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A6

TELCONE

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Garment

11:30 a.m. 8/12/73

LG: Henry, we'll trade shortly, I have a new first-person statement and I'll bring it over and you let me see the brief.

HK: I haven't got the text yet

LG: Oh you don't?

HK: I have the last version.

LG: That's what I mean.

HK: But they are working on the new one.

LG: That's all right. Just wanted to see they were doing for the fourth version.

HK: Okay.

LG: And we'll show you what we have.

HK: Good.

XE: I have pretty well come to the view that it has to be first person.

LG: I think we have something that is--

HK: And the way to do it is, you know, when I looked it over yesterday--

LG: I'll tell you it is entirely different--there is a completely new approach

HK: I thought it was fixable.

LG: No there is something now seven pages long, you'll see--a different approach.

Right.

HK:

Telcon
General Haig/HAK

Sunday, August 12, 1973;12:30 p.m.

K: Hello.

H: Henry?

K: Al, how are you?

H: Good. How are you doing?

K: (laughs) I'm doing fine, except every day I open the newspaper and read about Cambodia, I have an apoplectic fit. You know, those self-serving sons of bitches in the Pentagon -- we were out of it when they had to put out that execute order. They weren't asked for it.

H: Yeah. Well, it isn't playing too much, though, is it?

K: Oh, yeah. There's an editorial in every leading paper now, and it was front page yesterday. And it's just so totally unnecessary, and it will finally wind up with us, which is all right. The President ought to hit it next week. But that isn't what I'm calling you about. I'm calling about two things: one, Len Garment showed me the new statement he did which is in the first person -- he and Charlie Wright did. But I think it's damn good.

H: Right. Well this is what I'm working on.

K: I don't know whether you've seen it yet.

H: No, they read it to me.

K: But I really think, you know, I would change some parts of it. You can strengthen them. I'd add an introduction that explains more what it is -- a few paragraphs and a conclusion.

H: Yeah.

K: But I think this is a strong statement.

H: Right. I think so too. And it has to be that.

K: And when I thought about the third person one overnight I really came to the view that if we could do a good first person one. And this is not collusion with Len because I never saw it until ten minutes ago.

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H: No, I think this is right, and as a matter of fact, I think we've got the thing now. Added to that should be a layman's exposition on the tapes.

K: Yeah, but I understand there is gonna be a page or so of tapes.

H: Right. Then I think we're set.

K: And I think there should be...well I could work with Len on some of my rhetorical suggestions.

H: Well, I'd go ahead and do that.

K: I think there should be two or three paragraphs at the beginning explaining what this document is and what the issues are so that the reader can find his way through it.

H: Right.

K: I think one or two points, for example, where he refers to the telephone conversation on the 6th, with respect to CIA, he could add to that the idea that when Gray mentioned about aides not behaving properly, I instructed him to press on with his investigation and assumed that all the facts about everyone, including my aides, would come out.

H: Yeah.

K: Do you see what I mean?

H: Yeah.

K: But this is minor fixing.

H: Yeah, yeah.

K: And I think for the first time we have a professional document.

H: That's right.

K: While this thing yesterday was True Confession crap.

H: Oh, it was awful. Well, I agree with you, Henry, and I just...what you have to do is keep these guys drilling constantly, just like from what I've learned from you, the more you...they'll work at it, the better they get at it, and finally they start to get to something that's useable.

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K: Now this I think we can...this is good. Now the only thing is the speech. The more I read that, the less I like it.

H: No, the speech is much, much better this time.

K: I think you should cut out all sideswipes at Kennedy and Johnson.

H: Well, we have. We've taken all that out.

K: And I think he's got to say a little more clearly, in fact a little bit of the stuff that's now in the white paper ought to be in the speech. He ought to say very clearly, you know, just say I did not do this.

H: Well, there's a page of that too.

K: Have something to hold onto. And he's got to assume clearer responsibility, not just because it happened in his administration.

H: He's done that too.

K: Okay.

H: I think you're gonna like the new version. It still needs a little work. We've strengthened the end.

K: Good. That was needed. And, really, cut down on the foreign policy, Al.

H: I don't think you'll find the foreign policy thing here at all, except at the end as a task, building the peace.

K: Well, that's fine.

H: Now, what I'm gonna do is, he's looking at it now, him I want him to make it even a little bit tougher at the end -- not being deterred from our tasks, you know.

K: Yeah. Because I think we're getting there now, and I'm really very pleased with this Garment, uh, Wright...

H: Well, Wright, he's superb.

K: And, you know, I didn't see yesterday how we were ever going to get it done.

They've

H: No, I knew we would, Henry. It's there. We done the work. They had the information. It was just a question of getting it done and keeping everybody's nose to the grindstone. What I'll do on the speech is -- we're coming back. Ron and I are going to come back with him too.

-4-

K: Okay.

H: And I'd like to bring it to you then rather than put it into the system because it's...

K: Do you want to leave it in the office?

H: Yeah.

K: And then Brent will get it out to me.

H: Right.

K: And I won't talk to anyone about it except you.

H: No, that's right. And keep in mind that...

K: The only thing, if he calls me should I say I have it or I don't have it?

H: No, I'll tell Brent. I haven't talked to him yet. He's reading it now and I'm going over. And I'd like to get his okay for you and Bryce to look at it and nobody else, see.

K: Right.

H: Okay?

K: That's fine with me.

H: Good.

K: No, I don't have to mention to him that I way it anyway.

H: See, I'll put a note on it...

K: Even if I do see it, you know, I...

H: Yeah, well the better he likes it the more secretive he's gonna be with it.

K: Yeah.

H: And I don't know that he's comfortable ______ yet. But now I'm beginning to think we're getting a damn good speech. It's going to end up very, very healing, very statesmanlike, very much taking responsibility.

K: And now with this statement, I think it ought to be released with his speech.

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H: So do we. That's exactly what I want to do. When we get that tape in there -- the tapes -- then we've got something that can be in the newspapers, they'll have to print.

K: And then I think you ought to cut the tape section in the speech considerably.

H: It's still a little bit long in the speech, but we've cut it from yesterday.

K: Because it's not a good thing. It wasn't good in the speech; and you took out the San Clemente stuff, I hope.

H: Yeah. That's all out.

K: Because that we shouldn't raise.

H: I think you're going to find it's a hell of a lot better, Henry. We're getting there now.

K: Did you see that guy Abplanalp in the Star? (laughs)

H: He's gonna build a ten-story whorehouse?

