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PROCEEDINGS

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think Gerry Smith is the chairman of this enterprise. So I will say Mr. Chairman and distinguished guests, it is a particular pleasure for me to welcome you here to the Department of State. I have known about the Trilateral Commission since David Rockefeller talked to me about it when he first was approached with respect to it. And I have always believed that what you ladies and gentlemen are doing is central to the structure of a dynamic and peaceful world. The relationship between North America, Europe and Japan is at the core of any positive achievement that we may expect to make.

It is true that negotiations with Communist countries make more spectacular headlines. But despite what I read in the newspapers, I want to assure you that we are aware that the long-term achievements of American foreign policy will be measured, not in the regulation of conflict with our adversaries, but in the creation of new structures with our old friends.

Indeed, I would say that the most difficult problem we face is not to repeat in the relations with our friends the pattern which have first formed these

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close ties. And rather to find new relationships, and new patterns which reflect the current situation.

Now, I thought that it would be most useful if the greater part of our time together were devoted to questions and answers. But in order to get the discussion started, I wanted to make a few observations on three problems -- the energy problem, the Mid-East crisis, and a few very brief comments on the recent agreements in Vladivostok.

First, our approach to the energy problem.

The basic concern of the administration with respect to relations with Western Europe and Japan is to develop a new sense of cohesion, and to arrest the decline of political confidence which affects so many of the countries in the advanced industrial world and the disruptive tendencies which characterize so many of their activities.

We believe that apart from all the technical issues, the energy problem confronts the advanced industrial nations with a challenge and with an opportunity -- the challenge of how to deal with the problems of chronic balance of payments deficits, of potential energy shortages, of potential embargoes, and the opportunity to prove that through cohesive action they can master their fate. And

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our proposals for consumer cooperation are not intended to produce a confrontation with producers. They are intended to develop those actions which the consumers would have to take in any event to put themselves into a position to master the world in which they live.

Of course we are in favor of a dialogue with the producers. And indeed the United States is conducting a dialogue with producers all the time. I would say that our relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, or any of the other producers compare favorably with those of any other country. The question that we confront when we are asked to engage in a consumer-producer dialogue is what a multilateral consumer-producer dialogue adds to the very active consumer-producer dialogue that is in any case going on.

Now, the United States is prepared to engage in a consumer-producer dialogue on a multilateral basis, as soon as there is a sufficient basis for concluding that the consumer-producer dialogue will not lead to repeating in a multilateral forum all the disagreements that characterize the bilateral dialogues that are now going on.

As soon as that circumstance is achieved -- and we believe it is not so difficult to arrive at it -- we

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will welcome a consumer-producer dialogue.

With respect to the specific proposals we have made, I think you will find when you examine them that many of them, or that many of these areas could be dealt with as effectively or more effectively by the United States on the basis of unilateral action.

We have proposed consumer solidarity, for example, in the financial field -- primarily to emphasize the need of the countries most affected to get some control over their destinies, and some confidence in their future. And from that basis, we believe that a creative dialogue with the producers will be essential. And a creative dialogue with the producers must start from the premise that since both consumers and producers will live in the same world, it is in the self interests of both sides to create long-term conditions in which both can prosper. Just as it is not in the interests of the producers to adopt policies which will lead eventually to the economic ruin of the industrialized countries, so it cannot be in the interests of the consumers to attempt to impose solutions that run counter to the basic sense of justice of the producers.

I will be glad to go into this at greater length in response to your questions.

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With respect to the Middle East, we are engaged
in a rather delicate effort to proceed step by step towards
a solution of as many of the political problems as we can.

I am aware that there are some proposals that
we do jointly with the Soviet Union. And I would like to
make clear that in principle the United States is not opposed
to cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East.
The difficulty so far has been that the Soviet Union has
adopted the position of the radical Arab states, and therefore
we would add nothing to ourselves by attempting to settle
the issue with the Soviet Union, until the Soviet Union
is prepared to take a position which is somewhat distinguishable
from the extreme Arab position.

The United States could, if it wishes to impose
a settlement, do it just as well unilaterally.

Incidentally, I neglected to say in the beginning
that my understanding is that this is an off-the-record
meeting, and that this is the premise under which I spoke
here. The last time I attended an off-the-record -- I
spoke at what I thought was an off-the-record meeting,
we had a minor crisis with European countries for a few
days.

(Laughter)

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But that was speaking to ladies, where I got
carried away with myself.

