SHAPEX 97

Day One: 24 APRIL 1997

Dr Henry Kissinger

"The Future of NATO"

General Joulwan, ladies and gentlemen. I once was at a reception and a lady came up to me and said "I understand you're a fascinating man; fascinate me". We then had one of the less successful conversations that I have ever had, and after this introduction I find myself somewhat in that position.

Now before you get too carried away by my military exploits, I have to point out that I did land at Omaha beach, but the battle had moved on into Belgium at that point! I still got unbelievably seasick as we were landing at the beach. I was with an Infantry Division, and a General had given orders to assign me to Intelligence, but my Regiment was detailed for combat experience with another Division. So, before I could join Divisional Headquarters I had to do a month of combat duty near Aachen. I have had more elevating experiences in my life, but I wouldn't have missed it either - I can say that retrospect as I survived it! I would also point out, General, that I was not only Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, but I held both positions simultaneously for a while. I mention it only for students of American public administration, because never before and never since have relations between the White House and the State Department been as harmonious as they were in those days.

Finally, I want to say for the emotional stability of Ambassador Hunter, who did not quite make it here, that I do not represent necessarily the point of view of the administration. So that those of you who disagree with me can console yourselves there are others who disagree with me, and of course the point of view represented by the Ambassador and his staff is the view by which you should guide yourself. Let me add immediately that I am not here to disagree with our administration; I agree with the basic direction of their policy. I disagree with some tactical applications of the policy, but the fundamental direction I support, and in fact in terms of American politics today, there really are no partisan positions anymore because both parties are split, and those of us who are concerned with a coherent American foreign policy are trying to piece together a centre, from the right wing of the Democrats and the left wing of the Republicans; if left and right has any meaning in American politics today. I sometimes say the most consistent opponent that President Clinton has is the minority leader of the Congress in the House of Representatives, namely Representative Gephardt. He is much more critical of him than most Republicans, but I am not here to discuss American domestic politics.

I would like to discuss with you my view of NATO, the future of NATO and the American relationship to NATO and as I see it develop, and to stress that peace cannot be for America a partisan issue. NATO policy has been carried forward for nearly 50 years by a succession of administrations of both parties, and those of us who are concerned with it want a consistent, coherent American policy that can, and will, be carried out regardless of which party is in office. We are talking about the future of all of our societies and not the future of political parties here.

It's from this point of view that I want to make a number of observations. I belong to the generation that considered NATO the essence of American policy; we grew up with it, we saw it formed. I have known every NATO Commander personally in the history of NATO. I was a

disciple, friend and admirer of that whole generation which formed NATO on the American side. So I start from the premise that this is the key to, and has to be the key to, American policy. When you read articles about me in the United States (which you do not have to read with the same intensity of my mother and I) you may think that this is due to my European birth, but my experiences in my early years was not exactly conducive to developing an enormous affection for Europe! My conviction developed after the war when I came here with the American Army, saw the shattered Europe and the rebuilding of Europe after the war.

I once met President Truman. He had left office and I was a young political science professor. He asked what I had learnt in political science, so I said that what I had learnt was that the bureaucracy is the fourth branch of government, and not even the President can do every thing he wants to do. The ladies here will forgive me. He looked at me and said "bullshit; the President can do almost anything, as long as he knows what he wants to do. The problem is you don't have the courage to ask them." That was lesson number one. Lesson number two. Then I said "Mr President what are you most proud of in your time as President?" He said "what I am most proud of is that we completely defeated our enemies, then we brought them back to the community of nations, and we made them our friends." He said he would like to think that this was a specifically American contribution, and I think that this is true too. So, we are now celebrating in America - and I guess elsewhere - the 50th anniversary of the Marshall Plan, NATO and a lot of practical things that were accomplished. But the most important thing in my view was an almost spiritual and a moral thing that was accomplished, which was to reaffirm the cohesion of the democracies, and, if it is not politically incorrect to say - as it is in many American universities - the future of the rest of civilisation. This is what was accomplished in the Marshall Plan and in NATO. But the nations that had shared a comparable history and similar traditions, were also reaffirming some control over their destinies, and determined both to defend it jointly and to build the future together.

This is what my generation has seen in NATO and in European-American relations, and this is why I, and others, believe that the future of the north Atlantic region is of fundamental consequence, not just to our survival, but to our development politically, economically and morally in a rapidly changing world. This is why I was honoured to be asked by my old friend the SACEUR to be permitted to address this group, which to me is a depository of this conviction. So my view starts with the Atlantic area, and as far as the United States is concerned the only institutional link we have with Europe is NATO. We have a lot of other links, but the one thing that institutionally obliges us to address the problem of our common futures happens to be in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which is why I attach a very special importance to it.