K: Yeah. (laughter)

H: It's all right. That doesn't hurt.

K: That's all right. No, when was he thinking of -- Tuesday or Wednesday?

H: Wednesday.

K: Okay.

H: Then we give tomorrow the highway bill; Tuesday the property release.

K: Good.

H: And then Wednesday the speech, the white paper. I'll meet with Bill on Thursday.

K: Good.

H: That, he had some counter-pressures yesterday on that, I think.

K: From whom -- Connally?

H: I don't know. Connally did some press stuff overnight too.

K: From whom would he have counter-pressure?

H: I suspect him.

K: Connally.

H: Um.

K: Well, you know, that may be, but is he firm on it?

H: Oh, yeah, yeah. No question. No question.

K: Because if he doesn't, it's totally untenable now.

H: No, there's no doubt about that. It is.

K: I mean we have a sick situation now.

H: I had a good talk with him by the pool late last night and he said he's firm.

K: Okay, good. Well, it's inconceivable now.

K: Yeah, and he also told Ron. Ron just came back with him going over the news summary, and he's firm. No question about it.

K: Okay good. Well, leave it with Brent and he'll get it to me.

H: Good. Goodbye, Henry.

K: All the best.

H: Right. Bye, bye.

Telcon
Charles Wright/HAK

Sunday, August 12, 1973' 1:00 p.m.

[Beginning of conversation not on tape.]

K: I think this is definitely the way to go.

W: Well, I'm delighted to hear that. I think this will be a real contribution if we can move in that direction.

K: Well, I have already called Haig and told him that I strongly support it

W: Good. Good.

K: And that he should say that to the President.

W: Uh, huh. That will be helpful. Len is here now. He's just got the safe open. He's trying to get a copy for you. I understand you wanted a copy.

K: And I really think it's... you know, the danger of the other one was that any man mentioned in there could destroy us. ____ contradicting us.

W: That's why I tried to put this on a lofty enough level that there's no room for anybody to shoot at it.

K: Well, and it's a Presidential statement, you know, it's what a President can say.

W: Uh, huh.

K: Without arguing with all of his aides. And it's plausible and strong.

W: Let's hope we can sell it up at Camp David.

K: Well, if you get into, I've told Len I will strongly support it and I think he'll go along with it.

W: Well that's very helpful to have your support. We appreciate it.

K: Good, well I think it's another outstanding job. And I thought the brief was outstanding too.

W: Thank you.

K: Nice to talk to you.

DECLASSIFIED
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TELCOM
Mr. Kissinger/Helen Thomas
1:10 p. m. 8/12/73

T: ..... that some high ranking Cambodians have asked the White House to start a movement to remove Lon Nol and to bring back Sihanouk-- can you say anything on this subject?

K: I'm not familiar with anything like that. That does not seem to be true.

T: Really?

K: Really.

T: And how about this cable on--from Sihanouk to Mansfield?

K: I have only seen the news accounts of that.

T: Ah huh. You haven't been in contact with the Senator at all, huh?

K: No, I'm in frequent contact with the Senator and when he gets something that he considers significant, he is meticulous

T: Is that right?

K: Oh yeh, Mansfield is absolutely--this is not--you can say that I have found Senator Mansfield is always meticulous about keeping us informed.

T: Ah huh.

K: And we have not yet heard from him about this--

T: That cable--they say he is up in New Jersey and he had suggested that he had not received the cable

K: I don't believe he has, because if he had he would have called me.

T: Do you know when he'll be going to China, or has it been put off because of this congress.

K: It apparently has been put off, but I don't know for what reason.

T: How about yourself, do you have any plans to go soon?

K: I haven't got the date set yet, but really as soon as we have, we'll announce

T: Right, you still are going, though, huh?

Page 2

K: There has been no change in the basic plan.

T: Is there anything new on--

K: No really, Helen, just for your guidance, I have--am not familiar with any new major development. You'd expect at the time of the bombing halt that a lot of forces would start boiling up and rumors start flying, but right now, I'm not misleading you, I'm not familiar with any new major development. What we thought was going on early in July is sort of waiting and of course our ability to influence events is obviously changed--by definition, you'd expect it, with the end of the bombing, but there is no major event now going on, that I'm familiar with. K

T: Is our position just wait and see after the bombing halt?

K: Well, no I think the parties know what our position is, but I think until they have decided whether they can win or not, the communist side won't negotiate. They know in principle what our position is.

T: That we support a negotiated peace.

K: But they know what we mean by a negotiated peace, but I don't want to go into that.

T: What do we do now on Wednesday, do things just go on.

K: We'll stop bombing.

T: Do you think that will radically change our position?

K: I think that remains to be seen--I don't think anybody can tell. Okay Helen, it is a sign of my affection for you that I took the call on a Sunday

T: And vice versa--

K: You have been very decent. Bye.

By: NARA Date 6/9/69
E.O. 12958

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Telcon
The President/HAK

Aug. 12, 1973; 2:30 p.m. (Sunday)
(at HAK's home)

[Beginning of conversation not taped.]

K: On that basis I think you're not so defensive.

P: Right. That's the way it ought to be.

K: And I think there's a certain advantage in the first person, if it isn't done like one of these True Confession ones, in which you are not mentioning 20 other people, any one of whom can then start contradicting you and drag you into a debate with your aides, which isn't worthy of a President.

P: That's the whole point.

K: But this one I have read and it simply very objectively states what you knew without any editorializing. It doesn't say I was bewildered, confused...

P: Oh, crap.

K: It just very calmly states what you know, and it makes a very impressive document.

P: That's right.

K: And in fact, if you want to be totally off-beat, you might even consider reading it as a speech. It would be totally different from anything you've ever done. And since most people at this point don't give a damn about the details, they might just feel that you've been totally candid and put it all out. But this I don't feel strongly about.

P: We're kind of past that point, Henry. We've now decided to try to make a speech, and we're improving it all the time, which covers a couple of other points, too, and which particularly tells the country to get off its ass and get to work.

K: Right, well you know from our conversation yesterday that...

P: That's the part that we've strengthened enormously since we've talked.

K: Good. Well that I felt needed some expansion.

P: Right. Well, we've done that much better. You'd be pleased with it. In the meantime, we'll put this out.

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K: But I think, Mr. President, I don't feel strongly, but that was just a very off-beat idea. But I think the white paper yesterday when I saw it I saw no way it could be rescued. But this one needs some work yet and I talked to Charlie Wright. I had a few suggestions which he agreed with. But these are minor ones, and I think it needs an introduction that explains a little better where it's going. But I think if you would like it, it will be something that we could work with.

