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preponderant enemy alone. But when nuclear war risks the lives of tens of millions, some allies may consider the outbreak of a war the worst contingency and, in time of crisis, act accordingly.

As a result, many theories of nuclear control have a tendency either to turn alliances into a unilateral U.S. guarantee or to call into question their utility altogether. American strategic thought verges on the first extreme; some French theorists have hinted at the second.

As for the United States, official spokesmen have consistently emphasized that the European contribution to the over-all nuclear strength of the Alliance is negligible. The United States has made various proposals for nuclear sharing; the common feature of these has been the retention of the United States veto over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance.

See Section C of readings.

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However sensible such schemes may appear from the point of view of division of labor, they would perpetuate American hegemony in nuclear matters. Allies are considered necessary not so much to add to over-all strength as to provide the ability for applying power discriminately. Allies are useful because they permit resistance to aggression by means less cataclysmic than all-out war. In such a structure, American decisions must continue to be paramount. The nuclear weapons have to remain under central control, which in effect means American control.

According to the opposing view, alliances have lost their significance altogether. The French theorist, General Gallois, has argued, for example, that nuclear weapons have made alliances obsolete. 5

(See Selection.)

Faced with the risk of total destruction, no nation will jeopardize its survival for another. Hence, he maintains, each country must have its own nuclear arsenal to defend itself against direct attack, while leaving all other countries to their fate.

15, see below, pp. 80-82.

Pierre M. Gallois, "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe," See below, p. 82.

This formula would mark the end of collective security and
would be likely to lead to international chaos. In the face of the
growing nuclear arsenals of the major protagonists, it would be idle
to deny that the threat of nuclear retaliation has lost some of its
credibility. The Gallois theory would, however, transform a degree of
uncertainty into a guarantee that the United States would not come to
the assistance of its allies, thus greatly simplifying an aggressor's
calculation.

The preponderance of nuclear power in the hands of the United
States poses one set of problems; the range of modern weapons raises
another. In the past, a threatened country had the choice [either] of
resisting or [surrendering]. If it resisted, it had to be prepared
to accept the consequences in terms of physical damage and loss of
life. A distant ally could generally be helpful only if it was able
to bring its strength to bear in the area of conflict.

Modern weapons have changed this. What each member country
wants from the <u>Alliance</u> is the assurance that an attack on it will be
considered a <u>casus belli</u>. It strives for deterrence by adding the
strength of a distant ally to its power. But, equally, each state has
an incentive to reduce damage to itself to a minimum, should deterrence
fail. For the first time, the range of modern weapons provides the
technical possibility of combining these objectives. In 1914, Belgium
could not base its defense on a strategy that transferred to Britain

the primary risks of devastation. In the age of intercontinental rockets this is technically feasible.

Part of the strategic dispute within the Western Alliance, therefore, involves jockeying to determine which geographic area will be the theater of war if deterrence fails (though this obviously cannot be made explicit). A conventional war confined to Europe must inevitably will appear in a different light to Americans than to Europeans who remember the casualty lists of two world wars and on whose territory such a war (See binding selection that would be fought. A nuclear exchange which spares their territory may seem to Europeans a more attractive strategy and the threat of nuclear retaliation a more effective deterrent. Although the interests of the Alliance may be indivisible in an ultimate sense, this does not guarantee that there will not be sharply clashing perceptions about methods to reach common objectives.

Thus the deepest problem before the Atlantic Alliance is that the pressures of the new technology run counter to traditional notions

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of national sovereignty. The risks of nuclear warfare may be too great to be combined reliably with what has heretofore been considered a key attribute of sovereignty: the unilateral right of a sovereign state to alter its strategic or political views.

The nature of alliances has changed in yet another way. In the past, one of the reasons for joining an alliance was to impose an additional obligation for assistance in time of need. Were each country's national interests completely unambiguous, it would know precisely on whose assistance it could count; a formal commitment would be unnecessary. Both the aggressor and the defender would understand what they would confront and could act accordingly. Wars could not be caused by a misunderstanding of intentions. They would occur only if the protagonists calculated the existing power relationships differently.

Traditionally, however, the national interest has not been unambiguous. Often the aggressor did not know which countries would ultimately be lined up against it; Germany in 1914 was genuinely

surprised by the British reaction to the invasion of Belgium.

