TIME
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HENRY R. LUCE 1898-1927

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© 1973 Time Inc. All rights reserved.

Principal officer: Rockefeller Center, New York, New York 10020

A LETTER FROM THE PUBLISHER

Since the Watergate trials and tribulations of the Administration began dominating the news, there have been wide swings in public sentiment about President Nixon, his aides, Senate investigators and the press. Trying to measure public opinion can be tricky business, and this week scores of TIME reporters applied themselves to the task. For a special box accompanying our story on the mood of America after the latest Watergate developments, TIME revisited three dozen citizens whom we had first interviewed more than five months ago (TIME, May 28). For the story itself, TIME reporters round the country sought the views of hundreds of citizens from all walks of life.

In the South, where TIME reporters were directed by Atlanta Bureau Chief James Bell, most people seemed not only willing to talk, but eager to be heard. In fact, only one of all the Southerners approached by TIME—a shopper in Miami—declined to talk. Many of the individual interviews drew onlookers into the discussion. In a New Orleans neighborhood bar, for example, the quiet questioning of patrons by one reporter quickly turned into a spirited political seminar that included Tulane University teachers and local taxi drivers.

In Los Angeles, Bureau Chief Richard Duncan assigned reporters to sound the public's temper throughout the Western states. In addition, Duncan conducted interviews himself, questioning among others a cattleman, a small-town banker, a former Nixon Administration official and Duncan's own daughter—about the sentiments of her eighth-grade history class.

Midwest Bureau Chief Gregory Wierzynski, whose reporters covered the heartland, found that people were openly discussing the possibility of presidential impeachment. He detected a shift in the public's attitude toward the press. "In the early days of Watergate," says Wierzynski, "I used to get chewed out regularly about press irresponsibility, particularly when talking to partisan Republicans. For the most part, recent events have stilled the lectures."

The never-ending flow of surprising news events caused some unexpected difficulties. Boston Bureau Chief Sandra Burton, who with her reporters was responsible for the New England states, spent the early part of the week conducting interviews around Plymouth, Mass.—an area symbolic not only as the landing place of the Pilgrims but also as the only congressional district in Massachusetts to cast its lot with Nixon in 1972. When it was revealed at midweek that two Watergate tapes were missing, Burton was forced to conduct her interviews a second time to see how opinions had changed.

New York Bureau Chief Marsh Clark took charge of covering the rest of the Eastern states. "It was an interesting week for me," said Clark, who had recently been on special assignment covering the Middle East war. "I returned from Jerusalem on Monday and started working on this story Tuesday. I found the complexities of the domestic political war no less challenging than those of the Middle East."

RICHARD DUNCAN

GREG WIERZYNSKI

JAMES BELL

SANDRA BURTON

MARSH CLARK

INDEX

Cover Story 12
Europe 12
Law 53
Letters 2
Market Week 61
Medicine 60
Milestones 59
People 49
& Business 62
Environment 66

Press 50
Religion 56
Show Business & Television 55
Sport 58
Theater 57
U.S. 28
World 21

The Cover: Cartoon by Jack Davis.

EUROPE

THE ALLIANCE/COVER STORY

# That Was Some Year of Europe, That Was

The celebrated U.S. military alert may have been a low-key affair, but there was nothing restrained about the intercontinental verbal attacks by the U.S. that followed. One by one, like so many Minuteman missiles, top figures in the U.S. Administration emerged from their Washington silos to hurl megatons of advice and not a little contempt across the Atlantic. Their target: the U.S.'s Western European allies.

The astonishing public barrage began with Defense Secretary James

Instead of "cooperating in united action," he said, the European allies engrafted themselves "in gaining marginal individual advantages."

Kissinger repeated his complaints later in the week at closed-door hearings of the House Foreign Affairs Committee—and was still seething with indignation when the hearings adjourned. As the Secretary was leaving the room, an aide heard him grump unhappily to a Congressman: "I don't care what happens to NATO, I'm so disgusted." The

between the two great powers can just as well lead to a general confrontation as serve détente" struck a sympathetic nerve in European capitals.

A public slinging match may be unprecedented in NATO experience, but shock diplomacy is by now an established Nixon Administration practice—as the Japanese can attest. For some time, the White House had been considering trying something seismic in a desperation effort to kick life into the failing Year of Europe. When the Middle East crisis exposed what the Administration perceived, accurately enough, to be the alliance's drift and disarray, the White House decided that the moment had come to start kicking. That the campaign was deliberately excessive, Washington now concedes, and some State Department aides suggest that the President's remarks about Europe's freezing this winter "went too far." Even so, the mood in Washington is one of relief and satisfaction. "We have made our point," says one ranking State Department official. "We have shown our anger. Now we go on with business."

**Displaying Neutrality.** Though the exercise was carefully staged, there was nothing artificial about the depth of White House resentment over the efforts of so many allies to "separate themselves" from the U.S. when the Middle East shooting broke out. In fact, the divergence between the U.S. and Europe over the Middle East was hardly unpredictable. Western Europe was markedly pro-Israel during the 1967 Middle East war, and European opinion polls continue to give the Israelis a long lead over the Arabs in popular sympathies. But Western Europe's consumption of Arab oil has doubled since 1967. And as that oil has become more vital to Europe's prosperity, Arab aspirations have appeared more important to Europe's vulnerable governments.

That is understandable enough, but what annoyed the Nixon Administration was the spectacle of some allies in headlong—if not downright craven—efforts to display their “neutrality” at a time when the U.S. needed their support. American requests for logistical help (ports, overflight rights) resupplying Israel in the critical second week of the war were not exactly denied: European governments even ruled out requests for help before they could be made. Spain, which is 86% dependent on Arab oil and traditionally pro-Arab in its policies, was the first to move. On Oct. 9—the day before the massive Soviet supply airlift to Egypt and Syria

NIXON

KISSINGER

SCHLESINGER

*Anger and disgust: the Europeans acted as though NATO did not exist.*

Schlesinger's deliberately ominous warning that the U.S. would have to "investigate all aspects of the responsiveness" of its European allies in the light of NATO's disarray during the Middle East crisis. From there on, the range widened. State Department Spokesman Robert McCloskey criticized "a number of our allies" for trying too ostentatiously to "separate themselves publicly from us" in the Middle East imbroglio. Richard Nixon escalated another notch, combining 1) a charge that the European allies had "not been cooperative" in the showdown with Moscow, and 2) a bizarre if defensible claim that without the U.S. success in achieving a quick cease-fire, Europeans "would have frozen to death this winter."

**Deep Frustration.** Then came Henry Kissinger's explosive contribution. Addressing a delegation of European Parliament members in Washington, the Secretary of State bristled that when the Middle East blew up and the U.S. "had to make significant decisions, the Europeans acted as though the North Atlantic Alliance did not exist."

State Department promptly denied that Kissinger had ever made the remark. Whether he did or not, it accurately reflected the depth of U.S. frustration with its Western European "partners."

The Atlantic Alliance has shunned to numerous intramural squabbles since it was founded in 1949, and the latest would hardly rank in the catalogue of crises with such events as the U.S. undercutting of the British and French at Suez in 1956, and Charles de Gaulle's summary withdrawal of French military participation in NATO a decade later. But never before had a NATO government, much less the one that leads the alliance, chosen to display its rage in public. And the reaction reflected it. Georges Pompidou proposed that France and its eight partners in the European Economic Community meet before year's end to work out a common Middle East position, and talk about holding regular summits thereafter. This sounded somewhat like old-fashioned, opportunistic Gaullist maneuvering at the U.S.'s expense. But Pompidou's argument that "a private understanding

12

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

began—the twelve Spanish and Amer-
ican members of the joint U.S. military
group sat down for a tense meeting in
Madrid. It ended with a Spanish gov-
ernment communiqué announcing that
U.S. transport planes bound for Israel
would not be allowed to load or refuel
at Spanish airfields or even fly through
Spanish airspace.

Other governments followed suit. Turkey, a NATO member (unlike Spain) and a recipient of U.S. aid totaling $106 million this year, said it would not permit overflights by U.S. aircraft. Greece ruled its ports as well as its airspace out of bounds for the U.S. resupply effort. Despite Italian denials, reports persist that on Oct. 11, two days before the U.S. airlift actually got under way, Rome registered a "request" that Israel-bound planes not fly over its territories to the Middle East. In the end, just one European ally—Portugal—agreed to help, if grudgingly. The Caetano regime, whose colonial wars in Africa have left it virtually friendless in Europe, allowed U.S. transports to make refueling stops at the U.S.-leased Lajes airbase in the Azores. The government promptly forbade any mention of the agreement in Lisbon newspapers.

But the unkindest cuts, as the U.S.
saw it, came from the three leading
members of the European community:

WEST GERMANY. The principal bad actor in the alliance's Middle East drama, in the Administration's view, was Bonn. What irked the White House was the Foreign Ministry's press release announcing that it had demanded a halt to U.S. efforts to resupply Israel from American bases in West Germany. Chancellor Willy Brandt's government was trying to "signal" its neutralism to Arab capitals. But Washington understandably regarded the press release as a public slap. Though the episode grew out of missteps on both sides (see box page 4), Bonn concedes that its press-release diplomacy was a blunder, one that in any case has not won it immunity from Arab oil blackmail.

BRITAIN. So far as Whitehall has let
on, London escaped the White House
wrath. Not so. Washington is furious
with Prime Minister Edward Heath's
government, and not merely for its quick
ban on all arms shipments to the Mid-
dle East (which affected Israel's access
to spare parts and ammunition for its
Centurion tanks). What really jarred
Washington was Britain's behavior in
the United Nations. Under a plan
worked out by Washington, Moscow
and London in the second week of the
war, Britain was supposed to have in-
troduced in the Security Council a res-
olution for a simple cease-fire, which the
U.S. and Soviet Union would promptly
endorse. But the British motion never
came. In the American account, White-
hall had sounded out the Egyptians and
found them to be cool to the plan, ev-
idently confident that events were still

running in their favor, Britain thereupon
simply allowed the cease-fire opportu-
nity to "dribble away," as an amazed
U.S. official put it.

FRANCE. The upper reaches of the State Department are fairly smoking with rage over the performance of France's Foreign Minister, Michel Jobert. He had gone to New York for the opening of the U.N. General Assembly, and in the first week of the war went to Washington for talks. Jobert told a surprised and pleased Kissinger that France was ready to do anything short of going to war to help the U.S. in the Middle East. "It was the best meeting with a French Foreign Minister that we could recall," reported a U.S. official. But a week later Jobert rose in the French National Assembly and personally attacked the U.S. Secretary of State by conjuring up an image of Leonid

that when the U.S. alert came, "for all
we knew the Russians were about to
steamroller across Europe." In short, in
the middle of what the U.S. President
described as a grave confrontation be-
tween the two nuclear-armed superpow-
ers, America's most powerful allies were
forced to make decisions on uninformed
hunches and to communicate through
press releases. No wonder they were
unhappy.

**Shortchanged.** How could such a
situation come about—after all the sum-
mits and mini-summits, the millions of
miles logged between San Clemente and
Key Biscayne, the Azores and Iceland
and any number of European capitals?

The failure of communication began
well before the Middle East crisis. It pre-
dates the Nixon Administration. "West-
ern Europe has felt shortchanged in the
diplomatic arena since the beginnings
of the Viet Nam War," reports TIME's

BRANDT

HEATH

POMPIDOU

Dismay and disagreement: partners should keep each other informed.

Brezhnev and Henry Kissinger, "now a
Nobel Peace Prize winner, shaking
hands while sending thousands of tons
of arms by air." When Kissinger saw
the news reports of the speech, a State
Department man says, "he literally
couldn't believe it."

For their part, the Europeans also
have complaints. Though American
NATO officials say that they frequently
consulted their European allies through-
out the Middle East crisis, they concede
that the consultations—in the Brussels
headquarters of the NATO Council, the
political arm of the alliance—have been
in fact no more than briefings. The Brit-
ish recall the 1962 Cuban crisis when
John Kennedy made his rambling, re-
assuring midnight (5 a.m. London time)
phone calls to Harold MacMillan and
his Foreign Secretary, Sir Alec Douglas-
Home. This time it fell not to Prime
Minister Heath but to Sir Alec, again
the Foreign Secretary, to enjoy the du-
bious honor of a 60-minute audience in
an airport waiting room with Kissinger.
Indeed, London was kept so ignorant
of the crisis, said a Whitehall official,

Chief European Correspondent William
Rademaekers. "Lyndon Johnson totally
ignored NATO and the Common Market
—except when he wanted European
support for the war in Viet Nam. The
breakdown in communications began
when L.B.J. dispatched Secretary of
State Dean Rusk to tell incredulous Eu-
ropean leaders that 'the defense of Eu-
rope against Communism begins on the
beaches of Viet Nam.' Johnson wanted
the Europeans to show their colors in In-
dochina the way they had in Korea.
When the British turned down the Pres-
ident's request for troops, Rusk explod-
ed. 'You seem to forget the second World
War,' he said. 'Now you can ask your-
selves if we will ever do that again.'"

Under the Johnson Administration,
NATO intramural disputes remained
largely private, at least while the heat
was on. But under the Nixon Admin-
istration, they have become the grist of
public press conferences.

It did not start out that 'way. Eu-
ropeans had high hopes for Nixon's Ad-
ministration. When Nixon made his first
trip as President in 1969, it was to the

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

13

major Western European capitals. He was greeted warmly, even in Charles de Gaulle's Paris. Nixon stressed that he was committed to withdrawal from Viet Nam and then to reforging the links of the Western alliance. The withdrawal process took longer than the Europeans —and perhaps the Administration—expected. By the time Washington was finally out from under Viet Nam, moreover, it was deeply involved in super-power diplomacy. Western Europe was once again on the sidelines as the President and his plenipotentiary, Henry Kissinger, raced overhead to Peking and Moscow, leaving as their delegate to European power circles none other than John Connally, who has never, even in his home territories, won prizes in any Mr. Wonderful contests. What Europe needed, proclaimed the suave Connally, was "a good kick in the ass." Then came William Eberle, the President's special representative on trade. One of his specialties was lecturing Europeans on protocol: "I don't like people who nod their heads and fail to speak up," he once told a group of astounded Common Market negotiators.

Even without such diplomatic shortcomings, the Nixon men soon found that dealing with Europe's weak but willful

tribes could be a trying experience at best—especially on collective matters such as defense. There was an attempt to create a “political secretariat” to coordinate the foreign policy of the Common Market countries in 1972; it died swiftly in a typical haggle over whether

the headquarters should be in Paris (as the French insisted) or in Brussels (as everyone else wanted). Most NATO discussions were similarly discouraging. "Someone always wants to add a footnote, saying *ohne mich*—'without me'—to each and every paragraph of any given text," said one diplomat. And so Washington, for all its encouragement of European unity, often found it advantageous to divide the European government with so-called "salami tactics" when it came to monetary and trade matters.

**Diplomatic Vacuum.** As the Atlantic Alliance became more of an Atlantic rivalry, allies suddenly emerged in American eyes as villains, partly responsible for two devaluations of the dollar, and certainly—in the view of the U.S. Congress—unwilling to contribute sufficiently to their own defense. In this atmosphere, the Western Europeans began to have their own doubts about the life expectancy of the alliance. The unfolding détente with the Soviet Union puzzled them. The diplomatic vacuum in which European leaders were forced to operate encouraged perceptions of policy that differed from those of Washington. Bonn embarked on Chancellor Willy Brandt's tricky and perilous course of *Ostpolitik*. Britain edged cautiously toward Europe, aware that its "special relationship" no longer mattered much to Washington. France pursued its preoccupation with its own distant dream of utter independence from everybody.

Franco-American relations, meanwhile, remained typically ambivalent. After France's NATO withdrawal in 1966, West German Chancellor Ludwig Erhard told De Gaulle that West Germany "cannot survive without the protection of the U.S." To which De Gaulle replied, "Neither can we." The French have traditionally opposed U.S. military withdrawal from Europe. That is one reason why today France boycotts the Vienna arms-reductions talks. But

"Yes, you can come out now..."

