[Y]

FOR WHITE HOUSE USE ONLY

Mr. Robert Komer

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August 8, 1966

(A) A study should be made on how the United States military effort can be better geared to pacification. A layer percentage of its army Jones should be assigned to this mission. This may be improved by the 25th Division in this area.

(h) A group of inspectors responsible to Bill Porter should be created to tour the provinces and survey results.

(j) Priorities should be firmly established. We can wreck the effort by trying to do too much as surely as by trying to do too little. The Vietnamese administrative resources permit only a limited number of projects to be carried out at one time. To ask too insistently for too broad a spectrum is to encourage the tendency to build Potemkin villages.

(k)(1) Roles and missions of the American effort should be carefully restudied and rationalized. I understand that this is under way.

(Q) (j) Progress in the provinces requires structure in Saigon which is stable and representative of the major political forces. This requires patience and imagination. We must avoid applying American criteria; but we should also not rest content with surface stability. You and I agree on this. It may well and will handled the election some time & the very sophisticated

(A) (k) We do not know enough about the Vietcong. We should make a major effort to identify local leaders to encourage possible defections. CAS should be given as top priority & make a provisional profile of enemy leaders. This is very hurried. Each point should probably be expanded. But you indicated the need for speed and the desirability of brevity. I am at your disposal for anything I can do to ease the task which you are tackling with so much energy and imagination.

With kind regards.

FOR WHITE HOUSE USE ONLY

August 18, 1966

FOR THE AMBASSADOR'S EYES ONLY

The Honorable Henry Cabot Lodge
Ambassador
American Embassy
Saigon
APO 96243
San Francisco, California

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

When I left you requested that I put some thoughts about pacification
down on paper. Inevitably such a process tends to put emphasis on areas
still capable of improvement and what follows should be read in that context.
Let me begin with two general observations:

(a) I always find it inspiring to visit Vietnam. I can imagine no more vital assignment in today's world. Vietnam has become the hinge of our national effort. If we fail there, I foresee decades of mounting crisis. If we succeed, it will mark a historic turning point in the postwar era. Just as the Cuban-Berlin confrontation may have convinced the Soviets of the futility of seeking political breakthroughs by military means, so Vietnam can put an end to Chinese expansionism by the use or threat of force.

(b) The process of prevailing will necessarily be slow. We are engaged in Vietnam in rebuilding a political structure. In Europe the transition from feudalism to the modern state took three centuries. We must not be impatient if it takes a few years in Vietnam--especially as the problem there is compounded by a century of colonialism and two decades of internecine war.

....

bounded by a century of colonialism and two decades of interactive war, if it takes a few years in Vietnam--especially as the problem there is fundamental to the modern state took three centuries. We must not be impatient in Vietnam in rebuilding a political structure. In Europe the transition from (p) the process of prevailing will necessarily be slow. We are engaged

but an end to Chinese expansionism by the use or threat of force, as the Chinese-Berlin confrontation may have convinced the Soviets of the need to proceed, it will mark a historic turning point in the bohemar era. Just national effort. If we fail there, I foresee decades of mounting crisis. It is vital to installment in today's world. Vietnam has become the pride of our (s) I always find it inspiring to visit Vietnam. I can imagine no more

Let me begin with two general observations: still capable of improvement and what follows should be read in that context. When I left you requested that I put some thoughts about pacification down on paper. Inevitably such a process tends to put emphasis on areas

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

San Francisco, California
ARO 96843
Safon
American Embassy
Ambassador
The Honorable Henry Capot Lodge

August 18, 1968

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August 18, 1966

With this as a background, here are my observations:

(1) **Organization of the Embassy:** The organization of the Embassy has been vastly improved since my last visit. The plethora of competing agencies each operating their own program on the basis of partly conflicting and largely uncoordinated criteria has been replaced by an increasingly effective structure under the extremely able leadership of Bill Porter. Porter is on top of his job. He has replaced competition by coordination; he is well on the way to imposing effective direction on the basis of carefully considered criteria. The basic structure for progress exists now. Eight months ago I commented to you that each agency was conducting its own program. Today, the problem is how to translate structure into performance--a difficult but not insuperable task.

(2) **The American Effort in the Provinces:** Here two major changes for the better have occurred:

(a) The four principal American elements (Mac V, CAS, AID and JUSPAO) are coordinating their efforts.

(b) Joint reports force them to take cognizance of each other's activities.

