GENERAL PRINCIPLES

1. We have considered the first steps in a disarmament agreement in the framework of general and complete disarmament.

2. The first stage in such an agreement must involve arms reduction measures large enough to lead to a radical diminution of the chances of a nuclear war.

3. At all times during the stages of such an agreement, all parties must be convinced that the strategic balance is not upset.

4. The reduction of armaments must at all times be accompanied by sufficient effective controls to assure both sides against violation of the agreement.

5. The achievement of an agreement on general and complete disarmament and the attainment of a substantial first-stage of disarmament would contribute very substantially to the solution of outstanding political problems.

6. We urge that further detailed studies of a first stage, the outline of which is given below, are urgently needed and we strongly .. endorse the recommendation of Working Group 4 for an international study group.

******************************

In accordance with these principles the first stage of an agreement on general and complete disarmament should include!

1. Limitations on conventional forces according to a formula similar to those suggested by both sides in previous proposals.

2. A complete published inventory of military manpower, weapons, delivery systems, means of production of weapons and weapons materials, to be submitted by both sides to an international control commission at the beginning of the agreement.

9/15/61

3. Rapid reduction of stockpiles of delivery systems and weapons materials by a substantial percentage of the declared inventory; the corresponding destruction of delivery systems, and diversion to peaceful uses of fissile materials to be verified by the control commission.

4. The prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and of further production of weapons material and delivery systems with the institution of the required staged controls as outlined in the reports of other working groups (inspection at declared production plants).

5. Upon the completion of the above measures, the institution of a limited system of inspection using suitable forms of sampling aimed at the verification of the temporarily remaining declared stockpiles and of the test ban. From this point on, the completeness of inspection would bear a direct relation to the degree of reduction achieved. Simultaneous with the institution of this inspection, a continued reduction of delivery systems and stockpiles to agreed levels consistent with strategic requirements of both sides for a minimum deterrent force.

6. The last stage of the disarmament process should comprise complete inspection simultaneous with final reduction of delivery systems and nuclear stockpiles to the zero level.

Discussion Draft
Working Group 3

September 14, 1961

Eighth International Conference
on Science and World Affairs

September 11-16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

6. We urge that further detailed studies of a first stage, the outline of which is given below, are urgently needed and we strongly . . . endorse the recommendation of Working Group 4 for an international study group.

**************************************************

2.

3. Rapid reduction of stockpiles of delivery systems and weapons. materials by an appreciable percentage of the declared inventory; the ... corresponding destruction of delivery systems and diversion to peaceful uses of fissile materials to be verified by the control commission.

4. The prohibition of further production of weapons material and delivery systems with the institution of the required staged controls as outlined in the reports of other Working Groups (inspection at declared production plants).

5. Upon the completion of the above measures, the institution of a limited system of statistical sampling aimed at the verification of the remaining declared stockpiles. The extent of this limited system would be in proportion to the degree of reduction previously achieved.

6. Simultaneous with the institution of this inspection, a further reduction of delivery systems and stockpiles to the level consistent with strategic requirements of both sides for a minimum for a deterrent force.

7. The next stages of the disarmament agreement should commence with complete inspection simultaneous with final reduction of delivery systems and nuclear stockpiles to the zero level.

STATEMENT FROM THE

SEVENTH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS

STOWE, VERMONT, SEPTEMBER 5-9, 1961

The Seventh Conference on Science and World Affairs was held at Stowe, Vermont, September 5-9, 1961. The forty-one scientists from twelve countries attending the Conference were:

Sir John Crawford - Australia
Professor Hans Thirring - Austria
Professor C. Pavan - Brazil
Professor G. Nadjakov - Bulgaria
Professor G. Burkhardt - Federal Republic of Germany
Sir Edward Bullard - Great Britain
Professor A. Haddow - Great Britain
Sir Ben Lockspeiser - Great Britain
Professor J. Rotblat - Great Britain
Professor F.B. Straub - Hungary
Dr. G. Bernardini - Italy
Professor T. Toyoda - Japan
Professor B.V.A. Röling - Netherlands
Academician A.A. Blagonravov - Soviet Union
Academician N.N. Bogolubov - Soviet Union
Academician M.M. Dubinin - Soviet Union
Professor V.M. Khvostov - Soviet Union
Academician N.M. Sissakian - Soviet Union
Professor N.A. Talensky - Soviet Union
Academician I.E. Tamm - Soviet Union
Academician A.V. Topchiev - Soviet Union
Professor Harrison Brown - United States
Dr. William Consolazio - United States
Professor Paul Doty - United States
Professor Bentley Glass - United States
Professor C. O'D. Iselin - United States
Dr. Martin Kaplan - United States
Professor Chauncey Leake - United States
Professor Linus Pauling - United States
Professor Jay Orear - United States
Professor W. Pickering - United States
Mr. Gerard Piel - United States
Professor I. Rabi - United States
Professor Eugene Rabinowitch - United States
Dr. Roger Revelle - United States
Professor Alexander Rich - United States
Professor Walter Rosenblith - United States
Dr. Eugene Staley - United States

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Dr. Alvin Weinberg - United States
Professor Eugene Wigner - United States
Professor J.R. Zacharias - United States

This Conference had as its theme "International Cooperation in Pure and Applied Science." Our previous conferences have been chiefly concerned with ways of preventing the misuse of science in the wholesale destruction of mankind. In this Conference at Stowe, we have turned to the discussion of constructive international cooperation in science, because it is a way to create trust between nations, a trust which develops from common interests and from experience in working together.

Science misused by nations to foster their competitive interests as world powers makes possible the destruction of mankind. Science used cooperatively by all nations for the increase of human knowledge and the improvement of man's productive capacity can give all men on earth a satisfactory and worth-while life. Scientists bear a responsibility both to foster the constructive use of science and to help in preventing its destructive use.

The deliberations of the Conference were carried out in plenary sessions and in meetings of working groups. These groups were six in number as follows: I. Cooperation in the Earth Sciences; II. Cooperation in Space Research; III. Cooperation in the Life Sciences; IV. Cooperation in the Physical Sciences; V. Cooperation in Assistance to Developing Nations; VI. Exchange of Scientists and Scientific Information.

Similar suggestions for cooperative research activities arose independently from different working groups. This is reflected in several places in this statement. This is a welcome indication of the essential unity

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# I. COOPERATION IN THE EARTH SCIENCES

The planet earth is the common abode of all humans. They have a common interest, both intellectual and practical, in increasing the knowledge of the structure and dynamics of the earth.

As the work of the I.G.Y. has demonstrated, the earth sciences present an especially appropriate and fruitful field in international collaboration. The work in these fields must be carried forward on an international scale, as no one country is likely to provide sufficient funds to conduct on its own the world-wide investigations which are required.

In recognition of the developing sociological and engineering problems posed by the present trends in earth sciences, we recommend the enlisting of the social and engineering sciences in this work.

The following concrete proposals are made.

## A. A Survey of the Entire Ocean in Three Dimensions

### 1. The Ocean Floor

We propose an international program to develop a detailed map of the floor of the world ocean, including sub-bottom reflecting layers. This program would require, in the first instance, international agreements on exchange of data and methods, including intercalibration of instruments.

### 2. Waters of the Ocean

An international program to survey and map the three dimensional distribution of temperatures, salinity, density, dissolved oxygen, and nutrient salts, under average conditions, of the ocean and synoptic surveys to develop the broad picture of seasonal and shorter-period changes in more limited areas, as well as the study of the interactions among the major bodies of water in the ocean.

### 3. Ocean Life

An international survey and mapping showing the major biological provinces of the ocean and determination of the fertility of the waters at all levels in the food chain and the standing crop of food materials available for human use.

Prosecution of the foregoing program would necessarily involve the establishment of world-wide navigation and communication systems and allocation of radio frequencies for earth-science measurements which would serve many other significant objectives. These matters, as well as the new ocean-wide surveys recommended above, fall within the province of the International Oceanographic Commission (IOC).

### B. Earth's Crust and Mantle

#### 1. Deep Drilling Program

The objective of drilling through the earth's crust to the mantle at selected points around the globe presents many unsolved technical problems which call for international collaboration. We agree, therefore, that the calling of an international conference on these problems is an urgent first step. The conference would provide for the exchange and pooling of drilling techniques developed by present national programs and would consider methods for the solution of such unsolved problems as the re-entry and management of high temperatures to be encountered in depth even at oceanic sites. The survey and selection of drilling sites would be a primary responsibility of this conference. The conference could also undertake the establishment of scientific objectives for the drilling program. We further agree that the execution of the program would benefit from the continuous exchange of technique and personnel,

and that the full exchange of information and of samples is imperative
for the success of the program. It is recommended that when the prime
contractor for the United States Mohole Project is selected, arrange-
ments should be made for such meetings and the exchange of accumulated
experiences.

C. Total Environmental Forecasting

The water-air interface appears to be the primary site of heat,
water-vapor and momentum exchange between the oceans and the atmosphere,
and so the key to short-term and long-term forecasting of weather,
climate, and changes in the ocean. Together, the oceans and atmosphere
constitute a huge and complex heat engine. To some degree the ocean-
half of this system acts as the fly wheel over both short and long time
periods. Studies of these phenomena must necessarily be conducted on a
long-term and world-wide basis.

An international conference should be called to consider and to
organize the establishment of a world-wide network of radio-telemetering
observational buoys. This system of buoys would render continuous
reports on atmospheric conditions and so contribute to the completion
of the world weather map. It would also continuously monitor the energy
and water vapor energy exchange between the ocean and the atmosphere,
and would observe the changes in the flow of ocean currents in three
dimensions. Over a sufficiently long time period, such a network of
buoys would help to assign reliable values to the rate of overturn of
the ocean as a whole, a key problem in both climatological forecasts
and in the safe disposal of radioactive wastes at sea. The hydrographic
offices of the major maritime nations, as well as the World Meteorological
Organization (W.M.O.) should be encouraged to stimulate such a program.

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D. <u>Resources</u>

1. <u>Fresh Water</u>

The rising world population and the increasing concentration of
that population in metropolitan centers is already pressing upon the
water resources easily available for direct human consumption, for
industrial purposes, and for agriculture. We agree that an international
conference should be called to consider the organization of an Inter-
national Hydrologic Decade for the study of the many unknowns that
surround this ominous development.

The proposed conference would institute a world-wide survey of
water resources and of the future course of water use. Such a program
would have the significant incidental benefit of attracting the interests
of scientists to a field in which basic studies have been neglected.
Subjects for immediate consideration are the qualities of water considered
from the point of view of various uses, the economical desalting
treatment of water, the recycling and the reuse of water. The conference
necessary to set such studies in motion should be called by UNESCO.

2. <ins>Living Resources of the Ocean</ins>

Acre per acre the oceans today sustain at least as large a plant
crop on the average as does the land, yet man now gets only about one
percent of his food requirements from the sea. The oceans, therefore,
offer a means for the rapid solution of the protein deficiency afflicting
two-thirds of the world population. It is apparent that these resources
can best be exploited to this end through international cooperation.
The ultimate aim should be to elevate the fishing industry from a
hunting industry to an agricultural technology. It has been estimated

that existing fishery techniques could easily produce 5 times the present annual crop of fish, which is at present about 30 million metric tons. This yield could be even more greatly increased by development of means for helping the winds to overturn the oceans more rapidly. This is not an insurmountable undertaking, but experiments to this end must be conducted under international auspices (Food and Agricultural Organization-FAO, and Scientific Commission for Oceanographic Research-SCOR).

### 3. Mineral Resources of the Ocean Floor

Recent studies of the ocean floor show a vast reserve of minerals, especially nickel, cobalt, copper, and manganese. By means of bottom-photography organized on a world-wide basis, the potentiality of this reserve may be more fully assessed. The necessary observational program could be organized by SCOR.

### 4. Natural Catastrophes

The forecasting, minimizing or eventual control of violent natural catastrophes is one objective of the earth sciences which will also require continuing international cooperation. Earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, hurricanes, and tornadoes constitute the principal hazards of this kind.

With respect to the first three a better international seismological network, including better instrumentation and distribution of stations, is required. More detailed studies of hurricanes and tornadoes would reveal whether or not man can exert some control over these phenomena.

To implement these programs, we further recommend:

a) That insofar as possible existing international organizations such as IOC, UNESCO, FAO, WMO, SCOR, SCAR, etc., be

*Special Committee on Antarctic Research.

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the means of furthering these programs.

b) Since what is suggested here represents a long-term enlargement of their present activities, increased funds may have to be requested to finance continuing international conferences and studies in these various fields. At the outset, at any rate, the funds necessary to finance the travel of specialists to conferences so as to plan productive international programs are relatively small, and within the means of the agencies suggested. If forward-looking programs are agreed to, as was the case during IGY, it is likely that each nation will find means of financing its share of the total long-range program.

c) There is at present no effective means of promoting atmospheric research on a world-wide basis. WMO remains a data handling organization. At present, to suggest an international atmospheric research center on a scale considerably larger than the international meteorological research institute at Stockholm would tend to rob national centers. Thus it is recommended that this matter, however, desirable, be deferred to one of our subsequent conferences. For the present a considerable acceleration of international atmospheric research seems impractical.

d) Of the many desirable studies suggested the highest priority should be given to three:

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i. The world-wide survey of the oceans, including their contents in three dimensions.

ii. The deep drilling program, including systematic samplings of the unconsolidated sediments.

iii. The establishment of a total environmental, that is to say, atmosphere and ocean, forecasting service.

