Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Prof. Elliott

11/17/69 11:45 a.m.

K was sorry he hadn't seen E but he'd been working about 18 hours a day. And handling it quite well, E said. K said he always had to see the people who are soft and weak and E doesn't belong to those.

E said he wanted to talk about the books he is trying to put out--he is having trouble on that front. E hopes the President has got that book E sent him, talking about the impact of television on American culture.

E wanted to talk with K about a few things before he goes to see Joel Blocker. K said he thought E could be as informative on himself as anybody else. E said he had done this before and so has Kraemer. K said E should tell Blocker whatever he thinks best.

E said he thought he could be helpful on how K developed and what had been happening to him. E said K has had the broadest background of anybody who could have been picked out, and his foreign policy interests made him an exceptionally good choice. K said, and philosophical interests.

E said those books he is writing, he's got two finished and would be glad to put them into K's hands. One of the "____" bases of American Foreign Policy" and "The Fruits of False Freedom," on the SDS, black power, and weathermen, etc.

K said E had been such an important influence on K's life. E hopes to continue to be. E said Louise asked E to send K her love. K said sometimes, E has found things in K--K thought E had lost his mind. E said there had never been a time when there was a worse need for someone to set the tone, and K is doing it well. E said that he thinks K is using the Vice President brilliantly. K said he would go easy on that with Blocker.

K said the one thing he doesn't discuss is his divorce. E said the only thing he could say about that is that is helped to deepen him. E went through it himself--it is a testing experience. E said he had written K about his happiness that K keeps in touch with the children. K said he adores them--he doesn't just do that out of duty. That's one of things that E hopes K will continue in. K said he feels very strongly about E.

E said some day he wants to talk with K about the seminar--they were going to disperse all the records, and that's stupid.

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Senator Fulbright

11/17/69 12:07

K said he was calling because Ehrlichman and Symington are not here--
K said he was acting more as messenger than as principal in conveying
a message about the Symington hearings. K said there was some discus-
sion about who was to testify about the supposed Thai activities in Laos.
K said we recommend that F call Helms--the one who knows the situation
best, and Unger can be present to go into the political aspects. K said he
had talked to Symington Thursday, and he suggested K call S today.

F said he was expecting Unger this morning; why didn't he come? K said
he didn't know, he guessed Unger was waiting to get it clear about who was
to testify. F said they asked Helms about 2 or 3 points, and he said he
didn't know. F said they asked about the arrangement we made with the
Thais for sending their troops into Laos; F said we know we have such an
agreement. Unger said he simply was not aware. F said 'you shouldn't
have your ambassadors doing this--it's bad enough for Hoffa to do it--
shouldn't have ambassadors doing it. F said they asked Helms, and he
didn't know. F said Unger claimed executive privilege; F didn't think he
could do that. K said he really wasn't in a position to talk about this; he
hadn't followed it with that precision. F repeated that he thought Unger
was coming this morning, then asked if Unger was available to come this
afternoon. K said we would see that he does. K said he would see to it
that Unger and Helms were there.

F said he would like to see Helms, but Unger should testify by himself.
K said his understanding with Symington was that it would be all right if
Helms and Unger came together. K said this decision had been made by
the committee chaired by Ehrlichman. F said it was all right for them to
come together part of the time, but F wants Unger part of the time by
himself.

K said he understood only that the contingency plans weren't to be discussed.
F said he didn't care to ask further about that--that's water over the dam.
Laird took care of that in a most satisfactory manner. F said what he would
like is to have Unger come over along this afternoon. K said let them start
out together and then see what happens. K said those were his instructions.
F said when you send Helms in and it throws a cloak of secrecy about the
testimony. F said sending Helms back intrudes upon his time, but if K in-
sists, that's okay. But F insists that Unger come by himself. F thinks we

By KHL NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Fulbright

11/17/69 12:07

p. 2

can get rid of it in an hour or an hour and a half, and it will be more
bother to everybody the other way. K understood, but his problem is
that this is not in his jurisdiction. K was calling F because Symington
is out of town, and before he left he asked K to call. K said that in
areas in which he has discretion F would find him more helpful than
those in which he is just carrying messages.

F said Unger first pleaded executive privilege, then said he would take
it under advisement. K said the only thing he is aware of is that there
was to be no discussion of contingency plans. The rest, K is not even
briefed on. F said what he wanted to ask Unger he already asked
Helms, and he said he didn't know. But F does want Unger there before
he goes back.

K said Helms and Unger could come together--that's the only thing K is
instructed to tell F. K said he understood that F was telling him that
this doesn't foreclose having Unger alone. K said F's committee was pri-
marily the Secretary of State's responsibility, but we want to do everything
from this building to be helpful.

F said they could have a meeting with Unger tomorrow afternoon--F wants
him, for a brief period at least, alone. K said why didn't he send both
this afternoon. If F then feels that he must see him along for a brief
period, we will do our best to be helpful. F said if K does his best, he
knows they can do it.

F said he didn't know why they bother K with this. F said this is the first
time they've had an ambassador say he can't talk about what's happening
in his own country. K said he was learning one thing from this conversa-
tion--the next time he is talking to F he is going to make damn sure that
he is well briefed and he is not going to pass messages again. F said
this is bad business--like the Fitzgerald thing with the Pentagon--it
leaves a bad taste in the mouth. K said he was sure of that. K said he
hadn't found F unreasonable; K has enjoyed working with F and he's just
sorry he's been so unresponsive. K said he would send them there at
3:00 today.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/69

Telecon
Joe Alsop
2:30 p. m.

11/17/69

Alsop said there were a lot of things he wanted to discuss with K and invited him to dinner either tonight or tomorrow. K said he would have to do one of his usual things about tonight. He has an unbelievable amount of work and he may have to talk to the President about Okinawa. K asked if he could call back. Alsop said there is no reason why he can't come to a family dinner and then go back to work. K said he would call back by 5:00.

Alsop 5:28 p. m. 11/17/69

K said he thought he had better not try to make it tonight but he appreciated the invitation. K invited Alsop to come to the office at 5:30 on Tues. Alsop agreed.

By KHLW

NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Colonel Borman

11/17/69 3:50 p.m.

B wondered if K had two minutes; B always feels guilty talking to K because he knows K is so busy. K said no, B is one of the few people he enjoys talking with.

