[4]

Manchester Guardian

July 25

Mr. Macmillan after retrun from Geneva

"There ain't gonna be any war. This is based upon the now accepted fact that, in nuclear warfare there can be no victor ...... There are a lot of difficult problems to settle which will take time. The very fact that war is excluded means that the problems of the world have got to be solved by peaceful means and by an acceptance of the new conditions of these times."

Eden

"I feel more confidence about the international scene than I did when I left for Geneva. The most valuable feature of the whole business is that now there is a chance for nations to go ahead on a course which has been set and it is the right way towards peace."

Editorial

Geneva has been a success. It has made the risk of war more remote, has cleared some obstructions from the road to an agreement on Europe's future, and has given the West a clue to Russian intentions... and although hope is rising there can be no certainty yet of a happy ending.

July 27

Editorial

Mr. Dulles read a statement at his press conference today in which he said that the Geneva conference had registered a certain transformation in world affairs with the result that relations with Russia were now "less brittle" and were subject to "the patient processes of diplomacy" danger of war has definitely receded since Geneva

July 28

Opening debate in the House of Commons on Geneva Conference - Eden
"However, making all possible reservations, I do believe that we reduced tension; that we have created a situation in which the Foreign Secretaries can get to grips with major political problems. Some people will complain that the practical results of this conference have been small. That is true, but it was never to be expected that the problems of Europe could be solved in the short time at the disposal of the head of government. What we have done is to set in motion the long process of negotiations. It would be rash to expect rapid and far reaching results. It may be that limited solutions will prove the most practicable methods of approach and that as confidence grows we can advance to more ambitious proposals. Meanwhile Geneva has given this message to the whole world- It has reduced the danger of war.

LIFE

July 18

The Peace We Fought for is in Sight --- And We Can Win It
by Paul G. Hoffmann

"everyone is aware that the struggle between the free world and the Communist countries is entering a new phase, one which is already witnessing a relaxation of tensions and which may produce some more at next week's Meeting at the Summit in Geneva. We should not expect too much xxx from all this, as the President and others have warned, since the basic realities of the struggle endure. But it is highly important that the American people understand why this relaxation is taking place. The reason for it is the biggest news of our time: the fact that after a decade of costly struggle we are finally winning the peace.

"Because of these victories (Forcing Soviet army to evacuate Iran, 1946; Economic recovery of Europe through US aid, April 1948 to date; Survival of Yugoslavia outside the Soviet orbit with Western aid, June 1948 to date; Breaking Soviet blocjade of Berlin by air lift, June 1948-August 1949, Agreement on rearmament of West Germany, May 1955, etc. etc. etc.) the meeting at which the Summit finds the free world holding the top cards.

"The present relaxation of tension did not come about because one bright morning the Soviet leaders suddenly woke up feeling kindler toward the world. It came about because they finally realized that our strategy of waiting for the free world to collapse was not working out. It was failing because the free world was effectively waging the peace in the only way it could possibly be won, simultaneously, on four fronts: The military, the economic, the political and the psychological.

"That is why the Meeting at the Summit is our opportuniyy. If the Russians for whatever reason, are willing to let the cold war simmer down to "competitive coexistence", I do not see how our free society can fail to win the competition.

Aug. 1

atrie: The Great Spectacle at Geneva

"But as the second conference wore on it became a contest between Eisenhower and the Kremlin for the ideological leadership of the world. It was on the fourth day that Eisenhower won that award on hands down" by his offer to exchange defense blueprints, etc.

"But the failure of the Big Four to execute specific agreements on issues like Germany and disarmament was overshadowed by unspoken agreement on one thing; the evidence was that the West certainly and Russia probably consider nuclear war unthinkable, and both want a detente, or a period of relaxation of international tensions"

LIFE (cont)

Aug 1 The Great E Spectacle at Geneva (cont)

"Andre Laquerre, chief TIME-LIFE correspondent at Geneva cabled 'The Russians wanted a detente more than anyone, and text they got it amicably on their own terms, which were to collect the goods without giving up anything important'

"Most experts believe that for the next decade Russia will be contnet to hold what she has. To the extent that she still has short-term aggressive designs she can - in the absence of military superiority - further these amicably more effectively in an atmosphere of detente than in one of tenseness

Aug 1 Editorial

Eisenhower and Geneva

"The initialbox chief result of the Geneva conference is so simple and breathtaking that cynics and comma shasers still question it and Americans for other reasons, find it a little difficult to grasp. The championship of peace has changed hands. In the mind of Europe, which judges this unofficial title, it has passed from Moscow to Washington and it bringing amicably home the trophy President Eisenhower who captured it practically singlehanded, also brings home a new initiative in the cold war.

"The far-famed 'relaxation of tensions,' achieved without single meaningful agreement, means simply this: that the West can now proceed more confidently to make the world freer and safer, by means old and new.

"Thus there can be no relaxation of effort in American. But there can be new hope behind the effort. Our leaders have emerged from a great conference not only with popular laurels but, what is far more important, with the initiative."

[Y]

Economist

January 11th MacMillan "solemn pact of non-aggression. It would do
no harm. It might do good." then back-tracked. Economist called silly.

Jan 25 - suggested a British requirement might ask at negotiations are
no more arms to Arabs.

Feb. 8, p. 460. nuclear free zone most likely to bargain on.
Russians want atom free or leave completely only.

461. Western failure to bring up concrete counter-proposals.
If do go to summit with useful proposals, Russians may
not agree. "But an effort at least would have been
made, and seen to be made."

"It is after all, Russia, not the West, that is
determined to preserve the status quo."

495. Schmid -"Because they are unimaginative, there is no reason why we should be." urged whatever negotiations possible.

Feb. 15, p. 560. our reasonableness has deprived us of propaganda value of wanting summit. "it is the Russians who refuse to have on the agenda the most obviously dangerous problems in Europe."

March 8, p. "idea is for: the removal or reduction of acute
causes of conflict between two groups of powers
each having a similar predominantly powerful
member, with the hostility between these two being
alone sufficient to prevent any easing of world
tension." two might have success in negotiations.

March 15 proposal of no missiles til after Summit is silly.

they all want broadly disarmament and disengagement

p. 921 U.S. wants pre-summit meeting with real progress.
"On matters of substance...the only real test of
Russian sincerity will come when the [xx]xx[xx]xx President
faces the Marshal across a table." and that no guarantee.

The West's task is twofold: Before the summit,
simply to make sure that it will be the kind of
meeting where rational discussion is possible;
then, x if and when it gets there, to put forward
proposals which, with luck -- and without jeopardizing
any vital interests - might produce a reasonable
understanding.

they all also just want something to be done about it - a feeling
that there must be something more someone could do.

[Y]

New Statesman

January 18 "A meeting of heads of state is a supreme diplomatic weapon, which should be invoked sparingly, and only on occasions when it can be used to maximum effect. Obviously unless there is a clear will on both sides to reach agreement on at least some issues, it is better not to use the weapon at all.

The problem is, therefore, how can this will best be ascertained?" not foreign ministers conference - public, diplomatic channels.

d

"Finally, the substance of the agenda. At this stage, it is essential that both sides should agree to a self-denying ordinance not to raise subjects, however cherished, on which they are morally certain agreement is not now possible. This category includes, on the Western side, Mr. Eisenhower's strange revival of the UN veto issue, and, on the Soviet side, Mr. Bulganin's proposal to increase the area of disengagement to Scandinavia and Italy. Free elections in the satellites are equally taboo; so is the withdrawal of US forces from all Europe. There remains, however, the problem which lies at the heart of the present tension: the arms-race." Polish neutral zone; embargo of arms to Middle East a test area. "But it would at least prove that the present drift to destruction is not irreversible."

Feb. 8 "A national committee, under the presidency of Bertrand Russell, has now been set up to conduct the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. Its policy is to press for a British initiative to halt the nuclear armaments race and, as a first step, to seek top-level negotiations for stopping nuclear weapons tests, the establishment of new missile bases, and the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any more nations." "In the meantime, the committee urges, Britain as a proof of sincerity should offer to suspend patrol flights of aircraft with nuclear bombs, to stop tests of nuclear weapons, and to halt the construction of missile bases in this country."

...laudably comprehensive programme.

[Y]

New York Times

July 2, 1957 2-4

Representative Sterling Cole: "Humanity, decency and conscience" demand that the US continue atomic testing until 'clean' nuclear weapons are developed." "To have 'a flexible atomic capability' to meet the threat of small as well as large wars." suspension of all but those to reduce radioactivity is advocated.

July 2, 1957 2-6

Inglis we have clean tests, then all others have to have dirty tests to get them too, and you would still not have a tolerable war (concern only with major war) "The current negotiations envisage a trial period of stopping tests and...the great value of this proposal is that it might work and be continued. # For as long as it works we should have the satisfaction that Russian development of advanced weapons is being hindered as much well as ours. We and all nations would have the valuable assurance that we are all advancing less rapidly toward the precarious day of "push-button warfare" and that the risk danger of accidental war is being further minimized by keeping the number of atomically armed powers small."

July 3, 1957 2-4

Stassen: 10 months ban if monitoring stations set up - "first-step" advantages of first step: surprise attack eliminated; no spread of arms; no incidents; relief of arms burden (this one is almost never mentioned)

July 4 1957 1-5

Eisenhower - share clean bombs (all won't have to test)

July 4 1957 12-2

"Charles E. Wilson, secretary of defense, has said that the suspension of nuclear arms tests would not hurt the development of the long-range ballistic missile since the development of delivery systems could continue. In addition Secretary Wilson has said that suspension of the nuclear arms tests would constitute little more than a "nuisance" and indeed not affect the international arms race at all."

July 14 1957 19-1

International Trades Unions warns on Soviet intentions and calls for control and inspection.

July 17 1957 26-5

Sulzberger We want inspection for surprises, not actual ban on nuclear weapons. clean bombs are irrelevant.

August 6 1957 1-1

World Council of Churches - "Failing international agreement on stopping tests the Council proposed unilateral action 'in the hope that the others will do the same!' The church body predicted that this calculated "risk for peace" might bring new confidence and raise the foundations for 'reliable agreements.'"

August 7 1957 19-8 Stevenson: "But all is not lost and I hope that we will press on for the burden of arms is intolerable and nuclear war unthinkable. I believe we should now concentrate on ending nuclear weapons tests and production for that is the world's greatest danger."

August 11 1957 IV 1-3 "the reason it rejects the Soviet proposal for a simple ban on tests is that it includes no guarantees of compliance and would be pointless so long as there are no controls of weapons production and use."

[Y]

New York Times

April 1 - 16:3

Rayburn says is propaganda (Russian halt). "All the talk of the
Summit and the talk of stopping the explosions of these bombs, Russia has beaten
us on propaganda all around the world."

Hickenlooper: "The stopping of tests, in my view, is not an
important step toward world peace unless it is accompanied by responsible
and reliable stopping of production of weapons. It is just a propaganda move."

April 1 5-3

Gavin "It is in the interest of humanity for the US to continue
its testing of nuclear weapons. "Whether we like it or not, we are living in a nuclear
age..... and wants study and learning to make weapons that can be used without
destroying our planet."

April 1 14-7

Reston: propaganda. "Washington...finds itself once more on the
defensive." We want inspection and preparation. Haven either propaganda or unity.
Could have stopped tests or gone underground.

April 2 7-3

Dulles: "We must weighted very heavily all the pros and cons, and particula
ly... the fact that unless there can be a program which goes to the heart of this
problem, namely, the existence of nuclear weapons, we really ought to try to make
these weapons into something that could be used without human destruction,
and would could make progress toward their utility as more of a tactical weapon."

April 2 6:1

Dulles: "We have always been willing to halt tests as part of a program
which would lead to the effective elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals
of the nations." "The actual situation today is that the Soviet Union has, as
we have, enough large thermonuclear weapons to destroy the other, and perhaps a major
part of humanity. The Soviet Union is willing apparently to let it go at that.
We will not be willing to let it go at that. We want to do either of two things:
Either to cut down on this and to eliminate nuclear weapons effectively from the
international arsenals, or, if that is not going to be done, to develop the weapons
so that they can be effectively used as a defense weapon without a mass destruction
of humanity. ...We... have always preferred the first choice." "Also I may say,
we will continue to develop its uses for peaceful purposes." (a footnote)

April 3 8-2

Eisenhower: "The testing thing which you p- of which you speak, I think
is just a side issue, I think it is a gimmick, and I don't think it is to be taken
seriously." (does say only small bombs could evade detection) (Teller and
MacMillan say could evade detection)

April 5 3-4

Kenworthy of Times: 3 reasons against ban: Britain and France
would oppose cease because need tests; feasibility studies not complete; clean
weapons need testing.

