DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

TELECON
The President

(Brought in 3/29/71) Taped March 28, 1971

(Starts in mid conversation)

By. NARA, Date 5/26

K: And, that just doesn't happen when adequate precautions are taken. It was in the Danang area so it wasn't related to what was going on in Laos, in fact that's the sort of thing that would have happened to a much more intense degree if Laos had not taken place.

P: Well the main thing is how to handle the P.R. on it. Now how is it going to be handled? Going to put out a big story about it or are we or....

K: No, no not from here.

P: Or from there or anyplace else. I mean there's no reason to . . .

K: Let me check and let me make sure.

P: Yeah, just tell them to handle it in a routine way . . . Seems to me amazing that they could allow that sort of thing to happen. I wonder if . . . I think you're right. I think Abrams probably having a hell of a time keeping the boys up in good shape at this point.

K: That may be one of the problems.

P: On the alert and everything. They figure they're all out . . .

K: That's right, that's right. That's one of the problems. We've had a bleeding cable from our Consul in Dacca who wants us to put out a statement condemning what the West Pakistanis are doing. But of course we won't consider it.

P: Oh for Christ's sake.

K: Well, he's just one of these pansies.

P: And he says 'condemning them?'

K: Yeah, for genocide.

P: Well, now remove him. I want him out of the job. You understand. You get that over to . . . Who's in charge of that one? That's Sisco.

K: Right.

P: That man's to be out of there. That kind of a fellow with that

TELECON
The President
(Brought in 3/29/71) p. 2

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

kind of lack of balance and so forth . . . He's obviously in there joining
one side or the other. He's supposed to stay out of this god-damned war.

K: That's right. If we do that we're going to have anti-American
riots in West Pakistan.

P: That's right. I don't want that kind of fellow there and I want
his background checked immediately. I want to know who he is and so
forth. Then kick him the hell out of there.

K: Right.

P: Move him some place else.

K: Right.

P: Isn't that awful. Jesus Christ, I mean I wouldn't put out a statement praising it, but we're not going to condemn it either.

K: No matter what we think of . . . Even if we didn't have that
relationship with Yahya, this is just not . . . there's nothing we can say
that isn't going to get us more trouble than it's worth, for either side.

P: That's right. Well, boy! Isn't that something. Shows you
what those career guys would have us do virtually every time. You know,
they get over there, they get involved . . .

K: Exactly.

P: Par for the course. Nobody here in Sisco's . . . none of these
people want . . .

K: No, there was a little thought of it two weeks ago but we had a
meeting of the WSAG then, we had one on Friday just before we left and
everyone in Washington is postured correctly. They all understand that
you don't want to say anything and they all agree that we shouldn't say
anything.

P: Okay.

K: Right, Mr. President.

By. NARA. Date 5/26

TELCONE
Rogers/Kissinger

10:05 a.m.

3/29/71

K: I just wondered -- not a hell of a lot -- just wanted to check with you. Your World Report got a good play out here.

R: It got one here too but a criticism from Chalmers Roberts. He doesn't like anything.

K: LATimes and others gave a good play.

R: It's useful I think.

K: Roberts wouldn't like anything. The Pakistani thing has quieted down for what we can do. Alex is on top of that. We are getting a brutal press on VN here.

R: We are too. What about the stories on the split between the Pentagon and Saigon on Laos? It's bad back here. Stories they say tried to make SVN stay in Laos longer and so they wouldn't do it.

K: I am not aware of these things. The first thing I heard about SVN getting out was Thurs. after your press conference. We got a story they were thinking of leaving April 1. That was amended in Phase 5 plan.

R: In papers this morning. President's press conference.

K: He will not give it. He thinks the next time would be what I explained to you at the NSC. He thought the press conference would be overdoing it. He will announce tomorrow that he will make a speech April 7.

R: How's the weather?

K: Good the last two days but foggy now.

R: When are you coming back?

K: Sat. or Sun. I will check in with you every day.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger
10:15 a.m. 3/29/71

K: I understand I have been overruling you.

L: You always do. I haven't seen the fiscal guidance for '73 yet.

K: I am going to tell Anderson Laird doesn't show me the fiscal guidance until well into the year.

L: That didn't come out of here.

K: Nothing we can do about it.

L: The only think I am concerned about is that OMB is trying to reduce fiscal guidance.

K: I won't have that. That's why we need a DPRC. My strategy is in terms of ______ requirements. They will take effect That will shake up George and he will come with us but if the decision in fiscal terms he will try to get it down. So we need to discuss needs. If we can get that done then I can keep Geo. from whakking at it.

L: Maybe stories came from OMB. Geo. called and said the fiscal guidance is not real for '73.

K: I told him to wait until I saw ______ for '73 before making stating objections.

L: I wanted to call you about -- through Ehrlichman, Whittaker, and Train -- they want me to announce this week we will be off Calabia by '75.

K: They told me this morning.

L: I would like to hedge that, saying if we do certain things by the end of '72 and people want us off, we will be. But make changes in the next 18 months to see if we can make it acceptable. If not, then we will get off. So not come out now and say -- if certain changes made people there might want us to stay. Does the President want me to say we will abandon it?

K: I will check with him and call you in an hour.

L: Perret (?) says we will get out. But I want to say if people will change their minds and want us to stay --

K: Your position is that if you make changes and if it takes at end of the period you want them to stay, you will get out by the end of '75.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

10:15 a.m. 3/29/71

-2-

L: We will say that. See the fix difference?

