restraint. In recognition of this we have pursued a policy of consulting with other nuclear exporting countries in an effort to devise a common set of standards concerning safeguards and other related controls associated with peaceful nuclear exports. I believe these efforts have met with a significant degree of success.

As a result of these consultations, the United States has decided to adopt, as a matter of national policy, certain principles which will govern our future nuclear exports. We have been informed that a number of other countries intend to do the same. As other Administration witnesses have testified in recent weeks before another Senate committee, these principles include:

* Provisions for the application of IAEA safeguards on exports of material, equipment, and technology;

* Prohibitions against using assistance for any nuclear explosions including those for "peaceful purposes";

* Requirements for physical security measures on nuclear equipment and materials;

* Application of restraint in the transfer of sensitive technologies (such as enrichment and reprocessing);

* Encouragement of multinational regional facilities for reprocessing and enrichment; and

* Special conditions governing the use or re-transfer of sensitive material, equipment, and technology.

These are significant principles which have moved the level and comprehensiveness of international nonproliferation controls substantially beyond where they were only a few short years ago. But it is important to recognize that further efforts are needed to improve and extend these principles and that our efforts are part of a progressive and evolving process which we will continue in close consultation with other suppliers.

**NPT Adherence.** A second important element of our international nonproliferation strategy is our effort to secure the widest possible adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Adherence to the NPT is a key element in prevention of nuclear proliferation, because it involves a comprehensive commitment by nonnuclear weapons states not to develop nuclear explosives—a commitment verified by IAEA safeguards on all peaceful nuclear facilities in that country and also because it requires safeguards on nuclear exports.

While NPT adherence is still far from universal, nearly 100 states are now party to the treaty. The past 18 months have seen a number of important new adherents, including the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Benelux countries, the Republic of Korea, Libya, and Venezuela, as well as submission of the treaty by Japan—which has already signed the treaty—to the Diet for ratification.

We must continue to do whatever we can to increase support for this most important treaty in the hope that nonnuclear weapons states who see the disadvantages of acquiring nuclear weapons will perceive that their national interest would best be served by adherence.

**IAEA Safeguards.** Another essential feature of our international strategy—and, indeed, one that

4

underpins the progress we have made in consultations with other suppliers and one that is basic to the Nonproliferation Treaty itself—is the comprehensive safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Even in the case of recipient states not party to the NPT, the IAEA system provides internationally recognized safeguard arrangements to insure that nuclear exports are used for peaceful purposes.

IAEA safeguards entail techniques to account for nuclear materials, reinforced by containment and surveillance measures. Agency experts conduct onsite inspections to verify, through independent means, that safeguard material and facilities are being used for declared purposes. These safeguards can provide a high degree of assurance that any significant diversions will be detected and thus provide a real deterrent.

While a safeguard system cannot provide absolute assurance that all conceivable diversions, however modest, will be detected, it does not have to. What it must do—and what the IAEA accomplishes with confidence—is expose the would-be diverter to a high risk of detection.

We recognize that some question the adequacy of the international controls related to nuclear facilities and materials that have evolved over the years. However in the one instance where a nuclear device was exploded through the use of equipment obtained from outside, safeguards did not exist on the facility or its products. Consequently the question of adequacy of safeguards in this case simply did not arise. In fact, since the inception of safeguards, we know of no nation that has acquired nuclear weapons through any diversion of nuclear material subject to either bilateral or IAEA safeguards.

We believe that the IAEA system—with the active technical, financial, and political support of key suppliers and all nations interested in using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes—will continue to fulfill this requirement. Indeed the IAEA safeguards system continues to be a most vital and singularly important element in the battery of constraints developed over the years in support of our nonproliferation objectives.

**Sensitive Exports.** Another element in our international strategy is designed to meet what is perhaps the most troublesome nonproliferation

issues confronting us—namely, dealing with sensitive technologies, such as reprocessing, enrichment, and heavy water production. The problem has been made more acute as more countries become interested in acquiring these sensitive facilities. In terms of proliferation risks, plutonium reprocessing plants abroad pose the most immediate problem. This is unfortunate, since for most countries—those without very large nuclear power programs—the economic benefits of reprocessing spent fuel remain dubious.

As a result of growing perceptions of the direct proliferation risks, suppliers as well as recipients appear to be exercising increasing restraint in such sensitive areas and have concluded rigorous safeguard agreements. In this regard we greatly welcomed Korea's decision not to acquire a national reprocessing facility and hope that it will enhance multilateral efforts to develop alternatives to national capabilities.

One course of action which might meet the future reprocessing needs of certain countries in a potentially economic manner—and at the same time alleviate some of our concerns regarding the proliferation of such facilities—is the concept of a multinational fuel cycle center, serving regional needs, to which I gave my personal support before the U.N. General Assembly last year.

Such plants—involving management, operation, and perhaps ownership by more than one country—would reduce the incentive for small and inefficient national plants and provide useful added assurances against unilateral abrogation of nonproliferation undertakings, particularly if collocated with other parts of the fuel cycle such as the fabrication and storage of nuclear materials. They would also facilitate the application of international safeguards. The IAEA is currently carrying out a study of the multinational concept.

**Physical Security.** The final key element of our international nonproliferation strategy concerns the question of physical security of nuclear facilities and materials—and specifically the concern that a subnational or terrorist group might seize nuclear materials.

We have received excellent cooperation in our consultations with other countries designed to insure that adequate physical security measures are applied. Major suppliers are including provisions in

5

their nuclear cooperation agreements which specifically require adequate levels of physical security systems in recipient countries to protect nuclear materials and equipment. Experts from member countries are assisting the IAEA in developing an authoritative body of knowledge on the establishment of effective national physical security systems.

Also we are pursuing our proposal of an international convention-setting standards to protect the physical security of nuclear materials—that might serve to facilitate international collaboration and greater uniformity of practice in this area.

## U.S. National Strategy

**Basic Premise.** I have been discussing those multilateral measures we are pursuing in support of our nonproliferation objectives. U.S. national policies and practices in this area reflect our special concern with the problem of nonproliferation and are, in some respects, more stringent than those of some other supplier nations.

