SALT/Arms Control - 1969

June 10 Memo to President summarizing state of SALT
preparations

US cancels Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL)
program

June 12 RG meeting on SALT agrees that first NSC meeting on SALT will focus on scope of agreement and introduce itself to major issues. ACDA's "stop-where-we-are" proposal and other proposed packages would be used as illustrations

June 14 Henry Owen views on MIRV-SALT-ABM issues

June 16 HK suggests creating MIRV panel (G. Smith telcon)

HK forwards staff analysis of deep undercurrent
of worry among our allies on SALT. British
"disturbed" and Germans "deeply agitated"

June 18 NSC meeting on SALT (NSSM 28)

Brooke tells HK (telcon) he had to submit MIRV
ban resolution "as matter of conscience". 40
co-sponsors

June 19 RG meeting on verification (stop-where-we-are proposal). RG considers report, asks OSD/JCS to prepare counterarguments. SWWA looks good for US; therefore may not be negotiable. Steering Group is asked to prepare specific negotiating models and assess verification problems for NSC

MIRV panel meets to seek consensus on facts re
MIRV testing and deployment

HK directive to State transmits President's desire
that alternative SALT proposals based on the
"limited, intermediate and comprehensive" options
developed in NSSM 28 study be considered at 6/25
NSC meeting

Vietnam - 1969

-17-

Oct. 23
President wants Menu strikes every day next week, including DMZ. Laird tells HK there are only "water buffalo" to hit. (telcon)

HK expresses concern to Laird that Vang Pao's army in Laos is roaming around. Shouldn't they sit tight? Laird agrees, especially if B-52 strikes are planned. HK hopes Ambassador is in control. (telcon)

HK asks Wheeler and Laird for 3 day retaliatory package (related to Duck Hook) concentrated on military objectives, in case casualties go up. (telcons)

Oct. 24
Laird tells HK he has found some targets in DMZ, but "not good ones." Risk press will pick it up. (telcon)

HK directive to DOD that President wants a contingency plan for the conduct of a 3-day retaliatory air and naval compaign against North Vietnam - in order "to impose maximum damage against remunerative military and war-supporting targets...to demonstrate the ability and willingness of the United States to resume full-scale air and naval operations against North Vietnam..."

In response to Haldeman directive from the President that HK talk to Senator Scott to "make sure he stops his talk on ceasefire," HK reports he has talked to Scott in "strong terms" (Scott has been "way out of bounds")

HK briefing memo for Pres. 10/27 meeting with Dean Acheson to discuss Southern Africa, Vietnam.

Oct. 25
HK advises Herb Klein that the NSC should not be drawn deeply into public relations effort to support Admin. policy on Vietnam but HK offers services of the VIG office on NSC.

Pres. wants Lodge in Paris to call for restricted session, wants White House to clear all US statements. Lodge should hint at "new approach," since only thing agreed in year is shape of table. (telcons)

Strategic Policy - 1969

2.

<table>
  <tr>
    <td>March 15</td>
    <td>HK tells President (telcon) that Soviets (according to Marvin Kalb) reacted mildly to ABM announcement. HK calls Dobrynin and notes conciliatory TASS statement.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>March 17</td>
    <td>Clark Clifford praises ABM decision as "excellent" (telcon).</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>March 19</td>
    <td>Brzezinski (telcon) supports ABM decision.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 19</td>
    <td>Laird tells HK (telcon) of SS-9 test with three warheads, but maximum range wouldn't hit US cities.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>April 22</td>
    <td>Laird analysis of Soviet ICBM and ABM testing.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 23</td>
    <td>NSSM 57 asks review of US Civil Defense Policies.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 26</td>
    <td>NSSM 58 asks review of Planning Assumptions for Civil Emergency Preparedness.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>May 29</td>
    <td>RG discusses strategic posture. Doctrinal decisions on shaping our strategic forces will guide our SALT positions.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 4</td>
    <td>President approves REDCOSTE proposals of the Under Secretaries Committee.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 12</td>
    <td>RG meeting on SALT (NSSM 28).</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 13</td>
    <td>NSC meeting on strategic posture (NSSM 3).</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 18</td>
    <td>NSC meeting on strategic posture and SALT discusses criteria of strategic sufficiency.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td rowspan="3">June 19</td>
    <td>First meeting of MIRV Panel to examine consequences of MIRV test ban.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>President at news conference rejects Brooke proposal of unilateral MIRV moratorium.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>HK memo to President reports on final dates for missile deployment of Phase I of SAFEGUARD (1973 and 74 dates).</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td rowspan="2">June 24</td>
    <td>MIRV Panel meets.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>NSDM 15 declares four criteria of strategic sufficiency.</td>
  </tr>
  <tr>
    <td>June 26</td>
    <td>HK memo to President transmits Laird ideas on program to test reliability of Minuteman II. President approves, asking DOD to submit formal recommendation.</td>
  </tr>
</table>

General Purpose Forces - 1969

Sep 5 NSSM 3 study completed

Sep 10 NSC mtg reviews 5 alternative worldwide strategies for general purpose forces, along with respective guidelines for force planning and projected FY 71-75 DOD budgets

Sep 19 Pres approves HK recommendation to support compromise DOD/State position on troop reductions in Thailand: Withdrawal of 6000 to be done by 7/1/70. (DOD had urged 12/31/69 deadline while State argued for Aug or Sep 1970)

* Laird briefing on draft and draft reform

* Pres announcement on reduced draft calls "made possible by the reduction in our forces of 60,000 in Vietnam"

Sep 22 DOD announces US forces will be reduced by 77,500 men in order to save additional $356 million

Sep 24 Pres. mtg with Laird and JCS to receive DOD views on defense expenditures for FY 70 and 71

Sep 26 HK memo to Selective Service transmits NSC views on graduate school deferments re draft reform (Public announcement on Oct 1)

Oct 8 NSSM 78 asks review of guidelines, standards, procedures for draft deferments and exemptions. Due Dec 1

Oct 10 Pres. announces appointment of General Hershey as Advisor on Manpower Mobilization

Oct 11 NSDM 26 creates DPRC to review diplomatic, political, military and economic consequences of decisions on defense strategy, force deployments and issues

* NSDM 27 directs that Worldwide Strategy 2 as described in General Purpose Forces section of NSSM 3 study of Sept 5 (1 1/2 war strategy) is approved US strategy for general purposes forces. NSDM lists general budget guidelines for planning purposes, calls for DOD annually to develop 5-yr force and program plan and rationale to be reviewed by DPRC.

Oct 14 Pres. approves HK recommendation (based on USC study) that the US move quickly to consult with NATO allies to explain our reductions in force commitments

STRATEGIC POLICY - 1969

Jan. 21 . NSSM 3 asks for comprehensive review of US military posture and balance of power.

. NSSM 8 asks study of technical questions on US
strategic posture, including reliability and
command and control.

Jan. 27 President at press conference endoreses concept of "sufficiency". Ziegler queries HK (telcon), who tells him President has not changed his position.

Feb. 4 NSC meeting on SIOP.

Feb. 6 RG discussion of strategic policy begins with dis-
cussion of overall objectives of strategic forces.

Feb. 14 NSC meeting on strategic policy. President asks for strategic portion of NSSM 3 study to be ready by May 1. He asks for study of possible SALT positions within three months, but giving no public hint that US is committed to holding the talks.

Feb. 20 . NSSM 23 requests study of amendments to FY 70 Defense Budget, especially re Sentinel ABM program.

. NSSM 24 asks for analysis of Soviet perceptions
of military balance (merged with NSSM 3 study).

NSSM 25 requests study of Cape Keraudren Nuclear Excavation Project and Limited Test Ban Treaty, and options by which we might proceed with the project. (Project cancelled.)

March 5
NSC meeting on FY 70 Defense Budget and DOD-proposed "modified Sentinel ABM", which emphasizes protection of Minuteman.

March 8
HK and President (telcon) discuss ABM as "protection for the deterrent". Fear that we may lose it in Senate (later telcon).

March 11
State Dept. (Rogers telcon) suggests stretch-out of actual ABM deployment. HK tells Packard (telcon) it could kill the program.

March 14
. Nixon announces SAFEGUARD ABM program. HK backgrounder on decision.

. HK telcons with Bundy, Weisner et al try to calm
intellectual community on ABM.

Strategic Policy - 1969

2.

March 15 HK tells President (telcon) that Marvin Kalb says Soviets reacted mildly to ABM announcement. HK calls Dobrynin and notes conciliatory TASS statement.

March 17 Clark Clifford praises ABM decision as"excellent" (telcon).

March 19 Brzezinski (telcon) supports ABM decision.

April 19 Laird tells HK (telcon) of SS-9 test with three warheads, but maximum range wouldn't hit US cities.

April 22 Laird analysis of Soviet ICBM and ABM testing.

May 23 NSSM 57 asks review of US Civil Defense Policies.

May 26 NSSM 58 asks review of Planning Assumptions for Civil Emergency Preparedness.

May 29 RG discusses strategic posture. Doctrinal decisions on shaping our strategic forces will guide our SALT positions.

June 4 President approves REDCOSTE proposals of the Under Secretaries Committee.

June 12 RG meeting on SALT (NSSM 28).

June 13 NSC meeting on strategic posture (NSSM 3) considers basic issues of sufficiency -- nature of Soviet threat and adequacy of US forces.

June 18 NSC meeting on strategic posture and SALT reviews the four criteria of strategic sufficiency (strategic deterrence, crisis stability, equal destruction, damage limitation).

June 19 First meeting of MIRV Panel to examine consequences of MIRV test ban.

* President at news conference rejects Brooke proposal of unilateral MIRV moratorium.

* HK memo to President reports on final dates for missile deployment of Phase I of SAFEGUARD.

June 24 MIRV Panel meets.

* NSDM 15 declares four criteria of strategic sufficiency (Strategic deterrence, crisis stability, equal destruction, damage limitation).

June 26 HK memo to President transmits Laird program to test reliability of Minuteman II. President approves, asks DOD for formal recommendation.

STRATEGIC POLICY - 1969

July 1 HK and Symington argue over ABM (see Laird telcon)

Pres approves HK recommendation for follow-up to NSSM 3 with further NSSMs on US strategic posture. [One study would be on "US Strategic Capabilities" - to obtain analyses of less than all-out nuclear conflicts and of measures of war outcome other than the number of dead, i.e. extend the doctrine of strategic sufficiency to situations the Pres might actually face. The other study would be on the Relationship of Strategic and Theatre Forces in NATO - to analyze in depth the contribution of strategic forces and tactical nuclear forces to deterring and coping with conventional and tactical nuclear wars etc]

July 3 HK invites Gov. Dewey to serve on Disarmament Advisory Council, says we can get by 5-6 years or so but another 10 years of military deterioration will put US in very difficult position diplomatically

July 8 NSSM 64 asks for the follow-on studies evaluating (a) US capability to deter and respond to less than all-out Soviet attacks; (b) a range of possible war outcome measures such a surviving military and other economic assets; (c) command and control adequacy. Due Oct 1

NSSM 65 asks for the analysis of relationship among strategic, tactical nuclear and conventional forces for deterring or defending NATO

July 10 Sen. Percy urges MIRV moratorium and ABM delay (HK argues against)

July 15 Pres asks HK to meet with Howard Hughes re Safeguard ABM (Hughes against deployment)

Aug. 6 US Senate approves authorization for SAFEGUARD ABM by 51-49.

Aug. 12 Pres. letter to Kiesinger affirming LBJ understandings (ltr of 9/9/68) on consultations between US and FRG on use of nuclear weapons; matter to remain secret; issue raised during Kiesinger visit.

Sep. 15 Pres. approves HK recommendation that US confirm to UK existing understandings with regard to consultation on use of nuclear weapons; Nixon letter to Wilson (similar to US-FRG exchange).

Strategic Policy - 1969

Oct. 11 NSDM 26 establishes DPRC to review diplomatic, military, political and economic consequences of defense strategies, budgets, and deployments.

Oct. 21 DPRC meets to discuss procedures, FY 71 DOD Budget, and interagency involvement in 5-Year Force and Program Plan. (Packard not ready to discuss SAFEGUARD.)

Nov. 13 DPRC meets to discuss FY 71 programs.

Nov. 17 HK tells Laird that President has approved Phase II of SAFEGUARD ABM and SALT delegation should guide themselves accordingly (telcon).

Nov. 25 Presidential announcement of policy on chemical and biological defense policies and program (will ask the Senate to approve the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and renounce deadly biological weapons-DOD will study options for disposing existing bacteriological weapons).

Nov. 26 HK transmits to Pres. latest NIE on Soviet strategic attack forces. HK argues that NIE process is faulty and has produced superficial study: "...the most serious defect is the lack of sharply defined clearly-argued discussions of the characteristics and purposes of Soviet strategic forces. Admittedly, it is harder to be precise about Soviet deployment objectives or war planning than about the wing span of a bomber prototype. But there is evidence relevant to these questions - ranging from studies of missile silo orientation to analyses of power relationships in the Politburo - and it should be reflected." President totally agrees noting that "This report is virtually useless except for a superficial mindless recitation of what we know from the daily press - i.e., that the USSR is building lots of new missiles".

Dec. 9
* Laird reports Soviet SS-11 test confirms CEP of one mile (telcon).

* DPRC discusses budgeting for SAFEGUARD and new strategic bomber.

Strategic Policy - 1969

Dec 15 ABM wins key vote in Senate, 45-36.

Dec 19 DPRC meets on budgeting for Safeguard. HK stresses that Pres. wants to go ahead with Phase II.

HK tells Laird that Pres. wants Phase II of Safeguard ABM started; level doesn't make that much difference. Pres. wants principle of area defense established (telcon).

Dec 29 NSSM 54 Part I concludes that US naval shipbuilding industry is adequate in total capacity but woefully backward in adopting modern production and management techniques used abroad, including in the USSR. However, Navy said to be introducing new techniques. Part II on US naval and merchant marine shipbuilding concludes that the US should not count on post-mobilization construction to meet wartime needs. (HK sends to Pres.)

Dec 30 HK tells Packard that Pres. wants some Phase II to include some area defense capability, if only for bargaining effect (telcon).

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES - 1969

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Jan. 21</td>
      <td>NSSM 3 asks comprehensive review of US military posture and balance of power.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>NSSM 6 asks review of NATO policy questions of US troops levels, German offset, US nuclear relations with UK and France, consultations within NATO, and US policy toward intra-European defense cooperation.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 20</td>
      <td>NSSM 24 asks for full reappraisal of conventional and tactical nuclear strategies in light of strategic balance, as part of NSSM 3 study.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Apr. 8</td>
      <td>NSC Meeting on NATO.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Apr. 14</td>
      <td>NSDM 12 on REDCOSTE and Offset.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Apr. 26</td>
      <td>NSSM 50 asks review of US Naval Shipbuilding Capabilities and Requirements.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>May 13</td>
      <td>Nixon message on draft reform (lottery system).</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>May 29-30</td>
      <td>NATO Nuclear Planning Group Meeting (US paper on consultations on use of nuclear weapons).</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 4</td>
      <td>Nixon plugs defense in Air Force Academy Commencement Address.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 19</td>
      <td>HK memo to President reports final dates on deployment of Phase I of SAFEGUARD (1973 and 74 dates).</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 8</td>
      <td>NSSM 65 asks study of relationships between strategic and theater forces for NATO</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 9</td>
      <td>US announces reduction of overseas defense establishment by 20,000 personnel before 7/1/70</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 14</td>
      <td>NSSM 69 asks review of US nuclear policy in Asia</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 21</td>
      <td>HK directive to State relays Pres. desire for a 10% reduction in all American overseas civilian direct hire by USG and certain military personnel</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sep 4</td>
      <td>HK sends Prs. DOD report on draft reform with possible schedules of reduced draft calls covering both various levels of reduction and a moratorium for one or more months. Laird recommends "moving age group" system in the event Congress fails to act</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

General Purpose Forces - 1969

Sep. 5 NSSM 3 study completed.

Sep. 10 NSC meeting reviews 5 alternative worldwide strategies for general purpose forces, along with respective guidelines for force planning and FY 71-75 DOD budgets.

Sep. 19 President approves HK recommendation to support com-
promise DOD/State position on troops reductions in
Thailand: Withdrawal of 6000 to be done by 7/1/70.
(DOD had urged 12/31/69 deadline while State argues
for August or September 1970).

. Laird briefing on draft and draft reform.

* President announces reduced draft calls "made possible by the reduction in our forces of 60,000 in Vietnam".

Sep. 22 DOD announces US forces will be reduced by 77,500 men in order to save additional $356 million.

Sep. 24 Pres. meeting with Laird and JCS to receive DOD views on defense expenditures for FY 70 and 71.

Sep. 26 HK memo to Selective Service transmits NSC views on reform of graduate school deferments (announcement Oct. 1).

Oct. 8 NSSM 78 asks review of guidelines, standards, procedures for draft deferments and exemptions. Due Dec. 1.

Oct. 10 Pres. announces appointment of General Hershey as Advisor on Manpower Mobilization (relieved as draft head February 15).

Oct. 11 NSDM 26 creates DPRC to review diplomatic, political, military and economic consequences of decisions on defense strategy, force deployments and issues.

NSDM 27 directs that Worldwide Strategy 2 of General Purpose Forces section of September 5 NSSM 3 study (1-1/2 war strategy) is approved US strategy for general purpose forces. NSDM lists general budget guidelines for planning purposes, calls for DOD annually to develop 5-year force and program plan and rationale for review by DPRC.

Oct. 14 Pres. approves HK recommendation (based on USC study) that US move quickly to consult with NATO to explain reductions in force commitments.

