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super states, the frictions and antagonisms inherent in any alliance system,
and most of all, the fear of the consequences of nuclear weapons. This fear
is plural and paradoxical. Europeans recoil from the damage and destruction
they believe would result from the use of any sort of atomic weapons on their
concentrated targets, and they are afraid that the growing Soviet nuclear
stockpile will make the U. S. reluctant to risk devastation of the American
mainland in order to protect Europe.

The Strengths of NATO

For these reasons, the future viability of NATO cannot be taken for
granted. But its importance remains undiminished. The communists' deter-
mined drive to weaken and destroy NATO shows how high an evaluation the
Kremlin places on NATO's potential.

We have had recent demonstrations of the determined strength of will
of NATO members when subject to Soviet atomic blackmail. Within a period
of months, Turkey, Norway, West Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark,
Britain, Greece, and Iceland received overt threats from the Kremlin of Soviet
retaliation for their participation in NATO strategy. These warnings have had
little effect. Even the smallest and weakest nations of Europe, knowing they
were an integral part of NATO, have been able to ignore communist blackmail.

NATO Strategy

The fundamental strategy of NATO is made up of two components: a
shield of local tactical forces and a sword of nuclear retaliatory force. The

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shield -- or trip wire -- component of NATO has a double purpose: it maintains sufficient tactical forces in Western Europe to discourage or contain local aggression, and its presence notifies the communists that a major aggression with which these forces could not cope, would trigger the second component of NATO strategy, the sword of strategic air forces carrying nuclear weapons.

But the actual attainment of NATO forces has consistently fallen short of its goals, and to be meaningful morally, the European powers should carry a major burden of their defense. But Europe cannot be easily persuaded into providing large numbers of conventional forces when the U. S. and Britain are turning away from such forces to concentrate on air-atomic power. Against the background of the proclaimed nuclear defense for the NATO area, the continued maintenance of standard infantry forces and propeller-driven aircraft must seem to Europeans an exercise in futility.

To the U. S., the central problem of NATO is how there may be provided, within Europe and controlled by Europeans, a military capability that will substantially reduce Europe's dependence on U. S. power. This is necessary to bolster the European sense of hope and of participation, basic ingredients of the will to resist.

In the future, when the U.S.S.R. is generally satisfied with its capability for denying European waters to surface shipping, a new strategic factor will be added. From the Soviet point of view, the ability of their submarine force to interdict sea-borne supplies and reinforcements from the U. S., plus

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their ability to mine European harbors very heavily, supplies a most important strategic complement to the stand-off in long-range air power. In effect, it is an intimate part of the condition of stand-off as applied to any pressures they may wish to apply in Europe or the Middle East. We and our NATO partners face the prospect that at a not distant date the maneuver of cold war will see added to Soviet threats of rocket weapons on European cities open threats of sealing off Europe from the U. S. and, if necessary, attack on the U. S. Presumably this will not change our attitudes on the defenses of our own country in all-out war, but it will surely emphasize the need for achieving the best possible total, integrated capability of all NATO forces in Europe.

Any increase in joint effort between the U. S. and its NATO partners lessens the burden on us and interweaves Europeans more closely into the NATO fabric. In the longer run, a stronger and more self-reliant Western Europe, continuing along its present path toward greater economic unity, could become a great and equal partner in the future evolution of free society.

## The Outlook for NATO

An initial problem for NATO is to re-define its strategy to meet the altered conditions of a new technology. As long as NATO relies for security mainly on the U. S. strategic air force, outside NATO control, our allies will see too little significance in their own military contribution. As long as NATO assumes that the defense of Europe ultimately hinges on an automatic all-out exchange of nuclear blows between the U. S. and the U.S.S.R. our partners

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will be tempted to confine their role to furnishing facilities or token forces designed primarily as an insurance that U. S. forces will remain in Europe. Yet NATO is in the psychologically treacherous although unavoidable position of publicly announcing plans which its enemies can characterize as involving the destruction of Europe as the sole retort against any kind of Soviet aggression.

