GENERAL

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /B

WHD310 WAG316(1838)(2-000505E024)PD 01/24/73 1938

ICS IPMMTZZ CSP

13 JUN 25 11:08 37

ZCZC 3152451167 TDMT MCCONNELLSVILLE NY 93 01-24 0638P EST

PMS MR KISSENGER✓
WASHINGTON DC

WILL YOU PLEASE ASK THE PRESS AND THE TVMEMBERS OF VIETNAMS
CASUALTIES AND PRISONERS TO PLEASE NOT HAVE INTERVIEWS UNTIL
OUR MEN ARE HOME SAFE THERE MIGHT BE SOMETHING THAT THESE PEOPLE
WOULD INNOCENTLY SAY THAT COULD DAMAGE THEIR HEALTH AND THEIR
HAPPINESS IN COMING HOME. PLEASE INSTRUCT THE FAMILIES OF THE
MEN COMING HOME WHAT THEY MAY OR MAY NOT EXPECT IT CERTAINLY

WILL NOT BE WHAT THEY LEFT. I REQUEST THAT YOU OR YOUR AIDS
PASS THIS MESSAGE IMMEDIATELY TO THE FAMILIES WIVES AND CHILDREN
OF THESE MEN RESPECTFULLY

MISS CATHRINE F BRYANTMC CONNELLSVILLE NY BLOSSVALE 2 NY
13308

JUN 24 1970

GENERAL

ND 18/CO 1-7

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /B

Dear Zbig:

Many thanks for sending me the copy of your
article in the June 15 "Newsweek." I am
always interested to read your measured views.

It was good to see you last month. When will
you be coming down again?

Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski
Columbia University
Research Institute on Communist Affairs
New York, New York 10027

j1p:6/24/70

BY ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

RISKING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Two simple formulas are basic to an understanding of the Middle Easten crisis:

1. Of the four parties to the conflict, only one clearly considers an immediate compromise settlement to be in its interests;

2. Of the four parties to the conflict, only one stands to benefit from an inconclusive but protracted conflict.

The four parties are, of course, the Israeli, the Arab, the Soviet and the American. Of these, only the Americans see their interests as best served by a quick compromise solution; only the Russians stand to gain from prolonged hostilities.

CROSS FIRE OF POLICIES

The Israeli desire peace, but they fear, quite understandably, for their survival. They argue that any settlement must insure their security, but what is needed to insure their security tends to work against a settlement. In any case, there is no doubt that immediately after June 1967 a great many Israelis felt that time was on their side, that to delay a settlement was to increase the chances of consolidating some territorial gains, that even some dissipation of Western influence among the Arabs was desirable since it would, perforce, fortify the U.S. commitment to Israel as part of the wider U.S.-Soviet rivalry.

The Arabs, divided and humiliated, have been even more ambivalent. Some of them, to be sure, realize that they are the real losers in a prolonged conflict, yet they do not see any way out. Some would be satisfied with the restoration of the pre-1967 frontiers and an end to belligerency, but more and more they talk of a joint Arab-Jewish Palestine, which is only a more appealing way of still postulating the end of Israel.

The Soviets desire neither war nor peace. Another major war would mean new humiliation for Soviet allies and hence for the Soviet Union also. Moreover, given the Soviet presence in the U.A.R., it would probably necessitate Soviet involvement, with unpredictable risks. A major settlement—especially a compromise one—could only be achieved through U.S. diplomatic and political intervention, hence somewhat restoring the influence of the United States in the region, some-

thing which some Arabs would still prefer to growing Communist influence. Absence of a settlement means gradual expansion in Soviet influence and progressive radicalization of the Arab masses.

Only the U.S. has overriding reasons to desire a compromise. It is morally and politically committed to the survival of Israel, but it also has major interests and traditional ties of friendship with the Arab states. A compromise would serve to preserve both; prolonged conflict risks both.

Protracted conflict is likely in fact to prompt—as the Soviets calculate—intensified Arab frustration and increased Soviet military presence. Radicalization of the Arab masses will turn them eventually into tough, unyielding fighters, like the Algerians. Once they develop the will to sacrifice, on a sustained basis, 250 men per week to kill 25 Israelis per week (which would be equivalent to 2,000 American boys killed per week) the conflict will assume a very ominous character. In the meantime, increased Soviet military presence is already reducing Israel's freedom of unlimited retaliation.

MOUNTING RISKS

Indeed, it is quite possible that Moscow may be calculating that the U.S.—engaged in Vietnam and only adjusting to the new setting of nuclear parity—will react to a new Middle Eastern crisis by applying its pressure primarily on the Israelis to get them to desist from overly risky actions. Yet, if left alone, the Israelis will have no choice but to act, and even to announce—as the last resort—their reliance on an autonomous nuclear deterrent. World peace will hardly be thereby enhanced.

