# THE IMPACT OF NUCLEAR WARFARE ON SOVIET POLITICAL AND MILITARY THINKING: 1945-56

## Introduction

In discussing Soviet attitudes toward nuclear warfare three things must be kept in mind. First, the fact that there is clearly a huge gap between operating Soviet strategical principles and the nominal principles enunciated by Soviet politicians and military scientists. Second, that the existence of this gap is not an altogether unique Soviet phenomenon, but that the full implications of nuclear warfare have been only slowly realized by the military theoreticians of all nations. Third, that Soviet thinking itself has not remained static since 1945, but has undergone considerable evolution, though perhaps not as much as the rapid changes of official Soviet propaganda would suggest. The greater consciousness of the potential destructiveness of atomic and hydrogen bombs which the Soviet leaders display today may reflect the changing requirements of foreign policy, not a changing conception of nuclear warfare itself. This is not to suggest that operative changes have not occurred, but only to underline the ease with which the observer may be misled by official pronouncements. The greater frankness of Soviet discussions since Stalin's death has diminished the possibilities of such misunderstandings; but these problems still exist.

This analysis will be divided into three parts, in accordance with the distinctions outlined above. The first part will take up the official regime position taken immediately after the war, and continued with minor variations up to the time of Stalin's death. An attempt will be made to explain this position in terms of the special circumstances of postwar Soviet

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foreign policy. The second part will discuss the official position as it
developed after Stalin's death, in a period in which Soviet foreign policy
underwent considerable revision. The third part will summarize the entire
development of the Soviet position, as best as it can be ascertained from
official sources and unofficial conjectures.

# I The Official Soviet Position: 1945-1953

From the very start of the "atomic age," the Soviets made a vigorous
and consistent effort to minimize the impact of atomic energy on the science
and conduct of warfare. The bombing of Hiroshima was mentioned in the
Soviet press, but only briefly, and with no further discussion or elaboration.
The end of the Far Eastern War was attributed to the intervention of Soviet
armies on the Asian mainland. It was indeed later stated that the use of
atomic bombs on Japan was "of no military value," but only of political
importance. The bombing of Nagasaki was not even reported in the Soviet
press at the time it occurred. Akthough the Soviet regime was soon to
launch a world-wide campaign to "ban" the use of atomic bombs, the Soviet
public had to wait for nearly ten years to find out precisely what the bomb
itself was.

The initial Soviet "black-out" on information concerning atomic
warfare was so complete that it seems safe to assume that the Kremlin had
fixed on a settled policy even before the bombs fell on Japan. Stalin's
famous display of nonchalance on hearing of the atomic bomb from Truman at
Potsdam (as well as the later evidence of extensive Soviet espionage) indi-
cates that the Russians were sufficiently well informed to have sized up
the impact of the atomic explosions on their general postwar situation in

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Europe and Asia. The "black-out" was definitely a consciously determined policy from the start, and not a natural Soviet reaction in terms of previous propaganda lines. Indeed, the Western European Communist Parties, which were still following the wartime propaganda line, greeted the atomic bombs with excitement. *Unita*, the leading Italian Communist newspaper, had this to say on August 10, 1945:

> News that the American Air Force has used the atomic bomb, news that has made an enormous impression throughout the world, has been received in some quarters with a sense of panic and with expressions of blame. This, it seems to us, is a curious psychological kink, schematic obedience to an abstract humanitarianism...We do not, therefore, share the sense of dismay because we consider in the use of this formidable weapon of destruction in its concrete sense...

The French Communist newspaper, *Humanite*, boasted that Professor Joliot-Curie had been of "enormous assistance" in this "wonderful conquest of science."

The Kremlin by that time, in the middle of the summer of 1945, was several steps ahead of its European agents. It had already determined to create in its own press the impression that nothing unusual had happened at Hiroshima. It was not, however, until 1946 that this position, implicit in the regime's press coverage, was formulated as an explicit regime dogma.

Stalin said bluntly:

> I do not consider the atomic bomb as such a serious force, as several political groups incline to think it. Atomic bombs are intended for the intimidation of the weak, but they cannot be the decisive judge of a war, since for this the atomic bomb is completely insufficient. (Pravda, September 25, 1946).

Between 1946 and 1951 this single statement constituted the major, and practically the only, official Soviet formulation on the whole complex question of the meaning of the "atomic age." Stalin's concept was repeated in a variety of forms in every discussion of atomic warfare; it was considered definitive and final. The Soviet encyclopedia stated, for example,

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that "atomic bombs are meant to frighten people with weak nerves, but they
cannot decide the outcome of a war." (Bolshaya Entsiklopediia, 2nd Ed., Vol. III,
p. 433). This idea was repeated in Soviet journals with the same tiresome
regularity that, for example, Stalin's famous judgment on Mayakovsky ("The
most talented poet of our epoch") was used by Soviet literary figures.
The encyclopedia continued: "United States efforts to frighten peoples with
a super-bomb are doomed to failure, just as were their speculations on the
atom bomb monopoly... Its destructive effect is comparatively not great."
It was said furthermore that the reason the destruction caused at Hiroshima
and Nagasaki could largely be explained by the fact that Japanese homes are
made of light, inflammable materials.

A book on atomic energy published in 1952 (M. N. Korsunskii, *Atomnoe Yadro*, Moscow, 1952) of nearly four hundred pages disposed of the whole question of the military use of atomic energy in three pages, citing Stalin's statement to support the contention that the bomb could not be the "decisive judge of a war." This book appeared after the Soviets had exploded several atomic bombs, and only a year before they successfully detonated a hydrogen bomb. Yet it does not contain a single reference to Soviet nuclear-military achievements. The fact that the Soviets were working on the construction of their own nuclear weapons was not even publicly admitted until 1949. The American tests in the Pacific were ignored almost completely, except for a casual statement once that the results of the Bikini tests were "disappointing" to the American strategists, and that the damage caused was "insignificant." No discussion appeared of the possible "revolutionary implications" of atomic energy, whether for peaceful or wartime purposes. The Soviets had discovered it was later boasted how to harness atomic energy to civilian needs, but no

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one dared to suggest that these discoveries might seriously alter the
nature or accelerate the development of the planned Soviet economy.

Even after the Soviets had publicly admitted possession of an atomic
bomb, the black-out on Western achievements was continued. No mention was
made in the Soviet press of any of the following events: The December 1951
announcement that atomic-derived electric energy would soon be produced,
the October 1952 explosion of Britain's first atomic bomb, or the November
1952 American tests at Eniwetok. So loath were the Soviets to acknowledge
the role of atomic bombs in international politics that when they attacked
Truman's November 1950 statement that if necessary the U. S. would use
atomic bombs in Korea they did not even mention the bomb, but attacked him
only for creating "new war hysteria." (Note: For some of these observations
I am indebted to Leo Gruliow, whose article "What the Russians are Told"
in the March 24, 1955 issue of the Reporter is an excellent discussion of
the regime's press relations with its people).

This complete black-out on the problem of atomic warfare was broken
in 1949 when the regime felt called on to offer some comment on President
Truman's September 23 announcement that the Russians had exploded an atomic
bomb. So unprepared were the Russians for Truman's announcement that the
Soviet propagandists feebly tried to suggest that an obscure 1947 reference
of Molotov's had been a clear announcement of atomic construction, even
though it had been nothing of the kind. (Molotov had merely declared on
November 5, 1947 that "the secret of the atomic bomb has long ceased to exist").
Pravda stated defensively:

> Essentially there is nothing sensational about the [Truman] announcement itself. Stalin and Molotov had long ago announced the existence of the atom bomb...Why did the President behave so mysteriously?

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This statement not withstanding, the Truman statement had caught the Kremlin off-guard. Had Truman chosen to withhold the 1949 AEC discovery, the Kremlin would have kept its silence for another two or three years. As it was, Vyshinsky, in UN debate, adamantly refused to admit the atomic explosion had anything to do with military preparedness. "We want to harness atomic energy to carry out great tasks of peaceful construction," he explained "To blast mountains, change the course of rivers..." (Soviet News, November 14, 1949). This river-changing project was never actually announced in the Soviet press; indeed, this was actually the last word ever said on the project (except for an obscure reference in an East German newspaper). However, so successful was the ensuing general propaganda of "peaceful construction," that the myth of the mountain-blasing project remained embedded in the public consciousness for two years, until Stalin himself blasted the myth in 1951.

Ever since 1949 the Soviet propagandists have insisted that the major purpose of atomic energy in the Soviet Union was "peaceful construction," that because of the "superior" character of the Soviet economy, atomic energy could be exploited for peaceful purposes more easily than elsewhere. Malenkov summed up this idea, a continuous theme in Soviet propaganda, at the 20th Party Congress:

> This source, in the peaceful use of which the USSR has proved itself to be ahead of other countries, including the United States, offers great additional opportunities for increased power capacities. Our superiority in this field lies also in the fact that the conditions of a Socialist economy are most favorable for the inclusion on a wide scale of nuclear energy into the general power balance of the country.
> 
> However, in the late 1940s and early 1950s this alleged "superiority" was only a theoretical hope, and the regime mentioned the "peaceful" uses of atomic energy only to distract attention from its wartime potential.

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The Soviets maintained throughout this period the rigid position that no mechanical invention could possibly disturb the course of history predetermined by Marxist-Leninist doctrine. The atomic bomb itself was treated as nothing more than a figment of Western propaganda, designed to frighten the Soviet Union, conceived as a means of "blackmailing" the "camp of socialism" into submission. The few Soviet discussions of the problem were on a completely psychological level. Atomic warfare was not discussed; but instead the theories of people who did believe atomic warfare would change the course of history were ridiculed. A Communist philosopher (in Voprosy Filosofii, No. 3, 1949, pp. 294-300) O. V. Trakhtenberg, discussing "The Sociology of the Atom Bomb," summed up the entire American discussion of atomic warfare as an effort to "frighten both imaginary enemies and one's own fellow citizens,"" William Ogburn of the University of Chicago was ridiculed for allegedly having written "the atomic bomb brings death to mankind and the destruction of civilization," Lewis Munford for suggesting that after the atomic holocaust man would return to primitive conditions, D. Robinson for suggesting that whether or not to use the atomic bomb is a "complicated moral problem," and others for similarly provocative thoughts and conjectures.

