TELCORN
Mr. Kissinger/Sec. Rogers

11:54 a.m. 2/28/73

SR: I think we can talk on this line--the other one is--

HK: Oh no, the other one is impossible.

SR: I have a statement here that I'll explain to you--I'll read it to you --
issomething you might release here or you might release there,
depending on what the President wants to do.

HK: Right.

SR: "In a private meeting I first let me say we had two meetings--one with all four of us that lasted a couple of hours and that was just the usual stuff, and afterwards Trinh and I went into another room--just the two of us and he assured me that they would carry out the release of all our POW's within our 60 day period--there was no doubt about that, secondly, that they had no interest in causing unnecessary trouble and first they promise that the government's position is the same on the POW's release--secondly, that he would take all necessary steps on four separate occasions--and that as far as the next stage of the release is concerned he would have the matter taken up at once in the JMC in order to work out the arrangements. I think that's what they have in mind--I think they are doing it for two reasons because the PRG and two because concern that was expressed to me about mine sweeping--I think in any event they will move in the next day or two and I think the only reason they didn't do it this morning was because he felt it would have been under pressure--can you hear me all right?

HK: Yeh.

SR: Yeh. I have a statement here as I say--is a possibility, we are under
a lot of pressure to say something because everyone else has said somethin
!-in a private meeting between Secretary of State Rogers and Foreign
Minister Trinh which followed the meeting--well, "In a private meeting
with Secretary State Rogers and Foreign Minister Trinh, the Foreign
Minister stated that his government intended to fully carry out the
provisions of the Paris Agreement dealing with POW's. In this connection
he gave the assurance that his government and all POW's held by his
government would be released within the 60-day period set forth in the
agreement. With regard to the next phase of release of the POW's
Foreign Minister Trinh said that the matter would be discussed at once
and the JCM in order to work out the arrangements." Now the last
sentence is something that the President should decide on--"In the light

Page 2

of this, the President has asked Secretary Rogers to continue with
other business of the conference as scheduled.

HK: How do you interpret that statement Bill--will they release it--60 days isn't good enough because of the 15--at the protocols make it obligatory that they do it in 15 day increments--

SR: Let me say this--he committed himself as firmly as you can that the agreement--60 day provision of the agreement would be fully complied with. Secondly, he said that they'd do it four third, he gave the impression that they were prepared to discuss the second phase right away. And I have a feeling that what they have in mind is just a delay of another day or two--I tried to pin them down; I said could we get assurance that you'll do it tomorrow, he said, well I'll have to let you know on that. Now on the other decisions the President made, I wouldn't say change those at all-- so really the only question that I have to face is whether we want to extend the conference or not, or whether we ought to try to go ahead tomorrow and see how it goes.

HK: Can I call you back in 10 minutes and check with the President?

SR: Yeh.

HK: I'll call you right back.

SR: You understand that as far as the other decisions the President made are not affected--I am all for those--

HK: No, no, I understand that.

SR: So the only thing we would say is in light of this--these assurances, the President has asked Secretary Rogers to proceed with the other business of the conference as scheduled. Now if we don't get satisfaction--we can delay it till tomorrow afternoon, we don't have to go ahead on Friday.

HK: Right. Well, I'm pretty sure that--but I'll have to check--he will not agree to a signed document until we have assurances on the prisoners.

SR: Yeh, well we don't have to agree on that. But this sort of puts them on the spot I think in view of this promise--

HK: Good--let me go right into see him and I'll call you in fifteen minutes.

TelCon
Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

11:54 am, Feb. 28, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry. It would be extremely helpful to me if he were to go on this trip with me. Would that be possible.

K: Certainly.

R: Would you want to tell him.

K: Let me call him tomorrow. When are you going.

R: Would leave March 8 and be back March 22.

K: Yeah, let me talk to him. Would you promise me that position beforehand. Or indicate that it's likely.

R: I would. The President knows him fairly well, I assume.

K: Yeah, but you'd better let me talk to the President first, because he's a little ambivalent.

R: Well that is what--before anything is said to him I would like to--but the President's on board and I didn't want to bring it up with the President, I think it might well if you did.

K: Okay, good. I'll do that tomorrow.

R: All right.

K: Good.

R: And you'll tell Sonenfeldt about the trip.

K: Right.

R: Okay, thank you.

K: Have you talked to Cooper.

