PEOPLE

**FINAL FRONTIER:** The final frontier for television's "Star Trek: The Next Generation" has cast members acknowledging some melancholy.

"This is all very bittersweet," says **Jonathan Frakes**, who portrays Cmdr. William T. Riker, first officer on the starship Enterprise.

"I haven't come to grips with the end of the series yet," said actor **Michael Dorn**, the ship's Klingon security officer, in the May 14 issue of TV Guide magazine.

The series concludes May 23 after a seven-year run, but the cast has begun work on a "Star Trek" feature film scheduled for release late this year.

**LeVar Burton**, who plays the blind Cmdr. Geordi LaForge, said he looks forward to new horizons. He is in his 11th year as host of public television's "Reading Rainbow."

"This has been a very fulfilling seven-year cycle in my life, but I feel in my very being that it's time to move on," Burton said.

Frakes, who has directed several episodes, doesn't worry about finding other roles or being typecast, noting the success of the actors who portrayed Capt. James T. Kirk and Spock on the original "Star Trek."

"There are far worse fates than being permanently identified with the legend that is 'Star Trek,'" he said. "I'll take a career like William Shatner's or Leonard Nimoy's anytime."

**AT STARTING GATE OF NEW CAREER:** All those years in the saddle added up to valuable research for new author **Bill Shoemaker**.

The jockey turned trainer has written "Stalking Horse," a novel about a jockey unjustly banned in a race-fixing scandal. It is the first of a three-book deal Shoemaker has with Fawcett Columbine publishers, a division of Random House. The book was released last week.

"I like mysteries," Shoemaker said. "In a way, they remind me of watching a race. There's a starting point, then a period in which some surprises happen, and finally you're in the home stretch and then somebody wins and somebody loses. The fun is trying to figure out who the winner will be."

Shoemaker, 62, paralyzed from the neck down since a 1991 car accident, said he wrote the book with help from Dick Lochte, a mystery novelist.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

**MAKING A POINT:** TV journalist Barbara Walters with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at New York's Waldorf-Astoria Hotel on Saturday. Walters was roasted at a Friars Club function.

**A DEGREE OF SUCCESS:** He's got honorary degrees from all over, and a law degree earned in night school. Now **Sen. Robert Byrd** has been awarded his first bachelor's degree, with highest honors.

Byrd, 76, chairman of the powerful Senate Appropriations Committee and former Senate majority leader, got a degree Saturday at Marshall University.

He could not afford to attend college after graduating from high school in 1934. He later took courses at various colleges without earning a degree, and eventually got a law degree in 1963 from American University in Washington.

ASSOCIATED PRESS

**DOCTOR OF LAUGHTER:** Actress Whoopi Goldberg as students shouted her name during graduation at Wilmington College in Ohio on Saturday. She received an honorary doctor of arts degree.

VOL. 99 NO.

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# Self-Regarding Henry

*In his bid to write a tome for the ages, Henry Kissinger has penned an apologia for his years in power*

BY JOHN MORTON BLUM

Diplomacy

Henry Kissinger, *Simon & Schuster, $35*

In *Diplomacy*, Henry Kissinger has written another long, weighty, and important book. Swollen to more than 910 pages, some two kilograms of European heft, replete with controversial advice for current or future pursuit and with analyses of strategies suitable or mistaken in the past, it will command an audience of policy wonks. They will find the Kissinger they know—assertive, arrogant, disdainful of his critics, in favor of an imperial presidency and of tough diplomacy, impatient with Congress and the people. Though he dedicates the book to the men and women of the Foreign Service, he faults bureaucracy on several alleged accounts: for impeding innovative policies; for a tendency to avoid decisions by picking a middle course; for taking a segmented rather than holistic view of policy.

In the busy environment of Washington, readers will be tempted to turn at once to the last chapter; the repository of counsel for immediate and future use. They will learn enough there (though without surprises for Kissinger connoisseurs) to equip themselves for intelligent conversation about author and book alike. But even the busy should try to resist the temptation. A learned man, Kissinger is also an authority on diplomacy, a subject he has studied much of his life and practiced in the light of his conclusions. This book reveals the historical sources and contemporary vectors of his thinking. Therein lies its gravitas.

Kissinger writes in a tradition old for Europe but only recently established in the United States, by George Kennan and Walter Lippmann in particular, both of whom he frequently cites in support of his own views. Like Lippmann in several of his later books, and like Kennan in his *American Diplomacy*, Kissinger does not write as a historian but as a pamphleteer using history to make his case. Kennan, of course, did both, but Kissinger is too much the controversialist to spend his energy in research for the purpose of recapturing the past as it probably was. *Diplomacy* offers no evidence of

John Morton Blum is Sterling Professor Emeritus of history at Yale University. His most recent book is *Liberty, Justice, Order*.

May 1994/The Washington Monthly 53

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sustained or disinterested scholarship. Rather, Kissinger seems to have written a draft about European and American diplomats, subjects familiar to him, in order that his readers may draw lessons Kissinger thinks appropriate. Then he had his research staff provide a sparse documentation for his interpretations.

Kissinger's use of history elucidates his familiar diplomacy. As he sees it, geopolitical realities define national interests. Men in power then make decisions that govern relations among states. Those who are wise protect and advance their national interests by practicing a balance of power diplomacy enhanced, when possible, by the common values, cultural and moral, of necessary allies. Kissinger methodically, at times ponderously, builds an historical structure to sustain those generalities. The figures with whom he identifies invariably act as if they had been he. They succeed. The others do not.

He associates himself with men whose strategies he deems still vital for diplomacy. So we visit with Cardinal Richelieu, who first formulated the concept of *raison d'etat* the primacy of the interests of the state; with William III of Britain, who devised the system of the balance of power; with Benjamin Disraeli and Winston Churchill, who taught their reluctant countrymen to keep a hand in Europe. Disraeli and Churchill's leadership, Kissinger holds, "reflected a geopolitical fact of life"—the potential danger to Britain, "an island off the coast of Europe," if all the resources of the continent were arrayed against it. The United States now, Kissinger contends, is an island off the coast of Eurasia and must act accordingly.

In engineering the rise of Prussia, Otto von Bismarck, with whom Kissinger especially identifies, practiced a diplomacy that required political control which military chiefs later usurped; restraint which his German successors lacked; and flexibility which became incompatible with "an age of mass public opinion." Kissinger, for his part, also distrusts both the people and the politicians who use them.

Fundamentally a European intelligence, Kissinger falters when his narrative moves, in 1917, to the United States, which he persists in calling "America," perhaps in deference to his simplistic assertion of the country's hegemony

throughout the western hemisphere. He derides Woodrow Wilson for what Kissinger defines as a naive belief in the goodness of man, the related harmony of the world, and the resulting faith in a concert of powers to preserve peace by reliance on the moral force of opinion.

While praising Franklin Roosevelt for his insights about foreign affairs and for his leadership, Kissinger makes FDR appear more Wilsonian than he actually was. For example, Kissinger overlooks FDR's effort to tilt the balance of power in both Europe and Asia by recognizing the Soviet Union in 1933. More important, he criticizes FDR for assuming a community of interests that did not exist among the Four Policemen, the powers he expected to preserve the postwar peace. Roosevelt, Kissinger holds, was returning to an unrealistic Wilsonian hope for a concert of powers. But there is a strong case for viewing FDR's proposal as an implicit recognition of spheres of influence, though Roosevelt never considered Eastern Europe as part of a Soviet sphere. Further, Roosevelt's wartime strategy left the United States with sole possession of the atom bomb and with a ring of global bases which the Air Force deemed essential for an attack, if one became necessary, on the Soviet Union. Consequently, Moscow had reason to wonder about American intentions, though Kissinger dismisses that possibility as part of a deluded, "psychiatric" interpretation of the Cold War, a fantasy of Henry Wallace and others like him.

## Foreign Pol

In Kissinger's account, Stalin bore exclusive responsibility for the onset of the Cold War. He believes that the United States should have used its monopoly on the atom bomb to deter Soviet expansion in Europe. But how? When Secretary of State Byrnes rattled the bomb, Molotov shrugged him off—an episode Kissinger ignores. Would Kissinger have used the bomb? No—he makes it clear that once the Soviet Union had its own arsenal, nuclear war became unthinkable. Nonetheless, he derides the disarmament experts of the 1970s, whose advice he discounted at the time, as theologians whose work was marginal to the real tasks of diplomacy.

54 The Washington Monthly/May 1994

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In Kissinger's ideal world, statesmen would manage foreign policy without the interference of public opinion or domestic politics. He is quaintly nostalgic for the days of Bismarck.

And like Bismarck, he often makes sense. With the advantage of hindsight, Kissinger suggests the United States could have won the war in Korea by stopping MacArthur's advance at the thin neck of the peninsula and neutralizing much of the area to the north. He recognizes that the formation of NATO left "two military alliances and two spheres of influence" dividing Europe. In the early days of the Cold War, American strategy was still encumbered by Wilsonian principles. Truman and his successors employed a rhetoric of fear, which Kissinger neglects, to build public support for the time and treasure necessary for containment (this rhetoric also underlay McCarthyism, a factor Kissinger also fails to reckon with). Americans sought total victory over the Soviets instead of accepting, as Churchill did, peaceful coexistence, i.e., detente—Kissinger's own objective when his time came.

As he sees it, Khrushchev's recklessness brought on the crises that exposed the weaknesses of messianic American assumptions. Suez revealed that the interests of the United States and its European allies were not always congruent, and it left the United States with responsibility

for preserving the balance of power in the Middle East, as in the rest of the world. Europe could thereafter play a major role, as Konrad Adenauer said at the time, only if it united. And in spite of their talk of liberation, with the revolution in Hungary, "American leaders were not willing to risk American lives for a cause which . . . involved no direct American security." Encouraged by Suez and Hungary, Khrushchev tested American resolve in Berlin and tried to bypass containment by adventuring in the Third World. Then followed the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs and the embarrassment over Berlin that, in Kissinger's opinion, provoked Kennedy to seek compensation in Vietnam, where the United States had already engaged its grandeur.

Once he reaches Vietnam, and especially after he gets to his own years in high office, Kissinger's narrative and his accompanying analyses become self-serving. A proper geopolitical approach would have precluded intervention in Vietnam, he observes, though the United States needed to draw the line somewhere in the region to stop communist expansion there.

But he knows that Soviet and Chinese interests in the region were in conflict. Why not let them balance each other? Instead, he suggests the line should have been drawn at Malaya or Thailand, or at worst later by Kennedy in Laos. Why then fight on after 1968, the year Kissinger and Nixon came to power? Thailand at least was then out-

Scott Gorley

May 1994/The Washington Monthly 55

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side communist control. Because by then, according to Kissinger, national honor was at stake; Nixon had to arrange an "honorable extrication." But the terms Nixon and Kissinger eventually accepted in 1973 did not really improve on those Averell Harriman had come to in 1968. Why five more years of war? Why the bombing and invasion of Cambodia, with the dreadful ensuing disaster there? Here Kissinger still fails adequately to answer the charges of William Shawcross, the British journalist who blamed much of the genocide that ensued in Cambodia on Kissinger's policies.

Instead, he offers some bizarre retrospections. For one, that Lyndon Johnson should have run in 1968 to force a referendum on his policy in Vietnam. But what kind of referendum does Kissinger think domestic politics would have allowed in 1968? He sees the antiwar movement as a kind of conspiracy against him and Nixon, a conspiracy of

radical youth abetted by a cowardly academia and establishment. He seems unaware that generational issues, cultural differences, and especially the civil rights movement would have disrupted national tranquility even in the absence of Vietnam. After all, the Students for a Democratic Society had criticized American nuclear policy and American adventurism while Kissinger was still a college professor, long before Vietnam became a major issue.

Nixon and Kissinger deserve much credit for the geopolitics they defined and for the balance of power they achieved in the opening to China and in détente with the Soviet Union. But Kissinger replies to none of the telling criticisms of Raymond Gartoff and others about his and Nixon's exaggerated claims of Soviet involvement in the sundry crises they perceived in Cuba, in Chile, in the Yom Kippur War, in the

war between India and Pakistan. He does not even apologize for his own wiretaps his own invasions, let alone Nixon's, of the privacy of his staff. Watergate remains for him largely a regrettable interference with the management of foreign policy. In this account he offers essentially the hoary asseverations of his memoirs.

## Kissinger's use of history is too selective to be convincing. So is his memory, as former members of his staff might attest. Readers may conclude that "the arrogance of power," as Senator Fulbright used that phrase, is matched only by the arrogance of Kissinger.

