KISSINGER, HENRY A.

APR 3 1971

Dear Alex:

Many thanks for your letter of March 27. It was good to hear from you again and I appreciated your suggestion that I attempt to meet with Dr. Seffer and Mr. Stepanovich, NICK

As I am sure you know, the President came to the West Coast for ten days beginning on March 26 and I have been working out here since then. I was not in Washington on the day Harry Dent met with them and regret that I missed the chance to do so myself. You were very thoughtful to write to me about them.

I hope everything is going well for you.
Please stay in touch.

Dr. Alex N. Dragnich
Vanderbilt University
Department of Political Science
Nashville, Tennessee 37203

jlp:4/3/71

POPULATION CRISIS COMMITTEE

1730 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006
Telephone [202] 659-1833 Cable: CRISIS

Officers & Directors

William H. Draper, Jr.
Honorary Chairman

James W. Riddleberger
Honorary Chairman

Andrew P. O'Meara
National Chairman

Hugh Moore
Vice Chairman and Treasurer

Mrs. Phyllis Piotrow
Secretary

Lawrence R. Kegan
Executive Director

Directors

Charles E. Bohlen
Norman E. Borlaug
Harold W. Bostrom
Cass Canfield
John Conyers, Jr.
Ernest Gruening
Mrs. John L. Loeb
Mrs. Cordelia S. May
James S. McDonnell
George C. McGhee
H. Bruce Palmer
Rodney Shaw
Joseph D. Tydings
Willard Wirtz

August 25, 1971

EXECUTIVE

C034-2

WES

F08

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I was very pleased to receive the President's letter of August 20th in reply to mine, enclosing the booklet about *Population and Family Planning* in *The People's Republic of China*. I can see your fine Italian hand and I thank you sincerely.

After talking with the Chinese Ambassador in Rome, I visited Ottowa, as I indicated to General Haig I would do, and left a letter with the Chinese Ambassador there indicating my interest in arranging a visit to Peking in connection with population and family planning.

However, as I have told you, the German group - members of Parliament and Representatives of four German Ministries - will be leaving Friday of this week for Iran, India, Indonesia, Hong Kong and Kenya and there is obviously not sufficient time for Peking to approve of such a visit and for word to get to us before we reach Hong Kong. In view of the tie-in with the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, who issued the invitation to the Germans, it will probably be more appropriate for such a visit to take place after the People's Republic of China has been granted United Nations membership, particularly, if this should happen at the forthcoming session.

I was sorry to miss you two weeks ago and will telephone you after my return and hope I may have a chance to see you.

WHD:bz

RECEIVED
SEP 9 1971

CENTRAL FILES

telephone

(Type of request)

4/7/70

(Date received)

dcm

(By)

DREW

(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

To:

From:

Name: Elizabeth Drew, ATLANTIC MONTHLY

Request: She is doing an article on the policy making behind the Nigeria/Biafra issue, with special emphasis on the fall of Biafra and relief, etc. Her deadline is early next week.

DRY's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: 4/9 - NO

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

APR 4 10

CENTRAL FILES

PRESS, jlp, 2/9/72

DREW

Type of Request & Date

(Last name and pending date)

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Name: Elizabeth Drew, Atlantic Monthly

Request: Called to say that Mr. Kissinger has said to her many times that he would like to get together with her for lunch and told her to call the office and tell us so. She would like to do it some time before the China trip if possible.

Contact her at 223-6794

CSH's Recommendation:

HAK's Answer: WO - 2/14

Date and Time:

Party Contacted:

Additional Information:

Resolution:

FEB 14 1972

CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Vicky:

There is no way to adequately express my appreciation for making the children's and my stay in California so enjoyable. We all enjoyed your company, and the children, especially, will miss you.

I want to thank you also for taking care of all the "loose ends" and hope you haven't been inconvenienced too much.

The very best of luck with your new job at the hospital. The children and I look forward to seeing you soon, either in Washington, if you ever have the opportunity to travel East, or back in California.

Thank you again.

Miss Vicky Driscoll
33552 Big Sur
Dana Point, California

RECEIVED
SEP 17 1969

KISSINGER, HENRY A./D

SEP 10 1971

Dear Viki,

Just a short note to tell you again how much
we appreciate you. I always enjoy Califor-
nia, but cannot tell you what a pleasure it is
to bring Elizabeth and David with me and what
a relief it is to know that they will be well
taken care of. You are very important to our
enjoyment of the time we spend on the West
Coast.

