DATA SHEET

Professor J. K. Zawodny
Department of Political Science
Washington University
St. Louis, Missouri 63130

PERSONAL DATA

Born: December 11, 1921, Warsaw, Poland
American Citizen
Wife: Lorraine, born Iowa
Military Service: Underground Forces in Poland, 1940-44;
British 8th Army, 1945-48
Languages: Speaking and reading; Polish (fluent), Russian (good), Italian (good)

EDUCATION

United States

Stanford University Ph.D. 1955 Political Science (International Relations)
State University of Iowa M.A. 1951 International Relations
State University of Iowa B.S. 1950

Foreign

London School of Foreign Trade Diploma 1947-48 Economics
University of Rome 1945-46 Law
University of Warsaw 1943-44 Sociology of Law

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Teaching--International Relations (Courses taught: Graduate and undergraduate. Particularly enjoy undergraduate teaching)

Research--a) Violence as an instrument of political change; b) interdisciplinary approach toward analysis of sources of human tensions resulting in violence.

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Professor, Department of Political Science, Washington University, St. Louis, Missouri, 1963-

Associate Professor, Political Science Department, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1962-63

Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, San Francisco State College, 1960-61

Instructor and Assistant Professor, Department of Politics, Princeton University, 1955-58

- 2 -

## HONORS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Fellow, Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, Stanford,
California, 1961-62

Ford Foundation International Relations Faculty Training Fellowship,
1958-59, Stanford University. Study of psychological causes of the
application of violence in problem solving

Princeton Faculty Research Grant, 1957

Ford Faculty Fellow, Seminar on the Teaching of International Relations,
Summer 1956

Pre-doctoral Research Fellow, Social Science Research Council, 1953-54

## CONSULTANT

Educational Testing Service (Test Development Division), Princeton;
Stanford Research Institute; and several private academic and non-profit
research organizations

## PROFESSIONAL MEETINGS

### Papers and Lectures

Defense Research Corporation, California, September, 1964

Headquarters, United States Army, John F. Kennedy Center for Special Warfare,
Fort Bragg, May, October, 1963

Chairman, Panel on "Future of Political Science." Annual Meeting of
Political Science Association, New York, September, 1963

Spring Joint Computer Conference, American Federation of Information
Processing Societies, San Francisco, May, 1962

Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, February, 1962

Stanford Research Institute, January, 1962

M.I.T.-Harvard Joint Faculty Seminar on Arms Control, Harvard, November, 1961

Department of Psychiatry, Presbyterian Medical Center, San Francisco,
September, 1961

Annual Meeting of the Political Science Association, St. Louis,
September, 1961

Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, August, 1961

Institute of Industrial Relations, University of California, July, 1961

Princeton Center of International Studies, May, 1961

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PUBLICATIONS

Books

Parker and Greenberg, editors, *Communication in Crisis: Social Research on the Kennedy Assassination*. A chapter contributed. To be published by the Stanford University Press in 1965.

*Guide to Source Material in International Relations*. Accepted for publication by the Chandler Publishing Company to appear in 1965.

Editor and Contributor, *Personality, Small Groups and International Politics: Levels of Conflict and Integration*, 2 vols. Accepted for publication by the Chandler Publishing Company to appear in 1965.

*Death in the Forest: The Story of the Katyn Forest Massacre, Notre Dame, Indiana*: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1962, pp. 235. Japanese translation, Tokyo, 1963, pp. 206.

Editor and Contributor, "Unconventional Warfare," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Philadelphia*: The American Academy of Political and Social Science, May, 1962, Vol. CCCXLI, pp. 180.

Collaborated on *Satellite Generals: A Study of Military Elites in the Soviet Sphere*, by Ithiel de Sola Pool, et al. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1955, pp. 165.

Articles

"Civil War" in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. Accepted for publication to appear in 1966.

"Katyn Forest Massacre: Morals in American Foreign Policy," *The Minnesota Review*, III, No. 2 (Winter 1963), pp. 228-236.

"The Grievances and Sources of Tension During Stalin's Regime as Reported by Soviet Industrial Workers," *Soviet Studies*, Glasgow University, XIV, No. 2 (October, 1962), pp. 158-178.

"Unconventional Warfare," *American Scholar*, XXXI, No. 3 (Summer 1962), pp. 384-394. Japanese translation, Tokyo, 1962.

"Guerrillas and Sabotage: Organization, Operations, Motivations, and Escalation," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCCXLI (May, 1962), pp. 8-18.

"Unexplored Realms of Underground Strife," *The American Behavioral Scientist*, Princeton, IV, No. 1 (September, 1960), pp. 3-5.