April 6: IV 1-1

Times: 3 elements are contrary: deterrent role, cannot detect, allies.
IV 3-5

"In each Soviet propaganda success - sputnik, summit and testing - the record seems to indicate that US policy rather than US propaganda failure or Soviet astuteness was chiefly responsible for the American defeat."

[4]

New York Times

April 9 1-8

**Dulles:** will not join in suspension without controls unless didn't need controls any more. Stresses Soviet use for civilian blasting.
" So that it's no longer there would have to be, we think, a considerable degree of inspection; it would be to have some to establish a supervision of a cessation of testing that was effective. But whether or not the Soviet Union is thinking along those lines we don't know. That is the reason why we think it would be useful to get started at least on some of the technical studies while the other problems are being studied - in case of principle." "I don't think that you can separate psychological warfare from the substantive work that we are doing. We can't have propaganda which is any better than, or any different from, what we actually are doing as a matter of practice. So that while I think we can present our case more effectively than we have been doing, I don't think we can do it by trying to put propaganda in a totally separate compartment from policy making and operations."
"We must be not prepared to abandon the position that the program upon which we are embarked ought to cover as many aspects of disarmament as is possible, including the conventional which are, as I pointed out here before, of very great importance to some of our European allies and they would be reluctant to see the nuclear problem dealt with apart from the conventional. Now that doesn't mean that we are not prepared to take up technical studies which would deal just with the nuclear problem."

**Sulzberger** three explanations for Kremlin move: propaganda; self confidence in military posture; strategic advantage - less obvious and less discussed. West is in posture to begin to produce and USSR manpower and conventional weapons will fade. Our allies have, then, Russian have to put China and Poland into nuclear weapons - and they know would be unsteady. (Stresses our advantage if keep on and reliable? allies have nuclear weapons, doesn't stress Russian position if Japan ban, doesn't mention what will happen if we go on to advantage and then China and Poland have from our point of view) "Inadequate attention has been devoted to the purely strategic reasons which contributed to Russia's maneuver. For the reason is on the verge of winging our way." "Therefore such Europe must have its own nuclear warheads.... But if there is to be no more testing, France, West Germany and other Nato powers cannot every make such weapons."

April 10

**Truman** "The US and GB should invite Soviet Russia to join with them to pool scientific and technical resources in a program to provide for continued nuclear experiments - but under the control of the UN organization." practical bases, not wishing security. "We cannot stop in the middle of the greatest scientific development in mankind's history". "I don't believe in propaganda. I believe in truth" "How then could anyone construct this as any kind of victory for the Russians? At most this propaganda might have a short time impress certain groups here and abroad who by now ought to know better." need action and leadership "There can be no genuine disarmament except through the UN and a system of international control and inspection."

April 13th. meeting of scientists: Japan two groups: complete ban and (Leghorn and Wiesner) can't turn clock back, must learn to live, limit production and use, countries testing for clean bombs as deterrent. ground control.

April 13th I 9-4

**Kefauver** suspend after spring tests and go before UN with new disarmament plan. before a bomb dropped.

New York Times

April 13 IV 1-2 To Russia's advantage to limit nuclear, to ours to link with conventions.

1-3 willing to do unilaterally, not bilaterally - afraid Russia's urging banning nuclear weapons altogether and then no deterrent and no general controls. But are not afraid of cheating - can detect.

5-6 Stassen for inspected ban - a first step.

5-8 Must get alternatives to ban proposal of Russians that may be forthcoming.

April 14th

Humphrey "We have more to gain from a suspension of testing that anyone else, from a moral point of view, a political point of view and a technical point of view." "I personally believe that if you are going to have a truly effective disarmament agreement of major proportions, you must include within it Red China."

Red Option.

Effective quarantine agreement of water proportions, you must include within it
point of view." "I personally believe that it you are going to have a truly
effective, from a moral point of view, a definite point of view and a technical
point of view." "We have more to learn from a submission of testing that alone

April 14th

~~Corresponding~~

~~Corresponding~~

3-8 What get alternatives to pen broadcast of Russia that may be
3-8 Stateam for unabetted pen - a first step.

But are not strict of operating - can detect.

penning unferal weapons after them no deterrent and no general controls.

f-8 willing to go militarily, not differentially - strict Russia's using
conventions.

April 14th
IV 1-8 To Russia's advance to limit nuclear, to ours to link with
~~New York Times~~

[x]

[Y]

Herald Tribune May 1 - 15

May 5, 1958 5:5 Story on the Fed. of Am. Scientists: "The longer such an agreement is delayed the greater is the probability that nuclear weapons will get into the hands of irresponsible governments in other countries -- any one of which might be able to set off a general nuclear war," they want to limit under UN inspection, to not have a package deal because it is too broad and anyway you can detect blasts.

May 7, 9:1 Hans Bethe said "considerably to our advantage" if an inspectable test-ban could be negotiated, since the US now excels the Soviet Union in design variety and stockpile of weapons." Soviet Union blasts would be detected unless they played dangerous game of low-yield underground tests, and even then would find out. "You have, however, complete access and immediate access for any inspection team to any suspected area, and I think without that, the inspection system would be useless." "...matter of simple logic...that it is more advantageous to stop when you know that you are still ahead." If testing continues he said the Russians "will surely cause the same level of capability as we." Seek test ban agreement now after our tests, with inspection, but not limitation of production.

Strauss, same debate: I feel that text suspension at this time would be a disadvantage to us."

May 9, 3:1 Strauss: " He repeated his view that the tests must proceed in the absence of any cheat-proof international inspection system, and implied that the Russians may have announced their one-sided decision to halt tests March 31 in the belief that they now possess 'effective means of cancelling out' an American nuclear counterpunch."

Washington Post May 1 - 7

May 7 A5. article: small NATO nations want test ban to counter Russian one.

May 3 A9:4 Libby said "we must have further tests" to perfect nuclear defenses against Soviet H-bombers and continent-jumping missiles with hydrogen warheads. At the moment Washington is 'essentially defenseless' except for the threat of retaliation." the weapons for defense have a long way to go to catch up to weapons for offense. Pacific tests a major role in getting anti-missile missiles. (yet most articles talk about clean bombs rather than this role) Ike says 40% "We are just at the beginning of development of defensive atomic weaponry" for clean "... the benefits of continuing testing are so great as to outweigh the bombs minute hazard of testing fallout to health and genetics."

May 3 A14:1 Editorial: "The Soviet nuclear test suspension in itself did nothing to reduce the threat of nuclear war; and even if the U.S. were to respond with an inspection plan of its own after the new Pacific tests (as we think it should), this would not eliminate the danger from existing weapons and strategy. But it is still very important qualification. The Russians have offered to accept mutual inspection; and agreement on even a rudimentary system would establish a principle which just might be expanded into more meaningful applications."

May 6 A9:4 "There was once doubt expressed that thermonuclear energy would ever be used for peaceful purposes.... But we are getting closer and closer, and our now very close indeed, to achieving those peaceful purposes...if we are not prevented by some unreasonable international agreements."

[Y]

New York Herald Tribune, August 11 Walter Lippmann

There is a general movement among the great powers. They are turning from security based on publicity which inhibits surprise....It is no longer wishful thinking, then, to say that the great powers are on the way which, if followed further, means the avoidance of the 3rd World War.

But what is happening it would appear that we are entering a new era in the cold war, one in which that cold war is ceasing to be, as it has been for the past 10 years, the seedbed of a great and total war.

[Y]

New York Herald Tribune, December 2, 1958

Lippmann: From Berlin to Germany

Soviet looks upon Berlin as an instrument for raising the whole question of Germany.

"All in all, then, there is no instatn crisis and we are at the beginning of a long game in which the distance runners will do better than the sprinters".
proposals about Berlin are talking point not a serious offer. Khrushchev's 6-month limit would not be adhered to if promising negotiation underway.
not serious negotiations for next two years.

Soviet Union will not withdraw from Central and Eastern Europe without risk of an anti-Soviet and anti-Russian explosion among the satellites - risk in continuing military occupation, also fear of another Hungary.

On the side of the West, no serious negotiations on Dulles' and Adenauer's terms, i.e. calling for the liquidation of East German state and the extension of the frontier of NATO to Polish border - not a negotiating position

Soviet operation in Berlin addressed to successors of Dr. Adenauer and Mr. Dulles.

A risk that we shall become alienated from the Germans who succeed Adenauer.

"Before we make any more resounding pronouncements about the German problem we would do well to explore the situation in Germany with a fresh eye and an open mind and to ask ourselves whether it is still true what was true when Truman and Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles formed our established German policy.

[Y]

New York Herald Tribune, December 4

Walter Lippmann: The Reply to the Soviets

various ways to reply (must represent the agreed views of London, Paris, Washington, and Bonn)

Lippmann proposes a reply which focuses upon the thesis that the problem of Berlin can be settled only as and when there is a German settlement.

then next to propose the beginning of negotiations about Germany.

1. resume the discussion of a high level meeting or better yet

2. take notice of Soviet standing proposal that the future of Germany be worked out by the two German governments.

a. ask Soviet whether willing to allow two German governments to negotiate freely and whether willing to accept the result, if they are able to agree upon the structure of a confederation.

Almost certain S. U. will not agree to negotiations as free as this,

It will insist on: that the two Germanys live in an arrangement which limits their armaments and alliances.

An allied reply which took the line of a negotiation between the two Germanys would pose the basic question as to what are the practical conditions of a negotiated settlement - and what are the possibilities of an all European security system.

A reply of this kind requires a serious modification of Dr. Adenauer's policy of the non-recognition of East Germany; if he vetoes we cannot go over his head.

It is a good approach which would have Western support.

Difficult to see any successful approach which does not begin with the recognition of fact. There are two Germanys and two Berlins that only slowly over a long period of time, and in the climate of national freedom after the foreign troops have departed can the two Germanys become integrated again.

Washington Post February 3rd.

Walter Lippmann

Dulles and Adenauer trying to work out a policy on which the Allies are agreed and in which the Russians are interested enough to negotiate.

We are building in the new Congress an insistence that we move off dead center and do something more than decalim the reasons why we cannot do anything.

[Y]

Washington Post, Feb. 10

Walter Lippmann: On Flexibility

Issue not between appeasement and principle.

The real issue to which the reappraisal is addressed is whether to stand pat on positions that have become untenable or to move to new positions from which the Western Allies can recover the political initiative

Ex. Berlin

two streams of traffic: military and civilian

When on May 27 the East German govt. gains authority they will
control the check points. What do we do?

"inflexibles" say we don't recognize the East German govt. and therefore
cannot allow them to have anything to do without traffic to Berlin.

"flexibles" say as long as traffic is not hindered it does not matter
who stamps the papers. Adenauer is willing to accept E. G. govt.

inflexibles say that a blockade of West Berlin is fighting matter-whether
blockade is East German or Soviet is not a fighting matter.

flexibles say blockade is an idiotic issue on which to fight a war

Flexible position is a strong one. We stand firm on substance which is that
West Berlin is not to be lockaded - indifferent to formalities as long as
access to West Berlin is not allowed.

Our real objective to restore Berlin's status as the capital city to which all
parts of Germany have access.

Soviets may not guarantee access during period of negotiation - if so Soviet Union
in dangerous position - It will have given the East German govt. a free
hand to impose a blockade, which would be an act of war and it will be
committed to come to the defense of East Germany.

Bigger gamble than Moscow has ever taken-no reason to think it will take the
gamble now.

