Telcon - San Clemente

April 6, 1973 - 10:15 a.m.

George Sherman

**Sherman:** The first thing I want to ask you is how you feel about having all these new deputy Assistants to the President, swarming around under you.

**HAK:** I'm telling you, they are cutting me off. Of course, what you people don't realize, I won't have any ordinary staff members left. I am giving them all titles.

**Sherman:** That's just what I got finished telling Kraslow in Washington. Well, I think its splendid for them. Just think of all the new recruits you'll be able to attract.

**HAK:** Look how insuffrable they are going to be. All I want to make clear is that it will not change one iota their mistratement by me.

**Sherman:** By you and by everyone else.

**HAK:** So don't get any wrong ideas.

**Sherman:** Just so long as they don't.

**HAK:** No, I've been divided for four years, and I don't think they can form a coalition. They are just the Cambodian so-called loyalists.

**Sherman:** Are you going to see less of Sonnenfeldt?

**HAK:** But that's for the sake of my sanity.

**Sherman:** That's funny. That's just what he told me.

**HAK:** Well, he's damned able. Actually, Hal and I are good firends, quite seriously.

**Sherman:** Well, you'd have to be, after working so closely together, I don't see how you could have survived otherwise.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12957

D: XARA Dac: 6/13/91

R 2

**HAK:** Actually, we'll work closely together in his new job.

**Sherman:** Yes, as I would surmise from the announcement he's sort of going to be the liaison between you and Shultz, is that more or less accurate?

**HAK:** Especially as far as East-West trade is concerned.

**Sherman:** I suppose you'll have to get into this most-favored nation stuff with the Russians?

**HAK:** Oh yes, no question about it.

**Sherman:** Have you set up a time for us?

**HAK:** How about having a drink? this afternoon?

**Sherman:** OK. XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

**HAK:** You want to come to my house around 5:30?

**Sherman:** OK. What do we do? Just go through the gait at the compound?

**HAK:** You know Cypress Shores? You know where you go into the compound, the Coast Guard Station, as you turn off into that road, there is another one that leads into that housing area. That's where I am. You have to push the buttons that control the guard. The buttons are 3467. Go to the last street, turn right and it's the last house on the left. If you get lost, you go to the compound and call me. Now, all I can offer you is sherry. Can you guys survive on that?

**Sherman:** We might bring out own. You're not going to the baseball game with the President?

**HAK:** No.

**Sherman:** Would that interfere with our going? My only problem is that when he gets out into the open in crowds these days.

**HAK:** Well, check with Ron and if it ...

**Sherman:** I mean we could just go privately in our car afterwards. I mean Pete and I.

B: MRA DEC 01 1961

**DECLASSIFIED**

**HAK:** E012955

Telcon - San Clemente
April 6, 1973 - 10:20 a.m.
Ron Ziegler - HAK

Ziegler: Hi, HAK, we're going to go with the announcement.

HAK: They seem already to have it. George Sherman called me about it.

Ziegler: Oh, I gave it to him earlier because they're PM papers.
So it gets in the Star today. What questions did he have?

HAK: I told him I'd see him and Lisagore for a drink, if you want to
join us, you're welcome.

Ziegler: When are you going to do it?

HAK: At about 5:00 at my house.

Ziegler: You are going to do it off the record, aren't you?

HAK: Oh yes. Are you coming?

Ziegler: I might, if I don't get wrapped up in the tennis match.
That's nice of you to ask.

HAK: What time is the President going to the baseball game.

Ziegler: He leaves at about 7:00. Are you going to go with him.

HAK: No. Because they wanted to know and I want to know when I can
get rid of them.

Ziegler: The bus leaves here at 6:30 for . . so you can wrap it up at 6:00
with them.

HAK: And that will have to be at the compound at 6:30.

Ziegler: Well, they have to be back at the Surf and Sands at 6:30.
You want me to announce Haig tomorrow?

HAK: Yes.

Ziegler: Can I leak that to the Post?

HAK: Why would you leak it to the Post.

Ziegler: Because Carol Kilpatrick is a good guy.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: EO12625

D: ARA Date 04/13/01

2

HAK: OK.

Ziegler: I won't do it until late this afternoon.

HAK: Do it late this afternoon.

Ziegler: What twist do you want to put on it?

HKXX

HAK: Well, he's just going out to look the situation over and make a report to the President and me. Did you see that son-of-bitch Scali popped off again? I just hope no one here thinks that if it starts off again I'm going to be taking it this time. You know, I don't consider it a reflection on me but he is such a stupid bastard. The President doesn't have to do every detail to get the credit. And no one in his right mind can believe that.

Ziegler: Well, he's not... there's not much __?__ to be put on that

HAK: The only thing that it bothers is that people think its a crack at me. In terms of who gets credit, that's irrelevant.

Ziegler: I don't think people feel that way.

HAK: Well, not now but they did in the . . .

Ziegler: The initial one they did.

HAK: OK, Good Ron.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12295
By: JVA NARA Data 01/14/01

Telcon - San Clemente

April 6, 1973 - 10:25

KXXV-NEWX - HAK - Hestenas

**Hestenas:** Good morning, this is Arnie Hestenas, the Last of the Vikings. Thanks for calling back, I know you are pretty busy and Norway is a little country but I want so much if it would be possible for me to see you for ten minutes. Any time it would suit you. Tomorrow or Monday or . . .

**HAK:** Well, Monday I'll be back in Washington. What exactly do you want to discuss?

**Hestenas:** I just wanted to get a little glimpse of Mr. Kissinger and the work you are doing and two or three political questions. I have more on the cultural side . . .

**HAK:** Because quite frankly my experiences with European journalists have been disastrous. Its not because Norway is a little country because actually I like Norway very very much. I have good friends there and to say its my favorite Scandinavian country is not a compliment in this Administration.

**Hestenas:** I have just a little letter here - it takes one second to read it, in the name of our Foreing Minister. And he says: "It's a great pleasure for me to introduce Mr. Arnie Hestenas, Cultural Editor of the Daily Tag (?), one of the biggest weekly evening papers, Norwegian evening papers. Mr. Hestenas is a distinguished Norwegian fax journalist, specializing in the fields of film, theater and also other cultural activities and he is also a successful author. He has been awarded the prize for outstanding journalism, the Norwegian Pulitzer Prize as well as the prize for journalism awarded by the Norwegian Federation of Industries. Mr. Hestenas is also known for his TV and radio programs and for his performances on the stage as an entertainer. Mr. Hestenas is now on a tour of the United States and the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs would be grateful for any assistance during his stay in the United States. ????"

**HAK:** But that doesn't necessarily mean. . . You know, I really last year pretty well decided that there is almost nothing to gain for us and a lot to lose by seeing European journalists, because they are not restrained by anything after they leave me. And the more sensational they can make it sound, the better it is for them. And my denials never catch up with it.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295

BY NARA Doc. No. 6/13/73

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
By: ARA Dic: 6/13/01

**Hestenas:** Yes, but that is not this case. ????

**HAK:** Look, out here it's going to be impossible, because I am working on the Annual Report. We are putting out an Annual Report on Foreign Policy for the President. And if I don't get some uninterrupted time out here it will never get done. Now, if you are coming to Washington next week I will try to see you for ten minutes if it is understood it will not be an interview for quotation. I mean if you want to come into my office and then write your impressions of what sort of a person I am, I can take my chances on that. But I cannot give an interview for quotation.

**Hestenas:** I really will appreciate it. And also if you run into Liv Ullman she is a very, very good friend of mine.

**HAK:** Well I may see her tomorrow, and if I do, I'll ask her about you. Call me on Monday morning. Are you going back with the press.

**Hestenas:** No, I'm going for one day to Las Vegas and then I go to New York for 4 or 5 days because I'm writing about theater and so on.

**HAK:** So you won't be in Washington on Monday.

**Hestenas:** Would it be possible for me to see you for five minutes tomorrow. or if you come to LA?

**HAK:** No, if I come to LA it would be late in the day.

**Hestenas:** I could wait for you.

**HAK:** If I come up it will be too late for social reasons and I don't want to have to worry about an interview or about meeting anyone. If you wanted to come to my office in Washington for five or ten minutes, if you are there, when are you going to be in Washington?

**Hestenas:** Well, I'm going to New York Tuesday or Wednesday but I will come to Washington for you.

**HAK:** It's almost not worth your while because I couldn't spend more than 10, 15 minutes.

**Hestenas:** That I realize. And that's the reason for asking you.

**HAK:** That's the reason for asking me what?

**Hestenas:** That I was daring to take up your time.

**HAK:** Call the White House. I had suggested Monday because on the

3

day I come back my schedule usually hasn't filled up yet as much as it will during the week. But that's not all that essential. You won't be in San Clemente tomorrow? Now you would have to drive an hour and a half for ten minutes - that isn't worth it.

**Hestenas:** That is absolutely worth it, absolutely. That's no problem.

**HAK:** Well, look, let me call you around, either at the end of the day or early in the morning, to see whether I am free.

**Hestenas:** There is no problem.

**HAK:** Maybe at the end of the morning tomorrow. But you'd have to understand its 15 minutes and its not for quotation.

**Hestenas:** OK, then I will wait for your call.

**HAK:** OK, and if you have to leave, you call me..

**Hestenas:** Can I expect a call today or tomorrow morning.

**HAK:** Well, I don't know, either today or first thing in the morning.

**Hestenas:** OK, thanks.

DECLASSIFIED

Authoritär E01295

By: SARA Dae 6/12/01

Telcon - San Clemente

April 6, 1973 - 11:02 a.m.

Amb. Dinitz - HAK

Amb. D: Dr. Kissinger, how are you?

HAK: OK, we are going to make a formal communication to you about that Sadat interview, you know about substantive exchanges in which we say they did not take place. But you of course and the Ambassador are familiar with what really did take place. And just make sure that that stays in separate channels in Israel.

Dinitz: Sure. I understand.

HAK: I just wanted you to be informed of that.

Dinitz: Yes, a communication will be coming from State.

HAK: Yes, but you see, you know more than the people who are making the communication.

Dinitz: Yes, I understand. I appreciate you calling. And I'll see you some time when you come back.

HAK: I'll be back next week and any time.

Dinitz: Wonderful.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO12951
By: XARA Date: 6/17/19

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Mrs. Mosbacher/Kissinger

4/6/73 - 11:55 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Hello Henry, how are you?

