FOOTNOTES

9

Pg45:

¹Mankiewicz, a former Peace Corps official and press secretary to Senator Robert Kennedy, was accompanied by Kirby Jones, who had also been an official in the Peace Corps, and the documentary film maker Saul Landau. Subsequently, Mankiewicz and Jones published their lengthy interviews in *With Fidel* (Playboy Press, 1975; Ballantine, 1976).

²On March 30, 1977, *The Washington Post* published a brief story about secret talks between US and Cuban officials, based on an interview with William D. Rogers, who had served as Henry Kissinger's assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs. Drawing on that article, in early 1992 a team of researchers—including the authors, Boston University professor Janet Lang, American University professor Philip Brenner, and Harvard Univer-

October 6, 1994

sity professor Jorge Dominguez—arranged a series of meetings with the key people involved in both countries, among them: Kissinger, his then special assistant Lawrence Eagleburger, William D. Rogers, and Frank Mankiewicz; and in Cuba, Ramón Sánchez-Parodi, who served as Castro's special emissary during the talks, and Ricardo Alarcón, then Cuba's ambassador to the United Nations, whose office served as Cuba's headquarters for the negotiations with Washington. Through the Freedom of Information Act, we obtained the declassification of a "special projects" file kept by Rogers, which contained top-secret documents recording the process by which Kissinger formulated policy, as well as the furtive negotiations with Cuban officials and the diplomatic maneuvering designed to set the stage for a dramatic change in US-Cuban relations. For the memorandum containing Kissinger's quotation beginning "Behave chivalrously," see footnote 16.

³Sánchez-Parodi was interviewed in Havana on the Kissinger initiative in December 1992 and May 1993. His comments cited here are drawn from transcripts of those meetings.

Pg 46:

⁴"Normalizing Relations with Cuba," a comprehensive policy paper prepared for Assistant Secretary Rogers by his deputy Harry Shlaudeman in March 1975.

⁵Nixon became personally antagonistic to Castro soon after the revolution. They met in April 1959, when Castro made his first, and only, semi-official visit to Washington, DC. To avoid seeing him, President Eisenhower decided to leave town for a golfing vacation; instead, Nixon held a three-hour meeting with Castro at the then vice-president's Capitol Hill office. Nixon found the Cuban revolutionary leader to be "intelligent, shrewd, at times eloquent," but, as he reported to Eisenhower, "incredibly naive about Communism or [already] under Communist discipline." Nixon left the meeting, as he later wrote "the strongest and most persistent advocate of CIA covert efforts to overthrow Castro."

⁶Dr. Kissinger made these comments, and others cited here, at a private conference with the authors and several other scholars on August 23, 1993. Former secretary of state Lawrence Eagleburger and former assistant secretaries William D. Rogers and Harry Shlaudeman also attended the meeting, which was organized by the Center for American Policy Development at Brown University's Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies and held at the Rockefeller estate in Pocantico Hills, New York.

⁷Kissinger is not even sure whether he told Nixon about the Mankiewicz message. "There is a high probability that I'd told Richard Nixon," he recalls. "Ford knew for sure though I might have said I'd wait on details until something came back. Certainly Nixon had other things on his mind at that point."

⁸Eagleburger does not remember why he chose this particular alias, but he does recall that his failure to inform his wife almost ended the diplomacy before it began. "My wife came to me and said, 'Larry, a strange man has called three times tonight asking for a Mr. Henderson. First I told him he had the wrong number; then I told him that no such person lives here; then I hung up on him.'"

⁹The four officials were supposed to meet in a more isolated airport restaurant, but when the wait for a table proved too long, they ended up at the cafeteria. At one point, Sánchez-Parodi remembers, a blind man approached the table selling ballpoint pens. "Here we were in a fast-food joint, muttering in hushed tones about how to normalize US-Cuban relations, and a supposedly blind guy leans over our table and starts flashing pens around," he said. "Maybe he taped that meeting."

¹⁰Eagleburger to Kissinger, Secret/Sensitive "Meeting in New York with Cuban Representatives, January 11, 1975," with aide-mémoire attached.

¹¹Rogers to Kissinger, Secret, "The United States and Cuba: A Balance Sheet," January 2, 1975. Rogers also advised Kissinger that the Cuban government would want the US, among other demands, to halt surveillance overflights, crack down on violent exile activities, return Guantánamo, release frozen Cuban assets, and end trade restrictions.

¹²This small gesture was not so simple to carry out, however. "Unfortunately, the Byzantine bureaucratic structure passed down from an earlier age requires the approval of a State-Defense-Justice Committee for the move," Rogers informed Eagleburger. "It can be done quickly, but too many people will know about it. There will be some gnashing of teeth here. EUR [the European bureau] will want the same for Albania—EA [East Asia] for Mongolia."

¹³In fact, the Ford administration made this decision under pressure from the government of Canada. On January 28, Canadian embassy official Vernon Turner told Deputy Assistant Secretary for Canadian Affairs Richard Vine that his government considered a change in US policy on this issue "to be a matter of highest importance in US-Canadian relations."

¹⁴One gesture that was repeatedly considered but ruled out was "baseball diplomacy"—authorizing Commissioner of Baseball Bowie Kuhn to

FOOTNOTES p. 2

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Pg. 48

14 (cont'd.)

take a professional team to Havana for an exhibition game with the Cubans. Kuhn first proposed the idea to Kissinger in a letter dated January 14, 1975, and requested permission to set up a series of games in late March. Rogers supported the proposal, pointing out to Kissinger the inevitable parallels with "ping-pong" diplomacy: "The Chinese ping-pong players were accepted by the US public as a good way to break the ice between countries separated by decades of hostility. Baseball with Cuba would serve a similar purpose in bridging the gap between the Bay of Pigs and a new relationship with Castro." But Kissinger vetoed his recommendation because it would call too much attention to the secret diplomacy. Kuhn unsuccessfully proposed the idea again in May, June, and July of 1975 and was still pursuing the possibility of taking a group of All-Stars to Havana in November. "Basically, [Kuhn] wanted to be the 'ping-pong diplomat' of Cuba," Rogers recollects.

October 6, 1994

¹⁵Rogers to Kissinger, "Cuba Policy: After the OASGA [Organization of American States General Assembly]," May 17, 1975.