DEC 28 1967

December 18, 1967

Mr. Zoltan Tomory
Executive Director
Harvard University Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138

Dear Mr. Tomory:

As a matter of courtesy I would like to inform you
that I shall arrive with my wife in Cambridge between
January 15th and 20th of 1968. Through the valiant efforts
of Miss Sally Cox, we have secured living quarters. Mean-
while, I am sending several boxes with my research material
by rail express.

It will be good to meet you personally. Thank you for
your attention.

CC: Dr. Kissinger, Miss Sally Cox
JKZ:jg

TKS: ja

CC: Dr. Kraefder, Mies Sajly Cox

Professor of Political Science
J. K. Zawadny

Very sincerely yours,

Your attention.

It will be good to meet you hereafter. Thank you for
py rail express.

I am sending several boxes with my research material
of Mies Sajly Cox, we have secured living quarters. Mesn-
january 12th and 20th of 1968. Through the valiant efforts
that I shall arrive with my wife in Cambridge between
As a matter of courtesy I would like to inform you

Dear Mr. Tomky:

Cambridge, Mass. 02138
6 Divinity Avenue
Harvard University Center for International Studies
Executive Director
Mr. Zoltan Tomoky

December 18, 1967

DEC 38 1967

MAR 26 1968
MAR 9 1968

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HOLLIS B. CHENERY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SEYMOUR M. LIPSET
EDWARD S. MASON
GUSTAV F. PAPANEK
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

March 26, 1968

MEMO

To: Professor Henry A. Kissinger

From: J. K. Zawodny, Research Associate, (Professor of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania)

re: courtesy progress report of my work at the Center.

Since I am approaching the mid point of my fellowship here I have felt that it might be proper to let you know that the work is progressing extremely well and in accordance with my purpose of coming here. Let me take this opportunity to express my appreciation to the personnel: Mr. Tomory, his secretary Mrs. Cummings, and Miss Cox who have been most helpful and gracious in making my stay here comfortable.

You might be interested to know that St. Antony's College, Oxford invited me as a Senior Associate Member for the academic year 1968-69 to complete this study on their premises. The American Council of Learned Societies jointly with The Social Science Research Council, The American Philosophical Society and the Ford Foundation have granted me fellowships supporting that venture. Thus if my energy holds the study will be completed in the form of a manuscript by the end of 1969.

I would like very much to be useful to the Center and its fellows and to reciprocate the courtesies. As you probably know, my field of concentration is International Relations with a psychological slant, particularly new interdisciplinary behavioral and methodological approaches toward studying that subject. If you feel that this interest and my relative competence in this area will be of some use to the Fellows or the Center, do let me know please.

cc: Dr. Raymond Vernon
Dr. Samuel P. Huntington
Mr. Zoltan Tomory

MAY 13 1968

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director

HOLLIS B. CHENERY

SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON

ALEX INKELES

HENRY A. KISSINGER

SEYMOUR M. LIPSET

EDWARD S. MASON

GUSTAV F. PAPANEK

THOMAS C. SCHELLING

RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE

CAMBRIDGE

MASSACHUSETTS 02138

May 9, 1968

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs
6 Divinity Avenue
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

Dear Professor Kissinger:

On the eve of my departure from Cambridge I want to thank you for
being instrumental in bringing me to the Center.

With best wishes,

JKZ/amb

INTERNAL WARFARE: Civil War 499

It is, however, the second type of civil war—the *planned* one—that has been responsible for the majority of intrasocietal conflicts and has been of most interest to social scientists. In these cases a conscious division of labor and planning takes place. Planned civil war is a case of pathology in politics, upon which anatomical probing can be done with some precision.

**Development of planned civil war.** Two conditions appear to be prerequisites for the initiation of planned civil war. The first is an absence of effective formal and informal channels for settling political grievances or a sense of futility or fear of reprisals in claiming such grievances. Second is the assumption or conviction that there is no recourse other than violence for securing redress. Given these factors, a systematic building of the apparatus for subversion may begin. The ultimate objective is, of course, to seize power by violence, but unlike the spontaneous civil war, this approach is carefully calculated.

For long-range and planned civil war, it is necessary to build the structure of a resistance movement. This structure is the prerequisite for the emergence of sabotage and guerrilla groups systematically engaged in rendering violence. In an industrialized country, from one to two years is required for centrally controlled sabotage and guerrilla units to emerge from the resistance structure.

The second phase is the direct application of violence, occurring systematically but at varying intervals, against the physical resources and morale of the enemy.