K: OK, Pat, how are you?

M: I'm very, very well. I've organized every ballroom in New York for the last two weeks in May for Project HOPE.

K: Good, I can't give you a date until I get back.

M: When will that be, Henry?

K: Next week. By the middle of next week.

M: Pardon me by the middle?

K: Yeh.

M: You see because I will be in Washington all next week.

K: Well then let's talk to each other while you're in Washington.

M: OK. OK. Because it's getting a little close for us and I know the pressure is harder on you but . . . No chance for you to go to the hockey game on Sunday night. The Rangers have never been better.

K: No, they played what?

M: They won the two Boston games.

K: Have they won the second one too?

M: Yes, and the center for Boston is out. I can't remember - what's his name?

K: Esposito? Oh, really did they win yesterday.

M: They won last night. Yeh, so tomorrow night and Sunday night they're playing in New York.

K: Oh, gosh I wish I could go. The hell with you but a hockey game. Well, maybe before the playoffs.

M: We'll save all the playoff tickets as long as the Rangers are in it. You know hoping that you can come up.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12950
By: XARA Date: 6/13/73

TELCONE (San Clemente)

Mrs. Mosbacher/Kissinger

4/6/73 - 11:55 a.m.

K: Hello.

M: Hello Henry, how are you?

K: OK, Pat, how are you?

M: When will that be, Henry?

M: Pardon me by the middle?

K: Yeh.

K: No, they played what?

M: We'll save all the playoff tickets as long as the Rangers are in it. You know, hoping that you can come up.

2

K: I would love it. Maybe I'll come up during the week. I've done it once before.

M: Right. Right. Right. Great Henry, I hate to push you on this.

K: You're not pushing me.

M: But I know you understand.

K: No, no I understand the problem. We could slip it into the first week of June if necessary.

M: If necessary, yes. Like on Tuesday the fourth would be good - or the 5th but beyond that I think we run into graduations.

K: OK.

M: Should I call you say Wednesday?

K: That would be great.

M: OK, Henry, much love. I read that you were thinner.

K: Where did you read it?

M: I read it in the Los Angeles Times.

K: That's true, I'm so flattered. Where did they say that, I want to frame it.

M: (Laughs) No, I did read it. It said you were much thinner. Isn't that wonderful. I hope it wasn't over Liv Ullmann.

K: (Laughs)

M: No comment, uh?

K: Oh, God, you're all so jealous.

M: Absolutely. Well, I miss you dear and I'll sit in front of the White House steps until I see you.

K: See you next week.

Telcon - San Clemente

April 6, 1973 - 12:37

Amb. Dobrynin-HAK

<u>Dobrynin:</u> Hello, Henry, how are you?

<u>HAK:</u> I am doing fine.

<u>Dobrynin:</u> I'm sure you are doing fine. How long are you going to stay there?

<u>HAK:</u> I'll be back Monday. Three things. One, Semyenov keeps making these long speeches in Geneva and that keeps generating a lot of activity here and I wonder whether until you and I have had a chance to talk we couldn't slow him down a little bit.

<u>Dobryhnin:</u> You see, I received all the telegrams but last one - last one I guess was yesterday but I am receiving them regularly and you remember you asked this question but I didn't want to bother you back because you were already in California. I read his telegram dealing with this particular question, when they have a meeting, two of them, together. And it was quite a discussion from both ways, in connection with the summit.

Johnson was doing what Mr. Semyenov was writing to Moscow that he was interesting but he, let me put it this way, it is a long telegram, but he said that he had an attraction to it but because of the importance to press because of the importance within it one or two months we have to come to an agreement.

<u>HAK:</u> Johnson said that?

<u>Dobrynin:</u> Along those lines as it was...

<u>HAK:</u> It's inconceivable.

<u>Dobrynin:</u> But the differences between them that Semyenov was rather saying let's find it this time and leave it to agreements sort of zzzzz you maybe egging you to find out within one or two months and the Johnson position was no I have instructions to press as full as possible agreement and not to divert attention to some separate agreement on separate questions. So that was the basic differences as Mr. Semyenov discussed summed up discussions with him. It was not on the plenary session.

<u>HAK:</u> Johnson has no such instructions.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012958
By: MWAPAS D3404

**Dobrynin:** Well, he said it twice. It was in two telegrams saying that you said that well we had to do as full as possible and not to go...

**HAK:** Oh no, as full as possible, those are his instructions but he has no instructions to raise the summit.

**Dobrynin:** Oh no. In this connection, he didn't press this specifically. But he put it within these two months ?? ??? use the word summit but the timing which he has given which is by Semenyov he looks at this implication about the summit. He didn't use the word summit - no. Johnson did not use the word summit. But he (Change of Tape)

**HAK:** ... proposal to you.

**Dobrynin:** OK, So I will then just - you think its useful just to send a telegram saying that they play down this discussion.

**HAK:** He's made a very long statement now and let him not go beyond that now.

**Dobrynin:** Yesterday they made...

**HAK:** Semenyov - I think two or three days ago.

**Dobrynin:** Maybe yesterday. The latest I have which was on the third.

**HAK:** Yes, that's the one.

**Dobrynin:** But its official rather? a meeting but then by then he said? talks with Mr. Johnson it was a very detailed and long on which I am referring now. So they continue to do so. OK. Well, I will put it...

**HAK:** Yes, but he shouldn't make ... he should stop talking about the summit - that would be the most important thing.

**Dobrynin:** OK, I will do it. And you will give it around two weeks.

**HAK:** OK. Now, let me see. You never sent me that other paper on the Jewish question.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012058
By: N.N. Patsy Sae 00304

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MW BAPAS DE

ix 3

**Dobrynin:** Well, but you said when you come back.

**HAK:** OK, fine.

**Dobrynin:** I could give it today to Kennedy if you like but the question is it worthwhile . . .

**HAK:** No, give it to me when we come back. And then we can plan exactly what to do.

**Dobrynin:** When do you prefer.

**HAK:** Monday or Tuesday.

**Dobrynin:** Will you will give me a call?

**HAK:** I'll give you a call tomorrow morning. Now the third thing you still haven't got a date proposal. &

**Dobrynin:** Yes, we do not. As I said both Brezhnev and Gromyko are puzzled by the latest draft you gave them. So that particular draft I didn't receive any telegram from them at all. So I am just enjoying quiet within these three days. Not a single one did I receive.

**HAK:** Because the President is a little puzzled by first, you've made the rather urgent proposal at the meeting and then we get no reply to what's after all a fairly simple technical matter.

**Dobrynin:** When I give you the last time answer it was a I received from Moscow say just tell you it will be very soon for - during the last three days I didn't have anything.

**HAK:** I mean we're in no particular hurry. We don't even mind shifting it if you want to do that.

**Dobrynin:** I understand. I hope I will have it one way or another but then if you like me to mention to them the possibility of __?__ I will send it to.

**HAK:** Well, it's up to you. I mean you made the proposal, we have no reason to propose shifting it. And we are prepared to continue - if it keeps going very much longer than we have to consider where we stand. But right now another week is not a decisive matter.

**Dobrynin:** Well, I think this is exactly the point. So I don't think we should as yet talk about it.

HAK: So I don't think we should talk about it.

**Dobrynin:** So as of the time being this is were it stands. They owe you answer. On this I am too standing. I will just mentione to them that the President and you are expecting the answer. They should understand. For me it would be a matter to make this proposals involves shifting or no shifting because they know the situation and they have to make. . . I think they will come and say .yes. ??? But I don't know what ??? they give them. I am just using jokingly that this proposal was three ways and complete silence. What is going to be done, I don't know yet, but this is . . .

HAK: Well, they are probably in the causes.

**Dobrynin:** No, they don't like to go this time of year to their caucuses.

HAK: No, they probably think it all settled and they are going to accept it.

**Dobrynin:** Well, this is my impression. So maybe they are trying to find the nicest way to accept it. Not all of them but part of it. But I am sure that next week . . .

HAK: But, you know you told them with what attitude we are going to go at it.

**Dobrynin:** No, I mentioned it. Otherwise it was really definitely a step back to the 6 months which you discussed.

HAK: Oh no, no.

**Dobrynin:** Because I looked at the text of the declaration. You managed to put it in article I. You put it the same in article II. Then you put it even in Part III I guess. Not to speak about the preamble. So it's rather many things to do.

HAK: Well, let's see what they are coming back with.

**Dobrynin:** That's why I'm keeping quiet. Let them look it over and then. . .

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
E012004
By: W.W.ага

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01265
By: WW
Date 10/20/80

**HAK:** I read somewhere that you are being recalled.

**Dobrynin:** There is something in UPI. Well? minister is going on...

**HAK:** I hope we get some advance warning because I - so that we can leave together.

**Dobrynin:** Well, in this particular story it goes after the visit. So in this case there is nothing to fear - both of us.

**HAK:** Well, I'm torn, because on the one hand I would like you to have an even wider field of activity. On the other, you are almost ireplacable, here in Washington.

**Dobrynin:** I have, by the way, information about the talks with Madame Binh in Moscow. She was in Moscow for about a week. She met with Brezhnev, with some others so I received information but I there are things I don't want to tell by telephone. But when you get back.

**HAK:** Well, we will get together on Monday or no later than Tuesday.

**Dobrynin:** Well, you name the day and its quite alright with me.

**HAK:** Good, maybe breakfast on Tuesday.

**Dobrynin:** I have to look - I have my best friend, the Romanian Ambassador.

**HAK:** You have breakfast with him?

**Dobrynin:** Yes, he invite me. Well, we will organize something. Well, let's do it Tuesday, how about lunch.

**HAK:** No, lunch I don't think I can do on Tuesday. But let me see what I have.

**Dobrynin:** Maybe on Monday. Or I will try to switch it - then we'll have lunch all right.

**HAK:** No, I could do breakfast on Tuesday.

**Dobrynin:** What time?

**HAK:** Oh, about 8:15

**Dobrynin:** Make it then 8:30

6

HAK: 8:30 for breakfast.

Dobrynin: Yes, I think this will be all right. So I will drop in to you.

HAK: To the MAP Room.

Dobrynin: Map Room, 8:30, Tuesday. I will be there and you will have at least an hour I guess.

HAK: Oh, I have an hour and a half. I'll be back on Monday. I'll probably talk to you on the telephone.

