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# The Fall of the Allende Government

Kristian C. Gustafson

Downing College, Cambridge

When Allende's government was overthrown on 11 September 1973, there was widespread belief that the Americans had been the crucial ingredient, and perhaps the actual instigators, of the coup. It is a singular example of the faulty logical reasoning *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*: because of the US public posture against the Allende government, his demise *must* have been orchestrated by them. Indeed, this correlation is not all that far fetched, at least on the surface: it is clear that the US government, as led by Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, was happy to see the end of Salvador Allende. All these circumstances—plus liberal amounts of supposition and conspiracy theory—seemed sure proof of American complicity and this has gone unchallenged since the coup. Authors such as William Robinson in his book *Promoting Polyarchy* and co-authors James Petras and Morris H. Morley in their book *The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government* espouse the belief that the U.S. "guided Pinochet and his cohorts in their takeover" or were responsible for "orchestrating the 1973 overthrow."¹ Many other authors contend that the U.S. 'destabilised' the Chilean government through an 'invisible blockade' which made the coup inevitable.² Very little has been done by the U.S. government to attempt to dispel this belief, which is still widespread today. Indeed, the main source for these books is the partisan and purposefully ambiguous Church Committee report (*Covert Action in Chile*), from which many authors have

¹ William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy* (Cambridge, 1996), pp 161-162. See also Robinson, "Capitalist Polyarchy in Latin America" in Cox, Ikenberry and Inoguchi, p. 315. Also: Petras and Morley, *The United States and Chile*, (New York, 1975), p. 82.

² Ibid. See also

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taken the few facts known about the 1973 coup and merely insinuated or extrapolated American complicity and responsibility for Allende's ouster. One needs to look no further then Christopher Hitchens' "The Case Against Henry Kissinger II" to see the weakness of the argument. Hitchens uses a quotation of an American Naval Attaché—who stated that "Chile's coup d'état was nearly perfect"—to somehow demonstrate an un-referenced "thesaurus of hard information" proving American involvement in the coup.³ This observation attempts to link a reference to the professionalism of the coup to impute American complicity—this is an inference that most Chilean officers would have found (and still find) insulting.

The record indicates something far different from these widely accepted conspiracies. Not only were the Americans not involved in the coup, but they also so studiously avoided the appearance of promoting one that they failed, due to the lack of contacts with the military that this discretion demanded, to accurately predict its occurrence. Likewise, they were not clear on the nature of the new military government, nor had they had any contact with Augusto Pinochet, Chilean general and erstwhile Junta president. The truth, backed by 'hard information' more solid then out-of-context observations, points to a less sensational conclusion. The simple fact is that the U.S. government had no significant input into the coup that killed Allende on September 11, 1973.

## Civil Unrest, Part II

While the concerned US Government officers seemed sure of their programme of action in Chile, the situation in that country was becoming less and less predictable as 1973 proceeded. In order to break the truckers' strike, Allende had been forced to

³ Hitchens, Part II, March 2001, p. 49.

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make a controversial decision and on 25 October 1972 brought senior armed forces
officers into an emergency cabinet, led by Army Chief-of-Staff, General Carlos Prats.
The truckers returned to work in November, and the atmosphere in Chile cooled
significantly as the summer approached. Nonetheless, the long-term effects of a
military cabinet were negative, as described by Paul Sigmund, who wrote, "It
accelerated the politicisation of the military and undermined the position of those like
Prats who favoured the maintenance of constitutionalism and civilian rule."⁴

This loss of control was evident on the streets of Santiago and even in Chile's
neighbouring states. There were increasing indications of Cuban security agents in
the country, and some positive intelligence on Chilean-based support for the
insurgency in Bolivia.⁵ Journalist and historian John Dinges has written
authoritatively on the Allende regimes open support for the Bolivian rebel group
*Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN)* and the Argentine *Partido Revolucionario de
los Trabajadores (PRT)* and *Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP)*. These, along
with Peru's Tupamaros and other revolutionary groups benefited from safe haven in
Chile and weapons made in illegal (but tolerated) MIR factories.⁶ Internally, the CIA
had collected ample evidence of large 'street brigades' of pro-UP youth armed with
Cuban weapons (brought in via the *GAP*⁷), and knew of right-wing groups doing the
same.⁸ The UP government was unwilling to curtail the activities of *MIR*, and some
parts of the government even encouraged their excesses.⁹ Political deterioration
mirrored the deterioration in economic security: another set of strikes began in late
July of 1973, this time encompassing groups from as diverse backgrounds as

⁴ Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, p. 188.

⁵ Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "The Presidential Security Guard", 1 Nov 1971. [CIA]

⁶ John Dinges, *The Condor Years* (New York, 2004), p. 50-51 (uncorrected proof copy).

⁷ Pérez, "El Grupo de Amigos Personales", p. 51.

⁸ Memorandum, "CIA Bulletin", 30 June 1973. [CIA] See Also Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "During the Second Week of August", 25 August 1973. [CIA]

⁹ Alistair Horne, *Small Earthquake in Chile*, p. 139.