(Laughter)

But it is clear that no final settlement is possible
in the Middle East which will not involve the participation
of the Soviet Union at some stage. And therefore we face
the question of how far we can carry the process by existing
methods, and at what point we want to move to a more
multilateral forum, and that point will be reached in my
view in the not-too-distant future.

Let me say a final word about the recent discussions
at Vladivostok, and then take your questions.

These preliminary agreements in Vladivostok
have evoked one of the more amazing debates in America
that I have seen. There is the argument that it forces
us to increase our strategic forces, to build them up to the
level that is permitted in the agreement, as if that level
were compulsory. The argument is amazing because the present
Soviet level is some 200 delivery systems above that
permitted by the agreement. And if we are not willing to
build up to the level permitted by the agreement, it is
difficult to see how we would then be willing to build up
to the higher level that the Soviet Union already has reached,

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and the much higher level that the Soviet Union would reach
in the absence of the agreement.

It is said that the United States permitted
the Soviet Union to develop some astronomical figure
of warheads. First of all, that figure is totally wrong.
But leaving it aside, the United States did not permit the
Soviet Union to build anything. The Soviet Union is building
these weapons, and it is building them at a rate of which
even the lowest intelligence estimate is considerably higher
than the level that the agreement permits. And while we do
not consider the level that was agreed to the ideal level --
while we would have preferred a lower level, I think it is
important to keep in mind what our real choices were.

The only way we could have achieved a lower level
is by a substantial increase in our strategic budget,
threatening to drive the Soviet strategic forces into a
position of numerical inferiority. How quickly that would
have succeeded, whether at that point the level of 2400
would have represented a reduction, and therefore met some
abstract consideration -- what other factors would have
supervened, we cannot know.

It seems to us that for thirty years an attempt
has been made to put a ceiling on strategic forces. For
thirty years the military establishments on both sides have

(lc)

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justified additional expenditures by the argument that the other side was increasing its forces to a point where it might threaten one's own survival. Once a ceiling exists on both total forces and on the most dangerous forces, however temporary, however inadequate that ceiling might be from the point of view of theory, the race for strategic superiority must lose some of its urgency. And from that point, a substantial reduction of strategic forces can be discussed seriously.

If we consider that the agreement has eliminated the divisive elements of the discussion of forward-based systems, of the British and French nuclear forces, and such other items that were summed in the phrase "geographic compensation", we believe that it does mark a very important step forward in the control of the strategic nuclear forces which must be one of the principal objectives of any administration.

Now, I don't think it is useful for me to into other aspects of our policy. I remember when I was at Harvard, nothing used to infuriate me more than officials who would come by and say, in a rather tired manner, that all options had been considered, the best possible course had been chosen, and if the audience only knew approximately as much as they did, they would not take their

(uc)

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time in asking uninformed questions.

(Laughter)

Well, I would like to tell you ladies and gentlemen
that all options have been considered (Laughter), the
best ones have been chosen (Laughter) and if you only knew
as much as I did --- (Laughter)

And now I will take some questions.

(Applause)

Q Mr. Secretary of State, and ladies and
gentlemen, it falls to me to be the first to thank the
Secretary of State for the great honor he has done us in
inviting us here and speaking to us, and to thank him
for the very great frankness with which he has spoken to
us. He has been extremely refreshing. And I wish all other
Foreign Secretaries in the world were as frank.

May I just say, on the Vladivostok meeting, that
it does seem to me, if I may say so, Mr. Secretary of State,
that you had a very great diplomatic triumph there. You have,
as it seems to me -- though I haven't got a vote here
so I can't be of any use to you -- it seems to me that you
have won the argument that has grown up hands down. And
I must say what you have done and what you have said
finds I know a very great echo in London.

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As you know, the things at the conference which we are engaged in and have been talking were things that you started talking about. And I would like to ask you a question or two about that.

On the question of the unity of the consumer, oil consumer states, it seems to me that -- I think so -- perhaps the Americans have exaggerated somewhat the ease of achieving this. There are very great difficulties, countries that are not playing. And I think if there were a very great crisis or the actual danger of a Middle East war, you would find a great deal more.

But at the moment, if I might put this in the form of a question, would you agree that there is perhaps too much objection at the moment by certain countries to joining in on a consumer association.

