DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE UNDER SECRETARY

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TRANSLATION

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My dear Nelson,

I send you the questions which, if the occasion should present itself, I should like to put to President Nixon.

This afternoon or tomorrow I will send you my thoughts on what might be an answer. Meanwhile, you can talk with Kissinger about the possibility of having an interview and the desires that Nixon may have to answer things similar to these.

LSE

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On a number of occasions American presidents, operating
within the framework of a historic policy of preserving, expanding
and improving United States relations with Latin America, have given
particular emphasis --within the context of their overall foreign
policy-- to a special approach to the problems of the hemisphere
states.

To dramatize this concern for Latin America, they gave
their new policies catchy names such as the Good Neighbour Policy
under President Roosevelt or the Alliance for Progress under President
Kennedy. At one time, too, this special approach was referred to as
the policy of Good Partners.

Today, however, a skepticism is evident in Latin America to
any such policy slogan and your recent statements, Mr. President,
do not appear to indicate any such announcement. But Latin Americans
would certainly interpret, as a sign of special concern toward their
countries, an amplification of the ideas you expressed succinctly
during the electoral campaign on United States-Latin American policy
and of the aims your administration intends to pursue with respect to
Latin America.

1. The future of the Alliance for Progress. This multilateral commitment of the American nations to foster the development of backward regions by means of a joint effort in which the principal role of the United States consists in the financing of national development plans either directly or through international institutions such as the Inter-American Development Bank, was, according to the Charter of Punta del Este, to have a life span of ten years beginning with 1961. Will your administration favor terminating the Alliance in 1971 or would you, like President Johnson, propose an extension of this policy?

2. Are you inclined toward a multilateral treatment of Latin American problems or toward dealing bilaterally with each country within the framework of a common regional policy? Concretely, in the area of financial assistance for Alliance for Progress projects, do you favor extending such help through A.I.D., rather than the I.D.B. or the World Bank?

3. Among the reciprocal commitments subscribed to in the Charter of the Organization of American States and in many other multilateral documents, there is a pledge to preserve and further the establishment of democratic rule in the Hemisphere. In your view, what policy should the United States adopt to best attain this objective?

4. In your opinion, is there a conflict between the principle of non-intervention --a tenet supported with great zeal by the peoples of Latin America-- and any possible action that a country like yours might take to preserve democracy outside its territory by openly encouraging democratic solutions or unmistakably discouraging undemocratic ones?

/...

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5. In April 1965, the United States government sent troops into the Dominican Republic without prior agreement with the countries represented in the O.A.S., and without consulting the organs of the O.A.S. as President Kennedy had in the Cuban Missile Crisis. As much as can be foreseen in a similar situation, how would your government act?

6. Do you favor the establishment of an inter-American military force, or do you favor a coordinated action by individual armies of the Hemisphere in accordance with procedures outlined in the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro?

7. The U.S. government has not yet made a final decision on the need or convenience of building a sea level inter-oceanic canal, for which studies are now being carried out at various sites. At the same time the United States has furthered the review of the existing treaties with Panama to replace the old agreements and to open a new route under different conditions. Would your government favor a policy of internationalization, or at least the inter-Americanization of the inter-oceanic routes, reserving for the country in question the natural advantages derived from such passageways, but giving ultimate control of the waterway and its administration to international bodies so that no local condition could interrupt the transit essential to all nations? Or do you believe that it is vital for the United States to preserve its control over the defense, police and administration of the canals?

8. Would your government favor any modification of the present OAS-approved American policy toward Cuba?

9. Do you believe that the Latin American countries have honored their commitments regarding Cuba, and have supported and kept up the measures adopted by their governments to contain Cuban intervention in the American republics?

22 West 55th Street
New York, N. Y. 10019

Judson 2-7030

14 April 1969

Mr. Henry A. Kissinger,
The White House,
Washington D.C.

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Please find enclosed Nancy's Mexico paper
and Walter Thompson's CACM paper. When we have
them from the printers, completed books of these
will be sent to you, but I thought you might like
to see them now.

List of proposed advisers for Governor Rockefeller's mission for the
President. Comment if you want.

Finance

George D. Woods - Former President of World Bank;
now Director and Consultant to the First
Boston Corporation

Dr. Clark Reynolds - Professor of Economics, Stanford
University

Economics

William Butler - Vice President and Economist, Chase
Manhattan Bank

Business

Arthur K. Watson - President, IBM World Trade Corporation;
President of International Chamber of Commerce

Labor

Pending

Media/Press

Pending

Agriculture

Dr. Emil M. Mrak - Chancellor, University of California
Davis

Dr. Clifton R. Wharton Jr - Vice President, Agricultural
Development Council, Inc.

Education

Dr. Samuel B. Gould - Chancellor, State University of
New York

Dr. Kenneth Holland - President, Institute of International
Education

Science and Technology

Dr. Detler W. Bronk - President Emeritus, Rockefeller
University; former President of National Academy
of Science

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Public Health
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Dr. Harold D. Gotaas - Dean of Technological Institute
of Northwestern University

Dr. Kenneth Riland - Chief Physician, United States Steel
Corporation; Public Health Council, State of New York

Military
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General Robert W. Porter, Jr. - Former Commander in
Chief, U.S. Southern Command

Cultural
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Thomas Hoving - Director of Metropolitan Museum of Art

Urban Affairs
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Dr. Alan Miller - Urbanist, Commissioner of Mental Hygiene
for New York State

Women's Group
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Mrs. Flo Kampmann - Chief of Protocol for World Fair,
Texas; former Republican National Committee
Woman from Texas

A.I.D.
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Leroy S. Wehrle - Former head of AID in Vietnam; currently
with Harvard Development Center

Finance

Economics

Business

Labor

Pending

Media/Press

Pending

Agriculture

Education

Science and Technology

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Public Health
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Military
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Cultural
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Urban Affairs
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Women's Group
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A.I.D.
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Finance

Economics

Business

Labor

Pending

Media/Press

Pending

Agriculture

Education

Science and Technology

- 2 -

Public Health
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Military
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Cultural
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Urban Affairs
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Women's Group
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A.I.D.
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Finance

Economics

Business

Labor

Pending

Media/Press

Pending

Agriculture

Education

Science and Technology

Public Health
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Military
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Cultural
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Urban Affairs
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Women's Group
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Mrs. Flo Kampmann - Chief of Protocal for World Fair,
Texas; former Republican National Committee
Woman from Texas

A.I.D.
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May 2, 1969

Dear Nelson:

Attached are seven ABM papers which I hope
will be useful to you.

I will have several others to show you when you
are here next week (they are highly classified
and I would prefer not to send them on now).

Looking forward to seeing you.

The Honorable Nelson Rockefeller
Governor of New York
Albany, New York

BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON
SAFEGUARD ANTI-BALLISTIC BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEM

1. Statement of the President, March 14, 1969.

2. ABM Position Paper.

3. Description of the System.

4. Comparison of President's Ballistic Missile Defense System with the Sentinal Program.

5. Questions and Answers.

6. Memo to the President from Lewis Strauss.

7. Presidential Talking Points for NATO Foreign Ministers.

FOR RÉLEASE IN SUNDAY NEWSPAPERS OF MAY 4, 1969

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER ANNOUNCED TODAY THAT HE WILL BEGIN HIS MISSION FOR PRESIDENT NIXON TO 23 OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS ON SUNDAY, MAY 11. IN MAKING THE ANNOUNCEMENT, THE GOVERNOR SAID HE WOULD UNDERTAKE THE PRESIDENTIAL MISSION IN FOUR SEPARATE TRIPS:

MAY 11 - 19: MEXICO, GUATEMALA, EL SALVADOR, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, COSTA RICA, AND PANAMA.

MAY 27 - JUNE 4: COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, PERU, BOLIVIA, AND TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO.

JUNE 16-25, BRAZIL, PARAGUAY, URUGUAY, ARGENTINA, AND CHILE.

JUNE 29-JULY 6: VENEZUELA, HAITI, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, JAMAICA, GUYANA, AND BARBADOS.

"THE PURPOSE OF THIS PRESIDENTIAL MISSION IS TO LISTEN TO THE LEADERS IN THE OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLICS AND TO CONSULT WITH THEM CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON GOALS AND JOINT PROGRAMS OF ACTION WHICH WILL STRENGTHEN WESTERN HEMISPHERE UNITY AND ACCELERATE THE PACE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT," GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER SAID.

THE GOVERNOR ADDED THAT HIS REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT WOULD BE MADE PRIVATELY IN JULY AND THAT PRESIDENT NIXON WOULD DETERMINE WHETHER THE REPORT WOULD BE MADE PUBLIC.

