Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

Telecon
Secretary Laird
2/17/71 8:50 a.m.

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: On that question raised over here. We don't give port calls but
are confirming the presence of Russian ships in Cuban waters. The Russians
announced some time ago on this submarine.

L: We have to say no comment.

K: I think you should say today that the same ships are there except
a cruiser now in the Gulf of Mexico and a submarine in Cuban waters.

L: Right, and if asked about the understanding refer to what the President
said on January 3.

LK: Saying the submarine must be offensive

K: No.

KL: I assume it must have weapons systems, but we won't get into that.

K: No.

L: What's the President's feeling?

K: He chose the phrase "nuclear submarine."

L: I am afraid that by limiting it to nuclear...

K: We are saying all nuclear-powered and offensive weapon carrying
ones in the annual report.

L: Well, we won't get into that. I don't think there will be any problem.

K: Right

L: Any other problem you got?

K: I can't think of one now. I raised hell with Herb Klein. He says he
never mentioned the CIA or the 650 military men. You can just say he was
misquoted. You did a very good job briefing the cabinet. That was very helpful.

L: I don't know whether it was or not -- we can talk about it tomorrow.

*

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCON
President/Kissinger
9:20 a.m. 2/17/71

P: I got your memo. Anything new?

K: Haig told you they have cut the roads except one and that's under visual observation. Just a question of waiting and holding on there.

P: They can eventually get into Tchepone?

K: There's only one road into Tchepone going east. All others going south have been cut. They are doing this developing on the southern flank. The Egyptians gave us a forthcoming reply to the Jarring note but that's not likely to come up. They are still talking. Always hope and say nothing.

P: What about Dobrynin and that submarine?

K: I told him. It was a pretty starchy conversation. He said, do we have to check every submarine with you. I said no, just nuclear submarines and with a tender then it's a base. He wanted to talk about the other business. I said we had better wait a few days. He did say he had a message from Hanoi to us. I said if we had a ceasefire through 72 many things could be discussed. He said he had an answer but he wouldn't give it because of Berlin. He will give it to me. We have to show they cannot play with us while we are negotiating.

P: We have piddled around too much in getting stuff into the Baltic (and Mediterranean). Which will worry them the most?

K: Both. A larger ship into the Black Sea, like a cruiser.

P: Let's play that. They will talk.

K: It's a cheap move.

P: I will say we are watching it.

K: Just refer to the statement -- I would like to recall my statement that nuclear submarines being ? ? ? ? ?

P: Just leave it where it is. We can't change it now.

K: He knows that offensive weapons -- they have weapons they can reach the U.S. on other submarines. This is an attack submarine.

P: The other was phrased and I don't think we should fool around with it. Because then we are giving an edge. Perhaps we should have said it before but now we are stuck with it. Leave it nuclear submarines. I won't quibble about that.

Let me ask a couple of questions on the VN situation.

*

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

President/Kissinger

9:20 a.m.

2/17/71

-2-

K: Are you in your office?

P: I have people coming in. If this situation is -- I think a question that might come up is whether our goal is total withdrawal. So let's talk about Vietnamization without agreement.

K: You have said that you agree to the principle of total withdrawal. But the POW wives will go into --

P: No, no. That's covered too. No, I am talking about -- as long as prisoners there will be Americans in VN.

K: It would be a pity to shoot that arrow today if we can avoid it. We can use that later this year. Later this year we can offer them total withdrawal in return for the prisoners and a ceasefire.

K P: If they ask if we agree to release prisoners, what then?

K: We have agreed in principles of total withdrawal. Fuzz it.

P: The situation still remains something to be determined.

K: It will be dangerous to go to far if it can be avoided. It will get to a deadline.

P: I won't let it get to a deadline. We have Theiu to worry about.

K: If we can be tough through Laos thing then later this year we can negotiate a withdrawal package.

P: In connection with the Paris talks -- it says here we still have hopes for talks. I think that's silly. We have to be more realistic. 88% of the people in this country think the talks are useless.

K: We can be tough on that.

P: We are continuing talks but time is running out as far as further conversation ? ? ? ? When we leave it shifts to the parties involved.

K: Right.

P: I think it's good to tell them we are fed up with the Paris talks. The only subject we are discussing and our offer still stands -- but we are on Vietnamization and it's working and we will follow through. So the other is return of prisoners.

K: That's a strong statement to make.

*

By: KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

-3-

P: People are sick of the talks.

K: What would be helpful while Laos is going on not to pace prisoners to withdrawal because they will offer right away. It would be better to wait until the Thieu re-election.

P: Suppose they offer to return our prisoners in exchange for total withdrawal. The answer is no, isn't it?

K: We have never said it but it's what our plan has been. Later on we should.

P: They might make that offer.

K: And throw everything into a havoc.

P: That's Mansfield's suggestion. We should totally withdraw in exchange for the prisoners. We can't do that.

K: Not now.

P: We have made a comprehensive proposal and we are standing by it. We will not (deviate?) from it this time. It's well to say time is running out as far as negotiations are concerned.

