Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON
Mrs. Ed Mitchell

120xxx 10:12 a.m. 2/8/71

K: I just want to tell you I remember our meeting.

M: At the van.

K: And I have been thinking of you and your daughters all week.

M: My 17 year old was especially impressed. We were delighted to meet you.

K: Give them my best regards and I hope you will look in on me when you come up here. The worst is over now.

M: I will be happy when they are all snuggled down. It's been a peaceful flight and we have felt no particular apprehension.

K: There's always an uncertainty when your husband is so far away but it seems to be going perfectly. And they have donw the re-entry so often so it should not be a problem. We will be thinking of you tomorrow.

M: Thank you and we are delighted that you called.

K: Give my best to your daughters.

M: I will indeed and thanks so much.

Mr. Kissinger/Bill Safir

February 8, 1971 10:30

jlj

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: Bill, I will be in touch with you later today about the State of the World message.

S: I would like to get started on it and I need to have some time with you to get your thoughts.

K: Yes, I do want to see you. I know exactly what I want it to do.

S: That is good. You have something exact in mind.

K: I said I knew exactly not exact. All I need to be told is it is a great report.

S: I think it is better written this year than last.

K: I will get together with you later this afternoon. I just don't have time now. Anything you have to say about it though will be appreciated.

S: I think it has too many references to last years report.

K: That can be taken care of when we start to go over it.

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kweang (not verbatim)

February 8, 1971 1:20 p.m.

jlj

R: Have you seen the nodis from Phnom Penh.

K: No I haven't.

R: Lon Nol has a stroke and his left side is paralyzed.
Ambassador Swank has asked that we have the President send a
personal message of concern.

K: Yes, I will have that done.

R: Also Henry we are holding it close as long as possible.
I will sit on it over here.

K: I will hold it down here.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCOM

Gov. N. Rockefeller/Kissinger

3:35 p.m.

2/8/71

R: I think you are doing a tremendous job.

K: It's out of our hands now. It depends on how the SVN do.

R: How's it going?

K: On schedule. Haven't met the main force yet. Have 20 to go.

R: You are great. More power to you.

K: We have their attention, I will tell you that.

R: 3 things -- I wanted to tell you I had a nice meeting down there with those guys -- Haldeman, Ehrlichman.

K: They were thrilled.

R: What kind of reaction?

K: They are all for you.

R: I did quite a job for the President at the press club the next day.

K: And it was important to turn Haldeman and Ehrlichman around because they remember the days of confrontation.

R: We are working together on a common cause. On the meetings of the intelligence committee, we had a good discussion on re-organization but I can't move without you telling me what you want.

K: I will give you some ideas but I cannot do it on the phone. I will give you some suggestions.

R: They have been far-reaching discussions. The good friend, the Dr. Murphy, wanted to get into the structure of the Secyik Security Council but I said let's work on our assignment.

K: He thinks I am keeping him from the President.

R: I hope you are. We have a good discussion with these groups. It's starting to crystallize and I want to know what you want.

K: I will give you my suggestions in the next week.

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

N. Rocekfeller/Kissinger
3:35 pm 2/8/71

-2-

R: The atmosphere is good. Everyone is a little afraid of legislation legislating to Congress to amend the laws.

K: We will handle ? ? ? ?

R: Some powers of the CIA may be cut down. Next one -- there's a problem in Rochester in the Gleason works. Do you know that one?

K: Don't talk to me about it because if they harrass me once more I will knock them off completely.

R: This is the first I heard --

K: I know, you are only doing your job. If some things I talked to you about the other day happen then it will come off for them. Shall we notify them through you?

R: No problem. Rochester has lost 200 executives of Xerox because of tax and ? ? ? ? . A bund of weak sisters are left and they think they are going down the drain because of a 2% unemployment.

K: Don't tell them but they are number 1 on the list when we relax restrictions. We are playing it relation to --

R: Say no more. I get the picture. Geo. Henman is setting up a meeting on Feb. 25. A get together preparatory of fund raising and you said during the campaign you would come up and it didn't work out but if you could join us Feb. 25 at the Linx Club --

K: Is the date flexible? My top administration typ woman is getting an award for one of a few top outstanding federal women. If you cannot shift, I would send Haig to her and I would go with you. Let's say I could do it except for the 3rd, during the following week. Or the 23, 24, or 26.

R: This is great and I will get back to you.

K: If I can shift it, you can count on me.

R: You know -- Tom Gates and top financial people.

K: And talk about foreign policy?

R: A useful group and help me tremendously. You tell the President I am pitching here. I am trying to put the Democrats on the spot for not supporting that bill.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Joe Sisco
2/8/71 4:15 p.m.

S: I need a minute with you before the 4:30 meeting. I wondered if I could come over now.

K: Not right now; I have to go to something else. But if you can just wait for me I won't go down till I talk with you.

S: Well let me tell you what it is. I just talked to the Secretary and he agreed we should check this with you. There is a message from Cairo in which we have a further message from Sadat through Haikal. Sadat says please tell the Israelis to take this Suez Canal proposal very seriously. He said that nothing should be said in Golda's speech tomorrow that would preclude any options. It's quite a telegram. They offer to resume diplomatic relations and all of that. I wanted to show you this. We feel that I should call Rabin in this evening and convey the Egyptian message to the Israelis -- say we're not making any judgments but that we think Golda should play the speech to leave open all options. I have the impression from what Rabin said today that they are taking Sadat's proposal seriously.

K: Or I could call Rabin and tell him we want him to do that.

S: Why don't I have a chat first and have you follow up later this evening.

K: Okay.

S: I will go ahead on that basis. But I will see you at 4:30 this evening.

K: Okay.

*

TELCORN

Sen. Tower/Kissinger
5:40 p.m. 2/8/71

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

T: I am taking off late next week to attend the ____ in Munich next week at which I will be the ranking American. I always give the American view of policy. Anything that I can say officially.

K: It's a good group and one of the better ones.

T: If I could visit with you first it would be helpful. I leave a week from next week.

K: My problem today and tomorrow is that with the Laos operation cooking along, I am pretty busy.

T: As late as Tues. will be fine. If you need help in any way I can help, I would like that.

K: We will work it out. You are the kind of Senator we want travelling abroad. What do you think of what's going on in Laos?