P: The point is, if we could just get something I can put out. The damn thing could be a piece of toilet paper, and just say I put a paper out. As you say, the unwashed really don't care. They just want a -- well he put out a paper. Right?

K: And also, this has the advantage, Mr. President, that at press conferences you can stay within the confines of this paper, and you can't be drawn into these endless debates of what you said to...

P: On such and such a day.

K: On this date...

P: If I can remember. And I'm not gonna get into that. I mean, I'm not a witness. I'm not a defendant. That's the thing, you see, about the other thing that concerned me. It put the President into the position of being a witness and/or defendant in this whole damned mess. Well the hell with it, I'm not a witness or a defendant. I'm must trying, frankly, I'm basically a prosecutor trying to get the facts.

K: Exactly.

P: And I'm not gonna be in that position.

K: Well, then, actually this paper does that pretty well.

P: Okay, well, I'll look at it tomorrow morning.

K: Right, Mr. President, but I think these things have a way of jelling and I think this one is well on the way towards jelling.

P: That's good. I'm glad to hear that. Okay, have a good day. Nothing new on the international front? Nobody's shot anybody yet?

K: No, nothing of any consequence. The, oh, Sihanouk sent a telegram to Mansfield in which he said that if we stop sending military aid to Cambodia, then he will make peace with us. You know, that's exactly the ploy they used to pull in South Vietnam.

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P: Well, now, how can he make these when he doesn't control the Khmer Rouge?

K: Well, but what does it mean? What does peace mean if...

P: That means his peace, well...

K: If we've got to stop military aid. But of course it's the inevitable thing. You stop bombing and they go to the next thing.

P: (laughs) Yeah.

K: And once you stop military aid to Phnom Penh, it's gonna collapse. But he said he would then establish diplomatic relations with us.

P: Well, hell, how can he? He's not there.

K: Well, they'll bring him back for that purpose. And I suspect that this is what the Democrats are now going to try to do when the Congress comes back.

P: Stop all military aid to Cambodia?

K: Yeah.

P: Then have Sihanouk come back as the head of a Communist government. Is that it?

K: That's right. That's what it would amount to.

P: What do we say to the Chinese?

K: Well, I don't think we should -- I think, Mr. President, we should say nothing. What can we say? We have no bargaining chips left.

P: No, I know. But my point is, if they ask us what we think of such a proposal.

K: We say, this is a surrender. This is a unilateral...uh, we will promote a negotiation. I mean, if they drive us too far we will publish our proposal that we offered Sihanouk to come back as head of a coalition government, and then we proposed that...

P: I'm not sure he's got that strength in Cambodia, anyway.

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K: Well, he doesn't have any strength in Cambodia, but I think the Khmer Rouge will use him for this purpose as a...

P: As a way to get the aid, that's right.

K: ...as a way to get the aid stuff. That's the only thing of any significance. The Italian Foreign Minister saw Volpe and said they were backing us completely in these European things. That isn't gonna get us much, but it will prevent them from making unanimous resolutions against us.

P: Yeah. That's right. Well, anyway, it's sort of the dog days of August and except for the Washington Post and New York Times most of the country doesn't give one god-damn about what the hell happens in Watergate. They are sick of it, tired of it, you know. They want to get on with other things, Henry, believe me.

K: I am sure of that.

P: That's just what I sense from talking to a group of people. You know, it's finally gotten to that point. The post-mortems go on among the Krafts and the jackasses like that, but most people don't give one damn.

K: I think that is right.

P: You know, they get sick and...our people get very tired of something. They get tired of political campaigns, ice cream; they get tired of the energy crisis, or the environment crisis. Now it's the Watergate crisis.

K: Well, I think also they want to have their government governed instead of...

P: They may not understand that, but nevertheless, we do. (laughs) So, on we'll go, and we've come a long ways since April 15th, I was thinking, when we had that terrible time.

K: I know. Well you have really gone through an unbelievable amount in the last...

P: Well we've survived it, and we're gonna survive.

K: Well, I think it's on the upgrade now. I think there's no question about this being on the upgrade, Mr. President. And then we get control of the government and discipline it, and can go back to work. On foreign policy, Mr. President, within three months we'll be back where we were.

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TELECON

Oswald Johnson (Evening Star)/Mr. Kissinger

10:52 a.m., August 13, 1973

K: Hello.

J: Oswald Johnson here. Is it clear we are going out of
Cambodia in these last few days? It seems they are pulling back.

K: I don't have that impression, to tell the truth.

J: Is this a maneuver of Sihanouk?

K: We have not yet received that telegram. I talked to Mansfield yesterday and he hadn't either. But we have no doubt that he sent it.

J: There is a report from Phnom Penh today to the effect there has been a request from other unidentified members.

K: I have no information as of yesterday. We queried Phnom Penh and they say it is a total fabrication. They can't even find the Cambodians who might have said this.

J: To make a long story short then, it looks like it might be wishful thinking?

K: It looks like it to me. With the bombing halt, we are not in the main line of negotiation any more. We don't have much to negotiate about.

J: It has to be between the Cambodian parties. But without us, they have nothing.

K: I know.

J: What are the steps now?

K: I think if Phnom Penh doesn't fall, there will be negotiation; but I think it will be tested first. This is my own personal impression.

J: How long do you think the test would take?

K: A month or six weeks.

TELCONE

Amb. Scał /Mr. Kissinger

8/13/73 10:57 a.m.

S: Yes, Henry.

K: I want to talk to you about the council meeting this afternoon. What is your recommendation?

S: My recommendation is since the facts on this one are open that we go along with what is in effect a condemnatory resolution. If it is focused solely on this incident. However, if the Lebanese and the Arab countries seek to expand this to include sanctions of an undisclosed nature, then I suggest we take a very strong and hard look and maybe say no. I have talked with the Lebanese ambassador who says he has now been instructed by his government to explore the possibility of a two-phase resolution, one that condemn and condemn and condemning the incident and number 2, recommending to ICIO which is meeting in Rome that it take appropriate actions, against Israel. Now appropriate action is vague enough so that it can include almost anything and maybe we can get by on that. But if it is more specific such as expulsion of Israel, then I think that is a new ball game. I have warned Gora against overreaching himself like the Egyptians always do, he seems to be quite aware of the problems, he is being pressed by the fanatics on the Arab side, he also has promised to talk with me about two hours before the session gets underway at 3:00 so I have a clearer idea of where he is going.