B said he was calling about two things, both having to do with Vietnam.
1) At Cape Kennedy, the President asked B if he would talk with K about going to Vietnam in the rather immediate future--visiting the troops and saying a lot of people recognize why they are there, and appreciate it.
B said we also talked about the possibility of a trip to Hanoi concerning the prisoners. K said no. K said they wouldn't let B go, but he doesn't even want to offer it. B said somewhere the P is going to have to make it clear that we're trying with various avenues of approach. K said we are trying. B said he knew we were; he doesn't just mean on the prisoners--he means in all things. B is afraid from talking with the P--B doesn't want him to get static on the whole thing over there. B said he doesn't want to seem like he's talking out of line, but he saw this happen with Johnson. K said on the trip to Hanoi idea, first they wouldn't let B in; second they would use it against us. K said he just is not going to play that game. B said he thought maybe he could go to Paris. K said he would think about Paris. K said if he could figure out a way of doing it, he would let B know. But K said we strongly support the trip to Vietnam. B asked if he could go ahead and schedule the trip to Vietnam for some time before Christmas; K said yes, that was an excellent idea.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/13/69

Telecon
Secretary Laird
7:00 p.m. 11/17/69

Laird wanted to check a couple of items before the NSC meeting tomorrow. He thought the public affairs part of these discussions had been completely over looked in the paper. He said biological research is something that can be supported but biological warfare cannot be supported by anyone. K asked if that wasn't the purpose. Laird said as far as the paper is concerned, they would miss(?) the public affairs impact. K thought Laird should make that point at the meeting. K said that would be the thrust.

On Geneva protocol, Laird thought they could go along with that provided that there is the reservation on 14B (teargas). These are agents that we use right here. We should tie that reservation but support everything else. K said these papers are written so that everyone can say he has had far hearing. That would be K's recommendation and where he hopes the President will come out.

Laird said he had a meeting with the Chinese and asked if K saw the wire that the Embassy sent. (K hadn't) They will buy this program that was outlined by Packard(?) and McCain. K said then Laird doesn't have to keep the ships there. Laird said they would be left there for 5 days and they have the 15 transit ships in there. K said that's the only interest we had.

By: KHLW

NARA, Dato 5/12/69

Telecon
Joseph Kraft

5:30 p.m. 11/17/69

K said it was a very pleasant evening at Kraft's.

K wanted Kraft to know that he had not mentioned the letter from the Doty group to any other newspaper man and he didn't mean for Kraft to use it in his column. It was something that touched K and he didn't take it as an unqualified endorsement. At this stage of the game, understanding is almost as important as an endorsement. K said he was surprised that they were so went as far as they did go. K said he would not make any publicity of this and he showed it only to the President. Kraft said they asked him to get this message to K. K said he talked to Doty. K said if Kraft felt like calling Doty to explain it would help. If Kraft could also assure them that it wasn't made to them in any since as a means of getting public support. When K talked to Kraft, it was just social.

Kxk Kraft said he would call Doty.

By KHLW NAFA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird
6:10 p.m. 11/17/69

Laird wanted to check a couple things before the NSG meeting tomorrow.
His people were somewhat concerned about interpretation that is being
placed on our delegation. K said he was sending a paper out now th
remove any doubt. K. Said Farley called and asked

(missed)

K said he was notifying them that the President has approved Phase 2 and
that they should guide themselves accordingly. Laird thought that would be
the best way to do it. K said he(L) should guide any instructions accordingly.
Laird said the only thing is we may take our time in make it go all the way.
We should go for all the sites. K said he thought it was purely tactical.
K said he would draft the instructions now.

On the Okinawa business that K discussed with Laird, he asked Laird if we
needed Congressional briefings before we issue the communique on Friday.
We can't mention that particular thing. Laird said that they have almost
been promised a briefing. K asked if Laird and Gen. Wheeler could come
and give us strong support. Laird said he would. K said they could say
they feel they can live with this the arrangements that have been made.
Laird said some of our friends will raise hell. K asked if we should let
Russell in on it. Laird didn't think in all the arrangements unless the
President wants to do it quietly. Laird has found him reliable but the
President should do it alone with W Russell. Laird said we couldn't tell
Rivers. We will just have to take the heat from him.

By KHC

NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Elliot Richardson

6:15 p.m.

11/17/69

K wanted R to know that he checked into the Middle East business and Saunders tells him that he did this ...... They don't want to repeat that all the agency positions of last year on the Phantoms. The report on that goes to Sisco. The I. G. will get into the act. The intention was to prevent a State/Defense confrontation. K said he wasn't present when they were discussing the Phantom exercise but but they didn't want to repeat the same problem. This is one of those cases where there is no White House interest. K wanted to tell R that he(K) took it seriously. R said he appreciated it.

R mentioned something about a 24 hour slippage on the Biafra paper. He thought he would send over status of the report and what we are proposing to do. On the relief, R thought we should put in in the form of a report on what he proposed to do but xxx with enough of a lag so if there was a problem, they could feel it out. K said it made no great difference. R thought R had the general guidance. R said he only asked for a report on where we go from here. K said as long as R lets Morris sit in on it. R said Morris met with the group the other day.

K said he wouldn't be able to have lunch on Thursday since he has to talk to the Foreign Service Association. R said that would be a good opportunity to tell how well the operation is going. K said he intended on doing that. K suggested breakfast on Saturday.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
7:05 p.m. 11/17/69

K said he talked to Helms. K said he didn't quite understand the entire situation. He said he didn't believe we should head into a confrontation on this issue. K said he couldn't make a decision but the best course would be for Rogers to go talk to these people on the grounds of national interest. Rogers couldn't very well tell the Foreign Relations committee that they can't know about something an Ambassador negotiated and you can't shift that into intelligence. Rogers asked if K would call Ehrlichman on this and K said he would.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
John Ehrlichman

7:45 p. m. 11/17/69

K said the play *blow up today* at the Symington Committee and said "back to the old drawing board." Fulbright asked if Unger was trying to be a wise guy when he testified. Fulbright asked if we were trying to put everything that an Ambassador does into CIA. Now it is dead center. K said Symington should come up and talk with the President again. K suggested that we let Rogers take a crack at it. Ehrlichman thought this would be the place to make a stand. K said if the Sec. goes in there, at least he will show a position of concern. Ehrlichman said he was sorry it didn't work.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Peter Flanigan
Mr. Kissinger
11/17/69, 8:10 p.m.

F said the Pope came out with a strong statement to a group of visiting
governors strongly supporting the President. K asked if F knew who
the visiting governors were. F said he didn't know, but was trying to
find out. K said that was good and asked if he told the President yet.
F said not yet and let's wait until we get the document tomorrow. K
said now all we have to do is get the "bloody Protestants" moving. F
said I told you want Mendel Rivers said? He said Mendel Rivers said
you can tell one thing about my church -- we never discuss religion or
politics.

By: KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/64

Telecon
Mr. Yoshida

8:10 p.m.

11/17/69

K wanted to discuss the line business -- he wanted to know if there would be any public reference. Y said if it is agreeable, then his friend would be prepared to insert this into the communique(?). K didn't understand and asked "into what". Y said his friend was flexible regarding whether to put it into communique(?) or make it public or some other form. Y asked if K was concerned. K said he didn't know, and said they could leave that to be worked out when Y's friend is here as long as we make it public. Y said he was already in touch with his friend but he was unavailable then. As soon as he made contact, Y would call back.