IN EMPHASIZING THAT HE WILL VISIT EACH COUNTRY "TO LISTEN," THE GOVERNOR POINTED OUT THAT HE HAS NO PROGRAM TO PROPOSE TO THE OTHER HEMISPHERE NATIONS NOR WILL HE MAKE PROMISES OR COMMITMENTS ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT. "WE WANT TO HEAR THE LATIN AMERICANS' VIEWS AND IDEAS," THE GOVERNOR SAID.

TO ACQUIRE A MAXIMUM AMOUNT OF INFORMATION ABOUT EACH COUNTRY IN THE TIME HE WILL HAVE IN EACH CAPITOL THE GOVERNOR WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY SOME TWENTY DISTINGUISHED AMERICANS WHO WILL BE ADVISORS TO THE MISSION IN SUCH

FIELDS AS FINANCE, BUSINESS, LABOR, AGRICULTURE, EDUCATION, SCIENCE, PUBLIC HEALTH, MILITARY AFFAIRS, COMMUNICATIONS, CULTURAL AFFAIRS, URBAN AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION, AND AID PROGRAMS.

A STAFF OF MORE THAN 50 EXPERTS ON LATIN AMERICA IS PREPARING BRIEFING MATERIAL FOR GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER AND HIS ADVISERS ON THE COUNTRIES THE MISSION IS TO VISIT.

WHEN PRESIDENT NIXON ANNOUNCED IN FEBRUARY THAT GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER WOULD UNDERTAKE THE MISSION, THE PRESIDENT SAID HE HAD INVITED THE GOVERNOR TO DO SO "BECAUSE OF MY DEEP BELIEF IN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE OTHER AMERICAN REPUBLIC."

MR. NIXON HAS ASKED THE GOVERNOR "TO REPORT TO ME PERSONALLY ON YOUR CONSULTATIONS AND MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO HOW THE U.S. CAN IMPROVE ITS POLICIES RELATING TO THE OTHER AMERICAN NATIONS AND INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS COOPERATION AND SUPPORT OF COMMON OBJECTIVES."

AS HE PREPARED FOR THE FIRST TRIP OF THE MISSION, THE GOVERNOR POINTED OUT THAT, COINCIDENTALLY TWO IMPORTANT MEETINGS CONCERNED WITH FUTURE DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA WERE SCHEDULED. HE REFERRED TO THE FORTHCOMING SESSION OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR LATIN-AMERICAN COORDINATION (CECLAGL) IN SANTIAGO, CHILE, AND THE JUNE MEETING OF THE INTER-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO. "I PLAN TO FOLLOW THE RESULTS OF THESE MEETINGS WITH CLOSE INTEREST," THE GOVERNOR COMMENTED.

GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER SAID THAT HE HAD ARRANGED THE TRIPS SO THAT HE WOULD NOT BE OUT OF NEW YORK STATE FOR MORE THAN TEN DAYS ON ANY ONE TRIP. THE XXIXth U.S. AIR FORCE JET IN WHICH HE WILL TRAVEL IS EQUIPPED WITH RADIO AND TELEX COMMUNICATIONS THAT WILL ENABLE THE GOVERNOR TO KEEP IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH THE AFFAIRS AND OFFICIALS OF NEW YORK STATE. END HUGH MORROW

CONFIDENTIAL

June 9, 1969

Memorandum for Henry Kissinger

Tom Braden called the Latin American Desk man at the State Department (man not identified by name) about Governor Rockefeller's mission.

The man on the desk said he thought three or four countries might cancel the Governor's visit. He said that on the whole the State Department considered his trips pretty useless, that the situation was a little bit reminiscent of the Dulles era "where Dulles would travel all over the world to find out what was in his 'IN' basket."

The man on the desk said what the United States should do was to get "way in" or "get out" and since it was obvious we were not going to do either, the Rockefeller mission was a "holding" operation -- but that it was now useless as a "holding" operation since it had become a cause celibre, and it would probably be wise not to go on with it, but to call it off. They say "this is terribly bad" for Mr. Rockefeller, who has had a long relationship with the people of Latin America and this must have hurt NAR. On the other hand, they say that the trip is useful for NAR in that it brings his information up to date (which they claim is very out of date), but it is not useful for the country.

The entire attitude (of the State Department) is rather paternalistic, as though toward an errant son who is really going so far, they "really have to get him a hair cut."

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Frank Mankiewitz reported that last Thursday or Friday Charles Meyer had appeared before the House Committee on Foreign Relations, talked for some 45 minutes about Latin America and did not mention once the NAR mission. Finally he was asked a question about the Governor's trip, which he answered rather perfunctorily. In answer to another question about student riots, he said the students seemed merely to be aping the United States and that this whole thing was part of our great export of "permissiveness." The Governor said that the student riots were one thing the Latins claim to have exported to the U.S. - just the contrary. Both agreed it was good that Henry Kissinger was in the White House.

Personal and Confidential

STATE OF NEW YORK
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER

JAMES M. CANNON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT
TO THE GOVERNOR

22 WEST 55TH STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019

June 15, 1969

Dear Dick:

Before we travel further down this rocky and circuitous Latin American road, I just want to express my personal gratitude to you for all that your staff has done for us along the way.

They have given us solid information, informed judgments, and prompt action; and they have been personally hospitable and helpful whenever we have called on them. In Quito, for example, Morgan was able to give us a good reading on the local political situation when we were confronted with a situation that surprised and puzzled us. And later, when we were in the Embassy, trying to work out by cable and teletype a decision about going on to Bolivia, he and his staff were immensely helpful.

I did not get to meet your people in La Paz, but they did provide us in advance with the information and judgments that were essential to understanding the full depth of the problem and reaching the best decision. In fact, they usually gave us the answers we needed before we could send the questions down.

On behalf of Governor Rockefeller, and on my own behalf, I want to thank all of you who have been involved in assisting us.

Embassy
of the
Argentine Republic

Washington, D.C.

July 23, 1969

Dear Mr. Governor:

I should like to take this opportunity
to tell you how much we value your courage and
appreciate your spirit of duty demonstrated in
your recent trips to South America and assure
you that we feel that your mission will be a
turning point in our relations between the Amer-
icas, North and South.

Our Foreign Minister, Dr. Juan B. Mar-
tín, appreciated very much all the courtesies
you were kind enough to show him and he found
the interview most interesting and informative.
He was particularly impressed by how well you
grasp the Argentine point of view.

With all good wishes,

QUESTION: Governor Rockefeller, did we not know of the coming violence of the demonstrations in Latin America, its probable extent and importance, or did we ignore any warnings?

GOVERNOR NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER: Well, I'd say there were indications. We knew what the problems were. The question is, what are the answers, and how do we get action to solve them?

ANNOUNCER: From CBS, New York, in color, Face the nation, a spontaneous and unrehearsed news interview with Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York, who recently completed two of four planned fact-finding trips to Latin America for President Nixon.

Governor Rockefeller will be questioned by CBS News correspondent Robert Schakne, Robert Balme of the Buffalo Evening News, and CBS News correspondent George Herman. We shall continue the interview with Governor Rockefeller in a moment.

* * *

QUESTION: Governor Rockefeller, do I gather that you knew there would be some demonstrations, possibly some violence, but felt that the only way we could find out what it meant and what it was about was to plunge into it?

ROCKEFELLER: Well I think that's a fair statement. But I think there's too much emphasis put on the demonstrations. This concept of this trip really the President got from Galo Plaza, who is the Director-General of the Organization of

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American States, whom he met the first day in office, because of his interest and concern in the Western Hemisphere. And he asked Galo how he felt he should approach this problem, he said send a mission down. He said who do you think I ought to send, he said well, there's one person who knows and loves Latin America, and that's Nelson Rockefeller. So he picked up the phone and called me, and it was as simple as that.

Now I think myself that what's happened down there in the way of demonstrations really is evidence of the frustration that exists and the need for action.

QUESTION: Governor, we assume you're planning to continue with the mission. Have you made any structural changes? Are you going to merge the last two trips?

ROCKEFELLER: No, we're going just as planned in the beginning. And I'm hopeful that some of the people who dropped out, from the countries that dropped out before, will come back in again, and we'll get a little chance to sort of get reorganized on it.

QUESTION: Governor, you said that you don't think the demonstrations are really very important. But in fact the demonstrations, or the threats of them, have seriously interfered with trips to three countries - four countries, actually. So they are important.

ROCKEFELLER: Well, they're very important in terms of getting on the front page of the U.S. press and on television and radio in the United States. But as many Latins have said to me, we're deeply grateful to you because we've been

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on the back pages for years, now we're on the front page
in the United States, and the United States, the American
people, know we exist.

They're very pleased about that, because they've got lots
of problems. But we did get to ten countries - we were plan-
ning twelve countries in the first two trips, and we got to
ten. And we had intimate conversations with the president,
minister of foreign affairs, and then the various members of
our group with the key people, both governmental and private
in the broad range of areas that affect our common interests.

