disarmament has been most implicitly the focus of diplomatic negotiations. This is no accident. The level of armament of a Power reflects the extent to which it believes its vital interests or its survival to be in danger. If the contested issues seem peripheral, if the question of survival is not involved in every dispute, the Powers will not feel the need for maximum vigilance. In an international order, however, the components of which feel on the brink of catastrophe, there will arise a constantly rising level of armaments. In the absence of an agreement on the legitimacy of the international order safety can be found only in the maximum development of strength. Between the Congress of Vienna and the unification of Germany, the standing armies of the major Powers were minimal, because none of the outstanding disputes involved matters of life-and-death. After 1871 there w started an armaments war which has not been averted to this day. Between the unification of Germany and World War I, Europe was torn by two SCHISMS which the Powers concerned seemed to involve: "VITAL" INTERESTS: that between France and Germany over Alsace-Lorraine and that between

the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Russia over the fate of the Balkans.

After the first World War, the rebellion of Germany and the U.S.S.R. against the Treaty of Versailles and the rise of the dictatorships created a climate of insecurity which doomed all disarmament efforts to ~~futility~~ futility. And after the second World War the intransigence of the Soviet bloc forced the Free World to restore a measure of its strength even after it had disarmed unilaterally almost to the point of impotence.

There is little indication therefore that the level of armaments itself produces tension. Great Britain has a strategic airforce and a nuclear stockpile capable of inflicting serious, although perhaps not fatal, damage on the United States. But this fact has caused no ~~xenophobia~~ uneasiness in the United States ~~and~~ no increase in our defense effort. Conversely Great Britain did not seek to prevent the development by the United States of a navy of a size ~~it had formerly immovable means to keep out of~~ which in the hands of a continental Power would have impelled Great Britain into a war to seek its destruction. This was because the

Britain into a war to seek its destruction. This was because the
which in the hands of a continental power would have impelled Great
prevent the development by the United States of a navy of a size
caused no significant measure in the United States - no increase in
perhaps not far off, damage on the United States. But this fact has
airforce and a nuclear stockpile capable of inflicting serious, although
armaments itself produces a reaction. Great Britain has a strategic
there is little indication therefore that the level of

the point of importance.

of its strength even after it had disarmed unilaterally almost to
influence of the Soviet bloc forced the Free World to restore a measure
to kakkixxx entity. And after the second World War the intrins-
ically created a climate of insecurity which doomed all disarmament efforts
against the Treaty of Versailles and the rise of the dictatorships
After the first World War, the rebellion of Germany and the U. S. A.
the Anatro-Hungarian Empire and Russia over the fate of the Balkans.

"vital interests" of the both Powers are in sufficient harmony so that they can have a large measure of confidence in the intentions of the other side; they can afford to stand by in the face of the development of a weapons system capable of imperilling their security and perhaps even their survival because they know that this capability will not be so used. To be sure, it is impossible to draw absolute distinctions. The degree of confidence between the United States and Great Britain is exceptional. More usually, Powers are conscious of some clashing "vital interests" and as a result an increase in the level of armaments of any one major Power may be set in motion the vicious circle. On the other hand, the reason why an increase in the level of armaments has this effect, is at least in part because it serves as a symptom of the added importance attached to outstanding issues. It therefore operates as a warning that the stakes henceforth will be higher and the willingness to run risks greater. The other Powers can escape the pressure implicit in the increase in armaments only by making concessions, (a dangerous course for it may whet appetites and establish a method for settling

maintain the status quo in the center of Europe.

the Soviet Union on the contrary has defined their opportunity to

disarmament of the West at the end of World War II did not reassure

a level of equality as a pretext for a annexion. The unilateral

show

revolutionary power to treat efforts of its opponents to re-arm to

vacuum which will encourage expansion and it will enable the

face of it will be intellectual and dangerous: it may create a

victory more important than peace, unilateral disarmament in the

a Power believes the others inherentlyANILOLIC or if it considers

advantage of the disappropriation of strength time created. But if

disagreement and provided also that they do not prefer to take

provided they consider the distance at issue the real cause of the

reduction in armaments may induce other nations to follow suit,

ing issues have become less important. To be sure, a unilateral

a reduction in armaments may be taken as a symbol that the out-and-

It can be argued that the converse may also be true, that

race themselves.

future disputes) or else they are obliged to enter into the armaments

But even general disarmament is a difficult problem. In the call for a general disarmament, a sense, it is the most obvious example of the kind of total diplomacy described earlier. For it demands that diplomacy remove by negotiation the consequences of disputes it has not been able to solve directly. If the disagreements between the two blocs had been tractable, negotiations on specific issues would have born fruit. Since they have proved unavailing, it is not logical that a general disarmament scheme acceptable to all parties can be negotiated. A general disarmament scheme to be successful must party deprive each party of the ability to inflict a catastrophic blow on the other or at least it must not give either side an additional advantage. But such a relationship is almost impossible to negotiate on an over-all basis. For the same mistrust which produced the armaments race will inhibit confidence in any agreement that may be negotiated and will color the proposals which may be advanced. Each side seeks to deprive the other of the capability it fears most as a prelude to negotiation which while

keeping its most effective weapon under its control until the placing of disarmament was proved almost as difficult a matter to negotiate as the means of communication of it. Thus during our atomic monopoly the Soviets insisted that the outlawing of nuclear weapons precede any negotiations on disarmament, while we in turn refused to discuss surrendering our atomic stockpile until an air-tight control machinery was agreed. HAD FIRST BEEN PUT INTO OPERATION, on and functioning. With the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile both sides have continued to strive to neutralize the other's strongest weapon. The Soviet Union has attempted to expel our troops and particularly our airbases from Eurasia; we have striven for means to neutralize the Soviet ground strength. Each side wishes to protect itself against the consequences of the other's bad faith; each side, in short, brings to the negotiations the precise attitude which caused the armaments Race in the first place.

