NBC NIGHTLY NEWS NBC TV

6:30 PM JULY 2

Agreement On Weapons

JOHN CHANCELLOR: It was disclosed in Moscow tonight the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to a further limitation on antiballistic missiles and to new restrictions on underground nuclear testing, but that the big question of how to control offensive nuclear weapons still has not been solved.

The agreements on ABMs and underground testing had been expected and there had not been much hope on a deal controlling the offensive missiles, despite Secretary of State KISSINGER's talk early this year about a conceptual breakthrough.

The agreements were disclosed by Soviet Party Chief Leonid BREZHNEV on a day when President NIXON went on television to talk to the Russian people.

Tom Brokaw reports from Moscow.

TOM BROKAW: President NIXON went on Soviet television tonight to speak to the Russian people as he did at the 1972 summit talks.

There is no way of knowing for sure how many Russian people watched the President. This family was selected and filmed by a Soviet news agency for NBC News.

President NIXON opened his remarks with a Russian language greeting and then gave no hint of major nuclear arms achievements but concentrated instead on continuing negotiations.

PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON: We have many difficulties yet to be overcome in achieving full control over strategic nuclear arms. But each step carries us closer and builds confidence in the process of negotiation itself.

Our two nations will continue to have differences. We have different systems, and in many respects we have different values. Inevitably our interests will not always be in accord. But the important thing is that we are learning to negotiate where we

have differences, to narrow them where possible and to move ahead together in an expanding field of mutual interests.

Thus we have been able to meet this year, as we will meet next year in the United States. Not in an atmosphere of crisis, but rather in an atmosphere of confidence, confidence that the work we have embarked on is going forward. In fact, it might be said that the most remarkable thing about this summit meeting is that it is taking place so routinely, so familiarly as a part of a continuing pattern that would have seemed inconceivable just a few years ago.

Tonight President and Mrs. NIXON gave a dinner at the American Embassy for General Secretary BREZHNEV and the other top Soviet leaders.

Originally the President and BREZHNEV had scheduled a full day of talks but they met only briefly. Apparently they could get no farther on the difficult question of limiting missiles with multiple warheads.

At the dinner BREZHNEV had high praise for the agreements on limiting underground nuclear tests and the new limits on ABMs. For his part, President NIXON again stressed the importance of his personal relationship with BREZHNEV.

But for all the rhetorical flourish there is only a pledge to have new efforts on the control of strategic arms.

Tom Brokaw, NBC News, Moscow.

## Soviets Cut Communications

JOHN CHANCELLOR: It may have been all smiles tonight at the Russian-American dinner but somebody on the Russian side this evening was up to some mischief.

The American television networks have been using the facilities of Moscow television to send their reports home, but tonight when reports dealt with dissidents in the Soviet Union -- and especially with dissident Andrei SAKHAROV-- somebody pulled the plug on the American networks.

***

2 Wednesday, July 3, 1974

CBS EVENING NEWS CBS TV

7:00 PM JULY 2

Nixon Speaks on Russian Television

ROGER MUDD: As President NIXON and Soviet Party Leader BREZHNEV tried to display their increasing cooperation it became clear tonight that the Soviets were allowing only favorable stories to be transmitted back to the United States.

Repeatedly this evening the Soviets prevented film stories on Russian dissidents from being broadcast. What they did allow, for instance were stories on arms limitation agreements as Dan Rather reports.

DAN RATHER: After a reception and dinner tonight Communist Party Leader BREZHNEV said in a toast that the United States and the Soviet Union as expected have reached agreement to limit missile defense system sites, to partially ban underground nuclear tests and to make new efforts at limiting offensive nuclear weapons.

President NIXON in his toast again stressed his personal role in summit talks by saying that progress at the three summits between himself and BREZHNEV has been made possible by, "initiatives taken by the leaders of both countries."

In a nationwide television and radio address earlier the President told the Soviet people that much has been accomplished toward cooperation between the super powers but that many difficulties remain.

PRESIDENT NIXON: Our two nations will continue to have differences. We have different systems and in many respects we have different values. Inevitably our interests will not always be in accord. But the important thing is that we are learning to negotiate where we have differences to narrow them where possible and to move ahead together in an expanding field of mutual interests.

RATHER: Mr. NIXON added that the more each nation can be con-

vinced that it has a positive stake in peace, the better chance there is that peace will last.
Dan Rather, CBS News, Moscow.

## Moscow Agreements

MUDD: While the United States and the Soviet Union did agree on some aspects of arms limitation, they did not achieve what they had wanted.

Marvin Kalb reports from Moscow.

MARVIN KALB: The President and BREZHNEV failed to reach any agreement on limiting the deployment of multiple warheaded missiles, the so-called MIRVs. That was their major goal.

According to one White House aide it became clear yesterday during Secretary KISSINGER's meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO that this goal could not be achieved at this summit. KISSINGER then tried for an agreement in principle, pledging both sides to make a major effort this year. Not even an agreement in principle was possible.

There is now a strong likelihood that Russia will MIRV her long range missile force just as the U.S. is doing and a last gasp effort to head off a new generation of nuclear warhead has failed.

U.S. officials are trying to put the best face possible on this development. They acknowledge that there are strong forces in both capitals opposing a MIRV deal and neither the President nor BREZHNEV could overcome them.

The Russians had another reason too, that they are behind in MIRV development, they want to catch up, and they say they don't want to make a major deal with a President whose job is threatened.

Tonight there is a couple of interesting developments at the TV studios here. The State Committee on radio and television which controls all facilities...

MUDD: That was no accident, KALB's report was not cut off because of any technical difficulties here in the States. In Moscow Russian technicians said to be unhappy with so-called anti-Soviet stories pulled the plug.

3 Wednesday, July 3, 1974

Kalb was not the only person to run afoul of Soviet censors, all three networks had trouble.

ABC EVENING NEWS ABC TV

7:00 PM JULY 2

Arms Agreement Reached

HOWARD K. SMITH: The ABC News team covering President NIXON's Moscow visit ran into a censorship problem today. More on that later, but first Harry Reasoner with an uncensored report on today's major developments.

HARRY REASONER: This is the eve of President NIXON's departure from Moscow and the President was the host at a dinner tonight for Chairman BREZHNEV in Spathohouse (?), the U.S. Embassy.

BREZHNEV took the occasion to announce summit agreement on ABM sites and underground testing. He made the information known as a part of a toast to his American host. He also said that new efforts would be made to restrict offensive nuclear weapons.

BREZHNEV did not reveal any details of the agreement but he said they will be formally signed tomorrow before the President departs from his third summit meeting with the Soviet leader in three years.

Mr. NIXON told BREZHNEV that America's new, closer relationship with the Soviet Union is supported by the majority of the American people.

It was a well run dinner. Spathohouse may be the best substitute White House anywhere and it was easy and friendly. These people know each other pretty well by now. Even the normally somber members of the Moscow group, KOSYGIN and PODGORNY, smiled occasionally.***

More on the speech now from White House correspondent Tom Jarriel.

TOM JARRIEL: The President's

speech was void of any controversy that might offend his Russian government host or alarm their people.

Speaking slowly for simultaneous translation he confirmed what had been predicted earlier by an American official, this round of summitry will not result in a negotiated end to the nuclear arms race.

PRESIDENT NIXON: In our first summit meeting two years ago we signed the first agreement ever negotiated for the limitation of strategic nuclear arms.

This was an historic milestone on the road to a lasting peace and to mankind's control over the forces of his own destruction.

When we first met at the summit two years ago both sides were venturing into the untried waters of something new and we were perhaps a bit uncertain, even apprehensive about where it would lead.

But now we and the leaders of the Soviet Union have come to know one another. Each of us has a much fuller understanding of the policies of the other country, even where those policies differ. Thus we have been able to meet this year as we will meet again next year in the United States not in an atmosphere of crisis, but rather in an atmosphere of confidence, confidence that the work we have embarked on is going forward.

JARRIEL: In the hours before the President spoke his talks with BREZHNEV took a somewhat mysterious turn. They were over five hours late getting started. The Soviets leaked out word an agreement would be signed today, only to have the White House flatly deny it.

The delay could have been caused by indecision in the ruling Soviet Politburo, which reportedly met to examine the agreement BREZHNEV announced tonight.

Specifics of the agreement will be announced tomorrow, but the

4 Wednesday, July 3, 1974

antiballistic missile pact is
expected to limit each country to
one existing defensive ABM site.
The Russians have theirs guarding
Moscow, the American one protects
the Grand Forks, North Dakota
missile complex.

Also, sources say, the accord on
underground nuclear testing will set
a maximum size for explosions but
not all testing. Reaching agreement
to make new efforts to curb
offensive nuclear weapons is con-
siderably short of the target of a
permanent halt and appears to be a
major victory in the U.S. bureauc-
racy for Henry KISSINGER over
Defense Secretary SCHLESINGER who
wanted a full accord or none at
all.

Tom Jarriel, ABC News, in Moscow.

CBS MORNING NEWS CBS TV
7:00 AM JULY 2

Brown Replaces Moorer

BARRY SERAFIN: They had a big swearing in ceremony at the Pentagon yesterday, and the way Bob Schieffer tells it you may need a Who's Who for a while to recognize the men with all the stars on their shoulders.

BOB SCHIEFFER: The ceremony represented the biggest turnover in top military management in 20 years. Air Force General George BROWN was sworn in as the new Chairman of the JCS, the nation's top military job. He replaces Admiral Thomas MOORER who is retiring.

General David JONES, formerly a
top commander in NATO, takes BROWN's
place as head of the Air Force.

Admiral James HALLOWAY, whose
father was an Admiral too, is the
new head of the NAVY, replacing
Elmo ZUMWALT who is also retiring.

Defense Secretary SCHLESINGER
noted the new team will give the
Pentagon more than just military
expertise.

DEFENSE SECRETARY SCHLESINGER:
They will together form the Penta-
gon's most prestigious car pool.

By order of the Federal Energy
Office there will be reserved one
spot for an automobile which can be
filled as late as 8:15 in the morn-
ing provided that the car is no
larger than a Volkswagen.

SCHIEFFER: By law JONES and
HALLOWAY are appointed to four year
terms, BROWN is appointed for two.

Bob Schieffer, CBS News, Washington.

Correspondents Talk About Summit

SERAFIN: In Moscow to talk about
Mr. NIXON's visit is Hughes RUDD
with Dan RATHER and Marvin KALB.

HUGHES RUDD: While we begin,
Dan, what do you think the President
came here hoping to accomplish and
what do you think he has accomplish-
ed?

DAN RATHER: I think he came here
hoping to accomplish -- in no par-
ticular order -- momentum to keep
the momentum of detente going, came
here feeling no way that perhaps no
major breakthrough accomplishment
worth of that description would be
possible but wanting very much to
keep at least some momentum of what
he had started in 1972.

And he wanted the publicity at
home of being a President heavily
engaged in foreign policy, effective
in foreign policy and to drive home
the point that he does have personal
relationships with world leaders
and that that's -- if for no other
reason -- that perhaps he should
remain President.

As to what he's accomplished,
there have not been any break-
through agreements that I can find.
Perhaps we'll all be presently
amazed or astounded when the
communique comes out, I think not.
I do think that he has reinforced
the tone, the mood, the atmosphere
of we can do business with the
Russians. And again, I think it
has been of a publicity smash hit
at home.

RUDD: Just another sort of era
of good feeling, in other words.

Well, Marvin, what do you think
Mr. KISSINGER's the real profession-
al in all this stuff-- did he get
anything done -- do you think --
while he was here?

MARVIN KALB: I would differ a

5: Wednesday, July 3, 1974

little bit with what Dan was saying, just to put a slightly different emphasis on it perhaps.

I think that a number of things were accomplished. They are not of the magnitude of the accomplishments of 1972 and I think one reason is that when you get into the third summit it becomes a little bit business as usual and you don't get as excited about agreements.

But nevertheless there have been on a lower level three minor agreements, there probably will be another. There are going to be at least two agreements in the area of strategic arms. Again these are all minor things, but when you get into the strategic arms anything minor is really quite major, you are dealing with the weapons of death. They will revise the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty so that each side will opt for only one ABM site rather than two as allowed by the treaty.

There will be a -- probably -- a limited underground nuclear test ban treaty. Now it is said that above a certain threshhold neither side is really testing and they'll probably eliminate only above that level. But nevertheless it is a step, in my opinion anyway, in the right direction. And you are, as Dan pointed out, reinforcing the whole thing about detente.

So putting the politics of it aside, you have the two most powerful countries in the world nevertheless working in tandem to try to maintain rationality in diplomacy as opposed to irrationality. And that went on for so long and we all remember the cold war, and you're in a somewhat new period now and both sides are obviously trying to reinforce that spirit.

RUDD: What about the Jewish emmigration question, has that come up officially do you know?

KALB: I don't know that it has, but I would be terribly surprised if it has not come up, because this is certainly an issue that is tying up genuinely expanded trade between both countries. And its tying it up because the President in 1972 promised that there would be most favored nation treatment for the Soviet Union. He cannot

get it through Congress because there is a solid majority opposing that until the Russians do something about liberalizing their policy.

It may very well be that this is something that the Russians cannot admit to publicly but will act on privately. And this is the implication of any number of statements from KISSINGER on down.

RUDD: Didn't we hear rumors there for a while that they were going to raise the figure to 45,000 a year or something like that? From 35,000 I think it is now.

KALB: That's right. And if this was something that were to happen this would be 45,000 dissidents, all kinds of dissidents, who would be allowed out of the Soviet Union.

RATHER: I would not be surprised to see some kind of announcement -- perhaps not this week -- in succeeding weeks that yes the President and Dr. KISSINGER did raise the subject and the Soviets did agree to at least ease up a little in hopes of getting the most favored nation trade status, which as we know is a major goal of their policy.

RUDD: I would think trade is what they're after even more than arms limitation, I would think, wouldn't you?

KALB: Well, they're really concerned with the economy because if you continue the amount of money that both countries are on a whole new generation of multi-warheaded missiles it's going to cost a great deal of money. It means that you've moved up one cycle in violence and death that would go into a war. And this detracts from -- particularly in the Soviet case -- the ability of the Russians to invest money in consumer goods where they need it very badly.

RUDD: You know the Soviet Union much better than I do. I've never understood why they don't operate the way Castro did in Cuba. Everybody who wanted out of Cuba, he said please go ahead and leave. Why don't they do that do you suppose?

KALB: There are probably a number of reasons, but one thing it probably is a great affront to the Soviet Union to believe that any

6 Wednesday, July 3, 1974

number of its citizens, whatever
the percentage might be, would
choose to leave a country that is
being billed every day as the
greatest society on earth.

The second thing is that the
Soviet Union is composed of many,
many nationalities. The Russian
nationality used to be the majority
of the country. I understand that
it is now under fifty per cent. If
you were to suggest that one
nationality making up now more than
fifty per cent of the country can
leave for dissatisfaction reasons,
then maybe a whole lot of others
will leave and then you could tear
apart the fabric of the society.

RUDD: But surely those who want
to leave are an extremely small
minority, wouldn't you think, that
is my impression anyway?

KALB: It is a small minority,
but if an awful lot of Soviet
Jews leave and many of those end
up in Israel then you're dealing
with a terribly sensitive foreign
policy question as well for the
Russians are obviously trying to
build up their relations with the
Arab world at a time when the U.S.
is having so much success.

Boston Shipyard To Close

SERAFIN: The U.S.S. Constitu-
tion, Old Ironsides, one of the
most famous ships in American naval
history was one of the first
vessels built at the Boston naval
shipyards. The Constitution is
back in Boston now pretty much as
a museum piece and David Henderson
says the problem is that the entire
place is turning into pretty much
of a museum piece.

DAVID HENDERSON: The Boston
naval shipyard has been undergoing
military phaseout for nearly ten
years to a point where now the huge
cranes are idle, the mammoth dry
dock is empty.

But much of this country's naval
history began when this place
opened in 1800. Records were set
during WWII when 165 large ships
were built here. But only the
seagulls remain and the only boat
that comes by anymore is for
sightseeing.

One hundred and seventy-four

years of naval history ended
Monday at what the Navy called a
disestablishment ceremony.

NAVAL OFFICER: The Secretary
of the Navy by reference A has
approved the disestablishment of
the Boston naval shipyard, effective
1 July, 1974.

HENDERSON: The flag was lowered for the final time and the Boston naval shipyard was officially closed for economic reasons according to the Navy.

MAN: This has been my for sale
home anyway. I came in here during
the war and its been good to me.

MAN: I've very, very fortunate,
I'm one of the very, very few that
are assigned to the restoration of
the Constitution.

HENDERSON: But that's going to
be completed sooner or later.

MAN: And then here we go again.

MAN: I don't think it should
be closed but there is nothing I
can do about it.

MAN: This is my third time
involved in this. I'm getting to
the point now where I'm gettin a
little fed up working for the
government.

HENDERSON: It means the loss
of nearly 5,000 jobs and the
passing of an age.

David Henderson, CBS News,
Boston.

THE TODAY SHOW NBC TV
7:00 AM JULY 2

Moscow Talks Progress

RICHARD VALERIANI: While the
President was touring in Minsk
Secretary of State KISSINGER came
back to Moscow to continue negoti-
ations with Foreign Minister Andrei
GROMYKO.

Before entering the ornate
conference room in the foreign
ministry's reception halls the two
men chatted briefly with newsmen
and KISSINGER said he really did
not know whether there would be an
agreement of some kind at this
summit on MIRVs, multiple nuclear

7 Wednesday, July 3, 1974

TIMES HERALD, VALLEJO, CALIF., 23 JUNE 1974 (2 JULY)

# N-POWERED NAVY ESSENTIAL TO U. S. DEFENSE

**Admiral Rickover Claims N-Vessels Produce Savings**

"Changes in the Navy often come at a distressingly slow pace. It took two-thirds of a century for our Navy to change from sail to steam..."

These words were incorporated in an address recently in San Diego by Vice Adm. H. G. Rickover, USN, recognized as the father of the U.S. Nuclear Navy.

The message the admiral was bringing to his listeners is that it behooves the U.S. to move full speed ahead toward building a modern Navy in which as many ships as feasible are nuclear-powered.

"We should be planning now," he said, "for war that may erupt 15 or more years from now. Therefore, it is time to establish a firm program for making all new major combatant ships for our striking forces nuclear powered. It is a matter of national priority."

Admiral Rickover dwelt at considerable length in his talk on the advantages of nuclear power versus oil.

"The current lack of foreign oil," he said, "has reminded us of our vulnerability to outside pressures. It has not been easy for our citizens to accept the fact that this country is dependent on anyone or any thing..."

"A shortage of petroleum could have disastrous results on the ability of our oil-fired naval forces to fight in areas where fuel supplies are unavailable to us."

"This does not have to continue to be the case for future major U.S. naval combatants because we can build them with nuclear propulsion, if we exercise the foresight to do so," he continued.

"With existing designs of naval nuclear propulsion plants it is possible to provide enough energy for 10 to 13 years of ship operation without the need to refuel. And new reactor designs now under development will last 15 years. In contrast, oil-fired naval warships must be refueled every few days. The initial nuclear fuel for a Nimitz Class aircraft carrier contains the energy equivalent of 11 million barrels of Navy distillate fuel oil, or enough oil to fill

a train of railway tank cars, stretching from San Francisco to Los Angeles."

Admiral Rickover then asked the pointed question: "Of what value is an oil-fired ship if it is unable to get oil?"

He then turned his attention to comparative costs of N-ships as against oil-fueled vessels.

"Central to the opposition to nuclear powered ships has been the precept that we should not go to nuclear power until we can show it is no more expensive than conventional power. But why should we expect to get all the advantages of nuclear power at no additional cost?"

"For example," he noted, "the M-16 rifle costs three times as much as the World War II M-1 cost; a modern machine gun costs nine times more than one from World War II; a C-5 transport plane is over 300 times as expensive as the World War II C-47.

"Even so, the additional cost of nuclear powered warships is minimal when all factors are considered. First, nuclear powered ships are built to higher standards than conventional ships and have proved to be more reliable in the operation of their propulsion plants. These first-line ships carry the most modern and complex weapons systems and have incresse operational capabilities over their conventional counterparts — all of which naturally contribute to their higher initial cost. In addition, the construction cost of nuclear ships includes fuel for over 10 years of operation, whereas the initial cost of a conventional ship does not include the cost for oil," Admiral Rickover said.

He also spoke briefly on relative performance.

He noted that the nuclear frigate Truxtun, on a special mission, steamed 8,600 miles from Subic Bay in the Philippines to Perth, Australia, crossing the Indian Ocean twice enroute.

"This is the longest period of such high speed operation ever sustained by any ship. This high speed could have been continued for an essentially indefinite period had there been a need. At the conclusion of her mission, the Truxtun was fully ready to undertake protracted combat operation," the admiral declared.

Admiral Rickover's evidence in favor of a nuclear powered Navy, particularly combatant ships, is irrefutably compelling.

His question, which, simply put, amounts to "What are we waiting for?" cannot be answered with any sort of logic.

2-E

FEATURES COLUMNS

Admiral Moorer:

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT

8 JULY 1974 (2)

"IF THE SOVIETS CONTINUE
THEIR CURRENT BUILD-UP"-

Interview With the Chairman
Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Q Admiral Moorer, you have been Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for four years. Has the country's defense grown stronger or weaker during that period?

A In numbers, our defense has grown weaker, in the sense that we've reduced the number of people in uniform from about 3.2 to 2.2 million. The numbers of ships, the numbers of aircraft, and the numbers of Army divisions have been reduced.

On the other hand, we have managed to disengage in South Vietnam, which had a very significant impact on the morale and on the stability of the armed forces.