K: Okay, but will you check with me if you get any instructions contrary to this.

S: Yes. I think that we blew part of it on Saturday.

K: Of course.

S: Because having already deplored why this means we are ready to condemn and and so that encouraged him to go to step two.

K: There was absolutely no need for it.

S: You are familiar with the background on it and I finally ended up being accused of colluding with you on this.

K: It's of course a great government if one is colluding with a President.

S: Yeh, well that's where we are Henry.

K: Okay, thank you John.

S: I'll let you know prior to the meeting in case anything seems to be getting off track.

*

TELCON

Senator Mansfield - Mr. Kissinger

August 13, 1973

11:30 a.m.

K: Hello

haven't

M: Hello, Henry. I got the cablegram yet. I got with your office and asked that they send you one too. I don't know what happened. You may remember several years ago I sent one to Sihounouk and they sent it back. Would you please tell me how many did you see in the New York Times?

K: Yes, I saw the test that they must have carried.

M: Do you think it would be possible for us to trace through what's happened to that cable?

K: Yes, I'll do that.

M: The press is still after me. What would you think of this statement? "The contents of a cable from Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia to me have recently been reported in the press. This communication puts forth Prince Sihanouk's proposals for a termination of the warfare in his hapless country. It seems to me that the proposals provide a basis for ending the conflict among the Cambodians themselves and for the reconstitution of their Government, free as it should be from outside intervention.

"Under our system of government official reaction and responsibility to proposals of this kind can come only from the Executive Branch in the person of the President or his designee. Speaking as Majority Leader of the Senate and in light of the Congressional position adopted toward Cambodia, I would commend these proposals to the President of the United States."

K: Of course, this is entirely within your discretion but I believe our feeling is that there would be a difference between total withdrawal and unilateral withdrawal.

M: The idea was, though, that everything would depend on the question of the 14th. If he says anything about economics, you would find a difference there.

K: I have shown you what our proposal was to date applying an end to all outside assistance. But to agree to a unilateral and would be a death sentence. We would agree to ending military aid after a settlement if Hanoi, China and all the others shop sending assistance there. The only question is if it should be done unilaterally.

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["2", "M: Well, suppose for the time being I say nothing.", "K: I think that might be better. But, of course, you are within your\nrights to say whatever you felt. Our belief that is that if Congress cuts\noff all funds then there is no basis for the agreement at all.", "M: \"Ending the conflict among the Cambodians themselves. . . the reactions of our Government can come only from the President of his designees. Speaking as Majority Leader of the Senate, it is our belief that. . . . . . . . . . . . .

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K: OK.

M: "The contents of a cable from Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia to me have recently been reported in the Press. This communication sets forth Prince Sihanouk's proposals for a termination of the warfare in his hapless, devastated country. It seems to me that these proposals provide a basis for ending the conflict among the Cambodians themselves and for the reconstitution of their government free as it should be from outside intervention.

"Under our system of government official reaction and response to these proposals of this kind can come only from the Executive Branch in the person of the President or his designee. Speaking as Majority Leader of the U.S. Senate and in light of the Congressional position which has been legally adopted in opposition to U.S. military involvement in Cambodia in any way, shape, or form, I would hope, or I would respectfully suggest, that the President would do all in his power to promote the achievement of a Cambodian, or a Cambodia, free of outside interference."

K: I wonder whether the phase "any way, shape, or form," is needed. Because, really, what was ended was military actions.

M: Well, let's see. Adopted in opposition to U.S. involvement in Cambodia. Slash out in any way, shape or form.

K: Right. Now our reaction, Senator, so there is no misunderstanding... will be this. We will not accept the proposition that there should be unilateral aid ---a cutoff of military aid. So, we may try to drive a wedge there between us. But we will make a generally sympathetic comment on your statement.

M: But, the point is, Henry, that in my opinion, the Congress may well legislate to cut off military aid but not economic aid. Why say anything that might give them a chance to drive a wedge between us.

K: What do you recommend that we say?

M: Well, that I have been in contact with you and that we think that there is a reasonable grounds for negotiation.

K: OK.

M: That would make it a little more open. But I don't think wouldn't speak of continued military aid unless it was absolutely necessary.

K: No, we won't get into the military aid question.

4

M: Yes, that might stir up a hornet's next here on the Hill.

K: No, what we would be prepared to do is what we did to Laos.

M: Edonomic aid.

K: Yes, and where both sides agree not to supply military aid. I mean we wouldn't say we are opposed to flatly cutting it off. We would say the cutoff of military aid should be on a mutual basis.

M: Yes, and you might hold out the possibility of economic aid which I think we are duty-bound to extent.

K: Right.

M: Now, Henry, will you also try to run down that cable?

K: I will do that immediately. And, we really appreciate your extreme meticulousness and correctness in that.

M: Well you are kind but it is the only way to do it.

K: I know but you have been especially decent about it. We will be in touch. Do we know how to reach you?

M: No, you'll have to get the number from Selsie or Peggy down at the Leader's office.

K: Well, we'll get it.

M: OK, Thanks Henry.

K: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E.0.12958

By AB NARA Date 6/9/69

Telcon
Joe Sisco/HAK

August 13, 1973; 11:40 a.m.

K: Hello.
S: Henry.
K: Joe, your self-confidence must be eroding.
S: My what's that?
K: Your self-confidence is eroding when you get on the phone first.

S: (laughs) I thought I always did that. Henry, I think you're seeing... Ken Keating just called me and said he's going to get together with you for a few minutes. Let me tell you what he's going to raise so that you can be prepared. He said he's going to mention to you this question of raising the Israeli mission to a Class I mission. We here recommend it favorably to the administrative people, but it's on the administrative desk. What they're gonna do with it I just honestly don't know, so that this is really in that channel at the moment. You ought to be aware as to where it stands.

K: Right.

S: Especially, I think you ought to try to get across my judgment to him that the focal principal focal point as far as the Israelis are concerned is still going to be you and the White House, and whatever he reports is all, you know, fine. The reason why I say this, Henry, just entreneux, I think you will find that Keatings' powers of concentration at this ripe age of 73 are not what they were maybe ten or fifteen years ago. This is what we have found in the briefings here in the last three or four.

K: Oh, really.

S: Yeah. I don't want to overdraw this, but his attention span is not what it used to be, Henry.

K: Yeah.