¹⁶This dialogue is based on verbatim notes taken by Culver Gleysteen, one of Rogers's deputies, which were transcribed in a secret "Memorandum of Conversation on Cuba Policy: Tactics Before and After San José," June 9, 1975.

¹⁷Sánchez-Parodi's recollection of the Pierre Hotel meeting was that it was a rushed affair where the Americans discussed the US agenda, but the Cubans were unable to broach theirs. "I had come from Havana with a long list of issues to discuss," he recalls. "Eagleburger was obviously in a hurry. It seemed to me that he was more interested in not missing his shuttle flight than in discussing issues standing in the way of normalization of US-Cuban relations."

¹⁸Kissinger to the President, "Third Country Sanctions against Cuba," August 19, 1975.

¹⁹NSDM, "Termination of US Restrictions on Third Country Trading with Cuba," August 19, 1975.

²⁰Rogers and Eagleburger to Kissinger, Secret/Nodis/Eyes Only, "Cuban Family Visits," January 12, 1976.

²¹Eagleburger to Kissinger, Secret/Nodis, "Memorandum of Conversation," February 7, 1976.

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22 Rogers and Eagleburger to Kissinger, Secret/Nodis/Eyes Only, "Cuban Family Visits," January 12, 1976.

²³On Cuba and the missile crisis see Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Four Days with Fidel," *The New York Review*, March 26, 1992, pp. 22-29; Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, editors, *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962* (The New Press, 1992); and James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis and the Soviet Collapse* (Pantheon, 1993). □

10

interoffice
MEMORANDUM

**to:** Dr. Kissinger through Rosemary

**from:** Polly Kelekis

**subject:** Additional Cuba Information

**date:** April 18, 1997

Attached please find material from footnotes 1 and 2 of *The New York Review* article written by Kornbluh and Blight, "Dialogue with Castro: A Hidden History."

Included are the following:

* Footnote 1: *With Fidel: A Portrait of Castro and Cuba*, by Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, pp. 126-156. The section is entitled "The United States and Cuba." Within this section—specifically pp. 147-150—is a series of questions that Castro answered about his impressions of you.

* Footnote 2: *The Washington Post* article, "U.S. Held Secret Talks with Cuba in '74, '75," written by Don Oberdorfer, March 30, 1977. As the footnote mentioned, this brief article is about "secret talks between U.S. and Cuban officials, based on an interview with William D. Rogers, who had served as Henry Kissinger's assistant secretary for Inter-American Affairs. . . ."

Copyright 1977 The Washington Post
The Washington Post

March 30, 1977, Wednesday, Final Edition

SECTION: First Section; A11

LENGTH: 560 words

HEADLINE: U.S. Held Secret Talks With Cuba in '74, '75

BYLINE: By Don Oberdorfer, Washington Post Staff Writer

BODY:

High-level officials of the United States and Cuba engaged in secret discussions on a broad range of issues from November, 1974, until November, 1975, informed sources said yesterday.

The talks, which were known to only a handful of officials at the time, were acknowledged by the State Department as representatives of the two countries were meeting in New York City in new, publicly announced discussions. Though ostensibly dealing with fishing rights in the waters around the two countries, the current discussions are expected by many to lead to broader efforts to patch up U.S.-Cuban relations.

The earlier discussion, according to participants, led to a series of unilateral and seemingly unrelated steps by each side. On the Cuban side the steps included release of some political prisoners, invitations to U.S. lawmakers and other visitors, the return of the hijacker of an American airplane and $2 million in ransom money taken by an earlier hijacker, and "marked improvement" of public statements about the United States.

On the U.S. side steps flowing from the secret talks included U.S. approval for an end to the political and economic embargo imposed on Cuba by the Organization of American States, dropping of U.S. sanctions against trade with Cuba by overseas subsidiaries of U.S. firms, and easing of travel restrictions for Cuban diplomats at the United Nations. The Cubans were informed in advance of the steps before action was taken.

The U.S. participants in the 1974-1975 talks were Lawrence S. Eagleburger, then executive assistant to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and William D. Rogers, then assistant secretary of state for inter-American affairs Rogers who is now in private law practice here, said yesterday that Kissinger, Eagleburger and himself were the only State Department officials informed of the "very delicate" discussions at the time.

State Department officials working in Latin American affairs said they never

heard of the discussions until a few days ago. The State Department
acknowledged the talks at this time because the present open and direct talks
with Cuba makes continued secrecy unnecessary, officials said.

The secret talks were initiated by telephone contacts from Eagleburger to a
key official of the Cuban mission to the United Nations in November, 1974. This
was followed by a meeting between Eagleburger and a Cuban emissary at John F.
Kennedy International Airport in New York.

Rogers was brought into the discussions in February, 1975. He participated
in three face-to-face sessions with Eagleburger and a final meeting between
himself and a single Cuban emissary in the coffee shop of National Airport in
late November, 1975.

The growing Cuban military intervention in Angola in the fall of 1975 was
among the reasons for failure of the diplomatic effort. But specialists on Cuban
affairs speculate that divisions at high levels in Havana about U.S. relations
as well as the approach of the 1976 U.S. election may have contributed to the
collapse.

Rogers, who declined to identify the Cuban negotiators, said the earlier
discussions showed that "it is clearly possible and indeed essential to approach
problems of U.S.-Cuban relations in a comprehensive way." He said the full range
of issues between the two countries had been placed before the Cubans in
1975-75.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

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different. Two different cultures will be facing each other.

## THE UNITED STATES AND CUBA

**Q.** How can ties between Cuba and the United States be established?

**A.** Ah, which ties can be established? First of all, we are neighbors. Independently of our will, our geographical location and that of the United States makes us neighbors. We cannot move, nor can the United States. This is speaking realistically, that someday some sort of ties will be established between the United States and Cuba. It is dictated by geography, history, and the very interests of Cuba and the United States. Of course, we think of the future of Latin America, and we believe that the Latin American countries should unite, and we believe that in a not-so-distant future, Cuba will form part of that integrated community of Latin American nations. That someday we will have not only economic, but also political unity. And, as I said earlier, I don't believe there is any future for a small, isolated country in this hemisphere. But even under those conditions, there will have to be relations between the United States and that community of nations. And Cuba, either as a single separate state or as part of that community, is a neighbor, one of the closest neighbors of the United States, and logically, sooner or later, economic and political relations will have to

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develop between Cuba and the United States.