Kissinger's partisanship undermines his treatment of the Reagan and Bush years. He concedes that Reagan "treated biblical references to Armageddon as operational predictions," but he finds Reagan's foreign policy one of "extraordinary consistency and relevance." That assessment depends on Kissinger's interpretation of Reagan's truculent moralism—his special use of human rights—as a pragmatic tactic to induce the overthrow of communism and the democratization of the Soviet Union. Kissinger's reading also depends upon crediting Reagan's arms buildup with precipitating the collapse of the Soviet Union. Perhaps, but internal economic and social problems, and unrealistic efforts at external expansion, would probably in themselves have led to Soviet implosion. Further, those subjected to communist rule in the Soviet Union and in the satellite nations discovered how precious were their human rights without lectures from Washington.

About George Bush Kissinger has little to say. He condemned Anthony Eden for demonizing Nasser; he does not mention Bush's demonizing Noriega and Saddam Hussein. And he accepts Bush's moralism as necessary for selling the Gulf War, with its protection of the national interest in oil. He avoids criticism of American arms aid to Iraq before the invasion of Kuwait by not discussing it. Nevertheless, he argues, multilateralism cannot keep the peace. Since the

56 The Washington Monthly/May 1994

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United Nations lacks the means and the will for that essential task, it cannot serve as a substitute for great-power diplomacy. But more than Kissinger allows, the U.N. provides a forum where small nations can express their objections to the conceits of the great powers. Those discussions may not at once temper great power policies, but over time they can help to create the kind of moral climate that Woodrow Wilson considered the hope for the future. Kissinger does not calculate the value of that influence or the expense of losing it.

Indeed, in his general discussion of American policy during the Cold War, not the least during the Reagan presidency, Kissinger never tallies the total cost. It was not just dollars, not just lives, American and others. There were enormous costs also in distortions of the economy, in the underfunding and postponement of needed programs for social justice, in resulting social unrest, in victimization and resentment of peoples on every continent affected by American intrusions.

Though he calculates no such potential costs in looking toward the future, his concluding chapter makes significant observations. As he says, "vast global forces" now at work "will render the United States less exceptional" than Americans have long believed. Power is becoming more diffuse. The nation must tailor its obligations to fit its means for discharging them. Wilsonianism is less and less practical. Not all disputes are justiciable. Ethnic self-determination does not deserve unqualified support, nor do human rights. The interests of the state demand precedence in foreign policy, and they can be served best by flexible applications of the principles of the balance of power, q.e.d.

## Kissinger and Tell

Kissinger's applications of those sound conclusions to current problems are more controversial than are the conclusions themselves. He warns that, because a market economy is a long way off in Russia and some communists remain strong there, the United States should be wary about its aid and ties to any Russian regime. So he is critical of President Clinton's support for Yeltsin and recent suggestions for the Partnership for Peace. Kissinger is pre-

pared to risk a confrontation with Russia that Clinton seems eager to avoid. And Kissinger has little to say about the urgency of nuclear disarmament. As he long has, he remains so-llicitous of China's sensitivities and is less concerned about human rights violations there.

Kissinger ends on an incontrovertible note. The United States will experience only futility and disillusionment if its foreign policy rests on messianic hopes. The essence of diplomacy is not goals but process: "Peace, stability, progress, and freedom. . . will have to be sought in a journey that has no end." That will not come as news to the Clinton administration. As National Security Advisor Anthony Lake recently said at Yale University, the NSC is already trying to avoid both optimism and pessimism in its approach to global problems.

Some of these problems, especially but not exclusively those spawned by demographic and ecological changes, lie wholly outside of Kissinger's historical and contemporary range. There are grave weaknesses in this new tome he has produced. Though Kissinger understands the responsibility of power, he focuses too much on politics and "great men." His use of history is too selective to be convincing. So is his memo-ry, as former members of his staff might attest. In those ways he is less than forthright with his readers. Many of them may conclude that "the arrogance of power," as Senator Fulbright used that phrase, is matched only by the arrogance of Kissinger. He is his own Hegelian Hero. That is the inescapable message implicit in this book. ⚽

## Got a complaint?

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May 1994/The Washington Monthly 57

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# All the Presidents' Man

Diplomacy by Henry Kissinger.

Simon & Schuster. 1230 Avenue of the Americas.

New York, N.Y. 10035

This is a textbook on *realpolitik* by the master of the craft himself. Not content just to make history, Henry Kissinger wants to ensure that the record is properly understood. Provocative, penetrating and self-serving, Kissinger's *Diplomacy* interprets Western diplomacy from the 17th century to the end of the Cold War, focusing its critical wrath on American idealism in the debate between "proponents of foreign policy as strategy and of foreign policy as crusade."

In 900 pages of analysis and advice, Kissinger, national security adviser and co-author with Richard Nixon of the dramatic United States opening to China and, later, secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Ford, argues that there are two main schools of foreign-policy thinking in the U.S.: idealism and realism.

President Woodrow Wilson, author of the Fourteen Points in 1918 and proponent of the League of Nations following World War I,

typifies the idealist: proclaiming the universality of American values and a commitment to propagate them around the world. His predecessor, Theodore Roosevelt, hero in Cuba with his Rough Riders during the Spanish-American War, represents for Kissinger the alternative, realist vision: a "European-style" pre-occupation with the balance of power and the national interest. Kissinger's interpretation of U.S. diplomacy from Wilson to President Bill Clinton, which makes up the heart of the book, is woven around an evaluation of these two themes.

A proponent of realism and power politics, Kissinger is critical, even sarcastic, about Wilsonian-type idealism and the notion of diplomacy "as a conflict between good and evil, and as a struggle on behalf of the free world." For example, commenting on an early State Department explanation that NATO was designed to influence not the balance of power but "a balance of principle," former Harvard professor Kissinger remarks: "No history graduate student would have received a

passing grade for such an analysis." Nonetheless, he acknowledges that "Americans could be moved to great deeds only through a vision that coincided with their perception of their country as exceptional," a "beacon" of freedom and democracy for the world.

Then came Vietnam. "With the enthusiasm of the innocent," the Eisenhower administration leaped to the defence of South Vietnam after the 1954 Geneva Conference, writes Kissinger, and later "inexperienced idealists in Washington" under President John Kennedy led the U.S. deeper into overextension and disaster. "America's rejection of national interest

as the basis of foreign policy had cast the country adrift on a sea of undifferentiated moralism," he concludes. America had to confront the gap between power and principle.

Anyone can guess the rest of Kissinger's Vietnam story. Realpolitik came to the rescue. Beseiged by "violent" anti-war demonstrators at home, President Nixon, coached by Kissinger, achieved a withdrawal from Vietnam "with honour" by playing communists against

communists. When the Soviet Union threatened to attack China in the summer of 1969, Nixon warned Moscow that the U.S. would not remain indifferent if they attacked ("perhaps the most daring step of his presidency"), and thus began the famous opening to China. "It marked America's return to the world of realpolitik," which was sustained through the Ford and Reagan administrations — one would hardly know that Jimmy Carter was president in between — culminating in the collapse of communism.

Kissinger's interpretation of Western diplomacy in terms of geopolitics is illuminating about the dreams and deceptions of post-World War II U.S. foreign policy, but in the end, an analysis of political power alone is not enough. The pursuit of power as "national interest" was not sufficient, as Kissinger notes, to motivate the American people to support major U.S. initiatives abroad. And an analysis of relations among nations, both then and now, that conceives of foreign policy simply as the self-interested pur-

suit of power is not enough to explain why states cooperate as well as confront each other in the post-Cold War world.

Especially notable in Kissinger's single-minded treatment is a lack of consideration of the growing web of global economic relationships (trade, investment, foreign assistance and technology transfer) that binds all countries of the world together in patterns of growing interdependence.

Also ignored by the guru of realpolitik are the communications revolution and transnational ties among environmental campaigners, multinational corporations, peace groups and human-rights activists that have begun to shape international relations in new ways. Finally, the diplomacy of non-Western countries, with the brief exception of China, is barely mentioned at all.

Warily picking a path among the dangers and the opportunities in today's world after communism, Bill Clinton and other leaders are obviously confused about the possibilities. Kissinger describes the lowest common denominator, the pursuit of political power. Learning from the limitations of his vision, others will have to provide the imagination and the courage to attempt something better.

■ Peter Van Ness

Peter Van Ness teaches international relations and Chinese politics at the University of Denver.

36

FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW

NEW YORK NEWSDAY, SUNDAY, APRIL 10, 1994

JONATHAN SCHELL

Kissinger Salutes the Strongmen

N A REVIEW of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's new book "Diplomacy" in The New York Times Book Review, Ernest R. May, who teaches history at Harvard, accuses the author of factual inaccuracy, and retrospectively declines to recommend him for "a pass degree" in history. Too late! The moment for slowing the rise of Henry Kissinger with professorial disapproval has long since passed. Harvard had its chance in the 1950s, but, as the dust jacket of the new book is careful to point out, Kissinger in fact graduated *summa cum laude*. His Nobel Prize and his Presidential Medal of Freedom are also mentioned. (In any case, at least one of the assertions that May calls inaccurate — Kissinger's observation that President Woodrow Wilson's "doctrines of self-determination and collective security put European diplomats on thoroughly unfamiliar terrain" — is surely not so much a statement of cold fact as a judgment, and a defensible one at that.)

Ever since Harvard stamped Kissinger with its highest grade of approval and sent him out into the world, his career, for all its ups and downs, has been characterized by a remarkable philosophical consistency. In thought and in deed, he has been the champion of the politics of the balance of power guided by the principles of *Realpolitik*. It was this preference, certainly, that led President Richard Nixon unexpectedly to raise the professor to high office. Now comes "Diplomacy," a copious, learned, shrewd grand tour of the diplomatic practice of the last 400 years. Kissinger reveals himself to be a kind of missionary, and the cause is the one

he has always championed.

Kissinger offers himself as a bringer of Old World truths to the New World. There is, he believes, a distinct entity called power, whose manipulation in the service of national interests is the proper work of the statesman. One of his heroes is Cardinal Richelieu, chief inventor of *raison d'eta*! and practitioner of "a dispassionate foreign policy free of moral imperatives." Another hero is Otto von Bismarck, who unified Germany, and proved himself able to "exploit every available option without the constraint of ideology." Prussian conservatives "argued that legitimacy represented a value beyond calculations of power," but Bismarck knew that "power supplied its own legitimacy."

It is the "ability to assess power relationships" that Kissinger admires above all else in statesmen. He marches them one by one through his pages, and comments on their capacities and their actions. The rulers of England from Pitt to Churchill get high marks for their utterly pragmatic dedication to preventing any single country, whether it be the France of Louis XIV or the Kaiser's Germany, from dominating the continent. Hitler somehow seems to escape Kissinger's categories, and his spectacular, if short-lived, successes are attributed to "psychotic intuition and demonic will power." On the other hand, Stalin, though branded "a monster," is credited with a superb, "ice-cold" understanding of power: He "was the supreme realist — patient, shrewd and implacable, the Richelieu of his period." It's a judgment that one might have thought would be shipwrecked on Stalin's spectacular failure, in spite of abundant evidence, to foresee Hit-

ler's attack on the Soviet Union, and Stalin's subsequent apparent nervous collapse, but Kissinger passes lightly over this.

It is American statesmen, represented above all by Wilson, who drive Kissinger to distraction, for it has been their mistaken belief that "the practice of *Realpolitik* is immoral," and that the "criteria for international order were democracy, collective security and self-determination — none of which had undergirded any previous European settlement." In each of the great struggles of the century — the First World War, the Second World War and the Cold War — these errors, Kissinger finds, clouded American judgment, to the detriment of policy.

At one point or another in Kissinger's account of the Cold War (to which he devotes 400 pages), it will no doubt occur to the reader that the world Kissinger is describing has sunk under the waves of history. At the end of the Cold War, the Soviet leaders, whom Kissinger tends to credit with "realism," lost power—not just some of their power, but all of it. Kissinger's subject is power — how it is gained, preserved and increased. Yet the collapse of the Soviet Union — the greatest shift in power in a half a century — seems, in these pages, to come almost out of the blue. Could the collapse have had something to do with the principles of "democracy, collective security and self-determination" — principles that the Soviet Richelieu and his successors so assiduously shunned, right up to the moment the foundations of their power were washed away from under their feet? Our taxonomist of power does not say. For answers to these questions, we'll have to await another book.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL WEDNESDAY, APRIL 27, 1994

# How Nixon's Metternich Sees the World

By ENOCH POWELL

In "Diplomacy" (Simon & Schuster, 912 pages, $35) Henry Kissinger has written on a huge scale a description of foreign policy, growing outward from Europe to that world into which America has found itself drawn ever since it came into existence and, more especially, since its involvement in the 1914-18 War. Those who wish to understand America's interventions, their causes and consequences, will henceforth be able to use this descriptive book as a tool and a stimulant.