S: Between us. Now actually, he did very well in India, but if there's a weakness in India what it was was really an inability to carry on a really professional deeply rooted substantive discussion, and I think that this is going to be the same kind of a problem with Golda which means that the real business you are going to have to do with Dinitz with whatever help I can provide you with.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By NARA Dae 6/9/07

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
By: NARA Date 5/9/09

-2-

K: How is Moynihan doing in India, as long as I've got you on the phone? I can't make out from here.

S: Well, look he's doing all right. Moynihan will always play the press, as you well know, but on the whole he's following his instructions. I think you were very helpful to him on that last round. He's in the middle of these rupee negotiations. He's negotiating the rupee thing not like you and I would negotiate. We told him you told him he could go down to a million.

K: Well, eventually.

S: Well, hell, he told that to Indira Gandhi in the first meeting. The way to move to a million - to a billion, excuse me - is to start out as he did in the formal negotiations at a billion and a half. But we got a report the other day that he told her that he has the fallback to go back to a billion. Well, you don't negotiate that way.

K: No, that's amateurish.

S: Of course it's amateurish, Henry.

K: You know, I told him that we could sell that. I mean that he's with a bleeding heart in three or four months as a great favor of the President.

S: Yeah, now for example, Henry. Have you got just 10 more seconds, because I don't want to take too much of your time. This whole business of a <u>presspass</u> piece of housing which our stupid AID people built back in 1969 and gave back to the Indian government here in '73. I first heard about this a couple of months ago. The first question that came to my mind was, isn't there some way we can use this thing as a piece of leverage in the rupee negotiations. By that time it was all water over the dam. But be that as it may, he's doing all right. He's got a good image; he's doing basically what the President indicated to him, you know, he appears to be the liberal. Any time he can make some play with the press and make the State Department look foolish and make himself look good, he does that. If that all serves a purpose it's okay with me. That's about what it amounts to, Henry.

K: As far as this afternoon is concerned...

S: I don't think we'll have to stick with drafting a statement, but, Henry, I asked Brent to have a word with you. I don't see how we can avoid supporting a condemnatory resolution.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By: A.A. NARA Date 6/9/69

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Marshall Wright

3:45 p.m. 8/13/73

W: Henry, how are you?

K: Okay, Marshall, how about you?

W: Fine. Do you know about the Mansfield statement on the Sihanouk message?

K: Yes, and we have drafted something here and you are not to say anything until you see that.

W: I'm not going to say anything at all. But his office called me but I had gone out to lunch to give me the test of the thing.

K: He called me with it himself, and modified--you know it is still unacceptable, but it is much toned done from what he was going to say, he was going to call on us to accept the proposal which he's still partly doing.

W: The one I have is the one that says simply, I would hope that these proposals would receive your urgent attention.

K: Yeh, well he was --he was then going to say he was any form of military aid and he is taking that out

W: And he starts off by genuflecting towards the--he said the responsibility

K: Yeh I got him to put that in. We are drafting something that we will say in answer to questions and which you should see.

W: Great, you know he still does not have that message--operating on the basis of a

K: Can you do what you can to find out where the Gd thing is?

W: Sure, his office is moving heaven and hell to find it.

K: Yeh and so are we.

W: Did anybody hit RCA?

K: Q Well we will do that.

W: I go separate to see if we can't find it. _________ Must have it.

K: Yeh.

W: Although what they'll have is what was released in Peking, of course. We ought to be able to get that from downstairs. Listen anytime I see somebody, they ask me to speculate on your future, I want you to know that I keep telling them I am the last man in the world they should ask. It is impossible to go anywhere in town without getting on that subject.

K: I know. I know.
But I have no information on the subject.

W: Back to this other thing--Peggy in Mansfield's office is searching all over the world

K: Good, I think we are already looking into it so we'll let you know.

W: Good. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
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TELCONE

Secretary Weinburger/HAK

August 13, 1973/ 6:21 p.m.

K: Hello

W: Henry this is Cap.

K: Cap. How are you?

W: Fine sir thank you. As you know I am going to return these visits that the health ministers of Poland and Russia paid on me earlier in the year and I was just wondering if you had any advice or suggestions or anything you'd like to have taken up or anything you'd like not taken up or anybody you'd like me to call on or anything of that kind.

K: When are you leaving?

W: Leaving in the 26th of August, 24th of August. Beg your pardon.

K: Let me give it some thought and I'll be in touch with you.

W: If there is anything I could do I would be delighted to do it and also ...

K: I may get you a page of just general guidance.

W: That would be very helpful. I would appreciate it very much. Are we
going to get this other mess over sometime do you suppose.

K: You mean Watergate.

W: Yeah. So we can get on with business. God it's so grusome to see all this.

K: Cap I don't know a damn bit more than you do.

W: I don't know. All I know is that each morning I listen to the Washington Post being thrown up on the doorstep and I wonder what the hell is going to be reported today. It's pretty gruesome.

K: I've got the same problem.
of

W: Well anything you can think that you think would be useful for me to do I would be happy to do. I will be over there about 10 days I think.

K: Good. Thanks.

DECLASSIFIED
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By: NARA Dae 6/9/09

A2

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Tom Braden

8/13/73 6:30 p.m.

B: There is no such thing as D.C. Vietnam, Watergate or Dr. Kissinger
where I am--I'm in the mountains.

K: I believe in the possibility of all of this except the last statement. I
am a household word in New Hampshire.

B: Henry, is there any news on the President and the speech.

K: You mean when he will give it?

B: Yes.

K: Possibly Wednesday, but it isn't fully decided. I don't think it is save
to agree yet, but I promise I will do it.

B: I will figure sometime after Wednesday--or even after you get back from
California, then that we will do it. How are things--will we be out of the
woods?

K: You mean the watergate?

B: Everything.

K: It will take some compassion. We can't get a conclusive answer. I think
the country has to decide if it will live with an inclusive ending --because that is what there will be. The speech will not be
conclusive as was not Ehrlichman or Haldeman's hearings.

B: That is a promising note, Henry--it depends on the spirit in which
this is done. I know what an effort it will be but there is no reason
why everybody shouldn't come from their high mountains and be able
to converse with each other.

K: If we can achieve this, then maybe there is a blessing in this whole misery.

B: That's a good note.

K: Good, Tom You have been a good friend--not only a social friend.

B: Okay, Henry. Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By: NARA Dae 6/9/69

A2

TELCOM

Ken Freed, AP/Kissinger

9:45 a.m. - 8/14/73

K: Hello.

F: Good morning, sir. I hope this is the last time I have to talk to you about Cambodia but the office would like me to do a story on the situation. What is on the program side? Any negotiations?

K: First of all, we are talking background and administration sources. I don't think there will be a negotiation now until the new balance of forces.

