THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1976

Dear Mr. Commissioner:

It is with the greatest regret that I learned of the death of the Chief of State General Muhammed. In the brief period in which he was in office he showed a keen awareness of the desires and needs of the Nigerian people. These seven months were marked by decisions of far reaching significance for Nigeria for which he will long be remembered. Please accept my deepest sympathy for your nation's tragic loss.

His Excellency
Colonel Joseph Garba,
Commissioner for External Affairs,
Federal Republic of Nigeria,
Lagos.

INFORMAL S/S-0

2/14

S - MR. BARBIAN

PAUL,

HEREWITH THE ORIGINAL FOR SIGNING OF
THE SECRETARY'S CONDOLENCE MESSAGE
WHICH WAS TRANSMITTED ELECTRICALLY
IN STATE 37538 TOSEC 30075.

AFTER SIGNING, ED LODLIS, NIGERIAN DESK OFFICE
ASKS THAT YOU CALL HIM AT X-23407 OR,
AT HOME, 536 3823 RE MEANS OF TRANSMITTING
IT TO NIGERIAN EMBASSY.

JERRY HOGANSON

[LC]

LE PROGRAMME

A Tasting
of
French Regional Wines
and
Cheeses

*From 7:00 P.M. to 9:00 P.M.*

A
PARIS - NEW YORK
Fifty Years
1923 - 1973
JAZZ RETROSPECTIVE

*with*
JOSEPHINE BAKER
THE HARKNESS BALLET

*and others*

BRICKTOP

with Hugh Shannon
and her Cabaret

*From 1:00 A.M. to Daylight*

[LC]

LES COMITES

MRS. DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER THE DUCHESS OF WINDSOR

Honorary Chairmen

HIS EXCELLENCY JACQUES KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET

Ambassador of France

AND MADAME KOSCIUSKO-MORIZET

Honorary Chairmen

HONORARY COMMITTEE

HON. AND MRS. DAVID K. E. BRUCE

HON. AND MRS. C. DOUGLAS DILLON

DR. AND MRS. JAMES HESTER

AMBASSADOR AND MRS. AMORY HOUGHTON

AMBASSADOR JOHN M. IRWIN II

SENATOR AND MRS. JACOB K. JAVITS

MAYOR AND MRS. JOHN V. LINDSAY

DR. AND MRS. WILLIAM J. MCGILL

MR. AND MRS. JOHN H. G. PELL

GOVERNOR AND MRS. NELSON ROCKEFELLER

AMBASSADOR AND MRS. ROBERT SARGENT SHRIVE

AMBASSADOR AND MRS. ARTHUR K. WATSON

Honorary New York Chairmen

THE HONORABLE GERARD GAUSSEN

Minister Plenipotentiary Consul General of France

AND MADAME GAUSSEN

MRS. STEPHEN SANFORD

National Chairman

MARQUESA DE CUEVAS

MRS. SALLY FENELON-YOUNG

Honorary Ball Chairmen

MRS. JOHN R. MCLEAN II

General Chairman

MRS. RUDOLPH LIGHT

MRS. ALCUR H. MEADOWS

MRS. THOMAS P. F. MILBANK

MRS. JOSEPH A. NEFF

Co-Chairmen

MRS. WILLIAM K. DAUGHERTY

Vice-Chairman

HONORARY PARIS COMMITTEE

MARQUISE DE ROSANBO

Presidente

BARONNE DE CABROL

Vice-Presidente

MADAME DE BALKANY

PRINCESS DE BEAUVEAU-CRAON

BARONNE BENTINCK-THYSSEN

VICOMTESSE DE BONCHAMPS

MADAME BOUCHETAL

COMTESSE CHEREMETIEFF

COMTESSE E. DECAZES

MARQUIS DE GONTAUT-BIRON

MARQUISE D'HARCOURT

MADAME LA GENERALE KOENIG

COMTE A. DE LUR SALUCES

COMTESSE L. DE MONTMORT

DUCHESSE DE NOAILLES

BARONNE H. VON PANTZ

COMTESSE DE POURTALES

MARQUISE DE RAVENEL

COMTESSE J. DE ROHAN CHABOT

VICOMTESSE DE ROSIERE

MARQUISE DE SURIAN

DUCHESSE D'UZES

MADAME A. DE VILMORIN

[LC]

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE

MRS. ALBIN HOLDER

Chairman

MRS. H. STANLEY CAYZER

MRS. NORMAN COATES

MRS. RICHARD C. COWELL

MRS. GUILFORD DUDLEY, JR.

MRS. VICTOR W. FARRIS

MRS. MELVILLE HALL

MRS. ROBERT WILLIAM HAYMES

MRS. JOSEPH LAUDER

MRS. FRANK MCMAHON

MRS. DUNCAN MCMARTIN

MRS. JACK MASSEY

MRS. AUGUSTUS NEWMAN

MRS. WALTER SHIRLEY, JR.

MRS. S. JOSEPH TANKOOS

MRS. WILLIAM T. WAKEMAN

MRS. FREDERICK M. WINSHIP

MRS. GEORGE ZAUDERER

NATIONAL COMMITTEE

MRS. STEPHEN SANFORD

Chairman

MRS. H. LOY ANDERSON

MRS. ODETTE DE BRUNIERE BENJAMIN

MME. ALYS FAUROT BENNETT

MRS. FRANCES BROOKS

MRS. REAGAN CARAWAY

MRS. JEROME CASTLE

MRS. CARLING DINKLER, JR.

MRS. GALLAGHER FREIMANN

MRS. J. DENNIS FREUND

BARONESS CLAIRE HATVANY

MRS. GEORGE HAYHURST

MRS. FREDERIC B. INGRAM

MRS. DONALD B. GILLIES, JR.

Vice-Chairman

MRS. DAVID F. S. JOHNSON

MRS. PAUL WILLIAM LAWRENCE

MRS. EDWARD B. LINTHICUM

MRS. WILLIAM MCKELVY

MRS. WILLIAM G. MCKNIGHT, JR.

MRS. GORDON MORFORD

MRS. ERWIN J. SHIELDS

MRS. DEWITT M. SHY

MRS. ROBERT STAUB

MRS. DAVID TRAPP

BARONESS J. A. VON RUEFKRANG

MRS. PAUL WILMOT, JR.

MRS. WILLIAM WOOD-PRINCE

NEW YORK COMMITTEE

MRS. ROBERT D. L. GARDINER

Chairmen

MRS. JONATHAN D. FARKAS

MRS. LAWRENCE ELKIND

MRS. HOWARD G. CUSHING, JR.

Vice-Chairmen

MRS. PETER BOSSHARD

MRS. JACQUES CAPPELLA

MRS. EARL CARROLL

MRS. ROBERT CONSIDINE

MRS. DONALD CHIPMAN

MRS. R. COBIAN

MRS. ALFRED DE CABROL

MRS. SOLANGE DE LA BRUYERE

MRS. PATRICIA FERNANDEZ

MRS. LEWIS FRUMKES

MADAME PIERRE GABARD

MRS. WALTER C. GOLDSTEIN

MRS. DIETER HOLTERBOSCH

MRS. BEN R. JOHNSON

MRS. EUGENE KRAMON

MRS. RUTH LACHMAN

MRS. JEANNINE L. LEDER

MRS. BERNARD LIPPIN

MRS. PHILIP LUKIN

MRS. HERBERT NELSON

MRS. THOMAS S. NICHOLS

MRS. WILLIAM I. NICHOLS

MRS. L. CHRISTOPHER NICOLOSI

MRS. BERNICE RICHARD

MRS. EDGAR STERN

MRS. MARYE THOMAS

[LC]

WASHINGTON COMMITTEE

MRS. DAVID EISENHOWER
*Honorary Chairman*

MRS. ELLIOTT DODD DEGRAFF
*Chairman*

MRS. SAMUEL BOGLEY

MRS. MARY BROOKS

MRS. GEORGE BUNKER

MRS. MORRIS CAFRITZ

MR. & MRS. WILLIAM CAFRITZ

THE HONORABLE TRUE DAVIS

MR. & MRS. BERNARD GEWIRZ

HON. AND MRS. FRANK IKARD

HON. & MRS. LEONARD MARKS

MRS. CHESTER MIZE

MR. & MRS. MANDELL J. OURISMAN

MR. & MRS. CARL SHIPLEY

BARONESS GARNETT STACKELBERG

MRS. STANLEY WESTREICH

MR. & MRS. SIDNEY S. ZLOTNICK

MEN'S COMMITTEE

PIERRE DE MONTESQUIOU, DUC DE FEZENSAC
*Chairmen*

MR. ROBERT D. L. GARDINER

MR. PETER AUSNIT

MR. JOHN HARVEY BURGIN

MR. ANDRES J. CARRILLO

MR. CARLOS CONCHESO

MR. OLIVIER COQUELIN

MR. JAMES CRYSTAL

MR. HOWARD G. CUSHING, JR.

MR. JONATHAN D. FARKAS

COLONEL HAMILTON FISH

MR. BELDON FREEZE

MR. FRANCIS T. GRANT

MR. PETER GRIMM

MR. A. LAURANCE KAISER, IV

MR. GEORGE S. KAUFMAN

MR. EARLE I. MACK

MR. EDWARD H. MEYER

MR. THOMAS P. F. MILBANK

MR. JOHN NAGEL

MR. WILLIAM I. NICHOLS

MR. JOHN OLMSTEAD

MR. HOWARD OXENBERG

MR. JOSEPH PICONE

MR. JOHN CREWS RAINEY

MR. THOR H. RAMSING

MR. BENJAMIN REEVES

MR. FREDERIC W. RICHMOND

MR. JOHN REVSON

MR. JOHN A. C. ROYALL III

MR. DONALD W. SCHOLLE

MR. WALTER T. SHIRLEY, JR.

MR. GARY DEAN SOLDATI

MR. TALBOT T. SPEER, JR.

MR. DAVID TREHERNE-THOMAS

BARON J. A. VON RUEKFRANG

MR. SIDNEY WAUD

MR. WILLIAM WOODWARD

1040 Dead Run Drive
McLean, Virginia 22101

August 9, 1974

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Today I listened attentively via television to
your remarks in the East Room after you took the oath
of office as President of the United States. The words
you spoke and the tone you set are models for all Ameri-
cans to live by and to work by in going forward from the
tragic events of the past.

I am sure that many Americans are praying today
that Richard Nixon will at last find peace for himself
and his family.

I know, also, that my family and I, and many more
Americans, are praying for you and your family tonight.
And we join with you to pray that God gives you the
wisdom to see the right.

The aftermath of tragic events gives us pause to
reflect on thoughts and words to better express our-
selves and our innermost feelings, as you did today,
with such feeling, compassion, and forthrightness. So
many of us are so glad to have you as our President, and
we look forward to days ahead of achievement, purpose,
and rightness.

Some eleven years ago, I too was moved to search
for thoughts and words to express my reaction to the
assassination of President Kennedy. The words I was
compelled to write came out in rhythm and rhyme as the
tragic events unfolded during those hours of sorrow and
grief here in Washington. By December 6, 1963, I had
completed thirteen verses, and I published my poem "John
Kennedy -- Eternal Rest." I sent a copy of it to the
then new President, Lyndon Johnson.

then new President, Lyndon Johnson.
Kennedy -- Eternal Rest." I sent a copy of it to the
completed thirteen verses, and I published my poem "John
Griel here in Washington. By December '63, I had
tragic events unfolded during those hours of sorrow and
compelled to write came out in rhythm and rhyme as the
assassination of President Kennedy. The words I was
for thoughts and words to express my reaction to the
some eleven years ago, I too was moved to search
and rightness.

we look forward to days ahead of achievement, purpose,
many of us are so glad to have you as our President, and
with such feeling, compassion, and fortitude. So
selves and our innermost feelings, as you did today,
reflect on thoughts and words to better express our-
the aftermath of tragic events gives me base to
wisdom to see the right.

And we join with you to pray that God gives you the
Americans, are praying for you and your family tonight.
I know, also, that my family and I, and many more
and his family.

that Richard Nixon will at last find peace for himself
I am sure that many Americans are praying today
and tragic events of the past.

came to five p.m. and to work p.m. in going forward from the
you spoke and the tone you set are models for all Ameri-
of office as President of the United States. The words
your remarks in the East Room after you took the oath
today I listened attentively via television to

Dear Mr. President:

Washington, D.C. 20000
The White House
The President

Virginia 23101
1040 Dead Man Drive
Virginia 23101

poem.

Enclosure:

Department of State
Administrative Officer
Francis V. Gardner

Respectfully yours,

one also to Secretary of State Henry Klaarner.
Assured, John Kennedy." By separate cover I shall send
I enclose for you a copy of my new booklet poem: "Rest
dent Johnson, and to then Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
just as in 1963 I sent a copy of my poem to Presi-

Long after we are gone.
God grant it may continue thus ...

America lives on!

So, rest assured, John Kennedy,

God's a work must be done one day.

For, it's been said that, where on earth,

Despite what has been shown ... Yet, we'll protect this land we love,

The right ... and not the wrong ...

But, still we need exemplify

The heartache's almost gone ...

The war is done ... the attrite is less ...

to share them with you:
parallel those of my last three new verses, I wanted
Because some of the thoughts you expressed today

and a new title: "Rest Assured" John Kennedy."
again compelled to add five verses with new thoughts
Some ten years later, on October 30, 1973, I was

- 3 -

[LC]

The White House "Oval Room" was still,

As was the rocking chair . . .

But, could it be those youngsters did

Some make-believing there?

6

[LC]

The years have passed since Kennedy . . .
With heartache, war, and strife . . .
How would it be if only he
Had not then lost his life?

As President, he gave us hope . . .
And purpose to pursue . . .

He challenged us, and asked:
*What for our country we might do?

The war is done . . . the strife is less . . .
The heartache's almost gone . . .

But, still we need exemplify
The right . . . and not the wrong . . .

Yet, we'll protect this land we love,
Despite what has been shown . . .

For, it's been said that, here on earth,
God's work must be our own.

So, rest assured, John Kennedy,
America lives on!

God grant it may continue thus . . .
Long after we are gone.