QUESTION: Governor, I find you to be in general a natural
optimist, but I wonder how you square all this with the
statement in the Venezuelan communique which said that, "Far
from achieving the fundamental objectives sought by the visit,
it has provoked events which could make difficult and even
perturb the future relations between the United States and
Latin America." Not even just Venezuela.

ROCKEFELLER: Well I think they were worried, that would
be the way I'd describe that. They sent an emissary up here
following the cancellation. They had a peculiar grouping
of circumstances. The riots over in Curucao at the two
refineries there, and the president's two daughters were
over there and you couldn't get in touch with them - it's
a new government - then the press, as the emissary pointed
out, was filled with stories about what was happening in
other parts. The students who, let's face it, have got
problems, the same way students do up here, there's a gen-
eration gap, they're frustrated in terms of achievements

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that they hope for in their own countries, they're anti-establishment in many cases, and they're anti-U.S. now. You get that combination, and you get an emissary coming from the press of the United States, and this is a marvelous opportunity to demonstrate.

And there's enough frustration generally so that this is a way they feel they can say, look, things aren't going the way we hoped they should, we're not achieving what we expected under the Alliance for Progress. That there were promises made, twenty billion dollars to be invested, that the standard of living, opportunities for education, and so forth, and these haven't been realized.

Now in retrospect it is clear that it wasn't possible to realize them. There wasn't enough money - one - and there wasn't enough technical knowledge - number two - to achieve it.

So I think this is only putting the spotlight on the fact there are problems.

**QUESTION:** The Washington Star in an editorial entitled "Enough is Enough," and the New York Times in an editorial entitled "A Mission to Cancel," both say what the titles imply, that you should stop the trip at the half-way point, not go back. Do you disagree?

**ROCKEFELLER:** Well, of course I do. Excuse me, but I do. Neither of the groups who write those editorials have gone to Latin America. They see it in the eyes of Washington, and New York, they're worried. And you know, America loves to be loved. We are a very generous, kind people, we want to be loved. And if somebody makes an unfriendly gesture we get hurt.

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I don't think that's the way to take this at all. These people have got problems, we're part of the problem in the relationship. Everybody in these editorials you could have quoted and went on to say: all of this information is in Washington, why go to Latin America, you don't need to go.

The answer is yes, of course the information is in Washington. But the question is: who's done anything about it? Who's come up with the answers of how we're going to get the kind of relationships which will not make this kind of reaction necessary? And that's the purpose of our trip.

**QUESTION:** But it's your kind of trip, heavily publicized, a large entourage, going into the capital cities, as we did in Quito, Ecuador, with truckloads of armed troops, smelling a bit of tear gas on the way - is that kind of trip necessarily productive, at least in a public relations sense, to good relations between the United States and Latin American countries?

**ROCKEFELLER:** But half the entourage is you fellows, the press, radio and television. And we didn't - we're delighted to have you, but it was your editors that...

**QUESTION:** Are you really?

**ROCKEFELLER:** Of course I am, because that's how we get on the front pages of the papers back here, because these gentlemen write the stories.

**QUESTION:** But doesn't it make your trip a little bit of a circus?

**ROCKEFELLER:** Well I have great respect for the dignity of these gentlemen who are with us.

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QUESTION: I was just referring to the size.

QUESTION: At each stop, Governor, the demonstrations have
tended to escalate slightly, they've been getting a little
livelier. Don't you fear that on the next swing they might
-- some unfortunate incident might occur?

ROCKEFELLER: Well to tell you the truth the groups -- you know, students are highly competitive, and so they want to outdo the students in the last place. And it's a perfectly natural thing. The point is that there are problems, and that the American people need to realize it. And there's one article I read in the paper this morning, it said - or in one of the papers - "We think we've got problems now. What would it be like if we had twenty-one Castros in Latin America, in those countries?"

And all one has to do is to think about that to see
what kind of a problem we'd have. Now I think these -- the
real question is - and we ought to focus on this - and
the real purpose of this mission is to talk intimately.
When I sit down with these presidents, I've sat down as
long as six hours in one country with the president. It
was in two meetings, three meetings. Intimate discussions
of their political problems, of the relationships, what
they feel might be done to improve this. And we're getting
information, illustrations which will be very helpful in
our recommendations to the President.

QUESTION: Don't you feel that you have reached a point where you could let the public in on some of these recommendations to the President? You've gone more than half the way, and...

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ROCKEFELLER: Bob, that's a very good question. What we're doing is we're giving the President interim reports, and the State Department. And the President authorized me to say after the first trip that he already is reviewing some of these policy questions with the State Department, and they're working on them. And they are starting to try and correct some of these situations.

So that the program's in the works. But that's correct-
ing outstanding ills. The basic thing is a conceptual one
of how do - let's say, we're about twenty-five nations now,
leaving Canada out - how do these nations that have common
aspirations find a means of working together in the common
interest of our peoples on the basis of respect for the dig-
nity and the sovereignty of the other nations and individuals?

Now this is a very interesting, and challenging, and
exciting thing. And ever since the days of Simon Bolivar
and George Washington there's been this concept of pan-Ameri-
canism, these small nations all breaking away from colonial
rule, working together in their common interest. And that's
the basis of this mission.

QUESTION: Governor, as I listen to you talk about the
basis - bases, really - of this mission, it seems to me they
fall into two categories. You talked about two separate
classes of achievements that you hoped to get out of it. One
is to talk intimately with the leaders. The other is to get
on - not yourself - but to get Latin America on the front pages.
Are these two things really compatible?

ROCKEFELLER: Yes, and...

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QUESTION: Getting the attention and getting really inti-
mate things, really close contact with these leaders?

ROCKEFELLER: Yes, they are, and I'll give you an inter-
esting illustration as to this. There was a small nation
in the Caribbean area who sent their ambassador to see me
two days ago and said, look, please don't cancel your trips,
this is the first time in the history of our country we've
ever had such an opportunity, we have been working for months
trying to prepare for this, this is the greatest opportunity
for our country and we want you to come, we'll never have a
chance to talk to people with the kind of knowledge and
understanding that your group have. Because we're all out-
side of government, none of us have any official positions in
the government, and therefore we're free, not to be defensive,
but to be creative in coming up with answers.

QUESTION: How long will you spend with them?

ROCKEFELLER: In that country?

QUESTION: Yes.

ROCKEFELLER: Twenty-four hours, with twenty-three people, each meeting with their counterparts in the different fields, whether it's the president of the World Bank, the former president, George Woods, who's with us, or whether it's Dick Watson, one of the two top people in IBM, president of the International Chamber, or whether it's the president of the University of California, Davis, who's a leading expert in tropical agriculture, or culture, or social welfare, or urban planning, it's the equivalent of twenty-three days of intensive meetings, if only two or three of us went and tried to meet with these groups.

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So that we do a saturation approach in twenty-four hours.

QUESTION: It's sometimes been said in the course of your trip that it's a bit too establishment, that here you are talking largely to presidents, some of whom are by no means democratically elected, here your group is led by big businessmen, there is your own association of course through your family with large corporations, with investments in Latin America, that you're not really meeting the outside groups in Latin America, the protestors, the students, even though you've offered to.

ROCKEFELLER: Thank you. That's their own choice. This group has seven college presidents and professors. We have the former president of the American Academy of Science, who is president of Johns Hopkins. We have groups in the field of culture, we have a woman who is meeting with the women's groups.

There are only three of us, perhaps four of us of the 23 who have any association with business; and frankly, I've been 23 years in public life, so I appreciate your identification.

QUESTION: You have a student leader?

ROCKEFELLER: We wanted to have a student leader, but it's a little hard to know which student leaders are leading which groups. Now we have invited the students. I said publicly, as these two gentlemen on either side of you know, in Ecuador, Look, students are protesting about the U.S. participation in violence in Vietnam, and yet here they are out throwing stones in the street to protest violence in Vietnam. I said why don't they drop violence, which they're against, elect representatives and sit down and tell us what they're worried about.

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Now, we do meet with student groups. Dave Barnheim(?), who
is here at the Inter-American Center, has been doing a marvelous
job. We've had others doing the same.

The problem is that the violent students don't want to sit
down and talk; that would spoil their whole picture. They want to
create violence. And this is partly protest against the establishment
in their own country, or partly a protest against the U.S. Or just
the generation gap. It's understandable.

QUESTION: Governor, to assure that we avoid the--some of
the embarrassments of La Paz and Venezuela, are you attempting to
get more firm commitments from the other countries on your itinerary
that they will keep order when you get there? And that there will
be no problem?

ROCKEFELLER: There's been--there's no problem about firm commitments. In La Paz, which is a special case, that's Bolivia. There's one road leading down from the airport, which is about 12,000 feet, down to La Paz, which is--or maybe 12 or 13--down to La Paz, which is around 10,000. It's down a very steep bank, and it's an impossible road, 8 miles long, for them to preserve any sense of law and order, if a small group wanted to roll rocks at any point down there. So I said don't worry. We won't come down to La Paz; we'll meet you up at the airport.