## II. COOPERATION IN SPACE RESEARCH

Though believing that there should be close cooperation in space research, we realize that complete cooperation in this field, as in some others, will become possible only when the arms race is ended, international tensions are reduced, complete and general disarmament becomes a reality, and the need for secrecy disappears.

We believe, however, that certain advances in the presently established cooperation in space are possible now, and that certain others could be studied now with the hope of realization in the not too distant future.

A. First, we recommend an increase in the exchange of scientific information in areas such as the physics of space and the effects of the space environment on life. We further recommend periodic international symposia devoted to such subjects.

B. We also recommend the exchange of methods, and of information on instruments, for scientific space studies which have no military importance.

C. We recommend the orderly assignment and use of radio frequencies in space. We support the initiative in this direction

-11-

taken by the International Telecommunications Union, and hope that a
final solution can be reached within two years.

D. We recommend the expansion of existing systems of satellite tracking stations. Bilateral agreements between different nations, including (within the limits of military security) an agreement between the United States and the USSR, on the common use of tracking stations; such a bilateral agreement could serve as the first step in this direction.

E. International agreement should be reached on a coordinated program for the use of rocket and satellite during the Quiet Sun Year (planned for the second half of 1962).

F. Similar agreement should be reached on cooperation in the use of rockets and satellites in the projected world magnetic survey. This agreement should include arrangements for simultaneous observation from satellites launched into different orbits by different nations. This cooperation could be organized in the framework of the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR).

G. We endorse in principle the desirability of international world-wide systems of communications satellites and of meteorological satellites, since these would clearly be in the interests of all mankind. We realize that certain difficulties now stand in the way, but we hope that the governments of the United States and the USSR, as well as of other nations embarking on rocket and satellite programs, will undertake a common study of the ways to overcome them.

H. We recommend that cooperation should be established in the instrumental study of the moon, and also that the basic principles

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of the International Antarctic Treaty be applied to the moon and other cosmic bodies.

I. We recommend the calling of an international conference or symposium to consider how to avoid the biological and radioactive contamination of extraterrestrial bodies.

### III. COOPERATION IN THE LIFE SCIENCES

Among the many fields of biology in which international cooperation is possible, some are particularly well suited by their nature and importance for combined efforts. These, which relate especially to the promotion of human welfare, have been given primary concern by us. It is very evident that world-wide betterment of human welfare could be produced if the already existing biological knowledge were to be properly disseminated and fully utilized. Among the most important considerations are the means of bringing this about, so that local facilities and resources can be optimally exploited. The following recommendations incorporate proposals designed to achieve this end, as well as to promote research for the discovery of new knowledge in the field of biology.

#### A. Biological Aspects of Food Resources

One of the most important problems facing humanity is that of assuring an adequate supply of food. While some areas have an abundant food supply, in others there is a low yield of food production and a correspondingly low level of nutrition. Adequate biological information now exists to enhance food production in these areas considerably, provided the knowledge is adequately diffused and applied. This can be

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done most effectively by the development of regional agricultural experiment stations, which can deal with the problem of developing agricultural methods suitable to the local terrain, as well as the long-term problem of breeding plants and animals which are able to thrive in the specific locality. These local agricultural experiment stations should be coordinated with an international center. In this way it will be possible to teach agricultural practices which avoid errors experienced in the development of other areas, such as erosion of the soil, deforestation, overgrazing, etc. The implementation of this recommendation might be carried out through the establishment under the United Nations of an international center and a large-scale international training program, supplemented by interinstitutional exchanges of personnel between countries. Although some work has been carried out under the United Nations in this area, their program should be strengthened and extended considerably, especially in the newly developing countries.

Even though the majority of all life on this planet is synthesized in the oceans, man has utilized this source of food only to a limited degree. It is quite likely that the oceans can supply ten times more food for man than the total being produced at the present time. This can be done by developing methods for the cultivation of food in the oceans, rather than the use of the inefficient and self-limiting hunting procedures employed today. To do this we must greatly expand our knowledge of marine biology. Fortunately, the international oceanographic research expeditions, such as now planned for the exploration of the Indian Ocean, can afford a significant opportunity for increasing

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our knowledge of marine life. Another important means for expanding
knowledge in this area is through the work of marine biological laboratories,
situated in many countries. Many of these laboratories are now critically
short of funds and need a wider basis of support. We recommend that
these laboratories be united into an international system, perhaps under
the International Union of Biological Sciences, to ensure permanent
support and increase in number.

B. Preservation and Promotion of Health

The health sciences offer one of the most rewarding meeting grounds
for international cooperation in science. Increased international
cooperation and financial support is essential for the realization of
important advances in such fields as cancer, cardiovascular disease,
immunology, infectious diseases, mental health, environmental sanitation,
problems of aging, nutrition, human genetics, and others.

International institutes of health devoted to these problems should
be established in one carefully chosen place to serve as a world center
of medical research. Sufficient financial support of a long-term nature
should be provided to permit their efficient operation. Smaller sub-
sidiary institutes oriented towards more specialized problems or regional
needs (space medicine, medical entomology, tropical medicine) should be
established in different countries.

Other urgent needs in the health sciences characteristically
requiring greater international cooperation and support include: (1) more
effective and rapid dissemination of information on research and advances
in medical knowledge; (2) increased education and training of physicians
and allied scientific and auxiliary personnel at both undergraduate and

-15-

postgraduate levels; (3) an extension of epidemiological studies and control of important communicable diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis, and influenza, as well as of chronic degenerative diseases; (4) genetic and immunologic studies of human population groups; and (5) problems of reproduction.

The central coordination and administration of these institutes and programs should be entrusted to the World Health Organization of the United Nations, which is the major operating international agency in the medical field. It is realized, however, that these additional tasks in the health sciences cannot be undertaken adequately unless the funds now being spent for these purposes are at least trebled.

### C. The Environment and Its Modification by Man

The exponential growth of human populations and the accompanying industrial, agricultural, and scientific activities have given rise to a number of serious problems including pollution of air and water resources which are of considerable biological importance. We now recognize that continual chemical pollution of the air (known as smog) is a characteristic feature associated with most metropolitan areas, and as such constitutes a problem of world-wide importance. The great increase of industrial growth has brought about extensive water pollution, which is lethal to aquatic organisms and renders the water unfit for human use. Especially grave are the problems involving contamination of air, soil, and water with radioactive substances. Included here, as well as the more obvious problem of fall-out from nuclear explosions, there is the matter of the safe disposal of radioactive wastes.

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Even though several agencies of the United Nations have carried out
extensive studies in the field of radioactive contamination, more
international attention should be directed toward the problems of
chemical pollution of air and water. We recommend that international
conferences be scheduled on these topics.

Another of the more serious consequences of man's rapid growth
is the extent to which it may bring about the extinction of many
plant and animal species. There are large forest and game reserves
in the newly formed African countries which are seriously threatened
today because of a shortage of funds and trained personnel who can
maintain these preserves. This problem has been considered by a
committee on ecology in the International Council of Scientific
Unions. We believe that action on this problem should be taken by
the United Nations in order to bring about prompt and effective
results. If this is not done rapidly we will unfortunately suffer
irreplaceable losses. Another aspect of this problem should be
the establishment of a system of world-wide institutes for preserving
indigenous strains of plants, animals, and microorganisms. These
may have enormous practical as well as theoretical benefits in
future years.

D. "Endless Frontiers"

It has been said that the developments in biology during the
next century will be as explosive as the growth of the physical
sciences in the preceding century. This will undoubtedly offer
new opportunities for international cooperation. At least two

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directions of this advance are already evident.

There has been a phenomenal development recently in our understanding of the structure and function of biological macromolecules and the central role of the nucleic acids and the mechanism which relates the nucleic acids to the protein molecules. This work has led to a significant insight into the molecular events which underlie cell division, as well as viral infection. These developments have a significant bearing on the problem of cancer as well as the broader fields of molecular evolution and the origin of life. Intense interest in this field has developed among scientists in all countries, and it may be possible to capitalize on this enthusiasm by developing an intercontinental institute of molecular biology. This institute could serve as a research and training center for expediting the development of the subject and as an important continuing channel of communication in the biological field between "East" and "West" countries.

This proposal originated in both the biological and physical science working groups.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union have announced that they are planning to carry out manned exploration of space. It is not unreasonable to suggest that some of the biological developmental work be carried out in common. To implement this exploration it will be necessary for these proposed trips to develop a wide variety of equipment needed to maintain the human occupant for a prolonged period in a confined space. A considerable saving of

-18-

time and money would ensue from joint research projects in this
area. In addition, some of the instruments which man uses in
space for his scientific investigations could be included in this
cooperative program. Joint precautions must be exerted to prevent
the contamination of extraterrestrial bodies by terrestrial
organisms. Joint investigations of possible extraterrestrial
forms of life and macromolecules should be planned. We propose
that these suggestions be forwarded to COSPAR for its consideration.
It should be noted that the adoption of even a limited type of
cooperation in space research would be of great symbolic value and
have substantial popular appeal.

At the present time an International Biological Program is
under discussion by ICSU. Many of the projects described above
may be included in this Program, which if carried out broadly
and effectively, would have considerable scientific value as well
as a favorable impact on public opinion.

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#### IV. COOPERATION IN THE PHYSICAL SCIENCES

Modern physical science has in many of its aspects become very big and expensive. It therefore lends itself particularly well to intercontinental cooperation in which the costs are shared, and the results are made available to all mankind.

Four specific areas of physical science were identified as being ripe for vigorous action on an intercontinental basis. These areas were the following:

##### A. High Energy Physics

The field of high energy physics is an excellent one for cooperation between all countries of the world. This cooperation could center around the establishment of a laboratory whose main research tool would be an accelerator of not less than $300 \times 10^9$ electron volts and of a design which would achieve success in the shortest possible time.

##### B. Controlled Thermonuclear and Plasma Research

In the field of controlled thermonuclear research there has been much effective exchange of information and scientists. This development is particularly significant since thermonuclear research, prior to 1955, was secret. We urge that such collaboration be broadened, in particular, that the world's thermonuclear laboratories remain open to scientists of all nations who can contribute to this interesting and potentially important field of research.

Although a new very large thermonuclear device is probably not needed immediately, still there is a large field of general research in plasma physics which could well be advanced by the establishment of an intercontinental laboratory.

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### C. Ultra-Heavy Element Chemistry

The production and study of the very heavy elements (atomic number 95 and above) and the: resulting extension and elucidation of Mendeleev's periodic chart is a scientific investigation of great interest to mankind. Handling large quantities of the heavy elements is difficult and very expensive, and gives strong reason to pool the world's efforts in this field.

Two different devices are needed for such studies: high-flux reactors, and heavy-ion, high-current cyclotrons.

We recommend that an intercontinental center devoted to investigation of the properties of the ultra-heavy elements be established. The center probably should be equipped with the most powerful available heavy-ion cyclotron and with equipment for handling the materials. The ultra high-flux reactor ($10^{16}$ neutrons/cm$^2$/sec), because of its hazard, probably should be located at a different, more isolated site.

### D. Large-Scale Computers

The development of the large modern electronic computers with its enormous memory and high speeds represents one of the most significant scientific events of the last two decades. The future development of these computing machines, with larger memories and higher speeds by orders of magnitude, would be of immense value to science. Such computing machines will cost sums of the order of magnitude of a large accelerator--perhaps as much as $100 x 10^6$.

The development of such computers would be a suitable project for international cooperation. The utilization of such a machine will advance not only mathematics but all the physical sciences,

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and the biological sciences, particularly the unravelling of the
structure of macromolecules. It would also find great utility in
economics and other social sciences.

We recommend further study for such an intercontinental center.

E. <u>A Globular Cluster of Big Science Centers</u>

It is our belief that the separate big science laboratories
in high-energy physics, heavy-element chemistry, macromolecular
biology, health research, and possibly thermonuclear research,
will prosper better if they are reasonably close together than
if they are completely isolated from each other. We particularly
believe that the intercontinental computing center will be more
viable and will be a better center if it were the nucleus of such
a cluster.

We therefore urge that the Intercontinental Scientific
Laboratories be located in relative geographic proximity and that
they be served by the Intercontinental Computing Center. Such
an Intercontinental Science Center, comprising much of what is called
"Big Science", would represent a capital investment of the order of
$5 x 10⁹. It is our belief that the astute location of such a
striking epitome of Science--the most characteristic theme of our
modern civilization--could have extraordinarily great significance in
improving the tone of the present political situation.

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V. COOPERATION IN ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING NATIONS

We express the strong belief that assistance to developing countries is a duty and necessity for all countries.

This aid should be rendered so that it would not impair the independence of any country.

We express our support for greater international cooperation in assistance to developing nations. Such cooperation could help to reduce world tensions, to strengthen peace, and to further disarmament. Disarmament would in turn improve the climate for international cooperation in this and other fields and make available additional funds which could and, we hope, would be used to increase the assistance to developing nations. Clearly, the greatest cooperation and the release of maximum funds for the assistance program could be achieved by complete disarmament.

Assistance, we believe, should be provided both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis, including a substantial expansion of assistance through the United Nations.

