House committee 'contempt' action brings Ford rebuff

Congress pounds at doors of
U.S. spy chambers

By Clayton Jones
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Congress is banging harder and louder than ever on the doors of secrecy that shut in U.S. spy work.

First, the House Intelligence Committee cites Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger for "contumacious conduct" in refusing to turn over documents on CIA covert activities and reported Soviet cheating on SALT I — the strategic arms limitation agreement of 1972. This caused President Ford to invoke "executive privilege" for the first time since President Nixon left office.

Now, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is writing a new law to give Congress an equal share with the President in access to all U.S. intelligence data.

A slim chance exists that the contempt citation against Dr. Kissinger will be upheld by the House, say Capitol Hill observers, even though committee chairman Otis G. Pike (D) of New York calls the showdown a test of "the ability of the Congress to exercise its constitutional roll of oversight." An early December vote is planned in the house.

But the contempt action, voted by a 10-2 margin in the Pike panel Friday, caused quick concern by President Ford, who called the action "shocking." State Department officials, speaking for Dr. Kissinger while he was at the Paris economic summit, claimed the contempt citation could seriously hinder his ability to deal with foreign governments.

Unprecedented in U.S. history, the contempt action against the Cabinet member could carry a maximum penalty of three years in jail and a $3,000 fine.

But a dispute over whether two of the three committee subpoenas actually apply to Dr. Kissinger clouds the contempt move. The two subpoenas, addressed to the Assistant to the President for National Security, were issued after President Ford announced Nov. 3 that Dr. Kissinger was leaving that post, although he has not officially departed.

The third subpoena, which calls for 10 documents in the State Department concerning covert CIA operations since 1965, was denied by President Ford, who asserted executive privilege — even over communications of past presidents — after trying for five months to work out differences with the committee.

One document subpoenaed by the Pike unit is a letter written by then-Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger listing four reported Soviet violations of the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. White House officials

claim the letter is "destroyed or lost." But committee sources expect heavy pressure from Congress to be informed as to why Soviet cheating on SALT I has not been revealed.

Such secret documents would be required to be given Congress under legislation now being prepared by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.

Although the administration does not intend Congress to intrude upon the conduct of foreign affairs and covert intelligence operations, the legislation is supported by White House officials who agree that a joint congressional committee should receive unfiltered intelligence information once safeguards on secrecy are assured.

Then, such confrontations as between the Pike panel and Dr. Kissinger would be hopefully averted, since both Congress and the President would have the same information underlying foreign policy.

CSM

1/17

Mary
McGrory

Shrugging Off Contempt
Won't Be Too Easy

Henry Kissinger, peerless negotiator and "lonesome cowboy," had maybe better ride up to Capitol Hill and do a little horse-trading for himself.

The vote by the House Select Committee on Intelligence, citing him for contempt for ignoring subpoenas for National Security Council documents, could be a rather sticky thing.

His reflex translation of personal embarrassment into national trauma — he saw it as evidence of "what this country is doing to itself — may not suffice. Nor will his placing of the blame on Gerald Ford. Everybody knows who pulls the strings.

The evocation of "executive privilege" is futile. Republicans who spent two years at that Watergate shrine, do not wish a return visit.

THE PROBLEM for the secretary is that something more than his wonted, compulsive secrecy is involved. The substance of the withheld documents relates to the major and crucial matter of reported Soviet violations of SALT I agreements. They also expose the anatomy of President Ford's recent, shrouded shakeup exercise.

It was not, it appears, the lack of "elegance" that the secretary accused himself and former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger of displaying in their Cabinet clashes. What was involved was a head-on collision over detente.

This is a unifying issue. The left condemns executive secrecy out of hand. The right, generally applauds it, but not in the case of Soviet cheating. Since the Solzhenitsyn snub, they have been bristling with suspicion that Gerald Ford would do anything for detente. The issue is drawn for them in the contempt citation.

It was, in any case, no secret that Schlesinger was dubious about Soviet intentions and Soviet compliance. His doubts were echoed by such high-level doubters as Paul Nitze, Melvin R. Laird and Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, who will be called as a witness by the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

A LETTER Schlesinger cannot recall writing which specifies the violations has turned up missing in National Security Council files. Schlesinger may have been looking for and exaggerating Soviet violations, but the committee notes that Kissinger's alleged refusal even to consider them is a matter of concern for all citizens at the outset of SALT II negotiations.

The State Department over the weekend unleashed a "rolling thunder" barrage of outrage, calculated to push the House back into its customary fear and awe of the secretary. But their answers were technical and off the mark.

The subpoenas were addressed to the wrong person, according to William Hyland, head of the State Department's intelligence and research bureau. They should have been sent to the new, post-shakeup NSC Adviser, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft.

Chairman Otis Pike of New York — under whose gavel the contempt was voted — says that Scowcroft was not NSC adviser when the subpoenas were served or when the contempt was voted, and is, in point of fact, not now the officially sworn NSC adviser.

Hyland, in any case, may have been the wrong person to make the claim, since he is Kissinger's hand-picked successor as Scowcroft's deputy.

HIS CRY that Kissinger should have been spared such indignity at such a critical hour — during the European economic summit, on the eve of the China visit — left Pike unmoved, too.

"I heard he was about to go somewhere, and if we could find a moment when he wasn't going somewhere, that would be a different thing," he remarked sardonically.

The committee action has been received calmly by his colleagues. It could be that the House was conditioned by a previous defiance, a subcommittee vote to hold Interior Secretary Rogers Morton in con-

tempt for failing to come up with an Arab boycott list. Or it could be that Congress now regards Gerald Ford as weak and wounded. Whatever the reason, Pike is not being shunned as the author of sacrilege.

"People still speak to me on the elevator," he reported.

The full House vote will not be taken until after the Thanksgiving recess, during which members will have a chance to assess the consequences of taking on the "most-admired American."

"WHAT IT'S all about," says Pike, "is Kissinger's need for secrecy against our right to know — unless you want to take the position that Congress is a useless appendage that can't be trusted and should not be told anything at all."

"On the question of compliance to the SALT agreements, we are dealing with the question of whether intelligence is in fact adjusted to major policy decisions which have already been made."

"Nobody," he insists, "wants to put Henry Kissinger or Rogers Morton in jail or fine them 10 cents. We just sort of think that in the job of running America it is unhealthy for Congress to be kept in the dark — uninformed at best and misinformed at worst."

WS

11/18

Dr. Kissinger in contempt?

It's tempting to cry a minor plague on both parties in the row between Rep. Otis Pike's House Intelligence Committee and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. There has been too much shooting from the hip in both directions.

On Friday, the committee voted to cite the secretary of state for "contempt of Congress" because three subpoenas for executive department papers were not acted upon to its satisfaction. Mr. Pike, we gather, is exploring whether intelligence available to Presidents and their subordinates is sometimes doctored to suit policy. That is a legitimate interest. But whether the President and Dr. Kissinger are legally obliged to set aside their reservations and assist in this post-mortem is a murky question.

One can argue, in fact, that their principal obligations run the other way. In the interest of orderly government, they are duty-bound to guard subordinates against a scapegoat hunt. That is one underpinning of the doctrine of executive privilege, which is almost as old as the Constitution.

We know from the Nixon tapes case that executive privilege is judicially reviewable as to its scope, and that it cannot be invoked to conceal criminal evidence. But even in setting those limits, Chief Justice Burger observed — his words bear directly on the debate at hand — that "in the performance of assigned constitutional duties, each branch of the government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others" (emphasis ours).

President Ford, whose executive privilege is actually the issue in the committee's quarrel with Dr. Kissinger, has tried to keep his claims on solid legal ground. He compromised with the committee on the confidential critique of American policy in Cyprus. He has also sought the advice of the attorney general on the disputed subpoenas. In bringing the dispute to the point of a contempt citation against the secretary of state, the Pike Committee has displayed slight "respect" for the executive branch's interpretation of its duties.

Moreover, there is a substantial question of

procedural accuracy. The two subpoenas directed to the National Security Council may no longer even be binding on Dr. Kissinger. At least, the State Department contends that Dr. Kissinger ceased to function as the President's national security adviser as of November 3, when his approaching replacement by General Scowcroft was announced. If that borders on legalistic quibbling, it is just the kind of quibbling that is invited when a congressional committee grows litigious about investigative prerogatives.

It is too bad, to be sure, that Dr. Kissinger immediately saw the contempt citation as an assault on his credibility as a negotiator, profoundly regretting "that the committee saw fit to cite . . . a secretary of state, raising serious questions all over the world about what this country is doing to itself . . ." The secretary's response is too melodramatic by half; and indeed there is little evidence that foreign countries think Dr. Kissinger's due authority has been undermined by a petty controversy with a congressional committee.

The only salient constitutional issue at stake is whether executive privilege is retrospective — that is, whether a sitting President may protect the confidentiality not only of his own counselors but of those of his predecessors. If the full House votes to go along with the Pike Committee, that issue may have to be tested in court, although it does not lend itself readily to the cast-iron rigidities of law.

It would be indecorous at best, and it might be hazardous to the orderly functioning of the executive branch, if presidential advisers lived in fear that their confidential estimates and advice would be tossed into a public fishbowl on January 21 every four years.

Congress can well insist that each administration is accountable for public acts and policies. But so far as we can see Congress has no absolute constitutional right to conduct post-mortems on the nature and use of intimate presidential advice. The Pike Committee would do well, accordingly, to temper its demands with the recognition that important issues of privilege and the separation of powers are, after all, at stake.

Congress and Contempt

A House of Representatives committee has cited Secretary of State Henry Kissinger for contempt for withholding information. The next step is for the whole House to vote. If the House backs up the committee, the next step, we are told, is for the Sergeant at Arms to go to the State Department, or to Mr. Kissinger's Georgetown townhouse, grab him and take him to the District of Columbia jail. Even those who believe the committee is right to insist on seeing the secret documents surely find that solution is a little drastic, to put it mildly.

We line up on the side of Congress on most demands for information. Executive privilege —the claim that the President and his aides have a right to withhold information—is, in scholar Raoul Berger's word, "a constitutional myth." Mr. Berger and many other students of the American system have ably pointed out that such a privilege could be "a shield for executive unaccountability." The only time such a claim is valid, it seems to us as it has seemed to many jurists, is when "it would be fatal and pernicious to publish the schemes of government," as one of the founding fathers put it.

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger may believe publicizing the documents in question, intelligence reports over the past decade, would have such a result. But the Congress's suspicion that the documents would do no more than embarrass some individuals is understandable in this era. In any era the executive should not be the sole judge of what must be secret. Nor should Congress. Criminal proceedings need not be the only path Congress can follow. There is legislation before Congress now that would provide a rational answer to the very sort of

confrontation we are now witnessing. It would channel President-Congress disputes over information into the courts as civil, not criminal, actions. There the rights and desires of both branches of government could be balanced. Some members of Congress oppose this because they believe it is implicit recognition of an executive privilege that does not exist. But it does exist in fact if not in law, and will continue to if the only Congressional weapon against it is the overkill of criminal contempt proceedings.

Mr. Pike Goes Too Far

IF ANYONE NEEDED a clinching argument for better intelligence oversight by the standing committees of Congress, it lies in the current performance of the House special committee led by Rep. Otis Pike (D-N.Y.). By no fault of its own, the committee began its work months late. It is now playing catch-up ball with an abandon inconsistent with the sensitivity and seriousness that the object of its inquiry warrants. We refer specifically to its decision to hold the Secretary of State in contempt for refusing to produce certain documents. By this act the committee has forced an unnecessary and unwarranted confrontation with the executive branch. For the American system of government is simply not built to sustain such direct institutional clashes. It is built to have these clashes blurred and deferred by political compromise and a shared respect for the system's own vulnerabilities. That the Pike committee's single-minded quest for information has come to the issuance of subpoenas and the threat of a contempt citation by the full House, is evidence enough that the system has broken down.

Consider the sorts of information the Pike committee seeks. There are some 10 pre-Kissinger State Department recommendations, to pre-Ford Presidents, for covert operations. Mr. Ford was regrettably slow to assert a claim of executive privilege in the correct (direct) manner to protect these documents but that does not diminish the validity of the claim. If executive privilege does not mean that such pre-decision secretarial recommendations are protected, then it really means nothing at all. Second, the Pike majority asked for National Security Council documents on Soviet and American adherence to strategic arms agreements. These documents, besides containing technical material not readily mastered by an untutored committee in a hurry, presumably bear not only on sensitive in-

telligence-gathering methods but on the prospects of current negotiations. Their transmission to Congress could directly invade the President's prerogative to conduct foreign policy. Third, the committee asks for the NSC "Forty Committee's" records on covert operations approved since 1965. But these records too are bound to include pre-decision discussions, and to touch on some matters still current, and, of course, to intrude on the President's conduct of foreign affairs.

It is perfectly true that past Presidents abused the specific claim of executive privilege and the general claim of national security as rationales for secrecy. But that does not mean those claims are without substance. Excesses of the executive branch are not remedied by excesses of Congress. In its zeal, the Pike committee—unlike its Senate counterpart—has brushed by the time-tested "political" ways in which responsible standing committees can and do gain access discreetly to material which would not be forthcoming in the context of a hostile political confrontation. Indeed, the House panel has seemed to be unwilling to grant that there are any legitimate barriers to its inquiry—either in constitutional principle or in practical effect. But there are such barriers. The intelligence inquiry is not being pursued in a vacuum. The legitimate powers of the office of the Presidency need to be kept intact. These include the confidentiality of the presidential decision-making process and the conduct of the nation's foreign policy. Mr. Kissinger is not always his own best advocate. In this instance, he has been glibly quick to identify his own discomfort with national misfortune. Yesterday, for instance, he belittled his citation for contempt as "frivolous"—hardly a response calculated to mollify his attackers. Yet in a congressional investigation the burden of responsibility does fall on the Congress. We do not yet see the Pike committee measuring up.

Joseph Kraft

Congress and Contempt Citations

When a House committee cites the Secretary of State for contempt on the eve of a summit meeting, it is tempting to see congressional irresponsibility naked and unashamed. Tempting but not quite right. While the committee did not exactly outdo Cicero in statesmanship, the true trouble was ineptitude—and maybe even dirty politics inside the administration.

The contempt citation came from the House Select Committee on Intelligence headed by Otis Pike, a New York Democrat. The committee is trying to assess the quality of American intelligence. Since it began work in September and is due to end on Jan. 31, much of the work has been hasty. But it is hard to claim that the majority in the committee is deeply irresponsible or out to "get" the Secretary of State.

The proof lies in the case of Thomas Boyatt, a State Department official who opposed the Kissinger policy on Cyprus. The committee voted to subpoena the exact document in which Mr. Boyatt expressed his views. The State Department could have claimed the report was an internal communication and refused to yield an inch on that ground. If a fight developed, the department might well have won a significant victory in the committee or in the full house or even in the courts.

Instead, one of Dr. Kissinger's most astute aides, Lawrence Eagleburger, negotiated a compromise with the committee. The compromise, which included elements of the Boyatt report mixed in distinguishably with other critical comments, was virtually a total win for Dr.

Kissinger. But four Democrats broke with Chairman Pike to join the Republicans in a majority asserting that the compromise fulfilled the committee requirements.

But having won big with a soft approach, the administration suddenly switched to a hard line in response to a set of subpoenas issued on Nov. 6 at the behest of the Republican minority on the committee. Among other things the minority asked for three sets of documents. First, there was a request, addressed to the Secretary of State, for intelligence recommendations made by State to the White House from January 1961 forward. Next, there was a request aimed at Dr. Kissinger, as special assistant to the President for national

security, for summaries of White House decisions in intelligence recommendations beginning in 1965. Third, there was a request, also aimed at Dr. Kissinger in his White House role, for material relating to documents on Soviet violation of the 1972 arms control agreement.

This time the State Department made no attempt to negotiate with the committee. Under orders from the White House, it took the view that the documents in question belonged to the President. The White House, after advice from the Justice Department—in a message which arrived after the citation had been voted—said the documents could not be turned over on grounds of executive privilege.

As to the subpoenas addressed to Dr. Kissinger in his national security role, they were handled chiefly by Jack Marsh, a former Virginia congressman and buddy of the President who is not known for being particularly friendly to the Secretary of State.

At one point he told the Republican members of the committee he would deliver all the material which did not amount to much in any case. He next delivered a very slim package of stuff, much of it highly laundered for security purposes, to the committee. The committee staff was able to show that a lot more material was available, particularly on the questions of the arms control violation issue. Eventually, Mr. Marsh did come up with a whole new batch of material, but some documents were still held out apparently on security grounds.

That treatment seems to have infuriated some Republican members of the committee. Mr. Pike and the Democrats sat back and enjoyed the fun. Last Friday, three days after the due date on the subpoenas, the committee voted three contempt citations against the Secretary of State. Two of the four Republicans joined the Democratic majority.

No doubt a compromise is going to emerge. But the point of all this is not that the Congress has no right to vote a contempt citation on the eve of a summit meeting. It is that on the eve of a summit meeting the administration shouldn't do that. Congress. The unusually crude approach to Congress on this issue is a clear suspicion that somebody in the White House has it in for the Secretary of State.

Field Enterprises

Thursday, November 20, 1975

The Washington Star

A-23

## Crosby S. Noyes

# Impeachment bug bites Pike and like

The House intelligence committee is riding for a fall in its latest confrontation with the White House. The effort to nail Secretary of State Kissinger on three charges of contempt of Congress should be firmly rejected by the full House after the Thanksgiving recess. If it is not, it will certainly be rejected by the courts in any ultimate showdown.

The House committee and its chairman, Rep. Otis G. Pike, D-N.Y., have clearly been smitten by the impeachment bug. The effort to bring down the administration of Richard Nixon — which quite surely would have succeeded had it not been aborted by resignation — is being perpetuated by the likes of Pike and his colleagues on the intelligence committee.

It is a challenge that involves the fundamental elements of the relationship between the executive and legislative branches. The increasing assertion in both houses of Congress of a constitutional right to subpoena witnesses and documents from the executive branch amounts to nothing less than an assertion of congressional supremacy. It marks a drastic departure from the doctrine of the separation of powers.

There are some obvious reasons for this challenge in the aftermath of Watergate. That entire episode was

interpreted by most observers as a flagrant abuse of executive power, culminating in the destruction of a presidential administration. Not only that: The abuses themselves were widely held to be the result of a usurpation of power by the White House at the expense of Congress, continuing over many years. The argument is frequently heard that the time has come for Congress to reassert the role that the Constitution originally assigned to it.

Clearly, if there was ever an ideal time to do such a thing, the aftermath of Watergate provided opportunity. Not only was a president discredited and driven from office. He had been replaced by a man appointed by the departing president — a man who lacked any national mandate, whose background was entirely congressional and who might be expected to look with favor on a redistribution of power between the branches.

A corollary of the congressional revolt against the executive has been a large intensification of the normal antagonisms between the executive and the press. It was, in the first instance, the press that destroyed the Nixon administration. And in large measure, it is the press that has exploited, without any particular objective, the battle that has ensued

between the executive and the Congress.

Reduced to its ultimate simplification, it is the charge, repeated to the point of nausea by some of my colleagues, that the government habitually lies to the American people. And here, of course, the remedy is closer collaboration between the Congress and the press.

It is all beautifully simple. Congress claims unlimited power to subpoena everybody and anything involving secrets held by the executive branch. It then, on its own discretion, makes these secrets public, either openly or by leaking the information. In either case the result is the same, and, in the current idiom, the "people's right to know" is vindicated. The government is exposed in its sordid little deceptions and, at least in theory, we are all purified in the process.

This is what Chairman Pike is talking about when he speaks of "the ability of the Congress to exercise its constitutional role." It is also what Henry Kissinger is talking about when he complains of "what this country is doing to itself and what the necessity is to torment ourselves like this month after month."

Different people see the problem in different ways. Some of them will be explored in another article.

Pike Panel Presses
Citations of Kissinger

By Mary Russell
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House intelligence committee Voted yesterday to go ahead with three contempt citations against Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, despite further promises of cooperation by the White House on two of them and a protest from President Ford that the issues involve "grave matters affecting our conduct of foreign policy."

Committee chairman Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.) said after the session if Mr. Ford's advisers did deliver, as they promised yesterday, documents dealing with alleged Soviet violations of the SALT arms agreement and a compromise could be worked out on access to documents dealing with covert intelligence operations authorized since 1965 by the National Security Council's Forty Committee, "the matter would be over" on the two subpoenas that cover those areas.

But on the third citation, issued "over" Kissinger's refusal to yield documents dealing with State Department requests for covert operations since 1961, the President invoked executive privilege and offered no compromise.

The three contempt citations, approved by the committee last week, must be approved by the full House,

then would be forwarded to the U.S. attorney here for prosecution. Contempt of Congress carries a maximum penalty of a year in prison and a $1,000 fine.

In a letter to Chairman Pike, President Ford said he was claiming executive privilege on the State Department documents because, "I made a finding that, in addition to disclosing highly sensitive military and foreign affairs assessments and evaluations, the documents revealed to an unacceptable degree the consultation process involving advice and recommendations to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon."