14

[LC]

All of the sketches, except two, were drawn by Barbara Ferry, who was awarded a Bachelor of Arts Degree in Painting at Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 1968. Her additional works are currently on display at various galleries in Washington, D.C.

The sketches on pages 3 and 10 were drawn by George Villafranca of Laredo, Texas, a student at North Texas State University in Denton, Texas.

The author and publisher is Francis V. Gardner, a career employee of the Department of State in Washington, D. C., who has served for twenty-eight years in several departments of the Federal Government. He received a Bachelor of Science Degree in Social Science from Mount Saint Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Maryland, in 1948. He resides in McLean, Virginia.

For additional copies write to:

Memento

1040 Dead Run Drive

McLean, Virginia 22101

Retail price: $1.50. For each additional copy, send $1.75 in money order.
(25¢ for handling and postage.)

Wholesale rates are the same as in Washington, D. C., and such orders
are filled by C.O.D. mailing.

New York, New York.
432 West 116th Street,
Richard M. Garder, Ph. D.,

Henry A. Kissinger

Warm regards,

always.

enjoy hearing from you and welcome your advice

Please don't hesitate to get in touch. I
them as well as their son.

Your congratulations have a special meaning for
the chance to meet Danielle and you at the Assembly.

I was quite pleased that my parents had
for a relaxed and thorough reading.

worthwhile piece. I look forward to the opportunity
glance it strikes me as an extremely sensible and
copy of your Pacem in Terreis statement. At a
I appreciate your kind letter and the

Dear Dick:

November 53, 1973

Columbia University in the City of New York | New York, N. Y. 10027

SCHOOL OF LAW

435 West 116th Street

September 25, 1973

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

Dear Henry:

Congratulations on that fine speech at the
General Assembly yesterday. Danielle and I came to
hear you. We had the good fortune to meet your
parents outside the assembly hall and were pleased
to be able to congratulate them in person.

Your emphasis on a "comprehensive, institu-
tionalized peace" was widely appreciated. Last week
I completed a statement on what some of the elements
of such an institutionalized approach might be and I
take the liberty of enclosing it herewith. The state-
ment is scheduled to be delivered on October 10 at the
Pacem in Terris convocation, where I understand you
shall be the featured speaker on opening day.

Danielle joins me in wishing you much success
and satisfaction in your new assignment.

With best personal regards,

RNG/pm
Enclosure

THE UNITED NATIONS AND ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS -- THE HARD ROAD

TO WORLD ORDER

Richard N. Gardner*

Has the quest for a decent world order ever seemed so full of
contradictions, at once so frustrating and so hopeful? The international
institutions established at the close of the Second World War to establish
peace, justice and economic cooperation have failed to live up to the
world's expectations. Yet never has there been such widespread recog-
nition of the necessity of planetary planning or such an impressive
array of ongoing negotiations aimed at the cooperative management of
global problems.

The central policy-making organs of the United Nations -- the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council -- all seem drained of vitality. They are suffering from a "crisis of confidence," some would even say from "creeping irrelevance," The business of managing the world's political, security and economic problems is increasingly handled elsewhere.

Lord Caradon, the eloquent former British representative to
the U.N., liked to say that "there is nothing basically wrong with the
U.N. except its members." What is wrong with the members is painfully
obvious. Virtually all of them pay lip service to the organization
while at the same time pursuing their short-term interests at its expense.

*Professor of Law and International Organization,
Columbia University; Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for International Organization Affairs, 1961-65;
U.S. Member, Board of Trustees, the United Nations Institute
for Training and Research (UNITAR), 1969-73.

- 2 -

Questions are voted upon less and less with regard to the requirements of law and justice and more and more with a view to bloc affiliations and the protection of other interests. The willingness of U.N. members to risk their short-term interests for the good of the community often seems at the level of the frontier town in the unforgettable Western "High Noon," where the citizens abandoned their lawman as soon as the outlaw was released from jail. If a clear and unambiguous case of aggression came before the Security Council or General Assembly today, there would be little confidence that a majority of members would treat it as such or come to the aid of the victim. The Charter concept of collective security is obviously dead; even for consent-type "peace-keeping," little progress has been made in devising agreed constitutional and financial arrangements.

Given this state of affairs, plans for instant world government carry little credibility. The consensus on basic values and the willingness to entrust vital interests to community judgment is simply not there. One need only picture a world constitutional convention including President Nixon, Chairman Brezhnev and Chairman Mao, Prime Ministers Heath and Pompidou, not to mention Messrs. Castro, Peron, and Qaddafi and Mmes. Golda Meir and Indira Ghandi. What rules and procedures for world government could they agree upon?

The same considerations suggest the doubtful utility of holding a Charter review conference. To amend the U.N. Charter requires the approval of two thirds of the membership, including all of the five Permanent Members. If one examines carefully the attitude of U.N. members to specific proposals, one quickly discovers that the most

- 3 -

[Lc]

likely consequence of wholesale revision of the Charter would be to
diminish rather than enhance the strength of the organization. The
Charter of the U.N., like the U.S. Constitution, provides a framework
for organic growth in response to new demands and changing realities.
As in the case of the Constitution, we are more likely to make progress
by pressing to the outer limits of its potentialities through creative
use of the existing instrument, seeking amendments only on carefully
selected matters where they seem both necessary and capable of adoption
by the constitutionally required majority.

If instant world government and Charter review now seem
bankrupt of possibilities, so does the old-fashioned idea of achieving
"world peace through world law" by means of a greatly strengthened Inter-
national Court of Justice. The members of the United Nations seem less
willing than ever to entrust vital interests for decision to the fifteen
men at the Hague, as may be seen from the Court's lack of activity and
the small number of countries accepting the Court's compulsory juris-
diction without crippling reservations. This reluctance to take cases
to the Court partly reflects lack of confidence in the competence and
independence of some of its judges, but even if all of them had the
intellectual and moral qualities of a Philip Jessup the basic problem
would still remain. Not only are nations reluctant to risk adverse
judgments at the hands of third parties they cannot control, they are
understandably unwilling to commit themselves to have all contro-
versies to which they may be a party decided according to rules of
international law which may be of doubtful legitimacy, incapable of
alteration as circumstances change, and uncertain of enforcement. As
Professor Julius Stone once put it:

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"How satisfactory would the 'rule of law' be if we awoke one bright morning to find that there was no longer any parliament to make laws, and that the only way we could adjust legal rights among us was either by direct agreement between all the individual citizens concerned, or by naked force? But this precisely has always been and is still the final position in the international community and its law. If, without changing this, we tried to clamp the 'rule of law' on States by requiring every dispute to be settled by binding decisions of an international court this would freeze vested rights as they now are, and make it even more difficult to adjust legal rights to rapidly changing conditions. There is obviously not the slightest hope that States will agree to this. But to change this, a rule of law programme would also have to provide some accepted method of changing the law, and of enforcing it as it changes. The feasibility of this in the international as in a national community turns on whether the community as a whole, especially those who wield supreme power, share certain common ethical convictions as to the basic principles of decency between man and man." 1

If instant world government, Charter review, and a greatly strengthened International Court do not provide the answers, what hope for progress is there? The answer will not satisfy those who seek simple solutions to complex problems, but it comes down essentially to this: Our best hope for the foreseeable future seems to be, not in building up a few ambitious central institutions of universal membership and general jurisdiction as was envisaged at the end of the last war, but rather in the much more decentralized, disorderly, and pragmatic process of inventing or adapting institutions of limited jurisdiction and selected membership to deal with specific problems on a case-by-case basis, as the necessity for cooperation is perceived by the relevant nations. Such institutions of limited jurisdiction will have a better chance of doing what Professor Stone reminds us must be done to make a "rule of law" meaningful -- providing methods of changing the law and enforcing it as it changes and of developing the

1. Law and Policy in the Quest for Survival
(The ABC Lectures, 1960).

- 5 -

perception of common convictions and interests that is the prerequisite
for successful cooperation.

In short, we are likely to do better by building our "house
of world order" from the bottom up rather than from the top down. It
will look like a great "booming, buzzing confusion," to use William
James' famous description of reality, but an end run around national
sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, is likely to get us to world
order faster than the old-fashioned frontal assault. Of course, for
political as well as administrative reasons, some of these specialized
arrangements should be brought into an appropriate relationship with
the central institutions, but the main thing is that the essential
functions be performed.

The hopeful aspect of the present situation is that even
as nations resist appeals for "world government" and "the surrender
of sovereignty," technological, economic and political interests are
forcing them to establish more and more far-ranging institutions to
manage their mutual interdependence. Consider for a moment the insti-
tutional implications of negotiations already underway or likely to be
undertaken within the next few years:

-- We are embarked on an ambitious negotiation for the reform
of the international monetary system, aimed at the phasing out of the
dollar standard and the improvement of the balance-of-payments adjust-
ment process. The accomplishment of these objectives will inevitably
require a revitalization of the International Monetary Fund, which
will be given unprecedented powers to create new international reserves
and to influence national decisions on exchange rates and on domestic

- 6 -

monetary and fiscal policies. The strengthened IMF will probably be
able to back its decisions by meaningful multilateral sanctions --
uniform surcharges on the exports of uncooperative surplus countries
and the withholding of multilateral and bilateral credits and reserve
deficit
facilities from recalcitrant/countries.

-- We are undertaking a parallel effort to rewrite the basic
ground rules for the conduct of international trade and investment.
At a minimum, we can expect the strengthening of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade to cover a whole range of hitherto unregulated
"non-tariff barriers." This will subject countries to an unprecedented
degree of international surveillance over hitherto sacrosanct "domestic"
policies such as farm price supports, subsidies, and government pro-
curement practices that have transnational effects. New standards will
also be developed to regulate protectionist measures to cope with
"market disruption" from imports. To make these new rules of the game
meaningful, GATT arrangements for consultation, conciliation and enforce-
ment of its decisions will have to be greatly improved. In addition,
new standards and new procedures are likely to be developed through the
OECD and the U.N. to deal with the activities of multinational corpora-
tions and conflicting national efforts to regulate them.

-- The years ahead will almost certainly witness a continuing
increase in the resources of the multilateral development and technical
assistance agencies in contrast to static or declining bilateral efforts.
This will enhance the authority of the World Bank, the Regional Develop-
ment Banks and the U.N. Development Program over the economic policies

- 7 -

[LC]

of rich and poor nations. By the end of this decade, we are likely to have a substantial portion of aid funds channeled to international agencies from sources independent of national decision-making -- some form of "link" between monetary reserve creation and development aid and some arrangement for the payment of fees to international agencies for the exploitation of seabed mineral resources.

-- We are likely to witness a continued strengthening of the new global and regional agencies charged with protecting the world's environment. In addition to the comprehensive monitoring of the earth's air, water and soil and the effects of pollutants on human health, we can look forward to new procedures to implement the principle of state responsibility for national actions that have transnational environmental consequences, probably including some kind of "international environmental impact statement" procedure culminating in recommendations from independent scientific authorities. At the same time, international agencies will be given broad powers to promulgate and revise standards limiting air and ocean pollution by nations and their citizens.

-- We are entering a wholly new phase of international concern and international action on the world population problem, which is dramatized by the World Population Conference scheduled for Bucharest in 1974. By the end of this decade, a majority of nations will have explicit population policies, many of them designed to achieve zero population growth by a specific target date. These national policies and targets will be established and implemented in most cases with the help of international agencies. Under their auspices, several billions in national and international resources will be mobilized in fulfillment

- 8 -

of the basic human rights objective already proclaimed by the U.N. --
that every person in the world should be given the information and means
necessary to control the number and spacing of his children.

-- We can look forward, after several years of very difficult
negotiations, to a new international regime governing the world's oceans,
including new law on such important matters as the territorial sea,
passage through international straits, fisheries, the exploitation
of the mineral resources of the seabed, the regulation of marine
pollution, and the conduct of scientific research. To make these
new arrangements meaningful, there will have to be tough provisions
to assure compliance as well as to provide for the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes.

- 9 -

[Lc]

We will almost certainly have to create new international arrangements to cope with the emerging global politics of resource scarcity. The problem is not only that of increasing total supplies but of assuring their fair allocation between countries. Large parts of the world are dependent on food exports from the United States while the United States is increasingly dependent on oil from the Middle East. Unilateral cutoffs of these vital resources for political, economic or conservation reasons could have grave consequences and could trigger international conflict. In the early days of the Second World War, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill proclaimed an Atlantic Charter with the postwar objective of "access, on equal terms, to the trade and/raw materials of the world." In three decades of negotiations since that time, our focus has been almost exclusively on access to markets. In the next decades, we will need to place equal emphasis on new standards and new procedures to assure a fair allocation of scarce resources.

We will need to develop new international rules and institutions to regulate new communication technologies, notably direct broadcasting from satellites. While providing some safeguards against the unwanted intrusion of foreign broadcasts, these new arrangements should maximize the potential for using satellite communications to promote trade and economic development as well as world culture and understanding. Ways will very likely be found to give the U.N. and other international agencies access to this new technology for both operational and informational purposes. The International Telecommunication Union and other agencies will be given new powers to

- 10 -

allocate radio frequencies and satellite parking orbits among
competing users.

-- We will be obliged at some point in the years ahead
to move beyond bilateral discussions on strategic arms into further
multilateral negotiations to limit the spread of conventional as
well as nuclear weapons. It seems inevitable that the U.N., the
International Atomic Agency and perhaps regional bodies will be
given new responsibilities for the administration of these arms
control and disarmament measures, including means of verification
and enforcement.

- We are likely, despite the constitutional impasse over
U.N. peacekeeping, to resort increasingly to U.N. forces to contain
local conflicts in the Third World. The arguments over authorization,
financing and operational control will be resolved on a case-by-case
basis where the interests of key countries converge. The U.S., the
Soviet Union and China, in the happy phrase of an American journalist,
will each act "more like a country and less like a cause." Under the
aegis of the U.N., or possibly in bilateral negotiations, some
principles for mutual non-interference in the internal affairs of
other countries are likely to be worked out. A corollary of such
agreements will be international peacekeeping arrangements to patrol
borders, supervise elections and verify compliance with non-interven-
tion norms.

These and other developments that could be mentioned may not
add up to "world government" in the old-fashioned sense of a single
all-embracing global authority, but they will represent key elements
of planetary planning and planetary management on very specific

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problems where the facts of interdependence force nations in their enlightened self-interest to abandon unilateral decision-making in favor of multilateral processes.

