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## 1. A Proviso

In 1939 and 1940, at the beginning of the Second World War, it proved possible to give rather precise predictions of the course and outcome of the war. Contrary to what most people think, the course of this was was largely predetermined at the moment it started, because the forces and the masses which were going to decide the outcome were given--at least, approximately-- and no important new ones were likely to arise--or, in fact, did arise--before the end of the war. It is much more difficult to make predictions in peacetime, when masses are in slow fermentation and forces continuously change their intensity and direction!

In one respect, the variety of possible future developments is now narrower than it had been in-between war periods before 1945. One "degree of freedom" has been lost in world politics--the freedom to start a war in pursuit of rational political aims. This restriction has been amply demonstrated by events since 1945--by the aborted Suez invasion, by the inaction of the West in the face of the Hungarian uprising, by the Korean War ending where it started, by the Soviet rockets being withdrawn from Cuba, by the West's toleration of the partition of Germany and by Moscow's toleration of the thorn in its flesh which is West Berlin; and finally, by the Chinese withdrawal from most of the territory conquered in the Himalayan campaign.

The reason was in all cases the same: the prospect of an intolerably destructive nuclear war, or, at least, of an "escalation" of the local conflict, the end of which could not be foreseen. The latter may have been the case in the latest war that did not come off--the Chinese attack on India. The full reasons that had moved the Chinese, first to attack and then to withdraw, remain dark; but if the Chinese troops would have carried their campaign deeper into India, tenuously supported through the Himalayan passes, they undoubtedly would have risked becoming mired in a wide, hostile country,

*See "Things to Come - 1939," pp.

of this book.

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facing increasing Western intervention, growing distress at home, and danger of invasion from Taiwan--with no certainty that the Soviet Union will render them substantial assistance, thus risking a general nuclear war. Thus, even a war between two non-nuclear powers in the furthest corner of Asia was called off lest it gets out of hand.

Between 1939 and 1945 events had to run their way within the rigid framework of war; alternatives to fighting had to remain in abeyance. The present situation is, in a sense, complementary: of all theoretically available ways, only those are rationally open which exclude war. This still leaves open threats of violence, "brinkmanship," local application of force in guerilla campaigns, support of internal subversion--everything "short of war."

Because of this restriction of rational behaviour--and the compulsion to remain rational is more powerful now than it was ever before! --one can expect indefinite prolongation of highly unstable situations--such as that in West Berlin--which would have rapidly led to a war in the past. Such situations will resolve themselves in the long run--but by the general trend of world events, and not by drastic decisions of exasperated military or political leaders.

The same factors that permit lasting "metastable" situations, give a new significance to "accidents"--truly unpredictable small events with disproportionally large consequences.

We know in physics that every "macroscopic" assembly of particles undergoes continuous fluctuations. These are unimportant when the system as a whole is in equilibrium, or in slow transformation. But if the assembly is "metastable"--a physical chemist would say, if only a small "activation barrier" protects it from violent change, a fluctuation may suffice to overcome this barrier. In the nineteen twenties, an underground storage tank, supposedly containing a fertilizer, ammonium nitrate, blew up in Germany with disastrous consequences to the nearby city of Ludwigshafen. It was whispered at that time that the storage room contained a high explosive, concealed from Allied supervision. I do not know whether this suspicion was later confirmed; but the alternative hypothesis was that the allegedly "stable" fertilizer blew up in consequence of a local fluctuation of temperature. Theoretically, this can

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happen--once in a hundred, a thousand or a million years; it is an extremely unlikely, but not an impossible event.

The same is true of human affairs, in which the behaviour of nations sums up the behaviour of millions of individuals. The peculiarity of our time is that, more than ever before, a fluctuation, perhaps caused by the behaviour of only a few individuals, can radically affect world events.

In the past, unpredictable actions of individuals often appeared to have had a decisive effect on world history; but the farther the events receded into the past, the clearer it became that history was shaped by deeper and more ineluctable forces than the will or whim of an individual.

Be it as it may, the accidents which can now upset all predictions, are of an altogether different kind from the past deeds of national or ideological heroes. They do not consist in the possible unleasing, by new leaders, or new political, ideological or religious movements, changing the behaviour of peoples. They are literally "accidents." One can predict, with some degree of certainty, what the American or the Soviet leadership will do under foreseeable circumstances; but one cannot predict for certain whether the commander of a missile crew will suffer a nervous breakdown, or a staff analyst misread an electronic record! Yet, such a mistake could now snowball into a catastrophe out of all proportion to its cause--like an accidental fluctuation of temperature can cause the explosion of a metastable chemical system.

The error of a subaltern will be in most cases corrected by higher authorities; but what about a rash action of these authorities themselves? We have seen in our times how individuals such as Hitler or Stalin with obsessive ideas and a fanaticism close to madness, can gain decisive political influence and command unquestioned obedience of whole nations. Even in democratic countries, where a man of such a mental make-up could not reach the position of supreme authority, momentary mental confusion of an otherwise rational leader remains possible; staff consultations, which would normally correct errors in the judgment of a single man, may be practically impossible under the conditions of a five-minute warning. The strain posed on the President in the face of such a warning could be well-nigh intolerable, and lead to a rash

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decision even on the part of an otherwise deliberate man.

Another possibility, which seems fantastic, but cannot be entirely excluded, has been suggested: the catastrophe of a nuclear war could be provoked by a small nation, or even a group of fanatics, who had come into possession of a nuclear weapon, and exploded it in such a way as to suggest attack by one of the major powers. The authorship of such an explosion will not be easy to establish, if the bomb is planted by an agent, or launched from a submarine! There is a story about an old lady with a cute little fox terrier, who left her pet in the hall of a hotel tied up among ferocious-looking Newfoundland, Alsatians and Big Danes. As soon as the lady left, the terrier bit his neighbor--a Dane-- then jumped over him and bit an Alsatian on the other side. Soon the big animals were at each other's throats. When the lady rushed back, she found her pet whining innocently in a corner, while the other dogs were fighting furiously.

True, such a "catalytic" war is even less probable than an "accidental" one. But according to the theory of probability, the longer one waits, the more likely it is that an improbable thing will happen. How long is it safe to wait on the assumption that a storage tank of ammonium nitrate will not blow up? How long is it safe to assume that the metastable situation of the world abundantly stocked with nuclear weapons will not be upset by an accident, by design of a small group, or provocation of a single man?

Predicting the fate of mankind in the next decades is like predicting the fate of a drunkard who is picking his way along the edge of a precipice, swaying right and left as he goes. If this swaying will not bring him over the edge, one can figure out where and when he will arrive. What will happen if mankind does stumble over the edge of the nuclear precipice, defies all reasonable prediction, even of such intrepid crystal gazers as Herman Kahn or Nevil Shute.

All this is said here to qualify in advance the attempt to predict future events by evaluating the main masses existing and the main forces operating in the world in 1962. All such predictions must be preceded by the proviso, "This is what is likely to happen if no nuclear war breaks out by accident, or

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by willful act of a small group of people."*

Another difficulty of predicting the future now is the uncertainty of the *time scale*. Under the compulsion of war, resistance to change is broken down and events develop at their full intrinsically possible rate. The brakes imposed by the American political system were largely released in wartime. The one-man majority by which the introduction of military service in the United States was decided before the Pearl Harbor attack, was replaced by a one-woman minority in the vote on war declaration after it! In peacetime, even changes widely supported by the people, and consistent with the general trend of historic development, may be delayed for years by general inertia, or by willful opposition of a small minority--witness the civil rights legislation in the United States! Under the pressure of war, Churchill was able to offer common citizenship to England and France in 1940; in peace, European defense integration was voted down by the French parliament, and integration of Great Britain into the European Common Market remains at this writing highly uncertain. Because of this difference, the predictions of things to come in the Second World War could turn out to be approximately correct not only in their *content*, but also in their *schedule*; while in 1962, a prediction of things to come has to be uncertain not only as to *what* may happen, but also as to *when* it might happen--and this often means also whether it will have the chance of happening at all!

A final factor is the possibility of radical innovations in technology. The one wartime development that could have upset the 1939 predictions, was the perfection of the atom bomb. Earlier wars had been fought with weapons known long before their outbreak. In the Second World War, two new weapons appeared during the war itself--the radar, that blunted the German air attack on England, and the atom bomb, that catalyzed the capitulation of Japan. Of these two, radar was already "in the cards" when war started in 1939; but the

* It is worth considering that even a closely averted nuclear catastrophe may have an unpredictable effect. An "anonymous" nuclear explosion, prevented by some safety device (such as the recently proposed direct communication line between the White House and the Kremlin) from unleashing a war, could radically change the mood of nations; it could open the door to the acceptance of a world-policing authority, unthinkable before the incident. (Perhaps, a nuclear explosion "of unknown origin" would be an effective way to break the inertia now frustrating disarmament negotiations! )

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atom bomb had been, in 1939, only a glimmer in the eyes of a few physicists. If the atom bomb had become ready much before 1945, this would have changed the course of the war; and if it had appeared on the German, and not on the Allied side, it could have changed its outcome!