F: Will the new balance of forces include Lon Nol?

K: I don't want to go into the details. If Phnom Penh can hold out, I think so. You know, for your own deep background, that the Congressional vote just changed the whole negotiating pattern.

F: There is an indication in a *Times* story that both sides have taken the position to fight it out to the end.

K: I wouldn't take that so seriously. It's just too early to tell now.

F: Has the Sihanouk cable to Mansfield been studied?

K: We have never found the bloody thing. We have seen the text that has been published but we have been trying to find the actual cable and haven't succeeded.

F: How about substance?

K: Nothing new, just fundamental position.

F: No relaxation of ____________?

K: No. In what way? We have to cut off military aid.

F: I think looking at the amnesty thing. . . . . .

K: We went through all of that in Vietnam. It is amazing how people keep going back to the same thing. Then and again now we were told great breakthroughs were happening.

F: In regard to the entire Vietnam situation, assuming the fighting continues for some time, what would be the effect of the U.S. position on the ceasefire?

A6

K: We're not in a strong position now. Only bargaining chip is economic aid. You know you can negotiate in the abstract and deprive yourself of any means for bargaining and on the other hand you can expect miracles.

F: How long do you expect this to go on?

K: Cambodia now is no longer ours. The Cambodians have to negotiate it themselves.

F: Yeh. Is there any word on the Iranian membership on the ICCS.

K: It will almost certainly go through.

F: Any announcements on it soon?

K: That has to be worked out. That is also deep background.

F: Right.

K: OK, Ken.

F: Thank you.

★

Telcon
Amb. Scali/HAK

August 14, 1973; 9:51 a.m.

S: ...one step beyond deploring. That in itself won't be enough to satisfy the hard-line non-alligned group. They'll want something in there either about sanctions or appropriate actions. Our goal is going to be to seek to divert this to some sort of call urging of ICAO to take appropriate action. And then we can go along.

K: Yeah.

S: Now all of the editorials that I have seen in the morning American newspapers this morning, as for example, the New York Times, the New York News and the Christian Science Monitor, all rap the Israelis on this. So domestically, there doesn't seem to be any big groundswell of support for them.

K: Yeah.

S: These are the unhappy facts.

K: Yeah. Okay. Well, Dinitz is coming in to see me and I'll see what he'll have to say. But we cannot call for a specific action.

S: No, I don't want to call for a specific action. As for example, I would recommend a veto if the specific action were expulsion from ICAO.

K: Right.

S: Or anything which is hard and immediate. I think we cannot dodge or avoid some sort of reference to some outside civil aviation group to take a look at this.

K: Although, you know, as a basic principle it can't be maintained indefinitely that terrorist groups hijack airliners no government is responsible, while when a government then retaliates, not being in a position where it has its own terrorist groups, all hell breaks loose.

S: I understand that, but the point is that one is a government action, and the Arabs, with a big help from the Russians, are now proceeding to make a big issue out of "state terrorism" which it alleges that the Israelis...

DECLASSIFIED
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DECLASSIFIED
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Telcon

Bryce Harlow/HAK

August 14, 1973; 10:16 a.m.

H: Hello.

K: Bryce, I just want you to know that if you start talking to Harvard professors I'll start talking to Oklahoma Congressmen.

H: Well, if you start talking to cowboys, I'll keep on talking to Harvard professors, Dr. Kissinger. (laughs) And we'll both benefit.

K: I am a cowboy.

H: See, you need to step down - I need to step up.

K: I am a cowboy, leading a wagontrain into the sunset. You never read that interview of mine.

H: Well, no, I remember that simile. I thought you were a four-flusher instead of a four-shooter. Is that right?

K: Listen, don't ruin me with my goddam colleagues, for Christ sake.

H: Well, he's listening appreciatively to this exchange right here.

K: How are we doing on the goddam speech? Have you seen the latest draft?

H: No, I haven't seen the last. I got cut out of that. They told me you had it in hand.

K: (laughs) No, I got cut out about three drafts ago.

H: Did you? Yeah, me too. That's what gave me heart.

K: Although they've got a better white paper. Have you seen that?

H: Yes, I've seen that, and I think it is much, much better.

K: Well, speechwriting - us who have written speeches shouldn't participate in.

H: Well, I don't think that they really need to have the kind of talent that you and I could bring to it.

K: Well, I think it's much better to have the military commanders doing it.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
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H: It's a kind of a military effort. Yes, I'm with you on that, I'm with you on that.

K: That's what I felt.

H: Look, I wanted to ask you how free I am to talk to this man.

K: Neustadt?

H: Yes.

K: I wouldn't tell him anything. He's dangerous.

H: You wouldn't tell him anything? Well, I'll try to avoid it, but he's very probing.

K: No, he's a good chap.

H: He's asking me about whether or not you get to see the President very much, and I'm trying to help you without being dishonest. What could I say? Now and then? Something like that? (laughter)

K: Say that whenever we are on the same floor so that I can get in there on my knees. If it means going upstairs it's a little difficult.

H: Well, I'll try, Henry, best I can, to make Dick believe that you have influence here. Okay?

K: Christ, the one thing you will not succeed in doing is describe what really goes on.

H: I will not describe what really goes on in this building to anybody. (laughter) Okay? All right.

K: Okay. Bye.

Telcon
Fred Buzhardt/HAK

August 14, 1973; 11:15 a.m.

K: Fred.

B: Yes, Henry.

K: On that answer - one other point which I forgot to mention to you that Maw made was you were going to put in at the end of paragraph 16 something that as a result/the investigation.
of

B: Right.

K: Then we feel she ought to pick up that point again at the beginning of 17.
K:

B: Right. That was submitted to the director Miss Mitchell, based on the investigation - on evidence submitted - developed in the investigation requesting authorization.

B: Well, that's a problem, putting it there because the request for authorization doesn't get into the reasons very much.

K: Okay. Well, you can certainly do it on 16.

B: Right. We did it this morning already.

K: Oh, you did.

B: Yeah, we already did it. Both 16 and 21, I think it was.

K: Right. So then you send it up to Maw.

B: Uh, huh, I'll probably wait and send him the corrected copy.

K: No, I think you should send him - will you send me a copy of the correct...?

B: As soon as I get it back from Justice. We went over and reworded it this morning. They'll send it to me later.

K: Good. You haven't had a chance to find out the date.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By NARA Date 6/9/07

AB

TELCONE

Gov. Harriman/Kissinger

12:40 p.m. - 8/14/73

K: Hello.