In such circumstances it is unlikely that a reduction in forces will contribute to a lessening of tension. To be sure, it is possible that a reduction of forces may come about; but it is likely to be caused by tactical considerations. It may come because

likely to be caused by tactical considerations. It may come because
it is possible that a reduction of forces may come about; but it is
forces will contribute to a lessening of tension. To be sure, it

precise attitude which caused the armaments
in the first place.

bad faith; each side, in its turn, brings to the negotiations the
wishes to protect itself against the consequences of the other's
for means to neutralize the Soviet ground strength. Each side
trains and particularly our airforces from airarms; we have attained
strongest weapon. The Soviet Union has attempted to expel our
both sides have continued to arrive to neutralize the other's
on andioniing, which the growth of the Soviet nuclear stockpile
atomic stockpile until an air-sight control machinery was agreed
disarmament, while we in turn refused to discuss surrendering our
that the oulouing of nuclear weapons precede any negotiations on
the first moment. Tuna during our atomic monopoly the Soviete in矣
kunzui keeping its most selective weapon under its control until

conventional armaments have become obsolescent; or because some
kinds of military expenditures do not bring a strategic return
commensurate with the economic investment. The necessity of
adapting its unwieldy organization to nuclear warfare undoubtedly
was one of the reasons for the Soviet reduction in their forces
announced with so much fanfare in 1955.

There are, moreover, reasons inherent in the structure of
international relations and in the state of technology why a
reduction of forces cannot go beyond a certain point. None of the
major Powers -- or at least not the U.S.S.R. -- would *not* accept a
reduction of their relative position vis-a-vis the secondary Powers.
Nothing will induce the U.S.S.R. to accept a force level which would
reduce its ability to control the satellites or to play a major
role in contiguous areas such as the Middle East. But forces
sufficient to accomplish this task are also sufficient to imperil all
A reduction of forces might not affect the relative Soviet position
vis-a-vis the secondary Powers, however, and after the basic security problem
the peripheral Powers of Eurasia. On the technical plane, a
reduction of forces seeks to compare incommensurables. →

reduction of forces seeks to compare incommensurate

the peripheral powers of Eurasia. On the technical plane, a
sufficient to accomplish this task are also sufficient to imperil all
role in contiguous areas such as the Middle East. But forces
reduce its ability to control the satellites or to play a major
Nothing will induce the U.S. to accept a force level which would
reduction of their relative position via a via the secondary lowers.
major lowers -- or at least not the U.S. -- would accept a
reduction of forces cannot go beyond a certain point. None of the
international relations and in the state of technology with a

There are, moreover, reasons inherent in the structure of
announced with such failure in 1923.

was one of the reasons for the Soviet reduction in their forces
adapting its unwieldy organisation to unclear warfare unduly
commemorate with the economic investment. The necessity of
kind of military expenditures do not bring a strategic return
conventionally annuities have become obsolete; or because some

What is the relation between the Soviet ability to
Eurasia and American missile ships with 1500 mile range which,
within a decade at most, will be able to bring most of the U.S.S.R.
under attack? How can one compare American overseas air-bases and
Soviet ground forces? And even should an acceptable scale of
comparison be negotiable between Powers who have had difficulty
agreeing on much less complicated issues, it would still not
remove the real security problem: the uncertainty of each side
about the other's intentions and the fact that the potential
strength of a country exerts pressure on its neighbors even at a
relatively low level of armament. There exists, moreover, an
inherent incommensurability between the sophisticated AM weapons
systems of xtrag strategic air war and the pressures of large
ground forces. If the United States weakened its Strategic Air
Command, it would take years before it could be reconstituted;
if the Soviets cut their ground-forces the strategic impact would
be much smaller and given the PARA - military structure of Soviet
society, they could be reassembled in a matter of months. A

substantial reduction of Soviet forces would not eliminate the
consciousness by the other Powers of the availability of large
reserves of trained and rapidly mobilizable manpower. That such
thoughts were not far from Soviet minds is shown by Zhukov's
speech to the 20th Party Congress in 1956 explaining the Soviet
arms reductions;

**aim arms reductions:** "Due to reduction of Soviet armed forces,

"As a result of the reduction of the armed forces, a certain proportion of the draft group will not enter the forces. We must take steps to see that the young people who are released from the draft will receive, even outside the Army, the military training necessary to fulfill their duty to defend their homeland."

In such an atmosphere, a reduction in forces would not contribute a great deal to a lessening of tensions. Even should a scale of comparison of different weapons systems be negotiable among Powers which have been unable to agree on much less complicated issues, it would still not remove the real security problem: the uncertainty of each side about the other's intentions and the fact that the potential strength of a Power exerts pressure on its neighbors even at relatively low level of armaments.

(1) Current Digest Volume VIII, No. 10 (Speech by Zhukov) Apr 18, 1956 p 37.

the U.S.S.R. accepted this proposal in 1955, the Western Powers
realized, too late, that it would solve none of their security
problems. They would have no way of knowing whether the Soviet
Union was carrying out its side of the resolution and they would
certainly be unable to control any evasions by means of para-
military organizations, Young Communist League (Komsomol) and
similar devices. On the other hand, the West would presumably
carry out its part of the agreement, so that the chief result of
the reduction of forces would have been to place a flare under
Soviet calculations without making a significant contribution to
the chief security concern of the Free World. A force-level of
2.5 million would not seriously impair the Soviet ability to launch
an attack on Europe -- particularly with nuclear weapons. It is
not clear whether the Western Powers refused the Soviet acceptance
of their own offer because it would have placed too low a ceiling
on the West German forces (150 thousand men) or because it was
thought that the force-levels allowed to the West would not permit
it to carry out a defense of its vital interests or both. The

negotiations, in addition to demonstrating the unwisdom of making
proposals one is not prepared to see accepted, showed that agreement
on a reduction of forces ~~in x~~ is achievable only if it does not
mean anything; only if it does not affect ~~x~~ either Power's relation-
ships or the ability to carry out strategic missions.

Finally, disarmament negotiations based on categories of thought of the Twenties and Thirties miss the essential transformation of technology: the tremendously increased power of modern weapons and the enormous rate of change of weapons technology.

Given the power of modern weapons, the reduction of forces in the
category of retaliatory striking power would have to be almost
total before the capability of inflicting a devastating blow would
be impaired. The number of weapons required to launch a catastrophic
attack is so relatively small, the nature of strategic air-war so
subtle and sophisticated, the size of the existing stockpiles so
considerable that an agreement to reduce forces will either be
meaningless or disbelieved in the absence of the inspection system

which, as will be seen below, modern technology inhibits.

Moreover, all disarmament plans of the past were based on
the assumption of a stable weapons technology. The reduction of

forces sought to be achieved at least had the merit that its
implementation

strategic importance could be considered constant. But under

present conditions the real armaments race is in the laboratories.

