**_American Political Science Association_**
**_Annual Meeting, September, 1956**

WOODROW WILSON AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS
by Quincy Wright

There can be no doubt but that Woodrow Wilson deserves the title "Founder of the League of Nations" which appeared upon the old League of Nations building in Geneva, although he himself denied it.¹ His successful espousal of the League as a central theme of the peace treaties ending World War I, grew out of a profound conviction that such an organization was the indispensable means for securing major American values of peace, democracy, national independence and the rule of law under the conditions of technology and interdependence of the twentieth century. These were American values, and their realization for the United States was an American national interest. But he became convinced that in a shrinking and interdependent world, they could be secured for the United States only if they were secured for all other nations, great or small.² He was also convinced that the League was indispensable for dealing justly with the immediate problems of the peace -- territorial adjustments, reparation and rehabilitation, restoration of trade, development of colonies, and reduction of armaments. He appreciated that the passions of war made it inevitable that injustices would be imposed in the peace treaties,³ and looked to the League for future amelioration when passions had cooled.²

This conviction, however, was not the consequence of his scholarly thinking as a professor of political science, nor of his political experience as Governor of New Jersey and President of the United States up to World War I. It was the consequence of his persistent thought in dealing with the practical problems thrust upon him during that war. The theoretical and practical knowledge of politics which had been his life study came to his assistance, but he had to adapt it to a type of problem to which he had given little attention.

In reading Wilson's books on political science one is impressed by the absence of attention to foreign affairs. In *Congressional Government*, first published in 1885, he refers to the "treaty-marring power" of the Senate,⁴ which he says developed during the period of international tranquility after the Napoleonic Wars, when the vigor of the Presidential office was reduced and the United States became a government by Congressional committees. His concern with this type of government, however, was not primarily because of its ill effects on the conduct of foreign policy but because of its inadequacies in domestic policy. It was not until the 15th edition of this book, published in 1900, that he gave serious attention to foreign affairs. In the preface he discussed the new role of the United States in the world after the Spanish American War, the increased importance this would inevitably give to the Presidency, and the probability that the new situation would make his book obsolete.

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In his textbook entitled *The State*, published in 1889, he compares governments from the time of ancient Greece to the present. "Foreign affairs," however, has only one entry in the index and this concerns the constitutional distribution of power under the German Imperial Constitution of 1871.² A reference under "international law" in the index refers to a brief discussion comparing the "naturalism" of Bluntschli with the "positivism" of Bulmerincq. Wilson preferred the latter, and noted the trend toward a world society manifested by great international congresses and law-making treaties. He concluded this discussion in the Austinian tradition: "International law is, therefore, not law at all in the strict sense of that term. It is not, as a whole, the will of any state: there is no authority set above the nations whose command it is." It is only what nations ought to observe or what they have generally observed, not what they must observe. The index of this large book on the state indicates no other discussion of international relations, and the chapter on the functions of government is concerned with the distinction between "constituent" and "ministrant" functions. The former includes, among eight others, the function of "dealing with foreign powers: the preservation of the state from external danger of encroachment, and the advancement of its international interests."¹ It is, indeed, remarkable and illustrative both of the condition of the country and of Wilson's conception of political science that in a book of 668 pages, less than four should have alluded to international relations. He is concerned with the problem of laissez faire versus socialism, in the scope of domestic government, and with the distinction between what is, and what ought to be, in the approach to political science. His conclusion on the latter point indicates the realism, not unmingled with idealism, of his approach. "Under no circumstances," he writes, "may we instructively or safely begin with the question of opinion: the answer to the question of fact is the indispensable foundation to all sound reasoning concerning government, which is at all points based upon experience rather than upon theory."³ The volume ends with the statement: "The rule of governmental action is necessary cooperation; the method of political development is conservative adaptation, shaping old habits into a new one, modifying old means to accomplish new ends.²

In his book *Constitutional Government*, presented as lectures at Columbia and published in 1908, he devotes more attention to foreign policy than in the earlier volumes. He foresees a new Presidential leadership like that of the first period of American independence, as American involvement in foreign relations becomes greater as it inevitably will. There is, in this book, no direct suggestion of a League of Nations, though the points he made in the Preface to the 15th edition of *Congressional Government* are amplified.