During the Vietnam War, each service did what it could to equalize exposure of the individual to combat. This meant that there was a tremendous turbulence-a continuous rotation of people. The Army would draw people from Europe and send them to Vietnam. The Navy would take personnel from Atlantic Fleet ships and put them in the Pacific Fleet. This made it very difficult to develop a team. It was most difficult to develop *esprit de corps*.

Now we have stability to a much larger degree. The net effect is to develop far better teamwork, far better morale, an increased feeling of pride. This all adds up to combat readiness.

Q Should we have more troops?

A Yes-more forces over all-because of the dynamic mo-

mentum that's been evident in the Soviet arms build-up. The U.S. forces are certainly at a rock-bottom level. The risks would be reduced if the numbers were increased.

Q How would you characterize our ability to meet a threat from abroad?

A You can't answer that in a few words. I would divide it into, first, the strategic aspects of this capability and, secondly, into the conventional, including the capability to take such action as might be necessary worldwide to maintain what I like to call a regional balance.

Going back to the strategic forces: As of today, I am confident that the nuclear forces are adequate to provide deterrence, and that's what we seek. The concern in the strategic field focuses on what can happen in the future if the Soviets continue their current build-up-for instance, the deployment of the new MIRV [multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicle] missiles which they have under test.

It was for this reason that the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth three assurances which we consider the U.S. must meet in order to make acceptable the interim agreement arrived at in SALT I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the U.S. and Russia that reached accords in 1972].

They were, first, the development of improved systems for verification, secondly, a very dynamic and progressive research-and-development program and thirdly, the introduction of the new arms programs, two of which, in particular, were the Trident missile submarine and the B-1 superionic bomber.

You've got to bear in mind that the capabilities that we have today and the structure of the forces today have been determined in a large part by decisions that were made in the '60s. The decisions that we make today will determine the posture in the '80s. Consequently, it's most important that we move forward with these new programs in order to insure that we do not find ourselves slipping into a posture of inferiority. Once that situation exists, it's too late.

Q Are we in danger of falling into a position of inferiority against Russia?

A We are if we neither move ahead with the programs that we currently have under way, nor, secondly, arrive at some kind of agreement with the Soviet Union on curtailment of strategic arms.

Q Are the Soviets building up their missile forces? Have they actually begun to MIRV their rockets, for instance?

A Let me go back a bit:

The Russians put considerable emphasis on their land-based missile forces, initially, and subsequently they have added to that emphasis on their missile-firing submarine forces, but put no emphasis on bombers.

The United States, on the other hand, has emphasized the bomber, and we have built the submarine, and, of course, we have land-based missiles. We call these three "the triad." We endeavor to have a broad capability so that no technical breakthrough can nullify the over-all system.

What I'm saying is that it's not reasonable to expect one side to be a mirror image of the other.

The Soviets began by building, among other things, larger missiles than we have, and consequently they have greater throw weight. This means that they can carry either more warheads or the same number of larger warheads.

Q Where are they now?

A They have no MIRVed missiles deployed. However, they have been actively testing missiles of various sizes that are, in fact, equipped with MIRVs.

Q When do you expect them to begin replacing present missiles with the new MIRVed ones?

See ADMIRAL MOORER, Pg. 2-F

KEY POINTS MADE
BY ADMIRAL MOORER

Strategic arms: "As of today, [our] nuclear forces. are adequate to provide deterrence. The concern focuses on what can happen if the Soviets continue their current build-up."

Russian missiles: They are expected to deploy new multiwarhead missiles "probably within the next year." Moscow already has aboard its submarines missiles with a 4,000-mile range "which won't be available to us until 1978."

U. S. cutbacks: "I cannot accept the thesis that if we take the lead, the Soviets would be very happy to follow. That is a very, very dangerous concept."

Troops: We should have "more forces over all because of the Soviet arms build-up. U. S. forces are at a rock-bottom level."

GI's in Europe: "It would be a major mistake at this point in history to make a unilateral withdrawal."

War in Vietnam: "I do not see in the immediate future a large scale assault by the North Vietnamese."

Draftless military: "The volunteer force has been working." Yet, "it's very important that we have draft statutes standing by in the event of an emergency."

Congress: "War in the Middle East brought back a recognition of the worldwide interests of the United States, and the part our military forces play in enhancing these interests."

1-F

ADMIRAL MOORER...................CONTINUED

A In the very near future, probably within the next year. The Soviets have traditionally been very careful about insuring that they had a thorough test program. And the number of tests that they have conducted are just about at a level which would provide the necessary confidence to permit deployment. The deployment would be a progressive thing, and it would take them several years to make a complete replacement of their old with the new.

Q What does that mean to the United States?

A It means that the number of warheads that are available to the Soviets for targeting against the United States will be much greater than is the case today, because they can put 4, 5, 6, 8 warheads in each one of these MIRVed missiles.

Q Beyond that, does it mean we will have to take some action or build some new weapons to counter the Russian advances?

A As I said earlier, we have the programs that will provide this counter-namely, the B-1 and the Trident, and other developments of stand-off weapons systems.

Hopefully, we can reach an agreement which will put a ceiling on this.

On the other hand, this cannot be a unilateral action by the U.S. I cannot accept the thesis advanced by many that if we would take the lead and show that our heart is in the right place, that the Soviets would be very happy to follow along behind us. That, in my view, is a very, very dangerous concept.

Q Do you suppose, as some have suggested, that U.S. initiation of the Trident and the B-1 has, in part, been responsible for the Soviet move to MIRV their warheads?

A I do not. I would point out to you that there are two very important aspects of this over-all nuclear-balance problem:

One is the perception of the potential adversary as to your capability-how does he see your capability in military terms?

The other aspect is the perception of third countries as to which side has the significant lead. It would be contrary to the interests of the United States and the Western world for the Soviets to be able to project an image of superiority over the United States. I think that that would really be destabilizing.

Q Do you think it's possible for the U.S. to make any concessions that would stop the Soviets from MIRVing?

A There may be some trade-offs in terms of limiting the amount of MIRVing they do. But so far as stopping them from using the technique of MIRVing, I do not.

Q In any trade-offs, could we safely agree to drop one or more parts of our "triad"-as has been suggested-in return for a limit on Russian MIRV's?

A That would be most imprudent. This is a very complex business. I can't give you an answer and say that, for instance, we'll let them have 500 MIRV's while we have 1,000-something like that-because it's associated with other aspects.

Take the bomber, for instance. The real difference, when you get right down to it, between the U.S. capability and the Soviet capability lies not only in numbers but also with refueling techniques. If the Soviets would move forward with a very vigorous refueling program, a program for the construction and production of refueling aircraft, that would throw an entirely different light on their bomber capability.

Q Have the Russians deployed those big new missiles that we have heard they were developing?

A Their workhorse missile is the SS-11, and their big missile is the SS-9. It is a very large missile. We have nothing that even comes close to being this large. They also have an SS-13 in small numbers. What they are doing at the moment is testing a series of missiles-one of which is solid propellant and others are liquid propellant-which we think are conceived as replacements for the present missiles.

We think that the SS-17 and/or the 19 would replace the 11, and the 18 replace the 9. They're still in the test category, but nevertheless the testing has been thorough and successful and, consequently, I anticipate early deployment. We would expect that these new missiles would be more accurate.

Q Are there any signs that the Soviets are shifting emphasis from land to new submarine missiles?

A I think that they will continue their high rate of production of submarines. As you know, they have what we call the Yankee class and the Delta class.

The Delta class is a modified Yankee and now I fully expect the Soviets to "stretch" this submarine so it can carry 16 missiles. I also anticipate that they will build a new missile-launching submarine from the keel up, in addition to the submarines now operational.

The SS-N-8 missile is already at sea. It has the range of our Trident missile, which won't be available to us until 1978-and this is 1974-the range being in the neighborhood of 4,000 miles, which would permit them to simply operate out of the Kola Inlet, and be within range of most targets in the United States.

Q Does that mean they're ahead of us in submarine missiles?

A If you're simply talking about a race to see who is the first to deploy a 4,000-mile missile, the answer is "Yes." If you're more realistically talking about "ahead" in terms of the capabilities of the total package-the accuracy of the missile, the reliability of the missile, and the performance of the submarine-the answer is definitely "No."

Q When you look at Russia's whole fleet, is it really as powerful as the large number of ships indicate? Some analysts maintain the quality of the Soviet Navy is not so good-

A I do not agree with the thought that their quality is not good. They have a vigorous program of modernization.

Navies are structured to fulfill the tasks that they perform for a particular country. In other words, one country doesn't necessarily duplicate the navy of the other. In the case of the United States, we have maintained for years what we call a "forward strategy." For instance, we've deployed the Seventh Fleet in the western Pacific and the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. Consequently, we have utilized aircraft carriers, because our ships operate out from underneath the umbrella of land-based air.

One of the basic missions of the United States fleet is to protect the sea lines of supply from the United States to Western Europe.

The Soviets, on the other hand, have observed that twice during this century we have utilized the sea for projecting power into Europe-in World War I and World War II. So they have emphasized the production of the submarine.

In short, we have the mission of protecting the lines of supply while they have built to interdict the lines of supply.

Q What about ships other than submarines?

A The Soviets have produced some very modern surface ships of the destroyer type. They have one carrier almost completed, and now they're building another one. To me, this indicates that they recognize that, in order to operate off their shores in such places as the Indian Ocean and parts of the Pacific and the Atlantic, and if they want the assurance of air support during these operations, they will require an aircraft carrier to provide it.

They are building these new surface ships with the thought, in my view, of conducting naval operations at greater and greater distances from their home bases.

Q There is speculation about the Soviet Navy's activities in the Indian Ocean area. Are they developing bases there?

A Berbera, Somalia, is a very important base available to the Soviets in the Indian Ocean. That is a base where the Soviets not only have access to the harbor, they have a large communication station from which they control, in general, their operations in the Indian Ocean. They are also constructing a large airfield near the harbor.

Q Are you concerned that the Soviets might sometime try to cut our oil-supply lanes from the Persian Gulf?

A I feel that the Soviets recognize that the capability to deny access to Middle East oil would provide them with tremendous political leverage in peacetime and, of course, it would be a tremendous military advantage in wartime.

Q What would the reopening of the Suez Canal mean in this respect?

A The opening of the Suez Canal will greatly facilitate Soviet maintenance of a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, because they can draw their forces from the Black Sea rather than from the Pacific Fleet. So they will then have about a 2,000-mile versus an 8,000 or 9,000-mile run from their bases.

Q Turning to Europe, how long do you envision that U.S. soldiers, sailors and airmen will be stationed there?

A First, let me say that I'm fully aware of all of the argu-

See ADMIRAL MOORER, Pg. 3-F

2-F

MISSILE ... CONTINUED

15 minutes.

This morning a controversy was stirred when the word "personal" was dropped from the official Russian translation of a speech by President Nixon last night in which he said that the "personal relationship" between him and Mr. Brezhnev would be the basis for continued Soviet-American accommodation. [Details on Page 10.]

This evening, the President and Mrs. Nixon were guests of honor at a special performance of singing and dancing at the Bolshoi Theater. They were joined in the central box by Mr. Brezhnev, Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin and President Niko-lai Podgorny.

3 Agreements Signed

Three minor agreements for specialized cooperation were signed today.

Mr. Brezhnev emphasized the collective nature of the Kremlin leadership by having Mr. Nixon sign a housing agreement with Mr. Kosygin and an energy agreement with Mr. Podgorny. An agreement on joint research on artificial hearts was signed by Secretary of State Kissinger and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

The cancellation of a planned Presidential visit tomorrow to the Soviet space center at Stag City outside Moscow, where American astronauts and Soviet cosmonauts are training together, underscored how much negotiating remains before Mr. Nixon winds up his visit next Wednesday.

The arms agreement signed in 1972, permitted each side to maintain two antimissile complexes with up to 100 launchers each—one complex to protect the capital region and the other to guard offensive strategic missiles.

At that time, the Soviet Union had an antimissile complex covering a broad region around Moscow, and the Americans were constructing a complex to cover their missile bases in North Dakota and Montana.

Each country had the option of building a second complex, but neither has since chosen to do so. A new agreement would remove that option.

Instead of making full use of the opportunities presented in the 1972 pact on antimissile defense, the Soviet Union and the United States have concentrated upon developing increasingly sophisticated offensive missiles, which have posed intricate problems in the talks on limiting strategic arms.

An agreement on further limiting antimissile systems was seen as a convenient way to give the negotiations on strategies arms an appearance of the

PACT ... CONTINUED

detente.

As outlined by Dr. Kissinger, the current arms-limitation talks are aimed at restricting the development and deployment of missiles with multiple warheads before the arms race goes out of control and detente is undermined.

Specifically, Washington and Moscow have been searching for a formula balancing the United States' more numerous and more sophisticated multiple warheads and the Soviet Union's more numerous missiles.

While the United States now accepts the concept of this Soviet-proposed equation, Dr. Kissinger said last week that negotiators had not been able to agree on the numbers.

President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev met for nearly 4½ hours yesterday at Mr. Brezhnev's villa at Oreanda on the Crimean coast near here and then continued their talks during a three-hour sail on the Black Sea aboard a Soviet government yacht.

They will resume their talks in Moscow tomorrow morning—their last chance to reach an agreement before President Nixon leaves for the United States Wednesday.

Dr. Kissinger will continue the discussions today in Moscow with Andrei A. Gromyko, the Soviet foreign minister, while President Nixon tours the Byelorussian capital of Minsk.

Mr. Brezhnev is returning to Moscow rather than accompanying Mr. Nixon to Minsk and is expected to confer with fellow Soviet leaders on his discussions here.

major questions remained to be resolved here. These included the explosive level beyond which underground tests would be prohibited, whether peaceful nuclear expulsions would be allowed to exceed the level, or threshold, and what kinds of testing would be permitted below the threshold.

In a speech two weeks ago, Mr. Brezhnev declared that the Soviet Union was ready to sign immediately an agreement cur tailing underground testing and eventually banning it on an agreed timetable.

At a news conference today, the White House press secretary, Ronald L. Ziegler, said that the issue of American trade concessions for the Soviet Union, which Congress has tied to a freer Soviet emigration policy, had not come up so far in the current talks.

Mr. Ziegler made it clear that the Nixon Administration was still eager to fulfill its earlier

Only a meeting of the ruling Political Bureau of the Communist party could authorize Mr. Brezhnev to alter the Soviet position, informed Soviet sources said.

The two leaders have apparently agreed to restrict further their nations' deployment of defensive missile systems by not building the second system they are allowed under a 1972 treaty.

"The discussion of this question has been completed," Mr. Zamyatin told a news conference here:

Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon also are reported by Soviet sources to be near agreement on a treaty limiting nuclear underground tests. Technical talks on this are continuing in Moscow.

Mr. Ziegler declined to go in to detail on yesterday's discussion of weapons, but he sought to leave the impression there was little chance of a major new agreement.

He said the Brezhnev-Nixon discussions had not changed Dr. Kissinger's assessment that a new strategic arms limitation agreement was "impossible" this year.

"President Nixon said to me that the talks today on strategic arms limitation were very intensive and extensive," Mr. Ziegler said. "He said various positions were reviewed and discussed, and discussed in detail, of course. . . .

"My remarks are not intended, and I have no reason, to alter the previous statements by senior officials [Dr. Kissinger]."

than expected. He said that tomorrow's trip to the Soviet space center has been canceled because "both leaders felt it is important to use that time to have a thorough discussion on the outstanding issues before them." Tomorrow, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev are to fly to the Black Sea region for further meetings through the weeknd near Yalta.

The specialized agreements signed today provided for cooperation in the following areas:

Housing and other construction, particularly joint research on construction in cold, arid and earthquake-prone regions.

Conventional and nonconventional energy, including development of research programs and exchange of information. Nuclear power is covered in an earlier agreement.

Artificial-heart research and development, including exchange of artificial-heart models, improvement of cardiac

NEW YORK TIMES

29 JUNE 1974 Pg. 2

(1 JULY)

U.S. Will Leave Two Bases
In Thailand by End of Year

BANGKOK, Thailand, June 28 (Reuters)—The United States will withdraw from two of its six remaining air bases in Thailand by the end of the year, it was officially announced today.

The Thai Supreme Command said agreement had been reached on withdrawal from the Takhli base, in central Thailand, before October 1 and from Ubon, in the northeast, by the end of the year.

The United States has steadily been reducing its forces since the bombing of Cambodia halted last August.

Mr. Zamyatin, however, struck a far more positive note, quoting Mr. Brezhnev's remarks that morning that "we are now discussing serious questions, and for this we have still time to conclude an agreement in the next three days."

Mr. Ziegler then repeatedly refused to characterize yesterday's meetings, described by both Soviet and American sources as the most difficult of the conference, as having made any significant progress.

President Nixon and Mr. Brezhnev, who arrived here Saturday afternoon from Moscow, began the day by posing for photographers in the garden of the Oreanda estate where they are staying and then walked along the seafront.

WASHINGTON POST

30 JUNE 1974 Pg. 2

(1 JULY)

Saigon Trip Set
In MIA Search

A congressman says he hopes to meet with North Vietnamese and Vietcong representatives in Saigon this week to try to find out why U.S. teams are not being permitted to look for bodies of 2,406 American servicemen still missing from the Vietnam war.

Rep. G. V. (Sonny) Montgomery (D-Miss.) said Friday he also has asked for a side trip into North Vietnam and that a Pathet Lao official has agreed to meet with him later in the week.

But Montgomery said he is not optimistic on prospects of his visit achieving permission for U.S. teams to look for missing GIs'bodies.

They seem very slim but we've got to keep the pressure on the North Vi-

EDITORIALS

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS - 30 JUNE 1974(1 JULY)

## Summit III: The Need for Care

The first fruits of the third Nixon-Brezhnev summit — agreements on cooperation in the fields of energy technology, economic information exchange, housing development and artificial heart research — are unlikely to quicken many pulses.

The name of the game, and both sides recognize this, is a well-SALTed trade agreement.

The Russians desperately need — and have been getting — trade and technology from the West on favorable terms to revive their lagging centrally-controlled economy. The Soviet Union has purchased $1 billion in American grain to make up for the poor 1972 wheat harvest. In addition to the cheap wheat deal, which drove up prices for the American consumer, the Russians have picked up nearly $1 billion in credits from the Export-Import Bank and private American bankers to make other purchases here, some of this money at interest rates of as little as six percent, which in today's money market — as anybody who has had cause to call on his local banker knows

— is hardly in the realm of a commercial transaction.

One should be under no illusions as to what this aid — for it is that, really, rather than trade — means to the men in the Kremlin. It means, through the capacity to provide the people of the Soviet Union with more and better consumer goods, the damping down of dissent and the perpetuation in power of the men who now run the Kremlin.

We have no particular quarrel with this. Indeed the attainment of new levels of prosperity in the Soviet Union may well not only make the world a safer place for everyone but could, in the long run, lead to at least a modicum of freedom for the Russians themselves.

If selling cheap wheat to the Russians and giving them credits at bargain-basement rates will, as Secretary of State Kissinger theorizes, "give each side a stake in the maintenance of an orderly and increasingly humane international system," we are all for it, to the extent that an over-

heated U.S. economy can afford it.

But the occasional release from an insane asylum of a Russian dissenter or the granting of permission to 35,000 Jews to emigrate to Israel — welcome as these steps are — simply do not amount to an adequate quid for the hefty economic quo that the Russians have been extracting from us.

Nor is it enough that the two leaders apparently have agreed to minor curbs on missile defense systems and are working on some restrictions on underground nuclear testing.

What is needed, and it is our hope that Summit III will produce it, are concrete concessions on the part of the Kremlin to bring under control the dangerous and financially ruinous nuclear arms race that so very easily could get out of control.

The United States at present enjoys a roughly three-fold advantage over the Soviet Union in terms of nuclear warheads. But because the Russians, under the terms of the 1972 SALT agreement, are allowed more and heavier intercontinental ballistic missiles — and because they are on the verge of deploying multiple warheads on these missiles — this seemingly comfortable American lead could evaporate almost overnight. To do so, some experts estimate, would cost the Kremlin between $30 billion and $45 billion.

Now if the Russians are going to spend that kind of money on nuclear development, one is inclined to be just a wee bit skeptical of their intentions. We understand their historic distrust of the West, and their concern about their relations with Communist China. But at the same point in time (as somebody once put it) there has to be a mutual reduction in the arms race if mankind is not to live forever under the threat of nuclear extinction, and this is as good a time as any. It seems to us, at a minimum, that the Russians should agree to nuclear parity between the two nations.

In a rather strange way, President Nixon's Watergate problems may serve to insure against a strategic arms limitation agreement that would be disastrous to the United States. Mr. Nixon — and Kissinger — know that they will be negotiating with Senator Jackson and others skeptical of Russia's intentions looking over their shoulders. Much as he needs an agreement for domestic political reasons,

CHICAGO TRIBUNE

30 JUNE 1974 (1 JULY)

## Nuclear flak hits Mr. Wilson

Prime Minister Harold Wilson is getting a barrage of criticism from his Labor Party's Left Wing for conducting an underground nuclear test, and the ironic thing is that he did nothing wrong—even by Labor Party standards. The test occurred several weeks ago

### Quote

> "To carry out an underground test of a British nuclear weapon does not imply any change in defense policy. Not to carry out such a test might imply a change of great importance. ... There is no valid comparison between an underground test and an atmospheric test of the kind recently conducted by the Chinese and the French. ... To maintain its credibility, the British nuclear force must face the Russians with a high probability the British weapons system, granted that it exists at all, has to match the Russians' defenses. ... To stay in the league Britain must keep up with the technology. Failure to do so means resignation from the league."

ing treaties. It contributed in no way to nuclear proliferation—the spread of such weapons to countries which do not now have them. It was aimed at strengthening the Western military deterrent to aggression by a potential enemy. Nor did the test violate Labor Party policy.