Please stay in touch. We all look forward
to seeing you again.

Miss Viki Driscoll
33552 Big Sur
Dana Point, California

RECEIVED
SEP 1 1 1971
11:00 AM
FILES

jlp:9/7/71

A wet Saturday evening, listening to Mozart and

the cat in heat downstairs.

Dear Mr. Kissinger,

Thank you for your warm letter. I hope global strategies are proceeding as they should. I suppose we will remain ignorant of nine-tenths of the negotiations until you publish memoirs many years from now.

As for domestic concerns, summer plans are looking quite busy, but I would be disappointed if I could not somehow arrange to be free when you arrive. I will be leaving the end of September for the fall quarter at U.C., Berkeley. If I am able to go to Europe, it will be just before school begins. Otherwise, I will be working as usual at South Coast Hospital in Laguna. I will teach the x-ray students until early summer and then stand in for summer vacations. I am sure that if I am pressed for time, Dell would be able to help.

Dell and I filmed a horror movie for a social sciences class he is taking at U.C., Irvine, and I would like to show it to David and Elizabeth. It is a vampire spoof titled "The Two Dollar Funeral." We had a premiere last Saturday evening and served ladyfingers and bloody marys. To be honest there probably isn't a single moment of spine tingling terror to judge by the laughter, but we have a keener appreciation of the art of movie production. It was filmed in an artist friend's surrealistic apartment. You can guess who was the victim. I had to wear a flour and water mask for three hours.

Thank you again for the recommendation to Berkeley. I know public health will not be the dead end which radiography has become.

I wish you stamina with the Russians, skill with the Chinese, patience with the Vietnamese, and whatever else you require. History lives.

Always,

KISSINGER, HENRY A. /D

Dear Viki:

Just a short note to tell you how much I appreciate your letter of January 24. I enjoy hearing from you and hope I don't have to tell you that I expect that we will always stay in touch with one another.

It sounds to me like your life requires more stamina at the moment than mine! At least I get a chance to take occasional naps while in transit from place to place.

Please keep me posted on what you are doing. I suspect we won't have you for a babysitter this summer what with all your activities and plans, but I will be disappointed if you don't stop by to see us. And I don't exclude you from the possibility of taking care of us; I just wanted you to know that I will understand if it's impossible for you to do anymore.

Miss Victoria Driscoll
33552 Big Sur
Dana Point, California
92629

jlp:2/12/73

RECEIVED
FEB 2 1 1973

CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Dear Viki:

Just a short note to tell you again how much
we all appreciated your help during our visit
to California. You are a very large part of
the happiness and relaxation of these San
Clemente stays. Plus, the children enjoy
their time with you very much.

Please give Del my best wishes. I have his
resume and you will be hearing from me
regarding it shortly.

With warm regards and appreciation,

Miss Viki Driscoll
26527 Calle San Luis
San Juan Capistrano, California 92675

San Juan Capistrano, California 95672
26251 Calle San Luis
Miss Viki Driscoll

Henry V. Kissinger

Sincerely,

regarding it shortly.
resume and you will be hearing from me
Please give Del my best wishes. I have his
their time with you very much.
Clemente stays. Plus, the children enjoy
the happiness and relaxation of these San
to California. You are a very large part of
we all appreciated your help during our visit
just a short note to tell you again how much

Deariki:

KISSINGER, HENRY V.

NSC Christmas Party

December 23, 1969

THE BALLAD OF
THE WHITE HOUSE CHRISTMAS

by Dolf Droge

T'was the night before Christmas and not even a mouse
Could get past the Secret Service and into the White House.
When Santa arrived with a jet plane zoom
Hovering over the Situation Room.

The alert duty officer picked up the phone
And called Dr. Kissinger out at his home.
He said "Sir, I hate to get you out of bed
We're being attacked by a man dressed all in red."

The good Doctor took notes till it became clear
State would have to be called about visas for reindeer.
And Secretary Rogers cautiously noted
He understood the situation but wished not to be quoted.

Mel Laird was next to get the call
He said he knew the Vietnamese could handle it all.
Then Romney called in from the far end of town
To warn of no real housing in a real showdown.

A quick message came up from Scott and Ford
Who had a better idea but no encouraging word.
With phone lines in chaos, the crisis the most
Spiro Agnew kept picketing the Washington Post.