It may be objected that the above catalogue is more convincing as a statement of what nations _ought_ to do in the pursuit of their enlightened self-interest than as a prediction of what they actually _will_ do. Admittedly, the same forces of short-sighted nationalism that have crippled the central institutions of the U.N. may wreck all or most of these specialized negotiations, but I do not believe this will happen.

The reason is that the case-by-case approach is likely to yield some remarkable concessions of "sovereignty" that could not be achieved on an across-the-board basis. The Soviet Union, China and the United States may be unable to agree on the general rules that should cover U.N. peacekeeping in all unspecified future contingencies, but they may well agree on a new U.N. peacekeeping force to implement a Middle East settlement that is otherwise satisfactory to them. The same three countries are unlikely to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over all disputes to which they might be parties, but they may very well agree upon effective third-party machinery for compulsory settlement of disputes on the specific subjects dealt with in a new Law of the Sea agreement where they recognize compelling national interests in getting other nations as well as themselves to comply with the rules.

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What is the conclusion of all this for the foreign policy
of the United States? Stated simply, it is that the main preoccupa-
tion of U.S. foreign policy from here on in should be the building
of the international machinery necessary for the management of man-
kind's common problems. This means supplementing balance of power
politics with world order politics.

Some may argue that the present direction of our foreign
policy is incompatible with this approach. This is not necessarily
so. The achievement of a better balance of political and economic
forces and the normalization of relationships between formerly hostile
nations do not constitute world order politics, but they are necessary
first steps to make such politics possible. The achievement of a
better power balance surely enhances prospects for a world in which
power is subordinated to a rule of law. The burying of ancient
animosities opens new possibilities for cooperative action on emerging
global problems through the United Nations and other international
organizations.

One phrase has recurred throughout the foreign policy statements
of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger -- the building of a "structure
of peace." The use of the word "structure" is significant. New political
and economic relationships may clear the ground for building a structure
of peace, but they should not be confused with the structure itself.
To take one example: the Smithsonian agreement of December 1971 which
established a more realistic pattern of exchange rates between the dollar
and other currencies was a prerequisite to a satisfactory reform of the

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international monetary system. But in the absence of a new and acceptable
system for changing exchange rates and for settling international accounts,
the Smithsonian accord, hailed at the time as "the most important monetary
agreement in the history of the world," lasted only 14 months. The recent
political achievements in relations with the Soviet Union and China and
in relations between the two Germanies could prove equally ephemeral if
we do not make the distinction between new relationships and new structures.
For an enduring peace system, the former must be reinforced and buttressed
by the latter.

There is some evidence that this point is recognized in Washington
and that we are in fact at the beginning of a transition from one phase
of foreign policy to another. In his first press conference after his
appointment as Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, after summarizing the
achievements of the first four Nixon years, declared: "But now we are in
a different phase. The foundations that have been laid must now lead to
the building of a more permanent structure . . . that we can pass on to
succeeding administrations so that the world will be a safer place when
they take over. Now this requires that there be a greater institutional-
ization of foreign policy than has been the case up to now."

This reference to "institutionalization," to be sure, was in the
context of our domestic arrangements for the making of foreign policy.
By combining the post of Secretary of State with that of the President's
principal foreign policy adviser, the President has assured that the
traditional foreign affairs machinery will now be plugged directly into
the Presidential policy-making process. But "institutionalization" at

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the domestic level is likely to lead to "institutionalization" at
the international level. For Dr. Kissinger will now turn his atten-
tion to the broad range of foreign policy problems that face the
country in the years ahead. In addition his former preoccupation
with Southeast Asia and normalization of relations with the Soviet
Union and China, the very nature of his new assignment will take him
deeper into the reform of the international monetary and trading
system, the law of the sea, economic development, the protection of
the international environment, the world population problem, and the
global politics of food and energy, not to mention the search for
peace in such trouble spots as the Middle East and Southern Africa.
Faced with these new challenges, it would be surprising if Dr.
Kissinger did not encourage the foreign policy machinery to look
for new solutions through more effective international institutions
at the global and regional level.

Such a new emphasis on multilateralism would serve another
important objective emphasized by Dr. Kissinger -- the rebuilding
of the shattered domestic consensus for U.S. foreign policy. The
self-confidence and idealism of the American people are two of the
world's most valuable natural resources. They made possible our
sponsorship of the United Nations, the postwar financial and trade
arrangements, the Marshall Plan, Point Four, the Alliance for Pro-
gress, the Decade of Development, and many other programs of great
value.

Viet Nam has transformed much of this self-confidence into
self-doubt, much of this idealism into cynicism. It has even

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encouraged a school of thought which holds that the United States
is so violent, so racist and so imperialistic that it can no longer
play any constructive role in the world. But the threats to man-
kind's future from poverty, population growth, environmental degrada-
tion and the arms race cannot possibly be dealt with successfully in
the absence of a massive global effort in which American technology,
managerial skill, and political leadership play a major part.

Forced to choose between interventionism and isolationism,
the American people will eventually choose isolationism. Multi-
lateralism is therefore the only chance in the long run to sustain
a positive U.S. role in the world. It has always been the approach
most likely to win support for our actions abroad; but it is now also
essential for the achievement of a foreign policy consensus at home.

One of the most important but least appreciated functions of
the United Nations is in influencing the political process within
member states toward more cooperative and outward-looking policies.
and other international organizations
In a certain sense, the United Nations/constitute an "alliance of
doves," in which the outward-looking members of national governments
can reinforce one another in their struggle with more inward-looking
members of their national administrations. For an American President
wishing to gain domestic support for substantial cuts in the military
budget and a greater investment in economic and social programs at
home and abroad, international agencies represent a resource of
enormous potential. They can help us to reorder our national
priorities, to turn our country around.

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One of the serious dangers for the United States in its reaction from the Viet Nam tragedy is that we may disengage from international enterprises that are mutually beneficial and even essential to our enlightened self-interest. Here again, the United Nations offers an opportunity to American leadership. U.N. programs are yielding new perceptions of the linkages between conditions abroad and conditions at home. To give just a few obvious examples: U.N. assistance to Asian farmers to grow wheat or rice instead of opium can reduce drug addiction and crime in New York. U.N. efforts to limit the use of toxic pesticides in other countries can safeguard our interests in the conservation of wildlife, fish and the health of the marine environment. U.N. efforts to control diseases and establish minimum health standards can save the lives of/untold number of Americans. And, most fundamentally of all, men in blue helmets under a U.N. flag in a world trouble-spot can remove the occasion for American soldiers to fight or die there.

But even beyond these fairly obvious linkages between "foreign" organizations could give us and "domestic" problems, a foreign policy oriented to multilateral, a new sense of national purpose -- an opportunity for recommitment to some fundamental principles of justice and human dignity which, at an earlier and happier stage in our existence, we perceived as essential elements of our behaviour as a free people.

Increasing numbers of Americans, particularly young Americans, are raising questions about the justice of our domestic economic and political order. At present these Americans are mainly looking inward. But a foreign policy focussing on the building of a decent world order could help us by putting these concerns in a global context.

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would mean limiting our use of armed force to circumstances clearly permitted by the Charter and other sources of international law and submitting disputes to which we are a party to third-party processes of fact-finding, mediation, and, where appropriate, judicial settlement. There are undoubtedly risks in such a policy, but they are less than the risks inherent in the unilateralism that has characterized some of our actions in recent years.

3. We could put a new emphasis on world order issues in our bilateral negotiations with former adversaries, non-aligned nations, and old allies. In particular, this would mean using our negotiating leverage to encourage the Russians and Chinese to take a more affirmative position on such matters as the law of the sea, international programs to curb population growth, U.N. peacekeeping and U.N. financing, and the strengthening of machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes. There will be a growing number of people in both countries who understand the necessity of tackling such global issues in a cooperative and non-dogmatic way; we could strengthen their hand by the right kind of initiatives. For example, we have created a dozen U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral commissions as the result of the recent summit meetings: we could use the SALT Commission to explore the possibilities of mutual non-intervention by the superpowers in Third World areas and of limiting the spread of nuclear and conventional arms; we could seek support for global health and population programs in the bilateral health commission; and we could press in the environmental commission for Soviet cooperation in global efforts to curb whaling, protect ocean fisheries, and regulate land-based sources of marine pollution. We

- 17 -

If world order politics has at last become feasible as well
as necessary, there are some very specific steps which we in the
United States can take. I venture to suggest a few of them:

1. The President, the Secretary of State, and our senior policy-makers could assert that U.S. foreign policy from now on is aimed at the creation of a better world order founded on the enlightened self-interest of the United States and other countries -- and that the strengthening of the United Nations and other international agencies is indispensable to the achievement of that end. Some may dismiss this suggestion as just "rhetoric" -- but "rhetoric" can be important. It can stimulate new perceptions of interdependence here and overseas and build a new domestic and international constituency for U.S. foreign policy by identifying our purposes with those of mankind. We could both rebuild and draw upon the reservoir of idealism and generosity of the American people which has been so badly depleted by the war in Viet Nam. By substituting the language of constructive internationalism for reckless interventionism, we could find common ground between generations as well as political parties. Of course, the new language would have to be reflected in new action, which leads us to the other suggestions.

2. The United States could take a **principled** instead of an **instrumental** approach to the conduct of foreign policy. Instead of citing the U.N. Charter and other sources of international law when it suits our short-term interest and ignoring them when it does not, we would recognize our long-term interest in strengthening the norms and processes of a civilized world community. In specific terms, this

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could place a similar priority on world order issues in our
relations with the European countries and Japan both bilaterally
and in regional forums like NATO and OECD.

4. We could work harder to develop a "world order bargain" with the nations of the Third World. Because we appear to be neglecting their interests and concerns -- whether on Southern Africa or on trade and development -- we find ourselves increasingly isolated from them in the United Nations and are securing much less of their cooperation than is potentially available on population, environment, and resource questions. In the U.N. or in any political system, the price of getting support for one's own priorities is to offer some support for the priorities of others. Our objectives in the forthcoming negotiations on trade, monetary reform and the law of the sea may all be frustrated unless we urgently review our present policies on questions of interest to the developing world.

5. We could begin to seek help from international agencies in dealing with our own domestic problems -- particularly the problems we face in our cities, problems of pollution, mass transport, crime, and drug addiction. For too long our government has regarded the U.N. system as a great funnel where we stuff aid and advice in at one end and developing countries take out the benefits at the other. The last few years have raised some questions about this rather arrogant approach. We have more than a few problems for which we do not have the answers and we could benefit from insights and know-how from Europe, Japan and the developing countries. If the U.N. and

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other international agencies were to render services to developed
as well as developing countries, it would indicate to the world
that we regard learning as a two-way process. It would also help
build domestic political support for international agencies by
demonstrating to Congress and the public that we derive direct as
well as indirect benefits from our participation.

6. We could apply ourselves much more seriously to remedying the serious structural weaknesses in the present system of multilateral agencies. In collaboration with other countries, we should search for ways to harmonize the activities of global and regional organizations, to integrate the functional activities of the U.N. specialized agencies, and to strengthen the competence and the independence of the international secretariats. New thinking and new energy could also be devoted to reforming international decision-making procedures to find a satisfactory middle ground between the principle of unanimity and the principle of one-nation one-vote. There is growing dissatisfaction, for example, with the fact that countries representing less than five percent of the U.N. budget and less than ten percent of the population of the total membership can take decisions in the General Assembly by a two-thirds majority, including binding decisions on budgetary matters. Weighted voting is not now negotiable and possibly not even desirable, but we could explore the use in the U.N. and other agencies of "double majorities," bicameral arrangements and small committees so that action proposals of certain kinds would have to be adopted by a reasonable number of large and middle as well as small nations. There is a pervasive attitude of cynicism and defeatism about the organizational

- 21 -

[LC]

deficiencies of the U.N. and other agencies, but we have not really
involved our best minds and senior decision-makers in the search
for solutions.

7. We could strengthen our Executive branch and Congressional arrangements for participating in the multilateral system. Our Ambassadors to the U.N. and other international agencies should be men with broad experience and deep substantive knowledge, and their permanent missions should consist of the best talent our country can make available, not only from the foreign service but from the business, academic, professional and scientific communities. The temporary public members of delegations should be chosen on a non-political and merit basis and appointed long enough in advance so that they can make a serious contribution. The Department of State should provide strong policy leadership for our participation in the multi-lateral system, with better coordination of its own activities and with new powers to coordinate the activities of other Cabinet departments as they relate to the international agencies. To this end, we might consider creating a new Undersecretary of State for Multilateral Affairs, with responsibility for overall direction of the State Department's Bureau of International Organization Affairs, its Bureau of Economic Affairs, the multilateral sections of the various regional bureaus, the Office of Legal Advisor, and State Department functions relating to the environment, population, the law of the sea, fisheries and wildlife, and development aid. Whether or not such a fundamental reorganization is undertaken, a revitalization of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs is clearly essential. As for Congress,

- 22 -

there are a number of measures that could enhance its contribu-
tion to the building of more effective international institutions --
for example, separation of our U.N. appropriations from the State
Department budget and greater use of the International Organization
Subcommittees or the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees
(or possibly the creation of a new Joint Senate-House Committee on
International Organizations).

8. We could seriously reexamine our financial policies in international organizations. Our behavior here has been a classic example of penny-wise and pound-foolishness. A gradual reduction of the U.S. share of U.N. regular budgets was obviously called for in the light of new economic realities, dollar devaluations, and the addition of new members, but the unilateral and abrupt manner in which we pushed our 25% policy has undermined our bargaining power on matters where we have much more important interests at stake.

From now on, our efforts should be focussed not on across-the-board reductions but on selective measures to improve the financial and management practices of the U.N. and its Specialized Agencies, achieve greater centralized control, and enhance the influence of the major contributors in the budget and policy process. In addition, and no less important, we could take some new initiatives to liquidate the U.N.'s financial deficit and establish a modest peacekeeping fund, and we could take a much more affirmative approach to increases in our voluntary contributions to the UNDP and multilateral financial agencies.