Mr. Ford said Kissinger was "acting on my instructions" in refusing to comply with the subpoena.

Before the 10-to-3 vote to draft a report on that contempt citation, Rep. James P. Johnson (R-Colo.) said the President had raised executive privilege to "a new level" by extending it back to cover past Presidents. He said that amounted to "censorship" and was "totally unacceptable."

Assistant Attorney General Antonin Scalia, appearing on behalf of the administration, said all documents on intelligence estimates of Soviet compliance with the SALT agreement would be turned over to the committee.

On the third citation, which involved the subpoena for all approvals by the National Security Council's Forty Committee of covert operations since 1965, Scalia said Pike committee members and appropriate staff would be permitted to look at the documents, but if it insisted on taking custody of them the White House would consider invoking executive privilege.

Scalia said the administration considered it a security risk to deliver the documents to the committee. When Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-Calif.) said the insinuation was insulting to the committee, Scalia said, "It's not you we distrust, we distrust your safes."

In his letter, the President also said those two citations, which were addressed to Kissinger as assistant to the President for national security affairs, were improperly addressed, since Kissinger after Nov. 3 no longer held that post. "Secretary Kissinger had no responsibility for responding to these subpoenas nor for supervising the response to them," the President said.

But Scalia admitted that Kissinger's successor in the post, Air Force Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, had not yet been sworn in. He brushed off questions about where the citations should be addressed.

Pike said the citations should be addressed to "Kissinger or nobody" and added, "I would be inclined to accept the President's statement if he presented any alternative."

He urged the committee to go ahead with the two citations to ensure that the administration provides the documents. "I don't think we're acting to do anything but encourage substantial compliance," he said, before the committee agreed by an 8-to-5 vote on each of the other two citations.

Summary of CIA Plots, 1959-1972

By Bill Richards

Washington Post Staff Writer

The report issued yesterday by the Senate intelligence committee contains information on alleged Central Intelligence Agency assassination plots in five foreign countries between 1959 and 1972.

The time frame for the plots, according to the Senate report, begins with approval Dec. 11, 1959, by CIA Director Allen W. Dulles for "through consideration to be given to the elimination of (Cuban Premier) Fidel Castro" and ends with a directive in 1972 by CIA Director Richard M. Helms against further assassination attempts.

Following is a brief summary of various CIA assassination plans that took place between those dates, according to the report:

### CONGO

Late spring 1960—CIA Deputy Director for Plans Richard Bissell begins discussion of plans with Bronson Tweedy, CIA's African Division chief, and CIA scientist (identified yesterday by sources as Sidney Gottlieb), to kill unnamed African leader.

September, 1960 — Acting on Bissell's orders, Gottlieb gathers poison and hypodermic needles from Army stockpiles at Ft. Detrick, Md., and flies to Leopoldville with instructions for CIA station officer Victor Hedgman to kill Patrice Lumumba, dismissed as Congolese premier on Sept. 5. Director Dulles cables twice in support of mission.

October, 1960 — Hedgman cables CIA headquarters that he has located a local agent to kill Lumumba by injecting poison into his food or tooth-paste. Headquarters cables urging speed before poison's power diminishes.

Oct. 31, 1960 — Bissell asks senior CIA official Michael Mulroney to go to the Congo and kill Lumumba. Mulroney refuses but agrees to go and lure Lumumba from his U.N. guard so Congolese can capture and try him with strong possibility of execution.

Nov. 3, 1960 — Mulroney arrives and sends for two other CIA agents. One agent

described as "a foreign citizen with a criminal background" of smuggling and the other a former forger and bank robber. CIA provides bank robber with plastic surgery and toupee so he won't be recognized.

Nov. 27, 1960 — Lumumba leaves U.N. custody for Stanleyville. Hedgman cables Tweedy of departure and states his station is "studying several plans of action."

Jan. 17, 1961 — Lumumba put on plane by followers; plane diverted to Katanga Province where Lumumba is killed. CIA authorities in Africa later disclaim any connection with his death and cable traffic shows no evidence they were involved.

### CUBA

March through August, 1960

CIA officials discuss several schemes against Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. They include: spraying Castro's radio broadcast booth with LSD-type agent; impregnating Castro's cigars with disorienting agent before a speech; dusting Castro's boots with chemical that will make his beard fall out.

(Senate committee reported it had found evidence of at least eight plots by the CIA between 1960 and 1965 to assassinate Castro.)

July 21, 1960 — CIA Havana station arranges for "accident" involving Castro's brother Raul to be handled by Cuban volunteer who is assured his three children will be provided with college education if he is killed. CIA headquarters cables too late on July 22 to halt plan but it falls through anyway when agent can't get to Raul Castro.

Aug. 16, 1960 — CIA official gets box of Castro's favorite cigars and orders to treat them with botulinum toxin, according to records from CIA's Office of Medical Services. Cigars ready Oct. 7 and delivered to unidentified person Feb. 13, 1961. No record of any attempt to pass them on to Castro.

August, 1960 — Col. Sheffield Edwards, director of CIA Office of Security, and Bissell discuss Castro assassination and Edward suggests finding assassin from gambling syndicate operating in Cuba. Edwards turns job over to Robert A. Maheu, former FBI

agent and later an employee of millionaire Howard Hughes.

Early September — Unidentified CIA official asks Maheu to contact underworld figure John Rosselli. Maheu meets Rosselli in Hollywood's Brown Derby Restaurant and tells him "high government officials" need his help in eliminating Castro. Rosselli goes to Miami to recruit Cubans for the job and meets on project with CIA agent.

February, 1961—CIA's technical services division makes batch of poison pills, which are turned over to Rosselli for delivery to Castro assassin. At least $10,000 and electronics equipment given to potential assassin.

March-April, 1961—Cuban working in a favorite Castro restaurant was to administer poison but never received the "Go" signal from his contacts and returned pills and money to CIA.

April, 1962—CIA agent William Harvey reactivates Castro assassination plan. Harvey turns over poison pills and $5,000 worth of arms and radio equipment to Cuban contact.

May, 1962—Pills and guns arrive in Cuba. Despite reports of a three-man assassination team being prepared for Cuba, there is no evidence the attempt took place.

Early 1963—CIA "Task Force W" assigned to covert Cuban operation studies and rejects plan for implanting explosive seashell in area where Castro goes skin diving.

January, 1963—Diving gear contaminated with poison prepared as gift from James Donovan—negotiator for release of Cuban prisoners—but plan fails when Donovan decides to give Castro an uncontaminated suit.

Autumn 1963—Unidentified highly placed Cuban official meets with Desmond Fitzgerald, head of CIA Special Affairs staff, and offers to kill Castro with a high-powered rifle. Fitzgerald later told an in-house CIA investigation he rejected offer.

Nov. 22, 1963—Cuban told shipment of high-powered rifles and grenades would be dropped in Cuba. Fitzgerald offers Cuban CIA-

manufactured pen equipped
with hypodermic needle too
small to be felt.

1963—Early 1965—CIA
arranges for delivery of arms
and explosives to agent in
Cuba for Castro assassination.
No specifics in report on
assassination attempts.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

April, 1960—President
Eisenhower approves con-
tingency plan to remove
Dominican Republic dictator
Rafael Trujillo.

June, 1960—U.S.
Ambassador to Dominican
Republic Joseph Farland
agrees to be link between
Dominican Republic
dissidents and CIA. Farland
transmits request from
dissidents for rifles with
telescopic sights. CIA in-
vestigates plan for air-
dropping rifles.

Oct. 3, 1960—CIA prepares
memorandum for delivery of
300 rifles and pistols, am-
munition and explosives to
dissidents to “eliminate
certain key Trujillo hen-
chmen.”

March 15, 1961—Deputy chief of mission Henry Dearborn requests three .38-cal. pistols for dissidents. CIA sends pistols in diplomatic pouch to local station chief six days later.

June 7, 1961—Unsigned and
unattributed memo says
station officer passed two of
the pistols to U.S. citizen in
contact with dissident action
group.

On a month earlier a State
Department memo prepared
for former Assistant
Secretary Richard Goodwin
notes that three .38 cal.
revolvers and three carbines
had been passed to dissident
leaders "attendant to their
projected efforts to neutralize
Trujillo."

May 30, 1961 — Trujillo was
ambushed and assassinated
near San Cristobal in the
Dominican Republic.
Weapons were handguns and
shotguns; assassination
carried out by dissident action
group.

SOUTH VIETNAM

May 8, 1963 — South Viet-
namese troops in Hue fire on
Buddists celebrating Bud-
dha's birthday. Lucien
Conein, a CIA officer in
Vietnam later testified that
Buddhist uprisings following

incident led to coup against
South Vietnamese President
Ngo Dinh Diem.

Aug. 24, 1963 — State
Department cable approved
by President Kennedy told
Amabassador Henry Cabot
Lodge to press Diem to
redress the grievances of
Buddhists and remove Diem's
brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, and
sister-in-law. Madame Nhu
from power.

Oct. 3, 1963—Conein told by
Gen. Duong Van Minh (“Big
Minh”) of planned coup and
possibility of assassination of
Diem’s brothers, Nhu and
Can. Cables from CIA
Director John A. McCone
neither opposed nor supported
plan at first and later opposed
assassination plan.

Nov. 2, 1963—Diem and his
brother Nhu die and Conein
rejects offer from Minh to
view their bodies for fear of
damaging U.S. interests. The
Senate committee reported
that details of deaths aren't
known but there is no evidence
of direct or indirect U.S. in-
volvement.

CHILE

Sept. 15, 1970—President
Nixon tells CIA Director
Richard M. Helms that the
regime of Dr. Salvadore
Allende Gossens—which won
plurality in a presidential
election 11 days before—was
unacceptable to U.S. CIA
instructed by Nixon to play a
direct role in organizing
military coup.

Oct. 5 to Oct. 20, 1970—CIA
makes 21 contacts with key
police and military officials in
Chile giving assurances of
support in case of coup. Army
commander-in-chief Gen.
Rene Schneider is singled out
as target for removal to
prepare for coup.

Oct. 19, 1970 — Unsuccessful
attempt made to kidnap
Schneider by group of Chilean
military officers who were
supported by CIA. A second
unsuccessful attempt made
the following day.

Oct. 22, 1970 — During the
early morning hours, the CIA
passed machine guns and
ammunition to the group that
failed to kidnap Schneider.
Shortly after 8 a.m.
Schneider's car is intercepted
on his way to work and he is
mortally wounded during
gunfight. Conspirators in-
volved are not those who got
CIA weapons.

MOYNIHAN GETTING
CALLS OF SUPPORT

Messages Are Urging Him
Not to Quit U.N. Position
in Dispute Over His Role

By PAUL HOFMANN

Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N. Y.,
Nov. 22.—The office of Daniel
P. Moynihan, the American del-
egate, received many tele-
phone calls and messages from
individuals and groups today
urging him to stay in office
and praising his outspoken
stand on international issues.

But delegates from other na-
tions said privately Mr. Moyni-
han's credibility and usefulness
as the United States represen-
tative had been sapped by con-
troversy over his unconvention-
al style of diplomacy.

Reports that Mr. Moynihan
had been on the verge of re-
signing yesterday and had been
summoned to Washington by
President Ford were being dis-
cussed by diplomats at United
Nations headquarters and in
telephone conversations
across the city and between
here and foreign capitals.

In Washington, the spokes-
man for the State Department,
Robert Anderson, said that af-
ter consultation with Secretary
of State Henry A. Kissinger
he was in a position to dismiss
as "utterly preposterous" an
allegation that American and
British officials colluded in
public criticism of Mr. Moyni-
han.

A Wyatt Earp Style

A veritable whispering cam-
paign about Mr. Moynihan's
methods came into the open
last Monday when Britain's del-
egate, Ivor Richard in an ad-
dress to the directors of the
United Nations Association
condemned diplomatic postur-
ing in the way of a Wyatt
Earp. The target of the jibe
was clearly Mr. Moynihan.

Mr. Richard, in a statement,
described as "nonsense" the
suggestion that he had given
his speech "with prior Amer-
ican approval." He said his
address was a restatement of
well-known British attitudes
"and in no way should be con-
strued as a personal attack on
Mr. Moynihan.

The statement added that
the British delegate wished to
maintain the closest working
relationship with the American
counterpart, and that if there
had been "differences in ap-
proaches "those are differences
of tactics, not of aims."

In Washington, Mr. Anderson
also disclosed that Mr. Kissin-
ger had called Mr. Moynihan
by telephone yesterday morn-
ing and urged him not to quit.

A West European delegate
who did not want to be identi-
fied said Mr. Moynihan's role
had been discussed in a meet-
ing of Western delegates last
week. There was nearly general
criticism of the American's
"cowboy fashion," the delegate
reported.

"Those most critical of Mr.
Moynihan are the Nine," the
delegate said, by which he
meant the nine-country Eu-
ropean Economic Community.
"The Nine say his strategies
aren't getting results, and at
the United Nations we need
results. We are convinced that
things can be done, even occa-
sionally through confrontation-
al strategy if it is well coordin-
ated."

Western Group Complains

The West European delegate
said there had been complaints
in his group, which was more
than willing to collaborate with
the United States, that it was
not being consulted by Mr.
Moynihan.

"He always called a Western
caucus after things had hap-
pened, never before," the dipo-
mat remarked.

Arab and African delegates
expressed their relief today at
the prospect that Mr. Moynihan
might quit his post.

"If he is in trouble he richly
deserves it," an African said.
"He can always go into Ameri-
can politics, he has built a
constituency for himself."

The Arab group at the United
Nations generally charges Mr.
Moynihan with have "automati-
cally and uncritically" sided
with Israel and with having
introduced highly charged and
emotional language in his fight
against the resolution branding
Zionism as "a form of racism
and racial discrimination." The
resolution was introduced by
the delegates of radical Arab
Governments and Cuba.

African diplomats say that
Mr. Moynihan made an unjusti-
fied attack on the Organization
of African Unity in a speech
in San Francisco on Oct. 3,
reproaching it for having elect-
ed President Idi Amin of Ugan-
da as chairman of the regional
group. In the San Francisco
speech Mr. Moynihan also en-
dorsed a description of Ugan-
da's President as a "racist mur-
derer."

To See Ford Tomorrow

According to the United
States mission, Mr. Moynihan
will be in Washington on Mon-
day for a talk with President
Ford. Today, Mr. Moynihan,
a professor on leave from Har-
vard University, went to New
Haven to attend a Harvard-Yale
football game.

Meanwhile, Representative
Peter A. Peyser, a Republican
from New York, announced
that he had sent a telegram
to President Ford urging him
to retain Mr. Moynihan ambas-
sador.

"Since when does raising hell
in an effort to fight injustice
constitute a reason for recall?"
A message read.

NYT

11/23

EVENING REPORT

SATURDAY

NOVEMBER 22, 1975

NBC Evening News, John Chancellor.

THE UN.

DANIEL MOYNIHAN.

In a surprise at the United Nations this afternoon, the United States withdrew its resolution calling for a world-wide amnesty for political prisoners. That resolution was introduced only nine days ago by our country. Many saw it as a response to the UN vote on Zionism. In the meantime, however, so many amendments were tacked onto the proposal that it became unworkable, and it was withdrawn.

And, it seems as though the American ambassador to the UN, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, may be about to resign because he's not getting support from Washington. He scheduled, and cancelled a press conference today. The White House and Henry Kissinger say they want him to stay, but Moynihan says he's going to Washington next week 'to find out what is going on'.

CBS Evening News, Dan Rather.

JAMES SCHLESINGER.

Former Defense Secretary Schlesinger says disagreement over the new defense budget was a "major substantive problem" between him and President Ford," and he indicated that that led to his being fired three weeks ago.

In his first interview since then, Schlesinger told the Associated Press, he thought that Mr. Ford's budget request was inadequate, and didn't know if he could present it to Congress. Asked if he thought Secretary Kissinger or present Defense head Rumsfeld had anything to do with his ouster, Schlesinger said, "It's all water over the dam." The White House had no immediate comment on Schlesinger's remarks.

Kissinger Tries Shuttle
Diplomacy on the Hill

By Walter Pincus

Washington Post Staff Writer

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has brought his shuttle diplomacy home to Washington. A black limousine traveling between Foggy Bottom and Capitol Hill the past two weeks has substituted for the jet plane that last fall carried him from one Mideast capital to another.

Senate and House committee chairmen and individual members have replaced kings, presidents and prime ministers, but the egos are as great and the issues still complex.

In six days between Nov. 14 and 20, Kissinger appeared before three congressional committees to argue for approval of the President's $4.7 billion worldwide security assistance program, the bulk of which is the Middle East aid package. The secretary wants Congress to vote those funds and prepare itself for future large requests-steps that would affect his further negotiations in the Mideast.

While making the Capitol Hill appearances, Kissinger also had to handle senators and congressmen who wanted him to enforce old pieces of legislation on human rights and use of U.S.-purchased weapons or write new provisions-all of which affect

the freedom he wants to carry on foreign policy.

If that were not enough, Kissinger also had to face questioning by the Senate intelligence committee on his past actions and subpoenas from the House intelligence committee for documents.

In past years, Kissinger - following presidential policy-treated, according to the view of people on the Hill, with some

News Analysis

contempt attempts by
Congress to play a role in
foreign policy or intelligence
operations. Information

provided committees in those
days was slim and tailored to
support administration
positions.

A Kissinger appearance was often ceremonial. Perfunctory questions often asked by Kissinger's supporters encouraged generalized answers that did not include all the facts available to the secretary.

Times have changed. As Kissinger himself told a Senate Appropriations sub-committee Thursday, "Out of the many controversies (between the executive and Congress) it is inevitable that we will establish a new balance."

Kissinger appeared to do
well in his rounds of

congressional hearings on
Middle East aid. His tactic
was to disconnect the $3.3
billion sought for Israel and
Egypt from the interim Sinai
agreement of last fall.

Kissinger, according to his
aides, wants the aid this year
to stand on its own so that next
year, when the package is just
as large, he won't need
another new agreement to
justify the continued $3 billion
or more expenditure.

That is a hard thing to sell
Congress. The legislators need
to have this year's package
tied to the recent agreement to
justify a vote for tripling
Mideast aid.

Otherwise it is hard for a
congressman to defend
himself with voters who feel
the effects of federal domestic
spending cuts, inflation and
unemployment.

According to his aides, one
thing Kissinger tried to avoid
was laying out the long-term
costs of his Middle East
policies. It not only would hurt
the measure's chances this
year on Capitol Hill but
also-his aides
suggested-take away some
negotiating leverage with the
Arabs and Israels.

Nevertheless, when
pressed, Kissinger said he
would provide the requesting
Senate subcommittee with a
five-year projection of
country-by-country aid.
Whether it can or will be

specific enough remains to be
seen.

That wasn't the only
material Kissinger promised
to turn over. When Sen. J.
Bennett Johnston Jr. (D-La.)
questioned the level of
military credits being
provided Israel, Kissinger
said he would supply him with
a summary of conclusions
made by the interagency
committee that recommended
the Israeli program.

There were other com-
promises. After a harsh ex-
change with Chairman John
McClellan (D-Ark.), Kissinger
backed down on an earlier
statement that no long-term
commitments for aid had been
made to either Israel or
Egypt.

He conceded the ad-
ministration had an obligation
under the agreement to seek
enough funds to meet Israeli's
long-term military and
economic needs. But he
quickly added that Congress
was under no obligation to
approve the amounts
requested, though he would
strongly support them as
being in the national interest.

Along with the aid bill,
Kissinger has had to negotiate
other legislative issues. In
1974, Congress blocked arms

sales to Turkey under a
provision of law that
prohibited such transfers to
countries that were using
weapons for aggressive
purposes. As a result, U.S.
intelligence gathering bases in
Turkey have been closed and
relations have turned frosty.

Kissinger is working with
Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-
Minn.) to have the law
changed. "The intentions of
the law," Kissinger told a
Senate subcommittee. "have
to be applied to fit cir-
cumstances so they do not
detect national interests."

Another congressional
measure causing diplomatic
problems was hooked on to a
food assistance act now in
conference between the House
and the Senate. It would
prohibit aid to a nation that
bars U.S. nationals because of
sex, race or religion. It would
have a direct effect, Kissinger

told senators, on American
programs in Saudi Arabia.

In a letter to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Kissinger said he opposes the portion of the amendment that would cut off aid or military sales, although he supports the objective.

When questioned on his
objections by Sens. Humphrey
and Clifford Case (R-N.J.),
Kissinger said he would take
another look.

An amendment to aid legislation approved last year asked that the Secretary of State report to Congress on violations of human rights within aid recipient countries. Kissinger told a Senate questioner that, after consulting his legal adviser, he determined the law did not require a country-by-country report.

Told that the drafters of the
original language, Rep.
Donald Fraser (D-Minn.) and
Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.),
disagreed, Kissinger said he
was trying to find time to
negotiate some new
agreement with them.

Kissinger's problems with
the two intelligence com-
mittees are not easily han-
dled. Negotiations cannot
completely erase the Senate
committee record of con-
flicting testimony from
Kissinger and others on covert
Chile operations.

