CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE

# FORTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL COMMENCEMENT

Address by
Dr. Henry Kissinger
Former U.S. Secretary of State

Sunday, May 14, 1995

Claremont, California

Ladies and gentlemen:

I am here in greatest part because the chairman of your board, Robert Day, class of '65, is being honored today. President De Gaulle once said: "We go through life looking for hidden treasures only to find at the end that there were no hidden treasures, and that only friendship is left to us." Of course, De Gaulle didn't know Robert Day. If there are any hidden treasures, he is the one to find them.

[c]

I have had the honor of being his friend and I have witnessed
his dedication to this college and the warmth with which he
has treated all those close to him. Therefore, it means a great
deal to me to be here on the occasion of his receiving an honor-
ary degree.

Now one reason I have been reluctant to serve as a commence-
ment speaker in the past is that, when I was of the age of the
present graduating class, I used to think that the people up here
on the podium offering great advice about the future were not
really older editions of myself but an altogether different spe-
cies and that the relevance of their advice to the likes of me was
relatively limited. So today I shall talk about the things I know
something about, and let you figure out for yourselves what
they mean to you.

I have spent much of my life studying international affairs.
Having come to this country as a refugee in the 1930s, I
have, from the beginning, felt a special obligation towards this
country. When the validity of much of what America stood for

was constantly being chal-
lenged, I could never forget
what America had meant to
my family, to myself, and
to all those in similar posi-
tions. Having lived under a
totalitarian regime, I found
myself somewhat impatient
with all those who down-
graded what America rep-
resented—even when I did

not agree with government policies. When I graduated from
college, the Korean War had just started. Germany and Japan
were occupied countries. We had no contact whatever with
China. The Soviet Union was considered a structural enemy.
Nobody then predicted, nor could have predicted, that only a
few decades hence, Germany and Japan would be considered
economic rivals of the United States, that China and the United

2

States would conduct
friendly relations, that the
Soviet Union would have
ceased to exist, and that
about 100 states which
were as yet mere colonies
would have attained inde-
pendence.

I mention this because we
must never forget that
almost all of the foreign
policy problems we have
today are the result of our
successes in the post-war
period. I do not know of

any other nation which can say that the things it dreamed of
in 1950 had become reality in 1990. For if you compare what
American leaders of both parties were defining as American
objectives around 1950, you will find an amazing correspondence
with the world that came about and in which we live today.

That world, however, confronts us with a problem which George
Bernard Shaw described as follows: "There are two tragedies
in life. One is to fail to fulfill your heart's desire, and the second
is to fulfill your heart's desire." We are truly in such a position.
Moreover, we face a world for which very little in our history
prepares us and at a moment when all the other nations of the
world are likewise facing an environment with which they have
no experience. The United States is unique among the nations
of the world in having been populated almost entirely by immi-
grants, in never having had a powerful neighbor, and in always
having had the protection of two great oceans. As a result, the
United States evolved for itself a style of foreign policy which
caused it to believe that it could intervene or withdraw from
the world at its own discretion—that it had the choice of con-
ducting foreign policy or retreating into isolationism. The
United States never had to make the sorts of calculations of

Faculty marshal John J. Pitney, Jr.
prepares to lead the procession.

3

[LC]

reward and penalty that characterize the foreign policies of
almost every other nation of the world.

Now we live in a world in which the danger of annihilation in a
nuclear war has passed. On the other hand, economics have
become global. Communications are instantaneous. Events can
be witnessed in real time all over the world. All of this has tran-
spired in the past 15 years. With the decline of the danger of
nuclear holocaust, more and more local rivalries command our
attention. The problem we face is that, at the same moment
when technology became global, human loyalties in many parts
of the world retreated into ethnic and regional conflict. There
is no longer any necessary relationship between the political
loyalties, the economic necessities, communications and tech-
nology. Historically, when the various strengths of human
consciousness are out of sync with each other, a period of
considerable turmoil follows.