Now this is perfectly simple. We're willing to facilitate
the situation because we don't want to crystalize any difficulties
which could result in the loss of life.

Now there have been statements saying there were ten lives lost
as a result of this trip. It's not true. Three--and all of them
accidents--is the maximum that I think is the fact. There was 6
students killed in Guayakilo(?). That was the result of a very

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interesting situation, somewhat comparable to what we have in New
York City.

QUESTION: Free tuition, wasn't it?

ROCKEFELLER: That's right. Not free tuition; it was no exams.
The high school kids had been sitting in at the college for 3 weeks
because they didn't want to have to take exams to get into the
college. The college students were trying to throw them out. They
had been rowing for three weeks; finally the college students, believe
it or not, asked the police to come in and get the high school students
out. They did; and the result was that the fighting that ensued, 6
students were killed.

It had nothing to do with our trip, although when I asked for
a correction on that, the correction stated there was no direct
relationship. Well, there was no indirect relationship. But this
is one of the hazards--this kind of excite ment.

QUESTION: Are you still planning to go next Monday--a week
from tomorrow--to Brazil and then to Uruguay, Paraguay and then
later on to Argentina and the Caribbean countries?

ROCKEFELLER: That is correct.

QUESTION: They are planning to have you come?

ROCKEFELLER: Until there is any further change.

QUESTION: As you look--

ROCKEFELLER: And I hope to get back to some of the countries
that we haven't been to before.

QUESTION: Have they informed you that they hope to be able to reschedule--

ROCKEFELLER: They're working on it.

12

QUESTION: Venezuela in particular because there's a personal interest on your part?

ROCKEFELLER: There's no personal interest. I just love the Latins, and I love the country, and I think we have a most unique relationship in terms of history and of basic Judeo-Christian beliefs, in terms of dedication to human dignity, to social justice.

These are common--common heritage of the Western Hemisphere.

QUESTION: You leave me a little baffled. What do you mean they're working on it? They're working on police arrangements? They're working on scheduling arrangements? They're working on what? To get you back?

ROCKEFELLER: They are doing just what I said. They're working on getting us back. This is a free country; it is not up to me to tell them how to run it.

QUESTION: I understand--

ROCKEFELLER: Nor for us to discuss how they're going to handle their problems. That's their problem.

QUESTION: I just wondered if--

ROCKEFELLER: These are not provinces of the United States.

QUESTION: I just wondered if they had informed you what they were doing and if you could tell us.

ROCKEFELLER: I have been informed but I'm not at liberty to say. Excuse me, because one of the problems in this country; and I want to say that's nothing to what you said, George, but it's one of the problem is that we seem to think we sort of consider these countries as laboratory experiments which we have the right to discuss and tell them what to do and how to do it. And this is one of the things they resent.

13

QUESTION: When you say we, do you include the Nixon Administration?

ROCKEFELLER: The Nixon Administration is inheriting a problem that has become very serious in the last 6 or 7 years, and I would-- I could give you a few illustrations. Let me just tell you one illustration. It came up in a cabinet meeting in one of these countries.

The Minister of Public Works. He said let me tell you the problem we've got. We have negotiated for a long time, for a hundred million dollars for highways. Under the U.S. laws, and regulations, we had to employ an American engineering firm, even though we had very good engineers here. This engineering firm sent down people whom they were paying 3,000 dollars a month; they employed a lot of our own engineers and they paid them 150 dollars a month.

He said right there you've got a very serious source of irritation because it was our money they were paying them with. He said then they had to make a feasibility study which took three years. Then the United States cooled off on this government, so they dragged their feet for another three years, while they were still paying these fellows.

That's 6 years and no roads built. Now they've come back to talk about it again, and they say now costs have gone up, so we've got to make another study. This man said look, we're been 6 years now and we haven't gotten a road built. And our people are frustrated; we've been humiliated; and he said this is just an impossible relationship. Now these are the kind of things we're finding out first hand.

QUESTION: As you look on it after 10 countries, halfway through your trip, what are the major areas about present U.S. policy that distress you most of all? Is it the fact that what passes for our

14

policy in Latin America is sometimes a conglomeration of private and
parochial domestic interests? Balance of payments and so on? Is
there any area that you think needs change most of all?

ROCKEFELLER: No, there's a great many that need change, and the basic problem is double. One, the results that have been hoped for as a result of the Alliance for Progress have not been achieved. This causes tremendous frustration.

Secondly, the manner in which we are handling our relationship--
for instance, in another country they're doing a rural electrification
with a loan. They have to, under these conditions--and these are
the kind of conditions, the best way to illustrate it--they have
to import the power line poles from the United States, instead of
making them locally, which they're perfectly capable of doing.

They think this is unbelievable.

Another loan in another country, which are known as program
loans, they have to use all the dollar exchange to buy things from
the United States; not things they want, but things they're not now
importing and which they can get cheaper somewhere else. So they're
given a list, and this is absolutely destroying their economy.

Now these are the details which are frustrating, which are
humiliating, which they feel are a violation of their sovereignty
and intervention into their internal affairs.

QUESTION: Is the Alliance bad? Or does it need just changing?

ROCKEFELLER: This Alliance--everybody agress the objectives
of the Alliance for Progress were magnificent. The problem is that
it was overpromised and underdelivered, both up here and down there.

QUESTION: But will you advocate the continuation of the
Alliance and its program? Is that going to be ... recommendation?

15

ROCKEFELLER: When you say, Bob, the continuation of the Alliance, there isn't any such thing as the Alliance because there's no organization set up in Washington. There is no program that was designed in the Congress that agreed to certain principles and said we are now funded in the following way.

QUESTION: Well, will you advocate the establishment of some kind of an organization to deal with Latin America? Some super public authority to--?

ROCKEFELLER: Well, let's not call it super, but let's say this. I think the problem is one that there must be an understanding by the American people and the congress as to what the objectives are, what must be agreed to.

And then there must be specific implementation of that, carrying out that, an organization that can give the coordination that can do it. The power relating to decision making for Latin America is distributed between close to a dozen departments and agencies.

QUESTION: Governor--?

QUESTION: What, what--?

QUESTION: I'm sorry.

QUESTION: Go ahead.

QUESTION: Let me just--without any intention of flattery, you are one of our assets in Latin America. You are a piece of North American currency to be spent wisely and well in Latin America. Are you being used wisely and well? Do you have some feeling that what you produce, what you bring back from Latin America will actually have an effect in the Nixon Administration and in the United States?

ROCKEFELLER: Well, you're very generous in the way you put it, and I appreciate it. I'm tremendously optomistic, and...

16

QUESTION: Now, we're talking about Washington?

ROCKEFELLER: I understand that. And this is where the action is going to be. I am very optimistic as to the results, first in terms of a conceptual approach with the structure we can recommend; secondly, the President said, look, I want you to recommend to me what you and your group honestly feel is the right way to approach this whole Western Hemisphere problem. Don't be bound by past structures; just come up with your best thinking, and then from that, he said, we will take and make recommendations, for policy.

And I think it's a unique approach and a unique---what President has ever said, before I make a statement on policy on Western Hemisphere a new administration, I want to find out what our neighbors are thinking and what's their advice of counsel. I think it's the most wonderful approach. I really think. Now naturally there are many who don't want to see these relations improve because they would like to see a deterioration of the relationship.

There are others who are just frustrated and who are trying to evidence their frustration, and I don't blame them.

QUESTION: What will happen if nothing happens to your recommendations in South America? What's the worst you can see?

ROCKEFELLER: Well, I think it would be unfortunate, and I think the deterioration would continue; the disillusionment would be greater. But I honestly don't think that nothing will--I don't think it will be a case of nothing happening. I think the President is very sincere on this.

QUESTION: Governor, you have another kind of currency to spend, also. You're also a bit of asset, a bit of currency in the Republican Party. The outsiders--those outside New York State and New York City,

17

are looking on with some bemusement at what seems to be some
disagreement between you and Mayor Lindsay, who is considered around
the country another bit of important currency. There were 65 members
of the House of Representatives who backed Mayor Lindsay, and
everybody is sort of wondering, around the country, why you two aren't
closer together, why you're taking the really comparatively neutral
position on him.

ROCKEFELLER: Of course the press loves to try and work up
a fight between John and myself. I have stated right from the
beginning I hoped he'd run again; I hoped he'd be nominated; I hoped
he'd be re-elected. I feel this is important to the city; I think
it's important to the party.

And I have stated that as head of the Republican Party in the
state, traditionally, I am not going into primary election, but I
have made my own personal position very clear, and it's unequivocal
and I think John Lindsay is going to win the nomination and the
election.

QUESTION: Governor, the President in recent weeks has talked
about areas of foreign policy and local dissent. He's said there's
too much dissent; he says those who criticize them are--and criticize
the military budgets are possibly advocating a new kind of isolationism.
This would not seem to be what you have held before. What's your
view on the President's remarks.

