NOMINATION OF HENRY A. KISSINGER

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF HENRY A. KISSINGER TO BE SECRETARY
OF STATE

PART 1
SEPTEMBER 7, 10, 11 AND 14, 1973

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

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J. W. FULBRIGHT, Arkansas, Chairman

JOHN SPARKMAN, Alabama

MIKE MANSFIELD, Montana

FRANK CHURCH, Idaho

STUART SYMINGTON, Missouri

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island

GALE W. McGEE, Wyoming

EDMUND S. MUSKIE, Maine

GEORGE S. McGOVERN, South Dakota

HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota

GEORGE D. AIKEN, Vermont

CLIFFORD P. CASE, New Jersey

JACOB K. JAVITS, New York

HUGH SCOTT, Pennsylvania

JAMES B. PEARSON, Kansas

CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois

ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, Michigan

CARL MARCY, Chief of Staff

ARTHUR M. KUHL, Chief Clerk

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CONTENTS

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Page</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Statements by:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Camerota, Nicholas, Jr., National Youth Alliance, Washington, D.C.</td><td>222</td></tr><tr><td>Clark, Bronson P., American Friends Service Committee</td><td>166</td></tr><tr><td>Crown, Joseph H., Cochairman, Lawyers Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam</td><td>175</td></tr><tr><td>Dall, Col. Curtis B., chairman, Board of Policy, Liberty Lobby, accompanied by Robert M. Bartell</td><td>159</td></tr><tr><td>Fraser, Hon. Donald M., a Representative in Congress from the fifth Congressional District of the State of Minnesota; and national chairman, Americans for Democratic Action</td><td>155</td></tr><tr><td>Gruening, Hon. Ernest, former U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska</td><td>184</td></tr><tr><td>Hemenway, John D., National Association of Pro-America</td><td>196</td></tr><tr><td>Kissinger, Henry A., nominee to be Secretary of State</td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>Mendlovitz, Prof. Saul H., Rutgers University, Committee of Concerned Scholars for a Just World Order</td><td>215</td></tr><tr><td>Moore, Rev. Douglas, chairman, Black United Front, accompanied by Absalom F. Jordan, Jr., field chairman</td><td>191</td></tr><tr><td>Small, Dr. William A., president, Federation of American-Arab Organizations, New York, N.Y., accompanied by M. T. Mehdi, executive director</td><td>212</td></tr><tr><td>Insertions for the record:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Biography of Henry A. Kissinger</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><td>Letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright from Henry A. Kissinger, dated September 9, 1973, enclosing letter from Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush, concerning submittal of international agreements to Congress</td><td>24</td></tr><tr><td>Prince Norodom Sihanouk, press conference, May 13, 1969</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>Response to Senator Symington's request that Dr. Kissinger clarify his disagreement with the premise of Senator Symington's question</td><td>37</td></tr><tr><td>Letter to Senator J. W. Fulbright from Attorney General Elliot Richardson, dated September 12, 1973, concerning power of Executive to conduct electronic surveillance</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Kissinger's commentary on the "National Commitments Resolution"</td><td>75</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Kissinger's commentary on section in Senate bill 1443 covering police assistance</td><td>78</td></tr><tr><td>"Peace, National Security, and the SALT Agreements," news release from Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Office of Media Services, August 1, 1972</td><td>122</td></tr><tr><td>Dr. Kissinger's comments on the Department of State news release, "Peace, National Security, and the SALT Agreements"</td><td>126</td></tr><tr><td>U.S. Representatives and Alternate Representatives to the regular sessions of the United Nations General Assembly</td><td>130</td></tr><tr><td>Appendix:</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Responses of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to questions submitted by Senator Curtis for the record</td><td>229</td></tr><tr><td>Responses of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to questions submitted by Senator Hansen for the record</td><td>232</td></tr><tr><td>Responses of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to questions submitted by Senator Edward M. Kennedy for the record</td><td>234</td></tr><tr><td>Responses of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to questions submitted by Senator Hughes for the record</td><td>243</td></tr><tr><td>Responses of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to questions submitted by Senator Abourezk for the record</td><td>244</td></tr></tbody></table>

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FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 7, 1973

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator J. W. Fulbright [chairman], presiding.

Present: Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Church, Symington, Pell, McGee, Muskie, McGovern, Humphrey, Aiken, Case, Javits, Scott, Pearson, Percy, and Griffin.

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

HEARING PROCEDURE

As a preliminary statement on procedure I think the committee should proceed initially under the 10-minute rule. Then after every member has had an opportunity we will be flexible according to the circumstances as they develop.

The Committee on Foreign Relations meets this morning to consider the nomination of Dr. Henry Kissinger to be the next Secretary of State of the United States.

[Biography of Dr. Kissinger follows:]

BIOGRAPHY OF HENRY ALFRED KISSINGER

Position for which considered: Secretary of State

Present position: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Office address: The White House, Washington, D.C. 20500

Born: May 27, 1923, Fuerth, Germany (Naturalized U.S. citizen, June 19, 1943, Spartanburg, South Carolina)

Legal residence: District of Columbia

Marital status: Divorced 1964

Family: Children: Elizabeth, David

Home address: 2527 Waterside Drive, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008

Education: B.A. 1950, Harvard College; M.A. 1952, Harvard University; Ph. D. 1954, Harvard University

Language ability: German, French

Experience:

Government:

1950-61: Consultant, Operations Research Office

1952: Consultant, Director of Psychological Strategy Board

1955: Consultant, Operations Coordinating Board

1959-60: Consultant, Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1961-62: Consultant, National Security Council

1961-68: Consultant, the RAND Corporation

(1)

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1961-68: Consultant, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

1965-68: Consultant, Department of State

Nongovernment:

1954-55: Instructor, Department of Government, Harvard University;

1955-56: Study Director, Nuclear Weapons, and Foreign Policy, Council on Foreign Relations;

1956-58: Director, Special Studies Project, Rockefeller Brothers Fund;

1957-59: Lecturer, Department of Government, Harvard University;

1957-60: Associate Director, Center for International Affairs;

1951-71: Director, Harvard International Seminar;

7/58-1/71: Director, Defense Studies Program, Harvard University (Leave of absence Jan. 1969-Jan. 1971);

7/59-6/62: Associate Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University;

7/62-1/71: Professor, Department of Government, Harvard University (Leave of absence Jan. 1969-Jan. 1971);

9/60-1/71: Faculty Member, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (Leave of absence Jan. 1969-Jan. 1971); and

1968 Presidential Campaign: Foreign Policy Adviser to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller.

Military service:

2/43-5/46: 84th Infantry Division; 970th Counter-Intelligence Corps

1946-59: Captain Military Intelligence Reserve

Awards:

Bronze Star

Phi Beta Kappa; Harvard National Scholarship; Harvard Fellowship (non-stipendiary); Harvard Detur; Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship for Political Theory

1958:

National Junior Chamber of Commerce Award

Woodrow Wilson Prize for the best book in the fields of government, politics and international affairs

Citation by the Overseas Press Club, for *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*

1965-66: Guggenheim Fellowship

1973:

Federal City Club Award for very distinguished public service

American Institute for Public Service Award for the greatest public service performed by an elected or appointed official

International Platform Association, 1973 Theodore Roosevelt Award for the most outstanding official in the United States Government

Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States, Dwight David Eisenhower Distinguished Service Medal and Citation

Publications:

Books:

*A World Restored: Castlercagh, Metternich and Restoration of Peace, 1812-1822*, Houghton-Mifflin, October, 1957.

*Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Harper & Brothers, June, 1957.

*The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy*, Harper & Brothers, January, 1961.

*The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*, McGraw Hill, April, 1965.

*Problems of National Strategy: A Book of Readiness*, ed. Kissinger, Frederick A. Praeger, November, 1965.

*American Foreign Policy, Three Essays*, W. W. Norton, 1969.

Articles:

"Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich," *American Political Science Review*, December, 1954.

"American Policy and Preventive War," *Yale Review*, April, 1955.

"Military Policy and the Defense of the 'Grey' Areas," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1955.

"Limitations of Diplomacy," *The New Republic*, May 6, 1955.

"Congress of Vienna," *World Politics*, January, 1956.

"Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1956.

"Reflections on American Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs*, October, 1956.

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"Strategy and Organization," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1957.

"Controls, Inspection and Limited War," *The Reporter*, June 13, 1957.

"United States Foreign Policy and Higher Education," *Current Issues in Higher Education*. March, 1958.

"Missiles and the Western Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1958.

"Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1958.

"The Policymaker and the Intellectual," *The Reporter*, March 5, 1959.

"As Urgent as the Moscow Threat," *New York Times Magazine*, March, 1959.

"The Search for Stability," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1959.

"The Khrushchev Visit—Dangers and Hopes," *New York Times Magazine*, September 6, 1959.

"Arms Control, Inspection and Surprise Attack," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1960.

"Limited War: Nuclear or Conventional? A Reappraisal," *Daedalus*, Fall, 1960.

"The New Cult of Neutralism," *The Reporter*, November 24, 1960.

"The Next Summit Meeting," *Harper's Magazine*, December, 1960.

"For An Atlantic Confederacy," *The Reporter*, February 2, 1961.

"L'Evolution de la Doctrine Strategique aux Etats-Unis," *Politique Etrangere*, No. 2, 1962.

"The Unsolved Problems of European Defense," *Foreign Affairs*, July, 1962.

"Reflections on Cuba," *The Reporter*, November 22, 1962.

"Strains on the Alliance," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1963.

"The Skybolt Affair," *The Reporter*, January 17, 1963.

"NATO's Nuclear Dilemma," *The Reporter*, March 28, 1963.

"Coalition Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age," *Foreign Affairs*, July 1964. (Reprinted in *Survival, Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine*, and *The Atlantic Community Quarterly*.)

"Reflections on Power and Diplomacy," *Dimensions in Diplomacy*, Johns Hopkins Press, 1964.

"Les Etats-Unis et l'Europe," *Res Publica*, Revue de l'Institut Belge de Science Politique, Volume VI, 1964-1, p. 52-7.

"Classical Diplomacy," *Power & Order: Six Cases in World Politics*, Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964.

"The Illusionist: Why We Misunderstand de Gaulle," *Harper's*, March, 1965.

"Kann Man Den Soviets Trauen?" *Die Welt*, April 3, 1965.

"The Price of German Unity," *The Reporter*, April 22, 1965. (Reprinted in *Die Zeit*)

"Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," *Daedalus*, April, 1966.

"For a New Atlantic Alliance," *The Reporter*, July 14, 1966. (Reprinted in *Die Welt, Die Wehrkunde, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*)

"What Should We Do Now?" *Look*, August 9, 1966, p. 26.

"The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," *Daedalus*, Summer, 1968.

"Bureaucracy and Policy Making: The Effect of Insiders and Outsiders on the Policy Process," *Bureaucracy Politics, and Strategy*, Security Studies Paper No. 17, Univ. of Calif., Los Angeles, 1968.

"Central Issues of American Foreign Policy," *Agenda for the Nation*, The Brookings Institution, 1968.

"The Vietnam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs*, January, 1969.

## INADEQUACY OF PAST INFORMAL MEETINGS WITH WITNESS

The CHAIRMAN. During the past 4 years, members of the committee have met with Dr. Kissinger in his role as the head of the National Security Council informally in places other than the committee room for brief discussions of some of his activities.

Personally, I have never believed that such casual meetings were adequate substitutes for formal committee meetings for the consideration of our country's foreign policy or our military, diplomatic activi-

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ties. I am pleased that today we may have this meeting for a serious examination of Dr. Kissinger's views and of his actions during the past 4 years which are relevant to his responsibilities as the principal adviser to the Government on foreign affairs.

If I may recall a personal experience, on March 27, 1969, I met with Dr. Kissinger and the President at 5 o'clock in the afternoon in the Oval Office of the White House. We had a pleasant discussion in which I expressed the hope, that the President would end the Vietnam war in the near future. I based that hope on the President's assertions during the campaign of 1968 that he had a plan to end the war. I recall saying to the President if he did end the war soon, he would be regarded as a national hero just as Charles de Gaulle was after he ended France's war with Algeria.

I left the meeting with the belief that the President and Dr. Kissinger were in accord with my views about the war. Dr. Kissinger, as I left the White House, assured me that the new administration would not follow the Johnson administration's policies in Indochina. I took him to mean the war would be ended forthwith in accordance with the President's plan. Obviously there was a failure of communication and no meeting of minds.

On April 23, 1970, an informal meeting of eight Senators with Dr. Kissinger was held in my house from about 5:30 to about 7 o'clock.

One week later, on April 30, American forces invaded Cambodia, to the surprise of all of us. So again there was a failure of communication and no meeting of minds. Today I hope we begin a new era and I hope there will be communication and a meeting of the minds—and even an understanding of the role and responsibility of the Senate and of the Secretary of State in making the country's foreign policy.

## NEW OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Dr. Kissinger is widely regarded as possessing a brilliant mind, and an iron constitution capable of endless travel and interminable conferences. His travels to China and Russia have helped change the climate of international relations, a change long overdue and for which I congratulate him. How wisely we cultivate these new opportunities is one of the issues which will concern all of us and I hope is an issue which this hearing will clarify.

