EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL 12:00 NOON, EST

April 18, 1973

Office of the White House Press Secretary

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

At home and abroad, America is in a time of transition. Old problems are yielding to new initiatives, but in their place new problems are arising which once again challenge our ingenuity and require vigorous action. Nowhere is this more clearly true than in the field of energy.

As America has become more prosperous and more heavily industrialized, our demands for energy have soared. Today, with 6 percent of the world's population, we consume almost a third of all the energy used in the world. Our energy demands have grown so rapidly that they now outstrip our available supplies, and at our present rate of growth, our energy needs a dozen years from now will be nearly double what they were in 1970.

In the years immediately ahead, we must face up to the possibility of occasional energy shortages and some increase in energy prices.

Clearly, we are facing a vitally important energy challenge. If present trends continue unchecked, we could face a genuine energy crisis. But that crisis can and should be averted, for we have the capacity and the resources to meet our energy needs if only we take the proper steps -- and take them now.

More than half the world's total reserves of coal are located within the United States. This resource alone would be enough to provide for our energy needs for well over a century. We have potential resources of billions of barrels of recoverable oil, similar quantities of shale oil and more than 2,000 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Properly managed, and with more attention on the part of consumers to the conservation of energy, these supplies can last for as long as our economy depends on conventional fuels.

In addition to natural fuels, we can draw upon hydroelectric plants and increasing numbers of nuclear powered facilities. Moreover, long before our present energy sources are exhausted, America's vast capabilities in research and development can provide us with new, clean and virtually unlimited sources of power.

Thus we should not be misled into pessimistic predictions of an energy disaster. But neither should we be lulled into a false sense of security. We must examine our circumstances realistically, carefully weigh the alternatives -- and then move forward decisively.

WEIGHING THE ALTERNATIVES

Over 90 percent of the energy we consume today in the United States comes from three sources: natural gas, coal and petroleum. Each source presents us with a different set of problems.

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Natural gas is our cleanest fuel and is most preferred in order to protect our environment, but ill-considered regulations of natural gas prices by the Federal Government have produced a serious and increasing scarcity of this fuel.

We have vast quantities of coal, but the extraction and use of coal have presented such persistent environmental problems that, today, less than 20 percent of our energy needs are met by coal and the health of the entire coal industry is seriously threatened.

Our third conventional resource is oil, but domestic production of available oil is no longer able to keep pace with demands.

In determining how we should expand and develop these resources, along with others such as nuclear power, we must take into account not only our economic goals, but also our environmental goals and our national security goals. Each of these areas is profoundly affected by our decisions concerning energy.

If we are to maintain the vigor of our economy, the health of our environment, and the security of our energy resources, it is essential that we strike the right balance among these priorities.

The choices are difficult, but we cannot refuse to act because of this. We cannot stand still simply because it is difficult to go forward. That is the one choice Americans must never make.

The energy challenge is one of the great opportunities of our time. We have already begun to meet that challenge, and realize its opportunities.

## NATIONAL ENERGY POLICY

In 1971, I sent to the Congress the first message on energy policies ever submitted by an American President. In that message I proposed a number of specific steps to meet our projected needs by increasing our supply of clean energy in America.

Those steps included expanded research and development to obtain more clean energy, increased availability of energy resources located on Federal lands, increased efforts in the development of nuclear power, and a new Federal organization to plan and manage our energy programs.

In the twenty-two months since I submitted that message, America's energy research and development efforts have been expanded by 50 percent.

In order to increase domestic production of conventional fuels, sales of oil and gas leases on the Outer Continental Shelf have been increased. Federal and State standards to protect the marine environment in which these leases are located are being tightened. We have developed a more rigorous surveillance capability and an improved ability to prevent and clean up oil spills.

We are planning to proceed with the development of oil shale and geothermal energy sources on Federal lands, so long as an evaluation now underway shows that our environment can be adequately protected.

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We have also taken new steps to expand our uranium enrichment capacity for the production of fuels for nuclear power plants, to standardize nuclear power plant designs, and to ensure the continuation of an already enviable safety record.

We have issued new standards and guidelines, and have taken other actions to increase and encourage better conservation of energy.

In short, we have made a strong beginning in our effort to ensure that America will always have the power needed to fuel its prosperity. But what we have accomplished is only a beginning.

Now we must build on our increased knowledge, and on the accomplishments of the past twenty-two months, to develop a more comprehensive, integrated national energy policy. To carry out this policy we must:

- increase domestic production of all forms of energy;

- act to conserve energy more effectively;

- strive to meet our energy needs at the lowest cost consistent with the protection of both our national security and our natural environment;

- reduce excessive regulatory and administrative impediments which have delayed or prevented construction of energy-producing facilities;

- act in concert with other nations to conduct research in the energy field and to find ways to prevent serious shortages; and

- apply our vast scientific and technological capacities -- both public and private -- so we can utilize our current energy resources more wisely and develop new sources and new forms of energy.

The actions I am announcing today and the proposals I am submitting to the Congress are designed to achieve these objectives. They reflect the fact that we are in a period of transition, in which we must work to avoid or at least minimize short-term supply shortages, while we act to expand and develop our domestic supplies in order to meet long-term energy needs.

We should not suppose this transition period will be easy. The task ahead will require the concerted and cooperative efforts of consumers, industry, and government.

## DEVELOPING OUR DOMESTIC ENERGY RESOURCES

The effort to increase domestic energy production in a manner consistent with our economic, environmental and security interests should focus on the following areas:

### Natural Gas

Natural gas is America's premium fuel. It is clean-burning and thus has the least detrimental effect on our environment.

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Since 1966, our consumption of natural gas has increased by over one-third, so that today natural gas comprises 32 percent of the total energy we consume from all sources. During this same period, our proven and available reserves of natural gas have decreased by a fifth. Unless we act responsibly, we will soon encounter increasing shortages of this vital fuel.

Yet the problem of shortages results less from inadequate resources than from ill-conceived regulation. Natural gas is the fuel most heavily regulated by the Federal Government -- through the Federal Power Commission. Not only are the operations of interstate natural gas pipelines regulated, as was originally and properly intended by the Congress, but the price of the natural gas supplied to these pipelines by thousands of independent producers has also been regulated.

For more than a decade the prices of natural gas supplied to pipelines under this extended regulation have been kept artificially low. As a result, demand has been artificially stimulated, but the exploration and development required to provide new supplies to satisfy this increasing demand have been allowed to wither. This form of government regulation has contributed heavily to the shortages we have experienced, and to the greater scarcity we now anticipate.

As a result of its low regulated price, more than 50 percent of our natural gas is consumed by industrial users and utilities, many of which might otherwise be using coal or oil. While homeowners are being forced to turn away from natural gas and toward more expensive fuels, unnecessarily large quantities of natural gas are being used by industry.

Furthermore, because prices within producing States are often higher than the interstate prices established by the Federal Power Commission, most newly discovered and newly produced natural gas does not enter interstate pipelines. Potential consumers in non-producing States thus suffer the worst shortages. While the Federal Power Commission has tried to alleviate these problems, the regulatory framework and attendant judicial constraints inhibit the ability of the Commission to respond adequately.

It is clear that the price paid to producers for natural gas in interstate trade must increase if there is to be the needed incentive for increasing supply and reducing inefficient usage. Some have suggested additional regulation to provide new incentives, but we have already seen the pitfalls in this approach. We must regulate less, not more. At the same time, we cannot remove all natural gas regulations without greatly inflating the price of gas currently in production and generating windfall profits.

To resolve this issue, I am proposing that gas from new wells, gas newly-dedicated to interstate markets, and the continuing production of natural gas from expired contracts should no longer be subject to price regulation at the wellhead. Enactment of this legislation should stimulate new exploration and development. At the same time, because increased prices on new unregulated gas would be averaged in with the prices for gas that is still regulated, the consumer should be protected against precipitous cost increases.

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To add further consumer protection against unjustified price increases, I propose that the Secretary of the Interior be given authority to impose a ceiling on the price of new natural gas when circumstances warrant. Before exercising this power, the Secretary would consider the cost of alternative domestic fuels, taking into account the superiority of natural gas from an environmental standpoint. He would also consider the importance of encouraging production and more efficient use of natural gas.

## Outer Continental Shelf

Approximately half of the oil and gas resources in this country are located on public lands, primarily on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). The speed at which we can increase our domestic energy production will depend in large measure on how rapidly these resources can be developed.

Since 1954, the Department of the Interior has leased to private developers almost 8 million acres on the Outer Continental Shelf. But this is only a small percentage of these potentially productive areas. At a time when we are being forced to obtain almost 30 percent of our oil from foreign sources, this level of development is not adequate.

I am therefore directing the Secretary of the Interior to take steps which would triple the annual acreage leased on the Outer Continental Shelf by 1979, beginning with expanded sales in 1974 in the Gulf of Mexico and including areas beyond 200 meters in depth under conditions consistent with my oceans policy statement of May, 1970. By 1985, this accelerated leasing rate could increase annual energy production by an estimated 1.5 billion barrels of oil (approximately 16 percent of our projected oil requirements in that year), and 5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (approximately 20 percent of expected demand for natural gas that year).

In the past, a central concern in bringing these particular resources into production has been the threat of environmental damage. Today, new techniques, new regulations and standards, and new surveillance capabilities enable us to reduce and control environmental dangers substantially. We should now take advantage of this progress. The resources under the Shelf, and on all our public lands, belong to all Americans, and the critical needs of all Americans for new energy supplies require that we develop them.

If at any time it is determined that exploration and development of a specific shelf area can only proceed with inadequate protection of the environment, we will not commence or continue operations. This policy was reflected in the suspension of 35 leases in the Santa Barbara Channel in 1971. We are continuing the Santa Barbara suspensions, and I again request that the Congress pass legislation that would provide for appropriate settlement for those who are forced to relinquish their leases in the area.

At the same time, I am directing the Secretary of the Interior to proceed with leasing the Outer Continental Shelf beyond the Channel Islands of California if the reviews now underway show that the environmental risks are acceptable.

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I am also asking the Chairman of the Council on Environ-
mental Quality to work with the Environmental Protection
Agency, in consultation with the National Academy of Sciences
and appropriate Federal agencies, to study the environmental
impact of oil and gas production on the Atlantic Outer
Continental Shelf and in the Gulf of Alaska. No drilling
will be undertaken in these areas until its environmental
impact is determined. Governors, legislators and citizens
of these areas will be consulted in this process.

Finally, I am asking the Secretary of the Interior to
develop a long-term leasing program for all energy resources
on public lands, based on a thorough analysis of the Nation's
energy, environmental, and economic objectives.

Alaskan Pipeline

Another important source of domestic oil exists on the
North Slope of Alaska. Although private industry stands
ready to develop these reserves and the Federal Government
has spent large sums on environmental analyses, this
project is still being delayed. This delay is not related
to any adverse judicial findings concerning environmental
impact, but rather to an outmoded legal restriction
regarding the width of the right of way for the proposed
pipeline.

At a time when we are importing growing quantities of
oil at great detriment to our balance of payments, and at
a time when we are also experiencing significant oil short-
ages, we clearly need the two million barrels a day which
the North Slope could provide -- a supply equal to fully
one-third of our present import levels.

In recent weeks I have proposed legislation to the
Congress which would remove the present restriction on the
pipeline. I appeal to the Congress to act swiftly on this
matter so that we can begin construction of the pipeline
with all possible speed.

I oppose any further delay in order to restudy the
advisability of building the pipeline through Canada. Our
interest in rapidly increasing our supply of oil is best
served by an Alaskan pipeline. It could be completed much
more quickly than a Canadian pipeline; its entire capacity
would be used to carry domestically owned oil to American
markets where it is needed; and construction of an Alaskan
pipeline would create a significant number of American jobs
both in Alaska and in the maritime industry.

Shale Oil

Recoverable deposits of shale oil in the continental
United States are estimated at some 600 billion barrels,
80 billion of which are considered easily accessible.

At the time of my Energy Message of 1971, I requested
the Secretary of the Interior to develop an oil shale leasing
program on a pilot basis and to provide me with a thorough
evaluation of the environmental impact of such a program.
The Secretary has prepared this pilot project and expects
to have a final environmental impact statement soon. If
the environmental risks are acceptable, we will proceed
with the program.

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To date there has been no commercial production of shale oil in the United States. Our pilot program will provide us with valuable experience in using various operational techniques and acting under various environmental conditions. Under the proposed program, the costs both of development and environmental protection would be borne by the private lessee.

## Geothermal Leases

At the time of my earlier Energy Message, I also directed the Department of the Interior to prepare a leasing program for the development of geothermal energy on Federal lands. The regulations and final environmental analysis for such a program should be completed by late spring of this year.

If the analysis indicates that we can proceed in an environmentally acceptable manner, I expect leasing of geothermal fields on Federal lands to begin soon thereafter.

The use of geothermal energy could be of significant importance to many of our western areas, and by supplying a part of the western energy demand, could release other energy resources that would otherwise have to be used. Today, for instance, power from the Geysers geothermal field in California furnishes about one-third of the electric power of the city of San Francisco.

New technologies in locating and producing geothermal energy are now under development. During the coming fiscal year, the National Science Foundation and the Geological Survey will intensify their research and development efforts in this field.

## Coal

Coal is our most abundant and least costly domestic source of energy. Nevertheless, at a time when energy shortages loom on the horizon, coal provides less than 20 percent of our energy demands, and there is serious danger that its use will be reduced even further. If this reduction occurs, we would have to increase our oil imports rapidly, with all the trade and security problems this would entail.

Production of coal has been limited not only by competition from natural gas -- a competition which has been artificially induced by Federal price regulation -- but also by emerging environmental concerns and mine health and safety requirements. In order to meet environmental standards, utilities have shifted to natural gas and imported low-sulphur fuel oil. The problem is compounded by the fact that some low-sulphur coal resources are not being developed because of uncertainty about Federal and State mining regulations.

I urge that highest national priority be given to expanded development and utilization of our coal resources. Present and potential users who are able to choose among energy sources should consider the national interest as they make their choice. Each decision against coal increases petroleum or gas consumption, compromising our national self-sufficiency and raising the cost of meeting our energy needs.

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In my State of the Union Message on Natural Resources and the Environment earlier this year, I called for strong legislation to protect the environment from abuse caused by mining. I now repeat that call. Until the coal industry knows the mining rules under which it will have to operate, our vast reserves of low-sulphur coal will not be developed as rapidly as they should be and the under-utilization of such coal will persist.

The Clean Air Act of 1970, as amended, requires that primary air quality standards -- those related to health -- must be met by 1975, while more stringent secondary standards -- those related to the "general welfare" -- must be met within a reasonable period. The States are moving very effectively to meet primary standards established by the Clean Air Act, and I am encouraged by their efforts.

At the same time, our concern for the "general welfare" or national interest should take into account considerations of national security and economic prosperity, as well as our environment.

If we insisted upon meeting both primary and secondary clean air standards by 1975, we could prevent the use of up to 155 million tons of coal per year. This would force an increase in demand for oil of 1.6 million barrels per day. This oil would have to be imported, with an adverse effect on our balance of payments of some $1.5 billion or more a year. Such a development would also threaten the loss of an estimated 26,000 coal mining jobs.

If, on the other hand, we carry out the provisions of the Clean Air Act in a judicious manner, carefully meeting the primary, health-related standards, but not moving in a precipitous way toward meeting the secondary standards, then we should be able to use virtually all of that coal which would otherwise go unused.

The Environmental Protection Agency has indicated that the reasonable time allowed by the Clean Air Act for meeting secondary standards could extend beyond 1975. Last year, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency sent to all State governors a letter explaining that during the current period of shortages in low-sulphur fuel, the States should not require the burning of such fuels except where necessary to meet the primary standards for the protection of health. This action by the States should permit the desirable substitution of coal for low-sulphur fuel in many instances. I strongly support this policy.

Many State regulatory commissions permit their State utilities to pass on increased fuel costs to the consumer in the form of higher rates, but there are sometimes lags in allowing the costs of environmental control equipment to be passed on in a similar way. Such lags discourage the use of environmental control technology and encourage the use of low-sulphur fuels, most of which are imported.

To increase the incentive for using new environmental technology, I urge all State utility commissions to ensure that utilities receive a rapid and fair return on pollution control equipment, including stack gas cleaning devices and coal gasification processes.

As an additional measure to increase the production and use of coal, I am directing that a new reporting system on national coal production be instituted within the Department of the Interior, and I am asking the Federal Power Commission for regular reports on the use of coal by utilities.

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I am also stepping up our spending for research and development in coal, with special emphasis on technology for sulphur removal and the development of low-cost, clean-burning forms of coal.

## Nuclear Energy

Although our greatest dependence for energy until now has been on fossil fuels such as coal and oil, we must not and we need not continue this heavy reliance in the future. The major alternative to fossil fuel energy for the remainder of this century is nuclear energy.

Our well-established nuclear technology already represents an indispensable source of energy for meeting present needs. At present there are 30 nuclear power plants in operation in the United States; of the new electrical generator capacity contracted for during 1972, 70 percent will be nuclear powered. By 1980, the amount of electricity generated by nuclear reactors will be equivalent to 1.25 billion barrels of oil, or 8 trillion cubic feet of gas. It is estimated that nuclear power will provide more than one-quarter of this country's electrical production by 1985, and over half by the year 2000.

Most nuclear power plants now in operation utilize light water reactors. In the near future, some will use high temperature gas-cooled reactors. These techniques will be supplemented during the next decade by the fast breeder reactor, which will bring about a 30-fold increase in the efficiency with which we utilize our domestic uranium resources. At present, development of the liquid metal fast breeder reactor is our highest priority target for nuclear research and development.

Nuclear power generation has an extraordinary safety record. There has never been a nuclear-related fatality in our civilian atomic energy program. We intend to maintain that record by increasing research and development in reactor safety.

The process of determining the safety and environmental acceptability of nuclear power plants is more vigorous and more open to public participation than for any comparable industrial enterprise. Every effort must be made by the Government and industry to protect public health and safety and to provide satisfactory answers to those with honest concerns about this source of power.

At the same time, we must seek to avoid unreasonable delays in developing nuclear power. They serve only to impose unnecessary costs and aggravate our energy shortages. It is discouraging to know that nuclear facilities capable of generating 27,000 megawatts of electric power which were expected to be operational by 1972 were not completed. To replace that generating capacity we would have to use the equivalent of one-third of the natural gas the country used for generating electricity in 1972. This situation must not continue.

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In my first Energy Special Message in 1971, I proposed that utilities prepare and publish long-range plans for the siting of nuclear power plants and transmission lines. This legislation would provide a Federal-State framework for licensing individual plants on the basis of a full and balanced consideration of both environmental and energy needs. The Congress has not acted on that proposal. I am resubmitting that legislation this year with a number of new provisions to simplify licensing, including one to require that the Government act on all completed license applications within 18 months after they are received.

I would also emphasize that the private sector's role in future nuclear development must continue to grow. The Atomic Energy Commission is presently taking steps to provide greater amounts of enriched uranium fuel for the Nation's nuclear power plants. However, this expansion will not fully meet our needs in the 1980's; the Government now looks to private industry to provide the additional capacity that will be required.

Our nuclear technology is a national asset of inestimable value. It is essential that we press forward with its development.

The increasing occurrence of unnecessary delays in the development of energy facilities must be ended if we are to meet our energy needs. To be sure, reasonable safeguards must be vigorously maintained for protection of the public and of our environment. Full public participation and questioning must also be allowed as we decide where new energy facilities are to be built. We need to streamline our governmental procedures for licensing and inspections, reduce overlapping jurisdictions and eliminate confusion generated by the government.

To achieve these ends I am taking several steps. During the coming year we will examine various possibilities to assure that all public and private interests are impartially and expeditiously weighed in all government proceedings for permits, licensing and inspections.

I am again proposing siting legislation to the Congress for electric facilities and for the first time, for deepwater ports. All of my new siting legislation includes provision for simplified licensing at both Federal and State levels. It is vital that the Congress take prompt and favorable action on these proposals.

## Encouraging Domestic Exploration

Our tax system now provides needed incentives for mineral exploration in the form of percentage depletion allowances and deductions for certain drilling expenses. These provisions do not, however, distinguish between exploration for new reserves and development of existing reserves.

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In order to encourage increased exploration, I ask the Congress to extend the investment credit provisions of our present tax law so that a credit will be provided for all exploratory drilling for new oil and gas fields. Under this proposal, a somewhat higher credit would apply for successful exploratory wells than for unsuccessful ones, in order to put an additional premium on results.

The investment credit has proven itself a powerful stimulus to industrial activity. I expect it to be equally effective in the search for new reserves.

## IMPORTING TO MEET OUR ENERGY NEEDS

### Oil Imports

In order to avert a short-term fuel shortage and to keep fuel costs as low as possible, it will be necessary for us to increase fuel imports. At the same time, in order to reduce our long-term reliance on imports, we must encourage the exploration and development of our domestic oil and the construction of refineries to process it.

The present quota system for oil imports -- the Mandatory Oil Import Program -- was established at a time when we could produce more oil at home than we were using. By imposing quantitative restrictions on imports, the quota system restricted imports of foreign oil. It also encouraged the development of our domestic petroleum industry in the interest of national security.

Today, however, we are not producing as much oil as we are using, and we must import ever larger amounts to meet our needs.

As a result, the current Mandatory Oil Import Program is of virtually no benefit any longer. Instead, it has the very real potential of aggravating our supply problems, and it denies us the flexibility we need to deal quickly and and efficiently with our import requirements. General dissatisfaction with the program and the apparent need for change has led to uncertainty. Under these conditions, there can be little long-range investment planning for new drilling and refinery construction.

Effective today, I am removing by proclamation all existing tariffs on imported crude oil and products. Holders of import licenses will be able to import petroleum duty free. This action will help hold down the cost of energy to the American consumer.

Effective today, I am also suspending direct control over the quantity of crude oil and refined products which can be imported. In place of these controls, I am substituting a license-fee quota system.

Under the new system, present holders of import licenses may import petroleum exempt from fees up to the level of their 1973 quota allocations. For imports in excess of the 1973 level, a fee must be paid by the importer.

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This system should achieve several objectives.

First, it should help to meet our immediate energy needs by encouraging importation of foreign oil at the lowest cost to consumers, while also providing incentives for exploration and development of our domestic resources to meet our long-term needs. There will be little paid in fees this year, although all exemptions from fees will be phased out over several years. By gradually increasing fees over the next two and one-half years to a maximum level of one-half cent per gallon for crude oil and one and one-half cents per gallon for all refined products, we should continue to meet our energy needs while encouraging industry to increase its domestic production.

Second, this system should encourage refinery construction in the United States, because the fees are higher for refined products than for crude oil. As an added incentive, crude oil in amounts up to three-fourths of new refining capacity may be imported without being subject to any fees. This special allowance will be available to an oil company during the first five years after it builds or expands its refining capacity.

Third, this system should provide the flexibility we must have to meet short and long-term needs efficiently. We will review the fee level periodically to ensure that we are imposing the lowest fees consistent with our intention to increase domestic production while keeping costs to the consumer at the lowest possible level. We will also make full use of the Oil Import Appeals Board to ensure that the needs of all elements of the petroleum industry are met, particularly those of independent operators who help to maintain market competition.

