2.

K: When have they ever stood behind the President?

N: no, but come up with a cockeyed scheme of going to the United Nations, having a six power conference...

K: Never support what we are doing.

N: This meeting with the Arabs just about killed the damn press people. They expected all hell to blow up.

K: Of course,

N: There was a huge number out there today.

K: Well, trotted out the poor Foreign Ministers.

N: At a time when we are supplying Israel.

K: At a time when American planes are landing in Tel Aviv every half an hour. People take everything for granted, no minor feat.

N: Anything doing with battle?

K: Seems to be a tank battle going on ....

N: I think its a stalemate, I really do.

K: I do too.

N: Both sides sort of tied.

K: I suppose the Israelis can barely win, but not at any price that's worthwhile.

N: OK, have a good rest.

TELCOM

Douglas Dillon/Sec. Kissinger

Wednesday, October 17, 1973

2:45 p.m.

D: How are you?

K: Fine.

D: I have thought a lot about this and there is not really anyway I can justify my doing this. There is one think you should know and just for you and the President which I was not able to say the other night. when you talked to me. My wife has a sort of chronic illness. She has been treated the last four or five years for Parkinson Disease. The treatment is good but it leaves her very much reduced in energy to do things so this sort of rules me out of taking on anything that requires anything like that.

K: Does that rule out of possibilities in Washington.

D: Not generally. The other night she was right there and I did not want to say it.

K: I will not repeat it. How about Washington?

D: I think we would be delighted to work on that. You talked to me about this advisory committee. If you have any use for that that would be great. Beyond that I think I am too deeply involved where I am. I have problems with my father and my family which are very real and they could get much more serious because of his age.

K: I will accept it temporarily. But you won't mind if I come back to you periodically.

D: Not at all. If at anytime you would want me for this advisory committee I could come in for a few days.

K: That I will institute after the current crisis.

D: I really sympathize.

K: Started me off with a bank. I am sorry about your answer but I understand it and I hope to see you soon.

D: I want to congratulate you too. A little slow of me. A most remarkable thing. A great honor for you and the United States and for all of us that you have brought it here. I think it must be a great satisfaction after what some of the liberal and left wingers have been saying about you.

TELCOM
Hummel/Sec. Kissinger
Wednesday, Oct. 17, 1973

3:50 p.m.

K: Have we hard from Phnom Penh?

H: I have two telegrams for your clearance and a scenario for talking with the Chinese and an outgoing telegram.

K: Give me a hint of what they said even without an outgoing telegram.

H: Both of the incoming are on your desk. The answer is entirely favorable. It is going to happen smoothly. Enders did not do quite what we wanted.

K: Why not?

H: I don't know. We told him flatly in the outgoing yesterday to make it a US Govt request but he has arranged so that one of the Royal family will make a request anyway.

K: But I told him. What the hell are we going to say to the Chinese?

H: If I could show you this outgoing cable and get your clearance.

K: I have to go to the White House for a WSAG.

H: I need some instructions about getting the Chinese in. I have talked to Win Lord.

K: Have them in at 5:30.

H: Will I be able to see you before then.

K: Yes.

H: I will tell them to come in.

K: This is the kind of bureaucratic triumph ... not worth anything.
Next time tell Enders to carry out our instructions.

H: We have reminded him that he should make a request on behalf of the (reads the telegram)... (Prince so and so's request not with-standing, please see that this is done so we can tell PRC we are in front making the request.

<table><tr><td>CLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>Co. 1933.</td></tr><tr><td>Date</td><td>6/1/73</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>OHARA</td></tr></table>

2
Hummel

Oct 17

K: And tell them we are so informing them.

H: Yes.

K: If he does not want to do it we will send someone who will.

H: I think he can mp it up so it is not visible to anyone.

K: Tell him to do that.

H: It needs your clearance.

K: The outgoing message send it out. You do not need to show it to me if that is the substance.

H: Yes and Win Lord and I have worked on that.
Will I see you before I get the Chinese in.

K: Yes. Get them in at 5:30. Not to see me to see you.

H: Yes.

END

<table><tr><td>Declassified</td></tr><tr><td>Originately 50 03-05</td></tr><tr><td>By: CHUA, Date 6/16/01</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 17, 1973

5:20 p. m.

K. Yes, Mr. Ambassador.

D. I don't trouble you with news of the front. I keep the General informed. I have a message from Dayan who just returned from the front and called about 20 minutes ago. He just returned from the front and wants to add to the congratulatory note that he sent you on the Nobel Peace prize. He is sure he will not have any reasons to be ashamed of us at the Canal. He saw what he saw and liked it very much. Our position is such that his feeling is we don't need to beg from anyone. He means you and us. Any initiative but rather wait for them to wait for one of us.

K. You know what is developing....

D. I have pointed it out to the Prime Minister.

K. The Foreign Ministers were heading in the same direction. It's not going to be easy to do this; to reconfirm a Security Council resolution that already exists.

D. I did not get from the Secretary General the sort of language. They......about the ceasefire and 242.

K. This should lay the basis for 242. They didn't give us a formulation. It would depend on formulation before we could make a judgment.

D. I understand. That is what I informed the Prime Minister. The point is that 242 has so many interpretations.

K. We are not going to accept any interpretations.

D. I expect by tomorrow morning I will have the response from Israel and I will let you know. I thought the Minister of Defence's message was important. That you would sense the....

K. I am delighted. What is the supply situation?

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Activity 50 6/23</td></tr><tr><td>By CH</td><td>AR: Date 6/23/73</td></tr></table>

D. Very fine. Golda talked to me on the telephone. She said people are crying in Israel. She went to the airport and saw American guys coming with the planes and said it was one of the most exciting sights of her life. I want to add my own personal regards on the Nobel prize. We here at the Embassy were all very pleased yesterday with the news.

K. Thank you. The President in this one feels that just for your guidance this is one that will be very hard to refuse. Of course, we have no language.

E. Right. I would suggest that after the answer you would probably want to see something more specific.

K. We haven't a proposal.

D. When do you expect to get it.

K. My instincts are after Kosygin comes back from Cairo, if he is in Cairo.

D. We will not accept a specific reference to the 67 borders.

K. You can expect we will not accept a specific reference to the 67 borders and that we have told the foreign ministers that. We have also told the Arab Ambassador.

D. I will pass the information along.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Originality</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>Date: 6/16/64</td></tr></table>

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Rush

10/18/73; 9:50 a.m.

R: Good morning, Henry.

K: Ken, are you doing something about the people I appointed last week. You know what ever has to be done to submit them to the Foreign Relations Committee.

R: Yes. We are on that. As a matter of fact also -- and I don't know whether you know it or not -- the FBI is going around seeing everybody about Marty Hillenbrand and about . . .

K: Hillenbrand?

R: Hillenbrand -- Marty Hillenbrand.

K: What is he being considering for?

R: Damned if I know. But the came to see me about Marty Hillenbrand, Joe Sisco and Bill Porter.

K: Well how is that possible?

R: I'll be damned if I know. And they came to see me about them.

K: Well could you find out what the hell they are doing.

R: I'll see if I can find out. They just came in, you know. They wanted to see me and they brought up these various names. Just where they came from, I just don't know.

K: Well I don't understand it.

R: I don't either. I will see if I can chase it down. I'll talk to Ladd and . . .

K: Now the President would like to consider a man called Galvin who is on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board for Japan.

R: Good.

K: You know him?

R: I don't know him, no.

