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THE REPORTER'S NOTES

The Skybolt Affair

The President has been reported to feel that the scrapping of the Skybolt and the offer of Polaris to Great Britain was a sound technical decision and not a political one. But at the same time the Nassau agreement with Prime Minister Macmillan has been hailed by U.S. spokesmen as a historic step toward Atlantic partnership. The European reaction, ranging from cool to hostile, has been said to bewilder and anger our officials.

This difference in approach is at the heart of the problems of the Atlantic Alliance. Partnership is not furthered by a unilateral act that forces our closest ally to recast its entire military establishment without previous consultation. Nuclear strategy for NATO is not primarily a technical but a political problem. It is imperative to know the sequence of events that led to the Nassau agreement if we are to understand the commotion it has created.

The backbone of the British defense effort since the beginning of the 1950's has been the so-called independent deterrent. It was encouraged after 1954 by the amendment of the McMahon Act that enabled us to give nuclear information to Great Britain. The British retaliatory force has been composed of about 175 V-bombers. In 1957, Britain began to develop its own missile, called Blue Streak—similar to our Thor. This development was scrapped in February, 1960, in favor of Skybolt. Throughout the spring and summer of 1960, the Conservative government was under constant attack by Labour, which charged (a) that Great Britain should abandon its independent deterrent, (b) that it was dangerous to rely on Skybolt since the weapon did not exist and, as George Brown, Labour's parliamentary spokesman on

defense matters, said, "The Americans have not bought it."

The debate about the British retaliatory force took on added intensity after the installation of the Kennedy administration. In March, 1962, Harold Wilson, who often speaks on foreign affairs for the Labour Party, returned from Washington and claimed he had been told that the United States did not consider the British strategic forces of any significance and that the British military effort had better be channeled in other directions. This was denied by the Macmillan government. Labour then challenged the government to produce a single official U.S. statement affirming that the U.S. valued the British deterrent. This the Macmillan government was unable to do.

With respect to the risk of relying on a foreign-produced weapon, the Conservative government consistently referred to an agreement with the United States to supply Skybolt. This has never been contradicted by either the Eisenhower or the Kennedy administrations. However, throughout 1962 leading U.S. officials, including Secretary McNamara and President Kennedy, publicly depreciated the utility of independent retaliatory forces. Then without warning, a week before the last NATO meeting, we announced our intention to cancel Skybolt. The decision naturally produced an uproar in Great Britain. As a result, the Nassau meeting between Prime Minister Macmillan and President Kennedy, which was designed to review the world situation after Cuba, turned out to be focused on the question of nuclear strategy.

THE Nassau agreement is a document of extraordinary ambiguity. The United States agrees to furnish Polaris missiles (type unspecified) to Great Britain. Great Britain is to supply the warheads and the subma-

January 17, 1963

15

(MOVING)

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rines. British Polaris forces are to be
committed to NATO and "targeted
in accordance with NATO plans."
They are to be part of a multilateral
NATO force. Except when supreme
national interests are at stake, "these
British forces will be used for the
purposes of international defense of
the Western Alliance in all circum-
stances." France was invited to join
this arrangement on the same terms.

The phrasing of the agreement raises a number of momentous questions. For example, what happens when the British government decides that supreme national interests are at stake? Can it use the Polaris missiles independently? Or has Great Britain merely the right to abstain from NATO action? The communiqué also states that strategic war is indivisible. But what if Britain insists on reserving the right of independent use? Then the possibility exists that either the British strategic plan or the NATO strategic plan cannot be fulfilled.

Short of the period of supreme
emergency provided for in the com-
muniqué, who determines the de-
ployment of the submarines as-
signed to NATO? Is it SHAPE? the
NATO Council? And how? Who
controls the support facilities, par-
ticularly communications, without
which the Polaris force will be use-
less? It is clear that a Polaris force
under NATO command will not be
available to Great Britain as an in-
strument of its own policy in most
foreseeable circumstances. Indeed,
if and when it were made available,
it would result in a weakening of
the multilateral NATO force. In any
case, how is one to reconcile the
provisions of the agreement with
the insistent U.S. criticism of na-
tional nuclear forces?