The problems of assistance to developing nations are different in different parts of the world, and should be studied as such. Scientists could assist in this study through a cooperative program which should involve not only scientists of different countries but also specialists in different fields--biologists and physicists as well as anthropologists, economists and engineers.

Several programs have to be undertaken simultaneously if technical assistance is to be successful. This includes both measures

- 23 -

of immediate help as well as programs which require long-range approach. Coordinated study of such programs by scientists from different countries, including both scientists from the developed countries and those from the recipient countries, is required.

Useful in this connection may be further spread of sister relations such as already exist between some universities in the developed and in the developing nations. Similar relations could be established between research institutes, agricultural stations, and other centers of applied research. Particular attention should be given to problems of adaptation of advanced technology to the needs and resources of an underdeveloped area. Establishment of regional applied science research institutes appears desirable.

We believe that scientists have a definite role to play in the development of assistance programs and therefore suggest that we place special emphasis on this subject in one of our subsequent conferences. We believe that this conference should include a large participation of representatives from the developing nations.

We welcome the recommendation from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that a conference on science and technology in application to the problems of new nations should be held next summer in Geneva under United Nations sponsorship.

Among subjects related to the assistance to developing nations in which scientists have a particular interest, are problems of education in all its aspects--science education and general education, elementary education and higher education. Another subject of interest to scientists is that of natural resources of different

- 24 -

areas and of their population trends. Unprejudiced quantitative
study of the latter topic should be carried out on an international,
cooperative basis. Another topic for similar cooperative research
is world nutrition, including the study of reasons for widespread
occurrence of avoidable malnutrition in many parts of the world.
The problems of energy supply, particularly in areas in which the
demand for energy is diffused rather than concentrated in large
industrial centers, calls for a similar study. We suggest that
preliminary study groups on these problems be organized prior to
the above-mentioned conference.

We suggest that an international study be made of the
advisability and practicability of establishing an international
fund to which individual scientists from countries in which local
funds are insufficient for this purpose could apply for assistance
in their scientific research.

VI. EXCHANGE OF SCIENTISTS AND SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION

By its very nature and tradition science is a univeral enterprise.
Not only does the accumulating knowledge and understanding belong to
all mankind, but the work of science moves forward most surely when
it engages the collaborative effort of scientists of all nations.
The intimate character of this collaboration on questions of profound
import to the life of mankind serves to enhance the mutual trust
and understanding of the scientific community and of the nations
from which its members are drawn.

The rapid exchange of information, mutual visits of scientists and

The rapid exchange of information, mutual appeals of scientists and
show which its members are great.

and understanding of the scientific community and of the nations
into the life of working scientists to enhance the mutual trust
The intimate character of this collaboration on questions of problem
it engages the collaborative effort of scientists of all nations.
Each working, but the work of science move forward most surely when
Not only does the accumulating knowledge and understanding belong to
By its very nature and tradition science is a universal enterprise.

## AI. EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC AND SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION

in their scientific research.

There are insufficient for this purpose config適 for assistance
ing to which individual scientists from countries in which local
mutability and adaptability of adapting an international
We suggest that an international study be made of the
this proposed conference.

Preliminary study groups on these problems be organized prior to
industrial centers, calls for a similar study. We suggest that
demand for energy be gathered rather than concentrated in large
The problem of energy supply, particularly in areas in which the
occurrence of adequate administration in many parts of the world,
is world nutrition, including the study of reasons for widespread
cooperative plans. Another topic for similar cooperative research
area, of the latter topic should be carried out on an international,
areas and of their population trends. Unpublished quantitative

- 84 -

- 25 -

their working as guests in the laboratories of other scientists constitute the main pathways of scientific collaboration among scientists all over the world. We note that there has been substantial progress in recent years in the area of scientific exchange. Scholars of many nations have the opportunity to meet and discuss scientific questions at international conferences, symposia, and other meetings organized by international scientific organizations as well as by the national organizations of scientists and institutions of higher learning. In this epoch of accelerating progress in science the fostering of such international contacts and exchanges has become an increasingly urgent necessity. During the past decade, the accomplishments of the International Geophysical Year have provided triumphant demonstration of the fruitfulness of international cooperation in science. Moreover, the development of cooperative research among scientists of many countries and the consequent internationalization of Antarctica has given a concrete demonstration of how such cooperation can set precedents for constructive agreements among nations.

We express regret that there exist a number of difficulties which interfere in major ways with the further broadening of scientific collaboration and exchange.

## A. Exchange of Scientists

We recommend that the planned exchange of scientific personnel initiated by the Bronk-Nesmeyanov and similar agreements should be considerably increased. The visits should be extended over periods sufficient for the completion of research projects. In addition to planned exchange, the framework of these agreements should allow

-26-

for and encourage invitations to scientists in the country in
which they are to visit; and for the invited scientists to be
able to accept such invitations. We find that application of the
quid pro quo principle to visits under the agreement (that is, the
exchange of one solid state physicist for another solid state
physicist, etc.) has tended to hamper fruitful exchange, and we
urge that such regulations be set aside in future agreements.

The role of government bureaucracies in the administration of
these agreements should be minimized. To implement this recommendation,
we urge governments to expedite visas and passports for scientists,
since past and present failures in this respect have seriously
hampered scientific exchange.

We recommend that in addition to exchange via formal arrangements
the other traditional forms of scientific exchange--personal visits
and correspondence among scientists, attendance at international
scientific meetings and at meetings of scientific societies of other
nations, the framing of common plans for joint and parallel research
enterprises and so on--be encouraged and facilitated.

We recommend that the scientific organizations of various nations
should consider ways to facilitate the travel of pre- and postdoctoral
fellows across national boundaries to study for adequate periods of
time (one year or more) at research centers and under teachers where
their training and scientific maturation can be best enhanced.

## B. Exchange of Information

Noting the obstacle to the exchange of scientific information
presented by the mounting volume of current publication, which is
increasing exponentially and doubling about every decade, we feel that

- 27 -

the situation calls for radical measures of rationalization to be
designed and carried out through international agreement and
cooperation. Among potentially useful measures are the following:
to review and coordinate the character and content of journals
published in all countries with a view to reducing the number and
variety of journals which a scientist must follow to keep abreast
of work in his discipline; to institute standard formats for the
presentation of scientific papers; to formulate a standard system
for the annotation of the contents of published papers suitable
for coding and manipulation by machines for the storage and retrieval
of information; to institute regional depots under international
coordination to store complete experimental records and other
documentation in support of the brief published papers; to make
such material rapidly available to interested scientists; to
consolidate the abstracting services now carried on independently in
many countries, a measure that could reduce present duplication of
effort by a conservatively estimated factor of three.

We recommend that measures be taken to bring significant work
going forward in all countries to the attention of interested scientists.
This objective could be served by the publication of international
review journals of two types: interdisciplinary review journals written
in relatively nontechnical language for the benefit of scientists in
different disciplines and more specialized review journals which would
keep scientists working in a given area abreast of the work going on in
the same or related areas all over the world.

We urge that all governments open their postal systems to the
untrammeled flow of scientific publications whatever their country of
origin or destination.

Eighth *Conference on Science and World Affairs*
Sept.11-16, 1961
Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

REPORT FROM WORKING GROUP 1 ON NUCLEAR PRODUCTION AND STOCKPILES

Working Group 1 had a successful meeting in a very cooperative spirit. Nearly complete agreement was reached.

The group agreed to discuss the reduction or elimination of nuclear pro-
duction and stockpiles within the framework of a general and complete disarmament
agreement. It should form part of such an agreement and should fit into definite
stages of the approach to complete disarmament. In particular the reduction of
existing stockpiles must go hand-in-hand with the reduction of the means of
delivery of weapons.

The problem of the construction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons is very specific in the respect that fissionable materials used in these weapons are also to a large extent used for peaceful purposes and moreover are produced in the process of normal operation of atomic power plants. Therefore, much attention was paid to the problem how to achieve reliable disarmament in this particular field and at the same time to retain peaceful atomic industry. The problems relating to cut-off of production and to the elimination of stockpiles were considered separately.

A. Cut-off of Production

The elimination of further production of fissile material for weapons is a
far easier problem, and should take effect earlier than the reduction of stock-
piles. There was agreement that it would be best to discontinue completely the
production of highly enriched U-235. This would not seriously affect the ability
of the United States or the Soviet Union to make nuclear weapons, because of the
large existing stockpiles of this material. (The U.S. stockpile has been estimated
unofficially as 300-350 metric tons.) In fact, the nuclear powers would take
fissile material out of obsolete weapons and fabricate it into more modern ones.
However, a production cut-off would clearly by itself slow down the same race
and be followed by the elimination of stockpiles in the framework of general and
complete disarmament.

The demand for fissile material for nuclear power and other peaceful purposes in the next decade or two will be only a small fraction of existing stockpiles. Moreover, there was consensus that material of low enrichment is quite adequate for most nuclear reactors, 3-5 percent being sufficient in very many cases and 20 percent in nearly all. Twenty percent material is of little direct military value. It was realized that enrichment from 20 percent to over 90 percent, i.e., to military grade, is possible with much smaller isotope separation plants than enrichment from natural uranium (0.7 percent) to 90 percent. However, the group agreed that 20 percent material is considerably safer against diversion to military uses than 90 percent. It might therefore be considered to produce only 20 percent enriched material. However, the group recommends that the cut-off of production of U-235 should be effective immediately, should be complete, and should stay in effect for the next decade or so.

1 Kalkstein, M. and Smith, W., "An Estimate of the Nuclear Stockpile from Un-classified Sources," ARMS REDUCTION PROGRAM & ISSUES, edited by David H. Frisch, Twentieth Century Fund, 1961, pp. 91-97.

Working Group 1: Report

p.2

Plutonium presents a more difficult problem since it is produced in the normal operation of most reactors. A cut-off of plutonium production would mean an end of the nuclear power industry, and the group therefore recommends against such a measure. Instead, the group recommends strict control over plutonium production. The critical link in this production is the chemical extraction of plutonium from irradiated reactor fuel elements, and the group agreed that in view of the special danger of diversion of this material to military purposes, this extraction of plutonium should be done under international management. The (rather few and large) existing plants for plutonium extraction should be used and operated with about 90 per cent of the personnel consisting of the present national operators but 10 per cent of the staff, especially the managerial and analytical staff, being international. Nuclear power stations would continue to be nationally managed and operated but at least in the larger stations, a few per cent of the personnel would be international inspectors guarding against diversions of material both before and after irradiation. Transportation of irradiated fuel elements would best be done by the international management.

The question of denaturing of plutonium by admixture of Pu-240 was discussed. It was pointed out that this is not an effective measure against military use by a sophisticated nuclear power but might be of some effect in the case of new nuclear powers. Such admixture is therefore recommended for plutonium delivered under control for civilian use.

As already pointed out, a production cut-off without reduction and ultimate elimination of stockpiles will not decrease the nuclear weapons potential of the present nuclear powers. It would make it impossible for a new nation to build up its weapons stockpile, and if strictly adhered to, would make it impossible for additional powers to build nuclear weapons by their own efforts. A very important benefit would be that experience would be gained with a control system which would be largely applicable in the later stage of stockpile reduction.

Cheating on the agreement would be of very little benefit to the nuclear powers. Diversion of material from power reactors would be very difficult especially with the international inspection described below. It is unlikely that diffusion plants or major reactors could be concealed. Light aerial inspection will be necessary at some stage to discover possible clandestine plants but their large size and power requirements (or production) should make this rather easy. Centrifuge plants for separating uranium are reported to be smaller and therefore might be harder to detect. However, their production would be correspondingly small, and would be of no appreciable value to the nuclear powers in comparison with their present stockpiles. This might change when the stockpiles are appreciably reduced but at this time also the controls will be tightened.

A possibly more effective way to "cheat" for the nuclear powers might be to transfer some of their stockpiles to some ally before stockpile reduction takes effect but there are obvious elements of danger in such a procedure.

Working Group 1: Report

p.3

Small production units--centrifuge separators, or productive reactors plus chemical extraction of plutonium--might be of greater usefulness to some of the powers which at present do not have nuclear materials or weapons. Such action might cause considerable local disturbance but would not constitute a danger to world peace during the transitional period when the present nuclear powers retain an appreciable fraction of their present stockpile and are agreed to act against a smaller power breaking the cut-off convention. In the ultimate stage of complete disarmament it is assumed that inspection will be efficient enough to ensure against even small clandestine production units.

The group believes that it would not be practicable to control the production of fusionable materials. Heavy water is produced in large amounts for reactors and other civilian uses, amounts much larger than those in fusion weapons. Lithium-6 is not of much use outside of weapons although Lithium-7 might be (as a coolant for high-temperature reactors). Lithium separation required special uranium separation, and hence much harder to control. The only exception among fusionable materials is tritium for whose production reactors are required; its production can be cut off as easily as that of plutonium, and this would have the consequence of an automatic reduction of the stockpile because of the small half-life (12 years) of tritium.

The group agreed that the cut-off of production for military purposes, when agreed on, should be considered to be permanent, with a view towards ultimate complete disarmament, rather than limited to five or ten years.

## Stockpile Reduction

1. Much attention was paid to the question how accurately can past production of U-235 and Pu-239 be estimated in order to determine the possible size of existing stockpiles of these fissionable materials. In the opinion of the group a conservative and even perhaps a pessimistic estimate of the precision of such a determination of the size of past production would be of the order of 20 per cent, under the assumption that there would be (1) free inspection of relevant plans, (2) free access to the records of production and delivery, and (3) interrogation of the personnel of the plants. Such a degree of precision can be achieved even if there were attempts to forge the records.