No reduction of forces, however scrupulously carried out, could

protect the Powers against a technological breakthrough. On the

contrary, the consciousness that their fate may depend on just such

a contingency would bring about a frantic technological race even if—

the strategic striking forces were substantially reduced. Even were

strategic striking forces kept at fixed levels and rigidly controlled,

an advance in air-defense sufficient to contain the opposing retaliatory
force would upset the strategic balance completely. The knowledge by

each power that the others are working on ever more fearful means of
destruction or on means of attacking with impunity would cause current
international relations to be carried on in an atmosphere of tenseness

and imminent catastrophe whatever agreements might be concluded about
reduction of forces.

reduction of forces, and imminent catastrophe whatever agreements might be concluded about international relations to be carried on in an atmosphere of tenacity destruction or on means of attacking with impunity would cause current each power that the others are working on ever more fearful means of force would grant the strategic balance completely. The knowledge by an advance in air-defense sufficient to contain the opposing retaliatory strategic striking forces kept at fixed levels and rigidly controlled, the strategic striking forces were absolutely reduced. Even were a contingency would bring about a frantic technological race even if contrary, the consciousness that their fate may depend on just such a protection the Allies against a technological breakthrough. On the No reduction of forces, however scrupulously carried out, could present conditions the real armaments race is in the laboratories. strategic importance could be considered a constant. But under forces sought to be achieved at least had the merit that its the assumption of a stable weapons technology. The reduction of Moreover, air disarmament plans of the past were based on which, as will be seen below, modern technology impinges.

III

It is precisely because reduction of forces has proved so illusory and its rewards so negligible even if achieved, that the major emphasis of disarmament efforts has turned to the problems of inspection and control and prevention of surprise attack. It is at the same time a symptom of the prevailing mistrust that so much attention should have been given to means of safeguarding against the violation of agreements. However, since the Soviet domestic apparatus is difficult to maintain in the face of the only control system which would reassure the West every inspection scheme that has proved acceptable to the Free World has proved objectionable to the U.S.S.R. Conversely the difficulty of access to the Soviet bloc and its fetish for secrecy has caused the Free World to insist on what has come to be called a "foolproof" inspection system which in turn tended to confirm Soviet suspicions. As a result the negotiations about control and inspection have exhibited the same vicious circle already revealed by the efforts to bring about a reduction in armaments: were it possible to agree on an inspection and control mechanism, it would also be possible to settle some of the disputes which gave rise to

existing tensions. As long as specific issues prove obdurate, there
is little hope in an over-all control plan.

In addition to the psychological and political problems, the
technological race makes it difficult to negotiate a control plan.
For the rate of change of technology has outstripped the pace of
diplomatic negotiations so that control plans change their meaning
even while they are being debated. The original idea behind the con-
trol and inspection scheme of the first United States disarmament
proposal (the Baruch plan) was that inspection would serve as a corol-
lary to a reduction of armaments. It was assumed that an interna-
tional authority with adequate powers of inspection and in control of
mining, processing and producing fissionable materials would be able
to eliminate nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the Powers. In
fact, the United States' contribution to the Baruch plan was to be the
destruction of our nuclear stockpile as the last stage of the process
of disarmament. To be sure, even this scheme would not have been
"foolproof." Within the United States Atomic Energy program, with
every incentive to achieve an accurate accounting and no motive for
evasion, the normal "slippage" in the handling of fissionable material

due to error and mechanical problems of handling is about 2/3
A nation determined on evasion could easily multiply this percentage
without being in obvious violation of international agreements or
it could improve its own accounting methods and utilize the "saved"
slippage slowly to build up a nuclear stockpile of its own. And
their knowledge of this possibility would in turn give other Powers
an incentive for evasion.

Nevertheless at the early stages of the atomic energy program
the stockpiles were still so small and the possibility of building
them up to substantial proportions, relatively so negligible that an
inspection program would have contributed materially to reducing the
danger of nuclear war. Any Power determined to conduct nuclear war
would have had to break existing agreements flagrantly and thereby
bring down on itself either the international enforcement machinery
or the unilateral action of the United States. But in the age of nu-
clear plenty the control machinery envisaged by the Baruch plan --
whatever its utility for other purposes -- would be futile as a means
to reduce the danger of nuclear war. So many nuclear weapons have
been produced of so many different sizes and they are so easy to con-
ceal that not even the most elaborate inspection machinery could

2/ Dean, Gordon. Report on the Atom. (check with Gordon Dean)

account for all of them. Thus every Power would seek to keep back
part of its stockpile to protect itself against the possibility that
its opponent might do so. As a result a control machinery is futile
to prevent the use of nuclear weapons at this stage of their devel-
opment even assuming the desirability of doing so.

And so it is with each new technological discovery. In the
very early stages of its development, a scrupulous control system
might forestall its addition to the strategic arsenal. But by the
time disarmament negotiations have run their tortuous course, the
weapon will have become so sophisticated and the production of it
will have reached such proportions that any control machinery may
magnify rather than reduce the existing insecurity: it would com-
pound the present fear of surprise attack by concern about the viola-
tion of the agreement by the other side. Moreover, the tortuousness
of negotiations about control machinery reflects not only the pre-
vailing distrust but the inherent complexity of the problem. It is
one thing to prevent a stockpile from developing, it is quite another
to control it once it has come into existence, and it is not easy even
more difficult to eliminate it. Since scientific growth is exponential, it is in
addition next to impossible to define a meaningful point to "cut off"

610

weapons developments. At the beginning of the atomic age, a strict inspection
system might have succeeded in stopping the elaboration of nuclear weapons.

By 1952, it might still have been possible to "control" the development of
themo-nuclear weapons, albeit with great difficulty. For the Hydrogen
bomb developed so naturally out of research and production of nuclear weapons
that a foolproof inspection system would have been infinitely complicated.

In any case, by 1957, the production of thermo-nuclear devices had so far
outstripped any possible control machinery that the emphasis of disarmament
negotiations turned from eliminating stockpiles of thermo-nuclear weapons to
methods of restraining their use. And with the diffusion of nuclear technology,
through the spread of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, effective control of
nuclear weapons by even the smaller Powers will be almost out of the question.

Moreover, once a weapon is developed the next stage is to elaborate its uses
until ever wider realms of strategy become dependent on it. A nation may
be willing to forego the offensive use of nuclear weapons, but it will be most
reluctant to give up its defensive applications, such as anti-aircraft or anti-
missile role of nuclear weapons. In the third stage, however, there will be a
dual purpose: the launching site for ground to air missiles can be used as
well for ground to ground weapons; a nuclear weapon launched from a plane against
enemy delivery vehicles will be equally useful against enemy ground targets.

