938

93

A CHI-I WORLD
(CONTAINMENT AND CONFRONTATION)

A CRISIS (AND A SOVIET THREAT) REVIVES NATO;

THE WARSAW PACT RESTORES BLOC DISCIPLINE;

JAPAN JOINS "EXTENDED" NATO;

CHINA ACCEPTS SOVIET LEADERSHIP (AND PROTECTION);

A SUBSEQUENT CHINESE-SOVIET SQUEEZE PLAY ON ASIAN
PERIPHERY FORCES NATIONS ON THE PERIPHERY TO CHOOSE
SIDES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND SOVIET BLOCS;

U.S. AND EXTENDED NATO "CONSOLIDATE" AFRICA AND LATIN
AMERICA; AND THE

U.N. WITHERS.

938
94

A KAPPA-I WORLD
('COMMUNISM ON THE MARCH')

1. U.S.S.R. HAS SEIZED WEST BERLIN, SIGNED EAST GERMAN PEACE TREATY, THREATENS IRAN, AFGHANISTAN; ONCE AGAIN DOMINATES CHINA

2. LAOS, SOUTH VIET NAM HAVE FALLEN TO COMMUNISTS; CAMBODIA TEETERING

3. JAPAN NEUTRALIST, ANTI-AMERICAN, HYSTERICAL; INDIA, INDONESIA, BURMA SIGN TRI-PARTITE "NONAGGRESSION" PACTS WITH U.S.S.R., CHINA

4. WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION STRAINED; ECONOMIC GROWTH FLAGGING; SOME REVIVAL OF COMMUNIST VOTING STRENGTH IN FRANCE, ITALY, BENELUX

5. NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES UNDER EQUIPPED, UNDER-STAFFED; NATO NUCLEAR FORCE HAMPERED BY EUROPEAN DISSENSION, WISHFUL THINKING

938

98

THREE PLAUSIBLE U.S.S.R.'S - 1975

"STAGNATING U.S.S.R.": STAGNATING PARTY; PASSIVE COLLECTIVE RULE; MODERATE LIVING STANDARDS; LOSING LAST VESTIGES OF HOLD OVER SATELLITES AND WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT; IS SURPRISINGLY UNAMBITIOUS AND UNassertIVE ON WORLD SCENE; INTELLIGENTSIA DISAPPOINTED, BITTER, AND CONSCIOUS OF SOVIET BACKWARDNESS; YOUTH DISAFFECTED; ETC.

"RETREAT AND CONSOLIDATION": COMPETENT, COLLECTIVE RULE MAKES PLANNED RETREAT FROM FOREIGN COMMITMENTS; SEEKS CENTRAL EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT TO FACILITATE WITHDRAWAL FROM SATELLITES, EAST GERMANY, SECURE STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN REGION; DIRECTS CHIEF ATTENTION TO DOMESTIC PROBLEMS WITH MODERATE SUCCESS LIMITED BY LINGERING DOGMAS.

"YOUNG TURK": RISE OF RELATIVELY YOUNG, SOPHISTICATED, AMBITIOUS, assertive WING OF PARTY; SEEKS TO CORRECT STAGNATION AT HOME, DECLINE ABROAD, THROUGH ACTION-ORIENTED POLICIES ("PUT RUSSIA ON THE MOVE AGAIN"); EMPHASIS ON THE "NEW": ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, CULTURAL, MILITARY (NEW WEAPONS SYSTEM AND DOCTRINAL INNOVATIONS) AND PERHAPS MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL FOREIGN POLICY.

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104

SOME "OBJECTIVES" OF (OR FOR MAINTAINING) DETENTE

1. SLOWS DOWN AND PERHAPS FACILITATES CONTROL OF THE "ARMS RACE"

2. REDUCES THE PERCEIVED AND PERHAPS ACTUAL DANGER OF NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL WAR

3. ALLOWS FOR STABILIZED OR REDUCED DEFENSE BUDGETS

4. REDUCES TENSION AND EMPHASIS ON CONFLICT

5. LOOSENS NATO AND WARSAW PACTS

6. WEAKENS AND DISARMS OPPONENT (RELAXATION, IMAGE, AND VESTED INTEREST)

7. DEEPENS OR FREEZES SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT

8. ALLOWS FOR GROWTH OF U.S. AND SOVIET NEO-ISOLATIONISM (OR AT LEAST RETURN TO NORMALCY)

9. PRELUDE TO FURTHER U.S.-S.U. COOPERATION

SIX DISTINCTIONS OF POLICY

1. NATO AS AN INSTRUMENT VS. NATO AS A VALUE

2. EUROPEAN RECONCILIATION VS. EUROPEAN UNIFICATION

3. DISENGAGEMENT DESIGNED TO MITIGATE COLD WAR VS. SETTLEMENT DESIGNED TO RATIFY COLD WAR'S END

4. EAST GERMAN LIBERATION VS. ALL-GERMAN REUNIFICATION

5. LIMITED TREATY RESTRICTIONS VS. "PERPETUAL" RESTRICTIONS

6. NEUTRALIZATION VS. DISARMAMENT

790

938

113

THE GERMAN QUESTION

"...GERMANY HAS ALWAYS FELT AN ANGUISH, AND AT TIMES A FURY, CREATED BY ITS OWN UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ITS BOUNDARIES, ITS UNITY, ITS POLITICAL SYSTEM, ITS INTERNATIONAL ROLE, SO THAT THE MORE ITS DESTINY REMAINS UNDETERMINED, THE MORE DISTURBING IT ALWAYS APPEARS TO THE WHOLE CONTINENT."