R: Yes, and he seemed to be very pleased with the discussion and said he was hoping to see you today or tomorrow.

K: Were you well impressed with him.

R: I think he's a good guy, yeah. And his only problem he said was his family problem. He knew he was going to have to work very hard if he takes this job, and has to square that away with his wife, and so on.

TelCon
Irving Lazar/Mr. Kissinger
12:30 pm, February 28, 1973

K: Hello.

L: Hello Henry. . . . . . at the Douglases and there were a large
group of us waiting to see it, and we tho ught that you handled
it marvelously, as usual, you always do but there were some
particularly sticky things and I think that you cleared up a lot
of questions which had to be answered in precisely the way you
did.

K: Well aren't you nice.

L: Well you did. You fielded a lot of things about Connally and the
rest of it that made it clear up a lot of nonsense for that plagues
you apparently or should I suppose with all these constant repit-
titions that people make in cross references.

K: Yeah.

L: At any rate I wanted to talk to you--

K: It's a gossipy town.

L: Well we all know that but the point is you cleared up for the rest
of us for a lot of people who are not really knowledgeable about
gossip but rather interested in the political aspects of your thinking,
you cleared up a lot of nonsense that for the moment won't
plague you. But I called you really to find out if you're coming
through L/A. at any time soon because we'd love to have a little
dinner for you.

K: I am almost certain to be in L.A. with the President between, say
the 28th of March and the 8th of April.

L: Well, that's marvelous. We'll be back from, in fact permanently
insconced in our place in Beverly Hills, and I hope that if you think
of it that you let us know a week before you are coming out--if you
want to set a date now, we'd love to have a dinner for you the first
few days in April.

K: Well, it's a little tough for me to set a firm date, we can aim for
something like March 31st or April 1st.

L: All right. Let's aim for March 31st and then I'll call you about
the 25th and check you out.

-2-

K: Would you do that?

L: I'll be happy to do it. We'd love to have a dinner for you and
have all your chums, and we've love to see you, too.

K: That would be marvelous.

L: I'll call you--

K: I still remember your many kindnesses to me and--

L: Oh, nothing at all. I really am interested if you liked my friend
The Baroness Van Zwelan.

K: Very much.

L: Isn't she a darling lady.

K: She is a great lady, and very, very attractive.

L: I tell you, she's not only a beautiful girl, but she's a marvelous
friend.

K: She came out to see you afterwards, didn't she.

L: Oh, yes, she stayed with us for about a week.

K: I really liked her. She caught me during a really hectic week
and I came late and left early.

L: Well, she told me that and the reasoning, believe me if you find
her companionable, I can only tell you she's one of the best chums
you'll every have because that's the way she is with a lot of people
you know actually and a lot of people you don't know.

K: Yes, she's marvelous.

L: And her husband, by the way, is an extremely attractive and a
brilliant banker and publisher.

K: I didn't meet him.

L: I know you didn't. They were all here for about two weeks.

K: I see. Oh yeah, she's a wild golfer she told me.

L: Yes, yes, well they are very old friends of mine, I mean I'm a
Godfather of one of their children and Sam Speigler is a Godfather
of another one, so -- I know you know Sam quite well.

K: Yes

L: Well listen now, you take care and then you do as well as you've been doing and it will all come out marvelously. The whole bloody thing.

K: Yes, I don't want to be under an obligation to keep going at this pace.

L: I know, but you look wonderful. As a matter of fact I was so pleased, we sent you a wire at your press conference when you came back there.

K: Yes, I appreciated it very much.

L: And I thought the other they photographed you extremely well unlike the candid camera work they do on ordinary press conferences. You look marvelous as usual, of course you're very eloquent and you handled all the rather tough questions of Barbara's very very eloquently and very well.

K: Good, well aren't you nice.

L: Marvelous, well it couldn't have been more gleeful. There were a lot of your friends sitting around and we all enjoyed it enormously.

K: Well, of course, you are all a little prejudiced.

L: We are, that true, but then again why not.

K: Well, I'll look forward to seeing you.

L: I'll call you, we'll aim for the 31st and then I'll call you about the 25th or so and we'll check it out.

K: Excellent.

L: Okay, Henry.

K: Bye.

-3-

TelCon

2:45 pm, February 28

David Frost/Mr. Kissinger

K: Hello.