General Purpose Forces - 1969

Oct 16 Memo pertaining to study on Selective Service Deferments and Exemptions. HK notes that Flanigan should take the lead

Oct 21 DPRC meets to discuss procedures, FY 71 DOD budget and interagency involvement in 5-yr Force and Program plan

Oct 22 In response to a Pres. memo complaining about DOD cuts without selectivity (no fat ever gets cut) and Pres. interest that "we ought to be putting more into the strategic forces and less in the conventional forces, per reasons that we have previously discussed," HK responds with a memo that: "It is true that for a bureaucracy it is more comfortable to cut muscle - such as key operation - than to cut fat in support elements." HK argues that the new DPRC should help move DOD towards more selective cuts

Oct 23 Special Pres. message to Congress on new program for merchant marine

Oct 27 Laird announces closure or contraction of 300 military bases in US and overseas in order to save $600 million a year

Oct 30 Pres. statement urges Senate reconsider its blocking of draft reform legislation until following year

Nov 8 Laird briefing on pending draft legislation

Nov 13 DPRC meets to consider FY 71 DOD budget (Packard not read to discuss Safeguard. (Lynn worried that Laird wants to kell DPRC). Vietnam withdrawals, carriers, strategic bombers and NATO deployments discussed

Nov 21 NSSM 84 asks review of US strategies and forces for NATO

HK returns to DOD latter's response to NSSM 50 on Navy needs for 1970s as sloppy job. Staff analysis for HK had argued that NSC system would be subverted if DOD allowed to "wash hands" of Navy report and pass buck to HK

Nov 25 Bill signed amending Selective Service Act to permit draft lottery

General Purpose Forces - 1969

Nov 26 Release of new draft selection system fact sheet; Laird/Flanigan press briefing on draft reform

* Announcement on Random Selection for Military Service; Executive Order covering same

* Announcement of plan to reduce US personnel overseas

* Pres. remarks on signing of draft reform bill

Dec 1 Executive Order delegating to Laird the authority to approve regulations governing early discharge of enlisted members

Dec 29 NSSM 54 Part I concludes that US naval shipbuilding industry is adequate in total capacity but woefully backward in adopting modern production and management techniques used abroad, including in USSR. However, Navy said to be introducting new techniques. Part II on US naval and merchant marine shipbuilding concludes that the US should not count on post-mobilization construction to meet wartime needs. (HK sends to Pres.)

ASIA - 1969

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Jan. 21</td>
      <td>NSSM 5 asks review of Japan policy.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 21</td>
      <td>NSSM 26: Military supply policy for South Asia.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 22</td>
      <td>NSSM 27: Program Analysis Study of Korea.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>March 7</td>
      <td>HK memo to President: JCS paper on Okinawa is well done and points up that key issue before the NSC will be impairment of nuclear capabilities resulting from loss of nuclear storage rights. HK argues however that we should not overstress nuclear role of bases or assume that Sato will agree to continued nuclear storage.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>March 18</td>
      <td>HK analysis on Okinawa reversion: "By far the toughest and most crucial issue we face today with Japan."</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>March 19</td>
      <td>NSSM 31: US policy toward Malaysia and Singapore.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>March 20</td>
      <td>Presidential Decision on aid for India.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>March 21</td>
      <td>NSSM 34: Contingency Planning for Korea.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 10</td>
      <td>NSSM 38: Post-Vietnam Asian Policy.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 15</td>
      <td>North Korean aircraft shoot down EC-121 reconnaissance aircraft over Sea of Japan. President/HK telcon discusses disadvantage of seeming weak. President suggests naval blockade.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 16</td>
      <td>NSC Meeting on EC-121 shootdown.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 17</td>
      <td>HK/President telcon discusses retaliation option.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 19</td>
      <td>HK tells Rogers (telcon) President has decided against strike against North Korea, but will continue to move carriers in.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 21</td>
      <td>President approves strategy for handling EC-121 shootdown.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 23</td>
      <td>President (telcon) violently objects to Hickel's proposal of independence for Micronesia.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 24</td>
      <td>Reconnaissance flights resumed without incident.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 25</td>
      <td>RG discusses Japan/Okinawa. Consensus favors some reversion.</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

Note: References to South Asia moved to separate South Asia section at back.

Asia - 1969

2.

April 26 . NSSM 51: Program Analysis of Thailand.

. NSSM 53: Korean Contingency Planning in light of EC-121 shootdown.

April 28
HK tells Laird (telcon) President wants China reconnaissance flights resumed.

April 30 NSC meeting on Japan and Okinawa.

May 2 RG discusses Asia trade.

May 3
Presidential decision on US policy on future status of T.T.P.I.

May 7
NSC meeting on Far East trade mission (concessions we want from Japan).

May 9 Secretary Stans leaves on Far East trade mission.

May 21 HK and Japanese Ambassador discuss Okinawa.

May 23-27
Rogers visits India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran for CENTO meeting in Tehran.

May 26
President approves dropping request for Korean supplemental because of Congressional problems and need to save capital for more important battles. (HK memo to President).

May Marshall Green's trip to Southeast Asia.

May 28
NSDM 13 reaffirms importance of Japan, calls for Japan to undertake somewhat greater role in Asia and in own defense (result of NSSM 5).

May 29
HK sends President status report on difficulties in Okinawa negotiations. Japanese need concessions in other areas (economic). President notes his interest in getting "something on textiles."

June 2 NSSM 61: Policy Review of Indonesia.

June 7 Brezhnev in speech to Moscow Conference of Communist Parties proposes Asian collective security system.

June 23 NSSM 61: Policy Review of Indonesia.

June 28:
President's Asian trip announced. HK backgrounder in New York discusses trip's purpose.

June 2
President requests contingency plan for retaliatory strikes vs. Changjin Power Plant complex in North Korea.

ASIA - 1969

July 1-2 HK meets with Asia scholars in advance of Nixon trip

July 2 WSAG takes up Korea military contingency plans (NSSM 34). HK says Pres. wants precise courses of action for specific situations; aim should be to prevent counterblow

July 7 HK approval of policy guidelines for US-Japanese space cooperation proposed by State, to overcome DOD sensitivity to export of missile hardward and technology

July 10 Pres. tells Indian Foreign Minister of his interest in Asia

July 11 WSAG examines Korea contingency plans in detail

. HK meets with American experts on India/Pak

July 12 HK analysis for Pres. on insurgency in Burma (PRC intentions re Burma, Thailand, Eastern India) concludes that it is not a crisis now and no US action required

July 14 HK explains to BOB director Mayo that aid for Korea is to show response to EC-121 incident (telcon)

. NSSM 69 asks study of US nuclear policy in Asia, i.e. (a) strategic capability vs. PRC, (b) theater nuclear capability in Pacific, (c) nuclear assurances and (d) nuclear proliferation. Due Sept 30

July 16 HK drops hint to Indian Amb. that reception had better be good when Nixon comes

July 18 Pres tells HK we should focus on big issues with Japan, not through State, and leave technical issues for bureaucracy (telcon)

. Flap about leak of gas in Okinawa

July 25 Pres. backgrounder on Guam: "...As we look at Asia, it poses, in my view, over the long haul, looking down to the end of the century, the greatest threat to the peace of the world and for that reason, the United States should continue to play a significant role...as far as the role we should play...we should assist, but we should not dictate...we must avoid that kind of policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent upon us that we are dragged into conflict such as the one we have in Vietnam..."

Asia - 1969

July 26
Pres in Philippines: "But if peace is to come from Asia...the United States will play its part and provide its fair share. But peace in Asia cannot come from the United States. It must come from Asia. The people of Asia...they are the ones who must lead the way to peace in Asia...That is why I compliment the leaders of the Philippines in playing a role..."

July 27
Pres. statement in Indonesia (first visit by US Pres): "...we know you want to be independent and we understand that..."

* Pres statement on Asian Development Bank - strong support for work of bank in context of US policy towards Asia

July 27
Pres statement on departure from Philippines. Discussion of Vietnam, future of Asia in post-VN period and US-Philippine relations..."that the people of Asia must seek Asian solutions to Asian problems..."

July 28
Pres in Thailand: "...we will honor our obligations under that treaty (SEATO)....US will stand proudly with Thailand against those who might threaten it from abroad or from within..." Also, "Whether peace can be maintained in Asia and the Pacific will determine whether peace can be maintained in the world.. our determination to honor our commitments is fully consistent with our conviction that the nations of Asia can and must increasingly shoulder the responsibility for achieving peace and progress in the area...the greatest problem before us is not the war in Vietnam, but the bringing about of a dynamic set of international relationships which guarantee peace and progress..."

[Pres goes to Vietnam, India, Pakistan, Romania...]

July 31
HK has tea in New Delhi with Indian intellectuals

Aug. 1
President in Lahore. HK backgrounder notes US review of South Asian arms embargo. One side has arms industry; other does not.

Aug. 4
HK describes US Asian policy to French PM Chaban at Matignon.

Aug. 8
WSAG refines Korea contingency scenarios.

Asia - 1969

Aug. 9 President's letter to Mansfield supportive of his trip to Southeast Asia.

Aug. 10 In transmitting Mansfield report on his Asian trip to President, HK notes "it is apparent that Sen. Mansfield has chosen to interpret your recent policy statements on Asia as being in effect the adoption of the 'soft' policies which he himself advocates."

Aug. 11 . President's meeting with Amb. Byroade re Philippines.

. Pres. approval of HK recommendation that USIS activities around the world be "cut back drastically" (stimulated by complaints from Thais during Pres. visit to Thailand).

. Pres. meeting with Sec. Rogers following his Asia trip - and press briefing.

Aug. 12 As follow-up to visit to Philippines (and Phil. complaints), Pres. approves NSSM study on the revision of US Military Bases Agreement to bring it into line with the terms under which we occupy bases in other countries.

Aug. 13 Pres. meeting with Secretary Stans to discuss bilateral agreement covering all textile exports to the US from Japan (per Pres. decision not to seek a multilateral agreement involving Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong).

Aug. 14 NSC meeting in San Clemente reviews Korean situation prior to Park visit; later NSC meeting planned in fall to focus on specific questions. Discussion of military situation.

Aug. 21 President meets Park in San Francisco, stresses commitment to ROK. Park welcomes Nixon Doctrine.

Aug. 25 WSAG meets in San Clemente; reviews Korean military contingency plans.

Sep. 10 HK directive to NSSM 27 steering group providing very precise Presidential guidance (per August 14 NSC meeting) on alternative five year programs plans for Korea as outlined in NSDM 4; conveys tentative decisions of Pres. that significant increases in ROK and US forces in Korea (alternative 1 in NSSM 27) not be considered; ROK air and naval forces should be strengthened if necessary to deal with North Korean "hit and run" attacks; US economic assistance to Korea should not be eliminated if it is helpful.

Asia - 1969

Sep. 15
Pres. meeting with Congressional leadership (Fulbright
may raise questions about US role in Thailand).
President opposes providing copies of any contingency
plans to Hill and specifically Project Taksin plan
(covering joint US-Thai operations against aggression
under the more general provisions of SEATO)

Sep. 16
* Presidential meeting with Prime Minister Holyoake
  of New Zealand Toast: "We found we looked at the
  Pacific and Asia through basically the same
  principles..."

* President meets PM Holyoake of New Zealand.

* NSSM 73 asks review of US-Philippines Base Agreement
to bring Agreement into line with others and
eliminate possible Philippine grievances.

Sep. 17
WSAG approves Korea contingency plan (response to
NSSM 34).

Sep. 19
* NSC memo to State conveys Presidential interest in
the success of the candidacy of the Thai Foreign
Minister for the World Court.

* Pres. approves HK recommendation to support com-
promise DOD/State position on troop reductions in
Thailand: Withdrawal of 6000 to be done by July 1,
1970. (DOD had urged by Dec. 31, 1969, while State
urged August or Sep 70 as a result of working level
agreement with Thais in Bangkok.)

Sep. 25
HK memo to Laird requesting study on maintaining a
A-6 equipped carrier within 24 hours of Sea of Japan
as frequently as possible during the next year (Laird
had previously prepared a study on this indicating
there were limits to providing full-time A-6
capability).

Sep. 30
* Announcement of reduction of US forces in Thailand
  (6000 of 48000 US troops will be withdrawn by June 1970).

Oct. 1
HK transmits to Pres. confidential recommendations
of Mansfield following latter's recent trip to South-
east Asia.

Oct. 8
NSSM 77 asks program budgets for Thailand, Korea,
Philippines, Indonesia, Taiwan, India and Pakistan.

Asia - 1969

Oct. 20 HK directive to State on Presidential instructions for revisions in US base agreement with Philippines to bring the agreement into line with the terms under which we occupy bases elsewhere. USC should do a study..."the objective should be to put the Philippines on a most-favored nation basis..."

Oct. 23 Shah asks for more "bluecoats" to help maintain aircraft. President agrees, and HK passes on Presidential order to Laird (telcon).

Nov. 7-10 Pakistani troops called out to suppress renewed rioting in Dacca.

Nov. 17 . HK meets Japanese Okinawa adviser Tanaka, who says nuclear question is key.

. President meets with Indonesian FM Malik, praises Indonesia as key country. Malik hopes for political movement in South Vietnam. President backs regional cooperation.

Nov. 19-21 Sato visit to Washington. Discussion of Okinawa reversion. President urges Japan to take greater military role. Sato promises textile problem will be resolved by end of December. Communique indicates agreement on maintenance of Security Treaty and reversion of Okinawa in 1972.

Nov. 21 Presidential meeting with Congressional leadership to discuss talks with Sato and Okinawa issue.

Nov. 25 . RG considers NSSM 26 study on military supply for South Asia. Paper to be revised to consider question of resuming military aid to Pakistan.

. Gen. Wheeler report on talk with Park of South Korea. Park concerned that war is inevitable if US forces are withdrawn; Park insists ROK must have independent defense capability (implying that at some point in the future the ROK might "go it alone" with respect to No. Korea). President writes: "I want a plan developed now to bring about the ROK takeover - U.S. to provide a tripwire and air and SAM support only."

Dec. 1 Wakaizumi assures HK that Sato stands by the Nixon-Sato understanding on textiles and Jap. Amb. Shimoda is instructed accordingly. HK informs Alex Johnson (telcons).

Asia - 1969

Dec. 8 State analysis of Japanese reaction to Sato visit
notes critical comment centered on the communique's
preoccupation with security questions and on the
ambiguity of the communique language concerning
nuclear weapons.

Dec. 9 White House staff report of incredible performance
by Amb. McClintock at Symington hearings - McClintock
seen to have caved totally, straying way of
reservation.

Dec. 12
HK report to Pres. that study is underway for reducing
US presence in Korea. Pres. had written HK memo
arguing that: "the time has come" to reduce US Korean
presence..."We could not do so because of the EC 121
at any earlier date but I do not want us to continue
to temporize with this problem...maintain the air and
sea presence at whatever level is necessary for the
kind of retaliatory strike which we have planned...
cut the number of Americans there in half..."

Dec 22
RG meets on Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore
(NSSMs 31 and 61). Key issues are Indonesian
MAP and US involvement in continued operation of
Singapore base.

Dec 24
Pres. remarks at news briefing prior to Asia trip
by VP Agnew (25 day trip) (South Asia included).
Agnew to discuss Nixon Doctrine, programs for Asian
development after Vietnam.

Dec 29
HK, Armin Meyer note LDP success in previous day's
elections, see it as product of our Okinawa policy
(telcon).

Dec 31
Agency assessment of North Korean tactics towards
South is that Kim will stop armed harassment for
present, emphasize propaganda and political sub-
version...No. Korean brinksmanship has not generated
sufficient international support or support from
Peking and Moscow. HK sends to Pres. noting that
"it seems quite possible that the warning to Dobrynin
may have played a role in the change of Kim's tactics
to a less overt use of force."

HK analysis for Pres. of Japanese elections notes
collapse of left-wing socialists, "strong" victory
for Sato and the benefits of this for the American
alliance and relatively conservative Japanese
policies at home.

* _________

Dec 9
Pres. approves (12/15) letter to Chiang Kai-shek to
allay latter's concern over de-activation of Taiwan
Straits patrol; HK also against F-4s for ROC.

VIETNAM - 1969

Jan. 16 US and DRV announce agreement on shape of the table.

Jan. 21 First NSC meeting. Rogers says Harriman told him US really had no negotiating objectives in mind in Paris talks. HK notes lack of USG consensus on facts. President stresses (1) importance of US-GVN mutual confidence and (2) willingness to take the heat now rather than show undue optimism.

* NSSM 1 issued: Situation in Vietnam. Questions addressed to State, Defense, DCI, US Ambassador Saigon, JCS, MACV to prepare separate responses.

* HK recommends to President further study of USG opening statement at 1st Plenary session talks in Paris since draft which State forwarded (Vance drafted) is too much like LBJ position.

Jan. 22 Rostow memo to HK re proposed Nixon-Lodge "seven points"

* Draft statement for Paris talks.

Jan. 24 HK meets with GVN Ambassador Bui Diem, pledges cooperation.

Jan. 25 NSC meeting on Vietnam alternative outcomes and alternative strategies. (Paper prepared by NSC staff prior to Inauguration.) President asks USG to explore (1) ending the draft, (2) restoring relations with Sihanouk.

* HK tasks State, Defense, CIA to develop contingency plans re stepped-up activity of infiltrators assembled for attack on Saigon.

Jan. 30 HK meets at Pentagon with Laird and Wheeler, asks planning for steps to signal escalatory intentions.

Jan. 31 HK informs Roger of contacts with DRV before January 20.

Feb. 5 Nixon at press conference says question of U.S. troop withdrawals was "high on agenda of priorities", and depends on US training program, ARVN capabilities, and Paris peace talks.

-2-

Feb. 9 Gen. Abrams sends message to Wheeler indicating that recent intelligence from rallier and photos shows COSVN HQ just over Cambodian border, requests authority to attack with B-52's.

Feb. 11 NSSM 19 issues: SVN internal security capabilities.

Nixon meeting with Laird, HK, and Gen. McConnell on Vietnam: Are we maintaining enough pressure on the enemy? HK urges caution.

HK asks Helms (telcon) about status of earlier request re actions on Cambodia.