Occasionally, the defenders could not be certain of the extent of their potential support--as was the case with the Allies in both wars regarding U.S. participation. Historically, the existence of an understanding on this point, tacit or explicit, has often been the

determining factor in the decision to go to war. In the decade prior to World War I, the staff talks between Britain and France which led to the transfer of the French fleet to the Mediterranean were one of the key factors in Britain's decision to enter the conflict in August 1914. (Thus, the talks achieved one objective of traditional alliances: Great to commit Britain to the defense of France. They failed in another: to make the opposing alignment clear to the potential aggressor.)

One of the distinguishing features of the present period is that ideology and technology have combined to produce a global confrontation. This, in turn, has rendered the national interest of the major antagonists less ambiguous. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union can permit a major advance by its opponent, regardless of whether the area in which it occurs is formally protected by an

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alliance or not. Neutral India was no less assured of American
assistance when Communist China attacked, than allied Pakistan would
have been in similar circumstances. In these conditions, the distinction
between allies and neutrals is likely to diminish. A country gains
little from being allied and risks little by being neutral.

This inevitably results in the weakening of allied cohesion,
producing what some have described as polycentrism. But polycentrism
does not reflect so much the emergence of new centers of physical power
as the attempt by allies to establish new centers of decision.

The gap in military strength between the United States and its
European allies has in fact widened, not narrowed, in the past decade.
What has changed is the use to which the power can be put. On the one
hand, the enormous risks of nuclear warfare call into question traditional
pledges of formal assistance. On the other hand, these issues with
respect to which nuclear threats are credible are so clear-cut as not
to seem to require reinforcement by formal undertakings. Polycentrism is
on the rise not because the world has ceased to be bipolar, but

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because with respect to nuclear weapons it essentially remains so.

When allies became convinced that these circumstances in which the
United States might be prepared to resort to its nuclear weapons,

cannot be fundamentally affected by their actions, the United States
commitment need not be purchased by being conciliatory and cannot be
jeopardized by intransigence--within very wide limits at least.

Thus, more and more allies see little risk and considerable
potential gain in political independence. In a curious way, it is
possible they can add the senior partner's power to their own even
for measures contradictory to those of the senior partner. Although
traditionally a state's diplomatic influence corresponded roughly
to its military strength, this is no longer inevitably the case.

Influence can now be achieved by using another country's protection
even for policies not in accord with its ally's preferences.

and Switzerland have made unilateral declarations of neutrality. Or

before the two World Wars

else, as in the case of Belgium, neutrality may be given international

status through a formal agreement of the major powers.

Whether a neutral country will be able to maintain its position
depends both on the temptation it presents to an attacker and on the
assistance other countries are willing to supply. The temptations in
turn reflect the advantage to be gained by violating the neutrality.
Since Belgium lies athwart the invasion routes into France, she has
been less fortunate in escaping war than Sweden.

Countries aspiring to neutrality can rely for their defense on
their own strength or on the implied assistance that other countries
may furnish. If they aspire to self-sufficiency, they are likely to
develop military forces far in excess of those required by a member of
an alliance system. Even taking into account the difference in resources,
Sweden's military power is much greater than that of Norway,
which is a member of the Atlantic Alliance.

On the other hand, when a neutral, [either] because of] insufficient
resources or deliberate policy has made itself dependent on the assistance

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of other countries, it has in the past often combined the disadvantages of alliance policy with those of neutrality. By itself, the neutral country was rarely strong enough to deter aggression, while at the same time its neutrality prevented it from making joint defensive preparations with a would-be protector. Belgium's position in the two world wars illustrates this point. But no matter what military policy is pursued, neutrality has in the past implied the desire to abstain from close involvement in international diplomacy.

Though these traditional patterns of neutrality still exist, they have been significantly modified by two contradictory tendencies in the current period.

On the one hand, the advent of nuclear power has cast in doubt the ability of any non-nuclear country to defend itself against a nuclear opponent. In other words, the neutral is deprived of the capacity to impose military risks out of proportion to the aggressor's objective, if the latter is prepared to use nuclear weapons and if the neutral cannot count on foreign nuclear protection.

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At the same time, the bipolar nature of the international political order makes the probability of protection far greater than it was in the past. In contemporary international affairs, a country suffers fewer disadvantages from being neutral and may even gain some international stature through the competition of the major powers for its allegiance. In other words, the nuclear age has eroded the distinction between allies and neutrals. Though neutral, India was assured of much the same protection in the face of the Chinese attack as would have been extended in comparable circumstances to Pakistan, a member of two alliances.