Fourth, the new system should contribute to our national security. Increased domestic production will leave us less dependent on foreign supplies. At the same time, we will adjust the fees in a manner designed to encourage, to the extent possible, the security of our foreign supplies. Finally, I am directing the Oil Policy Committee to examine incentives aimed at increasing our domestic storage capacity or shut-in production. In this way we will provide buffer stocks to insulate ourselves against a temporary loss of foreign supplies.

## Deepwater Ports

It is clear that in the foreseeable future, we will have to import oil in large quantities. We should do this as cheaply as we can with minimal damage to the environment. Unfortunately, our present capabilities are inadequate for these purposes.

The answer to this problem lies in deepwater ports which can accommodate those larger ships, providing important economic advantages while reducing the risks of collision and grounding. Recent studies by the Council on Environmental Quality demonstrate that we can expect considerably less pollution if we use fewer but larger tankers and deepwater facilities, as opposed to the many small tankers and conventional facilities which we would otherwise need.

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If we do not enlarge our deepwater port capacity, it is clear that both American and foreign companies will expand oil transshipment terminals in the Bahamas and the Canadian Maritime Provinces. From these terminals, oil will be brought to our conventional ports by growing numbers of small and medium size transshipment vessels, thereby increasing the risks of pollution from shipping operations and accidents. At the same time, the United States will lose the jobs and capital that those foreign facilities provide.

Given these considerations, I believe we must move forward with an ambitious program to create new deepwater ports for receiving petroleum imports.

The development of ports has usually been a responsibility of State and local governments and the private sector. However, States cannot issue licenses beyond the three-mile limit. I am therefore proposing legislation to permit the Department of the Interior to issue such licenses. Licensing would be contingent upon full and proper evaluation of environmental impact, and would provide for strict navigation and safety, as well as proper land use requirements. The proposed legislation specifically provides for Federal cooperation with State and local authorities.

## CONSERVING ENERGY

The abundance of America's natural resources has been one of our greatest advantages in the past. But if this abundance encourages us to take our resources for granted, then it may well be a detriment to our future.

Common sense clearly dictates that as we expand the types and sources of energy available to us for the future, we must direct equal attention to conserving the energy available to us today, and we must explore means to limit future growth in energy demand.

We as a nation must develop a national energy conservation ethic. Industry can help by designing products which conserve energy and by using energy more efficiently. All workers and consumers can help by continually saving energy in their day-to-day activities: by turning out lights, tuning up automobiles, reducing the use of air conditioning and heating, and purchasing products which use energy efficiently.

Government at all levels also has an important role to play, both by conserving energy directly, and by providing leadership in energy conservation efforts.

I am directing today that an Office of Energy Conservation be established in the Department of the Interior to coordinate the energy conservation programs which are presently scattered throughout the Federal establishment. This office will conduct research and work with consumer and environmental groups in their efforts to educate consumers on ways to get the greatest return on their energy dollar.

To provide consumers with further information, I am directing the Department of Commerce, working with the Council on Environmental Quality and the Environmental Protection Agency, to develop a voluntary system of energy efficiency labels for major home appliances. These labels should provide data on energy use as well as a rating com-

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paring the product's efficiency to other similar products. In addition, the Environmental Protection Agency will soon release the results of its tests of fuel efficiency in automobiles.

There are other ways, too, in which government can exercise leadership in this field. I urge again, for example, that we allow local officials to use money from Highway Trust Fund for mass transit purposes. Greater reliance on mass transit can do a great deal to help us conserve gasoline.

The Federal Government can also lead by example. The General Services Administration, for instance, is constructing a new Federal office building using advanced energy conservation techniques, with a goal of reducing energy use by 20 percent over typical buildings of the same size. At the same time, the National Bureau of Standards is evaluating energy use in a full-size house within its laboratories. When this evaluation is complete, analytical techniques will be available to help predict energy use for new dwellings. This information, together with the experience gained in the construction and operation of the demonstration Federal building, will assist architects and contractors to design and construct energy-efficient buildings.

Significant steps to upgrade insulation standards on single and multi-family dwellings were taken at my direction in 1971 and 1972, helping to reduce heat loss and otherwise conserve energy in the residential sector. As soon as the results of these important demonstration projects are available, I will direct the Federal Housing Administration to update its insulation standards in light of what we have learned and to consider their possible extension to mobile homes.

Finally, we should recognize that the single most effective means of encouraging energy conservation is to ensure that energy prices reflect their true costs. By eliminating regulations such as the current ceiling on natural gas prices and by ensuring that the costs of adequate environmental controls are equitably allocated, we can move toward more efficient distribution of our resources.

Energy conservation is a national necessity, but I believe that it can be undertaken most effectively on a voluntary basis. If the challenge is ignored, the result will be a danger of increased shortages, increased prices, damage to the environment and the increased possibility that conservation will have to be undertaken by compulsory means in the future. There should be no need for a nation which has always been rich in energy to have to turn to energy rationing. This is a part of the energy challenge which every American can help to meet, and I call upon every American to do his or her part.

## RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

If we are to be certain that the forward thrust of our economy will not be hampered by insufficient energy supplies or by energy supplies that are prohibitively expensive, then we must not continue to be dependent on conventional forms of energy. We must instead make every useful effort through research and development to provide both alternative sources of energy and new technologies for producing and utilizing this energy.

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For the short-term future, our research and development strategy will provide technologies to extract and utilize our existing fossil fuels in a manner most compatible with a healthy environment.

In the longer run, from 1985 to the beginning of the next century, we will have more sophisticated development of our fossil fuel resources and on the full development of the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor. Our efforts for the distant future center on the development of technologies -- such as nuclear fusion and solar power -- that can provide us with a virtually limitless supply of clean energy.

In my 1971 Energy Special Message to the Congress I outlined a broadly based research and development program. I proposed the expansion of cooperative Government-industry efforts to develop the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor, coal gasification, and stack gas cleaning systems at the demonstration level. These programs are all progressing well.

My budget for fiscal year 1974 provides for an increase in energy research and development funding of 20 percent over the level of 1973.

My 1974 budget provides for creation of a new central energy fund in the Interior Department to provide additional money for non-nuclear research and development, with the greatest part designated for coal research. This central fund is designed to give us the flexibility we need for rapid exploitation of new, especially promising energy technologies with near-term payoffs.

One of the most promising programs that will be receiving increased funding in fiscal year 1974 is the solvent refined coal process which will produce low-ash, low-sulphur fuels from coal. Altogether, coal research and development and proposed funding is increased by 27 percent.

In addition to increased funding for the Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor, I am asking for greater research and development on reactor safety and radioactive waste disposal, and the production of nuclear fuel.

The waters of the world contain potential fuel -- in the form of a special isotope of hydrogen -- sufficient to power fusion reactors for thousands of years. Scientists at the Atomic Energy Commission now predict with increasing confidence that we can demonstrate laboratory feasibility of controlled thermonuclear fusion by magnetic confinement in the near future. We have also advanced to the point where some scientists believe the feasibility of laser fusion could be demonstrated within the next several years. I have proposed in my 1974 budget a 35 percent increase in funding for our total fusion research and development effort to accelerate experimental programs and to initiate preliminary reactor design studies.

While we look to breeder reactors to meet our mid-term energy needs, today's commercial power reactors will continue to provide most of our nuclear generating capacity for the balance of this century. Although nuclear reactors have had a remarkable safety record, my 1974 budget provides additional funds to assure that our rapidly growing reliance on nuclear power will not compromise public health and safety. This

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includes work on systems for safe storage of the radioactive waste which nuclear reactors produce. The Atomic Energy Commission is working on additional improvements in surface storage and will continue to explore the possibility of underground burial for long-term containment of these wastes.

Solar energy holds great promise as a potentially limitless source of clean energy. My new budget triples our solar energy research and development effort to a level of $12 million. A major portion of these funds would be devoted to accelerating the development of commercial systems for heating and cooling buildings.

Research and development funds relating to environmental control technologies would be increased 24 percent in my 1974 budget. This research includes a variety of projects related to stack gas cleaning and includes the construction of a demonstration sulphur dioxide removal plant. In addition, the Atomic Energy Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency will continue to conduct research on the thermal effects of power plants.

While the Federal Government is significantly increasing its commitment to energy research and development, a large share of such research is and should be conducted by the private sector.

I am especially pleased that the electric utilities have recognized the importance of research in meeting the rapidly escalating demand for electrical energy. The recent establishment of the Electric Power Research Institute, which will have a budget in 1974 in excess of $100 million, can help develop technology to meet both load demands and environmental regulations currently challenging the industry.

Historically the electric power industry has allocated a smaller portion of its revenues to research than have most other technology-dependent industries. This pattern has been partly attributable to the reluctance of some State utility commissions to include increased research and development expenditures in utility rate bases. Recently the Federal Power Commission instituted a national rule to allow the recovery of research and development expenditures in rates. State regulatory agencies have followed the FPC's lead and are liberalizing their treatment of research and development expenditures consistent with our changing national energy demands.

I am hopeful that this trend will continue and I urge all State utility commissions to review their regulations regarding research and development expenditures to ensure that the electric utility industry can fully cooperate in a national energy research and development effort.

It is foolish and self-defeating to allocate funds more rapidly than they can be effectively spent. At the same time, we must carefully monitor our progress and our needs to ensure that our funding is adequate. When additional funds are found to be essential, I shall do everything I can to see that they are provided.

## INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

The energy challenge confronts every nation. Where there is such a community of interest, there is both a cause and a basis for cooperative action.

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Today, the United States is involved in a number of cooperative, international efforts. We have joined with the other 22 member-nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to produce a comprehensive report on long-term problems and to develop an agreement for sharing oil in times of acute shortages. The European Economic Community has already discussed the need for cooperative efforts and is preparing recommendations for a Community energy policy. We have expressed a desire to work together with them in this effort.

We have also agreed with the Soviet Union to pursue joint research in magnetohydrodynamics (MHD), a highly efficient process for generating electricity, and to exchange information on fusion, fission, the generation of electricity, transmission and pollution control technology. These efforts should be a model for joint research efforts with other countries. Additionally, American companies are looking into the possibility of joint projects with the Soviet Union to develop natural resources for the benefit of both nations.

I have also instructed the Department of State, in coordination with the Atomic Energy Commission, other appropriate Government agencies, and the Congress to move rapidly in developing a program of international cooperation in research and development on new forms of energy and in developing international mechanisms for dealing with energy questions in times of critical shortages.

I believe the energy challenge provides an important opportunity for nations to pursue vital objectives through peaceful cooperation. No chance should be lost to strengthen the structure of peace we are seeking to build in the world, and few issues provide us with as good an opportunity to demonstrate that there is more to be gained in pursuing our national interests through mutual cooperation than through destructive competition or dangerous confrontation.

## Federal Energy Organization

If we are to meet the energy challenge, the current fragmented organization of energy-related activities in the executive branch of the Government must be overhauled.

In 1971, I proposed legislation to consolidate Federal energy-related activities within a new Department of Natural Resources. The 92nd Congress did not act on this proposal. In the interim I have created a new post of Counsellor to the President on Natural Resources to assist in the policy coordination in the natural resources field.

Today I am taking executive action specifically to improve the Federal organization of energy activities.

I have directed the Secretary of the Interior to strengthen his Department's organization of energy activities in several ways.

- The responsibilities of the new Assistant Secretary for Energy and Minerals will be expanded to incorporate all departmental energy activities;

- The Department is to develop a capacity for gathering and analysis of energy data;

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-- An Office of Energy Conservation is being created to seek means for reducing demands for energy;

-- The Department of the Interior has also strengthened its capabilities for overseeing and coordinating a broader range of energy research and development.

By Executive order, I have placed authority in the Department of the Treasury for directing the Oil Policy Committee. That Committee coordinates the oil import program and makes recommendations to me for changes in that program. The Deputy Secretary of the Treasury has been designated Chairman of that Committee.

Through a second Executive order, effective today, I am strengthening the capabilities of the Executive Office of the President to deal with top level energy policy matters by establishing a special energy committee composed of three of my principal advisors. The order also reaffirms the appointment of a Special Consultant, who heads an energy staff in the Office of the President.

Additionally, a new division of Energy and Science is being established within the Office of Management and Budget.

While these executive actions will help, more fundamental reorganization is needed. To meet this need, I shall propose legislation to establish a Department of Energy and Natural Resources (DENR) building on the legislation I submitted in 1971, with heightened emphasis on energy programs.

This new Department would provide leadership across the entire range of national energy. It would, in short, be responsible for administering the national energy policy detailed in this message.

## CONCLUSION

Nations succeed only as they are able to respond to challenge, and to change when circumstances and opportunities require change.

When the first settlers came to America, they found a land of untold natural wealth, and this became the cornerstone of the most prosperous nation in the world. As we have grown in population, in prosperity, in industrial capacity, in all those indices that reflect the constant upward thrust in the American standard of living, the demands on our natural resources have also grown.

Today, the energy resources which have fueled so much of our national growth are not sufficiently developed to meet the constantly increasing demands which have been placed upon them. The time has come to change the way we meet these demands. The challenge facing us represents one of the great opportunities of our time -- an opportunity to create an even stronger domestic economy, a cleaner environment, and a better life for all our people.

The proposals I am submitting and the actions I will take can give us the tools to do this important job.

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 27, 1973

No. 349

#1

PRESS CONFERENCE BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
AT THE UNITED STATES MISSION
TO THE UNITED NATIONS
NEW YORK, NEW YORK
SEPTEMBER 26, 1973

Middle East - 5/8

5, 8

Ladies and gentlemen, I wanted to give you a brief account of what I have been doing here, and then answer yours questions, hopefully relating primarily to my activities in New York.

You know my schedule, so there is no point in repeating that. My activities consisted of the speech to the General Assembly, meetings with various Foreign Ministers, and meetings with my staff in preparation for entering the State Department on Thursday, where I still haven't been.

Now about my speech to the General Assembly, the intention was to convey the tone, philosophy, and the attitude of the Administration in its conduct of foreign policy for the remainder of this term.

We wanted to convey beyond the specific initiatives that might be proposed, that the task which is before us now is to consolidate what has been achieved, to construct something that can endure, both within our country -- because it has popular and Governmental support -- and above all, something that can endure internationally -- because it is seen to be in the common interest.

This attitude and general philosophy, we felt, was more important at this stage than a list of specific proposals -- although some were made -- because you are familiar with the main outlines of many of our policies.

So for the President's second term, our agenda is to try to create an international consensus to international order that is seen to be just by all or at least the greatest number. Something that embodies humane and progressive ideas.

In my conversations with the Foreign Ministers, I obviously had to deal primarily with the current agenda. On my trip this week, I saw a great many of our allies. I saw many of the Foreign Ministers from Europe. I saw, of course, the Foreign Minister of Japan. I spent some time with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and today with the Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China.

I had a long and fruitful talk with the Foreign Minister of Brazil, to underline the great importance we attach to reinvigorating our relationships in that area. And I saw the Foreign Ministers of Thailand and Korea.

For further information contact:

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Let me say a word about the conversations with our European friends, and also the relation of Japan to that process.

There has been a great deal of speculation tied to a possible trip of the President to Europe. We still, of course, plan this trip, but its exact date will have to be determined by the pace of our preparation.

Much of the speculation has been in terms of an adversary relationship between us and the Europeans, and great difficulty in coming to an agreement.

I would like to correct this impression.

What we are confronting in the dialogue with the Europeans is the merging of several processes. There is the process of European integration. There is the process of the debate on security within NATO. And there is the redefinition of the Atlantic relationship, which covers all these areas.

As you know, on behalf of the President, I proposed a new Atlantic Declaration of Principles in a speech I gave in April.

There was some uncertainty in Europe on how and in what forum to respond; several months were spent in internal discussions within Europe -- whether the proper forum would be NATO, a series of bilateral negotiations with the Europeans, or a series of talks between the United States and the Common Market.

The result has been that after some months of going all these routes, European opinion crystalized; it was decided that those economic matters -- and political considerations relevant to economic matters -- relevant to Europe as an entity, should be discussed by the Nine, as a unit, with the United States. It was also decided that security issues -- and those political issues relevant to security matters -- should be discussed in the NATO Council.

And then, of course, bilateral channels have remained open throughout this process.

With respect to the declaration that the European Nine have developed, and that was presented to me yesterday on behalf of the Nine, by Foreign Minister Andersen of Denmark, let me say that the United States recognizes that this first attempt by Europe to speak with one voice on a political matter of trans-Atlantic relationships is an event of the greatest significance.

The United States in the post-war period has constantly supported the emergence of a European identity, and we therefore welcome the fact that Europe has now organized itself well enough so that it can speak to us with one voice. It may be that in historical retrospect, this meeting of the European Nine in Copenhagen will be seen as one of the decisive events of the post-war period.

At the same time, the United States, of course, reserves the right to its own opinion with respect to the outcome of these deliberations. They were not presented to the United States on a "take it or leave it" basis. They were presented to us in a spirit of partnership as the opening of a dialogue. Therefore, this Saturday the Political Directors of the Nine, and Assistant Secretary Stoessel, are going to meet for a discussion in which we will blend our ideas -- or attempt to blend our ideas -- with those of Europe in this declaration of economic and political principles.

-3-

Secondly, as you know, there are discussions taking place right now in NATO dealing with the definition of future allied relationships; they concern security and the political aspects of security.

There is general agreement that these discussions will be energetically pursued within the context of the NATO Council. We expect to make a significant contribution to this. And so will other countries.

What I want to underline here is that we are not engaged in an adversary procedure. We are engaged in a process in which we intend to give traditional friendship new vitality.

The trip of the President is not an end in itself. The trip of the President will certainly take place in the near future, but our concern is to produce documents that will have some historic significance. We believe that we are now well on the way toward accomplishing what we set out to do earlier this year. The discussions have been useful and they will proceed in a constructive spirit.

It was, of course, inevitable in the conversations with Japan that its relationship to these various efforts would be a subject of conversation.

Since the Japanese Foreign Minister and Prime Minister are going to be visiting Europe in the next few weeks, it would not be appropriate for me to comment, except to say that in my speech of April 23 we outlined the American point of view. We believe that at some stage of this process, in some manner, it is important for Japan to participate.

The manner and the kind of declaration remains to be discussed. I think it will continue to be discussed between the Japanese and ourselves, and between the Japanese and the Europeans on the trip of senior Japanese officials through Europe.

I will make no comment about the conversations we had with the Representative of the People's Republic of China and the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union.

As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko will meet the President on Friday in Washington, and after that he and I will have a lunch. Therefore, we are still in the middle of our discussions, which cover the entire agenda of US-Soviet relationships.

While I was here, I also met with the Representatives of African nations, and with the Representatives of Arab States, here at the UN.

These meetings were not intended as pronouncements of new policy, but as expressions of our profound concern.

We do not want to pretend to answers that have not yet been found. But we can pledge in both areas that we will make an effort at understanding and an attempt to find just solutions.

I think now it would be best if I took your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, this is not patently your talk with Andrei Gromyko, which you ruled out, but I would like to ask a question about his public speech in the Assembly, in which he demands that Western nations stop meddling in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union -- and I think something in connection principally with the emigration policy of the Soviet Union.

-4-

The manner in which he spoke of it left us uncertain as to whether this really meant any lessening of the spirit of detente or whether it was simply a public gesture in a private game. Could you --

A. Ladies and gentlemen, during my confirmation hearings, I was asked extensively about this issue. It is also an issue about which I plan to make a formal statement sometime in the next month or six weeks. But for now, let me reiterate what I said then.

The United States, of course, has its own deeply held views about the human values at stake -- both in emigration policies and in internal policies.

The foreign policy question we face is:

First, the degree to which our foreign policy can directly affect others.

And secondly, the alternatives we in fact confront if our direct actions are ineffective.

There is a great tendency to assume that everything that has been achieved is now automatically permanent and can be drawn upon as if its capital were inexhaustible.

We have taken the position that we would not, as a Government, take a formal, public position, but we have also taken the position that insofar as we have influence in other ways, we would use it to the limit of our capabilities.

Now you are all familiar with the fact that the emigration tax is not being enforced. On an unofficial basis we have brought many hardship cases that were submitted to us by various organizations here to the attention of various officials. Many of those have been permitted to emigrate.

So the choice we have to make is between a public stance and the influence that our general relationship gives us.

We believe that we have been quite effective. But we should keep in mind that there is a point beyond which one cannot press a situation as it exists.

Q. Mr. Secretary, according to a sworn affidavit made public in Washington yesterday, your former National Security Aide, David Young, cited your name as authority in requesting the Central Intelligence Agency to prepare a psychological profile of Daniel Ellsberg. Can you tell us whether you authorized Young to use your name in such a manner?

A. First, I do not know whether David Young used my name in such a manner, because all his affidavit said is, "This is the impression of the man making this affidavit."

And I want to add that I have to choose my words here carefully, because you know David Young is under indictment and I do not want to complicate his case.

In my confirmation hearings, both in public and in executive session, I stated my position very clearly. I did not know of any of the activities of David Young after he left my staff and joined Mr. Ehrlichman's staff, except for one project on declassification, which was publicly announced.

I did not know about the request for a profile. I never saw this profile. I never discussed this subject with David Young. And therefore, if my name was used, which I cannot confirm, it was used without authority.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, what significance does your upcoming African trip have, specifically for black Americans who identify themselves very closely with Africa and its problems?

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A. My upcoming African trip was promised for the year 1974 -- it is not a trip that I will take in the very immediate future.

The significance is that, at the highest level in the State Department and in the Administration, we are going to take a new look at our African policy. We want to see what useful role the United States can play in a Continent which is undergoing very rapid change, and which has many problems, some of which I mentioned yesterday.

Q. You say there is a point beyond which the detente should not be pressed. I wonder if you could outline what you think might happen if the Congress revokes or blocks the Most Favored Nation status for the Soviet Union in the new trade bill.

A. I don't want to speculate about Soviet actions. I have stated previously that the Most Favored Nation clause was part of a general arrangement with the Soviet Union in negotiations extending over a period of many years. If now the Most Favored Nation clause is blocked, then the most serious question has to be raised about the degree to which other countries -- in this case, the Soviet Union -- can rely on a complex negotiation and about the performance of the United States, over a period of time, of its commitment. There was no reason to suppose at the time that this Most Favored Nation issue was discussed with the Soviet Union, that the type of problem that is now blocking it could be the subject of conditions in Congress. It had never been so used in any previous case where Most Favored Nation status was requested for a Communist country. Therefore, it would certainly be a significant setback in the policy that we are pursuing.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there's been some talk about the convocation of a special conference on the Middle East. I was wondering whether the United States favors such a conference in the near future.

A. The United States position on the Middle East has been that we should avoid at this time any very dramatic moves until we have had an opportunity to discuss with the parties what the possibilities are and how far they are prepared to go in moving towards a just peace in the Middle East. I think the calling of a conference before one has determined the framework and has some understanding as to objectives would be putting the cart before the horse.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the other day in the General Assembly you said the United States is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. Can you tell us more precisely what you meant by that "more central role"?

