KISSINGER, HENRY A. / Contributions
KISSINGER, HENRY A. / Articles-Booke

OCT 23 1970

Dear Mrs. Abernethy:

Thank you for your letter of October 14.
I appreciate your giving me the opportunity
to contribute to your project for the bene-
fit of the Ben Murch Elementary School.

I regret that I do not have a stock of my
books which can be given out, and will
not therefore be able to help you.

I wish your project great success.

Mrs. John T. Abernethy
Co-Chairman

Ben Murch Home and School Association
International Fair

3738 Huntington Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20015

jlp:10/20/70

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

DRAFT

RWK/st

15 Dec. 1970

# TROUBLE AHEAD -- THE 1971 SVN ELECTION CAMPAIGN

1968 may have been the year of decision in Vietnam (just like 1942 in WW II), but 1971 will be critical to whether we can consolidate our upper hand and maybe speed up US disengagement (it will also define the terms for the Vietnam debate in our own 1972 election campaign).

As I've repeatedly argued, we need to keep revising our Vietnam strategy and programs to frustrate Hanoi's shifts. Much has already been done on this score, but is it enough? For my money, **1971 will be a very messy year, which could make it look as if we've failed again even if we face up to the key problems early and boldly enough.**

**What are these problems?** There are many, but the following seem central to capitalizing on our military/pacification gains by consolidating the GVN politico-economic position before Hanoi shifts back from protracted war:

A. We may have crippled the VC/NVA militarily, but **we are still far from crippling the VC politico-administrative apparatus** which Ambassador Colby rightly sees as becoming "the main threat." Yet even here the cumulative results the GVN is beginning to get from Phoenix (largely because DOD stirred the pot) are evidence of what can be done if top management gets behind it.

B. We are also far from safe on the **economic stabilization front**, of redoubled importance in a GVN election year. The PAAS surveys show more farmers now concerned over economic issues than physical security. We caught this problem just in time, but are still far from solving it.

C. Much **RVNAF leadership** remains inadequate, yet we are still devoting far less attention to this key variable than to re-equipping RVNAF.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

-2-

D. But the most painful aspect of 1971, and one which will overshadow all the rest, is likely to be, a bruising, free swinging presidential election race. It bids fair to look like the damnedest mess we've seen since Tet 1968, and to convince the US electorate all over again that SVN can't be saved at acceptable cost. Even if it is more sound than fury, it will be so magnified by the media as to remind the many doubters that they were right all along. Because anticipating this problem is so crucial, this memo will focus on it.

**Why Is Such a Donnybrook in Prospect?** Paradoxically, Thieu's very success (with US help) in largely winning the military/pacification war has encouraged all sorts of ambitious politicos who want to reap the fruits. To be president of a SVN on the road to at least short-term success is much more enticing than to lead an embattled and possibly losing side. Paradoxically too, the very political reforms we pressed on a feeble GVN have opened the door to a US-style electoral process which the GVN will be sharply inhibited from constricting lest it lose the rest of its US constituency. Though the media will keep focusing on minor acts of "repression," GVN will or ability to rig an election or massively coerce voters are probably even less now than in 1967. The spotlight of publicity will be even brighter, with both US and local opposition alert to cry foul. So let's fasten our seat belts and look at the prospects:

A. Unless the election law is changed, the odds favor another multi-sided race, with numerous candidates probably so splitting the vote as to rob anyone of a majority (it happened in 1967). Pressures for releasing Dzu and Chau so they can campaign will mount. Limiting the candidacies would make sense, but a run-off might merely enhance the chances of some popular oppositionist like Big Minh.

B. Even the pro-GVN vote might be split several ways. Big Minh still has many adherents in RVNAF. So does Ky, and I'll wager he'll run unless bought off at high price. If each stole votes from Thieu, his plurality (assuming he could get one) might be small indeed.

C. **Who's likely to win?** There are so many variables that prediction would be folly at this early date. Thieu has much going for him, not least his accomplishments (with massive US help) and the fact that the huge RVNAF and GVN bureaucracy are beholden to him. He also dominates GVN radio/TV, which is now the chief source of news dissemination. But how much is this translatable into votes, especially if the cautious Thieu is slow and uncertain in his campaign?

