-1-

December 9, 1986

NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING CORP.

INTERVIEW WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

Dr. Kissinger, it's a great pleasure for us to have your interview about this time of the year.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Oh, it's a pleasure for me to be here.

QUESTION:

Thank you. Now this time let me start with your assessment of the Reykjavik summit meeting that did not produce any immediate results, but probably raised a lot of questions as well as the level of expectations. Do you think it was a success?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

No.

QUESTION:

No?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

But I believe it was not a success for a different reason that is usually given. Most people think

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

it was not a success because no agreement was reached. I don't like the agreements that were in fact tentatively achieved. So and I have written several articles on that subject.

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

pointing it out. I feel we wound up in a situation where the Soviets picked out of proposals we had made over the years all the ones that would be most difficult and embarrassing for us, for the long term. And I am not in favor of continuing with the Reykjavik formula.

QUESTION:

Well, the prevalent interpretation, as I see it, in the United States, is that it came almost very close to the final agreement, but there was a dispute over the SDI. So what's left over is another compromise on SDI.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Yes, but I if you ask my personal opinion...

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

Yes?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

You're quite right. That is the prevalent view, but I disagree with that. I do not agree with a proposal to abandon all missiles. I do not agree with a zero option for intermediate range missiles in Europe and leaving a hundred warheads in Asia. I do not agree with a 10-year moratorium on SDI because I believe SDI is the most important American strategic initiative. And therefore, if another compromise were made on SDI and everything else then became part of the agreement, I would go into open opposition.

QUESTION:

When -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

And so would many of my friends.

QUESTION:

then what kind of arms control is desirable between the two superpowers?

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

An arms control agreement must meet the test that it actually improves the situation in some way. The kind of agreement that would improve the situation would be one that reduces the number of warheads that can be carried on a missile. Because right now the fact that each missile can carry so many warheads -

QUESTION:

Yes -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

- means that the defending missile is inherently vulnerable. That would be one agreement. Secondly, in those conditions if the number

of warheads is reduced on each missile - not just in total - then, of course, reductions in launchers would also be helpful. On defense, I do not accept the proposition that we should make a distinction between research and deployment. Because that is impossible to monitor.

I think we should limit deployment in relation to the offense. So the less the offensive weapons, the less can be the defensive weapons. It is

launchers ->

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

in these areas that agreements can be made.
That would be helpful.

QUESTION:

But moving to the single warhead missile system
itself is an enormous task and -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, it's no harder than destroying half of
the existing missiles.

QUESTION:

Well, in any event, it will take several years...

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Definitely. It shouldn't - cannot be done overnight. But if we had a, say, five-year program with specific numbers each year of reducing the numbers of warheads so that we eventually at the end of three or five years are at single warheads, that would have reduced the number of warheads by 80 percent. That's a bigger reduction than is now talked about, even though the number of launches would could remain the same. And then if the number of launches is reduced as well, we could reduce warheads by 90 percent.

But so will the
50% reduction.

[7]

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

That would be significant.

QUESTION:

Now, before asking you about the actual perspectives in '87, let me ask you two questions related to your - well, desire [the course] of the arms control talks. Now one is that - economic.

Do you think in budget terms United States can keep on - well, going into the arms race? That means, because of the budget deficit and Congressional pressures, probably defense spending will be frozen -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

[It should be].

QUESTION:

- in so many years to come. And that means

- well, you have to cut the existing program on the strategic arms area and impose some more funds. Or get some more funds for the SDI, which should be growing faster than the rest of the program.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, but the fact is that the strategic forces

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

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DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

take less than 15 percent of the defense budget.
Sixty percent is caused by personnel. So that
the amount of savings that can be made in the ~~strateg~~
defense budget _well, you are right, they will~~
~~be cut~~ limited, and will not affect decisively
the overall ~~budget deficit. So you're quite~~
right. There is this problem that in a period
of flat and maybe even declining defense budgets,
SDI will be competing with other claims on the
defense budget.

On the other hand I think to give up SDI would
mean that for the indefinite future the United
States would declare that it will be totally
vulnerable to any kind of attack and this would
sooner or later lead to pacifism and unilateral
disarmament.

QUESTION:

Well, what does - still, your, say, prescription
implies, probably, that you can still cut the
manpower in Pentagon without affecting its -
well, capabilities.

