DECLASSIFIED
Authority E-012055

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin, /Mr. Kissinger

6:27 pm, October 12, 1972

D: Hello.

K: Anatol!

D: Ok, welcome home, Henry.

K: Thank You.

D: Oh, you are really, really adventurous. They should give you
a chance to stay in bed for a long time.

K: I'm telling you.

two

D: Yes, yes, because you stay one/two days, three days, four days
--it's a little like Breshn ev. So any time tomorrow, it's
not very urgent, but any time it will be---

K: Well, let's do it definitely tomorrow.

D: Yes, tomorrow, give me about five minutes.

K: Shall I call you in the morning?

D: Yes, call me. I'm free anytime for you.

K: Good.

D: Secondly, after my call to you, I would like to clear a little matter
on Maritime business. This is rather complicated but I really
would like to have your final word and then it would be closed.
As of now, as you know, this Mr. Gusenko (sp), our Minister,
he is sitting here and they couldn't find yet the final agreement
with Peterson.

K: I thought that--I got a cable today that it's getting pretty close.

D: Yes, except one point which I discuss with you when you left. And
the question was: What will be the rate of freight (?), or so to
speak. You remember first we agreed on $8.00 per ton, but then
you raised it--should be on your roads rates.

K: But that will retire.

D: Yes, but it will retire. All right, B_______ just shake his head
all right. This is a proposal of Kissinger next year. But then
when you left I said should be the roads price plus Dollars. In

TELCONE/Oct. 12

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissing er ;

-2-

two days -- you think everything is beginning to come back. Then
I mention to him that there was an understanding with my talk
with you. Breshnev said probably you didn't have any information
but all information is available, that's why he accepted. But he
continued to insist on this one. Yesterday he mentioned that
he was in touch with you and you supported him, On this new
formula, road way plus Dollars. Now I have to tell Breshnev
where we stand--whether it still stands your formula or it's a
new formula supported by you and this is really--I would like
to know in a very---Prime Minister will discuss it with you. I
don't want any prolonged discussion but simply if you feel this
is not in the way because of your domestic situation, and then
I will frankly---

K: It's a tough problem because of our domestic situation--that is a real problem and I have really tried. But there's a strong feeling because of the domestic situation and I couldn't do any thing while I was away. Now If I could spend two or three days on it, I might be able to get some change, but I think it is a very tough domestic situation for us.

D: The sooner the better.

K: The sooner, the better. If you could do it, Anatol, I don't usually
like to go back on something---

D: I understand, I was really was waiting for you and holding the
whole thing.

K: I think if you could put it on that basis, I would appreciate it.

D: All right, then I will write and try to get this one because they
have been getting the final word from you and maybe I then in
a few ours get some answers.

K: Oh, very good.

D: This is the point I am taking. Okay, Henry, so please call me
tomorrow.

K: I'll call you tomorrow.

D: Any time.

K: And we had a rather good talk Monday night in Paris.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12958
By N.M. Parry Date 00-30-57

TELECON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

6:27 pm, October 12, 1972

D: Hello.

K: Anated!

D: Oh, welcome home, Henry.

K: Thank you.

K: I'm telling you.

two

D: Yes, yes, because you stay one/two days, three days, four days --it's a little like Breshn ov. So any time tomorrow, it's not very urgent, but any time it will be--

K: Good.

D: Yes, except one point which I discuss with you when you left. And the question was: What will be the rate of freight (?), or so to speak. You remember first we agreed on $8.00 per ton, but then you raised it--should be on your reads rates.

K: But that will retire.

D: Yes, but it will retire. All right, B_______ just shake his head all right. This is a proposal of Kissinger next year. But then when you left I said should be the reads price plus Dollars. In

DECLASSIFIED

Date: 20-12-958

Author: B. K. NATA

Due: 09/10/97

TELCOM/Oct. 12
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissing er ;

-2-

two days -- you think everything is beginning to come back. Then I mention to him that there was an understanding with my talk with you. Breshnev said probably you didn't have any information but all information is available, that's why he accepted. But now he continued to insist on this one. Yesterday he mentioned that he was in touch with you and you supported him. On this new formula, read way plus Dollars. Now I have to tell Breshnev where we stand--whether it still stands your formula or it's a new formula supported by you and this is really--I would like to know in a very--Prime Minister will discuss it with you. I don't want any prolonged discussion but simply if you feel this is not in the way because of your domestic situation, and then I will frankly--

Ks: It's a tough problem because of our domestic situation--that is a real problem and I have really tried. But there's a strong feeling because of the domestic situation and I couldn't do any thing while I was away. Now if I could spend two or three days on it, I might be able to get some change, but I think it is a very tough domestic situation for us.

D: The sooner the better.

D: All right, then I will write and try to get this one because they have been getting the final word from you and maybe I can get a few ours get some answers.

K: Oh, very good.

K: I'll call you tomorrow.

D: Any time.

DECLASSIFIED

By: 30/12/58

To: NARA Dec 5/10/61

TELCON 9:45

Oct. 12, 1972, /P. M. (ext)

Brian McDonald

K: How nice for you to--

Mc: Well, I just wanted to welcome you home and tell you

K: Aren't you nice

K: I was so sorry I didn't see you at lunch

Mc: Well, I understood, what I did, you know, is I recognize that
President would send out his--

K: Yeah, that was the problem.

Mc: How's your health?

K: Well, I'm pretty tired today, I just got back.

Mc: Well, I'm in New Orleans, with a friend of mine Barbara. I was
engaged to her before I met Alice

K: Yes.

Mc: And I just thought that I'd say hello and welcome you back
and say also we are in New Orleans and if you need a break
we will celebrate my birthday on Sunday. I know you won't come down.
I would,

K: / But, I can't.

Mc: I know you would (laughter) but I just wish--

K: Well, when you come to Washington again I hope you will let me
know.

Mc: I will, Henry. How are you?

K: I would like certainly to see you. I'm fine.

Mc: Well, I don't worry when you can't. I really understand.

K: Good.

Mc: But, I just sort of might think you -- maybe they'll
a break for you? when they schedule

K: Well, I hope so, yes.

CLASSIFIED
3012958

Autumn
B. M. Dine
G14101

Telcon / Page 2

Brian McDonald/Mr. Kissinger

9:45 pm, Oct. 12

Mc: Well I think I'll--- you turned out a damned good effort, Henry.

K: Well, I hope it will be great.

Mc: Well, just don't get yourself hurt.

K: I'll be all right, I'm very grateful. Well, where can we reach you, are you in New Orleans?

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Mc: I'm in New Oreand. I'm at the-- you want the number?

K: Yes, is that fairly permanent or is that are you going back to Phila--

Mc: No, no, I'm just here for my birthday for Sunday, I just got--

K: Well, then I don't need it.

Mc: No. I just needed a break.

K: Well, Brian, call me when you get back east.

Mc: Okay, you just stay home for a while.

K: I hope so, I hope so.

mint

Mc: Henry, one other question--you know Franklin didn't put out some things about Dodge and the Soviet hardships--the memorials, co;ins

K: Yes.

Mc: Coins, and I purchased some without checking with you about young David. Is it improper at this point to send some to him.

K: Oh, no, that'd be sweet.

Mc: I just didn't want to be improper either.

K: Perfectly sweet.

Mc: But I thought he might like them and I didn't think he'd get them.

K: Very sweet. That would be very nice.

Mc: I think, you know, he'll share a lot of memories.

K: That's very sweet of you. No, he would appreciate that.

CLASSIFIED

AUTHOR: E012958

B: NARA DSC 5/1/01

TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger/Sec. Peterson

10/13/72 8:15 a.m.

HK: Pete.

PP: Yes Sir.

HK: I got nabbed yesterday just as I wanted to come over.

PP: Nabbed by whom, Henry?

HK: The leader.

PP: Oh, I thought it was an even more attractive alternative.

HK: Which means about 320 million others.

PP: What is new?

HK: Dobrynin is coming in to see me today with a message that isn't connected with this, but he'll undoubtedly raise it.

PP: All right. I had a piece of paper ready last night. I can just briefly tell you what it says--it says--what we tell you is, if you want to have the stated rate of interest on the deferrals at a given number, approximately what happens to the global figure, and I know it's irritating Henry, but I really think it is worth something to get that interest rate up to a respectable number. If you want 5%--and they are willing to pay 2.8, the global figure would be around 700 million.

HK: I just don't see how we can--

PP: Okay this is the top number, Henry. You can go down now--and this is what my table tells you--4-1/2%, it would be 705 million--the number I like the feel of is 710, which turns out to be 4%.

HK: Then if they don't take the deferrals we are getting $15 million less.

PP: Yes, but aren't they clearly going to take them--

HK: That's what they said, but you know what it really boils down to is that for optics, we are giving up $15 million for the option of getting $15 million --ah--free.

GOLDEN GATE

5502103

BROOKLYN Dcline 5/10/72

Page 2

PP: I assumed the odds are very high, they are going to take them.

HK: The odds are very high. And then what would the total figure come up to--?

PP: That figure remains unchanged--it's about--oh, a little under $30 million, I believe, plus the 25, so it's somewhere between 750 and 755. Now I think a pretty good number, Henry, is 710 and 4--

HK: What did they say to that?

PP: Oh no, I told you I would not discuss it with them until you and I had cleared--I never discussed this concept with them. It is something Alkievmof threw out the possibility of reducing a little bit.

HK: Let me think about it and Let me just run it by the President.

PP: Yeh, the beauty of it Henry --

HK: No, I see it, and as far as the public is concerned, it doesn't make a goddamn difference what the base figure is

PP: That's right, but when we go to sell it, 4% is halfway between 2 and 6--you know which it now costs us for money and it sounds like a nice round compromise.

HK: Yeh, I understand that--and there is a lot to be said for that. We'll get it squared away today.