K: Very useful.

P: One thing I suggest is I noted a line that was reported out of the Cabinet meeting on the tough days ahead. We should indicate that things can be tough but that theme gives an unnecessary contour to the situation.

K: He is extremely nervous right now. We shouldn't play that..

K: I don't think when Ron hears one like that he should report it verbatim. What a person like Laird says. What's Laird doing now?

K: It's some of these casualites. They are less than 1/2 than Cambodia. 50 isn't bad. Until recently we hadn't lower. A year ago I think it was above 100.

P: I don't need it because the 50 will be announced today. But Ron should have that. He didn't reflect -- his reports to the press should be basically a little less repeating. These fellows like Laird don't figure out what they are going to say. None of us do.

K: And this was off the cuff.

By: KHC NARA, Dato:

5/12/04

TELCON
Sisco/Kissinger

10:07 a.m. 2/17/71

S: I want to give you my reading on this Egyptian proposal. It's very good and positive. That's the first time I've ever said that. It meets the principal Israeli private and public conditions that the Egyptians are directly responsive to whether they are or are not willing to make a peace agreement and it gets into specifics for the first time in a clear cut way. It's the first serious intention to get on with this thing. I think now the Israelis will have to face the tough decisions. I had a private meeting with Rabin yesterday and I said you get in touch when you have seen the reply. Let me know what we can do to help. Write a letter? Get out of it? So I put the ball in his court. I need a personal xafavor. Who do you know at Radcliffe? My daughter wants to transfer.

K: Almost everyone.

S: Mrs. Bunting?

K: Yes.

S: I want to be sure she is given a firm shake like everyone else. She has a B+ average at Berkley. She is lonely because it's too far away and she doesn't like Berkley and the west. If I could just know when the paper goes in that she will be considered. She has to complete her freshman year.

K: Let me know when the paper goes in. If I could say I knew her but I will say I know you and think highly of you. Is she coming here anytime in the next month?

S: Unfornately not. We can't afford it.

K: I will see to it that they give you individual attention. Perhaps I can help here get in. I know the Dean of Radcliffe very well -- Dorothy Zinberg.

S: If you could call Dorothy --

K: I can level with Dorothy.

S: I will pull it together and send it to you. In a week or two.

K: You can count on it.

By KML NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Gerard Smith/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., February 17, 1971

S: I am going to have to brief the North Atlantic Council on next Wednesday on mostly Helsinki. But they will be asking a number of questions. This will be in the time-span when the President's remarks in his World Message will be embargoed with the press. The Safeguard decision is already a matter of public knowledge.

K: What do you mean?

S: Mr. Toth had an article yesterday which even cited the number of your NSC document.

K: Oh, God damn it! I am just despairing. It's an outrage! We try to play fairly. We haven't said anything out of here.

S: I don't even know Mr. Toth.

K: I don't either. He is the Defense Department correspondent. I have never laid eyes on the guy. And I don't even know the NSC document number.

S: It would be helpful if I could tell the North Atlantic Council what the gist of those two positions is -- the Safeguard decision for 1972 and whatever you are going to put in the World Report -- and I hope it is minimal.

K: On SALT, I told my people to let your people know yesterday. We have accepted everything of yours on the conduct of negotiations -- the account of what went on at the conference. We put a little more in on the preparations -- we are somewhere between your recommendation and our original statement. There is some dispute on MIRV and on ABM specifications. I think you are too skimpy there -- you only had three lines. I told my people to call you, but I guess they didn't.

S: One of your people talked to Phil about it.

K: I want to come up with something less detailed than we had originally, but which gives more flavor of the problem.

S: I suggested to Phil that we should not cover language when we feel so strongly that it shouldn't go in. But I will go back to him. How long do you have to receive it?

*

Gerard Smith/Mr. Kissin

10:35 a.m., February 17,

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

K: Tomorrow morning. I am sending our draft to you today. It of course will not go in the way it is now.

S: We will take another look and see if we can do something on the verification and ABM questions.

K: We left those two as they were. We took verbatim your account of what went on at the conferences.

S: I talked to Henry Brandon and he said there is quite a difference between the White House and ACDA.

K: I have not talked to him. I give you my word I have not talked to him in six weeks. I am having lunch with him tomorrow, but only because he complains I haven't seen him in two months.

S: What do you think about the proposition for NATO people?

K: Let me think about it. On SALT, my philosophy is to make you succeed in Vienna. There is no difference on substance -- only in how much you want to say. You wouldn't differ about what to say if you wanted to be that full.

S: I agree; that is my understanding.

lds

*

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Safire/Kissinger

11:42 a.m.

2/17/71

K: I have asked Winston Lord to put together for you what I think should be the essential structure. You are off about 30 degrees now. It's inevitable. I thought it would be more helpful for you to have on target and you can translate it into English. You will have something by tonight. How is the chicken noodle soup?

S: Business is booming. Shall I just scrap mine?

K: I told him to use paragraphs from the report in sequence I want them but I can use some of yours.