Now when NATO was formed the conditions were quite different from what they are today. In those days we lived in a two power world. It was from the conceptual point of view for the United States an ideal world to conduct foreign policy. Ideal in this sense: of all the people, of all the countries represented in this room, we are the only ones that have never had a powerful neighbour; we are the only society whose origins can be dated precisely; the only society that is populated almost entirely by immigrants; the only society whose survival has never been threatened. So for the United States, foreign policy has always had a different quality than for other nations. We are the only country that has believed that we can commit ourselves and withdraw at our own choice. We are the only country that has presented its problems to itself as having limited time frames; even the Marshall Plan was represented as a five year project after we which we could withdraw. Therefore our foreign policy has been conducted as if sometimes it was an academic seminar in which we decide to act, or not act, on the basis of largely theoretical or judicial considerations. I used to tell my colleagues in the

foreign service when I was in the State Department - you have to remember most American service officers believed that the Secretary of State could not pass the foreign service exam, he is treated with a certain amount of condescension - I used to tell them they are a country not a foundation.

In 1917 we entered World War One which had started as a normal European war; it had huge consequences. It started for very precise European reasons, but by the time we entered it, we had transformed it into a personal assault on the German Emperor, who had been around for 38 years, and it was difficult to find people who had doubts about him or who never thought he was the cause of all the evil in the world. We then developed the theory that democracies produce peace, and therefore turned our foreign policy into a kind of social welfare programme, to produce democracies everywhere, separated from the security and other considerations that had dominated diplomacy. So this new tradition continues in both our parties; it's not that the left wing of the Democrats wants to spread democracy everywhere, or the right wing of the Republicans wants to destroy communists everywhere, but between the two of them there is a certain crusading spirit in American policy.

I have gone into all of this because we are now living in a totally different world. America has to undergo a big intellectual assessment. Nobody can pretend anymore that we can enter and withdraw at our choice. We are now part of a system. Every problem resolved is an admission ticket for another problem, and it will go on and on for all of history; we can't end it. We have to learn to adjust rewards and punishments. All this is new for us and therefore there is an overlay to all the discussions. Is Russia democratic? Is Russia not democratic? Is membership of NATO like membership in a club? - you first have to meet requirements. Does anyone who meets these requirements become a member automatically? Is there some other reason to have NATO, or any other activity we engage in? These are the subterranean issues which are now going on in America, and in both parties. It is within this context that you have to understand the foreign policy debate, and to understand my particular views in relation to them; whether you agree with them or not. I have at least thought about some of these problems at length, and studied the history and in one way or another; some of these considerations will have to be taken into account.

The first point is that there is no longer is a Soviet military threat. I don't even think there is a Russian military threat against all of western Europe. I do not think that is the fundamental problem, and I will say something about Russia in a minute. Let me first explain what I believe: Even without a threat of a military nature we should revitalise NATO. One, because its the only institution that exists for North Atlantic relationships now - I think we should create others but they don't exist yet; second because, unfashionable though it is to say in the better American universities today, I do believe there is such a thing as western civilisation. I do believe that the people represented in this room, have shared a certain common interest and a certain set of values which are worth preserving. This does not mean that we cannot cooperate enthusiastically with other countries; I am known as a great admirer of the Chinese for example, but the core group is the group that is in NATO, and this is why especially now, and precisely because we don't have to plan against a military attack against all of Europe from Russia, that I believe NATO is in a strange way perhaps more important than it was in its early stages.

Secondly, as some of you know I have been a strong supporter of NATO enlargement, and I remain a strong supporter. Whatever the criticisms I have offered of some of the messages by which it is being carried out, I will defend NATO enlargement before the Senate with perhaps more enthusiasm than some of those who devised it. I will try to get as much bipartisan

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support as I can, whether or not I agree with all the details. First, because I do not think that the historiç injustice of Yalta should be perpetuated as a permanent structure of European politics, or that nations that were unjustly occupied in the Cold War period should be precluded from joining together with those nations with which they have historically been connected. Secondly, I do not believe it makes any sense to have the eastern border of NATO at the German-Polish border, for that very reason. Thirdly, I think it is unwise and dangerous to have a vacuum between Russia and Germany which, in the absence of NATO, will then have to be filled by the national policies of the countries - resurrecting the precise political conflicts that have led to previous European wars. For all these essentially political reasons I strongly favour the enlargement of NATO.

I was originally opposed to the Partnership for Peace, when I thought it was a trick to prevent the enlargement of NATO. Now that the enlargement of NATO is accepted in principle, and after what I have seen here, I think that PfP can play a very constructive role in that enlargement which I consider so important.