611

In short, weapons can be kept from being added to stockpiles only at their inception when their implications are least understood. Thus the only time to control the soon-to-be missiles would be within the next two years before they go into mass production. By the time their dangers are realized, the possibility of preventing their addition to existing arsenals by means of inspection or control has usually disappeared.

The difficulty of developing a meaningful control machinery to end the production and development of certain weapons has caused most disarmament negotiations since 1955 to concern themselves with means to prevent surprise attack. It is said that one of the causes for present tensions is the insecurity caused by the consciousness of imminent catastrophe and that consequently an inspection system which would reduce the danger of surprise attack would also remove some of the urgency from international relationships. This was the reasoning behind President Eisenhower Eisenhower's proposal at the Geneva summit conference to exchange military blueprints with the Soviet Union and to permit aerial reconnaissance of each other's territories. The principle that inspection may prevent surprise attack has been accepted in the Soviet counterproposal for stationing ground observers at strategic points in the territory of the other nation.

It cannot be denied that the danger of surprise attack contributes to

612

the tensions of the nuclear age even if it does not cause them. It is less clear, however, that the uncertainty about the opponent's intentions, ρ (implicit in all inspection schemes, would be significantly reduced by inspection; or that the inspection schemes even if implemented would add a great deal to existing warning methods and intelligence information. It is doubtful whether inspection systems either of ground observers or of aerial reconnaissance or both would significantly reduce the element of surprise either for all-out or for local war. Because it cannot afford to be caught on the ground, a strategic striking force must be prepared to attack from its training bases at a moment's notice. If properly prepared, it should require no noticeable mobilization to launch its strike. Or to put it another way, its "normal" peace-time patterns of action should be as close as possible to its role in case of emergency. Any enemy should not be able to tell whether a given flight is a training mission or a surprise attack until its early warning line is crossed.

To be sure, the Soviet Long Range Air Force has not yet reached this point.

Because it probably does not possess a capability for aerial refueling, it would have to stage its planes to advance bases on the Kola or Chukotski peninsulas. A system of inspection would inform us of this move and it

3. See map, p.

613

[y]

might therefore increase our warning time. Nevertheless the gain would only be a relative one, because any substantial movement of the Soviet Long Range Air Force to advance bases could hardly escape high altitude detection or general intelligence surveillance even in the absence of inspection. And the next family of Soviet planes will be able to launch an attack from their training bases.

Because of the greater range of our planes and the nature of our base system, the Soviets would gain very little either from ground inspection or from

from ground inspection or aerial surveillance. They know the location of most of our air-bases and since they will presumably strike the first blow in an all-out war, they are assured of maximum warning in any case. It can be argued, of course, that the U.S.S.R. may not evaluate the danger of a United States surprise attack so low and that it would therefore gain added security from an inspection system. But it is not clear what added assurance would be so achieved. Unless all planes are grounded all the time and both sides are certain that no substantial air-installations are hidden, there is no assurance that planes on so-called training missions will not be used for a surprise attack. Even filing flight plans in advance will not eliminate this danger. For given the speed of modern planes, by the time inspectors

realize a violation of a flight plan and can communicate this information to their home government, the planes will probably have reached the opposing early warning lines in any case. Moreover, if flight plans are cleverly arranged -- and every incentive would seem to exist for doing this -- it will be very difficult to discover whether a given flight is a move to advance bases or a prelude to an all-out attack. Nor is it clear what consequences would follow from a seeming violation of the inspection procedure. Would any violation however slight call for unleashing of the retaliatory force? It would seem unlikely that any Power would be prepared to invoke so drastic a remedy. But if it does not, the net result of even an operating inspection system will be to wait with the retaliatory blow until the aggressor crosses the early warning line which is precisely the situation today.

Thus the maximum warning achievable by inspection systems is the interval between *t1* and *t2* the time when planes leave their bases and when they would have been detected by existing warning systems. With the present family of airplanes, an inspection system at best would add perhaps three hours warning to the side which is being attacked. The aggressor would gain no additional warning time from an inspection system because he would, in any case, alert his defenses before mounting his attack. To be sure, three hours additional

615

warning is not negligible; it may indeed spell the difference between survival
and catastrophe. But since the victim of aggression is almost certain to be
a *status quo* Power having everything to gain from assuming its opponent's good
have
faith, it may/difficulty psychologically utilizing this additional warning
effectively because it will tend to ascribe the violation to a technical break-
down to be removed by MX protests or negotiation. Moreover, as the range of
planes is extended, they will be able to strike from training bases and it
will become increasingly difficult to interpret their movements correctly.

As the MX speed of planes is increased, the warning time afforded by even
a perfect inspection system, correctly interpreted, is progressively reduced.

Unitl in the age of the *XUKEER* Intercontinental Ballistic Missile -- in less
than ten years -- the maximum warning time/possible, assuming perfect communi/cation,
between the inspector and the home government would be thirty minutes, because

the missile would be in transit for only this period of *x* time.

In the age of the missile and the supersonic bomber, even a fool-proof inspection system will only tell the Powers *x* what they already know: that the opponent possesses the capability of launching a devastating attack at a moment's notice and with a minimum of warning.

minimum of warning.

launching a devastating attack at a moment's notice and with a
already known: that the opponent possesses the capability of
proot inspection system will only tell the powers of what they
In the age of the misaffe and the aupeersonic bomber, even a fool-
the misaffe would be in tranatic for only this period of xxx time.

The proposals for inspection as a bar to surprise attack in fact reflect the
categories of thought of a period when forces-in-being could not be decisive and above
all when their power and speed were of a much lower order. As long as the forces-in-
being were relatively cumbersome and needed to be concentrated before an attack ~~possible~~
would be launched, the warning afforded by an inspection system might have been stra-
tegically significant. As late as 1946 had the Baruch Plan been accepted, a nation
determined on nuclear war would have had to wait several months ~~or even years~~ after a violation
until its stockpiles had been built up to respectable levels. The existence of a
all powers
control system in such conditions afforded a breathing spell. With the power and
speed of current weapons, ~~HOWEVER~~ even an airtight inspection system would not
supply ~~even relative~~ guarantees. When wars can be fought by the forces-in-being and when
striking forces are designed to be able to attack with no additional overt preparation,
warning can be attained under optimum conditions, only for the time the delivery
vehicles, whether planes or missiles, are in transit. At present this is a maximum
~~Because~~ a SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION ON ~~THIS~~ WHICH IS ALREADY EXISTING UNDER SURVEILLANCE
of ten hours, ~~but the time is constantly shrinking and will reach thirty minutes in~~
the missile age.