And it seems to me, too, that perhaps the pursuit of this at this moment does create in many minds the idea of a confrontation with the OPEC countries. And it seems to me, if you would agree with me, that it really is very, very important to avoid that. I know you have tried to avoid it: and intend to avoid it. But of course, it has to be avoided in fact as well as in desire. And the importance of trying to come to some kind of agreement and cooperation with the OPEC countries seems to me, and

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I think to most of us who have taken part in this conference, has been most important -- particularly in the attempt to associate the OPEC countries with recycling problems, and above all with trying to get them to lend more of their money by one means or another to the third-world countries.

Now, none of these things can be achieved without United States leadership. And the United States must decide what kind of leadership it wishes to give, especially as it knows much more than the rest of us. In fact, it knows everything.

But it seems to me, if I might say so, the point on which we most need your leadership, sir, and your energy and skill which you have shown so well in so many fields, is in the question of the Middle East and the danger of a new war there. It seems to me that this is the absolutely dominating factor, because if there were a new war there, there would be a new boycott and we would be in a frightful problem.

And if I might ask you whether you do not think that we should perhaps concentrate a little more than we have -- I know you have been trying, of course, to do it -- to prepare for the meeting of a crisis. And it seems to me that if one could shift the balance from the attempt to get

RAG CONTENT

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consumer solidarity to the preparation for a crisis,
that some of the countries which are awkward and difficult,
and even my own might be in certain circumstances, would be
much less difficult if it were a question of meeting a
crisis. And whether then -- if I might say so, although
I wholly agree with your rejection of the idea that the
Russians put forward of American and Russian troops in
the Middle East at that time -- if it were the only alternative
to a war -- I mean a war was on the point of breaking out,
and this were the only alternative -- whether it wouldn't be
worth considering in the new circumstances that the thing
you then rejected I think very wisely, of the idea of
Soviet and United States troops on the ground because there
are no other countries that can do anything in this field.
We all intend to do things. But it is only the United
States and Russia that can in fact do anything real
if there is an imminent danger of war in the Middle East.

Q I wonder if you would repeat the question.

(Laughter)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You are making it very hard for me to give an irrelevant answer.

(Laughter)

As I understood the question, it was whether

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consumer solidarity might not have some element of confrontation
whatever the desire, whether it might not in fact produce
a confrontation. And whether this particular problem could
not be avoided by concentrating less on consumer solidarity
in the abstract, but by focusing more on specific crises
that might arise in which the consumers might cooperate.

The second part of the question, as I understood it,
was the impact of the Middle East crisis on the energy
problem, or the danger of a new Middle East crisis. And
whether sufficient attention was being paid to avoid the
outbreak of a war. Leading to the final question -- whether
if the only way to avoid a Middle East war were the
introduction of Soviet and American forces, whether the United
States would be prepared to do so.

Is this a fair summing up of the question?

Now, with respect to the first part of the question --
it seems to me there are two aspects of consumer cooperation:
consumer cooperation that will have to be undertaken, or
should be undertaken, in any event, and that basically has
relatively little to do with the actions of the producers.
For example, we have developed out of the Washington
Energy Conference the IEA, International Energy Agency,
and the emergency sharing program, which the former dealing

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with certain cooperative efforts in developing alternative
sources of supply; the latter being an attempt to put the
participant countries into a position to withstand partial
embargoes, and to deal more effectively with general embargoes,
by a combination of conservation measures and sharing of oil.
Those measures seem to me essential, regardless of any
dialogue with the producers about oil prices. They are
essential for the health and self-confidence of the consumers.
And on this, a substantial agreement has already been achieved.

We would like to build on these measures by
creating a financial safety net which would help deal with
at least the most extreme forms of the balance of payments
difficulties. And we believe that in the first instance
this safety net should be brought about by action among
the advanced industrial consumers. Because we fear that
to introduce the OPEC countries too early into essentially
salvaging the advanced industrial countries will introduce
them into a political dialogue which might disrupt the
existing political relationships.

After the safety net exists, after consumer
cooperation is further developed, we would not object to
OPEC participation in this financial structure.

Thirdly with respect to recycling into the under-

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developed world, we believe that this must be a joint
effort of the advanced industrial countries and of OPEC.
And therefore there is no disagreement at all.

Now, those measures seem to us essential, regardless
of how we conduct the dialogue with the producers.

With respect to the dialogue with the producers,
there is really only one issue that remains. We have
agreed to such a dialogue. I repeat -- we are conducting
such a dialogue. I doubt whether any other country is
talking as intensively to Iran, to Saudi Arabia, and to
other oil producing countries as the United States. We have
set up joint commissions with these countries across a
wide range of joint activities, to take care of many of
these pressing concerns.