## THE VIEW FROM WASHINGTON

### O.K., Europe, Pull Up Your Socks

The shocks that rippled between the U.S. and Western Europe in recent days will not fade soon. More are in store, largely because U.S. officials feel that many NATO governments misunderstand the American notion of what the Atlantic Alliance is all about. In Washington, TIME Correspondent Joseph Kane talked to a senior—and outspoken—Defense official. The Pentagon's views come through bluntly in this report:

The U.S. believes that its European allies must put aside what it sees as their myopic, provincial views and "grow up into some form of statesmanship." NATO defense ministers are going to be told exactly that. A NATO conference is scheduled in The Hague this week, and U.S. officials are expected to use the opportunity to remind Europeans pointedly that the American arms and men based in their countries are not intended for the exclusive use of those countries or even NATO.

The allies have come to think of the uses of NATO forces as limited to NATO countries, complains the highly placed Pentagon official. In some tough talk, he adds: "Over the years, we have been tolerant and charitable on this point and turned the other cheek. But the time has now come for disabusing the allies of that notion. Today the NATO relationship has an impact on the world stra-

tegic problem, not just the allies. The Europeans must realize that what the U.S. does is in the interests of all the free world, and thus in the long-range interests of the NATO partners. When the U.S. and the Soviet Union clash, the allies' interests are not in a Soviet victory. A defeat of the U.S. is not something they can view as spectators."

The U.S., the official adds, "places a substantial portion of its forces in West Germany in order to enhance its readiness." The NATO allies would do well to "better understand" and "appreciate" that the forces are there to react to more than just NATO's needs. While the equipment may be stationed in NATO countries, it is in the interests of NATO that it be moved to neutralize a threat outside its geography. For example, "the West Germans must understand that it is not in their interests to have the oil supply from the Persian Gulf under the control of the Soviets."

Summing up, this Defense official says: "The U.S. is not going to kick over NATO because of some momentary irritation. But the U.S. must be firm about where Western Europe's interests lie. There has been a tendency among the allies to lean on us as a crutch. They cannot use the U.S. as a crutch and pretend they do not have a contribution to make. The U.S. cannot tolerate half of an involvement."

14

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

Bungling the German Connection

Normally, sensitive diplomatic negotiations are kept far from public view. Diplomatic bungles, however, have a way of surfacing on their own. So it was with the events that took place last month when the U.S. was resupplying Israel from West German bases. TIME Correspondent Gisela Bolte recapitulates the story from Bonn.

OCT. 6: Fourth Israeli-Arab war begins.

OCT. 13: U.S. begins using West German bases to resupply Israel.

OCT. 16: Martin Hillenbrand, U.S. ambassador in Bonn, asks for a meeting with West German Foreign Minister Walter Scheel. Scheel is worried because Arab governments are complaining about the U.S. use of West Germany for resupply. He raises the question in vague terms, acknowledges the U.S. view that balance in armaments is a prerequisite for attaining a cease-fire, but tells Hillenbrand that, as far as West German territory is involved, he hopes it will not be a long-term affair. Scheel adds that the Bonn government would welcome a little more information. Hillenbrand volunteers none. Bonn does not press the issue, nor does it investigate news reports that Israeli pilots are picking up Phantom F-4 jets at U.S. bases in West Germany.

OCT. 22: Cease-fire in Middle East.

OCT. 23: The Foreign Ministry's State Secretary Paul Frank requests a meeting with Hillenbrand. Frank tells Hillenbrand that West Germany feels that the need to ship arms no longer exists. Hillenbrand "thinks" shipments from West Germany have ended, but does not commit himself. He offers to inquire in Washington. Later, Bonn tells its ambassador in Cairo to inform Egypt that U.S. arms will no longer be shipped to Israel from West Germany. Meanwhile, the Bonn government apparently does not know that Israeli ships, guarded by armed U.S. military police, are still taking on cargoes of U.S. weapons at Bremerhaven.

OCT. 24: The Foreign Ministry receives a call from a Bremerhaven newsman inquiring about the Israeli ships. By this time, the first vessel, the *Narcis*, has already left the harbor fully loaded. State Secretary Frank tells U.S. Minister Frank Cash that the U.S. has no right to use West Germany as a reloading point for weapons shipments. Cash replies that he "thought" the U.S. had been given clearance from Bonn for these shipments. Frank insists that permission was neither requested nor granted, and that the resupply must stop. During the night, a second Israeli ship, the *Galila*, sails from Bremerhaven loaded with U.S. weapons.

OCT. 25: Worldwide U.S. military alert. Bonn is belatedly informed by the NATO council. Chancellor Willy Brandt, Foreign Minister Scheel and Defense Minister Georg Leber hurriedly leave a Bundestag budget debate for a conference among themselves. In what is now called a bureaucratic error, the Foreign Ministry announces publicly that the U.S. has been asked to stop arms shipments.

Hillenbrand calls on State Secretary Frank to say that the shipments have been discontinued.

OCT. 26: In Washington, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger tells West German Ambassador Berndt von Staden that the U.S. is annoyed by European attitudes during the Middle East crisis.

OCT. 28: In Bonn, Scheel defends the West German position on nationwide television, pointing out that ten Arab nations broke off diplomatic relations with Bonn in 1965 over secret arms shipments to Israel by West Germany, and that it took seven years to repair relations with the Arabs.

OCT. 29: President Nixon receives a personal note from Brandt, explaining the problems of West Germany's neutrality in the Middle East and pleading for improvement in communication and coordination of policy. Hillenbrand sees Frank at Foreign Ministry. Scheel meets with U.S. Special Envoy Walter Stoessel. All talks are "useful and friendly." Stoessel declares that he does not think the flap "caused serious harm" to U.S.-West German relations. In Washington, however, Henry Kissinger is disgusted.

SVEN SIMON

THE TWO WALTERS: U.S. SPECIAL ENVOY STOESSEL, GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL

French distrust of the U.S., always high, reached new peaks over Washington's secret diplomacy with Moscow. When Brezhnev met with French officials in Paris last summer on his return from Washington, he assured them that he had told all about his dealings with Nixon. One of the French officials present commented quietly to a colleague: "That's a lot of bunk."

It was in this atmosphere that Henry Kissinger last April made his proposal for a "new Atlantic Charter." It was in fact intended—and still is—to be a serious effort aimed at redefining a relationship altered not only by neglect but by fundamental changes in strategy.

and economic realities. To too many Europeans, however, the Year of Europe suggested spectacle rather than substance. In any case, Kissinger's speech was greeted mostly with a shrug.

**Not Listening.** As the summer ticked by, it became clear that the first priority had to be the Year of Waltergate. President Nixon's trip to Europe was first scheduled for the spring of 1973. After several postponements, it is now entirely up in the air. The calendar keeps slipping. Kissinger was supposed to have traveled to Europe in early October to help sharpen the three mild documents—on general principles, defense and trade—that are now to serve

as the hoped for new Atlantic Charter. But that was before the Middle East erupted. In Kissinger's stead, Assistant Secretary of State Walter Stoessel has been touring Bonn and London to talk up the charter—and to assuage bruised feelings.

Long before the Middle East crisis, the alliance had become "a dialogue of the deaf across the Atlantic," as U.S. Diplomat Robert Schaetzel put it after he resigned as U.S. ambassador to the European community in October 1972. Says another former U.S. ambassador living in Europe: "A child could have told the Administration how Europeans would react in the Middle East war.

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

15

Why was Nixon shocked? Because he did not care to listen. Because he did not care. That's why." The Europeans themselves, reports TIME's Rademakers, can be accused of the same thing: "They also are not listening. The Administration's word is no longer taken at face value. They do not believe. If anything, the Middle East war has again demonstrated to Western Europe how weak it is, how dependent it remains on the U.S., and this has scared them. It has scared them more than the Cuban crisis, because they find themselves less able to trust President Nixon. The result is a frantic effort on the part of many Europeans to climb out from under their superdependence on the U.S."

A total disruption of the ailing alliance is unlikely, as both Washington and Western European capitals are fully aware. The reason is not simply that the Atlantic partners are bound by common cultures and (along with Japan) common economic interests. For all of its growing prosperity, Western Europe still regards itself as the tenant of a militarily vulnerable outcropping on the western tip of a none-too-friendly Eurasian land mass. The general wariness about the Vienna arms-reductions talks —whose old initials, MBFR, are said in some defense ministries to stand for "much benefit for Russia"—bears witness to Western Europe's continued reliance on U.S. military protection. To Western Europeans, the 319,000 U.S. troops stationed on European soil have long since become the "hostages" that guarantee that the U.S. will be ready to use its nuclear power in the event of a real or threatened invasion by Warsaw Pact forces.

**Mutual Trust.** That concept has perhaps become too deeply established in the European mind. Europeans quaver at the prospect that the U.S. troops may be withdrawn. But they also shudder at the possibility that the troops might some day be used. Thus the Administration may have a point when it complains that NATO should, in a world where détente is still tenuous, accustom itself to the idea of peering beyond Europe's geographical borders in cases where its vital interests are at stake.

But the necessary element that is fading from the alliance is mutual trust. The U.S.-European relationship is no longer what it was in the 1950s and early 1960s, when the NATO Supreme Allied Commander (still always an American) was literally, in the words of British Strategist Alastair Buchan, a "viceroy of Europe." Although it is true that Europe has no real options outside of continued dependence on U.S. power, that does not mean that the U.S. should deal so insensitively with its most important allies. Intentionally or not, says John Tuthill, director of the Atlantic Institute of International Affairs, "we are in a situation where we may be pushing the Europeans to unite against us, not with us." That is scarcely what President Nixon had in mind.

OPINION

# Object Lessons for Everybody

As a kind of laboratory test of the relationship between the U.S. and Western Europe in an era of experimental détente, the superpower crisis over the Middle East has raised some sober and intriguing questions. Will U.S. and European interests continue to run a parallel course, especially in any showdown between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.? Or is it correct to conclude with Lord Carrington, the British Defense Minister, that the Atlantic partners, while continuing to count on the U.S. to recognize its self-interest in the defense of Europe, ought to do more on their own? TIME asked a number of Europeans for their views:

**HUGH CORBET**, 36, director of London's Trade Policy Research Center: Europeans want on the whole to have defense on the cheap. World problems are exacerbated by the inability of European countries to keep up with complexities in political, economic and security issues. The Middle East crisis has shown the need for a strong policy within Europe. But it has proved the opposite: the helplessness and disarray of the alliance. The way the Europeans behaved was pathetic. They were accusing the U.S. of overreacting to a situation they knew very little about. They certainly should not have been making any public statements about the wisdom of a U.S. alert. Given the present disunity among European states, it would not have been very practical for the U.S. to go consulting. Europeans have got out of the habit of thinking globally, but meantime, there is still an international security system which somebody has to lead. Like it or not, the U.S. has to exercise power, and it is quite conceivable that the Russians might have been exploiting the President's domestic preoccupations.

**ALBERTO RONCHEY**, 47, Italian author and columnist: The Nine, with its 253 million people, may be an "economic giant." But because it does not know how to achieve federated unity, we ask ourselves: How can we still persuade American citizens that Europe is incapable of providing for its own security? While the Soviet capacity to exert pressure continues to increase, Western Europe is still protected by a nuclear umbrella for which it does not pay the cost. Each year the debate over reducing the number of American troops in Europe grows more tense. It is important now to avoid one old error: Previously, when the Europeans talked of monetary and trade questions, the Americans talked of military burden sharing. All these questions must now be discussed togeth-

er, because they cannot be treated separately—politics, burden sharing, trade, monetary problems. If we cannot have a full, complete dialogue with our American allies, in the next few years Europe risks being "Finlandized," while the U.S. risks becoming isolated under the weight of internal problems.

**ANTOINE RIBOUD**, 54, president of France's Boussois, Souchon & Neuvesel (glass, plastics, food): The Western

MOISIO

ALBERTO RONCHEY

world is a big family, and like every family there are times when everyone is not in agreement. In moments of crisis, all the members stick together, but the Middle East episode was not a great crisis. It could have become one, but it did not. It is not possible for the U.S. and Europe always to agree. The U.S. derives 6% of its oil from the Arab countries, while Europe imports 73% of its needs. In other words, one is eating in the kitchen and the other in the dining room.

**GIOVANNI MALAGODI**, 70, leader of the right-of-center Italian Liberal Party: The contrast, or the difference, between the attitudes of the European members of NATO and the U.S. reflects a genuine difference of interests. And the general political and military weakness of the states of Western Europe. It is a serious matter. It reflects also a persistent insufficiency in consultation, due in part to the impatience of the larger ally and the caution and sometimes the equivocations of the lesser ones. It is difficult and uncomfortable—as Herr Schiller, the German Minister of Finance, once said—for an ordinary man to sail in the same boat as an elephant, even a friendly elephant. Yet the reasons for the alliance are so deeply rooted in the uncertainties of the present-day world, and in the constant push of Soviet might against our geographical, political and ideological frontiers, that we just cannot afford—neither the U.S. nor we Europeans—to allow the alliance to weaken, much less to wilt away.

16

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

GIOVANNI MALAGODI

DUFOTO

SVEN SIMON

KARL CARSTENS

GRAHAM ATWOOD

HUGH CORBET

BERRETTO - BLACK STAR

ANTOINE RIBOUD

LEFEBVRES

JEAN-FRANÇOIS REVEL

American criticisms are justified.

ANDRÉ FONTAINE, 52, editor in chief of *Le Monde*: American-European relations are rather like American-Soviet ones. That is, their interests are divergent in some areas but converge in others. In regard to the balance of forces in the world, the U.S. and Europe have convergent interests. They diverge, for example, in the Middle East and in trade. I would not care to risk any predictions about American-European relations five years from now. But it is unthinkable that Europe should say amen to all of the U.S.'s initiatives. The relationship of Europe and America is that of an alliance, not a community. Anyway, NATO never covered the Middle East. Besides, what did the U.S. do in Suez in 1956? Europe must forge its own unity if it is to make its weight felt. In the days of Brezhnev and Kissinger, there is no room in Europe for altruism.

KARL CARSTENS, 58, floor leader of the opposition C.D.U./C.S.U. in the West German Bundestag: This should be a lesson to all those involved to be more considerate of each other in the future. The European partners of the alliance will have to take more into account the worldwide commitments of

the U.S. to secure peace. It was also in the interest of the Europeans that with the help of the U.S., the balance of power was restored in the Middle East. As for the future, all partners must be interested in the alliance's being strengthened and consolidated while a balanced détente policy is being pursued. A successful conclusion of the Vienna arms conference is unthinkable without an Atlantic Alliance that is intact. To bring about a meaningful and fruitful Atlantic dialogue, such as proposed by Secretary Kissinger, the free part of Europe must organize itself in such a way that it can speak with one voice.

MANLIO BROSIO, 76, Italian senator, former ambassador to Moscow, London and Washington, Secretary General of NATO from 1964 to 1971: The difficulties between the European allies and the U.S. derive, first of all, from the fact that the alliance is committed to the defense of the Mediterranean, but not to the territories to the southeast of that sea. The peace and security of the sea and the Mediterranean bases are indivisible, however. Therefore, the situation is absurd and cannot help generating contradictions. The result has been that the crises of the Middle East have always eluded the control of the alliance, even when they touched profoundly on the interests of the allies. All this does not remove the fact that American nuclear defense and American military and economic power remain more than ever indispensable for the integrity and the independence of Europe. The recent conflict confirmed that. The Soviet Union did not hesitate to support the Arab attack against Israel, which, if it had succeeded, would have assured Russia a predominant position in the Mediterranean, to the obvious detriment of Europe. Only the American counter-

weight was able to prevent it. It is necessary now to renew and reinforce Atlantic collaboration. If this is not done, European interests and the European union itself will be compromised. The recent crisis should convince us that European unity must indeed be realized. The price otherwise would be to substitute Soviet influence for American friendship.

JEAN-FRANÇOIS REVEL, 49, French author (*Neither Marx nor Jesus*): Europe is in a state of total intellectual bankruptcy and has absolutely nothing to propose to either the Arabs or Israel. Europe cannot want the U.S. to give it military protection while pursuing a policy that is not even a united European one outside of NATO. I feel that American criticisms of the European attitude during the Middle East war are perfectly justified. Either Europe is capable of inventing and pursuing an original policy, or it must choose between the policies of the two major powers. Since Western Europe cannot adopt Moscow's line, it has to take into consideration the American position. Europe should start thinking about its own defense. I believe that the U.S. ought to stop defending Europe. It should withdraw totally to oblige Europe to face its problems. Find an "independent" European policy? That is just a pathological Gaullist myth. No one can pursue a really independent policy today. One thing is obvious, though: The interests of Europe and the U.S. are not diverging, even though fundamentally Europe's interests are not exactly those of Washington or Moscow.