This the practical consequences of an inspection system is that it might supply
additional warning as the time between when planes have their bases and

when they would have been detected by existing warning systems. With the present
family of aircraft, the maximum amount of time gained for us might be three hours if
the attack is launched from Soviet advance bases and seven hours if the attack were
launched from the interior of Russia. In practice because the start of an attack would
almost certainly coincide with a breakdown of communications with inspection terms,
this time would probably be less.
And if each new family of planes will reduce
the morning time, until in the missile age it will need 30 minutes.

The extreme readiness of the forces-in-being also reduces the use of aerial
reconnaissance. With the present family of airplanes each enemy airbase would have
to be photographed at intervals more frequent than 10 hours in order to obtain any
benefit from overflights. If the reconnaissance occurs at longer intervals,
the early warning line will supply a better indication of a surprise attack because
an attack launched immediately after an overflight would reach the Early Warning
Line before the next reconnaissance sortie discovered that the opposing retaliatory
force had left its base. As the speed of planes increases the frequency of recon-
naissance missions will also have to be increased so that in practice reconnaissance
planes to be effective would probably have to hover over enemy airfields almost
constantly. And in the missile age aerial reconnaissance would be next fortunate
if it could discover launching sites. It would not be able to furnish an indication
of impending attack.

620

the Soviet bloc from the Free World. Conversely, in the present climate of
distrust, an inspection system might do little more than add another element
of contention. Indeed, unless designed with extraordinary care, a system of
inspection *ix* may well make a tense situation even more explosive. In view
of the complexity of the strategy for all-out war, the value of an inspection
system depends not only on the collection, but also on the interpretation of facts.
Correct interpretation is all the more important because the only meaningful
reaction to the violation of an agreement is to launch an immediate retaliatory
strike. Negotiations and protests could not begin to be effective before the
enemy force has reached its targets. It is therefore vital that an inspection
system reduces rather than adds to the danger of an all-out war produced by
a misunderstanding of the opponents' intentions. But the inspection systems
so far advanced do not seem to meet this test. The information they produce
is of necessity *fragile* fragmentary; since no chance can be *taken* on an
optimistic interpretation any seeming violation must be dealt with as if it
were a prelude to the worst contingency. Moreover, inspection is likely to
run into most difficulties and evasions when it is most needed, when international
tensions are at their height. Unless the protagonists are prepared to draw
the full consequences from seeming violations, an inspection system may aid
an aggressor by lulling its *opponent*.

But to draw the full consequences
on the basis of inevitably *fragile* fragmentary and contradictory information, is
both psychologically *impossible* difficult for *status quo* Powers and it may well add to
the *impossible* tenseness of relationships.

Inspection systems may yield collateral
results to either side such as loosening up the Soviet control apparatus or
giving a fuller picture of military installations; but they will do little
to eliminate the underlying tension.

the Soviet bloc from the Free World. Conversely, in the present
climate of distrust, an inspection system would do little more than
add another element of contention. Such a system would reduce
insecurity only if both sides had a degree of confidence in each
other's intentions; but then if they possessed this confidence there
would be less need of an inspection system of the armaments race
which produces the need for it. Inspection systems may yield
such as loosening up the Soviet control apparatus or giving a
fuller picture of military installations;
collateral results to either side, but they will do little to
eliminate the underlying tension.

It is the technical complexity of inspection and its futility
in the present climate of distrust which has caused some thoughtful
individuals, appalled at the prospect of nuclear war, to advocate
world-government as the only solution. It is argued that as long as
both sides possess thermo-nuclear weapons and the means to deliver
them a vicious spiral of constantly growing insecurity and redoubled
efforts of protection against surprise is inevitable. The only
solution is the surrender of all strategic weapons to a world
authority which would then be the sole agency to possess heavy

armaments and the means for delivering them. With such a preponderance
of force it could then play the role of a world policeman and enforce
a peace if necessary. The United Nations police force for Egypt
was greeted in some quarters as a **PRECOSSER, THE FOREWINNER,**
agency.

The idea of escaping the tensions of international relations
by an analogy to the police powers has come up repeatedly in the
past, and usually at periods when international tensions made it
least a realizable. It is true, as the advocates of the plan of
world government contend, that the system of sovereign states itself
is a cause of international tensions because a sovereign will can,
in some sense only be controlled by superior force. As a result,
any increase in strength of one Power forces all others to **follow suit,**
and
In a two-power world aimed with thermo-nuclear weapons this must
lead to an increasingly explosive situation. But to expect these-
sovereign nations whose failure to agree in issues of much less

Finletter Power and Policy, p. 392; Bolte, Charles - The Price of Peace, pp. 68-71

importance has brought about the current tension, to be able to
agree on giving up their sovereignty. History offers no example
of sovereign states surrendering their sovereignty except to
outside compulsion.

Rome was able to establish the hegemony of-
Greece that generations of philosophers had demanded in the basis
of abstract reason.

PRUSSIA brought about the unification of thirty-
three German sovereignies by force after a half centruy of vain
revolution by German patriots.

To be sure the lessons of history
are no more conclusive than the unparalleled destructiveness of
modern weapons.

Still it is difficult to see any motive which
could make the Soviets to give up their thermo-nuclear stockpile
to an international body.

And the reaction of the United States
Congress will be hardly more hospitable.

The proposals for world government in its various forms would
therefore hardly warrant extensive consideration as offering
even a negotiating basis in the foreseeable future were they not such
an excellent illustration of a prevailing notion: that the United
Nations somehow has a reality beyond that of the Powers comprising

it. It is a symptom of our LEGALISTIC bias that some consider a legal entity, the UN United Nations as a real entity which somehow transcends the collective will of its members. For as long as the United Nations is composed of sovereign states, it will reflect the PRECISE RIVALS that animate those Powers outside of it. To be sure, the United Nations offers a convenient forum for the settlement of disputes, and it can give symbolic expression to the consensus of world opinion on the issues which where it can be marshalled. But the gap between the symbolic acts of the United Nations and its willingness to run substantive risks is inherent in its structure. For the delegates represent not popular constituency but sovereign governments and they vote not on their convictions but on the instructions they receive. Thus the United Nations is dependent on the willingness to run risks of its component governments which DIFFER as we have seen, by (WITH) and this is limited in national interest. The United Nations policy force came into being

4/ See above p.

