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4/2/91

By Henry A. Kissinger

Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.

The long career of Walter Stoessel, Jr., coincided almost precisely with an extraordinary period in American foreign policy -- our successful passage through and eventual triumph in the Cold War. His government assignments not only in Washington but across the faultlines of Europe -- in France and years later as Ambassador to Poland, the Soviet Union and Germany -- guaranteed his exposure to some of that era's most vexing geopolitical issues. Clearly, his responsibilities were as important as they were numerous. Among them was his contribution to a complicated diplomatic minuet with the People's Republic of China early in the first Nixon Administration when I was National Security Advisor.

For some years prior, Walter and I had been friends and professional colleagues. I had known him since 1959 when, as a Foreign Service Officer, he was assigned as a post-graduate fellow in the Center for International Affairs at Harvard where I had long been associated. I considered him one of the very best in the State Department -- expert, thoughtful, disciplined -- attributes which were present throughout our later dealings in government.

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When President Nixon assumed office, we agreed on
the geopolitical importance of ending China's isolation
and the decades of ideological hostility. Sporadic con-
tacts between the two giants had taken place at the
ambassadorial level between 1955 and 1968 in Warsaw
(when they were in suspension) but some 134 meetings
had produced nothing of consequence; indeed, these
talks became a sort of continual record in which not a
single important step forward occurred.

Nonetheless, the President was determined to signal
a new conciliatory attitude towards Beijing through what-
ever channel might prove productive. We, therefore,
initiated a few subtle feelers through those individuals
we knew to be friendly with the Chinese -- especially the
Romanians and the Pakistanis -- and also sought to revive
the Warsaw talks in which the Chinese, in the waning days
of the Johnson Administration, had expressed interest.

Walter Stoessel, then our Ambassador in Poland, was
assigned to strike up contact with the Chinese, though they
were loathe to be seen in public with American officials
unless formally instructed. In the fall of 1969 I suggested
that he try to engage the Chinese Ambassador at any social
function the two might be attending to let him know of the
American desire for serious talks. As it happened, the

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Page 3

Cultural Revolution claimed the Ambassador and there remained in Warsaw only the Chinese chargé d'affaires, Lei Yang.

As so often, some of the most interesting foreign policy events occur under seemingly trivial circumstances. In the unlikely venue of a Yugoslav fashion show held at the Warsaw Palace of Culture, on December 3, 1969, Ambassador Stoessel spotted Lei Yang, who, predictably, proved elusive and fled down a flight of stairs. In pursuit, Walter was able to convey our message through Lei Yang's Polish-speaking interpreter. Chou En Lai told me many years later that his astonished diplomat, totally without instructions for such a contingency, had fled because he did not know how to respond.

In the event, our Ambassador was shortly invited to the Chinese embassy and ostentatiously greeted at the front door (lest the Soviets miss the significance of the sudden embrace). That meeting, along with some interim contacts, ultimately led to a formal revival of the Warsaw talks on January 20, 1970.

Their resumption was an important public symbol of our willingness to pursue a more conciliatory approach towards China. Under Ambassador Stoessel's stewardship, they provided a forum for us to convey some nuances to initiatives we were taking in the secret channel through the Pakistanis. The latter was soon to gain momentum,

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the linchpin in Washington being Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly, whose brother was at the same time their country's Ambassador to China and whose sister had been a student of mine at Harvard. Backchannel contacts through Islamabad to Beijing were soon to pave the way for my secret trip to China in July 1971, and President Nixon's later visit in February 1972.

The era of fashioning triangular diplomacy was an extraordinarily complex one. Walter Stoessel was a player in the broader mosaic designed, we hoped, to reverse decades of hostility with the world's most populous nation, and transform the geopolitical balance. His contribution, matched later by distinguished service as Ambassador to Moscow, shall not be forgotten.

*

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RN

DRAFT - re Walter Stoessel

3/27/91

The long career of Walter Stoessel, Jr., coincided almost precisely with an extraordinary period in American foreign policy -- our successful passage through and eventual triumph in the Cold War. His government assignments not only in Washington but across the faultlines of Europe -- early on in France and years later as Ambassador to Germany, the Soviet Union and Poland -- guaranteed his exposure to some of that era's most vexing geopolitical issues. Clearly, his responsibilities were as important as they were numerous. Among them was his contribution to a complicated diplomatic minuet with the People's Republic of China early in the first Nixon Administration when I was National Security Advisor.

For some years prior, Walter and I had been friends and professional colleagues. I had known him since 1959 when, as a Foreign Service Officer, he was assigned as a post-graduate fellow in the Center for International Affairs at Harvard where I had long been associated. I considered him one of the very best in the State Department -- expert, thoughtful, disciplined, and attributes which were ever present in our later dealings in government.