By KHC NARA, Dato. S/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Yoshida

9:20 p.m. 11/17/69

Y had just spoken to his friend and Y wanted to tell K how his friend felt. First, with regard to Item 2. Y's friend's present thinking is that he would like to go with the present arrangement. K asked what he meant by that. Y said that the present talk should go on and probably the one already started we could hold substantial and fruitful conversations. That was his hope. His friend would rather not to have another one at the same time. K said, the ones that are now going on should be continued? Y said yes. Already his friend has given the specific instructions to his representative and on subsequent questions, however, if as K suggests as a third alternative, if we find that it is rather difficult then we might have some ________? and in the meanwhile we might have thesecond one. K said he wanted it clearly understood that the figures we discussed will be the outcome. Y agreed and said his friend does understand that. His friend very clearly understands the target and was sure that the figures would be achieved. Y's friend said he would like to think this over and asked Y to get in touch with K and himself(Y'sfriend) this time tomorrow. K said that would be o.k. K suggested that Y call about 7:30 p. m. our time. Y said he would do that and in the meanwhile his friend would think it over again and then give K's fix friend a clear answer of intentions so K's friend would have clear ideas by the time they meet. Y said his friend was very much concerned and he would make it quite clear that he cannot(?) expect the Item 2 included in the communique(?) in the specific terms. K said there would be no specific references.-- just the reference that the discussions took place but no figures at all. Y said even the very term must not be mentioned -- that was his friends request. Y said we could use economic problems and said we could refer to Item 3 but not the specific Item 2. K said he understodd. Y asked if we could cooperate with him on this. K said, on the figures of Item2 and the target at the end of December, that was understood. Y said that was right, but tomorrow he would talk with his friend and make it quite clear to him and give very definite reply to K by tomorrow evening.

With respect to Item 1, Y said he greatly appreciates and understands what K told him. K said Y should make sure that after the acceptance of Version 3, Y's friend then goes on to raise the question of the line automatically without being invited. Y said and also he would raise Item 4. K said he was prepared for that, except that we didn't want Item 4 mentioned in the talks -- that would be handled separately. Y said that was clearly understandable and he would make it clear to his friend.

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Yoshida

10:55 a. m.

11/18/69

K said he was working on Item 1 and there is no problem except K wanted to make sure we get the sequence straight. After Y's friend proposes his compromise and after K's friend .... Y said, plan 3? K said yes -- after K's friend accepts 2, then how the question is how to get a transition to line question. K said he would suggest that his friend ask Y's friend how this clause would be carried out in practice. K said he was not talking about 3, where it says "without prejudice." Y's friend should suggest, you know what I mean? Y said he was not quite clear of what K was talking about and asked him to repeat.

K said his friend will accept Item 3. In Item 3 there is a clause which we considered important. Y remembered. K said his friend will say "how do we carry this out in practice" and Y's friend should say "well, may I suggest perhaps the line." Y said, his friend would suggest why don't we set up a new line and we could carry this out. K said he could do it as he proposes his formula. K asked if that was possible. Y said he should think so but he would check with his friend this evening.

After discussing when the call would be made this evening, K suggested that Y call him about 8:00 this evening. Y agreed.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/69

Telecon
Secretary Laird

11:55 a. m. 11/18/69

K wanted to discuss the NSC meeting. #1 K said he was going to ask General Wheeler to give facts of what strikes we have. When they get into the policy, K said he would make sure the President calls on Laird first. On the BW, K's view was that we should keep R&D for decision positions(?).

Laird said the thing about it is that this paper deals with some important issues down the line -- it doesn't address the basic question -- what kind of weapons, strategic or ______ that have conversion capability. Laird didn't think biological warfare is a strategic weapon. K said that would be brought out at the meeting. There will be no affirmative decision for any BW program.

#2, the President keeps driving K crazy, and he is right, on cutting down the number of contract personnel in Vietnam. We have been hung up on that since Laird's people interpret contract work as only under direct contract and the President wants to include American firms and secondly, he would like to reduce the number of personnel in Saigon drastically. If we don't show some action, he will order a 50% cut. Laird said we also have some communications people there. He wants the communications and contract people cut back? K said that was right. K said he put out an order on November 15, which the President requested. K said he sent it to State and nothing has been done as yet - although there hasn't been any action yet much time. The President is concerned and K thought that Laird was the only one who could do something. K received a list from one of Laird's asst. sec. of the number of contract personnel in the sub-contract category. The President swears it has to be done. K said. K asked if Laird could let him know about that in about a week.

By KHLNARA, Dato. 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Stans
11/18/69 2:35p.m.

S wanted to know about the petition signed by 51 members of the Senate and 193 members of the House, to the President asking him to tell State that we want the textile matter straightened out. K said he would take care of it. K said there was another matter he needed to discuss. S asked if K wanted any publicity on these petitions or are they entirely for internal use. S said this question had been raised on the Hill. K said he would let S know in the morning. K said he had some people in his office now but wanted to talk with S about something else. K asked where S was. S was in Arthur Burns' office; said he would come by K's office at 3:15.

By KHL NARA, Dalo. 5/12/64

TELECON

Senator Symington
Mr. Kissinger

November 18, 1969 -- 3:25 p.m.

Senator Symington apologized for having forgotten about his talk with K concerning Unger's appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. When he was called to the effect that State understood that Helms was to talk for Unger, Symington had told them that was correct.

Symington said he had gone to Jefferson City on Monday to make a talk. Fulbright had asked the question, and he had said he didn't think it was right; therefore Fulbright delayed the session until 4:00 so Symington could make it. Symington did make it to the hearing.

When the hearing got going, Symington said he had kept quiet. Fulbright shifted it to a full Committee hearing. Unger had responded that he could not answer. Fulbright told Symington that 'in all his years on the Committee [20-odd], this had been the first time an Ambassador could not talk about details of a country with which we were not at war, in Executive Session of this committee.'

Rogers came up today and said there had been a misunderstanding and it would be cleared up. Symington repeated that he had been so damn busy he had forgotten and did not pass it on.

K asked what Rogers and Fulbright had worked out today. Symington said he did not know -- it had come up before the hearings started, and Symington had been late. However, later Fulbright said in passing to Symington that it had come up; that Rogers said there was a misunderstanding which could be worked out.

Symington said, on another matter -- the Laos hearings, it will have been a month the end of this week since he asked for the insertions for the record. Symington asked Rogers about it, and he said he would get on it again. Defense sent the sanitized copy to State sometime back. Symington jokingly said it was probably under K's desk. K said it was not, to which K replied "no; he doesn't get it; he doesn't censor it; he doesn't even look at it." Symington said he had been fishing a little -- he had heard it was at the White House. K said he didn't believe that either; some people appear to be trying to promote a fight between us and the Foreign Relations Committee. K said the position he has taken is that the relationship the Committee has is with the State Department. Symington asked K to do him a favor: do not mention his call to K, but check this back through. K said he would but he was

*

By: KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

- Z -

certain we don't have it. He didn't know whether Ehrlichman had it, but if so, he would be amazed. He thought it was at State.

Symington said he didn't want to get anybody in trouble, but he thinks the President has problems coming up. Symington doesn't think Vietnamization will work -- he doesn't think those guys will fight. He changed to this opinion in 1966, but he has been very quiet. However, it will give the KNDXX President lots of problems if he is correct. None of this is his problem. Everybody is getting increasingly suspicious because the Committee doesn't have any transcript back at all.