The key issue, therefore, is not whether there
should be a dialogue, but what should can be achieved in a
multilateral dialogue. And we cannot see how the situation
can be improved if the very countries that refuse to participate
in a consumer cooperation can then act as mediators at a
consumer-producer conference in which there is nothing
even approximating a common position.

We believe that common objectives are relatively
easily attainable. And I repeat, we will be happy to attend

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a consumer-producer conference if a minimum of solidarity can be achieved. And since we see this solidarity being achieved among all countries, except one, as it is, it should not be insurmountable to convince that country of the merit of this course. And if not, we are prepared to continue within the framework of the Washington Energy Conference. And if those nations achieve a sufficiently common position, to go to a producers' meeting.

Now, our experience has been that none of the principal producers with which we are in frequent dialogue has accused us of producing a confrontation. And therefore we have not suffered in the slight est in our relationships with those countries by the policies that we have pursued. Which leads me to believe that it could also be pursued on a multilateral basis.

The biggest danger of confrontation, as you correctly pointed out, is not in the dialogue. The biggest danger of confrontation is inherent in the danger of a Middle East war. That could indeed produce a very difficult problem.

In my position, I really don't think it is helpful to speculate what the United States would be prepared to do in an emergency and as a last resort. We would tend to believe that Soviet Forces once introduced into the Middle

(10)

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East under any guise would be extremely difficult to
dislodge. And once the Soviet Union had developed an
appetite for operating with combat forces far from the
epicenter of its power, and on issues not related to the
preservation of a Communist regime contiguous to it, might
conduct global policies with its conventional forces that
we would live to regret.

And therefore I believe we would be extraordinarily
reluctant to choose this particular method.

On the other hand, we recognize that another Middle
East war would represent the potential of a major catastrophe.
And we are now engaged, perhaps less dramatically than earlier
this year, but very actively in trying to promote steps to
avoid it. But I would have to say this is the biggest problem
before us. And I don't want to underrate its danger.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the two points 1, and 3 --
on Number 3 I would just like to reinforce what I think
is a general feeling here that aside from all other aspects,
it is a tremendous achievement to have reached the stage
where there is agreement on the Soviet side that there must
be a cap which both of us recognize on the total conventional
and atomic weapons. And the additional information, to me,
at least, which you gave tonight is further reinforcement

(10)

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of that. And I think this is something which all of us
here should be grateful for, in your successful efforts.

Number 1 -- in the case you have given, which I am
sure many of us here all share, the need for closer association
with the producing countries, avoiding the atmosphere of
confrontation, one area in which I may not be adequately
informed -- I have the impression that with most of the
Persian Gulf and other OPEC countries, the United States
does not now have treaties of commerce and friendship
of the kind that have been associated with our relationships
with most other countries with whom we have close and continuing
friendly relationships as a basis for our understandings.
If I am incorrectly informed, I would raise the question
whether this is another area, one that is alongside
the key issues of the moment, but in which there is an
opportunity for the United States to express its genuine
intention to regard the whole area of OPEC countries as
really in a position of equals in the problems the world
faces; whether there isn't an initiative here that the United
States could take which would be of benefit to all of us.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I will have to look into the
factual question. As you know, we have just -- I assume
you are talking of the smaller principalities along the

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Persian Gulf. As you know, we only established diplomatic relations with most of them within the last two years. And it is true that we have concentrated on establishing the commissions which are our vehicle for the joint effort primarily with Iran, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which is not of course an OPEC country.

In principle, we are prepared to adopt that method with respect to all of the other oil producing countries. And I take your point that this would be a wise thing to do. Tom, will you look into this -- as long as we are all here.

I think it is a good idea. We simply have not gotten around to it.

Q (Interpreted from French): Mr. Secretary, my poor English is even poorer than my poor French, and therefore I am forced to speak in French. The word "poor" is quite adequate when we talk about the wealth of the Arab language. The Trilateral Commission as a matter of fact has decided to talk Arabic from now on.

May I ask you, Mr. Secretary, just one question.

During the discussion this morning some of us have hesitated on two themes. We have to recycle Arab capital probably through all the underdeveloped countries. But before that, would we not perhaps settle the question

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of peace between Israel and Palestine? Any solution for
the recycling of capital may be found, and you have all
the bankers here in order to find the solution for it.
But any solution (unintelligible). Therefore is not peace
between Israel and Palestine a precondition for any settlement
of the oil crisis?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I believe that progress
towards a solution of the problem between Israel and its
neighbors is an important component of solving the oil
crisis. I do not believe that it is necessary to complete
the settlement before tackling the oil crisis.