So where did Mr. Wilson go wrong, if indeed he went wrong at all? Well, he is being criticized for not announcing the test in advance. He discussed the matter only after a London newspaper had broken the story of the test. And he pointed out, reasonably enough, that past tests have not been announced until after completion.

The blunt fact is that if Mr. Wilson had announced the test in advance, the far left element of his own party would have created such a hullabaloo as to threaten Labor's already weak government and very likely delay the test indefinitely. By going ahead, he was discharging his obligation to the defense of his country and thwarting the far left members of his own party who pretend that the path to peace lies in military weakness.

WASHINGTON POST 30 JUNE 1974 (1 July)

# A 'Personal' Detente

THE SOVIET-AMERICAN agreements of the last two years were made possible, Mr. Nixon told Mr. Brezhnev in Moscow, reciprocating a welcoming toast, "because of a personal relationship" between the two leaders. "Because of our personal relationship," he went on, "there is no question about our will to keep these agreements and to make more where they are in our mutual interest." Earlier, in the Mideast crisis last fall, Mr. Nixon had said that the crisis finally cooled "because he [Brezhnev] and I know each other ... because we had had this personal contact." For the President this is no new or accidental theme.

It is, nonetheless, a disturbing theme, the more so for being repeated and directly expressed in Moscow. What it suggests is that the search for improved relations with the Soviet Union hangs not on a solidly based perception of mutual national interest but on the necessarily much more ephemeral basis of a "personal relationship." For it is no reflection on the diplomatic prowess or the dedication to peace of either Mr. Nixon or Mr. Brezhnev to observe that their own relationship is the most changeable aspect of Soviet-American ties, the aspect most likely—as each side thinks about it—to fray the other's confidence in detente. In the past, we suspect, someone like Mr. Nixon might have dismissed any great-power relationship based on contacts or feelings between personalities as being "atmospheric," or worse. Moreover, to the extent that a "personal relationship" of leaders means that the bureaucracies and other interest groups in the two nations are less committed to the enterprise, that is cause for anxiety, too.

But perhaps we are taking the President too seriously. Perhaps his words were merely by way of arguing to a domestic audience that he is so important to world peace that he should not be impeached. As Mr. Nixon himself put it, in the interview in which he told James J. Kilpatrick that the United States needs a strong President equipped by experience to deal at the summit with world leaders: "I have to be here." But this explanation is really not reassuring at all. To advertise his domestic political distress to the

Kremlin in this fashion is not only to be in questionable taste on foreign soil but virtually to tempt the Russians to take advantage of him. Indeed, Mr. Brezhnev may have done something very much like that in his opening toast by his pointed reference to American critics of Mr. Nixon's foreign policy. What could have led the Soviet leader to imagine that Mr. Nixon would countenance this brazen intervention into the American political dialogue? Does their "personal relationship" offer an invitation, to one-sided meddling of this sort?

In any event, there are no grounds for believing that Mr. Brezhnev is so vitally interested in maintaining his personal relationship with President Nixon that he would pay a national price for it. On the contrary, the evident Russian position is to work with Mr. Nixon as long as he remains politically upright but, beyond that, to conduct with the United States a policy that will move Soviet interests forward even if Mr. Nixon goes. Mr. Brezhnev may be no less eager than Mr. Nixon to come to terms with posterity: each in his opening-banquet toast solemnly invoked "history" or "future generations" as the appropriate judge of their current acts. But the Soviet leader operates in a political context which requires him to be constantly accountable to a few peers—he runs for re-election daily, so to speak. He operates in a policy context which stresses long-term planning. That is to say, Mr. Brezhnev cannot afford even a rhetorical investment in a "personal relationship" with a politician who not only represents Moscow's chief adversary but—worse from a Soviet viewpoint—whose hold on power is, at least, precarious and limited by law to no more than two and a half years, at best. That the Soviet censors removed the word "personal" from the Nixon text, in reprinting it in the Moscow press, distastefully but definitely underlines the point.

We trust that Mr. Nixon, in his remaining days in the Soviet Union, will contain his personal exuberance or his political anxiety or whatever it may be that leads him to suggest that the policy of great nations is the personal expression of a pair of mortal men. Detente has to be more substantial than that.

WALL STREET JOURNAL
1 JULY 1974
NIXON AND BREZHNEV apparently were deadlocked in arms-limitation talks.

White House spokesman Ronald Ziegler indicated that although the Russian and American leaders, meeting at Yalta on the Black Sea, held "intensive and extensive" talks on the subject, there weren't any breakthroughs in the most crucial arms issue—limiting offensive nuclear weapons in general and multiple missile warheads, or MIRVs, in particular. Ziegler said nothing has happened to alter a senior American official's prediction that an overall arms-control control agreement is "impossible" at this summit.

But the two sides could still reach an important accord about the MIRV issue, recent remarks by Secretary of State Kissinger indicated.

The leaders set a 10-year economic agreement to spur U.S.-Soviet trade. In addition, agreements were reached on exchanging information, removing bureaucratic bottlenecks and encouraging joint ventures between the two nations.

DUN'S MAGAZINE MAY 1974 (1 July)
## Is Our Defense Slipping?

When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara went to the World Bank, he left behind at the Pentagon a system of cost/benefit analysis that has now been thoroughly discredited. Vietnam pointed up the failure of Secretary McNamara's strategic concepts of graduated responsibilities. The TFX and its performance shortfall demonstrated—with equal, chilling clarity—the failures of cost/benefit analysis and weapons planning.

Secretary Melvin Laird, Mr. McNamara's successor, partially did away with heavy reliance on quantitative appraisal, paying, instead, more attention to the "seasoned heads" in the uniformed services. Now Secretary James Schlesinger, a hard-nosed administrator of the McNamara school, has reinstituted systems analysis. True, he has given it several new names, but many of the same old faces are there.

If there has been no outcry over this, it is because of the vacuum of leadership in Washington caused by Watergate. This has allowed Secretary Schlesinger a freedom of action almost unprecedented in the planning of our nation's defense. It has led to a situation where our active forces are being reduced and their reserve components are being cut—simultaneously. Nor has there ever been such narrow, centralized management at the Pentagon, a situation so dangerous that it has caused a distinguished military statesman like General Lyman Lemnitzer, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Commander of NATO, to express grave reservations as to the nature and magnitude of some of the proposed "savings." Yet if

NEW YORK TIMES 30 JUNE 1974 (1 JULY)

## Trade, Détente ...

The evolving accommodation between the United States and the Soviet Union reflected in the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting in Moscow has taken both countries a goodly distance from their starting point in January 1971, when Mr. Nixon wrote his first personal letter as President to the Soviet leader. But it would be an error to forget the fundamental transaction that initiated this "era of negotiation" between the two super-powers and helped shape the Kremlin foreign policy that was announced, along with a new Five-Year Plan for the economy, at the Soviet Communist party Congress in March of that year.

In that transaction, the Kremlin's primary motivation in offering détente was to obtain American technology, trade, credits and managerial skill to advance the Soviet Union's lagging economy and living standards. President Nixon offered economic exchanges as the *quid pro quo* for détente—and for the Soviet cooperation that détente implied in such matters as ending the Vietnam war.

Full implementation of that agreement, which was embodied in indirect form in the May 1972 summit communiqué, has been blocked by the Jackson amendment, originally sponsored by 76 Senators, which in effect would make American trade and credits conditional on free emigration from the Soviet Union. Soviet concessions, many negotiated by the Administration's "quiet diplomacy," have eroded some of Senator Jackson's support, but Mr. Nixon's most delicate task during his visit to Moscow will be to seek further compromises between the Kremlin and the Jackson positions to open the way for passage of the pending trade bill.

Jewish emigration, which rose to a rate of over 30,000 a year, has now dropped back to about 2,000 a month and Moscow evidently has indicated a willingness almost to double it. Many Senators want not only a higher rate but, perhaps even more important, a halt in harassment of those who apply for exit visas and rapid resolution of a number of hardship cases.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

1 JULY 1974

### VFW officer unseated for pro-amnesty remark

Binghamton, N.Y.

Betty Grecco of Johnstown, the newly elected president of the New York State Veterans of Foreign Wars Ladies Auxiliary, was not allowed to take office Saturday after she expressed sympathy for granting amnesty to draft resisters. State VFW president Wolfgang J. Nauke forbade the installation ½ and his order was unanimously supported by the VFW convention held here, officials said.

In a newspaper interview published Saturday Mrs. Grecco said she did not think it was "all that terrible" to grant amnesty to draft resisters. The VFW has a national policy of total opposition to amnesty for draft resisters, draft evaders, and deserters.

The outgoing president of the ladies auxiliary will remain in office until the matter is resolved.

WALL STREET JOURNAL

1 JULY 1974

Debts owed by Israel to the U.S. totaling

## ... and Emigration

Secretary of State Kissinger framed the issue for the Senate in his predeparture press conference when he asked whether it was wise, whatever skepticism there is about détente and arms control negotiations, for "every positive incentive for restrained conduct" by the Soviet Union to be "systematically closed off." Do the critics of détente want to return to confrontation and tension? The country clearly does not.

Nevertheless, it is incomprehensible that the Soviet Government makes Mr. Nixon's task with the Senate more difficult than necessary by refraining from some gestures which it could easily make. The emigration issue involves not only Soviet Jews who wish to go to Israel, but a dozen so-called "dual nationality" cases involving American citizens long resident in the Soviet Union who wish to return home and hundreds of Soviet citizens who wish to be reunited with their families in America.

About a third of those on a list of 660 names handed to Soviet officials a year ago have now received exit visas. There is no reason why the others should not be permitted to leave in the wake of the summit conference if Mr. Nixon will forcefully put this case to Mr. Brezhnev.

The President and Mr. Kissinger have been right to point out that Americans cannot expect their Government to bring about the transformation of the Soviet system into a democracy as the price for détente and trade. The hope must be that liberalization will follow détente; it is more likely to be prevented than accelerated by excessive outside pressure, as Soviet dissident historian Roy Medvedev long has argued.

But the trade-emigration stalemate clearly has reached the point now where a major effort must be made on both sides to find an accommodation. Secretary Kissinger appears to be ready to force the issue in the Senate on his return from Moscow. He will need more help than yet has been forthcoming from the Soviet Government to do so successfully.

BALTIMORE SUN 30 JUNE 1974 (1 JULY)

## Personalizing the Summit

Whether men make history or Impersonal forces still more open, not to say unbridled. He refers to the value of his "personal relationship" with Mr. Brezhnev, as if his own occupancy of the American presidency and Mr. Brezhnev's occupancy of the secretaryship of the Soviet Communist party were the absolute prerequisites of détente, otherwise impossible to achieve. One is reminded of Mr. Nixon's dangerous dictum of a while back that it is no longer foreign ministers but chief executives who make foreign policy.

Both Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon are behaving today as if they believe the leaders of a moment can guide events decisively, if not indeed thoroughly control them. For a man of Mr. Brezhnev's ideological background this may seem rather odd, though he would hardly be the first Soviet leader to forget some of the stricter lessons of his ideology. In any case Mr. Brezhnev right now is acting

still more open, not to say unbridled. He refers repeatedly to the value of his "personal relationship" with Mr. Brezhnev, as if his own occupancy of the American presidency and Mr. Brezhnev's occupancy of the secretaryship of the Soviet Communist party were the absolute prerequisites of détente, otherwise impossible to achieve. One is reminded of Mr. Nixon's dangerous dictum of a while back that it is no longer foreign ministers but chief executives who make foreign policy.

Mr. Nixon's first reason for this posture is of course obvious. Against his troubles at home he is trying to make all possible points of his trip to Russia. He is attempting to create an image of himself as a president so globally important, in his own person, that he is in fact indispensable, however dispensable he may seem to some at home who have a narrower vision of the world than he has. To us he appears to be overplaying the role.

Back finally to Mr. Brezhnev: Is he too, for reasons less obvious, also playing a role, and also trying to create an image of personal indispensability? What secret struggles for power may be behind the Kremlin walls we can only

WASHINGTON POST 29 JUNE 1974(1 JULY)

# Zumwalt Retires Today as Chief of Naval Operations

By Michael Getler

Washington Post Staff Writer

At Annapolis today, the admiral who rocked the Navy's boat will step down as chief of naval operations and retire from military life.

Looking back over a 35-year career, including four years at the top, Adm. Elmo R. (Bud) Zumwalt said in an interview that he is optimistic about the Navy's manpower situation, pessimistic about the fleet's ability to keep the sea lanes open in a showdown with the Russians, and uncertain about America's willingness to keep its defenses up in an era of "apparent peace and tranquility."

During his years as CNO, Zumwalt became one of the most innovative, important and controversial naval officers of modern times.

The controversy started in 1970 when former Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird picked him—over 32 of his seniors—to become, at 49, the youngest chief of naval operations in the Navy's 194-year history.

Since then, Zumwalt has won both praise and rebuke for his battles to liberalize regulations governing enlisted men, for his uncompromising suspicion of the Soviet Union even during the "era of detente," and for his assessment that the Soviet fleet can now thwart the U.S. Navy's ability to control the seas.

"There is a good deal of indecision," Zumwalt is fond of telling interviewers, "as to whether I'm a drooling, fang militarist or a bleeding-heart liberal."

Zumwalt literally dragged his service into the new lifestyle of American youth, easing many of the "chicken" regulations that irked the new breed of sailors. And he broke down racial barriers that had clung to an aristocratic, tradition-bound Navy longer than to the other services.

For his troubles, Zumwalt at one point faced a mini-mutiny behind the scenes. It was led by a number of retired admirals and some ac-

ful of ships, most notably on the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk in 1972, marked the low point in Zumwalt's personal fight for reform and the high point of criticism and efforts to unseat him. A congressional subcommittee report echoed the view that "permissiveness" had eroded discipline.

But Zumwalt weathered the attack and things appear to have calmed down.

Re-enlistments by sailors after one hitch are now up from 10 per cent in 1970 to 23 per cent. Ninety-one per cent of the older hands are signing up again these days, compared to 80 per cent four years ago.

The proportion of black enlisted men is up to 8 per cent, twice what it was four years ago. Black officers still make up only about 1.5 per cent of the officer corps, but that, too, is double the earlier ratio.

If Zumwalt was a "liberal" on some issues, however, he was also widely viewed as the most "hard line" of the top U.S. commanders when it came to the Russians. Constantly he warned of a growing Soviet naval threat and demanded a bigger and bigger slice of the defense budget to counter it.

Zumwalt and his Russian counterpart, Adm. Sergi Georgievich Gorshkov, commander of the Soviet fleet, have much in common. Both command huge and owerful fleets. Each, in his own fashion; has dramatically transformed his mavy in recent years. In so doing, both have focused new attention on naval warfare strategy and have waged intense internal battles to get their way.

Zumwalt and Gorshkov also understand and exploit the concept of what some call "unsable" military power in an age of nuclear weapons.

Unlike missiles buried out of sight in prairies or mountain ranges, or bombers that fly too high for the eye to see, fleets are visible, understandable instruments of power. They can be moved about, in the admirals' view, to show resolve without intruding on another country's

not have to leave after four years at the top.

On the one hand, Zumwalt's departure could cause some weakening, at least initially, in the Navy's message to Congress about the need to challenge the growing prowess of the Soviet navy. Zumwalt is widely viewed as being among the most persuasive, attractive and articulate spokesman the Navy has ever had.

On the ther hand, some top Pentagon officials who believe Zumwalt has exaggerated the Soviet naval threat feel that his very persistence with Congress, coupled with his pessimistic outlook, has now begun to backfire on the Navy. Says a senior official:

> "You simply can't keep going back five times to Congress asking the same thing, telling guys who have authorized billions for fleet modernization that the Russians are going to whip us. Not only won't they give you what you ask for, they're going to cut something else as well."

Whatever the effect of his tactics, Zumwalt is widely respected as a keen military intellect whose admonitions cannot be ignored.

Looking back over his years at the top during an interview in his Pentagon office, Zumwalt expressed optimism only about the Navy's ability to meet ist manpower requirements in the draft-free era of an all-volunteer military.

He is proud of his efforts to improve the lot of the enlisted man and to further racial integration in the Navy, viewing both objectives as so fundamentally correct that there could be no backing away no matter how heavy the opposition.

"With regard to the capability of the Navy," Zumwalt said, "I'm much less optimistic."

The Navy, he points out, has cut the fleet by 47 per cent since 1969 to a current level of 508 ships, the lowest since 1939 (now it is slated to start going up). The idea was to use the saving for a massive investment in modernization. But Zumwalt argues that all of the shipbuilding budgets over the

do its job."

At the heart of the problem, as Zumwalt views it, is "the very great difficulty we've had in getting across to the people and to the Congress what basically is a very simple fact. That is that the Soviet Union is a land power, doesn't need the oceans, and its navy can accomplish its mission if it merely cuts our sea lines. "It's navy, in short, has an easier job," he says.

The United States, on the other hand is an island nation, not only importing oil and 69 of its 72 critical resources, but also having to reinforce its own and allied forces by sea in wartime. he says.

"If the U.S. Navy and the Soviet navy were able to meet in the middle of the Atlantic and fight it out, the odds are we could win," he says. The Soviets, for one thing, have nothing comparable to the U.S. fleet of 15 aircraft carriers, each laden with 75 to 80 jet fighter-bombers.

However, Zumwalt stresses, and all-out battle in the mid-Atlantic is not the problem. The problem is that the Russians do not need to have surface supply ships arriving in their ports to survive, while the United States and its allies do. That gives the U.S. Navy the much tougher added job of conveying those supply ships over thousands of miles of ocean in wartime, he says.

"Viewed in that context, and as a result of our major reductions," Zumwalt warns, "the odds are that today the Soviets come much closer to being able to carry out their mission of cutting the sea lines than we do to carrying out our mission of controlling and using the seas."

"That is a very serious state of affairs and needs to be recognized by better sup-

port of the President's defense budgets," he says.

Zumwalt's views are not entirely shared by Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger, though the Pentagon's civilian boss thinks very highly of Zumwalt's intellect.

In February — without naming anyone — Schle-

NEW YORK TIMES 30 JUNE 1974(JULY)

# Détente, With Caution

By Robert Taft Jr.

Seymour Chwast

WASHINGTON—President Nixon is in Moscow to further the cause of détente. There should be no one in Washington who does not wish him success. But at the same time that we work for the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, we must continue to watch not just the rhetoric but also the realities of United States-Soviet relations.

Foremost among these realities is the discrepancy between the Soviet public endorsement of détente and the quiet but constant build-up of Soviet military power.

In strategic arms, the Russians are preparing to deploy four powerful new intercontinental ballistic missiles plus a new strategic bomber.

More critically, they are moving to nullify the United States acceptance of the first agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, by adopting their own system of MIRV's, or warheads with multiple missiles.

In conventional armaments, their naval expansion is proceeding rapidly and includes the building of aircraft carriers. They are embarked on a major program to strengthen their conventional land forces in Europe, both with men and with advanced, high-fire-power weapons.

Nor do the private statements of Soviet leaders offer assurance. It is no secret that at the Prague conference of Eastern European party chiefs, Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet party leader, described détente not as a goal

but as a tactic with limited duration. Détente is justified within the party on the grounds that it is acceptable to bargain with the devil as long as you cheat him in the end.

As long as these Soviet policies and attitudes persist we must base our diplomacy not on pro forma détente, but on diplomatic and military realities. The foremost of these realities is our need for a strong and independent China to act as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.

In our recent concern with the Middle East and with improving relations with Moscow, we have diverted our attention from Peking, with unfortunate results. The Chinese leadership has been increasingly open about its disappointment with the United States and its feeling that China has received little American assistance in reducing the Soviet threat.

It is clear that an important element in the current Chinese power struggle is the argument of the old Lin Piao faction that the understanding with the United States has failed and that the only way to reduce the Soviet threat is through a new alliance with the Soviet Union.

If we are to maintain China's current position as a counterbalance to Soviet power, we must take forceful measures to strengthen the United States-Chinese relationship. Secretary of State Kissinger in a recent but unfortunately little noticed address did re-emphasize the United States interest in a strong and independent China.

But the American effort must be in concrete terms. Specifically, we must make it clear that we would expect to give active diplomatic and material support to China in the event of a confrontation with the Soviet Union. We should carefully examine inclusion of China under the Nixon Doctrine, providing her with an opportunity to acquire the material she needs to defend herself against aggression.

Exchanges of ballet troupes and orchestras are all very well, but Peking is aware, if some here are not, that antitank weapons are rather more effective in deterring potential Soviet aggression.

This does not mean that we should fail to seek détente with Moscow. A real détente would, by definition, include a reduction of the Soviet military threat to all powers.

But as long as the current discrepancy exists between Soviet public pronouncements and Soviet military preparations, we cannot afford to abandon the traditional practice of counting the divisions.

In the current world balance of power, it is imperative that the divisions of China's Army continue to be stationed on the Soviet frontier.

Robert Taft Jr. is Republican Senator fro 1 Ohio.

(ZUMWALT...CONT'D.)

rent superiority of the Soviet fleet."

Pentagon civilian analysts point out that the U.S. fleet has now once more begun to grow, while the Russians are running into an aging problem similar to that experienced by the U.S. Navy in the early 1960s. Thus, they argue it is now the Soviet fleet that will be shrinking in size, though not necessarily in capability.

In March, Schlesinger's annual report to Congress on the military power balance noted that "our current estimates are that with existing and planned U.S. and allied anti-submarine warfare forces, we could eventually turn back the enemy submarine threat without an unacceptable loss to our merchant shipping or to our naval forces."

In the long run, Schlesinger added, the planned future level of 12 U.S. carrier task forces would be adequate to any challenge from Soviet surface ships and aircraft.

naval balance again tilt in favor of the U.S., the administrative contends.