"The President," he writes, "can never again be the mere domestic figure he has been throughout so large a part of our history. The Nation has risen to the first rank in power and resources. The other nations of the world look askance upon her, half in envy, half in fear, and wonder with a

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deep anxiety what she will do with her vast strength.... Our President must always, henceforth, be one of the great powers of the world, whether he act greatly and wisely or not, and the best statesmen we can produce will be needed to fill the offices of Secretary of State. We have but begun to see the presidential office in this light; but it is the light which will more and more beat upon it, and more and more determine its character and its effect upon the politics of the nation."¹⁰

After the event, research has disclosed early Wilsonian utterances looking toward the League idea. In 1887, Wilson spoke of "governments joined with governments for the pursuit of common purposes, in honorary equality and honorable subordination."¹¹ But in view of the continuous discussion of the idea by writers such as Emeric Crucé, William Penn, the Abbe St. Pierre, Jean Jaques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and others since the French statesman Sully reported the alleged "grand design" of Henry IV in the early 17th century, the surprising thing is that Wilson dealt so little with the subject. The first positive statement of Wilson looking toward a League of Nations occurred in the autumn of 1914 when, according to his brother-in-law Stockton Ackson, Wilson, concerned with the War and its aftermath, suggested that four things would have to be done:

> "First, that small nations shall have equal rights with great nations; second, that never again must it be permitted for a foot of ground to be obtained by conquest; third, that the manufacture of munitions of war must be by governments and not by private enterprise; and fourth, that all nations must be absorbed into some great association of nations whereby all shall guarantee the integrity of each so that any one nation violating the agreement between all of them shall bring punishment on itself automatically."¹²

From this acorn grew Wilson's idea of the League, first publicly expressed in his address in the League to Enforce Peace in May, 1916,¹³ reaffirmed in his address to the Senate on January 22nd, 1917, reporting on his mediation efforts, and made a war aim in his war message of April 2, 1917, and his fourteen-point address to Congress of January 8th, 1918. The latter called for "a general association of nations ... under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike."¹⁴ It is significant that up to this point Wilson preferred the term "association" to "League."¹⁵

It is to be noted that in these statements Wilson indicated not only the idea of an association of nations but much of the form which was eventually set forth in the Covenant. That form included eight major elements: (1) A permanent organization with headquarters, secretariat, and frequent meetings of representatives of states. This was the essence

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of all proposals on the subject. (2) An obligation of the members to submit all disputes to a conference or to some form of pacific settlement. This was the central idea of the Bryan conciliation treaties, concluded just before the War. The Taft arbitration treaties, defeated by the Senate, had included the idea which was vaguely forseen in the Hague Convention of 1899 for Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Sir Edward Gray, the British Foreign Minister, emphasized this idea as did the American League to Enforce Peace. (3) A general guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence. This was suggested by the Monroe Doctrine and by Wilson's proposal to pan-Americanize it in the Pan American Scientific Congress of January, 1916. (4) Automatic economic sanctions to compel submission to pacific settlement. This was the central idea of the League to Enforce Peace. It grew out of Jefferson's effort in the Embargo of 1807, and Theodore Roosevelt's proposal in his Nobel prize address of 1910, for a union of the great powers in a "League of Peace. This idea, in the phraseology of the time, was designed to put teeth into the Hague system." (5) An international procedure for changing the status quo peacefully, Wilson particularly emphasized this idea to rectify inequities in the peace treaties and to balance the territorial guarantee. He proposed what might be called a procedure of international eminent domain. (6) The administration by the League of disputed territories, especially colonial territories, as "successor to the Empires." This idea was contributed by General Smuts and had a background in the American Northwest Ordinance. (7) The expansion of international economic and social cooperation through coordination of the international unions. Paul Reinsch, American minister to China had discussed this idea in his book entitled *Public International Unions*, published in 1911. (8) The reservation of fundamental national rights such as domestic jurisdiction, regional understandings, discretion in the use of armed force, and withdrawal from the League. This idea, inherent in the concept of sovereignty, was insisted upon by the Senate.