[Y]

New York Herald Tribune January 8, 1959

Lippmann: Mikoyan and Berlin

Soviet move in Berlin not an ultimatum but a move to open up negotiations on
a large range of questions

door has been opened to a negotiated solution of Berlin crisis, and may be to
bigger things than Berlin

reasons for saying Berlin crisis negotiable:

1. Western Allies will not withdraw their tropps from West Berlin until there is general German settlement.

2. Can't prevent Soviet from delegating to East Germany its present powers - therefore when at end of 6-month per iod Soviet transfers authority to East German will this interfer with our military presence

negotiations about powers of the East Germany controls officials

A Soviet guarantee that East Germany not interfer with our vehicles-a compromise
in which neither side loses face

Soviet side:

in accord with Soviet promise
possible cause for war removed

Our side:

East German officials subject to a Soviet gaarentee
would go a long way toward satisfying our official view that in Berlin the
S. U. cannot divest itself of its obligations undet the old international
pacts - *formula*

also in accord with Dulles's position in press conference of Nov. 26

if thos who exclaim any dealing with East Germnay are appeasement t han Dr.
Adenauer is leadang appeaser

Dr. Adenauer is now dealing with East German officials

Probelm of Berlin - must cease to be an island surrounded by the Red army and become
the capital of a reunited and unoccupied Germany

calls ofr more complicated negotiations not only with the S. U. but among Western
Allies

[Y]

New York Herald Tribune, January 15, 1959

Lippmann: Mr. Dulles moves

while the formula of reunification by free elections is #agreed formula# and "natural method"Mr. Dulles "wouldn't say that it is the only method by which reunification can be accomplished ( this point made in note of Sept. 30, 1958 and Dec. 31, 1958)

for a reunited Germany there must be military guarantees to reassure the S. U.
"If there is going to be any reunification of Germany, it has to take into
account realistically some of those very elemental, primitive facts of life" (Dulles)

real question about free elections is whether they should come first and whether
necessayr step to reunification.

impossible to achieve in any foreseeable time for it demands an
unconditional surrender of the Soviet position in the whole of Germany, and
unconditional surrender by the S. U. is a pipe dream

those who demand free elections as the first step to German reunification are not
urgently interested in bringing about reunification -

want to believe the S. U. will somehow collapse
don't face complications a reunified Germany would pose
in the status quo there are other interests that would prefer not to be
disturbed
reunified Germany far more to the left of Dr. Adenauer's Germany
political and economic structure would differ with 17, 000,000 East
Germans

sooner or later uprisings in East Germany and Poland - we may be involved

to avvert that we must proceed with reunification

proposes dual state with some common political institutions - pact of gradual
intregration culminating in a free election

[Y]

2.

Mar. Guardia
New Statesman cont.

We must decide whether to negotiate (of course cannot settle Berlin question in isolation, or have treaty before reunification) and will probably offer proposal for discussion of whole problem (this may be what R. wants says Wash)

page 8 two ways to answer notes - pay in kind with maximum proposals or try to find common ground.

hopeful: their suggestion of preliminary talks. Could explore:

trading recognition of West Berlin as part of Fed. Republic for recognition of E. Germany

acknowledges fact

would remove threat to Berlin

military withdrawl on Rapacki basis (not US overseas)

trade

then division between E and W Germany softened and time for peace treaty.

What R want now: surrender:

can't trade W. Ger withdrawal from NATO for E. Ger. from Warsaw

"Free" city would cut it off from freedom

confederation thru anti-Nazi clause would carry W. Ger. into

Soviet orbit. Excuse for intervention.

Yet unconstructed R. appraoch no justification for Western one.

break deadlock and have serious discussion

Can't ask for free elections because awkward for Ulbrecht and Khruschev

try indirect approach

January 22 page 1

Mikoyan - has "Sense of flexibility without giving away anything of substance." hails this.

Dulles - see new elasticity because(gave of substance) "Not only method" and offered security guarantees to SU if reunified. This perhaps an attempt to start with peace treaty and work toward reunification.

could have: something like Rapacki plan to bring closer to political settlement

closer ec. ties

lead by example

have to get unity between two Germanies by these methods or couldn't get along anyway.

Adenauer fears neutralization and estrangement.

Moscow fears German spearhead

at the front

Compromise could l devise new European security

2. look to German reunification with ties in pol and ec fields to west if not military

page 3. US and R attitudes right for negotiations, although no retreat yet from positions.

MacMillan statement on other than free elections as a course is "a new step towards an unfreezing of attitudes"

Bevan - complained going into conference with fixed and inhibiting attitude - that of a Germany free to choose allies.

[Y]

3.

February 5, page12

either deadlock or some kind of military disengagement
withdrawal
no nuclear weapons or
no alliances
no return of troops

R not eager, but why not press them?

on deadlock, risks are: gradually abandon hope of reunification
tensions - will be facing with nuclear arms

on disengagement, - advantages are: soften outlines of opposition.
Peaceful cooperation should work to our advantage and would
have our support

Reluctance to discuss in public because of psychological effect:
possible concessions apparent
raise hopes
whittle unity

"The answer to all this is that the Russians are shrewd enough to know what concessions are likely to be considered by the Western negotiators. Our discussions will not make them any wiser - and need not make us any softer. The political sense of the Western peoples is sound enough to protect them against exaggerated hopes, and too many international conferences in recent years have given them a training in modest expectations. For these same reasons, their determination is not likely to be undermined by the process of public discussion which is basic to free nations. More to be feared is the impression that our leaders are too scared to face the risks involved in changing their policy. Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Dulles, Dr. Adenauer, and General de Gaulle are not expected to produce magic formulas, but they ought to produce proposals which provide a genuine basis for talks with the Russians."

page 3

Adenauer - blunders to avoid : Berlin used as a lever
confederation
a Germany out of NATO
concessions in advance, such as
giving guarantee on Oder-Neisse line
not inventive, but realist. a rock. Knows SU, German peoples
inclination to dictatorship and must be part of West.

[Y]

The thing that everyone (almost) blindly accepts is that negotiations have as their goal the "relaxation of tensions" the phrase is used ad nauseum. The assumption is that if it is "successful" - if something is actually negotiated, then the relaxation will have automatically occurred.

Another assumption is that it is "suspicion and mistrust" which is the bug-a-boo in international affairs, that it is simply a matter of somehow getting a start and things will improve. Not as much recognition that it is irreconcilable interests, and that getting a start would be the beginning of a readjustment of the confrontation of power and will.

The Western governments do not disagree too greatly in their views on negotiation. The large difference comes with opposition parties and a few outspoken private persons.

Western concessions have not been so much in substance but in procedure and techniques. They have all come in the disarmament field and specifically in the inspection field. None of them have dealt with what could be called the "political" side (Germany and Eastern Europe). In fact no official discussion of disengagement. If the Soviets rigidly call Eastern Europe "internal", we rigidly call for German reunification and national self-determination.

In contrast, British discussion often centers around disengagement - even officially.

We seem to be stressing if anything more the value of some type of inspection etc. to guard against massive surprise attack - if are concerned about miscalculation, it would make this even more likely; and anyway would be

[Y]

London Times

November 28, p 12

Why not Russian proposal?

p. 13 - Berlin adjusted

only if a free unified Germany

intolerable pressures UN couldn't resist
needs Fed. G. subsidies
would be a divider of Berlin

Nov. 29 3 strands emerge: 6 months challenge will be met by us free Berlin impossible West Ber. only secure in a united Germany

One of Khrushchev's aims is to have discussion opened.

Set SU policy: no elections or alliances for Ger - or trouble therefore must seek wider settlement, be resolute, but no illusions.

Dec. 2 p. 9 The crux of the matter is recognition. Seems inevitable unless we determined to supply West B. without East German control and regardless of consequences.

p. 10 R. use rejection of free city to blame us for all woes, but they don't like: Strength of West Ger. in West and want: nuclear standstill

"Altogether a tough but not necessarily hopeless period of bargaining lies ahead, even on the assumption that the SU is ready to bargain.

Dec. 3 Adenauer makes situation difficult by bringing up Oder-Neisse line - is said to have said unity more important than policy.

Dec. 4 - p. 13. Any amount of room for fresh ideas, but not if they are presented in a way to arouse suspicions."

R goal: getting out of Berlin and forcing us to too get contacts to use as reason for confederation - but contacts in selves not bad

if R agrees to wider talks (and don't seem to want to), they are not likely to succeed. "But the West must demonstrate that success, not failure, is what it wants."

Assume R. move prompted by fear of Ger. rearm. - why not fewer arms all around? could be basis for agreement.

alot of giving of German view without comment.

Dec. 10 Lloyd reassured Adenauer - firm on Berlin. on general settlement, reunification if East G. demilitarized control system set up no change in military balance

Jan 1 p. 9 "No matter how armed are powerful America may become the strength and cohesion of the free world depends on the strength and cohesion of Western Europe.

2

[Y]

London Times

danger in becoming used to idea of bomb- so right to em;hasize
we are ready for wider talks - and Khru. will want talks more
if sees a thriving Europe.

Brittish reply - yields no ground yet not inflexible.

January 5 on Mikoyan visit "something may be done in the softening
of harsh opinions about R not only in the White House but in
America generally"

Jan 6 - 10 good of Mik visit to start new train of negotiations.
strengthens opinion Berlin crisis deliberately precipitated
as way to Summit.

Jan 12 8 - Moscow "clearly anxious" at Ber danger after we say will
stand firm.

9 - Khrus. problem is fear of German army

we must 1 Granted R wants to disrupt and conquer we should
seek military stability based on safeguards

2 genuine fears in future of Germany

3 not afraid to talk, though may be sterile
stunt
or card up K8s sleeve.

Jan 14 . progress: Dulles KNO points to negotiation.
Mik retrea on ultimatum

Jan 19. Both sides, without surrendering one point of principle,
give at least an appearance of greater flexibility

Jan 21. "Mr. Mik's visit has at least created a ferment of new
thinking here."

Jan 24 7 - In making counter proposals "the overriding need will
be for Western unity."
Khrus gave us 6 mo to disagree in
must stand firm on Berlin

"at same time pressing need for fresh ideas that do not jeopardize
Western interests."

if not free elections, still reun. in freedom (not SU confederation
plan as stands)

maybe no progress - then either status quo or gradual build up
corresponding with growing Ger. Unity.

But most promising way to achieve relaxation - remove fears
of Ger. remilitarization by limiting all forces.

[7]

New York Herald Tribune

July 25

Roscoe Drummond "Geneva Balance Sheet"

President Eisenhower succeeded in seizing and holding the diplomatic initiative
throughout the conference

July 25

Stewart Alsop "The Meaning of Geneva"

"As far as Europe is concerned, both sides have recognized the realities of the current situation and tacitly agreed to do nothing violent to alter these realities. Both sides have recognized the status quo.

....."the freezing in position which has been tacitly acknowledged here in
Geneva reduces the chance of war breaking out in Europe, in the immediate
future, almost to the vanishing point. Surely this is a gain, even though
for the long run, it settles nothing.

July 24

Gaston Coblenz,

"At least two interpretations of the Soviet demonstration of affection for the American President suggest themselves: the first is the simplest--that the "Ussians are seeking relaxation of Western pressure upon the, and so aimed at the key source of the pressure, the US"

(2nd, the S. leaders impressed by Ike and trying to lay ground work for better relations with is administration)

Roscoe Drummond

"No one suggest that Soviet trust in Eisenhower means an end of cold war. But it may well mean that the mounting war tensions will be reduced and the danger of war lessen ed, while patient, xmpainful, snail-like negotiations go forward.

July 22

Stewart Alsop

The Big Four conference here has now reached its first, and very probably
it only _is_ important agreement. The agreement is unwritten and was unspoken
yet it is implicit in everything that has been done and said since the
conference began. The _First_ 4 Powers, and above all the US and SU have
agreed not to have a war if they can possible avoid it.

"...that we can rock along for a long time without a war.

July 20

Stewart Alsop

"But at this early stage it is at least encouraging that the most experienced observers of all 3 Western powers, both here and in Geneva and Moscow are unanimous on one point. The Soviet rulers really do want to lessen tensions. They really do want to reduce the risk of world war. Interpreting Soviet policy ......is more a matter of sense of smell than of assessing hard evidence and the best smeller all smell the same thing -- a real if temporary and tactical, change.

Hansard

February 4, 1958

economic
negs.

982. **Hughes** "There is an impression in the world that Mr. Bulganin and the Russians are always taking the initiative in foreign policy. Do you not think it would be very difficult for the Russians to refuse a proposal for a world economic conference which would attract the imagination of people throughout the world?"

**Butler** "This is tied up with some relief of disarmament funds... the first thing is to reach some agreement with the Soviet Union on disarmament."