The basic premise of U.S. nuclear cooperation for over 20 years has been worldwide cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under effective controls. Our approach has been to offer long-term assurances of enriched uranium supply—accompanied by the especially economical U.S. reactor technology—in exchange for agreement on effective safeguard arrangements. In this connection, as I testified before another committee of the Congress last month in support of the Administration's proposed Nuclear Fuel Assurances Act, many of the positive advances we have made in pursuit of our nonproliferation objectives can be traced directly to our capability and willingness to furnish enriched uranium on a reliable and long-term basis, along with other elements essential to peaceful nuclear development.

**Policy Elements.** As I observed earlier our policies with regard to nuclear exports are fully consistent with the principles adopted as a result of supplier consultations and, in fact, in some areas go beyond them. For example in the areas of reproducing, enrichment, and heavy water production activities, our basic approach has been to avoid the export of such sensitive technologies. To insure adequate control the executive branch instituted in

1972 special regulations governing all proposed transactions in these areas.

With regard to the general problem of reproducing, the United States is providing significant technical and financial support to the IAEA in connection with its study of the multinational regional fuel cycle center concept. We are also urging that relevant groups of countries initiate discussions of the potential of this concept among themselves.

In the area of international safeguards, I would note that in his most recent energy message the President outlined the Administration's decision to make special contributions of up to a total of $5 million in the next five years to help strengthen the agency's safeguards program. We will, of course, continue research programs and technical support activities aimed at assisting the IAEA to develop more effective safeguard procedures.

Pursuant to the physical security measures we have adopted as a result of supplier consultations, the United States has adopted the policy that significant quantities of sensitive nuclear materials will not be approved for export unless adequate physical protection measures are applied in the recipient countries, and U.S. physical security teams have visited numerous countries in this connection to observe their protection systems.

**Proposals for Severe Constraints.** Against the backdrop of the strategies that we are pursuing internationally and as a matter of U.S. national policy, I believe it appropriate that I respond to some of the critics of our nuclear export policies who have called for what I believe to be overly severe constraints which would seriously set back, rather than advance, our nonproliferation efforts. These proposals range from a complete moratorium on our nuclear exports and to an embargo on nuclear transfers to non-NPT parties, to proposals to agree to nuclear exports to states not party to the NPT only if they have accepted approved IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear programs.

In essence it is our view that adoption of any of these proposals would for example:

* Violate the spirit, if not the letter, of a number of international undertakings to cooperate in peaceful nuclear programs, including Article IV of the Nonproliferation Treaty;

6

* Damage our political relationships, well beyond the nuclear area, with a large number of countries which have entered into long-term arrangements with us;

* Cast further doubt on the credibility of U.S. supply commitments and the constancy of our policy at precisely the moment when we can least afford such doubts;

* Reduce the influence we are now able to bring to bear in support of our nonproliferation objectives inasmuch as it is unlikely that such proposals will be supported by all major suppliers; and

* Might well result in the breakdown of supplier cooperation and a return to relatively uncontrolled competition among other supplier countries.

I have commented negatively on these proposals, not because I question the motivation and concern that underlie them but because I do not believe they would achieve our nonproliferation objectives. The problems of proliferation are complicated and not susceptible to quick and easy solutions. To avoid the further spread of nuclear weapon capabilities will require the diligent pursuit of complex political and technical measures which minimize the pressures for proliferation and at the same time erect effective controls against it. This Administration is firmly committed to this objective, and I know we can count on the Congress to work with us in insuring we can achieve this vital goal.

## Proliferation Prognosis

The arrangements I have described are designed to inhibit and detect any diversion. There remains the question of measures that could be applied in the event of a demonstrated diversion of nuclear material to nonpeaceful purposes or other violations of a nonproliferation or safeguards undertaking. This is a question of importance since treaty assurances against proliferation, even when backed by effective safeguards, could lose much of their deterrent power if nations came to believe that violations of such arrangements would not be viewed with seriousness by the international community.

Under the statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, all further peaceful nuclear assistance would be discontinued in the event a state violated its IAEA safeguards commitments. If U.S. nuclear material was involved, our bilateral agreements call for halting further assistance. The IAEA statute also provides for suspension of membership in the agency in the event of a violation and reporting to the U.N. Security Council. In addition both our bilateral agreements and the IAEA statute include the right to call for the return of supplied materials and equipment.

These actions are substantial. The discontinuance of supply to a country which has committed a major portion of its electrical energy generation to nuclear energy is, in itself, a significant disincentive to any violation. More generally I can assure you that the United States would treat a violation of one of its agreements with the utmost gravity. And I am confident that the world community at large would view such an action with comparable concern.

However, these considerations do not relieve us of the need to insure that we have taken all available and practical preventive measures to forestall the spread of nuclear weapons. To this end, as I have indicated, we have strengthened and standardized the system of safeguards and controls in our national policies and through multilateral initiatives, identified the improvements needed to further diminish the likelihood that peaceful nuclear technology will be used to build explosives, and established procedural and institutional arrangements to enable us to consolidate our gains and move toward our future goals.

Perhaps most fundamentally we recognize that proliferation is not a problem to be addressed solely through the technical and legal framework of safeguards and export controls-vital as these avenues may be. There is a direct link, as I have stressed, between our efforts in nonproliferation and our broader efforts to construct a more secure international climate. If countries remain convinced that regional and global tensions can be reduced through cooperation, that disputes can be resolved in a peaceful manner, and that their legitimate security requirements can be met there will be no need for them to develop nuclear weapons.

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

FOLLOWING APPEARANCE BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

COMMITTEE, MARCH 10, 1976

Chmn. Sparkman: Gentlemen, we've had a rather intensive meeting based primarily upon the Secretary's travels through South America, but as you would expect, we didn't remain solely on that subject. We explored everything that we could think of, so put your questions to him.

Q: What other subject did you review, Mr. Chairman?

Chmn. Sparkman: Well, we talked some about the situation in Africa, Angola -- but not just Angola -- different countries; We talked something about our trade and commerce, and just about everything you can think of.

Q: Did you deal with SALT at all? Did the Secretary speak up at all about the prospects of an agreement with the Soviet Union on SALT?

Secretary: No, that did not come up.

Q: How are the prospects of your returning to Moscow in March?

