HARVARD UNIVERSITY
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38, MASSACHUSETTS

March 10

Henry:

If you want to do something for me with your friend Ascoli you might suggest to him that he get somebody good to review Strategy and Arms Control by Schelling and Halperin, review copies of which will be mailed out in about three weeks. If he'd get Alastair Buchan, Bernard Brodie, Arnold Wolfers, Jim McCormack, Max Millikan, Dean Acheson, or somebody of that sort it would be good for the world. I'd suggest HAK himself but that might seem a little too unethical.

Tom

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HENRY A. KISSINGER,
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE 38
MASSACHUSETTS

March 10, 1961

From: T. C. Schelling fcs

To: H. A. Kissinger

Subject: Bob Levine

I have had another talk with Dan Ellsberg and, flattered and interested though he claims to be, we will not get him for the coming year. Fred Ikle also would not come until the spring of 1962 at the earliest. This eliminates the RAND people who were ahead of Levine on the list. Levine has a job offer from Harry Rowen but I think he would rather come here for a year. He also has a strong expression of interest from Klaus Knorr but I know that he would much prefer to come here.

I think he is very good. He will do good work on his own and will be a stimulating member of the various seminars and so forth. Considering how poor we are at spending our Ford defense money I think we ought to grab him.

I have checked with Bob Bowie who is willing to take my word for it. Are you agreeable to my phoning him and telling him to come at his present salary, for a year (of nine, twelve, or fifteen months as he prefers) any time between now and September? If you are I will call him and we will probably have it set in a few days. I will call him tonight if I hear from you in time; otherwise please let me know by Monday.

It looks as though Larry Finkelstein will join us; and that young man named Richardson is definitely coming from Oxford. It doesn't seem that we are so near to ex-housing our funds that we have to make careful comparisons between Levine and any other promising candidates at this late stage.

TCS:ac

ARMS CONTROL AND THE FEDERAL BUDGET

T. C. Schelling

Discussion of arms control and the American economy
is usually a blend of two ingredients--welcome relief at all
the money to be saved, and anxiety about whether the economy
can take it. Lower taxes, better schools, more housing,
and campaigns against disease are widely proposed as ways of
either forestalling depression or enjoying our savings.
Massive programs of foreign assistance have been proposed and,
at times, implicitly promised. But however we weigh the
opportunities and dangers in a sizeable reduction of the
forty billion dollars and more that we now spend on defense,
we ought first to ask whether arms control would bring such
a reduction.

Certainly one can deny the whole prospect by just
being pessimistic about arms control. We are not enjoying a
persuasive respite from international conflict. Soviet-
American mutual trust is at the usual low level. While both
the Soviet and American governments during 1960 vied with each
other in subscribing to total disarmament as an ultimate
vision, there was little sign that either, in its military
planning, was taking disarmament seriously. Only an extreme
optimist could start spending now the tax reductions that
disarmament is likely to bring him, and only an extreme pes-
simist would hedge now a disarmament recession.

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Nevertheless, there are signs that the new administra-
tion will treat arms control as a more urgent, active business.
And one supposes that the Russians will not forever be com-
placent about the risk of war, or the development of nuclear
weaponry by the Chinese, the Cubans, and the rest. Things
might start moving. And considering the lead time in the
orderly development of federal expenditure programs or tax
reductions, it makes sense to think now about the economic
implications of arms control.

This article will not explore the gamut of economic
programs that a large reduction in the defense budget would
permit or necessitate. Instead it will look at the question
whether arms control, _assuming there is arms control_, will
really confront us with a sizeable drop in defense spending.

Arms control does not necessarily save money. It
could even cost more. And while it is wise to be prepared
in advance for sudden changes in the defense budget--changes
either up or down-- there is little reason to suppose that
arms control would significantly reduce the defense budget
within, say, the next four to eight years. This is so,
even on the assumption that there is progress on arms control.

* * * * *

There are many reasons for this expectation. Most
of them have to do with the changed character of present-day
proposals and concepts of arms control, in contrast to the
more traditional approach to disarmament.

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The difference does not lie in the cost of inspection that might be incurred. Inspection personnel and facilities might prove to be expensive; but the point to be argued here does not depend on the prospect that enormous inspection schemes would take the place of present military establishments.

No, the point is that the strategic consequences of the more promising kinds of arms control just do not look as though they save money. To make this point plausible, consider measures designed to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. Take an extreme case. Suppose the "ban-the-bomb" enthusiasts came across a mysterious ingredient that, if let loose in the atmosphere, would contaminate all fissionable material on earth and make nuclear explosions foever impossible. Surely there are many people, here and abroad, who would propose that we take advantage of this particular ingredient, nullifying nuclear weapons for all time, and who would do so in the name of "disarmament." They would claim to have achieved at one blow a solution of the nuclear "Nth-power problem" as well as an involuntary but enforceable ban on the use of nuclear weapons by the great powers.

What would be the effect on the American budget? Surely, this is an open question. Like the Russians, we should have to spend "more bucks per bang." We could not rely on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter aggression around the world. We could not rely on the tactical use of nuclear weapons to keep our participation in nuclear war cheap and efficient. It is quite possible that American conventional forces would be urgently increased, to an extent outweighing

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the cutback in obsolete nuclear forces. And to those who would
consider this a measure of "disarmament," the increases in
conventional forces would not necessarily contradict the
purpose of the scheme--of the "nuclear disarmament."

They would probably argue that they had disposed for all
time of the most dangerous weapons; that this kind of "dis-
armament" comes at a price; and that part of the price is an
increase in the defense budget.

Neither the ingredient, nor its legal equivalent in
an enforceable agreement against the use of nuclear weapons,
is about to become effective. But the example reminds us that
there are many kinds of risk in the world, many kinds of war,
many kinds of weapons and military forces. Measures to limit
some of these may be offset as far as military expenditures
are concerned, by increases in others. If the sole purpose
of arms control were to save money, this would mean that
genuine arms control was impossible unless it was so com-
prehensive as to limit all directions of expenditure. But
if the purpose is to reduce the risk of war or the violence
of war if war occurs, the fact that certain limitations might
be offset in a budgetary sense does not mean that there is
nothing accomplished. Such arms control is not self defeating--
just not closely correlated with the budget.

Actually, there are measures that might in some measure,
have the effect of our hypothetical anti-fission contaminator.
The test ban itself would tend in that direction, by enhancing
the symbolic distinction between nuclear and other weapons.

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However doubtful it is that any such measures would reduce
the supply of nuclear weapons to American forces, they could
inhibit the utilization of nuclears and require us to place
less reliance on their instant and uninhibited use in limited
war. Whatever enhances American and Soviet expectation that
if one uses nuclears the other will, but if one abstains
the other may, is likely to inhibit the introduction of those
weapons. And any agreement that reserves to the American and
Soviet governments a near monopoly of nuclear weapons--a
monopoly that may be destroyed on the occasion of the use
of such weapons in combat--may require that plans be based
on the assumption that nuclears might be excluded. So there
is a possibility that certain measures of arms control could,
consistent with their purpose, require the United States to
rely on "less economical" weaponry, with negative budgetary
savings.