## HOPED-FOR NONPARTISAN NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

In a recent speech before the International Platform Association on August 2, 1973, Dr. Kissinger expressed fear of the loss of the national consensus which once sustained our foreign policy and hoped for its restoration, because as you pointed out, "No foreign policy," and I quote, "... has any chance of success if it is born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none."

There is no doubt that every member of this committee shares your hope for a nonpartisan national foreign policy on whose broad essentials the Congress, the Executive, both parties, and the American people can form a consensus. I know I speak for my colleagues in assuring the administration that it can count on the cooperation of this committee in the formation of such a foreign policy.

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Unity and nonpartisanship, however, require more than a simple act of will, more than a simple decision that hereafter we will have no controversy over our foreign relations.

The unity or lack of it with which Congress and the country is bound to a particular administration's policies must depend upon those policies themselves. Policies formed by open, democratic process, policies shaped by consensus among the people and their representatives, policies rooted in our national character and values can hardly fail to command unified nonpartisan support. Conversely, policies made in secret and by executive fiat, policies which go against our national grain are bound to be divisive, no matter how greatly our policymakers may regret it.

The divisions and disruptions of recent years are not properly attributed to partisanship in Congress or to a quarrelsome press, but to a foreign policy, as you put it so well, which was born in the minds of a few and carried in the hearts of none.

I refer primarily, of course, to the prolongation of the war in Southeast Asia. As I have already stated, the administration you served came to office in 1969 on a platform of ending the war. The President, we are told, had a plan, and not the slightest indication was given that his plan would not bring peace until 4 years later, and then only when Congress belatedly required it.

This is not to denigrate in any way your own role of bringing about the Paris agreement which all of us approved, but only to point out that it was the continuation of the war during 4 years of this administration which divided the Congress, weakened our economy, and sapped our national morale, and it was this divisiveness engendered by these policies which finally drove the beleaguered administration to unprecedented acts, which have so seriously disrupted our democratic system.

## OTHER ISSUES

There are, of course, many other issues which will develop as the hearings progress. The committee has received nine requests to testify by representatives of various organizations and private citizens, a further evidence of the interest of the people in you, Dr. Kissinger, and in your new responsibilities.

The dual role which the President has given you raises some serious questions which need to be examined.

## SWEARING OF WITNESSES

In accordance with recent practice of our committee, Dr. Kissinger will rise and be sworn.

In this hearing do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. KISSINGER. I do.

## BACKGROUND OF WITNESSES

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kissinger, since this is your first appearance before any Senate committee in public session, so far as I know, could you for the record give, very briefly, some of the background about

6

your youth, your birth, education, experience, prior to becoming the
President's principal adviser in 1969. Then make whatever statement
you care to.

## TESTIMONY OF HENRY A. KISSINGER, NOMINEE TO BE SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. KISSINGER. I was born in 1923 in the city of Fuerth in Germany, and went to primary school and several years of secondary school in that city. I emigrated to the United States with my parents in 1938, and attended high school in New York City. I was then obliged to work during the day and attended the College of the City of New York, at night until I was inducted into the armed services of the United States in 1943.

I served with the 84th Infantry Division and later with the Counter-
intelligence Corps until May 1946, and stayed on for a year as a
civilian employee with the U.S. Army.

In 1947 I returned to complete my undergraduate work at Harvard.
At Harvard also I took my Ph. D. degree, which I completed in 1954.
I eventually joined the faculty of Harvard University. I have func-
tioned as consultant to various administrations, first with the Eisen-
hower administration in the fifties, then the Kennedy and Johnson
administrations, before President Nixon invited me to become his
Assistant for National Security Affairs. I served in that position un-
til President Nixon nominated me for the position of Secretary of
State, and I still hold the position of Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Will you proceed with your statement?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

After talking to the chairman and most members of the commit-
tee, I have the impression that your purposes would best be served if
we moved quickly to your questions. Therefore, I shall confine my
opening remarks to a statement outlining the attitude I propose to
bring to the Office of Secretary of State if the committee and Sen-
ate should confirm my nomination. I take this approach, moreover, be-
cause the close and cooperative relationship that we shall seek between
the executive and legislative branches in foreign affairs depends
ultimately on the spirit with which it is implemented.

## PAST SECRETARIES OF STATE

My first thought is of the past and the great Americans who have
held the office to which the President has nominated me. I derive both
inspiration and a sense of gravity from that impressive roster, whether
at the dawn of this Nation's history—Jefferson, Marshall, Madison,
Monroe, Adams, Clay—or just since World War II—Byrnes, Mar-
shall, Acheson, Dulles, Herter, Rusk, Rogers. These men, however dif-
ferent their styles and personalities, epitomized one fundamental real-
ity: That the foreign policy of the United States transcends parties
and administrations. It expresses our ideals, our purposes and our
hopes for the world. It must fulfill the best in America.

7

If confirmed, I shall always be conscious that I hold in trust the legacy of some of our greatest and noblest men.

## TRIBUTE TO SECRETARY ROGERS

Let me pay tribute to my predecessor who performed his duties with such dignity and decency for 4½ years. Secretary Rogers headed the Department of State during one of the most difficult periods in our history, when we had to adjust policies to new realities amid major domestic contention. His calm judgment and his humanity helped steer us through this passage and win the respect even of those who disagreed with administration policies. The President and I will continue to look to him for counsel and support.

## RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEACE AT HOME AND ABROAD

Mr. Chairman, we have come to experience in recent years that peace at home and peace abroad are closely related. How well we perform in foreign policy depends importantly on how purposeful we are at home. America has passed through a decade of domestic turbulence which has deepened divisions and even shaken our national self-confidence in some measure. At the same time, profound changes have occurred in the world around us, now a generation after World War II. Our era is marked by both the anxieties of a transitional period and the opportunities of fresh creation.

These challenges, though they appear as practical issues, cannot be solved in technical terms; they closely reflect our view of ourselves. They require a sense of identity and purpose as much as a sense of policy. Throughout our history we have thought of what we did as growing out of deeper moral values. America was not true to itself unless it had a meaning beyond itself. In this spiritual sense, America was never isolationist.

This must remain our attitude.

This is why our international policies must enlist the contributions of our best people regardless of political persuasion. Our task is to define—together—the contours of a new world, and to shape America's contribution to it. Our foreign policy cannot be effective if it reflects only the sporadic and esoteric initiatives of a small group of specialists. It must rest on a broad national base and reflect a shared community of values.

With good will on all sides, I deeply believe that we can reach this goal. There is no dispute about many of the fundamental objectives of national policy. We are at a crucial point of transition in the international order, with major changes in the global structure promising a more peaceful world:

### CHANGES IN GLOBAL STRUCTURE PROMISING MORE PEACEFUL WORLD

Successful postwar policies have helped our friends to new strength and responsibilities. We shall work constructively and openly with our partners in Europe and Japan to give new impetus to associations based on shared purposes and ideals. We shall always remember that the vitality of our friendships is the

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necessary condition for the lowering of tensions with our opponents.

We have developed fresh relationships with adversaries that can ease us away from confrontation toward cooperation. Tensions have been reduced in many areas. For the first time since the end of World War II, all great nations have become full participants in the international system. There is the hope that the arms race can be arrested and the burden of armaments reduced.

Our most anguishing and divisive problem, the Vietnam war, is behind us. We achieved a negotiated settlement last January. The Congress has since expressed its view on how to terminate our military participation in the last area of conflict—Cambodia. As you gentlemen know, the administration differs with that view. But it will not attempt to circumvent it.

## TRADITIONAL ASSUMPTIONS NEEDING ADJUSTMENT

We face unprecedented issues which transcend borders and ideologies andbeckon global cooperation. Many traditional assumptions need adjustment. We have viewed ourselves as blessed with unlimited agricultural surpluses; today we must contemplate scarcity in relation to world needs. We have assumed self-sufficiency in energy; now we face increasing needs for external supply at least for an interim period. Environmental problems used to be considered national issues, if they were considered at all; now many must be met internationally if they are going to be met at all. We need to explore new conceptual frontiers to reflect the new reality produced by both technology and human aspirations: that our planet has become a truly global society.

## CHALLENGE FACING NATION

This administration will continue to adapt America's role to these new conditions. But we cannot take for granted what has been begun. We cannot let irretrievable opportunities slip from our grasp. Just as we have benefited from the efforts of our predecessors, so must we build for our successors. What matters to other countries—and to the world—is not so much the work of one administration as the steadiness of America. So the Nation is challenged to render our purposes durable and our performance reliable. This we achieved during most of a generation after the Second World War. We need to continue to do so.

This will require mutual effort and mutual understanding. We will do our part. The President has charged me with helping him to shape a foreign policy that can endure because it is carried in the hearts as well as the minds of Americans.

## BROADER BASED PARTICIPATION WITHIN EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The first necessity is a broader based participation within the executive branch. During the last 4 years, there were many delicate initiatives that required a high degree of secrecy and concentration of effort. Crucial foundations were laid. Now we need to build on these foundations a more permanent structure that we can pass on to succeeding administrations. Durability in foreign policy is achieved in the final analysis through the deep and continuing involvement of the

9

dedicated professionals of the State Department and Foreign Service, who will manage our foreign affairs long after this administration has ended. Thus one of my principal responsibilities as Secretary of State will be to infuse the Department of State with a sense of participation, intellectual excitement, and mission.

As you know, the President has asked me to retain my position as assistant to the President if I am confirmed as Secretary of State. I believe this will benefit the coherence and effectiveness of our foreign policy. The Secretary of State will be clearly the principal foreign policy adviser to the President. The locus of authority and the chain of authority will be unambiguous. Bureaucratic friction will be minimized. As the President said in announcing my appointment, the unity of position will underline the traditional principal role of the Department of State in the policymaking process.

## CLOSER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES

There must be, as well, a closer relationship between the executive and legislative branches. It is the President's objective to make policy more accessible to the scrutiny and the views of the Congress. This is the fundamental answer to the question of executive privilege. As you gentlemen know, over an extended period of time when I was fully covered by this principle, I met regularly with the members of this committee, both individually and as a group, and most frequently with the chairman. I did so partly because I valued this association on personal grounds, but above all because of my conviction that this Nation faced no more urgent requirement than to promote mutual respect where a consensus was unattainable.

In my new capacity, I shall be prepared to testify formally on all my activities in either capacity. In other words, I shall testify with respect to all matters traditionally covered by Secretaries of State and on my duties as assistant to the President concerning interdepartmental issues. I will not claim executive privilege in either capacity except for the one area customarily invoked by Cabinet officers, that is, direct communications with the President or the actual deliberations of the National Security Council.

We will, of course, need to determine together which subjects should be treated in public and which in executive session.

In short, as a result of my combined position, the committee should receive substantially more information than it has in the past. We will have acted positively on one of your most central concerns.

This process of greater cooperation will not be confined to formal testimony. If confirmed, I will propose to meet immediately with the chairman and the ranking member to work out procedures for enabling the committee to share more fully in the design of our foreign policy.

I will follow a similar approach with the House Foreign Affairs Committee and with the leaders of both branches of Congress, as well as with other congressional groupings of proper jurisdictions.

## WHAT IS MEANT BY "BIPARTISANSHIP"

This prompts the question, what do we mean by bipartisanship? We do not ask for rubberstamping and we cannot expect unanimity. Serious people obviously will continue to have differences. Where profound

10

disagreements exist, it would be self-defeating to paper them over with empty formulas. We, in turn, cannot give up basic principles; nor can we promise to act only when there is bipartisan agreement, though this will be our preference. But we shall work to shape a broad consensus on our national goals and to confine differences to tactical issues. When our views differ, we shall strive not to press the debate to a point that tears the overall fabric of the national consensus. We will seek to maintain a climate of mutual trust so that arguments can center on methods, not motives. We hope that this restraint will be mutual. In this manner, our foreign policy debate can avoid the extremes of civil war and sterile accord for its own sake.

## DEEPENING PARTNERSHIP WITH AMERICAN PEOPLE

If our foreign policy is to be truly national, we must deepen our partnership with the American people. This means an open articulation of our philosophy, our purposes, and our actions. We have sought to do this in the past, in the President's annual reports to the Congress on foreign policy. Equally, we must listen to the hopes and aspirations of our fellow countrymen. I plan, therefore, on a regular basis, to elicit the views of America's opinion leaders and to share our perspectives freely.

## URGENT NEED FOR RECONCILIATION

Mr. Chairman, I have sketched an agenda for seeking a more durable peace abroad and a cooperative climate at home. Both objectives point to the urgent need for reconciliation. Americans have recently endured the turmoil of assassinations and riots, racial and generational confrontations, and a bitter, costly war. Just as we were emerging from that conflict, we were plunged into still another ordeal.

These traumatic events have cast lengthening shadows over our traditional optimism and self-esteem. A loss of confidence in our own country would inevitably be mirrored in our international relations. Where once we ran the risk of thinking we were too good for the world, we might now swing to believing we are not good enough. Where once a soaring optimism tempted us to dare too much, a shrinking spirit could lead us to attempt too little. Such an attitude—and the foreign policy it would produce—would deal a savage blow to global stability.

But I am hopeful about our prospects. America is resilient. The dynamism of this country is irrepressible. Whatever our divisions, we can rally to the prospects of building a world at peace and responsive to humane aspirations. In so doing, we can replenish our reservoir of faith.