T: I am very much in support of it. It's time we did it.

K: I hope it works out well.

*

By KLC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Gerard Smith/Kissinger

5:45 p. m.

2/8/71

S: Are we likely to hear on the safeguard decision soon?

K: It was signed over the weekend. I've been so busy with this Laos thing -- the President accepted Bill's recommendations. 3 sites and a 4th optional between Warren and the NCA.

S: Better than what it might have been.

K: Not much.

S: Can you package it so we can make some money out of it?

K: Let me turn it around and ask you to do it. You were a little overgenerous on the State of the World chapter on Arms Control.

S: If you are going to get some real political splash out of this, it should not be buried away in a document with a lot of stuff. It should be a specific communication you ______. You will steal his thunder if you raise it in advance.

K: He wants to be specific. I will speak with him. Could you take a scalpel to it and not a meat axe? We can't say so little about it.

S: I hate to see the Soviet process of unwinding this except in regard to ABM and if we say so much it will be hard to say they are private talks. When would the public announcement be made on the safeguard?

K: We will wait until we hear from you.

S: I will have something tomorrow evening.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
President/Kissinger
5:55 pm 2/8/71

P: No one called Meany. It's no one's fault. I just remember that.

K: I should have thought of that.

P: No, no. It's no one's fault. Maybe you should get the operator to call him in Miami. You could say that because he was out of town, we could not brief him in advance. You could say there was a xxx small group I was briefing but for security reasons we couldn't brief him because he was out of town. Give him a brief run down. Then stop in before your 6:30 briefing.

Kc

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

February 8, 1971 6:00 p.m.

jlj

R: Henry, I heard you did some briefing to the press today.

K: Bill, I did not do any briefing here in my office. The President told Ron to call me in there. It was a direct Presidential order. When I heard about it I didn't want to do it and I told Alex immediately. Basically a factual meeting with them. How the supply system operates and how the trail operates but it was not done not only at my request but I didn't want to do it when I found out about it.

R: How many were there?

K: There were about 5. It was not a background session, there was no record kept, it was only factual. Ziegler called me into his office.

R: There was no record kept?

K: No, none.

R: I just don't want to be confronted with another Cambodia - with Herb Klein and everybody else talking.

K: I agree with you Bill. It was done by direct order of the President. This was not a backgrounder but a factual session and most of the talking out of here was done by Ziegler.

R: Will I am just afraid that there will be a repetition of the Cambodian operation.

K: You will not have a repetition of what we had last year. There was no comment on how the decisions were made or anything like that. Just how the system operates and why Route 9 is important and . . . much of that they should not judge on the basis of what was picked up. I said nothing about decisions - almost entirely factual. When I heard about it I was profoundly concerned and immediately told Alex. I did not want to do it.

R: I have trouble understanding this system. We all get together and solemnly agree that no one will say anything and the first thing I know the White House keeps violating the rules.

K: Bill, we have all played so well in this exercise. If something like this happens again I will go directly to you and perhaps we can go together. I am sorry about this.

R: OK

["Reproduced from the open files\nof the Nixon Presidential\nMaterials Staff", "DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By KCL NARA, Date 5/13/04", "TELCON\nGeo. Meany/Kissinger\n6:07 p.m. 2/8/71", "K: I am xdx calling for two reasons. One, to apologize because I was to call you yesterday prior to the start of the operation and when you were out of town and the hectic activities here, it was a slip up in my office. I want to call you to give you a run down. The SVN are about 7 miles inland.", "M: In Laos?", "K: Yes. They are attempting to cut the supply x trails that are going through areas that they are penetrating. With the loss of Sihanoukville, we think we can cut off their supplies and will strengthen our withdrawals. When are you coming back?", "M: Not for a couple of weeks. I have several meetings this week and a Council meeting next Mon.", "K: I will brief you when you come back.", "M: You will have the same opposition on the Hill?", "K: Less intense then on Cambodia. The people are saying --", "M: They x will say you are expanding the war.", "K: But the NVN are pretty ____.", "M: I don't hear xdx x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x_x

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

U. Alexis Johnson/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

February 8, 1971 6:15 p.m.

jlj

K: These Goddamn public relations people have set up a session with columnists for backgrounding on this operation. I feel very strongly that I do not want to do it alone.

J: Gee whiz Henry. How did we get into this? I came back here and the Secretary was dancing up and down with the ticker reports of a backgrounder and called Ron Ziegler and got it out of him that you met with some of the press. So I told him what you had told me.

K: I did not do any backgrounding.

J: Well, that is done. But what is pertinent to this thing.

K: I will not do it without you. We have worked together so well and I am outraged at this.

J: We just said that we weren't going to say anything. Well that is done with but. . .

K: Thing this afternoon was a direct Presidential order. Can you come over and do this thing with me now. They are all assembled but I will not do it alone.

J: For me to deliberately take part - I don't know. Knowing how strongly the Secretary feels about this I do not think I could do it without the Secretary's OK - I know I could not do it without his OK.

K: He is right. We have had enough clashes where there are differences of opinion. Not to add this thing to it. The President called me and told me to go into Ron Ziegler's office. This thing now, the first thing I knew of it was when someone handed me a piece of paper with who I was going to talk to.

J: Why don't you just say no?

K: Now they feel that it would be difficult to cancel. But I will not do it alone.

J: I would rather cancel it.

K: All right then I will cancel it.

J: Otherwise this thing will run away with us.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

R. Zeigler/Kissinger

6:40 pm

2/8/71

? ? ? ? ? ?

K: Why did they carry WH spokesman? I thought they wouldn't do that.
Alex Johnson just told me.

Z: If it relates to the next January, it's me and I told Rogers that and it's
in the Q&A guidance. I explained to Rogers. He asked if Henry Kissinger
had been doing any backgrounding over here today. I thought it was best
not to lie so I said he has carried no new ground and is just taking off the
edge.

K: Why didn't you say the President asked me?

Z: And I said only those who the President asked him to see. I made that
point.

K: I can't see this group without the Secy's approval. I won't kick him in
the teeth.

Z: There's nothing in the UPI story.

K: I told them no backgrounding and then I do it.

Z: I am only pushing the ones the President wants.