DE GAULLE

FEBRUARY 4, 1965

803

D

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129

JAPANESE SHOULD DO WELL IN THE FUTURE BECAUSE THEY ARE:

1. WELL EDUCATED AND TRAINED AT ALL LEVELS

2. ADEQUATELY CAPITALIZED

3. ABLE TO MANAGE CONTROLLED COMPETITIVE COLLECTIVISM WITH SUPERB EFFICIENCY AND INTELLIGENCE

4. ALLOWING, EVEN ENCOURAGING, DECLINING INDUSTRIES TO DECLINE AND PURSUING "MODERNIZATION" WITH AN ALMOST FANATICAL INTENSITY

5. ENORMOUSLY ELATED & SPURRED BY THEIR CURRENT SUCCESS

6. ASSURED OF IMPORTANT DEGREE OF U.S. & PERHAPS EUROPEAN SUPPORT IN OBTAINING MARKETS

7. ALMOST COMPLETELY OVERCOMING THE ONUS OF PAST INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION

8. ENORMOUSLY & PATRIOTICALLY ACHIEVEMENT-MINDED

9. INDIVIDUALLY & NATIONALLY DEDICATED TO SURPASSING THE WEST

10. ACQUIRING TECHNOLOGICAL & SCIENTIFIC CAPABILITIES THAT ARE LARGELY EQUAL TO THE U.S.'S.

1953

938

134

"THIS AGE GROUP DOES NOT KNOW WORLD WAR II AND HAS NOT DIRECTLY EXPERIENCED THE DEVASTATION AND POVERTY OF THE POST-WAR PERIOD. IT HAS A BELLIGERENTLY DEMOCRATIC MENTALITY, NURTURED BY THE POSTWAR CONSTITUTION, THE NEW EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM, AND RATIONALISM (EVEN THOUGH OF AN AMERICAN TYPE). THUS THE MOVEMENT TO BE ORGANIZED AROUND SUCH A GENERATION CANNOT BE DEVELOPED SUCCESSFULLY BY THE PRACTICES LEARNED FROM THE OLDER METHODS; IT CALLS FOR A NEW IDEOLOGY AND METHOD. WE HAVE FAILED TO WORK OUT THE NECESSARY POLICIES TO COPE WITH THE POLITICAL INDIFFERENCE NOW SPREADING AMONG YOUTH."

CHIEF OF THE YOUTH DEPARTMENT
JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY

459

938
135

SOKA GAKKAI: 14,000,000 MEMBERS

WOULD "REVIVE THE TRUE PRINCIPLES" OF NICHIREN--
ONLY INTOLERANT BUDDHIST SECT.

CONVERSION TECHNIQUE IS VERBALLY "TO BREAK AND TO FORCE" THE CONVICTIONS OF PROSPECTIVE MEMBERS.

IS A CLASSLESS ORGANIZATION CHARACTERIZED BY A
POWERFUL FOSTERING OF FRATERNITY.

POLITICAL POLICY IS NATIONALIST AND NON-ALIGNED
IN FOREIGN POLICY

THE NEW KOMEITO IS NOW A THIRD FORCE IN JAPANESE
POLITICS

938
139

POSSIBLE JAPANESE NATIONAL GOALS

1. CONTINUALLY INCREASING MATERIAL PROSPERITY

2. LEAD THE WORLD IN ECONOMIC GROWTH RATE

3. CATCH UP WITH THE UNITED STATES

4. SURPASS THE UNITED STATES

5. ENTER THE TOP CLASS OR LEAD THE WORLD IN VARIOUS AREAS SUCH AS: SPORTS, SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT, ART, ETC.

6. HIGH STATUS FOR JAPAN IN NON-ECONOMIC, NON-CULTURAL (POWER OR LEADERSHIP) TERMS

7. PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN ASIAN DEVELOPMENT

8. PLAY A CENTRAL ROLE IN THE WORLD PEACE MOVEMENT

9. OTHER SPECIAL FOREIGN POLICY GOALS

1958

SLIDE TRANSCRIPT

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142

SOME POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF A
DESIRE FOR CULTURAL IDENTITY

1. GROWING REALIZATION OF THE NEED FOR "JAPANESE SOLUTIONS"

2. PRESSURES AGAINST NAIVE XENOPHILISM AND INTERNATIONALISM OF ANY KIND, TOLERATION (OR EVEN ENCOURAGEMENT) OF XENOPHOBIA AND CHAUVINISM

3. SOME DEGREE OF POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT--EVEN ISOLATIONISM

4. PERHAPS EXCESSIVE REACTIONS AGAINST FOREIGN INFLUENCE

5. POSSIBLY SOME REACTION AGAINST "AMERICAN" OR EVEN PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY

GREATER INTEREST IN ASIA OR "ASIA FOR THE ASIANS" THEMES

PRESSURE FOR AT LEAST "TEMPORARY" NUCLEAR ARMAMENT

A CRUCIAL JAPANESE CONCEPT

"THERE IS AT ANY GIVEN MOMENT A DEFINABLE WORLD-RANKING ORDER OF SUCH CHARACTER THAT AS BETWEEN ANY TWO NATIONS ONE IS ALWAYS HIGHER AND THE OTHER LOWER. IT IS NEVER THE CASE THAT TWO NATIONS STAND ON EXACTLY THE SAME LEVEL. EVEN WHEN THEY APPEAR CLOSE TO EACH OTHER, THERE IS ALWAYS A SET OF CLUES THAT ALLOW THE SENSITIVE OBSERVER TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN THEM AND SEE THEIR PLACE IN THE ULTIMATE RANKING SYSTEM."