K: Could you look into him and give me . . .

R: Yes I will.

K: Thank you.

TELCONE

Secretary Kissinger/David Rockefeller

10/18/73 - 9:53 a.m.

K: Hello

R: Henry.

K: David, how are?

R: Well, I am just great and first of all congratulations on the Nobel Prize. I think that was really great.

K: Aren't you nice.

R: I am so pleased about it. Nobody could have deserved it more and it was rather daring of them to do it I must say...

K: You are putting it mildly.

R: My impression, Henry, is you are off to a grand start. I have been seeing it from a distance but hearing it from a number of different angles including, for instance, President Medici down in Brazil.

K: Oh, really.

R: He is very enthusiastic about your talking with Goodson(?).

K: Yes, that turned out very well.

R: And I think the whole--what you did at the Council of the Americas -- rather the Senate for Foreign Relations with regard to the Israelis -- and has just given immediately a whole new hope to the Latin Americans which I think is so important.

K: I hope we can now follow it up.

R: But I must admit your Middle East situation has certainly blown up. Is there any light in the tunnel?

K: Well, I think we can--so far we've managed to keep the Arabs and Soviets beyond the point of no return.

R: That's a great deal.

K: If we can hold it together a few more days I think we may be able to work out a ceasefire.

R: I certainly hope so. I didn't call you about my conversation with Zayyat because I didn't really think there was anything of sufficient newness or importance but....

K: They told me they had given you a message for me and I didn't know what it was.

R: He said that?

K: Ismail said it.

R: The message was something that he felt that you had taken his proposals of two years ago and distorted them, twisted them around was the way he put it. Really resurfaced them with new proposals which would involved further compromise by him and he wasn't prepared to do it. He was very tough and at the same time extremely friendly personally.

K: Does he speak English?

R: Perfectly. I think now according to him, out at his country place outside of Alexandria, ____________ Arab and I must say for a person who is about to launch a major drive, he was remarkably relaxed. I guess its been now in accordance with him. He listened very attentively to what I said. I did not show or read from the paper but it is very essentially what she said. He headed up--and his first statement was well done and then he proceeded to say that--to take a very tough line. But I didn't think this was really a message. I mean, that's why I didn't call you because I just didn't think to the Israeli--it was an attitude not a message to my mind and I think to a considerable extent the attitude was a posture more than anything else. But I tell you what did disturb me that Ismial whom I did have a very good meeting. Have you seen him.

K: Ismial no, but I've been in contact with him.

R: I see. Ismial shows with great enthusiasm about your first meeting with him in Washington and said how he thought you covered on a very phylosophical basis ____________. That apparently he was very disappointed in the Paris meeting where he felt that you had sort of crawled back into a harder more sort of State Department, as he put it, line and he felt that there was a falling apart of some of the ground gained in the first meeting. Not having been at either one I'm just reporting to you.

- 2 -

["K: The trouble was--I like Ismial very much.", "R: I do too and I think he certainly likes you.", "K: The problem is in the second meeting I tried to make concrete what had been discussed in the first one.", "R: Apparently he didn't like the concrete.", "K: I know. It's easy enough to make general statements.", "R: I can understand that but I'm just reporting. He did. . . Both he, I think probably the most positive thing was that both he and Sadat were--made it very clear that they wanted to continue conversations. There was no indication of a cutoff, they were tough, but by no means saying we won't listen or talk. I think that was all to the good. The thing I found absolutely amazing, Sadat is obviously feeling the pressures of . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

and he said Hijazi in the Finance Ministry and so if and when this thing
passes why we're going to send people to study it and keep in touch with
you to see whether you feel it would be useful but I thought it was a good
thing is a way that he was as friendly as he was and that he had this
attitude toward private investment.

K: Absolutely.

R: We're not at all altogether negative.

K: I consider that quite positive.

R: He called me by my first name and his personal attitude just couldn't
have been more positive. I reserved for one day and Ismial gave a
dinner which Hijazi and for Foreign Minister and really the top people
in the government came which --again for a country which doesn't have
diplomatic relations and so on is good. Gorbail(?) was the fellow who
organized the whole thing.

K: He was here as head of the Interest Section. David, I wanted to ask
you one other thing. As you know, I'm bringing Ingersoll back as
Assistant Secretary.

R: I hadn't heard that.

K: From Japan.

R: For what?

K: East Asia. And that means the Ambassadorship to Japan is open and
of course I'm so anxious to have you associated with the Government
I was---it is such a crucial post that I was wondering whether that
could tempt you until we could make the other move.

R: I'm inclined to feel that I can do more from here for the moment than
I can in an Ambassadorial post but again I don't want to give an off the
cuff -- I'm going to Japan the day after tomorrow and...

K: Can you give it some thought. I'd be very grateful.

R: Of course I will but Henry this one other thought too. I'm going back to
Latin America--we're looking for a new chairman for the Council of
the Americas which remember had that meeting with the President
and were ongoing discussions with your people there. The suggestion
has been made that Bill Rogers might be a good person for this. Would
this create problems from your point of view?

K: Not at all.

R: In a way you know he might enjoy it.

K: My estimate of his capabilities isn't very high.

R: But he does have a certain prestige nevertheless.

K: That's not much--he would be Chairman.

R: He would be the sort of figurehead.

K: Excellent.

R: In that respect don't you think he would be good.

K: I'd strongly support it.

R: I just didn't want to do it.

K: No hard feelings.

R: Another thing is what we're doing with respect to Israel in the thing is to continue to give them credit lines and extend credit for grain shipments and this kind of thing on a regular basis and I take it you don't see any problem about that.

K: No.

R: It seems to me the more we can do it (strictly non-war basis) that probably is a good thing.

K: I think that's right.

R: We also extended a 20 million dollar sugar credit to the Egyptians while we were there and I don't know whether we should or not but we haven't cancelled it.

K: There is no reason too because we hope to have very good relations with the Egyptians when this is over.

R: I would think this is not at all impossible and I really do think that despite his very hard line on this subject that the general fact of what he did while I was there is impressive, but a front.

K: He had to take a tough line.

- 5 -

R: I didn't call you because it really didn't seem to me that he had said anything new from what you already knew.

K: That's fine and it's a pleasure to talk to you David.

R: I'll be back in another week and of course you'll be in China.

K: I doubt that I'll get off.

R: Really. Oh dear.

K: It depends how that Middle East thing plays out.

R: That's too bad but it will just be postponed I hope.

K: Certainly.

R: Is that working out a little better?

K: Very well.

R: Good. Have you gotten any word on the ______ situation. The claims.

K: No, but I hope to work that out when I'm there.

R: Good. All the best Henry and congratulations again. Thanks for calling.

- 6 -

TELCORN

October 18, 1973/10:07 a.m.

Ziegler/HAK

K: Hello.

Z: Hi Henry. What is your reading this morning on the general direction we should take on the middle east.

K: Stay cool. Don't jazz it up. Just hold it where it is.

Z: Should we break off at your remarks last night.

K: I wouldn't do much beyond that. I said it now. I said it deliberately in a place where it couldn't get a hell of a lot of news. You know, I didn't distribute them ahead of time. I haven't seen them in the newspapers.

Z: It's on the wires.

K: But it isn't in the newspapers.

Z: It'll be in the afternoon papers. But it's not a boom headline story. But the breaking from State yesterday and your remarks indicate that there is diplomatic activity between the U.S.....