This modification accounts for the emergence of a new type of neutral: a nation that deliberately exploits the great-power confrontation in order not so much to enhance its territorial security as to magnify their diplomatic role. Far from standing apart in international conflicts, they actively embroil themselves by attempting to manipulate the great powers and to advance their own purposes in the process.

This type of diplomacy adds a destabilizing element to the international system. Though many of the neutrals have a stake in the avoidance of war, they also discover advantages in perpetuating the competition of the super-powers. For they see this conflict bestowing an enhanced bargaining position on them and prospects of economic development to which they could not otherwise aspire.

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In their turn, the major powers are handicapped by a paradox. Though their relative superiority over other nations has never been greater, it has also never been less relevant. The use of nuclear weapons against the uncommitted is for all practical purposes excluded. ~~The other military forces have in the meantime become less and less suitable for the low-threshold warfare that is waged in uncommitted areas.~~

A diplomacy of weakness has been the result. When the uncommitted nations threaten the West: "If I go Communist it will be worse for you than for me," this creates a pattern for blackmail. It encourages ~~many~~ local conflicts into which the major powers are drawn, often against their wishes. As a corollary, it means that any major country determined to upset the equilibrium can do so at little cost. The sale of obsolescent military equipment to a troubled area, like for example the Middle East, can undermine stability in a way that ~~could not~~ have been achieved by direct action.

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If the uncommitted nations today have unprecedented scope for pursuing their self-interest, they are also subject to novel pressures. In the past, neutrality was usually the posture of very cohesive nations certain of their identity and determined to defend it. But many of the newly independent nations are still in search of an identity. Often the sole link among their peoples is the common experience of colonial rule. Domestic cohesion is only precariously assured.

Thus while the governments of many uncommitted nations are relatively safe from the traditional military pressures that have weighed on neutral nations, they are extraordinarily susceptible to domestic subversion. Those countries with a high capacity for fomenting domestic instability can achieve enormous influence. The lack of traditional forms of power, including nuclear power, may be more than counter-balanced by the possession of guerilla training centers; capacities for subversion will be taken very seriously. Thus Communist China can be a major factor in Africa, even though it lacks almost all forms of traditional long-range power.

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The most frequent and likely kind of war is the one for which the West is least prepared—militarily, politically, and psychologically. In guerrilla war, superior fire-power loses its old relevance. Guerrillas need only join battle where they enjoy local superiority, but the defenders must be strong everywhere in anticipation of the unexpected.

No longer is the ability to occupy territory decisive, for the real target has become the morale of the population and the system of the civil administration. If these can be undermined through protracted struggle, the insurgents will prevail no matter how many battles the defending forces have won.

What makes the situation particularly complex is that there is no purely military solution to guerrilla war. Pacification requires a government capable of enlisting the loyalty of the population. But such a government is difficult to establish because of the very nature of guerrilla war, whose chief targets are often civil administrators. Moreover, for a Western government aiding an Asian or African ally, the criteria of what constitutes stable government may prove elusive.

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Government can be stable by being oppressive. By contrast, a
developing society inevitably creates dislocations. How does one
achieve both development and stability, both progress and security? There
is no more urgent task for analysis than to inquire into the nature of stable
enlightened government in developing nations.
The Selections by Zidney
and Lindley deal especially with this problem

The Control of Modern Weapons

Though proposals for disarmament have been made in the past,
particularly after World War I, there was an air of unreality about
them. In the era of what we now call conventional weapons, the
force-in-being was not nearly so significant as the industrial potential
and the mobilization base. A nation planning to attack had to engage
in extended preparations, which were very difficult to hide. Technology
was much more stable. Travel was relatively free. Since surprise was
not so crucial, and since victory could generally be achieved only
through a prolonged mobilization of resources after a war had started,
the contribution that arms control could make to stability seemed
marginal. Armaments, it was then correctly said, were the symptom

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and not the cause of tension. The best method of achieving a stable
peace was to remove the causes of political conflict.

Although this remains true today, conditions have basically
altered. Technology is extremely volatile. The advantage of
surprise can be overwhelming. The forces-in-being are almost surely
decisive—at least in all-out war; indeed, a major cause of instability
is the very rate of technological change. Every country lives with
the nightmare that even if it puts forth its best efforts, its survival
may be jeopardized by a technological breakthrough achieved by
its opponent. It knows also that every invention opens up the prospect
of many others. No country can protect itself against all the technological
possibilities increasingly open to its opponents. Conversely, an
advantage once achieved will produce a powerful incentive to exploit
it, for the scientific revolution that made it possible also ensures
that it will be transitory.