-- HERBERT PASSIN

1960

(c)

938
145

"IT WAS THE DESIRE NOT TO APPEAR INFERIOR IN THE EYES OF FOREIGNERS WHICH, GIVING AN ADDED SPUR TO THE INNATE VITALITY OF THE JAPANESE PEOPLE, ENABLED THEM TO CARRY THROUGH AN AS-TONISHING MODERNIZATION IN SUCH A SHORT TIME. IN THE SAME WAY, THEY BUILD NEW ROADS NOT SO MUCH FOR THEMSELVES BUT SO THAT THEY SHALL NOT BE ASHAMED FOR FOREIGNERS (FOR EXAMPLE, AT THE TIME OF THE OLYMPICS) TO SEE THEM--IN OTHER WORDS, IN ORDER TO PRESENT THEIR NATION IN A BETTER LIGHT TO FOREIGNERS."

-- INUKAI

938
146

"JAPANESE ARE CONSTANTLY AWARE OF RANK ORDER, AND THEY ARE CONSTANTLY ASKING THEMSELVES: HOW HIGH DO WE RANK? HOW HIGH SHOULD WE RANK? WHAT CAN WE DO TO IMPROVE OUR RANK? AND SINCE RANKING IS NOT ONLY A MATTER OF SELF-ESTIMATION, BUT THE ESTIMATION OF OTHERS, JAPANESE ARE EXTREMELY ATTENTIVE TO WHAT OTHERS THINK OF THEM. IF AMERICANS--SO WE ARE TOLD--ALWAYS WANT TO BE LOVED AND ARE ANXIOUS ABOUT THEIR POPULARITY RATING, THEN THE JAPANESE ARE EVEN MORE SO. JAPANESE ABROAD SHOW A CONSTANT PREOCCUPATION WITH THIS PROBLEM.

-- HERBERT PASSIN

SLIDE TRANSCRIPT

938
147

THE TENKO (INTELLECTUAL TRANSFORMATION) THEME

1. PASSIONATE EMBRACE OF A WESTERN IDEOLOGY

2. ALIENATION FROM AND REBELLION AGAINST JAPANESE SOCIETY

3. SEARCHING INVESTIGATION INTO THE NEW FAITH

4. DISILLUSIONMENT WITH WESTERN PRACTICES (OR EVEN THEORIES)

5. EXCESSIVE REACTION (APOSTASY OR TENKO)

6. CHAUVINISM AND XENOPHOBIA

938
150a

THE "STANDARD" (1975) JAPAN (CONT'D)

POLITICS OF COMPROMISE AND FACTIONALISM CONTINUE, BUT
INTENSITY GOES OUT OF SOME OF THE OLD ISSUES.

VIGOROUS PURSUIT OF SOME POLICIES--MODERATELY RANK-
ORIENTED.

"CENTRIST" PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT.

NATIONAL EMPHASIS ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (ACHIEVING
PLANNED RATE OF 6-9%); MODERATELY EXPANDED DEFENSIVE MILITARY
FORCES WITH EMPHASIS ON TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED EQUIPMENT
(NUCLEAR AND MISSILE OPTIONS); EMPHASIS ON CONSUMER PROSPERITY.

U.S. SECURITY TREATY EXTENDED WITH MAJOR AMENDMENTS; U.S.
BASES IN STAGED TRANSITION TO JAPANESE CONTROL WITH STRICTLY
QUALIFIED U.S. EMERGENCY ACCESS. MODERATE BUT STEADY REDUC-
TION OF U.S. INFLUENCE JUSTIFIED AS JAPAN'S ASSUMING "PROPER
RESPONSIBILITIES" IN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. SOME TEN-
SION OVER CONTINUED U.S. CONTROL OF OKINAWA.

IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH U.S.S.R. INCLUDING PEACE TREATY
AND PROFITABLE JOINT ECONOMIC PROJECTS; CULTIVATION OF CLOSE
RELATIONS WITH AUSTRALIA, INDONESIA, INDIA.

DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF CHINA WITH MODERATE (AND IN-
CREASING) LEVEL OF TRADE. SOME ATTEMPTS TO MEDIATE BETWEEN
CHINA AND WEST.

ACTIVE BUT NON-CONTROVERSIAL ROLE IN WORLD DIPLOMACY
PRIMARILY AS SUPPORTER OF U.N. PEACEKEEPING AND AID PROGRAMS--
"GOOD CITIZEN" AND "HONEST BROKER" ROLES; PRIMARY INTEREST IN
DEFENDING JAPANESE ACCESS TO MARKETS AND FREE FLOW OF INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE.

GREAT ATTENTION TO DEVELOPING ASIAN REGIONAL POLITICAL
COOPERATION BUT AVOIDING ANTI-COMMUNIST IDENTIFICATION.

EXTENSIVE ECONOMIC PENETRATION OF AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST,
AND SOUTH AMERICA.

ALPHA VARIATION
(PRO-AMERICAN)

1. CONTINUED CONSERVATIVE PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT; Waning SOCIALIST AND LEFTIST PARTY STRENGTH.

MODERATELY EXPANDED MILITARY FORCES INCLUDING NON-NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH UNITED STATES; CONVENTIONAL TROOP COMMITMENTS TO U.N. PEACEKEEPING ACTIVITIES.

2. U.S. SECURITY TREATY CONTINUED OR STRENGTHENED. ACTIVE COOPERATION WITH U.S. IN POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRAMS IN RIVALRY WITH CHINA.

3. MODERATELY IMPROVED, "CORRECT" RELATIONS WITH U.S.S.R.

SIZABLE AID PROGRAM, PRIMARILY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.

ACTIVE ROLE AMONG AFRO-ASIAN ANTI-COMMUNIST STATES INCLUDING TOLERANCE OF SOME CONTROVERSY IN SUPPORT OF GOALS HELD IN COMMON WITH U.S.

SUBMITTABLE

GAMMA VARIATION
(CONSERVATIVE NATIONALIST)

1. CENTER-RIGHTIST COALITION GOVERNMENT; SOME RESTRICTION ON COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST ACTIVITY; CONSTITUTION REWRITTEN.