A. Well, as you know, the issue of peacekeeping has been deadlocked in these negotiations between the belief of some -- that has included us -- that the Secretary General should have very wide discretionary authority and the belief of others that the Security Council should control even the day-to-day operations of such a force.

Q. Mr. Secretary --

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A. Just a minute; I'm not finished yet -- or do you want to comment on my remarks?

Q. No!

(Laughter)

A. We are prepared now to take into account the view of those who want the Security Council to take a more active role -- although we cannot go all the way with them into the detailed day-to-day supervision. So, my speech was to signal to the other parties concerned -- permanent members of the Security Council, countries that have traditionally supplied forces, and other interested parties -- that if they are willing to meet us in a cooperative spirit, if they are willing to work for a force that can act expeditiously, they will make a major effort to meet their common concerns. We are prepared to give the Security Council a greater role -- but not such a role that it can hamstring day-to-day operations.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us some of your views on the prospect of the Korean question debate this year at the UN -- particularly if the question begins to fall into another long series of international delays? Then would you welcome any chance of a higher dialogue negotiation between the major nation countries -- namely, among the Security Council members -- to avoid confrontation at the UN of the problem?

A. Our view, with respect to all issues, is that there should be a great deal of private diplomacy -- that the United Nations can be most effective if no side pushes its view to an absolute and public extreme. Then standard positions harden and compromises become extremely difficult.

So, with respect to the Korean question, we believe that the South Korean Government, in its June 23rd proposal, has made some very constructive initiatives; it has advanced some very constructive initiatives. We believe they deserve the most serious consideration.

On our part, we would welcome quiet discussions -- among the permanent members, as well as among other interested parties -- and we hope that everyone concerned will use this debate as a means of consultation rather than of confrontation.

Q. Mr. Secretary -- Dr. Kissinger, you said the President's speech would take place in the very near future, and you say --

A. The President's what?

Q. Excuse me -- the President's trip would take place in the very near future -- and it was hoped that it would produce documents of very major significance. Should we link the two at the same time?

A. No. Of course, a great deal depends on what you mean by "very near future." What I'm saying is we now have a process, and we have the outline of the ideas that can form the outcome of that process.

You should clearly line in your mind that the President's trip will have to result from progress in these talks. And, again, I want to

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stress: We're not looking for a publicity maneuver; we're not simply looking for a document that everyone can sign -- because that's relatively easy to achieve and we're within sight of achieving this already.

We have made a very serious proposal. It is based on our conviction that Atlantic relationships have basically changed in the last 25 years, partly as a result of the success of previous policies. We think that in order to give a new impetus to them -- in order in a period of detente to reaffirm the significance of friends -- we have to develop a new vision of the future.

This is not done in the American interest; it is done in the common interest. That is what we consider a "document of historic significance."

We believe that it is achievable; we believe that some progress has been made; that process will now continue. As I think Mr. McCloskey has already pointed out, I plan to be in England about October 15th to give a speech to the Pilgrims. On that occasion I plan to meet with several of my colleagues of the European Foreign Ministers. And we believe that we are now well under way, but we're not setting any artificial deadlines. The outcome of the deliberations will determine the timing of the President's trip.

Q. Dr. Kissinger --

A. Yes.

Q. -- If there is a delay in arriving at a consensus between the United States and Europe on shared goals, are you concerned at all that this will have an effect in slowing detente between the United States and the Soviet Union in the sense that the subjects of detente are basically the question of European Security and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, which are the matters being discussed between the United States and Europe?

A. We believe, as detente progresses, that the redefinition of relationships with our friends in both Europe and Asia become very important, because so much of the original relationship was based on the fear of military aggression, which presumably would be lessened by the progress of detente.

Now, whether you can reverse this and say that if these negotiations, slow down -- that, I think, is much more problematical. Therefore, I would rather phrase it positively: that it is the duty of statesmanship in this period to see to it that relations among friends keep pace with relationships among former adversaries. And it does not make any sense that we should make slower progress with our friends than we are making with our adversaries. We don't accept that proposition, and there's no reason for you to believe that that is what is going to happen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you envisage detente with Cuba as part of your definition of the policy force in Latin America?

A. Well, I've stated our view with respect to Cuba before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. I think we will first have to discuss

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this question fully with our friends in Latin America before we can
address this question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the average American regards the efforts of Dr. Henry Kissinger as being a prime motivation for working towards a resolution of the Viet-Nam war. Now, as you become Secretary of State and you turn your attempts to an area of the world like the Middle East, the average American might think that you could go in again and bring about what other people have not been able to accomplish.

As you look toward that troubled spot as you looked toward Viet-Nam,
how do you see your role and could you bring about something like that?

A. Well, first, while I think it has been pointed out that humility
is not my most distinctive trait --

(Laughter)

-- I do think it is important that foreign policy in this phase not
be identified with one individual or with virtuoso performances.

When this Administration came into office, we faced a series of
emergency situations that had to be dealt with by emergency measures.
But if we are going to build truly, we have to construct a more permanent
peace through more regular procedures and in a less personalized way.

Now, with respect to the Middle East, it would be a great mistake
to assume that any one man can pull a rabbit out of the hat. The
difficulties in the Middle East occurred not because the parties don't
understand each other but, in some respects, because they understand
each other only too well.

(Laughter)

And we cannot substitute ourselves for the parties concerned. Even
in Indochina -- as our critics have often pointed out -- it took four
years to bring about a settlement -- which, also, incidentally, was the
period of time that it took France to disengage in Algeria.

In the Middle East, we are prepared to use our influence to urge the
parties towards a spirit of compromise -- to encourage them in the
process of negotiation. But you cannot expect -- and no one should ask
us -- to produce all the formulas and all the will as a substitute for
that of the other parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Senate voted today to reduce U.S. forces
abroad 40 percent in the next two years. Is that a good idea, and how
will it affect the U.S. position and negotiating capability in the talks
on the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions and the limiting of strategic
weapons?

A. Well, as you know, the Administration strongly opposes this type
of resolution. It will be impossible to negotiate an agreement for the
reduction of forces when the United States unilaterally accomplishes what
the negotiations are supposed to bring about. It will be very difficult --

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if not impossible -- to convince our allies of the steadiness of American policy when the United States again unilaterally, before our discussions have well advanced, reduces its forces in Europe.

And I might point out that it is somewhat contradictory to be asked at one and the same time to conduct a foreign policy designed to bring about a transformation of the Soviet system and to cut one's forces for defense.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, you mention -- in your growing relationship with Europe, you mentioned your concern with the countries of Japan and in Asia. Canada is one of the largest -- if not the largest -- trading partners with the United States today. Where do we fit in with your plans for Europe?

A. Well, as you know -- shall I repeat the question? As you know, I met with your Foreign Minister, and this obviously was a subject of conversation.

Procedurally, Canada, -- as we are now envisioning the procedure -- there will be at least two declarations -- one between the United States and the Common Market, and another dealing with the United States and NATO.

Of course, Canada is part of NATO and will be a full participant in the discussions concerning NATO.

With respect to the U.S. association with the Common Market, Canada is technically not part of it. We will proceed in closest consultation with Canada with respect to this, and we are open-minded about an association that Canada may wish to make to such a declaration.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now what are your relations with Nigeria?

A. Well, obviously, it was impossible to cover every country in the world in the speech. I tried to convey that we will deal with Africa with understanding and with concern. Nigeria is, of course, one of the most important countries in Africa. It was visited by the Secretary of State two years ago.

We understand that your President is visiting here, and we are hoping that he can also pay a call on us in Washington.

So we consider Nigeria a very important, potentially decisive country in Africa.

Q. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

* * * * * * * * *

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS BETWEEN
THE PRESIDENT
AND
ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO
PRIME MINISTER OF PAKISTAN

STATE DINING ROOM

AT 9:56 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Bhutto and our distinguished guests from Pakistan and the United States:

We are very honored, Mr. Prime Minister, to have you, Mrs. Bhutto, the members of your official party here in this room tonight and we only regret that the room is so small that all of the friends that you have, and there are legions in this country, could not be here to honor you and to express their friendship for Pakistan and the people of Pakistan.

On this occasion, I would like to speak in somewhat personal terms, since this is essentially a dinner honoring you personally and your wife personally. I think of all of the leaders of great nations that have visited this country since I have had the privilege of being here as President and in a way I think I have known you longer, although we did not meet at the time, than any other, because in the year 1950, when I was a very young Congressman campaigning for the United States Senate, you were a very young student at the University of California. And so, while we did not meet, we knew each other, in a way. (Laughter)

Much has happened since then. Neither of us would have guessed that in 1950, in 1953 we would meet again in Pakistan, when you were still very young. You and Mrs. Bhutto had been married only two years and Mrs. Nixon and I were so honored to meet you then at the residence of our Ambassador on our first trip around the world.

In 1964 there was another meeting. I should not really disclose this to such a large group, but this is a group that is so small that a secret can be kept. (Laughter.) And in Washington that is saying a very great deal today.

But in 1964, I met Mrs. Bhutto again, at a private party, at which her husband was not present and my wife was not present. (Laughter) I was traveling around the world by myself with a friend on a business trip and the Prime Minister was on his official duties traveling abroad.

And then, of course, again we have had the occasion of meeting, particularly just two days before the Prime Minister assumed his present duties.

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[L]

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Now, what I have just referred to is not meant
to be simply a personal recounting of our association,
but is to make a point and it is this: Pakistan and the
United States of America have been friends since the time
that Pakistan became an independent nation.

I, as an American, sometimes in office and sometimes
out, out not at my own choice. (Laughter) But nevertheless,
I can assure you that Pakistan and the people of Pakistan
have always been very close to my heart. I admire them, I
respect them, as do all of the people, Mr. Prime Minister,
in this room, and many others across this nation. That
friendship has lasted through a generation and it will
continue to last and it will last for reasons that we do not
need to go into now, but one of the reasons that appeals
to me particularly to mention on this occasion relates to
what could have been a total national disaster for your
nation, a natural and national disaster of the past few
months. I refer to the floods that have been ravaging your
country just at a time that with your leadership the nation
was moving on after the very difficult and traumatic experience
of war.

I asked your wife, Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Bhutto,
what was the spirit of the people. I said none of the leaders,
none of the members of Parliament, but the peasants, the
others, the people that worked the land, were they discouraged,
were they giving up after a war, and after all of the bloodshed
and the tragedy and now the flood.

And her answer, it seems to me, tells us something
about Pakistan and also something about human nature generally
that is quite profound.

She said, no, as she visited the areas most ravaged
by the floods and talked to the farmers and their wives, they
did not talk about the past. They said, yes, the floods
had destroyed their crops for this year, but the floods
had brought new silt into the land and the land would be
richer for the crops next year.

And so, rather than looking backward, they were
looking forward. Rather than letting adversity destroy them,
they were proving the profound truth that from adversity
grows strength.

And this is the story of Pakistan and of many other
countries, including our own, from time to time. Pakistan
has had more than its share of adversity in recent years, but
out of that adversity has come a strong people, 65 million
in numbers and out of that adversity has come a strong leader,
our Prime Minister, who is our guest today, his wife and the
members of his official party.

And in paying our respects to him, to his people, we
do so because we have an official obligation to do so which
we welcome, but also because of a deep personal respect which
I have tried to convey, because of a deep personal friendship
which I have tried to convey.

And so I know all of you in this room and many others
who could not be here would like to join me in our toast to
the friendship between the people of Pakistan and the people
of the United States and express that friendship by raising our
glasses to the health of the Prime Minister.

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PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO: Mr. President, Mrs. Nixon, distinguished guests and friends:

Mr. President, you have been most gracious in your remarks and you have said that this is an intimate gathering of friends. I will proceed from that point.

Since it is an intimate gathering of friends, with your permission, I would like to tell them about our discussions, the inner truth of our talks.

We discussed three matters, economic matters, cultural matters and military matters. I don't know how, but cultural and military matters got intertwined, perhaps because Dr. Kissinger was there. (Laughter)

And we discussed these highly complicated problems. We were told that since military and cultural matters are interrelated, we must know that Jill St. John is booked for the Soviet Union -- (Laughter) -- and Raquel Welch is earmarked for China -- (Laughter) -- as far as our old friend Pakistan is concerned, Tallulah Bankhead is there available for Pakistan.

THE PRESIDENT: What do we get? (Laughter)

PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO: So we said we are old friends, but not in that sense. (Laughter) And then we were told that that is all we can do. And that also is true of either Saudi Arabia or Iran.

So we told our friends candidly that what we are interested in is not obsolete spare parts, but in red hot weapons. (Laughter)

Mr. President, I have been in your great country as a student. You have made mention of it and my sojourn here was a warm one. It is here that I came to respect the vitality of the people and I remember that on one occasion in 1949 I was standing outside your White House, this distinguished house, resplendent with history and I was standing by the rails looking at it, its architecture, its beauty and a Negro friend, a gentleman passing by stood by as well. And we both had our hands on the railing. He looked at me and asked me from which country I came and I told him from where I came and he said that, "If you were an American, what would you like to be?"

So I said, "If I were an American, I would like to be inside that house." (Laughter)

So he told me that, "You better get the hell out of this country because we are going crazy picking the man for the house itself in our own country."

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But that is how the past is, and it is remembered vividly. We know that you have been a good friend of our country, not in the subjective sense, because you have known that Pakistan has been a good friend of the United States and I don't use this word in its chauvanistic sense, in the sense of its past chivalry.

The world has changed and we must learn to adjust ourselves to the changes.

If you ask me, sir, what we have to offer to your great country, I would tell you candidly, nothing. We are not a nuclear power; we are not a technologically advanced country. There is nothing we can offer in that sense, but there is something which we can offer to you as your friends and that is that our country stands by its pledges. Our country is dedicated to its principles according to its own light and we have shown in the existence of Pakistan that in the last 25 years, no matter what the price, and sometimes we have had to pay a very heavy price, but we have stood by our principles and our pledges.

And if there is any place for us in your big wide world, please do remember that, although you might not need the friendship, or the assistance, or collaboration of my country far away from yours, it is a country which is allied to your country. It is a country which has stood by its commitments and pledges with your country throughout the vicissitude and buffets of life and we have every intention of doing so in the future.

This is our outlook and this is our concept of our relationship with the United States. We have admired, Mr. President, your own contribution to a new world order and when the history of this country is written, and when the history of the great Presidents of the United States is penned, what will they say of President Nixon.

As far as we are concerned, not only as a Pakistani, but as an Asian coming from Asia, I can tell you that at least my history books, the history books of my country will say here was a great and a lofty President who broke the barriers of prejudice and who chalked out a bold, new policy according to the finest traditions of American history and brought peace to a tormented part of the world.

There will be a stamp on the Vietnam chapter; there will be your mark on your relations with the People's Republic of China; there will be your image and your sign on your relations with the Soviet Union.

To us in Asia, these are very important pillars and we feel that the world would have been further tormented if you had not taken these splendid initiatives for peace in that part of the world where most of the humanity lives. And this is not how we alone feel, this is how many of the other countries in Asia feel.

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PRESS
Public Statements
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

September 24, 1973

No. 343

ADDRESS BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE
BEFORE THE 28TH UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLY
SEPTEMBER 24, 1973

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, Distinguished Delegates, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I come before you today -- confirmed in office but two days ago -- as probably the world's most junior Foreign Minister. That President Nixon should ask me as my first official act to speak here for the United States reaffirms the importance that my country attaches to the values and ideals of the United Nations.

It would be idle to deny that the American people, like many others, have sometimes been disappointed because this Organization has not been more successful in translating the hopes for universal peace of its architects into concrete accomplishments.

But despite our disappointments, my country remains committed to the goal of a world community. We will continue to work in this Parliament of Man to make it a reality.

Two centuries ago, the philosopher Kant predicted that perpetual peace would come eventually -- either as the creation of man's moral aspirations or as the consequence of physical necessity. What seemed utopian then looms as tomorrow's reality; soon there will be no alternative. Our only choice is whether the world envisaged in the Charter will come about as the result of our vision or of a catastrophe invited by our shortsightedness.

The United States has made its choice. My country seeks true peace, not simply an armistice. We strive for a world in which the rule of law governs and fundamental human rights are the birthright of all. Beyond the bilateral diplomacy, the pragmatic agreements and dramatic steps of recent years, we envisage a comprehensive, institutionalized peace -- a peace which this Organization is uniquely situated to foster and to anchor in the hearts of men.

This will be the spirit of American foreign policy.

This attitude will guide our work in this Organization.

We start from a bedrock of solid progress. Many of the crises that haunted past General Assemblies have been put behind us. Agreement has been

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reached on Berlin; there is a ceasefire in the Middle East; the Viet-Nam war has been ended. The rigid confrontation that has dominated international life and weakened this Organization for a quarter of a century has been softened.

The United States and the Soviet Union have perceived a commonality of interest in avoiding nuclear holocaust and in establishing a broad web of constructive relationships. Talks on strategic arms limitation have already produced historic accords aimed at slowing the arms race and ensuring strategic stability; we have, today, resumed negotiations on this subject. The positive results we hope for will enhance the security of all mankind.

Two decades of estrangement between the United States and the People's Republic of China have given way to constructive dialogue and productive exchanges. President Nixon has met with the leaders of that nation; we have agreed to an historic communique that honestly sets forth both our differences and our common principles; and we have each opened a Liaison Office in the capital of the other.

Many other countries have seized the initiative and contributed -- in substance and spirit -- to the relaxation of tensions. The nations of Europe and North America are engaged in a conference to further security and cooperation. The two German states have taken their place in this Assembly. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh have begun to move toward a welcome reconciliation. North and South Korea are at last engaged in a dialogue which we hope will lead to a new era of peace and security.

Yet these achievements, solid as they are, have only made less precarious the dangers and divisions inherited from the post-war era. We have ended many of the confrontations of the Cold War; yet, even in this room, the vocabulary of suspicion persists. Relaxation of tensions is justified by some as merely a tactical interlude before renewed struggle. Others suspect the emergence of a two-power condominium. And as tension between the two original blocs has eased, a third grouping increasingly assumes the characteristics of a bloc of its own -- the alignment of the non-aligned.

So the world is uneasily suspended between old slogans and new realities, between a view of peace as but a pause in an unending struggle and a vision of peace as a promise of global cooperation.

In 1946 James Byrnes, the first Secretary of State to address this Assembly, spoke of how the United Nations could help break down habits of thinking in national isolation and move toward "universal understanding and tolerance among all peoples."

The United States will never be satisfied with a world of uneasy truces, of offsetting blocs, of accommodations of convenience. We know that power can enforce a resigned passivity, but only a sense of justice can enlist consensus. We strive for a peace whose stability rests not merely on a balance of forces, but on shared aspirations. We are convinced that a structure which ignores humane values will prove cold and empty and unfulfilling to most of mankind.

The United States deeply believes

-- that justice cannot be confined by national frontiers;

-- that truth is universal, and not the peculiar possession of a single people or group or ideology;

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-- that compassion and humanity must ennoble all our endeavors.

In this spirit we ask the Assembly to move with us from detente to cooperation, from coexistence to community.

Our journey must begin with the world as it is and with the issues now before us. The United States will spare no effort to ease tensions further and to move toward greater stability.

-- We shall continue, in the spirit of the Shanghai Communique, our search for a new relationship with the People's Republic of China.

-- We shall work to promote positive trends elsewhere in Asia. The uncertain peace in Indochina must be strengthened; the world community cannot afford, or permit, a relapse into war in that region.

-- We shall continue to pursue vigorously the building of constructive relations with the Soviet Union.

-- We shall strive to promote conciliation in Europe. In the negotiations beginning next month we shall seek a reduction of the military forces that have faced each other for so long across that divided continent.

-- We shall give new vigor to our policy of partnership in the Western Hemisphere.

-- We shall honor our pledge to promote self-determination, economic development, and human dignity across the continent of Africa.

-- We shall press on with strategic arms limitation talks. We consider them crucial for security and stability in this period.

-- We shall search for solutions to the worldwide problem of conventional weapons, which drain our resources and fuel the fires of local conflict.

In these efforts, the United States will be guided by fundamental principles:

-- We have no desire for domination. We will oppose -- as we have consistently opposed throughout this century -- any nation that chooses this path. We have not been asked to participate in a condominium; we would reject such an appeal if it were made.

-- We will never abandon our allies or our friends. The strengthening of our traditional ties is the essential foundation for the development of new relationships with old adversaries.

-- We will work for peace through the United Nations as well as through bilateral relationships.

We recognize our special obligation, as a Permanent Member of the Security Council, to assist in the search for just solutions in those parts of the world now torn by strife such as the Middle East. While we cannot substitute for the efforts of those most directly involved, we are prepared to use our influence to generate a spirit of accommodation and to encourage the parties toward practical progress.

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But progress on the traditional agenda is not enough. The more we succeed in solving political problems the more other and perhaps deeper challenges emerge. As the world grows more stable we must confront the question of the ends of detente. As the threat of war recedes the problem of the quality of life takes on more urgent significance.

We are in fact, members of a community drawn by modern science, technology, and new forms of communication into a proximity for which we are still politically unprepared. Technology daily outstrips the ability of our institutions to cope with its fruits. Our political imagination must catch up with our scientific vision. This is at the same time the greatest challenge and the greatest opportunity of this Organization:

> The pollution of the skies, the seas and the land is a global problem.

The increased consumption of cereals and protein has reduced world food reserves to dangerously low levels.

The demand for energy is outrunning supply, and the need for technological innovation is urgent.

The growth of the world's economy is inhibited by restrictive trading blocs and an insufficiently flexible international monetary system.

The exploitation of the resources of the ocean beds which is essential for the needs of burgeoning populations requires global cooperation lest it degenerate into global contention.

Challenges of this magnitude cannot be solved by a world fragmented into self-contained nation states or rigid blocs.

I do not intend, today, to cover the whole agenda of international cooperation. Rather, I shall speak briefly of some illustrative areas of common action. I pledge the readiness of the United States to solve these problems cooperatively and to submit proposals aimed at their resolution.

## 1. A world community requires the curbing of conflict.

The United Nations, in its 28-year history, has not always been idle in this sphere. In Indonesia, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East, the Congo, and in Cyprus, it has shown its ability for effective fact-finding, mediation and peacekeeping missions. This central aspect of the United Nations' work must be strengthened. On a small planet, so bound together by technology and so interdependent economically, we can no longer afford the constant eruption of conflict and the danger of its spread.

Yet, in recent years, we have found ourselves locked in fruitless debates about the inauguration of peacekeeping operations and over the degree of control the Security Council would exercise over peacekeeping machinery -- an impasse which ensured only that permanent peacekeeping machinery would not come into being. Each peacekeeping unit we have formed to cope with an emergency has been an improvisation growing out of argument and controversy.

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We should delay no longer. The time has come to agree on peacekeeping guidelines so that this Organization can act swiftly, confidently and effectively in future crises. To break the deadlock, the United States is prepared to consider how the Security Council can play a more central role in the conduct of peacekeeping operations. If all countries concerned approach this problem with a desire to achieve a cooperative solution, the United Nations can achieve a major step forward during this session.

2. A world community must have the widest possible membership.

The exclusion of any qualified state denies representation not only to governments, but to peoples. Membership in this body should be a step toward reconciliation, not a source of conflict. The time has come for North and South Korea to be offered their rightful places here, without prejudice to a future evolution toward unification.