We, of course, will not plead with the United States to renew relations, economic relations; nor are we going to plead to reestablish political relations. I see this as an inevitable historical necessity, when circumstances change, when passions die down, and when men can think more calmly and coldly, so that someday they will take place, and those ties will develop.

They will be very different ties from those that previously existed between Cuba and the United States. First of all, they will have to be ties with a truly free country, which ours regrettably was not.

**Q.**

**A.** Even though Cuba fought very valiantly for its independence for over thirty years during the nineteenth century, in the end the United States intervened. That intervention meant the occupation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines, the intervention in and the establishment of large economic interests from the United States in Cuba; a growing political dependency; the Guantanamo base was established—a piece of our territory was occupied; the Platt Amendment was passed, which gave the United States the right to intervene in Cuba. This the United States knows and historians know—many have written about it. No country fights for decades for its independence to have a Platt Amendment imposed upon them. Besides, for a long time, many American Presidents considered the occupation and absorption of Cuba as their destiny. And that danger existed until the end of the nineteenth century. During our War of Independence, the purchase of Cuba from the Spaniards was discussed more than once; to buy her for a certain price and thus solve the problem as had been

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done with Florida and Louisiana. That was an old expansionist strategy of the United States. And I would say that what saved Cuba from annexation to the United States was the patriotic fervor of our people, the fact that they fought for so long for their independence, and had a national conscience. Then things changed. The intervention took place, the Platt Amendment was imposed, and the right to intervene legally to maintain order, and all those excuses. There was a real political domination and economic domination of the United States over Cuba.

But this situation will not return. When there are men in the United States who understand this reality, our relations should be based on absolute mutual respect and equality. We are patient, and we will know how to wait. We are in no hurry. We are also very realistic and we will therefore wait for the right historical conditions for the establishment of these relations.

But also from a realistic point of view we believe that those ties will develop. They could be economic ties, people-to-people relations, cultural exchange, technical exchange: but from the political standpoint it will be an exchange between two different cultures. It will be the culture of a free-enterprise, capitalist society and that of a socialist country.

I do not know when the United States will change its present system of free enterprise for a different social system, for a socialist system, but I am certain that it will be decades, many decades. But someday the economic and social system will change —I am sure. Someday the social systems of Cuba and the United States will meet, when the United States changes its social system. The capitalist social system will not be eternal.

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Q. How will relations develop between the United States and Cuba?

A. The course of relations? Look, I think that any step taken must first be taken by the United States. Because the major, fundamental problem is the economic blockade. It was a decision taken by the United States, which it has maintained, for the purpose of preventing the economic development in Cuba and of choking the Revolution. To tell you the truth, it has been a hard struggle, the fight against the blockade, but we have survived. The Revolution was not asphyxiated, the country is developing at a satisfactory rate, and we believe that nothing can prevent our country from maintaining this level of development in future years.

So that now we are used to the situation and all our plans have taken the economic blockade into account, but in our opinion it is up to the United States to put an end to the blockade.

We took an important step when we signed the hijacking agreement. We have no major airlines, and the hijackings were affecting, hurting, the United States and not us. The determining factor that led us to sign the agreement was really a concern for international public opinion—for the people of the United States. It was done in a favorable spirit in an attempt to help solve a serious problem which could result in many catastrophies and the tragic loss of lives. This was the basic reason, not a special desire to make a gesture towards the government of the United States.

We took this constructive step in order to find a common solution with the government of the United States. We now wait for the United States to take the next step. That next step would have to be

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putting an end to the blockade. This is a sine qua non condition, because the blockade, in our judgment, was an unjust act, which lacks logic and morale. It maintains a hostile cold war policy toward us, and the United States is involved in a demeaning fight with us, of course. It is more and more criticized throughout the world. The Latin American nations remove themselves more and more from this policy, and I don't think that these trends of reestablishment of economic and political relations between Latin American countries and Cuba can be stopped. It is a powerful movement. Therefore, the United States's policy toward Cuba is discredited, morally weak in every sense.

Q.

What does the blockade mean? What effect has the blockade had on Cuba's everyday life?

A.

The blockade affects us in many ways, and I can explain some of them to you in a practical sense. First of all, the transports—there is a blacklist for carriers. And Cuba has to export all its products by sea and import all the products it consumes by sea. It has to charter ships, and the fact that any ship traveling to Cuba is put on the American blacklist makes things quite difficult for us and the price of sea transportation is very high for Cuba. It is one of the difficulties.

Many of the world's industries produce goods with North American technology and have direct or working relations with North American patents. We do not. Whenever we try to purchase a certain type of equipment, we face the problem that we have no business relations with North American industries and we don't have their equipment. The United States has always hampered our development efforts

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because they have exerted pressure on other countries to prevent them from trading with us. Also, the United States makes it very difficult for us to have access to loans.

Q.

What about international organizations?

A.

We cannot rely on any organization because they are always dominated by the United States. There is also a technological problem. That is, we are deprived of access to the technological achievements realized by the United States.

And finally, from the commercial standpoint, there are problems in obtaining certain supplies. The United States is the source of some products, some agricultural techniques, some raw materials, and some products which we cannot obtain. All our purchases that we need have to take a long voyage to reach Cuba. Therefore, we cannot deny that the economic blockade is a very heavy drain on our country, but it has not prevented the consolidation of the Revolution, nor the development of our country, because our development will continue. But it does constitute an economic drain. The importance of the blockade for us cannot be underestimated, and they, of course, know it. They know well the figures and they know that the United States creates many difficulties for the Cuban economic development. The United States not only refuses to trade with us, but it takes punitive measures against the ships that come to Cuba, against the countries that trade with Cuba. Now, here you have a recent example: Bangladesh. A small country with fifty million inhabitants that has suffered a great natural catastrophe, enormous floodings, which is in need of food. Then the United States, in order to grant Bangladesh certain ship-

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ments of foodstuffs—I believe, one hundred thousand tons of wheat and some other foodstuffs—it set a condition to Bangladesh that it break its commercial relations with Cuba. In reality, actually, it is a great shame that in order to be able to extend a certain assistance to a country very much in need of it, you impose on it a harsh condition, a humiliating condition. I don't know what Bangladesh is going to do, but, of course, if Bangladesh stops trade with us because of a situation of *force majeure*, because they are in a situation of hunger and because they are going to receive food from the United States, we cannot criticize Bangladesh, because we understand its special situation. But isn't this really a shame, isn't it conceited, isn't it ridiculous that the United States, in order to ship a bit of food to a country which has faced a very great natural catastrophe, forbids it to trade with Cuba, because it is selling Cuba some jute bags, and henceforth Bangladesh won't be able to sell jute bags to Cuba? It is because of this that we are establishing the condition that there cannot be, that there cannot be an equality of circumstances for negotiations, so long as one of the parties maintains a coercive measure against us. And we have posed as an indispensable condition that the blockade must cease.