In such a world, then, what is the United States supposed to
do? We cannot get very much help from other countries. Russia
lives within borders it has not known since Peter the Great,
and it is torn between its imperial tradition and contemporary
realities; between the fact that it has always expanded outward
and the reality that, if it goes back to its historical policies, it
will launch another cycle of tension. The dialogue between China
and the United States has been complicated by the fact that
Americans find it difficult to understand Chinese chronology.
If you ask a Westerner when something has occurred, he will
give you a precise date. When you ask a Chinese when some-
thing occurred, he will name a dynasty. Most of those dynasties
have lasted longer than the entire history of the United States,
and it is therefore not self-evident to the Chinese why the United
States should lecture to them about domestic arrangements
which have evolved over 5,000 years.

In the economic field, we have recently witnessed a bank
employee in Singapore generating a loss in the billions over a
three-day period. And while people say it was due to inadequate

4

controls, it also tells us a great deal about the computer age. I listened the other day to the computer assessments of a major financial institution and they listed 26 categories which they were taking into account. I could not help wondering about the fellow at the other end of their computer: does he have the same 26 categories? Does he interpret them the same way? On top of

which, it turns out that there are about 100,000 similar transactions going on simultaneously. How does one prevent chaos in such a situation? And if everybody adheres to the same risk criteria, how to prevent everybody from

running to the same side of the boat and tipping it over? What is to happen to our societies if there is a really major crisis in the economic field?

> We are now witnessing a period of fundamental change in the human consciousness.

All these complexities are compounded by an enormous shift in the human consciousness. I suppose the older generation always finds the younger generation different. And it has to be since it has so much less experience. We are now witnessing a period of fundamental change in the human consciousness. My generation was brought up on books. The new generation is brought up on computers, in which I am illiterate. My ten-year-old nephews know more about computers than I do. And when you were brought up on books, you have to form concepts which relate ideas to each other in a way that helps you find your way through what you know for there is an inadequate amount of empirical knowledge. When you are brought up on computers, knowledge is ever just at your fingertip, but is there a true understanding of what it means? What my generation had to spend months digging out of libraries, my secretary can get from her computer programs.

The problem is, can we relate the increase of knowledge to a shape for the future? If you look at great statesmen in history,

5

you will probably agree with me that the difference between them and their contemporaries was very rarely intelligence. The difference was that they had a vision of the future and the courage to walk alone for part of the way. The task of any national leader is to move his society from where it is to where it has never been. That requires an inner strength and a conviction that is beyond mere knowledge. When you look at the cathedrals of Europe, it is not easy to remember that they were built by peasant societies with very small populations over hundreds of years; because they had, primitive as they were, a vision of the future—which is precisely the task before us today.

I keep hearing that the Cold War is over and that, because there is no imminent danger, we do not know what to do anymore. It is true. The Cold War is over. And my generation, which had the task of avoiding a general war, discharged that responsibility with greater or lesser success. In the contemporary world which I have sketched, some integrating principles are very much needed. The next generation has to build the peace in a way that goes beyond avoiding danger. In America, there is endless debate between the idealists and the pragmatists. But the greatness of America is that it has always represented

both. Idealism by itself can lead to posturing and self-righteousness. But pragmatism by itself can lead to a celebration of the status quo. Somebody once said, “If you don’t know where you are going, any road will get you there.”

Dean Fucaloro assists honorary degree recipient Robert A. Day '65.

6

[LC]

We are now at the beginning of a period in which the United States has a truly unique opportunity. Whatever our shortcomings, we have better relations with all of the key nations of the world than they have with each other. There isn't a crisis in which people do not come to us or that is beyond

America will play the decisive role in shaping a world in which the just can be free and the weak can be secure.

our capacity. But we cannot solve every crisis. We have to decide which issues might have to be handled alone, which we can do only together with others, and which we cannot settle at all. But whatever we decide, none of these solutions is possible without a major American contribution. In the world which I have described, the absence of an overriding danger ought to free us to come forward with ideas about how to shape the world. We cannot do this if our political debates are as bitter and as nasty as they have come to be, or in a nation where people celebrate credibility gaps and derelictions as if government were some sort of conspiracy.