Such a situation is demoralizing in the long run, and becomes genuinely precarious as the growing realization of the destructiveness of all-out war may raise doubts about our willingness to undergo it even for the defense of Europe.

It has proved impossible in preparing this report to reach any conclusion other than that a satisfactory NATO defense force must evolve from an atomic concept, solidly agreed upon among partners and adequately supported by all. Concert in strategy is the prerequisite. An appropriate atomic capability throughout NATO forces selected as the first line of combat would seem essential. U. S. assistance in designing the strategy and attaining the capability would of course be necessary.

Re-equipping NATO forces will not of itself solve the problems of NATO. However, it is the judgment of this report that with proper weapons and doctrine and a willingness to maintain sufficient forces a significant local defense of Europe is possible. The known capability that any Soviet attack will meet effective resistance is the most effective deterrent to aggression.

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<u>IX. DISARMAMENT</u>

<u>The Real Problem in Disarmament</u>

Ever since World War I, but particularly since the last global conflict
the United States has sought for agreements on the control and reduction of
armaments. We have been motivated by a desire to decrease the resources
devoted to military purposes, the feeling that a rising level of armaments
breeds insecurity, and the wish to give the Kremlin every opportunity to
negotiate a reduction of tensions. But while spurred on by knowledge of the
disastrous consequences of large-scale use of nuclear weapons, we have
been made cautious by the realization that, the illusion of security brought
about by a spurious agreement to disarm would be worse than the reality of
peril.

Unfortunately, disarmament plans, always a difficult matter to con-
trol, have been further complicated by the increasingly rapid rate of techno-
logical change. Scientific research and development can decide the armament
race. And therefore no reduction in standing forces, however scrupulously
carried out, can protect a nation against a technological breakthrough by its
enemy.

In addition to the technological problems, the structure of international
relations will prevent reductions in forces from going beyond a certain point.
Nothing is likely to induce the Soviets to accept voluntarily a level of arma-
ments which reduced their ability to control the satellites or to play a major
role in contiguous areas like the Middle East. But forces sufficient to

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accomplish this task are also sufficient to imperil all the peripheral powers of Eurasia. And a reduction of forces which does not affect the Soviet position relative to weaker powers will not diminish the basic security problems of the non-Soviet world.

It should also be noted that a massive threat will be possible from even a very few of the highly accurate and enormously destructive missiles which can surely become a reality during the 10-15 year period here under study.

## The Problem of Surprise Attack

It is precisely because reduction of forces has proved so nearly impossible to negotiate that the major emphasis of disarmament efforts has turned to the prevention of surprise attack. There is no doubt that the danger of surprise attack contributes to the tensions of the nuclear age, even if it does not cause them, and reduction in tensions, where it can be attained without sacrificing other important national objectives, is a worthy objective of itself.

Close attention has of course been given, in the preparation of this report, to proposals for inspections aimed at reducing the possibilities of surprise attack. The effort is a worthy one. This report would caution only against the amount of protection which might actually be attained through inspections.

Aerial surveillance would be very useful in affording an opportunity to observe changing patterns of national activity which might give clues

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to an impending attack. During the present time period of relatively low-performance manned bombers an appreciable amount of early warning of attack might be attained. However, if the speed of attacking aircraft increases, the warning time afforded by any inspection system will be progressively reduced. When ballistic missiles are available -- which is not many years away -- the maximum warning time possible will be of the order of half an hour, the flight time of such a missile.

Physical inspection on the ground to supplement aerial inspection would add to the effectiveness of the system, especially in the sensing of national intent which may be had through constant contact with people and events. Again, however, this report cannot see how present vigilance can be reduced, or insecurity more than partly removed, by any inspection system now in prospect. The more enduring values might well come from the effect of such systems on politically and sociologically closed societies.

## The Problem of War Limitation

The attempt to eliminate war through disarmament is the reverse of the attempt to prevent war through retaliatory power. Either of these methods is highly useful and desirable as long as it succeeds. But when either fails, the preceding exclusive concern with the avoidance of war has posed a fearful alternative: total war as the only alternative to total peace.

