Breakfast Meeting with Godfrey Sperling's Press Group

8:30 a.m., Wednesday, August 5, 1970

The National Press Club

Mr. Kissinger met with the reporters listed at Tab A for about an hour. Mr. Sperling opened the meeting by stating that the remarks would be attributed to "Administration sources." Mr. Kissinger replied that it would be helpful if they would not add "with a German accent."

Mr. Kissinger began by simply saying that, at this time, he thought it best to stay away from discussion of aspects of the Middle East and Vietnam. The questions and answers were as follows.

Q: What part did Haldeman and Ehrlichman play in reaching the Cambodian decision (with particular reference to the recent LOOK article)?

A: The LOOK article is quite accurate insofar as the parties and sequence of events are concerned. Haldeman sat in on a number of meetings and contributed from a management point of view -- not with regard to policy advice; in other words, what would have to be done if and when the decision were made. The Attorney General was at a number of the meetings, and he was asked and gave his advice with regard to policy questions. Ehrlichman was involved in connection with his assessment of the domestic impact of the decision and in putting

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together views of others on this aspect. It is not unusual for a
President, regardless of the subject area of a particular problem,
to consult the people who are closest to him when confronted with
a difficult problem. One naturally asks the advice of old and trusted
friends. Harlow's role was similar to that of Ehrlichman's in this
respect.

Q: Were the answers correct that were given by the various
persons asked?

A: Yes. There was no surprise with regard to the university
reaction, but there was some surprise with regard to the non-university
reaction.

Q: With whom do you deal at State now that Elliot Richardson
is no longer Under Secretary.

A: There is usually quite close touch with Secretary Rogers and
we deal daily by telephone. We have no regularly scheduled meeting
but we have met at least once each week since Richardson left. As
far as operational matters go, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson
is usually the one with whom we deal.

Q: Again, did Ehrlichman participate in assessing the military
aspects of the Cambodian operation?

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A: There were two separate issues in this regard: (a) the Parrot's Beak, and (b) the Fish Hook operations. I don't think there was much argument that in terms of military effectiveness, it was better to take all the sanctuaries than to take just one, but I am not going to engage in a checklist of who did or said what, as has been done by others with regard to Cuba.

Q: Does the situation in Indochina today justify the hopes you had at the time of the Cambodian operation?

A: In terms of the choices which we had at that time, the answer is yes. It would have been better if there had been no change at all. But if you will look at my April 30 backgrounder, the objectives which were stated have been substantially achieved. The military situation has improved and our withdrawal program has been able to go forward. Whether or not prospects for negotiations have improved, we don't know at this time, but if nothing had been done, the situation would have been worse.

Q: Did we go into Cambodia to sustain the Lon Nol government?

A: In answering this question, one must first realize what the Lon Nol government is. It is the Sihanouk government without Sihanouk. Lon Nol was the Prime Minister and Matak was the Deputy Prime Minister, and the rest of the cabinet remained the same. In answer

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to the specific question, we did not go into Cambodia in order to
sustain Lon Nol but to be able to continue our program in South
Vietnam. The indirect result of our operation has enabled the
Lon Nol government to maintain itself.

Q: It seems that at the beginning of the Cambodian operation, assistance to the Cambodians in the form of tactical air interdiction was the exception. It seems that now it has become the rule. What do you consider the distinction to be between direct air support and interdiction?

A: Such details on operations should be addressed to the Defense Department.

Q: Can any movement of North Vietnamese forces in Cambodia except on the Thai border be considered the basis for tactical air interdiction operations?

A: There are, of course, grey areas between what would be considered direct air support unrelated to interdiction and tactical air which is primarily interdiction. The basis for our air operations is that they are part of our on-going program in South Vietnam and are directly related to the security of South Vietnam.

Q: How fast is the Middle East initiative going to go? When do you expect to have a ceasefire arranged?

[x]

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A: It would seem that within a reasonable period of time a ceasefire should be arranged if no presently unforeseen difficulties develop, and within a month could be considered a reasonable period of time.

Q: Did the President's "tough talk" in San Clemente help the Middle East initiative so far?

A: The President's remarks together with my San Clemente backgrounder seem to have achieved their purpose. The problem that was faced at that time was that we had a peace move, it was several weeks old, and there had been little or no movement. The Soviet's had tried to slide to the sidelines and leave us with the issue. Nasser had recently made a very tough speech. We had to convince the Soviets that if the Middle East escalated, the major powers might be drawn in against their will (this was the basis for citing the situation which developed in the Balkans in 1914). We therefore wanted to remind the Soviet's that all had an interest in making the peace move good. The President's statements could not undercut a move he was already engaged in. All we know is that after San Clemente, the Soviets took a more active interest. [As for the use of the word "expel" in the backgrounder in San Clemente, if it is taken in context it is clear that it was used to explain what should be achieved by the peace settlement.]

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Q: Was this approach, in effect, an undercutting of the Secretary of State?

A: The peace initiative was not exclusively that of the Secretary of State. It was worked out within the National Security system and was the U.S. Government proposal. The President was therefore not going against it or undercutting the Secretary. He intended it to work and his purpose was to make clear the serious consequences of failure.

There was frequent communication between the White House and the State Department and there was no dissent from the Acting Secretary of State or the Assistant Secretary involved, and there was no desire on their part to change the approach which the President had taken. The Secretary of State had been kept fully informed but not, incidentally, by the way of an apology. [Peter Lisagor interjected here to say, "Henry, but you do not mean to deny the Secretary of State his day of glory?" Mr. Kissinger replied that, of course, he did not and that the Secretary of State had played a crucial and honorable role in getting the peace initiative moving but that he did not think he, himself, would claim that it was exclusively his, but rather a Government position.]