Negotiations have yet to
release Kissinger from a
House committee move to
have him cited for contempt
for failing to deliver sub-
poenaed documents.

Kissinger has told friends he
believes there are members
on both committees who want
him forced out of office at any
cost. But, as he said before a
Senate subcommittee last
week, excessive congressional
foreign policy oversight could
make a Secretary of State
paranoid.

According to Kissinger
aides, both intelligence
committees are dealing with a
past the secretary would just
as soon see trade into history.

Marquis Childs

# Aiming Arrows at Henry Kissinger

In his last two years as Secretary of State Dean Acheson was attacked by a form of congressional and public assault that had become known as McCarthyism. Something like this same attack from a variety of quarters is being directed at Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. It is as though we could exorcise all our troubles in the world by putting the principal agent of foreign policy to the stake.

The Pike commitee has cited him for contempt for refusing to surrender private documents of low level officials bearing on policy decisions. When Congress returns from Thanksgiving vacation, the House may or may not support its erratic intelligence committee.

But more than the conflict over such relatively minor matters is the effort to undermine the Kissinger policy of trying to bring at least a pause in the nuclear arms race. Waved about is the allegation of a missing letter that if it could be found would show that the United States had condoned serious violations of the current nuclear agreement by the Soviet Union.

I believe that the facts about this cloak and dagger mystery, of a piece with the fantastic revelations out of the past, are as follows. First, no one has ever been able to find such a letter. It cannot be found despite an exhaustive search in the files of the National Security Council, in the President's personal files, in the files of former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger nor anywhere in the Pentagon.

Second, those familiar with the charges the missing—or non-existent—letter makes are convinced they are minor violations. These matters involving the wizardry of modern weapons are so abstruse as to be almost beyond the understanding of the layman.

But apparently at one point the United States briefly made use of advanced radar in a way that was technically a violation of the Soviet agreement. This was then taken up by the Soviets. Having been discovered after two months, a protest to Moscow brought an end to the violation. The mysteries of telemetry, the reading of the other side's most secret reports on testing, have also played a part in the give and take here at home and in Moscow over the nuclear agreement.

The prospect, and a grim prospect

certainly, is that the whole matter of an agreement on offensive nuclear weapons, tentatively reached when President Ford met with Communist Party Chairman Leonid Brezhnev in Vladivostok, a year ago, will go by the board. That can mean a year's delay as the politics of detente or no detente resound loudly on the husting. In the intricacies of Kremlin politics, Brezhnev, who has been able and willing to make concessions, may be replaced and by whom during that year's delay it is impossible to guess.

At one point Kissinger backed the cruise missile, when it was a minor diversion of perhaps $30 million in the defense budget, as a trade-off in future negotiations. He has said recently that he never foresaw that the Pentagon would fall in love with

the cruise missile, a new kind of low level nuclear attack weapon which has become a serious obstacle to agreement.

On the day after Thanksgiving, Kissinger flies with President Ford to Peking and from there to Indonesia and the Philippines. While they are away, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt will be testifying on Capitol Hill on the evils of the Ford-Kissinger policies. Having been relatively moderate as Chief of Naval Operations when he failed to make Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and retired, he became one of the most vociferous critics of administration policy.

A further complication is Daniel Patrick Moynihan, the U.S. delegate to the United Nations. His critics among the Western

Europeans and some Americans say that if it had not been for his intemperate language, trumpeting through the halls of the U.N. like an avenging and self-anointed angel, a vote to put off the inflammatory resolution on Zionism and racism could have passed. It failed by only a few votes.

With the full backing of his President, Harry Truman, Acheson survived the often vicious attacks made on him. It is an example that should not be overlooked at this moment of grave uncertainty. Kissinger has made many enemies often needlessly and especially among career foreign service officers. But he is one of the few strong points in a cyclone of troubles.

United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

-6-

MORNING REPORT

TUESDAY

NOVEMBER 25, 1975

CBS Newsradio 15, First Line Report, Daniel Schorr.
<u>THE DANIEL MOYNIHAN AFFAIR.</u>

Anyone who analyses affairs knows that the thing you have to
look for is not the self-serving statement, but the tell-tale
procedural detail.

In the affair of Pat Moynihan, who threatened to resign as
ambassador to the United Nations, but was stroked into stay-
ing, the tell-tale detail is that he met with President Ford
alone for a half hour, and then they were joined by Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger for ten minutes. Anybody who has
ever attended a diplomatic reception can tell you what that
means. The President was emphasizing his personal relation-
ship with professor Moynihan, and <u>telling him not to worry</u>
<u>about professor Kissinger.</u> He was underlining Moynihan's
position as a Cabinet member, rather than a State Department
emissary, which was nice for Dr. Moynihan, not so nice for
Dr. Kissinger.

It no longer mattered very much whether Kissinger had anything
to do with the implied attack on Moynihan by the British del-
egate to the United Nations. What matters is, that the White
House desperately wants to keep Dr. Moynihan, <u>and that Dr.</u>
<u>Kissinger was perceived as a problem, and so, Dr. Kissinger</u>
<u>had to be put down...</u> just as others had to be put down in the
days when Dr. Kissinger, his star then brighter, threatened to
resign because of what was being said about him and wiretapping.

Just look at the politics of the situation, which some people
around here, in case you haven't heard, <u>do look at</u>. Here is
Henry Kissinger, who already has gotten <u>the Administration</u>
into trouble with the right-wing and some others, for the snub
to Solzhenitsyn. Here is Kissinger, whose past under President
Nixon keeps coming up in Congressional investigations. And
<u>there</u> is Pat Moynihan, who may have made a lot of non-voting
Arabs and Africans unhappy, but who is the ranking hero of
American Jews, and of George Meany of the AFL-CIO. It may not
serve Dr. Kissinger's diplomatic purpose to have Moynihan call-
ing Idi Amin a 'racist murderer', or branding an anti-Zionist
resolution as 'an obscenity'. But it serves the political pur-
pose of the Committee to Reelect,-or rather, to elect- Presi-
dent Ford.

What President Ford does not need is another departure from
his Cabinet so soon after James Schlesinger, another messy
squabble in the official family. So, no wonder then that

-7-

President Ford expresses strong support for Dr. Moynihan, and
wants it clearly understood that Ambassador Moynihan has his
complete confidence.

Well, that's the Moynihan affair. Only last Friday Pay Moynihan had already scheduled a news conference, where he planned to announce his resignation, and here he is, by golly!, on top of the world, a man of the hour, the intrepid American, facing up to the Arabs and the Africans *and* the British. And so much for British delegate Ivor Richard, who said an ambassador shouldn't conduct himself like Wyatt Earp in the O.K. Corral. The net effect of his attack on Dr. Moynihan has been to get Moynihan looking bigger in the saddly than ever.

And so much for Dr. Kissinger, and his walking-on-eggshells tactics in the Middle East. And so much for the UN, and the Arabs, and all the Africans. One thing about an affair that a European can tell you, is that when you start one, you can never tell how it's going to end. The Moynihan affair started last week with an ambassador being eased out, - and this week, he is the ranking hero. The question is, how the affair must look in Cambridge, - two Harvard professors in such an unseemly involvement.

CBS-TV Morning news, Hughes Rudd and Chris Kelley.

KISSINGER IN DETROIT.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made a speech in Detroit yesterday, and sounded pretty upset about events in Africa, and in Washington.

**Kelley:** The Secretary of State used the occasion to criticize Russia for what he called 'its policy of intervention' in the former Portugese colony of Angola. Kissinger said that if the Soviets continue supplying arms there, it will inevitably threaten other relationships.

**Kissinger:** We can not ignore, for example, the substantial Soviet build-up of weapons in Angola, which has introduced great-power rivalry into Africa for the first time in fifteen years. The Soviet involvement is resented by African nations most of all. But the United States cannot be indifferent while an outside power embarks upon an interventionist policy so distant from its homeland, and so removed from traditional Russian interests.

**Kelley:** Kissinger also suggested the recent Senate Sub-Committee report on CIA activities has served to undermine U.S. foreign policy.

**Kissinger:** It should be to cleanse our institutions without disrupting the conduct of the nation's business abroad, and buffeting all instruments of our foreign policy. When the

Editorial

[LC]

# Pitfalls of SALT-I

The United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating in Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) for about six years, and there is now enough factual experience on the record to draw some conclusions about the character and direction of these efforts. It is abundantly clear from the record of the past six years that the SALT negotiations have vastly improved the Soviets' military position in relation to the United States by failing to curtail any of their advanced strategic systems development programs, while eroding key U. S. programs fiscally, politically and technically. The results, if present trends are continued, will see the United States decline from its recent position of significant strategic superiority through a period of apparent parity that is really a thinly disguised slide into painful inferiority.

This trend in the SALT negotiations results from four major factors:

* First, a major difference in goals between the U. S. and the USSR. The USSR regards the SALT negotiations, as it does all other facets of its detente policy, as a means of improving the Soviet position to achieve its ultimate goal of international military dominance and political subversion. Detente as a basic policy has produced far more progress for the Soviets toward these goals than 30 years of the so-called "cold war." In contrast, the U. S. appears to regard the SALT negotiations and detente goals as achieving a fixed status quo with the Soviet Union that will relieve our government of its moral, fiscal and technical responsibility to defend this nation and its allies. The whole trend of the SALT negotiations has been for the United States to freeze, curtail and abandon technical weapons progress while authorizing the Soviets to continue whatever they wish.

* Second, a legal and technical incompetence on the part of the top-level U. S. policy team that has led to grave language loopholes and technical errors. These have imposed strict inhibition on U. S. activities without any similar restraints on the Soviets and have given the Soviets major technical advantages.

* Third, a deliberate policy of secrecy and deception on the part of the Nixon and Ford administrations that has tried desperately to conceal from the U. S. Congress and public the Soviet violations of both the letter and spirit of the SALT agreements and the gross U. S. policy errors that are steadily building an irreversible Soviet military advantage. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as the chief architect of the SALT policies, has become the most skilled practitioner of the art of not telling the truth without actually lying since Robert Strange McNamara left the Pentagon, and this is the crux of his current problems with Congress and the danger facing the American people.

This trend will be accentuated by the removal of James Schlesinger and his strong, technically accu-

rate dissents from the Pentagon and the appointment of President Ford's political henchman, George Bush, to head the Central Intelligence Agency. It will be difficult indeed to find any semblance of the facts on the Soviets, SALT or U. S. policy from this new White House coterie.

* Fourth, a series of unilateral perceptions and positions that are not included in any of the binding documents of the SALT agreements and have been firmly rejected by the Soviets. Yet these unilateral perceptions are presented in a sufficiently fuzzy manner to the American people to imply that they have a valid import for the SALT agreements. Included in these unilateral perceptions, to which the Soviets pay absolutely no attention, are definitions of heavy and medium ICBMs, mobile ICBMs, cruise missiles and strategic bombers.

These unilateral positions, which the Soviets firmly reject, have stimulated U. S. political currents that now threaten to take the impact of SALT even beyond the dire results already negotiated. One example is the current spate of senatorial amendments advocating U. S. abandonment of vital testing on new strategic systems still in early development stages, even though this lies far outside even the broadest interpretation of SALT. One by Sen.bert Humphrey (D.-Minn.) to delay flight testing of the U. S. Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MARV) until the Soviets begin MARV testing was passed by two votes, and another by Sen. George McGovern (D.-S. D.) to prohibit testing of cruise missiles beyond a 200-km. range drew 33 supporters on the Senate floor.

Even more dangerous is the action now contemplated by the Congress of closing down the one anti-ballistic missile (ABM) site authorized by the SALT I treaty. This ABM system in North Dakota protects about 70% of the U. S. Minuteman ICBM strategic deterrent and is the equivalent of the Soviet ABM system defending Moscow.

Yet Congress is heading toward a unilateral scrapping of this key defense system, already paid for, on the flimsy grounds of saving some operational funds and the fuzzy hope that Soviet restraint will make it unnecessary.

This is the really crippling damage to this nation's future spawned by SALT. While the spotlight is on the detailed discussions of weapon systems, their capabilities and their numbers, little attention is being paid to the false hopes and euphoria that are being deliberately generated by the White House and on Capitol Hill to persuade the American people that their future security can be guaranteed by some elaborate pieces of paper as a substitute for the money, technology and determination that have been its foundations for the past 200 years.

-Robert Hotz

Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 24, 1975

7

AIDE TO KISSINGER
SAYS HOUSE ERRED

## Contends 2 Subpoenas Were for Ford Adviser, a Post Given Up by Secretary

By JOHN M. CREWDSON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 15 —

The State Department contended today that the House Select Committee on Intelligence had erred in moving to begin contempt proceedings against Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. The committee voted yesterday to hold the Secretary in contempt of Congress for failure to produce documents demanded in three subpoenas.

Today William G. Hyland, who heads the State Department's bureau of intelligence and research, summoned reporters to a briefing. He told them that Mr. Kissinger had no responsibility for complying with two of the subpoenas, addressed to the President's adviser for national security affairs.

Mr. Hyland said Mr. Kissinger, who became the national

security adviser in the Nixon Administration in January 1967, relinquished the post Nov. 3 on President Ford's public announcement of his departure, three days before the two subpoenas were tendered by the committee.

As for the third subpoena, which was addressed to Mr. Kissinger by name as Secretary of State, Mr. Hyland said the lack of response had been ordered by President Ford, who asserted yesterday that the requested documents would not be forthcoming on the ground that they represented privileged Presidential communications.

Mr. Ford said at a news conference in Atlanta that he had made that assertion reluctantly after having been advised by Attorney General Edward H. Levy that the President was within his rights to do so.

The House intelligence committee, in three separate actions yesterday, each approved by 10 of its 13 members, voted to refer a report of what it termed Mr. Kissinger's failure to comply with the subpoenas to the House of Representatives, which must ultimately approve any finding of contempt.

Mr. Hyland said the State Department found the committee's action "unbelievable," coming as it did on the eve of important American diplomatic undertakings, including President Ford's forthcoming trip to China and the economic conference that opened today near Paris. Mr. Kissinger is attending the French meetings together with Mr. Ford.

Mr. Hyland expressed concern over the effect that news accounts of the committee's action would have on American diplomatic initiatives abroad, noting that "the impression all over the world is that the Secretary of State is in contempt on three subpoenas, and this is just not the case."

He conceded that he had not yet seen specific evidence of any adverse foreign reaction.

Mr. Hyland refrained from characterizing the committee's motives or intentions, but Robert McCloskey, an assistant to Mr. Kissinger for Congressional affairs, said he believed it was questionable whether the initiating of contempt proceedings was "an honest reflection of the public interest."

> Neither Representative Otis G. Pike, the Long Island Democrat who is the committee's chairman, nor A. Searle Field, its staff director, could be reached for comment.

## Two Unrelated Issues

The dispute between the House committee and the Ford Administration, Mr. Hyland said today, revolves around two essentially unrelated questions.

In the case of the subpoena addressed to Mr. Kissinger by name, which calls for the production of recommendations for covert intelligence actions sent by the State Department to the White House over the last 15 years, the ultimate responsibility rests with President Ford.

The State Department, Mr. Hyland said, found 10 documents that could be construed as such recommendations and passed them to the White House for a determination.

In the case of the two subpoenas addressed to the President's national security adviser, a high White House official acknowledged today that there had been neither a formal letter of resignation sent by Mr. Kissinger to Mr. Ford nor a written communication from the President to Mr. Kissinger setting a date for his departure.

But the official said he believed that Mr. Hyland's contention that Mr. Kissinger had not acted in the capacity of adviser since Nov. 4 was "very valid."

The two subpoenas called for the production of minutes of the Nationa Security Council's "Forty Committee," which approves covert intelligence actions, and for various documents relating to reports by American intelligence agencies on the Soviet Union's compliance with the 1972 arms limitation treaty.

The Pike committee is investigating the risks involved in covert intelligence activities and what it has termed indications of efforts, to slant intelligence reports by officials interested in encouraging further détente with the Soviet Union.

The White House official, a lawyer, said that an effort had been made to comply with the two subpoenas, which demanded production of the documents within a five-day period that expired on Tuesday, and that some of the documents had been discovered after the deadline had passed and had been surrendered.

Another White House aide said he felt that the Pike committee had acted unfairly in moving to begin contempt proceedings before all the returns had been made.

Mr. Pike acknowledged yesterday that some materials had been provided, but he said that the Forty Committee records had been so heavily deleted as to be meaningless and that some arms limitation documents had been discovered in White House files after the committee had been assured it had been given everything available.

Mr. Pike said he expected that the contempt matter would not reach the House floor for a vote before early December.

[LC]

William Safire

[10]

# Henry, Pat and Ivor: the power ebbs

As power ebbs, the sense of humor sours and the hatchet hand loses its skill. Some examples:

At the Rambouillet conference, one of the seats next to President Ford was momentarily empty when Secretary Kissinger's helicopter was delayed by weather. Happy to provide an old friend with a souvenir, the President sat economic adviser William Seidman next to him for that morning's picture-taking, and left word for Kissinger when he arrived not to claim his seat immediately.

When Kissinger arrived and was told the President's wish, he brushed presidential aides aside and gruffly told Bill Seidman: "I'll take my chair now, Secretary Richardson." Nobody smiled; the President pretended not to notice.

Another example of ill-humored mockery took place at England's Mendenall airfield, when Ford's party took coffee in a small room with ambassador Elliott Richardson and his wife. "Ron Nessen points out that there is a bible on the coffee table, Mr. President," said Secretary Kissinger loudly. "Is there to be a swearing-in?" The smiles were forced, those present knew that Henry envisioned Richardson's swearing-in at State and not at Commerce, and his remark was edged with self-pity.

The most obvious examples of the debilitation that sets in as the loss of power looms is in the heavyhanded manner Kissinger has been wielding his bureaucratic hatchet. His campaign to undercut the position of our outspoken Ambassador to the U.N. Pat Moynihan, lacks the surgical skill he used to practice on William Rogers. The finesse is gone.

At Rambouillet, he had a private breakfast and other talks with his friend, British Foreign Secretary Callaghan. With uncharacteristic vehemence, British and American spokesmen insist

that at no time during those long talks was a single word mentioned about British dissatisfaction with the style or positions of the American U.N. Ambassador.

That's curious; immediately after Rambouillet, the British ambassador to the U.N. — Ivor Richard, a Labor party politician anxious to follow Callaghan up the ladder — launched into an oblique but savage personal attack on America's U.N. ambassador.

Implying archly that much of the fury in New York City at Gen. Ibi Amin's call for Israel's extinction was "self-induced," politician Richard derided Pat Moynihan's speeches objecting to anti-Semitism at the U.N. as a "theological crusade" by "an avenging angel preaching retribution and revenge." As an argument against confrontation, Richard's blast was highly confrontational.

Since this denunciation was later described as "an informal reflection of official British policy," one might think that a friendly British foreign secretary would have tipped off his American counterpart that an attack of that magnitude was forthcoming. A quick "By the way, our chap is clobbering your chap tomorrow, first time this century" would be expected between allies.

Not so. The British are now claiming, against all logic, that Ivor Richard's blast was a sneak attack. Why? Because her majesty's government cannot appear to have been manipulated into attacking the American ambassador by his bureaucratic enemy, the American secretary of state.

"No collusion," say Henry and Ivor, which is ludicrous: of course there was no overt collusion in the campaign against Pat. It was the atmosphere created by the Kissinger

State Department that enticed the British into the diatribe against moral stands. For weeks, State Department spokesmen have been giving Moynihan less than lukewarm support; Kissinger even criticized Moynihan's position publicly; and the bloated bureaucracy that makes up the permanent U.S. mission to the U.N. took these signals not to dissuade other delegations from attacking our ambassador.

No wonder Ivor took advantage of the kick-me sign that Henry pinned on Pat. Truckling to General Amin is standard British Labor party procedure; here was a chance for an ambitious politician to become a Third World hero while secretly pleasing his boss's friend, the fading phantom of foggy bottom.

But Henry's hatcheting was all too obvious; even Ivor's reference to Wyatt Earp carried overtones of the Kissinger lonesome-cowboy interview with Oriana Fallacci. When Moynihan made known his intention to resign, Henry panicked — he could not afford to be caught with another severed intellectual head in his hands — and backtracked furiously. When Moynihan delayed his departure at the last-minute request of the White House's Richard Cheney, Henry passed the word to his coterie that this was "Moynihan's Salzburg," a phony resignation threat.

But Ambassador Moynihan is not playing those games. He is serious about the need to confront unrea-soned hatred with rational rhetoric. When he met with President Ford yesterday, he was strongly supported, and probably reminded that as a member of the Cabinet, the ambassador to the U.N. also reports directly to the President.

This will stimulate more unfunny cracks by Kissinger about the hot breath of

Elliot Richardson. But our ambassador to the U.N. offers a President a more affirmative form of irreverence. Last year, when India Ghandi crushed freedom in India, the wryly upbeat Moynihan was heard to tell the President after a Cabinet meeting: "Look at it this way — history will remember that it was during the administration of Gerald Ford that America became the world's largest democracy."