All persons in high office that I have known have sought to do the best for their country. They may make mistakes but these are made in the service of their country and in the service of the ideals of their country. We have to keep this in mind as we seek national reconciliation because, at the end of the day, it is America which will play the decisive role in shaping a world in which the just can be free and the weak can be secure.

7

CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE

Sunday, May 14, 1995

Claremont, California

Ladies and gentlemen:

I have had the honor of being his friend and I have witnessed his dedication to this college and the warmth with which he has treated all those close to him. Therefore, it means a great deal to me to be here on the occasion of his receiving an honorary degree.

Now one reason I have been reluctant to serve as a commencement speaker in the past is that, when I was of the age of the present graduating class, I used to think that the people up here on the podium offering great advice about the future were not really older editions of myself but an altogether different species and that the relevance of their advice to the likes of me was relatively limited. So today I shall talk about the things I know something about, and let you figure out for yourselves what they mean to you.

I have spent much of my life studying international affairs. Having come to this country as a refugee in the 1930s, I have, from the beginning, felt a special obligation towards this country. When the validity of much of what America stood for was constantly being challenged, I could never forget what America had meant to my family, to myself, and to all those in similar positions. Having lived under a totalitarian regime, I found myself somewhat impatient with all those who downgraded what America represented—even when I did

> Having come to this country as a refugee in the 1930s, I have, from the beginning, felt a special obligation towards this country.

2

[c]

3

4

[c]

5

[lc]

both. Idealism by itself can lead to posturing and self-righteousness. But pragmatism by itself can lead to a celebration of the status quo. Somebody once said, "If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there."

6

[L]

7

CLAREMONT MCKENNA COLLEGE
CLAREMONT, CALIFORNIA

Address by
Dr. Henry Kissinger,
Former U.S. Secretary of State
Sunday, May 14, 1995

Ladies and gentlemen:

I am here in greatest part because the Chairman of your
board, Robert Day, class of '65, is being honored today.

I have had the honor of being his friend and I have
witnessed his dedication to this college and the warmth with
which he has treated all those close to him. Therefore it means a
great deal to me to be here on the occasion of his receiving an
honorary degree.

1

Commencement speaker in the past is that, when I was of the age
of the present graduating class, I used to think that the people
up here on the podium offering great advice about the future were
not really older editions of myself but an altogether different
species and that the relevance of their advice to the likes of me
was relatively limited. So today I shall talk about the things I
know something about, and let you figure out for yourselves what
they mean to you.

I have spent much of my life studying international affairs.
Having come to this country as a refugee in the 1930s, I have,
from the beginning, felt a special obligation towards this
country. When the validity of much of what America stood for was
constantly being challenged, I could never forget what America
had meant to my family, to myself, and to all those in similar
positions. Having lived under a totalitarian regime, I found
myself somewhat impatient with all those who downgraded what
America represented - even when I did not agree with government
policies. When I graduated from college, the Korean War had just

[y]

started. Germany and Japan were occupied countries. We had no
contact whatever with China. The Soviet Union was considered a
structural enemy. Nobody then predicted, or could have
predicted, that only a few decades hence Germany and Japan would
be considered economic rivals of the United States, that China
and the United States would conduct friendly relations, that the
Soviet Union would have ceased to exist, and that about 100
states which were as yet mere colonies would have attained
independence.

3

George Bernard Shaw described as follows: "There are two tragedies in life. One is to fail to fulfill your heart's desire, and the second is to fulfill your heart's desire." We are truly in such a position. Moreover, we face a world for which very little in our history prepares us and at a moment when all the other nations of the world are likewise facing an environment with which they have no experience. The United States is unique among the nations of the world in having been populated almost entirely by immigrants, in never having had a powerful neighbor, and in always having had the protection of two great oceans. As a result, the United States evolved for itself a style of foreign policy which caused it to believe that it could intervene or withdraw from the world at its own discretion - that it had the choice of conducting foreign policy or retreating into isolationism. The United States never had to make the sorts of calculations of reward and penalty that characterize the foreign policies of almost every other nation of the world.

