16

who can make that kind of contribution. But I have found
in my visits to world capitals, to London and Paris and the
rest, that outside of government there are in other coun-
tries, as there are in the United States, foreign policy
experts who can make a very significant contribution to a
discussion.

I refer, for example, to men like Alistair Buchan
of the London Institute of Strategic Studies. It is this
kind of man that we from time to time, when they are visiting
the United States, whose knowledge we hope to tap.

QUESTION: They would not be on a paid capacity?

MR. NIXON: No, not in a paid capacity. This is
all in terms of simply trying to pick the brains of the best
people in the world.

QUESTION: Dr. Kissinger, you have made a study
of the National Security Council machinery. Can you tell us,
or can you describe this machinery to us in the White House
now, how many people there are, what they do, and how you
are going to change this?

DR. KISSINGER: The President-elect has asked me
to make recommendations to him well before Inauguration, and
I have not at this time. I am not at this time ready to
give you a detailed answer. At this moment, the staff of the
National Security Council is very small, and I am determined

17

to keep it very small.

QUESTION: Can you tell us how many people?

DR. KISSINGER: There are about 20 people, I think.

The major differences that I foresee in the operation of
the National Security Council staff and the White House staff
in Mr. Nixon's Administration is that there will be a much
more conscious emphasis on planning, and that the operating
functions will be pushed as far as possible into the depart-
ments.

Mr. Nixon in all of our talks, if I may repeat that
part of them, urged me to make sure that his staff and his
advisers free themselves for long-term thinking, to prevent
crises from happening rather than spend all of their energies
on managing crises which might have been avoided.

Again, I enthusiastically support that.

MR. NIXON: If I can use one example that members
of the press will appreciate, one statistic that intrigued
me in the study that was made by the planning group that I
referred to was that the amount of cable traffic -- this is
cable traffic from American installations abroad -- that now
comes to the White House each day is more in volume than all
of the wire service and other newspaper reports combined
around the world.

18

When I saw that monumental statistic, it brought me to the point that used to trouble me during the years I was in Government -- the fact that men in positions of responsibility and men who really have the ability to do creative thinking too often get bogged down in reading the interminable telegrams, most of which are not really relevant to the problems that they are concerned with, to dotting "i's" and crossing "t's" and preparing papers to come up the line and then to be approved.

What Dr. Kissinger, was referring to, I didn't want him to get down to the Situation Room in the White House and spend too much time there going through cables and the rest. I want him and the top policy planners, not only here but, of course, in the State Department, to be free as much as possible to do some creative thinking, and to have some creative discussions in these areas.

This, of course, is the objective I am sure every President and every executive has. But based on my experience and based on Dr. Kissinger's having found this particular problem, I think we will make some progress on it.

19

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, Dr. Kissinger is known as a European, North Atlantic specialist. Does this mean you are going to have more emphasis on that part of the world in your administration?

MR. NIXON: You ladies and gentlemen will have noted that during the campaign I emphasized the imperative necessity for the United States to get on the front burner the problems of Western Europe and to strengthen our ties and associations with Western Europe in order to be able to develop effectively what we all want, the position from which we can negotiate the reduction of world tensions in the East-West conflicts.

So, Dr. Kissinger's views and mine are very close together on this point. The answer would be that one of the first responsibilities as far as not only the State Department's policy planning board, but the National Security Council's policy planning board, is to examine our relations with Europe and make recommendations as to how they can be strengthened.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, one of the problems that has been discussed before has been that our main problem is General de Gaulle. Do you feel that way?

MR. NIXON: He may feel that way. Seriously, when we look at the problems of Europe, I don't think they can be

20

summarized and blamed on one man. I think as we examine
what has happened over the past years that we have to take
some blame, we in the broadest sense, the United States, and
all administrations have made some mistakes.

I have often said, and I say it again, I do not
believe that Europe, speaking of Europe as an entity, can go
forward without France. By the same token, I don't believe
France can go forward without Europe. I am confident that
General de Gaulle also has that belief. I think there is a
possibility for a common meeting place someday.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, earlier, in talking about East-West relations as one of the major problems you will face, you talked about up-coming negotiations between the United States and Soviet Union. Could you say what negotiations you are referring to?

MR. NIXON: There are a number of areas. There has been
public discussion, and I will limit my answer to that public
discussion. There has been public discussion with regard to the
possibility of negotiations on the Mid-East crisis and the
offensive-defensive missile system. These are two areas that
I would have in mind.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, you say you do not yet know who
your Secretary of State or Secretary of Defense will be, yet we
have the naming of Dr. Kissinger as your Assistant for National
Security matters. Just what will Dr. Kissinger's standing be

21

within your administration in relation to the Secretary of
Defense and the Secretary of State? Will his opinions carry
equal weight and will he be co-equal?

MR. NIXON: This is a problem that always comes up
with any White House advisor. Any White House advisor to the
President has great responsibility to see to it that in
advising the President he does so without derogating the
primary responsibility of a Cabinet Officer to be the primary
advisor in those areas. I would say that as far as the views
are concerned, naturally the views of Dr. Kissinger will
have great weight with me because he will be on the White House
staff and will be studying these matters. But I see no real
possibility of conflict with the Department of State in this
respect. I think the reason that I do not see that is that
Dr. Kissinger, in the paper I referred to, he and his colleagues
recognized that problem. It is only when an individual on a
White House staff does not recognize the problem that you have
the inevitable competition, empire-building and then the buffer
between the President and his Secretary.

I think you might respond to that, too, Dr. Kissinger,
your role vis-a-vis the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense.

22

DR. KISSINGER. The Secretary of State, as the President-Elect has said, is the principal advisor to the President. I have worked as a consultant in the State Department. I recognize that the operation of our foreign policy can only be conducted through the State Department, and that the White House assistants should not interpose themselves between the President and the Department.

My function as I see it is to make certain that among the range of issues that come before the President, all of the options are considered, that the long range considerations are given adequate weight. But there is no prospect as far as I can see of any competition between myself and the Secretaries of State and Defense. I think we complement each other, and it is my job to help them be more effective.

MR. NIXON: I could add one point on that, just to dissect the problem a bit. All of you who have covered foreign policy know that a traditional battle is always in the wings, and sometimes on stage, between the Planning Board of the National Security Council, or the group of consultants for the National Security Council, the full time staff, and the State Department's Policy Planning Board. What we want to do is not only to strengthen the quality

of the Policy Planning Board and the National Security
Council, but also it is Dr. Kissinger's assignment to do
everything possible, as he indicated in his statement, to
revitalize and to give greater responsibility to the State
Department's Policy Planning Board.

What this really involves is my concern that when
great decisions have to be made over these years ahead, I am
not presented with a paper that represents a consensus, the
least common denominator of what the various departments
are able to negotiate between themselves. Defense and State,
for example, get into these battles from time to time, and
finally they come up with a bland paper that really does
not meet the problem as effectively as it might.

I want to have the conflicts. The honest
differences of opinion which we know do exist between the
departments, or within a department, I want laid before the
National Security Council, and particularly before the
President, so that he will know what the arguments are, so
that he can make the determination as to what the policy
should be.

It is this point that Dr. Kissinger completely
agrees with. I think he, too, is sensitive on the point
of the State Department's Policy Planning Board and the
group in the Defense Department, the necessity of seeing to

24

it that they are part of the team, that they will know
that their input is going to be considered and not brushed
aside and be lost in a maze as eventually the paper comes
up to the President at the highest level as an accomplished
fact, without his considering the arguments that went into
it pro and con.

QUESTION: Mr. Nixon, will Dr. Kissinger begin functioning full time immediately, and will he have any liaison with Walter Rostow?

MR. NIXON. The answer is yes to both questions.
His first assignment will be to go to Washington I hope
immediately. Incidentally, Walter Rostow has been most
cooperative in offering his assistance in this assignment.
He will go there for the purpose, of course, of examining
the staff facilities, and for talking with Dr. Rostow on
the organizational problems. Over the next three to four
weeks he will continue the study that has already been
initiated with regard to the staff, the organization of the
NSC and the other responsibilities that he will have.

Then he will make those recommendations to the
President-elect prior to the Inauguration, so that on
January 20th we will be able to go forward with the new
organization plan.

In addition to that, he will be available to me

25

over these next few weeks to advise me on substantive
matters if I believe that such advice is needed.

I should also point out this. Dr. Kissinger's
assignment in no way is in conflict with that of Ambassador
Murphy. Ambassador Murphy between now and January 20th will
continue to be the President-Elect's representative in the
State Department, and with President Johnson on matters that
the President-Elect should be informed of or consulted on
prior to January 20th.

MR. ZIEGLER. Could we just take one more question?

QUESTION. Do you expect to have a task force
between now and the Inauguration to advise you on foreign
policy, comparable to the ten that you have already
appointed on domestic affairs?

MR. NIXON: Dr. Kissinger will be making a
recommendation to me on that. I think it is possible that
there will be. But I think there is very likely to be
more than one in the field of foreign policy, that is,
more than one task force.

MR. CORMIER: Thank you very much.

10:50 AM

END

[LC]

### 3rd Nixon-Brezhnev Meeting

Richard M. Nixon flew to Moscow June 27, 1974 for his third summit meeting with Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev.

Minor accords. In a gesture that broke protocol, Brezhnev met Nixon at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport on the latter's arrival June 27 for a series of meetings that, according to observers, produced no major agreements. Three nuclear accords were considered minor.

With Brezhnev at the airport to meet President and Mrs. Nixon were Soviet President Nikolai V. Podgorny and Premier Alexei N. Kosygin. Also in the welcoming delegation was Culture Minister Yekaterina Furtseva, participating in her first public ceremony since being dropped from the Supreme Soviet June 19.

Brezhnev and Nixon issued a joint statement June 27 in which they pledged to make their negotiations serve "the strengthening of universal peace." In dinner speeches that night, they lauded the improvement in Soviet-U.S. relations in recent years. Brezhnev noted resistance to progress in improving relations, however, from "those who oppose international detente, who favor whipping up the arms race and returning to the methods of the cold war."

Nixon and Brezhnev began their formal talks in Moscow June 28, after the President paid a morning visit to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. Three agreements emerged from the day's negotiations: a five-year housing accord calling for exchange of information and experts and for future joint projects in the housing and construction fields, with emphasis on residential building in earthquake-prone zones; a five-year energy accord calling for a range of joint scientific and technological research and development programs in non-nuclear forms of energy and related subjects such as environment and conservation; and a three-year medical research accord calling for cooperation in improvement in the design of synthetic cardiac valves and for development of artificial hearts. None of the three agreements were of major significance; they merely complemented already-existing accords signed in 1972.

A 10-year economic agreement was signed June 29, calling on Moscow and Washington to facilitate trade and

improve working conditions for trade representatives. Like the accords signed June 28, it augmented 1972 agreements.

Nixon, Brezhnev and their entourages, including Secretary of State Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, flew to Yalta, the Crimean Black Sea resort, where talks continued June 29-30. The White House had originally opposed the trip because of the connotations and associations such a visit would have with the 1945 "Big Three" Yalta conference which had been denounced by many, including Nixon.

Because Moscow had already carried out extensive preparations for the visit, the President's party acceded to the trip, insisting, however, on referring to the site as Oreanda, the precise location, although Oreanda was itself part of greater Yalta. Soviet reports were deferentially datelined either "Oreanda" or "from the Crimean press center"; Western reports were consistently datelined "Yalta."

The President July 1 flew to Minsk, the capital of Byelorussia, where he visited two World War II memorials. Brezhnev, Gromyko, Kissinger and other officials returned to Moscow from Yalta for further talks.