Shirts by Ford Appear
To Distress Kissinger

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Nov. 13—
Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger was asked the
other night in Pittsburgh how
much influence should be
wielded by the President's
national security adviser —
the position Mr. Kissinger
held until 11 days ago.

To a roar of laughter from
a dinner audience, Mr. Kiss-
singer replied: "Well, at this
moment I am very much op-
posed to the assistant for
national security having any
influence."

Now that he has been
forced to give up the White
House post after seven years,
Mr. Kissinger has been mak-
ing bittersweet jokes about
his loss of power. He has
also been arguing—not very
persuasively—that the shake-
up announced Nov. 2 by Pres-
ident Ford does not have
much significance for him.

Despite Mr. Kissinger's as-
sertion that he is satisfied
with the changes—they in-

cluded the removal of James
R. Schlesinger as Secretary
of Defense and of William E.
Colby as Director of Central
Intelligence—he has not been
acting like a person on top,
and he seems unhappy over
what has taken place.

"I have never believed that foreign policy-making depends so crucially on a particular bureaucratic structure," he said at a news conference here Monday. I am confident that I have sufficient access to the President so that my views are heard, and that is all that a Cabinet member has a right to ask for."

Originally, his replacement
in the White House post by
his deputy there, Lieut. Gen.
Brent Scowcroft, was re-
garded as a sign that he had
emerged victorious in the
Washington infighting since
he would still be the Presi-
dent's chief adviser on for-

eign policy.

However, his closest aides
insist that he advised Mr.
Ford not to replace Mr.
Schlesinger though they had
policy and personal differ-
ences. They say he was irked
at being forced to give up his
White House post for what
appear to be solely political
reasons.

Furthermore, his anger has
been mounting over what he
and his staff perceive to be
a campaign of press leaks
from Ron Nessen, the Presi-
dential press secretary, and
other White House aides sug-
gesting that he suffered a de-
feat and that his contact with
Mr. Ford would be limited.

The leaks which have be-
come part of the Washington
gossip mill, indicate that
once Mr. Ford's new team
is in place, Mr. Kissinger,
who has been seeing Mr.
Ford alone at least once a
day, will meet with him only
as part of groups, and that
Elliott L. Richardson has been
named Secretary of Com-
merce as a possible replace-
ment for Mr. Kissinger.

The Secretary of State's
aides assert that he has not
been told by Mr. Ford that
his access will be limited
and that he has seen Mr.
Ford privately at least once a
day since the changes were
announced. Nonetheless,
White House correspondents
have informed Mr. Kissin-
ger's aides that Mr. Nessen
and others have been spread-
ing such reports; similar non-
attributable leaks were
passed to correspondents of
The New York Times by the
White House press office.

The Rumsfeld Matter

Apparently Mr. Kissinger
has also been agitated by
published accounts saying
that Donald H. Rumsfeld, the
former White House chief
of staff who is the nominee
to succeed Mr. Schlesinger
was the major winner in the
shifts.

It was no secret at the
White House and the State
Department that relations be-
tween Mr. Kissinger and Mr.
Rumsfeld were chilly, Mr.
Kissinger indicated this at his
Monday news conference
when he was asked to de-
scribe Mr. Rumsfeld's qualifi-
cations. Instead of an imme-
diate laudatory response, he
paused for what seemed to
be almost a minute and re-
plied with a quip: "We
haven't had a brawl in this
town for all of three days."
He then said that Mr. Rums-
feld would do a good job and
added," and I intend to co-
operate closely with him."

In Pittsburgh, at a news
conference Wednesday, he
was even more candid when
a reporter said that news
magazines had raised ques-
tions about the Kissinger-
Rumsfeld relationship. Seem-
ing to address his remarks to
Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Kissinger
said:

"It is our obligation as Secretary of State and Defense respectively to conduct the nation's business and not to carry out feuds. I have every intention—and I am positive he has every intention—to work closely together.

"We have very important
national decisions before us,
and they cannot be constant-
ly evaluated in terms of per-
sonalities. The victories that
are celebrated should not be
personal victories but victo-
ries of national purpose. I
feel very strongly that if there
is one thing we cannot now
afford, it is this constant
public bickering between
senior officials."

Will He Stay the Course?

The chief question that has
been nagging Mr. Kissinger's
aides and preoccupying the re-
porters that cover his activi-
ties has been whether he will
last out the balance of Mr.
Ford's term, as he indicated a

few months ago that he
would.

The curiosity has been
fueled by his comments.
Asked in Pittsburgh what
further accomplishments he
expected, he responded-jok-
ingly: "Of course, I have
a lot of time so I can plan
ahead." At his news confer-
ence Monday he avoided a
direct answer to a question
whether he would remain
through 1976. His reply, a
joke alluding to the timing
of dismissals, was: "Well,
I don't answer my telephones
on Sunday."

Mr. Kissinger's over-all
mood was not improved by
the decision today by the
House Select Committee on
Intelligence to issue a con-
tempt citation against him.
He said this afternoon that
this action, which he believed
was uncalled for on legal
and historical grounds, raised "se-
rious questions all over the
world of what this country is
doing to itself and what the
necessity is to torment our-
selves month after month."

Possible Negative Factor

Mr. Kissinger's principal
aides believe that he does
not contemplate quitting as
long as the White House does
not try to cut off his access
to the President.

On the other hand, a factor
that might lead him to leave
is the growing difficulty of
accomplishing anything sig-
nificant in foreign affairs in
the coming year. If by spring
he sees diplomacy curtailed
for the rest of the year,
some of his aides believe,
he might quit to start work
on a book.

In Pittsburgh Mr. Kissinger
cited three areas in which
he hoped further progress
could be achieved in his re-
maining time: the Middle
Eastern negotiations, the
staleminated talks with the So-
viet Union on limitations on
with the devel arms and rela-
strategic arms and relations
with the developing world.

The Middle East talks
sem at a point of indecision,
with no clear road to prog-
ress evident. And the arms
talks will have to be held up
until Mr. Rumsfeld can be
briefed on the details of the
intricate negotiations.

[L.C.]

Joseph Kraft

# Kissinger's Role

How does Henry Kissinger emerge from last week's shuffle of national security advisers?

One theory is that he achieved a big personal victory which opened the way to an early arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. My own sense is the opposite.

I think Dr. Kissinger has lost ground at the White House and the Pentagon. He will have to scramble to retain his preeminence and to keep alive prospects for an arms control accord.

At the White House, as head of the National Security Council under President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger dominated the foreign affairs community through a network of NSC committees, panels and working groups that nobody else even understood. Under President Ford, the Secretary of State has relied on the personal connection and allowed the NSC machinery to become virtually defunct.

Now another system is evolving that will bring a new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and a new CIA director, George Bush, into the policy deliberations at the highest level. President Ford is working out his own system—his equivalent of President Johnson's Tuesday lunches.

Dr. Kissinger is at least as weighty in argument as Messrs. Rumsfeld and Bush. He is scurrying to rebuild the NSC machinery. The new NSC staff head is a loyal lieutenant, Gen. Brent Scowcroft. Another Kissinger loyalist, William Hylands, has just been sent from State to be Gen. Scowcroft's deputy, which indicates that Dr. Kissinger, not entirely sure where he stands, is already hard at work shoring up his White House position.

As to the Pentagon, Dr. Kissinger had a rocky marriage of extreme convenience with outgoing Defense Secretary James Schlesinger. Though constantly bickering, they were also constantly compromising. And when they agreed, those two heavies could ram their views past the President and the military and congressional hawks—which made it that much easier to sell to the Russians.

The proof of that thesis lies in the Vladivostok agreement negotiation between President Ford and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev last year. The chief feature of that agreement was the “equal aggregate principle” whereby the United States and Russia each agreed to have the same total of nuclear weapons and the same total of multi-headed, or MIRVed, nuclear weapons.

Dr. Schlesinger was the chief proponent of the equal aggregate principle. Dr. Kissinger at first thought the Russians would never accept it because it did not compensate them for the nuclear problems presented to them by China, France and Britain.

But when the two men got together on equal aggregates, they sold it easily to Mr. Ford. Mr. Ford, with State and Defense united, won the agreement of Mr. Brezhnev. Moreover, the weight of the Kissinger-Schlesinger alliance virtually crushed criticisms from the military and congressional hawks.

The same kind of pattern was shaping up on the chief issues remaining after Vladivostok—Russia's Backfire bomber and this country's cruise missile. Dr. Kissinger thought they would complicate an agreement and wanted them out

altogether. Mr. Schlesinger felt the United States should get a price for accepting Russia's terms on the Backfire and wanted explicit acceptance of this country's cruise missiles.

After a bruising battle the two worked out a compromise position that Mr. Ford approved and Dr. Kissinger submitted to the Russians. Had the Russians accepted, Kissinger and Schlesinger would have been together pushing the accord easily past the military and the Congress.

With Mr. Rumsfeld at the Pentagon this scenario goes out the window. He is chiefly a political man, and he may feel, given the challenge of Ronald Reagan and the right, that a new arms agreement is not that important at this stage.

Even if he shares Secretary Kissinger's passion for an arms deal, his support would count little with the military and congressional hawks who would write him off as a mere political opportunist. The more so if Mr. Schlesinger, as an outsider, opposed the agreement.

Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Rumsfeld do have one possible way to beat down hawkish opposition to an arms accord. By threats of budgetary stringency and the loss of favorite weapons systems, they may be able to win over the service chiefs.

But that is a long shot—certainly not a cause for rejoicing among the opponents of detente and arms control. On the contrary, just as conservatives need to learn that Schlesinger's departure does not mean that Kissinger gives the crown jewels to the Kremlin, so liberals need to realize that the obstacle to an agreement has been not so much Mr. Schlesinger as the Russians.

-6-

FIRST-LINE REPORT - Dan Rather, CBS News (Morning, Nov. 10)

## REAGAN BLASTS KISSINGER AS THE DOCTOR FIGHTS NOW TO HOLD ON TO HIS OWN JOB

Suddenly, the hunter has become the hunted. For months, Secretary of State Kissinger stalked Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. A few weeks ago, he began circling him, then jumped in and got him. Now, however, Kissinger finds himself in a clearing, and others circling him.

Ronald Reagan is among them. The former California Governor, sharpening his claws for a run at the Presidency, now is saying publicly what he has been saying privately for a long while, namely, "I worry about Kissinger." In this week's issue of Time magazine, Reagan, in a centerpiece interview, unloads on Kissinger. He says, among other things, "With Nixon gone, I worry about Kissinger. He needed someone like Nixon to keep him on that tough track."

Then there are the Chinese. Frosty, frosty was the greeting the Chinese gave Kissinger on his most recent visit to the mainland. Despite Kissinger's best efforts to put the best publicity face on what happened in China, the fact is, they gave him the business. They gave it to him because they too, in Reagan's phrase, worry about Kissinger. They too worry that he is in danger of giving away the store--to the Soviets, that is. Kissinger has gambled heavily upon the Russians dealing in good faith on the subject of so-called detente. Make no mistake -- Kissinger believes fiercely and sincerely that reducing tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union is the great work of his life, and to be fair, it should be noted that in personal conversation as well as in public statements, Kissinger makes a persuasive argument that this is not a matter of personal aggrandizement, but a matter of deep personal belief that it is what is best for America and for all mankind.

What has Kissinger in such deep trouble now, what has his job in jeopardy are the following things: (a) there are people just as sincere who believe just as deeply that Kissinger is wrong, that is, his priority is wrong, and he is wrong to even try to trust the Soviets as much as he appears to be doing; (b) Kissinger's power in foreign policy is and has been for a long while out of kilter with traditional checks and balances; in short, he has too much unchecked or barely checked power; (c) Kissinger has alienated so many people, many of them unnecessarily, through what they interpret as his arrogance. For example, former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, now a private but extremely powerful adviser to President Ford,

-7-

and the new Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld; (d) Kissinger has insisted upon trying to do too many things himself, and when possible, in secret without debate. China's Chairman Mao, according to current NEWSWEEK, complained to a foreign visit recently that Kissinger was trying to do too much. Quote Mao, "Like catching ten fleas with ten fingers." And finally (e), Kissinger increasingly has been wrong. Example, the Cyprus situation -- where U.S. foreign policy under Kissinger's direct guidance, has managed to anger the Greeks, the Turks, and the Cypriots. He hurt relations with Japan by secretly courting Communist China without prior consultation, then turned around and hurt relations with Communist China by courting the Russians so vigorously. Put all that together with the secret tilt toward loser-Pakistan in the war with India, and the debacle that was the last days of the Vietnam war, and well, suffice to say, that while Kissinger is unquestionably brilliant he also is far from infallible. With his friend and sponsor Nelson Rockefeller now a lame-duck President (sic), Kissinger finds himself increasingly isolated within the Ford Administration.

In the wild, wild world of present day Washington politics, even the powerful Henry finds his job insecure. The hunter has become the hunted.

Mary McGrory

Palace Guard Is Brought Back

Washington.

Say what you will about Gerald Ford's coup against his own administration, it has done wonders for Washington. The town's two great cottage industries, gossip and plot-charting, have decisively recovered from their long, post-Watergate slump.

The boredom under Mr. Ford, that of a rainy weekend at a poorly insulated lakeside cottage, has been abruptly ended by the sight of the President as bouncer Dinner parties that have been listlessly pushing Democratic candidates around their plates are now digging into a feast of conspiracy and intrigue so rich and varied as to be indistinguishable.

Nothing is known for an absolute fact except that Gerald Ford has a cold. And that

hardly seems sufficient to explain why James R. Schlesinger, the Defense Secretary, was hauled to the White House at the ungodly hour of 8.30 A.M. on a Sunday to be sacked like an errant file clerk. On his way in, Mr Schlesinger passed the Central Intelligence Agency director, William E. Colby, who was coming out with his head tucked under his arm.

Mr Colby had to be temporarily rehired Wednesday, which suggests that Mr. Ford's cold didn't last long enough for advance planning.

Both of them, the President said at his incredible news conference, had done "a superb job." Nor were there any policy differences, he insisted. It is just that at Jerry's pub, only regulars are welcome now.

The President said it was all his idea. Its chaotic nature—it bears a strong family resemblance to his clownish campaign wanderings—is persuasive, but a look at the winners, Donald H. Rumsfeld and Henry A. Kissinger, suggests that the President may have been as much plotted against as plotting.

Mr Rumsfeld and Mr Kissinger, long-time enemies, are the popular choices for the ringleaders. What brought them together was Mr Kissinger's desire for Mr Schlesinger's scalp and Mr Rumsfeld's craving for Mr Schlesinger's job.

Mr Kissinger, typically, tried to have it both ways, as victor and victim. At first, he was a winner, his "loss" of his national security post to his worshipful subordinate, Lt. Gen Brent Scowcroft, had to be put in perspective. But as

the reviews started coming in, Mr Kissinger abruptly reversed course. His press lackeys dutifully painted him as an innocent bystander, stricken at the violence, bewailing his lot as a prime suspect.

As in the days of the Nixon decline, the most outlandish theories were entertained. When Nelson Rockefeller suddenly strode on to eliminate himself, the stunned populace began to whisper that the Vice President fell on his sword untimely to protest the "humiliation" of his old friend, the secretary of state.

The recall of Elliot L. Ri-

chardson from England was the most easily absorbed shock of the week. It is a White House reflex, these five years past, when skuiduggery is in progress, to summon Mr Richardson to lend a high Yankee gloss to the enterprise.

Our erstwhile representative in China also has been called back for the same reason. George W. Bush's credentials for the job of CIA director are invisible. He was Richard Nixon's national committee chairman during the 1972 campaign.

Most of the evidence so far suggests that if the President had a bad cold, he had a worse case of Ronald Reagan. As the corpses piled up on the stage, he called Barry M. Goldwater to remark what he had wrought. Senator Goldwater obligingly counseled Mr. Reagan to cease and desist. Mr. Reagan, however, quite sensibly noted that he thought the White House was coming apart at the seams and for-bore to withdraw.

What the brutal extravaganza did for the country is nothing except perhaps to reduce still further its trust in its princes. What it did for Gerald Ford was to make him look remarkably like Lenny of "Of Mice and Men." As he sees Henry Kissinger skipping off to the SALT sessions and Donald Rumsfeld skipping off to the Pentagon, he's left with a pile of crumpled Kleenex and the tatters of his reputation as a nice guy.

BS

11/10

Henry, hush

Secretary of State Kissinger seems to have stuck his foot in his attache case again. One reason for recent tepidness in Sino-American relations, says the *Wall Street Journal*, may be animosity between Mr. Kissinger and Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.

After their meeting last year, Kissinger reportedly called the powerful Chinese leader "a nasty little man." Whether true or not, the *Journal* says, the story found its way back to Peking. We do not have, of course, any knowledge of either Mr. Hsiao-ping's stature or disposition, but it is understandable that the gentleman might be unflattered by Mr. Kissinger's alleged assessment.

It was only recently, you will recall, that the Secretary of State had a misadventure with a microphone, which he wrongly assumed to be inoperative. A trusted aide of Mr. Kissinger's should perhaps revive the World War II admonition and paste it above the Secretary's desk — *Loose Lips Sink Ships*.

MACHIAVELLI PRESENTS PRINCE GERALDO WITH A NEW DEFENSE SECRETARY, ETC...

Given this disarray, many Republicans would not be surprised to see a challenge to Ford from the party's moderates, possibly even from Rockefeller, who did not rule out the race (see page 19). Until Ford's recent slippage in the polls and last week's events, such a challenge from the moderates would have been inconceivable.

Beyond Ford's political future what will the effects of the shake-up be in foreign and defense policy?

The President promised that Kissinger would continue to have the "dominant role in the formulation of and the carrying out of foreign policy." Nonetheless, the changes will diminish Kissinger's powers. Ford stripped Kissinger of his second job, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. In that post, Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee, which oversees the CIA, and had control over all of the foreign policy recommendations sent to the President. Though the job went to a loyal Kissinger aide, Lieut. General Brent Scowcroft, the shift ended Kissinger's monopoly as the President's foreign policy adviser. One White House aide disclosed that Kissinger's daily one-hour private meetings with Ford on foreign policy may be cut down, perhaps even to one session a week. Rumsfeld, unlike Schlesinger, may also meet weekly with Ford —in private or jointly with Kissinger —to provide the President with what White House sources called "broader foreign policy input on a regular basis."

Kissinger and Rumsfeld have had an antagonistic relationship that dates back to the early days of the Ford Administration and has sometimes been displayed in public. One day in September 1974, Kissinger emerged from the Oval Office and facetiously asked Rumsfeld, then U.S. Ambassador to NATO, "Would you like to kiss my ring?" Two months later, both were in Peking with Ford. As they headed for the limousines

one morning, Kissinger asked Rumsfeld, "Would you like to go sightseeing with Nancy or come to the talks with me?" Rumsfeld winced noticeably and replied, "I'll come with you."

Kissinger last week maintained his sense of humor. While briefing congressional Republican leaders on foreign aid, he cracked, "I've been so busy figuring out what jobs I have left that I haven't had time to study this." Showing a visitor a dagger, a gift from the government of Abu Dhabi, Kissinger said with mocking menace, "You see what happens when you turn your back?" Informed by White House Barber Milton Pitts that Jerry Ford was next on his schedule, Kissinger responded, "Tell the President that the only place I'll get to see him now is in the barbershop."

Turning serious, Kissinger argued that the new structure would not reduce his influence. Said he: "In my seventh year in Washington, if I cannot get a fair hearing for my views, then I do not deserve to be in my job." Moreover, it is questionable whether Rumsfeld has the intellectual capacity to compete with Kissinger in debate. But "Rummy" enjoys Ford's full confidence and is much closer to him personally than Kissinger is. Thus, Rumsfeld may well be a powerful and effective rival, particularly if Ford allows election-year politics-on which Rumsfeld is most expert-to influence foreign policy.

Kissinger believes that it would have been easier to forge a SALT II pact with the Soviets if Kissinger had remained Secretary of Defense. Though the two men differed fundamentally about détente (see page 20), Kissinger respected Schlesinger's intellect and feels they would have reached a compromise. In contrast, Kissinger has no great regard for Rumsfeld. The Soviets have rejected the latest U.S. position on SALT, and Kissinger

fears he must wait until Rumsfeld is confirmed, probably early next year, before finishing work on a new negotiating proposal. Beyond that, the Administration may feel the need to take a tougher position to show conservatives that the firing of Schlesinger does not signal a new American softness. Schlesinger is expected to be called before Congress to testify on the SALT talks, and his opinion may well harden feelings against détente.

Rumsfeld is believed to hold Schlesinger's view that the U.S. should demand more concessions from the Soviets. Last summer, while Ford was flying to Brussels to attend a NATO conference, Rumsfeld worked with him to toughen his language in a speech on détente. Among the statements they composed was a call for a "realistic agenda for détente, an agenda that serves our interests and not the interests of others who do not share our values... that anticipates and precludes the exploitation of our perceived weaknesses."

If Rumsfeld concludes that a SALT agreement will jeopardize Ford's election chances, he might recommend that it be delayed until 1977. Indeed, Ford said at his press conference that the U.S. was "under no time pressure" on SALT.

