ARMS CONTROL AND MILITARY STRATEGY:
A CONTEMPORARY EVALUATION

CHAPTER ONE: IS THERE A STRATEGIC CASE FOR ARMS LIMITATION AND CONTROL?

1. The psychology of the problem.

This analysis proposes a question which it has no hopes of answering in dogmatic terms: can our national security and the peace of the world (with which it is indissolubly linked) be improved by an arms limitation agreement, given the character of our opponent? The result will be an exploration of facts, motives, and circumstances, some features of which, it is hoped, may shed light on this very great problem.

Fundamentally there has been little correlation in the atomic age between schemes for arms limitation and problems of military strategy. One has only to peruse a representative number of works on either one of these subjects to note the almost total absence of speculation over the intricacies of the other;¹ we may go so far as to say that the temperament and genius which might incorporate these matters meaningfully has not been encouraged to develop.

The reasons for this situation are quite clear. Military strategy is traditionally the province of the warrior-- or war-scientist-- who generally bases his assumptions on the multiplication or improvement of technique, an irregular parallelism of weapon and counter-weapon mounting to greater and greater intensity, cost, and complexity, rather than on the consequences which might ensue from subtraction or limitation of arms capability. Furthermore, he profoundly distrusts, both as a result of his experience and his training, any artificial impingement upon his capacity to provide for the national security. He is not apt to tolerate the non-use or non-production of a useful military object, unless this abnegation is counselled by sound strategic, or perhaps economic,² reasons. He may endorse, and in fact predict, the pragmatic renunciation of certain forms of violence (such as poison gas or microorganisms) or he may theorize along lines predicating the limitation of warfare according to rationalized formulae, but he will wish, nevertheless, for the case of emergency to have a capability in even those weapons whose use he does not anticipate. His basic vocation is to be prepared, as well as possible, for all eventualities. He looks at the potential enemy with the cold, gray eyes of one who is not disarmed by ephemeral political circumstances but must continue unswervingly to reckon with what he knows to be the given quantities of the

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the military balance. He believes-- and who can gainsay him?-- that actions speak louder than words, and he prefers to count the units of military hardware which the enemy has accumulated for possible aggression than the smiles at the latest session of the UN Security Council. He is too familiar with the abortive and untrustworthy attempts at disarmament that have occurred in his lifetime to believe that this solution is much better than Utopian, and he regards the negotiated surrender of any significant part of his essential weaponry as dangerously naive or perhaps treasonable.

Clearly his job is to deal with the mathematics of likelihood. He can-
not willingly subscribe to any venture, however honorable or seemingly favo-
rable, that might subvert the calculations which correspond to his estimate
of adequate security. Working as he does within the fairly ordered limits of
known objects, their functions and mutual effects, he does not care much for
abrupt reorientations or lingering uncertainties. If he fears on the one hand
the effects of "technological breakthrough," some type of progress so sudden
as to cast many of his equations in doubt, he is at least, by the nature of
his activity, prepared to face such a trial with painful resolution. But he
is intrinsically just as wary of "backward progress" which might deny him the
use of some highly dependable part of his arsenal, and he is less equipped to
revise his thinking for such an illegal happening. He may be as devoted--
often more devoted-- to the cause of peace as are his compatriots who know
less of war, but he is psychologically accomodated to the science of his métier,
whose purpose is primarily to insure security, and, in the case of war, de-
feat of the enemy. As he sees multitudes of his countrymen becoming stupidly
trapped in opinions and convictions which weigh heavily against strategic rea-
lism, he convinces himself all the more that in a world where mass destruction
may be instantaneous and imminent it is no time to let one's guard down.

The picture we have drawn is perhaps exaggerated in some of its details,
but it serves to place in focus a type of personality which clashes fundamen-
tally with that of the arms-limitation expert. This latter, if we may again
generalize, is apt to be a bit of an idealist or a pacifist, at any rate in
few cases a bona fide military scientist with an instinctive grasp of the
bewildering complexities of technological war. One of the historic features
of the drive for disarmament has certainly been a kind of humane optimism
which is belied by the experiences of the soldier and can only be justified,

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it would seem, by outrageous wishful thinking. The disarmament expert is at the disadvantage of not being legitimately professionalized-- there is no army for peace to form him as there is one for war to form the soldier. He may be a statesman, a scientist, or a scholar, but he usually issues from some vocational category that automatically inspires uneasiness in the military mind. One can imagine one of these people-- let us say a Bertrand Russell-- so carried away by his conviction of what humanity should be and should want that he willfully ignores some of the harsh-- the ultimately harsh-- realities of the current ideological and political struggle. Nothing is more calculated to make a strategy expert wince. It would not be unsound to say that the spectacular Utopians of disarmament who speak out *ex cathedra* at every opportunity and are continually active with petitions and manifestos have greatly curtailed the effectiveness of the true experts, whose careful and laborious policies and programs have been gulfed in the flux and reflux of the tide of professional humanity-savers. At any rate, disarmament-- like the UN itself-- has been widely construed as a pastime for bluestockings, parlor pinks, or nutty idealists. It seems abstract, confusing, cosmopolitan: unattainable, and hence useless; at the same time too dangerous to attain. In addition to the sceptical superciliousness with which even an open mind is prone to receive slogans like "atoms into plowshares," there is the further probability that the person who concerns himself closely with disarmament questions will not be disposed to think very highly of the military mind. If his concern was lavished in an official capacity-- like Mr. Stassen's in 1956-57-- he quickly found that after the diplomats had emasculated what he thought to be his very just efforts, the Pentagon was no less anxious to sabotage what remained. Finally, whereas disarmament presupposes the restriction or abolition of weapons, that is to say their universal or particular non-use, it seemed hardly beguiling to predicate a strategy of non-use, and it was of course hoped and indeed often expected that the principle of non-use might be contagious for even those weapons which would continue to elude control. This is one of the principal deficiencies of many of the earlier disarmament proposals, and it was a calculated irritant to the strategist, who cannot permit himself to take these things for granted.³ Thus we can readily see that on the psychological plane, to say nothing of the practical, there has been little incentive for the profitable correlation of views in these two highly vital spheres. Today, when, for reasons we shall presently

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consider, there is increasing pressure for the simultaneous study of arms limitation and strategic security (which is currently construed as capability of deterrence), it seems quite clear that many of the favorable opportunities of the past for this sort of synthesis have slipped beyond our grasp because a galloping military technology has made them invalid. This is not to say that the future is entirely without hope, so long as we discriminate in quality among valid, obsolete, and fatuous solutions, but it is unquestionable that our room for maneuver is presently more highly restricted and progressively self-limiting than ever.

## 2. What about the "balance of terror"?

It would not be amiss at this point to inject the caution that the flexibility of any hypothesis concerning the feasibility of arms limitation and control within this chapter is based primarily upon the objective feasibility and not upon our estimation of the intentions or probable response of the Communist bloc. The questions raised by our understanding of the enemy (or lack of it) are assuredly vast and highly relevant to the argument; they are indeed critical factors which should not be ignored. It is therefore our wish to analyze them as meticulously as possible in a further section. For the present, however, they need not affect our evaluation of the impact of an arms limitation agreement on general matters of strategy. The nature of the opponent is of theoretically little consequence in the discussion until it can first be ascertained that some technically feasible program exists on which we might agree. And, to be sure, a mere program will not suffice unless we are prepared to argue that the United States is interested in such a scheme for strategic no less than moral reasons. Observation shows us that this factor has not necessarily existed in the past. We shall proceed then to consider the circumstances which suggest that arms limitation may be strategically feasible at the present time.

Given the psychological hostility to arms limitation incipient in military planning (except for direct limitation on the battlefield in so-called "limited" war, which presupposes, nevertheless, the existence of a retaliatory arsenal of super-weapons that might, in certain cases, be used) and the frequently rudimentary attitude of some of the disarmament planners toward the cardinal axioms of military strategy, it would seem likely that a conversion of either one to the other's point of view could not easily take place. The strategist would be destined always to seem congenitally aggressive, the

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disarmament planner hopelessly naive. No such surrender of conviction has in fact happened on either side. But objective conditions (which are, in themselves, neither permanent nor irreversible) appear to have given rise to a line of thinking in which national security and control of arms are closely linked. At the same time several earlier notions, which may or may not have, in their time, been misconceptions but which unquestionably fostered this cleavage we have spoken of, have been dispelled or rejected. On the side of strategy, we seem, at least for the time being, to have entered a period in which the doctrine of "preventive war" or the "pre-emptive strike" has become impossible or meaningless, and the tendency in military thinking would appear to be away from "massive retaliation" except in those clear cases where its application would more or less precisely correspond to the threat. As regards disarmament, time has also brought with it some chattering conclusions. The gist of them is that we must hereafter be prepared to accept some measures which are far from being technically foolproof if we are to have any kind of workable agreement at all. Formerly, it had been thought that no agreement should be considered that did not cover all except the most obscure and relatively harmless sorts of contravention. It is possible, though by no means proven, that at a time when nuclear stockpiles were far from abundant and nuclear weapons generally large and unwieldy some satisfactory form of inspection might have been imposed. But today it is well known that efficient detection and accountability of atomic weapons in being in any of the three countries with nuclear military capability is out of the question. Other salient details have, year by year, minimized the chances of an adequate inventory. However, it is the anticipated future developments (some of them imminent), such as virtual concealment of missile delivery systems, their ability to remain operational without servicing over extended periods of time, and their capacity for near-instantaneous activation,⁴ which most profoundly disturb the premises on which a sound arms limitation and control program rests. These factors and the urgency with which it seems necessary to fashion a response to them might, in themselves, be considered a decisive reason why a wider number of experts are recommending that disarmament be looked at closely and why they are coming more and more to feel that we may have to settle for something less than a *summum bonum*. The question is to know whether there is some reasonable form of disarmament which can be expected to (1) decrease the likelihood of conflict; (2) assist

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in keeping a conflict restricted if it should break out; (3) promote an equi-
librium with the opposing bloc that will not be less favorable than the pre-
sent *status quo*; and (4) so long as a military threat is poised, be effective
in protecting the national security. This is admittedly a tall order, but
the alternative expedient of accelerated progress toward the conditions of
"push-button war" implicitly contains even greater dangers.

Inasmuch as it could have been predicted some years ago that rocketry
would in a short matter of time reach such a degree of perfection as to
make warfare efficient, economic, deadly, precise, and virtually automatic,
we can only attribute to shortsightedness and to the offensive propensity
of strategic thinking the fact that serious thought was not given by our
military staffs to the probable consequences of this development. Briefly,
our official conviction seems steadily to have been, at least until Sputnik,
that as the leading technological power in the world, we would continue to
enjoy the possession of at least slightly more advanced or polished weapons
systems than our opponent. His greater aggressiveness might tend to offset
this advantage somewhat, but it could be reasonably assumed that if we re-
mained in a state of preparedness, he would probably not be able to overtake
our advance. Now we unfortunately know better. But not only should we not
have underestimated our adversary's ability to overtake us in arms refinement
and production; we should have recognized at the outset that no matter which
power held the technological lead at any given moment, a point would inevi-
tably be reached-- unless war intervened-- where advantages we possessed could
not necessarily be traded for the factor of first-strike capability. We had,
to be sure, always worried greatly over the question of surprise attack; once
the Russian nuclear capability became respected, the prevention of surprise
attack became a persistent theme of all disarmament negotiations. But it
might have been foreseen that whereas our many costly devices for early war-
ning were, in their time, judicious investments, we would eventually be faced
with a situation where the expectation of alert would be reduced to a quarter
of an hour or less.

Even were the premonition of any enemy attack to be unambiguous, which
is highly doubtful, it could have been assumed that the problems of the fif-
teen-minute response might easily be overwhelming. As is well known, the
fifteen minutes are not available for clearcut military action, in any case--
they must include recognition, identification, communications contact, de-

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cision-making, etc. The scientific progress recorded on the missile-reentry problem has the effect of cutting the time still further, as well as making interception vastly more difficult.⁵ And in the case of the release of a missile from a submerged submarine upon one of our coastal cities the response-time would be cut to seconds. Obviously, whether we care to admit it or not, the problem of warning for a surprise attack has become strikingly academic.

We can logically expect under such conditions that our retaliation may miscarry or never be unleashed, and we cannot therefore place upon deterrence the cozy reliance that had been a sacred article of faith in the past. It is all too evident that with each cluster of seconds the enemy's scientists are able to subtract from the delivery time of their weapons, the possibility of our own retaliation becomes that much slimmer, and the potential value of the first-strike capability grows enormously. One may argue that with the advent of missile-firing submarines we exert the same pressure on the enemy and can reduce his own warning time to a negligible number of seconds, but given the likelihood that we would be hit virtually unprepared and given the imposing problems of under-water communications with our ships, whose commanders could not be expected to fire without an order, we can safely dismiss the total effectiveness of this blackmail. Assuming that our planes and land-based missile capabilities had been largely destroyed by an enemy first strike, the subs would, of course, remain the primary retaliatory threat we could muster. But they are, at best, a superior surprise weapon; caught off guard, they presumably would be committed to wait a certain length of time in the absence of command communications before proceeding to the attack, and it is conceivable that with the development of more highly sophisticated submarine-tracking devices the enemy might be willing to accept this risk. In short, it seems unchallengeable-- although this hypothesis has by no means gained general acceptance-- that scientific progress, far from encouraging what is presently called the "balance of terror," may threaten increasingly to upset what should, all along, have been regarded as an impermanent equilibrium, thereby loading the dice in favor of the aggressor power.