Now let me get to the point where I have not always agreed with official policy; but I want to put it on a more philosophical level. The first point I want to make is that in the American mind there is not always a clear distinction between an alliance and a system of collective security. We tend to use those words interchangeably, but there is a big difference. An alliance defends its specific territory; it has a clear cut line; all its members know what they are supposed to do; and they know that the causas belli is namely an attack on their territory, no matter where it comes from. A system of collective security is a sort of a judicial concept; everybody is in it; everybody is a potential defender; and everybody is a potential aggressor. When there is a problem, then the members of the system are supposed to get together, they are supposed to determine in the presence of the potential aggressor what's going on, and then they are supposed to make a common decision - without machinery, without the forces, without a strategy. In other words the UN. The UN is a system of collective security; NATO is an alliance. Therefore I don't accept the proposition that an alliance doesn't have any lines; of course an alliance has a line; that's what it's there for and one shouldn't pretend that there isn't a line. That's what you do with an alliance; the alliance defines the territory that is going to be defended. It doesn't have to define the attacker, that's up to the country attacking to decide, but it makes it clear that if the line is crossed there is a causas belli, and that the nations in the alliance are supposed to defend it. So this is point number one. I don't apologise for the fact that the alliance defines a territory; I don't consider that a sort of floating thing, and I don't think we should play games with this point.

Point number two. Is the alliance the right instrument for bringing about the reconciliation of others? This gets at the real problem of Russia, whose distinguished representatives are sitting right in front of me, and who will hear me say exactly in their presence what I would say in their absence, so that there can be no misunderstanding of my view. First, those of you who know the history of our domestic debate, know that I have a unique position in America: I have a tendency to unite the American intellectuals because both liberals and conservatives like to attack me - for opposite reasons! The liberals say I am too power oriented, and the conservatives say I was too friendly to the Russians. So I have that special distinction. I have always considered, and continue to consider, Russia a great country that has played a huge role in the history of Europe, but also in the history of Asia and the Middle East, and for this reason alone it is not a purely European country; it covers several continents.

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I have always believed, and I continue to believe, that friendly relations with Russia and potentially co-operative relations with Russia - between her, America and the West, are important, maybe crucial, for peace and progress in the world. I practised this when I was in office, maintaining a broad range of negotiations - against violent opposition mostly from my own party. So that is not what is at issue for us. What is at issue for me, quite frankly, is how do we conceive the problem of Russia. There are some who think it is a sort of a psychiatric problem; we need to calm the Russians down; they are a little bit excitable; they have been attacked so often there is a high threshold of nervousness, and we have to reassure them. Others say we have to make them democratic; once the Russians become democratic then we will not have anything to worry about, because democracies don't go to war. It is interesting where this theory comes from, because there have never been enough democracies to test it in action. Many wars have been extremely popular, and I think in Bosnia if you had taken a referendum among the participating nations, it would probably have endorsed the murdering of each other - with great enthusiasm, they certainly participated in it. But I don't want to pursue that theory. I am saying whether Russia becomes democratic or not, is not within our power. Russian domestic politics in my view is Russia's problem, not our problem. I don't get so nervous when people say that these are good guys and those are bad guys in Moscow; that's their problem, not our problem. Any Russian leader who cannot prevail in his own domestic struggle, and if he needs our help, is in deep trouble.

So, I focus on Russian foreign policies and I feel that the historical rhythm, since Peter the Great, has been of expansion. You can explain it: a flat territory, with many enemies and no normal security. There have been more wars fought by Russia, and even started by Russia, for very understandable reasons in all directions, back and forth, east and west. It's an interesting speculation that if Russia had won the Russo-Japanese War, would there have been no World War One? Or would Russia have then continued going East? It's an open question. I define the present problem as this: Russia it is now back, more or less, to the borders of Peter the Great - it's a little bigger, especially in Asia. Now that means between St Petersburg and Vladivostok there are eleven time zones, so there is no reason for claustrophobia. Can they not feel claustrophobic in a territory of eleven time zones? Will they live comfortably within these borders if that can be achieved? Relations between Russia and the West are bound to be harmonious; there are no conflicting interests once Russia accepts, really accepts, its borders.

Now can we make Russia feel less threatened? To some extent, yes. I would think that with 20,000 nuclear weapons, and, if we look at Western Europe - who can organise an attack from the west on Russia? I mean how is that to be conceived, no matter what happens to NATO? So with 20,000 nuclear weapons and modern technology she can be really safe, and you don't need territory anymore to expand your economy. What is the Western threat to Russia? I would say towards the South, in Central Asia, and towards the East we will find many areas for more constructive discussion. The problem of Central Asia, in my view, will not be a question of a military threat to Russia. The problem of Central Asia will be the energy resources of the world in the 21st Century; when the growth of China and of India, and of some regions of South America will defeat existing energy resources, or would at any rate make them tight. To assure uniform access to the energy resource regions; that will be an important problem and one that needs to be negotiated between all the interested parties. So, this being my view, I believe there are many constructive possibilities. I do not look at Russia as a permanent enemy, or even as a contemporary enemy, but I also don't look at Russia as a NATO country and I do not think we should play that game. Russia has Asian interests; it has Middle East interests; and these are not the only interests - it has borders around it's huge territory.