American writers were all accused of "exaggerating the effectiveness of the bomb" and at the same time praised for their "unwilling" admission that "the atomic bomb can add little to the destruction of Stalingrad," and that "it is hard to predict the limits of human courage." The greatest scorn was reserved for an English writer (D. R. Davies) who suggested in a 1947 book that the atomic bomb has "shaken the supercilious pride of man, his idea that he could master the earth alone." This scorn is understandable,

in terms of the Soviet insistence that man--Soviet man, at any rate, --was
in the process of "mastering the earth alone." Trakhtenberg wrote:

> The English reactionary finds more hateful than anything the working people's faith in their ability to master their historical fate, their faith in the progressive course of society's development in conformity with scientific principles. He would like the atomic bomb to shake this faith.

> Davies would particularly like to wean the working people away from any striving toward power; he says that 'the deceptive cult of power' is to blame for everything.

The author's concern with the "working people's faith" was moving, but it was clear that what really worried him was the threat to the popular belief in the Kremlin's "striving for power...in conformity with scientific principles." The author also ridicules those writers (Emery Reaves and Quincy Wright) who proposed "one government" or "one world" as an answer to the atomic crisis. This would mean nothing more than submitting to American domination of the peoples of the world. Molotov was more explicit on this point:

> We know that there are a few ways of forcing other nations to the side of the stronger powers. It is known that fleets of warships and formations of friendly airplanes have appeared sometimes in those seas and those places where they had not been earlier, when this is considered necessary for the achievement of greater successes in international diplomacy. It is also known that dollars and pounds sterling are also used...Now, as is known, we hear much about "atomic diplomacy." Nor is it a secret to anyone that these and other means, in various combinations, frequently are used for the purpose of influencing others... (Voprosy, *Vneshney Politiki*, 1948, p. 260).

Hence any conjecture which lends to "atomic diplomacy" an air of
effectiveness is dangerous. Those writers like Aldous Huxley whose book
*Ape and Essence* describes a primitive post-atomic civilization in New Zealand
were said to be unable to "face the possibility of complete happiness"
toward which "the peoples of the world" are currently moving. In short,

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Huxley wants (in the familiar terminology) to "frighten people with weak nerves." He has no confidence in "human reason" or "progress" and thinks that "revolt" is "inexpolent." (Znamyá, No. 5, 1949).

As for the atom bomb itself, it is not very much. Pravda of January 21, 1950 reported that "according to reports from Tokyo" only 8,481 people actually suffered from atomic bomb explosions in Hiroshima and 7,967 in Nagasaki. It was not clear which "Tokyo reports" were involved, but the effort to minimize the bomb is evident. Thousands more had, after all, been killed in Stalingrad, and the Russians had won the war. Furthermore, the Soviets tended to minimize, not only the bomb itself, but the scientific achievement involved in splitting the atom. The aforementioned study of atomic energy (Atomnoe Yadro, Moscow, 1952) emphasized the alleged contributions of the theoreticians—including a number of Russians like Mendeleev, Bekkerel—to atomic work, deemphasized the Western theorists—though Einstein is mentioned—and said practically nothing about the Western scientists who actually produced the bomb itself. Indeed, Lenin's alleged contribution to atomic science is given more prominence than that of any Western scientist. Lenin had taken note of the new theories of the "destruction of the atom," its inexhaustibility, the changing of its basic forms" in his well-known Empirio-Criticism (1911) as supporting evidence for "dialectical materialism."

The implication was that nuclear physics was a contemporary branch of dialectical materialism, "as Lenin wrote" (p.62). This general line was also followed in the Soviet encyclopedia's discussion of the scientific background for atomic energy (Vol. 3, Second edition, pp. 417-432).

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Up to the time of Truman's September 1949 announcement the official Soviet position had been that the atomic bomb was not a "serious" component of modern warfare, that it was indecisive, and that possession of it did not alter the basic global relationships one iota. This position did not change in 1949; but a new wrinkle was added to it, reflecting the obvious need to take the whole question a little more seriously now that the Russians had been forced to acknowledge that they too had constructed a bomb at great cost. The new wrinkle was the line that the next war would bring about the destruction of capitalism, but not of civilization itself. Malenkov was the first Soviet official to put forth this concept, on the thirty-second anniversary of the Revolution (November 7, 1949); it was repeated in articles in the official Party organ, *Bolshevik*, by Molotov, Mikoyan, Beria and others in subsequent months, and although this concept has undergone considerable *de facto* revision since, it remains formally the official line today (March 1956).

This "line" was not elaborated specifically in connection with the advent of nuclear warfare. Indeed, it was nothing more than an elaboration of the general Leninist principle that in periods of global crisis, such as a world war, Communism is likely to make considerable headway at the expense of capitalism. Certainly this principle had been verified by the two great world wars of the 20th century; Malenkov was simply stating that he expected a third world war -- should it come-- to bring further gains. The very idea that the atomic bomb should have made this historical principle outmoded was one the Kremlin would not tolerate. Therefore the now famous doctrine was evolved that "only the imperialists will perish, but not civilization." After all, as one Soviet analyst suggested in a tract published in 1951, the atomic bomb was only one of many futile devices conceived by America in its 35-year old struggle to destroy the Soviet Union and enslave the world. This was its only significance;

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and like other previous devices, this one too would surely fail to bring results.
The fact that the first atomic bomb was exploded in New Mexico on July 16, 1945,
"on the eve of the Potsdam conference," was certainly no accident, said the
author, but simply the first act of "atomic diplomacy." (M. Gusev, *Borba Soviets-
koro Soiuza za sokrashehenie... Atomnovo Orushia*, Moscow, 1951)

Soviet treatment of the atomic bomb in this period was entirely on this
psychological-political level. The idea was not that atomic warfare _could_
result in the "destruction of civilization" but rather that the "destruction of
civilization" was indeed the goal of the "atom-maniacs." It had been Hitler's
goal too, and he had been unsuccessful. There was no reason to expect the new
effort to destroy humanity would be any more successful. The famous "atom war
issue" of _Colliers_, published in 1951, evoked a characteristic response in the
Soviet press. _Literaturnaya Gazeta_, (November 15, 1951), which analyzed the issue
of _Colliers_, did not take up the question of whether _Colliers'_ portrayal was
accurate or not, but only examined the question of the motive of the _Colliers'_
editors: pathological sadism. _Izvestia_ (August 22, 1951) saw in the atomic bomb
an Anglo-Saxon plot to destroy the other races of the world, and Dr. Leo Szilard's
calculation that 500 tons of heavy water could in fact destroy the earth's entire
population was cited as evidence that such a plot was afoot.

In the early 1950s there is some evidence of slightly greater Soviet candor
on the question of atomic warfare. Having securely cracked the American
"monopoly", the regime evidently considered it necessary to augment Stalin's
sparse 1946 statement with a few more words on the subject. On October 3, 1951
the U. S. Government announced that the Russians had exploded a second atom bomb.
Three days later Stalin, in a relatively long interview, offered his second
comment (since the war ended in 1945) on atomic warfare. It was in the form of
an interview:

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Q. What do you think about the clamor roused recently in the foreign press in connection with the testing out of an atom bomb in the Soviet Union?

A. Indeed, a test was recently made by us on a type of atom bomb. Tests on atomic bombs of various calibers will be made in the future under the plan for the defense of our country from attack from the British-American aggressive bloc.

Q. In connection with the tests on atomic bombs, public figures in the United States raise a hullabaloo and shout about a threat to the security of the United States of America. Are there any grounds for such alarm?

A. There are no grounds for such alarm. Leaders of the United States of America cannot fail to know that the Soviet Union is not only against the use of the atomic weapon but is also for its prohibition, for the cessation of its production.

As is known, the Soviet Union has demanded several times the prohibition of the atomic weapon, but it has each time met the refusal of the powers of the Atlantic bloc.

This means that in the event of a United States attack on our country, the ruling circles of the United States will use the atomic bomb. Precisely this circumstance compelled the Soviet Union to have the atomic weapon in order to be fully armed to meet the aggressor.

The remainder of the interview concerned the problems of prohibition of atomic weapons. Stalin said that he thought the chances of such a prohibition were good "only in the event that the [aggressive bloc] realizes that they are already no longer the monopolists." He then repeated the traditional Soviet argument in favor of full prohibition and against the system of "control" which, he said, echoing a hundred Vyshinsky tirades in the United Nations, represented only the "legalization and legitimization" of the "right of the warmongers to annihilate tens and hundreds of thousands of civilian populace by means of atomic weapons."

Stalin's statement did not, formally at least, signify any change in basic regime dogma on this problem. However, informally, it represented a slight revision. The atomic bomb was no longer a figment of Western imagination, a phantom designed to "intimidate" and "blackmail." It was so real, in fact, that the Soviets had felt "compelled...to have the atomic weapon in order to be fully

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armed to meet the aggression." Implied in Stalin's statement was the idea that atomic weapons were a vital part of the equipment of a "fully armed" nation. Prior to Stalin's death little more was said to elaborate this new conception; but the seed had been planted. The regime might continue to insist that the bombing of Nagasaki and Hiroshima was "without military significance," but the insistence had inevitably less conviction.

Additional evidence of a greater willingness to face the complex realities of atomic warfare in public was contained in a long article which appeared in a Soviet theoretical magazine (*Voprosi Filosofii*, No. 1, 1952) several months after Stalin's interview. The author, the well-known Soviet historian E.V. Tarle, analyzed the American *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, and concluded that the Americans were slowly realizing that the atomic bomb was not the solution to all their international problems. He summed up the American strategy in this way: "(1) Providence has sent the atomic bomb for the purpose of defending the 'Anglo-American way of life'; (2) This weapon will make it possible to get along in a future war without clashes of land armies of millions of men, and 'our boys' will not come into contact with armed forces; (3) it will end with an air war." However, this complacent philosophy was shattered by two developments: the discovery that the Russians too had the atomic bomb and the realization, born of the Korean war, that "technical superiority all by itself is powerless to overcome even the most modest land forces of people fighting for their existence." The result has been "greater restraint, scepticism and reflectiveness" in the ranks of the American "cannibals". They realize now that "wars are decided not only by air power, but also by land power." They understand that "if cities in the rear of the enemy country are bombed, the population not only will fail to turn against its government, but on the contrary, will rally around it in particularly close accord." Tarle's article does not deviate basically from the postwar Soviet dogma. Its significance lies in the usually detailed and

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realistic discussion of the possibilities of atomic warfare, hitherto altogether absent from Soviet discussions. However, he closed his article on a typically dogmatic note:

> The authors of the Bulletin cannot but recall the example of Hitler's savagery in the Soviet Union, which failed to have even the slightest effect in bringing about that scoundrel's object.