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

No, probably not. But I think some capabilities will be reduced. It's inevitable. You know, for 30 years people have been saying you can cut manpower without affecting capabilities. And theoretically that may be possible; in practice it never happens. All I'm saying is I would give SDI very high priority and I would not eliminate SDI on budgetary grounds. Now, undoubtedly the consequence of this is that other desirable things will have to be stretched out, and I don't like this. But I would rather do that than give up SDI for budgetary reasons.

QUESTION:

And also in the other strategic area, you would prefer the [mystery that Midgetman course] rather than strengthening the Minuteman or moving into MX [INAUDIBLE OVER DR. KISSINGER]

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

No, I favor the - I like the MX also. I think we - I would be prepared to reduce the number of Minutemen in favor of MX and the so-called Midgetman--a mobile missile. I think that we

[y]

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):
have to begin to move to its mobile systems.
Because with the new improvements in accuracy
and terminal guidance, no fixed system can survive.
And you cannot substitute [hardening] for [mobil]i

QUESTION:

And do you think politically there is enough support for that mobile missile system in this country?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

No. The problem in the American defense communi-
ty, or defense discussion, is this: There are
technologists who are in favor of any weapon
that can be built. The scientists [and they
are a] majority, are against any weapon that
can be built because they are [they think that
their contribution to ending the arms race is
to prevent new weapons from being built. Some
people in the Congress want to use the defense
budget to save money. And we've been going
on now for 15 years on this process.
And we have lacked a systematic bipartisan approach
to long-term strategy. The MX was developed

[y]

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

in the early seventies and originally it was
supposed to be 250 of them replacing the Minuteman.

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

And substantially replacing the Minuteman, which
makes absolute sense. Now we kept the Minuteman
and we have 45 MX's and we won't deploy the
MX's because they're allegedly vulnerable.
Well, the Minuteman is just as vulnerable and
harder to launch. So it's a I don't think
there is enough support for the MX and the Midget-
man. All I can do as an outsider is to say
what is right. I can't get it necessarily adopted.

QUESTION:

Now, another aspect of the political problem is
that Irangate issue which has erupted into the
surface after I have actually prepared this
interview, and you have been commenting on this
point these days rather often about - to the
Japanese audience, tell us the implications
of diminished influence of the President over

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION (Cont'd.):

the arms control talks?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

First of all, there are three aspects to the
so-called Irangate.

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

One, improving relations with Iran. Second, selling arms in order to improve relations with Iran. Three, diverting funds from these arms sales to support the operations of the Contras in Central America. Of those three I agree with the objective of the first. It is important to improve relations with Iran and all the democracies and Japan have attempted to do that also.

And very effectively.

Second, selling arms was a terrible mistake.
And selling arms secretly was an even worse
mistake.

Third, the diversion of funds was also not right,

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

but at least there the objective was understandable.

Now, how much will it weaken the President?
That's as yet hard to tell. For the next months
it will be difficult for the President. I myself
believe that if no spectacular new facts come
out, that then it will be understood that any
President is entitled to make one mistake and
that he can recover a great deal of his authority.
If not, it will make negotiations with the Soviets
much more difficult.

QUESTION:

So it's a kind of scar on the surface but it
will not substantially affect his -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

It's too early to tell. It depends partly on
whether there are new revelations. And it depends
partly on the President's willingness to take
charge of his government and to move it in a
constructive direction. I think it can be
it is likely to be a scar, but not a fatal

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

or even a grave wound.

QUESTION:

I see. Then to summarize this part on the arms
control - What do you foresee in 1987?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, you know, unless Irangate so weakens the
President that the Soviets will no longer see
any incentive to deal with him--which I think
is unlikely--unless that happens I expect some
Soviet proposal early in the ~~new~~ near year. And
I expect, if not a Soviet proposal, some initia-
tive, either on our part or on their part, to
restart the talks. And I expect an agreement
- maybe a more limited agreement than Reykjavik,
before the Presidential election in 1988. My
reasoning is that the Soviets have an interest
in making an agreement with the most conserva-
tive American President of the postwar period.
Because this will end the domestic debate in
America whether one can make agreements with
~~them or should~~ the Soviets.

[y]

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

Secondly, President Reagan will still be very popular and he can get the support of the Congress. If the Soviets wait for the end of his term they have to wait for 18 months while the new President gets organized. So it's not waiting two years, it's waiting four and maybe six years. So for all of these reasons I believe, contrary to appearances, that 1987 will show significant progress on the arms control front.