Ever since the Middle Ages down to our lifetime, European thinking has been obsessed with a pursuit of the balance of power, in strategy and therefore in diplomacy. Though England, for obvious reasons, placed special store upon that concept, it was not an idea of English making. When the Spanish Armada swept up the English Channel in 1588 to conquer the obstreperous island, it was off the coast of the Low Countries that the fleet met with disaster before being ravaged in Atlantic storms. The notion which emboldened the Dutch king, William III, to claim and seize the English crown in 1688 was that of a Europe already familiar with the balance between Spain and the Holy Roman Empire, upon which the inhabitants of the Low Countries and of other lands depended to gain and to defend their independence. Balance of power, in fact, is always implicit in the co-existence of large separate powers, and it duly reasserts itself as long as those powers remain separate.

It was the balance of power which the Treaty of Vienna in 1815 sought; it was the balance of power which the rise of the new German empire of Bismarck threatened after 1870; and it was the balance of power which Nazi Germany overturned by military force in 1940. With the entry of the U.S. into World War II, the perspective

shifted: the balance of power was globalized and a moral motivation—democracy versus communism—was injected. In Europe itself the East-West balance of power was replaced by the antithesis between two blocs, whence American pressure upon Britain to join France in being politically amalgamated with West Germany.

It is this transformation scene which Mr. Kissinger analyzes from the American standpoint: "The America of the 1920s and 1930s rejected even its own doctrine of collective security," he writes, "lest it lead to involvement in the quarrels of distant, bel-

## Bookshelf

"Diplomacy"
By Henry Kissinger

licose societies ... Disillusionment with the results of the war erased to a considerable extent the distinctions between the Internationalists and the isolationists. Not even the most liberal Internationalists any longer discerned an American interest in sustaining a flawed post-war settlement and even the most dedicated Internationalists insisted that the Monroe Doctrine superseded the League of Nations and recoiled before the idea of America's joining League enforcement measures, even economic ones."

The rise of Japan, by throwing the Pacific Into the scales, contributed to undermining acceptance of the European balance of power and thus to altering the complexion of America's eventual involvement again in European war. So did the introverted preoccupation of the Soviet Union with affairs in its own state, which pushed France toward the unsatisfactory substitute of the "Little Entente" in the East and toward skepticism about

the value of the British alliance.

Mr. Kissinger's analysis has been rendered more timely and necessary by contemporary developments. The conclusion of the Cold War between America and the U.S.S.R. has coincided with a rising tide of resentment in Britain and in continental Europe against the loss of national self-determination in a European political union. With these developments American policy and public opinion is now endeavoring to cope. Hence in the present the phenomenon of America's "new world order," as exhibited in Bosnia and in Somalia. It is not Mr. Kissinger's fault but due to the nature of things that just at this point his lights become dimmed: "Both Bush and Clinton spoke of the new world order as if it were just around the corner. In fact, it is still in a period of gestation, and its final form will not be visible until well into the next century," he writes. "Part extension of the past, part unprecedented, the new world order, like those which it succeeds, will emerge as an answer to three questions: What are the basic units of the international order? What are their means of interacting? What are the goals on behalf of which they interact?"

The killing question there is the first one. What Mr. Kissinger—and America—must do in order to base their diplomacy upon a sound foundation, is to recognize the nation state as the "basic unit" of what he calls "the international order." But the American republic, having originated in a protest against the nation state, is not well situated to solve the insoluble. "Woodrow Wilson's appeal to America to go forth in the pursuit of democracy produced acts of great creativity. It also led to such disastrous crusades as Vietnam." So states Mr. Kissinger, but is "democracy" itself not a modality of the nation state?

Mr. Powell is a former British treasury minister and member of Parliament.

> The comprehensiveness, consistency and clarity of Thomas' narrative should enable it to command a readership for some time to come.

Hugh Thomas' history of conquest of Mexico is reviewed, E2.

# View

Sunday, April 24, 1994

## Audio Books

Time Warner has taken the idea of music on its abridgments to new levels. E4.

## BOOKS

United Press International

Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon in a historic 1974 meeting with Chinese leader Mao Tse-tung (center), Premier Chou En-lai (left) and their interpreter, Tang Wen-sheng

### Diplomacy, according to Kissinger

His book reveals that he knows the world — but not much about American culture.

**DIPLOMACY**
By Henry Kissinger
Simon & Schuster 912 pp $35

Reviewed by Robert A. Divine

For more than 900 pages of his new book, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger reveals a profound knowledge of world diplomacy and a nearly total ignorance of American culture.

In *Diplomacy*. Kissinger prescribes a sophisticated sermon on the virtues of Realpolitik without ever acknowledging that the success of the United States in world affairs stems directly from a repudiation of this Old World concept. At the end, he remains a stranger in his adopted land; he knows all the words, but never learned the music.

Kissinger explores the history of modern diplomacy to search for guidance for the United States as it seeks to adopt a foreign policy for the 21st century. His focus is on the great European diplomats — the Frenchman Richelieu in the

17th century, the Austrian Metternich in the first half of the 19th century and the German Bismarck in the second half — and he emphasizes the priority they gave to geopolitical factors.

Realpolitik as practiced by Richelieu and his successors was a careful weighing of national interests against the means at hand to create a realistic foreign policy. They worked to achieve a balance of power in which the goal was an equilibrium between the conflicting interests of the European nation-states.

The German-born Kissinger acknowledges that Americans from the outset had a different view of the world, an idealistic view. In part, this view was embodied in American exceptionalism — the conviction that the United States was morally superior to the nations of the Old World. And in part it was embodied in what Kissinger calls Wilsonianism, after Woodrow Wilson — the better that the United States had both the capability and the duty to transform the world in the American image.

Kissinger writes that, over time, American leaders have oscillated between two versions of

national mission — the passive role of beacon of liberty to the world and the active role of crusading for democracy abroad. He cites John Quincy Adams and Wilson as the prototypes for these alternatives, but, in fact, it was Thomas Jefferson, never mentioned in the book, whose call for "an empire of liberty" established him as the original proponent of the American mission to redeem mankind.

Kissinger is gracious enough to give Wilsonianism credit for winning the Cold War. After World War II, American diplomats refused to accept a spheroid of influence settlement with the Soviet Union, neither Dean Acheson nor John Foster Dulles was willing to write off the people of Eastern Europe to perpetual commuter rule. The American policy of containment aimed at nothing less than the ultimate trans

See HENRY KISSINGER on E3

Robert A. Divine is the George W. Littlefield Professor in American History at the University of Texas. His most recent book, "The Spatruk Challenge," was published last year by Oxford University Press.

In "Research," an older woman looks back with gentle irony on her

as inevitable as the others, they believe. But in a poignant moment, the

away, and you can justify or analyze but in the end it makes no differ-

and who is working on the novel.

[L]

cited author, who lessens the impact of her less有力 but never cures the problem.

It frustrates me to who seems to be on great insights opting whoopee cushions and

It frustrates me to through swampy prose only to find that caught up in a grandiose Dennis Miller mon-

Self, who has been Salman Rushdie as "a figure," has lots in common with Miller, the stand-up comedian Saturday Night. There's a flip, hip, attitude that permeates Fun and provides some laugh-out-loud moments in his pear-shaped body, his bathroom mirror, the ders: "Who let that Russian woman in here?" Prickly jokes to raunchy sex, ach-churning, dising jokes. Anything's good to chuckle here, most of all sense of some undose

# Kissinger's view of American diplomacy

HENRY KISSINGER from E1 formation of the Soviet Union into a peaceful, democratic state.

Kissinger and Richard Nixon, the president he served, tried to alter this strategy in the 1970s. They worked for a detente that would lead to a reduction in world tension through a series of negotiations with the Soviet Union and reopened U.S. relations with China, suspended after the communists took power there in 1949. Nixon, Kissinger writes, "was the first president since Theodore Roosevelt to conduct foreign policy largely in the name of the national interest." But Kissinger has difficulty explaining why this policy came under attack at home from both the left and the right; he does admit that it lacked "emotional resonance" with the American people. He seems to think that had it not been for Watergate, Nixon could have per-

suaded the American people to accept a balance-of-power approach based on peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union.

As it turned out, Ronald Reagan, one of the leading critics of detente, finally achieved the long-sought goal of ending Soviet tyranny. Described by Kissinger as advocating "a simplified version of Wilsonianism," Reagan relied on a single-minded belief in the power of American freedom to win the Cold War. Yet in pursuit of traditional American idealism, Reagan also advanced the vital geopolitical goal of protecting national security. What some have called "the higher realism" of Wilsonian idealism is embodied in Reagan's 1984 pronouncement: "Governments which rest upon the consent of the governed do not wage war on their neighbors."

American idealism has been a powerful force. It has been the American

advocacy of freedom and human dignity that has made this nation the last, best hope of mankind.

Kissinger concludes by calling for a new foreign policy for the next century based on a clear definition of the American national interest rooted in geopolitics.

He fails to realize that the spread of democracy and the American way of life is the essential national interest that has always guided this nation's role in the world. That idealistic interest in spreading the American way has led to tragic mistakes, as in Vietnam, as well as glorious victories in World War II and the Cold War.

For better or worse, the United States can only follow its own destiny — to try to achieve a peaceful, democratic world order, one based on fulfilling Jefferson's dream of an empire of liberty, not on Richelieu's balance of power.

Nixon (shown with Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev) worked with Kissinger for detente with the Soviet Union.

# In Fuentes' 'Orange Tree,' seeds of Mexican history

CARLOS FUENTES from E1

Fuentes are the children of a father with a name — the Spanish conqueror, Hernan Cortes — and a violated mother without a name. The chasm between Europe and the American continent becomes the emptiness of history in the hearts of a new people in an ancient, desecrated world. Language — inevitably, the Spanish language — must fill the void.

In "The Two Shores," the historical character Joronimo de Aguilar speaks after death. He tells of surviving a shipwreck in the Gulf of Mexico and living for eight years among the Indians of Yucatan, learning their tongue. He tells of being found by Cortes and becoming a teacher of Castilian to La Malinche, the Indian woman of noble origin who acted as a translator for Cortes and who spoke the Mayan and Aztec lan-

charge of taking the city. To do that, he creates a double of Numantia by reproducing its perimeter outside its walls. His monitor, the Greek historian Polybius, created the Circle of Scipio Aemilianus, a school to cultivate the literary arts. And so Scipio is two mon, "lover of war and husband of the word." In his precarious victory over Numantia, he concludes: "I reproduced my own self; I lay sloge to myself."

The last two shorter stories are connected by the name of a boat, the Two Americas.

In "Apollo and the Whores," an Oscar-winning Irish actor from the United States dies of a heart attack on the boat in Acapulco Bay, in the company of a madam and seven young prostitutes he has dubbed Snow White and the Seven Dwarves. The tone of the story is recy. reminiscent of Fuen-

inges by Fuentes, is fluid and elegant, and as faithful as it can be in a book in which the treason of translators has cataclysmic consequences.

At a time when Mexico struggles with its troubled present and asks fundamental questions about its future, words like those of The Orange Tree can be perturbing: "Mexico is a

country wounded at the milk of rancor, but the whisper of a shadow

It will be the broken more than their recurrent signal the arrival of a But with Carlos Fuentes both the power of the humble orange seed.

PAPERBACKS

Reviewed by
Ella Lotozo

## Detailing her time in a

'P'

people ask, 'How did you get in there?'" writes novelist Susanna Kayson of her stay

in a mental institution. "What they

staff's inability to cope less help, the difficult she also writes moving pain and terror of mo-

# 'Courage in the Face of Wrenching Domestic Controversy

Following the eulogy delivered yesterday by former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger at the funeral of former President Richard M. Nixon in Yorba Linda, Calif., as transcribed by The New York Times:

During the final week of Richard Nixon's life, I often imagined how he would have reacted to the tide of concern, respect, administration and affection evoked by his last great battle. His gruff pose of never paying attention to media comment would have been contradicted by a warm glow and the ever so subtle hint that another recital of the commentary would not be unwelcome. And without saying so, he would have conveyed that it would mean a lot to him if Julie and Tricia, David and Ed were told of his friends' pride in this culmination to an astonishing life.

When I listened — when I learned the final news by then so expected, yet so hard to accept, I felt a profound void. In the words of Shakespeare, "He was a man, take him for all, in all, I shall not look upon his like again."