1. Leaving aside the government itself, he has no political party base worthy of the name. Maybe he can yet put one together (the death of his "bagman" Nguyen Cao Thang is a blow), especially if he chooses a popular "sudist" running mate like Tran Van Huong. But then what does he do with Ky?

-3-

2. It is moot how much what Thieu has done for the rural sector in particular will produce votes at the polls, especially if free-swinging campaign criticisms cast doubt on his mandate. The less the voter's concern over security, the greater his concern over bread and butter issues (look at the P/AS polls). As usual, the regime in power will get the lion's share of the blame.

3. The more the war seems won, the more realizable seems the pervasive popular desire for peace. This may well work against hardliners like Thieu and Ky. Big Minh, An Quang and others will exploit this issue as much as they dare, remembering Dzu's remarkable runner-up performance in 1967 as a "peace" candidate. And the more the GVN clamps down on them, the more uproar will ensue (in Vietnam as well as in US media).

4. With even a little political flexibility, Hanoi and the NLF could play hob with the election -- not in terms of preventing it (much less winning it) but rather in terms of bolstering an oppositionist candidate by putting out word that they might be able to do business with him. At a minimum, they will (as in 1967 when they reputedly favored Dzu) influence a lot of votes simply by opposing Thieu and/or Ky.

5. Lastly, whether or not the NLF really exerts itself, it is already clear that the 1971 election campaign will have serious anti-US overtones. This is inevitable with the US disengaging and thus a convenient scapegoat. The hue and cry can only enhance US disenchantment with the war.

All this adds up to a very messy picture regardless of who wins. Even so, it would be less cause for concern were this 1965 or 1967, rather than 1971. Now both South Vietnamese and Americans are war weary with protracted struggle. Moreover, there are yet other worrisome problems.

D. **The Cost of Changing Horses in Midstream.** While Thieu is no great shakes, the other likely candidates look even less capable of governing. True, this was used as a reason for backing Diem long past his prime, but hopefully we know more about the current crop of candidates. Big Minh could be a disaster. I've only met him briefly, but almost all who've worked with him say he's a charming incompetent. We found precisely that to our cost in 1963-64. We've also had much experience with Ky, who's much brighter but quite erratic and a dilletante. Dzu is a demagogic charlatan. My favorite old line politico is Tran Van Huong, but he's old and ill. In any case, it is highly unlikely that any successor (even Ky) would be as responsive to the US as Thieu. Cautious and indecisive as he is, he has mounted by far the best GVN performance since the war heated up. So much for the conventional wisdom.

E. Equally important, if anyone besides Thieu wins we face a long post-election administrative hiatus while the new regime gets sorted out. Will troop morale hold up during a bruising election campaign and its aftermath, especially if "peace vs. war" appears to be the issue? How many province and district chiefs as well as Saigon bureaucrats will sit on their hands waiting to see who'll be kept and who fired, and what the new policies

-4-

will be? Even if a candidate like Ky wins, there'll be at least a 2-3 month hiatus. If Minh or another wins, the whole machinery of government will lose momentum while everyone waits to see what will happen.

**What Can Be Done?** I hate to sound like Cassandra when so many other things in Vietnam are at long last going our way. Yet if a prolonged election year fracas could so appear to undermine the GVN's painfully won ascendency can we afford not to anticipate it?

Unfortunately, it's much easier to define the problem than to come up with viable solutions. While Thieu may seem a better bet than any likely alternative, his ability to renew his mandate looks iffy indeed. **This confronts the US with a familiar painful dilemma.** We don't want to hitch our wagon to another falling star. Yet election of any other likely candidate would at the least bring an ill-timed hiatus in GVN momentum and probably create a volatile political situation in which the "acceptable outcome" we're currently seeking would again be cast in doubt. Pressures on the US to cut and run could become overpowering, especially if the NLF joined in at least covertly backing a compromise peace candidate and anti-Americanism grew. Of course, this could create a "legitimate" way out for us (a contingency worth considering).

**We must also recognize that, whatever our preferences, US influence would at best be limited and could at worst be quite counterproductive.** But if we decide that we'd prefer GVN continuity either under Thieu or a like-minded successor, we might consider such steps as the following:

A. Since economic issues seem to bulk ever larger in South Vietnamese popular consciousness, do more to stabilize the economy (and could use GVN need for such help as leverage to bargain for more economic reforms).