NATIONAL EMPHASIS ON TRADE IN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF RESTRICTIVE REGIONAL GROUPS; MODERATE RATE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH (5-6% WITH CYCLICAL INSTABILITIES REFLECTING INTERNATIONAL RESTRICTIONS); DELIBERATE FOSTERING OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND MILITARY PROGRAMS PROMOTING JAPANESE NATIONAL PRESTIGE; LESS EMPHASIS ON CONSUMER PROSPERITY.

SUBSTANTIALLY EXPANDED MILITARY FORCES, NOMINALLY DEFENSIVE BUT WITH NUCLEAR SUBMARINE PROGRAM, MISSILE DEVELOPMENT, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS OPTION - POSSIBLY AN ABM PROGRAM.

2. U.S. SECURITY TREATY GREATLY REVISED OR TERMINATED. MUCH UNOFFICIAL CRITICISM OF U.S. OCCUPATION POLICIES, COLD WAR ROLE, BUT OFFICIAL GOOD RELATIONS MAINTAINED.

3. MANY JOINT ECONOMIC PROJECTS WITH U.S.S.R.

RECOGNITION OF CHINA WITH EXTENSIVE TRADE AND JOINT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS; GUARDED POLITICAL RAPPROCHEMENT WITH CHINA WITH BOTH SIDES EXPECTING EVENTUAL DOMINATION OF THE OTHER.

VIGOROUS ROLE AS OPPONENT OF ALL "FOREIGN" POLITICAL INTERVENTIONS IN ASIA AND PROMOTER OF AFRO-ASIAN TRADE GROUPINGS; FORMAL DEMANDS FOR RETURN OF OKINAWA AND KURILES.

938
158

DELTA VARIATION
(LEFTIST NATIONALIST)

1. NEO-SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT WITH SOME KOMEITO AND COMMUNIST PARTIAMENTARY SUPPORT (INTRA-COMMUNIST PARTY SPLITS ON NATIONALIST-INTERNATIONALIST LINES).

NATIONAL EMPHASIS ON EXPANDED WELFARE PROGRAMS (BUT OTHERWISE RELATIVELY LIMITED CONSUMPTION), PLANNED ECONOMIC GROWTH (AUTARCHIC TENDENCIES; ACTUAL 3-5% GROWTH RATE WITH SOME SECTORS NEARER STAGNATION); SERIOUS BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PROBLEM. NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM; REDUCED CONVENTIONAL FORCES; EVEN-TUALLY WHOLLY DEFENSIVE NUCLEAR DETERRENT POSTURE.

2. U.S. SECURITY TREATY RENOUNCED. NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO END FOREIGN (=AMERICAN) INFLUENCES ON JAPANESE POLITICS, ECONOMY, CULTURE.

3. PEACE TREATY SIGNED WITH RUSSIA, PARTIAL RESTORATION OF LOST TERRITORIES; RECOGNITION OF CHINA; ACTIVE PROGRAMS GREATLY TO EXPAND SOVIET AND CHINESE TRADE.

INTERNATIONAL ROLE OF AFRO-ASIAN NEUTRALIST LEADERSHIP, IMPLICIT RIVALRY WITH CHINA; PROGRAM TO MOBILIZE AFRO-ASIAN NATIONS AS LEFTIST ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL BLOC RIVALING ESTABLISHED GREAT POWERS. SELECTIVE AID PROGRAMS TO "PROGRESSIVE" AFRO-ASIAN GOVERNMENTS DESIGNED TO DEVELOP EXCLUSIVE MARKET AND TRADE ZONE, CONTRIBUTING TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF INCREASING TRADE RESTRICTION.

1813

938

159

OTHER JAPANS

**KOMEITO JAPAN:** NEUTRALIST, REFORMIST, INTOLERANT, COLLECTIVIST (WELFARE-ORIENTED); MUCH DOMESTIC CONTROVERSY--NAIVE, UNSTABLE REGIME; PROBABLY WITHOUT CONSISTENT FOREIGN POLICY OF MAJOR CONSEQUENCE ALTHOUGH A FACTOR FOR INSTABILITY IN THE WORLD SYSTEM.

**NEO-IDEOLOGICAL:** RELATIVELY COLLECTIVIST SOCIETY WITH DRAMATIC, SOPHISTICATED, IMPLICITLY ANTI-WESTERN IDEOLOGY--POSSIBLY WITH UNIVERSALIST OR PAN-ASIAN CLAIMS; PROBABLY A RESPONSE TO MAJOR INTERNAL OR INTERNATIONAL CRISIS.

**REACTIONARY-NATIVIST:** MILITARIST AND PROBABLY ISOLATIONIST; MUCH DOMESTIC INSTABILITY; POSSIBLY RACIST (ANTI-WHITE); POSSIBLY DETERIORATING ECONOMICALLY IN ENVIRONMENT OF WORLD TRADE RESTRICTION OR DEPRESSION.

**COMMUNIST:** NATIONALIST, POLITICALLY EFFICIENT AND (POLITICALLY) AGGRESSIVE, HYPER-COMPETITIVE AND A CONTENDER FOR WORLD COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP--MILITARILY AMBITIOUS, DANGEROUS, AGAIN PROBABLY PLAUSIBLE CHIEFLY AS REACTION TO INTERNAL OR WORLD CRISIS (PROBABLY ECONOMIC, POSSIBLY POLITICAL).

938
175a

IN THE LAST DECADE OR TWO OF THE 20TH CENTURY (CONTD.)