* * * * *

The most mischievous character of today's strategic
weapons is that they provide an enormous advantage, in the
event war occurs, to the side that starts it. Both Russian
and American strategic doctrines reflect the urgency of
attacking in the event of evidence that the other is about
to. The urgency arises in the vulnerability of strategic
weapons themselves, and of the communication and other
facilities that they depend on. The side that attacks can
hope to blunt the other's retaliation. Closely related is

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the advantage, in the event the other attacks, of responding quickly and vigorously, of being a close second if not first.

By itself this urgency would pose the danger of unintended war, a war provoked by ambiguous evidence of attack. The greater the urgency of decision in the event of alarm, the greater the likelihood of converting a false alarm into war itself. These dangers compound themselves: each side must be alert not only to the other's premeditated attack, but to the other's incentive to reach quick decisions in an emergency.

Hardly anything dramatizes so well that some of the danger of war resides in the very character of modern weapons. What could be as tragically ironic as a war that both sides started, each believing the other was about to, each compelled by its expectations to confirm the other's belief that attack was imminent. This characteristic of modern strategic weapons--this advantage of "surprise" or, lacking surprise, of sheer speed--is evidently related to so-called "accidental war." It is hard to imagine how full-scale war would be precipitated by accident, false alarm, or mischief, if it were not for the urgency of quick response. If there were no advantage in striking an hour sooner than the enemy, and no disadvantage in striking an hour later, one could wait for better evidence of whether war is on. But when speed is critical, the victim of a false alarm is under terrible pressure to get on with the war if in fact it is a war, especially if he knows the other is under similar pressure.

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This problem is evidently related to keeping limited
war limited. The very occurrence of limited war will increase
each side's alertness to the possibility of general war and
each side's sensitivity to the other's alertness. The urge
to anticipate general war can be the very factor that
causes the expansion into general war.

Much of the current interest in arms control is
motivated by the hope that this particular characteristic
of modern weapons can be nullified, or offset, or in some way
compensated, by cooperative measures between the major powers.
This is essentially the problem of "surprise attack," which
was the specific subject of negotiation between eastern and
western powers in 1958 and which underlay the original "open
sies" proposal. More recently it has been subsumed under
the general objective of "stabilizing mutual deterrence."

There is unfortunately no concrete proposal available
that would manifestly tranquilize this characteristic of
modern weapons, reducing the urgency of initiative, eliminating
false alarm, and taking the advantage out of being the one to
start the war if war occurs. (Exchange of warning facilities,
on the "open-skies" principle, no longer looks very attractive
in view of the short reaction times entailed by the onversion
to missiles.) But efforts to find concrete proposals will
surely continue. What concerns us in this article is the
implication that success in this endeavor would have for
military budgets.

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Suppose measures could be found and successfully negotiated that would take the profit out of surprise attack, premeditated or impetuous. Suppose the original purpose of "open skies" could be achieved, even with modern weaponry, so that the victim of attack would always have adequate warning to launch his retaliation and the danger of false alarm were virtually eliminated.

The scheme might be enormously attractive to both sides. It could reduce the danger of general war. But look at the budgetary implications. While we and the Russians might both feel we had gained in one kind of "deterrence," namely, deterrence of all out attack by the other, we might lose some deterrence of lesser aggressions. Our threat of massive nuclear war against lesser aggression could hardly be credible if there were no chance that our attack could so catch the Soviets by surprise as to blunt their retaliation.

Furthermore, our threat of local resistance to aggression might pose less risk to the Soviets than in the past. Part of our deterrent threat resides in the possibility of "unintended war"--a limited war that gets out of hand, or a war that results from accident, false alarm, or misunderstanding in a crisis. Certainly the Russians or Chinese appreciate that, whatever the day-to-day danger of general war, that risk goes up in the event of, say, invasion of Quemoy or Taiwan, of a middle-eastern war, or of a European crisis. The very fact that modern strategic weapons are of

9

a quick-reacting sort--that they enhance the danger of a
general war that neither side intended--must serve to deter
provocation. Eliminate the fear of accidental war--reduce
the risk of limited war's eruption into general war, of false
alarm, of misinterpretation of intent, of some accident or
unauthorized action catalyzing a crisis and bringing about
war--and the world becomes safer for limited aggression,
limited violence, limited war.

This may be a reasonable price for a reduction in
the threat of general war. But it is a price. And it is
one that may be reflected in our defense budget. The more
that arms control succeeds in neutralizing strategic forces,
the more we may have to deter limited war by the threat that
we could fight it successfully.

It helps to keep in mind that reliance on the threat
of general war to police the world against limited aggression
has been at least partly motivated by economy. Measures that
reduce these threats on both sides should be expected to eliminate
some of those "economies."

* * * * *

An important form of "arms control" may be an under-
standing by the major powers that they will develop strategic
forces that are as nearly invulnerable as possible, and that
possess modest or minimal capabilities for attacking each other's
strategic forces. Such forces (if achieveable) would minimize
the temptation, even in a crisis, to jump the gun with a

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preventative blow. They would minimize the anxieties that
could cause inadvertent war.

This would represent "qualitative" arms control
rather than quantitative disarmament. It differs from the
older-fashioned qualitative disarmament proposals, which
discriminated against offensive weapons in favor of defensive,
and discriminated against weapons of civilian damage in
favor of weapons oriented toward military targets. The
qualitative criterion in this case would be nearly the reverse:
weapons good at striking a "disarming" blow at enemy forces
would be stigmatized as "unstable;" weapons good only at post-
attack reprisal would be considered more stable, in providing
no incentive to initiate war.

If successful, an agreement along these lines--
whether a formal, explicit agreement or just an informal
understanding--would be an impressive arms limitation.
But--aside from the implications for limited war, which have
been mentioned--the costs of pursuing this objective could
raise budgets.

"Invulnerable" strategic forces consist not only
of weapons and vehicles but of communications, command and
control arrangements, warning systems, reconnaissance and
intelligence, and all the other components of the "system."
Comparing, say, balistic-missile submarines with unprotected,
fixed-base long-range missiles of known location, the former
are much more consistent with the kind of understanding just
mentioned. The former is also likely to be more expensive.

11

Expense in this case is tricky to define. An unprotected ICBM, especially if eight or nine out of ten can be kept in readiness, is a cheaper way of delivering explosive power on enemy territory if nothing intervenes to hinder its arrival. The submarine, with smaller missiles and appreciably less than 100% time on station, is more expensive. But if we compare instead the cost per ton of explosive power delivered in unfavorable circumstances--in the event of a war that the enemy starts--the advantage lies with the submarine.

The submarine has what economists call a "comparative advantage" for the retaliatory strike, a "soft" ICBM has the comparative advantage in an initial strike. For a given level of retaliatory capability, the submarine force provides less of a first-strike capability than the soft ICBM; for a given level of a first-strike capability, the soft ICBM provides less retaliatory capability than the submarine.

That the submarine is in some respects an expensive weapon does not necessarily imply that defense budgets go up as we move in the direction of more "stable" strategic forces. (Nor is the submarine necessarily typical of other weapons that would enjoy similar invulnerability.) But at least this consideration provides no clear reason to suppose that an arms understanding with the Soviets along the lines mentioned would bring budgets down. They could well go up. They might especially go up, if we moved urgently in the direction of these better controlled, less vulnerable weapons. In the short run, shifts in the character of our forces could cause

12

appreciable budget increases.