QUESTION:

You said it will be limited in scope but could you -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

More limited than Reykjavik but still a significant agreement.

QUESTION:

For instance, what could be the major possible achievement in that?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, I think it is possible to do the 50 percent cut. I believe, probably, almost certainly, some significant reduction of intermediate range

[x]

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

missiles in Europe is possible. Probably some
limitation on SDI or slowing down of SDI evolu-
tion. It is not that I like every one of
these proposals; I'm just telling you what I
think is possible.

QUESTION:

So basically, on the extension of that Reykjavik
line, but not fully realizing -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Yes. I think that's the best that can be done.
It's also the most desirable that can be done
at this moment.

QUESTION:

And suppose there would be new initiatives from
the Reagan Administration, and also some proposals
from the Soviet side--the actual, say, agreement
itself between the two superpowers, apart from
the ratification in the Senate--do you think
it will come within '87?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

It will come either late in '87 or in the first

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

half of 1988. But it will be apparent by the end of 1987 that progress is being made. [OR "HAS BEEN"]

QUESTION:

So probably still before Reagan retires from his White House office there would be the final ratification stage.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

That's what I expect. Unless there are some very unexpected developments.

QUESTION:

Like further -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Like on the ~~so-called~~ Irangate.

QUESTION:

I see. And in your opinion, those developments in the arms control agreement is not entirely desirable or enhance -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

But some ~~It depends~~ what they are. I could imagine several that would be highly desirable. And of course a general improvement in East/West

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

relations is desirable.

QUESTION:

But still, in terms of that, say, total security
of the West, so to speak, that agreement could
give the Soviets some room to maneuver.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

We have to be very careful that we do not make
an agreement just to have an agreement. We
have to be very careful not to expose our allies
to additional dangers.

QUESTION:

Now, related to that, on the Soviet side, it
is [generally, genuinely?] that Gorbachev is
under even stronger pressure than the Presi-
dent of the United States and the Soviet economy
is in a very terrible shape. And the Soviet
system needs a major arms reduction just to
sustain their [?] standard of living, probably.
Now, on their side, what is going to happen?
That means, are they going to have an arms agree-
ment, say, almost at any cost?

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Certainly not at any cost. I agree that the Soviet economy is in difficulties. And that everything being equal, the Soviets would like an agreement. At the same time, the Soviet Union is run by a group of semi-feudal bureaucracies: The Communist Party, the Secret Police, the military. And the Foreign Office, which is a lesser one. Now, among these, the Secret Police and the military are two of the most important elements. And it is hard to conceive that the military are very eager to have their role reduced. So there are objective internal obstacles to what Gorbachev can do.

And for these reasons, I think that there is a limit to the concessions he wants to make or can make. Up to now what Gorbachev has done is to make a series of proposals which either maintain or improve every Soviet relative benefit or advantage in the arms race. That is, of course, the easy route for him to go. Sooner or later he must be brought to the point where

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

he makes reciprocal concessions. Where he gives
up something in return for what we are willing
to give up. And I believe that stage can be
reached in 1987. But it is wrong to believe
that they make an agreement at any cost. It
is not even desirable. Because to make an agree-
ment between superpowers or sovereign nations
there has to be a benefit for both sides. It
cannot be only a benefit for one side.

QUESTION:

So what you're saying is basically there would
be some sacrifice on the Soviet side as well,
and what -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

there should be. There hasn't been yet, but
there should be. And there can be.

QUESTION:

And specifically, what kind of a sacrifice can
be legitimately demanded on their side?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

well, What can legitimately be demanded is that
they reduce their capacity for a first strike

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

against the democracies, that they reduce their
capacity to attack adjoining countries like
western Europe, Japan and China, that they empha-
size defensive over offensive military capabili-
ties, and of course in time one also has to
demand a reduction in political aggressiveness
around the world. But that doesn't have to
be part of the first set of negotiations.

QUESTION:

[Mystery] that first set of, say, limited agree-
ment envisioned by you in late '87 or early
'88, is basically between the two superpowers
in the strategic area?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

In the strategic area, yes.

QUESTION:

And about that - its implications for Asia,
one is the - well, one hundred or so SS20's
in Asia that might remain after the arms agree-
ment -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

I don't like that either. It's only a hundred

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

warheads. That's about 35 SS20's. But still, a hundred warheads on Japan and China would be a serious matter.

