12/7/79

# ANECDOTES FROM LARRY EAGLEBURGER

## 1. How Not to Fire an Ambassador.

You had been trying to get rid of Fran Wilkowski in Lusaka for some months, but each time we marched up that hill we were forced, for some reason, to retreat down again.

But finally we had succeeded. The dates elude me, but I think it was in 1975 (you can check in your records). We had everything organized and a successor picked (Steve Low). The papers went over to the White House where they wandered their way through the maze of political clearances, double checks by NSC and WH staffers, IRS, etc. My recollection is that the process sometime took up to six weeks, and this was one of those times.

In any event, I forgot the whole thing once it left State. And then you went on one of your African trips (I think it was the first one).

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You can fill in the details of the arrival in Lusaka,
Wilkowski and the ticker item, etc., better than I.

The first I knew that we had a problem was when Scowcroft
called in a panic to say that the White House had
announced Wilkowski's "resignation" and the Low appointment,
that this had been nicely timed to coincide with your
arrival in Lusaka, that you had called Scowcroft, and that
you were--to say the least--unhappy.

I no sooner hung up the phone when Millie announced that
you were calling from Lusaka.

After some years of bruises I had learned that there was
one way to defuse the Kissinger explosion before it
occurred (assuming you knew in advance it was coming):
quickly--before you had a chance to open your mouth--apologize
for the screw-up, accept total responsibility, and say that
it would never happen again (it often did).

So, I picked up the phone, said "Hello, Henry" and then went
through the song and dance: "all my fault; shouldn't have
happened; should have been looked at in light of your trip";

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etc.

There was a moment of silence, and then you said,
"That's all right, Larry. Just don't announce my
resignation yet; I need the plane to come home on."

## 2. The "Secret Trip" to Moscow; Moscow; the Flight to Israel

Sometime not too long after the opening of the
October 1973 War you decided to fly secretly to Moscow
to see if an Egyptian-Israeli cease-fire could be arranged.

We went to dinner at Huang Chen's first, where we were
treated to fish stomachs and other delicacies that were, for
me at least, a less than auspicious start to a long and
wearing flight.

I recall nothing of significance during the flight, but
do remember that the press was madder than hell that you
had put one over on them.

In Moscow itself much is now a haze. But several things do
stand out.

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First, there was the massive communications problem.

Moscow Embassy then had a very inadequate land line out to Copenhagen, where it then fed into a more modern system. But transmission time--particularly for sensitive traffic that had to be double-encrypted--was very slow.

You will recall that as a consequence of your agreement with the Russians we had to tell a lot of people (Washington, Tel Aviv, and Cairo, to mention only a few) that they were about to have a cease-fire whether they wanted it or not.

And there was not a lot of time.

The cables were drafted, cleared, and sent to the Embassy for transmission. It soon became apparent that the Embassy was having great trouble moving traffic quickly, and that we were likely to be in a serious time bind. So, we packaged up copies of all traffic and sent it out to the plane for transmission over its facilities. And then we learned that something or someone was jamming all the aircraft's

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transmission frequencies. In short, the plane couldn't
send at all.

All of this had gone on while you were upstairs resting
(it was late evening as I recall), blissfully unaware that
there was a problem. I intended to keep it that way.

As if it were yesterday, I recall sitting at a desk
in a fairly large room in the villa, yelling over the phone
at the communications people in the Embassy. (I was yelling
because of the bad telephone connection, *not* because I
thought it would help move the cables faster. Unlike
certain Secretaries of State, I never believed that a loud
voice had much impact on inanimate objects, no matter
how badly they functioned.) There were some 20-30 people
in the room, all talking, with Joe Sisco (never a quiet
fellow) taking the lead. In short, the room was crowded and
noisy, but I was more-or-less hidden from view (and hearing)
by the crowd.

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I remember having glanced up and noticing the crowd
and the noise, and telling myself that when I got off the
phone I would have to clear everyone out if I was going
to get any work done. Then I glanced down again and
yelled, once again, into the phone. Unbeknownst to me,
you walked in at that moment and obviously heard what I
was saying (I still haven't figured out how). There was a
bellow along the lines of: "What, the cables aren't out
yet?!?!" I looked up, to find you standing in the middle
of the room with smoke issuing from nose, eyes, and ears, and
**no one** else (with an exception I'll mention in a minute) in sight.
All 20 or 30 people--no doubt led by Sisco--had exited with a
speed and facility that would have put Houdini to shame. The
single exception was Winston Lord, who was sort of huddled
in a corner, but--God bless him--prepared to hang around for
the pyrotechnics and to clean up the blood (mine) when it
was all over. Winston, ever since, has had a special place
in my heart, as well as my great respect for his outstanding
courage.

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I shouldn't bore (or embarrass) you with a detailed description of what ensued. Suffice it to say that some 15 or 20 minutes later, when I could get a word in edgewise, I told you that we had tried to send from the aircraft, but that we could get nothing out because the Russians were jamming our communications. You replied with great eloquence, greater heat and greatest contempt, that I was-- to put it mildly--in error because the Soviets would never do such a thing.

You can imagine my surprise when I heard you, the very next day, tell Golda Meir that we had had great communications difficulties in Moscow because the Russians had jammed the plane's radio frequencies.

We now move to the next morning (I think it was a Sunday). I was downstairs in the same room where we had our pleasant conversation of the night before. It was about 6 a.m. You buzzed and asked me to come up to your room. You had

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not been feeling well and I thought that might be the
reason for the early call. But when I got upstairs I was
surprised to learn that you had decided to fly to Israel
(we had been planning to return to D.C. that day; flight
clearances had been obtained, etc.). I told you I thought
it a great idea (I had never seen Israel), and would
take care of everything right away. Little did I know that
it was not the easiest thing to find a responsible Soviet
official at 6:30 a.m., much less get him to "ok" a flight
plan that would take us over a lot of the Soviet Union they
would rather we not fly over--particularly when they had
expected you to go due West rather than Southwest.

In any event, I tried, but with marked lack of success
for some minutes. Then I had a brilliant idea (which is why I
lasted with you so long). I got Spike Dubs (Chargé) out
of bed, gave him the problem, and told him to solve it. He did.

The scene now shifts to the aircraft about half way to
our destination.