* * * * *

Consider now some other understandings we might reach with our potential enemies. "Traffic rules" may be a promising area. It is sometimes argued that airborne alert for the bomber force is a "stabilizing" measure; it provides us assurance that we could retaliate after an attack, and therefore greater assurance that the Soviets would not attack. We need then be less hasty in a crisis. At the same time, it has been argued that airborne alert is "provocative" in getting a fraction of our bomber force in a state of alert that could be exploited for a quick effort to knock out Soviet bombers and missiles. Airborne alert is also considered conducive to dangerous false alarms, ambiguous accidents, or faulty communications and the danger of an erroneous decision to attack.

Suppose we decide there is truth on both sides. One possibility is to re-design airborne alert to preserve the advantage of mobile bombers while minimizing their apparent menace, reducing the likelihood of enemy misinterpretation, and improving our communications and control. In return for equivalent Soviet concessions, we might arrange flight patterns nearer to the continental United States, sacrificing proximity to target for other advantages.

This might come at a cost. There is the one-time

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cost of redesigning a complicated operation, testing it,
moving personnel, and so forth. There might be a rise in
the cost of keeping effective bombers airborne (due, for example,
to the increased fuel requirements for completing potential
missions from starting points farther from targets). There
might be cost reductions in abandoning certain criteria of
readiness that are expensive to maintain--namely, a first-
strike capability. But the cost implications are not obvious
a priori.

Similar restrictions might be considered for submarines.
At present our ballistic-missile submarines (and undoubtedly
any Soviet missile submarines) are severely limited by the
range of their missiles. To participate in a sudden well
coordinated surprise attack, the boats would have to be
close to the enemy. To threaten post-attack retaliation,
it is less necessary to be in a state of instant readiness.
Depending on how much delay in response is considered consistent
with deterrence, there might be a difference of several
hundred miles in the proximity zones required for a first
strike and for a persuasive retaliatory potential. Without
discriminating against ballistic-missile submarines, we and
the Russians might reach an understanding about their
proximity to each other's shores. A submarine close up is
prima facie in position to attack; a submarine farther off
shore is in retaliatory standby.

Such restrictions might or might not raise costs.
(They might lower them.) But again the point is that this

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kind of "arms control" does not obviously entail sizeable
reductions in the budget. It is a matter of technical ex-
amination whether costs go up or down. And to a first ap-
proximation, they might not be substantially affected.

Another proposal that has received some attention is
that there should be improved emergency communications between
Washington and Moscow. In the event of an accident, or false
alarm, or mischief by a third party, or of some crisis in
which both sides get into an alert status from which both
are reluctant to withdraw, last-minute negotiation may be
urgently needed. There is more to the proposal than just
the "gold plated telephone" (as the proposal is sometimes
referred to). An important part of the facilities might be
people and equipment able to be dispatched to critical observa-
tion points, and able to report home instantly through authentic
channels, on those occasions where an eye-witness account
could be reassuring but absolutely trustworthy witnesses
are required.

* * * * *

These are some of the ideas now taken seriously
as "arms control." Many of them do not qualify as "dis-
armament" in the literal sense. Most of them are more concerned
with tranquilizing the *incentives* that might lead to war than
with reducing the *capabilities* of the great powers for waging
war. They are aimed at converting the so-called "balance of
fear" into a "balance of prudence." They take mutual deterrence
for granted and seek to remove some of the risks, instabilities,
anxieties, and temptations.

15

Measures of this sort are not inconsistent with a reduction in the numbers of weapons. But they do not focus on numbers *per se*. Reduction in numbers might result simply from the higher cost of the kinds of weapons indicated by this kind of "arms control." More important, if both sides succeed in developing reasonably invulnerable retaliatory systems, so that neither can hope to disarm the other in a sudden attack, and so that neither needs to be obsessed with the imminence of attack, some reduction in numbers might come naturally. Certainly, nothing like the nuclear-energy delivery capability of our present bomber force would be needed if the entire force were reasonably secure against attack and also fairly impotent against the corresponding Soviet forces--i.e., if Soviet forces were similarly secure against attack.

One might say that the idea is to replace a numbers race with a "quality race," with each side trying to achieve better weapons rather than more of them, even accepting reductions along with qualitative improvements. But this would somewhat miss the point. In a "numbers race" either side is weakened by the other's advances. But if both move in the direction of secure, controllable, second-strike forces--forces that are designed to survive an attack, not to launch one successfully--the two sides are not exclusively competing with each other. What to the Soviets would be an "improvement" in their weapons would look good to us, too; and what to us is an improvement in our own strategic forces might be an improvement from the Soviet point of view.

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Surely, anything that reduces the likelihood of an accidental or otherwise inadvertent war is in the interest of both of us. Warning systems less subject to false alarm; more reliable communications; vehicles subjected to tighter control; and, in general, strategic forces that are capable of deliberate rather than impetuous response, are things that both may prefer to see on both sides. We have a common interest in confronting each other with strategic weapons systems that do not themselves exacerbate tensions and anxieties, and that do not constrain either side to make hasty decisions on the basis of ambiguous evidence.

* * * * *

A striking thing about this kind of arms control is that much of it makes sense as unilateral policy. In our own military policy we want to avoid accidents, false alarms, unauthorized actions, and hasty responses that might provoke an unnecessary war. To deter enemy attack we want to make it as clear as possible to a potential enemy that he need never be so afraid of our unprovoked attack that he has to attack first to forestall it. A persuasive ability to survive any attack he could launch against us, sufficiently to retaliate on a great scale, is only part of what deterrence requires; the other part is that we not confront him with forces that make him too sensitive to the danger, especially in a crisis, that if he does not go first he may be a poor second.

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This provides motivation for doing unilaterally many
of the things that we would like the Russians to reciprocate.
An advantage of doing it reciprocally is that we can feel
safer, moving in this direction, if the Russians are moving
in the same direction. The more the Russians appear to be
developing a first-strike force, the more urgent it will
appear to be for us to have such forces; the readier the
Russians appear to be for a quick strike in a crisis, the
quicker we will want our reaction to be. If instead the
Russians develope strategic weapons that, though potent in
retaliation, do not appear terribly good for a disarming
attack against us, we can feel safer in developing similarly
secure, controllable, second-strike weapons. We can worry
less about being ready to start war on a moment's notice.

But, done unilaterally or reciprocally, these things
may cost more money, not less. As in other kinds of business,
accidents and mistakes may be reduced by spending money. A
retaliatory system that is insecure not only makes its possessor
jumpy but is grounds for potential enemies to be jumpy too.
Skimpy budgets can mean skimpy protection against malfunction,
confusion, and misunderstanding.

March 13, 1961

From: T. C. Schelling

To: Messrs. Bowie, Kissinger, and Brown

Subject: Secretarial help for Morton Halperin

Mort is going to have a lot of work for a secretary next year. He will continue the Joint Seminar work; he will have work for the Defense Policy Seminar; and he will have his own work; including finishing his book on limited war and getting it in shape to submit for publishing. The Joint Seminar currently finances one quarter of a secretary; the Defense Policy Seminar will probably finance a fraction of a girl for him; and as a Research Fellow he will be drawing on another appreciable fraction. He thinks, and I do too, that under the circumstances it would be efficient to combine these fractions into the major claim on one secretary rather than small claims on several. Do you think we could quickly agree that the Center, the Joint Seminar, and the Defense Studies Program could each provide a quarter of more of a full time girl, so that Mort could count on really full time use of a girl so that in our personnel arrangements a girl could be provided who would work for him, subject to minor claims on her time during the peak load season at the Center?

