TELCORN

Ambassador Dobrynin/Mr. Kissinger

12:10 a. m., October 24, 1972

K: [Called in on outside line] I thought you might be someplace where it
didn't --

D: Oh, no, no, no. You are in the same -- It's better, it's much more --

K: I'll call you on it in a minute.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

D: It's much better because otherwise it's very difficult to by the telephone.

K: No, I understand.

D: Yes.

K: I wanted to tell you one other thing. I've just talked to the President again. We as a sign of our good faith are going to stop bombing north of the 20th parallel.

D: 20th parallel.

K: Yes.

D: In other words, tomorrow?

K: It's already been ordered.

D: Ordered, yeah. North of 20th parallel.

K: North of the 20th parallel.

D: Okay. I think it is too rather important.

K: And we will maintain this as long as we are negotiating.

D: Yes, okay. I think it's good -- a show of goodwill.

K: Good.

TELCOM

Ambassador Bunker/Kissinger

8:53 a.m. - 10/24/72

K: Hello.

B: Hello, Henry.

K: Ellsworth, how are you?

B: Fine.

K: Ellsworth, I'm getting in touch with you by cable.

B: Right.

K: On that one matter you sent me which I just received about the misinterpretation. Now if that stuff is put out it is total suicide. This is what we are fighting in the press here. Now if they say that's what it is, we're dead.

B: Yeh.

K: Then whether words are taken in or out is immaterial.

B: Right.

K: They are giving this thing - first of all there is no talk whatever of the lower level stuff. I don't know where they get that from.

B: Well, what they're talking about is what was in the - what was in some of the previous proposals. That's what Lam is talking about.

K: Yeh, but if he wants to be able to play in some achievements he ought to see that this is not the current thing and that they should stay a million miles away from that sort of an accusation. They're committing total suicide here. I mean not with us, we're trying to be helpful but in the way the public debate is going to be shaped here.

B: Yeh. Yeh.

K: The reason I call you so urgently is just if there is any chance of getting to them tonight to calm them down.

B: I doubt it very much Henry.

K: Well, at least first thing in the morning.

B: Yes, well I think of what is taking place here now. There are mass meetings being organized all around the country and people are getting stirred up against - all of the talk is against a coalition government and they are against a three-segment coalition government.

K: Well, it's either

B: They are given the impression that this is what's trying to be forced on them.

K: This could either be very clever or very insane. It depends on how they then represent the outcome.

B: Yes, that's right. That's what I say. That's what I said in that message.

K: Yeh. Ellsworth, you've been a tower of strength and we'll be getting in touch with you by cable with details, of course.

B: Right. All right. Fine.

K: But it's essentially here the way I told you it would be.

B: It is.

K: Yeh.

B: Well, I'll probably get a cable from you in the morning, would I?

K: No doubt.

B: OK. All right, fine Henry.

TELCOM

Ziegler/Kissinger

9:50 a.m. - 10/24/72

K: Hello.

Z: Hi, Henry.

K: Yes, Ron.

Z: We're going to do a press picture of your ten o'clock meeting, OK?

K: Yes. Do I have to be on my knees?

Z: No, just be there. I mentioned it to the President and I did it in a different way then I did it to Rogers, but - and I am going to mention it to Rogers - that the film that we use will be film where they'll underline stories about the negotiations and so forth. So I mentioned that to the President. He should get the word and I think he has that during the picture session there shouldn't be smiling and stuff - nothing stern, but it should be serious-looking.

K: Right.

Z: Now I'll cover that with Rogers. I've already mentioned it to the President. OK?

K: Ok.

Z: You do agree, don't you?

K: Yes, we should look optimistic.

Z: Yeh, not down, not too serious, but also not laughing and smiling. Just a serious to it.

K: Absolutely. Good.

Z: Thank you, Henry.

TELCORN

12:10 a.m., October 24, 1972

D: Hello.

K: Anatol.

K: No, I understand.

D: Yes.

D: 20th parallel.

K: Yes.

D: In other words, tomorrow?

K: It's already been ordered.

K: Good.

DECLASSIFIED

TELCONE

Clark MacGregor/Kissinger

12:50 p.m. - 11/24/72

K: Hello.

M: How are you, sir. Welcome home.

K: I'm fine, thank you.

M: Henry, the purpose of my call is very simple and hear me out for about a minute because I know your initial reaction - or I suspect your initial reaction will be as negative as mine was and then I thought about it a little bit more and I thought maybe I could accomplish something. Here is the purpose of my call. NBC's TODAY show has called this office, the campaign headquarters for the President and said "We would like a program exclusively on Vietnam tomorrow morning. We would like Mr. MacGregor to appear and we would like some representative of George McGovern to appear." My initial reaction, for obvious reasons, was negative and then I began, Henry, to think about it a little bit more and to think about how we have been damaged by McGovern's appearance, hour long appearance on FACE THE NATION or ISSUES AND ANSWERS, whatever it was on Sunday and by his repeated misstatement of the record.

K: I don't mind your appearing.

M: It occurred to me if I appeared and confined my remarks exclusively to the record of efforts that the President has made through you and others to achieve

K: I think you should appear.

M: OK.

K: And I think you should come over here and get a little briefing from Haig before you do it.

M: Oh, I will. I wouldn't even consider it unless that was acceptable to you.