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You called me into your cabin, pointed out that we
would be entering a war zone, that there might be one
or two maniacs around who would like to shoot us down, and
wouldn't it be a good idea if we asked the Pentagon to give
us some 6th Fleet air cover over the Mediterranean and into
Tel Aviv? Recognizing that it was this sort of prior
planning (which I should have thought of) that had brought
you your reputation for wisdom, I immediately moved to set it
up. We were, from the plane, in almost instant communication
with the NMCC, which told us not to worry--everything would
be arranged immediately. And it was--in what I considered an
outstanding demonstration of U.S. military efficiency, we
were met by a large number of US Navy aircraft over Cyprus;
they stayed with us until we landed in Tel Aviv.

Now I have to jump ahead about a year. Vice Admiral
Dan Murphy, a friend and former aide to Mel Laird, was
commander of the 6th Fleet at the time of your Moscow-Tel Aviv

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trip. Many months later I ran into Dan at a Washington
party and told him the above story, congratulating him
on the superb performance of his men. He then gave me the
"other side".

Dan was in the middle of launching exercises when the
word came from DOD to give Henry Kissinger air cover. When
Dan asked where you were, the Pentagon apparently said they
weren't sure, except that you were somewhere between Moscow
and Tel Aviv. (I do not know, but presume that your pilot
was reluctant to give too exact a fix for fear it would help
other less friendly aircraft also locate us.)

Dan immediately launched the rest of his aircraft on a
sweep of the Eastern Mediterranean, and told those already up to
look for you as well, so long as their fuel (already
substantially depleted) permitted. Dan, who was in Flag Plot
(I think that's the jargon), would frantically ask his pilots

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if they had found us yet, get a negative, and then answer
the NMCC queries with a nonchalant "we haven't found him
yet, but soon will." Which they did, much to Murphy's
relief. But the planes were low on fuel and only barely
made it back to their carrier. Dan said it was one of the more
hair-raising of his 6th Fleet experiences.

One more short recollection--this time of Tel Aviv. There
is, first of all, the recollection of your arrival at the
airport: the cheers, the weeping, the relief that you were
there. I often thought of that first arrival on later trips
when the "atmosphere" had become less friendly. It reminded
me how short memories--and gratitude--can sometimes be.

On this first trip we went directly to Golda's "Hitler
Bunker" overlooking the sea. And there, after a period of
briefing and discussion (with Rabin sulking on the sidelines;
I don't recall that he said a word throughout the whole
visit), we went to lunch. I was famished, and the food was
not up to Israeli standards--it was good. I would begin to

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eat one course and then be called away to the phone to talk
to Cairo. I would return for the next course, and the
same thing would happen. This went on through the entire
lunch, including what looked like a tasty dessert. And
when lunch was over, instead of taking pity on *my* starved and haggard look, you rushed us off to the plane and
we took off for D.C.*

By the way, the subject of all the telephone calls--
and a good bit of the luncheon discussion--was whether Israel
and Egypt were in the same time zone ( a rather crucial issue
if both sides are going to stop shooting at the same time).
No one seemed to know, and I don't now remember whether they
were or were not.

### 3. Damascus and the Mosque

Valeriani has used this, so you may not want to, but --
We arrived in Damascus (1st trip) on a Thursday after a

*London first, then D.C. (Pedantic PMR note)

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number of days in Egypt and Israel. We were dead tired but
worked until about 2 a.m. Friday and then went to bed. We
did not know that the main Damascus mosque was next door.

At 5 a.m. the muezzin (spelling?)--on record--began
booming out. I remember sitting on the edge of the bed in
my shorts, with my head in my hands as the noise went on and
on. Then, a knock at the door. I opened it, and there you
were in your shorts as you said: "Larry, can't you get them
to stop that?"

## 4. Defoliating North Korea

The North Koreans killed a GI (or two) at Panmunjom a
few days before the 1976 Republican Convention began in Kansas
City. You wanted a number of response options put together by
State and DOD, but they kept giving you pablum.

Just before you left for Kansas City you told Habib to
come up with something else. It was sent to you in Kansas City.

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The proposal was to march a company into the DMZ area
at Panmunjom, chop down the tree, and return.

When you asked Marlene what she thought of the
proposal (she and Nancy were with us at Kansas City) she
told you it was an excellent suggestion. If we used
it as a general working principle, and if the North
Koreans killed enough Americans, we would soon have
defoliated North Korea.

5. The Day the Xerox Machine Ate Page 2.

Your first speech after becoming Secretary was
to the UNGA in October of 1973. * It went through the
normal 10 or so drafts before you went to New York, and
then a further five or so in the Waldorf.

You finally finished working on it (I thought) at
about 2 a.m. of the day you were to give it. Jane
Mossellem typed it and then we xeroxed an extra copy for

*Except for Pacem in Terris, Oct.8 (Pedantic PWR note).

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the USSS man to carry (in case you lost the original).

But then you started working with it again at
7 a.m. This began to get a little nerve-wracking at
about 8, since you had to leave the Waldorf at 9 a.m.
sharp for the UN. Each new change meant retyping the
page and xeroxing, so Jane and I were hoping you would
knock it off by no later than 8:30 a.m.

But that was not to be. At 8:55 you handed me
page 2 for retyping, accompanied by some comment to the
effect that I was fired if it wasn't ready when you left.

I dashed out, gave the page to Jane, who retyped it
in about 2 minutes. So, we had three minutes to go.

Jane ran into the next room to xerox it, and came back
a few seconds later with a look of horror on her face.

"The xerox machine just ate page two", she said. If
the window had been open (we were on the 35th floor) I would
have thrown myself out. But it wasn't, so I dug the

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copy of page two that Jane had copied from out of the
waste basket, led Jane (who was looking a bit vacant)
back to the typewriter, and got her back to work. She
performed brilliantly: the page was finished just as
you walked out the door. I handed it to you and you
swept off to the UN. I then spent the next 2 hours
wondering whether you lost your original of the speech
and had to use the extra the Secret Service had. You
see, his copy had no page 2, since we had no time to
duplicate that page. If you had been forced to use
his copy there would have been an interesting (if for me
disastrous) moment when you moved from page one to page
three in front of thousands of delegates and the television
cameras.

6. Odds and Ends

These are not stories; rather they are a couple of
points you might not otherwise highlight that I think

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deserve a comment:

a. Handling of refugees after the fall of SVN:

In retrospect, the way we moved the refugees out of Vietnam, housed them and then moved them into U.S. society was a major triumph that has seldom been remarked upon. In particular, the success of integrating them into our society was certainly unknown in modern history and a great compliment to the U.S.

b. Sinai Support Mission: Here, again, the building of facilities, organizing of the teams, and getting all this done on a very short fuse, was a real success-- as was the performance of the Mission through the years virtually without incident.