TCS:ac

June 7, 1961

To: T.C. Schelling

From: H. A. Kissinger

I am attaching a copy of a letter
I received from Bart Leach. I wonder whether
you think we might use some of our Ford money
to get White here?

February 6, 1962

From: T. C. Schelling

To: Messrs. R. R. Bowie, H. A. Kissinger, M. H. Halperin

Subject: Political Military Seminar

Here is what I recently committed us to. Kenneth
Mansfield, Staff Director for the Jackson Committee,
will talk Tuesday morning, February 13 (next week).
Albert Wohlstetter will probably be here the following
week, February 20th, but he will call me next week
to confirm. Bob Komer of the White House staff ex-
pressed a strong interest in coming and I have suggested
March 6th. I expect a reply from him shortly. Malcolm
Hoag expects to be East sometime this spring and will
let me know so that we can invite him up. Jim King will
come and speak to us on April 17.

Nathan Leites will not return from Paris before things
are fairly well closed down for the summer; we will decide
later whether it is worthwhile for him to stop by anyway
or instead to come next year.

TCS:ac

cc: Prot. Henry Klaarner

Institut de Soins Boef

Sincerely yours,

him for the summer if would be mutually prototypical.
Service, not academic, put it anybody has and way of making
His direction of future interest in the Norwegian Foreign
Good knowledge of them, excellent English, and is very bright.
season. He has a deep interest in military problems, a
of the faculty Hofst was the most promoting man in the entire
Soviet American studies and disarmament. By general consensus
international relations. My own techniques were mostly on
month at Salzburg Seminar. The subject of the session was
services if I can. I have that finished beschung for a
either case. I am likely to be competing with him for his
interested in him for the international summer school. In
was for him next summer, if not perhaps Henry would be
young Norwegian named Hofst. I don't know if you have and
I understand that Warner Shilling wrote you about a

Dear Tom:

Cambridge, Mass.
6 Divinity Avenue
Harvard University
Professor Thomas Schelling

February 7, 1945

25 January 1962

496 Park Avenue
Leonia, New Jersey

Professor Thomas C. Schelling
Center for International Affairs
Harvard University
Cambridge 38, Massachusetts

Dear Tom:

This is to alert you to the fact that I have written to a former student of mine and have suggested to him that he write you about the possibility of his receiving a research fellowship for work at the Center in the summer of 1963. The student's name is Johan Holst, and he is currently doing graduate work in political science at the University of Oslo, Norway.

Actually, I have no real idea whether the Center even has money for summer fellowships (we don't), but if you should i think you would find Holst an extremely interesting person to have around.

Holst graduated from Columbia College in June 1960. He would have received Departmental honors except for some stupid rule which disqualified him because he had done his Freshman and Sophomore work elsewhere. He was in my seminar his Senior year, and he wrote two first-rate papers: one dealing with the considerations surrounding Norway's entrance into NATO, and the second with Norwegian thinking on the role of nuclear weapons in NATO military strategy.

Since leaving the United States, Holst has apparently developed an increasing competence in the defense field. When he last wrote me, in addition to his work at the university, he had a job in the systems analysis department of the Defense Research Establishment (I presume is some governmental agency), and he was also participating in two restricted study groups -- one conducted by the Ministry of External Affairs, and the other by the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Policy Research.

Whether out of all this Holst has in hand a research project that could be feasibly accomplished at Harvard and one which would be of interest to others at the Center, I do not know. The two study groups in which he is a member are concerned, respectively, with strategy and with arms control, and I would expect, for example, that he could write a very interesting piece on how the arms control discussion looks from the viewpoint of the Danes, Wedes, and Norwegians.

I should explain that when Holst wrote me many months ago, he was interested at that time in a fellowship for graduate work in a summer session. This, as you know, is practically a hopeless cause, most summer schools, and certainly Columbia's, are intent on making money, not handing it out. I have only now been struck by the belief

--2--

idea that the Center might be the answer to his financial need and a much better stimulus to his intellectual interests, and it may be that in the interim he has made other plans. If so, he might still be moved; his wife is Canadian, and part of his interest in coming to the United States for the summer no doubt turns on their interest in seeing his wife's family.

I hope that Holst will get in touch with you. Should it look like something might be worked out, you should know that Holst is a very pleasant individual as well as a bright one; that his spoken English leaves nothing to be desired and that when he was a student at Columbia he wrote better than the American undergraduates; and that I have the feeling he would pay his own freight across the Atlantic.

Many thanks for your consideration of the matter.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director

ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING

March 1, 1962

From: T. C. Schelling

To: H. A. Kissinger

I would suggest at least three books, the Brennan volume, Schelling-Halperin, and Hedley Bull, in that order. I would add the new one by Arthur I. Waskow, *The Limits of Defense*, as a sophisticated study of a slightly soft position. If they want more books, I would add the American Assembly volume and Barnett's *Who Wants Disarmament?* I would not recommend Herman, but in the field of "strategy" Bernard Brodie might be useful as a taste of American military thinking. Incidentally, the Committee for Sane Nuclear Policy put together a library for each delegation in Geneva next month; we might check on what it included to see what you might say about their selections.

There were not a great many good articles in the last year or two, and much of what has been done before has been superseded by these books. I would give them your *Foreign Affairs* of July, 1960, or call attention to the chapter in your book. (I assume they know your book, otherwise put it on your list.) I would give them my article which will appear in *Foreign Affairs* in March on "The Role of Deterrence in Total Disarmament." I would give them Fred Ikle's article in *Foreign Affairs* for January, 1961, "After Detection--What?" and it might be worthwhile to add Malcolm Hoag's paper "On Stability in Deterrent Races" in *World Politics* for July, 1961. I would also send them a copy of Glenn Kent's paper, just so that the scientists among them may get interested in that kind of research. And I think maybe Larry Finkelstein's forthcoming article in *International Organization*, Winter issue, to appear in a few weeks, and Linc Bloomfield's paper for IDA on "The Politics of Arms Control: Troika, Veto, and International International Institutions" would be very useful on the world organization issues.

* If they want to get some unofficial discussions of current thinking, Bob Levine's article in the last *New Leader*, is particularly informative, and my paper on "The Future of Arms Control" which appeared in *Operations Research* may be of some use. And as background I think Sam Huntington's "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results" is still very good, though awfully hard to obtain since it appeared in that Littauer year book.
* Bob Levine's paper on "Facts and Morals in the Arms Debate" in *World Politics*, January 1962 is a fairly sophisticated analysis of different American positions.

Some of these things we should probably put together and mail to them. Things like Sam Huntington's paper or Linc Bloomfield's, and reprints of some of the articles, we could probably collect for them if they wished; you might offer to do that.

You might advert to the SANE library and then you won't be obliged to give them a cross-section and can stick to things you think are genuinely constructive.