DECLASSIFIED

10/26/70
10:00AM

Telcon - San Clemente

April 6, 1973 - 12:37

Amb. Dobrynin-HAK

**Dobrynin:** Hello, Henry, how are you?

**HAK:** I am doing fine.

**Dobrynin:** I'm sure you are doing fine. How long are you going to stay there?

**HAK:** I'll be back Monday. Three things. One, Semyenov keeps making these long speeches in Geneva and that keeps generating a lot of activity here and I wonder whether until you and I have had a chance to talk we couldn't slow him down a little bit.

**Dobrynin:** You see, I received all the telegrams but last one - last one I guess was yesterday but I am receiving them regularly and you remember you asked this question but I didn't want to bother you back because you were already in California. I read his telegram dealing with this particular question, when they have a meeting, two of them, together. And it was quite a discussion from both ways, in connection with the summit.

Johnson was doing what Mr. Semyenov was writing to Moscow that he was interesting but he, let me put it this way, it is a long telegram, but he said that he had an attraction but ~~but he had to be a foreign correspondent~~ to press because of the importance within it one or two months we have to come to an agreement.

**HAK:** Johnson said that?

**Dobrynin:** Along those lines as it was...

**HAK:** It's inconceivable.

**Dobrynin:** But the differences between them that Semyenov was rather saying let's find it this time and leave it to agreements sort of ~~zzz~~ maybe egging you to find out within one or two months and the Johnson to position was no I have instructions to press as full as possible agreement and not to divert attention to some separate agreement on separate questions. So that ~~was~~ the basic differences as Mr. Semyenov ~~summed up~~ discussions with him. It was not on the plenary session.

**HAK:** Johnson has no such instructions.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO12554
By: NARA Doc. 6/17/73

*

**HAK:** _______________ Oh no, as full as possible, those are his instructions but he has no instructions to raise the summit.

**Dobrynin:** Oh no. In this connection, he didn't press this specifically. But he put it within these two months ???? use the word summit but the timing which he has given which is by Semenyov he looks at this implication about the summit. He didn't use the word summit - no. Johnson did not use the word summit. But he (Change of Tape)

**HAK:** ... proposal to you.

**HAK:** Yes, that's the one.

**Dobrynin:** OK, Yes, that's right. But ??? its official rather ? a meeting but then by then he said ? talks with Mr. Johnson it was a very detailed and long on which I am referring now. So they continue to do so. OK. Well, I will put it...

DECLASSIFIED

Author E01295C

Date 6/12/69

By JRA

ix 3

**HAK:** OK, fine.

**Dobrynin:** I could give it today to Kennedy if you like but the question is if it worthwhile...

**HAK:** Monday or Tuesday.

**Dobrynin:** Will you make me a call?

**Dobrynin:** Yes, we do not. As I said both Breshnev and Gromyko are puzzled by the latest draft you gave them. So that particular draft I didn't receive any telegram from them at all. So I am just enjoying quiet within these three days. Not a single one did I receive.

**Dobrynin:** I understand. I hope I will have it one way or another but then if you like me to mention to them the possibility of ______ I will send it to.

DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
E012557
By: NARA Doc. 9/1/67

KING OF KINGS

**HAK:** So I don't think we should talk about it.

**Dobrynin:** So as of the time being this is were it stands. They owe you answer. On this I am too standing. I will just mentione to them that the President and you are expecting the answer. They should understand. For me it would be a matter to make this proposals involves shifting or no shifting because they know the situation and they have to make. . . I think they will come and say .yes. ? ? ? But I don't know what ? ? ? they give them. I am just using jokingly that this proposal was three ways and complete silence. What is going to be done, I don't know yet, but this is . . .

**HAK:** Well, they are probably in the causes.

**HAK:** No, they probably think it all settled and they are going to accept it.

**HAK:** But, you know you told them with what attitude we are going to go at it.

**HAK:** Oh no, no.

**Dobrynin:** Because I looked at the text of the declaration. You managed to put it ask in article I. You put it the same in article II. Then you put it even in *Article III* I guess. Not to speak about the preamble. So it's rather many things to do.

**HAK:** Well, let's see what they are coming back with.

DECLASSIFIED
Authentic
EO 1295F
Dated: 6/13/97
By: XARA

5

**Dobrynin:** Well, you name the day and it's quite alright with me.

**Dobrynin:** What time?

**HAK:** Oh, about 8:15

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
E012553
By: NARA DEPT. 9 FEB 1967

Telcon - San Clemente

April 7, 1973 - 10:17 a.m.

Ehrlichman - HAK

HAK: John, I didn't know you were at the ? Spa. That's what I need.

Ehrlichman: Oh, yes, that's a great place.

HAK: Do you actually lose weight down there.

Ehrlichman: I think so, a little bit. At least it makes me feel better.
We'll get you down there next time. XXXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX. It's a great spa, have you ever been in it?

HAK: I've visited it, but I've never been. . . taken the treatment.

Ehrlichman: No, we don't sign up for the regimen because it's an all day thing. But they have very good facilities and very good masseurs. XXXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX.

HAK: Is your wife there with you.

Ehrlichman: No.

HAK: I have been bugged for months and I've never raised it with you by a fellow who wants to be considered for the FBI head. His name is Don Brennan. He is an executive at the Hudson Institute and he has no known qualification except you know he's a scientist and I think reasonably well of him as a scientist. I'm not recommending him. But if you had any interest in him you might take a look at him.

Ehrlichman: I tell you what you ought to do in order that he knows you followed through - why don't you ask him for a resume. Just have your office call and ask for a resume.

HAK: And tell him to send it to you. Why don't I do that. Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Autobiography EO 1295
D: 17 MARA Dated: 6/16/97

Telcon - San Clemente

April 7, 1973 - Joe Sisco/HAK

11:00 a.m.

Sisco: Hello, Henry, how are you?

HAK: OK, Joe, I've been reading some of Green's cables.

Sisco: The one that came in yesterday afternoon.

HAK: Yes, What the hell does Green think he is doing?

Sisco: I don't know. This is the one reporting on the . . .

HAK: First of all, the things I allegedly said are so insane that is it conceivable to you that I said to anyone they have to wear the uniforms of hotel employees?

Sisco: No, I don't know where the hell they got that.

HAK: And secondly, is it conceivable to Green that whatever I do do I do on my own?

Sisco: I don't see how, frankly.

HAK: To me, these look like trouble-making cables. WXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

Sisco: Well, I don't think so. I think he reported as given but I really don't know because . . .

HAK: Well, I don't give much of a damn. He can keep on his merry way.

Sisco: There's no way for me to know really. What do you think we ought to send out if anything?

HAK: Not a thing. I think you and I can have a talk.

Sisco: Are you going to be back next week.

HAK: I'll be in XXX on Monday. I'd like to have a talk with you and then get your advice on what to send out.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295C

D: 12 MARA Date 04/12/73

2

**Sisco:** And then Ken Rush and I are going to be going out to a Chief of Mission meeting and he will be there so that whatever guidance you have, why we'll just go ahead and...

**HAK:** I'll discuss it with Ken. That's the best way to handle it.

**Sisco:** Well, I'd obviously like to discuss it with you as well. I think maybe the three of us might sit down.

**HAK:** Good. But on the face what was reported to him was so absurd - I mean why would there be a third meeting if this is what I told them.

SISCO

**Sisco:** Do you know _________ that he talked to?

**HAK:** No.

**Sisco:** Well, he is the head of their intelligence arm. And I didn't know what to make of it quite frankly.

**HAK:** Well, I'll discuss it with you next week.

**Sisco:** Well, I'd like to see you in any event as to where we go from here.

**HAK:** If you could keep things calm in the meantime.

**Sisco:** You mean in the area.

**HAK:** Well, in the area and in your building because you can rest assured that nothing I do is done without Presidential approval.

**Sisco:** I've assumed that all the way along for four, years.

**HAK:** It wasn't always clear to everyone else. Are you free for breakfast on
monday?

**Sisco:** Absolutely.

**HAK:** Why don't you come by around 8:30. Just between you and me.

**Sisco:** All right, let's leave it at that. 8:30.

**HAK:** Can we do that?

**Sisco:** We certainly can - we've done it twice in the last month.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 12950

D: 12 MAR 1991

Telcon - San Clemente

April 7, 1973 - 11:05 a.m.

Ziegler - HAK

Ziegler: I said the President and Kissinger went to the airport wanted Haig to go to take a first-hand look at the situation there as we continue to assess developments, OK.

HAK: That's fine.

Ziegler: I said we have ongoing concern. I said everyone in this room knows, we know that there are ongoing violations of the Paris Agreement and that there is extensive military activity in Cambodia. Al is going to look at the whole situation in Southeast Asia from a military, economic and political standpoint - to give a first hand reassessment to the President and Dr. Kissinger. OK.

HAK: Excellent

Ziegler: Then they said well why won't they see leaders in South Vietnam? I said because they won't be there and they just met with ...

HAK: But he is going to South Vietnam.

Ziegler: Yes, I said he's going to be with American people but Thieu won't be there. Then they said will he go to Hanoi. I said a flat no. Will we reintroduce ground forces? And I picked up your line you know, just having withdrawn after 10 years we have no plans to reintroduce US ground forces into Southeast Asia.

HAK: You know, you're a pain in the neck but your a good briefer.

Ziegler: I'm more than a briefer, I'm a broad policy man.

HAK: Well, you've done a great job Ron.

Ziegler: Is Haig here yet.

HAK: Yes, he is here. I haven't seen him yet. Because now that he's a four star general I've got to let him cool his heels.

Ziegler: They asked whether or not we were in touch with any of the communist groups in Cambodia. I said to my knowledge we were not.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized

X MARA DCC: 6/13/97

2

Is that OK?

HAK: Well, that's technically true, but don't make it quite that hard.

Ziegler: Well, I said to my knowledge.

HAK: That's all right. We're not really, but we're trying to be.

Ziegler: Then they said was Dix Sihanouk? And I said no.

HAK: That's correct.

Ziegler: And I winged that one but I remembered what you had told me that we..

HAK: No, no, that was correct.

Ziegler: Then they said is Haig going there to talk to them about a coalition government between Lon Nol and the various enemy factions. And I said I certainly wouldn't speculate along that line if I were you.

HAK: That was well done.