WELL-UNDERSTOOD DOOMSDAY MACHINES (OR NEAR-DOOMSDAY MACHINES)

TSUNAMI (TIDAL WAVE) PRODUCERS

CLIMATE CHANGERS

EARTH SCORCHERS

VARIOUS FORMS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL, OR EVEN DIRECT MENTAL WARFARE

THE INVENTION OF A "NUCLEAR SIX-GUN" TECHNOLOGY--OR AT LEAST THE DEVELOPMENT OF INEXPENSIVE & WIDELY AVAILABLE VERSIONS OF MODEL T & A (AND PERHAPS MORE ADVANCED) TECHNOLOGIES

6. DEPENDING ON THE DEFENSES OF THE LARGE POWERS & THE SUPER-POWERS (& OTHER "DETAILS"), THESE WEAPON SYSTEMS MAY BE "EQUALIZERS" IN THE GALLOIS OR AMERICAN WEST SENSE. THEY MIGHT ALSO BE RELATIVELY AVAILABLE TO PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS OR AT LEAST PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS & EXTREMIST POLITICAL FACTIONS

7. FINALLY THERE SHOULD ALSO BE A DEVELOPMENT OF VERY EFFEC-TIVE TECHNIQUES FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY WARFARE--& PERHAPS INSURGENCY AS WELL. THIS LAST COULD INCLUDE SOME RELA-TIVELY MINOR BUT EXTREMIST DOMESTIC GROUPS

938
177

"REASONABLE" CHARACTERISTICS OF A LONG-RANGE
ANTI-NUCLEAR POLICY:

1. LIMIT BOTH CURRENT PROLIFERATION & THE PROLIFERATING EFFECT OF LIMITED FUTURE PROLIFERATION;

2. PERHAPS BY MAKING NUCLEAR WEAPONS BE & EVEN SEEM ALMOST USELESS AS WELL AS UNUSABLE--POLITICALLY OR PHYSICALLY.

3. REQUIRES PROVIDING BOTH A CREDIBLE & POLITICALLY ACCEPTABLE MECHANISM FOR PREVENTING NUCLEAR INTIMIDATION AND

4. DECREASING THE PRESTIGE OF OWNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

5. THE POLICY SHOULD NOT BE AIMED MAINLY AT PERPETUATING CURRENT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, DIVISIONS, & HIERARCHIES (IN PARTICULAR, U.S. & SOVIET STATUS, POWER, LEADERSHIP, PERQUISITES & OBLIGATIONS), THOUGH IT SHOULD BE CONSERVATIVE IN "USING UP" THE PRESTIGE, MORALE, OR INFLUENCE OF LEADING POWERS.

6. NOR SHOULD IT REQUIRE FRANCE, UNITED KINGDOM, JAPAN, INDIA, WEST GERMANY, OR ITALY (IN ROUGHLY THIS ORDER OF PRIORITY) TO ACCEPT AN INVIDIOUSLY INFERIOR NUCLEAR STATUS OR AN UNNECESSARILY PRECARIOUS OR DEPENDENT SECURITY POSITION. SIMILAR PROVISIONS MAY EVENTUALLY BE NECESSARY FOR BRAZIL, MEXICO, ARGENTINA, INDONESIA, PAKISTAN, ETC.

7. IF DESPITE THE ABOVE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE USED, THE POLICY SHOULD LIMIT THE PHYSICAL, POLITICAL & MORAL DAMAGE THAT IS DONE (IT SHOULD NOT RELY ON PERSUASION & DETERRENCE WORKING PERFECTLY).

8. IT SHOULD ALSO BE ABLE TO WITHSTAND CRISES & SMALL & EVEN LARGE CONVENTIONAL WARS AS WELL AS BREACHES OR EVEN SUSTAINED VIOLATIONS OF THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD.

9. IT SHOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO THE RELEVANT NATIONAL INTERESTS, SENTIMENTS, & DOCTRINES, & THUS BE NEGOTIABLE.

10. THUS IT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN FORECLOSED OR EMBARRASSED BY PRIOR COMMITMENTS OR ALIGNMENTS.

11. IT SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AS APOLITICAL ("ABOVE THE MELEE" OF NORMAL DIPLOMATIC IN-FIGHTING & POSTURING).

12. IT SHOULD ALSO BE THOROUGHLY PLANNED SO AS TO BE ABLE TO BECOME AN OBJECT OF "SUDDEN DIPLOMACY."

13. IT SHOULD IMPROVE CURRENT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, BUT NOT REQUIRE THOROUGH-GOING REFORM.

14. IT SHOULD BE PERMANENT, & YET FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO HEDGE AGAINST EVENTS & OPPORTUNITIES IN NEGOTIATION & OPERATION.

15. WHILE NOT DESIGNED AS A TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENT, IT SHOULD ALLOW FOR MAJOR OR BASIC DEVELOPMENTS & CHANGES.

938
179

$

1028
DUPR

# A POSSIBLE LONG-TERM ANTI-NUCLEAR POLICY

1. RETURN TO A LAW OF (NUCLEAR) LEX TALIONIS--I.E.,
NO ESCALATION

2. EUROPEAN NUCLEAR RETALIATORY FORCE

A. MIGHT BE ESDC BASED ON WEU

B. MIGHT ALSO BE WITHOUT ENGLAND, FRANCE, OR WEST GERMANY

3. ASIATIC NUCLEAR RETALIATORY FORCE

A. MIGHT BE A NUCLEAR DEFENSE ORGANIZATION BASED ON U.S., JAPAN, NEW ZEALAND, AUSTRALIA, PHILIPPINES, INDIA, ETC.

B. MIGHT ALSO BE WITHOUT INDIA, JAPAN, OR U.S.

4. DENUCLEARIZED LATIN AMERICA, AFRICA, EUROPE OUTSIDE OF WEU, AND NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

5. THERE MAY BE A LONG-TERM NOTION OF A NON-ALIGNED MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR FORCE FOR DENUCLEARIZED ZONES