He reiterated that it had been his fault about the other -- Fulbright smelled it and turned it into a full Committee hearing. Unger said he couldn't answer, and Symington felt he was right in this because Unger had his instructions.

K repeated that he doesn't have it, but he would see what he could do. If it is here, he would get it into channels immediately. As for the rest, K said he would like to be a friend to both parties and give his advice. When the President has an overwhelming interest, K said he (K) goes into action. As it is, the President expressed his particular concerns to Symington, and Symington left it up to them. Symington said Rogers had said he might make a statement expressing their appreciation.

K said for Symington not to misunderstand his position. He has no formal responsibility for this in the White House -- Ehrlichman is handling it. However, he could put a word in here and there. He would intercede with Ehrlichman. Symington said he had talked with Bryce Harlow who asked what the time element was. Symington had told him there was none specifically; they would just like to get it rolling.

lds

By KHL NARA, Dated 5/13/64

Telecon
Senator Javits

11/18/69 5:40 p.m.

J said K said he wanted to see Sadruddin Kahn. K said he didn't want to see him, but would be willing to. J wanted to know if K was free later on tonight. K said no. J asked if K wanted to see him at the office. K said yes. J said he would be seeing him tonight, at the Swiss Embassy. J said he would have his secretary work it out with K's secretary.

J said incidentally Bill Rogers had an interesting time at the committee. J said he got a revealing of the real issues. K said and what are the real issues. J said what the President has said in his speech, just what that commits us to and how it operates. J said he dealt with that question rather frontally, and others including the dangers which any policy involves. J said he was sure K would be hearing about it. K appreciated J's telling him.

K asked if J would be coming in with Sadruddin Kahn. J said however Kahn prefers.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/64

Telecon
Secretary Laird

11/18/69 5:50 p.m.

L wanted to make K aware of something for briefing the P. L said the force level in Vietnam is below 490. K noticed that yesterday. L hopes we don't go too far below 484--we probably will get down to 479. K said not to go too far below that, 479--we want to save for the next cut. K said he would go much below 480. L said he tried to get them to doctor their figures, but once we get the momentum going . . .

K said on the CBW thing . . . L said don't call it CBW; that's what the opponents call it. K said anyway, he would run that guidance past L. K wanted to make sure it's what L had in mind. K asked L if he could send over some legislative strategy. L said the problem is this has never been done--L has been working on this for 16 years, and they've never been able to get anybody to address himself to this. L said this would be useful--it's important to develop a few positions down the line like this. K said he would send over a draft. L said both on public affairs and legislative side. Then we can issue instructions, and L thinks we can keep everybody quiet until this thing comes out. L said they would try to get it released this weekend.

K asked if L went along with the Geneva protocol thing; L said yes, but we shouldn't get tear gas mixed up with the protocol thing. K said he would make sure in the NSDM to leave no doubt about the President's feeling about that. K asked if L had noticed what K put out yesterday on ABM. L said yes, very good.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Ambassador Lodge
11/18/69 6:00 p.m.

K said they were on an open line, so he would circumscribe the thing. K said on the matter they discussed yesterday, we are ready to move this week. K asked if L could backchannel to him a draft of what L would like to have said. And K said he would backchannel to L a response, and then L can tell K whether it's satisfactory. L said fine, he would do it first thing in the morning. K said he would talk to L on the secure line tomorrow.

L asked if K had gotten L's backchannel wire. K said yes. L said he just thought it would be helpful. K said he agrees with L's basic judgment about familiarity. L said he thought any other way would be impossible for the P.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Prof. Doty
11/18/69 6:10 p.m.

D said K should hurry home to Cambridge. D had just come from a faculty meeting in which they voted to institute partial representation in selecting faculty members on the faculty council. K didn't understand what D was talking about. D said the faculty council--the cabinet of the dean--determined through proportional representation, every body on the faculty gets a list of the new members and can vote. K asked why he should hurry home to that. D said because we need your vote. K said that was very nice.

D just wanted to say a word on the following point on this business tomorrow. D is quite in the middle here. D said he would like 30 minutes tomorrow instead of just 15. D is bringing along Sid Durrell; D said it would be helpful to do it for a few minutes without Larry Lynn. D said there was a matter of clearance--D perhaps would have to absent himself. K said oh the hell with it, you can stay. K asked if D had an agenda; D said yes; K said good, then he would count on D to lead it, because he doesn't have an agenda.

K asked if D had talked with K's friends about the Kraft thing, and told them that there was no intention of publicizing it. D said yes, they were all very pleased, except George was the most pessimistic about it, but everybody was okay. K asked what George thought K would do. D didn't know; George and D aren't getting along very well lately, D doesn't know what he's doing. K said that kind of thing is not very tempting to come back to. D said no there were other ways he'd rather spend his life than fighting with his colleagues.

D said he would be in with Durrell about 5:30. K asked if they had anything personal to discuss. D said he didn't think so, but if there were anything, he would just stay for a few minutes after the meeting, or stay over night, but he didn't think that would be necessary--D thought they ought to devote themselves to this problem.

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Admiral Moorer

11/18/69 6:35 p.m.

M called inviting K to the Army/Navy football game on November 29. M said K would be back by about 6:00 in the evening; take a train and come into Union Station. K said that was very nice. M said he could bring along a guest of his choosing. K asked if M would be shocked if he brought a girl. M said he would be disappointed if he didn't. K said as much as he loves the Navy, he was in the Army, so M would have K on the wrong side. But K said he thought he could compromise-- he had always wanted to go to the Army/Navy game. M said it is quite a spectacle. K said he would have to see what he would be doing on the 29th, if the P would need him. K xx asked if he could call M back; M said sure.

By KCLW NARA, Dalo. 5/12/64

Telecon
Mr. Yoshida

11/20/69 8:10 a.m.

Y said he just wanted to confirm to K that he had spoken to his friend this morning again, and Y's friend fully understands and will stick to the scenario on which Y and K agreed. Y said there will be no change in any substantive sense. Y said there might be some difference of nuance or wording--Y would like to have K prepare his friend for this. K said yes, but there will be no difference in substance. Y said no, that will be at the tête-à-tête meeting and we will stick to the scenario on which Y and K agreed. Y said there has been no misunderstanding.

K said he appreciated Y's meticulousness, and K said we will act accordingly. K said we would understand slight deviations, but no substantive ones.

Y said this particular ________ will not be included in the joint communique. K said we will do it this afternoon.

Y said his friend would appreciate it if item 3--Y's friend knows it has to be mentioned in the J.C.--but in as general and abstract a way as possible. K said he would do his best.

Y said his friend understands that it is better to get things down than just to have an exchange of words. K agreed; said it would be helpful if Y's friend would say this to K's friend just so we have something to act on.

Y said yes, thank you. Y said he would call back this afternoon--he wants to see if everything has gone well. K said he should call about 6:15.

By KHC NARA, Dato. 5/12/04

Telecon
The President

11/19/69 3:30 p.m.