And now the Secret Swinger let out a Teutonic sigh
He knew he would have to aim for the sky.
The situation called for the highest level fixin'
It was time to inform President Nixon.

This required three draft NSSMs from the NSC
With at least eighteen tabs and enclosures three.
And by the time the whole thing had been cleared
Santa had grown a twice longer beard.

The President sleepily picked up the phone
To learn of this Yuletide U-F-O o'er his home.
He first thought it must be Hubert, and then thought again
Hubert would have awakened all with sheer oratorical din.

(page two)

The President said, let me make one thing very clear
Any bills for roof repair are charged to the reindeer.
And please Secret Service be on your guard
For the tax bill from Congress is still laying out in the yard.

Then Santa Claus cleared his throat with a roar
And opened his huge sack on the floor.
He hauled out his toys with seniority
And gave to the President, the Silent Majority.

President Nixon was literally overcome with glee
He called all the networks and asked for TV.
He said "Happy Christmas, my season is merry
I will broadcast nationwide, you can follow with commentary."

Santa flew off for he had done his best
To bring to the White House, its most fervent request.
Santa still had one job left to fulfill
Fly to that Texas ranch and pay that overdue light bill.

And as he flew off into that yuletide night
He shouted: MERRY CHRISTMAS TO ALL, AND GO BACK TO SLEEP
SECRET SWINGER, THE WORLD IS ALL RIGHT!

######

MORNING
SUNDAY
EVENING

THE
SUN

THE A. S. ABELL COMPANY, PUBLISHER
BALTIMORE, MD. 21203
WASHINGTON BUREAU
1214 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
14TH AND F STREETS N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20004

June 10, 1971

Tell-It-To-Hanoi Committee
Box 965, Radio City Station
New York, N.Y.

Gentlemen:

This is written with reference to the half-hour counter to "Common Cause" that was televised in your behalf by CBS on Channel 9 here last night.

It was the best review of the Vietnam problem's origins, development, and current status that I have come across in a job that has compelled me to follow the situation closely for more than 17 years.

Are any transcripts available and, if so, would you be so kind as to send one for possible use by this bureau?

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

Reprint from _Civilizations_, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (1969),
pp. 209-215

Accelerated development
and policymaking improvement

Yehezkel DROR*

During the early stages of development studies and development policies, the rather optimistic assumption was often accepted, that socio-economic development can be achieved independent of weaknesses in the political and administrative system. With progress in the study of development processes and with the accumulation of frustrating experiences, this simple assumption was revised so as to somewhat take into account the interdependence of social, economic and political phenomena, and some necessary political and administrative requisites of accelerated overall development were identified.

Political stability, strong symbols of identification, ability to recruit support, implementation capacities, some professionalization of the bureaucracy and some acceptance of a merit system — these illustrate the characteristics of the political and administrative system, recognized as requirements for accelerated socio-economic development (though insufficient by themselves). Many development aid activities are directed at encouraging these and related characteristics, from civil service training to strengthening the armed forces so as to resist subversion, from improving organizational structures and procedures to encouraging widespread distribution of the instruments of mass communication as an essential tool for "nation building". These are without doubt highly desirable activities, as clearly all the above mentioned political-administrative characteristics are indeed essential for accelerated development. But it seems to me that at least one critical aspect of the political-administrative system, which constitutes one of the most important variables for shaping all facets of development, is very neglected in theory and action alike: this is the *policymaking* function.

Not that policymaking is completely neglected: quite some attention is paid — in theory and even more so in practice — to central planning orga-

* Any views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the view of the RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors. Papers are reproduced by the RAND Corporation as a courtesy to members of its staff.

209

RECEIVED

DEC 1 7 1969

CENTRAL FILES

YEHEZKEL DROR

nizations, budget procedures and monetary controls. Often, also, serious efforts are made to improve operational policies in respect to some selected subject, such as education, agriculture, concrete industrial projects and water management. But the main components of central public policymaking are usually neglected in the study of development processes and excluded from intensive self-improvement efforts and from international and bilateral aid activities.