4

[Y]

in a nuclear war has passed. On the other hand, economics have
become global. Communications are instantaneous. Events can be
witnessed in real time all over the world. All of this has
transpired in the past 15 years. With the decline of the danger
of nuclear holocaust, more and more local rivalries command our
attention. The problem we face is that, at the same moment when
technology became global, human loyalties in many parts of the
world retreated into ethnic and regional conflict. There is no
longer any necessary relationship between the political
loyalties, the economic necessities, communications and
technology. Historically, when the various strengths of human
consciousness are out of sync with each other, a period of
considerable turmoil follows.

In such a world, then, what is the United States supposed to
do? Nor can we get very much help from other countries. Russia
lives within borders it has not known since Peter the Great, and
it is torn between its imperial tradition and contemporary
realities; between the fact that it has always expanded outward

5

and the reality that, if it goes back to its historical policies,
it will launch another cycle of tension. The dialogue between
China and the United States has been complicated by the fact that
Americans find it difficult to understand Chinese chronology. If
you ask a Westerner when something has occurred, he will give you
a precise date. When you ask a Chinese when something occurred,
he will name a dynasty. Most of those dynasties have lasted
longer than the entire history of the United States, and it is
therefore not self-evident to the Chinese why the United States
should lecture to them about domestic arrangements which have
evolved over 5,000 years.

In the economic field, we have recently witnessed a bank
employee in Singapore generating a loss in the billions over a
three-day period. And while people say it was due to inadequate
controls, it also tells us a great deal about the computer age.
I listened the other day to the computer assessments of a major
financial institution and they listed 26 categories which they
were taking into account. I could not help wondering about the

6

7

The problem is, can we relate the increase of knowledge to a
shape for the future? If you look at great statesmen in history,
you will probably agree with me that the difference between them
and their contemporaries was very rarely intelligence. The
difference was that they had a vision of the future and the
courage to walk alone for part of the way. The task of any
national leader is to move his society from where it is to where
it has never been. That requires an inner strength and a
conviction that is beyond mere knowledge. When you look at the
cathedrals of Europe, it is not easy to remember that they were
built by peasant societies with very small populations over

8

[4]

hundreds of years; because they had, primitive as they were, a
vision of the future - which is precisely the task before us
today.

I keep hearing that the Cold War is over and that, because
there is no imminent danger, we do not know what to do anymore.
It is true. The Cold War is over. And my generation, which had
the task of avoiding a general war, discharged that
responsibility with greater or lesser success. In the
contemporary world which I have sketched, some integrating
principles are very much needed. The next generation has to
build the peace in a way that goes beyond avoiding danger. In
America, there is endless debate between the idealists and the
pragmatists. But the greatness of America is that it has always
represented both. Idealism by itself can lead to posturing and
self-righteousness. But pragmatism by itself can lead to a
celebration of the status quo. Somebody once said, "If you don't
know where you are going, any road will get you there."

9

[Y]

States has a truly unique opportunity. Whatever our shortcomings, we have better relations with all of the key nations of the world than they have with each other. There isn't a crisis in which people do not come to us or that is beyond our capacity. But we cannot solve every crisis. We have to decide which issues might have to be handled alone, which we can do only together with others, and which we cannot settle at all. But whatever we decide, none of these solutions is possible without a major American contribution. In the world which I have described, the absence of an overriding danger ought to free us to come forward with ideas about how to shape the world. We cannot do this if our political debates are as bitter and as nasty as they have come to be, or in a nation where people celebrate credibility gaps and derelictions as if government were some sort of conspiracy.

10

[Y]

11

Ladies and gentlemen:

1

CYJ

2

[Y]

3

CJD

4

CJD

5

6

[Y]

7

C Y J

8

CJD

9

CJD

Almost all persons in high office that I have known have sought to do the best for their country. They may make mistakes but these are made in the service of their country and in the

10

CJD

11

FORTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL COMMENCEMENT
Address by
Dr. Henry Kissinger,
Former U.S. Secretary of State

Sunday, May 14, 1995

Ladies and gentlemen:

CYJ

2

CYD

3

CYD

5