S: I took some paragraphs from you.

K: After I have his draft I would like to sit down with you for 1/2 an hour and tell you what I think we should have.

S: Okay.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Brian McDonnell/Mr. Kissinger

11:45 a.m., February 17, 1971

K: Brian, I am terribly sorry I haven't had a chance to get
together with you yet.

M: How is Key Biscayne?

K: As lower middle-class as always. I will do this after the
25th -- after the President's Foreign Policy Report. It's a combination
of Southeast Asia and the Foreign Policy Report which killed me.
The report is a 60,000-word document. He is making a speech about
it.

M: I told Winston Lord when it becomes public to get me a copy.
I would like to work on it and understand it.

K: I think you will like many parts of it. You will like the
philosophy -- you won't agree on Vietnam.

M: No. How are you doing?

K: We are going through one of the more complex periods again.

M: It's certainly complex. While I disagree, I can't on the practical
level understand, and I'm not trying. Then we'll do it after the 25th?

K: I do want to see them the week after the 25th.

M: I have something else which would be good therapy for you.
We talked about students coming down to talk. I have a group of
Haverford students -- 10 very mature students that I would like you
to talk with about social change internationally. I will write a note on
what I have in mind. I think it will be good for you to start teaching
again.

K: I want to do that. Let them come to the White House. I haven't
time to prepare anything, but I will be glad to answer questions.

M: That's what I want you to do. They are trying to talk about social
change -- the mammoth picture of the world growing under different
changes.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Brian McDonnell/Mr. Kissinger

11:45 a.m., February 17, 1971

K: I would be very pleased to do it.

M: After the 25th?

K: Yes; will you bring Alice?

M: Yes. I called you because I had Friday and Monday off. I was going to bring her down during the weekend, but you weren't there.

K: You have been a very good friend and I appreciate it.

M: I try it. Should I call after the 25th?

K: Call early next week, and we will settle something after the 25th. See you soon.

lds

*

TELCON
H. Klein/Kissinger

11:55 a.m. 2/17/71

By: KHC NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??

HAK: Ifrnakly feel we shouldn't do it at all. I don't particularly want to do it and don't want them to do it. The press can only get into the cracks.

HK: The President planning to do TV?

HAK: 20 mins. Thurs.

HK: If we can get a chance to do it.

HAK: What is your extension? How did I get you?

HK: 330.

HAK: You were going to set up something in NY and maybe Houston sometime.

HK: After we are through this.

HAK: Will you work with them?

HK: Yes.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:55 a.m., February 17, 1971

P: Are there any last-minute developments? Anything on the wire?

K: No -- I just checked a few minutes ago.

P: We have XXX all the rest of the stuff here.

K: I think that is right.

P: I am going to play it like we expected this to be hard.

K: Absolutely; and that is correct, too.

P: From my conversation with Haig, there are absolutely a lot of positive things to talk about.

K: I am getting a briefing every morning from one of Vogt's deputies showing the location of every unit. You know, Abrams is very intelligently going around...

P: If you look back, Eisenhower sent Patton around when they were tied down in the hedgerows.

K: They now have cut all the roads 20 miles further south than they had originally intended. The only thing we are not getting as quickly as if we had gone straight into Tchepone is any caches there, but we never justified it on that basis. There is only one road half-way down the Panhandle on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the west.

P: That is the one the Meo's will try to make it on.

K: We have 3 battalions -- they are not permanent interdictions, but will mine and make hit-and-run raids.

P: Make it tough.

K: From that road, they can't get over into Vietnam -- only into Cambodia.

The President/Mr. Kiss

11:55 a.m., February 1, 1969

By KHLU

NARA, Dalo.

P: Did you get that casualty number? I want to say our casualties last week were half of what they were a year ago. Everytime we put it out, we have to put it in that perspective. Our casualties in January of 1969 were five times greater than they were in January of this year.

K: And that was a low month. I think you should use February.

P: We haven't finished February yet. I don't want to get a defeatist psychology. I think Pursley is bugging Laird about this. Somebody prepared his speech.

K: It wasn't an enthusiastic presentation.

P: I would rather have had Vogt do it.

K: He could have shown how the roads were cut. We are not justifying it on the basis of caches.

P: I think Laird was trying to build an escape hatch. They all are trying to do that. Rogers does a lot better -- he has a much more positive concept. He realizes it is his tail. It didn't do Clifford, Vance or Rusk any good that they may have advised against what Johns on did.

K: There is only one position to take -- to be behind the President.

P: At least behind the troops. I told the Legion last night we will have to build our forces up in peacetime.

K: I saw that. On the figures -- they have taken 1300 rifles -- 150 crew-served weapons; it's adding up.

P: It does mean we are getting something.

K: The point of the operation, however, is they have cut all the major roads coming south.

P: Now, if they can develop the capacity to hold it -- and Abrams should be able to do that.

K: He has done one intelligent thing -- he's been shifting the points where they cut off south of Route 9 rather than north of Route 9 which has given himself a lot of cushion.