See above

The United Nations policy force came into being
national interest.
and this is limited as we have seen, by different conceptions of the
dependent on the willingness to run risks of its component government
but on the instructions they receive. Thus the United Nations is
but sovereign governments and they vote not on their convictions
its structure. For the delegates represent no popular constituency
Nations and its willingness to run autonomous risks is inherent in
managed. But the gap between the symbolic acts of the United
the consensus of world opinion on the issue which where it can be
the settlement of disputes, and it can give symbolic expression to
it. To be sure, the United Nations offers a convenient form for
reflect the x
that animates those Powers outside of
as the United Nations is composed of sovereign states, it will
somehow transacenda the collective will of its members. For as long
a legal entity, the UN United Nations as a real entity which
it. It is a symbol of our
that some may consider

[y]

in Egypt because it involved no assumption of substantive risk. It would never have entered Egypt had not both parties to the dispute accepted it and had not both parties sought a device to liquidate military operations. The United Nations force did not cause the cessation of the attack; rather it ratified a decision already made. It does not for this reason offer a particularly hopeful model for what will be the real security problem of our period: the growing Soviet power coupled with a refusal to yield to anything except superior force.

The argument that a supra-national authority can resolve tensions which have proved intractable in direct negotiations, and that it could be entrusted with the exclusive custody of weapons capable of encompassing the destruction of humanity, reflects two related notions: that aggression is by its nature *unambiguous* and that weakness somehow guarantees responsibility and perhaps even superior morality. But in the nuclear age recognizing aggression has proved as complicated as resisting it. Were a supra-national Disarmament Executive charged with enforcing the peace to come into being it is predictable that its major problem would be to define a meaningful concept of aggression. Moreover, it would be difficult to find Powers clearly recognized as neutral to act as custodians of the thermonuclear stockpile or with sufficient technical competence to administer it were they so recognized. Nor is it clear why a monopoly of power in the hands of states dependent for their equipment,

[y]

625

equipment, their training and their facilities on the two super-Powers should
offer a guarantee of stability. It is not at all obvious that weakness
guarantees responsibility or that Powers which have difficulty playing a role
in their own regions will be able to judge global problems with subtlety and
discrimination. And this still overlooks the dilemmas of where to store the <u>international</u> stockpile of bombs, where to locate the bases of the international
air force -- all of which will become matters of life-and-death to the nations
of the <u>mundix</u> world.

In short, there is no escaping from the responsibilities of the
thermo-nuclear age into a supra-national authority, for if all its complicated
problems would be negotiated, the substantive issues now dividing the world

would be soluble too. The quest for an international authority is in fact the
is in fact the most absolute manifestation of total diplomacy; it is the country
most absolute application of the total diplomacy which is the reverse side of
in diplomacy to a military policy of all-and-mur. And it is the same
a military policy of all-out war. The more terrible the consequences of a
pernicious consequence.

strategic doctrine, the greater the temptation to escape them by diplomacy,
by recourse to supra-national authority, by devices which somehow remove the
thermo-nuclear stockpiles from the relation among states. But the dilemmas
and total peace such a cause if
avoid
of the thermo-nuclear age cannot be so avoided. Indeed, the attempt to escape
dilemmas of the nuclear age by such a misstating
them altogether may ensure that war, if it does come, will take the most absolute

626

form because the diplomacy which preceded it had left no room between total war and total peace. The goal of disarmament and the avoidance of war is a noble and honorable one. But it should not be sought at the cost of the consideration of alternatives which may prove of more immediate benefit to mankind, even if they do not have the advantage of offering final solutions: the means of mitigating the horrors of wars which may break out.

## IV

The almost exclusive concern with means to avoid war begins with the most intractable element of the problems posed by nuclear weapons. It requires the major atomic Powers to stake their survival on the observance of an international agreement in an international order where the breach of agreements has become commonplace and containing a group of Powers, the Soviet bloc, the doctrine of which explicitly rejects the observance of agreements if they do not reflect a relation of forces. To ask the Soviets to accept the idea of an indefinitely prolonged equilibrium is tantamount to asking them to cease being LEHINISTS, in which case, in turn, international relationships would automatically lose a great deal of their tenseness.

627

Disarmament negotiations may therefore create an illusion of progress through the give-and-take of diplomatic interchange in which positions tend to approach each other only after they had been outstripped by technological developments, after, in short, they had become irrelevant to the primary security concerns. The attempt to eliminate war through disarmament is the reverse side of the effort to deter aggression through maximum retaliatory power and to defeat the enemy through the widest system of collective security. Each of these measures are highly useful and desirable as long as they succeed; the object is to ensure that the consequences of failure. For in each case the attempt to avoid war carries with it a fearful sanction: the more total the peace sought, the more total the consequences of violating an agreement. The policy of deterrence through maximum retaliatory power involves the sanction of all-out thermo-nuclear war; a doctrine of world-wide collective security involves the sanction of global war; and a system of general disarmament has as a sanction a combination of these. Thus disarmament negotiations, as heretofore considered, may reinforce the abstractness of both diplomacy and strategy.

As the symptom of our quest for total solutions and as that quest in the field of military policy they may exhibit the attainment of objectives which are achievable.

629

the Suez Canal was hardly foreseen by the Western Powers and perhaps not even
by the Soviet Union. And the Hungarian revolution came as a rude shock to the
Kremlin. Both instances resulted in military action which with the prevailing
strategic doctrines might easily have spread to become all-out. And similar
Soviet moves in East Germany or Poland would be fraught with even

have devastating effects on world opinion. And if a program of war limits war to a few specific areas, it might be limited an all-but-
tion became effective it could serve as a just step to total disarmament.

It has been argued that the deliberate ambiguity of our present po-
sition which refuses to define what we understand by limited war, or under
what circumstances we might fight it, is in itself a deterrent because it
CAN NEVER BE DETERMINED THAT MILITARY ACTION ON HIS
forces the enemy to plan on the basis of the worst contingency. (But if we
PART MAY NOT UNLEASH ALL-OUT WAR)

wish to pose the maximum deterrent, an explicit declaration of massive re-
taliation would seem by far more advantageous. The purpose of our
ambiguity is to combine the advantage of two incompatible causes: to pose
the threat of all-out war for purposes of deterrence, but to keep open the
possibility of a less catastrophic strategy should deterrence fail. If the
ambiguity is to serve any purpose, however, it may have precisely the con-
trary effect; it may give rise to the notion that we do not intend to resist
at all and thus encourage aggression. Or it may cause an aggressor to inter-
pret any resistance as a prelude to an all-out war. Instead of strengthening
the deterrent and giving scope for a non-catastrophic strategy, the deliberate
ambiguity of our position may weaken the deterrent and bring on the most
catastrophic kind of war.