## OUR COMMON CHALLENGE

This, then, is our common challenge:

* To distinguish the fundamental from the ephemeral.

* To seek out what unites us, without stifling the healthy debate that is the lifeblood of democracy.

* To promote the positive trends that are the achievements not just of this administration but also of those who came before.

* To shape new initiatives that will serve not just the next 40 months but also the decades to follow.

11

A few years before he died, one of our most distinguished Secretaries of State, Dean Acheson, entitled his memoirs, "Present at the Creation." He chose that title because he was one of the leading participants in the creation of the postwar international system. The challenge before our country now is whether our generation has the vision—as Dean Acheson's did more than two decades ago—to turn into dynamic reality the hopeful beginnings we have made toward a more durable peace and a more benevolent planet.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I am confident that, working together, we can speed the day when all of us here will be able to say that we were "present at the creation" of a new era of peace, justice, and humanity.

Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Kissinger. I think that is a very eloquent statement and it covers some of the fundamental questions with which we are concerned.

## ALLEGED WIRETAPS OF WITNESS STAFF AND PRESS MEMBERS

I am prompted to put a few questions by your statement that, "We will seek to maintain a climate of mutual trust so that arguments can center on methods, not motives." One of the disturbing recent developments has been the revelations in the press, that several of your staff associates and members of the press, some 17, altogether, I believe, were subjected to electronic surveillance without their knowledge. This concerns, it seems to me, a very serious matter of procedure and mutual trust within our Government, and a procedure which I do not believe is in accord with our traditions. I believe it would be useful to you and to the committee to clarify just exactly what was the truth about these allegations.

Could I ask you, did you or anyone else acting in your name, or on your authority, first purpose any of these wiretaps?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I think it would be helpful if I explained the circumstances of this particular event, and I think that will contain the answer to your question.

When this administration came into office, for a period of many months it was confronted with leaks to the press of documents that were considered of the greatest importance to the national security. These included discussions of National Security Council deliberations, of procedures in the case of emergency, of contingency planning, and of specific military operations.

The last conversation, in fact, that I had with President Eisenhower was when he called me from Walter Reed Hospital to protest that information that had been given to him by the President only 2 days before as extremely confidential had found its way into a newspaper on the day that he called.

In early May 1969, the President consulted the then Director of the FBI and the Attorney General about the best methods to deal with this problem. He was told that the most effective method was to apply procedures that had been followed also in previous administrations; that is to say, to tap individuals according to specific procedures. He was assured by the then Attorney General that this procedure met the legal requirements.

12

At that time I had been in the Government for 4 months, and I must say that it did not occur to me to question the judgment of these two individuals.

Certain criteria were then established, to follow precise procedures. These criteria were access to information that had leaked, and also information that might be developed in the course of the investigation.

My office was required to submit the names of those officials that had had access to the information that had leaked, because my office was a natural place for this information to exist.

The information was then transmitted by General Haig to Inspector Sullivan of the FBI.

After wiretaps were placed on certain individuals. I was not neces-
sarily informed of the fact that a wiretap had been placed. The FBI
would send a report to my office if the telephone conversation in-
cluded information that in the judgment of the FBI contained NSC
information. In other words, we did not receive reports on conversa-
tions in general. We did not receive regular reports about the contents
of these conversations. My office received reports only when, in the
judgment of the FBI, something was said that might involve national
security information.

These reports were screened by General Haig, and if in his judgment
they contained information of sufficient seriousness that they might
warrant action, they were brought to my attention.

WIRETAPS ON WITNESS' STAFF

In other words, the result of this double screening, first by the
FBI and then by my own staff, was that I saw very few of these re-
ports myself, and then only if, in the judgment of both the FBI and
of my staff, my staff in this case being General Haig, they contained
information of sufficient seriousness that action might have to be
considered.

After some months of this procedure, in the summer of 1970 it
was decided that the internal security aspects of national security
should be separated from the foreign policy aspects, in other words,
that my office should no longer have anything to do with the internal
security aspects of national security. From then on all these reports
went to Mr. Haldeman's office and not to mine. Also, from that time
on my office did not participate in any of the other internal security
operations that have recently come to public attention.

Informal liaison was maintained, however, in the one area that had
predated this decision, between General Haig and Mr. Sullivan of
the FBI. If the wiretaps that continued developed information of
sufficient gravity, Inspector Sullivan would call up General Haig and
either inform him of that fact or call his attention to the fact that
a report containing that information had been sent to Mr. Haldeman.

At this point I remember only one such event, but there may have
been others.

This is the extent of the participation of my office in a program that
we had reason to believe followed procedures of preceding admin-
istrations, and that was carried out by procedures believed to be legal
at the time, and in which every individual action was individually

13

authorized by both the Director of the FBI and the Attorney General, and in which the results of the investigation came to my office only for a while, only when they concerned national security matters, and after that not at all.

### TIME PERIOD OF WIRETAPS

The CHAIRMAN. How long, Dr. Kissinger, did the wiretaps continue? During what period were they?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I understand that they continued from May 1969 to February of 1971.

### END PRODUCT OF WIRETAPS

The CHAIRMAN. Could you tell us the end product of the wiretaps? Were the sources of the leaks discovered?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, I would prefer not to go into individual cases. There were cases in which the sources of some leaks were discovered and in which appropriate action was taken, but I do not think it would be fair to go into individual cases.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any objection to doing that in executive session?

Mr. KISSINGER. I believe that individual cases should be discussed by the Department of Justice and by the FBI, because I do not have any records in my office.

### AVAILABILITY OF REPORT ON WIRETAPS TO COMMITTEE

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Kissinger, the committee has requested from the Attorney General the copy of the report on these 17 alleged wiretaps and he has declined to make them available. Since they involved your office and your activities, do you not think they should be made available to the committee?

Mr. KISSINGER. The problem of revealing the content of FBI reports, Mr. Chairman, is a matter that involves many issue of fairness, and the usual procedure has been that the raw material of the FBI should not be made available. But I would prefer that this matter be discussed with the Attorney General directly.

### DID ALLEGED WIRETAP CONTINUE ON PERSON NOW EMPLOYED BY COMMITTEE?

The CHAIRMAN. One of the persons alleged to have been wiretapped is a member of the staff of this committee, which gives us, gives even me, a certain interest above the ordinary. He was at one time on your staff and I would like to know whether or not the wiretap continued after he became an employee of this committee.

Could you tell us whether it did or not?

Mr. KISSINGER. I do not have these records, but I think it should be determined, if such an individual was tapped, whether the wiretaps continued after he became an employee of this committee. I would doubt it very seriously.

I might explain, Mr. Chairman, that after a tap was placed on somebody, the only way I would be able to tell whether it had continued

21-172-73-pt. 1—2

14

would be if that person had used what the FBI considered national security information in a telephone conversation and a report had been made to my office. Therefore, my own recollection of this would be highly unreliable.

I do not recall any conversations between any Members of Congress and any members of my staff. But I cannot, out of my own knowledge, give you the precise date of the termination.

The CHAIRMAN. I was not asking you for the raw materials. I would think you would know whether or not the loyalty of any individual on your staff was cast in doubt. I particularly am interested.

I asked Mr. Ruckelshaus whether any members of this committee or members of the staff of this committee had been wiretapped. He came to my office. He did not reply in writing. He assured me that they had not been. Subsequent to that particular meeting, the press carried the report that one of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee staff, had been tapped. Of course, referring back to your statement, a climate of trust is not promoted if it is believed that members of the committee or of the staff are being tapped by members of the executive branch.

It seems to me this ought to be cleared up, that we ought to be assured that it was not or there was not going to be any in the future.

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman. I am sure that it is correct to say that if a member of your committee staff was tapped, it almost certainly preceded his employment on your staff, and it was due to the technical fact that he had been in a position where he had automatic access to the information that was in question and did not have anything to do with any duties that he later assumed. But I simply am not in a position from my own knowledge, under oath, to tell you the precise date of termination.

## REPORT PREPARED ON 17 WIRETAPS

The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen the report, which I believe was prepared by Mr. Ruckelshaus or under his direction, of these 17 taps? Have you seen that report?

Mr. KISSINGER. Mr. Chairman, on Wednesday afternoon the Attorney General informed me of the fact that there was such a report. Until that time I was not aware that the report existed. He sent a copy over to me, and I leafed through it and returned the report to him. It represents a summary of information picked up on these wiretaps.

The CHAIRMAN. That is the summary I had reference to, not what I believe they call the raw material. I think the summary is all we would be interested in. And I think to clarify it would certainly contribute to the generation of this climate of mutual trust which you mentioned.

My time is up. I will resume later.

Mr. KISSINGER. May I say one thing about this particular point? Since the time that this decision was made in May 1969, the Supreme Court has made a new definition of the procedures to be followed in the use of wiretaps, and therefore, many of the issues that have been raised with respect to the previous wiretapping by this or by previous

15

administrations have to a very large extent become moot. In any
future national security cases we would expect to observe scrupulously
the decision of the Court and bear in mind very seriously the division
between the concerns of national security and the requirements of
liberty which my predecessor referred to and which is a statement
with which I generally agree.

The CHAIRMAN. I think your predecessor recently made a public
statement that he did not approve of wiretaps of his associates. But
however that may be, inasmuch as you have been shown the summary,
I am unable to see why the committee is not entitled to see the sum-
mary also because we are involved in this very seriously, I think, and
very interestingly. But we will return to that. I do not wish to take
further time.

Senator Sparkman.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Dr. Kissinger, I join with the Chairman in commending you for the
very fine statement that you have given to us. It seems to me that it is
a considerable assurance of the State Department and this committee
being able to work together. I have enjoyed the various informal meet-
ings to which you referred in your statement. I have said many times
that even though these were not formal committee meetings, I know
of no instance in which you did not fully and frankly answer the ques-
tions that were put to you by the members of the committee.

## NECESSITY OF TWO-POSITION ARRANGEMENT

Here is the thing that causes me some, I will not say concern, but
makes me wonder why it is felt necessary to have this two-position
arrangement. If you are Secretary of State in my conception you are
the alter-ego of the President with reference to international relations.
Is that not in a general way correct?

MR. KISSINGER. That is in a general way correct, Senator. But, of
course, every President has the right to conduct foreign policy in the
way that helps him most in making decisions. There has been no invari-
able precedent that this would always be the case, but it is generally the
case, and, in my judgment, it should be the case.

Senator SPARKMAN. Why is it necessary for you to be designated
Assistant to the President?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, decisions under the NSC system are made
in two ways: One, they are made within the Department, in formula-
tion of departmental views. Second, as the NSC system has evolved in
several previous administrations and in this administration, there is
an interdepartmental mechanism in which each department then can
present its views to the President, and in which an individual is des-
ignated as Assistant to the President for preparing the presentations
of the various departmental views.

Now, in my particular case, I have really exercised three roles in my
office as Assistant to the President, of which two grew up gradually
over the first 4 years of the President's term and the third has remained
constant. The constant role is that which I have just described, of

16

managing the interdepartmental process. The additional roles have been those of adviser to the President and of a negotiator for certain sensitive, complex issues requiring a very direct relationship with the President, such as the opening to China, the negotiations with the Soviet Union, the negotiations with the Vietnamese on the peace settlement. And there have been other negotiations of this nature. Now, when I move to the Department of State those two additional roles will obviously move with me.

As I said, the third role has been that of an adviser, where the President would ask my judgment as to various opinions presented to him. Now, when I move to the Department of State the advisory role will move with me, and the President will not ask me whether I am speaking to him as Assistant or Secretary of State, and I will not wear two hats with respect to the advisory role.

The negotiating role will move with me and I will not wear two hats in relation to the negotiations that I may conduct on behalf of the President. I have already discussed with the executive secretariat of the State Department how we can organize the flow of information so that it is located now primarily in the State Department with respect to the negotiations that I may conduct.

That leaves my role as Assistant to the President concentrated primarily on the interdepartmental process. In that interdepartmental process I have considered it my obligation to see to it that the President receives in as fair and full a manner as possible the spectrum of points of view that exist within the bureaucracy. That is the role which the President has asked me to continue to exercise, and it is in that role that I will function as Assistant, and almost exclusively in that role.

The operation of that role has many checks and balances built into it, because if a matter goes to the National Security Council, all the appropriate Cabinet members are present, and they will be personal judges of the fairness of that process. If it is handled by documents and not handled by a formal session, there will always be a subordinate body of an interdepartmental nature, and if a department feels that it has not received a fair hearing its Cabinet member can always demand a meeting with the President. Of course, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has by law the right of direct access to the President. It is in this manner that we believe that these two positions can be combined. The interdepartmental system having developed in this manner, the President wanted to preserve the Assistant's role for this particular sphere.

NARROWNESS OF WITNESS' USE OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Senator SPARKMAN. Of course, as you know, some of the difficulty that we have had in cooperation and coordination with the Congress and the Executive, and particularly the Foreign Relations Committee in the field of foreign relations, has derived from this invoking of executive privilege. I was pleased to see the statement that you made with reference to the narrowness, I suppose is a proper word for it, with which you would make use of that.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct, Senator. I can repeat what I have said in my statement, and what I have said informally to many of the Senators of this committee.