Finally, the Nassau communiqué
reverses traditional NATO doctrines
by calling nuclear weapons the
"shield" and conventional weapons
the "sword." Does this mean that
we are proposing to resist a massive
Soviet conventional attack with con-
ventional weapons only? If so, none
of our Continental allies agrees with
this: are we prepared to face the
implications of such a radical shift
of doctrine in terms of force levels
or deployment? In fact we have
asked for an increase of conven-
tional forces from twenty-five divi-

sions to only thirty, the very number
that NATO, in 1957, considered ade-
quate to form a shield for a nuclear
defense. If we propose to defend
Europe with conventional forces, do
we propose to follow the same strat-
egy in other areas such as Iran? If
so, do we have enough conventional
forces for all those tasks?

The circumstances in which the
Nassau agreement was made create
a political climate that is not very
propitious for dealing with these
questions. We offer a Polaris force
with one hand while with the other
we furnish arguments to those seek-
ing to thwart a British nuclear pro-
gram. Opponents of the British gov-
ernment's military policy will be
able to use our antagonism toward
national nuclear forces as an argu-
ment against the program we have
offered.

The Skybolt issue is certain to
reopen the nuclear debate in Great
Britain. Mr. Macmillan has admit-
ted that there will be a deterrent
gap of three to four years after the
V-bombers become obsolete, around
1965, and before Polaris becomes
operational, around 1968. It will be
argued that if Britain can get through
this period without its own nuclear
forces, the British nuclear program
can be scrapped. In that case, do
we really believe that Great Britain
will substantially increase-rather
than simply redeploy-its conven-
tional forces? Are not all these
events and possibilities much more
apt to lead to a sense of impotence
that cannot be healthy for the alli-
ance?

Whatever the consequences in
Great Britain, the circumstances sur-
rounding the Nassau offer make it
unlikely that France will accept.
France will not make its own nu-
clear program dependent on an offer
of future delivery of U.S. missiles
after Britain's experience with Sky-
bolt. De Gaulle may well argue that
a separate European effort is re-
quired to hedge against our changes
of mind. He will reason that if we
behave so brutally even to Britain,
which subordinated almost every-
thing to its special relationship with
us, what prospects are there for the
Continental countries?

Apart from the merits of the Po-
laris offer, we have changed our pro-
posals to NATO so often that no

16

THE REPORTER

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one can tell any more what we want or believe. We have assigned sub- marines to NATO-only to have this gesture turn out to be shifting them from one U.S. headquarters to an- other. Last May we spoke of a NATO submarine force with mixed crews; in September we seemed to encourage a European nuclear force; in December we offered a multi- lateral NATO force composed of national contingents. It is not easy for other governments to base their military policies on so mercu- rial an ally.

JUST BECAUSE the Nassau agree- ment raises so many questions, it creates the urgency of recon- sidering the assumptions and, even more, the spirit underlying our strat- egy. The current quest for a "pure" strategy subordinates all considera- tions of psychology, policy, and the morale of our services to abstract and technical considerations of com- mand and control.

Much will depend on the spirit in which the Nassau agreement is implemented. If its ambiguities are turned into efforts to hamstring the Europeans technically, a further de- terioration of relations is inevitable. But if we approach the consultations in a less hectoring spirit, we may be able to escape the process by which our allies accuse us of unrealiability and we charge them with irrespon- sibility. An opportunity may then exist to discuss NATO strategy from the aspect, not of which member has the right to do what, but from the point of view of what the alliance as a whole should really want.

-HENRY A. KISSINGER

The Show Goes On

In its eagerness to become a cul- tural capital Washington is ignoring the potentialities of its own folk art, particularly that great American en- tertainment-the Congressional in- vestigation.

The 1963-1964 season on Capitol Hill promises something for every taste. Those who prefer legitimate theatre will have the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the activi- ties of foreign lobbyists, Senator Hubert Humphrey's subcommittee on the competence of the Food and Drug Administration, and a continu- ation of Senator Stuart Symington's stockpile hearings. For the tired businessman there will be the usual long-run hits-Representative Otto E. Passman on foreign-aid appropri- ations and Representative John Rooney on the debauches of the Foreign Service. And there's run-of- the-mill vaudeville everywhere.

