חבר הכנסת

Member of Parliament

הכנסת

The Parliament

Tel Aviv, May 14th, 1970.

Prof. Henry A. Kissinger,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
-----------------
U.S.A.

Dear Prof. Kissinger,

As things stand now, it would seem that I
should be coming to Washington at the end of June and
stay throughout the last week.

The U.S. Embassy in Israel, which is so
kindly making the arrangements for my visit there, has
approached your office with a view to enabling me to meet
you.

I hope that you remember me from the 1967
Harvard International Seminar and that you may have heard
of my being now a Member of the Knesset (Israel Parliament)
and Deputy Secretary-General of the Israel Labour Party.

May I hope that, in spite of your many heavy
responsibilities, it will be possible for you to find some
spare time in order to give me an opportunity of meeting
you, to which I am eagerly looking forward.

With anticipated thanks,

HAK-NO. 6/1

DEC 19 1968

World Politics [ac]

# The Atlantic Alliance: Storm Clouds Ahead

## ADAM YARMOLINSKY

If Europe seems an exasperating partner today to some Americans, the United States must be a rather frightening partner to most Europeans. Each partner must seem to the other to be particularly self-centered and self-absorbed, but European self-centeredness seems to America to make it more timorous, while American self-absorption seems to Europe to make it more irresponsible. Even the Czechoslovak crisis created more dissension than unity within the partnership: the Europeans suspected the Americans of playing great power politics with spheres of influence, and the Americans resumed fussing at the Europeans over NATO troop commitments. The fact is that if either pattern of behavior is pushed to its extreme, the result will be a kind of neo-isolationism in which genuine alliances among equals or near equals cannot survive.

The United States has entered a period of popular resistance, indeed almost revulsion to government, and particularly to central government. The candidacy of George Wallace was only an extreme form of a more general phenomenon. The continuing political success of men like Ronald Reagan and Lester Maddox is based on a deliberate separation of the person of the elected leader from the machinery of government. Governor Maddox can and does capitalize on the indignation of the voter over the misdeeds of the government of Georgia by joining in that indignation, in a way that leaders of European governments may envy. And in New York City, a once enormously popular mayor is attacked simultaneously by those citizens who support an illegal teachers' strike and those who support illegal activity by a community school board.

Similarly, national government is suspected of usurping the rightful powers of state government. A number of proposals advanced to transfer federal tax funds to state governments, with no strings attached, were supported, at least in general terms, by both major Presidential candidates. The Supreme Court and the President were both so vulnerable that a minority of the Senate could prevent consideration of the President's first choice for Chief Justice, and discourage him from even offering a second choice. Nor is the Congress itself immune from popular discontent, as the popularity of the slogan "time for a change" among congressional candidates showed.

It is difficult to estimate how much of this alienation from domestic government represents a reaction to the twin unsolved problems of race and poverty, as they have flared up in mass violence. But clearly the mood of the country is more attuned to deploring problems than to searching for solutions.

As seen from the other side of the Atlantic, the United States must present a striking illustration of the Yeats prophecy:

> Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
> Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
> The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
> The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
> The best lack all conviction, while the worst
> Are full of passionate intensity.

The prospects for continuing widespread and serious violence in the cities (twice as many incidents in the first eight months of 1968 as in the corresponding period in 1967), the unhealed wounds of the Presidential campaign, and the narrowly averted possibility that for the first time in more than a century the election might have been thrown into the House of Representatives because no one candidate was able to obtain a simple majority—all these circumstances suggest an Alliance partner so troubled by internal difficulties and divisions that her outward behavior must be regarded with some suspicion.

Europeans must be particularly puzzled about internal American dilemmas because these dilemmas lack substantial European counterparts. There is no problem of poverty in Europe in the sense that the problem exists in the United States. That this is so because Americans have been occupied in raising the ceiling on earnings of the average workingman while Europeans have been occupied more in raising the floor under earnings, does not make the poverty problem any less alien in European eyes. Similarly, Europeans have no experience of a race problem anything like what exists in the United States. The difficulties between white Britishers and colored Commonwealth immigrants, or between Frenchmen of the Metropole and Algerians, are simply not comparable to the American problem in magnitude or intensity. Only in student disorders does Europe rival the United States.