ROCKEFELLER: Well, I'm not quite clear. I think there are always
forces of isolationism in this country, and I think with the problems
we've got at home, a lot of people would like to concentrate on the
problems at home and forget our relations abroad.

18

I think myself that today we are so interdependent with the
rest of the world that it's impossible for us to pull back and live
in isolation.

QUESTION: Governor, we have ten seconds. Are you going to
be running for governor again next time?

ROCKEFELLER: Yes, sir.

MODERATOR: Thank you very much Governor Rockefeller for being
here today to face the Nation.

ROCKEFELLER: My pleasure, and I appreciate the opportunity.

Telegram

B AHA 102 NL PDC.AH NEW YORK NY 5
GOV NELSON A ROCKEFELLER
22 WEST 55 ST NYK

1909 JUN. 6 AM 10 44

I DEPLORE AND STRONGLY DISAGREE WITH NEGATIVISTIC EDITORIAL OF
NEW YORK TIMES REGARDING YOUR LATIN AMERICAN MISSIONS

CERTAINLY IN THE FIELD OF SCIENCE TECHNOLOGY AND EDUCATION
FACTS AND UNDERSTANDING HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED THAT HAVE BEEN
OF GREAT VALUE AND MANY NEW FRIENDSHIPS AND COLLABORATIONS HAVE
BEEN FORMED AT ALL LEVELS OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTORS. I
GREATLY ADMIRED YOUR WISE AND PERCEPTIVE LEADERSHIP

DETLEV BRONK.

SF-1201 (R5-69)

The Miami Herald
A KNIGHT NEWSPAPER

THE MIAMI HERALD PUBLISHING CO. • 1 HERALD PLAZA, MIAMI, FLORIDA 33101 • (AREA CODE 305) 350-2111

GEORGE BEEBE
Senior Managing Editor

November 11, 1969.

The Honorable Nelson Rockefeller
Governor
State of New York
New York

Dear Nelson:

I am somewhat embarrassed about the premature release of your report in The Miami Herald--but my conscience is clear.

I was not responsible for it, and the two copies of the report that Hugh gave me in New York, were packed away in my suitcase as Helen and I visited friends for the weekend in West Jefferson, N.C. I felt duty-bound to keep the report secret, as I promised Hugh.

It was not until I returned to Miami Monday night that I learned that our diligent Washington bureau chief had traveled to New York to get a copy from a high Washington official, and put his story on the Knight wire Saturday night.

I had talked with my office Friday about arranging for space for presentation of the report on Tuesday, so I perhaps was even more surprised than you and the New York Times when it appeared on Sunday.

I told Hugh Morrow that I would be glad to divulge the source of the "leak" within a week or 10 days when the heat is off the issue.

I also let Tad Szulc know today that I thought he had done a poor reporting job in implying in his Monday story that I was the culprit, based only on the fact I was a mission adviser.

Anyway, I thought the report was excellent--and a real tribute to the great effort you gave the assignment.

The attached tearsheets from The Herald may be of interest to you.

# FACT SHEET

## Type of Government

Authoritarian "democracy".

Federal republic consisting of 29 states with a President.

Dominated by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI).

## Area

758,259 square miles.

This is nearly three times the size of Texas.

## Topography

Dominated by two ranges of mountains - the Sierra Madre Occidental Mountains which run NW-SE near the west coast, and the Sierra Madre Oriental Mountains which are a continuation of the Rockies and which run near the Gulf of Mexico coast south to Veracruz.

Between the two ranges lies the central plateau with an altitude of 5,000 to 8,000 feet.

## Major Cities

Capital: Mexico City

Other major cities:

Tampico ) The two important

Veracruz ) coastal cities

Cuidad Juarez

Guadalajar

Monterrey

## Population

45,671,000 (1967).

Mexico is the second most populous nation among the Latin American countries.

Ethnic breakdown:

Mestizo 60%

Indian 25%

Mulatto 10%

White 5%

Rate of population growth - approximately 3.4% per year.

## Life Expectancy

1940 - 39 years

1963 - 60 years

## Religion

Mainly Roman Catholic

- 1 -

This paper is divided into 3 substantive sections. The first section describes the historical evolution of Mexico; The second concentrates upon its current political and economic status and the third covers relations between the United States and the Mexican Republic.

## II. HISTORY

### General Comment on Mexico's Historical Development

Modern Mexican history may be divided into two periods: 1821-1910; 1910-1940. The first period began with the attainment of independence from Spain and ended in Revolution. Although it was a time of continual political chaos, an era of revolutionary generals and competing ideologies, it was, also a period which assumes significance because it served to define what form of government could not be acceptable to Mexico (monarchical) and to establish the physical bases of centralized power.

The second period (1910-1940) embraces the creation of the modern nation-state and the definition of its socio-economic and political bases. The Revolution of 1910, which marks the birthdate of modern Mexico, has come to hold a mystique similar to the revolutions in France, the United States and the Soviet Union. Like the French Revolution, the Mexican one was incomplete; it did not succeed in destroying all past patterns and unleashed new forces.

To forge a nation from disparate political forces in a country which was not only economically backward and politically immature but in which the concept of a modern nation-state was lacking, has been a formidable task. If Mexico has been able to contain and/or unite its various political and economic interests, it has been at the cost of the political strand of the Revolution--a strand which was most easily expendable because it was not rooted in the Mexican value structure. The effort to create a modern nation has fostered an authoritarian political system which is apparently stable but which has had to maintain enough flexibility to accomodate emergent interest groups at the same time that it has had to establish enough control over these groups and be sufficiently attractive to gain

- 2 -

the support of this clientele. Whether this form of government survives as Mexico becomes increasingly sophisticated depends upon the elasticity of its institutions and the latent strength of the political strand of the Revolution.

A. The Search for Order 1821-1872

1. After a brief, and temporarily descrediting, period of monarchy, a republican form of government was established (1825). Despite apparent agreement on government structure, political and economic conditions in Mexico, already dislocated by civil war, deteriorated continuously. This deterioration was the result of 50 years of internal instability, war and foreign intervention.

a. Two political strands - not always clearly identifiable by clientele - emerged. These strands, centralism and federalism, (vaguely comparable to Hamiltonianism and Jeffersonianism) vied for control of the country.

(1) The Centralists, sometimes led by political opportunist, Santa Anna, (in the period 1821-55) were a homogeneous body representing traditional institutions and interests: the church; military and upper classes. Politically, they advocated a strong centralized government designed to uphold their economic interests.

(2) The Federalists led by Valentine Gomez Farias from the 1820's to the 1850's and then by Benito Juarez, (1855-76) were the inheritors of the romantic and revolutionary traditions of the 18th and 19th centuries. They were a heterogeneous group whose political concepts were rooted in Western Europe and the United States rather than in Mexico. Anti-clerical, anti-military; opposed to the privileged position of corporate groups, they favoured the adoption of a confederate form of government whose economic backbone would

- 3 -

be an independent yeomanry and whose
economic philosophy would be that of
laissez-faire.

b. The nature of these two groups changed somewhat during this period.

(1) The Federalists in the face of practical experience, discounted their own theories of a weak central government. Although their constitutions (1824 and 1857) curtailed Presidential authority, in fact the liberals, when in power, relied on the extensive and relatively unlimited use of presidential authority.

(2) In addition, the Federalist tended to become less pre-occupied with political form and more with economic reform. Although political issues (federalism, monarchy, anti-clericalism) dominated liberal thinking, they had become increasingly less important by the 1860's (The Era of "La Reforma").

(3) The Centralists became increasingly willing to re-establish a monarchical system.

c. The struggle between the Centralists and Federalists prevented the establishment of an effective government with a consistent orientation. As a result of the inability of one group to dominate the other, the country was not only victimized by constant civil war and economic deterioration, but was unable to resist pressures of foreign powers. Consequently, Mexico suffered:

(1) A loss of approximately one-half of its territory (1848).

- 7 -

(1) Internally, the large landowners could not compete with the wages paid to labour by the mining concessions and the modern farms (cotton and sugar, etc.). The *hacendado* resented the generally foreign-owned mining concessions and suffered from a weak labour market.

-- Consequently when a fall in the world market price (1907) bankrupted many of the *hacendados*, a large percent of the landholders turned against Diaz.

(2) At the same time, the continuation of policies which deprived the peasant of land created a reservoir of discontent which could be directed against the Diaz regime.

-- The peasants found a leader in Zapata.

(3) The migration of labour to the cities created another, and more integrated, group of "uprooted" people who benefited little from the economic development and could be rallied against the regime.

(4) The emerging middle class offered another source of political discontent. Denied upward social mobility by the landholders and economic mobility by the foreign capitalists, they increasingly resented the Diaz regime.

(d) Diaz's decision to violate the "no re-election" principle in 1910 offered his enemies an opportunity to fight.

