FRIDAY AFTERNOON 27 OCTOBER 1972

# Despite Offensive, Reds Only Control About 2% of Popplace

Hanoi's Army Seen Badly Battered After 7-Month Drive; All Important S. Vietnam Towns in Government's Hands

BY RUDY ABRAMSON

Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Seven months after launching a massive, combined arms offensive reminiscent of World War II, North Vietnam's badly battered army and its Viet Cong allies hold uncontested control of perhaps 2% of the South Vietnamese population.

U.S. Intelligence estimates place another 8% of the south's populace in contested areas, with the rest under control of the Saigon government.

The figures are not dramatically different from those of last Easter weekend (less than 1% uncontested North Vietnamese/Viet Cong control) when Hanoi sent troops and tanks through the demilitarized zone, beginning what may be the last convulsive gasp of the Vietnam war.

But in the intervening months, the North Vietnamese lost 80,000 men, perhaps 100,000, in the south.

Bodies are still being found by the dozens in areas where B-52s rained bombs.

The clear lines of battle have long since disintegrated. A military map of South Vietnam today is a leopard-spot affair that changes so rapidly it is meaningless.

But U.S. officials say that the North Vietnamese hold not a single important South Vietnamese town.

Though Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops in the war are still estimated at 200,000, the enemy now has the ability to renew a major attack only in the northernmost province of Quang Tri where they had captured their only provincial capital.

Confronting the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces are government military forces totaling about 1 million men.

### Over 500,000 in 1968

U.S. forces in Vietnam, which at one time in 1968 totaled more than half a million men, have been brought down to less than 34,000 by the Nixon Administration's Vietnamization program.

However, about 100,000 have remained involved in the air war which reached its most intensive level during recent months as it helped blunt the North Vietnamese offensive.

The enemy divisions that thrust into South Vietnam at the end of March threatening to overrun Kontum, Pleiku, An Loc and perhaps the imperial capital of Hue, are now reported undermanned, short of supplies, and suffering a lack of seasoned leaders.

Still, in the days since secret peace negotiations began to move forward, supplies and replacement troops have continued to flow into the south.

Small enemy units have stepped up mortar and rocket attacks.

Though most of the population remains under government control with enemy units outside the heavily populated areas, the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong hold a substantial part of the countryside.

"It's impossible to say how much," said one high-ranking Army officer. "It's just a guess. If you say 25%, nobody in the world can show that you are wrong."

But the South Vietnamese have recaptured much of Quang Tri province, overrun early in the offensive. Government forces have retaken most of the area around Kontum.

In the northernmost area of South Vietnam it is still easy to determine who controls what, officials said, but the picture becomes highly confusing farther to the south where enemy units may move into a village one day and disappear the next.

Officials estimate that the North Vietnamese still have 120,000 men in its division-size units in the south.

Seven divisions are still operating in military region I, the northernmost area of South Vietnam—the 304th, 308th, 312th, 324th, 325th, 711th and 2nd.

Two divisions, the 3rd and 320th, are in the Central Highlands, and the 9th and 7th divisions, which operate back and forth across the Cambodian border, are in military region III.

Three other divisions are in the Mekong Delta region.

"They have been hurt very, very badly, but they have considerable manpower left," a Defense Department source said Thursday.

### Mining of Harbor

Despite the beating taken from U.S. bombing, officials have conceded

LOS ANGELES TIMES

27 OCTOBER 1972 P-1

that the enemy is still able to move sufficient supplies to continue the present level of fighting indefinitely. The mining of Haiphong harbor last May 8 and the resumption of U.S. bombing made it far more difficult to move supplies but equipment is still being shipped by road and rail from China.

Officials here said Thursday that, while men and supplies have continued to move into South Vietnam, there has not been very much replacement of heavy equipment such as armor.

Besides killing at least 80,000 men, the South Vietnamese have reported capturing 25,000 small arms, and destroying or capturing more than 600 tanks, 300 artillery pieces, 1,000 trucks, and 7,000 crew-served weapons.

Losses have undoubtedly been heavy in the north with the U.S. flying daily air strikes but there is less information about the situation there. Estimates are that—in addition to the warehouses, bridges, and air defense installations — U.S. planes have destroyed more than 2,000 trucks, 30 tanks, 700 railcars and 2,000 supply shipments being moved by water.

### Negotiating Problem

With the battle lines no longer extensive and the North Vietnamese frequently operating in small units, one of the most difficult problems of future negotiations will be to determine who controls what.

At one time, plans called for joint teams of Saigon government and Viet Cong representatives to visit the field to determine who controls what territory. They would report to the international authority maintaining the cease-fire when they could not agree.

Officials said the cease-fire that they do not know whether current plans call for this approach.

Presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger expressed concern Thursday that there could be a brutal last round of fighting in an effort to extend control before the cease-fire.

"We would like to avoid the dangers of loss of life, perhaps in some areas even of the massacre that may be inherent in this," he said. "We, therefore, want to discuss methods by which the international supervisory body can be put in place at the same time the cease-fire is promulgated."

"I'm hoping there will be the opposite kind of reaction," said a Defense official, "that the troops on both sides will have the 'I-don't-want-to-be-the-last-to-die syndrome.'"

WASHINGTON STAR & DAILY NEWS 27 OCTOBER 1972 Pg-13

U.N. to Aid Asians Ousted From Uganda

Dispatch of The Times. London

KAMPALA, Uganda — Arrangements to enable stateless Asians to leave Uganda have been finalized after weeks of negotiations.

A United Nations center is being established to provide the Asians with documentations, assistance, and travel arrangements. No one is sure how many persons have not yet found any country to accept them, but current estimates range from 2,000 to more than 5,000.

Robert Gardiner, the U.N.'s special envoy, F. J. Homann-Heriberg, of the U.N. High Commission for Refugees, Frank Schmidt of the International Red Cross, and officials of the Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration have cooperated in making the arrangements.

Once given travel documents the stateless Asians will be able to go to temporary reception centers.

It is understood here that U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim is trying to mobilize funds for the operation, which may get under way within a couple of days. Waldheim is also understood to be handling arrangements for the establishment of reception centers.

6

NEW YORK TIMES

27 OCTOBER 1972 P24

Shriver Asks End to 'Fat' And 'Waste' in the Military

By CHRISTOPHER LYDON

Special to The New York Times

COLUMBIA, S. C., Oct. 26— Sargent Shriver introduced himself here today as the grandson of a Confederate officer from Maryland and said that an end of “fat, waste and bureaucracy” in the Pentagon and withdrawal from Vietnam are the steps to restoring the military traditions of Southerners like Wade Hampton, Robert E. Lee and George C. Marshall.

In a state thickly planted with modern military bases established under the influence of the late Representative L. Mendel Rivers, Mr. Shriver also promised "no loss of jobs" in the conversion to civilian industries.

If his running mate, Senator George McGovern, becomes President, Mr. Shriver said "we will revise the system of military justice." They would also release two reports commissioned but never published by the Nixon Administration, the Democratic Vice-Presidential candidate announced: one by Lieut. Gen. William R. Peers on American-led massacres in Vietnam, and another civilian study, led by Gilbert Fitzhugh, on Pentagon procurement and organization.

5,000 Attend Rally

Mr. Shriver addressed about 5,000 supporters and scattered hecklers on the Capitol steps of a state where the McGovern-Shriver ticket is prepared for defeat.

But the immediate setting

was not as hostile as the American Legion convention where Mr. McGovern addressed similar themes about military trauma. And it gave Mr. Shriver the chance to tell the South that he honors "gallantry" and military "spirit" that he said have been dangerously eroded in the Vietnam era.

"Why is it," he asked. "our Army cannot fight without carrying with it the suburban baggage of golf courses, limousines, high clubs, special PX's as elaborate as department stores? What have we got under Nixon? An army, or an insulated American 'suburbia' separate from all reality?"

At greater length than usual, Mr. Shriver ridiculed the makeup of the armed forces today. There are nearly six support troops for every combat soldier in Vietnam, he said, and added that there was one non-commissioned officer to supervise each enlisted man. Furthermore, he said, there are more senior officers than for a force six times as large at the end of World War II, and there are 250 lobbyists selling the Pentagon" to Congress.

In a McGovern Administration, he said, "we will revise the bureaucratic practices that favor lobbyists and empire builders who squabble over dollars. We will favor men of combat skills and professional military knowledge."

Discussing reports of an imminent cease-fire in Vietnam at a news conference here this

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

27 OCTOBER 1972 P2

McGovern 'SupportS Any Peace Effort'

election, that I will welcome it.

"Whatever the motives, if the administration can bring off a settlement of this war, they'll have my full support and cooperation in any effort that can lead to peace."

IF PEACE were achieved, he said, it would be because "we have been pressing so many years, trying to get a settlement."

McGovern said Hanoi's statement that the U. S. government had been the one delaying signing of a peace agreement disturbed him.