Lastly, American estrangement from the process of government, and particularly of national government, whether expressed in a desire for decentralization or in complaints about the credibility gap, sound more alarming in Europe, perhaps because Europeans by and large seem to expect less of their governments in the way of moral perfection—although they may expect more in the way of services. The US is, after all, the only Western country whose government is not founded on *de facto* power modified by concessions to popular demand, but sprang full-blown from an ideological declaration.

Europeans are probably not familiar with the American children's story of Chicken Little, who was struck by a falling acorn and ended up leading a parade of animals to the King, all shouting, "The sky is falling, the sky is falling!" But many Europeans would be inclined to agree with the slogan on the buttons worn by American teenagers reading, "Chicken Little was right." Some would regard American society as an enormously powerful engine now running out of control. Others at a minimum would feel that a dangerous proportion of Americans are either

*Adam Yarmolinsky is a professor at the Harvard University Law School.*

INTERPLAY/DECEMBER 1968

19

in a state of apathy or of outright revolt against civil authority.

If Americans are negative about domestic problems, the complex of attitudes about international problems can only be described as schizophrenic. Foreign aid appropriations are at the lowest level since the beginning of the Marshall Plan. But, despite a quite severe balance-of-payments problem, US troop deployments abroad are not in serious jeopardy. Everything focuses on Vietnam; but at the same time Vietnam is seen as a small and distant country. Instead of seeing the crucial issue there, as it is officially described, as a test of staying power, Americans still expect to wake up some morning and find that it's all been a bad dream—and yet US military strategy seems not entirely consistent with an effort designed for the long pull. Stereotypes about the Cold War still persist very widely; but there is a good deal of popular support for East-West bridge-building initiatives, even in the face of hardening Soviet attitudes.

## Domestic Concerns Outweigh Foreign Ones

Despite the very strong feelings of a minority of Americans, there is probably more popular discontent over the handling of domestic problems than there is over the handling of the war in Vietnam—even with half a million Americans embroiled there. The primacy of domestic politics is absolute. This primacy is in no sense a peculiarly American phenomenon. But its effect in the United States is paradoxically almost the opposite of its effect in Europe. Governments in Europe have relatively little room for maneuver in the world scene, because they cannot mobilize the national concern, and therefore the national resources, to play a positive role in world affairs. The United States, on the other hand, is rich enough and strong enough so that the US government can find the resources to back up its policy choices without being subjected to intensive popular scrutiny. The US military establishment, for example, is a much more readily usable instrument of foreign policy than it has ever been before, and certainly more readily usable than European establishments. Except in the area of foreign aid, the US government has enough weight to use the comparative freedom it enjoys, while European governments do not.

The result is that the United States is seen by Europe to be more adventurous in foreign policy, and Europe is seen by the United States to be less responsive in pursuing common interests. The difference is clear whether one compares the US role in Korea with the British role in Aden, or US and European attitudes toward the ACE Mobile Force. The fact that these differences are more of a function of capabilities than of intentions, and in neither case represent a strong expression of popular will, does not prevent them from becoming sources of irritation on both sides.

The sources of irritation between Europe and the United States are by no means limited, however, to the governmental sphere. As American business expands into European markets, through all the devices of direct sales, subsidiaries, licensing, etc., it creates inevitable resentments, which are only exacerbated by the knowledge that what are critical markets for Europeans are only marginal for Americans. Remarks like General de Gaulle's about American business getting a "free ride" on international credit are only symptomatic of a more general attitude. What

20

European businessmen see as an unfair advantage taken with the technological by-products of American economics of sale, Americans see as the proper reward for building a broader (and more democratic?) educational base from which to draw a managerial class. But broadening the educational base in Europe will take at least another generation—and meanwhile resentments proliferate.

## Discontent over Military Arrangements

Within the NATO alliance itself, the military arrangements are themselves potential sources of discord. To begin with, there is the disturbing fact for Europeans that the military instrumentality on which the alliance ultimately relies, the US Strategic Air Command, is not itself under alliance control. Then there is the fact that alliance military doctrine has changed radically, from massive retaliation to flexible response, and in each instance the doctrine originated with and was preached, with gospel vigor, by Americans. Now the Europeans have to reconcile themselves further to the deployment of a US anti-ballistic missile system—a system that will only be effective against a limited Chinese threat, but that must still make the Europeans worry, despite all assurances, that the United States is changing its doctrine again. Equally troublesome is that fact that the senior military officer in NATO is at the same time an American officer and an international military servant who reports to a committee, while the United States is officially represented in the North Atlantic Council by a civilian Permanent Representative, so that Europeans cannot avoid the impression from time to time that they are hearing inconsistent statements on alliance strategy from official Americans.