Since 1945, one new technological development has changed the world-wide military picture--the long-range rocket. The H-bomb merely gave greater emphasis to the already deadly threat of the A-bomb; whether an explosive power of 10 megatons or of "only" 100 kilotons TNT can be delivered in a single package, is of no decisive importance; but that this package can be delivered half-way around the globe within a few minutes, does create a new situation indeed!

In the following discussion, the technologically-induced military deadlock is taken to be a lasting state of affairs, not to be upset, within the time to which the discussion applies--say, the next 25 years--by innovations. In fact, the discovery of new *offensive* weapons could do no more than emphasize the deadlock. The discovery of *defensive* weapons, capable to defeat a nuclear missile attack, could upset it--but the assumption here is that such discoveries are unlikely, despite the much-advertised Soviet and American successes in intercepting missiles by missiles. There is all the difference in the world between intercepting a single missile fired at a known time from a known place in a known direction, and intercepting all, or almost all, missiles in an unexpected massive salvo, particularly if it is accompanied by the launching of decoys and interference with radio communications.

## 2. The Main Masses

Let us now consider the main masses and the principal trends at work in the world today.

The big masses of humanity are four: *First*, Western Europe and North America--a total of a half a billion men with the highest-developed science and industry, and with access to largest stores of natural resources of the world. These are peoples who have generated modern science, and who still carry most of its development, both in acquisition of new knowledge and in its application to the needs of mankind. *Second*, the Soviet Union and its European allies--

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a total of about one-third of a billion people, historically closely related and only recently (and incompletely) severed from the Western world, to which they belong by their history and by their past participation in technical and scientific progress. General de Gaulle likes to say that Europe extends from Brest to the Urals; but Europe, in the sense of common civilization and common history, extends around the globe, from Alaska to Kamchatka; the so-called Atlantic community is a large part, but not the whole of it.

The *third* mass of humanity is formed by 600 million Chinese, with their own civilization going back thousands of years. When Churchill called the Soviet Union a "riddle wrapped inside an enigma," he coined a description which applies to China much more than to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is, in essence, Russia--a part and parcel of Western civilization, only clothed into new (Western-made) clothes of a communist society. In China, it is the race itself, and not only its present communist incarnation, which is alien to the Western mind. When we were schoolboys, "world history" was the history of European peoples, interrupted by the Mongol, Turkish and Arab invasions, which could as well have come from Mars, so little we knew (or cared to know) about the history and civilizations which lay behind these eruptions. Much has been written since about these invaders, but familiarity with the East remains, at best, cerebral, with no feeling for the past or future of the close to a billion people of Southeast Asia. Kaiser Wilhelm once pretended to speak for all Europe, when he denounced the "yellow peril" hanging over its future. We know now that the yellow peoples are not a swarm of human locusts ready to consume the thriving fields and cities of the West, but carriers of equally old, if not older, cultures, which have known periods of flourishing, as well as periods of decay, and are capable of creative efforts in material civilization, art, science and political organization, not less impressive than those of the white race; but our understanding of the motivations and yearnings of these peoples remains dim. Communists used to think that they have a key to the understanding of the behaviour of all peoples in the consideration of the stage of their economic development on a universally valid scale. I am not so sure that the Soviet leaders are now satisfied with their understanding of China and its ways, and not worried about

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the turns which China's history may take in its communist phase!

The *fourth* great mass of humanity--also of the order of one billion--is what is now described as "uncommitted nations." These range from the primitive inhabitants of the jungles of Africa or Asia to the sophisticated city people of India and Latin America. Some of them now feel themselves part of the Western world, others are its reluctant allies, still others invoke "plague on both their houses," and some tend to support the communist bloc. Their character and national endowments differ widely; but history has brought them together in a community of "have-nots," latecomers to the feast in which the wealth of the world had been divided between nations first to reach technological maturity. Their common trend is to struggle for independence and viability--both political and economic--and to try not to become pawns in the conflict between the communist East and the libertarian West. Some nations in this group may be temporarily considered as safely in the Western camp--(but we have just seen how precarious this "safety" is in the example of Pakistan! ); others, such as Cuba, as having tied themselves irrevocably to the communist bloc. But only two kinds of truly stable ties exist--the voluntary ties of common interests, and the compulsory ties of military occupation. Neither of the two exist between Karachi and Washington, or between Havana and Moscow.

### 3. The Main Trends in the West

What are the main trends at work in the Western world? They appear rather encouraging. The dark future extrapolated by Marx and Engels for the capitalist economies has been averted, perhaps permanently, and certainly for some time to come, by the break-throughs of the New Deal in the United States, by the creation of the Welfare State in Scandinavia and in Great Britain, and more recent, similar developments in France, Italy and Germany. These reforms have converted industrial workers, the numerically largest class in technologically advanced nations--the class which, according to Marx and Engels, could have no ties of loyalty to the existing society and state--into an increasingly prosperous, and increasingly conservative, part of the nation.

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Stefan Dedjer said that capitalism was saved, in the nick of time, by the scientific revolution. This development can be traced to Henry Ford's assembly line. It made mass production more advantageous to the producer than the making of a small number of luxury items. Large-scale production required a large market, and so created a vested interest of the entrepreneurs in the buying capacity of the laborers. The continuation of a society in which the majority toiled to produce small amounts of goods accessible only to a small minority, became impossible. An industry producing eight million cars a year could not survive if only a few thousand people in the country could afford to buy a car; agriculture able to produce more grain, butter, meat, and eggs than the whole population can consume without overeating, could not exist if the majority of people were reduced to a starvation diet. The same capacity for increased production now makes the foremost Western nations concerned with the increase of the buying power of the under-developed continents--Africa, Asia and South America. What began as a drive to exploit the masses of this "colonial" world, by selling them cheap industrial goods in exchange for valuable raw materials, is being transformed, by ineluctable technological trends, into a drive to convert these masses into consumers of high-grade finished goods and machinery.

It is now possible to see a general trend which the scientific revolution, through the rise of productivity it engenders, imposes on all western societies. It is the trend towards a type of society, which not only provides assistance towards the education, health, and the old-age needs of its citizens, but is also concerned with wide diffusion of consuming power, needed to use fully the growing productive capacities of an industrialized and automated economy. Communist theoreticians grew up--and think they still live--in the time of frenzied competition for external markets between capitalist economies handicapped by insufficient domestic buying capacity. They predicted that this competition will inevitably lead to self-destroying wars among capitalist nations. After the end of the Second World War, Stalin confidently expected the renewal of such internecine capitalist wars. Communist theorists still seize on every sign of sharpened market competition, be it between West

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Germany and England, between the Common Market and the British Common-
wealth, or--above all--between Europe and the United States, hoping that it
will divide the West into warring factions. But the trend of development in
the Western world has switched away from--even if it did not entirely end--
the contest for external markets. To the great disarray of communist theore-
ticians, the economic conflicts within the "capitalist world" are being patched up
again and again, and collaboration replaces competition on an increasingly wide
scale.

Present attempts to set up the Common Market as a protectionist area
to the exclusion of Great Britain and the United States, are new water on the
mills of the communist dogmatists; but these attempts are contrary to the general
trend towards integration of world economics, imposed by the scientific revolu-
tion, and can only delay but not stop this development.

The Western world moves in our time towards integration rather than
fragmentation; towards the spreading of prosperity within each nation rather
than sharpening of class differences; towards more enlightened international
economic policies--helping underdeveloped countries to become economically
viable--rather than perpetuation of a captive-market status of colonial spheres
of influence.

This trend is not uniform, and many local differences slow down or
endanger it. A part of Western industrial leadership still lives in the psychology
of the late nineteenth century, and considers its own immediate economic ad-
vantages the only "realistic" aims of national policy. The attitude of the United
States towards the Cuban revolution is a good example of such narrow-mindedness.
It was influenced by financial and industrial interests, which feared Cuba's trans-
formation from a one-crop dependency of American capital, into a country with
more varied and viable economy. Instead of offering the immense American
economic and political power in support of this transformation, as the United
States are doing elsewhere (where the primary capitalist interests are European),
the United States grudgingly opposed it, by economic boycott and support of
attempts to dislodge the new regime. The regime was thus pushed into alliance
with the Soviet Union.

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What are the chances of this mistake becoming the pattern for future relations between the United States and Latin America? This future is dark and dangerous--and one or several upheavals of Cuban type are likely to happen. One can hope, however, that the Cuban affair will prove the last error of an obsolete policy, rather than the preview of future and graver mistakes. The weakness of American military intervention in Cuba was itself suggestive of moribund half-heartedness. The time of marine landings in banana republics is over; the more constructive policies in Latin America--the Good Neighbor policy of the Roosevelt era and the Alliance for Progress of the present administration--are likely to be more relevant to the future. The rapid population growth in South America, which calls for a particularly rapid acceleration of production to overtake it, is a more difficult obstacle on the path of a "new deal" on a continent-wide scale, than the power of American capitalist groups dreaming of puppet regimes in Latin America!