K: Very well. Let me check with Ehrlichman and see what I can get from him and if not there, then go to the President.

L: I hate to go to the President. Carl Wallace is being pressed to make the announcement without any guidance at all.

K: I will see what I can do.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Adm. Gaylor/Kissinger

11:06 a.m.

3/29/71

G: I called because I know you are concerned about the intelligence shortcomings in recent operations and it reminded and reinforced to me that we should talk to you about the sources of these things and what credence you can put to it. I am concerned about cut outs between you and understanding ? ? ? ? . I wrote you a letter but I know what your correspondence is like. I thought you might be able to use a senior knowledgeable man in Wayne Smith's office in the NSC. What you can get out on current intelligence on ? ? ? ? . It might be handy to have me to talk with WSAG. I think it's urgent that you understand these things.

K: How do we do it technically?

G: When you come back to the East Coast you could come up to Baltimore.

K: I am interested in it and let me work something out.

G: Between what we are doing and what you are getting, that you should be aware of.

K: Let me work something out.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Marquis Childs
3/29/71 11:10 a.m.

C: How are you?

K: Okay, how about you?

C: Good. I was wondering if there was any chance of my coming to see you while you are on the West Coast.

K: Sure.

C: Would Wednesday or Thursday be good?

K: Yes, you want to have lunch on Wednesday?

C: Fine. I'll fly to Los Angeles, and get a car to drive down, I think that's the best way to do it. Good, lunch on Wednesday.

K: Yes. It won't be good, but it will be private.

C: Good, thanks a lot.

K: Come to the Western White House -- it will be in my office or on the patio. Where can we reach you in case there's any trouble?

C: I'm staying at the Huntington Hotel in San Francisco, and the number is 474-5400.

K: Good. I'm not expecting any, but just in case.

C: Okay. About 1:00?

K: Yes, that will be fine.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Admiral Moorer

3/29/71 11:15 a.m.

K: I see our tigers couldn't go through with it.

M: ... Got another target

K: No, but we don't want them to look ridiculous. We don't want them to land on a mountain top in an uninhabited area.

M: No, we have a bona fide target. That place they were going was the best target, along highway 99. But they now have one on 922 which is ...

K: Yes, I know where it is.

M: But I'll make this point.

K: Don't do it to please us out here. To piddle away things is counter-productive.

M: No, we're not doing that at all.

K: Okay.

M: But I'll make that quite clear again. I have talked to ______ over the weekend 10 or 12 times.

K: Okay, you understand that everyone here feels you have done super-human things.

M: I understand that.

K: So don't worry about us.

M: I happen to agree with you, so I'm working on it.

K: The press is so eager to screw us -- anything that makes us look ridiculous is counter-productive.

M: Yes. We got the photographic business down south of here cleared away now.

K: Good, and how about that munitions dump. Did you ever get pictures of that?

M: We got some ______ photos-- we can see some tremendous explosions. Did you see the wire from Wyeand?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Admiral Moorer

3/29/71 11:15 a.m. p. 2

K: Yes.

M: I'm not satisfied with the photographs . . .

K: I saw that wire, but when it says a thousand __tons (?)__ of meat -- I don't know how those fellows count.

M: They're doing it on the basis of a couple of hundred pound packages.

K: Anyway it's large.

M: . . . . . .

K: I don't doubt that they have problems and I don't doubt that what we did was right and effective. Our problem is our enemies internationally. If we could keep them shut up we would be all right.

M: I'm working on them. They are not going to back me down.

K: They aren't going to back us down either. Did that DMZ thing go all right?

M: Yes, now they have moved them north on the authority we have and are working out a new goal.

K: You'll get the authority. Just the request up here.

M: Okay, I'll be right here. I probably won't come out for the meeting on Greece, because I've got General Angelis with me. I'm working on Greece through him.

K: Okay, good.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Safran/Kissinger
12:00 noon 3/29/71

S: I will be taking advantage of spring vacation to go to Israel. Is there anything you want me to look out for or anything?

K: No, I would be interested in your appraisal of their mood when you get back. Some people in Washington think they are willing to make greater concessions then the government.

S: On security even the most moderate --

K: I just don't know.

S: If there's anything along the lines I am proposing I think there would be a strong --

K: What are you proposing?

S: N&K Mutual Defense Pact.

K: Out of the question and why punish Israellike that?

S: In a context of a peace settlement.

K: Anyone who has us as an ally is in deep trouble and if a former ally, even worse.

S: There has not been a formal ally that has been challenged. Never. The Israelis are worried about the Soviets.

K: I don't think it's possible to get it.

S: Despite what Fulbright said a few months ago?

K: No, that's my impression.

S: On the basis of collective guarantees I know they will not accept it. The skepticism is true on this score but bylateral American ______. I had all sorts of decisions on "iron clad" U.S. assurances.

K: Look into it and let me know what you think. But it's not my idea.

S: Of course.

K: I would like to find out about their thinking.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Safran/Kissinger

12:00 noon

3/29/71

-2-

S: I will be in touch with you when I get back.

K: When are you leaving?

S: Fri. or Sat. Any greetings to anybody?

K: Allan. Colck, or Narcus. Thanks for calling and call when you come back.
How did Rothschild work out?