Asked why he is so pessimistic when it is generally acknowledged that the United States has a great advantage in aircraft carriers, better submarines, planes and sub-hunting equipment, and a more experienced Navy, Zumwalt cites the difference in mission, the fact that Congress is not going along unstintingly with the modernization plan, the Soviet numerical superiority in submarines, plus greater Soviet ship and submarine manufacturing facilities.

Has the emphasis on détente with the Soviet Union that has been so prevalent in the official U.S. language in recent years helped erode public willingness to support defense? Zumwalt was asked.

"Yes," he said, "I believe it is just very difficult for the man in the street to understand in an era of apparent peace and tranquility why one needs military strength. And I think the layman doesn't realize how very long the lead time is in the modern era to recover

Fortunately in the past we have had time to rebuild our strength, trading space and other people's territory for time.

"Secretary Kissinger himself has written, I believe, that the Russians have practiced détente in every decade. We've been there before, and we've seen it come undone," he says.

"I strongly supported the need for rapprochement with the Communist world, the need to work out our problems. What worries me about what has transpired is that it appears to be very similar to earlier historical examples, in which the current intentions of the other side are perceived to be so amicable that we permit our capability to retrogress.

"Again, it's very difficult in a democratic system to make it clear that his [Soviet] intentions can change overnight but it takes years to change [U.S. capability]."

Has there been too much rhetoric about détente? "I think people hear what they want to hear," says Zumwalt. "And right now people want to hear that things are going well. There have been

admiral says: "I think it remains to be determined whether this country is going to be able to meet its national security needs in the years ahead.

"One can visualize several alternative worlds. One is a world in which we have been successful in maintaining sufficient strength so that détente will continue on terms acceptable to the United States and the free world.

"A second is a world in which our military strength has become so inferior that the Soviets are tempted to become much more aggressive in their foreign policy.

"There are two forks in that road: one in which we recognize what is happening and accommodate; the other in which we do not recognize it, fail to accommodate, and, through miscalculation, are involved in a losing war."

Which of those roads are we going down? he was asked.

"I think it is very dangerous for anyone to gaze into his crystal ball that far ahead. The lessons of history would teach us that the

duction in the administration's own defense spending requests.

That poses a painful dilemma for Mr. Nixon. In White House meetings, he has agreed with Simon's fervent declaration that substantial budget cuts are essential to avoid continuous, ruinous double-digit inflation. But to cut the present budget by the $4-billion to $5-billion that Simon regards as minimal, he knows at least some gesture toward trimming the defense budget must be made. Yet, in view of heavy Soviet arms spending, it can be argued in interests of national security that Pentagon spending should be increased rather than decreased.

The President can effect no budget reductions whatever unless he cuts arms spending. Whether he does or not, therefore, will test the President's interest in making his first truly serious effort to brake ever-higher spending. Simultaneously, it will gauge Simon's strength and perhaps his future in Washington.

No sooner had Simon been sworn in at the Treasury May 8 than he began pushing for budget-trimming to fight inflation. His bitter personal rival, Budget Director Roy Ash, immediately responded that no effective cuts were possible. But their intermittent public debate only suggests the intensity of their incessant backstage struggle.

Fiscal economists at Ash's Office of Management and Budget (OMB) con-

cutting in administration councils, Ash explains at length why it cannot be done.

But Simon has allies. The Treasury cites support from prominent business economists—Alan Greenspan, Dr. Pierre Rinfret and Eliot Janeway—who seldom agree with each other but believe business markets would respond immediately and favorably to Simon's effort. Greenspan, expected to become chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, believes serious efforts must be made now to avoid a disastrous runaway budget by mid-1976.

This view is strongly buttressed at the Federal Reserve Board by Chairman Arthur Burns, who feels Mr. Nixon has never seriously attacked the budget. Finally, Kenneth Rush, named by the President as economic coordinator to referee Simon-Ash disputes, has backed Simon on the budget.

As for the President himself, Mr. Nixon has often given Simon his private support. But throughout his presidency, he has voiced traditional Republican budget-balancing rhetoric without making the hard decisions necessary to fulfill it. What Simon now proposes involves hard decisions indeed.

Over the long run, Simon wants to pare down the entire budget—including so-called “uncontrollable” social welfare spending. Moreover, he insists the Pentagon is not immune. For the present fiscal year, which began July 1, that boils down to cuts of $4-billion to

ridiculously inadequate. Nevertheless, it would represent a declaration by Mr. Nixon that, despite the need to compete with Moscow in arms, nothing receives a higher priority than fighting inflation. What's more, it would portend severe defense spending constraints in future budgets.

Although Simon is not submitting his proposals on a basis of approve-it-or-I'll-quit, his future here would seem bleak if the President rejects him. Simon's friends believe he will either become the preeminent economic policy-maker or return to Wall Street. They cannot envision him playing permanent second banana to Rush (though their early relationship has been quite congenial).

Many White House aides, resenting Simon's independence and flair for publicity, would not be unhappy if he packed up for Wall Street posthaste. But Simon's strong base of support in Congress (which includes such unlikely collaborators as Proxmire) and the business community would react to Simon's departure in a way that the hard-pressed President could ill afford today.

No immediate decision is expected. Simon leaves Thursday for the Middle East and Europe. By the time he returns two weeks later, the President may have been forced to come to grips with inflation, the runaway budget and the role and influence of Bill Simon.

© 1974, Field Enterprises, Inc.

WASHINGTON POST 10 JULY 1974

# The Soviet Refusal to Limit Strategic Arms

Joseph Alsop

Strip away the understandable political flackery. The results of the President's visit to the Soviet Union then look fairly ominous. No other conclusion is possible, on the basis of the first reports of what really happened.

Boiled down to the essentials, what really happened was simple enough. The President and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger went very far indeed to secure some sort of ongoing understanding about strategic arms limitation. It will be said—and said unjustly—that this was because the domestic political situation made the President desperate for “something to show” from the summit meeting.

There was undeniable desperation in the search for further SALT progress, particularly in the case of Secretary Kissinger. But this was because both the President and the Secretary, again with special emphasis on Dr. Kissinger, have come to feel that the on-rush of technology is causing the whole vast, ugly business of strategic arms development to get utterly out of hand.

Just what kind of deal was offered to the Soviets is not known as yet.

This is one of the plainest proofs that the President and the Secretary went just as far as they possibly could. In the Pentagon, in fact, only Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger was consulted. Dr. Kissinger's remark about the “intransigence” of professional military men can only be taken to mean that, some, or all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might have objected strongly to the real offer to the Soviets.

To the foregoing one must add a further fact. The summit atmosphere was cordial; and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and the other Soviet leaders were plainly eager to keep up all the now-familiar appearances of what is called “detente.”

 Marshal Andrei Grechko, for instance, positively went out of his way to talk at real length and with some intimacy with the President's Chief of Staff, General Alexander Haig. As defense minister, member of the Politburo, and second most powerful figure in the Soviet government, Marshal Grechko is one of the most important men in the world today.

The marshal is also one of the least known of the world's leaders, outside the Soviet inner circle; for he is far from given to being cosy with foreign-

ers. His long talks with General Haig (on whom he reportedly made a deep impression) therefore mean that the Soviet military chief was doing his best to be pleasant, like all his colleagues.

But it is one thing to do your best to be pleasant, and it is quite another to do real business, especially when the other side is going to great lengths in order to do business, as were the President and Secretary Kissinger. The American effort to do business met with flat failure, at least in the area of strategic arms limitation.

Rather plainly, there was some Soviet hesitation about the right course. The climax, in fact, was a Politburo meeting so ultralong that the discussion can only have been extremely careful and detailed, which in turn caused considerable delay in the final Soviet-American meetings.

One does not know, of course, if there would have been a second Politburo meeting, with an entirely different outcome, if the President had ended by talking cold turkey to General Secretary Brezhnev. That would have meant the President's saying: “Progress with SALT, however slow and careful, is what ‘detente’ is

(See ARMS, Pg. 5)

4

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 10 JULY 1974 Pg. 3

# U.S., Soviets spill out military information

Less bluffing and guessing,
but nuclear cutback still dim

By Dana Adams Schmidt
Staff correspondent of
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

As a result of the Moscow summit, the U.S. and the Soviet Union know a great deal more about each other's military power — and that could turn out to be the meeting's most important fruit.

Against this background, the White House and State Department staffs of Henry A. Kissinger are preparing for the new and vital negotiations on control of strategic nuclear weapons with the Soviet Union.

And planners for both the U.S. and Russia now are not guessing and bluffing as much as they used to, but working from knowledge and understanding, observers here believe.

Dr. Kissinger, before he left Moscow, told correspondents:

"There were the most extensive discussions at the level of the arms race than have ever taken place, and with a frankness that would have been considered inconceivable two years ago, indeed, with an amount of detail that would have been considered violating intelligence codes in previous periods."

## Questionable superiority

Dr. Kissinger also posed a question: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What do you do with it?"

He was talking, of course, about nuclear strategic superiority, which might be contrasted with the old-fashioned kind of superiority familiar from World War II — measured in terms of guns, ships, and planes.

Measuring nuclear weapons in such terms is not meaningful because they have introduced the factor of saturation. That is, if you already have enough firepower to wipe out your

enemy, what do you gain by doubling it? Or by attaining firepower superior to your enemy's?

This is what is meant by "overkill."

Almost everyone concerned with the nuclear talks on both sides now seems willing to concede this principle in one form or another and to agree that the objective of negotiations should be "equivalency."

The difficulty from that point on is twofold:

* The difficulty in defining equivalency. The Russians have more and heavier missiles, the United States has more warheads (in the form of MIRVs) and greater accuracy. How do you balance one against the other?

* Some negotiators (Dr. Kissinger accuses the military on both sides) seem to talk about equivalency but secretly work for superiority.

## More throw weight

Numerically, the SALT I agreement of 1972 gave the United States 1,054 land-based missile launchers and 650 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, with the right to build up the SLBMs to 710 if it at the same time cashes in 54 land-based missiles.

The Russians at the same time were given 1,618 land-based missile launchers while the ceiling on the SLBMs was set at 740. To build up their submarine-launched missiles they could cash in up to 210 of their older land-based missile launchers.

Because the Russians chose to build bigger missiles, they now have two or three times as much throw weight as the United States.

But the United States, enjoying a technological lead in the art of making one missile carrying multiple, individually targeted warheads (MIRVs), has the advantage of having about 6,000 missile warheads (or about 7,900 if the 450 long-range bombers are included) compared

## ARMS ... CONTINUED

mainly about in the eyes of Americans; so I have to tell you, Mr. General Secretary, that the answer I have been given here means the end of 'detente.'"

Rightly or wrongly, the President reserved that chilling message for the next time around. Instead, the word for now is that on the highest level of the administration, a vast effort will be launched of fundamental strategic review and analysis. No doubt that is no more than sensible.

But some plain facts also have to be faced. In brief, the present leaders of the Nixon administration tried to limit the worst of the arms race with an offer to the Soviets that would have seemed almost sloppily generous to many responsible people in the U.S. government. That offer was turned down flat, for good or ill, and despite an obvious Soviet desire to preserve the atmospherics of "detente."

That leaves the President and the rest of us face to face with the further ugly fact that losing an arms race is the only thing worse than being in an arms race. That also leaves the President with no remaining shot in his locker, except telling the Soviets and the American people that "detente" has turned out to be a bust. Doing just that before it is too late might even change the present Soviet course.

with the Russians' 2,352 (including their 140 long-range bombers).

The problem for the negotiators is how to work out true equivalency.

American experts calculate that small increases in accuracy are equivalent to large increases in weight. Or, increasing the destructive power, or yield, of the missile by eight is equivalent to doubling accuracy.

If it were just a mathematical problem it might be worked out quickly. But added to the problem are imponderables in the form of differences of perception.

In other words, one side might think it important to seem to have superiority. In numbers of missiles or in some other aspect, for the political effect that might have in third-world nations, or in domestic politics.

## WASHINGTON POST

10 JULY 1974 Pg. 10

Thai Students Hit

Handling of Riots

BANGKOK, July 9 (AP) Thailand's most powerful student organization today criticized the government and police for what it said was overreaction in last week's China-town riots that left 24 persons dead.

The 400,000-member National Student Center of Thailand said it was conducting an investigation into the cause of the three nights of gun battles in the streets, and urged the government to do likewise.

## WASHINGTON POST

10 JULY 1974 Pg. 29

U.S.-Spanish Statement

Initiated by Kissinger

MADRID, July 9 (UPI) — Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Spanish Foreign Minister Pedro Cortina today initialed a joint declaration calling for continued mutual defense efforts and close consultation on foreign policy and economic affairs.

The student center was a major force in last October's agitation which led to the overthrow of the military government here.

Senior U.S. officials traveling aboard Kissinger's plane said the agreement would open the way immediately to new negotiations to renew the U.S. lease of four vital bases on Spanish territory.

The officials said the United States is seeking a five-year renewal of these leases on the U.S. Air Force bases at Torrejon, Zaragoza and Seville, and the U.S. nuclear submarine base at Rota on Spain's southwestern Atlantic coast.

The agreement, similar to a joint declaration of the NATO countries signed by President Nixon two weeks ago in Brussels, said the United States

and Spain "believe that the defensive ties which unite them must be maintained because security cannot be disregarded."

It also reaffirmed that "A threat to an attack on either country would be a matter of concern to both, and each country would take such action as it may consider appropriate within the framework of its constitutional process."

This part of the statement fell short of the desire expressed by Spanish officials for an outright security guarantee by the United States, diplomatic sources said.

# Time Out for Henry Kissinger?

## Joseph Kraft

We have been witnessing, recently, a kind of Kissinger pathos. The Secretary of State has been systematically picking fights he doesn't need and taking positions he cannot defend.

So it is no favor to tell him that he is doing great except for a couple of pesky, nit-picking reporters. Those concerned for his survival, as a person and an official, understand that what he mainly needs is a time out.

Perhaps the most striking feature of Dr. Kissinger's recent performance lies in the new enemies he has been making. It is not as though he does not already have problems aplenty on his desk.

His chief accomplishments—the settlements in Vietnam and the Mideast—could both come unraveled. It remains to be seen whether he can work effectively with the new leaders in Western Europe.

The Chinese, as witness their recent reception of Sen. Henry Jackson, have doubts about the staying power of the Nixon administration. The Russians, as witness the meager achievements of the President's trip to Moscow, have rejected several American proposals for limiting nuclear weapons.

So, in these circumstances, what does Dr. Kissinger do? Well, he winds up the Moscow summit meetings with a claim that "both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefit of restraint." Then he issues invitations to a great national debate on the subject of "what in the name of God is strategic superiority?"

Not surprisingly, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who is not the most thick-skinned man in town, takes these comments for charges that the Pentagon gummed up a possible deal with the Russians. So now Dr. Schlesinger is girding for an all-out argument with Dr. Kissinger on American strategy.

But the Secretary of State cannot possibly win that argument. For one thing, the Moscow record makes it clear that the Russians—not the Pentagon—are to blame for the failure to reach agreement.

Moreover, even if he could overcome that handicap, he would emerge badly from the fight. For a showing by Dr. Kissinger that the Pentagon has overplayed its hand will only alienate defense-minded senators. John Stennis (D-Miss.) and other hawks hitherto partial to the Secretary of State would turn against him. And that, given the President's reliance on the right wing of the Senate for his impeachment defense, could be fatal.

The more so as Dr. Kissinger has already been forced into an awkward defensive position with liberal opinion in the country on two Watergate issues. The Watergate issues involve his knowledge of wiretapping and the "plumbers."

Narcissists in the press corps, and others who are uninitiated, think these issues are being forced by reporters who ask embarrassing and sometimes even insulting questions. In fact, that is not the case. Dr. Kissinger is in trouble thanks to his past and present asso-

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR - 11 JULY 1974

## Balance sheet of a third summit

By Charles W. Yost

### New York

President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev have held summit meetings in each of the last three years. The first two produced agreements which were significant in themselves but even more for having demonstrated that the shift from "an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation" was more than rhetoric. The negotiations necessarily dealt only with limited aspects of the relations between the two countries, but they produced concrete agreements of real value to each.

Still more important, they changed the whole climate of the relationship. They produced "detente" in the real sense of the term, that is, not some miraculous identity of interests, attitudes, and policies, but a relaxation of tensions and enmity, making possible cooperation in many fields where it would earlier have been unthinkable.

For this reason it was of the utmost importance that the third summit meeting be held as planned in June, 1974, even if the time was not propitious for new agreements of great significance. If it had not been held, the slowly gathering momentum of detente would have been arrested.

That being said, it must be frankly admitted that the third summit accomplished little of great significance.

That is not surprising. President Nixon, whatever his chances of impeachment and conviction may be, is in an extremely weak political situation. Any far-reaching agreements he might have signed in Moscow at this time, which necessarily would have to involve concessions on America's side as well as on the Soviet side, would have been attributed to that weakness by both Democratic and Republican critics, and might not have been endorsed by the Senate.

To these domestic obstacles must be added the fact that the easier problems had been resolved at the first two summits. The third was up against the really tough decisions, particularly on arms which are of course the heart of the still-persisting confrontation.

Secretary Kissinger put the situation in a nutshell when he said in Moscow: "My impression from what I have observed is that both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint, and that that is not a thought that comes naturally to military people on either side."

What then in concrete terms did the summit accomplish?

It limited deployment of anti-ballistic systems on each side to one area instead of two. However, neither side had apparently had the slightest intention of deploying in the second area.

ground nuclear tests after March, 1976. However, knowledgeable scientists assert that tests under this threshold will be quite adequate to continue sophisticated nuclear arms development.

Despite the agreement at the second summit to proceed with further limitations on offensive strategic weapons in 1974, all that was decided at Moscow this month was that there should be at some unspecified time a new agreement covering "the period until 1985" (1984 was not chosen for obvious reasons).

This was the great, perhaps the historic failure of the 1974 summit, for which the military establishments of the two countries are largely responsible. The failure was unnecessary. It was a failure of nerve and of common sense on both sides.

Even Defense Secretary Schlesinger in his post-summit press conference admitted that more competition in strategic arms "serves no further purpose" and that the levels of nuclear forces "already reached are unnecessarily high." Yet competition continues and force levels will get higher, probably much higher.

What else was accomplished at the summit? The two leaders urged that the European security conference proceed more rapidly, that the Geneva conference on the Middle East resume its work, that the Indo-China accords be implemented.

The summit did lay the groundwork for further expansion of trade and of joint production projects. It provided for cooperation in the fields of energy, environmental protection, transport, housing, space, and heart research.

One little-noticed accomplishment was a proliferation of the intention of the two governments "to continue their efforts toward increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations in every possible way, including in regard to peacekeeping." If this agreement should be followed by firm instructions from the leaders to their UN ambassadors to resolve without further delay differences which for 10 years have impaired UN peacekeeping, a restored UN capability in this respect could help keep the peace in wider areas than the Mideast.

In sum, with one or two exceptions, a meager and disappointing list of accomplishments. At least the climate and structure were preserved and, when government once more begins to function in Washington, perhaps we may be able again to move forward. But the Soviet leaders also will have to override the extravagant demands of their military.

The author of this article writes from a background of 40 years as a United States diplomat.

© 1974 Charles W. Yost

## Tom Braden

Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D-Wash.) is taking a lot of lumps these days for sounding like the voice of the cold war. Everybody from President Nixon to the New Left is hopping all over him for interfering with detente, arms control, hands across the sea and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. But if it is true that Jackson sounds like the voice of the cold war, maybe we ought to look upon him as a useful voice. For most adult Americans were cold warriors once upon a time, and Jackson provides us with a checkpoint. How far have we come since those days, and in what respects have we changed our views?

Realists is what we call ourselves now. We realize that we can't roll back curtains and go to brinks. John Foster Dulles is a faintly embarrassing name now, and the rhetoric and dirty tricks even more so. Most of us understand that in fighting an ideology we became intolerant and ideological ourselves.

But are the revisionist historians entirely correct? Were we entirely wrong? Listen for a moment to the last voice of the cold war and ask yourself the question.

Jackson is telling us that he is suspicious of detente for the following reasons:

### SECURITY ... CONTINUED

The Madrid declaration speaks of "territorial integrity" as one of the "fundamental principles which both countries will scrupulously respect." Some Spaniards think this to be an oblique reference to the Gibraltar issue.

Agreement on the declaration of principles initiated here was not easily come by. It is thought that one snag was insistence by the Americans that Spain agree to accept in the Madrid draft Article 12 of the NATO declaration.

The ideological gap that separates the West Europeans from Spain is brought out by this article.

It speaks of "dedication to the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, justice, and social progress," described as "the fruits of shared spiritual heritage" of the signing countries, which declare their intention "to develop and deepen the

First, because he is fearful of the possibility that one of the weakest Presidents in our history might make agreements for the purpose of keeping himself in office. Is the suspicion totally unreasonable?

Second, Jackson thinks Russian foreign policy is expansionist. Might he not be right about this? We all know that Russian foreign policy used to be expansionist. It seems to be in the process of change. But memory serves as a warning.

Third, Jackson thinks we ought to get more out of detente than a smile and a handshake. What's the point, he asks, in effect, of giving the Russians what they want—food, technology, credit—unless we get something in return?

And what do we want in return? In Jackson's view, we want to stop feeling guilty as human beings about how the Russians treat human beings. We want them to stop doing things which make us wince at the thought of shaking hands with those who do them.

Is this so wrong? Secretary of State Henry Kissinger would argue—and has argued—that we can't expect a nation to "transform its domestic structure" for the sake of foreign policy, and Jackson says in return, "Why not? Doesn't it depend upon the nation's priorities?"

### KISSINGER ... CONTINUED

ciations with President Nixon and his most intimate White House aides.