It was suggested, that in order to minimize the possibility of such a forgery all records of production and delivery of fissionable materials for the past should at the earliest possible data be deposited in each of the countries concerned in a depository guarded by an international guard, with the understanding (1) the records remain secret up to the time when the reduction of stockpiles would be affected and (2) that up to this time no records deposited could be withdrawn.

2. In the opinion of the group the stockpiles could, in a first stage, be reduced to about 20 per cent of their present size, either in a single step or in two. In the latter case, the first step might reduce their size to about 50 per cent, and they might be held at this level for about a year or two, while the control system is being put into effect and its efficacy is being tested. The particular figure of 20 per cent for the remaining stockpiles was to be equal

Working Group 1: Report

p.4

to the above estimate of the maximum amount which might possible be concealed
by some country from the international inspection system. Even if such con-
cealment were to be attempted, this would at most give a two-fold advantage
in stockpile to the violator, and the group felt that such an advantage would
not be sufficient for a country to initiate a nuclear war. In the opinion of
the group a reduction of stockpiles by a percentage less than about 50 per cent
will be of very great importance, and a reduction of about 80 per cent would
constitute a tremendous change especially if coupled with the reduction of
delivery systems.

The group discussed whether in this stage of the disarmament the stockpiles
of each country should be reduced to the same percentage of their present size
(which gives an advantage to the country possessing the larger initial stock-
pile) or whether the stockpiles of the United States and the Soviet Union should
be reduced to the same absolute size. It was agreed that when the level of
about 20 percent is reached the absolute amount of fissile material should be
equal on both sides, on the basis of the argument that a corresponding
absolute equality is also attempted in existing plans on the reduction of con-
ventional forces. In a first step of reduction to 50 percent(if such a step is
taken) both possibilities (reduction to the same percentage or to the same
absolute amount) should be further considered.

At later stages of disarmament when controls have been found to work
satisfactorily, further substantial reduction in military stockpiles should be
made, and ultimately complete elimination should be achieved.

3. It was the opinion of the group that there is no valid justification
for the destruction of the eliminated fissionable materials and that these
materials should be transferred to peaceful uses (e.g., breeding reactors, fast
atomic reactors, etc.) under a strict international control. Besides the
existing stockpiles of U-235 should be mingled with U-238 so as to be converted
into uranium containing up to 25 percent of U-235. Uranium with such a content
of U-235 will be appropriate for utilization in reactors, but could be used for
military purposes only after being subjected to a complicated process of
enrichment.

Only a small part of the existing amount of U-235 (of the order of one or
several percent) should be conserved intact for some special peaceful purposes.
Any stockpile of such a kind in any country derived from the breakdown of
weapon stockpiles should be available to other countries for peaceful uses and
should be under strict international control.

4. As to the fusionable materials (lithium, deuterium) it would be of use
to ascertain the past production only of the Li-6 and not for deuterium by the
methods outlined above for fissionable materials (inspection of plants, records,
etc.) But for the reasons discussed above the estimates of production of Li-6
are likely to be less reliable than those for fissile materials. However,
although different projects for the realization of fission-free atomic
weapons are under consideration and research in this direction is being conducted,
it was felt that at present fissionable materials, the production of which can
be ascertained more accurately, are indispensable for nuclear weapons.

Working Group 5

Eighth Conference on Science
and World Affairs
Stowe, Vermont
September 11-16, 1961

REPORT OF WORKING GROUP 5

It will be clear that there is considerable overlap with Group 4.
Probably it would have been better for us to have eliminated Group 5
and distributed the members among more useful groups.

The brief for discussion by this group was:

"Preconditions to Possible Success of Negotiations
and Initiation of Disarmament-Measures"

with the subheadings:

International Behavior;

Conditions for Creating Trust and Confidence;

The Role of the Scientist.

It is unfortunate that so constructive a brief turned out to be
incredibly difficult. At the last plenary session our rapporteur
presented an admirable account of our proceedings, but had to indicate
that we had reached no agreed conclusions. On this occasion he is not
prepared once again to take over the duties of the chairman, so that
I must do the best I can to emulate his performance, with the exception
that I am able to include, in what I say, three decisions, or
resolutions, reached after 2.5 days of work!

Our discussions were by no means confined to our brief, and
because some members of the group who submitted proposals had to
spend much time away from the meeting, it was necessary not only to
abandon the order of subjects in the agenda, but to consider some
questions in a series of disjointed moments.

For the sake of this report, I shall follow the order of matters
in our agenda and will gather together our spread-out discussions.

1. <u>International Behavior</u>

The Conference will recollect that a large part of the first day
of our work was devoted to this subject. This is equally true of
our second day of discussions, though the fruit of our efforts appears
insignificant.

There was one very important difference between East and West over
this question of international behavior. In the one case it was

WG 5

2

emphasized that conflict was part of nature and inevitable so long
as the West remained organized politically as it was: conflict was the
natural result of historical forces and influences and did not arise,
in general, from particular acts or decisions alone. On the other hand
most members of the Western nations believed that it was the acts of
governments which created conflicts and that it should be possible to
ensure that governments acted rationally and avoided conflicts which
are unnecessary. This difference proved insoluble. Proposals made by
Western members, aimed at such measures as agreement that political
conflicts be put in cold storage for a cooling off period, during which no
hasty actions were taken by either side, were rejected by our Eastern
colleagues. A suggestion that some rearrangement within the United
Nations be made which would enable it to act as an arbitrator mediator,
or conciliator in disputes, was opposed on the ground that negotiation
and settlement of all disputes was a major duty of the United Nations,
as it exists, and that it would be an impertinence and an interference
with the internal affairs of the U.N. were we to recommend any alterations
whatever in its structure. There was even greater opposition by the
East to any idea that a process of arbitration or mediation was feasible
outside the U.N.

On the other hand, our Eastern colleagues repeatedly urged that
all differences between nations be resolved by negotiation, and not by
resort to war.

The major premise of the West was that the new weapons make
obsolete the old responses i.e., expression of national purpose
through threat and build-up of arms, is both ineffective and
dangerous. Hence, we need completely new attitudes, procedures
and mechanisms.

## 2. Conditions for Creating Trust and Confidence

There was much discussion of the part played by existing
restrictions upon exchanges of persons and of information between
the East and the West, and other difficulties arising from the general
problems of secrecy. I use the term "exchange" because our
socialist colleagues were unable to accept such expressions as "free
flow of persons and information." However, these discussions (as
all our discussions) were illuminating and helpful to both sides.
The following statement was agreed unanimously:

### Statement - No. 1.

International confidence, necessary for progress in the field
of disarmament which in turn will facilitate the development of
international confidence, would be strengthened by the reduction
of unnecessary secrecy. We recommend to governments that they
encourage the expansion of scientific, cultural, touristic, and
other contacts, as well as of the exchange of information, and that
they take steps to remove obstacles in the way of such an expansion.

WG-5

3

It was felt by the Western members of the group that disarma-
ment negotiations were carried out at present without the essential
careful preparation and clarification of all aspects of the problem
before negotiations began. As a result of discussion, the following
statement has been agreed unanimously:

Statement - No. 2

The problems of disarmament are sufficiently complex as to demand
in most cases careful examination of them on a national basis and
informal discussions on an international basis, as an adequate
preparation for the negotiation of agreements. Failure to take these
steps may result in the premature taking of firm positions, and in
frustrations. We urge that nations provide for extensive and continuing
study of the problem of disarmament. The joint study group proposed
elsewhere in this conference under the aegis of the Academy of Sciences
of the USSR and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences should also
be very useful. We urge further that preparations for negotiations
should also include the use of informal discussions, these discussions
and any conclusions reached in them being protected from use for any
purposes harmful to the attainment of agreement.

The group discussed in detail the major obstacle to successful
negotiation of complete and general disarmament arising from the
absence from the negotiations of at least one very important
sovereign nation. It is unnecessary to elaborate this extremely
important difficulty. After prolonged discussion the following
statement was agreed unanimously:

Statement - No. 3

The Conference considers that the United Nations must play an
important role in the solution of the problem of general and complete
disarmament with effective control, including all those steps leading
toward the achievement of this goal which require the participation
of all nations.

Therefore the Conference urges the United Nations to make the
necessary efforts to insure representation in the U.N. of all the
peoples of the world, and to insure that the U.N. serve as a forum
for discussion between nations, as well as an organization for the
peaceful settlement of international problems.

On the question of trust between nations, it was the opinion
of the Western members of the group that certain steps could be taken
to build that degree of trust which would enable firm steps in
disarmament to be taken. Alternatively, one of our members put the
proposition that it was essential that a degree of trust be taken for
granted, even though it were unjustified.

WG-5

4

On the other hand, the attitude of the East was that trust can be
developed only through disarmament, so that the two--disarmament and
trust--must go hand in hand.

We were unable to discuss some of the most important subjects
falling within our brief, e.g., it has been suggested that there
were many unilateral acts by nations which would reduce tension--
e.g., delivery of weapons of all kinds to the smaller nations; deliber-
ately refraining from provocative statements; use of preliminary
steps of disarmament for propaganda purposes.

Finally, we failed completely to discuss what could have become
our major contribution to this Conference. This was consideration of
those long-term problems which will lead to differences between
nations when disarmament is finally achieved, and particularly those
problems which can be foreseen by men of science who can also suggest
solutions. Much progress has been made in this Conference in reaching
agreement on the immediate problems of disarmament, but this is not
sufficient to ensure that the legitimate long-term goals of mankind
are achieved.

Such problems as the estimation of the total resources of the
earth, in relation to the needs of nations, require very careful and
thorough consideration. Means by which trade is facilitated or
world-wide meteorological and communications systems set up and
managed, require investigation, and so on.

We suggest, therefore, that those more technical long-term
problems of especial human importance, rather than of more purely
scientific interest, be coupled with consideration of the sources of
tensions in a disarmed world, and be made the subject of a future
COSWA Conference.

FINAL REPORT
WORKING GROUP 3
September 15, 1961

EIGHTH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE
and WORLD AFFAIRS
September 11 - 16, 1961
Stowe, Vermont, USA

## SELECTED NEXT STEPS IN ARMS REDUCTION

The Morning discussion on September 14 was devoted to the study of the first step of a disarmament plan as part of a comprehensive plan for general and complete disarmament. The group had before them the detailed proposals of the USA and the USSR to the Committee of Ten in June 1960 and noted their marked differences in approach. A long discussion took place on possible ways in which a substantial degree of disarmament and increased security could be achieved while maintaining a strategic balance between the two blocs. The essential problem has long been recognized as that of finding a suitable phasing of the various steps in disarmament, inspection, and control. Following the argument at the Moscow Conference it was held that the degree and completeness of the inspection system should increase as the disarmament proceeds.

Clearly there are many possible solutions, and several were discussed. However, out of the discussion emerged one which seemed worthy of further detailed consideration. So a small committee of the group prepared a draft statement for submission to the afternoon meeting which was held in conjunction with Group 4. At the plenary session on September 15, various alterations were suggested and the following final draft incorporating many of their suggestions has been agreed by the group.

## GENERAL PRINCIPLES

page 2 Working Group 3

6. We urge that further detailed studies of a first stage, the outline of which is given below, are urgently needed and we strongly endorse the recommendation of Working Group 4 for an international study group.

## SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

In accordance with these principles the agreement on general and complete disarmament should include in the first step:

1. Limitations on conventional forces according to a formula similar to those suggested by both sides, in previous proposals. No transfer of nuclear weapons or technical information from the present nuclear powers to any other power.

3. Rapid reduction of stockpiles of delivery systems and weapons materials by a substantial percentage of the declared inventory and the diversion to peaceful uses of a substantial percentage of fissile materials to be verified by the international control commission.

4. The prohibition of nuclear weapons tests and of further production of weapons material and delivery systems with the institution of the required staged controls as outlined in the reports of other working groups, such as inspection at declared production plants.

5. Upon the completion of the above measures, the institution of a system of inspection using suitable forms of sampling designed to verify the temporarily remaining declared armaments, including delivery systems and stockpiles, and to monitor the test ban. From this point on, the completeness of inspection would bear a direct relation to the degree of reduction achieved. Simultaneous with the institution of this inspection, a continued reduction of delivery systems and stockpiles to agreed levels consistent with strategic requirements of both sides for a minimum deterrent force.

This phase of the disarmament process should imply a further commitment to proceed to complete inspection simultaneous with final reduction of delivery systems and nuclear stockpiles to the lowest verifiable levels.

Eighth Conference on Science
and World Affairs
Sept. 11-16, 1961
Stowe, Vermont, U.S.A.

September 12, 1961

THE PRESENT-DAY STATE OF THE PROBLEM OF DISARMAMENT

Academician A.V. Topchiev

Dear Colleagues,

We are starting to discuss an extremely important, I might say crucial, problem for all of mankind, the problem of disarmament. This important subject is at the same time also the most acute problem of the present day. Our discussion of the problem of disarmament coincides with a sharp intensification of international tensions and a sharp increase in the danger of war. If mankind will allow it to come about, it will inevitably assume world-wide dimensions and will be the most catastrophic thermo-nuclear war.