Feb. 12 HK asks Helms (telcon) if anything can be done about Cambodian assistance to NVA.

Feb. 13 NSSM 21 creates Ad Hoc Group on Vietnam.

NSSM 22 issues: Contingency Planning for renewed Communist attacks on urban centers or assassination of President of GVN.

Feb. 14 HK, in memo to President, endorses State approach to resuming relations with Cambodia: "Should we decide to step up military action against North Vietnamese in Cambodia, our case will be strengthened if we can demonstrate that at outset of your Administration you sought improvement in relations..."

Vietcong high command orders forces to "launch new simultaneous attacks" and "increase military pressure on all fronts" during new year.

Amb. Lodge's views on negotiating strategy.

Feb. 18 RG considers NSSM 22 papers.

Presidential message of appreciation to Vance at conclusion of his duties in Paris.

Feb. 19 B-52 Options Against COSVN Headquarters. HK recommends strike if suitable local action pretex t can be found (III Corps/Fish Hook vicinity). Otherwise should be deferred until end of March.

Feb. 22-23 Communist forces launch series of mortar and rocket attacks on some 115 targets in South Vietnam, including Saigon, Danang, Hue and US base at Bien Hoa.

-3-

Feb. 22 President approves B-52 option against COSVN.
HK informs Laird.

HK tells Dobrynin (telcon) that if situation
in Vietnam turns into general offensive or
attack on cities, we would have to respond
very strongly.

Feb. 24 Meeting between HK, Haldeman, Haig and Col. Sitton in Brussels and on AF-1: Approval of Breakfast strike discussed.

Feb. 25 Laird message to President urges against
Breakfast strike.

Feb. 26 President in Bonn cancels Breakfast strike.

Mar. 2 President meets with VP Ky in Paris.

Mar. 3 HK reaction to JCS memo on possible or feigned military actions to "signal" US escalatory intent: HK suggests "lower profile" options be considered, those "with less risk of international and domestic turbulence".

Mar. 4 President to press minimizes NVA offensive.

Helms sends options for reduction in movement
of NVA/VC supplies through Cambodia, says
"Risks would be low." HK transmits to President
without comment.

Mar. 5 Saigon shelled. Laird leaves on visit to Vietnam.

Mar. 6 HK analysis of offensive: "Enemy has made determined effort to keep attacks at level just below point where bombing halt agreements blatantly abrogated".

Mar. 7 Report from Paris on efforts to arrange meeting with Xuan Thuy.

HK tells Rogers (telcon) that lull in Vietnam
may be prelude to private talks.

HK and Moorer (telcon) discuss quick counterstrike.
Rogers (telcon) objects to Breakfast strike on
Mar. 9.

-4-

Mar. 8 Rogers/Dobrynin meeting. ROgers strays off the reservation and endorses four-party political talks.

HK and Packard (telcon) discuss Breakfast plan. HK tells Haldeman (telcon) that Packard protested cancellation. HK agrees with Rogers that move should be postponed for now. HK recommends to President (telcon) that it be done, but later. Hanoi must be worried by Sino-Soviet feud.

HK tells President (7:10 pm telcon) that Breakfast strike after private talks begin could be blamed for break-up. Discussion of Rogers' gaffe with Dobrynin about political talks.

HK draft memo "Reflections on De-escalation".

Mar. 10 Enemy rockets hit Hue.

Mar. 11 Swedish analysis sees DRV "more willing to compromise than ever before".

HK tells Haldeman (telcon) that before April is out, "we will be in a fight with State on Vietnam."

Mar. 12 NSSM 29 requests papers on Negotiating Strategy and Mutual Withdrawal Proposal.

Mar. 14 Summary of responses to NSSM 1 circulated for comment.

President at press conference reiterates warning against renewed NVA offensive.

President approves instructions for private talks (Lodge) in Paris negotiations.

HK explains to Rogers (telcon) why US-DRV talks should be on military, not political, issues.

Mar. 15 Five rockets fired into Saigon.

President (telcon) orders immediate implementation of Breakfast Plan, not appealable. State to be notified only after point of no return. HK informs Laird.

Vietnam - 1969

5.

March 21 Thieu conversations with Bunker. Mutual withdrawal as focus of private talks.

March 24 Indonesian analysis suggests NVA and VC are hurting.

March 25. Thieu press conference declares readiness to have direct private talks with NLF.

. Transcript of Clark Clifford remarks on Vietnam (later published in Foreign Affairs) - plea for phased unilateral withdrawal.

. President decision to defer any decisions on proposals for a quarantine of Cambodia "until we get another crack or two at Cambodia."

March 26 President in press conference says progress in Paris negotiations will come in private talks and he will not disclose content.

March 27 NLF rejects private talks with GVN.

March 28 NSC Meeting on Vietnam Game Plan. President decides: no de-escalation except by mutual withdrawal; US should declare willingness to accept mutual withdrawal.

March 31 President approves further steps in evolution of relations with Sihanouk -- issuance of border declaration following consultations with allies.

April 1 . NSDM 9 issued as result of NSC meeting and NSSM 29 Study: no de-escalation outside of mutual withdrawal; no repudiation of Manila formula (6-month waiting period); request for additional NSSM's.

. Confusion over apparent DOD announcement of B-52 cutback. Laird tells HK (telcon) that LBJ budget reduced B-52 Sorties from 1800 to 1600 on April 1, but Laird had continued 1800 to June 30, after which they must go down to 1600. HK also discusses with Richardson.

April 3 . Dobrynin asks HK about US "intentions to expand the war."

. Reston (telcon) sees B-52 cutback as signal "because you don't do a thing like this for purely budgetary reasons."

Vietnam - 1969

6.

April
March 4

* HK meets VP Ky at GVN Chancery, pledges mutual confidence.

* HK memo to President outlines strategy for Vance mission.

* HK/Rogers telcon discusses misleading press reports of B-52 "cutback" and alleged 50,000 troop withdrawal.

April 5 President/HK telcon discusses hitting North and then sending Vance.

April 7 President Thieu proposes "Six Points" for settlement in address to National Assembly

April 8 . HK memo to DOD: Quarantine of Cambodia project to be held in abeyance.

US paper on Mutual Withdrawals sent to Embassy Saigon for Bunker's consultations with GVN.

April 10 . Presidential decision to use the Australian route
re improvement in GVN-Cambodian relations instead
of contacts elsewhere such as New Delhi.

. NSSM 36 issued: Requests specific timetable for
Vietnamizing the war (including alternative completion
dates for turnover of combat role).

. NSSM 37 requests studies on mutual withdrawal,
Vietnamization, verification for mutual withdrawal,
South Vietnamese political settlement, and inter-
national guarantees.

April 12 . HK memo to DOD on Haiphong mining feint. Breakfast-
Lunch not contemplated immediately.

. US announces it had sent note to Cambodia recognizing
its sovereignty and integrity.

April 14 Negotiating strategy paper (reflecting NSDM 9) approved.

April 15 . No. Korea shootdown of US reconnaissance plane:
options for a response.

* President toys with doing Lunch Plan in wake of
No. Korean shootdown of EC-121. HK says we should
do Lunch Plan "only if they turn us down on the
other".

Vietnam - 1969

7.

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>April 16</td>
      <td>Cambodia announces resumption of relations.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 17</td>
      <td>
        <ul>
          <li>HK tells President (telcon) "we may be forced into even bolder move a year from now if we don't do this one" (i.e., react sharply to EC-121 shootdown).</li>
          <li>President/HK telcon discusses Sihanouk correspondence. HK says "it's practically on invitation".</li>
        </ul>
      </td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 20</td>
      <td>Laird says US would accept NLF representatives in freely elected SVN government.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 22</td>
      <td>
        <ul>
          <li>Laos - rain suggestion. (A Helms idea)</li>
          <li>Presidential meeting (State, Defense, JCS, HK) to approve scenario for B-52s and Cambodia.</li>
        </ul>
      </td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 24</td>
      <td>
        <ul>
          <li>Decision of caution re armed escort for reconnaissance flights near PRC and Eastern USSR (after Korean incident).</li>
          <li>HK recommends Executive Privilege re House Armed Services Committee inquiry on reconnaissance activities broadened to include EC-121 incident.</li>
          <li>HK memo to President outlines a "peace plan" speech and a scenario for negotiation on political settlement.</li>
        </ul>
      </td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 25</td>
      <td>
        <ul>
          <li>HK recommendation to President that he move ahead with speech given negotiating situation.</li>
          <li>Breakfast-Lunch report.</li>
          <li>HK directive to State: Presidential approval to resume reconnaissance. (Gulf of Tonkin to Sea Okhotsk; North Korea orientation will be dealt with separately.)</li>
        </ul>
      </td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 29</td>
      <td>
        <ul>
          <li>Further Abrams' report on Breakfast Bravo and Coco and Lunch.</li>
          <li>Sihanouk changes mind about resuming diplomatic relations. (HK/Rogers telcon)</li>
        </ul>
      </td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 30</td>
      <td>
        <ul>
          <li>Captured COSVN document describes major purpose of VC/NVA offensive as the killing of American troops and states that purpose of planned summer offensive "is to force the Americans to adopt a policy in our direction."</li>
          <li>HK memo to President: Frustration with DOD foot-dragging on implementing President's decision on resumption of flights (re N. Korean incident).</li>
        </ul>
      </td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

Vietnam - 1969

8.

May 1 HK analysis on Vietnamese Communist strategy: "...no longer tailoring their military action to affect the military situation... But...mainly at influencing public opinion in the US." President notes Breakfast may have to occur on a "regular basis".

May 2 HK backgrounder on possible progress in negotiations.

* HK tells Semple of NY Times (telcon) that simple NVA de-escalation of fighting without pullback is insufficient.

May 5 HK meets with five Quakers.

May 6 Vernon Walters report (HK transmits to President) on his talk with Pierre Darcourt, Xuan Thuy and Le Duc Tho.

May 7 HK meets with Amb. Bui Diem.

May 8 NLF announce "Ten Points".

May 9 President meeting with General Abrams.

May 11-13 Communists launch wave of more than 200 attacks on SVN against civilian and military targets.

May 12 Lee Kuan Yew meets with President. He sees Thailand as key.

May 13 Lee Kuan Yew urges HK not to withdraw too fast.

May 13 Sihanouk in press conference says US bombing doesn't concern him.
May 14 Presidential speech on Vietnam outlines new negotiating position: mutual withdrawal.

* Lee Kuan Yew says publicly: US should withdraw gradually so "confidence in American commitments in the region can be maintained."

* HK backgrounders explain new policy.

May 14-19 Rogers trip to South Vietnam.

May 15 Recommendation to President (JCS, HK support) to expand B-52 operations in southern half of DMZ due to major change in level of enemy activity.

Vietnam - 1969

9.

May 16 Paris negotiating session, HK analysis: "...communists clearly engaged in a holding operation in this session...to give your (President's) proposals further study..."

May 18 Harriman urges immediate withdrawal of 50,000 US troops, to be followed by further withdrawals "as North Vietnamese withdraw theirs."

May 19 Laird criticizes North Vietnamese treatment of POW's.

May 21 Japanese Ambassador tells HK President's speech was very well received in Japan.

May 22
* 7-nation Foreign Ministers meeting in Bangkok reviews US-GVN proposal for mutual withdrawal.

* Assessment of May 22 Paris talks: The Communists showed effort to engage in substantive discourse on elements of peace proposal. Of special interest were their comments on withdrawal and a political settlement.

May 23
* HK assessment of Vietnamese Communist reaction to the peace proposals: "...most positive reaction Hanoi has ever made publicly to US proposals for ending the war..."

* President sends instructions to HK to "kill" press stories President has seen indicating that the US would not rule out the replacement of the Thieu government by a caretaker coalition to conduct new elections in SVN.

May 25 Thieu launches new anti-Communist political party.

May 26 President wants White House staff to get out line that US is not escalating the Vietnam war.

May 26-27 HK backgrounders on issues of de-escalation and casualty figures.

May 30 HK and Romanian Amb. Bogdan discuss Vietnam.

May 31 Le Duc Tho - Lodge private meeting in Paris - new tack of proposing to negotiate bilaterally with US on all questions. Hanoi no longer insists we negotiate with NLF but refuses to talk to GVN.

Vietnam - 1969

10.

June 5 Rogers declares US is "not wedded to any government in Saigon."

USAF bombs anti-aircraft batteries in NVN which shot down US reconnaissance plane.

June 6 HK backgrounder at Laguna Beach on forthcoming meeting between Nixon and Thieu in Midway.

June 8 Nixon-Thieu meeting at Midway. Communique. Announcement of first troop withdrawal (25,000 by August 31). Thieu agrees to new US-DRV private talks on military issues; US can listen to DRV political proposals but not reply without consulting GVN.

June 9 HK backgrounder at Laguna Beach assesses Thieu-Nixon meeting.

June 10 American study team accuses GVN of torture.

NLF announces formation of PRG.

Sihanouk's speech to special session of Council of Ministers on conditions for improving US-Cambodian ties.

June 11 HK/Dobrynin discuss Vietnam. HK links US-Soviet relations to Vietnam.

June 13 President approves operation against Dien Bien Phu barracks and storage facilities.

HK recommends "eyes only" consideration of NSSM 36 on Vietnamization due to sensitivity of issue on withdrawals and "rash" of unauthorized disclosures in the press.

President threatens to recognize provisional government for Cuba because Soviets recognized PRG (telcons) (see Richardson telcon June 17).

HK memo to President says situation is not so alarming in Laos as press stories allege.

June 14 HK reports to President on world reaction to President's proposal for a supervisory commission for Vietnam: Vietnamese Communists "have reacted guardedly...not flatly rejected the US concept."

Vietnam - 1969

11.

June 15 Cyrus Vance calls for "standstill ceasefire" by all sides.

June 16 President approves asking Under Secretaries Committee to examine options to improve military situation in Laos (Sullivan memo concluded there was very little more US could do except for arms).

June 18 Rusk (telcon) admits LBJ administration had no serious discussion of de-escalation, denies Harriman charges that Nixon Administration screwed up measures planned by LBJ.

June 19 Nixon responds to Clark Clifford's Foreign Affairs article calling for withdrawal of 100,000 by end of 1969 and of all US ground troops by end of 1970; says he "would hope that we could beat Mr. Clifford's time table."

June 20 LBJ regrets Clifford statements (Tom Johnson telcon).

June 20 President approves special message to Thieu as soon as possible that comments made re withdrawal of US forces at President's press conference of June 19 should be seen in context of buying time in complex domestic situation". Bunker to reaffirm Midway declaration to Thieu and tell him US plans bold moves to speed up settlement.

June 21 Sihanouk says VC have signed a paper admitting that its troops have violated Cambodia's integrity, esp. in Svayrieng Province.

June 21 Harriman urges US shift to defense of cities in South Vietnam.

June 21 McNamara offers to get Clifford, Vance, Harriman to shut up (telcon).

June 23 HK talks with Dean Rusk. Rusk is outraged at Clifford's article. Clifford had occasionally talked this way but never made a formal proposal. Rusk urges patience in negotiation, and pressure on Moscow.

June 23 HK memo to President analyzes JCS plan for Vietnamizing the war. Laird urges no commitment in 1969 beyond the 20-25,000. State urges withdrawal of 85,000 in 1969.

June 23 Le Duc Tho in interview denies any progress in secret meetings.

Vietnam - 1969

12.

June 23 . HK transmits to President DOD report from "Project Vietnamization" Conference at CINCPAC to plan for the redeployment of 25,000 troops from Vietnam during July and August.

. News item asserts that Hamburger Hill had lost Nixon
the time and tolerance with US public which Nixon
had gained from his May 14 speech: HK analysis
(via memo) is that the May 14 speech will have
more lasting effect, combined with instructions to
low-key body counts and keep US casualties to a
minimu.

. HK sends President a report from Laird which cites
100% improvement in the combined combat performance
of the regional and popular forces since the beginning
of 1968..." HK argues however that "I do not believe
the Vietnamese armed forces will be able to achieve
the necessary combat effectiveness within the time
frame visualized under the Vietnamization game plan.
This underlines the need for reciprocal withdrawals
by the NVA." President notes "Can't we do more?"

June 24 . HK briefing memo for President meeting with Amb. Lodge on Vietnam (useful wrap-up of status of VN negotiations).

. Laird tells HK he has Menu schedule ready to propose
to President (telcon).

June 25 . US Navy turns over 64 river patrol gunboats in biggest single transfer to GVN thus far.

. HK and Bui Diem discuss possible new GVN political initiative for July.

. HK tells Laird that President approves first of two,
and others after 4-day interval. (See also June 30
telcon.)

June 26 . HK advises (via memo) President that pattern of attacks on Saigon does not suggest they are triggered by US actions in Cambodia: "On the contrary, I would suspect that just the opposite may be occurring... the only attacks on Saigon have been isolated minor ones..."

. HK memo to President concurs in State recommendation
that the President approve a message to Cambodian
government agreeing to resumption of relations.

Vietnam - 1969

13.

June 26 . HK backchannel to Bunker confirming President plans to visit Saigon. Notes President does want Bunker to press Thieu to propose a ceasefire prior to elections.

. HK directive to State that Under Secretaries
Committee should examine options to improve
military situation in Laos, per President's request
of June 16.

June 27 US allocates $1 million to support new GVN land reform program.

June 28 US military sources report clashes between Cambodian and NVA troops as Cambodians attempt to drive NVA from sanctuaries.

June 29 NVA and Pathet Lao capture strategic form of Muong Soui in Northern Laos.

July 2-3 Halperin memos to HK analyze Vietnam policy alternatives; weigh ceasefire-in-place option. Halperin urges new talk in negotiations (territorial accommodation) while remaining flexible on Vietnamization.

