TELECON

Mr. Richardson/Secretary Kissinger

January 26, 1974

9:26

K: Elliot,

R: Hello, Henry. How are you?

K: My incumbency is reaching the ____ imperial phase of Rome.... If you're still free for lunch on Monday I would be happy to have lunch. I thought we mentioned something about it.

R: We did.

K: My staff thought you fit in better on Tuesday but I knew you would be out of town.

R: Fine.

K: I thought it might be nice.

R: I would enjoy it very much.

K: Do you want to come over here at 1:00?

R: Yes. Good. I look forward to seeing you.

K: Good.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12/58
By AB NARA Date 6/9/67

TELECON
Mr. Vest/Secretary Kissinger

January 26, 1974

V: Larry suggested I call you on this blasted list of newsmen you had gone over.

K: But I talked to Larry and told him that I didn't think there was any point in my seeing that group.

V: I know. I thought that and I did a memo in which I put that.

K: But I got it today and that doesn't do my any good. It means I am seeing nobody next week in that line.

V: That's correct. As you said there is no particular value in that lunch.

K: Not in that group but if someone planned on a press group each week I might be able to do something.

V: Well, would you like me to try something.

K: No, that would be impossible it would look too frenzied.

V: Alright.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/01

TELCON

Amb. Dinitz/Secy Kissinger

10:56 a.m., January 28, 1974

D: Hello.

K: Mr. Ambassador

D: Good morning, Mr. Secretary. How are you?

K: Okay. I'm assuming the Cabinet decisions were too awful for you to communicate to me.

D: Not quite so. I waited for the pretext but in any event I have received
_______ which is of two parts. The first part is saying that the
Government of Israel's position about its preparedness to enter with
Syria into negotiation regarding the separation of forces. The second
part restates our position on the prisoners and says that as soon as
we get the list, we will be very happy to enter into negotiation. That
was the best that could have been done. In addition to it, I have a
cable from the Prime Minister to you which I was just deciphering --
that is why I was waiting to call you back -- and this is a message
to Sadat. I can read it to you over the telephone if you like and then
send it to you if you like. I think the gist of it is important because
she says: "Thank you very much for the message. I want you to
know that we are ready to enter into disengagement talks with Syria
at any moment. There is, however, one obstacle that must first
overcome. The Syrian Government should as a minimum hand over
to us the list of our prisoners of war and permit them to be visited
by Red Cross Representatives. I meet often with the parents and
wives of our POWs and find it most difficult to explain not only that
their dear ones continue to be detained but also that their families on
living in uncertainty as to their fate. We hold over 300 Syrian prisoners
of war whose names we transmitted to the International Red Cross
immediately after their capture. The POWs in Israel are, of course,
being visited by Red Cross representatives. We are ready to carry
out an exchange of POWs with Syria."

K: That means, in other words, she will not respond to that Syrian
proposal.

D: What Syrian proposal?

K: That I left there.

D: Oh, the maps you mean?

K: Yeah.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.12158

NARA Date 6/9/74
By AB

*

Amb, Dinitz/Secy Kissinger

2

D: From what I understand, I don't even think the Cabinet -- I mean, the level of the Cabinet even discussed it. But on that I don't know. There was no reference to the Syrian proposal in the cable. But naturally, I mean, responding to Syrian proposal in a positive manner, Mr. Secretary, would --

K: I'm not asking -- I didn't expect you to respond in a positive manner.

D: No, no; I mean, responding to it would be formulating one of our own, Because just saying that is no good, that is --

K: No, no, but in other words, you have not accepted the idea of giving some ideas to me.

D: Right, right. That's exactly what I mean; from the cable. The Prime Minister says -- if I may read a few more lines: Please inform Dr. Kissinger in my name that there are certain things that I really cannot do. This for instance applies to what you suggest (she says to me) in your cable 68 (which means that I said that maybe they could transfer to me proposals to you and delay the arrival of Dayan until we get response from Syrians). Remember what we discussed?

K: Yeah.

D: To this she said that I should tell you that she can't possibly do this. She's sorry she says but she hopes that you will understand that the reason today in which the government is not faced with the renewed demand of the ...... So I mean, --

K: Well, of course, you will have to make the judgment: (a) whether you will get the prisoners back, if there's a total stalemate; and (b) -- Well, let's see you've played roulette several times and won, maybe you can conduct foreign policy that way.

D: Well, I don't really think it is so. Mr. Secretary, really, if we can say for a minute --

K: No, no; I will transmit what you have said. And now we just have to wait what the various responses will be.

D: I had Joe Sisco calling me this morning, Mr. Secretary, and he asked me what was the Cabinet's reaction. ...... I did not refer to the Sadat message at all but I told him only the first part with regard to the government decided that we are ready to talk to the Syrians but reiterated our position on the --

DEC. 14, 1968
 Authority E.O. 1658
By AS NARA Date 6/9/68

*

Amb. Dinitz/Secy Kissinger

3

K: Yeah.

D: So in case he --

K: Well, I don't give a damn what Sisco thinks.

D: No, no, I just thought that I should inform you that he called.

K: Yeah.

D: I have really passed all the exchanges of views between heads.

K: Well, all we can do now is see what happens.

D: We'll wait. In the meantime, they are continuing the shelling there in heavy manner thinking that they could force us into it, which is also bad. You know, because it creates an opposite reaction on this one. You know, they've been shelling heavy ...

K: Mr. Ambassador, you remind me of a man who has won the grand prize in the lottery and is now trying to spend it as fast as you can. You have about two months to wreck the Arab coalition. My judgment hasn't been all that wrong on strategy in the past.

D: No --

K: And I wouldn't give a nickel for all these maneuvers that are now going on, which are good tactics and which may only bring back a much more strategic situation. We've now got the Europeans out of the game; we've got the Russians out of the game. Any hint of stalemate will bring them back into the game prematurely.

D: Mr. Secretary, may I suggest something, I would say that --

K: But maybe there won't be a stalemate, maybe they'll deliver the prisoner list and in that case --

D: Maybe you can suggest to them that they should give it to you and you will hand it to us ... a proposal.

K: But you know damn well I couldn't take that responsibility.

D: Well, at least we know that they are alive. You know, I mean it's -- You know, I'm just thinking aloud without any such ... Maybe they give it to you and then you give us the number. You know, without giving us the list and then we send you proposals for your view -- for your consideration. Then they want Dayan here and then they give the full list. You know, I'm trying to --

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1258
By AB NARA Date 6/9/01

*

Amb. Dinitz/Secy Kissinger

4

K: Well, all I can say is -- You know, I have a message today from the Head of Egyptian Intelligence pointing out the extreme complexity of the situation for them. If there is no progress on anything in Syria by the time the disengagement is completed, --

D: Yeah.

K: But, you know, you know the situation as well as I do.

D: I understand.

K: And it may work.

D: No, what I'm trying to do is say that maybe if there is some move on the part of Syria, we can -- I can influence my government to take a parallel move. But as it is, the position of the Syrian has been so very hard from the very beginning and hasn't bent one inch. And here we are trying --

K: Well, they've bent by making a proposal to Israel, which is more than they've ever done before.

D: But, Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, I mean, their big concession was that they are prepared to let us move. You know, I mean, it's almost like what you said to me that our separation of forces will be that we will advance towards Cairo. So here they made a big concession and say to Israel they are going to behave themselves; we are going to be prepared to let them move towards the Golan Heights.

K: That's a big concession for them to admit to talk to you at all. And the major thing we want from the Syrians is to be able to split -- I mean, one cannot -- Well, you know, you'll just get me mad again. It doesn't make a goddamn bit of difference as long as we can isolate the Syrians eventually.

D: I understand this.

K: And that we cannot do if all hell starts breaking loose again withint the next two months.

D: I understand that.

