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Walter Mills - 18.

forces were welcomed as liberators by a majority of the Cuban and Puerto
Rican peoples. They would hardly be so welcomed in Cuba now. The
psychological and emotional foundations for an operation on the 1898
pattern simply do not now exist; the international context in which it would
have to be set is totally different, and it would be useless to attempt it. In
regard to Cuba, war has lost its meaning for the United States.

It seems similarly to have lost meaning in the power
relations of the states throughout the world. As has been said, organized
international war within either the Atlantic world or the areas of Communist
empire seems almost inconceivable at present. Along the unstable frontiers
where the two great international systems meet, there are many difficult
situations; and over almost everyone the cry is usually raised that it
carries a threat of major war. Actually, these cries are mostly propaganda;
with one, or perhaps two, ominous exceptions it is very difficult to see
anywhere in the world today a genuine and serious threat of all-out war.
One is Berlin; the inappeasable Arab-Israeli conflict may be a second. For
the rest, in Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, the Pacific littoral,
where the great military states vie with each other to advance or defend
their power, they do so by "indirect" means. They may supply weapons,
economic support, technicians and even "volunteers" to the contending
factions in such areas. They do not deploy their own armed forces, partly
out of fear of the great war, but mainly because military invasion has become
obsolete as a solution for the power issues actually presented. In the highly

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Walter Mills - 19.

militarized world of today, organized international wars, even such as
might successfully be kept "limited," are largely futile as instruments
of policy. In a world demilitarized to police-force level a return to the
general war system would seem even more futile; but the light weapons, as
well as the economic and propaganda instrumentalities which are applicable
to modern power issues, would still be available.

One may now recapitulate the image of "peace by
assumption." The international system would be composed of substantially
the existing independent sovereignities -- large and small, wealthy and under-
developed, stable and unstable. Forms of government would be of all kinds,
from Communist proletarian dictatorship through non-Communist radical
or conservative dictatorship, to constitutional authoritarianism to consti-
tutional democracy. The economics would range from total state owner-
ship through the various "mixed" forms, though all would be highly
bureaucratized. In all there would be elite classes or groups, bending the
instruments of government to the maintenance of their own power and prestige;
in none would "the people" be wholly voiceless or enslaved; in none, on the
other hand, would the people have more than an indirect participation in
the decisions of the bureaucracy, although in some, of course, this popular
participation would be much more extensive than in others. The critical
point here, it is believed, is neither the degree of popular participation
nor the ownership of the means of production. It is in the common bureaucratic
organization. While bureaucracies commonly wage titanic struggles within and

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Walter Mills - 20.

against each other, they do so normally by non-violent means; they are,
indeed, the principal instruments developed in contemporary life for
reconciling the endless clashes of interest and judgment arising out of
the developing technical complexity of our times. Two rival national
bureaucracies can resolve differences between them far more efficiently
and fairly than can two rival military systems -- and it is believed that
this is just as true when one is "Communist" and the other "capitalist" as
when both wear the same ideological tag.

As a consequence of the assumption, all of these states
would have renounced the use of war as an instrument of policy. All
would be committed to the principle that no further territorial, political
or social change could take place except as such changes could be effected
by non-military and if possible non-violent action. Most of the states
would be quite highly organized domestically. All would be living behind
well-stabilized frontiers. (This, also, is a consequence of the assumption,
though it should be noted that most national frontiers are well stabilized
today.) All would have divested themselves, not only of their heavy
weapons but of their military formations, their staffs, war ministries and
war industries. In the result, all would be relieved of any immediate
military threat and those strategic considerations by which we are now so
deeply pre-occupied would become largely irrelevant, as they have become
within the Atlantic world. They would have an international police and
inspection force of some kind, not primarily to "keep order" --- since the

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Walter Mills - 21.

order declared and established by the act of demilitarization would largely
keep itself --- but to warn the states, at the very least, against any
tendency on the part of their neighbors to rearm. Even if one or another
great state had held out a clandestine military establishment it would, in
such a world, be an instrument of no use to it. Every state would have
its own national police force to guarantee its internal "monopoly of force.
With the abolition of military missiles, aircraft and war vessels, no state
would have any reason to fear non-contiguous enemies; while there would
be powerful political and legal considerations to protect smaller states
against the misuse of their police forces by their great neighbors. There
would be, presumably, a considerable further development of international
law to deal with such justiciable issues as might arise.

But the non-justiciable issues would remain. These are
those issues of power which lie beyond the scope of an agreed and
commonly-accepted structure of law; and it seems improbable that a
world containing both Communist and non-Communist, dictatorial and
democratic, states can generate a commonly-accepted system of law broad
and strong enough to deal with the power issues likely to arise. If the
nations no longer felt that they had to fight for their military security, they
would doubtless still feel that they had to contest for power. "Power" is
a difficult and elusive word in this context. Power has many shapes. There
is moral, political, economic, legal and police power, as well as purely

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Walter Mills - 22.

military power. If the latter were eliminated from the "power struggle" just what would remain? This is the really critical question about the assumed demilitarized world --- a question which neither Western nor Communist political thought seems fairly to have faced. In general, the West has gone no farther than to posit a world in which the power struggle would be legally confined within non-military means of settlement, and would therefore redound (it is supposed) to the conservation of the existing international system and the West's predominant position within it. Soviet thought, on the other hand, seems to have gone no farther than to posit a world in which the power struggle would be legally confined within those means of settlement (violent or non-violent) which would ensure the universal triumph of socialist proletarian dictatorship. The legal structure of this world will be such as to prohibit any violence opposed to this end and to permit any violence necessary to attain it.

The objective has been repeatedly stated by all Communist leaders from Lenin to Khrushchev. It appears very clearly in the Soviet disarmament proposals of June 1960. Considering the measures to be taken "to insure peace and maintain international law and order... under conditions of general and complete disarmament," the proposal suggests an undertaking by the states to place detachments of their national police at the disposal of the UN Security Council to form an international police force. It then adds: "Naturally, such police --- militia --- detachments should be used exclusively for maintaining peace among nations and not for

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Walter MilLS - 23.

suppressing peoples who are struggling for their independence and social progress, and not for interfering in the internal affairs of states." This would authorize any violent revolutions or seizures of power of, for example, the Castro type. It would not forbid the great states from supporting them from outside with money, propaganda or light arms. It would prevent any international police action to control such situations (as an interference in internal affairs); and while it would debar the threat of organized war by a great power in support of its own faction, it would seem to leave virtually unaffected the present Soviet and Chinese power to promote such operations in the Communist interest. Communist political theory has reason for anticipating that the result would be the universal victory of populist dictatorial socialism. It is for this reason that many in the West accept the Soviet proposals for general and complete disarmament as basically sincere. Advanced as they were at a time when there was obviously no possibility of their acceptance by the West, they must have had a large propagandist content; but there is every reason to believe that the Soviet Union would be glad to settle on such terms. What is in question here is not the sincerity of the proposals but their common sense.