VIETNAM - 1969

July 1 HK and Cushman (telcon) discuss Haiphong and Cambodian papers which Pres is asking for

HK directive to Sullivan's Ad Hoc Group: Pres desires immediate re-examination of US policy on visits of Communist defectors to US in order to counter Viet Cong propaganda

July 2 HK/Laird discuss (telcon) State remarks at interdepartmental mtg that goal was 100,000 withdrawn in 1969. HK says they have no business saying anything on subject

Memo records Pres pleasure with Mansfield letters to Sihanouk and Chou

Pres memo to Rogers indicating that Working Groups on Vietnam to be staffed by HK within NSC system; Mitchell should be included

July 3 HK puts lid on comment about alleged NVA withdrawals from SVN and Cambodia (telcon with Erlichman)

Hanoi announcement on release of 3 US POWs

July 7 HK tells CIA he doesn't want to influence CIA assessments of situation (R.J. Smith telcon)

HK report to Pres on results of Snack, Dinner, Coco and Dessert

Sequoia mtg with Pres, Laird, Rogers, Wheeler, Cushman, Mitchell, HK to assess lull in enemy activity, next trance of troop withdrawals, Thieu political proposal. HK briefing memo says necessity is coming to choose between Vietnamization and negotiating routes; HK would choose accelerated Vietnamization

Erlichman requests views on Father Drinan's article asserting that State "lies" about US Vietnam policy re POWs

July 8 HK tells Laird (telcon) that Pres wants option to the right to wind up war quickly

Vietnam - 1969

July 10 RG examines 4 NSSM 37 papers on negotiations and withdrawals. They need not go to NSC but can be considered staff studies. Follow-on studies requested re mixed commissions, territorial/political accommodation, de facto mutual withdrawals, verification, and internal security. CIA is asked for assessment of our indicators

July 11 Thieu announces election proposal, challenges NLF to compete politically; suggests "six principles" to govern elections

* Pres statement on Thieu speech: "Thieu has put forward a comprehensive, statesmanlike and eminently fair proposal for a political settlement in South Vietnam..."

* HK sends Pres report on views of Ha Van Lau, Deputy Chief of DRV delegation in Paris, that military action will continue (current lull is not a signal) and stressing theme of no progress in Paris; Lau wants no publicity on private meetings. HK notes that Lau's statements "would seem to confirm that Hanoi is convinced it can crack American resolve..."

* Marshall Green's outline for negotiated settlement ("Ultimately we must accept a coalition government ...if the other side is to agree to a negotiated settlement and the fighting is to be brought to an end...")

July 15

Nixon letter to Ho Chi Minh

July 16 Aiken, Percy lose their nerve about supporting resolution praising Thieu but will give speeches

* State does not think President's idea of US tour for VC defectors is a good one but suggests US TV do a show on defectors

July 12 Harlow organizes Senatorial response praising Thieu; HK calls Percy et al (telcons)

July 18 Private talks in Paris go well; DRV asks questions

* HK backgrounder discusses broad purpose of Pres. Asian trip. Asia is at a turning point and discussion is needed with allies on arrangements of the future, which will depend on their own creativity and dynamism. US uncertain of meaning of "lull" in fighting in Vietnam.

Vietnam - 1969

July 18. Pres. approves HK-Mitchell recommendation that planning go forward on possible operation against Dien Bien Phu in NVN (Cushman, Packard, Alex Johnson were opposed at July 8 303 Committee meeting.

State memo to HK on Hanoi's release of POWs only to representatives of the "American peace movement".

July 21. Laird has mining plan ready (telcon).

July 22. Pres. reacts to press item that Thieu popularity is declining, describes author Richard Dudman as a "violent leftist," suggests CIA take a private poll. HK recommends against this.

July 25. Nixon backgrounder in Guam says post-Vietnam Asian policy should involve continued US role. We should keep treaty commitments but avoid encouraging dependents.

Souvanna Phouma in Paris charges 60,000 NVA are waging war in his country, says he authorized US bombing raids along Ho Chi Minh trail as measure of legitimate self-defense.

July 29. Press reports US commanders have modified battlefield strategy of "maximum pressure" in recent weeks to strategy of limited response to enemy tactics, "protective reaction" designed to hold down US casualties.

Announcement of HK visit to Paris August 4.

HK in backgrounder in Bangkok points out US could end war by pulling out but key is to end war in a way that helps keep peace in the world. US is concerned at Soviet failure to meet obligations as Laos Co-Chairman.

US will stand by its commitments but aid allies to enable them to take care of own internal security. US can't act as if self-defense was more in US interest than in local country's interest.

July 30. Pres. meets Thieu in Saigon. Thieu says Communists would take over Cambodia if military overthrow Sihanouk. HK notes that US negotiating position puts doves on defensive, made firm reaction possible.

HK backgrounder in Bangkok says Pres. discussions in Saigon focused on long-term strategy. HK says US is studying lull, apparent slowdown of infiltration rate. US prepared to negotiate end to war but will make no new proposals in immediate future.

July 31. Sihanouk writes warm letter to President inviting him to visit Cambodia.

VIETNAM - 1969

Aug. 1
HK backgrounder in Lahore notes new NVA pressure on Laos which "shakes our confidence" in Soviet role.

Aug. 2-3
Pres. tells Ceausescu in Bucharest that next 3 months are critical.

Aug. 4
In response to strong Pres. interest that committee of prominent citizens be formed to support Administration policy on Vietnam, advises Erlichman that he will discuss with Buckley.

DRV releases 3 POW's to American peace group.

HK Secret talk in Paris with Xuan Thuy and Mai Van Bo. HK says DRV has not reciprocated US moves on mutual basis and accept any political outcome. If no progress by Nov. 1, "greatest consequences." HK proposes new channel, major effort to make progress, including slightly accelerated withdrawal and 10% cutback of B-52 and tacair operations. Thuy reiterates Ten Points.

Aug. 5
HK fills President in (telcon) on secret talk. HK now sees 1-in-3 or 1-in-4 chance "this thing will work." Thuy seemed conciliatory: HK told him they would face another test of strength later in year. Pompidou agrees no further concessions needed now.

Aug. 6
Laird complains to HK there are "no targets" for B-52's. (telcon)

Cam Ranh Bay attack. HK memo to Pres. concludes that "in this instance, this effort does not appear to warrant counteraction.."

Aug. 7
Pres. approves HK/State option that idea of a US tour for Viet Cong defectors be dropped but that US TV do a show

Pres. tells Kiesinger there may be strong US reaction if no progress by November 1.

Aug. 9
Pres. letter to Mansfield supportive of his forthcoming trip to Southeast Asia.

Vietnam - 1969

-2-

Aug. 10 Mansfield report on his Asian trip. HK notes "it is apparent that Senator Mansfield has chosen to interpret your recent policy statements on Asia as being in effect the adoption of the 'soft' policies which he himself advocates." His recommendations without exception are intended to speed US withdrawal.

Aug. 11 Communists attack more than 100 cities, towns and bases across SVN with rockets, mortars, and infantry, breaking an 8-week lull.

Press item suggests that Ho Chi Minh will keep going into 1970 on assumption that President will by then be forced to make concessions (elections-Cong); Pres. directs HK to "knock" this line. HK can deal with this in next backgrounder.

New mission statement for US Southeast Asia forces (JCS "reluctantly" concurred)

Aug. 12 HK reports to Pres. that enemy units launched heaviest shelling and ground follow-up attacks in Vietnam since June 6.

HK sees Prof. Starobin in San Clemente before latter's visit to Paris.

Aug. 14 President-Laird meeting on Vietnam

HK sends Pres. bomb damage assessment from Operations Dessert, Alpha and Breakfast Delta

HK memo to Pres. calls attention to "inappropriate pressures" which State is putting on Thieu... the kind of problem that we are dealing with (re State) at this most difficult time"

Aug. 15 Special backchannel instructions to Bunker and Lodge to keep them on the reservation during next secret Paris talks (from both Pres. and HK).

HK sends Mitchell (for review) plans for mining of Haiphong and quarantine of Sihanoukville.

Vietnam - 1969

-3-

Aug. 19
Laird memo to Pres. on military actions which
might be taken in support of Laos concludes that
"...should Hanoi decide to pay the price and
conquer Laos, Laos could not be defended short
of massive US intervention on the ground as
well as a renewal of air and naval operations
against North Vietnam.." Laird recommends
against extending B-52 operations to North
Laos but suggests additional equipment, increasing
Lao tactical air capability, providing greater
ARDF support in No. Laos.

Aug. 21
Private Pres. meeting with Lodge in San Francisco.

* Plenary session in Paris talks - described by HK as "nothing new"

* Pres. tells Park (ROK) he may reassess situation if no progress by Nov. 1.

Aug. 22
State Dept. announces US and Thailand will begin
talks on reducing US forces in Thailand.

Aug. 25
HK directive to Laird that the Pres. would like
detailed breakdown on US casualties in Vietnam over
past two months and alternative proposals
for reducing the draft

* Ho Chi Minh reply to Nisan letter
* HK passes on to Laird President's queries about
causes of US casualties and what level of US
forces in Vietnam could be sustained with no
draftees.

Aug. 26
HK/Laird (telcon) discuss stopping Menu now.
Laird responds to above query saying draftee
moratorium could be sustained only for 3 months.

* HK bomb damage assessment for the Pres. on
B-52 operations in Cambodia -- "strikes were
highly successful"

Aug. 27
State Dept. sees infiltration drop as
"significant". DOD spokesman disagrees.

Aug. 29
Laird memo argues for formalized interdepartmental
structure for POW policy at the highest level.

Vietnam - 1969

-4-

Sept. 2 Laird eager to move up announcement of second troop-cut increment (telcon).

HK transmits to Pres. study (State, DOD, CIA) on options for improving military situation in Laos, noting that the study is unhelpful in that it weights options so that none are viable except providing more military equipment, food and salaries: "...this recommendation would provide for a limited military response to the critical situation in Laos...hardly seems sufficiently tangible or responsive to the situation to please either the Thai or the Lao. HK recommends a series of steps including reintroduction of Thai battalion in Laos. HK also strongly recommends contingency planning for the next crisis (dry season in November) "in order to avoid a recurrence of slow bureaucratic response...to a need for action in Laos..."

Sept. 3 HK to Pres. transmits DOD report on US combat deaths in Vietnam over previous two months. US-initiated actions accounted for 63% of US KIA. "While these figures might be taken to indicate that a reduction in US operations would cut US casualties, in fact one cannot with assurance draw such a conclusion from them... a reduction in the tempo of US operations would allow the enemy to increase his own..."

Sept. 4 Death of Ho Chi Minh announced. VC announce 3-day ceasefire beginning Sept. 8.

HK to Pres. transmits DOD report on draft reform with possible schedules of reduced draft calls covering both various levels of reduction and a moratorium for one or more months. Laird recommends "moving age group" system in the event Congress fails to act.

Sept. 5 HK recommends that first item for VSSG be analysis of statistics on casualties, infiltration and engagements in Vietnam. Recent statistics would indicate a lull by some measures; however, "we cannot with any precision describe the relative importance of the various causes of American casualties..."

Vietnam - 1969

-5-

Sept. 5
HK memo to Pres. proposes creation of VSSG because of differences over facts.

Sept. 9

HK convenes "Duck Hook" Group in Sit/Room to devise strike plan vs. NVN

Sept. 10
Halperin memo to HK urges fixed Vietnamization schedule.

Prof. Starobin tells HK of his Sept. 1 meeting with Xuan Thuy in Paris. Thuy stresses importance of US stating principle of complete withdrawal and is optimistic about settlement within 1-5 months.

✓ HK memo to Pres. expresses concern at our present course in Vietnam. HK skeptical of Vietnamization; Hanoi is clearly waiting us out.

Sept. 11
✓ HK forwards analysis of options to Pres., including escalation.

Sept. 12
President wants one more series of Menu strikes. (HK/Laird telcon)

Separate Pres. meeting with Bunker/Abrams (B-52 thirty-six hour suspension among other things to be discussed)

Ziegler explains 36 hour halt in B-52 raids on Sept. 8.

NSC meets on Vietnam strategy: second troop withdrawal and possible ceasefire initiative. Options: current strategy; accelerate negotiations; accelerate Vietnamization; escalate militarily. Helms briefs on apparent drop in infiltration. No give in negotiations. President: "We have given up the bombing for nothing." Discussion of ceasefire initiative. Bunker says Thieu will be wary unless NVA withdraws. Laird recommends against setting timetable for US withdrawal, but "we need a program." HK: "We need a plan to end the war, not only to withdraw troops. That is what is on people's minds."

Sept. 15
HK tells Romanian Amb. Bogdan that Pres. remains serious about what he said in Bucharest.

President instructs DOD to begin special military assistance to Laos.

Vietnam - 1969

-6-

Sept. 15 Ky lets cat out of bag re next troop cut of 40,500; President decides to go ahead with our announcement.

Sept. 16 HK promises Gen. Wheeler that JCS will not be pressed to go beyond 60,000-troop withdrawal (telcon)

HK transmits to Erlichman of Laird memo on how DOD will handle the Green Beret case (trial by general court-martial on non-capital basis). HK notes: "I felt you should have a copy so that we could jointly share in its consequences."

Second troop withdrawal announcement: President announces further cut of 35,000 troops before end of 1969. HK backgrounder sees negotiating stalemate but reduced fighting. Missing ingredient in negotiation is DRV response, not US lack of ingenuity or novelty. Hanoi calls it "driblets."

NSDM 23 creates VSSG for more systematic analysis of facts underlying US programs, policies and activities in Vietnam.

Sept. 17 HK meets with GOP Congressmen Reigle and McCloskey who urge rapid end of war.

Lao troops, with US and Thai support, launch counteroffensive to retake Plain of Jars.

NSDM 24 instructs Bunker to explore GVN's essential conditions for a ceasefire, avoiding any hint of US pressure and avoiding public discussion of ceasefire. Future decisions on troop withdrawals will be based on 3 criteria enunciated by President and therefore further speculation by officials is to be avoided.

NSSM 74 asks for study of military planning for Laos, anticipating crisis in November dry season.

HK sends Pres. bomb damage assessment of B-52 operations in Cambodia (strikes of 9/7 9/14, 9/15). Operations apparently caused heavy damage to target areas. No indication of damage to Cambodian facilities or personnel.

Vietnam - 1969

-7-

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Sept. 17</td>
      <td>HK meets with Indian Ambassador to receive impressions of Indian Foreign Minister on Vietnam at Ho's funeral.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sept. 18</td>
      <td>HK directive to State conveys Pres. decisions on improving military situation in Laos: additional arms, logistic and ammunition support, pay and allowances, artillery support for key points in Laos (including Thai battery), improved reconn capability and ARDF support on LOC's into No. Laos.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sept. 19</td>
      <td>
        <ul>
          <li>Indian Amb. tells HK DRV will respond defacto to substantial US withdrawal.</li>
        </ul>
        President reacts to CBS report that Laird overruled JCS on troop cuts and urged sharper cuts to put pressure on Thieu and take the heat off the Administration on college campuses this fall. HK reports that Laird had taken a position for higher troop withdrawals but thought the report was distorted in arguing that Laird actually overruled JCS.
      </td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sept. 20</td>
      <td>
        <ul>
          <li>Pres. letter to Thieu in response to latter; memo of August 20 asking for increased economic aid, notes joint discussions in Washington and Saigon will review requests.</li>
          <li>President announces reduced draft calls made possible by 60,000 reduction in Vietnam.</li>
        </ul>
        Announcement on draft: draft calls cancelled for Nov. and Dec. and October will be stretched out over rest of year (HK/Laird-telcon)
      </td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sept. 21</td>
      <td>
        HK tells Laird that President agrees to 3-4 B-52 strikes a week (telcon). HK suggests hitting Fishhook.
        <br>
        NSC staff analysis of DRV response to US troop reductions: "it is uniformly and strongly negative." "The line has been grimly consistent in terming the reduction a continuation of the 'drop by drop' approach which is allegedly designed to strengthen our side's ability to protract the war and does not indicate a real willingness to settle it. However, some straws in the wind seen as possibly signalling a shift (conversations between the French and Russian Amb. to France, Mai Van Bo and Pham Van Dong) although these signs must be treated with great caution.
      </td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

Vietnam - 1969

-8-

Sept. 21
Vance calls for "standstill ceasefire."
leading to "Leopard-spot solution."

Sept. 22
HK gives Laird go-ahead on some Fishhook
strikes (telcon).

Sept. 23
Pres. complaint about Sen. Kennedy 9/18
speech on Vietnam that no progress has
been made by Nixon. Pres. wants Admin
to get out speeches and articles to answer
this charge. HK response defends proposition that
progress has been made.

* Pres. concern over Sept. Newsweek story that US will withdraw troops at 10,000 per month until the 1972 elections and that US has a contingency plan for fighting the South Vietnamese if necessary during the final withdrawals. HK memo to Pres. notes concurrence of DOD and State that article is grossly distorted and should not be answered. Pres. strongly disagrees and orders Haldeman to prepare a letter to the editor.

* In response to Pres. reaction to press item that Thailand is pulling its troops out of Vietnam: HK sends memo indicating that this is not true though the Thais are considering how to reduce their troop contingent in view of US troop withdrawals.

Sept. 24
Pres. meeting with Laird and Mitchell for "intimate" discussion on Vietnam. Briefing memo from HK notes this as an opportunity to discuss basic options. HK feels accelerated Vietnamization would be a swift road to disaster." (Major pro and con arguments for the options presented - useful wrap-up) "I do not believe we can make enough evident progress in Vietnam to hold the line within the US (and the US Government) and Hanoi has adopted a strategy which it should be able to maintain for some time -- barring some break like Sino-Soviet hostilities. Hence my growing concern..."

* Army Secretary Resor dismisses charges against 8 Green Berets charged with murdering suspected double agent because CIA personnel would not testify.

Vietnam - 1969

- 9 -

Sept. 25. Proposed NAR public statement on Sen Goodell's resolution on Vietnam would defend Admin. position.

HK breakfast with GVN FM Lam.