Nixon and Brezhnev continued their talks in Moscow July 2. In a television address delivered to the Soviet people that day, Nixon noted the "dramatic change in the nature of the relationship between our two countries" in the past two years, but observed that "we have many difficulties yet to be overcome."

In a farewell dinner speech that evening, Brezhnev revealed that the three partial nuclear accords had been reached. A communique issued in Moscow July 3 before the President's departure took note of other areas in which agreements had been made: environmental protection, space ventures, transportation innovations, cultural exchanges and the establishment of new consulates.

**Nixon stresses personal relations**—In his dinner addresses June 27 and July 2, President Nixon underscored the "personal" basis on which Soviet-U.S. negotiations were conducted and the vital role of "personal relationships" in the evolution of detente. In his June 27 speech, Nixon said previous Soviet-U.S. agreements had been possible "because of a

Facts on File Book:

KISSINGER & DETENTE

D

pe
ar
H
co
fr

to
div
the
ner
two
did
Nix
kn
of
co
per
tor
to
thu
det

the
Jun
ne
the
wh
"Bri
Nix
ab
[th
ma
int
Ta
28
al

ag
by
re
th
bro
th
pe
ter
ne
co
for
ag
go
M
es
an

DETENTE ADVANCES: 1972-74

169

personal relationship that was established between the general secretary [Brezhnev] and the President of the United States." He stated July 2 that "our differences . . . could never be solved unless we met as friends."

Brezhnev, for his part, was less inclined to balance detente on the shoulders of individuals. While he too, in his addresses at the Moscow welcome and farewell dinners, noted the good personal relations between himself and the President, Brezhnev did not repeat the theme as forcefully as Nixon. Observers viewed this as an acknowledgement of the collective structure of the Soviet leadership, which would discourage founding detente on individual personal relations. Moscow and Washington sources also saw it as an indication that Moscow was not anxious to link detente to a President whose viability was undermined by the threat of impeachment.

A brief controversy arose June 28 over the official Soviet translation of Nixon's June 27 speech. As published in the Soviet newspapers, the Tass translation omitted the word "personal" from a phrase in which it had been used by the President: "Because of our personal relationship," Nixon had said, "there is no question about our will to keep these agreements [that had been made in the past] and to make more where they are in our mutual interest."

Leonid Zamyatin, director general of Tass, the Soviet news agency, denied June 28 that there was any significance to the alteration of the text.

**Nuclear & other accords**—The minor agreements on nuclear arms were signed by Nixon and Brezhnev July 3. In first revealing them July 2, Brezhnev had said that the accords “could have been broader.”

Kissinger had conceded June 28 that the impact of Watergate and impeachment efforts would hamper attempts by Nixon to exert leadership in the negotiations. In a Moscow press conference July 3, Kissinger laid blame for failure to achieve more substantial agreements on factionalism within both governments: "Both [Washington and Moscow] have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint, and that does not come easily to either

side." Kissinger and U.S. Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger had expressed contrasting views on the issue of limiting nuclear arms.

Nixon and Brezhnev signed a communique committing their countries to negotiate a new interim accord dealing with both quantitative and qualitative limitations of strategic nuclear arms to cover the period until 1985. The present interim agreement, signed in 1972, was due to expire in 1977.

In a separate treaty and protocol, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed not to conduct any underground nuclear weapons test with a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (more than seven times the power of the bomb used over Hiroshima, Japan in 1945). U.S. officials said the level was far above what either side considered necessary for most tests. The treaty, which did not cover underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, was to become effective March 31, 1976.

A second protocol limited each side to a single area for deployment of antibalístic missile (ABM) systems. The 1972 ABM treaty had allowed both countries two such areas, but officials confirmed that neither side intended to avail itself of the option to maintain the second.

**Other instruments included:**

A joint statement in which the two sides agreed to begin discussions on controlling the use of environment-modification techniques, including climate modification, for military purposes;

Two secret protocols, to be submitted to U.S. Congressional leaders, on the dismantling and replacement of missiles under provisions of the 1972 defensive missile treaty and interim accord on offensive arms. Kissinger said they were made secret at the request of the Soviet Union, but that "they break no new ground, they change no provisions";

An unwritten agreement in principle by Brezhnev to permit on-site inspection of explosions carried out for peaceful purposes. The signed treaty limiting underground tests called only for the use of "national means of verification" and the exchange of various data on the conduct of the tests.

**Soviets arrest dissident Jews.** More than 50 Jews were arrested in Moscow,

170

KISSINGER & DETENTE

Leningrad, Odessa and Kishinev June 21-24 in an apparent effort to forestall demonstrations during President Nixon's visit to the Soviet Union. Among those arrested June 21 were Drs. Viktor Brailovsky, Mark Azbel and Alexander Voronel, prominent scientists who were organizers of a scientific meeting planned for July to support Jewish scientists excluded from work in the Soviet Union.

**Nixon bars emigration role**—Before his trip, Nixon had stressed in a commencement speech at the Naval Academy June 5 that “we cannot gear our foreign policy to the transformation of other societies.” In an apparent allusion to the effort in the Senate to withhold trade favors from the Soviet Union unless its curbs on Jewish emigration were removed, Nixon said, “Eloquent appeals are now being made for the United States, through its foreign policy, to transform the internal as well as the international behavior of other countries, especially the Sóviet Union.” And while foreign policy “must respect our ideals and ... reflect our purposes,” he said, there were limits to what could be achieved.

"Not by our choice but by our capability," he said, "our primary concern in foreign policy must be to help influence the international conduct of nations in the world arena. We would not welcome the intervention of other countries in our domestic affairs, and we cannot expect them to be cooperative when we work to intervene in theirs.... In the nuclear age, our first responsibility must be the prevention of a war that could destroy all society."

We must recognize, the President told the graduates at Annapolis, that "we are more faithful to our ideals by being concerned with results, and we achieve more results through diplomatic action than through hundreds of eloquent speeches."

**Kissinger got pledge**—Kissinger was reported to have received assurances from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko that the restrictions on Jewish emigration would be eased. The report emerged from a meeting Kissinger held June 5 with Sens. Henry M. Jackson (D, Wash.), Jacob K. Javits (R, N.Y.) and Abraham Ribicoff (D, Conn.) to discuss Jackson's amendment tying the trade curbs to the Jewish emigration issue.

**Telecasts on dissidents blacked out**—Moscow cut off the TV broadcasts of three major U.S. networks July 2 as American correspondents tried to send filmed reports on Soviet dissident activities. Two of the broadcasts included interviews with physicist Andrei Sakharov who had begun a hunger strike on behalf of political prisoners June 29.

Despite several attempts to broadcast explanations of the interruptions as well as the reports themselves, the networks were each time blacked out within seconds.

A White House spokesman said: "It is the White House position that the networks should be able to send anything they wish." He said the White House would protest the action "if the networks wish it."

A CBS correspondent asserted that the Soviet action appeared to be in violation of an agreement that Moscow would allow transmission of any and all news relating to the summit meeting.

Valentina Zheleznova, a Soviet television official, took the position that the telecasts had no relation to the President's visit. Before the evening's broadcasting began, she had warned an ABC producer that the technicians did not like "the anti-Soviet material" being prepared and said they would refuse to transmit it.

## President Nixon Visits NATO Headquarters and the Soviet Union

President Nixon left Washington on June 25 for a visit to Belgium and the Soviet Union. While in Brussels June 25-27, he met with NATO heads of government and signed the Declaration on Atlantic Relations. In the Soviet Union June 27-July 3, he met with Soviet leaders, signed several agreements, and addressed the Soviet people on television and radio. Following are his remarks upon departure on June 25, his exchanges of remarks with foreign leaders, his address to the Soviet people, his report to the Nation upon his arrival in the United States on July 3, and remarks to the press at Brussels by Presidential Assistant and Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler, together with the texts of a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on dangers of military use of environmental modification techniques and a joint communique signed at Moscow on July 3.

### PRESIDENT NIXON'S DEPARTURE REMARKS, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, JUNE 25

White House press release dated June 25

Members of the Cabinet, members of the diplomatic corps, and ladies and gentlemen: I first want to express my appreciation to all of you for taking the time to come off to see us as we take off on another journey for peace. This time we go first to Brussels, as you know, and then to Moscow.

Our purpose in Brussels will be to meet with old friends and to renew our support of the great NATO alliance, which for 25 years has been responsible for and indispensable for keeping the peace in Europe. We expect to give new purpose and new direction to that alliance on the occasion of visiting with the heads of government of most of the NATO countries.

From Brussels, we go on to Moscow. There we shall have the opportunity to meet again with General Secretary Brezhnev and his colleagues. The purpose of this summit

meeting, as was the purpose of the other two—the first in Moscow two years ago, and in Washington and in other parts of the United States last year—is threefold:

- First, we expect to strengthen the bilateral relations between the two strongest nations in the world;

- Second, we hope to develop areas of cooperation to displace confrontation in other critical areas of the world that might be those places where conflict could develop between the two great powers; and

- Third, we hope to make more progress on a goal that we began to achieve and move forward toward in 1972, of limiting both the burden and also the threat of nuclear arms over our two nations and over the world generally.

These are very great goals, and like all great goals they are very difficult to achieve, just as was the case of the goals we sought to achieve on our first trip to the Mideast. But we are confident that when we look at

July 29, 1974

165

these goals, not only must we seek to achieve them but we believe that we can achieve them, because when we speak of the two strongest nations, the Soviet Union and the United States, cooperation between these two great peoples is indispensable if we are to build a structure of peace in the world that will last.

And we know that with American strength, American resolve, and above all, American determination and dedication, that we will be able to make progress on this long but vitally important journey for peace, not only for America but for all mankind.

And we have appreciated particularly the messages that we have received before each of these trips from people all over America, because your prayers, your good wishes for our success, means that the American people, the great majority, are united behind the efforts we are making to attempt to resolve differences that otherwise would lead to a runaway arms race, that otherwise would lead to confrontation not only between two great powers but all over the world, that otherwise would dash all the hopes and the ideals that Americans have had from the beginning of this country—the ideal of a world of peace so that we can devote the energies of all great peoples to the works of peace and not simply to preparing for war.

Thank you.

## THE VISIT TO BELGIUM

### ARRIVAL, BRUSSELS, JUNE 25

White House press release (Brussels) dated June 25

### Remarks by King Baudouin

Mr. President: Because Belgium has for several years been the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, during which time it has also been the host of the European Communities, it is my duty and pleasure to welcome you again this evening on the soil of my country.

You have just completed a tour in the

Middle East in the course of which happy results of untiring diplomacy have been confirmed. We all hope that the efforts made will be the prelude to final peace in that region.

In two days' time you will be in Moscow, where you will carry on conversations the outcome of which is important for us all. Before starting them, you have desired not only to come here to sign the Ottawa Declaration of Atlantic Relations, which again precisely states our convergent objectives, but also to make confident contacts with the heads of the governments of friendly and allied nations in order to explain your views and obtain their opinions.

We are delighted with the action you have taken. It shows once more that however much times may change, there is still between our peoples the same fundamental understanding based on so many common memories, and so many peaceful contests or deplorably cruel battles waged side by side, and on faith in the same essential values.

Mr. President, throughout the world men feel increasingly bound together by the same destiny. We know that they eagerly wish hostilities to cease, tensions to be reduced, and a just and lasting peace to be established.

We wish you and Mrs. Nixon a cordial welcome and express our hopes for the success of the work we shall carry out together.

### Remarks by President Nixon

Your Majesty, Mr. Secretary, and all of our distinguished guests: Your Majesty, I wish to express our grateful appreciation for your gracious welcome and also for your eloquent words with regard to the hopes we all share for building a structure of peace in the world.