TCS:ac

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director

March 9, 1962

From: Thomas C. Schelling

To: Henry A. Kissinger

I suggest the following this afternoon. Let's break the subject into three parts, "strategic-general-war" issues, European issues, and other non-strategic including South-East Asia, etc.

Suppose I talk for a while about the "strategic." I will talk about parity versus superiority, counter-force versus relative targetting, controlled response, disarmament implications, civil defense, some implications of stability if attained, and all that.

Suppose you talk about Europe--anything you want to, but preferably including both the politics of nuclear weapons and the conventional-force questions.

And that is enough, unless you have something exciting to say about guerrilla warfare and all that.

Bob can join in as he pleases.

I plan to talk for ten to fifteen minutes, not counting interruptions; I suggest you plan on the same. Between the two of us we ought to keep discussion going for an hour or more. I suggest we try to get the Committee members to pipe up with comments of their own. For that purpose maybe we should ask Bob to be a kind of moderator with us as "discussion leaders." OK?

TCS!ac
cc. R. Bowie

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Faculty of Arts and Sciences

Dept. of Government

March 19, 1962

Dear Tom,

Thank you for sending me your piece on Deterrence. It is admirably lucid, and I have no disagreement. The discussion of the International Military Authority inspires me to make a proposal, however--one which is, I think, at least as practical as the average of such proposals.

I agree with you that an International Military Authority (IMA) would have to be strong enough to take on any comer, including therefore any coalition of states: e.g. the U.S. and Russia together.

There is, then, the obvious danger of the IMA's becoming a world despotism. Only the self-restraint of its commanders would stop it. Doubtless these would be Scandinavians, but even they are human. The danger of despotism is therefore real.

This danger could be very greatly reduced by having two IMAs instead of one. The two would be entirely separate, each the arm of a wholly independent World Organization, and each would be prepared not only to enforce upon the nation states but upon the other IMA as well. Each would protect the world from the despotism of the other.

Therefore each IMA would have to have enough military power to deter the other IMA (and any coalition of states it might enter into) from attacking.

What is to prevent collusion between the IMAs? This is a very serious problem. The best we could hope for is that they would develop opposed ideologies, and that the ideological cleavage would make mutual trust impossible to achieve. An encouraging feature of the situation would be the fear that each would have of preemptive attack by the other. Mutual suspicion might be so great as to make collusion unthinkable.

If it were possible to create a confusion of tongues, that would also help a great deal too, of course. The more unlike the language and cultures of the competing IMAs the better.

The competition between them would of course necessitate an elaborate apparatus of espionage, subversion, propaganda, etc. Each would have to take every possible step to strengthen itself and to weaken the other. Unless this were done, the system would eventually break down into world despotism.

2

Meanwhile the world would be governed pretty well. I must
admit that the competition between the IMAs would prevent the enforce-
ment of world law in any instance in which either IMA felt that its
vital interests were affected. But there would be some matters in which
neither IMA was interested and others in which their interests would
be complementary or the same. Even where their interests were
opposed, there would be a good deal of "competitive cooperation."

The real defect of the system, of course, is the danger of
its breaking down into collusion on the one hand or of the competition
getting out of hand on the other.

These defects could be largely overcome by increasing still
more the number of IMAs. Five would be better than three. Ten would
be still better. But if we could have about eighty, that would be
ideal. It would replace oligopoly with real competition. Blocs and
coalitions would be formed, no doubt, but it would be virtually im-
possible to bring enough IMAs into any one coalition to constitute
a vital threat to all of the others.

If profound differences of ideology, language, and culture
could be established among all of the eighty IMAs, that, of course,
would improve the situation infinitely.

It seems to me that it is in this direction that forward-
looking people must seek for peace and freedom under world government.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

May 9, 1962

From: Thomas C. Schelling

To: Henry A. Kissinger

I have quickly read your draft and have two main comments on substance.

First, the paper is wholly concerned with the danger of premeditated Soviet assault on Western Europe; for that danger I quite agree with your analysis of the arithmetic of conventional forces. I think the great danger is that the Japanese may attack Pearl Harbor instead of the Malay peninsula, and we will have expected the wrong attack. I don't know whether it will be Finland or Yugoslavia or a Bulgarian skirmish with the Greeks, but I can think of at least a few possibilities in which a margin of flexibility is needed, particularly because the NATO treaty might not be automatically invoked. It seems to me, too, that various kinds of "probes" either Westward or Eastward may require an extra margin of force so that it does not denude the defenses. And I even recall that a recent exercise strongly suggested that the sheer value of "force in being" Westward of the curtain may appreciably reduce the Soviet ability to use their own and satellite divisions to stamp out any internal revolt. None of these considerations directly point to thirty rather than twenty, although they suggest that another half-a-dozen divisions may be worth a certain amount of strain to get. There probably are ways of analysing the relative adequacies of twenty, twenty-five, or thirty, but I can't do it.

Aside from how this affects your position on conventional forces, I am mainly concerned that you not give aid and comfort to the people who, even forgetting last year's Berlin crisis, think there is only one war in Europe worth planning on.

Second, you rather distinguish too sharply, I think, between the "demonstrative," and the tactical uses of nuclears. I should think the most likely, and possibly the most effective "demonstration" would be their "tactical" use. But, as you have heard me argue,

I think the criteria about timing, choice of targets, number of weapons, origin and means of delivery, etc., should be at least as concerned with the demonstration as with the tactical consequences (e.g. this might be an argument for earlier use than otherwise). I think this, if anything, reinforces your arguments about weapon security, command and control, reorganization of nuclear forces, etc. I really don't know anybody who proposes hitting Kiev (except possibly Morton Kaplan and he doesn't count). And for a war in Europe, in contrast perhaps to the Middle East and elsewhere, I should think demonstration would most likely esclude counter-strategic-force targets in the USSR. In this connection you might be even more emphatic, or more repetitive, on the terrible importance of not letting so-called tactical aircraft rush off to targets that were selected in competition with SAC.

A minor point, I-4, three lines from the bottom, I would say, "as an excuse to <u>depend on</u> traditional policies." Some of my friends think the Soviets may be slower than you imply about developing a potent invulnerable force; traditional policies may work a little longer than you imply, but even so we surely shouldn't depend on it.

Page II-10, second paragraph, your <u>coup de main</u> with five divisions ought to be identified as to location; I assume you mean in Germany, otherwise your argument is not persuasive.

Page II-12, I don't understand the last sentence of the top paragraph.

The third section I have had to read very quickly and my impression is that I substantially agree with you.

TCS:ac

July 20, 1962

From: T. C. Schelling

To: R. R. Bowie

Ray Cline (Deputy Director, CIA) spoke to me yesterday about a Fellow for the Center. I have talked with him at some length about sending us a Fellow six to eight weeks ago, and he was very interested, and was going to see if he could find somebody for the coming year. He said yesterday that he cannot, but that he is very much interested and determined to pick a good man for the following year. Since we are fairly well loaded for next year, it is probably just as well. The main point of this letter is just to report that he really is interested and almost certainly will pick a good man to send us as a Fellow for 1963-64. I was not sure, from the way he spoke, whether you had been in touch with him also. I think I made pretty clear what kind of people we thought would do best here, and what the general nature of the arrangement was.

I suggest that sometime after your return you get in touch with him, especially since I was not able to be very clear about the formalities and administrative procedures.