In the conduct of foreign policy, Richard Nixon was one of the seminal Presidents. He came into office when the forces of history were moving America from a position of dominance to one of leadership. Dominance reflects strengths; leadership must be earned. And Richard Nixon earned that leadership role for his country with courage, dedication and skill.

## 'He Dared Confrontations'

When Richard Nixon took his oath of office, 550,000 Americans were engaged in combat in its place as far away from the United States as it was possible to be. America had no contacts with China, the world's most populous nation; no negotiations with the Soviet Union, the other nuclear superpower. Most Muslim countries had broken diplomatic relations with the United States, and Middle East diplomacy was stalemated. All of this in the midst of the most anguishing domestic crisis since the Civil War.

"When Richard Nixon left office, an agreement to end the war in Vietnam had been concluded, and the main lines of all subsequent operations were established: permanent dialogue with China, readiness without illusion to ease tensions with the Soviet Union, a peace process in the Middle East, the beginning via the European Security Conference of international issues, weakening the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe.

Richard Nixon's foreign policy goals were long-range. And he pursued them without regard to domestic political consequences. When considered our nation's interest at stake, he dared confrontations despite the imminence of elections and also in the midst of the worst crisis of his life.

And he bore, if with some pain, the disappointment of longtime friends and allies over relaxing tensions with the Soviet Union. He drew a length from the conviction he often expressed to me: the price for doing things halfway is no less than for doing it completely, so we might as well do them properly. That's Richard Nixon's greatest

Henry A. Kissinger, who was Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford Administrations, bows to the coffin of former President Richard M. Nixon after delivering an eulogy to him yesterday at the funeral in Yorba Linda, Calif.

"He drew strength from the conviction he often expressed to me: the price for doing things halfway is no less than for doing it completely, so we might as well do them properly. That's Richard Nixon's greatest accomplishment. It was as much moral as it was political."

Henry A. Kissinger

## Reconciliation at Journey's End

To lead from strength at a moment of apparent weakness, to husband the nation's resilience and thus to lay the basis for victory in the cold war. Shy and withdrawn, Richard Nixon made himself succeed in the most granegorous of professions and steered himself to conspicuous acts of extraordinary courage in the face of wrenching domestic controversy. He held fast to his basic theme that the greatest free nation in the world had a duty to lead and no right to abdicate.

Reznor

Richard Nixon would be so proud that President Clinton and all living former Presidents of the United States are here, symbolizing that his long and sometimes bitter journey had concluded in reconciliation.

I wish that in his final hours I could have told him about Brian McDonald, who during the Cambodian crisis had been fasting on a bench in Lafayette Park across from the White House until, as he said, President Nixon redeemed his pledge to withdraw American forces from that anguished country in two months. A promise which was, in fact, kept.

Across the chasm of the decades Brian called me the day Richard Nixon fell ill and left a message, "When you talk to President Nixon, tell him that I'm praying for him." So let us now say goodbye to our gallant friend. He stood on pinnacles that dissolved in the precipice. He achieved greatly and he suffered deeply. But he never gave up. In his solitude he envisaged a new international order that would reduce lingering entities, strengthen historic friendships and give new hope to mankind. A visionary dream and possibilities conjured.

Richard Nixon ended a war. And he advanced the vision of peace of his Quaker youth. He was devoted to his family, he loved his country and he considered service his honor. It was a privilege to have been allowed to help him.

Get new ideas on the Op-Ed Page.

him a debt of gratitude for that service.

Oh yes, he knew great controversy amid defeat as well as victory. He made mistakes and they, like his accomplishments, are part of his life and record. But the enduring lesson of Richard Nixon is that he never gave up being part of the action and passion of his times. He said many times that unless a person has a goal, a new mouth without oxygen, a new lamb, his spirit will die. Well, based on our last phone conversation and the letter he wrote me just a month ago, I can say that his spirit was very much alive to the very end. That is a great tribute to him, to his wonderful wife, Pat, to his children and to his grandchildren whose love he so depended on and whose love he returned in full measure.

## 'We Bid Farewell'

Today is a day for his family, his friends and his nation to remember President Nixon's life in totality. To them let us say, may the day of judging President Nixon on anything less than his entire life and career come to a close.

May we heed his call to maintain the will and the wisdom to build on America's greatest gift, its freedom, to lead a world full of difficulty to the just and lasting peace he dreamed of.

As it is written in the words of the hymn I heard in my church last Sunday: "Grant that I may realize that trifling of life creates differences, but that in the higher things we are all one."

In the twilight of his life President Nixon knew that lesson well. It is, I feel certain, a faith he would want us all to keep. And so, on behalf of all four former Presidents who are here — President Ford, President Carter, President Reagan and President Bush — and on behalf of a grateful nation, we bid farewell to Richard Milhous Nixon.

BOB DOLE

# 'The Largest Figure of Our Time Whose Influence Will Be Timeless'

Following are excerpts from the eulogy delivered yesterday by Senator Bob Dole, Republican of Kansas, at the funeral for former President Richard M. Nixon, as transcribed by The New York Times:

I believe the second half of the 20th century will be known as the age of Nixon. Why was he the most durable public figure of our time? Not because he gave the most eloquent speeches, but because he provided the most effective leadership. Not because he won every battle but because he always embodied the deepest feelings of the people he led.

One of his biographers said that Richard Nixon was one of us. And so he was. He was the boy who heard the train whistle in the night and dreamed of all the distant places that lay at the end of the track. How American.

He was the grocer's son who got ahead by working harder and longer than everyone else. How American.

He was a student who met expenses by doing research at the law library for 35 cents an hour while sharing a rundown farmhouse with water or electricity. How American.

He was the husband and father who said the best memorial to his wife was her children. How American.

To tens of millions of his countrymen, Richard Nixon was an American hero; a hero who shared and honored their belief in working hard, worshipping God, loving their families and saluting the flag. He called them the Silent Majority. Like them, they valued accomplishment more than ideology. They wanted their government to do the decent thing but not to bankrupt them in the process. They wanted his protection in a dangerous world, but they also wanted creative statesmanship in achieving a genuine peace with the people from whom he had come and who have come to Yorba Linda these past few days by the tens of thousands.

You must never be satisfied with success, he told us. And you should never be discouraged by failure. Failure can be sad, but the greatest sadness is not to fail to try. In the end what matters is that you have always lived life to the hit.

Strong, brave, unafraid of controversy, unyielding in his convictions, living every day of his life to the hit, the figure of our time whose influence will be timeless. That was Richard Nixon. How American. May God bless Richard Nixon and may God bless the United States.

[L.C.]

E

2 The San Diego Union-Tribune

Sunday, April 3, 1994

## BOOK BEAT / Mary Hellman

### THIS WEEK

#### ■ TOMORROW

The UCSD Bookstore in Price Center on the La Jolla campus begins its monthlong "Clean Sweep Sale." Titles are discounted up to 75 percent.

#### ■ WEDNESDAY

Del Mar literary agent Sandra Dijkstra discusses "How to Get Published" from 6:30 to 9:30 p.m. at the San Diego Mission Valley Hilton. Sponsored by the Learning Annex, the lecture costs $49 ($29 to Annex members). To register, call 544-9700.

San Diego Union-Tribune columnist Richard Louv discusses "101 Things You Can Do for Our Children's Future" from 7:30 to 9 p.m. at Warwick's Bookstore, 7812 Girard Ave., La Jolla.

Kachinas Kutenai discusses and signs "Treatment for AIDS and Positive HIV" at 7:30 p.m. at Obelisk Bookstore, 1029 University Ave., Hillcrest.

#### ■ THURSDAY

Margaret Maron signs her Edgar Award-winning mystery "Bootlegger's Daughter" from 5 to 6 p.m. and then talks about "A New Voice" at Grounds for Murder Mystery Book Store, 3858 Fifth Ave., Hillcrest.

Award-winning Chicano author Rudolfo Anaya discusses "Bless Me, Ultima" from 7:30 to 9 p.m. at Warwick's Bookstore, La Jolla.

#### ■ FRIDAY

The Reduced Shakespeare Company performs and signs "Reduced Shakespeare" from noon to 1 p.m. at the USCD Bookstore, Price Center on the La Jolla campus.

#### ■ SATURDAY

Friends of the Library host a used book sale from 9:30 a.m. to 4 p.m. at the Benjamin Branch Library, 5188 Zion Ave., Allied Gardens.

Encinitas author Bill Branon signs "Let Us Prey" from noon to 2 p.m. at Bookstar Costa Verde, La Jolla.

James W. Hall signs "Mean High Tide" from noon to 2 p.m. at Mysterious Galaxy, Clairemont Square.

Hugh Crumpler signs "On the Trail of the Desert Wildflower" from 1 to 3 p.m. at Warwick's Bookstore, La Jolla.

April Sinclair reads from "Coffee Will Make You Black" from 3 to 5 p.m. at Bookstar Costa Verde, La Jolla. For reservations, call 457-7561.

Mary Hoffman autographs "Amazing Grace" from 3:30 to 5 p.m. at The White Rabbit Children's Books, 7755 Girard Ave., La Jolla.

### COMING UP

#### ■ SUNDAY, APRIL 10

Award-winning science fiction author Kim Stanley Robinson talks about and signs "Green Mars" from 1 to 3 p.m. at Mysterious Galaxy, Clairemont Square.

Local lesbian writers and poets Jayne Relaford Brown, Lynne Bush, Wendy Caster and Marian Thacher read from their work at 5 p.m. at Obelisk Bookstore, Hillcrest.

#### ■ MONDAY, APRIL 11

Representatives of Coffee House Press discuss

and demonstrate the art of bookmaking from noon to 1 p.m. at the UCSD Bookstore, Price Center on the La Jolla campus.

Illustrator Ruth Heller signs "The Korean Cinderella" from 4 to 5:30 p.m. at The White Rabbit Children's Books, La Jolla.

Betty Eadie ("Embraced by the Light") discusses "What Happens After We Die" from 6:30 to 9:30 p.m. at the San Diego Mission Valley Hilton. Sponsored by the Learning Annex, the lecture costs $49 ($29 for Annex members). For reservations, call 544-9700.

#### ■ TUESDAY, APRIL 12

Dottie Erdman demonstrates and signs "Hands-On Sculpting" at 7 p.m. at Barnes & Noble, Del Mar Highland Towncenter, Del Mar.

#### ■ WEDNESDAY, APRIL 13

Five local authors — Claire H. Accomando, Jonathan Freedman, Sally R. Gary, Evelyn Kooperman and Louise Thistle — discuss their books at 6:30 p.m. at the Point Loma Branch Library, 2130 Poinsettia Drive.

San Diego Union-Tribune art critic Robert L. Pincus discusses "The Art of Edward and Nancy Redding Kienholz" at 7 p.m. at Esmeralda Books & Coffee, 1555 Camino del Mar, Del Mar.

#### ■ THURSDAY, APRIL 14

Elizabeth Marshall Thomas discusses "The Hidden Life of Dogs" from 6:30 to 9:30 p.m. at the San Diego Mission Valley Hilton. Sponsored by the Learning Annex, the lecture costs $49 ($24 for Annex members). To register, call 544-9700.

Suzanne Lipsett discusses "Surviving a Writer's Life" at 7 p.m. at Esmeralda Books & Coffee, Del Mar.

Marian Prokop signs and discusses "Managing to Be Green" at 7 p.m. at Barnes & Noble, Del Mar Highland Towncenter, Del Mar.

#### ■ FRIDAY, APRIL 15

Contributing American and Mexican poets read and sign "Flight of the Eagle: Poetry on the U.S.-Mexico Border" from noon to 1 p.m. at the UCSD Bookstore, Price Center on the La Jolla campus.

#### ■ SATURDAY, APRIL 16

Friends of the San Diego Library hold a used book sale from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. at the University Heights Branch Library, 4193 Park Blvd.

Singer Frankie Laine signs "That Lucky Old Son" at 1 p.m. at Barnes & Noble, Del Mar Highland Towncenter, Del Mar.

Jack Leonard signs "The Time of My Life" from 1 to 3 p.m. at Warwick's Bookstore, La Jolla.

Linda Rehberg and Lois Conway bake bread and sign "The Bread Machine Magic Book of Helpful Hints" from 1 to 3 p.m. at the Silver Skillet, Flower Hill Mall, Del Mar.

Mystery writers Peter McCabe ("Wasteland") and James Delessandro ("Bohemian Heart") sign and discuss their books from 2 to 4 p.m. at Mysterious Galaxy, Clairemont Square. McCabe also signs his books from 4:30 to 6 p.m. at Brentano's Horton Plaza.

#### ■ SUNDAY, APRIL 17

Retired Navy Captain P.T. Deuterman signs "The Edge of Honor" from 2 to 3 p.m. at Loma Theatre Bookstar, 3150 Rosecrans Place, Point Loma.