The P asked K how it went over there. K said it went very well. K told Bill they had sent a message from Blair House that he wanted a minute along with the P. K had left something there that was the essence of Johnson's secret minute. The P asked if he knows the minute exists. K said yes, he told Johnson the P just decided this will be best. K said the P wants to help Sato. The P said he knew this would work out; he kept checking with them. The P said if you let him know in a little you don't have to let him know on all.

The P said he had set this thing up for Tuesday morning. K said he thought the P didn't want to have the Congressional meeting. The P said, no on the BCW, Bryce thought it would be a good idea just to have a breakfast.

K said he was not sure we should make a big production of the NPT, because the Soviets aren't. K said they plan simply to make a press announcement. The P said failing to have a signing isn't going to be noticed there, but it sure is going to be noticed here. The P said we could just have a small one, not bother with Johnson. K said we don't want to give them the impression that we were begging for an agreement. The P said he guessed K was right--let's not have a ceremony. The P said he would justANNOUNGE sign it and announce it. The P said Aiken, Mansfield, and Fulbright know it's going to be done. The P said K might call them; say we found that the Soviets prefer just a press announcement, so we're just going to sign it. Then we can make more of the meeting the next morning. The P said on that bacteriological thing, we have an awfully good case. The P said KANNOUNCE should make him a talking paper on that for Tuesday morning. And K should call Fulbright, Aiken and Mansfield about breakfast Tuesday morning. The P said maybe we don't have to tell them what the breakfast is going to be about. K said we could just say, a review of disarmament. The P said call it a consideration of a review of disarmament. The P said he would just sign the darn thing, and then announce it. We would get the credit for it anyway.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/69

Telecon
David Rockefeller

6:20 p.m. 11/19/69

On the Middle East thing, Rockefeller thought it was getting rather serious. The people at Standard Oil (Ken Jamison - Chairman of the Board) and Mobile (Wally Warner) have put together statement and would very much like to see *with* see the President. He suggested over the weekend. K said over the weekend would be almost impossible and asked if it could wait until next week. The President is all involved in the Sato visit and the negotiations are very complicated. He hasn't had a chance to focus on anything else and K said he would be able to even raise it with the President until after the meetings are over.

K said he would raise it and call Rockefeller as soon as he could get an answer.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
U. Alexis Johnson
11/19/69; 7:15 p.m.

K said he heard there was a donnybrook about textiles and he wanted to know who raised it. J said Sato did. He raised it in connection with the economic section of the communique. J said at Geneva they put in a proposal which offers some hope and it is a very complicated thing. J said it is not acceptable on the face of it but it is something we can discuss. J said we just got it by telephone. J said if at Geneva our delegation were able to say(see?) something forthcoming we could consider, subject to the President, not having textiles as such in the communique. K asked if J would be willing to live with that. J said yes if we can get something out of Geneva. J further said it would have to be a statement at Geneva that the President would be able to use with the leadership tomorrow. K said don't worry about the leadership. It is Friday morning now. K asked if J was thinking of an agreement in Geneva. J said no, not an agreement but that we are making progress.

J said, while I've got you Henry, concerning that paper that you gave the Secretary -- the Japanese don't even have a copy in English. K said but they brought it in. J said but it was their only copy in English and wanted to know if it was okay to give them a copy. K said he had no objection. K said I am sure they won't object to smoothing out the English. J said the English I gave you is a little bit better from their standpoint. K said I told him (President?), as you told me, if he thought he could carry it with the leadership you would not insist on the last two sentences and he accepted that. J said that's okay. J asked if K was going to tell Mel of the language. K said DOD is my problem and I promise that they will be quiet. K said I will tell him that you have the agreed language and that is it.

K said you come over with the Secretary, about a quarter to 8:00. K said I will see you at the reception

K said I want to avoid leaks that things aren't going well. J said I wouldn't characterize it as a donnybrook. J said he (Sato?) was resisting putting anything about the economic situation in the communique. J said he was concentrating on the textile portion and he did not want that in.

K said I told Wheeler what the outcome was. I told him he had to be at the meeting and he should support us. K said that J better plan to be at the meeting. J said okay. K said I have not seen the list but I imagine can't imagine him doing it without you. K said I will recommend that he make a statement and then leave it up to you and the Secretary.

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/12/69

Telecon
Secretary Stans

7:20 p. m. 11/19/69

K said we may have to make Stans the villian tomorrow. State is going to be bugging us tonight on (1) they want to say there has been some progress in Geneva in order to be able to ______ textiles in the communique. K said he didn't object as long as Stans doesn't give up on comprehensive (?) Stans may say there has been some progress as long as he doesn't give in. He added, just for Stans' information, that they agreed to Stans' proposal. (2) The Japanese want to handle it at Geneva for awhile. They want us to ask for a tougher line than the one they are willing to settle for. Stans should come in on option A. Stans said he would not back down. K said he would be behind Stans. Stans wanted to clarify -- we will continue discussions on the basis of 1968 level ..... K said until they come in with compromise. Stans said he only wanted to know how it is going to come out. K asked if Stans would police the report tonight. He said he would.

*

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Marilyn Berger

7:35 p.m. 11/19/69

Berger wanted K to comment on a letter that Sterobin had given to Sen. Fulbright regarding Sterobin's contacts with Kissinger and his trips to Vietnam to talk with Thuy. Sterobin said he had been in to see HAK and told K of his forthcoming trip to Vietnam and that K asked him to report back. Sterobin supposedly had private meetings with Thuy at which time Thuy told him if we would withdraw 100,000 troops, they would talk to us about some of the U. S. proposals. K indicated that Sen. Goodell had called him about Sterobin and asked if K would see him. K did, as he would anyone who had contacts in Vietnam. He listened to Sterobin and said he would be interested in hearing about his trip when Sterobin returned. K told Berger that Sterobin brought nothing back that we hadn't already tried in ohter more efficient channels. Berger asked if Sterobin was the man or contact the President referred to in his speech. K said he would not answer that question and not because he didn't want to deny or admit, but that people would keep dropping names on him and eventually make him hedge on a name. Berger mentioned something that Sterobin said Thuy had announced to newsmen. Berger was there and Thuy didn't say what Sterobin claims. She asked K if Sterobin was reliable. K said he had no reason to believe that he was or wasn't -- K had only seen the man twice. Berger asked if she could quote K or a WH source and K said no only if she wanted to mention that K had seen him twice, listened to him in the hope of picking up something new. K added that he may have left himself open for criticism for doing that.

By: KLW NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

Telecon
Robert McNamara
7:40 p.m. 11/19/69

M wanted to know if the President and Sato had gotten on the(?) subject.

K said no -- they spent the whole time discussing Okinawa. They will
discuss it in the morning.

M said he had to go to the UN tomorrow but he would have someone in
his office arrangement an appointment with him(?) on Friday.

K said he would mention to him(?) that it would be appreciated if the
appointment could be made if it would be helpful. M said it would.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/64

Telecon
Mr. Yoshida

7:45 p.m. 11/19/69

Y had spoken to his friend in detail and he understood and appreciated it. However, he has his own particular difficulty on the statement and asked said he would like to think this one over at dinner tonight. He would like to call Y after the dinner at which time Y would then call K. Y urged his friend to proceed exactly along the lines K suggested and his friend said he would seriously consider this over dinner.