K: I scolded McCloskey. We should not...he shouldn't have done that. There is the slightly self-serving quality in all this briefing. I mean by McCloskey. It is not our custom to discuss diplomatic activity while its going on.

Z: What do you feel is our best position to take on the oil thing. He'll be asked about the 5% reduction in production.

K: Say we can handle it. I know that as a token thing but if you say its a token thing, that will force them to escalate it. Let's say you're aware of it. Isn't it possible for us in effect to say in this delicate phase we don't think any useful purpose is served by...

Z: I think that's the best answer and I think that would be useful. We had a very constructive meeting yesterday, we're in touch with all parties.

K: On the constructive Id refer to what the Arabs Foreign Minister said.

Z: That's what I mean. And we continue to be in touch with all parties of course in touch with the Soviets and in this delicate phase it would just not serve the interest of achieving a peaceful peace in the Middle East by commenting on the oil thing. Right?

K: That's right. I think that's the best thing to do and it will make us look better when its all over. I must tell you that if we get through this without breaking it with the Arabs or Soviets it won't be a bad achievement.

Z: That's true. Can we say anything about Eban's remarks.

K: No. Just say...just keep giving the same answer. It's premature. We said that we want to end hostilities and now so that we can have a comprehensive settlement afterwards and that is all we...there is no useful purpose to go into further discussion.

Z: Right. That's enough on the press. Now how do we stand.

K: We won't really know until Kosygin comes back from Cairo but you should not officially concern.

Z: I'm not talking press now.

K: I personally think that unless the Israelis score a spectacular victory which will then totally ____ the Arabs that we're going to bring it off.

Z: When do you think the chance exists for doing that?

K: Sunday or Monday.

Z: How does that effect your trip.

K: I'll have to delay it. You know I have a cushion of two days of the Japan stop but I might have to put it off by a week or two.

Z: OK. On that score while I have you on the line. The Daily News and I've talked to McCloskey about this, is just up the wall and...

K: I told him to coordinate it with you.

Z: We talked to some degree but I want to raise this Daily News thing with him because it's not good for you. In otherwords, the Daily News...

K: It's ridiculous. The New York Times has been killing us. Well we'll have to drop the USIA guy.

Z: I think that is probably right. Drop the USIA guy and put the Daily News on. I think it is almost essential from our stand point. The Daily News is.

- 2 -

K: There is no question about it.

Z: Alright. I'll talk to Bob about that and say I have discussed it with you
One final thing. On this ceasefire if there are any questions about that
hold the same line. Right?

K: What about it.

Z: In other words should they ask about what is our goal on the ceasefire
just to stop the fighting or to have a ceasefire which relates to withdrawal.

K: We haven't been in a position have we?

Z: No.

K: Then that's what we must hold.

Z: I mean your remarks last night sort of indicated we wanted to stop the
fighting now and then work for a....

K: That's our position.

Z: Yeah.

K: The problem is whether there should be a reference in the ceasefire
resolution to a final settlement but that gets to complex, we shouldn't
get into that. But we should say the first problem is to stop hostility
and then to move toward a diplomatic settlement as rapidly as possible.

Z: OK. Bye.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>APRIL 13 1983</td></tr><tr><td>By CH</td><td>Date 6/15/83</td></tr></table>

TELCOM
Secretary Rush/Secretary Kissinger

10/18/73 11:22 a.m.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Ken, I just found out that no one from the department has been in touch with either Maw or Donaldson, either about briefing them or what they have to do about congressional hearings and so forth.

R: Donaldson is coming down on Tuesday--I meeting him and he has a series of meetings with ________

K: Because Maw is here today.

R: I'll be glad to see him today.
I got in touch with Donaldson and -- of course Maw will primarily be
be involved with the legal end

K: Right.

R: But Donaldson is coming down Monday to give a speech and we're going to be seeing him on Tuesday.

K: Good could wemake them feel at home?

R: Absolutely, Henry. If Maw is here today--I will

K: Good well I'll ask him to call your office, but what can we do to get the process started with the Foreign Relations Committee?

R: That is underway. See we first have to have the FBI--the FBI report has to come in. Then as soon as that comes in, we will--it will be announced from the White House and the papers go up to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

K: Fulbright promised me expedited hearings.

R: Right, but until the FBI report is in--

K: Can we speed up the FBI?

R: Yes, we're trying to speed that up.

K: Okay, otherwise, I'll do it out of here. What is this running around about Hillenbrandt? Have you found out?

Page 2

R: No, I haven't -- all I know is that the FBI--who never tell you what they are doing, wanted to see me and they came in and they said they were investigating Hillenbrandt, Porter, Sisco and Brown--

K: Who?

R: Brown--you know, our new

R: I have no idea what that could be about.

R: These are FBI investigations. I'm trying to find out now.

K: Okay, can't we call the FBI what they are doing it for?

R: Generally, when these go in, they will not tell anyone where they came from or who asked them to do it.

K: Well, they'll tell me.

R: They'll certainly tell you.

K: Okay, thank you.

R: But Henry, I'm trying to find out any way.

K: Good, I'd appreciate it.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>EO 1983+</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CH</td><td>Date</td><td>6/1/83</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

Sen. Fulbright/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, Oct. 18, 1973

1:15 p.m.

K: Mr. Chairman, how are you?

F: Fine. How are you?

K: How are things in Arkansas?

F: Fine here. I have been traveling since I have been here. I am in
Little Rock now..

K: Is it exhausting?

F: Pretty much.

K: What I would think. I wanted to bring you up to date where things
stand. As you may know Kosygin is in Cairo. He is basically putting
forward the proposition that you and I discussed the other evening.
Cease-fire in place and linked to the implementation of the Security
Council Resolution #242.

F: Good.

K: The Russians have told us they were supporting it. He has tough
going because the Egyptians want a fixed date to withdrawal of '67
borders. The thing we all have to remember is with all of this detente
talk, without the detente Kosygin would not be in Cairo. The Soviet
press would not be accepting our airlift and all hell would be breaking
loose. We have talked to the four Arab oil men, including the Algerian,
and made the same proposition. We made a commitment if there is a
cease-fire we would put the whole prestige of the United States behind
getting behind a solution to the causes of the war. Even though it seems
quiet we hope within the next 48-72 hours something will break and we
hope in the right direction.

F: Sounds like progress.

K: I hope we are going to get somewhere.

F: You feel the Russians are really trying?

K: There are only two interpretations -- either perpetrating a hoax on us
which would rip the whole relationship and prove Jackson right for the
next 10 years or they are trying to help and I don't see why the former makes

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>Original Date 6/16/73</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>By: CHA. Date 6/16/73</td>
  </tr>
</table>

2
Fulbright
Oct. 18

any sense at all from a hardline point of view. Why send us a communi-
cation that they are supporting one particular approach. In order to
stir things up they don't have to send Kosygin to Cairo. Things are
stirred up enough.

F: If there is any rationality left at all it is the only solution I can see.
I cannot see that it would be in their interest to go through another
ten years.

K: That is also my belief. I believe they are trying. Everyone is so
inflamed. I had the sense from the Arabs yesterday that with a little
give here and there this might actually begin to move.

F: Yes.

K: We made the same proposition to -- to make sure we were not at
the mercy of Kosygin -- to the Egyptians through a private channel to
Ismail who is my opposite number in my former job and the Egyptians
have not yet refused it. An interesting sign.

F: Hope it turns out this way.

K: I will keep you posted. When are you coming back.

F: Next Tuesday or Wednesday, I believe.