WHICH WE INTEND TO LOCALIZE /

military situation unless a complete collapse of the enemy opens unexpected opportunities. For if conditions are raised with each military success, an incentive is afforded to increase his commitment as a prelude to negotiations. The purpose of a limited war is to inflict losses or to pose risks for the enemy out of proportion to the objective under dispute. The more moderate the objective, the less violent the cause of the war is likely to be. This does not mean that military operations cannot go beyond the territory or objective in dispute; indeed one way of increasing the enemy's willingness to settle is to deprive him of something (a piece of territory or an objective) he can regain only by making peace. But the result of a limited war cannot depend on military considerations alone; it reflects an ability to harmonize political and military objectives.

A "purely" military decision in a limited war is therefore a contraction in terms.

In start, it is necessary to devise a concept of war in which time does not become an enemy ally and in which the impossibilities of achieving absolute solutions does not inhibit the solutions which are attainable. Skill is therefore required not only in presenting physical but also in presenting psychological challenges. A limited war between major Powers can remain limited only if at some point one of the protagonists prefers a limited defeat to

636

an additional investment of resources, or if both sides are willing to settle for a stalemate, in preference to an assumption of maximum continued risk. In either case, however, the protagonists retain the *physical* ability to increase their investment. To the extent that both parties do so the war will gradually expand until one or both Powers reach the limit of their physical resources -- until the war has become total. To the extent that only one party is willing to run greater risks it gains an advantage. The ability to conduct a limited war therefore presupposes an understanding of the psychology by which the opponent's calculus of risks is determined and to present him at every point with an opportunity for settlement that appears more favorable than continuation of the war. Skill is therefore required not only in *foreseeing* physical, but also in presenting psychological challenges.

For this reason limited war cannot be conceived as a small all-out war with a series of uninterrupted blows prepared in secrecy until the opponent's will is broken. On the contrary, it is important to develop a concept of military operations conducted in phases which permit an assessment of the risk and possibilities for settlement at each stage before recourse is had to the next phase of operations. Paradoxical as it may seem in the jet age, strategic doctrine should address itslef to the problem of slowing down if not the pace of military operations, at least the rapidity with which they succeed each other. Strategic doctrine must never lose sight of the fact that its main purpose is to affect the will of the main enemy, not to destroy him, that it can be limited only by presenting the enemy with an unfavorable calculus of risks and this requires pauses for calculation. A concept of operations should not lose sight of the fact that the speed of modern weapons may have outstripped the capacity of the human mind to evaluate the significance of events. It should compensate for it by a measured

636a

pace in the sequence of operations, however rapid the maneuvers in each stage.

Each campaign should be conceived in a series of self-contained phases, each of which implies a political objective and with a sufficient interval between them to permit the application of political and psychological pressures.

Therefore, too, it will be necessary to give up the notion that direct
diplomatic contact ceases when military operations begin. Rather direct con-
tact is never more necessary to ensure that both sides possess as much infor-
mation as possible about the consequences of expanding a war and to be able
to present political formulae for a settlement. To the degree that diplomacy
presents alternatives to expanding a conflict it will inhibit the decision to
run greater risks. To the extent that military operations can be phased, so
that a sequence of events is approximately concluded before the next commitment
is made, it will give an opportunity for an evaluation of the circumstances
which make a settlement advisable and for the proper balancing of political,
psychological and military risks. Not the least paradox of the nuclear age
may be that contrary to traditional notions, lack of secrecy may be a military
weapon and that in a period of the most advanced technology, battles will
approach the stylized contests of the feudal period which served as much as
a test of a will as a trial in strength.

If our military staffs could become clear about a doctrine of limited
war, we could then use the disarmament negotiations to seek to establish a
degree of acceptance of it by the other side. It would not be necessary that
such a concept be embodied in an international treaty or even that the Soviets
formally adhere to it.

638

No
There should be no illusions, in fact, about the ease with which the Soviets
might be induced to forego the advantages of atomic blackmail. The primary
purpose of such a program would be to convey our intentions to the Soviet bloc
and to encourage it to consider a limitation of war with its own military planning.

The incentive for Soviet cooperation in substance, if not in form, would be
self-interest; it can work only to the extent that our military policy leaves
no doubt that all-out war would mean disaster for the Soviet bloc. A program
of arms limitation would presuppose an adequate retaliatory capability: it
would not prevent every kind of all-out war; only those which develop from
undue reliance on miscalculation or a misunderstanding of the opponents' intentions.

It is difficult for anyone who does not possess all the
technical information to sketch a program of more limitation in
detail. 7/ It would seem however that many of the long cherished
notions of traditional warfare will have to be modified or aban-
doned. One of the cardinal principles of air strategy is that the
air is indivisible -- that wars can be won only by dominating the air power
completely. 8/ But any attempt to deprive an enemy of his retaliatory force would inevitably bring an all-out war, because a major
Power without a retaliatory force is at the mercy of its opponent.
Thus the minimum condition of war limitation will be the immunity
of the opposing retaliatory forces. The advent of missiles will
impose this limitation in any case because it will be technically
impossible to destroy all enemy launching sites. Another concept
which will have to be modified is the elimination of enemy communication and industrial centers which was meaningful only so long as
the major movement of armies was by road or rail. As the importance

7/ For an excellent brief statement, see Buzzard, Sir Anthony; Blackett, P.M.S.; Healy, Dennis and Gould-Adams, Richard, *On Limiting Atomic War*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1956.

8/ Sir John SlessoP. *Strategy for the West*. p. 105.

of air transport increases to the point where it will become the chief source of movement of troops and supplies, the interdiction of communication centers loses much of its significance. 9/ Finally in a war which will be largely fought by the forces-in-being, the destruction of industrial potential will play a much smaller role. 10/

As has been shown above, the significant attrition of modern weapons is of the forces-in-being and not industrial facilities. 10/ In turn as the targets grow smaller in size there will be less incentive to use the most powerful weapons whose primary utility is the destruction of large areas.