K: And so whether you withdraw 10 kilometers or 15 kilometers, if it -- once there is a disengagement agreement with the Syrians, they're pregnant. Whether ..... have negotiated with you. Then you can see what you can see what you can get from the Egyptians. And once

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12158
By NARA Date 6/9/1981

*

Amb. Dinitz/Secy Kissinger

5

K: (cont'd) you've done that, you can sit forever. Because the Syrians by themselves can do nothing.

D: I understand. And that is the reason why we want to negotiate with them. It's not that I said to you since it's a unilateral move, we will not negotiate. But I'm saying that this is something that the Syrians should be interested in too. My own logic is that they should be interested in it too. They are not doing it in our favor.

K: The Syrians are above all interested in having a blowup between the Arabs and Israel because they believe basically only with the destruction of Israel can they get what they want.

D: I know.

K: In this respect they are quite different from the Egyptians. And if they could have prevented an Egyptian disengagement, they would have blocked any disengagement. They would rather have you 13 kilometers -- what brings pressure on them is the isolation produced by the Egyptian disengagement agreement.

D: Yeah.

K: And, therefore, what they will try heaven and earth to bring about is force the Egyptians to line up with them again.

D: That is correct.

K: And, therefore, to the extent that you give Sadat an alibi that negotiations are going on already, you are making it harder for them to do it. To the extent that there are no negotiations, sooner or later Sadat will have to support them.

D: I understand this. What I am saying, Mr. Secretary, this is precisely why we want to negotiate with them. But all what I am saying is that they too have some stake in addition to the things you said, which are absolutely correct. And they must debate to you and ............

K: Well, there are two things that are going to be different. One is I'm not going to come out to the Middle East. Secondly, Asad is not Sadat. But, look, I've made my points. I can't be --

D: Mr. Secretary, I've made it as eloquently as I could.

K: And, you know, we'll just have to see what happens now.

D: Yeah. Maybe they will reconsider and have some sort of a first move.

K: I doubt it seriously. But I may be wrong.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.1255
By NARA Date 6/9/77

*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
The President
1/28/74; 11:23 a.m.

P: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

P: Hi, Henry. Anything new today?

K: Yes, Mr. President. I was just going to call you. We have had word from Sadat that the oil embargo will be lifted in a way that you can announce it in your State of the Union Address. And we have had word from Jidda which is a little less -- can I have those cables, which is a little less precise but still precise enough to enable you to make a statement in which Faisal says he doesn't want his name mentioned but you can say you have been in touch with senior Arab leaders who are now in the process of engaging in the lifting of the embargo and let's see, let me get what he . . . You can say that you have been in direct contact with important Arab leaders who have called an urgent meeting of the Arabs to arrange the lifting of the oil boycott and that you have every reason to believe that this action will be taken in the very near future. That is a direct quote from Faisal that you are authorized to say.

P: That's a little bit . . .

K: No, we can jazz it up a little bit more.

P: Maybe jazz it up a bit.

K: It is a clear statement that the embargo will be lifted and. . . .

P: I think the way you might ______ of it Henry, would be in terms of saying that I have been in touch with leaders -- Arab leaders -- and I can tell the Congress that I have every reason to believe, that I have . . .

K: That you have been assured.

P: That I have received assurances that the embargo will in the very near future be lifted.

K: After certain legal formalities.

P: After certain formalities will in the very near future be lifted.

K: Right.

P: This means there will be no rationing. Work out some language like that, if you would, Henry.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1958
Authority
By AL NARA Date 6/9/67

-2-

to

K: Right, Mr. President. We have/add a paragraph or so on the Middle East which has to go with it.

P: Oh, I see.

K: If that fits into the scheme of your speech.

P: Well, we are going to say something on the Middle East but I think what you mean. You mean about developments and what we are pumping to do or . . .

K: That's right. It's basically *innocuous* innocuous but it is sacramental language.

P: Uh-huh.

K: You know 242 and . . .

P: Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, we could even more it. We could put that paragraph in another section if we didn't want to put it right there. But we will.

K: That's where the Arabs would want it.

P: Yeah. We could just type the darn thing up in the briefest possible form, you know, and the most -- you know -- striking form.

K: Right. You will have it this afternoon, Mr. President.

P: That's plenty of time. plenty soon. Or tomorrow morning.

K: You will have it late this afternoon.

P: Fine, Henry, you have plenty of time to get something in. But as I said, what we say about 242 and the rest, make it brief.

K: Oh, very brief. The less the better from my point of view.

P: I know. But we have to say it because their . . .

K: And it's . . .

P: Right.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 1958
Authority
By AB NARA Date 6/9/1958

*

-3-

P: Anything else on your front?

K: No, otherwise things are . . .

P: You went up to New York over the weekend?

K: That's right I went up Saturday afternoon.

P: Was it restful?

K: It was very pleasant.

P: You didn't have to do a lot of work?

K: I saw Waldheim . . .

P: Oh!

K: The choice between seeing him up there or having him come down here and I thought he would be easier to get rid of up there.

P: [Laughter] Down here you would have to have him for dinner.

K: That's right.

P: Very good. Very good.

K: I don't know whether Haig had a chance to mention it to you -- the Russians wanted me to meet them in Geneva about the Middle East -- Gromyko did, and I have no interest in that. I proposed if he wanted to come here.

P: Then we'll see him he's coming here.

K: A week from today.

P: Sure. Fine.

K: I think you should see him.

P: Sure. By all means. By all means. Yes. He'll be coming here from Cuba.

K: That's right, which I think is a nice ticket . . .

DECLASSIFIED
F.O. 12. 58
Authority

NARA Date 6/2/74

By

*

-4-

P: Yeah. Sure. Yeah, I told them that's fine.

K: And the only other person I know . . .

P: The King of Jordan, yes, I'll see him.

K: Okay.

P: But this time I don't think I should give him a dinner, you know.

K: I'll be glad to give him the dinner.

P: Only because of the fact that I haven't given Mrs. Meir a dinner. You know what I mean? This time I should just see him and somebody else could give him the dinner.

K: I could easily give him the dinner.

P: Or let Ford give him the dinner.

K: That's even better. Let Ford give him the dinner.

P: Let Ford give the dinner.

K: I think that's excellent.

P: But I will be glad to see him, Henry. Good work.

K: Good, Mr. President.

P: And the King of Italy -- I mean the President of Italy a little later, if you don't mind.

K: No, no, no, that's in March sometime.

P: Yeah, Yeah. Let's hold that off.

K: Absolutely. Oh, no, that's in March.

P: All right, fine.

K: Right, Mr. President. I will have this worked out.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12/58
Authority
By AB
NARA Date 6/9/61

TELCORN
Secretary Kissinger - Senator Stennis

January 28, 1974

2:45 p.m.

K: Mr. Chairman, How are you?

S: I'm just fine how are you?

K: Just fine

S: I just want to take one minute of your time to see what you
feel on the Kissinger-Moore r matter.

K: Fine, but I hate to have it called the Kissinger-Moorer matter.
It's not.....

S: Excuse me I just used it for ... to identify it. The newspapers
have played it up that way, I suppose. We;ll have to talk to the
Committee members about it more formally and I thought I ought
to talk to you to see if you had any different situation on your
mind. It may come up tomorrow at the Foreign Relations
Committee. By the way I think Senator Fulbright, ...well, he
doesn't think much of these allegations and all. But as a practical
question about approaching this, I don't know whether the armed
services committee...

K: Mr. Chairman, let me tell you my own personal view, just
between you and me, looking at it from my own point of view I think
the lousy thing is ... it was a lousy thing to have done but I don't
think it warrants undermining the confidence in the military.
That's my attitude, it has been my attitude all along. It shouldn't
have been done, it shouldn't have been tolerated but I don't believe
it was a 7 Days in May thing. I think it was sort of a cheap move
to make a few points. I believe Moorer when he says he didn't
focus on it. He had a lot of other things to do and given my relations
with Moorer, he didn't need to do it....

S: But the practical thing is what are we going to do with it?

K: I have never seen the report David Young wrote. I don't
know what the allegations are.

S: I haven't seen it either. I heard they had a report of it at
the Pentagan too.