17

PURPOSE OF WIRETAPS

Senator SPARKMAN. Let me say this with reference to the questions that the chairman made regarding these wiretaps. Do I understand correctly that at the time they were made it was for the purpose of finding out where national security leaks were coming from?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, this was the only thing, and there was no personal issue involved at all. That is proved by the fact that several of the individuals who have been mentioned in the newspapers have continued to work with me in close and confidential relationships and have continued to be close personal friends of mine. It was a very painful process which was believed to be necessary for the protection of national security, and a very difficult thing. But it was done for only that reason.

LEGALITY OF WIRETAPS

Senator SPARKMAN. Am I correct in my understanding that this was done at a time when it was not necessary to get an order from a judge?

Mr. KISSINGER. It was my understanding, at the time that I was asked to supply the names, that it was a procedure followed also in preceding administrations. I do not know this of my own knowledge. And second, that it had been declared legal by the Attorney General, who individually certified every case before it was instituted.

COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator SPARKMAN. Dr. Kissinger, before I surrender my time, I want to commend and congratulate you upon some of the most tremendous performances that anybody has ever been able to achieve. I think you built, shall I say, new life in international relations between our country and other countries of the world. I congratulate you upon your appointment by the President and I wish you great success. I feel certain that, so far as our committee is concerned, we will be able to work together quite well with you.

Mr. KISSINGER. Thank you.

Senator SPARKMAN. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Aiken.

DOES RETAINING PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANT POSITION REPRESENT POLICY CHANGE?

Senator AIKEN. Mr. Chairman, since we have some very important international meetings impending, including the United Nations meeting, which is due to convene within the next 2 weeks, and since it is necessary for the Secretary of State of the United States to attend those meetings, I feel that we should not delay in determining just who will be our Secretary of State. Therefore, I have only two or three questions to ask, feeling sure that any questions which I might have asked will be asked by other members of the committee. The first question relates to your statement that you will retain your position as Assistant to the President, and also be Secretary of State. You say, "The Secretary of State will be clearly the principal foreign policy adviser to the President. The locus of authority and the chain of authority will be unambiguous."

18

Does this represent a change in the policy of Government?

Mr. KISSINGER. No, it does not represent a full change. But in the last three administrations the fact that there has been an Assistant to the President located at the White House and a Secretary of State has led to endless speculation as to who was the dominant influence. It tended to encourage a certain bureaucratic rivalry. So there is no formal change in the position, but it will make it easier to implement what has always been the position.

## AMBIGUITY OF LOCUS OF AUTHORITY

Senator AIKEN. But you say the locus of authority and the chain of authority will be unambiguous. How long has it been ambiguous? [Laughter.]

I assume that you are telling us that it has been ambiguous in the past. Do you refer simply to the present administration or to other administrations?

Mr. KISSINGER. No, I think this is a situation which has existed since the last years of the Eisenhower administration. It certainly existed in the Kennedy-Johnson administrations as well. It is inherent in the nature of the function, and it is not necessarily a bad thing.

Senator AIKEN. You mean that it was ambiguous when Secretary Dulles—

Mr. KISSINGER. No, after Secretary Dulles.

Senator AIKEN. Secretary Herter, Rusk, Rogers, the last one you mentioned.

Mr. KISSINGER. I think the process of the institutionalization began under President Eisenhower at the time that Secretary Herter was in office. It was elaborated under President Kennedy, continued under President Johnson, and continued under President Nixon.

## NEW INFORMATION TO BE RECEIVED BY COMMITTEE

Senator AIKEN. I realize it is very difficult to draw a precise line of ambiguity so I will go on to the next question, which is, which relates to your statement, "In short, as a result of my combined position, the committee should receive substantially more information than it has in the past."

What information do you feel that the committee should have received that it did not receive in the past? [Laughter.]

And/or to put it the other way, of what will the new information be comprised?

Mr. KISSINGER. In my previous meetings with the committee there was expressed by various Senators a rather strong view that there were many areas that were withheld from them on the grounds of executive privilege, primarily matters of an interdepartmental nature which tended to fall between various stools. And what this paragraph attempts to say in perhaps too eloquent language, is that the types of questions that were asked of me by the committee in the informal sessions that we used to have before can now be asked in a formal hearing. And therefore, whatever lacunae existed in previous testimony on interdepartmental matters or on matters that might be entrusted to me in any capacity as special emissary for the President I could now testify to, where I could not previously.

19

SUGGESTION OF CURTAILING FOOD EXPORTS

Senator AIKEN. Thank you for those answers. I have a couple more questions of a more practical nature to help members of the committee in arriving at the decision which they will have to make. First, should we, as some have suggested, curtail exports of food to other countries except during emergency periods?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, this is really a new problem for us, because for the greater part of my foreign policy experience and for all the period that I have been in office, it was one of the basic objectives of American foreign and American agricultural policies to have free trade in agricultural commodities. Many of our trade negotiations, for example, with the European Common Market, were designed to gain greater access to the Common Market for our agricultural products. Similarly, in relation to Japan, one way we sought to offset the trade surplus in favor of Japan was through the export of agricultural commodities.

If we now make a drastic reversal of this position, then those countries that had geared their own economy to the purchase of American agricultural products will have to make a drastic change in their commercial patterns. So for the United States to implement export controls would transcend the immediate crisis which keeps arising for them, and would be a fundamental change in our policies. Up to now it has been my view that we should go to great lengths to attempt to avoid this, and I would think the situation would have to become much more grave before we did this. I think there is a need for us, however, to manage our agricultural production more systematically and to have a clearer picture of the potential needs of other countries and of the potential contribution that the United States should make, so that we do not repeat some of our recent difficulties which we saw in any one year. We have, as a matter of fact, recently issued a directive through the National Security Council system to study the very question which you raise, the relationship between our agricultural production, our exports, and our foreign policy.

Senator AIKEN. I think that that is a very good answer. If you need any further help I will be glad to help you and I am sure Secretary Butz will be more helpful than I would be.

EXTENSION OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRIVILEGES

In connection with that, do you think we should extend most-favored-nations privileges to countries other than those who now enjoy them?

Mr. KISSINGER. The administration has favored very strongly the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, or the granting of authority to the President to grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union. This is an issue that should not be seen simply in the narrow terms of most favored nation but in the whole context of our relationship with the Soviet Union, in which we made a series of agreements for which the quid pro quo on our side was the readiness to extend it, and where now the refusal to grant most-favored-nation status after the Soviet Union had performed on its side would raise very serious questions about the possibility of long-

20

term arrangements between our two countries. Most-favored-nation status really only means that the Soviet Union should be treated like any other country; it is not extending a particularly favored status on them. So our view is that most-favored-nation status should be granted.

Senator AIKEN. So you believe that the extension of the most-favored-nation privileges to Russia would have a very beneficial effect, both upon our economic and political situation in the world?

Mr. KISSINGER. We believe it is an essential part of the policy of relaxation of tension that we have pursued.

## SEPARATION OF MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID LEGISLATION

Senator AIKEN. The last question is, do you believe that in enacting aid legislation that the military and economic aid should be separated as the Senate believes or go together in accordance with the apparent desires of the Congress? I do not know that you need to answer that question.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I am reputed not to be an expert on administrative matters.

Senator AIKEN. That is a good question not to be an expert on, I think, at this point.

That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Church.

## PRESENT PERIOD OF CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS

Senator CHURCH. Dr. Kissinger, in the view of many people in the country today, we are living through a period of acute constitutional crisis that takes the form of excessive use of Executive power. There are any number of illustrations. For one, the impoundment by Presidential decision of congressionally appropriated funds for lawful programs, a practice that continues despite the fact that the courts, thus far, have declared it to be unlawful. The crisis is also exemplified by the last two wars which have been fought on Executive initiative and waged under the argument that there is an inherent power in the Presidency that permits him to engage in foreign wars without the specific consent of Congress. And, at present, it is reflected in the speculation in the press as to whether or not the President intends to comply with a Federal court order concerning the notorious White House tapes. If the position were to prevail that he need not comply with the court order on final appeal, I would think that 500 years of Anglo-American progress toward government under law would be seriously imperiled.

## PUBLIC LAW 93-50

It is against that background that I would like to ask you two questions concerning two provisions of present law. One of those provisions, in its original form introduced by Senator Case of New Jersey and myself, is now Public Law 93-50, a part of the Supplemental Appropriations Act. It reads as follows:

None of the funds herein appropriated under this act may be expended to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia, Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam or off the shores of Cambodia, Laos, North Viet-

21

nam, and South Vietnam by U.S. forces, and after August 15, 1973, no other funds heretofore appropriated under any other act may be expended for such purpose.

From your initial statement, I take it that you view this provision of law as binding upon the President and that you would advise the President, as Secretary of State, to conform to it. Am I correct?

Senator CHURCH. I have great personal respect for you. I welcome that answer for, had it been the opposite, I could not support your confirmation.

## COOPER-CHURCH AMENDMENT

There is another provision of law that has been known as the Cooper-Church amendment reenacted several times over by the Congress. I would like to read it to you and then ask you a question or two relating to Cambodia today. It reads: "In line with the expressed intention of the President of the United States, none of the funds authorized or appropriated pursuant to this or any other act may be used to finance the introduction of U.S. ground combat troops into Cambodia, or to provide U.S. advisers to or for military, paramilitary, police, or other security or intelligence forces in Cambodia."

The first question I would ask of you, Dr. Kissinger, is whether or not that provision of law is being complied with?

Mr. KISSINGER. To the best of my knowledge, it is.

## TELEVISION NEWS SHOW, SHOWING U.S. COLONEL WITH CAMBODIAN FORCES

Senator CHURCH. About a month ago, I watched a national network television news program which showed an American colonel, as I recall his rank, in the field in Cambodia with Cambodian forces. The film showed him pointing in various directions on the battlefield, discussing what must have been matters of tactical concern, with Cambodian soldiers in uniform, and opening a map and discussing with reference to the map and the terrain, what he had to say. The Cambodians were listening very intently to what must have been his advice.

Assuming that this film was actually taken in Cambodia, as it was purported to be, and that the camera accurately recorded the event, would not that colonel be acting as a military adviser, contrary to the provisions of the law?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I honestly do not know anything about that event, and it is very difficult for me to speculate. If the colonel was advising Cambodian troops in combat actions he was acting in violation of the law.

But let me make a general comment. The Vietnam war was conducted in an atmosphere of extraordinary bitterness within this country, I would say on both sides of the discussion, in which both sides believed that very grave issues of national policy were involved; under those conditions it is possible that things were done that seemed overwhelmingly in the national interest and that was considered the primary criterion.

If what I have said to this committee is to have any meaning, then it would be totally inadmissible for me, as Secretary, or as adviser to the President, to behave like a sharp lawyer and to try to split hairs

22

and find some legal justification for something clearly against the intent of the law. So I think the better answer to give you, Senator, is to say, that when the law is clearly understood—and it will be my job to make sure that I clearly understand the intent of the Congress—we may disagree with it, but once the intent is clear we will implement not only the letter but the spirit. If such an event occurred as you describe, I will do my best to have it stopped.

Senator CHURCH. Dr. Kissinger, I want to thank you for that assurance and, knowing you as I do, I am certain that you will follow through with it.

Mr. KISSINGER. Thank you.

## ACCOUNTING FOR MISSING IN ACTION

Senator CHURCH. May I ask you a question or two concerning the missing in action? As a part of the cease-fire agreement, it is my understanding that the North Vietnamese promised to cooperate in giving us a full accounting of the missing in action. As I recall, there were some 1,300 Americans that we listed as missing in action at the time that this agreement was entered into. How many of these 1,300 have been accounted for to date?

Mr. KISSINGER. I do not believe, Senator, that any of them have been accounted for adequately. It has been one of the unsatisfactory aspects of the implementation of the agreement. If they have been accounted for, it has been through the testimony of prisoners who could give us some account of, say, the death of a person who was missing, or some other disposition. The North Vietnamese were supposed to permit American teams to go to the grave sites and to exhume bodies and to give us other information.

When I was in Hanoi in February, I brought some 80 files of individuals who we had reason to believe had been captured. In some cases these included pictures of individuals who looked like the missing persons, who had been seen being captured or in some prisoner group. In other cases we gave very detailed circumstances. They told us they would make an immediate investigation. So far we have not had any results of that. Other files have been turned over to them of the best information we have. The only cooperation we have received is the visit to one grave site of, I think, some 23 Americans who died in captivity in North Vietnam. I am not absolutely sure that that number is correct. It has been one of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the implementation of the agreement. In Laos, actually, we have more reason for concern, because the ratio of prisoners to those that we have reason to believe parachuted is smaller than it is in any other part of this area. We have been promised that, upon the conclusion of the agreement which is now in the final stages of being negotiated, we would be given the opportunity to search in Laos. It may be somewhat easier to do it there because the agreement should produce, or is designed to produce a central government not under North Vietnamese control.

But the answer to your question, Senator, unfortunately, is that we are extremely dissatisfied with the results of the implementation of that part of the agreement, and that it is one of the reasons why we cannot proceed in certain other areas such as economic aid negotiations.

23

WAS RUSSIAN OR CHINESE AID ENLISTED IN SOLVING MIA PROBLEM?

Senator CHURCH. On behalf of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing In Southeast Asia, the committee has been requested to ask you whether you have enlisted the aid of the Russians or the Chinese in solving this MIA problem?