K: You turn these guys off.

Z: I didn't set that up. It was set up by Rob Odle.

K: He is the horses ass of all time!

Z: It's not mine. I am staying out of it. On the 3rd group, don't tell
the President Loory was in there.

K: I won't mention it. I didn't notice -- who was there from the NYT?

Z: Jim Naughton. You didn't tell them anything but you took the edge off.

*

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
2/8/71 6:45 p.m.

K: Just 25 minutes ago they told me they had brought in a group of friendly columnists. Let me read the names . . . . whom Buchanan and Colson brought in and asked me to brief. I refused. I asked Alex Johnson to come over too but he says he doesn't want to do it without your permission. I am outraged by the thing. This after just answering a few questions. The ticker stuff was Ziegler's, not mine and Ziegler will tell you that himself.

R: They? Who brings them in?

K: Buchanan and Colson . . . got these guys without any knowledge on my part. They're going to write columns three or four days from now. They are here for a meeting and I have refused to see them. You and your people have played this squarely and I wanted to play it squarely with you. I can cancel it; I can go in there and answer a few questions or call some of your people over. These are our choices.

R: Is this something the President wants? I get so . . . . . the question of credibility becomes believable.

K: You are right. I went to him and told him the same thing. He sees your point now. He said quite honestly, "Try to sell him on it but if he doesn't want to do it we won't." I have no interest in doing this.

R: Why doesn't Ron do it? That's not enough?

K: No, and they were not invited to meet with him. He didn't do this -- it was done by Buchanan and Colson and without anyone's knowledge except Haldeman.

R: I think it would be a good thing for me to stay out of it. Whatever the President wants is okay with me. I don't want to be a problem, but everyone agrees this is okay, good teamwork. And then everyone goes ahead.

K: I could send Haig. Maybe I'll do that.

R: I think I should just stay out of it. Whatever the President wants is okay.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
2/8/71; 7:05 p.m.

K: I just wanted you to know I have cancelled the thing. Colson and Buchanan are taking them for a drink, saying I got tied up.

R: I don't want the President to think I am a burden.

K: No, you are right. Look, I would not have cancelled it if I thought you were wrong.

R: If the President wants to do something he does not have to get my permission.

K: The reason I called you was because we all had agreed there was not going to be one. Therefore we have to stick to the agreement.

R: No reason why we have to stick with the agreement -- we can change it.

K: I think we should cancel it now and if the lid is lifted we can do it together.

feg

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Amb. Rabin
2/8/71; 7:30 p.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador, how are you?

R: I understand that you are the busy man.

K: We have things going all the time.

R: I hope they are going fine.

K: They seem to be going fine. You know that it is not always easy to see how things are going the first day.

R: (I did not get this because of distraction -- R mentioned something about knowing how things were going the first day on something they did because of the operation and type it was)

K: We are quite optimistic. I think on this discussion that we had -- if the Prime Minister could leave it so that it stays open -- unless you have already decided to close it -- then you and I can have a further talk in a day or two.

R: I understand. Keep it open for the timebeing.

K: You don't have to be very encouraging, as long as you don't close it completely.

R: It might be possible to keep it open just for making inquiries -- to get more information. This is what I think would be the maximum we could decide upon.

K: There might be something to be said for that. I have mentioned it to the President but I have not had a chance for a full discussion.

R: Before the Sadat speech it was not open, it was not official. The fact that it has been put officially by him and openly, of course, makes certain decisions on the part of the Israeli Government much more urgent to be made. Second, from the very beginning she did not want to do it without knowing that she would not doing anything in contradiction to the President's views. This is the reason why I have been asked -- especially when she has to make a speech. The public wants to know the Israeli position.

By: KHC NARA, Dated: 5/12/04

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/President Johnson

9:30 p.m., February 8, 1971

K: Mr. President

J: I am delighted to hear from you.

K: Did you receive the message I sent to you?

J: Yes, I'm very grateful to you.

K: I called Walt the day before in order to find out how to reach you.

J: Yes.

K: Thought I would check in with you to let you know that so far we are 8 miles inland which is where we wanted to be and if we succeed in our objective which is to interrupt their communications and supplies.

J: Someone told me that you were going to come down a week ago.

K: I was planning to in March.

J: That's going to be too late for me. This is the most delightful place we have ever been. Would like to see you take a deserved rest and get some sunshine.

K: I would enjoy it, I have never been in that area.

J: It is about 75° every day, maybe up to 80°, very little moisture, clear water, no pollution and a wonderful bay. The boys have excellent communications here and we will just leave them here for you.

K: You are nice.

J: We have been here a couple of weeks.

K: I will stop by the Ranch in March either coming or going.

J: And spend a night with us. Before I finalize the chapters on the war, I would like for you to give me your judgment if you have the time. Three or four hours. There are 23 chapters, 12 have __________, three more to go and I have about 5 on the war.

K: I would consider it a privilege.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCORN

9:30 p.m., February 8, 1971 --

J: Since you are a principal character, I thought you might be interested.

K: You are very generous. If you should have a deadline before I get down there, I would be glad to read them here.

J: They have to be in by May.

K: Well, I will be sure to come by the Ranch before then.

J: Call me before you come down. I do hope you will get away and spend some time down here.

K: I am planning to do that in March and give my best to Mrs. Johnson.

J: Right, Bye.

*

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON

Ernst van der Beugel/Kissinger
morning 2/8/71

K: When you come here you get involved in a military operation.

V: I know. I felt guilty about that. Any possibility of taking up 5 mins. on the phone?

K: You are not coming down?

V: No. I simply cannot. I am only here for 2-3 days and they are filled with meetings. We will see each other in April.

K: I will come to the Bilderburg. I wish it were in Europe. I want an excuse to go over.

V: You can come visit us. What is your schedule tomorrow morning early? 10 mins. on the phone.

K: I have a breakfast with someone. I could call you around 9:30.

V: That's perfect. I will wait for your call at the Regency in Rm. 1101. I must leave at 10:00.

K: I will call as close to 9:30 as I can make it. It's a hectic period but otherwise it's fine.

V: Without ? ? ? ? ? ?

K: The big decisions are easier than the little decisions.

V: I want a few words from you about the ______. And the children are all right?

K: Fine.