February 19, 1958

1230 **MacMillan.** "Then there is a view which, I am sorry to say from recent speeches Mr. Khrushchev seems to take: that the agenda should be whatever the Russians want and that they should have a veto on anyone else's suggestions."

lots on method, then: "what are the subjects which are most likely to offer a chance of success? This of course is just what the diplomatic or any other preparatory method would have to decide. I would rule out anything in principle but in practice we may find it necessary to concentrate on subjects which seem likely to have a good chance of leading to some success. I must say that the general subject which seems to me to offer this chance of progress is that of disarmament in its widest sense. .... It is one of practical arrangements and not of theoretical or ideological dispute. .... if achieve a modest advance here, .... agreement even on quite a small scale, it would open up further possibilities. "We might in addition deal with some subjects less polemical in character -- trade, individual contacts, interchange of information; and so forth. " I want to leave nothing undone." must have confidence in moral basis - not force or negotiations alone.

1234 **Gaitskell.** defensive alliance on its own is not enough today. Maginot line mentality. international position is wrong and dangerous. is for an "ice-breaking type of conference. I do not agree with him (MacMillan) that an ice-breaking conference necessarily means something that gets nowhere, but it is a conference which begins rather than ends the process of negotiation.

but says do need preparatory - where, when, who and what discussed.
with him

"But I do not quite agree that we should expect to get far at the discussions of the actual proposals themselves, simply because I do not think that that is the Russian approach to this problem.

" Marshal Bulganin's original proposals.... are really not a bad list. He proposed discussing the suspension of nuclear tests, a nuclear free zone in Europe, a non-aggression pact, the renunciation of the use of force in the Middle East and what he called cultural collaboration.

2.

"I would say not just a suspension of hydrogen bomb tests by breaking the disarmament deadlock....Secondly I would say not just a nuclear free zone in Europe by disengagement in Europe, thirdly I would say peace and security in the Middle East, not just the renunciation of force."

(Israel, arms embargo, economic development)

says Britain should have accepted cessation of tests to improve atmosphere and break deadlock and yet that linking of other provisions to it as MacMillan did --"should we really have been any nearer a subsequent agreement?" go ahead

"will not <u>happen</u> with any physical preparations for establishing these missile bases until we have talked with the Russians, until after the Summit conference. ... <u>Western</u> Might very well help towards the conclusion of a disarmament agreement about which the Prime Minister was so hopeful."

"The key to disengagement in Europe... is the withdrawal of foreign forces both from West Germany and from East Germany, and, I would say also, from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary."

"We must recognize one thing at the start. It is really no good going on thinking in terms of any settlement unless it involved a neutral zone or belt and the agreement on the part of Germany in the event of such a plan succeeding, to withdraw from NATO

Rapacki too little.

Rapacki said "What we should do... is to put forward our own proposals for disengagement." "Here is what we should like to see done.

"gradual withdrawal of foreign forces from East and West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary"

"agreement to limit <u>Western</u> or control the conventional forces -- and no nuclear weapons -- permitted to the nations covered by the agreement."

"Thirdly German reunification"

"fourthly a security pact underwritten by the great powers and guaranteeing the frontiers of the countries in this neutral zone. Finally and if everything else is agreed, agreement for Germany to withdraw from NATO and for Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact."

"There are after all enormous gains from a plan of this kind. The danger, first, of a nuclear clash is clearly reduced. We should have achieved German reunification, we should have achieved the prospect at least of greater freedom for the satellite countries, and we should have introduced an experiment in controlled disarmament which is probably the best in this field that we can hope for at the moment. Finally we should perhaps have prevented - I don't think not say <u>one million</u> for a moment an outright attack, because nothing will do that except complete disarmament, elaborate controls and so on - but we should have enormously diminished the danger of outbreak of friction in that part of the world, because, fundamentally, we should have solved the problems or dangers that exist at present."

[Y]

3.

"We are at the beginning of bargaining, and it is very unlikely that we shall get agreement at first. We have to go to the conference table and see where we get."

"We may be told that this is all very hopeful, but that the Russians who are not likely to agree to it... There is no use talking in these terms until and unless we try."

### Mott-Radcliffe

"Then we had the usual suggestion that we should have talks to reduce the very tension which the Soviet Union has a few weeks earlier had itself largely created."

"The theory of disengagement is extremely attractive superficially, but it bristles with snags. ... it may sound curious to the leader of the Opposition, but at least the advantage of the present situation is that there is no neutralione. ... Everybody knows that the moment one side goes over the line is bound to mean trouble."

"But I do not like the idea of getting into a position in which there is a nuclear zone which can easily become a kind of Tom Tiddlers' ground, with the Western powers either being unable to do anything at all or else obliged to resort to the nuclear deterrent.... that degree of uncertainty would be very dangerous, indeed much more dangerous that the present situation."

"Nor do I believe that we should for one moment contemplate making any kind of agreement with the Soviet Union which formally so to speak wrote off the satellite countries in perpetuity behind the Iron Curtain by recognizing what is now called the status quo" "Morally and absolutely this is indefensible."

in disengagement have begged whole issue of Germany. "What does 'taking the initiative' mean if the Russians continue to say 'no'? it means that we make ... fresh concessions."

### Henderson

"The time has come to end this barrage of letters and to move from words to deeds ... Above all what is needed is to make a beginning and this should be made at such a conference."

"The Prime Minister referred to the impossibility of disarmament, and I hope that on this vital problem the Western heads of government will show their own sincerity of purpose and will test the sincerity of purpose of the Soviet government by a new approach."

of burbooe of the Soviet Government by a new abbracou.
will show their own sincerity of burbooe and will test the sincerity
they that on this vital question problem the Western peace of Government
with the Prime Minister referred to the inappropriacy of disassemhent, and I
should be made at such a conference."

## Houdgeron

that we make ... treat conferences.
the initiative, mean if the Rasatans continue to ask 'no'; it means
in disassemhent have been made before the end of Germany." What does "faking
spitefully" this be indele Responsible."

by recognising what is now called the status quo." "Moralist and
 wrote out the satellite countries in barbarea, pending the Iron Cross.
 kind of agreement with the Soviet Union which commonly so to speak
 "Nor do I believe that we should for one moment consolidate making any
 attempion.

would be merely dangerous, indeed more dangerous than the present
offered to resort to the unclean deterrant.... that degree of uncleanly
the Western Powers either pointing out to do something at all or else
a worse one which can easily become a kind of Tom Tippitera, ground, with
"But I do not like the idea of getting into a position in which there is

rose over the fine kmz is bound to mean trouble.
there is no newspaper. ... Everybody knows that the moment one appears
obedient, put at least the advantage of the present before us that
it prates with ease. ... it may sound curious to the leader of the
team theory of disassemhent is extremely attractive sublimatively, put
itself entirely created."

the very father of which the Soviet Union has a few weeks earlier had
"Then we had the same argumentation that we should have taken to reduce
the air force created."

## Mott-Radefille

talking in these terms until and unless we try.
"We may be told that this is all very doubtful, but that the Rasatans
and see where we get."

The air force agreement at that. We have to go to the conference table
"We are at the beginning of paragraphing, and it is very unlikely that we are

3.

[A]

[Y]

4.

Mark II

Maitland

"I believe that the success of the summit talks lies simply and solely in the hand of the Russians."

Davies 1268

"I should have thought there would be agreement at once that it is desirable to hold those talks and that it was not necessary to waste so much time before replying in detail to the letters that have been passing. I should have thought it the last thing to do was to say that the sooner we come together the better. The whole world is waiting for some relief from the tremendous perils which threaten it. I do not think it see that it helps to insist that it should be very carefully prepared. ... If we are to have the summit talks should we not better wait for the discussion which will arise there?

"I have said that it would be better for them not to meet if they are not to discuss the very questions that cause trouble."

"Let us assume that the heads of government do not get very far at a conference in discussing partial disarmament. I never thought that they would get very far.... Could we not turn our minds away from an arms conference and see how far we could get by talking about something else, particularly trade?"

Kerr 1273

"We have vividly in mind the memory of Hungary.... the only possible solution to the problem of sudden attack is I think disarmament strictly supervised by international teams."

Short 1282

"Hungary showed quite conclusively that war was out of the question." I think that only a guine permanent neutrality...would induce Russia to withdraw from Germany ... and... is the only hope of any sort of liberation of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe." (must be forces in France and East)

Smyth

choice

"Today we have a decision between total war and total peace."

"We must not change that state of peace unless we are certain that the change that we make will be for the better and not for the worse."

Oram 1289

"In my view we should make a mistake if we spoke to much about achieving summit talks and too little about what we are to be said and offered at the talks. "....They do not in themselves spell success."

[4]

5.

"What is desperately needed is a new initiative". - PM not offering any. Need China and Nehru - his gifts and coloured people should be recognized.

"Most hopeful point from which we can begin to the problems id best expressed in the word disengagement." not just Europe by global. Ban on atomic weapons throughout and limited conventional -- agreement on delivery of arms and foreign forces and bases.

Zilliacus 1301

"The contention that they fear even a partial peace with the Soviet Union is borne out by the fact that they consistently reject any proposals made as a first step to coming to terms. They refute the idea of planning bomb tests.... They will have none of the Rapacki Plan" The government are against the idea of unifying Germany with an all Europe treaty based on the Charter.

(They use Hungary as an example of Soviet use of force but not usually of mistrust. But feeling that if disengage must be in a position to force to hold to the agreement so that we won't have to trust.)

"anti-Communist intervention disguised as liberation"
"not killing with preparation, but policy proposals"

Mallaliew

it does not
"The government say that if we have a conference and we succeed, we will be worse off that ever before.... I just do not believe it. We must get together and try to hammer something out whenever we have the chance."

"Gulfs...however, are like ditches on farms. They tend to fill up: and every shower of rain that comes, as anybody who has ever had to clean out farm ditches knows, tends to fill the ditch.

Healey

I believe that the British government should commit themselves now to negotiation with the Soviet Union on Disengagement" agreement on German reunification in context of troop withdrawal, permanence of Oder-Neisse, armed forces and how controlled in these countries (no nuclear weapons)

may have to start with zone limitation and inspection - then
on to the total examination of foreign policy
and political neutrality.

6.

[Y]

Armsby-Gore 1341

The Russians have one over-riding objective in Europe. It is a quite
simple one -- to disrupt NATO and assure American withdrawal from
the continent so that European countries, faced with overwhelming
forces may have no effective means of resisting Soviet pressure.

lesson

"It is surely far more likely that the lesson the Soviets learned
after Hungary was that their physical control of the satellites
is more essential than ever" would take on new risks -
broader commitment and fewer forces.

Bevan 1417

"I.fear that a great opportunity has been lost and that we have
not taken advantage of the Russian mood at the time when it appeared
to be more favorable to us."

"It does not matter that there is no military advantage to either side
or that there may be some small military advantage to one
side from a proposal of that sort. The essential condition is that
we should be able to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union by
which both the Soviet Union and ourselves could for the first time
cooperate and not quarrel with each other. These are deeds not
words."

1422. I know that the Prime Minister has said, and it has been said
by others 'Why is it that we should accept only the Russian proposals
for the Summit Conference and not put proposals forward of our own?'
I understand that the Russians have not refused that. The Russians
have agreed to look at our proposals. But is this a conference
aimed at agreement or is it a conference aimed at disarmament?

I am afraid that the is against the government here.
Let us see. At least I should try to modify that. It is on the
American side that there is an apparent attempt at disarmament. --
because President Eisenhower put forward his alternative agenda
the liberation of Eastern European states. I know very well that in
present circumstances that is inpracticable. (Why?) Really
no one is here arguing for a momentor defending Russian policy in
Eastern Europe. We are seeking to find ways of reaching agreement
which will make further agreement easier.

Stonehouse

"Something a (PM) should not insist should go on the agenda is the
question of Germany reunification".... "I hope that the prospect of
success at the Summit Conference will not be jeopardized by insistence
that German reunification should go on the agenda. There are many
other more important things to discuss which deserve the attention
of the world long before the question of German reunification is
considered.

We should respect the opinions of the Poles on this matter."

I do not think it is wise to say that there was no use putting this
or that item on the agenda because the Russians will have it.
and it would not be wise for the Russians to say the same thing about
us... I think it is for each nation to put down what it thinks is

7.

wise, taking into account of course what is expedient and sensible.

Bennett

I am extremely suspicious about the capacity of Russia to follow
examples..... they have never shown themselves impressed by
voluntary gestures from the West.. - Hungary, Suez - argued if
they got out Russians would.

"I should have thought that if the Russians genuinely want a summit
conference....it would be they that should now be making such a
reciprocal gesture... if the Russians were to do something decisive
about Hungary........

Younger - lists mutually exclusive.