It is quite clear that it is our duty, the duty of participants in the broad movement of scientists which exists in order to fight against the danger of global nuclear war, to intensify our efforts and direct them against sliding into a destructive war. We must qualify and point out authoritatively those elements and factors of the current international situation which threaten an explosion and which would throw the peoples of the earth into a nuclear catastrophe. We must also point toward ways for its prevention.

In the interest of the correct clarification of the essence of the current tense international situation and the determination of ways of overcoming it, we must clearly outline the conditions and causes which have created it.

Our meetings and conferences, up to and including the sixth one in Moscow, have established in our consciousness enough confidence in the prospect that mankind will go toward peace and not war. The realization of the inadmissibility of thermo-nuclear war was shared not only by wide circles among peoples but also by those persons from the world of science who have an authoritative influence on the politics of the governments.

The widest and most varied circles of world and national societies including our own movement have accepted in principle the idea of total disarmament. It has also been announced by members of governments.

The Soviet Union offered for consideration of the General Assembly of the United Nations a concrete, well-argumented program, worked out in all detail on total and universal disarmament which took into careful consideration the suggestions of Western governments, especially those concerning a concrete system of disarmament. This program has been widely accepted and supported by the United Nations as well as by the international community.

Thanks to the initiative of the Soviet Union no nuclear tests were conducted for a period of several years, although in Geneva endless and fruitless arguments on this matter were continued.

In the realm of ideology important advances were made directed at the scientific substantiation of life without war and armaments and pathways toward this goal were indicated.

A.V. Topchiev

p. 2

Later on, a new programming document was issued -- the Project of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union -- which contains the principle bases of Soviet theory and practices on the question of war and peace. It is considered as the basic problem of the present day. "The main thing is to prevent thermo-nuclear war, not to let it flare up." As we think that the present generation of mankind is able to do it, that we can prevent war. The Program underscores: "To destroy wars, to institute eternal peace on earth is the historic mission of communism. The peaceful coexistence of socialist and capitalist countries is the objective necessity of development of human society. War cannot and must not serve as a method for settling international disagreements.

"Peaceful coexistence or catastrophic war -- this is the question posed by history." The Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union discloses the content of peaceful coexistence. It presupposes denial of war as a means of settling arguments between nations and their solution by means of discussions; equal rights, mutual understanding and trust between nations, consideration of each other's interests; nonintervention into internal affairs; recognition that each country has the right to decide independently all problems pertaining to its own country; a full respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and the development of economic and cultural cooperation on the basis of complete equality and mutual advantages.

This is how we understand policies for peaceful coexistence; we believe that the support of principles of peaceful coexistence corresponds to the interests of those circles of the West, including representatives of the capitalist class, who realize the destructiveness of nuclear war.

I have described our program in some detail in order to show that the peaceful policies of the Soviet Government are not just tactical ways, but that they flow out of the essence of our system. There can be no discrepancy between theory and practice in the realm of government policies in our case. You can be sure that the principles of our program, the principles of peace and of peaceful coexistence will be recreated into life consequentially and unflinchingly. It is particularly important to understand it now, in the days of sharpening of international relations, when some politicians and organs of the western press distort in all sorts of ways the essence of Soviet foreign policy.

The foreign policy course of the Soviet Union was directed consequentially and clearly toward ways to peace, to peaceful coexistence, to the avoidance of war by means of total and complete disarmament under the strictest international control.

The Soviet government has also endeavoured in every way to achieve peaceful regulation in Europe, i.e., to abandon that peculiar state where sixteen years after the end of the second World War there still is no peace treaty which would fixate its results and where transition to peaceful status would be based on international lawful norms.

A.V. Topchiev

p.3

Allow me to draw your attention now to what confronted the Soviet Government during the realization of the Program for Peace and what were the policies of the Western States, particularly of the United States as the acknowledged leader of the Western world in the field of deterrence of war and the establishment on earth of foundations for peaceful coexistence.

You have seen at the sixth Pugwash Conference in Moscow that the advent of President Kennedy and the new government in the United States was favorably received in the Soviet Union. We believed the official statements, as well as the commentaries of the press, that the foreign policy of the new administration of the United States will be directed toward peace and the lessening of tensions. During the sixth conference our American friends tried to help us in every way to understand those favorable objectives which might have developed in the relations between our countries, and in general between the East and the West.

Our American friends pointed out also those internal difficulties which the new leadership would face in the transition toward the policies of diminishing international tensions and warned us that this would take from four to six months. They pointed out the importance of the fact that during that period the Soviet Union should not undertake anything which might have made the position of the new President difficult, in particular with respect to the regulation of the German problem. We were advised to look calmly upon those actions of the new administration which we may not like but which are necessary for tactical reasons. As time and the course of events have shown, the Soviet Union has carefully considered all these circumstances although during this period there was no lack of steps made by the United States which would have been qualified as a "challenge," if they were undertaken by the Soviet Government.

I don't want to offend anyone but I think we must talk very frankly about the relationship between our governments. We have come here as friends visiting friends, in order to understand each other better and furthermore, to find together ways to eliminate tensions which carry the threat of nuclear war. We came here, as was well stated at the opening of our conference, not for discussions but in order to study together the present situation, and in order to search together for ways to eliminate the dangers of war.

We are not diplomats but scientists. Now, as scientists, we must analyze the basic conditions of the present-day international situation and indicate the recommendation of scientists, who look broadly upon the fate of the world and progress.

Allow me to start with the problem of universal and complete disarmament. The principle of universal and complete disarmament has been accepted widely; although we have not arrived at a unified point of view on this problem any more than on other problems of contemporary international relations. As I said before, the Soviet Union has presented a concrete program of universal and total disarmament, which you know. More than a year has elapsed since then, and if one considered the proposals of N.S. Khrushchev during the 14th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, more than two years. Although these proposals have received approval and support on the part of the world community and the United Nations, it appears that up to this date, the leaders of the Western powers cannot find the time, nor the possibility to discuss these proposals.

A.V. Topchiev

We are told that the Soviet proposals contain clauses which are not
acceptable to the Western powers. But, up the present, not a single Western
government has submitted equally concrete proposals to begin round table dis-
cussions at which Soviet proposals could be taken up point by point, so that
those acceptable to all governments could be chosen.

A great many of our Western partners kept insisting that the Soviet
proposals did not include sufficient controls. This statement does not
correspond to reality and is used by the opponents to disarmament in order to
confuse public opinion. As a matter of fact, in the disarmament program pro-
posed by the Soviet Union during the fifteenth session of the General Assembly
of the United Nations, this problem was thoroughly examined. Moreover, the
head of our government, N.S. Khrushchev, repeatedly stated that the Soviet
Government is ready to accept any proposal put forward by Western powers con-
cerning international control.

According to the statements put forward by the Soviet Union, one thing only
was expected from the Western powers, namely that they should join us in our
proposals for general disarmament and that they should add their proposals
concerning general controls. What seems to us extremely surprising is that the
governments of Western powers remain silent, although they have unlimited
possibilities of formulating and implementing their ideas concerning systems
of international control.

Unfortunately, there is silence concerning this question also on the part
of the community and of scientists of the West. At the risk of appearing as
poor hosts and of imposing upon our guests, we repeatedly tried to obtain a
proposal about control from our friends during the sixth Pugwash Conference in
Moscow and during the Crimean Conference of the Soviet-American community. Some
of the participants of both these conferences are also attending the present con-
ference. But, so far, we have not received an answer from them.

How are we to understand such a proposal? Involuntarily the thought comes
to mind that Western powers are not really interested in and do not want to
disarm. If, in addition, we take into account that among Western powers the
theory of preservation of atomic armaments as a deterrent force is openly taking
shape, (in other words, that the possibility of atomic war is not eliminated
and that there is a strong argument for the necessity of so-called limited wars
with atomic weapons) it becomes obvious that the Western powers have a negative
attitude concerning the problems of disarmament. Such an attitude obliges the
Soviet Union and other socialist countries to adopt caution and vigilance and
necessitates the adoption on their part of steps directed toward the insurance
of security. This seems to us fully justified.

I shall now turn to the second problem which causes great concern to large
circles of the world community and to peoples of practically the whole problem
of nuclear tests.

The Soviet Government was lately compelled to adopt a decision concerning
the resumption of nuclear tests. As has been announced by the Soviet Govern-
ment, it was compelled to take this step with a heavy heart, with much regret
and only as a result of a most thorough and comprehensive study of this question.

A.V. Topchiev

The Soviet Government was compelled to take this step, the meaning of which it
fully appreciates, only under the pressure of the international atmosphere and
because the policy of the leading members of NATO do not leave the Soviet Union
any other way out. But I will say more about this later. In the meantime, let
us, objectively, as befits scientists, glance at the events tied up with elimina-
tion of nuclear tests.

As is well known, at the beginning atomic weapons were the monopoly of the
United States; accordingly, they used this monopoly as a right to test at will
and ignored the proposals concerning the prohibition of nuclear weapons. But
this monopoly ended; atomic weapons made their appearance in the armaments of
the Soviet Union and England. The atomic club grew in size, the volume of
nuclear tests rose sharply and, at the same time, increased the danger to
humanity. Scientists clearly indicated the danger of such tests, among them the
initiators of our movement. The peoples of the world began to demand the pro-
hibition of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union responded first to such demands,
unilaterally ceased nuclear tests and began actively to ask for the general
abandonment of nuclear tests. I want to stress that the Soviet Union stopped
tests of nuclear weapons when, even according to the evaluation of Western
specialists, the number of tests made by them was three times smaller than the
number of tests made by the Western powers.

Moreover, Western powers did not follow the Soviet Union at once in the
stopping of nuclear tests. Before doing this they effected a significant and
fairly intensive program of nuclear tests -- about 60 explosions between April
and October 1958. I mention this only in order to help throw some light on the
factual side of the problem concerning nuclear tests. Then started prolonged,
difficult and fruitless negotiations in Geneva concerning the banning of
nuclear tests.

I shall not tax your attention with the enumeration of all stages of
these negotiations, of all the facts linked with the rejection by Western powers
of the recently accepted proposal based on scientific and authoritative data
provided by experts of many countries. Finally, it became clear that the Western
side does not aim toward the banning of nuclear weapons tests and is using these
negotiations to conceal its policy in this problem and wants to leave open for
itself the possibility to continue as it sees fit, tests of certain weapons in
the development of which it is especially interested.

The system of control, as proposed by Western powers, was set forth in such
a way as to serve not so much the purpose of detection of possible violation of
the nuclear test ban, but rather to organize the general strategic and even
tactical reconnaissance in the Soviet Union.

By the way, I want to remind you that during a period of over three years
of actual stopping of tests, even in the absence of a system of controls, the
Soviet Union has not violated its gentleman's responsibilities and, when the policy
of Western powers concerning this problem compelled the Soviet Union to take this
step, she openly declared her intentions and explained to the peoples of the
world the motives which compelled her to take this step.

Defining further the process of the Geneva negotiations about the dis-
continuance of nuclear tests, one must note the insistence displayed by our
Western partners on creating such a system of management of controls that would

A.V. Topchiev

p.6

change this international organization into an obedient servant of Western
governments. The negotiations reached a dead-end and, in order to pursue them,
the Soviet Government proposed to link solution of the problem of nuclear test ban
with that of general and complete disarmament. This proposal should have
simplified the decision concerning the problem of creation of a system of control
and increased the possibilities of reaching an agreement.

But the proposals set forth by the Soviet Union were met aggressively and considered as propaganda. The meaning and purposes of these proposals were subjected to useless distortion. We were told here, too, that the West supposedly made big concessions to the East during the Geneva negotiations. But this is not so. When partners are divided, let us say by 200 meters, it is not essential that each side move 100 meters to effect a rapprochement. However, one cannot call it a rapprochement if one side moves only 10 meters and obliges the other side to move 190 meters; and, if the other side refuses to do so, to blame it for the refusal to meet and effect this rapprochement. But this is not all. As experience showed during the Geneva negotiations, even in the face of agreement on the part of the Soviet Union, new obstacles would have been created, new demands would have been made. One must say that there was and there is sufficient data to consider that the government of the United States was already preparing for conduction of the nuclear tests and their resumption was only a matter of time.

Allow me to submit a selection of materials on this matter, which have found
their reflection in the Soviet press. The number of the excerpts I am going to
quote could be significantly increased.

1. "The Air Force, military industrialists, some fairly influential scientists and other elements in the Pentagon insist that President Kennedy should either stop negotiations, or declare that, although negotiations will continue, the United States, none the less, will resume tests."

Washington Post and Times Herald, May 24, 1961

2. "The Kennedy Government is quickly moving in the direction of resuming underground nuclear tests. The debates within the government have not so much to do with questions of whether or not tests should be resumed, but rather when and where they should be resumed."

New York Herald Tribune, June 22, 1961

3. "Demands concerning the resuming of nuclear tests are coming from all sides, but particularly from Congress. Among both parties the demand for termination of negotiations and resumption of tests have sharply increased. The Pentagon is seeking to obtain the testing of new weapons, and on this matter there is full agreement among all concerned; the quicker it will be possible to start unlimited testing, the better. Among the types of weapons which the Pentagon would like to test are the following:

- Atomic warheads for 'Polaris' rockets installed on submarines and for ballistic rockets of airforce 'Minutemen'.

- Perfecting of warhead for ballistic rockets 'Atlas' and 'Titan' (the old

Topchiev

p.7

warheads for these rockets were tested before the moratorium but they are
too cumbersome).