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

17

DIPLOMACY

U.S.-Russian Détente: Is It Durable?

The Middle East war not only tested the strength of the Atlantic Alliance. The near-confrontation of the two superpowers also raised serious doubts about the viability of the détente achieved with the Soviet Union by the Nixon White House. Although it was hardly his intention, the President virtually conceded, at his Washington press conference two weeks ago, that something had gone wrong with his policy of easing relations with the Soviet Union when he spoke of "the most difficult crisis we have had since the Cuban confrontation of 1962." The logical question, which spokesmen for the President have yet to answer adequately: How could a Cuban-type exercise in eyeballing take place in the midst of a détente

watched in stunned dismay. "Non-sense!" Malik shouted back. Said one U.N. observer: "Détente's got off to a very wobbly start. The cracks are showing everywhere."

More telling, perhaps, was the treatment in the Soviet press of President Nixon, who, for an American politician, has hitherto been afforded extraordinary deference. After the U.S. military alert, an unusually blunt statement by Tass accused Washington of "absurd" reports about the Soviet military alert intended to "intimidate" the U.S.S.R. Soviet newspapers, which had virtually ignored "Vatergatski," even began hinting to the Russian public that Nixon might not survive in office.

Soviet commentators, however, have

without splintering into rival factions.

The other side of the coin is that the Russians are desperately anxious for American trade and technology. Even as military alarms were being sounded round the world, U.S. oilmen, paradoxically, were mounting a $20 million display of oil- and gas-extraction equipment in Moscow. American technicians estimate that Soviet drilling and extraction equipment lags 15 years behind U.S. technology in the field. Thus it was novel but not really surprising to find the Soviet press berating Washington's diplomatic actions at the same time that it was wistfully quoting American businessmen as favoring "the liquidation of trade barriers" with the Soviet Union.

The events of the past two weeks made any quick agreement by Congress to Soviet trade concessions more remote than ever. Last week Peter Flanigan, chief White House adviser on foreign economic policy, asked Congress temporarily to drop trade legislation that would grant the Russians most-favored-nation status. The move for delay was partly a face-saving gesture, both for the Administration and Moscow. A Senate amendment sponsored by Senator Henry Jackson, tying MFN to free emigration from the Soviet Union, had seemed embarrassingly certain of passage.

**No Love Affair.** The delay is likely to inspire many members of Congress to a closer examination of whether preferential trade advantages to the Soviets—that is, credits and advanced technology—are in the U.S. interest. "Trade should be seen, and I think now it will be seen, as a straight trade-off," says Morton Halperin, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. "What can we get for those concessions?"

Once the Middle East situation has subsided, it is likely that détente as a whole will also be viewed in a somewhat more cautious and realistic light, at least in Washington. "Most people think of détente as a love affair," observes former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Averell Harriman, 81. "It isn't that. It just means that a few things have been settled. The trouble with Nixon is that he blows up his successes too high, and then he has to create a crisis to get back to basics again."

There seems no reason why agreements already struck for Soviet-American cooperation in space, medicine and other research should be adversely affected by superpower conflict. Moreover, the continuing threat of a nuclear confrontation suggests the need for even limited efforts to strike new safeguards. Marshall Shulman, director of Columbia University's Russian Institute, thinks that the Middle East can serve as a good case study. "The progress of détente is limited. It's going to be a zigzag course with episodes of tension. The basic question is: To what extent did some restraints hold? Détente does not mean that the Russians won't press an advantage, but how far they will go without straining the relationship."

"Cooperation."

that was designed to avoid just that kind of cold war brinkmanship?

Despite White House assessments that Nixon's knowledge of Soviet Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev had averted an even more scarifying crisis, there were other signs of strain in Washington's relationship with Moscow. Although the U.S. and the Soviet Union had jointly hammered out the basis for the United Nations' resolution establishing a ceasefire, the two powers clashed repeatedly at the Security Council over the makeup of the U.N. Emergency Force.

At one point, the sour relations between burly Soviet Delegate Yakov Malik and the U.S.'s acerbic Ambassador John Scali broke into a nasty public spat. In a shrewd parliamentary maneuver, Malik tried to get certain changes he favored incorporated in a revised text of a report by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim on the U.N. force. Scali, who thought that he had reached agreement with Malik on the report in a behind-the-scenes huddle, was apoplectic. "Breach of faith!" he shouted, shaking his finger at Malik, as other delegates

stopped short of painting the Middle East dispute as a fracture in détente. Indeed, Brezhnev would appear to have as much riding on the policy as Nixon. One reason is that the Soviet leaders never perceived détente as an all-inclusive mood of relaxation, much as the West would like to see that develop, but as a policy option to be applied in areas of mutual interest. For the moment, those areas, in Russian eyes, are 1) the reduction of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe and 2) the expansion of Soviet-American trade.

As it happened, the Vienna conference on reduction of forces was just getting under way, and the détente crisis could hardly have come at a worse moment for the allies. The arms talks are viewed as a litmus of Soviet intentions: How far is Moscow willing to go in pulling back part of its huge army poised on the border of Western Europe in order to relax tensions? The talks will also be a test of whether the Atlantic Alliance has the cohesion and strength to engage in a long, hard and potentially divisive negotiating process

18

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

OIL

The Curtains Close on the Canals

In the golden light of a fall afternoon, the world's largest port throbs with activity. Rotterdam's drawbridges open and close rhythmically for the steady stream of canal barges, and longshoremen hurry along the piers, bundled up against chilly North Sea winds. Looming over the other ships in the crowded harbor, a huge supertanker glides toward a terminal that will drain its hold of a valuable cargo of crude oil. But in less than a month's time, reports TIME European Economic Correspondent Henry Muller, Rotterdam's hum may well be reduced to a low drone.

The first blow was the Algerian boycott. Then Kuwait and several other Persian Gulf sheikdoms followed suit; and when Saudi Arabia last week announced it was shutting off its annual supply of 43 million tons of crude, Rotterdam and much of Northern Europe shivered. Unless dramatic diplomatic events persuade Arab oil producers to modify the boycott, Rotterdam's tanker traffic will be reduced by 70% by the end of this month. By striking at Holland on the pretext of longstanding Dutch support for Israel, the Arabs in effect threaten all of Western Europe while maintaining the fiction that it is only the Dutch who are being punished. Holland is in reality the nerve center of Northern Europe's oil supply. Only 25% of the 150 million tons of oil unloaded this year goes to the local market. The balance is re-exported, either as crude or in refined forms. These exports account for one-quarter of Western Europe's oil supplies. West Germany, for example, receives 20% of its crude and just under 50% of its refined supplies from the giant port. Britain buys a third of its oil products from Holland.

Can Europe be supplied through other ports? Theoretically, yes, though the logistical problems would be enormous. There has been talk, for instance, of using the Rotterdam-Antwerp pipeline in the opposite direction—but Antwerp cannot handle supertankers. Le Havre's pipeline capacity is inadequate to supply West Germany and the Benelux countries in addition to France. Logically, some sort of Western European cooperation would seem to be the answer, but neither the OECD nor the EEC has yet been able to come up with a workable plan, for the simple—and stark—reason that the European nations not yet directly boycotted by the Arabs are reluctant to antagonize the sheiks. Late in the week, the Arabs showed just how much pressure they were prepared to exert. The Libyan ambassador to Bonn warned the West Germans that any expressions of solidarity with Holland might endanger West Germany's own oil supplies. Bonn promptly backed off. An angry NATO official said: "I would have declared the man per-

sona non grata, but instead the Germans made attempts at conciliation."

While other European nations dither, the Dutch are grimly preparing to pay the price. Unemployment looms: 20,000 workers in petrochemical industries are directly affected by the ban, and the 400,000 Rotterdamers who depend on the harbor for their livelihood will suffer too. The port itself stands to lose an estimated $1.6 million a month in harbor fees.

Beyond this, individual consumers face real difficulties. Government oil reserves now stand at about 70 days, and the country's vast natural-gas fields—which supply 43% of Holland's annual energy needs—offer some consolation. Prudently, however, the Dutch government has announced an initial fuel-conservation program: Sunday pleasure driving is banned; motorists are asked to keep speeds under 60 m.p.h.; and housewives are requested to close their lace curtains early in the evening to keep heat within their homes. Says one Dutchman: “That’s very Dutch.” If all this fails, rationing would seem to be the next logical step. Elsewhere in Europe, the situation is not much more encouraging:

**AUSTRIA.** While the government repeatedly proclaims that current petroleum stocks are adequate, Austrian consumers continue to load up on oil. Laments Minister of Trade Josef Staribacher: "Every bathtub in the country

*Early in the 17th century John Calvin told the Dutch that "one who keeps his curtains closed might be committing some very hidden sin." Ever since, the Dutch have opened their windows to the outside world.

DPA

AUSTRIANS LINE UP WITH EMPTY CONTAINERS OUTSIDE VIENNA GAS STATION
Every bathtub in the country is filled with oil or gasoline.

is filled with oil or gasoline." The government refuses to consider rationing despite hoarding. "When people stop buying because they have no more storage places," says Staribacher, "we stand a chance of getting back to normal."

**BRITAIN.** Prime Minister Edward Heath is holding off on distribution of fuel-rationing books. Instead, he is gambling that Britain's assiduous courtship of the Arab states will make rationing unnecessary. In Parliament last week Heath reported that the government has received "firm assurances from oil-producing countries" that they do not plan to damage Britain. Heath's hopes are directed less at preserving consumers from inconvenience and more at keeping the British economy moving at full tilt. Heath estimates that Britain has about 100 days' supplies on hand or aboard tankers. One major firm has already slowed deliveries of top-grade gasoline.

**WEST GERMANY.** Still hoping that the Arab boycott of The Netherlands will somehow not apply to their country, Germans face an imminent gasoline price rise. Industrial sources predict an increase in prices of both super and regular gas of roughly 11% to 12%. If the world supply stabilizes at current levels, rationing is unlikely. Instead, West Germany will rely on price increases to control consumption. At the moment, no rationing law exists. Meanwhile, the nation is readying for a chilly winter: owners of several Frankfurt apartment houses are advising tenants to buy electric heaters.

**FRANCE.** The pro-Arab policy is clearly paying off. Government Spokesman Jean-Philippe Lecat summed up the situation this way last week: "We have nothing to fear for our oil supplies. The special situation of France is effec-

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

19

Each minute, each day something happens somewhere that makes news. Each week **TIME** sorts out the most important happenings, extracts what makes news from what merely makes noise. In the process, **TIME** keeps the world's most interested readers informed on the world's most interesting people, places and events.

tively recognized by the producing countries." To Frenchmen, that meant that current three-month reserves were secure, and that oil would continue to arrive at a normal rate. The government launched a token drive against wasting fuel: motorists were asked to drive at 50 m.p.h. or less, and householders were requested to lower their thermostats a fraction. Last week gas prices jumped by about 10¢ a gal.

**BELGIUM.** The dependence on supplies from neighboring Rotterdam has already triggered protests. Heating-oil suppliers, unable to meet demands, last week staged two days of strikes and demonstrations to protest the lack of government policies on the problem. At the moment, Belgium has an estimated 110 days' reserve. But Antwerp can handle only smaller (70,000 tons and under) tankers, and the largest of those only at high tide. Complicating the outlook is the fact that most of the oil refined in Belgium itself comes from Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait.

**SPAIN.** There is no supply problem. Says Carlos Pinilla, government representative on the board of the nation's gas and oil monopoly: "We have no difficulty with oil supplies from the Middle East—only a preoccupation with the increase in price." In other words, Madrid's fervently pro-Arab line has paid off. On Jan. 1, however, prices for gasoline will go up, and by April the cost of heating oil will rise. There is no plan for rationing.

**SWEDEN.** The government will ask its citizens to cut back on everything from warm baths to hot meals—and to shift from private to public transportation. If government pleas fail, the threat of rationing by Christmas is real indeed—and the gasoline ration cards are already printed.

BACK TO BICYCLES IN AMSTERDAM
In Arab eyes, friends are enemies.

DAILY NEWSPAPER

IRELAND

## The Canny Copter Caper

*The length and breadth of Ireland*
*No finer sight to see,*
*The day the Provie birdie*
*Released the Mountjoy three.*

A new little ditty is now being sung in Catholic pubs all over Northern Ireland. It is also burning the ears of Irish Prime Minister Liam Cosgrave, as well it might. Last week the militant Provisional wing of the Irish Republican Army pulled a canny caper in downtown Dublin that made a mockery of Cosgrave's get-tough policy on the I.R.A.

At 3:35 p.m., the shuffling exercise routine in Mountjoy Prison was noisily disturbed when a helicopter suddenly settled in the yard, scattering prisoners in all directions. One Mountjoy warder thought it was a surprise visit from Defense Minister Patrick Donegan, who is fond of heli hopping round the country. Instead, a masked man stepped down and trained a gun on the guards as three prisoners bolted forward and scrambled into the cabin of the chopper, which then whirred away. Freed in the daring daytime snatch, which took only a minute, were three top Provisionals: Seamus Twomey, 54, the former Provo chief of staff; Kevin Mallon, 35, a commander of I.R.A. units on the border; and Joe O'Hagan, 50, a top Provo gunrunner.

Prime Minister Cosgrave was said to be "severely shocked by the escapade," particularly since his eight-month-old government had boasted that its tight security and tough crackdowns had kept the Provo gunmen under control. The opposition Fianna Fáil Party immediately blasted the government for its "incompetence in security matters."

**Overt Step.** The operation had been meticulously planned. According to police, the first overt step was taken two days before the breakout when a young man with an American accent, calling himself "Mr. Leonard," arranged to rent an Alouette II helicopter from Dublin's Irish Helicopters Ltd. It would be used, he explained, to photograph historical sites near Dublin.

Instead of snapping pictures, Leonard instructed Pilot Thompson Boyes to land at an isolated field located in the village of Stradbally. Leonard then bolted away as two armed, masked men approached. One gunman climbed aboard and ordered the pilot to fly to Mountjoy Prison. After the prisoners were liberated, the copter put down on a deserted race track outside Dublin; the I.R.A. men sped off in a hijacked taxi.

At week's end, despite a massive police and army manhunt, the escapees had not been found. To add insult to injury, the daring jailbreak cost the I.R.A. not a penny. Irish Helicopters Ltd. had rented the Alouette to the mysterious "Mr. Leonard" without asking for any advance payment.

20

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

THE WORLD

MIDDLE EAST

Now for the Bitter Battles of Peace

Except for scattered skirmishes along the Suez Canal, the guns of war fell silent last week across the Middle East. Almost as abruptly as it had begun, the superpower saber-rattling also came to an end. One week earlier it had threatened to involve the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the 18-day war between Israel and its Arab neighbors. The U.S. last week ended a worldwide military alert called to forestall apparent Soviet troop moves into Egypt; after briefly chiding the U.S. for giving in to baseless fears, Moscow then let the matter drop.

With all these fronts quiet, diplomats began to take up where the generals had left off. To them was given the job of trying to create a peace settlement that could be as dramatic as the war itself. The short-term problems created by the war and the intensified hazards built up over 25 years made the task difficult. But there were some opportunities, and along with them there was hope.

**Dangerous Notes.** One immediate problem was that the latest Middle East war ended on an inconclusive and potentially dangerous note. From a purely military viewpoint, Israel had won, but not in the spectacularly decisive way that its generals had hoped.

Egypt's Third Army of 20,000 men, which had crossed to the east side of the Suez Canal in the first days of battle, was still there. But it was surrounded, trapped and desperately short of food, water and medical supplies. An Israeli task force, crossing the canal in the opposite direction, had surrounded the city of Suez and rolled up the flanks of units protecting the Third Army. As a result of such maneuvers, troops of the United Nations Emergency Force moving into the battlefield area to keep the peace found it hard to find the lines. In some places, the blue-helmeted U.N. troops discovered Egyptians and Israelis a scant 30 yds. away from one another. In other places, the lines were kilometers apart.