QUESTION:

So you'd prefer a total elimination of SS20's on the Asian border.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Yes.

QUESTION:

Now, from Japanese viewpoint, probably the Foreign Office had prepared the schedule or invitation of Mr. Gorbachev to Japan, anticipating that there would be a breakthrough in the Reykjavik so they can talk about increased economic cooperation, et cetera. And they are trying to - well, back away from it. Back off for a while until the dust clears out on two superpowers arms control agreement. However, on Japan's side, at least some business circles - some people in the business community - well, want to expand their trade with the Soviets. And of course, from the Soviet side they covet

-22-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION (Cont'd.):

Japanese technology and capital, especially
in developing the Siberian natural resources.
And as the second-largest economy in the free
world, Japan has a lot of stakes as well as
a lot of dangers in dealing with this situation.
And what do you think is going to develop in
this Russia/Japan and American area in 1987?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, unless it I don't think that the final
direction of the internal Soviet policy has
yet been determined. One, Gorbachev has not
yet accepted the proposition that he has to
change his internal system. That with central
planning he cannot make the economic progress
that he wants. He has to go at least to the

of incentives. Chinese system. This affects also his foreign
policy decisions. In foreign policy he has
proposed agreements, but at the same time he
pursues a very active diplomacy that is more
aggressive vis-a-vis the United States and some
other countries like the Federal Republic of
Germany than that of his predecessors. By bringing

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

at every conceivable point simultaneously.

So he has not really made a final decision.

I still think the odds are better than even
that in 1987 we may see a breakthrough. In
that case, improved economic relations will
be possible. Now, we have to be sure, however,
that these improved economic relations follow
some significant agreement and don't precede
it. Because otherwise, we would be enabling
the Soviets to strengthen themselves for an
even more aggressive policy without any improve-
ment in the long-term situation.

QUESTION:

So it's a warning for the Japanese business-
men not to move in such a haste.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, I think the Japanese businessman will
do better business in a climate of political
reduced tensions than they will to try to achieve
too quickly short-term successes that will then
be swallowed up in some explosion, like Afghanistar

[x]

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

Now, moving to other areas, but still discus-
sing about the arms control, what do you think
will be the reactions from western Europe -
in our interview with former President Giscard,
he said - well, Reykjavik was not a great success
and to a certain extent it was failure. And
particularly he wished there had been more con-
siderations on the European situation because
it took so many years to reach even at this
stage of, say, supporting the U.S. deployment
of SS20 and other alliance concept.

And almost overnight appeared to be - well,
discarded. And in - well, making further arms
control agreement, or moving forward to that
- in that direction, more attention should be
paid to the European sentiment. Given his comment,
could you elaborate on those - on the implications
of the U.S./USSR arms control on Europe?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, of course, President Giscard d'Estaing is
an old friend of mine.

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

And so it's not surprising that I agree with
most of the views that you have summarized here.

The Reykjavik was a terrible shock to the Europeans for a number of reasons. One, many European governments had paid a tremendous political price to permit American intermediate range missiles to be placed on their territory. Less than two years after they began to be deployed, we offered to withdraw them all without even discussing it with our European allies. Well, this had--this weakened the governments that had staked their own domestic position on supporting the United States position.

Secondly, it did not solve the problem of the vulnerability of Europe. Because even if the Soviet intermediate range missiles are withdrawn, they still have short-range missiles from - with which to attack Europe, and intercontinental missiles with which to attack Europe.

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

While the American capacity to retaliate from Europe will have disappeared. That's an important event which was the reason why the missiles were put there to begin with.

Third, when we proposed to abandon our missiles, that was a direct challenge to the nuclear forces of Britain and France. So I think the impact of Reykjavik on the western alliance has been not good. On the other hand, I believe that this is now generally recognized and there are active discussions going on with our European friends to bring out more consensus. And so I believe in 1987 we can overcome some of these self-inflicted wounds.

QUESTION:

Now, China, who has been a bystander in this arms control, also has a keen interest in what will happen, and they have substantially reduced their resources spent for arms and defense in general, and coupled with their westernization or -

-27-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Modernization.