PP: Yeh. Did you need any paper from me or not?

HK: If you can send that piece of paper over it would help.

PP: What I would love to have you do Henry if you are going to discuss it with Dobryninis do not hold yourself to precise numbers, but rather the concept, because you have to run this through computers--the concept is --

HK: What I may do, depending on how he raises it is to say if we do the 2.8, can they help us in the presentation of it.

PP: Right--until the stated rate is 4 let's say.

HK: Right, but I wouldn't say that's make it 710 or 715 or 705 --okay--thank you Pete.

DECLASSIFIED
Auth: E0172958
B: ANA Drec 5/1/91

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Rogers
10/13/72; 9:45 a.m.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes, Bill.

R: Alex's mother broke her hip and he's flown out to California to be there when she has the operation so he is not here.

K: I might as well talk to Bill Sullivan.

R: Bill Sullivan.

K: Don't you think?

R: Sure.

K: Isn't he the best?

R: Yes, he is by far the best. As a matter of fact he -- really on the things we are working on -- does all the work anyway. And I will go over it with him as I did the last time.

K: Well, that was a good operation and it worked beautifully. And you will see when you see the international commission stuff -- not that it is exactly the way you did it -- but the basic ideas were picked up.

R: Well, you know, in the final analysis on that the goddamn thing -- I mean the thing that is important is to get some agreement on it. It doesn't...

K: Well, frankly that is how I feel.

R: The goddamn thing isn't going to work anyway very well and all we can do is make the best of it.

K: Exactly my feeling. If Bill could come over here at 10:30, will you send him.

R: Yeah.

K: Good, I won't call him then.

R: Okay, Henry. Bye.

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Tom Jarriel

10/13/72; 10:30 a.m.

J: Good morning, welcome back.

K: Thank you.

J: Every morning -- extended for another day.

K: I tell you those girls are wild!

J: Well, fine. I am trying, of course, to get a feel of how things are going and I know that you have serious limitations but after so long of a session I was hoping that we might . . .

K: No, I just can't say anything. I wish I could help you but we and the North Vietnamese have agreed not to say anything. And they have kept it pretty well.

J: Right. Do you feel the four days did move things any further or . . .

K: Well, you know, there is a hell of a long way to go. So, you know, I always feel unless it is done you can't say whether it has moved it further or not. You know we obviously are talking about something.

J: Right. How about with the President? You spent some time with him. Roughly how much time have you spent since you got back? We have a picture today showing that the two of you together.

K: Where did you get it?

J: I think they made it this morning over in the mansion.

K: Oh, yes. I'd say about 5 hours with him since I got back. Four or five hours.

J: Right.

K: That includes the hour and a half we spent with the Secretary of State.

J: Right -- this morning. Ninety minutes.

K: Yeah.

J: Okay. You feel it might be -- of course you had a longer session but there are still a lot of things that need to be . . .

CLASSIFIED BY
AUSTRALIA DEC 30 1972

BROOKLYN DUE 11/1/72

-2-

K: Well, when Le Duc Tho left Paris today he said there are still a great many difficulties and I won't challenge him.

J: I know this is the standard question and I don't know if there is anything you can say or add to it but -- what are the chances that there may be a change in either the military or the political situation within the next three or four weeks?

K: Where, in Saigon?

J: Right.

K: Well, I don't know what you mean by change in the political situation. I don't see any in that -- I mean, how can there be a change in the political situation?

J: I was thinking of -- we hear stories that maybe there will be a ceasefire and maybe there will be something worked out in conjunction with that on a political side.

K: Oh, oh, you are asking me about the negotiations.

J: Right.

K: I just can't go into the negotiations but the President has expressed our views at the press conference.

J: Okay. They still hold firmly from your sessions -- huh?

K: Well, yeah.

J: Really, what I am trying to do is bring my own perspective up to date.

K: Well, you know, you people -- the press -- and it's not a criticism because goddammit it you don't know what the hell is going on so how can you be intelligent about it.

J: And we are always thrown into a position of our bosses expecting us to . . .

K: But you all have the idea that there is going to be one tremendous, climactic moment where everyone says this is it.

-3-

J: Right.

K: But if you just look, as I told you a few weeks ago, there area hell of a
lot of complex issues so you can talk about a lot of them -- begin to narrow
some differences and you still can't speak of a dramatic change.

J: Right.

K: But I just don't want to speculate on how it will move.

J: Okay.

K: But obviously I've said since July 19 there are serious talks going on.

J: And that certainly would still stand up to four days.

K: That would still stand.

J: Right.

K: What we have said publicly also stands.

J: Right. Alright. Fine. I sure do thank you very much.

K: Okay, I call you back because of my respect for your work. I know it
isn't satisfactory to you -- I can't be very helpful.

J: Well, I can tell you that it is most helpful to me to have even this much
of a feel.

K: Well, that's what I would like to do. And let me make one other
suggestion to you. Don't listen to anybody else.

J: Alright.

K: Because really no one else knows. And don't listen to people who
pontificate wisely and tell you it may go this way or that way. They really
don't know. This is as much as you can get authoritatively.

J: Fine. I certainly do thank you, Henry.

K: Nice to talk to you.

CLASSIFIED

Author: E012958
Date: 5/14/74
By: NARA

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Laird
10/13/72; 10:37 a.m.

L: Henry.

K: Mel, how are you?

L: Welcome home!

K: What the hell are you guys doing bombing this bloody Hanoi while I am talking.

L: Well, you know, you have -- it might have been a hung bomb there.

K: Yeah.

L: But you know, that was three miles away.

K: Yeah.

L: You know, I can't guarantee you that with that bombing stuff -- you know you can't be sure of it every time, Henry.

K: Yeah. Okay.

L: It didn't cause you any problems, did it?

K: Yes it did, but they were overcome. Look, what did you call me about? I have something.

L: I called you -- you know I've got to go down again to Hanoi again. I am making two appearances down there this afternoon with a big press conference at 4:00 with all the weekly and daily newspapers.

K: Jesus, what time are you leaving?

L: I am scheduled to leave now at 2:00.

K: Can you come over here at noon so that I can talk to you. Because I need your help on a number of things. And I want to talk to you on a very personal basis.

L: Alright. I'll come over around what -- 12:00?

K: Yes. I'd come over to you but I am really swamped.

L: No, no, I'll come over -- I'll see you at about 12:00.

DECLASSIFIED
BY
NARA Dues
BRO
10/12/58

TELCORN

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

10:45 a.m., October 13, 1972

Z: Have you seen what Shriver has said about you?

K: Oh, that #*@!, what did he say?

Z: Well, they're getting pretty hard on the peace talks. Here's the wire
service report out of Cleveland where he said that Kissinger's secret
peace talks in Paris were the most immoral thing Richard Nixon has
done since being in the White House.

K: Why is that?

Z: Well, of course, he doesn't explain why because it's being used as an
election ploy.

K: That's all right. No comment.

Z: I think I'd like to say something -- you know

K: Or you can say it's beneath contempt if you want to say that.

Z: Well, we better just "no comment" then, huh?

K: Ask Haig. I would basically say, "no comment."

Z: Yeah.

K: I would just let him talk.

Z: Okay, fine.

K: Or just say it's a typically irresponsible statement.

Z: Okay.

K: That you could say. But otherwise we have no comment to make.

Z: Good.

K: Good, thank you.

wgh

CLASSIFIED
BY
SANDRA DREY
9/17/72

9/12/72

RJ Rees

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Peterson

10/13/72 11:10 a.m.

HK: Pete, how are you?

PP: Welcome back. Hope you had a great trip. We got both a solution and a problem. We have had the world's worse time on maritime that you and I should sit down and discuss, but I just got--

HK: Dobrynin called me last night and asked me if I was backing your position and I said absolutely. It was world price plus a dollar.

PP: Yeh, plus $10 is the way it's going to work out.

HK: Or whatever.

PP: But just thought that was extremely desirable given all of the--

HK: Yeh, I backed you and he said he'd give on it.

PP: This is what I heard last night--but I didn't know if you knew that. So I think we are now virtually in shape probably for signing tomorrow. Now on the lend-lease issue, there is still an awfully lot of stickeynes on this interest rate question and they claim there was an understanding and all that sort of business. I would like you to think about a concept that maybe you can't react quickly, I don't know, but it's as follows. Keep in mind the way we are going to merchandize this thing to the public is to use a British settlement--and I have never taken you through these numbers except demonstrate to you you will recall, that if we use the principal based on the British settlement, it is much, much less than 500M--it's numbers like 200 300 400 Mollars which permits us to claim a healthy interest rate--now the difficulty we have in inserting numbers like we are now talking about which is 3 and they say only 2.7 on a mortgage basis and this kind of business is in the middle of this nice rhetoric about good interest rates, we got a much lower interest rate number. Now there are two possibilities that occur to me--both of which are somewhat different than your understanding but I don't want to try them unless you in general approve. Suppose Henry for the moment we didn't have any interest rates announced and one alternative would be to add the interest rate at you know, whatever it is, 2.9, 2.8 or 3.0 to the 7.25 and come

Page 2

up with a new global sum of 7.60 let's say which would then say
that there are postponements, you know, that they can take, now
the advantage--

HK: Yeh, I Understand.

PP: okay--the advantages of that are obvious--it's global, we don't
get interest rates, the disadvantage that it obviously triggers
--that they are going to take postponements which is both an
advantage and a disadvantage, given for what we all know.
The second approach would be to say it is two numbers-- either
the number we have or the larger number -- depending upon
whether they do take settlements--I mean postponements and the
payments we have agreed on are such and such and avoid the
interest rate question--

HK: Yeh, but who will be bothered by the goddamn ~~by~~ the interest rate?