V: Your health is good?

K: Yes. I will go crazy one day suddenly but that's not predictable.

V: But how will we know? David Young is not with you any more?

K: He is with me but he is doing substantive work.

V: I will be in the hotel tomorrow morning. Just a couple of words on my impressions on the other side of the ocean. You know the difference between Park Avenue and the Suez Canal?

K: No.

Ad V: On Park Ave., the Jews are on both sides.

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Van der Beugel/Kissinger
9:47 a.m. 2/9/71

V: I have nothing very important to report from our part of the world. I was very uneasy about the German a month ago because he had too much prestige in this thing but now he is in the good camp but he has invested so much prestige in this thing that he has polarized the domestic political life in Germany and put himself into the hands of the other party. But I am a little easier. The gambleis whether he has success in telling his people that he has done what he can and it's failed or that he has done what he has for success.

K: He makes one unfavorable treaty and then make another unfavorable treaty to radify the first.

V: I am less uneasy about it then 2-3 weeks ago. He is weak but loyal. The British are in a mess but they have a tough Prime Minister.

K: He is surprisingly tough.

V: It doesn't surprise me at all.

K: It surprises me.

V: I think inspite of all ? ? ? ? ? it should be support to get them in. One worry and your people could give attention is that the monetary thing is out of the news and the newspapers but I think the whole monetary situation will be difficult with regard to US/? Euroep.

K: In what way?

V: It's absolutely clear and the boss is right to give the total priority to the domestic scene but it means the balance of payments deficit and the world must hold dollars up with us in an increasingly difficult way. Whether they will create dangerous tensions in '71, I take into account.

K: The French are behaving notably on Laos.

V: And their drive in Europe is to do something nasty against the dollar. You should be tough in this respect and tell them they can choose between the dollar and something else. It's so out of the limelight and it's one of the main problems of 1971.

K: Right. We are getting Peterson here for the international economic policy and that will help us.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Van der Beugel/Kissinger

9:47 a.m.

2/9/71

-2-

V: xfly It would be a good thing for one of your people to brief you on this point. My instinct is that in 71 something could break on that point.

K: I will get on top of it. You will be back for Bilderburg?

V: You are coming?

K: I have every intention.

V: You will see Denis this week?

K: For lunch today.

V: You will hear what he is going to say. I find him in much more reliable and intelligent than out. I disagree with him on many things -- he supports Ost Politik now. You will see that he is back in opposition and gets a kind of intellectual arrogance he had when he was in . A good substantial bunch of Europeans thinking at Bilderburg. You will be there and it's well that it's it. Muskie will be there.

K: Will he?

V: Probably, yes. Stevenson. A good young American group. The dialogue will be Sat.

K: My plan is to arrive Friday night. I will have to see how to get up there. I will worry about that.

V: There are all kinds of private planes and if you tell Joe, he will take care of that.

K: I can get a military plane.

V: How is everything?

K: Fine.

V: You see Nancy?

K: Yes. I am in a hectic period but it maybe 2-3 weeks. I will see you in April.

V: Unless I have an emergency meeting.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Van der Beurgel/Kissinger

9:47 a.m.

2/9/71

K: What brings you back?

V: Die Borg, ______, ______. It's dangerous business when you have your inane balanced on mergers and money flow and it's insecure.

K: At my level of income and my alimony, it's a case of when I run out of savings.

V: But your life in Washing is inexpensive?

K: No, I seem to live above my means.

V: Apart from the house it should be not too expensive.

K: You are right. I cannot explain why I spend so much money.

V: Because you don't have time to give attention to the problem and that's always expensive. Any ideas beyond this?

K: No. If I go back to university it will be as a formal base.

V: We will discuss that in a much more quiet atmosphere. The university is always an alternative but it should be chosen when all others are exhausted. There are scores of other possibilities but it means 6 mos. to think about it. In my opinion, no problem. I want you immediately to warn me if you have anything in your mind about timing. You can talk to people if there's a possibility of 6-8 months but I am sure that in the atmosphere I work, there are possibilities.

K: That's interesting. I haven't got a 6 mos. period now ahead of me. If progress in some things, there might be. We can talk in Bildergurg.

V: This was hectic because of these meetings. But I will be here in April and May and June. Then I will spend a couple of days in Washington and you can summe me when you are free.

K: You know how to appeal to my ego.

V: It's difficult if I only have 2 hours.

K: We will do it and I look forward to it.

*

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

10:43 p. a.m. 2/9/71

By KML NARA, Dato' S/12/04

S: One, to apologize that I couldn't come last night. I got caught by the Secy. I have been filled in and you should send us a memo on the decisions taken as it relates to airlift.

K: That was 12--

S: I will have Atherton work it out with Saunders. That solved half the problem. Packard said that on internal arrangements, there would not be a production hitch and the President should have the option. In wahtever you send us put in a paragraph that says the Defense Dept. is making the arrangements Pin it down on both points on your decision.

K: How did you do with Rabin?

S: Well and it's in a memo at the WH. Golda has come out and ? ? ? has put out a statement that will put out an amount of talk in the Israeli government. There's fluidity on this. I don't know where it will get us.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12956, Sect. 3.6

*

By: K.L.V. NARA, Date: 5/12/64

Telecon
Larry Lynn

2/9/71 2:35 p.m.

L: You may know your friend Richardson has offered me a job, and I'm strongly inclined to take it.

K: You will make the same mistake you did the last time.

L: You really think so?

K: Yes, but I know a strong man when I see one. That sort of job you can always get while this one you can't.

L: I know that. I've been eager though to get into some domestic work and I can't think of a better guy to do it under.

K: No question. I am not talking against Richardson. What is it? An Assistant Secretary?

L: Yes. Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, about 40 to 50 men professional shop that plays a fundamental role. I find it hard to turn it down.

K: Then you can't.

L: But I would value your advice.

K: I have selfish interests. And working here is more precarious.

L: That's doesn't bother me.

K: But any planning and programming not done out of here won't be done. And I can't get it done with my present staff and Wayne Smith is the first to admit this. He recommended that I ask you back so you wouldn't be stepping on any toes there.

L: I guess I know that. It's not that what you offered me isn't attractive because it is. But I think this other is different and it's the kind of difference that I want to do sooner or later.