F: Henry.

K: David, how are you.

F: Very well, how are you today.

K: Okay.

F: It looks like a very hectic day.

K: Well, every day is hectic.

F: Right.

K: And I'm not yet--are you coming down anyway?

F: Well, there's one other thing I could while I'm there but I wouldn't come down unless we are having the pleasure of a get together, that is all.

K: Let me let you know, can I do it as late as 3:30.

F: Oh, God, yes, please do. Please don't feel pressed in any way.

K: I don't feel pressed I just might-- I don't have anything that I must do, it's simply a question that I must get over some material by tonight, that is the only question, I want to see if I have a chance of finishing it by 8 or 8:30.

F: Of course.

K: Let me call you around 3:30.

F: Oh, that would be delicious. If I could juggle tomorrow, would lunch tomorrow be any good.

K: No, lunch tomorrow is impossible. Tonight may well be the best.

F: All right, well seeing you then would be lovely.

K: Good, I'll call you then.

F: May the Lord be with you.

K: Bye.

TelCon
Carter Brown/Mr. Kissinger

2:48 pm, Feb. 28, 1973

K: Hello.

B: Hi, it's Carter Brown.

K: How are you.

B: Many thanks for getting in touch. I have two quickies for you.
The first is that you will be getting an invitation from Paul and
Bunny Melon for dinner at the National Gallery before a preview
of the Soviets on the 29th of March and we would love to have you
circle it on your calendar and also let us know if you'd like to
bring a date.

K: Thank you. If I'm in town I'd be happy to.

B: Should we get in touch with your secretary about the name and
address of anyone that you'd like to bring.

K: Yes, a little later.

B: A little later, great. Secondly I have a communication from
Paul Melon who's out of the country about getting in touch with
the Chief Justice. The Chairman of our Board was here at the
Board meeting where we approved in principle on an if and when
basis about the Chinese show.

K: Right.

B: And I hesitate to go through all of this if there really isn't any
news because I did have a chat with the President, very briefly,
on Sunday morning at the worship service in which he told me
that as far as he knew it would be opening in Washington, but I
didn't want to--

K: I have no such information.

B: You have no such information, okay good.

K: And he hasn't either.

K: Well I didn't want to take that as gospel without checking with
somebody who is--

K: No, I think once we get a little further down the road, we ought
to raise that issue formally.

-2-

B: Good. Okay, fine. Because the--we have been in touch with the USF and Len Garment and the State Department over a long period of time on this and have voluntarily offered not to do anything without getting in touch with Chinese unilaterally or directly because my own view is that this is really in your hands and it should be done whichever way the U.S. government thinks it is the best solution.

K: Well, why don't you wait until we get a little further down the road.

B: Okay, great. I do have some information from the National Gallery in Canada who says that they would much prefer having the show after us, because they are committed through March and our contacts in London say that the delegation in Peking has worked out details now for the show and that they've gotten a month's extension for both Paris and London, and so it won't be coming through until next January, and some other details that I can work out when it's appropriate. But it might give the U.S. an opening wedge to say that wouldn't it be nice to slip it in for Americans before the Canadians, but that's not an--

K: You want to write me a letter on that so that I have something to work from.

B: Okay, great. All righty, well that's really what I have in mind and just wanted to let you know that we are here to be as helpful as we can.

K: Good, Well I appreciate this and we'll see what can be worked out on getting it(a( the show to Washington and secondly to get it in before the Canadians.

B: Right.

K: But I think we may be successful in getting it to Washington but it isn't true that it's already been agreed to.

B: Good.

K: It hasn't even been proposed yet.

B: No, exactly, but we haven't wanted to suppose our own approaches and initiatives with the Chinese, my instinct is that from what I've heard about their mentality, they would probably be most happy about having it open in Washington.

TelCon

5:00 pm, Feb. 28, 1973

Phil Geyelin/Mr. Kissinger

K: Hello.

G: Henry.

K: Phil, I wish you wouldn't get me into -- is this a Washington Post plot.

G: Henry, I just want to tell you I'm leaving for Mexico in the morning. I wanted to say goodbye.

K: Well--

G: I appreciated your present very much.

K: I hope you give the reasons for it publicly.

G: Well I will, I going down there to get laundered, is that okay.

K: Sure.

G: Listen, I want to thank you for coming by last night.