938
180

1172

8

(u)

938
188

VARIABLE CHARACTERISTICS OF A NUCLEAR DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

1. SUPRANATIONAL, CONFEDERAL, OR MIXED

2. EXTENSIVE, LIMITED OR NO NUCLEAR SHARING

3. DEGREE AND CHARACTER OF U.S. GUARANTEE, BACKING, AND PARTICIPATION

4. COMPLEMENTARY AND SUPPLEMENTARY ARRANGEMENTS

5. RELATIONSHIP OF SOVIET UNION

6. ANCESTRY AND SPONSORSHIP

7. RELATIONSHIP TO GLOBAL, REGIONAL, OR OTHER ARRANGEMENTS

8. CAN BE DESIGNED TO MINIMIZE OR MAXIMIZE SIDE EFFECTS

9. CAN BE MORE OR LESS OPEN TO COUNTRIES THAT WANT TO ENTER, OR TO LEAVE

10. CAN BE EXTENDED OR NOT EXTENDED TO TACTICAL NUCLEAR OR CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE

11. RETALIATION DOCTRINE

12. RELATIONSHIP TO POSSIBLE "NO-FIRST-USE" DOCTRINES

938

193

Notes for December 19, 1967 Briefing

By

Herman Kahn

HI-938-BN

These memoranda are distributed for the convenience of the seminar participants, and are not intended for publication or general distribution. Readers are cautioned that items on the charts reproduced here may be unintelligible or directly misleading if they are interpreted outside the context of the talk they are designed to accompany. (Some, e.g., have been included, ironically, in order to raise questions, and in order to be controverted by the speaker, as well as in order to provide outlines and emphasize points.)

The charts, as well as the views expressed in the summaries, are the responsibility of individual authors, as is the case in all Hudson Institute documents, and no conclusion should be attributed to the Hudson Institute or any other associated individuals or agencies.

HUDSON INSTITUTE, INC.
Quaker Ridge Road
Croton-on-Hudson
New York 10520

938

i

Table of Contents

1. Why Study The Year 2000?

2. Some Current H.I. 5 To 10-Year Policy Studies

3. Subjective Estimates (Both Current And Ad Hoc) Of The Probability Of A NATO "Disaster" In The Next Decade

4. World Seems Safer Today Because Of:

5. Von Neumann Quote

6. Year 2000 Perspective (Ideology?)

7. The Year 2000

8. Another Way To Look At Man's Economic Progress

9. Quote From The Sermon On The Mount

10. Keynes Quote

11. Keynes Quote (Contd.)

12. Keynes Quote (Contd.)

13. Keynes Quote (Contd.)

14. Keynes Quote (Contd.)

15. There Is A Basic, Long-Term, Multifold Trend Towards:

16. Three Standard Cultural Phases

17. Ideational, Idealistic Or Integrated Art

18. Sensate And Late Sensate Art

19. One Could Contrast The Ideational, Integrated (Idealistic), And Sensate Systems Of The:

20. Another Important Cultural Variable

21. There Is A Basic, Long-Term, Multifold Trend Towards:

22. Karl Marx Quote

23. Negritude--A Heretical Philosophy

24. The Black Muslims--A Schismatic Philosophy

25. Traditional Societies Tend To Emphasize The Following More Than Modern (Americanized) Societies Do:

26. North Americans Are Often Characterized By:

27. Some Usefully Analogous Acculturation Situations

28. Some Possible Reactions To Contact Between Unequal Civilizations (Outline)

29. I. Nonviolent Rejection Of Intruding Culture

30. II. Violent Rejection Of Intruding Culture

31. III. Nonviolent Synthesis With Intruding Culture

32. IV. Violent Synthesis With Intruding Culture.

33. Some Possible Reactions To Contact Between Unequal Civilizations

34. There Is A Basic, Long-Term, Multifold Trend Towards:

35. Five Levels Of Income & Industrialization In Year 2000

36. Income Distribution

37. One Year 2000 Economic Scenario

38. Tons Of Grain Transferred From The Developed To the Less Developed Countries

39. Current Rice Yields And Selected Countries Related To Japan's Historical Trend

40. Some Approaches Requiring Investigation

41. Artificial Lakes And Canals Of The Choco Development Project (Map)

42. Over-All Concept Employing Seven Low Dams To Create Regional Lakes

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Table of Contents (Contd.)

43. There Is A Basic, Long-Term, Multifold Trend Towards:

44. "Disposable" Family Income--Low & High

45. "Disposable" Family Income--1965 & Medium

46. Historical Annual Average Workweek

47. Historical Increase In Productivity

48. To Achieve A Low Year 2000 GNP

49. To Achieve A High Year 2000 GNP

50. There Is A Basic, Long-Term, Multifold Trend Towards:

51. An Overemphasis On Education Can Result In:

52. Why "Trained Incapacity"

53. 1951 Technology

54. 1956 Technology

55. 1961 Technology

56. 1965 Technology

57. Lead Times

58. Model T And Model A Strategic Eras

59. The Next Decade Or Two

60. One Scenario For Nuclear Proliferation

61. In The Last Decade Or Two Of The 20th Century

62. Subjective Estimates...

63. There Is A Basic, Long-Term, Multifold Trend Towards:

64. Some Issues Raised By Rapid "Technological" Change

65. 1. Intrinsically Dangerous Technology

66. 2. Gradual And/Or National Contamination Or Degradation Of The Environment

67. 3. Spectacular And/Or Multinational Contamination Or Degradation Of The Environment

68. 4. Dangerous Internal Political Issues

69. 5. Upsetting International Consequences

70. 6. Dangerous Personal Choices

71. 7. Bizarre Issues

72. A Dystopian Sequence

73. Final Third Of Twentieth Century

74. The Post-Industrial (Or Post-Mass Consumption) Society

75. Before World War I The Average Middle Class American Asked Two Questions

76. Now He Tends To Ask:

77. Some Possible Reactions To A Post-Industrial, Avocation-Oriented World

78. A Definition Of A "Gentleman"

79. Adams Quote

80. Some Of The Reasons Why Americans Might Reject Current Work-Oriented, Achievement-Oriented, Advancement-Oriented Attitudes

81. Values Fulfilled By Work

82. In A "Normal" Post-Industrial Affluent Society Of Those (40%) Normally In The Labor Force:

83. A Leisure-Oriented "Post-Industrial" Society

84. Thus In A Leisure-Oriented Society One Could Spend:

85. The Epicurean Outlook

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Table of Contents (Contd.)