There has been building within the alliance over the last two or three years a basis for common understanding of the problems of NATO strategy, particularly through the Nuclear Planning Group—the so-called McNamara Committee. But the process of arriving at agreement on first principles is a painfully slow one, and requires a high degree of stability within the alliance in order to proceed.

That process has undoubtedly been complicated by the debate on the feasibility and the desirability of deploying an anti-ballistic missile system. The American decision to deploy a light anti-Chinese system, while based on a rationale that has no application to the military posture of the alliance, cannot help raising questions about that military posture, and even about the relative effectiveness of deterrence as against defense. The fact is that the anti-Chinese system would only be effective against a very limited Chinese offensive capability, and was designed, originally at least, to supplement deterrence with temporary defense in the period between the time China acquires an intercontinental nuclear delivery force and the time it acquires a secure second-strike capability, so that it will not have to strike first if it is to strike at all.

Because both the United States and the Soviet Union have such a secure second-strike capability, the security of both, and the security of Europe as well, is considerably enhanced. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could afford to permit the other side to develop an ABM system which could not be penetrated, and either side could maintain its assured penetration simply by increasing its offensive force enough to saturate the defensive system. Therefore neither side would stand to gain by

[LC]

INTERPLAY/DECEMBER 1968

[LC]

deploying such a system, and the only results of deployment would be acceleration of the arms race. It is important to distinguish here between a limited ABM deployment around offensive missile sites, in lieu of an increase in the number of offensive missiles, and the deployment of an ABM system intended to protect population. The former deployment does not affect mutual deterrence, since neither side can strike without receiving a mortal blow in return; the latter deployment would be a futile attempt to upset the strategic balance, a major setback for the political forces opposed to further horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and an enormous waste of resources in both countries.

In sum, the projected US deployment of the anti-Chinese system affects neither the US commitment to the defense of Europe nor the strategy of the alliance. Nevertheless, the fact that the subject of ABMs has been raised creates a new, unfamiliar, and therefore disturbing, prospect for Europeans to contemplate. Even if the United States were to begin building a "thick" ABM system, its vital interest in the territorial integrity of Western Europe would remain absolute. But European worries would be considerably exacerbated.

## Different Approaches, Different Outcomes

There are good reasons, then—political, economic and military—for Europeans to be concerned about their American partner's behavior. By the same token, the United States can justifiably express concern on its side. The United States has always seen the alliance as a partnership, while the Europeans have tended to see it as a means to engage US nuclear force—in their view the only really relevant force in the defense of Europe. They are currently cutting back on their military contributions to the alliance. They have already almost completely opted out of commitments in the Third World. The making of Europe has been indefinitely delayed, and the idea itself seems to have lost some of its excitement. The Europeans create unpleasant problems about sharing the international monetary burdens of the common defense, and take unreasonable stands on principle about the disposition of

forces on their territory. Individual states even appear to be dallying, from time to time, with representatives of the power against which the United States is pledged to help defend the alliance, if need be.

None of these frictions, on either side, are relevant to the core of the alliance itself. Without the American nuclear deterrent, Europe would not be defensible. An effective European deterrent could not be created without a unity of effort that presupposes the creation of the equivalent of a new nation-state. On the other hand, the United States could only survive, if at all, alongside a Soviet-dominated Europe, by itself becoming a garrison state. The essential strength of the alliance is that both sides need each other, and will presumably continue to need each other for the foreseeable future.

The great danger is that one side will press the other to assume burdens the other side is unwilling to accept, and in the process essential commitments will be threatened if not destroyed. The danger is not that refusal to assume new commitments (or what appears to one side to be new commitments) will result directly in the abrogation of existing commitments. It is rather that any alliance depends on a degree of mutual trust. And if one party to an alliance reneges on what the other party (or parties) regard as its proper obligations, the atmosphere of mutual trust may be dissipated—or at least somewhat attenuated. It is unreasonable to assume that serious resentments cannot develop, even among members of the Atlantic community—and these resentments can even prevent them from pursuing their common interests.