Mr. KISSINGER. In every conversation that I have had with high Chinese or Soviet officials, I have raised this issue, and when I go to Peking I will again bring it to the attention of the Chinese leaders.

FURTHER STEPS TO SECURE NORTH VIETNAMESE COMPLIANCE WITH MIA
PROVISION

Senator CHURCH. As Secretary of State, if confirmed by the Senate, can you tell us what further steps you have in mind that you might take to secure compliance by the North Vietnamese of this very important provision of the agreement?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, one of the results of our continuing disengagement from Indochina is that the pressures and incentives that we have available are also shrinking. We will not be able to proceed with the implementation of the economic assistance provisions, or the negotiation of those, until we have achieved a more satisfactory compliance with the missing-in-action provisions of the agreement. We will use diplomatic pressure to the extent that it is available to us, and we will have to make clear to the North Vietnamese that the normalization of relations with them, which we would otherwise seek and welcome, is severely inhibited by their slow compliance with the missing-in-action provisions.

I may say that as Assistant I have regularly met with the League of Families, including a few weeks ago when they had their convention here, and it is rather a profound human experience to meet with these families—

Senator CHURCH. I know—

Mr. KISSINGER [continuing]. And I will continue to give it my personal attention.

Senator CHURCH. Thank you very much, Dr. Kissinger, for your answer. My time is up.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Case.

Senator CASE. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

QUESTIONS ON WIRETAPS

Mr. Chairman, you raised some questions with Dr. Kissinger in regard to wiretapping and I have further questions on that matter which I shall, with your approval, defer until we receive the FBI report that you have referred to Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Pardon me.

Senator CASE. I shall defer the questions on wiretaps until we have received the FBI report that you referred to earlier. I think it is very clear that the committee will not be in position to act on the nomination until that report has been received.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with the Senator.

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## COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator CASE. At the outset I want to join my colleagues in expressing admiration and respect for you as an individual and for your accomplishments and our satisfaction in the relationships we have had with you personally. Questions as to your confirmation in no way reflect upon personal relationships, as you know.

## FURNISHING OF EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS TO CONGRESS

In this initial 10-minute period that I have, or so much of it that remains, I do just want to deal with one important theme. All of us welcome your offer of cooperation. We desire cooperation too. I think you will agree, cooperation depends upon a mutual exchange of information and on confidence in the information that each gives the other. A specific question on that point is a subject in which I have a particular interest.

We have adopted a law which says that the Executive must send up to the Senate and the House Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committee all executive agreements made with foreign countries. A Department of State memorandum or opinion to us confirms that the law means "all." I take it you agree with the State Department opinion. It means all executive agreements. This law provides not for some, but for all agreements to be furnished.

Mr. KISSINGER. I frankly am not familiar with that Department of State memorandum, but I have no reason to question it.

Senator CASE. Would you be good enough to check that particular point?

Mr. KISSINGER. I will check that point.

Senator CASE. And either confirm or change your answer to that please.

Mr. KISSINGER. I will supply the answer; I have not studied it.

Senator CASE. That can be done for the record.

The opinion was given us earlier this year and, I am sure will be available to you.

[The information referred to follows:]

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, September 9, 1973.

Senator J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: When I appeared before your Committee on September 7, you requested a statement for the record on whether I agree with the Department of State views, as expressed by its Legal Adviser's Office, regarding the agreements that are required to be submitted to the Congress under the Case Act.

I agree with the statements made in the letter of January 26, 1973 from the Department's Acting Legal Adviser, Charles N. Brower, to the Honorable Carl Marcy regarding the requirements of that Act. I also agree with the views of Acting Secretary of State Kenneth Rush as expressed in his letter of September 6, 1973 to the heads of other executive departments and agencies requesting their cooperation in assuring that the requirements of the Case Act are complied with. I am enclosing a copy of that letter for the information of your Committee.

Best regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, September 6, 1973.

DEAR __________: I want to invite your personal attention to the problem of ensuring that all international agreements to which the United States becomes a party are cleared, prior to conclusion, with the Department of State and are submitted, after conclusion, by the Department of State to the Congress, as required by the Case Act (Public Law 92-304; 1 USC 112b). Although cooperation by the various executive departments and agencies has, in general, been most gratifying, there remain difficulties, particularly in achieving mutual understanding of the types of agreements covered by the applicable law and in assuring sufficient awareness by officers and employees of the implications for the operations of their department or agency. It may well be that a combination of new regulations and broad educational efforts within each affected department and agency will suffice to eliminate these difficulties, and I hope you will ensure that the necessary action is taken within your jurisdiction.

A recent Report by the Comptroller General, "U.S. Agreements with and Assistance to Free World Forces in Southeast Asia Show Need for Improved Reporting," B-159451, April 24, 1973, has recommended that the Congress consider legislation requiring that the Secretary of State submit annually to the Congress a list of all such subordinate and implementing agreements made involving substantial amounts of U.S. funds or other tangible assistance, together with estimates of the amounts of such funds or other assistance. I believe that such legislation should be unnecessary. Certainly it is preferable to bring about full cooperation through our own efforts.

On August 15, 1973 the Department of State published in the Federal Register a Public Notice inviting comment on a proposed revision of its Circular 175 Procedure, and related procedures, regarding the authorization, negotiation and conclusion of treaties and other international agreements (38 Fed. Reg. 22084). We would appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you any particular questions or problems that you may have regarding the application of that procedure, which we hope will provide a satisfactory basis for instructions within each of the departments and agencies concerned.

In this connection, I would also note that neither the form in which an agreement is expressed nor the fact that an agreement is of a subordinate or implementing character in itself removes the agreement from the requirements of the Case Act or of the law regarding the publication of international agreements (1 U.S.C. 112a). The determination whether an instrument or a series of instruments constitutes an international agreement that is required to be transmitted to the Congress and to be published is based upon the substance of that agreement, not upon its form or its character as a principal agreement or as a subordinate or implementing agreement.

As the subject matter of our international agreements is, in general, as broad as the scope of our foreign relations, it is not practicable to enumerate every type of agreement which the Department of State should receive from the other executive departments and agencies. However, it seems clear that texts should be transmitted to the Department of State of the agreements referred to in the recommendations of the Comptroller General and of any agreements of political significance, any that involve a substantial grant of funds, any involving loans by the United States or credits payable to the United States, any that constitute a commitment of funds that extends beyond a fiscal year or would be a basis for requesting new appropriations, and any that involve continuing or substantial cooperation in the conduct of a particular program or activity, such as scientific, technical, or other cooperation, including the exchange or receipt of information and its treatment. In general, the instruments transmitted to the Congress pursuant to the Case Act, and those published (other than those classified under E. O. 11652), should reflect the full extent of obligations undertaken by the United States and of rights to which it is entitled pursuant to instruments executed on its behalf.

The fact that an agency reports fully on its activities to a given Committee or Committees of Congress, including a discussion of agreements it has entered into, does not exempt the agreements concluded by such agency from transmission to the Congress by the Department of State under the Case Act.

In the event of a question whether any particular document or series of documents constitutes an international agreement, inquiry may be made of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Treaty Affairs in the Department of State, telephone

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632-1074. We look forward to your continued cooperation in ensuring compliance with these requirements.

Sincerely,

KENNETH RUSH,
Acting Secretary.

STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION BILL PROVISION CALLED "ACCESS TO INFORMATION"

Senator CASE. In the State Department authorization bill as it passed the House—as a matter of fact, it has been agreed to in conference—there is a provision, which our chairman proposed, called “access to information.”

Are you familiar with that amendment?

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes, it is a provision with which I am familiar.

Senator CASE. What is your view on it and will you support it?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I am afraid I could not support this provision, because, as I understand that provision, it means that the majority of any congressional committee, at least of the Foreign Relations Committee, can request any departmental document except direct communications between the Department and the President, and therefore, by implication, any communication between the Department and foreign countries, any instruction that the Secretary may give to an ambassador. I believe, while we strongly advocate the fullest sharing of information, that this would invite a degree of intrusion into the confidentiality of international exchanges that might be dangerous to the conduct of foreign policy. So I have to say, with all respect, Senator, that this is a provision of the act that we could not support.

Senator CASE. Dr. Kissinger, I do call your attention to the provision that is contained in the amendment that it shall not apply to any communication directed by the President to a particular officer or employee—

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct. I am aware of that.

Senator CASE [continuing]. Of the department or by him to the President.

Mr. KISSINGER. I understand that, Senator. But it would apply to any communication involving anyone else in the department except between a departmental officer and the President.

Senator CASE. I am sorry, a particular officer or employee of such department.

Mr. KISSINGER. To the President. However, that is the only exclusion.

Senator CASE. No, directed by the President to any officer or employee of any department, agency or corporation or any communication directed by any such officer or employee to the President.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct, Senator. But the point I am making is that this exclusion would not apply to a negotiation that would be conducted, for example, with a foreign country. It would be possible to request all the raw material of such a negotiation constantly while it is going on, and we believe that this would have a dangerous impact on our conduct of foreign policy.

However, as I have said in my statement, I would be eager to sit down with the congressional leadership to work out procedures by which you could receive the fullest briefings.

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## AMENDMENT TO STATE DEPARTMENT AUTHORIZATION BILL

Senator CASE. I want to call your attention to this. I am very serious about this matter because if the President, on your recommendation, would veto the State Department bill, I would take it as a very important step backward in the effort to bring about better relations between the Congress and the President in foreign policy.

It is absolutely clear that matters to which executive privilege inhere in the President cannot be affected by this amendment to the State Department authorization bill.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct.

Senator CASE. And there is no attempt to do it.

The chairman will speak for himself on this as the author of the amendment. But certainly the members of the committee feel this is an important measure. And specifically, such a request can be made only if a majority of the committee requests information. This would not be done lightly.

Now the conference committee agreed to limit information to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Foreign Affairs. To speak in general terms about the desire for cooperation, and we all share this concern, but then, when you make a specific effort to react with the worst possible case argument, it does not lead to good relations and I am sorry about your view on this matter.

I hope we may come back to this later in the hearing, but if I may, Mr. Chairman, for the remainder of my time I would like to go to another point unless you want to comment, since this was your amendment.

The CHAIRMAN. I only comment that I agree with the Senator that we have had instances, as you know, of papers which were in no sense sensitive in the matter of intelligence that have been refused on the ground they were.

I agree with my colleague.

Senator CASE. I thank the chairman and I would like to come back to this and consider it more fully.

## AVAILABILITY OF NSC STUDIES ON FOOD AND FUEL

Could you answer a few specific questions on this matter of information? You have asked for studies by the National Security Council on fuel and food?

Senator CASE. Will those studies be available to us in the committee and in the Congress?

Mr. KISSINGER. It has not been in the past the practice to make National Security Council documents available to senatorial committees. We would, however, be prepared to submit the conclusions of these studies when they are embodied in Presidential decisions, or before they are embodied in Presidential decisions to the committee.

## AVAILABILITY OF NSC STUDIES GENERALLY

Senator CASE. I appreciate that very much and I take it when you say these studies you mean not just food and fuel studies, but generally. You will provide National Security Council studies.

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Mr. KISSINGER. I would think that in general the direction that the policy is intended to take should be discussed with this committee before final decisions are made. Even if we adopt decisions that do not meet with your approval, I think the committee should have an opportunity to express its views in the Senate first.

Senator CASE. I think this is a terribly important point.

The National Security Council studies are something we cannot duplicate with our facilities. They are enormously important in development of policy and for us to have a chance to examine them and to comment on them before policy decisions are made by the President on the basis of those reports, I think is a vital matter.

Mr. KISSINGER. No, Senator; I want to be precise.

Senator CASE. I want you to be precise, too. We do not want any fuzziness.

Mr. KISSINGER. I did say that we would, in executive session or in some other arrangement to be worked out with the chairman, brief the committee on the general thrust of the studies and give the committee an opportunity to express its views before a finalization is made.

Senator CASE. Would that include the pros and the cons?

Mr. KISSINGER. Yes.

Senator CASE. If there is an important negative or a minority view expressed in the report?

Mr. KISSINGER. Absolutely.

Senator CASE. That would be a matter that we would be advised of in substance?

Mr. KISSINGER. That should be part of the discussion.

Senator CASE. Again, we will go into this more fully at a later time, but I think it is a most important matter and we, Mr. Chairman, of course, as a committee, will have to be in a position to receive the information and to review it on a regular basis. I am sure under your guidance we will accomplish that.

## GIVING FALSE INFORMATION TO CONGRESS

On the matter of information—and I do not like to do this but I have to—everything depends upon not only getting information but on being able to be sure it is accurate, and this committee has had and the Congress, and the Senate, I know, has had instances in which this has not been done for us. If you find a certain tentativeness in our acceptance of your warm offer of cooperation, it can be traced directly, for example, to the fact that Secretary Rogers told us that our "hands were clean," in Cambodia. This kind of thing just cannot form the basis for any kind of cooperation between the Senate, the Congress, and the executive branch.

I do not want you to comment on an individual. I do wish you would comment on what you would do in circumstances of the sort Rogers faced. Do you regard it as necessary in carrying out of your job to give false information to Congress—

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator—

Senator CASE [continuing]. Where you feel it is in the national interest?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I would think that the events to which you referred were in a very particular circumstance, one which I have

29

made clear in my statement we have every intention to transcend. If we succeed in implementing what I have described here, a condition of confidence would be created between the committee and the executive branch so that such an event would be inconceivable.