Dean Brown and Clay McManaway ran the refugee program; McManaway was largely responsible for the early success of the Sinai Mission.

I. 1968 - 69 - Transition

Not much I can recall from so long ago -- particularly
of any importance. A few things still remain, however:

1. Your Foreign Affairs article on Vietnam appeared shortly after you were named Assistant to the President. I recall going through the lobby of the Pierre with you when the newsmen cornered you on it. I can't remember what you said but I do recall it was there that I decided you would do: the waltz was superb and they never laid a glove on you.

2. Meeting with Lee Kuan Yew: The details are hazy, but I do recall that he was one of very few you agreed to see. There is a memcon in the file somewhere, but I recall he impressed you and you did a memo to Nixon on his rather pessimistic view of the future of SEA.

3. I also recall that several Saudi princes or lowly Sheiks gave you some silver doves (or something of the sort) and they plagued us for months. The last I saw of them they were on a table in Dick Allen's EOB office (they may now be in his living room for all I know).

4. Which leads me to a general recollection: the way you handled Allen (I helped a bit, I confess). He (in New York) started out rather heavily engulfed in substance. But it wasn't long before that began to slip (access to RN, info, etc.) He also, as I recall, tried to have a good bit to do with the personnel selection (NSC and otherwise), but again soon was out of the pattern.

By the time we got to DC he was already well contained.
You will recall how we got him the plushest possible
office in theEOB, set him up like a pasha, and then
largely forgot about him.

5. NSDM-2(structure of the NSC system): You and Halperin were already at work on this when I showed up in NY. You also had Andy Goodpaster come up, but as I recall that was *after* the draft was well along.

I remember that you showed me a draft early on and
later asked my view. I said, "It looks fine, except
I wonder what happened to the Sec. of State. He is
never mentioned." You handed it back to lent and told
him to "mention the Secretary". (I told this to Roger
Morris years ago, and now see that the SOB has used it
in his book.)

-2-

Which again, brings me to another recollection. Sometime in late '68 -- or from probably, January of 1969, you, Goodpaster, and I met in the State Department Rogers' transition office with the Secretary-designate and Richardson to discuss the NSDM-2 draft. You let Goodpaster do most of the talking in defense of the draft (I'll have more on him in a moment). Rogers knew, in some inchoate way, that he was in the process of being screwed to the wall, but was neither sure hor or how best to defend himself. Goodpaster was pedantic, a bit old-womanish, stubborn as hell, and rather effective in his arguments. Rogers was incoherent, less than well prepared, and unprepared for a confrontation. Richardson started out on Rogers' side, I recall, but all-of-a-sudden (you c-uld see the bulb go on in his head), totally switched and rather effectively defended NSDM-2. I often wondered if that was the time when EF decided where his bread was buttered and where the power was going to lie, or whether it was simply that the logic of the arguments for NSDM-2 (there were, and still are, many good reasons for the structure you established) finally overwhelmed him. I have always expected it was the latter -- his rather good and precise lawyer's mind was aptivated by the sense and symetry of it all.

6. Goodpaster: My recollection is that when he got into NSDM-2, he looked at the Kissinger/Halperin draft, thought it was far too generous to State, and persuaded you to strengthen the NSC role substantially.

7. Personnel selection for the NSC: Not much here, except that it was less well organized than when you went to State in 1973, but still -- on the whole -- impressive. It is interesting, too, to note that, even then, you used a lot of FSO's. I would remind you of a *few* mistakes we made:

-- You: Davidson, Halperin, and (later) Lake.

-- Me: Moore and (I guess) Morris.

II. 1969 (Jan. 20 until I left in June).

1. The first NSC staff meeting: I had to work like hell to get you to agree to it. Then... Sonnenfeldt and Halperin rivalled each other in bitching about parking passes, WH mess privileges, etc. Your comment to me as we walked out of the meeting: "Those two are almost enough to make me anti-semitic."

[Lc]

-3-

2. There were, of course, the well-remembered struggles over privacy, with Halperin and Lynn each trying to get the last grip on the NSC meeting briefing books, Sonnenfeldt sulking and sneaking over to the WH basement to try to read your or my in-box (even when we put things in face-down and upside down he still seemed to get it by osmosis).

3. The chaos of your outer office, with the general atmosphere of a newspaper cutting room - noise, you yelling for Haig or me, or Sally Dollar. The panic into which you threw that secretary I got for you (I've forgotten her name).

4. The nightmare preparations for RN's first trip: late in getting the papers, late in getting them edited (my fault), late in getting the books put together (my fault). *But*, my recollection is that they were damned good books.

5. Sonnenfeldt (in front of Harriman) asking if AH had a job for him (the first of so many resignations). You then told me to talk to Ray Garthoff in Brussels about replacing him (I did my best not to carry out that order, but you finally told RG to talk to me. So I waffled all over the place and nothing ever came of it.)

6. I vaguely remember walking with you one night (I think in London) as you talked about possibly bombing Camodia. Haig flew oever, I know. What transpired there after I can't remember.

7. The EC-121 incident: Plane shot down, Laird stops all recon. without telling anyone. Haig and I urge you to get RN to retaliate. You agree. To my surprise, when you get Halperin in. he, too, agrees there should be an *armed* response. We work up a plan (the details of which I have forgotten), RN buys it. Then, you come back late on night and report that RN (in his cups) has chickened. "The next time, Henry, we'll kick the shit out of 'em."

8. Back to the RN Europe trip:

A) the arrival remarks at Orly that were written, distributed and then not used (with Safire fussing because I had cut him out of the drafting).

B) DeGaulle's superb "review of the world" in the Petit Trignon before the assembled Americans, while Couve de Murville slept quietly on the great man's right. He, (de Gaulle) ended the monologue with: "et le GrandeBritauge, le petit ile." That, literally, was the only time he mentioned the UK.

-4-

That is about the extent of my recollections of the
first chapter in the saga of my times with you. If
more occurs later I will pass it on.

### III. May (when I come back) through the rest of 1973.

1. Paris and Le Duc Tho. I barely get back and am dumped into Vietnam negotiations (a subject I had, until then, always successfully avoided (first because I thought we should never have been in and then because I thought we should not get out once in).

We flew off to Paris (with me acting like I knew what the issues were all about). Wild ride from the airport through town. Then we begin meetings at the NVN villa (if I ever knew what we were there for I have now totally forgotten). Sullivan very articulate, but I, at least, was never confidant that he was more than an elegant mechanic. G. Martin also there (at least part of the time as I recall). He wandered around the edges, but seemed to begin to have some influence on you as time went on.

