3/96

[Lc]

initial use of nuclear bombs without regard also to the nature
and location of the targets to be attacked. It would seem
practicable to draw up several categories of targets - 'A',
'B', 'C' - so that the first use of nuclear weapons authorised
would cover targets in category 'A' only; would be required for targets in category 'B' and a third for
targets in category 'C'. The purpose of the categories would
be to try and equate military objectives with the political
objective of attempting to control the level of nuclear
escalation. It is conceded that the crucial decision is
probably that to employ any nuclear weapons, and that once
nuclear weapons are used it may well prove impossible to avoid
an all-out nuclear war. We cannot, however, be sure; and
thus it is prudent to plan on the basis that some control may
be possible, since it will be manifestly impossible to devise
such a system should the worst happen and we find ourselves at
war.

It is also desirable that the use of the tactical air
forces should be correlated with the tactical use of the
atomic artillery on the battlefield. Both should therefore be
subject to the same channel of command. I have suggested the
designation of a new Commander-in-Chief for Tactical Nuclear
Weapons (TACTNUC) for the control of army atomic weapons and
consider the best arrangement would be for him to have charge
of the tactical air forces as well. He would be responsible

3/101

[LC]

However, in September 1960 a compromise was reached whereby a unified system of command and operational control was established, with effect from 1 May 1961, for Western European air defences, including the United Kingdom, and for an early warning system over the whole NATO area. General de Gaulle's objections were met by "unifying" as distinct from "integrating" (a word which has been banished from the French military vocabulary) the French air forces with those of the other nations concerned in the forward area, i.e. in the zone on either side of the Franco-German frontier. The greater part of France remains under French national control, but this agreement means that it will now be possible to have a unified system in the key forward area.

Mr. Watkinson, in announcing the British participation in the scheme, said:

"I am arranging for General Norstad to be given formal notice of the assignment of Fighter Command to NATO in accordance with the decision on unified air defence taken last year by the North Atlantic Council. The assignment will take effect from 1st May, 1961. It will improve the air defence capability of the whole area including the United Kingdom.

"The Fighter Command forces assigned to SACEUR will be the air defence fighter squadrons and the operational units of the Bloodhound Mark 1 SAGW system and of the control and reporting system. The size, composition, role and deployment of these forces will remain matters for our own decision.

"Air Marshal Sir Hector McGregor, the Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Fighter Command, is being nominated for appointment by SACEUR as Commander, United Kingdom Air Defence Region. SACEUR's responsibilities for air defence in the United Kingdom region will be exercised through the Commander."

[LC]

5/124

balance of payments suffered unduly. For example, the foreign exchange cost of the United Kingdom's troops in Germany might be offset by purchases of supplies and equipment from Britain by the fund.

I do not suggest that this proposition satisfies all possible objections. In particular I anticipate many problems in working out the proportions to be paid by the member countries and real difficulties in assessing those contributions in the light of the non-NATO commitments of some countries. The accounting procedures would also be cumbersome and complicated. But since there is not much point in setting up an integrated military alliance in terms of men and then denying them the means to make the military operations effective, I do not see any alternative to tackling the logistics problem on a NATO-wide basis.

4/1

PART 4 : WHAT NEXT FOR NATO?
The
Chapter 12 : Commando Military Tasks

It is obvious that military commanders can never be given
all the forces and equipment they would like, even if money and
resources were more readily agreed for defence than they are.
As in every other facet of life, defence policy is a matter of
priorities. The essence of my criticism of NATO is that it has
not got its military priorities right. Indeed I am not sure
that it has any clear priorities at all. Several allied
commanders have replied to my question as to whether they would
like more infantry or armoured divisions or more tactical nuclear
weapons by saying they would like more of both.

Again, as so often in life, it is the dramatic and spectacular
proposal which catches the headlines whereas it is uninspiring
routine work that makes the difference between efficiency and
incompetence. The effective strength of the Alliance is, in my
opinion more likely to be enhanced by an integrated logistics
system than by the acquisition of 5 or 50 Polaris submarines.

Few travellers by civil airlines can fail to have asked
themselves whether there is any point in all the efforts that are
now being made to develop a supersonic airliner. If the object
is to get from one place to another more quickly, could not much
more time be saved by reducing the waiting time - the 30 or 45
minutes one must report before take-off, the delay in collecting
baggage and clearing customs, the frequent delays before the

[LC]

4/4

assigned. Britain, France and any other member acquiring
nuclear power status should assign the whole of their nuclear
strike and tactical forces in the same way. Political control
over the whole range of nuclear weapons would be exercised by
the North Atlantic Council through a new Supreme Commander who
would exercise overriding military control in the nuclear field.