HELLMAN is Books editor for the San Diego Union-Tribune. The next Books section will be published April 17. Notices for this column — signings, sales and other such events from April 17-May 1. — must be received by April 7. Send them to The San Diego Union-Tribune, P.O. Box 191, San Diego, CA 92112.

# Asimov's memoir keeps you moving

## I, ASIMOV

### Isaac Asimov

(Doubleday, 576 pages, $25)

### REVIEWED BY MICHAEL BERRY

Isaac Asimov updated two previous autobiographies in his new posthumously published memoir.

If any author seemed guaranteed to be posthumously prolific, it was Isaac Asimov.

Asimov wrote or edited more than 470 volumes of fiction and nonfiction and, in the process, became, arguably, the most famous name in the field of science fiction. Now, two years after his death at age 72, Asimov's legacy continues with "I, Asimov," a memoir focused on the more personal aspects of a well-documented life.

Asimov already has two large volumes of autobiography to his credit, "In Memory Yet Green," and "In Joy Still Felt," published in 1979 and 1980. "I, Asimov" isn't the culmination of a trilogy, but rather a recapitulation and updating of the first two books, organized not by strict chronology but by subject matter, the chapters broken into bite-sized chunks.

The son of harried, but well-meaning Russian emigrants who ran a New York candy store during the Depression, Asimov chronicles a childhood that was hard but not necessarily unhappy. He unabashedly describes himself as an infant prodigy, capable of great mental feats at an early age.

Asimov's sense of his own prodigiousness seems to have caused him a good deal of grief. His high expectations produced great mental anguish when upper-level science and math classes didn't prove as easy as he thought they should. Moreover, Asimov's complete inability to suffer any fool gladly earned him enemies at school, in the Army and on the job as a professor at Boston University.

His compulsion to be a "know-it-all" was so pervasive that Asimov clearly recalls the first time he fought down the urge to correct somebody, an occasion when he overheard three soldiers wrongly explaining the inner workings of the atomic bomb. He writes, "It doesn't mean that my character changed suddenly and completely, but it was a step, a tiny first step, in the forging of what I can only describe as a new me. I was still obnoxious to many, I still failed to get along with my superiors, but I began to change."

Asimov's cleverness served him best as a writer. Under the tutelage of John W. Campbell Jr., the legendary editor of "Astounding." Asimov began crafting the magazine stories that millions of readers still enjoy, the robot tales and the galactic saga that became the "Foundation Trilogy." It was within science

fiction fandom that Asimov seemed most at home, and in this memoir he provides sketches of its most noted members, including Arthur C. Clarke, Harlan Ellison, Robert Silverberg and Frederick Pohl.

"I, Asimov" moves at a steady clip through the decades, allowing the author to chronicle the dissolution of his first marriage, his turn away from science fiction to nonfiction and mystery stories, his successful second marriage, his eventual return to writing novels and the sharp decline in health that marked his last years.

At times, the books feels flabby with unnecessary detail, but it's to Asimov's credit that his clear, conversational style and sense of humor keep the reader going even when the interest level of the material drops. There are times, however, when Asimov deliberately overflows over troubling, and potentially compelling, subjects, such as his difficult relationship with his son and the affairs that occurred during his first marriage.

Asimov's previous autobiographies now are difficult to come by, and his fame has grown considerably since their publication. Long-time fans aren't likely to begrudge the overlap in "I, Asimov," and other readers will welcome another opportunity to revel in the musings of one of this century's more influential popular writers.

BERRY is a Bay Area reviewer who specializes in science fiction, fantasy and horror.

Sunday, April 3, 1994

DIPLOMACY

FROM PAGE 1

magnum opus. Like others, I have been ambivalent about Kissinger over the years, wondering about his notions of *raison d’être*, that the interests of the state always justify the means to pursue them; wondering if he understood America well enough to have been such a pivotal figure in our foreign policy for so long. If I still am ambivalent on that, I am not on this book.

Kissinger is a unique figure in U.S. diplomacy. Because he grafted American culture onto a European heritage, combined the analytical skills of an academic with the manipulative skills of a statesman and mastered the nuances of the English language, he became an American original.

In recent years, the line between Henry the smoothie and Henry the brain became blurred, and I have no doubt that is why he wrote this book. Unlike old soldiers, great artists don't fade away; they die. When they can't create anymore, they turn to booze or a double-barrelled shotgun or just walk off into the sea in the moonlight. Artists must keep reinventing themselves, launching a new "period," searching for new forms and rhythms or discovering, as John Updike has just done with "Brazil," new worlds. And Kissinger — as anyone with an ear for language, interest in diplomacy or taste for history knows — is a great artist.

Recent history has been unkind to Kissinger on Vietnam. The criticism of the Nixon administration is that it was elected to end the war in Vietnam but it took too long to do it — and too many Americans died in the interval, 1,000 per month while Henry negotiated. The central dilemma of the Nixon-Kissinger policy of Vietnamization — which was gradually to turn the war over to the South Vietnamese — is well known. It was summed up by Le Duc Tho, Hanoi's chief negotiator, to Kissinger in 1970: "How can you expect to prevail with the South Vietnamese Army alone when it could not win with the assistance of 500,000 Americans?"

The question haunted Nixon and Kissinger. Yet, imperfect as their solution was, no one has ever convinced me that any other would have been better: A further U.S. buildup was politically impossible; a slower retreat would not have changed the central dilemma; and precipitous withdrawal, that is, surrender and capitulation, would have been unforgivable.

Kissinger's aim in this sweeping book that starts with 17th-century European diplomacy is less to tell how we got out of Vietnam than to analyze the forces that got us in, and, throughout history, have tempted other nations into equivalent adventures. The Vietnam chapters are dessert for a main course that offers a sweeping view of how the world's great powers over the years have defined and defined their interests.

Why America got into Vietnam turns out to be not very different from why Russia went to war in Crimea, or Britain in the Sudan or why it's hard to decide what to do about Bosnia today. We're not the only ones who get things wrong. The great value of "Diplomacy" is that Kissinger provides a historical panorama for these dramas, telling us how and why others acted.

As one might expect, Kissinger is at his virtuoso best with 19th-century diplomacy. Anyone who remembers "A World Restored," about the Congress of Vienna, or his essay on Bismarck, "The White Revolutionary," will remember how much Kissinger's ideas on relations among nations were formed by studying the 19th-century greats — Castlereagh, Metternich, Talleyrand and, above all, Bismarck.

But it would be wrong to see this work as mainly historical. It is rather an etiology of diplomacy, a survey of the origins of the art and its practice by great statesmen, which relates those origins and practices to contemporary problems. Put another way, to understand Kissinger, you have to understand Teddy Roosevelt; to understand TR, you have to understand Bismarck; to understand Bismarck, you have to understand Cardinal Richelieu.

The criticism of Kissinger always will be that his diplomacy was "too European," too secretive, too concentrated on balance-of-power calculations and cut off from American traditions of morality and exceptionalism. The criticism is fair but doesn't really bother Kissinger. Describing Bismarck, Kissinger says he was regarded as "too democratic for conservatives, too authoritarian for liberals, too power-oriented for legitimists."

I doubt that Bismarck found that description particularly galling and neither would Kissinger, because it applies to him as well. Diplomacy — like politics, the art of the possible — requires a certain flexibility of mind and policy in pursuit of national interest. If that doesn't please all of the people all of the time, and never pleases ideologues of any persuasion, it just proves you're doing your job.

GOLDSBOROUGH is foreign affairs columnist for The San Diego Union-Tribune.

■ BOOKS

# How the World Works

*Henry Kissinger's Diplomacy silences all doubt that he is among this century's most profound thinkers on international affairs*

By WALTER ISAACSON

BOTH FANS AND FOES OF HENRY Kissinger, whose ranks rival each other in fervor, have long agreed on one thing: he is brilliant at analyzing national interests and balances of power. If only he would step back from his corporate consulting and fashion-set socializing, they say, he might produce the grand tome that secures his place alongside George Kennan among the great diplomatic thinkers of our century.

Now he has, and it will. In *Diplomacy* (Simon & Schuster; 912 pages; $35), a sweeping portrayal of historical forces that begins with Cardinal Richelieu and ends with the challenges facing the world today, Kissinger makes the most forceful case by any American statesman since Theodore Roosevelt for the role of realism and its Prussian-accented cousin realpolitik in international affairs. Just as Kennan's odd admixture of romanticism and realism helped shape American attitudes at the outset of the cold war, Kissinger's emphasis on national interests rather than moral sentiments defines a framework for dealing with the multipolar world now emerging. He has produced one of those rare books that are both exciting to read and destined to be a classic of their genre.

I should make it clear that I come to this book as an interested party. Two years ago, I wrote a biography of Kissinger, for the same publisher, which many of his detractors, and some of his putative friends, said pulled too many punches, and which his fervent defenders (himself among them) decried as too harsh. My conclusion was that Kissinger had a remarkable feel for the interplay of national interests but that he failed to appreciate the strength America derives from the openness of its democratic system. His strategic and tactical brilliance made possible the U.S.'s rapprochement with China, but his secretive style and disdain for the moralism that undergirds America's sense of mission led to a backlash from both the left and the right against détente with the Soviet Union. *Diplomacy* reaffirms both my respect for his brilliance as an analyst and my reservations about the low priority he places on the values that have made American democ-

racy such a powerful international force.

The world, Kissinger writes, is entering an era when many states of comparable strength will compete and cooperate based on shifting national interests. America has never felt comfortable with such balance-of-power arrangements. So to understand what lessons history may hold for this new order, Kissinger maintains, we should study the diplomatic dances that began in Europe 350 years ago—a topic that, perhaps not coincidentally, is Kissinger's area of academic expertise.

NATHAN L. YOON/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE

Cardinal Richelieu, the First Minister of France at the time, developed the concept of national interest while working to prevent the revival of the Holy Roman Empire, which he deemed a threat to France's security even though both were Catholic. No longer were national interests to be equated with religious or moral goals. During the 18th century, balance-of-power diplomacy was perfected by England, an island state with a security interest in preserving equilibrium on the European continent.

In discussing the century of relative stability after the Congress of Vienna in 1814, Kissinger draws on his published doctoral dissertation on Metternich and Castlereagh (*A World Restored*, 1957) and an academic paper he wrote on Bismarck. (Like a good professor, he footnotes himself.) One difference between

the earlier works and *Diplomacy* is that Kissinger now puts slightly greater emphasis on the role of justice and values. "The Continental countries were knit together by a sense of shared values," he writes. "Power and justice were in substantial harmony."

This relationship between moral concerns and national interest, Kissinger argues, is the dominant theme in American foreign policy. There are the idealists, who believe that spreading American values should be the nation's motive force, and the realists, who emphasize national interests, credibility and power.

Kissinger, a European refugee who read Metternich more avidly than Jefferson, is unabashedly in the realist camp. "No other nation," he writes, "has ever rested its claim to international leadership on its altruism." Other Americans might proclaim this as a point of pride; when Kissinger says it, his attitude seems that of an anthropologist examining a

rather unsettling tribal ritual. The practice of basing policy on ideals rather than interests, he points out, can make a nation seem dangerously unpredictable.

In fact, America's idealism and realism have been interwoven ever since Benjamin Franklin played an ingenious balance-of-power game in France while simultaneously propagandizing about America's exceptional values. From the Monroe Doctrine to Manifest Destiny, the U.S. has linked its interests to its ideals. This was especially true during the cold war, which was a moral crusade as well as a security struggle.

Kissinger's tone shifts from academic to defensive when he discusses Vietnam and his own turn on the world stage, as National Security Adviser and then Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford. He pounds away at the naiveté

TIME, APRIL 11, 1994

of the peace movement, the hypocrisy of
the Establishment and the perfidy of the
North Vietnamese. And he dismisses the
notion that America's national interests
would have been better served if Nixon
had set an early withdrawal date (and in
the process lands a little jab—"Would
that history were as simple as journal-
ism"—at the contrary treatment of this
point in my book).

Kissinger casts Nixon as a realist, the first in the White House since Theodore Roosevelt. To support this contention, he quotes from Nixon's annual foreign policy reports, which Kissinger himself wrote. But as Kissinger admits, Nixon placed a picture of the unabashed idealist Woodrow Wilson in the Cabinet Room and repeatedly proclaimed the altruism of American policy. It amounted to a combination that Kissinger rather disparagingly calls "novel" but which seems to me quintessentially American.