QUESTION:

Modernization - whatever the best terminology
might be - with that new effort their economic
situation has improved substantially. And what
- well, let's see - what do you think would
be desirable from the Chinese side? What kind
of an arms agreement is most beneficial for
the Chinese?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, the Chinese I think have made a funda-
mental policy decision. That first of all,
their army's equipment is too antiquated and
that therefore it would be ~~foolish for them~~
~~what~~ a waste of resources ~~to keep~~ reducing
more antiquated equipment. So they're taking,
in my understanding, a calculated gamble. They
are reducing the resources put into defense
until their economy has strengthened enough
so that they can produce more modern equipment.
So that's just a temporary phase. Now, what
kind of agreement would be helpful to the Chinese?

-28-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

Any agreement which moved Soviet troops away
from their border. Any agreement that some-
what reduced the nuclear threat to China like
the SS20's. But I think the Chinese are very
sophisticated and they know there are many Soviet
airplanes, many Soviet short-range and long-
range weapons with which to attack China. So
I don't believe that the Chinese attaches much
importance to arms control as western countries
do.

QUESTION:

In a way, they acknowledge that they are vul-
nerable, after all.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

They have run the risk of a temporary vulner-
ability to improve their economy. But we cannot
afford the same.

QUESTION:

You're right.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Because we are in a way a reserve for China.

CyJ

-29-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Whether we have an agreement or not. But there's
no reserve for the United States.

QUESTION:

So that - say, wisdom of Chinese behavior, so
to speak, can be more applicable to Japan's
behavior in the postwar era. And you see, now...

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Yes, but not everybody can shelter behind the
American protection. We haven't got resources
for everybody.

QUESTION:

You're right.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

And it was certainly correct until now, but
it cannot go on like this indefinitely. Nor
have the Chinese any intention of remaining
in that position indefinitely. But maybe neither
does Japan.

QUESTION:

Well, there is the area of the emerging debate

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION (Cont'd.):

among many Japanese, say, policymakers and business
community as well. Now, we are seeing the decline
of the economies of the two superpowers, prin-
cipally by the burden--heavy burden of the arms
buildup. While so far Japan could, well, stand
on the sideline and improve their civilian economy.

At the same time, the United States was build-
ing - probably having more, say, anyway wanting
$150 billion dollars foreign debts almost each
year. And no country has ever kept on borrowed
from overseas just to spend the other countries.

But as you might well know, there are some political
inertia and some pacifism. A deep-rooted pacificism
in Japan.

But still, Japanese example shows that we might
be better off by staying away from the arms
race and - but at the same time, it was achieved
at the cost of - well, U.S. taxpayers, so to
speak. What could be, say, the future course?

That means, will we have - will we be having
less arms on this globe, and moving towards

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

-31-

QUESTION (Cont'd.):

more, say, more pacified or global community
with less military tensions?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

I would think that if Soviet/U.S. relations
take a positive turn, we could have a period
of five to ten years with reduced tensions.
But it depends on the ability to make precise
agreements, and not just in the arms field but
also in the political field. As for the role
of Japan in the military field, I don't think
this is something that the United States should
take a position on. Looking at Japanese history
of several thousand years and of Japanese inde-
pendence for that period, it is my belief that
sooner or later Japan will decide to assume
again a larger role for its own defense than
it has in the past. That, however, should not
be in response to American pressures, American
proposals. It should be a Japanese decision.
And I think it will be done, if it is done,
with Japanese thoroughness and determination.
And therefore, will not always be totally comfortabl

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

for every neighbor of, of Japan. This is why
I don't think it should be an American proposal.

QUESTION:

Well, it's a very good [ ? ] for us. Now,
let me move to other parts of the world. Let's
see - In the Mideast things are moving, as you
have predicted. The Iran/Iraq war has been
petered out, although it's continuing, but it
is very clear that neither side can win. And...

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

That isn't so clear to me.

QUESTION:

Is it?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

I think it is possible - it's not desirable,
but it is possible that Iran could win. Not
a totally military victory, but if Sadam Hussein
is overthrown then that would be an Iranian
victory.

QUESTION:

And so related to that, could you give your
general overview about the Mideast situation?

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DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, my overview of the Midcast situation is that it is in the interest of all people who want moderation in the world that there be no victor in the Iran/Iraq war. In other words, that there is a compromise peace. That is not at this moment in the cards, and I do not expect that to happen in 1987. I think sometime in 1987 - either in the spring or in the fall - there will be an Iranian offensive. And that will determine the outcome of that war for the time being.

Either Iran will win or it will lose its offensive capability for several years.