In this spirit also, we support the permanent membership of Japan in the Security Council.

3. A world community must assure that all its people are fed.

The growing threat to the world's food supply deserves the urgent attention of this Assembly. Since 1969, global consumption of cereals has risen more rapidly than production; stocks are at the lowest levels in years. We now face the prospect that -- even with bumper crops -- the world may not rebuild its seriously depleted reserves in this decade.

No one country can cope with this problem. The United States therefore proposes:

-- That a World Food Conference be organized under United Nations auspices in 1974 to discuss ways to maintain adequate food supplies, and to harness the efforts of all nations to meet the hunger and malnutrition resulting from natural disasters.

-- That nations in a position to do so offer technical assistance in the conservation of food. The United States is ready to join with others in providing such assistance.

4. A world community cannot remain divided between the <u>permanently rich</u> and the <u>permanently poor</u>.

Let us therefore resolve that this Assembly, this year, initiate a search -- drawing on the world's best minds -- for new and imaginative solutions to the problems of development. Our search must be candid and realistic, but it must also be free of peremptory demands, antagonistic propositions, ideological confrontation, or propagandistic rhetoric -- or we will surely fail.

The United States is prepared to join in this new search, providing freely of the experience gained over two decades. We have learned not to exaggerate our capacity to transform nations -- but we have also learned much about what progress is possible.

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We will participate without preconditions, with a conciliatory attitude and a cooperative commitment. We ask only that others adopt the same approach.

In this spirit the United States is willing to examine seriously the proposal by the distinguished President of Mexico for a Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of States. Such a document will make a significant and historic contribution if it reflects the true aspirations of all nations; if it is turned into an indictment of one group of countries by another it will accomplish nothing. To command general support -- and to be implemented -- the proposed rights and duties must be defined equitably and take into account the concerns of industrialized as well as of developing countries. The United States stands ready to define its responsibilities in a humane and cooperative spirit.

5. Finally, a world community must harness science and technology for the benefit of all.

We must begin to match our remarkable technological skills with our equally remarkable technological needs. We must find the means for the cooperative and judicious development of our energy resources. We must responsibly confront the problems of population growth, which are fast pushing humanity towards the limits of what our Earth can sustain. We must embark on a new scientific revolution to increase agricultural productivity in all lands. No field of human endeavor is so dependent upon an open world for its advancement, no field is so in need of international cooperation to cope with its potential dangers.

Mr. President, fellow delegates:

Are we prepared to accept the imperatives of a global society and infuse our labors with a new vision? Or, shall we content ourselves with a temporary pause in the turmoil that has wracked our century? Shall we proceed with onesided demands and sterile confrontations? Or, shall we proceed in a spirit of compromise produced by a sense of common destiny? We must move from hesitant cooperation born of necessity to genuine collective effort based on common purpose.

It is a choice no country can make alone. We can repeat old slogans or strive for new hope. We can fill the record of our proceedings with acrimony or we can dedicate ourselves to dealing with man's deepest needs. The ideal of a world community may be decried as unrealistic -- but great constructions have always been ideals before they can become realities. Let us dedicate ourselves to this noblest of all possible goals and achieve at last what has so long eluded us: true understanding and tolerance among mankind.

**********

This Copy for

NEWS CONFERENCE

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

12:55 P.M. EST

APRIL 19, 1973

THURSDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: I know Jerry has already given you the schedule for this morning.

The meeting with the leaders from the Jewish community lasted an hour and 10 minutes, and in this meeting today, as was the case in the meeting with the Congressional leaders yesterday that I mentioned, the President said to the leaders of the Jewish community that the United States has had constructive communications with the Soviet leadership on the emigration of Soviet Jews.

The President told the Jewish leadership that he could confirm the fact, as reported yesterday from comments of Senators on the Hill, that the communications we have received from the Soviet Union state that the Soviet Union will exempt Soviet citizens who have received permission to emigrate from refunding the educational expenses required by the August 3rd decree.

In today's meeting, the President indicated to the Jewish leaders that he was pleased with the communications from the Soviet leaders and informed them of this constructive step and reiterated to them his feeling about the importance of United States-Soviet trade and our overall efforts to reduce world tensions. The meeting, I think, was a very frank session and very worthwhile from the standpoint of everyone who attended.

We also have a few other announcements this morning.

The President is announcing his intention to nominate Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent to be a member of the National Commission on Materials Policy. He will be succeeding Peter G. Peterson, who he also succeeded as Secretary of Commerce.

The National Commission on Materials Policy has seven members representing the Government and the private sector, and the Commission is described in some detail in the notice to the press which we will make available to you after the briefing.

Those are all of the announcements that we have today.

The President, as you know, went to Camp David yesterday evening and returned this morning at about 10:00 o'clock and will be working in his office throughout the day.

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The President will have a regular meeting of the
Cabinet tomorrow morning at 8:30.

Q Ron, there is a group of Chinese officials
walking around the grounds. Would you like to tell us what
they are doing and give us permission to photograph?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is the delegation which arrived
last night to staff the PRC Liaison Office here in Washington.
I know Han Shu, who a number of you met when we were in the
People's Republic of China, is here today. I saw him in the
West Lobby. They are here for the purpose of touring the
grounds. Dr. Kissinger is seeing them, as I understand it.

Q Can we get pictures?

MR. ZIEGLER: I do not know what the situation would
be with that. There will be other opportunities, Bob, if you
don't get them today.

Q Ron, what was the reaction of the Jewish leaders
to the President's appeal on the MFN? Second, is it your
understanding that the Russians have promised to suspend or
revoke or annul the decree?

MR. ZIEGLER: First of all, in relation to the
reaction by the Jewish leaders, I would prefer not to provide
that to you as it is a group or a number of leaders represent-
ing the Jewish community and various organizations within the
Jewish community, and I think it would be inappropriate for
me to convey their views to you.

I characterized the meeting earlier as a very
frank and complete discussion which I think was valuable from
the standpoint of all those who attended.

In terms of the second part of your question, the
decree which I referred to earlier provides for a total exemp-
tion, and this action, therefore, which the Soviet Union
has communicated to the United States, does not require the
repealing of the decree itself.

Q Well, Ron, is it correct that at least some
of these Jewish leaders conveyed to the President their dis-
satisfaction with the Soviet action on the ground that this
decree has been suspended, but that would not prevent it being
reimposed or reactivated after MFN status was given to the
Soviet Union?

MR. ZIEGLER: In relation to that particular point
of view that has been expressed by some, it was pointed out
that this is an official communication from the Government of
the USSR to the President of the United States, and we are
treating it in that light. Treating it in that light, there
was an expression on our part that that development would not
arise.

Let me just say that the development that he referred
to in his question, that if MFN was granted to the Soviet
Union, what would prevent them from suspending it later on,
the point was made that we would not anticipate or expect
that to take place.

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Q Are you saying to us that the President gave this meeting of Jewish leaders an assurance that this decree was not going to be reactivated and imposed after MFN was passed?

MR. ZIEGLER: He did. He did give them those assurances based upon the point of view that I expressed to you earlier.

Let me just add one final comment on this subject, to a degree in response to Jim Deakin's question.

The Jewish leaders who attended the meeting this morning, without question, expressed very forthrightly and very fully their concerns, their points of view, and their interest in this matter, and they will be doing this, of course, I am sure, on other occasions. But it was worthwhile for the President, of course, to listen to their views. The President assured the Jewish leadership that he would continue to pursue the objective that he has always had, and that is that there should be freedom of emigration, and that, of course, is a policy and a position that this Government has always held.

'The President has expressed his ongoing concern regarding Jewish citizens in the Soviet Union. Without question, this is a forward step that has been taken.

Q Ron, can we judge from what you say, then, that he gave them assurances, and that these assurances, in fact, did not totally dissipate their concerns?

MR. ZIEGLER: I again would want the Jewish leadership to speak for themselves. I will tell you that we regard this, and the Jewish leadership was so told, this communication as an official communication, although it was oral, an official communication from the Government of the USSR to the President, and we are treating it in that light.

- As a result of the exchanges that have taken place, as I mentioned yesterday, on the highest level between the President of the United States and the Soviet leadership, the President gave assurances that it was his view that it would not be suspended.

Q Ron, do you think if it were not for the threat of the Jackson Amendment that the Soviet leadership would have taken this step?

MR. ZIEGLER: Bob, that is a question that I cannot be responsive to because I do not feel it would be appropriate for me to assess actions by the Soviet leadership. I will say, as we have pointed out to you before, that there have been ongoing communications and discussions between the President of the United States and the Soviet leadership on this matter.

Q Ron, you are implying but not saying directly that this assurance given to the Jewish leaders is based on a specific assurance received from the Soviet leaders. You have not quite said that, but you are implying it.

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MR. ZIEGLER: I don't want to get into the details of the communications, but I will say to you as directly as I can that, based on the communications that the President has had with the Soviet leadership, he provided assurances to the Jewish leaders that it would not be suspended.

Q And you said this was on the highest level; it would not be reimposed? Didn't you say this was on the highest level?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes. The assurances that the President gave to the Jewish leaders regarding this matter are based on the communications that the President had with the Soviet leadership.

Q Was this by paper or by a telephone, or what?

MR. ZIEGLER: It was through the diplomatic channels and processes that we have.

Q May I ask a related question on this role of the communications with the Soviet leaders that goes to the question of press procedure here at the White House?

Yesterday you told us only that the United States had had constructive communications with the Soviet leaders on the question of Jewish emigration and you declined to give any further details of that. When Senator Scott got back to the Hill, he informed the newspapers and the press precisely what had come about in those constructive communications; in other words, what the heart of the thing was, what the news was.

This morning the President conferred with Jewish leaders and told them what these constructive communications led to.

Finally, third and last, the White House press, whose job it is to report to the American people what the President is doing, we get it third. First Scott, then the Jewish-leaders, and then the American people, through us.

Q Right on, Deakin.

Q Now, why is it we have to wait for Senators to get back to the Hill, for a meeting to be held with Jewish leaders, to find out something that the President knows, the President obviously has no objection to getting out? Why do we have to be last in this sweepstakes?

MR. ZIEGLER: The reason is because I have responsibility here to communicate those positions and points of view in a manner that we feel is constructive to our foreign policy. You will note in my earlier statement that I said that the President confirmed to the Jewish leadership, and I can confirm today, that the stories which were reported from the Hill have been confirmed. You have been around town long enough, Mr. Deakin, to recognize the process.

Q Why is it, when you have very good reason to know that some Senator is going to go up to the Hill after a meeting with the President and tell what went on, why does it have to be kept a secret from the White House Press?

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MR. ZIEGLER: I have no further comment on this.
Any other questions?

Q Ron, is the President now going to communicate the results of today's meeting to the highest levels of Soviet leadership?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't want to say that a precise report regarding today's meeting will be provided to the Soviet leadership. The President will continue to express our point of view to the Soviet leadership in our ongoing communications with them.

Q Mr. Dean has just issued a statement from his office saying that he will not be a scapegoat in the Watergate affair. I am wondering if there is any special significance attached to the fact that he issued the statement privately; that it did not come as a formal communication from your office. Why did he do it that way?

MR. ZIEGLER: First of all, Doug, I don't know if you were here yesterday, but I outlined a position yesterday that, following the President's statement of the 17th of April, it would be inappropriate for me to attempt to provide answers to questions on this subject and attempt to satisfy your understandable desire for information on this subject, and I hold that position again today, based upon the recommendation of the appropriate authorities, that any comment that I might make here in regard to this could very well prejudice the judicial system and the rights of innocent individuals by something that I would say perhaps by pure inadvertence or by lack of knowledge. Therefore, that position which I stated yesterday is one which I will adopt today.

Mr. Dean released an individual statement from his office today, and that is the way it should be characterized because of the position which I have just stated to you.

I would make one comment, however, in relation to the news story that ran, and that is, I think, the President's statement of the 17th made it quite clear that the process which is now in motion is not a process to find scapegoats. The process now in motion is a process to find the truth in this matter.

I will, having said that, rest on the President's statement of April 17th and my comments made to you yesterday in terms of providing answers to you on this subject.

Q Is this a mild wrist-slapping of Mr. Dean?

MR. ZIEGLER: I would not characterize my comments in any way, nor should any conclusions be drawn from my statement beyond the statement itself.

Q Did you or the President know about the statement before it was issued?

MR. ZIEGLER: I understand that it was phoned to the press office at the time of its release.

Q What time was that, Ron?

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MR. ZIEGLER: I do not know. I was in a meeting.

Q I would like to know what time the Press
Office got it.

Q Did you know about it in advance, or did the
President know about it in advance, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. The answer would be that we
did not know about the statement in advance.

Q Did he ask that the Press Office put it out
when he called the Press Office?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I think Mr. Dean was aware of
my comments yesterday, and, understanding the position that
I adopted, proceeded in the manner he did.

Q Since Mr. Dean's statement seems, at least
in a major sense, to be consonant with the President's state-
ment and with the position that you have taken today, does
the President welcome Mr. Dean's statement?

MR. ZIEGLER: I will have to stand on the position
which I took yesterday and ask for the next question.

Q Ron, without getting into the business of wrist-
slapping --

MR. ZIEGLER: I haven't gotten into that.

Q No, without my getting into it, is your remark
in reply to Mr. Dean's statement a direct reply?

MR. ZIEGLER: My comment regarding the objective
of the President's April 17th statement was an observation
made by me in relation to the reference to the news reports
using the term "scapegoat", and I simply make the observation
that because the news stories which are being reported make
reference to this, I make the observation which I have stated.

Q Does Mr. Dean work for the White House?

MR. ZIEGLER: He is in his office.

Q He is in his office today?

MR. ZIEGLER: That is my understanding.

Q When was the last time he talked to the Presi-
dent?

Q The question was: Does he work for the White
House? Now, does he or does he not? You said he is in his
office today. I know that.

MR. ZIEGLER: Mr. Dean is in his office, and as I
said to you yesterday, the position that I must hold is the
one I stated to you. As I said to you yesterday in response
to similar questions, the position of individuals on the White
House staff was stated in the President's April 17th statement.

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Q Ron, as far as his resignation, does this inappropriateness of comment cover that, too?

MR. ZIEGLER: Sorry, I didn't hear the question.

Q If Mr. Dean should resign, would you announce it here?

MR. ZIEGLER: That situation is not before me; therefore, it is hypothetical in nature.

Q Has Mr. Dean resigned?

MR. ZIEGLER: Mr. Dean has not resigned.

Q Have there been any resignations?

MR. ZIEGLER: There have not.

Q There are two things I want to know. One, is there a rift between you and the President and Mr. Dean; and the other thing I would like to know, is this going to be the procedure? In the future, will other members of the White House staff make their individual statements?

MR. ZIEGLER: I simply would, first of all, eliminate the matter of rift.

Second, this is a matter before us today, and I am prepared to comment on the matter before us at this time, as I have.

Q You have taken umbrage at Dean's statement that they are looking for a scapegoat. He said, "Some may hope or think I will become a scapegoat," and you are taking personal umbrage, I think the White House is, at this particular --

MR. ZIEGLER: I think, Helen, that is not what I said. I said that I would stand on the statement which I made earlier and which I made yesterday, and made reference to, and made an observation, because reference to "scapegoat" has come into the news reports, and I felt because that was the case that I would not comment, because of news reports based on this statement.

I made the observation that I made for the reason that I made it, and that is to indicate to you that the objective of the President's statement is not to find scapegoats; it is to find the truth.

Q Ron, Mr. Dean says in his statement that some people hope he will become a scapegoat. Who is he talking about?

MR. ZIEGLER: I have no further comment on Mr. Dean's statement or on this subject.

Q Ron, have you communicated with him since he called the White House Press Office and gave you the copy of the statement?

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MR. ZIEGLER: I talked to John in his office after the statement moved on the wires and indicated to him that the position which we have followed is the one that will be followed today, and he understood that. I indicated to him at that time that I intended to make the observation which I have made.

Q Ron, you were breathless when you came in here today. Was it because of your conversation with Dean?

MR. ZIEGLER: I was breathless? It was because I ran out here to get to the Briefing Room. I was an hour and a half late. That happened to the President one day. He came up the steps real fast and came out here for a press conference. You would be surprised if you step up here after you don't pause for a moment. You have a shortness of breath. That happened to the President once and it was widely interpreted that he was breathing anger into the microphone.

Q Maybe exercise would help. (Laughter)

MR. ZIEGLER: I asked him, as a matter of fact, that day if he wanted to stop for a moment, but he wanted to get in here to be with you gentlemen. (Laughter)

Q Ron, you said flatly that Mr. Dean has not resigned, but in answer to the question if he still works for the White House, you said he is in his office today, which leaves open the possibility that he may have been fired. Do you want to clear that up?

MR. ZIEGLER: Mr. Dean is in his office. He has not resigned and he still holds his post in the White House.

Q Does the President have confidence in him?

Q Will any resignations from the White House staff that may be submitted and accepted be announced by you at the time they are submitted or accepted?

MR. ZIEGLER: I would assume so, John. I didn't mean to imply earlier that that would not be the case.

Q Ron, is Dean just sitting in there doing nothing, or is he working, or what? I am serious about this.

Q He is writing statements. (Laughter)

Q Ron, that is a serious question. Is he working?

MR. ZIEGLER: He is in his office, I don't know what he is doing. I assume attending to business of some sort.

Q Ron, the question has been asked.

MR. ZIEGLER: Ladies and gentlemen, I made the point yesterday of my position. I respect your desire to ask questions on this matter, and I am going to go to the next question if we are going to continue to pursue this. I do not want to turn a matter like this into a situation -- I know you don't mean it that way, where we are referring to individuals in a situation like this-- as one of anything less than some seriousness.

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Q The question has been asked about how we will know if people have resigned. May I ask you: Will we be told if people have been suspended from duties or just relieved of their normal duties, or will that just happen, perhaps, without our knowledge?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. Anything relating to members of the White House staff we, of course, will announce.

Q Ron, at Camp David last night, as I understand it, the main actors were Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Haldeman and the President. Was there any discussion last night of transferring Mr. Haldeman's duties to someone else?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, there was not, as far as I know. I was not there. I am sure that was not the case.

Q Ron, we have a Cabinet officer who has put five personal guards on at an expense to the taxpayers admittedly by that Department of $60,000, and I understand that he also carries a gun. Has he a permit to carry a gun?

I would like to know, first: He has put out a covering statement saying that he is giving employment to Vietnam veterans. Also, he said he is using these guards to keep women in the Department from being molested and to keep down thievery, but the guards are not protecting the women, the guards are protecting him. Now, I wonder if this does not make him a security risk.

MR. ZIEGLER: Any definition of policy from the Department would have to come from the Department itself.

Q It has already come from him, and I repeated it to you. His statement is that he has five guards --

MR. ZIEGLER: You don't have to repeat it again, Sarah.

Q All right. This is a White House appointee, a Cabinet officer. Does he carry a gun when he comes in to see the President? Does he check his gun outside? What happens here? We need to know this thing. This is an expenditure of $60,000 at a time when the President is trying to save money.

MR. ZIEGLER: I do not know what procedure is followed.

Q Well, you find out about this and come back to us with a report on it, will you?

MR. ZIEGLER: Go ahead, Carroll.

Q Is the Deputy Attorney General handling the Watergate case?

MR. ZIEGLER: I noted in a news report yesterday a comment made from the Justice Department that indicates that. I think the Attorney General had a comment or issued a statement on that today.

Q You mean, Ron, that you are not going to pay any attention to my question here, because it involves a Cabinet member?

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MR. ZIEGLER: I can't help but pay attention to your question, Sarah. I will have to look into the situation.

Q Good. All right. Come back to us with a report.

Q Ron, do you have anything on travel plans yet, please?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I do not.

Q Ron, you were asked before, but I didn't catch the answer, when was the last time the President spoke to Mr. Dean?

MR. ZIEGLER: I do not know.

Q Do you know whether it was this week; since this statement here?

MR. ZIEGLER: Bob, I do not know.

Q People who are accused in the press of implication in the Watergate case, does the White House resent their making a personal answer on their own?

MR. ZIEGLER: I do not resent that. I think any man whose name appears in the paper has a right to speak out for himself.

Q Ron, Senator Ervin is quoted as saying that it will be the committee that decides what questions shall be answered and what questions shall not be answered during the Watergate hearings. Now, would this tend to reinforce, do you think, the idea that a compromise has been reached on Executive privilege?

MR. ZIEGLER: I have not been involved in those negotiations. John Ehrlichman and Len Garment have. I think, as the President announced yesterday, the ground rules that have been worked out are satisfactory. I am sorry I do not have the specific rundown of those. The committee, I understand, was going to release those. To my knowledge, there is no variance in point of view as to how they will proceed.

Q Ron, I have been standing back here under the impression, and drawing the impression, that under the circumstances of the last few days, you must have the world's worst job. I was wondering how you might characterize it yourself?

MR. ZIEGLER: My job? I love it.

Q You love it?

MR. ZIEGLER: I enjoy it. I like working here.

Q You like all of this?

MR. ZIEGLER: Well, we go through difficult periods in the Briefing Room from time to time, but I understand that.

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Q Ron, the Ervin Committee guidelines published in text this morning, are they the guidelines that the President knew of and had in mind when he made his statement Tuesday afternoon?

MR. ZIEGLER: They were. The guidelines were provided, as I understand it, by Senator Ervin to John Ehrlichman, and with the exception, I believe, of some non-technical changes, but a few word changes that had no bearing on the thrust of the guidelines, they were as submitted to Mr. Ehrlichman.

Q Ron, has the White House decided not to appeal the judge's ruling in the OEO case?

MR. ZIEGLER: There has been no decision made in that regard, Tom. There is still discussion of the matter taking place within the Administration, but there is no decision that has been made in regard to that.

Q Ron, now that the meeting with the Jewish-American leaders is over, can we now expect the official announcement of the date of Brezhnev's arrival in the United States?

MR. ZIEGLER: You can expect the official announcement of the date of arrival for the summit meeting with Mr. Brezhnev when it is finalized and agreed to with the Soviet Union. An announcement date has not been agreed to.

Q Ron, I believe you said you were not aware of Mr. Dean's statement in advance. Did anyone in the White House who has authority over Mr. Dean have any advance knowledge on it?

MR. ZIEGLER: To my knowledge, no. It was a statement released by Mr. Dean in response to a news report about him.

Q Is it accurate to say this statement came to you as a surprise? Were you startled, let us say?

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't think it is relevant to characterize my reactions. The statement came to me.

Mr. Schram, I want to note that his questions are particularly penetrating.

Q Thank you, Ron. Thank you very much for the introduction.

You said earlier in the briefing it was inappropriate for you to supply answers on this subject based on the recommendations of the appropriate authorities. Could you tell us who you talked to as appropriate authorities? Was the Counsel to the President one of them?

MR. ZIEGLER: I talked to individuals who are involved in the legal aspects of this matter.

Q Would that be John Dean?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, it was not.

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Q Ron, now that the President has announced that he is sort of personally involved in taking personal charge of the investigation, could you tell us if he is working on it, and to what extent, and whom he has seen? Has he seen Mr. Peterson again yesterday or today, and so forth?