The worst stories about Dr. Kissinger's role in the wiretap operations and the plumbers' case have been put out by former White House officials. It is notable that John Ehrlichman called Dr. Kissinger to testify in his own case about prior knowledge of the plumbers. What Mr. Ehrlichman has done through the courts is only a sample of what other former White House aides have done in leaks.

No matter how vehement he is, no

application of these principles to their countries."

Such high-sounding pledges were set to a lower key in the Madrid parallel declaration, which refers simply to "values, ideals, and aspirations based on the dignity and freedom of the individual" and expresses approval of "social justice for all peoples and universal respect for human rights."

Elsewhere around the globe we are not adverse to using the carrot technique in order to bring about changes in internal policies of other nations. Why should we not use the same technique with the Russians?

There is some evidence in the exodus of the Jews that the technique works; and for that exodus Sen. Jackson can take a lot of the credit. But he would be among the first to point out that the exodus itself is painful. How far have we progressed since the 10th century that in the 20th we should be talking, like so many ancient Spaniards, of the exodus of the Jews?

We need detente, Secretary Kissinger argues, in order to survive in the nuclear age. And Jackson replies that, detente or no detente, mutual fear is the only thing that enables us to survive in the nuclear age.

So the voice of the last cold warrior is very tough and not very hopeful. I don't see how his argument will ever bring about a reduction in the defense budget.

But I think it is not an unreasonable voice. We can argue with it, oppose it, try to answer the doubts it raises. But it is a useful antidote to overoptimism and a good thing to have around.

matter how articulate, Dr. Kissinger cannot confidently defend himself against their charges. For at bottom he doesn't fully know what happened. The true pathos of Dr. Kissinger's situation lies in the identity and character of the only two people who can truly clear him on wiretapping and the plumbers. They are the President and Gen. Alexander Haig, Kissinger's former assistant and now White House chief of staff.

The President was ultimately responsible for the wiretapping and the plumbers. Gen. Haig handled the detailed arrangements for Dr. Kissinger.

The Secretary of State does not have total knowledge of what either man did. But he cannot expect them to clear him. To do that they would themselves have to step into the line of fire.

In these circumstances, Dr. Kissinger should stop forcing the issues. Confrontation can only make matters worse for him. What he needs is a couple of weeks off to regroup his intellectual forces for the difficult times which lie ahead.

### WASHINGTON POST

11 JULY 1974 Pg. C7

By Jack Anderson

Military Madness—Rather than question a Defense Department directive, the brass hats have destroyed millions worth of surplus equipment that was as good as new.

The directive was issued in 1970 to keep surplus weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. But the obtrident brass, with appalling lack of judgment, have been scrapping surplus parts which don't have the remotest combat use.

Several sources, who are directly involved in demilitarizing the surplus stocks, have given us an incredible account

including such innocuous items as doors, wheels, tires and even paper cups.

Yet the terrorists, in the meantime, have had little chance getting weapons, sometimes stealing them right out of U.S. arsenals. Other resourceful terrorists have fashioned make-shift weapons such as flame throwers from aerosol cans and bombs from the cardboard centers of toilet paper rolls.

The Defense Department would do better assigning as security guards the men who are now busily engaged in destroying perfectly good equipment.

Many of the parts, which have been destroyed, have had to be replaced with new parts from the factories at costs anywhere from 50 to 300 per cent above the

checked into dozens of silly destruction orders. Here are just a few examples:

* The F-4 fighter is still one of the most widely used planes in the Air Force. Yet surplus parts, including wheels, tires and fuel attachments, are being destroyed daily despite the fact that replacements are constantly in demand.

* Hill Air Force Base, Utah, placed an order for 257 fuel tank noses of the same type that had been destroyed in the base's salvage yard. Had these fixtures been spared, it would have saved the taxpayers more than $18,000.

* Engine access doors, which are in constant demand by the military, have been destroyed at the same time new doors were

* Incredibly, 250,000 paper cups were destroyed, according to competent sources, because they had been intended for use in fighter jets.

* At least one 60-foot truckbed was destroyed because it had been used to haul tanks.

* The S-2F, a Navy aircraft, is considered combat worthy, so its surplus parts are smashed into junk. Yet these planes are being used to fight brush fires. Without surplus parts, the planes will soon be grounded. Planes used in agricultural spraying and dusting also depend heavily on surplus military parts.

One way to stop this senseless destruction, if we may suggest a solution, is to deduct the waste from the salaries of the Pentagon policy makers.

WASHINGTON POST - 11 JULY 1974 Pg. 25

## Joseph Kraft

Narcissists in the press corps, and others who are uninitiated, think these issues are being forced by reporters who ask embarrassing and sometimes even insulting questions. In fact, that is not the case. Dr. Kissinger is in trouble as a

By Charles W. Yost

### New York

For this reason it was of the utmost importance that the third summit meeting be held as planned in June, 1974, even if the time was not profitable for new agreements of great significance. If it had not been held, the slowly gathering momentum of detente would have been arrested.

What else was accomplished at the summit? The two leaders urged that the European security conference proceed more rapidly, that the Ge nevna conference on the Middle East resume its work, that the Indo-China accords be implemented.

One little-noticed accomplishment was a reliteration of the intention of the two governments "to continue their efforts toward increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations in every possible way, including in regard to peacekeeping." If this agreement should be followed by firm instructions from the leaders to their UN ambassadors to resolve without further delay differences which for 10 years have impaired UN peacekeeping, a restored UN capability in this respect could help keep the peace in wider areas than the Mideast.

In sum, with one or two exceptions a meager and disappointing list of accomplishments. At least the climate and structure were preserved and, when government once more begins to function in Washington, perhaps we may be able again to move forward. But the Soviet leaders also will have to override the extraneous demands of their military.

# CURRENT NEWS
## PART I - EARLY BIRD EDITION - 0730

PART II - MAIN EDITION - PUBLISHED AT 1130

WEDNESDAY, JULY 3, 1974

NEW YORK TIMES

3 JULY 1974 Pg. 1

ARMY RESTUDYING
BIG CARGO COPTER

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 2.—In 1970 the Army embarked upon an “austere” $80-million program to develop the technology for a huge cargo-carrying helicopter. Four years later the technology has still not been proved, but the program has expanded to $250-million, two flying models and an ultimate investment of more than $1-billion.

Meanwhile, at an ultimate cost of about $500-million, the Navy has been developing its own heavy-lift helicopter. The major difference is that the Army helicopter will be able to lift 22.5 tons and the Navy one, 12.3 tons.

Despite Congressional urgings, the Army and Navy were not able to get together on a common helicopter. The Army objected that the Navy craft could not lift a big enough load and the Navy objected that the Army version was too big to fit on its ships.

Navy Craft on Schedule

The Navy program, which involved a modification of an existing helicopter, is proceeding on schedule with little controversy. But even Army officials are beginning to acknowledge that the Army has a huge helicopter by the tail and is undecided whether to hold on or let go.

For the first time in four years, the Army's heavy helicopter program is being subjected to what Army Secretary Howard H. Callaway describes as "a real hard look." Upon the current review depends an Army decision whether to continue or abandon the project to build the biggest helicopter ever flown.

To Representative Les Aspin, Democrat of Wisconsin, a member of the House Armed Services Committee who is often critical of the Pentagon, the Army helicopter program is "a perfect example of how minor research and development projects acquire a bureaucratic life of their own and are converted, without adequate internal or Congressional Review, into major programs."

Complaint by Chairman

WASHINGTON POST

3 JULY 1974 Pg. 3

Syria Has
Migs, SAMs,
Israel Says

From News Dispatches

Israel Defense Minister Shimon Peres told the Knesset (parliament) yesterday that Israel has confirmed the presence of Soviet-supplied Mig-23 warplanes and SAM-9 surface-to-air missiles in Syria. The weapons are among the most advanced in the Soviet arsenal.

Speaking in Jerusalem, Peres also said that senior Soviet officers had served in forward Syrian command posts during the October war, and had suffered some casualties. He did not say whether any of the Soviets were killed.

Peres' comments, and a statement by another government leader that Israel must bolster its military might, came as Palestinian guerrillas were reported ready to urge a new Arab oil boycott of the United States if it does not force Israel to end its raids against guerrilla bases in Lebanon.

The Beirut newspaper An Nahar said the Palestinian request would be made to Arab foreign and defense ministers Wednesday when they meet in Cairo to map action to combat Israeli reprisal attacks.

In Israel, Finance Minister Yehoshua Rabinowitz said that Israel must build up its military strength despite troop-disengagement agreements with Syria and Egypt because of continued Arab threats.

"When across the border... we hear extremist proclamations, our actions day by day must be guided by the lessons of war," he said.

"We are striving to ensure that the materiel required to strengthen the Israel defense forces—and in quantities greater than ever before—will indeed be at our disposal..."

In preparation for Wednesday's meeting in Cairo, Lebanese Prime Minister Takieddin Solh, who will head his country's delegation, met with President Sulaiman Fränjieh, Foreign Minister Fuad Naffah and Defense Minister Nasri

NEW YORK TIMES - 3 JULY 1974 Pg. 7

Pentagon Sees Saigon Aid Cut
To Ammunition, Fuel and Parts

By JOHN W. FINNEY

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 2.—United States military aid to South Vietnam in the current fiscal year will probably be limited by Congressional budget cuts largely to ammunition, petroleum and spare parts, Pentagon officials said today.

The State and Defense Departments, according to Pentagon sources, are discussing with the American Embassy in Saigon a sharp curtailment in planned military aid to South Vietnam in the fiscal year that began yesterday.

Based on Congressional actions thus far, Defense Department planners are assuming that Congress will authorize $900-million to $1-billion in military aid for South Vietnam. The Administration had requested a $1.6-billion ceiling on the aid program.

Estimate on Ammunition.

The House cut the request to $1.126-billion, the same level authorized for the last fiscal year, and the Senate reduced the amount to $900-million. In an action not yet announced, a House-Senate conference committee has set the ceiling at $1-billion. According to Congressional sources, the House Appropriations Committee, in acting on the defense appropriations bill, is prepared to set the level at $900-million.

The $900-million, according to Pentagon officials, would just about meet requirements of the South Vietnamese for ammunition, petroleum and spare parts. On the basis of the current level of military activity in South Vietnam, for example, the Defense Department had budgeted nearly $500-million for ammunition alone.

The anticipated Congressional cuts, Pentagon officials said, would leave little for the planned new equipment for the South Vietnamese forces, such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, weapons and airplanes.

One of the possibilities, officials said, is that the Administration will have to scrap or See AID, Pg. 5

but refused to give details. Diplomatic sources said Lebanon will call for stronger Arab political and diplomatic posi-

WASHINGTON POST

3 JULY 1974 Pg. 1

Brezhnev
Confirms
A-Pacts

Terms Talks
With Nixon
'Constructive'

By Murrey Marder
and Robert Kaiser

Washington Post Staff Writers

MOSCOW, July 2—Soviet Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev confirmed tonight, as the latest American-Soviet summit meeting ended, that three partial nuclear accords have been reached, but he said the results "could perhaps have been broader."

At a dinner given by President Nixon, Brezhnev said in a toast that his country expected the summit talks to show equal determination "to go on developing and deepening" U.S.-Soviet cooperation for detente.

Brezhnev indicated that the three agreements would limit antiballistic missile systems, curtail underground nuclear weapons testing and set guidelines for negotiating limits on the multiple nuclear warheads known as MIRVs.

The Soviet leader did not explain why he said that the agreements could have been broader. Numerous authoritative Soviet officials, however, have discussed that issue privately during the summit: The specific reason they cite is the pressures on the American political scene as a result of Watergate and the impeachment

CURRENT NEWS

PART II - MAIN EDITION - 1130

THIS SUPPLEMENTS PART I-EARLY BIRD EDITION

WEDNESDAY, JULY 3, 1974

BALTIMORE NEWS
AMERICAN - 2 JULY
1974 Pg. 3 (3)

## Volunteer Army a Paradox

### Manpower Yardstick Points Out Good, Bad

WASHINGTON — (UPI) — The first full year of the all volunteer Army was one of the best recruiting years in a decade — or one of the worst — depending on which of the military's two basic measurements is looked at.

Army Secretary Howard H. Callaway said Monday that the all volunteer Army was a resounding success. He announced that when the government's fiscal year ended at midnight Sunday, there were a little more than 783,000 men in Army green — more than 1,500 above the official strength figures set for that date by Congress.

Earlier in the year, the Pentagon was girding publicly for an expected 20,000-men shortfall.

In eight of the 12 months, the army missed its recruiting goals but got help from several other quarters. First Congress cut the sizes on the four services. Then reenlistments recovered from their Vietnam low. And desertion and AWOL rates plummeted.

"We didn't lose as many people as we thought we would," Callaway said.

He brushed aside charges that quality of manpower had fallen in the rush to get numbers. "Quality is far more important that quantity, and I think you'll find that our quality is far higher than it was last year."

The military services have for years used two basic measures of quality — the percentages of high school dropouts and of low intelligence scorers among their recruits.

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
3 JULY 1974 Pg. 6

## Nuclear aid defended by U.S. envoy

GENEVA, Switzerland, July 2 [Reuters]—The United States said today that its officers of nuclear aid to other countries are protected by adequate safeguards, indicating that its recent agreements with Egypt and Israel do not jeopardize Middle East security.

Ambassador Joseph Martin, addressing the 25-nation Geneva disarmament conference for the first time since the United States announced the agreements with the two Middle East powers last month, said the U. S. remains opposed to the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices.

HE SAID that in all nuclear agreements "the use of material or equipment supplied by the U. S. for any nuclear explosive device is precluded."

Any agreement includes clauses stating that the International Atomic Energy Authority will check to see that material is not used for any nuclear explosive device, he added.

Martin said that "the continued cooperation of the United States with other countries in the nuclear field is dependent on the assurance that these understandings will be respected in the future."

lower percentage than most years and right on target, as Army personnel specialists say they need 17-19 per cent low scorers because they have that proportion of nonskilled jobs.

By the other measure, it was the worst year in the decade. Fully 44 per cent of the recruits were dropouts. During the previous 10 years the

BALTIMORE SUN
3 JULY 1974 Pg. 1

## Nixon talk stresses ally spirit

BY MICHAEL PARKS
Moscow Bureau of The Sun

Moscow—President Nixon appealed to the Soviet people yesterday to support a policy of detente based not on the fear of war's destruction but one aimed at improving the quality of life.

"Traditionally, when peace has been maintained, it has been maintained primarily because of the fear of war," he told a Soviet television audience in a 20-minute address.

"The peace we seek to build now is one that is far more than simply the absence of war. We seek a peace in which each man, woman and child can look forward to a richer and fuller life."

In effect, it was an appeal to halt a still-accelerating arms race and live not as super-power competitors but as allies to improve living standards and to fight "hunger, want, misery and disease wherever it exists in the world."

### Better living conditions

For Americans, there were no surprises in the speech, reflecting as it did the routine, unsensational nature of the summit meeting this year.

President Nixon did say, however, that, "We will meet again next year," and he again laid heavy emphasis on the importance of the personal relations between himself and Leonid I. Brezhnev, the general secretary of the Soviet Communist party.

Televised nationally, the speech was directed to the Russians' great emotional desire for peace—the Soviet Union suffered the greatest casualties of any nation in World War II, 20 million killed—and perhaps an even stronger desire now for a substantial Improvement in living conditions.

NEW YORK TIMES
3 JULY 1974 Pg. 1

## NIXON, BREZHNEV AGREE TO REDUCE SOME ARMS AREAS

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

MOSCOW, July 2—Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet leader, said today that he and President Nixon had agreed on a limitation of underground nuclear testing and on a lower ceiling for defensive missile systems. But he indicated that a breakthrough on controlling offensive missile systems had eluded them.

The arms agreements worked out in five days of talks, the 67-year-old Communist party leader declared, "could prob-

Nixon speech, excerpts from 2 leaders' toasts, Page 1-F

ably have been wider," indirectly evincing disappointment on the question of curbing the offensive missile race.

But he said the progress made, to be described tomorrow in a communiqué and in signed agreements, "tangibly substantiates and deepens the easing of international tension."

### Weaving a Fabric

Earlier, in a speech delivered over Soviet radio and television, President Nixon said that the United States and the Soviet Union were weaving a fabric of cooperation that would give both nations a positive stake in peace. [Page 2.]

American television correspondents reported later that the Soviet authorities had stopped the transmission to the United States of network programs about a hunger strike by Andrei D. Sakharov, the physicist, and about a suppressed seminar of Jewish scientists. [Page 3.]

In toasts at an American dinner on the eve of Mr. Nixon's departure, the President stressed the importance of personal relationships in promoting détente and emphasized the American intention to in-

EDITORIALS

WASHINGTON POST 3 JULY 1974

How to Stop Nuclear Cheating

PRESIDENT NIXON'S offer to sell nuclear power re-
actors and fuel to Egypt and Israel has provoked a
congressional review of ways to insure that no other
country follows India's example of accepting help for
"peaceful" nuclear purposes-India got help from
Canada-and then of building a bomb. With the oil-price
increases pushing many nations to consider nuclear
power and with nuclear reactors now being built or
planned by the hundreds, it is plainly past time for such
congressional concern. None of the 29 countries to which
the United States has given non-military nuclear aid
over two decades has been found to have cheated like
India. But as Sen. George Aiken (R-Va.), a member of
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, conceded the
other day, "we have been getting a little careless" in
approving agreements for nuclear aid.

The immediate congressional reaction is good as far
as it goes. Sen. John Pastore (D-R.I.), Joint Committee
Vice Chairman, has introduced a bill to tighten con-
gressional oversight-by assuring committee review and
floor debate on civilian nuclear-aid agreements sub-
mitted by the Executive and by permitting Congress to
block the agreement by concurrent resolution in 60
days. This would in effect extend to civilian agreements
the screening already applied to military agreements.
It should have been done years ago.

The more important need, however, is to tighten the
specific terms of the aid agreements. Here Joint Com-
mittee Chairman Melvin Price (D-Ill.) has pointed a use-
ful way by indicating some of the "safeguards" that
ought to be written into the new Egyptian and Israeli
agreements. These would: give the United States con-
trol over reprocessing of fuel used in reactors; detail
measures for physical security against theft of nuclear
materials; prevent the transfer of highly enriched nu-

clear material; and block what has been called the
"Canadian loophole" whereby India claimed that its
blast was done for the "peaceful" purposes laid down
by Canada. We do not claim to be experts on the sub-
stance of these safeguards. But we think the burden
should be on the Executive branch to respond to any
reasonable questions on safeguards which the Congress
may bring up. This is one issue on which responsible Ex-
ecutive officials should welcome congressional grilling.

Beyond closer congressional scrutiny and more sub-
stantial safeguards, however, there lies a more difficult
set of issues which the Joint Committee--disposed as it
is to promote nuclear power-may not be so well sit-
uated to weigh. We refer to the area of policy-the
province of no one Executive department or Congres-
sional committee-where technology, economics and dip-
lomacy meet. What is the United States' proper role in
helping other countries to meet their future energy
requirements, especially when our own are still far from
assured? If the United States does help, should it put its
aid into nuclear power, solar power, oil or what? Should
such help be put through bilateral or multi-national
channels? Should political concessions be solicited, such
as ratification of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty
or-an admittedly far-out idea for the Mideast-agree-
ment to share nuclear facilities on a regional basis?

We raise questions like these not because we have
the answers but because in the Egyptian and Israeli
cases, the administration seems to have committed the
United States without fully asking them. The adminis-
tration simply went ahead and made nuclear-aid pledges
to serve the requirements of its short-term diplomacy.
We do not at all dismiss those requirements. But the
complexity and consequence of the issues at stake com-
pel a responsible government to take a reasoned long-
term approach.

NEW YORK TIMES 3 JULY 1974

The Routine Summit

How much progress has been made at the Moscow
summit toward a second strategic arms limitation treaty
(SALT II) may be revealed in today's communiqué. Apart
from that, as President Nixon stressed in his radio-
television address yesterday, the salient point in this
third annual Nixon-Brezhnev encounter is that it has
taken place "so routinely . . . as part of a continuing
pattern that would have seemed inconceivable just a
few short years ago."

Two not unimportant strategic arms accords evidently
have been reached - one reducing underground nuclear
testing, the other further curtailing deployment of defen-
sive antiballistic missile (ABM) systems. Other agree-
ments on cooperation in trade, medical research, home-
building and energy management contribute - however
slightly - to that "web of interests" which it is hoped
will ultimate give both sides such a stake in pèace that
the risks of war will be carefully avoided.

Mr. Brezhnev is doubtless primarily interested In
obtaining American technology and keeping his Western
frontiers quiet during a period of tension with China.
Mr. Nixon's primary objectives probably are to slow
down the arms race, stabilize the nuclear balance and
obtain Soviet acquiescence in American peace-making
in the Middle East. But both know that none of this
would be feasible if an era of superpower confrontation
returned.

It is in these circumstances that the reported agree-
ment to restrict defensive antiballistic missiles (ABM's)
on each side to one site, instead of the two permitted
by the SALT I treaty, must be evaluated. SALT I per-
mitted the Soviet Union to defend one ICBM site in
addition to the ABM deployment already made around
Moscow. The United States was authorized to add an
ABM system around Washington to the one already
deployed around a Minuteman ICBM site in the West.
For both countries to stop where they are consolidates
the doctrine of deterrence. Each side is committed to
leave itself open to retaliation in the event that it

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR

3 JULY 1974

## Argentina's
uncertain
future

Juan Domingo Peron so dominated Argentina for a generation that now on his passing there are no successors waiting in the wings. Indeed, his selection of his wife, Isabella, as running mate in last September's election was, in part, recognition of this lack of political talent.