PP: Well, the people who will be bothered by it are the people whom we are saying we got a damn good interest rate on--the Congress and others, we can demonstrate a fabulous interest rate based on the British deal, and what I am trying to do Henry is get off of this 500M dollar wicket which I think is the wrong wicket to be on-- I think we can say the 500M included back interest and should not be considered a principal -- but that get's us to using British principal calculation. My question is if they are willing to do it how would you feel about it--or would you rather we would not discuss it or what? I think it is better and so do most people think it is better than what we got now. And my assumption is they have had to go all the way up to the top anyway, to review this interest rate question, so it isn't as thought it's going back--

HK: My concern is that -- I made a deal in Moscow and I have got to
preserve the position and when I make a deal it isn't the beginning
of another goddamn negotiation, but it sticks.

PP: Right. Now your deal I think Henry--I don't think you have any
idea how much interest was involved. Your real deal was obviously
7 and a quarter plus 35.

HK: I understand that.

RECLASSIFIED
Author: E017958
Date: 5/1/69
BY ORDER OF

Page 3

PP: So you're not going back on your word at all. It is just the question of whether it is presented as a global number or not --the essence of the deal is identical because they are going take them right if there is any question about that.

HK: But then we have to say right away we have reason to believe they are going to take them?

PP: That is the disadvantage of the first option--they would obviously be taking them--on the other hand the number is bigger--the second option just gives you two ranges--

HK: That is impossible--that requires too much explanation.

PP: What do you mean--the 7.25 and the 7.60?

HK: Yeh. That's just too cute. I mean the 7.60 has a certain advantage

PP: Because *th* under that we'd never get an interest rate-----would say it's a theological issue, we don't want to get into it, and we interpret it one way and they interpret it another way.

HK: That's right.

PP: I have a feeling they'd at least consider it, but I do not want to be --

HK: Well you see his problem is this: he obviously claimed at home, he scored a spectacular victory by getting me down to 7.25, I think he was willing to settle for 7.50, I let him have those .25 because I wanted him to win something.

PP: Right, I understand perfectly.

HK: Now my worry is that if we go to the higher figure, he has the same bunch of clucks at home that we are trying to bamboozle here.

with

PP: Yeh, but my assumption is Henry it was/all the wires going back and forth now this issue of interest on postponements--

HK: the average American will just consider it a good deal anyway.

PP: Yeh, for him the larger the better--the number you see.

Page 4

HK: Well, that's right but if-- it's not that much, you know, what the hell, because he figured nothing--I mean every congressman I have talked to thinks around $500--you have been terrific on that.

PP: What I think Henry, I don't hear you responding to this point by now the issue of interest on postponements, I assume has been thoroughly ventilated--

HK: No that part of it--I am just wondering from--I am more interested in him looking good than in our looking good.

PP: Right, but now let me tell you what I would do. If we were to go to the second basis which gets us out of interest rates totally, then I'd be willing to yield another 1/10 point--.1 or .2 for precisely the reason you mentioned. It makes him look good and who the hell cares over here whether it is 7.60 or 7.56. And then that gets their friend Alkiemov off the hook because he is in real trouble.

HK: Well, let me think about it for 15 minutes and call you back?

PP: All right, I am in the middle of meetings so I will be listening to you when you call--because Patolichev will be in there.

HK: Okay good.

PP: All right.

RECLASSIFIED

E0172958

Author: B. MIRA DREC 5/1/91

TELCON

Secretary Peterson/Mr. Kissinger

12:00 Noon, October 13, 1972

K: Pete, my instinct is this -- I would do whatever is easier for the Russians and rather take the heat on a lower interest rate. I mean, if you can get the higher figure as a global sum without getting them climbing walls, fine. I think we ought to settle for what we've got because I think we've tested their patience enough.

P: Right. Now I think, Henry, that if we're willing to give a little on the rate itself which becomes more or less irrelevant in the global scene -- you know to 2, 8 or 9 -- they will go back with a negotiating victory. You follow me?

K: Yeah, I understand what you're saying.

P: Alright.

K: So if you -- you know, like 7.5 -- you know, I understand your point.

P: Alright, fine.

K: Good.

P: Thank you, Henry. Henry --

K: Yeah, what are you doing for dinner tonight?

P: Well, this is what I forgot to mention to you -- I'm giving a dinner for Patolichev and the Maritime guy will probably be there and Dobrynin. Is there any chance you could join us? At Blair House.

K: At Blair House, I'll do my best. When, 8:00?

P: 7 o'clock we start. We won't eat till 7:45. I think it would be great if you could be there.

K: I'll do my best.

P: Cause we've bruised them up pretty good.

K: Yeah, I'll do my best.

P: Okay.

K: Bye.

wgh

DECLASSIFIED

Authority F012587
By CNARA Date 01-01-87

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:12 pm, October 13, 1972

K: Hello. Anatol!

D: Hello, how are you.

K: I'm extremely busy

D: Oh, Yes, that's why I didn't want to bother you, you are sneaking wisely like a mouse.

K: I was wondering whether tomorrow morning would be time enough for our meeting.

D: Well, I think that would be all right--say 9:00 o'clock.

K: Nine o'clock is too early, how about 9:30. How much time do we need.

D: Oh, I think maybe around ten or fifteen minutes. Let's have a lunch after then.

K: Because I have to meet with the President about 10:00.

D: 9:30--let's say 9:15 maybe.

K: Well, I have a breakfast, unfortunately.

D: Oh, well 9:30 is all right. Maybe we're signing off the Maritime Agreement tomorrow, isn't that right?

K: They're signing of the Maritime Agreement tomorrow, isn't that right.

D: Yes, it's quite possible.

K: About 10:30, isn't it?

D: Yes, it's something about that--but we--will you have time enough.

K: I'm just wondering maybe if we should meet after that? Then we could talk a little longer.

D: Well, what-- 10:30

K: Well, let's say at 11:00, whenever the signing is over.

D: Oh, I see. Well, well, well-- maybe---

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EOLAST
By CNARA Date Stetot

TELCON

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:12 pm, October 13, 1972

-2-

K: Are you going off to the country?

D: No, I don't think so. Okay, let's make it at 11:00.

K: Okay, either at 11:00 or right after the signing whichever it is--

D: Where will it take place, the signing?

K: I think over here in the Cabinet Room.

D: Oh.

K: And the President wants to see the Maritime Minister and you, just for ten minutes.

D: Yes, I understand. All right we'll do it right after the ceremony.

K: Good.

D: Good, now a second question I would like, now they umm, Peterson and umm Patolichev wants to sit in the discussion with me.

K: Right.

D: Private and quietly. As of now, I think everything is real except this unfortunate tele______, you remember, this-- this performance.

K:a That's right.

D: Potolichev propose that I get two and march them through in the half, particularly the stage of an------. Why do you split it?

K: Oh, I told, Peterson told me, God dame it, I tell you never again will I permit a negotiation to go this way. Peterson told me that he was going, this morning, that he was going to offer Patolichev a formula which would in effect split it and which would split it again in a total sum, you see, without mentioning what it was.

D: Well, I didn't know the details again, because probably by---

K: When did you talk to Patrolichev last?

D: Well, it was around fifteen minutes ago, look, Mr. Patolichev

DECLASSIFIED

Authority 5-012507
By CHNARA Date 05-01-72

TelCon
Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:12 pm, October 13, 1972

not him, but his deputy, Mr. Alchymen, he was trying to make a
report about his talks.

K: Let me call Peterson.

D: But I don't think you--now they have established to accept this
about--

K: We have come up with a formula which I think might have that
effect.

D: But, then they discuss this formula but they didn't find it acceptable.
But is it possible--I don't know ____ because he just
said the only thing we disagreed about is the number of figures.

K: Let me call Peterson.

D: Okay.

K: We're going to settle the God Damned thing and we are going to sign
it next Wednesday.

D: Well, I think this is the best way to do it, really. Let's look into it.

K: I will look into it this minute.

D: Okay, tomorrow immediately after the meeting.

K: Good.

D: Okay, thank you very much.

K: Bye.

TELCOM

Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:12 pm, October 13, 1972

K: Hello. Anatol!

D: Hello, how are you.

K: I'm extremely busy

D: Oh, I think maybe ten or fifteen minutes. Let's have a lunch after them.

K: Well, TELCOM a breakfast, unfortunately.

D: Oh, well 9:30 is all right. Maybe a signing of the Maritime Agreement tomorrow at 10:00 or 11:00?

D: Yes, it's quite possible.

K: About 10:30, isn't it.

D: Well, what -- 10:30

D: Oh, I see. Well, well, well -- maybe---

CLASSIFIED

3012958

By: ARA Dues 5/1/72

TELECON

Amb. Debrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:12 pm, October 13, 1972

-2-

D: Oh.

K: Good.

K: Right.

D: Private and quietly. As of now, I think everything is real except this unfortunate telephone, you remember, this-- this performance.

Kra: That's right.

K: Oh, I told, Peterson told me, God dame it, I tell you never again will I permit a negotiation to go this way. Peterson told me that he was going, this morning, that he was going to offer Potolichev a formula which would in effect split it and which would split it again in a total sum, you see, without mentioning what it was.

K: When did you talk to Potolichev last?

D: Well, it was around fifteen minutes ago, look, Mr. Potolichev

BECLASSIFIED
Author: E0172958
Date: 5/1/72
BY: NITA DRE

TelCon

Amb. Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

4:12 pm, October 13, 1972

not him, but his deputy, Mr. [signature], he was trying to make a
report about his talks.

K: Let me call Peterson.

D: But I don't hold you--now they have established to accept this
about---

D: But, then they discuss this formula but they didn't find it acceptable.
But is it possible--I don't know because he just
said the only thing we disagreed about is the number of figures.

K: Let me call Peterson.

D: Okay.

K: Good.

D: Okay, thank you very much.

K: Bye.

CLASSIFIED
By: E0172958
Date: 5/1/72
NRA

TelCon

Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

4:20 pm/October 13, 1972

K: Hello.