K: Theoretically I am supposed to go over to China Monday night but I
will never make that. I have a two day cushion I was going to spend in
Japan. I could still get off on Tuesday and go direct.

F: Best of luck. Wish I could do something for you.

K: You have been tremendously helpful. I will call you the date after
tomorrow even if I have nothing to report.

F: Fine.

END

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>DECLASSIFIED</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Original Date</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>By: CH</td>
      <td>AR: Date 6/16/04</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 18, 1973

8:25 p. m.

K. Anatolyi, I was just talking to the President and he is going over a message to Brezhnev in reply to his oral message. It is not very...and doesn't add anything new but is the.... He was going to finish it about 10:00 tonight. We can send it over tomorrow morning but given the time differential maybe you would like it this evening. I don't want to mislead you. It won't add anything new to his message.

D. I would like to tell you within maybe 10 minutes I should have some suggestions on the resolution. I have not finished it but I assure you within five or ten minutes I will have received the whole thing.

K. Is that the result of the Cairo visit.

D. I don't know yet. I have only received part of it but I must see the end of the telegram.

K. They will have to understand in Moscow that what I am giving you tonight is in response to Brezhnev's oral message.

D. I understand that.

K. I will stay glued to my telephone. I just wish you were prettier. Fond as I am of you, in the evening I would like to talk to other people.

D. I understand that and I appreciate it. I will talk to you in five or ten minutes.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date</td></tr><tr><td>By OAKARA: Date 6/18/73</td></tr></table>

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 10587
by N.W. Alts 5/27

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 13, 1973

6:45 p.m.

D. Mr. Drouhnev asked you to convince the President of the following: This is not exactly the text of the message but I'm reading..."We continue to carry on very expatriate consultations with the Arab leaders. For its consideration we need a little bit more time. At the same time we - the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders - want to think of what kind of formulation should be included in the text of the draft resolution of the Security Council. In our opinion this resolution should include the following main provisions:

1. A call to the sides to immediately cease fire and all military action on the positions where the troops actually are.

2. A demand to start immediately after the ceasefire placed withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Res. 262 of the Security Council, with completion of this withdrawal in the shortest period of time.

3. A decision to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire appropriate consultations should be established at establishing a just and honorable peace in the Middle East.

This is the main point. I will repeat it. (Repeated three times)

K. Appropriate consultations with whom?

D. Our commentary involves the following conclusions. We feel that the best thing would be to have limited number of participants in these consultations. We, the Soviet Union, are prepared, if it suits you and the immediately involved participants and Israelis, for this kind of consultation on the part of the Soviet Union and the U.S.

K. Why are you so hard on your allies?

D. On what allies. We have many allies. I would like a clarification.

K. The one ally you have as a permanent member of the Security Council.

D. For the sake of conversation, why not drop them.

K. Actually we are no more eager to have your allies there than you are. We are not much more eager to have our own allies there.

D... Let's have these conclusions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The question arises about a guarantee if the resolution is to be adopted. I agreed together with you, if it is acceptable to both of our allies, that the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a recent forum guarantee the fulfillment of this resolution. We also are prepared to guarantee the territorial integrity, security and inviolability of the borders and the frontiers of all, including Israel, taking into consideration at the same time its right to sovereignty and independent existence. With these kind of guarantees from the U.S. and the Soviet Union we feel that hardly anybody will have a doubt about the visibility of the guarantee. So Mr. Brezhnev would like to share his thoughts along those lines with the President and he would like to receive the reaction of the White House. On my own there are two basic things: the Middle East and our relationship to cement with you.

K. I understand. You will see in the message that the President will send to you at about 10:00 or 10:30 this afternoon and wants to work on it personally--which is not an answer to this--that he makes exactly the same point without going into details. Should I still send the message of the President's to you?

D. Yes, I will mention that it was received before this.

K. Because we can't have an answer in two hours. Thinking it loud without having talked to the President, the most difficult point here is point number two about immediately after ceasefire that the Israelis should withdraw to a line under Res. 242 which really isn't established yet. First let me say I realize you're making a very constructive effort...

D. Yes, I'm being very constructive.

K. Why don't we consider it later rather than debate it out now and if we have a counter-proposal we will get back to you.

D. Did you get it all down.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MWala Date: 03/04/04

TELECON
Dobrynin/Kissinger

October 18, 1973

8:45 p.m.

D. Mr. Brezhnev asked you to convince the President of the following: This is not exactly the text of the message but I'm reading... "We continue to carry on very expansive consultations with the Arab leaders. For its consideration we need a little bit more time. At the same time we - the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders - want to think of what kind of formulation should be included in the text of the draft resolution of the Security Council. In our opinion this resolution should include the following main provisions:

2. A demand to start immediately after the ceasefire phased withdrawal of the Israeli troops from the occupied Arab territories to the line in accordance with Res. 242 of the Security Council, with completion of this withdrawal in the shortest period of time.

3. A decision to start immediately and concurrently with the ceasefire appropriate consultations aimed at establishing a just and honorable peace in the Middle East.

This is the main point. I will repeat it. (Repeated the above three provisions).

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Activity</td><td>EO 1883</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CH</td><td>Date</td><td>11/10/73</td></tr></table>

D...Let's have these conclusions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The question arises about a guarantee if the resolution is to be adopted. I agreed together with you, if it is acceptable to both of our clients, that the U.S. and the Soviet Union in a recent forum guarantee the fulfillment of this resolution. We also are prepared to guarantee the territorial integrity, security and inviolability of the borders and the frontiers of all, including Israel, taking into consideration at the same time its right to sovereignty and independent existence. With these kind of guarantees from the U.S. and the Soviet Union we feel that hardly anybody will have a doubt about the viability of the guarantee. So Mr. Brezhnev would like to share his thoughts along those lines with the President and he would like to receive the reaction of the White House. On my own there are two basic things: the Middle East and our relationship to cement with you.

K. I understand. You will see in the message that the President will send to you at about 10:00 or 10:30 (this he has and wants to work on it personally)--which is not an answer to this--that he makes exactly the same point without going into details. Should I still send the message of the President's to you?

K. Because we won't have an answer in two hours. Thinking out loud without having talked to the President, the most difficult point here is point number two about immediately after ceasefire that the Israelis should withdraw to a line under Res. 242 which really isn't established yet. First let me say I realize you're making a very constructive effort....

D. Did you get it all down.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Originality</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td></tr><tr><td>AR: Date 6/1/69</td></tr></table>

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>EO 1988</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CHARA. Date 6/1/89</td></tr></table>

TELECON
The President/Kissinger

October 18, 1973

9:35 p.m.

K. Hello Mr. President. I just wanted to tell you we have had a
preliminary message from the Russians. They are moving in
our direction but are not quite there yet.

N. I see.

K. It is from Brezhnev. It is their preliminary observations.
Kosygin hasn't left Cairo yet. They are moving definitely towards
the position you outlined yesterday. We have to stay very cool and
not let on to anyone.

N. Yes, we don't want...

K. I have the impression the Israelis may be doing very well in
the tank battle. They don't tell us.

N. That will move the Russians.

K. I think--well we shouldn't count our chickens but I think you
have pulled it off again.

N. That is good news.

K. It will take us another 48-72 hours. I'm sending on your behalf,
Brezhnev a response to his message yesterday which says nothing except
you are holding things together here and want to...and that a
constructive outcome is highly desirable.

N. Just assure him we are prepared to follow through. We don't
want them to think we'll get in cement...Thank you.

TELECON
Vorontsov/Kissinger

October 18, 1973

10:20 p. m.