Operating with Security Council sanction—and aided in large measure by U.S. pressure on Israel to let the surrounded Arab troops be resupplied—the U.N. Emergency Force began to bring food and water through Israeli lines to the beleaguered Egyptians. Beyond that mercy mission, the role of the peacekeeping force was uncertain. It faced unfortunately some of the same handicaps as did a similar force that attempted to keep the peace in Gaza and Sinai before Gamal Abdel Nasser ordered it out in May 1967, thus paving the way for the Six-Day War.

This time, as then, the Egyptians indicated that they might want a say-so on the disposition of the U.N. force. This time also the Soviet Union was threatening to withhold funds later if it disagrees with the operations of the U.N. troops; the Chinese will ante up nothing at all. And Soviet Ambassador to the U.N. Yakov Malik was continuing to try to bring the emergency force under the control of the Security Council, where Russia has a veto, rather than under Secretary-

General Kurt Waldheim. The U.S. opposes Malik's demand.

Considering the international character of the negotiations that led to the cease-fire, it was no surprise that the broader diplomatic discussions last week took on a kind of intercontinental jetset frenzy. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetzov, for example, hurried to Cairo for an indefinite stay. One reason for his trip, perhaps, was Moscow's desire for firsthand information. Soviet intelligence on the war had been notably less proficient than that of the U.S., which recovered from initial misjudgments about Arab intentions and reported the remainder of the war accurately.

Convinced that the Arabs could and would win, the Soviets did not realize until it was almost too late the size of

the Israeli task force moving across the Suez Canal and its significance to Egypt's Third Army. It was the plight of the Third Army that forced the Soviet Union to ask U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to visit Moscow for cease-fire talks. The threatened Soviet troop movements, which led to the American alert, were primarily designed to pressure Washington into forcing the Israelis to stop fighting while the Third Army was still more or less intact. No

other incident of the war has so influenced the Israelis, who consider that the superpowers thereby deprived them of victory.

After his return to Washington, Kissinger rescheduled a postponed trip to Peking for this week. Along the way, he will stop at Rabat, Cairo, Amman and the Saudi Arabian capital of Riyadh to discuss the Middle East situation with the Arab leaders. (Syria's Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed Zekarya Ismail last week met Kissinger in Washington, but Iraq steadfastly refused any contact.)

Kissinger will be accompanied by State's top Middle Eastern expert, Assistant Secretary Joseph Sisco, who will make additional visits to Tel Aviv, Beirut and Kuwait. Sisco will also have the unenviable job of trying to explain U.S.

PICTORIAL PARADE

UNITED NATIONS TROOPS MOVING INTO SUEZ CITY TO TAKE UP PEACE-KEEPING POSITIONS

Backed by Security Council sanction and superpower pressure.

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

21

EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT ANWAR SADAT
Worried about his children.

ROBERT J. ZYBAR

Middle East moves to representatives of the NATO nations in Brussels, who were roiled by Washington's unilateral decisions and efforts to resupply Israel from U.S. military stocks in Europe (see story page 12).

Last week also, both the Israelis and the Egyptians invited themselves to Washington for discussions with Kissinger and President Nixon. First to arrive was Egypt's Ismail Fahmy, 51, who had been dispatched by President Anwar Sadat to get a firsthand explanation of Washington's attitudes about the cease-fire. Even while Fahmy was in Washington, word came from Cairo that Sadat had elevated him from acting to permanent Foreign Minister. That was a hopeful sign as far as future peace negotiations are concerned. Fahmy replaced Mohammed Hassan Zayyat, who felt that he could not carry out a new Sadat-ordered policy of rapprochement with Washington.

**Extra Kilometers.** Meanwhile, Sadat appeared in Cairo in field marshal's uniform to hold a press conference for 350 Egyptian and foreign correspondents gathered to report the war. In a remarkably relaxed and genial mood,* he gave one reason why he accepted the cease-fire: "I would not fight the United States of America. I fought Israel for eleven days. They would have run out of ammunition in two [more] days. I am not ready to fight the U.S." Although he criticized Washington for giving aid to Israel, Sadat praised the U.S. for taking a "constructive position" on peace negotiations. As for the muddled cease-fire lines, Sadat chuckled: "I am willing to give Mrs. Meir an extra ten square kilometers."

Egypt's Fahmy was followed to Washington by Israel's doughty Premier. Looking alarmingly fatigued as she arrived at Dulles Airport aboard an El Al airliner, Golda Meir, 75, remained seated for an airport press conference. Her visit, as it turned out, was somewhat more urgent than Fahmy's. The U.S., after all, is Israel's principal friend and chief armorer. According to reports from Jerusalem, Washington is not only replacing planes and tanks Israel lost in the war but has also provided anti-tank weapons and new "smart bombs," such as the Walleye and the Rockeye, that the Israelis have never had before. At the same time, however, President Nixon had pressed so vigorously for a cease-fire that his actions rekindled latent Israeli fears of an imposed settlement. Mrs. Meir had come to Washington to find out what the President had in mind.

What Washington wanted, as President Nixon told Mrs. Meir in two days of talks that were officially described as "very constructive," was for Israel to cooperate in setting cease-fire lines and taking pressure off Sadat by feeding his trapped Third Army. The American

pressure on Israel was obviously intense. At one point last week, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan told Israel's parliament: "I do not know whether Knesset members are aware that the shells that the Israelis are firing today were not in their possession a week ago. The war cannot be waged without shells, and without shells we shall not be able to release the prisoners. Whoever proposes that we conduct this war split off from the U.S. is suggesting that we will not win this war."

In return for allowing supplies to reach the Third Army, Israel expected a prisoner-of-war exchange that was very slow in getting under way. Israel seeks the return of 440 men listed as missing in action, most of them on the Sinai front. To recover them Israel is willing to send back some 8,000 Arab prisoners, most of them Egyptian—at least 2,500 more than it held after the Six-Day War in 1967.

By week's end, however, the Egyptians had handed over only 85 names of Israeli prisoners to the International Red Cross in Geneva, and the Syrians none at all. There were rumors in Israel that many of the prisoners, especially those held in Syria, had been brutally tortured—which in fact had occurred in 1967. Wives and relatives of the missing men turned out in angry demonstrations before the Knesset building in Jerusalem and the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv. They carried signs: WHERE IS MY FATHER? and NIXON, YOU GAVE THE EGYPTIANS A CEASE-FIRE. NOW GIVE US BACK OUR SONS.

The demonstrations underscored one more reason for Mrs. Meir's hasty visit to Washington. The war and its uncertain ending have created Israel's most serious domestic political crisis in 25 years. Defense Minister Dayan, the hero of the '67 war, is already being excommunicated for not having prepared Israel's forces to rebuff the initial Arab attacks. Mrs. Meir's Labor-dominated coalition government is also under attack, particularly from army officers, who resent that they were not allowed to finish off the Arabs. Some observers of Israeli politics predict a significant shift to the right when national elections, originally scheduled for last week, are held in December after a war-inspired postponement.

"My Children." To some extent, Mrs. Meir's political future rests on how she solves the prisoner issue, which last week threatened to become as important in the Middle East as it had been for the U.S. in Viet Nam. Sadat bluntly warned the Israelis against further attacks on "my children" of the Third Army. He was holding out not merely for a cease-fire and the return of prisoners, but for a withdrawal of Israeli forces to the positions they had held when the cease-fire was ordered on Oct. 22. For the Israelis, the point of that demand was obvious. To get their prisoners back, they would have to withdraw from key positions on the west bank of

*In fact he was in mourning for his half-brother, a MIG fighter-pilot who had been shot down and killed over the Sinai during the fighting.

22

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

the canal. Meanwhile, Sadat would be able to maintain his forces on the east bank and claim an Arab victory.

Egypt also had one other card to play. Mrs. Meir protested that Egyptian destroyers were blockading Bab el Man-deb, where the Red Sea meets the Indian Ocean, thereby preventing tankers from sailing on to Eilat to unload vital oil.

While Washington was working hard to end the diplomatic impasse, the Russians last week were content merely to sit back and observe. Moscow was unquestionably delighted by the disarray in the Atlantic Alliance that had been created by President Nixon's unilateral handling of the Middle East crisis. Though the Western allies insisted publicly that nothing had changed, privately they complained that Washington's actions had made it more difficult for them to negotiate as a united bloc with the Russians.

"Great Martyrs." But if Washington had overreacted in panic to the threat of a confrontation with the U.S.S.R., it had skillfully seized the initiative in serving as the real peacemaker in the Middle East. Even though Egyptian officers at the front were not only meeting with Israeli officers but in some cases carrying on their conversations in Hebrew, Sadat insisted at his press conference that he would never negotiate with Israel face to face. The State Department, however, quietly contended that when the time came Cairo would take part in direct meetings. Meanwhile, Israel was additionally pressured to concede that at an appropriate time it would withdraw from some of the territory it has held since 1967. For Mrs. Meir, who still remembers bitterly that as Foreign Minister in 1957 she had to bow to John Foster Dulles' dictate and hand back the captured Sinai territory to Egypt, there is one large proviso. This time, any such arrangement will have to guarantee Israeli security.

There were other optimistic notes in the course of the week. Certainly the most unexpected was a display of realism on the part of fedayeen leaders. Up to now, the Palestinians have represented perhaps the most insoluble problem of the Middle East cold war. Meeting in Beirut, officials of the multi-group Palestine Liberation Organization hinted that they might be willing to take part in any discussion on peace. Shafiq Hout, the P.L.O.'s head for Lebanon, explained why there was a trend among the fedayeen organizations to move away from long-held demands for the restoration of all of pre-Israel Palestine. "If we say no to peace negotiations," Hout told TIME Correspondent Karsten Prager, "we're finished. We will have turned out to be great martyrs and lousy politicians."

That sense of Realpolitik was the reason why the Palestinians—except for George Habash's militantly Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine—may be willing to settle for a

new Palestinian nation, vintage 1973. It would include the West Bank of the Jordan River, the Gaza Strip and the Hemmeh region around Lake Tiberias in the panhandle between Syria, Israel and Jordan.

What about Israel and Palestine co-existing as neighbors? "Why not?" answered Hout. "The situation is no longer what it was before Oct. 6. In negotiation now, we will stand at an equal level. We can threaten to resume war. We can say no—which we could not do when they were still swimming in the Suez Canal. We can keep a settlement of the Palestine question open. Who knows? We might live next to one another, engage in peaceful competition, leave final settlements for another time, perhaps another generation."

Even if the Palestinian proposal becomes policy, major obstacles have to be overcome. One is King Hussein of Jordan. He is willing to give the Palestinians the West Bank and has suggested that Gaza might also be included, but only under a federation subservient to his monarchy in international and financial affairs. Another is Mrs. Meir, who once said that "there was no such thing as Palestinians. They did not exist," and warned that Israel would not allow an independent Palestinian nation on its flanks.

The Beirut declaration, however, was at least a start on the long road to peace. So were Mrs. Meir's discussions in Washington and the Egyptian moves. In the meantime, nagging and possibly dangerous details remain to be settled. For a beginning, the cease-fire lines have to be drawn. A place for long-range negotiations has to be selected, although by last week everybody's choice seemed to be Geneva. The representatives who will sit around the table must be chosen. With memories of the squabbles over the shape of the conference table that preceded the Viet Nam peace negotiations in Paris, U.S. diplomats, at least, could only be horrified at the thought of seating perhaps a dozen delinquencies instead of only four.

**Evaporating Optimism.** Before peace can succeed, however, there has to be optimism, and at week's end some of that seemed to be evaporating. President Sadat made a hurried trip to Kuwait in company with Syria's President Hafez Assad and stopped off on his way back to Cairo for discussions in Saudi Arabia. Sadat was angry over the Israelis' continued presence on the west bank of the canal in what he feels is defiance of the original cease-fire provisions. Nighttime blackouts were ordered again in the Egyptian capital. Wrote Editor Mohammed Hassanein Heikal of the influential Cairo newspaper *Al Ahram*: "I find a return to war more probable than going to a peace conference." The various moves could, of course, simply be posturing on the part of the Arabs. But after the events of the past month in the Middle East, no one could ever be sure of that again.

DAVID RUBINGER

ISRAELI PREMIER GOLDA MEIR
"Where's my father?"

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

23

## "Good Thing, This Cease-Fire"

By the middle of last week, 791 Swedes, Finns, Irishmen and Austrians from the United Nations peace-keeping force in Cyprus had picked their way through heavily mined areas to positions between the Egyptian and Israeli armies along the Suez Canal. The first and most difficult objective of this vanguard of what is expected to be a 7,000-man United Nations Emergency Force was to locate the cease-fire line on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Last week TIME Correspondent Marlin Levin visited the U.N. forces and sent this report:

Just north of Great Bitter Lake, a U.N. station wagon drove up to a military police checkpoint. Vast clouds of dust, churned up by tank trailers, had all but obscured the "U.N." that had been painted on the once white vehicle. An Irish officer in a powder-blue beret shook his head. "How can we fix the lines as they were on Oct. 22 [the day of the first Security Council truce]? None of us were here then. We don't know where the parties were, and you can't believe either side. Our business now is to try to keep it from starting up again."

Before the war began, the captain had been stationed at one of the U.N. observer posts along the canal. "Now my post is mobile," he said with a grin. "We have six patrols moving up and down the canal." In the back of the vehicle were a couple of days' rations of food and water, and bedding for him and two fellow officers.

**Fruit and Cologne.** About 20 miles inside Egypt on a barren ridge, we passed an unshaven Israeli artillery sergeant sitting in a ditch eating sardines and fresh tomatoes. "Good thing, this cease-fire," he said. "Just so it doesn't cease." On a parallel road to the south, a grisly Israeli soldier flagged us down. The smell of corpses was heavy in the air. Just beyond us was Kilometer 101, where Israeli and Egyptian generals had met under the protective cloak of the U.N. An Israeli officer told us: "Both sides want this cease-fire to work. The other day an Egyptian general turned over to us some of his own men who had sneaked through our lines because he feared that the arrangements for supplying the Third Army would break down if he didn't."

Relations between the Israelis and the Egyptians at Kilometer 101 were described by a U.N. man as "good." At that point in the wilderness, the trucks carrying relief supplies for the remnant of the Third Army, which is surrounded on the east bank, move into Israeli-held territory. We saw an example of the little courtesies that hostile army officers sometimes allow one another

when battles have ended. An Israeli officer passed out some fresh fruit; an Egyptian reciprocated with eau de cologne. The Egyptian told his Israeli counterpart: "Since no one really knows who won this war, the chances for peace are much better than ever." The Israeli nodded.

Sand-colored five-ton Egyptian trucks with relief supplies from Cairo for the Third Army lumbered past Kilometer 101 into Israeli-held territory in

the direction of the city of Suez. The drivers were U.N. noncommissioned officers. About ten miles north of Suez, a truck with cartons of food and cigarettes had arrived at U.N. observation post Kilo—a collection of whitewashed shacks on the edge of the canal. There we talked with Vienna-born Joseph Nekhan, 27, a first lieutenant in an Austrian tank battalion who had been seconded to the U.N. Emergency Force. Below him, Egyptian soldiers in beige work clothes carried cartons from the trucks to a makeshift wharf. Israeli officers spot-checked the boxes for contraband by occasionally ripping open a

package of sweets or a carton of cigarettes. The Egyptians then put the cartons on Russian-made amphibious tanks that churned slowly across the canal to the east side where they were unloaded. The process was slow and laborious.

"It's going much better now," said Nekhan. "When we came here on Sunday with the first truck, we were not sure how to make contact with the Egyptians across the canal. So we raised our U.N. flag, took a bullhorn and started calling them in English, Russian, German, Arabic and French. We got no response until we spoke in French. We shouted, 'This is the U.N. We have supplies to deliver. We have water for you.' When we said water in French we got a reply. That was the key word.

"My orders," said the lieutenant, "are to keep things going. Only if there is a dispute do I try to help. The other night there was some shooting near by from the Arab side. The Egyptians were disturbed because the Israelis kept shooting flares over the positions all night. We got them both to stop."

"Peace Boulevard." The mood was starkly different in Suez itself. The Israelis hold three quarters of the port city. The residential quarters remain in Egyptian hands, but the port, the oil refineries and the suburbs are occupied by Israeli troops. On all the main boulevards leading from Ismailia down into the port city, there was evidence of bitter fighting. Whole blocks of apartment buildings have been destroyed. Many of them still contained bodies. Part way down the main street, now nicknamed "Peace Boulevard," two burned-out Egyptian trucks blocked the road. On one side were Israeli troops, some of them carrying captured Russian-made Kalashnikov rifles. Twenty yards across the street were Egyptians, some of them with captured Uzi submachine guns from Israel. The troops on either side leered at one another but so far had made no move to shoot.