And it is indeed an honor for me to join with my colleagues in the Atlantic alliance in tomorrow reaffirming our dedication to the great principles of that alliance. We must all recognize that the Atlantic alliance has been indispensable in keeping

166

Department of State Bulletin

the peace in Europe for the past 25 years.

As you have noted, this visit to Brussels comes midway between two other visits, the first to the Mideast and the next to the Soviet Union. It is significant that this is the case, because this symbolizes the central role that the Atlantic alliance plays in pursuing our goal of a lasting peace in the world. Without the alliance, it is doubtful that the détente would have begun, and without continuing a strong alliance, it is doubtful if the détente would continue.

It is also very significant that this meeting will take place in Brussels, now the capital of Europe, and in Belgium, a nation which has suffered so much in two world wars. And I am sure that all of those attending the meeting tomorrow will have in their hearts these sentiments that we wish that whatever we do there and whatever decisions we make and whatever we say may contribute to the goal we seek, not only for each of our own countries, but for all nations in the world, a peace that will last.

Remarks by Joseph Luns,
Secretary General of NATO

Your Majesties, Mr. President: It is with very great pleasure that I welcome you, Mr. President, on your arrival in Brussels for the forthcoming high-level meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

It is five years since you last sat in the Council that was in Washington. Then you spoke of entering into negotiations with the Soviet Union on a wide range of issues on the basis of full consultation and cooperation with American allies.

In the five intervening years, aided by your distinguished Secretary of State, you have given dramatic effect to that policy.

As His Majesty has just remarked, you come from the Middle East, where your journey has opened new prospects for the future in that area and for the world at large. You go on to Moscow to take one more step along the road of negotiation with the Soviet Union.

Tomorrow you will consult with your

friends and allies and sign with them the Declaration on Atlantic Relations. Your visit will once again mark a page in the history of the Council and of our alliance.

LUNCHEON HONORING NATO LEADERS,
BRUSSELS, JUNE 26

White House press release (Brussels) dated June 26

Toast by King Baudouin ¹

Mr. President, Your Excellencies the heads of governments, and gentlemen: It is a great pleasure for me cordially to welcome you to Brussels, the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

You have this morning signed the important declaration which the Atlantic Council approved a few days ago at Ottawa and have thus, on the occasion of its 25th anniversary, drawn attention to the youth and vigor and cohesion of the alliance.

On April the 4th, 1949, President Truman declared when the Washington treaty was signed that:

> For us, war is not inevitable. We do not believe that there are blind tides of history which sweep men one way or the other. . . . Men with courage and vision can still determine their own destiny.

We today, who no longer feel afraid, can estimate how much the situation has changed. What was happening 25 years ago now appears to be as far behind us as would the events of a period we had not lived through.

The panic in which our defense was hastily set up so that we might survive has given way to a feeling of security which goes so far as to make us skeptical about the existence of any danger.

By their determination and by the choices they made, the men with vision of whom Mr. Truman spoke have allowed our younger people to have no experience of war. They have also rejected the old rules of political action, under which fixed purpose often took the place of law and power that of ethics.

¹ King Baudouin began his toast in French and concluded in English.

July 29, 1974

167

By entering into a system of collective
defense, Belgium has made a fundamental
option in order to avoid a recurrence of the
wars which twice within 35 years had rav-
aged the country, to participate in the quest
for a lasting peace, and to foster the con-
struction of a united Europe.

Owing to the safeguard provided by the
solidarity and indivisibility of our defense,
it is possible to conduct a policy whose pri-
mary objective is peace and, more particu-
larly in Europe, the pursuit of understand-
ing and cooperation with all the countries
of the continent.

To be sure, the alliance is not altogether
identical with defense; since a few years
ago, a correlation has been established be-
tween the notions of defense and détente.
They had until then been separate.

Defense, for its own sake, seemed to ex-
clude détente. The outcome of détente seemed
to be to destroy defense. Since then, the
delicate threads which bind them together
and strengthen the significance of them both
have been grasped.

Without defense, there can be no equilibri-
um of forces, and no coexistence is possible.
Without détente, there can be no progress
toward peaceful solutions. The Atlantic
Treaty, which is an instrument of security,
thus appears as a combination of forces
tending to peace.

Belgium, moreover, has always hoped that,
in the spirit of friendship and solidarity
which ought to mark the relations between
allies, the progress made as regards the po-
litical unification of Europe should favor
the establishment of a transatlantic dialogue
between two equal partners.

The idea is, in any case, recognized by
all, since in the Ottawa Declaration we wel-
comed the beneficial effect that the further
stages toward unity which the member states
of the European Community are determined
to pass through will have for the Atlantic al-
liance.

From Belgium's point of view the two
choices—European and Atlantic—are com-
plementary. Without the achievement of a
genuine European union on the political level,

the European states and the European Com-
munity will be unable to assume the respon-
sibility imposed on them by their economic
success.

Unless they speak with one voice, how
can they play a part in diplomacy, make
original contributions to more equitable re-
lations between the industrialized states and
those that are trying to develop, and finally,
uphold the essential democratic values?

The assertion of that European identity
will foster more thorough cooperation and
will give the transatlantic dialogue the na-
ture of a conversation between equal part-
ners who take care to show respect for each
other and are united in a joint venture.

The alliance is permanently confronted
with the internal problems of states, the
loosening of bonds, and the weariness of
efforts. But, due to Western solidarity and
to the habit of living together, it may be
stated—and seems rather paradoxical—that
after adding up the problems before it the
alliance has always been in better health
than might have been feared.

Of course, the alliance is challenged, and
if it were not, anxiety would have to be felt
about its vitality. No viable and active in-
stitution fails to make headway between the
pressures of opposing forces.

Twenty-five years after its establishment,
the governments have confirmed the com-
mitments entered into and have placed them
in the context of the new requirements. After
having justified its existence in the past,
the alliance remains one of the guarantees
of our future.

It is with a thought to that future that I
request you to join me in raising your glasses
to our continued cooperation.

## Toast by President Nixon

Your Majesty, my colleagues from the At-
lantic community and distinguished guests:
Your Majesty, we are all most grateful for
your eloquent remarks, and we can think
of no more appropriate place or time in
which to celebrate what in effect is an an-
niversary.

168

Department of State Bulletin

As I stand in this place, I think back five
years when you so graciously hosted a lunch-
eon on my first visit to NATO. I think back
over what has happened over those five
years. It is perhaps safe to say that more
profound changes have occurred in the world
in those five years than have occurred in
any peacetime period in this century.

There has been the opening of a dialogue
between the United States, as well as other
nations, but between the United States, and
the People's Republic of China, where one-
fourth of all the world's people live. We
have substituted for a period of confronta-
tion with the Soviet Union a period of nego-
tiation, and other nations as well in the
European and Atlantic community have done
so.

The very long and difficult war in Viet-
Nam has ended, and most recently, develop-
ments have occurred in the Mideast which,
while only a first step, are nevertheless a
most hopeful step toward a goal that every
nation around this table represented has
an interest in—the goal of a permanent and
just peace in that critically important part
of the world.

And as we look over those five years of
developments, we of course can see how much
the world has changed. We also can see
how much the world can change and be
changed in the future, provided we continue
the strength, the purpose, of this great al-
liance without which most of these great
initiatives could not have been undertaken
and would not have succeeded.

Today in the brief talks I have had with
some of my colleagues in the Atlantic com-
munity and also in the meeting this morning
—the plenary session—I have heard raised,
very justifiably, the issues that are on the
minds of every leader in the industrial, more
advanced nations of the world today: the
problem of inflation, the problem of energy,
the problem of international monetary mat-
ters, balance of payments, economic prob-
lems generally.

And, of course, all of us are recognizing
the fact that in various nations, in addition
to economic problems, there are the continu-

ing political problems which will always be
present in free societies.

If we look at those problems that we pres-
ently confront, by themselves—and at the
moment—they seem overwhelming. But to-
day, around this table, we can be thankful
that the problems we face today, as dis-
tinguished from five years ago, are primarily
the problems of peace rather than the prob-
lems of war. And this is progress.

It is progress, although it does not mean
that the task we have as leaders is easier,
because in fact it is more difficult—more
difficult because peace is not something that
is achieved at a certain time and then signed
and sealed by a treaty which brings it into
being.

Peace is a process in which agreements
and treaties and understandings must con-
tinually be made and continually be reaf-
firmed, whereas in the case of war, once it
ends then peace in the sense of absence of
war begins as the result of the signing of
a document or some other kind of agreement.

And so to those gathered here on this
historic occasion, I recognize, as all of you
recognize, that the challenges that we con-
front today in building a structure of peace
are as great in their way and in some ways
more great, because they are more complex,
than the challenges of leading nations in
war.

This is an anniversary, a 25th anniver-
sary, and usually we think of an anniver-
sary as an end of an era; this, I think, we
would all rather think of as the beginning
of an era. This great alliance in its first
25 years came into being and was indis-
pensable for the purpose of saving freedom
and preserving the peace in Europe. This
alliance for the next 25 years will have a
greater goal and a broader one of preserv-
ing freedom wherever it exists but also of
building a structure of peace not only for
Europe and the Atlantic community but
for all the world. This is a great goal for
an alliance, and it is a great goal to which
all of us as leaders can be proud that we are
dedicated to it.

I think, for example, back 15 years when

July 29, 1974

169

a very young, but very wise, king addressed
a joint session of the Congress of the United
States, when I was then—I thought I was—
a young Vice President presiding along with
the Speaker over that session. And I re-
member well what he said. He said that it
takes 20 years of peace or more to make
a man. It takes only 20 seconds of war
to destroy him.

And so when we think of peace we are
thinking not only of ourselves—looking back
on the years we have been privileged to
serve our nations—but we are thinking of
generation upon generation of young people
all over this world, young people who have
not known a full generation of peace in this
century, young people who live in nations
who share totally different philosophies from
ours, but young people with the idealism,
with the hopes, with the drive that is so
characteristic of youth wherever they are in
whatever nation anyplace in the world.

And we, in this great community of ours,
can be proud that for the past 25 years we
have served the cause of preserving peace.
For the next 25 years we can broaden that
cause, as I have indicated, to serve the
cause of peace not only for Europe and
the Atlantic community but for all mankind.

When I spoke at the beginning of the
new relationships that have been developed
between the People's Republic of China and,
for example, the United States, between the
Soviet Union, where I will be tomorrow, and
the United States, I did not intend to leave
with this distinguished company, or any
others who may listen to these words, any
illusions.

We live in a world where there are still
deep and basic differences about philosophy.
We live in a world, however, where whatever
those differences are, statesmen must find
ways to solve them without resorting to the
use of force that could destroy civilization
as we know it.

When we negotiate, for example, with the
Soviet leaders, we can and will negotiate
on such matters as arms control, on troops,
on European security, on trade, on health,
on the environment, on energy. But there

is one thing that is not negotiable, and that
is the great principles that are the founda-
tion of the Atlantic community, principles of
freedom, of justice, principles which we have
inherited in many instances, and some have
acquired, but principles which we deeply
believe in, must be defended and, we trust,
preserved for generations to come.

That does not mean to suggest that those
we negotiate with will not have the same
determination to stand by their philosophies
and their principles as we will by ours.

What it simply does mean is this: that in
the world in which we live, with the nuclear
power that overhangs it, there is no alter-
native to peace, there is no alternative to
negotiation.

And you can be sure that, as far as we
are concerned, we not only will consult with
our allies in this great alliance before but
also afterward, to make sure that our nego-
tiations serve not only the cause of peace
but also the cause of freedom and every-
thing it means to those who are privileged
to be members of this great alliance.