Altogether, if Western Europe and North America were left alone in the world, they could now be expected to progress slowly towards political and economic integration and increasingly widely diffused prosperity. But they are not alone.

### 4. The Main Trends in the Soviet Union

What of the trends of development in the Soviet Union? There is a lot of unnecessary discussion going on as to whether the Soviet policy is a continuation of the historic limited expansionist policies of the Russian Empire, or the policy of an international ideological group, only utilizing the resources and manpower of Russia to pursue a world-wide unlimited revolutionary program. The answer, of course, is that this policy has both roots, and that their relative importance is shifting with time. The present leaders, represented by Nikita Khrushchev, are the "children of the civil war," with little or no formal education. This background of the ruling elite gives continued strength to naive ideological commitment; but the next generation, now approaching power, which has learned ideology from books and lectures and not from personal

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participation in the revolution, is much more pragmatic. It is inevitable that for them, this commitment becomes a matter of formal belief more than of living faith--somewhat comparable with the commitment of the Western world to Christianity and political democracy, rather than with the ardor of Crusaders of the Middle Ages, of Moslems at the time of the siege of Constantinople--or even of Hitler's SS in the early years of the Third Reich. There is in the Soviet Union no, or not much, questioning of the communist dogma, but neither is there much willingness to sacrifice oneself, not to speak of one's whole country, on its altar.

Every ideological upheaval in history had started with a fanatical belief in the newly proclaimed truth--be it Christendom, Islam, or Communism. In every case, the fanaticism subsided with time, even if the ideological system remained formally untouched. Economic and political growth created vested interests--collective ones in a newly developed political and economic establishment, and individual ones in the security and status of the members of the new ruling class and their families. The "Communist Manifesto" said that the proletariat has nothing to lose but its chains; but the Soviet leadership, from the Kremlin down to the directors of factories and chairmen of the provincial economic councils, now have a lot to lose, and are disinclined to take the risk of losing it.

For one who did watch the Soviet press and literature from 1917 to 1962, the change is unmistakable. "Anti-American" articles in the "Pravda" now talk about racial iniquities in the American South, the smog in Los Angeles, the venality of police in big cities, or the difficulty of making ends meet experienced by underprivileged groups of Americans--the things which any social critic, and particularly one from a politically alienated foreign country, is bound to emphasize. Gone are stories about American working men dying by the thousands of hunger in the gutters of New York City, while fat millionaires feast on caviar and champagne in luxurious night clubs. Instead of denouncing the degradation of art in America, there is much tentative imitation ("Soviet jazz"), and full-throated enthusiasm for visiting American artists, dancers and actors. Among Soviet and American scientists, there is mutual respect,

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and considerable coincidence of general attitudes. There is not much left of the original revolutionary mentality of absolute good in conflict with absolute "evil," of a crusading revolution on the way to conquest--whatever may be written by communist theologians in their theoretical exercises, or by newspaper hacks in their editorial diatribes.

While the commitment of the Soviet Union to a world-wide communist revolution is gradually decreasing--not so much in vociferousness, as in virulence--its commitment to the traditional national values of Russia is growing. Already before the Second World War, Stalin found it advisable to invoke Russian nationalism in support of his foreign policy. He restored the continuity of Russian history before and after the revolution, in complete reversal of Lenin's attitude after the revolution. During the war, this patriotic aspect of the conflict was stressed much more than the ideological one. It was fought above all as a "great fatherland war" for defense of Russian soil against Teuton conquerors, and only secondarily as an ideological war against capitalism. The first new monument erected in Moscow after the war was dedicated to Prince Jury Dolgoruky, the founder of Muscovite power in the thirteenth century!

When the war ended victoriously, and large territories of Eastern Europe found themselves under Russian military occupation, the temptation to establish communist regimes in these captive territories was too strong to be resisted. Here was a unique chance to create ideologically-bound military allies, to protect Soviet Union from the West by a "cordon sanitaire" in reverse. Only political naivete made some Americans hope at that time that the Soviet Union will patiently wait for peace treaties, where it could create faits accomplis; that it would respect free elections in the occupied territories, while it did not respect them at home!

It has been repeatedly reported that Stalin looked forward to a new war with the West after the recovery of the Soviet Union from the damages of the Second World War; but it is very doubtful whether, even if Stalin had been alive today, military aggression would have been on the political agenda of the Soviet Union, as it had been on that of Hitler's Germany. The Russian people were ready to fight and die on behalf of their fatherland in the "great patriotic war,"

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but not likely to follow the leader in fighting an aggressive war for the greater
glory of communism!

The question is: how far, by now, did this evolution progress? Are
paroxysms of renewed fanaticism possible--a new Lenin proclaiming a com-
plete break with the past, a second Trotsky declaring Russia a match good
enough to light the fire of the world revolution, and leading a Red Army onward
to the West, another Dzershinsky commanding a fanatical Cheka?

All that can be said is that the probability of such reverse "fluctuations"
in the overall trend of the Soviet society is small. Even in the absence of con-
stitutional guarantees, or of freedom of political debate, the mood of the nation--
including the most vital elements in its communist leadership--will act as a
brake on attempts to return to extremes of terroristic rule and reckless foreign
policy.

The more successful the Soviet economy, the higher the standard of
living of the Soviet people, the greater will be the national concern with the
preservation of these achievements and with further improvement of life con-
ditions. *L'appétit vient en mangeant.* The American public opinion and political
leadership have never yet made it clear to themselves whether to consider
economic advancement of the Soviet Union a "good" or a "bad" thing. Of course,
it is both: It is bad in that it strengthens a potential adversary, biologically
and physically; it is good in that it makes this adversary more contented and
hopeful, and less likely to risk losing his achievements in a desperate gamble;
in my opinion, the second consideration far outweighs the first.

From this point of view, there is no reason for rejoicing in the obvious
failure of Soviet agriculture to match the progress of industry. Of course, it
is a satisfaction to Americans to see confirmed, on a continental scale, their
widespread belief that productive agriculture requires personal concern of an
individual farmer with the land he tills--that agriculture is best served by a
strong and prosperous farmer class. In the Epilogue to "Dr. Zhivago" a
spokesman for the author says that everybody in the Soviet Union knows that
collectivization of agriculture was a failure, but nobody dares to say it and
to act accordingly. If the Soviet Union could follow Poland in reversing

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collectivization, much--but not all! --of its agricultural troubles would
probably disappear. However, the socialization of agriculture in the Soviet
Union, as contrasted to that in Poland, probably has passed the point of no
return. It is most likely that the Soviet Union will not abandon collectivized
agriculture, but experiment with its reorganization, and increase investments
in it, until it works halfway satisfactorily. We in the West must hope that--
whether by abandoning the collectivized system of agriculture, or by making it
work--the Soviet Union will get over the imbalance of its present economic
situation, in which forty-five percent of its population work in considerable
poverty to provide the other fifty-five percent with a rather monotonous diet.
(In the United States, seven percent of total population provide the country with
an overabundance of proteins, fats, fruits, and vegetables!) This would further
increase the peaceful "have" psychology of the Soviet people, and make its
leadership less likely to engage in reckless policies.

To sum up: The *masses* standing behind the Soviet world-political
drive are large, both in numbers and in technological equipment; but the *forces*
that drive them towards aggressive policies are weaker than is widely believed
in America, and are growing weaker with time.

Whether the trend towards the lessening of ideological fanaticism, and
growth of an economically viable society will be coupled in the Soviet Union
with a trend towards political liberalization, is less certain. By their very
nature, totalitarian political systems have great difficulty in evolving towards
greater spiritual and political freedom. In all likelihood, the political evolution
of the Soviet state will not be smooth. As earthquakes are needed from time to
time in the evolution of distorted earth layers towards a more stable equilibrium,
so political earthquakes may be inevitable in the stabilization of a political
system originally formed in the volcanic eruption of a social revolution, followed
by rapid crystallization of the molten lava. It is, however, not to be expected
that these upheavals will be directed against the fundamentals of the Soviet social
and economic order, which popular masses have gradually accepted, and now
have no intense motivation to change. The upsets will be within the system,
affecting the ruling political groups and personalities, but not the basic structure

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of the society.

In the past, Soviet leadership has been unable to carry out any political
liberalization plans, because as soon as opposition was permitted to raise its
head, it became an opposition to the regime as such. For this reason the
"Stalin Constitution" with its democratic provisions, remained (and still
largely remains) a sham. Similarly, Chinese attempt to "let thousand flowers
bloom" quickly revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the communist regime
as such, and had to be abruptly terminated.