In a way, this should be a help to Isabella Peron as she assumes her new duties as President of Argentina — and therefore the first woman chief executive in Latin-American history. Despite her tutelage under Mr. Peron, she has had virtually no experience in government and politics. Few observers expect her to remain in office very long. But the fact that there are no major rivals on the horizon stands in her favor, and it is likely that Peronista politicians and others in Argentina are just as glad that the Peronista succession has worked the way it has.

The road ahead is difficult. Argentina is in an economic shambles. Decades of poor agricultural policy have left the rich cattle-raising and wheat-growing regions of the country in a state of uncertainty. The once buoyant middle class has fallen on hard times and there are many pockets of serious poverty around. Political stability is lacking as terrorist elements within the Peronista movement and other groups outside of it regularly carry out acts of murder, kidnapping, robbery, and bombing.

It is all a sorry commentary on the one country in Latin America that, based on its past, ought to be an example of stability, economic progress, and social order.

The problems before Mrs. Peron, therefore, are enormous. Her late husband, whose political skills and leadership abilities were undisputed, failed to solve them — perhaps because, by the time Argentina turned to him last year after his 18 years in exile, he no longer had the enthusiasm he once did.

There is a tendency to feel that if Mr. Peron couldn't solve the prob-

has said she will seek. After all, Argentines are tired of the problems they have faced for a generation. They might just rally around Mrs. Peron and lend her support in the difficult days ahead.

Whatever the future course of Argentina, and whoever emerges as the real leader, Mrs. Peron or

DETROIT NEWS - 26 JUNE 1974 (3 JULY)

## Warning to Nixon

As President Nixon and Secretary of State Kissinger took off on the first leg of their trip to Moscow, they left behind a new controversy over the terms of the 1972 nuclear agreement with the USSR that ought to serve as a warning to both of them.

The warning is twofold: First, in any new agreement reached with the USSR, the United States must make certain that both sides have the same understanding of the terms of the pact and, second, the U.S. negotiators must make all the information about any new pact available to Congress and the American public.

On the basis of what has been said to the present time, it seems unlikely that Kissinger and the President in 1972 actually made any new and secret agreement with the USSR that let the Soviets increase the number of their missile launchers beyond the totals permitted in the public pact. Kissinger has denied the accusation in the strongest possible terms.

But there are two disturbing factors about the charges raised by Sen. Henry Jackson, D-Wash., and the replies by Secretary Kissinger at Monday's press conference.

One is that the USSR did sign an understanding with the United States just before the 1972 election which clarified details of the SALT I (strategic arms limitation talks) agreement reached in Moscow earlier that year. The second is Kissinger's revelation that Mr. Nixon informed Communist Party chief Leonid Brezhnev the United States had no intention of building as many submarine missile launchers as the pact permitted.

What is disturbing about these revelations is they show, in the first instance, this country's negotiators had failed to pin down the agreement with the USSR so that both sides had the same understanding of what they had agreed to and, in the second instance, that Mr. Nixon had voluntarily given away a U.S. talking point about building the permitted number of missile launchers in event the USSR

failed to live up to the terms of the pact.

There already is dissatisfaction in this country over the SALT I agreement, which voluntarily conceded the USSR a numerical advantage in missile launchers both on land and at sea. This country presumably made this concession because it had more sophisticated missiles than did the USSR and also the ability to equip its missiles with multiple independently targeted reentry warheads. But now the USSR reportedly is catching up to the United States in quality as well as quantity of its missiles.

Kissinger told his press conference the United States did not expect to reach any new arms control pacts during Mr. Nixon's visit to Moscow but did say the two countries were hoping to be able to announce agreement in principle to limit the size of future underground nuclear tests.

Even if this new limited ban is all that comes out of the Nixon visit to Moscow, the President and the secretary of state ought to be forewarned by the new controversy over the terms of SALT I that they had better make certain they and the Russians have the same understanding of any agreement they reach. It would be well for this country also to insist upon positive verification of such a ban.

Nor should the President, in the name of detente or any other cause, voluntarily make any promises to the Russians about limiting the level of this country's preparedness. Otherwise, he and Kissinger could prompt a new controversy when they get home as to whether they have jeopardized U.S. security by making new and unwarranted concessions to the USSR.

Many Americans are concerned that Mr. Nixon, under siege at home over Watergate and its related scandals, might be persuaded to make some new deal with the USSR that would build his own prestige in international affairs but be harmful to U.S. interests and security. The new flap over SALT I indicates there is reason for that concern.

## WALL STREET JOURNAL
3 JULY 1974

Israel levied nearly $1 billion in new taxes to improve its armed forces and try to stem soaring inflation and a severe payments deficit, which was spawned by the October war. Separately, a Beirut newspaper said Palestinian guerrillas would urge resumption of the Arab oil boycott against the U.S. if Israel doesn't end attacks on Palestinian camps in Lebanon.

About 200 veterans of the Vietnam war

LOS ANGELES TIMES 2 JULY 1974(3)

Personal Diplomacy

After President Nixon seemed to suggest in a Moscow speech that continued Soviet-American accommodation depends on the "personal relationship" between him and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev, Soviet press accounts of the speech dropped the word "personal."

The deletion almost certainly represents more
than a difference in translation. It appears to be
the Kremlin's way of saying that it is interested in
pursuing what has come to be known as detente
whether Mr. Nixon remains in office or not.

This is not the first such signal sent out by Moscow. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) was treated as a potential President on his recent visit to the Soviet capital. And Soviet spokesmen have been going out of their way to tell American politicians and newspapermen that they like and admire Mr. Nixon, but hope and expect to work on friendly terms with his successor—Democrat or Republican—in 1974 or after the 1976 presidential election.

The President is not the first Western political
leader to find it convenient to exaggerate the im-
portance of his personal relationship with one or
another Soviet leader in order to enhance his
image at home. British prime ministers and French
presidents have played the same game.

In Mr. Nixon's case, the temptation is particularly great because the stakes are higher; the argument that his removal from office would endanger the movement toward better relations with the Soviet Union is one of his main lines of defense against the threat of impeachment.

It should be noted, furthermore, that the Rus-
sians have not been above playing the game them-
selves. Soviet diplomats and journalists frequently
drop hints that Brezhnev might be forced out and
replaced by someone hostile to the whole idea of
detente if economic concessions desired by the
Kremlin are withheld or seriously watered down.

There is no question that personalities can be im-
portant. The world should be thankful that, at this
critical point in history, both the United States and
the Soviet Union have been led by men flexible
enough to begin moving away from the cold war

dogma and postures in which they were nurtured.
If it had been otherwise, the real though limited
improvement in relations would not have occurred.

The fact is, though, that the movement toward
more cooperation and less confrontation has roots
far deeper than any personal rapport between
Brezhnev and Mr. Nixon.

Both countries have a mutual interest in avoiding
nuclear destruction, as well as in controlling arms
spending.

Good relations with Washington give the Rus-
sians a badly needed feeling of security on their
western flank as they confront China in the East.

Most important of all from Moscow's viewpoint,
the Russians are plagued by a slowdown in their
economic growth rate that is attributable to low
productivity. The fastest way to get the Soviet
economy moving—the only way, in the view of
many experts inside and outside Russia—is mas-
sive importation of Western, particularly U.S.,
technology.

The economic imperatives are less pressing on
the American side, but they exist.

If Mr. Nixon were removed from office, there
might well be an interval when the Kremlin would
mark time while it sized up the new American
President—possibly even tested his mettle. But the
Russians didn't start down the road to improved
relations with the United States because of some
special chemistry between Brezhnev and Mr. Nix-
on; they did so because the ruling collective per-
ceived it to be in the Soviet interest.

On the American side, there is no reason to be-
lieve that the removal of President Nixon, if it
comes, will produce a discontinuity in foreign poli-
cy. Vice President Ford, as well as most of the
potential candidates for the Presidency in 1976,
support that policy in its essentials.

Until and unless the Soviet perception of national
interest takes a change for the worse, the move-
ment toward detente rests on foundations consider-
ably stronger than Mr. Nixon's continuation in of-
fice.

THE CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER (TEXAS)

Arms traffic

Defense Secretary James Schlesinger has asked
Congress for $200 million for military credit sales to
Latin America. And the request, as might be expected,
has run into opposition.

Rep. Wayne Hays of Ohio charges the arms sold to Latin American nations "are used to fasten dictatorships more tightly around the necks of the people."

Schlesinger counters that the U.S. military
programs are "a force for liberalization in Latin
America."

9 JUNE 1974(3 JULY)

Moreover, the money Latin American nations pour
into arms must be diverted from their crushing social
needs. Most of them, suffering the ills of overlarge
population growth, cannot even feed a majority of their
people adequately.

So there is much merit to Hays' argument. However, there is the counter-argument — a more sensible one than that advanced by Schlesinger — that arms sales serve our diplomatic ends. In that pragmatic view, U.S. arms sales prevent the Soviet Union and China from dominating the field instead, and thus keep Communist influence in Latin America at a minimum level.

There is little moral defense of the traffic in arms

AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY JULY 1, 1974(3)

# Ten MIRV Proposals Prepared

## Pentagon excluded from final drafting of positions for summit on accord attempts on both ICBMs, underground nuclear tests

By Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.

Washington-Ten U. S. proposals have been prepared for the current Moscow summit meeting in an attempt to achieve an accord with the Soviets limiting deployment of multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Of the 10 positions available to President Nixon, only one would meet the essential equivalence criteria established earlier by the White House as an acceptable negotiating position.

All 10 proposals would involve a reduction of MIRVs by the U. S. and would limit the Soviets to MIRV deployment by numbers of missile launchers which would affect both MIRVs and total missile throw weight. The Soviets rejected, in meetings with Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger in March, limiting MIRVs by throw weight only. Under that concept both sides would be limited to 5 million lb. throw weight that could be MIRVs. U. S. now has about 2.5 million lb. (AW&ST May 27, p. 14).

The single position that falls within the essential equivalence criteria-adopted by the Administration to comply with the amendment by Sen. Henry M. Jackson (D.-Wash.) to the ratification of the present offensive interim strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) agreement- would require limiting missiles with MIRVs to the low hundreds.

The U. S. is expected to have 550 land-based Minuteman ICBMs with MIRV warheads operational by next year and 31 Poseidon submarines, each with 16 MIRVed ballistic missiles, a total of 1,046 MIRVed missiles.

The acceptable position would cause a major cutback in U. S. MIRVs but would also result in an equivalent reduction of the Soviet force level by throw weight as their MIRVs are built up to the reduced U. S. level.

In recent weeks, the Pentagon has been excluded from preparation of positions by the Administration for the summit meeting.

A National Security Decision Memorandum has been published on the U. S. position for obtaining an agreement on underground nuclear testing with the Soviets. According to Defense Dept. officials, that position was achieved without input or approval by the Pentagon.

Curbs on underground testing of nuclear warheads are expected to be agreed to, at least in principle, during the Nixon visit, to be based on thresholding-limiting nuclear detonations by warhead force.

The Soviets advanced the thresholding request in the March meeting with Kissinger. But because of the secrecy involved and communications between the White House and Moscow without explanations to U. S. SALT negotiators in Geneva, some senior U. S. officials initially believed the thresholding idea was offered

"State [Dept.] believed that Defense [Dept.] would not concur with the timing and threshold limits involved because they might impact on the near-term retargeting doctrine Schlesinger is pushing," an official said.

The retargeting of Minuteman to provide a deterrent by having sufficient accuracy to destroy hardened military targets, including ICBM sites in the Soviet Union, would require a new reentry vehicle to accommodate the guidance package for improved accuracy and would necessitate designing a new nuclear warhead requiring underground testing.

The Pentagon already has asked Congress for money in Fiscal 1975 to develop a Mk. 20 nuclear warhead in the 400-kiloton range to replace the Minuteman's Mk.12/12A current warhead in the 200-kiloton range.

It is expected that a threshold agreement will limit underground nuclear testing to the 150-200-kiloton range. Under such an agreement, verification would be accomplished by seismic detection devices to police an accord. Experts believe that a Richter Scale reading of about 4.5 will emerge as a limiting factor for underground tests.

Controversy surrounded the SALT negotiations up to the time President Nixon arrived in the USSR. Sen. Jackson declared that Kissinger had made a secret agreement with the Soviets that would permit the Russians to deploy an additional 70 modern ballistic missiles on their older G-class diesel submarines above the 950 limit in the interim agreement.

Kissinger immediately denied the charge, calling it false in every detail. He also expressed pessimism from Europe last week on the eve of the summit over reaching any significant SALT agreement during Nixon's visit.

Sen. Jackson claims to have a document classified secret by Kissinger that proves the terms of the interim agreement on SALT were altered by Kissinger without the knowledge or approval of Congress.

Kissinger said that all he did was to gain clarification of the portion of the agreement dealing with submarine-launched ballistic missile totals and did not change the interim agreement. He added that the Soviets, after first rejecting a U. S. interpretation of the agreement as

respect to the limitation of the strategic offensive arms signed on May 26, [1972] the United States understands that: one, the aggregate level of ballistic missile launchers by the protocol for the United States and the USSR, 950 for the USSR and 710 for the United States, includes ballistic missile launchers on all nuclear-powered submarines and launchers for modern ballistic missiles which may be deployed on diesel-powered submarines."

Kissinger added, "There is, therefore, no basis whatever for saying that we authorized the modernization of missiles on diesel-powered submarines.

"Secondly, launchers for older ballistic missiles on diesel-powered submarines are not included in the above-mentioned levels and, therefore, cannot be used for purposes of replacement as defined in the protocol." In other words, Kissinger added, they had to get rid of ICBMs if they wanted to add submarine launchers.

"Three, a modern ballistic missile on a submarine is a missile of the type which is deployed on nuclear-powered submarines in the USSR since 1965. The Soviet side has indicated its agreement with this interpretation," Kissinger said.

"In other words," he added, "the so-called secret agreement is nothing other than a statement by the United States of what we had already stated publicly on May 26."

Kissinger said the U. S. believes the Soviets have 20 operational G-class submarines. Eleven have missiles in the 700-mi. range, and nine are equipped with 300-mi.-range missiles.

He added that no G-class submarines have been off the U. S. Atlantic coast since 1967, and none has been off the Pacific coast since 1969.

"The G-class submarine is a diesel-powered submarine that can stay under water for only two to three days, that is extremely noisy and, therefore, extremely vulnerable," Kissinger explained. "And moreover, the 300-mi.-range missile which is, as I pointed out, on nine of the submarines, can be fired only if the submarine surfaces-it cannot be fired from under water," he added.

It also has been charged by Sen. Jackson that the Administration secretly agreed not to build up to the permitted level of 710 submarine-launched missiles.

Kissinger explained that before going to Moscow to negotiate the interim agreement, he conferred with the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on submarine building programs. "Both told me that they did not wish to build additional submarines, missile-carrying submarines, of the type that it was then possible to build-substantially the existing Poseidon boats. And that they preferred to wait with the building of new submarines until what was then called ULMS [undersea long-range missile system], and is now

AVIATION WEEK 1 JULY 1974(3)

# Nixon Pledges Consultations
## With NATO on Soviet Parleys

Brussels—Heads of North Atlantic Treaty Organization nations last week were assured by President Richard M. Nixon that they would be fully consulted on any matters concerning the alliance that stems from his talks with the Russians in Moscow.

Nixon's emphasis on consultation was considered here as a major effort to mend a subdued, but continuing rift between the alliance and the U. S. over the latter's sudden international alert during the October Middle East War.

In a briefing after the 2-hr. heads-of- state session, Dr. Joseph Luns, NATO secretary general, joined in the effort to downgrade any special significance to the lack of consultation with NATO at that time.

He pointed out that the time between the decision to put U. S. world forces on a Condition 3 alert status and the time that the NATO Council was informed was only 5 hr. Luns said four of those hours were used in discussions between Washington and Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, Supreme Commander Allied Forces Europe, and the fifth hour between Good-

paster and the NATO Council.

Luns also contended that the U. S. at that time did what any other alliance member would have done if faced with a Soviet probe of the magnitude shown during the Middle East War.

Nixon, who arrived here with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, signed the NATO declaration on Atlantic relations reached recently in Ottawa, along with other heads of state or their representatives. Political leaders of Canada and Iceland were not present, due to elections in, their countries, and France was represented by Premier Jacques Chirac who signed for President Giscard d'Estaing.

Before signing, Nixon told the alliance that the issue of forward bases would not be part of the Moscow talks and that Kissinger would return to Brussels to brief the NATO Council on the talks and their outcome, as they related to the alliance and its strategy in facing the Warsaw Pact countries.

He also assured the alliance that U. S. troops would remain in Europe as long as the threat to the West continued. But he added what was considered a veiled

warning—that the troops would remain as long as the Europeans took a fair share of the defense burden.

His comment was generally considered an aside to the heads of the British and Netherlands governments—Prime Minister Harold Wilson and J. M. den Uyl—both of whom are presiding over defense reviews aimed at drastic cuts in spending and commitments (AW&ST June 24, p. 16).

Nixon also stressed that detente with the Soviet Union and its allies is not inevitable and should not be taken for granted.

The President and Luns both told the group that, in their opinion, detente is complementary to defense and not a substitute for it.

Along with the necessity for consultation, money problems continue to trouble the alliance, and not only through a tendency to cut defense budgets. Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt informed the alliance chiefs that if continued inflation and poor balance of payments situations were not dealt with by the alliance as part of its strategy, the result could be a serious threat to NATO's solidarity.

( MIRV ... CONTINUED.)

agreement, Kissinger added. "Nevertheless, we put into the interim agreement a provision according to which we could convert 54 of our older ICBMs [USAF's Titan 2 missile] to submarine-launched missiles. We put it into the interim agreement, quite frankly, for the third and fourth reasons which I gave with respect to our general strategic policy—the perception of other countries of the American position."

He added that "we did not think it was desirable to put into an agreement a Soviet right to convert old missiles into submarine-launched missiles without maintaining an American right to convert old missiles into submarine-launched missiles. And therefore, to maintain the formal symmetry of the agreement, we put into the agreement a right which we had no intention to exercise."

Kissinger said that because of published information about Trident President Nixon decided at the 1972 summit to tell the Soviets what would soon become obvious within weeks, "namely, that we had no intention of exercising the conversion right from Titan missiles to submarines during the period of the interim agreement."

"This did not change the total figures," Kissinger said.

"We testified that the United States was entitled to have 1,710 missiles. It did not—I repeat—change the total figure. It

neva, and testimony by him to the Senate Armed Services Committee's arms control subcommittee, which Sen. Jackson heads.

The controversial "secret clarification" resulted from Nitze's testimony. Nitze resigned unilaterally after the Administration refused to accept his request to resign. He left so that he would be free to publicly criticize the way SALT negotiations have been handled in an atmosphere of secrecy privately by Kissinger without members of the negotiating team being aware of progress or positions in the talks.

The move by the White House to negotiate an extension to the interim agreement until 1979 was another reason for Nitze's action.

"Such an extension, of course, would be in defiance of the explicit congressional mandate to negotiate a permanent agreement based on the principle of parity," said Sen. James L. Buckley (Cons.-R.-N. Y.). He added: "The United States would have expressed by its action a willingness to live with very unequal terms for an extended period of time—seven years. Moreover, as the Soviets begin exploiting their quantitative advantages through qualitative improvements in their warhead technology, they could achieve an overall strategic superiority that could blunt their interest in a permanent agreement based on true parity."

agree, the Soviets are moving to deploy their new land-based missile-SSX-16, SSX-17, SSX-18 and SSX-19—with MIRVs and improve accuracy with onboard computers.

Soviets have apparently abandoned the rail-type launching system for their MIRVs and are developing a post-boost control system similar to that used by the U. S. Minuteman and Poseidon missiles, an expert said.

The Soviets also have tested the 4,500-naut-mi. SS-N-8 submarine-launched ballistic missile with a stellar-inertial guidance system comparable to the Trident I's proposed system.

Soviet SLBM deployments have increased from 120 in 1964 to more than 820 in 1974. The Soviets have tended to keep obsolete submarines in their forces even after replacements are available. There has been no attempt by the Soviets to phase out their G- and H-class submarines when Y-class boats were introduced. Y-class boats have been retained even though more capable D-class boats are available.

The Soviets have a preference for 12 or 16 missiles per boat so the actual missile ceiling, including 66 SS-N-5s on G boats is likely to be 1,010, Adm. Thomas H. Moorer, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told the Senate. "An unexplained anomaly is the role of the nine H-class submarines. These are nuclear powered and capable of launching ballistic mis-

Marquis Childs

BALTIMORE SUN 3 JULY 1974

# Jackson Will Do His Best To Torpedo Arms Pact

Whatever may come out of the Moscow summit the chances are about 99.9 per cent that Senator Henry M. (Scoop) Jackson (D., Wash.) will try to shoot it down. Given the present mood of distrust, Watergateism, isolationism and general disillusion the chances are nearly as good that he will succeed.

With his eye fixed on 1976 and the presidency you can never fault Scoop for lack of stamina and drive. Having been furnished an Air Force plane, he is spending the July 4 congressional recess in Peeling accompanied by professional China watchers. His conviction that the Russians are deceivers bent on doing in the United States and China at one and the same time will be cheerfully underwritten by his hosts.

Given the broad target of the latest summit and the detente with the Soviet Union, the senator from the state of Washington has many resources. If by remote chance an agreement should be reached limiting the number of multiple warheads the Russians can place on their outsize missiles, Senator Jackson can play the numbers game. This he did on the eve of the summit to insist that poor old Uncle Sam had been taken in a rigged poker game.

The issue of the multiple independently targeted warheads now on most U.S. missiles is so complex that it can be played both ways by the pros and the cons. It resembles the ancient theological argument about how many angels can dance on a needle point. In this argument the needles are loaded with the stuff of annihilation.

But arms agreements to one side, Senator Jackson has a far more emotional weapon with a strong political appeal. That is the plight of the Jews in the Soviet Union and how many shall be permitted to emigrate to Israel.