Secretary: Whether I will go to Moscow depends on the kind of reply we will get from the Soviet Union from our latest SALT proposal. That proposal was submitted to the Soviet Union in the week before their party congress, and therefore we do not think they have had as much time to study it as they will probably need. After we get a reply we can make a decision on how next to proceed.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how do read the election results from Florida? Do you see that as an vindication of your position and your foreign policy --

Secretary: I notice that after foreign policy was introduced, the President's margin increased. I'm no expert on primary elections, and I don't want to comment.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you ask the committee to support any specific action against Cuban use of force in Africa?

Secretary: I did not ask the committee for any particular action. We haven't decided on any action. We discussed the general implications of unchecked Cuban military adventures in the world without applying it to any specific situation. There was some discussion of the particular difficulties faced by the nature of the regimes in southern Africa, but the Administration has

-2-

not made any final recommendations as to what should be
done and we did not ask the committee for any particular
endorsement. But I will say that the discussion was
-- the entire discussion, including that -- was in a
very constructive, cooperative and friendly spirit.
So, both the Committee, and speaking for myself, and I
had the impression we were aware of a common problem,
which ought to be dealt with in a serious and constructive
way. But we made no specific proposals.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would the Administration go ahead with the letter of offer for the C-130s to Egypt, and was this discussed today?

Secretary: Our present intention is to proceed with the C-130s but we will discuss that fully with the relevant committee. It did not come up today.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, could I ask you about another subject? In a sworn deposition released today, former President Nixon appears to contradict your sworn written statement when Mr. Nixon said that he never heard the name of Morton Halperin prior to the authorization of the wiretapping against Mr. Halperin, and that in fact he ordered you to give the names and that you gave Mr. Halperin's name to the FBI. I understand that your sworn statement was that Mr. Hoover did that and in Mr. Nixon's presence. He says --

Secretary: I think it is highly inappropriate to discuss depositions and interrogatories that take hours to assemble in pending court cases with one-line questions of this nature. I believe that there is substantial agreement in all of the statements that have been made on the essentials of the issue. And to pick out isolated phrases and to ask the parties concerned to comment on them in front of television, or for the parties to comment in front of television or any public medium is a violation of the judicial process and I won't engage in it.

Q: Sir, Mr. Nixon said that you did, and you say that he did --

Secretary: First of all, I do not think that this is a correct re-
presentation of what either of us said, and therefore it
is -- and it is not a matter that I propose to discuss
as long as it is before the courts, since the courts will
decide this. But it is not an accurate representation
of what either of us have ever said, certainly not of what
I have said.

Q: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you and Senator Case, both whether you see any disposition in the Congress to support any active US role against the use of Cuban forces in Africa?

-3-

Chmn. Sparkman: Well, of course Congress has not stated a position on that, but I certainly think that the Secretary in discussing it this morning gave us a well-reasoned course of action if it becomes necessary, and it would be my thought that Congress would support it.

GAP

Sen. Case: He reiterated statements that he made publicly
before about the questions that were being raised
before the U.S. in the event of continued Cuban
activity of this sort here or in Africa or in other
places. But there was nothing suggested at all by
him which would make it possible for us, I think,
to give any answer as to Congressional reaction in
the event of such a suggestion.

any

Secretary: We have not put/concrete proposal before the
committee and it would have been impossible to react
to anything specific. We discussed the problem
conceptually and in terms of the over-all national
interest and without any attempt to come to a clear
concensus of it.

Chmn. Sparkman: That is correct. That's what I meant
by saying a general plan--

Q: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

**************

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

[LC]

March 11, 1976

No. 121-A

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
TO THE ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE
BOSTON WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
MARCH 11, 1976

AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE [Chairman of the Boston World Affairs Council]: Our speaker today makes me think of the ancient Greek definition of happiness: "the exercise of vital power along lines of excellence in a life affording them scope."

He seems to me to have lived that kind of a full life — in the Army, at Harvard, and in government. Perhaps after one of those long, lazy, peaceful afternoons on Capitol Hill, he may even feel that his life nowadays is sometimes too full. [Laughter]

It would be brashness for me to think that I could tell you anything about our Secretary of State that you don't know. He is one of the best known men in the whole world. Thanks to him, our relations with other nations rest on a much sounder basis — as in the Middle East, in Moscow, in Peking, to name only some of the places where his activities over the years have created more constructive and encouraging arrangements than had existed before.

His achievements have undoubtedly changed the course of history. It is no exaggeration to say that they have moved the world away from war.

What a stupendous accomplishment!

He is clearly a most remarkable man. His insight, his power of analysis, his stamina, his creativeness are all of the highest order. We Americans are lucky to have his services and it is no exaggeration to say that humanity owes him an immense debt.

We in the Boston World Affairs Council are proud to welcome him here. I was about to say, "welcome him home," but I didn't say it because he is a citizen of the District of Columbia. Nonetheless, his many fruitful years at Harvard give us a feeling of special warmth and kinship with him, and we believe that he feels at home with us.

We are therefore particularly happy to present the Secretary of State, the Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, to this Boston audience today and, at the same time, to confer on him as a mark of our affection and esteem the World Affairs Council's highest honor, named for another great Secretary of State — the Christian A. Herter Medal.

*****

For further information contact:

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Ambassador Lodge, distinguished guests, friends:

I deeply appreciate the honor you bestow upon me today not only because it is given me by old Massachusetts friends, but also for the name it bears. Throughout his long career as legislator, Governor and Secretary of State, Christian Herter embodied the ideals of selfless public service and responsible patriotism which have always marked our nation's great leaders. Most of all, Christian Herter was a man who had faith in his country and its goodness. He understood the decisive role this nation must play in the world for security and progress and justice.

In this election year, some ten years after Chris Herter's death, we would all do well to remember his wisdom. For America is still the great and good country he knew it was, and our participation in the international scene remains decisive if our era is to know peace, and a better life for mankind. We must never forget that this nation has permanent interests and concerns that must be preserved through and beyond this election year.

This can be a time of national renewal — when Americans freely renegotiate their social compact. Or if the quest for short-term political gain prevails over all other considerations, it can be a period of misleading oversimplification, further divisiveness and sterile recrimination.