A study of Wilson's successive drafts of the Covenant throws light on the immediate sources of these ideas. In his first draft in the summer of 1918, utilizing ideas in the British Phillimore draft and a draft by Colonel House, Wilson set forth the general structure of the League (but without the Council), the concept of compulsory pacific settlement, and of economic sanctions, and, as the key article, a territorial guarantee coupled with a procedure for peaceful change in the following language:

"The Contracting Powers unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity; but it is understood between them that such territorial readjustments, if any, as may in the future become necessary by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations or present social and political relationships, pursuant to the principle of self-determination, and also such territorial readjustments as may, in the judgement of three-fourths of the Delegates be demanded by the welfare and manifest interest of the peoples concerned, may be effected, if agreeable to those peoples; and that territorial changes may in equity involve material compensation. The

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contracting powers accept without reservation the principle
that the peace of the world is superior in importance to every
question of political jurisdiction or boundary."

This provision, which gave the Assembly by a three-fourths vote
a power of international eminent domain, to transfer territories in the
general interest contingent upon a plebiscite in the area and payment of
compensation to the ceding state, appeared also in Wilson's second and
third drafts. It was criticized by Wilson's legal advisor, David Hunter
Miller, but appeared in qualified form in the draft made by the latter
and Lord Robert Cecil in their draft of January 20th, 1919. It was
omitted in Wilson's fourth draft of February 2, 1919, but reappeared in
the separated and attenuated form, ultimately adopted in Articles 10 and
19 of the Covenant, in the Hurst-Miller draft, which was the foundation
of the latter instrument.<sup>19</sup>

In his second draft, made in Paris, January 10th 1919, Wilson
added the Council to the Assembly as a major organ of the League in
accord with proposals by General Smuts, Lord Robert Cecil and others, and
also the mandates idea, set forth by General Smuts.<sup>20</sup> Wilson, however,
applied it, not only to the Hapsburg and Turkish Empires as Smuts intended
but also to the German colonies.<sup>21</sup> The reservations of national sovereignty
insisted upon by Senator Lodge and recommended by ex-President Taft, were
inserted in the Covenant after Wilson's return to Paris following a brief
sojurn in the United States in March, 1919.<sup>22</sup>

The final draft of the Covenant contains all of these ideas,
the basic structure in Articles 1 to 7; obligations for pacific settlement
in Articles 12 to 15; general guarantee of territory and independence,
called by Wilson the heart of the Covenant, in Article 10; economic
sanctions, to compel pacific settlement, in Articles 16 and 17; procedures
for peaceful change in Articles 11 and 19; mandates in Article 22, sup-
plementing provisions for the international administration of Danzig and
the Saar Valley in other articles of the Versailles treaty; social and
economic cooperation in Articles 23 to 25; and the reservations of sover-
eignty in various articles -- comestic juridiction (Art.15, par.8), Monroe
doctrine (Art. 21), withdrawal, (Art. 2), and veto on the use of armed
force (Art. 5, par.1 and Art. 16, par. 2). Other provisions of the
Covenant dealt with disarmament (Art. 8, 9), treaty publicity (Art. 18),
supremacy of Covenant obligations (Art. 20) and amendment of the Covenant
(Art. 26).

Between Wilson's first expression of the idea that an association
of nations was necessary, in the Autumn of 1914, and the general ratifi-
cation of the League of Nations Covenant giving form to this idea in
January 1920, there was an interesting history, in which Wilson's
thought, world events, American foreign policy, the foreign policy of
other governments, and American and world opinion, interacted upon one
another. Wilson was especially concerned with American opinion, upon which
his public addresses exerted a tremendous influence, as American foreign
policy moved from neutrality and freedom of the seas to mediation for
peace and a war to establish a League of Nations.