H: Hello, Henry.

K: Averell, how are you?

H: I'm fine. I've been thinking of you lately.

K: Well, you are very nice. How nice of you to send me that note.

H: Well, I was just so blistering with indignation this morning. I know I didn't always agree with Sonnenfeldt; in fact I thought he was a little unduly tough. If anything he erred on the side of caution in dealing with our Russian friends.

K: If I had to make a criticism I would say that.

H: And I have had quite an argument with him once or twice. He's very definite and I was quite rough with him once or twice but it was always in relation to his looking at the blackest side of things.

K: That's right.

H: And his being subversive is absolutely nonsense.

K: But he's been very helpful on this detente.

H: And I would think to be in the Treasury where I think they ought to be cautious, that's a good man for them.

K: Averell, the reason I actually called was I'd like to talk to you about that. I think at this particular moment, don't do anything because I'm trying to develop a strategy for this matter and I also have some other plans for Sonnenfeldt and I want to make sure that we put our weight in the right place.

H: Yes, I don't know whether he's so right for the Treasury but I just hate this - well, I didn't assume there was much I could do. You know I pitched in and helped our mutual friend

K: Well, I was so grateful for you. Bill Sullivan

H: I couldn't do anything for the other fellow because their point of view was to have an Assistant Secretary that wasn't involved. And I didn't object to that. But Sullivan was most unfair. On this one I don't know what I can do because I would be considered to be subversive by those McCarthyites myself.

K: Let's wait. Where are you going to be?

H: I'm going to be - my office will know where I am. I'll be right here at Haywire.

K: You're not going to be in Washington.

H: I don't plan to be here until right after Labor Day, but I can come down and see you if it's of any importance.

K: I'm going to the West Coast next Monday for two weeks until after Labor Day.

H: You've postponed your trip to the other place.

K: Yeh, for the time being.

H: If you want me to I could come down a little later next week but it would be - normally I would be there

K: All I really want is a general roundup with you.

H: What?

K: I just wanted to have a general review of the situation with you.

H: Would you like me to come down next week? When are you going to the Coast?

K: On Monday. How about Friday?

H: I've got this damn cold.

K: Then you better not leave.

H: I don't think I better do it.

DECLASSIFIED
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By NARA Date 6/9/69

*

DECLASSIFIED
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By AB NARA Dzie 6/9/09

K: Well, let's meet then as soon after Labor Day as you possibly can make it.

H: The fans right here say why don't you come up and spend a night with us.

K: I'd love to do it but I'm afraid I'm stuck here until the

H: I think I'd better not, I'm still on antibiotics until Monday and it's probably stupid for me to, unless it's very important.

K: No, it's not that important.

H: Anyway,

K: Let's have lunch or breakfast

H: I didn't think there was anything I could do right away but I thought at some time when this comes up before reasonable people I might be able to be helpful.

K: Averill, I want to talk to you about that but above all I'd like to discuss the whole foreign policy situation with you.

H: Can I take a raincheck? If I feel better later this week I'll give you a ring and come on down.

K: Good. And if not we'll meet a day or two after you return.

H: OK.

K: Say hello to Pam. Bye.

TELCOM

Joseph Alsop - Henry Kissinger

August 14, 1973

5:00 p. m.

A: Hello, Henry.

K: How are you?

A: Well, I'm OK. I went to the meeting this morning and it was an occasion
a la Kissinger.

K: What did he say?

A: That this was the best foreign policy ever... and that no individual
counted very much. How is the thing coming now?

K: It hasn't come out yet.

A: When will it?

K: I think this week or next.

A: And you haven't changed your mind.

K: Don't you think I'm right.

A: Henry, I don't know. I wouldn't say it at all without making it clear
to the President. Making it your duty. If the worst happens, it would be
like the ceiling falling in. On the other hand.....

K: You see, we XXX will be heading into a confrontation in the future and we
need discipline.

A: Like what?

K: The Middle East, Europe and we don't know what the Chinese are going
to do.

A: Yes, I still think that they could change their mind. It is quite a possibility.
Did you hear what I just told Bill Hyland? I got a letter from Hong Kong from
a very old and reliable friend. A, he said Mark Gann has been refused a
visa.

K: Who is he?

By: NARA Date 6/9/69
DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958

["A: He's a left wing figute who was mixed up in some questions. But, I think he is also mixed up with the Russians. Now Neville Maxwell got a visa. He is currently traveling up and down the actual northern border with my friend Mr. Maw.", "K: Really? Well, I just don't think we can survive in foreign policy without total discipline here.", "A: Well, I agree with you. The only thing is, what happens if you go. It is all so awful. I am told that . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECLASSIFIED
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By A2 NARA Date 6/9/69

TELECON

Rowland Evans/Mr. Kissinger

5:20 p.m., August 14, 1973

E: Henry.

K: Yes, Rowly.

E: Stew, Tish and I were looking for an experienced contract bridge-player for a fourth tonight. We think you could handle it.

K: First of all, fond as I am of all of you, I am busy tonight. Secondly, I don't play bridge. But I am a quick study.

E: Do you think that pretty blonde in Ziegler's office...?

K: She doesn't play bridge either.

E: How are you doing otherwise?

K: Brilliantly. I am going from success to...

E: How is the speech making out?

K: I really don't know, and I'm not being evasive.

E: It's going to be tomorrow?

K: I think it will be, though I'm not 100 per cent sure. I know he wouldn't speak on a Moslem Holiday, so it won't be Friday.

E: Okay; go back to your work. See you soon.

K: Right.

TELCONE

Amb. John Scali/Mr. Kissinger

7:25 p.m., August 14, 1973

S: It's a whole new ballgame down here.

K: Why?

S: The non-aligned have now put pressure on Ghorra to back off from the Resolution where we thought we were about to agree with him. And they've come up with one which we think has been egged on by the Egyptians, which has six uprated paragraphs, including one, which says that we should either cut off or consider cutting off aid to Israel if it does this once more.

K: Well, we can't accept that.

S: Of course we can't. We've just gone through two hours with Odero-Jowi who was the representative of the non-aligned, who has been asked to present this to us...

K: What country is that?

S: ... Lebanese Ambassador was sitting beside him.

K: What is that non-aligned -- what country is he from?

S: He's Kenya. And he represents Sudan, Peru, Panama, Guinea --

K: Well, I'm glad we got the Latins on our side.