MR. ZIEGLER: No. I don't want to at this particular point in time get into a step-by-step rundown in relation to the President's activities in this regard. He is spending a good deal of time on this matter, and I think he indicated that to you the other day. He does have, as I understand it, daily reports from the U. S. Attorney's office. More specifically, he has been in touch with Mr. Peterson.

Q Has the President been informed of Mr. Dean's statement?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, he has been.

Q Ron, what is his reaction?

MR. ZIEGLER: Gentlemen, I am not going to take any further questions on this subject, and will ask for the next question, which Mr. Fulson has.

Q Thank you. Will the President be turning over the results of his investigation to the Senate committee?

MR. ZIEGLER: I cannot answer that question.

Q Ron, could we go back in history on this a little?

(a) The report that Mr. Dean made to the President, was this oral or was this written; and (b) how intensive an investigation would you say it was?

MR. ZIEGLER: I am not prepared to characterize that particular matter because, as I have said to you frequently over the past few months, I have never seen the report. So, therefore, I don't know if it was oral or what form it took.

Q But the President was satisfied with it at the time?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President, as you know, has made comments about the subject in the past.

Q When did the President leave for Camp David?

MR. ZIEGLER: The President went up there yesterday evening to, I assume, review a number of matters with Mr. Ehrlichman and Mr. Haldeman. I was not present, have not received a report of the discussions, and, therefore, cannot reply.

Q Were economics a part of the discussion?

MR. ZIEGLER: It could have been. I was not there, so I do not know. The President did meet on the subject of the economy yesterday, and I made reference to where we stood on that matter in yesterday's briefing. There has been no change in the status of that subject since my comments yesterday.

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Q Ron, did I understand you to say that the President is getting daily reports from the United States Attorney? Does that mean the United States Attorney is handling the Grand Jury in this case?

MR. ZIEGLER: Perhaps "reports" is the wrong way to characterize it. I do not know they are in daily communication. I don't know the nature of those discussions.

Q Isn't that a violation of the separation of powers? Isn't the judiciary supposed to function, and the President, even if he does appoint this man, he is supposed to stay out of the Grand Jury? Isn't he?

MR. ZIEGLER: I didn't suggest anything in relation to the Grand Jury.

Q But this is the man who is handling the Grand Jury.

MR. ZIEGLER: Mr. Peterson, the U.S. Attorney who is --

Q Mr. Peterson is not the U.S. Attorney.

MR. ZIEGLER: The Assistant Attorney General. Excuse me. He is the individual that the President is in touch with.

Q It is Mr. Peterson.

MR. ZIEGLER: It is Mr. Peterson.

Q Ron, isn't this an unprecedented thing?

MR. ZIEGLER: Excuse me. I misspoke myself. Thank you.

In reference to Henry Peterson, I am obviously referring to the Assistant Attorney General.

Q What are you referring to? You said a while ago that he is getting daily reports from the United States Attorney, and then you --

MR. ZIEGLER: But Sarah, I corrected the record.

Q You meant it to read that he is getting reports from the Assistant Attorney General, or, Peterson?

MR. ZIEGLER: What I intend to say is that the President has been in contact on a regular basis, as he stated to you, and as I have stated to you previously, with the Assistant Attorney General.

Q All right. Now, does this have to do with the President getting -- it sounds like he says he is getting daily reports about what is happening inside the Grand Jury Room.

MR. ZIEGLER: I don't know what the reports are.

Q Ron, do you know whether the Watergate case and the President's investigation of it, and its ramifications, was discussed at Camp David yesterday?

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MR. ZIEGLER: I do not know that.

Q Ron, on this matter of the Grand Jury investigation, we have been told that the President is, in fact, receiving reports on what is being told to the Grand Jury. You just now did say, in fact, that he was getting daily reports from the U.S. Attorneys. Is it not true that he is getting reports on the Grand Jury investigation?

MR. ZIEGLER: Bob, I indicated that I misspoke myself, and the record should clearly indicate that. What I was making reference to in response to Ted Knap's question is that in the course of the process which he is following and has put into motion, he has had discussions with the Assistant Attorney General, Henry Peterson. The content of those discussions is something that I am not aware of, so, therefore, I cannot provide you information on that.

In terms of information that flows from the Grand Jury, or whatever the legal processes are that bear on this matter, I am not a lawyer and I am not familiar with them, but I am sure that the discussions that he is having with the Assistant Attorney General are within every legal bound.

Q Ron, in reference to John Dean's report, you said you didn't know whether it was oral or written on his Watergate investigation. Do you know whether the report went from Mr. Dean directly to the President, or to one of Mr. Dean's superiors other than the President?

MR. ZIEGLER: Here, again, as I said, I cannot comment on this process because I am not familiar with it.

Q Ron, just to clear it up and sort of add it up, the impression that you are giving, and I assume that you mean to give, is that Mr. Dean is still fully empowered by the White House, he is still the White House counsel and in full communication with all other members of the White House staff, including the President; that he is in no way isolated, but that he is carrying out his duties in a normal manner; that he is still a full member of the team.

MR. ZIEGLER: I think the point that I made was quite clear, and that is that Mr. Dean is in his office today, Mr. Dean has not resigned, and Mr. Dean has not been relieved of his duties. I simply will stand on that comment.

(A short recess was taken.)

MR. ZIEGLER: Just so there is no misunderstanding, I did want to clear this up about the discussions that the President is having with the Assistant Attorney General -- Assistant Attorney General Henry Peterson -- relating to his investigation, the investigation of the Assistant Attorney General. It does not relate to the Grand Jury proceedings. That is the Number 1 point that I thought I made, but I wanted to make it clear.

Secondly, the President will leave for Florida tomorrow at approximately 12:30. Jerry will post the details on the press plane departure and so forth, but I wanted to make sure that --

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Q Ron, let me ask you, then: Are you then deny-
ing that the President is receiving any reports on the progress
of the Grand Jury?

MR. ZIEGLER: He is not. What he is receiving in
his discussions, and receiving and providing in his contacts
and discussions with Henry Peterson relates to the investiga-
tion of the Assistant Attorney General's office. It does not
relate to the Grand Jury.

Q Does that mean Peterson is performing the
investigating for the President?

MR. ZIEGLER: Well, he has an investigation underway
for the Justice Department, and it is a part of that. He is
discussing the two facts.

Q Ron, concerning that, if Jeb Magruder, or anyone,
for example, would talk with the U.S. Attorneys not in the
Grand Jury, but just talk with them, that would come to Peter-
son's knowledge?

MR. ZIEGLER: You are out of my field. I just don't
know.

Q Ron, I missed the beginning of this. Maybe
you can clear up a point in that respect. The President
referred to his investigation and the Department of Justice
investigation. Are these two separate entities, and if so,
who is --

MR. ZIEGLER: The President indicated that he is
proceeding in a personal way in his discussions with the Assis-
tant Attorney General and relate to that what they are doing
in their investigation.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

END

(AT 1:45 P.M. EST)

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April 23, 1973

[10]

Text of Address to be Delivered at 2:00 p.m. EST,
Monday, April 23, 1973, by Henry A. Kissinger
to the Associated Press Annual Luncheon, at the
Waldorf Astoria Hotel, New York, Embargoed for
Release until 12:00 noon EST.

## THE YEAR OF EUROPE

This year has been called the Year of Europe, but not because Europe was less important in 1972 or in 1969. The Alliance between the United States and Europe has been the cornerstone of all post-war foreign policy. It provided the political framework for American engagements in Europe and marked the definitive end of U.S. isolationism. It ensured the sense of security that allowed Europe to recover from the devastation of the war. It reconciled former enemies. It was the stimulus for an unprecedented endeavor in European unity and the principal means to forge the common policies that safeguarded Western security in an era of prolonged tension and confrontation. Our values, our goals and our basic interests are most closely identified with those of Europe.

### A New Era

1973 is the Year of Europe because the era that was shaped by decisions of a generation ago is ending. The success of those policies has produced new realities that require new approaches:

- The revival of Western Europe is an established fact as it is the historic success of its movement toward economic unification.

- The East-West strategic military balance has shifted from American preponderance to near equality, bringing with it the necessity for a new understanding of the requirements of our common security.

- Other areas of the world have grown in importance. Japan has emerged as a major power center. In many fields, "Atlantic" solutions to be viable must include Japan.

- We are in a period of relaxation of tensions. But as the rigid divisions of the past two decades diminish, new assertions of national identity and national rivalry emerge.

- Problems have arisen, unforeseen a generation ago, which require new types of cooperative action. Ensuring the supply of energy for industrialized nations is an example.

These factors have produced a dramatic transformation of the psychological climate in the West -- a change which is the most profound current challenge to Western statesmanship. In Europe a new generation -- to whom war and its dislocations are not personal experiences -- takes stability for granted. But it is less committed to the unity that made peace possible and to the effort required to maintain it. In the United States, decades of global burdens have fostered and the frustrations of the war in Southeast Asia have accentuated a reluctance to sustain global involvements on the basis of preponderant American responsibility.

Inevitably this period of transition will have its strains. There have been complaints in America that Europe ignores its wider responsibilities in pursuing economic self-interest too one-sidely and that Europe is not carrying its fair share of the burden of the common defense. There have been complaints in Europe that America is out to divide Europe economically, or to desert Europe militarily, or to bypass Europe diplomatically. Europeans appeal to the United States to accept their independence and their occasionally severe criticism of us in the name of Atlantic unity, while at the same time they ask for a veto on our independent policies--also in the name of Atlantic unity.

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Our challenge is whether a unity forged by a common perception of danger can draw new purpose from shared positive aspirations.

If we permit the Atlantic partnership to atrophy, or to erode through neglect, carelessness, or mistrust, we risk what has been achieved, and we shall miss our historic opportunity for even greater achievement.

In the Forties and Fifties the task was economic reconstruction and security against the danger of attack. The West responded with courage and imagination. Today the need is to make the Atlantic relationship as dynamic a force in building a new structure of peace, less geared to crisis and more conscious of opportunities, drawing its inspirations from its goals rather than its fears. The Atlantic nations must join in a fresh act of creation, equal to that undertaken by the post-war generation of leaders of Europe and America.

This is why the President is embarking on a personal and direct approach to the leaders of Western Europe. In his discussions with the heads of government of Britain, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France, the Secretary General of NATO and other European leaders, it is President's purpose to lay the basis for a new era of creativity in the West.

His approach will be to deal with Atlantic problems comprehensively. The political, military and economic issues in Atlantic relations are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other. The solutions will not be worthy of the opportunity if left to technicians. They must be addressed at the highest level.

In 1972 the President transformed relations with our adversaries to lighten the burdens of fear and suspicion.

In 1973 we can gain the same sense of historical achievement by reinvigorating shared ideals and common purposes with our friends.

The United States proposes to its Atlantic partners that, by the time the President travels to Europe toward the end of the year, we will have worked out a new Atlantic charter setting the goals for the future -- a blueprint that:

- builds on the past without becoming its prisoner,

- deals with the problems our success has created,

- creates for the Atlantic nations a new relationship in whose progress Japan can share.

We ask our friends in Europe, Canada, and ultimately Japan to join us in this effort.

This is what we mean by the Year of Europe.

## Problems in Atlantic Relationships

The problems in Atlantic relationships are real. They have arisen in part because during the Fifties and Sixties the Atlantic community organized itself in different ways in the many different dimensions of its common enterprise.

- In economic relations, the European Community has increasingly stressed its regional personality; the United States, at the same time, must act as part of, and be responsible for a wider international trade and monetary system. We must reconcile these two perspectives.

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-- In our collective defense, we are still organized on the principle of unity and integration, but in radically different strategic conditions. The full implications of this change have yet to be faced.

-- Diplomacy is the subject of frequent consultations, but is essentially being conducted by traditional nation states. The U.S. has global interests and responsibilities. Our European allies have regional interests. These are not necessarily in conflict, but in the new era neither are they automatically identical.

In short, we deal with each other regionally and even competitively in economic matters, on an integrated basis in defense, and as nation-states in diplomacy. When the various collective institutions were rudimentary, the potential inconsistency in their modes of operation was not a problem. But after a generation of evolution and with the new weight and strength of our allies, the various parts of the construction are not always in harmony and sometimes obstruct each other.

If we want to foster unity, we can no longer ignore these problems. The Atlantic nations must find a solution for the management of their diversity, to serve the common objectives which underlie their unity. We can no longer afford to pursue national or regional self-interest without a unifying framework. We cannot hold together if each country or region asserts its autonomy whenever it is to its benefit and invokes unity to curtail the independence of others.

We must strike a new balance between self-interest and the common interest. We must identify interests and positive values beyond security in order to engage once again the commitment of peoples and parliaments. We need a shared view of the world we seek to build.

## Agenda for the Future

### Economic

No element of American post-war policy has been more consistent than our support of European unity. We encouraged it at every turn. We knew that a united Europe would be a more independent partner. But we assumed, perhaps too uncritically, that our common interests would be assured by our long history of cooperation. We expected that political unity would follow economic integration; and that a unified Europe working cooperatively with us in an Atlantic partnership would ease many of our international burdens.

It is clear that many of these expectations are not being fulfilled.

We and Europe have benefited from European economic integration. Increased trade within Europe has stimulated the growth of European economies and the expansion of trade in both directions across the Atlantic.

But we cannot ignore the fact that Europe's economic success and its transformation from a recipient of our aid to a strong competitor has produced a certain amount of friction. There has been turbulence and a sense of rivalry in international monetary relations.

In trade, the natural economic weight of a market of 250 million people has pressed other states to seek special arrangements to protect their access to it. The prospect of a closed trading system embracing the European Community and a growing number of other nations in Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa appears to be at the expense of the United States and other nations which are excluded. In agriculture, where the

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The gradual accumulation of sometimes petty, sometimes major economic disputes must be ended and be replaced by a determined commitment on both sides of the Atlantic to find cooperative solutions.

The United States will continue to support the unification of Europe. We have no intention of destroying what we worked so hard to help build. For us European unity is what it has always been-- not an end in itself but a means to the strengthening of the West. We shall continue to support European unity as a component of a larger Atlantic partnership.

This year we begin comprehensive trade negotiations with Europe as well as with Japan. We shall also continue to press the effort to reform the monetary system so that it promotes stability rather than constant disruptions. A new equilibrium must be achieved in trade and monetary relations.

We see these negotiations as an historic opportunity for positive achievement. They must engage the top political leaders for they require above all a commitment of political will. If they are left solely to the experts the inevitable competitiveness of economic interests will dominate the debate. The influence of pressure groups and special interests will become pervasive. There will be no overriding sense of direction. There will be no framework for the generous solutions or mutual concessions essential to preserve a vital Atlantic partnership.

It is the responsibility of national leaders to ensure that economic negotiations serve larger political purposes. They must recognize that economic rivalry, if carried on without restraint, will in the end damage other relationships.

The United States intends to adopt a broad political approach that does justice to our overriding political interest in an open and balanced trading order with both Europe and Japan. This is the spirit of the President's trade bill and of his speech to the International Monetary Fund last year. It will guide our strategy in the trade and monetary talks. We see these negotiations not as a test of strength, but as a test of joint statesmanship.

## Defense

Atlantic unity has always come most naturally in the field of defense. For many years the military threats to Europe were unambiguous, the requirements to meet them were generally agreed on both sides of the Atlantic, and America's responsibility was preeminent and obvious. Today we remain united on the objective of collective defense, but we face the new challenge of maintaining it under radically changed strategic conditions and with the new opportunity of enhancing our security through negotiated reductions of forces.

The West no longer holds the nuclear predominance that permitted it in the '50s and '60s to rely almost solely on a strategy of massive nuclear retaliation. Because under conditions of nuclear parity such a strategy invites mutual suicide, the Alliance must have other choices. The collective ability to resist attack in Western Europe by means of flexible responses has become central to a rational strategy and crucial to the maintenance of peace. For this reason, the United States has maintained substantial conventional forces in Europe and our NATO allies have embarked on a significant effort to modernize and improve their own military establishments.

While the Atlantic Alliance is committed to a strategy of flexible response in principle, the requirements of flexibility are complex and expensive. Flexibility by its nature requires sensitivity to new conditions and continual consultation among the allies to respond

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to changing circumstances. And we must give substance to the defense posture that our strategy defines. Flexible response cannot be simply a slogan wrapped around the defense structure that emerges from lowest common denominator compromises driven by domestic considerations. It must be seen by ourselves and by potential adversaries as a credible, substantial and rational posture of defense.

A great deal remains to be accomplished to give reality to the goal of flexible response:

- There are deficiencies in important areas of our conventional defense.

- There are still unresolved issues in our doctrine, for example, on the crucial question of the role of tactical nuclear weapons.

- There are anomalies in NATO deployments as well as in its logistics structure.

To maintain the military balance that has ensured stability in Europe for 25 years, the Alliance has no choice but to address these needs and to reach an agreement on our defense requirements. This task is all the more difficult because the lessening of tensions has given new impetus to arguments that it is safe to begin reducing forces unilaterally. And unbridled economic competition can sap the impulse for common defense. All governments of the Western Alliance face a major challenge in educating their peoples to the realities of security in the 1970's.

The President has asked me to state that America remains committed to doing its fair share in Atlantic defense. He is adamantly opposed to unilateral withdrawals of U.S. forces from Europe. But we owe to our peoples a rational defense posture, at the safest minimum size and cost, with burdens equitably shared. This is what the President believes must result from the dialogue with our allies in 1973.

When this is achieved the necessary American forces will be maintained in Europe, not simply as a hostage to trigger our nuclear weapons but as an essential contribution to an agreed and intelligible structure of Western defense. This too will enable us to engage our adversaries intelligently in negotiations for mutual balanced reductions.

In the next few weeks, the United States will present to NATO the product of our own preparations for the negotiations on mutual balanced force reductions which will begin this year. We hope that it will be a contribution to a broader dialogue on security. Our approach is designed not from the point of view of special American, but of general Alliance interests. Our position will reflect the President's view that these negotiations are not a subterfuge to withdraw U.S. forces regardless of consequences. No formula for reductions is defensible--whatever its domestic appeal or political rationale-if it undermines security.

Our objective in the dialogue on defense is a new consensus on security addressed to new conditions and to the hopeful new possibilities of effective arms limitations.

## Diplomacy

We have entered a truly remarkable period of East-West diplomacy. The last two years have produced an agreement on Berlin, a treaty between West Germany and the USSR, a SALT agreement, the beginning of negotiations on a European Security Conference and on mutual balanced force reductions, and a series of significant

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practical bilateral agreements between Western and Eastern countries, including a dramatic change in bilateral relations between the U.S. and USSR. These were not isolated actions, but steps on a course charted in 1969 and carried forward as a collective effort. Our approach to detente stressed that negotiations had to be concrete, not atmospheric, and that concessions should be reciprocal. We expect to carry forward the policy of relaxation of tensions on this basis.

Yet this very success has created its own problems. There is an increasing uneasiness -- all the more insidious for rarely being made explicit -- that superpower diplomacy might sacrifice the interests of traditional allies and other friends. Where our allies' interests have been affected by our bilateral negotiations, as in the talks on the limitations of strategic arms, we have been scrupulous in consulting them; where our allies are directly involved, as in the negotiations on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, our approach is to proceed jointly on the basis of agreed positions. Yet some of our friends in Europe have seemed unwilling to accord America the same trust in our motives as they received from us or to grant us the same tactical flexibility that they employed in pursuit of their own policies. The United States is now often taken to task for flexibility where we used to be criticized for rigidity.

All of this underlines the necessity to articulate a clear set of common objectives together with our allies. Once that is accomplished, it will be quite feasible, indeed desirable, for the several allies to pursue these goals with considerable tactical flexibility. If we agree on common objectives, it will become a technical question whether a particular measure is pursued in a particular forum or whether to proceed bilaterally or multilaterally. Then those allies who seek reassurance of America's commitment will find it not in verbal reaffirmations of loyalty, but in an agreed framework of purpose.

We do not need to agree on all policies. In many areas of the world our approaches will differ, especially outside of Europe. But we do require an understanding of what should be done jointly and of the limits we should impose on the scope of our autonomy.

We have no intention of buying an illusory tranquility at the expense of our friends. The United States will never knowingly sacrifice the interests of others. But the perception of common interests is not automatic; it requires constant redefinition. The relaxation of tensions to which we are committed makes allied cohesion indispensable, yet more difficult. We must ensure that the momentum of detente is maintained by common objectives rather than by drift, escapism or complacency.

## America's Contribution

The agenda I have outlined here is not an American prescription but an appeal for a joint effort of creativity. The historic opportunity for this generation is to build a new structure of international relations for the decades ahead. A revitalized Atlantic partnership is indispensable for it.

The United States is prepared to make its contribution:

- We will continue to support European unity. Based on the principles of partnership, we will make concessions to its further growth. We will expect to be met in a spirit of reciprocity.

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-- We will not disengage from our solemn commitments to our allies. We will maintain our forces and not withdraw from Europe unilaterally. In turn, we expect from each ally a fair share of the common effort for the common defense.

-- We shall continue to pursue the relaxation of tensions with our adversaries on the basis of concrete negotiations in the common interest. We welcome the participation of our friends in a constructive East-West dialogue.

-- We will never consciously injure the interests of our friends in Europe or in Asia. We expect in return that their policies will take seriously our interests and our responsibilities.

-- We are prepared to work cooperatively on new common problems we face. Energy, for example, raises the challenging issues of assurance of supply, impact of oil revenues on international currency stability, the nature of common political and strategic interests and long-range relations of oil-consuming to oil-producing countries. This could be an area of competition; it should be an area of collaboration.

-- Just as Europe's autonomy is not an end in itself, so the Atlantic Community cannot be an exclusive club. Japan must be a principal partner in our common enterprise.

We hope that our friends in Europe will meet us in this spirit. We have before us the example of the great accomplishments of the past decades -- and the opportunity to match and dwarf them. This is the task ahead. This is how, in the 1970's, the Atlantic nations can truly serve our peoples and the cause of peace.

###

Secretary Rogers Discusses Six Concerns
of American Foreign Policy

Statement by Secretary Rogers¹

Under Secretary [Curtis W.] Tarr and my
other colleagues in the Department have al-
ready provided you with our detailed views
on our budget. As you know, the Department
of State has the smallest total budgetary re-
quirements of any Cabinet-level Department.
Over the past decade, in the face of ever-
increasing demands upon our diplomatic re-
sources, we have reduced the number of our
personnel by over 10 percent. For this coming
fiscal year we are requesting authorization to
hire an additional 151 personnel. Ninety of
these are to meet the growing workload in
such areas covered by statutory requirements
as consular services to our citizens overseas.
Most of the rest are required for the major
trade negotiations beginning this fall.

We are requesting authorization for appro-
priations of $578 million. This increase of
$47 million over the current fiscal year is
primarily to meet statutory and mandatory
cost appreciation such as overseas wages and
prices, contributions to the assessed budgets
of international organizations, salary adjust-
ments, and increased passport and consular
workloads. These items comprise over 80
percent of the requested increase. I believe
that both our personnel and budgetary re-
quests are the minimum necessary to ade-
quately support our diplomatic establishment
and foreign policy goals.