With the growing prosperity of various economic groups in the Soviet
society, the path is being opened for opposition trends within the system,
clamoring for an independent role in the determination of national affairs. The
system of "democratic centralism," which permitted--and still permits--
dispute only within the party councils, but requires absolute discipline once
party leadership had spoken, has survived in the atmosphere of permanent
danger to the regime as such; with this threat gone, the compulsion not to fight
for one's ideas (and group interests) outside the secret party conclaves, must
weaken. Within the next ten or fifteen years, the Soviet leadership will have to
accommodate itself to the existence of some forms of opposition, and the need
to create legal forms in which these groups could operate.

## 5. Europe and the Underdeveloped Continents

The main trends within the two super-powers, the United States and
the USSR, point towards cautious relaxation. This eases, but does not end,
the dangerous state of affairs in areas where the interests of these two super-
powers clash. The crises in these areas do not create the metastability of the
world situation, which follows from the very existence of large stocks of nuclear
arms; but they make this metastability more dangerous, in that human failures
or technological accidents can be particularly critical at the height of a political
conflict, such as the world has experienced in October 1962 over Cuba. It
depends very largely on the policies of the two super-powers how far the "back-
ground" of the US-USSR relations will be kept from the blowup point. De facto,

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both sides have entered, since Cuba, into a cooling-down period; but so far, no deliberate decision has been made to stabilize it and to put all local conflicts into a "deep freeze." This decision is mostly up to the US, because--at least as far as Europe is concerned--the West is the "revisionist" (the Soviet speakers like to call it "revanchist") side, while the Soviet Union is the satiated and therefore conservative side. The stabilization of West European economies since the Marshall Plan has put an end to plans of the Soviet Union to further revise in its own favor the political map of Europe: since that time, Soviet aspirations have become concentrated on holding on to what has been acquired. The exposed position of West Berlin is being used by the Soviet Union to exert pressure on the West for formal recognition of its acquisitions--of Soviet annexations in the Baltic and East Prussia, of the Oder-Neisse border between Poland and Germany, and of a second, communist German state. The US could have decided on such recognition soon after the war--and it may have been the wise thing to do; but the Acheson-Dulles policy was to keep the situation in Eastern Europe as unsettled and uncomfortable for the Soviet Union as possible, in the expectation of a political upheaval there--while at the same time refusing American military support, without which such upheavals had to go the way of the East German uprising of 1953 and of the Hungarian revolution of 1956.

In recent years, greater dependence of the US on its Western European allies, by now restored to their full economic, if not military, power, makes it increasingly difficult for the US to do what it may now recognize as advisable--to recognize the *de facto* frontiers and regimes in Eastern Europe. It is therefore to be expected that instead of decisive abandonment of all support for revisionist aspirations in Europe, the US will continue to extend only grudgingly, step by step, its *de facto* recognition of the *status quo*, thus keeping the political temperature in Europe dangerously hot. This continued tension will become increasingly dangerous with time. The present asymmetry of nuclear threats from the East and the West, which has lead to the American victory over Cuba, is bound to disappear through increase in the number of American and Soviet hardened missile bases at home and invulnerable rocket launchers on submarines, thus devaluing the present advantages to America of its advanced

18.

European and Asian bases and of its now unique Polaris-armed underwater fleet. With the threat of a first nuclear strike becoming equally plausible (or rather, equally implausible!) on both sides, crises of brinkmanship could be increasingly risky, because both sides will become as unwilling to retire from the brink as the US had been in the Cuba conflict. The game of "chicken" may thus go on longer, and the danger of an "accidental" war increase in proportion.

Will internal developments in the countries of Western and Eastern Europe permit the stabilization of the present order of things in Europe?

In Western Europe, critical upsets are unlikely. Upheavals such as a communist election victory in Italy, or a new nationalist wave in Western Germany, or a popular front revolution in France, are nowhere in sight, and progressive economic and political integration, increasing the viability of Western Europe, is indicated. The greatest single obstacle to this integration--de Gaulle's belief in France's mission of leading Europe with, or preferably and hopefully including Russia, without Great Britain, towards conversion into a third world power, beside the US and China --is not rooted in common feelings of European masses, and is likely to disappear with the end of his personal rule, be it in five or in ten years. The delay in Britain joining the Common Market is prolonged by this attitude, and this may cause a revulsion of British opinion against it--but ultimately, Britain has nowhere else to go. That England "does not belong to Europe," was--and still is--a British conception; Europeans have always been bewildered and, to some extent, amused, by Englishmen asserting that British Isles are not a part of Europe. If in Britain itself, the outward pull of the Empire in its much attenuated "Commonwealth" form, fails to sustain the traditional "insular"--or, rather, "oceanic"--psychology, European resistance to British association based, as it is in de Gaulle's case, on personal mystique and irrational resentment, more than on rational considerations, will not be prolonged or effective. British association with Europe is one of the inevitable things which can be long delayed under peacetime conditions, but are bound to come sooner or later.

Stabilization and progressive integration are much less certain in Eastern

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Europe. In this area, two trends are in conflict. One is the trend, parallel to that in Soviet Russia itself, towards the acceptance of the now existing social and economic order, of permanent association with the Soviet Union in a communist commonwealth, and gradual evolution towards greater independence, and a certain internal liberalization, within this association. This way is beset with difficulties. In the countries of Eastern Europe, opposition to the ruling party groups is still apt to explode, as it did in Hungary, into opposition to the system as such, and therefore cannot be tolerated by communist leadership.

It is logical to presume that, in the long run, the countries of Eastern Europe will free themselves from their present subservience to Moscow; but the possibility of this liberation occurring by peaceful changes within the system, not provoking Soviet military intervention, is problematical. In some countries, such as Bulgaria and Rumania--perhaps, also in Czechoslovakia--which have had only a limited tradition of national independence, and a long tradition of pro-Russian attitudes--the development may follow that in the Soviet Union itself, with the economic system becoming increasingly acceptable to the people, and a certain liberalization occurring without threat to the survival of the system. Chances for such a transformation are much smaller in nations with strong nationalist and anti-Russian traditions, such as Poland and Hungary.

Poland, in particular, is tied to the Soviet commonwealth primarily by the support it needs against German revisionism. Western recognition of the Neisse-Oder border and decisive opposition to any German plans to upset it, could weaken this tie dangerously, and put an end to Polish commitment to support the East German regime. Poland, similarly to Yugoslavia, could then regain considerable freedom of action. The Soviet Union, in continuation of its present trend, may not oppose this process, but accommodate itself to it, as long as it does not upset the _strategic_ balance in Europe. (The fateful error of the Hungarian revolutionary regime was to announce its quitting the Warsaw military pact!)

The greatest communist headache in Europe is, of course, East Germany. Lavrenty Beria, Stalin's last terrorist-in-chief, recognized the difficulty of keeping one third of the German nation tied up in a communist dependency, and

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advocated its release from Russian grip. Beria's downfall, which followed the Berlin uprising of June 1953, closed this avenue of retreat. The soviet Union drifted into the position of the proverbial bear hunter who had caught a bear, but could not bring it home, because the bear did not want to go, and could not come home himself because the bear did not let him go. There is very little chance of the DDR becoming a viable German state, standing on its own legs and accepted by its population (as independent Austria has become accepted after the experience of the Auschluss under Hitler). It is more likely to remain indefinitely a bleeding sore in the body of the communist alliance, a "sick man" of Eastern Europe. The "operation Berlin" has for the Soviet Union the one purpose to prop up, by foreign recognition, the shaky DDR.

Gradually, step by step, this operation is likely to succeed--because the West is unable to support "revisionist" aims of West Germany by force, and will have to accommodate itself grudgingly to the *de facto* existence of the DDR as price for continuation of the independent status of West Berlin. However, even full diplomatic recognition of the DDR would provide only a momentary shot-in-the-arm for this communist rump state, and would increase only temporarily the malleability of its population. One has merely to imagine how the problem of migration from Eastern into Western Germany will appear after the recognition of the DDR, and the consequent loosening of its border controls! The best policy for the West would be to press for the implementation of the Soviet proposals for a "confederation" between the two Germanys. The DDR would not be able to survive such a confederation, which would require, at the very least, freedom of travel, newspaper and book circulation, and other exchanges between the two confederated states. The confederation program, like the program of "complete and universal disarmament," should have been a fighting program of the libertarian West, and not of the totalitarian East!

Continued existence of unstable communist states in Eastern Europe, particularly of DDR, is bound to delay political and economic stabilization and relaxation of tensions in Europe, and repeated "fluctuations" in the area will bring the West and Soviet Union into "brinkmanship" situations. However, since neither of the two sides will be ever in the position of deciding "to get over with

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it" by the test of arms, these fluctuations will end in the same way in which almost all fluctuations end in nature--a return to *status quo ante*. At least, that is what one has to expect under the assumption underlying this analysis--that the major trends of events will not be overturned by accidents or irrational acts of small groups.