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completely destroyed that it could no longer act as a check upon Russia. His discussions with British Foreign Minister Grey convinced him, however, that unless the war could be ended by negotiation with something less than complete victory for either side, the United States should enter on the allied side to restore the balance of power, and to maintain it for the future by uniting British and American sea power to do the job which Britain could no longer do alone as she had in the 19th century. This was, indeed, the concept of Sir Edward Grey in his proposal of September, 1915 linking "freedom of the seas" with a "League of Nations" to end "militarism and navalism."²⁶ Set up as it was with economic sanctions involving sea power as its teeth and with dominant naval power controlled by Great Britain and the United States, the League could well be conceived as an elaborate system to accomplish this purpose. The insistence by Lord Balfour, after the United States had failed to enter, that this changed the League's character and made it impossible for Great Britain alone to shoulder the burden of Article 16, faced as it was by the possibility that the United States would pursue a policy of freedom-of-the-seas-neutrality, suggests that Great Britain had this conception of the League.²⁷ Wilson, though aware of the balance of power considerations pressed on him by House, and aware of the interpretation of the proposed League as a union of American and British sea power, which was much discussed in United States naval circles, did not espouse them because his aims were broader and also because he doubted whether the American public with its anti-British and isolationist sentiments could be brought to accept an alliance with Britain or a balance of power concept. "Peace without victory" called for in his address to the Senate of January 22, 1917 reporting his efforts at mediation, accorded with the tradition of the Treaty of Ghent (1814) and seemed an acceptable way of saying that the balance of power should not be upset.²⁸ "Freedom of the Seas" for every one but the aggressor, called for in the second of his fourteen points of January 8, 1918, implying not neutrality but a League to prevent both navalism and militarism by maintaining peace, discussed by House and Grey, seemed more acceptable than an alliance.²⁸ª

It was from these various lines of advice, and from the changing exigencies of the situation which he faced, that Wilson reached the conclusion that the League of Nations should be the central theme of American policy during and after the war. He reached this conclusion because, like Bryan, he wanted peace, and doubted whether democracy could survive without it. But he came to see that neutrality was not the answer in a shrinking world-- even less of an answer than it had been in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, when the policy of neutrality had led the young country into war, first with France (1798) and then with England (1812).²⁹ Neutrality had meant in American history freedom of the seas or the right to trade with both belligerents, and in principle the limits of this right were defined by international law. Freedom of the seas therefore naturally became the first slogan of American policy on the outbreak of war. But as the war progressed and both sides exerted themselves, by blockade or by submarine sinkings, to destroy the trade of the other, it became clear that, as in 1812, this slogan would probably lead to war through rising resentments of public opinion, and, as Wilson

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seems to have thought in regard to that was, it might get us in on the
wrong side. To avoid such a development, in demanding rights under
international law, 'ilson had to make the distinction, which the public
had made spontaneously, between violations of international law affecting
only property -- the British blockade -- and those affecting human life
-- the submarine. Such a distinction, however, transferred the basis of
American protest from law to humanity. 30 Furthermore, American opinion
was coming to believe, under the stimulating writings of former President
Theodore Roosevelt, that the invasion of Belgium was evidence of German
aggression, that international law permitted discrimination between the
aggressor and his victim when the latter's neutrality was guaranteed as
was Belgium's, and that as a party to the Hague Convention on Neutrality,
the United States was obliged to intervene. 31 Finally the issue of
democracy versus autocracy could not be wholly ignored and certainly there
was more democracy on the Allied side than on the German side. 32