Ziegler: It wouldn't have been wrong to suggest that, would it have? I mean is he going to do that?

HAK: No, he's not. You did the right thing.

Ziegler: But I said I wouldn't speculate along that line.

HAK: Good, Ron, I think it came out well. You know they are just looking to make it look like a failure. I didn't think that Lisagore and Sherman were actively nasty about it.

Ziegler: One guy in a question said he was going to see how we can break the blockade of Phnom Penh. I said first of all, I wouldn't accept your premise. There'd be a question whether there is a blockade situation when in fact there is almost is.

HAK: There practically is but its the right way of putting it. He is going to look into that but we don't have to admit that.

Ziegler: OK Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
Date 01/13/91
By: XARA Ders

Telcon - San Clemente

April 7, 1973 - 2:40 p.m.

Rush - HAK

HAK: Ken, how are you.

Rush: Well I'm fine, but I had no idea you'd called me. I was out playing
golf with Mel Larrd this afternoon, Your old friend.

HAK: Well, I like Mel. Ken, I have had a very violent response from the
Chinese about this _______ adjournment of UNCURK. They say that we
pretty much promised them to abolish UNCURK, if they play ball. Now can
you take a look into the possibility of that and let me know by Monday.

Rush: Yes, I will, Henry. We discussed that you know.

HAK: Well, as I remember, you said you preferred they the adjournment.

Rush: At least the last time we discussed it, and I gave you a paper on it,
we were wondering whether or not we could do away with UNCURK. And
what has happened since? I didn't know anything had happened.

HAK: Well, personally, I have only personally told the Chinese what we
are thinking of and asked for their comments. And they didn't comment
about dropping the issue. They did comment though about the adjournment,
KNOX saying the only they'd consider is the abolishing.

Rush: I see. Well, the adjournment was all we really _______ were discussing.

HAK: Well, could you take a look at it. I don't need it before Monday evening.

Rush: I'll be in touch with you Monday. But I think But do they think
we should abolish UNCURK entirely?

HAK: That's right.

Rush: We hoped to get something for that, as you remember.

HAK: To drop the Korea item from the agenda.

Rush: Right. Well, let me look into it.

HAK: You see what I mean.

Rush: Yes, I do. I really haven't looked at it since you and I talked
the last time. And nothing has happened since then, has it?

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized EO 1295C

By: XARA Date: 6/12/94

2

**HAK:** No. And there is no hurry about it. The only hurry is that I would like to get them an answer to their demarche.

**Rush:** Right. I'll be in touch with you Monday.

**HAK:** And see whether you can make it possible.

**Rush:** That we do abolish it?

**HAK:** Yes.

**Rush:** OK. We do want to abolish it, do we?

**HAK:** Well, I think . . . otherwise, they'll drag us before the UN.

**Rush:** Yes, I know. We were hoping that by adjourning it . . .

**HAK:** Well, if the price is too high, we can't do it.

**Rush:** Right, let me look into it again and I'll talk to you Monday.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: NARA Data 6/13/09

Telcon - San Clemente
April 7, 1973 - 3:00 p.m.

Kosciusko-Morizet-HAK

First part of conversation not on tape.

**HAK:** ... which was that he should come over because I would really much like to have a talk with him on some matters that I had mentioned to your President of various Soviet proposals to us.

**Morizet:** I know the problem, yes.

**HAK:** And I wanted to discuss it with you. If he can find a way of coming over Ο all it means is he would have to see his counterpart but we could still have a private meeting.

**Morizet:** I'll come back as soon as possible and I'll let you know and for the time being we maintain Wednesday. If it's not possible Wednesday, maybe on Friday.

**HAK:** Right. You haven't had any response to our last discussion except from Dobrynin.

**Morizet:** It was very funny.

**HAK:** I tell you the reason it came up was because they were mentioning various schedules but his behavior was very bad.

**Morizet:** Well, it's his usual manner to fish for some information.

**HAK:** And if in the process he can throw a little discord that's a bonus.

**Morizet:** Well, I look forward to seeing you next week and meanwhile . . .

**HAK:** Good, and you can tell your associates that we are really very serious about what I told you. And we will have then, then we meet some possible agenda and topics to discuss. Goddbye, have a very good trip.

**Morizet:** Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority E01255
 By: MIRA Date 04/14/73

7

Telcon - San Clemente
April 7, 1973 - 3:10 p.m.
Secy Richardson - HAK

HAK: Elliot, how are you?

Richardson: I'm fine, how are you?

HAK: OK. Elliot I'm the object of Presidential wrath, because that Libyan mission hasn't flown yet. Now the President takes the position we will not be driven off, 75 miles off the shore of any country. Whatever the reason. If we want to stand this thing down later he's willing to entertain a proposal, but he insists that exactly the same track be flown with exactly the same plane and air cover at the soonest possible moment. And he doesn't want any more reclamas. And he doesn't want any more fancy proposals of cargo planes or anything else because none of this accomplishes what he wants. Every time its ordered is another delay or another wrinkle to it. His basic point is that we don't want to be driven off by a country like Libya when we are way out at sea. If it were 12 miles off it would be a totally different proposition.

Richardson: Well, there's no disagreement on that park on my part. I don't know what all the time is going to do - there haven't been any reclamas that I know of. There's been a lot of discussion between your staff and JCS people and so on.

HAK: Well, it had been ordered and then there were some ideas of having only a cargo plane and then there were some ideas now of delaying it again.

Richardson: We tried to prevent that. There was a delay - the only one I know about was...

HAK: Well, we don't mind the delay over the weekend. We don't want the carrier...

Richardson: not to have the carrier move on Sunday.

HAK: That's correct. But now they want to delay it again for the carrier to exercise its systems. Now you know if the Navy says that's the only way it can fly a mission off a country of 2 million 75 miles at sea and that they have got to have an exercise first, we can't tell the Navy that they can't exercise their systems. But with every day that passes the

Telcon

2

the principle that they have stood us down gets more firmly established.
And we're certainly willing after a few of the regular missions have been
flown to entertain a proposal in the context in the utility of these missions
of either changing the requirement or changing the manner of fulfilling
the requirement. But it has to be our own decision and not because we
were pushed by two Libyan mirages.

**Richardson:** I don't have any question about that. All right. I talked to Dan earlier today who was trying to prevent this further delay. I'll call him again.

**HAK:** Right. Your testimony reads well in the newspaper. I really think you've done a staunch job up there under difficult conditions. I'm seeing you for breakfast on Wednesday.

**Richardson:** Yes, good. I look forward to that. Have a good weekend.

**HAK:** Thank you.

DECLASSIFIED
Authorize EO 12957
Date 01-14-07

Telcon - San Clemente

April 7, 1973 - 3:55

Don Kendall - HAK

**Kendall:** I'm going to see Dobrynin Wednesday afternoon and I'm leaving for Moscow on Sunday. You have time on Wednesday?

**HAK:** I don't have my schedule in front of me. I'll find time.

**Kendall:** OK, What would you like me to do - come right over after I see Dobrynin - I assume that will be ...

**HAK:** Well, say 4:30.

**Kendall:** I'm meeting him at 12:30. I'll be through I imagine around 2:00.

**HAK:** Well, you can try for 2:30 and after that I won't be free till 4:30. Let's try for 2:30.

**Kendall:** OK, that would be much better for me if I could.

**HAK:** Now that Stans proposal won't fly. I talked to the President.

**Kendall:** Well, I was afraid it wouldn't. Something has got to be done for that guy. But that's another problem.

**HAK:** OK Don.

DECLASSIFIED

E012557

Authority

D: 12 MARA DEC 91 01:04

TELCORN

Mr. Flanigan/Mr. Kissinger

9:58 a.m. 4/9/73

PF: Good morning, Henry. Do you know the President is sending a message to Congress tomorrow requesting authority to grant MFN to the USSR without even taking cognizance of the fact that there is a problem that it's stirred up the whole Jewish community.

HK: That is correct.

PF: Okay, I think you are making a domestic mistake. I don't see how he can ignore a reality.

HK: What would you have him say?

PF: We recognize the problem, we are trying to deal with it, we don't think this is the right place to deal with it. Rather than ignoring it. Inevitably in the subsequent press conference somebody is going to bring it up and it seems to me we have to say something--I have been taking the position which may be giving you a little heartburn, but we think this is a mistake in policy, but we don't think this is the right place to deal with it.

HK: I think you shouldn't say anything because we are dealing with the Soviets right now and we may be getting some results within another week.

PF: I am well aware of that, but you can't say nothing to a subject that is deeply concerning the American people and Congress when you are asking the Congress for any authority that relates to it. The only other thing to do would be to have taken it out of the Bill entirely and say we are worried about it.

HK: For the President to make an official statement, while we are trying to deal with domestic legislation of the Soviet Union is very tough.

PF: I didn't say we should say that--I said we should say that he is concerned with this, but he does not believe that denying them MFN treatment is the appropriate answer--he doesn't have to say he is doing something else-- he has to recognize it exists, Henry. Isn't that the proper thing to do. It won't go away because we don't talk about it. And we can't help but talk about it because if we are going to send up a Bill asking for this authority people are going to say yeh, but what about--

HK: And what about the *Baharis* in Bangladesh?

PF: (laughs) Henry please don't ask me to defend ridiculous positions. I can't do that anymore than I can do anything about the Baharis in Bangladesh,

DECLASSIFIED
Author E012951
Date 6/12/73
BY NARA

and that's not the right answer for these people. I think we have to
at least say, we recognize the problem--

HK: We recognize congressional concerns--

PF: We recognize congressional concern, we do not think that <u>the</u> <u>congress</u>
denying MFN should be--is the proper response.

HK: And we will be dealing with congressional leaders--well--all right fine.
Yeh, I agree with that.

PF: Would you like to put something in the message--would you want to draft it?

HK: No, no why don't you draft it and let me see it?

PF: All righty.

HK: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
B: NARA Doc. 6/17/04

TELCONE

Amb. Dinitz/Mr. Kissinger

10:58 a.m. 4/9/73

AD: Good morning, Dr. Kissinger.

HK: Mr. Ambassador, we just had a cable here from our embassy in Tel Aviv
that your FonMin has asked our Charge for an authoritative version of the
background of the Sadat-interview, saying that the assurances you have
received weren't high level enough--that Alizore--whoever he is--

AD: Alizore yeh

HK: Now what I am trying to avoid is everytime something like that happens, me
and more papers have to be generated here and as you know you know more
than our people,

AD: Yes, and I have cabled it to Israel immediately after I talked to you, you see, but it probably didn't sink down to the level of Alizul (sp), but I will take care of it right away.