Sept. 26. Pres. press conference: Pres. opposed to arbitrary cut-off time for withdrawal of US troops; opposes Goodell resolution; defense of Admin. position on Laos and on draft calls; re "We are on a course that is going to end this war. It will end much sooner if we can have to an extent, to the extent possible in this free country, a united front behind very reasonable proposals. If we have that united front, the enemy then will begin to talk..."

HK sends Pres. report on all B-52 operations to date: 1270 strike sorties in 29 days. Per Pres. decision, Abrams authorized to conduct 3 strikes per week in weeks to come.

Pres. reacts to Cronkite story that GVN were not observing Ho Chi Minh ceasefire. HK sends memo to Pres. that "statistics on GVN military actions confirmed that there was no significant drop in GVN offensive operations during the truce period... but there was no particular effort to put extra military pressure on the Communists, although there was also no discernible effort to ease it up."

HK memo to Harlow is not wildly enthusiastic about Harlow suggestion that US wives of POWs continue to go to Paris to try to obtain information. State said to be studying issue.

HK memo on the Green Beret case notes Presidential concern about the long-term ramifications of a public trial and that he may decide to withhold proceeding with the trial pending full review of the case by White House.

Report to Pres. on US air activity in Laos notes approximately 400 air sorties per day flown in Laos; 60% against targets along Ho Chi Minh trail. 400 is a slight increase over 1968 but double the average of 1966-67. Today, about 20 of the 400 are B-52 strikes.

Vietnam - 1969

-10-

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Sept. 26</td>
      <td>Pres. approves HK recommendation that State work on GVN to pass effective land reform bill.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sept. 27</td>
      <td>P/HK telcon: President is thinking of making "the tough move" before Oct. 15 so it's not linked with demonstrations at home.<ul><li>HK tells Dobrynin that Vietnam is critical issue, that train had left the station and was headed down the track. Dobrynin says HK private talks in Paris had impressed Hanoi; HK says next move is up to them. Dobrynin grumbles at lack of progress in relations.</li></ul></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>NSSM 76 supersedes NSSM 74 and asks overall review of US policy toward Laos.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Sept. 29</td>
      <td>HK tells Froment-Meurice US will not yield to DRV's "insolent methods" and unacceptable proposals.<ul><li>WSAG reviews plans to supply Laos in view of imminent NVA attacks.</li><li>Lao govt. troops recapture Muong Soui.</li><li>Brookings study group on post-Vietnam US security role in Asia (Sam Huntington chairs)-- paper on balancing power in East Asia.</li></ul></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct. 1</td>
      <td>Nixon tells Stew Alsop: "We're not going to be defeated in Vietnam as long as I'm here," sees himself as in stronger position than LBJ.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct. 2</td>
      <td>Duck Hook plan presented to President.<ul><li>Pres. reactions favorably to press play of wives of POWs denigrating North Vietnamese and requests further action to keep the Admin. on propaganda offensive on POW issue, including possibility of a Pres. meeting with wives. HK recommends against showing USG hand in activities of wives in Paris since Hanoi has made clear it will only cooperate with the wives if there is no USG role.</li></ul></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

Vietnam - 1969

-11-

Oct. 2
HK analysis for Pres. of speech of Truong Chinh, notes that it provides first evidence on likely direction of DRV policy in the post-Ho period. "continuation of efforts to strengthen the DRV economy and army in order to make Hanoi the 'greatest rear area' for the 'great front line' in South Vietnam."

Oct. 4
HK memo to President on Thompson Plan for Vietnam in response to Presidential concern that emphasis in plan on police forces and other GVN elements may not be adequately stressed in current US policy. HK argues that current US policy is in some respects very close to that advocated by Thompson although "he believes that the American people will sit tight for a long protraction of the struggle after the tempo is reduced to about half of its 1969 level. This is a proposition that, at the least, is debatable." HK also disagrees with Thompson idea that there should be thorough integration of US and GVN command in South Vietnam on both the military and political side (this would tie us too closely)

Oct. 6
HK briefing memo for Pres. meeting with Rogers recommends that Pres. firmly discourage Rogers on the issue of any new initiatives on Vietnam so that Hanoi will make the next move.

* Pres. reacts favorably to press reports that some critics of the Admin Vietnam policy have gone to Vietnam and returned with changed minds; he thinks it would be a great idea to encourage more such travel by critics. HK memo advises that this might be worth trying although HK points out this could also backfire.

* Pres. approves HK recommend. for a coordinated approach to handle impending press investigation of the Green Beret affair. Helms is particularly concerned that investigation could spill over into how intelligence is organized in Vietnam

* WSAG reviews Laos supply plan, considers precise actions.

Vietnam - 1969

-12-

Oct. 6
Humphrey indicated he opposes Goodell resolution, wants to talk with President (telcon)

Thieu Speech

Oct. 7
Pres. reaction to press item alleging corruption in Saigon. HK responds with memo conceding corruption is a problem; study is being conducted by an Interagency ad hoc group on Vietnam. Pres notes "give this priority"

Pres. receives Souvanna Phouma. Pathet Lao expected to try to recapture Plaine des Jarres. Souvanna says US aid, including air strikes, is consistent with Geneva Accords. RLG needs no US ground forces, only logistical aid.

HK, Rogers, Laird agree it would be mistake for Souvanna to make public statement (telcon)

Oct. 8
HK/President telcon: Rogers now scared Pres. will do something on Nov. 1. President wants to do something on Nov. 1. HK suggests report to people revealing secret diplomacy (HK's Paris meeting and letter to Ho). (Telcon) Pres. says we will leave Rogers out of it completely.

HK discusses Vietnam with State Dept. Senior Seminar.

NSSM 77 asks for program budgets for Vietnam

Oct. 9
HK briefing memo for Pres. meeting with Bunker to discuss Vietnam. Cites key issues as Vietnamese concern about accelerated US troop withdrawals, joint ceasefire strategy with GVN in light of Thieu's Oct. 6 speech, US interest in adequate land reform bill.

Pres. reactions to Wall Street Journal editorial (9/19) that a clear statement of US policy in Vietnam is needed. HK advises that a speech would be helpful.

Adam Walinsky tells HK that Moratorium will be big and Administration better shift course. HK says "all those who got us into this should keep their mouths shut."

Vietnam - 1969

-13-

<table><tr><td>Oct. 9</td><td>HK report to Haldeman on actions taken to counter the anti-Vietnam war line in media and on Hill.<br/>HK report to the President on views of Thieu and Ky. Concern about possible US-arranged coup when the US finds the GVN will not agree to a coalition; need to monitor loyalty of US officers.<br/>HK report to the Pres. on the latest B-52 strikes in Cambodia notes that they were particularly successful.<br/>Pres. reaction to press item that Pres. meet with the "doves" on Vietnam; HK sends memo advising against this. HK indicates that he will quietly work on the doves in a private meeting with the SFRC. Pres. agrees to this.</td></tr><tr><td>Oct. 10</td><td>WSAG Meeting.</td></tr><tr><td>Oct. 11</td><td>President tells HK war will be over by 1972 and we should "put it right to the bastards." HK says we should present dignified manner to opponents. If we yield on this we're just inviting Soviets into a confrontation. Pres. pleased with Cambodia strike results. (telcon)<br/>HK tells Haldeman that Pres. will announce enigmatically he is giving speech on Nov. 3. HK tells Rogers, Laird to cancel public statements in interim (Oct. 13 telcon)<br/>Draft Pres. letter to a student on Admin opposition to the Oct. 15 demonstrations would lay out Admin position that "there is nothing new we can learn from the demonstrations..." Letter signed and released Oct. 13.<br/>Pres. letter to Thieu urging the passage of a strong land reform bill.<br/>Pres. meeting with JCS.</td></tr><tr><td>Oct. 13</td><td>Pres. meeting with Lodge, Habib. (Lodge should be instructed to take tougher tone in Plenary session especially re personal attacks on President, and walk out if necessary; Paris delegation should take no initiative with respect to the Soviets)</td></tr></table>

Vietnam - 1969

-14-

Oct. 13
Pres. note indicates his interest in stepped-up US bombing to counter North Vietnamese infiltrators to South Vietnam.

Oct. 14
HK survey of NYT editorial policy notes that "in every aspect of US policy where limited concessions have been made, the NYT has first welcomed the move and then pressed the President for a greater concession..."

* Pres. approves HK recommendation that Laird be instructed to maintain a capability to rapidly restore higher rates of B-52 ARC LIGHT sorties (Laird had favored some reductions of capability)

* Agnew news briefing on letter to Americans from Premier Pham Van Dong.

* In response to request from Pres., HK sends memo analyzing use by the North Vietnamese and NLF delegates of US domestic war criticism: "The review confirms that the other side has leaned heavily on our domestic critics in the exposition of their case..."

* Pham Van Dong letter to American people calls on them to repudiate Administration. President sees it as DRV blunder (HK/P. telcon)

Oct. 15
Country-wide "Moratorium" demonstrations against Vietnam war.

* HK luncheon with Washington Post reporters discusses Vietnam.

* HK memo to Erlichman expressing concern about the Oct. 15 demonstrations and prospects for violence. HK suggests that Erlichman staff may wish to touch base with Califano who dealt with similar problem under LBJ.

* Pres. approves HK recommendation that State order demarches to all countries which urged a US halt of bombing of North Vietnam as essential for progress in the negotiations. US would recall these statements, review efforts by US to get negotiations started and urge that Hanoi take reciprocal steps (HK implementing memo sent to SecState on 10/21). Soviets not included (as the only country with "the inside knowledge of the negotiations which actually encouraged us to believe that Hanoi understood and would observe the 'understandings' regarding the DMZ and shelling of cities in exchange for a bombing halt.")

Vietnam - 1969

-15-

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct. 15</td>
      <td>HK transmits to Pres. support of UK Foreign Secretary support for US Vietnam policy; Foreign Secretary is taking heat from Hanoi for this.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct. 16</td>
      <td>HK briefs Business Council, explains Admin attitude, notes Admin. has done everything demanded by doves a year ago.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct. 17</td>
      <td>Pres. receives Sir Robert Thompson, emphasizes determination. President sees worldwide ramifications of defeat. Sir Robert agrees to visit Vietnam.<br/><ul><li>Evidently in reaction to press coverage of possible State-DOD differences over the significance of the reduction in NVA infiltration into South Vietnam, Pres. requests study. HK memo transmits State and DOD views that infiltration is down but neither agency offers clear cut reasons. DOD argues for need to develop contingencies to deal with both prospects of renewed NVA infiltration or continued reduced infiltration (HK agrees). HK argues that if enemy maintains lower level of activity through early November, Pres. speech should take cognizance of this and also defer consideration of escalation.</li></ul></td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct. 20</td>
      <td>HK memo to Pres. expressing concern over Percy pitch for what would in effect be a unilateral ceasefire. "Percy is trying to be all things to all people" on Vietnam. Pres agrees.<br/><ul><li>HK report to Pres. on B-52 strikes against enemy base camps along the Cambodian/South Vietnam border; no damage to Cambodian facilities or personnel.</li><li>HK transmits Hubert Humphrey views on Vietnam to Pres. "HHH willing to help moves towards peace but feels Admin. should step up withdrawal and put pressure on Saigon to take over burden of battle. Pres. inclined to believe HHH being helpful and notes" "K-he is doing very well considering his pressures."</li><li>President tells HK he should tell Dobrynin that President is "out of control" on Vietnam. (telcon)</li></ul></td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

Vietnam - 1969

-16-

Oct. 20
Pres. points out to Dobrynin that year has passed since bomb halt; US will "have to pursue its own methods for bringing the war to an end." If Soviets helped war end, US "might do something dramatic to improve US-Soviet relations." Soviet note rejects US hints at "alternate methods of solving" war.

Oct. 21
Report of President's Committee on the Vietnam Veteran released.

HK tells Marshall Green that Lodge should give no statement at next plenary (telcon).

Oct. 22
HK directive to State to kill the requirement for a NSSM on Laos; work already done in the contingency study exercise.

Oct. 23
HK directive to State, DOD, CIA requesting study on military operations in North Laos. Backdrop is Vang Pao's offensive in North Central Laos.

HK reports to President that the new Soviet line on Vietnam - most recently in Franco-Soviet communique of 10/13 and Kosygin toast for Pham Van Dong 10/15 - reflects a new sense of urgency about a Vietnamese settlement and end to the war.

HK transmits Laird report to Pres. on US military operations in Laos and relative strengths of the Communist and Lao govt. forces. It suggests that the availability of NVA manpower gives Communists the edge and that greater US effort may not alter the power balance substantially. If Communist forces advance in North Laos beyond limits reached in previous years, this would threaten the long-established but precarious balance of neutral govt. "If this government should collapse, we would lose the justification for our attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos" (or if he acquiesced to the Communists he could order us out).

Presidential directive to implement WSAG recommendations for military aid to Laos: small Thai fire-control element; training for Thai forces; B-52 reconn flights.

Vietnam - 1969

17.

Oct. 23. Zbig Brzezinski, following trip to Vietnam, writes to President and HK urging that President's speech declare that we have achieved many of our objectives in the war, propose a ceasefire, and set a more definite time table for withdrawal.

. President wants Menu strikes every day next week,
including DMZ. Laird tells HK there are only
"water buffalo" to hit (telcon).

. HK expresses concern to Laird that Vang Pao's army
in Laos is roaming around. Shouldn't they sit
tight? Laird agrees, especially if B-52 strikes
are planned. HK hopes Ambassador is in control
(telcon).

. HK asks Wheeler and Laird for 3-day retaliatory
package against North Vietnam, concentrated on
military objectives, in case casualties go up (telcons).

Oct. 24
Laird tells HK he has found some targets in DMZ,
but "not good ones." Risk press will pick it up
(telcon).

. Formal HK directive to DOD that President wants
contingency plan for conduct of 3-day retaliatory
air and naval campaign against North Vietnam - in
order "to impose maximum damage against remunerative
military and war-supporting targets...to demonstrate
the ability and willingness of the United States to
resume full-scale air and naval operations against
North Vietnam..."

. In response to Haldeman directive from the President
that HK talk to Senator Scott to "make sure he stops
his talk on ceasefire,", HK reports he has talked
to Scott in "strong terms" (Scott has been "way out
of bounds").

. HK briefing memo for President's 10/27 meeting with
Dean Acheson to discuss Southern Africa, Vietnam.

. Pres. wants Lodge in Paris to call for restricted
session, wants White House to clear all US statements.
Lodge should hint at "new approach", since only thing
agreed in year is shape of table (telcons).

Vietnam - 1969

-18-

Oct. 27
HK transmits to State Presidentially approved statement for Oct. 30th Plenary session in Paris, proposing that in view of the recent "sterile exercise," a restricted session be held on Nov. 4.

Oct. 28
HK transmits to Pres. Laird views on NVA infiltration; HK concurs with Laird view that careful consideration of US diplomatic and military initiatives which would make it more difficult for the No. Vietnamese to justify increasing their infiltration rates is a major subject for study by special Vietnam study groups.

* Pres. agrees with Bunker/HK recommendation that State avoid any references to "political aspects" of Vietnamization program. (GVN concern that presenting Vietnamization in a political sense connotes satellite relationship)

* Fulbright in interview attacks "major operation" in Laos.

* Thieu tells Bunker that ARVN can replace 150,000 US troops in 1970. Urges that timetable not be announced. HK suggests that next increment of withdrawal be announced before Dec. 15 and cover longer period. Pres. thinks military are footdragging on training.

Oct. 29
Useful wrap-up of extensive press speculation on another troop withdrawal announcement sent to the President in connection with upcoming Pres. speech.

* In transmitting letter to Pres. from US University President's critical of the Vietnam War, HK notes that the "chief significance of this letter lies in the fact that the signers are playing to the heavy anti-war sentiment of their students and faculties"

Oct. 30
Pres. approves State recommend. on the US share of economic stabilization program for Vietnam for FY 70 as of "crucial importance to the overall success of Vietnamization"

Vietnam - 1969

-19-

Oct. 30
HK report to Pres. on schedule for
21 Menu strikes for week of November 2.

* Pres. directs wide circulation of Paul Douglas report on Vietnam supporting Admin. policy on Hill and among editors in US. Pres also notes that a nice "tax free" option for some Admin supporters would be to support a broad mailing of Douglas materials.

* Sample Keogh/Safire "one liners" (cute phrases) for Pres. Vietnam Speech.

* Bunker backchannel assesses prospects for 1970: Carefully paced Vietnamization will work if flexible enough to counter enemy moves and careful enough not to demoralize GVN. GVN must be seen as participant in decision-making.

* Interagency paper on phased Mutual Withdrawal.

* Pres. feels confident because he has option for 2 different plans; depending on what happens one will go into effect. HK agrees, adding that GVN will gain confidence faster if they aren't given too short a deadline. (telcon)

* HK tells Laird President wants to discuss a general troop withdrawal program at Key Biscayne.

Oct. 31
HK transmits to Pres. approved Laird mission statement for Vietnam - switch from victory over the enemies (per May 14 speech) to emphasis on assisting GVN forces.

Vietnam - 1969

Nov. 3 . HK calls Acheson, Reagan, LBJ, Humphrey, Meany, McNamara to preview President's speech.

HK, President confer three times after speech,
agree it was success. HK talks next day with McNamara,
Amb. Sullivan, Percy.

* President in major speech rejects immediate withdrawal but sets Vietnamization as a primary task. HK backgrounder says: "We believe we have a plan that can work."

HK briefs McCormack, Albert, Fulbright, GOP leaders, Mansfield, Kennedy, Meany on President's speech.

Nov. 4 . President shows reporters thousands of supportive telegrams.

Pres. letters to Laird and Rogers on Vietnam:
"...it is essential that there be tight discipline
throughout the Administration" on three points:
Don't give impression US will offer further negot.
concessions; no speculation whatsoever on troop with-
drawals. Do not expand on the Presidential speech.
Pres. notes next Gallup Poll will show American
public behind his policy; one can forget the liberal
press.