There exists, therefore, an unprecedented incentive to
stabilize the arms race. All countries have an interest in preventing

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control could prove highly useful in reducing the tensions caused by weapons themselves, they should not be considered a substitute for dealing with the political causes of the Cold War. Until progress is made towards solving these more fundamental problems, measures for arms control can ameliorate but not remove the climate of

Edvard Tellee (selection - ) is consequently distrust. < Arms control policy thus merges with the wider foreign

emphasized the dangers and ambiguities underlying that policy perspectives which define a system of international order

in arms control schemes in a climate of international unease.

## National Security Policy and Governmental Organization

One of the key problems of contemporary security policy is the ever-widening gap that has opened up between the sophistication of technical studies and the capacity of an already overworked leadership group to absorb their intricacy. It is unlikely that even the most conscientious President can devote as many hours to a given problem as the analyst has had years to study it. He will have to work with approximations and his decisions must have to be made under stress. Even if he perfectly comprehends the logical symmetry of a strategic theory, he must also weigh the consequences

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of its failure. In other words, there is a danger that doctrines of too great a complexity could bring about the kind of psychological failure that I have been noted in connection with the Schlieffen Plan in 1914.

Inevitable problems of confidence and competence between the technical and political levels of domestic decision-making may make it difficult to implement a strategic doctrine. Architects of strategy need to be continually aware that their audience is not a group of colleagues of similar technical competence but of hard-pressed individuals for whom strategy can be but one of a number of concerns.

Thus excessive complexity may lead to paralysis. The strategists must at every stage ask of the decision-maker: Does he understand the doctrine? Does he believe in it? Will the doctrine meet emergencies or provide an excuse for inaction? Does it instill a sense of mastery or produce a feeling of impotence? What does the decision-maker really mean when he accepts a strategy? Does he accept it with the notion that in prescribed circumstances this is what I will do, I will do nothing?

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Thus, national security policy mirrors a social and political problem: where to strike the balance between the requirements of organization and the need for inspiration. Organization expresses the importance of continuity; the routine by which it operates represents a recognition that a society must be able to assimilate and utilize mediocrity. Inspiration, on the other hand, is the mechanism of growth; it is the ability to transcend a framework which has come to be taken for granted. The stability of a society depends on its skill in organization which enables it to react mechanically to "ordinary" problems and to utilize its resources to best effect. The greatness of a society derives from its willingness to chart new ground beyond the confines of routine. Without organization, every problem becomes a special case. Without inspiration, a society will stagnate; it will lose the ability to adapt to new circumstances or to generate new goals.

There is a temptation to confuse this problem with a smoothly running administration. But efficient administration, though necessary,

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is not enough. A smoothly working bureaucracy creates the illusion of running by itself; it seeks to reduce all problems to administrative terms. The basic motivation of a bureaucracy is its quest for safety; its preferences in favor of a policy of minimum risk. A bureaucracy, therefore, tends to exaggerate the technical complexities of its problems and to seek to reduce questions of judgment to a minimum. Technical problems are susceptible to "objective" analysis, whereas questions of judgment contain too many uncertain elements. An administrative mechanism has a bias in favor of the _status quo_, however arrived at. Short of an unambiguous catastrophe, the _status quo_ has the advantage of familiarity. No "objective" criteria can prove that a change of course will yield superior results. The inclination of a bureaucracy is to deny the possibility of great conception by classifying it as "unsound," "risky" or other terms which testify to a preference for equilibrium over exceptional performance. It is no accident that most great statesmen were opposed by the "experts" in their foreign offices, for the very greatness of the statesman's conception tends to make it

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inaccessible to those whose primary concern is with safety and
minimum risk.

A society owes its vitality to its ability to strike a
balance between the requirement of organization and the need for
inspiration. Too much stress on organization leads to bureaucratization
and the withering of imagination. Excessive emphasis on inspiration
produces a tour de force without continuity or organizational stability.
The best solution is a bureaucracy that runs sufficiently smoothly enough to take care of ordinary problems as a matter of routine, but not so pervasive as to inhibit the creative thought that is inseparable from true leadership.