V. This is Vorontsov.

K. Yuri, the most depressing thought is to know you are in town.

V. That is called psychological warfare.

K. Now I know things are going to get tough. The President had made some changes in the message to the General Secretary. He thought in the light of the message we just received from you tonight he should just send the general thoughts and not get involved in a debate at this point.

V. Of course.

K. They are just general thoughts about the Middle East and our relationship with the Soviet Union. What you are getting is... which you will see is very constructive and positive and pledges the U.S. to make a major effort but does not stress the one major point about withdrawals. We will be exchanging views on that at a later time. The President thought it might be too confusing right now.

V. I got it and will explain it by all means.

K. We have a messenger on the way over right now. It is a very warm message which we think you will feel and we believe this has to be ended by the two countries.

V. That is our approach. Thank you. I will report it to the Ambassador.

K. Just wanted to tell the General Secretary that it is slightly different than if we were handling complete negotiations. If you have any questions after you receive it why don't you call me.

V. All right.

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger

October 18, 1973

10:45 p.m.

K. When Dinitz mentioned 20 helicopters...

S. They have asked for a total of 50, 25 of two kinds. Defense is now sending eight. It's a big kind.

K. Will you let Dinitz know that tomorrow. We were supposed to tell them when we shipped the whole compliment of Sky Hawks.

S. They were talking about it and whether we should ship ten more.

K. Can you get that done?

S. I will get that done right away and...

K. The Soviets have sent us a three-point plan which I will get over to you, of which points one and three are highly acceptable. Point two is not acceptable, however. It calls for a withdrawal to the line in Res. 242 which they will not accept. As to the frontiers....I called Dinitz and left out point three so I will have something to use as an incentive tomorrow. They are as obnoxious as the Vietnamese.

S. I think you have it started just right. By the time we get something down we can live with they will be relatively pleased.

K. They also told me they are going across with more tanks. I am afraid it will turn into a turkey shoot. If they keep going across somebody is going to get killed, that's for sure.

S. The real danger is the Egyptian army is going to panic.

K. Once they get across in division strength that means the sand belt is gone. When they saw the army from top and bottom they are going to disintegrate. They are not that good. They won't be able to get supplies. They'll die of starvation. What I can't understand is how they broke through the Canal.

S. That is a mystery to me. They had this new defense position. They broke through two divisions, one infantry and one armor.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Origin</td><td>5 1973</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CHARA. Date 11/1/73</td></tr></table>

-2-

K. Is that the detailed report?

S. Yes, they attacked through a strong point because if they went through a weak point they would have two strong divisions surrounding them.

K. They broke through a strong point and went across the Canal. They are a good army or the Egyptians are very bad.

S. The Israelis are very smart and audacious and willing to take chances and back them very strongly.

K. It is going to turn into a nightmare. I wonder if and when I should go to China. The Russians suggested negotiations be conducted between them and us and not have any other UN members, together with the Arabs and Israelis. You can imagine what Chou En Lai is going to say to this. Of course, the Europeans will go right up the wall.

S. Of course, the trick of trying to get negotiations with permanent members of the Security Council...

K. I am going to get a message out to Ismail. Do you think that is all right? I thought I would say this will remain my position regardless of the military outcome but it might make them suspicious.

S. I like it and you should send off a message but telling them that might tip them and antagonize them.

K. I am afraid they will all get hung. I think this is the end of Sadat.

S. I think you are right. They might just run them out.

K. They have to be careful. The fact of the matter is when all is said and done it is a Soviet defeat. The same reasons why we could not accept an Israeli defeat will operate against them and even if they say the supplies did it, that should make them realize they better get on our side.

S. In that sense it couldn't have been better.

K. When should I go to China? Next week has the advantage...Larry said the President will start a peace initiative when I am gone. I can't think he will do too much without me.

-3-

S. I will want to reflect a bit. My first reaction is that he would.

K. You think he wants to give up a winning compromise. He will be up to his eyes in alligators with Cox next week.

S. He wants to be out in front with this one.

K. Supposing I go in two weeks. He can move even more easily then. I have three choices; to go next week, to go in two weeks, or to go in four weeks. Which do you think is best?

S. Honestly I don't see how you can go next week. I think it would look bizarre now that we are at this point under almost any circumstances.

K. Should I delay two weeks or five weeks?

S. Five weeks would bring you up to November....

K. I then move up against the Nobel prize and NATO. My instincts are two weeks.

S. If things move we may be at the point of a ceasefire and the meetings or something started.

K. I will have a ceasefire my Monday. I promise.

S. I agree there will be a ceasefire but I mean all the....will have quieted to the point it should be under control. That is probably too early to anticipate any real negotiations will be underway.

K. Have you heard about the Egyptians. They have already prepared for my arrival there.

S. That is probably that draft public announcement. That's beautiful! They are something else.

K. In the nutty Arab world I am sort of a mythical figure. The Arabs think I am a magician.

S. That's right. Might not be possible right now.

K. But I probably would have had an unbelievable welcome.

S. I think it would have been unbelievable. They have been so far. It has to be against all their instincts. They underestimated their military capacity.

K. If they had accepted our proposition last Saturday they would have been in a superb position.

S. They really would have. They just wanted a little more I guess. It just doesn't make sense.

K. I will send those three points over to you.

S. Ok. Goodbye.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority Ex 1983</td></tr><tr><td>By: JG MAR. Dake 6/16/84</td></tr></table>

TELCOM

October 19, 1973/9:56 a.m.

HAK/Joel Alsop

K: Hello

S: Hello Henry.

K: Joe, how are you?

S: I'm fine. I'm going off to Hot Springs today. I really should have gone yesterday but I missed my plane to be honest with you. That's a thing I've never done before in my whole life. I'm about to do a piece on detente. You all know I'm being attacked by...

K: By the great heroes who have stood so firm on everything.

S: I think quite nasty too Henry. I talked to Phil Jana(?) about it and I don't want to go into it at any length now but I would say he is just plain hard about it.

K: Who was? Why is he a tough liner now?

S: No he's saying that detente was all that you and the President had to offer and that you were desperately anxious to hang on to your job for another three years and I don't know what.

K: Therefore, we should have a little confrontation?

S: No. He was just saying in effect that the last thread of respectability of this dreadful administration has now been torn away. I was really very shocked to be honest with you and...

K: But these people want to destroy the Administration and they are prepared to destroy the foreign policy.

S: They would destroy the country as far as I can see.

K: After all we've managed to get through two weeks of a Middle East crisis with massive air supply into the Middle East without having the Arabs or the Soviets blow it sky high. That's not a minor achievement.

S: I agree with you it's not a minor achievement. The only thing is how do you assess detente now?

K: The way I've always assessed it. I've never had any illusions about it. We will resist foreign policy moves as we always have. We don't mix into their domestic policy. What they have done. You know, there are necessities on all great powers. We can't ask them to break all their relationships with the Arabs. I don't believe that they knew that this was coming.

S: I do myself.

K: I do not.

S: You do not.

K: No. But, they gave them a lot of equipment. Since then I think...

S: It looks to me like -- another thing they were divided about.

K: That's probably true.

S: This enormous equipment program. Really, its...

K: This enormous equipment program was also the price they had to pay for not delivering one g.d. thing for them diplomatically.

S: That's true.

K: I mean we tracked them through two summit meetings making them look like idiots.