K: Not at all, it seemed like a great party, a lot of friends were there.

G: I appreciate it very much.

K: Well, I was delighted and you know I've respected your work enormously. That's why it's occasionally painful, but I've never doubted, you know, what you stood for.

G: Well, I'd like to, I really would like to have a breakfast and talk about the rest of the world, something that that other party's going to take care of itself.

K: Let's do that soon.

G: Okay. I have been left by one of my--an editorial on this kind of situation in the hold up of the prisoners, which to be quite frank about it, I find is--I myself am a little concerned with it, he's--it gives you the impression that the Saigon government is in fact not complying and although I have edited it, point out that that has nothing to do with the release of the prisoners under the terms of the contract--

2

K: Well, I will say that we will use really maximum pressure on them to comply. We have no interest to have gone through this agony to let them screw up the agreement.

G: Yeah.

K: And, --

G: Ziegler is right, there is no connection between what we do and what Saigon does, but as a practical matter it is all one big ball of wax, isn't it.

K: Well, you know, the North Vietnamese, the Vietnamese on both sides are bastards, you have to start with that. And they are too engaging in massive violations, not of the ceasefire than in terms of infiltration. But this may be, as it may be, it, we will use our maximum influence and we are in discussions, just for your information, with the South Vietnamese now to bring about better compliance.

G: Yeah, Okay, well that I think solves my problem. I just don't want--the sound of the way this was before I put it through the machine again, as if you know they were all right and Saigon was all wrong, I'm sure that isn't the case.

K: That is not true, but I can assure you we have in the last few days made energetic representation.

G: Okay.

K: Good, Phil.

G: Thank you Henry.

K: Bye.

G: Bye, bye.

TelCon

5:35 pm, February 28, 1973

Ambassador Cromer/Mr. Kissinger

K: Hello.

C: Oh, yes, sorry to worry you again. Now I have a telegram giving a report of the NATO MEETING today.

K: Don't tell me it didn't work.

C: It went on exactly the same as it was before. What is even honor about it. Alec Humes saw Bill Rogers in Paris and they had a word about what you and I discussed and Bill said exactly the same to Alec as you said to me. I mean, give or take a week or so doesn't make too much difference. Your character Rumsfelt at the NATO meetings.

K: He's a bloody go-getter.

C: I know he is. My report from my people say at the meeting this afternoon Rumsfelt continued to press for acceptance as soon as possible of the American--

K: Listen, people are raising hell with my staff for my allegedly slowed them down so the word has certainly gotten to the State Department.

C: Yes, well I'm sure it has, but either Rumsfelt hasn't got it or he's not reading it.

K: Is the meeting over now.

C: Yes, the meeting is over, they're not meeting again until Friday.

K: Okay, I'll

C: I said I'd let you know right away.

K: Look, Rollie, by Friday he'll be slowed down or he'll be on vacation.

C: I should tell you this is my interpretation, but that's what our chap's has reported back.

K: Okay, we'll slow him down.

C: Okay. Lookforward to seeing you tomorrow.

K: Right, bye.

C: Bye.

TelCon
Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

5:37 pm, Feb. 28, 1973

K: Ron?

Z: Hi, Henry.

K: What's eating you.

Z: Anything new.

K: No.

Z: Nothing at all.

K: No, the message of today was on some other subject.

Z: They haven't reacted to our statement.

K: Well, let's see what happens in the Commission.

Z: Yeah, but they are not going to meet tomorrow are they/

K: Aren't they.

Z: No, they are not due to meet tomorrow.

K: Well, then there's no plenary session tomorrow. I've asked Bunker to demand a meeting of the commission tomorrow.

Z: Well, maybe they will. They were scheduled to meet Friday, so they may meet tomorrow. We haven't heard back from Bunker.

K: No.

Z: Say, did Golda Meir meet with King Hussein.

K: No.

Z: Secretly.

K: No, for Christ sakes. You mean here in Washington.

Z: Yeah. Yesterday.

K: The truth is they are lovers.

Z: Now, seriously, Bill Gill's calling me and he said that they asked Golda Meir whether or not she met with King Hussein yesterday

-2-

here privately, and she said, Oh, you know about that already.

K: He's pulling your leg.

Z: He's not, Bill Gill

K: Look, if she met with him, she'd never, never admit, it would be suicide for both of them.

Z: Yeah.