The goof of all goofs: Stearman contradicts you and supports point made by Tho. Your response: "Stearman, pick up your chair and move to the other side of the table."

I was, reluctantly, fascinated and impressed by Tho. An ascetic; he ate like a bird, played his games, made his speeches, etc. But with all of that I came away with the impression that you and he understood each other and that there was mutual respect. My recollection of his cohorts is a faceless, smiling mass. There was, I recall, one fellow who seemed to have some influence, but the rest sat there, smiled, frowned, blinked, smiled, frowned, blinked...

2. The State Dept. The highlights on that move, as I now recall them, were:

- preparations for the confirmation hearings;

- picking people for the Department.

ANECDOTES (for HK)

January 1969 - First meeting with NSC staff. Instead of substantive discussion, main focus was on parking permits, mess privileges etc.

1969 - Chaos, intrigue, rivalry on NSC staff. e.g., getting ready for first Presidential trip to Europe; briefing President on Mauritius instead of Mauretania (or vice versa?); Halperin vs. Lynn/Sonnenfeldt over SALT and deputyship.

1969-1970 and Hunnebelle in Washington and Paris.

February-April 1970. On one of early secret trips to Paris plane breaks down and Walters has to arrange for repairs.

March 1970 - Laos Statement. Desire to lay out all facts vs. fiasco over "no American killed in ground combat." Impossibility of getting figures from agencies. Washington Post Sunday article on Captain Bush and subsequent furor. (Lord's baptism in front office.)

April 1970 - Cambodian operations. Meeting before with 5 "doves" on NSC staff. Meeting after with professors from Harvard; also with series of student groups. Brian McDonnel fasting and subsequent friendship.

1970 - Japanese textiles. Mysterious Japanese go-between, representing "my friend." Incomprehensible phone talks between him and HK/Haig.

- 2 -

**June 1970 - Report on Cambodia.** In San Clemente, with 24 hours to go, HK tells Lord report is "total disaster". From 5:00 PM to 7:00 AM Lord rewrites entire report (30,000 words?).

**September-October 1970 - President's Trip to Europe.** Laird and Cigar visiting Pope. From Prince of Peace to Sixth Fleet by chopper from the Vatican. HK, Haig, Lord etc. watching movie "A Man Called Horse" when interrupted by news of Nasser's death. Do we go to Yugoslavia? Nixon mad because of cancellation of firepower demonstration. Spectacular Madrid motorcade. Gaudy/awful Mulcahy house in Ireland.

**1970-72 Presidential speeches.** Constant battle between HK/WL drafts versus President/speechwriter's drafts, e.g., Vietnam and Cambodia speeches "pitiful, helpless giant", damage limitation.

**January 1971 (and other years) - Annual Review.** Agony every year in Washington and San Clemente. Driving small band (Lord, Rodman, Hyland, etc.) to insanity. On final morning of process in 1971, HK asks exhausted Lord on way to bed to do a final paragraph with "generation of peace" for President, a phrase we had avoided throughout 10 drafts of 250 pages for three months.

**1970-1971 - Secret trips to Paris for Vietnam negotiations.**

The early AM departures on AF-2 or other back-up planes. The cover stories in Washington and Haig frantic camouflaging and taking of phone calls. Always went on weekends or holidays. Once overnight and right into meeting. Usually over on Saturday

- 3 -

and meet/fly back on Sunday. The various routes - e.g.
change to French jet in middle of France; or Frankfurt; or
sneak in from London; or there publicly for other reasons
(President's trip in September 1970; HK London trip in June
1971; return from China July 1971). Fantastic Walters
Bond-like capers; his gruff complaints; anecdotes. Role
of Jobert. Rented car. Walters apartment and maid and white
cat. Code names, including "General Kirschman" for HK. Drive
to Vietnamese house. Armchairs. Their facing across
green covered table. Conference garden to avoid bugging.
Vietnamese snacks served during breaks. Reports to President
and long trips home.

September 1970 - Amb. Watson takes HK for drive in the country
/change cars at Trocadero).

June 1971 - HK private Sunday in Henley (HK and Lord in Jetstar
to Paris and back).

July 1971 - HK in Embassy for all day conferences (sneak out in
car through back). HK public dinner with Meg Osmer (Maxim's?)
criticized for frivolity when he should have been with Le Duc
Tho.

Spring-early Summer 1971 - Preparations for secret China trip.
Cover trip through Southeast and South Asia. Messages from
Chinese through Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly. Construction of

[c]

- 4 -

cover story and logistic plan. Briefings by CIA and special
locked briefcases. Knowledge of HK/Haig/WL vs. CIA, Ambassador
Farland, Chinese and Vietnamese experts on staff, the President
(our actual destination), Rogers. Each knows different
slice and keeping in mind who knows what and who sees what
documents. Skull sessions with Lord and Holdridge in
Bebe Rebozo's house in Key Biscayne during late June weekend.
1971 (and elsewhere) - the public vs. private record. April
Ping Pong team visit vs. secret preparations for July trip.
Waiting for North Vietnamese response to our May 30 proposal
vs. publishing of Pentagon papers. North Vietnamese private
nine points and public seven points. Criticism for dinner with
Meg Osmer vs. 6-7 hour meeting with Le Duc Tho.

July 1971 - First secret trip to China. Tiring, tense ride through Vietnam, Thailand, India and Pakistan. Waiting for Moscow's answer to possibility of summit (Haig calls Lord in New Delhi with negative response). Real stomach ache for HK 2 days before Pakistan. Banquet hosted by Amb. Khan on eve of trip. Up in middle of night, drive to airport, 4 Chinese on plane and Secret Service surprise. Flying by K-2 and other spectacular mountains as dawn rises. Crisis of lost shirts that Halperin had failed to pack; borrow some from Holdridge who is 6 feet 2 inches; his have label "Made in Taiwan".

- 5 -

Smyser called back for consultations with HK 10 minutes
before Chinese border; Lord sitting up front and therefore
the "first American into China." Met by Marshall Yeh and
others. Ride through streets and Tien An Men Square
in limousines with curtains drawn. First handshake and
meeting with Chou at Guest House. First gourmet meal.
Private tour of Forbidden City, all closed off, very warm,
carrying two heavy briefcases, tour guide is head of all
Chinese museums, tea. Meeting with Chou in Great Hall.
Peking duck lunch and Chou recounting of Cultural Revolution,
how he was trapped, how Chairman was wiser than he. See
duck ovens. Meetings over brief communique and Chinese style
of negotiating. Long, long wait for Chinese to reappear.
Walking around guest house outside to avoid bugging.
Always stopped at bridge by suddenly appearing guards.
Flight home and reentry. Meeting with North Vietnamese in
Paris and elaborate cover to get out of Ambassador's
residence to meeting and back with all newsmen on alert.
Premature hope by HK and Lord that we are close to agreement
with North Vietnamese. Announcement and news conference in
San Clemente on President's China trip.