In any event, no matter what the relationship is between the committee and the executive branch, I would not consider it appropriate to mislead the committee as to any matter of foreign policy.

Senator CASE. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Symington.

## COMMENDATION OF WITNESS

Senator SYMINGTON. Dr. Kissinger, I join my colleagues in commending you for a fine statement this morning.

## WITHHOLDING OF INFORMATION CONCERNING CAMBODIAN BOMBING

When your nomination for this position was announced, I made a short statement stating I would like to talk to you about executive privilege, which has already been discussed; wiretapping, which has already been discussed. I may have several questions to ask on those matters later on, but in this round I would talk about a subject we worked on during the recess in another committee.

Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee revealed that the bombing of Cambodia, which began in March of 1969, was deliberately held secret, not only from the American public but from the relevant committees of Congress.

Did you approve this withholding of information regarding the extension of the Indochina war?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, let me answer your question first and then let me perhaps add a sentence or two to it.

First, as Presidential assistant and administrator of the National Security Council system, it was not my role to approve it or disapprove it at that time. Therefore, the technical answer to your question is that this was not my function in the early stages of the administration.

Nevertheless, I do not want to mislead the committee. I was in agreement with the policy that was then being pursued, and I believed then, and must say in all honesty that I believe now, that the action itself was correct.

I do not accept the proposition that it was an extension of the war into Cambodia as such. The circumstances were that we were confronted with a massive North Vietnamese offensive, in which our casualties were 1,300 a month, in March, in violation of the agreement on the bombing halt. When the agreement to halt the bombing was made in November 1968, all the senior officials of the then administration pointed out that if there were any violation they would resume the bombing of North Vietnam.

We waited for 4 weeks before we took any major action. There were several Presidential warnings in press conferences, and, I repeat, our casualties were 1,300 a month.

There were some 50,000 North Vietnamese troops shuttling back and forth across the Cambodian frontier, engaging in combat operations with our troops, and inflicting heavy casualties.

21-172—73—pt. 1—3

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But the problem that we faced in March 1969 was to do something that was significant without resuming the bombing of the North, which we were not prepared to do at that time.

Senator SYMINGTON. I do not mean to interrupt you, but we have been through that. When the bombing was discovered and all the reasons were given as to why it was done, I asked if you approved it.

Mr. KISSINGER. I just wanted to make clear it was not a bombing of Cambodia, but it was a bombing of North Vietnamese in Cambodia.

## WHO SET POLICY OF DECEPTION IN MOTION?

Senator SYMINGTON. Who in the White House set this in motion, this policy of not telling about the bombing of Cambodia, starting in March of 1969, this policy of deception?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, in the hearings before your committee, there were two issues of so-called deception raised. One was the double bookkeeping that was engaged in in the Air Force, and the other one was the cover stories that were used with respect to the bombing. Now one thing that I do not think has been brought out in the hearings sufficiently was that when the bombing first started it was intended as a series of individual acts. For example, there was only one attack in March, two attacks in April, and two attacks in May.

Senator SYMINGTON. There were more than that. But the point I am trying to make is who approved it, who was the one who directed it?

Mr. KISSINGER. There were more sorties, but there were only those days on which the attacks took place.

The double bookkeeping we never had any knowledge of, though in retrospect I must say that, given the requirements of security that were imposed, perhaps one should have asked oneself the question how these raids were going to be accounted for. But we had no knowledge of the double bookkeeping.

On the cover story, at that National Security Council meeting that approved the first operation, which was the only one that was approved then, it was agreed that the formal press guidance would be that there were attacks taking place northeast of Tay Ninh, without specifying their exact location. We would neither agree with nor deny any accusations that they were in Cambodia, but we would say they would be investigated; if the Cambodian Government protested, we would apologize, and would admit that it had taken place. This was the press guidance that was agreed to at this National Security Council meeting, and it is to my knowledge the only press guidance that was ever discussed at the White House level.

Senator SYMINGTON. You said it was directed. Who directed it?

Mr. KISSINGER. What do you mean, Senator?

Senator SYMINGTON. Who directed the secrecy with respect to the bombing as well as the bombing itself?

Mr. KISSINGER. General Wheeler has testified before your committee that the secrecy had been ordered by the President but there was unanimity within the National Security Council that it should be kept secret for the reasons that have been given.

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INFORMING PROPER CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES OF USE OF MILITARY
FORCES

Senator SYMINGTON. You are now taking this position, which, as you know, based on a talk I made on the floor of the Senate some 21½ years ago, I felt you were conducting in fact. Would it be your position if you are confirmed as Secretary of State, that the proper committees of Congress cannot be entrusted with information of this character, the use of military forces in a foreign country with which we were not at war?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, this was a very peculiar circumstance which I cannot conceive ever arising again. However, I would believe that in the unbelievable event that such a circumstance would arise again, a procedure must be found by which the proper congressional committees are informed.

Senator SYMINGTON. I appreciate that answer. If you do not tell the proper committees, and they recommend the money for the purpose as expressed when you asked for the money, the executive branch, and it is used for another purpose, I think that is not only illegal but unconstitutional.

INTENT OF FURNISHING MILITARY AID TO LON NOL GOVERNMENT

When we first began to furnish military aid to the Lon Nol government in Cambodia, we were told this was not intended to support the Cambodian Government, rather a part of our war effort in Vietnam.

In criticizing the congressional call-off of American bombing in Cambodia, however, President Nixon asserted we were abondoning a friend. Did military assistance to the Lon Nol government somehow create a commitment to that government?

Mr. KISSINGER. It has created a situation in Cambodia, where, in our judgment, the negotiations which we sought would be most likely if there were a certain balance in Cambodia which gave both sides an incentive to negotiate. We thought this, in turn, was important for the maintenance of the cease-fire in Vietnam. Therefore, it has been the judgment of this administration that the cut-off might have unfortunate consequences.

There is no formal commitment to any particular government in Cambodia, but we have considered the Lon Nol government a friendly government.

PRESENT JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED MILITARY SUPPORT TO CAMBODIA

Senator SYMINGTON. If there is no formal commitment and we are out of Vietnam, what is the present justification for the continuation of military support?

Mr. KISSINGER. Military support can be given to countries on the basis of the American national interest, and on the basis of the importance the United States attaches to the developments that would flow from not giving economic assistance and military assistance, even if there is no formal commitment. That can be decided from case to case.

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U.S. POSITION CONCERNING CIVIL WAR IN CAMBODIA

Senator SYMINGTON. Do you consider it is our responsibility to take sides in a civil war in Cambodia?

Mr. KISSINGER. Do I take it to be our responsibility?

Senator SYMINGTON. Yes.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have explained what our position is with respect to what you called the "civil war" in Cambodia. We have no particular interest except that it be settled peacefully and through negotiation, and we have many times said that we would acquiesce in any solution that is freely negotiated and would support it. Indeed, we were attempting to promote this during June and July.

RISK OF BECOMING INVOLVED IN FOREIGN COUNTRY'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS

Senator SYMINGTON. Given this history, do you believe that the furnishing of military assistance to other foreign countries may create a risk that we will become similarly involved in their internal affairs?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, the experience of the Indochina war was that we started with one set of assumptions and as the war progressed, there was always a shifting evolution. I believe I would turn your question around: that we should give military assistance only in cases where we find that our national interest is sufficiently involved to warrant it, and not start by giving military assistance and derive our national interest from that.

WITNESS' OCTOBER 26, 1972, STATEMENTS AND SIMILAR SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

Senator SYMINGTON. In your press conference of October 26, 1972, you announced that "We have now heard from both Vietnams." And that, "We believe that peace is at hand."

Mr. KISSINGER. That is right.

Senator SYMINGTON. These statements were later flatly contradicted in an interview given by President Thieu in which he stated that he could not accept the October terms and so notified you in October. Moreover, your statement that peace was at hand preceded the most intensive bombing raids of the war on North Vietnam.

Now we have, in effect, the same situation in Cambodia. When we discovered through a British newspaperman, who was flying from Phnom Penh to Saigon and noted the bomb craters, that we were heavily bombing Cambodia, we stated this was being done with the acquiescence if not the actual approval of Sihanouk. This, now he flatly denies. So here we have a repeat, you might say, of the same type and character of problem that developed with respect to President Thieu. What are your thoughts?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, let me comment first, Senator, about the October 26 press conference. First, I said on October 26 that "peace is at hand", the final negotiations to bring about the peace concluded about January 8. I do not want to split hairs about how you would define "at hand," but it would seem to me that an 8-week interval between that statement and the subsequent conclusion of the peace settlement is not unreasonable. Nevertheless, I will confess to you that when I

33

made that statement on October 26, I thought the process would be
even more rapid.

But let me explain the circumstances of the statement of October 26:

We had concluded an agreement which in its main outlines seemed
satisfactory to us and we had agreed tentatively to certain schedules
of implementation, schedules which could then not be met for a variety
of reasons, including the violation of the secrecy of the negotiations
by the North Vietnamese and the opposition of the South Vietnamese
Government.

When I stepped up on that press podium on October 26, my primary
concern was to salvage the agreement. It was the first official com-
munication that we could make after the North Vietnamese had dis-
closed the contents of the negotiation, and my primary concern was
to convey to them that, despite the opposition of Saigon, the basic
principles of the agreement would be maintained. And, therefore, I
spelled them out, and said that we would remain committed to carry-
ing out this agreement, in order not to create a circumstance in which
the whole agreement would get reopened. I believe that this was one
of the factors that made it possible to continue the momentum and to
achieve the agreement—a little more slowly than I had hoped, but in
any event, in a not unreasonable period of time.

Now, in the case of Prince Sihanouk, I would recommend, Senator,
that you read a press conference that he gave on May 13, 1969, in
which he was asked about the B-52 bombing—and I would be glad to
supply it for the record—in which he said—and I am paraphrasing—

> If a buffalo is killed or a Cambodian is killed, then I protest immediately. But in unoccupied parts our country, the Americans are killing North Vietnamese, I do not object. The Americans will not admit it and the Vietnamese cannot protest.

He is in a difficult position. We have respect for him. We do not
want to make his position more difficult. It is clear that it was in his
power to stop it if he had protested, and he did not do so. But I can
also understand why in his present position, where he is dependent
more on his former opponents, he will take a different tack.

PRINCE NORODOM SIHANOUK—PRESS CONFERENCE—MAY 13, 1969

(As reported by Foreign Broadcast Information Service)

SIHANOUK ON REJECTION OF U.S. RECONCILIATION—MAY 13 SPEECH

[Supplied by Executive Office of President]

Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodia at 1050 GMT on May 13 carries a recording of a press conference given by Prince Sihanouk in Kompong Seila Province on May 13. Sihanouk begins by asking permission to speak in French. He then announces that he will deal with two problems—U.S.-Cambodian relations and relations between Cambodia and the Federal Republic of Germany.

Sihanouk complains that facts have been distorted in press agency dispatches on his press conferences. He reads a UP cable published in Le Figaro on the conference in which he rejected reconciliation with Washington and Bangkok. He says editing of his words by U.S. agencies is unjustified. "For instance, I said the Americans themselves changed, but their press jumped on this occasion to show that I am not consistent. For example, they said: At first Sihanouk demanded a formula declaring the recognition of his frontiers, and we satisfied him. Then he added that we must include Preah Vihear and so forth. They have deliberately and simply left out the (? hypen) that explains Sihanouk's demand. (? my second request).

34

"Since I have set forth my formula and asked everybody to use it, there is no reason for me to have America use another. I find it perfect, and I give it twenty marks over twenty. But they have broken the bridge between the first affair and the second.

"What is most important is the statement a fortiori of Washington. But after it, a U.S. Government spokesman said: 'What we have done is to [word indistinct] Sihanouk. We have told him we recognize his frontiers without knowing their whereabouts because they are vague and undefined.' Because of such statements I accused the Americans of making an aboutface.

"By garbling, passing over in silence, and putting under [words indistinct], the Washington spokesman's statement made the statement on recognition of our frontiers meaningless. However (? if people gave credence to their arguments), the entire world would have believed that I was really cynical. The Americans said: 'Lo and behold, Sihanouk asked everybody to say this. He accepted everybody's statement except ours. At first he accepted our statement, but he rejected it the next day. You see, he has twice been inconsistent. First he accepted the same statement from other people but rejected ours. Second, he accepted our statement and rejected it some days after.'

"You see, they consider me a child, and this is prejudicial not only to me but also to Cambodia and its entire policy. You know very well that I have not acted illogically and that, on the contrary, I have always acted according to a formal and mathematical logic. But they have ignored this.

"Therefore, please stress that the gist of the affair is the fact that the statement by the spokesman of Washington and the State Department stripped the Washington statement of all meaning. This has been passed over in silence by the news agencies. You stated the truth in your dispatches, but when they reached London, Paris, New York, and Washington, people simply overlooked the story in order to present me as a man of bad faith, an idiot, and a child.

"My rejection was due solely to the statement of the U.S. Government spokesman that the recognition was made on nonexistent frontiers and that Sihanouk did not request them to specify what frontiers. I did not ask for any specification, because the frontiers are known. They should have known the frontiers prior to recognizing them.