- 24 -

some of these programs might well become self-sustaining. Why not, for example, create a one-hour weekly television serial called "The Peacemakers," featuring a fictional representative of the U.N. Secretary-General grappling each week with the different kinds of problems that international agencies must deal with, whether monitoring a cease-fire between hostile nations, combating a plague of locusts, or coping with relief and refugee problems. Most people are not interested in international organizations as such, but they _are_ interested in the problems with which these organizations are dealing, particularly if they can identify with them. E. G. Marshall and "The Defenders" helped influence the attitudes of a whole generation of young television viewers toward the legal profession. With skill and imagination, "The Peacemakers" could do the same for international institutions.

This paper has offered no simple and dramatic solutions, only a hard road to world order with a continual process of institution-building to manage mankind's common problems. To hasten this process, we will need to stimulate new perceptions of interdependence. For the most basic division in the world today is not between communists and non-communists, between blacks and whites, between rich and poor, between young and old -- or even between men and women. It is between those who see only the interests of a limited group and those who are capable of seeing the interests of the broader community of mankind as a whole.

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[LC]

9. We could create a private political-action group to translate support for international institutions and international law into the American political process. The trade unions, the corporations, the environmentalists and the welfare recipients of our country have all learned how to get the government to respond to their needs. Citizens interested in a stronger United Nations and more effective U.S. participation in international agencies have not. Ralph Nader has shown how hitherto ineffectual public interests can be given effective voice and political clout. Perhaps the time has come to create a "Nader's Raiders for World Order" -- a group that could keep a box score on how Congressmen vote on matters like our U.N. contributions and on legislation violating the Rhodesian embargo. If such an enterprise were properly run, it might attract broad support -- particularly from young people who are looking desperately for some way in which they can help the United States play a more constructive role in the world. We might even make such a U.S. group part of a broad transnational effort linking similar groups in key U.N. member countries.

10. We could find new ways of using the mass media to increase public support for international institutions and world order processes. The work of organizations like the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions and the United Nations Association is excellent -- but they do not reach mass audiences. We need to try some new approaches. We could establish a foundation to underwrite television programs which could bring new perceptions of interdependence to the American people through prime-time programs. After an initial period

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When people of my generation were coming of age, we were inspired by a number of leaders who spoke for these broader and women interests. One thinks of men/like Wendell Willkie, Eleanor Roosevelt, Adlai Stevenson -- and Philip Jessup. It remains for new leaders to pick up the fallen standard of constructive internationalism. They would find, I believe, a ready constituency in the United States -- and throughout the world.

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By Richard N. Gardner

“I was the best of times, it was the worst of times.” What Dickens wrote of the last quarter of the 18th century fits the present period all too well. The quest for a world structure that secures peace, advances human rights and provides the conditions for economic progress—for what is loosely called world order—has never seemed more frustrating but at the same time strangely hopeful.

Certainly the gap has never loomed larger between the objectives and the capacities of the international organizations that were supposed to get mankind on the road to world order. We are witnessing an outbreak of shortsighted nationalism that seems oblivious to the economic, political and moral implications of interdependence. Yet never has there been such widespread recognition by the world's intellectual leadership of the necessity for coöoperation and planning on a truly global basis, beyond country, beyond region, especially beyond social system. Never has there been such an extraordinary growth in the constructive potential of transnational private organizations—not just multinational corporations but international associations of every kind in which like-minded persons around the world weave effective patterns of global action. And never have we seen such an impressive array of ongoing negotiations aimed at the coöoperative management of global problems. To familiar phrases like the “population explosion” and the “communications explosion” we should now add the “negotiation explosion.”

What is “worst” about our times for those who wish for rapid progress toward world order is clear enough. The United Nations is very far from being able to discharge the responsibilities assigned by its Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. The willingness of U.N. members to risk their short-term interests for the good of the community seems at the level of the frontier town in *High Noon*, where the citizens abandoned their lawman as soon as the outlaw was released from jail. If a clear and unambiguous case of aggression came before the Security Council or General Assembly today, there would be little confidence that a majority of members would treat it as such or come to the aid of the victim. The Charter concept of collec-

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tive security is obviously dead; even for consent-type "peace-
keeping," little progress has been made in devising agreed con-
stitutional and financial arrangements. Nor are the world's
principal economic forums in much better shape. In contrast to
the accomplishments of happier days, nobody now takes a major
issue to ECOSOC, UNCTAD, GATT, IMF or OECD¹ with
much hope for a constructive result. Even the European Com-
munity threatens to unravel under current economic and political
pressures.

In this unhappy state of affairs, few people retain much con-
fidence in the more ambitious strategies for world order that had
wide backing a generation ago—"world federalism," "charter
review," and "world peace through world law." The consensus
on basic values and willingness to entrust vital interests to com-
munity judgment clearly do not exist. One need only picture a
world constitutional convention including Messrs. Nixon, Brezh-
nev, Mao, Brandt, Pompidou, Castro, Perón, and Qaddafi, not
to mention Mmes. Golda Meir and Indira Gandhi. What rules
or procedures for world government could they agree upon?

The same considerations suggest the doubtful utility of holding
a Charter review conference. To amend the U.N. Charter re-
quires the approval of two-thirds of the membership, including
all of the five Permanent Members. If one examines carefully
the attitude of U.N. members to specific proposals, one quickly
discovers that the most likely consequence of wholesale revision
of the Charter would be to diminish rather than enhance the
strength of the organization. As in the case of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, we are more likely to make progress by pressing the existing
instrument to the outer limits of its potentialities through crea-
tive use, seeking amendments only on carefully selected matters
where they seem both necessary and capable of adoption by the
constitutionally required majority.

Just as world federalism and charter review now seem bank-
rupt of possibilities, so does the old-fashioned idea of achieving
"world peace through world law" by means of a greatly strength-
ened International Court of Justice. The members of the United
Nations seem less willing than ever to entrust vital interests for

¹ Respectively, to give their full names, the Economic and Social Council, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development.

558

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

decision to the 15 men at The Hague, as may be seen from the
very few countries that are willing to accept the Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction without crippling reservations. In the two cases
now before the Court—one involving the “cod war” between
Iceland and the United Kingdom, the other the French nuclear
tests in the Pacific—the “defendant” countries, Iceland and
France, have even refused to appear. In part, this reluctance to
accept the Court's jurisdiction reflects lack of confidence in the
competence and independence of some of its judges, but even if
all of them had the intellectual and moral qualities of Solon of
Athens the deeper problem would still remain. Nations are reluc-
tant to risk adverse judgments at the hands of third parties they
cannot control; moreover, they are reluctant to commit them-
selves to have their controversies decided according to rules of
international law that may be of doubtful legitimacy, incapable
of alteration as circumstances change, and uncertain of general
enforcement.

If instant world government, Charter review, and a greatly
strengthened International Court do not provide the answers,
what hope for progress is there? The answer will not satisfy those
who seek simple solutions to complex problems, but it comes
down essentially to this: The hope for the foreseeable future lies,
not in building up a few ambitious central institutions of univer-
sal membership and general jurisdiction as was envisaged at the
end of the last war, but rather in the much more decentralized,
disorderly and pragmatic process of inventing or adapting insti-
tutions of limited jurisdiction and selected membership to deal
with specific problems on a case-by-case basis, as the necessity for
coöoperation is perceived by the relevant nations. Such institutions
of limited jurisdiction will have a better chance of doing what
must be done to make a "rule of law" possible among nations—
providing methods for changing the law and enforcing it as it
changes and developing the perception of common interests that
is the prerequisite for successful coöoperation.

In short, the "house of world order" will have to be built from
the bottom up rather than from the top down. It will look like
a great "booming, buzzing confusion," to use William James'
famous description of reality, but an end run around national
sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomplish much
more than the old-fashioned frontal assault. Of course, for polit-
ical as well as administrative reasons, some of these specialized

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arrangements should be brought into an appropriate relationship with the central institutions of the U.N. system, but the main thing is that the essential functions be performed.

The question is whether this more modest approach can do the job. Can it really bring mankind into the twenty-first century with reasonable prospects for peace, welfare and human dignity? The argument thus far suggests it better had, for there seems to be no alternative. But the evidence also suggests some grounds for cautious optimism.

II

The hopeful aspect of the present situation is that even as nations resist appeals for "world government" and "the surrender of sovereignty," technological, economic and political interests are forcing them to establish more and more far-reaching arrangements to manage their mutual interdependence. It is instructive to ponder the institutional implications of the negotiations to which nations were already committed before the "energy crisis" preempted international attention in the fall of 1973. Although some of these tasks of institution-building may be complicated or postponed by the energy problem, all are now continuing fixtures on the diplomatic agenda:

1. The non-Communist nations are embarked on a long-term negotiation for the reform of the international monetary system, aimed at developing a new system of reserves and settlements to replace the dollar standard and at improving the balance-of-payments adjustment process. The accomplishment of these objectives would almost surely require a revitalization of the International Monetary Fund, which would have unprecedented powers to create new international reserves and to influence national decisions on exchange rates and on domestic monetary and fiscal policies. Such a strengthened IMF might be given power to back its decisions by meaningful multilateral sanctions, such as uniform surcharges on the exports of uncooperative surplus countries and the withholding of multilateral and bilateral credits and reserve facilities from recalcitrant deficit countries.

2. Roughly the same wide group of nations is launched on a parallel effort to rewrite the ground rules for the conduct of international trade. Among other things, we will be seeking new rules in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade to cover a whole range of hitherto unregulated nontariff barriers. These

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will subject countries to an unprecedented degree of international surveillance over up to now sacrosanct "domestic" policies, such as farm price supports, subsidies, and government procurement practices that have transnational effects. New standards are also envisaged to regulate protectionist measures to cope with "market disruption" from imports. To make these new rules of the game meaningful, GATT arrangements for consultation, conciliation and enforcement of its decisions will have to be greatly improved. Moreover, as will be discussed, the energy and food crises have stimulated a new concern about access to raw materials and a clear need for new ground rules on export controls.

3. The trend in recent years has been toward a steady increase in the resources of the multilateral development and technical assistance agencies, in contrast to static or declining bilateral efforts. This should enhance the authority of the World Bank, the regional development banks and the U.N. Development Program over the economic policies of rich and poor nations. By the end of this decade, a portion of aid funds may be channeled to international agencies from sources independent of national decision-making—many have proposed some form of "link" between monetary reserve creation and development aid and some arrangement for the payment to international agencies of fees from the exploitation of seabed mineral resources.

4. The next few years should see a continued strengthening of the new global and regional agencies charged with protecting the world's environment. In addition to comprehensive monitoring of the earth's air, water and soil and of the effects of pollutants on human health, we can look forward to new procedures to implement the principle of state responsibility for national actions that have transnational environmental consequences, probably including some kind of "international environmental impact statement" procedure by which at least some nations agree to have certain kinds of environmental decisions reviewed by independent scientific authorities. At the same time, international agencies will be given broader powers to promulgate and revise standards limiting air and ocean pollution.

5. We are entering a wholly new phase of international concern and international action on the population problem, dramatized by the holding this year of the first World Population Conference to take place at the political level. By the end of this decade, a majority of nations are likely to have explicit popula-

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tion policies, many of them designed to achieve zero population growth by a specific target date. These national policies and targets will be established and implemented in most cases with the help of international agencies. Under their auspices, several billions of dollars in national and international resources will be mobilized in fulfillment of a basic human rights objective already proclaimed by the United Nations in General Assembly Resolution 2542 (XXIV)—that every family in the world should be given “the knowledge and means necessary to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children.”

6. Belatedly, a World Food Conference has been scheduled to deal with the long-neglected problem of assuring sufficient *food supplies* for the world's rapidly growing population. As reserves of food and arable land dwindle under the impact of crop failures and disappointing fish harvests, there is mounting concern about “world food security.” The Conference is likely to result in efforts to expand agricultural productivity, assure the maintenance of adequate food reserves, and food aid.

7. In the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference and beyond—in what may be several years of very difficult negotiations—there should eventually emerge a new international regime governing the world's oceans. New law is, all agree, urgently needed on such crucial matters as the territorial sea, passage through international straits, fisheries, the exploitation of the mineral resources of the seabed, the regulation of marine pollution, and the conduct of scientific research. To make these new rules of law meaningful, there will have to be tough provisions to assure compliance as well as to provide for the compulsory settlement of disputes. The regulatory responsibilities of the new oceans agency are likely to exceed those of any existing international organization.

8. As the INTELSAT conference has foreshadowed, and in accordance with responsibilities already lodged in principle in the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the United Nations, new rules and institutions will almost certainly be created to regulate emerging communication technologies, notably direct broadcasting from satellites. While providing some safeguards against the unwanted intrusion of foreign broadcasts, these arrangements will aim to maximize the potential for using satellite communications to promote trade and economic development as well as world culture and understanding. Ways will very likely be found to give the United Nations and other interna-

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tional agencies access to this new technology for both operational and informational purposes. The ITU and other agencies will probably be given new powers to allocate radio frequencies and satellite parking orbits among users.

All these are cases where negotiations are already underway or scheduled for the near future. In addition, one could add two other items that have already been, one might have said, negotiated to death over the years; nonetheless they are so absolutely critical that progress simply must be made—and nations must come to know this.

9. At some point in the years ahead the world will move beyond U.S.-Soviet agreement on strategic weapons, and NATO-Warsaw Pact agreement on some measure of force reduction, to a truly multilateral set of negotiations (comparable to the non-proliferation treaty) designed to limit conventional weapons. It seems inevitable that the United Nations and perhaps regional bodies will be given new responsibilities for the administration of these arms control and disarmament measures, including means of verification and enforcement.

10. And finally, despite the constitutional impasse over U.N. peacekeeping, there will in practice be increasing resort to U.N. forces to contain local conflicts. The arguments over authorization, financing and operational control will be resolved on a case-by-case basis where the interests of key countries converge, as they have already in the launching of the United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East. With the United States, the Soviet Union and China each behaving "more like a country and less like a cause," some principles for mutual noninterference in the internal affairs of other countries are likely to be worked out, either bilaterally or under U.N. auspices. A corollary of such agreements will be international peacekeeping arrangements to patrol borders, supervise elections and verify compliance with nonintervention norms.