"By the beginning of the last decade of the twentieth century," Kissinger writes, using a typically grandiloquent phrase to say *by 1990*, Wilsonian idealism "seemed triumphant." This does not please him. He concludes his book with sentences of pro forma praise for America's idealism followed by sentences that begin with *But*. In the end, the *buts* win: "American idealism remains as essential as ever, perhaps even more so. But in the new world order, its role will be to provide the faith to sustain America through all the ambiguities of choice in an imperfect world."

Kissinger is probably right that the end of the cold war has made Wilson's emphasis on exporting American values "less practicable." Instead of engaging in a moral showdown with a rival superpower, the U.S. will have to participate in a balancing act with Europe, Japan, China and others. The irony may be that his emphasis on national interests and power balances may turn out to be more politically palatable now than when he had the chance to put it in practice in the midst of the cold war and Vietnam.

FURTHERMORE

His previous writing was limited to a
spiritual newsletter, but the first
novel of Alabama therapist James
Redfield, 43, is a phenomenon. *The
Celestine Prophecy*, a tale of a
Peruvian manuscript that unfolds the
secrets of life, sold 100,000 copies in a
self-published paperback. Now the
Warner Books hard cover has sold an
additional 450,000 in six weeks and
just reached No. 1 on the New York
Times best-seller list.

BOOKS

# It's a Wonderful Life

*A biography details Steve Ross's rise from undertaker to mogul*

By NEAL GABLER

WHEN STEVE ROSS, NEAR death with cancer, checked into a Los Angeles hospital in late 1992, he registered as George Bailey, the self-sacrificing common-man hero of Frank Capra's *It's a Wonderful Life*. No doubt that was how the man who masterminded the merger of Time Inc. (which owns TIME) and Warner Communications wished to be perceived. But the Steve Ross who emerges in *Master of the Game* (Simon & Schuster; 395 pages; $25), *New Yorker* staff writer Connie Bruck's intelligent and fascinating biography, is composed equally of George Bailey, Don Corleone, Felix Krull and Oskar Schindler—Steven Spielberg has said Ross was a model for the portrayal of Schindler in *Schindler's List*.

Born in Brooklyn in 1927 to a once affluent Jewish family that lost everything in the Depression, Ross was a young opportunist without an opportunity until he married a woman whose father owned a string of funeral parlors. Within a few years, Ross expanded the company's businesses to include car rentals, parking lots and cleaning services. In 1967 Ross acquired a powerful talent agency, and two years later, he bought the faltering Warner Bros. studio.

As Bruck amply demonstrates, Ross's charm made him a natural for Hollywood, where everyone is a vortex of ego and where success belongs not to those who count the beans but to those who extravagantly spoil the stars. If Barbra Streisand wanted a painting, why not buy it for her? If Dustin Hoffman was vacationing in Europe, why not provide him with a yacht? If Steven Spielberg was looking for a home in the Hamptons, why not arrange the sale for him? "It's about people, really—realizing what they want," Ross once told Bruck.

With Ross expertly stroking egos, Warner prospered astonishingly, but his highly personal, unbusinesslike style had its darker side. Bruck provides the most

Neal Gabler is the author of *An Empire of Their Own* and the forthcoming *Winchell*.

detailed account yet of an illegal cash-
skimming operation at the Mob-run
Westchester Premier Theater in the
1970s. Ross's best friend, Warner execu-
tive Jay Emmett, pleaded guilty to two
counts of fraud arising from the scheme,
and Bruck leaves the unmistakable im-
pression that Ross himself was deeply in-
volved, which Ross steadfastly denied.
(Ross cut off Emmett summarily when

LOUIS FERREY—MATTE

THE CHARMER: If Barbra wanted a painting, why not buy it for her? Why not provide Dustin with a yacht?

Emmett began cooperating with the
prosecution.)

The silver-tongued Ross always extri-
cated himself from dicey situations and
moved on to the next play in a bigger
game. The 1989 merger of Time Inc. and
Warner was his triumph. Personally, he
reaped $193 million in stock from the
deal, and while, technically, Time was
acquiring Warner, and Ross and Time
chief Nick Nicholas were to be co-CEOs,
Ross quietly maneuvered himself into
supremacy by dazzling the board with
promises of a rich future. He then or-
chestrated a coup in which the directors
ousted Nicholas.

The only thing Ross couldn't whee-
dle to his own advantage was cancer. On
his deathbed, unable to ply his wiles, he
was superseded at Time Warner by Ger-
ald Levin. Superseded but not replaced.
Ross was the inimitable master of the art
of seduction. From Spielberg to the
Time Inc. board, he convinced others
that he wasn't a venal capitalist—he was
really George Bailey.

TIME, APRIL 11, 1994

NOV 21 REC'D

HENRY KISSINGER'S "DIPLOMACY" IS A MEDITATION ON HISTORY WITH A POINT OF VIEW. BEGINNING WITH CARDINAL RICHELIEU, ITS FIRST PART IS A DISCUSSION OF THE SUCCESSES, AND WEAKNESSES, OF THE EXERCISE OF the BALANCE OF POWER AS PLAYED BY THE NATION STATES OF EUROPE.

WITH THE EMERGENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED STATES ON THE WORLD SCENE, KISSINGER TURNS TO THE ROLE IDEALISM HAS PLAYED IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. HE PLAYS OFF THIS IDEALISM, UNTIL THEN NOT SEEN IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, AGAINST THE TRADITIONAL METHODS OF USING POWER FOR A STATE'S ADVANTAGE: THE IDEALISM OF WOODROW WILSON VERSUS THE POWER POLITICS OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

IT IS THE FIRST TIME THAT KISSINGER HAS ACKNOWLEDGED SO FULLY THE PLACE OF IDEALISM IN AMERICAN THINKING ABOUT THE WORLD, THE FIRST TIME HAS HAS CONCEDED THAT IT IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE AMERICAN MIND.

HOW, THEN, IS AMERICA, WITH ITS OFTEN-CONFLICTING TUG BETWEEN THE USES OF POWER AND THE IMPULSES OF PROMISE, TO ACT IN A WORLD IN WHICH IT THE MOST POWERFUL NATION BUT BY NO MEANS OMNIPOTENT?

KISSINGER SUGGESTS THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD REMEMBER THE USEFULNESS OF THE BALANCE-OF-POWER CONCEPT AS IT MANEUVERS AMONG THE GREAT STATES AND REGIONS OF THE WORLD, BUT HE DOES NOT OFFER DETAILED PRESCRIPTIONS. HE IS FOND OF SAYING THAT "A STATESMAN'S TASK IS TO ASK THE RIGHT QUESTION. THEN YOU HAVE A CHANCE AT FINDING TO THE RIGHT ANSWER."

IN THIS BOOK, OFTEN WITTY, ALWAYS PERSONAL, SOMETIMES

Cleveland, OH
Plain Dealer
Cleveland Met Area
SUN 643.050

APR 3 1994

N60908

PRESS CLIPPINGS

# Kissinger's foreign policy clinic

DIPLOMACY. By Henry Kissinger. Simon & Schuster, 912 pp., $35.

## A readable tour of diplomatic arena

By JEAN DUBAIL

If your politics tilt leftward, you probably view Henry Kissinger as the bespectacled Iago responsible for President Nixon's decision to mine Haiphong harbor and launch the "incursion" into Cambodia.

If your politics tilt rightward, you probably see him as the amoral diplomat who sacrificed American principles to detente with the Soviet Union.

If your politics tilt to neither side, you might see him as the brilliant geostrategist who helped Nixon play the China card — possibly the shrewdest diplomatic move the United States has made since World War II.

Whatever the case, it's hard to ignore Kissinger, who has exerted extraordinary influence on American foreign policy — and not just during the years when he was the not-to-gray eminence in the White House. It is even tougher to ignore him now that he has written "Diplomacy," a massive summary of what he has learned in a lifetime of thinking about and acting in the diplomatic arena.

The book is big but, considering its subject, surprisingly readable. And its theme is fairly simple: that American leaders are forever torn between two contrasting approaches to foreign policy: the classic balance-of-power approach perfected in Europe over the last four centuries, and the crusader-democracy approach most closely identified with Woodrow Wilson.

Kissinger devotes several chapters to a

discussion of the first approach, invented by France's Cardinal Richelieu. As the key minister of Europe's strongest Catholic power, Richelieu unhesitatingly allied with Protestant rulers in what is now Germany to keep rival powers — chiefly Catholic — in check. By preserving the balance of power, he also

preserved the peace, and France's security.

Richelieu was widely criticized at the time for sacrificing France's principles to its interests, a charge leveled at every practitioner of the technique ever since.

When America entered World War I, President Wilson disavowed this approach, which

he and many Americans considered amoral and which they said was the root cause of the conflict. Wilson insisted on making the war, and the peace of Versailles, a crusade for democracy, open diplomacy, self-determination and the rule of international law.

Despite the failure of his vision, largely because America showed no interest in policing the peace it had made, Wilsonian idealism has persisted as the dominant theme of American foreign policy to this day.

In Kissinger's view, this lack of realism has caused a world of trouble. If Franklin D. Roosevelt had been hard-headed enough, for example, to think of Eastern European countries as bargaining chips in postwar negotiations with Stalin, the West might have saved some of them from communism.

On the other hand, Kissinger recognizes that Wilsonian idealism has deep roots in the American psyche. Its people will not rouse themselves to think about faraway places, much less fight over them, unless they are convinced that freedom itself — not something as abstract as the balance of power — is at stake.

In other words, America needs not only its Teddy Roosevelt and its Richard Nixons, presidents who relish the game of geopolitics, but also its Woodrow Wilsons, John F. Kennedys and Ronald Reagans, who know how to preach the crusade.

It's a pleasant surprise to find that the man most responsible for the opening to China — a balance-of-power gambit if there ever was one — is not too jaded to see that America's real strength lies in its devotion to its own ideals.

Dubail is a Plain Dealer assistant metro editor.

PD file

Henry Kissinger speaking during the Town Hall series here in 1989.

ARTS, BOOKS AND SPORT

to lure foreign visitors and foreign investors to China itself. Cultural understanding is another aim, according to park officials. But its critics regard the park as a propaganda ploy, using make-believe and entertainment to polish China's image as preferential trade terms with the United States come up for renewal next month. "Don't look too hard for the Murdered Dissidents' Pavilion," is how the *Miami Herald* put it in a recent editorial.

Amnesty International and other human-rights groups charge that the park, which features more than 60 miniature versions of such famous Chinese landmarks as the Great Wall and the Forbidden City, portrays a false picture of social harmony and contentment among China's persecuted religious and ethnic minorities. In China, dissent is quashed. At Splendid China, Buddhist monks and human-rights activists are staging sporadic protests against the theme park and Chinese repression.

The International Campaign for Tibet, a Washington-based pressure group, is particularly agitated by the placid scene involving the replica of the Potala Palace, the exiled Dalai Lama's residence in Lhasa, Tibet,

which was invaded by China in 1950. The Dalai Lama, Tibet's religious and political leader, fled into exile in 1959 and since then the Chinese authorities have persecuted Buddhist religious orders and shut down temples in Tibet. Another group of protesters is angered by the way the theme park presents the Mongolians as people content with their lot. In the tableau of the Forbidden City, there is no mention of Tiananmen Square, known to most Americans as the place where the pro-democracy movement met a bloody end in 1989.

Pan Xin Liang, the managing director of the American subsidiary of the Hong Kong-based China Travel Service (CTS), which owns the park, denies the charge of propaganda. "People have been trying to stress the political side instead of the cultural exchange and instead of what is more peaceful," he says. Since 1989 CTS has owned and operated another Splendid China theme park in China's Guangdong province near Hong Kong. The narration of the introductory film shown at the Florida park explains that this enterprise was such a hit "that the Chinese people wanted to share it" with people in the United States.

## Balancing idealism and Realpolitik in diplomacy

### Henry Kissinger weighs in

DIPLOMACY. By Henry Kissinger. Simon & Schuster; 1,104 pages; $35 and £25

ATTENTION must be paid to the views of Henry Kissinger. The Harvard professor turned diplomatic superstar and winner of the Nobel prize for peace in 1973 (with Lee Duc Tho of North Vietnam) has produced a massive, elegant and provocative tome which traces the evolution of the system of nation states from the Thirty Years' War of the 17th century. Its focus is entirely on great men. The purpose is not to recount history but to analyse and instruct—and, not so incidentally, to defend the author's own role.

Mr Kissinger's prime concern is to reconcile his advocacy of the European approach of Realpolitik and balance-of-power diplomacy with his recognition that Americans can be moved to great deeds only through a vision that fits their view of their country as moral and exceptional.