There are two directions that United States pressure on its European allies is likely to take. The first is toward involvement of the NATO alliance in problems of international security outside the present geographical area of the alliance's concern. The second is away from involvements with the Soviets or the Soviet bloc, which might seem to the United States to compromise the integrity of the alliance. Both of these kinds of pressures are likely to be both ineffective and abrasive.

NATO involvement in Southeast Asia seems almost as clearly out of the question to Americans as it does to Europeans. The European reaction to the Vietnam war can

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INTERPLAY/DECEMBER 1968

21

[L]

be contrasted to the European reaction to the Korean war: then the reaction was, "Thank God, it's happening over there." Now the reaction is, "My God, if it goes on much longer it may affect the situation over here." But it is at least conceivable that if the war in Vietnam drags on long enough, or spreads far enough to other parts of Southeast Asia, American policy makers may decide to try to persuade themselves that alliance interests are directly involved and alliance resources should be also. The predictable result would be enormous strains within the alliance, and no alliance resources for Southeast Asia. But the attempt may still be made.

## Other Possible Pressure Points

If not in Southeast Asia, then perhaps the pressure point may develop in the Near East, in Africa, or even conceivably in Latin America. The American motivation may be primarily actual burden-sharing, or it may be primarily image-building, but in either event the European response is likely to be the same. Indeed, some of the same considerations that may lead the United States to stay away from other potential conflict situations in the Third World should weigh even more heavily with Europeans as they observe what has happened in Vietnam.

Even if the United States succeeds in controlling its impulses to attempt to expand the geographic scope of the alliance, it will take additional self-control to resist criticizing the actions of European allies that seem inconsistent with alliance policy. But some of these actions are bound to occur, and US criticisms will by and large only make the situation worse. Just as the United States decided, after the first shock reaction to General de Gaulle's decision taking NATO out of France, that to fight the decision would not change it, but might multiply its consequences, so the natural US impulse to fight other analogous European decisions ought in general to be resisted.

The thesis has been advanced by some commentators that although the overt military phase of the Cold War may be ended—or interrupted—we can anticipate a continuing effort by the Soviet Union to disrupt the alliance by political means—and this effort needs to be resisted, if necessary, by American pressure on its European allies. It may well develop that the Soviets, having consolidated their position in Eastern Europe, will pursue splitting tactics in the West—by offering diplomatic concessions individually and differentially to European states. But that the US policy should be one of political intervention rather than one of political abstention seems extremely doubtful.

France is not alone among the nations of Europe in a desire to assert national independence, and at the same time to make the United States the scapegoat for many of the things that seem to be going wrong in the world. Germany in particular has apparently given up on European unification as a solution to its divided state. For a time she looked to the East with as much hope as she once had looked to her Western neighbors, and as the shock of the Czechoslovak affair wears off, she may be looking in that direction again. To Germans, as to other Europeans, there is nothing inconsistent in their negotiations with the East and their role in a defensive alliance. Both are in pursuit of domestic self-interest, and besides, Europeans are inclined to be somewhat less ideological on these issues than Americans. They can manage at the same

time to be indignant about US-Soviet arms control negotiations while they are conducting conversations on their own about closer trade relations.

The United States might be able to compel European states to choose between US military support and closer relations with the East. But if the possibility of such relations were abandoned under pressure, the consequences for the alliance would on balance be negative.

There is still a third direction that Atlanticists on both sides of the Atlantic might take in pressing for changes in alliance relationships. That would be to try to transform NATO into an instrument for achieving positive political goals, both by way of improving East-West relations, and strengthening ties within the West. The goal is appealing, but the means may not be appropriate. NATO is a limited, defensive military alliance. As such it performs a definable and essential function. Whether its members would embrace additional goals for it today is at least questionable, and it is scarcely questionable that the argument over additional goals would strain existing relationships. It might be the better part of wisdom for the Europeans to pursue these goals in other forms, with or without Americans.