It seems that to be effective an investigation requires an element of sensation. Senator Estes Kefauver's two-year probe into the drug indus- try only produced significant legis- lation after the Thalidomide scare. The element of mystery, real or feigned, is also essential. When the Un-American Activities Committee took its show on the road a while back, the members managed to seem positively astonished in at least six major cities when their touring customs official discovered Communist propaganda in a sealed mail bag. Not long ago the commit- tee went so far as to invite secret testimony from a witness who was wearing a cloth bag over his head.

ICECAPADES

"Large-scale weather control techniques might be used
... to bring a new 'ice age' upon the enemy," Admiral
[William F.] Raborn suggested.—Associated Press

How peaceable the frozen enemy,
Glittering apex of the coldest war!
The Kremlin jeweled in ice, the hordes at last
Stopped in their shuffling, the Praesidium
A gelid waxworks, all the invincible
Machines ice-bound! Now all can see
The Frigor Mortis of a bad idea
Caught in the act—in aspic—prison in prism—
As intricate, overworked as any
Fabergé of the Czars, and equally
Outdated: Communism.
—SEC

18

THE REPORTER

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THE REPORTER

THE MAGAZINE OF FACTS AND IDEAS

MAX ASCOLI. Editor and Publisher

Executive Editor, Philip Horton Managing Editor, Robert Bingham
Senior Editor, Couverneur Paulding Washington Editor, Douglass Caterer

Art Director, Reg Massie

Writers: Claire Sterling, Marya Mannes, Edmond Taylor, Meg Greenfield, George Bailey, Ward S. Just

General Manager, John J. Borghi
Circulation Manager, George Hinckley Director of Advertising, Harry R. Davis

Director of Promotion, Shirley Katzander Production Manager, Ann Hollyday Sharp
Controller, Anthony E. Lanza

VOLUME 27, NO. 9

NOVEMBER 22, 1962

THE REPORTER'S NOTES .................................... 12

THE ELECTIONS-AN EDITORIAL ............................ Max Ascoli 20

Communism Shows Its Hand

REFLECTIONS ON CUBA .................................... Henry A. Kissinger 21

WHERE DO WE GO FROM VICTORY? .......................... Max Frankel 24

ONE TIME THE SOVIETS WISH THEY COULD BE UNCOMMITTED TOO ............................................ Marvin Kalb 26

THE HARVEST OF MENONISM .............................. Prem Bhatia 28

At Home & Abroad

FRENCH POLITICS AFTER THE REFERENDUM ................ Edmond Taylor 30

FARMERS ON STRIKE ............................................ Julius Duscha 32

OUR INTEGRATED ARMY .................................... Robert E. Schweitz 35

Views & Reviews

THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE-A SHORT STORY .................... M. N. York 37

THE RELEVANCE OF IRREVERENCE ............................ Nat Hentoff 44

RECORD NOTES .................................................... Roland Gelatt 48

Books:

'I KNOW WHERE I AM FROM' .................................... A. B. Guthrie, Jr. 50

A VOICE FROM THE FLOOR .................................... Nelson W. Polsby 52

WHENCE COMES THEIR PASSION ............................ Michael Harrington 55

THE REPORTER PUZZLE ............................................ 43

THE REPORTER, November 22, 1962, Volume 27, No. 9. Second-class postage paid at New York, New York, and at Dayton, Ohio. Published every other Thursday except for omission of two summer issues by The Reporter Magazine Company, 660 Madison Avenue, New York 21, N. Y. © 1962 by The Reporter Magazine Company. All rights reserved under Pan-American Copyright Convention. Subscription prices, United States and U. S. Possessions: One year $6, Two years $9.50, Three years $12. Additional postage for Canada and Pan-American Union, $.50 per year; all other countries, $1.00 per year. Please give four weeks' notice when changing address, giving old and new address. Send notice of undelivered copies on Form 3579 to: The Reporter, McCall St., Dayton 1, Ohio, Indexed in Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature and Public Affairs Information Service.