Therefore, he wrote, it is no wonder that the "authors" state that the prohibition of the bombing of urban centers would "diminish the American chances of a victory."

## The Military Aspect

The postwar Soviet position on atomic warfare was compounded of two elements: the traditional Soviet military strategy and the character of the postwar Soviet political offensive. The former will be taken up in this section; the latter will be taken up in the next.

In strictly military terms, the line on atomic warfare was closely connected with the whole character of Soviet military ideology as it emerged after the great victories of World War II. This war had appeared to vindicate the strategic concepts which had guided military thinking before the war, and gave them what appeared to be a more solid footing in reality than they had ever enjoyed.

"The combat experience of the Red Army is and will be in the future," wrote Major General Talensky of the General Staff toward the end of the war, "the fundamental and decisive factor which determines the development of peacetime military art for many decades." (Bolshevik, No. 10-11, 1944). A close student of Soviet military doctrine, Raymond Garthoff, noted furthermore that in no country in the world does the Historical Administration play so important a role in the formulation of military doctrine as in the Soviet Union. (Soviet Military Doctrine, Glencoe, Illinois, 1953, p. 60). The result was, on the surface at least, an intense concentration on the "lessons" of World War II. Among these "lessons" seemed to be ample proof to support the traditional Soviet contention

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that military strength does not depend on technological supremacy -- which encourages sudden military thrusts based upon particularly advanced weapons -- but rather on more solid historical circumstances which the Soviets term the "constantly operating factors." The Germans had set off to conquer Europe with complex modern weapons and the strategy of the "blitzkrieg" attack, but it was the Russians, possessing neither, who in the end conquered half of Europe. This seemed to be clear proof that it was the Soviet superiority in the "constantly operating factors" which were the "decisive" elements in the war. Among these "constantly operating factors" are the superiority of the Soviet social system, the higher morale of the Soviet soldier, the greater support given the Soviet military forces by the civilian population, the profound strength and inexhaustibility of the Soviet economy, etc. Stemming from these "constantly operating factors" were the components of Soviet military strategy: the great reliance on massed formations of infantry, supported by concentrations of tanks and artillery, delivering a series of hammer blows on a particular front until a break-through was achieved; the strategy of placing complete emphasis on the creation of a particular break-through on the front, to the exclusion of other tasks such as strategic bombing, thereby to take advantage of the colossal Soviet manpower resources, to minimize certain technological deficiencies, and to gain maximum value from the higher "morale" and durability of the Soviet infantryman; the insistence on centralized control of the entire front so that particular armies cannot draw supplies and support for operations not related to the particular break-through on which the General Staff is then concentrating its attention; the doctrine of completely subordinating aircraft, armored units and artillery to the main attack which, in the final analysis, must be made by massed infantry; the willingness of Soviet leaders to sacrifice many more men in a particular engagement than other leaders, made possible by greater Soviet manpower reserve and by the firmer discipline and "morale" in the Soviet ranks; the preference

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for land battles, a preference dictated by all the above factors and by the
vast land areas in which Soviet armies can maneuver without giving up vital
urban centers; the dependence on securing local support, from partisans or
foreign Communist Parties, in disorganizing enemy forces and in securing reliable
civilian control once the Red Army has conquered an area.

Soviet military doctrine, as one can plainly see, was little more than a
series of descriptive generalizations based on the experiences of World War II.
One of the most important of these generalizations was that no "single weapon"
can turn the tide of battle. Thus we find Major General Isayev writing in 1949
that prior to the recent war

...military thinking in the capitalist armies, under the direction of unresolved class contradictions and the adventuristic nature of their war aims, displayed an erratic and extravagant predilection for one-sided development, now of the air force (Douhet), now of the tank force (Fuller) and to underestimate the importance of artillery, infantry and other services...

As we know, all these one-sided theories and vagaries of military
thought resulted for the capitalist states only in bitter dis-
illusionment and great catastrophies. (*New Times*, No. 52, 1949)

The appearance of these "one-sided" theories in the "capitalist" states was no
accident. The Soviet leaders can depend on their infantrymen, whose discipline
and endurance are excellent, whereas the capitalist leaders cannot depend on
their infantrymen, because they fear the people. "The underestimation of the
infantry reflects the fear of the imperialist bourgeoisie before their people,
before mass armies," wrote Marshal of Aviation Vershinin in 1949. "Not having
reliable reserves of manpower at their disposal...the warmongers boom and exagge-
rate the role of the Air Force out of all proportion...[believing] that the
peoples of the USSR and of the People's Democracies will be intimidated by the
so-called 'atomic' or 'push button' war." (Pravda, July 17, 1949).

While it may not be true that the "imperialist bourgeoisie" fears "their
people," it is certainly true that the Soviet infantry, for a variety of reasons,
was capable of more astonishing military feats in World War II than perhaps any

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other infantry, and that the Soviet reliance on the massed infantry-artillery-armored unit offensive was justified. In this sense the extraordinary Soviet military achievements of World War II were a tribute to what may be termed "constantly operating factors." Thus one can understand the Soviet writer who said:

> Victory in war does not depend on "chance" factors, on one weapon or sudden invasion, but on certain constantly operating factors: durability of the rear, moral spirit of the army and the people, comparative character of the armies, the superiority of the social and economic system. (Gusev, op. cit.)

The Soviet military achievement did in fact seem to reflect the superior capacity to tap popular energies and demand popular sacrifices. Only a small portion of the American people were called on to make sacrifices during the war, while the majority busied themselves with the immense task of manufacturing and wielding the complicated instruments of warfare and supplying troops with the mass of personal equipment necessary for the soldiers of an advanced country.

The Red Army's tremendous success stemmed partially from its extra-ordinary morale and discipline (as well as its size and inexhaustible reserves). The conquest and consolidation of Eastern Europe was a direct by-product of the continued westward march of these armies; the communization of Yugoslavia could be traced to the same type of strategy. If Europe continued to tremble at Russian might after the war, it was because everyone realized that this army, posed as if to strike again, was indeed capable of overwhelming any force opposing it -- except possibly the atomic bomb.

This is not to imply that had not the Americans discovered the atomic bomb, the Russians would have moved their armies westward. This can never be known. But what is clear is that, with the atomic bomb, the Russians really never had any choice in the matter. It could not even be said that Europe's continued independence was at Russia's sufferance; the Kremlin was not even in a position to take advantage of the critical situation in France in 1947.

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Any military advance into Europe meant taking the real risk of a global war in which atomic bombs would be employed. The Soviet freedom of action was severely limited by this fact, and the fear of Soviet armies -- the major weapon of Soviet postwar diplomacy was thereby partially nullified.

It is not difficult to imagine the chagrin with which the Kremlin greeted the news that the United States had successfully exploded an atomic bomb in New Mexico in July 1945, "on the very eve of the Potsdam conference," as one Soviet writer later wailed. They must have sensed immediately that the release of this tremendous and incalculable force threatened to impede or disrupt the unfolding of the mighty historical trends unleashed during the war, forces from whose success the Soviets could only stand to gain. They may have realized then the fact which Winston Churchill later articulated: that the atomic bomb stood between the powerful advancing Soviet armies and the fruits of the tremendous military and social victories which these armies had achieved during the war.

It is, as we have stated, impossible to declare with absolute conviction, as Churchill did, that had it not been for the atomic bomb the Russian armies would have moved at will across the European continent. However, it is clear that since the U. S. possessed the bomb such an advance was out of the question, and the only place where the Kremlin dared to direct the overwhelming might of its "constantly operating factors" was in the small area where their faulty intelligence indicated that the U. S. would not even put up armed resistance of any type -- atomic or otherwise -- to the Soviet advance and that place was Korea.

Considering these facts, the great Soviet reluctance to acknowledge the "decisive" character of the atomic bomb was quite understandable, and the Soviet insistence on the myth of the exclusive demise of capitalism in the next war was a logical one. Soviet diplomacy depended on the world-wide fear and respect for Soviet military power; the vast ascendance of the Soviet Union as a world power in the postwar period depended on the regime's capacity to exploit fully

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the reputation it gained during the war. The American attempt to wipe out this strategical advantage by boasting of the "decisive" character of atomic weapons, had it been altogether successful, would have deprived the Kremlin of much of its enormous weight in world affairs, and reduced the Kremlin to the status of one of many have-not nations in the Pax America of the postwar years. The victorious Soviet regime, embarking on its most gigantic industrialization plans, was determined to preserve its place as the second center of power in the world. In preserving its postwar gains the "myth" of the insignificance of the atomic bomb played an important role.*

The superiority of the Soviet "constantly operating factors" was not confined to the manpower and morale of the Red Army. It was further enhanced by the existence of large and powerful Communist Parties in Western Europe, whose leverage the Soviet diplomats skillfully employed in the postwar years in boosting the general position of the USSR. These parties were partly sustained by the conviction that certain inevitable historic forces would propel them, and the Soviet Union, into positions from which they would control the world. The sudden intrusion of the atomic bomb into the postwar picture seemed to cast serious doubts on the validity of this historic timetable. The impact of the bomb was incalculable, its long-range significance seemed to surpass human comprehension, and its implications were open to the educated guesses of almost any observer. Men had conceived an instrument of power which they were not certain they could control, whose possibilities for both economic welfare and human destruction were unlimited. The purely ideological problems which this eventuality posed for the Soviet leaders were so great that the Kremlin insisted

* The Soviet refusal to consider seriously various American plans for the control and inspection of atomic weapons also stemmed from the regime's refusal to acknowledge the seriousness of the atomic bomb as an instrument of warfare. It was true, of course, that the regime opposed the Baruch plan because it did not exactly prize the idea of submitting to international control. But this was probably not the primary reason, which was the regime's desire to create the impression that the complex question of the control of atomic weapons could be resolved by a simple U.N. resolution "banning" the atomic bomb.

(continued on p. 20)

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on ignoring the whole matter as long as was feasible. The planned economy pre-
supposed complete mastery by a small group of men over all the known forces of
the earth, animate and inanimate. The assumption of the final victory of Commu-
nism presupposed the capacity to predict with precision the consequences of all
contemporary trends and human decisions.

In this sense, the advent of the atomic bomb posed a problem for all those --
in East and West -- with fixed beliefs and rigid commitments, spiritual or insti-
tutional. For the Soviet leaders the problems were greater, the solutions more
difficult. This was particularly true in the postwar period of extreme regi-
mentation, ever-tightening ideological orthodoxy, and sharply accelerating tota-
litarization of all phases of Soviet life. A more realistic appraisal of the
atomic age could only be made when these basic social trends were reversed after
Stalin's death in 1953.