Through this process of criticizing the arguments of his principal
advisors and following the inhibitions and demands of public opinion,
Wilson finally became convinced that the League was the only solution, but
not until he had attempted mediation to achieve a "peace without victory."
Only after this had failed, following his reelection in 1916 on the
slogan "He kept us out of War," and after Germany had renewed submarine
warfare, was he prepared to move toward war, synthesizing the arguments
of all his advisors in his war address of April 1917 -- the submarine
barbarities, freedom of the seas, (for all but the aggressor), Democracy,
(strengthened by the recent Russian revolution, German aggression (by the
government, not the people), and, most of all, the necessity to establish
a League of Nations to maintain future peace, all figured in this address. 33

Dealing with this problem, Wilson exhibited the critical approach
of the scholar skeptical of all extremes. This detachment enraged activists
like Theodore Roosevelt, who more than anything else disliked indecision --
a Hamlet, "sicklied o'er by the pale cast of thought." 'Wilson unlike
Hamlet, came to decisions but only after much thought, and having reached
a decision, it was difficult to move him. It was because of the deliberation
and ultimate deep conviction behind his decisions that he gained the reputa-
tion for stubbornness. His deliberation, in balancing considerations while
maturing his judgement, was a significant feature of his personality
as a statesman.

He resisted the excessive subjectivity of appraising complicated
entities by simple abstraction as in identifying the allies with democracy
and Germany with autocracy, and also the excessive objectivity of appraising
entities in terms of current performance, as in judging the belligerants
in terms of immediate American interest. He desired neither a crusade for
democracy nor a renunciation of interest in democracy, so he adopted the
League, not to make the world democratic but "to make the world safe for
democracy," 34 as well as for other forms of government. In his opinion,
the form of a state's government was a domestic matter for each to decide
for itself, but he believed that nations would eventually decide for
democracy if assured against aggression. Democracy could, he thought, grow
only by discussion in a peaceful world, not by military crusading.

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Wilson was enough of a philosopher to doubt whether in a rapidly
changing world, the traditional analysis of American policy in the con-
crete terms of 'Washington's farewell address and the Monroe Doctrine,
was adequate, but he was enough of a historian to doubt, with Edmund
Burke, whether wise policy could be deduced from abstract principles of
peace, democracy, and justice. So he favored a League which would be
a "disentangling alliance" and a "Monroe Doctrine of the World," thus com-
bining tradition and reason, the concrete and the abstract.²²

He resisted the emotional activism of Theodore Roosevelt demanding military preparedness and vigorous action to liberate Belgium and to stop the submarine outrages, because he thought it put emotion before reason, neglected the genuine goals of policy, and overlooked the need of balance likely to be upset by total victory of one side, especially the need for a strong Germany to check Russia. But he also resisted the intellectualism which would substitute theory for action, understanding for commitment, reason for power because history told him that in international affairs the strong had often devoured the weak. He was not unaware of the dangers of German victory, continually brought to his attention by Page, Lansing, and House. Consequently like Pascal, he proposed to combine force and justice in a League of Nations.²⁶

Wilson's liberalism kept him from identifying the national interest with the territory and other material assets of the nation,²⁷ but his conservatism kept him from identifying it with all humanity. So he sought to identify it with a League to protect the particular interests of each and the general interests of all.

He particularly resisted the excessive "realism" of a policy guided only by "national interests" without regard for the interests of others,²⁸ urged by both isolationists and interventionists, but he also resisted the uncritical "idealism" of Bryan's "peace at any price" which subsumed the interests of all in a universal principle to be observed in all circumstances without regard to consequences.²⁹ Consequently he urged a League of Nations promoting peace by uniting the force of all to preserve the territory and independence of each.

He had too much religion and faith in humanity to accept a fatalism stifling to human effort and reform, but he had too much scientific sophistication to assume that progress was inevitable,³⁰ or that good ideas could realize themselves without appropriate means,³¹ so he wanted a League with teeth, able to implement high purposes by political means.

The League of Nations thus appeared the middle road, and after he had become convinced that war could not be avoided it seemed the objective most likely to win American opinion for war and most likely to win world opinion for a just peace in the Conference.