"Peace by assumption" presupposes a universal agreement upon the desirability of the world system which would result. It is simple folly for either the Western or the Communist world to imagine that it is possible to get a consent agreement to any system which promises the inevitable destruction of one side or the other. But one is led to look again

Walter Millis - 24.

at the assumed state of demilitarization. There are flaws in
the Communist expectation just as there are, no doubt, in the
expectations of the West. General demilitarization would seem,
at least at first sight, to give an advantage to the Communist
technique of indirect support for local populist revolution in
the underdeveloped and unstable areas of the world. It would
confer no corresponding advantage upon Russia in the great and
stable Western democratic societies, where Communism has largely
lost any operative significance. In the demilitarized world,
the Russians must certainly expect a large, hard core of capitalist
democracy, with great political and economic power, to remain;
just as the West must reconcile itself to the permanent continuance
of the great and stabilized Communist societies.

If the power struggle continues in the "uncommitted" areas,
some things would soon become rather more apparent than they seem
to be today. The spread of dictatorial socialism, even when it
is directly supported from Moscow, is by no means the same thing
as the spread of Russian Communist power. At the time of writing,
Nasser is engaged in a violent propaganda battle with the Soviet
Union. Recent history is strewn with figures from Tito or even
Mao to Castro or Toué in Guinea who, while operating socialist
or populist dictatorships and accepting Russian support, are far
from being Russian puppets. The abortive invasion of Cuba, while
seemingly consolidating Castro's position beyond any chance

Walter Miltis - 25.

of his overthrow, has at least tended to weaken his subservience to Moscow. It may well be that populist dictatorial socialism will prove the only visible answer in the more chaotic or more backward areas of the world. If so, it may take the military form (as in Egypt or now, apparently, in Korea) as well as the explicitly Communist form; even in the latter case it will not necessarily represent an expansion of Russian political power, and even less will it be equivalent to the "Communist conquest of the world."

It is often said that the Russian and Chinese leaders are bestriding the world because of their dedicated, unremitting "purpose" to conquer it for Communism; whereas the democratic-capitalistic West is losing the cold war because it does not know what its "purpose" is, has no corresponding historic conviction and cannot make its gospel effective in the "battle for men's minds." One must look with some suspicion on this analysis. It is true that Marxist predestination and the Communist slogans built upon it provide powerful weapons in the struggles of radical leaders like Castro toward dictatorial power; it is probably also true that the Western slogans of freedom and democracy cannot be made effective in those large areas of the globe where democracy appears to be unworkable and "freedom" only too often carries the connotation of freedom for small elite groups --- both native and representative of foreign capital --- to preserve their own profits and prestige at the expense of much needed social and economic reform for the mass of the population.

Walter Millis - 26.

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While the Communist slogans are often illusory, they cannot be combatted by Western-democratic slogans which in the given conditions are likely to be more so. But the battle of slogans is by no means the same thing as the battle for power. The real question is not the comparative fighting value of the slogans; it is whether a working international political system can be constructed out of the non-military factors now available. Such a system must allow for the inevitable power conflicts in the world; it cannot be so constructed as to foreclose their outcome in either one sense or another; it must provide a fluid co-existence for many contrasting forms of government, and must probably allow for a fair amount of violence. But it must exclude the appeal to organized international war as the final arbiter in its affairs.

With demilitarization, the West could face such an international system with considerable confidence. It has not remained helpless in face of the rise of dictatorial popular socialism. The West is neither as ruthless nor, perhaps, as skillful as the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders in exploiting the issues which /raises; while the West still carries a weight of 19th Century liberal tradition which makes it extraordinarily difficult for it to understand the implications of the bureaucratized, populist political economy which seems to be typical of the modern era. But its lack of doctrinaire ruthlessness is an asset as well as liability in the world power structure; while its understanding and its techniques (in spite of the Cuban flasco) have been steadily improving.

Ideologically, the democratic West has been puzzled and embarrassed

Walter Milles - 27.

by the appearance of anti-Communist military dictatorship (the most
recent represented by the military coup in Korea)/but in practice it has
seemed quite capable of accommodating itself to such developments in
the Soviet-Western power structure. The foreign aid programs of the
United States, the Point four and now the Peace Corps operations, the
willingness to abandon, almost without protest and wholly without military
threats, the extensive American private and public investments in Cuba,
all indicate a new grasp of the realities in the world in which we are now
living. The West is not unprepared to deal with them. Relieved, through
a general demilitarization, of the Soviet military threat, the United
States could have met the problem of social revolution in Cuba far more
intelligently than it did. The social and economic problems in the "Pearl
of the Antilles" were not basically different from those which the United
States has in fact met with marked success in Puerto Rico. The structural
similarities between the proto-Communist Castro regime in Cuba and the
military, but fundamentally populist, Trujillo regime in the Dominican
Republic were so strong that many looked to a possible coalition between
the two. The United States was unhappy, for different reasons, about both.
A clearer view of the real social and political forces at large in the world
today might have made it possible for the United States to manage its
relations with both to more constructive ends.

The old, conventional patterns of international life and
policy are breaking up; they have been fractured, first, by the military

Walter Mills - 28.

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consequences of the nuclear arsenals and second, by the social and economic consequences of the new bureaucratized technology. New patterns of international relations are developing in which organized war is not now a prominent factor and may never so become. If war and the war system were abolished, the capitalist-democratic West could face the resultant situation with quite as much confidence in its political, economic and moral power as any Communist could muster. The question which the West is forced to put to its Communist opposite numbers is whether Communism could do so? In a demilitarized world, the specialized Communist technique of supporting, if not actively fomenting, dictatorial social revolution in non-Communist countries might well be turned against the great Communist states themselves. This is what the Soviet Union alleged occurred at the time of the Hungarian revolt. But it was clear then that, whether or not there was any substance in the charge of Western "imperialist" incitation, the fear of precipitating a great war prevented any practical exploitation of the situation by the West. In a demilitarized world there would be no fear of a great war. How, one is forced to ask, do the authors of the Soviet general disarmament plan envisage a repetition of the Hungarian situation?