The final phase is an insurrection in which the conflict explodes into open, coordinated uprisings in various parts of the country, preferably in cities. With this action the insurgents hope that the rest of the country will follow, that the power structure in existence will be overthrown, and that they will be able to assume the symbols of legitimacy and claim their political objectives openly. In this event, the result is an accomplished revolution.

The contemporary American term for this type of operation is "unconventional warfare" (Zawodny 1962). The term encompasses tactics and strategies of resistance movements, counterresistance measures, guerrilla, sabotage, and evasion activities, and related psychological warfare.

The stages of organizational development of a resistance movement resulting in civil war may also be described in terms of the escalation of violence. In the initial stage, while the structure of the resistance movement is being erected, the application of violence will be sporadic, uncoordinated, and nonselective.

# I
CIVIL WAR

Civil war is conflict within a society resulting from an attempt to seize or maintain power and symbols of legitimacy by extralegal means. It is civil because civilians are engaged in it. It is war because violence is applied by both sides. Civil war is intrasocietal and may take place within a group, some parts of which either desire to maintain or wish to initiate separate ethnic and/or political identity or wish to change the government.

There are two basic types of civil war. The first is the *spontaneous type*: without any previous planning or even actual leadership, a street crowd can take on the characteristics of a mob and on impulse initiate events leading to the overthrow of the government in power. Subsequently, a political vacuum is created, providing opportunities for the seizure of power. This type of civil war defies systematic classification and is prone to occur in societies having no tradition of stable political institutions within which political changes could take place. This situation usually coincides with the weakening of the power structure to such an extent that the crowds on the streets can perceive its weakness.

500 INTERNAL WARFARE: Civil War

In the intermediate stage, when the structure has solidified and covers the country with its ordering, message-receiving network, the sabotage, underground, and guerrilla units apply terror at intervals, selectively hitting the brain and nervous system of the enemy power structure—the elite, the communication centers, transportation centers, the most sensitive industries, etc. Such actions are usually regulated and planned in terms of their frequency, intensity, and territorial coverage.

The third step in the escalation of violence in civil war consists of probes on the part of the resistance movement to obtain control of either the capital or strategic parts of the country in order to establish some sort of legitimate "government" which would act openly on behalf of the organization. This stage is critical because it compels the resistance to emerge on the streets and to fight until it wins or is destroyed. At this point the insurgents act in large units, and street fighting is conducted according to the rules of infantry tactics. The insurgents' objective is a series of uprisings, spreading like brushfire, intended to destroy the enemy's formal power structure and machinery of violence throughout the whole territory. The time intervals between the phases and the length of each phase will depend not only upon the relative power ratio of the factions engaged in conflict but, above all, upon the cultural values, lore, and conditioning of the groups involved in the struggle.

The difference between civil disorder and civil war can be discerned by any of the following phenomena, which indicate a state of civil war: The insurgents control an area continuously without an attempt to disappear after clashing with the government forces; the insurgents act in units of approximately battalion size; they control the country during the night; they compel the legal government to invoke martial law; they are able to create and maintain a government of their own in the contested territory.

**Organizational structures.** It must be recognized that a clandestine organization is a social structure within which there is some division of labor. Five basic factors affect this structure. (1) A primary consideration is the density of population and the manner in which it is clustered. Organization of an urban underground will differ markedly from that of an agricultural country. (2) Topographical features are extremely important. (3) The ethnic composition must be taken into account. There is a propensity for ethnic groups to cluster and to treat other ethnic groups with suspicion, especially when under stress. (4) The

local customs, lore, traditions, and social mores all affect the organization. For example, in some cultures women are encouraged to join fighting units, while in others this is not true. (5) Finally, and obviously, the quality and rate of influx of members greatly affect the group.

It can be assumed that the basic structural elements are: (a) the civil leadership of the resistance movement, who preferably should live abroad for security reasons; (b) the military headquarters, which, if possible, should also be abroad for the same reasons; (c) intelligence; (d) communication; (e) propaganda; (f) cadres in reserve and training; (g) logistic support; (h) fighting arms (guerrilla and sabotage units); and (i) services (units providing false documents, medical care, evasion assistance, etc.).