S: In view of the situation in the area he would like to remain "fluid" and after
he saw you he told me that he decided to help. After that he also wrote a
number of things and used explanation of before we go to town with that project.
But in view of the situation he thinks we ought to --

K: Is he working for the Prime Mihister now?

S: Yes.

K: I never heard from him.

S: Entered into functions recently. He went on a two month trip after he saw you.

K: OK.

S: If you -- On Rogtschild if you do get a chance to drop a note and --

K: I will perhaps be in London in a couple of months and perhaps we see him there.
I understand my colleagues are writing a joint letter to me.

S: I haven't seen it yet. You could cool agitation with military success and when things seem good they shut up and when it seems to be going wrong, everyone screams.

K: I will hear from you when I get back.

S: Remember the Rothschild thing.

K: I would rather do it in person then writing. I will be in England till the
end of June.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN
Bob Hope/Kissinger
2:37 p.m. 3/29/71

H: I don't know any girls!

K: Then why am I calling you? They gave me the wrong number. The President asked me to call you and tell you how outraged he was at the award business.

H: It's a disgrace. I wish you could read the letter from them saying my work (had been in the good of the country, etc.). And then to let 3 or 4 jerks upset the thing. The IATS banquet at the Century Plaza the Rabbi said we have to help him because ?? ISSUE. But when I heard dissidents because of unequivocal ISSUE.

K: The people are with you. All organizations let themselves get panicked by groups of fanatics. These people cry about lack of communication and then they run to the newspapers. What I wanted to talk about in addition to this was to tell you How things are going in Laos. Some of the news stories frighten me to death. Our assumption here is that we have an extensive policy review to be sure we haven't kidding ourselves. We have turned up more supplies in Laos then in Cambodia last year. In addition to bombing and supplies we picked up this is going to have a major impact for the next year and this year. The 150 tanks that had near Tchepone would have come to First Corps this year. We got 108 down. We destroyed 100,000 tons of supplies. If the other side has luck they may have in SVN to keep up the level of last year but not enough for a big offensive.

H: That's great.

K: We are taking a shellacking in the press but friends should not be discouraged because it will turn out all right.

H: That's good. That was too bad about those 33 kids.

K: Between you and me, that was the fault of the commander. We aren't saying that. They got in and raised them during their sleeping. Negligence. They weren't even in combat. We only killed 12 of theirs. So you know someone goofed. They tried it in Khe Sanh last week and we lost 2 and they lost 50.

H: I talked with the President last week at Camp David. He was optimistic about it.

K: We will do all right if people don't panic. The President is firm and when the going is tough he is at his best.

H: I played Jacksonville Univ., W. Va. and Mobile and people are nice and I try and tell them how I feel. They are reading between the lines and go past the negative stuff. But some propaganda working over there would be marvelous.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

-2-

H: (cont) SVN make released.

K: The press won't pick it up. We give the press some of the statistics out there and they didn't use it. They show SVN corpses but won't print NVN. Nice talking to you. If you come to Washington and have a lunch free, let me know.

H: How's the President's schedule this week? I would like to get him on the golf course.

K: I will mention it to Chapin. Or call him.

H: I will when the heat is off his day.

K: How would be pleased to talk with you. That would be nice.

H: All right.

By. NARA, Dato' 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger

2:47 p.m.

3/29/71

K: There was one other matter I forgot to mention. It's come up again. I have the impression that the President isn't very happy about proceeding along the lines of the China discussion and what he wants to do is send someone over there to talk with Chiang (?) and see what he wants to do. He mentioned sending Bob Murphy.

R: I spoke to him before he left and recommended it. I recommended Bob Murphy.

K: Good.

R: I never know if he forgets these things.

K: We both know how he does these things.

R: I just talked with Connally about it. He was concerned about what Connally said. He didn't understand it. I am going to have Marshall Green talk with him. Connally said he agreed and thought we should take a position that we will admit Communist China so long as Taiwan stays in. He said let's announce it. I said there's a speech written in your folder. He said he didn't understand.

K: I think you and me and the President should get together when he gets back.

R: I said there was no pressure.

K: He is in no anguish. Before it got to be far wanted to mention it to you to be sure it's not too far off the fact.

R: I think when Connally understands he will change his views. He did on the phone. I said think about it some more. If Communist China is admitted to membership and Taiwan independent and we persist in the present policy, the President will be seriously damaged.

K: It would be interpreted as a cynical number (?). By sticking to that it will be speeding entry of Communist China.

R: Said it is that or out of __________. By failure to take a stand you have brought about the worst of all possible worlds.

K: He looks like a cynic. What he would like to do is show concern because if that

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Rogers/Kissinger

2:47 p.m. 3/29/71

-2-

K: (cont) it's correct Chiang Kai-Shek should see it too.

R: But if he acquiesces his whole life is shattered. It's been his whole world.

K: Yes. It's best not to make a decision out here and not do anything diplomatically until next week.

R: Bob Murphy could go out fairly soon. April 7? From here?

K: From Washington. He will be back a week from today.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
Secretary Laird
3/29/71 2:55 p.m.

K: On that island, I talked to Ehrlichman and he is willing to go along on your proposal which as I understand is to give till the end of '72. If at the end, the people aren't satisfied, then it will be at the end of 175.

M: That's right.