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engineers and doctors to peasant and labour groups. 10 Don Miguel Otero, founder of the PN, commented that in Chile “from July until September [1973] you knew when you were going out of your house but you didn’t know if you were going to be able to come back! There were riots everywhere, disturbances, and so on. Nobody worked.”¹¹ The UP’s breakneck land-redistribution programme was a disaster where, like modern-day Zimbabwe, under-capitalized and inefficient small estates or cooperatives replaced the once-productive *latifundios*. Food was in short supply: Chile, a net exporter in 1969, was by 1972 importing $280 million worth of foodstuffs. 12 As the British Embassy in Santiago reported to Whitehall, “President Allende may claim that the Chilean Way to Socialism got off to a good start in 1971 with a series of major measures… In reality the situation in every field is becoming increasingly difficult.”¹³

The government's situation became so unstable that on 9 August 1973 Allende formed his second emergency military cabinet, bringing the C-in-Cs of the four services into key portfolios. Generals and Ministers were resigning as fast as they could be brought into government. Street violence was an everyday fact. 14 As CIA director William Colby reported to the White House, it was “increasingly apparent that three years of political polarization had strained the fabric of Chilean society to the breaking point.”15 In *Small Earthquake in Chile*, Sir Alistair Horne quoted locals saying, by late 1972, that “civil war in Chile is inevitable.”16 Ex-President Frei was reported to have said that the only choice left for Chile was between ‘military

¹⁰ Cable, Santiago Station to CWH/D, “Strike in Chile”, 22 August 1973. [CIA]

¹¹ Interview, Sñr Miguel Otero.

¹² Alistair Horne, *Small Earthquake in Chile*, p. 223.

¹³ Memorandum, Hildyard, “Annual Review for Chile 1971,” 12 Jan 1972. [FCO 7/2210]

¹⁴ Davis, Chapter 8 in *passim*.

¹⁵ Memorandum, Colby to Kissinger, “CIA’s Covert Action Program”, 19 September 1973. [CIA]

¹⁶ Alistair Horne, *Small Earthquake in Chile*, p. 226.

dictatorship and a dictatorship of the proletariat.’¹⁷ Even worse, for Allende, none of his partners in the Socialist world were prepared to back *El Compañero Presidente* due to disagreements over ideology (with Castro) or lack of funds (the Soviet Union).

“It was just a question of time,” said Jack Devine. “[Reporting from] the Communists—some of our best reporting came from the Communist Party—showed that they had a pretty good fix on Allende and his durability. The KGB at the time, they knew they had backed a bad horse” and no further help would be extended.¹⁸

Indeed, Soviet Premier Andropov contradicted the Soviet’s earlier activist policy developed in the mid-1960’s and wrote “Latin American is a sphere of special US interests. The US has permitted us to act in Poland and Czechoslovakia. We must remember this. Our policy in Latin America must be cautious.”¹⁹ Allende was facing a grave situation indeed.

## The Coup Decision

By the time of the coup in September 1973 many were expecting a coup. Yet, to say that plotting had been ongoing for any length of time, or that the military looked at the task with relish, would be inaccurate. The military had been, from before Allende's election through to mid-1973, general adherents to the 'constitutionalist' school which forbid their entrance into politics. This was eroded by political events—such as the military cabinet of 1972 and its successors—and perceived threats against the military institution. While MIR did not carry out armed actions during the Allende presidency, it was widely known that they had been

¹⁷ Sigmund, *The overthrow of Allende*, p. 237.

¹⁸ Alistair Horne, *Small Earthquake in Chile*, p. 226.

¹⁹ Andrew and Mitrokhin, p. 77.

training for them and importing, producing and stockpiling weapons throughout in
anticipation of a 'fascist coup.' MIR central committee chief Miguel Enríquez had
also publicly called for disobedience amongst soldiers in the case of such a coup.²⁰
Worse still, MIR actively tried to recruit cells within the armed forces. On 7 August
1973 Chilean naval intelligence announced the discovery of a MIR plot to start a
lower-deck mutiny amongst sailors at Valparaíso and Talcahuano. Socialist Senator
Carlos Altamirano and MAPU Deputy Oscar Garretón were also publicly implicated
in the coup, directly tarnishing the legitimacy of the government in the eyes of the
military. But the most important event on the road to the coup was *El Tankazo* of
June 1973. While some of the Agency's analysts believed that the military's own
resolution of the crisis had reduced the chance of their subsequently launching a
coup—that the incident had reinforced their preference of sticking with Allende until
the 1976 elections—this was in fact not the case. Jack Devine offered the Agency's
retrospective appreciation of *El Tankazo* and the rest of the threats to the military:

> The military went back to their senior people and they decided that
> there had been a breakdown in discipline among the junior members of
> the institution, and for the good of the institution—which outranked
> the constitution and the president and the democratic process—they
> had to take the coup plotting out of the dark. They began coup plotting
> in earnest.²¹

The analysts at Langley were not the only ones to miss the implications of this event
or of the military's general view of the break down of social and political order. In a
25 July cable sent by the Station (possibly written by Devine) the view was affirmed,
noting that General César Ruíz of the Air Force and Admiral Raúl Montero of the
Navy "seem ready to move against the government" while affirming "that they cannot

²⁰ Dinges, p. 44.