The omission of treatment of the main policymaking components, despite their constituting a critical factor in determining the probabilities of success in accelerated development endeavors, is not too difficult to understand. Three clusters of reasons do explain, at least in part, this situation:

a. The study of policymaking and systematic approaches to policymaking improvement are new even in the most highly developed nations. Policy sciences knowlegde is still in its infancy; proved policymaking improvement suggestions are scarce; and qualified professionals in the policy-relevant disciplines (or, more correct, "interdisciplines") are scarce and are much in demand in their home countries, in addition to being difficult to identify and often disliked by more traditionally trained administrations.

b. Effective policymaking-improvement involves changes in the main components of the policymaking system, that is, in the political institutions. Patterns of decision-making by the senior ministers and by the Cabinet, information flow to the legislature, the social roles of intellectuals and universities — these are just a few illustrations of the foci of attention of any serious efforts to improve policymaking. Much can be done to adjust recommendations to prevailing power structures, indigenous values and personal styles of the dominant political figures. But even after all possible adjustment, improvement of policymaking involves significant changes in the political institutions. It therefore is a very sensitive area, particularly hostile to foreign experts and external aid — which tend simultaneously to be absolutely essential and completely unacceptable. The result is that experts and aid concentrate on more technical activities, which are very useful but are often completely frustrated because of weaknesses in public policymaking.

c. In order to achieve worthwhile improvements in the policymaking processes of development countries (and of highly developed countries as well), a whole set of interrelated improvements is necessary, which together reach the critical mass needed for making any real impact on such complex, diffuse and aggregate a process. True, the apparently more simple structure of the public policymaking system in development countries may lower the relevant threshold and relatively fewer changes — in comparison to a highly developed country — may influence the quality of policymaking. But appearance may be misleading, with many complexities being invisible to the insensitive eyes of the foreign observer, only to reveal themselves when interfered with; also, the resources in qualified personnel, political support, span of attention, information etc. needed for improving policymaking are extremely scarce in most development countries, often making even a small critical mass impossible to achieve without very effective new types of aid, which at present are unavailable.

210

ACCELERATED DEVELOPMENT AND POLICY MAKING IMPROVEMENT

Each one of these three clusters of barriers to the improvement of policy-
making in development countries is by itself sufficient to explain the absence
of activities in this direction. Each of the first two reasons also explains the
neglect in theories of development of the role of the public policymaking
system. Taken together, those factors reinforce one another and constitute
in combination most serious hindrances to policymaking improvement in the
development countries.

Nevertheless, policymaking improvement seems highly necessary for acce-
lerated development. There is evidence to indicate that parts of the develop-
ment process are quite independent from conscious, goal-directed, social actions
— being more the result of basic socio-economic, psycho-cultural and cross-
national evolutions. There are also indications that parts of the development
process can be stimulated through a series of "shock policies", any one of
which will do, so that careful selection of a policy is not necessary. Even
granted these assumptions (and not all will equally subscribe to them), still
the quality of policymaking is very important: better policies can make quite
a difference for the rates, directions and sequences of accelerated development,
and bad policies can radically increase the human and socio-economic costs
of development and strongly retard it. Because of the broad scope of public
policymaking and its widespread impacts on different facets of development,
it constitutes a high-leverage variable, improvements of which will often have
widespread and fargoing impacts (though difficult to measure). Therefore,
investments in policymaking-improvement may be very efficient in terms of
benefit-cost, being often one of the optimal uses of limited energy and re-
sources, both internal and aid-supplied.

My conclusion is, that in development efforts major emphasis should be put
on improving the policymaking system — in research, theory and practice.

One of the characteristics of efforts to improve policymaking is, that a prag-
matic approach is inadequate. Weaknesses in policy machines have no clear-
cut immediate symptoms which permit diagnosis by the time-honored method
of obvious "pains where the shoe presses" and treatment through "debug-
ging", that is removal of the external manifestations of trouble. The policy-
making system is too complex and its features too submerged for such a
"practical" approach. Instead, we need careful study of a given policymaking
system and sophisticated redesign. Such study and redesign require in turn
thorough theoretic understanding of the operations of the policymaking system
as our open-ended, complex and dynamic, social and political decision-making
institution on one hand; and explicit models of preferable decision-making
modes and structures, including creative invention of designs moving in the
direction of the preferable models and still being feasible under given political-
social-human contraints, on the other hand. In respect to the improvement of
policymaking at least, good theory is thus an essential foundation for good
practice. A main operational conclusion of my analysis is, therefore, that
intensive efforts should be made to advance as rapidly as possible research and
study on policymaking in development countries and on designs for its
improvement.

211

YEHEZKEL DROR

This I regard as an important conclusion, having immediate implications
for the allocation of attention and the distribution of resources. But we can
proceed one step further.