Three weaknesses remain:

(a) The joint reports are useful in producing coordination. They have the drawback of encouraging a series of non-aggression treaties among the various agencies. People forced to live together in small Vietnamese provincial towns in some isolation and danger are not likely to compound their difficulties by challenging each other systematically. This suggests the need for an independent group of inspectors--similar to the old provincial reporters--at the Embassy.

(b) Saigon is under too much pressure to show immediate progress. As a result, technical and economic problems tend to overshadow the political issues--especially in the provinces.

(c) The inter-relationship of political, military and economic factors in the pacification field while theoretically recognized has not yet been achieved. In particular Bill Porter requires a greater degree of influence on the problem of how to achieve local security.

....

on the problem of how to achieve local security.
achieved. In particular Bill Porter requires a greater degree of influence
in the facilitation field while theoretically recognised has not yet been

political phenomena--especially in the provinces.

(p) Aid is under too much pressure to show immediate progress.

official reporters--at the Embassy.

the need for an independent group of experts--similar to the old bro-
their difficulties by challenging each other systematically. This and also
provincial towns in some isolation and under are not likely to combine
various agencies. People forced to live together in small Vietnamese
the campack of encouraging a series of non-addressable ties among the

(s) The joint reports are useful in producing coordination. They have

Three weaknesses remain:

activities.

(p) Joint reports force them to take coexistence of each other's

UNESCO) are coordinating their efforts.

(s) The four principal American elements (Mac V., CAS, AID and

better have occurred:

(S) The American Effort in the Provinces: Here two major issues for the

translating structure into performance--a difficult but not infeasible task.
each agency was conducting its own program. Today, the problem is how to
structure for progress exists now. Eight months ago I commented to you that
effective direction on the plans of carefully considered criteria. The plans
He has replaced competition by coordination; he is well on the way to imbed
under the extremely able leadership of Bill Porter. Porter is on top of his job.
uncoordinated criteria has been replaced by an increasingly effective structure
each operating their own program on the plans of fairly conflicting and largely
been greatly improved since my last visit. The barriers of competing agencies

The Honorsple Henry Capet Lodge

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August 18, 1966

[A]

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August 18, 1966

(3) The Situation in the Provinces: Candor compels me to say that I did not find any substantial change in the provinces with the possible exception of Bin Dinh. It may be that the "secure" areas are more so--though security is a relative concept. (For example, whenever I asked our advisers in how many hamlets listed as "secure" they would be prepared to sleep, they would list at most 25% of the so-called pacified areas.) The reasons for this state of affairs seem to me as follows:

(a) The criteria for pacification require further elaboration. The official Mac V criteria include too many subjective elements and lead to over-optimistic conclusions. For example, one criterion is the elimination of the VC infrastructure. But his is very hard to demonstrate. In Hau Nglia I was told that 18 hamlets scattered across the province were "pacified." There are 180 hamlets in that province. It seems to me impossible that the infrastructure could have been eliminated in such a small percentage of hamlets which, moreover, are not clustered. Another criterion involves the existence of village fortification. This tells us little unless we know something about the capabilities, training and motivation of the cadres manning these fortifications. Another criterion involves the existence of an elected village government. This may be irrelevant. In the Hoa Hoa areas there is high security even though elections are likely to be formalistic. In other areas there can be elections without security.

(b) One of the difficulties is the short term of duty of provincial advisors. I found almost no one who knew about conditions in October 1965. Thus there is no collective memory. New people start with great enthusiasm but little sophistication. By the time they learn their job it is time for them to leave.

(c) Some areas listed as pacified may be so because the VC find it convenient to leave a source of supply undisturbed. It seems to me essential to make a survey of how much of each province is subject to VC taxation--especially in the Delta provinces with respect to rice. For example, in one province shown on our maps as 70% pacified I was told by our sector advisor (supported by the other American components) that 80% of the population was subject to VC taxation. In all rice producing provinces I visited anywhere from 30 to 60% of the disposable rice seemed to be going to the VC.

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August 18, 1966

(d) The cadre program suffers from growing pains and too rapid expansion. We simply do not know enough about what the cadres are doing. It was difficult to find individuals who had made spot checks of the cadres. The usual pattern seems to be that the cadres are performing a PF function. There is doubt about the cadres' motivation. There is a danger that they will degenerate into another armed group adding to the pressures on the countryside and inadequately related to long-term political objectives.

(e) Even if the cadres were more effective, they are being employed in a wasteful manner because of the reluctance of ARVN to undertake pacification missions and the low priority given to RF and PF. In classic anti-guerrilla doctrine, the regular army provides a perimeter within which the RF and PF provide local security and the cadres supply local government. In Vietnam exactly the opposite is true. The cadres are frequently at the most exposed point while ARVN sits in provincial towns protected by RF and PF.