Does this list read like a decalogue, more convincing as a statement of what nations ought to do in the pursuit of their enlightened self-interest than as a prediction of what they actually will do? Let the reader who has this impression go back over the ten items. Admittedly, there is not a one of these specialized negotiations that could not be wrecked and brought to nothing by the same forces of shortsighted nationalism that have crippled the central institutions of the United Nations. But is it not a totally

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hardheaded prediction that we shall see very substantial changes
in the great majority of these areas by the end of the decade?

The reason is simple: for most, perhaps eventually all, of the subjects, failure is simply not an acceptable alternative to decisive coalitions of nations. Felt necessity is often not strong enough to command assent to general principles with unpredictable applications; but it can lead to agreement on specific measures and regulations.

In short, the case-by-case approach can produce some remarkable concessions of "sovereignty" that could not be achieved on an across-the-board basis. The Soviet Union, China and the United States may be unable to agree on the general rules that should cover U.N. peacekeeping in all unspecified future contingencies, but they may well agree on a U.N. peacekeeping force to secure a permanent Middle East settlement that is otherwise satisfactory to them. The same three countries are unlikely to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice over all disputes to which they might be parties, but they may very well agree upon effective third-party machinery for compulsory settlement of disputes on the specific subjects dealt with in a new Law of the Sea agreement—where they recognize compelling national interests in getting other nations as well as themselves to comply with the rules. Thus, while we will not see "world government" in the old-fashioned sense of a single all-embracing global authority, key elements of planetary planning and planetary management will come about on those very specific problems where the facts of interdependence force nations, in their enlightened self-interest, to abandon unilateral decision-making in favor of multilateral processes.

III

For the moment, it may seem that the "energy crisis" has oper-
ated to reduce the chances of progress on some of these key multi-
lateral action fronts. Certainly it has deferred a new monetary
agreement, triggered a series of nationalistic actions affecting
trade, contributed to the U.S. Congress balking at the American
share for the World Bank's soft loan activity, jeopardized some
domestic measures for the environment in the United States and
elsewhere, and sharply affected the food balance for countries
increasingly dependent on fertilizer. There is no rule in interna-
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better; they can just go on getting worse. Even with some roll-
back in oil prices, it will require a special effort of coöperatión
for the industrialized countries to absorb the economic impact
of increased oil costs without resorting to beggar-my-neighbor
policies. It will take considerable statesmanship to maintain the
flow of development assistance to those resource-poor develop-
ing countries which have little to offer the industrialized nations
in return. And it will require still greater ingenuity to "recycle"
a portion of the additional oil revenues back to these countries
so that they can realize their minimum development goals.

But if one takes a longer view, it becomes apparent that, far
from reducing the practical importance of multilateral agree-
ment on specific subjects, the "energy crisis" has made the exist-
ing agenda even more crucial, and in fact added what is in effect
a new action item. For some years we have been talking of re-
source scar cities in terms of physical limits; what is now appar-
ent is that long before any such limits are approached we con-
front what Lester Brown has called "the emerging global politics
of resource scarcity." The problem is not only one of increasing
total supplies of scarce materials, but of assuring their fair allo-
cation between countries. Large parts of the world are depen-
dent on food exports from the United States, just as the United
States has become dependent on oil from the Middle East.
Unilateral cutoffs of these vital resources for political, economic
or conservation reasons could have grave consequences, even to
the point of triggering international conflict. In the early days of
the Second World War, Roosevelt and Churchill proclaimed
an Atlantic Charter with the postwar objective of "access, on
equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world."
In three decades of negotiations since that time, our focus has
been almost exclusively on access to markets. In the next decades,
we will need to place new emphasis on arrangements to assure
reasonable access to scarce resources.

Over the next few months, it seems likely that initial answers
to the specific problem of oil will be sought in a widening series
of negotiations that will come to embrace producing and con-
suming countries. But it is already clear that such negotiations
will not be limited merely to the terms and conditions, including
price, on which oil will hereafter be made available by its prin-
cipal producers. These latter have made it abundantly clear that
their intended "terms and conditions" extend at least to the trans-

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fer of technology and investment and to the price and availability of raw materials and finished products that now move from the major oil consuming countries to the oil producers. Once other developing countries become involved, moreover, other subjects could form a part of the multilateral bargain that may be necessary—such as market access for developing countries' exports, the participation of the oil producers in aid and relief for the developing consumer countries, and provisions for food that guarantee its availability and price on terms paralleling those worked out for oil.

In all probability, these negotiations will not be crammed into the framework of the already-scheduled trade negotiations for which principles were agreed at Tokyo last fall. But certainly what is worked out for and around the question of oil will have a major impact on those negotiations—and may well leave unresolved many of the wider issues of principle involved in the question of access to resources. These issues have now become critical, and we need to look hard at the present state of international law and organization and what can be done about it.

Not surprisingly, after three decades of neglect, the present state is far from satisfactory. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does contain a general prohibition on the use of export and import controls (Article XI) as well as a requirement that both export and import controls should not discriminate between countries (Article I). But a subsequent article adds exceptions to these rules—and exceptions to the exceptions—which make it extremely difficult to discern any coherent guidelines for national policy.² And, what is more to the point, all of these principles are effectively vitiated by a subsequent GATT article (XXI) which declares that nothing in the GATT shall be construed “to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations.”

² Article XX of GATT permits measures deviating from these and other GATT rules “relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.” The same article also permits measures “essential to the acquisition or distribution of products in general or local short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled to an equitable share of the international supply of such products . . .” These authorizations of export restrictions are subject to the requirement that such measures “are not applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or disguised restrictions on international trade.”

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A major objective in the forthcoming trade negotiations should be to incorporate some new and stronger rules. At a minimum, these should prohibit the use of export or other controls for political purposes. A country should not be permitted to cut off or threaten to cut off exports in order to change another country's policies (although exceptions would have to be granted to permit countries to restrict the export of weapons and national security information and also to restrict trade in the course of actual hostilities). The new rules should also seek to define more precisely the economic, conservation and other purposes for which exports can be limited, and should place greater emphasis on the need to take account of the interests of others. Most important of all, since the rules on this complex subject will inevitably require interpretation in specific circumstances, new GATT procedures should be created requiring advance notice, consultation, authoritative interpretation of the rules, and settlement of disputes by impartial conciliation commissions under GATT auspices.

Where countries are found to have violated the new principles and fail to adjust their policies in accordance with multilateral decisions, they should face the possibility of multilateral reprisals. If this cannot be done through the GATT, it may have to be undertaken through the OECD or some other multilateral forum. In extreme situations, multilateral sanctions may even have to be applied to countries that are not GATT members, on the theory that violation of broadly agreed-upon community standards are gravely threatening community interests. If we can propose cutting off air service to countries that give refuge to hijackers, if we can contemplate denying port facilities to nations that pollute the oceans with their tankers, we should certainly explore the possibility of multilateral trade, aid and investment embargoes on nations that threaten the world economy by arbitrarily withholding vital raw materials.

None of the Arab oil producing countries is a party to GATT except for Kuwait, but a number of them (including Saudi Arabia) have committed themselves in bilateral treaties with us to refrain from the very measures of trade discrimination which they recently aimed in our direction.³ Moreover, all of these countries voted for U.N. Resolution 2625 (XXV) of the 1970 General Assembly, entitled "Declaration of Principles of Inter-

³ The export embargo on oil was applied selectively to the U.S. and the Netherlands, and thus clearly violated the most-favored-nation provisions in the bilateral agreements.

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national Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." One of the key principles of the Declaration was the following: "No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind."

It was the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, including the Arab countries, that pressed hardest for this principle and for the proposition that it was already part of international law. Of course, their motive was to prevent the United States and other industrialized countries from using economic power as an instrument of political pressure. Not a single voice has been raised in the United Nations to cite the relevance of this authoritative declaration to the Arab oil embargo—which is typical of the “double standard” that currently prevails in the world organization and accounts for much of the skepticism about the integrity of its decision-making process.

Lest we adopt an unduly self-righteous attitude on these matters, however, we should recognize that the United States itself has been one of the worst offenders in using trade controls in ways which have adversely affected other countries. As a result of congressional pressures, the President was given the authority to cut off aid to countries trading with Cuba or North Vietnam. Last summer we unilaterally cut off exports of soybeans and other agricultural products to our trading partners in Europe at the very time we were pressing them to modify policies of agricultural self-sufficiency and become dependent on our production. And the House of Representatives only recently adopted amendments to the trade bill denying most-favored-nation treatment and trade credits to the Soviet Union and other "non-market economy" countries until they grant free emigration to their citizens.

It is obvious from recent events that the whole concept of an open and cooperative trading system is under serious attack. International trade is becoming heavily "politicized." This trend is destroying the traditions of reasonably free and non-discriminatory access to markets and supplies that are essential in an increasingly interdependent world.

Cordell Hull, Secretary of State under Franklin Roosevelt, was a believer in the theory that "if goods can't cross borders,

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armies will." Since the U.N. Charter, countries are no longer permitted to use force to back up their economic claims. Quite apart from legal prohibition, such actions now entail costs and risks that make them politically undesirable. But if the Atlantic Charter concept of equal access to raw materials cannot be guaranteed by the use of force, we need to implement it by institutional arrangements that include an effective combination of incentives to cooperation and deterrents to destructive behavior.

Amendments have now been proposed to the trade bill which would authorize the President to cut off trade, aid and private investment from countries that injure the international community by the unreasonable denial of essential commodities. In using such new powers our government should act multilaterally, not bilaterally, for at least three reasons. The first is that in most cases a threat of reprisals against raw material cutoffs will have little practical significance unless we have our OECD partners with us. The second is that unilateral U.S. action will look to others as a destructive act of nationalism unless it is related to multilateral rules and procedures. The third is that such an effort of "collective economic security" could degenerate into a North-South economic war unless it is based on principles acceptable to a substantial number of developed and developing countries.

Obviously codes of conduct by themselves are not enough. On both sides of the great economic divide, there will need to be more enlightened perceptions of national interest. In recent years, the developed countries have manifestly failed to discharge the aid and trade obligations that were necessary to make a success of the Development Decade. Partly in response to this failure, partly out of a misguided nationalism, many developing countries enlisted under the banner of "sovereignty over natural resources"—failing to see that developed countries also have "sovereignty" over their capital resources, their technology and their internal markets, and that some mutually agreed limitations of sovereignty are essential to give full possibilities to the sovereignty of all. Ironically, the greatest victims of the "sovereignty" that the OPEC countries exercised in quadrupling oil prices in 1973 were the developing countries themselves.

It would be tragic if developing countries were to conclude from the temporary "success" of the OPEC countries in raising oil prices that confrontations through producer cartels and across-the-board nationalizations now offer a better future for

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them than cooperation. Growing resource pressures do promise some additional bargaining power to many developing countries, but outside of oil the possibilities for successful producer cartels to raise prices are very doubtful—either the producers lack the identity of interest and the necessary foreign exchange reserves for a collective cutback in supply, or the consumers have too many other options in the form of large stockpiles, home-based production, and the availability of substitutes. The danger is that a policy of confrontation could push developed countries into policies of self-sufficiency, denying developing countries the technical assistance, the capital and the market access without which they cannot meet their development goals. In the economic and political backlash, even the resource-rich developing countries would lose; and the have-not countries would lose most of all.

In the next several years, the United States and the other industrialized countries, in their enlightened self-interest, should commit themselves to a number of measures to assist the economic development of the developing countries—more multilateral aid, more market access for developing countries' exports, more transfer of technology, a world food reserve, more private investment on mutually satisfactory terms, revenue-sharing from seabed exploitation, the issuance of special drawing rights to multilateral lending agencies, and a new look at commodity agreements in those special situations where they may be practicable. In return, the developing countries can fairly be asked to do their part in the construction of a cooperative economic order which would include nondiscriminatory access to raw materials at reasonable prices.

Thus the elements of a "world order bargain" between rich and poor are emerging more clearly as a result of the energy crisis. The way to strike it is not through bilateral North-South arrangements that can only lead to political friction and an unfair distribution of both aid and raw materials. To find a truly multilateral solution to the energy problem, as part of the broader issue of economic relations between developed and developing countries, is perhaps the most urgent challenge that now faces the international institutions and their members.

IV

The need for multilateral agreement and management is, then, becoming steadily greater and more widely felt. But of course

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need alone is not enough. Most national leaders around the world do not have to be persuaded that it would be much better to approach key problems on a multilateral basis, usually a global one; the question that troubles them is whether international rules and organizations can be made to work. Unless some major structural weaknesses can be dealt with more effectively, even the existing responsibilities of existing international agencies will slowly wither away, and new responsibilities, however badly needed, will simply not be given either to old or new agencies.

Since the structural problems are political in origin, to remedy them will require not just technical ingenuity but an act of political will on the part of key member-states. The deficiencies of international institutions that governments cite as reasons for bypassing them are of the governments' own making. Some acts of creative statesmanship are needed to break out of the vicious circle. To paraphrase a slogan of the peace movement: "All we are saying is, give the international organizations a chance."

The most obvious structural problem is in the decision-making process. How to equilibrate voting power, not just with national sovereignty but with responsibility for implementing decisions, is a riddle that continues to plague the international agencies. It is understandable that large and middle-sized powers will not grant significant authority to a General Assembly where countries representing less than ten percent of the population of the total membership and less than five percent of the budget can take decisions by a two-thirds majority. It is equally obvious that the "principle of unanimity" under which any one country can veto action is not a recipe for progress.

Fortunately, there are a number of methods that have been developed to assure that influence in decision-making bears a reasonable relationship to power in the real world and to the responsibility for implementing decisions. Weighted voting is the most obvious, but the assigning of differential voting rights is often non-negotiable. Other approaches deserve greater attention: "double majorities" (requiring a majority of all the members plus a majority of specially defined categories of members); "weighted representation" (delegating decision-making to a small committee in which the countries that are most important in the particular subject matter have more than their normal proportion of seats); "bicameralism" (in which decisions must first be adopted by a small committee with weighted representa-

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tion and then by the membership as a whole); and "conciliation" (deferring a vote for a "cooling-off period" of further negotiations at the request of a specified minority of countries).