In the Hungarian case, the rebels overpowered or subverted the local police forces (including Russian as well as Hungarian units), and the Soviet Union restored the situation by invading with the Red Army. Under the Soviet plan for demilitarization there would be no Red Army. The proposed international police force would be expressly debarred from intervening in a

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Walter Mills - 29.

"domestic" issue of this kind. The Soviet Union's national police force would, naturally, be very much larger than Hungary's; in organization and equipment it would be ill-suited to a military invasion, but it would presumably be physically capable of over-running the neighbor state and "restoring order." Nor would the international police (if composed and commanded in accordance with the Soviet plan) be competent to prevent it. Would the Soviet Union launch a "police" invasion of Hungary? To do so would be in flagrant violation of the treaty structure on which the demilitarized world rested; it would bring down that world --- from which the Soviet Union like all others, would be deriving many benefits, --- in irretrievable ruin. Would she simply accept the results of the revolution, probably imperiling thereby the stability and internal security of the whole Russian Communist empire? Or would there ensue within Hungary a competition between East and West, using the "indirect" methods discussed above, of which the outcome would necessarily be left open?

These are not empty questions; it is essential to have answers for them if one is to form any picture of how a demilitarized international society would actually operate. The questions can, of course, be modified by assuming an international police force with more authority and power to intervene in Hungary-type situations than the Soviet proposals would allow to it --- as well as a much more developed structure of international law and government than the Soviet Union appears to contemplate --- but such an assumption would only beg the underlying power issues which would have to be met before such a

Walter Milles - 30.

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force or such a government could be brought into being by common consent.
Of the three possible Russian responses, in a demilitarized world, to another
Hungary-type situation, the third seems to the present writer the most
probable. But whether it seems the most probable to the Soviet proponents of
general and complete disarmament we do not know.

There are other present or potential situations which the West may
fairly ask Russian spokesmen to analyze. It is evident that today the Soviet
Union and China do not always see eye to eye; but it is perhaps equally
evident that in the existing military context a war between China and the USSR
is a virtual impossibility. Each partner is too vital to the other's military
security to contemplate an armed conflict between them --- a situation much
the same, indeed, as that which exists within the NATO community. In a
demilitarized world a Sino-Soviet war would be equally out of the question,
but how would such power issues as might arise between the partners be
resolved? The Western nations can say with confidence that there will be no
issues among themselves which will be insusceptible to resolution by non-
military means. Can the members of the Communist bloc say the same?

So far, this paper has endeavored to project the kind of world which
would be brought into existence by a universal agreement on general and
complete disarmament --- the kind of world we would be living in if the
Soviet plan or its equivalent had been adopted by all powers, carried out in
good faith, military establishments demobilized and military industries
converted to peaceful uses and at least a minimal international force set up to
see that they remained so. The attempted projection raises a good many

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Walter Mills - 31.

difficult issues, like those just discussed, as to the power structure of such a
world, as to how power relationships would be regulated and power issues
received. These issues demand much more careful thought and study than has
been given them. But the projection is on the whole optimistic. Initially,
the peoples (and their governing groups) would be relieved of the fear of
military aggression and the heavy pressures which this has always put upon
them to achieve military security, military power and prestige. Territorial
frontiers would be stabilized everywhere, as they now are within the Atlantic
world, subject to change only by consent or by internal revolutionary
processes. With their national police forces, the several governments --
whether dictatorial, democratic or of intermediate form -- would be confirmed
in their internal "monopoly of force" which is the necessary attribute of all
government; and while many international differences would doubtless continue
to arise, few would be of a kind which would seem to any government possible
of resolution by re-starting the processes of rearmament, military threat
and war. It has been said over and over again that a pre-requisite to de-
militarization is the development of an international legal and judicial system,
with forcible sanctions, to compel the peaceful settlement of international
"disputes." But it is almost never asked what such disputes would be or could
be about, other than issues of the kind which are readily settled today by
adjudication or negotiation.

In a world of this character, the incentives which today drive
governments to armament races and war would be reversed. Today, it is

Walter Mills - 32.

taken as self-evident that violater of a disarmament agreement will thereby
gain an overwhelming advantage at no cost to himself, and it is therefore
felt necessary to devise inspection, control and international police measures
of the most extreme rigor to prevent violation. In a world which had once
been demilitarized, there would be no popular pressure for reviving the war
system; while one may be fairly confident that among the great majority of
leaders, dictators, policy-formulators, rearmament would hold out no attractions
comparable to those of maintaining the demilitarized world.

Once successfully demilitarized, the world would have an inherent
stability, in contrast with the inherent and apparently ineradicable
instability of the contemporary militarized world. It is not to be supposed that
armed violence could be excluded from this global system, any more than it
has been excluded from even the most orderly of existing national systems.
But where violence seemed inescapable in the interests of social or political
change, it would be confined to the methods of riot, mob violence, guerilla
and civil wars, employing only the light, police-type weapons which would
alone be available. If the great, stabilized powers felt it necessary to
meddle in such affairs, they would do it at most by the "indirect" methods already
discussed. A substantial degree of world order would be maintained, not by
an overriding international military force nor by "world opinion" (an elusive
and most unsatisfactory concept) but by a political situation which would make
disorder unprofitable to any important wielder of world power.

The demilitarized world would not rely on a military stabilization.

Walter Mills - 33.

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It could come into being only as military stability was seen to be unimportant; and it would have to take its chances with local disturbance and the power shifts incident upon them. But it would possess a stability rather like that which we now see operating in Latin America. The contemporary world, resting as it does upon a balance of terror, has often been said to be in a position only of "metastability," like that of a ball poised on the top of a hill, with only a slight displacement required to send it rolling to the bottom. The demilitarized world would, rather, resemble the situation of a ball at the bottom of a hollow, where even large displacements will result only in its return to the original position.

Such is the promise of the demilitarized world. The modern bureaucratic nation state, in conjunction with the technology of which it is both the creature and the creator, is among the most remarkable inventions of man. Regardless of the particular ideologies which may inform it, its powers of organization and achievement are enormous. Once freed of the incubus of its strategic origins, its strategic obsessions and its strategic fears, it could finally become the greatest of all instruments in the perfection of the human lot, rather than the probable agent, as it now seems to be, of the annihilation of mankind. That is the promise of demilitarization.

Performance is a different matter.