- 9 -

During the past forty years the revolution has
succeeded in crushing, containing or absorbing the
forces opposed to the revolution. At the same time,
the revolutionary strands have changed character and
become institutionalized. It has been a gradual pro-
cess of unwinding and the conflicts have not all been
resolved.

1. Post-revolutionary instability, 1911-17.

a. Civil war and its concomitants, social and economic chaos, were constants for nearly the entire first decade following the revolution. The revolutionary forces split into various factions.

(1) Zapata and his peasant followers defected because of the lack of land reforms.

(2) Orozco withdrew his support of the revolu-
tionary government, ostensibly because of
its failure to meet workers demands.

(3) Various leaders (Orozco, Villa, etc.) sought to obtain control over the government.

-- Political rivalry was furthered by the United States' lack of support of Huerta in 1914 -- Huerta had originally become president as the result of U.S. sponsorship.

2. Controlling and defining of the Revolution: The Constitution of 1917.

a. By 1917, General Carranza was able to make an
attempt to consolidate his position as president
and heir to the Revolution by establishing a

- 11 -

were elaborated in the document, as being
part of the "Revolution." These provisions
illustrate the possible areas of contra-
diction within the revolutionary strand:
The power of the executive vs. the division
of power; centralism vs. federalism.

(4) The state assumed a socio-economic role by the adoption of labour provisions ranging from minimum wages to profit sharing and by the inclusion of the stipulation that landless villagers were to receive expropriated land.

(5) The constitution also declared war on the church and foreign capital.

(a) Earlier laws stripping the church of its landed property were re-enacted. In addition, the church was prohibited from teaching and priests were required to register with the civil authorities. The number of priests in each state was determined by that state and priests were neither free to critize nor hold positions in the government.

(b) The Mexican government claimed title to the sub-soil of Mexico. Land rights could not be acquired by foreigners who did not surrender their claim to protection by their own national government.

(c) The adoption of a Constitution, however, did little to solve the most pressing problems of

(1) orderly succession of government

(2) The average Mexican's lack of identification with the central government - and the resultant force of separatism

- 13 -

2. Crushing the opposition to the Revolution

a. The Army

(1) The same technique was used by Carranza, Obregon, Calles and Cardenas to destroy the power of the generals and their revolutionary bands.

(2) The generals were offered high positions within the framework of a national army. Those who resisted were exiled or shot.

(3) A system of shifting commands was adopted in order to prevent the forging of personal loyalties.

(4) The size of the army was reduced and young officers were trained at staff colleges and in Europe. This was done in order to promote an attitude of professionalism.

-- The success of this program is shown by the Army's increasing reluctance to engage in revolutionary outbreaks. In 1923, one-half of the officer corps joined in an attempt to overthrow the government. A similar outbreak in 1927 found support among less than one-quarter of the officers and, in 1937, no officers joined a rebellion against governmental authority.

(5) At the same time that the political power of the army was being reduced, it was offered an opportunity to participate in the political process through the governmental party. A military "sector" of the party was created but, at the same time, the presidents (particularly Cardenas whose position was threatened by the Army's personal loyalty to Calles) worked at off-setting the strength of this

- 14 -

section by promoting labor and farm
groups so that they could be used against
the generals. The elections of 1940
were a test between labor and military
interests.

The fact that the military accepted
defeat (a few incipient rebellions were
crushed) showed their lack of strength.

(6) In 1940, President Avila Camacho was able to abolish the military sector of the Revolutionary Party - thus removing the military as a body entirely from the political sphere.

b. Separatism

(1) "Separatism" was tied to both the military <u>caudillo</u> and the local politician.

(2) The presidents followed the same procedure with the local politicians as they had with the generals. The strongest local politician was absorbed into the national system by giving him a stake in its survival. Where possible, he was appointed Governor or granted some administrative post; again, those who resisted were shot or exiled.

(3) In addition, the power of the local politi-
cian was undercut by the process of in-
creasing national taxes at the same time that
state and local taxes remained at a low level.
This increased state reliance on the federal
government since funds for school building,
etc. had to be obtained in Mexico City.

c. The Church

(1) The war between Church and state waged
throughout the entire period.

- 15 -

(2) When the government expelled the apostolic delegate (1923), a clerical movement, "Viva Cristo Rey," began. This movement culminated in a three year strike by the clergy (1926-29) which was finally settled in 1929 by the state's recognition of the Church's preeminence in clerical matters and the government's tolerance of the Church's right to offer religious instruction within Church walls.

(3) However, the restrictions imposed by the states upon the number of priests was a source of constant tension and violence.

By 1933, there were only 200 priests for the entire nation.

(4) Relations between the Church and state began to improve by 1940. The Church's interests -- reformulated in the face of official anti-clericalism and changes in Vatican policy -- have been absorbed into political life through the channels of minor parties.

### d. The landowners

(1) Agrarian reform was one of the ideals of the revolution. It was necessary, in order to restore rural calm, to gain the political support of the peasant and to improve and rectify the serious dislocation of rural life.

(2) Land distribution took place at a very slow rate because the government did not want to alienate completely the articulate hacendados and, of equal importance, did not want to risk destroying the entire economy by uprooting the hacienda system.

- 19 -

intra-party cohesion, each sector
was to support another's candi-
dates - candidates originally
chosen by the President.

(3) Business federations were repres-
ented.

(c) The Party underwent its final altera-
tion at the hands of President Camacho.
The name was once again changed to the
Partido Revolucionaro Institucional
(PRI) and the military sector was
dropped.

D. By 1940, the revolutionary forces had come under the control of the central government and had been shaped into a recognizable pattern. The central government - claiming itself heir to the Revolution - had succeeded in meeting the most pressing demands of the Revolution and achieving a balance of revolutionary interests which served as counter-weights to each other.

What had emerged, in practical political terms, was
the control of the state by one party, the PRI. The
party's personnel, particularly in the early stages of
development, controlled the decision-making process for
the nation. Although the party sought to organize and
represent, successfully to some extent, the emergent
socio-economic interests, in the final analysis, its
methods of rule were authoritarian. The political strand
of democratic representative government had been sub-
sumed by the exigencies of political expediency.

III. DOMESTIC

General Comment

The formal structure of the Mexican government does not reflect the actual balance of forces. Presidential authority dominates all other branches of government; congressional authority is generally confined to confirming executive wishes and passing regulatory legislation.

While other parties do exist, the PRI controls the governmental apparatus and, consequently, is responsible for a large share of the decision-making process. Presidential decisions are generally made in consultation with governmental-sector leaders and the "official family." By this method, the government has managed to reconcile societal factions located both within and outside of the PRI. The preservation and perpetuation of the system depends upon its ability to do this in the face of increasing factionalism without (1) causing disruption and the breakdown of the system (2) becoming immobile.

The PRI's control of governmental power rests, to a large extent, not only upon the reconciliation of the interests of various groups, but upon its ability to reward cooperation--either through political patronage or by money--and to punish recalcitrants. Consequently, the system suffers from administrative corruption. President Diaz Ordaz, the present incumbent, is making an effort to end the corruption. However, it is questionable that such an effort can be successful since making a fast peso has been built into the system and corruption is a normal by-product of one-party domination. In addition, it is impossible to judge how sincere his efforts are.

Scholars generally refer to the Mexican government as one "in transition" and predict that economic sophistication will create a democratic state. This point of view is questionable in view of the government's general disdain towards political reform combined with the lack of democratic tradition and political initiative on the part of the Mexican people. There is no established and proved correlation between economic progress and political structure--in any case, the experience of the late 19th and 20th century would suggest that established political values determine the manner of industrialization rather than the contrary. Indeed, the experience of the 20th century has shown that an increasing number of industrializing countries lean towards the Mexican form.

governing the issuance of a writ has
been tightened so that it is more
difficult to obtain.

-- The change in procedure was the
result of a tremendous backlog
of amparos.

## B. The Parties

### General Comment

The government of Mexico is controlled by the revolutionary party, the PRI. However, other parties do exist and hold seats in Congress. So far, these parties have been unable to present a real challenge to the PRI and have served one useful function of channeling discontent in a harmless manner.

### 1. The Legal Status of Parties

a. The election law applying to the formation and registration of a political party requires that:

(1) The party have at least 2,500 members in each of no less than two-thirds of the states and territories. Memberships must be in excess of 75,000

(2) The party must:

(a) pledge obedience to the legal and constitutional provisions of the Republic.

(b) not be subordinated to foreign political parties or international organizations.

(c) agree to confine itself to peaceful political activities.

(d) select its delegates from the majority vote of a constituting convention held in at least two-thirds of the federal entities.

-- A notary must attend all meetings to attest to the requisite membership attendance and to the legality of the voting procedure.

determines what is "right"
or "left."

-- The largest union in the anti-BUO group is the Confederacion Revolucionaria de Obreros y Campesinos (CROC) --formed in 1952 from several leftist organizations.