While Ford insisted that his personal shake-up did not reflect "any weakness" on national defense, U.S. allies are adversaries were confused about what the changes would mean. Though the Soviets have often criticized Schlesinger as an ugly American, Moscow reacted cautiously to his ouster, because Rumsfeld is virtually unknown to them. contrast, the Chinese officials fear that Schlesinger's firing could produce closer ties between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Now they may want to assess the impact of the Cabinet shuffle before confirming that Ford's China trip will take place as scheduled in early December.

South Koreans were shaken by the

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loss of Schlesinger, who had been extremely popular because of his recommendation that the U.S. use "nuclear weapons if necessary" to repel any attack from the North. Schlesinger's replacement by Rumsfeld dismayed many European defense officials, who are afraid that the new man will pay more attention to the winds of American politics than the needs of facing up to the Russians. NATO officials got a good look at Rumsfeld while he was the U.S. Ambassador to the alliance, and while they became used to his crisp style, they rank him far behind Schlesinger, who they feel is a brilliant strategist. One NATO official said that his colleagues welcomed having "a tough-minded guy like Schlesinger around who acts as an alternative opinion to Kissinger."

Some Pentagon officials who have worked with Rumsfeld admire his quick mind; others find him shallow. Said a retired general who knew Rumsfeld at NATO: "You had the feeling that he was propped up reading someone else's position paper." Other generals and admirals worried that he would be running for the vice-presidential nomination from the Pentagon's E-Ring. On the other hand, many hoped that Rumsfeld's political savvy would make him more successful than Schlesinger in pressing Pentagon programs on Congress.

George Bush, Ford's choice as CIA

director, is in a similar situation. In his brief, unremarkable diplomatic career, he has served for two years as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations and spent the past 13 months as chief of the U.S. liaison office in Peking. But he has no firsthand knowledge of the CIA, its operations or the investigations that have rocked the agency for nearly a year.

In Peking, Bush told a correspondent for the Toronto *Globe and Mail* that he would be a strong defender of the CIA because "I believe in the importance of a sound and strong intelligence capability." His friendship with Ford and experience with Congress, where Bush served two terms in the House, might help the agency as it tries to rebuild after the congressional investigations end.

These considerations were outweighed by apprehension among CIA officers that Bush may also try to use his new job as a steppingstone to the vice presidency. Some CIA officials called him "a pol," "a hack" or "a p.r. man." Said one officer: "It's understandable why the President couldn't pick someone from the profession itself, but did he really have to pick someone who is so much the opposite of a professional?"

Bush faces a stiff confirmation fight from Senators who believe that Ford should have chosen a non-politician. Among the opponents inevitably will be Idaho Democrat Frank Church, who heads the Senate's investigation of the CIA. As if to confirm that the nomina-

tion of Bush had not been considered carefully, Ford had to change his plans to force Colby out immediately. One day after he fired him, the President asked Colby to stay on until Bush is confirmed. Rather belatedly, Ford realized that Bush should remain in Peking until after the presidential visit. Colby's early departure would have left the CIA in the hands of his deputy, General Vernon Walters, during the last stages of the congressional investigations and Bush's confirmation fight. Walters would not be the CIA's best witness before a committee because he was somewhat tainted by the Watergate scandal. Acting on White House orders shortly after the break-in, Walters had urged the FBI to restrict part of its Watergate investigation for national security reasons that turned out to be nonexistent.

Ford's nominations are expected to be confirmed. But none of them excited admiration in Congress, not even among Republicans. Commented one G.O.P. House leader: "Ford said that he wanted 'my guys' in the Government, and then he picked a lot of old faces from the Nixon Administration—Richardson, Rumsfeld, Bush." Team players they may be, but they will have a hard time showing that they fit the positions to which they have been assigned.

## Musical Chairs on High

In not quite seven years, the Republican Administrations begun by Richard Nixon and continued by Gerald Ford have had an astonishing record of high-level turnovers. The CIA has gone through three directors—Richard Helms, James Schlesinger and William Colby—and will soon have a fourth, George Bush. The FBI has had four chiefs: J. Edgar Hoover, L. Patrick Gray (acting), William Ruckelshaus (acting) and Clarence Kelley. The Office of Management and Budget (formerly the Budget Bureau) has had five directors: Robert Mayo, George Shultz, Caspar Weinberger, Roy Ash and James Lynn.

Most remarkably, the new nominees will bring to 36 the number of people occupying the eleven Cabinet jobs since January 1969—and that figure does not include the repeat performances of Elliot Richardson, George Shultz and Rogers Morton. The most stable departments have been State (William Rogers, Henry Kissinger) and Agriculture (Clifford Hardin, Earl Butz). All other departments have had from three to six Secretaries:

**JUSTICE**, six—John Mitchell, Richard Kleindienst, Richardson, Robert Bork (acting Attorney General), William Saxbe, Edward Levi.

**COMMERCE**, five—Maurice Stans, Peter Peterson, Frederick Dent, Morton, Richardson (nominated).

**DEFENSE**, four—Melvin Laird, Richardson, Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld (nominated).

**TREASURY**, four—David Kennedy, John Connally, Shultz, William Simon.

**LABOR**, four—Shultz, James Hodgson, Peter Brennan, John Dunlop.

**HEW**, four—Robert Finch, Richardson, Weinberger, David Mathews.

**INTERIOR**, four—Walter Hickel, Morton, Stanley Hathaway, Thomas Kleppe.

**HUD**, three—George Romney, Lynn, Carla Hills.

**TRANSPORTATION**, three—John Volpe, Claude Brinegar, William Coleman.

TIME, NOVEMBER 17, 1975

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THE NATION

# Scenario of the Shake-Up

Gerald Ford's Sunday shake-up had its roots in the very beginning of his Administration and was a belated attempt to deal with several high-level personality and policy clashes.

Even as Ford prepared to take over the Administration from Nixon in August 1974, some members of his informal “kitchen cabinet”—which included former Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, former Presidential Aide Bryce Harlow, former Pennsylvania Governor William Scranton, Michigan Senator Robert Griffin, and then NATO Ambassador Donald Rumsfeld—had some advice.

TERRY ARTHUR

DISMISSED DEFENSE CHIEF JAMES SCHLESINGER

"I haven't resigned, sir."

They urged that Ford relieve Henry Kissinger of his job as head of the National Security Council to devote full time to his duties as Secretary of State. No matter how able, they argued, he could not do justice to both, and his dual role tended to "rupture the process" of policy-making. Ford, emphasizing the need for "continuity" in foreign relations, rejected their advice.

Also, when he was still Vice President, he expressed his personal misgivings about working with Defense Secretary James Schlesinger. He told the *New Republic's* John Osborne in April 1974 that if he became President, he might not keep the caustic Schlesinger in his Cabinet because he did not think the Secretary could deal with Congress. Ford, as well, felt uncomfortable with Schlesinger. But, apparently for the sake of continuity, he made no change.

As Ford's Administration pro-

gressed, Kissinger's two-hat burden and Schlesinger's abrasiveness became more troublesome to the President, and in a way, the two problems began to merge. Last March, when Kissinger's Middle East shuttle collapsed just as South Viet Nam and Cambodia began to fall, the Secretary lashed out at Congress for not responding with more arms and money for Southeast Asia. Ford's advisers again warned that Kissinger was overworked and overwrought. But rather than rein in Kissinger, Ford joined him in an unproductive attack on Congress.

At the same time, relations between Kissinger and Schlesinger, two strong-willed, independent men, grew tense. They had been squabbling since the Yom Kippur War of October 1973, when Kissinger charged that Schlesinger tried to stall the massive resupply of U.S. weapons to the Israelis. A year later, Kissinger promised to consider sending Pershing missiles to Israel; Schlesinger, who had not been consulted when Kissinger made the promise, contended that reopening production lines for the missile was impractical. More seriously, they increasingly disagreed on détente, notably on just what concessions could safely be made to the Russians to gain an agreement on limiting offensive nuclear weapons (see box page 20).

Each suspected the other of using guerrilla tactics. Schlesinger aides complained that their boss would present persuasive views at National Security Council meetings chaired by Kissinger or send reasoned position papers to the White House, but because all national security proposals flowed through Kissinger, arguments were emasculated by the time they reached Ford. Kissinger assistants, in turn, claimed that Schlesinger would seem to concur in policy sessions, then disclose contrary views to reporters. At one NSC meeting attended by Schlesinger and some of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Kissinger threw a copy of *Aviation Week* on the table and, shouting, demanded to know who had leaked a story headlined SOVIET TREATY VIOLATIONS DETECTED. Schlesinger, a strong advocate of tighter measures to prevent cheating on weapons agreements, claimed not to know.

Sometimes Schlesinger did not speak out publicly but, according to some Ford advisers, conveyed his message through his two main supporters in the Senate, Washington Democrat Henry Jackson and New York Republican James Buckley. Says a Buckley aide: "Kissinger's office was keeping the book on Schlesinger. There was a minor industry in the State Department of putting the blocks to him." The suspicions were mutual. Early this year Kiss-

singer told Nelson Rockefeller he was convinced that Schlesinger was out to get his job as Secretary of State. Kissinger and Schlesinger began finding reasons to skip their once-a-week scheduled breakfasts. The last was held on Sept. 12.

The impression of a divided Government became embarrassing to Ford. And he faced other problems within his Administration. Both Kissinger and Rockefeller were complaining about the way CIA Director William Colby was candidly answering questions by con-

DENNIS BRACK—BLACK STAR

OUTGOING CIA CHIEF COLBY

"Good luck, Jim."

regional committees about the CIA's assassination plots against Cuba's Fidel Castro, its failure to destroy potential biological weapons and its illegal snooping on the mail of domestic political extremists. Publicly, Ford claimed that Colby was carrying out his directions, as befits an "open" Administration; privately, Ford was irritated.

Above all, the politics of trying to discourage a challenge from Ronald Reagan grew urgently important to Ford. Finally, he moved to tackle all of those problems in a burst of decisive action. His maneuvering unfolded on the following eventful days:

**Oct. 16.** Ford's unofficial group of advisers, who had been meeting periodically with him and a few senior White House aides for more than a year, held another of their straight-talking. "you've

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SHAWN HUGHES

GEORGE & BARBARA BUSH IN PEKING

got problems, Jerry" sessions. Ford was told by Harlow, Laird, Griffin and others that he was not conveying a take-charge image in foreign policy. The conflicting signals on SALT and détente from Kissinger and Schlesinger were confusing the public.

**Oct. 20.** Schlesinger convened a press conference and scathingly denounced cuts of $7.6 billion made by the House Appropriations Committee in the Pentagon's proposed $97.8 billion budget for next year. He called the cuts "deep, savage and arbitrary." The outburst angered Ford, confirming his belief that Schlesinger did not understand congressional lobbying. It is one thing for a President to lambaste Congress; that's politics. But department heads are supposed to get along with the legislators who shape their budgets. Schlesinger, moreover, was seeking higher defense spending than even Ford wanted—and the committee chairman, Democratic Congressman George Mahon, was a close friend of Ford's.

That same day, Ford's 1976 campaign advisers, including Republican Senators Hugh Scott and Robert Dole and Ohio Political Pro Ray Bliss, met just after David Packard resigned as finance chairman of the President's election campaign. The disarray in the campaign worried them, and they sent word to the White House that Ford must start acting more "presidential."

**Oct. 25.** By now Ford had decided to move on all of this advice. Apparently consulting no one—with the possible

major exception of his chief of staff, Rumsfeld—Ford had sketched out the shifts. Kissinger would have to give up his NSC post, which would be filled by his NSC deputy, Brent Scowcroft; Schlesinger would be replaced at Defense by Rumsfeld; Colby would lose his CIA job, giving way to George Bush. Ford apparently told no one when he planned to announce the new appointments.

The President summoned Kissinger, who had just returned from his trip to China, and Rumsfeld to the Oval Office. The two wary antagonists sat on a yellow sofa by the fireplace, facing the President. "I want to talk to you two about some thoughts I have," Ford began gently. He looked at Rumsfeld, told him that he wanted him to take Schlesinger's job. Rumsfeld, who told intimates later that the offer surprised him, said

he needed time to consider such a big assignment.

Addressing Kissinger, Ford said that he must leave the NSC position. Kissinger too expressed surprise but, when told that Scowcroft would succeed him, raised no objection. The President only tentatively raised his idea of replacing Colby with Bush.

**Oct. 26.** Ford golfed with Congressman Mahon, who made no mention of Schlesinger's attack on the budget reductions. Mahon had defended the cuts in answer to Schlesinger, and the Secretary had called him later to explain that he had meant no personal criticism. Mahon seemed to brush off the incident.

Ford's intention, however, was to have Rockefeller announce his withdrawal first and to reveal the other changes later. That would not only separate the political and staff issues but give conservatives a reason to be so pleased with Rocky's demise that the Schlesinger dismissal might seem only a sop to the party's moderates and liberals.

**Nov. 1.** At 8:20 on a Saturday morning, the red and white lights outside Schlesinger's Pentagon office were aglow. White meant he was in; red meant he had visitors (green indicates he is on the phone to the White House). His budget aides were with him, orga-

nizing arguments against the Defense Department taking as big a share of Ford's promised $28 billion expense reductions as the President wanted. At 9:45, the green light flashed; Schlesinger had called Ford to ask if he could explain some of the dangers of drastic cuts. Ford agreed.

At 11:30 Schlesinger met Ford and some of the President's top budget officials at the White House. The Defense Secretary was discouraged to find that Ford's men were insisting on sharp cuts by the Pentagon. As the talks continued, Schlesinger turned testy. He also brought up another matter: one of his aides, Robert Ellsworth, wanted to quit

THE NATION

(LC)

**Oct. 28.** At his regular weekly meeting with Ford in the Oval Office, Vice President Rockefeller raised the sensitive issue of his future. He told Ford that he wanted to drop off the 1976 ticket and thus remove himself as a political issue. Undoubtedly relieved, Ford made no attempt to dissuade Rocky. The Vice President said he would submit a letter making his intention public, although the timing was not decided.

ELLIOT RICHARDSON OUTSIDE U.S. EMBASSY IN LONDON'S GROSVENOR SQUARE

Returning to the action, even in a fading Administration.

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THE NATION

as head of the Pentagon's International Security Affairs Agency because he felt the State Department was ignoring his advice. Schlesinger suggested making Ellsworth a Deputy Secretary of Defense, which would place him on an equal, No. 2 ranking with the Pentagon's William Clements. Ford, who had already offered Ellsworth the presidency of the Export-Import Bank, was non-committal. Although the cool meeting lasted for 90 minutes, Ford gave no hint that he planned to fire Schlesinger.

By Saturday afternoon, both the White House and the Pentagon started getting press inquiries about rumors of high-level shifts: *Newsweek* began inquiring about the possibility that Kissinger was losing his NSC position. Quite truthfully, Press Secretary Ron Nessen turned back initial inquiries with the comment, "I haven't heard about that." Schlesinger relayed through spokesmen his belief that no plan was afoot to scuttle him, since he had just spent time with the President and the top-
ic did not arise.

The rumors messed up Ford's announcement plans. By Saturday night the inquiries were so persistent that Ford decided he must inform Schlesinger and Colby that they were through. "It was the human thing to do," a top White House aide later explained. Presidential Counsellor John Marsh called Schlesinger to ask him to meet with Ford the next morning, without explaining why. He also left a similar message for Colby.

**Nov. 2.** As Colby sat down with Ford promptly at 8 a.m., the President tried to be friendly. He conceded that he was moving abruptly in asking Colby to step down so quickly

and implied that he realized this was going back on his earlier promise to let Colby retire with dignity and honor after the inquisitorial ordeal of investigations was over. He wanted to act now, Ford explained, as part of a reorganization of his entire national security team. Colby was offered the NATO ambassadorship, but declined. A professional to the end, the CIA director made no attempt to change Ford's mind. As Colby left, he saw Schlesinger waiting to enter the Oval Office. After explaining that Ford had just fired him, Colby said with a sympathetic smile: "Good luck, Jim."

The meeting between Ford and Schlesinger was not acrimonious, but both men were uncomfortable. Ford said he needed his own team, that he had to end the public feud between Schlesinger and Kissinger. He kept referring to Schlesinger's "resignation." Schlesinger was irritated by the repetition of the word. "I haven't resigned, sir, you are firing me," he corrected the President.

Ford told Schlesinger that he wanted Rumsfeld to replace him but that Rumsfeld had not yet agreed. Schlesinger was offered the presidency of the Export-Import Bank and, alternatively, the ambassadorship to NATO. He turned down both and left after 30 minutes—stunned. (Learning later that his job had been offered to others, NATO Ambassador David Bruce, 77, a distinguished career diplomat who has no plans to retire, was outraged.)

At Schlesinger's home in Arlington, Va., a post-firing wake turned into an impromptu party. Army Secretary Martin Hoffmann—who was a Princeton roommate of his new boss, Rumsfeld—dropped by. So did Colby and his wife, who seemed radiant at the prospect that her husband would soon be

out of the harsh spotlight. General Vernon Walters, deputy director of the CIA, arrived with a box of chocolates and a battery-operated car for the youngest of Schlesinger's eight children. Schlesinger's wife Rachel cooked a 22-lb. turkey. Before carving it, Schlesinger asked: "Where do I apply for food stamps?" Later, as Colby left, Schlesinger clapped him on the back and said: "Who would ever have thought that Dick Helms would survive the both of us?" (It was under Helms, rather than either Schlesinger or Colby, that the CIA committed many of its much-criticized transgressions; Helms remains Ambassador to Iran.)

At the White House the President concluded his painful morning chores and flew off as scheduled to resume his meetings with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in Jacksonville. But he had other unfinished business as well. He put in a call on the presidential scrambler telephone to Elliot Richardson, U.S. Ambassador to Britain.

At his office in London, Richardson stopped editing some proofs for a book on the responsiveness of government to the people that he hopes will be published this spring and took the ten-minute call. Ford ran through his list of proposed changes and said that Commerce Secretary Rogers Morton wanted to leave his job at year's end. Would Richardson be interested in that position? Another interim possibility was offered. (Richardson has not said what it was, but Administration sources suggested that he recently was sounded out for the CIA post.) Ford wanted Richardson to return to offset any distress among Republican moderates over Rocky's removal from consideration and to enhance another vice-presidential prospect.

Richardson asked for time to consider. He returned to his embassy res-

idence in Regent's Park and talked to his wife Anne. Somewhat reluctant to move again and give up her activity with two British singing groups (including a Bach choir), she nevertheless was willing. Richardson tapped longtime associates by telephone. One warned that Ford was unlikely to win another term, so why should Richardson take up a lackluster post like Commerce in a failing Administration? Others advised that Richardson should accept the job to get back into the thick of the political action in Washington. Richardson decided to do so.

By Sunday afternoon, Rockefeller had prepared his letter renouncing a place on the 1976 ticket. He called Ford in Jacksonville to find out when to deliver it. Ford suggested that it be released at 3 p.m. the next day. Later on Sunday Ford became convinced that the rumors of the shifts, particularly the firing of Schlesinger, could not be contained. The President recognized that his plan for Rocky's announcement to precede the

GENE BASSET—SCRIPPS-HOWARD NEWSPAPERS

"Rocky, I'm glad you decided to leave on your own."

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TIME, NOVEMBER 17, 1975

news of the Schlesinger-Colby firings was lost. To make the best of the matter, he decided to call a televised press conference for Monday night.

Nov. 3. Monday-morning headlines blared the Schlesinger and Colby firings. When Rockefeller reached his office at 10 a.m., an urgent message from the White House asked him to rush his letter over earlier than planned—by 10:30 a.m. The surprising Rockefeller withdrawal was immediately announced to reporters. By the time Ford went on TV at 7:30 p.m. E.S.T., the only real news

was the substitution of Richardson for Morton.

Ford insisted that he had executed the shake-up on his own. State Department sources agreed that Kissinger, for one, had argued for nearly a week against the Schlesinger dismissal. Claimed another Cabinet officer about Kissinger: "Hell, he'd beaten Schlesinger on the substantive issues, and he still respected his intellect. But he can barely talk with Rumsfeld, and now Rumsfeld is in Defense. Henry hasn't gained anything."

Yet there were solid doubts in Washington last week over whether Ford had acted alone in the not very astute scheme. The suspicions centered on Rumsfeld. His professions of surprise and reluctance seemed a bit overdone. When a visitor asked Kissinger whether Rumsfeld really had seriously hesitated about wanting the Pentagon post, the Secretary of State snapped: "Yes, and Richard Nixon didn't want to be President." It seemed obvious that last week's sensations have not ended the White House intrigues.

## A Grace Note from Rocky

Nothing so became Nelson Rockefeller in the vice presidency of the U.S. as his renunciation of it. In a week of tawdry infighting and ugly speculation, he struck one of the few grace notes.

No one ever went to more trouble than Rockefeller to attain an office for which he was, if anything, overqualified. He was subjected to relentless, often brutal questioning by his congressional investigators. Yet after less than a year in office he announced last week that "it's just not worth it" to remain on the ticket. He was candid about the reasons for his decision. "I came down to Washington to serve the country I love and to help in solving the problems which we face. I did not come down to get caught up in party squabbles. I came here to help the President, not to complicate his life."