It is relevant at this juncture to reflect for a moment on the missed opportunities of 1967. At that time, the Arabs—bitterly disappointed with the Soviets—might have been responsive if given a way out, though we will never know. We do know that no generous and concrete Israeli offer, backed overtly by the United States, was made. Some friends of Israel argued for precisely that in the White House, but they were overruled by those in Washington and Tel Aviv who preferred “to let the dust settle.”

We may be moving toward a situation in which something along the above lines may become both possible and necessary. The U.S. should continue pressing publicly for a compromise settlement, but the Soviets have absolutely no incentive to go along, given their longer-term calculations. They could, however, become more interested if they were confronted with the real possibility of a major new clash, with their bases in the U.A.R. and their logistical lines still quite vulnerable.

A WAY OUT

The Soviet evaluation of the dangers of such a clash would depend heavily on their reading of the U.S. role. The Soviets, no doubt, actually prefer the U.S. to give the Israelis a few more Phantoms than for the U.S. to become itself more actively involved. The Phantoms will not qualitatively change the situation; they still mean that Israel is on its own, and they help to consolidate further Soviet influence in the Arab world. But a demonstrable increase in U.S. naval presence—coupled with further U.S. efforts to obtain a settlement—would signal something altogether different in the event that the Arabs and the Soviets remained unresponsive to new compromise proposals.

An overt Israeli peace plan would be an essential component of such a strategy. It could involve basically a return to the 1967 frontiers, with some special arrangements for religious Jerusalem in exchange for a Jordanian (Arab-Palestinian) free port zone in Haifa, and some security adjustments. Some Arabs might be responsive to this, since not all of them enjoy being used as pawns in a larger chess game. Moreover, as Professor Avineri of Hebrew University has written recently, “Cooperation between our peoples will be possible only when each feels secure in its own spheres of legitimate existence—when Jews stop fearing that Arabs want to push them into the sea and Arabs stop fearing that the Israelis want to take over more and more Arab territory.” Such an Israeli peace plan, coupled with more direct American concern, could go a long way toward achieving an eventual settlement, either with or without new hostilities.

60

Newsweek, June 15, 1970

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

ON

NEW NUCLEAR IDEAS

The very tentative agreement in SALT about the priorities of seeking an eventual agreement is a welcome first step, provided it does eventually lead to a more comprehensive limit on offensive weaponry. But agreement or no agreement, crises between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. may still occur, and they will do so in a setting in which parity in non-survivability is the new reality of American-Soviet relations. That new reality is relatively simple in the event of an unlimited war: both societies would perish. But how the relations between the two states will unfold short of that apocalyptic eventuality is likely to prove more decisive for the future of mankind.

It is very important to reflect on this novel relationship and to draw responsible conclusions from it. It is possible that much of our intellectual arsenal, acquired during the 25 years of the cold war, has now become antiquated.

Take the role of nuclear weapons and the concept of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear weapons, in the context of American monopoly, were briefly, and tragically, fighting weapons; later, in the setting of overwhelming American superiority, they became deterrent weapons; it is quite likely that in the context of relative parity they will become psychological bargaining weapons.

**STRATEGIC CREDIBILITY:** Accordingly, such long-established concepts as strategic credibility may be becoming dated. Credibility made sense when the stronger wanted to deter the weaker: precise knowledge of the margin of one's superiority was helpful to deterrence. In the setting of parity, precise knowledge may put a premium on bluffing and particularly tempt the government that is better able to control its public to test the will of the adversary. Hence a limited measure of strategic ambiguity concerning both sides' systems and posture may be a more compelling source of restraint, provided it does not seem to give one side a decisive first-strike edge.

It may also turn out that it takes more to bar-

gain than to fight. In other words, massive overkill is pointless in the actuality of a war; in the setting of a crisis, national determination, derived in part from the nation's own sense of power, may prove to be of vital importance to the ability of a government neither to panic nor to overreact.

These new problems are not discussed in the Defense Report issued in March. The new defense posture of the U.S. is labeled as "the strategy of realistic deterrence", and its aim is said to be "deterrence of armed conflict at all levels," but the crucial political-psychological dimensions of the new U.S.-Soviet relationship are hardly examined. Instead, the document deals in relatively traditional terms with deterrence, ignoring the probability that the vital issues of the future are likely to be resolved in the vast no-man's land between actual war and true peace.

**DOMESTIC DIVISION:** In view of this, and given also the domestic division over foreign policy, the President would be well-advised to appoint a special commission to reflect on the implications of the new situation. Such a commission should be bipartisan, and it should include statesmen of divergent persuasion (e.g., Senators William Proxmire and Henry Jackson); it should also include men concerned with the political-psychological aspects of the dynamics of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

The key question for the future is not what happens during a war but what could happen without a war, in the setting of a crisis. This matter calls not for a passionate debate but for very serious and systematic examination. A high-level commission, truly bipartisan in spirit as well as form, could take the national-security issue out of the domain of emotion and politics. It could render a vital national service by dealing nationally with a uniquely complicated political and intellectual task: how to infuse stability into the U.S.-Soviet relationship without jeopardizing long-term American interests. SALT is only a part of the answer.

64

Newsweek, June 7, 1971