"I hope that report from Hanoi is not true that it's our government that is blocking the settlement. I hope we are not permitting Gen. Thieu to block the settlement," he said.

DETROIT, (UPI). — Sen. George S. McGovern said Thursday that if peace is achieved in Vietnam, it will be because "we have been pressing so many years."

"I hope that we're moving toward a peace settlement," the Democratic Presidential candidate said in a news conference regarding the announcement from Hanoi about an agreement to settle the war.

He spoke before White House adviser Henry Kissinger's disclosure that an agreement would be signed "within a matter of weeks or less."

McGovern, asked if a settlement so near the Nov. 7 election would hurt his chances of defeating President Nixon, replied, "I have said repeatedly that even if the settlement comes on the eve of our own

afternoon, Mr. Shriver said, "The peace agreement is a triumph of George McGovern's campaign."

Mr. Shriver dismissed the suggestion that an end of the war would seal President Nixon's re-election. Voters will recognize the final negotiations as a campaign "maneuver," he said, and they will be "skeptical about an Administration that waited so long."

After stating wire-service reports of the agreement, Mr. Shriver said the terms—including the proposed "coalition government" of South Vietnam—were not appreciably different from what the Nixon Administration could have negotiated three-and-a-half years ago.

"The question, I think, that Americans have to ask is this," he said. "Was four years' additional expenditure of money and blood worth the terms we have agreed to today? My answer is: No."

CORPUS CHRISTI TIMES 19 OCTOBER 1972 (27)

Continued Workload At ARADMAC Seen

By SPENCER PEARSON

ARADMAC should have a heavy workload of Army helicopters to repair for some time to come, a top Pentagon spokesman said here today.

He is Jerry W. Friedheim, deputy assistant secretary of defense for public affairs, who was here to address the Corpus Christi Rotary Club at the Sheraton Marina Inn. He held a press conference at Naval Air Station prior to the luncheon.

Friedheim said at the press conference that while Army helicopter operations in Vietnam have dropped with the Vietnamization program, "We will be increasing the use of helicopters throughout the Army."

Not only will active duty Army outfits use more helicopters, but the National Guard and Army Reserves "need more and will get more," he said.

"I think ARADMAC will have plenty to do for some time to come," he remarked.

Friedheim's remarks were in reply to a question about how the reduction of the armed forces would affect local military installations.

He did not mention the Naval Training Command as such, but he said sizeable

reductions had already occurred. "We are down 1.2-million personnel," he said, adding that the size of the armed forces is at its lowest level in 22 years, a level which he called a "base line," which he said probably should not be lowered.

At another point he said there have been suggestions that the Navy mothball 10 aircraft carriers. That would mean the Navy would need about 50 fewer aircraft squadrons and would require a reduction in the training of aviators, which is the basic mission of the Naval Air Training Command.

"The question is, what is safe for the United States?" he said. Cutting out 10 carriers would result in difficulty in keeping any in the Mediterranean Sea.

"I think aircraft carriers are a stabilizing factor. The idea is to deter attack and negotiate on a position of strength."

Friedheim said the Soviet Union does not negotiate on goodwill but "operates on self-interest and a position of strength."

In relation to the reduction in forces, he said the Nixon administration is working toward the concept of an all-volunteer armed force by July 1. He said it would be difficult to achieve but he believes it can be done.

"Congress has supported the all-volunteer concept and, among other things, has provided pay increases for enlisted personnel. Their pay has gone up 327 per cent in the past 10 years.

One disadvantage, he said, is a lack of incentives, such as re-enlistment bonuses for the National Guard and reserve forces.

In the past the draft was an inducement for young people to join the National Guard and the reserves, but without it, "we will need other ways."

He said he believes the American people support the all-volunteer concept.

"Some think we lost a lot during the Vietnam period, but I don't think so," he said. "I believe we still have a great reservoir of young people."

More opportunities are opening up for young people in the military, which he emphasized is "an honorable profession." In addition, opportunities for young women are increasing. ROTC is opening up to women, and the secretary of the Navy announced this week that flight training would be opened to them.

"We haven't made the final step" of opening the service academies to women, but, he said, "we need young women, and you will see more and more of them."

EDITORIALS

NEW YORK TIMES - 27 OCTOBER 1972

Peace at Last?

Henry A. Kissinger's firm assurance that "peace is at hand" in Vietnam and his confirmation of the agreement announced by North Vietnam should go far to relieve doubts about the Administration's determination to end the long United States involvement in Indochina. Nevertheless, an apparent delay in the signing of the pact and Saigon's resistance to provisions that require South Vietnamese cooperation indicate that peace remains elusive.

The nine-point agreement hammered out in a hectic round of negotiations by Mr. Kissinger and North Vietnamese envoys represents a truly remarkable achievement for the tireless professor-turned-diplomat. He deserves the thanks of the nation and has certainly earned the respect of even the severest critics of the policies he has so doggedly pursued. Long-overdue concessions on both sides have produced a document that realistically recognizes a military stalemate and transfers the struggle for power in South Vietnam to the political arena where it has always belonged.

Despite the assurances voiced by some American officials President Thieu is understandably apprehensive about this prospect. But Mr. Thieu has no grounds for complaint. The proposed agreement leaves his government free to work out his own arrangements with the other side under the only kind of Vietnamization that ever made any sense—Vietnamization of the peace.

Meanwhile, the provisions that will be hailed with especial enthusiasm by all Americans are those which provide for an immediate cease-fire and the release of prisoners and withdrawal of all United States military personnel from Vietnam within sixty days. Saigon must not be permitted to stand in the way of the settlement that is now within reach, a fair settlement that would evoke universal relief and gratitude for the end of a bitter, searing war that serves neither American nor Vietnamese interests.

BALTIMORE SUN - 27 OCTOBER 1972

‘Peace Is at Hand’

So said Dr Henry Kissinger yesterday in response to North Vietnam's release of what it described as the stipulations of an Indonesian peace agreement between Hanoi and Washington. We may hope that at long, painful last, after so many years of false signs of movement toward a settlement, it is true. Those who had guessed that the Administration's first reaction to Hanoi's breaking of an understanding of silence on the negotiations would be angry demobilization turn out to have been wrong. Dr Kissinger did deny that, as the North Vietnamese declared, a commitment had been made to the firm date of October 31, next Tuesday, or the signing of the agreement and he did dispute the assertion that the full document was ready for signature. But at the same time he called the remaining points minor subject to solution in one more short negotiating session. The North Vietnamese statement

of the terms of settlement, he said, was "essentially" correct.

If that is so, it is impossible to see how the United States, on its own part, could at this late moment permit lesser matters to cause a collapse. Could President Thieu's government in Saigon, then, cause a collapse? The quick Saigon comment that "a separate agreement between North Vietnam and the U.S. does not concern us in any way" sounds as if Thieu were determined to do just that. Yet Dr. Kissinger viewed this question mildly, apparently as on the list of minor points, saying merely that one of the questions yet to be determined was whether the United States should sign on behalf of South Vietnam, and that it was understandable that the South Vietnamese would "want to sign their own peace treaty." His mildness could of course conceal a real and

NEW YORK NEWS - 27 OCTOBER 1972

'PEACE IS AT HAND'

So said presidential adviser Henry Kissinger yesterday in confirming that the U.S. and North Vietnam have reached a broad agreement on terms for ending the Vietnam fighting.

Dr. Henry Kissinger

Kissinger broke the administration's long silence on hush-hush talks with the enemy only after Hanoi blew the lid off for its own devious ends.

The Communists made public a nine-point understanding, said the U.S. had agreed to it without reservation, and charged President Richard M. Nixon with trying to welsh on a commitment to sign the pact by Oct. 31.

The White House aide's version is different, and has more of the ring of truth about it. Kissinger says North Vietnam's statement of terms is generally accurate. But he adds that the U.S. wants some hazy details cleared up; that one more session of serious negotiations could do the trick, and that Oct. 31 deadline is something Hanoi made up.

It isn't hard to guess the purpose behind this duplicity. The enemy transparently hoped its announcement, with fanfare and flourishes, would jostle Mr. Nixon into final acceptance without a full spell-out of disputed points.

A cute trick, but it didn't work. The unflappable Dr. K. says the U.S. will not "be stampeded into an agreement until its provisions are right." On the other hand, he estimates a solution can be found "within a matter of weeks or less" if the other side will stick to business.

The administration, then, will continue its pursuit of peace in the same firm, calm and orderly manner it has displayed in the past.

True Americans owe it to themselves, their country and the administration to show the same steadiness and fortitude.

The road has been long; the sacrifices heavy, the dis-appointments many and bitter; there is a heartfelt yearn-ing for peace.

But we should not, in what appears to be the eleventh hour of the ordeal, give in to rash or careless actions that would imperil prospects for a peace that is genuine, just and lasting.

serious continued impediment; we will know soon. But it is not an impediment that can be allowed to destroy the agreement.