However, it should not be assumed that, because of the blackout in the
public organs of information, Soviet politicians and industrialists were unaware
of the revolution which was taking place in the technological world. The con-
trary is true. Far from ignoring the vast technological and scientific revolu-
tion, the Soviet leaders had allocated an enormous portion of the total national
resources -- larger proportionately than in the United States and Britain -- to
the exploration and exploitation of the new sources of military and economic
power. The hysterical propaganda of the Stalin era obscured this from the view
of Western observers, many of whom foolishly equated the wild ravings of Soviet
propagandists with the substance of Soviet economic life. The fact is that bet-
ween 1945 and 1953 Soviet industry made enormous strides forward, both in a
quantitative and qualitative sense, taking advantage of the latest techniques
developed by Western scientists and their own increasingly competent and imagina-

By supporting such a resolution the Soviets also put themselves resolutely
in favor of "peace" in the eyes of its world-wide following, but this too
was subsidiary to the major objective of eliminating the atomic bomb as a
factor in the diplomacy of the cold war, a factor which favored U. S. aims
until 1953.

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tive technicians. This became evident in the post-Stalin era, when Western technicians were once again permitted to inspect Soviet plants, factories, and scientific installations. In the realm of jet aviation, automation, atomic physics, intercontinental rockets, and even interstellar travel, the Soviets had more than held their own, but in many realms had pushed forward of their American counterparts.

In 1953 Stalin died, leaving a vast industrial system and a heritage of a semi-oriental despotism no longer compatible with this industrial system. The regime's greatest asset was no longer its colossal manpower, the extraordinary morale and endurance of its people, the unique inspiration of its ideology. The regime's assets could now be counted in units of technological accomplishment, ready to begin to compete freely on the world market, literally and figuratively. As a result, with the death of the anomalous figure of Stalin, many of the semi-oriental features of his despotism were shed, among them the increasingly untenable doctrine that the atomic bomb could not seriously alter the type of military art which had so brilliantly thrown back the Germans at Stalingrad. The successful Russian detonation of a hydrogen bomb in 1953, several months after Stalin's death, may well have hastened this process of reevaluation; but unquestionably the death of the dictator in March of that year was the decisive turning point.

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(2) The Post Stalin Change.

Since the middle of 1953 the Soviet position on nuclear warfare has under-
gone considerable revision. The basic position denying the "decisive"
character of nuclear arms - remains, but it is a shell of its former self.

These changes follow closely the vast change which has occurred in Soviet foreign policy itself, a change which has already radically altered the nature of the Cold War. As the Kremlin has turned toward the employment of more conventional means of imperial expansion economic and military aid, systems of alliances, support of the national aspirations of its allies, etc. - its treatment of nuclear warfare has become more conventional. As the Kremlin's world-position increasingly depends on its capacity to command a rapidly expanding industrial machine and as it equals and excells the U. S. in certain technological achievements, its position no longer depends as much on the traditional "constantly operating factors" of World War II.

The first step in this direction was Malenkov's August 8, 1953 announcement that the Soviets had produced a hydrogen bomb, soon followed by the announcement that a hydrogen bomb had actually been set off. In his speech Malenkov stated that as a result of these technological advances peaceful coexistence of the two world-systems was an "obligation." An aggressive war against the U.S.S.R. would be "folly" and would meet with a "decisive rebuff." In the previous period, when the Soviets were playing down the role of nuclear weapons, the Kremlin spokesmen had very rarely boasted of the Soviet power of retaliation. This was partly because at that time their power of retaliation was still limited (though not nearly as limited as optimistic American strategists then believed), and partly because such boasts would have contradicted the Soviet strategy of de-emphasizing the role of nuclear weapons. The policy was now under slow revision; and Malenkov therefore permitted himself the luxury of boasting of the impending "decisive rebuff."

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In the next six months the Soviet press betrayed a growing willingness to treat the problem of nuclear warfare in a realistic manner. In October Ilya Ehrenburg admitted in an article that atomic bombs did represent a "threat to civilization" but branded Dulles' statements to this effect as "ludicrous" and "exaggerated." Eisenhower's December 10, 1953 speech to the UN appealing for extraordinary measures to save mankind from the hydrogen holocaust was reprinted in part in *Pravda*. The continuing Soviet reluctance to admit the problem was reflected in the fact that several particularly ominous references - such as the statement that the U. S. possessed hydrogen bombs "in the range of millions of tons of TNT "equivalent" - were deleted in *Pravda*. However, one of the President's most striking statements was not omitted - his warning that unless measures were taken soon it would mean "to accept helplessly the probability of civilization destroyed." In the Soviet reply to a U. S. note proposing an international agency the regime noted the "particular danger of the atomic weapon" for the peoples of the whole world, and recognized the necessity of urgent steps to spare "mankind ... the horrors of an atomic war." An article in *Izvestia* (January 19) stated that under modern conditions war "means colossal destruction."

*Pravda* of January 30, 1954 greeted the idea of a disarmament conference which would "contribute to the freeing of mankind from the terror of atomic bombing."

On February 25, 1954 the Bulgarian Communist Premier, Vulko Chervenkov admitted that there might be "new and unheard of destruction" in another war, "particularly terrible now that there are weapons like the atomic bomb." Three days earlier Marshal Bulganin, Soviet Minister of Defense foresaw "monstrous and unprecedented calamity" in the prospect of another war. On March 12, 1954 Premier Malenkov, climaxing the Soviet turnabout on this question, declared that his Government was "resolutely opposed to the policy of the cold war, for this policy is a policy

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of preparation for fresh world carnage, which, with modern methods of warfare, means the ruin of world civilization." A few weeks later the Soviet people received their first glimpse into the frightening realities of thermonuclear power. ***Krasnaya Zvezda*** (March 26, 1954) stated that the hydrogen explosion could be compared to the impact of the meteorite which fell in Siberia in 1908, which "uprooted trees over a distance of 100 square kilometres..." The next day a Moscow radio commentator said that atomic and hydrogen bombs "would threaten the very existence of civilization."

Thus in six months the whole fabric of the Soviet position on the capacity of Socialism to withstand a nuclear war appeared to have dissolved. Evidently there were forces in the Kremlin, however, which felt that the myth of the invincibility of socialism was too precious to be abandoned so lightly, despite the obvious need for much greater frankness on these major issues. On April 5 ***Pravda*** repudiated Malenkov's bold statement: "Not terror, not fear, not submission to threats, but a universal indignation...is taking hold of the nations." ***Kommunist*** (No. 4) criticized "some people" who believe in the "absolute force of modern weapons," and underestimate the power of forces "fighting for peace."

These people were unable to figure out in time the real sense and objectives of the fable about the destruction of civilization... and began repeating this fable in their oral and printed speeches.

The result was the sowing of "seeds of fatalism," and the undermining of the people's "creative and optimistic attitude toward the future." On April 26 Malenkov himself, addressing the Supreme Soviet, rejected his own statement, asserting that an atomic war would 'inevitably lead to the breakdown of the capitalist system.'

In the two years since the reassertion of this Stalinist dogma, this line has remained in force. Molotov told the Supreme Soviet in February 1955 that "'world civilization' will not perish, no matter how much it might suffer from

25

new aggression, but what will perish is that already rotten social system...

*Pravda* of February 26, 1955, echoing these remarks, said that it was absurd to think that atomic weapons "can cancel the forward development of mankind. Weapons have never altered or cancelled the laws of social development. They have never created or abolished conditions which could alter social structures or entire countries." This idea was repeated again, with perhaps less vigor, at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956 by Mikoyan and Molotov.

In Soviet political and military journals one can find in the past two years many examples of the continued use of the myth of the superiority of the "constantly operating factors." The major difference between these statements and those which characterized the earlier period is that they are not simply repetitions of Stalin's 1946 dogma, but take the whole matter far more seriously. For example, *Krasnaya Zvezda* (August 3, 1954), commenting on the effectiveness of nuclear weapons, declared that research on the impact of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs and analyses of the Pacific tests have "somewhat cooled the hotheads of some U. S. war strategists." The article claims that these researches, plus the Soviet atomic achievements, account for the "sober voices heard more and more often in the American press." The Americans, it was claimed, are beginning to realize that "it's the soldier in the battlefield who decides the final outcome" of a war. The same article, however, was accompanied by the first photograph to appear in the Soviet press of the mushroom cloud which had much earlier become a symbol in the West of the horror of the atomic age.

Another characteristic article was published in *Sovietskaya Armiya* (July 1 1954) during the same summer following the repudiation of Malenkov's "destruction of civilization" line. The author, Colonel F. Gavrikov, admitted that "atomic weapons pose certain problems" but added that "they are not to be overestimated."

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Soviet military art assumes that this new means of combat not only does not reduce, but on the contrary, enhances the part played by the foot soldier and raises his role to a new level.

The outcome will still be determined by men strong in spirit, physically hardened, knowing how to employ first class equipment and possessing high moral combat qualities. There are means and methods for protection...

The basic dogma is evident in Gavrikov's analysis; but it is clearly not as solid or self-confident a dogma as it was in the period when the whole problem was haughtily dismissed by Soviet strategists with a brief reference to Stalin's 1946 statement.

The cynical use of the 1946 dogma becomes increasingly apparent as the Soviet politicians alternate statements of it with a dose of realism.* The Joint Soviet-Indian statement of December 13, 1955, signed by Nehru and Bulganin, contains this statement:

> The meeting of the heads of Governments at Geneva in July, 1955 led to a recognition by the great powers represented there of the futility of war which, owing to the development of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, could only bring disaster to mankind.

> In order to establish world peace and to eliminate conditions leading to the inconceivable disaster of another world war, there is no other course than that of disarmament.

This statement seemed unequivocal in its meaning. However, in an interview given several weeks later to an American Newspaperman (Charles E. Shutt), Bulganin made an extremely awkward effort to deny the central significance of

* So lax have the Soviets become in the last year regarding their old dogma of the absolute invincibility of the "socialist camp" that, for example, they permitted Titel Petrescu, a Romanian politician returning from exile, to issue a statement which included the following. "Today, when all nations in the world ardently demand peace, we, the Socialists, can be only beside them. In our century a war, as wished by those who want to revive the past by this means, would be destructive and immensely damaging for the whole world, due to the atomic and hydrogen weapons." (Radio Brasov, Dec. 18, 1955).