At a point exactly midway between the two sides in the street, U.N. observers had set up a table. "No one goes beyond this table except us," said a U.N. officer. Three Finnish soldiers wearing newly painted blue helmets and carrying Belgian FN rifles marched stiffly up and down. Overhead, an Israeli Mirage appeared and swiftly disappeared. Two Egyptian missiles fired and missed, leaving white puffs of smoke in the cloudless azure sky.

So far, the U.N. men have had little more to do than report violations and arrange "local agreements." Said the officer: "In one spot some Arabs tried to move forward, and the Israelis threatened to shoot. But the Arabs merely wanted to remove some dead bodies. When we explained it to the Israelis, they permitted it. We've been able to help Arab farmers get some stray cattle back across the lines. And we've caught local commanders trying to improve the lines. On the whole, both sides are cooperating."

24

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

SIMON PIETRI—STOCK

SOVIET-BUILT SA-6 ANTIAIRCRAFT MISSILE ON EGYPTIAN TRUCK, CAPTURED BY ISRAELIS NEAR GREAT BITTER LAKE

A Battlefield Post-Mortem

Every war undergoes an autopsy. Even before the last guns are silenced, military experts start examining each thrust, parry and feint of the armies on the battlefields, hoping to discover a yet unknown tactic or a new strategic wrinkle. Post-mortems on the latest Middle East war have begun. Computers at NATO's Brussels headquarters, for example, are being fed data from the war that, according to a NATO spokesman, will "test whether the battle effectiveness of some weapons has changed."

Some basic questions have already been raised by experts about conventional ideas of how to deploy armor and airpower on the battlefield. Ian Smart, deputy director of Britain's Royal Institute of International Affairs, notes that "Soviet technology in Arab hands has consigned to history" an era in which the "tank and aircraft ruled the battlefield." The introduction of new highly mobile and simply operated antiaircraft and antitank missiles, Smart argues, "marks a transformation that recalls the way in which the longbow enabled the English foot soldier of the 14th century to overcome the mounted knight. The Arab guiding his Snapper [antitank missile] to destroy a 50-ton tank has been refighting the Battle of Crécy." Indeed, for the first time since 1916, when the tank made its combat debut in the Battle of the Somme, a single infantryman armed with an antitank guided weapon was potentially an equal match for the armor-plated behemoth.

**Universal Lessons.** This could have enormous implications for NATO. The alliance calculates the balance of strength between itself and the Warsaw Pact nations largely in terms of tanks and aircraft. NATO does not seem to have paid as much attention to antitank missiles as has the U.S.S.R. Moreover, it has generally regarded surface-to-air missiles as primarily defensive weapons.

The Egyptian thrust across the Suez Canal demonstrated that these missiles can also play an offensive role, enabling an attacking force to establish and hold a beachhead. With the extremely mobile SA-6, beachheads can be expanded by slowly moving the missiles forward, thus increasing the area protected from aerial assault by their umbrella.

Other military experts caution against drawing universal lessons from the war too quickly. Moreover, experts note that advances in weapons technology trigger the development of countermeasures that eventually neutralize the original advantages.

American engineers are already dissecting and studying a Soviet SA-6 antiaircraft missile that was captured intact by the Israelis. Presumably, they will soon be able to develop electronic devices to confuse that missile's targeting mechanism—just as they did with the Soviet SA-2 and SA-3 missiles after U.S. pilots encountered them over North Viet Nam.

An electronic antidote may also be found for the new antitank missiles. One U.S. Army systems analyst insists that missiles will no more make the tank obsolete than the invention of the machine gun made the infantryman obsolete. The mechanized unit, which includes tanks, will still be needed to provide armies with speed, firepower and shock action on the ground. "The stakes of armored warfare have merely been raised," this analyst adds. "It will just be a lot more bloody than before."

British tactical experts note that the most likely battlefield for any NATO-Warsaw Pact clash would be the northern part of Germany—a region plagued by terrible weather and heavy clouds. The climate would make it very difficult to employ the umbrella-like missile cover for troops that the Egyptians used so successfully to protect their Sinai

beachhead. The new Soviet antitank weapons, which rely on a steering mechanism controlled by a soldier who can see his target, would be less effective on the hilly terrain of Central Europe—which provides natural cover for tanks—than it was on the wide-open stretches of the Sinai desert.

Perhaps the most important military lessons of the war are those reconfirming several orthodox maxims:

* Overconfidence can be an army's own worst enemy. A retired Israeli major general, Matityahu Peled, admitted that "Israel was afflicted by an infirmity derived from an overconfidence from laurel wreaths from the past."

* The best military intelligence is no guarantee against a surprise attack. (Reason: it is easier to measure a foe's capabilities than his intentions.)

* Once a surprise attack is launched, a strategic buffer zone, like the Sinai, enables a nation to abandon its first line of defense (e.g., Israel's Bar-Lev Line) without exposing its major population centers to danger.

But possibly the most significant lesson was that demonstrated by the massive resupply efforts undertaken by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. They proved that an efficient logistics system is the backbone of any sustained conflict. America's airlift capacity showed itself able, on very short notice, to mount an intercontinental round-the-clock schedule.

**No Substitute.** Finally, there is the lesson to be learned from the Egyptians' failure to exploit their initial advantage in the Sinai by pushing out from their beachhead toward the Mitla Pass, and the Israelis' consequent success in discovering and punching through a soft spot in enemy lines to open a front on the west bank of the Suez Canal. Despite advances in electronics and weapons technology, there is, finally, no substitute for officers who can take advantage of unexpected battlefield opportunities by improvising new tactics.

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

25

ASIA

Honorable Settlement

In a face-saving deal likely to raise
incredulous eyebrows in both countries,
South Korea and Japan last week moved
to bury the affair of Kim Dae Jung. The
case involved the leading opposition
spokesman, whose abduction from a To-
kyo hotel room had been eroding ties be-
tween the two countries for the past
three months.

After a week of intensive negotia-
tions, South Korea dispatched Prime
Minister Kim Jong Pil to Japan to bow
and offer an apology for the kidnaping to
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. Under
the terms of the compromise, the gov-
ernment of President Chung Hee Park
conceded that the chief "suspect" in the
kidnaping was Kim Dong Woon, the
former first secretary of the Korean em-
bassy in Tokyo and a suspected agent of
South Korea's Central Intelligence
Agency. South Korea, though, insisted
that whatever Kim Dong Woon might
have done was not in any way an official
act, but entirely private. That distinction
was essential to the compromise. The

government of Prime Minister Tanaka
had stated earlier that Japanese sover-
eignty would have been violated only if
it turned out that the kidnaping was an
"official" act of the Seoul government.

As for Kim Dae Jung, Korea's For-
eign Minister said that he had been freed
from protective custody in Seoul. South
Korea would waive any action against
Kim for past activities if he did not re-
peat his "crimes"—presumably public
opposition to the Park regime.

Passing Blame. The deal reflected
the eagerness of both governments to
end the affair, if only for economic rea-
sons. The South Koreans are heavily de-
pendent on the Japanese economically,
while the Japanese were getting jittery
about their vast investments ($350 mil-
lion) in South Korea, which are now
greater than those of the U.S. The set-
tlement cleared the way for a long-
delayed ministerial conference to decide
on new Japanese aid commitments.
Moreover, it allowed the Park regime
to pass the blame to an expendable un-
derling, and permitted the Japanese
government to find "cause for congrat-
ulation" that "the victim of the crime
has regained his freedom."

PRESIDENT DIEM

FRANÇOIS SULLY

RICHARD STACK

MOURNERS AT ANNIVERSARY MEMORIAL

The Curious Rehabilitation of Diem

Ten years after his murder in a
bloody military coup, the memory of
South Viet Nam's President Ngo
Dinh Diem last week stirred a cu-
rious nostalgia in Saigon. About 3,000
Diem supporters marched to the
city's Victorian cathedral to attend
a memorial service, then moved on
to a nearby cemetery where Diem lies
buried under an inconspicuous con-
crete slab. Gongs tolled. Drums
thumped. Buddhist monks intoned
prayers. Two Catholic bands played
the national anthem.

President Nguyen Van Thieu,
who had backed Diem's overthrow,
helped defray the costs of the com-
memoration with a $1,000 contribu-
tion, presumably in hopes of using
the incipient Diem cult to solidify
non-Communist ranks within the
country. He is in no danger of being
overthrown as Diem was. But grow-
ing economic problems at home,
along with the continuing threat of
a North Vietnamese military offen-
sive, mean Thieu needs all the help
he can get.

THAILAND

The Caretaker Premier

"I still feel as if I'm dreaming," said Thailand's Premier Sanya Dharmasakti last week. "Give me some time so I can wake up." Sanya's bewilderment was understandable. Three weeks ago, he was hastily installed in the Premier's vacant seat when a revolt of Thai students (TIME, Oct. 29) prompted King Bhumibol Adulyadej to oust and exile General Thanom Kittikachorn, General Praphas Charusathiara and Colonel Narong Kittikachorn—the unpopular military trio that had ruled Thailand. Like most of his countrymen, Sanya, formerly rector of Thammasat University, has only gradually recovered from the shock of that brief revolution, which saw scores of Thai students gunned down in the streets of Bangkok by government security forces.

Well aware that he heads merely a
caretaker government, Sanya waited un-
til last week before taking any kind of
decisive action. To the delight of the
populace, he froze the assets of the three
exiled officers and began a probe of their
extensive real estate holdings and myr-
iad bank accounts. Most of the new Pre-
mier's activity, though, has been less
dramatic—directing the planning of a
new constitution for the country and the
elections that he has promised to hold
within nine months.

**Cautious Pace.** Drafting a consti-
tution—a task Sanya has entrusted to a
broad-based committee of judges, law-
yers and law professors—will not be all
that easy. Any new political charter
must assign an important role to its very
popular King, even though Bhumibol
desires little political power. The King
has hinted that he is even uncomfortable
about the role he was forced to play in
ousting the former leaders. A new con-
stitution must not only exclude the mil-
itary from politics but must also create a
government so stable that the military
will not be tempted to overthrow it. The
members of the new national Parlia-
ment must be selected in a way that will
not confuse the politically unsophisticat-
ed peasantry. Above all, the constitution
must find some method of preventing
the growth of dozens of factions and
splinter groups, which paralyzed Thai-
land's previous attempts at parliamenta-
ry government.

Sanya's cautious pace and his con-
centration on the constitution have ir-
ritated Bangkok's newspapers. Now that
they have complete freedom, they have
become vocal and critical. The papers
have chided the Premier for doing little
to help Thailand's sluggish economy,
curb soaring inflation and eliminate
rampant corruption. The English-lan-
guage Bangkok *Post* complained that in
slum areas of the capital, police services
have deteriorated so badly that "robbery
and violence are at a level which
can only remind one of New York and
Chicago."

26

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

## CANADA

### Non to Separatism

THAILAND'S PREMIER SANYA

Time to wake up.

The students voice a different complaint. They worry that Sanya, a gentle, scholarly Buddhist who studied law in London, may not be able to keep the ambitious young Narong from returning to power. Leaders of the twelve-man executive of the National Student Center of Thailand, which organized most of the demonstrations against the Thanom regime, are so afraid of reprisals from the military that they sleep in a different house each night. Explained one student leader: "Colonel Narong still has his followers. We don't want to go out in the dark night alone." There were so many rumors that the ousted leaders were about to return that Defense Minister Dawee Chuliasapya had to refute them at a press conference: "Are you really afraid of them? Why be afraid of two or three people when demonstrations can be staged by huge waves of people?"

**Low Profile.** Despite the fears of a possible military coup, the students still remain solidly committed to Sanya. "We must give the government time to work," observed Prasarn Triratvorakul, a Student Center leader. Because three university rectors and one dean now sit in the Cabinet, the students have an unprecedented line of communication into the new government. This easy access seems to overwhelm some of them who prefer a lower profile. Reflecting the modesty and caution that marked the students' revolution, Prasarn remarked: "We are being listened to. But if our ideas get too radical, then the government should stop listening. We don't want the government to recognize us too much."

"This will be the most important election in Canada's history," declared Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa. Hyperbole aside, last week's Quebec elections did involve something less parochial than the issues that normally dominate the politics of provincial Canada. At stake: whether Quebec would remain in the Canadian confederation or opt out.

When the returns were in, Bourassa's Liberal Party had buried the separatist opposition, winning 102 out of 110 seats in the assembly. Despite the landslide, the separatist Parti Québécois did score a victory of sorts. By winning six seats, it became the official opposition in the assembly and gained about 30% of the total popular vote.

Secession from predominantly English-speaking Canada—or separatism—has been an issue in Quebec for more than two centuries. But only in the past decade has it emerged as a potent political force. In the 1970 election, the péquistes (for the initials P.Q. in Parti Québécois) won 23.7% of the vote and seven seats in the assembly. In 1970 a separatist terror organization called the Front de Libération du Québec (F.L.Q.) kidnaped the British trade commissioner and murdered Pierre Laporte, the Liberal Party's Labor Minister. Ottawa's response was blunt: it imposed near martial law under the War Measures Act, and the Montreal streets were patrolled by helmeted troops.

Although the F.L.Q. violence diminished after the government crackdown, separatism—and the problems that gave it birth—remained. Many French-speaking Quebeckers still saw themselves as what Separatist Theoretician Pierre Vallières acidly calls "the white niggers of Canada." They are still paid

less than English-speaking Canadians, in a province whose economy is controlled by English interests.

Since 1968, the Parti Québécois has been led by René Lévesque, 51, a brilliant journalist who left the Liberals because of their strong support of federalism. Although the péquistes enlisted an impressive array of French-Canadian intellectuals as assembly candidates, the momentum of the campaign gradually swung to the Liberals, whose slogan, *Bourassa construit* (Bourassa builds), was a not too veiled hint that Lévesque destroys.

**Sigh of Relief.** Separatism, warned Bourassa, would force Quebec to create a new currency, which would immediately lose value in relation to the Canadian dollar. This was the single most devastating attack against the Parti Québécois. The Liberals were also helped by their undeniably good economic record. In Bourassa's 3½ years as Premier, his government had created a vast social welfare program—including free medical and dental care—without raising taxes. New industries were blossoming, and unemployment had dropped from 10% to less than 6%.

Outside Quebec, politicians, regardless of party affiliation, heaved a sigh of relief when returns indicated a resounding defeat for the Parti Québécois. Said a satisfied Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who heads the national Liberal Party: "Quebeckers prefer Canada to separatism."

Shaken by the margin of their defeat—they had expected to win at least 20 seats—Parti Québécois leaders last week locked themselves into a series of strategy meetings as they tried to determine where they can go from here. "There will always be a next time," said Lévesque before a crowd of weeping party members on election night. But then he added morosely: "I don't know when and I don't know how."

UPI

BOURASSA & DAUGHTER MICHELLE

A resounding defeat meant a victory of sorts.

CP

LÉVESQUE & WEEPING SUPPORTER

TIME, NOVEMBER 12, 1973

27

## An Editorial

# The President Should Resign

Richard Nixon and the nation have passed a tragic point of no return. It now seems likely that the President will have to give up his office: he has irredeemably lost his moral authority, the confidence of most of the country, and therefore his ability to govern effectively.

The most important decision of Richard Nixon's remarkable career is before him: whether he will give up the presidency rather than do further damage to his country. If he decides to fight to the end, he faces impeachment by the House, for he has indeed failed his obligation under the Constitution to uphold the law. Whether two-thirds of the Senate would vote to convict him cannot be certain. But even if he were to be acquitted, the process would leave him and the country devastated. Events have achieved an alarming momentum; additional facts that would be brought out under subpoena power at an impeachment trial could strike in many unforeseen and dangerous directions.

Moreover, a trial would take at least several months, during which the country would be virtually leaderless. The White House would be paralyzed while the U.S. and the world awaited the outcome. The Republic would doubtless survive. But the wise and patriotic course is for Richard Nixon to resign, sparing the country and himself this agony.