HK: Could you get your FonMin not to press our people there?

AD: Right, right. I will do this right way. I do this when we talked on Friday but evidently they--do you have any idea, Dr. Kissinger, when this report was made--today or Friday?

HK: No, on the 7th.

AD: On the seventh--that must have been just before they got my cable.

HK: Yes, you know, it's not very--the last paragraph of the cable says I am
at a loss to explain--this is our Charge - -why Eban should want me to confir
what department may have told Israeli Embassy.

AD: Fine, I will take care of it right away.

HK: Right, so if he could just tell him he is satisfied, it would help. Because, you know, you have seen all the exchanges.

AD: Sure, sure.
I will do this right away. Ah while we are on the line, Dr. Kissinger, we
got some word from Israel that there was attempt of another blast of our
residence of our ambassador in Cyprus this morning.

HK: Yes, I just received that too.

AD: And some shooting on the plane in Nicosia, but from the reports I got

DECLASSIFIED
 Authority EO1295C
 D: XA RA Date 0/12/01

over the telephone we--there were no casualties there that we could discern and that two or three of the attackers were killed.

HK: That is essentially also the report I have just received. I am glad it turned out that way.

AD: Yeh, yeh.

HK: I would like to see you--I just got back, so I will call you in a day or so--

AD: Wonderful, I didn't want to call you because I knew--

HK: We have had another communication on that from the Egyptians which I wanted to discuss with you. And we won't answer until we have talked to you.

AD: Fine, I will be in NY for one day--tomorrow--

HK: Tomorrow isn't good for me--I'll let's get together Wednesday or Thursday.

AD: Wednesday or Thursday is fine--shall we wait for a call from your office?

HK: Yes. Let's aim for Wednesday.

AD: You know I am going to see the President this afternoon for the credentials.

HK: Oh--well, I hadn't focused on that. Good. That's a record speed. So then I can legally talk to you.

AD: Right.

HK: I hope you have a very successful stay here, but I know you will.

AD: Thank you very much.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
Dated XARA Date: 6/13/94

TelCon
Charles Bartlett/Mr. Kissinger

11:04 am, April 9, 1983

K: Charles?

B: Yes. Henry, how are you.

K: I was going to threaten you to pull out on Friday.

B: I'll bet you would do it Henry.

K: But I'll do it a little more dramatically, just before when you can't
possibly--

B: Listen, you've got the biggest problem in the history of central
Washington.

K: Really.

B: Put tents up so they could get more people--

K: Where is it--never mind about that, I'll find out where--

B: It's at the City Club.

K: Oh, it's at the City Club. Also you put tent out in the garden.
Now look, I'm just beginning to focus on what I'm supposed to do.
I'm supposed to speak how long?

B: Anything you say Henry is exciting to people, so you just do it according
to your wants.

K: Yeah, but what would you recommend as a friend.

B: I think 15 or 20 minutes would be great.

K: And what--serious or humorous.

B: You'll do it right Henry, God I'd be foolish to tell you how to talk to
anybody.

K: Make sure I get you on our staff as an adviser, you are so precise.

B: You know--

K: How about Under Secretary of State?

2

B: You could do anything you want, you--

K: You wouldn't want to be Under Secretary of State to prepare position papers. Now, all the other three, are they also going to speak.

B: Yeah, they are going to speak short. I imagine old Pete will come up with a few jokes and say a few nice things, and ______ doesn't want to speak.

K: Yeah.

B: And, so, it would be really you. Jimmy Sannisan is the toastmaster, he's very funny. And he adds a lot.

K: And that's the membership of the Federal City Club. Okay. Well I let you down, I didn't bring Miss Osmer.

B: That's all right, I like the one you got. I like your judgment.

K: Okay. You are no help to me in preparing the G____ damned speech.

B: You can do it back hand--

K: That's what they all say. But that isn't true. But at least I want to think about it a bit. Okay. Many thanks. I look forward to it.

B: Great Henry.

K: Bye.

B: Bye, bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz
E01255
BY MARA Dat: 9/1/69

TELCONE

Dobrynin/Kissinger

11:27 a.m. - 4/9/73

D: Yes.

K: Anatol.

D: Ohyes, hello Henry.

K: I just wanted to report back in.

D: (Laughs) Well, it is my impression you are back definitely.

K: Why should it be your impression that I am back definitely?

D: Well I saw already the President - who he is going to receive and so on so I gather that you should be involved one way or another. Because the schedule I look through. They publish it.

K: I see. I thought you put your wire tap on me again.

D: No, no. You now have an easy life, Henry, going to the sunny California, Florida - really you're not very busy, my impression. So tomorrow we see each other.

K: We have breakfast tomorrow and we can discuss things then. I've had a good chance to talk to the President yesterday about that agreement.

D: Oh, you mean the Agreement. I receive it today a telegram from my boss. It's really - I will tell you, it's rather lengthy and he - well, well, you will listen to it - the major reason is he had a feeling we were very close but he feels we have separated from what we started. And he really asks some questions and so on.

K: Let's take a look at it tomorrow.

D: Yeh, tomorrow then.

K: Because uh

D: My impression is he is now he doesn't know where to go from now.

K: Has he made any specific proposals or is he going back to his original draft?

D: No, he says you go back to the point from where you began. This is his impression. From the very beginning he gets the impression after talking with you - my talk with you - that well they are moving. And it starts to

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E012052
By: W.N. APAS DCS-00304

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012658
By: M.W. Page Date: 04/04/58

2

roll, but then your last draft was of course of such a nature and your economic proposals, everything, he thought too it was exactly where it was a year ago.

K: Well, that's a little exaggerated because

D: I'm telling you generally. He didn't use a year ago but he said that - well, if you like I can read you some and some tomorrow I put in ______ if you like it. You have more time?

K: Well, how long is it?

D: It's two pages.

K: Does he propose anything particular?

D: Nothing, he is rather asking the President his ideas. . . . . . . . . . . . . . he just ask him because it's his impression that you throw everything back so he sounds rather puzzled but at the same time very understanding on this important question. So he didn't propose any specific proposal because he took really your proposal as you remember at the very beginning and he make some suggestions on your proposal. And then what really happened, you gave us which was . . . really on the last proposal on which we operated. So this way it's rather emotional I should say outgrowth. . .

K: Well, that's a little exaggerated though because all we did was to put into that first Article one clause.

D: Let's go over it tomorrow more precisely because really

K: Yes, let's look at it more precisely tomorrow.

D: Yeh, tomorrow. And Henry, on a personal basis, ______ would like you if possible to work if necessary during this week on a more extensive basis because by Sunday it looks as though I will go home.

K: Oh, god, really?

D: Yeh, because Brezhnev would like to discuss with me various things, really. But I am telling you now because you should be prepared that maybe by Sunday I would like you to have some special consultation. For me, so to speak, to be ready to go. I could wait - maybe for a week I will go but this is

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12058
By: MWB P. 500 04304

K: May I make a suggestion to you Anatol?

D: Yeh.

K: Unless it's geared to some event in Moscow, I have the British coming over next week some time.

D: Oh, I don't like this at all.

K: But not on this. They are coming over on MBFR.

D: They ask me to come home in connection with this documents.

K: Oh, well then we don't have to necessarily

D: No, no really he ask me to come with a document and I think he rather would like to read you where he stands now.

K: All right. You and I will work on this this week.

D: Yeh, I think it is better way. All right?

K: Now in the meantime could you keep Semyenov (?) under control. The thing has become totally unmanageable here. Let me read you a sentence - that's really why I called you.

D: Well, I send __________ a telegram quite frankly. Before I did not mention anything but yesterday I send telegram to stop his exercises.

K: I've told Johnson to relax, that you and I were going to talk but that I told Johnson he should not raise summit talks.

D: I understand.

K: Let me read you what he replied: He said, "You can tell Dobrynin that I do not know who is kidding whom, but there's not a meeting here that passes in which Semyenov as well as individual members of his staff do not push clearly the urgency of getting something ready for the Summit. As you know I have not, and I will not mention what might be negotiated for a Summit meeting."

D: No, yesterday I send a telegram in this sense.

K: I will show you the telegram tomorrow.

3

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: E012058
By: MWAPAS DOD

4

D: That's all right but I know that he doesn't have any instruction on this I know for sure.

K: He probably wants to get the order.

D: No, I think he - he knows that when he left that there was an idea that in June we'll be meeting so keeping in view this one - as you know, as one of the objects to discuss so he tried to produce some results. But he didn't have, I know for sure, his instructions because I read it.

K: I tell you what we should do this week, Anatol. We should talk on a thinking out loud basis what we should try to manage on this treaty.

D: This is exactly, really.

K: And then we must have some latitude to manage it with our Allies. That's - usually when we have discussed on a thinking out loud basis it's come out that way.

D: Yeh. You see, with the Allies we have the same problem that you have. And after all really, the really beginnings when the President was in Moscow there was discussion with our leaders. Even at that time there was some concern as though we didn't have it and it was our impression that you didn't have it. Some maybe say something but nobody said anything against. After all, a leading country has a right to say something or do something. It is good for them and for their Allies. They don't go in to deceive them so why should they be concerned about what somebody said and so on, I mean.

K: Anatol, what we should do tomorrow is to have a preliminary talk going through it carefully.

D: The two texts, yeh.

K: Then we meet again later this week. At least once and probably twice. And then if you go back on Sunday - what about the date though?

D: Well, up to now I don't have anything really.

K: That frankly is beginning to irritate the President.

D: I understand.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E012058
By: MW CAPA 00304

K: You know as far as we're concerned

have to

D: No, no, Henry, I understand your feelings and you understand mine too. They know very well there so why the delay is I don't know. Probably they are thinking about the ______ because before I receive your draft they mentioned

K: If he thinks it's being used as a favor without which is done to him...

D: No, no.

K: Then I'd say let's just start again much later.

D: No, I wouldn't go so far as that - Both of our bosses are mature enough that nobody is playing or ... it's a mutual interest. It's very, very clear.

K: Look I am optimistic that this will come out with something fairly close to what we discussed in your counterdraft.