###

Walter Mills - 33A

## 4. Peace by Evolution

In attempting to project the characteristics of a world pacified "by assumption," the foregoing section has omitted any discussion of most of the issues which are now being actively debated in this field. It has said nothing about the terms of the assumed disarmament treaty. It has said nothing about the development of an international legal and jurisprudential system --- regarded by many as a pre-requisite to disarmament. It has said nothing about the structure of the central international authority, and very little about the composition, the command and the functions of its international police force. It has not discussed the complicated problems of inspection and control of armaments. It has raised only obliquely the very real issues involved in the remaining national police forces and their functions. It has said nothing about the technical economic problems of demobilizing the uniformed establishments and reconverting the war industries to pacific employment. It has not even discussed possible political solutions --- particularly in Germany and Formosa --- which obviously must be found before any general and complete disarmament by common consent can possibly take place.

These omissions were deliberate. All these topics concern, not the nature of a world demilitarized, but the means of attaining such a situation. The distinction is critical; and endless damaging confusion has been caused by the failure to observe it. It is too often argued that because a pacified world

Walter Milits - 34.

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will be a disarmed world, disarmament is the best means to secure the pacified world. Decades of experience have indicated that there is a fallacy in this syllogism, yet it still persists in high places and low. The goal --- a state of general disarmament and pacification --- seems, once it has been attained, to be workable and desirable. But unless this image of the goal can be clearly distinguished from the discussion of the means to its attainment, it will be difficult to bring useful analysis to bear upon the many means which are currently proposed. The imagined future can at most throw a helpful, perhaps encouraging, light upon the issues of the dangerous and distressful present; but it cannot in itself resolve them.

It is the conviction of the present writer that most if not all the proposals offered as ways of attaining the warless world in fact describe the consequences of a general pacification rather than causes which will produce it. General disarmament, the development of the rule of law, of more effective world government, of improved global economic organization, will play only an ancillary role in the progress toward pacification and will in the end prove to be reflections of that progress rather than the generative forces behind it.

This is certainly the case with disarmament. The course of present negotiations, to say nothing of the whole previous history of the subject, combine to indicate that there is no purely military solution to the problem of peace. It seems safe to say that no significant disarmament treaty can be written so long as the parties are convinced that the preservation of their

Walter Milles - 35.

[10]

security through military means is the first requirement. It is apparently
impossible to abolish war through any process which maximizes its
importance in international affairs. In the United States it is often said that
a complete and rigid inspection system is a pre-requisite to creating the
confidence without which no disarmament agreement can be reached; yet
it is plain that the insistence upon complete inspection only undermines what
little confidence exists today. It is the paradox of the inspection problem
(as, indeed, of the whole disarmament problem) that even the most elaborate
and perfect of inspection systems is unlikely to work (much less to be
acceptable) unless the question of whether it works or not is of little conse-
quence. As between the Soviet Union and the West today there is actually a
good deal of at least tacit limitation and control of armaments; while nations
have frequently in the past reduced their military preparations, or halted or
refused to enter upon arms races. But they have never done so through
negotiation processes which unavoidably concentrate the maximum attention
upon arms, exaggerate their political and social importance and seek solutions
for the dangers they present by trying to balance the military "securities"
they are supposed to provide.

An ironic (and now probably forgotten) example of this effect occurred
in the latter '20's, when the British and Americans were endeavoring to extend
the Washington Treaty limitations on battleships to the smaller naval classes.
The controversy which thereupon arose between them as to "big" as against
"little" cruisers was totally irrelevant to the already developing international

Walter Milns - 36.

context. It had no significance to the real military security of either
nation. But simply because a treaty was to be signed, because the negoti-
ation focussed attention upon the naval types involved and because neither
nation dared mortgage the future by a present commitment, the argument
was hotly waged across the Atlantic --- and was probably one of the
most meaningless arguments in the history of international relations.

The present Western position on disarmament, unassail-
able as it may seem in logic, represents the pursuit of an illusion. Both
the US and the USSR are, officially at least, committed to general and
complete disarmament within some comparatively brief period of time.
To the West it seems obvious that this can only be attained by graduated
steps, each fully controlled and inspected for compliance before the
next is taken. The Soviet refusal to accept this view is commonly regarded
by the American press as an indication that the "Russians do not want to
disarm;" the American insistence upon control and inspection is no less
regularly presented by Soviet sources as an indication of a similar
recaicitrance on the part of "capitalistic warmongers." To neither side
does it seem to occur that the real difficulty is not one of motive, but is
due to the inherent complexities and psychological difficulties raised by
any attempt to achieve peace by military means.

In the United States in the past few years more serious
thought and study has been given to the disarmament problem than in any
other country. This labor has been really earnest and sincerely motivated

Walter Milns - 37.

by a desire for peace. But since it has all proceeded on the assumption
that the first requirement of any disarmament plan must be the military
security of the parties, the results have been almost wholly negative.
Nearly all of this work sums up to a demonstration that nothing can be
done --- nothing, that is, which the Russians would accept; which on the
fundamental principle that disarmament can proceed only by common
agreement comes to virtually the same thing. The most for which any
of these American students hold out any hope is "arms control," which
means a better stabilization of existing military forces and weapons
systems. It does not seem impossible that a good deal can be done towards
"arms control" --- more of it, probably, through tacit understanding than
through formal treaty arrangements --- but this is obviously no answer
to the major problem of war in a world already too highly integrated for
war to be an acceptable mode of politics.

The Russian position is really more logical than the
Western, but it also represents the pursuit of illusion. Khrushchev stated
it admirably in his report on his conversation with Kennedy:

In conditions of universal and complete disarmament, the
question of international security will appear in a new light: There
will be no armies and no danger of one state attacking another. Under
these conditions, the Soviet Union will be ready to accept the Western
powers' control proposals. We shall agree that provisions should be
made for a control system without any restrictions by whatever side...
And this is perfectly logical, because if there are no armies, no arms
race, nations will have no military secrets, and then the Western
nations will be able to enter any door, any plant or institute in our
country just as our representatives will in their countries.

Walter Milns - 38.

What this says, quite reasonably, is that the only way to abolish war is to abolish it. If there is a general agreement on dismantling the war system, details as to control and inspection will become manageable, in fact, unimportant. But without the general agreement as to abolishing the war system, the effort to accomplish such a result by a balancing of military securities, inspections and so on, is doomed to failure. This seems obviously true. But until Khrushchev can offer some practicable proposals for abolishing, not simply large armaments but the war system itself, he is in a world as unreal as that of Western statesmanship.