By all reason and all sanity this is a sensible way out of the years of confusion and error and death and destruction in Indochina. It provides for a standstill cease-fire, with the tangled politics of Vietnam to be sorted out later; and in that process it even lets Thieu save a bit of face, for a while. It provides for a return of prisoners on both sides; an international cease-fire supervisory committee; an international conference on Vietnam; an end to the fighting in Cambodia and Laos as well, with their status of neutrality acknowledged; the setting up of elections for a coalition government in South Vietnam; unification of North and South "realized gradually by peaceful means."

Easier said than done, to be sure. Cease-fires can be broken, and on a map so complicated as South Vietnam's military situation-map undoubtedly would be, at spots. Thousands of difficulties would arise, but would they be worse than, or by any measure so bad as, the difficulties of today? And, to be sure, the North Vietnam-ese would not have come so far toward agreement if they did not see this document as favorable to-ward themselves. For example, reunification by peaceful means to them means eventual Communist domination. In this and other ways, their faces are saved too

The simple fact is that the Indo-china situation is one that can be solved only by a good deal of face-saving for all concerned, including the United States. This agreement, which we trust can now be moved swiftly toward a signing, appears to accomplish that.

1-8

ATLANTA JOURNAL
22 OCTOBER 1972 (27)

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER - 27 OCTOBER 1972

## Laird's
Safeguard

WITHIN THE framework of our democratic system of government, it is utterly essential that the armed forces of the nation be indisputably under civilian control.

To take any other course is to endanger, if not remove, the people's voice in government.

That was the gut issue in the question of whether Gen. John Lavelle, commander of the 7th Air Force in Southeast Asia, was disregarding civilian authority. The cause for concern was whether a field commander could get away with making decisions contrary to those set forth by the defense secretary and the President.

If one could get away with it, an ugly and dangerous precedent would be set. If one field commander felt he could ignore civilian authority, there would be a danger to civilian control.

Although all evidence points to the Lavelle case as an isolated one, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird has wisely and judiciously taken steps to insure there is no breakdown in civilian control of the military.

In a letter to Sen. John Stennis, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Secretary Laird said he was creating new military inspectors general in major unified commands. Those inspectors generally will report to the defense secretary through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Officers commissioned in our armed forces are informed on their commissions that the President "reposes special trust and confidence" in them. This is as it should be. There must be special trust and confidence in both directions in order for the armed forces to do the jobs assigned them.

But the Lavelle case indicates — as cases do from time to time — that safeguards are needed to insure the continuation of that trust and confidence.

Secretary Laird has taken steps to insure this and expressed confidence that it is "highly unlikely" that there will be again a recurrence of the Lavelle incident.

This is a sensitive area and one where reassurance is required.

## Gen. Lavelle is exonerated, but the Pentagon is not

Air Force Secretary Robert C. Seamans Jr. has decided that John D. Lavelle has paid in full for his deeds in Vietnam and thus has dismissed courts martial charges against him and put the case to rest. The decision is almost as appalling as the manner in which it — and the entire matter — has been handled by the Department of Defense.

We have little taste for rehearsing the Lavelle case in all its complexity. But in essence, as a full general in the Air Force and its top commander in Vietnam, Gen. Lavelle ordered 24 bombing strikes in violation of the U. S. government's stated limitations. He counterfeited and caused others to counterfeit and pass back to the Pentagon reports to befog the violations.

All this he has admitted. And in doing so, he has insisted that he was only doing what was clearly expected and intended by his superiors.

We have come to find increasing plausibility in his interpretation. When we sift through everything that has been made public in the case, the truest ring comes from the theory that Gen. Lavelle was going along with the system, and with the Pentagon's systematic hypocrisies: "What we put in the record is for public consumption — but we know what we're really up to. Keep that in your ol' kit bag, and smile."

Even if this hypothesis is ultimately proved to be true, it does not exonerate Gen. Lavelle, for he flouted the established policy of the United States.

And demonstrating its genius for making the saber cut both ways — but not very deeply — the military establishment has not exonerated him. It relieved him of his command and retired him

with an almost entirely tax-free pension of some $27,000 a year.

There has been a sort of arabesque over his retirement rank the involved matter of temporary and permanent ties; but the pension is that of a full general.

In its announcement that nothing further would be done, the Air Force stated: "This action has served the interests of discipline by its punitive impact and by placing commanders on notice that the Air Force does not condone the manner in which Gen. Lavelle discharged his duties."

Balderdash! Or some other pungent barracksroom expulsive

Condeone is exactly what the Air Force's decision has done. To anyone in or familiar with the chain of command Mr. Seamans has said, in effect, that there are risks at the top but the Pentagon will do its best to take care of its own even if they're caught.

The most disturbing implication of it all — a constitutional question of profound consequence — is that the military and its congressional allies can and will defy the principle of civilian control of military policy, if not directly then by resilient patience.

In specifics, the manifestation of this defiance has not been proved in the Lavelle case. The Senate Armed Services Committee, with a tradition for triarichial protectiveness of the military hierarchy, has yielded neither the truth nor, a full record from which to find it. There are other committees in the Senate, and in the House. One of them should publicly resolve the questions that still hover unclarified about the Lavelle case.

KANSAS CITY TIMES - 17 OCTOBER 1972 (27)

## A Good Trend for Volunteer Forces

The latest figures on enlistments in the full-time forces are so good that military manpower officials are almost exuberant. They speak of last month's 4-year recruiting record of more than 50,000 men as an encouraging—but by no means certain—sign of success in efforts to "achieve an all-volunteer military by next July.

As a new basis for hope the Pentagon's manpower chief, Roger T. Kelley, cites the fact that 83 per cent of the new men signed up since last July are "true volunteers" rather than youths

joining to avoid the draft. Surveys a couple or two years ago showed that 70 per cent enlisting in the regular services and even more in the reserves and National Guard were draft-motivated. That is, they enlisted instead of waiting for a draft call that would offer them no choice of a branch or type of assignment.

Skeptics about the Nixon administration's plan to end the draft have said that conscription was required to keep large numbers interested in enlisting the military. Not only has the draft provided conscripts for the Army but its pressures have been the principal recruiting weapon of all services, especially the Navy and the Air Force. Hundreds of thousands signed up for air or naval duty as a hedge against ending up with the

infantry in Vietnam.

But even the combat specialties of the ground force are taking on new attractiveness with the aid of a cash bonus of $1,500 offered in exchange for a 4-year term of service. Last month 22,552 young men and women donated the Army green. Few of them were prompted by a draft system that is down to small monthly quotas and may be in mothballs by the end of the year.

At least the prospects for getting along without the draft have improved. Congress is being asked to increase enlistment bonuses and otherwise add to fringe benefits. A favorable response no later than the early part of 1973 could help make that July 1 goal of all-volunteer forces a reality.

3-E

BALTIMORE SUN 27 OCTOBER 1972

Timing was right for peace concessions
by North Vietnamese

By PETER J. KUMPA

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Just a month ago, North Vietnam's premier, Pham Van Dong, told an interviewer in Hanoi that “it is impossible not to form a coalition government if we want to have a solution of the South Vietnam problem.”

Until 10 days ago, the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong have been maintaining with vehemence that no “correct solution” could be reached in the Vietnam war unless Saigon's President, Nguyen Van Thieu, was removed and support for his “stooge” government by the United States stopped.

The Vietnamese Communists, moreover, were insisting on formulae that would give them either immediate or assured control, in time, of the South Vietnamese government.

In these three major areas, Hanoi has surprisingly relented, making the significant concessions that have led to the nine-point peace plan reached in secret Paris negotiations. The peace still has to be nailed down in what the White House adviser, Henry A. Kissinger, hopes will be one last round of talks.

The announced peace terms—if they hold up—will bring an end to the fighting, the total withdrawal of the United States from the war, the return of prisoners, and allow the South Vietnamese to work out their own political solution—though with risks to both sides.

The terms closely follow those put forward by President Nixon on May 8 and to a lesser extent back in January. If the peace egg does hatch, it means a considerable diplomatic triumph for the President with whatever political bouquets the American voter chooses to give him.

Giving more, taking less

Under the nine-point agreement, the North Vietnamese are giving far more and taking a lot less than was offered by Senator George S. McGovern, the Democratic presidential nominee.

He would have stopped all American military action against the Communists immediately upon taking his oath of office, pulled out all American troops within 90 days without any assurances of getting the release of prisoners. Mr. McGovern would also have cut off all aid to the long ally of the United States, the South Viet-

namese government, and left it alone to accommodate with the Communists.

Hanoi's action indicates that by October 8, when the critical Pham Van Dong in the talks came, the North Vietnamese had downgraded Mr. McGovern as a realistic hope although they have gushed about his candidacy and his stand. With it, they also dimmed their hopes that the American peace movement could give them a victory they had not won on the battlefield.

This is a switch from their strategy during their war against the French when they aimed for a collapse of a political will to fight in Paris—a collapse that did come.

The turnaround by the North Vietnamese probably came because of several reasons, though there is no certainty about any of them.