July 1971 - 1972. Secret meetings with Amb. Huang Chen in Paris. Red velvet and food and picture of Mao and incense.

-6-

**October 1971 - trip to China.** Advance trip for President. Outrageous press and logistic demands by White House staff. 1st American plane into China in over 2 decades after stop in Hawaii (Rockefeller cabin on big island). Tension in Peking and tight security after Lin Piao incident. Press rehearsal for President's trip in trips to Opera, Summer Palace etc. Gradual exposure to Chinese people - in press, then cadre audience at opera, then people at Summer Palace. President asks us to stay a day extra in Peking because of UN vote on China question. Long, tough drafting sessions on Presidential Communique. CHou's attack on our draft (ordered by Mao) and their stress on justice rather than peace or stability. Lord and HAK completely redraft communique between 12:30 am and 7:30 am. We go through 7 drafts in 60 hours. Final feeling of success and accomplishment punctured by news, 5 minutes out of Shanghai, that we had lost China vote in the United Nations.

**July 1971 - May 1972.** Most incredible period of all during the 8 years. Secret China trip, then October trip, China into the UN and Haig January trip, President's trip and Chairman Mao and Shanghai Communique, meetings with Chinese in Paris and New York. Agreement on summit with

Russians, Berlin and arms control agreements, pre-summit Moscow trip (we fly there secretly with Dobrynin while technical team public -- this is first trip to Moscow), Hanoi/Haiphong bombing and tension whether Moscow cancels summit, Moscow summit and signing of various agreements and principles, SALT, Vietnam lecture by Soviet leadership in Brezhnev dacha. Secret meetings with Vietnamese, January speech revealing negotiating record, further meeting with Vietnamese, bombing and mining. Summit meetings with four European and Japanese leaders. South Asia (Bangladesh) crisis, various maneuvers with Chinese and Soviets. Anderson leaks on "tilt." Annual review exercise. International monetary crisis and change. All this and more in 10 months. When Vietnam agreement reached in January 1973 and most successful trip to China takes place in February 1973 and there is continued progress with Russians, all the major pieces are in place. Then Watergate.

## February 1972 - President's trip to China.

Departure by chopper from South Lawn - ceremony. Fantastic electricity and build-up in the US and around the world. On Air Force One we watch ourselves take off on TV. HAK and Lord speculating on the excitement of seeing yourself crash live on TV. President conscientiously wades through mass of briefing books, asks for more even up to Guam, conducts

-8-

himself quite well in meetings, but always on precipice.
Usual pre-positioning with Chinese officials on meetings,
counterparts, agendas etc. between Shanghai and Peking.
Sparse but correct airport arrival. Chou-Nixon handshakes,
honor guard, national anthems. Immediate notification of
Mao meeting. HAK takes Lord along; he is deleted from
communique and all pictures to protect Rogers' feelings.
HAK tells Lord his including him should allow him another
month of free sadism. First banquet and toasts and army
bank playing American songs. Nixon and Madame Mao at
ballet. Colorful gymnastics exhibition. President-Chou meetings
and Rogers-Chi meetings on bilateral matters. Also
continual late night communique drafting sessions with
Chou, mostly on Taiwan and after much Mao tai. Crucial
late night session last night -- Peking and checking with
President around 4:00am. We think we have communique settled
as we leave Peking. Rogers blow-up in Hanchow and choice
between embarrassing reopening of draft and possible State
undercutting of trip results. President comes into Lord
room when he is in bright orange boxer shorts. Frets with
HAK and Lord over Taiwan issue and asks HAK to go back to
Chinese. Beautiful trip on Hangchow Lake but tense over
communique. Walter Cronkite seen through portal. After
fantastic meal, embarrassing session with Chinese who
berate us correctly but throw a few crumbs. Final day in

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Shanghai with nerve-wracking Nixon toast proclaiming an alliance. Issuance of communique and HAK tightroping press briefing, including reaffirmation of Defense Treaty on Chinese soil. Flight leave on Air Force One with initial apprehension and then happiness over public reaction.

April 1972 and later - incidents on trips to Moscow.

Security chief indicates to HAK that girls at dacha are available. Joking with Dobrynin on walk around grounds that trees are full of antennas; with Gromyko and Brezhnev in meetings that microphones are in the fruit etc. Gromyko double negatives. HAK trying to stall on Middle East and Rodman mistakenly produces paper that HAK claimed was still being typed. (as a result of this incident, Lord -- on a later trip to Peking when asked by HAK in the meeting if he had a paper to show the Chinese -- asked HAK "What's the right answer?" ) The billiard table in the dacha where the balls are huge and the holes small and it's almost impossible to put the balls in the holes. On April 1972, a barrage of nitpicking, hawkish cables from Washington (President and Haig) demanding Soviet concessions on Vietnam as price for going ahead with summit -- while we were getting concessions on SALT, other issues.

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## May 1972 - Bombing/Mining Decision.

After fruitless secret meeting with Le Duc Tho, the agonizing in Washington over what, if anything, to do about North Vietnam. President's hawkish mood. The feeling that all that has been accomplished (in Moscow, and Peking and elsewhere) could be unravelled in a downward spiral versus spectacle of President's going to Moscow while Soviets fuel major North Vietnamese invasion of South. HAK and others indecision. Meeting in Situation room with close advisers (Haig, Sonnenfeldt, Lord, Holdridge, Negroponte, Howe, Carver). WSAG and NSC meetings. Role of Connally: later resignation and speculation about his future. On a Saturday afternoon Lord and HAK reflect in office how all the progress/work of previous months could evaporate.

Disastrous White House speech draft. Lord and HAK go by helicopter on perfect spring Sunday to Camp David. Work with Andrews and the President on speech draft. HAK to Lord: "well, we can blow three years in twenty minutes."