K: She thought she was being funny.

Z: Yeah, but I should tell Gill--he's not asking--

K: We have absolutely no reason to believe that if she did it, it was kept a secret from everybody which is impossible, given all the security she's got.

Z: Okay.

K: Good.

Z: Okay, thanks.

TELCOM

George Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

6:27 p.m., February 28, 1973

S: Henry, the more I think about the Sonnenfeldt idea, the better it seems to me.

K: Okay.

S: I wonder how you are reacting to it?

K: I react very favorably to it.

S: It would be extremely helpful to me if he were to go on this trip with me. Would that be possible?

K: Certainly.

S: Would you want to tell him?

K: Let me talk to him tomorrow. When are you going?

S: Would leave March 8th and be back March 22nd.

K: Yeah. Let me talk to him. Would you promise him that position beforehand or indicate that it's likely?

S: The President knows him fairly well I understand.

K: Yeah, but you better let me talk to the President first because he's a little ambivalent.

S: Well, before anything is said to him I would like to know that the President's on board. I don't want to bring it up with the President. I think it might be well if you did.

K: Okay. Good. I'll do that tomorrow.

S: All right. And you'll tell Sonnenfeldt about the trip?

K: Right.

S: Okay. Thank you.

George Shultz/Mr. Kissinger

6:27 p.m., February 28, 1973

K: Have you talked to Cooper?

S: Yes, and he seemed to be very pleased with the discussion and said he was hoping to see you today or tomorrow.

K: Were you impressed with him?

S: Yeah, I think he's a good guy. Yeah. And his only problem he said was his family problem. He knew he was going to have to work very hard if he takes this job and he has to square that away with his wife and so on.

K: Right.

S: So I said well, that's right, you will have to work hard and you might as well go into it with your eyes open.

K: That's right. No, there's no sense having anyone work for me on another premise.

S: Yeah.

K: Okay.

S: Very good. See you tomorrow morning.

K: Right. Bye.

wgh

TelCon

6:28, Feb. 28, 1973

K: Hello.

C: Henry.

K: Rollie, I have called off the dogs for tomorrow. Will you then show some patience with us when it comes around the track again.

C: Oh, yes, sure.

K: And I will get our people together to see if we can get some sanity into the procedures. Because I think on the objectives we are not in disagreement.

C: I don't suppose at all on disagreements, purely on tactics and we're saddened, not angry.

K: You're frightened. You have no reason to be.

C: No not frightened, I said saddened.

K: Oh, saddened--

C: Because they are without--

K: Now, Rollie, one other thing. We have instructed our Embassy in London to make our presentations to you tomorrow.

C: Yes, good.

K: Now, I cannot guarantee that we can turn off our Ambassador in 24 hours once he's pointed in this.

C: Oh, that's all right.

K: So, you keep in mind what I'm telling you supersedes the--

C: Yes, surely. As long as your instructions get to Brussels--

K: No, no, Brussels is taken care of.

C: And the other?

TelCon
Scotty Reston/Mr. Kissinger

6:45 pm, Feb. 28, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Henry.

K: Oh, Scotty, how are you.

R: Fine, how are you.

K: Okay.

R: I see you're recovered from your long trip.

K: Yes, I guess I'm pretty well back in shape.

R: I congratulate you. It was a marvelous trip.

K: It really was the best trip since the first one to China. I mean the China part. The Hanois are more delegate and complex situation.

R: Yeah, well, you know, it'll go on that way, it's awful complex in the South too.

K: That's right. Exactly right. Can we have lunch, breakfast or--

R: Oh sure, any time.

K: I had the impression you weren't free this week.

R: Well I've got to go to Buffalo tomorrow, and then I'll be back on Friday for Meir's lunch, and then any time.

K: You want to do it Monday. Breakfast or lunch, whichever you prefer.

R: Let's have breakfast.

K: Good, at the Metropolitan Club?

R: Right.

K: We can have breakfast and we can talk also about the interview which we still have hanging.

R: All right, fine. What time is best for you.

K: About 8:15.

2

R: 8:15 is fine.

K: Good. I forget whether you live anywhere near--how do you get down.

R: I've got a ride down.

K: You have, I would have offered to drop by.

R: Well, where are you.

K: I'm on Mass. avenue near the Mosque, Waterside drive.

R: Well, I think you'd have to hook back. I'll see you at 8:15.