Since all-out war could start not only by surprise attack, but also by spreading of a small war, this study has considered various suggestions for

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setting in advance of possible war the ground rules under which it would be
conducted, with the objective of helping to prevent the catastrophe of an all-
out war caused by miscalculation.

None of these suggestions has proved entirely persuasive when exam-
ined closely, mainly because they so largely depend on agreement prohibiting
some action rather than on supporting a positive course of action. None
seemed likely to inhibit miscalculation on the part of the U.S.S.R. as much
as would a simple statement by the U. S., reiterated from time to time, that
in case we are directly involved again in fighting communist aggression we
will use the weapons that are best adapted to quick termination of open mili-
tary operations, not to spread war but to prevent its spreading.

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# X. CIVIL DEFENSE

There are few problems of the atomic age with which the United States has had greater difficulty in coming to grips than civil defense. Our traditional invulnerability to direct military attack and our predilection for the offensive over the defensive in war have combined to cause us to treat civil defense as a minor adjunct of our overall strategic posture both in terms of planning and in resources allocated to it.

The study on which this report is based has been directed primarily toward U.S. international strategic objectives. The total of the civil defense problem is well beyond its scope. The technical possibilities of defending our cities and homes, the costs, the impact on our national psychology and ways of working and living -- these present a complex of both broad and specialist considerations deserving examination at least as far ranging as this report is able to devote to its entire subject. Nevertheless, the connection between civil defense and the other elements of our national security requires that any report on the latter make a general evaluation of the possibilities of the former.

An enemy who felt confident that he could disrupt and disorganize our society while preserving the substance of his own might be tempted to launch an all-out blow. As offensive delivery vehicles gain relative to the defense, as seems likely, and given even the present destructiveness of weapons, the relative protection of civilian populations may become one of the key factors in the strategic equation.

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If the struggle between Soviet Communism and the system of freedom we represent ever reaches the show-down stage, the edge of difference which may be very fine, may well depend on the resolve of the competing wills. This in turn will depend importantly on relative vulnerabilities. The concern of our country in the field of civil defense must, of course, center on what we can do to protect ourselves in the event of an actual all-out attack. But another profit we seek is in stoutness of heart for the times when our immediate choice may be to surrender or to accept the potential devastation. It is an oppressive thought that such circumstances might arrive in fact, but it would be indeed feckless to suggest that they cannot. And courage in crisis, if it is to be effective and continuing, must rest on at least a modicum of reasonable hope. Deterrence of all-out war depends on a combination of power and will. The factor of power requires a retaliatory capability sufficient to overcome any defense the enemy can pick up against, and as invulnerable as possible to surprise attack. The factor of will, in the judgment of this report, may hinge importantly on adding a reasonable combination of passive civil defense measures to the active military measures now receiving great attention.

Even a modest civil defense is certainly not easy, and it can never be complete. But it may well become easier in some ways than active military defenses against incoming weapons, especially as we move into the era of ballistic missiles. Protecting against massively destructive weapons is an enormous problem. A 20-megaton thermonuclear weapon; for example, with a radius of total destruction of between five to eight miles

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will inevitably have devastating consequences. The impact of sophisticated
chemical or biological warfare is even more difficult to calculate.

Difficulty does not mean impotence, however. While it may be very
expensive to protect the population against the blast and heat of a direct
atomic explosion, protection against radioactive fall-out and other contamina-
tion appears to be relatively easier. Above all, it is essential that the
population understand the dangers of modern weapons and the possibilities of
mitigating their effects, so that it can react with discipline and so that no
enemy can bank on our loss of organized activity more than temporarily.

While the whole field of civil defense requires, above all, the most
careful study, it is possible to state a few general principles in relation to
it.

1. Civil defense must be considered as part of the overall U.S. strategic posture. It should therefore be part of our defense planning and included in our overall strategic plans. It should be understood that the expense involved is an addition to military outlays.