K: Well first of all, you do what you feel right about. Secondly, the other thing you would be able to do and I would help you if this Administration gets re-elected, which I think will happen.

L: I appreciate that and am sure that's true.

K: I think you have made up your mind anyway.

*

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon
Larry Lynn

2/9/71 2:35 p.m. page 2

L: After I talked with you last, and before Richardson offered me this, I was so convinced that I wanted to come back to Washington that I at least told Stanford that I was thinking of leaving here and coming back to you. And I would do that if it weren't for this thing. But I am pretty excited about this.

K: Then why don't you do it.

L: I don't want to hurt feelings.

K: There won't be any. That's ridiculous.

L: I owe you a great deal, perhaps more than anyone else in the world.

K: But that's no basis for making a decision.

L: I am sure I would benefit as much or more back there but I kind of want to do this other.

K: Then you have got to do it -- no question. It's good to have you in Washington anyway.

L: I'm looking forward to coming back. I really don't like it here.

K: You couldn't work with a better man than Richardson.

L: I always thought the best thing is to pick a good man and work for him. I've done that every time except this last one.

K: You have certainly picked the best man in the cabinet.

L: I think I will do it. It's very painful. If it hadn't come along I'd have come back to you.

K: Is Richardson's Assistant Secretary leaving?

L: Yes. I have known him. He wanted to leave and decided to do it when he knew I was interested.

K: Well, check in with me when you are back.

L: I will. And I think you have done more for analysis than any other man. I appreciate all you have done.

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/13/04

TELCOM

Roland Evans/Kissinger

4:55 pm

2/9/71

K: Some secret document you missed this morning?

E: No, I asked a couple of weeks ago if I could chat with Bill Steelman <u>so</u> on from time to time. He thinks it's negative.

K: No, I will approve it. I will talk with him. I will get it done.

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/94

TELCOM
VP/Haig

6:07 pm

2/9/71

VP: What's the current situation. I am going to L. A. to check on the earth quake.

H: There has not been any break today. The units in Laos are moving on schedule. They already got the old Ho Chi Minh trail and sitting astride it. The troops in Cambodia are doing well. Hurt the <u>LAO</u> enemy badly. We have <u>prelim</u> already started to get 17 & 18 trucks and large <u>ambulances</u>. We are all very pleased with the way they are progressing.

VP: How about casualties?

H: 4 due to helicopter shot down yesterday. The ARVN CAsualties are minimal. We don't have a precise figure.

VP: What about the domestic situation?

H: No Congressional kickback up. An indicator is that State had one question on Laos and Ron had one.

Telecon
Senator Bennett
2/9/71 6:45 p.m.

By KCLW

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

B: I am getting out of my field, but you are so patient

K: The latter I wouldn't guarantee.

B: There is a staff man on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy who grabs me every time he sees me about the fact that we have refused to give the Russians our most sophisticated computers...

K: That is true.

B: But that he is afraid the British are about to do it.

K: That is not true.

B: But that's what he thinks. And he grabs me and says 'how can you stop the British from giving to them what we have refused.'

K: The British have a project to sell some computers to the Soviet Union. But what they say is that they have only civilian application. We want to send a team of civilian experts over there to check it. If it is wrong, we will not approve it.

B: So you are on top of it?

K: Yes.

B: So the next time he comes up to me I can tell him I have found someone who is doing something about it.

K: Yes.

B: Good. Thank you very much.

By K.L.V. NARA, Date 5/12/94

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/The President

8:05 p.m., February 9, 1971

P: You should have told him that I will put myself to the sword.

K: I told them and I'm sure they wrote it down that the President said there was 18 reasons to do it and only one reason not to do it. You don't want to make the wrong decision for the wrong reason. Everyone of them wrote that down. These are really our friends. Mollenhoff was not too good when we had him here but today he was very, very favorable.

P: Good, good.

K: The whole tone of it was so grand.

P: Was he impressed by the Laotian thing now, he knew what we did in Cambodia. Did you tie it together?

K: We came in when we had 200 casualties a week. We took the ________ away from them but the pacification gains were vulnerable because of the sanctuaries. Then we took the sanctuaries away from them. This year they will make a tremendous buildup and we will ________. Did you see this evening's Star? The briefing we did yesterday for example played on ABC and NBC and all the major newspapers.

P: Today's Star was okay then.

K: Excellent! I told them not to ascribe it to the White House, yesterday's briefing, because I wanted it to go to the Administration.

P: Dick Wilson positive?

K: He was great.

P: He's just an honest reporter.

S

K: Timmisch was excellent. This was the sort of meeting one has all too rarely at this time. I think, Mr. President, it is a little early to be <u>reminiscent of a previous situation</u>, counting our chickens yet. If they really don't resist, we will know in three or four hours.

P: Be sure that the plan is ready, is it? Tell Moorer I expect him to be there. I am having him over tomorrow night. It is Alice Longworth's 87th birthday. I've invited Moorer, the Joe Alsops, and her kids.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCON

Mr. Kissinger/The President

8:05 p.m., February 9, 1971 -- page 3

K: Such a nice gesture.

P: The Alsops are cousins you know and I want Moorer there to brainwash them. How is Moorer?

K: Moorer is ecstatic. The military feel that they have a new lease on life.

P: Sure.

K: I also told them that the psychological shock to the American people to all this anguish ............

P: Did they write that down?

K: Particularly the war story for Chamberlain. They don't forgive their leaders for disloyalty.

P: It is just as well we did it today instead of yesterday.

K: Oh, yes. Did I tell you that Bill Sullivan told me at the WSAG meeting that Harriman called and told him that as long as we don't have American troops in there, he is for it. Isn't that amazing?

P: I'll be damn. Has Muskie said anything?

K: Only about not consulting Congress and just asking questions.

P: How did Rogers come out?

K: Very well. I talked to Vogt who was there and he said it was very friendly. Symington said it was the best use of airpower and why hadn't we done it two (?) years ago.

P: I think you ought to bomb those choke points right now or is it too early?

K: Give them another week. It could be that the Chinese may feel that they have to come in. I think we should use reconnaissance flights to find out how much supplies they have.

P: Find out.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/The President

8:05 p.m., February 9, 1971 -- page 4

K: I will talk to Moorer.