K: I haven't seen that either.

S: Well, I don't want to get into this plumbers group on this. I
don't have any confidence in them.

*

*

2.

K: My personal judgment without having read the Young report.... Young was on my staff and he did not inspire me...

S: Didn't what?

K: He did not inspire me with confidence that what he did do would be very serious or balanced. I would never have imagined he would be given a responsible assignment like investigating the military. As I have said publicly, I don't know about his investigations. That doesn't change the fact that he was doing it, or apparently, according to Krogh, was developing some damaging information. I mean, here was a kid who was not doing very well working for me, thrown into the Erlichman atmosphere. He may just have tried to prove how good he was.

S: I don't know if we have to go through all of that. They can make anything appear to be true almost.

K: That's the trouble. There's nobody I would rather have investiaged this than you, Mr. Chairman.

S: Well, if we don't take some, if we don't do something. What do you think of this? I would ask you and Admiral Moorer to each, separately write me a letter undertaking to tell how you feel about this matter, say anything you want to. It might just be that it would settle it, or two, we might be able to settle it by asking the two of you to come before the Committee and subject yourselves to questions.

K: Yes, the only problem, Mr. Chairman, is that my own direct knowledge of this matter is extremely limited. It really is confined to listening to 12-15 minutes of a taped interrogation of Admiral Wellander. I would be glad to say that and what I know.

S: I am thinking of the ... of your saying you have no grievance, what you just said to me.

K: I would be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.

S: It might just be that our Committee would be convinced that you and Moorer worked together, had no grievance against one another officially or personally and he was getting information anyway, then so far as you and Moorer were concerned it might satisfy the Committee although whether we should insist on the military proceeding with reference to the yeoman, etc....

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.1558
Authority
By AB NARA Date 6/9/67

*

3.

K: That would be up to you. I have never felt any purpose would be served by digging up the matter now in a period when every other national institution is being questioned.

S: In keeping with what you told me in the beginning, we have got to move in some way.

K: I will be glad to write you a letter stating what I know, and stating whatever it was could not be based on personal animosity, that we worked closely together, it strikes me as a bureaucratic gamesmanship, and it would not affect the confidential relations between Moorer and me. We have worked closely together.

S: I think that would be splendid. It might just satisfy the membership. If not, if somebody insisted on the right to ask question, you could come over and we could ask the questions. I called you first. I think I'll call Moorer now.

K: You are free to tell him about our conversation, tell him what I propose to say in my letter...

S: We are not cooking up anything here that would be final.

K: I understand.

S: We have to take it step by step.

K: Of course.

S: Is the Foreign Relations open or not tomorrow?

K: Executive session. I thought I would ... the allegations, say I wasn't content with them and take the initiative and say what I know. I don't know if that would be appropriate. In your judgment.... said you

S: Well you know the New York Times can falsify one thing with another. I've seen what Percy asked you, I believe it was Percy.

K: He asked if I knew about burglaries or other illegalities. I answered in that connection.

S: I saw ... he showed me the question and answers. I think I would cover that by my own volition. I think Fulbright would welcome it. About the letter...

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By NARA Date 6/9/61

TELCOM
Kubisch/Sec. Kissinger
Monday, January 28, 1974
3:03 p.m.

K: Jack, I just found out from Larry that he has already
talked to you about doing it all in one day.

JK: Right.

K: Don't you think that the best?

JK: Sure. It will be a very hard day for you but we can
talk it out.

K: The hard part is riding in the plane with so many ARA
people.

JK: You said you would be prepared to leave at 8:00 in the
morning.

K: Yes, and they can still give the lunch.

JK: You get there at 12:30 and you stay there until 4:10.

K: I am willing to stay until 6:00.

JK: It is a five hour and 20 minutes trip down with one hour
time change.

K: Five hour trip down?

JK: Five hours and 20 minutes each way; block to block --
Andrews to Panama.

K: That happy news you never gave me.

JK: I did not know that myself.

K: Even so, if we leave at 5:00.

JK: If you leave at 5:00 it puts you in here at 11:20.

K: So what. Even 6:00 is all right with me.

JK: I think, actually, three or four hours there is adequate.

K: As long as we do it we should do it gracefully.

DELEGATED
Authority F.O.VESS
By AB NARA Date 6/9/74

Kubisch

Jan. 28, 1974

JK: They have agreed on Saturday from Thursday. No problem.

K: Do you think we should stick with the original 7-8 schedule.

JK: Up to you, Mr. Secretary. This one will work out all right. It just becomes an arduous day for you. If you go down the night before you get a good night's sleep and a shorter day. You can work going down and back on the plane.

K: And I can take a nap on the plane coming back.

JK: Right. I won't be going down with you. I will be meeting you there.

K: Can you be back by Thursday.

JK: Yes. I was going to meet you in Panama on Thursday night and spend time talking with you coming back.

K: Let's keep it open and I will see you at 5:00. We will decide it then.

END

DELEGATION OF THE
Authority E.O.1558
By AB NARA Date 6/9/61

*

TELECON

Secretary Kissinger/Dan Rather

January 28, 1974, 5:30 p.m.

R: Well, the difficulty is that Marvin is off for a while, and Walter is insisting that we do a piece tonight on the Conference.

K: Which conference?

R: The oil-producing countries.

K: Consuming.

R: Oil-consuming -- with, hopefully, one on the producers later. He seems to feel -- on what he bases this, I'm not certain -- that the conference is as good as dead.

K: Absolutely not.

R: Well, because it's so important, I need some guidance.

K: We have -- The meeting is scheduled for the 11th. We are working on a program for it which I think is really shaping into... For your information, Heath is sending his Cabinet Secretary over here to coordinate their position with ours. The only problem now is France -- they're going to be isolated.

R: Would that include the Belgians?

K: The Belgians will certainly come. It's a technical problem because they haven't got a Cabinet. But there is no doubt whatever that the Conference will take place. They're all sending senior delegations. The British are sending Lord Carrington and Lord Hume. Everyone is sending their Foreign Minister. I haven't seen any of the papers of the other countries. We are making a major effort in coming up with some challenging approaches.

R: No danger that the Japanese will buckle?

K: They're sending Ohiro over here.

R: Yamani had this news conference.

K: That XXXX I can't tell. I cannot imagine

R: But he did say if the purpose of the conference is to get a united front for pressure, then our ______ would be very negative.

By AB NARA Date 6/9/87

K: Realistically -- We are not advertising it as a united front for pressure. We want a united front for analyzing the problem -- such as consumer restraints, research and development -- that's not pressure. It's a common problem all industrialized nations have. This

R: This is the first in a series of steps to put something together.

K: Right.

R: That's very helpful to me.

K: You'd be way off base saying ______. I don't know whether the Japanese -- we have heard no word at all. Have you?

R: Quite the contrary. There's every indication - they're concerned about things and have every intention of coming. WOPEFMIYXX They're hopeful it may lead to something.

K: Right.

R: I appreciate your taking the call, and I appreciate your help.

K: Not at all.

END

DECORATED BY
Authority F.O.VESS
By AB NARA Date 6/9/67

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/General Scowcroft

January 28, 1974, 7:05 p.m.

S: I'm looking at the papers themselves.

K: 6 of September 1972?

S: That's right.

K: On the classification project?

S: That's right.

K: XXXXX Was that in 1972?

S: It's still going on. As a matter of fact, it's still going on.

K: Well, that's even better. So I had every reason to believe that during that whole period he was working on declassification.

S: Oh, sure. In fact, the memos you were getting from him...

K: But not until then.

S: There was a lot of work to be done before they got out.

K: When is the first memo of a meeting?

S: The first minutes I have here are in September of 1972, but I know there are some before that. There have to be. But they're the first ones I have. I'll find out where the other ones are because there have to be some before that. There were two press concerences -- one in March, one in May of '72.

K: O.K. Thank you.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.12158
By: NARA Date 6/9/74

TELECON
The President/Secretary Kissinger

January 28, 1974, 7:10 p.m.