S: That's true. I think my own instinct is that there were some of them that wanted to do it and had actually planned doing it and others who didn't.

K: That is almost certainly true.

S: I further think that you have to conclude...I found that Brent agreed with this more or less, and he's so conservative, that you have to conclude that it makes the ... that it adds a few points to the possibility that the military or military-minded faction will win the ultimate argument probably next summer.

K: Yes, but I've always expected that.

S: I know you have.

- 2 -

K: What is going on now Joe, unfortunately I have to go to a meeting. What's going on now is a revolting spectacle. We have had a Congress that has voted us out of every confrontation. We have been under unbelievable pressure. We have conducted detente in an absolute pragmatic cold eye way and the only reason they now want to wreck it is to punish Brezhnev for having been seen with the president. Who the hell stood fast at Shien Fu-huags(?). Who the hell stood fastat Jordan in 1970. Who the hell fought the Berlin issues. Who ever got any support from any of these people who are now screaming detente and what the hell has been our practical policy in this crisis? Who the hell started the air lift? Who's been phasing the Soviet's down? I mean for us to be attacked and being snookered by the Soviets is just revolting. What did they snooker us with?

S: I agree with you.

K: What did we not do that we should have done. And you know g.d. well that Phil Zurla isn't an advocate of a tough policy. He is an advocate of the destruction of Richard Nixon.

S: That's all.

K: And the reason they are now coming after me is because I am the one man left in the Administration who has more or less unsolid public position.

S: Well, thank God I wrote that series on American foreign policy just before all this started.

K: I mean all these people who've been cutting our defense budget, been screaming that we are to belly coast, who for 20 years have been creating the malice are now attacking the one people who have been using detente in an offensive way. But for Christ sakes if you can avoid writing about me in that sense you'll do me a great favor. I don't mind these articles.

S: Well, It think its important and you'll be pleased with the final outcome so you must trust me about that.

K: OK Joe but....

S: How does it look?

K: I think we are going to succeed.

S: You do?

K: Yes.

TELCONE HAK -- DOBRYNIN

October 19, 1973 11:04 a.m.

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Hello. I received a short message from Brezhnev to the President.
The text I will read you. OK?

K: Yes.

D: "Dear Mr. President:

The events in the Middle East become more and more
dangerous. Our two powers, as we both have agreed, must do the
utmost in order to keep the events from going beyond the limits,
when they could take even more dangerous turn.

K: Right.

D: If they develop along this way there is a danger that harm could be
done even to the immediate relations between the Soviet Union
and the United States. We believe that neither you, nor we want
to see it. If it is so then prompt and effective political decisions
are needed. We have conviction that with due willingness our two
powers can facilitate the finding of such decisions.

K: Right.

D: Since time is essential and now not only every day but every hour
counts,

K: Right.

D: my colleagues and I suggest that the US Secretary of State and your
closest associate Dr. Kissinger comes in an urgent manner to
Moscow to conduct appropriate negotiations with him as with your
authorized personal representative. It would be good if he could con
tomorrow, October 20. I will appreciate your speedy reply.

Sincerely, L. BRezhnev, October 19, 1973 "

K: You are friendly, aren't you?

D: Hum?

K: That's a friendly suggestion.

D: Of course it is.

K: Well, I will have to get to the President and call you back.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By W.W.AGAPEN
Date 10/19/73

TELCONE HAK DOBRYNIN

October 19, 1973 11:04 a.m.

K: Hello Anatol.

D: Hello. I received a short message from Breshnev to the President
The text I will read you. OK?

K: Yes.

D: "Dear Mr. President:

K: Right.

K: Right.

K: Right.

D: my colleagues and I suggest that the US Secretary of State and your
closest associate Dr. Kissinger comes in an urgent manner to
Moscow to conduct appropriate negotiations with him as with your
authorized personal representative. It would be good if he could co
tomorrow, October 20. I will appreciate your speedy reply.

D: Hum?

D: Of course it is.

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Dobrynin
10/19/73; 11:38 a.m.

D: Yes.

K: Anatol, I have had a preliminary talk with the President and we agree in principle to a high level contact.

D: Yes.

K: And you give me your quick reaction, why should Gromyko not come over here?

D: Because I think my reaction is because Kosygin is back from there so they would like to discuss, I guess, the three of them. Brezhnev, Kosygin and Gromyko.

K: I see.

D: This is really the idea -- not to send a telegram telling what was said by Sadat or what was said back and forth. They would like you for one day to come there and then I am sure Kosygin will everybody. This is my real impression why they are asking this one because he is fresh so to speak in what he was thinking and they could discuss with you.

K: Will you come back there with me?

D: Yes, if you don't mind I would like to go both ways.

K: With me?

D: Yes.

K: Well, as long as you sit in the front compartment.

D: (Laughter) All right. I would rather be in the tail but nevertheless.

K: Now what are we going to do about navigators and so forth?

D: There is no problem. We will give you a navigator and we will take care about this.

K: Well all right. I will call you back -- oh, what is it now, a quarter to 12:00?

D: MXXXIXX Yeah.

10/19/73 11:38 a.m.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority
E.O. 104
By: N.W.Y.

-2-

K: No later than two.

D: No later than two. Okay.

K: We are very sympathetic to the proposal.

D: I think this is really important, Henry.

K: Anatol, when the Soviet Government makes such a proposal on the basis of urgency it is not a matter we take lightly.

leave

D: Yes. And/tomorrow because they really feel it is urgent.

K: Well they want me to arrive -- well I can't leave now until about midnight tonight.

D: No, I understand. So you will arrive tomorrow but . . .

K: I will arrive tomorrow but -- I will arrive tomorrow night and we could talk Sunday.

D: Sunday, yes.

K: You know I would like to get a few hours sleep before your three men starting working me over.

D: (Laughter) Oh you are a beautiful fellow. Yuri saw it in Moscow.

K: One night please I think I am entitled to.

D: No, because . . .

K: My present thinking is that I leave around midnight tonight.

D: As it was last time.

K: As it was when we went on the secret trip.

D: I think it is right. So you will arrive approximately around in the evening.

K: Around 8:00 or 9:00.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012058
By: MWAPASFOR
Date: 10/3/73

10/19/73; 11:38 a.m.

D: Yes and then you go to bed and fresh in the morning on Sunday --
you will be as fresh as you usually are.

K: That's right. Just tell Antanov not to offer me his diversions because
I need a night's sleep.

D: Okay. He will do it afterwards.

K: Okay.

D: Then we will wait a call . . .

K: It is not yet approved.

D: No, no, I will not say anything until you finally say to me okay.

K: Okay, fine.

D: Bye

DECLASSIFIED

TELCORN

Lisa Minelli/Kissinger

Oct. 19, 1973 - 11:55 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Hello.

K: How are you?

M: I'm fine, Dr. Kissinger, how are you?

K: O.K.

M: Listen, excuse me for bothering you, I know you've got enough....

K: I'm a great fan of yours.

M: But I felt free to call you because I really feel I have a bit of a problem and I don't know what to do. I'll just tell you exactly how it happened. I was approached yesterday by Stephanie Phillips who is my agent and she said, "You've been invited to go to Israel for the State Department. And you will be the first one to know that." And I said, "To entertain"? And she said, "No. It's to say hello to the troops." I said, "Oh, alright." And everything got very excited around me, you know? But they went ahead and they've made all these plans, and I suddenly thought, "I don't want to endorse anything. I don't know what to say."

K: Well, when were you supposed to go?