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this statement:

It is wrong to assert that inasmuch as East and West possess hydrogen weapons the possibility of a thermonuclear war is automatically excluded. Assertions of this kind can, in fact, lull the vigilance of peoples who support the elimination of the threat of an atomic war.

He acknowledged that because "atomic and hydrogen weapons. . . "cannot be used with impunity" they have "some deterrent effect" on Western strategists, but he clearly did not want to acknowledge the existence of what Charles Shutt termed an "atomic deadlock" between East and West. His explanation of his position was simple: to believe otherwise would be to "lull the vigilance of peoples" struggling for peace. In this sense, the dissemination of the concept of an "atomic deadlock" was as difficult for the Soviets to accept as the concept of the "destruction of world civilization." Indeed, the two ideas are logically connected with one another, since an "atomic deadlock" presupposes the possibility of the "destruction of world civilization." It was precisely this line of reasoning which Maurice Thorez followed when, in an article in *Humanite* (March 3, 1955), he attempted to silence those Communists who were "exaggerating" the dangers of atomic war. On January 19, 1955, for example, the Communist-controlled World Peace Council had warned that "the use of atomic weapons would result in a war of extermination." Some days before Joliot-Curie, a leading French scientist and "peace fighter" had stated that atomic war means "collective suicide" and that "effective civil defense is illusory." No less a figure than Nikolai Tikhonov, the well-known Soviet writer, had told a World Peace Council session in Berlin that "atomic war gravely endangers civilization" (May 25, 1954).

The fact that statements of this type were being made for foreign consumption almost a year after they had been condemned inside the U.S.S.R. is one of those rare, but possibly significant, instances in which Soviet internal and external propaganda widely diverged. The Soviet line abroad had to be far more flexible, due primarily of course to the availability in the non-Soviet world

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of objective information to compete with Soviet panegyrics. However, there were
dangers in permitting such a wide divergence between domestic and foreign lines.
Therefore Thorez was called on to clarify the issues:

> Atomic danger is a very real menace, which amply justifies the protest and the struggle of the people against so frightful an eventuality. Exaggerations (however) are only grist for the mill of the American imperialists who would like to prepare an atomic war with impunity by spreading false ideas among the masses like these: "nothing can be done!" "What's the use of fighting!" "It is the end of the world!" or like another: "The atomic peril is so great that they would not dare to drop their bombs; they would not want to commit suicide." It does not matter to the warmongers that these arguments are contradictory. What is important to them is to discourage, disarm, demobilize the masses, to turn them aside from action necessary for peace.

Despite this firm statement, the Communists continued to wrestle with the problem of reconciling the admission that the 'atomic danger is a real menace' with the necessity of leaving Soviet diplomacy unbridled by the concept of an actual "atomic deadlock." Novy Mir (April 1, 1955) acknowledged that "atomic weapons are certainly powerful," but declared that "they will not be able to produce the required effect if the proper precautionary measures are applied."

However, the very same article criticized certain Soviet writers for having neglected to discuss the means of defense to be employed by citizens living in urban areas under atomic attack. The article tended to minimize the dangers of such an attack, but it was the first open Soviet admission that its citizens might be faced with such an eventuality.

This same problem haunted the speakers at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956. Molotov followed the traditional line of approach:

> It must not be forgotten...that in historical trials the decisive role lies with the people and their solidarity and confidence in the justice of their cause. This was proved by our people in a particularly convincing manner during the heroic years of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War...

It was more than likely that this statement was a remnant of those "ossified forms of diplomacy" for which he was so sharply criticized by Mikoyan at the Congress.

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Khrushchev was not nearly as schematic in his own presentation, and did not repeat the sterile dogma of the "decisive role" of the "people." He saw signs, he said, of a "certain sobering up" in Western circles.

Nor is it fortuitous that prominent leaders of bourgeois countries with increasing frequency frankly admit that "there will be no victor" in a war in which atomic weapons are used.

Khrushchev's assumption that this "admission" was a victory for Soviet attitudes is rather amusing, when one considers how frequently Soviet leaders have boasted that socialism would be "the victor" in an atomic war! Krushchev was apparently aware of the contradiction, and tried to make amends to the official doctrine with the following curious afterthought:

> These leaders still do not venture to state that capitalism will find its grave in another war, should it unleash it, but they are already compelled openly to admit that the socialist camp is invincible:

> This confused statement of the traditional dogma contradicted what was otherwise a fairly coherent line of thought, climaxed by the statement "either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history, there is no third way."
> 
> Krushchev not infrequently yields to such spontaneous expressions. Speaking before a Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on June 15, 1954, he said that "we know what the atomic and hydrogen bombs really mean" and therefore favor their prohibition. But, he added, we are prepared for a struggle, should one ensue.

> We have done everything we could. We have developed atomic energy, we have developed the atomic bomb. We have forestalled the capitalists and developed the hydrogen bomb before them. The capitalists will not fight now.

Whereas the orthodox Soviet orator simply boasts of the Soviet power to retaliate, Khrushchev has put forward the concept of "deterrence" on a number of occasions. Speaking to a number of Indians in Bangalore (November 26, 1955) he said:

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We shall be glad if these bombs are never exploded over cities and villages. Let them lie buried, but let them influence the nerves of those who want to unleash war. Let these bombs tell them that it is impossible to unleash another war.

Thus while Soviet doctrine remained *de jure* static, its basic content was being subject to substantial revision in the post-Stalin period. Beneath the surface of rigid political and historical declarations, a steady undercurrent of reality was corroding the fortress of Stalinist orthodoxy.

These undercurrents rose to the surface in 1954 and '55 with the following series of developments: First, the regime initiated a widespread public discussion of atomic weapons, their components, their potential destructive power. Second, the regime permitted a limited discussion in military journals of the concrete implications of atomic weapons for military operations. Third, the regime indicated in various ways that it was in the process of reorienting its strategy to the peculiar demands of atomic warfare. The metamorphosis in military thinking had clearly begun much earlier; but the necessity of employing outmoded concepts in internal and external propaganda in the 1945-53 period had constituted a break on the process of military reorganization. The decision to loosen the bounds of public discussion therefore probably accelerated the strictly military changes.

The frank discussion of the atomic bomb actually began in the spring of 1954 in the army newspaper, *Krasnaya Zvezda*. These articles gave the Soviet reader the kind of basic information on atomic explosions which the Western public had learned in 1945 - concerning the means by which atomic energy is released, the power of the resulting explosion, the impact on objects in the vicinity of the explosion. An atomic explosion was compared with the volcanic eruption of Krakatao in 1883 and with the fall of a certain famous meteorite in Siberia in 1908. The mechanism of the atomic and hydrogen bombs was described in the same popular language which had characterized Western articles on this

31

subject. The articles were coldly factual and contained very little conjecture or philosophy. The fact that the hydrogen bomb is equivalent to several million tons of TNT was mentioned, but very little else was said on the hydrogen bomb.

The explosion most frequently described was of the type which had destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki (equivalent to 20,000 tons of TNT). Throughout, the authors of these articles emphasized that the atomic bomb need not disrupt the normal functions of an army.

The dissemination of information was furthered by the publication of a number of books and pamphlets for popular consumption. Among them were *Atomic Energy and Its Use* by S. Petrovich and D. Didov (Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1954); *Atomic Energy and Its Utilization* (I. K. Naumenko, DOSAFF Publishing House, Moscow, 1954); *The Atom and Atomic Energy* by V. A. Mezentsev (Military Publishing House, Moscow, 1954). The fact that so many of these books were published either by the military publishing house or by the civil defense organization (DOSAFF) indicates that the regime was slowly dropping the myth that in the U.S.S.R. atomic energy is used only for peaceful purposes. Interestingly enough, a review of a number of these books (appearing in *Novy Mir* April, 1955) dealt solely with the military aspects of atomic energy, even though the books themselves take up both the military and civil uses of it. *Pravda* (June 17, 1955) reported a "special series of lectures on atomic energy" held in Moscow, and presumably these lectures reflected this new realistic approach.

The second development in this direction was the series of articles appearing in the winter of 1954-55 on the operation of military units under atomic attack, another subject which had hitherto been prohibited in the Soviet press, and which presumably had not been taken up in detail in the training of troops.

*(Krasnaya Zvezda*, January 27, 1955; *Sovietski Flot*, January 5, 1955; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, January 30, 1955; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, February 1, 1955; *Komsomolskaya*

Pravda, June 7, 1955). These articles, with such titles as "Radiation Checks and Activities of Troops in a Contaminated Area in Winter", "The Protection of Troops Against an Atomic Attack", "The Effects of an Atomic Explosion on Populated Areas", were extremely factual and dry accounts of the means by which troops can minimize the effect of an atomic explosion. For example, regarding naval units, Sovietski Flot wrote (January 5, 1955):

> Atomic defense makes it possible to reduce to a minimum the effect of the damaging factors of an atomic explosion, to maintain the fighting capacity of the ship and its crew, and to ensure success in carrying out of military tasks in conditions of the use of atomic weapons.

> The organization of atomic defense is far more complicated than defense against normal weapons. Atomic weapons possess considerably greater power, and a whole number of damaging factors operate almost simultaneously....

The remainder of the article is an account of the impact of atomic explosions under a variety of conditions and the various means of preparing a ship for various possible eventualities.

> It should be remembered that one of the most important factors of atomic defense in the ensuring of successful performance of combat tasks is the preparedness of crews for action at gun emplacements, both at the time of atomic attack as well as in liquidating its consequences...

The article closes with a note of assurance:

> The Communist Party and the Soviet Government have provided our armed forces with all they need for a crushing rebuff to any aggressor possessing any type of weapons.

The article seems to be based primarily on conclusions arrived at by American military investigators after the Bikini tests.

The articles dealing with the defense measures of land troops bore much the same character, although in the case of troops the problems are frequently of a more individual character. These articles indicate that the Soviet military have arrived at the same conclusions regarding the type of defense to be employed as have American experts. Men subjected to radioactive radiation need not be

33

withdrawn from action, but can continue to fulfill their duties. The basic means of atomic defense are local natural cover as well as specially designed protective cover, varying in season, and in degree of distance from the center of the explosion. In winter snow may be successfully used to reduce the degree of dangerous radiation. Well-trained troops can cross contaminated areas, especially if they do not come in contact with walls. Removal of contaminated earth can make trenches usable again. Speedy movement of troops through contaminated areas, using motorized equipment, may avoid the worst damages. Decontamination equipment can be employed successfully in almost any situation.