The test of any organization is twofold: (a) whether it brings
its members to think spontaneously about the problems which are in fact
of deepest concern and (b) whether the qualities which are encouraged
in the rise to eminence are those required in key positions. All
discussions about organization return to these issues and the
selections listed in this volume are no exception. The difference
in the approach of Gelsurtik and Huntington (Selick,
and 11) illustrates the problem.

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VII

Conclusion

The traditional mode of military analysis which saw in war a continuation of politics but with its own appropriate means is no longer applicable. Policy and strategy merge at every point. No statesman can overlook the cataclysmic alternatives before him. No problem can be left solely to the arbitrament of arms. Communication in the nuclear age is particularly important among adversaries. Arms control requires the same sense of urgency as does the study of strategy and of diplomacy.

Some years ago when strategy first attracted the attention of academic analysts, the inconsistency between traditional modes of thought and the nature of modern weapons was obvious. As long as an analysis was systematic, it was likely to uncover discrepancies and weaknesses that needed correction.

Today, the situation is more complicated. A great degree of sophistication in technical studies has been achieved, so much, in fact, that the danger today is precisely the opposite of what it was a

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decade ago. Skill in quantitative analysis may downgrade those factors which cannot be quantified. A complex strategic theory may be so intellectually satisfying that the difficulties of its employment may human begins in moments of great tension and confusion may be overlooked. It may be tempting to treat allies as factors of a security arrangement and to forget that their ultimate contribution depends on many intangibles of political will. In the day-to-day press of events we may lose sight of the fact that we need sound general criteria for measuring political progress in the developing countries. This is another way of saying that national security policy is not primarily a technical problem but a challenge to political understanding and, ultimately to philosophical insight.

FREDERICK A. PRAEGER, INC., PUBLISHERS • 111 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10003 • ALGONQUIN 4-4100 • CABLE: PRABOOKS

BOOKS THAT MATTER

November 9, 1965

NOV 15 1965

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Dear Professor Kissinger:

PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL STRATEGY is on press. There is nothing left to do but sit back, breathe deeply, and wait. I have--and I suppose it is a minor law of history that this must happen--discovered a mistake, though, which I did not catch when there was still time to do something about it: we have cited "The Delicate Balance of Terror" as having appeared in *Foreign Affairs* in January, 1958, when, I think, it should have been April, 1959. Can this stupendous, world-shaking problem be checked into so that we can correct it when it comes time to reprint? I shall make the appropriate apologies to *Foreign Affairs*.

I wish I were 1) in the right city and 2) in the relevant profession that would permit me to attend a Kissinger-Returned-From-Vietnam Debriefing Session. One feels badly in need of informed assessments, and especially yours. In any event, welcome home.

ES:nr

Henry A. Kissinger

Sincerely yours,

Best regards.

get pack.
Vietnam. I hope to see you when I
I am off for several weeks in
that the typed acknowledgment, which I
with minor changes. Please make sure
I am returning the page proofs

Dear Elisabeth:

New York, New York 10003
111 Fourth Avenue
Frederick V. Praeger, Inc.
Mrs. Elisabeth Stilton

October 4, 1962

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In preparing this book the assistance of Maury Feld,
Librarian of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard
University, has been invaluable. His advice regarding selections
and introductory notes has been crucial.

Elisabeth Sifton of Praeger has been patient and
enormously efficient.

Henry A. Kissinger

9. "Nuclears, NATO and the New Strategy," by Thomas C. Schelling

Professor Schelling's essay deals with one of the major areas of
national security policy: the debate within the Atlantic Alliance about
nuclear weapons and strategy. It examines the relationship of nuclear
delivery systems to various prevalent concepts of national interest and
international relations. These systems are treated as counters in a
bargaining process involving not only potential enemies but also traditional
allies. Professor Schelling's dominant thesis is that the members of the
Atlantic Alliance are subject to two contradictory pressures. As individual
nations they are tempted to try to achieve maximum freedom of action. Yet
the Alliance can be effective only if there is a measure of mutual responsibility.

Because in the early Fifties Western Europe was too weak to pursue
independence, the illusion was created that the Atlantic Alliance had escaped
tensions inherent in other coalitions. The political and economic recovery
of Western Europe has made the coordination of autonomous military policies
one of the key problems of the Atlantic Alliance. Because each member of
the Alliance pursues simultaneously somewhat contradictory purposes, an
effective strategy depends on the ability to achieve some consensus on
strategic doctrine. Professor Schelling deals with the background and
strategic components of American policy, emphasizing that just as the European
members of NATO have individual as well as collective interests, the United
States has strategic responsibilities and capabilities that overlap, but do
not coincide with, those of its NATO partners. (See below, Selection 18.)

not concilje with, those of its NATO barriere. (See below, Selection 18.)