Nixon should of course be succeeded by a Republican. The Republicans did win the presidency last November (not because of Watergate or dirty tricks), and fortunately there seems no disposition among congressional Democrats to try to rewrite the election returns. We assume and hope that Congress will speedily confirm Gerald Ford's nomination as Vice President. If Nixon did leave office before this confirmation and Speaker Carl Albert became President, there is good reason to think that Albert would resign as long as Ford was confirmed.

Gerald Ford would be an unmistakable improvement over the grievously wounded Nixon. Barring some unforeseen revelations, Ford has the immense asset of a corruption-free reputation. He has a solid if unimaginative record in domestic policy, stands somewhere near the American center, and is greatly liked and respected on Capitol Hill. In foreign affairs, he is obviously inexperienced, but other Presidents have risen above such limitations, as the example of Harry Truman demonstrates. With Henry Kissinger's help, Ford should be able to carry on the basically sound Nixon policies. He would have one overriding advantage in dealing with foreign powers: their certainty that Ford would be in the White House for at least three more years. Nixon's great skills in foreign affairs are now alarmingly offset by the uncertainties about his future and his patent loss of power at home.

It was just one year ago this week that Richard Nixon was celebrating his fabulous electoral sweep and seemed to stand at the very summit of power and opportunity. Hard-core Nixon haters may gloat over his fall from those heights; for most Americans it is a matter of profound disappointment. The editors of Time Inc., speaking on the editorial page of TIME's sister publication LIFE, have endorsed Nixon for President three times, in 1960, 1968 and 1972. We did so with acknowledgments that aspects of the Nixon record and temperament were troubling, but we believed that his strengths of intellect and experience and his instinct for political leadership equipped him well for the office. In endorsing Nixon in 1972, following on his first-term achievements in foreign policy, we expressed a hope that by the end of his second term we could "salute him as a great President." Thus we come with deep reluctance to our conclusion that he must leave office. We consider the situation so unprecedented, the issue so crucial to the country, that we publish this first editorial in TIME's 50-year history.

In the almost daily rush of revelations, it is not easy for the numbed citizen to keep in mind the full enormity of "Watergate."

Despite ample instances of past Government corruption, nothing can be found in U.S. history even remotely approaching the罪 of events that the word Watergate no longer defines or contains. A Vice President, twice personally chosen by Nixon, forced to resign to escape jail. A former Attorney General and intimate adviser to Nixon under indictment. Another former Cabinet member under indictment. One of the two most powerful presidential aides under indictment. Six other White House aides or Administration officials indicted, convicted or having pleaded guilty; seven more fired or resigned. Most of them shown to have been either in charge of, or aware of, illegal operations. The whole White House pervaded by an atmosphere of aggressive amorality—amorality almost raised to a creed. A ruthless determination to hide as much of this as possible from the public and investigators.

The question that once seemed so important—Did the President know about the cover-up?—was always somewhat beside the point. Whatever he knew or did not know, he must be held accountable for the actions of his top aides and the standards he established. To the extent that the question had meaning, it was almost impossible from the start to answer it in the President's favor: the men involved were too close to him to make his ignorance plausible; after initial indignant denials, each of his later explanations gradually admitted more knowledge, thereby conceding each previous explanation to have been at least partly false. One cannot think of any organization, public or private—including some dictatorships—where a Chief Executive could survive in office after such a performance.

The catalogue of the President's involvement in illegal or grossly improper acts has become all too familiar. He approved the so-called Huston plan, which permitted illegal means (including burglary) to combat radicals. He established the "plumbers" unit, ostensibly to plug leaks, and it used illegal methods (wiretaps, forgery) to embarrass or spy on political foes. He impeded an investigation of the plumbers on specious national-security grounds while his aides tried to use the CIA and FBI to help the cover-up. He had a job offer (chief of the FBI) dangled before the judge presiding over the trial of Daniel Ellsberg. He withheld knowledge of the Ellsberg-psychiatrist burglary from that judge for at least a month. His aides offered Executive clemency to some of the Watergate defendants; others, including his personal lawyer, used campaign contributions for payments to Watergate defendants.

President Nixon's most recent actions come as a staggering climax to all that went before. We devoutly hope that it is the climax. When he originally refused to hand over the White House tapes either to the Senate Watergate committee or to Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox, his argument for the confidentiality of the President's deliberations certainly deserved consideration. Then the court narrowed the issue in such a way that confidentiality could be largely safeguarded: only the judge was to hear the tapes, and only for the purpose of deciding whether any parts were potential evidence in the cases arising from Watergate. If the President had wanted to contest this ruling, he had a clear opportunity to have the matter settled in the Supreme Court, by whose decision he had earlier said that he would abide.

Instead, the President and his lawyer worked out the "compromise" under which summaries would be provided (they would not hold up as evidence in court), and Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox was to be forbidden any further recourse to the courts in seeking presidential papers. Cox sensibly refused, and was promptly fired in flagrant violation of the President's pledge to the Senate, through then-Attorney General-designate Richardson, that Cox would be independent and could be dismissed only for gross improprieties. That brought on the resignation of Richardson and the dismissal of his principal assistant, honorable men

Top of the Week

Nixon with Egypt's Fahmi...and Israel's Meir

Mideast Maneuvering PAGE 11

From bloody battle, the Mideast conflict was trans-
formed into a furious diplomatic struggle last week.
In rapid succession, Egypt's Ismali Fahmi and Israel's
Golda Meir flew to Washington to argue the positions
of their governments. Richard Steele wrote the cover
story and Richard M. Smith, Milton R. Benjamin and
Contributing Editor Olivier Todd added companion
pieces. (Cover photo by Wally McNamee—Newsweek.)

Transatlantic Quarrel PAGE 19

According to conventional wisdom, allies are sup-
posed to pull together in the face of a common crisis.
But the Mideast conflict has brought only accusations

and recriminations between the U.S. and Europe. With
files from Peter R. Webb in London, Scott Sullivan in
Paris, Milan J. Kubic in Bonn and Bruce van Voorst
in Washington, Associate Editor Faye Willey examines
the disarray in the Atlantic Alliance.

Watergate Goes On—and On PAGE 26

It began as a week of fence-mending for the U.S.
Administration as President Nixon selected a new At-
torney General and another special prosecutor for the
Watergate scandals. But the calm was shattered when
the White House disclosed that two of the crucial
Watergate tapes had never existed. With files from
the Washington bureau, Peter Goldman reports.

Dressing Up PAGE 47

This week's Life and Leisure section deals with two completely opposite ends of the women's-fashion spectrum. With reports from the salons of the haute couture, Associate Editor Merrill Sheils discusses the old-fashioned "baggy look" of the new spring designs from Paris. In a more casual mode, Associate Editor Lynn Young describes the latest fad in the

United States: jazzed-up T shirts encrusted with rhine-
stones and high-priced blue jeans decked out in flashy
sequined patterns.

Studded jeans

View From the Kremlin PAGE 48

If Anatolii Gromyko's recently published account of
John F. Kennedy's Presidency is any guide, the "era
of détente" has done little to correct Soviet miscon-
ceptions about American society. Associate Editor An-
drew Nagorski examines the book, the stunned re-
views it has drawn in the U.S. and the questions it
raises about the future of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Contents

November 12, 1973

SPECIAL REPORT 11

*   Putting on the pressure for peace (the cover)

Redrawing the Mideast map—again
Israel's winners, losers and scapegoats

ASIA 15
The Indian Ocean: superpowers at sea
South Korea:

A house arrest ends
A talk with Kim Dae Jung
Vietnam: rekindling the fires of war
Japan: charity begins abroad—and pays

WORLD AFFAIRS 18
Perón's' purge of the left
The return of a sacred statue
Quebec's "non" to separatism

EUROPE 19
Division in the Atlantic alliance
The oil embargo hits Holland
Great Britain:

Roy Jenkins returns
Probing politicians' psyches
Home rule for Scotland and Wales?
Ireland: the Mountjoy airlift

U.S. AFFAIRS 26
Nixon and the missing tapes-what next?
ITT again-and other scandals

Senator Gurney under fire
The new White House special prosecutor
Maverick Saxbe
Gerald Ford's winning performance
A tough job for Judiciary

BUSINESS AND FINANCE 38
The worsening energy crisis
Flight cutbacks—blessing in disguise?
Coal—black ace in the hole
The economy: two bright notes
Japan:
A yen to buy
Honda's founder steps down
The pause in U.S.-Soviet trade

JUSTICE 46
Son of the Chicago Seven

LIFE AND LEISURE. 47
Fashion's old-new baggy look
Jeans are getting high and stoned

IDEAS 48
The debate over Gromyko's book

SCIENCE 54
A comet's coming

THE ARTS 45
"The Iceman Cometh": majestic

BOOKS 52
"Portrait of a Marriage," by Nigel Nicolson
"Burr: a Novel," by Gore Vidal

ART 53
Modernism at the National—too late
Breakthrough for the male nude

MUSIC 55
Four faces of The Who's Jimmy
Dancers from Utah

OTHER DEPARTMENTS 5
Letters 5
New Products and Processes 6
Periscope 9
Newsmakers 24
Transition 25
International Marketplace 37
Worldwide Stocks 43
Interview: Michel Oksenberg 56

THE COLUMNISTS 10
Stewart Alsop 10
Olivier Todd 22
Kermit Lansner 36
Henry C. Wallich 43

© 1973 by Newsweek, Inc., 444 Madison Ave-
nue, New York, N.Y. 10022. All rights reserved.

Newsweek, November 12, 1973

3

SPECIAL REPORT

# The Cloud Behind the Silver Lining

She arrived in Washington a tired and worried woman, thrust into what one confidant called “the encounter of her life.” Her country stood at a particularly perilous moment in its embattled history and her only powerful ally was showing signs of backing away from total commitment. Yet when Israel’s Prime Minister Golda Meir emerged last week from talks with President Nixon she acknowledged no clouds, only silver linings. She scoffed at the suggestion that the U.S. had put pressure on Israel to make concessions to the Arabs and she insisted that “the friendly relations between the two governments will be enhanced and grow.” But for all Mrs. Meir’s public confidence, the fact was that the U.S. and Israel were on the brink of a historic rift last week —and that the Mideast might be on the verge of yet another deadly blowup.

The strain on the American-Israeli relationship was impressive. The nation that had been Israel's military as well as moral guarantor suddenly appeared to be courting the Arabs. A special emissary from Egypt was accorded the full V.I.P. treatment by the White House, and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was delegated to fly off on a diplomatic mission to five Arab capitals. Rumors flew that the U.S. and the Soviet Union had struck a secret bargain and would present the Israelis with a peace offer they would not like—but could not very well refuse. And America's commonality of interest with Israel seemed all at once to clash with other U.S. interests—in Western Europe, in Arab oil fields and in the Kremlin.

Trying to reconcile those conflicting interests on the eve of his departure for the Mideast, Kissinger plunged into an eleventh-hour round of talks with the two belligerents. But, one high-ranking Administration official told *NEWSWEEK*, Kissinger ran into stone walls. "It is going so badly," the official said, "that I think we will have another explosion." Asked whether he meant that he foresaw a new outbreak of Mideast fighting, he replied ominously: "It may have broader scope—and we will all have to bear the responsibility." That appeared to be a hint that Mr. Nixon's aides still feared that the Soviets might take advantage of the President's domestic troubles to provoke a superpower confrontation.

Confrontation and contretemps characterized the diplomatic circuit last week. Indeed, on several occasions it appeared that the U.S. was angry—or at least annoyed—with everyone. After testifying at a closed session of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Kissinger reportedly snarled that he was “disgusted” with the position taken by America’s NATO allies during the Mideast crisis (page 19). And there was little question that the crisis had revived a certain

amount of animosity between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

At the United Nations, U.S. Ambassador John Scali wrangled bitterly with Soviet envoy Yakov Malik over Moscow's insistence that Warsaw Pact troops be included in the new Middle East peace force. In the end, the U.S. accepted Polish participation, but only in the form of "logistical support," not front-line duty.

Whatever the purpose of Washington's maneuvers vis-à-vis the Soviets, there was no denying that the White House had put unaccustomed and uncomfortable pressure on the government of Israel. After the first "cease-fire" during which Israel made key advances on Egyptian territory, the U.S. insisted that

the fighting stop before Israel could thoroughly rout its opponents. Then, the U.S. forced Israel to permit a relief convoy to resupply 20,000 men of the Egyptian Third Army, cut off and encircled on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Israel's Defense Minister Moshe Dayan acknowledged that only the U.S. threat to withhold military supplies persuaded Israel to let the convoy through. Said Dayan, "We had no choice."

Evidence of what Israelis began to

consider a U.S. tilt toward the Arabs escalated with the visit to Washington of Egypt's new Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy. A close adviser to Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, Fahmy met four times with Kissinger in talks that the U.S. glowingly described as "promising and productive." Fahmy's visit, said a State Department spokesman, "represents the beginning of discussion between ourselves and the Egyptians looking forward to find means to begin a negotiation." And if that were not enough, at the end of the talks between the Egyptian aide and Mr. Nixon, the President personally escorted Fahmy to his car and warmly shook his hand. Not to be outdone, Kissinger and Fahmy posed for photographers with their arms around each other's waists.

## 'There Is No Pressure'

Against that backdrop, Mrs. Meir began her own Washington talks—four with Kissinger and one with Mr. Nixon. She told a press conference that Mr. Nixon had “reassured” her that the U.S. would continue to support and protect Israel. And she said that the U.S. had not done any arm-twisting to force

Israel to make undue concessions. Reporters persistently brought up the subject of American pressure, until Mrs. Meir, with a trace of despair in her voice, finally insisted: "There is no pressure." Asked why, in that case, she found it necessary to hurry off to Washington, she replied simply: "Just to find out that there is no pressure."

Neither the U.S. nor Israel would give any details about the substance of Mrs. Meir's talks in Washington. But high-level Israeli officials admitted to *NEWSWEEK's* Michael Elkins that the first Meir-Kissinger talks "verged on the abrasive" as the Israeli leader sharply rejected what she interpreted as Washington's efforts to limit Israel's maneuver-

Mike Lien—New York Times

A White House salute for Mrs. Meir: Pressure point

Newsweek, November 12, 1973

11

Dally Mall-Pictorial

U.N. peace-keepers enter Suez: Overcoming roadblocks and harassment

ability. When Kissinger strongly urged
that Israel, as a preliminary concession,
permit establishment of a resupply cor-
ridor from Cairo to the Egyptian soldiers,
whom Israel cut off after the truce,
Mrs. Meir bristled. In what a knowl-
edgeable Israeli called "absolutely un-
equivocal" language, she came up with
a precondition of her own: the release
of Israeli prisoners of war. "The issue
of the Third Army," she is said to have
told Kissinger, "is very much second
to the issue of our boys. One issue is
simple decency and international law
and the other is an effort to help Sadat
out of the military mess he got himself
into by starting the war."

Leaning on the Israelis

For all the public insistence on both
sides that U.S.-Israeli relations were just
as cozy as always, the fact was that the
Administration had made it clear that
Israel was going to have to make some
compromises in the interests of a stable
Mideast peace. "We are leaning hard on
the Israelis," one high-ranking Adminis-
tration aide told NEWSWEEK'S Henry L.
Trewhitt. But he went on to add that the
talks were conducted in an atmosphere
of "tough realism but not acrimony." The
U.S., a senior official said, pressed hard
for Israel to agree to permit more ex-
tensive resupply of the stranded Third
Army, strongly called for Israeli with-
d withdrawal to the east bank of the Suez
Canal soon and pushed for movement by
Israel to spur peace talks. "We would
like the Israelis to be more positive about
giving up some of the territory occupied
in 1967 as a gesture toward permanent
peace," said one insider.

In part, Mrs. Meir's optimistic remarks
were designed to deflect growing crit-

icism at home that could threaten her
government's heretofore impregnable po-
litical position (page 14). But they were
also designed to ensure that Israel went
into any eventual negotiations with the
strongest possible bargaining position.
And, to a degree, claimed Israeli officials,
Mrs. Meir achieved that aim. Kissinger
flatly denied that the U.S. had reached
any secret covenants with Moscow, and
he told Mrs. Meir that Washington had
"no map to offer" to redraw Mideast
boundaries. (Kissinger and the Kremlin
did agree, however, that the talks
should be held under U.S.-Soviet aus-
pices, probably somewhere in Europe.)