K: 8:15 at the Metro Club.

R: Thank you Henry.

K: Good, bye.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority</td><td>Co. 88-3</td></tr><tr><td>By</td><td>OHARA, Cale</td><td>6/15/85</td></tr></table>

TelCon
The President/Mr. Kissinger

6:50 pm, Feb. 28, 1973

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry, anything new before I have to prepare for the Governor.

K: No. We got a long message from the NVN today which avoided the prisoners issue completely, just bitching about mining. I think they have raised enough issues on which we can give them satisfaction.

P: Uh humm. Bitching about the mining, not our decision, but--

K: No, no, bitching about the fact that we were going too slowly. which is partially true because I had told them to go slowly so, that I know, we can speed up.

P: Uh humm.

K: And, we'll give them an answer tomorrow.

P: Yeah. What is your dissipation then, that it will drag on through the weekend perhaps, or --

K: No, because we won't go to the session tomorrow if they don't do something. We've asked Bunker to ask for a meeting of the Joint Military Commission tomorrow.

P: Yeah.

K: It's bound to meet on Friday. My guess it will be settled by Friday.

P: Hummm.

K: No later than Friday.

P: Do they have to have a meeting of the Commission in order for the thing to meet.

K: They just sent over the list.

P: That's my point. Well, what--

K: I've read now the conversation between the Secretary and Singh, and the guy was trying to snooker us.

P: He was?

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 833
Date: 6/16/73
By: O.H.

K: Yeah, he said that they would all be released in 60 days, and they'll be released in four installments, but he didn't say these installments would be in 15 days.

P: Yeah.

K: So, he's just given a little twist to what he said.

P: Uh humm.

K: And that the Commission would work out the time of the installments.

P: But that was in the Protocol already wasn't it.

K: That's right. Absolutely, the Protocol said no question even the New York Times said we are right.

P: Uh humm. Well, they are just kinda horsing around, isn't that it. But Ken would have never told Rogers it would seem to me.

K: No, I know these bastards, what they would have done next is to argue that these four installments can all be in the last week.

P: Yeah, in order to keep our nose to the grindstone.

K: To keep our nose to the grindstone. That's how they would have played it.

P: Well, let us suppose, just as a contingency, that this fellow-- that they don't furnish the list and Rogers just has to stonewall at that meeting--

K: He just can't go to the meeting, and that mobilize others against the NVN.

P: It should, shouldn't it. On this issue--

K: Domestically, I think our defending the POW's cannot lose.

P: That's right. People don't give a damn about the conference. They care a great deal about the POW's.

K: And we take the position, what's the sense of endorsing an agreement that's being broken.

P: Right.

TELCON
The President/Mr. Kissinger
7:26 p.m., February 28, 1973

P: Would there be any problem as far as when you talked to Chou En-lai. He would have no objection if we recommended it to have the small bi-partisan group of Governors. I mean, in other words, just something that they naturally are tremendously interested in.

K: But I don't think we can announce it as having been agreed to.

P: Could we just say that we know a lot of them are interested and that we hope that --

K: That we'll take it up.

P: That we'll be glad to take it up.

K: That you can certainly say.

P: I'll just simply say that this is a matter we have discussed and I notice some of the Governors have expressed an interest and we will take the matter up.

K: That you can safely say.

P: Fine. All right.

K: Right, Mr. President.

wgh

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Original</td></tr><tr><td>By: J. Kissinger</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 2/27/73</td></tr></table>

TELCONE

Joe Alsop/Mr. Kissinger

8:35 p.m., February 28, 1973

K: Joe, I just remembered that I hadn't phoned you about --

A: Doesn't matter a damn. I didn't think you were coming but if you would like to come at the last minute, there's a place.

K: No, no; I can't. But I want to note that your influence with Nancy is greater than with me.

A: (laughter)

K: I told Nancy, moreover, that when you say me with another girl, you cut me dead at the party --

A: I did, yes. Quite right. (laughter) I didn't know who she was -- she was rather pretty. But I regard her as part of the core plus anyway.

K: (laughter)

A: And I'll see you on Sunday.

K: Right.

A: Very good.

K: Bye.

wgh

TELCOM

Amb. Rabin/Mr. Kissinger
11:15 p.m., February 28, 1973

- 2 -

R: And second, that nothing will be done to commit you to something which will be completely unacceptable to us.