2. The American people need to hear more clearly the dimensions of the problem of civil defense and what can be done to reduce them. Any effective civil defense program will have as a prerequisite a perceptive program of public information supported by the Federal Government and carried through at all levels.

3. A civil defense program should be integrated with the construction program needed for the normal development of our expanding population and economy.

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An effective civil defense program can be separated into three stages.

1. **To provide warning and to give advice on how to behave most effectively.** This requires an attack-proof warning system and radio net to provide information and instructions during and after an attack. The cost of such a program would be reasonable.

2. **Protection against contamination.** It has been estimated that half of the casualties of a large-scale atomic attack might result from radioactive fall-out. Moreover, it would be essential that individuals in an area contaminated by radioactivity, chemicals, or biological agents behave with discipline and effectiveness. The condition for all other protective action is a credible and measured program of public information. A monitoring system for radiological levels will be needed. Simple home shelters can add greatly to the general safety. The program should be locally financed. The chief role of the Federal Government lies in setting the example, in public education, and in creating incentives in the form of loans, tax relief or similar measures.

3. **Protection against atomic blast and heat.** This is a major problem, particularly in our big urban concentrations. A case can be made that it is possible to construct shelters capable of resisting even a direct hit, located so that they can be reached within 15 to 30 minutes by the population they serve, and useful meanwhile for peacetime purposes, such as underground passages. The subject is of such complexity, however, and the costs are so very large that this report cannot plausibly go further than to commend such a

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deep shelter program for careful study. If indeed it is feasible it will add greatly to our security as a nation.

Before any progress can be made in any field of civil defense, the problem must be treated as an integral part of our defense planning. It is not reasonable that our large military defense effort should lack a complementary effort for the direct protection of our most important resource: our civilian population.

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XI. BUDGET FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

Achievement of the objectives of our national security programs in the years ahead hinges on the availability of financial resources and the manner in which they are applied. There is reason for concern both as to the present level of the Defense Department budget and as to the workings of the budgetary process under existing procedures.

It is presumably clear by this point in this report that the participants in the underlying study are well aware that not every defense dollar is now equally well spent. However, the real potential savings will not be affected quickly for they must come mainly through evolution of organization and strategic concept, through modernization of facilities and the elimination of unnecessary duplication. And, taking into account all major and minor improvements that can be considered feasible, the present level of defense expenditures still seems clearly inadequate for the pressing requirements of the foreseeable future.

It should also be added that this study has given much attention to well known and strongly held opinions that the present level of government spending presents a real hazard to our domestic economy. With full regard for the sincerity of such opinions, although far from persuaded by many of the arguments, the conviction of this report is that they cannot be determining when balanced against the threat we would confront by neglecting our national security program.

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## The Budgetary Level

Programs of great importance to U.S. security now suffer from insufficient funds, and the immediate prospects are for even greater fiscal stringency.

Several reasons have brought about the present state of affairs. In the first place, when the Korean war ended, it was natural for the American people to demand that military expenditures be drastically cut. But the execution of the cutting process, displaying less accuracy than force, had serious ill effects, although they did not become evident for some time. For example, the momentum of the Air Force build-up continued until unspent appropriations from 1952 to 1953 ran out and, where major procurement is concerned, the Army has lived off its pre-54 appropriations practically until now.

The other cause has been the continuing technological revolution -- with its inevitable consequences of rising military costs.

The downward trend has yet to be arrested; the upturn, if it comes, may be too little and too late. The following seem the principal soft spots in present budgetary support levels for national security programs:

## Strategic Forces

### Deterrence

1. Additional aircraft procurement should be authorized to maintain modernization of existing units sufficiently into the 1960's so as to avoid a gap in ready forces between the latest types of manned aircraft

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and the operational stage of ballistic missiles. We cannot risk
obsolescence of present weapons before new ones are ready.

2. The SAC base structure, long out of phase with other elements in its program, should be made less vulnerable to surprise attack through dispersion and other protective measures, such as underground fuel storage, revetments, and similar measures.

3. Accelerated research and development support should be provided for such key programs as high performance bombing systems and advanced reconnaissance systems.