K: He said that's fine if you want to do that. Think it was the right position. So you, see, I do help you out occasionally.

L: I'm glad you are helping me out Henry.

K: I talked to Ehrlichman and Haldeman this morning. I am making sure they will give me a chance to comment and work it out with you in case there are any problems.

K:L: It's so much better if we can work it out that way.

K: I know. You've been terrific.

L: Well Henry, the backbiting I've been taking from the Bureau of the Budget isn't fair.

K: Well, you're sure as hell not getting it from me. You have been a great supporter.

L: I had a meeting today with the Joint Chiefs. I'll talk to you about it when you're back. They have got several good plans they're working on. We'll wait till you get back -- there's no big hurry on it now.

K: No, if there is I'll let you know.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Governor Reagan

3/29/71 3:05 p.m.

K: I wanted to talk with you because every time I read a paper I get a heart attack about how dangerous things are in Vietnam. I'm going to send you, just for your own information, the results of an internal study we made here. But in the meantime I got our top intelligence people together and said what was the consequence of this. The opinion was that Laos made a bigger difference than Cambodia. The amount of supplies picked up, the amount used by supplying four combat divisions, and extra men. We estimate 20 to 25 thousand tons didn't get through. The judgment is that we have a big offensive in I Corps. Second, the casualties to the North Vietnamese must have been enormous. We have estimated 14,000, but we think this time that figure is low. The bombing was intensive, and most of it was over jungles so we couldn't tell the exact extent of the damage. Finally, we think the best the enemy can do in supplies is maintain the levels of 70-71, but they can't make any big offensives. The President is standing firm and anyone with him won't be embarrassed. Second, we think he'll look good six months from now.

R: I'm glad to hear this. I just came back from these briefers in the Mid West. Things were said contesting this. I talked with my fingers crossed behind my back as if I had complete knowledge and said a lot of what you have just said including the critics will be embarrassed a year from now like the critics of Cambodia are now.

K: I think you are safe to say that. We've had setbacks, but I think it will pay off. The next troop announcement will be a fighting speech.

R: One more question. I know at least four battalions got badly mauled. Was there...

K: Our judgment is that most of the units fought extremely well. They were outnumbered two to one. They had trouble at the beginning coordinating air with ground observers because of the language. It's the first time that the ground observers had not been American. And the weather closed in in many stages. But given all those hinderances, they did extremely well. Two ranger units had never fought in large battles before. In the first week they didn't do well, and you can't blame that on the circumstances. But they were pulled out of the line and when they were put back, they did well. They withdrew in good order and did a good job.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Governor Reagan

3/29/71 3:05 p.m.

page 2

R: I gathered from briefings in Washington that in going in we thought we were going to find ______. Didn't know which was going to be done.

K: Never any intention of ______ the enemy's power like in a normal war. ______ threw every reserve into this battle -- pulled divisions out of North and South Vietnam. Abrams estimates he lost 8 of 13 regiments and ______ out of 32 battalions were badly chewed up. He can keep going a few more weeks, but won't be able to do any more major operations the rest of this year.

R: Then it doesn't matter that he didn't pull back.

K: It proves only that he was at the edge of an abyss. We think if we don't pull back now we will have a better chance of negotiation. One of the things that breaks your heart is to have people undercutting their President.

R: Well, thank you very much. I'm glad to have this. I won't have to backtrack on anything I've said and I can say a little more.

K: Exactly and I'll send you that piece of paper. You going to be in Los Angeles this week?

R: Yes, it's possible that I may come to San Clemente at the President's invitation.

K: Oh, in that case, I'll see you here because I'd like to hand it to you personally.

TELECON

John Mitchell

3/29/71 - brought in

TAPTO . 5/28/71

M: Henry?

K: John, how are you?

M: I'm fine; I hope I didn't wake you up.

K: No.

M: I had a call this morning from Tom Pappas and Tasca over from Athens. They say that the number two man of the junta is over here for the purpose of visiting the Air Force Academy in Colorado. They thought that perhaps a private visit with our friend might be of help in inducing these people to move in the correct direction. I know it has its pluses and minuses but . . .

K: Right, how do I get in touch with him?

M: With him?

K: Well, I can do it through the Air Force Academy.

M: Yeah, that's right. The military flew him over here. He is undoubtedly under the guidance and so forth of the Air Force.

K: What's his name?

M: His name is Angelisi, he's the number two guy.

K: Is he the chief of the armed forces there?

M: I don't know, they referred to him as the number two man in the junta.

K: Yeah, I think he's the chief of the chief of the armed forces; I think we've seen him already last year in Naples.

M: Oh did you?

K: Let me look into it.

M: All right. If you'd have, after a determination is made, if you would let me know because they're going to call back tomorrow, whichever way it goes.

K: Right. I may not be able to let you know before tomorrow.

M: That's perfectly all right.

K: Good, I'll let you know tomorrow.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

The President
(brought in 3/29/71)

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi Henry. You sleep well?

K: Yes, very well. It's really a very restful place out here.

P: What's new today. Got anything on the wires or anything of interest?

K: There's nothing of any great consequence Mr. President.
Apparently Yahya has got control of East Pakistan.

P: Good. There're sometimes the use of power is . . .

K: The use of power against seeming odds pays off. Cause all the experts were saying that 30,000 people can't get control of 75 million. Well, this may still turn out to be true but as of this moment it seems to be quiet.