Nov. 5 Pres. meeting with Douglas Comte (including George Meany) re their support for Vietnam policy.

Nov. 6 . Pres. agrees with HK recommendation that we go along with the UK desire to send a message to Kosygin as UK wants to express support for Pres. speech on Vietnam and urge Hanoi to negotiate seriously. HK sees this as not doing any harm, although US should avoid having the UK become an intermediary.

HK meeting with Dobrynin re Pres. Nov. 3 speech.
HK made clear the seriousness of the threat in case
of escalation, that Dobrynin should not be confused
about linkage and that the US favored improvement in
US-Soviet relations but not until considerable progress
was made on the Vietnam issue.

Nov. 8
HK note to President that Meir amenable to having
her message to Pres. praising the Vietnam speech
used among Jewish groups via Len Garment

Vietnam - 1969

Nov. 10 . Transmittal of Dean Acheson interview with Marvin Kalb expressing support for Pres. approach to Vietnam.

. HK analysis of policy differences among Hanoi's
leaders since Ho's death. "At issue is the proper
use of North Vietnamese resources in supporting the
war in South Vietnam". No evidence to suggest which
faction will emerge stronger, though debate in Hanoi
could result in changes favorable to the US.

. HK directive to JCS relaying Pres. request for study
of situation in Delta.

Nov. 11 . HK memo to Mitchell conveys report of concern of Thai for Minister that Taksin Contingency Plan had been shown to US Senators in course of hearing. HK notes to Mitchell that "you will recall the meeting in the President's office in which it was stated that Thanat would welcome release of the Taksin Contingency Plan."

. Veteran's Day demonstrations in US in support of
President's policy.

Nov. 12 . HK does not oppose Paul McCracken recommendation that White House establish office to coordinate Federal policy on the domestic economic reconversion from Vietnam war.

. MACV assessment of military picture in Vietnam con-
cludes that size and timing of future replacement
should be based on a reduction in operations by
battalion or larger-sized enemy units and on a further
effective expansion of GVN security. MACV does not
rule out major enemy offensive in 1970; nor does HK
but HK notes that "if Hanoi does not begin to put
substantial numbers of men into the infiltration
pipeline within the next six weeks, we can conclude
that they almost certainly do not plan a major Tet-like
offensive in early 1970."

. Pres. approves HK recommendation that control be
tightened over USG official involvement in support
for military operations in Laos undertaken by Lao
government or irregulars.

. Laird report to President defends DOD progress on
equipment modernization requirements and delivery
schedules for Vietnam against assertions that DOD
is still using schedules drawn up in December 1968.

Vietnam - 1969

Nov. 12 . HK receives Laird (Moorer) analysis of Communist morale and offensive strategy in So. Vietnam which argues that the Communists are engaged in a series of "high point" actions designed primarily to support political goals.

. Press briefing by Senator Allot and Cong. Wright, Hays and Adair and Arends on Congressional support of the Pres. program for peace in Vietnam.

. Publication of reports of My Lai "massacre" in
March 1968.

Nov. 13 . HK reacts strongly to State study urging that a ceasefire offer by the US be made now.

. JCS assessment of Laos concludes that enemy objective is to restore prior holdings and inflict substantial defeat on Lao govt forces. Enemy will then seek to assure Pathet Lao a greater share in government and pressure Lao government to halt our bombing.

. At President's request, HK directives sent to USIA and DOD to widely disseminate among forces and US missions positive reports on Pres. Nov. 3 speech.

Nov. 14 . CIA assessment on war-weariness of Hanoi.

. HK directive to Bunker/Abrams for their views on timing and magnitude of next US troop replacement - options of 60,000 by April or 100,000 by June; they are to keep the "matter...strictly between the two of you and under no circumstances..be discussed outside of that forum."

. HK tells Laird that President feels he is in good shape and doesn't want to get triggered into dramatic initiatives.

. HK memo to President suggests that US avoid new proposals on Vietnam (e.g., ceasefire) for time being.

Nov. 15 . Abrams assessment of enemy intentions in Delta. HK believes Abrams more optimistic than situation warrants.

. Moynihan, HK analyses for Pres. on the student demonstrators - who and what they are (Pres. asks "Can we win the Harvard et al types?") HK joins Moynihan in recommending against taking students on head on.

Vietnam - 1969

Nov. 15 . President meets with Laird, Rogers, Mitchell and HK to discuss new enemy activity, suggestions for a ceasefire proposal, and next increment of troop cuts.

. Major "Moratorium" demonstration in Washington (250,000) against Vietnam War.

Nov. 17 . HK directive to DOD relaying Pres. interest in expanding weapons and training programs for South Vietnam.

. Zbig Brzezinski views on Vietnam following his trip.

Nov. 18 . In reaction to press item, Pres. demands full investigation by State as to who is behind NYT article that certain USG officials feel Mme Binh's proposal to deal with a "peace" cabinet in Saigon offers encouragement.

. HK directive to State conveying Pres. wish that US presence in Vietnam, too visible, be trimmed.

Nov. 19 . HK directive to DOD relaying President's interest in measures to interdict increased enemy infiltration to South Vietnam.

Nov. 20 . Lodge and Walsh resign. Habib named head of Paris delegation.

. In reviewing report on Vietnam casualties from DOD, Pres. takes special note of very high US casualties in August and September 1968 (only half of the amount in October 1968) and writes: "Significant in election period prior to bomb halt - attempt to help HHH in October."

. HK memo to Pres. concludes that "we are now seeing a resurgence of infiltration activity which could reach or exceed the level of infiltration noted Dec. 68."

Nov. 21 . HK tells Laird President hopes Laird handles My Lai case properly. Laird says story is authentic (telcon).

Nov. 22 . Gallup Poll shows President's approval rating rose 12 pts in one month, now at 68% approval, 19% disapproval.

Vietnam - 1969

Nov. 24. Pres. memo to HK requests report on efforts to disrupt morale among North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, noting that "the CIA, of course, is a miserable flop in this field.

Pres. memo to HK complains that Americans are "falling all over each other" and at the "bursting point" in Vietnam and demands "drastic" cuts in US presence there.

Pres. immensely pleased with Dean Acheson's letter to the NYT defending Admin. Vietnam plan.

Abrams periodic assessment of military situation in Vietnam argues increasing evidence that enemy is preparing to step up offensive activity during the winter-spring campaign.

HK explains to Fulbright that we have been prepared to discuss political issues with DRV, but they have refused (telcon).

Nov. 25. Bill signed to permit draft lottery.

Reference to Wright and Mansfield resolutions on Vietnam - both call for elections but Mansfield draft also talks of a "mutual ceasefire".

Staff memo to HK on alleged massacre of 100 villagers in Quang Ngai province urges Presidential statement immediately to condemn atrocity.

Nov. 26. HK explains to GVN Amb. Bui Diem that US is not pressuring GVN on ceasefire proposal.

President determined to stop speculation about ceasefire proposal (telcon).

Pres. meeting with George Kennan on Vietnam. HK notes that "he requires careful handling."

Dec. 1. Sir Robert Thompson tells HK situation has improved.

HK tells Sidey, re My Lai, that every time Hanoi begins to make twitches, something happens to make them wait (telcon).

HK complains to Mitchell about State "power play" to turn Xmas ceasefire into permanent ceasefire. President wants to fire Sullivan (telcons).

Vietnam - 1969

Dec. 1 .

HK recommends to President strong guidance to
Rogers to bring State into line on issue of whether
the US should offer a ceasefire now (useful wrap-up
of State's own initiatives contrary to Pres. direction).

. Bunker authorized to approach General Minh and Tran
van Don that US will not allow any activity designed
to lead to overthrow of Thieu.

Dec. 2 . Pres. approves formation of Interagency Ad Hoc Group (HK recommendation) on Laos on how to develop more effective control over US involvement in the planning and support of military operations in Laos.

. Pres. meeting with Sir Robert Thompson on Vietnam.

Dec. 3 . Pres. meeting with Habib on Vietnam.

. Pres., HK agree with Laird proposal that Christmas
truce period be used to dramatize positive aspects of
Admin Vietnam policy. Pres. directs Haldeman to "see
if our P.R. group can get this implemented broadly"
including passing the word to editors and supporters.

. Pres. meeting with Packard to report on his trip to
Vietnam, Taiwan and Bangkok (he went to assess progress
of Vietnamization).

. Pres. directs latest Gallup Poll (entitled "Only 1 in
5 supports goal of Vietnam demonstrators") be sent
to non-career ambassadors around the world since Time
and Newsweek may not give this news "a ride".

. NSDM 36 outlines holiday truces, emphasizes close-hold
nature of consideration of ceasefire and troop with-
d withdrawal.

. Pres. meets with Habib, tells him he will be in charge
in Paris and not be replaced.

Dec. 4 . Pres. memo to HK directs that Abrams be asked to quietly reduce the number of PR personnel in Vietnam, especially those assigned to photographic and press relations duties at Abrams headquarters. Pres. notes that "For many years, one of the abuses that has been particularly obvious throughout government and in all the agencies, and, in the Armed forces, is the excessive number of PR people...You will generally find that the kind of people who go into press relations in the Services, just like their counterparts in the press in this country in civilian life, lean to the left..."

Vietnam - 1969

Dec. 4 . As follow-up to Pres. meeting with Acting Secretary of Defense, HK directive to DOD indicates Pres. decision to maintain the current level of B-52 aircraft and F-4 aircraft in support of operations in South Vietnam for next three months.

Dec. 6 . HK analysis for Pres. indicates there is some evidence that in power struggle in Hanoi Le Duan's point of view has the upper hand. "It is interesting that the current signs point to a Communist intention to keep up fairly heavy military pressure in SVN during the coming months" (Truong Chinh seen to have favored less aggressive approach).

. Pres. approves low key approach to TCCs (following Marcos decision) on their withdrawal plans as prelude to USG decision on how to handle possible withdrawals on our own terms.

. HK recommends against Presidential Commission of My Lai (being pressed by Senators Stennis and Margaret Chase Smith). "I am not convinced that it would accomplish its purpose...it would tend to prolong public interest in the incident which has hopefully already reached its peak..." Option however left open for future.

Dec. 8 . State Department officials say Chinese engineers are building road from Chinese border through Northeast Laos near Thai border.

. Presidential press conference: Indicates another troop withdrawal imminent, acknowledges US subsidizes Thai and South Korean troop operation in Vietnam but denies either country planning to withdraw their troops, rates the chance of a negotiated settlement of Vietnam as "not good", emphasizes that US has "a plan" for removal of US troops from Vietnam regardless of outcome of negotiations, denies any US combat presence in Laos and affirms US involvement in Laos at the request of Souvanna Phouma, does "not consider the infiltration (rate) significant enough to change our troop withdrawal plans", defends US request for postponement of SALT talks as necessary to develop positions on issues and cites prospects of talks as "better than I anticipated they would be when the talks began". Numerous questions on Agnew attacks on the press.

. HK reaction to Moynihan proposal that the Pres. empanel a group of "wise men" to make a philosophical and moral examination of what went wrong at My Lai: "...would be tantamount to a Presidential declaration of the guilt of the accused, without the benefit of trial..." President agrees.

Vietnam - 1969

Dec. 8 . Pres. (via Brown-gram) directs immediate investigation to try to identify what American officials in Saigon are criticizing GVN statement and position on My Lai.

Memo on President's request that his Vietnam speech be sent to Ambassadors reveals problems with Haldeman/ Magruder trying to take the lead (including drafting letters to foreign leaders) on matters more appropriately handled by NSC. HK advises Haig that these matters must go through the NSC.

Dec. 9 . HK analysis for Pres. of Dec. 4 plenary session in Paris notes following as of interest: First tacit acknowledgement by Hanoi that its forces are in the South; indication of Hanoi desire to get its own prisoners back; slight thaw in Hanoi line on refusal to deal with Thieu regime; "for the first time Xuan Thuy chose to discuss US peace policies in the terms we ourselves have formulated: and end to US involvement either through a negotiated settlement or through Vietnamization..."

HK authorizes Bunker to inform Thieu of US willingness - in response to Xuan Thuy's public statement - for private meeting.

Dec. 10 . HK report to Pres. notes that lack of response for private meeting re Xuan Thuy's proposal indicates Hanoi divided on how to handle the questions and concern about what would be said substantively in meeting.

Dec. 11 . Pres. reiterates his interest in reducing US press presence and media coverage generally of Vietnam war.

Pres. meeting with Clay, Acheson, Governor Dewey to discuss Vietnam, Middle East, Europe in post-DeGaulle period.

Pres. approves HK recommendation that GVN be approached to institute combat pay for Vietnamese armed forces because of high desertion rate by South Vietnamese armed forces; this seen as about the only option to cope with desertion problem; Pres. troubled by desertion rates.

Dec. 12 . Sir Robert Thompson reports on his trip to SVN, sees present strategy as correct.

Pres. meeting with Lodge for latter's final report on Paris talks.

Vietnam - 1969

Dec. 12. HK transmits to Pres. Sir Robert Thompson's written report on his trip to Vietnam - relatively optimistic with respect to GVN strategy and progress.

Pres. remarks following his meeting with POW families:
"Promised that "in reaching a settlement of the war, then an integral part of any settlement that is agreed to must be a settlement which is satisfactory on the prisoner issue and, second, that clearly apart from reaching an overall settlement of the war that this Government will do everything that it possibly can to separate out the prisoner issue and have it handled as it should be, as a separate issue on a humane basis."

HK memo to Pres. recommends against the "enclave" proposal forwarded by Tom Gates (Chairman of Pres. Commission on an All Volunteer Army). This would be damaging to the US paced effort at Vietnamization, putting too much burden on the RVNAF at this point were US to suddenly pull back to enclaves. President agrees but notes that the "military should quit trying to build ARVN in their own image - want to needle them heavily on this point."

General Walters meeting in Paris with My Van Bo (HK transmits report to Pres.). Other side rejects private meeting although HK describes tone of Walters meeting as "milder than anything we have heard since spring. HK message to Bunker advises him of the rejection.

HK transmits to Pres. DOD report that all appropriate measures are already being taken to interdict enemy infiltration into South Vietnam (Pres. has been very interested in this). US has capability to increase air attacks against infiltration targets should this be considered worthwhile in future.

HK directive to DOD urges study of Lodge proposal that the US encourage in SVN a more intensive development of the regional and popular force structure; Lodge had argued that the Vietnamese would only fight effectively if they are stationed in their local home areas.

Dec. 13. President, HK discuss failure of Moratorium. HK says the kids respect success, look for something to emulate. "In a revolutionary period, the worst thing is to give in to every manifestation of dissatisfaction." We can now go back to Paris any time without loss of face (telcon).

Vietnam - 1969

Dec. 13. GVN releases text of COSVN 9, dated July, which urges attacks to inflict casualties on American forces, and reversion to guerrilla and political war-fare.

Dec. 15. Third troop reduction announcement: President announces plan to withdraw another 50,000 by April 15, 1970 (bringing total withdrawals to 110,000). HK backgrounder defines "success" as negotiated peace which enables South Vietnamese to determine their own fate.

* After President's speech, HK tells President it was effective and we've kept the initiative (telcon).

* HK report to Pres. on recent intelligence on Hanoi's views: Hanoi is putting more emphasis on a long-term agreed neutrality for SVN - combined with a political foothold for the Viet Cong but not necessarily with much of a territorial foothold, as the Communist price for a settlement.

* With Pres. approval, HK directive to State and DOD for an assessment of psywar programs with particular attention to bolstering programs against North Vietnamese morale.

* Presidential address to nation on Vietnam: "...there has been no progress whatever on the negotiating front since November 3" but the US shall continue in the Paris peace talks. Refers to recommendations of Sir Robert Thompson mission to Vietnam. Pres. expresses concern that rate of enemy infiltration has increased. Announces reduction in troop ceiling of 50,000 by April 15 but let me remind the leaders in Hanoi that if their infiltration and the level of enemy activity increases while we are reducing our forces they also will be running a risk..." Pres. expresses thanks for Hill resolution supporting the Pres. strategy outlined Nov. 3.

* HK report to Pres. on enemy infiltration: "The pace of infiltration since October is roughly comparable with 1968...We did not detect all of them until several months later...if the enemy chooses to expand his forces, he is capable of a fairly major offensive in the III Corps in early 1970..."

* HK recommendation that Haig go to Vietnam to Pres. HK feels ARVN suffers from rather serious problems (most recently ARVN had abnormally high casualty rate in a 1/18 skirmish).

Vietnam - 1969

Dec. 15. HK sends Pres. Rogers report on latter's talks in Paris with Schumann. French see opportunity for negotiated settlement in Vietnam and urge private US contacts with other side outside the Paris talks.

. Bunker message to HK on Thieu's current thinking on problem of General Minh and Don. Thieu confident their "gambit" is petering out.

Dec. 16. Pres. and HK react positively to Rogers strategy re the Paris talks. Concur with Rogers assessment of the sensitivity of the other side that the US might downgrade talks; US could exploit this to move towards restricted sessions; HK signs directive concurring to State on 12/30.

. Rocket attack on Saigon. HK reports to Pres. that there is probably no correlation with Pres. Dec. 15 Vietnam statement; reaction would take longer time to be effected.

Dec. 17. Pres. approves contingency planning and WSAG on possible military, political and diplomatic reaction in the event the enemy increases military activity during coming months.

. Richard Barnett, after visit to Hanoi, assures HK DRV wants negotiated settlement; says US has strengthened its ties with Saigon. HK explains US frustration with DRV.

. HK reports to President on his conversation with Romanian FM Macovescu. DRV states its usual conditions. HK told him next move is up to them (telcon).

. President signs bill prohibiting introduction of US ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand, but opposes Mathias Resolution which would repeal Tonkin Resolution.

Dec. 18. HK end-of-year backgrounder contrasts US and DRV approaches to negotiation. Every previous breakthrough in negotiation has been preceded by hopeless-looking stalemate; therefore, deadlock does not exclude rapid future progress. Not clear whether NVA are preparing a new offensive.