Q. Could you tell us some of the specific results of the blockade during 1959, 1960?

A. It was very serious, because all of Cuba's industries were American-made. Our transportation means came from the United States, and all of a sudden we found ourselves unable to buy spare parts for vehicles or for industries.

There are many countries which at first did not

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dare trade with us for fear of the American prohibitions. Slowly, trade developed, and it is much greater now. We trade with almost all the Western capitalist countries. Our trade with Europe has increased considerably, and our trade with Japan as well, and we are receiving better terms. Our means of transportation have slowly been replaced. Our industrial equipment has slowly been replaced. That is why in the beginning, the blockade hurt us much more than today.

The United States has always exerted pressure on other countries to prevent the establishment of trade. The financial resources of the United States have also exerted pressure to prevent the obtaining of financial resources on the part of Cuba. The blockade has also forced us to develop a policy of austerity, to be more careful with our resources; we had to try harder. But it has also had a positive effect, because we had to force ourselves in the midst of all these difficulties. We wonder what would be the conditions in other countries with a similar blockade as that imposed upon Cuba by the United States, by the most powerful country, financially, economically, technologically.

One should ask therefore, not how much Cuba has developed, but under what conditions Cuba has developed during these past years. Of course, Soviet aid has been very valuable to us. That has been a determining factor in our fight against the blockade. For example, with the energy crisis, which has presented such a problem for other countries. We did not suffer an energy crisis. We continued to receive, as in the past fifteen years, all our energy sources from the Soviet Union, in spite of the blockade. We

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Q.

have received food items, the wheat we consume, fertilizers, considerable transportation equipment, agricultural and industrial equipment, and a lot of basic materials. Our electric plants have been installed basically with Soviet equipment, and we produce more electricity now than before the Revolution. Our workshops are equipped with Soviet tools. It has been not only our effort, but the fact that we have the support of international solidarity. While from the United States we received only aggression, from them we received aid. We have received ample proof of their friendship and solidarity. And I must mention this in all fairness and sincerity. Although I think we will profit from the lifting of the blockade, so will the United States.

How is it in President Ford's interest to change relations with Cuba and lift this blockade?

A.

Look, first of all, I believe that those who can actually make a better evaluation are in the United States, right? But I believe that in the first place, to abandon the policy pursued against Cuba is to abandon a policy that today cannot be morally or politically defended, that is devoid of ethics, and that has no justification of any kind. At a moment of international detente, of disappearance of the cold war, what sense does it make to maintain a micro-cold war with Cuba? It really is ridiculous. I believe that, first of all, the United States would benefit morally and would gain politically.

In the second place, take relations with Latin America. There is in Latin America a growing feeling of rapprochement and of solidarity with Cuba. As long as the United States maintains a policy of hostility towards Cuba, its relations with Latin America

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will become more difficult. I have no doubt about it.

There is another element. Cuba will not be the only revolutionary country in Latin America because the history of the United States is not going to repeat itself in Latin America. Latin America is not going to find a solution to its problems along the roads of capitalism. We have talked of the important changes that are taking place in Peru, in Panama, in other countries—and these are the realities that no one can prevent from occurring, the United States cannot prevent them. The United States has to learn to develop relations with revolutionary countries in this hemisphere, and I believe that the form in which the relations of the United States and Cuba will develop will serve as example; the solutions found with Cuba will be solutions similar to the ones the United States will have to find with other countries in this hemisphere. The United States must learn to deal with the community of Latin American countries on terms of equality. And it must develop amicable political and economic relations with this community.

The United States has to learn to live in peace with the rest of the world, because peace interests all of us. The United States has to become interested in peaceful relations with Latin America, with the socialist camp, with Africa, with Asia, with the whole world. Because war and conflicts have not produced any benefits for the United States. That is to say that all this policy of repression of change, all this policy of the international policeman, have not only cost the United States hundreds of billions of dollars, but many other countries as well. The cold war, the arms race, inflation, poverty in the world, and many other problems are all the result, in part, of this policy

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which the United States pursued in earlier years. It is impossible that the North American politicians do not think rationally that these errors of the past must be overcome and that the United States and all the other peoples have to learn to live in peace. Because there is no alternative to peace in today's world, and I believe that the manner in which the problems with a country such as Cuba are approached will indicate the extent to which the United States is really adapting itself to today's world. The United States must be capable of developing friendly relations even though they may have different social regimes, even though it may have a different political ideology. The United States will have to face the fact that in the future Cuba will not be the only revolutionary country in this hemisphere.

Q. Not the only country?

A. It will not be the only socialist country in the hemisphere.

Q. In this hemisphere?

A. Yes, because I am convinced that in one way or another, the people of this hemisphere are headed toward socialist systems of production. Be they the same as Cuba's, be they different, more or less radical. So that in the future, the United States will have to deal with one, two, ten socialist countries in this hemisphere, and maybe even with a union of these peoples. Relations with Cuba will be more or less the beginning of a form of relations with revolutionary countries. The U.S. cannot continue with other countries the policy it applies to Cuba.

It was, for instance, an error to keep the Soviet Union isolated during such a long time. Commercial trade relations could well have been developed. It

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was a mistake to keep China isolated for such a long time. Extensive economic relations could have been developed with these countries, which need equipment, which need technology, and which in turn had products of interest to the United States. And so, the policy towards Cuba is an absurd policy.

There could be other benefits, of an economic nature, even of a material nature—which I have left for last. The United States might be interested in some of Cuba's products and some of the raw materials Cuba is producing. Historically, the United States was a buyer of our products. We were their principal source of sugar. We do not aspire, of course, to return to being their principal source of sugar supply, because we have also developed commercial relations with other countries and we sell sugar to those countries. Our tobacco enjoyed great acceptance in the United States.