In order to make political control effective in the case of
tactical nuclear weapons and to avoid dangers of unpremeditated
nuclear escalation, I have suggested that the nuclear weapons
of the Alliance available for tactical use on the battlefield
should be organised separately from the conventional artillery
and be subject to a separate allied channel of command under a
new Commander-in-Chief for Tactical Nuclear Weapons. He would
be under the direction of two supreme commanders - SACEUR for the
deployment and military operations of his units and the new
Supreme Commander for Nuclear Weapons for the direction of initial
use of his various types of weapons. A separate
authorisation would be required for each category of nuclear
weapon, so as to limit escalation as far as possible.

I have further proposed that the new allied atomic artillery
units should be, like the present tactical air forces and
General Norstad's new mobile fire-brigade force, multi-national
in personnel and organisation. If there are no national atomic
artillery units, there should be no awkward problems of national
prestige, equality within the Alliance and custody of warheads.

[LC]

4/11

NATO requirements to be drawn up by the Allied Commanders in conjunction with the Military Committee and then the tasks divided among the various member countries. (This is in direct contrast to the present practice whereby most countries plan their defence expenditure and equipment on a national basis and then consider, in the Annual Review procedure, what they can assign or earmark, from forces and weapons designed to meet national needs, to the Alliance.) Obviously for all the principal countries of NATO there is the problem of commitments outside the NATO area and this poses difficult questions, requiring political rather than military solutions. It is now generally agreed that NATO's interests are much wider than its defined area and that the menace which draws the Atlantic powers together, in the words of the statement issued by the North Atlantic Council after its Oslo meeting in May 1961, "is now not only military, but also has world-wide political, economic, scientific and psychological aspects." Thus the commitments undertaken outside NATO by some of its members ought to make at least an indirect contribution to the strength and purpose of the Alliance, and it seems to me that there is no reason why these obligations should not be freely discussed within the Alliance and account taken of them in allocating tasks and in assessing each member's contribution. If a country is unwilling to discuss its non-NATO responsibilities with its NATO allies, it would seem prima facie that this country doubts their relevance to the objects of the Alliance and is pursuing them from entirely national interests.

4/12

In considering NATO's naval strength it has been pointed out how absurd it is for each naval power to seek to provide a whole range of hardware instead of adopting the principle of division of labour and making a specialised contribution, thus building up balanced collective forces for the Alliance as a whole. In the naval field the conflict of NATO and national requirements and obligations is particularly evident since all the major NATO naval powers have substantial commitments outside the NATO area and cannot follow Belgium's admirable example of concentrating on one type of vessel (in her case, mine-sweeping craft). However, a good deal of duplication could be avoided without neglect of non-NATO responsibilities if there was more concern to build balanced collective forces for the Alliance.

It is true that while the naval forces of NATO rate a lower priority than the provision of an invulnerable nuclear strike force and adequate ground conventional forces in Europe, undoubtedly naval shortcomings could be minimized by a collective rather than a national approach. It seems very unlikely that any hostilities in the NATO area will start at sea and in this sense naval forces, except for their increasing contribution to the invulnerability of the strategic nuclear striking force, have a less clear role to play as a deterrent against war or nuclear blackmail. However, should hostilities begin, either as a result of a mistake or miscalculation in Europe or by an all-

4/16

The insistence on national sovereignty, often in small
rather than big things, and the concern to maintain national
defence forces rather than provide a specialised contribution
to the balanced forces of the Alliance would make sense if
independent national defence were a viable alternative to a
collective defence system like NATO. But surely no country
really believes it could provide its own defence in the 1960's -
not even the United States? And what is the benefit to our
security to set up a collective defence system and then grudge
it the men and equipment and money needed to make it effective?
If these simple, and to me undeniable, principles were trans-
lated into military practice by the member Governments, the
strength of the Alliance would be transformed almost overnight.

4/33

[LC]

and at best lead to a weakening of the Western position. But it is a mistake to suppose that NATO itself can be refashioned into a suitable instrument to deal with these problems.

NATO will carry the stamp of a military alliance no matter what may be done to change its character. As such it would not be acceptable as a vehicle for dealing with the newly independent countries who value their neutrality in the cold war as highly as their new independence. Nothing we can do is likely to change this and we must come to terms with this fact. As Henry Kissinger has pointed out¹, there is a parallel in American history. In the first 150 years of American history no conceivable British policy would have produced an Anglo-American alliance. Neither the invasion of Belgium in 1914 nor the aggression against Poland in 1939 seemed to Americans at the time sufficient to justify the surrender of their neutrality. Attempts to widen the scope of NATO in this direction or to change if from being a regional military alliance would produce many difficulties and no tangible results.

The best that can be achieved within NATO is for there to be the prior political consultation recommended by the Committee of Three so that members can co-ordinate their individual policies, and for all NATO members to recognise that their shortcomings are certain to reflect upon the Alliance as a whole. On the military side, there is much to be said for informal consultations between NATO and the other Treaty Organisations in

1 "The Necessity for Choice" (Harper, New York) p. 331

Inset A

[lc]

Unless this principle is followed progress
towards disarmament, never easy and be-
coming now increasingly difficult, will
be impossible.