Your Majesty, we are grateful for the
hospitality that you have extended to all of
us who are members of this community, and
consequently, it is for me a very great honor
on behalf of all of my colleagues in the At-
lantic community to respond to your remarks
and to propose a toast. But before doing
so, I should like to add one word about the
sometimes unsung heroes in this whole area
of negotiations, communique, declarations,
and the rest.

When history is written many years from
now, it may well be said—it probably will
be said—that the leaders of nations were
the architects of peace. That may be true;
it may not be true. But of this I am sure,
and every one of my colleagues in a position
of head of a government I am sure will
agree: While the leaders and the heads of
government may be the architects of peace,
the builders of peace are their ministers, the
foreign ministers, and all of the others
around this table who devote their lives to
the art of diplomacy, to carrying out what-
ever programs or policies will contribute to

170

Department of State Bulletin

a goal of peace for not only our time but
for all times to come.

And so then, on behalf not only of my
colleagues the architects, but also on behalf
of all those who are here, the builders of
this new world which we trust will be a
world of peace, I ask you to raise your
glasses to our host, His Majesty the King:
To the King.

REMARKS BY PRESS SECRETARY ZIEGLER 2

The President was pleased and impressed
this morning with the discussions of the
North Atlantic Council. All of the delegates
in various ways spoke of the vitality of the
alliance, of the continued need of a strong
common defense while we pursue better
East-West relations.

President Nixon found the general har-
mony of views expressed in the NATO Coun-
cil this morning most gratifying. He wel-
comed the support around the table to full
and frank consultation on all issues in which
the interest of the allies are involved.

President Nixon also noted with interest,
as did others who attended the meeting this
morning, the remarks of Chancellor [of the
Federal Republic of Germany Helmut]
Schmidt regarding the importance of eco-
nomic problems that the NATO countries are
facing. The President, incidentally, also re-
ferred to this matter, which I will get into
in a moment, in his own remarks.

President Nixon appreciated the positive
comments around the table as each represen-
tative spoke concerning the role that he
had played and that Secretary Kissinger
played in the Middle East negotiations and
also the expressions of confidence and sup-
port for our policies in East-West issues on
the eve of the Moscow summit.

The President began his remarks follow-
ing Secretary Luns' opening comments at
about 10 minutes after 10. He spoke for
about 25 minutes. We will not provide a

text of the President's remarks, because this
was of course a consulting session and a
private session, but I will provide to you
at this time the general framework of what
the President said to the NATO Council and
generally the President's views regarding
the declaration that was signed today.³

In President Nixon's remarks to the Coun-
cil, the President, of course, welcomed the
signing of the declaration in this 25th anni-
versary year of the alliance, stating to the
Council that it lays the groundwork for an-
other quarter century of Atlantic coopera-
tion, solidarity, and security. And the Pres-
ident pointed out that the declaration forms
the foundation for even a brighter future.

The President pointed out that the dec-
laration signifies that as NATO enters its
second quarter century, the alliance stands
stronger and more united than ever before.

In his opening remarks to the Council,
the President made the point, which has
been made before, that the world we face
in 1974 is, of course, very different from
the world of 1949. At that time, the Presi-
dent said, peace was in serious jeopardy and
the sovereignty of many of the nations of
Europe was in jeopardy. The prime need,
the President went on to say, was for unity
in the common defense so that a period of
rebuilding could go forward.

Today, he said that the very success of
NATO over the last 25 years provides the
security for the pursuit of national, regional,
and global interest but there is no less a
need for security and no less a need for
unity in pursuing our common objectives.

Indeed, the President pointed out, it is
more important than ever to keep before us
the recognition of our common objectives, re-
ferring to the alliance, as to reconcile our
interests as individual nations with our in-
terests as allies.

Again, referring to the document signed
today, the President pointed out that it
demonstrates recognition by all members

³ Made at a news conference at Brussels on June 26 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated July 8).

For text of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted by the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Ottawa on June 19, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1974, p. 42.

July 29, 1974

171

that if we are to successfully pursue our in-
dividual national interests, again referring
to the alliance, then we must do so in essen-
tial harmony and, above all, remain united
in the common defense of every member of
the alliance.

The President also discussed the signifi-
cance of the declaration signed today in the
context both of his forthcoming visit to the
Soviet Union and his recent visit to the
Middle East.

The President, again referring to the dec-
laration, noted that the declaration reaffirms
the foremost purpose of the alliance: that
of assuring the common defense. He em-
phasized the importance of each alliance
member devoting the efforts and resources
necessary to maintain NATO forces at the
proper strength.

He said that, for the U.S. part, that he
would again, and did, renew our pledge that
the United States will maintain and improve
our forces in Europe if there is a similar
effort by our allies and the United States
will not reduce forces unless there is a recip-
rocal action by the other side.

The President pointed out that reductions
in conventional forces in Europe can have
repercussions far out of proportion to the
number of men involved and the amount
of money saved. They can set into motion,
the President said, a chain of reductions
whose consequences could be tragic, and went
on to make the point that the price of peace
is continued strength.

He said that defense and détente are es-
sential to each other and that only by
strengthening détente can we eventually re-
duce the defense burden our people must now
support, of course, addressing the NATO
conference and referring to the nations in-
volved.

Beyond that, he said the United States is
encouraged by the direction and pace of
recent efforts, as reflected in the declaration,
to give fresh impetus to NATO's partner-
ship.

In particular, he cited the recognition
given to the importance of meaningful con-
sultations to the work of the alliance, and
he indicated the U.S. full preparedness to

consult on matters of alliance interest.

He pointed out and reiterated the position
that Secretary Kissinger stated in Ottawa,
and again recently in his press conference:
that consultation should not be viewed as
a legally binding obligation.

That is not the purpose of the declaration;
rather, it is to symbolize a spirit of coopera-
tion within the alliance which the United
States hopes will grow into a recognition
that no member of the alliance should con-
sider taking any actions or action affecting
the alliance without seeking the support and
understanding of its members.

He went on to point out—and I am not
directly quoting the President, but para-
phrasing—that while it is true that the legal
obligations of the alliance are confined geo-
graphically, events that occur outside the
formal area of obligations can affect us
all.

This is a point that Secretary Kissinger,
as you recall, made in Ottawa, and the
United States recognizes this reality and
affirms today our determination to consult
fully on all matters which affect the interest
of the allies. I call your attention again to
Secretary Kissinger's comments and also the
pool report last night where reference was
made to this point.

The President also said—and this is recog-
nized in the declaration of our common de-
fense and political association—that these
elements of the common defense and political
association must be sustained by cooperative
and constructive economic relations.

He said that the United States will ap-
proach economic issues in a spirit of friend-
ship and in the conviction that the common
goal is to benefit all peoples and those of
the world at large, including the less devel-
oped countries.

A few more concluding comments—the
President in his remarks emphasized the im-
portance of the alliance to the efforts being
made toward greater international peace and
stability, and in this context he cited the
importance of the new declaration to the
current efforts being made to ease East-West
tensions and to improve relations with the
Soviet Union.

172

Department of State Bulletin

Western cohesion, the President said, provides the basis on which the policy of détente can be conducted in the common interest. He noted, for example, the opportunities to bring the arms race under control and to build a network of East-West cooperative agreements contributing to mutual restraint and expanded contacts between peoples and said that the meeting today of the NATO Council provides significant evidence of Western solidarity and forms a vital backdrop for the upcoming summit in Moscow.

In discussing the upcoming Moscow summit, the President made reference, of course, to the extensive briefing that Secretary of State Kissinger provided to the Foreign Ministers in Ottawa and spoke in general and long-range terms about the summit. Addressing the summit specifically, the President told the Council that he felt there were three aspects to the Moscow summit. He said that we will exchange views on, of course, the major international issues and that we will have an extensive review of the entire state of our bilateral relations. He said that he expects that a number of agreements will be signed in various cooperative areas and that there was difficult negotiating ahead in relation to arms control, but that he hoped there would be progress also in that area.

He discussed each of these categories, of course, in more detail than I am providing.

In reference to détente and what détente means to the alliance and what détente means to the United States, he said that it gives us a chance to try to bring the nuclear arms race under control before it can get out of hand.

Secondly, he said it creates an environment in which problems ranging from energy to peace can be addressed outside the context of bipolar confrontation, and third, it builds up a network of East-West trade and cooperative agreements that should reenforce mutual restraint and may gradually ameliorate conditions in the East.

In discussing also the upcoming Soviet talks, the President assured the NATO Council that the United States would continue

to consult fully and again made reference to the fact that Secretary Kissinger will return to Brussels on July 4 to consult with our allies.

In discussing the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the mutual balanced force reduction and all other issues in which the interests of our allies are engaged, such as strategic arms limitation talks, he said that American positions will continue to be developed in full consultation and in concert with our allies. He made a point of emphasizing that we will never sacrifice the interest of our allies to achieve agreements.

He talked then, in concluding his remarks, about the Middle East and the recent Middle East trip. He pointed out that the recent crisis there and the first tentative steps toward its resolution have provided the clearest possible demonstration that all of us have a stake in maintaining peace outside our own boundaries, of course referring to the countries present in the NATO Council.

He said that because of its unique position—referring to the United States—and the desires of the parties in the area, the United States must continue to play a central role and will continue to play a central role in the process of seeking realistic diplomatic alternatives to war.

He went on to say that at the same time there is no American intention of attempting to exclude anyone from the area, that we, the United States, recognize that our European allies have vital interests there and will wish to play substantial roles of their own, and we hope that our activities in the area, he said, can be coordinated so that we can work together for peace and economic progress.

Then, finally, in summing up, the President feels that this morning's session of the North Atlantic Council provided the President with the occasion to express the very great satisfaction of the United States with the new Declaration on Atlantic Relations, which underlines the continuing strength, spirit, and unity of purpose of NATO at a time when the nations of the alliance are facing major challenges and opportunities.

July 29, 1974

173

and the freer flow of information, as well as
confidence building measures and essential
aspects of the principles guiding relations
between states. Ministers expressed their
governments' determination to pursue the
negotiations patiently and constructively in
a continuing search for balanced and sub-
stantial results acceptable to all participat-
ing states. They considered that, to bring
the second stage to its conclusion, these re-
sults need to be achieved in the various fields
of the program of work established by the
Foreign Ministers at the first stage of the
Conference in Helsinki.

Ministers reviewed developments in the
Middle East since their last meeting. They
welcomed the recent progress achieved, in
particular the disengagement of Syrian and
Israeli forces. They affirmed the support of
their governments for the relevant resolu-
tions of the United Nations Security Council
and for all endeavors directed towards a
just and lasting settlement bringing peace
to the area; they also welcomed the con-
tributions made by allied governments to
UN peace-keeping activities. Ministers took
note of the report by the Council in Perma-
nent Session on the situation in the Mediter-
ranean prepared on their instructions. They
invited the Council in Permanent Session
to continue to keep the situation under re-
view and to report further.

Ministers representing countries which
participate in NATO's integrated defense
program reviewed the conduct of the nego-
tiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Re-
ductions. These ministers continue to be-
lieve that mutual and balanced force reduc-
tions achieved through allied solidarity
would contribute to the lessening of tensions
in Europe and to a more stable peace. They
expressed satisfaction at the results so far
reached in the continuing consultations in
the Council in Permanent Session on ques-
tions of objectives and policy. They in-
structed the Council to continue this work.