Q. We like Cuban cigars.

A. Tobacco was in high demand. They tried to produce the same tobacco in Central America, Santo Domingo, and they were unsuccessful. They took the seeds from Cuba, but failed. Probably due to the climate. The quality of the tobacco is dependent upon the climate, and we remember that even Kennedy would ask his friends to bring him Cuban cigars because he was fond of them. He was an aficionado of Cuban cigars. We also exported seafood, lobsters, shrimp, which are in high demand in the United States. We also produce some raw materials which are very important for industry. For example, we have large nickel deposits and we export it. Today, the United States follows our nickel all over the world to stop its commercial use, when in reality

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nickel is one of the raw materials that it needs for its industries.

But we are also a potential market. We buy in Japan, in Europe, and in many parts of the world. We buy construction equipment, for example, transportation equipment, raw materials, foodstuffs, from countries that are much further away than the United States. So that there is an economic advantage for commercial dealings between the two countries. It would be based mostly on economic exchange, the relations between the two countries. I think we would both have to live within international norms of mutual respect.

I am not going to say that the United States is going to get rich trading with Cuba; materially, the United States can well disregard trade with Cuba, just as Cuba can also disregard trade with the United States; but this is not reasonable. I believe that it would bring about advantages of a material nature. Now, the most important advantages are of a moral nature and of a political nature, because if you are doing something wrong, something unjust, and you rectify it, you gain from this. And all that policy has no moral justification at all at this moment. Besides, sooner or later, it will have to do it.

The important thing that I want to point out is that we are not impatient; time is in our favor. The Revolution is more secure today than ever. The people are more united than ever. And so, we can wait all the time that may be necessary until the United States makes the corrective change, because we have nothing to rectify. What would we have to rectify? All we have done is to defend ourselves, we did not seek to change American society. Nor to impose on

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the United States an economic and political system, a social system. We have sought to change Cuban society and to establish an economic and political system in Cuba, not in the United States. So, we do not have to change anything, it is our right. Now, the United States does not have any right to impose upon Cuba an economic, social, or political system, and it has no right to interfere in the politics of Cuba. It is the United States that must rectify its policies. We are not the ones to carry on a blockade, nor are we the ones who impose conditions; this is reality. But we can wait.

**Q.** What will happen after the blockade is lifted?

**A.** Once the blockade stops, then we can start discussing all the other problems as may be desired. There is the Guantanamo base—it is one of the problems to be discussed.

**Q.** Guantanamo?

**A.** There are two types of problems. Guantanamo is a piece of the national territory of Cuba. It is occupied by the United States, but we do not pose as condition that they must—that in order to start discussions, they must withdraw from Guantanamo; rather we have posed a single condition, which is that the economic blockade be stopped. I can imagine that they have things to claim from us. We have things to claim from them. But in essence, we have not taken any measures against the United States. They, the United States, have taken them against Cuba. We do not have a piece of territory in the United States. We have no base in Florida, or in Washington, or in New England, or in California, or anywhere. They have a base here.

**Q.** What are the other problems?

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A. The United States has to account the amount their interests were affected by the nationalization laws of Cuba, and we have to account the amount of economic damage done to Cuba by the economic blockade. This is without counting the Bay of Pigs, without counting the counterrevolutionary gangs the CIA organized in Cuba which cost us hundreds of millions of pesos, without counting the expenses the United States has forced us to spend on defense, without counting the sabotage. There have been almost fifteen years of hostilities against our country, which have affected us economically. All these questions we can discuss ... but I believe that also we are interested not only in the problems of Cuba, we are also a Latin American country, and we are also interested in what is the political attitude of the United States towards Latin America. Because while the United States takes for itself the right to intervene in any country of Latin America, I do not see any form in which the relations between Cuba and the United States can improve, because we are not going to neutralize ourselves, we are not going to remain silent. We are not going to cross our arms, because we regard ourselves as part of Latin America, economically and politically. We are interested in the attitude of the United States towards Latin America and nothing would please us more than to know that the United States is going to follow with regard to Latin America a policy of respect and a policy of nonintervention.

Q. Some North Americans say that the United States should not renew relations with Cuba until Cuba stops "exporting revolution," as they charge you are doing.

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A. That is inaccurate. I can assure you that Cuba is above all an exporter of sugar. (laughter) It is an absurd assumption, that revolutions can be exported, because they either spring from the people of the nation or else no one can carry them out for them. I don't quite know what is meant by exportation of revolution. That we sympathize with revolutionaries. Yes, we do. That we have aided revolutionaries as much as we have been able to do so, yes, this is true. That the influence of the Cuban revolution can be felt in the revolution of another country. Yes. But that cannot be labeled exportation of revolution. It is an impossible task, to export revolution.

Q. For example, in my country, when we refer to exportation of revolution, we refer to Che Guevara in Bolivia.

A. Right. And what type of exportation of revolution was involved there?

Q. A Cuban, a revolutionary leader ...

A. Right, Che Guevara. He was born in Argentina and fought in the Cuban revolution. It can then be said that Argentina exported revolution to Cuba, and there is nothing further from the truth. A revolutionary with a Latin Americanist spirit fought with us and was willing to die for the Cuban revolution—and he was determined, even while we were still in Mexico, that once he had fulfilled his obligations insofar as the Cuban revolution was concerned, he would fight in Latin America. This was an old dream of his, and he always used to say to us that after he had fulfilled his obligations toward the Cuban revolution, we would allow him to continue his revolutionary struggle. And he followed his ideal. We are not going to say we did not share his beliefs. We did, but the

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decision to continue with the revolutionary struggle was entirely his. He wanted some of the Cubans who had fought with him in the Sierra to accompany him, and they did. They were Cubans and they were revolutionaries and they agreed to go with him, and we had no objections.

Q. What support do you give to other revolutionaries?

A. Well, for us to support revolutionaries it is essential that they be fighting. When they do fight, we help them.

Q. How?

A. Morally and materially, because we had no commitments of any sort that we had to abide by, because if they wanted to export counterrevolution, if they wanted to crush the Cuban revolution, if all the Latin American governments with the exception of Mexico yielded to the orders from the United States and joined the economic blockade and the efforts to destroy the Cuban revolution, we were not going to remain with our hands tied, tied to an international norm. We, therefore, felt that we had the right to help fighting revolutionaries who were trying to carry out a revolution in their countries, because we had no ties with those countries which were trying to crush the Cuban revolution through a blockade. What cannot be said is that Cuba violated its normal relations with any country. That is, if a nation abides by the norms in their relations with us, we reciprocate. Those countries that do not interfere in our internal matters have our highest respect with regard to their internal affairs. But those that violate the international rules in their relationships with us, who attack us, who interfere in our internal affairs, those do not have our respect. I believe we

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are very explicit with regard to this policy.