If I may speak very frankly -- I have seen King
Faisal eight times in the last year and have developed
some competence in theological questions as a result.
I find that he presses the issue of Palestine and Jerusalem,
strangely enough, with less intensity than some of our
European friends. And while he is passionate about it as a
theoretical point, I think he has understood and accepted
the necessity of moving step by step. And I frankly do not
think it wise for outsiders to make the Arabs more impatient
than their romantic temper already inclines them to be.

Now, it is necessary that there be clear and
constant progress. I also believe that if one attempts to

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rapidly, there can be an explosion. If one moves too slowly, there can be an explosion. And it won't be easy to find the right means.

My impression is that as long as King Faisal, to use him as an example, believes that progress is being made, even though it is not as rapid as he himself would wish, he will cooperate in solving the oil problem.

If he believes there is a stalemate, even more, if he believes that the stalemate is caused by the United States, then the oil problem will become very difficult to solve.

But I do not believe that we can wait with dealing with the recycling problem until the Arab-Israeli issues are all settled, because that may take quite some time.

Q Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you feel hampered in posing the U.S. position among the consumer nations on energy by what you might view as lack of credible conservation policy in the United States?

Secondly, on a different question, to what extent is nuclear proliferation outside of the major powers a matter with which we are concerned and how can we deal effectively with that problem?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With respect to the conservation programs in the United States, as I have pointed out on another occasion, before I gave the speech on behalf of the

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administration in Chicago, the President went over this speech with me a number of times. And he clearly understood the domestic implications of the foreign policy proposals.

I am confident that within a measurable time the administration will make proposals which will represent the domestic corollary of our international position, or to put it another way, will take those steps of conservation in the United States that will give effect and credibility to our international position.

These problems are being worked on with great urgency. And I repeat, I am confident that we will have a credible position within a measurable time.

Now, with respect to nuclear proliferation. We are extremely concerned about the problem of nuclear proliferation. Up to now, nuclear weapons have been in the hands of advanced industrial countries, that have had a great deal to lose, and at least a somewhat sophisticated military establishment. And also they have been in the hands of countries that were not divided by issues of elemental passion. These conditions will soon not be met if nuclear weapons spread to more and more countries.

There are essentially two ways we can deal with the nuclear proliferation issue. One is by bringing

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about a general acceptance of the non-proliferation treaty.
We frankly believe that there are not too many more
candidates for additional signature to the non-proliferation
treaty, though we would welcome it.

Failing this, we are making an effort to bring
about agreed international standards for the export of nuclear
materials. And we are trying to get together a nuclear
exporters conference in order to establish safeguards on
the export of nuclear material, the processing of nuclear
material, and the handling of nuclear reactors. And we are
in the meantime urging all countries to exercise the greatest
restraint in their export policy, and specifically we are
prepared to accept any restraint that any other country is
prepared to accept for itself. We are not asking for a
special position, either for ourselves or other super powers.

What about Egypt?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: A question about the
nuclear reactor to Egypt. With respect to the nuclear
reactor to Egypt, we have proposed safeguards that are
considerably more stringent than the IAEA safeguards. And
in fact, the case of Egypt illustrates the importance of
an exporters' agreement -- because while we are negotiating
these more stringent safeguards, there are two other countries

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that are attempting to compete with us on the basis of less
stringent safeguards. And on that basis nuclear proliferation
will be inevitable.

If we cannot get countries to agree that they will
not compete with each other on the basis of safeguards,
then inevitably there will be a large number of not
adequately safeguarded reactors in the world.

Q What is the relationship between the Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty and the safeguards for export? More demanding?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, they are of a slightly
different nature. I think the safeguards that we are
proposing to other exporting countries, and that we are
discussing with them, including the Soviet Union, would
give us a fairly high assurance against proliferation. In
any event, it would delay it by many years.

Q I want to ask, Mr. Secretary of State,
not to forget that monetary matters are not out of your
jurisdiction. I'm afraid Mr. Simon is here. But I hope he
will not be offended.

Tomorrow I have to speak to the gathering from
Japan on inflation and its political implications.
Inflation is so much politically implicated. And since
it is internationally politically implicated, that must

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be within your jurisdiction, which are in charge of
international affairs.