The West has found no purely military solution to the problem of war. But Russian thought has found no non-military solution to the same problem. Khrushchev has offered no persuasive reason why the West should enter a treaty of demilitarization. The argument that in a demilitarized world Communism will inevitably "bury" the West may be strong, but it certainly cannot move the West to accept demilitarization. The Khrushchev view is as politically unrealistic as the Western view is militarily unrealistic. In the whole disarmament debate, neither side has grappled with the motives that might make disarmament proposals practical politics.

The only real motive operating today on either side is the fear of thermonuclear war, the inapplicability of such a war to the resolution of any human problems, and the doubt as to the possibility of

Walter Milles - 39.

conducting any significant war without sooner or later calling down the
nuclear arsenals. These are, however, very strong motives; they have
clearly dominated the course of international policy at least since the
beginning of the Korean War in 1950, and may be expected to operate in
the future. If the consequences of these fears are sufficiently effective,
international politics may be modified into a system in which the demilitar-
zation of the world becomes a political possibility. Otherwise, the
civilized world will presumably destroy itself. If this outcome is to be
averted, what modifications in our existing system must in fact take
place?

For the reasons already discussed, it is believed
impossible to provide any "plan" or program of modification which will
hold out any hope of success. The modification must be regarded in
terms, not of pre-constructed plan, but of process. One must look, not
for a program (such, for example, as the establishment of world government
and the "rule of law," or, for that matter, the universal triumph of
Communism) but for a dynamic which will tend toward the desired end,
employing such concepts as world law, or international policing or general
disarmament only as they become useful to it. The energizing heart of
such a dynamic must be found in the steadily growing realization of the
inutility of major war. We put it now primarily in terms of the fear of
nuclear weapons; yet this realization has in fact been growing since the
tragic years of the First World War. As George Kennan has put it, by

Walter Mills - 40.

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1917 at least it was apparent to many and should have been apparent to all that war was no longer a practicable instrument of policy. It is true that a still greater war was to ensue; but both the publics and most of the statesmen of 1939 were very different from the publics and statesmen of 1914, and the publics and statesmen in the two great, potentially hostile military colossi of today are very different from those of Germany, France and Britain in 1939. We have been learning, taught not only by the bombs but by the whole scale of experience in the past half century.

One might expect the first consequence of this experience to be manifested, not in a general disarmament treaty, but in a comparative stabilization of existing military systems --- in some degree of what American students now call "arms control." The tendency here will be to slow down the arms race. It is not now operating at anything like maximum possible pressures --- as is illustrated by the essentially absurd *contre-temps* which has been arrived at over the nuclear test ban negotiations. There is every reason to believe that both the Khrushchev and the Kennedy administrations would be relieved if no further testing should take place. But neither dares bind itself to do what both want to do, for fear of being outwitted; so each tries to use the threat of restarting a process that neither wants to resume as a means of forcing the other to agree to its idea of how the process should be halted. This application of games theory to international policy has its very dangerous implications; but it is also grotesque, and the grotesquerie may ultimately overcome the gamesmen.

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Walter Mills - 41.

Another example of the relatively lowered pressures of the arms race is provided by the refusal of American opinion to enter with any seriousness into civil defense programs, and the apparent disinclination of the Soviet Government to do so either. There is a good deal of obscurity in the United States about the real extent and effectiveness of Soviet civil defense programming. Our impression is that while Russia has done a good deal more than the United States in the way of drills, indoctrination and so on, it has done little if anything more in the way of reliable defenses --- vast fall-out shelters, stockpiling of resources, deep underground protection of industrial resources -- than has the United States. Both countries, one may conclude, are much more interested in seeing that a thermonuclear war does not occur than in taking precautions against one. This means that both the arms race and war itself takes a secondary place in their calculations. The arms race is being carried on today at too high a pitch for safety, but it is not a maximum pitch. Neither of the great contestants really thinks that military power is everything. And this belief is more likely to grow than to diminish.

If it does grow, "arms control" should tend toward the second obvious prerequisite to general demilitarization. That is the effective stabilization of frontiers. It has already been observed that most of the world's frontiers are today well stabilized and generally accepted by those concerned. Perhaps only in Germany and in Formosa is the territorial question really acute. These are, certainly, large exceptions; and

Walter Milns - 42.

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the danger of the civilized world blowing itself to pieces over them --- especially over Berlin --- is much too great for comfort. But both are subject to compromise; and as the military threats and military calculations which surround them can be reduced, by arms control or otherwise, compromise must become increasingly possible. In the case of Germany a wide range of compromise proposals has been advanced. In a demilitarized world almost any one of these would yield a reasonably just and stable solution. In the contemporary world of military power politics, they offer no practicable basis for compromise because they do not reach to the strategic factors involved in the power issues.

It is the same difficulty as one encounters with disarmament proposals. If Khrushchev was right in saying that there is no possible compromise of the "inspection" problem unless the West is ready to forswear war, the West is certainly right in saying that there is no practicable compromise of the German problem unless the Soviet Union is equally ready to forswear war. So long as war and threats of war remain the final basis of the international system, the West cannot sacrifice Adenauer's Germany to Communist expansionism --- as, indeed, Russia cannot sacrifice East Germany to Western expansionism. With complete demilitarization, on the other hand, the problem of the Germanies would be as readily negotiable as the problems of inspection. Any progress toward de-emphasizing the significance of military or strategic factors in the minds of responsible statesmen will bring compromise solutions that much nearer; and compromise solutions of remaining important territorial

Walter Milus - 43.

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issues will in turn facilitate disarmament.

The old question --- endlessly debated since First World
War days --- as to whether "political" solutions must come before dis-
armament or disarmament must come before political solutions, has
never been answered, no doubt because it is essentially meaningless.
Military and political factors are too deeply entangled in contemporary
international politics to be susceptible to this kind of distinction; in
neither can one find the key which will unlock the riddle of the other, since
both are ultimately the same. Only in a changing international context
can solutions increasingly be found in both areas, solutions in each reacting
to encourage those in the other. It seems quite illogical to hope that a
political settlement of the German Question adequate to resolve in itself
the armaments problem can be drawn up, proposed and ratified today.
It is less illogical than many may suppose to hope that the international
context is changing and will continue to change to a point at which a poli-
tico-military resolution will become possible.