Since future displays of brinkmanship will not lead to anything except periods of dangerous instability, it would be wise policy for both sides to renounce all political gambits likely to lead to such situations; and instead, to collaborate in the stabilization of the *status quo*, either openly or--as long as this proves impossible for reasons of domestic policies--at least, *de facto*. How much--if any--of this political wisdom will be shown by the West or by Moscow, one cannot predict; but the ultimate result remains the same: The only alternative to the catastrophe of an unwanted nuclear war, is preservation of the existing political map of Europe, and the only change the West can reasonably expect there, is slow evolution of the countries of Eastern Europe to a more independent and open status. It is conceivable that, at a certain stage of this evolution, Moscow will be willing to let the DDR go as a heavy drag on its own security, perhaps by pushing it into a confederation with Western Germany--despite the knowledge that such a confederation is likely to go the way the German confederation went in 1966--becoming the first step towards a unified German state, dominated by its strongest component, Prussia then and FRG now.

## 6. Underdeveloped Countries

Are there any other areas of conflict which may endanger the process of gradual accommodation between the US and the USSR? It is most likely that, whether the Cuban communist state survives or not, other areas in South America--Venezuela, Peru, Brazil, or some smaller Latin American state--will experience, in the next two decades, violent social upheavals. I believe, however, that the Soviet Union, while sympathetic to these upheavals, will stay out of direct intervention--and that the US will do the same, so that these revolutions will be given the chance to find their own way. The result is likely to be

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a radical, but pragmatic reform; a national rather than a Soviet-type brand of socialism. The US could, of course, oppose these revolutions by ineffective interventions, similar to the one attempted in Cuba, and thus push the revolutionary regimes into the arms of the Soviet Union; this seems "against the trend" of American policies, but great American private investments in South America may exert a powerful "backward pressure" on this trend. Therefore, events in Latin America are the most likely source of critically dangerous world situations in the next quarter century.

The situation is not so dangerous in Africa, because there, American vested interests are much smaller, and the possibility of such interests upsetting a rational and enlightened policy is less. It is much easier for the US to act rationally when the threatened investments are English or Belgian, and not American!

In Asia, the opposing forces of the West and the Soviet Union stand already now in the shadow of China. The conflict between the two present super-powers over, say, Iraq, Iran, or Turkey could have led to war between 1945 and 1960; but, luckily, it did not. In future, both sides will have an increased interest in keeping this part of the world stable, to avoid provoking Chinese interference. The danger of Chinese intervention has permitted the patching-up of the East-West conflict even in remote Laos, on the very door-step of China. Disregarding Chinese intervention is still possible now, but may become impossible, 10 or 20 years hence, anywhere in Asia.

To sum up, the big masses of the Soviet Union and the United States are not now on a violent collision course in any of the conflict areas in Europe or Asia; and may enter into collision only as a result of unexpectedly reckless policy on one or the other side--the most dangerous potential source of such collision being Latin America. It is in the mutual interest of the US and the USSR to convert their present *de facto* community of interests in general stability into a common, established policy, to "cool down" the hot climate of their relations, and reduce the danger of a small fluctuation destroying the precarious peace between them.

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7. China

China is the great puzzle of the future. Two major trends are obviously at work there: the Messianic drive of a "young" communist movement, whose leaders think that the mantle of revolutionary world leadership has descended on them; and the pressure of an already enormous and rapidly growing population. Together, they create a potent aggressive force, acting on an immense mass of people.

The Chinese revolution is obviously "out of phase" with the Soviet revolution. Whether it will go through the same cycle, and ultimately lead to the same type of stable society, we do not know; but at present, the difference between these two communist empires is getting wider, as the Soviet Union settles into a (relatively) prosperous and relaxed existence, while China goes through its leanest years of hunger and destitution, stimulating the revolutionary fervor and permitting no relaxation of iron discipline within its leading elite.

This phase difference puts a great strain on Chino-Soviet relations, exacerbated by the patronizing attitude of the more "mature" Russians, and the racial pride of the Chinese, conscious of representing a much longer cultural tradition than the white nations—including Russia—and long smarting under the semi-colonial treatment by the latter. The bond of ideological brotherhood between the two communist empires is obviously close to snapping, and each of the two is ready to go its own ways. The separation could be gradual, repeatedly masked by the cloak of a continuing formal alliance concealing the truth of political estrangement. The Chinese could remain satisfied with the acceptance of their leadership by the communist parties in South-East Asia, and not interfere with Soviet leadership of the communist movements in the rest of the world. However, already the case of Albania suggests that such tacit division of communist "spheres of influence" is not likely. "Internal Chinese" exist in many communist parties in Europe and elsewhere, and Chinese leadership is unlikely to renounce exploiting them to extend its influence. The Soviet leadership cannot let this happen, if for no other reason, than because its own "Chinese faction" is not negligible. It is therefore most likely that in

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the next few years--perhaps after additional attempts to patch the differences up by new international gatherings, such as the one that was held in Moscow in November 1960--the communist movement will openly split, and a Chinese-led "Fourth (or Fifth?) Internationale" will follow the Moscow-sponsored third one. Who is likely to follow Peking in this break?

It is rather safe to predict that the communist movements in Western Europe will stay with Moscow. The laboring classes in Europe are growing increasingly prosperous and conservative and this imposes an increasingly cautious and reformistic policy on European communist parties--particularly mass-membership parties, such as those in Italy, France, or Finland. The "Chinese" faction is stronger in the Soviet Union, and in some East European countries, where life is much harder, and communist dogmatism therefore finds more numerous adherents. (Although apparently more among intellectuals, such as the theoreticians from the Marx-Engels Institute in Moscow, than among unions and practical administrators.) Acceptance of Chinese slogans of inevitable violent world revolution is unlikely--at least, in the foreseeable future--also in the new countries of Africa, where the revolutionary spirit is channeled primarily into nationalism, and where truly "proletarized" population masses, susceptible to anti-capitalist fanaticism, do not exist. The situation may be different in South America, or at least in certain parts of it, where a genuinely revolutionary leadership can find more susceptible human material. These revolutionary masses consist of impoverished peasantry rather than of industrial proletariat; but after all, similar disgruntled peasant masses had brought about the success of the bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917! Disappointed in Soviet leadership since its retreat from Cuba, these masses may be ready to follow the Chinese banners; perhaps mediated by Cuba.

Chinese communist society is still in the "incubation" period, similar to the 1920-1933 period in Soviet history. After the failure of first over-optimistic Soviet attempts to carry the communist revolution westward on the bayonet tips of Soviet soldiers, and to organize Comintern-sponsored armed uprising such as the Max Hölz insurrection in Central Germany in 1921, the

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Soviet revolution withdrew into itself, to "build communism in one country." It reappeared on the world stage 25 years later, in the Second World War, in

possession of an enormous military establishment and of a vast production apparatus--but minus much of its original revolutionary élan.

When Mao Tse-tung and Khrushchev fight each other with quotations from Lenin, the Chinese leader has a more convincing case--the present Chinese policy is closer to Soviet policy in the early period of the revolution, than is the Soviet policy after Stalin's death. But, as marxism preaches, Das Sein bestimmt das Bewusstsein--and the reality of existence of the Soviet Union has changed radically since the early twenties! Is the same change of "Sein," and thus also of "Bewusstsein" in store for China?

The failure of the "great leap forward" had demonstrated--what should have been obvious from the beginning--that China could not compress 20 years of Soviet development into 5 years of its own, and thus combine large industrial power with intact revolutionary fervor. Considering the much weaker original technological and scientific level of pre-revolutionary China compared to pre-revolutionary Russia, it is to be expected that it will take China more time than it did Russia to become an advanced industrial power! If Russian physicists could catch up with the wartime development of nuclear arms in the US (which itself took about five years) in about six years, a similar achievement should take China ten. (The first Chinese atom bombs would then make their appearance not before 1965.) But however long it may take, one must prudently assume that within two or three decades, the Chinese leadership--if it avoids premature military showdowns (such as it seemed for a while to seek in India)--will emerge in possession of a military and industrial power of the same order of magnitude as that of the other major world powers.

The Korean war and the brief Himalayan campaign made it clear that the Chinese communists have already succeeded in building up an effective military machine. This is natural: even in democratic countries, military machines are hierarchical organizations, based on absolute obedience and elementary indoctrination--mechanisms which a totalitarian regime is quite competent to create and handle. Trotsky, and the czarist generals mobilized

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by him, built up an effective Red Army in Russia at the time when administra-
tion, industry, transportation, agriculture, education and science were still
in a state of collapse and anarchy. Heavy industry was the next area of
national endeavour that proved, in Russia, to be susceptible of rapid develop-
ment under centralized leadership. The area of economic activity that has
shown itself, in all Eastern Europe, most refractive to centralized leadership,
is agriculture--because it is still largely a primitive art, requiring much in-
dividual instinct, insight and devotion.