Rocky did not arrive in Washington with exaggerated expectations. Aware of how precarious the vice presidency could be, he tried to head off criticism by making himself close to invisible. He called himself a "staff man, an assistant to the President." He deferred to the President, sang his praises and never took public issue with him. Even so, his very presence was upsetting to the lesser men around him. Says a Rockefeller associate: "The White House staff was sitting there, like tigers at the gate, waiting for him to make his move, ready to jump him."

He remained unacceptable to the G.O.P.'s hard-core right wing, which had never forgiven him for his opposition to Barry Goldwater in 1964. Nothing Rocky did could assuage them. When Howard ("Bo") Callaway, a Georgia conservative, was named Ford's campaign chairman, he went out of his way to say that Rocky was Ford's "No. 1 problem" in winning the nomination. In an effort to pacify his enemies, Rocky went South to

exchange compliments with George Wallace, but the trip riled liberals without changing the minds of many conservatives. A September Harris poll showed that only 34% of the American public wanted Rocky as Vice President on the 1976 ticket. Noted an exasperated Rocky supporter in the White House: "Whatever he's doing out there, it's not working."

Rockefeller finally stopped being a team player when he broke with the President over New York City. The split was not acrimonious. When Rocky was quoted as saying that default would be a "catastrophe," the President mildly reprimanded him but did not order him to stop speaking out. White House aides, on the other hand, were more emphatic. Donald Rumsfeld, said a Rocky sym-

pathizer, was "jumping up and down." Already miffed because the President had backed Rocky's plan for a $100 billion energy independence authority, Treasury Secretary William Simon joined the sniping. As the pressures mounted, Rocky decided to take himself out of the race. When he revealed his intentions to the President two weeks ago, Ford did not try to dissuade him. In fact, a Rockefeller source claims, Ford accepted with unseemly alacrity.

Freed from the endless political bickering, Rocky hopes to be able to devote his remaining months as Vice President to the urgent national problems that have always concerned him. But stripped of his political power, he may find that he lacks clout in other areas as well. Instead of being attacked, he may be ignored—the ultimate humiliation for such a lifelong political activist. Richard Cheney, Rumsfeld's successor as White House Chief of Staff, is a Rumsfeld man. When a White House staffer was recently asked a question about the Vice President, he replied "Who?" and then chuckled malevolently.

Yet Rocky is not without political resources. Still the nation's foremost Republican moderate, he refused to take himself out of the 1976 presidential race when he was questioned at his press conference. If Ronald Reagan upsets Ford in the early primaries, and forces him out of the running, it is conceivable that Rocky would enter the race. In part, Rockefeller dropped off the ticket because he did not want to continue to feed ammunition to the Republican right—what he calls "a minority of a minority." He feels that nothing less than the salvation of the Republican Party is at stake. He said at his press conference, "I think the Republican Party is only going to be an effective party if it reflects the best interests of the American people, and traditionally that is in the center. That is where our country has always been. That is where the Republican Party has won."

THE VICE PRESIDENT NEAR HIS VACATION HOME IN MAINE

DENNIS BRICK-PLECKIT/TNS

Détente: H.K. v. J.S.

Henry Kissinger and James Schlesinger, the two most brilliant members of Gerald Ford's Cabinet, have disagreed sharply and frequently on the meaning and objectives of détente. What are their differences? Briefly put, Kissinger thinks any nuclear exchange between the superpowers would be disastrous, involving "colossal, indeed catastrophic damage." Schlesinger is just as appalled at the prospect of such an exchange, but he argues that a limited war with tactical nuclear weapons must be seriously considered and planned for. "What we need," he has said, "is a series of measured responses to aggression that bear some relation to the provocation [and] have prospects of terminating hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out."

Schlesinger watched Moscow's rising defense expenditures with concern, counting every new missile and tank and worrying that the military balance was gradually shifting in the Soviets' favor. He feared that the perception of military strength was as important as the strength itself. Accordingly, if the Russians believed themselves to be superior to the U.S., whether in fact they were or not, they would be tempted to test American resolve. In numerous speeches, he maintained that in constant dollars U.S. defense expenditures have dropped 20% since 1964, while Soviet expenditures have increased by about 40% during the same period.

Kissinger, by contrast, feels numbers alone do not tell the story. The U.S., he says, has the power to destroy the Soviet Union several times over—and vice versa; adding to the number of American missiles would be futile. An enemy can be killed only once, his reasoning goes. He believes the U.S. needs only a "sufficiency" of arms to deter the Soviets, not a superiority, and that sufficiency already exists.

The negotiations with the Russians over the second phase of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT II) have sharpened the dispute. The talks have been at a standstill since July, when Kissinger made a series of new proposals to Moscow. The Russians did not reply until two weeks ago, and when they did, they simply passed over the new proposals.

In SALT I, signed in 1972, the U.S. allowed the Soviets numerical superiority in ballistic missile launchers (2,358 v. 1,710 for the U.S.). This advantage,

Washington reasoned, was balanced by three factors: the greater accuracy of the U.S. missiles; a big American lead in the development of MIRVs—clusters of missiles independently aimed from a big rocket as it nears target; and U.S. bombers and bases near the U.S.S.R. But, Schlesinger's Pentagon now complains, the Soviets perfected their MIRV technology sooner than anticipated, giving them an even greater potential superiority in numbers. The Russian missiles have greater throw-weights—that is, they can carry more and bigger warheads—the Pentagon also points out; thus even if the number of launchers was equal, the So-

viets would have a strategic edge. In response, the U.S. military is now promoting development of the "cruise missile," a long-range, jet-propelled, guided bomb that can be launched from either a bomber, a ship or a submarine. Capable of flying close to the earth and therefore below enemy radar, the missile has a range of 1,500 miles and is extraordinarily accurate. The Pentagon says that since the cruise missile flies through the atmosphere, it should not be counted with ICBMS, which travel through space, in the SALT II ceiling. The Russians insist that it should be included.

At the same time, the Russians argue that their new Backfire bomber should be excluded from SALT II because it has only a limited range (5,500 to 6,000

miles). The Pentagon counters that an to-air refueling could send it to the U.S. and back. The U.S.'s July proposal the Soviets suggested a compromise that would limit both Backfires and cruise missiles. Reflecting his distrust of Moscow, Schlesinger argues, however, that the Soviets will eventually perfect cruise missiles of their own to match ours. Or, as they do, he says, they will unquestionably cheat in declaring how many of the easily concealed weapons are in their hands. When the whole issue of arms negotiations was raised at a recent National Security Council meeting, Kissinger and Schlesinger engaged in what on-the-scene observer described as the most heated exchange in the Security Council in memory.

It is sometimes said that Schlesinger's profound distrust of détente stems from a fundamental pessimism about human nature, or least about the American people. Schlesinger argues that the opposite is more nearly true. He is, says, basically optimistic about the strength of the U.S. and the capacity of its people to respond challenge despite a temporary lack of confidence in the wake of Watergate and Viet Nam. That it is unnecessary to make disadvantageous deals with the Soviet Union simply for the sake of being time, since the U.S. will eventually snap out of its desponding mood anyway.

It is Kissinger who is the policy, Schlesinger maintains, the cause the Secretary of State feels the West may generally be incline and not just temporarily weakened by the events of the past decade. Indeed, Kissinger has guessed that détente is necessarily largely because Congress and the people will simply not stomach the effort and sacrifice necessary for confrontational policies at what Schlesinger would call strong defense posture and tougher bargaining stance.

In the main, Kissinger believes détente has served the U.S. well. The U.S., he feels, has not given up anything vital to the Russians. Washington, in argument goes, has extracted from the Kremlin all that can reasonably be expected as a result of détente. More pressure might cause Moscow to reject détente entirely, just as it rejected a Soviet-American trade agreement earlier this year, when Congress insisted, part of the package, that more Soviet Jews be allowed to emigrate. Indeed, Kissinger concludes, détente may have been oversold in the U.S. It is not a peace act for peace. It is instead a means which two mutually hostile societies can compete, co-exist and occasionally solve their differences.

"Détente"

DRAWING BY RICHTER; ©1974 THE NEW YORKER MAGAZINE, INC.

THE NATION

(L)

THE ADMINISTRATION/COVER STORIES

# FORD'S COSTLY PURGE

A concerned Gerald Ford met with some of his closest old friends and domestic advisers three weeks ago for a bare-knuckle assessment of what had gone wrong with his presidency. During the year of transition from the trauma of the Nixon Administration, his open and candid manner had calmed and reassured the nation. But then his fortunes had changed. His popularity fell to a low 47% in the Gallup poll late in October. His tireless campaigning for election drew yawns from even the party faithful. Ronald Reagan was challenging him on the right and moving up in the polls. More and more Americans were complaining that Ford's presidency lacked purpose and direction. Thus, at the private strategy session, recalled one adviser, "the President was urged to make everybody understand that he was definitely calling the shots."

Last week Ford tried to seize control of the situation with a barrage of firings and hirings such as the nation had not seen before, with the exception—in very different circumstances—of the Saturday Night Massacre by the desperate Nixon Administration in 1973 (see following story). For Ford, the moves backfired—at least initially. To many Americans, his actions seemed abrupt, not to say panicky. Instead of strength and certainty, he conveyed the impression that he was bumbling and dominated by political motives.

Ford insisted that he only wanted to field "my own team" in the crucial area of national security; he invoked the word team 16 times during a 33-minute televised press conference, four times in a single sentence. He exulted, "I did it totally on my own. It was my decision. I fitted the pieces together, and they fitted excellently... These are my guys." Despite the Mr. Touchdown talk, the explanation did not score: the men who were benched had all served Ford ably. If his shuffling had been done only to put in more congenial and compliant subordinates, then it was even more unattractive and potentially dangerous.

Most of the criticism focused on the summary dismissal of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, an iconoclastic intellectual who says what he thinks —often in a prickly way. Was the reason for the firing his strong dissent from Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's brand of détente? Or was it that Ford considered him overly acerbic, abrasive, aggressive? The answer, it seemed, was

a combination of both, with the personal motive outweighing the policy problem. A President is certainly entitled to fire advisers with whom he cannot work. But a self-assured President should also be tolerant of dissent for the sake of keeping himself open to different points of view.

Ford's reasons for firing CIA Director William Colby were clearer. A fresh figure, preferably someone from outside the intelligence community, was needed to restore public confidence in the agency. Moreover, in the Administration's view, Colby had been too forthcoming in releasing secret information about the CIA's past misdeeds to the congressional investigating committees. But Ford's timing in dismissing Colby was odd indeed. Many political leaders wondered why the President had not waited until the investigations were over.

At the same time, many liberal and moderate Republicans were disturbed by Nelson Rockefeller's announcement that he was withdrawing from consideration as Ford's Vice President in 1976. Despite Ford's denials, the consensus in Washington was that the President had got the word to Rocky to jump before he was pushed. Ford's purpose: to keep conservative Republicans from deserting to Reagan.

In general, Congressmen of both parties felt that Ford had blundered, not only because of some bad timing and a lack of usual courtesies, but, more important, because of the questionable caliber of a couple of the replacements. As successors to Schlesinger and Colby, Ford chose two ambitious and heatedly partisan Republicans: for Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, the White House chief of staff; for CIA director, George Bush, the chief of the U.S. liaison office in Peking. Senator Henry Jackson, a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination, charged that Ford was surrounding himself with "yes men and lackeys." The switches further increased the record number of high-level Administration changes since 1969, a churning of Government that not only reflects bad management but also has upset planning and subverted morale in many departments.

Ford's credibility with the American public suffered. For the first time, the earnest, honest man from Grand Rapids looked straight into the television cameras and obviously disassembled. He insisted that "there were no basic differences" on détente between Schlesinger and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger.

An incredulous reporter, John Osborne of the *New Republic*, asked a carefully worded follow-up question: "Are you saying and intending to be understood to say that neither personal nor policy differences between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Schlesinger contributed to this change?" Responded Ford: "That is correct." Obviously, it was not correct.

There were many questions raised by Ford's precipitate moves, and the most immediate one was whether they improved his chances of winning the Republican nomination—and the election —in 1976.

On one hand, the restive Republican right will be placated—at least tentatively and temporarily—by Rockefeller's withdrawal. With Rocky gone, said Republican Governor James E. Holshouser Jr. of North Carolina, "it will now be more difficult to mount a conservative challenge." Added a Ford campaign aide: "We pulled the rug out from under the Republicans who have been holding out. Now we can say, 'If you want to have an influence on the ticket, you'd better get in line.' "

Candidate Ford can dangle prospects of a vice-presidential nomination to induce various Republicans to back him. Mused California Pollster Mervin Field: "Ford has a wide-open dance card because he's not coming to the prom with a girl of his own." Among the contenders are three members of the Administration's new "team": Rumsfeld, Bush and Elliot Richardson (see page 30), who was named to succeed Rogers Morton as Secretary of Commerce. Morton is expected to take over leadership of the President's campaign from Director Howard ("Bo") Callaway, who has been blamed by many Republicans for its ineptitude.

For all that, and some praise among Republicans for Ford's "decisiveness," the prevailing opinion within the party was that Ford had hurt his chances, although the President himself predicted after the changes that he would be a winner "right up to the end of 1976." Quite a few Republicans, especially conservatives, were unsettled by the sacking of Schlesinger. Others were upset by the way Ford handled the whole shuffle. Said former California Republican Chairman Gordon Luce: "People are asking, 'What is going on in Washington? Why the musical chairs? Who's in charge?' Such a massive change has to raise the question of whether the Administration is in disarray."

RUMSFELD & FORD IN WHITE HOUSE CABINET ROOM LAST WEEK

DENNIS BRACK—BLACK STAR

9

Susan T. McKiinney—Newsweek

## Kissinger: Fewer tête-à-têtes?

among the casualties of the massacre—and quite possibly of Rumsfeld himself, an old and adroit adversary in the court intrigues at the White House. Kissinger did outlast two leading antagonists in Schlesinger and Colby, and Ford himself certified at his press conference last week that the Secretary will remain the “dominant” man in U.S. foreign policy. But Kissinger lost caste in the shuffle—so much so that some of his gloomier friends at State wondered if he might not quit after a decent interval. His losses included not only the NSC directorate but probably six key national-security committee chairmanships that go with it. More critically, the shake-up cost him his hour's daily tête-à-tête with Ford; he will have to share the President hereafter with the rest of the team—including Donald Rumsfeld.

■ Colby, 55, had been expected to go, but not so soon or so precipitately; he was shown the door with so much haste that first Rumsfeld, then Ford himself had to beg him back to run The Company until the new management takes over. That could be a long while. Bush, 51, did a tour as Nixon's GOP chairman in 1973—an odd credential for an agency trying to fight free of political abuse. The nomination kicked up instant opposition, notably from chairman Frank Church of the Senate's CIA investigating committee—and even some of Ford's best friends doubted its wisdom. “It's a stupid act,” said a member of the President's kitchen Cabinet. “If a Democratic President nominated Larry O'Brien to run the CIA, we'd be raising hell.”

■ The departure of Morton, 61, and the return of Richardson, 55, seemed almost an afterthought—a throw-in by Ford to make the changes look less like a palace coup and more like a coherent package,

## NATIONAL AFFAIRS

as well as to offer at least one move that had not previously leaked. Morton actually had told Ford three weeks ago that he would like to leave sometime in the next several months; he learned that the time was now only hours before Ford went on national television and announced it. Richardson, restless in London under Kissinger's blanketing shadow, was readily available for a Cabinet job—his fourth in five years—and for a concomitant shot at the second spot on the national ticket.

### 'A STATE OF PANIC'

In the aftermath of the massacre, there was much speculation in Washington as to who held the smoking gun; the most popular guesses were Rumsfeld, Kissinger or even Ford's old guru Melvin Laird, but the most likely answer was the President himself. His Administration had fallen into public bickering, his campaign into public disarray. His popularity rating had stagnated at 47 per cent in the Gallup poll and had withered to 38 per cent in a new Harris survey. His capacity for leadership was widely suspect; the persistent advice of his political handlers was no more Mr. Nice Guy—do something Presidential. And looming just ahead was a right-flank challenge whose dangers had only belatedly dawned on the President's men. It was telling that conservative elder Barry Goldwater was the first party leader Ford consulted before going public; the President's people, according to one of them, “are in a state of panic over Ronald Reagan.”

Their fears have quickened in direct proportion to the widening of the public fissures in the Administration—particularly Schlesinger's dissidence over dètente and defense budget-cutting. The President papered over these differences in a press conference that could

most charitably be described as disin genuine; he insisted over and over that there were no serious divisions—he simply wanted his own team in place of the one he inherited from Nixon. But his own chill regard for Schlesinger clearly played a part in his decision-making; he told one close adviser it was “essential to have people whose chemistry meets yours”—as Schlesinger's manifestly did not. More damaging still was the prospect that the Schlesinger-Kissinger feuda would blow up with disastrous diplomatic and political consequences. “The President,” said one intimate, “would have been confronted in six weeks, perhaps, with a very grave problem—open fundamental irreconcilabilities between two infallible dogmatists.”

## THE INSIDE GAME

The shake-up is likely to quiet those dissonances, and so make it easier for Ford to achieve such front-burner objectives as a SALT II agreement with the Soviets and an exemplary $7 billion cut in the Pentagon budget. The policy implications of the Schlesinger-Rumsfeld switch tended to be greatly overstated, particularly by conservatives for political effect; Ford himself felt obliged to assure “allies and adversaries” alike in a weekend speech that the moves signaled no softening of America's military posture. Rumsfeld in fact walks as hard a line as Schlesinger. The real difference is that, where Schlesinger felt obliged to plead his case out of court to be heard, Rumsfeld is as adept as Kissinger at the inside game—and is close enough to Ford to play it.

Still, in purely political terms, Ford plainly underrated the anger of the Republican right at Schlesinger's exit—and overrated their joy at Rocky's. Goldwater, for one, did suggest publicly that the Veep's withdrawal put a “crimp” in

James K.W. Atherton—The Washington Post

Welcome back: A reprieved Colby, with House CIA inquiry chairman Otis Pike

26

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

in defense spending by the House Appropriations Committee, whose chairman—Texas Democrat George Mahon—is an old pal and sometime golfing buddy of the President. As it happened, Ford agreed that the cuts ($7.6 billion) were too sweeping, and he said as much to Mahon. The President did not mention Schlesinger's rebuke, but it was a striking example of the Defense Secretary's blunt personal style and impatience with political finesse, both of which Ford found increasingly uncongenial.

Even before Richard Nixon's resignation, Vice President Ford had speculated to The New Republic that as President he would probably look for a Pentagon boss who could handle relations with Congress more deftly. Once installed in the Oval Office, Ford developed a great appreciation of Schlesinger's management and grasp of complex defense issues, but he never felt comfortable

further irritated Ford, said another source, was that "the audience lapped it up... It was the sort of speech Reagan could have given, and the President hated it even more because of that."

The speech also followed Schlesinger's decision to permit Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, to circulate within the Pentagon a cold-warish study of "Détente in Soviet Strategy." The report listed such Soviet objectives as dominance in Europe and an acceleration in the breakup of the Western alliance. "In Moscow's view," it concluded, "détente is clearly working to its advantage."

SATURDAY, OCT. 25

Kissinger, just back from his distinctly untriumphant mission to China, briefed the President on his trip. At the 90-minute session, Kissinger argued for a diplomatic downgrading of Ford's own

assert control over foreign policy. Schlesinger must go, Rumsfeld would replace him, and Kissinger would have to give up his post as head of the National Security Council. Neither Rumsfeld nor Kissinger accepted on the spot, nor had the President decided when he wanted to make the changes. But the die was clearly cast. Afterward, the President went out to play tennis with adviser William Seidman against Rumsfeld in campaign director Howard (B) Callaway. The President and Seidman lost both sets.

By some accounts, Rumsfeld was less surprised by the President's decision than he later suggested. Administration sources said that Rumsfeld had long been the strongest proponent lifting Kissinger's NSC hat. And as early as last winter, other sources said, Rumsfeld was known to be looking at the position of Secretary of Defense as

advantageous one for his self—"a concept waiting for an opportunity."

TUESDAY, OCT. 28

Now it was Ford's turn to be surprised, pleasant Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, in for one of his regular weekly meetings with the President, told Ford that he would not be available as a running mate next year (page 41). Rocky's decision provided the President with a bit of honey to sweeten news of the Schlesinger firing among Republican conservatives. According to the plan that began to emerge from the Oval Office called for announcement of the Rockefeller move before all others.

With Schlesinger still the dark and Kissinger also quietly cleaning out his fice in the White House. Ford then began thinking other changes that might tuck into the package most obviously the last expected replacement

William Colby as director of the beleaguered Central Intelligence Agency. Discussion of who should succeed Colby had been going on for months in the Ford inner circle, with Elliot Richardson receiving early consideration. In the end, however, U.S. envoy to China George Bush finally emerged as the strongest contender.