"Soviet Union's list whilest perhaps not objectionable lacks reality
in the sense that all the Russians wish for is some kind of declaration
of good will ...non-aggression, things that are uncontrollable.
The Americans seem to have put in the all the things that
they would like to get at the very end of a long period of
negotiation. We must realize that a great many of those things
will make it much more difficult to get discussions started at all."

"Surely in those circumstances our job,..,is to pick on some of the
subjects which the Soviet Union appears to be willing to discuss
and to see whethe we can adjust them of widen the terms of reference
in each case so that we can too in addition to the Soviet Union will
be able to make our legitimate points to these headings.

February 27th.

Crossman 640.

"We should go to the summit talks and try to agree upon disengagement.

Disengagement is the great hope of the world -- the creation of
a belt in the middle of Europe which is free both of occupation
forces and of nuclear weapons. But we have to face facts. It is
quite possible that the summit talks will be only a limited success,
and that we shall be faced ... with the necessity of remaining
or 12 years in a world of coexistence without peace.

We shall all have to make up our minds what we ought to do
after the summit talks. It is very easy to make resolutions
about what to do before, but how are we to live after the talks?
I make the suggestion -- as I did last year -- that our biggest
single contribution to peace that we could make would be to prevent
anybody else joining the nuclear group.

585 I am not too optimistic but let us try it out. It is more
preferable to go on talking than fighting.

1.

Dulles, October 10, 1955

"Today it is the Soviet policy to appear friendly and to mingle with all the world. ...So we cannot tell whether what is now going on marks a genuine change of purpose or whether it is merely a maneuver.

Harsch, Harper's, September 1956

Two theories are equally permissible about ulles' conduct of our foreign policy. One is that with a truly Machiavellianskill he has kept the Senate war-waging happy by his public pronouncements, while quietly paving the way for a settlement with the Communist world by his actual operations. The other theory is that the domestic Soviet aftermath of Stalin's death - coupled with a vast American urge for peace which seized upon DE as its instrument - have together produced a more relaxed world with which Mr. Dulles has, if sometimes tardily, come to terms.

Dulles, News Conference, October 16th, 1956

reaction to Stevenson proposal:

"Well, we have for a long time been studying this whole question of the H-bomb and the possibility of having effective controls and that has been a preoccupation of this Administration for several years, ever since the big thermonuclear bombs have been developed. ...I believe that if there is an effective way to control and limit the use of these bombs that we will find it. So far we have not found it and I doubt very much if those who are not fully conversant with the details of the problem, which have to remain to some extent confidential, are in the best position to find it."

Dulles, News Conference, July 16th 1957 after Kremlin

The rulers of Russia face a rising, and in the long run irresistible, demand of the people for more personal security, more personal freedom, and more enjoyment of the fruits of their labor. The ruling group, the Presidium, then with 11 voting members, was sharply divided as to how to cope with the situation.

The "fundamentalists" in the Presidium seem to have believed that the only course was to maintain absolute centralized power in the Kremlin, and to rule from there with a rod of iron, in accordance with the Stalin example. The "modernists" seem to have believed that it was better to give an appearance at least of flexibility, and allow the people at least to hope for changes that would improve their lot.

not completely power politics

means no change in foreign affairs - the modernists have been conducting it.

Dulles, News Conference, July 22, 1957

possibilities: aerial and ground for massive surprise attack; control use of newly produced fissionable material; monitor tests; future development of means of transmission - ICBM; limit forces; reduce conventional weapons; transfer from weapons to peaceful uses.

First, would join in inaugurating a system of inspection which will provide dependable safeguards against large-scale surprise attack.

Second - stop production, reduce stockpiles, suspend testing.

2.

[y]

fourth - outer space

Dulles' News Conference of August 27, 1957

We are not trying to settle every detail. The application for instance, of
the program for inspection of the suspension of testing, if there is such,
will occur after the agreement is signed. The arrangements for inspecting
the cut-off of fissionable material will be installed after the agreement
is signed and we think it is in line with that that the details of trying to
control this other thing shall be worked out after the basic thing (the
first phase agreement) is signed.

Dulles before the U.N., Sept 19, 1957

if no other measures "then we doubt that it is prudent to forego efforts to
make nuclear weapons into discriminating defensive weapons substantially
free of radioactive fall-out."

Dulles News Conference, March 25, 1958

...it is not a correct interpretation of what I said at Manila that we would accept a Summit Conference with only one item on the agenda, that is, disarmament. We would feel that it would be quite important to resume the discussion of ...all of the items, that constituted the last agenda at the Summit Meeting....

says agenda subject to negotiation.

Dulles News Conference of April 8, 1958

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it a fair reading that the US is now prepared to accept or to limit its disarmament package to the matters discussed here? That is, test suspension, production offcut and stockpile reduction, all with inspection?

A.. No, I think you will find a reference made in one place to being as part of 'a broad disarmament agreement' and in another place a reference to 'nuclear and conventional armaments'. We are not prepared to abandon the position that the program upon which we are embarked ought to cover as many aspects of disarmament as is possible, including the conventional which are, as I pointed out here before, of very great importance to some of our European allies and they would be very reluctant to see the nuclear problem dealt with apart from the conventional.

Now that doesn't mean that we are not prepared to take up technical
studies which would deal just with the nuclear problem. Also, I have already
indicated we would be prepared to deal with technical studies dealing with
the problem of outer space quite apart from anything else.

"We would not suspend testing merely on the basis of their declaration, without supervision and control, unless and until we came to the conclusion that we had gained from the testing substantially all of the information that we needed in order to make cleaner weapons, and smaller weapons and the like.

Dulles, May 1, 1958

he establishment of one important zone of international inspection as proposed
by the US would be a constructive first step toward easing world tensions.
It is a step that can be taken at once without awaiting any high level
conference. ...technical discussions toward arctic inspection zone.

"Yes, it means to that extent we have broken the package. However, as you will recall, the original proposal of President E for an open-skies inspection system and his acceptance as a supplement of that, of the Soviet proposal for ground posts, was put forward as a prelude to what you might call disarmament talks. You see, an inspection system is not disarmanent, ... But it could create...an atmosphere under which a genuine disarmament would in fact take place. .....We were willing to take it believing if it were taken other steps in fact would be taken.

(any other parts separated?)

Only to the extent of our willingness to begin technical studies of the
problems involved without prejudice ...to the position of any government
as to their interdependence or separability.

(testing issue and cut-off still linked?)

They have not yet been disjointed, although we are prepared to have
studies carried on as to how you would supervise a suspension of tests
without anybody being committed on the proposition of whether or not that
was to be interconnected with the cut-off, for example, of fissionable
material or other aspects of the disarmament package.

materiai or other subjects of the disassembly package.
was to be interconnected with the out-oil, for example, of fusible
without anybody being committed on the proposition of whether or not that
studies carried on as to how you would elaborate a submission of tests
They have not yet been disintegrated, although we are prepared to have

(testing issue and out-oil still linked.)

as to their interdependence or asynchronicity.

problems involved without prejudice ... to the position of and Government
only to the extent of our willingness to begin technical studies of the

(and other parts ascertained.)

ateba in fact would be taken.

place. ...... We were willing to take it peevingly if it were taken other
than as an atmosphere under which a genuine disassembly would in fact take
take. You see, an inabection event is not disassembly. ... But it could
tor ground boats, was but forward as a prelude to what you might call disassembly
aftermath and his acceptance as a subassembly of that, of the Soviet boatboat
recall, the original boatboat of President E for an open-sky's inabection
"Yes, it means to that extent we have broken the backgve. However, as you will
conference. ... technical discussions toward a specific inabection zone.
It is a step that can be taken at once without swatting and high level
by the U2 would be a constructive that step toward easing world tensions.
the establishment of one important zone of international inabection as proposed

Duffies, May 1, 1958

The Sunday Times, March 2, 1958

(magnificent blurb on Britain's having h-bombs and nature of peace and
humanity).

London Times, March 19, 1958

(outlines of the Rapacki Plan, the Kennan Plan, the Eden Plan and the
Gaitskell Plan for disengagement)

Acheson - April 1958 F.A.

"For us there is only one disengagement possible -- the final one, the disengagement from life which is death." quoted in the New York Times of March 30th, which was in agreement. "We can also disengage ourselves by bringing home our troops - which is substantially what Mr. Khrushchev, now sunning himself in the grandeur of a new title, has blandly proposed as a preliminary to a summit meeting."

Christian Science Monitor April 7, 1958

Why want disengagement: 1. lead away from developing military strength.
2. hope will release Soviet military pressures on central European countries.
3. permit the US to appar more "peaceful" to uncommitted.

What disengagement won't do: 1. won't disengage two major powers, or
make us safe from missiles.
2. won't guarantee won't create vacuum
inviting Soviet influence.

"As long as Communist aims include the transformation of free society into the Soviet image, disengagement means both military and political retreat for the West. It implies military but not political retreat for Moscow. The military withdrawal will take Russian forces only a day's distance from the areas formerly openly contested."

Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 1958

"Mr. Khrushchev has just said that Moscow will not discuss reunification or freedom for all Germany, nor the situation of the satellite states, at a summit meeting. This would indicate that what the Communists seek through "disengagement" is what the world has long known as "spheres of influence."

A spheres-of-influence agreement would give Communists a firmer and freer hand in certain territories in return for a more secure Western position in other areas. If this is disengagement Western peoples may well ask whether the risks they take in discussing it do not far outweigh the probable gains which would accrue from its achievement." "...important British opinion is not too far from American opinion on this matter."

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New York Times, July 16

Prime Minister Eden said today he hoped the conferees in Geneva by patience and perseverance would make progress "toward reducing the troubles and easing the tensions which now beset the world."

p. 14. If Geneva produces agreement to search for new ways and means of reaching agreement on the basic problems, the conference will have accomplished all that it is supposed to accomplish.

Sulzburger: The Soviet Union has an admirable opportunity to win a maximum propaganda advantage in the Geneva conference. All it needs is to carry to their logical conclusion adroit maneuvers already set in motion. Without relinquishing anything but appearances of good will and compromise.

July 17 p 3. According to members of the British delegation the Prime Minister believes that although the conference may not be fertile in international agreements, it will create diplomatic instruments and an atmosphere through which the search for agreements can be pursued.

p. 8 e. ed: Geneva. We go there with maximum concessions, they will make with maximum demands.

Eisenhower.

Reston: However, however might be able to convince them that the world has changed and that is the main hope of this conference. (new defense of SU cannot rely on space as in past)

July 18. Baldwin- same false hopes as 30's

Senator George: I am more encouraged than I have ever been to believe it is quite possible that some steps will be taken to permit the world to move in a new direction to lessen tensions and towards a more stable order.

Flinders expected "real progress towards complete universal controlled disarmament.

July 20 - S ulaberger - SU wants status quo

July 21. Reston: Eisenhower wants to encourage conciliatoriness and establish personal relationships. Steer away from details.

p. 22 - ed. Blown up wishful thinking that for reasons of internal political and economic weakness the Soviets were at last really willing to end the cold war etc.

July 23 Sulzburger: Russian now appears to want detente.... and the Government realizes it is over-extended. It cannot support such vast commitments. ....But at any rate Russia is beginning to move along what Eisenhower terms "a new road." Realism is into Soviet political assessments. One moment of possible transcendent importance in Geneva - listened to President E's pledge of peace -- and seemingly believed him.

["and seemingly preferred him.\n\nThe atmosphere was very warm in Geneva - fraternized to President E. A. Pledge of the U. S. -\n\nSoviet boffier and assessor. One moment of possible transcendence\n\nabout what E. A. E. A. is making beginning to move\n\n...But at least there is some hope of agreement.\n\nThe U. S. and U. S. will be overpaid and so will the U. S.\n\nThe U. S. and U. S. will be

New York Times

2

July 24 Agreed tonight that the four power conference had achieved
its modest aims: prepare for second stage and lessen tension.

provided: atmosphere, personal contacts, commies know we want peace.

July 25: Eden: S id Geneva conference had been more successful than he
had expected. Through all three objectives? To agree upon the nature of
the problems we have to solve, to chart the course and to try in private
discussions to reduce the sense of mistrust.

MacMillan- the very fact that war is excluded means that the problems
of the world have got to be solved by peaceful means.

July 31. The big four it seems have agreed that they can disagree without
resorting to war.

reporting to war.
July 31. The pig farm it seems have agreed that they can disagree without
of the world have got to be solved by peaceful means.