S: Yugoslavia, India and all of our great friends. In any event, this new Resolution is six paragraphs. Among other things, it firmly condemns Israel, calls on ICAO to take adequate measures against Israel with a view to insuring future safety; calls on Israel to desist from all acts; solemnly warns Israel against repetition; and paragraph six, which is the real lulu, calls upon all states to refrain from extending any aid or assistance to Israel which may directly encourage it to repeat such acts. I told Odero-Jowi flatly that was unacceptable and then we went over paragraph by paragraph and I stopped to point out to him what he was doing was just pinpointing Israel as the sole cause of terrorism, which is just not true.

K: Yeah. And what do they say of that?

S: Well, they're going to sit now and consider our views and get back to us tomorrow.

K: Well, what I was going to suggest on that other thing -- I've had a call from Dinitz who is wild-eyed about the other draft.

DECLASSIFIED
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A2

Amb. John Scali/Mr. Kissinger

2

S: Well, if he is wild-eyed about that draft, just wait till he sees this draft.

K: I agree with you to take out "strongly".

S: What?

K: To say "condemns the actions of Israel" rather than "against the Government of Israel". And I agree with your change in paragraph 4. . . agree with Council will consider taking adequate steps . . .

S: Seeing an effort by the Egyptians and the Iraqis to take the ball out of the hands of the Lebanese and to come up with a Resolution which is so goddamn tough that we will have to veto.

K: Yeah.

S: Now if the Israelis were unhappy with the old version, and I know they were from talking with Yosef Tekoah, they will be eight times as wild about this new one. And in the final analysis, they will be very pleased because we're just going to have to veto the goddamn thing.

K: Yeah, except this doesn't do us -- Of course if we had reserved our condemnation and sold it yesterday.

S: That's right goddammit!!

K: That's where we lost on Saturday.

S: That's right!

K: We already started out having given away the best part of it.

S: That's why they're screaming. And then I wound up getting accused by that other fellow of colluding -- I suppose you've been talking with Scali.

K: Yeah.

S: Well, it just makes a tactical sense and anybody but an idiot would have recognized what we were doing.

K: That's right. We could have sold it on Monday as a great concession.

S: That's right. And we could have had a vote on Tuesday and had this thing locked up.

K: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED
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Amb. John Scali/Mr. Kissinger

S: But now we're in a position where we got the non-aligned up in arms and the Egyptians just egging on the poor Lebanese, who may or may not stand up under the pressure.

K: We might have talked on Saturday that we want an equal condemnation of terrorism and then gotten off that.

S: That's right. But in the meantime, we really have a mess down here now, Henry.

K: Okay.

S: I just met with the Kenyan for two hours and I did my very best along with Tap Bennett and the rest of my staff. We put up a good strong fight on this. I feel pretty good about it. But I don't know that it's going to make that much difference because in the final analysis I don't think it's the Kenyans who even know they are speaking for the non-aligned are the ones who are the secret instigators. I think it's the Egyptians and the Iraqi. And the poor old well-meaning Lebanese are just getting euchred into the corner and having the ballgame taken out of their hands.

K: Yeah. Okay. I'll

S: So, you know, I just do the best I can.

K: Well, that's all anyone can ask and I think you're doing a great job.

S: Well, just so that -- Well, the next time that they put statements out on a weekend where we give away the jewels in advance --

K: It made no sense; it got us nothing.

S: Of course it got us nothing! But maybe you and I can arrange to lock the safe or kidnap somebody to prevent it from happening the next time.

K: Yeah. Well, okay. Many thanks, John.

S: All right, Henry. Bye, bye.

TELCONE

HAK

August 15, 1973/9:13 a.m.

K: Hello

B: Hello Henry. I'm sorry to bother you so early but things are moving ... We've got a rather delicate tactical situation up there. We've got a resolution which you .. Which we sent to you yesterday...which the Lebanese are .. they are trying to keep circumscribed and we sent suggestions and changes yesterday which I think Scali now has succeeded in getting in sor far as the Lebanese are concerned. However, we've got the more militants, the God damn Egyptians, the Koreans and so on that are playing around with an alternative resolution which not only condemns Israel but is quite specific in terms of sanctions and that kind of thing.

K: Yeah.

B: Now, I am about to go up to see the secretary to review the situation with him but I wanted to have a word with you. The Israelis are coming in around 12:30 and we told them yesterday obviously we are going to do the best that we can and these changes that we've had in getting are obviously all in the direction that they would like. Now I gather that from New York that one of the suggestions which was sent up from you or from the White House is a change in operative paragraph one which would term the action rather than the government as Israel. Is that correct? Just so I'm straight.

K: Right.

B: My own judgment for what it is worth Henry is this. If we try for that as desirable as it would be I think we're in great danger and I owe this to you of really ending up with this other proposition which then will force I think probably veto on our part and Christ another veto is going to be fairly difficult. Moreover, what really worries me is that the militants to accept these very important changes that we called yesterday.

K: You took out the word strongly and to ....

B: And to order the sanctions paragraph to merely consider rather than to ______ the decision in principle. Both changes of which have abeen made Henry.

K: Ok Well then I think...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E0.12958
By A6 NARA Date 5/9/69

Buzhardt/HAK

B? See, I'm worried a little bit and I don't know what to do and I want your guidance on the thing.

K: Well if you trust me. That's the only thing to do.

B: Look if we can get it ~~now~~ or if ______ feels that he can raise it gingerly and even go through the form so that we can even tell the Israelis that we've had another plug at it in a light way. But on this one we are really in a hell of a delicate position Henry. That's my judgment.

K: OK

B: Well, we'll do the best we can and thanks alot.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E 0.12958
By A. NARA Date 6/9/69

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By NARA Dute 6/9/09

A6

TELCOM

Bill Jordan/HAK

august 15, 1973/9:50 a.m.

K: Bill

J: Hello Henry.

K: Bill I had promised Rabasa some months ago that I'd come to his 25th Wedding Anniversary. I think it's on the 23rd or 24th.

J: 23rd of August I think.

K: Yes but I think he switched it to the 24th.

J: Oh did he?

K: Yeah. Now one, I may cancel it at the last minute but I want to go through the motions of having tried.

J: Yes.

K: Don't you think.

J: Oh I think so.

K: So would you call him and find out what the drill is.

J: Yes I certainly will.

K: And you know what time should I get there, where I should stay.

J: I'll do that.

K: Do we have an Ambassador there?

J: Yes but Brad is there still.

K: He probably doesn't want me to stay with McBride because then he's got to invite him.

J: No I think he'd sooner have you staying separately.

K: Why don't you discuss that with him.