T: Hi, welcome back. You missed two non-lunches.

K: I'm sorry.

T: I just wondering if there are any kind of guidance I might get to
on whether or not you might expect anymore meetings before
the election.

K: Well, I just never speak about that ahead of time.

T: Uh huh. One of the things that intrigues me is looking back over
the President's comments on the possibility of stopping the bombings
and minings. He always ties this with substantial progress in the
negotiations.

K: Yes,

T: And if there has been substantial progress, is there any hope
of some sort of ammunition in this activity.

K: Well, I just don't want to comment on it, you know, of course I
stand behind what the President said.

T: Yeah, naturally. There's no guidance or pointers?

K: No, you don't think so? No, you due course, this thing with either
show visible progress or it won't.

T: You think, before the election?

K: From our point of view, we are not gearing it at all to the election.
It is really astonishing to me how people could believe that it could
be geared to the election.

T: Well, I appreciate that, but look at it---

K: Look at it--why would Le Duc Tho meet with me? I mean, there
are only two possibilities--one Le Duc Tho is collaborating in an
electoral ploy, that's in fact. The other possibility is that we are
making concessions, that we wouldn't otherwise make, in order to
get a settlement before the election.

T: Yeah.

TelCon
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger
4:20 pm, October 13, 1972

K: When you are thirty points ahead, that isn't very self-evident and we wouldn't do it anyway, but that we will have to see when a settlement is arrived at, you know, whenever that is. And then we can see whether we are appreciated while they listen to what we've always said. But I cannot predict will I meet him again before the election, you know, it just depends, on Hanoi.

T: Why do you think he went back? He doesn't usually go back between sessions like you do.

K: Well, he goes back when he wants guidance. / He doesn't tell me why he doesn't go back goes back.

T: Well this thing, especially from his comments today, looks like there's still matters to be worked out, sort of--

K: Of course.

T: That one has achieved some sort of common ground here, that is it's gone now to the detail stage, especially since I understand you are farming out some work over to the State Department.

K: Oh, Jesus Christ, you know you got more bureaucratic selfish maniacs around here.

(Laughter)

T: It does sound pretty heartening to me that they are being rung in on the staffing out problem.

K: Yeah, but that's always done.

T: But it's not been them you cut in until now.

K: Yeah, well, okay, like I said--

T: But, what kind of, in general terms, do you look for as a difficult problem at this stage. They seem to suggest tripartite coalition and Thieu says he'd never stand for that and he would resign and--

Telcon
Bot Toth/Mr. Kissinger
4:20 pm, October 13, 1972

-3-

K: I just won't talk about the substance.

T: Uh huh. Well, how did the meetings go, I mean, they didn't break off badly, did they?

K: The meeting!! Who said they broke off at all.

T: Well, you know, he's going back to Hanoi, could possibly be interpreted also as if they didn't go---maybe some sort of stalemate and they were broken off.

K: Well, we will just have let events take their course.

T: Can you say why you spent the extra day in Paris.

K: Wednesday?

T: Thursday--did you come home Thursday.

K: No, we closed the meeting on Thursday. The meeting on Wednesday night ran beyond the time that Orly was open.

T: Oh, it's as simple as that, huh?

K: Yeah.

T: But then you spent most of Thursday there, huh?

K: Well, I spent, I frankly slept most of Thursday morning.

T: (Laughter) Somebody was suggesting that it was a girl friend, Henry.

K: I tell you, that's spoof penetrated again.

T: We are always thinking of you. You sound kinda tired now.

K: No, I'm just trying to think of a way not to tell you anything. I think you'd be wrong if you said the talks had been broken off. I can give you that much guidance, but don't go overboard in the opposite direction.

T: No.

K: I told you it's a complex problem with many factors; I've told you you were the only one of the reporters who understood what I was saying early September, and I told you in the summer what I thought.

CLASSIFIED

855272

5/14/72

Autumn

B. MARA DATE

Telcon
Bob Toth/Mr. Kissinger

4:20 pm/ October 13, 1972

T: But, you mentioned the election, and I think you are rightly critical of our focussing on it, but I mean, everybody is looking at it in this respect. I was out with McGovern and everytime there is one of these stories, UPI stories you remember that one, he rushes out with a statement--everybody is you know, kinda focussing on it as the only thing that might be some more interest in this God damned campaign.

K: Well, look, Bob, we have suffered four years of anguish on this issue for one reason only--to maintain the dignity and charactaer of America as we saw it. We are not turning this into a tawdry election ploy. We'll just explore that one last thing we've got left to get out of the war. And, it isn't gonna hkappen. We cannot tell you when it's going get settled because we have a record of what we said-- essentially we wanted to settle for. Now then there are many mortalities --now this is either going to be substantially achieved or not, and we can be touched by it.

T: We are just too impatient with you.

K: Well, you know, I'm sitting there, and I'm not--noone could have a greater desire to get this war ended.

T: Well, from a purely physical point of view, does one--given the facts of mortalities, there's not a lot of details still could be worked out, as you said, is it now very unlikely that you would have something within the next month.

K: I just cannot tell it. I'm not yet able to say it.

T: However, that's not foreclosed.

K: It's not foreclosed, but it's also not guaranteed. It's also not necessarily likely. All I'm saying is what history will set whether we got a decent end of the war, not whether we got it in time for the election or in time for any artificial deadline.... what the president said about the deadline is correct.

T: Well, once when I was talking to you, when we were talking about this problem--

K: This is all off the record.

T: Okay, but we were talking about the problem created by what Rogers said. Your view was that while it was a possibility it would be settled before the elections, that it was a probable that it will be settled sometime within a year from the time we spoke.

TelCon
Murray Mardar/Mr. Kissinger

4:32 pm, October 13, 1972

K: Hello.

M: Murray Mardar, here, Henry.

K: Yes, Murray, how are you?

M: Fine. How do you feel?

K

K: Well, a little tired, otherwise fine.

M: Henry, I wanted to ask if you could give any guidance on the
precision on the comment that Zeigler was making--

K: All he was saying is he isn't going to argue with Le Duc Tho.
He didn't even have anything more, nor did I, than the conflicting
press stories.

M: Well, this is why I was trying to get back. I wasn't sure whether
at this time he said it that he was aware---

K: Some press stories that there was difficulty, some said there
were obstacles, and all I told Zeigler was not to get into a debate
with Le Duc Tho, that our basic position is that by agreement with
them we are not revealing the substance. That in accordance with
Le Duc Tho. What is the significance of Le Duc Tho's comment,
and he said he's not supposed to debate with him.

M: Yes. That's what I wasn't sure of, that's why, ---

K: Really, it had no profound significance.

The

M: The question was, because it was a third-hand quotation to start with,
as you know, out of the--

K: I've still not seen what he actually did say.

M: It was relayed to the press by someone on the French side who overheard
him talking to the Soviets, and Ambassadors, and the French
version came back, at least by AFP's account that there are still many
difficult things to settle, and AP and UPI agreed at least on that whereas
Reuters said some difficult things to settle, and it was just a question
of that. We were not quite sure which---

RECLASSIFIED
Author: EOL7958
Date: October 13, 1972
B

4:32 pm, October 13, 1972

-2-

precise

K: I wouldn't attach from that point of view any/significant to what Zeigler had said except that we wanted to let whatever Le Duc Tho said stand without giving our own new answer.

M: Uh huh. The reference that was -- the fact that the formal are now off 'till October 26--

K: That was decided a long time ago.

M: From that standpoint, I believe, I haven't made an absolute check, have they always wanted the formal sessions to be on when the private talks are on, does that--

K: Well, they don't want the adjourned. They didn't say there had to be a session a week necessarily, that there was a private meeting.

M: Right. Well, I wasn't trying to be secure, what I was trying to see whether there ank significance in the fact that because there won't be any formal sessions until the 26th, whether that could be construed as meaning that it would be unlikely that Le Duc Tho would be back before then.

K: I frankly don't know when he will be back.

M: One of the things we actually were puzzled about is to whether it is the intention to re-esculate the press expectation that has been built up here.

K: Well, you know, with a few exceptions, you were one of them. The press has a sort of an image which is totally wrong, you know, it is building for some sort of dramatic confrontation, afterwards you can say yes or no.

M: Yes, and I find this a great struggle, you know, on my part, maintaining but I spent practically---

(change of tapes)

4:32 pm, October 12, 1972

K:q Tomorrow morning we were to announce it settled, and don't worry, it's not going to happen.

M: Right.

K: That wouldn't mean that today a tremendous happened, it just may mean that the last little item got settled.

M: Yes, this is what I am trying to educate my own people. You donot in this kind of sequence have a dramatic--Uyes, I will agree to anything you say and you sign a document'. But, this has been tahe difficulty going through here and it has been escalating so that it really can go almost nowhere except up from now to Nov. 7th and the thing was getting, from my standpoint, almost absurd, but in the absence of --

K: You know, obviously, we are talking about something. I mean obviously when Le Duc Tho and I meet for four days, unless he is part of a plot to re-elect Richard Nixon, and therefore sits through four days of ;meetings just to make us look good, assuming that I would hold still for such an exercise, obviously we are talking about something.

M: Yes.

K: Now, how much progress that means, how much accumulation it is, that's a different issue.

M: You evidently are not in a position to initiate whetaher you are likely tobe seeing him within the next couple of weeks or so or whether you go to, or Al go to Saigon or anything of that kind.

K: That definitely hasn't been decided yet, I mean about a Saigon trip.

M: Would Scott--

K: I don't know--Scott has been predictisng things-- strictly off the record-- from what you know of Scott, you think we tell him.

M: Frankly, I was--been reasonably confident as to the way this thing goes. No, and the question was when he made a remark yesterday that conceivably someone had asked him to "would you scale this thing down a little bit, it's getting too shrill here", I thought that was possible.