There is ample evidence that both the Soviet Union and China joined in urging a negotiated settlement of the war. Back as far as August, Hanoi was rebuking publicly and only in thin disguise both Moscow and Peking.

The official party paper, *Nhan Dan*, was complaining about those “who are departing from the great all-conquering revolutionary thoughts of the time and who are pitifully bogging down on the dark, muddy road of compromise.”

Hanoi smarted during President Nixon's summit trips to Moscow and Peking. A visit to the North Vietnamese capital by the Soviet president, Nikita V. Podgorny in June ended in a communique that showed “frank” discussions between the Communist allies, a diplomatic codeword for disagreement.

And in early September, the Chinese premier, Chou En-lai visited Hanoi and upon his return, according to Cambodia's Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was predicting that a peace settlement could be reached by the time of the American presidential election.

Undoubtedly important to the ideologically minded Hanoi Communists was the fact that in the Communist world, they were out of step. For China and the Soviet Union as well as North Korea, it was a time for compromise with the capitalist world, a time to shore up internal problems, a time for compromise and peace.

The North Vietnamese have prided themselves on their independence and freedom from their giant comrades. They

have also exalted in their ideological purity. What pressures they faced are uncertain but it is unquestioned that they could not carry off a war or support a viable economy or even feed their own people without heavy outside help.

Aid to North Vietnam visibly dropped as neither the Soviet Union nor China challenged for American mining and bombing reaction to Hanoi's large-scale invasion of the South in May.

One may speculate that the heavy American bombing helped change Hanoi's mind as well as the success of the South Vietnamese Army, admittedly aided with massive United States air support, in fending off the tanks, artillery and the disciplined divisions of North Vietnam at Quang Tri and An Loc.

Despite the heavy patriotic rhetoric that they could withstand many more years of war, North Vietnam had been badly hurt. It admitted it to a growing number of friendly visitors, including many Americans.

The resort to gain more sympathy for a bombed and beleaguered populace could in itself be a sign of greater war weariness than was otherwise visible.

The addition of two rather mishandled figures to Hanoi's Polifibure gave analysts a handle to predict changes from the decades-long hard-line position epitomized by the first secretary, Le Duan, architect of the war policy in the South, and by Nguyen Vo Giap, the military strategist of a costly, bloody stalemate.

A strong warning must be issued that if a peace settlement is signed, one that no expert believed likely until short weeks ago, a differentiation must be made between an end to the war and end to the “struggle” of Vietnam and therefore Indochina.

Still brutal

The military side of the conflict may have been emphasized too much by the United States. The war has always been a political one and the “struggle” shifts to the ground once the stooching stops.

The struggle will continue to be brutal in a different sense. Neither side trusts the other and whatever control commission takes charge, it will have a monumental task to keep cheating, terror and intimidation down to a tolerable level.

Settling Cambodia, about half controlled by the Communists, should prove a more

THE END OF THE
TUNNEL... CONTINUED

"We will not be stampeded into an agreement until its provisions are right," he said in a statement that was obviously intended for Hanoi. "And," he added, aimed at Saigon, "we will not be deflected from an agreement when its provisions are right."

It is reason for saying that Kissinger meant by this that the United States will not give General Thieu in Saigon a veto over the truce agreement, but at the same time won't be hurried into signing an agreement that leaves important details unsettled.

For example, it is not clear in the draft agreement as now written where the North Vietnamese troops will go after they leave Cambodia and Laos— whether into North Vietnam or South Vietnam. This is not unimportant.

Nor is it clear that the international force to supervise the cease-fire will be in place and operating effectively at the moment of the cease-fire, for if it isn't, the temptation to scramble for territory at great loss of life may be unavoidable on both sides.

Also, there is an important ambiguity—maybe it is only a misunderstanding between the Vietnamese and English language translations—on the question of whether the proposed National Council of Reconciliation, which is to help arrange the final political settlement between the North and South, is to be merely an “administrative structure”—as it appears in the English translation—or maybe some kind of new coalition government structure, as it could be interpreted in the Vietnamese language.

Fortunately, at the end of his four-day meeting with the Communists in Paris, which broke the stalemate, Dr. Kissinger had a long philosophic talk with Le Duc Tho in which they agreed to defend the principles of their agreement and not allow technicalities to prevent the movement, not only to a cease-fire but to reconciliation and the reconstruction of Vietnam.

Accordingly, while Hanoi has known since last Sunday night that the United States wanted another meeting to clarify these important details and has not yet answered or agreed to such a meeting, Dr. Kissinger is confident that Hanoi will agree to talk again and that the differences can be settled both with Hanoi and Saigon.

He does not exclude the possibility of a troubled and even angry delay, but is confident that the truce will be signed at least before the end of November, and if this proves to be true, the efforts of Dr. Kissinger in these last few months will make one of the most intriguing chapters in the long and chequered history of American diplomacy.

difficult task than Laos where a tripartite government needs to be re-established. The North Vietnamese are supposed to get out of those countries but the terms are vague and in 1962 they cheated flagrantly and got away with it.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

9-F

Marquis Childs

BALTIMORE SUN 27 OCTOBER 1972

Kissinger deserves highest rewards for durability
in negotiations

Washington.

For sheer stamina Henry A. Kissinger has set a new diplomatic track record. Traveling with the speed of light, in the words of the ancient limerick, he returns the previous night, or so it seems from the way place names get into the headlines.

What is more, he does this with an air of complete in-
souciance. The smile in those glimpses the public has of him on arrivals and departures is jaunty. Not a hair is out of place. The picture of health, he might have come from a rest cure in some placid, pleasant place.

Granted that he travels in the grand style with a limousine and an official escort awaiting his arrival and the berth on the presidential plane made up for him for the moment of takeoff.

Yet pressures such as the jet lag, the time change between Paris and Saigon and Saigon and Washington are a fact no matter how cushioned the official mode of travel. And 14 hours spent with that sticky figure, President Nguyen Van Thieu, in the tropical heat of Saigon can hardly be considered a rest cure.

It is too early to say what will be the ultimate outcome of the latest Kissinger round on Vietnam. Mr. Thieu may have succeeded in balking temporarily even an interim step toward peace. This is the power that has been put in his hands thanks to the rethoric of self-determination

and free choice coming from. two Presidents of the United States; not to mention the enormous sums in military and economic aid propping up his military regime.

But, regardless of how this latest trial by jet turns out, Dr. Kissinger's contribution to American diplomacy can- not be dimmed. Working under the President's man- date, he has developed an orderly relationship with the two great powers, Russia and China.

On the left this is denounced as merely an exercise in power politics that cannot survive the test of a revolutionary age. In this view, Dr. Kissinger is a pres- ent day Metternich preoccu- pied with the outward manifestations of power. Not only is it bound to fail but it goes against the long tradition of American diplomacy based on peoples, their needs, their desires, their response to American ideals of freedom and self-improvement.

To say that Dr. Kissinger is a realist is perhaps a sufficient answer to this criticism. The structure of the nations that make up the world cannot be separated from the powers they exer- cise. To pretend that this power, when it appears contrary to our interests, is a transitory delusion that must yield to the good, the true and the beautiful is dangerous wish fulfillment.

China shut away from any American view for 20 years was a perfect example. Under a messianic policy,

say the policy of John Foster Dulles, the United States could confidently expect to transform an evil society such as the Communists had imposed on the mainland of China. Russian communism would wither away and freedom dawn for the satellites if only American policy remained pure and undefiled.

Almost as much determin-
ism went into this view as
into Marxism with the inevit-
ability of the withering away
of capitalism.

Speculation as to Dr. Kissinger's future is at this point idle. Even if the Vietnam exercise falls, with the record of the past three years a future must seem almost irrelevant. He is entitled to the highest rewards, but democracies have curious ways of rewarding their public servants.

In Britain if he were to step down he would be made Lord Kissinger of Waterside, Directorships and other emoluments would come his way. He would sit in board meetings and take part as a private citizen in decisions of moment.

There can be little doubt that he enjoys personal power. He would be less than human if he did not. Timing, as he has said, is all important in the kind of role he has played and above all the timing of departure. The temptation to overstay one's potential for creativity has overwhelmed others in this role in the past. The realist, one must assume, knows the limits of the possible.

TIMING WAS

RIGHT... CONTINUED

Still, the squabbling is preferable to killing. Great credit has to be given to the theory that Hanoi, in the end, preferred to make a deal with President Nixon before Election Day rather than risk another four years of a Nixon administration that might do what it wished without electoral pressure.

Arguments by Senator Mc-
Govern that something like
the present nine-point settle-
ment could have been made
four years ago are not borne
out by any records nor sup-
ported by serious analysts.

It is easy to recall both the testament of Ho Chi Minh and the first speech by his successor, Le Duan, just two years ago. The words of both called for sacrifices for a long war when Hanoi would not even, discuss cease-fire with the likes of President Thieu.

They were shooting for the
"complete victory" in the
South that they have now let,
slip away.