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BUILD IT TO WORK...BENEATH THE SEA...FOR 20 YEARS... That's Western Electric's assignment as it undertakes production of a new type of undersea amplifier to help the Bell System handle the growing volume of transoceanic telephone calls—well over four million last year alone. Spaced every 20 miles along a single cable laid on ocean floors, these amplifiers will transmit in two directions (a job now requiring a pair of cables) and handle many more conversations simultaneously. • In manufacturing these amplifiers, Western Electric exercises special engineering abilities and disciplines to create new machines, processes and procedures. Uncompromising quality standards touch every one of the 5,000 precision components. Meticulous skill places each one in its exacting position in a cylinder 13 inches in diameter and 26 inches long. The reason for such care? Failure of any of these interconnected components could interrupt vital intercontinental circuits, so they are designed, manufactured and tested to operate continuously—without fail—for a minimum of 20 years. • We expect they will—because of Bell System teamwork. Bell Laboratories developed the new amplifier. Working with them, Western Electric people solved the complex problems inherent in making, testing and assembling the components. Behind it all, the idea: dependability of equipment to insure reliability of Bell System communications, whether across the American continent or under oceans to other lands. We work best because we work together.

MANUFACTURING AND SUPPLY UNIT OF THE BELL SYSTEM *Western Electric*

Cutaway of the undersea cable amplifier which must withstand pressures at 2½-mile depth of over 5,850 pounds per square inch.

# Reflections on Cuba

HENRY A. KISSINGER

On October 22, President Kennedy boldly seized an opportunity given few statesmen: to change the course of events by one dramatic move. His action achieved far more than the immediate goal of dismantling Soviet missile bases in Cuba. It exploded the myth that in every situation the Soviets were prepared to run greater risks than we. This myth had been the basis of Soviet atomic blackmail and had transformed too many conferences into opportunities for the Soviets to set the terms of negotiations. The President's stroke demonstrated that a great power leads not so much by its words as by its actions, that initiative creates its own consensus.

It is clear that we took skillful advantage of a serious Soviet mis calculation. But even this success does not free us from the need to understand how we arrived at the point where such a dramatic and risky action was necessary. What tempted the Soviets into so rash, so foolhardy an adventure as establishing missile bases on an island

only ninety miles from our shores?

Part of the answer probably lies in a fault common to many dictatorships: the Soviets began to take their own propaganda too seriously. The Soviet leaders had spoken so insistently and so confidently of their capacity to protect "national liberation movements" that they overlooked the difference between supporting guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia and establishing a missile base in the Western Hemisphere. In the one case, the Communists could engage us in highly ambiguous situations and with a mode of warfare that is very difficult for us to deal with quickly. In Cuba, the only purpose the Soviet action could possibly serve was to threaten United States territory directly, an issue that lent itself to decisive resolution.

Another reason for the Soviets' behavior may have been a crude interpretation of the possibilities of nuclear deterrence. The Soviet leaders may really have believed that a limited number of nuclear missiles in Cuba would make the risks of an

American attack on Cuba seem out of proportion to the gains to be achieved. This argument, however, does not explain why the threat of nuclear retaliation had to be mounted from Cuba. As long as the bases remained under exclusive Soviet control, they were after all only an extension of Soviet nuclear power and not relevant to a local defense of Cuba. If the Soviets felt that missiles based on Cuban territory were necessary to redress the over-all strategic balance, then the Soviet arsenal of intercontinental rockets must be much smaller than had generally been believed. If, on the other hand, the Soviets consider their arsenal of intercontinental rockets adequate, then nuclear bases in Cuba were irrelevant to the security problem in Cuba. Given the vulnerability of these bases, it is difficult to understand to what military problem they were addressed.

The chief benefit the Soviets would have obtained from these bases was political, not military. Missiles in Cuba would have been an over-

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whelming proof of the inexorable advance of Soviet power and of U.S. impotence. Such a success would have emboldened all the extremist elements in Latin America and would have disheartened our allies. A U.S. government incapable of preventing the establishment of Soviet missile bases in Cuba would certainly have been thought incapable of defending interests farther from its shores. Had the Soviets succeeded in their gamble in Cuba, another critical showdown on Berlin would not have been long delayed. Perhaps Khrushchev counted on a dramatic unveiling of the projection of Soviet nuclear power into the Western Hemisphere to force us into a diplomatic settlement on his terms in Berlin, disarmament, and other issues.