N: Hello.

K: Mr. President.

N: Henry, how are you. I was wondering if you got that document up yet.

K: I sent it up a couple of hours ago. It may be caught in the system, Mr. President. It's just one paragraph, but all the information in it is requested by the Saudis.

N: What we want to do is to get the damned embargo lifted, and we want to say the things that will not be put out -- you know the point -- to make it appear like a helluva foreign policy achievement of this Administration. If you hadn't worked out the Israeli-Egyptian thing, we wouldn't be here.

K: That's absolutely true. I don't mean

N: When they start that crap, I say except for Henry Kissinger we wouldn't even have a chance to have the embargo lifted.

K: It wasn't that. It was what we did for four years.

N: You're good to say that.

K: No, but it's true.

N: Thank God you had the guts to stand up and do the right thing. If I can announce it in a subtle way -- what do you think I should say?

K: You should read what I gave you, but you certainly can add a paragraph of your own. Incidentally, in foreign policy, it's the credibility.

N: But the main thing I should say is that as a result of the conversations we have had in the last 48 hours, etc., etc., that the embargo will be lifted.

K: That you can say.

N: Secondly, I will say, as a result, I can now announce with full confidence to the American people there will be no rationing.

DELEGATION
Authority E.O. VASS
By AS NARA Date 6/9/74

*

-2-

K: That you can also say.

N: That will be the good news of this speech -- just that --
that's all we need.

K: What you cannot say is about production restriction will
also be lifted -- but the public won't understand that, so
there's no point.

N: You and I know it took four years to do it. Where
are you now?

K: I'm in my office.

N: My God -- it's so late.

K: It's only 7 o'clock.

N: No, it's longer than that.

K: No, it's 7:15.

N: State Department or White House?

K: State Department. I was in the White House in the
morning. What I usually do is spend the mornings at the
White House and the afternoons at the State Department.

N: We've taken care of all your needs now? Let's see.
We've taken care of Gromyko. We've taken care of the Italian -
in March. Nobody else you have to worry about at the moment?

K: No, Mr. President.

N: Thank God. I was just thinking -- when I talked to my
old friend Bill, I'd have to go into great ______, but with
you we all know what the game is -- you do what's necessary.
No more.

K: Exactly, Mr. President.

N: These are necessary.

K: These are necessary.

N: Fine. I'll do them. Incidentally, if dinners are
necessary, I'll do them, but I prefer for you to have them.

K: I don't think that's necessary.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1958
By NARA Date 6/9/07

TELCOM
The President/Secretary Kissinger

January 29, 1974

1:25 p.m.

N: How did you get along up there.

K: Very well.

N: Foreign Relations Committee.

K: Right.

N: I was talking to Brent Scowcroft -- you are back at the State Department?

K: That's right.

N: Because of the length of the thing, I have to boil down the section on the embargo. He is working on it but I would appreciate your help. I'll make all the points but I want to cut it as much as I can.

K: Right. I have it in front of me, Mr. President.

N: I don't have it in front of me. It is over with Price. I'll make any commitments that we need. But I don't want to put too much there. It is not only the length of it but the rhythm of the section. I move from that to the (part) on energy. If I have too many words it will destroy the thing.

K: I am looking through it. There are a few key phrases that have to stay in, like "this is only the first step" -- "the agreement on disengagement"...

N: On the disengagement -- we are talking about two different subjects. I know they are interlocking.

K: I see about three sentences...

N: What I am getting at is -- the embargo is what I am talking about. I know the disengagement is locked to it but without the disengagement you could not have the embargo lifted. But I want to make it clear we support the disengagement and support the disengagement and support the additional steps for permanent peace. Boil it down as much as you can, will you, please.

K: Absolutely.

N: Send it to me and I will take another look at it.

K: I will get it to you by 3:00.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1958
By NARA Date 6/9/87

The President

January 29

N: Good. Is everything else all right?

K: It went beautifully.

N: (Not clear)

K: You run the risk -- this is what the Saudi Arabians authorized. Kuwait may start climbing the wall but then we just have to crack them but Saudi Arabia authorized it. The text we have given you has been cleared in fact suggested by Saudi Arabia and has...

N: In the speech...

K: And has been approved by Sadat. It would be a hell of a risk for them if they disavowed you.

N: O.K. Fine. Thank you Henry.

K: I would take the chance.

END.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By NARA Date 6/9/01

TELCOM
Secretary Kissinger - Amb. Dobrynin

January 29, 1974

3:50 p.m.

FRE

K: It's a new wiretap device that translates immediately into English.

D: That's why you are in trouble. You can voluntarily.....

K: What do you want?

D: Eiyou call me just now.

K: Why should I call the Russian Ambassador?

D: Well anyway I will take the opportunity to make two points. First, you remember I mentioned to you about Congress. I received from Moscow today and invitation from our government to discuss in the future (at least in the next year or two), to be in communication with Congress, to send a delegation in general for discussions, a committee with Albert, Carl Albert, for instance, in this connection.

K: Very good. I will strongly support it.

D: I am going to visit them tomorrow but I heard from Moscow that I have to advise you about doing this. Second. Gromyko will be here on Sunday evening. He will leave on Tuesday. In any case all negotiations, discussions will go on on Monday.

K: That's right. You want to have dinner on Monday night?

D: I think that is a good idea, Henry. If you will organize it.

K: Do you want me to get a date for him.

D: That depends what kind. He is rather sophisticated man now you know.

K: How about Meg Osmer?

D: After Cuba she should be something special.

K: Well a blonde... they won't give him a blonde down there.

D: You're probably right. Monday night.

K: And I'll give you the time for the President.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E012958
By: MW Kita, Spc. 003701

TELECON

Senator Mansfield/Secretary Kissinger

January 29, 1974

4:09 pm

K: How are you?

M: Fine. Good job this morning.

K: Thank you.

M: Secondly, are you going to bring up Marshall Wright with you tomorrow to the luncheon?

K: It is up to you.

M: That's fine. Do you want to bring Lord?

K: It is entirely up to you.

M: It is up to you, if you want him.

K: What are we going to discuss?

M: Anything. It is going to be on the Middle East and other wide-ranging issues.

K: Why don't I just bring Marshall Wright then.

M: OK. Next thing, will you contact the Chinese at your convenience and flint out what their problems are?

K: I think they are having domestic problems again. I think the imminence of your arrival causes that.

M: (Laughter) That is very likely.

K: I will do it today.

M: We'll see you up here tomorrow at 12:30 in my office, in the leadership office in the Senate.

K: I look forward to it.

M: We're delighted to have you

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1958
By NARA Date 6/9/01

TELCOM
Otis Chandler - Secretary Kissinger

January 29, 1974

4:15 p.m.

K: Otis, how are you.

C: Fine, how are you?

K: OK.

C: Have you recovered a little bit.

K: Oh, yes, I'm in good shape.

C: Are you going to have any time to go to Acapulco.

K: That's what keeps me going, that possibility.

C: The reason I'm troubling you, I'll only take a minute of your time because I know how busy you must be, I'm calling for Mother. She has written to you about speaking to about 500 ladies at the music center here on the west coast. I thought now that things have calmed down a little bit you might be able to look ahead to February or April and give her some idea when you would be able to come out.

K: Let me review my calendar and get back to you by the end of the week.

C: Fine. How are things otherwise?

K: Well I'm getting back into the time zone. Things are going along, though. I think we're getting something started with Australia, I mean Syria.

C: Henry, you are the one bright spot in the newspaper every day. The rest of the news is not very good, but...

K: Otis you have been a very good friend, at all times.

C: Henry, anything you want, I'll be here.

K: What you said, I won't forget what you said when you made the toast at the dinner for the Chinese.

G: When are you going to come out to see us and have a little fun?

K: You guys have made it impossible for the President to go to San Clemente. Think of me when you write those things.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1258
By: NARA Date 6/9/01

TELCONE

Mr. Sonnenfeldt - Secretary Kissinger

January 29, 1974

5:05 p.m.