D: Let's try to do something.

K: But we have to go through a certain process in getting there.

D: OK, let's try one way to do it because . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . not this Summit as I mentioned to you but I didn't go into details because of the telephone but at that time it was in the ______ he wanted to clarify the details of this Agreement or if you have some details they are some questions to be discussed. So when he send the ______, it was already when he mentioned to me that . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . and then I am telling you to what extent he was ______; everything pressing. And he thinks only left a few minor things and for you to come on this ______. But now it looks - OK, we will discuss it tomorrow.

K: Anatol, I think we can

D: It is my impression too.

K: Actually

D: I don't know why but the telegram I receive surprise myself. Honestly, I warn you jokingly, but it was not joke, I expected that there would be some - remember when I ask you to look at once again, it not because I try to be clever but I knew how it would be this especially - rather ______. There are some other things too, and so this was reaction not completely unexpected to me but I think the important thing is for us to sit down and discuss it. This is my impression.

5

6

K: I mean after all if we don't look at it bureaucratically the difference between this two drafts is not world shaking. I understand there are some points there that you're sensitive to but it doesn't make them earth shaking.

D: No, I understand especially Article I. If you could manage to move some of your - what you wanted - it is my impression. I don't have really an expression on either but I am prepared to because I know what the thinking in Moscow is.

K: That's what I'm thinking. Frankly, Anatol, that's my thinking too. And frankly speaking here as friends, I told you right away I have to go through something with Article I to show that we haven't just accepted when this thing surfaces, the first version.

D: No, I understand. But I think if you could find out very closely on paragraph first it would be enough to do everything. Do you understand what I mean?

K: Oh, of course, let's talk about it tomorrow.

D: So tomorrow is 8:30.

K: And as I understand it there's really only one offending clause in paragraph 1.

D: Second paragraph.

K: Second paragraph the thing about the conditions that war . . . . . but it is the only one that is really a problem.

D: Yes, you look, maybe you'll have a chance to look before tomorrow just for yourself, you look in our paragraph number 1 and I will look at yours once more and then we will try to do something about it tomorrow.

K: Exactly, but tell them to cool off in Moscow. You and I have solved worse problems.

D: I mention already to them and I mention to you tomorrow - I already send telegram to Brezhnev saying that I have a date with you Tuesday morning. So then I don't send anything today. Until tomorrow.

K: Good, I also have something about the Egyptians to discuss with you.

D: OK. So 8:30. K: Right. D: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority
By: WW
Date: 10/25/75

TELCON

Debryna/Kissinger

11:27 a.m. - 4/9/73

D: Yes.

K: Anatol.

D: Chyes, hello Henry.

D: Oh, you mean the Agreement. I receive it today a telegram from my boss. It's really - I will tell you, it's rather lengthy and he - well, well, you will listen to it - the major reason to he had a feeling we were very close but he feels we have separated from what we started. And he really asks some questions and so on.

D: Yeah, tomorrow then.

K: Because uh

DECLASSIFIED

DECEMBER 9, 1973

J5595

BY AMRA DEK 09/11/73

["2", "roll, but then your last draft was of course of such a nature and your economic proposals, everything, he thought too it was exactly where it was a year ago.", "K: Well, that's a little exaggerated because", "D: I'm telling you generally. He didn't use a year age but he said that - well, if you like I can ready you some and some tomorrow I put in ______ if you like it. You have more time?", "K: Well, how long is it?", "D: It's two pages.", "K: Does he propose anything particular?", "D: Nothing, he is rather asking the President his ideas. . . . . . . . . . . . .

DECLASSIFIED

Authorit

E01295

MAR 13 1969

B:

D: Yeh.

D: They ask me to come home in connection with this document.

K: Oh, well then we don't have to necessarily.

K: Now in the meantime could you keep Semyenov (?) under control. The thing has become totally tamnangible here. Let me read you a sentence - that's really why I called you.

D: Well, I send a telegram quite frankly. Before I did not mention anything but yesterday I send telegram to stop his exercises.

D: I understand.

D: This is exactly, really.

D: Yeh. You see, with the Allies we have the same problem that you have.
And after all really, the really beginnings when the President was in
Moscow there was discussion with our leaders. Even at that time there
was some concern as though we didn't have it and it was our impression
that you didn't have it. Some maybe say something but nobody said
anything against. After all, a leading country has a right to say something
or do something. It is good for them and for their Allies. They don't
go in to deceive them so why should they be concerned about what some-
body said and so on, I mean.

D: The two texts, yeh.

D: I understand.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO 1295C

Date 6/13/10

By NARA

["5", "K: You know as far as we're concerned", "have to", "D: No, no, Henry, I understand your feelings and you understand me too. They know very well there is why the delay is I don't know. Probably they are thinking about the ______ because before I receive your draft they mentioned", "K: If he thinks it's being used as a favor without us which is done to him...", "D: No, no.", "K: Then I'd say let's just start again much later.", "D: No, I wouldn't go so far as that - Both of our bosses are mature enough that nobody is playing or... it's a mutual interest. It's very, very clear.", "K: Look I am optimistic that this will come out with something fairly close to what we discussed in your counterdraft.", "D: Let's try to do something.", "K: But we have to go through a certain process in getting there.", "D: OK, let's try one way to do it because . . . . . . . . . . . .

D: So tomorrow is 8:30.

K: And as I understand it there's really only one offending clause in paragraph I.

D: Second paragraph.

D: I mention already to them and I mention to you tomorrow - I already send telegram to Breshnev saying that I have a date with you Tuesday morning. So then I don't send anything today. Until tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
By: MARA DOD 6/13/19

TelCon
Robert Ellsworth/Mr. Kissinger

12:00 Noon, April 8/ 9, 1973

K: Hello.

E: Henry, Bob Ellsworth.

K: Bob, you're a mind reader.

E: How so.

K: Because I wanted to see whether we could get together sometime.

E: Any time at your convenience. The reason--

K: Dave showed me your letter.

E: Pardon

E: Ah, yes. Listen, I'm going to be in town on Friday, that is in Washington on Friday, any chance you could join me for lunch.

K: There's a slight chance, but it depends on whether somebody with whom I have a lunch on Wednesday has to shift it to Friday. If he doesn't I'll see you.

E: All Right.

K: Otherwise, if I don't see you for lunch, I'll see you anyway.

E: Certainly. Let me suggest that I touch base with you by telephone on Friday morning.

K: Or Thursday.

E: All right.

K: What did you want to talk to me about.

E: I want to talk to you about the Suez Canal.

K: I see, well I want to talk to you about Europe.

E: All right, fine. Well I'll check with you on Friday afternoon--Thursday afternoon.

TelCon

The President/Mr. Kissinger

12:15 pm, April 9, 1973

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi Henry, anything new today?

K: No. Another helicopter was shot down, another ICCS--

P: Shot at, not down this time.

K: No, it landed, but no one was killed.

P: Yeah.

K: But otherwise there isn't anything. Oh, and was this morning an attack on an Israeli airliner in Cyprus, and also on the Israeli embassy in Cyprus. But no casualties, no Israeli casualties. And this reports that one and three Arabs were killed.

P: Right.

K: But otherwise, things are very quiet.

P: You still feel we should wait until Haig gets back before deciding anything on the Cambodian thing.

K: Yes. Because then we know better what the--

P: I had a good talk with Mansfield. You know, he was good on one point, he did get the Byrd thing--amendment watered down so that at least --you may not have even followed what happened--

K: Oh, yes.

P: Harry Byrd's amendment is a disaster--at least it got watered down so North Vietnam is open-- under no circumstances would we even suggest taking it up unless they were complying with the Agreement.

K: That's right. And my impression is that we won't be able to recommend it.

P: Certainly not as--at the moment the way the state of play is.

DECLASSIFIED
Authoriz
By: NARA DECE 01/14/94

2

K: No, I see no evidence.

P: But then it's not being able to recommend, we've got to have another
hold don't we--well the only restraints we--

K: That pushes us more into the military side.

P: Yep.

K: It's going to be painful.

P: Well, and more difficult, more difficult than the Aid.

K: Much more.

P: Yeah. Well I'm not too happy about that. The aid is hard, the military
is harder too because--

K: No, no, no, if everything were equal the aid would be the easiest way
to police it. If it could be done that way.

P: Well, let's see what we hear from our Russian friends.

K: That's right, I'm having breakfast tomorrow morning.

P: Right, Okay.

K: Right, Mr. President.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
BY NARA Doc. No. 6/17/67

TelCon
Prof. John Roche/Mr. Kissinger

12:42 pm, April 9, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Hello Henry.

K: How are you?

R: Well I'm holding up pretty well thank you.

K: Where are you?

R: I'm up at home. Look the reason I called you, I know you've got a
few little problems here and there, but here's one--you know that
Commission on the radio for Europe ----------liberty?

K: Yeah.

report

R: Two months ago we filed our <u>quarrel</u> with the President.

K: Yeah.

R: It's fallen somewhere between the slats, of OMB and someplace,
I don't know where. The stations are funded until the 30th of June.

K: I'll get on it right away.

R: I just know, but we just can't let those stations go out of business.

K: Absolutely not.

R: And I hate to bug with--

K: Oh, no, no, no, no that's what old friends are for because--for all I
know the thing is lying around in my office.

R: Well it may still be on Sonnenfeldt's desk, I don't know. But I bust
my ______ on how to put due pride of authorship on that report and
----</

K: We'll get it out this week, if it's in our office.

R: Good, if you need a copy, I'll send you one in a plain brown envelope.

K: no, by next year we'll have the government organized so well that
nothing gets to me anymore.

2

R: Well, how are you doing otherwise?

K: Okay. I read your article on Watergate. That was well taken.

R: Do you see the piece I did on the peace negotiations as Communist political warfare.

K: No.

R: No. I'll send you a copy. If you ever have any free time--

K: Oh, I'd love to read it. When are you coming down here again.

R: Well, I'm leaving for Europe Sunday, and I'm going to do a little vacationing for once.

K: For how long?

R: Until about May 1st.

K: Why don't you call me when you get back.

R: I'd love to, I'd love to see you.

K: Good.

R: And good luck on this Cambodian mess. Jesus Christ!

K: Well, you know, it's awfully hard to conduct foreign policy when the Congress takes away both your threats and your incentive.

R: I know. And, of course, the Congress can't even agree on why they are doing it.