²¹ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

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and will not move until the army is ready to participate in force" which they did not believe it was in the aftermath of the revolt.²²

Martial pride also had its role to play. Hundreds of housewives, both rich and poor, angry at food shortages and convinced that the UP was going to turn primary education into Marxist indoctrination, threw chicken feed at parading soldiers in front of *La Moneda*. "We felt vilified and cornered; the people were calling us cowards," recalled air force commander general Leigh."²³ On 21 August 1973 a large number of army officers' wives gathered at the home of Genera Prats, C-in-C of the Army, demanding his resignation. This straw, some argue, broke the camel's back, for on 23 August 1973, General Prats resigned from Allende's Military Cabinet under severe pressure from the rest of the officer corps, along with his two greatest supporters, General Sepulveda of Santiago Garrison and General Pickering of the military academy. These resignations removed the last bastion of constitutionalism in the military; the last officers who, like the late General Schneider, adhered to a strict interpretation of the constitution and the military's role within it. The uncontroversial General Pinochet, then *Jefe de la Plaza*, became C-in-C of the army. A Defence Information Agency (DIA) report written after the coup reported these resignations as the most important contributing factor to the success of the coup "because [it] effectively freed Army plotters to join with the other two services and the Carabineros."²⁴ But to ascribe the beginnings of coup plotting to any particular event is probably pointless. US Ambassador Nathanial Davis wrote in his memoirs of his time in Chile that the military did not rush to begin coup plotting, but only did so reluctantly, and then without alacrity:

²² Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Situation Report on Abortive Uprising", 25 July 1973. [CIA]

²³ Constable and Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies*, p. 28.

²⁴ Intelligence Information Report, "Events leading up to the 11 September Military Coup", 29 October 1973. [DOD]

They went to see Allende again and again, mostly through their commanders-in-chief, but sometimes collegially, and asked the President to reconsider his policies and control the extremists. They squirmed, temporised, and looked for ways out, and it was a reluctant, uncertain, inconclusive process... [The passage] from planning to talk to discussion and action was made slowly. It was late—only days before the coup—when the armed forces moved collectively beyond the point of no return.²⁵

One sure statement is that all of these stages on the road to the coup were domestic, and resulted only in domestic plotting: in none of the text, in not one of the CIA documents, can one find reference to American involvement, passive or active, in coup plotting. Regardless, if one cannot identify the specific genesis of coup plotting, one can at least, as Davis wrote, find the moment that the *Alto Mando* was at least irrevocably committed. This point of no return was the naval chain-of-command crisis, where Allende tried to rig the supposedly non-political appointment of Navy C-in-C in his favour. A spate of protest retirements ensued and the Navy was finally galvanised into action: coup plotting rapidly spread through all the services. The navy, the most conservative service and so the prime instigators, had secured the inter-service coordination that had been lacking in previous coup plots or attempts.

Paul Sigmund's research, backed by more recent evidence, shows that the decision to stage the coup was made on Friday, 7 September, after the support of two Carabinero generals had been secured. The declaration supporting the coup—pushed by the very bellicose Generals Leigh and Pinochet—was signed on 9 September.²⁶ On the morning of 11 September, all services moved to secure the main population centres in Chile. Before noon *La Moneda* was surrounded by tanks and strafed by attack jets.

By the two in the afternoon Allende was dead and the Junta was in charge of Chile.

Some writers, even one as recent as Peter Kornbluh, describe the fall of *La Moneda* in

²⁵ Davis, *The Last Two Years of Salvador Allende*, pp. 165-166.

²⁶ Sigmund, p. 239-240.

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ambiguous terms which suggest that Pinochet had Allende murdered, though it is now
widely accepted that he died by suicide.²⁷ A more pertinent point of contention is this:
what did the U.S. know or contribute to the coup that killed Allende?

## Knowing Pinochet

It is often erroneously supposed that because of the U.S. support of Pinochet after he became dictator of Chile that the U.S. supported his coup planning from the start. Gabriel Kolko, for one, asserts quite assuredly that the CIA "did everything from maintaining constant contact with the coup plotters, whom it encouraged in every way... to drawing up arrest lists and the key targets to take when the coup began."²⁸ Extending this argument, the leader of the coup, General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte, would be a well-known figure to the CIA's station officers in Santiago. Yet the evidence suggests that he was not. Even taking into account the now well-accepted fact that Pinochet was late in joining the plotters, evidence suggests that the CIA had little knowledge, and less contact, with the man who would emerge as the leader of the post-coup Junta, a man supposedly chosen by the CIA.²⁹

Through routine intelligence gathering after the inauguration of Allende, the CIA had of course identified Pinochet as a notable character within the leadership of the Chilean army. Pinochet (who replaced Valenzuela as Jefe de la Plaza and Santiago Garrison Commander in early 1971) had held the command and war-

²⁷ Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File*, p. 113. For a much more authoritative discussion, see Ignacio Gonzalez Camus, *El Dia En Que Murio Allende* (Santiago, 1988). Almost all sources now agree that Allende took his own life with a submachine gun gifted to him by Castro. Some still argue, against evidence, that Allende was murdered by the military, and one DIA source, a Chilean Colonel named Bejares, even argued that a 'fanatical member of GAP' shot Allende in order to martyr him. Cable, Santiago MAO to Pentagon, 'Part II of USDAO/Caracas 7981', 13 September 1973. [DOD]

²⁸ Kolko, p. 220.