. President meeting with Andre Fontaine.

. Agency begins weekly indicator reports on Vietnam for President.

Vietnam - 1969

Dec. 18. Packard report on his trip to Vietnam sent to Pres.

Soviet Minister in Paris Oberemko meeting with DCM
Blake. HK reports to Pres. that the Soviets have
reopened this channel which used occasionally over past
year when the Soviets want to convey impression of
North Vietnamese flexibility. Oberemko says Hanoi
is "ready" to discuss conditions for holding elections
and ready for longer holiday truces. HK believes US
should wait to see if Soviets make higher-level approach
in Washington, but Habib will probe Oberemko in any
event.

Dec. 19 President meeting with General Abrams.

Dec. 20 HK message to Bunker re CBS story that Bunker is resigning - President wants Bunker to stay on through Tet season.

Dec. 22. HK message to Bunker relays Pres. concern on how to get US officials in Vietnam to stop talking about other hidden My Lai incidents.

President pleased with NYT article covering Sir Robert
Thompson in which latter prominently praised President.

Group of Harvard professors (Reischauer, Doty, Kistiakowsky, Bator and Yarmolinsky) are mildly complimentary on Vietnam policy.

John Paul Vann gives President and HK favorable
assessment of Vietnamization and situation in Delta.

Dobrynin tells HK a US military move vs. North Vietnam
would bring Chinese in. Dobrynin says Soviets tried
to sway DRV in spring, but DRV insisted on agreement on
coalition government.

Dec. 23 HK directive to DOD refers Laird to Pres. discussion with Abrams of Dec. 19 on troop withdrawals. Laird had sent DOD memo (dated 12/12) indicating that JCS position was that third tranche of US troops replacements should be deferred or at minimum should not exceed 35,000.

Dec. 27. HK sends Pres. analysis on Soviet media commentary which asserts Washington is preparing the American public for an escalation of the war. President notes this point: "Good! - unexpected dividend...Keep Dobrynin guessing".

CHINA - 1969

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Jan. 30</td>
      <td>HK, in meeting with Laird and Wheeler at Pentagon, urges renewal of reconnaissance flights over PRC.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 1</td>
      <td>Nixon note to HK urges that we "give every encouragement to the attitude that this Administration is 'exploring possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese.'"</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 5</td>
      <td>NSSM 14 asks review of US China policy.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 18</td>
      <td>PRC cancels proposed Ambassadors' meeting in Warsaw planned for February 20.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>March 2</td>
      <td>Armed clash between Chinese and Soviet border troops at Damansky Island on Ussuri River.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>March 3-7</td>
      <td>Major demonstration in Peking and Moscow against each other.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>March 4</td>
      <td>Nixon at press conference says: "Looking further down the road, we could think in terms of a better understanding with Red China. But being very realistic, in view of Red China's breaking off the rather limited Warsaw Talks that were planned, I do not think that we should hold out any great optimism for any breakthroughs in that direction at this time."</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>March 17</td>
      <td>Dobrynin asks US view of Ussuri River clash, launches into emotional speech.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>March 28</td>
      <td>NSSM 35 asks review of US trade policy with all Communist countries.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 3</td>
      <td>Dobrynin asks HK again about China.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>April 10</td>
      <td>NSSM 38 asks review of post-Vietnam Asian policy.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Apr. 16-17; 25; May 2</td>
      <td>Armed clashes on Sino-Soviet border at Sinkiang.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>May 12-14</td>
      <td>Armed clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops on Amur River.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>May 15</td>
      <td>RG discusses China. Long-term strategy to reduce tension, and one or two immediate steps to signal it. State urges several immediate decisions. HK asks how we can influence China's evolution.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>May 28</td>
      <td>NSDM 15 on East-West trade asks for no change in legislation.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 7</td>
      <td>Brezhnev in speech to Moscow Conference of Communist parties proposes Asian Collective Security System.</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

China - 1969

2.

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>June 23</td>
      <td>Romania resumes diplomatic relations with PRC.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>June 26</td>
      <td>NSDM 17: Decision in principle to relax economic controls against China. President asks Under-Secretaries to prepare detailed recommendations.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 3</td>
      <td>NSSM 63 on US policy on current Sino-Soviet Differences.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 11</td>
      <td>HK recommends that measures to liberalize trade controls against PRC not be held up further pending passage of Export Control Act. Rather, NSSM 17 should be implemented prior to Pres. departure on trip (State concurs).</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 14</td>
      <td>Evans and Novak article links PRC and Romania visit. HK tells McCloskey we are neither pro-PRC nor pro-Soviet.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 17</td>
      <td>HK asks Richardson if there are any restrictions we can lift re PRC before President's trip to Asia. Richardson suggests grain, students, journalists, etc (telcon).</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 18</td>
      <td>HK calls Sen. Mundt re lifting of restrictions; Mundt is agreeable re tourist purchases, travel restrictions but not grain sales (telcons).</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>Pres. tells HK that by the time the trip is over the Russians will be out of their minds realizing we are playing the Chinese game.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 23</td>
      <td>Announcement of lessened restrictions on travel and tourist purchases.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>July 29</td>
      <td>President tells Thanom in Bangkok we are even-handed between Peking and Moscow. No major change is possible without change in Chinese attitude.</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

China - 1969

Aug. 1 President tells Yahya in Lahore that US would welcome accommodation with China and would appreciate it if Yahya passed word to PM Chou.

Aug. 2 President tells Ceausescu in Bucharest, in long discussion of China, that US does not wish to isolate China and hopes in long run to have better communication. "One billion Chinese fenced in is a bomb about to explode." President welcomes Romania in mediating role. Ceausescu indicates willingness, while noting US could talk directly to Chinese.

Aug. 6 HK tells ROC Ambassador there is no basic change in our China policy.

Aug. 14 NSC meeting in San Clemente considers basic direction of China policy. President feels that usual image of China as more hardline and Soviets as more reasonable is wrong. President says we must look at China on long-term basis. "China can't stay permanently isolated."

Aug. 21 Nixon discusses Sino-Soviet conflict with Park (ROK).

Aug. 22 Nixon discusses China with Park.

Aug. 25 WSAG at San Clemente reviews contingency of Soviet attack on China.

Aug. 28 Saunders tells Pakistani Amb. Hilaly that we want single HK/Hilaly channel for this subject.

Chinese CP Central Committee exhorts population to prepare for war.

Pravda editorial warns China of danger of nuclear war.

Sep. 4 WSAG at San Clemente studies implications of US impartiality in Sino-Soviet war, asks for refinement.

Sep. 11 HK gives President his assessment of Kosygin-Chou meeting: He sees no reconciliation; both sides are positioning selves for what is to come (telcon).

CIA analysis of Kosygin-Chou meeting in Peking after Ho funeral: Meetings were called by Soviets and reflect Soviet concern that the Sino-Soviet conflict is hurting them. Likely Kosygin sought to indicate little possibility of imminent devastating attack on PRC, but they could expect a strong reaction to further border provocations.

China - 1969

Sep. 17 WSAG reviews revision of Sino-Soviet contingency paper.

Sep. 25 RG reviews NSSM 63 paper on Sino-Soviet conflict. Options are: leaning to one side or other; strict non-involvement; more active policy to gain leverage. Ad hoc committee is to revise paper to spell out consequences of options in various situations of hostilities.

Sep. 26 CIA analysis of PRC 9/22 nuclear test: "...the significant factor is that the Chicomes are now sufficiently advanced in their technology to undertake the complexities of an underground test program..."

Sep 29 HK memo to President on increase in Sino-Soviet tensions and Soviet probe on attitudes toward a possible Soviet air strike on PRC nuclear/missile facilities. NSC contingency planning for major Sino-Soviet hostilities is underway, but HK notes concern about US responses in the interim to Soviet probes: "The Soviets may be quite uncertain over their China policy and our reactions could figure in their calculations. Second, the Soviets may be using us to generate an impression in China and the world that we are being consulted in secret and would look with equanimity on their military actions...a related issue is the shifting Soviet attitude on Chinese representation in the UN...dangling the prospect before us of cooperation on the representation issue...I believe we should make clear that we are not playing along with these tactics, in pursuance of your policy of avoiding the appearance of siding with the Soviets..." PRC diplomats have been giving the impression that they might want to put US-PRC relations on a more rational and less ideological basis. HK recommends State be given clear guidance in dealing with the Soviets on these probes and on deploring reports of a Soviet plan to attack PRC.

Oct. 9 HK memo to the President on whether to resume reconnaissance over South China, HK, CIA recommend, but State opposes because of political risks, including fact that the Warsaw Talks might be renewed. (In special cover note, HK notes that the package on this issue "does not include consideration of our November 1 problem and the desirability of conveying accompanying readiness signals. The members of 303 are, of course, not uniformly abreast of our plans in this area...I would add the desirability of conveying signals...to the considerations favoring approval of this action...")

China - 1969

Oct 10
Sher Ali Khan tells HK that Yahya has told Chinese he is ready to discuss US intentions in Asia when Chou visits Pakistan. Sher asks HK for more specific message for Chinese; HK says Yahya might say US in removing two destroyers from Formosa Straits.

Pres. meeting with Paks on food situation in East Pakistan. Briefing memo notes that Paks may send an emissary to PRC.

Oct 15
In response to Pres. reaction to a press item on improving PRC-Soviet relations, HK sends memo noting that PRC says it can now have "normal" state relations. "This might be an opening we will want to explore."

Oct 20
Pres. tells Dobrynin anything we do with China is not directed at USSR, hints at new moves. Soviet note warns US vs. exploiting Sinvo-Soviet conflict.

Oct 21
WSAG reviews Sino-Soviet contingency paper.

Nov 10
Final approved version of Sino-Soviet contingency paper (see WSAG file).

Nov 14
HK tells Laird that ROC Ambassador asked for 2-3 week delay in removal of 2 destroyers from Straits, asks Laird if it's feasible (telcon).

Nov 15
HK tells ROC Ambassador that two different destroyers will go into Straits pending outcome of Packard's discussions with Chiang (telcon).

Nov 20
Second RG meeting on NSSM 63. Options now to stark. NSC should consider the problem even though there is no immediate operational decision to be made.

Nov 21
HK approves State recommendation to use the elimination of the Taiwan Strait patrol as lever to encourage PRC to reopen Warsaw talks.

Dec 10
Chinese agree to open Warsaw talks.

Dec 11
Pres. approves further relaxation of economic controls against PRC.

US and Chinese Ambassadors meet in Warsaw for first time in nearly two years.

China - 1969

Dec 11 Llewellyn Thompson advises we inform Dobrynin of proposed talks with PRC. Rogers, HK advise we shouldn't (telcon).

Dec 12 HK memo strongly concurs with Rogers against advising Dobrynin of US talks with the Chinese: "If Dobrynin questions, we should respond with nonchalance that they concern matters of mutual interest and not go beyond that."

Dec 13 State is leaking all over about China meeting -- informing Japs, Sovs etc. Pres. says we will have to handle talks with Chinese and Soviets on confidential basis because that's what was agreed. "We'll kill this child before it's born." Nothing has happened yet, but if it leaks the Soviets will assume something has happened. PRC will assume we're playing them off against the Russians (telcon).

Dec 15 HK informs Richardson that Pres. has approved new China measures - easing of trade controls. HK also complains about leaking on Warsaw talks: "We'd like to do it mysteriously. The less we give them that they can reject, the less they can feel we are using them." (telcon)

Dec 17 HK reports to President on his conversation with Romanian For Min Macovescu. Chinese are interested in normal relations with West but nothing specific. (telcon) HK gives rundown next day to Rogers (telcon).

Dec 18 HK, Marshall Green discuss gestures we can do for Chiang Kai-shek.

* Pres. meets with Romanian Deputy For Min Macovescu, says he hopes Soviets not alarmed by "our efforts to normalize relations with China."

* HK end of year backgrounder says we will judge China by its actions, not its ideology and "we hope we have started a process...that will permit a more calibrated relationship to develop...in which a large part of humanity will not be excluded from the international community." "We are prepared to have serious, concrete, and, we hope, constructive talks with Communist China."

Dec 19 Announcement of easing of restrictions: (1) $100 in tourist purchases can come in unaccompanied; (2) US-owned subsidiaries in foreign countries can do business with PRC; (3) burden of proof shifted on what is PRC-manufactured. HK informs Scott, Ford (telcon).

China - 1969

Dec 19 Hilaly tells HK that in early November Yahya had told PRC Amb. of US interest in normalizing relations and of 2 destroyers. PRC responded with appreciation of Pak role and released 2 American yachtsmen. HK says we will give Paks more to say when Chou visits, and Pres. is ready to establish a secure channel.

Dec 20 President's letter to Yahya reaffirms US interest in bringing about "a more meaningful dialogue with Chinese leaders."

HK memo to Pres. expresses concern about problem of leaks from State on Warsaw contact with Chinese. HK directive to State follows reaffirming Pres. directive of Colorado Springs and Oct 31 directive on leaks, stressing need for White House clearance on SALT and on all matters relating to Chicomes.

Dec 22 Dobrynin asks HK "what exactly are you up to" re China.

Dec 23 Hilaly tells HK that new letter from Yahya says Chinese appear ready to resume Warsaw talks without preconditions but are worried about US-Japanese agreement and Japanese militarism.

Dec 27 HK sends Pres. Agency analysis of Sino-Soviet relations which shows the PRC the underdog in the current round: "Peking will remain the vulnerable and defensive party and seek to improve its international diplomatic position."

EUROPE/NATO - 1969

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Jan. 21</td>
      <td>HK transmittal to President of de Gaulle con-<br>gratulatory message.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Jan. 21</td>
      <td>. Amb. Lucet asks (telcon) if de Gaulle can publish<br>Nixon letter.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>. NSSM 6 asks review of NATO policy affirmatives.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Jan. 24</td>
      <td>Approval of State draft of allied reply to Soviets<br>re their opposition to FRG decision to convene Federal<br>Assembly in Berlin, but delivery to be delayed.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Jan. 28</td>
      <td>HK tells Rogers (telcon) that President has decided<br>on Europe trip in early March.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Jan. 30</td>
      <td>HK invites Birrenbach (telcon) to make private visit<br>to Washington to offer "some unofficial German advice".<br>HK tells Rogers.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Jan. 31</td>
      <td>Henry Brandon tells HK (telcon) that Wilson feels<br>slighted because of US praise of de Gaulle.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 3</td>
      <td>Eisenhower sends HK a proposed DDE letter to de Gaulle<br>to introduce President prior to Europe visit. (See<br>HK-Ike telcon Feb. 4.)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 6</td>
      <td>. President's press conference; announcement of European<br>trip.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>. First HK backgrounder discusses European trip,<br>concept of "linkage" in US-Soviet relations, and<br>announcement of annual review of US foreign policy.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 9</td>
      <td>East Germany imposes temporary ban on road and rail<br>traffic to West Berlin as reprisal for plan to hold<br>FRG presidential election there.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 20</td>
      <td>Rogers reports (telcon) Soviet Embassy complaint<br>re Germans riding on US plane to Berlin.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 21</td>
      <td>. HK backgrounder in Indian Treaty Room on goals of<br>President's European trip, new thrust of our Alliance<br>policy.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>. HK/President telcon on European trip. French over-<br>ture to UK.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Feb. 22</td>
      <td>. President comments to reporters on Europe trip.</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

Europe/NATO - 1969

2.

Feb. 22 . HK memo to President draws attention to US-French
controversy over concept of "Europe" (de Gaulle-
Soames conversations).

. Dobrynin hints to HK (telcon) that US should discourage FRG from calling Federal Assembly in West Berlin.

Feb. 23 President in Brussels. Meeting with PM Eyskens.

Feb. 24 President's address to NAC pledges full consultations on SALT.

Feb. 24-26 President in London.

Feb. 25 HK backgrounder at Grosvenor House, London, with Hillenbrand.

Feb. 26 President in Bonn, addresses Bundestag.

Feb. 27 . President in Berlin address at Siemens Factory
hints at Berlin settlement.

. HK backgrounder at Hotel Excelsior, Rome.

Feb. 28 . President in Rome. Meeting with PM Rumor.

. President meets with de Gaulle at Elysee. De Gaulle sees USSR as needing detente with West because of China. President states realistic approach to detente. De Gaulle urges 4-Power talks on Middle East.

. HK backgrounders at George V Hotel, Paris, explaining Nixon's praise of de Gaulle and discussing problems with FRG.

March 1 . Meeting with de Gaulle at Grand Trianon, Versailles. De Gaulle deprecates "Europe", NATO, urges contacts with China. Nixon sees no change in US China policy in short run.

. HK memo to President reviews Europe trip for briefing of Congressional leadership. On balance, "there is a new spirit of trust and respect in the Alliance: US is establishing a dialogue with Alliance though *they* must choose their own form of European unity."

March 2 . Meeting with de Gaulle at Elysee. President offers
HK as channel for sensitive business. De Gaulle
urges US withdrawal from Vietnam.

Europe/NATO - 1969

3.

March 2 . Meeting with Pope in Rome.

March 4 President's press conference on European trip.

March 17 . President approves US position on Spanish base negotiations renewal (aid package trade-off).

. Warsaw Pact meeting in Budapest issues appeal for CSCE.

March ____ De Gaulle message to President complaining about UK-Dutch-German Gas Centrifuge Project (HK recommends on 3/21 that US stay out of this).

March 24 RG discusses NATO issues (NSSM 6).

March 24-25 Trudeau visit with President (concerns: Canadian reaction to ABM decision; possible reduction in Canadian role in NATO).

March 26 HK hopes Bundestag can approve NPT (letter to Birrenbach).

March 29 HK report to President that US position on German-Dutch-UK gas project has been conveyed to French. Rogers separately informed on close-hold basis.

March 30 President approves strategy for handling UK request for support of European "caucus" within NATO.

March 31 De Gaulle, at Ike funeral, urges direct US-Soviet contacts.