Delivery of speech and agonizing waiting for several days for Soviet response. Relief/elation when Moscow gives green light on summit

## May 1972 - Summit Meeting in Moscow.

Tension between HAK and President/White House staff. Departure in rain from Andrews Hangar ceremony. Demonstrators on runway (Germany or Austria?) delays Air Force landing. Pleasant Salzburg castle spring day interlude before Moscow. Rather flat, subdued, edgy 1st day in Moscow -- airport ceremony,

-11-

opening banquet in Kremlin, President's solo meeting
with Brezhnev. SALT negotiations, including frantic
cables to and from Washington and Helsinki; Russian
official (Smirnov)'s What was
that? of Soviet military data,
generals discomfiture at American knowledge, late night
breakthrough after Swan Lake ballet, late night briefing
in Moscow night club on HAK's 49th birthday. Signing
ceremonies. Vietnam tongue-lashing of dignified President
by three Soviet leaders in turn, followed by rousing, jovial
banquet upstairs with heavy drinking. Lord misses (and
HAK almost misses) motorcade to dacha with all briefing
books for the meeting when Brezhnev and President take
off suddenly; Soviets refuse to help until security
clearance received from dacha. Side meetings with Gromyko
on communique, Vietnam, Middle East, etc. Nixon speech
on TV about heroine girl and Leningrad. Diplomatic reception
in Kremlin grand hall with playing of national anthems.
President's plane grounded in Moscow because of engine
problem. Elation as we leave Russia and arrive in Iran with
friendly crowds, tumultuous motorcade, the warmth of the
West after oppressiveness of Soviet Union. (Same feeling
when we went from Hanoi to Hong Kong in February 1973). Belly
dancer at press party -- Tehran; HAK briefs press that they
talked about Y class submarines and how he wanted to make
the world safe for "Nadias". Polish band almost marches
into the plane at the WAr saw airport. Dignity and suffering
of Polish people. We all take helicopter from Andrews

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to Capitol over night-lit Washington to hear President's
report to the Congress.

## June 1972 - Japan trip.

1st visit, after two postponements, to heal relations after
shock. Tight, extensive, efficient security on roads
and at hotel. Two rightist students throw pamphlets at
HAK in hotel lobby; momentary nervousness and confusion
among us all as Secret Service blanket HAK. Private dinner
meeting with PM Sato, with Lord again anonymous notetaker,
a la Mao meeting with Nixon. Geisha parties.

## June 1972 - 4th trip to China.

Mostly about Vietnam and Moscow summit. HAK tells Chou
that Lord is good ping-pong player; a couple days later
Lord (and Solomon) is semi-humiliated at sports academy
before large crowd of Chinese as three-times world
champion Chaung tse-ting hits pat balls and Lord does
badly because of thick paddles and very light ball that
keeps sailing out. Lord depressed for days. "Friendship
1st, competition 2nd!" Session in nearby villa where
Chou shows us photographic evidence of US bombs falling
in Chinese territory. Pleasant afternoon/evening boat
ride on lake at Summer Palace, and dinner up on hillside.

-13-

Last minute negotiations on communique; Lord wakes HAK up in middle of night and latter yells with fright.

**July 18-19, 1972 - Secret meeting with North Vietnamese.**

Storm delays us at airport. We then fly to Paris through
lightening and thunder. 6 1/2 hour meeting despite
bombing. Meeting was announced but only after completed.

**August 1, 1972**

Eight hour meeting with North Vietnamese. Again stayed at
CIA man's house and announced the session afterwards.

**August 14, 1972 - Paris, Saigon, and Tokyo.**

2 hours with North Vietnamese. They are generally negative, but it's holding action as Le Duc Tho tells us he's going back to Hanoi. Stop in Zurich for HAK to see parents on golden anniversary. Beginning of second-guessing from White House on whole effort (culminating in anti-HAK backgrounders etc. later in fall). Present ideas to Thieu-Saigon.
Uneventful stop in Tokyo.

**September 1972 - Munich, Moscow, London and to Paris secretly.**

Olympic Israeli tragedy. US "losing" to Russians in
unbelievable basketball steal while HAK in last few minutes
asks Lord for a secret document which had been left on plane.
HAK stuck in helicopter. Discussions - Moscow, mostly on
trade/economic deal. Stay in Lenin Hills guest house again
with hair-raising Soviet motorcades to and from the Kremlin.

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We get word from Thieu he rejects our latest plan.
We all ponder consequences as we watch Russian circus.
Cables to Washington to get President's green light to
proceed with North Vietnamese anyway. Secret departure
from London to Paris from mildly encouraging session with Le
Duc Tho. CBS TV cameras waiting for us as we emerged
from meeting.

**September 26-27, 1972. Meetings with North Vietnamese.**

Our first two day session and our first at new location (former brothel) in countryside. North Vietnamese increasingly eager and proposals presented back and forth. HAK walks with Lord and others in garden to discuss tactics.

**October 8 - 13, 1972 - Meetings with North Vietnamese.**

After Haig gets a violently, tearful negative reaction from Thieu in Saigon over the direction we are heading, we take off for Paris again. Haig's first encounter with Vietnamese (HAK took along to shore up his position versus President and Thieu and hawks at home). Tense days in Washington as we decide on strategy in light of Thieu's reaction. (Lord suggested military agreement only.) Usual scrambling on plane on way over as we modify our proposals, talking points, etc. First meeting with other side is on a beautiful Sunday in the new meeting place in the countryside. Le Duc Tho asks for break after our initial presentation. We

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all go off to a park and lake and walk around on a perfect
afternoon among bemused French people as we wonder about
North Vietnamese reaction. Upon our return Le Duc Tho
tables a plan that, with all its remaining problems,
effectively separated the political and military and was
the essential breakthrough. We ask for recess. Back at
Ambassador's residence HAK and Lord shake hands and agree
that this was it; reminiscing over what we had been through
to get to this point. Negroponte and Lord work frantically
through the night to draft a counter-proposal. HAK
rejects the next day as too tough and Lord/Negroponte redo
whole plan again while we ask for further delay in meeting.
We then go through three more days (unexpected) of meetings --
long bargaining sessions, point by point in peace document.
In between sessions frantic work by Lord/Negroponte/Haig/
HAK/Rodman/Engle and the secretaries on drafts, talking points,
cables to Washington (don't get them too excited) and Saigon
(continue to keep on edge about possible political elements).
Ups and downs in our moods. Rollercoaster of emotion.
Exhaustion, laughs, tension. Hard bargaining but clear that
both sides now pushing for a settlement. Le Duc Tho pushes
for HAK visit to Hanoi and gives sentimental epic poem toward
the end. Conferences in garden during breaks in meeting.
Our outrage when we hear that French Embassy in Hanoi has been
bombed by us in the middle of our talks. Laughter over
incredibly complicated international supervision mechanism.