Q: Couldn't we tell the Soviets through ordinary channels of our attitude rather than by the President on national TV?

A: Of course, we could have. A public statement is obviously not the sole channel we have but, under the circumstances which had

[x]

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developed and given the limited time and the seriousness of the
issue, there is utility in making such a statement publicly.

Q: Do you think that the activities of Soviet pilots in Egypt has had anything to do with the movement of the initiative especially with regard to public opinion?

A: It would not be surprising if the change in the Russian approach was in some way affected by these reports.

Q: How can we be sure that there is no Russian or UAR buildup
during the ceasefire?

A: We cannot be sure but we have an understanding that there will be no buildup during a ceasefire. If, however, there is, we are no worse off than we were before the initiative.

Q: Do you think that the Egyptians want the Russians there?

A: Simply on the basis of personal speculation, it does not seem
that the Egyptians would be eager to have them or any foreign force
there, but in comparison to the other choices open to them, they have
decided to have them there.

Q: How serious do you take the dogfights between Soviet and
Israeli aircraft?

A: If this occurred every day, it could become serious but at this
point it does not appear to be serious enough to hurt the peace initiative.

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Q: Does the resignation of the right-wing in the Israeli Cabinet
help or hinder the initiative?

A: In some ways, both sides have had a catharsis in that both have had to face their hawks. There are short-term costs as a result, but it may make it easier for the present government to settle in the long run.

Q: It may be a naive notion, but why is the Mediterranean so important to the United States?

A: There are two aspects in which the Middle East is more significant to us than is even Southeast Asia. Vietnam is an anguishing and very difficult problem, but we are winding it down. It is not spreading. It is difficult to foresee circumstances under which the major powers would come into direct confrontation there.

In the Middle East, on the other hand, there are intense emotions involved in the rival countries. The boiling points of each are quite low and the U.S. and Russia are tied to the rival countries. In such a situation, the major powers could edge toward a confrontation which they do not control. The second aspect of the significance of the Middle East is the result of our close relationship with Western Europe. To the degree to which there is creeping Soviet influence in the Middle East which affects Western Europe, it also indirectly affects the U.S.

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Eight-five per cent of Europe's oil and 95 per cent of Japan's oil comes from the Middle East, so in this respect, the Middle East is important to us. The Middle East also has a direct effect on Africa and its development. It is also important in regard to the development of the Persian Gulf area during the 1970's and whether or not the countries there will be moderate or radical Arab regimes.

**Q:** Why are England, Italy, France and other so-called Mediterranean allies not more concerned about the growing dominance of Russia in the Middle East?

**A:** With respect to Italy, in particular, it has been without a government for the last 30 days and it is difficult for them to make any sort of foreign policy decisions at this time. But, in general, most of the above countries would agree with the analysis of the problem of increased Soviet influence in the Middle East, but there is disagreement on how to deal with it. There is one view which holds that the root cause of the trouble is Israel and that the way to solve the problem is to squeeze back Israel to the point at which you satisfy the Arabs. The situation is not analagous to the Cuban missile confrontation where the Soviets were creeping in. In contrast, we may suddenly be faced with significant Soviet power in the Middle East which threatens the existence of Israel and which, in turn, would put us in a position of being the ones that are creeping in on the Israeli side.

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Q: What do you think of the view of Mort Halperin that if we wind down our involvement in Vietnam the North Vietnamese are bound to escalate their activity at some point and that there is great danger of a serious situation ahead.

A: In the eighth year of a Southeast Asian land war, there are no good choices left. Every decision is a 51-49 or 55-45 sort of choice. One can therefore always take the negative side and point out all the holes in the position that has been taken. The danger and seriousness of the situation ahead is not denied. We have tried to face it and to minimize it. We are not looking for an excuse to escalate the war. The difficulties we face are not trivial; however, I disagree with Halperin's exaggerated assessment but I share the same degree of concern.

Q: Has Ambassador Bruce been given any new instructions?
(The Attorney General spoke to this group last week and said that he had not.)

A: Ambassador Bruce said that he has been given great latitude in his approach to negotiations. [Peter Lisagor interjected to ask whether or not he had been given any longitude and Mr. Kissinger replied that he has been given wide latitude so he could shift from side to side, but no longitude.]

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[u]

Q: It has often been put forward by the Administration that if the North Vietnamese do not choose to negotiate with the U.S. now, they will likely have to negotiate with a tougher Vietnam if they wait. Are Thieu's recent statements on coalition government and ceasefire indicative of this?

A: To the extent that South Vietnam feels more confident, it is true that they will be more difficult to deal with. But the more basic question is that the North Vietnamese may not ever be able to agree to the sharing of political power. It is the concept that is not understood by the Vietnamese thinking or to Leninist thinking. The North Vietnamese may be the last true Leninists in power. Furthermore, there doesn't seem to be any single person that can move the whole country to accept the sharing of power. It seems that the only way to get the North Vietnamese to negotiate is to show them a strong South Vietnam.

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[Mr. Kissinger wanted to clarify what he had said earlier about the military operations in Cambodia; namely, that there was no disagreement on the Parrot's Beak operation and that with regard to any disagreement on the Fish Hook operation, he was not going to give any checklist.]