P: Well maybe things have changed. But hell, when you look over the history of *xxx* nations 30,000 well-disciplined people can take 75 million any time. *xxx* what the Spanish did when they came in and took the Incas and all the rest. Look what the British did when they took India.

K: That's right.

P: To name just a few.

K: Well in those cases the people were more or less neutral. In the Inca case they expected a god to come from the West . . .

P: That sort of . . . yeah, put them out.

K: Which helped a bit.

P: That's right. But anyway I *keep* wish him well. I just . . . I mean it's better not to have it come apart than to have to come apart.

K: That's right. The long-term impact of its coming about . . . people now say that the fellow Mujib in the East is really quite moderate and for a Bengali that's right. But that's an extremely unstable situation

page 2

By NARA, Date 5/26

there and the radical groups are likely to gain increasing strength.

P: This will be only one blip in the battle and then it will go on and on and on and it's like everything in the period we live in isn't it since World War II.

P: Where revolution in itself, independence is a virtue which of course it never was. That wasn't true at the time of the French revolution either and it isn't any more true today. The real question is whether anybody can run the god-damn place.

K: That's right and of course the Bengalis have been extremely difficult to govern throughout their history.

P: The Indians can't govern them either.

K: No, well actually the Indians who one normally would expect to favor a breakup of Pakistan aren't so eager for this one. Because they're afraid that East Pakistan may in time, or East Bengal may in time have an attraction for West Bengal with Calcutta and also that the Chinese will gain a lot of influence there.

P: Interesting.

K: And that, I think, is a good chance.

P: Yep. Nothing in Southeast Asia of interest particularly either. I just scanned the papers.

K: No, no, there's sporadic . . .

P: I saw this piece by MacArthur in the Los Angeles Times.

K: That isn't so bad actually when one reads . . .

P: I didn't read it; I just read the first . . . Did you read it?

K: Yeah I read it.

P: He's a pretty good writer you know. Don't you think he's a pretty good writer?

K: Yes, and he's been writing fairly well in recent weeks about it. It's a pretty fair assessment of Giap's strategy. It makes it pretty clear

s

NARA, Date 5/26

page 3

that he was at the end of his rope also, that this was the biggest concentration of North Vietnamese forces ever and that he was just throwing everything into one roll . . .

P: Does he leave out the possibility that it's too early to say who won or lost?

K: That's right. Oh yes, he makes that clear. He says it's too early . . . He says despite it looks like a defeat it doesn't appear as a defeat when an army withdraws but he recognizes that the North Vietnamese suffered heavy losses with the disruption of the trail system. It's a pretty fair balance.

P: One thing about this that I think is quite interesting. You know when they try to compare it with Dien Bien Phu and Dunkirk and the rest there are two differences. One, there was no massive capture of arms . . . I mean, I mean . . . Right?

K: Right.

P: Second, there was no massive surrenders.

K: That's right.

P: Right?

K: Absolutely.

P: When you have a . . . The difference between withdrawal and defeat is really the question 'Did they come out with their arms and their men' and "Did they surrender". In other words, you always have casualties, casualties on both sides but isn't that the significant point here?

K: That's right and the fact that if the South Vietnamese . . . the fact that they withdrew in such good order really is a testimony to Vietnamization.

P: Well another point is, which of course has been so badly obscured, is that while the time is . . . . why they move out quicker . . . they were always intending to withdraw. In other words, we would have paid some price in withdrawing I think even if we'd stayed another six weeks.

K: Oh, no question.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

P: See what I mean? Cause they would never believe it you know.
I think part of the deal . . . the whole strategy was to withdraw . . .

K: If we could have posted it a little better we could have . . .

P: . . . All we could have said, they've just told us what
the hell we could have said, "Now they're going to withdraw and we're
going to . . . It's a tough maneuver" And yak, yak, yak, and that's that.

K: But it would have, . . . we would have . . . they would have
suffered losses in withdrawing and there would have been people who were
hacking away . . . After all Mr. President when we got out of Cambodia
everyone was poor-mouthing that too.

P: Yeah, they were, weren't they.

K: And the reason why I now am fairly confident about the achievements of Laos is that even if CIA reluctantly admits that we achieved something in Cambodia, at the end of the operation they gave us an analysis that we picked up only 30 percent of the supplies.

P: Looked like a blip didn't it? Well I'll tell you this. There isn't
any question in my mind on this one Henry, that this achieved far more than
Cambodia.

K: That is becoming increasingly clear.

P: And that really . . . Sombody has got to get up and say 'The
King has no clothes' and say that's true. Because when you think of it
now . . . in terms of the supplies and so forth it just had to do that.

K: It's also interesting the fact that the troops are out now for a
week they haven't started any big convoys south yet. Because apparently
we really ripped up those stations along the way which they need to keep
them going.

that despite

P: Now that it's out a week, I think that the whole thing is . . .
they'll have all the analysis this week in the Sunday papers and they'll
have analysis in the news magazines and then they'll have to go on to
another subject and we'll come back with our own announcement and that
will be the next phase in the battle.

K: Exactly.

page 5

BY NARA, Date 5/26

P: I think we have to have in mind the, of course . . . that our Democratic candidates and the Democrats generally may jump right in here. Now this could prove to be, as I said yesterday, -- it isn't any wishful thinking -- but it could prove to be a very serious mistake for them. I mean to jump in . . .