Let us briefly consider the case of the submarine, since it is held by many to be the potentially least vulnerable and most highly effective retaliatory weapon in our arsenal.⁶ Let us assume for the sake of the argument that both the Soviet Union and ourselves have developed a nuclear fleet sufficient through their megaton missile capability to destroy all valid military targets in the opposing country.⁷ Let us suppose also that our scientists have been

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able to provide us, on both sides, with a reasonably effective way of locating
the enemy's submarines or, at least, a significant number of them. The mere
location of a given number of Russian submarines in international waters,
however threatening their posture might be to our coasts, would not, in it-
self, be sufficient reason for launching a retaliatory attack. Therefore
the aggressor might well send off all his missiles with impunity and, at the
same time, be in an instantaneous position to decimate the undersea retali-
tory force, which, anyway, might not be in an immediate posture to threaten
him for lack of orders.⁸ Written only a few days after the launching of the
first American nuclear submarine with Polaris capabilities, these words must
nevertheless convey the feeling that the submarine may not be an ultimately
effective counter-strike weapon.⁹

One can, in fact, with only trivial contradiction, chart the progress of
modern war in terms of a progressive elimination of the defense, whether it
be construed as capacity for resistance or counterattack. From the defensive
pre-eminence of World War I, which was already being threatened by the possi-
bilities of air power and the development of a sound doctrine for armor, through
World War II, when defense came largely to depend on interdiction and attrition
of enemy supply lines or simply on enemy overextension, rather than on fixed
fortifications, to the present day when the hypothetical best defense seems to
be vested purely and simply in retaliatory capacity or offense-defense, this
trend is evident despite the continual development of numerous highly ingenious
and partly successful weapons of defense such as radar-controlled AAA, anti-
tank guns, and, more recently, air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles. Today,
it remains only for the science of armament to conquer the problem of defense
through retaliation, and this is surely being done through the severe compres-
sion of the time factor available for response. Perhaps it remains for the
defense to develop electronic machines whose milli-second responses could over-
come the time-locked frailties of human decision, but are we ultimately willing
to place the mathematics of our survival in the circuits of such machines and
trust them not to commit that one, single ghastly error that would suffice?

It is fashionable to regard the "balance of terror," the concept of the
"two scorpions in a bottle," as the compelling reason for negotiations with
the adversary. Neither one of us, it is argued, can harm the other without
risking his own destruction; therefore, we should be chastened and begin to
act like rational states which see no possibility of eliminating the features
they most dislike about each other. But, it is said, *détente* has its dangers,

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too. The Soviet Union's undisguised intention is world domination, through one or another means, and we must be careful not to bargain into a position where the "balance of terror" disappears, leaving only the heady temptation of unpunishable aggression. This is undoubtedly true; any negotiation which recorded an agreement for limitation of arms would have to include provisions for strategic stability and methods for compelling it. And it is a fearfully great problem: given the fact that a *status quo* never really exists and can only be defined relative to other balances with the benefit of historical hindsight, it is virtually impossible to reshuffle political and strategic factors, especially to eliminate them, with the end of restoring a previous equilibrium. But we should not despair totally of this dilemma before first recognizing that its alternative is even less promising. For the "balance of terror," if indeed it exists today, will not always be with us.¹⁰ Inevitably it will be overthrown by the consistent application of technology or perhaps, more stunningly, by "technological breakthrough."

We most assuredly cannot predict that the balance will break in our favor; moreover, even if it did, we would then be living in a still more dangerous world, since the enemy might be more strongly tempted to launch a "preventive" or "pre-emptive" operation. Therefore, if our analysis is not seriously out of joint, it should not be astonishing to see many of our strategists choosing arms limitation and control as the less drastic and dangerous of two tortuous alternatives. It is, of course, recognized that the same technological factors which seem to be working toward increased vulnerability of the defensive power in any modern total war militate as well against the effectiveness of arms control. "It is a disturbing fact that while weapons grow increasingly effective, they also tend to outgrow previous control possibilities. Plans for arms control that would work in one stage of technology often will be rendered useless by later developments. Diplomatic tenders that might be acceptable in one environment may be less acceptable in another."¹¹ But this does not mean that the effort may not be worthwhile; otherwise we would surely be admitting the omnipotence of the dilemma and would resignedly become its certain prisoners.

It has perhaps been unjust to propose that the unlimited spiral of weapons development (tending over the period of a comparatively short time to place inestimable advantages in the hands of the aggressor if his nervous system is strong enough) and the diverse possibilities of arms limitation are the sole alternatives for American strategy. There is indeed still a brilliant third:

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the old doctrine of "preventive war," now, it would seem, safely in mothballs. But this strategy will hardly be appealing to any side until the point is defined where first-strike capability can carry a decision without crippling loss to the aggressor. We are apparently at least two years or more short of that critical time. Furthermore, it is presently inconceivable for the deepest kind of national psychological reasons that this strategy could ever be adopted in our democratic society. We shall dwell neither on the history of the concept nor on the logic of our judgment, the latter of which should be reasonably obvious.¹² The subtle variant of "preventive war" which has been named "preemptive attack" is equally discarded for this reason and for the additional one that contemporary warning time is not likely to favor its execution.

Sound strategy, then, for a power which must rely on its counter-strike capability in the event of the unleashing of total war, would seem to be amenable to the search for rational solutions within the framework of arms limitation and control, and it is this unavoidable situation which counsels a rapidity between the war and peace planners, however far their past judgments of the critical factors have set them apart. It has been all very well until recently to count on the relative invulnerability of the retaliatory forces to produce a stalemate, but there is now great likelihood of strategic imbalance occasioned by the diminution of the time factor unless the defensive forces can be sufficiently "hardened," mobilized, hidden, or dispersed to withstand attack. These methods of "passive defense" are all worth considering, but inasmuch as they entail a severe economic strain and may not, in the last analysis, prove reliable given the enemy's obvious superiority in military intelligence of our installations, it would be unwise to rely on them without comparing the merits of other procedures. There is, it would seem, much wisdom in undertaking as complete a correlation as possible between strategic security and arms limitation, after which both the susceptibilities and good faith of the opponent should be tested with seriousness, frequency, and utmost competence. For, as we shall see, he is subject to certain varieties of pressure which might contribute to an enforceable agreement. If certain types of arms control can be imposed it will surely be in the interest of the nation that has no intention of preliminary aggression. Moreover, the involvement of an international agency in this task will evidently provide a conspicuous element of moral deterrence to any Soviet temptation to steal a march on history by flattening the United States, since it is of some concern to the Russians to see communism joyfully triumphant rather than wrathfully destructive of all opp

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opposition including a part of the very proletariat whose fealty they claim. Also, as one commentator who is distinctly more interested in security than in beating "atoms into plowshares" puts it, "as technology advances, as weapons become more powerful and more diverse, it is most likely that there will have to be at least implicit agreement on their use, distribution and character if we are not to run unacceptably high risks of unauthorized or irresponsible behavior. No matter how inimical the Soviets feel toward us, they have common interests with us in this field. This does not mean that they will not try to use the common threat to obtain unilateral advantages; it just means that there is an important area for bargaining here and one which we must fully exploit."¹³ This writer does not believe such bargaining would be premature at the present time when it requires little clairvoyance to have a rough idea of the situation which will exist in a few years' time; it is only to be hoped that we are not drastically late in testing this approach.

### 3. Arms Limitation and Control: Introduction.

There are necessarily many components to the disarmament picture, and certain but not all of them will be combined in any disarmament scheme. Moreover, the operations will customarily be phased over a period of time, so that all parts of the program will ultimately mesh but will not necessarily become simultaneously operational. Basically these components can be resolved into four categories, which we shall describe respectively as Limitation, Control, Administration, and Sanction. It is likely that any feasible scheme of disarmament will have to deal satisfactorily with the problems arising in each of the four categories. Here we shall not deal with the history of particular disarmament plans which interested governments have presented over the past decade and a half, many of them now obsolete; we shall limit ourselves to a short critical discussion of the contemporary scene which will not presume to be exhaustive. Let us commence therefore with the variety of problems and propositions that occur under the four subheadings.

### 4. Limitation: General; Arms and Force Limitation.

Limitation may, of course, be total or partial, but we shall deal here only with the partial variety since the outlawing of all aggressive weapons is too fantastic for even the most sanguine observer to visualize.¹⁴ Limitation pertains to forces as well as arms. In the recent history of the concept of limitation, proposals for force limitation have been made in numerical units by all members of the Big Four at one time or another. Both Great Britain and France, impelled by public opinion and economic concerns, have

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been fairly ardent in the past for force cutbacks;¹⁵ the United States, conscious of its present widespread deployment of forces and persistent in its extravagance with logistical, support, and special service troops,¹⁶ much less so. In effect force cutbacks have taken place in significant numbers—unilaterally— on both sides of the Iron Curtain in the last five years without the intervention of an agreement. This has been largely a matter of efficiency, modernization, and adaption to new strategic needs, and has not, justifiably, been construed in any quarter as an overture to peace.¹⁷ There has been substantial accord among the Four Powers in the past, however, that the troop ratio might follow the approximate pattern: Russia, 10; U.S., 10; China, 7-10; U.K., 4; France, 4; Others, 1. Significant in this sphere of negotiations is the fact that the problem of China has been debated by the other powers, with or without Chinese consent. However, when Mr. Stassen presented the last U.S. proposal of this nature in 1957 he scrupulously avoided mentioning any Chinese quota.¹⁸ The United States has found the China problem particularly thorny with regard to disarmament and has frequently given the impression of pretending that it did not exist. Of this, more later.

Force limitation is not presently one of the burning issues of disarmament; it received greater prominence in 1955-57, partially owing to its obvious appeal as a propaganda factor. No agreement on this matter could be reached in isolation from other components, and it was always evident that no nation was going to demobilize enough men to impair its strategic posture. Furthermore, it was thought likely that the Soviet totalitarian state would be able through paramilitary activities to maintain a clandestine reserve which could always be swiftly re-equipped and reintegrated into the regular forces, much as had taken place in Weimar Germany.¹⁹

Arms limitation, a vastly more significant factor, was willingly proposed by the Soviets as well as by the West in various stages of the protracted deliberations of the UN Disarmament Committee, since it would naturally be impossible to guarantee limitation without relevant controls. The problem was treated in terms of fractions of weapons in being, and the procedure was to be phased, with conventional weapons (at least to include objects of the magnitude of tanks and large field pieces) generally being eliminated ahead of nuclear stockpiles, which were themselves to be retained until the last minute as potential deterrents against violation. There was no salient meeting of minds on this point in the absence of any agreement

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on inspection procedures. The Russians tended to admit by 1956 that some inspection was a necessary corollary of limitation, but they never opened their minds on the subject beyond repetitious restatements of the Bulganin Plan of 1955.²⁰ Today, important as it remains, arms limitation is no longer squarely at the middle of the disarmament controversy, if we take care to separate it from arms production. It is generally conceded that any country has the ability to hide significant parts of its nuclear armaments in being from even the most diligent kind of inspection, if it so desires. Nor is there any satisfactory way to check past nuclear production from military budgets, procurement orders, or other industrial or official documents, since it requires little imagination for a government to destroy records or practice double-bookkeeping in this highly critical field. Consequently, there is a general feeling that any broad disarmament agreement that might be negotiated at the present time should not presume to include restrictions on the weapons of yesterday. The Soviet Union, it is felt, would be almost certain to violate such an agreement, considering itself immune from detection, while the United States, reflecting on this fact, might be equally tempted to withhold a part of its arsenal in the interests of security. It is alleged that this atmosphere of mutual suspicion and the intermittent possibility of dramatic detections of these evasions would so poison international relations as to effectively nullify the more *enforceable* parts of the treaty and perhaps bring tension to an unbearable pitch. Possibly this is so; but it is fair to say that one would fall drastically short of an effective disarmament if this factor could not be ultimately dealt with in some fashion, particularly if the delivery systems in being were likewise to be excluded.²¹ If nuclear parity means what it is supposed to mean, it is hoped that some arrangement might be worked out whereby equivalent numbers of the devices on both sides might be surrendered to international control (even the old U.S. formula of 53-47 might be feasible), thereby at least blunting the capability of each nation. That, too, is unfortunately a path fraught with its own dangers.

In any case, it is the delivery system or means of conveyance rather than the warhead itself which is today receiving a vast amount of attention. This is not in the least an illogical result, since the development of long-range ballistic missiles has assuredly dramatized the nature of the threat. But one suspects that we should not thereby let the nuclear device itself go unheeded: the rocket will, if we survive, be with us to stay, in one or another form, always presumably capable of crossing oceans; the bomb we could well dispense with if we knew how. One did not suggest five years ago that all planes be grounded

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or destroyed or even supervised because of the danger of atomic attack, and
the rocket in its time may prove almost as unmanageable.

What is now hoped for in a moderate scheme of disarmament is the possibili-
lity of complete cessation of the production of mass-destruction weapons from
the time that inspection teams are on the spot and ready to function. This
would certainly be a great virtue, and there is no reason to treat it as if
it were a hopelessly modest demand. But it has its dangers. It still seems
evident that some way must be devised for at least the wholesale reduction of the
weapons in being if the world is to breathe much more easily. Talk is often
heard of the ability to freeze weapons at the point of mutual deterrence, to
create a perpetual "balance of terror,"²² but in the absence of any figures
and close reasoning to support such an unlikely case, it would be best not to
put too much store in it, particularly since a concentration on certain civil
and passive defenses, which would presumably be legal, might significantly
alter the stalemate by making it attractive for the industrious side to under-
take aggressive war after a prolonged period of shelter construction.