WITH THE STAKES so high, what made the Soviets believe they could get away with it? Over the past decade Khrushchev may well have become convinced that the United States would never run risks to protect its interests, either because it did not understand its interests or because it did not have the appropriate doctrine for using its power. In Suez we collaborated with the Soviets to humiliate our closest allies. Our intervention in Lebanon did not prevent the displacement of the only Middle Eastern government that had accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine. A year and a half ago in Cuba, we gambled on indirect intervention and accepted failure when it miscarried. In Laos we pretended a readiness to intervene, only to settle for a solution that is at best ambiguous. Our reaction to the building of the Berlin Wall may have indicated a propensity to accept just about any *fait accompli*. All this may have led the Soviet leaders to the conviction that given a face-saving formula, the United States would choose retreat rather than a head-on confrontation.

This judgment may have been confirmed by our first reactions to the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba. Though President Kennedy made it clear in his press conference of September 13 that we would take a grave view of the introduction of offensive weapons, this distinction was in itself nebulous and the statement

was in the context of an explanation of why we would not intervene at that time. From then until October 22, administration spokesmen emphasized the risks of both blockade and invasion. They pointed out that we possessed perfect intelligence about Cuban affairs and had detected no offensive build-up. Senator Keating's allegation on October 10

that offensive missiles were being installed in Cuba was denied. It must be assumed that preparations for the installation of those missiles had been going forward for some weeks, even if the actual missiles were not put in place until the middle of October. The Soviet leaders may well have decided that the administration knew of these preparations and had decided to acquiesce by denying their existence.

## Where They Went Wrong

Nevertheless, even making allowance for all past U.S. vacillations, it is difficult to explain Soviet actions except as a colossal blunder. The Russians clearly misjudged the character of the President and the mood of the country. They failed to understand that it is highly unlikely for any man to be nominated or elected President who does not have a strong will to prevail—a consideration particularly crucial in the case of a President who has had to overcome handicaps of youth and religion to achieve his position. Moreover, even if they thought that the President meant to ignore the existence of the missile sites, they should have realized that this would have provided only a brief respite. No President could have avoided taking action in the face of such a challenge, and the public would not have tolerated

acquiescence. If Soviet diplomats and intelligence personnel failed to warn of the possibility of a U.S. riposte, the Soviet system has fallen prey to a common disease of dictatorships: that the top leaders are told only what they wish to hear.

The original misjudgment was compounded by many others. As we have seen, the bases were of only marginal military use in a defensive war. In an offensive war their effectiveness was reduced by the enormous difficulty—if not impossibility—of co-ordinating a first strike from the Soviet Union and Cuba. If the Soviets thought that they required bases closer to the United States, it is not clear why they did not choose safer launching platforms than Cuba—ships and submarines, for example. Militarily, the action was confused; its gains hardly justified the risks.

Politically, the Soviet miscalculation was equally great. The purpose of the missile bases in Cuba may well have been to force us into accepting Soviet terms over such issues as Berlin. However, an attempt to connect any issue outside the Western Hemisphere with Cuba was bound to make us increasingly intractable. We could not have left the impression that we were trading the vital interests of our allies for our own without undermining any claim to leadership in the West.

If the Soviets counted on allied disunity to provide an interval of hesitation to consolidate their bases, this was foiled by the President's decisiveness. After the President's speech, the only way other nations could gain an influence over our actions was by supporting us. The Soviets even misunderstood the temper of the uncommitted. Most of them are glad enough to play off both sides against each other, but their attitude is bound to be very different if the protection of "national liberation movements" takes the form of nuclear missile bases that would project them into the very center of the East-West conflict.

PERHAPS the most fundamental mistake was in assessing the reason for their earlier successes. They had expanded in Eurasia, above all, because they were able to choose the battlefield and the issue. They had generally confronted the United

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States with ambiguous challenges whose threat to U.S. security seemed vague and remote. The area of conflict was usually close to the center of Communist strength. Thus the Communists were capable of increasing their commitment—"escalating," as the technical term has it—by small increments while the United States could escape its difficulties only by threatening nuclear war.

