TelCom:12:32-11, 1/72

Mr. Kennedy/
Ambassador Dobrynin

D: Good morning Colonel.

K: How are you sir.

D: Thank you very much. How are you?

K: Fine thank you.

D: Busy.

K: Well we keep that way.

D: Really I would like to ask you the following things. I have agreed to have lunch with him on Tuesday.

K: Right.

D: So it stands. I just received a telegram. They are asking me to come for some urgent consultations in Moscow - just in the evening on Tuesday. So it is very good that we coincide. I will have lunch with him and then in the evening around 7 o'clock I will leave for Moscow. But I would like you when you have a chance to speak with Henry just to mention to him that I would like during the lunch to discuss with him the whole things - I mean SALT questions because it is now entering -- I already gave him our considerations - and since I am going I would like him to look into this.

K: Right.

D: So then the questions about the treaty -- he knows what kind of treaty, then Middle East, Vietnam, and European questions.

K: Right.

D: SALT treaty, Middle East, Vietnam, European questions.

K: Right.

D: Because it will concern with probably within the next summit meeting so I would like to go through - to make it too very long - so to speak with him.

TELCOM

Rabin/Kissinger

9:30 a.m. - 11/1/72

K: Hello.

R: Hello. Good morning.

K: Hello. How are you, Mr. Ambassador?

R: How are you? I'm sorry to bother you with our problems. I've got a small minor problem. The Defense Minister has been invited by the Secretary of State to visit on the 13th of November here. I think it's a good idea if you'll meet him too.

K: Certainly.

R: He prefers, I think, that the meeting will not be off-the-record, but it's up to you.

K: You mean that it's known that he saw me.

R: Yeh.

K: That's all right.

R: All right.

K: But can we announce it afterwards rather than before?

R: Yeh. Yeh. Yeh.

K: All right. OK.

R: I think. Now I'll work it with your office about timing.

K: Well, of course I don't know whether my maniacal Vietnamese clients will be demanding my attention at that time.

R: I see. But let's assume that if it's possible, of course, that you'll meet him.

K: Absolutely.

DECLASSIFIED

Article E01725&
By DAVID DOFSKY

TELCORN

Kay Graham/Kissinger

10:25 a.m. - 11/1/72

K: Hello.

G: Henry.

K: Kay, you're trying to destroy me.

G: Listen I'm not.

K: How dare you call me in the White House.

G: Well, why do you answer it?

K: Because I'm fond of you.

G: (Laughs)

K: You mustn't tempt me like this.

G: Oh, I'm so sorry. Listen consider it another Graham.

K: You notice the power loss on my telephone. There are six taps that go on in addition to the regular one.

G: Oh, no. Not that. Listen, Henry, you know you were kind enough - I looked up November 8th when we were supposed to have our reunion lunch after the election and it's a board meeting. So what I'm proposing is either the day before or the day after.

K: The day before I'll be in California. You mean on the 7th?

G: On the 7th, it's election day.

K: I'll be coming back from California.

G: I see.

K: But if I don't go with the President to Florida after the election.

G: I hope you go and I hope you don't go. From my point of view I hope you don't go.

K: Good. Well, let's say tentatively the 9th.

DECLASSIFIED

Autograph
By DAVID HARDAUGH

2

G: Or Henry, listen

K: Or why don't we say definitely the following Monday because then I'll certainly be back.

G: Listen that's just terrific. Why don't we put it down for that?

K: Because that cannot be - that we cannot miss.

G: All right. Listen, Henry, let me ask you. I'm always asking this awful question. As much as I want to have lunch with you at Sans Souci and greater that I hope to flaunt myself in front of Maxine Cheschire. Is it time to do a working lunch yet or not?

K: You mean with the editors?

G: Yeh. What do I do because I hate like hell not to have you here willing?

K: Would that get out?

G: You know if I have 10 of them I can't ever promise you it won't. I mean, you know they won't use it.