180. "Reasonable" Characteristics Of A Long-Range Anti-Nuclear Policy

181. European Nuclear Retaliatory Force

182. The (WEU) ESDC Budget

183. Votes On Political Committee

184. Some Examples For Previous Illustration

185. Administrative Decisions

186. Crisis Decisions

187. An ESDC Probably Should Have:

188. Variable Characteristics Of A Nuclear Defense Organization

189. Why An ESDC Cannot Be "Above" Politics?

190. Costs And Risks Of Proposal

191. Objections To Proposal

192. Possible Inducements For The French And British

193. "Reasonable" Characteristics Of A Long-Range Anti-Nuclear Policy

194. Escalation In The Twenty-First Century

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WHY STUDY THE YEAR 2000?

1. "PLAYFUL" SPECULATION

2. CONTEXT FOR 5 TO 10 YEAR "POLICY RESEARCH" STUDIES

3. MAY MAKE PRACTICAL 10 TO 20-YEAR "POLICY RESEARCH" STUDIES

4. DIRECT GUIDANCE (OR EVEN PROPER PERSPECTIVE) TO "ARMS CONTROL" AND "POWER POLITICS" POLICIES

5. PROPER PERSPECTIVE FOR MANY DEVELOPMENTAL AND EVOLUTIONARY-TYPE ISSUES

6. THE END OF THE SECOND MILLENIUM A.D. MAY BE A MOST IMPORTANT HISTORICAL TRANSITION POINT

A. EFFECTIVE END OF PRE-INDUSTRIAL CULTURE

B. ONSET OF POST-INDUSTRIAL CULTURE

C. PRECURSOR OF (ALMOST) POST-ECONOMIC CULTURE

Copy for all slides is to be typed directly on this template.

Center all copy and keep type within the outer margins.

Do not use correction tape. Snipak or chalk paper may be used to correct errors.

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"The great globe itself" is in a rapidly maturing crisis--a crisis attributable to the fact that the environment in which technological progress must occur has become both undersized and underorganized...

In the first half of this century the accelerating industrial revolution encountered an absolute limitation--not on technological progress as such, but on an essential safety factor. This safety factor...was essentially a matter of geographical and political Lebensraum: an ever broader geographical scope for technological activities, combined with an ever broader political integration of the world. Within this expanding framework it was possible to accommodate the major tensions created by technological progress.

Now this safety mechanism is being sharply inhibited; literally and figuratively, we are running out of room. At long last, we begin to feel the effects of the finite, actual size of the earth in a critical way.

Thus the crisis does not arise from accidental events or human errors. It is inherent in technology's relation to geography on the one hand and to political organization on the other...In the years between now and 1980 the crisis will probably develop far beyond all earlier patterns. When or how it will end--or to what state of affairs it will yield--nobody can say.

John von Neumann

Fortune, June 1955

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19 Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal:

20 But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal:

21 For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.

24 No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold the one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon.

25 Therefore I say unto you, Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat, or what ye shall drink; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on. Is not the life more than meat, and the body than raiment?

26 Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they?

27 Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature?

28 And why take ye thought for raiment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow; they toil not, neither do they spin:

29 And yet I say unto you, That even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these.

30 Wherefore, if God so clothe the grass of the field, which today is, and tomorrow is cast into the oven, shall he not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?

31 Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or, Where-withal shall we be clothed?

32 (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek:) for your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things.

33 But seek ye first the kingdom of God, and his right-eousness; and all these things shall be added unto you.

34 Take therefore no thought for the morrow: for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself. Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.

From The Sermon on the Mount

Matthew 6: 19-21
24-34

King James Version

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I DRAW THE CONCLUSION THAT, ASSUMING NO IMPORTANT WARS AND NO IMPORTANT INCREASE IN POPULATION, THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM MAY BE SOLVED, OR BE AT LEAST WITHIN SIGHT OF SOLUTION, WITHIN A HUNDRED YEARS. THIS MEANS THAT THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM IS NOT--IF WE LOOK INTO THE FUTURE--THE PERMANENT PROBLEM OF THE HUMAN RACE.

WHY, YOU MAY ASK, IS THIS SO STARTLING? IT IS STARTLING BECAUSE--IF, INSTEAD OF LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE, WE LOOK INTO THE PAST--WE FIND THAT THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM, THE STRUGGLE FOR SUBSISTENCE, ALWAYS HAS BEEN HITHERTO THE PRIMARY, MOST PRESSING PROBLEM OF THE HUMAN RACE--NOT ONLY OF THE HUMAN RACE, BUT OF THE WHOLE OF THE BIOLOGICAL KINGDOM FROM THE BEGINNINGS OF LIFE IN ITS MOST PRIMITIVE FORMS.

THUS WE HAVE BEEN EXPRESSLY EVOLVED BY NATURE--WITH ALL OUR IMPULSES AND DEEPEST INSTINCTS--FOR THE PURPOSE OF SOLVING THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM. IF THE ECONOMIC PROBLEM IS SOLVED, MANKIND WILL BE DEPRIVED OF ITS TRADITIONAL PURPOSE.