Here, a parting of ways seems to announce itself between communist
China and communist Russia. The Soviet Union had let agriculture mark time--
if not go to the dogs--while frenziedly building up heavy industry. To provide
the army and the industrial workers with a minimum of food, the regime re-
sorted to mass terror in the villages, to the "extermination of the Kulaks as
a class." (All prosperous and independent peasants were relegated to this class.)
The Chinese, after the failure of an even more ambitious attempt to make a
"great leap forward" in industrialization, and even more frenzied establishment
of land communes, made a turnabout and decided to give highest priority to the
development of agriculture, letting heavy industry "mark time." Two results
are conceivable: The first is that this deviation from the royal road to commu-
nism through development of heavy industry, will prove as short-lived as has
been the NEP (New Economic Policy) proclaimed by Lenin in 1921. The other
alternative is for the concentration on agriculture and consumer industries to
become serious and long-lasting. In this second case the Chinese communism
may become bogged down, and perhaps even gradually transform itself into the
"agrarian reformism," for which some Americans have once taken it. This
course would make the development of communist China quite different from that
of Soviet Russia; it could be considered in better agreement with the greater
predominance of peasantry in China, even in comparison with the also pre-
dominantly agricultural pre-revolutionary Russia; it would be also much more
desirable from the Western point of view. However, the first alternative
appears more likely. Continuing pre-occupation with their own agricultural
problems would make it practically impossible for Chinese communists to

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sustain their drive for world-wide revolutionary leadership--even in countries (such as Brazil) where land-hungary peasants constitute the main revolutionary material. Therefore, it is more likely that after a pause of a few years, Chinese leadership will again concentrate on heavy industrialization. If this will be the case, communist China may emerge onto the arena of "big politics," in 20 or 30 years, in the possession of a powerful military establishment, including nuclear weapons, and of a vast industrial machine, but with agricultural production still lagging behind. How much of its revolutionary élan will be still alive, we do not know; but its population pressure is bound to remain and grow.

There are many who predict that Chinese population pressure will exert itself above all in the direction of the more thinly populated lands beyond the Chinese frontiers to the North West--Mongolia, Siberia and Russian Turkestan; and that this land hunger may even lead to military aggression, as it did in the case of Japan. One can even envisage an alliance between revolutionary China and Japan in pushing the white man out of North East Asia to give more living space for the yellow man. The present Japanese prosperity, after the loss of all its overseas possessions and captive markets, is a dangerously unstable "miracle" and likely to be replaced, sooner or later, by renewed struggle for greater "Lebenstraum." Soviet political experts must worry about this possibility. However, one has to consider that by the time China will be at all capable of active power politics, the nuclear armaments of the Soviet Union will be even stronger than they are now. It is easy to say--and still easier to repeat--that China, with its now 700 million, and by then close to a billion inhabitants, will be able to risk, and survive, the loss of several hundred millions of them in a nuclear war; but this is plain nonsense. China's economy is as vulnerable to the kind of nuclear attack made possible by thermonuclear weapons, as that of any other country; and with growing industrialization, this vulnerability will increase. Thermonuclear weapons are even now capable of covering all China with deadly radioactive fall-out, and inflict intolerable damage to its economic viability. An expansionist Chinese drive will have to seek outlets in directions in which no certainty of powerful nuclear opposition may exist. This could be the case in South East Asia (Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines,

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Indonesia, Australia), Central Asia (India, Pakistan), or South West Asia (Iran, Iraq)--unless expansion in this direction is blocked by equal certainty of nuclear reaction.

It was suggested at the beginning of this paper, that the *time scale* of possible happenings may well determine which of them will have the chance to happen at all. The question whether China's population pressure will have a chance to expand towards the South and South West, depends on whether by the time China becomes strong enough, militarily and technologically, to exert this pressure, the West and the Soviet Union will have arrived at a general accommodation. In the face of combined opposition of the West and the USSR, Chinese expansion into Southern Asia certainly will be impossible; but if the nuclear power of the West will be neutralized at that time by Russian nuclear power, such expansion may become possible. China could foster revolutionary movements in certain Asian countries--in Burma or Malaya, in Iran or Pakistan--and the West may be unable to oppose these movements militarily (as it does now in Viet Nam), because of Soviet threat of intervention.

The two trends--the drawing together of the two present major "have" powers--the US (and Western Europe) and the USSR, and the growth of the revolutionary "have not" power, China, run in competition. If--as I believe more likely--the US-USSR accommodation will be achieved first, spurred as it is by the common apprehension of China--then Chinese expansionism, despite its twin moving forces of population pressure and of a (at least, at the present time) still virulent revolutionary fervor, will be forced to mark time, until communist China, too, will have gone the way of other revolutionary movements, settling into some kind of a stable society, with a new ruling class and an overriding interest in its own preservation. But the US and the USSR leaderships should better hurry to comprehend the challenge, and act in time to meet it!

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8. Disarmament

One may wonder why the word "disarmament" has not yet occurred
in this presentation. Is not the arms race generally supposed to be the greatest
threat to peace? Is not the danger of war by misunderstanding or technical
accident the consequence of the arms race; and is not disarmament--in
particular, nuclear disarmament--the only way to eliminate this danger?
Is not disarmament the first area in which the US and the USSR have common
interest, and a chance of mutual accommodation?

This is logical--and yet it disregards the impossibility of separating
military from political programs. As long as nations pursue conflicting power
policies, they will not be able to end competitive armament drives. The current
wide awareness of the enormous costs and deadly dangers of the nuclear arms
race, which is common to all peoples, and has communicated itself to all
governments, has led to almost continuous disarmament negotiations. These
went on, with brief interruptions, for the last fifteen years; but without success.
The awareness of common danger could not change the stark but simple fact
that disarmament remained--and still remains--impossible without previous
(or at least simultaneous) political settlement! The disarmed state (as well
as the state of "stabilized nuclear deterrence" or "arms control" aimed at by
some American theoreticians), are states of equal military status of both
sides; this equality cannot be accepted by the two competitors except in
combination with an equality of political status. This the West refuses to give
to Soviet Russia, and will continue refusing as long as it considers the
Soviet political aim to be the West's destruction.

Certain partial agreements, such as that on cessation of nuclear tests, or on overall limitation of armed forces, can and probably will be reached, and may produce dangerous euphoria, "hallelujah, peace is come"; but such partial successes will not change the fundamental fact of our time--that the major nations possess the means for sudden and complete destruction of all other nations. They will not end--although they may moderate--the critical metastability of the world situation.

30.

The only possibility of a substantial slow-down, or complete elimi-
nation, of the arms race, lies in a world-wide political settlement; political
warfare must be ended first, for the arms race to end, too. As between the
US and the USSR, common interests in stabilization of the political set-up in
the world are so strong--compared to their interests in winning more power
at the expense of each other--that _in abstracto_ such a world-wide settlement
appears possible. However, the recognition of this community of interests of
the two successful super-powers of our time is as yet dim, and in many leading
groups, altogether nonexistent. The approach to _de facto_ stabilization is there-
fore likely to be, particularly on the American side, tentative and grudging,
rather than radical and whole-hearted. Under these conditions, far-reaching
disarmament agreements are not in the cards for the next two decades. What
the world can hope for is, that after a decade of _de facto_ absence of acute
political crises between the USSR and the West, and with increased East-West
cooperation in various technical and economic areas, the endless frustrating,
all-or-nothing disarmament negotiations will yield place to a succession of
partial agreements, ultimately ending in a significant reduction of armaments.
However, even this delayed and gradual progress may be by then endangered
by the great question mark of the growing military might of China.

9. Revolutions Ahead ?

Another sceptic may ask: and what about new revolutionary forces
that may arise in the next ten or twenty years? So much conscious and sub-
conscious expectation is alive in the West that the "unnatural, " "godless,"
"tyrannical" communist systems are going to be upset, one day, by the uprising
of their own masses, disappointed in their yearnings for political freedom and
economic prosperity! And, symmetrically, so much conscious and subconscious
expectation survives in the communist states that one day, laboring masses of
the West will rise against the iniquities of the capitalist system. It appears,
however, that both expectations are unreasonable, at least as far as the next
quarter of a century is concerned. No political or economic system collapses

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unless it first shows itself incapable of ruling or producing effectively, and
unable to maintain the active support of an energetic minority, and tacit
acceptance by the mass of the population. Neither the Western system in the
US and Western Europe, nor the communist system in the Soviet Union, shows
signs of such internal decay. Both operate effectively in the technological and
economic areas--whether the production growth is at the rate of 3, 5 or 8 per-
cent annually, is not important, as long as it is *growth*. Both are able to main-
tain enthusiastic support of the most active minority, and acceptance of politically
inactive majority. Both seem to show the characteristic which is as decisive
for a viable society as for a viable individual organism--the capacity of ad-
justing itself, to cope with new conditions of existence.