K: Right. Right.

R: If this good, everything is agreed on.

K: Good. I think you can count on that. If there should be any problem -- I will see the President at 9:00. I'll call you --

R: I'll be there at 9:30.

K: Good. I'll call you -- If for any reason you don't hear from me, you can assume that it's in order as we discussed.

R: I think it will be better --

K: Well, you see, if I'm in the President's office, it will be hard for me --

R: I know.

K: But I will do my utmost to call you.

R: And I'll be at --

K: At Blair House. Good, see you in the morning.

R: Basically this another thing where ... will be done in according to what we have talked about.

K: Right, the only victim of this arrangement will be I but don't let that worry you.

R: I'm sure you will find a way how to bail out.

K: (laughter)

R: Down a later stage at least.

K: Somebody will catch up with me sometime.

R: I think basically --

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:30 p.m., February 28, 1973

K: Mr. President.

P: Oh, hi, Henry.

K: Just wanted you to know we've won.

P: Oh, really!

K: Yep.

P: That's great. Tell me about it!

K: Well, they -- we called Bunker and told him to demand a meeting of the Four Party Commission. They hadn't scheduled it until Friday. They wanted to have an initialling of the -- In Paris they wanted to have an initialling of the Treaty tomorrow afternoon and Rogers called us and wept all over us that this would be awful if we didn't.

P: Bullshit!

K: That's what I said, that your orders were explicit; that you had personally issued them.

P: That's right.

K: And that you --

P: Well, does he really think that we could sign the treaty with having this thing on -- nobody could do that.

K: Well, he was so focussed on his Conference that he forgot the other game. Well, we then called Bunker -- Bunker insisted on a meeting. They held the meeting and their spokesman said the way is now clear to continue the releases, we will not demand anything difficult from the United States side and it's as good as done.

P: Say, you think that -- But he didn't give the names yet?

K: No but -- Well, this was at the beginning of the meeting and the meeting isn't concluded yet. The meeting just started about 15 minutes ago.

P: Yeah.

TELCOM

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:30 p.m., February 28, 1973

- 2 -

K: But when they go into the meeting and said the way is now clear to continue the releases, all is ready to continue the releases he said.

P: Yeah. Great.

K: And all the news tickers say --

P: Oh, how did this get out? Did Bunker put it out?

K: No, Saigon -- the North Vietnamese fellow entering the meeting.

P: Oh, he said that.

K: He said it on the way in.

P: Oh-h-h, great. So what are the news tickers saying, Henry?

K: They say -- North Vietnam said today that the way is clear now to resume releases of U.S. prisoners of war. That's the lead on --

P: Yeah.

K: AP. Reuter says the Chief Delegates -- The North Vietnamese spokesman said at last all is ready to continue the releases.

P: (laughter)

K: And the spokesman was asked whether General Hoa carried into the meeting a list of the next group of 120 Americans to be freed. We will tell you later today, the Colonel said. Well, that's a sure tip off. The fact that they agreed to a meeting. They also told us in Paris they wanted us to have a discussion on the Economic Commission and Sullivan called in and asked what he should do and I said tell them we are not prepared to discuss it until the POWs are released. So they told him it would be settled by Noon tomorrow, Paris time.

P: Good, good.

K: So I think it's 99% done.

P: Um-humm.

K: And if we had been anything other than --

P: We wouldn't have had it.

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:30 p.m., February 28, 1973

- 3 -

K: Never! They would have fiddled us along.

P: Henry, you can be sure they were going to keep those people hostage. What have they done up to date? That's the thing that Bill and the rest have got to realize. They've been screwing us all the time. Now, they'r not going to do a thing and we'll continue to drag our feet in those mines too.

K: Mr. President, if we had let them drag -- If we had accepted what they said this morning, that they would do it within the 60 days but in four stages, they would have had the four stages all in the last three days.

P: Um-humm.

K: Now, your statement which forced them -- when you said this morning it was within 15 days --

P: Yeah, well, you put that in (laughter).

K: No, but that --

P: That's right, that's right.

K: And your directing Rogers not to return, that did it.

P: That's the point. But, you know, really for us to -- Believe me, we're not going to give them one thing if they renege on one part of this deal. Now, you know what I mean. This idea of going ahead -- What the hell do we care about the Agreement. What the Christ do we care? Nothing.