He told the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, that he would be satisfied with nothing less than a public assurance from either the secretary or the President on the quota to be allowed out. Presumably the numbers will be part of the negotiation in Moscow. Moreover a public assurance must also be

has said that the United States cannot dictate a change in the internal system of the Soviet Union. He argues that by a relaxation of tensions the plight of the Jews will ease and increasing numbers be granted the coveted exit visa.

Recently the figure of 45,000 a year was reported as tentatively agreed on. In 1973 35,000 left for Israel, with a small number coming to the United States.

The senator feels, according to his counselor on foreign and domestic policy, Richard N. Perle, that 45,000 is far from adequate. He puts the total number of jews in the Soviet Union at 2,500,000 of whom, by his estimation, half would like to leave.

In addition Volga Germans want to emigrate to Germany and Ukrainians to Canada. These, too, should be counted in with the Jewish emigrants. Needless to say this is a demand for a radical change in the closed Soviet System. However abhorrent that system is, as testified to by generations of the oppressed, it will not be transformed by dictation from Washington. On the contrary, if the present attempt to ease tensions and abate the nuclear arms race aids, the jailer will double the locks and the plight of the Jews will worsen.

In the general chorus of gloom and 'don't trust anybody,' W. Averell Harriman has raised a plea for reason and sanity. Having recently spent three hours with Leonid Brezhnev during a Moscow visit, Mr. Harriman is convinced that the Communist party chairman wants to reach an agreement on arms limitation, emigration and a wide range of other areas.

Mr. Harriman can never be counted a pushover for Moscow. Ending his wartime tour of duty as ambassador to the Soviet Union, he was the first to warn of Stalin's imperial drive and the ruthless cruelty of the dictator. Not for nothing was he known during his long and varied career in government and diplomacy as 'the crocodile.'"

A loyal Democrat actively

NEW YORK TIMES 3 JULY 1974

# A Spare Tire Policy
—Without Change

By C. L. Sulzberger

WASHINGTON—Should Vice President Gerald Ford ever be propelled to the White House by fate, an impleacable Congress or the blind godness of justice he would continue to apply United States foreign policy along present lines and would do everything in his power to retain Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State.

The Vice President is understandably reluctant to discuss the eventuality of his own advancement, being a loyal colleague and supporter of President Nixon. But when pressed on the subject of Mr. Kissinger—in hypothetical circumstances—he insists:

> "There is no question but that I would keep him. I think he is a man of destiny. For all the world. He is the most successful Secretary of State we have had in my lifetime. He is indispensable."

Mr. Ford has known Henry Kissinger for some fifteen years. He spoke to seminars arranged by the latter at Harvard on three occasions. "My association with him," the Vice President adds, "is close and personal."

Therefore it has been particularly easy for him to receive the briefings Mr. Kissinger regularly gives him in Washington. Mr. Ford stresses that President Nixon personally arranged that he should be particularly well-informed on foreign policy and national security affairs following his succession to Spiro Agnew as Vice President last December.

"As far as Kissinger is concerned," he told me, "at least once a week either he or [Gen. Brent] Scowcroft [Kissinger's former White House assistant] briefs me. If he's in Washington, it is Henry. Also every day I get the same C.I.A. analysis that is given to the President. It is in the office when I arrive."

"Usually I meet the Secretary of Defense formally once a month and frequently communicate with him by telephone. I meet with every U.S. ambassador abroad when he is here in town. I attend all meetings when the President and Secretary of State report to the Congressional leadership. I periodically meet our military chiefs and the heads of the C.I.A."

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vandenberg, who switched dramatically away from isolationism, he fought and won his first Congressional campaign in 1948 as a supporter of the Marshall Plan.

Since then he believes he has acquired a good background on foreign policy. As House minority leader he participated in many meetings on this with Presidents Johnson and Nixon and served on House subcommittees on foreign affairs and the C.I.A. He visited China two years ago.

Now he attends all Cabinet and National Security Council meetings as part of the "regular process of keeping a Vice President informed." He adds: "There is nothing more I can get," and also that he is privy to all secret matters, problems and decisions even when the President is out of the country, as is now the case. General Haig, Nixon's right hand, calls Mr. Ford on scrambled communications from abroad and fills him in, whether from the Middle East, Brussels or the Soviet Union.

I asked the Vice President if he was making any special personal efforts to bring himself up-to-date on diplomatic and defense matters. He replied: "In the sense that I am very conscientious about my briefings and my meetings, I can answer yes." I then asked if he felt, with this background, that he was sufficiently in the picture to assume prompt charge in any emergency that might give him leadership responsibility for the country. Categorically, he replied: "I have no hesitancy in saying yes."

The importance of these views is that the number two man clearly shares the policy aims of the country's number one man. Moreover, he would seek to pursue them with the same diplomatic team if circumstances should move him to an office he insists he does not covet although it is one for which he feels prepared, thanks in a large degree to arrangements made by the President himself.

This primordial fact should be properly understood not only by Americans but by both the friends and adver-

Joseph Alsop

WASHINGTON POST

3 JULY 1974

# The Power of Marshal Grechko

At the Nixon-Brezhnev summit, the world is now unknowingly watching the logical consequences of an event of seven years ago. That was when the professional leaders of the Soviet armed forces acquired the unusual prerogative of naming their own boss.

No other major nation in modern times has given this prerogative to its senior men in uniform—except for Japán in the decade or so before the attack upon Pearl Harbor. The lonely precedent is not exactly encouraging.

What happened back in 1967 was simple enough. Nearly a year earlier, the Soviet defense minister of those days, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, succumbed to cancer. The cancer was known to be terminal by the last months of 1966, but the Politburo made no move to relpace the dying man at the head of the armed forces. At a minimum, that indicated uncertainty about what to do next.

The justification for the uncertainty was then revealed when Malinovsky died in the spring of 1967. It is now known with certainty that a majority of the Soviet Politburo wished to name a high party man, Dimitri Ustinov, as the next defense minister—thereby restoring what we should call “civilian control” of the armed forces. It is also known with certainty that the military leaders instead insisted that another professional military man must replace the dead Malinovsky.

The struggle was evidently sharp and complex, for the Soviet Union lacked a defense minister for an entire fortnight. In the end, however, the professional military leaders got their way, all but certainly with the active

assistance of Leonid Brezhnev, now the Soviet Union's political boss. The result was the appointment of Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, who is still defense minister and was more recently elevated to full membership in the ruling Politburo.

Far too few people in the U.S. intelligence community, or among other Western students of Soviet affairs, have been brave enough to draw the obvious deductions from the foregoing simple and well established facts. This is because the necessary deductions are so disagreeable.

At a minimum, you have to assume that any human society is half way to being militarized, if that society gives its professional military leaders the unique prerogative that these men have acquired in the Soviet Union. At a minimum, you must also assume that in such a society, the professional military leaders have an automatic veto over all matters within their own province, plus an enormously high call upon the share of national resources invested in armed strength.

These assumptions are in full accord with everything that has happened since 1967, including the years of so-called "detente." Not least in the "detente" years, Soviet armed strength has been continuously increased at vast cost and with iron determination. As his last message as a brilliant chief of naval operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt therefore had to tell the country that the U.S. had now lost control of the seas to the Soviet Navy.

What has been happening at the Nixon-Brezhnev summit meeting has instead concerned U.S. and Soviet stra-

tegic forces, however. In the nuclear-strategic area, the Soviets have already tested and are now beginning to deploy a whole series of powerful new missiles. The majority have the multiple warheads that used to be regarded as a comforting American monopoly.

By no coincidence, Soviet testing of these new missiles began almost immediately after the conclusion of the first SALT agreement. The tests incidentally revealed the usual over-optimism of U.S. estimates of Soviet weapons development. The new Soviet submarine-launched missile, for instance, has exactly twice the range—about 4000 miles—that the Soviets had been thought capable of achieving before the test.

Testing and deployment of these new missiles in turn created a wholly novel negotiating situation for Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Obviously, he could do little further about strategic arms limitation without insuring parity—or what is called "essential equivalence"—for the U.S. Equally obviously, he could not achieve this aim without persuading the Soviets to limit, or even halt, the new missile programs that were already under way.

But think for a moment about the automatic response of our own professional military leaders to suggested rollbacks of this kind. Then consider the immensely greater leverage of the Soviet military leaders, that is so clearly revealed by the story of Marshal Grechko's appointment.

The moral is that if anyone wants to study a military-industrial complex in tip-top working order, the Soviet Union is where to begin.

The Los Angeles Times

## ATOMIC ENERGY:

### Bombs Away?

When the first atomic bomb burst over New Mexico in 1945, physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer was reminded of a line from a Hindu holy book, the Bhagavad-Gita: "I am become death—the shatterer of worlds." Ever since then, the proliferation of nuclear weapons has terrified the better part of the world. For years the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain and France maintained a great-power monopoly over nuclear devices, and the nuclear test-ban treaty of 1963 barred trial shots from the skies, the ocean and outer space. But now India has joined the nuclear club, and two weeks ago both France and China resumed their tests in the atmosphere. About a dozen other nations—including Egypt and Israel—are consider-

Britain had conducted an underground nuclear test in Nevada "a few weeks ago." The experiment was designed to streamline the Polaris missiles carried on Britain's four nuclear submarines. It turned out that the test had been scheduled by Edward Heath's Conservative government before it fell from power last winter. "You have no need to apolothesize," Heath told the Prime Minister, "for taking action so clearly in the national interest."

Apologize Wilson did. "All of us want to see an end to this horror weapon," he said. But since Britain had been among the first to criticize India, China and France for their recent tests, the declaration was rather limp. "We were hoping," grimaced one furious left-wing Laborite, "we would have some more influence in persuading other nations not to proceed with their own tests."

Moral suasion didn't seem to be the order of the day anywhere else. An enter-

scare stories that Israel had already stockpiled a cache of atomic weapons by warning that the next Arab-Israeli war could well be "a nuclear one." And the Shah of Iran—who signed a $5 billion deal with France including the purchase of five nuclear power plants—had to disavow a report that had quoted him as saying that he wanted nuclear weapons "without any doubt—and sooner than one would think."

It seemed inevitable that the number of nuclear-prone nations would increase. Brazil, Argentina, Sweden, Mexico, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt and perhaps Iran led the list. But few observers predict overnight proliferation. In an age of global inflation and resource shortages, the cost and problems of developing nuclear delivery systems are burdens that even the richest and most advanced societies would find difficult to bear. "Our effort will be to convince countries that they have more to lose than gain from

CURRENT NEWS

AFTERNOON EDITION - 1330

WEDNESDAY, JULY 3, 1974

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS 3 July 1974 Pg. 1

# Arms Limitation
## Goal Scaled Down

By Oswald Johnston
Star-News Staff Writer

MOSCOW—Admitting a deadlock on all earlier approaches to a permanent arms limitation agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed today to try again for a less ambitious SALT agreement that would expire in 1985.

The joint abandonment of the goal of a permanent strategic arms limitation agreement was the most significant result of a summit that was mostly concerned with continuing existing policies. It was announced in a lengthy joint communique that included a series of minor agreements, containing no surprises.

AS EXPECTED, the two superpowers agreed to ban underground testing of nuclear warheads larger than 150 kilotons—seven times the size of the Hiroshima bomb—and agreed to limit antiballistic missile sites in each country to one.

The two powers also agreed to explore a new area of weapons control by agreeing to work toward a limitation on "environmental modification techniques"—such as the American use of defoliants and rainmaking techniques in Vietnam.

In a sectin on the Middle East, a subject of increased importance to the Russians since the emergence of American diplomacy in the area, the Soviets reasserted their role as cochairman of the scheduled Geneva peace conference.

In a concession, the United States for the first time accepted a reference to "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." In a parallel concession, the Soviets accepted a reference to "the right to existence of all states in the area" —meaning Israel.

THE COMMUNIQUE, the limited test ban treaty and protocols redefining the 1972 ABM treaty were signed by President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev today.

But in all the verbiage of all the official paper issued today to commemorate the 1974 summit, by far the most important was the brief sentence in which the two superpowers admitted their inability to reconcile their dif-

WASHINGTON STAR-NEWS
3 July 1974 Pg. 6

### Move to Block Loans for India

The House has voted to try to block international loans to India as a protest of her nuclear test last month.

During debate yesterday on a $1.5 billion U.S. contribution to the International Development Association, many House members said they objected to giving more money to India, which has received up to 40 percent of IDA funds in the past.

Rep. Clarence D. Long, D-Mi., won approval of an amendment requiring the U.S. governor to IDA to vote against loans to any country which develops nuclear explosives and does not sign a nuclear nonproliferation pact.

WASH.STAR-NEWS 7/3/74 Pg. 2

### Navy Back

The U.S. Navy has quietly reestablished itself in the Indian Ocean. There was no announcement but the Navy acknowledged when asked that it had entered the ocean for the first time in more than two months.

The presence of a guided missile cruiser, two destroyers and an oiler was likely to stir new protests from Indian and other nations which contend that such operations will spur Russia to increase its fleet there.

WASH.STAR-NEWS 7/3/74 Pg. 2

### Viet Aid Limit

Pentagon officials are saying that U.S. military aid to South Vietnam in the current fiscal year will probably be limited to ammunition, petroleum and spare parts. Reason for the limitations: Congressional budget cuts.

Pentagon sources say officials in the United States have been discussing the issue this week with the American Embassy in Saigon. Planning is being done on the assumption that Congress will authorize $900 million to $1 billion.

to take the place of the 1972 SALT agreement upon its expiration in 1977 "should cover the period until 1985." Both nations, the statement added laconically, would send delegations to Geneva around Aug. 1 to resume negotiations, and would give these delegations new "instructions."

EXPLAINING this intricate subject to reporters here, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger put the best face he could on it. He denied that the abandonment of the concept of a permanent agreement and the summit deadlock on a short-term agreement was a failure.

Kissinger expressed the same urgency and fervor with which he has discussed nuclear arms control in recent weeks. He once again asserted that the "explosion" of multiple warhead technology was moving so rapidly that by

NEW YORK TIMES
29 JUNE 1974 Pg. 1

(1 JULY)

# NIXON AIRES SPLIT ON MISSILE PACT

Kissinger and Schlesinger
Arguing Over What Is
Attainable in Moscow.

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 28 — President Nixon flew to Moscow with his two principal advisers on national security still in disagreement over what would constitute an acceptable accord now to limit strategic nuclear weapons, high Administration officials have disclosed.

These officials described Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger as having the kind of "fundamental differences where neither can be shown to be right or wrong. "It is a matter of judgment," one high official explained, "and the President has a clear choice."

Both Secretaries want a comprehensive agreement eventually. But Mr. Kissinger believes the United States should press for a limited agreement now to restrain the deployment of more nuclear warheads known as MIRV's, for multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

Mr. Schlesinger, on the other hand, is arguing that a limited accord reached in Moscow could prevent the achievement of a comprehensive treaty later.

Mr. Schlesinger favors an agreement that would limit the number of missiles, base limits on MIRVs on the sizes of missiles, and limit the number of bombers and the size of strategic nuclear forces in and around Europe.

Mr. Kissinger favors such an agreement but insists that the Russians will not sign one now and seeks an agreement that he feels can be signed.

## PACT ... CONTINUED

From the day the Presidential party left Washington, the two Secretaries or their subordinates have continued to air their varying views through news conferences and news leaks. Mr. Kissinger has been arguing the need for at least an agreement in principle now. Military officials have been warning about military security being sacrificed to a diplomatic triumph.

Nothing could be learned about the President's attitude or even whether he has already made a decision. Mr. Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented their recommendations and Mr. Kissinger has at a meeting of the National Security Council last Friday. Mr. Nixon presided, but, according to sources, no decisions were made then.

## Another Factor

Another factor in the President's ultimate decision is that Mr. Kissinger is with the President, while Mr. Schlesinger remains in Washington and learns only what Mr. Kissinger is prepared to cable back.

Mr. Kissinger, in his news briefings, is apparently trying to assuage Pentagon sensitivities. He alternately plays up and plays down the chances of reaching any missile accord in Moscow, and when he plays it up, he stresses that the accord could be only a "statement of principles."

The Kissinger-Schlesinger dispute is over the 1972 treaty limiting defensive missile systems on both sides or the proposal in Moscow now to further limit these systems.

Instead, the controversy is centered on the agreement, reached at the same time, to limit offensive nuclear missiles. This agreement, which does not cover weapons such as bombers and MIRV's, expires in 1977. The accord limits missile totals to 1,710 for the United States and 2,360 for the Soviet Union.

MIRV is the name for the part of the missile containing nuclear warheads that can be aimed at individual targets once it arrives over a target area. One missile can be used to destroy several targets, and such multiple-warhead missiles are more accurate than a missile with a single warhead.

The officials in Washington who revealed the split between the two Secretaries said they were doing so not to cause a public controversy but to insure that the two different approaches to the nuclear arms negotiations received a public hearing.

As disclosed by these high officials and confirmed in the State Department and the Pentagon, the dispute is over questions of timing, leverage, the score of the agreement, and what kind of accord Soviet leaders are likely to accept.

## Acceleration Feared

Mr. Schlesinger argues that accords covering only parts of the arms race will inevitably lead to an acceleration of competition in weapons that are not included. He cites MIRV developments since the 1972 agreement as an example.

Mr. Schlesinger does not believe that it is possible to achieve a comprehensive accord in Moscow now. He thus maintains that the United States should continue its research and development programs for new weapons to be used as bargaining chips for a wider accord later.

The Defense Secretary contends that Moscow would be amenable to a comprehensive approach later when it has to confront the costs of matching American arms developments.

Mr. Kissinger responded to these arguments at the National Security Council meeting, saying that the Soviet Communist party leader, Leonid I. Brezhnev, would not sign a comprehensive accord because Soviet Defense Minister Andrei A. Grechko would not accept it.

## Kissinger's Argument

Mr. Kissinger argued that he wanted to negotiate something Soviet leaders would sign. His plan was to seek a simple extension of the present missile accord if, and only if, Moscow would agree to limit the deployment of its new large missile able to carry many MIRV's. The United States, in turn, would restrict its own further deployment. Controlling MIRV's, Mr. Kissinger maintained, was the immediate problem and the negotiable issue.

But the Pentagon and Mr. Kissinger remain divided on how to achieve such control. While the officials were vague on this subject, the dispute seems to be over allowable numbers of Soviet missiles able to carry MIRV's and verification of MIRV deployment.

Reports from Moscow confirmed in Washington indicate that Soviet-American discussions are, for the moment, focusing on MIRV's. The officials said the Soviet Union is willing to limit its MIRV deployments—predicted to begin soon—below the current American level of MIRV's if it can keep its lead in numbers of missiles in general and heavy missiles in particular.

The differences between Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Kissinger go beyond typical Pentagon-State Department disputes, in terms of the negotiating process, the two men are playing traditional roles. The Defense Secretary is arguing for a tough bargaining stance, and the Secretary of State is trying to negotiate what is negotiable.

But from the standpoint of the traditional arms control goal of containing strategic arms competition as a whole, Mr. Schlesinger might be viewed as the dove and Mr. Kissinger as either an owl or a hawk. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, officials related, has taken a position closer to Mr. Schlesinger's than to Mr. Kissinger's.

But perhaps the most unusual aspect of the situation is that a President embarked on a major negotiating venture without first ironing out basic compromises among his top advisers.

354 The SALT Experience

Pincus, "U.S. Seen Favoring Extra Missile Holes," *Washington Post*, July 9, 1978; George C. Wilson, "Joint Chiefs Chairman Says U.S. Needs a Mobile Missile," ibid., July 26, 1978; Don Oberdorfer, "U.S. to Retain 'Shell Game' Mobile Missile Option, Brown Says," ibid., August 23, 1978. In November 1978, Secretary Brown again asked for funds to begin full-scale development of the MX, although it was stated that a decision on how the missile would be based might be deferred for another year. See Richard Burt, "Pentagon Includes Two New Missiles In Its 1979 Budget," *New York Times*, November 14, 1978.

111. See, for example, Paul H. Nitze, "The Comparative Costs of MAPS/ALPS Incremental Aim Points Additions Versus Soviet Warhead Fractionization" (Arlington, Va., August 16, 1978.) (Mimeo.)

112. See Chapters 9, p. 192f; 11, pp. 228, 231f.

113. *Brown FY 1979 Report*, p. 63.

114. Ibid. See also Chapter 7, pp. 142f., 146.

115. See Chapter 7, pp. 145-46; see also Chapter 6, p. 120f.

116. *Brown FY 1979 Report*, p. 53. However, it was reported in late November 1978 that tentative moves toward enhancing U.S. capabilities for limited nuclear conflict were under discussion within the administration, as part of a revision of U.S. strategic doctrine. See Richard Burt, "U.S. Moving Toward Vast Revision of Its Strategy on Nuclear Warfare," *New York Times*, November 29, 1978.

117. Ibid., p. 55.

118. Ibid., pp. 79, 108.

119. See Bernard Weinraub, "Brown Says Soviet Can Fell Satellites," *New York Times*, October 5, 1977.

120. *Brown FY 1979 Report*, pp. 125, 129.

121. See Chapter 6, pp. 133-34.

122. See *Rumsfeld FY 1977 Report*, p. 95.

123. Henry S. Bradsher, "U.S. Scraps Effort to Curb Soviet Civil Defense as It Seeks to Match It," *Washington Star*, November 22, 1978; Richard Burt, "Carter Adopts a Program to Bolster Civil Defense in a Nuclear Attack," *New York Times*, November 13, 1978.

124. Richard Burt, "Carter Uncommitted on Money For Plan to Bolster Civil Defense," *New York Times*, December 2, 1978.

125. See *Schlesinger FY 1975 Report*, p. 26; *Rumsfeld FY 1978 Report*, p. 64; *Brown FY 1979 Report*, p. 62.

126. *Brown FY 1979 Report*, p. 62.