K: Yes. Because for example they keep saying that what we are doing is what they've been proposing. You can't tell them what we're doing but you can say the record will demonstrate that this is a total outrageous misstatement. Then another thing they're saying is that we could have settled on the terms we are now negotiating for years ago. You just call that a total absolute lie.

CLASSIFIED

8/27/72

BY: JANE DREY 8/27/72 5:10:01

TELCONE
Laird/Kissinger
3:07 pm - 10/24/72

K: Hello.

L: Henry, welcome back!

K: How are you?

L: Pretty good. Did you survive all right?

K: Yes, barely. I want to thank you for all the cooperation from
your people.

L: Well, I think they've--

K: You've been terrific. You're going away tomorrow, aren't you?

L: Well, I just wondered if I should or not. I've got this nuclear
planning---

K: I think you should. What time are you leaving?

L: I'm leaving about 9:00 o'clock.

K: I'm just wondering whether you want to have breakfast first?

L: Well, maybe it would be a good idea, Henry, to have it.

K: At 8:00 o'clock.

L: Okay.

K: Are you going to yell at me as I come in?

L: No, I never yell at you. I think though it probably--Ben will stay
here. He'll be here and be in touch with me all the time.

K: Good. Nothing is going to happen, I think. How long are you going
to be gone?

L: I'll be back here Monday night.

K: I think you are safe.

L: You think I'm safe!

K: Yes.

CLASSIFIED
AD

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B&W A4 Die 5/17/75

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TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Jo Kraft

10/24/72 4:17

JK: Hi, Henry, how are you?

HK: Okay. Joe I may have a little trouble getting to you, I know
you asked to see me and I just wanted to call you to explain
that I'm going to be pretty busy for a couple of days.

JK: I see. You couldn't see me thursday, you don't think.

HK: Oh Thursday, I probably could, but not before Thursday.

JK: Well, if you could Thursday morning, that would be fine.

HK: I'll do my best. I'm planning a press conference on Thursday
sometime.

JK: I see.

HK: So after that.

JK: Okay fine. Could you indicate on the phone what you think--
you--they've really moved quite a long way--haven't they?

HK: Oh yeh, I think we are making--

JK: I mean both on prisoners and the time limit between ceasefire
and political settlement.

HK: I think we made good progress.

JK: Are there other areas where you think--

HK: Oh I think we've made all along good progress.

JK: No, no, I mean in other areas where you think there's been
movement on their part--

HK: Ah---Oh yeh, oh yes.

JK: At the ceasefire arrangements--

HK: Well I don't want to go into ah--

JK: I see. Are you going to be going back to Paris?

BRA DECE 5/1/72
DECLASSIFIED

Page 2

HK: I really haven't set a date yet, but I would expect--obviously
conversations are going to continue--

JK: Yeh. Is there a reparations agreement?

HK: No.

JK: No--no figure or anything like that?

HK: No.

JK: Where does Thieu stand--is he coming along or digging in.

HK: Well you know when you make a compromise peace both sides--
I wouldn't take what either side now says as the gospel because
both sides now have to posture themselves, ah vis-a-vis
what they've been saying previously.

JK: Oh I see--

HK: I wouldn't take at face value all the various forumla that are being
printed about the nature of the settlement that are being discussed.

JK: I see, yeh. How about timing--is there going to be something that
he can do between now and then--or election day?

HK: That we can do between now and election day?

JK: Yeh.

HK: You know, I know this sounds riduclous, but we've not working on
in terms of election day--

JK: I know, but I think Mr. Thieu is.

HK: In what sense?

JK: To delay things, halt things--

HK: What difference does it make?

JK: I don't think it makes much to me but I think it makes some to him.
I think it means something to Van Dong--that was an extremely
adroit interview that he gave.

HK: That's what you expect from Pham Van Dong--

JK: I know. I was beginning to doubt him--no that is what you'd expect.

Page 3

HK: No, but you know, I've always had the view that whenever they'd make concessions, they'd make them all at once, rather than in dibbles. I consider the election an artificial deadline--There might have been a reason in '68 to rough it for the election on the one hand and there may have been a reason for Thieu to hold out beyond the election but that won't change the basic outcome now. I mean unless McGovern is to win the election in which case--but that wouldn't improve Thieu's position.

JK: No, not at all. Will the President be making a statement?

HK: That depends on developments.

JK: I see.

HK: You know I don't say it's impossible, but you see as you get to a certain phase of negotiations you suddenly then discover a lot of nuances which you sort of brush aside when you can't even begin to see the--the shape of it--now they may be complex and they may take time, but they are of a different order of difficulty than you original problem which is what's the shape of the settlement going to be like. I mean you knew--take SALT--you knew in the last two months there was going to be an agreement--whether it was going to be signed one month or another was really a subsidiary question. It's not a perfect analogy but what I am saying is take categories in which you have some fundamental agreement then you suddenly become very conscious of details which previously you didn't even examine now they'll take you so me to work out they may even produce a temporary impasse but you know damn well that if you could settle the fundamental question, you're going to find a way out of that impasse because it's in a position which you are both determined to reach--

JK: Can you indicate what the details are that are in the nuances that have suddenly become --

HK: No, you know the trouble is if I tell you these things, you'll draw very profound conclusions from them--I'm trying to give you the order of problems that arise and that it is possible to be--to--it's hard to know whether you can tell them one week or another week. But you don't--have the sense--as you had a month ago where I had one theory of how it might end and someone else had another theory, but neither side really had a hell of a lot to go except its assessment of the situation --very little empirical proof.