States has strategic ressources and capabilities that overlast, put to
mempers of NATO have individual as well as collective interests, the United
strategic components of American policy, emphasizing that just as the European
strategic doctrine, Professor Schelling desse with the background and
effective strategy depends on the ability to achieve some consensus on
the Atlantic barriere simultaneously somewhat contradictory barriere, an
one of the key problems of the Atlantic Viliance. Because each memper of
of Western Europe has made the coordination of autonomous military policies
tempeuse imperat in other conditions. The political and economic recovery
independence, the inflation was created that the Atlantic Viliance had encased
Because in the early 1960s Western Europe was too weak to burrate
the Viliance can be effective only if there is a measure of mutual ressourcepility.
nations they are tempted to try to achieve maximum freedom of action. Yet
Atlantic Viliance are subject to two contradictory pressures. As individual
allies. Professor Schelling's dominant theme is that the mempers of the
pertaining process involving not only potential enmies but also traditional
international relations. These systems are treated as counters in a
delivery systems to various prevalent concepts of national interest and
nuclear weakness and strategy. It examines the relationship of nuclear
national security policy: the debate within the Atlantic Alliance epon
Professor Schelling's easy desse with one of the major areas of

3. "Nuclears," NATO and the New Strategy," by Thomas C. Schelling

9. "Nuclears, NATO and the New Strategy," by Thomas C. Schelling.

Professor Schelling's essay deals with one of the major areas of national security policy: the debate within the Atlantic Alliance about nuclear weapons and a common strategy. It examines the relationship of nuclear delivery systems to various prevalent concepts of national interest and international relations. These systems are treated as counters in a bargaining process involving not only potential enemies but also traditional allies.

Because each member of the Alliance pursues simultaneously somewhat contradictory purposes, unity depends on the ability to achieve consensus on strategic

some purposes, unity depends on the ability to achieve consensus on strategic

doctrines. Professor Schelling deals with the problems raised by this effort within the framework of tacit bargaining which is his distinctive contribution to

strategic thought. (See below, Selection 18.)

-15-

18. "Managing the Arms Race" by Thomas C. Schelling.

Two occasionally contradictory considerations must shape national security policy in the nuclear age: (a) the consequences of a decision for the society making it; (b) the effects of the same decision on the behavior of possible opponents. On one level national security policy involves mobilization of national resources. On another, it is a form of tacit bargaining by which potentially hostile nations adjust their relations. Professor Schelling's concern is to transform this bargaining from a haphazard process into deliberate and rational acts. He is interested in determining how unilateral programs can be transformed into a coordinated system of maximum stability.

This article complements the earlier selection by Professor Schelling. In "Nuclears, NATO and the New Strategy," (Selection 9) he was concerned with harmonizing strategic doctrines among friends, specifically the U.S. and its NATO partners. In this essay, Professor Schelling deals with the even more complicated problem of how potential enemies can concert their strategic doctrines and programs in order to achieve maximum stability. According to Professor Schelling, what appears as an arms race thus contains elements of arms control. A relationship of conflict at the same

-16-

time includes complicated forms of international negotiation. And the
reverse is also true. Any form of arms reduction must be seen in
relation to the sanctions against violation and the risks of evasion.

General Pierre Billotte

Chief of the French delegation to the
Committee of Chiefs of Headquarters of the
United Nations (1946-1950)

Minister of National Defense and the Armed
Forces (cabinet Edgar Faure from October
1955-January 1956)

Representative U.N.R.-U.D.T. de la Seine
November 1962

Vice Chairman of the U.N.R. Chamber of
Representatives (December 1962)

President of the International Movement
for the Atlantic Union

Deputy Director of "NOTRE REPUBLIQUE"
(July 1963)

8/20/65

8/30/82

(July 1983)

Deputy Director of "NOTRE RÉPUBLIQUE"

for the Atlantic Union

Representatives (December 1983)

Alice Chairman of the U.N.R. Chamber of

November 1983

1982-January 1983)

Borus (capitol Edgar Faure from October

United Nations (1949-1950)

Committee of Chieftain of Headquarters of the
Chief of the French delegation to the

General Pierre Biliotte