As already mentioned, policy sciences — which focus on the study and improvement of policymaking — are still young even in the highest developed nations. Nevertheless, the present state-of-the-art in policy sciences, in combination with available knowledge in the various development study disciplines, do already permit some recommendations in respect to the improvement of policymaking in development countries. These recommendations are tentative and must be revised in view of the conditions and needs of each country. But they serve the double functions of (a) concretizing the contents of the terms "improvements of policymaking" and "redesign of the policymaking system" in respect to development countries; and (b) of supplying immediate operational suggestions for policymaking improvement, implementation of which can and should start immediately, without waiting for the results of future study and research. (Such implementation activities in turn are a main source of added knowledge and, as a result, better operational suggestions — experimentation and collection of field experience being essential for building up policy science knowledge relevant to accelerated development conditions.)

Available knowledge seems to support, among others, the following illus-
trations of operational recommendations for improvement of policymaking
in development countries (1):

1. The operations of the highest political decisionmaking organs, such as the president, prime minister and cabinet, should be improved through (a) restructure of information input; (b) provision of staff aids for analysis; (c) monitoring of implementation results; and (d) changes in deliberation preparations (e.g., background papers and briefings).

2. The macro-structure of the government should be subjected to reconsideration, including the number of ministries, the composition of the cabinet (e.g., ministers without portfolios), the relations between different levels of government, the role of quasi-government agencies etc. This reconsideration should look at the picture as a whole and from above, focusing on basic features and not the details of sub-structure and procedure.

3. The higher civil service patterns should be reconsidered, with special attention to their policy functions. For instance: easy interchange between governmental, other public, quasi-public and perhaps private organizations and compulsory rotation in the government seem essential for preserving imagination and readiness to innovate. Fixed-term appointments and freedom to engage in various forms of political activity may well meet better the needs of some development countries than the British-type career civil service pat-

(1) The systematic theoretic basis for these recommendations is presented in my book *Public Policymaking Reexamined* (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Corporation, 1968).

212

terns. Academic training in social science and analytic methods may be prefer-
able for the policy level civil servants, requiring radical changes in the mana-
gement and administrative technique orientations of many of the training
centers in and for development countries.

4. Social science and analysis professionals should serve as central staff officers for policy issues, in addition to and instead of the traditional civil servants, budget officials and economic feasibility examiners. A special pro- fession of "development policy analysts" (2) may be required, for heading staff analysis units working on the higher policy level in the main ministries, on the cabinet level and for the legislature (if the latter has autonomous policy- making functions).

5. Policy-oriented research and study in the involved country should be encouraged by establishment of special interdisciplinary policy analysis units and by motivating local universities to focus on national policy-relevant research. The policy analysis units should enjoy considerable freedom in their studies, but maintain confidential relations with the government (3).

6. Innovative action must be initiated to improve the qualifications of the politicians. This is clearly possible within many given basic values and ideologies, for instance by encouraging politicians after their election and/or appointment to engage in studies, paid for by the government or by external aid. Design of suitable courses for politicians from development countries is one of the urgent needs (4).

7. New orientations and modes for considering policy-alternatives under conditions of accelerated development must be designed, tried out and conveyed to the main policymakers — politicians, civil servants and professionals alike. These orientations and modes should be adjusted to the high degrees of uncertainties involved in efforts to direct accelerated development — e.g., through contingency planning, sequential decision-making, self-insurance, sensitivity testing, social experimentation, etc. (in contrast to prevailing development planning models, most of which tend to repress or at least ignore uncertainty).

These seven illustrations should be sufficient to concretize the main ideas
of this paper and demonstrate their importance. These illustrations also clearly
bring out the difficulties of realizing any advances in policymaking-improve-
ment. Intense, dedicated and innovative efforts are necessary if we want to
meet the challenge of contributing to better accelerated development through
improving public policymaking in the development countries.

(2) See Yehezkel Dror, "Policy Analysts: A New Professional Role in Government Service", *Public Administration Review*, Vol. XXVII, No. 3 (September 1967), pp. 197-203.

(3) For an illustration, see my detailed suggestions in "An Israeli Institute for Policy Analysis: A proposal", *Civilisations*, Vol. XVII, No 4 (1967), pp. 435-441.

(4) For a design of such a course, see Yehezkel Dror, "The Improvement of Leadership in Developing Countries", *Civilisations*, Vol. XVII, No. 1/2 (1967), pp. 72-82.