In Cuba, however, the Soviets chose to challenge us in the most direct and brutal fashion. Here the threat was not remote or the issue confused. The secrecy and the rapidity of the build-up underlined the menace. But ruthlessness and deception do not necessarily bring their own reward. The challenge took place in an area close to our strength, on an island easily accessible to our overwhelmingly superior sea power. This time we were able to escalate gradually while the Soviets could respond, if at all, only with the threat of nuclear war. Thus the Soviets threw away their traditional advantages in a gamble that left them no recourse if it failed.

The result was a demonstration that the over-all strategic balance was far from being as favorable to the Communists as their propaganda had painted it. In fact, the course of events proved that the statements of Defense Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric have made about our nuclear superiority are essentially correct. The crisis could not have ended so quickly and decisively but for the fact that the United States can win a general war if it strikes first and can inflict intolerable damage on the Soviet Union even if it is the victim of a surprise attack.

Whatever one's reservations about the counterforce strategy enunciated by Secretary McNamara for the long term, it proved its efficacy in the Cuban crisis. The Soviet leaders did not dare invoke the threat of nuclear war against our blockade. If we believed the threat, even a nation like ours might feel compelled to strike pre-emptively. And if the Soviets struck first, they would only bring about the destruction of their homeland—without being able to affect the outcome in Cuba. Moreover, the Soviets refrained from starting crises in places where they enjoyed local

superiority, such as Berlin or Turkey. They obviously calculated that two crises occurring simultaneously, particularly if one of them involved bases in Cuba, carried with them an exorbitant risk of nuclear war. In short, for this crisis at least, the credibility of our deterrent was greater than theirs.

As a result, contrary to their usual practice, the Soviet leaders did not assume a posture of belligerency. Messages of conciliation chased each other. The demand for dismantling our Turkish bases was barely turned down before Khrushchev sounded the retreat in Cuba. He had drawn the correct conclusion that the best thing he could do was cut his losses. He could not credibly invoke the threat of general war over Cuba. And he could not menace other areas closer to the source of Soviet power because these were protected by our strategic superiority.

## Back to the Treadmill?

Where do we go from here? We have a unique opportunity. The hesitations of the past years can be turned into an asset for us in the eyes of those who have come to realize that we exhausted all means of concilia-

tion before taking decisive steps. The doubts expressed, particularly in Europe, about our capacity for leadership have been significantly reduced. We have the best opportunity in a decade to establish unity among our allies, particularly in the Atlantic area and the Western Hemisphere. And in the uncommitted nations, some second thoughts are likely to develop about the reliability of Soviet guarantees or about the purposes

for which they are given. The overweening self-confidence of the Soviets, which has turned almost all diplomatic contacts into probing operations for another advance, must have suffered a severe blow. We should now be able to confront the Soviets with both confidence and moderation. Henceforth, moderation will appear an act of policy, for it is a virtue only in those who are thought to have a choice.

But in order to draw the proper lessons from the Cuban crisis, we owe it to ourselves not to confuse ourselves with irrelevancies. Already one reads about the need to save Khrushchev from the hard-line Stalinists. According to one version, Khrushchev has faced down the militant generals in a dramatic confrontation. Surely the time has come to declare a moratorium on such trivial speculations. It should be plain that our ability to play domestic politics in the Kremlin is extremely limited. Nor is there any evidence of a "peaceful" Khrushchev facing down hard-line Stalinists. If Khrushchev planned the Cuban adventure, it is difficult to see how much more reckless hard-line Stalinists could have been. If the Cuban policy was imposed on Khrushchev, he does not need any further assistance to prove that such tactics are bound to be disastrous.

Indeed, the administration might well take this opportunity to compare the expectations of the past two years with the actual course of events. It may be useful to consider what influence the confusion of a conciliatory tone with a conciliatory policy by so many self-appointed emissaries to the Kremlin—and by some official ones as well—had on Khrushchev's expectation that his gamble in the Caribbean would succeed.