Moreover, it is not absolutely sure that an agreement of this sort would
be politically feasible. Soviet Russia and the United States count for much
in the world by the terror of their weapons and their other vast resources,
but they are clearly far short of being all-powerful. We may doubt that the
powers of the second rank would countenance or enter into any accord which
left the arsenals of the giants virtually undisturbed which prohibiting them
from the chance of developing an independent defense capability. Nor, even
in our haste to see the world made a safer place, should we be totally unsym-
pathetic to these aspirations of the secondary nations on whom we, as a demo-
cratic power, must substantially depend for co-operation in the guidance of
the free world community. This grave question, which is generally known as
the "fourth country" or "Nth country" problem, had been treated with great
earnestness and sometimes with little realism by many commentators. Therefore
it deserves and will receive separate treatment on a later page.²³ Suffice
it to say for the present that, contrary to the majority of current opinion,
we may find it not only necessary but strategically feasible to allow a cer-
tain limited amount of nuclear weapons development in countries demanding it,
even if we have in the meantime reached an agreement with Soviet Russia for
the complete cessation of our mutual manufacture of these devices.

The problem of limitation after agreement we shall consider under the
heading of control, assuming that no accord will be entered into without sui-
table provisions for inspection.

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## 5. Force Limitation and "Limited" War.

Force limitation, which is not altogether meaningful when we speak in terms of total nuclear war, will probably have to be considered in the light of the increasingly more favored expedient of "limited" war, which, if it took place within the auspices of an arms agreement would hopefully be conventional in character, but which is otherwise construed as being either conventional or nuclear, depending on the circumstances.

First, a word about "limited" war would seem to be in order, since it is a concept which has received an extraordinary amount of attention since 1954. While there is vast disagreement among the experts as to what the character of this war shall be,²⁴ there is general consent that it will have to be pursued for comparatively limited objectives and confined to an area roughly congruent with the tactical battlefield if it is to stay contained. Furthermore, it is thought that there will have to be very precise agreement between belligerents at the outset (or perhaps before) as to what the rules of the fighting shall be, and a need for constant channels of communication between warring countries is anticipated. If all these preconditions seem fairly artificial in the light of past experience, it must be remembered that we live in a weird age where peculiar innovation may often be the first rule of survival.²⁵

Limited war is also generally defined as a war of confined means in which either implicitly or explicitly the United States and the U.S.S.R. confront one another: the concept would not apply, for example, to the Arab-Israeli War of 1947.

However, the character of common concepts of "limited" war remains questionable in several ways. In the first place, the idea of rule-making, particularly if tactical atomic weapons are to be employed, is suspect, inasmuch as most games played for the first time tend to develop and refine their rules as they proceed, and the danger is great that this refinement might take place most disastrously on the first throw of the dice. Moreover, the philosophical substratum of limited war has always been perplexing from certain angles. If, as most commentators agree, the objectives of a limited war will have to be extremely narrow, will it indeed ever be worth taking this risk to gain such slender ground? Will not subversion and other indirect methods always seem more profitable?

Limited war seems to be predicated on two observations, the one empirical and the other highly systematic. Empirically, it is noted that a genuine, perhaps a classic "limited" war did take place in Korea in 1950-51; once the beast

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is known to exist, is it not likely that we shall see his traces again? However, it is also generally conceded that the Korean conflict issued from a fundamental error on both sides-- the American failure to include the country it was later to defend within its strategic perimeter, the Soviet failure to calculate the American response. If such an ambiguous pattern emerges in the future, it is likely we shall again have "limited"-- or total-- war, but it is in the interest of both parties to see that it does not happen and they are perhaps wiser and more cautious for the experience. There is, of course, the further possibility that the Soviet Union may encourage its satellites to wage limited wars of attrition with the United States in widely scattered zones, but if this occurs, we have very little choice except to engage our allies in the struggle if feasible, threaten with our deterrent, or gracefully withdraw from the untenable positions.

The second stimulus for the concept of limited war proceeds jointly from the emotional feeling that total war is too inconceivable for there not to be some more palatable substitute, and from the rational insight that mankind seems incapable of composing his quarrels without violence and that some doctrine of violence which is less than catastrophic is greatly to be desired. This point of view has failed, incidentally, to elicit much manifest sympathy from the other side, which is prone to condemn limited war as an imperialist disguise for a sneak attack. The latter fact is, in itself, not terribly heartening for proponents of limited war in its (now) classical sense.

On the basis of our admittedly meagre evidence concerning the possible shape of a future limited war (it must be recognized that truly "tactical" nuclear weapons were not available for Korea, and that limited war there would have undoubtedly meant interdiction bombing of staging, supply and communications targets with bombs resembling the Nagasaki "nominal weapon"), it is difficult to imagine all the theoretically desirable factors coming into play at once, particularly if the other side continues to demonstrate a lack of interest in the experiment. Korea, ruggedly mountainous and bounded on three sides with water, seems almost to have been too perfect a setting for this "limited" phenomenon; would similar conditions apply given the physical characteristics of Western Europe, Finland, Iraq, or even Turkey, whose situation recalls Korea in so many ways but which is so vitally closer to the core of danger and mutual strategic interest?

Furthermore, there has been a widespread tendency to predicate the likelihood of limited war on the same structure of logic as we predicate the tenacity of peace: in both cases the existence of the ultimate deterrent is supposed to be influential in maintaining the delicate equilibrium, in assuring that the

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status quo will persist without violent transformation. It is argued that the deterrent may function as surely to limit conflicts as it now seemingly functions in seeking their avoidance. But is not the transformation from a condition of "cold war" to that of "limited" nuclear war an abrupt enough shattering of the status quo to cast the parallelism of the two circumstances into doubt? If the threat of deterrence (to whose persistency we have previously addressed some pessimistic remarks) can be construed as presently powerful enough to prevent the outbreak of a conflict implicitly involving the major powers, is it not likely that it will fulfil this role as long as it lasts, thereby counselling the impracticability of limited war? Strong arguments can be educed in favor of this point of view, inasmuch as we have had no instance of anything which might qualify as limited war since 1954,²⁶ in short, since nuclear parity and the "balance of terror" became paramount concerns. It may well be that conflict is endemic in the human condition, but this fact does not presuppose the outbreak of a limited war as unambiguous as many observers predict. In fact it is highly probable that we would be wise in directing more attention toward coping with "brushfires" and "colonial skirmishes" (Algeria-type), not to mention small conventional wars between minor powers that are not directly inspired by any of the greats but present possibilities for manipulation, than toward "classical" limited war in any of its incarnations. If this is true, a highly developed limited war capability applied in any of these areas may be the surest means of expanding what was originally a much smaller conflict and perhaps of encouraging a dangerous degree of escalation of weapons both because of the absence of doctrine and because of the probability that the interested Great Powers may themselves be far from the scene of conflict and less reflective than they should be over the choice of weapons. Add to this the persistent temptation of military staffs to test new armaments and techniques in distant battles where the national security is little threatened (as in the Spanish Civil War), and the danger becomes great that many situations treated as "limited" may in fact turn out to be "the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time," if anyone is sufficiently critical to make this evaluation in their aftermath. If the foregoing analysis has merit, it does not mean that we can and should do without a limited war capability; it suggests that this capability, once attained, should be readily divisible into many kinds of specialized combinations.

Obviously, restricted force levels are not going to have terribly great bearing on wars of the "brushfire" kind, unless we postulate a situation where the United States feels compelled to deal with a number of these conflicts di-

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rectly and at the same time, incidentally violating one of the cardinal rules of the strategists in so doing. Up to date this has not occurred, although certain possibilities for intervention have presented themselves. It was pre-cidely this anomaly which furnished the major premise of the Dulles argument that the United States had to "be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing," in short, the doctrine of massive retaliation.²⁷ As suggested earlier, this solution seems, for cogent reasons,²⁸ to have been largely abandoned, and we may try without success to determine how influential it ever was in preventing communist quick grabs of exposed areas. More probably the Soviets have found other types of operations less risky and more profitable; in all likelihood their own strategic capability does not allow any more than does ours for the indiscriminate extension of the sphere of domination wherever an opposing weakness shows up temporarily (cf. Hungary); and it is tempting to place confidence in Herman Kahn's argu-ment that the stiffening in the American economic and military posture that would result from such an overt pursuit of aggressive aims could more than re-dress the universal balance in our favor,²⁹ and by that token act as a suf-ficient deterrent against Soviet peripheral adventures. Consequently, al-though the United States might find serious disadvantages in force limitations for the reasons just ascribed, mobilization possibilities under the aegis of an automatically self-nullifying treaty might provide sufficient protection. This type of escape-hatch, although it appears on the surface to negate the reality of the treaty commitment, is felt by some to be, on the contrary, a factor of strength, particularly in a time when international suspicions are so overpowering. The argument here is that "the right to withdraw from the treaty [or perhaps to abrogate temporarily a part of it] is itself a sanction."³⁰ It is of course also to be hoped that an international police force of suf-ficient strength might be empowered to intervene decisively in such a case; unfortunately, nothing could be less certain. On the problem of peripheral attrition we shall have more to record from the political angle when we treat the problem of Soviet aims and susceptibilities in another chapter.

If we consider the case of "brushfire" wars which might take place be-tween smaller powers or assume the character of civil or colonial disturbances on a relatively massive scale, then, at least in the initial stage, force li-limitations are meaningless. Either the permissible forces in being will be sufficient for such operations or else the parties involved will have no moral reservations about unilateral abrogation of their treaty obligations (if they have any), since the issues involved will customarily be, to them, total and

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ideological independence or the seizure of political power in the state. Whereas it might often appear to be the advantage of one of the Great Powers to intervene decisively on behalf of one of the warring elements, the probability of the chain reaction incumbent on such an act may well counsel instead a concerted action to limit the damage and restore (more or less) the status quo. This is, to be sure, what in effect happened in Korea and what might have happened very early in that conflict if the nature of the event had been thoroughly understood or reflected on. It happened no less in the settlement of the Indo-Chinese states. It would behoove the major powers to consider this caution seriously as an alternative to conducting limited nuclear war against each other. It is senseless to believe that evolution will not take place in many parts of the world regardless of the "balance of terror" or of treaty commitments, and it is sane to think that certain aspects of this evolution will be regarded unfavorably by both sides. In most cases the interests of the sides will be quite opposed; in a few others they will be parallel. Neither side will care to relinquish its tacit advantages in influencing this evolution, and it is quite likely that both will be using most means short of war in the attempt to gain the upper hand. But this is a kind of competition in which we should have some confidence-- we are defeated if we have none-- and the Soviet bloc loses few opportunities to assure us that they themselves are most supremely confident. It is perhaps a good thing that the communists are so optimistic-- this at least somewhat discourages the tendency to seek dangerous or desperate shortcuts-- and it would, of course, be a major step forward for world security if such an attitude toward the "uncommitted" portions of the world could supersede direct military threat. Unfortunately the Soviet Union has no reason to doubt that it gains distinct psychological advantages from the existence of the threat, and it will be consequently difficult to establish as explicit a principle which is perhaps already tacit.

## 6. Limitations Phasing; the China Problem; Limitation vs. Control.

Universal force limitations can, perhaps, aid in creating a psychological atmosphere for détente, provided that they could be effectively imposed, that is, if a firm inspection were stipulated together with the consent of the Great Powers that they would regard violation as intolerable to the strategic equilibrium and be prepared to intervene to restore the balance rather than exploit the temporary imbalance. Undoubtedly the limitations would have to be phased in both time and space. Graduated phasing in time would tend

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to overcome the deep suspicions of the antagonists. One thinks in this connection of two growling dogs tugging on opposite ends of the same bone who, alerted by some outside stimulus, might be tempted to drop it at the same time. Phasing in space would permit major defensive alliances to operate at deterrent capacity up to the last minute and would also test the limitation concept by relieving dangerous pressure points of fighting strength in scattered parts of the world. Korea is a good example of this; here, within a small country, twenty divisions on a side glower at each other across an artificially drawn line. Surely this is, by objective standards, an illogical saturation of force for such a small area, even in spite of what happened there in the past. Disengagement in Central Europe is a more complex matter, since there is no longer, strictly speaking, with the advent of tactical missiles carrying hundreds of miles into the adjacent countries, a validly pristine Central European zone.