B. Since Thieu's most viable claim to re-election is that he is "winning" the war, help the GVN to get this point across more effectively to its domestic audience. The more credibly this can be demonstrated, the less the Vietnamese (or US) electorate would be misled by hysterical election campaign oratory.

C. Try discreetly to convince prospective candidates like Big Minh that if they go overboard, they might risk loss of US support. Whoever wins will obviously need us (and be nervous about accelerated disengagement), but I don't underestimate the trickiness of such an effort.

D. Most of all, sort out promptly in Washington and Saigon what stance we want to take vis-à-vis the election and set in train whatever precautionary moves seem indicated. It may be that we should do nothing, and let the Vietnamese version of the democratic process run its course. But this in itself is a "decision," so should be a matter of conscious choice.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 20, 1971

HAK:

Attached is a letter which I received last
week from Ike Shapiro, one of the young
partners at Millbank Tweed, who apparently
met you during the Rockefeller campaign.
I had a long discussion with him over the
Christmas vacation on the "collapse of
intermediate leadership" and the lack of
interest by Wall Street types in the
Administration.

As a result, he sent down the attached
letter with an article on Japan he said
you might be interested in reading together
with a letter which he apparently wrote
you in December 1968 which was never
answered.

Attached is a draft reply.

DRY

ONE CHASE MANHATTAN PLAZA
NEW YORK 10005

January 5, 1971

Mr. David R. Young
The White House
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D.C.

Dear David:

I enclose a copy of the piece by Gerald Curtis
which I mentioned to you when you were in the office
last Thursday. I think it points up quite sharply the
unusual problems faced in any negotiations with the
Japanese.

Apropos of one of the subjects you and I
discussed, I thought you might be interested in the
enclosed copy of a letter which I sent to Henry Kissinger
in December 1968, to which I never received any reply.

With best regards,

IS:ri

Encls.

Mr. Shapiro/RI
Office General
2012-4

Isaac Shapiro

December 9, 1968

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
c/o Nixon Headquarters
Hotel Pierre
450 Park Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Congratulations on your new appointment. It bodes well for the future of American foreign policy!

From my brief contact with you last spring in connection with Governor Rockefeller's campaign for the Republican nomination, you may recall my interest in foreign policy matters, particularly with regard to Japan and the Far East generally.

In recent conversations I have had with Japanese government officials they expressed concern over the fact that the Nixon entourage appeared to lack people with intimate knowledge of Japan and the Far East.

As you may recall I spent the first 16 years of my life in Japan and China and speak both Russian and Japanese. In the years to come I would like to play some part in the formulation of American foreign policy as it

Dr. Kissinger - 12/9/68

2

relates to Japan and the Far East. I believe that based
on my background and experience, I would make a positive
contribution. I am therefore writing to ask you to con-
sider whether there is some capacity in which I could
usefully serve. I assume you no longer have my curriculum
vitae from last spring and I therefore enclose one.

IS:ri
Enclosure
By Hand

Translation of "Sengo Hajimete no 'No' e no Gimon", Shokun, November 1970, pp.22-30

"The Communication Problem in Contemporary Japanese-American Relations"

Gerald L. Curtis

Columbia University

## Introduction

The "age of communications" is a phrase one often hears as being characteristic of the contemporary world. Man is today exposed to enormous quantities of information on a scale that has no parallel in human history. Accordingly the problem of communications in a society with sophisticated technology is qualitatively different from the problem of communications in earlier eras. Particularly in international communications where information must be transmitted about different political, economic and social structures, through different cultures and often through very different languages, the problem of transmitting accurate information is enormous. While in previous centuries a major problem in international communication was the scarcity of information, a major problem today is an overabundance of information. The problem is not simply to find out what is going on but to accurately communicate the significance of what is going on. The problem is compounded because of the speed with which modern technology fosters communications. The instant relay of information has greatly decreased the time span between the input of information into a communications network, its reception and subsequent behavior. Consequently there is often little time to check the accuracy of information before making a response. The ability to communicate instantly has increased the dangers of miscalculation.

-2-

lations as the response to each input of information is fed back into the communications network and modifies subsequent behavior.

For Japan and the United States the problem of communicating accurate information has particularly difficult aspects. On the most basic level of language there are enormous problems. There are very few Americans who can communicate effectively in Japanese and far too few Japanese who have an adequate command of English. Differences in the political and social structures of the two countries raise extremely complex problems of interpretation. Furthermore, significantly large sectors of the publics in the two countries have stereotyped views of the other and of the relationship that make the accurate evaluation of information received particularly difficult.