James Reston has shrewdly observed that the issues now
actually being raised over Berlin are not really of a military character:
"the talk of war, while it makes big headlines, makes very little sense."
The Russians, he argues, are "really engaged in a clever non-military
strategy to solidify their postwar gains." Khrushchev's governing objective
is not the destruction of West Germany but the stabilization of the
Communist empire in Eastern Europe; it is "obvious" that this cannot be
done by precipitating a war over West Berlin, just as it is obvious to the

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West that West Berlin cannot be defended by a war. War is really useless to both sides, and both sides already know it. Just as the Russians are deploying a "non-military" strategy in this affair, there are non-military strategies open to the West; and there is a good possibility that through the inter-play of these strategies the situation can ultimately be stabilized without a war. The great danger is, of course, that each side feels it necessary to back its "non-military strategy" with threats of war --- threats which may easily be miscalculated by one side or the other. But both sides may also appraise the threats accurately (the penalties of miscalculation being altogether unacceptable to either) and a reasonably stable result be attained. Here the context of international relations in one critical area is in fact changing; if it changes sufficiently, we shall be that much nearer to a general stabilization of the world's frontiers, the elimination of territorial issues and the creation of a situation in which general disarmament will become a possibility.

If the control of the arms race is the first condition for pacification, and the stabilization of frontiers the second, a general acceptance of some form of international authority is presumably the third. This authority might, it is believed, be quite modest in the scope of its powers and armed forces, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that it would have to be genuinely international --- or, better, supra-national --- in character. However limited its role, within the limits of

Walter Millis - 45.

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that role it would have to operate free of veto by any nation state. It would have to be in fact an authority.

Since 1945 the Russians have insisted with great pertinacity upon the "unanimity" rule and its corresponding veto power; they are raising the question once more with their proposals to reduce the UN Secretariat and arms inspection to a "troika" system. The West, too confident of its generally dominant position in existing international organs, has never taken the Russian argument with the seriousness which it deserves; but the Soviet Union itself seems never to have fairly faced its implications. The very idea of an international "authority" is somewhat more complex than either Russia or the West has admitted. Brute force can, of course, be exercised over anyone too weak to resist it; but an international authority --- like authority of any kind ---, can operate only within a consensus which recognizes and accepts it. True authority can exist only in the framework of a general agreement that it is better, within the areas in which the authority is empowered to act, to have a decision of some kind, however adverse it may be to any particular interest involved, than no decision at all. To the extent to which the affected interests retain a veto power, there is no authority.

As a simple illustration, there is a general consensus in the United States that it is better to accept the decision of a majority of the Electoral College as to who shall be the next President, than for any candidate or his supporters to retain a veto power against an adverse decision. In the recent election, although one-half the voters would have

Walter Millis - 46.

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preferred a different result, the decision itself was of too much value for
any of the disappointed to demand a power of veto. In this particular situa-
tion the authority of a majority of the Electoral College (which wields no
physical power whatever and never even meets as a body) is unchallenged,
because it operates within a consensus which accepts it.

The idea of an international authority raises the problem of
securing the consensus on which it may rest. The Russians were well-justi-
fied in their insistence upon and repeated use of the veto as a defense
against the claims of a spurious consensus, where no real consensus
existed. But they were mistaken if they supposed that a unanimity rule
could generate such a consensus. Where the foundations for authority do
not exist, a unanimity rule cannot create them; it can lead only to a deadlock
rendering the development of consensus impossible.

In their bitter-end defense against the claims of a spurious
consensus (often advanced by the West in the name of "world opinion," or
majority votes in the UN, or "respect for treaty engagements") the Russians
have made no positive effort to develop what minimums of international autho-
ity may be required to support a warless international order. They have
repeatedly indicated the areas where they believe they must have the
protection of the veto; they have never tried to explore possible areas in which
they might be able to do without it. Unfortunately, it is not clear that the
West has done much better in this respect; it clings to its own veto powers
as jealously as do the Russians, and when it appeals to "world order" or
"world law" it is still basically appealing for an anti-Communist consensus,

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which obviously cannot meet the problem. It is quite pointless to argue the question of culpability. If one is seriously addressing the possibility of "co-existence" in a world containing both powerful Communist and powerful democratic-capitalistic states, one cannot pause over these insoluble moralistic problems. The practical issue is clear, whatever one's moralistic views may be. "Peaceful co-existence" will require at least some supra-national authority. This cannot exist except under a consensus that its decisions (always within the areas in which it is empowered to act) are superior to any of the interests which they affect. They must, therefore, be veto free --- just as are the decisions, for example, of the Russian Communist Party within the area of its competence.

No unanimity rule can produce such a consensus. There are no "neutrals" today who can clearly command it. It cannot be generated by any reshuffling of representational systems. A reconstruction of the UN General Assembly, for example, along the lines suggested by Clarke and Sohn might well compound the present confusion, but it could not produce the common consent to supra-national decisions which is essential. Khrushchev's "troika" can no more bear him to the universal triumph of Communism than a one-horse sled driven by a Hammerskold can carry the West to democratic world domination. The only possibility of advance appears to lie along two avenues. One is in reducing the putative role of the supra-national authority to limits within which acceptance of its decisions becomes generally preferable to resisting or nullifying them. The other is in enlarging the areas within

Walter Milles - 48.

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which national governments will be willing to accept supra-national authority. If these two processes or tendencies can be carried far enough to sustain a general demilitarization, the warless world will become a possibility. What is essential is not systems --- of even the most ingenious kind. It is the consensus necessary to permit any systems to operate.

A consensus which will permit the establishment of a supra-national "world government" --- analogous, for example, to the Federal Government of the United States --- over all the various races, economic systems and political organizations of modern mankind seems totally beyond reach at present. On the other hand, we already have a general consensus that major war (especially with nuclear weaponry) is useless, anachronistic, and probably imperils the whole future of humanity. Is it possible to develop this consensus far enough to empower the minimum of supra-national authority required to sustain a demilitarized system? If it is, the design and manning of the supra-national agency should present no insuperable difficulties. The development of the UN Secretariat, composed of nationals of many countries under a "neutral" General Secretary, raised no serious problems until it was forced into activities reaching beyond the area where an effective consensus existed to support it.