We return to the China problem. This nation, with grandiose and belligerent aspirations and a population that staggers the mind, will scarcely be content to limit its forces to, say, a par with the United States and Soviet Russia, and still lack nuclear capability. Nor is it likely that Russia, for whatever obscure reasons might impel her, could convince her ally to the path of consent. Even should control prove feasible and China be allowed to enter the nuclear club in a minimal way by consent of the other powers would her thirst be very greatly quenched. We can anticipate more trouble on this score than on any other, and it is sheerest folly to ignore the China problem, for which there is no easy solution. The best long-range possibility would seem that of trying to create and legitimize a China-India standoff, by elevating India to commensurate rank and contriving by all means to keep her there. The Soviet Union might feel compelled to go along with such an arrangement, and world opinion would probably look with favor on it. But China, if she grudgingly submitted for tactical reasons, would be perpetually and actively seeking loopholes, and there is no assurance that she would not swiftly break out of such a tight bondage more bellicose than ever. Let us state at this point that all proposals for arms limitation are fallacious unless they can be universally applied in all particulars, and that it is insane to think otherwise. The thought of a belligerent China as a free agent is inconceivable. This means, in short, that if arms control is realized, Communist China will concomitantly have to enter the community of nations in the fullest sense of the word, up to and including the Security Council of the UN. United States planners, whatever their mental and moral reservations at such a step, must prepare for this eventuality

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and anticipate all its consequences. It is well, however, and it illustrates a dramatic foresight which is pure coincidence that this *quid pro quo* exists at all. If any sound disarmament plan can be established which will satisfy both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., this is the type of political bargain which will be crucial to its success. Hopefully we will guard our trump card until it comes time to play it.

Negotiations of arms and force limitations have not, on the whole, been attractive to the United States at any point in its interrupted series of talks with the other major powers. Efficient inspection has been insisted on as the sine qua non for reasons which are too obvious to need clarification. In fact, at times the United States has been accused by certain of its NATO partners of wishing "inspection without disarmament."³¹ There is no question but that arms limitation has had over a period of years great immediate propaganda appeal, whereas programs for inspection must be highly complex and technical affairs that make little sense to the layman. Furthermore, the United States has several times been placed in the embarrassing position of having to welsh on its previous inspection proposals as scientific knowledge became available that cast doubt on their reliability.³² Obviously, with the experience of the past in mind, it is crucial to develop the ability to postulate, to think ahead in this regard, so as not to be put constantly in a bad light; for techniques of adequate inspection become outdated practically as fast as weapons systems. 1970 Without Arms Control, a thoroughly thoughtful pamphlet useful to both layman and student, put out under the auspices of the National Planning Association,³³ has the following counsel to offer: "If disarmament plans, then, are to keep abreast of the inventiveness of our weapons designers, there must be a far more serious application of scientific and planning skills to the problem of arms control. Within governments, such skills are indispensable to the production of plans which are both thoroughgoing and sufficiently sound in terms of national security so that a government can stand solidly and consistently behind them. The scientific staff performing such planning must necessarily have primary responsibility to the agency of government which is co-ordinating and supplying the forward momentum to disarmament efforts. Other agencies cannot be depended upon for final scientific judgment in technical matters." The warning makes good sense, although it is discouraging that this is virtually the only remedy the writers have been able to offer for our critical dilemma. The United States is not wrong in considering control to be the core of the problem; it follows that we must put our best minds to that problem and not be too afraid

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of straining our imaginations. If this problem can be met by international
action, however, we would be wise to give limitation its due at the same time
and be ready to come forward with our own comprehensive proposals in that
field as well, if for no other reason than to avoid forfeiture of the pro-
paganda initiative.

7. The Psychology of the Control Controversy.

The essential dilemma of control rests in the brains of the enemy. A lo-
gical riddle appears to be created from which there is no issue. It can be
stated in the following way. If an inherently aggressive state should agree
to a stringent system of controls which appeared to the other contracting na-
tions as sufficiently foolproof, would it not then be denouncing or denying
its own aggressiveness? Does not the converse of this axiom, namely that a
nation reveals its own aggressive tendencies when it obstructs and fails to
accept appropriate control measures, point equally to the crucial nature of
the puzzle? Could we perhaps reduce the quibble even further by maintaining
that no nation which accepts "total"³⁴ inspection actually needs to be in-
spected? The above is, to be sure, scholastic jargon, but it indicates some-
thing of our current feeling vis-à-vis the Soviet Union at the simplest psy-
chological level. It sounds like "ring around the rosey," but it is so basic
that it perhaps needs exploring. If it is evident that the Soviet Union will
continually thwart meaningful inspection in order to protect and perfect its
aggressive capacity, what good is all this verbiage? Why do we not swiftly
and prudently mobilize to the teeth and launch a preventive attack in the hope
that it might end the dreadful suspense and leave some of us alive to carry on?
At this point the black and white of the syllogism begins to shade off into a
spectrum of grays. Extenuating questions are asked: are not the Russians
afraid of us, highly suspicious of our motives? does not Marx assure them that
the capitalists are sneaky? is not Russia historically a country jealous of
its internal secrecy and does not the regime regard this secrecy as an essential
strength? have the Russians not shown greater willingness to meet the control
problem, even though they always fall short of the requirements we regard as
minimal? These are psycho-political questions and will be dealt with later on,
but they give us a background for the great deadlock on arms control and they
convey a certain number of our suspicions and hopes on the subject.

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understood, could lead to techniques for climatological conflict." 1970 *Without Arms Control*, p. 45.

36 For much of the subsequent material the author is indebted to Seymour Melman (ed.), *Inspection for Disarmament*, New York, 1958, a collection of specialized papers on the different aspects of inspection and control linked by a general introduction by the editor. To this writer's knowledge, it is the only concentrated study of its type, and it has the advantage of fairly strict adherence to the scientific method and a lack of emotionalism. As a prophecy it of course may be futile, as may all other works of the sort. It suffers from a few disadvantages, all of them pardonable. In the first place, whereas the results of the investigations are reported, the conditions and methods of the research are often passed over in silence. Secondly, the country of study in naturally the United States, which is not only an open society and one familiar to the writers but one where they have had the opportunity to obtain voluntary information and co-operation which a nation might be in a position to withhold from a staff of inspectors. Thirdly, the conclusion of the book (that inspection is, on the whole, feasible) presupposed, as does this paper, that all important components of the mixed system will be accepted. These criticisms should not be regarded as an excoriation of this most useful text, which should be supplemented by other, more detailed studies of the same character.

37 It is estimated that the personnel needed for a "total" inspection of the United States would be in the neighborhood of 30,000 highly trained specialists, presumably exclusive of clerical personnel. See Melman, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

38 Jesse Burkhead, "Fiscal Inspection," in Melman, p. 84. One major piece of evidence that has surely influenced this survey is the concealed yearly CIA appropriation in the U.S. budget.

39 Cf., for example, Thomas C. Schelling, "Surprise Attack and Disarmament," in Klaus Knorr (ed.), *NATO and American Security*, Princeton, 1959, p. 191: "The technical problem of devising a practical inspection scheme that could yield each side adequate warning of an attack by the other has probably become not only much more difficult to discuss, but much more difficult to solve, since the first open-skies proposal was made.... The problem now would seem to be one of intensive surveillance of strategic forces by a vast organization that could transmit authentic messages reporting suspicious activity... eventually within a few minutes, in a way that is not tolerably susceptible of false alarms."

40 Data learned from the most recent bomb tests were, one believes, chiefly important for the development of "tactical" weapons. For example, the argument often given in 1958 for continuing nuclear experiments, despite Russia's unilateral moratorium, was that they were needed for the production of "clean" bombs, the type that would be of most use on a "limited" war battlefield. We do not need to recall the controversy that involved AEC chief Admiral Strauss on one side and numerous scientists and highly-placed members of the Democratic Party on the other.

41 Jay Orear, "Nuclear Weapons Testing," in Melman, *op. cit.*, pp 85-99.

42 D.C. Brennan, "The Detection of High-Altitude Missile Tests," *ibid.*, p. 172.

43 Detection is presumed to be almost infallible in the case of ballistics missiles; air-breathing missiles, however, which are essentially pilotless planes, are too easily confused with aircraft to be positively identified. The only consolation here is that such missiles, because of their low speed, are highly

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8. Control: "Total" Inspection and Maximal Security.

As for the practical aspects of the control problem, they are very numerous and cannot be treated exhaustively in so short a space. Suffice it to say for introduction that in the presence of so many lethal weapons systems which are theoretically available to the Great Powers, the only logical assumption for a control policy is that it will discover methods for effectively dealing with each one, preferably through abolition of the manufacture of their components, that it will be able to anticipate and control all new developments,³⁵ and that it will not only have virtually absolute powers of detection but the ability to terminate the violations and prosecute the offenders (discussed under Sanctions). Moreover, certain weapons now considered obsolete for military purposes would have to be included, if, for example, they promised ways of nuclear delivery, since they would again reign supreme in the absence of their more progressive counterparts. Thus the insistence in control and inspection is currently on a mixed system of high ingenuity that will account for all these possibilities.³⁶ It is dismal to have to add that whereas certain components of this comprehensive system have been brought up in international negotiations, others have not. This suggests not only that the way toward adequate control will be, to say the least, tortuous, but that a once "total" system, by the time it is agreed to, may have become technically invalid. As a consequence, it would be desirable that the inspecting organization be granted powers based on scientific estimate for the revision of its tasks and the re-composition of its teams, wherever this is deemed necessary.

At least five broad types of inspection will be necessary, described as follows: inspection to detect missile or nuclear bomb tests, inspection of numerous kinds of manufacturing and of laboratories, inspections of pre-existing weapons stockpiles, inspection of military installations, and inspection of fiscal, budgetary, and procurement documents of the government. The principal weapons types (conceivable today) which will require suppression or strict supervision (particularly in connection with potential delivery systems) are: nuclear bombs and shells (requiring supervision of all nuclear production), long-range planes, missiles and other pilotless devices, bacteriological and radiological devices, poison gases, and, if one wishes, climatological devices. It is difficult to imagine how inspection would be capable of preventing the clandestine production and assembly of machine guns, mortars, and small arms, but it might be possible to police against tanks, large cannons, warships, etc.

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For purposes of this analysis, we shall leave the matter of conventional weapons aside, except insofar as they might be auxiliaries for nuclear capability.

Inspection would be conducted from both ground and air, visually, photographically, and with the aid of a wide variety of instruments and skills. The requirements for scientific and technical personnel would be enormous for a single country alone,³⁷ and this problem would become thoroughly staggering when the needs of a global inspection were considered. Likewise, the possibilities for evasion, while supposedly effectively curtailed after the stationing of the inspection personnel and the activation of their equipment, remain admittedly vast during the period between the signature of a disarmament treaty and the placing in operation of the control system. Not only can the nuclear powers easily conceal significant parts of their nuclear stockpile (even fathoms under water) but they may soon have the capability of hiding operational missile sites of great durability, perhaps "hardening" these also beneath the surface of the sea. Also, it would be possible in the Soviet bloc for Russia to deliver nuclear weapons or materials prior to the installation of controls to an ally or satellite that was presumed to have no nuclear capability and consequently would be assigned a number of inspectors inadequate to deal with the situation. The imagination can invent still other alternatives, none of which are too bizarre completely to be overlooked. Thus the problems of a "total" inspection are, to say the least, extraordinarily challenging, even provided that an effective agreement could be struck. We may in fact say, in considering the numerical proportions of an efficient inspection system in relation to the possibilities of evasion, that the ratio bears a striking resemblance to the collateral one of defense vs. offense in the nuclear age. This is not a very charitable description of a method which might promise a very high degree of security, if not assured salvation, in a time of menace, but it is better to be precise about such things within the limits of one's understanding than glib or naive.

The statesmen have made no particularly giant strides toward solving the problem of control since the Geneva meeting of the Big Four in 1955. It is fairly appalling that four years have slipped away so irrecoverably, but it is perhaps not surprising that this should be so, inasmuch as the period corresponds to the Soviet attainment of nuclear parity and to their threat of becoming at least *primus inter pares* in the nuclear domain. It will be recalled that four procedures of inspection were proposed at that meeting: the American

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plan for aerial inspection and exchange of military blueprints, the Russian plan for ground inspection at limited critical points, the French plan of budgetary review for prevention of illegal military expenditure, and the British plan for mutual inspection by forces in the field in Central Europe. Of the four, only the first three need concern us in this discussion, since any plan for "total" inspection would be carried out by international teams and not by contending armies. All these features are important components of any "total" plan, but they would not in themselves today be, if they ever were, adequate for satisfactory control.

The once pregnant possibilities of aerial inspection have been severely curtailed by the onslaught of the missile age. Not only might the visual and photographic evidence obtained by this method fail to show the location of operational rocket emplacements, but the time expended in the development and interpretation of the photographs is not calculated for particularly swift reaction. It is, as it has always been, more highly feasible to check violation at its source, that is to say in the manufacture of illegal weapons. Still, it should be assumed that even in the case of the most clandestine and automatically contrived attack a certain amount of suspicious traffic or other activity might be observed by an alert inspectorate, and there is no method more suited to cope with this evidence than aerial inspection. This suggests that inspection flights should be given the privilege of considerable randomization, that teams should not have to announce their schedules in advance to the inspected power, and that there should be no curtailment of their right to retrace a given route as many times as seems necessary. Of course, a representative of the inspected nation would at all times accompany the flight personnel, and a specific block of air space would be assigned to the control planes, which would themselves bear clear markings, in order to insure air safety and allay probable suspicions otherwise attending the identification of unknown aircraft.

The Soviet plan, which would provide for ground inspection at critical points but would limit the mobility of the inspectors, is primarily of interest as a token or as a breach in their previously monolithic wall of refusal to countenance "international interference." Their acceptance of the principle of inspection seemed, in its time, highly encouraging, and some are optimistic that they will be prompted to offer more substantial assurances in the coming year. We may expect, however, that any further assurances that are forthcoming will know no essential conflict with Soviet strategic requirements. As for

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the Bulganin Plan, which the Western Powers sensibly accepted without criticism and merely superimposed on their own schemes of control, it obviously suggests the metaphor of the fierce dog on the chain who can make trouble for all who come within his range, but who can only growl at whatever takes place beyond the radius of the leash. An essential feature of "total" inspection is that the teams be permitted great mobility and that their actions, routes, and schedules be guarded from the foreknowledge of the government in whose country they operate.