These ministers noted that the current
round of negotiations is proceeding in a
businesslike way. They expressed their de-
termination to persist in their efforts to
bring the negotiations to a satisfactory con-

clusion. They recalled that the general ob-
jective of the negotiations is to contribute to
a more stable relationship at a lower level
of forces with the security of all parties
undiminished. This objective should be
achieved by establishing approximate parity
between the two sides in the form of a
common ceiling for overall ground force
manpower on each side in the area of re-
ductions, taking into account combat capa-
bility. These ministers reiterated that a
first phase agreement providing for the re-
duction of United States and Soviet ground
forces would be an important initial step
forward towards that objective.

In reaffirming their conviction that reduc-
tions of allied forces in Europe should take
place only within the context of an East-
West agreement, these ministers referred to
the statements contained in paragraph 4
of the Communique of the Defense Plan-
ning Committee in Ministerial Session is-
sued on 14th June, 1974.

Ministers expressed appreciation for con-
tinuing consultations on developments with
respect to the SALT negotiations. They noted
with satisfaction the efforts undertaken by
the United States towards limitations of
strategic arms and expressed the hope that
these efforts would lead to satisfactory re-
sults.

The next Ministerial Session of the North
Atlantic Council will be held in Brussels in
December 1974.

DECLARATION ON ATLANTIC RELATIONS, JUNE 19

Press release 258 dated June 20

1. The members of the North Atlantic Alliance declare that the Treaty signed 25 years ago to protect their freedom and independence has confirmed their common destiny. Under the shield of the Treaty, the Allies have maintained their security, permitting them to preserve the values which are the heritage of their civilization and enabling Western Europe to rebuild from its ruins and lay the foundations of its unity.

2. The members of the Alliance reaffirm

42

Department of State Bulletin

their conviction that the North Atlantic Treaty provides the indispensable basis for their security, thus making possible the pursuit of detente. They welcome the progress that has been achieved on the road towards detente and harmony among nations, and the fact that a conference of 35 countries of Europe and North America is now seeking to lay down guidelines designed to increase security and cooperation in Europe. They believe that until circumstances permit the introduction of general, complete and controlled disarmament, which alone could provide genuine security for all, the ties uniting them must be maintained. The Allies share a common desire to reduce the burden of arms expenditure on their peoples. But states that wish to preserve peace have never achieved this aim by neglecting their own security.

3. The members of the Alliance reaffirm that their common defense is one and indivisible. An attack on one or more of them in the area of application of the Treaty shall be considered an attack against them all. The common aim is to prevent any attempt by a foreign power to threaten the independence or integrity of a member of the Alliance. Such an attempt would not only put the Alliance but also threaten the foundations of world peace.

4. At the same time they realize that the circumstances affecting their common defense have profoundly changed in the last ten years: the strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union has reached a point of near equilibrium. Consequently, although all the countries of the Alliance remain vulnerable to attack, the nature of the danger to which they are exposed has changed. The Alliance's problems in the defense of Europe have thus assumed a different and more distinct character.

5. However, the essential elements in the situation which gave rise to the Treaty have not changed. While the commitment of all the Allies to the common defense reduces the risk of external aggression, the contribution to the security of the entire Alliance provided by the nuclear forces of the United

States based in the United States as well as in Europe and by the presence of North American forces in Europe remains indispensable.

6. Nevertheless, the Alliance must pay careful attention to the dangers to which it is exposed in the European region, and must adopt all measures necessary to avert them. The European members who provide three-quarters of the conventional strength of the Alliance in Europe, and two of whom possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent role of their own contributing to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance, undertake to make the necessary contribution to maintain the common defense at a level capable of deterring and if necessary repelling all actions directed against the independence and territorial integrity of the members of the Alliance.

7. The United States, for its part, reaffirms its determination not to accept any situation which would expose its Allies to external political or military pressure likely to deprive them of their freedom, and states its resolve, together with its Allies, to maintain forces in Europe at the level required to sustain the credibility of the strategy of deterrence and to maintain the capacity to defend the North Atlantic area should deterrence fail.

8. In this connection the member states of the Alliance affirm that as the ultimate purpose of any defense policy is to deny to a potential adversary the objectives he seeks to attain through an armed conflict, all necessary forces would be used for this purpose. Therefore, while reaffirming that a major aim of their policies is to seek agreements that will reduce the risk of war, they also state that such agreements will not limit their freedom to use all forces at their disposal for the common defense in case of attack. Indeed, they are convinced that their determination to do so continues to be the best assurance that war in all its forms will be prevented.

9. All members of the Alliance agree that the continued presence of Canadian and substantial US forces in Europe plays an irreplaceable role in the defense of North

July 8, 1974

43

America as well as of Europe. Similarly the substantial forces of the European Allies serve to defend Europe and North America as well. It is also recognized that the further progress towards unity, which the member states of the European Community are determined to make, should in due course have a beneficial effect on the contribution to the common defense of the Alliance of those of them who belong to it. Moreover, the contributions made by members of the Alliance to the preservation of international security and world peace are recognized to be of great importance.

10. The members of the Alliance consider that the will to combine their efforts to ensure their common defense obliges them to maintain and improve the efficiency of their forces and that each should undertake, according to the role that it has assumed in the structure of the Alliance, its proper share of the burden of maintaining the security of all. Conversely, they take the view that in the course of current or future negotiations nothing must be accepted which could diminish this security.

11. The Allies are convinced that the fulfilment of their common aims requires the maintenance of close consultation, cooperation and mutual trust, thus fostering the conditions necessary for defense and favorable for detente, which are complementary. In the spirit of the friendship, equality and solidarity which characterize their relationships, they are firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be affected by events in other areas of the world. They wish also to ensure that their essential security relationship is supported by harmonious political and economic relations. In particular they will work to remove sources of conflict between their economic policies and to

encourage economic cooperation with one another.

12. They recall that they have proclaimed their dedication to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, justice and social progress, which are the fruits of their shared spiritual heritage and they declare their intention to develop and deepen the application of these principles in their countries. Since these principles, by their very nature, forbid any recourse to methods incompatible with the promotion of world peace, they reaffirm that the efforts which they make to preserve their independence, to maintain their security and to improve the living standards of their peoples exclude all forms of aggression against anyone, are not directed against any other country, and are designed to bring about the general improvement of international relations. In Europe, their objective continues to be the pursuit of understanding and cooperation with every European country. In the world at large, each Allied country recognizes the duty to help the developing countries. It is in the interest of all that every country benefit from technical and economic progress in an open and equitable world system.

13. They recognize that the cohesion of the Alliance has found expression not only in cooperation among their governments, but also in the free exchange of views among the elected representatives of the peoples of the Alliance. Accordingly, they declare their support for the strengthening of links among Parliamentarians.

14. The members of the Alliance rededicate themselves to the aims and ideals of the North Atlantic Treaty during this year of the twenty-fifth anniversary of its sig-nature. The member nations look to the future, confident that the vitality and creativity of their peoples are commensurate with the challenges which confront them. They declare their conviction that the North Atlantic Alliance continues to serve as an essential element in the lasting structure of peace they are determined to build.

44

Department of State Bulletin

Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at Brussels and Moscow

NEWS CONFERENCE AT BRUSSELS, JUNE 26

Press release 268 dated June 27

Secretary Kissinger: I thought I would make very few comments about the forthcoming summit and then answer your questions.

Primarily I want to recapitulate what I said in my last press conference. The summit has the following purposes: To enable the leaders of the two countries with the capability of destroying humanity to exchange ideas and perceptions about international affairs; secondly, to deal with bilateral issues, especially in the field of arms control in an attempt to moderate the arms race; and thirdly, to seek to work out cooperative arrangements in various fields designed to give each side a stake in a moderate course and in a constructive foreign policy.

As I pointed out, the arms control field has become the most controversial and we are following these principles: Neither side should gain a strategic advantage; neither side should be in a position where it can gain a political advantage; neither side should be in a position where it perceives either a political or military advantage, whatever the facts are; and neither side should be in a position where other countries perceive a military or political advantage in the relationship that results from agreement.

These principles once stated are obviously not automatic, and serious people have differed and will continue to differ as to what constitutes an advantage, either militarily or politically. With respect to military advantage, it is crucial that neither side falls into the trap of equating advantage simply

with numbers. There must be some relationship between numbers and the purpose to which these numbers can be put.

Moreover, the forces of the two sides have been designed in a manner that makes comparisons very difficult. The United States, by its own choice and not as a result of any agreement, emphasized in the sixties, and continued in this administration, weapons of relatively low throw weight but substantial accuracy.

The United States, in the sixties and continued in this administration, placed a relatively greater emphasis on bombers than the Soviet Union did. How to compare the throw weight of missiles and the effectiveness of such weapons, how to relate bombers to missiles, and how to translate all of this into numbers is a very complicated subject. We believe that the first SALT agreement was in the interest of the United States and in the interest of world peace. It at least limited the quantitative race at levels that had been achieved at that time and with which both sides seemed to be comfortable even in the absence of an agreement.

Since then there has been an explosion with respect to technology. How to control technology and how to relate technological change to quantitative limits is one of the major problems of our period, and if we express concern about this and if we believe that it is in the national interest to pursue this subject, it is not only because of the inherent quality of the arms race, it is also because of the kind of justification that will have to be used to sustain an unlimited arms race.

We are prepared to continue in the arms race as long as we must, and we will never accept a strategic disadvantage for the

196

Department of State Bulletin

United States. But we do believe that we
have an obligation to make a serious effort
to explore how the technological explosion
can be moderated and how to prevent the
pace of deployment from driving the pace
of diplomacy.

These are our purposes, and how well we
will fulfill them depends of course on the
outcome of the negotiations, which, as I have
pointed out before, will certainly not be com-
pleted in the form of any permanent agree-
ment on this visit.

With these introductory remarks, I will
turn to your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as we approach the summit, does either side have a military advantage, or as you have engaged in discussions prior to the summit, does either side think it has a military advantage—where do we stand now?

Secretary Kissinger: Where we stand now
is that the Soviet Union has a numerical
advantage in missiles. This numerical ad-
vantage in missiles is substantially made up
if you add to it the 450 long-range bombers
we possess, and if you look at it from the
strategic point of view and not the negoti-
ating point of view, you will have to add to
it also the fact that we possess weapons
deployed elsewhere that would certainly be
used in a general nuclear war.

Therefore, whether you count numbers of
vehicles that can reach each other's coun-
tries or warheads that are deployed, the
United States still has a substantial nu-
merical advantage.

If you look only at the throw weight of
missiles, then you will have to argue that
the Soviet Union has an advantage in mis-
sile throw weight, though it is less clear
what they can do with it. If you add to it
the throw weight of our bombers, then
you are again at a level of substantial equal-
ity.

I would say that these comparisons can
be used for almost any purpose, but we are
convinced that the United States probably
has an advantage, but one that is not po-
litically of any decisive importance, and it

is our basic conviction that if the arms race
is continued for another 10 years, it will
not yield either a strategic or a political ad-
vantage for either side but that it may well
complicate the political relationships.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you refer to the fact
that you don't expect an agreement in the
form of a permanent final agreement. Will
the President and Mr. Brezhnev be going for
a conceptual breakthrough of the kind you
went for in March—a statement of princi-
ples in an effort to resolve the MIRV [mul-
tiple independently targeted reentry vehicle]
issue, with a set of directives to the nego-
tiators?

Will you be trying for that, and do you
expect it?

Secretary Kissinger: I generally try to
avoid making the same mistake twice.
[Laughter.] But basically, there are two
ways of going at the problem.

The Soviet Union gave us an approach
when we were in Moscow in March which,
if the numbers were changed, could be con-
sidered a conceptual breakthrough. We did
not reject the approach; we reject the num-
bers in which they expressed it. That is
one way of going at it.