M: I'm supposed to go tomorrow.
(silence) Hello?

K: Yeah, I'm thinking.

M: I'm afraid of going as a woman, and I don't understand why, because I once spent some time there.

K: Yeah, I think it will be alright.

M: Well, I have to make some kind of a statement and I don't want to get....

-2-

K: Well, just say you're going, that you're an entertainer, you're not making any political judgments, you're going on, you know, you're doing this because of your friendship for the people you know there.

M: My personal friendships.

K: Your personal friendships.

M: Alrighty. O.K. I'd like to meet you sometime.

K: I would enjoy that.

M: Me too.

K: Do you ever come to Washington?

M: Sure.

K: Well, when you do, when you can, will you let me know?

M: Yes I will, sir.

K: Good, I'd love to meet you.

M: O.K.

K: Good, and all the best.

M: ..see me on the news, I hope I say the right thing.

K: Well, say as little as you can about politics.

M: Yes, well, I know nothing so I can't say anything.

K: That hasn't stopped some of your colleagues from saying things.

M: I know, but some of my colleagues I don't admire.

K: Good. I hope to meet you. All the best. Call me when you get back.

M: O.K. I will. I love you, bye.

K: Bye.

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

October 19, 1973

1:35

K: You can talk to the Chinese Ambassador. He is your ally but leave our allies alone.

D: What happens now?

K: I understand you are having lunch with the British Ambassador. I want to make sure you being.. of you.. Ambassador Huang Chen told me he is very fond of you. He says if you give him half of Siberia and the Mauritanian.. he will sign a non-aggression treaty.

D: Will this say something?

K: Anatoly, about that letter. The President agrees that I should go to Moscow. You understand this will present us with enormous domestic difficulties.

D: Well..

K: Oh, never mind. I think it's important that we say publicly it was done at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

D: I see no difficulty in that.

K: In our interests to announce it about 1:00 this morning our time.

D: 1:00 am

K: Yes, I think we should leave about 12:30

D: This is acceptable.

K: Then we should say it is the invitation of the Soviet Government.. I am going on urgent consultations. Of course we will be delighted to have you come with us and .... we are assuming that no unilateral actions will be taken while I am in transit.

D: What do you mean?

K: No military threats. And I am assuming both of us will keep the situation calm .... I don't believe while I am there I will be able to negotiate a final settlement. I will be able to negotiate a cease-fire.

- 2 -

D: A cease-fire?

K: But we can't expect to settle it in one day.

D: OK

K: Is there anyway you could get in touch with someone over there. We may be able to get an airplane that could fly non-stop.

D: I will talk to Moscow.

K: The other possibility is to stop in Copenhagen

D: I will get on it.

K: If we want to ask for the right to stop in Copenhagen... it will then get out.

D: They won't know what plane is stopping.

K: I am not sure..

D: So, two possibilities... non-stop and stopping in Copenhagen. OK, everything is settled and you leave at 1:00.

K: Let's say 1:00 to be safe.

D: And announce at 2:00.

K: We will announce at 2:00. That way no Soviet military... I would like that I get a night's sleep before they jump on me. And we're going to Leningrad, right?

D: One night sleep. I put on menu. You want to... I will put it this way -- that you demand it be in Leningrad.

K:

K: Say that I insist I get to go to Leningrad. I will not go unless I can meet in Leningrad. Look we appreciate the letter and we gladly accept the invitation. I am going to see if we can bring about a cease-fire. All we want is to say it is the invitation of the Soviet Government.

D: I understand.

K: We have not even told the Israelis.

TELCOM

Harlow/Sec. Kissinger

Friday, Oct. 19, 1973, 2:00 p.m.

H: I am sorry to bother you. You are sitting on a letter to Anna Chennault.

K: Right.

H: I am trying to exercise it from you.

K: I am against whatever you want.

H: Knowing that, I would like to change the sponsorship of the letter to someone who will respond.

K: I have told Scowcroft no.

H: Can I change it to yes?

K: No. Not under the circumstances, which Scowcroft will explain to you tomorrow.

H: Nothing we can give that lovely lady.

K: No.

H: Nothing at all.

K: No.

H: Nothing from Kissinger.

K: No. We cannot afford to get into trouble with the Chinese now.

H: Can we say Happy Birthday Chiang.

K: I will talk to Scowcroft.

H: That would just be decency.

K: Decency can be expensive. We will call you.

H: O.K.

END

TELCONE

Gen. Haig/Sec. Kissinger

Friday, Oct. 19, 1973, 3:20 p.m.

H: On this thing we are working on. The President wants to go out tonight and announce your trip.

K: Impossible.

H: Why?

K: First of all, we have now told the Soviets we would do it at 2:00 in the morning and secondly, I will be at a Chinese dinner that the Chinese are giving me. When does he want to do it?

H: Whenever we put this other mess together which could be anywhere from 6:00-8:00. He would assemble the press in the Press Room and with cameras.

K: And say what?

H: Say in consultation with Chairman Brezhnev and that he has been in communication with him.

K: Say at the invitation.

H: He wants you to prepare the statement that he should say. Very brief.

K: Why should he do it?

H: There are a couple of reasons. One is he feels it for the reason of what he is going to announce after that.

K: He is going to make them both at the same time.

H: Yes.

K: A disaster.

H: Why?

K: My honest opinion is that it is a cheap stunt. It looks as if he is using foreign policy to cover a domestic thing.

2

Haig

Oct. 19, 3:20

H: The domestic thing is not controversial. A very good one. A very good settlement. It would also look very weird for him to make a major announcement on Watergate and ignore the fact you are going to Moscow when everyone wants to know what is going on in the Middle East. I don't see it as a contrived phony. I think you have two very important things happening.

K: He is not firing Cox?

H: As of now no. Just giving him a desist order which will probably result in his resignation.

K: I would not link foreign policy with Watergate. You will regret it for the rest of your life. I don't think he has to do either of them himself.

H: He has Ervin, Baker and Stennis. We are doing a hell of a thing here. He has to do it.

K: But if he gets that mixed up with foreign policy, Al, then he has to do this with the Jewish Community. It will forever after be said he did this to cover Watergate. I really would plead with you. If he wants to make it as an announcement separate from the other.

H: He wants to do that. That is his idea.

K: No, no, no. He is going to make both announcements together.

H: You mean at the same time.

K: Right. I would be opposed if he even wanted to make an announcement. Now the Soviets have asked us -- by his stepping out there it becomes high profile.

H: You are the best judge of that.

K: That does not bother me nearly so much. I think that is poor tactics. Also we would have to get back to the Soviets. This will be a situation where the President has put his prestige on the line. Right now the Soviets have asked us to come. We should do it as a reasonable low-key thing simultaneous announcement. We call some newsmen in the middle of the night. It is still a big thing but not the President's going before TV announcing it.

TELCON
Haig/Sec. Kissinger

Friday, Oct. 19, 3:35 p.m.

H: I have an answer to your problem. He says o.k. but he wants an announcement of your trip to come from the White House.

K: Yes. Ziegler should make it. One other question, must you do it tonight.

H: Absolutely no way out of it. We have a midnight deadline to file.

K: All right. You will explain that?

H: How do you mean explain it?

K: It is my problem quite honestly. It is no joy to be in Moscow under these conditions as it is. Anything the President says makes it tougher.

H: This will strengthen it dramatically.

K: You think so?

H: No question. All the press knows we have until midnight to file.