K: No, no, that's all right, but I tell you quite honestly Kay, the feeling here is really of an intensity that's hard to describe.

G: Well just don't do it. Look, and don't take me to Sans Souci. Why don't we have lunch at the *Post*.

K: Why don't we leave it open?

G: Or at home alone. So you don't come in the building.

K: Oh hell, I'm not going to be that neurotic.

G: I don't think you ought to take me to Sans Souci. If the feeling's that strong, what's the use of irritating them.

K: Can we leave it open? Until after victory - magnanamity.

G: Yes. I'm going to write Mr. Ehrlichman because I don't want him to think I'd say asininities such as I hate them at dinner because I do not hate them and I've never said any such thing and we uldn't.

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Act. 1. EOL 12/25/58
By: HARRY MCGISBY

3

K: Yeh.

G: Nor as you know would we attack anybody for such an idiotic reason if I did.

K: Right.

G: And I thought I'd better write John that lest he believes that.

K: I think it'd be a good thing to do and I think, if I may say so, a good thing to do before the election.

G: I'm going to do it today.

K: So that it doesn't look as if, assuming that the polls are right, that this is the aftermath of a victory.

G: Well, I want him very much. Oh well, you know nobody thinks you're going to have anything else but a sweeping victory. But I want him to know that I wouldn't want him to feel that way.

K: Well, I think it would be a good thing to say.

G: I can't believe that I did it myself but I guess I might. Now how can you hate the government or a President. You don't. I mean you may agree or disagree with measures but you don't hate a man who's President. You can't. I mean why should you.

K: No, and I think that after the election we really will have a new situation. I know you wouldn't have acted on that basis anyway.

G: Of course not. Because one knows perfectly what's going to happen, why, you know. I only want to live them and have to. I know I have to. I mean you know it's nothing.

K: Right. Well, I think - I'll do my best to help - I think it'd be a good thing

G: Ask him to pass it along.

K: Good. At any rate let's count on the 13th.

G: Perfect, Henry. I'll put it down and we'll meet anywhere. And thank you so much.

K: I'll look forward to it.

DECLASSIFIED

Audio: E01725f
By: D/A HARVEY GIBSON

TELCONE
President/Kissinger

10:50 a.m. - 11/1/72

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. I'm just working on my radio speech but I wondered if you had anything new to report this morning or is it about where it was?

K: It's about where it was. Thieu popped off again yesterday.

P: I saw that, but I wonder if maybe a line shouldn't go out to him through Bunker saying that he has confidence in the President. How does that sound to you?

K: That's right. I'll get that. He's sick now; he's gone to bed.

P: Yeh.

K: I don't think we'll hear another word out of him now until the election.

P: Well, he's popping for other reasons. You're stuff has played adequately here.

K: Oh, I think it's front page. Now we got the troop issue out.

P: That was a diabolical thing. Very well done.

K: And we got it on CBS; we got it on the TIMES so now no one can say

P: We've got to hold to right to an extent.

K: I think we'll hold to right.

P: You got that impression in talking with

K: We got a long message from the Chinese yesterday.

P: Yeh. What is their view?

K: Well, you know, it's sort of a plaintive message. I read it as saying give us some arguments we can use with the North Vietnamese. They're sort of taking the North Vietnamese side, but in a rather weak way.

RECLASSIFIED

2

P: Well, they're going to work it out. Now I'm working with Price. I worked a lot last night attempting to get this Vietnam thing - I'm trying to get it said in a way that will do everything. It's primarily got to reassure Americans that we're not going to make a bad settlement because of the election.

K: That's right. But we shouldn't imply that what we have now is a bad settlement.

P: No, no, no. I know. I'm saying that we made progress and that a settlement is our goal and so forth. But we've got to say that we're not going to leave any uncertainties with regard to coalition government and so forth.

K: Right.

P: OK. Before it's finished - now that'll be about four o'clock or 4:30 - No, sometime before 3 when Ray gets something ready he'll come over and talk to you about it.