SATURDAY, NOV. 1

In the morning, Schlesinger entered 90-minute meeting with Ford at which the President gave no hint of the Secretary's terminal status. In fact, Schlesinger thought the session a "cordial" one which he had actually made some he way in his campaign against the cuts in next year's defense budget. White House

Wally McNamee—Newsweek

Before the press conference: Rumsfeld, Marsh, Ford, Morton aide, Morton, Buchen

with the cerebral, often disdainful, Harvard Ph.D. By mid-October, too, Schlesinger had begun dropping hints that he might resign rather than preside over the heavy cuts contemplated in the 1976-77 Pentagon budget.

FRIDAY, OCT. 24

This time it was a speech by Schlesinger—filling in for an ailing Ford in Gainesville, Fla.—that made the President "blow his stack," according to sources close to the Secretary. Schlesinger did nothing to restrain his doubts about reductions in U.S. defense spending, emphasizing that "the Soviet Union will—if these trends continue—become a major military power."

upcoming China visit—for foreign policy reasons—by the addition of stops in Indonesia and the Philippines. Donald Rumsfeld and other White House aides later contended that the extra stops might be a domestic political liability. Kissinger won out in the end, but some insiders thought that the problems over China had angered Ford and sharply reduced Kissinger's standing.

After the China meeting, Ford tried to watch some football on TV (Southern California vs. Notre Dame), but he evidently decided the time had come for the decisions he had long been pondering. He abruptly called Kissinger and Rumsfeld back to his office. After the obligatory small talk, Ford laid out his plan to

edged the sweep of his power. "Let me tell you about a decision I made today," he told reporters—before catching himself: "I mean, let me tell you about a decision the President made today."

Rumsfeld even managed to hack away at Kissinger's once impregnable position as the lone influential voice of American foreign policy. In the declining days of the Vietnam war last April, Rumsfeld helped to convince Ford to declare in his Tulane University speech that Vietnam 'is finished as far as America is concerned.' He also orchestrated the chorus of leaked reports that Kissinger's National Security Council directorship was in jeopardy. Few in Washington expected the Secretary of State to have an easier time with Rumsfeld at the Pentagon than he had with Schlesinger. "If Henry thinks his main foreign policy nemesis

has been removed, he's got another think coming," said a White House aide. "The guy who used to oppose Kissinger was a guy Ford didn't like; the new guy has the President's ear."

Not everyone in the White House shares Ford's fondness for Rumsfeld. True, virtually everyone respects his talent ("He's a mean goddam bulldozer, but he's damn capable," says one colleague) and most concede that he can be charming when he wishes. But more often than not he is abrasive and even insulting in dealing with subordinates. He has been known to hang up on aides in mid-conversation, and during one large meeting he barked to another Cabinet-level official: "Stand up when you ask a question!" Even Rumsfeld's friends admit that they sometimes wonder about his principles. "I don't think Don could list the five principles that mean the most to him," says one congressman who knows him well. "He's a kind of mechanical, upwardly mobile guy. But I'm not clear what makes Rummy run."

Ambition is clearly one of his fuels. He is an native of Winnetka, Ill., a wealthy, conservative Chicago suburb where he was captain of the high-school wrestling team and first ran for Congress. After three terms on the Hill, he served Richard Nixon as head of both the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Cost of Living Council and as a counselor to the President. In 1972, Rumsfeld left Washington to become U.S. ambassador to NATO,

a move that seemed a puzzling one for an up-and-coming politician. But Rumsfeld has long shown an uncanny ability to leave a post before it became a liability or a danger, and it was while he was safely in Brussels that the Watergate scandals broke around the Nixon Administration. Rumsfeld was never stained by Watergate and when he returned to Ford's request to supervise the Presidential transition, he soon stepped into a more influential job than ever before.

## LOOKING AHEAD

The future Defense Secretary, a handsome, muscular man (he says he can still do 25 one-handed push-ups), quite obviously sees himself as a future political candidate—and few expect him to stay in the Pentagon job for long. Rumsfeld was barely tapped for the Defense post last week before he was mentioned as a possible Vice Presidential running mate for Ford in 1976. If that should not be offered, Rumsfeld is widely expected to leave the Pentagon after the election to start running for office in Illinois.

In any campaign, Rumsfeld will certainly have one valuable ally: Gerald Ford. The two have been friends since 1965 when Rumsfeld joined a band of Republican congressmen who successfully overthrew Charles Halleck as House Minority Leader and installed Ford in his place. Even now that he is officially leaving the White House, Rumsfeld will certainly be called on regularly to advise the President on matters ranging far beyond national defense. The Pentagon job has never been a particularly promising springboard for political advancement, but if anyone can make it so, that person may well be Donald Rumsfeld.

—RICHARD STEELE with THOMAS M. DeFRANK and PHILIP S. COOK in Washington

Rumsfeld as sports star: 25 one-handed push-ups

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Oliver Williams—Vena & Froyer

Up From Anonymity

In Gerald Ford's sweeping shake-up last week, two of the most anonymous men in political Washington suddenly stepped into two of the most important and powerful posts in the Administration. Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft was named chief White House adviser on national-security affairs and Richard Cheney became the President's chief of staff. Profiles of the two:

His Secret Service code name is "Red Baron," but his secretaries call him "Babycakes." Brent Scowcroft, the 50-year-old Air Force general whom President Ford named last week to succeed Henry Kissinger as director of the

hole 100 hours a week. He is the first White House staffer to brief the President each morning and frequently one of the last to leave the White House at night. A slight (5 feet 8 inches and 130 pounds), baldish man, Scowcroft is not considered a vigorous "take-charge guy" by those in the Ford Administration, but is credited with excellent judgment and intelligence. "I know that if I don't agree with Brent, I should rethink my position," says Kissinger assistant Lawrence Eagleburger.

Scowcroft achieved his present position as a military theorist and national-security specialist quite literally by accident. He had hoped to become a career military pilot, but during one flight his aircraft threw a connecting rod and crashed—putting Scowcroft in the hospital for several months. "I assumed I'd

the President with a clear choice—options—particularly when some of those options might conflict with singer's recommendations. Scowcroft's critics have also charged that he took control of the council's administrative apparatus. They fear that though Scowcroft is no longer singer's deputy, the NSC will still have Henry Kissinger's operation—primarily since Scowcroft's deputy-to-William Hyland, head of the Stanford Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and a Kissinger man to the President. But Scowcroft is under no illusion: where his ultimate loyalties lie. "Fellow loyal to Kissinger," says one NSC official, "but he's also become the President." Scowcroft's promotion from prence to sorcerer last week was ably proof enough that that was the

brain trust had gathered Oval Office to prepare Geralynn for last week's news conference. The President methodically wor

Barry Scott

National Security Council, merits both sobriquets. He can be tough enough to disagree with Kissinger (who rarely welcomes being challenged), yet he is affable and gracious with his staff subordinates. He is unfailingly modest and calm—his strongest outburst when something goes wrong is rarely more than a startled "Oh, gosh"—and Kissinger himself calls his former deputy "one of the two or three best officers I've ever encountered."

Since Scowcroft first became Kissinger's NSC deputy in April 1973, he has been an indefatigable worker, laboring in his cramped, cable-strewn cubby-

never be able to fly again,” he recalls, “so I started looking for something else.” He took a master’s degree in international relations at Columbia University (later earning a doctorate) and did a two-year stint as military attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. After postings to the Air Force Academy faculty and the Pentagon, Scowcroft finally went to the White House in February 1972 as Richard Nixon’s military assistant. There he caught the eye of Henry Kissinger. “I watched him stand up to [former White House chief of staff H.R.] Haldeman,” Kissinger says. “That impressed me.”

Some in the White House complain that Scowcroft's closeness to Kissinger, coupled with his lack of assertiveness, has resulted in the NSC's not presenting

way through a stack of likely q and then suddenly burst into la prankster had slipped in on "Who is Cheney?"

It wasn't all that unlikely a for Richard Bruce Cheney, 34, was unknown outside the Administration councils until last week was named to succeed Donald as White House chief of staff. In fourteen months since he became the deputy and alter ego maintained the lowest of low befitting his Secret Service c "Backseat." The new White House of staff clearly intends to live nickname. "Don was very much figure when he came to the job says. "I don't see my role as a public figure. My role is to run

Wally McNamara

Scowcroft (left) and Cheney: The apprentices graduated to sorcerers

Newsweek, November

Washington Whispers®

[Items appearing on this page are being talked about in Washington or other news centers.]

# Will Kissinger Be Next? ... Barnstorming Plans
For Reagan ... Doubts About a Politician at CIA

The view that Henry A. Kissinger emerged a big winner in the White House power struggle is not universally shared. Speculation is that President Ford may well dispense with his Secretary of State before the '76 election. Pretext for Mr. Kissinger's exit would be that congressional interference makes it impossible for him to pursue an effective foreign policy.

Choice of Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense is being defended on the ground that he will be every bit as much a hard-liner as the departing James Schlesinger. Says one Rumsfeld backer: "Anyone who knows him knows he isn't timid. He'll have just as many differences with Henry Kissinger as Schlesinger had."

White House insiders expect Robert Hartmann, the President's long-time associate and top speech writer, to try for a comeback now that Mr. Rumsfeld leaving the White House. Mr. Hartmann had been sidetracked. Betting is that Mr. Hartmann will now share the total power with Richard Cheney, the new chief of staff, and John Marsh, another trusted presidential adviser.

Rockefeller's decision to bow as Vice President after this term—a way of removing himself from the political squabbles—strengthens the hand of Gerald Ford's campaign man-ager, Howard ("Bo") Callaway, who is first to say on the record that the late President was a political liability.

Former Governor Ronald Reagan now has a formal announcement of his candidacy during the week of November 17, to be followed by a barnstorm-trip to important primary States, — an appearance in Washington, —ending back in California.

Although he still harbors White House hopes, Democrat Edmund Muskie is busy keeping his fences mended back home in Maine. He expects a challenge for his Senate seat from youthful William Cohen, the Republican Representative who won national attention during the Watergate hearings.

Doubts are already being expressed that a Democratic Senate will approve George Bush as new head of the CIA. While he is held in high esteem personally, his opponents insist that what is needed at CIA is a "professional" and not a partisan politician. Mr. Bush, now in Peking as U.S. representative, was a former Chairman of the Republican National Committee.

Some American experts believe there will be no significant improvement in U.S.-China relations before 1977 because of leadership uncertainties in both countries. Real worry: In the meantime, relations between Washington and Peking could worsen.

Senator Henry Jackson, White House aspirant, has secretly asked his Senate investigating subcommittee to lie low for a while. The Washington State lawmaker was deeply embarrassed by his panel's "wild goose chase" for the body of missing former Teamster boss, James Hoffa.

British and Canadian spy agencies have demanded—and obtained—a written guarantee that no secrets they provide to the CIA under an exchange agreement will be revealed to U.S. congressional investigating committees.

President Ford is leaning, as a last resort, to simple extension of oil-price controls until after the 1976 election,

rather than let them expire on November 15. Blame for higher fuel prices is a heavier political burden than Mr. Ford wants to bear at this stage of his election campaign.

The public's disillusionment with Congress is making Senators increasingly skittish about missing votes. Absenteeism is averaging about 10.6 per cent this year, the best record since 1964. The average for the last 10 years has been 16 per cent.

Support from the Administration and Chairman Peter Rodino of the House Judiciary Committee is reviving proposals for a federal plan to compensate crime victims. The Senate, prodded by Democratic Leader Mike Mansfield, has passed such a bill several times, only to see it die in the House.

Insiders discount reports that President Ford will name Senator Hugh Scott, the Senate's G.O.P. Leader, as the next envoy to China. The reason: Pennsylvania's Governor Milton J. Shapp, a Democrat, almost certainly would appoint an anti-Ford man to succeed Mr. Scott.

Thousands of American servicemen and their families now qualify for food stamps, Pentagon pay studies show. Because few military families are aware of procedures for applying, some military bases have begun counseling them on the red tape involved.

Despite Detroit's efforts to win domination of the small-car market in the U.S., foreign manufacturers aren't giving up. A tiny diesel-powered auto from Volkswagen capable of 35 miles a gallon in stop-and-go city traffic may be introduced here next year.

NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 17, 1975

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Newsweek

Nov. 2

Newsweek cited Administration sources as saying that Secretary Kissinger had fumbled the President's upcoming trip to China. But the sources had other criticisms, too. "At the White House he was charged with giving Ford bad advice on his meeting with Russian dissident Alexander Solzhenitsyn. The plan for an overall peace settlement in the Middle East seemed to be stalled at least temporarily. Detente, with Russia, the cornerstone of his diplomacy, was going slowly -- but much too fast, Ford's people noted, for Republican conservatives. And some Presidential advisors complained that Kissinger was not responsive enough to domestic political needs, particularly in the demands he had been making on Ford's travel time."

The article goes on to quote "some sources close to Gerald Ford" as saying that the President has less need for Kissinger these days. The article cites a man who knows both of them as saying "Ford has a great respect for Kissinger but the relationship is not as warm as it was. Ford is feeling more independent of the Secretary. He has no intention of doing it, I'm sure, but if Ford decided he needed or wanted to get rid of Kissinger, he could get along without him."

New York

Times

Nov. 2

The *New York Times* ran a long story by Les Gelb about the impending changes. The article cited "Administration officials" as saying that the President was relieving the Secretary of his NSC hat but to soften the blow to Mr. Kissinger, Scowcroft would be his replacement. "White House sources acknowledged that the reason for the President's decision to take away Mr. Kissinger's prized Security Council position had more to do with politics than with policy differences." "White House officials" are also quoted as saying that the change was the result of "months of maneuvering by Mr. Rumsfeld to crack the Secretary's power, arguing on numerous occasions that 'Henry is now a political liability to the President'".

The Gelb article quotes "officials familiar with the White House deliberations on these matters" as saying that in his meeting with the Secretary, the President said that they both knew that criticism of Mr. Kissinger in Congress and elsewhere had been intensifying and perhaps the best way to dissipate this was to take away his NSC hat. One of these sources "intimated that Mr. Kissinger made it his condition for giving up his Security Council post that Mr. Schlesinger be removed from the Pentagon."

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NBC News

Nov. 3

Tom Brokaw reported that Kissinger may be a "casualty" of the personnel change. He reported that while Kissinger is the only member of the Administration who meets privately with the President for one hour daily, after the Cabinet shuffle "Kissinger's access would be cut back to one meeting a week, and as the new Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld would share that privilege." Wire service reports the same day noted reports that Rumsfeld by virtue of his close association with the President would be a formidable balance to Kissinger in the new Cabinet.

Wash Post

Nov. 4

Lou Cannon, in an article entitled "Rumsfeld: Silent Architect," cites a variety of "Administration officials" as alleging that Rumsfeld engineered the White House makeup thereby accomplishing the dual purpose of diminishing Kissinger's authority and finding himself a new job. A "White House official" is quoted as saying that Kissinger will lose his daily private meeting with the President as will Scowcroft and that the President will now adopt "a team approach" scheduling a one hour meeting each day with his foreign policy advisors -- Kissinger, Rumsfeld, and Bush.

UPI, Nov. 4

Helen Thomas quoted "Administration officials" as saying that "Henry Kissinger lost great power in President Ford's Cabinet makeup and suggested Eliot Richardson might succeed him as Secretary of State within a year." These "Administration officials" added that Kissinger's loss of his NSC hat would "severely reduce his access to Ford and provide 'more balance' in foreign policy decisions. They said Kissinger, who has met with Ford for one hour every morning until now will normally see the President for only one hour each week." The same "Administration officials" alleged that Rumsfeld would get the same access to the President and that he, 'Kissinger and Bush would meet jointly with the President twice a week.

Later in the same article the "Administration officials" speculate that Richardson may have accepted the Commerce job "with the expectation that he might eventually replace Kissinger as Secretary of State -- perhaps even before the 1976 elections."

UPI, Nov. 4

Richard Growald proclaimed "the age of Kissinger may be over. In the eyes of White House officials, President Ford has stripped Henry Kissinger of his prime power source -- his workaday morning hour in the oval office." In the article, it is alleged that Rumsfeld and his men "grew irked" at Kissinger's access to

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the President, claimed that Kissinger refused to funnel his work through the White House paper mill and that he was a bad team player. The "White House officials" go on to say that plans are being drawn up which will give Kissinger one meeting a week with the President. "Furthermore, the officials say, Kissinger will not be meeting alone with Ford. He will share the sessions with Rumsfeld and George Bush."

NBC, Nov. 4

Tom Brokaw noted first that Rumsfeld had a conservative voting record though his current thinking on Defense policy is unknown. Brokaw went on to quote "Kissinger critics around the Ford Administration as insisting that Rumsfeld will be an effective check against the Secretary of State's power."

UPI, Nov. 5

Nick Daniloff quoted "High Administration officials" to the effect that Kissinger was "maneuvering" Bill Hyland into the Deputy job at either the NSC or the CIA. One "knowledgeable Administration source" told Daniloff: "If Scowcroft is the graven image of Kissinger, Hyland is even more so."

Daniloff's article goes on to assert that some "Administration officials" are saying that Kissinger lost great power in the Cabinet shakeup. Instead of meeting an hour a day privately with the President he will now normally see the President an hour a week. These officials said that the reorganization was aimed at putting President Ford's personal stamp on national security policy and at "achieving greater balance between Kissinger and the Secretary of Defense."

Another UPI article of the same date cites some "informed Administration sources" as suggesting that Richardson might succeed Kissinger within a year."

Wall Street Journal

Nov. 5.

Robert Keatley notes that the President has looked at 1976 and seen much potential trouble ahead in foreign affairs. He may this be putting distance between himself and Kissinger. Keatley wrote that "early word from the White House is that Kissinger will no longer have his daily hour alone with the President in which he pushed his diplomatic ideas and batted down contrary thoughts served up by other bureaucrats." Keatley cites "White House reports" that the President will consider foreign policy issues in a committee including Kissinger, Rumsfeld, and Bush. This system will soon be replacing the Secretary's daily private access to the President.

-5-

And, the CIA, like the Defense Department will have a leader
who is a personal friend of the President and who can have the same
access to him as Mr. Rumsfeld or Dr. Kissinger. The Chinese
view, according to Harsch, will get more attention now through
Mr. Bush and the NATO, West European and Arab points of view
will get more attention through Mr. Rumsfeld.

Moreover the article alleges Kissinger "is only one among equals. He will no longer see the President alone for an hour each morning. Instead he and the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Secretary of the Treasury and others will all together see the President -- once a week. . . it' will no longer be a one-man show. . . the collective process in foreign policy making is slower than the one-man process which Dr. Kissinger has been practicing. But it should be sounder. "

Wash. Post

Nov. 8

Marilyn Berger reported that Kissinger stands to lose the Chairmanship of six important Committees as a result of his removal from his NSC post. She quotes Administration sources as saying yesterday that while no decisions have been announced it is expected that since Kissinger held his other chairmanships as head of the National Security Council, these six jobs would now go to Scowcroft.

In the same paper, November 8, Lou Cannon, travelling with the
President's party in Boston states that there have been persistent delays
in the advance planning of the President's China trip. He says that
some Administration officials "privately have expressed concern
that these delays reflect Chinese uneasiness over US detente policies
and continued strategic arms limitation negotiations with the Soviet
Union. "

CBS Radio

Nov. 8

Bernard Kalb reported that no reasons have been revealed for the delay in announcing the President's China trip. "But there have been reports of problems dealing with the duration of the visit." Also speculation that the President's ouster of Schlesinger, a favorite of Peking because of his hardline on detente, may have cooled Chinese interest in the trip.

NYT, Nov. 9

James Naughton reported that "a central reason for Mr. Ford's decision to juggle the National Security side of his cabinet was said by a number of his associates, to be a desire to demonstrate to the voters that he -- not Secretary Kissinger, not Secretary Schlesinger, not Vice President Rockefeller -- was in charge."

TIME, Nov. 10

In a long article on the Cabinet changes, TIME quotes one White House aide as saying that Kissinger's daily on-the-hour private meeting with Ford on foreign policy may be cut down, perhaps even to on-the-session a week. Rumsfeld, unlike Schlesinger, may also meet weekly with Ford -- in private or jointly with Kissinger -- to provide the President with what White House sources called "border foreign policy input on a regular basis."

"Kissinger and Rumsfeld have had an antagonistic relationship that dates back to the early days of the Ford Administration and has sometimes been displayed in public. One day in September 1974, Kissinger emerged from the Oval Office and facetiously asked Rumsfeld, then U. S. Ambassador to NATO, "would you like to kiss my ring?" Two months later, both were in Peking with Ford. As they headed for the limousines one morning, Kissinger asked Rumsfeld, "Would you like to go sightseeing with Nancy or come to the talks with me?" Rumsfeld winced noticeable and replied, "I'll come with you."

NEWSWEEK

Nov. 10

The news magazine states that Kissinger lost caste in the shuffle. "The shakeup cost him his hours' daily tete-a-tete with Ford. He will have to share the President hereafter with the rest of the team-- including Rumsfeld."