The other way of going at it is to con-
clude that that particular approach cannot
be translated into appropriate numbers and
to attempt therefore to find a new approach
that then might perhaps deserve the label
you gave them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since you last spoke to
us in Washington at the press conference,
what progress has been made toward an
underground test ban pact?

Secretary Kissinger: The experts' discus-
sions have been suspended pending our ar-
rival; and where we stand now is, they have
gone as far as they can get. We still have
to settle the threshold. There are still a
number of issues that have to be settled—
the level of the threshold, there are differ-
ences between us and the Soviet Union both
with respect to what is permitted below the
threshold and what is permitted above the

July 29, 1974

197

threshold. So there is a great deal that remains to be done in Moscow.

Q. I didn't understand that, Mr. Secretary. What do you mean by what would be permitted above?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is one argument that below the threshold there should also be a limitation on the number of tests that are permitted.

Q. Above?

Secretary Kissinger: Above the threshold there is the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, whether they should be extended.

Q. Could you define the differences you have with Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger on this matter and also explain what he means by rhetorical flourishes?

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't see his press conference, and that is such an inconceivable idea as applied to me that I am sure he was misquoted. [Laughter.]

Q. Wait a minute. I would like to know more about that.

Secretary Kissinger: I read about those differences in the newspapers. I am not conscious of differences when we meet. I have expressed my view on counterforce strategy and on first-strike capabilities. I have never been led to believe that he differs from these views, so I will be glad to express my view on certain strategic issues.

I do not believe that a country can rely politically or militarily on a first-strike capability and I do not believe that a country can achieve a first-strike capability and I believe that the effort to do so will raise profound political issues, but I understand that he has also said that he doesn't believe this is possible. But this is a view that I have held.

Q. Mr. Secretary, speaking of differences with other people, did you intend in your discussion of your differences with Senator Jackson the other day to suggest that a man like Paul Nitze with his long experience in the disarmament field would be incapable of understanding the fact that he was discussing?

Secretary Kissinger: I have the highest respect for Mr. Nitze. I have not seen his testimony, and therefore I cannot dispute specifically what he said.

The facts, as I explained them and supported with documents, happen to be the correct facts, but as long as you have asked that question, let me point out that there is a very abstruse and esoteric point that was raised at the end of the press conference with which I did not adequately deal.

When I read the formal statement of Senator Jackson, I understood him to say that the United States, by a secret agreement, had granted the Soviet Union 70 additional missiles. This was totally and abysurdly false, and it was totally contradictory to the negotiating record, in which we had spent two nights in the Soviet Union precisely to avoid this contingency.

All our exchanges with the Soviet Union concerned the replacement provision, specifically whether missiles on G-class submarines could be traded in for modern missiles.

Now, at the end of the press conference and afterward and in newspaper articles that I have seen since, I understand that the argument that is being made now is a more complicated one. It isn't anymore that we made a secret agreement to grant the Soviet Union 70 missiles but that, in attempting to close the replacement-provision problem, we unintentionally produced a loophole that might have given the Soviet Union the right to an additional 70 missiles.

Let me deal with this problem also, because I believe public confidence is involved if, prior to a summit meeting, one is accused of either deliberately deceiving the public about the true numbers or having made errors of a magnitude that might have had that result.

Now, the argument about this loophole. Let me first state flatly the following: The U.S. Government has never acknowledged that such a loophole existed. The Soviet Union has never claimed that such a loophole existed. In the entire Soviet arsenal of land-based and sea-based missiles, there isn't one missile that fits the category that that loophole allegedly represents.

198

Department of State Bulletin

So, by the most strained and most esoteric definition, one would have to say that the Soviet Union in the last three years of an agreement is going to develop an entirely new missile of a kind for which we have no intelligence and no evidence and put it on 25-year-old submarines.

Now let me explain the nature of this alleged loophole. The phrase which allegedly produced that loophole was "a modern ballistic missile on a submarine is a missile of the type which is deployed on nuclear-powered submarines commissioned in the USSR since 1965."

Now, at first, some people argued that this meant that any other missile except those that are on Soviet nuclear-powered submarines was permitted. It was then pointed out that "of the type" means, obviously, something wider, and it is obvious that the United States would have claimed that any missile on any submarine has to be of a type that can also be deployed on a nuclear-powered submarine.

That was the purpose of this phrase. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense and the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] claimed that a loophole existed. I may say that this never reached my level. All of these discussions took place at the middle level. The State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the National Security Council (NSC) consistently maintained that there was no loophole, and, I may say, the Russians never claimed that there was a loophole. It is true that this particular definition was not seen by the bureaucracy until 1973, but in that whole period, neither Mr. Nitze nor the Secretary of Defense nor the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ever raised this issue with me or the President or the then Secretary of State, because it was one of these innumerable debates that always go on at the middle level.

When the Standing Consultative Commission started negotiating, it was decided that, the issue having been raised, even though the overwhelming majority of the government disagreed with it there was no harm in trying to find a formulation that avoided the de-

bate, and therefore the Commissioner on the Standing Consultative Commission was instructed to try to find a formulation that would make it impossible to claim that esoteric, preposterous interpretation—that, I repeat, the Russians never claimed, that we would never have accepted, but that some people at the middle level thought could be used, even though they could not point to a single weapon in the Soviet arsenal to which it might apply.

I repeat, it was an issue that was never raised at the policy level. It was negotiated for six months, and while we approved the new formulation, we never even looked at it in terms of conflict with any previous formulation. Since it was the purpose of the Standing Consultative Commission to make specific and more precise a lot of the terms in the agreement, the precise purpose of the Standing Consultative Commission is to bring more precision into the discussion.

In May of this year, the Soviet Union, in the course of a lot of other agreements on dismantling provisions, accepted this formulation, and the principal reason they didn't accept it previously was because they thought the previous agreement covered it.

There was no great debate over it. Therefore the allegation that I have seen in a newspaper today that this was a last-minute cover-up is nonsense. We didn't feel that there was anything to cover up. If the issue had not been raised in our bureaucracy, we would never have attempted to refine it, and it was not raised.

The predominant view in our government was represented by the State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the NSC staff, and our Commissioner on the Standing Consultative Commission—that there was no problem. But as long as somebody claimed there was a problem, even though there wasn't the slightest evidence for it, we unanimously decided to let him go ahead to do it.

Incidentally, it never was put to us in terms of a loophole; it was put to us in terms of refinement of language, which happened on a lot of provisions on dismantling, replacement, and so forth.

July 29, 1974

199

There are about eight or nine issues that we are going to sign in Moscow, each of which has as its specific purpose the more precise definition of more general clauses in the existing agreement.

So, what we have here is a middle-level bu-
reaucratic argument that has been made the
subject of senatorial investigation. Under no
circumstance was there ever any question of
an additional 70 Soviet missiles, and if the
Soviet Union had ever claimed this loophole,
which they never did, it would have been an
act of such overwhelming bad faith that we
would never have stood for it, and it would
have affected their relationship with us in
ways far beyond putting 70 missiles of a
type that no one has yet seen or been able
to describe on a submarine that hasn't been
off the American coast since 1967.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in light of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have been unable to find the basis for a new SALT agreement, do you think it is now inevitable that the Soviets will deploy the MIRV, and if so, when, and how serious is that in terms of the arms race?

Secretary Kissinger: We think that on
some categories of missiles, the Soviet Union
is nearly ready to deploy MIRV's. At what
rate they will deploy them it is not yet fully
possible to foretell. We have estimates of
what the rate will be, with an upper and
lower limit; and obviously it would be our in-
tention, if an arms control agreement were to
be meaningful, to have a ceiling that is lower
than the estimate of what we think they are
going to build—otherwise, the ceiling will
not have any meaning.

But I would say we have about a year and
a half altogether before the decisions will
be irrevocable, but it becomes harder with
every passing six-month period.

Q. Is it inevitable now that they will do it?

Secretary Kissinger: It is inevitable that some MIRV's will be deployed. The rate of deployment is still subject to negotiation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have no desire to be-

labor this point, but you did raise some new
elements in the discussion of the loophole
controversy when you referred to the disa-
greement among the agencies. Two points I
would like to make—Senator Jackson's ulti-
mate claim was that the dispute concerned
the withholding of information from Con-
gress and the public, which he was describ-
ing as one of the dilemmas of the particular
time in the American political climate, which
he regarded as a major problem. First, I
would like to hear you on that point. Sec-
ondly, if there were such disagreements
among the government departments, and
there are still disagreements among the gov-
ernment departments on SALT, can you give
us your appraisal of the problem involved in
attempting to negotiate with the Soviet Un-
ion at a time when there is an unresolved
governmentwide American position on many
of these essential issues involved in the SALT
agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the first point, we were under the impression that in our instructions to all interested agencies of June 17 [1972], in my news conference of May 26, and in my appearance before the congressional leaders on June 15, we had put forward all the elements of the agreement, including the interpretation of the replacement provisions; so the only thing that was not available was the signed document, which we elicited primarily, in fact exclusively, in order to avoid the issue ever being raised again.

I would say, however, that that part of
Senator Jackson's comment is one that under
current practices would not arise—under the
current practices, every understanding that
has been reached has been put before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Nevertheless, it is an entirely technical
point because the essence of it was testified to
by Ambassador [Gerard] Smith, it was cov-
ered in my press conference, and it was cov-
ered in the instructions to the departments of
how they should testify before congres-
sional committees. This was not in any sense
an attempt to keep anything from the Con-
gress.

200

Department of State Bulletin

With respect to the second point, when you have such disputes, when you have the Standing Consultative Commission meeting, for example, it is normal practice to ask every agency for its comments, and it is not unheard of that agencies raise points in which the various individuals prove their vigilance to their superiors.

That doesn't make it a huge dispute. This is a normal practice. This particular dispute that I have just described to you was never raised to the policy level. It wasn't a big dispute. It wasn't a dispute that any Cabinet member was ever conscious of, and it was settled.

What would normally happen is that you adopt the most extreme position because this keeps everyone happy, and then if you find resistance, then you see whether you have to fall back. In this case, we adopted the most extreme position, which was the OSD-JCS [Office of the Secretary of Defense-Joint Chiefs of Staff] position, with which no one else in the government agreed, and it was accepted, so why not go along with it.

This was not a world-shaking event. There are 500 disputes like this in the government at any moment in time, and if everyone takes his case then to a congressional committee, there will be no end of investigations.

Now, with respect to the general problem: how we can negotiate when there are more fundamental problems. This was in no sense an important problem, but how we can negotiate when there are more fundamental problems, without going into the question of whether or not there are fundamental problems, if the situation is as I described it, even more so if it is the perception of the President that the problem is as we described it. Then it is his duty to move ahead in the direction which he believes to be in the long-term national interest, keeping in mind the views of all of his senior advisers but, if necessary, choosing among them and realizing that, in the present climate, if anything is achieved, a fundamental debate is inevitable.

But that is the duty of government, and we cannot stop doing what is thought to be

necessary for world peace just because it might evoke controversy.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, might it be a problem in the negotiations if the House Judiciary Committee releases its evidence early next week while you are still in Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: On what?

Q. It was announced today that the Judiciary Committee will release all of its impeachment evidence, starting early next week. My question is: Might that create a problem in the negotiations if it is being released while you are still in Moscow?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not familiar with the evidence, and foreign policy has had to be conducted in this atmosphere continuously, so I don't want to pass any judgment on this. I just don't know enough of the—

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, how inhibited will the President be in negotiating because of his domestic weakness, and will this summit produce less because of his domestic problems and possible Soviet doubt about his future?

Secretary Kissinger: The President will not be inhibited. He will negotiate in what he considers to be the national interest. It is obvious that in the most important areas any possible result will produce controversy, and that certainly will not help the domestic situation.