²⁹ Constable and Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies*.

academy posts required of those destined for senior flag rank.³⁰ The CIA felt that he was a "narrow-gauge military man...who clearly enjoyed [the] feeling of being important."³¹ A CIA cable of September 1971 listed Pinochet as one of the main officers "strongly opposed to [the] present regime," yet while he would favour a coup "would want to close [his] eyes to events."³² Nevertheless, the CIA noted that Pinochet avoided making any provocative statements and that he "is cautious and quiet on political matters," though he did have notable family contacts with the conservative National Party. Overall, the assessment in 1971 was very similar to the one-reached two years later: "[we] assess subject as person who could possibly be neutralized by conspiratorial group but who would not lead any coup."³³

The next step in the evolution of Pinochet from unknown army general to integral anti-Allendista happened in late 1972, undoubtedly mirroring the worsening of the domestic situation. It had come to the CIA's attention that there was increased coup plotting going on amongst the junior officers of the Chilean forces, prompted by the high command's 'compliance' with Allende policies. Pinochet, it was noted, though "previously the strict constitutionalist" was now "harbouring second thoughts."³⁴ He apparently felt that Allende would have to be forced to step down or be 'eliminated.' Another short cable suggests that Pinochet may be involved with "coup preparations of General Alfredo Canales Marquez, Army Chief-of-Staff."³⁵ One may still note, however, that Pinochet is still not touted as the leader of this coup, merely 'Prats' Man' and a loyal soldier. A follow-on cable suggests "Pinochet's changing attitude [may] reflect Prats' new posture. Some officers have recently

³⁰ Cable/Note, "Pinochet Ugarte", 13 September 1971. [DOD]

³¹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Pinochet at Dinner 5 August 1971", 6 August 1971. [CIA]

³² Cable, Santiago Station to Director, "August in Talk", 31 August/1 September 1971. [CIA]
Emphasis added by hand on original document.

³³ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Pinochet at Dinner 5 August 1971", 6 August 1971. [CIA]

³⁴ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Gave Following Impression", 27 September 1972. [CIA]

³⁵ Cable/Intelligence Note, "Pinochet, Augusto," 27 June 1972. [CIA]

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commented Canales was ahead of his time, that Prats will lead eventual coup.”³⁶
According to these views Pinochet was a follower, a yes-man, not a leader.

It becomes exceedingly clear that Pinochet did not really rate as a likely coup leader to anyone who even noticed him in the first place. Dr. Kissinger has said "We did not know Pinochet, and when he [became Army Chief of Staff] we thought he might be someone favourable to Allende."³⁷ This opinion is consistent with the reporting in the CIA's and DIA's files. On 2 May 1973, Santiago reported to CIA headquarters some coup plotting information that they had recently received: the CIA contact in the Chilean army had reported that plotting was well advanced, that these plans had the input or support of most of the influential generals, and that "Allende would not last another 30 days in office." More importantly, however, is what the Chilean contact says about Augusto Pinochet, army general and would-be Junta President: "Pinochet will not be a stumbling block to the coup plans."³⁸ This impression of Pinochet being outside the plotting circles was reinforced when the General, along with Prats, led the soldiers that put down the abortive uprising of 29 June 1973.³⁹ In the aftermath of that uprising, CIA intelligence on certain mid-ranking coup plotters showed that the conspirators favoured the next most senior officer, General Manuel Torres, over Pinochet who was seen as an "[un]suitable replacement" for Prats in a developing coup atmosphere.⁴⁰ Simply, no one knew the intentions of the famously inscrutable General Pinochet. As late as 24 August, 1973, the DIA asserted "Pinochet lacks the prestige and influence that Prats enjoyed and is unlikely to *wield the authority and control of his predecessor over the services*."⁴¹

³⁶ Cable, Station to Unknown, "Pinochet's Changing Attitude", 28 September 1972. [CIA]

³⁷ Interview, Dr. H.A. Kissinger.

³⁸ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Was sent to the Case Officer", 02 May 73. [CIA]

³⁹ Faúndez, p. 245.

⁴⁰ Cable, Santiago Station to Unknown, "Following the Uncoordinated", 07 July 1973. [CIA]

⁴¹ DIA Intelligence Summary, "Chile: The Resignation", 24 August 1973. [CIA] Emphasis added.

What one gets is the impression of a 'grey man', not a natural leader, an uninspired military technocrat finding his way to the top by hard work and loyalty, not by insight.