This Administration has for many months been prepared to put its policies, its premises and its design for the future before the American people. The President has often spoken about our concerns and hopes in the world. In the past 14 months alone, I have given seventeen major speeches, some twenty major news conferences and countless interviews across this country, and I have testified 39 times before Congressional committees. Certainly there is room for differences on the policies to be pursued in a complex and dangerous world. But those who challenge current policies have an obligation to go beyond criticisms, slogans and abuse and set forth in detail their premises and alternatives, the likely costs, opportunities and risks.

America has come through a difficult time — when our institutions have been under challenge, our purposes doubted and our will questioned. The time has come, as Adlai Stevenson said, to "talk sense to the American people." As a nation we face new dangers and opportunities; neither will wait for our decisions next November and both can be profoundly affected by what we say and do in the meantime. Complex realities cannot be dissolved or evaded by nostalgic simplicities.

Throughout the turmoil of this decade, our foreign policy has pursued our fundamental national goals with energy and consistent purpose:

- We are at peace for the first time in over a decade. No American fighting men are engaged in combat anywhere in the world.

- Relations with our friends and allies in the Atlantic Community and with Japan have never been stronger.

- A new and durable relationship with the People's Republic of China has been opened and fostered.

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— Confrontation in the heart of Europe has been eased. A four power agreement on Berlin has replaced a decade and a half of crisis and confrontation.

— We negotiated an interim agreement limiting strategic arms with the Soviet Union which forestalled the numerical expansion of Soviet strategic programs while permitting us to undertake needed programs of our own.

— We are now negotiating a long-term agreement which, if successfully concluded, will set for the first time in history an upper limit on total numbers of strategic weapons, requiring the Soviet Union to dismantle some of its existing systems.

— Significant progress toward a durable settlement in the Middle East has been made. Much work and many dangers remain, but the peace process is underway for the first time since the creation of the State of Israel.

— There is a new maturity and impetus to our relations with Latin America reflecting changing realities in the Hemisphere and the growing importance of these countries on the international scene.

— The United States has taken the role of global leadership in putting forward a comprehensive agenda for a new and mutually beneficial relationship between the developed and developing nations.

— We have defended human rights and dignity in all international bodies as well as in our bilateral relations.

This is a record of American accomplishment that transcends partisanship, for much of it was accomplished with the cooperation of both parties. It reflects the ideals of the American people. It portends for this nation a continuing role of moral and political leadership — if we have the understanding, the will, and the unity to seize the opportunity history has given us.

Thirty years ago this country began its first sustained peacetime involvement in foreign affairs. We achieved great things, and we can continue to do so as long as we are prepared to face the fact that we live in a more complex time:

— Today the Soviet Union is a superpower. Nothing we could have done would have halted this evolution after the impetus that two generations of industrial and technological advance have given to Soviet military and economic growth. But together with others we must assure that Russian power and influence are not translated into an expansion of Soviet control and dominance beyond the USSR's borders. This is pre-requisite to a more constructive relationship.

— Today scores of new nations have come into being, creating new centers of influence. These nations make insistent claims on the global system, testing their new economic power and seeking a greater role and share in the world's prosperity.

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— Today the forces of democracy are called upon to show renewed creativity and vision. In a world of complexity — in a world of equilibrium and coexistence, of competition and interdependence — it is our democratic values that give meaning to our sacrifice and purpose to our exertions. Thus the cohesion of the industrial democracies has a moral as well as a political and economic significance.

Americans are a realistic people who have never considered the definition of a challenge as a prophecy of doom or a sign of pessimism. Instead, we have seen it as a call to battle. "The bravest," said Thucydides, "are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding go out to meet it." That has always been the test of democracy — and it has always been the strength of the American people.

Let me now deal with America's permanent interests: peace, progress and justice.

## Equilibrium and Peace

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, the world's fears of catastrophe and its hopes for peace have hinged on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In an era when two nations have the power to visit utter devastation on the world in a matter of hours, there can be no greater imperative than assuring that the relationship between the superpowers be managed effectively and rationally.

This is an unprecedented task. Historically, a conflict of ideology and geopolitical interests such as that which characterizes the current international scene has almost invariably led to conflict. But in the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality, humanity could not survive such a repetition of history. No amount of tough rhetoric can change these realities. The future of our nation and of mankind depends on how well we avoid confrontation without giving up vital interests and how well we establish a more hopeful and stable relationship without surrender of principle.

We therefore face the necessity of a dual policy: on the one hand, we are determined to prevent Soviet military power from being used for political expansion; we will firmly discourage and resist adventurist policies. But at the same time, we cannot escalate every political dispute into a central crisis; nor can we rest on identifying foreign policy with crisis management. We have an obligation to work for a more positive future. We must couple opposition to pressure and irresponsibility with concerned efforts to build a more cooperative world.

History can inform — or mislead — us in this quest.

For a generation after World War II, statesmen and nations were traumatized by the experience of Munich; they believed that history had shown the folly of permitting an adversary to gain a preponderance of power. This was and remains a crucial lesson.

A later generation was chastened by the experience of Viet-Nam; it is determined that America shall never again overextend and exhaust itself by direct

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involvement in remote wars with no clear strategic significance. This too
is a crucial lesson.

But equally important and too often neglected is the lesson learned by an
earlier generation. Before the outbreak of the First World War, there was a
virtual equilibrium of power. Through crisis after crisis nations moved to
confrontation and then retreated to compromise. Stability was taken for
granted until — without any conscious decision to overturn the international
structure — a crisis much like any other went out of control. Nation after
nation slid into a war whose causes they did not understand but from which
they could not extricate themselves. The result was the death of tens of
millions, the destruction of the global order and domestic upheavals whose
consequences still torment mankind.

If we are to learn from history, we cannot pick and choose the lessons from
which we will draw inspiration. The history of this century tells us:

- that an imbalance of power encourages aggression;

- that overcommitment cannot be sustained domestically;

- and that an equilibrium based on constant confrontation will
ultimately end in cataclysm.

But the lessons of history are never automatic; each generation must apply
them to concrete circumstances.

There is no question that peace rests, in the first instance, on the maintenance
of a balance of global stability. Without the ultimate sanction of power, con-
ciliation soon becomes surrender. Moderation is a virtue only in those who are
thought to have a choice.