- 4 -

TELCORN

Murray Mardar/Mr. Kissinger

Oct. 13, 1972

K: Well that conceivable. Even so, I wasn't aware of it.

M: Because he did say--he may have done it entirely on his own
from a strictly political---

K: But didn't he say that the military activities would end by January 20th?
That's what I saw on television.

M: If he said that one, I didn't hear. I thought what he was doing yesterday was trying to calm down the expectation that which would seem to be quite plausible, politically--

K: Oh, but that I didn't see. When I came in last night I saw on
television Scott saying that he's confident that military operations
would have ceased by January 20th. I though Jesus Christ.
not

M: That one I did/see, as a mattaer of fact if we had we would have
used it. That was a more logical version of that which was
that Scott was saying he thought it/likely an agreement would be
reached by election day but he thought it was probable that one would
be reached by January 20th. It was that kind of statement which---

K: There's no basis for it one way or the other.

M: I don't know if you had any particular quarrel or if you wanted to comment in any way for guidance about the reference we made to the neutrality issue this morning.

K: I haven't read it yet.

notice

M: We used a reference that we obtained/from unofficial sources
saying that an agreement had been reached on the question of
neutrality for South Vietnam. And notice that this was a lesser
area than trying to explain what the neutrality--

K: But, you know, in our January 25th proposal, we offered to abide by
the military provisions of the 1954 agreement.

M: Right. Also, previously you had proposed the actual neutrality for
South Vietnam and you, in your January 26th statement, had said

KX: that it was related to the principle of non-align;ment for South Vietnam
as long as all the other countries of Indo-China agreed to the principle
of non-alignment, and the implication of what we had yesterday was
that there was an agreement simply on South Vietnamese neutrality
which did not require North Vietnamese neutrality, also which is a
larger barrier for them in the Communist Bloc nations.

Telcon
Murray Mardar/Mr. Kissinger

Oct. 13, 1972

K: But, I don't want to comment---

M: I knew you didn't want to get into that. Is there any--what --
you could tell me this as a matter of record, has Le Duc Tho's
turn around time ever been less that a couple ;of weeks; can he,
because of his base touching, in Peking, in Moscow--

K: I'm not familiar with any case that's been less than two weeks.

M: Because this is going to carry us, if you have another meeting,
up to an election eve kind of sequence.

K: Well, we just don't know how to gear it that way.

M: Pardon!!

K: We don't gear it that way.

M: Well, I was wondering if this bothers you. From an expectation
standpoint, I know we just talked about this and you made the point
that it was not geared that way; obviously in terms of the public
expectations, nevertheless carrying it into that kind of sequence,
with the expectations building up to---

K: Well, we will do what the President says, what we think is needed
to get a settlement, and we are not gearing it to the election, period,
We won't slow down or speed up because of the election.

M: Is anything sayable for guidance about the --

K: All of this if off the record.

M: Right. I realize that. I'm not quoting you of course. About the
Saigon sensitivities which are rising, they have a large public relations
campaign going, I don't know if you saw it during your absence,
television, radio, attacks, colonialists, advocates, etc.

K: Well, I can see that developed--Murry, I have to run.

M: Fine, appreciate it Henry.

K: Right, nice to talk to you.

CLASSIFIED

Auth: 3012258
Date: 12/1/72
To: MARD

B No. 5101

TelCon

Rowland Evans/Mr. Kissinger

5:25 pm, October 13, 1972

K: Hello.

E: Henry!

K: Yes, Rowland.

E: You look like a pale shadow of your former self. I watched you
爬 crawl into this seedy day, and you've lost about 17 pounds.

K: That's it, how did you know?

E: You haven't had any fun. I think you've really been working.

K: That's the truth, I'm down to 190 pounds.

E: Well, it was obvious, there was a lot of comments "Henry has become a shadow".

K: Yeah.

E: Henry is fatigued; Henry is pushing himself too hard; what are we going to do about Henry. You know, it was all over the place.

K: Was it really.

E: No.

K: I wanted to go over and speak to that foreigner you were probably with.

E: You know who I was with, don't you?

K: Who, the Chinese Attache.

E: No, Spearman (laughter), your own dear Stearman. Listen, two things, have you heard about Stew?

K: No!!

E: Stew went to the hospital this morning with something branded as pneumonia, and I don't know whether it's very, very mild, or what. But, I thought you ought to know that and I was supposed to have dinner with him tonight, but he's going to be in the hospital and I will let you know--I think I will try to go out to see him, to see what the situation is, but

K: Let me know.

CLASSIFIED

MAR 13 1972 9:00AM

BY: ANNA DECE 5/14/72

5:25 pm, Oct. 13, 1972

-2-

E: It's obviously--if it isn't pneumonia, it could be serious.

K: Yes.

E: On the other hand, they probably caught it very, very fast and maybe it's nothing to get alarmed about.

K: Well, maybe it will trigger one of his reactions again.

E: Might, it's a possibility. Second, would--

K: I've got to call--basically I'm furious with him--but I'll call him.

E: Oh, Bull S---! You mean not call him.

K: Listen,

E: Listen, listen, Henry, you're lucky--

K: He told Richard Nixon that without me he would be a menace to the country!

E: You've got a thicker skin than that.

K: I don't have a thicker--my skin he can say about me what he wants, it's what he says about Richard Nixon in connection with me.

E: Well, he's not quoting you, he writes--that what he believes.

K: Okay, well, look I--

E: You're not the only one. I've been sitting on a column for weeks but I haven't written it because there's too much politics to write.

K: Stew is one of the men I'm most devoted to.

E: I know that, and he told me you wrote him a letter.

K: He wrote me a letter, I didn't answer him.

E: He said Henry will never speak to me again, I said Bull S---, don't be silly, Stew, of course, he's going to speak to you.

K: I'll call him.

E: But, I wouldn't call him tonight.

["TelCon\nRowland Evans/Mr. Kissingener", "Oct. 13, 1972", "K: No, no, I'll call him when you tell me.", "E: When are you going to be--are you going to be in town this weekend.", "K: Yes", "E: Are you all dated up, can you have breakfast with me.", "K: Not tomorrow.", "E: Do you have any time <u>tomorrow</u> at all tomorrow.", "K: Could I call you in the morning--", "E: I don't want to bother with it, if it's a tight day, forget it. How about breakfast Monday.", "K: Let's aim for that, about 8:15.", "E: Do you think you could do it?", "K: Almost certainly.", "E: You want to do it at the club or at your office.", "K: No, let's do it at my office.", "E: At 8:15?", "K: Right.", "E: Will you tell your secretary?", "K: Yes.", "E: I'll be there at 8:15.", "K: Good.", "E: And, welcome home, it looked like a pretty productive session.", "K: Well, let's see.", "E: I'll see Monday morning.", "K: If we bring it off, Stew will never talk to me again.", "9\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n1\n

TELCOM

Mr. KissingerSec. Peterson

10/13/72 6:15 p.m.

HK: Pete?

PP: Yes sir.

HK: What have you now decided on this?

PP: Jim is now preparing the numbers, Henry as to what it would take-- we are getting intrigued with lowering the number 15 to 25--we don't know yet how much--

HK: What --to 2.15?

PP: No, I say lowering it 15 to 25 M but XXXXX.

HK: My major concern is not to get it so confused now that we--they think--I mean basically I like the idea.

PP: What we are going to come up with is a base number that is lower and then an interest rate on the postponements at substantially higher and then equate that to the 2.8 you know that you have talked about so that the total dollars are the same.

HK: I just wonder how sticky and unworthy we look when we go through all these machinations.

PP: Well, you had to decide how that 2.8 number looks.

HK: But that's a pure publicity gimmick because no one gives a damn-- who gives a damn about it?

PP: Of course whoever we have to sell it to.

HK: Yeh to whom though do we really have to sell it?

PP: Yeh, no I mean Moorehead and that crowd--it would obviously help if you would get a higher rate. Are you coming to the dinner tonight.

HK: I'll try, I'll let you know in half an hour.

PP: What I thought we'd do is hand you a piece of paper right there with what we proposed and Jim will have it ready.

HK: Okay--is it black tie?

PP: No, business suit.

CLASSIFIED

E012255

Autobahn

BANA Date 5/1/72

TELCOM
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

9:15 p.m. 10/13/72

BR: Henry--

HK: Hi, Bill. Two things--Marvin Kalb I saw on CBS tonight had a pretty accurate account of what was going on.

WR: What did he say?

HK: Claiming that State Department sources told him.

WR: There is nobody in State Department who knows about.

HK: Well, he said ceasefire in place and you know, it's being swallowed in a lot of other speculations so I am not paying too much attention to it.

WR: Yeh, he must just have made it up or something.

HK: I am sure he didn't get it from State but--the next thing I wanted to mention to you is I am wondering whether I shouldn't take Bill Sullivan with me to Paris next time.
It might be a nice symbolism and he has made some really damn helpful suggestions.

WR: Yeh, no reason why you shouldn't. Is it next Tuesday?

HK: Yeh.

WR: No, I don't see any reason why he shouldn't--I think it'd be a good idea.

HK: Okay.

WR: Really, I didn't hear what Kalb said but he couldn't have gotten anything from us because Christ nobody knows it. He is writing a book about you--he's been trying to see me every week. I haven't seen him.

HK: Actually there is so much speculation it doesn't make a goddamn bit of difference. Since one is closer to the truth than the other.

WR: Anybody can guess most of these things--I

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Sec. Rogers

Page 2

HK: They were pretty accurate--Ted Elliott doesn't talk to them--he doesn't know does he?

WR: He doesn't know. I didn't tell anybody and I am sure Bill Sullivan wouldn't say--and Elliott isn't around.

HK: And Alex doesn't even know enough about it.

WR: No. As I said I am not sure what he said but you know, a lot of it has been very -- Murry Marder for example had a lot of stuff this morning--where did he get that--nobody even knew that --even Bill Sullivan didn't--

HK: What I don't know what it was--I haven't read it yet.