Krasnaya Zvezda (August 4, 1955) explained, for example:

> ... it is necessary in every possible way to use the protective properties of the terrain. For example, forests, ravines, ditches, and the far slopes of heights possess good protective qualities...As regards a person in open terrain he can always find an object of protective quality, let us say, a ditch or a shell-hole. If there are no such things one should simply lie face down on the ground, with one's feet towards the explosion...

All such discussions emphasized that basic military operations can be conducted under circumstances of atomic attack. Major-General Olisov, writing in Krasnaya Zvezda (August 3), stated that "troops that are well prepared and trained for action in conditions where atomic weapons are used can successfully carry out combat operations: attack, and defend themselves, fulfill any combat tasks." He further explained that, as in the past, "new types of weapons...have always brought about the appearance of means of counter-action," and that "simple ways and means of protection" were being devised.

Neither Olisov nor anyone else had much to say about troop conduct under circumstances of hydrogen attack, and indeed most of the instructions related above are based on lessons learned from the more primitive atomic bombs. However, since very little of public American writing on troop movements under nuclear attack has dealt seriously with the prospects of hydrogen bombs, this is not of particu-

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lar significance. Both the American and Soviet military men evidently realize that there is little that can be profitably taught to troops concerning their response to a hydrogen bomb, since in this case it simply cannot be said truthfully that military operations of any character at all would continue. Soviet discussions have been less frank on this point than American discussions, but the difference is certainly only one of degree.

However, the Soviet military leaders are certainly aware of the indisputable fact that the use of hydrogen bombs in war would completely disrupt the traditional fabric of military operations, to say nothing of the traditional fabric of life itself. At the 20th Party Congress the Minister of Defense Zhukov referred to the possibility of the "destruction of millions of lives by modern weapons. The Soviet radio commentator, Viktor Shragin, noted (January 31, 1955) that "according to the most optimistic estimates...it would take only a few hydrogen bombs to ensure the destruction of Britain's principal industrial centers and fewer still would be needed to paralyze the vital centers of France, Belgium and Holland."

 Marshal Vasilevsky, writing in Pravda (December 4, 1954) spoke of a future war which would cost "hundreds of millions of lives" as well as the "major cultural and industrial centers" of the world. Vasilevsky's article, which was in the form of a reply to recent statements of Britain's Field Marshal Montgomery, was an extremely interesting one, especially since it has been conjectured that he was among the more aggressive of Soviet military figures. This article should cast some doubt on this conception:

> One might conceivably understand the senseless statements of irresponsible American Congressmen who brandish the atomic bomb: they do not know what they are talking about. But when atomic war is called for by a British Field Marshal, who should certainly realize the horrors of such a war, particularly for countries like Britain, it is not merely recklessness but something worse...

You and I, Field Marshal, are military men. We know what war is and

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we are now pretty well aware of the destructive force of atomic
and hydrogen weapons and of the terrible consequences of atomic war.
I am amazed by the levity with which you talk of atomic war...

You and I, Field Marshal, have spent all our conscious lives in
military service. We have seen the growth of the destructive
potential of military weapons and we know that nowadays that
potential is unusually great. We military men are responsible
for the hundreds of millions of lives which might perish in a
future war and for major cultural and industrial centers which
might be wiped off the earth. The destructive force which science
has placed in the hands of soldiers is so great that we military
men must realize how necessary it is to ban atomic weapons and to
establish effective international control over the ban.

Vasilevsky's conclusion is, of course, something of an anti-climax to an otherwise
striking personal statement. However, there are certain doctrinal commitments
which Vasilevsky cannot overlook. He too cannot acknowledge the unfeasibility of
thermonuclear war. And therefore in his appeal to Montgomery there appeared this
echo of the usual postwar Soviet themes:

> As for your statement that you "will give the Russians the works,"
> I would like to remind you that there is a difference between
> wanting to "give someone the works" and being able to do so...

> I want to remind you, Field Marshall, that the Russians themselves
can "give the works" to all who attempt to disturb their peaceful
labor. He who dares to unleash war will find himself in a most
unenviable position. The World War II is still too fresh in
everyone's memory for it to be necessary to recall the outcome of
the Hitlerite campaign against the USSR. Since then great changes
have occurred in the world. The Soviet Union, as you know, is
even stronger now, and beside it stands the Chinese People's Republic
...the other People's Democracies...

> And you realize, of course, that the technical aspects of war have
> been developed quite successfully in the Soviet Union in the past
ten years.

Very shortly after Vasilevsky's statement, in the beginning of 1955, the
first signs appeared that the traditional theory of the automatic superiority of
the "constantly operating factors" was undergoing revision. The re-evaluation of
traditional theory had undoubtedly begun much earlier; but the process reached
a climax in a series of articles published intermittently between January and June
1955. As early as March 1954, however, Defense Minister Bulganin had implicitly

f

36

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repudiated the Stalin concept of the role of atomic weapons: "We may not count," he said, "on the imperialists' having spent great material means and billions in money for armaments simply to scare us." In short, the atomic bomb is not merely a device to "intimidate the weak," as Stalin had said. "We may not count either," Bulgenin continued, "on the humanity of the imperialists who are capable, as life has shown, of applying any means of mass destruction. We must constantly be prepared crushingly to reply to any enemy possessing any weapon."

This new line of emphasizing the Soviet power to retaliate was given special prominence in the first half of 1955. "We have today," said Lt. Gen. Shatilov (February 22, 1955) "in sufficient quantities airplanes, fast and easily maneuverable tanks, fierce artillery, remarkable naval ships with incomparable firing power. We also have in our country atomic and hydrogen weapons, and their production, as is well known, is ahead of that of the Americans." Chief Air Marshal Zhigarev said (March 21, 1955):

> It is known that the United States imperialists, pursuing their aggressive designs...are putting the main emphasis on the air force and thermo-nuclear weapons.

> However, the imperialists will not succeed in intimidating the Soviet people with their air force and atomic weapons. The Soviet people have both, and if necessary will be able to use them in the best way for the defense of the motherland.

Major General Isayev (March 5, 1955):

> Under modern conditions the United States ruling circles have no grounds for the hope that, should they commit aggression, U. S. territory would remain outside military retaliation. And as regards the production of hydrogen weapons, the Soviet Union is well ahead of the U. S.

Radio East Berlin (April 17, 1955), always a little bolder than any other Soviet-controlled radio:

> Strategic long-range bombers of the Soviet Union, having a speed of more than 480 miles an hour and a range of 9,600 miles, can reach Chicago, Cleveland and the atomic plants in Washington (State) in six hours.

The more the Soviets boasted of their own technological achievements in

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the realm of modern warfare, the more they acknowledged that the conflict had
shifted from traditional factors to technology, and the more the "constantly
operating factors" receded into the background. This was the sum and substance
of the January-June Soviet military discussion. Marshal Sokolovsky, Soviet Chief
of Staff, manifested the new spirit when he demanded (February 23, 1955) that
there be more "creative research and bold study of the most pressing problems of
military science," that "the increased significance of the surprise factor be
taken into account in view of the existence of a weapon with enormous destructive
power," and that the study should include "the latest achievements not merely in
our country, but also abroad." Major General Kalashnik, in an article (May 20,
1955)*implied the existence of a special new drive in this direction when he
wrote that "at the moment all efforts of commanding officers...are concentrated
on the solution of the main problems put forward by the Minister of Defense for
stepping up and perfecting the battle preparedness of the troops, the study of
new battle technique and armament, and the strengthening of discipline." That the
regime was hastily trying to overcome an attitude of complacency bred over the
past years by the theory of the automatic supremacy of the "constantly operating
factors" was clear. Marshal of Armored Troops Rotmistrov, one of the most
original of Soviet military thinkers, writing in Krasnaya Zvezda (March 24, 1955)
said:

> We cannot regard these [recent] events passively; we must not lull
> our military cadres with outdated theories; we must reveal the
> increasing danger of surprise aggression and likewise increase the
> the military preparedness of our Army, Navy and Air Force.

He stated that "the possibility of a surprise aggression has increased, not
diminished" in recent years. Whereas in the past the Soviet Union had nothing
to fear from a surprise attack, "it must be frankly admitted that because of the
power of atomic and hydrogen weapons in some cases a surprise aggression might
become a deciding condition for success, not only in the initial phases of a war

* In Krasnaya Zvezda.

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but even in its final outcome." Surprise aggression must not be underestimated. Preparation must be so complete that Soviet forces "would be capable of disrupting any plans of the aggressor and in time defeat them." Despite the inferiority of the capitalist in the "constantly operating factors," it cannot be denied that bourgeois military science is developing rapidly. Rotmistrov attacked two works on military theory. M. Tarasenko's pamphlet "Constantly Operating Factors Which Decide the Outcome of Wars" and V. Petrov's article "On Constantly Operating Factors Which Affect the Fate of War." He said that these articles present a "purely theoretical point of view without considering all the complications which may arise in practice." In the first place, the capitalists too are conscious of "constantly operating factors" and "do everything possible not only to improve their armaments, but also to strengthen their economy and to boost the morale of soldiers." Secondly, under "contemporary conditions" the prominence of atomic and hydrogen weapons makes it possible for a "short war" - traditionally favored by the country with a weak economy or poor popular morale - to be more decisive than in the past. At the same time, Rotmistrov restated the conventional thesis that "in case the imperialists start a war against us, and use atomic and hydrogen weapons, the wide spaces of our Motherland will work in our favor, as contrasted with many of the capitalist states with small territory and great density of population." However, he said, while the huge spaces of Russia may be an advantage, this does not mean that the Soviets can permit a repetition of the last war, when the major battles were fought on Soviet soil. He called for a "re-analysis" of this entire problem, and suggested that the Soviet military forces must be ready to assume a more aggressive posture should a war threaten. That this was indeed what was on his mind seemed to be confirmed by Colonel Kashrin in an article in Krasnaya Zvezda (May 28, 1945) in which the problems of the morale of the Soviet army in foreign countries was frankly discussed.

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Soviet military ideology has always been animated by a striking preference for offensive operations, and it was this preference which was allegedly partly responsible for the 1941 fiasco in front of the invading German armies.* However, this purely military doctrine of offensive preference was submerged in the regime's political doctrine of defense against the "capitalist encirclement." The result was that the pattern of warfare which ensued during World War II - vast retreat into Russia's limitless spaces, followed by a prolonged shift-over to offensive tactics - became embedded in the Soviet military mind. The fact that this pattern had been followed by Russian military leaders when faced by Napoleon's armies in 1812 seemed to reinforce the conviction that this was a successful formula which might be employed again.