Q. Some liberals in the United States will say that we are the exporters of revolution—Chile, for instance.

A. Against Chile it was counterrevolution, it was the export of fascism.

We cannot have any illusions from the point of view that our relations would improve while the relations of the United States with Latin America worsen, because we are a Latin American people and we are not going to hold to a selfish position, because we will be in solidarity with the other Latin American countries. When the blockade of Cuba was actually implemented and when they cut off our sugar quota, the United States distributed the quota among many Latin American governments, a certain form of bribery to many governments, handing over to them the sugar quota of Cuba. I understand this to be an act of betrayal of another Latin American country by these governments, but we are not disposed to act in this manner—we are not willing to turn traitors to the interests of our Latin American peoples.

Q. But do you think that without betraying the positions of the Latin American countries the relations with the United States could improve?

A. I believe that if the relations of the United States with the rest of Latin America are bad, then we cannot improve the relations between Cuba and the United States.

Q. You speak of the intervention in Chile, then, from the Latin American point of view, not from that of your country, but overall....

A. No doubt, in this position, I reflected a Latin American sentiment, not only a Cuban sentiment. And we

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have no fear of voicing criticism, because the im-
provement of the relations with the United States, the
possibility that the relations between Cuba and the
United States would improve, cannot be advanced on
the basis that Cuba renounce its principles, that Cuba
renounce its honesty, and that Cuba abandon its soli-
darity with the rest of the Latin American peoples.
If we are going to obtain an improvement in the
relations with the United States at the cost of betray-
ing our principles, then we could not have any im-
provement in the relations with the United States.

You have read what President Ford said about Cuba at his first press conference, saying that our blockade policy is actually the policy of the OAS. If they don't want it, then we shall follow them.

The first statement Ford made ratified to a certain extent the prior policy in which he said that there was no change and there would not be any unless there were changes in the attitude of Cuba. Later, referring to the OAS, he said that in this matter he would follow the measures taken by the OAS. Of course, within the Latin American countries, there is at present a very strong movement against the isolation of Cuba which, in my judgment, is irrepressible and cannot be contained. If the United States attempts to check this movement, it would expose itself to a defeat, because either it would find itself in the minority among the countries making up this organization, or even if it were to maintain a minority sufficiently large to prevent the lifting of the isolation and of the blockade of Cuba and it were to succeed in this, many more countries would move to establish relations with Cuba, in spite of the OAS.

The winds of history are blowing in our favor,

Q.

A.

Havana skyline.

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Kirby Jones and Frank Mankiewicz (r) interviewing Fidel Castro.

Fidel speaking on July 26, 1974, the 21st anniversary of Cuban revolution in Matanzas province.

and therefore I believe that if, in fact, the United States follows this feeling of the majority of Latin America, it would be acting in an intelligent manner. If it does the contrary, it would be acting in a manner that is greatly mistaken. Of course, up until now, the OAS has always done what the United States says, and it would really be interesting to see if, for the first time, the United States would do what the Organization of American States says.

**Q.** Under what conditions would you meet with the President of the United States?

**A.** Two people are not going to sit down to talk with a knife at one's throat, and to talk with the blockade still being imposed is precisely that. If the blockade is ended, then we will sit down to talk, and we would then do so with whomever represents the government of the United States. We could then have an open agenda to discuss the issues that interest the United States, but the requirement for all this is the lifting of the blockade.

**Q.** Have you ever met President Ford?

**A.** No. Not that I recall. I did not have an opportunity, because when I was in the United States many years ago in 1959, I did not meet with members of Congress.

**Q.** Have you read anything about him?

**A.** Not much, only what has been published in the papers.

**Q.** What is your impression of President Ford, so far as you can determine, what he is like, and what he is doing?

**A.** My personal opinion?

**Q.** Yes.

**A.** It seems to me that during the first days he acted with

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great caution, with much discretion. It seems to me
that he found almost unanimous support in the
United States. However, as you know, some things
have happened. I have read a good deal of criticism
because of the pardon of Nixon. I also think that this
posed a moral problem, because it is difficult to un-
derstand that Nixon be pardoned and all the rest of
the people be left to be punished. This does not seem
to be very just. This is, of course, a matter of the
internal policy of the United States and I imagine
there must have been certain reasons for taking this
decision.

From our point of view of foreign policy, there
are two statements that concern us. One was his
justifying statement on the intervention of the CIA in
Chile. And the other was his speeches in the United
Nations and in Detroit on the energy issue, in which
he used what seems to us very strong, pressuring
language, and in a certain form threatening, to the
oil-producing countries. This reflected a certain po-
litical style, from positions of strength. These two
international events are, to the Cubans, to the Latin
Americans, to the countries of the Third World,
something that worries us. Of course, on the other
hand, he has made other statements, favoring the
continuation of the policy of international detente,
which we regard as positive pronouncements. Still, it
is much too early to be able to make an evaluation
of what will be Ford's path in the presidency of the
United States, but up until now we have observed
some positive deeds and others which, from our point
of view, are negative.

Q.

I know that it's early, but have you seen any indica-
tion that President Ford might be the kind of Presi-

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dent with the courage to change his mind and ques-
tion his own policies?

A. He is not involved with the Cuban counterrevolu-
tionary elements. Nixon was personally very much
involved with them. And we have seen in Ford a man
who is above this, these relations of friendship.

We think that the policy of a large and powerful
nation such as the United States cannot be deter-
mined by reason of personal bonds with certain peo-
ple.

From the Cuban point of view, we see Ford with
a certain hope in the sense that he may, after all,
adopt a different policy towards Cuba, and at least he
does not have the personal involvement that Nixon
had in this regard. This is a positive point that can
be pointed out from the Cuban angle. That is all I can
say in fairness, but I have no elements to form an
opinion.

Q. Have you ever met Rockefeller before?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. No. Rockefeller is known, because a lot has been
written about him.