Macmillan - the very last that war is excluded means that the problems
disagreements to reduce the sense ofamatrat.

the problems we have to solve, to start the course and to find in private
and expected. Throughout all three objectives! To agree about the nature of
July 52: Eden: 2 id Geneva conference had been more successful than he

brought: atmosphere, personal contacts, common know we want peace.

its modest aims: prepare for second stage and lessen tension.
July 54. Agreed tonight that the four power conference had succeeded

New York Times

2

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Time

July 11:22 - split up into 3 topics.

Disarmament - U.S. The State Department is convinced that Russian essentially a poor nation, cannot keep up with ever increasing ante in the nuclear weapons game.

European security - France

German unity - Eden.

"remarkably agreed on what they want, what they hope for and where they stand.

July 18:13 As if they made their preparations, the statesmen publicly pondered what they would talk about on the summit and how they were going at all. why

Dulles - it has been their system that is on the point of collapse.

Eisenhower: We must go there with very hopeful attitudes, but that hope has got to have greater food on which to nourish itself before it can become anything like expectation.

Eden: It is reasonable to look for real, if modest, progress.

July 25:9

Everyone recognizes Geneva is a testing place, though no one was sure what the testing standards would be. If Geneva is too succeed at all its success would come not from settling anything but from starting something. The West went to Geneva not to sign agreements out of trust but to see whether trust itself is possible, or whether mutual self-interest now provides grounds for limited arrangements where trust is lacking.

Aug: 1:16

Lyndon Johnson: This proposal is our pledge of sincerity and good faith. (it will test theirs)

August 1:16 For American diplomacy and for Dwight Eisenhower the conference at Geneva was a triumph. Throughout the week the President dominated the scene in every move he made.

1:16 If Geneva was to be measured by the letter, nothing was agreed to their - only an agreement to discuss disagreements again in October. But if Geneva was to be measured by the spirit, as all the participants insisted it should be, then quite a bit was achieved.

But Geneva was more than a competition in public relations. It was a unique chance to assess those increasingly less mysterious Russians. ...And it was a time of reading of intentions. The reading was optimistic.

1.

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## New Statesman

November 27th - page 8 (pre-note)

no difficulty if East German officials are at ontrol points.

We can accept as agents - no recognition implied or necessary - has
worked elsewhere.

no peaceful way to get us to give up principles or Berlin

December 4, page 2

Eden "Drift is the demon of democracy"

page 3 objections to the note:

applies only to West Berlin

leaves B disarmed in Warsaw countries

communications subject to East G. interference

guarantee of status by SU would mean West couldn't intervene

East G. refugees no way out of country

page 8 shouldn't reject complete - useful if link with military disengagement and reunification.

but only if we have Berlin they leave E. G.

only if reunion of Germany in freedom

BU loses direct contro l of G. and Poland but gain West retreat to Rhine

West G. would have to agree to confederation
could do it before deadline....

(Lippmann line)

December 18, page 3

Berliners - resolution and fear - of what may happen and of being
left in lurch

We must give every ounce of pol. physical and moral support

page 3

settle only in framework of whole German question.

page 8 a flat no (such as Adenauer wishes) and non-connection
of issues no good. We should put forward a practicable solution.

There is a slight chance this might ease R. out of Germany,
and at least put onus of no on them.

Will mean a difficult situation because we won't accept
agents, communications but air will be cut off, and no use
of force by us - over barrel.

Would have been better to play hand gradually and keep open

January 8 page 8

Result of Western replies: nicety of Western expression leaves

door open a crack - but can have conference only if R keeps

quiet about handing over to East Germans Berlin access.

2.

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New Statesman cont.

acknowledges fact

would remove threat to Berlin

military withdrawal on Rapacki basis (not US overseas)

trade

What R want now: surrender:

Yet unconstructed R. approach no justification for Western one.

January 22 page 1

closer ec. ties

Moscow fears German spearhead

Compromise could 1 devise new European security

3.

New Statesman

February 5, page12

on disengagement, -advantages are: soften outlines of opposition.
Peaceful cooperation should work to our advantage and would
have our support

"The answer to all this is that the Russians are shrewd enough to know what concessions are likely to be made considered by the Western negotiators. Our discussions will not make them any wiser - and need not make us any softer. The political sense of the Western peoples is sound enough to protect them against exaggerated hopes, and too many international conferences in recent years have given them a training in modest expectations. For these same reasons, their determination is not likely to be undermined by the process of public discussion which is basic to free nations. More to be feared is the impression that our leaders are too scared to face the risks involved in changing their policy. Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Dulles, Dr. denauer, and General de Gaulle are not expected to produce magic formulas, but they ought to produce proposals which provide a genuine basis for talks with the Russians."

page 3

14

**Sir John Slessor** - September 8, 1955, The Reporter

"we should not even begin nuclear disarmament while Russians continue to hold down any of their neighbors by military force......It is fundamental to western policy that German unity and European security are indissolubly linked. How then are we to break this deadlock? .....But if the are obdurate - then what? Then, I submit, since they will not willingly withdraw, and since there can be no question of pushing them out by force, by some means (other than by fighting) they must be made to withdraw, and the only alternative left to us is to make it impossibly awkward and difficult for them to remain." "It is surely only realistic to admit that the Red Army will not withdraw from East Germany - and hence German unification will be impossible - as long as British or American forces remain on the soil of West Germany. It is not practicable to withdraw our troops to France of the Low Countries. Can we safely remove them from continental soil altogether before the Russians are back behind their own frontiers? Nothing is safe in this dangerous world; it is a balance of risks, and in my view the risk is well worth taking. ......... We should go ahead with the rearmament of Germany and include West Germany not only in NATO but in the system of guarantees under the Brussels Treaty as well.....The next step suggested was to announce our intention when Westn German rearmament had advanced to a point that we consider adequate, to withdraw Allied forces from German soil whether or not the Red Army withdraws from the Soviet zone..... At the same time we should offer to extend the protection of the Brussels Treaty to Russia, Poland, and Czech if and when the Soviet withdraws completely behind its own frontiers. We should offer, on the reunification of Germany when the Russians withdraw, to demilitarize the present Soviet Zone. Finally, the whole system should be guaranteed (as in point of fact it is now) by western strategic air power.

I find it very difficult to believe that in the face of such a policy the Russians or their Communist stooges would long be able to maintain their domination in eastern Europe. But even if it did not make it impossible for them to remain, we should be no worse off than now - indeed in many ways better off.

**Jules Moch** - Reporter, December 15, 1955

"No control without disarmament; And no disarmanet without control."
Then outlines some plans based on Eden, etc. "What is important is to
unde stand fully that the rigidity of fixed positions such as they now
exist, with no move toward compromise, increases mistrust on both sides,
each accusing the other of bad faith. ...Suspid on exists on both sides.
The West accusee Russia of bad faith, and does so in all earnestness...
I have come to believe that the reverse also is true: The East mistrusts the
West as fiercely as the West mistrust the East."

"The spirit of consel iation and compromise, realistically depending on effective controls, must work to abolish gradually this mutual mistrust... How could public opinion anywhere possibly tolerate continued inaction - particularly since it becomes increasingly clear to everyone that inaction is folly?"

Francis O. Wilcox, June 29, 1956

"A third period, from 1953 to 1955, might be called a period of new approaches. Within this period various events, among them the end of the Korean War and the Death of Stalin, brought changes in the political climate which were conducive to new approaches and to renewed hope that progress might be made." first KAPANAOKI "atoms for peace" then "open skies"

"As we entered 1956, the General Assembly under Western leadership overwhelmingly endorsed the practicality of a partial approach short of immediate adoption of a comprehensive disarmament plan as the most promising basis for negotiations." thus aerial and ground inspection, inspection personnel, small strips of territory to test system, advance notification. "These may not seem to be far-reaching steps. Yet if anyone of them were put into effect by the great powers, it would do much to erode the barriers of suspicion and distrust that have made successful negotiations impossible."

Arden House Conference on Disarmament, December 1956

1. should take up recent Soviet proposals on: 2,500,000 manpower ceiling and aerial inspection in Europe and 2nd control posts. Then perhaps freeze on nuclear weapons and missiles.
2. European security agreement - proposal unacceptable but basis for discussion. agree in principle and stage by stage. Then on to disarmament.

R.S. Leghorn: "It seems incredible that the U.S. Government continues not to act favorably on a valuable arms control measure offered by the Soviets. Yet the Soviet proposal of May 10, 1955, since reiterated persistently, to exchange ground control posts at major airfields, ports and transportation centers, has evoked no U.S. acceptance, despite the November 17, 1956 supplemental Soviet offer of an aerial component in Europe."

advantages:
* warn of mass surprise attack
* increased East-West contacts;
* A major intelligence gain
* Considerable warning of technological surprise
* observe other countries
* opportunity to negotiate a control agreement of tests of nuclear weapons and space flight;
* psychological gains

arguments versus:

we have guilt of all-or-nothing thinking on inspection.
of fear
aerial inspection provides the best system to warn of surprise -
actually not - only 10 hours apart.
needed to verify blueprints - have enough intelligence to know
anyway, and also even if do evade we have given up nothing

At this point UK and France, Bandung and Neutrals, American scientists and other orgs urged U.S. to give up comprehensive disarmament plan or nothing commitment. So in 1956 subcommittee meetings US proposed preliminary steps which could be undertaken prior to comprehensive disarmament. Crack in complete disarmament and controls - now only complete controls.

3

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David Lawrence - June 1957 -

"The big fallacy remains. It is that free governments by negotiating disarmament "agreements" with treacherous governments still think they can thereby prevent wars.

Unless we can count on the support of the peoples behind the Iron Curtain today....."

Selwyn Lloyd, July 23, 1957

"We want disarmament, but we have to insist that nuclear and conventional disarmament should be tied up with one another. Just as it is unreasonable to expect the Soviet Union to accept a radical measure of properly controlled conventional disarmament without anything being done about nuclear disarmament, etc. " "control is the essence of any disarmament"

"I think it has emerged from all these discussions that the scope of a disarmament agreement must be confined to measures which can either be controlled in an acceptable manner or are of such a limited character that a certain looseness of control can be accepted......"

Secondly, I think it is accepted that it could be possible to have a system of control capable of detecting when nuclear material was being manufactured for weapons purposes. Thirdly, but on the other hand, I think it is agreed....that it is impossible to determine scientifically whether existing weapons and materials already manufactured for weapons purposes have been destroyed or disclosed.

Therefore, the conclusion from these facts, it would seem to me, is that the possibilities of realistic control in the nuclear field are at the present time limited to the suspension of tests and the cessation of the manufacture of fissionable material for weapons purposes." also force levels.

"I do not think that detracts from the value of the partial agreement, and if a partial agreement is soundly based I think it will be a contribution to a reduction of tension and the creation of an atmosphere in which the political settlement of outstanding difficulties will be the more easily obtained and in which the way will be clearer for further stages towards disarmament."

"...the one thing which is agreed by everybody, so far as a first stage agreement is concerned, is that no political settlements of any sort are conditions precedent to that. Therefore, I think that I am on common ground in saying that we should leave the question of political settlements to the second stage, because, as I say, that matter does not prevent a partial agreement."

"It is the linking of the suspension of tests with the cut-off in the manufacture of fissionable material for warlike purposes which is the great prize to be attained." (as well as conventional etc.)

"I think that in the matters to which I have referred there is scope for a useful agreement which will lessen tension and pave the way therefore for political settlements and other stages in disarmament."

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2.

Lodge continued

**on tests:** "The danger to the world lies in the possible use of the nuclear weapons and not in some small addition to natural radiation because of testing."

"What is seldom realized is that the tests themselves are enabling us to develop weapons with reduced fall-out..."

If concentrate on banning tests: Even if obeyed, "the efforts to pile up more and more atomic and hydrogen bombs would go right on."

2. they would have a great

deal of radio-active fall-out.

3. additional nations

could without tests acquire weapons.

Must remove danger of nuclear war.

"First: Atoms for peace, not war..."

Second: Suspend nuclear tests.

This would be done immediately upon there being a treaty in existence and would be followed by the prompt installation of an agreed monitoring system with inspection posts wit in our respective countries.

Third: Reduce armed forces and armaments.

Fourth: Prevent surprise attack.

Fifth: Control outer space weapons.

"I should like to make it clear that we are ready to begin the entire first-phase disarmament program without any political conditions whatsoever, without demanding that a single political issue be met. That includes all of the five headings which I have just finished summarizing... Also, we intend that the very first part of this program to go into effect would be the suspending of nuclear tests."