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Last session lasts 17 hours straight. Finally agreement on basic points and scenario for completion, with a couple of issues left and much technical cleaning up to do. Lord and Engle left behind to go over English and Vietnamese versions for correlation and technical clearing up. Lord utterly exhausted; average of 2-3 hours sleep for 4 nights; no meals at all for 48 hours at one point.

He and Engle conduct 10 hour nitpicking sparing session with North Vietnamese, cleaning up many points and bracketing others. After 1 hour sleep Lord is instructed by Washington first by cable then HAK phone call at 4:00 am to see Xuan Thuy with a tough message for the record. Does so at 8:00 am before flying home.

Oct. 17 - 23, 1972 - Paris and Saigon.

Twelve hours with Xuan Thuy narrowing remaining differences with both sides, straining tensely for compromises against time deadline (which HAK uses as pressure). Two remaining issues plus unilateral statements. Very tense, long flight to Saigon as we are apprehensive about Thieu reaction and boxed into tight schedule, including Hanoi stop. Pham Van Dong message to President received on plane, caving on two issues but tough on unilateral statements. The incredibly tense agony of the stop in Saigon as we outline plan to South Vietnamese and await their reaction. For a couple of days our hopes rise as Thieu asks non-committal questions. Tightness of schedule and scenario and White House nervousness and waiting

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for Thieu reponse add up to unbearable tension. Lord waked
up every night by messages from President or Haig. Sullivan
and Negroponte to Laos and Thailand. Thieu delays meeting
and keeps 78 year old Bunker by phone. Arrogance of Nha.
Endless stream of cables to and from Washington (President
and Haig on one end, Lord and HAK drafting on other) including
various conceptual pieces, game plans, option papers. Hanoi
continues to give on remaining issues. De Borchgrave
interview with Pham Van Dong. After slightly hopeful meeting
with Thieu, HAK goes to Cambodia briefly. Continual stomach-
churning tension as we are caught between Hanoi, Saigon,
the White House and a tight schedule including a trip to
Hanoi. Finally Thieu drops bombshell - he flatly rejects
agreement, refuses thought of modification, rants and raves
about betrayal. An incredible night then takes place -- perhaps
the most depressing, frantic and tense one of the eight
years. From dinner to 5:00 am, HAK dictates to Lord a
continual stream of cables to Washington. Lord writes
them up in long-hand, gets them over to communicator despite
post-curfew hour. The same pattern is repeated several times:
HAK would dictate a think piece or analysis or future
options message to Lord and go to sleep. Just as Lord
gets it out to Washington he receives another cable from
Haig/President and wakes up HAK and the whole process is
repeated. Tension and tough language at both ends as

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well as fast-thinking on where we go from here. All
of this complicated by fact that each side is about 2
cables behind so they are talking past each other. ALso
great difficulty of getting phone calls through. Continual
Lord-HAK discussions and drafting throughout the night.
Final session with Thieu the next day and then home in deep
depression and tension. Lord, Haig and HAK converge on
office in early morning in response to Hanoi's blowing
the lid on the negotiations. "Peace at Hand" press conference,
aimed at Hanoi and Saigon, not the election.

November and December, 1972.

Public meetings with North Vietnamese at their and our
places. Nightly consultations with stubborn South Vietnamese.
Elaborate motorcycle escorted motorcades. Our tries to get
more concessions out of North Vietnam while brutalizing
South Vietnam at same time. Lord/Negroponte. technical
sessions with Vietnamese. Our tension and gathering gloom
often ups and downs keyed to particular meetings. Le Duc
Thos's "Headaches." "You make an effort, we'll make an
effort." The pedant, "Blinkers", the smooth Thach and the
ill-looking Xuan Thuy. HAK/Haig/Lord skull sessions in
HAK's bedroom at Ambassador's residence and cables to
Washington. Crowds of press waiting outside the meetings.
The contrast between what was happening in meetings and
where the press and world thought we stood: when world was
upbeat (e.g. smiles and handshakes with North Vietnamese),

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things were falling apart; when world was pessimistic,
talks were actually going better. Our depression as we
at in Champs Elysee restaurants or in residence (fantastic
food). Rollercoaster of emotions. Gathering evidence that
Hanoi won't move sufficiently. Ludicrous final session with
Hanoi pulling back on some issues and time wasted on
frivolous semantics. Flight home in deep gloom aboard President's
communications plane (on which communications don't work
very well!). Christmas bombing starts. After a few days
Hanoi sends word in December that it's ready to resume
meetings.

January 1973 - final negotiations on Vietnam.

Alternate between their place (GIF) and ours (borrowed home).
Motorcycle escorts to and fro. Journalists outside meeting
place - they write glum stories based on surface atmosphere
while inside there is immediate business-like negotiations
(a few days after holiday bombings) and increasing cordiality.
Rising hopes but we all keep fingers crossed because of
Oct-Dec. experience and SAigon problem. Kraft and other stories
suggesting backgrounding by certain members of our team that
HAK is too soft and agreement is too loose. Brutal sessions with
South Vietnamese (followed by brutal Nixon to Thieu letters).
Tie for Xuan Thuy (he wore at signing ceremony), other gifts
I can't recall. We get through agreement, then understandings,
then protocols (Sullivan mostly). Unbelievable gourmet meals
at Ambassador's residence. Separate expert meetings. Finally

official photographers

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we get press of both sides in for pictures. Final lunch and HAK-Tho exchange of toasts about past and future. We fly home, all of us working frantically as we had for days. Rodman, puffed up on cortisone, throws up on plane and HAK persuades him to get off in Washington as we go to Key Biscayne.

## Mid-January 1973 -Wrapping up of Vietnam Agreement.

Sullivan in Paris on protocols. HAK and Lord get Haig ready for Saigon trip. Series of letters to Thieu before and after. Lord does about 12 hours of work in 6 hours before Redskin - Dolphin superbowl -- talking points, cables, briefing book, etc. HAK calls Lord down to his cabin 10 minutes before kick-off. Early in game, when Redskins doing poorly, HAK calls Lord and says they aren't "making a big effort" (one of Le Duc Tho's favorite phrases). Thieu finally, after agonizing step-by-step carrot and stick process, subscribes to the agreement. Final HAK trip to Paris for a few loose ends, initialling ceremony, and toasts. Presidential speech and HAK briefing. Rogers goes for signing ceremony. Lord (after three years) seated by State in last row behind a bevy of State people with little or no role in negotiations.