K said he must tell Y that it would really shake our confidence if now that we did something that was so difficult for us, it turned out that something was agreed and understood on many occasions, were changed. Y said as soon as he heard from his friend, he would get in touch with K. K said he must call at any time. K said he would be home about midnight and Y could call him at home. (K gave Y his home phone number and if he received no answer Y was to call the WH switchboard and ask for Dr. Jones.

K said that Y really must convey to his friend. This is not a subject which K understood, therefore he had no personal interest in it. K said we have staked our prestige with our own people here on the proposition that we could deal satisfactorily with you and it would be unfortunate consequence if it did not work. Y said he personally understood the implications. His friend understood and appreciated it. He only asked for time to think about it again. K asked if any reason K said Y must call K no matter what the answer is. Y agreed that it must be made clear before tomorrow morning.

By KLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Elliot Richardson

9:20 a.m. 11/20/69

K could not reach the Secretary this morning and had to go upstairs so K wanted R to get to the Secretary. Lodge wants to resign and the time has sneaked up on us faster than K thought it would. Lodge wanted it announced today. Richardson said, "Oh, no." K asked what he meant by that and Richardson said he was just surprised and asked who the replacement would be. K said we didn't have one yet. When Richardson asked where it stood, K said it was a stalemate at this point. Jokingly, K said if Richardson doesn't watch himself, we will put Strausz-Hupe in there. Richardson had heard various names mentioned, though for a replacement. K didn't think there was a problem since we could announce a replacement in two weeks.

K wanted Richardson to tell the Secretary also that Scranton said Walsh wants his resignation to be announced at the same time. Richardson didn't think that would be such a good idea -- it would look as though the whole delegation was giving up. K indicated that Walsh's resignation could wait but we wouldn't mind if it looked that way for a few weeks.

By KHLW NARA, Dalo 5/12/69

Telecon
Secretary Rogers
10:10 am 11/20/69

Rogers said he had talked to the President and he didn't want it(?) in. Rogers was only trying to help. K said the President has great confidence based on his association with Sato that Sato will be helpful. If Sato is helpful, the President said what he wants is substance and doesn't care about the communique. Rogers told the President that he didn't see any reason to use the word "textiles" in the communique. Rogers though we should keep the pressure on. The only reason the meetings are going on in Geneva is to keep the pressure. Rogers indicated that this is subject to legislative support and we can use Congressional support as weapon. K agreed with Rogers' judgment. K said if we can go through this agony with Okinawa, we might as well strengthen the other(?) Alex Johnson came on the line and said we have been bargaining with them and they respect this. Johnson didn't think they resented it. K said if Sato is reasonable with the President, Johnson should yield on textiles. Rogers was under the impression the President wanted to hold economic section out. It is important for the Congressional people who normally are against reversion idea that he is going to be. It will be more liberal on trade(?). K said that Kendall hit Johnson with that one. Rogers felt that position should be left in but as far as textiles, he didn't care. Johnson was hoping to get a statement of some kind out of Geneva and would not make that conditional. K said unless Sato is really obnoxious with the President this morning, so that the President feels he has to show some teeth -- if he shows any movement at all...... After the President and Rogers talked, the President said to Kissinger who happened to be in the room, he said he wanted the substance - and didn't care about the words. Kissinger's impression is this is an issue in which all he could do is take Stans' view, and break the lock. The President feels as strongly as Stans -- he agrees to get comprehensive agreement. Rogers said the President told him this morning that he didn't care about textiles. K indicated that the President thought Rogers was talking about the joint communique. Rogers said you either indicate to the Japanese that we are serious about textiles and mean it or you give impression we are just going through the paces. Rogers has tried to be firm. K said that he can only interpret what he wants and it was something close to what Stans recommended. Rogers didn't think Stans would get what he wants. Johnson added, very frankly, not in the wayjStans was going about it. Rogers said he doesn't make a good case. K suggested they wait and see what comes out of the meeting this morning. K said he would be seeing Johnson at the Foreign Service luncheon and K would brief Johnson.

*

By: KL V NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K asked if Johnson had a chance to mention the hot line to Rogers. Johnson hadn't as yet.

About tomorrow morning, Rogers suggested that Laird and Wheeler be there. K said he had already asked them. Johnson asked if he could surface the communique language and K said yes. Wheeler's basic recommendation was against it but now they are satisfied. On nuclear re-entry, Rogers thought they should say the President made a decision and now they are satisfied -- also consultations and treaty language. K indicated that he had told Wheeler that the President expects support on this and it is a high priority WH concern. Johnson asked if there was agreement on the hot line and K said yes but they don't want it in the communique. K said he would send over the record of conversation.

K said they would release the resignations today. They were satisfied with the Walsh letter. K asked if they were satisfied with the Walsh letter. With the content, yes Rogers said but wanted to know if the President was content with it. K said he was.

On Sterobin, K indicated that he was not a mediary. K attached so little importance to his visit. He came in to see K having seen Thuy. Goodell had introduced him. All K wanted to be able to say is that we didn't turn someone off who might have had something. He brought nothing new. When Sterobin said that Sterobin Thuy was prepared to meet privately, private meetings were already going on. Rogers suggested that these people who come off the street should be screamed by Marshall Green. When Rogers or K see them, they place much more importance on it. K agreed. When Sterobin called and said he was on the West Coast and had just returned from a trip, K saw him. Sterobin went back to Paris on his own and came back with another speech with the statement about 100,000 troop withdrawals.

K only wanted to give Rogers the background on this.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/64

Telecon
Senator Fulbright

12:05 p. m.

11/20/69

K meant to call Fulbright some time ago. K knew Fulbright was in hearings. K wanted to explain about Sterobin. Fulbright said it arose in the hearings yesterday. K was calling just for Fulbright's information and asked if F was aware of who Sterobin was. Fulbright explained the letter he sent to him which enclosed the article in the Post. K explained that Goodell had introduced him to K. S saw Thuy in Paris and it is K's policy to see anyone who has been in touch with the North Vietnamese. We never used him as an intermediary. K said he just listens and doesn't tell them whether they are telling us anything new or not. S told K he ask was going back and K told S that he was always glad to hear what tookplace. K indicated that he had given S no message. S came back with something that we already had already done and it was not accurate account. K suggested Fulbright look at the UN speech. Wwz The President mentioned things in the speech which would have brought out what they were saying if it were true and we had no response. K said (a) Sterobin had nothing we didn't already have and (b) we did respond to it in a number of ways and it turned out to be there was nothing to it. K said he was not calling Fulbright to turn off any comments Fulbright might wish to make,, but if there was an opportunity to talk personally, K would give Fulbright the full picture. K indicated that if we wanted to have a mediator, we would use somebody who was known by both sides. We have a number of those people available. We wouldn't use somebody who just walked in off the street. Sterobin hadn't even seen Thuy for 15 years. Fulbright mentioned something about the report by Sainteny. K didn't want to get into it now but said he would go over to Fulbrights office next week and talk more. When Sterobin's story was investigated it got more complicated. Sterobin didn't know that since we didn't indicate anything to him. Fulbright asked if K was saying that there was nothing to Sainteny's report. K said there has not been any movement yet. K said if you do what they ask, it doesn't guarantee you have a deal. Fulbright mentioned the criticism about the transitional provisional government. K said that was a very difficult thing and if it were analyzed, it wasn't at all new. It just isn't what it seems to be when you explore it. To Fulbright it was a very difficult point. K said it was not being taken lightly. Fulbright mentioned Laird's testimony. K said that Mel was describing one contact and there is another contact(? ). Fulbright said that was the one he was trying to get at. Fulbright asked Rogers briefly and Rogers didn't want to discuss it. K said that Sterobin vastly over-rates his own importance. K suggested again that he come in and discuss this matter again, but wanted to do it on a personal basis without any press.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/04