These policies are comprehensively set forth in my third annual report to the Congress, which you recently received.² In that report I discuss the major progress we have made in the past year toward President Nixon's goal of moving the world from confrontation to negotiation. We substantially transformed our relations with our adversaries, we signed a historic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union, we concluded an agreement on access to Berlin, and we negotiated a peace agreement in Viet-Nam.

The foundation for the generation of peace
President Nixon is seeking has been laid.
Nineteen seventy-three therefore will be a
year of building on that foundation. I have
outlined in my report the concrete objectives
we will be pursuing in 1973 as we seek to
build the framework of international rela-
tions for the rest of the century.

Let me focus this morning on six areas of
current concern to both the Congress and the
administration.

Developments in Southeast Asia

In Southeast Asia developments have been
disappointing in the last few weeks. We are
greatly concerned over the repeated and
serious violations of the Viet-Nam peace
agreement by the Communist side, and we

¹ Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Apr. 30 (press release 124). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² United States Foreign Policy 1972: A Report of the Secretary of State (Department of State publication 8699); for Secretary Rogers' letter of transmittal and introductory comment, see BULLETIN of May 7, 1973, p. 545.

May 21, 1973

633

have communicated these concerns very clearly to the authorities in Hanoi. Earlier this month, President Nixon and President Thieu issued a joint communique at San Clemente expressing these concerns. Further, we have been explicit in informing the North Vietnamese that any reconstruction assistance that we might provide depends on their observing the terms of the agreement. Most recently we have taken additional steps to emphasize our concerns to Hanoi—for example, the Department's note of April 20 citing violations of the agreement, the suspension of mine-clearing operations, and the return to Washington of our chief delegate to the Joint Economic Commission meetings in Paris.

The North Vietnamese are violating article 20 of the Viet-Nam agreement by continuing to station large numbers of troops in Laos and Cambodia and by conducting military operations in these countries—including large-scale logistics movements. The situation in Laos, nevertheless, has been more encouraging. Despite Communist stalling, negotiations continue between the Laotian Government and the Pathet Lao on the formation of a provisional government and on the cease-fire protocols. However, on two brief occasions and at the request of the Laotian Government, we did reinitiate air combat support in response to North Vietnamese attacks. The Cambodian situation has been the most difficult. Here we have had to intensify our air combat support, at the request of the Cambodian Government, due to heightened military offensives by Communist forces. As you know, the Cambodian Government unilaterally suspended offensive operations following the Viet-Nam cease-fire, and the United States halted its air operations. These activities were resumed only when the Communist forces launched a countrywide offensive and repeated their "total victory," no-compromise position on negotiations.

In this connection, Mr. Chairman, in reply to your query regarding Presidential authority for bombing in Cambodia, I have with me today a more detailed discussion

which, if agreeable to you, I can place in the record.³ An encouraging factor in the Cambodian situation has been the formation of the new High Political Council. This Council will run Cambodian affairs on an emergency basis for the next six months, and one of its primary tasks is to find a solution to the present conflict.

We obviously would prefer that steps such as the combat air support in Cambodia were unnecessary. However, we did not sign the Viet-Nam agreement with the thought that North Viet-Nam could act in clear violation of the agreement once our troops were withdrawn. The agreement was intended to end military warfare in favor of political action. We seek full implementation of the agreement—including the provisions on withdrawal of foreign forces from Laos and Cambodia and the cessation of infiltration activities. Continued North Vietnamese violation of article 20, we firmly believe, threatens to vitiate the premise of the Viet-Nam agreement and thereby imperils an important element of the emerging structure of peace in Asia and elsewhere.

Despite these troubling events of recent weeks, we continue to be hopeful that a real peace can be achieved in Indochina. Ambassador Sullivan [William H. Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs] is now meeting with his North Vietnamese counterpart in Paris to prepare to review the implementation of the agreement, preparatory, if the meetings go well, to a meeting at a later date between Dr. Kissinger [Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs] and Le Due Tho. We remain convinced that the Viet-Nam agreement provides the framework upon which a lasting peace can be accomplished in Indochina. We will continue to do everything we can to bring this about.

## Positive Elements in Middle East Situation

In the Middle East the cycle of violence continues. Each new outbreak adds to the heavy burden of suspicion, distrust, and

³ See p. 652.

634

Department of State Bulletin

hatred that has frustrated all efforts to get a meaningful dialogue started. The obstacles to progress toward an Arab-Israeli settlement are familiar to all of us. But there are positive elements in the situation as well:

- The cease-fire between Egypt and Israel resulting from our initiative almost three years ago is still holding.

- The principal parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict still adhere to Security Council Resolution 242, the only commonly accepted framework for a settlement, and say that they want to keep the doors of diplomacy open.

- The risks of major-power confrontation in the area have been sharply reduced over the past year.

- Largely due to our firm stand, the Security Council on April 21 passed a resolution incorporating language that all concerned recognize as a condemnation of international terrorism. While we abstained because the resolution was not sufficiently balanced, we nevertheless recognize it as a small step forward in getting the international community to face up to this serious problem.

- There is an encouraging measure of stability in many countries of the area, Jordan being a prime example. On the whole, there has been an orderly and stabilizing evolution of the situation in the important Arabian Peninsula-Persian Gulf area. Most of the states of that region, with our encouragement and support, are themselves assuming increasing responsibilities for their development and security.

As I have said before, if there could now be a cease-fire on inflammatory rhetoric, a cease-fire on belligerent statements of ultimate and rigid positions, and a cease-fire from violence of all kinds from whatever source, I am convinced that progress toward a permanent solution could be achieved.

Despite the positive elements I have noted, we find no grounds for complacency in the present situation and will continue to work actively for an honorable negotiating process to bring peace to the Middle East. Realisti-

cally, we continue to think that such a process should be based on a step-by-step approach—an approach that could begin, for example, with an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt for some Israeli withdrawal from the Suez Canal and a reopening of the canal by Egypt, as the first steps in a negotiating process dedicated to a final settlement implementing Resolution 242 in all its parts.

A word is needed to put in perspective recent speculation about the relationship between our Middle East policy and our projected need for increasing quantities of Middle Eastern oil. We of course, and certainly not for reasons of oil alone, seek good relations with the Arab countries. We also seek stable conditions in the area in which mutually beneficial producer-consumer relations can continue to thrive. These goals, far from indicating a change in our policy as some have suggested, only highlight the importance of pursuing our longstanding policy of working actively for a Middle East peace settlement, a settlement which will bring security and justice to the states and peoples of the area—the Palestinians, the other Arabs, and the Israelis alike.

## Worldwide Political and Economic Cooperation

In my foreign policy report to you, I stressed that we will be seeking this year to strengthen economic and political relationships among all the world's industrialized democratic countries. It is no longer satisfactory to think solely in Asian terms, in European terms, or in North American terms. A substantially higher level of worldwide cooperation is required among us all—Japan, Canada, western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. We will be seeking to bring such cooperation about in various ways. One will be through more intensive cooperation in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], the one organization whose membership is closely linked to these states. Another will be through augmented cooperation at the policy level, including the possibility of a collective consultation by Foreign

May 21, 1973

635

This Copy For

4/30

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1728

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH JERRY WARREN

AT 12:15 P.M. EDT

APRIL 30, 1973

MONDAY

MR. WARREN: Just as a prelude to this, I will make an announcement regarding Dr. Kissinger and be able to take a few questions on that matter, but I will be unable to take questions on the items covered in the earlier briefing.

Q How about other items?

MR. WARREN: No.

As previously agreed, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President of the United States, will arrive in Moscow on May 4th for an exchange of views on matters of mutual interest to the Soviet Union and the United States.

That is the extent of the announcement.

Q When is he leaving?

MR. WARREN: We expect him to leave Thursday.

Q How long will he be there?

MR. WARREN: I believe four or five days, Adam.

Q Will he go from there to Paris?

MR. WARREN: No, he will not.

Q Will he come back here?

MR. WARREN: It is expected that he will return here, yes.

Q Why is he going?

MR. WARREN: As I said, to discuss matters of mutual interest. That is the purpose of the visit.

Q Will that include discussion of Mr. Brezhnev's expected visit here?

MR. WARREN: Yes, the summit visit, of course, will be discussed.

Q Jerry, is there a date on that yet, or approximate date?

MR. WARREN: No, we have no information on that.

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Q Will Dr. Kissinger set the date?

MR. WARREN: I just don't know.

Q Will there also be discussion on this visit of the Paris accord and the Indochina military situation?

MR. WARREN: Indochina will probably come up, Ted, but the purpose of the visit is to hold discussions on a whole range of bilateral and international issues of mutual interest.

Q Jerry, don't you find it strange that in the midst of these thunder clap announcements you have made that you would make an announcement that Dr. Kissinger is going to Moscow within a matter of a few minutes?

MR. WARREN: He is not going within a matter of a few minutes.

Q But that you should make an announcement about it. Is there a relationship between the two?

MR. WARREN: There is no relationship between the two. I would like to put this ON BACKGROUND, if I may. This has been in the works for some time and it was agreed on to announce it at this time. It is unrelated to any other issue.

Q Is this a joint announcement being made in Moscow?

MR. WARREN: Let me put it this way. It was agreed upon with the United States and the Soviet Union, again ON BACKGROUND, to announce it at this time.

Q Is Dr. Kissinger stopping anywhere else on the way or the way back?

MR. WARREN: I have nothing on any other stops, at this point, except to say he will not stop in Paris on this trip.

Q Isn't that a change of plans for Dr. Kissinger? Had he been in fact intending to stop in Paris either before or after his trip to Moscow?

MR. WARREN: He will go to Paris as we have indicated to you, but it has nothing to do with this trip.

Q Do you have a schedule now as to when you expect him to go to Paris?

MR. WARREN: No.

Q Is that still mid-May?

MR. WARREN: Nothing has changed on that.

Q Can you perhaps to solve a problem raised by Pete's question tell us when it was agreed that this announcement would be made today?

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MR. WARREN: There have been discussions about such a visit for several weeks and the actual date was agreed upon in about the last ten days.

Q And the agreement to announce it today?

MR. WARREN: I don't know when the agreement to announce it today was reached, but it was previously reached.

Q What can you tell us about successors to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman?

MR. WARREN: Jack, before you came in I said I wouldn't be able to provide any information on previous announcements.

Q Are they working here at the White House today? You can at least tell us that. Did they come in and then leave? What is their status today?

MR. WARREN: I believe they are at the office today.

Q Is the President still at Camp David?

MR. WARREN: Yes. He is and he will be returning sometime today.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 12:21 P.M. EDT)

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
6:00 P.M. EDT, MAY 3, 1973

MAY 3, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE, PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

THE BRIEFING ROOM

10:40 A.M. EDT

MR. WARREN: Just a note that the information in this briefing is embargoed until 6:00 p.m., along with the report which you have now read and which Henry will discuss with you.

Q: There will be a transcript, will there not?

MR. WARREN: There will be.

Q: In Florida, too?

MR. WARREN: Yes.

DR. KISSINGER: Gentlemen, you presumably have read the report and I summarized its basic thrust yesterday. Perhaps one word about the process, which by now should be fairly familiar to you, by which this is produced.

We ask each of the departments and agencies that deal with international affairs to submit their recommendations as to what the report should say, and then the report is written by my staff, and the tortured parts by me. After we have discussed with the President what the major direction should be, it is then reviewed by the various departments and submitted to the Congress. So it is a joint effort that is gone over by all of the responsible agencies.

Let me now answer any questions that you may have about the report.

Q: Dr. Kissinger, would you elaborate on the passage on page 8 in which you explicitly apply the Nixon Doctrine to the Atlantic Alliance?

DR. KISSINGER: The Nixon Doctrine has many aspects. One of the essential aspects of the Nixon Doctrine is that other countries should assume a greater responsibility politically, where appropriate militarily, and economically, and that we are trying to create a new, peaceful structure which is maintained by the commitment to it of all of the countries involved, rather than through unilateral actions and declarations by the United States.

In this sense, the Nixon Doctrine applies, as well, to the Atlantic Alliance. However, detailed views with respect to the Atlantic Alliance are stated in the chapter on the Atlantic Alliance and has been also stated in the speech that I gave at the President's direction on April 23rd to the AP newspaper publishers.

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Our view with respect to the Atlantic Alliance is
that the relationship between the United States and its
European allies is as essential to the new phase of American
foreign policy as it was to the last phase of American foreign
policy.

The President has affirmed, and the Secretary of
State has repeated, that there will be no unilateral Ameri-
can cuts in the commitment of our forces to Europe, and,
therefore, the reference of the Nixon Dolerine in this
paper cannot be interpreted in that sense.

Q Doctor, in the conclusion, is that --

DR. KISSINGER: When he calls me "Doctor", I know
I am going to get it. (Laughter)

Q Is the conclusion a step away from the concept
of five centers of power in the world that the President
and you have enunciated from time to time?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me first explain what this concept is. The President, in his speech in Kansas City in July of 1971, pointed out that in contrast to the immediate post-war period, when there were really only two major powers, there were now five centers of power in the world. This has been interpreted to mean that we were going to conduct a classical balance of power policy in which alliances were going to lose some of their significance.

What this last chapter attempts to do is to explain
how we interpret this five-power world, because there are many
aspects to the contemporary international environment that
are quite novel.

First, of course, is the familiar one of the enor-
mous destructiveness of modern weapons. In the past, it
would have been inconceivable to any statesman that he could
ever have too much power, and any increment of power was
politically useful. In the contemporary period, we are in
a situation in which the overwhelming fact for the nuclear
superpowers is the knowledge of their capacity to destroy
each other and where additional increments do not necessarily
have either military or political significance.

A second fact in the contemporary situation which
is quite different from any previous period is that there is
no necessary relationship between economic strength and mili-
tary strength.

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Again, in the past, if you look at history, nations that were economically powerful were generally militarily powerful as well, and there was a direct relationship between the size of a nation, its economic potential and its military potential.

Today we live in a world in which in the military sense there are only two superpowers; that is to say, the United States and the Soviet Union alone possess the full panoply of modern armament.

On the other hand, in the economic field, you would certainly have to include Japan and Europe as superpowers, and in the political field, in the sense of having a major political impact in the world, even though they are not yet an economic or military superpower, you would have to count the People's Republic of China.

It really makes a great deal of difference of what area you are talking about or what area of activity you are talking about.

Secondly, this notion of the five centers of power was interpreted in many parts of the world as an American assertion that it make no difference any more between its friends and its opponents, that it was conducting foreign policy entirely on the basis of a temporary juggling of relationships. Indeed, this was equated with classical balance of power.

Of course, it wasn't even true in the old balance of power that alliances did not exist. Alliances existed throughout history, even in periods when the balance of power policy was pursued.

The difference between classical power politics and the contemporary period is enormous. They are the differences I have already mentioned in the destructiveness of weapons, in the disparity between economic and political and military factors and in the enormously increased role of ideology.

Therefore, we felt it important that in our last chapter of this report we emphasize just what we understand by the international environment today: that we continue to value our friends, that we do believe there must be a recognition of the emergence of other centers of power, but that power cannot be an end in itself in the contemporary period, and that power politics in its purest sense is the most difficult and the most treacherous form of international politics.

Q Doctor, how do you assess the prospects for a real peace in Southeast Asia?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the record should show that it took until the third question to reach Southeast Asia.

Q It is Topic "A".

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, one has to ask oneself what is meant by "real peace." If one means a consciousness of tranquility, if one means that the parties to the conflict

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in Southeast Asia will live henceforth with a consciousness
of reconciliation, then I would say that that day is very far
off.

The essence of the settlement was that the military
issues were settled in some detail, at least in the document,
and the political issues were left to further evolution.
The political issues were not solved; they were left to hopefully
a political rather than a military contest.

The parties that had fought for 25 years did not
suddenly give up their differences. Therefore, the issue in
Southeast Asia is not whether a consciousness of harmony can
be brought about or the absence of tension but whether the
political evolution that will inevitably occur take place
essentially in peaceful forms or at least without large-scale
conflict.

We have stated repeatedly that we are disappointed
at the way the agreement has been implemented, but is also
true that for all of the parties there is a difficult process
of adjustment.

We are not pessimistic about the long-term prospects
in the negotiations that we are conducting with the North
Vietnamese. We are approaching them with the attitude that
the difficulties can be ameliorated, if not solved, and that
one should look at this as an evolutionary process rather than
a final settlement.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how much progress is actually
being made in both Cambodia and Laos toward a political settle-
ment within those countries?

DR. KISSINGER: Just to give myself some possibility of
avoiding some questions later on, I must point out that this is
not exactly related to the subject of this press conference, which
is to explain the report.

The situation in Laos and Cambodia differs in the
sense that in Laos -- they are similar in one respect.
Article 20 of the agreement provides for the withdrawal of all
foreign forces and for an end to the use of Laos and Cambodia
as bases against any neighboring country.

In this sense, the obligation is clear and unambiguous,
and obviously is not being fulfilled. There is a difference,
however, in the sense that in Laos there exists a cease-fire
agreement between the Laotian parties.

We are not formally a part of that agreement, and this
is why the agreement provides that within a fixed time period
after a political settlement, which in turn was supposed to
come 30 days after the cease-fire agreement, all foreign forces
should be withdrawn.

This is not, strictly speaking, in accordance with
Article 20, which makes no prior conditions to the withdrawal
of foreign forces.

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If this agreement is implemented among the parties, then a definite deadline will exist for the withdrawal of all foreign forces. Up to now, the political agreement has not been achieved, so the negotiating problem in Laos would be for the outside countries to encourage a conclusion of the political negotiations, which would automatically produce a deadline for the withdrawal of foreign forces. This, in turn, would achieve one of our principal objectives as far as Laos is concerned.

Q How much progress has been made in that respect?

DR. KISSINGER: Our judgment is that enough progress has been made so that a settlement could be achieved rapidly if it were wanted by both sides. The obstacle to a settlement right now is the reluctance, I would think, to withdraw troops rather than the conditions of the settlement. If a decision were made to have a settlement, it could come fairly rapidly.

Q Dr. Kissinger ---

DR. KISSINGER: I am not finished yet with Cambodia. In Cambodia, for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the forces opposing the Government were divided among various factions, some of which were receiving their support from different capitals, it did not prove as feasible to arrange a global negotiation as it turned out to be in Laos.

However, we believe that some of the same process that operated in Laos can be applied also in Cambodia, particularly now as all the opposing forces claim to be rallied under one central direction and that the government in Phnom Penh has broadened its base.

We are not too pessimistic that over a period of weeks, maybe some months, some cease-fire negotiations could start. Cambodia is somewhat behind Laos in this process. What form these negotiations would take, we would leave to the parties.

Q Dr. Kissinger, since three-quarters of the Senate and almost two-thirds of the House are opposing MFN for the Soviet Union, why is there no mention made of this matter in your report to the Congress dealing with the Soviet Union?

DR. KISSINGER: We have made very clear -- and I will repeat here -- that the Administration has strongly supported the provision in the trade bill that would enable the President to grant MFN to the Soviet Union.

If this provision is approved, it is the President's intention to grant MFN to the Soviet Union. It is furthermore the belief of this Administration that the issue of MFN for the Soviet Union is part of the whole fabric of our negotiation with the Soviet Union over a period of two years and should not be separated as an issue to be addressed in isolation.

Finally, we believe that the exchanges that took place between the Soviet leadership and the President on the issue of the exit visas substantially meets the concerns that were expressed by many of the signers of these resolutions.

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[L-C]

We hope that as the Congress studies the problem in its entire range, and as we continue our discussions with Soviet leaders on some of the problems that gave rise to these concerns, that by the time the Congress votes on MFN it will see matters in the same light.

Q Dr. Kissinger, are you proposing some sort of consortium consumer union with Europe in terms of the energy crisis in the Middle East, to put the pressure on the Arab nations to provide more oil? There seems to be some sort of an ambiguity in the report.

DR. KISSINGER: May I point out, incidentally, that MFN is mentioned at the bottom of page 34 and at the top of page 35 of the report.

Q I am thinking in terms of the issue of immigration, in terms of MFN.

DR. KISSINGER: That issue we did not deal with separately, it is true.

With respect to Miss Thomas, her question was whether we were implying a consortium of consumer nations to bring pressure on the producer nations to produce more oil. Frankly, we have not thought of this problem in terms of pressure.

Indeed, we have not completed our own deliberations on the international implications of the energy problem. The Energy Message dealt primarily with the domestic implications, and we are now engaged in the MSC process in an investigation of the international implications.

It is clear that we face here a number of problems with which we have had no previous experience in the international field. For example, the dollar reserves of the oil producing nations are going to increase enormously as the dependence on mid-East oil and foreign oil increases.

This fact alone creates a new reality for the international monetary system, and frankly, we have not thought through all of the implications, but we know we have to study the implications.

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It is a fact that many of the producing nations... are operating in the form of a consortium. What that means for the consuming nations is really not clear, and there are totally different points of view on the subject. How you define the national security interests in this respect is, in itself, a question that I must tell you honestly we have not yet fully resolved.

There is one school of thought that argues that it is to produce as much of our energy requirements, at least in the Western Hemisphere, as possible. There is another school of thought that points out that this would deplete the resources in the Western Hemisphere at a very excessive rate, and that, therefore, under peacetime conditions it is best to increase one's imports from the more distant areas and to preserve the Western Hemisphere reserves for crisis situations.

I just want to put before you the sort of issue that we are looking at. If the national security definition were in the sense of relying on Western Hemisphere sources primarily, then the pressure on the producing nations in the Middle East, for example, as far as this country is concerned, would be much less.

So until we have completed this study, we will not be in a position to make any very definitive statements. We have had preliminary talks with some of the Arab nations, when the Saudi minister of oil production was here, and we are in constant contact with the Iranians, and with others.

We are having some preliminary conversations with some European countries, but this is really one of these areas of new exploration where we have to get our own intellectual house in order first, before we can make any definitive statements. But we are definitely not approaching it with the attitude of wanting to bring pressure, because at this point we first have to define what our objectives are.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the European chapter puts great stress on the need for developing a new security concept, especially in the field of nuclear strategy. On one point, would you amplify on that a bit; and secondly, could you explain the concept of the timetable that you have in mind in relation to what is mentioned on page 207; namely, the need for the alliance to set its security goals before it enters into effective negotiations on MBFR, in view of the fact that those negotiations are currently anticipated in the fall?

DR. KISSINGER: The two questions are really two sides of the same point.

With respect to the first question, we have felt that obviously NATO today is in a strategic environment entirely different from the time when it was conceived. When it was conceived in the late '40s, and when it received impetus after the beginning of the Korean War in the 1950s, the security of Europe depended almost entirely on the American strategic nuclear guarantee, and the American forces in Europe were conceived primarily as a means to trigger the American nuclear guarantee and to deprive the United States of any great freedom of action with respect to it.

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But as the years have gone on, as the nuclear stockpiles on both sides have increased and the delivery systems have multiplied, the reliance on strategic nuclear war is bound to have a different significance.

We find ourselves today in Europe with a deployment that was designed in the late '50s, that was adapted at various stages, but which requires an explicit adaptation to new circumstances in a number of areas, and we believe that this is one of the pre-eminent tasks of the alliance.