Relations between states are of course more than a problem of communications. Even the most accurate reporting of events and understanding of the other side's position cannot eliminate real conflicts of interest. On the other hand, however, a relationship in which communications are insufficient or, more importantly, inaccurate, constantly runs the danger of unnecessary conflict. In the Japanese-American relationship in the seventies it is this danger rather than any major conflict of interest that is most real. Over the past twenty five years of Japanese-American relations there are any number of examples of a serious communications gap. The recent textile negotiations and public reaction to them leave little room for optimism that the gap is narrowing.

## The Attention Gap

The communications problem between Japan and the United States has a number of dimensions. One is the perennial gap in the flow of information

each country has about the other, or put in somewhat different terms, an attention gap. This gap is readily apparent to anyone familiar with both the Japanese and American press. In Japan there is never a day in which some article does not appear about the United States in the press, usually on the front page. In the American press, on the other hand, Japan receives extremely little attention. In the twenty six days preceding the breakdown of the textile negotiations there were thirty seven front page articles on the issue in the Asahi Shinbun. During the same period there was only one front page article on the issue in the New York Times, on the day the negotiations ended. The comparison admittedly is not quite fair in that the *New York Times* is not a national paper in the sense that the Asahi is. Local papers in southern states surely carried a great deal on the negotiations. Nonetheless the point is clear. What is often a national issue of major importance in Japan receives exceedingly little national attention in the United States.

In a sense there is a serious problem of overcommunication about the United States in Japan. There is a tendency to publish everything and anything relating to Japanese-American relations, often giving the information greater attention than it deserves. In the last months before the breakdown of the talks, the textile negotiations occupied almost as much space in the Japanese press as did the Okinawan issue in the last months before the Sato-Nixon communique. Yet it is absurd that this issue, which should be regarded as a minor conflict in the overall relationship, should have been made into as large an issue as it was. One of the best indicators of the extent to which the Japanese-American relationship stabilizes and the extent to which Japan develops a more global awareness will be the rate of decline in space given

to news about the United States and Japanese-American relations in the Japanese press in the coming years.

One of the dangers of overcommunication is a loss of balance in judging the significance of available information. A case in point was the extensive coverage the Japanese press gave to a report by two members of the House of Representatives on a revival of Japanese militarism. The report deserved little of the attention it received. The two Congressmen involved are relatively uninfluential on foreign policy and security matters and most importantly the position they expressed reflected little of Congressional sentiment. On the contrary, the problem with many Congressmen's attitudes about Japan is that they believe Japan is not militaristic enough. If one looks hard enough a Congressman can be found to express just about any conceivable position on any issue, particularly on foreign policy. But because of over-communication (as well of course because of the growing interest in the issue in Japan) the report received coverage that greatly exaggerated the degree of concern in Congress and communicated a grossly distorted picture of Congressional attitudes toward Japan.

For its part the United States has a problem in the general lack of communication about Japan. Because of the United States' global involvement there is a greater competition among foreign news items for space in the press than is true for Japan. Furthermore America's traditional Europe orientation insures greater coverage to that part of the world than to Japan. Nonetheless the lack of information about Japan in the United States is extremely serious. Even among well educated people and people attentive to international relations the level of knowledge about Japan is terribly low. I always begin my course

on Japanese politics at Columbia University with a short identification
examination. In no class have as many as half the students, most of whom are
graduate students, been able to name the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister
or to give the names of the political parties in Japan. If this is true for
an educated and interested public, the ignorance of the general public is
of course only so much greater. During the textile negotiations it became
clear that some Congressmen came out in support of restrictive legislation
because of a lack of understanding of Japan's liberalization program. Statements by many Congressmen indicated that they were unaware of the scope of
Japan's trade and capital liberalization program. For more than a few
Congressmen the only thing known about liberalization is that Japan is refusing
to let in American automobiles. One suspects that Japan would have gained
more allies in Congress if it had paid more attention to publicizing its steps
toward liberalization than rallying data to support its position on textiles.