K: I'd love to see it.

P: And before we finish - but I'll do the final work on it myself. He didn't talk to you yesterday; I thought he had. You'd sent the memo to me and I didn't realize that

K: Well, I sent him a copy this morning.

P: I see. Well, anyway it's all worked out now because I got him in and gave him the whole drill and so forth. But if you, as soon as he does call you, work with him a bit.

K: Absolutely.

P: You and I will work on the final thing that goes in the speech about maybe I hope 5 o'clock because I'll have to finish it tonight.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: All right, fine. How're you feeling?

K: I feel fine.

P: Good. I won't call you today unless you have something. I'm in the middle of all these things.

Byron HARVEY GIBSON

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AUTO 012958

3

K: Well, if something comes up I'll come over.

P: Yeh, you can come in. I'm doing the radio speech at 12 and working on the speech and so forth. It's really something- how to run foreign policy and run a campaign.

K: Oh, God.

P: And all this.

K: It's really an enormous strain. The Liberals are now moving to the right.

P: You mean on Vietnam.

K: Yeh.

P: Ah, hell.

K: I saw Schriver said yesterday it was a sellout. But he's insane. I heard Stone had an article today saying - no he was right - he said Hanoi, Moscow and Peking have sold out the Communists in the South.

P: Good.

K: It's a cynical deal by the Communists.

P: That's the stuff. You know some of that'll help us with Thieu.

K: Exactly.

P: Also will help us later on.

K: Alsop has a very good article.

P: Has he?

K: Joe Alsop.

P: Good. Did Buckley ever get a good article?

K: Yeh.

P: Keep rolling Henry. You're going to try to see Chancellor are you?

K: I'm having lunch with Chancellor tomorrow. P: Good.

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TELCONE

Lou Harris/Kissinger

11:08 a.m. - 11/1/72

K: Hello.

H: Hello.

K: Mr. Harris. How are you?

H: Just fine. Congratulations on what has to be a superhuman effort.

K: Well, we haven't finished it yet.

H: No, No.

K: But I wanted you to know that at one point in these talks your polls were very helpful.

H: I'm glad to hear that.
showed
and

K: I asked them your polls early in October/brought home to them that there wasn't much sense waiting.

H: I have, I don't know why but for some reason I get the same feeling from the Russians who come to me. In fact I think it was that first week in October, too, I saw Kirtkof(?) at the UN and another fellow asked me in great detail what they thought my next poll would show; that seemed to be a pivotal one and they wanted to tell Gromyko. I suspect that they had taken quite seriously the McGovern claim that by the 10th of October he would close the race.

K: Yeh. Yeh.

H: Because I think these people are essentially political, you know.

K: Entirely. Well, I wanted you to know that I have been - that your polls really were very helpful in addition to the fact that I read them always with great interest.

H: Thank you very much. I think one interesting thing we found

(Here they were cut off and the call replaced.)

DECLASSIFIED

Advisory E01725f
By: HARRISON D. O'BRIEN

DECLASSIFIED

Autumn 1975

By D. H. McVay

H: I was just saying that the interesting thing was the turnabout on the negotiations with the North Vietnamese which is very interesting because people are - we've been running all year 88% - very high numbers. They were very dubious that any settlement could be reached. I think the sense in America is one that these are very difficult people to deal with; they really want to stretch this out and therefore the greatest sceptism we'd always run into - in fact in June it was 61 to 31 negative marks to the administration for negotiating a settlement in Vietnam. And that turnabout now the 62 to 43 in one weeks time is just incredible.

K: But did that precede my press conference.

H: About three-quarters of the interviewing was before that. That's correct.

K: So that the turnabout really preceded it.

H: To a degree, yes.

K: Because there was a lot of activity there.

H: Oh yes, I think when you went to Saigon for example. Now one of the things that immediately comes through is that the public neither wants a coalition government - that's higher than it's ever been - 48 to 33 opposition. But they also feel that the only way to end the war is to get rid of Thieu, 65% would favor that too.