The regime is evidently taking steps to purge the military men of the complacent attitude toward the modern technological developments which have made this time-honored strategy somewhat obsolete. The advent of nuclear weapons has forced the Soviets to take more seriously the doctrine of "blitzkrieg" based on a "single absolute weapon." This is largely the significance of the series of articles which appeared in the Spring of 1955. Certain commentators have seen in this a Soviet doctrine of a "preventive war," but there is no grounds for such speculation, even though it is unquestionably true that the new doctrine of "offensive priority" is closer to preventive war than previous Soviet

* This brings to mind Khrushchev's recent criticism of Stalin for his failure to prepare the Russian armies for Hitler's surprise 1941 attack. As long ago as April 9, 1955 Krasnaya Zvezda, foreshadowing Khrushchev, called for more study of the early part of the "Great Fatherland War," the period of rapid and stunning defeat. Previously, almost all studies had concentrated on the period in which the Soviet armies finally assumed the offensive. Marshall Bagramian, writing in *Oktiabr* (May 24, 1955), said that "military leaders teach that victory can be won not only in conditions analogous to the victorious march of our troops after the enemy had been substantially weakened, but also under difficult conditions, such as those of the Moscow, Stalingrad or Kursk battles." Current Soviet military doctrine is leaning neither on the earlier or the later periods, but is evidently preparing for an entirely new type of warfare in which retreat into Russia itself is not envisioned. The repudiation of the Stalinist myths suggested above are chiefly significant insofar as they reflect a generalized ferment among military men in the USSR today.

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[y]

doctrines based on World War II experience. The new doctrine simply means that should there be a danger of foreign attack, Soviet forces must be in a position to move so rapidly that the attack will be met immediately behind the enemy's most advanced lines. Major General Talensky noted in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (January 17, 1955) that as a result of recent developments it is

more easily possible to unleash an atomic war in secret from the peoples .... At any moment as a result of a criminal adventure on the part of a small circle of political and military leaders... mankind may be faced with the accomplished fact of the beginning of a destructive atomic war.

And Marshal Vasilevsky (*Izvestia*, May 8, 1955):

The Soviet Union has at its disposal everything that is necessary to deprive the aggressor...of those advantages which he has gained by preparing himself in good time for an attack, and to deny him the factor of suddenness and treachery.

Therefore the "personnel and staff of the Army, Air Force and fleet train in a spirit of decisive offensive activity," ready to act swiftly forward should the aggressor move.

It is known that among the favorite weapons in the arsenal of the imperial-
ist aggressors are treachery and suddenness of attack. In view of the speed
of jet-propelled aviation and the existence of weapons of great destructive
power, the significance of the factor of suddenness has considerably increased.
The Soviet Union is aware of these dangerous and drafty practices...and has
drawn corresponding conclusions for itself.

Should a war be unleashed, it is ready to anticipate a surprise attack and to strike before the aggressor can take advantage of his own preparations for an initial blow.

This statement may be construed as the justification for a "preventive war,"
but actually it is something less than that. Any discussion of the precise
timing of blow and counter-blow in a war governed by the complex relations of
radar stations and widely dispersed air fields is a subject over which a great
deal of misunderstanding - much of it semantic - may arise. The American Stra-
tegic Air Force is largely governed by a concept much like the one put forward
by Vasilevsky. The central point in both the Soviet and American cases is the

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to stimulate an intensely offensive outlook in the armed forces, and to serve
warning thereby to the respective opponents of their readiness to employ every
weapon of "massive retaliation" should one side become convinced - and here is
the rub! - that the enemy has determined to strike.

Inevitably the adoption of such doctrines further reduces the scope and
importance of the "constantly operating factors," since it means the Soviets
acknowledge the likelihood of a short and decisive war, in which the matter of
the respective timing of the initial blows may be of extreme importance. This
had hitherto been denied, since it was asserted that, no matter how the war
began, the Soviets would be triumphant due to the greater endurance and depth
of their economic system. Furthermore, as Col. Kashirin admitted, the doc-
trine of "offensive preference" means that the regime sacrifices one of the
most important psychological components of the popular morale of its armies:
the traditional bravery and élan of troops which are defending their native
soil. To offset this loss a new moral strength will have to be imbued into
the army.

The question of popular morale thus takes on a new character, in which
Soviet soldiers have no more experience than any others, and which may be
as much a product of technical training as physical hardening. Major-General
Korniyenko, writing in *Sovietskii Flot* (May 6, 1955), wrote:

> With the appearance of new weapons possessing tremendous powers of destruction, the importance of the surprise factor in contemporary war has enormously increased. In view of this, the Communist Party demands that the whole personnel of our Army and Navy should be imbued with the spirit of maximum vigilance and constant and high military preparedness, so as to be able to wrest the initiative from the hands of the enemy, and having delivered smashing blows against him, defeat him completely....

> Our military scientific cadres are now called on to solve various questions concerning the exploitation of the latest discoveries for military purposes, and to elaborate problems connected with the organization, security, and conduct of these operations, and with the methods of commanding the troops in the new conditions.

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The question of "commanding the troops in the new conditions" is of special interest. Assuming the possibility of military operations under atomic attack, a very high degree of mobility is absolutely necessary. Armies can no longer be ranged in one continuous line along a "front," but must be ready to move quickly in any direction, to avoid fatal enemy blows, to remove themselves from contaminated areas, to take rapid advantage of atomic attacks leveled by one's own forces. To accomplish this there must be first of all iron discipline in the ranks of each military unit and secondly, a high degree of initiative on the part of local commanders. However, Soviet military practice has traditionally depended on a high degree of centralized control, making possible the slow accumulation of massive pressures on a particular point, pressures which in time finally break out into a full-scale offensive. Such tactics would make the Soviet armies highly vulnerable to concentrated atomic attack, and therefore must be abandoned.

Thus far there has been no open discussion in the Soviet press of this extremely important point, except for an increasing emphasis (evident, for example, in Sokolovsky's February 23, 1955 address) on the importance of training commanders at all levels capable of taking independent action. Korniyenko called for a strengthening of the role of commanding officers. Zhukov added a word on this subject in a talk to the Moscow Military District (reported in Krasnaya Zvezda, January 25, 1956):

> Individual attempts have been noticed in the district to subject the official actions of commanders to criticism at meetings. Such attempts merit condemnation. Our task is to strengthen the authority of commanders in every way, to support exacting officers and generals....

Whether the regime can successfully transfer authority to the field commanders without jeopardizing the essential features of centralized military control remains to be seen. There is no question that the Soviets have closely studied

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Western military writings on atomic warfare. Krasnaya Zvezda (February 17, of Atomic Weapons in Land Combat 1955) carried a long review/by Colonel G. C. Reinhardt and Lt. Col. W. R. Kintner (Harrisburg, 1954) which said that the book contains "data and arguments" which deserve "careful attention." This book devoted considerable attention to the necessity of abandoning the old concept of large centralized armies, supplied with overwhelming amounts of equipment, massing in good time in the sector to be attacked, and it stressed the importance of providing for flexible and highly maneuverable armies, easy to disperse, easy to assemble, difficult to hit, quick on the offensive, supplied from the air, with local commanders able to make quick decisions without contacting central authorities. Presumably the Soviets, having studied these Western materials closely, have begun to implement some of these obvious points in military organization. Major General Talensky's reference to the "highly dispersed military formations" of modern armies (Mezhunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 1, 1955) indicates that the Soviet leadership is aware of the necessity for decentralized command at certain levels in time of atomic crisis.

However, the process of "re-evaluation" called for by Rotmistrov is not by any means completed, and therefore it is likely that a high degree of centralized control incompatible with modern warfare continues to characterize the Soviet army. Soviet military thinkers continue steadfastly to resist the idea of the feasibility of "tactical" use of atomic bombs, despite the fact that one would imagine their well-known preference for land battles would lead them in this direction. Major General Isayev, writing in the New Times (No. 13, 1955) said:

> The first thing to realize is that even if atomic weapons are used solely for tactical purposes, they do not cease to be weapons of mass destruction all the same.... What the Pentagon strategists have in mind is the employment of "tactical" atomic weapons on a massive scale....

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With both sides possessing atomic weapons, it is easy to imagine what this would mean for the densely-populated regions and whole countries in Europe...

Consequently, any use of atomic weapons must inevitably lead to a devastating war generally, for which the Pentagon strategists have chosen Europe as the main battlefield.

He scoffed at the idea of "precise action" bombing and the concept of employing bombs over a "limited range." Whether Isayev really believes that there is no distinction between the "tactical" and general uses of atomic weapons or whether he is simply trying to minimize the feasibility of their employment for "limited" purposes cannot be determined. He concluded, in any case, that the Soviet Union would, "if compelled, fittingly retaliate to any 'tactical' or 'strategic' blow of the imperialist aggressors." Even though the Soviets have now acknowledged the great influence of atomic weapons on conventional warfare, they continue to emphasize that their primary purpose is the destruction of civilian centers.

Major-General Talenski wrote, for example (Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn, No. 1, January 1955):

> Atomic weapons, by their military characteristics, are designed primarily for use against big economic and political centers, against large towns, against civilian populations. The use of atomic weapons... against troops acting in the modern highly dispersed military formations, having the possibility of taking cover in specially-built trenches and shelters...is not very effective. In any case, it is much less effective than the action of the same weapons against towns or economic centers...

The phrase "in any case" may well be the crucial one in Talenski's line of reasoning, since it suggests that he is none too certain of his previous statement on the ineffectiveness of atomic weapons against troops, even when they are "acting in the modern highly dispersed military formation." The Soviet attitude toward "tactical" atomic weapons may only reflect a carry-over of the postwar attitude toward atomic weapons in general. Or it may reflect a well-reasoned belief that once atomic weapons are used "tactically" they must be employed generally, in which case the fate of the war will be decided by the

45

capacity of each side to destroy the opponent's major industrial and civilian centers, and not by strictly military movements at all.

Several major Soviet moves taken in 1955 suggest that this conviction is taking an increasing hold on their strategical thinking, and that they do not seriously envisage the future military conflict in terms of strictly military clashes, whether supported by "tactical" atomic weapons or not. Among these moves were the decision to reduce their armed forces by 640,000 men, a decision soon echoed by similar announcements in the European satellites; the decision to abandon Port Arthur and Porkkala, two military bases whose retention made sense only in an era in which conventional weapons were decisive; the increased budgetary allotment for military research, air force, and intercontinental ballistics; the unfolding of a vast program of economic aid to underdeveloped countries, opening up new peaceful levers for the expansion of Soviet influence; and the sudden decision (in May 1955) to give way partially to the Western insistence that disarmament begin with conventional arms rather than with nuclear and thermonuclear weapons as the Russians had for so long insisted.