K: And the desire to lose is really overwhelming. Nothing would please most of the Democrats more than to have this whole thing come apart.

R: I know it. It's absolutely scandalous. Well, good luck.

K: Thank you for calling. And really do call me when you get back, I'd love to see you.

R: All right, Henry, thanks.

K: Good. Bye.

R: Bye

TelCon
Nick Thimmesch/Mr. Kissinger

12:57 pm, April 9, 1973

K: Hello.

T: Henry, how are you? I read a little a piece on the wire that you said that this trip by Al Haig was actually planned two weeks ago. So there wasn't any--

K: It wasn't an immediate emergency. That doesn't mean the situation isn't serious, I'm just trying to make clear the context.

T: If you're thinking of making a trip like this and it was planned two weeks ago, then the situation must have been serious two weeks ago I agree gather.

K: Well, no, we just wanted to get a comprehensive look at this situation. We've got a lot of people stuck out there who haven't got the whole Washington picture and we like to send--one of advantage of Haig is he can also give the word to these people.

T: We have no commitments to Cambodia in the same sense we had a commitment to the South Vietnamese government, so these many years, isn't that right.

K: No.

T: Right. What about the other situation, the North Vietnamese are in Cambodia and I see one writer speculated that they could just build up there to lengthen the drive to Saigon, what do you think of that kind of speculative---

K: Well, it's a possibility.

T: And there are we involved?

K: Nick, I am not just getting into that sort of debate. I don't see how it is possible to conduct foreign policy when there's a systematic attempt to destroy both your threats and your incentives. I'm just not getting involved in what we will do in every contingency that anyone can think up.

T: Of course, I was going to just write a column today assessing how serious this is, should I go moderate or should I go--

K: I'd go moderate.

T: Moderate. The components are there but it's not an emergency situation.

K: Exactly. That would be the right line to take.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951
Dated NARA Doc. 9/13/73

*

TelCon
Secy. Rush/Mr. Kissinger

3"28 pm, April 9, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Ken, how are you.

R: I'm fine, how are you.

K: Okay. Ken, I'm proposing that we have breakfast on Thursday, is that agreeable with you.

R: I'd like that very much.

K: And if you behave during the week I won't even keep you waiting.

R: Well, that would be--Henry, I get so anxious to see you when I have an important that it's a very serious strain on my heart when you are late.

K: I know. And I'm deliberately playing on that.

R: Oh, I'm looking forward to it very much, seriously Henry.

K: One thing I wanted to discuss with you--

R: What time should we get together.

K: About 8:30!

R: That'd be fine.

K: Good. That idiot you have in Cairo keep sending in cables that are bound to create nothing but trouble.

R: I know.

K: You know, his job isn't to be a detective and finding out what may be going on. His job is to find out and to see how it can be handled.

R: Exactly. I saw those cables Henry and--well for a diplomat to be quite that stupid is a little bit querisome to me. I don't know Greemmyself.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: EO 12952
Date: 6/13/73
By: NARA

2

K: Well, I'm counting on you to straighten him out at the ____ Mission's meeting.

R: I will do that.

K: And if you want to, I'll take you in to see the President to get it straight from him.

R: Henry, you don't have to do that with me, you know that.

K: I'm sure. But obviously something was going on, 'cause a lot of what he got was total garbage.

R: I know it. But the bad thing was to put in a cable.

K: If he had back-channeled you or me or somebody and said what's going on here--

R: Exactly, that would have made sense. But to do this sort of thing really is--well it's either naive or deliberately mischievous.

K: Well it's deliberately mischievous. He's--there's no law that says he's got to be informed.

R: None whatever.

K: And he's the representative of the President, he isn't the representative of the Foreign Service.

R: Absolutely, and he's not a detective either.

K: That's right.

R: He's not a representative of the CIA.

S Audi

K: Because I don't believe that the SA audi just volunteered that information.

R: Of course you know, Henry, they know how to play angles too, and they know how to divide and conquer as well as at least divide and have quarrels as well as other people, but the thing that I really, you have to expect this out of the Saudis or anyone else, what really annoyed me so much was putting this thing in a cable. There's no excuse for that. I'm going to speak to him about that. Now, I do not think that he was prompted to do that by anyone higher up, I think this was his own--

K: Oh, no, no, no, of that I'm sure.

R: To scratch his own back.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 1295C
D: 12 NARA Doc. 61709

DECLASSIFIED

Authoritär EO 12951
By: ARA Dae 6/13/91

K: Oh, no, he keeps screaming that he--you know every since that I said that there was a prior exchange, he's been sulking.

R: I know. And he wasn't in on it I suppose.

K: Right, he wasn't in on it.

R: Henry, I wasn't disturbed by that at all.

K: Well, I'm going to work out an arrangement to keep you informed.

R: Good, good. Incidentally I will be calling you later today, I've had--my day is pretty well tied up--but I'm seeing Marshall Green on UNTURK later on today.

K: Just tell Marshall Green to treat that as if it was Cambodia.

R: Right. There is a point really, Henry, if we could use this thing on' Cambodia it would really be worthwhile. Frankly my own feeling is that UNKIRK is an anachronism, and an unnecessary irritant.

K: That's my feeling. But I think we are going to get voided out it anyway, by either this one or the next general assembly.

R: Right.

K: So if you could--and also last year the Department pretty well gave me to believe we could abolish UNKIRK. For the right price.

R: Right. Well I think I'll be able to bring him along on that.

K: Good. Wonderful.

R: Okay, Henry.

K: Thank you Ken.

R: Looking forward to seeing you on Thursday.

K: Fine.

R: Right you are.

K: Bye.

R: Bye.

TELCOM
Scotty Reston/Mr. Kissinger

5:32 p. m., April 9, 1973

K: Scotty, how are you?

R: Well, I'm pretty good.

K: You called me a little earlier.

R: Yeah, we agreed to get together after your holiday, which I hope was
a good one.

K: Yes, I had a good trip.

R: Do you want to do that interview, Henry, or do you want to forget it?

K: No, I want to do it and I will get you a -- my colleagues have been
preoccupied with other matters, as you know. I would just like to
mention it to them and I will call you within 48 hours.

R: Yeah, sure. Well, there's no -- I had the feeling that maybe you
thought I was being unduly --

K: No, not at all.

R: I don't want to do that.

K: No, certainly not that, Scotty. I would like to do it.

R: This domestic thing is a bloody awful mess and --

K: It's just that the sensitivities are so great that I don't want to rub
salt in ...

R: As a matter of fact, for another reason, that makes the philosophic
thought about other things impossible in that atmosphere anyway.
So, you know, even from our point of view, it's better to take a few
days here.

K: Although, leaving aside what I do, four years of this poisonous
atmosphere is more than the country can stand.

R: Oh, Henry.

K: I mean, as you've been trying to say -- as you've been saying.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12952
Date 6/13/73

By: NARA DCS: 6/13/73

K

Scotty Reston/Mr. Kissinger

5:32 p.m., April 9, 1973

2

R: I went out to St. Paul in Minneapolis the other day and, you know, that state is a remarkable state but full of really noblesse oblige characters at the top of the community.

K: Yeah.

R: That's how they managed to keep the Mojave Range out of the hands of the plunders all these years.

K: Oh, no, it's a fine group of people.

R: But they are really so worried about this. And then Cleveland on Friday night; the same thing. It's a real problem. But, anyway, I'll be around, Henry, whenever you feel like it --

K: I will call you no later than Thursday morning.

R: Great. Thank you, Henry.

K: Bye.

R: Bye.

w gh

TELCORN
Secretary Rush/Mr. Kissinger

5:58 p.m., April 9, 1973

K: Hello.

R: Hello, Henry.

K: Yes.

R: I've gone into this UNCURK thing in considerable depth. The thing is undoubtedly an anachronism and we would certainly like to avoid a UN debate.

K: Right.

R: The problems that we have in doing away with it are one, the South Koreans. We would have to work up a scenario where they would take - where it was to their benefit to do away with UNCURK and then you have to work up a scenario on how to do away with it and keep away from a UN debate which we all want to keep away from. Now as you know this thing out of the UN debate involves not only the Chinese but the Russians. And of course also North Korea has had the Algerians present their resolution and we have to keep them out of it too.

K: OH, no, we have to have an understanding with North Korea that it won't be pursued.

R: Exactly. Now the easiest way to do it would be to have, and maybe this would not satisfy the Chinese, but if UNCURK just passed a resolution dissolving themselves never to meet again, that would be

K: themselves or dissolving themselves?

R: They would disband or they would adjourn sine die - not to mean again and then all the individual countries in UNCURK would pull out. This would effectively do away with it but I suppose

K: No, that's not good enough for them.

R: The Chinese would want to have the UN formally dissolved. Now if the UN's formally dissolved, then how do you avoid a debate? This is a problem.

K: Well, unless UNCURK dissolves itself.

R: They can't legally do that anymore; they could disband themselves or do away with themselves and let it go at that. And if no one says anything about it that would be it. Just disband and individual countries could just withdraw.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: EO12557
Date: 9/13/73
By: NARA

2

K: Yeh.

R: We have to work up what would be acceptable from that standpoint. What I can do over here is have our people, have our own ideas, to see how can we legally disband them without anything going before the UN and work up a scenario from that standpoint, not bringing in of course anything about the Chinese or dealing with the Chinese because if the South Koreans thing we are doing this to get something on the outside or having agreed to the Chinese behind their back so to speak, we'll run into the same sort of thing.

K: Now can we tell the Chinese that when we said adjourn sine die that this is all that UNCURK can do and that then the countries - we would cooperate with the countries concerned in pulling out.

R: We can do that. If they adjourn sine die and we cooperate with the countries to pull out, they might not even disband sine die. But this, Henry, is what we could try to do. I would have to really study the legalities of that more to be sure that it would stand up, but we could tell the Chinese that that, we think, is the best way of doing it. If it stands up legally and frankly I think they should accept it and we could go ahead on that basis. Now we'd also have to evidence (?) then with the Russians and with the North Koreans.

K: We'll let the Chinese deliver the North Koreans and then we'll worry about the Russians.

R: Well, we could do that, but the Russians could still, as you know, cause trouble and you'd have your UN debate.

K: Yeh.

R: In addition to UNCURK, as you know, we also have the UN command there and the South Koreans I understand, would be very upset if the UN Command were liquidated.