No service is done to the nation by those who portray an exaggerated specter
of Soviet power and of American weakness, by those who hesitate to resist when
we are challenged, or by those who fail to see the opportunities we have to
shape the US-Soviet relationship by our own confident action. Soviet strength
is uneven; the weaknesses and frustrations of the Soviet system are glaring
and have been clearly documented. Despite the inevitable increase in its
power, the Soviet Union remains far behind us and our allies in any overall
assessment of military, economic, and technological strength; it would be
reckless in the extreme for the Soviet Union to challenge the industrial
democracies. And Soviet society is no longer insulated from the influences
and attractions of the outside world, or impervious to the need for external
contacts.

The great industrial democracies possess the means to counter Soviet expansion
and to moderate Soviet behavior. We must not abdicate this responsibility by
weakening ourselves either by failing to support our defenses or refusing to
use our power in defense of our interest; we must, along with our allies,
always do what is necessary to maintain our security.

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It is true that we cannot be the world's policeman. Not all local wars and regional conflicts affect global stability or America's national interest. But if one superpower systematically exploits these conflicts for its own advantage, and tips the scales decisively by its intervention, gradually the overall balance will be affected. If adventurism is allowed to succeed in local crises — an ominous precedent of wider consequence is set. Other nations will adjust their policies to their perception of the dominant trend. Our ability to control future crises will diminish. And if this pattern is not broken, America will ultimately face harder choices, higher costs and more severe crises.

But our obligation goes beyond the balance of power. An equilibrium is too precarious a foundation for our long-term future. There is no tranquillity in a balance of terror constantly contested. We must avoid the twin temptations of provocation and escapism. Our course must be steady and not reflect momentary fashions; it must be a policy that our adversaries respect, our allies support and our people believe in and sustain.

Therefore, we have sought with the Soviet Union to push back the shadow of nuclear catastrophe — by settling concrete problems such as Berlin so as to ease confrontations, and negotiating on limitation of strategic arms so as to slow the arms race. And we have held out the prospect of cooperative relations in the economic and other fields if political conditions permit their implementation and further development.

It goes without saying that this process requires reciprocity. It cannot survive a constant attempt to seek unilateral advantage. It cannot, specifically, survive any more Angolas. If the Soviet Union is ready to face genuine coexistence, we are prepared to make every effort to shape a pattern of restraint and mutual interest which will give coexistence a more reliable and positive character making both sides conscious of what would be lost by confrontation and what can be gained by cooperation. And we are convinced that when a vigorous response to Soviet encroachment is called for, the President will have the support of the American people — and of our allies — to the extent that he can demonstrate that the crisis was imposed upon us; that it did not result from opportunities we missed to improve the prospects of peace.

No policy will soon, if ever, eliminate the competition and irreconcilable ideological differences between the United States and the Soviet Union. Nor will it make all interests compatible. We are engaged in a protracted process with inevitable ups and downs. But there is no alternative to the policy of penalties for adventurism and incentives for restraint. What do those who speak so glibly about one-way streets or pre-emptive concessions propose concretely that this country do? What precisely has been given up? What level of confrontation do they seek? What threats would they make? What risks would they run? What precise changes in our defense posture, what level of expenditure over what period of time, do they advocate? How concretely do they suggest managing the US-Soviet relationship in an era of strategic equality?

It is time we heard answers to these questions.

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In short we must — and we shall — pursue the two strands of our policy towards the Soviet Union: firmness in the face of pressure and the vision to work for a better future. This is well within our capacities. We owe this to our people, to our future, to our allies and to the rest of mankind.

## The World Community

The upheavals of this century have produced another task — the fundamental need of reshaping the structure of international relations. For the first time in history the international system has become truly global. Decolonization and the expansion of the world economy have given birth to scores of new nations and new centers of power and initiative. Our current world, numbering nearly 150 nations, can be the seedbed for growing economic warfare, political instability and ideological confrontation — or it can become a community marked by unprecedented international collaboration. The interdependence of nations — the indivisibility of our security and our prosperity — can accelerate our common progress or our common decline.

Therefore, just as we must seek to move beyond a balance of power in East-West relations, so must we transcend tests of strength in North-South relations and build a true world community.

We do so in our own self-interest for today's web of economic relationships links the destinies of all mankind. The price and supply of energy, the conditions of trade, the expansion of world food production, the technological bases for economic development, the protection of the world's environment, the rules of law that govern the world's oceans and outer space — these are concerns that affect all nations and that can be satisfactorily addressed only in a framework of international cooperation.

Here too we need to sustain a complex policy. We must resist tactics of confrontation; but our larger goal must be to shape new international relationships that will last over decades to come. We will not be stampeded by pressures or threats. But it is in our own interest to create an international economic system that all nations will regard as legitimate because they have a stake in it and because they consider it just.

As the world's strongest power, the United States could survive an era of economic warfare. But even we would be hurt, and no American true to the humane heritage of his country could find satisfaction in the world that confrontation would bring in its wake. The benefits of common effort are so apparent, and the prospects of economic strife so damaging, that there is no moral or practical alternative to a world of expanded collaboration.

Therefore, at the World Food Conference in 1974, at the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly last September, and in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation now underway in Paris, the United States has taken the lead in offering programs of practical cooperation. We have presented — and are vigorously following through — on a wide range of proposals to safeguard export earnings, accelerate industrial and agricultural growth, better conditions of trade and investment in key commodities and meet the plight of the poorest countries. In every area of concern we have proposed forms of collaboration among all nations,

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including the other industrial countries, the newly wealthy oil producers, and the developing countries themselves.

It is the West — and overwhelmingly this nation — that has the resources, the technology, the skills, the organizational ability and the goodwill that attract and invite the cooperation of the developing nations. In the global dialogue among the industrial and developing worlds the Communist nations are conspicuous by their absence and, indeed, by their irrelevance.

Yet at the very moment when the industrial democracies are responding to the aspirations of the developing countries, many of the same countries attempt to extort what has in fact been freely offered. Lopsided voting, unworkable resolutions and arbitrary procedures too often dominate the United Nations and other international bodies. Nations which originally chose nonalignment to shield themselves from the pressures of global coalitions have themselves formed a rigid, ideological, confrontationist coalition of their own. One of the most evident blocs in the world today is, ironically, the almost automatic alignment of the non-aligned.