K: considering French forces, are they outside of that?

S: They are outside.

K: Then when we say they have got to be reduced by 700,000...

S: Oh, I thought you were talking about SALT. The French are outside of that.

K: 50,000 Frenchmen we claim as a bonus for ourselves. That's absurd.

S: That's in deference to the French.

K: I'm surprised the Soviets haven't raised that yet.

S: They haven't talked common ceiling at all.

K: We would give them a 50,000 bonus?

S: I don't know the result of that.

TELECON

General Scowcroft/Secretary Kissinger

January 20, 1974

8:40 PM

S: Yes sir.

K: Have you checked your files whether there's anything,-- whether
you've any minutes from Latina of earlier meetings?

S: No, I haven't found any yet in my files. There may be some in the
general files. I'm sure the meetings went on and on throughout this
whole period.

K: See if you can find some of the earlier ones.

S: Is first thing in the morning all right?

K: I've got to have it first thing in the morning.

S: I understand when you want it.

END

DECEMBER 11, 1974

Authority E.O. 1958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/74

TELCONE
Gen. Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

Wednesday, January 30, 1974

9:35 a.m.

K: Have you seen the cable from Saudi Arabia?

S: Yes.

K: I don't think we should put anything in there that makes
the President look silly.

S: You mean about assurances.

K: Yes. I don't know.

S: My inclination was to leave it the way we had it and if
the assurances proved not accurate that gives us even more
reason for sitting on our hands with respect to the Arabs.

K: No. No. But just a minute, we now have a letter. This
was fine yesterday -- that was my view yesterday. I think
it a revolting performance. If I was the President I would
tell the Arabs to shove their oil and tell the Congress we
will have rationing rather than submit and you would get the
embargo lifted in three days but I am not President until this
GD constitutional amendment.

S: Laughter.

K: As long as they are at it (anything ) against being emperor?

S: Not as long as I can be your grand vizer.

K: I would take the language the Saudi gave me.

S: The only trouble is in doesn't that make the President
look silly by saying anything?

K: I would not say anything if I were him. My problem is
if the Saudis get the word out that they urged us not to do it.
We cannot claim that they tricked us if we go beyond what they
authorized us to say. And then the President will be blamed for
playing cheap politics which God forbid he would not do. My
strong view is to put it in the language that they gave us.

S: O.K.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.1988
Authority
By AB NARA Date 6/9/87

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Larry Eagleburger
1/30/74; 9:45 a.m.

K: Larry.

E: Yes, sir.

K: Make sure that what I told Campbell to send out on that Syrian message of last night gets impounded.

E: It has been. I checked this morning.

K: The outgoing as well as the incoming?

E: Both of them, yes, sir. They are both locked up.

K: Okay. And I don't want Pickering to panhandle it around the building.

E: He hasn't even got a copy himself. They are all in the safe.

K: Okay. And I am now going to create a committee of Scowcroft, you and Campbell to make my schedule. What is being done now is inhuman. Why you all had to schedule four meetings at Congress this week -- what it is about the Ways and Means Committee that couldn't wait until next week, no one will ever be able to explain to me. Why I have to go up to the Hill twice a day every day. I have the Panama Statement, the Latin American thing, and then I have not one hour to read one operational cable. I don't know what it means to be Secretary of State under these conditions.

E: Okay, sir, we will...

K: I am not in control of any Goddamn thing. I don't know what one operational thing that is going on in these days!

E: Okay, Sir. I will meet you on the Hill.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1255
By NARA Date 6/9/74

*

Telcon
Secretary Kissinger
Art Hummel
1/30/74; 9:50 a.m.

K: Hello.

H: Good morning, sir.

K: Could you find out from the Japanese Ambassador who of course is
______ national characteristic of not being able to tell a lie what this
story is about of their deal with the Saudis?

H: All right, sir, I will try.

K: What do you think? There must be something to it.

H: I honestly don't know sir. They have -- uh, I'll have to look in to it.
While I have you on about the Japanese, you know that you promised Yasukawa (?)
to get back to him and the time is long past, with whether or not we would
refuse to sign a bilateral if there is no trilateral. Do you remember this
query? Ken Rush is going to see Yasukawa but doesn't have an answer on
that point and there is no point in Ken Rush seeing him unless we can pin
that down.

K: As I understand it the Japanese are threatening us to go ahead in bilateral
talks.

H: No sir, they want to know whether we will hold firm and if so, how firm
on insisting on a trilateral.

K: We will insist on a trilateral.

H: Will we refuse to sign a bilateral? That was Yasukawa's question to you.

K: Well, frankly, I haven't gotten a clear answer from the President yet.

H: Yes.

K: We will certainly go very far in pressing for a trilateral and I've said
so publicly.

H: Yes. All right. Go very far.

K: Just tell him, you know, that issue hasn't been raised yet but we have
raise them in the closest context with each other.

H: Yasukawa's going to be disappointed. There isn't a clear-cut answer
to that clear question.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. LASS
Authority
By AB
NARA Date 6/9/74

*

- 2 -

K: What do you think?

H: I don't honestly think we ought to promise to refuse to sign other things under such circumstances but I don't know how to formulate the reply to the Japanese.

K: Well, can you see whether we can formulate a very tough reply. I mean that we will go very far but stop just short of saying that we won't refuse. We will refuse?

very

H: Yes. All right, sir. We will go/far but we cannot say at this time whether we would.

K: Because we don't think that issue -- we hope this issue will not arise.

H: Yes.

K: Okay.

H: All right, sir.

K: Good.

H: And I'll get back to you about the Saudis.

K: Right.

H: Bye.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.1258
By NARA Date 6/9/01

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Mr. Simon

10:15 a.m. 1/30/74

K: Hello

S: Hi, I had breakfast with Walter Levy this morning and he thinks it is extremely important that he have a brief meeting with you if you can fit it in. He is extraordinarily concerned and his contacts with ______ people and maybe he can shed some light.

K: Okay good.

S: He is over in Grendon (?) Groves office in the State Department right now.

K: Right, I will be tied up for a couple of hours and I will try to fit him in.

S: Super, I'll have him call your secretary.

K: Good.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12158
Authority
By: A3 NARA Date 6/9/74

*

TELCONE

Secretary Kissinger/Mr. Simon

12:13 p.m. 1/30/74

S: Henry, I am sorry to bother you--we have a major problem and that is the meeting with the Canadians tomorrow. Trudeau as you know offered a treaty and sent it to President Nixon which was a rather thing to do--the present strategy in the State Department is to waffle that and say we are looking at that proposal and so on--I would propose we say this is great--let us proceed, let us do it--if it breaks down later, that's something else--but let's make the first step as far as the treaty on the McKinsey Valley Pipeline is concerned and I think this is what our relations have needed for a long time--But I'm no expert in the foreign policy area.

K: Let me get back to you by the end of the day.

S: That would be super because I'm meeting with Minister McDonald privately this evening and if I could wisper that in his ear tonight before the meeting tomorrow, we could really set the tone and really have a successful meeting tomorrow. He is an antagonistic bastard

K: Okay, let me see what I can do.

S: Super.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/74

TELCONE

Secretary Kissinger/George Vest

12:13 p.m. 1/30/74

V: George Vest here.

K: George, two things. We just have to connect everyday. I can't let you brief without my knowing what you are briefing on. That just cannot be.

V: Right. Right.

K: I'm not secure enough that way. Secondly, would you call the London Times Correspondent here and say I just read that Saltzburg article and they should know that the first time I changed my itinerary to stop in London at the specific request of Home while fear of meeting him at the airport hadn't even crossed my mind

V: Hm huh.

K: And the second time, I also changed my itinerary--though I took the initiative, but given the fact that I deprived myself of any sleep at night to do it, and I think it is goddamned ungracious of them.

V: Right.
Did you notice the Alsop story this morning, sir also--in the Post.

K: What did he say?