## Active Defense

The effort should increase for improving early warning and anti-missile defense systems and, in the case of the Navy, anti-submarine measures.

## Tactical Forces

To provide something more than the token mobile units presently in being, additional troop airlift should be authorized and the Army should be permitted to speed up the modernization of its division structure.

## Civil Defense

At least a start should be made on the federal government's proper share in funding a home shelter construction program and related warning and communications equipment.

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To remedy these several deficiencies will require successive incre-
ments of as much as $3 billion a year in the Defense budget for the next
several fiscal years. As applied to the present Defense Department budget,
such an increment would represent an increase of about 8%. Looking beyond
1960, it seems inevitable that, unless there is an agreement on disarmament,
the cost of military programs will continue to rise with no level-off occurring
before about 1965. Thus, we should face up to the prospect that three to
five years hence the combined Defense Department and Civil Defense budgets
may reach $50 billion to which should be added the $4 billion for military
programs of the Atomic Energy Commission and for military aid to our allies.
Together these would make a total of about $54 billion, or about 20% in excess
of the present figures. This is a heavy burden. But it is essential for our
survival.

To speak solely in terms of dollars is misleading, however. A
better gauge for measuring the budgetary burden is by relating it to national
income or national production. By this standard, even with the increases
outlined above, defense expenditures by 1962 would be no greater than 12%
of the Gross National Product predicted for that time.* This is the same

*Compared to the 12-15% of Russian GNP which, it is estimated, the Soviet is devoting to military expenditures. In this connection, however, a note of warning might well be sounded against dollar versus ruble comparisons as indicative of the USA-USSR military equation. In terms of pay and subsistence, an American soldier received 2-1/2 times as much as his Russian counterpart, and our aircraft technicians are paid five times as much as theirs. Thus, even though Soviet total national income is less than ours, any given percentage of Soviet GNP may buy more military strength than an equivalent percentage of our GNP.

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percentage level at which defense expenditures were running in 1952.

The capacity of the U.S. economy to provide the necessary increased support of our national security programs seems abundantly clear. Moreover, increases in the Federal budget of the order suggested above can surely be affected within our national economy and without bothersome controls. For the foreseeable future our GNP should rise sufficiently to permit annual increments even of $5 billion to the Federal budget without requiring an increase in taxation. Moreover, the latter do not take into account offsets which should result from a retailoring of military roles and missions of the armed services and from further improvements in the organization of the Defense Department.

## The Budgetary Process

Increased defense expenditures for the present programs should be accompanied by changes in the existing processes of budgeting.

The budgetary process could be greatly improved if military budgets were prepared and presented in more meaningful terms. The present method of preparation does not give the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress or the public a clear indication of what the funds to be provided will accomplish in terms of military missions or effective units. As a result, it is natural for the Congress, and not unacceptable to the public, to make reductions by percentage cuts across-the-board, rather than by selective examination of individual programs.

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Complete budgetary reform may not be immediately feasible. However, a start can be made toward a system of budgeting that corresponds more closely to the general strategic philosophy of this Report. It should not be too difficult, for example, to restate the presentation of the Air Force budget, so that instead of the present categories of "aircraft and related procurement", "procurement other than aircraft", "operation and maintenance," "military personnel", etc., there would be a clear indication of how much goes to SAC, how much to Air Defense, how much to the Tactical Air Command, and how much to Air Transport. The present budget structures of the other Services are even further from indicating expenditures along mission lines, and large improvements of the type here suggested could be readily made.

Another highly desirable change is to transform the present one-year budget cycle to two years. Under existing ground rules, the top personnel of the Services spend the first six months of every year preparing, justifying and revising the budgetary requests of their departments. The next six months are consumed in testifying before Congressional committees and otherwise defending the Service budgets as approved by the President. If the process of budget-making and justification could be confined to once in two years -- that is, once for each Congressional term -- there could be more concentration on efficient financial management and less pre-occupation with repetitive budgetary procedures. Such a change would at the same time permit more Congressional control because examination of budgetary requests could then be more careful.