Perhaps Pinochet was consciously misdirecting all observers, both Chilean and American, as he determined his course of action in the brewing chaos. Even the defence attaché in Santiago, whose significant contacts within the military were often exploited by the CIA, expressed to David Atlee Phillips the belief "it was highly unlikely that the Army would move against Allende so long as the top leadership such as Generals Prats, Pinochet, Sepulveda, Urbina, Pickering and Brady remained firm in support of the constitutional regime."42 A slightly earlier report does not rank him alongside the firm constitutionalists, but neither does it list him among the five army generals joining five others from each service in coup plotting, either because this group's full composition was unknown to the CIA or because Pinochet was uninvolved.43 Confirming the former, the DIA reported on 31 August that Pinochet "is trying to diffuse the current tension" that many felt were leading to a coup. The report continued:

> He has set aside his earlier request for the resignation of army generals and intends to stage a series of intensive arms raids against extremists. The general also plans to take action against striking truck owners. He may adopt a stronger position toward the government to convince Allende to ease tension by making concessions to the political opposition.44

Whether this was sincere and Pinochet had not yet come to plotting, or whether he was camouflaging his real intentions behind a screen of loyal staff-work, remains unknown. What is clear is that the US intelligence community did not have a good read of the man with whom most people believe they were in bed. Said Jack Devine:

42 Memorandum, David Atlee Phillips (C/WHD) to DDO, "Recent Visit of", 13 August 1973. [CIA]

43 Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Situation Report on Abortive Uprising", 25 July 1973. [CIA]

44 Intelligence Summary, "Chile: Strikes Continue", 31 August 1973. [DOD]

"I do not remember the Pinochet role at all. Pinochet was not considered a very strong military leader... which is very interesting."⁴⁵ But if he was not the instigator of the coup, reporting based on interviews with Chilean army officers has shown that Pinochet may have been responsible for its violent nature. John Dinges suggests that Pinochet, once involved in plotting, took charge and transformed the plan from a *golpe blanco* into "a unique historic project to physically eliminate all possibility of another Allende in the future."⁴⁶ Some of Pinochet's later bravado could stem from a visit he made to Panama in 1972, where junior US army officers told him their private belief that the "US will support coup against Allende 'with whatever means necessary' when the time comes": but this is pure, unproven speculation.⁴⁷ That Pinochet had been so severely underestimated by almost all observers and pundits, Chilean and American, is a critical missed point in the understanding of the coup. It not only speaks to the nature of the man and the coup, but to the CIA's involvement (or lack thereof) in the coup as they gathered intelligence on the military.

## Intelligence on the Coup Plot

As with assumptions about US complicity with Pinochet specifically, it is often assumed, as discussed in the last chapter, that the US government had the CIA acting to engineer a coup. But this may be a fairly significant overstatement. Matters changed little for the CIA from the advent of the Allende government to its ouster, save for the increased difficulty in gathering intelligence in Chile due to the improved security structure of the UP government.

⁴⁵ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

⁴⁶ Dinges, p. 44.

⁴⁷ Cable, Station to Unknown, "Following Impression", 27 September 1972. [CIA]

As matters grew more serious for the Allende government by the end of 1972, representatives of the different American agencies gathered to discuss what the U.S. reaction would be if they were asked to support a coup. One of the first points raised, as noted in the minutes of the meeting, is that "it is unlikely that the United States will be asked to help in preparing or delivering a coup." Discussing this at length, the minutes indicate that U.S. 'positive involvement' in a coup would have only the barest support within the U.S. and would not suit the international image the nation wished to project at the time. Moreover, "it would at most have only marginal influence on the course of events."⁴⁸ The memo goes on to discuss the nature of the requests they might receive, the nature of the coups potentially plotted, and sums up the core problem succinctly:

> On the basis of presently available evidence it would...seem that we would be well advised to hold ourselves back from specific commitments to Chileans who seek assurances on our attitude toward a new regime produced by a coup. If such commitments were to contribute to a decision to attempt a coup they would be too dangerous to give; if they would not contribute to such a decision they would be superfluous.⁴⁹

This belief was born out by the farcical 29 June uprising. In an undated, secret, internal memorandum designed to answer potential legislative questions about US involvement in the uprising, the author acknowledged US connection with some of the coup plotters, but added that this individual only ever "provided this Agency with information on military matters and made no secret of his opposition to the Allende regime" but never requested any Agency support or assistance in planning a possible coup. On one occasion a CIA contact requested an 'arrest list' to help round-up key government officials in the event of a successful coup, but this request was denied.

⁴⁸ Memorandum for the Record, "U.S. Reaction to Possible Approach by Chilean Coup Plotters", 30 October 1970. [CIA]

⁴⁹ Ibid.

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Overall, the Agency stressed, military contacts "were developed exclusively for intelligence purposes and have never received any encouragement with regard to coup plotting."⁵⁰ Perhaps as a reflection of the past requests for assistance by men such as Valenzuela and, especially, Viaux, the U.S. realised that only an indigenous coup would be potentially desirable to American interests. There was a strong belief that the UP government was inexorably sliding towards defeat in subsequent elections, and that the U.S. interests would be much better served by an elected successor regime than a regime produced by an armed coup.⁵¹ Any failed coups in the mean time would only bolster Allende's grip on power but once again allowing him to rally political support around the external *gringo* influence.