WR: Well he said the same kind of thing--

HK: Of course the number of things that can happen aren't all that many --

WR: That's what I mean.

HK: Okay.

WR: Fine.

CLASSIFIED

Autobahn E012958

BRA Date 05/04/04

TELCORN

Max Frankel/Mr. Kissinger

10/13/72 9:16 p.m.

MF: Hello, Henry, welcome home.

HK: Thank you Max. You tried to see me today. I didn't have the time.

MF: I can well understand that.

HK: So I thought I better give you a call.

MF: I don't know why you didn't squeeze me in ahead of the President.

HK: I sometimes am tempted to squeeze anybody in ahead of the President.

MF: The town is full of rumors and all that sort of thing.

HK: But no one knows anything.

MF: That I am sure. And my question is whether you were either going to formally or informally give out any guidance because if so we wanted to --

HK: No. I just think--you know they are not saying anything and I think it is best if we stick to this agreement until these things have either conclusively succeeded--in which case, of course, we'll give out the whole thing--or conclusively fails--

by

MF: Does that include characterization ~~think~~ you of the situation?

HK: If it has failed?

MF: No, no. Whether you are not giving out not just details but characterization of this.

HK: Like what?

MF: Like the tone of thing--

HK: You know Max, you're sophisticated enough to know that one talks for hours in meetings that went long into the night that you are not doing it just for effect.

MF: Nope, as I say the long distance effect is one of considerable seriousness and--

950-5545

85521003

BROOKLYN DEPT 5/10/72

Page 2

HK: And I think--it is absolutely true--and on the other hand, it is a hell of a subject--you know even with goodwill, which I don't think is present in excessive quantities, but in greater quantities than before

MF: Right.

HK: it isn't easy to settle. You know x apportioning political power is a textbook exercise in political science and in a civil war they may just not be any way of doing it.

MF: Right.

HK: Ceasefire--I am just giving topics--ceasefire in a civil war situation all of this is off-the-record--

MF: Right.

HK: Is a tough intellectual problem. And then you have Cambodia and Laos and prisoners --

MF: And Thieu

HK: Yeh. So it is a --and a goddamn election on top of it--now is the nightmare--but it makes you wonder whether you should slow down. And then--

MF: I just got through writing a Sunday piece suggesting very much that it was very--since a settlement was not needed in the bold sense of the word, you know to win the election, that probably would see some advantage in not setting Thieu screaming.

HK: Yeh, but on the other hand we are not quite at that point but it's a hell of a responsibility to say I'll keep the war going three weeks longer than I have to, because I'll look a little better in tomorrow's newspapers. So it's really a pretty anguishing and somewhat ironic problem.

MF: Right.

HK: Because if one could ever have--if it would reach a point where war might end too soon--we are not at that point, so I don't want to mislead you but actually I would have thought from an election point of view it is sufficiently unnecessary for it to be no consideration.

MF: Right. Right. Will there have to be further meetings--that's what is implied by your saying 'not at that point'.

DEC 19, 1967

301/255

Aubrey
BRADE DEC 5/10/67

Page 3

HK: I would think, yeh, they'd have to be--

MF: I mean we are not in a situation where a few cables can be exchanged.

HK: Right. No.

MF: What about the fail safe concept that you and I once discussed. In other words, that one of these days this thing is going to break that we can settle a lot of things contingent on a total commitment by each side. Is that still the pattern or are you really doing it piecemeal?

HK: Well, somewhere in between.

MF: Well, I wish I knew (laughing)

HK: Well, I wish I knew how it is all going to evolve in detail and you know--it's a very fragile fabric and frankly it is only my respect for you that makes me call you at all.

MF: Thank you you are very kind.

HK: The best thing from my point of view is to have nothing written right now--just as an idle dream.

MF: Exactly. Things that are going to be written you can only hope that they don't get ahead of the times.

HK: Or that they don't cancel eachother out. Max what I will actually--whatever point this thing either succeeds or collapses I do want to talk to a few of the senior newsman.

MF: Well, I thought it might have to take that form rather than the press conference.

HK: There will have to be a press conference at some point, but at some point I'd like to see how we can have a thoughtful account of what the process was and --

MF: That's--it was with that in mind really that I called. Just in case--

HK: No, we are not in that point.

MF: I won't bother you on this kind of thing. Knowing you know my interest in this you will remember me when--

TelCon
Winston Lord/Mr. Kissinger

9:30 am, October 14, 1972

K: Win?

L: Yes, sir.

K: I might have an up to date copy--first of all I insist that every copy of these documents are numbered and that somebody keep control.

L: Right.

K: Well, but here's Dick Campbell handing out copies to me as if, you know, as if it were a visiting card.

L: There were three copies done over-night and put into my safe and just told them by phone that you should have it if you asked for it this morning, I didn't get a chance to number them.

K: Okay, well that's all right.

L: The rest are in my safe.

K: But what I need is--the only way that I can live through this stage is that I can keep drilling the stuff into my head before I go there. I'm not just a talking machine.

L: Right.

K: Well, I don't have any copy that has the three changes that you gave them on Thursday.

L: Yes, sir, I'm going to code that in. I haven't just done that yet.

K: Yes, but could you just as soon as you get in one copy--I need two things, one copy with all the changes that we have given them of a substantive nature, the three, and the two we gave them yesterday. That makes four. And another copy that has all the nit picks on it.

L: A separate copy.

K: Right.

L: And the differences that I left behind.

9:30 AM

850221003

BANKRUPTCY 5/10/70

Telcon
Winston Lord/Mr. Kissinger

9:30 am, October 14, 1972

K: Plus the Sullivan nit picks

L: Which we went ahead.

K: Yeah.

L: Fine.

K: Bkut, they should be in different colors so that I--

L: I understand.

K: Because otherwise we'll never make it.

L: Right.

K: I want to change now one of the insertions we gave them but I
am trying to find what the God damned one was. I think the
easiest way to express this thing of control, rather than say
control, administrative control including foreign relations is
to say "pending the political settlement, the two parties will continue
to exercise their functions in the areas they control". Theh you
don't get into the question of what these functions are--

L: I don't see much of your mention foreign relations.

K: Right.

L: Well, I'm coming right in and I will get it up to you, it won't
take long at all.

K: That's fine.

L: Right.

TELCOM

Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

9:52 am, October 14, 1972

S: Hello.

K: Hello, Bill, two things, I just wanted to check with you--you are working on this economic thing?

S: Correct. And I've got the multilateral furnishings already here,

K: And, then some bilateral--if you could get some idea of what a bilateral agreement, you know, for a commission would like.

S: For a commission, yeah.

K: For a joint commission. The second thing is--

S: Henry, let me ask on that--I'm very much an expert on that, can I discuss that with anybody else.

K: Oh, I'd rather not

S: Okay, then mine will be--have to be fairly amateurish, I wouldn't--but I'll take a crack at it.

K: Good. Second, we've just got to get you people set up over there.

S: They've just showed me the New York Times, but I don't know--that sounds like an awful lot of speculation because--

K: But, if they don't talk, there can't be any speculation. There's no speculation coming out of here.

S: Well, I don't know where the hell--I think that--Murray Marder's was clearly off the top of his head, it was so damned inaccurate. There was nothing in it as far as I could see.

K: Well, but, can't we just tell you; our people to shut up?

S: Well, I do, and the Secretary has given that instruction. Unfortunately, it's a lot of people who don't know anything who--

K: Well, can't they just be ordered on the pain of getting thrown out to shut up.

S: I'll speak to the Secretary about it, kyes.

K: I guarantee you, I'll shut them up. My guys don't talk.

BECOME ASSISTED

301/2255

Author's Signature: B. M. A. Dic. 5/14/74

TelCon

Amb. Sullivan/Mr. Kissinger

9:52, October 14, 1972

S: I don't these things really represent--at least Murray Marder's thing didn't represent anybody talking. The Stolz one looks a little more like--

K: I haven't even seen the Stolz one.

S: What he says is that State is supposed to be getting probable responses from Hanoi as well as Saigon, with possible changes in the American position. Where the hell all that is coming from, I don't know.

K: Well, I just wish that all would be quiet.

S: Yeah. Henry, I talked with Alex last night. And this is his situation. His mother is being operated on at 10:00 a.m. California time which is 1:00 pm our time.

K: Yeah.

S: She should be out of intensive care at around 3:00 our time. The doctors have told Alex this sort of a 50/50 chance that she may not survive the operation.

K: Oh.

S: He will know, he says, by about 7:00 pm our time whether she's stabilized. Now, if you really want him back to see him before Monday, the only thing we can think of would be to send a plane which would pick up his sister and she could go out and sort of relieve him there, and he can turn around and come back on the plane this evening, Saturday evening.

K: Well, let's consider that, don't you think.

S: The other way would be to stay over, he has missed the last plane this evening, and come back on Sunday. What he proposes to do is call me this evening after he sees whether she's stabilized, but if you want to set the plane in motion, that has to be done prior to that.

K: Okay, well let me look into that first.

S: Okay

K: Good, thank you

DECLASSIFIED
Author: E017958

B. J. MARRIAD GIAO

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Jo Alsop

11:35 a.m. 10/14/72

HK: Joe, how are you.

JA: Hello, Henry. Are you less tired--have you recovered?

HK: Not completely

JA: Nancy told me you were dead tired

HK: She tells me she's arranged that we all get together tonight.

JA: Yes indeed she has--I ordered a very quiet dinner here.

HK: Oh good.

JA: To save money and it is generally much quieter than a restaurant and pleasanter in my opinion.

HK: Good, shall we say--can we make it as late as 8:30? Or what time did you set it?

JA: Well, I said 8:00, but you can--as near as you can make to 8:00 that's all right--it's just a matter of warming things up.