TCS:ac

cc. H. A. Kissinger, S. Anderson, B. Brown

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
HOLLIS B. CHENERY
SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
SEYMOUR M. LIPSET
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

6 DIVINITY AVENUE
CAMBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS 02138

June 8, 1966

TO: H. A. Kissinger
Z. Tomory

FROM: T. C. Schelling

Bob Bowie received a letter from Leon Lindberg saying he would like a few months to finish in early '67, the work that he was doing here before. Bob thought it was going to be a good book and in view of our earlier connection with it that we should try very hard to help Lindberg to come here. For the coming fiscal year we saved two-three thousand dollars as a result of Carl Friedrich's not wanting salary this summer, and that puts us within three or four thousand dollars of the figure Lindberg wants. Under the circumstances I decided we should go ahead and make a commitment, particularly since most of the outside contracts and grants that various faculty members have been hoping for seem to be coming along all right for next year.

I hope this is agreeable. I guess we will put through a new appointment as Research Associate when the time comes.

TCS:ac

October 2, 1962

Professor Henry A. Kissinger
Center for International Affairs

Dear Henry:

I have written to Bernard Brodie, Tom
Wolfe and Nathan Leites asking if they
might come to talk to our Political-
Military Seminar. I was about to write
to Herman and remembered that you might
want to concert that with the Defense
Policy Seminar. If so I will let you
take care of it; if not, I will go ahead
and write to him about the available
dates for the Tuesday seminar. Would
you let me know?

TCS:ac

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

October 9, 1962

From: T. C. Schelling

To: Messrs. R. R. Bowie and H. A. Kissinger.

In a couple of days you will get a revised copy of Mort's book. He finished his book last May. I looked at it, decided we ought to publish it, and let it sit during the summer. In October Max Hall read it and had serious misgivings about its structure, its language, and everything else. I read it very carefully again and spent about eight hours with Mort, or Max, or both together. Mort has very substantially changed the structure, cut out some parts, and done extensive rewriting. Max, I believe, is still sceptical about its readiness for publication. I shall read the new version; I believe Mort has accepted even my most drastic suggestions, and I know that he works awfully fast. I expect it to be in good shape now, subject to line-by-line improvement editorially.

Mort has been offered a contract by Wylie so publication itself is not really at stake. Wylie, Mort tells me, had Sam Huntington and somebody else read it. It is unquestionably in better shape now than it was then. I plan to ask both of you to help reach a decision quite soon whether this is to be a Center book. If the answer is to be yes, which I expect, there is then the question whether we prefer Harvard Press or Wylie, and this raises perhaps matters about which Max and Bob have special considerations to raise.

Would you try real hard to look at the thing in the next two weeks. I feel a little guilty about giving it such hasty treatment last May and letting Mort lose four months when he might have had my suggestions earlier. I am asking you to make up for my delinquency be helping me be a little bit speedy now.'

I would solicit an opinion from Sam Huntington but will have to check and see whether we can catch up with him very readily.

TCS:ac

November 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM

To: T. C. Schelling

From: M. H. Halperin

Re: Memo on J. J. Martin of November 26th

This situation suggests to me, as did the case with Nils Ørvik last year, that the Center really needs another category of people associated with it. These would be people, whether academics, journalists or government officials who intend to come to the Center for a year not to broaden themselves generally as the Fellows do but rather to emerge themselves in military strategy or arms control.

I have the impression that Ørvik is doing a good job of not getting involved in all of the Fellows' activities, but I still think the year would have been more valuable for him if he came simply to study military politics.

As I recall, we invited a Swiss journalist to come somewhat on this basis last year. I think somebody like Paul Ramsay, assuming we thought he was good enough, would be in the same category.

I think there are now a number of good people--journalists, government officials and academics from other disciplines--who would like to get a better understanding of strategy, and I think this is the place for them to get it. I think we would benefit as well from intelligent lay criticism of our work.

I do not know whether we could use Ford money for this or whether we should. Perhaps we ought to look for a grant specifically for this purpose.

MHH:tb
CC: Bowie
    Brown
    Kissinger

Klaasinger
Brown
Bowie
CC: MHH:tp

apology. Perhaps we ought to look for a grant specifically for this burpere.
I do not know whether we could use hard money for this or whether we
on work.

I think we would benefit as well from intelligent lay criticism of
better understanding of strategy, and I think this is the place for them to
officials and academics from other disciplines--who would like to get a
I think there are now a number of good people--journalists, government
we use good enough, would be in the same category.

As I recall, we invited a Swiss journalist to come somewhat on this
politics.
would have been more amenable for him if he came simply to attack militarily
involved in all of the fellow's activities, but I still think the year
I have the impression that Bravik is doing a good job of not letting
militarily strategy or some control.

selves generally as the fellow do put rather toكر themselves in
officials who intend to come to the Center for a year not to broaden them-
with it. These would be people, whether academics, journalists or government
years, that the Center really needs another category of people associated
This situation angers me so, as did the case with Bill Bravik last
year.

From: M. H. Halperin

To: T. C. Scheffling

MEMORANDUM

November 20, 1983

December 4, 1962

From: T. C. Schelling

To: R. R. Bowie

Did you see my memo on Martin and Mort's memo to me on the
same subject? I think Mort has a good point. Our Swiss
journalist was going to come at our expense, but Martin,
like Ørvic, would come at his agency's expense.

There are two questions.

Do we want people of this kind--people who want to go deeper
rather than broader. Second, do they seriously compete for
space and attention with the Fellows.

If they are good, I think we want them. I think even the
Fellows gain from having them around. I think we do want
to distinguish them from the Fellows, so that the Fellows
keep their identity as a group. It seems to me the problem
is just space, once we know some people we'd like to have.

I propose this for the agenda of our next meeting. Are we
going to have a meeting?

TCS:ac

cc. Brown
    Halperin
    Kissinger

Kissinger
Herbert
cc: Brown

TCS:sc

Do you have a meeting?

I brook this for the audience of our next meeting. Are we
just abase, once we know some people we'd like to have.
keep their identity as a group. It seems to me the problem
to distinguish them from the elevates, so that the elevates
below stay from having them around. I think we do want
It they are good. I think we want them. I think even the
pace and attention with the elevates.

rather than prosper. Second, do you seriously compete for
Do we want people of this kind--people who want to do better
There are two questions.

Mike Graic, would come at the weekend, a expense.
Journalet was doing to come at our expense, but Martin,
same subject? I think Mork has a good point. Our Swiss
Did you see my memo on Martin and Mork's memo to me on the

To: R. R. Bowie

From: T. C. Schelling

December 4, 1961

November 26, 1962

From: T. C. Schelling

To: Messrs. R. R. Bowie, B. B. Brown, M. H. Halperin, F. Ikle
H. A. Kissinger

This past summer I became very closely acquainted with Charles
Herzfeld, Assistant Director of ARPA for Active Defense. He is
brilliant, imaginative, and I believe a good judge of intellect.
One of his people, J. J. Martin, was going to be nominated for the
National War College next year. Herzfeld thought that a year at
our Center would be better for him. Martin is a physicist who has
worked on a lot of weapon problems but in the last few years has
gotten interested in war, deterrence, and all that. He wants to
improve his general education in these areas, and also to do some
writing.