- Small atomic bombs and missiles for use in the field in small war areas.

- A neutron bomb which destroys all life but leaves untouched buildings and has a short-lived radioactive effect."

Newsweek, June 26, 1961

4. "The Atomic Energy Commission plans to conduct in December an underground atomic explosion at a point approximately 25 miles south of Carlsbad, New Mexico. This test will be conducted on the basis of the program GNOM intended for utilization of nuclear explosions. At the direction of the Commission this project was transferred into the hands of scientists in the Radiation Laboratory of the University of California in Livermore, California. Dr. Wilmot Hess, who works in this laboratory stated that the power of this explosion will be 5 kilotons. This is a nuclear charge whose power of explosion is equal to 5,000 tons of trinitrotoluene."

San Francisco Chronicle, July 17, 1961

5. "On the testing grounds north of Las Vegas tunnels have been excavated several miles below ground. It is supposed that the installations intended for tests, for which an order of priority already has been established, are waiting only for a signal from the Capitol to be dispatched to Nevada and assembled in the tunnels, upon which American testing will resume."

Associated Press, August 31, 1961

To this one should add frequent mention of the necessity of nuclear testing, in particular of a neutron bomb, which is reflected in the scientific literature of Western countries.

I remind you also that, according to the statement of former President Eisenhower, December 31, 1961, the United States considers itself free of the moratorium on nuclear testing. Nor can we ignore nuclear testing by France. These tests were conducted in spite of warning by the Soviet Union that it will be forced to renew its testing if France will not stop its nuclear experiments. International public opinion is disturbed by the fact that France is testing atomic weapons in cooperation with other members of NATO, in particular with the active cooperation of Western Germany.

It is characteristic that those governing circles of the Western powers who now accuse the Soviet Union of violating the moratorium on nuclear tests, did not do anything to restrain their ally from conducting nuclear experiments, while other powers abstained from it.

Moreover, representatives of these circles did not even find words of censure, and when the General Assembly of the United Nations debated a resolution calling upon the Government not to conduct nuclear tests, the United States and England refused to support such a resolution.

A.V. Topchiev

p.8

It is proper to ask whether such a position reflects an interest of
these powers in nuclear testing in the Sahara.

Such is the state of affairs with respect to the nuclear tests ban.
As you see, this state is such that it demands responses on the part of the
Soviet Government for the security of its people and the defense of its country.

Finally, we cannot bypass the sharp increase in the danger of war in the
zone of Western Germany. As stated by the Soviet Government in connection with
its decision to renew nuclear testing, "the Soviet people, the Soviet Government,
cannot neglect the fact that again, as twenty years, ago, at the approaches to
the borders of our country there are gathering ominous clouds of war and that
Western Germany and the present allies of German militarists are shaken by the
fever of military preparations." The Government of Adenauer and the powers
that support it are already moving in the direction of transformation of
Western Germany into a militaristic state armed to the teeth. It is very clear
to any disinterested observer that the main purpose of the foreign policy of
this Government is revenge and reconsideration of the borders which were
established in Europe as the result of the Second World War.

So, when it became necessary to do away with the remnants of the Second
World War by the conclusion of the German peace treaty, which would assure the
safety of nations from new encroachments of German militarists, we were met not only
with direct opposition on the part of Western powers but also with an open threat
to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries of the unleashing of a third world war.
And not only verbally. The Western powers increased their military
budgets, increased their armed forces by recalling of reserves, by movement of
troops, by introducing into Berlin new military forces of Western powers.
Military drumbeating is unleashed in Berlin and around it an atmosphere of extreme
extremely susceptible to war explosion is created.

Under these conditions, as was stated by the Soviet Government, "it would
be unforgivable and shortsighted not to make proper deductions from the situation
which was created by the aggressive policy of the military bloc of NATO and not
to take care of improving the security and strength of the Soviet State--the
great socialist camp of all peace-loving nations."

We remember too well the Second World War, remember how it was prepared
and who it was who prepared it, and we shall not permit the repetition of it.

We are openly threatened by force and we have nothing left but to answer
force with force. We are not Tolstovians and not followers of Ghandi. The
Soviet Government clearly understands its responsibility to its people and to
the entire socialist brotherhood, to the whole of humanity.

It solemnly declares again and again that the armed forces of the Soviet
Union never will be the first to take up arms. You must not doubt it. The
Soviet Union is also ready at any moment to sign an agreement on universal and
total disarmament which would put an end to the testing of nuclear weapons.

What should we scientists who understand well the tremendous danger of war
do? Our duty is again to raise our voice in defense of peace. With the entire
force of our authority we must demand universal and total disarmament under

A.V. Topchiev

p.9

strict international control, as the only radical method of excluding the danger of any war which would eliminate the necessity for any testing of nuclear bombs. They will not be needed by anybody.

Assuming the necessity of universal complete disarmament in order to decrease international tension and strengthen trust between governments it would be possible to arrive at agreements about such separate undertakings as creation of zones free from atomic weapons in Central and Northern Europe, in the Near East and in other areas of the world; about decreasing of military forces and military equipment of the countries of the world, those who are members of NATO and those who are members of the Warsaw Pact, and about establishment of international inspection; about the removal of all foreign military forces from foreign countries within the limits of international borders. We can also conclude a pact of nonaggression between governments--members of NATO and of the Warsaw Treaty, prohibit the utilization of the space for military purposes, liquidate military bases in foreign territories, make solemn statements about not being first to use nuclear weapons.

We come to you also with the proposal to conclude a German peace treaty, to settle the German problem. This would greatly ease the international tensions.

We call on you to state strongly and authoritatively that never before in history was a peace treaty a cause of an outbreak of war. It should not serve as a push towards the war in our days either, when such a war would lead to a global catastrophe.

September 13, 1961

Background paper

September 11 - 16, 1961

Stowe, Vermont

THREE ARMAMENT POLICIES FOR THE 1960'S

J.C. Polanyi

An apologist for arms control or disarmament is well advised to preface anything he has to say, with the admission that arms races in the past have not always lead to war, nor have wars invariably been caused by arms races. By this admission he skirts a difficult question, without in the least compromising his basic belief, which is simply that the present arms race is proceeding at such an extremely rapid pace (largely because of the rapid rate of obsolescence in weaponry) and involves weapons of such fearful destructive power that, by contributing to international fear and tension, it might easily be the cause of the next war - the most horrible in history.

This was forcibly brought home to me when I attended a discussion on arms control and disarmament with Soviet scientists, strategists, and others, in Moscow. Perhaps the most striking impression that remained after 10 days was that of the symmetry of fears on either side. Not infrequently one had the feeling that one was arguing with one's reflection in a mirror. It was as plausible that the Western powers might launch a surprise attack on the Soviet Union, to forestall a surprise attack that they feared the Soviet Union was on the point of unleashing against them, as was the reverse occurrence with the Soviet Union as aggressor.

The surprising thing, of course, is not that this symmetry of fear existed, but that its existence was freely acknowledged. The mutual fear could be acknowledged because it was so evidently a consequence, not of our common criminality, but of our common predicament; namely involvement in a provocative and ever-accelerating arms race.

As Lord Grey of Fallodon remarked in more leisurely times,

> "...each government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its own country not to take every precaution, while every government regards every precaution of every other government as evidence of hostile intent."

Today the mounting spiral of precaution - fear - increased precaution - increasing fear...gains momentum from the unparalleled scale of the 'precautions' and of the consequent fears. The Russians are at work on a thermonuclear weapon with the equivalent power of 100 million tons of TNT. The appearance

Polanyi-2

of a single bomber armed with such a weapon over a city would
represent a threat equivalent to a ten-million-bomber raid in
the last war, if one can conceive of such a thing.

The Rand Corporation has estimated that a major nuclear
war in the next few years would be likely to result, in the
States, in the destruction of the fifty major cities and in the
death of around 90 million people.

A "Credible" Threat

Strategic thinking (as it is called) on this problem appears
to be taking three distinct directions. The first proposal
would involve an attempt to blunt the blow from an all-out
thermonuclear war by means of civil defense. The objective
would be to reduce the anticipated casualties to a sufficiently
low level that the threat of thermonuclear war could be credibly
used in order to deter the Soviet Union from undertaking any
'extremely provocative acts (acts which threaten vital Western
interests). This view is set out at length in an important study
by Herman Kahn of RAND; On Thermonuclear War.¹

He argues that the consequences of nuclear war without
civil defense are so ghastly that the United States can credibly
threaten such war only if its homeland is threatened. (Threats
used in order to deter an enemy from attacking the homeland,
he refers to as 'Type I deterrence.') The United States is
therefore without an effective deterrent against highly provoca-
tive acts short of a threat to the homeland. (Attempts to deter
highly provocative acts, short of a threat to the homeland,
he classes as 'Type II deterrence.')

Kahn and his colleagues have calculated that a 'minimum'
civil defense program, costing about $500 million, would reduce
casualties from the figure of 90 million quoted above, to around
50 million. The corresponding times for economic recovery are
sixty years as against fifteen years. 'Minimum' civil defense is
largely a matter of fall-out protection. In addition Kahn's
proposal includes a program for 70 per cent evacuation of all
major cities in moments of crisis. With this major evacuation
the casualty figure should drop to around 15 million (time for
economic recovery seven years), he calculates. The Soviet Union
suffered 20 million casualties in the course of the last war,
so a threat on the part of the U.S.A. to risk 15 million
casualties should he suggests, strike them as a credible threat.
(However, they did not suffer these casualties on one day, nor
risk them on one throw of the dice.)

¹On Thermonuclear War, by Herman Kahn, Princeton University Press, 1960.

Polanyi-3

The evacuation of cities occupies a special role in his proposal. He considers it necessary that we have some way of indicating to our opponent the genuineness of our resolve. The evacuation of cities would provide us with a method for doing this, since it would constitute what he ponderously describes as a 'pre-attack mobilisation base'--a position of evident battle readiness.

## A Credible Calculation?

Mr. Kahn is to be commended for having the courage to take a hard and objective look at the world as it would be after a nuclear war. Not only is the calculation enormously difficult, it is also enormously distateful. Moreover, anyone who dares to point out that 50 million dead are better than 90 million, and 15 million better than 50 million, must expect to be accused of being an unfeeling and inhuman monster. Mr. Kahn expected to be so accused, and he has not been disappointed.

Kahn is not inhuman, as his critics suggest. But neither is he superhuman, as his disciples unconsciously imply. Because he has attempted to substantiate his arguments by numerical calculation, his conclusions have been hailed, with varying degrees of naivetee, as constitution 'scientific proof'; if not of his thesis at any rate of his figures. It seems to be necessary to point out that when one says that Mr. Kahn has been 'scientific', one is merely saying that one believes his conclusions to follow from his premises.

However, his premises consist of a simple 'model' of reality, a model with sufficiently few elements as to render it susceptible to calculation. The problem in reality is one of staggering complexity. Nuclear weapons of the size and type, let alone the number, he is postulating, have never been employed against any city. The effects of fallout, of blast and of fire are problematical in the extreme. Indeed, they must vary from city to city and from one day to the next. The effect on the national economy of the sudden removal of these cities from the map is, strictly speaking, quite incalculable. A city is a socio-economic unit, a nerve center in the body of the nation. What is the effect of removing the fifty major ganglia? And beside the social and economic effect, what of the psychological effect?

Kahn and his colleagues at the Rand Corporation were forced to reduce this complex reality to a simple 'model'. Their conclusions derive from this simple model. The only test we have of the validity of their model is the plausibility of their conclusions.

Polanyi-4

It may be asked what is the value of their elaborate and painstaking calculation if we are forced, ultimately, to rely on an intuitive assessment of the 'reasonableness' of their conclusions. This question has many answers at various levels of profundity--most of them far beyond my reach. It will be enough to note that the 'intuitive assessment' referred to above is not made *in vacuo* but will undoubtedly be influenced by the calculation it is meant to assess. Secondly it is valuable to have a body of self-consistent data, even if it all stems from a shaky premise, that is to say from a greatly oversimplified model. Though the absolute results (90 million U.S. casualties from an attack in the next few years) of the calculation are subject to very considerable error, relative figures (about one half saved by 'minimum' civil defense) could be sufficiently reliable to act as a guide in our thinking.

Even this, of course, is far from certain since important new assumptions are involved in a calculation 'with civil defense' that were not part of the calculation without civil defense. Moreover, ultimately our thinking will be based on absolute figures, not relative ones, since it is the absolute number of casualties that determines the suffering of a nation, and hence determines the credibility of any threats the nation makes which imply willingness to tolerate such suffering.

So much depends on the reliability that we place on calculations of this type, and the reliability that we may reasonably suppose our opponents will place on similar calculations, that it is worth giving a couple of illustrations of the degree of unreliability to which they are subject.

In 1942 a committee of distinguished scientists, experienced in strategic calculations, attempted to calculate for the British government the damage that would be caused by mass bombing of Germany. The results of their calculations showed a spread equal to about five times the lowest estimate.

The problem, of course, was far easier than the one Kahn has tackled. The British scientists were speculating about conventional explosives, which had been used again and again under wartime conditions. Moreover, they had control over the amount of explosive to be used, and the targets on which it would be dropped. (It has been alleged that the member of the committee who arrived at the high estimate, Lindemann, later Lord Cherwell, was biased. If this is indeed the effect that prejudice can have on the calculations of an eminent scientist, then we should take careful note of the fact. Since we have no guarantee that the Russians will share our prejudices, it would appear that we have no guarantee that they will share our conclusions as to risk, credibility, and so forth.)