HK: Good, as close to 8:00 as I can make it.

JA: Good, good. Marvelous, lovely--see you then. I haven't asked anyone else at all.

HK: That's a relief.

JA: Good, good.

HK: See you then.

CLASSIFIED

301/2255

BOSTON
MARIA DEI
5/10/72

TELCONE
Secretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m. 10/14/72

SI: Welcome home, Henry.

HK: Thank you Jack.

SI: You've hardly had time to sleep.

HK: Not much.

SI: Sorry to burden you further so soon after your very important missions

HK: That's all right.

SI: I was calling just to -- on this question of flank participation of the MBFR. As you know for the past several months we have taken the position that participations should be limited to those whose troops were involved, and then we agreed because of the strong pressures of the Turks and Italians and Greeks that we would permit an observer--one observer from each flank that would represent the three-flank nations for example in the south --they would rotate. The Turks particularly came back hard on that--against that. And in a less degree by the Italians, but they didn't have to speak out because they had the Turks taking a strong position. The Turkish FonMin spoke to the Secretary in New York about it and made noises--

HK: Well the stupidity of NATO will never cease to astonish me. What we are working ourselves into are two issues--one is this one, the other one is the mania for introducing substantive discussions in January. The Russians will do one of two things--they either will not agree to it, or will use the January meeting as the substitute for the whole MBFR. Now we have agreed with them and I must be able to--

SI: This is why I am calling you, Henry, to know what your feel for
Russians are because--

HK: My feeling is first--

SI: ...foolish for us to be drafting cables and doing things unless
we have your feel of what--

CLASSIFIED

3012255

BANA DRE 5/14/72

Page 2

HK: My feeling is the Russians will go through precisely with the procedure we agreed to that is to say--a procedural MBFR conference which can discuss agendas and--in January and the regular one in September. If we start loading substance into it in January, it's going to collapse. I see no need for it either. We aren't ready--

SI: That's a separate issue than the flank participation--

HK: The flank participation, I don't understand the Turks because they will wind up expanding the area of this in a most undesirable way.

SI: That's what we always--

HK: That isn't our fault. I willing to listen to anything you suggest --

SI: I think the only other possibility is to--if we agreed to accede to the Turks in effect is to agree for the exploratory talks in January but not necessarily for the negotiations until we see what happens in the exploration--is to admit the flank states in effect that would be five additional observers sitting there. Now this is what we have been opposing, but the question then arises which is are we more apt to have real problem with the Turks and Turkish government vis-a-vis the undesirability of having these additional members sitting there during exploratory talks with the possible precedent for the negotiations but without a commitment for it.

HK: I think we haven't got much choice.

SI: This is the point and the reason I think we sent over a draft of such cable informally to you, that I didn't circulate around because as I say I want to get your feel of what you --happened in Moscow because it does seem to me rather silly for us to be doing things when you may have a very good feel of what is possible and what isn't.

HK: Exactly.

SI: On the other point I did send over a memorandum to the various people which was more on the point you said on the question of whether or not one should talk substance or not--we tried to point out the advantages and disadvantages of both--and what the alternatives were.

HK: But we are pretty well committed to keeping it non-substantive.

Page 3

SI: This is the otherpoint that from my view I wanted to learn from you what had happened and what--these were.

HK: Yeh, we are pretty well committed to keeping it non-substantive. Except for agenda which of course gets you substance indirectly.

SI: Yeh. We can take it to whatever degree you think the traffic will bear. And then we can take it from there. But other than --going back to participation--in a sense I gather had been preferred not to lay for a while before we go back and say that all the flank nations considered observers and so I've told our people to do nothing until after the meeting on Monday--there's a NATO council meeting on Monday--just sit and see what happens --probably nothing much although there may be some more objections and then make the final decision that I think my inclination will be to go ahead and permit the observers for only exploration--hope it doesn't set a precedent and see what directions--recognize that they may come back and say we won't--don't like these observers and then it at least puts us in the position vis-a-vis Turks. If we want to go ahead with the conference which we do we will have to go ahead with it and just recognize the Turks.

HK: Right.

SI: One other thing--on a different subject. We have to send in our '74 budget to the OMB on development aid and support and assistance and we're quite far apart from OMB on development aid and I think it would be very helpful if I could get you and Weinberger together for 15 minutes just so everyone understood what the circumstances were--

HK: Why not try for that next week.

SI: Yeh. I'll ask my secretary to try to set up a date.

HK: Good.

SI: Thank you sir.

TelCon
Sen. Javits/Mr. Hissinger
11:50 am, October 14, 1972

J: Henry, how are you?

K: Okay

J: Welcome home.

K: Tkhank you.

J: Listen, Mary and I are having a big fun brunch in New York
tomorrow and thought you might be there.

K: Unfortunately, I'm not. I'd love to come.

J: We invited that Chinese gentleman/but we haven't heard
from him. Remember that fellow you told me about.

K: Yeah.

J: So, if you happen to see him or talk to him you might tell/that we'll try again.

K: Good.

J: Henry, I had quite a talk with Dobrynin. And, sometime when
you get a minute, I'd like to tell you about it because he's in
effect, invited ideas. In other words, he asked me what
could I suggest to find some way out of this thing.

K: Yeah.

J: And, I said I'll, you know, I get some general ideas, for example,
I told him that in the Steeden/Long program in the United States
we let them work it off over a period of five ;years by ______
and so on, that we have forgiveness clauses, and there was nothing
like that in their measure. They said, well there might be something
to that. I suggested the possibility of payment after the people left
out of their earnings, and he said no they wouldn't want that, it
would exaggerate the issue. But, he said he is very interested
in ideas and as soon as I get anything together to back to him.
What I was going to suggest is this: I'd like to put one or two of
my own people, even Humphrey would like to join me in trying to
work this out--and I'd like to if that's agreeable--

K: That's fine.

Telcon
Sen. Javits/Mr. Kissinger
11:50 am, October 14, 1972

-2-

J: I'd like to put some of my own people to perhaps work with one or more of your's because you people have undoubtedly explored various ideas, and you know, I'd be very glad to see what we can all come up with, and, for whatever it's worth, propose it.

K: All right, well let's see

J: Because he seems to be ~~interested~~ interested.

K: Good, excellent idea.

J: All right, well then, Henry, when you get a chance, I know you are just loaded, and I hope everything you're doing is just blessed with success--I hope that we can talk about this.

K: I would love it.

J: Well, I'll have my office, you know, see what your situation is.

K: Good, great.

J: Goodbye, take care.

CLASSIFIED

Auth: E017258

Date: 10/1/72
By: B. J. MARRIAD

Telcon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:55 a.m., October 14, 1972

K: Mr. President.

P: Henry, there is one thing I have to know; I will probably be talking to Mike Mansfield later today due to the fact that he calls me when they adjourn, if they adjourn. Now he may raise the China, I just want to know---

K: Yes, we haven't had an answer from them yet.

P: All right, I can just say---

K: But we have submitted it to them.

P: You have submitted it; that's all I need to know, thank you.

K: Right, Mr. President.

CLASSIFIED

3012958

B. M. DUE 5/1/72

TelCon

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 pm, October 14, 1972

K: Hello

DK: Hi, Henry

K: How are you, Dave?

DK: Fine, how are you sir. Welcome home.

K: Thank you

DK: Guess you're pretty worn down to a frazzle.

K: Yes, pretty, I guess, it's pretty hectic.

DK: It must have been. Henry, it's probably not fair, but I have been reading Murray's piece, and a--

K: Nobody knows a God damned thing.

DK: Well, okay, don't get exercised but--

K: Well, I; but I have never seen such irresponsible stuff written.

DK: Well, okay.

K: Do you think we would tell Murray at this stage?

DK: No, I didn't think you would tell Murray anything, but I just wanted to satisfy myself. You know, Le Duc Tho is on the record about the difficulties--

K: No, he wasn't on the record. A French journalist overheard him talking to the Russian and Chinese ambassadors and we don't even know the wording of what he said. You know, some people say he said this "still some difficulties remaining". Obviously, or we would announce the settlement.

(Laughter)

DK: Well, is there any hand holding or guidance you can do for me on this one.

K: No, I really can't. I really mustn't.

DK: You think it would be too far to say that difference are narrowed but that they're still serious.

CLASSIFIED

TelCon

Dave Kraslow/Mr. Kissinger

12:50 pm, October 14, 1972

K: No, we obviously talked about serious matters or it wouldn't have lasted so long.

DK: But it would be fair to conclude that, you know, there have been a narrowing of these differences and that---

K: In some areas, yeah, and how serious they are just don't want to characterize.

DK: But there are problems remaining? Obviously.

K: Yeah.

DK: And one might reasonably expect that they might be another session?

K: That would be a reasonable assumption.

DK: Henry, is there anything at all you can tell me for the rationale for Thieu calling home the ambassadors.

K: No, I just don't know what he's got in mind.

DK: It's a mystery to you?

K: Yeah.

DK: Do you think it's fair to infer that he's a little nervous.

K: Oh, yeah, I think it is fair.

DK: Then, that would be the explanation for it.

K: That's quite possible

DK: Okay, I can't bother you. I still hope we can have our luncheon, but you seem to be flying off to Paris every time we try to get set.

K: That's right.

DK: Well, I'll call again on Monday if I may, and maybe I can set something up with Dick.

K: Good, Dave, Thank you.

DK: Bye.

9501503

B&MA DEC 5 1975

TELCON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

10/14/72 1:45 p.m.

AD: Hello Henry. I just looked through the information that I received and I would like to check with you some points. Well, in general it is pretty close to what you said, but there are some things that I would like to check with you. On a political side, I will just read to you--there is an agreement reached of creation of a political structure consisting of three parts--you know

HK: It was administrative structure--

AD: This says a political structure.

HK: Well, we can't accept that. My test is the agreed upon text.