NEW YORK NEWS

27 OCTOBER 1972

Dole Asks McGovern
For Silence on War

Washington, Oct. 26 (NEWS Bureau) — Sen. Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.), Republican National Chairman, urged Democratic presidential candidate George McGovern in a telegram today "to refrain from further political discussion of the war" lest final settlement talks be upset.

NEW YORK NEWS 27 OCTOBER 1972

The Longest Conflict
In American History

By FRANK VAN RIPER

Washington, Oct. 26 (NEWS Bureau)—American involvement in Vietnam stretches back to the end of World War II, but the first deployment of several hundred military “advisers” took place in 1954 during the Eisenhower administration.

From 1954 to 1960, the average number of U.S. advisers in Vietnam was 650, according to the Pentagon. Under President John F. Kennedy, "in-country strength" mushroomed to more than 10,000, and shortly after Lyndon B. Johnson took office, the U.S. troop level was 16,300.

During the Johnson administration, the U.S. buildup began in earnest, so that by 1968 more than half a million American troops were in Vietnam. Following are key dates in the final years of the longest war in American history.

March 31, 1968—President Johnson announces bombing halt North of 20th parallel, says he will not run for reelection, in order to search for peace.

May 13, 1968—Preliminary peace talks begin in Paris.

Jan. 18, 1969—After months of haggling over the shape of the conference table, four-party Paris peace talks begin.

10-F

First Withdrawal: June 1969

Jan. 20, 1969—Richard Nixon inaugurated as President; authorized U.S. troop levels for Vietnam at their highest, 549,500.

June 8, 1969—Nixon announces first U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam, 25,000 men. The withdrawals will continue throughout the next three years.

Aug. 4, 1969—First secret meeting between Henry Kissinger and Hanoi Politburo member Le Due Tho in Paris.

Nov. 15, 1969—About 300,000 war protesters mass at Washington Monument, demanding immediate end to war, U.S. pullout. Speakers include Sen. George McGovern.

April 30, 1970—Nixon orders several thousand U.S. troops into Cambodia to stem flow of Communist supplies south.

May 31, 1971—Opening of serious talks between Kissinger and
Tto.

Bombing Resumes: April 1, 1972

April 6, 1972—U.S. resumes bombing of North after Commu-
nist offensive against positions near demilitized zone.

May 8, 1972—Nixon announces mining of North Vietnam's harbors; offers three-point solution to war, including offer to com-
mit U.S. troop withdrawal from three months.

Oct. 8, 1972—Kissinger, Tho and Hanoi negotiator Xuan Thuy begin unprecedented five days of talks. Kissinger later reveals groundwork for settlement laid at these sessions, with Communists agreeing to negotiate the question of military disengagement as a separate issue.

Oct. 13, 1972—The leaves Paris for Hanoi saying "many diffi-
cult things" block Viet settlement.

Oct. 17, 1972—Kissinger meets with Xuan Thuy, then flies to Saigon to tell Thieu of settlement plans.

Oct. 25, 1972—Hanoi announces it has reached nine-point peace
agreement with U.S.

Reds Yield on Thieu

Washington, Oct. 26 (NEWS Bureau)—
President Nixon got most of what he had
been demanding in the peace agreement
hammered out in secret Paris negotiations.

Hanoi gave up on what had been its major de-
mand ever since the negotiations started—the ouster
of South Vietnam's president, Nguyen Van Thieu.

The Communists did not even get the coalition
government in the south that had been widely
regarded as their minimum demand. All that they
got was a "national council of concord," in which
both the Communists and the Saigon regime would
participate.

This council would help to maintain the cease-
fire and would supervise elections, to be held at
some indefinite time in the future, after negotiations
between the Viet Cong and Thieu.

The election might, conceivably, indirectly bring
about formation of a coalition government including

NEW YORK NEWS

27 OCTOBER 72

the Communists. But there was not a flat promise
this would happen.

The council could only act when it was unan-
imous. It could do nothing if the Saigon represen-
tatives objected.

In the meantime, Thieu's government would re-
main in power.

In essence, Hanoi accepted the proposal Nixon
made last May 8, when he ordered intensified bomb-
ing of North Vietnam and mining of northern
harbors.

Sets Forth the Conditions

Nixon said then: "These actions I have ordered will cease when the following conditions are met: First, all American prisoners of war must be returned. Second, there must be an internationally supervised ceasefire throughout Indochina. Once prisoners of war are released, once the internationally supervised ceasefire has begun, we will stop all acts of force throughout Indochina, and at that time we will proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam within four months."

In the agreement, the timetable for American
withdrawal was cut to 60 days.
Stan Carter

WALL STREET JOURNAL 27 OCTOBER 1972

VIETNAM CEASE-FIRE may be harder to
make stick than to negotiate.

Neither Saigon nor Hanoi trusts the other;
Washington expects both to cheat. The big
problem will be to keep inevitable incidents

from leading to a general breakdown of the
truce. Setting troop boundaries, limiting resup-
ply, verification will all be difficult-what rules
to apply, how to enforce them?

Official U.S. studies conclude Hanoi can
gain greatly from a cease-fire, though the risk

is deemed worth taking. The Communist forces
are masters at combining political pressure
with strong-arm tactics to spread their control.
Some analysts figure the enemy could take
over 15% of South Vietnam's hamlets in a year
without provoking collapse of a cease-fire.

Aerospace Daily

October 27, 1972

SEN. COOPER LOOKS AT SALT II

Sen. John Sherman Cooper (R-Ky.) sees as a possibility for the second round of strategic arms limitation talks negotiating lower overall ceilings on land-based and sea-based ICBM launchers with freedom to choose the mix desired. The second phase of the U.S.-Soviet talks will begin Nov. 21 in Geneva.

Cooper said in remarks in the Congressional Record that "an important possibility" is a limi-
tation on testing and a way of imposing a curb on improvement of missile accuracies.

Although SALT II is expected to be concerned only with offensive weapons, since the ABM treaty is unlikely to be changed, Cooper did not rule out the possibility of "further limitation" of U.S.-Soviet ABM systems to one site each or none.

The first round of strategic talks produced a treaty limiting the U.S. and Russia to two ABM sites each. Work is well advanced on an ABM network at Grand Forks, N.D. Although the treaty permitted a national command site, Congress has slapped a prohibition against one in Washington.

The first round of SALT negotiations also led to an interim offensive agreement to provide time for the U.S. and Russia to work out a more comprehensive treaty.

It is expected that the new negotiations will deal with strategic bombers--not covered by
the interim agreement--as well as land and submarine based weapons.

Hits 'Bargaining Chip' Approach

Cooper, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said it is possible that addi-
tional signatories to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty such as China would assist the aims of
SALT II.

Although he praised the strategic agreements as among the "most significant accomplishments by President Nixon in foreign affairs, Cooper warned that the so-called "bargaining chip" approach could undermine the basic purpose of arms control negotiations.

He noted that the President and Defense Secretary Melvin R. Laird have stated their deter-
mination to maintain the U.S. technological lead and that Congress has approved programs toward
this end. The Soviet Union, he added, has said it would do whatever is necessary to maintain
equality with the U.S.

"The pitfall that lies before the country in the SALT II negotiations," he continued, "is that arguments justifying the need for negotiating chips in order to be in a position of strength could, if successful, disastrously distort the basic purpose of these arms control negotiations which have given so much hope to the world."

Gerard C. Smith, director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, will head the American delegation to the talks as he did in the first round.

Also back on the American delegation will be Philip J. Farley, deputy director of the arms control agency; Lt. Gen. Royal Allison, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Paul Witze, an advisor to the Defense Department.

11-F

BALTIMORE SUN

27 OCTOBER 1972 P1

FRIDAY MORNING - 27 OCTOBER 1972

# Reds push for pre-truce gains

BY CHARLES W. CORDDRY

Washington Bureau of The Sun

Washington—Communist military strategy in South Vietnam has been designed for some weeks to get their forces into the best possible positions for the standstill cease-fire that may be at hand.

Henry A. Kissinger, the top United States foreign policy adviser, alluded indirectly to this yesterday when he spoke of the "temptation" to try to seize territory at the last moment and gain political control over given areas.

The current Communist strategy, according to military analysts here, is to try to sever key lines of transportation and communication in all parts of South Vietnam and, particularly, to try to isolate Saigon in order to reduce its control of the countryside.

Specific aims of the Communist military operations are said to be to cut off provincial capitals and South Vietnamese bases, discourage the population (90 to 95 per cent of which is reported to be under Saigon's control), undercut the economy and give an overblown impression of their own real military strength.

The whole strategy is certainly meeting with far less than thundering success when measured against the Communists' evident ambitions. But there is no doubt, either, in the minds of military analysts that the crazy quilt distribution of military forces in South Vietnam is going to make implementation and supervision of a cease-fire a nightmare.

Dr. Kissinger noted the difficulty in referring to the lack of "clear front lines." There is only one possible exception—in the far northern portion of South Vietnam.