These considerations bear also on the question of whether the lesson of Cuba is that the "tough" line has prevailed over the "soft" one in our own national councils. For too long, adjectives such as these have served as substitutes for thought. Rather than debate abstract words like "tough" and "soft," we now have an opportunity to clarify the substance of the programs to which any such words must refer. Those who press for immediate resumption of nego-

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tiations do not generate a program; the reverse is true. In the absence of a clear purpose, negotiating tactics predominate over substance. This leads to the exaltation of "negotiability," which is often merely a way of trying to discover the minimum terms the Soviets will settle for. It produces the constant demand for "new ideas" which, while unexceptionable in itself, may only serve to prevent the Soviets from accepting any American proposal, since a better one may be coming along any minute.

No purpose would be served if we returned to the weary treadmill of proposals that have been repeated so often that their tired phrases seem to have become ends in themselves. We now have the opportunity to define what we stand for rather than go through a shopping list of Soviet demands in an effort to determine which of them may be tolerable. In particular, the best time to articulate our notion of a settlement in Central Europe is *before* another Berlin crisis is upon us and while the impetus of our action in Cuba still invigorates the alliance.

The desirability of lessening international tension requires no debates. But the prerequisite is that the Soviet leaders come to see the perils for mankind as well as for themselves of turning all diplomacy into harassment, pressure, and political warfare. We, in turn, have an obligation to make it clear that we do not propose to threaten legitimate Russian national interests. Responsible Russians should be given every chance to understand that the obstacle to coexistence is the Communist quest for world domination. On such a basis negotiations are highly desirable.

## Prudence and Intuition

For too long the Western Alliance has been beset by doubts, recriminations, and uncertainty. In strategy and diplomacy it has failed to establish its priorities. The President's handling of the Cuban crisis has given us another chance to vindicate the leadership of the West. And here is where our greatest opportunity lies. The "great design" for Atlantic partnership still remains to be realized, but for the first time in years the moral basis for it exists. The

Alliance for Progress can also be pursued with greater mutual conviction. Even the uncommitted nations should have been shaken out of their complacency and shallowness by the concurrent shocks of Cuba and the Chinese invasion of India. There is now therefore a possibility for us to free our relations with the new nations from the inhibitions of a dialogue between opportunism and sentimentality.

Whether we can seize this opportunity depends on an intangible issue: the attitudes of our government toward the most difficult problem of policymaking, that of conjecture. The dilemma of any statesman is that he can never be certain about the probable course of events. In reaching a decision, he must inevitably act on the basis of an intuition that is inherently unprovable. If he insists on certainty, he runs the danger of becoming a prisoner of events.

His resolution must reside not in "facts" as commonly conceived but in his vision of the future.

The Cuban crisis raises some questions in this respect. The administration has demonstrated skill, daring, and decisiveness in dealing with a problem once it was recognized. A number of doubts remain about the time required to assess the nature of the Soviet build-up. This is not exclusively a problem of our intelligence setup. It is above all a question of the criteria of certainty by which a government operates. We shall not be able to wait everywhere for "hard" intelligence about Soviet intentions. Most situations will prove more ambiguous, most opportunities will appear less clear. The challenge, then, is to couple the prudence, calculation, and skill of a government of experts with an act of imagination that encompasses the opportunities before us.

## Where Do We Go from Victory?

MAX FRANKEL

PITY the Washington Policy Maker. He is burdened, after Cuba, with new prowess, respect, and momentum and therefore with guilt. Unexpected challenge has suddenly turned into unwanted opportunity. But Policy Maker wants to be a gracious winner, to be loved, not feared. Initiative seems almost as unwelcome as it is unaccustomed. He goes to his analyst, the Kremlinologist.

For the Kremlinologist, as for any analyst, business is good when times are bad. He is trained to see danger, not opportunity. And he treats the

ailment, not the patient. He is today less concerned with what else Washington might do to the Kremlin than with what the Kremlin might now do to Washington. And with what Washington might do for the Kremlin.

Policy Maker, thy guilt is just, he says. For to the Kremlinologist, Communism is schizophrenic. Some Communists are better than other Communists, and the trouble with the Cuban affair was that Washington was forced to triumph over the better ones. So there is danger

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