It appears that until the very day of the coup, neither the CIA nor any other U.S. government agency had a clear idea of the scope of contemporary coup plotting. In a cable of 25 August 1973, the Santiago Station chief described to Langley their contingency planning options over the coming few months. The COS boiled it down to four options: (a) do nothing; (b) continue on the present programme as authorised by the 40 Committee; (c) plan a coup; or (d) slightly expand the current support to the opposition. Of these options, Santiago Station opined "The dynamics of the present situation point to either massive re-entrance of the armed forces into the government or an outright military coup. Until it becomes more clear which of these two outcomes, if either, will prevail, it is difficult to do realistic long-range planning."⁵² The HQ reply two days later agreed that no change to the current operations should be made, as the situation was too unpredictable.⁵³ Clearly, up to this point, the CIA was

⁵⁰ Memorandum, originator unknown, "Questions Which May be Raised Concerning Chile", 'circa July 1973'. [CIA]

⁵¹ Memorandum for the Record, "U.S. Reaction to Possible Approach by Chilean Coup Plotters", 30 October 1970. [CIA].

⁵² Cable, Santiago COS to CIA HQ, "He Described Preliminary", 25 August 1973. [CIA]

⁵³ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago COS, "Agree that Realistically", 27 August 1973. [CIA]

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not involved in coup plotting and could barely keep abreast of the exponential growth
of plotting against Allende. As there was no foreknowledge of Pinochet's
involvement in the coup, there was also precious little intelligence on when and where
the coup was going to happen. According to Jack Devine, this was partly due to the
poor connections they had developed with the military, as discussed in the last
chapter. He did not highly rate the Agency's success in their intelligence-gathering
mission against the military:

> [Military] sources were few and not that forthcoming. The military, well, I would give it a 'C'. It was not like we were in bed with them at the planning/policy level. We knew what they were doing, we had advanced information about the coup, but that information did not come, *officially*, from the military, from a military officer. We did get the best report the day before—a very detailed report—from an officer. But to that time we were relying on civilians talking to their military friends.⁵⁴

Accordingly, Station planning was necessarily a bit vague. With the military's
plotting being somewhat haphazard, and the Agency having little contact with what
did exist, they could do little but guess. That a coup was going to take place was about
the only sure knowledge—and one did not need to be a CIA operative to surmise this
much.⁵⁵ In this instance the DIA, via its defence attaché relationships, may have had
better contact with the Chilean army generals than did the CIA. In May of 1973, DIA
issued a summary that identified—as did the CIA at the same time—that "discontent
amongst field grade officers has been increasing steadily for some weeks, and their
leaders have been meeting this month to draw up tactical plans for a move against
Allende." They carried on to note that the navy and air force were the most
aggressive in this planning, but predicted a coup before 4 June.⁵⁶ On 3 August 1973,
the CIA received intelligence that the PCCh had received warning of a coup attempt

⁵⁴ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

⁵⁵ See *Le Monde*, 25 August 1973. As printed in Kalfon, p. 239.

⁵⁶ Intelligence Summary, "Chile: Some disaffected", 24 May 1973. [DOD]

that would be carried out "this week" by "unnamed military leaders."⁵⁷ It is
interesting to note, bolstering Devine's and Phillips' comments about the relative
superiority of Agency reporting from sources from the PCCh, that this intelligence
came not from CIA contacts in the military but through informants in the UP. The
CIA 'comment' at the end of this memorandum is deleted, unfortunately, denying the
reader any hint if the CIA knew of these plans from other quarters. Regardless, there
is no other CIA intelligence report about this erstwhile-coup. On 7 September 1973,
only four days before the coup, an inter-departmental meeting could not achieve a
consensus on what was going to happen in Chile. While the CIA representative
believed that a 'creeping coup' might occur (where Allende's military cabinet slowly
took control), the State department representative "felt that if circumstances continued
to deteriorate an armed coup might be more likely."⁵⁸ In retrospect, the initial
indications of a solid coup climate emerged 8 September, when it was reported by the
CIA that the Chilean Navy planned to overthrow Allende on the early morning of 10
September. It was thought by the CIA that the Navy would initiate the revolt by
seizing control of a province (undoubtedly their home station of Valpraiso), and
would then be joined by the Air Force and perhaps even the Army: the Air Force C-
in-C contacted General Pinochet, the new Army C-in-C, and reported that Pinochet
would "not oppose the navy's action."⁵⁹ The Army, it was said, *might* join the coup
after the Air Force did, but their generals might not: this was hardly hard evidence of
a US-organised coup with Pinochet as chosen man, not to mention of a coordinated
coup plot at all. "The different military units were of a different frame of mind," said
Jack Devine. "The navy was gung-ho and the air force was not far behind them. But

⁵⁷ Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "PS Leader Clodomiro Almayda Informed", 03 August 1973.
[CIA]

⁵⁸ Memorandum, "ARA/CIA Meeting", 11 September 1970. [State]