K: Actually that is a good cover for me to get out of town. I had already explained that Ziegler should call a few selected press people about 2:00 in the morning. Tomorrow morning he could give a briefing at the White House. It would be all White House. Not State Department. Moreover, when I come back what ever comes out of it, then he should step forware.

H: I understand you and you are right.

K: Thank you.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original Date 6/1/88</td></tr><tr><td>By: OJ</td><td>Date 6/1/88</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Scowcroft/Kissinger

October 19, 1973

4:05

K: I just had a call from Dobrynin. He says we should fly on the commercial route of Pan American.

S: And we don't need their navigators?

K: Do you think they ... I told them for easy identification I would be flying on a B-52.

S: Oh, Henry. I'll have them get in touch with Pan American.

K: Did they tell us... Oh, we are going to have a merry time of it.

S: It will be dandy.

K: Do you know what I saved us from tonight?.. The President wanted to say he is firing Cox and sending me to Moscow.

S: Oh boy.

K: So, I am going in a strong position.

S: This 2:00 am announcement... will make everyone hyper.

K: After what he is doing... nothing will get them hyper.

S: You're right.

K: And that will explain why we didn't do it earlier. OK, you will come over here about 5:00.

S: I told Ron and he said he would try to make it.

K: Well, the hell with him. Let him send Diane Sawyer and...

S: OK, I'll get him.

END

October 19, 1973

4:30

D: ... A short telegram from Breshnev. He thanks the President and you for your positive answer on his proposal. He says no objection for your public statement concerning your visit to Moscow and I was told you may come without any of our men on your aircraft.

K: We are announcing it between 12:00 and 1:00.

D: But you are going at 1:00?

K: Yes, but they can't get me out at the airport.

D: No problem, no problem at all. You may do it.

K: Try to understand. We are discussing in the framework you and I have been discussing...not a final settlement.

D: No need for me to tell them that.

K: I just don't want them to be disappointed.

D: They have invited you and you tell them the position of the President.

K: Exactly.

D: OK, good.

K: OK.

END

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Activity</td><td>EO 188-3</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>CHARA: Date 6/18/73</td></tr><tr><td>RECEIVED</td></tr></table>

TELECON

Rep. Arends/Kissinger

October 19, 1973

6:20 p.m.

A. About the newspaper reports... They said that some of our troops were over there.

K. Total nonsense.

A. I don't know where it came from.

K. We have kept this thing cool these last few weeks. Between you and me, while we are ramming a defeat down the Soviets throat.

A. You think we are on top of it? That suits.... I know the President said we weren't going to send troops.

K. There are no plans for sending troops in and won't be unless the Soviets send troops in.

A. All right. Thanks for returning my call.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Originator</td><td>6 09</td></tr><tr><td>By: AHARA</td><td>Date 6/16/73</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 19, 1973

7:09 p.m.

K. Mr. Ambassador, I am assuming that I can just announce myself to Israel if I think it is a useful way to get your views.

D. Sure. At any time. Would you let me know so I can go with you.

K. If I want to go from where I am going now I will do that and let Scowcroft know and you can get over there.

D. I have not told the Prime Minister, but I am sure it is all right.

K. I have no desire to do it. It is just a possible delaying move.

D. I will call her right now and give you an answer within ten minutes.

K. I have the President's approval, which I didn't have earlier, to begin with your proposal instead of his. I will begin to sell S______ and our proposal.... That presumes that if they accept your proposal you will accept it immediately.

D. You mean by Sunday night?

K. I don't give you a time because I don't think they will, but I don't know how desperate the problem will be.

D. Very. The last report we have taken a town 35 miles from Cairo, which is halfway between the Canal and Cairo. It is 70 miles between the Canal and Cairo and this is halfway.

K. It took you a little longer. I just like to give you a tough time.

D. We have gone together with very tough times so we are allowed a little relaxation.

K. You understand my strategy as we have discussed it. To sell the other condition to (Veetre) and to refer it back to Washington. The discussions will not start before Sunday morning Moscow time and cannot conclude before Sunday afternoon Moscow time and depending on the outcome cannot be implemented before we have discussed it with you. This I tell you for your own planning. May I make one request? The importance of maintaining the President's

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author's E.O. 12-3</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>Date: 11/1/73</td></tr></table>

good will for diplomatic performances that must follow. Because
the outcome you have achieved is the destruction of the Egyptian
army...you lived six years with 242 and I didn't....

D. We won't go into this again.

K. I am not asking you to change the position of your government which you cannot do. If the matters reach that point, which they will reach and which I cannot avoid, please keep in mind that after ceasefire it is important for your sake that the President look good and is not accused of having sold anybody out. You will need him very much in the diplomacy that follows.

D. Sure, I understand. You mean while....

K. Supposing the worst happens from your point of view. That resolution that I gave you will not happen. Nevertheless praise him for his statesmenlike achievements.

D. You don't even imagine that any of the linkage....

K. No phrase of section 2 will be incorporated.

D. What I understand you to say is that you want some linkage with 242....negotiation in order to implement 242.

K. Exactly. I am not saying you can count on it being refused in all its parts. It is the sort of link I give you...should it turn out to be the best possible after long consultation you should...in your head to thank the President. You will need it. They may be so disp... that they are....

D. I will call the Prime Minister on your proposal. Your trip to Moscow is secret?

K. Until it is announced at 2:00 this morning here.

D. I will try to give General Scowcroft the full situation in the field.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>DATE 12-05-85</td></tr><tr><td>STATUS Open</td></tr><tr><td>BY: JG. CDR. H. K. YORKE</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Dinitz/Kissinger

October 19, 1973

7:40 p. m.

D. I talked to the Prime Minister. She said with open arms.

K. Women shouldn't say that to me.

D. There is a certain age they are safe even from you, Mr. Secretary.

K. I am trying to be prepared for any event. What if they want to go back to October 6 ceasefire at October 6 lines and no linkage on anything?

D. I will have to ask the Prime Minister.

K. The greater flexibility I have the better it will go. Tell it to Scowcroft. He can get it to me.

D. I will get it to Scowcroft by tomorrow morning.

K. And any other combination you can think of. I will open with your position in any event. I don't know if their first point is so attractive to them any more.--The ceasefire at these lines. I have no doubt with all the complaining....I think you and I ran a good operation together.

D. Either we will wind up as worst enemies for best friends.

K. Most people don't realize that both diplomatically and militarily it was done very well. You did a great job.

D. Bon voyage. You have a successful trip.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Origin: 6.15.73</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>PARA. Date: 6.15.73</td></tr></table>

TELECON
Laird/Kissinger

October 19, 1973
7:50 p.m.

K. Yes, Mel.

L. Good luck to you. You know about the arrangements on the tapes?

K. Frankly I am not fully....

L. Senator Irwin and Baker will have Stenis listen to the tapes and summarize portions relating to the Watergate and the coverup and report back to the Special Committee. The President has made this concession to end the atmosphere.... The procedure was proposed by Richardson to the Special Prosecutor and has been under discussion this whole period of time. The proposal has been rejected by the Special Prosecutor today. The President decided to put this into effect and not appeal to the Supreme Court. The Special Prosecutor has been directed not to take any further actions on this.

K. Good move.

L. Is Schlesinger with you? I have to tell him too.

K. No, he left about 10 minutes ago. I have to try to put this thing together.

L. It might work out though.

K. I will do my damnedest.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>APRINCD</td></tr><tr><td>By: CH</td><td>Date: 10/19/73</td></tr></table>