Digest: September 9, 1957

"Secretary of State Dulles has notified the Soviet Union that the Western powers will never agree to stop testing nuclear weapons without an agreement to cease their manufacture."

Nehru, November 28, 1957

"I appeal to them (America and Russia) to stop all nuclear test explosions and thus show the world that they are determined to end this menace and also proceed to bring about effective disarmament."

"The moment this is done a great weight will be lifted from the mind of man."

Washington Post, September 7, 1957

Chief Western Concessions: The US and its allies, after long opposition to any test ban, agreed first to a conditional 10-month, then to a conditional two-year test suspension. Each was rigidly coupled to the production cutoff as well as to an acceptable inspection system for both. (The West flatly refused to accept any "ban" on nuclear weapons beyond a semantic reshuffling...which grants the right of individual or collective self-defense.)

Other Western Concessions: The U.S. and its allies agreed to put a test suspension into effect before an actual halt to production of new nuclear weapons material. They also agreed to suspend tests after only a Soviet promise to work out details of such a cutoff. The initial position had been that both suspensions had to go into effect at the same time.

U.S. Concessions to its allies: The US agreed to take fissionable materials out of a limited number of bombs in stockpiles (the Soviets doing the same) to be used for peaceful purposes. This was to win consent, from France esp., on a test ban. Also no open skies unless included U.S territory as well as European - a German demand.

Soviets conceded international inspectors, aerial as well as ground inspection, dropped demand for liquidation of bases and for banning the bomb, then picked up again at end.

Hubert H. Humphrey, January 5, 1958 N.Y. Times magazine

"The United States and its allies must free themselves from the sterile course of allowing the SU to call each play on the world scene. To do this requires more than an expanded defense program. It demands, first, pointing the finger of world opinion at the SU to fix responsibility for the breakdown and current Soviet boycott of negotiations on armaments control.

111...

At the same time, it is essential to make the US position clear. This must include a determined willingness to re-examine our own proposals and to make those constructive changes which are safe and reasonable.

If we can conduct a peace offensive along such lines, the SU may be led to see the futility of its course of boycott and blackmail.

In addition to our apparent inability to communicate to the rest of the world the essence of our disarmament proposals, we have also failed to challenge the sincerity of what the SU was propounding - cessation of nuclear weapons tests. .....We should determine for ourselves as well as the rest of the world the extent of Soviet sincerity or hypocrisy on the test ban issue. I know of no military reason why it is necessary to couple a ban on tests with the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear material for weapons purposes.

..our spokesmen have been preoccupied with rebutting preposterous Soviet accusations. We have neglected to devote greater or even similar energy to making an affirmative case. Probably another mistake we have made was to ask too much for a first-step agreement. utopianism ....An additional error...was that we violated the principle of negotiating for disarmament from a position of relative military strength. ......The rulers in Moscow revere and live by power and force, and reject the moral standards of good faith and respect for the pledged word which are our guiding principles.

"I do not think we can expect to achieve a comprehensive disarmament agreement with the SU, encompassing large-scale reductions in modern weapons and armed

Humphrey continued

forces, until progress has been made on some of the outstanding
political problems confronting the major powers. .....U.S. policy on these
problems must undergo the most careful re-examination.

Despite the lack of progress hitherto on these questions, I believe we should continue to offer to negotiate with the Soviet Union through the United Nations for a limited and partial arms control agreement......In negotiating for disarmament our preparations must deal specifically with the most crucial aspect of a disarmament agreement, the nature of an inspection system. ..... We should consider, as a pilot project, open skies aerial and ground inspection over border regions of various Middle Eastern Countries.

But the record thus far shows that some progress can be made, and offers
reasonable grounds for hope that international tension can eventually be
reduced through an enforceable international covenant to limit and control
the implements of war.

Stassen New York Times, February 26, 1958

I propose that the first step or trial agreement consist of four basic parts:

First, the establishment of a special agency of the UN with the responsibility of inspecting and assuring the fulfillment of the steps agreed upon by signatories for the reduction, control and limitation of armaments.

Second, the installation of necessary inspection posts inside the territories of the SU and the US equipped with scientific instruments designed to verify the ending of nuclear test explosions.

Third, the SU and the US to agree not to conduct any nuclear explosions for two years from the date the treaty is ratified both by the US Senate and the Supreme Soviet.

Fourth, the setting up of a negotiating group to work effectively and seek diligently additional steps of disarmament during this first two-year period.

others wouldn't have to join unless wanted to

Stassen New York Times, February 27, 1958

When major powers possess the unprecedented capacity of destruction to mankind that they now do possess, the responsible heads of such governments should talk and talk. .....They should include face-to-face across-the-table sessions of the top men, and the sooner the better. These would serve the objective of peace and would advance the true interests of the people of both sides and of mankind.

This summit conference at the UN might well prepare the way for patient detailed negotiations on the complex, difficult problems during the ensuing months. This is the minimum result that might be achieved by such a conference. (or result in system outlined above)

For those who express disappointment when an international meeting fails to come up with sensational results, let me emphasize that the importance of major international meetings such as a summit conference is that they help maintain direct contacts between leaders of governments and they focus world attention on constructive efforts to resolve problems.

Thus they aid in a more thorough understanding of the positions, interests and viewpoints on each side. Misunderstanding and miscalculation are two of the

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8

### Mark Stassen continued

principle sources of war in the centuries of recorded history. Plain direct discussion will contribute to peace.

### Strausz-Hupe U.S. News and World Report, April 11, 1958

Why not summit - we not free agents, have to have results
- numbs our reflexes
- Soviets prepared only to talk about liquidation of NATO
- bargaining position weak - no determination

we do negotiate all the time

only basis for negotiating is if hold to national self-determination and democratic process. if can't do it on this basis, negotiations may help on fringe, but not in basic terms.

no effect on uncommitted to give in in Europe. in fact in Europe are our only hopes for success

### Washington Post, May 12, 1958

No one needs to emphasize that the Russians have been recalcitrant. But they have offered, in connection with their own suspension of nuclear tests, to accept some sort of inspection. It seems to us incredible foolishness for the Administration not to take up this offer, in a realistic proposal of its own, as a means of getting inspection started.

### May 28, 1958 Western Agenda Proposals for a Possible Summit Conference

1. Measures to control production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons and to reduce existing military stocks of such materials.

2. Suspension of nuclear tests.

3. The reduction and limitation of conventional arms and manpower.

4. Measures to guard against surprise attack.

5. Use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

6. Reunification of Germany in accordance with the terms of the 1955 Director of the four heads of government to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

7. European security arrangements.

8. International exchanges.

9. Means of strengthening the UN

10. Ways of easing tensions in Eastern Europe

London Times

November 28, p 12

Why not Russian proposal?

p. 13 - Berlin adjusted

would be a divider of Berlin

Nov. 29 3 strands emerge:

and want: nuclear standstill

Jan 1 p. 9 "No matter how armed or powerful America may become the strength and cohesion of the free world depends on the strength and cohesion of Western Europe.

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2

London Times

Jan 7 - 10 good of Mik visit to start new train of negotiations.
strengthen opinion Berlin crisis deliberately precipitated
as way to Summit.

Jan 14 . progress: Dulles KMX points to negotiation.
Mik retrea on ultimatum

But most promising way to abhieve relaxation - remove fears
of Ger. remilitarization by limiting all forces.

[Y]

Foreign Affairs, October 1957, Vol.36 No. 1 page 32, *Challenge and Response in United States Policy by John Foster Dulles*

....They know that if Soviet conventional forces were operating in Europe the megaton-type weapon with large fission fall-out could not be used by Western forces without endangering the friendly peoples of the area. Under these conditions Sino-Soviet manpower and its conventional weapons would become the dominant military force in Eurasia. Such considerations make it important to combine the suspension of testing with other measures which will limit armament and the possibilities of surprise attack....................Unless there are effective measures to reduce "the threat of surprise attack," whether nuclear or otherwise, it would be imprudent to interrupt the safeguarded search for methods to apply nuclear power to weapons in a manner to enlarge the possibilities of defense greatly and at the same time greatly reduce the lethal fall-out factor inherent in weapons which are still in a relatively early stage of development.

As nuclear weapons come to provide greater possibilities for defense this will require changes in military and related political strategy. So long as collective security depends almost wholly upon the deterrent of retaliatory power and the ability to wreak great destruction upon an agressor nation, there has to be almost sole dependence upon the United States.

[Y]

Foreign Affairs, April 1958, Vol. 36 No. 3, pages 470-471

Very little can be achieved, however, if the Western Powers lack confidence in each other and if they stick rigidly to the idea that negotiations not only are morally suspect but are doomed from the beginning to be fruitless. Those who refuse to negotiate are left with only the choice between open force—which the nuclear situation rules out—and tacit acceptance of the status quo. Of all immoral acts in the face of Communist dictatorship such an acceptance would be the most immoral. As far as Germany is concerned, it is rejected as unrealistic and intolerable.

Hence, negotiations. But who will negotiate and how will the negotiations be conducted? In the framework of a policy which had ceased being conservative and had become active, the question of who will negotiate depends largely upon what will be negotiated. If the subject is mainly atomic, everything will depend upon agreement between Washington and Moscow. And a failure there would render a whole series of other negotiations impossible. If that agreement is reached, no third or fourth nation can seriously contest it. This is why there is a tendency at present, particularly in Germany, to believe that the western world should give the United States the necessary power-of-attorney to make an effort with the Soviet Union to stop nuclear competition. It is true that bilateral talks can always have unfortunate implications for third parties. But compared to the horrors toward which mankind is drifting so long as the race in nuclear weapons continues unchecked such risks are minor and must be taken.

From the European point of view in general, and from that of Germany in particular, it is necessary that diplomatic and not merely propagandistic talks begin between East and West. This would offer an occasion for the Germans to renounce atomic armament. It would allow the German problem to be limited to the narrow area of Central Europe without obscuring its connection with the question of Disarmament. It would permit military and political changes in Central Europe without upsetting the balance between East and West.

Even if by extraordinary efforts German reunification could be brought about, this would by no means imply immediate European reunification. On the other hand, European reunification, is unthinkable without German reunification. There has to be a beginning at some point, and there is an advantage in starting with limited problems instead of global ones. Some believe that the German question can be solved only in the context of larger issues. Others hold that the pervading malaise can be cured only if man himself changes his nature. Both views are based on moral more than political ideas. Should a chance of solving the East-West conflict appear suddenly tomorrow—so much the better. But if our destiny does not include such a miraculous event we shall have to make a start along a more modest course. This leads by way of negotiations with a limited goal through successive gradual understanding of each other's point of view; and only at the end, if all is well prepared, can there be conferences as the last stage on a long road.

[Y]

2

Foreign Affairs, April 1958, Vol. 36 No. 3, page 461 (cont.)

The basic requirement is for a common program of the western world which will aim at the new power system without upsetting the balance in Europe. The United States as a non-European power will have to participate. For it to withdraw from Europe entirely in the near future would be a catastrophe. Yet traditional weapons have already diminished so much in importance that rearrangement obviously becomes feasible. If the Soviet Union shows an interest a hopeful star will rise. If it refuses, the free world will nonetheless have gained the kind of initiative and effectiveness which it cannot any longer hope to achieve by simply sticking to traditional methods.

War, said both the President of the German Federal Republic and the President of the Bundestag at the beginning of the year, has lost its function as the continuation of policy by other means. This is true. Therefore our policy must at last disengage its concept and actions from the handicap of predominantly military thinking. At no point along the line between the free world and the Communist world can a far-reaching and acceptable policy be shaped so well as on the soil of Germany. It would indeed be an historic act of reconciliation if following such unspeakable sufferings and in the face of such infinite dangers the nucleus of a new political order were formed at the very spot where chaos had originated.

[Y]

Senate Appropriation Committee, hearings on the 1947 Army budget, Testimony of D.D. Eisenhower, CoS.
On the 1947 Budget economy drive:

Outlining the responsibilities of the War Department for 1947:

1. Occupation in Germany, Japan, etc.

2. Maintenance of key points in national security structure, of lines of communications and of supporting installations within the U.S. "We must provide for a small reserve force and for the training of new men. We have the maintenance of adequate programs of intelligence and research and development. Finally we have the continuing job of the preservation of peace with the use of our structure for that job."