⁵⁹ Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "According to the Navy", 8 September 1973. [CIA]

the army was slow coming to the coup-table. Why? Because they had to do the street-work, and they did it but they also said they wanted the lion's share of control afterwards.⁶⁰ Despite the fractured nature of the military's plotting, and the disagreements between the services, of which the CIA may have been aware, it was certain that "President Allende is unquestionably confronted with the most serious threat from the Armed Forces to his continuance in office since his election...."⁶¹ The CIA Station's moment of awareness that a coup was on the way came from Allende personally, said Jack Devine, likely recalling Allende's national address of 4 September:

> I do not remember the date, but Allende had a radio broadcast a week to ten days before [the coup], I cannot remember exactly what it was I was looking for but, whatever it was, he did not deliver it. Whether it was giving the military even a greater role, or taking a harder line on them, and I thought well, he has just crossed the Rubicon. The tension in the city was high. [But] our analysts in Washington were still saying 'no coup.'⁶²

Devine said that soon after this, on or about 8 September, good reporting started to arrive from civilians connected with the military giving dates and times of the coup. These rumours and the report of 8 September notwithstanding, the first hard intelligence about the 11 September coup arrived only the day before. The detail of the reports, and the extreme dispatch with which they arrived, keyed Devine to the possibility that many of their Chilean army contacts were using the US as much as the US was using them:

> [A] day before [the coup]—maybe 48 hours—but within near real time, a definitive report arrived that went into great detail. If you had doubts about the first two reports you should not have had any doubts about the third report that came from a very good [military] source. That was not a source that was reporting regularly. He had not provided a single report over the previous two years. The point was 'Go tell the Americans that we are coming.' Was it a controlled

⁶⁰ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

⁶¹ Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "According to the Navy", 8 September 1973. [CIA]

⁶² Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

source? I cannot tell you. But my point is that it was not someone that would have been reporting that calibre of material all along, and just added this other piece, because he would have been able to add other pieces before that.⁶³

Regardless, the CIA had a detailed report, a day, perhaps two days before the coup. Most serious reporting was arriving within a four or five day period. The CIA, up to the very last moment, was still sceptical that a coup was going to happen. And, as Devine added, several slight delays convinced the Station officers that these coup plots were as illusory as the dozen others they had heard about over the past three years: "Well, they changed the day; we knew that. I was in the embassy the night before it was supposed to start to start, at seven (and it started at eight.) So at 07.25, 'One more BS report!' It was not as though everybody, including in Washington, were sitting there convinced that it would happen. [It] speaks to how well wired, how involved were we, in the planning."⁶⁴ Both CIA and DIA intelligence reports of September 10 indicated that intelligence had been received and "that a coup attempt will be initiated on September 11. All three branches of the armed forces and the Carabineros are involved in this action."⁶⁵ Several days after the coup the British political attaché in Washington cabled back to Whitehall the substance of a conversation with ARA's Jack Kubisch, who said the US government:

> did not know that the coup was going to take place when it did, the report they had received was one of many that they had had over the past few months that a coup was imminent and there was nothing to indicate that this one was any more reliable than the others....⁶⁶

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Intelligence Report, "That a coup attempt will be initiated", 10 September 1973. [CIA]

⁶⁶ Telegram, Sykes (Washington) to FCO, "Chile: Coup" 13 Sept 1973. [TNA: PRO 7/2411 Internal Political Situation Chile]

Sources reporting to DIA had similar difficulty in winnowing the wheat from the chaff in their coup information. In a report filed at 0110hrs on 11 September, it was suggested:

> Navy plotters, perhaps heeding the call of Vice Adm Jose Merino to hold off, postponed a take-over of Valparaiso Province... However, the plotters have allegedly informed the National Police that a new jump-off time has been set for today, possibly hoping this will evoke action from Allende. The defence attaché in Santiago reports that of 0100 EDT the situation appears normal but that early this morning is apparently the planned time for a coup attempt.⁶⁷

They mused about the possibility of junior officers forcing the high command to make "a show of force," at least, against Allende, something the DIA apparently thought unlikely. The CIA, as Devine said, was still sceptical, noting that this attempt was apparently supposed to have been undertaken on 10 September but had been delayed to improve the tactical situation. It was thought that Allende's planned national address on the afternoon of 10 September might be used "to announce some dramatic proposal such as the calling of a plebiscite which could again cause the plotters to hesitate."⁶⁸ Indeed, this was Allende's plan, though the speech, which was to be read on 11 September, was never given the chance to be heard.

While there is a small chance that these sceptical messages are plotted dissembling, it is more likely that U.S. intelligence on the coup plotters was minimal, or that the analysis at Langley was off the mark. Devine made this argument clear:

> I do not think the analysts had a good feel. They overestimated the military, and the Agency, its analysts—not the operators, the analysts—felt that the military would never move against Allende. And that was even into the very late days before the coup came: 'this is a constitutional government; the military feels bound by the constitution, and therefore they are never going to remove him.'⁶⁹

⁶⁷ Intelligence Summary, "Chile: President Allende", 11 September 1973. [DOD]

⁶⁸ Memorandum, Intelligence Report, "That a coup attempt will be initiated", 10 September 1973.