AD: It says, Henry, it was an agreed upon--no, no, I do not have a text of agreed text--it is just a summary that they make.

HK: No, but the text I gave you is the agreed text--

AD: It could be--I am simply telling you what it said--as a political structure which will include the Revolutionary Government, Saigon, and some neutral political forces. You will call created a council--I translate from Russian now--Soviets of Reconciliation and accord like this one. Then in relation of this Council of accord, then there is about elections, then about organization six months after elections, then this structure must not enter into military alliance, then the right for both governments to keep their international links, in the about principle of reunification, then there is a lengthy page about the creation of mixed two-side, three-sides and four-sides commission and there is a function of them, but it is not of great interest. And this is probably most interesting but I am discussing with you personally because their summary--what is not agreed upon, as yet. First, it has not reached an agreement upon precise date of ceasefire.

HK: That's right. But that's minor--we'll settle that next week.

AD: Second, it is not agreed upon the procedure of releasing the prisoners. They say that you would like to free all your American prisoners but at the same time not all the prisoners which are in the hands of yours and Saigon administration.

HK: That's that issue I mentioned to you.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012058
By MWAPSA 5-04

Page 2

AD: Yes, it's exactly what you mentioned, but I understand that you said that within three months it could be settled.

HK: Well, we would use our influence.

AD: Yeh, along those lines. Then another one, they said it was not settled the question of about replacements, about weapons

HK: Right.

AD: They said their impression is you would like to leave for Saigon administration more weapons than for the troops of the revolutionary government, then ceases equal principle--the principle of equality.

HK: Well, if they count themselves in we will accept the principle of equality.

AD: Laughs.'

HK: Well, they cannot take the position that they have the unlimited right to receive arms but Saigon does not.

AD: But they feel that you want to have more for Saigon administration than they.

HK: It would be very easy to settle if they accept--include themselves in this arrangement.

AD: What do you mean include themselves--in what sense?

HK: If they said--we are willing to say we will regular our military assistance by the degree of military assistance they receive.

AD: But they have on the principle of equality--what is not yet--

HK: They don't consider themselves part of the PRG.

AD: Oh you mean--

HK: They want to take the position that they can receive unlimited aid in the north, but then they will give to the PRG on the principle of equality what we give to Saigon.

AD: Hm, huh, I see. With one their own.

HK: You see what I mean?

Page 3

AD: Yeh.

HK: So there are two possibilities-- if they include themselves we accept the principle of equality. If they don't include themselves we must reserve the right to gear the replacements to what they receive.

AD: Actually those who are in South Vietnam.

HK: That's right.

AD: I understand.

HK: On this point, we will not yield.

AD: Then there is another one they said there is no agreement on the composition of the international control commission -- there is a lengthy explanation that you don't like the present composition about 4 members--

HK: No we'll accept -- that will be settled.

AD: Reports Hungary and Poland and you didn't agree to this one and you propose Canada and Indonesia and but very lengthy--I think this is a small one. Then he says they were not agreed upon the function about the international commission--you would like to have a broader authority and including military contingent for international control commission. Then that you insist that both South Vietnamese parties will inform the international commission on the location of their troops and so on and so on. Well it isn't really big issue.

HK: That's already passed. They must have given it to you on an earlier-- that is already settled.

AD: No, no, they gave it to me just after he left--

HK: I think they gave you things so that they could claim a victory afterwards.

AD: Oh, it could be. (laughing) Well, about this decision, etc. that the month about the circumstance and demonstrated--they quote you as you said I already mentioned to you. Then they said you mentioned to them that after consultation with the President you will give a reply on a correction

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By MWBAGGIE CO 04

Page 4

which those which agreement had not been reached. So now as I
understand your amendment or what you put in this agreed text
is your actual reply--yes?

HK: Yeh.

AD: Yes. Then you agreed that on the 17th you are going to meet with Xuan Thuy, and then.........and then they say you intend to go to Hanoi. By the end they put it this way--as you mentioned to them that the United States prepares or inclines to reach agreement of the Indoehinese problem before November 7 but they are not so sure that you will keep your promise.

HK: (laughs).

AD: This is completely off the record I am telling you. So this is the situation I don't know why you put them and then do not assure you will keep your promise? What promises you gave them? (laughing)
Did you give any promise?

HK: No, that I would try to get it settled.

AD: Yeh, but this is what they are quoting, you said that the United States is looking for to solve all this before the 7th. Well, here we are--and this is all the details. Of course there are some maybe small differences but it is only in sense of translation. Nothing really.

HK: Good, well, I appreciate this.

AD: So this is situation as it stands. We'll be in touch on Monday--you are leaving on Monday morning or evening?

HK: I leave Monday morning.

AD: I will receive a letter from you on--

HK: On Monday morning.

AD: On the two Germanys--before you go. Then I'll be in touch with you on Monday morning.

HK: Exactly. We'll talk to each other.

TELCORN

10/14/72 1:45 p. m.

Page 2

AD: Yeah, along those lines. Then another one, they said it was not settled the question of about replacements, about weapons

HK: Right.

AD: They said their impression is you would like to leave for Saigon administration more weapons than for the troops of the revolutionary government, then cease equal principle--the principle of equality.

AD: Laughs.

AD: Oh you mean--

HK: You see what I mean?

DELEGATIONS

8502103

BANGLADESH DUE 5/10/74

Page 3

AD: Yeh.

HK: So there are two possibilities--% if they include themselves we accept the principle of equality. If they don't include themselves we must reserve the right to gear the replacements to what they receive.

HK: That's right.

AD: I understand.

AD: Reports Hungary and Poland and you didn't agree to this one and you propose Canada and Indonesia and but very lengthy--I think this is a small one. Then he says they were not agreed upon the function about the international commission--you would like to have a broader authority and including military contingent for international control commissions. Then that you insist that both South Vietnamese parties will inform the international commission on the location of their troops and so on and so on. Well it isn't really big issue.

AD: Oh, it could be. (laughing) Well, about this decision, etc. that the month about the circumstance and demonstrated--they quote you as you said I already mentioned to you. Then they said you mentioned to them that after consultation with the President you will give a reply on a corrections

RECLASSIFIED
Date: 01/29/95
To: Mita Dc
From: B. Mita Dc S/1/95
Author: E012958

Page 4

HK: Yeh.

AD: Yes. Then you agreed that on the 17th you are going to meet with Xuan Thuy, and then......... and then they say you intend to go to Hanoi. By the end they put it this way--as you mentioned to them that the United States prepares or inclines to reach agreement of the Indochinese problem before November 7 but they are not so sure that you will keep your promise.

HK: (laughs).

AD: Yeh, but this is what they are quoting, you said that the United States is looking for to solve all this before the 7th. Well, here we are--and this is all the details. Of course these are some maybe small differences but it is only in sense of translation. Nothing really.

HK: I leave Monday morning.

HK: On Monday morning.

BECLASSIFIED
Author: E0172958
Date: 5/1/94
BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Stewart Alsop

10/34/72 2:15 p.m.

SA: Are you speaking to me again?

HK: Only as long as you are sick.

SA: (laughing) Otherwise there's not a chance, huh?

HK: That's right.

SA: I never heard of anybody getting so damn angry because somebody said he was indispensable.

HK: Well because you achieved the exact opposite of what you said and it's the last paragraph that did me the damage --

SA: My brother Joe has told me that it was unwise and I can see that it was unwise--

HK: The rest of it, you know, I would rather not have happened, but that would have been to your discretion. But that is *nt* why I called you--I just wanted to find out how you were.

SA: I have a little trouble again--I've got some pneumonia. But I'm on antibiotics and will be out of here in a week or so. The problem is that my defenses are so low--

HK: That's what I was wondering about.

SA: Yeh, my doctor thinks he is going to get me out of here.

HK: Oh terrific. You sound much better--

SA: I don't feel too bad. I have been wandering about the corridors and have a temperature--but not a high one. How are you Henry, you must be exhausted.

HK: I have had a hectic week.

SA: You sure have. I hear you are having a little dinner with my aging brother.

HK: That's right. Miss Maginess arranged it--I'm delighted but this is the Alsop/Maginess access.

Page 2

SA: The last time the Alsop/Maginess access was established ____ was there, but I suppose he has a good excuse because I am locked up in NIH.

HK: We hope to see you when you get out.

SA: All right, fine. Actually, I got from various conversations with other officials that the ____ died down and I made it very clear to everyone that --

HK: Well you know it is somewhat an historical period here. But it can't affect my respect and affection for you--I was just very annoyed that one week, but

SA: I was carried away by a good phrase.

HK: Look these things happen, you just get back and--and continue writing whatever you write. We need you.

SA: All right, Henry.

HK: Good Stewart, Bye.

TelCon
Lord Cromer/Mr. Kissinger
3:40 pm, Oct. 14, 1972

K: Hello.

C: Welcome back.

K: Thank you.

C: You've had a very, very strenuous time, haven't you?

K: Yes, I've had it pretty hectic.

C: Yes, I'm sure you have.

K: Your ambassador in Bonn has a little problem. He stated that the four power group---

C: I thought he had--

K: And, you know, things I tell you shouldn't go into those---

C: I'm extremely sorry about this, I don't know what the hell happened. Quite honestly. And I apologize.

K: Now, could he sort of square it away?

C: Yes, what is the scenario; going to be? Are they going to produce------

K: Well, we will produce whatever text they've agreed on, and the Russians will produce something, and let's agree on something in common.

C: Yes, sure.

K: I mean, all I wanted from the Russians was something that was close enough to what we had so that it could be negotiated.

C: Absolutely, but of course, where the is concerned, we are to go on asking the Russians to produce their piece of paper.

K: Well, we can both produce them. We'll produce the NATO paper and they'll produce theirs, and then the four gentlemen will get gentlemen will get

C: Yes.

K: Okay.