Q. And he has written a lot, and has talked a lot with—

A. He has some relations with the Latin Americans, but
with us Cubans I think he has had no relations.

Q. Under what conditions would you consider meeting
with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger?

A. Well, if Kissinger wishes to come to Cuba as an
individual, as a tourist, like all of you come, we
would not object. In general, we think highly of his
capabilities. He is an intelligent and realistic man,
and truly able—so that we are favorably disposed
toward him. The day that he comes to speak for the

HAK

CASTRO ou HAK

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government of the United States, he would be speaking as its representative, but our condition would be that the blockade be lifted, and then we could discuss as equals. Otherwise, it would be like saying, "We have you blockaded, but let's sit down and discuss our differences."

**Q.** Do you see any problem with the fact that Kissinger was also President Nixon's foreign policy adviser?

**A.** It seems to us that there was not always total agreement between the policy of Kissinger and the policy of Nixon. You see, I do not believe that Kissinger has a personal position that is hostile towards Cuba, while Nixon undoubtedly had a personally hostile position towards Cuba. Besides, Kissinger has shown himself to be a realistic politician who undoubtedly has fought for international detente. And I must say that the positive facts that Nixon has shown in international policies are to a large extent also to be attributed to Kissinger.

**Q.** What about Dr. Kissinger's involvement in the CIA activities in Chile?

**A.** Well, according to the North American press, he was the head of the Committee of Forty, and according to this information, he has a responsibility for this CIA participation in Chile. The fact is, of course, that this is a blow to his prestige. It is a blow, because international public opinion certainly always regarded Kissinger as a man of peace, and this episode in Chile is considered as an act in contradiction with the opinion held of him internationally. But it could also have happened that his enemies, that is, the enemies of international detente, might try to exploit, might try to take advantage of this episode to weaken Kissinger's position and to combat Kissinger's policy. In spite of all of it being very lamentable that

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he might have had any part in the events in Chile, I believe that he is no doubt the most realistic politician, and one who has made the greatest effort to find a solution to the cold war problems in recent years in the United States.

**Q.** Do I understand, then, that despite the revelations about Dr. Kissinger's role about what happened in Chile, that you still consider him a man to respect?

**A.** I am not going to say, of course, that because of that, the image that I and many others had of him, has not been hurt. I will tell you very frankly, for me this was disappointing. Objectively and independent of these unfortunate events, I continue to have a positive evaluation of his international role.

One cannot deny the role he has played in international politics because of a single factor, because of a single event. I believe sincerely that in United States politics, Kissinger is a fighter for detente and for the improvement of international relations. Maybe there are within the government of the United States tendencies favorable to cold war and favorable to international tensions; it is because of that that I consider —I tell you in all honesty—that the role of Kissinger was in general a positive role, and that it will continue to be a positive role in international politics.

**Q.** If you did sit down to discuss with Kissinger, what would you say to him?

**A.** (Laughter) I have not thought about it. We have not thought of it as an immediate possibility. We know he has been successful in diplomatic negotiations and we have spoken to people who have relations with him and who esteem him and consider him a highly intelligent and capable man. He enjoys high international prestige.

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**Q.** Also in Cuba?

**A.** In Cuba he is considered a very capable man for his activities in international diplomacy.

**Q.** Our secretary of state believes in a policy of linkages—

**A.** What?

**Q.** Linkages... that one policy links up with another. In your point of view, is there merit in viewing foreign policy under this light?

**A.** I really do not quite understand the meaning of the theory. Perhaps if you were to explain it better....

**Q.** When he speaks, for example, of Vietnam, he speaks of Vietnam tying in with the Soviet Union, China, Thailand, Cambodia. Foreign relations are not isolated, but each country and each problem is a link with another.

**A.** Well, then, I understand you in that sense. I believe problems are interconnected, and that there was a great linkage among problems. There is no doubt that the problems of Vietnam concern the Soviet Union very much, as they do China. This is to say that the act of aggression against Vietnam was a typical example of aggression against a socialist country, and it was seen badly, annoyingly, by all the socialist countries, and we did, too. In that sense, as you explain that problems are interconnected, there is no doubt that it is so. I don't understand in what sense Kissinger meant it, though. Is this the same theory as Metternich's?

**Q.** Well, they are related, no?

**A.** Then it is obvious that we must study Kissinger's theory in order to be able to criticize it.

**Q.** But if we are speaking of linkages....

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**A.** Lenin said, for example, that the Czarist empire was the weakest link in the capitalist world, and that therefore the revolution could be started. Cuba did not seem to be the weakest link the United States had in Latin America.

**Q.** Which link is it?

**A.** The weakest link? It is the link where the chain breaks. On the contrary, however, Cuba seemed to be one of the strongest links.

**Q.** If Cuba maintains its socialist path, how can Cuba take advantage of an end to the blockade and a renewal of relations with the United States?

**A.** The socialist path is not in question.

**Q.** Without compromise? How can the peoples from such different cultures learn to come together in a new way?

**A.** Of course, we are speaking of two different political cultures—one with a socialist mentality and the other with a capitalist one. It is a fact, and we have to remember that it is precisely the material base, the bases for production, which determines habits. For example, I imagine it would puzzle an American to see how a socialist restaurant, a socialist hotel, factory, store, functions. Americans are used to seeing the proprietor of the restaurant running it, although we should not forget that in the United States there are also private organizations which resemble socialist organizations very much. For example, restaurant chains. The restaurants, the stores, are run by administrators who work for these large companies that own the chains. That is why in general the Marxist theorists, and even Lenin, said that capitalism, when highly developed, created organizations similar to those of a socialist state. But one has to realize that

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other forms of administration still function because, next to the large enterprise, there is the small company, where everything is run by the owner, so that in a capitalist system, a more individualistic attitude is developed. In general, man depends on himself and on himself alone. He does not really rely on others; he expects little from others. Under socialism, a spirit of solidarity results and people work with a feeling of community, and we can see it in the way our people's mentality has changed over the years. Our people now have a socialist conscience, a very high sense of solidarity. In the United States, individualism has been emphasized from the very beginning and it is the type of society that developed. Culturally, we may have similar traits, others that are very different. I am referring to political terms.

**Q.** How will these two mentalities relate to each other in closer contact?

**A.** It will be a problem. We will have to analyze the implications this will have for us, as the Americans will have to consider the effects it will have on them.