The United States remains ready to respond responsibly and positively to countries which seriously seek justice and an equitable world economic system. But progress depends on a spirit of mutual respect, realism and practical cooperation. Let there be no mistake about it: extortion will not work and will not be supinely accepted. The stakes are too high for self-righteous rhetoric or adolescent posturing.

At issue is not simply the economic arrangements of the next quarter-century, but the legitimacy of the international order.

Technology and the realities of interdependence have given our generation the opportunity to determine the relationships between the developed and developing countries over the next quarter-century. It is the quality of statesmanship to recognize that our necessity, our practical aspirations, and our moral purpose are linked. The United States is ready for that challenge.

## The Moral Unity of the Great Democracies

Our efforts to build peace and progress reflect our deep-seated belief in freedom and in the hope of a better future for all mankind. These are values we share with our closest allies, the great industrial democracies.

The resilience of our countries in recovering from economic difficulty and in consolidating our cooperation has an importance far beyond our immediate well-being. For while foreign policy is unthinkable without an element of pragmatism, pragmatism without underlying moral purpose is like a rudderless ship.

Together, the United States and our allies have maintained the global peace and sustained the world economy for more than thirty years. The spirit of innovation and progress in our societies has no match anywhere, certainly

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not in societies laying claim to being "revolutionary." Rarely in history have alliances survived — let alone flourished — as ours have in vastly changing global and geopolitical conditions. The ideals of the industrial democracies give purpose to our efforts to improve relations with the East, to the dialogue with the Third World and to many other spheres of common endeavor.

Our ties with the great industrial democracies are therefore not alliances of convenience but a union of principle in defense of values and a way of life.

It is in this context that we must be concerned about the possibility of Communist parties coming to power — or sharing in power — in governments in NATO countries. Ultimately, the decision must, of course, be made by the voters of the countries concerned. But no one should expect that this question is not of concern to this Government. Whether some of the Communist parties in Western Europe are in fact independent of Moscow cannot be determined when their electoral self-interest so overwhelmingly coincides with their claims. Their internal procedures — their Leninist principles and dogmas — remain the antithesis of democratic parties. And were they to gain power they would do so after having advocated for decades programs and values detrimental to our traditional ties. By that record, they would inevitably give low priority to security and Western defense efforts, which are essential not only to Europe's freedom but to maintaining the world balance of power. They would be tempted to orient their economies to a much greater extent toward the East. We would have to expect that Western European governments in which Communists play a dominant role would, at best, steer their countries' policies towards the positions of the non-aligned. The political solidarity and collective defense of the West, and thus NATO, would be inevitably weakened, if not undermined. And in this country, the commitment of the American people to maintain the balance of power in Europe, justified though it might be on pragmatic, geopolitical grounds, would lack the moral base on which it has stood for thirty years.

We consider the unity of the great industrial democracies crucial to all we do in the world. For this reason we have sought to expand our cooperation to areas beyond our mutual defense — in improved political consultation; in coordinating our approaches to negotiations with the East; in reinforcing our respective economic policies; in developing a common energy policy; and in fashioning common approaches for the increasingly important dialogue with the developing nations. We have made remarkable progress in all these areas. We are determined to continue. Our foreign policy has no higher priority.

## The Debate at Home

This then is the design of our foreign policy:

- We have the military and economic power together with our allies to prevent aggression.

- We have the self-confidence and vision to go beyond confrontation to a reduction of tensions and ultimately a more cooperative world.

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— We have the resources, technology, and organizational genius to build a new relationship with the developing nations.

— We have the moral courage to hold high, together with our allies, the banners of freedom in a turbulent and changing world.

The challenges before us are monumental. But it is not every generation that is given the opportunity to shape a new international order. If the opportunity is missed, we shall live in a world of chaos and danger. If it is realized we will have entered an era of peace and progress and justice.

But we can realize our hopes only as a united people. Our challenge — and its solution — lies in ourselves. Our greatest foreign policy problem is our divisions at home. Our greatest foreign policy need is national cohesion and a return to the awareness that in foreign policy we are all engaged in a common national endeavor.

The world watches with amazement — our adversaries with glee and our friends with growing dismay — how America seems bent on eroding its influence and destroying its achievements in world affairs through an orgy of recrimination.

They see our policies in Africa, the Eastern Mediterranean, in Latin America, in East-West relations — undermined by arbitrary Congressional actions that may take decades to undo.

They see our intelligence system gravely damaged by unremitting, undiscriminating attack.

They see a country virtually incapable of behaving with the discretion that is indispensable for diplomacy.

They see revelations of malfeasance abroad on the part of American firms wreak grave damage on the political structures of friendly nations. Whatever wrongs were committed — reprehensible as they are — should be dealt with in a manner consistent with our own judicial procedures — and with the dignity of allied nations.

They see some critics suddenly pretending that the Soviets are ten feet tall and that America, despite all the evidence to the contrary, is becoming a second-rate nation. They know these erroneous and reckless allegations to be dangerous, because they may, if continued, persuade allies and adversaries of our weakness, tempting the one to accommodation and the other to adventurism.

They see this Administration — which has been condemned by one set of critics for its vigorous reaction to expansionism in Southeast Asia, in the Middle East, in Africa — simultaneously charged by another group of opponents with permitting unilateral Soviet gains.

They see that the Administration whose defense budgets have been cut some $39 billion dollars by the Congress in the past seven years is simultaneously charged with neglecting American defenses.

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The American people see all this, too, and wonder when it will end. They know that we cannot escape either our responsibilities or the geopolitical realities of the world around us. For a great nation that does not manage events will soon be overwhelmed by them.

If one group of critics undermines arms control negotiations and cuts off the prospect of more constructive ties with the Soviet Union; while another group cuts away at our defense budgets and intelligence services and thwarts American resistance to Soviet adventurism, both combined will, whether they have intended it or not, end by wrecking the nation's ability to conduct a strong, creative, moderate and prudent foreign policy. The result will be paralysis, no matter who wins in November. And if America cannot act, others will, and we and all the free peoples of the world will pay the price.

So our problem is at once more complex and simpler than in times past. The challenges are unprecedented but the remedies are in our own hands. This Administration has confidence in the strength, resilience and vigor of America. If we summon the American spirit and restore our unity, we will have a decisive and positive impact on a world which, more than ever, affects our lives and cries out for our leadership.