WILL THIS BE A BENEFIT? IF ONE BELIEVES AT ALL IN THE REAL VALUES OF LIFE, THE PROSPECT AT LEAST OPENS UP THE POSSIBILITY OF BENEFIT. YET I THINK WITH DREAD OF THE READJUSTMENT OF THE HABITS AND INSTINCTS OF THE ORDINARY MAN, BRED INTO HIM FOR COUNTLESS GENERATIONS, WHICH HE MAY BE ASKED TO DISCARD WITHIN A FEW DECADES.

TO USE THE LANGUAGE OF TO-DAY--MUST WE NOT EXPECT A GENERAL "NERVOUS BREAKDOWN"?*

*J.M. KEYNES, "ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR GRAND-CHILDREN" (1930), IN *ESSAYS IN PERSUASION*, PP. 365-6.

380

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YET THERE IS NO COUNTRY AND NO PEOPLE, I THINK, WHO CAN LOOK FORWARD TO THE AGE OF LEISURE AND OF ABUNDANCE WITHOUT A DREAD. FOR WE HAVE BEEN TRAINED TOO LONG TO STRIVE AND NOT TO ENJOY. IT IS A FEARFUL PROBLEM FOR THE ORDINARY PERSON, WITH NO SPECIAL TALENTS, TO OCCUPY HIMSELF, ESPECIALLY IF HE NO LONGER HAS ROOTS IN THE SOIL OR IN CUSTOM OR IN THE BELOVED CONVENTIONS OF A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY. TO JUDGE FROM THE BEHAVIOUR AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE WEALTHY CLASSES TO-DAY IN ANY QUARTER OF THE WORLD, THE OUTLOOK IS VERY DEPRESSING! FOR THESE ARE, SO TO SPEAK, OUR ADVANCE GUARD--THOSE WHO ARE SPYING OUT THE PROMISED LAND FOR THE REST OF US AND PITCHING THEIR CAMP THERE. FOR THEY HAVE MOST OF THEM FAILED DISASTROUSLY, SO IT SEEMS TO ME--THOSE WHO HAVE AN INDEPENDENT INCOME BUT NO ASSOCIATIONS OR DUTIES OR TIES--TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM WHICH HAS BEEN SET THEM.*

*IBID., P. 368.

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...WHEN THE ACCUMULATION OF WEALTH IS NO LONGER OF HIGH SOCIAL IMPORTANCE, THERE WILL BE GREAT CHANGES IN THE CODE OF MORALS. WE SHALL BE ABLE TO RID OURSELVES OF MANY OF THE PSEUDO-MORAL PRINCIPLES WHICH HAVE HAG-RIDDEN US FOR TWO HUNDRED YEARS, BY WHICH WE HAVE EXALTED SOME OF THE MOST DISTASTEFUL OF HUMAN QUALITIES INTO THE POSITION OF THE HIGHEST VIRTUES. WE SHALL BE ABLE TO AFFORD TO DARE TO ASSESS THE MONEY-MOTIVE AT ITS TRUE VALUE. THE LOVE OF MONEY AS A POSSESSION--AS DISINGUISHED FROM THE LOVE OF MONEY AS A MEANS TO THE ENJOYMENTS AND REALITIES OF LIFE--WILL BE RECOGNISED FOR WHAT IT IS, A SOMEWHAT DISGUSTING MORBIDITY, ONE OF THOSE SEMI-CRIMINAL, SEMI-PATHOLOGICAL PROPENSITIES WHICH ONE HANDS OVER WITH A SHUDDER TO THE SPECIALISTS IN MENTAL DISEASE. ALL KINDS OF SOCIAL CUSTOMS AND ECONOMIC PRACTICES, AFFECTING THE DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH AND OF ECONOMIC REWARDS AND PENALTIES, WHICH WE NOW MAINTAIN AT ALL COSTS, HOWEVER DISTASTEFUL AND UNJUST THEY MAY BE IN THEMSELVES, BECAUSE THEY ARE TREMENDOUSLY USEFUL IN PROMOTING THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL, WE SHALL THEN BE FREE, AT LAST, TO DISCARD.*

*IBID., PP. 369-70.

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...FOR WE SHALL INQUIRE MORE CURIOUSLY THAN IS SAFE TO-DAY INTO THE TRUE CHARACTER OF THIS "PURPOSIVENESS" WITH WHICH IN VARYING DEGREES NATURE HAS ENDOWED ALMOST ALL OF US. FOR PUR-POSIVENESS MEANS THAT WE ARE MORE CONCERNED WITH THE REMOTE FUTURE RESULTS OF OUR ACTIONS THAN WITH THEIR OWN QUALITY OR THEIR IMMEDIATE EFFECTS ON OUR OWN ENVIRONMENT. THE "PUR-POSIVE" MAN IS ALWAYS TRYING TO SECURE A SPURIOUS AND DELUSIVE IMMORTALITY FOR HIS ACTS BY PUSHING HIS INTEREST IN THEM FORWARD INTO TIME. HE DOES NOT LOVE HIS CAT, BUT HIS CAT'S KITTENS; NOR, IN TRUTH, THE KITTENS, BUT ONLY THE KITTENS' KITTENS, AND SO ON FORWARD FOR EVER TO THE END OF CAT-DOM. FOR HIM JAM IS NOT JAM UNLESS IT IS A CASE OF JAM TO-MORROW AND NEVER JAM TO-DAY. THUS BY PUSHING HIS JAM ALWAYS FORWARD INTO THE FUTURE, HE STRIVES TO SECURE FOR HIS ACT OF BOILING IT AN IMMORTALITY.*

*IBID., P. 370