President Theodore Roosevelt is presented as a believer in European statecraft whose views were incompatible with American experience and values. In contrast, President Woodrow Wilson grasped that idealism was the main spring of American motivation. Mr Kissinger's frustration can be sensed when he concludes: "For three generations critics have savaged Wilson's analysis and conclusions; and yet, in all this time, Wilson's principles have remained the bedrock of American foreign-policy

thinking."

Mr Kissinger's history is sometimes flawed. It is made fascinating by his conclusions, which are often expressed in striking epigrams. It is also enjoyable to ponder the grades he confers on the protagonists. The man who, with Richard Nixon, set new

standards of American duplicity gives Franklin Roosevelt high marks at the same time as he points out that FDR's tactics were devious and that many of his actions were on the fringe of constitutionality. Did he have any other statesman in mind?

His logic can be so relentless as to leave reality behind. During the American civil war, was the main foreign-policy concern of Abraham Lincoln's administration really, as he asserts, to prevent the Confederacy from being recognised by European nations "lest a multi-state system emerge on the soil of North America and with it the balance-of-power politics of European diplomacy"? Or was it, as generations of American schoolchildren have been taught, to preserve the union? Can Winston Churchill's intransigence towards Germany in the summer of 1940 really be interpreted "as a decision in favour of American over German hegemony"? Or is it more accurate, as well as simpler, to say merely that Churchill decided that England would try to preserve its historic liberties?

In discussing the need for the United States to reach a consensus on where to draw the line on the use of military force in the post-cold-war world, Mr Kissinger points out that in its heyday Britain would have gone to war to prevent the occupation of the Channel ports in the Low Countries, even if they had been taken over by a major power governed by saints. In his next paragraph he concludes that the "domination by a single power of either of Eurasia's two principal spheres—Europe or Asia—remains a good definition of strategic danger for America, cold war or no cold war." That danger, he says, "would have to be resisted" even were the dominant power apparently benevolent—for "if the intentions ever changed, America would find itself with a grossly diminished capacity for effective re-

The Concert of Europe

THE ECONOMIST MAY 14TH 1994

93

ARTS, BOOKS AND SPORT

[L]

A sense of the ridiculous

IN THE British diplomatic service, says Ruth Dudley Edwards in her endlessly fascinating "True Brits"*, an officer used to be allowed two illegitimate children without being fired. These days, it seems, there are no limits. Cohabiting couples are treated as if they are married when applying for a joint posting abroad. Homosexuals are no longer barred "automatically" from the service. It would be wrong, though, as British diplomacy tries to adjust to the modern world, to assume that the service is full of dangerous radicals and gays. In most of the things it does it clings to tradition.

Gentle British humour is apparently one of its admired skills. A book of advice to newcomers to the Foreign Office includes the instruction, "Maintain a sense of the ridiculous." During Britain's tussle with Iceland over fishing rights in the 1970s Sir Donald Maitland, an eccentric even by Foreign Office standards (and dubbed the "poison dwarf" by his foes), was ordered to make urgent representations to his Icelandic opposite number. The Icelander was a foot taller than the Brit. Sir Donald climbed on to the Icelander's desk. "I have been told," he an-

nounced, "to make representations at the very highest level."

What Miss Edwards, an occasional reviewer for *The Economist*, calls British "self-deprecating wit" may not be understood by foreigners, but she says British diplomats are regarded by their foreign colleagues as among the best in the world. If there is a longueur in her book it is her pleas for diplomats to be treated kindly by the public.

Life can be tough for our people in

cramped quarters in Minsk or sweltering it out in Kampala or sipping orange juice at diplomatic receptions in Islamic lands. Perhaps, but most people will continue to regard the foreign service as an agreeable, cosseted life, if only because people such as Sir John Ure, a former British ambassador, write about it so affectionately. His "Diplomatic Bag"† is a collection of diplomatic anecdotes from Marco Polo onwards. It is just the thing to read in bed at the end of an undiplomatic day. Miss Edwards's book, sadly, may have a shorter shelf life because it is tied to a BBC series.

KEITH COLQUHOUN

Security reminder in the lavatory of the British Embassy in Bangkok

* BBC Books; 256 pages; £16.99

† John Murray; 248 pages; £19.99

sistance.”

What policy is Mr Kissinger suggesting for the United States towards development of an enlarged European Union capable of acting as a single unit? Or towards a potential entente between the European Union and Russia? The questions raised by his conclusions are just as provocative as the conclusions themselves.

Britain's industrial decline

Who's to blame?

THE ANATOMY OF CHANGE. By John Banham. Weidenfeld & Nicolson; 308 pages; £20

MANY and various reasons have been offered for Britain's century-long industrial decline: the end of empire, the exhaustion of two world wars, the fading of the industrial revolution, a class-ridden anti-business culture, and an educational system ill-equipped to secure commercial success. The all-purpose single explanation, favoured by Sir John Banham, is bad government or, more generally, the failure of

British institutions.

He has had several useful perches from which to observe this process. He began life as a diplomat, before becoming a director of a firm of managing consultants. He was then picked by Michael Heseltine to be the first controller of the Audit Commission, and subsequently became director-general of the CBI, the bosses' union. He is currently chairman of Tarmac and of the Local Government Commission.

This broad experience makes his views worth listening to, but the scatter-shot approach he adopts makes the whole less impressive than the parts. Government, Parliament, the civil service, local authorities, the education system and the National Health Service all come in for a wigging. The supply-side revolution of the 1980s was not let down by industrialists, rather it was betrayed "by the economic-policy establishment, Parliament, the civil service, and our financial institutions". Chief scapegoat is the Treasury, whose style and ethos have become "part of the problem rather than a solution to the failures of national economic policy-making". His solution is to scrap the oldest department of state and merge its functions into the Cabinet Office and a newly created Department of Commerce.

Like many businessmen, Sir John is im-
patient with politics and politicians. This
leads him to compare the cabinet to the
board of a company, and to argue that, if
only it were streamlined, it would be more
effective at taking decisions. But the art of
politics is not the same as running a com-
pany, nor are voters as biddable as share-
holders. The author acknowledges that busi-
nessmen who make the switch have not
always been outstandingly successful in
politics—witness Sir John Davis and, more
recently, Lord Young—but he still wants a
ministry of all the talents, leavened by a
sprinkling of top-level managers.

At best, this hankering after business val-
ues is unconvincing. At worst, it reads like
an after-dinner discussion at the CBI when
the port has circulated a bit too freely. The
author is on much firmer ground when he
argues the case for stronger local govern-
ment, independent of Westminster and
Whitehall. He notes that Lady Thatcher was
driven mad by the antics of a handful of
"loony-left" councils. The malign conse-
quence was not just the poll tax but also an
excessive centralisation of power. The de-
moralising cycle of decline in many of Brit-
ain's inner cities, coinciding with the emer-
gence of an alienated urban underclass, has

94

THE ECONOMIST MAY 14TH 1994

C16

THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 28, 1994

Books of The Times

A Policy Maker on the Subject He Knows Best

By MICHIKO KAKUTANI

With Henry Kissinger's "Diplomacy," the reader actually gets two books in one. On one level, the volume is an elegantly written study of Western diplomacy, from Richelieu down through Metternich and Bismarck to modern times. This book tries to give the reader an understanding of four centuries of Western politics and history, as well as an appreciation of the highly divergent traditions in statesmanship found in Europe and the United States. Like Henry James, Mr. Kissinger contrasts European coldbloodedness and sophistication with American innocence and naïveté; like Tocqueville, he wants to examine the consequences that American optimism and democratic ideals have had on the country's practical conduct.

The second book, the book that emerges as a subtext in "Diplomacy," is a more subjective and cunning one. To begin with, this book attempts to place Mr. Kissinger's own policy-making exploits (as national security adviser and Secretary of State under President Richard M. Nixon) in context with the policy-making records of such historical giants as Metternich, Castlereagh and Bismarck. While making an impassioned case for such Kissingerian concepts as triangular diplomacy, linkage and balance-of-power negotiations, the book also tries to spin recent and not-so-recent history to support Mr. Kissinger's own embrace (as both a scholar and a policy maker) of the power-oriented pragmatics of realpolitik.

For instance, the failure of the Western democracies to recognize the dangers of Nazi Germany early on, Mr. Kissinger suggests, can be attributed to those countries' failure to pay attention to traditional balance-of-power tenets, which "should have made it clear that a large and strong Germany bordered on the east by small and weak states was a dangerous threat," regardless of Hitler's motives.

Such arguments, of course, serve another purpose in this book as well: they provide a resonant historical backdrop for Mr. Kissinger's efforts to explain and vindicate his own handling of foreign affairs for President Nixon. After all, as Mr. Kissinger well knows, books have the capacity to help shape one's place in history (or at least affect how one's efforts are perceived): his second book, "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" (1957), made him an intellectual celebrity at the age of 34, while his later books, including his best-selling memoirs, helped cement his fame. In this respect, "Diplomacy" can be seen as a kind of response to the publication of recent books (from Seymour M. Hersh's angry diatribe "The Price of Power" to Walter Isaacson's comprehensive biography, "Kissinger") that have provided less-than-flattering portraits of the former Secretary of State.

Indeed, the last portion of "Diplomacy" rehashes events dealt with at length in Mr. Kissinger's two volumes of memoirs ("White House Years" (1979) and "Years of Upheaval" (1982), including the end of the Vietnam War, détente with the Soviet

Associated Press, 1987

Diplomacy

By Henry Kissinger

Illustrated. 912 pages. Simon & Schuster. $35.

Union and the opening to China. Although Mr. Kissinger does not directly address the charges of secretive-ness frequently made against him and Mr. Nixon, he argues (in a passage about Franklin D. Roosevelt) that "there is inevitably in every great leader an element of guile which simplifies, sometimes the objectives, sometimes the magnitude, of the task." Elsewhere, he suggests that only hands-on ministers "with executive powers over all aspects of foreign affairs" can rise to the level of greatness.

Many arguments in "Diplomacy" are decidedly familiar. Once again, Mr. Kissinger complains that Watergate undermined the authority of the President and his long-term foreign-policy objectives. He defends Vietnamization as "the best of the available options." And he angrily rebuts critics like William Shawcross who have charged that his policies set the stage in Cambodia for the Khmer Rouge atrocities.

What overall lesson does Mr. Kissinger draw from the Vietnam War? "The nightmare of Vietnam was not the way in which America entered the war," he writes, "but why it did so without a more careful assessment of the likely costs and potential outcomes. A nation should not send half a million of its young to a distant continent or stake its international standing and domestic cohesion unless its leaders can describe their political goals and offer a realistic strategy for achieving them — as President Bush did later in the gulf war. Washington should have asked itself two basic questions: Was it possible to establish democracy and achieve military victory more or less simultaneously? And even more crucial, will the benefits justify the costs?"

Whereas the sheer amount of detail in Mr. Kissinger's memoirs often shrouded the larger policy goals of his tenure in the Nixon Administra-

tion, "Diplomacy" provides a succinct overview of both his basic philosophy and his interpretation of individual events. The reader finishes the volume with a vivid sense of the author's dark, Hobbesian view of the world and the political implications of that vision.

Moving from the philosophic to the anecdotal with ease, Mr. Kissinger holds the reader's attention with colorful cameo portraits of statesmen, and sharp aperçus about the practice of power. He is also adept at articulating parallels between seemingly disparate situations — between, say, 19th-century Europe and the post-cold-war world — and using this ability to define broad historical patterns and dynamics. The book's final chapter sketchily sets forth Mr. Kissinger's current views on such matters as United States relations with the former Soviet Union, Germany, Eastern Europe, China and Japan, views that will be familiar to anyone who has followed the author's frequent appearances on public-affairs talk shows on television.

Mr. Kissinger argues that the conduct of American foreign policy has historically divided into two dominant schools: the realist school exemplified by Theodore Roosevelt and Richard Nixon, and the messianic, idealist school exemplified by Woodrow Wilson and Ronald Reagan. He argues that America's universalist ideals, combined with its advocacy of collective security, has sometimes blinded the country to the cultural differences of other countries. And he argues that the United States, alone

A history of
international
relations through
four centuries.

among nations, has "rested its claim to international leadership on its altruism," a claim that possesses "a certain aura of unpredictability" for other countries used to blunt calculations of national interest.

Such assessments of America's role in the world should win Mr. Kissinger a new set of readers, even if "Diplomacy" itself fails to solidify the place in diplomatic history Mr. Kissinger would like. In fact, while Mr. Kissinger's focus on national interests and geopolitical realities frequently led to criticism that he lacked an innate feel, as a policy maker, for American values and mores, his very position as a philosophical outsider in this country makes him a provocative observer and essayist, the roles best ratified by this shrewd, often vexing and consistently absorbing book.