Fulbrights only point is, while he recognizes that Vietnamization is better than what it was, he felt there has not been as much emphasis on negotiations. Mel put so much confidence on the negotiations and Fulbright was to shift the emphasis. That was his purpose in raising this question. He said K could see the record. There is great skepticism by Church and Symington. K said he was questioning how the hearings were being conducted.

K suggested he come over to discuss this with Fulbright. F wanted him to and asked if a few other members of the committee could be present. K said yes as long as it doesn't get into the papers. Fulbright agreed.

By K.L. NARA, Date. 5/12/64

Telecon
Secretary Laird

4:25 p.m. 11/20/69

Laird wanted to let K know that Russell, Stenis and Margaret Smith are probably going to be rather adverse to Okinawa. Laird had lunch with them today. There is no vote in the Senate but they will oppose anyway unless we have a commitment from the Japanese to take over the defense in Asia.

K asked if Laird was going to support us at the Congressional briefing tomorrow. Laird said of course. K asked if Laird had seen the communique language. He said he saw the earlier version and asked if therewere any changes. K asked if Laird thought he should talk to Russell before. Laird didn't think it would be necessary. K suggested that Laird could say that under the consultation provision in the communique, we have a right to ask for going back in there.

Laird mentioned amemo he received from Mayo in which Mayo outlines a meeting that the President, Ehrlichman, Mayo and Kissinger had on Saturday. In the memo, instead of the 72.5 figure, Mayo says it will have to go to 70 billion. K was very upset and said this fellow cannot get the message. K was at the meeting, and the President specifically K suggested to the President that he(K) would work with Laird on this to get it to 72.5. Mayo kept pushing for 70. Laird said he was working on it, but he is getting the idea that we are disarming without SALT(?). K said the President made it clear that he considers this decilion in a special category. Laird said he would send the memo to K as chairman of the committee. Laird indicated that he hadn't even circulated the 72.5 around the building yet. K said Mayo did exactly the opposite. K told Mayo 72.5 we could talk about but 70 was unreasonable. Laird said we had some tough decisions here to make. Mayo has Laird getting all forces out by 72 budget and Laird doesn't want to go to Congress and ask for a supplement on Vietnam. K asked him to have it hand carried over and to give him some idea of what would happen if Laird tried to implement the 70. Laird said instead of going 500,000 men we would have to go 1 million in one year.

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/13/64

Telecon
Secretary Laird

11/20/69 5:08 p.m.

K wanted to tell L that he talked to Fulbright earlier about Starobin and he said L was superb. So you must have done something wrong, K said. Fulbright told K he disagreed with L's Vietnamization approach, but he said it was the best statement he's ever heard. Fulbright said L did a splendid job--I disagree--but it was the best I've heard. K said he had told the President. L said he had heard some nice things. L said Cooper sent a nice note and so did Symington. K said well, congratulations. L said thanks.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
General Wheeler

11/20/69 5:48 p.m.

K wanted to check with W on the Congressional briefing tomorrow; asked if W was going to be there. W said yes. K wanted to ask for whatever help W can give to make it look as good as possible. W said he would do his best. K said when we talk about nuclear things, W could refer to the consultation provision in the communique. W said he would. K said he knew this was unnecessary, but he was just touching all bases. W understood.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Rogers

pp/x 11/20/69 6:03 p.m.

K wanted to check in with R. K said he told Alex Johnson what he knows on what went on this morning. K said the President thinks Sato agreed to use his personal influence to get a comprehensive agreement. K is now going to get from Stans what Stans considers a reasonable agreement, and Sato will take it from there. R said you want to bet? K said do I want to bet what, that Sato will deliver? R said he doesn't think we'll ever get all the minds involved together. K said he's not part of that one; he doesn't have anything in his mind. K said if the Japanese gave him a blank piece of paper and said write what you want, it would still be blank. R said well we don't have to worry for the moment.

K said Sato told the P he would see that the Geneva talks led somewhere. K said he even made a rather concrete proposal. Sato said we should agree in Geneva, keep the agreement secret, then the Japanese would call a GATT meeting at which to say what we agreed on in Geneva. R said he's got a problem, because his Diet says he can't enter into discussions. R said they are willing to enter into it when we can show that American industry has been harmed. R said you know that would be quite a while. K said the P's impression is that Sato is willing to go far as long as it's after the election. R said well, we still have a lot of bargaining power. R said we must get congressional approval. K said the P has broken his back to meet his commitment. R said we have lots of ways to put pressure on if necessary.

K said he had talked to Laird and Wheeler to make sure that they would support the P. K said we are going to have to be a tough time. K said that Stennis, Margaret Smith and ______ were going to be tough on reversion. R said that was surprising about Smith, but he guessed she was just sticking to the military line. K said but Wheeler said he would be there and support us.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCON
Mr. Yoshida
Mr. Kissinger

6:15 p.m., 11-20-69

K said how are you? Y said fine thank you. Y asked how did things go this morning? Was your friend satisfied? K said my friend is not absolutely sure what he means. Your friend did not follow the script exactly. For example, he did not say agreement would be made by the end of December. Y said I must check with him. It was absolutely clear to him and he understood that he would (could not hear).

K said and he did not use the word comprehensive. Y said that is very strange. K said otherwise he said pretty much what he was supposed to. Y said how does your friend feel about this? K said he feels it depends now on the good faith and he performed his part yesterday which was very difficult for him because we have our own problems tomorrow. And I must tell you quite honestly that if my understanding proved incorrect our channel will be useless. K said that is alright, that does not have to be but it would affect the trust. K said the issue itself is not of importance of the other one except my friend has problems with it.

Y said my friend feels it is very important. I made it quite clear to my friend that your friend had a personal problem. Y said I don't quite understand why he did not follow script. K said he may still intend to do this. Y said I will check with my friend immediately. My friend will honor the understanding. K said could you confirm this to me because I cannot afford to look silly in front of our bureaucracy and we have to give instructions tomorrow. K said if it turns out he will not be able to honor understanding, we have to know this.