American opinion was confused. It seemed unwilling to accept **alliance** with Britain because of the traditions of 1776 and 1812, not to mention the special attitude of citizens of Irish and German origin, or defeat for Britain because of fear of expanding Germany and appreciation,

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perhaps unconscious, that power must be checked and balanced. Opinion was increasingly insistent that Germany must be punished because of the submarine sinkings, but also insistent that there should be an ideal cause for war higher than mere resentment at injury. Freedom, peace, democracy and American traditions, especially Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine, were plus slogans in American history and opinion. Wilson's addresses from May, 1916 to April, 1917 merged freedom of the seas into economic sanctions against aggression; the equity of neutral mediation into evidence of German aggressiveness after mediation had been rejected; the Monroe Doctrine and opposition to "entangling alliances" into the idea of the League of Nations; and finally, "peace without victory" into war to suppress aggression and to establish a League to "make the world safe for democracy" by assuring peace and security for all. By these syntheses he won overwhelming acceptance of war.

Wilson continued the same themes during the war and during the negotiations with the Central Powers leading to the Armistice, convincing the peoples, and in less degree the governments, of Europe that his middle way was the best way.

American and world opinion supported the merging of the Treaty with the League, the latter serving both as an instrument for its execution and improvement, and a goal justifying the war effort. There were compromises in the Treaty but it cannot be demonstrated that if the United States had ratified the treaty the Wilsonian theory would not have worked. The European powers might have adhered more completely to its principles. Reparation demands might have been moderated. The world economy might have been strengthened. The Ruhr invasion, the depression of the German middle class, and the rise of Hitler, might not have occurred. Russian communism might have been moderated. The great depression of 1930 might not have occurred. Japan's Manchurian adventure might have been prevented or suppressed. Mussolini without Hitler's support and Japan's precedent might not have grabbed for Ethiopian Empire. It is idle to speculate on historical might-have-beens but American opinion long after the event, manifested in its enthusiastic acceptance of the United Nations, and in numerous scholarly and historical analyses, suggests that if the United States had entered the League, the world might have enjoyed a long period of peace and prosperity under the leadership of the Atlantic powers. In such circumstances, self-determination might have proceeded with less rapidity in Asia and Africa. Russian and Chinese experiments in rapid industrialisation through dictatorial governmental control might have proceeded more slowly. It is certain that history would have been different. It seems probable that history has confirmed Wilson's prediction that American rejection of the League would result in another World War. 41

Wilson's struggle with the Senate was, in the light of these considerations a momentous historic event. The factors resulting in his failure were numerous— Partisan desire by Republicans to deflate the Democratic president and party; traditional Senate jealousy of presidential power; sincere conviction by some, perhaps the fourteen Senate "bitter enders," that isolationism was a sound policy; confusion of

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public opinion over reservations -- were they significant or merely
political; the natural tendency of people to withdraw from responsibility
after the exertions of war; Wilson's illness and the weakness of
Democratic leadership without him. The complex working of these
factors has often been narrated. The suggestion that Wilson's stub-
bornness killed his own treaty is not sustainable. There is sufficient
evidence that the initial success of the method of killing the treaty
by reservations, mentioned in correspondence between Senators Lodge
and Watson, had convinced the Republican leadership that the treaty
could be killed and opinion could be exploited to Republican victory in
1920, using the argument with the internationalists that an "association"
better than the League could be framed, and with the isolationists that
the League was dead. In this the Republicans outguessed Wilson,
who hoped that a "solemn referendum" in 1920 would bring victory for
the League.

The event was disasterous. The League went through a period of
hopeful development for 10 years but the sense of dissatisfaction in
Central Europe and Japan, the rise of fascism and communism, the loss
of faith and energy in the West, brought problems which the League was
unable to face in the 1930's. The combination of aggression and appease-
ment led to World War II, while American opinion, seeking a more
isolated neutrality than ever, made it impossible for even the pro-League
administration of Franklin Roosevelt and Cordell Hull to undo the dis-
asterous turn given to opinion in the 1920's. Not until after the
outbreak of war and the great struggle between the "Committee to Defend
America by Aiding the Allies" and the "America Fist Committee" had
been won by the former did American opinion change. Perhaps it was
too late. The world, polarized by hostile ideologies, was less
adapted to a successful League in 1945 than it had been in 1920. Today
we can only hope that the great work of Woodrow Wilson, pointing the
way by which world politics may be adapted to the new technology,
reaffirmed in the establishment of the United Nations by Cordell Hull
and Franklin D. Roosevelt, will continue, and will eventually educate
peoples and governments to an opinion capable of sustaining an interna-
tional organization able to reconcile their political values with the
conditions of the atomic age.