So, the decisions will not be on the basis of domestic necessities, but on the basis of our judgment that the pace of technology will not wait for our domestic situation to clarify. But I have also given you my judgment of the probable outcome. Now, what more could have been achieved, no one will ever know.

Q. Can you say something about the talks today with Mr. Schmidt, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Rumor? And secondly, a senior government official was quoted on the plane as saying you are going to tour Western Europe after Moscow to discuss the next phase of NATO

July 29, 1974

201

developments. Could you say something about that and where you are going?

Secretary Kissinger: The talks with the leaders of the Federal Republic, of Britain, and Italy dealt with—I didn't sit in on the meeting with Prime Minister Rumor, except for the first five minutes—but they dealt very much with economic problems that Europe and the United States face, with some of the financial difficulties raised by the energy crisis, and with the means available for cooperative solutions in those fields.

There was an explanation by the President of the American attitude at the summit, with particular emphasis on those topics that the Europeans are also involved in; namely, the European Security Conference and force reductions. As to my trip afterward, the senior official was well informed [laughter], and what I intend to do is, on behalf of the President, to discuss with the various leaders how to give effect to the closer consultation that is foreseen in the Atlantic Declaration and perhaps in somewhat more detail some of the issues that were raised this afternoon.

Q. Could you explain an apparent contradiction to me? On June 14, General Secretary Brezhnev said he expected very soon some type of concrete result in the partial reduction of forces or arms, I believe he said, in Central Europe, and yet the President today, through Mr. Ziegler, has said he expects the United States to maintain and improve our forces.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the position of the United States is that we will not reduce our forces unilaterally but that we are prepared to reduce them as part of the mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR).

I am assuming that General Secretary Brezhnev gave an optimistic appraisal of the future of the mutual balanced force reductions. The American position is that we will not reduce unilaterally.

Q. In view of the fact, Mr. Secretary, that you try never to make the same mistake twice, will your technique of disclosure in the

forthcoming summit be different than it has been in the past?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't understand the question.

Q. Well, you have an obvious hassle with Senator Jackson because he believed that you were not particularly forthcoming.

Secretary Kissinger: As I have said, the disagreement is a substantially technical one because all of the essential facts were put before the Congress. Nevertheless, any agreement or understanding that would be achieved at the summit will be put before the Congress in the form in which it is achieved.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, if I may go back for a minute to the question of the so-called loop-hole in the definition. Can you say why it was that Mr. Nitze and others were not given copies of this new definition since they were part of the process? And I have another part I would like to follow up after this.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we did not believe that a redefinition was involved. There had been a public statement. There had been a meeting of the Verification Panel. There had been a written instruction to the bureaucracy that, almost verbatim, held this interpretative statement. The Verification Panel was told that we would attempt to achieve an interpretative statement. Therefore we did not believe that anything new had been done.

As soon as the bureaucracy needed to act on it, we sent them the interpretative statement; and this was not a particularly dark design—this was an afterthought. We had no intention originally of getting them to sign it. Originally, we had intended to make it as a unilateral statement, and only when there was some dispute about it did we add the signature and there was no particular profound reason for it since we had instructed the bureaucracy along that line and since we obviously distributed it a year later.

Q. If I can follow up on the other part. Just to clarify in my own mind, have you been taking the position that the Soviets have not

202

Department of State Bulletin

modernized any of their G-class submarine missiles, or have they modernized them to some degree?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge—and I don't want to get hit on the blind side now by some intelligence information that has been leaked that has never been shown to me—to the best of my knowledge, no G-class submarine has been modernized. There are two G-class submarines that are being used as test beds for missiles, for submarine-launched missiles. We obviously would consider the submarine-launched missiles as being of the type that are installed on nuclear submarines.

There has been one missile tested on one of these submarines that is a ship-to-ship missile and on which you can have a dispute whether that—well, as a ship-to-ship missile it wouldn't fall under the agreement—whether it could be converted to a land missile.

Again, we consider this an absurd interpretation which we would totally resist. There is no operational G-class submarine that has been converted, and for a very good reason—that those G-class submarines are so overaged that they were never shown in any of our Defense Department documents as strategic weapons long before this dispute ever existed. We never showed them as strategic weapons, and to the best of our knowledge there has been no installation of a modern missile on a G-class submarine.

And, I will say again for the record, if any modern missile were put on a G-class submarine, and if the Soviets attempted a "shyster" interpretation that it is of a type that cannot be used on a nuclear submarine, they would risk any arms control negotiation with us, because it is totally inconsistent with the intent of the document, with the content of the negotiation, and they have known much better than to try this.

Q. Mr. Secretary, two points, please. The first, you mentioned earlier on, I think, that there are eight or nine issues that we will sign in Moscow.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I said as part of

the Standing Consultative Commission there were eight or nine problems having to do with dismantling provisions that were settled. The Soviet Union has asked us to keep those provisions secret because in order to make them public goes into the characteristics of the weapons, but they will be put before the appropriate congressional committees.

Q. Secondly, is there a likelihood of MBFR agreement at this summit?

Secretary Kissinger: It is technically impossible for us to have an MBFR agreement, because that negotiation is between NATO and the Warsaw Pact; and therefore if any progress were to be made or if the Soviet Union were to make a suggestion that in our view represented progress, we would take it back to NATO for their views.

Q. That is what I was getting at. There isn't at this point something that the Soviet Union and the United States have close to an agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: No. There is nothing before us that is different from what exists at Vienna.

Q. May I ask a philosophical question on the basis of certain consultative acts and pieces of paper that were signed last year. About a year ago at the Washington summit, a statement of principles was issued which in fact called on both parties to help bank the fires of international disputes when they arose. But a short number of months later, the Soviets were rushing arms in Antonov transports to the Middle East. There was also a consultative NATO assembly on energy, out of which emerged a scramble bilaterally and every man for himself scrambled for available oil surplus. On this basis, do you at all feel concerned that the credibility of the documents and actions that emerge from rushes to summits and consultative assemblies may be losing credibility as far as public opinion is concerned?

Secretary Kissinger: Their credibility is not as important as their effectiveness. Now,

July 29, 1974

203

first with respect to the Washington Energy
Conference. The principal result of the
Washington Energy Conference has been to
set up a coordinating group in which the
Western nations and Japan—that is, the
major oil-consuming nations—have worked
together to exchange information on re-
search and development and to develop an
emergency procedure, to develop a procedure
for emergencies, and to develop alternative
supplies.

This coordinating group has worked ex-
tremely effectively, and we expect to com-
plete an interim report to the governments
by the end of July or early August, and I
think it will represent a major step forward
and a substantial fulfillment of many of the
goals of the Washington Energy Conference.
We will then see what the next phase of
cooperation will bring.

With respect to bilateral oil deals, in fact,
there have been very few, if any, since the
Washington Energy Conference, and those
bilateral economic deals that exist we hope
to coordinate through the consultative mech-
anisms that we are now setting up.

With respect to the first problem, the role
of the Soviet Union in the Mideast conflict,
it is clear that détente will not stop either
country under conditions when it believes
its vital interests are involved, and there-
fore it is important to prevent situations
in which either country believes that its
vital interests are threatened.

But the position of the Soviet Union in
the Middle East is at least ambiguous, be-
cause we have the public statements of
Sadat and other Arab leaders that claim that
the bad relations between them and the So-
viet Union are caused by the fact that the
Soviet Union placed the requirements of
détente over the interests of their Arab
allies and tried to hold them back from cer-
tain military action.

So, I would say that the record on this
is ambiguous. The Soviet Union did not
behave well during the crisis, and when they
did not, we resisted very strenuously. But
prior to the crisis, one can describe the So-
viet actions as ambiguous.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it has been reported
that you have been trying to equitably re-
solve the problems of free emigration and
harassment that the Jackson amendment ad-
dresses itself to. I have a three-part ques-
tion. Firstly, has there been any progress;
secondly, do you intend to raise these mat-
ters in the forthcoming meetings; and
thirdly, 21 Senators, as well as the leaders
of the American Jewish community, have
appealed to the President to raise the issue
of the imprisoned Jewish activists when
he arrives in Moscow. Could you address
yourself to these questions, please?

Secretary Kissinger: I addressed myself
to this question at my last press conference,
and I can add very little to it. The United
States is profoundly concerned about the
issues which you raise, and we are attempt-
ing to deal with them.

We are attempting to deal with them in
a manner that in our judgment is most likely
to produce results. We have had discussions
on these subjects with the Soviet leaders
as well as with Senator Jackson, Senator
Ribicoff, and Senator Javits as well as with
the Jewish community, and when matters
have reached a certain point, we will talk
to other Senators.

Our concern is to bring about results. We
have no interest in "defeating" Senator
Jackson. We are prepared to grant that
his pressures have had an influence, just as
we believe that our détente policy has pro-
vided the framework within which discus-
sions could take place.

So we are conducting those discussions
with the primary purpose of bringing about
the results in which there is no difference
as to objectives. But no useful purpose is
served by my spelling out numbers and de-
tails, because my doing so might prevent
the achievement of the result.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if a permanent agree-
ment on nuclear arms control cannot occur
in the Moscow summit, should we anticipate
an extension of the interim agreement of
1972?

Secretary Kissinger: It is impossible that

204

Department of State Bulletin

there will be an extension of the interim agreement unless it is tied to some substantial agreement on multiple warheads, and that probably will also not be fully achieved at the summit.

NEWS CONFERENCE AT MOSCOW, JULY 3

Press release 283 dated July 3

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Ziegler said I should entitle this briefing "The View From Ten Feet Behind." [Laughter.] They don't read the pool reports.

I thought I would give you a brief summary of the summit as we see it, and I think the best way to start is to look at it in terms of the press conference in which I tried to explain the purposes of the meeting.

I pointed out that there are three fundamental purposes in these summit meetings; one, for the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States to exchange ideas and to check assessments about international affairs in general. The necessity for this arises because, as the two nations capable of destroying humanity, they have a special obligation to prevent conflicts caused by inadvertence, by miscalculation, by misassessment of each other's motives, examples of which history is replete. The second is to see whether they can, by meeting the needs of their peoples and of mankind, construct a network of positive relationships that will provide an incentive for moderation and for a beneficial and humane conduct of foreign policy.

The second large objective is to prevent the nuclear arms race and the arms race in general from dominating international affairs, and I want to stress again that this objective is no mean goal and one that will occupy American administrations in the absence of comprehensive agreements for as far into the future as we can see. It is not only the complexity of the weapons and their destructiveness, it is also the justifications that will have to be used in each country to sustain large armament programs that will, over a period of time, present a major ob-

stacle to the humane or even safe conduct of foreign policy.

And the third general goal is to identify those areas of common interests, either produced by the nonmilitary aspects of technology or by others or by the nature of modern life, in which the Soviet Union and the United States can cooperate and thereby create a perspective on world affairs that recognizes the interdependence of events and the fact that isolation and confrontation are, over a period of time, inimical to progress and inconsistent with human aspirations.

Now, in terms of these three objectives, a great deal of time was spent by the two leaders in reviewing the international situation, and I will get into details when I go through the various documents.

They were the most extensive discussions at that level of the arms race that have ever taken place, and with a frankness that would have been considered inconceivable two years ago, indeed with an amount of detail that would have been considered violating intelligence codes in previous periods.

So, on the issue of SALT, for example, on which I will have more to say in a few minutes, the words of the communique, that far-reaching and deep conversations took place, are of very profound significance. And in the next phase of discussions, difficulties cannot be caused by misapprehensions about each other's general intentions and general perceptions of the nature of the strategic environment.

And thirdly, there were a series of agreements, about most of which you have already been briefed, in the field of cooperative relationships.