Israeli officials reported that Washing-
ton gave Jerusalem a free hand in de-
veloping its negotiating tactics—stopping
short, for example, of demanding that
Israeli forces pull back to their positions
on the day of the first cease-fire or free
the trapped Egyptian forces. "It's a tre-
mendous card for bargaining with the
Arabs," said one informed Israeli official,
"and we are very happy that Washing-
ton understands this."

For their part, Egypt and its allies
were engaged in much the same kind of
maneuvering. Sadat met with Soviet First
Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznet-
sov (sent to Cairo to reassure the Egyp-
tians of Soviet support) and later in the
week journeyed to Kuwait to confer with
Syria's President Hafez Assad. In be-
tween, Sadat held his first press confer-
ence for the foreign media. It was a
carrot-and-stick affair: Sadat in one
breath praised the U.S. for its "construc-
tive" position on the Mideast conflict and
in the next threatened to renew the
fighting. He contended that his generals
wanted to resume the campaign against
Israel but said he was restraining them.

However, he warned, "if anything hap-
pens to my children on the east bank
[the Egyptian Third Army] I will take
the necessary action."

Whether that was a bluff or a promise
was impossible to tell. Even though Sa-
dat's army still had plenty of fight left
in it (and sufficient shipments of military
equipment coming in each day on the
Soviet airlift), there was only the most
sporadic military activity last week. But
that did not mean that the belligerents
were going all out for peaceful coopera-
tion, as NEWSWEEK'S Arnaud de Borch-
grave cabled from Cairo:

The first contingent of the United
Nations Emergency Force barreled down
the Cairo-to-Suez highway—and prompt-
ly began to run into one set of roadblocks
and harassments after another. Stopped
time and again by Israeli troops, the
frustrated U.N. peace-keepers eventually
decided they might as well return to
Cairo, only to be told that Israeli Defense
Minister Moshe Dayan would accompany
them as they set up observation posts
around the city of Suez.

Dayan never arrived—due to a spe-
cially called Cabinet meeting in Jerusa-
lem—but the Israelis eventually permit-
ted the U.N. observers to set up their
posts in the city and along the canal. The
U.N. team subsequently accomplished
what no one has been able to do since
1956—arrange a meeting at which rank-
ing representatives of Cairo and Jerusa-
lem could try to settle their differences.
In the midst of the desert, Egypt's Brig.
Gen. Adly El Sherif and Israel's Maj.
Gen. Aharon Yariv exchanged salutes.
"Two valiant armies have fought for
three weeks," Yariv declared. "Now let's
try to work out an honorable peace."

On-scene in Israeli-controlled territory
for that historic meeting was NEWSWEEK'S

Israeli greets Egyptian POW's

AP

Newsweek, November 12, 1973

12

SPECIAL REPORT

Nicholas C. Proffitt. As he reported:

It was 1:30 a.m. and the desert was
bathed in soft white starlight as the
Egyptian officers strode past double
strands of barbed wire that marked off a
few yards of no man's land on the west
bank of the Suez Canal. They continued
into Israeli-held territory, passing the
sign telling them that Cairo was exactly
101 kilometers to the west. There, by the
side of the desert road near a dry gully
called Wadi Al Jandalin, was a tent fly-

ing the blue and white Star of David, the
flag of Israel. And there, Egypt's Sherif
and Israel's Yariv discussed the resupply
of Egypt's Third Army. They reached a
general agreement after two hours, but
although Israel pledged to permit 125
supply-laden trucks through its lines,
only 25 trucks had been allowed to
reach the besieged soldiers after three
days of attempts. When I found one
group of sixteen trucks—carrying among
other supplies, desperately needed wa-
ter—halted at a checkpoint, I asked why

nothing was moving. "I'm under Israeli
orders," a U.N. driver told me. Just then
an Israeli officer walked up and his con-
versation with the driver—in English—
went like this: "I'm moving now," the
driver said. "No," replied the Israeli.
"You'll have to stop me with a gun," said
the driver. The Israeli answered, "Fine."

But while there were many ugly con-
frontations, there were encouraging mo-
ments as well. Israeli soldiers, demon-
strating that elusive bond that has always

REVISING THE MIDEAST MAP—AGAIN

Nowhere has the map changed as fre-
quently in the past 25 years as it
has in the Middle East. As the two su-
perpowers press Israel and her Arab
neighbors to negotiate one final altera-
tion, the rigid public statements of the
belligerents-filled with non-negotiables
-seem to leave no room for compromise.
But these are maximum positions, and
the big powers still hope that through
private negotiations (and even-more-
private arm twisting) a breakthrough can
be achieved. The map of a Middle East
settlement is still far from being drawn,
but last week some possible outlines
were beginning to emerge:

The Sinai: At a minimum, Israel in-
sists that the Sinai be demilitarized so
Egyptian bombers will never again be
only six minutes' flying time from Tel Aviv.
There is no realistic prospect that Israel
will be able to hold onto the Abu Rudeis
oil fields in the western Sinai. Israel will
probably be happy if the peace line is
drawn roughly from El Arish to Sharm
el Sheikh. This will let Israel push for-
ward its plan to build a major new port
just southwest of Gaza City, while re-
taining control over the Strait of Tiran

(and thus preventing Egypt from sealing off the port of Elath).

Egypt, for its part, is rigidly opposed
to a continued Israeli presence at Sharm
el Sheikh—but is believed willing to have
the city placed under international con-
trol for a generation. As part of an agree-
ment with Egypt, Israel wants guaran-
teed freedom of navigation in the Red
Sea, Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Aqaba—
and would like (but in a showdown
might not insist on) the right of its mer-
chant fleet to use a reopened Suez Canal.

Gaza and the West Bank: Jordan's
King Hussein advocates a Palestinian
state (perhaps in confederation with
Jordan) encompassing the Gaza Strip
and the West Bank of the Jordan River,
which would be linked by a narrow cor-
ridor through Israel. Israel is opposed to
the creation of a new nation in this area,
but this proposal would take some of the
Arab pressure off Israel to absorb hun-
dreds of thousands of Palestinian refu-
gees—many of whom still live in squalid
U.N.-operated refugee camps 25 years
after being driven from their homes.
Israel's Deputy Prime Minister Yigal
Allon has discussed a plan to restore most
of the West Bank (with its heavily pop-

ulated Arab towns) to Jordanian control
—while keeping for Israel a chain of
defensive strong points along the river
and a protective ring of urban settle-
ments around the Old City of Jerusalem.

**Golan Heights:** Since Israel regards
Syria as the least trustworthy of her Arab
neighbors, there appears to be no pos-
sibility of an Israeli withdrawal from the
Golan Heights, which would leave set-
tlements in the valley below once again
under the Syrian gun. The most Israel
might agree to is withdrawal to the
Golan ridgeline if the rest of the Heights
were totally demilitarized and turned
into a buffer zone under international
control.

**Jerusalem:** This is the one subject both
Israel and the Arabs discuss in absolute
terms. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir
vowed anew last week that "Jerusalem
will never again be divided," and she
firmly rejects the suggestion that Jerusa-
lem be made an international city. Arab
leaders are equally determined that East
Jerusalem must be restored to Arab
control. Diplomats believe the ultimate
compromise might leave Jerusalem a sin-
gle city with Israel controlling the mu-
nicipal government—but with Jordan or a
future Palestinian state having some
form of administrative jurisdiction over
the Muslim holy places.

Newsweek, November 12, 1973

13

in an effort to appease public opinion, Kim was surfaced in Seoul.

In the eyes of the South Korean Government, however, Kim remained a dangerous man: he had, after all, taken 46 per cent of the vote away from President Park Chung Hee in South Korea's last free election. Accordingly, while ostensibly searching for his kidnapers, the South Korean Government also put Kim under house arrest.

This succession of events should have taught Kim Dae Jung to expect the unexpected. But just in case he had not learned that lesson, the South Korean Government recently took the most unpredictable action of all; it withdrew the police cordon surrounding his house and left him a "free" man.

**Bargain:** As NEWSWEEK'S Tokyo bureau chief Bernard Krisher reconstructs it, Kim's liberation represented a face-saving bargain between the Japanese and Korean governments, both of whom had been urged to such a step by the U.S., which did not want to have its two best Asian allies in a state of open hostility. Briefly, the bargain called for South Korean Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil to personally deliver to Japan's Premier Kakuei Tanaka his "regrets" over the

kidnaping. It also obliged Seoul to fire an official of the South Korean Embassy in Tokyo whose fingerprints had been found at the abduction site.

For Korean strongman Park Chung Hee, these concessions were worthwhile because they produced an immediate thaw in the near-frozen relationship between Tokyo and Seoul. Korea depends heavily on Japanese investment and Kim's release clears the way for Japanese yen to start flowing into Korea again; it also will make possible the re-scheduling-possibly for next month-of a crucial Japanese-Korean economic conference which was postponed after Kim's abduction. And the move had political as well as economic benefits: it might mollify the restless Korean university students who have rallied behind Kim and should help to bolster Seoul's international image at a time when it is trying to rally votes to defeat a United Nations resolution aimed at removing U.N., i.e., U.S., troops from the country.

Not all Japanese were as pleased with the deal as Park was. The Tokyo press accused the Tanaka government of disregarding human rights when it failed to insist that Kim be guaranteed passage to a foreign country. "We have been cheat-

ed," cried the Asahi Shimbum-and Japanese officials do not deny the charges. For them, the deal was simply expedient. "We need Park," explained a government spokesman. "For us Korea is a good market for investment."

All but forgotten in this flurry of diplomatic maneuvers was the victim himself. Though Kim Dae Jung remains openly hostile to the Park government (box), he presumably bought his freedom by agreeing to restrict his political activities. What Kim would like to do, he now says, is to accept a fellowship to study at Harvard. Korean Government officials have told him he will be treated like any other citizen if he applies for a passport. That, however, is not necessarily an encouraging assurance.

## VIETNAM:

### The Fire Next Time

It rarely makes the front pages any more, but nine months after it was supposed to end, the Vietnam war rumbles relentlessly on. The fighting has been generally unspectacular, and there have been few significant changes in the leopard spots on the map. But since the so-called cease-fire went into effect in January, 50,000 Vietnamese have died in battle, and the political struggle that both sides were girding for last spring is virtually forgotten now. Instead, there are indications that the Communists are preparing to launch a major new military offensive-aimed directly at Saigon. The push is not expected before December at the earliest, and some sources think a general offensive may be months away. "But it's not a matter of if," a U.S. intelligence analyst said last week. "It's only a matter of when."

As a result of a massive buildup, the Communists are now believed by U.S. intelligence to be in a stronger military position in South Vietnam than at any time in the past decade. In recent weeks, intelligence sources say, Hanoi has sent 40,000 fresh troops into the south-many of them into Military Region III around Saigon. Hanoi has also been pouring in tanks, heavy artillery pieces and SAM-2 missiles-and has moved anti-aircraft regiments into Quang Tri Province, the A Shau Valley and the Tay Ninh area northwest of Saigon. U.S. analysts say the South Vietnamese Air Force would face the prospect of extremely heavy losses if called upon to attack these Communist base areas.

**Enlarged:** Perhaps even more significant, the Communists have dramatically improved their resupply situation. Intelligence sources report that the North Vietnamese have renovated and enlarged twelve former American airfields in areas of South Vietnam now under Communist control, and are also now able to resupply their forces by sea through the rebuilt port of Dong Ha. In addition, the North Vietnamese have erected more than 3,000 buildings for munitions storage

## A Talk With Kim Dae Jung

Last week, hours after his release from 71 days of house arrest, Kim Dae Jung granted an exclusive interview to Bernard Krisher. Below, highlights of their talk:

### ON KOREAN DEMOCRACY

I am convinced democracy in Korea has been decisively damaged. That is why I told my interrogators I would not modify my criticism of the government. The Korean people have a high level of education ... There is no basis for the assertion that we are not capable of managing democracy.

### ON PRESIDENT PARK

I am convinced that if President Park goes on ruling in the way he now is, it will be dangerous for ... the nation. But I am not seeking revenge on anyone, including Mr. Park.

### ON POLITICS

In Korea we have government but no politics. It's best not to engage in politics when no politics are allowed.

### ON THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT

If we try to compete with North Korea in dictatorship, we cannot hope to win, for we are amateurs and they are professionals. The North Koreans closed their borders because they did not want democracy to penetrate into their society. If we turned South Korea into a totalitarian state, our people would find no cause to fight

for this country in confrontation against the north and that would seriously weaken our security.

### ON DISSENT

As in the past, I am constantly faced with danger, but this does not prevent me from doing what I want to do. I have a strong conviction that as long as I do what is right for the nation, the people will support me.

Bernard Krisher—Newsweek

Kim: Not seeking revenge

16

Newsweek, November 12, 1973

Page Two

JEWISH OBSERVER AND MIDDLE EAST REVIEW

November 9, 1973

We can promise you a banquet
to remember.

The Heathrow is a brand-new luxury hotel.
But it's a brand-new luxury hotel with a
difference.

It has that very rare commodity: separate kosher
meat and milk kitchens.

Under the supervision of the Sephardi Kashrut
Authority, we can prepare an intimate party or a
banquet for 300.

But whatever the number, we can also promise
you two things:

1. Very comfortable surroundings.

2. Great Kosher food.

For reservations, or more details,
call Valerie Nead on 01-897 6363.

The Heathrow

A LEX HOTEL

One of the finest Kosher Kitchens in England. Or anywhere else.

["ISRAEL IS IN MOURNING THIS WEEK FOLLOWING THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT 1,854 MEN HAD BEEN KILLED IN ACTION AND 1,800 WOUNDED WERE STILL IN HOSPITAL. MANY BEREAVED RELATIVES, LIKE THE WOMEN ABOVE, FLOCKED TO THE WESTERN WALL IN JERUSALEM. ON WEDNESDAY, MEMORIAL SERVICES WERE HELD IN MILITARY CEMETE-RIES THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. ISRAEL RADIO'S ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE HEAVY SACRIFICES WAS FOLLOWED BY A READING OF DAVID'S LAMENT ON THE DEATH OF SAUL AND HIS SON JONATHAN :-", "The beauty of Israel is slain upon thy high places;\nhow are the mighty fallen!", "Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets\nof Askelon; lest the daughters of the Philistines\nrejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised\ntriumph.", "Ye mountains of Gilboa, let there be no dew,\nneither let there be rain, upon you, nor fields of\nofferings: for there the shield of the mighty is vilely\ncast away, the shield of Saul, as though he had not\nbeen anointed with oil.", "From the blood of the slain, from the fat of the\nmighty, the bow of Jonathan turned not back, and\nthe sword of Saul returned not empty.", "Saul and Jonathan were lovely and pleasant in\ntheir lives, and in their death they were not divided:\nthey were swifter than eagles, they were stronger\nthan lions.", "Ye daughters of Israel, weep over Saul, who\nclothed you in scarlet, with other delights, who put\non ornaments of gold upon your apparel.", "How are the mighty fallen in the midst of the\nbattle! O Jonathan, thou wast slain in thine high\nplaces.", "I am distressed for thee, my brother Jonathan:\nvery pleasant hast thou been unto me: thy love\nto me was wonderful, passing the love of women.", "How are the mighty fallen, and the weapons of\nwar perished!", "הצבי ישראל על במותיך חלל איך נפלו גבורים:", "אל תגידו בגת אל תבשרו בחוצת אשקלון פן תשמחה", "ôn\n\nón\n\nb\n\non\n\nb\n\non\n\nb\n\non\n\nb\n\non

Page Four

November 9, 1973

# CRISIS

## WHO WENT WHERE WHEN

### WEEK OF THE SUPERSONIC DIPLOMATS

*Jewish Observer reporters*

With renewed war seeming imminent at any moment, there has been a world-wide web of activity by diplomats. US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made the most spectacular trip of all. Already booked to visit Peking and Tokyo, he blazed a trail through Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

He took off on Monday after a week of intensive jawing in Washington with Israeli Premier Golda Meir, Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy and Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Zakaria. By the time Kissinger hit the Middle East, Mrs. Meir and Fahmy were already back home.

Russia also had a diplomat in orbit. While Mrs. Meir was in the US, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov, who has long been Moscow's top trouble-shooter, spent four days in Cairo before proceeding on Saturday to Damascus.