And what I tell tomorrow I would not like to pre-say.
But for example, coming back to the matter of oil, I am
rather for your call for consumer countries to deeply go
into their programs first and to make up their programs
of protests or their negotiating platforms. But Japan is
very much afraid that she should not offend the OPEC
countries So this is not my official saying. But I would
like to ask or even criticize why you take the matter of
recycling oil money so easily. It makes the difficulty be
forgotten. Everybody who feels that recycled money
would come to him would be happy forgetting something of
the difficulties which he should be facing against in
totally remodeling his country's economy or the way of living
of his country. And this is not criticism. But I'm afraid
the terminology -- I hope that the matter of recycling
be studied even after such difficulties to Japan or to
the United Kingdom or Italy, or some of the developing
countries devoid of any meaningful underground resources
or surface resources should face this.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think if you study the
American bureaucracy, you will find that any assertions by

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the Department of State of jurisdiction over monetary
matters would require us to conduct the next disarmament
negotiations with the Treasury Department. (Laughter)

With respect to taking the recycling problem
lightly, I don't believe we take it lightly. A great
percentage of the money to be recycled comes, of course,
to the United States. And we could take several of these
measures unilaterally. The reason we are proposing to do it
on the basis of the cooperation of the advanced industrial
countries is precisely to give them a sense of cooperation
and a sense of a shared destiny. And we have in mind
especially not the United States and even Japan, or the
Federal Republic of Germany, but countries like Italy, that
are in chronic deficit, and which, if they had to be bailed
out by short-term loans every six months can only get an
increasing demoralization of their entire political process.

So our purpose is to deal exactly with the countries
that you have mentioned. And also to use this recycling
facility, quite honestly, to impose some discipline on their
financial behavior.

Finally, about offending other countries. When
I was in Japan some Japanese friend said to me they will
walk along in our shadow one quarter of a step behind. That

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is fine with us. You can all blame us for being out front.
As long as we understand why it is being done.

We have not found in our experience that the measures
we have proposed have led other countries to tell us that
they were offended by them. And I think if we behave
in an unprovocative fashion, and if we conduct the inevitable
dialogue in a conciliatory and constructive spirit, I believe
that it will be to the benefit of both consumers and
producers.

Why don't I take one more question.

Q May I come back to the previous matter of
the consumer point, which I think was very well taken;
that there should be a minimum understanding among the
consuming countries. I agree with you on that point.
I would like to ask you if this position and the position
I understand is taken by the French government -- there
are many aspects to this, probably -- but the insistence
on having a larger forum involving also the so-called
fourth-world countries. Would you say that these two
positions are completely opposite, or are they not
complementary. And if they are complementary, what are
the minimum agreements you would want to have among the
consumer countries before you would think of working at both

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levels?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, first of all, with
respect to the fourth world, this is simply a factual point
in our experience. Many of the countries of the fourth
world, which are the principal victims of the high oil prices,
tell us privately that they are grateful for our initiatives;
that they cannot tolerate these high prices; but for God's
sake, to keep them out of all international meetings because
they do not wish to express their view towards countries
on whom they finally depend. This is not a decisive point,
but it is a factual point.

Secondly, with respect to the French point of view
and the United States point of view. We are not looking
for a dispute with France. I believe that the two positions
can be made compatible. If France is interested in a serious
producer-consumer dialogue, it should in fact welcome our
willingness (1) to participate, and (2) to arrive at common
positions. What we will not participate in is to be
straight-men in an international conference where others
use us to maneuver between us and the producers and therefore
create an artificial confrontation. If that is going to be
the case, we will conduct our own bilateral dialogue,
and others can conduct their bilateral dialogue, and we will

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see where we all come out.

We expect, and we are going to Martinique with this attitude of working out with France an arrangement on consumer cooperation, leading rapidly to a producer dialogue, all well within this year. And we believe that this is attainable, and with good will on both sides it must be attainable. And too much is at stake for the industrialized countries to tear themselves apart over tactics of energy policy. And there will be no victors in an internal dispute among the advanced industrialized countries. That will be our attitude in Martinique. And we believe strongly that it is a soluble problem.

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

MR. SMITH: Mr. Secretary, before we leave, may I on behalf of the Trilateral Commission members here thank you very much for your splendid hospitality. I might say that one of troubles recently is that we have had to hold off the number of people who want to join this Commission, which is a very hopeful sign. Just today we lost a Commissioner when he became the Foreign Minister of Japan. And this very same day we have had the splendid occasion to listen to your wisdom,

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your great hospitality, which will be a high point in the
life of this Commission.

Thank you very much.

(Applause)

(The proceedings adjourned at 11:15 p.m.)