The plan suggested by (then) Président du Conseil Edgar Faure of France makes a modest contribution to the security system. If it largely duplicates the other more particular varieties of inspection, it nonetheless provides a valuable countercheck to existing information. Furthermore, in the case of a projected illicit manufacture of weapons, budgetary examination, if it turned up suspicious items, would provide warning time to the inspectors and permit them to prefigure their best lines of action. Unfortunately it has been estimated that budgetary inspection allows for a considerable margin of ambiguity; in the case of the United States (budget: about $70 billion) it would be impossible to account for sums approaching $100 million. The analysis of fiscal control proposed by one expert implies that perhaps one out of every fifty dollars of government appropriation might elude the vigilance of the inspectors.³⁸

This, in terms of contemporary Soviet and American budgets, would be entirely insufficient for the financing of a total war capability, but it might serve to keep such a capability fully operational if the weapons themselves had previously gone undetected. Three ways in which the maximum utility of fiscal inspection might be achieved are: (1) to incorporate the inspection rather closely in the budget-making process; (2) to insure close liaison at all times between the budgetary and the industrial inspectors; and (3) to suppress the announcement of all suspicious discrepancies until they could be verified as such or accounted for by the inspectorate.

## 9. Monitoring of Tests and Alert for "Surprise Attack."

More recently than the Geneva Conference considerable attention has been devoted to two other control problems which merit discussion. These are, respectively, monitoring of nuclear experiments and missile shots, and investigation of methods for prevention of surprise attack, the latter of which is implicitly covered in some of the preceding pages. That these topics in particular, and in the form in which they are presented, should so dominate current negotiations on arms control suggests that the strategists are becoming more wholeheartedly involved in the disarmament problem. This is, in itself, an

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encouraging sign. Unfortunately, as we have had occasion to remark, the critical question of early warning, which is at the core of surprise attack formulas, is rapidly becoming more difficult of solution because of the astonishing speed with which an attack may soon be able to be launched. It would therefore be disconcerting for our negotiators to get tied up in this problem to the detriment of others equally pressing at a time when it was threatening to become academic.³⁹ This, however, can only be determined once and for all on the basis of a careful study of information which the present writer does not possess. But it does appear that the matter of surprise attack might be better clarified by our familiarity with the enemy psychology and his military doctrine than by the achievement of a few minutes more of retaliation time, though this is again a particular view and not a scientific fact.

Elimination of nuclear tests has since 1956 been a popular theme for the negotiators, not only because it is in essence a problem less complicated to deal with than some of the others we have treated, but also because it elicits the most interest and indeed the most furious emotionalism in world opinion. Much public feeling in all nations has been aroused over H-bomb tests (1) because they are the most vivid symbols of the grim tragedy that might someday take place, and (2) because of widespread horror (and much misunderstanding) of the toxic and genetically injurious effects of radioactive fallout. If the average person knows one thing about the characteristics of fission-fusion bombs, it is usually that they have radioactive by-products (in the form of contaminated earth and debris), and that the absorption of this radioactivity is cumulative. Even among those who very well recognize that atmospheric contamination is still far off, contemplation of even the radioactive accumulation of today promotes very little peace of mind. Despite the obvious tug of popular feeling on governments regarding the cessation of nuclear experiments and the corresponding temptation to inject propaganda into a type of negotiations which should be conducted with the highest sense of responsibility, it would be hard to prove that the popular instinct has been wrong. Now that the three nuclear powers have been led, for mixed reasons, to unilateral stoppages of bomb-testing, largely on account of the pressure that propaganda has been able to bring to bear, there is little evidence to show that the strategic posture of either the U.S. or the U.S.S.R. has seriously suffered as a result. Moreover, much genuine relaxation of tension has been gained in the process. One can easily visualize the potential dangers if the present situation is long extended, for it remains feasible to explode relatively large devices with minimal chances of detection,

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thus improving the quality of the weapon, so long as monitoring must be conducted from abroad. This could, over a period of time, give quite considerable advantages to the violator for the conduct of certain types of military operations, conspicuously "limited" war,⁴⁰ but one does not see how it could, by itself, reduce the ultimate strategic balance short of "technological breakthrough." For the known techniques of bomb-making and the known strategies of bomb explosion are quite deadly enough as a deterrent, provided that the retaliatory capacity remains unimpaired. And nobody has stopped making bombs nor suggested that he would do so at any time in the future. It would seem advisable, however, to supplement the ambiguous self-restraint that exists today with an effective system of monitoring nuclear tests. According to one set of figures,⁴¹ adequate detection of all nuclear explosions in the range of 10 KT and up could be insured by the placement of properly equipped monitoring stations at distances of 300 miles. This estimate would require seven such stations in the U.S. and thirty in the U.S.S.R. They would be supplemented by additional seismic stations in areas where earth tremors are known to occur, so as to reduce the possibility of confusion with earthquakes to a negligible minimum. Others feel that these figures err on the side of optimism; but scientists universally concede that normally all except low-yield underground explosions are capable of detection. Outer space explosions, too, are apparently susceptible to monitoring. Certain methods are known by which illicit nuclear testing might be possible such as explosions in gaseous water, etc., but these all approach the limits of practicality. Monitoring is no less feasible economically, since it is estimated that a single station can be constructed for little more than five thousand dollars. Nuclear monitoring in non-nuclear countries and in international waters undoubtedly raises particular problems of its own, but there is no reason why they cannot be solved. In sum, there is every reason why we should press for this type of control, especially before the present uncontrolled situation becomes sacrosanct and unnegotiable, which is probably the way the Russians would like to construe it. If one aspect of disarmament is allowed to drag by resting solely on the airy principle of good faith we shall have that much more difficulty in arranging other types of controls. We should, in this light, probably be prepared to resume our own testing if we find our adversaries completely obdurate in this regard.

Similar problems are presented in the detection of high-altitude missile tests, a possibility which has become increasingly important with the development of very sophisticated delivery systems. Here the spacing of stations would

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depend entirely on the altitudes to be covered, since the feasibility of
detection is contingent on the geometric capabilities of the radar equipment.
It will be necessary to monitor the entire surface of the earth, since we know
that missiles of all kinds can or will be able to be launched from comparatively
small ships or oceanic platforms. As our author states, "there would be little
point in providing any radar coverage at all if any parts of the world were
to be left uncovered; it would be too easy to arrange clandestine tests in an
uncovered area."⁴² The present writer has seen no discussion of inspecting
missiles launched from outer space, either from platform devices or from some
hovering craft with high-altitude capabilities; obviously the method of in-
spection would have to be improved to meet such contingencies. The best plan,
however, would be to abort them through rigid examination of all space devices
before they were sent up. Dr. Brennan estimates that in the world of existing
possibility an effective system for monitoring missiles would require about
1600 stations spaced 282 miles apart. They would have a detection capability
of ten miles of altitude.⁴³ To some extent they could be merged with the nu-
clear-explosion stations, thereby slightly cutting the cost factor, which is
given as the robust sum of $16 billion inventory and $1.2 billion yearly ope-
rating expense. These hefty figures begin to suggest the economic limitations
of "total" inspection, which would indeed be a very costly substitute for the
brotherhood of man, but perhaps also a comparatively parsimonious price to pay
for the safety of civilization.

## 10. Industrial inspection; psychological deterrences of a "total" system.

It will be readily seen that whereas there is a certain reassurance in
knowing that international teams are in place, equipped and qualified to moni-
tor nuclear explosions and flights of missiles, they are in themselves helpless
to prevent the missiles from being fired or the bombs from going off. The
only way this is possible is to find the things and destroy them or render them
inoperable. The only strategic aid that international inspectors in this cir-
cumstance might be able to provide to an about-to-be-victimized country would
be to flash an early warning and perhaps some information about the trajectory
of the deadly fusillade. Perhaps, though, the inspectors, knowing that nothing
in their power could recall the missiles, would deem it preferable that one
country be destroyed instead of two, whosever the guilt, and as human beings
they would not be anxious to summon a holocaust of retaliatory destruction on
their own heads. This, however, is a situation more appropriate for Nevil Shute
to treat than the present writer. Our conclusion must be that although moni-

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toring of nuclear tests and missile flights is feasible and may be worthwhile, it cannot be construed as a panacea but simply as one component of a truly "total" system.

The possibility of stationing as many as 30,000 international inspectors of high culture and competence on the soil of a single country gives rise to the tendentious argument that there may be considerable moral pressure exerted on an aggressor country not to start a war, however fanatic its designs or unprincipled its conduct. One prediction of Götterdammerung we have not yet had from any strategic expert is the eventuality that a single country would be capable of decimating the rest of the world in an outburst of megalomania- cal fury. If one does not eliminate the others, one must live with the others, and international sociability would not be very great if one country flattened another, among whose victims would inevitably be a judiciously high proportion of the 30,000 world citizens sent there to keep the peace.

Another conceivable-- though less virtuous--function of the numerous inspectors might be that of arbitration and umpiring should a "limited" war manage to get started. They would be able to move swiftly to the tactical battle area to provide on-the-spot verification of the "limits" of this war, and their unparalleled communications system would be instantly available to the warring countries for discussion of the rules of the conflict or negotia- tions leading to its termination. The present writer regards this situation as unlikely, but still considerably less bizarre a possibility than some other cases which have received discussion. It would be unwise in any case to publi- cize this aspect of the inspectors' mission, lest it should tempt the incautious to take advantage of the facility.

One of the most critical types of inspection concerns the surveillance of laboratories, industries, and military installations. This is, of course, directly at the heart of the inspection problem, if we except the case of wea- pons in being. Among the many items it would be necessary to survey are all nuclear production, public health facilities, bacteriological laboratories, production of guidance systems, gyroscopes, air frames, propulsion systems, solid and exotic fuels, etc. The list could be increased so as to make the precautions more infallible, but the law of diminishing return would swiftly come into operation. More impressive are the requirements for skilled per- sonnel to accomplish these tasks and the great difficulty of determining which factories and installations to monitor habitually. The realm of possibility does not necessarily end on land: it might be underground, or factories at

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sea for certain purposes could be equipped and disguised in ships before controls were instituted; the burden then would fall on aerial inspection. Yet, in the last analysis it is doubtful whether the production of super-weapons or first-rate delivery systems could remain hidden from a "total" inspection in which the efforts of sufficient numbers of competent experts on the ground were complemented by surveillance from the air. It is a little uncertain where all these people could be found. Probably the expedient would have to be some kind of international compulsory draft whereby all scientific and technical personnel, if found reliable, would have to give a certain length of time to service with the control organization. Many persons would no doubt be willing to volunteer,⁴⁴ and there is little danger that a collection of scientists would give rise to any true military hierarchy or caste. Unquestionably, though, orders would have to be issued, and the chauvinism of the individuals would have to be progressively erased. There would be relatively little expenditure for this vast network above and beyond the salaries and other compensations of the inspectors and administrative charges, but, considering the numbers necessarily involved, the cost could be quite formidable. Given these limitations, a worldwide scheme of industrial, laboratory, and military base inspection, if not absolutely foolproof, would be applicable.

Professor Melman, in his study of inspection procedures, places much reliance on an esoteric system which he somewhat grandioquently labels "inspection by the people."⁴⁵ In connection with the feasibility of this concept public opinion surveys were run in six major countries by the American Institute of Public Opinion and its international affiliates. The poll-taking revealed a condition of popular response which had always been thought to exist, namely that people in all countries feel quite strongly about the abolition and control of nuclear weapons. A further finding which the polls elicited, more surprisingly, was the favorable acceptance of individuals to regard it as their duty in particular and anyone's duty in the abstract to report personally to the inspecting teams any suspected violations taking place on the national soil. The United States scored especially high in this respect. These conclusions, if valid, suggest two very important prospects: (1) that the presence of many international functionaries on a national soil may not produce the chauvinistic irritant that some suspect, and (2) that these inspectors might anticipate a large measure of voluntary co-operation from the ordinary population. Of course, it was not possible to run any surveys in the Communist countries, but one might reasonably expect to find

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there a significant, if reduced, duplication of the sympathies of the free world. The difficulty is whether, under any feasible inspection scheme, the international teams could be made so omnicompetent as to encourage unsolicited information from populations living under totalitarian rule. In short, if "inspection by the people" is universally possible, this suggests that the political character of certain nations as we know them today would have to alter enormously to accomodate the event. Such a transformation would indeed imply that the world was becoming a radically different place from what it has always been within man's memory.