This task becomes particularly acute as we begin the negotiations on the mutual balanced force reduction.

Murray is quite right: We anticipate these negotiations starting in the fall. We believe that they can be conducted effectively only if the allies first understand what the elements of their security are, so that specific proposals can be related to their understanding of how they affect the security situation, rather than to be caught in a negotiating process in which abstract figures are thrown around, and in which, then, domestic pressures and pressures within the conference room become predominant.

Now, in terms of the timetable, we have submitted to NATO, I believe this week, a document which outlines, on the one hand, our perception of these elements of security in Europe, and secondly, two principal approaches by which one can look at these mutual balanced force reductions from the point of view of security with some additional models by which they could be approached.

We want to elicit from our European allies, first, a response to the security section, and equally a response to the approaches we put before them to the issue of mutual balanced force reduction. That doesn't mean that every figure we put before them is necessarily the final one. It is really a more conceptual approach at this stage of the game in order to define where are we trying to go, how should we look at this problem, how can we have security, how can we have equal security at lower force levels and how do we reach these lower force levels, how can we make the cuts in such a way that they enhance the sense of security of all of the participants, hopefully to reduce both sides' capacities for offensive action, and thereby give each side a sense that the danger has been lessened.

This is the reason why we are linking conceptually the security issue and the MFBR issue, and we are really following a procedure we adopted in the early stages of SALT and which then has enabled us, once the basic principles and building blocks were understood, to move fairly rapidly in the actual negotiations.

Q Can I follow that up?

DR. KISSINGER: First this gentleman who has been very patient, and then I will come to you.

Q Doctor, a rather parochial question, if you please.

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know what parish you represent. (Laughter)

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Q Do you want me to tell you?

When is the President going to visit, this year, Latin America, and what countries is he going to visit? Does he still believe, as he said, that "As Brazil goes, so goes the rest of Latin America," and finally, don't you think that we are being left out on a limb in relation to the whole question of recognition of Cuba, inasmuch as half a dozen countries have already recognized Cuba and others are making noises, and the obvious way to undercut the prestige and effectiveness of an international body, the argument doesn't hold any more, since that prestige has already been undercut?

DR. KISSINGER: The gentleman asked about six questions.

Q In direct proportion to the time I had to wait.

DR. KISSINGER: All dealing with Latin America, specifically, when is the President planning his trip to Latin America, which countries does he intend to visit, what relative importance does he attach to Brazil specifically in the light of a comment he made during the toast for the President of Brazil, and various questions connected with our Cuban policy, particularly as the questioner believes it is being eroded anyway.

Q That is right.

DR. KISSINGER: Now, with respect to the President's trip, he announced some weeks ago that he was planning a trip to Latin America this year. There has been no further, detailed planning on this, and, therefore, I haven't much that I can add to what the President said. He has not yet decided which countries to visit, although it would probably be that countries whose leaders visited here would have a special claim on a return visit.

Now, we attach great importance to Brazil as geographically the largest country in Latin America, the greatest population, and making great progress. Therefore, we attach great importance to our relationship with Brazil, but this does not mean that we do not think other countries in Latin America also play a very major role or that we will hingour whole Latin American policy on one country alone.

With respect to the Cuban policy, I think the basic considerations have been stated in the report, which are related to the policy that Cuba is pursuing and which can be affected by changes in Cuban policies.

Q Well, this went to Murray's question on MBFR. It seemed to me in reading last year's report you were much firmer against symmetrical reductions on both sides than you are now. You said it was inherently unstable, I think. In this report, it seems to me that you are backing off that position and leaving open various options. Is this correct?

DR. KISSINGER: In the interval we have, of course, made many more studies, and the complexity of our argumentation always increases with the number of studies that we conduct, not necessarily our lucidity. It depends how you define symmetrical.

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Basically, our view remains that if you have an unequal number of forces, and if the forces on one side are composed heterogeneously, and the forces on the other side have a predominant element, then having cuts of exactly the same size is not necessarily the most sensible way of approaching the problem. Therefore, if there is an implication in this report that we have backed away from our attempt to wind up with equal security rather than to look at it in terms of the cuts that have to be made, then that is wrong. That is not our intention.

We have this year really made extensive studies. We have looked at eight different ways of approaching it. We finally have gotten it down to two or three.

In general, our approach is that the answers will have to be somewhat complex, and that the straight percentage approach is probably not the most realistic, but since we are in the process of discussing this with our allies, we don't want to pre-judge that question.

Q If you would indulge a question that is not directly related to this report, but which is connected with stories in this morning's paper concerning a former staff member of the NSC who, according to these stories, was implicated in wiretapping efforts, I wondered, first, if you knew about this, or what your response to these stories is.

DR. KISSINGER: First, I have no knowledge whatever of the activities to which this report refers.

David Young, who was a trusted member of my staff, was detailed on July 1, 1971, to join the Domestic Council which, under the direction of Mr. Ehrlichman, was conducting a study of declassification procedures and the security procedures within the Government. These studies led to a new classification system which was promulgated by the President, and this study was publicly announced.

Upon the completion of these studies, or of this report, which occurred in the early fall of 1971, David Young, whose interest was more in the domestic than the international area -- he was a lawyer when he joined me -- remained with the Domestic Council, and he continued to be paid from National Security Council funds because the Domestic Council had no budget of its own, and as most of you will note, most members of the White House staff are paid by some agency that has a budget for them.

He continued to be on the Domestic Council until he left in March of this year, before these stories became known. What his duties were, I do not know, and, therefore, I cannot make any comment about what he did except for the study on declassification. But I knew him as a trusted junior member of my staff.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, in the Cambodian section, the report says there has been little progress in Cambodia and the military picture at times has remained spotty and precarious. You said that you were not pessimistic that a cease-fire might evolve in the weeks or perhaps months ahead.

This seems a bit inconsistent with the estimation of the Cambodian situation in the report, and would you please square the two?

DR. KISSINGER: I wanted to point out that in the report, which of course was written several weeks ago, we described the situation as well as we could in the light of the conditions that then existed.

The military situation in Cambodia is uneven, and in some sense precarious. We do not judge that the opposing forces have the military capacity to occupy the whole country and, therefore, the problem is whether the political structure in Phnom Penh will become so demoralized that it collapses.

If the political structure can be maintained, then we believe a basis for a negotiation exists. Recently, the political base of the government in Phnom Penh has been broadened. The rainy season is approaching, there has been no major change in the military situation in recent weeks, and in fact, there has been probably a slight slackening of pressure.

Therefore, we say that the conditions exist for a negotiation. Anyone who would say flatly that he is certain it will come about would, of course, be excessively optimistic.

Q Dr. Kissinger, could you possibly provide an answer to the "fundamental question" on page 79 as to the possibility of reconciliation of the old Atlantic concept of unity in defense as opposed to what you call European regionalism and what would happen if European regionalism persists.

DR. KISSINGER: First of all, let me explain there has been some comment in Europe that we wanted to confine Europe to a regional European role while we reserved for ourselves the right to conduct a global foreign policy.

The references to regionalism, both in this report and in the speech that I made some weeks ago, were intended to be descriptive and not prescriptive. It has been the whole thrust of American postwar foreign policy to encourage the Europeans to assume a responsibility in the world commensurate with their economic power and their political vitality.

It is the Europeans who have preferred to concentrate primarily on their region. To the extent that the Europeans want to play a global role, we welcome it, and we will be happy and eager to consult with them and to cooperate with them.

In the economic field there are strong tendencies towards regionalism in Europe, and it is the nature of the economic field, in any event, in both the United States and in Europe that as negotiations are prepared, pressure groups and special interests will advance their particular claims, which on their merits are usually quite reasonable and which in the

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absence of an overriding framework are extremely difficult to
resist by political leaders on both sides of the Atlantic.

Therefore, what we are attempting to do, what the
President is urging, is that the political leaders on both
sides of the Atlantic and in Japan first set themselves some
general political goal in the name of which they can then
adopt a more generous, a more flexible and a more farsighted
approach to their economic relationships.

If regionalism is continued or if regionalism is
enhanced, then the consequences will, of course, be a conscious-
ness on both sides of the Atlantic of constant conflict, of
every negotiation turning into a test of strength. Sooner or
later this is bound to affect other relationships.

When I say this, I am not saying this as a threat.
We expect that there is enough statesmanship on both sides of
the Atlantic and on both sides of the Pacific to recognize the
overriding political imperatives and that, therefore, we believe
we can avoid the development of regional blocs and these
autarchic groupings confronting each other.

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Q To what extent do you think oil would be a dangerous destabilizing influence within the Western Alliance? Specifically, as one example, I refer to the differences in posture vis-a-vis the United States and France in the Middle East.

DR. KISSINGER: It is obvious that as energy becomes a growing concern for all of the industrialized nations that it is conceivable that the competition for energy, for sources of energy, will take forms that could threaten other political relationships.

If Western nations engage in a process where if one is expropriated and expelled, the other one moves in to pick up the pieces, as sometimes has been done by every Western nation with regard to every other Western nation, then, of course, you are creating a high premium on all sides to continue this process.

On the other hand, we expect again, as in the other areas, that as we look ahead 10 or 15 years it should be possible to develop policies that assure the energy supplies of all nations and in a manner that is consistent with the dignity of the producing nations.

It has to be consciously pursued from a long-range prospective and in a generous framework. If it isn't done, and if it is permitted to run wild, then the divisive tendencies may easily predominate.

Q Doctor, on page 11 of your report you refer to the political relationship with Japan as not yet having been fully defined. Could you explain that a little further, please?

DR. KISSINGER: As we explained in the chapter on Japan, Japan went through a phase in which its predominant effort was on economic recovery and then on this tremendous industrial expansion.

The degree of political activism was not commensurate to the economic power that had been developed. The political change from the occupation era and the post-war era to one in which Japan pursues a diplomacy that is more in keeping with its economic strength and its new vitality began in the last years of the Sato prime ministership, but took symbolic form when Prime Minister Tanaka acceded to office.

For example, he has now announced the trip he is intending to take later this year is in pursuit of his multi-polar diplomacy, which is a different word than Japanese prime ministers and foreign ministers used in the past.

The adjustment of Japan is from pursuing a rather single-track foreign policy to a more complex foreign policy. After all, last year was the year when Japan restored or normalized its relations with the People's Republic of China. They are now engaged in peace negotiations, or of seeing whether they can get them started with the Soviet Union so that the political role of Japan is now in the process of transition.

How we relate ourselves to this change and how we can maintain, as we intend to, our traditional friendship while at the same time taking account of the greater complexity of the Japanese role is the task that the President attempted to describe in this report.

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Q Dr. Kissinger, could you amplify what you said on page 87, where you talk about the need to review the strategic options involved in conducting a nuclear defense, if necessary, and how that would relate to what you said about MBFR and to an alliance role in defense?

DR. KISSINGER: I am just trying to see what you are referring to. I understand.

The question is what we meant on page 87 of the report, in the chapter on Europe, by a review of the strategic options involved in conducting a nuclear defense if it should become necessary, and how we can prepare within the alliance a framework that integrates defense planning and diplomacy. Isn't that what you asked, to explain No. 2 and 3?

Q I was talking about the alliance role in that, and the alliance planning.

DR. KISSINGER: Okay, fine. I will just confine it, then, to the first question.

I keep looking over here. Where is Ron Ziegler when I need him the most to cut off the questioning? (Laughter)

Q Where is he? (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: He is measuring the walls of my office. (Laughter)

Q There is a lot of other empty space around here. (Laughter)

DR. KISSINGER: It is clear that the use of nuclear weapons under current conditions has a different significance and must pursue a different strategy than was the case in the 1950s. Now, the problem of how nuclear weapons are to be used, if that should become unavoidable, the relationship between what used to be called tactical and strategic uses, what rational purposes can be achieved, has to be addressed by the alliance.

There exist several bodies which can do this; for example, the nuclear planning group that was established in the Kennedy Administration to perform this role. What we are attempting to bring about is to shift the discussion from the more formalistic agreement on general propositions to a more concrete perception of what would actually occur in specific circumstances. So the forums exist, but what needs to be done is a more systematic and comprehensive approach to what is a very serious problem.

MR. WARREN: One more question is all we have time for.

Q Mr. Kissinger, I have an additional question.

DR. KISSINGER: You pick it. Why should I make an enemy? (Laughter)

MR. WARREN: This gentleman down here.

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Q You have on page 142 a four-point program for the Middle East. Could you kindly elaborate a little on that? In the first sentence you speak of the process of negotiations. Do you mean by that that the Jarring mission has been abandoned in your future attempts to bring peace?

DR. KISSINGER: The question is, on page 142 where we list four areas or four points with respect to the Middle East, to what extent that represents an American program for the area; and secondly, whether the first point which refers to a process of negotiation with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict means that we have abandoned the Jarring mission.

Actually, our attitude toward the negotiations in the Middle East is more fully covered on pages 138 and 139, and we make very clear that we are in favor of both the comprehensive approach as well as to the so-called interim approach; that we support both the Jarring mission as well as the various schemes that have been proposed that would have a practical consequence of clearing the Suez Canal and bringing about a withdrawal from some areas. We have explained on page 139 that we recognize that there has to be a relationship between the so-called interim approach and the so-called overall approach, and that we recognize the fact that one of the concerns is that if this relationship is not established, a new arrangement may take on the character of permanence.

Our view, however, is also that we should proceed on whichever route seems most promising at a particular moment; that we should be flexible about the modalities by which this relationship is established, and that the process by which progress is made must engage the parties in the Middle East in some form of contact with each other at some stage of the negotiations. This we have spelled out on pages 138 and 139. What you have on page 142 is really a summary that covers issues other than the Arab-Israeli issue, as well.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 11:35 A.M. EDT)

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

May 7, 1973

#135

AN ADDRESS BY THE HONORABLE
JOSEPH J. SISCO, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS, AT
THE CELEBRATION OF ISRAEL'S 25th ANNIVERSARY,
MONDAY, MAY 7, 1973, At The
SHERATON-PARK HOTEL, WASHINGTON, D.C.

In this twenty-fifth year of Israel's independence, much is being said -- and rightly so -- about the accomplishments of this remarkable state and its remarkable people. The Second World War accelerated the striving of many people for national independence and changed the map of our world in ways few could have imagined when that war began. In one sense, Israel is simply one of the many young states that have swelled the membership of the United Nations from 51 when it was originally founded to 132 today.

But in another sense, Israel is unique among the new states of the world. There were many, well before the beginning of this century, who _did_ envisage its creation, and for millennia, before the phenomenon of the modern nation state appeared on the historical scene, Jews everywhere kept alive the vision of their nationhood.

In our century, out of the horrors of the holocaust, the vision of those generations of men and women was transformed into the reality of the State of Israel. Israel could not have come into being and survived had it not been for the indomitable will of its people for existence and independence. At the same time, on this twenty-fifth anniversary, it is fitting to recall also the role of others. First, the partition decision and subsequent admission of Israel to United Nations membership were an important part of the juridical foundations of the state. The United Nations itself is only three years older than the State of Israel, and their histories have been intertwined for the past quarter of a century -- occasionally for better and particularly in recent years too often for worse. Secondly, while Israel with some justification has often felt it stood alone, the support of other nations -- above all the United States -- has been indispensable at critical moments to Israel's creation, growth and survival. That support draws in the first instance on the help and faith of the Diaspora, but its base is far broader than that.

As these opening remarks suggest, I believe this is an occasion for standing back from the preoccupations of the moment, from the crises and headlines and tragedies and hopes of today -- a time for a sober look at the past 25 years to see what lessons they teach us for the next 25.

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First, Israel had to feel strong and secure and confident of its survival before it could think about tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Israel lived so many of its first twenty-five years with an abiding sense of insecurity that some have not yet become accustomed to the fact that Israel today is strong, is secure and is confident of its survival. Moreover, there is no doubt that the support of the United States, both material and moral, has made a major contribution to the strength of Israel. That support and that strength have been a principal deterrent to the renewed hostilities in the area. I am confident that the United States will remain steadfast in its support for Israel's security.

Foreign Minister Eban has recently alluded to Israel's strength in this way:

> "It is of course a fact that we are still the target of perils and threats, but it is also a fact that Israel is, in the last resort, a strong and solid reality. Strong and solid in its capacities of defense; strong in the inspiration of its heritage and faith; strong in its economic resources; strong in the support that it receives from the Jewish people; strong in its science and learning; strong in the overall balance of its links with governments and peoples across the world. True, all these elements of strength and solidity are relative and not absolute, but they are impressive in relation to the resources and capacity of all our adversaries."

At the same time, I believe it is appropriate here to express a few words of caution to our Israeli friends -- words expressed in the spirit of friendship and mutual confidence between us, which permit us to speak frankly, and without suspicions of ulterior motives. I would suggest that while Israel's strength must be maintained, the next 25 years present a corollary challenge. Again, I want to borrow the words of Israel's Foreign Minister:

> "... A confident and balanced national style is perfectly reconcilable with an alert security consciousness and a rational and firm political line. The problem is how to put the emphasis on freedom, tolerance, equality, social justice, spiritual and intellectual creativity and human brotherhood, as the salient characteristics of a strong and confident Israeli society ..."

There is a second point regarding the past 25 years which I believe is worth making and this relates to both Israel and its Arab neighbors. For most of the past 25 years, both have held seemingly irreconciable perceptions of what their respective national interests required with respect to the other. Before 1967, the Arab world, with few exceptions, was unanimous in believing that its national interest required the elimination of the State of Israel. Before 1967, Israel believed its national interest required above all

PR #135

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Arab recognition of its sovereignty and its right to exist in peace and was prepared to accept something like the armistice lines of 1949 as its recognized international boundaries. Since 1967, while there are still Arab voices calling for the disappearance of Israel, there are many others in the Arab world who now perceive their national interest as compatible with the existence of a sovereign Israel, though within the former armistice lines. I believe that for most Arabs Israel's existence is no longer the principal issue, and this is a major positive element in the Middle East today. Unfortunately, while the gap on the question of existence and coexistence of Israel has narrowed, the gap on the question of borders has widened. Since 1967 while Israelis have not agreed among themselves on what the boundaries of the state should be, they are generally agreed that those boundaries should be substantially different from the armistice lines. Sadat, in turn, insists that there can be no changes in his borders. "Not an inch of territory" he repeats time and again.

Third, the vision of both sides has often been clouded by *myths* of the past which have persisted in obscuring the realities of the present.

-- Before 1967, each side's perception of the other was compounded in part at least of myth. To the Arabs, Israel did not exist as a dynamic evolving reality. It was "occupied Palestine" and referred to as such. Arabs tended to think of Israel and its society as frozen in the patterns of 1947, as a state which would be made to disappear someday, leaving no trace on the land. Israel was seen as on the verge of collapse from internal decay, an artificial entity propped up by others which would not withstand the tide of history.

-- The Israeli counterpart of this myth before 1967 was its perception of a monolithic Arab world, strife-torn and backward. All Arabs were perceived as essentially the same, and there was little understanding of the sense of a Palestine-Arab identity in the Middle East which distinguished the Palestinian Arabs from the Arabs of Lebanon or Syria or Trans-Jordan or the Peninsula.

-- In the aftermath of the 1967 War the increasing interaction of Arabs and Israelis, in Gaza, in the occupied West Bank and across the Jordan River began a process of breaking down these myths which each had held of the other. This is an essentially healthy process and one of the positive byproducts of that War.

But other myths have arisen and persist.

-- There is the myth -- now accepted as reality in much of the Arab world -- that the Six Day War was the result of unprovoked Israeli aggression.

-- There is the myth -- believed still by many even though now discounted by some Arab leaders -- that units of the U.S. Air Force participated on Israel's side in the Six Day War. This myth has recently arisen in a new form in the "big lie" charging that the CIA and the American Embassy in Beirut were parties to the recent Israeli raid in Lebanon.

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On the Israeli side, there is the myth that the Six Day War was the result of a calculated Arab plan to launch a war of destruction against Israel. In my view, the most plausible explanation is that the Six Day War resulted from improvised actions and reactions by each side. Combined with each side's perception and suspicion of the other's intentions, the cumulative weight of these actions and reactions made inevitable a war neither side deliberately sought at that time.

-- Next, there is the myth that security is solely a function of the physical location of territorial boundaries. As Foreign Minister Eban said recently, much more eloquently than I can, "The question of boundaries is one of the components of peace and not its sole condition. The balance of forces, the spirit and resourcefulness of our defenders, the application of science to the reinforcement of the economy, the strength of our international ties, these are all factors of equal weight. Without them our security would be undermined, no matter what boundaries we were to establish. The problem is not merely how to define our own historic rights, but how to bring them into harmony with the rights of others and with our own right to peace."

-- Another myth, of which we have heard much lately in the Arab world, is that peace can be achieved by going to war. Certainly the lessons of the last three wars between Arabs and Israelis prove just the opposite.

-- Finally, there is the myth that peace can be made by proxy - that powers not party to the conflict, acting independently or through the United Nations, can somehow substitute for negotiations between the parties themselves. This has not been the case in any of the successful negotiations of international disputes in recent history, and the Middle East is no exception. The United Nations and outside powers can play a responsible role in encouraging the parties to get a negotiating process started, but they cannot be part of the process itself. When they seek to substitute their views for the positions of the parties directly concerned or openly advocate the positions of one party, they do not further progress, they inhibit it.

All of this suggests a fourth lesson, and I believe it is the principal lesson to be learned from the past. The history of the Arab-Israeli problem is a history of lost opportunities. So often opportunities have slipped through the fingers of those concerned -- slipped through their fingers just when they thought they could grasp them. At such moments, the opportunities were all the more precious because they seemed near enough to be seen but too far off to be tasted.

Perhaps the greatest opportunity came after the Six Day War in 1967. In November of that year the United Nations Security Council was able to agree unanimously on a set of principles, embodied in its Resolution 242 and accepted by the principal parties to the conflict, which laid a new foundation for a peaceful settlement.

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-- First, the Security Council did not label one side or the other as an aggressor in the 1967 War. Rather than looking backward and seeking to apportion blame, it looked forward and sought to build a better future.

-- Second, the Security Council did not call for unconditional Israeli withdrawal to the armistice lines as had been the case at the time of the 1956 War in Sinai. Rather, it called for "withdrawal from territories occupied" in the 1967 war as part of a package settlement in which the parties would agree to respect each other's right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries. The Security Council resolution established principles. It did not establish borders or define precisely the obligations of peace and security.

-- Third, the United Nations recognized that a settlement could not be imposed from outside. Instead, it established the principle that peace should be based upon agreement between the parties to the conflict.

These were principles for which the United States fought hard and successfully in the deliberations of the United Nations. They remain the essential framework for peace in the area, and if the Security Council departs from these principles any future prospects for negotiation between the parties will have been seriously jeopardized.

Why have so many opportunities been missed since the adoption of the November 1967 Security Council resolution at great costs in lives and resources? If we had the complete answer to that question, perhaps our efforts in the cause of Middle East peace would have been more successful over the years. But I do believe I know part of the answer, and it is this. Neither side, Arab or Israeli, has collectively defined its goals in terms of what economists like to call the "opportunity costs" of achieving those goals -- in other words, in terms of what it is willing to forego in the process. To be sure, there are Arabs who still say today: We want peace but only when Israel as a Jewish State is no more. There are Israelis who say: We want peace but only if we can also keep the occupied territories.