There are not a few cooperative international operations in which the sovereign states have for convenience agreed to submit themselves to veto-free supra-national authority in one form or another --- William O. Douglas gives an impressive list of them in "The Rule of Law in World Affairs." When these are suggested as possible models for a supra-national

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authority to control demilitarization, the usual answer is that they are
practicable only when they deal with relatively unimportant issues.
No sovereign state will commit its "vital" interests to supra-national
authority. But the European Coal and Steel Community, operated by a
supra-national "High Authority" whose decisions are appealable only to
its supra-national Court of Justice, deals with matters of fairly vital
interest to the member nations. Some of the other international authorities
might also be cited. In such instances one is confronted by an existing
and effective consensus that it is more "vital" to get a supra-national
decision on the issues involved than it is to leave them, through some
form of veto, to independent and chaotic determination by the separate
states concerned.

Considering the appalling nature of the threat of war in a
nuclear age, it does not seem impossible that a minimum consensus of
this kind could develop in regard to the military relations of the states,
as it has in regard to the economic relations of the European Coal and
Steel Community. The powers of the supra-national authority would not
have to reach very far. As in the case of the European Coal and Steel
Community, they certainly would not and could not reach to a power of
life and death over any of the hundred-odd constituent nations or the vary-
ing political and economic systems they have developed. The supra-national
authority would have to have sufficient veto-free power to police the execution
of a general disarmament treaty, and to ensure that rearmament was not
begun anywhere. It would presumably have to have a certain amount of

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Walter Millis - 50.

armed force at its disposal, but its power would not normally
be exercised by force of arms.

Within the concepts of international relations available
to us today, it does not seem possible to create a supra-national
authority empowered to coerce any of the great nation states.
In the last analysis, if a treaty of general disarmament was
violated, the damage could not be repaired by resort to war;
just as it is now pretty well recognized that the undertaking
in the UN Charter to settle all disputes by non-military means
could not, in the event of violation, be repaired by resort to
military means. The primary weapons of the authority would be
inspection, intelligence, publicity and report. In a world pre-
pared to disarm by common consent, these weapons should be suf-
ficient in themselves to insure that the disarmament treaty was
faithfully executed and to create the indispensable condition
for its survival -- that nothing could be gained through rearm-
ament by any power comparable to the costs which rearmament would
impose. Khrushchev has already said that once disarmament has
been agreed to, Russia would accept any form of inspection and
control for which the West might call. Would the Soviet Union
be unwilling to accept a supra-national control authority on a
veto-free basis? Since some authority -- which means effective
authority powerful within its limits -- appears to be inescapable,
if the Russian answer is in the negative there seems no hope of
advance. But neither does there seem to be any clear reason why
it should be in the negative.

A more difficult issue perhaps resides in the national police
forces which, as has already been suggested, would obviously have to

Walter Millet - 51.

remain at the disposition of the national governments. There are many ways
in which a national government might attempt to develop its police forces into
an armed threat against neighboring states, or in which clandestine revolution-
ary forces within a state might attempt to create paramilitary forces against
the wishes of the legal government. How far must the supra-national police
force be empowered to intervene in such cases? Must it be so organized and
weaponed as to be superior, in military strength, to any national police? If
so, under what conditions could it be utilized?

The Soviet disarmament plan suggests that it could never be em-
ployed to intervene in any "domestic" issue, but only to keep the peace
between nation states. This appears to raise a certain contradiction. If it
cannot intervene in domestic situations which threaten to end in a revival of
armaments and war, then it must be made powerful enough to coerce the
states concerned as they approach the brink of war. But if it has the military
strength to interdict armed action by one state on the territory of another,
it must, under the view which the Soviet Union has consistently maintained,
be subject to veto, and thus be rendered nugatory as an agency of supra-national
authority. The whole idea of a supra-national army powerful enough to enforce
peace and disarmament seems to the present writer illusory. It must be re-
peated that peace and disarmament can rest only on a general consensus that
war has become an unacceptably dangerous and useless mode in the conduct
of international relations, and that adequate alternative modes exist or can

Walter Mills - 52

be constructed. A consensus cannot be enforced. But the institutions to
which it gives rise can be policed.

The true functions of a supra-national police force are those of
policemen. And if it is to police a demilitarized world it will have to have
certain limited and specified powers of intervention in the domestic affairs
of nation states. It will probably have to have limited powers over individual
citizens of such states, comparable to (though of course far less extensive
than) those which the American Federal government exercises under Federal
law over the individual citizens of the American states. It will have to operate
in the framework of a consensus which regards warmongering or inciting pre-
parations for war as a crime, and a crime not only against a vague inter-
national community, but against the national community of the country where
it occurs. To police a demilitarized world the supra-national authority would
have to have a certain amount of armed strength and defined powers --- really
comparable, as armies today are not, to the weapons and empowerment which
are given to the police in civil life --- but an attempt to provide it with a super-
army would be self-defeating.

Lewis C. Bohn has advanced some interesting speculations on what
he describes as a "non-physical inspection method for arms control." He
argues that what is important is the detection, not of physical violations of
arms control agreements, but the guilty knowledge of such violations which
must, if the violations are to be of any practical significance, reside some-

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where in the minds of comparatively few top leaders of the nation. One of
his suggestions for discovering such guilty knowledge is to offer rewards,
honors and protections to informers within the country; in other words
turning its general public into an anti-war espionage system. His ideas
seem quite fantastic in the present contexts, but they do indicate how a
demilitarized world could be policed if clandestine preparations for war
became as generally recognized as a crime as, for example, is the trade
in narcotics or slaves today. And Bohn's speculations are in themselves
one indication that an evolution toward such a situation is going forward.

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5. Conclusion

"We are," Kenneth Boulding writes, "totally unprepared for Peace" --- "that drab girl with the olive-branch corsage whom no red-blooded American (or Russian) could conceivably warm up to." "We have never had peace, and it may be forced upon us before we really want it... We have dreamed of Utopia, and secretly been thankful that it is only a dream. Now we are going to be compelled to think about it, and think hard and long, for we may be forced into it by the absence of any alternative but doomsday."

It is only as that kind of thinking gradually proceeds and a new general consensus develops from it, that the international system can approach the goals of pacification and demilitarization. Sudden, sweeping plans --- whether the Soviet plan for total disarmament within four years or the Clark and Sohn plan for establishing world law and disarmament within ten --- cannot succeed. It is impossible to encourage a growth by periodically tearing up the plant to examine the roots. Every disarmament conference ever held has probably done more to prevent than to promote disarmament, because it has focussed an exaggerated attention upon factors which are really irrelevant --- upon myths of military power and defensive might which do not correspond with realities, upon hopes for military dominance or fears of military defeat which are alike largely illusory. Conferences could be held today looking seriously toward the demilitarization of the world. But they would not record the kind of statements and speeches which both Soviet and Western statesmen now

Walter MilLS - 55.