Those who have faith in America will tell the American people the truth:

- that we are strong and at peace,

- that there are no easy or final answers to our problems,

- that we must conduct a long-term and responsible foreign policy, without escape and without respite,

- that what is attainable at any one moment will inevitably fall short of the ideal,

- that the reach of our power and purpose has its limits,

- that nevertheless we have the strength and determination to defend our interests and the conviction to uphold our values,

- and finally that we have the opportunity to leave our children a more cooperative, more just and more peaceful world than we found.

In this Bicentennial year, we celebrate ideals which began to take shape around the shores of Massachusetts Bay some 350 years ago. We have accomplished great things as a united people. There is much yet to do. This country's work in the world is not a burden but a triumph — and the measure of greatness yet to come.

Americans have always made history rather than let history chart our course. We, the present generation of Americans, will do no less. So let this year mark the end of our divisions. Let it usher in an era of national reconciliation and rededication by all Americans to their common destiny. Let us have a clear vision of what is before us — glory and danger alike — and go forward together to meet it.

*****

The Secretary
of State

Speech

AMERICA'S PERMANENT INTERESTS

*Secretary Henry A. Kissinger upon receiving the Christian A. Herter Award presented by the Boston World Affairs Council.*

I deeply appreciate the honor you bestow upon me today not only because it is given me by old Massachusetts friends, but also for the name it bears. Throughout his long career as legislator, Governor, and Secretary of State, Christian Herter embodied the ideals of selfless public service and responsible patriotism which have always marked our Nation's great leaders. Most of all Christian Herter was a man who had faith in his country and its goodness. He understood the decisive role this Nation must play in the world for security and progress and justice.

In this election year, some 10 years after Chris Herter's death, we would all do well to remember his wisdom. For America is still the great and good country he knew it was, and our participation in the international scene remains decisive if our era is to know peace and a better life for mankind. We must never forget that this Nation has permanent interests and concerns that must be preserved through and beyond this election year.

This can be a time of national renewal—when Americans freely renegotiate their social compact. Or if the quest for short-term political gain prevails over all other considerations, it can be a period of misleading oversimplification, further divisiveness, and sterile recrimination.

This Administration has for many months been prepared to put its policies, its premises, and its design for the future before the American

March 11, 1976

Boston, Mass.

people. The President has often spoken about our concerns and hopes in the world. In the past 14 months alone, I have given 17 major speeches, some 20 major news conferences, and countless interviews across this country, and I have testified 39 times before congressional committees. Certainly there is room for differences on the policies to be pursued in a complex and dangerous world. But those who challenge current policies have an obligation to go beyond criticisms, slogans, and abuse and set forth in detail their premises and alternatives, the likely costs, opportunities, and risks.

America has come through a difficult time—when our institutions have been under challenge, our purposes doubted, and our will questioned. The time has come, as Adlai Stevenson said, to “... talk sense to the American people.” As a Nation we face new dangers and opportunities; neither will wait for our decisions next November and both can be profoundly affected by what we say and do in the meantime. Complex realities cannot be dissolved or evaded by nostalgic simplicities.

Throughout the turmoil of this decade our foreign policy has pursued our fundamental national goals with energy and consistent purpose.

* We are at peace for the first time in over a decade. No American fighting men are engaged in combat anywhere in the world.

* Relations with our friends and allies in the Atlantic community and with Japan have never been stronger.

* A new and durable relationship with the

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2

* Confrontation in the heart of Europe has been eased. A four power agreement on Berlin has replaced a decade and a half of crisis and confrontation.

* We negotiated an interim agreement limiting strategic arms with the Soviet Union, which forestalled the numerical expansion of Soviet strategic programs while permitting us to undertake needed programs of our own.

* We are now negotiating a long-term agreement which, if successfully concluded, will—for the first time in history—set an upper limit on total numbers of strategic weapons, requiring the Soviet Union to dismantle some of its existing systems.

* Significant progress toward a durable settlement in the Middle East has been made. Much work and many dangers remain, but the peace process is underway for the first time since the creation of the State of Israel.

* There is a new maturity and impetus to our relations with Latin America reflecting changing realities in the hemisphere and the growing importance of these countries on the international scene.

* The United States has taken the role of global leadership in putting forward a comprehensive agenda for a new and mutually beneficial relationship between the developed and developing nations.

* We have defended human rights and dignity in all international bodies as well as in our bilateral relations.

This is a record of American accomplishment that transcends partisanship, for much of it was accomplished with the cooperation of both parties. It reflects the ideals of the American people. It portends for this Nation a continuing role of moral and political leadership—if we have the understanding, the will, and the unity to seize the opportunity history has given us.

Thirty years ago this country began its first sustained peacetime involvement in foreign affairs. We achieved great things, and we can continue to do so as long as we are prepared to face the fact that we live in a more complex time.

* Today the Soviet Union is a superpower.

Nothing we could have done would have halted this evolution after the impetus that two generations of industrial and technological advance have given to Soviet military and economic growth. But together with others we must assure that Russian power and influence are not translated into an expansion of Soviet control and dominance beyond the U.S.S.R.'s borders. This is pre-requisite to a more constructive relationship.

* Today scores of new nations have come into being, creating new centers of influence. These nations make insistent claims on the global system, testing their new economic power and seeking a greater role and share in the world's prosperity.

* Today the forces of democracy are called upon to show renewed creativity and vision. In a world of complexity—in a world of equilibrium and coexistence, of competition and interdependence—it is our democratic values that give meaning to our sacrifice and purpose to our exertions. Thus the cohesion of the industrial democracies has a moral as well as a political and economic significance.

Americans are a realistic people who have never considered the definition of a challenge as a prophecy of doom or a sign of pessimism. Instead we have seen it as a call to battle. "...the bravest," said Thucydides, "are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding go out to meet it." That has always been the test of democracy—and it has always been the strength of the American people.

Let me now deal with America's permanent interests: peace, progress, and justice.

## Equilibrium and Peace

This is an unprecedented task. Historically a conflict of ideology and geopolitical interests, such as that which characterizes the current interna-

3

tional scene, has almost invariably led to conflict. But in the age of thermonuclear weapons and strategic equality, humanity could not survive such a repetition of history. No amount of tough rhetoric can change these realities. The future of our Nation and of mankind depends on how well we avoid confrontation without giving up vital interests and how well we establish a more hopeful and stable relationship without surrender of principle.