Polanyi-5

Estimates of the time, or 'cost', of recovery, which figure largely in Kahn's argument, must be subject to additional uncertainties. It is hard to find a precise analogy, but the example quoted (in another context) by Albert Wohlstetter of the Rand Corporation suggests the sort of spread that cost estimates can have, when there is uncertainty as to the number, nature, and cost of the items that contribute to a complex whole. The estimated cost of a missile when calculated in 1949 came to $35,000 per missile. When recalculated in 1957 the figure came to $2,000,000. "The less we knew," Wohlstetter remarks, "the more hopeful we were."

Kahn and his colleagues have attempted to hedge against this danger by making the more pessimistic assumption wherever there was an evident choice. Consciously or unconsciously they would, of course, have to set a strict limit to their pessimism. Otherwise the uncertainties in their calculations (as indicated by the much simpler calculations referred to above) would surely have led them to conclude, pessimistically, that major nuclear war, with or without civil defense, would involve losses of such a magnitude as could only credibly be risked in defense of the homeland (Type I 'deterrence).

Credible to Whom?

I have been at pains to underline the uncertainty in Kahn's calculation, not because I would think it proper to reject it out of hand but because I fear that the nonscientific reader may feel that he is under some compulsion to swallow it wholesale.

A rather extreme example of what I have in mind is evident in the reaction of an experienced military commentator who reported that as a result of a "thorough scientific enquiry conducted by the U.S. Rand Corporation" it had been established that, provided certain basic preparations are made, economic recovery would be 60 per cent complete within one year of a nuclear war in which the U.S. lost its fifty largest cities.

If science claims to have proved this, science is an ass. Kahn is not; for he says (on p. 629), "we concede that the uncertainties are large enough to raise the question of sheer survival, and the problem gets more severe in later time periods."

I have already suggested, parenthetically, a further important reason for taking note of the uncertainties in this type of calculation; a great deal depends on the degree of assurance that we can have that our opponents will believe our calculation, or even will believe that we believe it.

[LC]

Polanyi-6

This point merits closer examination.

The main burden of Kahn's argument, it will be recalled, is that by evacuating all our major cities at moments of international crisis we can simultaneously (a) demonstrate our intention to fight an all-out nuclear war if need be, and (b) protect our population to such a degree that the threat appears credible.

The difficulty with this policy is that it forces us to walk on a tight-rope; our pre-attack mobilisation must be credible enough that our opponent decides to cease his provocative behaviour, but not so credible that he panics, believing that his security will shortly be threatened, and attacks us while we are still vulnerable, that is to say while evacuation of our cities is in progress. The precise location of this tight-rope is dependent on the results of a Kahn-type calculation, not necessarily made by Kahn. For it is not enough that we convince ourselves that we are standing on the tight-rope; we must convince our opponents.

A number of factors over which we have no control could make the opponent prefer to attack rather than back down: internal politics, a belief that vital interests are at stake, national pride, the feeling that once he submits to 'nuclear blackmail' (in our own phrase) he is lost, an exaggerated idea of the efficiency of our civil defense (that is to say, an exaggerated idea of the shift in balance of power that will result from our evacuation; this is where the uncertainty of the Kahn-type calculation is so important), and the fear that we may have developed an anti-missile device with which to supplement our civil defense.

Alternatively he may evacuate all his major cities and provoke in us the response to which I have just alluded(a desire to pre-empt) for the reasons I have just outlined. One thing is sure: if we permit the Soviets to evacuate their cities then Type I detterence will, by our own calculations, be at an end. They can now attack our homeland without suffering an unacceptable retaliation.

What are the chances of extricating ourselves from this tangle without being driven by pride or fear over the brink into war? What are the chances of extricating ourselves once? Twice? An indefinite number of times? (Kahn envisages an evacuation every few years).

It is essential to bear in mind that these exercises in brinkmanship will occur in a world where constant efforts must be made to keep the path over the brink smooth and slippery. Otherwise, our opponent will surely be tempted to call what he believes to be out bluff - with disasterous consequences.

An important factor contributing to international tension under these circumstances will be the emergence of a new type of 'arms race'; that is, a competition in civil defense. This will be far more conspicuous and therefore more dangerous than the present arms race. It is impossible to have effective civil

Polanyi-7

defense - including provision for speedy evacuation of all major cities - without the full cooperation of the civilian population. This cooperation can be obtained partly by coercion. Largely, however, it must be obtained by convincing the population of the reality and the imminence (for where horror is concerned only the imminent seems real) of the danger. International tension is seen to be not simply a concomitant of effective civil defense, but a prerequisite.

We come back to the same question that I posed earlier; how long could we hope to continue making use of such threats in a world far more tense than that of today, without finding ourselves either having to concede that the threats are empty (failure of Type II deterrence) or having to implement them and accept the consequences (failure of Type I deterrence)?

If the answer is, as I think it must be, "a few years", then we must ask ourselves whether we are willing to sacrifice in the region of 15 million people every few years in order to ensure the integrity of the 'free world'?

If there are people who can take such a question seriously, then the process of "moral deturbation" that Wayland Young has described, is moving apace.

I cannot leave Mr. Kahn's proposal - which one might characterise as 'the strategic use of civil defense' - without commenting on the likely future of civil defense. As the '60's proceed, civil defense requirements will become more stringent in proportion as the nuclear threat becomes more massive. Kahn himself discusses this*, and concludes that the policy he outlined is feasible for the next few years only.

It may be asked why one should trouble to refute his argument if it will, before long, die a natural death. The answer is that policies suggested for the next few years are still being suggested for 'the next few years', more than a few years later. The strategist, having submitted himself to the lengthly and painful process of indoctrination ('On Thermonuclear War' has 651 somewhat dishevelled pages) is in no mood to let his mind be changed in a hurry.

## Complete Disarmament

In opening these remarks I observed that strategic thinking today appears to be taking three distinct directions. I have mentioned only one of these directions. It is actually a retrogressive policy, since it seeks to tame all-out nuclear war in order to make it serve, as has warfare in the past, as an instrument of diplomacy. This appears in the short view to be highly dangerous, and in the long view completely irresponsible.

*However, he fails to give proper weight to the fact that once civil defense becomes a really significant factor in the balance-of-power calculation, modifications are likely to be made in the arsenals of both sides to render civil defense more difficult. Chemical and biological weapons, for example, would be expected to have an enhanced efficiency against a population which has sunk itself below ground level.

## Polanyi-8

### What remains?

The two remaining paths, 'limited arms control', and 'complete disarmament', both involve agreement between potential opponents that they will limit the permitted range of military competition.

These too are in the military sense 'retrogressive' policies since they attempt to stop the armaments clock, or turn it backwards. The objective in this case, however, is not to restore all-out war to its classic role as an instrument of diplomacy, but simply to make it less likely to occur, or, ideally, to make it impossible.

I shall use the term 'limited arms control', or simply 'arms control', to describe any measures that may tend to stabilize the 'balance of power', excluding complete disarmament. 'Complete disarmament' is the particular measure of arms control that seeks to stabilize the balance of power at a very low level indeed, namely the level of forces required by each nation for internal security.

Until quite recently such proposals, which in effect require that parties to a disagreement agree as to the fashion in which they may disagree, have been regarded by all but professional dreamers, as being utopian. Today time is changing. Agreement on limited measures of arms control is regarded as a definite possibility. However, complete disarmament is still regarded by the majority of professional and quasi-professional Western strategists, as a chimera.

The extent to which limited arms control has achieved respectability is illustrated by the following quotation from an article by George A. Kelly in the Military Review of January 1961 (as reprinted in 'Survival', May-June 1961).

> "...it now appears that an unlimited arms race must, sooner or later, produce either technological breakthrough, favouring the potential attacker out of all due proportion, or else lead to such conditions of hostile suspicion and political disequilibrium that a total war would become inevitable. The alternative to this mounting spiral of menace would seem to be some kind of limitation or 'freeze' on the essential strategic weaponry of the antagonists."

The burgeoning of interest in limited arms control has not, however, been accompanied by any appreciable softening in the attitude of disdain for the 'disarmament expert', who is described by the same writer as "apt to be a bit of an idealist or a pacifist, in few cases...with a grasp of the bewildering complexities of technological war."

It is encouraging thing to read a statement like this one on arms control in a military magazine, and to feel the educational process at work: even if one believes, as I do, that education will have to be followed by re-education. For, as I shall try to show, though the notion of complete disarmament today is utopian, the policy of limited arms control, regarded as anything but a very short-term palliative, may be even more utopian. Complete disarmament would require an act of will. An act of will so improbable that we might characterize it as a miracle. Effective and enduring arms control, on the other hand, would appear to require a sustained

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is utopian, the policy is limited arms control, regarded as anything but a
very short-term palliative, may be even more utopian. Complete disarmament
would require an act of will. An act of will so improbalbe that we might
characterize it as a miracle. Effective and enduring arms control, on the
other hand, would apperar to require a sustained display of diplomatic skill
and mutual understanding between fully armed opponents, that would be
tantamount to an unending sequence of miracles.

The difficulty with complete disarmament is that nobody wants it. Not
East or West, and still less the other compass bearings. For the political
price of complete disarmament is high.

A disarmed world, it has been formally agreed by the Soviet Union and
the U.S.A., would not long be a world at peace, without an effective inter-
national police force. Such a police force could not be effective unless
there were a supra-national organization² to control it according to an
agreed code of behaviour. This is the political price; the surrender of a
substantial amount of national sovereignty to an international agency. And
this no nation has yet shown willingness to do, since all are convinced that
survival can be assured at some cheaper price.

At present, the prevailing view is that limited measures of arms
control represent the greatest hope for survival at a political price which
is not exorbitant.

The 'political price', in this case, can be measured in terms of the
amount of veto-free inspection, or other infringements of sovereignty, that
the measure entails.

Whether or not the price does turn out to be exorbitant will clearly
depend not only on the price itself but also on the likely gain in security
from the measure under consideration. There is, I fear, reason to doubt
whether this gain will appear great enough to justify the payment of any
but a very small price. If this is correct it will make it extremely difficult
to reach agreement. I shall attempt to give substance to these fears in what
follows.

## Limited Arms Control

The philosophy of limited arms control can best be illustrated by re-
ference to the large and growing body of literature on the subject. An
excellent general introduction is to be found in a volume of essays entitled

²The most detailed attempt to describe such an organization is to be found in 'World Peace Through World Law' by Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn. Harvard University Press.

Polanyi-10

Arms Control: Issues for the Public³. The point of view of the book is summarised by Robert R. Bowie (assistant secretary of state until 1957, now director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University) at the close of his contribution. He says,

> "This article has explored the relation between political tension and hostility, and cooperation for arms control under current conditions. Its conclusion is that the underlying hostility does not exclude measures for arms control which would reflect existing mutual interests in avoiding unintended war or futile arms burden or dangerous arms competition. Yet any such measures will have to be designed for adoption and operation within a framework of intensive struggle and conflict among the participants."

Here is the crux of the matter. Can we really hope to reach and maintain agreements which have sufficient substance that they significantly diminish the "dangerous arms competition," and yet are so neutral in their effects, and remain so neutral, that they do not run afoul of the "intensive struggle and conflict among the participants"? I fear that we shall encounter great difficulties; not because I wish to argue that it is pointless to seek agreement on limited measures of arms control, but because I believe that these considerations have a relevance to our search for such agreements. They may determine whether we seek limited agreement while paying lip service to the idea that further steps (political and military) are essential, or whether we really believe this to be the case.

Limited measures of arms control will, I believe, be hard to obtain and hard to maintain in force, for two reasons. The first is that mutual reassurance against the dangers of cheating will be extraordinarily hard to achieve in a world of intensive struggle and (military) conflict. The second reason has to do with the changing military requirements in a fully armed world: a world in which technological revolutions follow one another with unprecedented rapidity. These military requirements are of two kinds: requirements for the maintenance of effective tactical forces (limited-war forces) and requirements for the maintenance of invulnerable strategic forces. The latter constitute the essential element in 'stable deterrence'; a concept which lies at the heart of arms control.

I shall discuss in turn the problems of mutual reassurance against cheating, and the problems involved in reconciling changing military requirements, with arms control.

## Limited Inspection

"Mutual reassurance" will be based largely on mutual inspection. Unfortunately it is extremely hard to design an inspection system which

³ Arms Control: Issues for the Public. Edited by Louis Henkin
Prentice-Hall.

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provides a satisfactory assurance to side A that side B is not cheating, without at the same time presenting an unacceptable risk to side B that side A is spying.

'Spying' of course means the gathering of information about military matters that are not subject to the arms control agreement. The substitution of random sampling for systematic searching, in an attempt to deter violation rather than detect it, may go some way toward meeting this difficulty; however, the difficulty will remain. Jerome Wiesner (Science Adviser to President Kennedy) gives an example of a random sampling program, in 'Arms Control: Issues for the Public';

> "A reasonable inspection procedure would be to examine 5 to 10 per cent of each nation's) total area at any one time, and to have several cycles of inspection per year so that 30 to 50 per cent of a country would be covered in that period."