But these are statements of individuals or political groupings, not the positions of governments. There is no broadly agreed consensus on either side as to what the acceptable trade-offs might be. States seem to follow the patterns of human nature -- the desire to have it both ways, to have their cake and eat it too, to keep their options open.

In this sixth year since 1967 of no/war and no/peace, I believe it is time for the parties to begin to choose options,

PR # 135

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to establish priorities, to decide what is most important and
what it will cost, and to decide whether it is worth the price.
I do not say that this or any other opportunity that may come along
is the last one in history, but I do believe that the cost of each
missed opportunity in the Middle East is becoming progressively
higher than the previous one.

As we stand back and view the Middle East in the perspective
of time what do we see today? We see a situation that every rational
person knows in his innermost thoughts is not normal, not stable
and not durable. True, the world has lived with many such situations
and, when the balance of power is properly maintained, such situations
can last for a surprisingly long time. But need they? And isn't
the cost in the end often greater than it would have been if both
sides had seized the opportunities and taken the risks necessary to
resolve conflict sooner?

We have a 33 month old ceasefire in the context of the reduced
likelihood of a Soviet-American confrontation. However, the cycle
of violence continues and has taken an appalling toll of life. The
victims have included many innocent and uninvolved civilians --
Olympic athletes, airline passengers, dedicated diplomats, recently
a foreign national in Beirut, and countless others in Israel, in the
Arab world and elsewhere.

The Security Council on April 21 took a small step forward in
facing up to this pressing problem. The resolution which was passed,
while very far from the balanced outcome we sought, condemned
terrorist violence for the first time. For the first time, the
Security Council has recognized that terrorism is part of the
problem and not simply an irrelevant by-product. The question now
is: Where do we go from here? How do we at long last begin to
build on the framework for peace contained in Security Council
Resolution 242; on the ceasefire along the Suez Canal negotiated by
the United States; on the stability in Jordan and the efforts to
find a new stability in Lebanon; on the widely shared desire to
develop further the mutually beneficial relations between high-energy
consuming countries and the oil-producing nations of the Middle
East?

In this connection, there has been much speculation of late as
to whether the so-called energy crisis is going to lead to changes in
our Middle East policy. In my view, this is the wrong way to pose
the question. The question is whether our policy of seeking to
promote a peaceful settlement is going to succeed, so that there will
be no temptation for some to seek to politicize the energy problem,
to their own detriment as much as to the detriment of others.

For its part, the United States is continuing to press the search
for answers. The present no-war-no-peace situation is unstable and
unsatisfactory. As a beginning, it would be well to build on the
present ceasefire. There should be a ceasefire on inflammatory
rhetoric; a ceasefire on public statements of ultimate and rigid
positions; a ceasefire on violence of all kinds from whatever source,

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Just as we called on the parties in 1970, on the eve of the U.S. - initiated ceasefire, to stop shooting and start talking, today we urge they stop shouting and start listening.

We need-- the world badly needs -- a period of calm and quiet diplomacy in the Middle East. For our part, we began that process during what President Nixon has described as his Middle East month. We had useful discussions with the leaders of Jordan and Israel and with a senior adviser to the President of Egypt. That continuing process has been complicated by the recent kaleidoscope of violent events but it has not been stopped. We intend to carry it forward through diplomatic channels. We intend to continue urging on the parties the need for getting negotiations started and to continue exploring with them ways to do this. The principal parties concerned have said they want to keep the doors of diplomacy open. We intend to take them at their word.

It would not be realistic to think, after so many years of effort, that there lurks somewhere, waiting to be discovered, a magic formula which would suddenly solve the Arab-Israeli problem in a single dramatic stroke. A way must be found in the first instance to reconcile Egyptian sovereignty and Israeli security needs. In our judgment, the chasm on an overall settlement is too broad to bridge in one jump. But practical step-by-step progress is feasible, beginning with negotiations on an agreement for some Israeli withdrawal in Sinai, the reopening of the Suez Canal and an extended ceasefire. I am convinced an interim Suez Canal Agreement would not and should not become an end in itself, but would lead to increasingly productive negotiations on the larger issues. There

also include the Jordanian-Israeli aspects of the settlement and the need to meet the legitimate concerns of the Palestinians. It is in the context of such active negotiations between the parties that the United States can be most helpful.

The President has said we will give high priority to moving the Middle East situation toward a settlement. Since we set that course four years ago, we have had some notable successes as well as some temporary setbacks. We see no reason to change course or

diminish our efforts. I can assure you we do not intend to do so. Opportunities for diplomacy still prevail in 1973 Israel needs peace, its neighbors need peace, and the world needs peace. I would hope that we will not look back several years hence and conclude that the present period was another in the tragic catalogue of lost opportunities.

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This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

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AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 12:20 P.M. EDT

MAY 14, 1973

MONDAY

MR. ZIEGLER: We have posted the schedule for this morning.

The President has just presented the Presidential
Citizens Medal to Roberto Clemente, posthumously. Accepting
the medal was Mrs. Clemente. This is the first presentation
of the Presidential Citizens Medal which is awarded to U.S.
citizens who have performed exemplary deeds of service
for their country and fellow citizens. I believe we have
fact sheets on that particular medal.

Also, during the Oval Office ceremony, the President
signed into law H.R. 3841, which provides for the striking
of medals in commemoration of Roberto Clemente. The proceeds
from the public sale of these medals will go to the Roberto
Clemente Memorial Fund in Pittsburgh and in turn toward the con-
struction of a sports complex in Puerto Rico. Funds also will be
used for relief effort in Managua, Nicaragua, for earthquake
victims and we have a fact sheet for you which gives further
details.

There was a photo opportunity on that occasion and
remarks were made by Senator Scott and Senator Schweiker and
Congressmen who were there and we should have a text of those
remarks for you shortly.

At 4:00 today, the President will meet with Governor Nelson Rockefeller to discuss the new National Commission on Third Century America. Governor Rockefeller will be in the press room at 3:30 to brief members of the press on the activities of the Commission. We will provide you a fact sheet on that.

Q Is he the Chairman?

MR. ZIEGLER: Governor Rockefeller will meet
with the President at 4:00. He is the Chairman of the National
Commission on Third Century America. Governor Rockefeller
will be here at 3:30 to discuss the Commission with you
and I believe that Jerry has a fact sheet outlining the
activities of the Commission.

The Commission originally began as a New York State
study and at the President's suggestion in February of 1973,
Governor Rockefeller widened the concept to a national commission
which would be bipartisan and broadly representative of all
Americans. Governor Rockefeller is here today to report that
he is prepared to undertake the project on a national basis
and he will be here to brief on that at 3:30.

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Q: Will that be for sound, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, it will be.

Also, as we previously announced on Tuesday, tomorrow, May 15th, the President will meet with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia at 11:00 a.m. There will be a photo opportunity of that, and the President and Mrs. Nixon will host a black tie dinner in honor of the Emperor tomorrow evening beginning at 8:00

We also have several other announcements this morning.

The President today is announcing his intention to nominate Kenneth B. Keating to be Ambassador to Israel. Ambassador Keating is a former Congressman and Senator from New York and was the United States Ambassador to India from 1969 to 1972. As Ambassador to Israel, he will succeed Ambassador Barbour, who was the Ambassador for nearly 12 years until his retirement from the Foreign Service in February of this year.

Also, the President today is announcing the appointment of three members of the Marine Mammal Commission which was established late last year by the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972. We have given you a release on that which indicates who the three members will be and gives biographical information to you on that.

Also today, the President is appointing Dr. H. Guyford Stever, the Director of the National Science Foundation, as Acting Chairman of the Federal Council for Science and Technology. He will replace Dr. Edward E. David who was Science Advisor to the President until January of this year. We will post information on the Council and Dr. Stever following the briefing.

Then finally, the President today acknowledged the retirement of Robert M. Weston as an Associate Judge of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Judge Weston has held this position since the creation of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia in 1971 and before that was Judge of the D.C. Tax Court. We do not have a successor to announce today, but we will post information on Judge Weston.

The President has been working in his Oval Office this morning, meeting with members of the staff and I believe will spend the afternoon in the Executive Office Building.

Tomorrow at 8:30 in the morning, the President will hold a Bipartisan Leadership Meeting. We will post, after the briefing, those who will attend the Bipartisan Congressional Meeting tomorrow. I believe that is going to be scheduled at 8:30, but we will verify the time for that meeting in the posting of those who will attend.

Q: Pictures, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: I think we will have one, if you would like one.

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STATEMENT OF JOHN SCALI

May 29, 1973

MR. SCALI: I was pleased to have had this
opportunity to discuss with the President a number of
matters currently before the United Nations, including
the forthcoming meetings of the Security Council to review
the Middle Eastern situation.

In his discussion with me today, the President
made clear he is continuing to give high priority to the
situation in the Middle East.

We believe the key to a settlement is the
start of a serious negotiating process, whether direct or
indirect between the parties. In this way practical step
by step progress can be made as soon as possible toward
a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute
based on the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

As you know, the Security Council on June 4th,
or thereabouts, is about to undertake a sweeping review
of the Middle Eastern problem, a review which promises to
be the most searching since the 1967 war.

Our attitude in the Security Council will be
influenced by two main considerations. The principal
parties to the dispute have each accepted the 1967
resolution called 242 as a basis for a settlement.

While we recognize that each side has long held
different interpretations of this resolution, we continue to
feel that it is a fundamental framework whose continued
existence is essential.

Accordingly, we believe that the Council must
avoid any action which would have the effect of altering
its substance and delicate balance.

Equally important, we have noted in this regard
that whenever United Nations bodies seek to reinterpret
Security Council resolution 242 or have suggested procedures
not acceptable to both sides, they have impeded rather than

promoted negotiations between the parties. We believe therefore,
that the Council must avoid any action which would make
more difficult the achievement of a meaningful dialogue
between the parties.

Too many opportunities have already been missed
and no one's interest is served by resort to recriminations
or unworkable procedures. In the coming Security Council
discussion, we will work for a constructive outcome that
will enhance and not impede the prospects for a just and
equitable negotiated agreement between the parties.

We shall be guided by our friendship and esteem
for both sides and the conviction that peace in the area
is essential for both, as it is for the international
community.

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

MAY 29, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE
OF
JOHN SCALI
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS

BRIEFING ROOM

AT 11:11 A.M. EDT

MR. WARREN: Good morning.

Ambassador John Scali met with the President this morning for about 30 minutes to discuss the Middle East. Also in that meeting were Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger.

I thought it would be appropriate to have Ambassador Scali come out and discuss the meeting with you and take your questions.

Mr. Ambassador.

AMBASSADOR SCALI: I was pleased to have had this opportunity to discuss with the President a number of matters currently before the United Nations, including the forthcoming meetings of the Security Council to review the Middle Eastern situation.

We believe the key to a settlement is the start of a serious negotiating process, whether direct or indirect, between the parties. In this way, practical step by step progress can be made as soon as possible toward a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute based on the November 1967 Security Council resolution.

As you know, the Security Council on June 4th, or thereabouts, is about to undertake a sweeping review of the Middle East problem, a review which promises to be the most searching since the 1967 war.

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We believe, therefore, that the Council must avoid
any action which would make more difficult the achievement
of a meaningful dialogue between the parties. Too many
opportunities have already been missed and no one's interest
is served by resort to recriminations or unworkable procedures.

In the coming Security Council discussions, we will
work for a constructive outcome that will enhance and not
impede the prospects for a just and equitable negotiated
agreement between the parties.

Q May we have that statement, a copy of it?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: I am ready to take on some
questions.

Q What are you really saying? Are you saying
the U.S. fears the Security Council may deviate from the
'67 resolution and have we ever abided by the '67 resolution
in terms of withdrawal of Israeli troops and so forth?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: Helen, I think what I have said
is that we continue to believe the continued existence of
Resolution 242, as it is now written, is an essential framework
and take-off point for discussions, direct or indirect,
between the parties and we want to avoid, in this debate,
anything which alters the substance or what we consider to
be the very delicate balance.

Q John, do you have any realistic hope this
year will see either direct or indirect negotiations between
the parties?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: It is difficult to say. Much
will depend upon the temperature of this debate and on
whether it is a constructive discussion or a forum for
exchanging denunciations and insults. We had hoped that
all sides would watch their language very carefully so as
not to inflame the already existing tensions in the region.

Q Do you expect, John, to come forward during
this debate with a United States proposal for a settlement?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: The question is, do I expect
to come forward with a United Nations resolution or suggestion.

This debate was asked for by the Egyptian Government
and we are waiting with considerable interest whatever
action they wish the Council to take. We have no present plans
for introducing any resolution of our own under the present
circumstances.

Q Do you anticipate the Council will make some
effort to change the substance or whatever of the resolution
and if it were to do that, could it do that without United
States approval?

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AMBASSADOR SCALI: It is always possible that one party or the other will seek (a) to reinterpret Resolution 242 of November 1967, and/or perhaps offer a different basis for a settlement.

We are saying that we think the existing resolution which was approved after very painful debate remains the only vehicle that we can see for the time being to which all sides subscribe, even though they continue to interpret it differently.

Q Are you saying you will in fact veto any resolution that is supported by other countries which would alter the meaning of 242?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: I will be prepared to take whatever action is necessary. I do not anticipate that a veto will be necessary. I look forward to a low key instructive discussion.

Q Have the Soviets made their position clear on this, that is, would they favor revision of 242?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: We have not been privy to the Soviet thinking up to this point. There have been many discussions behind the scenes and informally with people who will participate in this debate.

Q What indirect negotiations do you have in mind?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: It has been our long standing policy that we think that the best route to a Middle East settlement is for the parties to begin either indirect or direct negotiations and it basically is up to the parties to decide exactly how they want to do this.

As you know, we have also suggested that perhaps the parties start by an interim settlement which would seek to reopen the Suez Canal as part of an arrangement whereby there would be a pull-back of troops.

We continue to believe the interim settlement offers the best route for a start to a settlement.

Q There were published reports not too long ago, John, I think, in the Israeli papers that the Egyptians had in fact approached the Israelis for talks and the Israelis had rejected this initiative. Do you have any evidence to support that?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: You can find published reports alleging this and alleging the contrary about every other day in the Middle East and I just don't want to focus on any one of them.

Q How would you explain the difficulty, since '68, of getting indirect or direct talks going? It has been a long time.

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AMBASSADOR SCALI: Yes, it has been.

Q John, what basic circumstances --

Q May I repeat the question? To what do you ascribe the difficulty?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: The parties just decline to negotiate with one another. It is as simple as that, even though we have tried our best to act as a mediator and as one who encourages discussion. There is no way we can drag them to the conference table if they are unwilling to come.

Q What basic circumstances would have to exist for the United States to introduce a resolution?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: There are so many --

Q The ones you are keying on that you have in mind when you say we have no present plan for introducing a resolution under the present circumstances.

AMBASSADOR SCALI: There are so many imponderables in this it is really difficult for me to answer the question.

Let me reiterate we have no plans under present circumstances to introduce a resolution, but we are prepared to play a constructive role in this debate.

Q Will this subject come up when Brezhnev is here in June?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: I would rather not answer.

Q What is your reaction and the President's reaction to the Canadian pull out of the ICCS?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: We did not discuss this and I am not an expert in this area, so you will have to forgive me if I do not reply to that.

Q Doesn't this 1967 amendment call for withdrawal of Israeli troops from occupied territories?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: Yes, Helen. Among other things, there has always been a big question of interpretation.

Q Is it our position they should withdraw?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: Helen, there is a history on this debate which goes back to 1967 --

Q I am asking --

AMBASSADOR SCALI: Will you allow me to answer my way?

There is a history of this debate going back to 1967 that includes several million words. One of the key questions has always been, does this resolution demand the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all occupied territory or does it say -- or does it leave this just a little fuzzy. This is the whole heart of the argument.

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Q What is the U.S. view?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: The U.S. view is that both sides should get together and negotiate their varying interpretations of this resolution.

Q Does the Rogers December '69 position still stand that there should be insubstantial alterations of the borders in any peace settlement?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: You will have to forgive me, I really can't get into that at this time.

Q Going back to your opening statement, you used several phrases which suggest, for example, "equitable friendship and esteem for both sides, peace is essential for both sides," which seem to suggest you are stressing an American attitude equally balanced. Is this an attempt to respond to suggestions that the United States has been pro-Israel long enough?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: Did everyone get that question?

Q No.

AMBASSADOR SCALI: The question that was asked was whether the wording of my statement, where I talk about --

Q Both sides.

AMBASSADOR SCALI: Both sides. -- of our friendship for both sides, as to whether this was aimed at offsetting --

Q -- suggestions that the United States has been pro-Israel long enough.

AMBASSADOR SCALI: The statement was very carefully drafted to make it clear that we are seeking to be friends to both sides and that we wish to take both sides' security and other requirements very much into consideration in this debate and any discussions which might be held.

Q The answer is yes?

AMBASSADOR SCALI: The answer is what I just gave you.

That is about it. Thank you very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

(AT 11:31 A.M. EDT)

This Copy For

NEWS CONFERENCE

#1750

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH RON ZIEGLER

AT 10:30 P.M. IST

MAY 30, 1973

WEDNESDAY

(Reykjavik, Iceland)

MR. ZIEGLER: I thought I would give you a little fill. You have the pool report which has already been provided to you.

The meeting which took place, as the pool report points out, at the State Council House, lasted for about 40 minutes and the participants in the meeting are also included in the pool report which you have, so I won't repeat that.

In the meeting the President thanked the leaders of the Icelandic Government for their hospitality in serving as hosts for his meeting with President Pompidou over the next two days.

As you know from the schedule, there are two meetings set for tomorrow: the first one in the morning beginning at 10:00 and in the afternoon, and the final session will be held on Friday morning.

While President Nixon is meeting with President Pompidou, there will be meetings between the Foreign Minister and Secretary of State Rogers and also Secretary Shultz will have meetings with the Finance Minister from France. So there will be those two sessions taking place concurrently while the meetings are taking place between the Presidents. Those two meetings will take place while President Nixon is meeting with President Pompidou.

As I said, in the meeting this evening, the President thanked the members of the government for their hospitality and serving as hosts for the meetings that will be held here. The conversations dealt primarily with United States-European relations and the Atlantic alliance. Also, the Icelandic leaders were interested in the President's observations regarding the upcoming conversations with the Soviet leaders and the recent China initiatives.

Iceland, of course, being a member of NATO, they discussed NATO matters, noting the ongoing East-West negotiations. The President said that this is a very important time for the alliance and expressed his appreciation for Iceland's continuing contribution and role in the alliance.

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Tomorrow morning the meetings begin, as I said, and President Nixon is looking forward to frank, friendly, and constructive talks with President Pompidou and I think you all know that the President has a very high regard for President Pompidou and holds him in very high regard. So the President is looking forward to very successful and productive meetings over the next two days.

I should also say that the President wants to express again our concern, the United States concern and his concern for the well being of the brave people of Westmann Islands. As the pool report earlier points out, the President flew over the area earlier today before he landed and wants to assure his Icelandic hosts the United States will continue to render assistance as needed. I believe the pool report should point out the extent of the assistance that has been provided up to this point.

I should also say that President Nixon wants to and did express satisfaction that our two nations, referring to the United States and Iceland, have close ties not only in the common defense in NATO, but also through the excellent economic trade and cultural relations.

That is about all I have to report.

Q Is there any agenda for tomorrow?

MR. ZIEGLER: No.

Q Did they say anything about (a) the difficulties between Iceland and Britain, referred to as the "cod war" and (b) the forthcoming negotiations of the NATO base?

MR. ZIEGLER: There was discussion of the dispute between Iceland and Britain, but mainly the discussion went to the point of the Icelandic leaders explaining the situation and their position.

We have said before, and the President pointed out en route here, that we are not playing any role of substance in the dispute. We are good friends with both of the countries, they both are NATO allies and we hope the matter can be resolved amicably and as soon as possible.

Q And on the second point, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: On the second point, there was general discussion about the base. I think it is well known that the United States, as I said in my initial remarks, values the role of the NATO allies and the contribution that Iceland makes to that and the base was discussed in general terms, but nothing specific.

Q Did the Icelanders ask the President to do anything, such as use his good offices in the dispute with Britain?

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MR. ZIEGLER: Well, I was not in the meeting, so I can't report to you on the full extent of the discussions, but I am told by those who attended it that the thrust of the discussion went to the outline on the part of the Icelandic leaders of the situation and our point of view was expressed as I gave it to you.

Q You said the President expressed his views en route. Did he re-express them, did he reaffirm those views to the Icelanders?

MR. ZIEGLER: On the subject of the fishing?

Q Yes.

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, I think I said that in my earlier comments to you.

Q When does the lease on the base expire?

MR. ZIEGLER: There is no precise date, as I understand it, that the lease on the base expires. There is no lease on the base as such. It is a NATO facility and there has been some discussion in relation to recent events regarding the base, but it is not a matter of lease expiration. That is why I responded to Mr. Apple earlier that the base itself and its contribution to the NATO alliance was discussed, but that is really the extent of the discussion.

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Q There will be no contact with President Pompidou tonight and can you say whether there is any set agenda tomorrow? How will the talks begin, will it be free-wheeling?

MR. ZIEGLER: There is no specific agenda for the talks. Dr. Kissinger, before he left Washington, I think, gave you a pretty complete rundown as to the subjects that would be covered and the objectives of the talks. I think when the two Presidents, President Nixon and President Pompidou, get together, they really set their own pace as they proceed with the discussions. They don't follow a fixed agenda as such. Of course you know that Secretary Shultz and Giscard d'Estaing will be talking about trade and economic matters. That is a fixed subject for discussion and also the Secretary of State will be covering with the Foreign Minister of France overall East-West relations, bilateral matters and the entire world scene.

Q Will those counterpart meetings be held in the Museum also?

MR. ZIEGLER: Yes, they will be.

Q What will Dr. Kissinger do tomorrow?

MR. ZIEGLER: Dr. Kissinger will very likely sit in a portion of the discussions with President Nixon and President Pompidou. They will determine that tonight.

Q When will you brief us again, Ron?

MR. ZIEGLER: We will try and work that out tomorrow. I don't want to hold a briefing for the sake of holding a briefing. I should add that Andrew will be around and Les Janka will be around to help you with any technical questions you have and Jerry will be available to list the times and participants in the meetings.

There is a three-hour break between the morning meeting and the afternoon meeting and we will be available at some point after the morning meeting to give you a general rundown on the subjects and topics covered. We will do that here. AS to the precise time for that briefing, I don't know yet. We will let you know in the morning.

Q Will you do that here rather than the Museum?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, I'm sorry, we will do it at the Museum.

Q How is the President spending the evening?

MR. ZIEGLER: Let me say, before I firm up where the briefing is, it depends a great deal on when we have time to talk with the participants after the meetings, so Jerry, or Andrew, or Les will fill you in as to where it will be held. We will do that in the morning. It might be better to hold it here if we all return here.

Q Are you expecting a communique or statement tonight?

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