Now, let me speak for myself about the two areas of arms control and the general review of the international situation.

With respect to arms control, let me cover first the agreements that have been made and then let me talk about the strategic arms limitation talks.

With respect to the agreements that have been made, there are three: the agreement that neither side will build the second ABM site, the agreement on the limited thresh-

July 29, 1974

205

NEW YORK TIMES 26 JUNE 1974

Presidential Journey

President Nixon's eight-day journey to Brussels and Moscow will focus on the future of détente with the Soviet Union; but it begins fittingly with a summit meeting of the NATO allies, the first in seventeen years.

The signing of the Atlantic Declaration in Brussels today will be more than a symbolic event. It will put the approval of chiefs of government on a lasting commitment to Western unity in the 25th anniversary year of history's most successful peacetime alliance.

The task of managing the increasing interdependence of the United States and a uniting West Europe in the last quarter of the twentieth century is just beginning and it will require new attitudes and new institutions which are still only vaguely seen. The intensive dialogue of the last fourteen months, set off by Henry Kissinger's April 1973 "Atlantic Charter" speech, undoubtedly will resume when the Secretary of State visits the main Western capitals enroute home from Moscow.

Meanwhile, what is most urgent is to consolidate the East-West accommodation during Mr. Nixon's week-long talks with Leonid Brezhnev. The President's discussions with other Western leaders are an essential preliminary. Mr. Nixon's voice in Moscow will be strengthened by allied support. Allied concerns about "superpower condominium" should be significantly eased.

The three-fold purpose of the Moscow meeting, as summarized by Secretary Kissinger, is to maintain a dialogue on world events, to further contain the danger of nuclear confrontation and to continue the process of building peace through a "web of interests" between the Soviet Union and the West.

MIRV multiple warhead missiles are at the core of the two projected negotiations at Moscow on nuclear weapons, one for a limited underground test-ban and the other for a step forward in the second round of the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT II).

The SALT discussions will center on Mr. Brezhnev's March proposal to extend the 1972 five-year interim agreement on offensive missiles, meanwhile limiting to an agreed number—which Washington considered much too high—the replacement of existing Soviet launchers by new, more powerful MIRVed missiles. President Nixon is willing to accept the Brezhnev concept if the numbers, types, locations and verifiability of the replacement missiles can be agreed—and held below a level that might give the Soviet Union a first-strike capability against American land-based missiles.

As to the nuclear test-ban, Mr. Brezhnev wants to set a timetable for reaching a total ban on underground explosions. Verification difficulties will limit the initial ban to larger tests, which can be detected without on-site inspections. Even this limited step has value, for it can help to head off the development of a new generation of more accurate and more powerful MIRV warheads that could create fear that the other side was achieving a first-strike capability.

The Moscow summit will also see a discussion of the Middle East and European problems. There will probably be agreements on transport, urban development, agriculture and medical cooperation, as well as a framework treaty on commerce and friendship, none of which will be spectacular. Real headway on trade and credits depends on an Administration compromise with Congress affected not only by the emigration issue but by doubts about the future of détente stemming from the Mideast war and Russia's missile build-up.

It is precisely these doubts and the need to keep the momentum of détente going that lends importance to this third annual summit meeting of the world's two most powerful nations. It is a meeting that is less likely to achieve spectacular new progress than to consolidate

the relationship that has thus far been achieved. It will, in effect, be more or less a routine encounter. But, then, who would have believed a few years ago that Soviet-American summits could become "routine?"

RECEIVED

VV EHC152
00 RUE HMO
DE RUEHC #2915 1832029
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
0 022011Z JUL 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHD C

TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3641
BT
UNCLAS STATE 142915

TOSEC 238

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: PRESS REPORTAGE, JULY 2, 1974

FOR BREMER FROM S/PRS

Jul 23 1974

AMERICAN EMBASSY
MOSCOW U.S.S.R.

<table><tr><td>ACTION:</td><td>S/S</td><td>15</td></tr><tr><td>INFO:</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>AMB</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>MIN</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>POL</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ECON</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>P&C</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>CONS</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>ADMIN</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>USDAO</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>SCI</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>AGRIC</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FILES</td><td>1</td><td></td></tr></table>

1. MARVIN KALB - CBS RADIO - FIRST LINE REPORT FROM MOSCOW:

IMPRESSIONS OF A MOSCOW SUMMIT: PRESIDENT NIXON SEEMS TO BE GETTING TIRED, THE PAIN IN ONE LEG CAUSED BY PHLEBITIS FORCED THE PRESIDENT TO LIMP DURIV HIS VISIT TO MINSK, THE RE-BUILT BUT ESSENTIALLY GRAND CAPITAL OF THE BELORUSSIAN SOVIET REPUBLIC. IT WAS FOR THE PRESIDENT ESSENTIALLY A ROUGH DAY. UP EARLY IN YALTA, OVER-LOOKING THE BLACK SEA, HE HAD TO RIDE TO THE AIRPORT, A RIDE THAT TOOK AN HOUR AND A HALF. THEN A TWO HOUR PLANE RIDE TO MINSK, CONSTANT SOCIALIZING AND SIGHT-SEEING THROUGHOUT THE DAY, THE RETURN FLIGHT TO MOSCOW, THE RETURN TO THE KREMLIN PAST TEN PM LOCAL TIME, THE LIMP QUITE PRONOUNCED BUT ZIEGLER SAID THE PRESIDENT IS FEELING FINE. TODAY THE PRESIDENT AND BREZHNEV RESUME THEIR DISCUSSIONS FOCUSSING CHIEFLY ON STRATEGIC WEAPONS. IT IS CLEAR THEY HAVE NOT REACHED AGREEMENT, A COMPREHENSIVE DEAL OUT OF THEIR GRASP AT THIS SUMMIT. MINOR ARRANGEMENTS MORE LIKELY: A LIMITED UNDERGROUND TEST BAN, A REVISION OF THE 1972 ANTI-BALLISTIC TREATY AND IN THIS CONTEXT,

MOST IMPORTANT, A JOINT PLEDGE TO TRY TO REACH AN AGREEMENT BY YEARS END TO PUT A CEILING ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF MIRVS. SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD HOPED TO BE ABLE TO REACH A MIRV AGREEMENT DURING THIS SUMMIT, THAT IS NOW IMPOSSIBLE. THERE IS NO UNIFIED AMERICAN POSITION AND THERE IS NO ACCEPTABLE SOVIET PROPOSITION, SO A DEAL IS POSTPONED BUT WITHIN A FRAMEWORK THAT MAKES IT APPEAR AS THOUGH IT IS POSSIBLE IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. IT IS HARD TO TELL WHO IS HAPPY HERE, EVERYONE IS SO TIRED BUT KISSINGER DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE HIS USUAL BOUYANT SELF. IN YALTA THE OTHER DAY A REPORTER SPOTTED THE SECRETARY CHATTING WITH GROMYKO OFF TO ONE SIDE OF THE CROWD. THE REPORTER ASKED HIM A QUESTION -- RONALD ZIEGLER MOVED QUICKLY TOWARDS THE CONVERSATION ABOUT TO BEGIN. KISSINGER DEFERRED IN AN UNCHARACTERISTIC FASHION -- THEY DON'T TELL ME ANYTHING HE TOLD THE REPORTER WITH A VERY FAINT SMILE, I JUST WALK TEN STEPS BEHIND THEM. THIS JAPANESE BRIDE APPROACH TO DIPLOMACY IS NOT USUALLY KISSINGER'S. WHEN THE SECRETARY WAS YTOPPED BY ANOTHER REPORTER YESTERDAY AND ASKED ABOUT A POSSIBLE MIRV AGREEMENT GROMYKO DARTED TO THE SECRETARY'S SIDE. QUIETLY HE ADMONISHED REPORTERS DON'T HURT MY FRIEND. KISSINGER ALLOWED HIMSELF TO BE PROTECTED. THERE HAS BEEN SPECULA-

TION AMONG THE TRAVELING WHITE HOUSE PRESS CORPS THAT KISSINGER AND THE PRESIDENT HAVE BEEN AT ODDS ON THIS STRATEGIC ARMS NEGOTIATION. KISSINGER PUSHING FOR A DEAL, THE PRESIDENT HOLDING BACK FOR A VARIETY OF REASONS, ACTING TOUGH. IF THIS IS NOT CLEVER STRATEGY AND REALLY TRUE THEN IT IS AN INTERESTING POSITION FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO BE IN. HE SEEMS TO BE PRESSING THE PRESIDENT TO SOFTEN HIS POLICY HERE IN MOSCOW. THE PRESIDENT SEEMS TO BE UNABLE TO RECONCILE KISSINGER'S QUARRELS WITH DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER, UNABLE OR SIMPLY UNWILLING. WHILE THE SUMMIT CONTINUES TODAY, SO DOES THE HUNGER STRIKE OF SAHKAROV. SAHKAROV IS LOSING STRENGTH; NOW IN HIS FOURTH DAY OF DRINKING ONLY MINERAL WATER, NO FOOD. HE WANTS RUSSIA TO CHANGE, ADMIT TO DEMOCRACY IN EFFECT AND THAT IS NOT LIKELY THE PRESIDENT AND BREZHNEV MAY WANT TO BASK IN THE GLORY OF SUMMITRY, ALL THE AGREEMENTS WILL HAVE BEEN ANNOUNCED BY TOMORROW BUT BOTH IN DIFFERENT WAYS WILL BE BOTHERED BY SAHKAROV. TO THE PRACTICIONERS OF POWER DANGLING SALT AND MIRV, MORALITY SEEMS ALMOST IRRELEVNT.

## 2. WTOP RADIO - SCHOR-COLSON INTERVIEW:

COLSON SAYS IT WAS DR. HENRY KISSINGER WHO CREATED THE ATMOSPHERE AT THE WHITE HOUSE THAT LED TO THE PLUMBERS WHEN NEWS GOT OUT THE US WAS SECRETLY BOMBING CAMBODIA.

COLSON ZHENRY KISSINGER WAS IN A FRENZY OVER THE LEAKS -- THE THREATENED LEAKS -- AND I MUST SAY WITH CONSIDERABLE LEGITAMACY. THERE HAD BEEN LEAKS PRIOR, TOO -- THERE HAD BEEN A LEAK OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION OF THE MOST SENSITIVE KIND AT THE TIME OF CAMBODIA AND FRANKLY THAT PARTICULAR LEAK COULD HAVE COST MANY MANY HUNDREDS OF AMERICAN LIVES. KISSINGER WAS HYPER-SENSITIVE TO THIS. I THINK IF ANYTHING HE PROBABLY EXERCISED THE PRESIDENT A GREAT DEAL IN TERMS OF WHAT HENRY WAS SAYING IN VARIOUS MEETINGS THAT I WAS IN AND I THINK HE UNDOUBTEDLY HEIGHTENED THE PRESIDENT'S OWN CONCERNS." (FROM SCHORR-COLSON 'PRAY MEETING')

## 3. DANIEL SCHORR - CBS TV CRONKITE SHOW:

COLSON SAID THAT PRESIDENT NIXON IN CREATING THE PLUMBERS HAD BEEN EGGED ON BY HENRY KISSINGER'S RAGE OVER ELLSBERG. COLSON -"CERTAINLY IN MY VIEW KISSINGER WAS THE MOTIVATING FORCE IN THE GREAT CONCERNS THAT EXISTED, IN THE WHITE HOUSE OVER THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION AND SOME INFORMATION THAT WAS NOT CLASSIFIED BUT MIGHT HAVE BEEN- PERHAPS, DAMAGING IN TERMS OF UNDEFMINING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF FOREIGN POLICY." SISCO
BT
#2915