If, as in this example almost half the area of a country is inspected each year, the opportunity for 'spying' will be considerable.

Supposing that the arms control measure is a military significant one (and only such a measure has any real value) then there will at the same time be a very strong incentive for 'spying' - that is to say for extending the range of objects being inspected beyond those specifically sanctioned by the treaty. It is not enough, after all, for a nation to formulate suspicions of cheating; before it dare abrogate the treaty it will have to find evidence of cheating that can hope to stand up in the court of world opinion. As every court lawyer will attest, a case is not proven by a simple invocation of 'facts', but by the weight of evidence.

This is only one of the reasons for seeking to widen the scope of inspection. Another is that "inspection and surveillance must serve to keep side informed of significant military developments that may require modifications in the agreement, or supplementary understandings"⁴. An arms control agreement may be acceptable to both sides in the context of one military picture and yet may favour one side if the other makes adjustments in its forces. Naturally the other will seek to make precisely those adjustments. (I shall return to this point, later.)

Finally we must take note of the important fact that (quoting Wiesner again), "interaction of...various inspection systems would make up for the uncertainty permitted by any one."

These three considerations all argue for a flexible and wide-ranging inspection system. However, this will surely be unacceptable except in the context of a wide agreement.

⁴ Strategy and Arms Control, by Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin. The Twentieth Century Fund Inc.

## Polanyi-12

This suggests the possibility that the 'wide agreement' might take the form of a package of limited measures. However, there appears to be a grave difficulty with this approach. If as a result of changing tactics or technology a signatory to the agreement feels compelled to release himself from one of the controls comprised in the package (I shall suggest below that this is a likely contingency), this would necessitate a complete reassessment of the interlocking inspection system. The entire treaty would be thrown in jeopardy. If it survived it would be at the expense of heightened suspicion. If it failed to survive, it would be a major failure which could have serious consequences.

In essence the problem of inspecting limited arms control agreements will be to satisfy a legitimate demand for broad and flexible inspection, without at the same time doing violence to the equally-legitimate requirement for military secrecy. The middle ground between these two requirements may be narrow and shifting; if this is the case there is a real danger that over a period of time arms control will aggravate international tension. If, then, arms control agreements break down (and even if they do not) we must expect an acceleration of the "dangerous competition" and an aggravation of the other dangers we have been seeking to combat.

## Tactical-Arms Race

The problem of inspection has been discussed first simply because it is so conspicuous. It constituted the principle subject for debate in 3 years of negotiation over the test ban treaty. However, the problem posed by the conflicting demands of military requirements and arms control, is more fundamental and consequently more serious.

I have indicated that a major military requirement is 'stable deterrence'. Stable deterrence enters into arms control in the following way. The condition of stable deterrence is one in which both sides are in possession of powerful and invulnerable forces. The term 'invulnerable' is meant to imply that the force is sufficiently protected that it could still be used with devastating effect following a surprise attack by the opponent. Any lesser force than this would be dangerously provocative, since in moments of international tension each side would be strongly tempted to make a preemptive first strike against the other; this being the only type of attack that offered hope of success. More armaments than the minimum required for invulnerable deterrence are also to be regarded as dangerous, since they invite an indefinite continuation of the arms race. Somewhere in between lies a zone of stability ('stable deterrence') which we must seek first to achieve and then to maintain. It is the role of arms control to assist in this, by regulating the development, production, or use of strategic nuclear weapons.

The second military requirement is for a tactical force. In the world of 'stable deterrence' major international disputes which could not be settled by other means would, it is reasonable to suppose, be settled by a limited excercise of force. That is to say they could be settled by what, it is hoped,

Polanyi-13

would be limited wars, fought by armies against armies, with the aid of
'tactical' weapons.

There is no reason to look for an abatement, under stable deterrence,
of the armaments race involving tactical arms. If this armaments race runs
afoul of controls designed to moderate the pace of the other armaments race,
that in strategic weaponry, then a serious strain will be placed on the
controls. Since tactical armaments differ in degree and not in kind from
strategic armaments, it is, in fact, very probable that controls designed
to interfere with one type of armament will interfere with the other.

The test ban negotiations furnish an example. There is evidence that
President Kennedy was under considerable pressure to permit resumption of
nuclear testing in order to facilitate the development of an anti-personnel
nuclear weapon, the neutron bomb, which it is believed would be an important
weapon in a limited war. This pressure from the Pentagon was not, though
under slightly altered circumstances it might have been, responsible for the
breakdown of the negotiations. However, it is altogether to be expected that
a similar pressure exerted by the Russian generals on Mr. Khruschev (the
Soviets having tested fewer tactical weapons are probably significantly weak
in this department) contributed to their unwillingness and finally their
refusal, to continue the negotiations.

## Strategic-Arms Race

The edifice of arms control is designed to rest on a foundation of
'stable deterrence', guaranteed by invulnerable strategic weapons. This
foundation is both shaky and shifting. It is shaky for political reasons,
shifting for technological ones.

The political limitation on deterrence is the following. The deterrent
will only deter acts which are rationally conceived and rationally implemented.
Regretably, rationality is not the distinguishing characteristic of political
actions. Hedley Bull⁵ makes this point in a passage which deserves to be
quoted in extenso:

> "In general there is no such thing as 'rational action'. The notion
> that there is a distinction between rational action and other kinds
> of action, or between reason and the passions, is indefensible in
> philosophy and psychology, but has somehow survived in political
> theory. The notion of 'rational action' is useful only when it is
> defined in a particular way, for the purposes of a particular body
> of theory. A great deal of economic theory proceeds upon some such
> notion of what is 'rational action' for 'economic man'. A great
> deal of argument about military strategy similarly postulates a
> 'rational action' of a kind of 'strategic man', a man who on further

⁵ The Control of the Arms Race by Hedley Bull.
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1961.

[LC]

Polanyi-14

acquaintance reveals himself as a university professor of unusual
intellectual subtlety...where 'rational action' is defined to
exclude the deliberate choice of military catastrophe, this is not
a notion in terms of which it is possible to account for any great
part of the history of international politics, or to base any confident
prediction about its future. The idea that war is a catastrophe which
no government will choose to bring about has been a commonplace of
writing about international relations since the turn of the century.
The decisions of governments on matters of peace and war, like those
taken by the European powers in July and August 1914, do not always
reflect a careful weighing of long-range considerations, or a mastery
of the course of events: the questions which strike the historian
of these decisions a generation afterwards as important appear crudely
answered or, more often, not even asked: the governments appear to
him to stumble about, groping and half blind, too preoccupied with
surviving from day to day even to percieve the direction in which
they are heading, let alone steer away from it."

Some of these threats to the stability of 'stable deterrence' have been
catalogued, in discussions of arms control, under the headings of 'the danger
of accident', '... of folly', '...of unauthorized action', and so forth.

These dangers are easier to catalogue than to combat. The measures
that have been suggested to deal with them appear depressingly feeble
("improved communications," and "international inspection team" that will
go to the scene of unaccountable nuclear explosions...)

However, in my view, it is the technological threat to stable
deterrence that will be decisive.

Let us suppose that agreement is being sought or has been reached
on one or more limited measures: a test ban, demilitarization of outer
space, a cut-off in the production of fissile material, a limit on
stockpiles, controls on numbers of missiles, range of missiles and
testing of missiles, renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons... ⁶

The opposing sides can only be expected to tolerate restrictions
on their freedom to develop strategic weapons, so long as there is in
existence an unmistakable balance of strategic power; that is to say, so
long as the condition of stable deterrence obtains.

Dalimil Kybal, a leading exponent of stable deterrence, analyses in
'Arms Reduction; Program and Issues'⁶ the various types of technological
breakthrough which could destabilize the strategic balance by rendering
the deterrent (on one side or the other) vulnerable to a first strike. These
include improved missile guidance accuracy, improved anti-submarine warning,
and the development of anti-ICBM devices.

⁶ These measures are discussed in moderate detail in *The Nation's Safety and Arms Control* by Arthur T. Hadley. (Viking Press, 1961) and in greater detail in *Arms Reduction; Program and Issues*, Edited by David H. Frisch (Twentieth Century Fund Inc., 1961). The latter is alone in discussing the measures in the context of a stage-by-stage program leading to virtually complete disarmament.

Polanyi 15

It should be noted that these innovations will not arise by chance. Even though both great powers may be fully committed to the stability of deterrence, neither can afford to take the chance that the opponent will be the first to make the destabilizing discovery; destabilizing in his (the opponents) favor. So both must give top priority to research which is designed to undermine the very agreement that both (if they are convinced of the value of arms control) are most anxious to see remain in force. If this competition is allowed to run its course, then the arms race is, in large measure, continuing. Kybal makes this clear when he concludes that,

> "arms control agreements...should permit legal introduction of a new weapon system into the forces as soon as it is apparent that an enemy breakthrough has destabilized the existing force composition; this new weapon must be designed to counter the enemy breakthrough."

However, Kybal hopes that some partially-effective restraints can be applied to the arms-innovation race. It is, however, extremely hard to design such restraints. Unless we alter the nature of our society, developments in civil technology will continue to move very rapidly forward and are bound to affect the art of war.

The only hope of controlling military innovation--and it is a slim one--is at the testing, manufacturing and training stages. But it is really reasonable to suppose that, in a fully-armed world, our opponents will permit us to prowl around looking for evidence of testing, manufacturing or training involving promising new types of weapons or anti-weapons? Surely this is tantamount to asking for an end to all military secrecy?

Of course, it may be argued that both sides, if they are basing their security on stable deterrence, should welcome the opportunity to give and to receive reassurance that the balance is not on the point of being upset. The difficulty with this argument is that in so vital and yet so elusive a matter as military innovation, the sort of reassurance that could be obtained from any inspection scheme (any that might be acceptable to two armed camps) would be utterly inadequate. The problem of inspection for hidden stocks in a disarmed world (alleged to be the stumbling block in all disarmament negotiations) looks quite tractable by comparison.

Faced with the near-impossibility of ending all military innovation some writers have suggested that we adopt a policy which is the complete opposite, namely that we seek to establish joint research and development establishments with the Russians. These joint research undertakings would have to be staffed with the ablest men on either side and be provided with every facility, so that they could outdistance any independent research that might be going on secretly in the participating countries. The joint research would be directed not only to developing new weapons but also to developing the means of implementing a ban on these new weapons, should any country attempt to bring them through the testing, manufacturing and training stages.

Polanyi 16

This proposal seems quite fantastic. It is impossible to believe
that two fully-armed antagonists could agree to undertake a vigorous
program of joint military research. Indeed, they would be very rash to do
so, in view of the large overlap between the technology of strategic
weapons and the technology of tactical weapons. By cooperating in the
development of strategic weapons and anxillary devices, they would also
be assisting one another in the development of tactical weapons--the
-weapons that they would plan to use against one another in the event of
a (limited) conflict.

Stability or Control

We can hope to place some barriers in the way of technological
innovation at the testing stage, through the agency of such measures
as the test ban and the demilitarization of outer space. However, we cannot
hope to stem the strong tide of innovation by this means, only at best, to
deflect it. To protect our deterrent force from the destabilizing effects
of innovations we must be prepared to reorganize and re-equip as the art
of war develops. This is, of course, precisely what the Great Powers
have been doing over the past decade of unstable deterrence. It has
involved them in a continuous process of re-design and re-equipment.
It is this process, coupled with the complementary activity of intensive
military research, that has constituted the economic and psychological
burden of the arms race.

How much different will the situation be in the next decade; even if
we succeed in making it the decade of 'stable deterrence'?

The two related major features of the arms race, competitive military
research and the need to refashion our weapons system, will still be
operative. Can we hope to moderate the pace of the arms race significantly
By building a structure of limited arms control on the basis of the stable
deterrent? Only, it would appear, in the short run. In the long run
the demands of stability, which take precedence over the need to control
the arms race, will come into conflict with the provisions for arms control.

For example (the examples are hypothetical, and are offered simply
by way of illustration) it may be considered necessary, in order to
guarantee the invulnerability of the strategic deterrent, to place missiles
beneath the polar ice cap. This could conflict with the only measure of
arms control which has so far been achieved; the international agreement
to demilitarize the Antarctic. Or (to give another example) it may be
thought essential, in order to counteract the destabilizing effect of
antimissile devices, that we increase the total number of missiles -
contravening an agreement to limit this number. Or, to assure invulnerability
to a first strike, it may be decided that we must disperse our deterrent force
as widely as possible; this would suggest placing the weapons on satellites -
contravening the demilitarization of outer space, at present the most
hopeful area for arms control.

These considerations will be (and should be) in the minds of the
delegates who sit down to negotiate agreements for limited measures of arms
control. Realizing the limited utility and limited life-span of such

Polanyi 17

agreements on armaments. All that we may have proved is that you cannot
reach agreements which are not worth reaching.

An agreement which would undoubtedly be worth reaching is one
which represented a real step toward total disarmament, and which formed
part of a program for total disarmament. But the ultimate political price,
as I have remarked, is high. It would involve a renunciation by all
parties not only of wars from which they have nothing to gain, but
of all wars.

Have we an alternative?

The danger is that we may think we see one in Kahn's proposal;
a last attempt to tame the nuclear monster--by civil defense--and to set
the clock back to the time when major wars could be fought and won.
There seems little doubt that this would result in wars being fought;
but there is very serious doubt as to who or what would win.