V: There is a complete misnomer in there--he deals with instance around the fact that there were to have been four--an announcement our of four capitals including Moscow saying that your party had originally given out that story and in the end Moscow declined to issue the announcement

K: Call him up and tell him it is a total lie.

V: Right I will do that

K: And can you call Sisco and tell him I am outraged at the Gwertzman story on the oil embargo--

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F.O.1058
NARA Date 6/9/74

TELECON
George Vest/Secretary Kissinger

January 30, 1974

8:05 PM

K: Did you get to the London Times today?

V: I got to the London Times, one of their minor columnists. I explained the full background to make sure they were aware of the circumstances of your arrival under which you were coming to London. Fred Emery assured me he would do so. I got to Joe Alsop and explained the background of that particular information. He said thanks very much and that was that. I passed on your comment to Joe Sisco. However, in looking at the story - it was a story that was being carried in a number of other places as well - but that one had a high State Department source. The story itself was widely carried. If a may, may I see you before or after your Rabassa visit tomorrow.

K: I want to see you before you brief. Look, I've got to get going.

V: Yes sir.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1958
By NARA Date 6/9/67

January 30, 1974, 10:03 p.m.

K: Mr. President, this was a great and courageous speech.

N: Well, it's nice of you to call. I looked at you a couple of times, and I gave Dobrynin a couple of looks, too.

K: I think it was very moving, Mr. President.

N: I thought it was necessary to add that little - the five minutes at the end. Otherwise they would have said I ignored the damned thing.

K: It was good that you did not include it in the formal text. In the formal text you laid out an agenda.

N: If I had ignored it completely, they would have said you were afraid to.

K: I wondered about how it would be handled.

N: Not in the formal speech at all, you know.

K: It was tremendous and moving.

N: We hope it helps, Henry. I coppered down that Arab part. The coercion bit bothers me, but Al said you thought it was important. It's a shot across the bow. We gotta let them know we don't have to have them.

K: You'll get more credit for having said it. Everyone understood what you were saying.

N: You notice how I did the Soviet part. I rewrote it. That military part - I struck it all out __________ -- strength for the sake of strength.

K: That came out extremely well. It was very, very powerful. I think you got out of the energy thing what you need. We got a message from the Saudis this morning in which they asked us to tone down what you said ______ stuck to the original.

N: I understand. This way we get two bites at the apple. Well, Henry, keep the faith.

K: No question about it.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1958
By AB NARA Date 6/9/01

*

TELECON

January 30, 1974

10:15 PM

S: Hello.

K: Brent.

S: Yes sir.

K: Do you have the line to the Soviet Ambassador switched off in my office.

S: Just a second. Apparently we do. You want him back on. I guess it's ringing over there and someone told the secretaries to switch it off.

K: It was shorting. The light would come on but nobody would be on it. It could be he was trying to call me.

S: Apparently it was ringing over there. It has been continually shorting as you know.

K: Yes.

S: You want it back on?

K: No. I just wanted to make sure I'm not missing a call from Dobrynin.

S: Of course, it's ringing back here, we can't turn it off.

K: What did you think of his speech.

S: I thought it was good.

K: I hoped he would get off foreign policy. He's going to invite an attack.

S: It was a very spirited delivery. He did well. I don't know how you got him to put in the particulars on the embargo.

K: You think it was all right?

S: I do, don't you?

K: Oh, yes. He's worried about it, said it made him nervous.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12158
By: NARA Date 6/9/1974

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Ambassador Dinitz

January 30, 1974, 10:33 p.m.

D: I have just seen you at the Joint Session of Congress.

K: How did you like my speech?

D: I thought it was good, especially the part you wrote.
I think he could have done without the last part.

K: ________ caused me about not listening to coercion.

D: No, Mr. Secretary, I was driving back from Congress
with Vivian -- and I told her the sentence about we won't
be coerced was put there by the Secretary.

K: Put by the Secretary is no expression. It did took me a
week until 3:00 this afternoon. Mr. Ambassador, I have
been in close touch with the Egyptians about your obstinacy.

D: That's not the right

K: You people believe in the continued possibility of miracles.

D: No.

K: Let's not argue now. If the Egyptians produce for you
the number of prisoners -- not the names, but the number --
would you then be willing to make some sort of proposal and
with the understanding that when the negotiations start you
get the list and the Red Cross?

D: Some proposition to you?

K: Which we would then pass on through the Egyptians to the
Syrians.

D: Of course, I will pass it to Israel, but I would tell you
what I would suggest as a matter that would be acceptable, I
think. If we can say, as I am trying for the last two days
to sell my Government, and I did not succeed

K: I don't want to argue. I'm just filled with despair as a
friend and admirer of Israel.

D: Mr. Secretary, I will tell you what I have in mind, but
the important thing is what I was trying to get Israel to do --
that they would authorize me to tell you that we are prepared to

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. VESS
Authority
By AB NARA Date 6/9/67

*

-2-

bring Dayan here - that you are authorized to inform the
Syrians that Dayan would be coming with EXEM a complete
proposal and talk with you. Once you give him the list,
they should give you -- because Dayan is coming to receive
the list. That is what my suggestion is. Which was not
acceptable. I don't think it's games, but

K: What the Egyptians have said to me is that they think they
might be able to get the number of prisoners -- a suggestion
I made at Geneva.

D: You made it in Jerusalem.

K: In Geneva I discussed it with Eban and Everon (sp?).

D: I did not know that. This I will pass on.

K: I just would like to see the number. At least that gives
you stability. Even if it's 10, it means that they cannot
give you less than that.

D: Then for this number, what do we have to do -- pass to you
the proposal?

K: We haven't been told at this point -- only a question of
what you would do for the number. The Egyptians seem to be
in despair about this themselves -- they're not trying to
squeeze you. They've now said they think they can get the
number -- what can we say to the Syrians?

D: Maybe we can say that for the moment we can have Dayan
come here with a proposal and then before he presents it he
will get a list -- maybe that can be worked out -- because,
you see, the Prime Minister and Dayan did not want to come here
not because they don't trust the Syrians but because they don't
want to take the

K: Just a minute. That I understand. On the other hand, if
they give you the number, that doesn't ease the mind of the
people, but it gives a fl_.

D: I understand.

K: You at least can stop worrying about people getting murdered.

D: The question is how do we move on our part?

*

-3-

K: I'm just trying to find out what we can do to get the number. The Egyptians have said to me they think they can get the number, but obviously not -- they haven't said what you should do for the number.

D: Why don't I suggest to Israel

K: What they obviously seem to think -- will you give a proposal for the number -- because that's the context of the whole discussion -- how to get the negotiations started.

D: I am trying to think aloud.

K: How about the following -- and really, I have no authority to say this at all. Supposing we say to them Dayan comes over here and gives me the proposal. I will then certify that it is a rational proposal for discussion. If I say that, before I transmit it they have to give the list and permit Red Cross visits. You see what I mean?

D: Of course.

K: I don't pass it on.

D: Of course. Well, I'll pass this on.

K: But I don't know whether they'll accept that.

D: That I am pretty sure they will accept because I'm trying to make myself clear, Mr. Secretary, because I had long talks.

K: I understand your problem. Your problem is not to be in a position where you make a proposal, then they say "great" -- now make another one before you get the list. If they give me the number I give you the number, then you have gotten -- you've at least saved the lives of those whose number you have because they have to deliver them. Supposing Dayan comes over here, gives me the proposal -- not one like the Syrian -- which is a total insult

D: The Prime Minister did not even bring that up with the Cabinet. It would have leaked -- just too disgraceful.

K: You know, your information about my briefings is so accurate that I

D: Well, Symington has said a new romance has developed -- and he called me - Javits - to say if he heard you he has heard me.

K: Strategically, we are now in complete accord.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.1958
Authority
By: NARA Date 6/9/67

-4-

D: But I wanted so much to get across to you. We are not stubborn on this. But the prisoners will become pawns and hostages.