The modesty of this program was explained on the basis of the following assumptions:

1. "The United Nations will gain recognition as a central factor in the establishment and maintenance of world security. We make the assumption that that would possibly increase our prestige; and therefore we will be able to recede from this position of an armed camp or an armed nation to something that approaches, let us say, a reasonable posture in national defense."

Senator Reed: "I earnestly hope you are right, General."

Eisenhower: "The best we can all do for it is to pray for it, Senator."

Further assumptions made:

2. occupied peoples will remain tractable, don't become rebellious.

3. occupation in Germany is continued to be shared with allies and that British, Filipinos and Chinese will assist in occupying Japan.

4. foreigners and POW-s will partly fill manpower needs.

5. There will be no delay in disposal of surplus property.

6. Occupation of Austria and Italy should cease during the year.

Reasoning offered on manpower reduction:

"We are going to put in our whole effort during the year to meet our requirements with the minimum strengths I have indicated. In that connection I should like to state that these strengths have not been questioned by any committee to which we have presented the facts concerning our problem for the coming year. People have questioned our advice on the way the numbers should be provided, but none on the actual numbers we need. In fact, most of them have said we have gone dangerously low and we agree. We think we are taking a very definite risk but believe that we can meet our programs during the year. If we do not it will be only in the event something comes up which can be classed as of an emergency character."

[Y]

On the minimum needed to give at least token support to our
diplomacy:
Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson testimony at Senate Appropriation
hearings for the 1950 defense budget; pp.3-ff:

"We want peace...but must maintain substantial military forces -
Considering our population and resources, the new weapons and
materiel to be provided under the program submitted by the
President to Congress, are models when compared with the effort
devoted to military purposes by other nations. We believe,
however, that the forces provided for in the President's budget
will permit maintaining a military stature sufficient to show
our continuing interest in world affairs - recognizing that
certain risks are involved"+.

["82°. 308'. 10 March, co. 1326-1944.", "mending. 84\nway of dealing with the most serious problem that ever affected\nto increased amounts in these circumstances the situation\nof peace, and not of defence....The issue is now whether the\nstatements were真的....The component problem is the problem\ntimes which have her been made....It is title to ask that since\nthe two issues. These must prove to be the most important\nfacing the whole world. The other issue which ought to be taken\nairies. Herr Hitler made a statement, earning with one hand and\nthe other a statement...ought to be accepted at the time", "encouraged by Hitler first, Greenwood said:", "proven a tree which is not only a few years after the German Government had\nthe same debate, still only a few days after the German Government had\naccepting, however, distinguished a version of Nazism? Still as part of\nthat opportunity to come with Hitler except by surrendering and by\nWhat opportunities one would have had an opportunity", "83°. 308'. a March face, co. 1936-1944.", "after opportunity of coming to terms with him. 83", "is also true that the German Government has from now on observed\nthat it is true that Herr Hitler has broken treaty after treaty. It", "brutalized brood sense but forward in Herr Hitler's latest decision\nintention of the Government to raise a frank discussion of the\nI think, and of my own. I think, therefore, before me, make complaint of the\nwhich may be pending this action. For this reason, neither I, nor,\nthe Germanies which do not act still entertain me and all the motives\nthat one should talk with this man...and bring up to the surface all\nthat one should talk with this man...and bring up to the surface all

32

At the same time another Labour Member, James Milner, said:

> I suggest that we ought to take advantage of Herr Hitler's offer to negotiate through and by reason of his promise to return to the League; and that we should negotiate not only on the matters on which Herr Hitler has offered to negotiate, but also on this very matter of disarmament...I know it will be said that this is impossible, but I would remind hon. Members that Herr Hitler has made frequent offers of disarmament during the past two or three years....In my view he should be taken at his word. In the meantime, it would be right and proper for the Government ...to offer to suspend taking part in the armaments race. If the Government did that, it would be an ameliorating factor. If we proceed, as is suggested by the National Government, with speed and energy, our action will obviously aggravate the situation.⁸⁵

quite

85. 309. 10 March 1936, col. 2046-2047.

It is fair to remark that not even Neville Chamberlain ever made quite such a foolish statement. Since, however, Milner was not Prime Minister, his foolish ideas did not have quite the same catastrophic results, and can, therefore, be more easily forgiven and forgotten.

A few days later during the debate on the repudiation of Locarno a Labour Member, R.T.H. Fletcher, said:

> We really should be realists in this matter....If your object is to get Germany to negotiate, surely the only successful thing to do is to endeavor to remove all possible obstacles to such negotiations....It is important at this moment to try and drop our likes and dislikes....Endeavor to set in motion machinery for a revision of just grievances from which we know Germany is suffering.⁸⁶

86. 310, 26 March 1936, col. 1515-1516.

In the following June Duff-Cooper, then Secretary of State for War, made a speech in Paris to a semi-public gathering. He said that France and Britain were united by their common struggles in the World War and by common interests. He also said that German rearmament constituted a menace to the peace of Europe. For some reason the Labour

attributed a menace to the peace of Ancona. For some reason the Papouk
War and by common interests. He also said that German recruitment con-
trance and Britain were united by their common strings in the War.
Max made a speech in Paris to a semi-busy gathering. He said that
In the following June Dutt-Coober, then Secretary of State for

82. 310. 26 Mar 1938, c.c. 132-136.

in 36. 8c. a relation of just Evolutions from which we know Germany is enter-
ing like and like... Nuremberg to set in motion machinery for
negotiations.... It is important at this moment to find some way
to go to engaged to remove all hostile obstacles to an
is to get Germany to negotiate, ameliorate the only encroaching drug
We really should be realists in this matter.... It is not optet

Papouk Mempel, R.T.H. Rietover, said:

A few days later using the debate on the rebirth of the Republic a
resulta, and can, therefore, be more easily forgiven and forgotten.
Minister, hissaried ideas did not have quite the same castiglione
and a toothed statement. Since, however, Münner was not prime

It is fair to remark that not even Meiffele Comperisliam ever made quite

82. 308. 10 Mar 1938, c.c. 2042-2044.

and energy, on account will opinionally evaluate the situation.8p
brought, so is interested, by the National Government, with a view
to offer to engage in some kind of discussion with the German
Government, big that, it would be an ameliorating factor. It is
...to offer to engage in some kind of discussion with the German
Government, two or three times.... In what way he should be taken at his
heart? He has made a great error, offers to谈 with the German
that he is uncooperative, put I would say, I think he would be taken at his
heart to the letter; so that we should negotiate not only on the
offer to negotiate through and put reason of the brousses to return
I am best that we ought to take advantage of Herr Hitler's

At the same time another Papouk Mempel, James Münner, said:

33

Party Members objected to this speech, especially to the passages that referred to Germany, and insisted on holding in Parliament a special debate on it in order that they might formally record their disapproval. One of them, Ernest Thurtle, said:

The first point is the emphasis which he laid upon the imminent peril existing in Europe. Now, one does not talk in the air about an imminent peril; it must have been that the Secretary of State was referring -- he could not have been referring to anything else -- to the menace of Germany....In emphasising the menace of Germany at a time when we are conducting negotiations with Germany...and at a time when the Government are still pledged to the policy of collective security, surely the Secretary of State for War was giving...a new turn to British foreign policy.⁸⁷

87. 314, 29 June 1936, col. 135-136.

The cynic might be tempted to remark that, in calling attention to the realities of the situation, Duff-Cooper was certainly giving a new turn to British post-1919 policy -- but hardly, as the speaker implied, an undesirable turn.

Over a year later to the annual Party Conference a Labour Member of Parliament, Dr. Alfred Salter, said:

> If we want to detach the German nation from Hitler and the Italian nation from Mussolini we must, instead of shaking an armed fist in their faces -- true, they are doing it to us -- but instead of shaking an armed fist back, we must offer them definite and specific concessions which will detach these German and Italian people from their Dictators. The only effect the decision of the British Labour Party to back the Government's Rearmament Programme has, and will have, will be to rally the German people more determinedly than ever behind Hitler. Instead of doing that, if we offer them disarmament, if we offer them a sympathetic attitude towards their real grievances, we shall effect more than by all the reararmament and all the additional aeroplanes and battleships it is possible for this nation to make.⁸⁸

88. Report...1937, p. 206.

It is only fair to the Party as a whole to say that Dr. Salter was opposing a resolution that was endorsed by almost 90% of the delegates.

[Y]

34

By the middle of December 1937 Germany, Japan, and Italy had all left the League and had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Rome-Berlin Axis was well established. Italy had conquered Ethiopia and with German assistance was helping Franco conquer Spain. Germany had reestablished compulsory military service and had then increased the training period to two years, had remilitarized the Rhineland, and had frankly proclaimed the guns instead of butter policy. George Lansbury had just returned to England after interviewing Hitler. To his fellow Members of Parliament he said:

> I do not think Herr Hitler will think I am betraying his confidence when I say that almost the first words of our conversation was on that particular point, and I have never heard it said to me more emphatically than by Herr Hitler, that another war would mean neither victors nor vanquished but the ruin of everybody...Both these men [Hitler and Mussolini] want something for their country, and I should like to know when our statesmen have not wanted something for our country...The fundamental thing is that they are as convinced as any other people in the world that another war means collapse and ruin for everybody.⁸⁹

89. 330, 21 December 1937, col. 1823.

That Lansbury was correctly reporting Hitler's words is certain; that he did not understand Hitler is equally certain -- just as Chamberlain did not understand when Hitler said, after the Munich settlement, what he had so often said before: that he had no further territorial desires.

A few minutes after Lansbury's revelation Arthur Henderson said:

> I also agree...in welcoming, so far as Europe is concerned, the attempt of the Government to establish contact with the rulers of Germany. Any attempt to separate the sheep from the goats and to have the world divided into two or more camps based upon ideological differences would be absolutely fatal to the future welfare of the world.⁹⁰

90. 330, 21 December 1937, col. 1841.

[Y]

35

About a week after the seizure of Austria and at a time when the verbal campaign against Czechoslovakia had already started, a Conservative Member closed his speech by saying:

> If he [Chamberlain] can bring appeasement to distracted Europe, he will earn the gratitude of mankind.⁹¹

91. 333, 24 March 1938, col. 1437.

The very next speaker, James Milner, was a Member of the Labour Party. He opened his speech by remarking:

> We shall all agree with the last words of the... [previous speaker]. We all hope for appeasement.⁹²

92. 333, 24 March 1938, col. 1437.

On the same day Arthur Henderson said to Parliament:

> There are two ways of dealing with aggression -- by permitting the aggressor to do what he wants or by resisting the aggressor. There may be a third method of making it unnecessary for the aggression to take place. Both political and economic appeasement throughout Europe is the most vital question of the day.⁹³

93. 333, 24 March 1938, col. 1487.

It is evident that, though their words and motives may have been different, the Members of the Labour Party were advocating towards Germany precisely the policy that Chamberlain was pursuing. And that is not surprising, for the inadequate state of British armaments -- which would have been even more inadequate had Labour's advice been followed -- permitted no alternative to appeasement other than surrender -- resistance not being possible. Furthermore -- and this was perhaps even more influential if we recall the whole-hearted if ineffective assistance the British tried to give Poland, when its

inoperative resistance to the British tried to give Polang, when it was because even more influential it recall the whole-hearted it alienated -- resistance notجد bosomp. Amtermore -- ang fide been followed -- permitted no alternative to abatement other than menta -- which would have been even more inadequate had London's advice which is not surprising, for the inadequate state of British arms towards Germany breached the policy that Cremerstein was pursuing been criterious, the Members of the London Party were advocating

It is evident that, through their words and motives may prove

82. 323'. 24 March 1938, col. 1437.

throughout Europe is the most vital question of the day.⁸³
aggression to take place. Both political and economic abatement
There may be a tried method of making it unnecessary for the
to the aggressor to go what he wants or by relaying the aggressor.

83. 323'. 24 March 1938, col. 1437.

skeletx). We all hope for abatement.⁸⁴

We shall all agree with the last words of the... [brevia]

He objects if speech be remeeting:

The very next speaker, James Milner, was a Member of the London Party.

84. 323'. 24 March 1938, col. 1437.

Europe will earn the gratitude of manning.⁸⁵
→ It be [Cremerstein] can bring abatement to distracted

Conversative Member offered his speech by saying:
the aeroplane against Czechoslovakia had already started, a
out a week after the start of the war and at a time when

when a week after the start of the war and at a time when

32