It is virtually axiomatic today-- and this represents the culmination of one of the trends of modern industrialism that has the greatest military and political significance-- that wars are prepared by governments and not through the connivance of unscrupulous bands of private adventurers. Today Aaron Burrs and Jean-Cristophes have little room for maneuver. Of course it still remains theoretically possible-- in the absence of inspection and control-- that an unprincipled country might produce a nuclear device and sell it to a syndicate of individuals, whose byzantine motives we shall not go to the trouble to guess at. This bomb, carried in a suitcase and detonated in the midst of one of the great centers of population, could conceivably lead to international reprisals and total war. But the prospects of such an incident, if fictionally intriguing, are not alarming. The fact remains that for incontestable economic and political reasons all significant evasion attempts perpetrated under an inspection would reveal the heavy hand of the government. The people do not want war, or war of this type; governments may still find wars feasible. Therefore, the psychological complexion of modern governments is highly important to the maintenance of peace, and we might add that popular pressure can influence, if not in all cases determine, the character of governments. We doubt, therefore, that there is anything to fear from an enlightened public. "Inspection by the people" is a valid if distant goal, if simply because the psychological materials favorable to its operation exist already. Fraternization of inspection personnel and civilian populations, to the extent that it does not interfere with the judgment of the former, should be encouraged-- or rather, insured-- in any arms control agreement. This proposition needs to be stated because it is altogether possible that the United States, judging by past performance, might oppose such an idea on obscure grounds of security.

One further element of hope arises from the situation where we might find

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numerous international personnel functioning in the national territories as observers of all suspicious events. Total war in the nuclear age, as is well known, will be sudden, massive, and brutal. It would very likely catch the mass of people in the aggressor country by surprise as well as those in the victim country, given the great advantages to be gained from absolute secrecy. Still, it is generally understood that populations, whether totalitarian or democratic, must be psychologically prepared for war, if that war is to capture their support and patriotic response. Hitler launched his wars after a decade of clever and venomous propaganda; the great Russian victories of 1943 could probably never have been achieved without the belated but highly concentrated appeals by the government for patriotic unity and defense of the fatherland; the United States might never have entered the war short of attack-- in any case, it is evident that the Roosevelt administration had to go to great pains in preparing the country for such measures as the repeal of the Neutrality Act and Lend-Lease. Today, to be sure, a government may launch a savage, massive war with neither the consent nor the foreknowledge of the population. But the question is: stung by the horror and surprise of the event, would the population rally spontaneously to the cause of a first-strike aggression? In all likelihood, such an attack would be presented as ambiguous: if Russia were triumphant and managed to occupy the United States, some hapless SAC colonel, if any were left alive, would be dragged out of the wreckage and made to confess his "war crimes" and perhaps some allegedly American nuclear devices would be allowed to go off on Soviet soil and represented as the colonel's handiwork which had misfired. But all this legerdemain takes time, and a country committed to desperate total war does not have time to smooth over the rough spots until the issue of battle is no longer in doubt. In the meantime, a public response, if surprised and spontaneous, could be so stunning as to render total victory rather hollow, even if the aggressor had himself escaped without crippling damage. And, if the aggressor country chose the opposite method and attempted to prepare its population psychologically for the outbreak of war (probably through unremitting denunciation of the aggressive intentions of the enemy)-- in which case there would probably be, among other things, a rush for the shelters, if any existed-- the international inspectors would be in that much better a position to verify what was taking place, to look unceasingly for hidden weapons, and to launch immediate warnings to other nations. It is of highest interest to us to determine how the Soviet Union would care to treat this problem.

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## 11. The "Nth Country" Problem.

We have already suggested that world stability must depend on more than a bilateral stalemate because nuclear weapons are potentially more than a bilateral affair. This leads us to say a few words about the condition which is commonly known as the "Nth country" problem. The "Nth country" is the country whose state of technology makes it likely that it will be the next possessor of nuclear weapons, and the problem is how to prevent this from transpiring. At present the dog in the manger is France, and it is in defence to her and in recognition that many other nations may soon be in the same position⁴⁶ that we avoid the more popular terminology of "fourth country" problem. The fact that in a comparatively short time nuclear weapons will be widely possessed (though probably in small numbers) is held to be one of the gravest challenges of our present time, one that threatens to upset the "balance of terror;" and it is, in great measure, this fear which has propelled so many previously aloof strategic experts to seek solution in the field of arms limitation.⁴⁷ All questions of strategic policy aside, another— perhaps graver— fear is predicated on the principle of maximalization of accidental conflict. If, it is held, the possession of nuclear weapons by Soviet Russia and the Anglo-Saxon countries admits an accident factor of x in their employment, then the distribution of such weapons among many other nations will cause the value of x to increase in geometric proportion, making the likelihood of war that much greater.⁴⁸ This argument, which appears to be impeccably scientific because it is impeccably abstract, is voiced by many distinguished observers, who seemingly ignore the fact that any secondary nations acquiring nuclear capabilities will still be in no position to offer a very vigorous threat to world peace so long as the two major powers are themselves determined that war shall not take place. And that is precisely the problem we face, Nth country or no Nth country. As for the factor of accident, we can conjecture that a mathematical increase will take place if the bombs become more widely available, but this factor of increase will be determined only by the additional bombs in existence and by their treatment and handling, not by the number of countries which possess them. Furthermore, it is not entirely impossible that the existence of limited numbers of nuclear weapons among the not so very grand will be a chastening experience for the Very Great, who have long treated their monopoly of terror as an almost congenial sort of exclusive club. The gravest consequence other than accident— whose danger is always with us— that we can foresee as issuing from the proliferation of Nth

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countries is that it will disturb strategic stability and hence increase the probability of "preventive war." Incidentally, it should be quite obvious to the strategists that the wider distribution of nuclear capability will tilt the balance, by whatever factor the occurrence might imply, in favor of the West, since the majority of countries acceding to nuclear partnership would be NATO members or friendly neutrals.⁴⁹ If we fear the Soviet reaction to this new challenge, our response should be to bargain discreetly with our impending advantage rather than to gaze at it helplessly in chill terror. It is frequently argued by those who despair of significant arms limitation and control that it is folly to think of reversing or halting technology.⁵⁰ But they are often the same observers who believe that it may be feasible to prevent the "Nth" countries from developing nuclear weapons. One or the other argument is false: either technology can be controlled or it cannot. Any nation with sufficient nuclear knowledge for peacetime uses can, without too great difficulty, produce a bomb. If such a course is therefore inevitable,⁵¹ it makes no great sense to speak in anguished tones about preventing it at all cost, even if it means the surrender of potential strategic prerogatives to the Soviet Union. What we should do, instead, is recognize the inevitably widening effects of nuclear technology and prepare our plans and goals to meet this eventuality. Only political naivete could counsel us to impose sanctions on friendly powers in the hope of turning their wishes from bomb production, if they feel it is in the interests of their security to do so. This clearly does not mean that we should become prodigal with our nuclear weapons as we were with our conventional ones and deal them off to any and all in whom we place some sort of temporary reliance. It would even be hazardous to say that we should give them to other NATO powers in existing circumstances. Our much-lamented nuclear stinginess, economically preposterous as it has seemed at times, may have, after all, been the path of wisdom. But that is an entirely different problem from the one of allowing another country to develop a nuclear capability independently. Mr. Khrushchev cannot legitimately hold against us that which we have no control over. If the Nth country problem presents its dangers, its incidence is still not illogical because it is the precise strategic complement to the political fact of "de-bipolarization," which, despite bilateral meetings and such, seems to be taking place at an ever accelerating speed. We can argue on both counts that a secure world must be premised on the prerogatives of the community of nations, and that any attempt to impose the ridiculous anomaly of a *pax Sovieto-Americana* is, in the present situation, unthinkable.⁵² If the

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present writer were a strategist he would be more pleased than not at the 11th
country development, and if he were a negotiator he would regard it as providing
him with a bargaining strength vis-à-vis the Communist bloc which had not pre-
viously been his. He will confine himself to the observation that it offers
possibilities which seem by no means hopeless to global security. The assump-
tion, so prevalent today, that we— and Soviet Russia by dint of circumstance—
are alone capable to treat the dilemma of nuclear weapons and that we had best
be left alone to chart global destinies is even more preposterous than the ma-
jority of commonplaces. In the absence of our ability to exterminate each other
or admire each other, what we perhaps require above all else is some firm in-
termediary whose opinion as to the limits we cannot legitimately transgress
stands a chance of being valid to each. Since this is more a strategic than a
political problem, it is indifferent that such a mediator might be more sym-
pathetic to our way of life than the Soviet, and that should not be regarded as
a decisive advantage in the sense our military planners would desire. If we
manage to avoid a shattering war, our politics may some day prevail even though
our strategy will have to compromise. This is, in fact, what our basic policy
aim has always been, even though we have had strong and urgent temptations to
lose sight of it in the past decade and a half. We could do well, even threa-
tended as we are, to dwell on the idea again.

Whether or not the foregoing interpretation of the "Nth country" problem
is correct-- and it is a minority opinion<sup>53</sup> -- the chances are that the very
existence of the problem may well be conducive to some kind of arms agreement.
The Soviet Union will presumably have two motives in this regard: (1) desire
to check a tendency which, if carried very far, would create new strategic dis-
advantages for them; and (2) desire to prevent new, and basically unpredictable,
political factors from interfering with their planning. Our negotiators should
lose no time in channeling this pressure along the most productive paths.

12. A Criticism of "Limited" Control.

While we have devoted some space to the advantages and limitations of plan-
ning for "total" control, we have not yet considered the possibility, widely
discussed, that a partial control which will leave the nuclear powers "sta-
bilized," that is to say, each in possession of an effective, invulnerable de-
terrent, might be more feasible and more effective. This view, which grows
logically out of the interpretation that a nullifying "balance of terror"
exists at the present time and could, through negotiation, be perpetuated, has

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found currency among those observers who fear the extension of the arms race but fear equally that "total" control could not work. The latter contention generally depends on the fact that existing arms caches may be undiscoverable and that effectively concealed operational missile sites may already exist, and on the danger that any artificial attempt made now to tamper with the present "balance of terror" might, in fact, produce an imbalance even more terrible. This point of view is clearly stated in the following proposition: "An arms limitation agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union which permitted each side to retain a number of retaliatory systems capable of surviving a first strike from the other, but which were insufficient in number, destructive power, and accuracy to execute a first strike themselves, could create a ratio of controlled to uncontrollable force favorable to nuclear stability."⁵⁴ This assumption is but one of many conceivable schemes of limited disarmament which might be devised as a basis for negotiation; since, however, it is one of the most recurring and thought to be one of the most intelligent, we shall confine our analysis to its qualities uniquely, recognizing that some of the observations may apply to the question of limitation in general.

One can easily see that the plan is premised on the retention by both powers of a considerable portion-- but not necessarily the most modern part-- of their nuclear forces in being, on their subsequent "hardening" or "mobili-zing" with the end of invulnerability, and, it seems, on rather severe force limitations in other respects. Let us proceed to criticize this notion on several grounds. In the first place it cannot be argued that this type of standoff would be easier to create or to police than a "total" disarmament: the same controls would be necessary, and the same temptations to violation would probably exist. Therefore, no significant practicality, economy, or efficiency could be gained by the plan. Furthermore, it is perhaps easier to inspect against nuclear arms of any kind than to determine whether two hundred nuclear missiles or bombs in planes (presumably concealed from the in-spectorate) had not, in effect, grown to four hundred (by making smaller bombs out of big ones) or been made pre-eminently "dirty" instead of only relatively so. It is likewise difficult to know how any effective inspection could take place at all if certain arms were declared off limits to the international teams; and if those teams had free access to all places, would the inspected power not feel its security in jeopardy?

Secondly, the plan would probably, by eliminating intermediate weapons and leaving the strategic deterrent in place, make it more likely that should

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war break out, it would be as total a war as the aggressor could possibly fight with the means at his disposal. Perhaps, though, the intermediate weapons— themselves easily concealed— would not be disturbed either, in which case the only practical advance achieved would have been the elimination of the deadlier systems of the future. In this event, we might have imposed the burden of a complicated inspectorate on the world with very little net gain to show for our effort, since its activity would be basically the same as under "total" inspection but its prerogatives and prestige would be quite limited.

Thirdly, it is not altogether sure that the "balance of terror" is so perfect a concept as has often been assumed, nor that it could be reproduced through partial arms limitation, nor that its future vicissitudes will be very easy to foresee. Would the proponents of the "limited" plan be prepared to look into the future toward a time when the bristling arsenals of retaliation could be done away with? Would they simply rust away? If so, the "limited" plan becomes a mere phasing operation in some more "total" plan, and as we have seen, it may be important to act more swiftly and decisively than this assumption would allow, especially since the mathematical factor of accident does exist. If not, do the exponents of a "limited" disarmament truly believe that the world can go on indefinitely in as antagonistic a posture as they propose? Might not certain other countries object to the idea that the two nations would continually possess absolute strategic domination over their existences? After a number of years a **volte-face** might create a situation where the nuclear giants, weary of glowering at each other, decided to share the helpless world between/among them. Surely the military strategists of the secondary nations may be permitted to think in terms of far-fetched possibilities, as we occasionally allow ourselves to do. The most likely result of this **contremps** would be a situation in which the agreement would be bilateral and hence meaningless, with the remainder of the world uncontrolled.

Finally, one would presume that the insistence on the "balance of terror" or invulnerable retaliatory capacity depends on the psychological principle that the one side deeply distrusts the other. No country could willingly agree to create an indefinite, airtight "balance of terror" if its aim were ultimate military aggression, because it would be robbing itself of the very instrument needed for the conduct of its policy. If this is so, and if the Soviet Union were willing to observe this type of limited disarmament, it is evidently through fear of the United States that it would wish to keep its retaliatory capacity. Would it not be better to try to convince the Soviet Union of our peaceful intentions, which

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they should be but are apparently not assured of, and then propose a meaningful agreement for total control of armament, that is to say of those arms which are needed for waging a strategic war or nuclear war of any variety? If the Soviet Union will have none of this, then we are stymied in both cases, and will have little choice but the lethal pursuit of the arms race.