As between the Arabs and Israel, I believe that both sides are too weak to be dominated now to make progress towards an overall settlement. I think some limited progress can be made towards alleviating, say, the conditions of life of Arabs on the West Bank. Maybe even some limited military arrangements are possible. But a general peace agreement is not possible in 1987. And not in 1988 either.

CyJ

-34-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

Now, let me move to Central America where the warfare has been going on. And do you think any turnaround will come?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, of course, I think the worst result of *this so-called* what you have called the Iran-gate *one of the worst results* is that it will probably lead to the reduction, if not the abro-gation, of American military aid to the Contras.

Now, whether you're for it or against it, *this is the worst reason for it to end it*. And if at the end of all of this a Communist govern-ment should remain in Nicaragua, with the large army that it has compared to its neighbors, and ten thousand Cubans, then this will be a permanent element of instability. First in Central America and then in other parts of the western hemisphere. So I think that the situation in Central America at this moment is rather precarious. And many of the achievements of the last few years have been jeopardized. the basic principle hasn't been changed. I still

[4]

-35-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

believe that the results of that bipartisan
commission - that I chaired and in which both
Democrats and Republicans agreed on a program
to strengthen Central America--if those recommenda-
tions are implemented we can still make progress.
In the rest of Latin America the big problem
will be the debt issue.

QUESTION:

Well, since I think I have taken more time than I had anticipated, I will ask you just two final questions. What is your - well, prediction on U.S./Japan relations in '87?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, U.S./Japan relations are always charac-
terized by endless guerrilla warfare on specific
economic issues.

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

And they're always bolstered by the fact that
both sides know that we really need each other.
And so there will be - on a day-to-day basis

-36-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

there will be many disagreements. In the long-term, however, Japan and the United States are the two pillars on the opposite sides of the Pacific, and with wise leadership on both sides and with the excellent personal relationships that exist--not just between the existing leaders but between alternative leaders--I believe the fundamentals of Japan/American relations cannot only be preserved, but strengthened.

QUESTION:

All right, my final question is, overall, what is the year 1987, and if you have a message to the Japanese business community and the general public, let us know.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, my message would be that on the economic level, we are living in a rather precarious situation. There are very few trends making for improvement and there are many - there are many dangers. And therefore, one has to be thoughtful and careful. To both the business community and the Japanese people, I would say,

-37-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

that even with all the difficulties we have discussed here we ought to keep this in mind: Almost all our problems--economic or political--can be solved by policy decisions. Maybe difficult policy decisions, but decisions within our control. Almost all the Soviet problems are structural problems. They have to change the nature of their system if they want their economy really to become comparable to those of any of their neighbors. They are now in the position where even India and China are progressing faster than they are from a lower base.

So fundamentally, I'm optimistic about the future because what this means is that the shape of the future is in our own hands.

QUESTION:

Thank you very much.

[OFF-MIKE COMMENTS]

[SOUND CUT]

END INTERVIEW

[N]

DEC 10 1986

NOMURA RESEARCH INSTITUTE

180 MAIDEN LANE, SUITE 2901, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10038
(212) 747-1805

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Kissinger Associates
350 Park Ave.
26th Floor
New York, NY 10022

December 9, 1986

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

Thank you very much for the interview this morning. I really enjoyed it and our Washington office has already delivered the honorarium to your Washington office.

I am delivering to you the transcript of the interview, as promised. After reading and revising it, please let your secretary contact Mr. Takahashi at 747-1805, the New York office of the Nomura Research Institute, to tell him that the transcript is ready. Mr. Takahashi will immediately send a messenger to your office to pick up the corrected transcript, which will be sent to Tokyo, via facsimile, instantaneously.

Please let me know also through our New York office about the response of the _Yomiuri_ concerning the publication of an independent book of the whole transcript of your interview, together with the record of the Tokyo forum, as soon as possible.

It has been and will always be a pleasure to talk to you and hear your insights on the international political situation.

[47]

-1-

December 9, 1986

NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING CORP.

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

No.

QUESTION:

No?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

-2-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

-3-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

When -

-4-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

Yes -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

[x]

-5-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

But if we had a, say, five-year program with
specific numbers each year of reducing the numbers
of warheads so that we eventually at the end
of three or five years are at single warheads,
that would have reduced the number of warheads
by 80 percent. That's a bigger reduction than
is now talked about, even though the number
of launchers would need to remain the same. And
then if the number of launchers is reduced as
well, we could reduce warheads by 90 percent.