A line running from the coast south of the Cua Viet River hooks around Quang Tri city, reaches west to the mountains and then runs back southeastward toward Fire Base Bastogne about 18 miles from Hue. Beyond that line, toward the buffer zone between the Vietnams, the Communists control much territory but little of the population.

Nowhere else is there such a clear division. The Communists, rather, engage in salles from Lao and Cambodian border bases and in hide-and-fight tactics throughout the country designed to carry out the strategy of enhancing cease-fire positions.

There are still 14 Communist divisions in South Vietnam, Hanoi having committed virtually its entire Army to the Easter offensive. The largest part of this force is in Quang Tri and Thua Thien, the two northern provinces. The divi-

WASHINGTON POST

27 OCTOBER 1972 P24

## Peace Is at Hand

Yesterday's word from Dr. Kissinger that he believes "peace is at hand" in Vietnam raises as many questions as it answers, beginning with the question: Can it really be? After the killing of hundreds of thousands of people and the maiming and the aprooting of millions more; after the savaging of an awesome part of the resources of the whole of Indochina; after the spending of more than $100 billion by the United States alone; after the undermining of the American international position and the rending of the American social fabric—after all this, is it possible that the killing and wasting is finally going to come to an end?

After so long a wait, and so many false flashes of lights at the end of so many tunnels, there is a temptation to doubt everything, until an agreement is signed. We would prefer to proceed today, however, on the assumption that Dr. Kissinger knows confidently what he is talking about; for even if that is accepted, large and unanswerable questions remain. For example, exactly when will peace come? And in what form will it arrive? The shape it takes, the final terms, and the consequences that follow from it in terms of South Vietnam's ultimate destiny, will be the final measure of this long, costly tormenting American enterprise. We will not know the answers to these questions next week, or next month—perhaps not even next year. So there is no point at this stage even to begin an accounting of gains and losses and costs, and still less a reckoning of credit and blame. For now it is enough to welcome Dr. Kissinger's heartening word; any day peace comes to Vietnam and the rest of Indochina is a great day which cannot come too soon—election politics or any other considerations aside.

Peace in Indochina—deep as its meaning must be for all of us, its deepest meaning must be to Indochina itself. What to most Americans has been a political and moral dilemma, afflicting various of us in different degrees, has been for the people of Southeast Asia the overwhelming reality, the central agony of life. Peace would mean, one would hope, an end to organized killing and a beginning for the survivors at last to rebuild. It is hard to conceive of any scale of international, especially American, assistance too generous to provide.

It is, of course, on the shape of a settlement and the manner of its shaping that rebuilding will hinge. Here we can judge only by the sparse outline of the terms offered yesterday by Hanoi and the White House in turn. Lofty aims for transformation from war to peace are stated. These will be

sions, guerrilla forces and administrative units probably add up to about 200,000 men.

U.S. defense sources say that, in their current tactics, the Communist forces are operating against key communications lines in all military regions.

Around Saigon, efforts are made to retain the cut in Route 13 that runs northward to An Loc, scene of bitter spring battles, and on to Cambodia; also, the Communists are trying to cut Route 1,

leading east to the coast. They also frequently hit Route 4 in an effort to cut off Saigon from the delta, and are expected to attack Route 2 running west through Hau Nghia province. Still further on, they are trying to cut Route 22 in Tay Ninh province.

Much of this is regarded more as harassing action than anything else, but far more determined attempts are expected with the approach of a cease-fire. The same is true of other areas where the Com-

pursued, however, within the context of a South Vietnamese power struggle that may tremble on a line between political and guerrilla conflict for years. It is the essential fact of the terms sketched yesterday that their implementation will take place over a time (stretching long past the American election), and in a condition of increasing American inattentiveness, and in a style which Americans may find surprising and perverse, not to say obscure. It can be no other way if the Vietnamese are to work out their political future themselves. That, of course, is the way it should be and almost certainly—in retrospect—should have been.

The alternative is a degree of continuing American involvement which, mercifully, not even Richard Nixon seems prepared to contemplate. What he has done, if we understand correctly, is to provide for the end of an American combat role and, with that, for a nobulous structure of international guarantees designed to insure that President Thieu has that "chance" to survive, which has long been Mr. Nixon's stated goal. Whether it was worth four extra years to bring events to this stage—back to this stage, one might say, casting an eye at Hanoi's post-Tet military prostration and the options available to Richard Nixon in 1969—will be the stuff of much political and historical debate. Our own view that the United States had long since fulfilled its full proper measure of success to Saigon remains unchanged by Mr. Nixon's apparent achievement of success on his own terms now.

In this regard, we would comment on the nature of the debate now likely to unfold in the country. The President and his supporters may well be tempted to claim that achievement of a settlement—no matter that its real meaning to Indochina cannot be told for years—vindicates his general course since 1969, and in particular the political and military pressure whose application apparently induced Hanoi to move toward the Nixon negotiating terms. On Oct. 8. Those who have criticized his war policy or who otherwise oppose his re-election may be similarly tempted to question whether he could not have gotten as good a settlement four years ago, or whether the kind of squeeze he evidently intends to apply to assure Saigon's going along is much different from the policy favored by Mr. McGovern.

To both sides in this debate we would urge caution. At this point the effect of a possible settlement on the election concerns us much less than the possible effect on the psychological balance of this country. In particular, because Mr. Nixon is the President, it is his responsibility to set the tone of reconciliation which presumably all of us would like to see spread through the land. He is in the best position to heal the nation's wound—or to salt it. Only if his leadership rises to the very large demands of the occasion can he realize in full measure Dr. Kissinger's promise that "peace is at hand."

munists are able to muster strength for the effort.

"It has become apparent to us," Dr. Kissinger said yesterday, "that there will be a great temptation for a cease-fire to be paralleled by a last effort to seize as much territory as possible and perhaps to extend operations for long enough to establish political control over a given area."

Hence the urgency of having international supervisors in place with the start of a cease-fire.

4

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR 27 OCTOBER 1972

# The Kissinger-Tho terms for peace

The terms of the Vietnam peace worked out by Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho fall short of what President Thieu of South Vietnam wants and no one can blame him for holding out against them as long as he can. But these terms also reflect the military realities of the moment. As such they are the best anyone could reasonably expect Mr. Kissinger to be able to get or the North Vietnamese to accept. They had best be accepted because nothing better is in sight, and because this war has already gone on too long.

What Mr. Thieu, understandably, would like would be a settlement under which all of the soldiers of North Vietnam would withdraw from South Vietnam and leave him to deal with the surviving remnants of the Viet Cong forces while he proceeded with the political consolidation of his own regime.

The Kissinger-Tho agreement fails short of what Mr. Thieu wants on two main counts. It provides for a cease-fire in place and for a three-cornered "military council of reconciliation and coordination" in which Mr. Thieu will control only one corner. The Viet Cong will have a second corner. The third will belong to the present political opposition in Saigon. This means that Mr. Thieu must come to terms with his own political opposition in Saigon if he is to keep the Communists in long-term subordination in Saigon.

In other words Mr. Kissinger has not been able to negotiate a Thieu victory, or a total withdrawal of Communist influence from South Vietnam. But then, he

never had a chance to do that since such a total victory was never won on the field of battle.

But Mr. Kissinger did negotiate a political settlement under which the non-Communists will have an excellent chance of surviving in Saigon if the two non-Communist factions can work together. By working together Mr. Thieu and his own "loyal" opposition can dominate the "council" and keep the Communists in minority status.

If these terms are formally approved and put into operation by all concerned it means the following:

A total American withdrawal will begin at once and be completed within 60 days.

While it is proceeding the prisoners of war will be progressively released, by all sides.

Saigon's armed forces will control the cities, all the provincial capitals, and most of the population of South Vietnam. But the bulk of Hanoi's army will still be sitting in South Vietnam and in control or considerable stretches of countryside.

The political settlement for South Vietnam will begin with establishment of the three-cornered "council." The bargaining over the future will begin in that Council on the basis of a triple reality: (1) total American withdrawal, (2) a strong Saigon Army, but (3) a Hanoi Army physically located in South Vietnam. The bargaining will revolve around the price Saigon must pay to get the Hanoi Army to go home.

The continued presence of the Hanoi Army in South Vietnam means that Mr.

Thieu cannot liquidate the Communist political element in South Vietnam. But control of the cities and most of the people by the Saigon Army under Mr. Thieu's command means that the Communists cannot liquidate the non-Communists — for as long as the three-cornered political settlement survives.

Nothing better than this for Mr. Thieu was possible. Nothing better for the Communists was acceptable to Washington. President Nixon has given the non-Communists of Saigon a perfectly respectable chance of survival. It will be up to them to take advantage of the opportunity he has given them. If they fail, it will be their fault, not his.

Sooner or later it was bound to end like this — with the long-term future of Vietnam to be worked out among the Vietnamese themselves. We must just hope that Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger will be able to persuade Mr. Thieu to accept what is inevitable, reasonable, and all that Washington can provide.