K: That's what I think . . .

P: And then particularly if we pull it off. You know they were playing a pretty clever little line there, that well, after all, they had been supporting the Administration and all this coming out . . .

K: I think that would be much harder to deal with. If what we do works, then if they had taken a policy of support or aid had said January 1, 1973 they could emerge as pretty responsible. This way I think we have a devastating record of how these people turned on their President every time things got tough. I talked to somebody yesterday on the East Coast whose wife is studying at Wellesley while he's getting a degree and had said a Professor there wanted to get his history class pass a resolution for a fixed date and only two supported it out of a class of 40 and the other 38 girls were against it, which amazed me. His point was that the students are getting fed up with this constant agitation by their professors.

P: Well, we're going to have to play it very steady and tough and I'm going to turn all the partisans loose on these guys this next week. They're going to have to start attacking them for aid and comfort to the enemy. I think if you get to every columnist you know on that point that these people are on a very very bad wicket here. That, you know, the line that I gave at that breakfast.

K: I thought that was . . . I tried to reconstruct it yesterday and wrote it down just so that we have a record of it because that was really . . . And also it was tactically clever but it also took a tremendous amount of courage for the President to step up to them and say I have full responsibility for this: If it fails I'll take the responsibility but don't you make it fail.

P: But these fellows are . . . These fellows are . . . The other side . . . I think what ought to be done is to, just a few . . . I think if a very responsible columnist would get up and hit this, even though he's on our side, like Alsop or Dick Wilson, you know, run over in your own mind the people. There's Alsop, Wilson, Bill White is another one.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

And the idea that the Democrats are playing this partisan, are going to
run into a stiff uppercut because. First on the partisan thing, I've already
laid the foundation to say "You want to be partisan, I'll point out the eight
year record you know. I'm not going to blame it on Johnson; I'm going to
blame it on Kennedy too. And point out that when we left Washington there
was nobody dead in Vietnam and there were 30,000 dead when we came
back. Then come on and say and there was no plan to get out of there.
Then come and finish them up and say now we tried to end this thing and
we're ending it in an honorable way and they sabotaged it . . . they sabo-
taged a peaceful . . . you know, a winning the peace. They sabotaged
it. They ended the war but they lost the peace. It's just, you know, that's
the kind of thing . . .

MacArthur makes

K: Another point is similar to our own conclusions that it's now
impossible he thinks for the North Vietnamese to launch an attack for the
remainder of this year.

P: He says that?

K: Yeah.

P: Well you see he's . . . he
If/says that that's gotta be . . . What
is his evaluation of the morale in South Vietnam. Does he go into that?

K: He doesn't go into that but he says that they have . . . that they
fought very well until . . . except for occasional incidents in landing zones
and he says no one wants to be the last one off a fire base. And that I think
would be true if you had crack American rangers in there.

P: Oh hell. This idea . . . there have been a few instances of
going down with the ship in the Navy and the rest, but in the Army it's
never been that way Henry, you know that.

K: That's right.

P: You know, with draftees and everything. And I understand it.
We all think we're going to be brave. But you know, men panic and ships
go down . . . The last man on the lifeboat and the rest. You know the
whole history? Isn't that something?

K: Absolutely.

P: But anyway, the thing is that I want to be sure . . . I think it's
time to get some of the columnists interested to start counter-attacking
these people on this . . .

By NARA Date 5/26

TELECON

K: Hello, Mr. President.

P: I wanted to be sure that in the handling of that fire base thing that they don't . . . people have the good sense not to have a bunch of god-damned press people come in there and all that sort of thing, take pictures and . . .

K: Right.

P: I don't know . . . who's handling it? Is that Abrams again?

K: That's Abrams, yeah.

P: Well, what is the situation?

K: That's Abrams and I will check immediately on how they're going to handle it and let you know.

P: Well, I would think that it would be handled just as a routine matter. Hell we've had other times we've lost 24 or 5 you know and it's just one of those things. We haven't had any in the last 4 or 5 months.

K: That's right. Well, we haven't had any for quite a while like this and . . .

P: But Haig just contributes to negligence, huh?

K: To a considerable extent. He says a unit that does its job can't get into a position like this. Because there were only 12 enemy killed and that indicated to him that they sneaked in there.

P: Hmmm. Now for Christ's sakes, they don't get those figures out either. They don't have, to, you understand?

K: Right.

P: You don't say that in this way and the other thing they were surprised, overrun, etc. They'll build it into a hell of a story unless it's handled properly for a change. And they've screwed every story up so far. Find out who that Major was who put out that statement?

K: I've been trying to reach Moorer . . .

P: Somebody on Abrams' staff obviously.

K: I've been trying to get Moorer who was in New York, but I'll get him later this morning. In fact I'll get him within the next half hour.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

P: Get to Vogt. Let him find out. They ought to . . . rather than us trying to find out they ought to find out. That's their job.

K: Right.

P: On such a thing like that. You know, the point being not to . . . can't do anything to them. God dammit we gotta know, they ought to be a little more careful of what they're . . . having junior officers go out and talking to the press. The services are getting like everybody else, State Department officials and the rest. They go out and try to . . .

K: Well, in Saigon they are just terribly bad. They have got the press running all over them and they have lost any sense of proportion.

P: Well, I just don't want . . . I want the statements made by people who know the whole thing and not people who just giving bits and pieces.