K: But now we have a little movement. Can you -- when you're not a Marxist, you can be very ingenious. Get your geniuses there -- seriously -- if you can get the number, you have something. I don't know whether I want to be in the position of passing on the merit. That worries me a bit.

D: Yes. May I correct it a bit and say this -- that you get the number, you pass us the number, then Dayan comes here, then he gives you the proposal but doesn't authorize you to transmit. Once he does it, before you pass it on, you get from the Syrians a promise for the Red Cross visits and then you pass them the proposal. What the people in Israel are afraid of is that once we will pass the proposal to you, then the Syrians will use our prisoners as a leverage on us.

K: I will have a proposal?

D: You will have a proposal which will bait them.

K: The only thing that I then require is that you make the ______ so that if I pass it on, I won't be totally dis-credited. Make it as serious

D: I think we will make a serious proposal, but it won't be anything like the Syrian proposal.

K: ______ limit of your endurance. I'm not even going to discuss the Syrian proposal. Not even a provision for a UNEF in Syria -- you need a UNEF. You couldn't have the Syrians within artillery range of the Galilee.

D: I tell you the truth. At this stage our concrete thinking on the matter -- because my Government doesn't even trust me.

K: I have a theory.

D: What?

K: My theory is that they don't have a proposal.

D: That could be -- but they will have. It may take about two weeks -- it won't be overnight. Well, we have to get the O.K. from the Government. I want to tell you the mood there is very very bad -- the families -- it's a Jewish state, let's face it.

DECLASSIFIED
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NARA Date 6/9/87

By AB

-5-

K: Our families have been through this. This could now be transferred into some kind of movement.

D: I was thinking. You have added this element. I was vetoed on a less liberal proposal. That Dayan would come -- that you would have the list in your possession -- and that was not accepted.

K: Maybe with a list at least they will not kill the people.

D: I will see. Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. What do they mean - the part about lifting the embargo?

K: That's the oil producers.

D: OPEC? Are there going to be conditions there?

K: We have already told them we won't accept additional conditions.

D: There there was so carefully the phrasing about 338 and 442. That was the 442 -- it did not exist in the agreement

K: This has been -- he's been wanting to do this for months.

D: Well, so long as it doesn't

K: I've tried to explain the situation to you. If I can keep control of the process because this -- I've always delivered what I said I would. You've got to keep me in charge of the process, and therefore I'm trying to avoid the consciousness of a stalemate penetrating throughout this government, and therefore I have kept this matter very close up to now.

D: The one item I - Misrafi

K: Misrafi and Levy -- they will be released when your disengagement is....

D: As a matter of

K: I will raise it tomorrow.

D: You will let me know when you hear from them.

K: You can count on that.

D: And you will tomorrow raise it with Sadat.

K: And get me an answer tomorrow.

END

DECLASSIFIED
E.O.1558
Authority
By AB NARA Date 6/9/61

TELCOM

Ron Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger
Thursday, January 31, 1974
3:00 p.m.

K: How are you Ron?

RZ: Fine.

K: You called me.

RZ: Yes. I wanted to dovetail with you on the meeting. I
left it very loose.

K: Which meeting?

RZ: The oil Arab meeting. I handled it in the briefing by
saying I was not going to discuss the details of contacts
that the President has but that the President had indicated
that this matter would be urgently addressed.

K: Correct.

Z: They said when is the meeting. I said we know of the
Feb. 14th meeting but we were not told. None of the communica-
tions said when the meeting would take place. I said certainly
no later than the 14th.

K: Correct.

Z: I said I could not rule out that they might do it before
then but I did not know.

K: I agree.

Z: Did you pin it to the 14th -- there is a bulletin.

K: That was coming out of the Ways and Means Committee. I said
it was one meeting I knew was taking place. I had vest put out
today exactly what you have said. We don't know whether it is the
14th or before but it would be not be after.

Z: We are right on target.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E01.958
By: NARA Date 6/9/87

TELCOM

Amb. Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, January 31, 1974

3:05 p.m.

D: Henry, I am calling you about the communique. We are prepared to do it tomorrow or the day after if you like.

K: I will check and let you know.

D: I will give you approximately -- I will call you three minutes later.

K: Leave it with my secretary.

D: Then you will look at it -- not necessary for you to follow word for word. If you have suggestions let me know. When you decide to have it tomorrow or the day after let me know.

K: I will let you know by 4:30.

D: O.K. I will give you the text that Gromyko proposes to make public. For him it is all right tomorrow or the day after.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 12158
By AS NARA Date 6/9/01

TELCON
Ziegler/Sec. Kissinger

Thursday, January 31, 1974

4:18 p.m.

K: I wanted to check with you. I have arranged with Gromyko to come from Cuba to visit Washington.

Z: Muzm Hmm.

K: On Monday.

Z: Hmm.

K: He will also see the President. Two questions -- should that be announced on Friday or Saturday.

Z: Saturday.

K: All right. Should we announce it at State or at the White House.

Z: Is he coming here to see you.

K: He is coming principally to see me but ~~I~~ will also see the President.

Z: Then why don't we announce it from here and say he is coming to visit you and will be seeing the President.

K: There is an agreed text. Fine with me. I have no great ambition to have it announced here. Just wanted to check with you.

Z: O.K. Let's do it Saturday and we will announce it from here.

K: Good.

Z: Fine, Henry.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O. 1258
By NARA Date 6/9/81

TELECON
Mr. Sonnenfeldt/Secretar y Kissinger

January 31, 1974

4:55 pm

S: I was going in your place with Casey to this meeting.

K: I hope you were forthcoming.

S: I was hung up with the Congressional thing.

K: The hell with the Congressional thing.

S: The next thing they are going to do is the next step in this long
term agreement -- Petrosyants is coming here and as Kendall's
guest in this Chamber of Commerce thing at the end of February
and that will be the time to decide whether to give the Soviets an
actual counter draft in this long-term agreement.

K: I am in favor of the draft.

S: We left it open but as long as you want to do it I'll tell Shultz
that is the decision.

K: Good.

S: OK. In preparation for your Bahr meeting, a letter from Ron that
he gave me to the President, which you'll see as a Bahr ploy. I am
sending you another memo.

K: May I have it in time to address it before the meeting?

S: You'll have it.

K: My problem is everyone is working for himself and not for me. I get
these things too late.

S: Well, it has been down there for two days.

K: God damn it, the practical result is..

S: I am not in your outer office staff. They are holding it for you.

K: Don't talk to me about things I have not seen

S: I want to alert you to the fact that Bahr is coming here, thinking he
would be received by the President.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12158
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*

TELECON

Ambassador Dobrynin/Secretary Kissinger

January 31, 1974

5:10 pm

K: Where were you?

D: I was on the Hill trying to help our mutual friend.

K: I spent one and a half hours trying to talk to the Ways and Means Committee today..

D: I was only with the Chairman.

K: I think we may turn this MFN thing around.

D: Really?

K: If we can... keep our course in the Middle East cooperative, without drama on either side..

D: We are.. I am..

K: I am telling them it is enough and I am making headway.

D: I think it is good news.

K: It isn't a question of ..

D: No, it is a symbol.

K: We would like to make the announcement on Saturday.

D: Alright. 12:00 or when?

K: 11:00 our time.

D: That make it 6:00 in the evening...

K: You don't mind if we do it in English?

D: It is our translation.

K: There will be nothing else.. no substantive change.

D: You don't object to it?

K: No. We will use, that is there will be no substantive change.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12158
Authority
By NARA Date 6/2/1974

TELECON

Secretary Kissinger/Robert McNamara

Thursday, January 31, 1974, 5:30 p.m.

K: Bob, I wondered whether you can give me a date when you can go to Egypt.

M: Well, what I need to know is what I should do there, but I can tell you roughly.

K: Let's have breakfast on Saturday on what you should do there. But can we in the meantime communicate a possible time to them?

M: I could be there -- it depends on what there schedule is -- but I could be there Saturday, February 23rd.

K: All right.

M: And I don't know how long

K: Maybe a couple of days?