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I believe also that the present weakness of Russia is very temporary. As soon as a few structural changes have occurred, we will be astonished by the rapidity of its economic recovery - because of talented, trained people which is the essential element we have learned of in modern economic growth, and they have huge resources and huge resources of its territory - which in Russian history have never been adequately explored. So once Russia decides to act like Japan and China, and Singapore, and build up its own territory, one will see the paradox that it will become more powerful in many ways economically, than it was when it had an empire.

So is NATO the right instrument for the future? That's the only point where I differ with what is going on. I think that NATO is an alliance. It is not designed for this purpose. Some of you have read my article, and Miss Conell [US PERMREP's representative] will write a devastating report about me, but I have my doubts about this scheme of the NATO-Russia Council. And of course the Secretary General is very happy with me, because now he looks like the good guy - the Russians will love him; they will probably sign tomorrow - bring them a document!

I think this because if I unite the what the Russian press and Russian statements say about NATO, I do not think their enthusiasm for NATO is exactly the same as that of the Permanent Representative in this room. So therefore I believe that the Russian representative at this NATO Council meeting, will not look at the strengthening of NATO as his primary obligation, and I suspect that every time an issue comes up there will be a debate over which council should discuss it. This is based on my experience, which may no longer be relevant. But there will always be some European nations, and maybe the Untied States, that play their own game, and no matter how unanimous your adoptive principle, it will be known who wanted the Russians in, and who wanted the Russians out, and the nervous strain of that over a period of time maybe too much. So that the NATO Council may be not effectively expanded. I wouldn't let anybody take that chance.

I am all for negotiations with the Russians, but in some other place and by creating some other institution. It would also focus the Russians on common objectives, rather than on disrupting NATO. I want Russia to participate in important decisions. I strongly support what has happened in Bosnia. I have had the privilege of seeing what is being done here, and to meet the representatives. I think it is a technically excellent operation and its a politically important one; that should possibility should be open, but for that we don't need to create the new NATO council. We can do that ad hoc. Let anybody name me ten things that could happen like this; so that when they happen, we can do them. We should do them and we should cooperate. So this is my concern. To understand my view, remember, in the picture I have drawn, that I believe other developments in other parts of the world, will produce a greater and greater concurrence of views on a global basis.

To sum up. One, I believe NATO remains crucial. We in the West need to reaffirm our common purposes because when you look around the world, you see the growth of Fundamentalism in the Middle East, the spread of ethnic conflicts in Africa - which morally will affect us, and then you see Asia developing into something similar to Europe in the 19th Century. These countries have tremendous economic dynamism, and will be huge competitors to the existing industrialised nations.

While I believe that a war between European powers is out of the question no matter what happens - France and Germany, or Britain, or any of the historic countries of Europe will never again look at each other as strategic enemies, looking for a military solution to their problems among each other - that is not true in Asia. China, Japan, Korea, Russia and in Asia,

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India, in some way look at each other as potential strategic opponents. I am not saying they will go to war, but they assess their relationships in this way. The reunification of Korea will be different from that of Germany, because the surrounding countries will assert strategic interests that were not asserted in the reunification of Germany. So therefore the conflicts that will emerge in my view, that are calculable, are more likely to arise in that part of the world.

We who are assembled here ought to develop a somewhat common view; if not identical, at least a common strategy. It is for that reason also, incidentally, that I have always favoured greater coherence of the European segment of NATO. I'm not frightened by it, because in the strategic field our interests are sufficiently compatible, and anyway it's a question of resources; how much is one willing to put into it - and that will determine what can be done autonomously. I cannot conceive many situations in which the European component would risk going to war without American support, so its not something on which I have spent sleepless nights. So this is the architecture that I foresee.

For that reason, on the big issue that we will face domestically in America, NATO expansion, I will strongly support it. I will also urge the Senate to give some expression to its view that the historic NATO should retain its identity, in the greatest possible way including the new regular members of NATO, and that we should not confuse all the other elements. I also favour constant negotiations with Russia, even if I have a different idea where the best location for these negotiations should be. But that's independent of the question of enlargement, and maybe you can tell your ambassador [US PERMREP] to come back - it wasn't so bad, I didn't pull teeth!

This is my basic view on the future of NATO. It's a great pleasure for me to be here, a great honour and it is a group to which I feel emotionally committed - both the old and the new members. I am sure the day will come where the fine points of whether Russia should be, or should not be, part of the NATO discussion will be overtaken by events. Thank you very much.