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1. Address, Seattle, September 13, 1919, Saul K. Padover, Ed., *Wilson's Ideals*, Washington, D.C., Am. Council on Pub. Aff., 1942, p. 104

2. Address, Arlington, Va., May 30, 1916; to Senate, Jan. 22, 1917; to Congress, April 2, 1917 (war message); Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918; to Congress, Jan. 8, 1918 (fourteen points); Boston, Feb. 24, 1919; New York, March 4, 1919, Padover, op.cit., 11, 71, 89, 96, 111, 112, 120; August Heckscher, ed., *The Politics of Woodrow Wilson*, New York, Harper, 1956, pp. 262ff., 273ff., 299ff. Wilson's speeches are also conveniently assembled in J.B. Scott, Ed., *Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, December 1916 to November 1918*, Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 1921.

3. Address before Peace Conference, Jan. 25, 1919; to Senate, July 10, 1919, Heckscher, op.cit., pp. 335, 365; David Hunter Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, New York, Putnam, 1928, vol. 1, pp. 76ff. In his address to the Senate, Jan. 22, 1917, Wilson said, "The peace must be made secure by the organized major force of mankind," but at Mount Vernon, July 4, 1918, he said, "What we need is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind." His thought had travelled from "the" peace to peace in general. Padover, op.cit., p. 96.

4. Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government, A Study in American Politics*, Boston, Heath (1889), 1895, pp. 266, par. 427.

6. Ibid., p. 628, pars. 1216, 1217

7. Ibid., p. 639, par. 1233

8. Ibid., p. 638, par. 1231

9. Ibid., p. 668, par. 1287

10. Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1908), 1917, p. 78

11. Harley Notter, *Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1937), p. 521; Ruhl J. Bartlett, *The League to Enforce Peace*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944), p. 52

12. Bartlett, *op.cit.*, p. 52

13. Ibid., p. 51; *Enforced Peace, Proceedings of the First Annual National Assembly of the League to Enforce Peace, Washington, May 26-27, 1916*, (New York: 1916), p. 159ff.; Heckscher, op.cit. p. 258ff.

14. Above, notes 2,3.

15. Bartlett, *op.cit.*, p. 52; Miller, *op.cit.*, vol. 1, pp. 12, 18. The word "League" has been used by the British and by the American League to Enforce Peace. The French used the word "societe" which appears in the official French text of the Covenant.

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16. Green Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, (Washington; Government Printing Office, 1943, vol.5, p. 442

17. Bartlett, *Op.cit.*, p. 26

18. Miller, *op.cit.*, vol.2, p. 12. See also vol.1, p. 14ff.

19. *Ibid.*, vol.2, pp.70, 99, 106-107, 134, 146, 661, 666.

20. *Ibid.*, vol.2, pp. 23ff. For other expressions of the idea see *Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations*. (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1930), pp. 18ff.

21. Miller, *op.cit.*, vol.1, p. 34ff.

22. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 322 ff. See also Hackworth, *op.cit.*, vol.5, p. 4433. Wilson's statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 19, 1919, Heckscher, *op.cit.* pp. 373ff.

23. Edward H. Buehrig, *Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power*, (Bloomington, Indiana: University of Indiana Press, 1955), pp. 125ff.; Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in American Foreign Relations*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 87, 93, 186, 203.