## American Impatience, European Restraint

If the United States will find it difficult to avoid putting additional pressures on Europeans, Europe may find it somewhat less difficult to avoid putting additional pressures on the United States. On the subject of Vietnam, for example, Europeans have shown admirable self-restraint. They seem to react irrationally only when the suggestion is advanced that new developments in military technology make it possible to modify the disposition of American forces in Europe. Leaving aside certain temporary aberrations, it is primarily in the insistence on literal compliance with military commitments that European pressures strain the alliance. Here again the process of mutual education has been proceeding within NATO, despite the debris from the MLF interlude, with generally useful results. And the very fact of greater intercontinental mobility, of the disappearing military need for bases, makes it clear that the durability of the alliance is not a function of military technology.

If the United States should be so ill-advised as to undertake the deployment of a "thick" anti-ballistic missile system, designed to try to counter more than an interim Chinese threat (plus some protection for Minuteman silos), then it would undoubtedly be faced with European pressure for a similar deployment on the continent of Europe. But this would be only one of many unfortunate consequences of such a decision.

The next few years will be a difficult period for the Atlantic alliance. The United States is in trouble at home and abroad, and Europe is marking time, without any clear sense of the direction in which it should move. It is a kind of winter of our discontent, on both sides of the Atlantic. For the time being, therefore, the best course of action for governments seems to be to respect their partners' freedom of decision, or indecision, and not press for responses that will be given grudgingly if at all. If the effect of this course is to treat the alliance as a less comprehensive or cohesive structure, the greater flexibility that it gives to alliance bonds will increase their strength and durability.

22

INTERPLAY/DECEMBER 1968

Law School of Harvard University

Cambridge, Mass. 02138

12 February 1969

Personal

Dear Henry:

I have just come from a lunch meeting of the West European Seminar, at which Waldemar Besson spoke. I know that Besson likes to epater le bourgeois Americain, but, after brief consultation with Stanley, I thought I should report the gist of his remarks nonetheless.

His subject was German foreign policy after Czechoslovakia, and he began by recapitulating the German Eastern policy, and describing the "heightened sense of dependence" on the United States, the high hopes for the new U. S. administration, and their being somewhat dampened by recent events. He then addressed the question as to what the German position should be in Eastern Europe, and proceeded to argue for a Soviet-German partnership, creating an economic and political, although not a military, sphere of influence for Germany in that area.

He supported his proposal with some fairly strong statements about domestic confrontations and polarization ("the wind is blowing in our face, and Berlin is dying"), and references to the victories (sic) of Gaullist nationalism in Quebec and Latin America, although he conceded that the Germans cannot imitate De Gaulle directly because the French have the German glacis to protect them.

When he was asked if what he was describing didn't amount to resurgent German imperialism, he said the word did not trouble him, even if it might scare some people. Another auditor remarked that he was scared already; and someone else observed that if we were scared, imagine how the Russians would feel.

At any rate, you probably know all this from previous exposure, but if not, I thought you ought to have a report of it.

Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Adam:

Thank you for your note of October 4. I always
appreciate your thoughts and find them valuable,
no matter how unpleasant.

It was good to see you at lunch.

Mr. Adam Yarmolinsky
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

P.S. You have really been a good friend in difficult times,
and I will not forget it.

TL:jlp:10/8/69

RECEIVED
OCT 1 6 1969

CENTRAL FILES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

2/19/70

Dianne:

On Monday, March 2, Mr. Kissinger is having lunch with a Harvard group consisting of: Doty, Yarmolinsky, Bator, Neustadt, Reischauer, Kistiakowsky.

Mr. Kissinger would like to see Doty for a few minutes before the lunch, but as Doty can't make it before 12:15, he has said that he will stay after the lunch if that's all right.

Cambridge, Mass. 02138

January 27, 1970

Dear Henry:

A conversation with one of our common friends leads me to send you this unsolicited comment on what he believes to be the administration view on nuclear strategy.

The argument as put to me runs this way: If the Russians continue to deploy the SS 9, and do so in a MIRV'ed configuration, they will be able to destroy all our Minutemen, leaving us with a counter-city Polaris force and a residual second-strike bomber force, but no second-strike counter-force capability. To let them acquire this capability is dangerous, because they may be tempted to destroy our Minutemen without any fear of retaliation, since we would not retaliate, against a strike directed only at weapons, by a strike directed at cities. Therefore, we must develop and deploy extensive ABM protection for our Minutemen forces, -without regard to possible vulnerability of Polarises, because we cannot afford to be left with only a counter-city capability after a Soviet first strike. This argument is somehow bolstered with reference to the McNamara Montreal (sic) speech, (which I think is a garbled reference to the Ann Arbor speech, where he discussed the doctrine of controlled response).