K: That I understand.

R: And the feeling is that the only way you get the South Koreans to go along with this would be to give them our assurances that we would certainly try to see that the UN Command was not dissolved and that there would not be an unraveling of the entire UN picture in South Korea.

K: Well the fact is that last year I was told by Alex Johnson that I could tell them that UNCURK would be abolished if they avoided the UN debate.

R: I think we can do that.

DECLASSIFIED
Author: EO 12557
Date: 9/17/97
By: NARA

K: Now if you can give me something I can tell them - that accomplishes that - I can say that I've met my commitment to them.

R: Right.

K: Do you see what I mean?

R: Yes, well why don't I get at the paper for you?

K: Good.

R: In essence it would be just what we say, but I'll get at the paper saying that we would adjourn sine die and that this is what it would be.

K: But that they won't accept.

R: Then they would have to - we could vote to disband and withdraw - and the members withdraw. Whether we can get that - well the members themselves I think would do it.

K: We could say that all UNCURK can do is adjourn sine die and that then if they want a UN resolution abandoning it - abolishing it we won't oppose it.

R: We would certainly say that.

K: OK, that might be a way of doing it.

R: If we can avoid a debate on that; we want to avoid a debate of course. But if we can have a resolution of the UN abolishing it that would be fine. If we can avoid a debate and do that.

K: Right. Can you look at it again and let me know tomorrow.

R: Yes, Henry, that really is the answer. Now we are willing, if the Koreans will go along, and we'd sell this to the Koreans, we would approach the Koreans and tell them that we think UNCURK has served its purpose and tell the Koreans that we do not intend to touch the UN Command; that we want to avoid a debate in the UN; that we think a way that could accomplish this would be for UNCURK to adjourn sine die and then it might be that there would be a resolution in the UN agreed to by everyone abolishing UNCURK with no debate. And this is what we would try to do.

K: OK.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority EO 12951

Dated: 6/13/07
By: J. M. S. M. A.

TelCon

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

8:02 pm, April 9, 1973

K: Hello.

S: Hi, Henry.

K: Joe, how are you?

S: Good Henry.

K: Where are you.

S: I'm at home right now. Just getting into a black tie.

K: I see, where are you going ?

S: Well, you know, one dinner after another.

K: Oh, you are not going to the symphony.

S: No.

K: Okay.

S: Listen, I want to thank you first of all, you know what happened today don't you.

K: Yes. The President told me about it. I had a brief talk with him this morning.

S: Yeah, well he got me in the Rose garden. The way I put it was as follows: that it's up to him.

K: No, he told me about it, I've just seen him.

S: Right, he mentioned that you mentioned it and I left it strictly neutral and up to you all.

K: Right, he also said--I talked to him about seeing you later this week.

S: Oh good, that's fine.

K: And that's definitely going to be done.

DECLASSIFIED

Authorized

B:

S: I really want to express my gratitude to you Henry, really.

K: Not at all, and he will see you for about 15 or 20 minutes later this week.
Before you go up.

S: You know, I had the distinct impression he's in quite a bit of a dilemma
and I can see what the problem is, and he's just inclined to move me for
reasons and on the other hand you've also got a problem as it related
to Moscow.

K: That's exactly right. Oh, you can have Moscow if you really want it.

S: Well, I put it strictly neutral, I said--

K: No, you put it in the way that will do you the most good in the long run.

S: Anything he says to me, I'll do what he wants me to do is what I told him.

K: Now, Joe, on your cable, I talked to the President. The first thing
he wants to have understand is whatever happened was at his personal
direction.

S: Right, that's the first thing. Can I jot these down.

K: Yeah. And now this is not my recommendation, these are things he told
me. Second, on the first paragraph he wants to make clear that he is the
guy, that it was the President who made the distinction between security
and sovereignty.

S: Well, that's--I purposely fuzzed it, but that's my fault more than anybody
else's. I just put the word 'President' in there.

K: Now on the next one, I have no problem with paragraph 2. On paragraph 3
I've read that Green stuff again. I never said anything that specific about
Sharm El Shak.

S: Yeah. Well then you ought to add that to my little repertoire there.

K: I didn't discuss the 5 to 7 year interval. That proposition might lose
price because it's too little for the Israeli and too much for the Egyptians.

S: That's correct, Henry, the Egyptians Israelis would give you a very
hard time on that one.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority EO12957

Date 01/12/01

By: AARA

2

*

K: Look, I never made this proposition.

S: Yeah.

K: I want out--the Soviets have substantively been given general information--that's none of his God damned business.

S: Good. Delete that.

K: And U.K. I don't want to give him any authority to conduct any further discussions.

S: Well, that's good too. That's not necessary at all Henry.

K: With anybody else.

S: That's right.

K: And frankly, I took out where it says "may draw upon it if raised by either Egyptians or Saudis.

S: All right. Let's not have him talk, period. There's no reason why he should say anything.

K: That's right.

S: All right, that's just fine Henry. I will make all those changes in the morning.

K: Good.

S: I'm going to send it through the regular channel and then you'll reread it again on a regular telegram when it comes to you tomorrow. In case I've made any mistakes based on these notes, you can correct them you see.

K: Good, Joe, and I'll get you over here definitely in the next few days.

S: Well, let me just say to you again I'm grateful to you--

K: Joe, you hear the philosophy and so that it's in his mind what your role is.

S: Well the President just couldn't have been nicer. I was highly flattered.

K: Well, I told you.

S: It was obvious cause that's what he told me.

K: I'm delighted.

S: Okay Henry, thank you.

TelCon
John Osborne/Mr. Kissinger

8:50 pm, April 9, 1973

K: Hello.

O: Hello, how are you.

K: Okay. I'm sorry that the President took me away.

O: Well, I'm sorry too, but you know.

K: All the more so because I had a grievance I want to express.

O: What's you do, I mean, you have an opportunity to express it.

K: Well, I have my doubts about the propriety of publishing, you know, in effect an evesdropped conversations to begin with.

O: Well, when they are coming over our public loud speaker, Dr. Kissinger, well--

K: Yeah, but you know, none of us knew that the microphones were that sensitive. Secondly, the comments were not directed at Rogers, I was joking with Rogers about Porter. You know, it's no sense explaining these things, it's -- but I was joking about the fact that at the meeting in the morning my nameplate said Dr. Kissinger and Porter's said The Honorable Porter, and that's why I said he's hard enough to deal with as it is.

O: Well, visibly you seemed to be addressing--talking to and at Rogers, you know.

K: Yeah, I was talking to Rogers about Porter.

O: When you said that to Porter, you were quoting yourself to Rogers.

K: That's right. You know, it's not a world shaking event, but it's --

O: I didn't think I---(end of tape)

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Authority EO 1295F</td></tr><tr><td>B: NARA Doc. 6/13/73</td></tr></table>

2

K: (new tape).... in any event WHAT is your deadline, when must you--

O: Well I tell you, I told Dick Campbell, my deadline for this week as I have to turn in a piece by Wednesday at 10:00. But actually if it is not an imposition on you, I'd like to take a little time with this, it's been a good two years I think since I've done the considered piece on the structure and working through your staff.

K: Right.

O: See some of your people and then come to you after--

K: I think that would be better.

O: Rowland is doing an off the cuff thing you know, and even with the help only, I talk to you--

K: The trouble is my people wouldn't all necessarily know this reorganization very well.

O: Well that may be, they would at least have a feel of how it stands anyway.

K: Probably.

O: And--

K: Also, I have to profess, they're also the most rebellious staff.

O: Well I can appreciate that. But rebellious wouldn't be my word, but, my impression over these years have been you also have a staff that's more than worthwhile if I can see them.

K: I think that's right.

O: Seriously, if it's all right with you, I'd like to get around a little bit, and of course, to get around you, as you well know Dr. Kissinger, I must--your people, the word has to know it's all right with you.

K: Okay. Well whom do you want to talk to.

O: Well just off the base of my hat, I'd like to start with Scowcroft, Col Kennedy was very helpful to me a couple of years ago.

DECLASSIFIED
Author E012957
Date 01/13/97
B:

SARA DEAC 01/13/97

3

K: That's fine.

O: Maybe John Holdridge, I know is going out--

K: No, that's fine.

O: But, Hal Saunders maybe, is guess he's the veteran on your staff.

K: That's fine.

O: Sonnenfeldt maybe, and two or three other youngsters like David Young and--

K: Oh, David Young is no longer with me.

O: Oh, he's not.

K: You ought to talk to one of two of the people who are on my immediate staff.

O: Yes, Winston Lord, Rodman, I don't know.

K: Fine.

O: People like that, you know.

K: Okay.

O: And then I could call them and then come back to you. I'd much rather do this and then come to you. Quoting them to you--

K: No, I don't expect you to quote them, but if you have some impressions--

O: That I undoubtedly would have, and would be much more comfortable writing such a piece. I hope this to be a fairly considerate piece you know.

K: You've done consistently the best pieces on the White House, painful as they sometimes are.

O: Well I haven't--had any complaints--

K: About me I have no complaints. I really have no complaints.

O: Well with that approach to this story, I would be delighted to take another week with it you see.

DECLASSIFIED
Author E01295
Date 01/13/01

B: NARA Doc. 613/61

4

K: I would prefer that.

O: Right. And come back to you. Maybe I'll check late this week, or--

K: The only thing in THE NEW REPUBLIC I read is you.

O: Well, I have a feeling you could--there are occasional good pieces in there you know.

K: The one thing I read consistently anyway is you.

O: Well, I'm flattered. I just hope it's not always disturbing to you.

K: No, I think that it's--almost always, I'd tend to say always, but in my field not often disturbing.

O: Well, it's good of you to say it, it's a comfort to me frankly. I'll tell you what, I'd be very happy to take another--

K: Well, let's do a better conversation because if I tell you what I try to do that's still doesn't tell you that it will in fact happen. And I'd be sort of interested in what you make of it after an interval.

O: Right.

K: So, why don't you go ahead just as you described.

O: All right, and I'll check with Dick Friday as to when you might fine a little time to see me then or the next week.

K: Then I'll see you maybe Saturday, maybe next week.

O: I'm at your disposal over the weekend. A Saturday would be fine.

K: Good.

O: Thank you very much.

K: Right, bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Author E01295C
Date 6/13/64
By NARA