We, therefore, face the necessity of a dual policy: On the one hand we are determined to prevent Soviet military power from being used for political expansion; we will firmly discourage and resist adventurist policies. But at the same time we cannot escalate every political dispute into a central crisis; nor can we rest on identifying foreign policy with crisis management. We have an obligation to work for a more positive future. We must couple opposition to pressure and irresponsibility with concerned efforts to build a more cooperative world.

History can inform—or mislead—us in this quest.

For a generation after World War II statesmen and nations were traumatized by the experience of Munich; they believed that history had shown the folly of permitting an adversary to gain a preponderance of power. This was and remains a crucial lesson.

A later generation was chastened by the experience of Viet-Nam; it is determined that America shall never again overextend and exhaust itself by direct involvement in remote wars with no clear strategic significance. This too is a crucial lesson.

But equally important and too often neglected is the lesson learned by an earlier generation. Before the outbreak of the First World War, there was a virtual equilibrium of power. Through crisis after crisis nations moved to confrontation and then retreated to compromise. Stability was taken for granted until—without any conscious decision to overturn the international structure—a crisis much like any other went out of control. Nation after nation slid into a war whose causes they did not understand but from which they could not extricate themselves. The result was the death of tens of millions, the destruction of the global order, and domestic upheavals whose consequences still torment mankind.

If we are to learn from history, we cannot pick and choose the lessons from which we will draw inspiration. The history of this century tells us that:

* An imbalance of power encourages aggression;

* Overcommitment cannot be sustained domestically; and

* An equilibrium based on constant confrontation will ultimately end in cataclysm.

There is no question that peace rests, in the first instance, on the maintenance of a balance of global stability. Without the ultimate sanction of power, conciliation soon becomes surrender. Moderation is a virtue only in those who are thought to have a choice.

No service is done to the Nation by those who portray an exaggerated specter of Soviet power and of American weakness, by those who hesitate to resist when we are challenged, or by those who fail to see the opportunities we have to shape the U.S.-Soviet relationship by our own confident action. Soviet strength is uneven; the weaknesses and frustrations of the Soviet system are glaring and have been clearly documented. Despite the inevitable increase in its power, the Soviet Union remains far behind us and our allies in any overall assessment of military, economic, and technological strength; it would be reckless in the extreme for the Soviet Union to challenge the industrial democracies. And Soviet society is no longer insulated from the influences and attractions of the outside world or impervious to the need for external contacts.

It is true that we cannot be the world's police-man. Not all local wars and regional conflicts affect global stability or America's national interest.

4

But if one superpower systematically exploits these
conflicts for its own advantage—and tips the scales
decisively by its intervention—gradually the overall
balance will be affected. If adventurism is allowed
to succeed in local crises, an ominous precedent of
wider consequence is set. Other nations will adjust
their policies to their perception of the dominant
trend. Our ability to control future crises will
diminish. And if this pattern is not broken, Ameri-
ca will ultimately face harder choices, higher costs,
and more severe crises.

But our obligation goes beyond the balance of
power. An equilibrium is too precarious a founda-
tion for our long-term future. There is no tran-
quility in a balance of terror constantly contested.
We must avoid the twin temptations of provoca-
tion and escapism. Our course must be steady and
not reflect momentary fashions; it must be a policy
that our adversaries respect, our allies support, and
our people believe in and sustain.

Therefore we have sought with the Soviet
Union to push back the shadow of nuclear catas-
trophe-by settling concrete problems, such as Ber-
lin, so as to ease confrontations and negotiating on
limitation of strategic arms to slow the arms
race. And we have held out the prospect of co-
operative relations in the economic and other fields
if political conditions permit their implementation
and further development.

It goes without saying that this process re-
quires reciprocity. It cannot survive a constant at-
tempt to seek unilateral advantage. It cannot,
specifically, survive any more Angolas. If the
Soviet Union is ready to face genuine coexistence,
we are prepared to make every effort to shape a
pattern of restraint and mutual interest which will
give coexistence a more reliable and positive
character making both sides conscious of what
would be lost by confrontation and what can be
gained by cooperation. And we are convinced that
when a vigorous response to Soviet encroachment
is called for, the President will have the support of
the American people—and of our allies—to the ex-
tent that he can demonstrate that the crisis was
imposed upon us; that it did not result from oppor-
tunities we missed to improve the prospects of
peace.

No policy will soon, if ever, eliminate the
competition and irreconcilable ideological differ-
ences between the United States and the Soviet

Union. Nor will it make all interests compatible.
We are engaged in a protracted process with inevita-
ble ups and downs. But there is no alternative to
the policy of penalties for adventurism and incen-
tives for restraint. What do those who speak so
glibly about one-way streets or preemptive conces-
sions propose concretely that this country do? What
precisely has been given up? What level of confron-
tation do they seek? What threats would they make?
What risks would they run? What precise changes in
our defense posture, what level of expenditure over
what period of time, do they advocate? How con-
cretely do they suggest managing the U.S.-Soviet
relationship in an era of strategic equality?

In short we must—and we shall—pursue the
two strands of our policy toward the Soviet Union:
firmness in the face of pressure and the vision to
work for a better future. This is well within our
capacities. We owe this to our people, to our
future, to our allies, and to the rest of mankind.

World Community

The upheavals of this century have produced
another task—the fundamental need of reshaping
the structure of international relations. For the
first time in history the international system has
become truly global. Decolonization and the ex-
pansion of the world economy have given birth to
scores of new nations and new centers of power
and initiative. Our current world, numbering nearly
150 nations, can be the seedbed for growing eco-
nomic warfare, political instability, and ideological
confrontation—or it can become a community
marked by unprecedented international collabora-
tion. The interdependence of nations—the indivisibi-
bility of our security and our prosperity—can ac-
celerate our common progress or our common
decline.

Therefore just as we must seek to move
beyond a balance of power in East-West relations
so must we transcend tests of strength in North-
South relations and build a true world community.

We do so in our own self-interest for today's
web of economic relationships links the destinies of
all mankind. The price and supply of energy, the
conditions of trade, the expansion of world food
production, the technological bases for economic
development, the protection of the world's en-
vironment, the rules of law that govern the world's

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