**Rumanian opportunity:** Meanwhile, both Israel and Egypt sent out new emissaries in different directions. Dr. Mohammed Hassan al-Zayyat, transformed overnight from Foreign Min-

ister into Presidential Adviser, was sent to France and Britain to encourage those countries not to waver from their pro-Arab stance. Zayyat saw Premier Edward Heath in London on Wednesday.

In view of his own diminished position — as well as the secondary political role of France and Britain — Zayyat's trip attracted less attention than that of Israeli Foreign Minister Eban to Rumania on Sunday.

For Rumania, the trip was a presage matter, underlining its role as the only Warsaw Pact State retaining diplomatic relations with Israel. For Eban, it seemed to provide an opportunity to study at first hand what the Soviet Union and her satellites thought about the crisis, instead of hearing about it only from the Americans. It also raised speculation that Rumania would be the ideal site for Arab-Israeli peace talks.

**Kuwait summit:** The Middle East was also at the top of the agenda for the Foreign Ministers of the nine Common Market countries who had converged on Brussels. They failed to

take a united front against the Arab oil boycott — despite entreaties by Holland. Instead, they found it more convenient to line up against orange juice-exporting Israel, calling for her evacuation of territories occupied in the Six Day War.

But true to their nomadic traditions, it was the leaders of the Arab States who clocked up the most flying time. President Sadat of Egypt and President Assad of Syria converged on Kuwait for talks with its ruler. Sadat flew home via Saudi Arabia (where he chatted up King Feisal) and Assad broke the hate barrier by calling in on his traditional rival, Iraq's President Bakr.

Sadat and Assad were barely back in their home towns than, out of the west, Libya's Colonel Kadhafi and Algeria's President Boumedienne blew in. From Cairo and Damascus, the two headed for Iraq where, it was reported, PLO chief Yasser Arafat had also been consulting prior to a trip to Moscow.

**Hussein too:** It was not clear what all these travels were leading up to. Algeria and Libya are officially committed to the destruction of Israel, and Algeria was canvassing a new Arab summit which — like the notorious one of Khartoum in August 1967 — would rule out the idea of recognition of, or direct contacts with, the Jewish State.

Meanwhile, hardly noticed, Jordan's King Hussein had flown to Riad for a talk with King Feisal. He flew home via the Persian Gulf and Syria.

As one wit put it, with so many executive planes flying about there can't really be a fuel shortage,

KISSINGER AND FAHMY
*The new relationship*

U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE KISSINGER WITH GOLDA MEIR
*Pause for reflection*

November 9, 1973

Page Five

WASHINGTON

KISSINGER BID TO BREAK DEADLOCK

GOLDA MEIR GETS PARTIAL ASSURANCES

from E. R. Kraft

Washington:

A hectic round of "close proximity" talks between Egypt, Israel and Syria set what Israelis here view as a gloomy stage for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visits to Arab capitals this week. Mrs. Meir left Washington on Sunday, after appearing grim and pessimistic during her whirlwind trip.

Before leaving, she told journalists that while many things had been cleared up, others still needed to be clarified. This was after one meeting with President Nixon and three with Dr. Kissinger.

Meanwhile, Kissinger went from meeting Mrs. Meir to Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy and back again to Golda. The last meeting ended in the small hours of Sunday and delayed her departure. A few days earlier, the US Secretary of State also met the Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Mohammed Zakaria Ismail.

**Long way to China:** On Monday Kissinger flew to the Middle East and went first to Tunis. Also on his itinerary were Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan and China. Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco may stay on in Damascus.

All this was part of an American effort to seize what it sees as an opportunity for a long-range settlement in the current fluid situation. But Israeli sources indicated that Mrs. Meir told the Americans that it was more important to settle the immediate problems, such as the exchange of prisoners and the Egyptian blockade of the Red Sea. She emphasised similar points in a breakfast meeting with senators.

In her only press conference, held after her meeting with the President, she said that she hoped that Kissinger would bring back from the Arab capitals "a final settlement" of the prisoner issue and "a preparedness to begin peace negotiations immediately without preconditions".

GOLDA AND NIXON
Brave faces

But she left the impression that such talks were far from imminent.

**Corridor rejected:** Mrs. Meir repeatedly denied that she was under pressure from the Nixon Administration despite such claims in Tel Aviv after Israel had agreed to allow supplies through to Egypt's beleaguered Third Army.

The issue touched off repeated questioning and open scepticism by the press, who thought Mrs. Meir was trying to put on a brave face. The Israeli Embassy and the State Department have remained tight-lipped about the talks. But political observers and some senators suggest that President Nixon, who likes to avoid face to face confrontation, probably did not exert direct pressure on her. Senator Hubert Humphrey said that he is probably leaving the "details" to Kissinger and Sisco.

According to informed sources, the details under discussion included proposals to open a supply corridor to the Third Army but that Israel turned them down.

**Egypt's lies:** Typical of the mood among Israeli circles here is the story that Mrs. Meir was highly upset at

Kissinger's response to the Egyptian Foreign Minister's claims that Israel faked photographs of her trip to the west bank of the Suez Canal and that she never in fact went there. When Mrs. Meir retorted that this showed what liars the Egyptians are, Kissinger is reported to have replied merely that "they are romanticists". Though he was speaking in jest, the Israelis were not amused.

It remains to be seen from Kissinger's visit to Cairo whether he has sufficiently absorbed — and can relay — Israel's concern over its future. But some pro-Israeli political circles here are concerned that the secret diplomacy might lead to a settlement at any price which might appear good in the short-range — enough to help Nixon's Watergate-battered image—but might be dangerous to Israel in the long run. The precedent being cited are the violations of the US-sponsored ceasefire on the Suez Canal when Egypt deployed her anti-aircraft missile system.

Mrs. Meir was reliably reported as

RUSSIA BRINGS
IN NUCLEAR
ROCKETS

Russia has placed nuclear-tipped missiles in Egypt, and marines aboard her ships in the Mediterranean, according to intelligence reports in the US.

The highly-respected "Aviation Week" magazine said that some Russian surface "Scud" missiles recently sent to Egypt are now equipped with nuclear warheads. They were under Soviet control, the report added, and no great effort was made to conceal their shipments, which led to speculation that the 160-mile range missiles were placed partly to exert pressure.

This theory would fit in with reports that Leonid Brezhnev's note to the United States was brutal and contained threats to Israel's existence.

In addition, Senator Henry Jackson said on Sunday that the Soviet fleet in the Middle East now comprised more than 100 vessels and included about a battalion of "naval infantry" complete with landing equipment. He said on television that the Russian threat was now greater than during the American military troop alert of October 25.

Page Six

November 9, 1973

suggesting that the Egyptians and
Israelis withdraw to their own sides
of the Canal leaving a buffer zone
in between. But this has been rejec-
ted by the Arabs.

**Fulbright courted:** While US sources say that no long-range settlement blueprint was drafted during Kissinger's talks with the Russians, the introduction of United Nations peace-keeping forces is seen by some analysts here as opening a wedge towards an imposed settlement.

Senator William Fulbright, who is being carefully courted by Kissinger, told reporters that it looked to him as if the trend was towards his own 1970 plan—a forerunner of the Rogers plan—calling on Israel to withdraw to her pre-1967 boundaries with her security protected by the UN or super-Power troops and perhaps even a US-Israeli security pact.

Despite denials, it defies credibility that Kissinger is merely a go-between, flying around the world without some definite ideas.

## THIRD ARMY
### STILL DANGEROUS

MRS. MEIR WATCHES
CAIRO TALKS

from Arie Haskel

**Jerusalem (Tuesday):**

Israel's leaders were this week facing one of their toughest decisions since the war began: whether to lift the siege on the encircled Third Army. It was this more than anything else which occupied Mrs. Golda Meir's talks in Washington and on which Israel and the US still disagreed when she flew home on Sunday.

Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger — and to a lesser textent President Nixon himself — made it clear that they saw no other way of easing the current diplomatic deadlock. Mrs. Meir's achievement was probably to delay the point at which the Americans would begin to apply heavy pressure.

I am told that Mrs. Meir informed Kissinger that she had no mandate to agree to lift the siege and that this point should be left open for now.

**Driving a wedge:** Egypt's position, as conveyed in Washington by Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy, was that she could not consider such matters as exchanging prisoners or lifting the blockade of the Straits of Bab el-

FOOD FOR THE ENEMY
Israeli troops near Suez unloading supplies for the Egyptian Third Army

Mandeb, until Israel withdrew to the October 22 ceasefire lines.

Golda's reply to Kissinger was that nobody knew precisely where these lines were. Eventually, the Americans produced a compromise proposal to grant Egypt a supply corridor to the Third Army. It was this which was being discussed in Jerusalem this week. Fahmy, it is reported, was not unfavourable to the idea.

However, it is clear that the plight of the Third Army is not nearly as desperate as at first suggested and that US pressure on Israel to let a United Nations supply convoy through was part of a political wedge driven between Jerusalem and Washington by the Egyptians.

**Two assurances:** What remains unclear, though, is Egypt's real intention regarding the future of the ceasefire. Fahmy's replies to Kissinger were far from specific and certainly failed to satisfy Mrs. Meir and her entourage.

At home, the Israeli Cabinet has been under intense internal pressure both from the army, angry at seeing total victory snatched from its grasp by the ceasefire, and by the public, which thinks Israel was cheated not only by the Arabs but also the Americans who had promised an early deal on the prisoners as part of the ceasefire package.

But Mrs. Meir did bring back two important assurances — first, that the US still considers herself Israel's friend and will keep her army supplied; and secondly, that there is no

secret Soviet-American deal on an imposed settlement.

**Winter war:** On the battleground, Egyptian threats of renewed fighting are being taken seriously and Israeli forces remain poised for immediate action on both warfronts if the shaky ceasefire breaks down. Military observers estimate that if the siege were lifted, the 20,000-man Egyptian Third Army would again become a serious fighting element which would be of more than a nuisance to the Israelis west of Suez.

On the Golan Heights, with temperatures dropping to zero, there are reports that Iraq is sending back her troops after settling her differences with Damascus. The Syrian army, like Egypt's, has been totally re-equipped by the Soviet Union.

So it looks increasingly possible that, for the first time since 1948, Israel will have to fight a winter war.

## CONTENTS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>ISRAEL TAKES STOCK</td><td>8</td></tr><tr><td>LEADER</td><td>10</td></tr><tr><td>JERUSALEM NOTEBOOK</td><td>12</td></tr><tr><td>BARLEV DEMANDS INQUIRY</td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>EUROPE YIELDS TO THREATS</td><td>14</td></tr><tr><td>DANNY KAYE'S CANAL CROSSING</td><td>16</td></tr><tr><td>TRAGEDY IN THE HOSPITALS</td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>ARAB'S ROSY FORECAST</td><td>20</td></tr><tr><td>SAPIR ADDS UP THE COST</td><td>21</td></tr><tr><td>POST-WAR ARRESTS IN MOSCOW</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>SPOTLIGHT</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>WILSON ACCUSES UK</td><td>28</td></tr><tr><td>I.P.O. FOR JNF DATE</td><td>32</td></tr></tbody></table>

COVER PICTURE: Kissinger leaves Washington for his Middle East tour.

The dramatic pictures on page 18 of Israel's war wounded were taken by SALLY SOAMES.

## JEWISH GRAVE IN ISMAILIA

An Israeli soldier found the grave of his father who died while serving with the British army in Egypt during World War Two on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

"We've been looking for my father's grave for 33 years", Itamar Weissbein told the Israeli Army radio. "We knew he had been buried near Ismailia, and since our unit was posted there, after the Israeli forces crossed the Canal, I've been looking for British military cemeteries in the area".

Weissbein has applied for permission to have the remains transferred to Israel.

BANNERLINE: KISSINGER ARRIVES IN RIYADH

SUBHEAD: Kissinger arrives to the Kingdom as mediator for peace.

At 9:00 p.m. last night His Majesty King Faisal received at the Royal Palace his Excellency Dr. Henry Kissinger United States Secretary of State, attending the meeting on the Saudi side was His Highness Prince Fahd bin Abdul Aziz, Minister of Interior and Second Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Rashad Faron, Special Advisor to His Majesty, and His Excellency al-Sayyed Umar Saqqaf, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, and His Excellency Shaikh Ibrahim Suwayel, His Majesty's Ambassador in Washington.

Attending on the American side were Mr. Joseph Sisco, Asst. Secretary of State for Middle East Affairs, and His Excellency James Akins, the American Ambassador to the Kingdom,

His Excellency Dr. Henry Kissinger arrived at Riyadh International Airport at 5:45 p.m. yesterday and was met by His Excellency al-Sayyed Umar al-Saqqaf, and His Excellency Shaikh Ibrahim al-Suwayl, and Mr. Salim Sonbul, Director of Protocol in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Khalid Nasir Al-Turki, Ambassador at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the American Ambassador in Saudi Arabia.

The visit of His Excellency Dr. Henry Kissinger to the Kingdom comes within the trip which he is now undertaking to a number of countries in the Middle East as a mediator for peace,

Dr. Kissinger had previously visited Amman for a visit which lasted five hours to meet with His Majesty King Hussein, and Mr. Zaid al-Rifai', Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign

LA PRESSE (French Daily)
p. I,6
Wednesday, November 7, 1973
Tunis Tunisia

Les entretiens de Bourguiba et de Kissinger ont porté sur des questions de fond dont l'affaire palestinienne

SUITE DE LA PAGE 1

devait être reçu par le Président Bourguiba avec lequel il s'est entretenu du problème du Moyen-Orient et de la possibilité de faire régner la paix dans cette région.

Le Dr. Henry Kissinger est accompagné de MM. Joseph Sisco, sous-secrétaire d'Etat chargé des affaires du Moyen-Orient, David Newsom, sous-secrétaire d'Etat chargé des affaires africaines, Robert Mc Closkey, porte-parole du département d'Etat ainsi que dix sept journalistes.

C'est vers 18h30 que M. Kissinger est arrivé au palais de Carthage où il a été accueilli par le Président Bourguiba, qui était entouré de MM. Hédi Nouira, Habib Chatti et Habib Bourguiba Jr.

Après avoir longuement serré la main à son hôte et à ses collaborateurs, le Président Bourguiba a montré à M. Kissinger des photos et des tabpteaux représentant le Combatant Suprême dans certaines étapes de la lutte nationale.

A l'issue de l'entretien, le Président Bourguiba a accompagné son hôte jusqu'au perron du palais présidentiel et, tout en exprimant l'espoir de le revoir en Tunisie, lui a souhaité bonne chance dans sa mission.

M. Kissinger a ensuite regagné directement l'aéroport de Tunis-Carthage, accompagné de MM. Hédi Nouira, Mohamed Masmoudi et Abdelmajid Krouil, directeur du protocole.

A 20h00, le secrétaire d'Etat américain a quitté Tunis à destination du Caire. Le secrétaire d'Etat américain qui s'est refusé à toute déclaration a été salué à son départ de l'aéroport international de Tunis-Carthage par M. Hédi Nouira, Premier Ministre et les autres personnalités qui l'avaient accueilli à son arrivée.

L'ACTUALITE
RELLE

## Le livre technique et scientifique

A la suite du fameux discours du Président Bourguiba sur la technologie et sur la nécessité pour la jeunesse scolaire et estudiantine de se familiariser avec la démarche scientifique et technique, la S.T.D. avait organisé, l'année dernière, une exposition du livre technique et scientifique. Devant le succès obtenu par cette manifestation, la S.T.D. va récidiver : une exposition est prévue sur le même thème pour bientôt. La Société française Sodexport y participera.

Toujours dans le domaine du livre, une autre exposition achalandera des livres, des disques et des timbres soviétiques.

## Hommage aux talents des enfants

Dans deux mois aura lieu à New-Delhi un concours international prestigieux : organisé par Shankar, fameux caricaturiste politique indien, et directeur de l'hebdomadaire connu « Shankar's Weekly », ce concours décerne 24 médailles d'or et 1.000 médailles d'argent à des dessins et essais d'enfants. Une dizaine de milliers d'enfants de tous les pays y participent, qui de la description de la maison de ses rêves, qui de l'évocation du souvenir le plus frappant de sa vie et qui de la restitution de son univers familial, etc...

La Tunisie y est présente depuis quelques années : en 1971 le jeune Taoufik Habib de Béja et en 1972 Werghemmi Lassaud de Bessé.

## COMMUNIQUE
Organisation de la campagne

1971-74