Since the new conditions of life are imposed by the scientific revolution,
and are therefore largely the same on both sides of the iron curtain, these
adaptive changes are largely parallel, and increase the similarities rather
than accentuate the contrasts, between the two societies. I do not suggest,
as do some analysts, that the US and the USSR are bound to become more and
more similar; the difference in the hierarchy of societal values remains funda-
mental, and cannot be erased even by twenty years of technological revolution.
The West is committed to a value hierarchy which places individual achieve-
ment, individual freedom and individual satisfaction above service of an in-
dividual to society; the Soviet Union is committed to a reverse order of
priorities. Both value systems seem to be able to support a viable, growing
society, although certain efforts prosper better in one and others in the other
type of society. To those who may suggest that the difference is small, I would
answer with the famous remark "vive la différence," with which a French deputy
answered the arguments of a violent feminist minimizing the differences between
the two sexes. The individualism of free society is the most important in-
spiration of Western achievements for humanity; society-devotion is, similarly,
the main source of achievements in the Soviet society. We may dream of a
synthesis of the two, but as Goethe's Epimetheus said: "des tätigen Mann's
Behagen sei Parteilichkeit"--creative efforts are most effective when based
not on contemplative synthesis, but on partisanship for one idea, even if it

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means blindness to others.

Revolutionary movements, and changes caused by them, are not un-
likely in the next twenty years, particularly in some countries of Eastern
Europe; but there will be probably changes within the existing society, and
not revolutions against this society.

What about political changes imposed by new scientific and technological
upheavals? Truly revolutionary scientific events are unpredictable--much
more so than supposedly unpredictable political events; because, similarly
to great achievements in art, they are creative breakthroughs of the human
mind. However, with some degree of probability, one may predict that the
most revolutionary developments in science of importance to society are likely
to find place, in the next few decades, in biology. New discoveries in *physics*
may give us understanding of the world of elementary particles, bringing order
into chaos, as quantum theory had brought order into the world of atoms and
molecules; it is even possible that they will give access to new, more powerful
elemental forces than those mankind has obtained by its first penetration into
the atomic nucleus. Discoveries in *astrophysics*, made possible by manned and
unmanned space flights, will add largely and unpredictably to man's under-
standing of the universe; but will not change significantly the material life on
earth, or give new economic or military assets to the nations achieving them.

The progress in *biology* is more likely to confront mankind with great
new practical challenges. The mastery of heredity, free decision over the sex
of children, capacity to influence mental make-up and the psychological attitudes
of humans, possibility of prolonging significantly the life span of individuals,
the elimination of detrimental genes from the hereditary plasm, artificial
creation of living matter--these are among the problems towards the solution
of which modern biology is advancing with a speed that may any day bring about
an unpredictable breakthrough. Many of these solutions will confront society
with heavy new responsibility. Who is to decide on the application of new fateful
knowledge, what general principles should be used in their application? For
example, if methods are found to prolong life to, say, one hundred fifty or two
hundred years, whose lives should be so prolonged? Should making space for

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children be given preference to prolonging the life of oldsters, or the other way round? If human population on earth is to be stabilized on some optimum level, who is to decide where it lies? These will be fateful questions, confronting all societies--democratic or totalitarian, libertarian or communist. Even in the military field, biological discoveries may change the situation more significantly than new nuclear weapons or new means of their delivery!

It is unlikely, however, that any one of these fateful challenges will become acute in the time span to which this essay applies--the next twenty-five years. If this proves wrong, the effect may be similar to that which an earlier perfection of the atom bomb would have had on the validity of the 1939 predictions about the course of the Second World War!

## 10. What to Do About it All?

If these estimates of trends now at work in the world-political stage are correct, what do they mean for American political leadership?

Two choices offer themselves--to follow the existing trends, to sail before the wind, or to stem it.

One thing is certain--one cannot stem a powerful trend by weak opposition. If the United States wants to upset the existing trends, this can be done--not through half-hearted measures, but by full application of American power, directed by a strong will--as General de Gaulle now opposes the trend towards increasing political and economic integration of the West.

This is what is wrong with many a well-meaning advice given to American policy-makers. A small first step in a certain direction often is advocated, without reasonable hope that it will be followed by stronger further steps, whatever the result of the first one, and however strong the opposition to it is likely to be. Thus, people who suggest a policy of unilateral disarmament steps, or of political concessions, do not consider that if the US government takes their advice and tentatively engages on the suggested road, it is certain to meet, at first, with political defeats--long before the revolutionary effect

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of a consequent policy of the suggested type could appear; and that strong
national and international pressure will soon reverse it--unless it is undertaken
with an iron determination and readiness, from the beginning, to go to the end,
and not to be detracted by reverses, and buckle all storms.

The same applies to "activist" steps, such as the overthrow of Castro's
regime on Cuba by force. Unless the US have the will, not only to face the
waves of hostility beating in their face from all over the world after such a
display of force, but to follow it by other applications of force, to install and
maintain pro-American regimes in every country threatened by social revolu-
tions, such a policy will be an ultimate failure--because nothing short of world-
wide victory over the forces of social revolution would vindicate it. In hot or
cold war, pinpricks or local victories are of no ultimate avail; you merely
strengthen the regime of a Franco, Castro or Mao Tse-tung by nonrecognition,
sabotage, quarantine, or refusal to trade.

In the same way, a policy aiming at the establishment of a world
government, or another new international authority, cannot lead to success
unless it is entered into not tentatively, but with full strength, and pursued
with persistence and national will which could survive inevitable initial dis-
appointments, detriment to America's international power, and damage to
its alliances.

The alternative of following the trends of the time has the advantage
that individual steps, however small, if they point in the "right" direction,
are not likely to be reversed, as is likely to happen to small steps against
these trends.

In the present situation, the trends suggested above, are not unfavorable
to the United States interests, or incompatiable with American ideals. One
concordant
can imagine a highly imaginative and revolutionary American policy—with the
direction of these trends; but such policies would require, to begin with, a
revolutionary change in American public opinion, of which there is at present
but few signs. What the American government could do, however, is to sail
before the wind of time with a stronger will, and a firmer hand at the tiller than
it does now. Only in this way can we shorten the deadly dangerous time during

THINGS TO COME - 1939-1940

by Eugene I. Rabinowitch

The following piece was never before published. I have written for newspapers as a college student in 1920-25, but between 1926 and 1939, all my writing has been in the field of science. At the beginning of the war, on August 30, 1939, the idea came to me to write down some considerations about its likely course and outcome; but I did not think of publishing these forecasts--only of giving myself the chance of doing what a scientist calls "checking theoretical predictions against experiment." I read this paper then to some of my friends, and their memory is the only support I can claim for the assertion that the piece is reprinted here as it was written then. The first section was written on the day of the German invasion of Poland, September 1, 1939; the second, in May 1941, after the fall of France and the battle of England.

In 1946, I read this piece to some of my colleagues at the University of Illinois, and they urged me to publish it; but I felt that my own statement about the time of the writing would not be believed. Since then, my writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists has given me--I hope--some public reputation, and now, perhaps, my assertion that the piece is reprinted exactly as originally written, will be accepted--at least, by some of the readers.

An attempt to write a third part after the end of hostilities in Europe has remained in outline, and is reprinted as such here.

It is easy to spot the errors--the invasion of Denmark and Norway was not anticipated, a German drive through the Balkans and Turkey into the Near East was predicted, and the cohesion (although not the tenacity) of Russian resistance was underestimated. The correctness of other forecasts and of the overall expectations concerning the duration, course and outcome of the war, may appear self-evident now, a quarter of a century later. But re-reading this piece strengthens my belief that approaching world events with some of the detachment to which the study of science has accustomed one, has some advantage in avoiding errors into which partisanship usually leads the most astute political leaders and writers; and I cannot resist the temptation of placing it at the head of this collection of essays.

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THINGS TO COME - 1939-40

September 1, 1939--Woods Hole, Mass.

Six years ago, a few days after Hitler came to power, I met (in Göttingen, where I was then working) a Nazi acquaintance of mine. He objected to my distress, saying, "You should not look on all things only from the point of view of a Jew." I said that what distressed me most was not the probable fate of Jews under Hitler, but the certainty of a new war. My friend laughed at me and said, "How can Germany make war? Look at the French army, at the British fleet." I answered: "That's why war will not come right away, but only after Germany has had time to arm." And so we made a bet--I said there will be war in seven years. Now, six months short of seven years have elapsed, and war is here. This makes me think: To what extent can one predict the future in politics; and it seems to me that one can do so with considerable chance of success if one does it without wishful thinking, particularly if the masses on the world scene have coagulated, and the forces that drive them have become oriented. Then, the law of mechanics can be applied to forecast the probable collisions and their results.

Applying this kind of forecasting to the present situation, it is clear that the impact of German mass multiplied by the force behind it will destroy Poland within a few--say, four weeks. It is also clear, if one leaves aside wishful thinking, that the USSR has a pact with Germany which probably permits it to march in and occupy the Baltic countries and Eastern Poland, perhaps also Bessarabia.