Y said I appreciate your point. After all, this channel must (garbled). Y said what are the points you would like me to discuss with him. K said I just want to make sure that the piece of paper with you with the precise figures and dates will be honored so that we can give instructions to our people to ask for more. If it will not be honored, you will pay a price in degree of trust will have in our arrangement. K said that is the decision you must make. K said you must have a clear answer of what was our understanding and will it, in fact, be carried out.

Y said in order to avoid any misunderstanding, would you repeat it. I said I want to make sure your friend wants to carry out to a degree by end of December, figures I gave you a few weeks ago and which you told me were agreeable on Saturday.

By: KL V NARA, Dato_5/12/04

Y said that was my understanding and I will check with my friend. K said I do not doubt it. It is just that he did not use the key words. My friend said he gave him three opportunities and he never came back to it and did not give deadline. Y said I will check with my friend. K said when are you calling your friend? Y said in about 30 minutes. K said you can reach me through official number here, 456-1414 until 9 PM my time and ask for Dr. Jones. Y said will you please take steps so that I can immediately reach you. K said yes, I will. Y said until 9 PM your time? K said until 9 PM and from 11:30 p. m. on you can call me at that other number I gave you yesterday. Y said I think I should be able to get in touch with you in an hour's time. Y asked if K had any other comments. K said no. Y said alright, alright, you will hear from me.

mlh

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Assistant Secretary DePalma

11/21/69 10:40 a.m.

K just made a finding that the UN construction is critical for our
foreign policy. Ehrlichman is going to approve it on those grounds.
K expects it to be supported in that language out of D's shop. D
asked when is it going ahead? K said right now; D could tell Charlie
Yost. D said in the language that was in the President's message?
K said yes. D said thanks, that's great.

By KHC NARA, Dale 5/12/04

Telecon
Asst. Sec'y. DePalma

11/21/69 11:20 a.m.

D wanted to check on one thing; one thing they have to do is to inform certain people on the Hill--the question is bound to arise--is the President's name to be invoked? K said D could say that the White House approved it. D said, refrain from using his name, but say the White House approved it? K said but not the P himself.

By KHC NARA, Dated 5/12/64

Telecon
Frank Lincoln

11/21/69 2:45 p.m.

K asked what had been done about the Union League Club. L said he told them K would come if he could make it. K asked if they couldn't switch it to the afternoon. L said no, it's a luncheon group. L told them that K preferred later; they asked if we could persuade K to make it for lunch. L asked if there was anything he could to help K-- make it easier for K to get there for lunch. K said he will get a military plane. L said they can have a car at the airport to pick K up and take him back again. L said to have Sally or someone call. L said he hates to impose on K like this. K said that's okay, but L just has to realize that K's life is precarious. L said yes, in many ways. K asked who would be there, how many people. L said about 350 would be there; lunch would be at 12:30. They would like for K to speak for about 15 minutes and then questions and answers.

L said by the way, while he had K on the phone, L said nothing about his memo to K and the P. L doesn't think we should. K agreed and said he wouldn't mention it.

cc: Jon
Sally

*

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Secretary Laird

11/21/69 3:50p.m.

K was calling about the atrocity case; the President wants to make sure L got on top of that--got a game plan. K said it was going to be a terrible mess. L said he's got the thing on his desk--the General is going to request that we give him a trail. K said he didn't object to that. L said he thinks the guy is going to plead insanity, and L thinks he'll get off. L asked if K had the pictures. K said no. L asked if K would like to look at them. K said should I? L said K might as well not. They're pretty terrible. L said what can you do? L said it didn't happen in our watch and we're going to make that clear before the Fulbright committee. K said Haldeman heard that the Army is trying to impound the pictures-- that can't be done. L said the pictures belong to the guy so we can't do anything with them. L said _______________ only said he would appreciate not doing anything with them until after the trail because they would prejudice the trial. But L said they're already published in the Cleveland Plain Dealer. L said some of the press wants us to give them out, but we're not going to. K said no, we don't want you to. That's right. L said the Sargeant has already given them out. L said about a game plan, he's like to sweep the whole thing under the rug, but you can't do that. K said we just need some unified line. L said he's going to say that he discovered it in March; he was shocked; he ordered a full investigation. L said but under the orders in Vietnam, only someone who had lost his sanity could carry out such an act. L said let me send you what I sent to Fulbright. L said it would be released Monday or Tuesday. L said he thought about how to sweep it under the rug. K said we can't do that. L said these are lousy looking things. L said those boys had been suffering terribly; one of their boys had been killed just 24 hours before. L said you can understand a little bit of this, but you shouldn't kill that many. L said there are so many kids just laying there; these pictures are authentic. L said he didn't know what to do; it bothers him, but he doesn't know what to do. K said he wondered if we could establish a press policy for DOD, and L should send the requests over to K. L said yes.

K said he thought the Okinawa things went okay. L said he may send a game plan. L said we've got all kinds of problems with this atrocity thing, but we've got to be careful that we don't take on everybody on the Vietnam war thing. L said he thinks we can sell a lot of young people and other people if they know what our policy is. L said we would be left holding the bag after about 12 months. L said we've got to be careful that we don't overdo these things. L said the major problem in the minds of Americans is Vietnam, but if we keep up this way we're going to affect

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By KHC NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

Telecon
Laird

11/21/69 3:50 p.m.

p. 2

what we're trying to do in Vietnam. L has written up some notes; maybe K should see them. K said he would love to see them. L said it's the long-term thing you have to look at. L said they'll be ready to jump on you. L said if you polarize people on this . . . you can only get 22% of Americans. L said look at Goldwater on those speeches. L said we've made our point; we ought to let it ride a little bit. K said right, if you could let me see those notes, I basically agree with you.

*

TELCON
The President
Mr. Kissinger
6:07 p.m., 11-22-69

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/13/04

K said Mr. President. P said the meeting with Mansfield was fine. K said did he have anything specific? P said no, he said that he realized that I did not start it and get them in the war. He (Mansfield) wanted to be helpful. He wanted to cooperate any way they could. He wanted to do this on an oral basis, secretly, helpful - at the moment. P said I will tell you about it tomorrow.

P said this damned Scott. Who did he get that from? I can't help thinking that someone is talking ceasefire. K said Laird thinks it is coming from State. I talked to Scott. And although I saw the statement, I pretended I had not seen the news report. I was very hard on him.

P said and also we have offered a ceasefire. Scott says what we want to do is save skin. P said that is a silly statement. P said it sounded like the Democrats. P said what in the name of God? P said someone at State is doing this. We have got to lay it on that we have offered it.

K said it is in this new draft. P said is it? K said it is toward the end. P said it has to be in there very carefully. K said I will look it over again to see if we can make it stronger. P said well, I will rewrite it.

P said again, what does Scott think he is up to? He is the Majority Leader now. These Republicans saying they want me to include something in my speech -- we are absolutely not going to make any more offers. K said if you do, I think the Doves will say you don't have courage to go the last step. P said call Harlow and tell him that I noticed something in the newspaper. K said I will have called him before the end of the day.

mlh