April 2 HK tells Greek Deputy PM that we will work with existing governments whatever our convictions may be.

April 8 NSC meeting on NATO issues (REDCOSTE, offset, political consultation, and new areas of consultation).

April 9 HK meets with FM Debre.

April 10 President addresses Commemorative Session of NAC, Washington (20th anniversary).

April 11 NAC communique calls for Berlin negotiation.

April 14 NSDM 12 on NATO issues.

Europe/NATO - 1969

4.

April 15 . NSSM 43 on implementation of President's proposals to NAC.

. President approves guidance for French-US talks
on military/nuclear cooperation.

April 19 . NSSM 44 on US positions for NPG.

April 21 . NSSM 46 on Spain.

. NSSM 46 on military relations with France.

April 26 . NSSM 52 on military aid policy toward Greece.

April 27 De Gaulle resigns after defeat of his Constitutional
proposals. Presidential message to de Gaulle: "in
this age of mediocre leaders...America's spirit needs
your presence". President/HK (telcon) reflect on
French situation.

April 30 . NSSM 55 on post-de Gaulle France.

May 1 President meets Roy Jenkins, Chancellor of Exchequer.

May 2 HK backgrounder comments on French situation.

May 5 Presidential meeting with Erhardt (who has just visited Latin America).

May 12 RG discusses France.

May 15 RG discusses NPG (NSSM 44) in preparation for London NPG meeting (May 29-30). Laird to offer new procedure for consultation on selective release of tac-nukes.

May 16 Spanish officials tell HK Spain wants to join NATO.

May 19 HK report to President on implementation of the
President's three proposals made to NATO Ministerial
April 10 (increased consultations, political planning
group, and CCMS).

May 22 RG discusses France.

May 23
HK analyzes importance of NPG meeting: whether to
seek commitment to specific or generalized increase
in force levels.

May 26 President meets with Heath.

Europe/NATO - 1969

5.

May 27 President approves conclusions of NSSM 55 study on US policy in post-de Gaulle France (watchful waiting over short term) and approves new NSSM on study of longer-term US-French relations.

May 28 HK sends concurrence to State re its proposal for a Hot Line to the FRG.

May 29-30 NATO NPG meeting receives US paper on consultations on use of nuclear weapons.

May 30 FRG adopts declaration of policy on relations with GDR replacing Hallstein Doctrine.

June 5 President approves compromise on Spanish base negotiations after Franco decision conveyed May 30. (Only two-year extension of the Defense Agreement but "best available package at present time". Authorizes study of US-Spanish relations for 1970s.)

June 13 President meets with Walter Scheel.

June 14 President decides to resume full military aid to Greece (HK memo to President).

June 15-20 Pompidou elected President, appoints Chaban-Delmus as PM.

June 16 HK forwards staff analysis to President of deep under-current of worry among our allies on SALT. British "disturbed" and Germans "deeply agitated."

June 28 President's trip to Romania announced. HK backgrounder in New York explains background of Romania visit, denies it's anti-Soviet gesture.

June 21 HK sees Bogdan and suggests Presidential visit to Romania; Bogdan receptive.

June 23 Romanian charge gives reply welcoming visit.

June 29 Reston attacks Romania trip as "provocative blunder."

Europe/NATO - 1969

July 1 Goodpaster succeeds Lemnitzer as SACEUR

July 2 HK at dinner discusses Europe with Violet, Pinay, Andreotti, Otto von Habsburg, Crosby Kelly, David Rockefeller et al. HK expresses annoyance at European's petty responses to Nixon's European initiatives

July 3 HK explains to NATO SYG Brosio the Nixon CCMS proposal

July 7 Nixon letter to Kiesinger (re visit)

July 8-9 Second round of consultations with NATO allies on SALT (US presentation of illustrative positions)

July 8 NSSM 65 asks analysis of relationship among strategic, tactical nuclear and conventional forces for deterring or defending NATO

July 9 US-FRG agreement to offset $1.52 billion of foreign exchange costs of US forces in FRG for FY 70 and 71

July 10
HK status report to Pres on sessions with NATO allies on SALT. Reactions in two categories: "Some were mainly impressed with what seemed to be a situation of "parity" and others were more concerned with the new developments that threatened to upset the "balance". "The principle preoccupation of the Europeans, however, seems to be whether SALT will undermine their own security"

In response to Pres reaction to news item (NYT 7/1) by Binder asserting that Kiesinger upset by Nixon "snub" for changing dates of visit, HK advises Pres that Chancellor not upset and that NYT and anti-Kiesinger forces are giving the story an anti-Admin. twist

July 11 WSAG briefly discusses Gromyko's stated willingness to discuss Berlin

Pres tells Bogdan reasons for his desire to visit Romania: We do not wish to draw distinctions between countries. Bogdan tells HK that Bucharest informed Moscow 36 hours before public announcement

Europe/NATO - 1969

July 11
Pres approves (on recommend. of Laird and Rogers with HK concurrence) slight changes - at the request of the Belgian DefMin - in the US position paper presented at the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting on the use of nuclear weapons, such as adding "governments" to NATO commanders as among those who could initiate requests for release of weapons. However, in conveying concurrence to DOD, HK to make clear that "in urging acceptance of our position, however, we should avoid any peremptory rejection of further discussion"

July 21
HK report to Pres on results of SALT consultations with NATO allies (country-by-country). "The allies have all expressed satisfaction with the way in which we are handling this...certain specific reservations...but in general seem confident...The British and Canadians were most eager to have us negotiate bans on ABM and MIRV...

July 22
HK memo to Pres transmits McCracken analysis that a new speculative crisis is likely by mid-August because of conflicting statements by German officials about the possibility of revaluation and continued reserve losses by France. HK analysis is that a crisis will not happen that soon

Aug 2-3
Pres. in Romania. Ceaucescu says Romania not afraid to expand relations with US; Pres says US hopes to establish better relations with China.

Aug 4
HK lunches with French FM Schumann at Quai; meets PM Chaban at Matignon and Pompidou at Elysee. Pompidou pleased with Romanian trip, skeptical of need for allies to raise Berlin

Aug 5
HK briefs NAC in Brussels on President's trip

Pres approval of 8/5 memo on State's position to be taken by US with UK, France and FRG to probe Soviet intentions on Berlin. HK notes this idea is largely at FRG initiative and it is HK judgment that the probable results will not be encouraging though he does not oppose making a try

Aug 7
Pres-Kiesinger mtg. Pres. discusses Vietnam, Europe. Kiesinger praises US Soviet policy as "just right". Bonn "hot line" created

Europe/NATO - 1969

Aug 7 US, UK, French ambassadors deliver notes with allied proposals on Berlin

Aug 8 Pres-Kiesinger mtg discusses the future of Europe, student problems

* Treasury Sec Kennedy wants FRG to revalue but won't put pressure (telcon). HK agrees (see also Richardson telcon)

* Pres. decision to approve State recommendation for bilateral conversations with French, on transistor sales by Paris to Poland, preliminary to submitting to COCOM.

Aug 12 Pres. letter to Kiesinger affirming LBJ understandings (ltr of 9/9/68) on consultations on use of nuclear weapons; matter to remain secret; issued raised during Kiesinger visit

Aug 14 Staff memo to HK on Congressional concern over plans to increase consultations with Dutch on naval nuclear propulsion technology (JCAE opposed on national security grounds)

Aug 15 HK memo to Treasury re FRG concern over US taxation of US firms doing business in Berlin and impact on commitments of US, UK, France and FRG to Berlin's viability. HK hopes FRG views can be accommodated in view of Pres. interest in Berlin's viability (issue raised during Kiesinger visit)

Aug 18 Arthur Burns gets Sec. Kennedy under control about pressing FRG to revalue (telcon)

Sep 15 Pres. approves HK recommend. that US confirm to UK understandings with regard to consultation on use of nuclear weapons; Nixon letter to Wilson (similar to US-FRG exchange)

Sep 17 HK directive to USC for study on problems in US force commitments to NATO. This generated by fact that DOD plans to admit to NATO allies this year (in answer to Defense Planning Questionnaire) for first time the relative lack of readiness of US forces in US earmarked for NATO and will reveal naval reductions as well as reduced readiness in Army Strategic Reserve -- actions which will be read in NATO as part of an overall US cutting back on its commitments. Need seen to develop common Admin. line on force levels in Europe.

Europe/NATO - 1969

Sep 19
HK sends to Pres. Laird report on naval force reductions that affect our worldwide naval posture. JCS concerned over degrading US ability particularly when the Sov activity in Mediterranean and Atlantic is increasing. HK recommends a DPRC to prevent the problem of faits accompli concerning important changes in our military posture and to prevent allies from being faced with unilateral US decisions without prior consultation. Pres. approves formation of DPRC.

Sep 22
HK memo to Moynihan on latter's report to Pres. on the meeting of the Prep Group for CCMS. HK notes "the coolness you noted among the foreign representatives...probably derives in large part from the problem of fixing the locus of responsibility in each government for staffing the CCMS...the direction of our CCMS effort must stay in the White House...."

Sep 23
NSSM 75 directs program analysis of aid to Turkey

HK memo to Pres on UK-Dutch-FRG gas centrifuge project. US has potential problems with UK over transfer of US information or equipment without US consent. US also concerned about safeguards against diversion of enriched uranium to weapons use: "To be realistic, we must expect to see in the near future the development most frightening to Europeans - the FRG not only a co-producer but potential recipient of enriched uranium...." "over the long term, the centrifuge project has a potential to disrupt much of our current nuclear planning, our thinking about NATO, and even our special atomic relationship with the British" though we have told the French we believe there will be adequate safeguards.

Sep
Soviet reply to three-power sounding of August 7 on Berlin. HK (9/26) memo to Pres. concludes that Sov reply contains no substantive advance: "While the Soviets have more or less accepted the idea of talks, their note does not suggest a time or place." "...Thus I feel we should not appear at all anxious to move on Berlin, nor should we probe very hard for clarifications on the Soviet position. They are obviously in no hurry...pushing the negotiations runs the danger of forcing the Soviets simply to repeat their rigid support for East German 'sovereignty'."

Europe/NATO - 1969

Sep 27 Dobrynin asks HK whether US prefers 2 or 4 party talks on Berlin

Sep 29 FRG elections. CDU/CSU lose ground; discussions open on SPD/FDP coalition. HK memo to Pres. notes: "...(election) does not appear to have significantly altered the make-up of the Bundestag. Neither of the prominent political parties gained a clear-cut majority...the CDU would ve a few seats short of an absolute majority...consequently a government by coalition must be arranged..."

Oct 2 RG considers military supply policy to Greece and examines question of purpose of our military supply and degree of influence it has on domestic policy there. Group asks Saunders to prepare summary paper presenting two options - continue freeze or resume supply

* HK agrees with staff recommendation that better coordination on European security issues and forthcoming NATO meetings be enforced since State's activism getting out of hand

* HK sends directive to State noting that the Pres. wants to personally review issue of voting rights of the 22 Berlin deputies in Bundestag (Brandt's desire to pad the coalition majority) before any final USG decision is taken

Oct 6 HK briefing memo for Pres. meeting with Rogers. Rogers is opposed to Bahr visit. HK notes to Pres. that "obviously if Brandt wants to use Bahr to open personal contact with you, you should have the option of considering it"

* HK directive to State requests close-hold ad hoc group to study possibility of Communist entry into Italian govt. and options on how to preclude this

Oct 8 NSSM 77 asks program budgets for Turkey and Greece

Oct 13 NSSM 79 asks study of implications of UK accession to the EC. Due Feb. 15

Oct 14 Pres. approves HK recommendation (based on USC study) that the US move quickly to consult with NATO allies to explain our reduction in force commitments

*Oct 13
HK meets Bahr who explains policy of new Brandt government. Bahr covered Brandt's desire to have Allied approval to enhance voting rights of 22 Berlin deputies, FRG timetable for signature of NPT; FRG moves towards Sovs; concern about unilateral US troop withdrawal (HK report to Pres. on the mtg - 10/20)

Europe/NATO - 1969

<table>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct 15</td>
      <td>HK report to Pres. on new Soviet arrangements for Berlin; Allies to protest</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct 20</td>
      <td>Pres. approves HK/State position of not opposing sale of French transistor technology to Poland. DOD and Commerce opposed on grounds that the technology would enhance Polish and thus Soviet capability to produce silicon transistors and integrated circuits used in communications equipment and that the COCOM embargo on manufacturing equipment would be undermined.</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct 21</td>
      <td>Brandt elected Chancellor of SPD/FDP coalition</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct 21</td>
      <td>WSAG reviews Berlin contingency plans, sets up briefing for President</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct 25</td>
      <td>HK report to Pres. that Pompidou, Wilson and Brandt now in receipt of private Pres. messages advising them in advance of beginning of SALT on Nov. 17. Private Pres. letters seen as good sign that US maintaining close consultation with three major allies</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct 28</td>
      <td>HK tells Dutch Amb. we appreciate Dutch PM's speech supporting US on Vietnam (telcon)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>Brandt expresses readiness to sign NPT when "clarifications" obtained, advances thesis of two German states within one nation</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td></td>
      <td>HK tells FRG Amb. we won't rush ahead on MBFR</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Oct 30-31</td>
      <td>Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers in Prague call for CSCE in early 1970</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Nov 3</td>
      <td>HK briefs UK, French and FRG Ambs. on Vietnam speech</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Nov 5-6</td>
      <td>Special NAC mtg in Brussels endorses MBFR talks</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Nov 6</td>
      <td>HK approves DOD-suggested revisions in Belgian draft on NPG consideration of nuclear weapons use. NPG will also consider UK-FRG paper on guidelines for use of tactical nuclear weapons, at mtg in US on Nov 11-12</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Nov 10</td>
      <td>Pres. meeting with NATO Nuclear Planning Group (prior to NPG mtg at Airlie House 11/11-12)</td>
    </tr>
    <tr>
      <td>Nov 11</td>
      <td>Pres mtg with Amb. Ellsworth to discuss NATO</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

Europe/NATO - 1969

Nov 12 HK reports to Pres. on Italian PM Rumor's strong reaction against REDCOSTE reductions in Italy: "...the issue will be what price will we pay in our relations with Rumor, whose political position is quite delicate, if we proceed, and will the economic savings *justify the price*? Pres. notes: "Re-evaluate - on this point".

Nov 13 HK breakfasts with UK Def Min Healey; lunches with FRG Def Min Schmidt

Nov 14 HK report to Pres. that NATO allies pleased with CCMS

Nov 17 Pres. approves HK directive to State to put brakes on Rogers latest proposal to go back to Soviets on Berlin

Nov 18 President receives credentials of Greek Amb Vitsaxis; says internal problems of Greece inhibit more complete bilateral relations.

Nov 19 HK transmits to Pres. Brandt's message concerning FRG line with Kosygin expressing skepticism about an early European Security Conference and reiterating Brandt interest in improved relations with USSR, Poland and East Germany.

Nov 21 NSSM 83 asks review of US approach to current issues of European security, diplomatic and strategic. Pres. reaffirms US approach to CSCE as stated in Pres. directive of April 9; negotiating proposals to be held in abeyance until NSC mtg.

NSSM 84 asks study of alternative US force deployments in NATO in terms of political, strategic and budgetary implications, pursuant to NSDM 27 and in conjunction with work being done for NSSM 65.

Nov 24 PRG note offers talks with Poland on frontier issues

Nov 28 FRG signs NPT

Dec 3 HK report to Pres. on objectives for Rogers forthcoming trip to NATO mtgs, France and FRG

Dec 11 RG considers NSSM 60 paper on France to develop a list of bilateral issues for consideration by Nixon prior to Pompidou visit. Issues are: Basic direction of US policy with France and military relations.

Europe/NATO - 1969

Dec 13 HK tells President that Germans blundered in agreeing to Berlin negotiation. Soviets have made tough proposal; FRG is committed to a negotiation and won't get anything out of it (telcon).

Dec 15 President approves holding of NSC meeting on NATO and European policy following Rogers recent trip.

Dec 16 HK, at Pres. request, calls Robert Tyson at US Steel to ask for help in getting coke to the Romanians for their stell furnaces, since they're being squeezed by the Soviets. He agrees. (telcons)

HK meets with Romanian Dep For Min Macovescu to discuss economic relations and European security.

US, UK and France renew proposal for Berlin talks in identical notes to USSR.

Dec 17 HK asks David Rockefeller to help Romanians to get private credit (telcon). Rockefeller calls back (12/18) to say Romanians have not yet put in a request.

Dec 18 Pres. meets Macovescu who urges a CSCE. President hopes Soviets not alarmed by our efforts to normalize relations with China.

HK end of year backgrounder discusses significance of Romania visit.

Pres. expresses interest in moving forward on diplomatic ties between US and Vatican having heard of possible Vatican initiative towards ties with Sovs.

Dec 19 Pres. mtg. with Ambassador Rush (who among other things is concerned about being cut out of communications between White House and Brandt)

*
Dec 22 Dobrynin complains US has never replied to Soviet proposal on CSCE and is linking it to Berlin. HK says US is interested in concrete detailed negotiation.

Dec 23 HK sends Pres. Robert Murphy's report of his quiet trip to Italy (part of PFIAB travel but described as private travel). Italian concerns: Growing Soviet presence in Mediterranean and in penetrating Italy; Murphy complains about quality of US embassy in Rome.

* Dec 20 Pres. mtg with Tasca arranged to provide Amb. with guidance on how Pres. wants US policy toward military govt. carried out re Greece

Europe/NATO - 1969

Dec 29 Dobrynin lists CSCE among subjects Soviets wish to pursue in HK/Dobrynin channel.

* HK and FRG Amb. Pauls discuss press stories that US opposes Ostpolitik.

* HK memo to Pres. defends success of Administration policy in improving relations with Europe despite body of criticism against our "low profile" stance.

Dec 30 Useful background memo on history of Soviet proposals on European security, 1966-69.