We have never had a civilian Fellow from the Department of Defense.
Most civilians in DOD probably don't need a year here if they are
very good, since most of them have had years in contact with
academic life. Perhaps we should consider somebody like Martin,
whose background is rather more technical than that of somebody
like Art Barber or Harry Rowen, and who could use the year here much
the way an Air Force officer could.

Since Martin looks pretty good, the possibility is more than hypothetical.
We might pursue Martin, or we might open up regular procedures with
the Secretary of Defense with the expectation that Martin would
probably be one of the candidates.

We have thirteen Fellows this year. CIA will probably resume sending
a man next year. A DOD person would raise the total to fifteen.
In principle I would be for letting DOD civilians come, if it makes
sense for the particular individual, as it may in the case of Martin.
But this begins to raise the question of what total number we want.

I am in no hurry to say anything to Martin, but if there were any
likelihood that he would be asked here he would like to come and
visit us for a day or two.

If you have any thoughts on this would you please send them to
Bowie, Brown and Schelling.

Enc. (1)

JOHN J. MARTIN

EDUCATION:

B.S.M.E., University of Notre Dame - 1943

M.S.M.E., University of Notre Dame - 1950

Ph.D., Purdue University - 1951

INDUSTRIAL EXPERIENCE:

1960- Institute for Defense Analyses
1960 Advanced Research Projects Division. Scientific Consultant on Project DEFENDER Re-entry Physics and Range Measurements programs.
1960- Research and Engineering Support Division. Scientific Consultant to Office of Director Defense Research and Engineering relative to Project DEFENDER, Limited Warfare, Penetration Aids research and development; also, member of Nike Zeus Technical Advisory Group, and consultant to British Royal Radar Establishment and Australian Weapons Research Establishment on Black Knight Program.
1961- Weapons Systems Evaluation Division. Scientific Consultant to Joint Chiefs of Staff on Penetration Studies.
1953-1960: Bendix Aviation Corporation, Products Division, South Bend-Mishawaka, Indiana.
1959-1960: Chief, Engineering Research, Advanced Development Laboratories. Responsible for preliminary analyses of commercial and military systems.
1958-1959: Chief Engineer, Applied Sciences Laboratory. Responsibility for technical direction of 30-40 engineers and scientists in the area of Mechanics, Aerodynamics and Propulsion, Aero- and Astrophysics and Applied Mathematics. This was a development of 1957-1958 responsibilities, and related generally to ballistic missile defense.
1957-1958: Senior Systems Engineer in Preliminary Design and Systems Engineering Group with responsibility for Applied Science analysis and design relating to anti-ICBM and other activities.

-2-

[Lc]

1955-1957 Assistant Chief Systems Analyst with technical direction of 4Q-50 engineers working in Talos aerothermodynamics, structures, dynamics and computer facility activities which covered problems in the following specific areas: external aerodynamics, ram-jet diffuser design and internal aerodynamics, heat transfer and thermodynamics, flight test proposals, structures, stress, loads analysis and weight and balance accounting; electronic and mechanical systems pre- and post-flight analysis; computer facility (including analogue, digital and digital differential analyser computers).

1953-1954 Senior Engineer in Systems Analysis Group with supervision of Talos structural, electronic- and mechanical-system heat transfer, internal and external aerodynamic problems, mechanical systems dynamic analysis and structural analysis.

1951-1953 North American Aviation, Inc., Downey, California, as Research Engineer in Preliminary Design and Analysis Group of Aerophysics Laboratory. Primary responsibilities for thermodynamics, heat transfer and aerodynamic problems relating to Navaho - specifically in fuel heating, structural heating, applied boundary layer stability analysis, radiation problems, etcetera.

MILITARY:

1943-1946 U. S. Navy - honorably discharged. Navy experience was in N. T. Schools (U. S. Naval Academy, Harvard, M.I.T.) and NOB Guam as Ship Repair Officer.

MISCELLANEOUS:

Registered Professional Engineer in California
(by examination).

Patent: Ballistic Missile Defense System (SECRET).

Papers:

Effect on Heat Transfer of Angle of Attack at Supersonic Velocities", North American Aviation, Inc., Aerophysical Laboratory Report PDM-75, March 25, 1952.

"A Graphical Method for Determining Exact Boundary Layer Temperatures," J. Aero. Sci., August 1952.

"Energy Removal from a Supersonic Boundary Layer," J. Aero. Sci., February 1953.

"Graphical Solution for 'Turbulent Boundary Layer in Compressible Fluids'." J. Aero. Sci., February 1953.

"Effects of Angle of Attack on Local Skin - Friction Coefficients at $Mo=4,$" J. Aero. Sci., March 1953.

"An Investigation of Aircraft Fuel Heating Problems," Bumblebee Aerodynamics Panel (Navy BuOrd), June 1955. (Confidential).

"Combined Forced and Free Convective Heat Transfer in a Horizontal Pipe," Annual Meeting ASME, November 13-18, 1955. (With M. B. Carmichael).

Book Review, Jet Propulsion; December 1955: "Probability and Information Theory".

Book Review, Jet Propulsion, April 1956: "Mathematics of Engineering Systems".

Advanced Research Projects Agency, Ballistic Missile Defense Symposium, June-Sept., 1958, three Secret papers.

"Atmospheric Reentry Slowdown," published by Bendix Products Division - Missiles, Mishawaka, Indiana. Circa 1957.

"Ballistic Trajectory Ranges," published by Bendix Products Division - Missiles, Mishawaka, Indiana, 1957.

"Ballistic Time vs. Position," published by Bendix Products Division - Missiles, Mishawaka, Indiana, 1958.

"Anti-ICBM Target Study," Bendix Report BPD867-3, December 1, 1958, six Secret papers. Army Contract DA-11-022-ORD-2649.

[LC]

-4-

"Downrange (Ballistic Missile) Data Analysis and Correlation," Proc. Jan. 1960 Anti-Missile Research Advisory Council, Advanced Research Projects Agency, January 19-20, 1960 (Secret). Also published as Bendix Report BPD867-21, December 17, 1959 (Secret).

"On the Determination of Ballistic Characteristics from Passively Emitted Radiation," Ballistic Missile Defense Symposium, RAND Corp., Inc., June 13, 14, 15, 1960.

"The 90-Kiloyard Effect". Proc. July 1960 Anti-Missile Research Advisory Council, Advanced Research Projects Agency.

"Chemistry and Contaminants in Reentry Measurements," Proc. May, 1961 Anti-Missile Research Advisory Council, Advanced Research Projects Agency.

"Weighing Reentry Objects by Redundant Stationary Means", Proc. Nov. 1961 Anti-Missile Research Advisory Council, Advanced Research Projects Agency.

January 9, 1963

From: T. C. Schelling

To: R. R. Bowie

John Dunlop, who is some kind of mediator between the
Air Force and the Union at Cape Canaveral, would like
to get a General Thurman invited to Harvard for a month.
Thurman apparently is in charge of procurement contract-
ing for the Air Force. He thinks Thurman would be quite
interesting on some of the politics of procurement,
placement, etc.

I told him I thought we were probably not the place to
invite that particular General for a month, but maybe
the Business School could be his sponsor. But if he
were invited I said we would probably write him a
letter inviting him to get acquainted with the Center
when he arrived. Dunlop may pursue this, and we may
hear further. I told him I thought there was no need
to check with Bowie or Kissinger at this stage. OK?