"I was perfectly logical. However, they failed to do me justice concerning my rejection. I do not ask them to admit that I am right, but I do ask them to take note of the explanations behind my rejection. They did note my rejection, but they set aside its explanations. That is serious, in my opinion."

After reiterating the above arguments in Cambodia, the Prince says: "I have requested the specification that Preah Vihear and so forth be included in my frontiers, because the Washington spokesman said I accepted the recognition statement without grumbling.

"On the contrary, I congratulated America for saying exactly what I wanted. But the spokesman said they pleased Sihanouk so they could come back to Cambodia; that it was understood that Sihanouk's frontiers are vague and undefined [words indistinct]; that people do not know what these frontiers are; that Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam still contest these frontiers and have claims to make to Sihanouk; and they could not commit themselves in freezing the frontiers of Sihanouk. There, they [words indistinct] passed over such statements in silence so as to describe me as a whimsical man."

After rejecting reports in the US press that Cambodia was going to cooperate with the United States, Prince Sihanouk reads the May 9 report by Huot Sabath citing military sources that Cambodian officers in border posts secretly conferred recently with their US and South Vietnamese counterparts on action to be taken against enemy positions.

Prince Sihanouk again categorically refutes this false news and denies that he has ever allowed US bombing of his territory. He says the United States wants to sabotage Cambodia's neutrality, and that Cambodia has had no contact with the Americans and Vietnamese of Saigon. He says: I have not protested the bombings of Viet Cong camps because I have not heard of the bombings. I was not in the know, because in certain areas of Cambodia there are no Cambodians.

The Prince then states: Several weeks ago I showed you on a map a mountain range that lies between our [South Vietnam-Cambodian] frontiers. That mountain range—even on the Cambodian side—is not frequented by us. Suppose the Americans bomb the Viet Cong and Viet Minh camps there? As long as the Viet Cong and the Viet Minh do not report that they have been bombed, [Sihanouk

35

laughs] that their camps on Cambodian territory have been bombed by the Americans ... [sentence not completed]. But do you really think the Viet Cong and Viet Minh will tell about that? [Sihanouk laughs] I don't have the police, and the Viet Cong and Viet Minh themselves, [Sihanouk laughs]. You understand [words indistinct]. It's rather humorous, but it's like that.

When the Americans and the Viet Cong and Viet Minh kill one another on our territory where I have no administration, no police, no army, then I cannot be informed about it. Suppose I am informed by the Americans? I still want confirmation from the Viet Cong and Viet Minh. But I don't think the Viet Cong and Viet Minh, or his Excellency Hieu or His Excellency Thuong [NFLSV and DRV representatives in Phnom Penh] will tell Phurissara: "We have the honor to complain to you that the Americans have bombed us while we are occupying your territory. They have bombed us." Will they protest against the Americans? I don't see how they can do that, [Sihanouk laughs] because both of them are at fault.

If the Viet Cong and Viet Minh have really come to enslave our country, then they are at fault. If the Americans bomb our territory, they are also at fault. In fact, both of them are at fault.

But if the Americans say that they bombed such and such a place here, we have to ask the Vietnamese whether they penetrated our country or not. I think that Hieu and Thuong will not answer, even if they have been bombed. I think that they will not tell.

Sihanouk notes that there are some places which are so remote that the Cambodian authorities cannot go to investigate all alleged bombings, if there are any. But if the Viet Cong and Viet Minh announce they have occupied a part of Khmer territory and that the Americans have bombed them, Cambodia will protest both their occupation and the U.S. bombings. He points out: Cambodia only protests against the destruction of the property and lives of Cambodians. All I can say is that I cannot make a protest as long as I am not informed. But I will protest if there is any destruction of Khmer life and property.

Here it is—the first report about several B-52 bombings. Yet I have not been informed about that at all, because I have not lost any houses, any countrymen, nothing, nothing. Nobody was caught in those barrages—nobody, no Cambodians. It is true that we have occupied Bo Kham, but we do not go beyond Bo Kham. It is true that we have been at San Monorom, but we are not at (Nam Lea) Mountain. Suppose people bomb (Nam Lea) Mountain—my God, it is in Cambodia, but if we are not at (Nam Lea) Mountain, then it means nothing. [Sihanouk laughs]. If the wolves [words indistinct] kill one another—my God, it is very bad, very bad for us concerning the violation of our airspace and our territory. But with regard to their loss, it does not (? concern us). [Sihanouk laughs].

That is what I want to tell you gentlemen. If there is a buffalo or any Cambodian killed, I will be informed immediately. But this is an affair between the Americans and the Viet Cong-Viet Minh, without any Khmer witnesses. There have been no Khmer witnesses, so how can I protest? But this does not mean—and I emphasize this—that I will permit the violation by either side. Please note that.

Speaking about the rupture of diplomatic relations between South Vietnam and Cambodia, Sihanouk refutes a report by the Los Angeles TIMES that the rupture was caused by the unilateral occupation of the former Norodom Palace [the present Independence Palace] by the Vientnamese Government. The palace was partly owned by Cambodia, according to the newspaper. Sihanouk stresses that the real cause of the rupture was the claim made by the South Vietnamese over certain Cambodian coastal islands and border villages.

Speaking of relations between West Germany and Cambodia, Sihanouk reads a West German Foreign Ministry Declaration of 9 May pointing out that the recent elevation of diplomatic relations between East Germany and Cambodia to ambassadorial level is an unfriendly act toward West Germany and that it may have repercussions on relations between the two countries. He stresses that this declaration is a threat against and a condemnation of Cambodia. Sihanouk says he is not angry with West Germany, and that Cambodia is grateful for West German aid. But, he says, we worry about the Viet Minh, the Viet Cong, and China. It is essential that our three big neighbors respect us. But Germany is too far away. Sihanouk rereads the important passages of the West German declaration and comments: Its aid is conditional. West Germany has proved that its aid is conditional.

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Sihanouk notes that Cambodia rejected American aid, which was far more important than that of West Germany. He says: We will not miss this aid, and it should not think we will miss it. He points out that although Chinese aid and friendship are more important than West German to Cambodia, Cambodia has not hesitated to oppose Chinese interference in Cambodia's internal affairs.

Sihanouk says: Let me tell you that we do not fear this kind of threat or the execution of such threats. After a long explanation of the Cambodian attitude toward big and small countries alike, he says: If Germany wants a break in diplomatic relations, I will accept it. I am not only ready to agree to a cessation of aid, but also to a break in diplomatic relations.

Sihanouk goes on to read an article in a Swiss newspaper which comments on Cambodia's desire to enter into negotiations with the United States. He refutes this report, saying: I want to correct the so-called "desire to enter into negotiations with the Americans." This is not right at all. I have never had a desire to enter into negotiations. You know very well that it is the Americans who announced through the Australians that they were going to recognize my frontiers. I said very well. If the Americans recognize Cambodian frontiers without reservations, I will have no reason to treat the United States badly.

Sihanouk continues: I have treated well those who have recognized my frontiers, so I will treat the United States on the same footing. That is all. There has never been a desire to enter into negotiations. I have told you that reestablishing diplomatic relations does not mean reestablishing friendly ties. Having diplomatic relations does not automatically mean being friends. Sihanouk cites the example of China, which maintains an embassy in the Soviet Union, but this does not mean that China is a friend of the Soviet Union.

Sihanouk goes on to refute a report by the same newspaper which says he has bank accounts in foreign countries. He says he is not wealthy at all, and that he would not survive one month abroad with the money he has. Sihanouk adds that he will hire a French lawyer to sue the Swiss paper for this defamation against him.

## DECEPTION CONCERNING SECRET WARS IN LAOS AND CAMBODIA

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I would ask one more question.

This committee, through its own staff, discovered a secret war being conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency in Laos, not only unknown to the American people but also unknown to the Congress. Later on, the Armed Services Committee discovered a secret war being conducted from the air in Cambodia, even though we were assured by the President himself as late as April 1970, that we were preserving the neutrality of Cambodia.

Now you are up here for confirmation as Secretary of State. I can say advisedly, we have been consistently deceived in this Foreign Relations Committee and the Armed Services Committee with respect to what was actually being done in Laos as well as Cambodia with the money we appropriated for reasons we thought different from what was actually done with the money.

As I understand it, you believe that, as Secretary of State, you will not approve, and will not find it necessary, to continue this type and character of deception. Am I correct?

Mr. KISSINGER. I do not quite agree, Senator, with your description of the event, but if you will let me phrase it without it, I can answer the question without accepting your premise. I will say that I believe as Secretary of State that we cannot conduct our foreign policy by deceiving the elected Representatives and the appropriate committees of the Congress.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

Kindly file for the record where I made a mistake in my question.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

RESPONSE TO SENATOR SYMINGTON'S REQUEST THAT DR. KISSINGER CLARIFY HIS
DISAGREEMENT WITH THE PREMISE OF SENATOR SYMINGTON'S QUESTION

I do not accept the premise that there was deliberate deception in either case. To the best of my knowledge, there was no such intent. The policy of no formal public acknowledgement was for positive diplomatic reasons. Congressional leaders were informed about CIA activities in Laos and the bombing in Cambodia. More thorough and systematic procedures for such consultation would have been desirable. It is my intention, if confirmed, to improve the flow of information to the Congress.

The CHAIRMAN. We will recess for 5 minutes. There is a vote on in the Capitol. We will be back in 5 minutes.

[Short recess.]

The next member is Senator Javits.

Senator JAVITS. Mr. Chairman, my time will not start to run until we have a witness.

The CHAIRMAN. I did not know he was not here.

Senator Javits is recognized.

MOST HISTORIC ASPECT OF HEARING

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Kissinger, one thing has not been noted this morning which may in a way be the most historic aspect of this hearing. I refer to your statement in your press conference of August 23:

There is no other country in the world in which a man of my background could be even considered for an office such as the one for which I have been nominated, and that imposes on me a very grave responsibility which I will pursue in the national interest.

Dr. Kissinger, you are an immigrant refugee naturalized American. Though you are in the line of succession, you lose one of the prerequisites of this office. You cannot be President. And yet, I can think of nothing which proves the American system to all the people in the world more validly than by sheer talent and energy and patriotism you have attained the most exalted place in the Cabinet, and one of the most exalted places in the Government of the United States, and you still are in the fullness of your powers. I know every one of us speaks for you the fruition of that historic first in this country, with a historic and legendary incumbency as Secretary of State, as I hope you will be quite soon.

My questions relate to matters of broad interest in which we are all engaged. They are substantive.

SHARING OF WAR POWERS

My colleagues, I think, have begun very appropriately to explore the wiretapping incident. I know how deeply troubling that has been to you as a man. Questioning has begun on the executive privilege question which is critical. I will go into that myself somewhat later.

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But now, I think we have a right to know how you approach this job from the point of view of the fundamental policies and procedures which inhere in it.

One of those relates to the making of war. You are well aware, Dr. Kissinger, that Congress is wrestling with that problem. You have yourself suggested in your statement that the Vietnam war was a bit-ter and costly war. You have said, in answer to a question, it was deeply divisive of the country. As you approach this job, what do you think about the sharing of the war powers?

Shall we leave it essentially with the President, which we have done pretty much up to now by what I consider to be an erosion of power over the decades? Or, must we find some other way in which the Con-gress may really share in that awesome responsibility?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, first of all, let me thank you for what you said at the beginning. It is true that I do feel a very special obligation in the exercise of my functions here.

Now, with respect to the question that you have raised, we discussed this privately, and I have been troubled by the same issue which you have raised, that is to say, the conduct of war in this period and the relationship of the elected representatives of the people to the war-making powers.

We face this problem: On the one hand, I understand the concern that you have expressed, and with which you are associated in various bills, that there must be some way by which the Congress can associate itself in a decision to go to war.

On the other hand, there is that problem that in the modern period the rapidity of decision is sometimes crucial, and the judgment of other countries about our ability to sustain these decisions may deter a war. So in the process of circumscribing the warmaking powers of the President, one must not bring about a situation in which war becomes more likely.

Now, I have looked at the two bills before the Congress. I have serious doubts about them. But I do not want to get into the specifics, because I think perhaps the most useful approach would be a joint Executive-Legislative Commission could be created, with a reporting deadline, to study this question from all the aspects, to present the consideration of congressional concern, but also the consideration of some of the necessities with which we may be confronted.

I remember, for example, that one of the most difficult crises we had since this administration has been in office was the 1970 invasion of Jordan by Syrian forces, which in my judgment got us closer to the brink of a war than some of the more highly publicized crises. I have been trying to apply some of the provisions I have seen to the circumstances that then existed.

I believe that perhaps the best course at this moment would be to have a joint study by the executive and legislative branches from which then a more general approach to the warmaking powers could emerge.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you very much, I appreciate your suggestion.

We are in conference; I do not know how it will go. I felt it was important to get your views for the record.

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U.S. POSITION CONCERNING MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT

Now, Dr. Kissinger, Middle East policy is very high on the list. The President said in his press conference just the other day:

"We have put at the highest priority moving toward making some progress toward a settlement of that dispute."

He also added:

"That is why, in talking to Dr. Kissinger, both before I nominated him and since," and so on. The President referred to both of those subjects as, one as it is concerned the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the other as it concerned the energy crisis. I ask you this question because I admire so much your declaration that you are not the least bit inhibited as the Secretary of State of the United States by your own origin. I think that it is very admirable and I have every confidence in it and I think every other American should.