M: I could probably be there part of Friday and Saturday and part of Sunday. Friday is probably a holiday in Egypt.

K: I will communicate with them. ______ to discuss a rational American development program, and I don't have the capability in this department to send an intelligent person there.

M: I'm not sure I'm the right person.

K: What they need now is understanding and seriousness. They don't need nit-pickers to go there and tell them what they can't do.

M: I can go there, Henry, but it's a little delicate to be talking from an American international bank point of view.

K: Can't you go there as my friend?

M: Definitely.

K: Thank you.

M: I'm perfectly prepared to do it that way. I'm supposed to be in New York Friday night late, so it would be difficult to get there early on Saturday.

K: Let's do it late Saturday morning.

M: 11:00. I'll be -- make it 11:30. I'll be in your office 11:30 Saturday morning.

END

*

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Gerry Warren

January 31, 1974, 7:35 p.m.

W: This is Gerry Warren. Woodward and Bernstein are doing a long, rambling gossip piece for tomorrow saying that you and Haig tried unsuccessfully for six months to persuade the President to disassociate himself publicly from Haldeman, Ehrlichman and Colson in their legal defense. They say they have notes from John Andrews, the former speech-writer.

K: Well, I can't speak for Haig, but I can tell you I never discussed this matter with the President at all.

W: They're quoting comments from John Andrews.

K: John Andrews is a GD horse's ass. The only time I ever talked to John Andrews is when -- he called me once and said that -- before Haldeman and Ehrlichman were fired, or left -- was he wept on my shoulders about the misery of the situation. That is all.

W: He has notes which Woodward says he gave to them of a meeting that you attended on July 27 -- after Haldeman and Ehrlichman left -- in which you recommended that the President say in his August 15 speech that he had cleaned out the old people and gotten rid of them and that "I'm responsible for a climate of excessive warfare in the White House."

K: My problem is -- I consider that highly unlikely, but, you know, I don't have notes of every meeting I attend.

W: I understand. That's the one mention of you. The thrust of the story

K: I just don't remember that Andrews was at any meeting I ever attended, but I don't want to say that because you know these guys wandered in and out. What do you want me to do?

W: I don't know.

K: The only way I could have been involved at all WX -- was that in Camp David?

W: He did not say.

K: It was during that week I was at one or two meetings. I did not have anything basically to do with these discussions.

W: A week at Camp David?

DECLASSIFIED
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K: I was once up at Camp David for a day in which I was supposed to see the President and, in any event, saw him only for a half hour on foreign policy matters. July 27 I don't remember, frankly. But it is totally incorrect to say that I for six months attempted to do something because I essentially was out of these discussions. I may have been once called in to express a view, but the phrase that I did it for six months is certainly incorrect. But Haig would know this better than I.

W: Haig says this has never been his position.

K: This question was never put to me that way. But let me think about it and call you back.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1558
By AB NARA Date 6/9/01

January 31, 1974, 7:50 p.m.

D: How are you?

K: O.K. You have, I take it, not had a response from Israel?

D: I did talk to Israel on the telephone at noon today, and the Prime Minister wanted me to tell you she'll make an answer in two or three days.

K: Jesus. For your information, I had a message from the
Syrians today giving me the same hint that they gave to the
Egyptians.

D: About the number?

K: Yes. And secondly, asking me whether I would be willing
to engage myself if the negotiations lead to a release of the
prisoners list. I sent them a note of your position the other
day, and they said in what way is this different from your
old position?

D: You mean?

K: The prisoners list. No number -- that I didn't give them.
I gave them your former proposal, and they said is that,
in any way different from what you have always said?

D: No.

K: And therefore I deduce from that -- give me anything that's
different, and we will be able to do something.

D: That is why you have reason to believe... Last night

K: Last night we were just speculating. I think now we
have a better than 50-50 chance that they give us the number in
return for which you send Dayan. Dayan gives me a plan on which
I will not move until I have in my hands a list and the Red
Cross visits.

D: That's what I cabled. I think this will be discussed by
her tomorrow. I hope maybe by Saturday I'll be able to give
you an answer.

K: I would urge you to do it as soon as possible because if --
I have not told any of this to anybody -- I don't want the
pro-Israeli mood to shift here, and I also think it's in your
interest.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.0.12958
By: NARA Date 6/9/74

*

-2-

D: But I think it is, too, in all of our interests that there would be a number ______ because of the Sadat situation. I don't know if you saw the Prime Minister's statement today about disengagement with Syria -- we don't want to stay in the area.

K: Will you do me a favor? Will you tell your GD people to shut up about what you may offer -- because the Syrians are not like the Egyptians. I wouldn't even have said you don't want to stay in the area.

D: Well, I will mention not to speak because I know in the status of forces agreements we will not be discussing anything beyond the line of the pre-67 war -- they want to have half the Golan Heights.

K: What I would recommend, though -- just for your consideration. Sadat seems to think that if Kinetra could be put under Syrian administration -- don't answer me now -- and from my conversations with Assad, I think you'd be better off if you could ______ two kilometers beyond the October 6 line - to the UN - not to them - but not let them come all the way forward.

D: Of course not. I passed to Israel your idea about the UNEF buffer zone -- what you told me yesterday. I think

K: Well, I think the Syrians would be happier without them.

D: In any event, what I think -- the thinking in Israel is that there would be nothing that would be going beyond the pre-Yom Kippur war and that the buffer zone will be beyond those lines, but I don't want to say this. I believe, because right now they are still discussing it. I'm not sure ______ is so happy Dayan is coming.

K: Have them both come.

D: Mr. Secretary, can I ask you something about your -- about Mr. Sisco. He was today at the Subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the Middle East, and I'm not criticizing...

K: Criticize him if you want to.

D: Well, I wonder if you have any information. He said that the number of Israeli prisoners in Syria is so small -- much less than the Israelis anticipate -- "When they hear the number, there will be such a hue and cry in Israel."

K: I know nothing. I assure you that it is one theory that

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. VESS
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*

=3-

people have advanced, but we know nothing.

D: The other thing -- he told the Senators that the next move would be beyond the Mitla Pass.

K: He is a horse's ass.

D: This is -- the Senators asked me whether.

K: Look, Mr. Ambassador, I am already an hour late for something. It is -- I will have to get him under control.

D: Don't holler at him. I am having lunch with him tomorrow, and he will only be sour-pussed. I can handle Joe. I was concerned only

K: It was not at the Senate -- it was at the House.

D: At the House, the Subcommittee. Forget about what he said about the prisoners.

K: O.K., Mr. Ambassador, I have to go.

END

DECEMBER 11, 1968

 Authority E.O. VASS

 By AS NARA Date 6/9/68

TELECON
Secretary Kissinger/Secretary Schlesinger

January 31, 1974, 8:04 p.m.

K: I just heard that Rosenfeld has an article tomorrow of a split between you and me.

S: Rosenfeld?

K: Of the Washington Post -- on the ¤ editorial page. I just want you to know I don't know Rosenfeld. He must have been in that group that you

S: The Overseas Press Club?

K: Yes. But that doesn't mean you said it.

S: Aside from seeing him at the Club that time, I've never spoken to him.

K: I don't even know what he looks like.

S: Don't worry much about that. I saw something that looked good on that -- the _______ article. Oh, well, it's a lot of crap.

K: It is crap. I've been knocking it down this week. I'll see you for breakfast tomorrow -- I just wanted you to know I've had this

S: It just adds to the spice around town. Stennis seems to have ______ on Diego Garcia. Two months ago he didn't say anything, but now he's

K: John Stennis? You want me to call him.

S: No. I think it would be premature.

K: We can get him to go along, I'm sure.

S: He was a little rambunctious -- his stomach problems -- he was more irritable than I've ever seen him. He's usually a courtly guy.

K: Let me see what I can do. I'll see you at breakfast. What time is that -- 8:00?

S: 8:00.

END

DECLASSIFIED
Authority E.O.1258
By AS NARA Date 6/2/01