I give you the example of Teofilo Stevenson, who is the Olympic boxing champion. He was offered a million dollars and he refused it, and in general we have many athletes who have been invited to join the professional ranks with excellent remuneration but they turn these offers down easily. Why? Because their mentality does not have room for professionalism or earning large sums of money. They have other moral values which prevail, and as a result it is natural for them to turn down a million dollars. I would imagine it would be much more difficult for an American athlete to turn down a million dollars. This is why I believe there are two different ways of thinking and they will come into contact in case we

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had a massive exchange in the future—traveling between the two countries. But we have to think of the future and be prepared. I prefer the people to be prepared for all contacts rather than an isolated, ascetic people with no contact.

**Q.** And how can they be prepared? What will you do?

**A.** I think through education based on socialist thinking. This is a way to prepare man not to see work as a burden or as a punishment, but as a natural, logical activity to which he becomes accustomed at a very early age. I believe a deep sense of conviction based on socialist values is developed through this type of educational system.

**Q.** Have you developed such an effective new educational system in fifteen years?

**A.** I think so. If we believe we represent a just society, a superior society with higher spiritual values, which we consider higher than those of the capitalist society, there is no reason for us to fear contact with a capitalist society. The new generations must be educated in that spirit. When I speak of education, I do not speak of indoctrination, because I don't believe ideas can be imposed. One can develop ideas, one can give people access to them, and if these ideas are superior, they will prevail.

**Q.** Are there many in Cuba now who are undergoing this educational preparation?

**A.** By 1980 we will have a million youths integrated into the work/study programs. When the Revolution triumphed in 1959, we had seventy thousand. Besides, we now have more and more professors with more experience, and they are very young. By 1980 the average age of high-school professors will be twenty-four years. So you can see what it will be like when we have professors with ten, fifteen, twenty years

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experience. I think we will then have a very well-educated generation, politically as well. Cultural activities are encouraged in every aspect. I think we are prepared to face the future, a future not made easy by being neighbors of the United States.

**Q.** Is there not a danger that because of this educational process, all Americans will be seen as enemies of Cuba?

**A.** I think our people can distinguish, discern the issues clearly and they are not confused as to who is guilty of certain wrongs. In our political relations we do not blame the people of the United States, but rather the system, the capitalist system, the imperialist system. But we can say with great satisfaction that our people do not hate the people of the United States. Because we have had many friends among the Americans. Young brigades have come here year after year to help us with the crops. Our people have not been left with the memory of Bay of Pigs alone, of the infiltrated spies, the blockade, the sabotage. We also have fresh memories of American citizens who have opposed all this, who have approached us and made a great impression on us. This is a point which we always want to make clear—that we do not confuse the people with the system, and we do not blame the people for the system.

**Q.** What do you mean by the system, because the people are part of the system?

**A.** Well, the people are part of the system and they are the victims of the system. Was not Cuba a country that lived under the capitalist system? Didn't we live under colonialism? Are we to blame the people for the colonial system or the capitalist system?

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**Q.** Don't you think people, though, may be the creators of their system?

**A.** I do not believe in the maxim that each country has the government it deserves. Because why should we blame the Dominican Republic when it tried to liberate itself with the American troops there? We cannot say that the Dominicans do not deserve a more advanced, socialist system than the one they now have. Are we going to blame the colonized for the colonization system? And are we to blame people who live under a certain social system for the existence of a social system with such historical background? Capitalism in the United States goes back two hundred years, and it flourished there due to the geographical and natural conditions. The North American was brought up under this system. They have lived well, materially. The Americans never knew the famines of Europe nor the devastation of war. The Soviet people know what it is like to be invaded by Nazi troops, the destruction of its cities. They lost twenty million lives in the Soviet Union. The European countries know war. American soldiers have participated in wars, but not on American soil.

**Q.** What, then, does determine the system?

**A.** Historical, geographical conditions determine a social regime or system. One cannot blame the people. Besides, there are millions of people in America who have known discrimination—manual workers, intellectuals, scientific workers, artists, students, blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos. We do not confuse the American people with the large monopolies, trusts, or with the financiers who dominate the economy and the politics of the United States. We cannot make this mistake because our ideology teaches us to

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distinguish within a people, their constitution, or
makeup, their social classes, the dominating classes
and the dominated, the exploiting class and the ex-
ploited. And the lower classes suffer in one way or
another because of the system, and this is the
majority of the nation, and we therefore have to see
them in this light.

In other words, we have an advantage in our
contact with Americans, because we do not feel ha-
tred toward the American. Perhaps it is not the same
in the United States. They may feel differently if they
feel as nationalistic people only. If one thinks in
terms of classes, those types of feelings can emerge,
but Cubans have never felt this way and the Revolu-
tion has never encouraged chauvinistic national feel-
ings of hatred for the American people. If we did
that, we would not be true Marxists.

So that I believe we will be ready for the neces-
sary, inevitable contact between the two social sys-
tems. I believe we will be prepared. That is our opin-
ion.

THE UNITED STATES

Q. Looking at the U.S. political and economic system, what do you think is in store for the future?

A. Of course I am convinced that the last country in the world where a change toward socialism will take place is the United States, because the free enterprise institutions wield great power in the United States. It is the country where capitalism has given the maximum results, where capitalism has gone the farthest, and where the greatest economic and technological

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achievements have been realized. Favored by its
abundant natural resources, by its political institu-
tions, and because the parliamentary system—the
republican system of government in the United States
—has adapted perfectly to its economic policy, ideal
conditions for the flourishing of capitalism were
created. And the system enjoys prestige among the
American people. If one thinks of the crises that can
occur in Europe and in other capitalist countries,
they will take place in those countries before they
take place in the United States. The United States
will be the last bastion of capitalism. Maybe you will
achieve social change through parliamentary means,
peaceful means. Up to now one cannot foresee a
change in the United States's economic and social
policy. Crises, such as the energy crisis which is now
affecting the world, affect the United States less than
Japan, Italy, France, England, and other countries.
Why?

Q.

A.

Because the United States is self-sufficient in energy
sources. Eighty-five percent or more of the energy
that it consumes, it produces. It produces a lot of gas,
almost the entirety of its industries use gas. It has
large coal reserves, it produces more than five hun-
dred million tons of petroleum, it is the world's larg-
est oil producer. It has developed almost all its hy-
draulic resources.

It is at the head of the Western world in the
utilization of nuclear energy in industries, and it has
a large reserve of fossil fuels. I am not saying that it
is easy to manage all these resources, because the
utilization of nuclear energy has its difficulties—tech-
nical problems, disposal of waste products, the resist-
ance of the natural environment. The exploitation of
coal reserves, even where those reserves are great,