(3) The Labour Sector has become increasingly less cohesive. The division between the two groups and even within the CTM has caused political embarrassment to the PRI. At present, the "right" (CTM) wing of the labour movement has greater strength than the left wing, (CROC). However, should farm workers be organized successfully by CROC, it is probable that the labour sector will be seriously split and the PRI will have a heavier burden of factionalism to bear.

(4) The Labour Sector and the Western Hemisphere.

(a) Since the early 1950's, the CTM has been a strong affiliate of the current International American Regional Organization of Workers (ORIT) and a member of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).

(b) Now that the AFL-CIO has withdrawn from the ICFTU (January 1969) and may be asked

since 1964. His predecessors,
Lauro Ortega and Carlos
Madrazo had both criticized the
party. Madrazo had tried to
"democratize" the party. He
was dismissed as the result of
this effort combined with
local PRI electoral losses for
which he received the blame.

(a) His concept of the party is that it is one of permanent coalition. His major concern--in the face of criticisms expressed by the former occupant of the post--is to 'further unite the party and the people and (to strengthen) the party as an instrument of the people.' In addition, Martinez has drawn a distinction between party and government. However, he has not explicitly defined the party's role in relation to the state.

(b) In practical political terms, Martinez is on the record as favouring a 'just distribution of wealth' and 'keeping political powers always in the popular majority.'

(2) The real leader of the party is, of course, President Diaz Ordaz.

2. Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN)

a. PAN was founded in 1939 and represents part

of the right-wing strand opposed to
the revolution.

-- Originally composed of professional men and intellectuals: PAN was formed in opposition to Cardenas' leftist policies of the 1930's. (Cardenas extended government influence and control in all spheres.)

b. PAN represents:

(1) The church

(2) Big business

(3) Upper and middle class professional people.

c. PAN did not nominate its own presidential candidate until 1952.

-- It chose Efrain Gonzales Luna in 1952; Luis H. Alvarez in 1958 and Jose Gonzalez Torres in 1964.

(1) In order to increase its chances in the presidential and legislative race of 1952, PAN sought to broaden its base through an alliance with the fascistic Union Nacional Sinarquista. At the same time, PAN tried to form lower middle-class and white collar unions in some states.

(2) This alliance crumbled after the election was lost. In addition, a split -- which has not yet healed -- appeared among the young and old leaders.

d. PAN has been able to win only about 8-10% of the vote.

-- In the most recent elections (Chamber of Deputies, 3 July, 1967) PAN received 8% of the total balloting. On the basis of the proportional system (5 deputies for each 2.5% of the vote; 1 deputy per ½% over 2/5% up to 20 deputies) combined with direct election, PAN has 20 deputies-the same that it had in 1964.

3. Partido Nacionalista de Mexico (PNM)

a. The PNM is an opposition party which generally supports the PRI presidential candidates.

b. Under one name or another PNM has existed since 1927.

c. The party's purpose is "to unite the Mexican Revolution with Christianity." It supports clerical authority and attacks progressive secularization.

d. The fact that PNM could support PRI candidates and that the PRI can accept them indicates the degree of flexible pragmatism within the system.

4. Partido Autentico de la Revolución Mexicana (PARM)

a. PARM is the most recently created party. It is composed of those who think that the Revolution of 1910 has been betrayed by the PRI.

b. PARM has made little effort to win elections.

-- two of its leaders have received governmental posts.

c. PARM did win 2% of the vote in the 1962 elections to the Chamber.

b. A coalition of the Communist dominated National Liberation Front and the Central Campesino Independiente, the Popular Electoral front was led by former President Cardenas.

-- At the last moment Cardenas shifted his support to Diaz Ordaz.

D. Relationship of government to Parties

1. Obviously, the government exercises considerable control over the parties.

-- It sets the standard requirements for party registration and determines which groups are eligible.

2. The government itself is dominated by the PRI and, consequently, can be used almost as a party instrument.

3. The government, after the labour strikes and violence of 1958-59 has sought to insure the opposition of a governmental role by creating a proportional system of representation which increases the number of non-PRI candidates in the Chamber of Deputies.

a. This, however, is a relatively harmless move since the Chamber is virtually powerless.

b. On the other hand, the PRI has little formalized opposition. Most groups prefer to seek the solution to their problems through the PRI.

E. The Present Government and its Policies

1. The present cabinet, under the leadership of President *Diaz Ordaz*, is composed of the following men:

- 40 -

a. Secretary of Foreign Relations - Antonio Carrillo Flores - appointed 1964

b. Secretary of Industry and Commerce - Octaviano Campos Salas - appointed 1964

c. Chief of the Federal District - Alfonso Corona del Rosal - appointed 1966

d. Secretary of the Interior - Luis Echeverría Alvarez - appointed 1964

e. Secretary of National Defense - Marcelino García Barragan - appointed 1964

f. Secretary of Agriculture - Juan Gil Preciado appointed 1966

g. Secretary of Labor and Social Welfare - Salomon Gonzalez Blanco - appointed 1966

h. Secretary of Finance and Public Credit - Antonio Ortiz Mena - appointed 1964

i. Secretary of Communications and Transport - Jose Antonio Padilla Seguro

j. Attorney General of the Republic - Julio Sanchez Vargas - appointed 1968

2. All of these men have worked their way up through the PRF governmental apparatus.

F. The decision-making process

1. Real political power and formal legal authority do not coalesce so completely as they do in the United States. However, access to policy-making is possible and the political system is stable.

2. The President with the official family (PRI leaders, leading industrialists) are the decision-makers.

3. There are specialized and bureaucratized interest groups which have a role in policy making -- mostly in the area of implementation.

a. For the most part these groups have been assembled into the PRI. However, the most important business association, organized into Chambers of Commerce (Confederacion de Camaras Nacimales de Comercio: CONCANACO) the Brokers and Manufacturers' Confederacion de Camaras Industriales (CONCAMIN) are outside the PRI but share in the decision-making process.

b. Most of the specialized groups tend to be more involved with the implementation of policy-making rather than its formulation. They seek to "protect" themselves from government decisions--rather than to formulate and influence it independently of the government apparatus.

G. Policies of the present government

-- Diaz Ordaz' government, like those of his predecessors has ignored political reform (witness the lack of response to Madrazos' proposal to have direct primaries on the municipal level) and concentrate on socio-economic programs. The following charts provide information on the basic socio-economic conditions that prevail in Mexico. In general, the lot of the average citizen has improved slowly in recent years--largely as a result of government efforts in the areas of education, health, etc.

1. Education

a. Education on the primary and secondary level is largely a national, not a state or private responsibility.

students and schools do not go
beyond second grade. To counter
this, adult education centers are
being set up.

e. Mexican education has had to establish a special teaching program for rural Indian children who do not speak Spanish.

-- At present there are 56,000 students handled by bilingual liaison workers.

f. The general need for growth in the educational sphere is illustrated by the fact that only about 6% of the potentially eligible student population receives training beyond primary school.

g. Diaz Ordaz has made an effort to expand education in practical areas.

(1) Agricultural and livestock brigades, Indian welfare brigades, reading rooms, etc. have been set up.

(2) In addition, UNESCO funds have been used to train engineering and technological professors and set up a Regional Technical Industrial Educational Center in Guadalajara.

2. Agrarianism

a. Agriculture plays an important role in Mexico's economic life

1. Mexico relies upon agriculture for approximately 1/2 of its export earning.

-- This makes the Mexican economy highly vulnerable to agricultural conditions. Droughts and floods in 1967 reduced cotton exports by 35% and coffee sales by 28%. This in turn, increased Mexico's perennial trade deficit by 43% ($644 million)

2. Agriculture employs approximately 55% of Mexico's economically active population.

-- Rural unemployment and underemployment are major economic problems.

3. Despite the high percentage employed by the agricultural sector, agricultural activities account for only one-sixth of the GNP.

b. All governments since Cardenas have tried to increase the rate of growth in the agricultural sector and solve the problems in that area by concentrating on four types of programs.

1. Re-distribution of land.

2. The extension of credit to agriculture.

3. The improvement of the rural infrastructure (dams, roads, schools, etc.).

4. Technological improvement (new seeds, etc.).

These programs have all been aimed at:

1. satisfying the potentially politically dangerous discontent of the rural areas, and

2. changing agriculture from a subsistence to a market economy.

c. Land redistribution

1. Land redistribution is one area deeply rooted in the Revolution. A basic tenet of the Revolution was to return the land to the peasant.

-- The corruption of the redistribution programs - whereby one owner holds a number of land parcels under different names - has added to rural discontent.

2. However, land redistribution has raised basic problems.

(a) Mexico is land poor.

(1) 30% (of total 196.4 million hectares) of its land is considered agriculturally useless (most of this is in the extra tropical and arid zones).

(2) 35.9 (of 196.4) million hectares are potentially arable (about 20%).