Obviously no one decision-making formula will be applicable across the board. Different structures are required for different functions—what is appropriate in a new oceans agency may not be appropriate in multilateral development assistance. Moreover, the decision-making reforms that are needed will not always adjust power in the same direction. The United States will justifiably seek "a GATT within the GATT" where decisions can be taken by the key trading nations on some special voting basis rather than on the one-nation one-vote formula among 86 contracting parties. At the same time, it can reasonably be asked to concede a greater voice in the IMF and World Bank to Japan and the Arab countries, whose voting power does not adequately reflect their financial power. To be sure, changes in outmoded or unreasonable decision-making arrangements may be opposed initially by the countries that presently have more than their fair share of influence. The challenge to multilateral diplomacy—and one that has not been seriously faced so far—is to persuade the countries that are overendowed with power in a particular institution that a fairer sharing is needed to save the institution from creeping irrelevance and make it more effective on matters of interest to them.

A related but separate structural problem is how to improve present arrangements for creating, adapting, interpreting and enforcing international law—what some would call the “normative process.” The development of new rules of law has become both more cumbersome and more politicized—we need only contrast the highly political 90-member preparatory committee for the current Law of the Sea negotiations with the small and expert International Law Commission that prepared the texts for the Law of the Sea conventions of 1958. While the membership explosion of the U.N. system makes it politically impossible to return completely to the old ways of doing things, the common interest of all countries in the orderly development of new rules of international law suggests that greater use of small and expert bodies should be made in the preparatory stage of law-making conferences.

Once the rules have been created, we need better arrangements for adapting them in the light of rapid and possibly unforeseen

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changes in political, economic or scientific circumstances. The traditional amendment process is as unsatisfactory a means for modernizing treaties on oil pollution from tankers as it is for modernizing the GATT provisions on nontariff barriers. A possible formula here is the delegation of power to small and expert groups to promulgate changes in the rules, subject to an "opting out" privilege for countries that do not wish to accept the changes. With respect to interpretation and application of the rules, we will need to have greater resort, in such diverse contexts as trade and environmental protection, to fact-finding, conciliation and arbitration by disinterested third parties. Finally, we will need to find better ways of enforcing the rules, as by multilateral action that denies benefits and applies punishments. As has been noted, where essential community interests are threatened, as for example in hijacking, marine pollution or the withholding of vital raw materials, action may need to be taken not only against those who ratify the rules and then break them but against those who refuse to accept the rules at all.

A third structural problem that must be mentioned is the crisis in morale and effectiveness that now afflicts the international civil service. Though a few international agencies may be exempt from this generalization, in most of them the concepts of independence and efficiency have been badly eroded by political pressures, particularly the excessive emphasis given to the concept of "equitable geographical distribution." If the vitality of the international agencies is to be assured, more must be done to apply standards of excellence in recruitment, promotion and selection out. Greater efforts should be made to fill senior positions with outstanding persons from the professional, scientific and business worlds, rather than predominantly, as is now the case, with persons on loan from member-governments. As with the other structural problems, what is required here is a change in national behavior resulting from a new perception by key governments of their enlightened self-interest.

A final structural problem is how to coördinate and rationalize the fragmented system of international agencies. Governments are encountering increasing difficulties in coping with the proliferating conference schedule and the bewildering variety of secretariats that deal with separate pieces of a total problem. The need here is not just to cut overlapping and wasteful activities, but to clarify responsibility for taking and implement-

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ing decisions. It involves both functional coordination (e.g., the respective responsibilities for balance of payments adjustment between IMF, GATT and OECD), and regional coordination (e.g., the division of functions on air pollution between the U.N. institutions and agencies like NATO¹, OECD, and the Council of Europe). Once again, the problem is fundamentally political, since the proliferation is partly the result of “forum shopping” by governments which wish to promote a favorable outcome, and partly the result of the launching of special purpose programs (e.g., on population, environment, and narcotics) financed by voluntary contributions from governments which feel they cannot achieve their objectives within the U.N.’s central policy and budget process.

A generation ago the central problem was to create new institutions where none existed; today it is to get several hundred functional and regional commissions, boards, committees and secretariats to work together effectively. Perhaps the most difficult obstacle in the way of the objective is the projection into the international organizations of the fragmented system of “portfolio government” that still characterizes most of the major countries. Governments will have to do a better job of coordinating themselves if the functional approach is to produce a coherent system of international institutions. The special session of the General Assembly on economic issues now scheduled for 1975 provides a useful opportunity for governments to clarify their objectives and improve their internal processes for the achievement of this purpose.

v

If the functional approach to world order is to have any kind of chance, there are some obvious things the United States will need to do.

One obvious and pressing need is to take a hard look at the way the American government is organized to cope with the present sweep of multilateral negotiations. Multilateral diplomacy increasingly cuts across the interests of many domestic departments. The effort to resolve foreign policy conflicts between agencies has led during the past decade to excessive concentration of power in the White House. The new practice of having

⁴ Specifically, NATO's Committee on Challenges of Modern Society, which is directly concerned with this subject.

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cabinet officers like the Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury double as assistants to the President, with responsibility for directing policy in certain areas, offers a new opportunity to coordinate our approach to different multilateral negotiations, achieve consistent solutions to structural problems, involve the necessary disciplines and interest groups in the policy process, and exploit potential "trade-offs" between different negotiating sectors. The mechanism of the National Security Council (NSC) could be used more than it has been to achieve these objectives.

Moreover, for many of the multilateral negotiations discussed earlier, we could establish an interagency task force as a sub-group of the NSC, with a supporting staff in the executive department most directly concerned with the subject matter. The model could be the NSC interagency task force on the law of the sea and the new office established in the State Department for the law of the sea negotiations. It would also be useful for many of the ongoing negotiations to appoint an outstanding professional from within the government or from private life to serve as Ambassador-at-Large to direct the U.S. negotiating team. Regular congressional consultation and private-sector involvement through a working (not ceremonial) public advisory group—as is now the case on the law of the sea—could assure a more open and democratic policy-making process.

It is people, of course, not just boxes on organizational charts, that determine the effectiveness of a nation's policy process. Our ambassadors to the United Nations and other international agencies should be individuals with broad experience and deep substantive knowledge; their staffs should consist of the best talent our country can make available, not only from the foreign service but from the business, academic, professional and scientific communities. We will know we are serious about our "world order business" when we stop using positions in our missions and deletions to international agencies for political payoffs, and start applying the same requirements of excellence here that we apply in negotiations with the Russians and Chinese. Another test of our seriousness will be the extent to which we include in the very top structure of decision-making—in the White House and the key executive departments—persons experienced in and committed to the multilateral approach.

Third, we need to put a new emphasis on world order issues in our bilateral negotiations with former adversaries, nonaligned

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nations, and old allies. In particular, this would mean using our negotiating leverage to encourage the Russians and Chinese to take a more affirmative position on such matters as the law of the sea, international programs to curb population growth, U.N. peacekeeping and U.N. financing, and the reform of the decision-making and law-making processes along the lines mentioned earlier. This will be a difficult and long-term effort, but there will be a growing number of people in both countries who understand the necessity of tackling such issues in a cooperative and non-dogmatic way; we could strengthen their hand by the right kinds of initiatives. For example, we have created a dozen U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral commissions as the result of the summit meetings: we could use the SALT Commission to explore the possibilities of mutual nonintervention by the superpowers in Third-World areas and of limiting the spread of nuclear and conventional arms; we could seek support for global health and population programs in the bilateral health commission; and we could press in the environmental commission for Soviet cooperation in global efforts to curb whaling, protect ocean fisheries, and regulate land-based sources of marine pollution. We could place a similar priority on world order issues in our relations with the European countries and Japan both bilaterally and in regional forums like NATO and OECD. And we could work harder to strike a "world order bargain" with the developing countries—showing more interest in their priorities in order to encourage their support for ours.

Most important of all, we need a more principled approach to the conduct of foreign policy. Instead of citing the U.N. Charter and other sources of international law when it suits our short-term interest and ignoring them when it does not, we would recognize our long-term interest in strengthening the norms and processes of a civilized world community. We would make a greater effort to use our armed force and economic power consistently with multilateral undertakings and with other sources of international law, submitting disputes wherever possible to third-party settlement. We would resort to unilateral action only in very exceptional circumstances where multilateral processes were clearly unavailable, and any unilateral action on our part would be carried out in a manner calculated to promote the restoration of multilateral processes. To be specific, we would abolish the CIA's "dirty tricks" department, avoid the excesses

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of unilateralism that characterized our Vietnam and Dominican interventions, do more to strengthen multilateral processes in foreign economic policy, and show a really objective concern with human rights questions on a global basis—whether within the borders of former adversaries, neutrals, allies or in our own society. This does not mean unilateral disarmament or ignoring valid concerns of national security. It does mean recognizing that national security can only be promoted from now on by achieving a better balance between traditional preoccupations with power relationships and emerging requirements of global order.

Implicit in all these recommendations is a redefinition of our foreign policy objectives. We would make it clear that a "structure of peace" cannot be achieved merely by maintaining a precarious balance between five power centers—that it requires strengthened international institutions at the global and regional levels in which all interested nations have a chance to participate. By making "world order business" our central preoccupation we could help rebuild support for our foreign policy at home and abroad by identifying our purposes more closely with those of the rest of mankind. By demonstrating a commitment to constructive internationalism, we could find common ground between generations as well as political parties.

Were we to commit ourselves fully to the multilateral approach, were we to enlist the energies of our Congress and our citizens, were we to exploit to the full what leverage we still have with other nations, we might begin, very gradually, to deflect the divisive tendencies of nationalism that are now emerging and to exploit the latent possibilities for strengthening the international system. Some may object that a generation of arduous and possibly futile negotiations on specific functional problems is not a very inspiring prospect to put before a democratic electorate. Let them ponder again the words of Dickens: "It was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, we had everything before us, we had nothing before us, we were all going direct to Heaven, we were all going direct the other way." We do have to aim in one direction or the other. The road to world order will still be a long and hard one, but since the short cuts do not lead anywhere we have no choice but to take it.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD N. GARDNER BEFORE
THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE ON THE
TRADE REFORM ACT OF 1973, APRIL 3, 1974

I am grateful for this opportunity to testify before the Senate Finance Committee on the Trade Reform Act of 1973. In accordance with your request, I shall focus on the so-called "Mondale amendments" and then go on to offer some specific suggestions for strengthening the legislation in other respects.

Let me state at the outset that I consider the Trade Reform Act of 1973 to be, on the whole, a good piece of legislation. I believe its enactment this year to be highly important to the national interest of the United States, for two main reasons:

**First**, the rules and institutions governing world trade are in dangerous disarray. They must be revised and strengthened -- **soon** -- if we wish to preserve and enlarge the benefits of a cooperative world trading order and avoid a further drift toward economic conflict. Without the negotiating authority provided in this bill, the United States will be powerless to work for a new trading order in its own and the general world interest.

As this Committee is well aware, major changes are required in our trade relations with every part of the world -- with the developed non-Communist countries, with the Communist nations, and with the developing areas. If we do not pass a trade bill this year,

Richard N. Gardner, Professor of Law and International Organization at Columbia University, served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs in the Kennedy Administration and was a member of President Nixon's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy in 1970-71.

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it will be difficult to pass one before 1977. Thus we may lose our
last clear chance to reform the world trading system in this decade
and avoid an irreversible deterioration in our relations with these
three key groups of nations.

Second, the energy crisis has added an even greater urgency to
world trade negotiations. Faced with large trade deficits from
sharply higher oil costs, virtually all the world's major nations
will be under severe pressure to resort to trade restrictions or
trade-distorting measures to protect their trade positions and push
the burden of adjustment onto others. This would be a serious problem
even in a world with strong institutions for trade cooperation and clear
and equitable ground rules covering resort to tariff and non-tariff
barriers. It could prove an unmanageable problem in the world in which
we now find ourselves -- a world with a debilitated GATT and with outmoded,
ambiguous, and, on some subjects, non-existent trading rules. Without
this bill, one would have to view with profound pessimism the prospects
of finding cooperative solutions for the trade problems caused by the
energy crisis.

## THE MONDAL AMENDMENTS

Last fall, in a statement before the National Foreign Trade Conven-
tion, I urged that the Trade Reform Act of 1973 should be revised to focus
on access to supplies as well as access to markets. Senator Mondale has
introduced a number of amendments to the bill to accomplish this purpose.
They deserve the most careful and sympathetic consideration. Our national
interest, and the interest of the world community generally, would be
served by the adoption of amendments along the lines which Senator Mondale
has proposed.

The case for such amendments was developed fully in Senator
Mondale's statement to the Senate on December 3. But perhaps I may
add a few thoughts on the history, the law, and the politics of this
difficult and complex subject.

In August 1941, Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill met on
a destroyer off Newfoundland to draft the Atlantic Charter, a statement
of postwar aims which could unite freedom-loving people everywhere in
the fight against fascism. The fourth paragraph of the Charter pro-
claimed the principle of "access, on equal terms, to the trade and to
the raw materials of the world."

The motivation behind the fourth paragraph of the Atlantic Charter
was simple. The leaders of the wartime alliance believed that peace
could not be achieved unless it had a sound economic basis. The exper-
ience of the first four decades of this century suggested that if
countries were denied access to raw materials and markets, they might
be tempted to secure them by resort to force -- or at least would seek
to justify aggression on the grounds that they were denied the opportunity
to meet their economic requirements through peaceful means.

Cordell Hull, the father of the trade agreements program, was a
believer in the theory that "if goods can't cross borders, armies will."
This perception of the close relation between economic policies and
peace had a profound influence not only on the Atlantic Charter but
on other wartime statements and on postwar planning.

Yet despite this background, international economic negotiations
from the end of the Second World War to the present time have focused
almost entirely on access to markets and have virtually ignored the

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problem of access to supplies. The reason for this one-sided
emphasis is obvious -- for most of the postwar period the central
problem seemed to be how to avoid depression and unemployment by
selling goods to other countries. Now, however, we are moving into
an era of resource scarcity and accelerating inflation -- an era
which requires a new approach to international economic policy, or
perhaps we should say a return to the old and forgotten perceptions
which lay behind the fourth paragraph of the Atlantic Charter.