["THE NEW YORK TIMES, MONDAY, MARCH 28, 1994", "C15", "NING", "<table><thead><tr><th>9:00</th><th>9:30</th><th>10:00</th><th>10:30</th><th>11:00</th><th>11:30</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>Murphy Brown<br> Murphy catches<br> lies in the nude</td><td>Hearts Afire<br> John and Billy<br> Bob join a men's<br> club (CC) 54954</td><td>★ Northern Exposure<br> Maggie flies in<br> another doctor after<br> Joel complains<br> about feeling professionally<br> isolated<br> club (CC) 5916</td><td>NEWS (CC)<br> 2049935</td><td>Late Show (CC)<br> (11:35) (1 hr.)<br> 4957374</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TV FILM And the Band Played On (1993).<br> Ian, Ian McKellen, Lily Tomlin, Richard Gere, Steve Martin. Fear, rivals<br> and ignorance block a doctor's crusade in early years of AIDS plague.<br> Morty, stimulating dramatic mosaic, via Shifts book. (CC) 2468</td><td>Matthew Modine, Alan<br> (CC) 49138</td><td></td><td>NEWS 2034003,<br> (11:35) (1 hr.)<br> 4975770</td><td>Tonight (r/CC)<br> Herbert Marshall, George Sanders. A marvel-<br> ous vintage Hitchcock thriller about an Ameri-<br> can reporter pursued by German spies in Eu-<br> rope. 169515</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Estevez, Lisanne Falk, Carrie<br> women involved in a hit-and-run</td><td>NEWS 17461</td><td></td><td>Golden Girls<br> (CC) 53652</td><td>Night Court<br> 95886</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>TV FILM Stolen Babies (1993).<br> Athleen Quintan. Welfare worker exposes corrupt adoption agency in<br> 440's Tennessee. (CC) 22393</td><td>Mary Tyler Moore, Lea Thompson,<br> (CC) 58732</td><td></td><td>NEWS 2989585<br> (11:35) (30 mins.)<br> 7389119</td><td>Nightline (CC)<br> (11:35) (1 hr.)<br> 39008</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Thunder in Paradise Action-ad-<br> ture about crime-fighting ex-<br> eals; series premiere. (CC) 58732</td><td>NEWS (CC) 68119</td><td></td><td>Stories of the<br> Highway Patrol<br> (r) 43312</td><td>Arsenio Hall<br> (r/CC) (1 hr.)<br> 38480</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Star Trek: Deep Space Nine Dax<br> files an oath she made with Klingon<br> warriors 80 years before 83428</td><td>NEWS (CC) 86515</td><td></td><td>Cheera (CC)<br> 38480</td><td>Murphy Brown<br> (CC) 22954</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Going Home to Gospel With<br>atti LaBelle Tribute to gospel<br> music with Edwin Hawkins, others<br> 92190</td><td>Washington National Cathedral<br> History of the cathedral; film clips<br> and newsreels; George Page, narra-<br> tor (r/CC) 21567</td><td></td><td>Charlie Rose Eric Bogosian, de-<br> signer Gianni Versace, Brian<br> l'urquhart 49206</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>The Women of Country Performances by Suzy Bog-<br> liss, Mary-Chapin Carpenter, Emmylou Harris, Wynonna<br> ludd, Patty Loveless, others (CC) 49138</td><td>Old Time Music<br> Maker Melvin<br> Wine 61409</td><td></td><td>Are You Being<br> Served? Peacock<br> picks a fight 43954</td><td>ITN News (r)<br> 88225</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Korean Programming 13062</td><td>Inside Money<br> 96119</td><td>Poltel Polish<br> News 32157</td><td>Fighting Words<br> 89770</td><td>Dennis Wholey<br> 22683</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>In the Mix (CC)<br> 1393</td><td>Gross National<br> Product 85515</td><td>First Exposure<br> 56515</td><td>Korean Nightline<br> News 92954</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Clarisa 74770</td><td></td><td>Cristina ... Edicion Especial (r)<br> 84157</td><td>NEWS 6895931<br> NEWS (11:35) (½<br> hr.) 3854645</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>FILM Lenca la Taxiwa Lucila Mariscal, Cesar Bono. 35867</td><td></td><td></td><td>NEWS 53634<br> Paid 93428</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>★ American Experience \"Geronimo.\"<br> In 1886, the U.S. sends 5,000 men to<br> capture the Apache leader (CC) 90732</td><td>★ Red Skelton: Funny Faces III<br> the comedian portrays a variety of char-<br> ters in a 1982 performance 21549</td><td></td><td>Charlie Rose Eric Bogosian, de-<br> signer Gianni Versace, Brian<br> l'urquhart 47848</td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Darling Buds of May A handsome<br> stranger endears himself to the<br> Larkins (Part 1 of 2) 351409</td><td>NEWS (r) 354596</td><td></td><td>ITN News<br> 606461</td><td>Are You Being<br> Served? 850480</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Man, Julie Andrews. Yank physicist</td><td>NEWS 76799</td><td>Magnum, P.J. 16799</td><td></td><td>FILM (See Late<br> Movies)</td><td></td></tr></tbody></table>", "UM CABLE", "<table><tr><td>Natasha Richardson, Faye Dunaway.<br> via Atwood novel. (R) 168866</td><td>South Bank Show \"Margaret At-<br> wood\" 147393</td><td>★ FILM The River (1951). Nora Swin-<br> burne. (See Late Movies)</td></tr><tr><td colspan=\"3\">★ FILM Foreign Correspondent (1940). Joel McCrea, Laraine Day. Vin-<br> tage Hitchcock. 169515</td></tr><tr><td>Sissy Spacek, Kevin Bacon, Tommy Lee Jones, Gary Oldman, Michael.<br> in his book claiming conspiracy of just about everybody. 25852954</td><td></td><td>TV FILM Eleanor, First Lady of<br> the World (See Late Movies)</td></tr><tr><td>Haynes, Marlon<br> 31</td><td>FILM Coming to America (1988). Eddie Murphy, Arsenio Hall, James<br> Earl Jones. 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Murderous robots<br> Weak human drama, best for the gizmos (10:05) 2564480</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Charles Bronson, Will Sampson. Odd<br> Bit muddled. (PG) 360157</td><td></td><td>TV FILM Heart of Darkness (1994). Tim Roth, John Malkovich. Turn- of-cen-<br> tury young Briton hunts insane trader hiding in Africa. 610684</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Wrestling (CC) 230729</td><td>Silk Stalkings (CC) 448026</td><td>Wings (CC)<br> 358751</td><td>Wings (CC)<br> 502770</td></tr></table>", "IC CABLE", "<table><tr><td>Sherlock Holmes \"The Sign of Four\"<br>(Part 2 of 2) 463157</td><td>Lovejoy Lovejoy attempts to stop a<br> man con 433916</td><td>Charlton Heston Presents the Bible<br> \"Genesis\" (Part 1 of 4) 687935</td></tr><tr><td colspan=\"3\">★ FILM Tales of Manhattan (1942). All-star episodes linked to a tailcoat, thin<br> to grand. Best are Charles Laughton and Edward G. Robinson. 802022</td></tr><tr><td>Video Soul 787935</td><td></td><td>★ FILM Decision Before Dawn<br>(1951). 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Anyway, lively. 800799</td><td>The 700 Club 877461</td><td>Bonanza 865751</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>4</td><td></td><td>Unsolved Mysteries (CC) 878225</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>I Love Lucy<br> 726138</td><td>Bob Newhart<br> 531080</td><td>Yanks 38157<br> Collector 14577</td><td>Sports Desk/Martial Art s 4274225</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>Catwalk 875003</td><td>Beavis 167596<br> Beavis 153428</td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td>Mary Tyler Moore<br> (CC) 356428</td><td>Dick Van Dyke<br> 721683</td><td>Get Smart<br> 940916</td></tr><tr><td>and \"Cats,\" offer a 12,000-year his-<br> tural influences (8:05) 5660799</td><td></td><td>FILM Runaway (1984). Tom Selleck, Cynthia Rhodes. Murderous robots<br> Weak human drama, best for the gizmos (10:05) 2564480</td><td></td></tr><tr><td>Charles Bronson, Will Sampson. Odd<br> Bit muddled. (PG) 360157</td><td></td><td>TV FILM Heart of Darkness (1994). Tim Roth, John Malkovich. 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Josef von Sternberg's stirring masterpiece about a professor whose love for a cabaret singer leads to ruin. 6067469", "24-HOUR NEWS", "(C-SPAN) At 10 A.M. \"Public Policy Conference\"; at 6:30 P.M. \"Viewer Call-In,\" the appropriations process for the U.S. Departments", "of Labor, Health and Human Services and Education; at 8 P.M. \"Event of the Day.\"", {"bbox": [903, 173

MAR-09-94 15:03 FROM: KORDA-NYC

Rt Hon Lord Callaghan of Cardiff KG

ID:

House of Lords

1st March 1994

MAR 09 1994

Dear Michael

Thank you for sending me the page proofs of Henry Kissinger's
important and timely book which I have read with great
appreciation. You ask for a comment, so here goes.

The book impressively sets out the fruits of a lifetime's
study and reflections by a practitioner in the world of
International Affairs who is uniquely qualified to do so by
his own experience. This book is addressed primarily to
Americans but non-Americans would also wish to join in the
debate about what is the best way of reconciling America's
pursuit of her national interest with President Wilson's
concept of international morality.

As Henry Kissinger says, the United States and Europe must
maintain the closest links although we are likely to be more
uneasy bedfellows in the future than we have been since the
end of World War II. We are greatly in his debt for setting
out such a clear agenda for debate, and it should be read and
digested by everyone who will play any part in shaping the New
World Order."

Mr Michael Korda
Corporate Vice President
Simon & Schuster, New York

#579 P02

FAX NO: 16174263078

ID: SCM ASSOCIATES

WED 16:37 MAR-30-'94

B6

THE NEWS JOURNAL

FRIDAY, MARCH 25, 1994

# Kissinger trying to work his magic

## Legendary diplomat campaigns for Roth

By TOM CURLEY
Staff reporter

WILMINGTON — Henry A. Kissinger is a good luck charm for local Republican candidates.

Pierre S. du Pont IV, then governor, first brought Kissinger to town in 1979 to raise money for du Pont's successful re-election campaign. In 1988, the legendary diplomat was in Wilmington to press the flesh for Sen. William V. Roth Jr.

With Roth facing a tough campaign this year, Kissinger was at the Delaware Art Museum Thursday to again dole out nuggets of foreign policy wisdom to the GOP faithful.

"I've known [Roth] for a long time. We've worked together on many projects. He's one of those senators who you can always rely on for a patriotic, strong and far-sighted foreign policy," Kissinger said.

It is expected that it will cost Roth $2 million to defend his seat against Attorney General Charles M. Oberly III, the senator's well-regarded Democratic opponent.

Roth raised $50,000 Thursday from supporters who paid $500, $100 or $30, depending upon how close they wanted to get to Kissinger.

Approximately 200 people attended the Roth fund-raiser, but

Roth was not among them. He was in Washington, unable to come home because of an unexpected Senate filibuster.

Roth's absence, of course, was noted, but the audience really turned out to see Kissinger, Secretary of State under Republican presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald Ford.

Kissinger, who now runs his own consulting firm, recently was named a Common Wealth Award winner. The awards are administered by the Bank of Delaware through a trust established by Ralph Hayes, a former Coca-Cola executive.

At 70, Kissinger's hair is graying but his agile mind and dry wit apparently have not diminished. Du Pont introduced Kissinger "as a man who knows more about foreign policy than everyone in the Clinton administration put together."

Kissinger responded by jokingly accusing du Pont of damning him with faint praise. "To know more than the members of the Clinton administration leaves a lot of room for ignorance," Kissinger said to great laughter.

Kissinger's speech, received warmly by the partisan crowd, amounted to a survey of the world's trouble spots laced with a fair bit of humor.

Here's what he had to say:

The News Journal/SUSAN L. GREGG

Matt Minker, one of the Blue Rocks owners, holds a baseball autographed by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who is standing in front of Steve Meyers, Sen. William Roth's campaign manager.

* On Russia: "We shouldn't make American foreign policy geared to domestic politics in Moscow, which local people have trouble following and we can not influence very well."

* On the Arab-Israeli peace process: "I think there's a chance of success. I think it will be incredibly messy but I don't know a better alternative."

* On North Korea: "Their leader is 82 years old and has the reputation for irrationality, except when you compare him with his son, who he wants to be his successor. Compared to his son, he looks very rational."

* On American foreign policy

generally: "If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there. We are drifting indeed in that direction."

03-30-94 03:42PM P002 #39

SCM ASSOCIATES