P: If they are ready, just bomb the choke points routinely.

K: They are trying to get them to use up their whole supply system.

P: How did Laird get along?

K: The friendliest meeting he has ever had with the Armed Services Committee.

P: This is not the last even if they withdraw now, they will have lost a hell of a lot. Already got some ammo.

K: They tell me they have already blown up 1,000 gallons of gasoline but I think take that with a grain of salt because it is based on fire

P: This is by bombing?

K: In that area but they do have big POL supplies but there is no reason to withdraw because they have met no opposition today. Some intelligence today that just north of Kompong Som they stopped some trucks

P: We are bombing that are we?

K: Oh, yes.

P: Just make sure that Moorer has a plan, recon and hit the choke points.

K: Right, Mr. President.

By KNW NARA, Date 5/12/04

*

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/General Vogt
8:50 p.m., February 9, 1971

K: How are you?

V: Oh, very good.

K: Johnny, the President would like you to brief 1/2 of the Democratic Congress who are coming to breakfast about what is going on in Laos and Cambodia, particularly Laos, along the lines of the Armed Services Committee but keep it about 15 minutes.

V: That's a pretty big order but I will do my best.

K: At 8:00 a.m. in the East Room of the White House.

V: The East Room.

K: No, the State Dining Room. Will you bring your charts.

V: Yeah.

K: They are not interested in the altitudes of the airplanes when they are making their bombing runs.

V: Gotcha! I'll do my best.

K: Listen you, don't pull the leg of your old professor. Just explain how the supplies move, that most of them are north of Route 9 and how bombing has totally failed.

V: (Laughed -- a joke) How many will be there?

K: Maybe 100, certainly 120 or so.

V: I don't know if the charts will be adequate.

K: The Chairman has a chart so big it impresses the hell out of us.

V: The same one I've got. We will get it together.

K: Yes but keep it to about 15-20 minutes.

V: Right.

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

Robt. Evans/Kissinger

morning 2/9/71

Evans told HAK of the earthquake in L. A. and said that tremors were still occurring. He went on to say the was going to Caneel Bay on Friday (he wanted something absolutely quiet and it was either that or Mt. Sinai) and would be returning Tues. HAK indicated in may be in NY Tues. but Evans said he would not be arriving back until late Tues. but would be there the rest of the week. HAK then indicated that if he went to NY over the weekend of the 20th, he would get together with the Evanses for dinner or a cocktail. Evans stressed dinner and said they would be staying at the Sherry Netherlands.

*

Telecon
Under Secretary Johnson

2/10/71 8:45 a.m.

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: I just had breakfast with George Shultz. He agreed to let me do it on behalf of the President and not to bother the President with it. I will transmit the instruction to him and he will execute it with the Council.

J: Excellent, very well handled.

K: So you are not directly involved at all.

J: Excellent.

K: It will be done on its merits. This is for advance information. Now I have to retrieve the paper from the President's office . . .

J: How much time will this take?

K: I will get the paper from the President's office today. Then I will transmit it to Shultz as a decision. He will then take it up with the Council at whatever time that takes. But that is firm.

J: Thank you very much -- very well handled.

K: Not at all. It's absolutely the right thing to do.

*

Telecon
Admiral Moorer

2/10/71 8:50 a.m.

Secure Voice (couldn't hear Mr. Kissinger)

By KHLW

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Moorer:

Let me explain this to you. I talked to Abrams and you got it right: that message was at 2:30 in the afternoon out there, and probably written an hour before that. So it's almost a mid-day report. Route ______ is okay; the road it open to the junction of 92. They had airborne troops in there, but ground troops hadn't gotten to them. They went in by airlift. But the road to Tchepone is a good road. Wouldn't say exactly when going to make ______ on that, but I am generally told that it is being played carefully according to the situation and the weather. They knew there would be temporary lowerings of the ceiling and they would have to handle the aircraft accordingly. I was talking with General Sutherland. He is extremely pleased with the professionalism of the South Vietnamese. They have a top organization and are playing it very well. It's going very well from his point of view. Can't hold them to a strict timetable because ______. Yes, all right. ______. That's what he said, and just talked to the most senior U.S. delegate on the soft, the best source of information.

One side, thing you might be interested in. Two South Vietnamese, and I stress South Vietnamese, helicopters were lost yesterday and one of them may, I repeat may have had aboard four U.S. newsmen. They were seen to get into a helicopter on the South Vietnamese side and the helo was to stop en route. Haven't found out whether they disembarked at the first stop. If they didn't, chances are they are lost. He (?) thinks it unlikely that they were captured because the helo was seen to explode in the air. We are trying to conduct ops and will get more information on that ______. He is not confirming that; it is possible they got off at the first stop. ______.

I think the main objective is to continue these ______ with 105 milimeter howitzers to assure it's well-picked along this route. When we've got that licked, we'll be going into Tchepone. We might schedule the helo lift. ______. ______ we've got to make sure we have adequate visibility. ______ could well happen over the weekend. ______.

According to the forecasting, the clouds are lifting; that means they are lifting during the night. There is always a temporary fog when the sun comes up and then it continues to lift. It's improving in a general sense.

Tell the President it's all right. We're going according to plan. They are confident out there. They expected some of these delays down there due to weather. We have the situation well in hand. I'm going to spend time this morning straightening out this report thing and will talk to you about it at 11:00.

*

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/94

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
11:02 a.m. 2/10/71

R: I am going to dedicate a new press room at 12:30. Anything the President wants said or which should be said, I could say it. I don't plan to say anything. I am not sure there's anything we should do.

K: You did such a spectacular job at the Foreign Relations Committee.

R: NYTimes story came out well.

K: I hear you handled it. I liked your answer to Case.

R: He said he didn't understand my answer and I said that's what I intended. The end was helpful. Fulbright and Muskie were there. I asked them ask in the name of national interest that they be moderate in their comments because domestic turmoil could only be harmful. If we fail, there's plenty of time to criticize us and if we succeed, you will be glad you didn't. Fulbright read me his.

K: What you said was fine.

R: Muskie said nothing and Symington was ? ? ? ? ?.

K: Hubert Humphrey treaded water back and said Vogt made an extremely good case. The less we stir up -- You have positioned (?) it so well.