When President Nixon assumed office, we had agreed on the geopolitical importance of ending China's isolation and the decades of ideological hostility. Sporadic contacts

MAR.28 '91 15:22 212 753 7248

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Page 2

between the two giants had taken place at the ambassadorial
in Warsaw
level between 1955 and 1968/(when they were in suspension)
but some 134 meetings had produced nothing of consequence;
indeed these talks represented the longest continual record
not that could not point to a single important achievement.

Notwithstanding, the President and I were determined to
signal a new conciliatory attitude towards Beijing through
whatever channel might prove productive. We, therefore,
initiated some subtle feelers through those whom we knew to
be friendly with the Chinese -- especially the Rumanians
and the Pakistanis -- and we also sought to revive the Warsaw
talks in which the Chinese, in the waning days of the Johnson
Administration, had expressed interest.

Walter Stoessel, then our Ambassador in Poland, was
assigned to strike up contact with the Chinese, who were
loathe to be seen publicly with American officials unless
formally instructed. In the fall of 1969 I suggested that
he try to engage the Chinese Ambassador at any social function
the two would be attending and let him know of the US desire
for serious talks. As it happened, the Cultural Revolution
claimed the Ambassador and there remained in Warsaw only the
Chinese charge d'affaires, Lei Yang. Nor was I deterred by
the fact that large diplomatic gatherings are hardly
a place for discreet contact or important messages.

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Page 3

4

As some of the most interesting foreign policy events can
under
occur in seemingly trivial circumstances, and so it was.

In the unlikely venue of a Yugoslav fashion show held at
the Warsaw Palace of Culture, on December 3, 1969, Ambas-
sador Stoessel spotted Lei Yang, who, predictably, proved
elusive and fled down a flight of stairs. In pursuit, Walter
was able to convey our message through Lei Yang's Polish-
speaking interpreter. Chou En Lai told me many years later
that his astonished diplomat, totally without instructions
for such a contingency, had fled because he did not know how
to respond.

In the event, our Ambassador was shortly invited to the
Chinese embassy and ostentatiously greeted at the front
door (lest the Soviets miss the significance of the sudden
embrace). That meeting, and some interim contacts, ultimately
led to the formal revival of the Warsaw talks on January
20, 1970.

Their resumption was an important public symbol of
our willingness to pursue a more conciliatory approach
towards China. Under Ambassador Stoessel's stewardship,
provided
in which we were able to offer a glimpse of hope
they yielded a forum for us to provide some nuances to
the
initiatives we were taking in the secret channel through
the Pakistanis. The latter was soon to gain momentum, the
linchpin in Washington was Pakistani Ambassador Agha Hilaly,
being
his country's
whose brother was their Ambassador to China at the time and
so are

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Page 4

whose sister had also been a student of mine at Harvard,
Backchannel contacts through Islamabad to Beijing were
soon to pave the way for my secret trip to China in July
1971, and President Nixon's later visit in February 1972.

The era of fashioning triangular diplomacy was an extra-
ordinary complex one. Walter Stoessel was a participant in
a broad mosaic designed, we hoped, to reverse decades of
hostility with the world's most populous nation, and to trans-
form the geopolitical balance. His contribution shall not
be forgotten.

matched later
by distinguished
service as
ambassador
to Russia,

MAR.28 '91 15:26 212 753 7248

P.08

STANFORD
MAGAZINE

December 3, 1990

DEC 10 1990

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Kissinger Associates Inc.
350 Park Avenue, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Stanford University will celebrate its 100th birthday in the fall of 1991, and the centerpiece of that celebration will be a special 304-page Centennial issue of *Stanford Magazine*. I'd like to invite you to write a brief piece for that issue.

The theme of the magazine will be Stanford's impact on the world. We will tell that story with profiles of alumni and faculty, living and dead, who have changed their corners of the world. One of the people we are going to feature is the Hon. Walter Stoessel Jr., the American ambassador to Poland during the Nixon Administration. We are not so much interested in a tribute to Stoessel as in your behind-the-scenes account of his role in opening the door to Red China by acting as a go-between for you and the Chinese. You are uniquely situated to tell that story.

What we have in mind is not a major treatise, but a *brief treatment, say 350 words, possibly fewer, depending on how much you have to say*. We would love to see any personal remembrances or other *anecdotal material*. If the idea appeals to you, we can discuss the specifics further. If for *some reason* you wouldn't be able to write a piece, could we schedule a few minutes to get your thoughts over the phone? We will be glad to provide you with research material and any other assistance you might need.

I'll try to reach you by phone soon. In the meantime, you can call me at the office (415 725-5109, direct) or at home (415 661-3824), or return the enclosed postcard to our office. I hope the idea intrigues you--we would love for you to be part of our Centennial issue.

Editorial (415) 725-0672 • Advertising (415) 725-0678 • Facsimile (415) 723-8597

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