The whole argument seems to me very strange, since it assumes that the Soviets would be prepared to risk Armageddon by a first strike against Minutemen, on the double assumption that they really could knock out all of them, and that if they did, we would be deterred from retaliating against their cities. This seems a pretty unlikely possibility to justify a further round in the arms race, and particularly alarming if it implies that the United States must always maintain a second-strike counter-force capability (which can look alarmingly like an attempted first-strike knockout capability) with consequent escalatory effects on Soviet fears, intentions, and capabilities.

jl

New York, New York 10033
82-63 Bennett Avenue
Educational Institutions
Keshava Rapp Samson Rafael Hirach
The Eighth Grade Graduating Class

Henry V. Klausinger
Personal Secretary to
Julienne R. Pluesu

Sincerely,

and happiness,
With all good wishes for your future success

help you.
in this regard and is sorry not to be able to
Klausinger appreciated your writing to him
make it impossible for him to comply. Mr.
requests such as yours which he receives
ever, his very heavy schedule and the many
him for your earook. Unfortunately, how-
was honored that you wanted a few words from
response to your letter of February 17. He
Mr. Klausinger asked me to write to you in
Dear Eighth Grade Graduating Class:

March 6, 1925

KISSINGER, HENRY V.

Bud Yorkin

May 12, 1973

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Executive Offices
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Henry:

It's been a long time since we've had a chance to chat,
but it goes without saying that I have followed all your
moves closely. Now that there is no further need for us
to discuss Vietnam, I am looking forward to having just
a plain, old-fashioned social visit with you.

I have a slight problem, and I am not sure whether or not
it can be solved. A good friend of my family is a gentleman
by the name of Dr. Vladimir Mash, one of the most distinguished
economists in Russia, who has been trying to
immigrate to Israel. He has been refused several times,
and, from what I understand, it has been increasingly
more difficult for his family to function in Russia.

I know the above is rather insignificant in light of what's
happening in the world, however, I am determined to try
and contact anyone who might be able to help this man.
Please forgive my forwardness in asking you, but one can
never tell when Henry Kissinger might be going back
through Moscow on his way somewhere.

I hope this finds you well, and I look forward to seeing
you in the near future.

Enclosure
BY/cj

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20016

SCHOOL OF GOVERNMENT AND
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

July 20, 1970

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Office of the President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Upon the advice of Winston Lord, I am addressing my inquiry to you directly. In a telephone conversation with Mr. Lord on July 15, he stated that the complexity and sensitivity of the problems involved would require your consideration.

Under the direction of Dr. Howard McCurdy of the School of
Government at the American University, I and six students are
writing an analysis of President Richard Nixon's decision to
enter Cambodia on April 29, 1970, for publication. Our interest
is in the field of Presidential Decision-Making Processes, thus
it is an analysis and not a critique.

During the past two months we have been involved in reading
all accounts of the decision. Our group has been divided among
the obvious agencies and departments of the government in
carrying out the activity. My specific area of interest is
the reasoning and judgement used by the President.

From the research certain areas have become question
marks. We do not want our book to be hypotheses and guesses
on what happened, but are hoping to come up with as factual
(and as fair) an account of our President's action as possible.

Realizing the sensitivity involved I will understand if your
answers must be negative. If a personal interview with you or
with your staff would be better suited to my area of questioning,
I would be most happy to agree. In either case, I hope you can
be of help to us with the questions enclosed.

cc: Winston Lord

Enclosure

RECEIVED

NOV 19 1970

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GENERAL

F08

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

April 2, 1971

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Henry:

I have returned from nearly a two-month trip to East Asia. My time was spent mainly in Southeast Asia where I talked with over two hundred and fifty local officials, legislators, private representatives, and young professionals of what I call the post-independence generation. Except in Vietnam, I focussed on external issues, particularly the dynamic interplay between the Asian regional thrust on one hand and the influence of the four Big Powers on the other. I was especially interested in trying to see these new relationships and future issues from the various Asian viewpoints, rather than from an outsider's standpoint. Of course, the Nixon Doctrine and the "nightmare of American withdrawal" came up spontaneously in every conversation.