R: Could you get Klein to lay off? We don't have to say who attended what meetings.

K: They are under instructions to keep their mouths shut.

R: The Committee yesterday, there was no question -- I said it was well planned and coordinated and nothing we did stoped the military action. It was right on schedule. Decisions, we couldn't tell much in advance on the operation itself. First because no final decisions made. Church raised a question and I gave a strong answer and that was the last question.

K: Zeigler at the briefing on Monday went on background and said it was early January but I told him to lay off. Everyone worked together.

R: Answers like that cause trouble.

K: We don't want to be in a position fear of what newspapers will write, people will not state their views.

R: Having thought through the problem, we solved the problems.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Rogers/Kissinger

11:02 a.m.

2/10/71

-2-

K: If we had known the domestic would go as it did --

R: We had to solve the Soubanna problem.

K: And then Stennis and then public relations. I hope you understand some of these guys are maniacs. Colson is an example. I will put it in writing.

R: And Klein feels he has to go to NEWSWEEK and TIME.

K: We are beautifully positioned and we should keep quiet.

R: And it's a success and it seems to be, it will go in the President's book.

K: He will get the press no matter how it was arrived at.

R: Strong leadership of President and he is a strong leader. When it looks like it will work. Then we can say it's leadership we have been looking for.

K: I will call Klein personally.

*

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger
12:11 p.m. 2/10/71

L: I am a little concerned about going too far in getting my hands tied on withdrawal increments. Fact of 40-50 combat troops in VN. k The President apparently said it at the Congressional briefing. Then he asked Vogt and he had to agree.

K: I thought it was turned off last night and I will do it again now.

L: We have 40-50 troops that can maneuver but we will have 2/3 on 284 that will be combat.

K: The mistake I made was not to talk with him personally.

L: I called Bill and he thought he understands now. He will be careful. I want to deliver on things when the President --

K: I will have it shut off. He doesn't understand.

L: Help a little bit on some of these things.

K: I have been bothered for days and I thought it was shut off. I guarantee it will not be repeated at the Congressional meeting tomorrow.

L: The next thing, he gave ______ to Alsop. I can't deny it.

K: I didn't read the damn thing.

L: Do you -- we have to use the points that legalize it by Congress. Insuring American kx troops because they reason is air support.

K: I haven't read the columns.

L: He says the President called him and said he had to reasons why he did it. Maybe it was my fault.

K: I will tell Joe the next time to check with us. The President doesn't look at it from the point of view on what impression it will make on Congress.

L: We have Congress aborad. We have done some good things there. We have worked hard on the briefings. And looks like Congress is with us. We have John Spermon Cooper aborad. We did that with his wife -- We took them to Camp David.

K: That's more than anyone should be asked to put up with.

L: As far as these things are concerned, we are a hell of a lot better

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Laird/Kissinger

12:11 p.m. 2/10/71

-2-

L: (cont) off. I got a briefing on WSAG yesterday. Tom Moorer should have known I took the limitations off. It's in the execute.

K: That's what I thought you had done.

L: I had. To discuss take an hour discussing something like that -- I told him that was pretty already off. Then set up that B-52s on Laos.

K: I agree with you on that.

L: I think we have that well in hand. I watch that every single day.

K: Everyone is working well on that.

L: I told you a week ago.

K: I was the execute but I didn't know if it applied to Laos.

L: To the whole thing. Some of our friends think it's good targets. We have a shortage of targets and not sorties. I am concerned about troops.

K: I will have the President lined up on it.

L: I am afraid of a disagreement between the President and me and I don't want to be too much of a hawk.

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger
12:33 p.m. 2/10/71

S: I would like to make a procedural suggestion. I wonder if it would not be a good idea to request Dick Helms to do a study on (the M.E. ?). We have had INR do a study of the obvious -- oil, etc. Wouldn't it be well to have Helms make an assesment of our interests? If you add up the pros and cons you might make an argument its a slight disadgantage but if you weigh it against ? ? ? ? AND give you the opportunity of cease fire they obviously would underline what-ever disadvantage there might be. I never worry about access of Russians to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf because we have use anyway.

K: It will be done.

S: I was in Chicago last ngth speaking before the Council. They are very anxious to get you and they asked me to convey their desire.

K: Is it a good group?

S: Excellent. Chicago, NY, LA are the best in the country.

K: In L. A. I have have evenings free, you understand.

S: You have dropped a low silouhette in this issue recently. I will get worried if it's true for a long period because I will assume you are getting serious.

K: No.

*

By K.L. NARA, Dato 5/13/04

TELCOM

Murray Marder/Kissinger
2:40 p.m. 2/10/71

K: Did I say something wrong?

M: No, I was trying to see if we can get guidance on strategic implications. We are getting close guidance as to whether to characterize this as a spoiling action or cutting the jugular vein in large strategic standpoint. I understand the Pentagon this as a choking operation. It's essentially a spoiling operation. Vogt tended to emphasize the longer range- Is it clarifiable?

K: Partly it depneds on how it comes out. If it gets the maximum conceivable, we will be delighted but we would be satisfied if it were a substantial spoiling operation and anything beyond that as a bonus. That's not a very satisfactory answer. To gain time for withdrawal and build up SVN forces so anything that complicates the NVN problem is good. But I don't use that language at a briefing.

M: Stennis and Rogers -- Vogt didn't use that broad terminology. It depends on how it comes out. I saw what Carroll had from you in terms of your account in the backgrounder. It didn't get into probable responses. I don't know if you were cut short or what.

K: The Soviets have confined themselves to the moderate. The Chinese as our intervention into Indochina in 65. The NVN will have to decide whether to fight. They must pay the price if they go against fire power and risk supplies in fight or falling back and cutting off of supplies faster. I think they will do both. Fight moderately but not to a point they will risk the losses they had in the Tet offensive.

M: Do you think it hits them harder than Cambodia.

K: It is less than Cambodia but long term could be more ____.

M: In time frame does it appear that they probably cannot bring enough forces to overwhelmingly challenge the SVN forces?

K: Substantial fight but not overwhelming. If they do, we will have a number of offices who will have to have explaining to do. All this is for background.

M: Of course. Anything to change their strategy in Northern Laos?