127. Ibid., p. 45.

## NOTES TO CHAPTER 8
SALT POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PERIOD PRIOR TO VLADIVOSTOK

1. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Kissinger or Schlesinger?" *Washington Post*, September 19, 1974. See also Victor Zorza, "Worrying about Kissinger," ibid., October 8, 1974. See also Chapter 2, pp. 27-28.

2. Ibid. In this connection, following Gerald Ford's succession to the

Notes 355

presidency in August 1974, there were rumors that Schlesinger might soon be
replaced or that Kissinger might lose his "second hat" as head of the National
Security Council apparatus. In both cases, the White House reaffirmed that the
two men remained secure in their respective posts for the time being, though
before the next year was out, Schlesinger would lose his. See: L. Edgar Prina,
"Doubts Erased, Schlesinger to Stay," *San Diego Union*, August 13, 1974;
"White House Denies Any Plans to Take a Job from Kissinger," *New York
Times*, September 18, 1974.

3. See Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Kissinger and Schlesinger," Washington Post, February 3, 1974.

4. See, for example, James Reston, "Kissinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff," *New York Times*, June 23, 1974.

5. Leslie H. Gelb, "Schlesinger for Defense, Defense for Detente," *New York Times Magazine*, August 4, 1974, p. 35.

6. Ibid.

7. Rosenfeld, in the *Washington Post*, February 3, 1974.

8. Murrey Marder, "Kissinger: Ford Firm on Detente," *Washington Post*, September 20, 1974.

9. For an illuminating list of similarities and differences in the positions of the two, see Leslie H. Gelb, "Debate on U.S. Nuclear Policy: Just What Is Strategic Superiority?" *New York Times*, July 30, 1974.

10. Ibid.

11. Secretary Kissinger's Statement on U.S.-Soviet Relations, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, September 19, 1974, Department of State, Office of Media Services, p. 11.

12. Kissinger Press Conference in Moscow, July 3, 1974, in *Department of State Bulletin*, July 29, 1974, p. 215 (hereafter cited as *Kissinger Moscow Press Conference*, July 1974).

13. Secretary Kissinger's Statement on U.S.-Soviet Relations, September 19, 1974.

14. Secretary Kissinger's address, "Constancy and Strength in U.S. Foreign Policy," August 20, 1974, Department of State, Office of Media Services, p. 3.

15. Ibid.

16. Secretary Kissinger's Statement on U.S.-Soviet Relations, September 19, 1974.

17. Ibid., p. 10.

18. Ibid., p. 12.

19. See Gelb, in the *New York Times*, July 30, 1974.

20. Ibid.

21. See Secretary Kissinger's Press Conference, March 21, 1974, Department of State, Office of Media Services, p. 9; Secretary Kissinger's Statement on *U.S.-Soviet Relations*, September 19, 1974, p. 10.

22. Secretary Kissinger's Press Conference, March 21, 1974, p. 9.

23. Gelb, in the *New York Times*, July 30, 1974.

24. Gelb, in *New York Times Magazine*, August 4, 1974, p. 44; Joseph Kraft, "Letter from Moscow," *The New Yorker*, July 29, 1974, p. 70. For previous discussion of the MIRV and other issues at the mid-1974 summit, see Chapter 5, pp. 101-102.

356 The SALT Experience

25. RN: *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), pp. 1024-25. Nixon's account, which gave a very disparaging picture of the attitude displayed by Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs, said nothing explicit about how an acceptable proposal was to be worked out. According to other unconfirmed accounts, however, irreconcilable differences led to excluding Pentagon inputs into the final drafting of a U.S. position for the summit meeting. See Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Ten MIRV Proposals Prepared," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, July 1, 1974, p. 12.

26. Kissinger Moscow Press Conference, July 1974, p. 210. See also Chapter 3, pp. 72-73.

27. See Leslie H. Gelb, "Schlesinger Rebuts Kissinger Remark, Denies Pentagon Impeded Arms Talks," *New York Times*, July 4, 1974; Michael Getler and Thomas O'Toole, "Military Supports Accords," *Washington Post*, July 4, 1974.

28. See Chapter 4, p. 82f.

29. Leslie H. Gelb, "How U.S. Made Ready for Talk at Vladivostok," *New York Times*, December 3, 1974; "Background Briefing by Henry Kissinger, 3 December 1974," in *Survival*, July-August 1975, p. 192 (hereafter cited as *Kissinger Background Briefing, December 3, 1974*). See also Chapter 2, p. 31.

30. Gelb, in the *New York Times*, December 3, 1974.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid. See also Victor Zorza, "The SALT Bargain with the Military," *Washington Post*, December 12, 1974; Chapter 2, p. 42.

33. Gelb, in the *New York Times*, December 3, 1974.

34. Ibid.

35. See Alton Frye, "Kissinger and Arms Limitation," *Washington Post*, August 17, 1974.

36. For an interpretation along these lines, see the two-part commentary by Chalmers M. Roberts, "How Much Detente?" *Washington Post*, August 19 and September 7, 1974.

37. Ibid. See also Gelb, in *New York Times Magazine*, August 4, 1974, pp. 9, 43.

38. See Chapter 7, especially pp. 136-45.

39. See Observer article, "Strange Position of J. Schlesinger," *Pravda*, July 12, 1975. See also Christopher S. Wren, "Soviet Assails Schlesinger on Nuclear Arms Remark," *New York Times*, July 13, 1975.

40. For typical commentary along these lines, see: B. Svetlov, "Despite the Spirit of the Times," *Izvestiia*, January 4, 1974; A. Platonov and L. Alekseyev, "A Responsible Task," *Pravda*, February 14, 1974; V. Vinograd, "An Increase for the Pentagon," *Krasnaia Zvezda*, August 28, 1974; A. Grigoryants, "Those Who Are against Detente," *Nedelya*, no. 35 (August-September 1974), pp. 2-3.

41. V.A. Matveyev, "Fresh Gains in the Struggle against Opponents of Detente," *Za Rubezhom*, no. 22 (August 1974), p. 9; Grigoryants, in *Nedelya*, August-September 1974.

42. V. Larionov, "Arms Limitation and Its Enemies," *Pravda*, April 17, 1974.

43. See Chapter 5, p. 34f.

THE KISSINGER-SCHLESINGER PHASE
OF POLICY DEBATE

A large share of attention in the national debate that arose in the United States in 1974 around the so-called Schlesinger strategic doctrine was given to such questions as whether significant differences existed between Secretaries Kissinger and Schlesinger over the meshing of strategic policy with the SALT negotiations, as well as in their basic philosophies of how best to deal with the Soviet Union. In addition, there was recurrent speculation that the Kissinger-Schlesinger relationship had taken on the character of a power struggle between two strong and intellectually well matched protégés representing rival constituencies in the realm of national security policy.

To comment on the question of power rivalry first, Schlesinger, who had come more recently to the higher politics of defense as the top man of the Pentagon bureaucracy, was generally depicted as the challenger in a struggle for power, grown restive under the near total domination of national security policy exercised by Kissinger in his dual NSC and State Department roles.¹ One implication of this view of their relationship was that even if no serious substantive or philosophical differences existed between the two men, bureaucratic rivalry alone was likely to put them on a collision course, perhaps forcing Gerald Ford, the new president, to choose between them.²

By contrast, some speculation on the Kissinger-Schlesinger relationship occasionally pointed in a quite different direction. For example, since both men were known to be tough-minded intellectuals long engaged in studying the uses of power in international affairs, it has been suggested that, rather than having spent their energies in vying with each other for pre-eminent influence on the shaping of U.S. security policy, the two may in fact have been working together as subtle collaborators in a carrot-and-stick act to influence Soviet policy.³ Seen in these terms, Kissinger, sounding the softer line, had held out the carrot, and Schlesinger had brandished the stick.

A variation of the view that the two secretaries might have been operating more closely in concert than sometimes assumed was to be found in the suggestion that the real internal split over U.S. strategic and SALT policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union lay essentially between positions favored respectively by the uniformed Joint Chiefs of Staff and Kissinger, rather than between Kissinger and Schlesinger, described as the two men who in common "understand the ambiguities, dangers and opportunities of the present situation."⁴

Whether they were to be regarded as rivals in an internal power struggle or as a complementary team working effectively in harness, neither man was known to have exhibited anything but respect for the other's abilities. In Schlesinger's case, though he was perhaps a more redoubtable figure than any with whom Kissinger had previously had to deal in the national security apparatus, those who knew him were of the opinion that Schlesinger had never had any hankering to take on Kissinger. Indeed, some commentators made the point that as secretary of defense, Schlesinger was obliged to spend most of his time dealing with generals and admirals in the Pentagon and with congressional guardians of the purse strings,⁵ so that little time was left over for taking on anyone as formidable as

the secretary of state. For Kissinger's part, though he was reported to have once said that "if Schlesinger and I start fighting, it will blow the town apart,"⁶ and though his associates had at times hinted that he was facing an internal challenge of serious dimensions from Schlesinger,⁷ Kissinger himself repeatedly discounted rumors of a feud with the secretary of defense. As Kissinger chose to put it in response to questioning before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in September 1974: "There is no struggle going on. There are occasional differences of emphasis. There is no power struggle."⁸

## Comparison of Substantive Positions

Turning next to the question of substantive differences between Kissinger and Schlesinger on strategic issues, it would appear that their positions on many key issues were often less far apart than the rhetoric of debate in 1974 might have suggested.⁹ For example, though there may have been some hidden bones of contention that went unrevealed in public discourse, the catalog of items upon which the two men appeared to be more or less in agreement included the following:

* The overall military budget proposed by the secretary of defense, as well as the share of it devoted to strategic forces, was supported by Kissinger, who said he found it consistent with the policies he was espousing.¹⁰

* The goal of "essential equivalence in strategic capabilities" with the Soviet Union, as enunciated by Schlesinger, also was endorsed by Kissinger,¹¹ and neither man was an advocate of re-establishing "strategic superiority." On the second issue, however, the secretary of state had exhibited somewhat stronger feelings, as when he asked, after the frustrating summit session of mid-1974: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority ... at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?"¹²

* The general notion that large imbalances in strategic forces can be destabilizing and are therefore not acceptable was embraced by both Schlesinger and Kissinger, with Kissinger agreeing that "the appearance of inferiority—whatever its actual significance—can have serious political consequences."¹³ Of the two, however, Kissinger had been more disposed to emphasize the difficulties of translating strategic power into political advantage, noting that "an upper limit exists beyond which additional weapons lose their political significance."¹⁴

* The assertion that the United States would never accept the "strategic preponderance of another power" was voiced by both

Schlesinger and Kissinger; both also stressed the point, as Kissinger put it, that "we will maintain the nuclear balance by unilateral actions if we must and by negotiations if at all possible."¹⁵

* The value of conveying to the Soviets that the United States would not draw back from strategic competition if the Soviet Union should seek to alter the strategic balance through "unrestrained competitive programs" was subscribed to by both men. However, though Kissinger had warned that "if we are driven to it, the United States will sustain an arms race,"¹⁶ he had not gone as far as Schlesinger in applying this warning specifically to the case of "matching" any Soviet attempt to acquire substantial counterforce capabilities.

* The proposition that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States could "realistically" expect to develop a "credible disarming capability" against the other was adhered to by both Schlesinger and Kissinger.¹⁷

* The various strategic weapons development programs espoused by Secretary Schlesinger and the Pentagon, including the major programs for the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber, were publicly supported by Secretary Kissinger,¹⁸ though he reportedly had some reservations about their utility.¹⁹ It also was said that Schlesinger had privately raised questions about the Trident and B-1, presumably in the context of looking for cheaper alternatives.²⁰

* The Schlesinger shift from the doctrine of mutual assured destruction to a more flexible range of nuclear options and to development of a more discriminating targeting capability was also endorsed by Kissinger.²¹ However, Kissinger's position on improvement of missile accuracy appeared more ambiguous than Schlesinger's, for he confined his endorsement to the "obligation" of having the ability to use strategic forces "in the most discriminating manner possible."²² Some observers speculated that Kissinger had refrained from seeking limitations on missile accuracy primarily out of the belief that such curbs would be too difficult to negotiate, not only with the Soviet Union, but with the U.S. military as well.²³

Beyond the points of full or partial agreement listed here, there appeared to be several strategic issues over which substantive differences between Schlesinger and Kissinger did indeed exist. One of these, already suggested above, was the secretary of state's apparent lesser degree of commitment to a matching counterforce capability, especially in numerical terms. Other differences also appeared to

hinge essentially on numbers—on what would constitute a prudent spread in the numerical levels of strategic arms overall, and in MIRVed missiles in particular, that the United States could afford to accept in a negotiated agreement with the Soviet Union.

Apparently, judging from the available sources, these differences peaked in connection with the June-July 1974 summit in Moscow, with Schlesinger reportedly having wanted to concede fewer MIRVed missiles to the Soviets than Kissinger and President Nixon were prepared to grant, as well as favoring a more comprehensive accord on total strategic force levels than Kissinger and the president believed to be negotiable.²⁴ According to Nixon's own account in his memoirs, Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs had brought their opposition on proposed MIRV numbers and other issues "to a head" at an NSC meeting on June 20, 1974, where Schlesinger presented a Pentagon proposal that "amounted to an unyielding hard line against any SALT agreement that did not ensure an overwhelming American advantage." Without specifying the contents of the proposal, Nixon's account quotes himself as having said: "Secretary Schlesinger's proposal simply has no chance whatever of being accepted by the Soviets, so we should try to work out something consistent with our interests that will."²⁵

Apart from having supposedly compounded the difficulties of establishing a U.S. negotiating position prior to the summit, the Kissinger-Schlesinger differences became an even more controversial matter immediately afterwards, when at a postsummit press conference in Moscow, Kissinger made his much-cited remark that "both sides have to convince their military establishments of the benefits of restraint."²⁶

Not surprisingly, Kissinger's statement was promptly interpreted in the press as implying that the Pentagon shared the blame with military leaders on the Soviet side for impeding agreement at the summit. Just as promptly, Schlesinger in a press conference in Washington rejected this suggestion, observing that "we have firm civilian control in this country," and noting further that none of the Soviet proposals acceptable to Kissinger had been vetoed either by himself or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁷

The next phase of substantive differences on strategic and SALT issues involving Kissinger and Schlesinger apparently occurred in the interval between the mid-1974 summit and Dr. Kissinger's October 1974 trip to Moscow,²⁸ while the new Ford administration was in the process of establishing itself in office. Toward the end of this period, after a series of Verification Panel meetings, a debate pitting the two men against each other reportedly came to a head in an

October NSC meeting over which President Ford presided, and which was addressed to the question of what to try next in order to break the SALT deadlock with the Soviet Union.²⁹

Although the available details of the options under debate are
sparse, Schlesinger reportedly contended that "we must face the
Soviets down" on their desire to deploy a large number of MIRVed
missile launchers. The basic alternatives favored by Schlesinger were
said to be either that both sides should agree to substantial mutual
force reductions resulting in overall equality, with a MIRV ceiling
low enough so that neither side would be tempted to take advantage
of the other, or that, if the Russians would not agree, then the
United States should "buckle down for a five-year, all-out arms
race."³⁰ Kissinger was said to have argued that Moscow was bound
to reject the first alternative, and that it was doubtful that support
would be forthcoming in the United States to outbuild the Russians
in an all-out race. Therefore, he reportedly favored an approach
initially providing for force levels, including MIRVed launchers, high
enough to be negotiable with the Soviets, leaving reductions and
controls on modernization to be negotiated step by step later.³¹

In the debate over these contrasting approaches, the Joint Chiefs
were said to have sided with Kissinger—a switch from their putative
alignment in a solid "Pentagon front" with the secretary of defense.
This shift reportedly came about both because the Kissinger plan
would allow completion of various modernization programs upon
which the Joint Chiefs had set their sights, and because they too
doubted that Congress would vote the funds to make an all-out arms
race feasible.³² At any rate, it would appear that by the time
Kissinger left Washington in October 1974 to talk with Brezhnev, a
U.S. position essentially embodying his approach had been adopted,
with Schlesinger's concurrence and the president's approval.³³

The revised set of U.S. SALT proposals that Kissinger carried to
Moscow in October 1974 reportedly offered the Soviets two broad
choices: (1) an equal aggregate number of 2000 "central systems"
delivery vehicles for each side, including an equal ceiling of 1000
MIRVed missile launchers, together with sublimits on both the
largest Soviet missiles and American bomber-launched missiles; or, if
this were rejected, (2) a greater overall total of non-MIRVed delivery
vehicles for the Soviet Union, offset by more MIRVed launchers for
the United States.³⁴ The developments following Kissinger's October
visit that culminated in the SALT transaction at Vladivostok in
November 1974 will be taken up presently.

Differing Views on How to Deal
with the Soviet Union

Apart from whatever substantive differences may have obtained
between Kissinger and Schlesinger in the pre-Vladivostok period of
formulating U.S. SALT policy, there was also the broader question
of whether a fundamental divergence lay at the core of their
respective philosophies for dealing with the Soviet Union. Needless
to say, this was an exceedingly complicated question, subject to a
wide range of speculation. Perhaps the first point to be made is that
though the two men had sometimes been pigeonholed as holding
diametrically opposed views on detente with the Soviet Union,
Schlesinger's basic philosophy was not indifferent to the merits of
the detente relationship that Kissinger was trying to cultivate. At the
same time, however, there did appear to be real differences between
the two as to how detente itself might relate to the problem of
negotiating SALT agreements with the Soviets. Some variations were
to be found in the divergent views ascribed to the two men, but in
general they ran along the following lines.

Kissinger, for example, was said to fear that detente had become
rather brittle in light of events between the May 1972 summit and
the last Nixon-Brezhnev summit of mid-1974, that the pressure of
technology was threatening to spur an arms race inconsistent with
maintaining detente,³⁵ and that the opportunity for coming to terms
with the Brezhnev regime on curbing the nuclear arms race might be
lost unless the United States were willing to settle for what it could
get in SALT without prolonging the negotiations—or at any rate, that
the longer the U.S. side might wait, the poorer its chances of a
reasonable agreement.³⁶

Schlesinger, on the other hand, was said to believe that Soviet
stakes in detente were so great that it was not in the Soviet interest
to break off detente lightly and that there was a chance of educating
the Soviets to come around to a reasonable SALT agreement by
explaining U.S. concerns and posing hard alternatives if the concerns
were ignored. Hence, he was said to favor a tougher set of terms for a
SALT accord, as well as prudential fallback programs that would
exploit U.S. technological advantages, for which the Soviets had a
healthy respect, in the event agreement were not reached.³⁷

Assuming that the postures described above represented a reason-
ably accurate picture of the essential underlying differences between
the Kissinger and Schlesinger philosophies, it would appear that the
positions of both men entailed certain vulnerabilities. In Kissinger's

case, the hope of making satisfactory adjustments with the Soviet Union was predicated basically upon the assumption that an accommodating U.S. SALT approach, combined with economic incentives, would be reciprocated by the Brezhnev regime without undue delay. But if the Soviets were to drag their feet, either because of reluctance to constrain their own strategic programs, or because of a belief that Kissinger had lost control over the economic incentives dangled before them, or for whatever combination of reasons, then the logic of the Kissinger position seemed to leave little choice but to offer ever-increasing concessions.

The Schlesinger case rested upon offering a somewhat narrower, but more disagreeable, set of incentives to the Soviet side. As an incentive to persuade them that their best interest lay in a reasonable agreement with the United States, the Soviets were to be let known, in essence, that they would not be permitted to amass a preponderant counterforce advantage. But the problem here was that this message might be misunderstood by the Russians, who might not believe that the United States would stop merely at matching them, and who therefore might choose to redouble their own strategic programs. In short, while the Kissinger philosophy seemed to entail the risk of an unfavorable deal with the Soviet Union in SALT, the Schlesinger philosophy seemed to involve the possibility of no agreement at all.

At bottom, it might be said that the two positions amounted to a very real dilemma—one which only the Soviets themselves might resolve by demonstrating that in fact they were prepared to come to terms on a "reasonable" agreement.

NEW YORK TIMES

29 JUNE 1974 Pg. 1

(1 JULY)

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

Both Secretaries want a comprehensive agreement eventually. But Mr. Kissinger believes the United States should press for a limited agreement now to restrain the deployment of more nuclear warheads known as MIRVs, for multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles.

## PACT ... CONTINUED

about the President's attitude or even whether he has already made a decision. Mr. Schlesinger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented their recommendations and Mr. Kissinger his at a meeting of the National Security Council last Friday. Mr. Nixon presided, but, according to sources, no decisions were made then.

## Another Factor

## Acceleration Feared

## Kissinger's Argument

NEW YORK TIMES

29 JUNE 1974 Pg. 1

(1 JULY)

# NIXON AIDES SPLIT ON MISSILE PACT

## Kissinger and Schlesinger
Arguing Over What Is Attainable in Moscow

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

These officials described Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger as having the kind of 'fundamental differences where neither can be shown to be right or wrong. "It is a matter of judgment," one high official explained, "and the President has a clear choice."

## PACT ... CONTINUED

## Another Factor

## Acceleration Feared

## Kissinger's Argument

NEW YORK TIMES

29 JUNE 1974 Pg. 1

(1 JULY)

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

These officials described Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger as having the kind of fundamental differences where neither can be shown to be right or wrong. "It is a matter of judgment," one high official explained, "and the President has a clear choice."

Mr. Schlesinger favors an agreement that would limit the number of missiles, base limits on MIRV's on the sizes of missiles, and limit the number of bombers and the size of strategic nuclear forces in and around Europe.

## PACT ... CONTINUED

### Another Factor

### Acceleration Feared

### Kissinger's Argument