TCS:ac
cc. HAK

January 15, 1963

From: T. C. Schelling

To: R. R. Bowie

I had a nice talk with John Vogt who is managing the selection of the Air Force Fellows. We discussed a few names and will keep in touch. It will help now if the Chief of Staff gets the usual letter.

I located the Army people who now have the responsibility for the selection. Under the Chief of Personnel Operation (Maj. General S. R. Hanmer) there is a Director of Officer Personnel (Maj. General H. J. Jablonsky), under whom is the Executive Officer for Career Planning (Col. S. N. Homan), and finally, the guy who is at the end of the line, Lt. Col. J. J. Briscoe, Chief of the Civil School Branch. I believe this is different from the way it was handled in the past. I chatted a while with Homan and Briscoe; they are not the highest type officers I have ever met. They seem happy to be in touch and are eager for suggestions; I told them I would be happy to look over their own lists of candidates if they wished me to. They seemed, I suppose, for bureaucratic reasons, to be interested in your sending your letter not to the Chief of Staff but to General Jablonsky, on grounds that it would both save time and please their General. I didn't meet Jablonsky so I don't know whether he cares. I said I thought we'd want to keep the direct relation with the Chief of Staff but possibly we could send an action letter to Jablonsky as well as a letter to the Chief of Staff saying that we were already in touch with the Officer of Personnel Directorate. OK?

Larry Legere is very much interested for the year after next; Mac Bundy is releasing him in a few months, he will command troops for about a year and then would like to come here. He would be good. Most of my candidates appear unavailable for next year, but I am still working on it.

TCS:ac

cc. B. Brown, H. Kissinger

cc. Meares, Brown, Harberin, Klaarner

TC2:sc

man to talk with.

when he comes to the seminar next month. He is a very easy
the French for a Fellow? We might talk about this to Larry
What do we do about France? Have we given up pressing

find a good officer. I think we should take the ideas seriously.
it with Krabt when he comes next month. They could help us
having two from a country, and in any case we can talk about
Office) Fellow. I said I thought we might consider occasionally
ever, wanted not to do it at the expense of their own (foreign
at our Center was an unrivaled opportunity. They both, how-
new generation of German officers, and believed that a year
were extremely interested in ways of broadening some of the
officer as a Fellow at the Center. Krabt and Reinkemeyer
we treated was a possibility of inviting a German military
Reinkemeyer and another man in Brown, and among the subjects
I had a rather long conversation with Krabt,

To: R. R. Bowie

From: T. C. Schelling

April 10, 1963

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
ALEX INKELLES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

May 9, 1963

From: T. C. Schelling

To: Messrs. Bowie, Kissinger, Halperin, Holst

Subject: June Seminar

I have quite firmly told Nils Orvik that we were assuming he would join our seminar in June and that the only reason his name was not on our list was oversight in the treatment of local talent. I have assumed all along that we meant this and had explicitly agreed on it back at the time when we talked about Norwegian participation.

Fred Wyle, who initially helped us in selecting some of the Europeans would like very much to spend a day with us during the seminar so that he can discharge his responsibility for promoting similar activities in the future. He and Tim Stanley (back in Paul Nitze's office after a year at the Council) are a two-man State-Defense working group to promote the "strategic dialogue" with our Atlantic partners. I took the liberty of saying that we would surely make one of them welcome for a day, that we already had invited three people (Rowen, Herzfeld and Kent) and that probably Wyle should come rather than Stanley and that he should try to come when the others were not here just to even out the attendance. They may both want to come, and I hedged a little on that. Is this OK? If you really think we are getting too jammed I can always call them back and say we have overpopulation problem. They are probably less interested in attending the formal sessions than in seeing the people and talking to us, so the questions is whether they clutter up the halls and dining rooms.

Incidentally, what is our own internal agreement about attendance? Are we all planning to spend most days there, or to have a controlled absence rate for ourselves, or just wait and see whether we will all show up most of the time? I have been assuming that I would try hard to be present nearly all of the time but would be free to skip a day or two if it was urgent. O.K., I have declared my hand.

TCS:ac

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

June 12, 1963

From: T. C. Schelling

I was extremely well impressed with Nathan Leites at our conference, particularly his original presentation. I told him so with such enthusiasm that we ended up agreeing that he should spend some time here next year. He may be free in the month of December. I told him I was quite sure that if he came here for a month out of the time that he would normally spend out at RAND we could probably finance his salary for the purpose. I would like very much to have him here, and he would very much appreciate a chance to work with several of us. We might or might not get an "occasional paper" out of him for his stay, but I am sure there will be several of us who could benefit from having him.

Would you be agreeable to my telling him in writing that we would finance him for a month at the Center sometime in the middle of next year? I think he will come only if I can promise to spend some time working with him, and I am not ready to make any promise. But I would like to let him feel that the arrangement was otherwise confirmed.

TCS:ac

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director
ALEX INKELES
HENRY A. KISSINGER
EDWARD S. MASON
THOMAS C. SCHELLING
RAYMOND VERNON

July 16, 1963

Mr. Peter King
The Research School of Pacific Studies
The Australian National University
Box 4 GPO
Canberra A.C.T.

Dear Mr. King:

For the past few months we have been making our various plans and commitments for next year, considering quite a number of people who would like to spend time with us, and it has now become quite clear that we are not in a position to offer you any kind of research association with the Harvard Center in the immediate future. I am sorry about this; it would have been a great pleasure to have you here.

I shall continue to take an interest in the work you do and would appreciate your continuing to send me reprints of anything you publish. Our position a year from now may be different, and I wish you would consider yourself eligible in principle to join us for a year at some time. It just could not be worked out this year.

TCS:ac

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

ROBERT R. BOWIE, Director

July 22, 1963

From: T. C. Schelling

To: Messrs. R. Bowie and H. Kissinger

I have been getting better acquainted with Pete Scoville at Woods Hole this summer. Pete has been Director of Scientific Intelligence for CIA for a good many years, I believe since about 1956 or 1957. Before that he was in the Atomic Energy Program from about 1946, in charge of at least one series of nuclear tests, and has served on a number of memorable committees in the field of nuclear weapons. I have been on a few panels with him from time to time and liked him; this summer I have been absolutely delighted to draw on his knowledge and I have truly enjoyed working with him.

He has retired from CIA, taken a two weeks' fishing trip to Newfoundland, spent about four weeks with my group in Woods Hole, and is thinking about what to do next. One thing he has in mind is to take two years to collect his thoughts on the history of nuclear weapons policy, particularly weapon testing, and the test ban. He is evidently in a unique position to do this. I know, also, that he can write.

I told him that if he decided to go ahead with this project he ought to consider our Center as a place to do it. I went pretty far in saying that we would enjoy having him and could probably finance it. I did this without consulting you because it arose when I had dinner with him and it seemed a good opportunity to raise the possibility with him and I really thought that there was no risk at all in believing that you would be pleased with the prospect. I suggested to him that he might try to drop in in August and meet you so that we could all talk about it.

For family reasons he has a preference for Washington. He may think that, even if he does the project, Washington will be a better place because of the information available. But I think