(f) Even when the cadres become more effective, their impact will be limited because the structure of local government and security to fill in behind them does not exist.

(g) The U.S. military effort while useful in thwarting Main Force activity is inadequately related to pacification missions--except in the Marine and recently the 25th Division area.

(4) A Few Recommendations:

(a) We urgently require a security map less formalistic than the existing one. Its criteria should determine who can make the villagers do what at what time of day.

(b) High priority should be given to improving local government through systematic training programs and adequate supervision. I would recommend that Vungtau be used to train village chiefs and selected PF's in addition to cadres. This may mean a reduction in the cadre program to what can be phased with the development of local administration and security forces.

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August 18, 1966

(c) RF and PF should be organically part of the pacification effort. This suggests that they should be removed from the Ministry of Defense and probably put under the Ministry of Reconstruction.

(d) At least half of ARVN (i. e. one division in each corps) should be assigned to pacification on the basis of an over-all concept. These forces, too, should be under the same central direction as other pacification efforts.

(e) A study of all available security forces should be made. Overlap should be eliminated and central direction established.

(f) Bill Porter should be given staff assistance in the area of local security. Perhaps a general officer should be put on his staff to advise on the use of RF, PF and the part of ARVN assigned to pacification.

(g) A study should be made on how the United States military effort can be better geared to pacification. A larger percentage of the Army forces should be assigned this mission. I was much impressed by the 25th Division in this respect.

(i) I wonder whether the tours of duty of provincial advisors could be extended to 18 months or perhaps two years. This is against our rotation policy but we might be able to find enough volunteers.

(k) Roles and missions of the American effort should be carefully restudied and rationalized. I understand that this is under way.

(l) Progress in the provinces requires structure in Saigon which is stable and representative of the major political forces. This requires patience and imagination. We must avoid applying American criteria;

....

(i) Progress in the provinces requires structure in Saigon which is rearranged and rationalized. I understand that this is under way.

(ii) Roa and minions of the American effort should be carefully
proud a spectrum is to encourage the tendency to build Potemkin villages
of projects to be carried out at one time. To ask too immediately for too
The Vietnamese administrative resources permit only a limited number
effort by trying to do too much as merely as a ploy trying to do too little.

(j) Priorities should be firmly established. We can wreck the
rotation policy but we might be able to find enough volunteers.
be extended to 18 months or perhaps two years. This is against our
(1) I wonder whether the tours of duty of provincial advisors could
creased to cover the provinces and accurately reflect.

(f) A group of inspectors reasonable to Bill Porter should be
created to cover the provinces and accurately reflect.

(g) A group of inspectors reasonable to Bill Porter should be
selected to cover the provinces and accurately reflect.

Self Division in this respect.

force should be assumed this mission. I was much impressed by the
can be better derived to certification. A larger percentage of the Army

(d) A study should be made on how the United States military effort
on the use of RE, PF and the part of ARVN assumed to certification.

(i) Bill Porter should be given staff assistance in the area of most
security. Perhaps a general officer should be put on his staff to advise

certification efforts.

forces' to, should be under the same central direction as other forces
be assigned to certification on the basis of an overall concept. These

(d) At least half of ARVN (i.e. one division in each corps) should

and properly be under the Ministry of Reconstruction.

This endorses that they should be removed from the Ministry of Defense

(c) RE and PF should be ordinarily part of the certification effort.

The Honorspie Henry Capot Lodge

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August 18, 1966

[x]

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August 18, 1966

but we should also not rest content with surface stability. You and I agree on this. The way you and Phil handled the election issue seems to me very sophisticated.

(m) We do not know enough about the Vietcong. We should make a major effort to identify local leaders to encourage possible defections. CAS should be given as a top priority to make a provincial "profile" of enemy leadership.

I realize that much of what I am recommending is already being thought about. I want to repeat my respect for the gallantry and dedication of your effort.

With warm good wishes and high regard.

The Honorsble Henry Capot Lodge

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August 18, 1968

Henry A. Knaufder

Sincerely yours,

With warm good wishes and high regard,

effort.

I want to repeat my respect for the loyalty and dedication of your
spouse. I realize that much of what I am recommending is already being thought
of enemy leadership.

CAB should be given as a job priority to make a provincial "bottle".
major effort to identify local leaders to encourage possible detections.

(m) We do not know enough about the Vietcong. We should make a
move very sophisticated.

agree on this. The way you and Bill handled the election issue seems
but we should also not retest content with attitude stability. You and I