The most important problem in the formation of such an organization is the degree to which centralization should be imposed upon the structure. The issue here is that of control versus security. The more highly centralized and closely knit an organization is, the more easily it can be controlled by the underground leadership. However, when penetrated by the enemy, it is much more easily destroyed. The more loosely tied the organizational network, the more difficult it is for the enemy to penetrate it and arrest its development. On the other hand, it is then quite difficult to control and, consequently, might be conducive to the proliferation of various splinters in which ambitious politicians, playing the roles of local Robin Hoods, create their own resistance units, quite often keeping the membership under false pretenses; or the units can be misused for other private purposes under the guise of patriotic duty. There is a visible reluctance on the part of political leaders to surrender their private armies to a unified political leadership in these instances. In fact, one gauge of the stage of preparation for a nationwide revolution is the degree of cohesion among the various factions of the resistance organization. The greater the cohesion and centralization of leadership, the greater the possibility that unified action is approaching.

**Techniques of violence in civil war.** Guerrilla and sabotage units, the armed forces of resistance movements, which are usually organized along military lines, bring violence directly to the enemy. The techniques of guerrilla and sabotage units may range from inciting and assisting riots to selective or nonselective assassination, massacres, all forms of terror, sabotage on all levels of civilian activity and all phases of production, and the support of industrial strikes and slowdowns.

INTERNAL WARFARE: Civil War 501

There are also nonviolent techniques aimed at separating the enemy in power from the population. This can be done by applying psychological warfare in both directions, that is, molding the hostile attitudes in the population, and creating self-doubts by disrupting images within the ranks of the enemy.

One of the most important contributions of sabotage and guerrilla units to the ultimate success of a civil war is that they catalyze the application of nonselective counterterror by the enemy. The dynamics of this process are quite simple. Even in the beginning phase of organizational development, during which nonselective terror is spontaneously applied by initial and rudimentary elements of resistance movements, the government delegates its security organs to restore order and prevent repetition of terrorist acts. As a rule the security organs (usually police in conjunction with counterinsurgency military units) apply pressure to the population from which, obviously, the logistic support and manpower for guerrilla and sabotage units come. Such pressure can be applied by controlling the movements of population or through other nonviolent means, including supervised hamlets and resettlement. What occurs more often, however, is counterterror in which the counterinsurgency forces, frustrated as they usually are with their inability to pin down guerrillas and saboteurs, in one way or another vent their frustration through violence on the population. If and when counterterror commences, the long-range result is that the population recoils against the counterinsurgency forces, and either from the fear of repression, or for revenge, joins and augments the guerrilla forces. Thus begins a chain reaction ultimately working to the benefit of those who initiated the terror—the guerrillas.

**The impact upon the participants.** Mass participation in violence has a conditioning effect upon the participants and also upon the operational values of the society. Some of these effects are of particular interest to social scientists.

It can be speculated that inevitably some experiences will leave permanent scars on the personalities of participants. On the other hand, it is possible to argue that for some an opportunity for direct expression of hostility would have a therapeutic effect.

In terms of group behavior, it is recognized that a profound reorientation of the operational values of a society takes place during strife. What was previously respectable and in conformity with social mores possibly would not be in time of war. For example, an honest fulfillment of a working

contract in a factory situation is expected under normal conditions. However, during civil strife it will be a newly created social virtue to slow down and to sabotage production in all possible ways. What normally would be dishonest acquires the attribute of a social virtue, if not a duty.

To this can be added an inferred expectation that when conflict has broken out, both sides are beyond the stage of accommodation in a peaceful fashion. This means that there is a mutual expectation of violence and that violence has become an expected *modus operandi*. From this attitude it is only one step to a common approval of violence as a technique of social problem solving. Under normal circumstances violence is controlled by ethical and moral norms of society. However, during civil strife such norms are, as a rule, greatly modified, resulting in common expectation of violence. Moreover, in this type of violence the original causes are quite often forgotten and the struggles become merely an opportunity for waging personal vendettas.

In terms of political analysis, two developments appear to be the traditional aftermath of civil war. First, when the insurgents are victorious and their position has become legitimate, there is already a nucleus of a counterrevolutionary force within their own ranks, potentially ready to trigger the aspirations and develop the structures of a new countermovement. There are two explanations for this paradox: (a) With victory comes the elaboration of the political, social, and economic program of the new elite, which obviously cannot satisfy all the latent aspirations of all the revolutionaries; and (b) violence has become a part of the operational code of the participants. Quite often after a successful revolution, new revolutionaries are immediately ready to repeat the whole experience. The postrevolutionary difficulties of the Ben Bella government in Algeria in 1963 and of Castro's regime in 1961 illustrate this point.