## APO 57

WASHINGTON) -- PENTAGON SOURCES HAVE IMPLIED THE US IS LIKELY TO DELAY ANY SIGNIFICANT CUTBACK OF AIR POWER IN THAILAND OR NAVAL FORCES OFF VIETNAM UNTIL ALL AMERICAN TROOPS AND PRISONERS OF WAR HAVE RETURNED. THE MAINTENANCE OF THE HEAVY AIR AND NAVAL FORCES WOULD BE A FORM OF INSURANCE DURING THE PROPOSED PERIOD OF TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND PRISONER REPATRIATION--WHICH COULD LAST UP TO 60 DAYS.

OFFICIALS SAY AFTER THAT, THE U-S WILL CONTINUE TO BASE SOME FIGHTER AND BOMBER SQUADRONS IN THAILAND UNDER THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND THE SOUTHEAST ASIAN TREATY.

## O41A

SAIGON (UPI)--DESPITE GROWING REPORTS THAT PEACE IS NEAR, THE NORTH VIETNAMESE AND THE VIET CONG ESCALATED THE VIETNAM WAR TO ITS MOST INTENSE LEVEL IN MORE THAN FIVE YEARS THURSDAY, MILITARY SPOKESMEN SAID TODAY. THE HEAVIEST FIGHTING BROKE OUT IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS.

FOR THE SECOND SUCCESSIVE DAY COMMUNIST ATTACKS EXCEEDED ANY TOTAL SINCE THE 1968 TET OFFENSIVE.

MILITARY SOURCES SAID THERE WERE 124 SUCH ATTACKS THURSDAY, 11 MORE THAN 113 ATTACKS REPORTED WEDNESDAY--WHICH SURPASSED THE RECORD 110 ATTACKS FOR THE YEAR SET LAST JUNE.

THE LATEST ATTACKS INCLUDED 95 SHELLINGS.

SOUTH VIETNAMESE INFANTRYMEN AND ARMED CAVALRY BACKED BY ARTILLERY AND AIR STRIKES KILLED 42 COMMUNISTS THURSDAY IN TWO HOURS OF FIGHTING SEVEN MILES SOUTH OF KONTUM IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, MILITARY SPOKESMEN SAID. GOVERNMENT CASUALTIES WERE THREE DEAD AND 33 WOUNDED.

U.S. B52S FLEW FOUR RAIDS IN SUPPORT OF THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE IN THE KONTUM FIGHTING, WITHIN 13 MILES OF THE PROVINCIAL CAPITAL, LOCATED 260 MILES NORTH OF SAIGON.

THE VIET CONG EARLY TODAY INFILTRATED THE HAMLET OF TAN THANH DONG, 21 MILES NORTH OF SAIGON, MILITARY SOURCES SAID. DETAILS OF THE FIGHTING WERE NOT IMMEDIATELY KNOWN.

WASHINGTON POST
27 OCT 1972 P-20
Sen. Hughes Charges
Laxity on Lavelle

United Press International

Sen. Harold E. Hughes (D.-Iowa) said Wednesday that Gen. John D. Lavelle got only "a slap on the wrist" for ordering bombing of North Vietnam in violation of President Nixon's guidelines.

"The decision . . . to dismiss all charges and close the books on the Lavelle incident does not, in my judgment, come anywhere near upholding accepted standards of justice and military discipline," Hughes complained. He said the retired general should have been court-martialed.

... Western Europe, p. 2

Asia, p. 11

Communist Countries, p. 14

HANOI DISCLOSES PEACE AGREEMENT, KISSINGER COMMENTS

Summary

Hanoi's disclosure early yesterday of a negotiated agreement to end the Vietnam war and Henry Kissinger's comments on it at a press conference dominated media around the world.

While headlines and broadcast bulletins welcomed the news and Mr. Kissinger's statement that "we believe that peace is at hand," many observers expressed concern and doubt.

--The London *Daily Telegraph* remarked, "Hanoi no doubt thinks it is being mighty clever.... The North Vietnamese now publish their version in full, yell 'Foul!' and sit back in the expectation that the American voters will turn on Mr. Nixon and rend him..."

--Moderately conservative *Figaro* of Paris said that "the summons to act which accompanied the unilateral publication of the document has put the U.S.... in an almost humiliating position."

--Conservative *Muenchner Merkur* of Munich warned that acceptance of the agreement by President Thieu would mean "the loss of everything for which the Americans and South Vietnamese have struggled.... Everything now depends on Thieu's steadfastness."

Despite such expressions of misgivings, many credited the U.S. with an apparent breakthrough after four and a half years of deadlock.

The *Times* of London said that if Mr. Kissinger is borne out in what he said yesterday, "it will be difficult for President Nixon to be denied his claim to have gained a settlement that virtually gives the South Vietnamese the chance to determine their political future in peace."

French television reported from New York that "whatever can be said now, no one will really challenge the 'Nixon peace' in Vietnam."

Hanoi's *Nhan Dan* declared today, "The U.S. Government must bear full responsibility for the fact that the already completed [peace] agreement has not been signed and that the war is dragging on in Vietnam." Soviet media refrained from originating comment on the subject directly critical of the U.S., and gave a brief account of the Kissinger news conference. Peking's *People's Daily* carried the text of the DRV statement without comment.

*

*

*

No. 128

1

10/27/72

London: "Time Not on Hanoi's Side"

British media commentators today welcomed the prospect for peace confirmed by Mr. Kissinger, but they did not consider peace inevitable. Some expressed admiration for the strength displayed by President Thieu, and there was some feeling that Hanoi is exceedingly anxious to conclude an agreement immediately.

The independent *Times* of London said that if Mr. Kissinger is borne out in what he said yesterday "it will be difficult for President Nixon to be denied his claim to have gained a settlement that virtually gives the South Vietnamese the chance to determine their political future in peace."

The paper's diplomatic correspondent noted that "time is not on the side of the North Vietnamese, who believe that President Nixon will be re-elected and will then be in no pressing need to induce President Thieu to accept unpalatable terms. Conversely, the South Vietnamese have every reason to hold up agreement until after the election."

The paper yesterday ran a dispatch from Peking saying China would "undoubtedly welcome a negotiated settlement of the Indochina war if it results from the present diplomatic activity. But Peking still retains serious doubts about American intentions in Asia and around the world."

"Hanoi's Ploy Does Not Help"

The conservative *Daily Telegraph* today chided the North Vietnamese for their unilateral disclosure of the agreement. It said:

"Hanoi no doubt thinks it is being mighty clever. Having negotiated in secret with America for weeks, on the basis that neither side would reveal details--an undertaking scrupulously observed by Washington, city of leaks par excellence--the North Vietnamese now publish their version in full, yell "Foul!" and sit back in the expectation that the American voters will turn on Mr. Nixon and rend him, come polling day Tuesday week. Fortunately for American democracy, they are likely to be proved completely wrong....

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"It is greatly to America's credit that signing any agreement with Hanoi for a cease-fire in the south should have been considered out of the question without the acquiescence of Saigon...."

"It is encouraging that Dr. Kissinger should have reaffirmed yesterday that peace was within sight. But Hanoi's ploy does not help."

"Chief Movement Came From U.S. Side"

The liberal *Guardian* of Manchester and London asked in an article today, "Why did the two sides come to terms at this point in time? Hanoi probably recognized the existence of a military stalemate and that Indochina is at the margins of superpower interests. But the chief movement came from the American side."

"Politically there was no compelling reason why Mr. Nixon should concede at this time. He already looked certain of re-election. But...by entering into deep negotiations he gave himself room for maneuver should the opinion polls suddenly swing round and Senator McGovern's antiwar rhetoric take hold. And having gone so far it became hazardous to draw back."

The paper also carried an editorial suggesting that the Hanoi radio broadcast was "an attempt to show the extent of Thieu's isolation and to push the U.S. into leaning on him more. Dr. Kissinger's optimistic statements yesterday raise the intriguing possibility that the U.S. is not ungrateful for the additional pressure." The paper added that "Hanoi may be in a hurry, but it would be an error on Washington's part to interpret this haste as panic."

The conservative *Daily Mail* had a different interpretation of Hanoi's timing. After remarking that the vigor with which President Thieu "asserts Saigon's right to self-determination is much more confident than anyone would have forecast a few months ago," the paper commented:

"By contrast, there was an air of pleading about North Vietnam's protests yesterday, and both the leaders in Hanoi and their delegation in Paris sounded suspiciously like men who want to get the cheque signed before the banks shut."

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# "No Settlement Over Heads of People"

In an editorial written before the Kissinger news conference, the independent weekly *Economist*, out today, pointed out that "no truly viable settlement can be negotiated and implemented over the heads of the South Vietnamese themselves." It observed:

> "Mr. Thieu is not the world's most democratic, or popular, president. But he has won a lot of support this week, even among his political rivals, by showing that he is prepared to stand up to his patrons. He has said he is ready to step down in order to hold free elections. The Americans fell once before for the delusion that by casting aside a South Vietnamese president, they could find a solution for the war. It did not work with Diem in 1963, and it is even less likely to work now."