The transformation of the Soviet military position in the last two or three years was reflected very vividly in the speech which Defense Minister Zhukov delivered to the 20th Party Congress this February:

> In building up the Soviet armed forces, we keep our eyes on the fact that the forms of the future war will be different in many respects from all past wars. The future war will be characterized by the mass use of air force, different rocket weapons, and various means of mass killing such as atomic, nuclear, bacteriological and chemical weapons.

> However, we consider that even the most modern weapons, among them the means for mass killing, do not reduce the decisive importance of land armies, the navy and the air force. A modern war cannot be waged without a strong land arm, without a strategic air force, and without a modern navy, which must cooperate with each other in a well-organized way.

> The quality of the Soviet Armed Forces has basically changed. They have far outstripped the level at which they were at the end of the Great Fatherland War. They now have various atomic and thermonuclear weapons, powerful rocket and jet weapons of various types, including long-range rockets and a first-class jet air force.

Zhukov's statement was sober and realistic, and had little in common with the bombastic insistence of an earlier day that atomic weapons are not "decisive." On the contrary, Zhukov gave the current technological developments a very strong emphasis in his talk; the infantry-centered doctrines of World War II have been left far behind. He went on:

> Recently utterances of political and military figures in the United States reflect with increased frequency the idea that United States strategy should be based on the utilization of atomic weapons for operation on battlefields and fronts. In view of the geographical distance of America these gentlemen attach weight to the fact that the atomic weapon would be first used on European territory, naturally as far from U.S. industrial centers as possible.

The U.S. monopolists are surely aware of the effectiveness of retaliatory atomic blows; yet they have no objections if in the course of operations these deadly weapons destroy millions of lives and immense casualties in countries which are America's allies -- in West Germany, Italy, France and elsewhere.

However,

> ...things would not work out as the crafty strategists planned. Today it is impossible to fight and avoid counterblows. If you want to deliver atomic blows to an opponent you must be prepared to receive the same and perhaps even stronger blows from the other side. The punitive military expeditions and colonial wars of the 18th and 19th centuries are a thing of the past....

The Soviet Union threatens no one, it does not intend to attack anyone. Yet for the time being no agreement has been reached on the reduction of armed forces and the ban of atomic weapons....

We must therefore have armed forces capable of reliably defending the interests of our homeland so that no provocation of the enemies can take us unaware....

The importance which the Soviets attach to their retaliatory capacity was also underlined at the Congress by Mikoyan:

> In the event of American aggression, hydrogen bombs can in turn fall on American cities too. Nor will the American imperialists be able to hide from these bombs; they will not be able to hide their factories. This time war will very definitely not be a source of enrichment for them; as a result of this they would suffer only destruction or annihilation.

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The doctrine of "no stalemate," to which the regime continues to adhere for pro-paganda reasons, was also put forward by Mikoyan:

> Hydrogen and atomic warfare can bring about great devastation, but it will not result in the destruction of mankind and its civilization. It will destroy the outdated and pernicious regime of capitalism in its imperialist stage.

However, he modified this dogmatic assertion by stating that the aggressive imperialist forces

> ...are restrained - apart from public opinion, apart from the great military strength of the countries of socialism - by another new important circumstance. It is the appearance of atomic and hydrogen bombs not only in America but also in the Soviet Union, as well as the means to carry these bombs to any point of the earth by aircraft or rockets.

Molotov echoed this idea:

> We possess no fewer of these possibilities than the other camp. Our material resources, our latest technical achievements, our colossal manpower, and the growing friendship and moral and political unity of our peoples give useful confidence in the invincibility of the camp of Socialism.

> All this has now become so obvious that it ought to have an effect on the circles who are still nursing plans of war for world domination, an act which has lost all meaning in the present international conditions and which primarily threatens those who may try to unleash a new world war.

Molotov went to great lengths to explain that although imperialist society automatically breeds war, the forces of "peace" might be strong enough to prevent one. But he added, ominously, "of course, under the present conditions, insofar as imperialism exists, there exists also a threat of a new world war, *not to mention other military conflicts*." (Italics added). This third alternative between war and peace - a localized conflict - is almost never discussed in Soviet analyses, and Molotov's reference was quite extraordinary in this respect. More characteristic of Soviet thinking at the present time was Zhukov's statement that "the punitive military expeditions and colonial wars of the 18th and 19th centuries are a thing of the past." Although this statement ostensibly applies only to localized military actions of the "imperialist aggressors," it is clear in the context of Zhukov's speech that it applies to localized military actions of the Soviet Union

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as well. The war which the Kremlin launched in Korea in 1950, which was only
possible on the supposition of no substantial enemy resistance, may have been
the last of the "punitive military expeditions" to which Zhukov made reference.

3) <u>Summary of the Development of the Soviet Position</u>

The evolution of Soviet policy regarding nuclear warfare closely follows
a) the development of Soviet foreign policy in the postwar decade and b) the
development of technology and industry in Soviet society in the same period.

The official position of denying the "decisive" character of atomic weapons in the immediate postwar years stemmed from a) the fact that the commanding position of the USSR, as the second world center of power, depended on the world's fear of Soviet strength in conventional arms and b) the fact that technologically and industrially the USSR was at that time far behind the more advanced countries of the West, particularly the US. The Kremlin was aware of the crucial importance of atomic weapons, but in order to maintain the appearance of diplomatic freedom of action, refused to acknowledge it. The Korean war may be taken as the culmination of this policy.

The change in policy, made possible by Stalin's death, was due to
a) the fact that, with the consolidation of the East European empire and with
the successful completion of two gigantic Five Year Plans, the Soviets had
assured for themselves the position of a second "center of power," completely
independent of the first "center" built around the United States, and b) the
achievement of such strength in the realm of nuclear and thermonuclear
weapons, as well as the other modern instruments of intercontinental warfare,
that the Soviets could compete with the US successfully in this sphere.

The postwar denial of the "decisive" character of atomic weapons was
therefore only a tremendous and successfully executed "bluff," a bluff which

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the United States called on several occasions: Azerbaijan (1946), Korea (1951), Berlin (1948), Indochina (1954) and the Formosa straits (1955). However, despite the fact that the "bluff" was so often called, the Soviet-inspired myth continued to dominate world politics. As recently as the 20th Party Congress, Zhukov gave expression to his intense irritation at the idea that American threats should have ever exercised influence over Soviet actions:

> In contradiction to well-known facts, Dulles tried to prove that the position of strength policy and direct threats to use the atomic bomb allegedly helped to bring to an end military action in Korea and Indochina, and to avert military activity in the region of Taiwan.

Zhukov does not tell us what these "well-known facts" are, but it is quite clear that he is simply trying to maintain the fiction that the Soviets have not been intimidated by American military power. The excited Western reaction to Dulles' "brink of war" doctrine indicates how successful the Soviets have been in getting this fiction accepted. Dulles' threat to employ atomic weapons was not, of course, the only determining factor in the settling of the Korean, Indochinese and Formosan crises. The mere threat of armed clash in recent years contains within it the possibility of leading to thermonuclear retaliation, whether this is expressed explicitly or not.

The postwar Soviet "bluff" was not an altogether "adventuristic" policy, but was based on the Kremlin's accurate appraisal of the future potential of Soviet industrial and political organization. The regime was, so to speak, gambling on what their system would be in ten years, not on what it was in the immediate postwar period. The Soviets were working from a _future_ "position of strength," and the gamble was a successful one. _The only other alternative would have been to have accepted publicly the overwhelming superiority of the United States as the major world power._

One other question remains: If the Kremlin leaders were aware as early as 1945 of the "decisive" importance of atomic bombs in warfare, why did they

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wait until 1955 to begin to reorient the army to the new type of warfare demanded by atomic weapons? The only way of answering this question is to say that this was part of the huge gamble on future power. Like all gambles, a half-way effort would have failed to achieve its purpose. Were it known that the Soviet armed forces - the conventional armies of World War II on which so much of Soviet postwar diplomacy depended - were in the process of reorganization, the loss in prestige would have been great. There were other factors as well. The basic morale of these armies, which depended on the notion of their invincibility, would have been partly shattered. Moreover, the new type of warfare - the technological warfare of nuclear weapons - was so remote from daily military routine that it could be pursued in the Siberian vastness by technicians who had hardly any substantial contact with the existing armed forces. Only when the Kremlin was ready to launch itself on the world scene as a full-scale technological military power did it become feasible to integrate nuclear concepts with daily military routine.

The post-1953 transformation is not of course complete, as we have pointed out. Many of the myths which formed part of the postwar 'bluff' still resound in Soviet speeches and military lectures, but they have been largely submerged in discussions of the Soviet power to retaliate. Some American military leaders - particularly General Ridgway - continue to believe in the importance of retaining the myth of the foot-soldier's basic role. And international diplomacy at this point still responds to some degree to conventional arms strength, but the response is growing smaller and smaller since the Soviets have given up complete dependence on it.

At present therefore it seems likely that the Soviets have accepted the concept of thermonuclear weapons as a "deterrent." Possessing this power of

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"deterrence" constitutes one of the important attributes of the Soviet position as the "second center of power," dominating the second "world-system," the "socialist camp," whose strength and prestige is increasing daily.

The struggle between the two worlds - East and West - continues to go on. However, since there are an inexhaustible supply of economic and political battlegrounds in which this struggle can be waged without decisive result for either side, the likelihood of a military clash in the next few years is very remote. It is for this reason that any abstract conjectures on Soviet plans for the use of nuclear weapons might not have much meaning today. Each situation, each crisis, must be judged in terms of the specific issues involved. A close study of Soviet documents relating to this topic leads this writer to believe that the Kremlin leadership is capable of far more sober and realistic appraisals of a situation than the West has in the past given them credit for. Therefore, it seems likely that in any given crisis the Kremlin will behave much as the American leadership would behave, given the terrible responsibilities attached to possession of thermonuclear weapons. The "atomic stalemate" has been largely accepted, despite propaganda statements to the contrary, and it will be broken only when all other means of advancing Soviet interests have been exhausted or when vital imperial conquests are threatened by a foreign power. However, these two eventualities are so remote at this time that it would be foolish to speculate on them further. The main function of thermonuclear weapons - and the intercontinental ballistics race now in process - is to provide the "deterrent" power necessary for the psychological and military support of the Soviet Union's present economic and political bid for world supremacy.