## Bureaucrats and Congressmen

The tendency for people to interpret others' actions in terms of their
own mode of behavior is clearly seen in the way in which Japanese and Americans
interpret information about the political processes in the other country. The
way in which many Americans interpreted last December's general election, in
the absence of knowledge about the electoral system, is one example. The
problem is in a sense compounded for the Japanese because of the complicated
decision making process in the United States. In trying to gain accurate
information about Japan one does not have to take into consideration a Congress
that often votes legislation opposed by the Administration, by a central
government that leaves important powers in the hands of the constituent

states, and by political parties that have little tradition of party discipline.
Yet these are precisely the problems one confronts in dealing with the United
States.

Because the Diet lacks a strong independent position in the Japanese
political system and because the bureaucracy plays such a central role in
decision making, there is a tendency in Japan to underestimate the powers of
Congress and greatly overestimate the powers of the Administration. The
tendency to become preoccupied with bureaucrats was clearly reflected in the
textile negotiations. During the last twenty six days of negotiations the
Asahi Shinbun mentioned the name of Commerce Secretary Stans six times.
During the same period the name of Wilbur Mills, chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, was mentioned only once. In the Mainichi Shinbun the
ratio was five to one. The surprise with which many greeted the Mills bill
can only be explained by a failure to fully appreciate the role of Congress
and the inability of an Administration to always control Congress.

Although the American President has tremendous powers he is in some
respects of policy making less powerful than the Japanese Prime Minister.
Though factionalism is often pointed to as an important characteristic of the
Liberal Democratic Party, the Japanese party is infinitely more unified and
under the control of its leadership in voting legislation than is the American
Democratic or Republican party. Nixon like every President before him has
faced defeat in Congress at the hands of his own party, whether in the
Carswell and Haynsworth Supreme Court nominations or the Mills bill. While
a vote by LDP Diet members against a bill sponsored by the LDP would provoke
a crisis of major proportions, such behavior is commonplace in the American

-7-

Congress. Since there is a lack of a tradition of party discipline in voting the party program, the individual Congressman is extremely susceptible to constituent opinion, to pressure groups and to other outside pressures.

Nixon's problems with Congress are compounded by the fact that the Republican party is the minority party in both houses of the Congress and, in the textile issue, by the demands of his southern strategy. His need for southern support in the Presidential election led him to issue his campaign promise to slow down textile imports and his lack of a Republican majority in Congress has made essential reliance on a coalition of Republicans and southern Democrats to get through his legislative program.

Southern Democrats hold a unique position in the American Congress. Because the south has been dominated by the Democratic party, southern Congressmen account for a disproportionately large number of senior Congressmen. In the Congress it is seniority and seniority alone that determines chairmanship of Congressional committees. The committees and their chairmen wield a great deal of power in determining what bills reach the floor. In the House of Representatives southerners are chairmen of ten of the twenty one standing committees, including such important ones as appropriations, armed services, ways and means and the rules committee. In the Senate the leadership position of southerners is even more dramatic. Of the sixteen standing committees, southerners are chairmen of eleven. Though Nixon relies on a southern Democrat-Republican coalition he cannot always control it. It was this coalition that got the Mills bill through the House Ways and Means committee over Nixon's opposition. Republicans and southern Democrats account for seventeen of the committee's twenty five members and in voting on the Mills

-12-

rational understanding of Japanese policies. Japan's complex of subordination
is dangerous because it tends to exclude the possibility of conflict from the
relationship. A relationship of clear subordination does not allow for overt
conflict because the more powerful commands the subordinate. If conflict does
occur it threatens to undermine the entire relationship. In a more equal
relationship however conflict is as natural and inevitable as cooperation,
whether the relationship be between man and wife, friends or nations. It is in-
conceivable that in a relationship as deep as that between the United States
and Japan interests will be identical on all issues at all times. Within a
broad framework of cooperation some degree of occasional conflict is unavoid-
able. Yet what is striking about the Japanese complex toward the United
States and what was so clearly expressed in the public reaction to the break-
down of the textile negotiations, is that conflict is perceived as unnatural
and a failure to reach agreement on textiles interpreted as a weakening of the
structure of the entire relationship.