K: Amazing.

H: They have no use really for either alternatives 100%. In other words, what they feel is that some kind of fair middle ground. And McGovern's mistake has been - and he did it again on Sunday on Meet The Press, I was amazed - so was John Chancellor - was that he somehow has communicated that he wants a lopsided settlement.

K: Yeh.

H: We asked very direct questions - do you think if McGovern were President in settling the war in Vietnam, he would accept terms that were right and honorable for the United States or he'd accept terms that were wrong and not honorable? By 47 to 32 he said he'd accept the wrong terms.

K: Yeh.

H: Now somewhere he has communicated in that preacher way a
sense of we have to feel so guilty about our participation in the
war that it's all right for the North Vietnamese to win. The American
set doesn't want ______ the American people.

K: Yeh.

H: But support for the bombing had fallen off.

K: It has?

H: Yes, sir, some 55 - 32 to 46 - 44. And the reason is people -
that it isn't the impact of the bombing on lives or anything like
that, it's they are more or less convinced that - and this is of
that same period - but the reason is that people were very pragmatic
about this. If it leads to a settlement that's fine; if it doesn't,
it isn't worth it. It's a strange kind of impatience and pragmatism,
you know?

K: Yeh. Yeh.

H: But I would say if it's possible to at least have that meeting before
election day it would be extremely helpful.

K: It's not up to us and I think that's probably what the other side is
figuring, too. And they probably will wait, but I don't know.

H: The only worry I have is that they might - there might be some
feeling that somehow it's becoming unstuck and people want a
settlement here. They're quite convinced, I'm sure, that the terms
are - you know, they trust the President and yourself and are con-
vinced that the terms that you outlined are very fair.
isn't

K: Right. No, we're not holding it up. That is the problem. We are
definitely not the obstacle.

H: Would it be at all possible - the Russians came to me immediately
after your press conference and asked - then they seem to always
be very basic and said "Do you see any change in the results".
Fortunately, my results were coming in that night and I said,

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Autumnal E012258
By DAVID

there's a--no, if anything it's been widened. And they said no chance that this will now reverse. The way I left it with them, was they said it seems to me that they are offering you courteous advice, that the South Vietnamese would be much better advised to had that meeting and settle this as soon as possible from their standpoint. They seemed impressed with that.

K: I think that's right. Well, okay, and I wanted to see you when you are here.

H: Okay. Well, Thank you very much. Is there anything I can do in terms of communicating this--any of this further.

K: Well, I think when you have a chance to make that point again that you just made to me, I think that's certainly well taken.

H: Okay. I'll try to do it. I have a feeling though the Russians want very much for this to come to an end now.

K: I agree with you.

H: Good. Then speaking in behalf of the people we surveyed, I say the American people are highly grateful to you.

K: Aren't you nice.

H: Great.

K: Thank you.

H: Thank you, bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Anonymously E017258

By a HARRY M. ALISBAY

TELCONE

Peter Flanigan/Kissinger

12:02 p.m. - 11/1/72

K: Hello.

F: Henry, Pete.

K: Yeh.

F: On this subject, I'm having a small White House review of the Foreign Service put together with an OMB review that they're doing for Commerce on commercial services. We'd like to have a high level fellow from NSC, preferably not a Foreign Service Officer because this goes well beyond the commercial aspects. . . whether the Foreign Service should be in State or be independent, whether it should include Treasury, Commerce, etc.

K: Let me give some thought whom to put on that.

F: Right. The level will be Ken Dam.

K: Maybe Sonnenfeldt.

F: He's a Foreign Service Officer and he is a little bit chatty and if this thing gets out to the Foreign Service Association, which is a union, we'd be in deep trouble.

K: Let me talk to Haig whom we have who can do this.

F: Great.

K: Thank you.

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Aero. fly 01/25/72
By: H.A. Blythe