It is felt that the foregoing arguments are sufficiently valid to expose the serious disadvantages of any limited disarmament based on the mutual retaliation scheme, and to suggest that "total" arms control, even though it will not reduce chances of aggression to zero and will be economically very costly to maintain, deserves close attention. This does not mean that some plan similar to the "limited" one might not prove useful in the phasing of an eventual "total" disarmament; indeed it might be a sagacious intermediate step. But it would not be particularly plausible as a goal in itself.

We must refrain here from discussing the very knotty problem of the phasing of disarmament, because this will inevitably involve many complex political factors that have not previously entered the argument. But we should note in passing that one of the obsessive questions in any disarmament scheme will be the difficulty in sustaining a strategic equilibrium between the great powers at each step of the phasing down of their arms and forces. It is in this category of argument where some of the "limited" disarmament plans legitimately belong and can be of service.

## 13. Administration.

Since it is generally agreed that all meaningful systems of disarmament will need to be universally applied and will require the consent and approval of all national states, it becomes axiomatic that no bilateral agreement between the Soviet Union and the Anglo-Saxon powers will solve anything effectively, other than demonstrating a previously unsuspected quotient of good will, and that the agreement which will be binding as an international contract must consequently make certain concessions to the interests of the other powers. In like manner, the control organization will have to be international in administration, with all signatories freely participating in its functions. Its efficacy will be increased, in fact, and the suspicions of the antagonists will be allayed, if the smaller nations possess a large measure of influence in the tasks of supervising the phasing down of weapons and policing the peace. It would stand to reason, however, that the major economic support should come from those powers whose military postures had, in the first place, created the need for the control. Undoubtedly the United States would not quarrel with this judgment. A fraction of

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the appropriation previously applied to national defense would probably suffice to guarantee each nation's share in the costs of the inspecting body.

Presumably the higher staffs of the organization would first be put on an operating basis and then permitted to practice their recruitment according to predetermined national quotas, with all possible aid from the contracting countries. The problems of nationality and citizenship of the inspectors would prove difficult to surmount, particularly in view of the likelihood that much of the personnel would be impermanent or perhaps even conscripted. It may be that international law would have to provide for the suspension of national citizenship during the period of service. In any case, the organization would want to have the power to take educational steps for ensuring the loyalty and enthusiasm of its employees. Original citizenship would be automatically returned to the individual without discrimination following his compulsory tour of duty or retirement from the inspection service. These, it appears, would be some of the rudimentary considerations to be followed.

Quotas, of course, would also have to be established for the composition of the inspecting personnel in each of the national territories. It would seem essentially wise not to place any inspectors at all in nations of which they had been citizens. Linguistic training should be provided within the organization, and rotation procedures would have to be set for the career personnel as well as leaves of absence, compensations for accrued seniority, salary structure, etc. Similar provision would have to be made for the administrative as opposed to the technical personnel. The administrative capital of the apparatus had probably best be located in a neutral city of sufficient facilities that is acceptable to both Eastern and Western blocs.

A serious question arises as to whether this organization should be incorporated into the actual structure of the UN. Surely it should not be allowed to fulfil the role of a competing agency, but, on the other hand, given its critical importance, it might be best to divorce it as much as possible from the disturbing platform of world politics. Undoubtedly a supervisory council of national representatives would have to be attached to the control body, and as in the UN Security Council there would probably have to be both permanent and rotating chairs. One thing is certain: there must be no veto power or other feasible mode of obstruction. The control organization should be basically autonomous and omnicompetent in its field, founded not on the not so nice exigencies of power politics but on the scientific requirements of its mission. Another possibility is that it might be administratively at-

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tached to an international police force (discussed under Sanctions), which would be its arm of enforcement.

This brief sketch undertakes to mention but few of the serious problems that might easily arise in the formation of such a control body, in its procedures of operation, composition, jurisdiction, position relative to international law, etc. Many moot points exist; they cannot be ignored or swept under the carpet, when the need is for total effectiveness. However, it is felt that if the control problem can be adequately solved to the satisfaction of the two opposing blocs, we have a right to think that the administrative articulation of the inspectorate or its status in law will not be too ticklish. At any rate, all factors relating to the construction of this body will have to be considered with greatest care and must lead to minute definition of the organization's character, function, and competence at the time the "total" disarmament plan is offered, and not at some later date.

## 14. Sanctions.

The history of international sanctions against aggression is a dismal one, depressing enough to suggest that we are faced with a real dilemma in trying to establish a viable policy of sanction in the international control organization, even if the problem of control is successfully met. Manifestly the placing of thousands of inspectors with sensitive equipment, superior talent for detection, and unlimited mobility in a critical area will not of itself suffice to guarantee world security. If these gentlemen are reduced to standing with their hands on their hips when a bomb goes off or shaking an admonitory finger at the transgressor when the first flotilla of missiles blasts off for foreign shores, the experiment of control will have been an extraordinarily costly, deceptive, and useless one. Yet, at every step of the way in trying to determine what effective sanctions might be imposed on a violator, we sideslip into the thorny brambles of mutual suspicion and vexatious national sovereignty. The Soviets, we presume, for a plethora of reasons, are none too anxious to put any policy of international sanctions "with teeth" in vigor; thus far, their only contribution to the discussion has been to suggest that the country in question should impose its own legal sanctions on cases of violation.⁵⁵ Obviously this is preposterous, since no one is going to be the violator but the government itself. Yet, on the other side of the Atlantic, the desire to cede national prerogatives in the interest of international solidarity has never been exactly intense, as the history of the "Bricker Amendment" will recall. The only optimism we can hold out for the

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promise of sanctions, on past performance, is exceedingly slender at all odds. Perhaps, we may say-- only perhaps-- if a meaningful agreement were to be reached on control, the rest might follow. But it is perfectly conceivable that the Soviets might accede on control and then return to their congenital intransigence when the problem of sanctions was raised.

Let us, nevertheless, try briefly to examine what might be an effective program of sanctions. Arguing from the premises so familiar to our strategists it seems likely that in the case of possible nuclear war, the greatest sanction is the deterrent itself. This suggests that an international force of deterrent power must be created and armed with nuclear weapons. It must function in collaboration with or under the same joint command as the control body, and be prepared in short order to threaten by mobilization or perhaps, in direct extremity, to go to war. Hopefully, this last expedient would not be necessary, since the deterrent police force would be significantly stronger than any respected power's clandestine nuclear capability. This argument is founded on the simple axiom that force must be countered with force if there is to be any backing down. Of course, it is practically assured that neither East nor West would countenance the gathering of such a force unless it could be infallibly shown that it would not ultimately become the political pawn of the one or the other bloc. All built-in guarantees to this effect will, furthermore, have to be of such a nature as to strengthen the autonomy and effectiveness of the international deterrent, rather than stifling it in prohibitions and compromises. This is not an easy or probable step, given the present global tensions. But it would have to be done. It is better than self-perpetuating mutual deterrence. Also, the deterrent army would hopefully be placed under the command of rational and dedicated leaders, not trigger-happy patriots.

The international retaliatory force, if it came into being, would have to be stationed on scattered pieces of territory willingly relinquished to the control authority by certain of the national states, preferably not the U.S. or U.S.S.R., or in international waters. It would be more likely to rely on plotted aircraft than on pre-pointed solid-fuel missiles, inasmuch as its function would be to deter and protect rather than threaten. Moreover, it would probably have to be used for "armed reconnaissance." This, in turn, raises the vexatious question as to whether an aggressor power might not strike first at the control force and then proceed to its other business. However, we must assume that the inspection will at least be competent enough to rule out the possibility of an aggressor second-strike.

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An effective deterrent is not all that will be needed. Obviously, as with our present national deterrent, the force is provided for the case which we hope will never arise. But what of the quite likely possibility that a team of inspectors may one day stumble over a cleverly concealed ICBM, or a covey of them, projected toward another country, operational, and lacking only the decision to push the button? Or what if they turn up an arms cache containing many megatons of nuclear explosives? Or discover high-precision gyroscopes or guidance systems being produced in a clandestine factory? Or come upon some gross budgetary discrepancy which might indicate that large sums were being applied to rearment? Would they summon the deterrent and make an end of the unlucky villain on the spot? It is doubtful that this would happen, because it would produce the very catastrophe they were trying to avoid. Moreover, it might not even be certain that these were aggressive weapons; they might simply be a part of what that nation considered its security needs if it did not trust either the other country or the effectiveness of the inspection there. The immediate action, then, would depend on the nature of the circumstance. If it were a case of operational missiles with nuclear warheads, the deterrent force would be instantly alerted and sent to the air. If it were a budgetary discrepancy, it might first involve a silent investigation. Techniques would depend on established doctrine and on the resourcefulness of the inspectorate.

Sanctions, sooner or later, would have to be imposed on the violator. What could be done? It is unlikely that the offending government could be deposed unless the people demanded it and resorted by some means to its overthrow, which is not beyond the realm of possibility. The weapons or illegal devices would, of course, be confiscated. Mobilized world opinion would place the violator in an extremely bad light; this would constitute a vague but highly unpleasant sanction, if the offender had to suffer the loss of his international good will. But the onus of guilt should at all times be placed squarely on the government, and the incident should not be considered an indictment of the nationality. Additionally, it is thought that a heavy fine should be imposed on the nation, which might have to be met through increased taxation, austerity, or other disagreeable measures. This would promote an unwillingness on the part of populations to see their governments take such dangerous risks. After events of this nature had taken place several times it might be wise to declare a period in which additional concealed arms might be turned over to international control without further reprisal. International (and national) rewards should be pos- ted for information leading to the detection of evasions. This list could be

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prolonged, but these are the major points which seem likely to be made.

The imposition of effective sanctions would necessarily involve a reassessment and reinvigoration of international law. Countries would have to concede certain losses of sovereignty, at least in the areas of criminal jurisdiction, control over non-nationals, and restriction on movement. But the right of all countries to lead a national life would not be challenged; indeed it might be enhanced through mutual understanding and co-operation. None of this would be simple, either to conceive or to effect; none is perhaps likely as the world looks today: but all is perhaps necessary. Use depends on limitation, limitation on control, and control on sanction. The keystone of the edifice is vital.

## 15. Conclusions.

Does not all this sound imposingly artificial: international planes taking reconnaissance photographs from one's skies; Egyptians, Poles, and Japanese constantly surveying one's industrial production with a cautious eye; foreigners of all sorts breathing over one's budget; "soldiers of peace" eating in one's military messes? Perhaps. But is there any alternative that is not equally bizarre or more susceptible to turning us back from what is freely conceded to be madness; is there any other approach that, as well as having regard for the strategic sensibilities of mistrustful powers, augurs favorably for the creation of more normal international relationships? The reader should make his own answer to the question; it has not been the writer's purpose to convince him of anything, but to set before him a catalogue of facts (themselves hardly exhaustive) which cannot be ignored in the formation of any decision.

The inadequacies of a "total" disarmament policy have been noted, principally the inescapable impossibility of locating aggressive weapons systems in being if the inspected country desires to conceal them; nor have we suppressed the outstandingly serious varieties of mistrust, misconception, and aggressive doctrine that stand in the way of any "total" agreement. They are formidable, but if their alternatives are even less promising, as we have tried to show, this fact should not doom us to pathetic inaction and slow convulsion. There is much to be gained by speed in the present stage of weapons development, so long as caution and foresight are not surrendered in the headlong rush. Most of all we must resist all temptation to regard arms limitation and control as a strategic possibility whereby, if fortunate, we would gain a military advantage over the Communist bloc of nations: that is a vain hope. We are not negotiating for the type of advantage that can be parlayed into a strategy of victory in total

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war; we are offering to strike a deal for honorable survival that should im-
ply neither gain nor withdrawal, neither conquest nor surrender. If we believe
that our systems of government and social organization are ultimately just and
strong, we should not fear this course.

Naturally, if we should be fortunate enough to negotiate a "total" arms
plan that satisfied us both in its effectiveness and as to the earnestness of
the other signatories, we would, over the period of phasing down, have to be
prepared to see certain sacred idols tumbled, certain holy articles of faith
cancelled which have served us tolerably well in the time when we put our
trust in them. The military side of NATO would go (presumably close to the
end of the phasing), our overseas bases would be closed up one by one, and
any forces we would be permitted by the new limitations would be confined to
"Fortress America." Whether this drastic step would tend to isolate us from
Europe once again and lead us to chart a more prominent course in the New
World, whether the newly-budding European institutions themselves would abort
with the lessening of the threat and the mandatory sacrifice of the cement
of military collaboration cannot be known. We hope that a sufficiently great
number of wise individuals would be left, influential enough to push forward
what was begun in danger and to counsel against the revival of petty chauvi-
nisms. But if the chance were not taken, the admirable new institutions
might never operate at all.

It is commonly supposed that our withdrawal from Europe in any form such
as this would leave Soviet Russia as the paramount power, capable of control-
ling the destinies of the Western European nations. But in circumstances of
"total" arms limitation we might expect the effect to be quite different:
the secondary nations would automatically regain much of their lost prestige
*vis-à-vis* the greats, and would be more likely to resist the pressure of
Soviet incursion. There would also be hope for the Eastern European countries
to adopt more independent policies in the light of this development.