The Problem of the Seventies

In terms of the total Japanese-American relationship the textile
negotiations were disturbing because they point to a lack of deep mutual trust.
There was a bitterness in the dialogue, a vindictiveness in the public reaction,
and an emotionalism in the debate that does not augur well for the future.
Significant sectors of the publics in both countries are locked into outmoded
concepts of the relationship and communications have failed to maintain a
sufficiently accurate flow of information. If, as so many assume, there are
few major issues in the Japanese-American relationship on the horizon, the
problem for the seventies is to improve communications and mutual understand-

ing so that minor issues are not made into major ones. To accomplish this there
must be a recognition that the quantity of communications alone is not the issue.
The need is to improve the quality of communications to insure as much accuracy
as possible. There is a need for more systematic analyses of the differences
of the Japanese and American social and political systems and the dissemination
of this information in a way that will be meaningful to various groups in the
society and not simply to other scholars. Most importantly there is a need to
keep issues in perspective, to accept occasional minor conflicts as natural in
the relationship and to overcome the complexes that have dominated so much of
the thinking Japanese and Americans have done about each other over the past
quarter of a century. The communications gap is a gap in understanding. To
bridge this gap and thereby strengthen the base of the relationship is a
major challenge of the seventies.

GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

KISSINGER, HENRY A./Articles-Books

FEB 18 1971

Dear Mr. Arthur:

Thank you for your letter of February 8 inviting me to contribute to an article you are putting together for your magazine. I agree that an study of how a variety of people relax and restore themselves will be of great interest and value.

Since assuming my present position, however, I had to adhere to a policy of not speaking or writing for public use or consumption. I do not feel that it would be appropriate for me to violate this policy by drawing attention to even an unofficial aspect of my life.

I appreciate your thinking of me.

Mr. William B. Arthur, Editor
LOOK
488 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

RES
FEB 19 1971
CENTRAL

jlp:2/17/71

LOOK

A PUBLICATION OF COWLES COMMUNICATIONS, INC. 488 MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK NY 10022 750-7571

WILLIAM B. ARTHUR
Editor

February 8, 1971

Mr. Henry Kissinger
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

In these days filled with change and the problems created by change, I think you will agree that it has become more necessary than ever for men and women to find some means to achieve peace of mind. The world seems to be filled with stresses and strains, and the need for an individual to find some means of rediscovering himself is great. Every man has his own way of doing this, I am sure, which brings me to the point of this letter:

How do you "get away from it all?" How do you find the time in your busy life to reassess yourself and your role in a situation where the individual seems to be more and more submerged? How do you find peace of mind?

I think that your answer, your own personal statement in no more than 500 words, and those of other Americans I am writing to, could provide LOOK with an extremely valuable article, one that would have great meaning for others, whoever they may be. Certainly, every human being requires, at some time or other, a restoration of self.

I would greatly appreciate hearing from you as to how you achieve this.

WBArthur/dk

# A Curiosity of History

ESTELLE AND SAUL GILSON

> *The thing that hath been, it is that which shall be;
> and that which is done is that which shall be done;
> and there is no new thing under the sun.*

IF THERE WAS NO NEW THING under the sun before the birth of Christ, what has historical man experienced since? Is nothing unique? Horace wrote in 20 B.C. that “many poets, cultivating their genius with unkempt beard and dirty nails, despise work, withdraw from society and shun baths and barbers.” Today, two thousand years later, the one hundredth generation of unwashed poetasters parade their flowing locks and revel in the derision of their elders.

Knowing history, we yet seemed doomed to repeat it. For history is a record of successive dooms whose lessons are as ambiguous and obscure as any Delphic utterance. Learn from the past? Coleridge said: “Passion and party blind our eyes and the light experience gives is a lantern on the stern which shines only on the waves behind us.” History is just there—an ocean of experience into which our wake gradually disappears.

Consider, for example, the American experience with the Vietnam war. Surely we did not learn from the French disaster, nor did we learn from a similar experience recorded in our own tongue and of which we were the cause. Two hundred years ago the American Revolution brought to Great Britain dissension, repression and turmoil that could read as do the topics of our times.

## For Credibility Gap

Read Horace Walpole in 1777: “Eleven months ago I thought America subdued; and a fortnight ago, it was as little likely to be subdued as ever. We, the people, know little of the truth . . . for General Howe's retreat produced despair; the taking of one post has given confidence. If you ask me what I believe . . . nothing

● ESTELLE GILSON, who has just completed her first novel, has published articles in *Opera News* and *Saturday Review*. SAUL GILSON practices internal medicine in New York City. His poetry has appeared in “little” magazines.

267