Newsweek also discusses the President's upcoming China trip and states that Donald Rumsfeld and other White House aides later contended that the extra stops might be a domestic political liability. Kissinger won out in the end but some insiders thought that the problems over China had angered Ford and sharply reduced Kissinger's standing.

The magazine discusses the Rumsfeld-Kissinger relationship as follows: "Rumsfeld even managed to hack away at Kissinger's once impregnable position as the lone influential voice of American foreign policy. In the declining days of the Vietnam war last April, Rumsfeld helped to convince Ford to declare in his Tulane University speech that Vietnam 'is finished as far as America is concerned.' He also

-7-

orchestrated the chorus of leaked reports that Kissinger's National Security Council directorship was in jeopardy. Few in Washington expected the Secretary of State to have an easier time with Rumsfeld at the Pentagon than he had with Schlesinger. 'If Henry thinks his main foreign policy nemesis has been removed, he's got another thing coming,' said a White House aide. 'The guy who used to oppose Kissinger was a guy Ford didn't like; the new guy has the President's ear.'

In discussing the appointment of Brent Scowcroft as NSC head, Newsweek states the following: "Some in the White House complain that Scowcroft's closeness to Kissinger, coupled with his lack of assertiveness, has resulted in the NSC's not presenting the President with a clear choice of options -- particularly when some of those options might conflict with Kissinger's recommendations. Scowcroft's critics have also charged that he never took control of the council's administrative apparatus. They fear that even though Scowcroft is no longer Kissinger's deputy, the NSC will still be Henry Kissinger's operation -- particularly since Scowcroft's deputy-to-be is William Hyland, head of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and a Kissinger man to the hilt."

U. S. News &
World Report
Nov. 10

In its Washington whispers column, this magazine carried the following item: "The view that Henry A. Kissinger emerged a big winner in the White House power struggle is not universally shared. Speculation is that President Ford may well dispense with his Secretary of State before the '76 election. Pretext for Mr. Kissinger's exit would be that congressional interference makes it impossible for him to pursue an effective foreign policy."

[LC]

# Schlesinger's View of Kissinger Described

By DREW MIDDLETON

In the view of Secretary of
Defense James R. Schlesinger,
differences between him and
Secretary of State Henry A.
Kissinger on how to deal with
Soviet violations of the first
agreement on limitation of
strategic arms were a major
cause of Mr. Schlesinger's dis-
missal, according to a close
aide of the Secretary.

Mr. Schlesinger has consist-
ently been highly critical of
the Secretary of State's nego-
tiating tactics in seeking dé-
tente with the Soviet Union,
which he has characterized as
"a strategy of pre-emptive con-
cession," meaning, in his view,
that Mr. Kissinger was making
extensive concessions before
the Russians asked for them.

The reported criticism of the
Secretary of State's dealings
with the Russians focused on
two tactical aspects of nego-
tiations: allegations that Mr.
Kissinger was reluctant to ac-
cuse them of violations and
that he was overly willing to
make concessions to them.

A Larger Question

The dispute on these points
apparently did not involve a
larger question—distortion of
estimates of Soviet and Amer-
ican nuclear strength and de-
ployment. The House Intelli-
gence Committee reported
Thursday that it had substantial
information indicating Ford Ad-
ministration attempts to distort
such estimates.

In Mr. Schlesinger's view,
according to the aide, his
dismissal by President Ford
was the culmination of a cam-

paign—mounted by the State
Department and waged by
leaks and calculated indiscre-
tions to the media—aimed at
weakening the Defense Secre-
tary's position with the Presi-
dent and in Congress.

Another source, a high De-
fense Department official, said
his conviction was that Mr.
Kissinger's tactics in intramur-
al disputes were to eliminate
all those who did not agree
with his views. The source
added that the Secretary of
State appeared to see any
opposition as personal attack
rather than as differences over
issues.

Intensified by Bickering

In Mr. Schlesinger's view,
it was reported, there was an
honest intellectual difference
between the two Cabinet minis-
ters, and this was exacerbated
by bickering at lower levels
of the Defense and State De-
partments.

Other sources in Washington
have suggested other reasons
for Mr. Schlesinger's dismissal.
These include his attacks on
House Appropriations Commit-
tee for cutting the defense
budget and President Ford's
personal uneasiness in the com-
pany of the Secretary, an in-
tellectual only too obviously
disdainful of small talk. Mr.
Schlesinger, a Defense Depart-
ment official said, did not fit
the "folksy" style of the Ford
Administration.

Sources in the higher military
echelons of the Defense Depart-
ment express deep concern
over what they regard as irra-
tional attacks on Mr. Schlesin-
ger's "realism" in negotiations

with the Soviet Union. From
their standpoint the Secretary
of Defense, when he had,
evidence of Soviet evasion of
the first arms agreement, had
no option but to put it before
the President and the Cabinet.
Mr. Kissinger, in Mr. Schle-
singer's opinion was reluctant
to lay evidence of evasions
before the Russians and repea-
tedly took the position that
they had made a mistake or
that an evasion, if it occurred,
had not been made known to
the leadership in Moscow.

Officers familiar with the
tight Kremlin control over the
military and civilian bureaucra-
cies find this hard to swallow.

Satellite Photographs

From the outset, it was said,
Mr. Schlesinger felt that when
the Russians had been caught
in an evasion they should have
been charged with it immedi-
tely. To his mind there was
no profit in sitting on the
evidence.

A military source familiar
with the negotiations said:
"Henry thought they could be
babled along, Jim thought you
had to stick it to them—make
them respect the rules at the
outset or they would never
conform."

Satellite photographs and
other information convinced in-
telligence analysts in the Penta-
gon that the Russians were
systematically cheating on the
overall agreement including the
provisions on antiballistic mis-
siles, on concealment under the
interim agreement of strategic
offensive arms and on the de-
ployment of a follow-on gener-

ation of "light" intercontinental
ballistic missiles.

The most serious infractions,
in the view of the analysts—a
view shared by Mr. Schlesinger
—were construction of illegal
ICBM silos and of up to 200
"command and control" centers
that can be rapidly converted
to silos.

As Mr. Schlesinger saw it,
Mr. Kissinger was willing to
turn a blind eye to these
and other evasions thus weak-
ening the American position
in the negotiations and encou-
raging Soviet cheating.

The defense Secretary was
also critical of what he regard-
ed as the Secretary of State's
penchant for making conces-
sions before the negotiating
teams had reached substantive
questions. His description of
this as a strategy of pre-emp-
loyed Mr. Kessinger, whose
irritation was said to be in-
creased by repetition in foreign
governments.

Mr. Schlesinger, it was said,
felt that on the whole the Rus-
sians had behaved no worse
and no better than they could
be expected to behave. But
he insisted in the Cabinet that
Mr. Kissinger's reluctance to
draw the violations to the at-
tention of the Soviet Govern-
ment weakened the American
negotiating position.

Issue at Vladivostok

The Secretary was reported
to feel that Mr. Kissinger's ea-
gerness to reach agreement had
become obvious to the Russians
and that they adopted a "sit-
tight" position, expecting—and
receiving—further concessions.

The United States, Mr. Schles-
inger is said to believe,
reached a satisfactory agree-
ment with the Soviet Union
at Vladivostok in, November
1974 only because President
Ford rejected out of hand con-
cessions Secretary Kissinger
was prepared to make.

Those concessions, it was
said, include allowing the So-
viet Union more missile launch-
ers on the basis that it had
legitimate fears about the al-
leged threat posed by China
and by American forward bases
and tactical nuclear weapons
in Western Europe.

Concessions to an authorita-
rian country to reach agree-
ment on weapons have little
to recommend them historical-
ly, senior military and civilian
sources in the Pentagon empha-
sized. These sources said they
were not involved in the Kissin-

negotiating position.

Issue at Vladivostok

Concessions to an authorita-
rian country to reach agree-
ment on weapons have little
to recommend them historical-
ly, senior military and civilian
sources in the Pentagon empha-
sized. These sources said they
were not involved in the Kissin-
ger-Schesinger dispute and
were merely reflecting on the
lessons of history.

Marquis Childs

THE SUN, Saturday,

# Schlesinger Ouster Allows Easing of Nuclear

Washington.

The old razzle dazzle, he's up, he's down, he's out, he's finished, is the familiar interpretation of the Ford administration shakeup. Infinitely more important than the fate of any individual is the significance in policy for a further easing of nuclear arms on each side of the ideological divide.

James R. Schlesinger was a hard-liner. At the outset he sought to bring about a subtle change in United States nuclear policy. A highly intelligent rationalizer, he denied that he was moving toward a first-strike capability, but that was the interpretation put on it by those with a broad background of knowledge in nuclear strategy.

In fighting the cuts in the defense budget imposed by the House, Mr. Schlesinger used language so strong as to offend George Mahon (D., Texas), the committee chairman. It happens that Mr. Mahon is an old friend of President Ford.

As for detente, the Secretary of Defense was again a subtle opponent of the policy of Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, of seeking

an agreement with the Soviet Union limiting offensive nuclear weapons. He espoused the cruise missile, the newest nuclear weapon, which is a threat to any agreement, since it does not come under the limitations defined by Mr. Ford and Leonid I. Brezhnev in their meeting at Vladivostok, USSR.

With the development of the Trident submarine and the new manned bomber, the budget carved out by Mr. Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff met with resistance even from those in Congress long sympathetic to the demands of the Pentagon.

His successor, Donald H. Rumsfeld, faces at 43 a remarkably difficult test. If he comes together with Mr. Kissinger in agreement on a position at the second strategic arms limitation talks, he must convince the hard-liners and the skeptics in Congress that this does not impair U.S. capacity to retaliate against a Soviet strike.

Ronald Reagan, soon to announce his candidacy for President against Mr. Ford in the Republican primaries, immediately singled out the Schlesinger dismissal as proof

of the administration's weakness on the military-Communist issue. This was the reaction of a knee-jerk conservative. Let's face it, there are knee-jerk conservatives as well as knee-jerk liberals, the latter so often the target of the right wing.

## Buildup

That the prospect of a SALT II agreement should become a political issue as early as the first primaries next year, which Mr. Reagan seems to be promising, is dismaying. This can carry over into the election, thereby confirming the gloomy prediction of the pessimists that it is useless to try to make any advance in 1976.

- Lots of help will come from that spear-carrier in the big weapons chorus, Senator Henry M. Jackson (Wash.), a ranking candidate for the Democratic nomination for President. The news of Mr. Schlesinger's dismissal had hardly been leaked when Mr. Jackson rushed to television and radio to express his shock and horror that one of America's principal defenders had been made to walk the plank.

Since increasingly Senator

Jackson has become a one-is sue candidate, with weapons and the threat of the Soviet Union as his principal theme, he has dropped in the popular-ity ratings.

As an occasional alternative, he jumps on the big oil companies as the root of all evil. But he can be counted on, given the competition in the ever growing field of Demo-

cratic hopefuls, to thump the weapons tub.

In the game of nuclear armament and disarmament, there can be no still pond, no more moving. The momentum out of SALT I, such as it was, must be kept up. A year lost may put an end once and for all to the attempt to check the drift toward confrontation and nuclear war.

FIRST-LINE REPORT — Bernard Kalb, CBS Radio (Morning, Nov. 8)

A LOOK AT SUMMITRY — PAST AND FUTURE

That giant-sized warrior of World War II, Winston Churchill, is usually credited with introducing the word "summit" into the vocabulary of diplomacy. There have been a lot of summits since then, with former President Nixon out front in the record books as America's most indefatigable summiteer, with the exception of Henry Kissinger.

Nixon flew off to Peking in February of '72 for a summit with Chairman Mao-tse Tung; in May of that year to Moscow for a summit with Leonid Brezhnev. Brezhnev summited in the United States the following year; Nixon returning to Moscow in '74 for a third summit with the Russian.

Gerald Ford got his first taste of Presidential summitry toward the end of last year — a mini-summit, as it was described — with Nixon's old summiting partner, in Vladivostok. 1975 was expected to be a year of double summitry for President Ford, one with the Russians, the other with the Chinese. It was all part of America's triangular diplomacy: dealing with two antagonistic Communist states in an effort to gain leverage with both. As Moscow anxiously watched what America was up to in Peking, Peking in turn watching the US in Moscow.

But so far this has been a slow year for summitry on the Presidential level, insofar as the Sino-Soviet monolith is concerned — that word "monolith" exhumed as a reminder of how relations can change, even among professed allies. There had been talk earlier this year that there might be a US-Soviet summit sometime in the summer; it all depended on completing a second agreement on limiting strategic weapons. But completion kept eluding the two sides and with it the date for a summit kept slipping and slipping deeper and deeper into '75. In fact, it looks as though '75 may go summitless after all — a Soviet-US summit, that is. The State Department Spokesman disclosed yesterday that a Soviet reply has a last been received from the Kremlin to the US proposals on SALT II as set forth last September. The Spokesman did not volunteer that information; it came in reply to a question. And that was regarded as a sure indication that the Soviet reply did not resolve the deadlocked issues. A check with informed sources confirmed that indication, and negotiations are continuing. But the US position has consistently been, no SALT II agreement, no summit.

Even if there were a sudden breakthrough, officials say it would take four to six weeks to work out the final details — '75, in other words, may go barren, summitly speaking so far as Washington and Moscow are concerned. As for a Washington-Peking summit, well, the story is complicated but more optimistic, as US officials see it. The expectation was that an official date would have been

-2-

announced by now for a Ford visit to China later this year. It hasn't happened. Why is not being officially revealed, but there have been reports of problems dealing with the duration of the visit. Also, speculation that the President's ouster of James Schlesinger might have cooled, which is not to say cancelled, Chinese interest in a Presidential visit. The ousted Pentagon chief had been a favorite of Peking because of his hardline on detente with Peking's foe, the Soviet Union.

"As far as we're concerned, the trip is still on," says President Ford. Administration officials say the President still expects to go, even though the plans are described as not yet being locked up 100 percent, only 80 percent, with the White House still waiting for a cable from Peking that could produce the final word.

Mr. Ford's 'Guys' Turn Out to
Look Like Everybody Else's

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON

WASHINGTON—The most intriguing aspect of President Ford's chain-reaction Cabinet shakeup last week was his insistence that the “personnel changes,” as he called them with wondrous understatement, were meant solely to round out his own team.

"These are my guys that I wanted," the President said of three Cabinet-rank officials, one Air Force general, two diplomats and one White House aide whose abrupt transfers were occasioned by the dismissals of the Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, and the Director of Central Intelligence, William Colby. "I wanted a team that was my team," he said.

But his new team contained not a single new face, and if the players were anyone's "guys" they were former President Nixon's. Their involvement suggested a curious scarcity of executive talent was available to the nation's Chief Executive.

"We're swamped with job applications," said a White House official. "There's no dearth of talent." Perhaps, but the list of changes Mr. Ford announced on television sounded like a play-by-play broadcast of a game of high-stakes musical chairs. Those who were named to new jobs will arrive at them with extensive resumes:

* Donald H. Rumsfeld had been President Nixon's Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, White House counselor, Director of the Cost of Living Council and Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He had been Mr. Ford's White House Chief of Staff for scarcely a year.

* Richard B. Cheney, who had been Mr. Rumsfeld's deputy in the White House had also been his deputy at each of the Nixon Administration posts except the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

* George H. Bush, under Mr. Nixon, had served as Chairman of the Republican National Committee and Ambassador to the United Nations. He has been head of the United States liaison office in Peking for 13 months.

* Elliot L. Richardson, the most peripatetic Presidential assistant of all, served Mr. Nixon as Under Secretary of State, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Secretary of Defense and Attorney General. For the last eight months he has been Ambassador to the Court of St. James's.

The dizzyingly circular nature of all the chair swapping was best suggested by the fact that Rogers B. Morton, who had been Secretary of the Interior and Chairman of the Republican National Committee under President Nixon, before becoming Secretary of Commerce last spring, declined an invitation to become campaign finance chairman in place of David Packard, the former Deputy Secretary of Defense, who quit amid reports he could not get along with the campaign chairman, Howard H. Callaway, the former Secretary of the Army, who had complained that Republican conservatives were unhappy at the prospect that Mr. Ford's running mate would be Vice President Rockefeller, who announced last Monday he would not be Mr. Ford's running mate.

As if that were not enough, it turned out that the President had offered to name Mr. Schlesinger Chairman of

James M. Naughton is a White House correspondent for
The New York Times.

the Export-Import Bank and Mr. Colby to serve as Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Both said no. Already there is speculation that Mr. Richardson would be a logical choice for Secretary of State if Mr. Kissinger should ever resign, and that Mr. Ford would choose as a Vice Presidential running mate one of three men—Mr. Rumsfeld, Mr. Bush and Mr. Richardson.

The situation seemed to conjure up visions that the Republican Party, hurt more badly than anyone had thought by Watergate, was now reduced to a dozen individuals who, fortunately, could do anything.

A central reason for Mr. Ford's decision to juggle the national security side of his Cabinet was said by a number of his associates to be a desire to demonstrate to the voters that he—not Secretary Kissinger, not Secretary Schlesinger, not Vice President Rockefeller—was in charge.

Whether the Byzantine reorganization would afford a new, crisp image of a President in command was moot. But the reliance on the same cast of characters to play new roles before some had learned old ones was in curious contrast to most, if not all, of Mr. Ford's earlier Cabinet decisions.

He reached into university presidents' ranks for, an Attorney General, Edward H. Levi, and Health, Education and Welfare Secretary, F. David Mathews. He chose a distinguished Philadelphia lawyer, William T. Coleman Jr. to be Secretary of Transportation. He selected a woman, Carla A. Hills, to be Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

The latest set of nominations and appointments seemed more of a piece, though, with Mr. Ford's previous retention of old Nixon hands—the controversial Secretary of the Treasury, William E. Simon, and Secretary of Agriculture, Earl L. Butz, remain and the President chose John T. Dunlop and Thomas Kleppe to be, respectively, Secretaries of Labor and Interior.

As a whole, the Cabinet seemed such a mixed assortment of facile veterans and attractive newcomers that it offered few clues to the character of the President who assembled it. The most that could be said about the most recent changes was that they reflected a tendency toward in-bred leadership.

It may seem, said a White House official, comparable to "what used to be called 'cronymism' in Harry Truman's day." But the narrowness of Mr. Ford's search for substitute Cabinet members was instead proscribed, in the White House view, by the quickness with which the President wanted to move and his consequent focus on those he knew well from his own tenure in Congress and the White House.

Even before the dramatic shakeup last week, however, the Ford White House had something of a reputation for reassigning pillars to take the places of posts. In a practical joke on one of their colleagues, a group of White House correspondents pretended last month to be privy to the information that Ron Nessen, the Presidential spokesman, was going to be named campaign chairman. For several hours, the correspondents' colleague thought it might be true and sought to verify or refute it.

Then again, who knows? It may only have been premature.

Two other views of the Ford shakeup: what it might look like from Moscow and Peking and from C.I.A. headquarters,
Page 6.

Evening Press Coverage of the President's Speech

CBS, Bob Shaefer: The President's speech in Boston emphasized that the recent Cabinet changes do not represent a change in national security or defense policy. After the speech, Shaefer asked the President at the airport if it meant a change in Henry Kissinger's role. The President replied, "Henry Kissinger has and will continue to have influence on foreign policy matters. But there are other voices in the preparation of recommendations coming to me which have to be heard and which will be heard too."

NBC: The President today in Boston went out of his way to say that the change in the Defense Secretary does not mean a change in Defense policy. The President stated that there would be no softness or weakness in our national defense or security.

ABC: The President today strongly reaffirmed that a strong defense policy remains his national policy. "There will be no change in my life-long vigilance and commitment to a strong national defense," the President said.

Schlesinger at a Defense Department ceremony said, "In earlier years it could be said that politics would automatically stop at our water's edge. In these complex times we cannot automatically say that anymore. We must forge a national consensus about the role of our military establishment."

Friday, November 7, 1975

CBS Evening News

**Cronkite:** While President Ford spoke about US military strength, the issue of what's been said about Soviet military strength is becoming a controversy, and possibly a scandal, in Washington. The question: whether US intelligence data on Soviet military power was altered for political purposes. Yesterday, the House Intelligence Committee voted to subpoena documents from the White House in order to investigate the matter.

**Schorr:** What the subpoena calls for is the most secret data on the Soviet arms buildup. The aim: to establish whether US intelligence was manipulated to promote detente. With backstage help from insiders and a report from ex-Defense Secretary Melvin Laird, the Committee is investigating these allegations:

- that "double bookkeeping was maintained, with different kinds of projections of Soviet strength, using estimates higher than many expected to argue that an arms control treaty would hold back Soviet expansion.

- that pressure was put on the Intelligence Community to come up with more acceptable figures by sending back reports for further study.

- that evidence of Soviet violation of arms control agreements was suppressed or, as reported, "discouraged."

A source close to Secretary Kissinger denied any such bias, but said the documents, if turned over, may show the inherent ambiguities in using such intelligence. The source said Soviet cheating was often a matter of interpretation and legal judgement, and sometime no protest was made to avoid compromising secret sources.

Coincident with his firing of Secretary Schlesinger, a long-seething controversy within the Government appears about to explode over whether detente politics has been played with strategic intelligence.