24. Buehrig, *op.cit.* p. 131ff.; Osgood, *op.cit.* p. 163ff.

25. Osgood, *op.cit.* p. 154ff.

26. Buehrig, *op.cit.*, pp. 188ff., 200ff.; Osgood, *op.cit.* pp. 160ff.

27. See Balfour, remarks in *League of Nations Council*, August 2, 1920 (Minutes, p. 26) and Memorandum rejecting the Geneva Protocol read in the Council by Austen Chamberlain, March 12, 1925; Alfred Zimmern, *The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918.-1936*, (London: Macmillan, 1936), pp. 302ff., 257. See also F.P. Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), vol. 1, p. 73; William E. Rappard, *The Quest for Peace*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), p. 242.

28. Herscher, *op.cit.* p. 273ff.; Buehrig *op.cit.*, p.260; below Note 36. See also *Address, Manchester, England, December 30, 1918; to Senate, Jan. 22, 1917; Los Angeles, Sept. 20, 1919; and Letter March 8, 1920, Padover, op.cit.*, pp. 72, 100, 104, 106; Osgood, *op.cit.*, pp. 172ff., 189, 285.

28a. Padover, *op.cit.*, p.112; *address San Diego, Sept., 1919, Buehrig, op.cit.*, p. 207 ff.; p. 262ff.

29. Osgood, *op.cit.*, pp. 188ff.

30. War address, April 12, 1917 and Lusitania (May 13, 1915) and Sussex (April 18, 1916), Notes Summarized by John Bassett Moore, *Principles of Diplomacy*. (New York: Harper, 1918), pp. 70ff. Wilson is said to have remarked that he did not want to make the mistake of the only

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other President from Princeton (Madison) of getting into war on the
wrong side.

31. In an article in the *Outlook*, Sept. 23, 1914, Theodore Roosevelt favored United States Neutrality and detected no legal responsibility of the United States in respect to the invasion of Belgium, but in his book, *Fear God and Take your Own Part*, (New York: 1916), published after the Lusitania incident, he found both legal and moral arguments for American intervention on the Belgium issue. See Osgood, *op.cit.*, pp. 135ff.; Buehrig, *op.cit.*, pp. 160ff.

32. For summary of Wilson's attitude see Buehrig, *op.cit.* pp. 108ff., Osgood *op.cit.*, pp. 172ff.

33. Heckscher, *op.cit.*, pp. 273ff.

34. *Ibid*.

35. Address (Arlington, Virginia, May 30, 1916; to Senate, Jan. 22, 1917; New York, March 4, 1919, Padover, *op.cit.*, pp. 71, 111, 120.

36. Wilson espoused the preparedness movement reluctantly and refused to identify a particular nation as its objective. Osgood, *op.cit.*, pp. 205ff. Frank Cobb related that in a talk with Wilson on the eve of his war message, the President was worn down with doubts and feared Germany would be so beaten that the peace would be dictated and disastrous, Buehrig, *op.cit.*, p. 264. Above note 28.

37. See his Mobile address, Oct. 27, 1913, Heckscher, *op.cit.*, p.203ff.

38. *Ibid*.

39. His basic realism was suggested in his academic writings, above note 8

40. Above, note 9.

41. Above, note 27. In his Jackson Day Letter of Jan. 8, 1920 Wilson wrote: "The maintenance of the peace of the world and the effective execution of the treaty depend upon the whole-hearted participation of the United States. -- If we keep out of this agreement, if we do not give our guarantees, then another attempt will be made to crush the new nations of Europe." In his Omaha address, Sept. 8, 1919, he predicted "with absolute certainty that within another generation there will be another world war if the nations of the world do not concert the method by which to prevent it." Padover, op.cit. pp. 126, 129.

42. Denna F. Flemming, *The United States and the League of Nations, 1918-1920*.
(New York: Putnam, 1932); Bartlett, *op.cit.*, pp. 167ff.

43. James E. Watson, *As I Knew Them*, (Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1936) pp. 190-191

44. Letter to Jackson Day Dinner, Jan. 8, 1920, Padover, *op.cit*.p. 127