Thus it is possible to visualize limitations at least as to the size of targets and to/weapons used. We might propose that neither bases of the opposing strategic airforces nor towns above a certain size would be attacked, provided these bases would not be used to support tactical operations and the towns not contain military installations useful against armed forces. Such a proposal could be combined with the inspection schemes of the general disarmament schemes. Thus each side could be required to list its strategic airbases which

9/ See above Chapter VI, p. ___.

10/ See above Chapter V, p. ___.

would then be immune from attack. It would be helpful although not essential that inspectors be admitted to all these bases. No airbase within a stated distance of the battle zone, say five hundred miles, could purchase immunity by being declared strategic save by admitting inspectors which verified it was not being used for tactical purposes. Again, all cities within the same distance of the battle zone would be immune from/attack if they were declared "open" and admitted inspectors. An open city would be one which did not contain itself, or within a radius of thirty miles from the center, any installation which could be used against military forces, such as airbases or missile launching sites. The term military installation should be liberally defined and not extended to industrial plants. Cities at a greater distance from the battle zone would be immune altogether. The inspectors could be a commission of neutrals; it would be preferable if they were experts of the other side because this would give their reports a much higher credibility. The inspectors would have their own communication system and would operate even during hostilities.

Such a program would have several advantages over inspection

schemes designed only to prevent surprise attack. It would ac-
complish most of the goals sought by the general inspection scheme:
It would, in so far as a inspection system is able,
but in addition it would serve as an instrument of war limitation,
and not simply of prevention. Such a program moreover would be
self-policing. Each of the protagonists would have a powerful in-
centive to observe it, because the penalty would be the catastrophe
of an all-out war. For this reason both sides would probably be
eager and not reluctant to overlook occasional violations. The in-
spectors moreover could serve as points of political contact and
thus the mechanics of arms limitation might bring about the
the possibility of a rapid settlement should the parties decide it.
And by relating disarmament negotia-
tions to military strategy it would force the opposing staffs to
consider options other than the stark alternative of total peace
and total war.

as well as living about
the possibility of a
CONCEPT of operations described earlier, it should not be
the case, since it is clear from the text that the purpose of
the elimination of area targets will place an upper limit on
the size of weapons it will be profitable to use. Since fall-out
becomes a serious problem only in range of 500 kilotons and above,
it could be proposed that no weapon larger than 500 kiloton will be
employed unless the enemy uses it first. Concurrently the United

The elimination of area targets will place an upper limit on
the size of weapons it will be profitable to use. Since fall-out
becomes a serious problem only in range of 500 kilotons and above,
it could be proposed that no weapon larger than 500 kiloton will be
employed unless the enemy uses it first. Concurrently the United

643

States could take advantage of a new development which eliminates fall-out. The so-called "clean" bomb eliminates the last stage of the fission-fusion-fission process. 11/ Since fusion produces very little radioactivity, the fall-out is confined to the radioactivity of the trigger mechanism and this is not a serious problem.

We could therefore propose that all weapons above 500 kilotons should be "clean" bombs and this too would be self-policing. <u>Since</u> any significant fall-out would indicate a violation. It may be objected that such a procedure would in effect neutralize cities and seriously interfere with military operations. But the neutralization of cities is inherent in modern technology quite apart from any arms limitation schemes. It would seem to make little difference whether a city is neutralized by the presence of inspection teams or through the explosion of megaton weapons. As for impairing military operations, the handicap would be the same for both sides and the military will have to accept the fact that short of a thermo-nuclear holocaust, purely military decisions are no longer possible. <u>Also</u> another criticism

<u>assess</u> <u>test</u> <u>program</u> may concern the demands made by a war-limitation program assumes a degree of human rationality for which history offers no warranty.

11/ See above Chapter IV, p. ____.

But history offers no example for the extraordinary destructive-
ness of modern weapons either. Moreover, a program that sought to
establish some principles of war limitation in advance of hostili-
ties would seem to make fewer demands on rationality than one which
attempted to improvise the rules of war in the confusion of battle.

The United States could therefore shift the emphasis of dis-
armament negotiations from the technically almost <u>impossible</u> problem
of preventing surprise attack to an effort to mitigate the <u>havoc</u> of
war. It should do so, moreover, in order to make a distinction be-
tween Soviet "ban the bomb" propaganda and disarmament. We should
leave no doubt that any aggression by the Communist bloc may be re-
應 and we should create the frame· much for this well in advance if any
sisted with nuclear weapons. But while we should treat the use of
nuclear weapons as not negotiable, we should make every effort to
limit their effect and to spare the civilian population as much as
possible. We could therefore announce <u>unilaterally if necessary</u>
that Soviet aggression would be resisted with nuclear weapons if
necessary; that in resisting we would not use fission-fusion-fission
weapons of more than 500 kiloton explosive power unless the enemy
used them first; that we would use "clean" bombs with minimal fall-out

whatever the utility of the pronouncements of impending doom for
paralyzing resistance, the Soviets would face a considerable dilemma
if we maintained our position even in the face of a Soviet rejection.
Whatever their distrust, they would possess a powerful incentive to
test our sincerity. And we in turn would lose nothing. If the So-
viets begin the war as an all-out surprise attack, the same relation
obtains heretofore and we could react accordingly using every wea-
pon in our arsenal. If they begin it as a limited war, it could be
fought according to rules established well in advance. And the in-
spection system sketched here would serve a dual purpose as a warning
against surprise attack, as an instrument of war limitation, and as
a device to establish contact with the opponent for a political set-
tlement during the conduct of operations.

The limitation of war proposal described here is impossible
however without the strategic doctrine described earlier or some
adaptation of it. It presupposes an ability to use force with dis-
crimination and to establish political goals in which the question of
national survival is not involved in every issue. 12/ It also requires

12/ See above, Chapter VI, p. ___.

a public opinion which has been educated in the realities of the
nuclear age. A program of war limitation, in short, cannot be used
as a cheaper means of imposing unconditional surrender. 13/
Deep
aerial penetrations of enemy territory will have to be foregone by
both sides lest they unleash a retaliatory strike. The relationship
of force to diplomacy is not to be established as a variation of
all-out war. The possibility of total security has ended with our
atomic monopoly. Limited war and the diplomacy appropriate to it is
a means to escape from the sterility of the quest for absolute peace
which in the face of a dedicated revolutionary Power paralyzes by
the vagueness of its hopes and for absolute victory, which in the
face of the enormity of modern weapons paralyzes by the vastness of
its consequences.

13/ See above, Chapter VI, p. ___.