Raw material access has acquired a new importance for the United
States. By 1985 our country, even if it achieves energy self-sufficiency,
will be primarily dependent on imports for nine of the thirteen basic
minerals required by a modern industrial economy. As Lester Brown has
pointed out, within the relatively brief fifteen year span of 1970-1985,
"we will have made the transition from being an essentially self-sufficient
country to -- at least in terms of raw materials -- a have-not country.
We do not yet appreciate the economic, social, and political consequences
of this historically abrupt transition."

The Arab oil embargo was undertaken with the explicit purpose of
forcing the United States and its allies in Europe and Japan to change
their policies on the Middle East. It has been lifted, but subject to
further review in the light of progress toward a Middle East settlement.
Moreover, output is being held well below capacity for economic as well
as political reasons.

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Other raw material suppliers, encouraged by the success of the oil embargo, now threaten to follow suit. Representatives from 16 East and Central African countries meeting in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania on November 24, 1973, called for diplomatic, economic and other sanctions against the United States, Britain, France, West Germany, Japan and Brazil unless they ceased "support" for white minority regimes in Southern Africa. The Chairman of the conference, Foreign Minister John W. S. Malecela of Tanzania, said the sanctions could include a ban on both exports to and imports from the United States and the other named countries. Although most of the sixteen countries do not possess materials of vital importance to us, some of them, such as Zaire, the former Belgian Congo, clearly do.

What is perhaps more to the point, many developing countries are now tempted to form producer cartels for the purpose of raising prices and achieving international transfers of wealth that seem otherwise impossible. One well informed observer, Ugandan social scientist Ali Mazrui, sums up their attitude as follows:

> "From the point of view of millions of Asians and Africans, the Arab oil sanctions against select Western countries will probably rank in history alongside Japan's victory over Russia in 1945 -- as milestones in the story of how Asians and Africans discovered their own potential power against Caucasian might ... As a lever against the rich, certain Third World resources will become the equivalent of organized labor in the history of the industrialized countries -- as a basis for collective bargaining."

Statements to the same effect were made recently by Algerian representatives at a meeting of developing countries in preparation for the forthcoming U.N. General Assembly on raw materials and economic development.

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Economists disagree as to the probable success of price-raising producer cartels for materials other than petroleum. My own view is that growing resource pressures do promise some additional bargaining power to many developing countries, but that outside of oil the possibilities for successful producer cartels to raise prices are very doubtful--either the producers lack the identity of interest and the necessary foreign exchange reserves for a collective cutback in supply, or the consumers have too many other options in the form of large stockpiles, home-based production, and the availability of substitutes.

Producer cartels may achieve some results for their organizers in the short run, but in the middle and long run they are likely to backfire. The danger is that a policy of confrontation could push developed countries into policies of self-sufficiency, denying developing countries the technical assistance, the capital and the market access without which they cannot meet their development goals. In the economic and political backlash, even the resource-rich developing countries would lose; and the have-not countries would lose most of all. The role of international law and organization, in my view, should be to reinforce cooperative behavior that will serve the long-run interest of all. Specifically, this would mean restricting the right of producer nations to form price-raising cartels except as part of mutually-agreed commodity arrangements in cooperation with consuming countries, as was proposed in the Charter for an International Trade Organization 25 years ago.

Let us adopt an unduly self-righteous attitude on these matters, we should recognize frankly that the United States itself has been one of the worst offenders in using export controls in ways which have adversely

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affected other countries. For years we have applied an embargo on trade with Cuba. Last summer, we unilaterally cut off exports of soybeans and other agricultural products to our trading partners in Europe at the very time that we were pressing them to modify policies of agricultural self-sufficiency and become dependent on our production.

It is obvious from these examples that the whole concept of an open and cooperative trading system is under serious attack. International trade is becoming heavily "politicized." This trend is destroying the traditions of reasonably free and non-discriminatory access to markets and supplies that are essential in an increasingly interdependent world.

Since the U.N. Charter, countries are no longer permitted to use force to back up their economic claims. Quite apart from legal prohibition, such actions now entail costs and risks that make them politically undesirable. But if the Atlantic Charter concept of equal access to raw materials cannot be guaranteed by the use of force, we need to consider guaranteeing it in some other way.

but

There is no easy solution to this problem, but it is certainly in our own and the general interest to try to develop some new international rules and procedures to assure reasonable access to raw materials. The present state of international law in this area is not satisfactory. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does contain a general prohibition on the use of export and import controls (Article X) as well as a requirement that both export and import controls should not discriminate between countries (Article I). Article XX of GATT permits measures deviating from

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these and other GATT rules "relating to the conservation of exhuastible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption." The same article also
permits measures "essential to the acquisition or distribution of products
in general or local short supply; Provided that any such measures shall be
consistent with the principle that all contracting parties are entitled
to an equitable share of the international supply of such products . . . "
These authorizations of export restrictions are subject to the requirement
that such measures "are not applied in a manner which would constitute a
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where
the same conditions prevail, or disguised restrictions on international
trade . . . "

In this tangle of rules, exceptions to the rules, and exceptions
to the exceptions to the rules, it is extremely difficult to discern any
coherent guidelines for national policy. And, what is more to the point,
all of these principles are effectively vitiated by a subsequent GATT
article (XXI) which declares that nothing in the GATT shall be construed
"to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers
necessary for the protection of its essential security interests . . . taken
in time of war or other emergency in international relations. . . "

It seems to me that a major U.S. objective in the forthcoming
trade negotiations should be to incorporate some new and stronger rules
in the GATT limiting the resort to export controls. At a minimum, the new
rules should prohibit the use of export or other controls for political

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[lc]

purposes. A country should not be permitted to cut off or threaten to cut off exports in order to change another country's policies (although exceptions would be granted to permit countries to restrict the export of weapons and national security information and also to restrict trade in the course of actual hostilities). The new rules should also seek to define more precisely the economic, conservation and other purposes for which exports can be limited and should place greater emphasis on the need to take account of the interests of others. Most important of all, since the rules on this complex subject will inevitably require interpretation in specific circumstances, new GATT procedures should be created requiring advance notice, consultation, authoritative interpretation of the rules and settlement of disputes by impartial conciliation and arbitration commissions under GATT auspices.

Where countries are found to have violated the new principles and fail to adjust their policies in accordance with multilateral decisions, they should face the possibility of multilateral reprisals. If this cannot be done through the GATT, it may have to be undertaken through the OECD or some other multilateral forum. In extreme situations, multilateral sanctions may even have to be applied to countries that are not GATT members, on the theory that their violation of broadly agreed community standards are gravely threatening community interests. If we can propose cutting off air service to countries that give refuge to hijackers, if we can contemplate denying port facilities to nations that pollute the oceans with their tankers, we should certainly explore the possibility of multilateral trade, aid and investment embargoes on nations that threaten the world economy by arbitrarily withholding vital raw materials.

- 10 -

None of the Arab oil producing countries is a party to GATT except for Kuwait and many of the sixteen African countries who made the declaration referred to earlier are also outside the GATT. However, a number of these Arab and African countries who are not GATT members (including Saudi Arabia) have committed themselves in bilateral treaties with us to refrain from the very measures of trade discrimination which they recently aimed in our direction. Moreover, all of these countries voted for U.N. Resolution 2625 of the 25th General Assembly, entitled "Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." In promulgating this resolution, the General Assembly declared that "the principles of the Charter which are embodied in this Declaration constitute basic principles of international law, and consequently appeals to all States to be guided by these principles in their international conduct and to develop their mutual relations on the basis of their strict observance."

One of the key principles of the Declaration is the following: "No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights and to secure from it advantages of any kind."

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It was the Afro-Asian group in the United Nations, including the Arab countries, that pressed hardest for the principle quoted above and for the proposition that this principle was already part of international law. Of course, their motive was to prevent the United States and other industrialized countries from using economic power as an instrument of political pressure. It is interesting that not a single voice has been raised in the United Nations to cite this authoritative declaration of the General Assembly since the Arab oil embargo began.

In his speech to the General Assembly in September, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announced the willingness of the United States to negotiate a new instrument on the "Economic Rights and Duties of States" as proposed by the Government of Mexico. The Department of State has hitherto been reluctant to raise the issue of access to resources in these negotiations because of our own use of export controls. We certainly cannot have it both ways. I believe we should offer to reform our practices in this area in return for reciprocal changes in the practices of others.

In implementing a new international economic policy of access to supplies we should seek to act multilaterally, not bilaterally, for at least three reasons. The first is that in most cases a threat of reprisals against raw material cut-offs will have little practical significance unless we have our OECD partners with us. The second is that unilateral U.S. action will look to others as a destructive act of nationalism unless it is related to multilateral rules and multilateral procedures. The third is that such an effort of "collective economic security" could degenerate into a North-South economic war unless it is based on principles that are acceptable to a substantial number of developed and developing countries.

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I would hope that the Mondale amendments in their final form would specify that the President should exercise his authority to retaliate in conformity with GATT or multilateral agreements, once these have been renegotiated to deal adequately with supply access. Pending such renegotiation, the United States would reserve the right to retaliate without multilateral approval. It should be understood, would however, that the President/use this authority only as a last resort, and in conjunction with other consuming countries wherever possible.

Obviously codes of conduct by themselves are not enough. On both sides of the great economic divide, there will need to be more enlightened perceptions of national interest. In recent years, the developed countries have manifestly failed to discharge the aid and trade obligations that were necessary to make a success of the Development Decade. Partly in response to this failure, partly out of a misguided nationalism, many developing countries enlisted under the banner of "sovereignty over natural resources" -- failing to see that developed countries also have "sovereignty" over their capital resources, their technology and their internal markets, and that some mutually agreed limitations of sovereignty are essential to give full possibilities to the sovereignty of all. Ironically, the greatest victims of the "sovereignty" that the OPEC countries exercised in quadrupling oil prices in 1973 were the developing countries themselves.

To sum up, I doubt that new rules and procedures assuring reasonable access to supplies can be negotiated except in a much broader context involving a fundamental restructuring of international economic relations between developed and developing countries. The developed countries are

[Lc]

rightly concerned about secure access to raw materials at reasonable prices. But the developing countries are/concerned about other kinds of access -- access to markets, to capital, to technology, to management skills, and to an adequate voice in decision-making in international economic forums. The challenge facing U.S. foreign economic policy in the next few years is to help fashion the "world order bargain" that will make access to resources a negotiable element in a new system of collective economic security that works in the interests of developed and developing countries.

14

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## OTHER FEATURES OF THE BILL

The trade bill could be strengthened by a number of other
changes, the most important of which are suggested below:

### 1. Tariff Authority

Section 101 gives the President authority to eliminate tariffs
of 5% or less, to cut by 60% tariffs of from 5% to 25%, and to cut
by 75% tariffs which are over 25% -- provided that no rate over 25%
is reduced below the level of 10%. I believe the national interest
would be better served by replacing this formula with the zero-tariff
authority contained in the original Administration bill. This would
enable us to work more effectively for the objectives of the legislation
set out in Section 2, particularly the goal of "open and non-discriminatory
world trade." Zero-tariff authority is particularly important if we are
to reduce the margin of discrimination against American trade by bar-
gaining down the common external tariff of the enlarged European
Community and the tariffs of other countries in association with it.
As the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment
Policy stated in its Report (p.14):

> "Our objective should be the progressive elimination of most tariffs over the next 10 years, and of all tariffs over the next 25 years. Progress toward this objective would gradually eliminate the discriminatory effects on the United States and other nonmember countries of the European Community and its preferential trading arrangements."

Even if the goal of tariff elimination proves impossible, it is
still in our interest to reduce world tariff levels as far as possible.
We have a comparative advantage in many products, such as agricultural
produce and high technology manufactures, that are currently subject to

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a high rate of protection by other nations. If we are restricted
in the concessions that we can make in other areas, we may not be able
to achieve the necessary competitive opportunities for our export
industries or reach the general level of reciprocity in overall reduc-
tions that is so essential to a successful trade negotiation. Trade
negotiations are a two-way street; and if one partner will go only a
certain distance, the other partner cannot be expected to go any further.
We should not jeopardize the trade negotiations by limiting unduly the
negotiating authority of our representatives.

If the Senate is not prepared to grant zero tariff authority in
the form originally proposed by the Administration, a useful compromise
would be the formula adopted in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 author-
izing the elimination of duties on products for which the Community and
the United States account for 80% or more of world trade. That formula
was of little use in the Kennedy Round when the U.K. failed to join the
Community, but it could be extremely valuable now.

## 2. Non-tariff Barrier Authority

The otherwise excellent formula for negotiating on non-tariff
barriers is flawed by the provisions for "sectoral equivalence" inserted
by the House Ways and Means Committee. Section 102 states that a
principal negotiating objective in the field of non-tariff barriers
is to obtain, with respect to "each product sector of manufacturing"
and with respect to the agricultural sector, "competitive opportunities"
for U.S. exports to developed countries that are "equivalent" to the
"competitive opportunities" afforded to these products in the U.S.
In pursuit of this objective, the President is required to negotiate

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trade agreements "to the extent feasible" on a sector by sector basis
and to indicate with respect to each trade agreement submitted to
Congress the extent to which equivalent access in each sector has
been achieved. Although these provisions do not appear in the section
of the bill covering the President's tariff-cutting powers, the report
of the Ways and Means Committee states (on page 19) that the objective
of sectoral equivalence is also to be applied "to the extent feasible"
in the tariff area as well.

I believe it would serve the national interest if these provisions
for "sectoral equivalence" could be removed from the legislation or at
least substantially modified. In the forty years since the trade agree-
ments program was inaugurated, we have conducted our trade negotiations
on the basis of overall reciprocity, permitting concessions in one pro-
duct sector to be reciprocated by concessions in another, subject only
to the requirement that there be a balance of advantage in the total
package. Trade-offs between product sectors have been and will continue
to be necessary for the achievement of substantial progress in the reduc-
tion of trade barriers -- particularly non-tariff barriers -- because in
individual product sectors we and our trading partners differ in trading
interests, productive efficiency, and the type of trade barriers we employ.
It might conceivably be appropriate to require that the President seek
reciprocity within the manufacturing sector as a whole in order to prevent
excessive concessions here on behalf of our agricultural and service
exports -- although even this kind of requirement would need careful
examination. But requiring that equivalence must henceforth be achieved
in thirty or forty product sectors -- which is apparently the way the

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[L.C.]

legislation is interpreted by the Ways and Means Committee and the Executive Branch -- risks placing unsuperable handicaps on our negotiators before the negotiations even begin. It would make it extremely difficult -- perhaps impossible -- to negotiate new rules in GATT on such non-tariff barriers as subsidies and government procurement, since the competitive effects of such new rules will inevitably differ from one product sector to another. In one product, we may gain somewhat greater than equivalent competitive opportunities from the new rules; for another product, somewhat less, depending on our comparative advantage or disadvantage in production.