I am enclosing a summary of my observations on the East Asian part of the trip, minus South Vietnam and its neighbors.

My trip to South Vietnam took a week. I talked with some eighty persons and visited three provinces, in addition to Saigon, Tay Ninh, Da Nang, and Hue. A fairly long report on my observations there is being completed, and I will send you a copy.

If you would like me to come down to see you, as you suggested by recent letter, I will be only too glad to. There are a number of points which, as a former Ambassador, I would like to pass on to the President, especially about Thailand and Vietnam. Please give him my best regards. Most of his Doctrine is doing quite well in East Asia.

And my very best wishes to you.

KTY/dlp

Young Presidents' Organization, Inc.

EAST CENTRAL AREA CONFERENCE

November 3-6, 1971

Washington, D.C.

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Thomas and Linda Klein
Michigan Chapter

Wilbur and Dorothy Lane
Michigan Chapter

Peter and Toby Lewis
Cleveland Chapter

G. Richard Lezius
Cleveland Chapter

Barry and Arleen Lhormer
Pittsburgh Chapter

Laird and Joanne McGregor
Cincinnati Chapter

David and Nancy Marantette
Michigan Chapter

Harold and Barbara Marko
Michigan Chapter

Southwood and Cynthia Morcock
Maumee Valley Chapter

Joseph and Marilyn Myers
Cleveland Chapter

J. Patrick and Sheila Nicholson
Maumee Valley Chapter

Richard and Florence O'Neil
Michigan Chapter

Henry and Patricia O'Neill
Columbus Chapter

William and Judith Osterman
Maumee Valley Chapter

William and Allie Overly
Pittsburgh Chapter

Edward and Elaine Perkins
Michigan Chapter

E.R. and Jean Preston
Cleveland Chapter

Lawrence and Lila Raskin
Maumee Valley Chapter

[L]

Page 3

Murray and Gilda Reidbord
Pittsburgh Chapter

Douglas and Jeri Reniger
Michigan Chapter

Merle and Dorothy Roberts
Columbus Chapter

D. Dean and Sandra Rogers
Pittsburgh Chapter

Richard and Lois Romanoff
Maumee Valley Chapter

David and Theo Rosenberg
Pittsburgh Chapter

James and Nancy Ross
Columbus Chapter

Thomas and Lois Roulston
Cleveland Chapter

Frederick and Marilyn Rudolph
Maumee Valley Chapter

John and Mary Rudolph
Cincinnati Chapter

Edward and Ann Ryan
Pittsburgh Chapter

P. Donald and Jane Sanborn
Cleveland Chapter

Ron and Karin Sargent
Michigan Chapter

Herbert and Henriette Savin
Yankee Chapter

John and Dianne Sennett
Michigan Chapter

John and Myra Shepherd
Cincinnati Chapter

George and Penny Simon
Michigan Chapter

William and Helene Skutch
Maumee Valley Chapter

Jackson and Sue Smart
Michigan Chapter

Richey and Sandra Smith
Cleveland Chapter

Robert and Judy Solomon
Michigan Chapter

A. Gideon and Virginia Spieker
Maumee Valley Chapter

Stanford and Ann Stoddard
Michigan Chapter

Daniel and Sylviann Sudarsky
Yankee Chapter

James and Mabel Sutphin
Cleveland Chapter

Joel and Shelby Tauber
Michigan Chapter

Donald and Mary Ternes
Michigan Chapter

Curt and Norma Terova
Michigan Chapter

Ralph and Karin Thomas
Michigan Chapter

John and Mary Claire Torbeck
Cincinnati Chapter

YPO East Central Area Conference
Who's Here
Page 4

William Toto
Cleveland Chapter

Sheldon and Anne Towson
Cleveland Chapter

Lyman and Nancy Treadway
Cleveland Chapter

George and Harriet Urschel
Columbus Chapter

Robert and Gretchen Valade
Michigan Chapter

Melvin and Barb VanderBrug
Michigan Chapter

Harry and Virginia Van Wormer
Michigan Chapter

Charles and Kitty Weir
Michigan Chapter

William and Jan Wetsman
Michigan Chapter

Edward and Joan White
Indiana Chapter

Bert and Grace Williams
Michigan Chapter

Frederic and Mary Wolfe
Maumee Valley Chapter

THE WASHINGTON OFFICE

207 C STREET, NORTHEAST
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 20002
(202) 543-0757 (202) 543-0758

April 27, 1971

Miss Diane Matthews
% Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Diane:

Thank you for your advice and help regarding YPO's invitation to Dr. Kissinger for the fall conference. Mr. Marko's invitation to Dr. Kissinger was mailed a few days ago and should be in your hands by now. I realize that it may be some time before you can give us even a tentative commitment but I will check with you from time to time just to get an idea of how we may stand.

Thanks again.

Dutch Vandervort

DV:le

DUTCH VANDERVORT

THE WASHINGTON OFFICE

GOVERNMENT RELATIONS CONSULTANTS • WASHINGTON REPRESENTATION

1971 EAST CENTRAL AREA
CONFERENCE

WASHINGTON HILTON HOTEL
WASHINGTON D.C.

April 22, 1971

MICHIGAN
HOST CHAPTER

CONFERENCE CHAIRMAN

Merle Harris

EDUCATION

Herbert J. Graebner

Harold M. Marko

SOCIAL CHAIRMAN

William Wetsman

FINANCIAL

Jackson W. Smart, Jr.

REGISTRATION & HOSPITALITY

Melvin C. VanderBrug

TRANSPORTATION

James J. Groves

CHAPTER SALES & LIAISON

Joel D. Tauber

PROMOTIONS

Warren J. Coville

ADDRESS CORRESPONDENCE TO:

Merle Harris
Barsteel Division
U. S. Industries, Inc.
24700 Northwestern Hgwy.
Suite 608
Southfield, Mich. 48075

Dr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

It gives me great pleasure to invite you to attend and take part in the Young Presidents' Organization's East Central Area Conference at 11:00 a.m., Friday, 5 November 1971, at the Washington Hilton Hotel. This conference promises to be an outstanding educational event. A message from the President's National Security Advisor would be a major highlight for our group.

This conference will draw 100 couples from YPO's international membership, with a concentration from our home area of Ohio, Michigan and Pennsylvania. We usually keep our meetings very private, but the press could be included if you so wish.

Enclosed is a brief brochure describing YPO. Though I am reluctant to heap praise on, I find that most YPOers are just the dynamic, informed and active group you would expect young presidents to be. They are invariably opinion leaders who will take your message and spread it throughout their home communities.

Dr. Kissinger, thank you for considering this invitation. We hope to see you on November 5.

Sincerely,

Harold M. Marko

HMM;le

enclosure

official 4/9/71

Young Presidents' Org.

Type of Request & Date

(Last name and pending date)

Name: Young Presidents' Organization (Dutch Vandervort)

Request: This group, consisting of young men who must have been President of their company before they are 40 and that company must earn 1 1/2 million dollars a year. The members must leave the org. by the time they are 50. They would like HAK to address, off-the-record, their group of 200 men with wives at their convention next Nov. in D. C. The young men will be from Michigan, Penn., and Ohio. The first title of the conference is "View from the Top" and they would want HAK to discuss the decision making process. Nov. 5 is WH day, when they hope to meet with the President and take a tour of the WH and they would like to meet with HAK sometime that morning -- either post-breakfast or around 11:00 at the Hilton. (FYI: They hope to send out a bulletin to their members in July -- strictly for their use -- saying HAK DRY's Recommendation: will be speaking -- if of course he agrees to do so -- subject to his schedule changes.) Call: 543-0757/8

A formal write will come of HAK expresses interest

HAK's Answer: YES - 4/12

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

KISSINGER, HENRY A. / INV / 1971 / D.C

JUL 17 1971

Dear Hugh:

Many thanks for your letter regarding Mr. Harold Marko's invitation to attend and take part in the Young Presidents' Organization's East Central Area Conference this coming fall. As I have indicated to Mr. Marko, I was pleased to receive the invitation and, providing no difficulties arise, I will be present for at least part of the meetings.

It is always good to hear from you, and I appreciate your interest.

Honorable Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
20510

jlp:7/17/71

RECEIVED

JUL 2 1 1971

CENTRAL FILES