Now, does the statement of the President at his press conference on September 3 represent any change in the policy of the United States toward Israel or the Arab states?

Mr. KISSINGER. No.

Senator, the position of the United States with respect to the Middle East conflict has been that we cannot substitute for some form of negotiation between the parties, but that we, on the other hand, would be prepared to be helpful if the two parties began some movement toward accommodation. And, as the President pointed out in another part of the press conference, it is the view of this administration that both sides have to make some movement in order to achieve a settlement.

Now, it is true that we attach importance and considerable importance to a peaceful resolution of the Middle East issue. But it is also true that we must not attempt to do things that are not in our power to do. What we shall do is to use our good offices energetically where we see any prospect of progress. But American policy cannot of itself substitute for the actions of the parties most immediately concerned.

If I am confirmed, I plan to spend several days in each week at the General Assembly, and I will plan to meet there with Arab leaders who are attending as well as with Israeli diplomats, and that will give me a better possibility to judge what concrete steps we can take. But it does not represent a basic change in our position.

Senator JAVITS. The last I think is very important because there have been all kinds of speculations about that and so I would like to repeat it: it does not represent a basic change in our position.

Mr. KISSINGER. That is correct, sir.

SOVIET DENIAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND MFN TREATMENT

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Kissinger, many of us have been very deeply exercised about the denial of fundamental human rights in the Soviet Union, including the outstanding difficulties which have been created for the world by that attitude. As I understand it, it is one of the fundamental tenets of the United States, of the European Security Conference, and in company and harmony with the other European powers to insist on freedom of movement of ideas and people and the observance of the Declaration of Human Rights.

40

Mr. Sakharov, who is properly admired by the world for his un-
believable courage, has said we should not grant the Soviet Union
most-favored-nation treatment unless it gives some satisfaction to
the conscience of the world on this critical subject.

Can you reconcile that with your recommendation made in response
to Senator Aiken for the granting of MFN to the Soviet Union?

I raise that question in order to specifically pinpoint on an issue
which has so deeply exercised me and hundreds of millions of other
people in the world.

Mr. KISSINGER. I have been very moved as an individual by Academician Sakharov, who wrote 5 or 6 years ago a very lengthy declaration of his conception of human liberty and of the progress that at that time he felt was being made in the Soviet Union toward that goal. I am disappointed, as a member of the intellectual profession, that this progress has not continued, and I am certainly dismayed by the conditions that Academician Sakharov reports. And yet we as a country have to ask ourselves the question whether it should be the principal goal of American foreign policy to transform the domestic structure of societies with which we deal, or whether the principal exercise of our foreign policy should be directed toward affecting the foreign policy of those societies.

Now I recognize there is a certain connection between domestic
policy and foreign policy. But if we adopt as a national proposition
the view that we must transform the domestic structure of all countries
with which we deal, even if the foreign policy of those countries is
otherwise moving in a more acceptable direction, then we will find
ourselves massively involved in every country in the world, and
then many of the concerns expressed by Senator Symington and Sen-
ator Church of a constant American involvement everywhere will
come to the fore again. Therefore, despite some very painful aspects
in the Sakharov case, and despite the inevitable sympathies produced
by my origin for the plight of minority groups that are denied the
right of free emigration, I cannot in good conscience recommend as
a principle of American foreign policy that our entire foreign policy
should be made dependent on that particular aspect of the domestic
structure of the Soviet Union.

We have in a semiofficial capacity pointed out to the Soviet leaders
the unfortunate impact that some of these policies have on our opinion
and on the general atmosphere of our relationship. As a result of
these representations, the exit visa tax was suspended, and various
lists that were given to me by various groups of special cases were
receiving special attention, although I do not think this is the place
to discuss that formally. But as a general proposition, painful as I
find the Sakharov document, emotionally connected though I feel
myself to him, I feel nevertheless that we must proceed on the course
on which we are. And I continue to recommend MFN for the Soviet
Union.

QUESTION OF MFN AND SOVIET DENIAL OF RIGHTS

Senator JAVITS. Dr. Kissinger, I noted with great interest you
used the word "question." I gather therefore you are prepared to join
issues on the question that, one, this is not the "entire" foreign policy

41

of the country, which is the word you used, because we do not know
how the Russians will react. They may have lots of détente with us
even without MFN. Second, what I think is also equally important—
we are not interfering in their domestic affairs—it should be the high-
est foreign policy of our country to seek a decent open world and
that that may be an infinitely more important thing than most of the
other things that we seek.

All I ask, Dr. Kissinger, I do not want to debate that with you
now, you are not yet confirmed as Secretary of State. But, do you
agree that this is a question worthy of debate by you as Secretary
of State in the public forum and before the Congress?

Mr. KISSINGER. It is a section that is essential to debate. I took the
liberty of suggesting to the chairman that he might even wish to hold
hearings on that subject. I will further say, within the context of the
European Security Conference, I strongly support those provisions
that call for freer exchange of ideas and a more liberal policy on the
movement of people. But I do support a full discussion of that issue.

Senator JAVITS. Thank you.

If my time is up I am through, but if not, I would like one question; may I?

The CHAIRMAN. Your time is up.

Senator JAVITS. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## PARTICIPATION BY CONGRESS AND PUBLIC OPINION IN FOREIGN POLICY

In a democracy the formulation and discussion of foreign policy
is a lot more difficult than in a totalitarian nation. I was wondering
if you thought that participation by the Congress and public opinion
in our country made for additional strength in the final attainment
of foreign policy results or if you felt that it was more of a nuisance
or a hindrance. Would you enlarge on your reactions to that thought?

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, as a Government official, I have probably
had occasions when I would feel that it is a nuisance. But seriously,
I must recognize, and I feel strongly, that while the process of achiev-
ing decisions in a democracy is much more complex and much slower
than it is in other forms of government, once a policy is achieved
through a national consensus it is then much more reliable and can
be carried through on a much more effective basis. So I believe that
over a historical period, over decades, a democracy, a democratic way
of making decisions, is far to be preferred, even if one sacrifices some
flexibility of action in the process.

## CRANKING CONCERN FOR HUMAN RIGHTS INTO ECONOMIC NEGOTIATIONS

Senator PELL. Thank you. I have just returned from Europe and
am struck at the difference between détente when you look at it from
behind the curtain and as it looks to us. To us détente is great, and I
applaud the efforts and success of President Nixon and of you in these
efforts.

But, when you look at the impact on the human beings behind the
curtain, you realize that the more détente there is between the great

42

powers the tighter the screws are being put on the people. I am wondering, following up the thought of Senator Javits, if you could see any way of cranking into our trade negotiations, into our MFN negotiations with the Soviet Union, greater concern for all the human beings. We are being very involved with not only the question of Jewish emigration but all of the human desires for liberties and more freedoms because whether we like it or not they are our brothers. We have a common bond with human beings everywhere. I was wondering if you saw any way of keeping this emphasis applied in the negotiations.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, I think, first of all, that one has to distinguish between the various Communist countries in this respect. I do not think it is necessarily true—in fact, I do not think it is true at all—that détente means a clamping down in the countries of Eastern Europe. Many of the countries of Eastern Europe, for example, have advocated a European Security Conference precisely because they believe it gives them a greater possibility to develop their national identities. In several of these countries it has led, not to a change in the governmental structure, but to a greater—what we would call liberalization within this governmental structure.

Now, in the Soviet Union this trend has not always been the same, because détente sets up these contradictory tendencies.

I would like to remind you, however, Senator, that about 10 years ago it was axiomatic in the intellectual community and among students of foreign policy that the reason the Soviet system was able to maintain its authoritarian hold was because of its invocation of foreign danger, and that to the degree that the foreign danger diminished it would not be able to maintain the more repressive aspects of its system. And I believe that, in the long run, this will turn out to be a correct judgment, because, in a way, as we live in a world in which these countries become more related to the free countries and economically more interdependent, the pressures represented by Sakharov are going to become more numerous. And even if they are repressed in any 1- or 2-year period, in the long term one would think that it will be freer—it would be conducive to that—in this situation.

Now, what can we do specifically? This is a very difficult issue to answer in the abstract. There are some things we have already done, as I pointed out with respect to the exit tax. There are other things that will happen gradually. What is very difficult is to write as an explicit condition of an economic arrangement something that can look like an intrusion into domestic legislation. But I think we can use our influence, we can strengthen the trend, and we should not give up the principles for which we stand.

Senator CHURCH. Dr. Kissinger, excuse me for interrupting. There is a vote in the Senate, which accounts for the absentees at the moment. Some of us have to go over to catch that vote. The chairman has asked that we continue in session, and I think the Senators to remain here have already voted. So with your understanding, Senator Pell, will you please continue your questions?

## EFFECT OF DÉTENTE ON SOVIET AND ROMANIAN CITIZENS

Senator PELL. I would disagree respectfully on one point you mentioned. That is that the very reason for some of the trials in the Soviet Union is to try to increase the screws on people there so that as

43

détente occurs, as there is a greater exchange of people, as there is a greater area of contact, the Soviet citizens will be scared to be in touch with our people. By the same token, in Romania, which has the greatest area of détente behind the curtain, you have the tightest conditions. So I would hope that the direction you say will come, but for the moment when you are there, détente has an unpleasant sound to the unfortunate people who are involved.

Mr. KISSINGER. Senator, the question is whether an increase in tension would have a more beneficial result, and I doubt that seriously.

Senator PELL. I think that is a well taken point, but I hope, as I said, that in the future we will crank this concern for human rights in.

Mr. KISSINGER. I agree.

## WITHDRAWAL OF U.S. TROOPS IN EUROPE

Senator PELL. Also, in connection with Europe, as you know, there is this discussion about the withdrawal of troops, the number of troops. I am wondering if we could not maintain our military commitment and withdraw our support or Coca Cola troops and their dependents, in line with President Eisenhower's recommendation, and be able to cut our financial commitment and still maintain our actual military presence the way it should be done. Do you think this could be done?

Mr. KISSINGER. Let me, Senator, answer this question in a more general way. First, our troops in Europe have a number of functions. One is to represent our commitment. The symbolic commitment is hard to express in abstract numbers.

Second, they have a particular strategic function in case for some reason deterrence should fail.

Now, one of the objectives we have attempted to achieve in the dialog that we have started with Europe is to find some definition of the security objectives that we have in Europe. There has been a fair amount of ambivalence on the part of some Europeans who, on the one hand, want our troops in Europe for symbolic reasons but who have for some period, at least, resisted the effort to give them a concrete function because they felt that this might weaken deterrence.

Now, we believe it is essential to develop a rational strategy for all of NATO, in the name of which we could then conduct the debate about the level of forces in Europe.

Now, as one looks at the strategic equation, with the growth of strategic forces on both sides, the recourse to general nuclear war becomes a less and less plausible and a less and less rational method.

Senator PELL. Thank you. My time has expired and I have to go and vote. I will return for the next round.

Thank you.

Mr. KISSINGER. But anyway, if forces should be cut they should be the support forces.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Scott.

Senator Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## PURSUIT OF INFORMATION CONCERNING MISSING IN ACTION

Dr. Kissinger, first, I want to underscore what has already been said regarding the unsatisfactory state of the pursuit of information regarding the missing in action. I would like to include in that

44

concern the missing foreign correspondents, including Welles Hangen, Sean Flynn and others. Would it be your intention to pursue this situation constantly and vigorously in an effort to relieve the concern of all the persons affected?

Mr. KISSINGER. You are correct, Senator. It would be my intention to pursue this vigorously and energetically, as indeed I have done in my present position.

## WITNESS' INITIAL SPEECH AT U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Senator Scott. Reference has been made to the opening of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which occurs on September 18. If you are confirmed in time, what expectation do you have as to when you would give your initial speech?

Mr. KISSINGER. If I am confirmed in time, my expectation would be to give the opening speech for the United States, which is now scheduled for the morning of September 24, and to use the occasion of my visit there to meet with many of the delegations from other countries.

## FOREIGN MINISTERS AND HEADS OF STATE ATTENDING U.N. SESSION

Senator Scott. I understand this is a very important session. Can you tell us how many Foreign Ministers and heads of state will be attending?

Mr. KISSINGER. To the best of my information yesterday, it was 54 Foreign Ministers and some 10 heads of state.

## DATE OF SALT TALKS

Senator Scott. And I understand the SALT talks begin on the 24th also.

Mr. KISSINGER. The SALT talks also begin on September 24.

Senator Scott. These hearings, therefore, do inhibit, until you are confirmed, whatever you may be able to do in preparation for the SALT talks. Is that correct?

Mr. KISSINGER. Well, I obviously am available to the committee to the fullest extent that the committee requires me. From the point of view of the dates that we found on the calendar when I was appointed, there are some of these imperatives that are produced by the already scheduled negotiations, yes.

Senator Scott. In other words, you need some time to prepare yourself for those talks.

Mr. KISSINGER. If at all possible, yes.

Senator Scott. Sir?

Mr. KISSINGER. If it were at all possible, it would be helpful.

Senator Scott. If at all possible.

## MBFR TALKS

When do the mutual and balanced reduction of forces talks [MBFR] begin?

Mr. KISSINGER. Those begin on October 30.