It is significant that the idea of sectoral equivalence was carefully considered and firmly rejected by the President's Trade Commission in 1971. I believe the reasons given by the Commission's Report (p. 12) are as timely now as they were then:

> "Reciprocity should be conceived in terms of the whole set of negotiations rather than as an objective to be achieved within self-contained compartments. . . . In some cases, of course, it may be possible to arrive at mutually advantageous solutions within specific industrial sectors, and efforts should be made to find such solutions. On the other hand, in many cases a country will have to give more than it gets in one sector or functional area, and recoup by securing an equivalent advantage in another."

If the Senate is not prepared to drop the sectoral equivalence provisions or to modify them substantially, I would recommend, as an absolute minimum, that Section 102(c) be amended to make it clear that its provisions are to be implemented only to the extent consistent with of the overall objectives/the legislation laid down in Section 2.

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### 3. GATT Revision

Section 121 (a) directs the President to take such action as may be necessary to bring trade agreements to which the U.S. is a party -- primarily the GATT -- into conformity with certain "principles." GATT urgently needs revision, and this Section would raise no problem if the "principles" subsequently enumerated were limited to broad statements of the kinds of rules sought to be achieved. Unfortunately, however, some of the numbered paragraphs appear to prejudge the question of what specific institutional means should be employed to improve the trade rules.

For example, Article 121 (a) (1) requires "the revision of decision-making machinery in the GATT to more nearly reflect the balance of economic interest" and Section 121 (a) (3) requires "the extension of GATT articles to conditions of trade not presently covered in order to move toward more fair trade practices." Given the fact that GATT now has more than 80 members and follows the rule of one-nation, one-vote, amendments of the GATT articles to achieve U.S. objectives in these areas are not likely to prove feasible. A more practical approach would be to negotiate a new Code of Trade Liberalization, supplementary to GATT and supportive of it, open to participation by those relatively few key trading nations economically capable of assuming the new responsibilities, as has been proposed by the Special Advisory Panel to the Trade Committee of the Atlantic Council under the chairmanship of Ambassador John Leddy. The GATT members accepting the Code (which would deal, among other things, with non-tariff barriers not now adequately covered in GATT, could then apply between themselves in its administration such new and more realistic decision-making arrangements as they would agree upon.

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[lc]

I would, therefore, recommend revising Section 121 (a) along the following lines: "The President shall, as soon as practicable, take such action as may be necessary to strengthen the GATT and other trade agreements heretofore entered into to make them more effective instruments for the development of an open, nondiscriminatory and fair world economic system, including (but not limited to)......" The six numbered paragraphs that follow would then be reworded to eliminate specific references to the GATT articles individually or as a whole, leaving the President sufficient negotiating flexibility to accomplish the objectives laid down in the opening paragraph of Section 121 (a) by whatever means proved most practicable.

### 4. Import Relief Under the "Escape Clause"

Title II of the bill is too permissive in allowing U. S. industries to resort to tariff and other forms of protection in the face of import competition. True, this part of the bill does emphasize adjustment to import competition, provides more ample assistance for this purpose than ever before to workers and firms, and favors relief through tariffs and tariff quotas over quantitative limitations and orderly marketing agreements. But other innovations in the bill could substantially increase the number of successful applications for escape clause relief which will go from the Tariff Commission to the President.

For example, the existing requirement that imports be the "major" or principal cause of injury to a domestic industry is changed to a requirement that they be only a "substantial" cause -- a cause defined as "important and not less than any other cause." Alongside the existing

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law's tight definition of "serious injury" -- the significant idling of productive facilities, the inability to operate at a reasonable profit, significant unemployment, etc. -- we have a new standard relating to a "threat" of serious injury on the basis of which relief can be granted. The "threat" can take the form of a decline in sales, a growing inventory, and a downward trend in production, profits and employment -- obviously a much easier test to meet.

Those who believe in freer world trade might be reconciled to these new provisions if relief in the form of higher tariffs or other restrictions were clearly limited to a short time period. Unfortunately, the legislation provides for a five year period of protection renewable by an additional two years -- with the opportunity to apply for yet another period of relief after a two year interval. If the concept of the legislation is to grant temporary protection to permit industries to become more competitive or to change into another line of production, one seven year period ought to be enough.

No less disturbing is the legislation's ambiguity on the key question of whether the more permissive standards for import relief are to constitute the exclusive mode of protecting domestic industries -- or whether such industries will continue to have access to non-legislated methods such as the special international arrangements on textiles and steel. If we are going to set a new and easier standard by which industries are to get temporary relief from imports for the purpose of making competitive adjustment, I believe these standards should apply to everyone. At the very least, the bill should provide that no new restrictions, "voluntary" or otherwise, should be imposed to take care of industries that are unable to satisfy the new standard, and existing

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[LC]

special arrangements that are not embodied in multilateral agreements under the GATT should be rapidly phased out. This would mean phasing out the steel agreement but not the multilateral textile agreement.

The American people are justifiably fed up with a double standard of law and justice -- one standard for the rich and powerful and another for the rest of us. One place to start rectifying the double standard is in this new trade bill.

Some loosening of the current escape clause provisions is obviously necessary as the price for passing a trade bill, but I fear the loosening in the House version has gone too far. The new provisions would mean many more recommendations for trade restrictions by the Tariff Commission -- and much more political pressure on the President under the escape clause than he has faced in recent years. I hope the Senate will tighten up the escape clause both with respect to the criteria of causality and injury and with respect to the other matters mentioned above. And it is absolutely essential to retain the discretion the President has under existing law and in the proposed legislation to deny the application of an industry for new trade restrictions in the light of broader national and international considerations.

## 5. Countervailing Duties

There is no valid national interest in countervailing against foreign subsidies which neither cause injury to an American industry nor prevent one from being established. Other countries recognize this fact and require that injury be shown before countervailing duties are imposed. The prevailing practice in this regard is embodied in Article VI of GATT, which requires "material injury" as a prerequisite to the

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imposition of countervailing duties. Yet the United States continues
to apply a countervailing duty law that has no injury requirement,
taking advantage of the "grandfather clause" of GATT permitting con-
tracting parties to maintain pre-1947 legislation inconsistent with
the GATT rules.

I would favor amendments to Section 331 of the bill bringing us
into line with GATT standards by requiring proof of "material injury"
before countervailing duties are applied. On the other hand, I can
understand the argument that in order to maximize our negotiating
leverage, we should postpone such a change in our legislation pending
the negotiation of new rules on subsidies that are consistent with our
national interests. But if we are to follow that negotiating strategy,
we should certainly provide the Secretary of the Treasury with the
temporary discretionary authority included on page 123 of the bill
not to impose countervailing duties which would jeopardize the satis-
factory completion of the trade negotiations. The provision begin-
ning on the bottom of that page requiring the mandatory application of
countervailing duties with respect to articles produced by a government-
owned subsidized facility in a developed country could complicate our
negotiating problems and should be removed.

6. Preferences for Developing Countries

Title V of the legislation constitutes an important step forward
by recognizing the important national interest of the United States in
assisting the developing countries to increase their export earnings
and thus accelerate their economic development. However, tariff pre-
ferences are not available with respect to articles that are subject

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[LC]

to "escape clause" actions under old or new legislation, nor will they have much value with respect to articles subject to "voluntary" or other forms of quantitative restrictions. This underlines the importance of tightening up our policies for "import relief" along the lines outlined earlier. We should not be in the position of taking back from the developing countries with one hand what we are giving with the other. In the long run, we should be moving with our developed trading partners toward a system of one-way free trade on behalf of the developing countries.

I would also recommend deleting paragraph (c) (1) of Section 504, which makes preferential treatment unavailable for the product of a beneficiary developing country when that country supplies more than $25 million of that product during a calendar year. It is inconsistent with the purposes of tariff preferences to limit the trade benefits so severely.

On the other hand, I support the provision in Section 504 (c) (2) withholding preferential treatment from the product of a developing country when that country secures more than 50 percent of U.S. imports of that product in a calendar year. The 50% limitation serves a useful purpose in preventing a few relatively advanced developing countries from gaining most of the benefits of tariff preferences at the expense of all the others.

* * * * *

DR. VANNI GAROFOLI

VIA A. STOPPANI, 10

00197 ROMA

Tel.: 870.468

PERSONAL-CONFIDENTIAL

The Honorable Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
U.S. Embassy
Rome

July 4, 1974

My Dear Mr. Secretary:

The "meeting" which has represented one of my hopes for a long
time will take place momentarily. You will certainly remember
my several letters on this matter. I am sure that this
historic event will be crowned with great success.

Please accept my heartfelt welcome to Rome. I doubt whether
you will have the possibility to see me. Of course, I would be
very happy over the chance of even the shortest meeting.

Anyhow, I will write you soon. I am perfecting a little plan
stemming from my unforgettable experiences as a pupil of
Dr. Kissinger. I hope you will have a chance to give a look
at some material I am presently preparing.

With warmest regards, I am

SECSTATE WSH

WWU WSH

TLX 120

WAA 150(1524) (1-025554C266)PD 09/23/74 1520

ICS IPMHDLA LSA

01076 HOLLYWOOD CA 343 09-23 1156A PDT

PMS HENRY KISSINGER, SECRETARY OF STATE

DEPT OF STATE

WASHDC

NBC IS PLANNING A SPECIAL HOUR PROGRAM HONORING AMERICA'S LONG-
TIME AMBASSADOR OF GOOD WILL AND COMEDY, BOB HOPE, HE HAS
RESPECTFULLY AND SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED WE INVITE YOU, AS A MAN
HE GREATLY ADMIRES, TO HAVE A BRIEF PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS.

WE WOULD BE DEEPLY HONORED AND GRATEFUL, AS WOULD WE, IF YOU WOULD
CONSIDER PREFILMING A BRIEF SEGMENT WHICH COULD BE INCORPORATED
INTO THE SHOW.

WE HAVE ALSO INVITED PRESIDENT GERALD FORD TO PRE FILM A FEW
JOVIAL REMARKS ABOUT AMERICA'S FAVORITE ENTERTAINER. HIS STAFF
IS HOPE-FUL (PUN INTENDED) OF WORKING THIS OUT.

THE PROGRAM WILL BE BASED ON THE TRADITIONAL "ROAST" FORMAT.
WHILE WE WILL SALUTE BOB IN HIGH GOOD HUMOR, THERE WILL BE NO
LOSS OF DIGNITY OR GOOD TASTE. DEAN MARTIN WILL SERVE AS
TOASTMASTER. JOINING BOB IN PERSON ON THE DATE WILL BE HIS GOOD
FRIENDS GENERAL OMAR BRADLEY, HERB SCHLOSSER, PRESIDENT OF NBC,
BING CROSBY, JIMMY STEWART, JACK BENNY, LUCILLE BALL. FORMER
ASTRONAUT NEIL ARMSTRONG, GOV. RONALD REAGAN, JACK NICKLAUS,
DON RICKLES, PHYLLIS DILLER, DICK MARTN AND DAN ROWAN, NIPSEY
RUSSELL AND HOWARD COSELL.

THE SHOW WILL BE TAPED AT NBC BURBANK STUDIO ON WEDNESDAY, OCT 23. IT WILL AIR ON THURSDAY, OCT 31 FROM 10PM TO 11PM. WE ARE AWARE OF YOUR BUSY SCHEDULE AND WILL ARRANGE TO FILM YOUR ONE TO TWO MINUTE SPOT AT YOUR CONVENIENCE IN YOUR OFFICE OR WHEREVER YOU CHOOSE. DUE TO OUR PRODUCTION SCHEDULES WE MUSTN HAVE AN ANSWER FROM YOU NO LATER THAN OCT 4 AND WE MUST FILM YOUR SEGMENT NO LATER THAN OCT 15.

MY WRITING STAFF WILL PREPARE MATERIAL FOR YOU WHICH YOU WILL
RECEIVE IN TIME FOR APPROVAL, REWRITING, ETC. OF COURSE, YOU
ARE FREE TO DRAW ON YOUR OWN HIGHLY ACKNOWLEDGED WIT.

ALL THOSE PARTICIPATING IN BOB'S SPECIAL NIGHT WILL RECEIVE
AN HONORARIUM OF $2,500.

KENDIS ROCHLEN OF MY STAFF WILL BE AVAILABLE TO COORDINATE WITH
YOUR STAFF AT ANY TIME. HER DIRECT LINE IS (213) 653 2577.

OUR ADDRESS IS 3630 RIVERSIDE DRIVE, BURBANK CALIF 91505.

PHONE (213) 849 2471

THANK YOU

GREG GARRISON GREG GARRISON PRODUCTIONS

637P EDT.

SECSTATE WSH

RECEIVED

23 SEP 1974 23

10

Thank you, Dean.

It's a great pleasure for me to pay tribute to Bob Hope, who symbolizes
so well the sense of humor of our country.

There was some doubt as to whether I could make an appearance on this
show because of my tight schedule. But Bob said if I didn't appear, he'd
stop paying his taxes--and you know what that would mean for Government
solvency.

I've had some fun with you, Bob--but I do want to extend a message to
you from the entire Congress. They have proclaimed you the funniest
man in the world. The vote was 268 to 267......

I have often asked myself why Bob Hope is important to America and to
the world. First, he _gives_ something _from_ America _to_ the world. When
he travels abroad--which is nearly as often as I--he communicates to
others so much of America's spirit and zest as a nation. He is, truly,
an Ambassador of goodwill.

Second, he represents something universal. The joy and laughter he brings
us all belong not just to America, but to every nation. In a world of so
much turmoil it is good to be able to stand back and get some perspective