After this division of the East, Hitler probably will again offer peace to England and France. But the forces now in action there will not permit English or French politicians to accept such an offer. Thus, it will end--probably in Spring 1940--with a German attack on the West. Because of the Maginot line and the mountains to the south of it, Germany will be forced to repeat the 1914 strategy of marching through the Low Countries. There is little doubt--comparing the quantities of motion (mv) that existed in the West

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in 1914 with those in existence now, and the absence of an Eastern Front, that the Germans this time will succeed in overrunning France.

Then, they probably will again offer peace to England, and will again fail, because of the persistence of British mass once set in motion. Germany has started the war without a navy; the fate of England therefore depends on whether the German air force alone will be sufficient to subjugate England, or to make it untenable. The ratio of German to British air force cannot be judged at present, so no prediction is possible. But one thing is certain--even if Britain is occupied, the war will not end, but will spread over the globe, involving in the subsequent years, America, Russia, and Japan, as a second center of aggression against the "haves" in the Far East. Considering the mv's, (manpower and industrial power times drive and leadership) available on both sides, this contest will certainly lead to a final defeat of Germany and Japan, but it may take a long time--perhaps five years, if England stands, and ten to fifteen years if it falls; and America will have to carry the brunt of it.

May 5, 1941--Watertown, Mass.

Poland is divided, France overrun, England bombed but not defeated or invaded. My prediction in 1933, and again in 1939 was: *Germany will almost win the next war, but it will be defeated at the end because it will overestimate its own force, and underestimate that of its enemies--as it did in 1914-18--and strike before it is prepared to meet all eventualities.*

This prediction still stands. Germany struck before building a large naval force; she struck before achieving a degree of superiority in the air which would lay England defenseless at her feet. If Hitler would have restrained himself before Prague and Danzig, he might have built up an air force much more formidable than the one he actually had at the outset of the war, without arousing England into action. His error was to think that the strength he already possessed was sufficient to frighten the "effete" countries of the West into submission without a fight; he still clinged to this hope when he offered "peace," after the conquest of Poland and again after the defeat

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of France. He might still entertain similar hopes in respect to America.

However, it is not in Hitler's power to choose the time of the conflict now. He cast the dies, and they are now rolling. The conflict will be decided on the basis of realities--masses and velocities--as they exist in the world *now*, not as they could be cleverly rearranged at another, later junction. These realities are: Germany is and will remain for a long time, an immensely superior *land* force. England and America are the superior *sea powers*, even counting Japan in. Land power cannot strike directly at *sea power*; neither can *sea power* strike directly at land power. *Air power* will be on the side of Germany for probably another year--until Summer 1942; the two sides will be about equal in fall of 1942 and the development will probably begin to work against Germany in 1943. Air power alone cannot bring *quick* decisions. Therefore, the *war* will be long--it may easily last another five *years*.

Even a conquest of England would not bring the end of the war. But I do not expect England to be invaded; I do not even expect an attempt to invade it, because the possibility of Germany gaining control of the air over England is now less likely than it was in 1940.

The Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Near East are likely to fall to Germany, since they are accessible to land power. An American intervention in Summer 1940 could have prevented the French fleet and colonies from deserting the cause of the Allies; it would thus have insured the conquest of Italian North Africa and increased tremendously the chances of preventing the overflow of German army into Africa. This chance has been missed. An American intervention *now*, with a direct attack on Dakar and an expeditionary force in North Africa, still could retrieve the situation; but obviously, no such action will be taken, and this chance will be lost too, thus prolonging the war for perhaps another two years.

It is probable that the German thrust through Lybia desert will remain unsuccessful, because of the difficulties of maintaining adequate supplies for a large mechanized force. But how can Turkey refuse the passage of German troops, and if she refuses, how can she expect to stop

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them? Therefore, the eruption of German hordes into the Near East appears inevitable. Egypt will be attacked from two sides and the British fleet will have to be evacuated through Gibraltar or Suez. It is only to be hoped that it will be able to get away without too severe losses. This will probably happen about July 1, 1941.

Russia will do nothing about Germany's move through the Balkans, because the only thing it could do would be to make war on Germany, and Stalin is not ready for a suicide. He might, however, move into Iran and attempt to seize the oil fields there--not because of a secret understanding with Hitler about the division of the Near East, but because of advantage such a move may bring to his bargaining power. Hitler is not in the necessity of buying Stalin's cooperation any more, as he was two years ago; but he might still prefer to close his eyes on some looting Stalin may do for himself.

After the conquest of North Africa and the Middle East, the German military machine on land will have only one task left—the subjugation of Russia. Perhaps, before undertaking this, Hitler will once more attempt to throttle England into submission by using his newly acquired bases in West Africa and on the Iberian Peninsula. I think that this will be the period—in July or August, 1941—when Germany will come into open conflict with the USA. America will be unable to stay out once the communications in the Southern Atlantic are endangered.

Once USA will be in it, the war will resolve itself into a gigantic contest of technology. Industrial production will be reduced under the aerial bombardment in England and in Western Germany; the contest will thus be between USA and the less accessible parts of Germany. All advantages in respect to materials, equipment and labor will be with USA, so that already in 1942 the production of war material will be probably higher on the Allied side than on the German side. However, Germany will have the advantage of being able to make better use of its production, because of the absence of appropriate bases for Allied attack except the British Isles. This is when the loss of African bases will become bitterly felt. Probably, an American Expeditionary

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Corps will be sent to Africa to fight its way, together with British Imperial forces, up the coasts of West and East Africa to reconquer North Africa. This operation may take the whole of 1942.

In the meantime, *Germany will attack USSR, probably in Spring 1942.* Firstly, because it needs occupation and victories for its 250 divisions. Secondly, because it cannot afford to take the chance of its own industrial production declining under the stress of a long war, and thus losing the preponderant strength it had relatively to that of Russia. Germany will have to dispose of Russia before the exhaustion stage is reached in the war with England and America.

The conquest of a large part of European Russia probably will be achieved in 2-3 months, because of predominance of German technology, leadership, and above all, of a superior supply apparatus. After this time, the Germans will be at or in Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, perhaps even North Caucasus. If they would adopt a wise policy in dealing with the occupied country, they may easily disorganize the whole Soviet state and bring the people solidly behind them. *But it is very unlikely that Germans will be wise.* More likely, they will treat the occupied country so brutally, starting to make space for Germans to move in, and will thus provoke a guerilla war, endangering their lines of communication and permitting the Russian army to acquire a new spirit of resistance and a measure of equality with the German army at the end of the extended German supply lines. In this way, the war in the East, is likely to be dragged out, with the German army gradually bleeding white in attempts to keep subjugated a vast, seething country, and to maintain a continuous barrier against the Russian army over a 3,000 mile long front, from Archangel to the Caspian.

The Battle of the Atlantic will become so serious that *USA will have to call its fleet from the Pacific*, giving Japan a go-ahead signal in the South Seas. The resistance of Dutch East Indies and Singapore may delay the Japanese progress, but a spread of Japanese might over all Far East during this period is inevitable.

By 1943, *North Africa will be in American hands and the reconquest of the Asia Minor will begin.* The cities of Germany and England will by that

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time be utterly devastated. In summer 1943, Germany will probably begin
to have the worst in the aerial attacks from bases in England, and North
Africa.

In 1944, Germany and the whole continent of Europe will suffer in-
creasing terror, hunger, and finally, anarchy. The Anglo-American Expe-
ditionary force will then begin local landings--first in Italy, then in Norway,
and finally, the main one in France. Germany's defeat will be sealed! But
Hitler will retain a firm grip upon a die-hard fraction of the German people.
His terror will assume unheard-of proportions, with mass executions of all
who try to stop the hopeless war. England and America, utterly exhausted
themselves--since they will also have the task of gradually driving Japan out
of its vast occupation area--will find themselves, in 1945, confronted with a
stupendous task of re-organizing a Europe (and Asia), fallen into anarchy,
with the Eastern half of Europe probably in the hands of Communists or other
revolutionary groups, torn by fratricidal wars of a cruelty not known in modern
history, fed on economic disorganization and hunger. Will they master the
chaos or will the chaos engulf them?

May, 1945--Chicago

1. Crystallization of masses and forces now:

1. Eastern Block. Communism and Slavic drive vs. West.
   Russian Imperialism. Main frontier in future Europe:
   Lübeck to Trieste.

2. Western block: it may or may not solidify.

3. American imperialism--newcomer on world stage.

4. Nationalism--old and new--everywhere.

2. Even if these mv's will dissolve, the general situation will remain the same. National sovereignties, no organization able to prevent war. Who would have expected Italy to become the first aggressor after the last war--somebody will become it now.

3. Technical change--capacity of civilization to destroy itself, $ for $.

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4. Alternatives:

1. War before Russia has bomb--Outlook.

2. War afterwards--destruction of American cities.

3. War with "somebody" later--if it were not for Russia, we would have even less unity and international organization than we have now.

5. Only change can come from a new, large *my* World Government--*lots* of *m*, but little *v*.