K: Absolutely. There's no excuse for it.

P: That's what we're talking about here. This fellow shouldn't have popped off like that mainly because, as I said, not because . . . it wasn't all the picture. It was not a . . . You know a Major, for example doesn't really know everything that's going on.

K: Certainly not.

P: He's seeing bits and pieces of it.

K: Certainly not. And actually even that Major when one went further down in the story had it in better balance. But Majors shouldn't talk to the press at all.

P: Cause they don't know how.

K: Exactly.

P: The press always sucks them in to one statement they're going to use and then they think they're giving a balanced story and what happens is that the unbalanced part comes out.

K: That's it, they give them a headline.

P: That's right, that's right. It's really something the way our people seem to have a compulsion to talk to the press. I just think, all through

TELECON
The President
(Brought in 3/29/71) p. 3

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

government you've just got to put a tighter rein on this exposure to the press. People who talk to the press have to be people on the highest levels who know everything, and nobody else. This press running around with junior people and they get them drunk or they talk to them...

K: Flatter them. No one wants to admit he doesn't know anything so they make it up.

P: Tell them things, so the press will run with that and build a hugh story. As a matter of fact, really the handling of the whole Lam Son operation and so forth was mainly the result of the press talking to a very, very few one-sided people.

K: Absolutely.

P: Now, that's just all there is to it.

K: Plus the press

P: Oh yes, they wanted to find it that way, I admit. But the point is they're biased that way and ... like Arbuckle of AP as I told you, I knew it was the same guy and it did turn out to be the same guy that had been down there in ...

K: In Cambodia.

P: That's right. And here our press office out there didn't even know it. Theirs knew it though.

K: Well, they gave us another figure ... they gave us another name.

P: Laird knew it; he said it's Arbuckle, it's the same guy and bad. It has been for five years. Well, that's my point, that the South Vietnamese get a bad rap out of this, mainly because they show a few battered up things and don't show the good side of it. But that's all right. That will work out ... But on this thing, I just don't want it badly handled. I want for them to handle right. I mean just as a ... sort of carry it over a couple of days or something like that. Can't they do that or ...

K: Well, I just have to find out how far it's gone up to now. These guys all talk. They have daily briefings and there's just no telling what they've already said.

P: Well, okay, fine. Also get me a report now over the weekend again on the Saigon morale, the armed forces, the political situation there ... I want to know what that is right up to date and another thing, I want Helms to get off his ass and get something more effective on that black stuff in

UNCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON
The President
(Brought in 3/29/71) p. 4

North Vietnam, you know.

K: Right.

P: Do you understand?

K: Of course, I'll get that...

P: I don't think that was strong enough, vigorous enough -- it was too much like the Voice of America and not like CIA's supposed to be.

K: I'll get on that immediately. I completely agree on that.

P: He doesn't understand the difference. I mean they're not there to... like the _______________. They're supposed to be there ripping the hell out of the other side. Just like they rip the side out of us.

K: Right, Mr. President. I'll get on that.

TELECON
The President

(Brought in 3/29/71)

in middle of conversation)

P: ... thinking with further reference to our propaganda front. The thing about most newsmen, columnists and so forth is that they like to be a little ahead sometimes so that they'll it, not because they believe but only because they like to be proved right to take what appears to be the weaker side of the story and build it up. Now that's something that can be played on at this time if it's done cleverly. Two points that should be made ... you can use that business about division -- that must be gotten out very heavily about division in North Vietnam.

K: Right, well now that we got from communications intelligence.

P: Perfectly all right, perfectly all right. Just say that there are reports that ...

K: Right.

P: Don't need to say where the hell you got it.

K: Right.

P: They don't know. Reports that ... reports from Hanoi indicate ... hanging on to some ... The other thing is to get the idea that the whole week should be that a sober assessment now of this ... tends more and more to show that the North Vietnamese, if they claimed a ... victory, appearing victotry, that they had a ... they suffered much greater losses than they could afford to suffer. You see, there's a very good case to make here where these guys might want to write it and actually it's true. It's only ... because they've all gone overboard on the other thing based on just a three-day battle and a three-day report at the end and they've lost sight of the whole deal.

K: Oh absolutely. They were all focused on the last few days which were partly deliberate, I mean mostly deliberate except for that first series of attacks.

P: That's correct.

K: And there's just no way of getting out of there as this fellow MacArthur wrote today, for any unit without ... not wanting to be the last man off the landing zone.

P: That's all right. And they trying to make that out and so forth so that's fine, but the point is that the enormous casualties that they suffered

By. 5/26

NARA, Dato

5/26

and so forth and that where are they now. I mean, you know, they've
been riding this story all week about the big punch and the big guns in
the DMZ and all that sort of thing. Well now, that's nonsense...

K: Incidentally, we're going to hit them tonight.

P: Hit those guns?

K: Yeah.

P: Good. With what? B-52s?

K: With tactical air.

P: Use anything they need. They've got some good fixes on them
have they?

K: Yeah, they've got them . . . they needed weather.

P: Yeah, and they can . . . Well, that's good. This is a good
time to do it. And then the other thing will go off at what . . . at 6:00
our time?

K: Well, the other thing will go off at 7:05 our time . . .

P: Pacific time huh?

K: Pacific time assuming the landing zone isn't too hot. But they
think it won't be.