## February 1973 - Trip to Bangkok, Vietiane, Hanoi, Hong Kong.

Wind-sniffing Thai, peaceful Laotians and Souvannadinner. Eerie feeling as we flew into Hanoi and had people stare at us totally impassively -- a couple of weeks after heavy bombing.

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HAK's huge bathtub and gymnastic skill required to get
into bed without disrupting mosquito netting. HAK, as
head of delegation, wasn't given a pass -- but wasn't
allowed into compound because he didn't have a pass! Pham
Van Dong. Usual jokes about where are the cameras and
microphones hidden. Basically pedestrian meetings -
implementation, economic aid, Laos (pinned down ceasefire),
and Cambodia (no luck). Tour of museum and Le Duc Tho emphasis
on prisons. Meanwhile American POWs are beginning to arrive
in Phillipines and US. HAK - Pham Van Dong talks about
war, history. Toasts. Feeling of relief as we leave Hanoi
and get into Hong Kong. Feeling of freedom, color, bustle.

## February 1973 - Peking (and Tokyo).

Best trip, substantively and personally, of all. 1 1/2 years
of dealings, Nixon reelection, end of Vietnam war all made
for very warm atmosphere. HAK (and Lord) have late night
meeting with Mao; the Chinese pointedly invite Lord to go
along, knowing he had been made anonymous during Nixon visit.
(Mao phrases include "invitation from god" for first time, and
sending 10 million women to America) Opening of Liaison
offices, release of prisoners, increase in bilateral dealings
etc. Extremely warm relationship with Chinese, including
Mao and Chou. Last meeting, late at night, extended by
mutual HAK/Chou desire tough communique easily settled and
it was really small talk. Chou escorted us back from nearby

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villa over bridge (where guards stopped us on previous trips) and said affectionate farewells very late at night. Chou in good form throughout, last time he was really in charge.

**Spring-Summer 1973** (Lord on 3 1/2 months, May-Sept. sabbatical but somehow our foreign policy survives).

Year of Europe speech, Watergate; tapping; exchanges with Chinese on Cambodia and negative impact of bombing halt; fruitless sessions with Le Duc Tho in Paris; movement toward HAK appointment as Secretary of State; skull sessions about State Department in San Clemente between HAK, Scowcroft, EAgleburger and Lord. Confirmation hearings. Emotional swearing-in with parents.

**Early October 1973 - Middle East Crisis breaks.**

In New York for United Nations, Sisco tells HAK of war at Waldorf. Hal Saunders' wife dies. HAK (with Lord's help) continue to work on Pacem in Terris speech right through crisis - illustrative of importance and incredible amount of effort and time attached to major speeches (indeed all public statements) as means of educating Americans to new era in American history as well as vehicle to advance substantive issues with foreign countries and Washington bureaucracy.

Nobel Prize.

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## Late October 1973 - Trip to Moscow and Israel.

Right after pre-China banquet hosted by Chinese, we take off on trip to Moscow re Middle East. Surprising immediate acceptance by Brezhnev of ceasefire proposal. Then incredible communications foul-up (the weather or the Russians) as we lose several hours getting off messages because plane communications won't work. Eagleburger helplessly on phone as HAK (understandably) rants and raves. Golda Meir invites us to Israel. Ceasefire takes effect as we are there.

## November 1973 - Trip to Middle East and China.

Morocco (1st of three meals with three different kings on trip) and Tunisia. Blackout, headlights painted blue in Cairo. Crowds on way to Pyramids cheer a Jewish Secretary of State. We climb up inside great Pyramid. Usual wisecracks - HAK: "Good practice for heart attack."' Lord: "HAK looking over pyramid, thinking of building one for himself;"Lord: (as xerox machine tilts towards Sisco)"Stop that machine, we cannot afford more than one Sisco." (See Rodman for multitude of wisecracks on this and most other trips.) Jordan and Hussein flying HAK in his helicopter. Saudi ARabia and very stiff dinner as several score identical-looking shieks watch Faisal to see when to eat, when to laugh, etc. Tehran. Pakistan and sentimental overnight at same guest house where

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we stayed the night before secret China trip. Huge
banquet with regional dishes and Bhutto toast in which he
says he is glad to give honor guard farewell to HAK after
doing so for so many nincompoops in the past. To
China (Lord meets up with his wife). Helen Thomas catches
HAK dozing during ballet. Chou more subdued and restrained
than usual. Customary routine of Miss Wang shuffling in and
out during meeting, signalling that we're on verge of Mao
meeting. Incredible 3-hour session. Chairman compares
Watergate to "breaking wind." Chou inserts potentially
meaningful "principle of one China" phrase in communique.
Tokyo and then home.

## February 1974 - miscellaneous.

Preparations for Energy Conference in Mexico City. 1st real
workings with State and inter-agency bureaucracies in new
areas, trying to make conceptual and substantive progress,
break bureaucratic molds, resistance to new ideas etc.

Skull sessions, including Burns and Bruce, on Energy Conference.

Duel with Jobert. Lost weekends (as always) on redrafting
speeches for Conference and Mexico City. Last minute re-
writings of communique in Tlatelolco, including Kubisch/Lord/
Einaudi in 20 straight hour session and HK shirtsleeve session.

Misunderstandings over "community"; final plenary discussing
text that wasn't yet distributed.

[L]

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## February 1974 - London and Middle East and Bonn, Brussels.

Egyptian belly dancer - HAK: "she'll get first cultural visa." HAK to Lord as they emerged from tomb with 4000 year old mummy: "You missed your chance to lock me up."

Son et lumière at Pyramids (Sphinx in rain) HAK cancels visit to Damascus mosque because of security threat. King Faisal lecture on Communists and Jews (Lord gets mild version). We see Heath and Gold Meir on this trip and both leave office a few days later.

## Spring-Summer, 1974 - Miscellaneous.

Marriage to Nancy. 1st (dinner) meeting with Teng Hsaio-ping in New York -- not a single reference to Chou En-lai. During meeting on speech for UN Special Session HAK says that he always gets good work out of Lord on 13th draft, wonders why not before then; Lord replies that HAK doesn't read the first 12 drafts. NATO Declaration at Ottawa. HAK 30-day shuttle breakthrough with Syria; bags constantly packed for return home. President Nixon's last trips, to Middle East; his phlebitis leg. The Soviet Union. Salzburg press conference, though criticized by many, served to burst bubble and proves to be effective tactic. (The next day the Chinese invite HAK and Nancy to a dinner in their honor - typical Chinese gesture).

HAK thinking of resigning during some of this period (tapping stories and Watergate tensions). Nixon resignation and massive amounts of telegrams, background papers, and policy