-6-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

That would be significant.

QUESTION:

Now, before asking you about the actual perspec-
tives in '87, let me ask you two questions related
to your - well, desire [the course] of the arms
control talks. Now one is that - economic.

Do you think in budget terms United States can
keep on - well, going into the arms race? That
means, because of the budget deficit and Congres-
sional pressures, probably defense spending
will be frozen -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

[It should be].

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

-7-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

take less than 15 percent of the defense budget.
Sixty percent is caused by personnel. So that
the amount of savings that can be made in the ~~STRATEGIC~~
defense budget ~~will not be cut/limited, and will not affect decisively~~
the overall budget deficit. So you're quite
right. There is this problem that in a period
of flat and maybe even declining defense budgets,
SDI will be competing with other claims on the
defense budget.

QUESTION:

Cyd

-8-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

-9-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

have to begin to move to ~~mobile~~ systems.
Because with the ~~with~~ improvements in accuracy
and terminal guidance, no fixed system can survive.
And you cannot substitute [hardening] for ~~for the~~ MOBILE 17

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

No. The problem in the American defense communi-
ty, or defense discussion, is this: There are
technologists who are in favor of any weapon
that can be built. The scientists (and they
are a majority, are against any weapon that
can be built because they are) they think that
their contribution to ending the arms race is
to prevent new weapons from being built. Some
people in the Congress want to use the defense
budget to save money. And we've been going
on now for 15 years (this) on this process.
And we have lacked a systematic bipartisan approach
to long-term strategy. The MX was developed

-10-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, the Minuteman is just as vulnerable and
harder to launch. So I don't think
there is enough support for the MX and the Midget-
man. All I can do as an outsider is to say
what is right. I can't get it (necessarily) adopted.

QUESTION:

CyJ

-11-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION (Cont'd.):

the arms control talks?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

One, improving relations with Iran. Second, selling arms in order to improve relations with Iran. Three, diverting funds from these arms sales to support the operations of the Contras in Central America. Of those three I agree with the objective of the first. It is important to improve relations with Iran for all the democracies and Japan have attempted to do that also.

And very effectively.

[y]

-12-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

It's too early to tell. It depends partly on
whether there are new revelations. And it depends
partly on the President's willingness to take
charge of his government and to move it in a
constructive direction. I think it can be so
it is likely to be a scar, but not a fatal

[y]

-13-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

or even a grave wound.

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, you know, unless Irangate so weakens the
President that the Soviets will no longer see
any incentive to deal with him--which I think
is unlikely--unless that happens I expect some
Soviet proposal early in the near year. And
I expect, if not a Soviet proposal, some initia-
tive, either on our part or on their part, to
restart the talks. And I expect an agreement
- maybe a more limited agreement than Reykjavik,
before the Presidential election in 1988. My
reasoning is that the Soviets have an interest
in making an agreement with the most conserva-
tive American President of the postwar period.
Because this will end the domestic debate in
America whether one can make agreements with

the soviet
demands
them or should.

-14-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

For all of these reasons I believe, contrary
to appearances, that 1987 will show significant
progress on the arms control front.

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

More limited than Reykjavik but still a signifi-
cant agreement.

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

-15-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

[y]

-16-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

Like further -

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Like on the ~~Iran~~ so-called Irangate.

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

But some[ ] It depends what they are. I could
imagine several that would be highly desirable.
And of course a general improvement in East/West

[y]

-17-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

relations is desirable.

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

-18-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

cyp

-19-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, what can legitimately be demanded is that
they reduce their capacity for a first strike

-20-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

In the strategic area, yes.

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Cypri

-21-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Yes.

QUESTION:

CYJ

-22-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION (Cont'd.):

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, unless it I don't think that the final direction of the internal Soviet policy has yet been determined. One, Gorbachev has not yet accepted the proposition that he has to change his internal system. That with central planning he cannot make the economic progress that he wants. He has to go at least to the Chinese system This affects also his foreign policy decisions. In foreign policy he has proposed agreements, but at the same time he pursues a very active diplomacy that is more aggressive vis-a-vis the United States and some other countries like the Federal Republic of Germany than that of his predecessors. By bringing

-23-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):
/ at every conceivable point simultaneously.

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, I think the Japanese businessman will
do better business in a climate of political
reduced tensions than they will to try to achieve
too quickly short-term successes that will then
be swallowed up in some explosion, like Afghanistan.