P: Yeah, I see. Well, in other words they see what the situation . . .
What I think, this one will be somewhat of a surprise probably.

K: Unless they have, unless they've penetrated the South Vietnamese,
this ought to be a surprise. And it's right on their main south route.

P: Right.

K: It will disrupt about a week and they're going to leave mines
behind. All agreed, but it's again one of those things where your interest
in it gave them the courage to go ahead with it.

P: Well they have to do it. I just wish that they would do the
Cambodia thing to because I don't think that would cost them nearly as
much casualties as this.

By

NARA, Dale

5/26

TELECON
The President

(Brought in 3/29/71) p. 3

K: Oh, no comparison. The tragedy in Cambodia was the death of Tri. He was running them ragged and you can literally see that from the minute he died the operations just lost their punch. They're still doing all right and they're still keeping them. . . Well, it's mostly now a first-class defensive action, that is they're keeping them from moving toward Route 7. Now, of course, last year, we would have congratulated ourselves for having Route 7 open and Kom Pang Cham in Cambodian hands. Now we've sent a very strong message to Ladd today that the Nixon Doctrine cannot be interpreted as an excuse not to make a maximum effort in getting the Cambodians to fight for themselves

(End of tape)

Here the hell you got it.

By. NARA, Dale 5/26

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi Henry

K: Two items I thought that you should know. I just talked to Laird. One is they are planning that operation we were talking about to end the thing on an upbeat probably for tomorrow.

P: What does that entail, an airlift into the . . .

K: That's right, but in a flat area where there's . . .

P: How many people?

K: About a thousand. And as long as they'll stay three or four days and they'll leave.

P: What's the purpose of it, to just disrupt some . . .

K: That's the road trunks and where all the Ho Chi Minh trails come together.

P: And there's no significant enemy force there?

K: Well, it doesn't look that way.

P: All right.

K: And it will at least indicate that the thing didn't end with just a rout.

P: Yeah. Well they want to do it?

K: They want to do it, yeah. And I think it has some pluses.

P: How is it going to be postured in terms of announcing it and so forth?

K: They'll do it from out there. The Vietnamese will do it.

P: They'll say there're doing it . . .

K: As a continuation of the operation. That's what they've been saying all along anyway.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

P: They've prepared the way for it I guess.

K: That's right.

P: Said this is a raid on the road junction and it's the last three or four days, so when they come out they won't say they've been driven out.

K: That's right. They'll say it from the beginning.

P: All right.

K: And we'll get a look at the plan within the next two hours, so I'll know more details then. One piece of bad news, an American company in the southern part of I Corps, not in the combat area, was overrun yesterday at night and suffered about 24 dead and it looks like gross negligence because they got in there with a Sapper unit and they mustn't have been patrolling. Haig thinks it looks like total negligence

[end of tape]

By.

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCONE

John Mitchell/Kissinger

3/29/71 afternoon

K: John, I've talked with the President about this Greek and Angelis, and we saw him in Naples last year. So we have everything that he's got to say and he's heard everything the President has to say.

M: OK

K: So, the President feels that we shouldn't see him this time though if he's still in Washington next week, I'll be glad to see him.

M: All right,

K: He is in Washington tomorrow, I know.

M: How shall I -- I'll just advise Pappas and let it go at that.

K: That's right and I'll be working with Moorer who's hosting him about whether I can -- whether he'll be there long enough for me to see him.

M: I would believe that probably that channel would be good enough to impress upon them that we are looking for some action toward reform. It isn't necessary for the President to do this.

K: That's right.

M: All right.

K: The President feels it would be misinterpreted if he saw him. It would look as if he's going in bed with them and if he says publicly he did it in order to urge them to reform he's putting too much heat on them.

M: All right, I think that's probably as good a judgment as any on both sides. I'll advise Pappas and he'll advise Tasca the reasons for it and if he's here next week and your back, he can see you.

K: Right. Good. I'll be keeping in touch with you, John, about any developments out here.

M: All right, sir. Does anybody look kindly on the peace negotiations in connection with the up-coming --

K: I've raised it with the President and he's still kicking it around.

M: That's third item or the sub-item in connection with what these people are doing in this country is rather intriguing to me.

K: What do you mean?

By NARA, Date 5/26

John Mitchell/Kissinger

3/29/71 afternoon

-2-

M: I'm talking about the activities of the North Vietnamese and the rest of them are exciting and accentuating over here for the April-May operations.

K: Oh, yeah. Which is the third item though?

M: That's it.

K: Oh, I see. Oh, the peace negotiations?

N: No, the peace negotiations are something that may very well be considered for that talk because of the off-again, on-again Paris thing and --

K: Oh, I get what you mean. Yeah.

M: The sub-item is the fact that if you read your cables -- that's not the word --

K: I know what you mean.

M: OK?

K: Good.

M: It's extremely interesting as to their efforts to be more active in this up-coming April-May operation.

K: Yeah. Well, they sure as hell are pulling out all the stops, there's no question about that.

M: If they are, and I don't know how to assess them, it might be that some of them might be considered in connection with the up-coming troop withdrawal statement.

K: Right.

M: I hope the weather's changing.

K: It was good yesterday.

M: It's changed to the worst. I understand it's been quite foggy and cold.

K: It's foggy and cold today.

M: Then it's changed in the wrong direction.

K: That's right.

M: OK.