With vigil the balance might be expected to remain about the same in
Africa and generally in favor of the Western democracies throughout the Wes-
tern hemisphere, if the arms threat were removed. In Asia the case is pro-
bably reversed: the vast abutment of the two leading Communist powers in
this area, the fact that disarmament would inspire much greater economic
freedom of action for the Soviet Union, and the impression that Communist pro-
paganda has already made in this vital region suggest that we would have our
hands full in containing the Sino-Soviet surge by peaceful means. What this
disadvantage might mean over a long course of time is difficult to say. It

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may be that our position in Asia is ultimately untenable (with perhaps the exception of Japan, the Philippines, Iran, Pakistan, and the Commonwealths of Australia and New Zealand) and that the question is thus insoluble in favorable terms. Or it may even be that an eventual softening of doctrine and relaxation of political rigor in the Soviet Union could shed new light on this problem. It would be folly to predict any of these consequences. What our planners must understand, however, are the immediate political results of any actions we take, before they are taken.

These conclusions in themselves suggest that, although we have surveyed
with some precision the strategic factors involved in international arms limi-
tation, half the problem is still missing. For it is certain that all these
things depend in great measure on the aims of our opponent and the ultimate
historical realities as he sees them. A necessary complement to this study,
then, would be an examination of the psycho-political factors affecting our
present relationship with this power. We would thus gain much insight into
the difficulties of implementing any such plan as we might devise to counter
the dangers of the unlimited arms race. This would not only be a complex and
hazardous type of assessment; it would lead us full tilt up against one of the
currently most provocative chicken-and-egg controversies, *disarmament* vs. *dis-
engagement*. Let the problem speak for itself:

[SENATOR HUBERT H.] HUMPHREY: Is it possible to have a legitimate start on a disarmament item in some specific geographic area or in some specific realm of armament?

[GEORGE F.] KENNAN: I think that a reduction of forces might take place as a result of a political agreement about the area-- I am not sure that the reduction would take place as a result of an agreement about disarmament.

HUMPHREY: You feel that political settlements have a priority before
you can really even move to the questions of disarmament?

KENNAN: The reduction of armaments must await the political settlement.⁵⁷

The categorical evaluation of Kennan's *must* is one of the things we have to undertake. In the present world we have every right to be afraid of ambiguity; perhaps, though, we are too much bound by the spate of contradictory *musts* and *shoulds* that have issued from the minds of many people we respect and admire. It is useless even to say, *we must survive*, if it is to be nothing more than pious rhetoric. But it is intolerable that we should not survive.

***

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NOTES

1. For example, in the recent works by Oskar J. Morgenstern (The Question of National Defense, New York, 1959) and Bernard Brodie (Strategy in the Missile Age, Princeton, 1959) the possibility of negotiated arms limitation is not discussed or dismissed in a few sentences.

2. One needs only to recall that President Eisenhower was himself a general and head of the nation's highest military staff. On this point, see Brodie, *op. cit.*, p. 366.

3. It might be said in this connection that the feasibility of controlling armament (as we shall presently see) is so tantalizingly intricate that the military mind may, in a sense, be justified in regarding even the most careful schemes with a great deal of scepticism. This does not, however, cancel the fact that military strategists are often quite as romanesque as the disarmament people in looking ahead. Cf. for example, the article, "On Limiting Atomic War," by Sir Anthony Buzzard (et al.), Royal Institute for International Affairs, reproduced partially in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (hereafter *BTAS*), June 1957, pp. 216-222. These writers profess to believe that limited atomic war can take place on such gracious terms that "highly mobile U.N. teams" can be dispatched to the battlefield to insure that no "non-tactical" weapons are detonated and to adjudicate the "open city" problem. What a lark!

4. See *1970 Without Arms Control*, National Planning Association, Planning Pamphlet No. 104, May 1958 p.3; "... considerable improvements will be required over the present ICBMs and IRBMs. Among likely improvements are: *The circular error probability (CEP) will be progressively reduced. *Better fuels will provide more thrust and permit advance loading without fear of decay or spoilage. *Nuclear-powered rockets are a possibility. *Detonation will be made simpler and surer; the proverbial goal of push-button operation will be approached. *Re-entry speeds will be increased..."

5. *Ibid.*, loc. cit. "Today the re-entry problem is solved partly by blunting the nose cone in such a way as to reduce speed. At the time of the first contact with the dense upper atmosphere, the missile is travelling at a speed of Mach 25. The slowdown effect of the blunt nose is such, however, that when the missile approaches its point of impact it has reduced speed to about Mach 1. This impact speed will increase greatly within the next decade. The speed of arrival is important in avoiding antimissile attack and radar detection."

6. See Morgenstern, *op. cit.*, "The Oceanic System," p. 80 ff.

7. Morgenstern assumed that the Polaris-type submarine would carry sixteen missiles. If we assumed that five out of eight missile would reach their mark, this would mean that 100 submarines could detonate 1000 targets. However, the first American atomic submarine with IRBM-Polaris capability carries only ten missile launchers, assuming on our ratio about six hits.

8. Whether or not this impression is correct may not be as influential as it seems. Morgenstern, *op. cit.*, p. 95, says that the Navy is close to the solution of the command communications problem in the Polaris system. Whatever this means, and we may represent many possible communications schemes to ourselves, some dangerously accident-prone, we may be certain that the cleverest minds have been at work on the problem. Even assuming the infallibility of this system, there are only a few things you can do with a handful of minutes. Moreover, problems of this kind will always arise in connection with retaliatory reaction; there is no assurance that all of them can be met.

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9 See Hanson Baldwin's article on the new Polaris-type submarine, *New York Times*, January 6, 1960.

10 For a concurring opinion, see "United States Foreign Policy-- Western Europe," Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study No. 3, Washington, October 15, 1959, p. 4: "The 'balance of terror' is not a stable balance. In order to maintain a viable deterrent in an age of incessant change, weapons systems must be constantly brought abreast of latest technological development." But can they always, mutually and in correct proportion? History suggests not.

11 *1970 Without Arms Control*, p. 2.

12 Brodie, *op. cit.*, pp. 235-237.

13 Herman Kahn, "Why Russia Would Risk Nuclear War on U.S.," in *U.S. News and World Report*, XLVII, December 21, 1959, p. 111.

14 The word "total" will presently be used in a different sense; see ahead, p. 22.

15 Great Britain has proceeded to drastic elimination of ground troops, whereas the Algerian "pacification" has currently robbed France of this option.

16 See the comparison of Soviet bloc and NATO troops in F.O. Miksche, *The Failure of Atomic Strategy*, London, 1959, pp. 62-63n.

17 Indeed there is now the case where decisive cutbacks of conventional forces seem to convey a bellicose impression. The country acting unilaterally in this regard is seen as reducing his possibilities for waging any but a total nuclear war. Cf. UPI dispatch, January 2, 1960: "Soviet Premier Nikita S. Khrushchev has served notice on the West that any future East-West armed conflict would be total nuclear war, responsible British sources said today. In effect, they said, Khrushchev has ruled out the possibility of a localized 'brushfire' war over such a flashpoint as Berlin. This was the first unofficial British reaction to Khrushchev's New Year eve hint that the Soviet Union would reduce its armed forces and rely instead on rockets and missiles for defense."

18 "On force levels, the United States repeated its earlier proposal that the United States and the Soviet Union cut down to 2,500,000, and France and Britain to 750,000 [Russia preferred 1,500,000 and 650,000, respectively]. For the first time, we said nothing about China; always previously we had suggested that the Peking regime, too, be limited to 2,500,000 men. Some observers took this to mean that Washington thinks something might actually be done about cutting nonatomic armaments and men, and doesn't want to become involved in negotiations with Red China," William Frye, "A New Chapter," *BTAS*, March 1957, p. 93.

19 See E.J. Gumbel, "Clandestine Rearmament," in Seymour Melman (ed.), *Inspection for Disarmament*, New York, 1958, pp. 204-205.

20 See Bulganin note of July 21, 1955.

21 That is, delivery systems capable of concentrating a simultaneous attack in mass.

22 See "Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy," U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study No. 8, Washington, December 6, 1959, p. 91. On this point, more under the heading of "limited controls," p. 36.

23 Cf. also: *1970 Without Arms Control*, *op. cit.*, p. 39; Davidon, Hoehnemser, Kalkstein, "The 4th Country Problem," *Deedalus*, Summer 1959; Wayland Young, *Strategy for Survival*, Penguin Books, 1959.

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24 For example, Henry A. Kissinger (Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, New York, 1957) and Oskar J. Morgenstern (op. cit.) argue that limited nuclear war is a feasible and perhaps desirable alternative. F.O. Miksche (op. cit.) and W.W. Kaufmann (Military Policy and National Security [ed.], Princeton, 1956) regard it as rather unthinkable. Bernard Brodie (op. cit.) sees it as unlikely, though conceivable, and generally undesirable.

25 But one may argue: if the enemy can be convinced that it is 'in his interest' to keep a nuclear war "limited," why could he not be as easily convinced that a controlled arms limitation was 'in his interest'? To argue the dissimilarity of these propositions, though they will apply to different circumstances, and to insist on the "realism" of the first is the same as saying that an enemy might agree to fight the kind of "limited" war we propose because he sees favorable chances of winning it on our terms. If this is true, is it the outcome we desire? Of course, the enemy's estimate of the strategic situation may be wrong and so, in fact, may be our own; but is the possibility of error a sound basis for security?

26 Unless Suez and the various incidents surrounding the Chinese offshore islands can be contained in this sense. In both cases, however, there seems to have been a sufficient deterrent, military or otherwise, to make even "limited" war infeasible.

27 New York Times, January 13, 1954.

28 On the factor of credibility, see Bernard Brodie, op. cit., pp. 257-258; also William W. Kaufmann, "The Requirements of Deterrence," op. cit., pp. 20-25.

29 Op. cit., p. 111.

30 Cf. Joseph H. Spingarn, "Is Disarmament Possible?", Public Affairs Pamphlet No. 235, May 1956, p. 19.

31 Notably M. Moch of France, speaking at a time (1956) when the French atomic bomb was not so close to reality.

32 In late 1955, shortly after the introduction of the Eisenhower Plan, Disarmament Advisor Stassen placed "reservations" on all former U.S. positions, arguing that new developments in nuclear weapons had invalidated earlier premises. The Killian Report of 1958 found inadequate the number of monitoring stations for nuclear explosions which the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had earlier apparently agreed on as feasible. In a short matter of time, the Eisenhower aerial inspection plan will be far short of adequate, since it will be unable to detect concealed ICBM emplacements.

33 Op. cit., above.

34 The word "total" is used here for lack of a better term. It has, of course, a relative meaning. Hereafter, we shall use "total inspection" to signify the application of a mixed system rigorous enough to exploit the maximum of known techniques. We might also draw a linguistic parallel and say that "total" inspection is that inspection which is thought capable of preventing the outbreak of a "total" war.

35 Cf., for example: "... science will probably be asked to develop tools of a more subtle type. Psycho-physiological instrumentalities and bacteriological conflict could appear in forms entirely dissociated from violent conflict. And the possibilities for weather modification, now only faintly

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vulnerable to modern weapons of defense. This, in turn, raises the question: if control were "total," would purely defensive (so-called) weapons have to be abandoned? After all, contiguous countries might threaten each other with Bomarcos and Nikes in the absence of a more gaudy arsenal.

44 See Melman, *op. cit.*, p. 48, for results of a poll taken among the Columbia University faculty on this point.

45 *Ibid.*, pp. 38-44.

46 The estimate is for twelve more nuclear powers (A-bombs) within the next five years, namely Belgium, Canada, Red China, Czechoslovakia, France, both Germanies, India, Italy, Japan, Sweden, and Switzerland. Eight others might be expected to follow shortly after. See Davidon, Hohenemser, and Kalkstein, "The Nth Country Problem," *Daedalus*, Summer 1959.

47 Cf. Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study No. 8, pp. 90-91; "At a minimum, the impossibility of foreseeing all the possible combinations of capability and policy that could arise in a world where many countries have strategic nuclear weapons gives grounds for grave concern."

48 See *1970 Without Arms Control*, p. 39ff.

49 See "Fight or Surrender?", *U.S. News and World Report*, December 21, 1959, p. 52.

50 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study No. 8, p. 94; "It is partially impossible to reverse or otherwise 'undiscover' those scientific or technological advances in weaponry that have already been made.... Furthermore, it is almost as difficult to keep the clock of scientific progress standing still as it is to turn it back.... The point is that absolute stability is probably not attainable through arms control, disarmament, and inspection. Even more important, it is not certain that the greatest attainable stability is achieved by maximum disarmament."

51 Certain countries which might soon have nuclear weapons capabilities, like Japan, may find it politically profitable to forego the honor.

52 Besides being unfortunate. There is a tendency in all ascendant nations to wish for the world that is most compatible, regardless of what wisdom or experience may counsel.

53 A persuasive argument of the opposite point of view is made by David Inglis in "National Security With the Arms Race Limited," in *BTAS*, June 1956, p. 196ff. Inglis is highly pessimistic about the speed of weapons technology: "It is a diplomat's nightmare to think of trying to keep a stable world with dozens of nuclear powers. With so many sources of the spark to touch off the holocaust, with so many statesmen in a position to make the final error, it would be a miracle indeed if a decade could pass without disaster.... Here, then, is the common motivation to an agreement to prevent, or effectively retard, the rise of other nuclear powers without upsetting the balance called stalemate."

54 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Study No. 8, p. 95.

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