K: Mr. President, at the end of March when our prisoners are out, then we are in great shape.

P: That's right.

K: And they thought they could diddle us along and get a little public outcry started, focus it on Thieu.

P: On Thieu. They were trying to do him in, Henry.

K: That's right.

P: That's it.

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:30 p.m., February 28, 1973

- 4 -

K: And we just reacted very toughly. We sailed the whole mine sweeping fleet away. We didn't just have it inactive.

P: (laughter)

K: We moved it a hundred miles off shore.

P: That's the stuff! And don't think they didn't notice that.

K: Oh-h-h. They don't usually cave unless you kick them in the groin.

P: Well, I'm delighted. You know, we just have to, as we say, through all the East keep our balance and --

K: You said it this morning when the outcome wasn't clear.

P: Yeah, yeah. You know, we've just got to do that. Now do you still think that I should wait till Monday for my news ..

K: Well, I don't know, Mr. President, whether you mightn't want to do it Friday if this thing comes off in a clear cut way.

P: Um-humm. In other words, right on top of it, huh?

K: Why not?

P: Could be.

K: I mean, you'll have brought off another one. It's not as big as the January one but still they tested you, you took charge and kept on course. What are the nitpickers going to say now?

P: Well, course I could say -- yeah.

K: Well, let's see what was agreed to.

P: Yeah. Well, we'll see. We'll see.

K: By Monday, the thing will certainly be done.

P: Be done by then. The only thing is, you do it Friday -- yourpoint is that it's the bigger news and we might as well hit it while it's hot.

K: Well, if they gave us the names of the prisoners tomorrow, I'll be half inclined to do it tomorrow. You'd rather do it Friday?

The President/Mr. Kissinger

11:30 p.m., February 28, 1973

- 5 -

P: Yeah, I see your point. And they just walk out there -- Because you see another thing too, Henry, as you realize some of our critics have got out on a limb again. You notice that this morning the *Times* and the rest this Sylvan Fox had these stories saying this thing is all going to hell. Have you noticed?

K: Exactly.

P: Didn't you have that sense of ____ that they were trying to --

K: Oh, yeah, they were trying to gin something up again.

P: Um-humm. Well, good. What time do we meet tomorrow?

K: At 11:00, and I have worked something out with her and the Ambassador, which I think you might consider, and it also would have the support of the equipment side of the Defense and State Department, who have come in with an independent recommendation very similar to it.

P: Right, right, fine. Why don't we move that time up to 10:30? What do you think? Don't you think we need a little more time with her than just an hour and a half.

K: Oh, I think you can do it in an hour and a half.

P: I think you're right too. It's all in English, that's right.

K: Right.

P: And also the point is, I'm going to get her in the right channel. She's not going to just sit there -- you're going to talk about this damn thing and she knows.

K: Oh, yes, she'll be all right. I think -- it took some doing but I think she's --

P: Okay.

K: Right, Mr. President.

P: I'm glad to hear this thing.

K: Well, congratulations.

wgh

telcon

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

11:35 p.m., February 28, 1973

K: Ron, it looks as if our little yellow darlings have caved.

Z: Oh, you're kidding.

K: No.

Z: Oh, that's wonderful.

K: When you play with your friends here, it usually turns out all right.

Z: Gee, that's great.

K: I called Bunker and told him to demand a meeting of the Four Power Commission. They said Friday. I said the hell with it and drop discussions on the Economic Commission too so they agreed to meet at 11:00, which is now. But on the way in they said everything is now ready for releases. So I'm sure that it's going to be done.

Z: That's perfect, isn't it?

K: So what you said is standing up very well.

Z: Yes, it sure is. I think it's going to work.

K: Oh, yeah. They just didn't have the cards this time.

Z:q: Yeah.

K: A year from now when I'm out of here, they're really going to put it to us. Not for that reason but a year from now, they're going to be tigers but now they're not ready.

Z: Well, if this works Kissinger --

K: Oh, no, this is going to work. This I was positive on. Maybe not today but -- It will work tonight I'm sure.

Z: You think so?

K: Oh, yeah. By this time tomorrow, it will be all done.

Z: If it is, it's a good piece of work.

K: Well, Ziegler, you played your invaluable role. Really, your briefing today was -- met even with my approval, and that's almost impossible.