K: We expect an offensive in Northern Laos. They are preparing. Their lead time is several months. They moved 312 diffix division into Northern Laos 7 weeks ago. We expect an offensive but whether it will go to Vientiane we would doubt.

M: Some people say we are playing the SVN in Cambodia. Some say it's more important than what we are treating it.

By KHW NARA, Date 5/13/04

M. Marder/Kissinger

2:40 p.m.

2/10/71

-2-

K: I think it's part of the same strategy. Attempting to destroy supplies at the other end. You should consider on the editorial page -- when people say widening the war and spreading the SVN thin, they would be defending ________ miles of frontier. A few miles across Laos doesn't spread them thin. Or along the Mekong doesn't spread them thin. Noting to report further south except to destroy base areas.

M: I assume that editorial concern is obvious one that if SVN forces in Cambodia and Laos are attacked --

K: My point is so are NVN forces. The NVN fighting in Cambodia would otherwise be fighting in NVN.

M: Any other possible development here of a communist initiative on the diplomatic side?

K: I see no evidence but when they look over the choices they might try something more.

M: Does Lon Nol's illness mess anything up?

K: We don't think so. We would have preferred if it hadn't happened.

M: Is it a stroke?

K: He is out of operation.

M: Does that have any discernible effect?

K: Our people feel not really.

M: Is it possible to amplify on the chronology? On how this was laid on?

K: Not really.

M: You avoided that the other night.

K: It was planned for sometime and not the same time, true there was stop and go. I have a meeting at 2:45 and I am late.

M: Thank you.

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Irwin
2/10/71 p.m.

I: One question (and I thought if you didn't know about this you might have time to think about it now). The question is that Secretary Kennedy is asking about Micronesia. He wants to have a backgrounder . . .

K: Do you want him as your special representative?

I: No, I'm just wondering . . .

K: The suggestion has been made, but I am not sure.

I: Well, I'm not in favor myself. But people have been briefing him.

K: If he's been approached it's without authority, but with my eager beavers running loose I can't guarantee. I have not talked to him nor has any member of my staff. I think it highly unlikely the President has.

I: We are briefing but I think it curious.

K: He's way down on my list.

I: He wasn't what I had thought of as what we wanted. It's not his metier.

K: Maybe he's confusing it with Taihiti.

I: We could point him toward the economic side if you wanted.

K: I would keep out of it altogether unless the President wants him in. But to the best of my knowledge there's no Presidential knowledge of this.

By: KHW NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

TELECON

Ambassador Rabin/Mr. Kissinger

11:20 a.m., February 11, 1971

K: I have talked to the President about that matter mentioned the other day, and as far as we are concerned, we have no objections if this thing were opened. We are not asking you to do it, but the answer is we have no objections.

R: I understand you. Thank you very much.

K: We can talk again next week.

R: That will be helpful, and we can elaborate on it.

K: This is for your meeting on Sunday -- they can proceed. There will be no difficulty on our side at all.

R: Thank you very, very much.

Ids

*

By KHW NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCON
Prof. Groff/Kissinger
11:47 a.m. 2/11/71

G: I have long had an interest in decision making at the WH. This morning the NYTimes magazine ca-led to see if I would have an interest in talking with you and the President about the decision making in the Administration. Not to tear it apart but to talk about the process. I took the liberty of calling a fellow academic and I would be eager to know how you respond.

K: xRixxx First of all, my reaction is a sense of horror because it's what I need least. It just feeds intramural fights. Any decision making process that says foreign policy is centered in the WH makes me 50 enemies around town so I would welcome an article hat says it's not true but that would be untrue.

G: I have long expressed admiration --

K: I know of your writings. That's why I returned your call. I like your work in general..

G: You are very kind.

K: I think it's extremely improbable that the President will see you. He never gives interviews.

G: I think it's too bad because he looses marginal values to his gift as a conversationalist.

K: He might but it would be an unusual occurrence if he did. If you are decided to do it the article I will work with you.

G: You have very kind.

K: I can tell you how it runs.

G: I am sure you can.

K: The President can tell you why he wants it that way.

G: As you describe it?

K: Yes. No WH assistant can usurp power because the only thing he has going for him is the President's support.

G: The article would have a patina if it referred to a conversation with the President. It's an opportunity for the Administration as well as an opportunity for me as an academic in good faith.

K: I recognize that but he almost never does it. If you want to do it start with any me and then there's a 5% chance if I can get him interested we can improvise a meeting. But I don't say it's probably.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/13/04

Prof. Groff/Kissinger

11:47 a. m.

2/11/71

-2-

G: Would it seem possible for us contemplating talking to one or two other people? Adm. Moorer?

K: Certainly.

G: Rogers?

K: I am sure.

G: Could I give you a ring on Mon. or Tues.?

K: I would like to do it after the 25th. We have a report coming up.

G: I am looking forward to it.

K: After that.

G: You are very generous indeed.

K: Another person you should talk with is Elliot Richardson who made the system work when he was Under Secretary.

G: Could I enlist your help?

K: Certainly.

G: Did you read my book, "The Tuesday Cabinet"?

K: No. Send me a copy. I know you are a serious writer or I wouldn't do it.

G: I realize that and I see how an idea is corrupted by one view point. I told the NYTimes that on (--- something to do with VN) you didn't make a case for what's happeneing to these Americans.

K: Call me towards the middle of next week to work something out.

G: Thank you very, very much and I will look forward to seeing you shortly.

*

TELECON

Amb. Ortona/Kissinger

12:20 p.m.

2/11/71

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: I understand you have been trying to see me.

O: One of those things

K: This is not the quietest week we have had here. In addition to this, we are putting out an annual State of the World policy report. But I want you to know I am paying attention to the trip and we will make it a success. I spoke to the President again yesterday about an additional 20 mins discussion. This is against all rules. So even though I have not seen you, I have been working for you.

O: I will learn from the State Dept. what time the meeting is?

K: We will try for Sat. morning.

O: I talked to Sonnenfeldt about what will come out of the meeting.

K: The President is looking forward to it.

O: The Prime Minister is eager to come and make it a success. It's important to us.

K: We have every interest to have a stable and constructive situation in Italy.

O: That's what we are working for. Thanks for calling.