(3) Much of the land under cultivation is exhausted.

(b) The economic problem of the inefficiency of small holdings has created a dilemma for all Mexican governments since "land for the landless" has been a universal election slogan.

3. The land code was revised in 1949 by President Aleman to reverse the tendency towards small farms.

(a) The Agrarian Code established a minimum grant of 10 hectares (24.7 acres) of irrigated land or 20 hectares of seasonal land to the *ejidos*. Most land was to be given to private farmers.

-- Land held by *ejidos* was inefficiently farmed yielding approximately 25% less produce per acre.

(b) The Code also guaranteed the existence of private holdings up to 100 hectares of irrigated land or 200 of seasonal land.

* Although the title to the land is held in perpetuity by the *ejidos*, it is individually farmed throughout the farmer's life.

-- Special assurances were given to larger land holdings which produced badly needed crops or products.

4. In addition, the Colonization Law was revised, (1947) to open new lands to colonists on an individual basis.

(a) This program was designed to give land to the poorest peasants. The Agrarian Department transports 25 of the farmers and pays for land clearance.

-- These costs must be repaid.

(b) The land is sold cheaply to the settlers on a long term basis.

The colonization program was abolished in 1968.

5. Under Aleman 5.4 millions of hectares were distributed; under Ruiz Cortines 3.5, and under Mateos approximately 10 million hectares of land was given to the *ejidos* and individuals.

6. Diaz Ordaz has devoted increasing attention to solving the agrarian question.

(a) He has continued the program of land redistribution. He has expropriated lands whose concessions have run out.

-- Extensive land holdings (above that permitted by agrarian law) for cattle raising were given concession by the government in the mid-1930's. Under the terms of the concession, the landowner agreed to dispose of excess land within a 25-year period. The

2. At present, Mexico has an excellent agricultural research agency, The National Institute of Agricultural Research.

-- This institute is one outgrowth of the Mexican agricultural program of the Rockefeller Foundation which started in 1943. The Institute has developed improved seeds -- especially wheat and corn.

3. Agricultural education is being furthered. The National School of Agriculture is expanding its enrollment with financial assistance from such outside agencies as A.I.D., I.D.B., U.N. Special Fund and The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations.

4. In addition, the Alliance for Progress has provided technical assistance for increasing agricultural production.

g. The present state of agriculture

1. The Mexican land structure is now a dual structure with about half the land held by *Ejidos* and one-half in private property.

-- By and large, individual *haciendas* have kept the best land.

2. While productivity has greatly improved -- 24.3% increase in yield per hectare 1961-1966 -- and the value of farm production has increased by an annual average of 4.4%, the agricultural sector is "sluggish" compared to the rest of the economy.

-- Compared to most Latin American countries, Mexican agricultural improvement has been spectacular.

3. An increasing proportion of agriculture -- aided by irrigation programs -- has acquired

*weighted average % change in yields of 5 major crops.*

(3) The worst conditions exist among the approximately 1.5 million families of landless farm laborers -- of whom fully one-third averaged monthly incomes of $18 and only 5% earned more than $80 in 1960.

7. The social and political situation in Mexico's rural areas is potentially most explosive.

-- The activities and demands of the CCI give some evidence of the radicalization of the country-side.

### 3. Labour

a. The worker has not fared so poorly as the agricultural laborer but he has not profited from Mexico's industrial boom as much as might be expected.

b. The labour sector is lacking in cohesiveness and, in general, the unions have done little to improve the economic position of the average worker.

c. At present, there is a labour law before Congress which will:

1. Enforce the 1931 provision that companies supply housing to workers or award rent compensation.

2. Oblige new companies to share profits in the first year of operation (formerly they had a two-year exemption).

-- new companies producing a new product will have to share profits after a two-year period, rather than be permitted a four-year exemption.

Profit sharing is based on distributable profits, without any deductions.

3. Require double-time be paid for the first nine hours of overtime and triple-time thereafter.

-- There would also be double-time for work on holidays; triple-time for work on "days-off" and a 25% differential for working on Sunday, if it is a part of the normal work week.

4. Formalize the Christmas bonus and create a 25% bonus on vacation pay.

5. Provide equal pay for equal work.

6. Require promotion by seniority.

7. Require intervention by a conciliation board in mechanization disputes.

8. Expand the inspection rights of labour inspectors.

9. Permit 25% of union members to call leaders to account.

d. It would appear that the government is seeking:

1. To reward the workers for not supporting the student rebellion last summer.

2. To by-pass labor leaders and possibly crush both an increase of strength by the unions and any corruption on the part of the leaders.

3. To ignore labour demands for centralization of the labour courts -- this bill might divert attention from this demand by the union leaders.

4. To extend Mexico's prosperity to the workers.

e. The bill has been opposed by both labor and industrial leaders.

1. Labor leaders believe that the government is undermining the negotiation position of the unions and reducing their own roles to dues collectors.

  - In addition, the labour leaders object to the clause permitting 25% of a union's members to call its leaders into account.

2. Employers have objected to the increase in labor costs -- estimated at 20-35% -- that the passage of the bill would require.

f. The law will probably be passed this year, although the housing provision may be dropped and costs cut in half.

  - If the law does not pass, the government will undoubtedly substitute an increase in minimum wages for it.

g. By and large, governmental policy towards labour is to increase that group's economic power in such a way that labour remains loyal to government.

4. Economic Development and Policies

a. The industrialization of Mexico has been proceeding rapidly since 1940:

1. The Second World War stimulated industrial growth.

(a) The war created a new external demand for Mexico's exports, especially manufactures.

  - Total exports doubled between 1939-45.

c. Financing industrialism

1. Budgetary figures (1945-67) show an increasing amount of governmental expenditures in the area of communications, investments and development of hydraulic resources.

2. Although internal savings provide about 90% of gross investment, foreign financing has played a crucial supplemental role.

(a) U.S. government assistance to Mexico FY 1946- FY 1967 amounted to more than $1.06 billion of which $777 million was in project type loans from the Export-Import Bank.

(b) During the same period, international lending agencies have loaned $885.4 million to Mexico.

(c) At present, Mexico is borrowing more money from Europe and less from the United States.

-- This is partially a result of the increased interest rates on U.S. loans.

(d) 91% of all economic aid is given as loans. Consequently, 36% of federal expenditures is devoted to amortization.

3. In addition, private foreign investment plays a contributory role in the development of the economy.

(a) The United States has invested heavily in some areas of the economy.

(b) However, the Mexican government limits and restrains direct foreign investment by both legislation and policy.

(1) Foreign capital is forbidden by legislation in:

-- state owned enterprises (electric

-- There has been a yearly growth above 6% (except 1965) since 1963.

2. GNP per capita has increased from $426 (U.S. dollars) to an estimated $510 over the same period.

3. However, population growth has shown an annual increase rate of 3.5% a year throughout the 1960's so that one-half of the economic gains have been absorbed by this.

e. The Mexican government is trying to foster a change in industrial orientation.

1. Throughout the 1950's, emphasis was placed on import substitution and production for the local market.

-- To foster this development, the Government offered tax incentives and import restrictions.

2. During the past few years, increasing attention has been paid to export prospects.

(a) Although liberal benefits are still provided to local manufacturers, there is increasing stress on competitiveness through quality control, organizational efficiency and the provision of low cost intermediate and raw materials for industrial conversion.

(b) The government has created the Centro Nacional de Informacion Sobre Comercio Exterion (National Center for Information on Foreign Trade). This institution operates in the Banco Nacional de Comercio Exterion (National Bank for Foreign Trade) and provides advisory assistance regarding possible markets as well as information on foreign regulations.

(c) In addition, the Fondo para Fomenti de Exportaciones de Productos Manufacturados

(c)

4. In addition to being its principal market, the United States has consistently provided a stable market and price for Mexican sugar.

(a) Under the terms of the Sugar Act (extended in 1965 to 1971), Mexico's share in the quota system is 521,287 tons (of 10.7 million tons) per year. (This figure includes proration of Cuba's suspended 1.1 million ton quota).

-- The price received under the quota system is generally higher than the world price. (At present the U.S. price is 6.5¢; the world price is 3.7¢).

(b) Mexico was one of the nations which employed a Washington lobbyist for the bill.

5. As a signatory to the International Coffee Agreement, Mexico is assured of a fairly stable price for coffee.

(a) The Coffee Agreement is designed to keep coffee prices from fluctuating.

-- Price fluctuations had injured Latin American economies in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

(b) Under the terms of the Coffee Agreement, the Coffee Council determines export quotas. Mexico's quota is 1.5 to 1.6 million bags of a current world total of 48.1 million.

(c) The United States may limit entry into the United States of coffee imported from countries not participating in the Agreement and may prohibit entry of coffee from members that are not accompanied by certificates of origin or re-export.

(d) Under the Agreement, a Diversification Fund to encourage members to divert land from coffee production to other crops is to be established.