The second development (and this is particularly conspicuous when the revolutionary government has placed itself in a position of dependency upon strong supporters from abroad) is that even if the revolution is successful, the revolutionary leadership is apt to be eliminated by the foreign government which had been supporting the insurgents. In such a situation, the real purpose of the civil war and the intent of its supporters are likely to be distorted. A rule of political survival can be postulated: No revolutionary government or government-in-exile should permit itself to become politically dependent. An example is the unenviable position of the Polish government-in-

502 INTERNAL WARFARE: Civil War

exile after World War II, when the American and British governments withdrew recognition to placate the Soviet Union and disregarded the Polish leadership's choices in decisions which determined the political makeup of Poland, her frontiers, and national fate.

Further research in intrasocietal violence

Civil strife and the application of unconventional warfare has increased markedly since World War II: at least 12 countries have changed their ruling elite through civil war. In 1964 there were active resistance movements in at least 11 countries—Angola, Cambodia, Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Guatemala, Laos, New Guinea, Republic of South Africa, Vietnam, and Yemen. In at least ten other countries one could discern symptoms of presently dormant underground movements waiting for an opportunity to initiate violence. There are two explanations for this phenomenon. Not only is there accelerated striving toward national identity in the twentieth century and resentment toward the last vestiges of colonialism, but there is also the plain fact that extralegal violence and its techniques are "cheap" in strictly economic terms. Under combat conditions the U.S. soldier uses 37 pounds of supplies per day (consisting of 6 pounds of equipment, 5 pounds of fuel and oil, 20 pounds of ammunition, and 6 pounds of miscellaneous supplies). However, for the monetary equivalent of this day's supply, volunteers, guerrillas, and saboteurs in underdeveloped countries can maintain whole units for a month.

Because civil war has become a common instrument for the allocation of political power and values, more research is needed in order to understand its dynamics. Specifically, there is not enough knowledge about catalysts, organizational development and behavior, symptoms of emergence and escalation, methods for discernment, and manipulation of the stages of formation, to name several factors.

So far the bulk of the literature on subjects related to civil war deals mainly with historical treatment of events or descriptions of personal experiences of participants. It is expected, however, that analytical works will appear in the years to come.

Revolutionary organizations are basically groups in frustration and conflict, and they could serve as laboratories for systematic inquiry into the general nature and propensity of man to apply violence in solving his problems. It is suggested that a research institute under academic auspices be established for the sole purpose of analyzing the political and

organizational behavior of resistance movements, guerrillas, and subversive organizations. The focus should be on selected cultural groups in frustration and under stress. Data could be tabulated and stored in a manner permitting efficient access. Such an institute should be staffed by an interdisciplinary team of social scientists. The range of investigation could include: (1) integration of the available body of theories and empirically validated hypotheses in the social sciences bearing upon behavior of groups in frustration which apply violence; (2) development of methods and techniques for discerning the sources of tensions in other cultures from a distance; (3) psychological barriers to communication; (4) escalation of conflict on various levels; (5) decision making under stress; (6) controlling factors in human motivation with regard to cooperation; (7) the integrative process of group behavior under stress.

There is already a considerable body of research in some areas of human behavior. What is needed now is a systematic and sustained effort in collating the data to fill the gaps in knowledge and to draw conclusions concerning human behavior under specific conditions of intrasocietal and intersocietal strife. Such work would not only expand our knowledge of political behavior but would also provide empirically certified data for making policies relating to violence as an instrument of social and political change.

J. K. ZAWODNY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
1962 *Unconventional Warfare*. Edited by J. K. Zawodny. Annals, Vol. 341. Philadelphia: The Academy.

BRINTON, CLARENCE CRANE (1938) 1952 *The Anatomy of Revolution*. Rev. ed. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.

CANETTI, ELIAS (1960) 1962 *Crowds and Power*. New York: Viking. → First published as *Masse und Macht*.

CLUTTERBUCK, RICHARD L. 1966 *The Long, Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam*. New York: Praeger.

GUTHRIE, EDWIN R. (1938) 1962 *The Psychology of Human Conflict: The Clash of Motives Within the Individual*. Gloucester, Mass.: Smith.

HOPPER, REX D. 1950 *The Revolutionary Process: A Frame of Reference for the Study of Revolutionary Movements*. *Social Forces* 28:270-279.

KOMOROWSKI, TADEUSZ (1950) 1951 *The Secret Army*. New York: Macmillan; London: Gollancz.

TRINQUIER, ROGER (1961) 1964 *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency*. New York: Praeger. → First published in French.

ZAWODNY, J. K. 1962 *Unconventional Warfare*. American Scholar 31:384-394.

ZAWODNY, J. K. 1966 *Men and International Relations: Contributions of the Social Sciences to the Study of Conflict and Integration*. 2 vols. San Francisco: Chandler.