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submit to disarmament conferences.

To say that demilitarization and pacification must be gradual
is in no sense to support the present Western position, calling for
graduated disarmament by rigidly inspected stages. If it were called
today, the imagined serious disarmament conference would waste no time
on precise periods between the stopping of bomb manufacture and the
destruction of bombs, or on technical details of absolutely perfect
inspection systems. It would concentrate upon developing the basic govern-
mental attitudes and policies which would encourage the growth of that
measure of general consensus necessary if peace is to become possible.
The conference would not in the first instance discuss the control of
armaments; it would discuss the political and psychological requirements
for the total abolition of war. Once these have been defined with some
clearity, the useless armies and weapons systems would largely take care
of themselves.

To create the general consensus requisite for pacification and
disarmament may seem an impossible task, given the nature of men and
governments. But actually, a good deal of it already exists and the
necessary extensions do not seem beyond the bounds of practical political
thought. For progress toward ultimate pacification and disarmament there
must be, it would appear, developing general agreement on these points:

1. That major war has become inacceptably dangerous and destructive; and is practically useless in governing the relations of states.
As to the first there is no doubt; we are far along the road to agreement as

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as to the second. The armaments of all great powers have long been maintained
for "defensive" reasons only --- "aggressive" war has been considered an
international crime for centuries. In the past, the difficulty always was that
what one power considered a legitimate "defense" of extra-territorial "vital"
interests appeared to the opponent as an illegitimate aggression upon its own
vital interests. Since the appearance of the nuclear arsenals this difficulty
has to a large extent been removed.

The military policy of the United States (and I think the same is true
of the Soviet Union) is today founded, not upon the idea of "winning" even a
defensive war, but on the idea of preventing any major war whatever. This
is the only rationale of the policy of "deterrence." In the hands of its exponents,
deterrence leads to some very gruesome possibilities. But at bottom it is not
a system for winning wars but a system for never fighting any wars at all. This
is a novel development in military history. The military establishments of
the two great military colossi exist, not to fight each other, but to prevent any
fighting whatever. Few of the lesser powers have any reason to fight each
other, and lack the power to challenge the two colossi. The inutility of war is
pretty well exemplified in this situation and should be subject to demonstration
to the world at large.

2. That it is better to accept existing territorial borders and political systems than to attempt to change them by organized war. Here again we are close to general agreement. The German, Formosan and perhaps the Israeli-Arabian situation admittedly raise some very dangerous question marks; but what happened after the Napoleonic and the First World Wars has substantially

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happened in the aftermath of the Second. Each of these conflicts caused great
shifts in territorial boundaries and governmental systems. Each witnessed
a subsequent period of unsettlement and disturbance, which in each case
resolved itself into a fairly workable international structure. The European
system after Napoleon lasted substantially for a century. The Versailles
system lasted for eighteen years only, but it had been fairly well stabilized, and
was finally overthrown less by the evils and errors of the peace than by the
rise of new forces which exploited the peace in order to destroy it. Since
1945 the world has again returned to a relative stability, but no destructive
force comparable to Hitler's Germany has appeared. Few would regard the
present territorial distribution of the world as the acme of justice, but it does
have elements of reason and stability and looks as though it could substantially
endure. Great wars are, at any rate, unlikely to improve it, and there seem
to be no responsible statesmen in positions of power who think that they would.

3. That adequate means, other than resort to international war or to the threat of it, exist to conduct the power relations of states and of the factions and groups which struggle for power within them. Certainly there is no consensus here, but the international world has in fact been experimenting with such means since 1945. There is a rather striking difference between the period from about 1930 onward, in which a series of lesser wars, interventions, military threats and competitive armaments built up to the explosion in 1939, and the period after 1945 in which there has been almost as much war, violence and threat but in which the cumulative, explosive effect has been rather notably absent. The Korean War was perhaps the first consciously limited war in modern

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history. No one, not even Stalin, was to use the threat of war in the brutal way in which Hitler employed it. To go back to the history of Mussolini's conquest of Ethiopia, Japan's "China Incident," the Spanish Civil War, Hitler's annexation of Austria and crushing of Czecho-Slovakia, is to go back into what now seems a past and barbaric age. It is true that democratic Czecho-Slovakia was destroyed a second time, in 1948, by methods not dissimilar from those which Hitler used, but the techniques were different and the threat of a world war was not a part of them. Despite the violence which has accompanied it, the power struggle has already assumed quite different forms from those which were accepted as unavoidable --- almost axiomatic --- before the Second War and the nuclear arsenals had taught men better. It is reasonable to hope that this educative process will continue.

4. That some measure of veto-free international authority must be accepted generally, simply to police a demilitarized condition. There is little doubt that the peoples of the world (if there were any way in which their combined voices could be heard/agree to this with alacrity. That the governments and governing elites would do so may be more questionable. Their power, after all, resides in their sovereignty. It is their ability to promise their people protection against foreign military threat as well as domestic economic distress which keeps them in control and in office. To devolve final responsibility for the military security of the state upon a superior international authority would no doubt greatly improve the real security of the state, but in dictatorial countries it could only undermine the security of the governing elite. Fidel Castro, in deliberately converting the United States into a putative military

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threat to Cuba, did little or nothing for the security of Cuba but the policy was apparently essential to maintain the political security of Castro. In the great, stabilized democracies with their ordered political processes, this factor would hardly constitute a problem. Whether, considering the small degree of supra-national authority required to maintain security in a demilitarized world, it would be a problem for the military and Communist dictatorships is a question for them to answer.

On this fourth point there is again little or no consensus today; and until a general consensus is obtained on all four there seems small chance of process toward either demilitarization or pacification. At best the consensus will not grow quickly, and there is always the possibility that the world may be overwhelmed by unutterable disaster before the growth becomes sturdy enough to support a more rational international system. But the growing is visible; and there is a great deal that intelligent statesmanship and wise leadership could be doing today to encourage it. Khrushchev, with his plan for total disarmament in four years, accompanied by threats and gestures which make the plan impossible of acceptance, is doing nothing to establish the bases of pacification and demilitarization. But neither is Western statesmanship, with all its protestations of peace plus absolute military security.

Peace cannot be founded on military security, and security of any kind is impossible without peace. But a statesmanship, on either or both sides of the iron curtain, which can genuinely take peace and total disarmament as its goal, which can have the courage to work immediately for a stabilization