[y]

-24-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

Now, moving to other areas, but still discussing about the arms control, what do you think will be the reactions from western Europe - in our interview with former President Giscard, he said - well, Reykjavik was not a great success and to a certain extent it was failure. And particularly he wished there had been more considerations on the European situation because it took so many years to reach even at this stage of, say, supporting the U.S. deployment of SS20 and other alliance concept.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

[y]

-25-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

And so it's not surprising that I agree with most of the views you have summarized here. The Reykjavik was a terrible shock to the Europeans for a number of reasons. One, many European governments had paid a tremendous political price to permit American intermediate range missiles to be placed on their territory. Less than two years after they began to be deployed, we offered to withdraw them all without even discussing it with our European allies. Well, this had--this weakened the governments that had staked their own domestic position on supporting the United States position.

[y]

-26-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

QUESTION:

Cy

-27-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Modernization.

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, the Chinese I think have made a funda-
mental policy decision. That first of all,
their army's equipment is too antiquated and
that therefore it would be foolish for them
~~what a waste of resources~~ to keep reducing
more antiquated equipment. So they're taking,
in my understanding, a calculated gamble. They
are reducing the resources put into defense
until their economy has strengthened enough
so that they can produce more modern equipment.
So that's just a temporary phase. Now, what
kind of agreement would be helpful to the Chinese?

[y]

-28-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

Any agreement which moved Soviet troops away from their border. Any agreement that somewhat reduced the nuclear threat to China like the SS20's. But I think the Chinese are very sophisticated and they know there are many Soviet airplanes, many Soviet short-range and long-range weapons with which to attack China. So I don't believe that the Chinese attaches much importance to arms control as western countries do.

QUESTION:

In a way, they acknowledge that they are vulnerable, after all.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

They have run the risk of a temporary vulnerability to improve their economy. But we cannot afford the same.

QUESTION:

You're right.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

-29-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

Yes.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

You're right.

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

-30-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION (Cont'd.):

-31-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION (Cont'd.):

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

I would think that if Soviet/U.S. relations
take a positive turn, we could have a period
of five to ten years with reduced tensions.
But it depends on the ability to make precise
agreements, and not just in the arms field but
also in the political field. As for the role
of Japan in the military field, I don't think
this is something that the United States should
take a position on. Looking at Japanese history
of several thousand years and of Japanese inde-
pendence for that period, it is my belief that
sooner or later Japan will decide to assume
again a larger role for its own defense than
it has in the past. That, however, should not
be in response to American pressures, American
proposals. It should be a Japanese decision.
And I think it will be done, if it is done,
with Japanese thoroughness and determination.
And therefore, will not always be totally comfortable

-32-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. KISSINGER (Cont'd.):

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

That isn't so clear to me.

QUESTION:

Is it?

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

QUESTION:

-33-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, my overview of the Mideast situation is that it is in the interest of all people who want moderation in the world that there be no victor in the Iran/Iraq war. In other words, that there is a compromise peace. That is not at this moment in the cards, and I do not expect that to happen in 1987. I think sometime in 1987 - either in the spring or in the fall - there will be an Iranian offensive. And that will determine the outcome of that war for the time being, whether Iran will win or it will lose its offensive capability for several years.

As between the Arabs and Israel, I believe that both sides are [too big, be ?] domestically now to make progress towards an overall settlement. I think some limited progress can be made towards alleviating, say, the conditions of life of Arabs on the West Bank. Maybe even some limited military arrangements are possible. But a general peace agreement is not possible in 1987. And not in 1988 either.

-34-

DR. KISSINGER

SIDE #1

QUESTION:

DR. HENRY KISSINGER:

Well, of course, I think the worst result of
this so-called what you have called the Iran-
gate one of the worst results is that it will
probably lead to the reduction, if not the abro-
gation, of American military aid to the Contras.
Now, whether you're for it or against it, this
is the worst reason to end it. And if
at the end of all of this a Communist govern-
ment should remain in Nicaragua, with the large
army that it has compared to its neighbors,
and ten thousand Cubans, then this will be a
permanent element of instability. First in
Central America and then in other parts of the
western hemisphere. So I think that the situation
in Central America at this moment is rather
precarious. And many of the achievements of
the last few years have been jeopardized. the
basic principle hasn't been changed. I still