## Paris: "Hanoi Got the Jump on U.S."

French media commentators generally considered the settlement as outlined by Hanoi radio as more advantageous to the DRV than to the U.S. They saw Mr. Nixon in a difficult position, facing a President Thieu standing adamantly on a power base which the U.S. itself had provided him.

State-run television's first network said that "Hanoi has lost patience with Washington's shilly-shallying." A Washington correspondent judged that "Hanoi got the jump on Washington: Nixon will have to announce the practical abandonment of Thieu, which will disturb a certain number of U.S. voters." In Paris, a commentator remarked that "despite Laird's warning that military aid to South Vietnam is negotiable, Thieu's resistance is not a small problem because his regime would be able to hold out for some time."

# "None Will Challenge 'Nixon Peace'"

The second network said that now "the name of the game is, 'Who is the star peacemaker?'" Its New York correspondent felt that "what Americans will remember above all is that the U.S. involvement in Vietnam is ending and that the POWs are coming home." He said President Nixon was "embarrassed" but would not give in to achieve a peace at any price just for electoral reasons. He concluded, "Whatever can be said now, no one will really challenge the 'Nixon peace' in Vietnam."

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"Almost Humiliating for U.S."

Moderately conservative Figaro today ran a front-page column by Academician Thierry Maulnier judging it "no wonder" that Hanoi was pressing to conclude peace "with such advantageous conditions as these." He continued:

> "Added to conditions already very rough for American pride, the summons to act which accompanied the unilateral publication of the document has put the U.S. -- which seems practically to be bending before that summons-- in an almost humiliating position.

> "More than ever, the tactics used against Mr. Nixon have tended to envelop him in a dilemma: Either he took the responsibility for continuing the war, or he abandoned his allies and thereby assumed the appearance of a political victim of a war he had not lost militarily."

The writer said the agreement was being presented as already agreed, putting Washington in the position of having to impose it on Saigon "like a diktat." He concluded:

> "Accused by all his adversaries of abusive intervention in Indochinese affairs, Mr. Nixon now sees himself called on to admit before the world that Mr. Thieu and his army are nothing but 'puppets' and that he has used them long enough.

> "Mr. Nixon did not resist the temptation to bring peace as a present to his voters before the November 7 election. Has he thus let himself be trapped? We'll soon know."

"Peace Without Consultation"

Independent-left Combat remarked in a front-page editorial today, "Desirable, expected, thus henceforth indispensable, this peace of the diplomats is a strange peace. The Americans and North Vietnamese have settled the fate of the South Vietnamese, the Cambodians and the Laotians without even consulting them."
It went on:

> "Hanoi made only one concession--the political survival, no doubt temporary, of President Thieu...

> "It was Hanoi that proposed the text finally adopted with a few amendments, and it was from Hanoi that the decisive initiative came."

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The paper considered that "what counts is that the Americans have admitted that a communized Indochina is not a menace to their own security; that if Communism is bad it is still better than pure and simple destruction..." It concluded that in the end America, "after hurling so many bombs at Vietnam, will flood it with dollars."

West German TV: "Nixon Can Keep 1968 Promise"

The Washington correspondent of West Germany's first television network reported that the agreement revealed "five accomplishments...."

"It is a great success for Henry Kissinger and President Nixon, who can now redeem his 1968 election promise.... There is hardly any chance that the agreement will collapse. Thieu will agree to it...."

"Nixon wants not only a cease-fire but a real permanent settlement including a U.S. contribution to the reconstruction of all of Indochina.... According to Kissinger, the spirit of national unity can be restored in the U.S. This means that Vietnam is no longer a campaign issue for McGovern--thereby reducing still further his chances."

The second network's Washington correspondent, reporting via satellite, noted that Mr. Kissinger "did not once mention Thieu's name." He concluded:

"Twelve days before the election, Hanoi has created the situation that President Nixon wanted to avoid at all costs--he is under psychological pressure, and Saigon is under political pressure."

"Abandon an Ally?"

A network anchorman said:

"President Nixon is in a difficult position. If he does not accept the agreement, he has to live with the charge of having missed a chance for peace and of delaying the return of the POWs. If he accepts, he must abandon an ally--the Thieu regime--something he has assured us he would never do."

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Left-center Frankfurter Rundschau, an opponent of U. S. policy in Vietnam, wrote that President Thieu "is probably right" about Communist intentions in South Vietnam. The U. S. goal of blocking Communist access to power over a period of two decades has failed, the paper said, "because the U. S. has always backed the wrong power and ignored the Geneva accords of 1954.

"Even superpowers are not spared the lesson that they cannot always prevail. The consequences of this extend beyond Vietnam."

Essen's independent Westdeutsche Allgemeine called the U. S. withdrawal "in-
glorious... What is really bad is that a settlement like the present one could
have been reached years ago...."

A writer in independent *Stuttgarter Zeitung* said that "perhaps the North Viet-
namese indiscretion" of disclosing the terms of the agreement and insistence
on signature on October 31 may "furnish Washington additional arguments for
increasing its pressure on Thieu, who is obviously the last obstacle to peace."

The military affairs analyst of independent-right Frankfurter Allgemeine
asserted that Mr. Thieu's view "may not be entirely wrong" in maintaining that
a coalition government would necessarily lead to Communist domination of
South Vietnam.

"Acceptance Means the Loss of Everything"

Muenchner Merkur, pro-Christian Democratic of Munich, said that acceptance of the agreement by President Thieu would mean "the loss of everything for which the Americans and South Vietnamese have struggled..." Accepting a cease-fire would mean "surrendering the decisive advantage" of strength gained through Vietnamization, the paper said, asserting that the conflict would then revert to guerrilla warfare which "defies verification" under the peace settlement. It concluded:

"The end of the conflict would be Communist control of
South Vietnam. The South Vietnamese, whose govern-
ment is apparently being left in the lurch by Nixon,
would be the losers. Everything now depends on Thieu's
steadfastness."

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Pro-Christian Democratic Frankfurter Neue Presse declared the agreement "represents a victory for Hanoi and the Viet Cong," asserting that the Communists "will pursue their aims slowly and cautiously.

"But we should not delude ourselves about the outcome, particularly in the light of several object lessons in Europe."

## Rome TV: "Still Two Problems"

The Kissinger press conference was the top story in Italian media today.

A New York correspondent for state-run Italian TV said last night:

"At this point there are still two problems, according to Washington observers: Thieu's reaction--despite Kissinger's attempt to give the impression that it offers no obstacle--and Hanoi's response, which has been to insist that an agreement be reached before the election. Perhaps the North Vietnamese fear that conditions may become harsher later and are therefore insisting on a immediate agreement..."

## "Hanoi's Implied Threat"

A New York correspondent of independent-conservative Corriere della Sera of Milan wrote today:

"Nixon is faced with a difficult problem requiring the utmost manuevering ability. On the one hand, he must persuade Thieu to give up his intransigence, and on the other, he must dispel Hanoi's doubts of his good faith. The latter aspect of the situation is the more sensitive. Hanoi's weapon...is the implied threat...that U.S. failure to sign the cease-fire agreement by October 31 may scrap the negotiations..."

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## Brussels: "A U.S. - Hanoi Maneuver?"

Conservative La Libre Belgique of Brussels observed today that "it is not certain that the North Vietnamese initiative took the White House by surprise, and some are even wondering if it is not simply a maneuver arranged between Washington and Hanoi to force Saigon to bend. What can President Thieu do now... except accede to a solution that finally looks like a compromise and preserves as much as possible the political chances of the present South Vietnamese regime?"

Independent Le Soir carried a dispatch in which its Saigon correspondent remarked that "the Americans have protected their rear. The guarantees they have obtained should reassure the most enlightened elements of the South Vietnamese right."

High-circulation conservative Gazet van Antwerpen saw attempts to put pressure on Washington in actions by both Hanoi and President Thieu to publicize their respective positions.

## "Ending a War With Honor"

Catholic Le Rappel wrote today that "if the U.S. wants a peace that will not amount to capitulation it must continue to move carefully. Nothing is more difficult than ending a war with honor and dignity. The U.S. owes it to itself to surmount that difficulty."

## Vienna: "Hanoi's Pre-Election Bomb a Dud?"

Austria's leading TV-radio commentator, Dr. Hugo Portisch, who is in the U.S. to report the elections, wrote today in Vienna's independent Kurier that Hanoi's "pre-election bomb" would likely prove a dud, because Mr. Kissinger had emphasized that election day was no deadline for a Vietnam settlement.

He judged that Hanoi's intention in disclosing the terms of the agreement "was not only to put President Nixon under pressure but also to drive a wedge between the Americans and President Thieu.... with whom Americans are impatient, seeing him as an obstacle to peace....

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