213

YEHEZKEL DROR

ACCELERATION DU DEVELOPPEMENT
ET CONDITIONS PROPRES A AMELIORER
LA STRUCTURE POLITIQUE
(Policymaking Improvement)*

(Résumé)

L'expérience acquise depuis les premiers travaux portant sur les conditions
du développement a démontré l'interdépendance des phénomènes sociaux,
économiques et politiques. Elle a en outre mis l'accent sur les impératifs politi-
ques et administratifs impliqués dans un développement général accéléré.

Cependant, il semble que dans les propositions avancées jusqu'ici on ait
négligé l'un des aspects les plus importants du système politico-administratif
susceptible d'influencer profondément le développement lui-même : l'élabora-
tion de la structure politique ou « policymaking ».

Cette omission peut s'expliquer par plusieurs raisons. En premier lieu, l'étude
systématique de cette méthode d'élaboration politique est encore à ses débuts,
même dans les pays hautement développés. Il faut considérer d'autre part que
cette méthode visant au perfectionnement effectif exige des modifications
dans les institutions politiques elles-mêmes. C'est donc un secteur d'activité
particulièrement difficile pour les experts venus de l'étranger. Enfin, pour
réaliser d'appréciables progrès dans la structure politique des pays en voie de
développement (aussi bien que dans les autres), il est nécessaire d'entreprendre
une action d'ensemble, visant des améliorations combinées en divers domaines.
Tout ceci montre à suffisance à quel point la méthode de structuration politi-
que ou « policymaking », est à la fois complexe, étendue dans ses zones d'acti-
vité et unificatrice dans son objet final.

Quels que soient les processus d'intervention tendant à accélérer le déve-
lopment, la méthode de structuration politique conserve son importance.
Son action s'exerce aussi bien sur le degré d'accélération que sur la direction
et les résultats du développement. Les investissements portant sur le perfection-
nement de la structuration politique s'avèrent efficaces et en définitive payants.

Les tentatives d'ordre pragmatique faites jusqu'ici en matière de structuration
politique se sont révélées fort insuffisantes. Elles ont au moins permis d'aboutir
à une directive générale, que l'on peut formuler en ces termes : le perfection-
nement de la structuration politique suppose d'abord une bonne base théorique,
d'après laquelle s'orienteront les applications d'ordre pratique. Il importe en
conséquence de multiplier les recherches et les études dans les pays en voie de
développement, pour en tirer des propositions de perfectionnement.

* On sait que le Professeur Dror s'est attaché tout particulièrement à cet aspect du développement désigné par le terme « policymaking », terme qui n'a pas encore, à notre connaissance, d'équivalent en français. Il s'agit en fait de l'élaboration de la structure politique convenant au gouvernement d'un pays en voie de développement.

214

Si l'état d'avancement des sciences politiques en ce qui touche les méthodes de structuration n'est guère marqué, même dans les pays hautement développés, il apparaît cependant qu'un certain nombre de recommandations peuvent être données dès à présent touchant le perfectionnement de la structuration dans les pays en voie de développement. Ces recommandations, de caractère opérationnel, se ramèneraient aux sept points suivants :

1. les organes de la haute direction politique seront pourvus des moyens indispensables à leur information et à l'organisation de leurs travaux ;

2. la structure générale du gouvernement sera reconsidérée dans son ensemble ;

3. les cadres supérieurs de la fonction publique seront réorganisés suivant une plus grande efficacité politique. Il est possible, par exemple, que des fonctions temporaires et la liberté de choisir tel mode d'activité politique soient préférables dans certains pays, plutôt que la forme rigide de la carrière dans la fonction publique, selon le type britannique ;

4. les professionnels des sciences sociales prendront le pas sur les fonctionnaires traditionnels dans les questions touchant la politique gouvernementale. Il pourrait même se révéler nécessaire de créer une catégorie de spécialistes qui auraient à traiter des problèmes du développement politique ;

5. la recherche en matière de développement politique sera encouragée et la plus grande liberté de travail sera donnée aux équipes d'étude ;

6. les capacités des hommes politiques seront développées par l'étude et l'information. Il est vivement souhaitable que des cours soient organisés, à l'usage d'hommes politiques appartenant aux pays en voie de développement ;

7. les recherches seront orientées sur les diverses alternatives pouvant apparaître dans la structuration politique soumise au développement accéléré, recherches qui seront définies, mises à l'épreuve et enfin transmises dans leurs résultats aux principaux responsables politiques.

215