⁶⁹ Interview, Jack Devine.

It also seems that the earliest *direct* contact with the coup plotters came as late as 10 September, 1973, probably only hours after the message mentioned above, when it was reported to Kissinger by the CIA that a contact in the Chilean military met with a CIA agent to advise the U.S. that: "early 11 September 1973 a significant part of the Chilean military planned to move to overthrow President Allende."⁷⁰ The Chilean officer then asked if the US would provide support to the coup if the situation became 'difficult.' The agent, it is reported, responded by telling the Chilean officer that "the planned action against President Allende was a Chilean operation, and he [CIA agent] could only promise that [security deletion] question would promptly be made known to Washington."⁷¹

Even though the CIA learned of these coup efforts too late to affect them, there was continued interest in the CIA, especially amongst the Chilean country-team, to foster a coup in the national chaos of late August, 1973. On the resignation of General Prats from Cabinet, the CIA in Chile believed that the Allende government was in such a shaky position that "significant events or pressures could affect its future."⁷² The time was ripe, the station urged, for the CIA to support a major move by the opposition (including the private sector) to force on the government an emergency military cabinet that would administer the country until stability was restored. There was a danger: "While this is probably the most realistic objective, it should be borne in mind that events may carry the armed forces beyond this point to

⁷⁰ Memorandum, CIA (via Mr. William Jorden, NSC) to Kissinger, "Possible Request for U.S. Government Aid", 10 September 1970. [NSC] This is a direct telegram that would have gone directly from Santiago to Washington and Langley. The 'intelligence report' in note 65 would have been prepared in Langley from intelligence sent from Santiago the previous day.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Opposition Parties Are Maintaining", 24 August 1973. [CIA]

that of a full military takeover.”⁷³ Despite all the pressure to avoid direct connection to any coup plotter, the CIA would still have been happy if a coup had occurred.

## The CIA to 11 September

That the US continued in its desire to see Allende fall is no great surprise, as their political aims had been clearly defined almost a decade before, but it does not mean the US intelligence community was working behind the back of the lawmakers in Washington to foment a coup. Reporting the station's plans in the weeks before the coup, DCI Colby assured Kissinger that "the Santiago station would not be working directly with the armed forces in an attempt to bring about a coup nor would its support to the overall opposition forces have this as its objective."⁷⁴ There is no response to this memorandum, though it is doubtful that there was sufficient time for a new directive before the coup was executed. Regardless, the memorandum from Colby—along with a veritable thesaurus of other evidence—shows that the CIA, up to the last moments of the Allende regime, were not involved in coup plotting, and indeed were avoiding any move that might indicate to the Chileans that they favoured one any more than was already public knowledge. The US's actions to cut off funding to Allende's Chile can likewise not be related directly to the coup. Despite a continuing desire to see the collapse of the Allende government, in the three years from his election to his death, the U.S. government carried out no action against the Chilean government that could not be justified within the norms of international banking or trade law, and produced no policy with the direct intent of promoting a coup. As one US government officer said:

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Memorandum, William Colby to Kissinger, "Proposed Covert Financial Support of Chilean Private Sector", 25 August 1973.

Whatever [the CIA] did with the military collection had no impact on them moving. Yes, we were supporting all these different [political and civil] institutions, but only in a moment of bravado would someone have said we wanted a coup—and someone may have said something—but the only real cause here was Allende and his policies.⁷⁵

Indeed, so careful were the CIA in avoiding the appearance of favouring a coup that they had trouble predicting the timing and nature of the coup that did occur. Dr. Kissinger recalled that he did not have any specific warning of the coup:

> [I was aware] there was a building crisis. This was a period when Watergate was cooking. I was being confirmed as Secretary of State, I had a lot of other things going on. I cannot say that I walked into [the White House] in the morning and knew first thing that there was a coup ongoing. There was a general coup climate, but there was not a specific consciousness of a coup.⁷⁶

The State Department as a whole seems to have shared Kissinger's point of view, for a document originating from Foggy Bottom on the very day of the coup shows that many in the department "doubted that there would be a military coup" but indicated the possibility of increased military power over government.⁷⁷ If, as it appears, many in government did not have warning of the coup, then it can be argued that the Agency failed in its primary task of assisting policy makers with timely intelligence. Devine's 'C'-grade might be too generous, yet it speaks to the point of American complicity: if they could not predict it, how could they have plotted it?

The policymakers' opinions on the coup are hardly a better indication of complicity. While Kissinger went on to note "We had no particular reason to be unhappy with [the coup]" this does not mean that the US specifically had a coup as its goal or worked at all to make it happen.⁷⁸ The last NIE on Chile before the coup, issued in June of 1973, noted "the US lacks powerful and reliable levers for

⁷⁵ Interview, Anonymous US Government Officer.

⁷⁶ Interview, Dr. H.A. Kissinger.

⁷⁷ Memorandum. McAfee to Gardner, "ARA/CIA Meeting of 7 September", 11 September 1973.
[State]

⁷⁸ Ibid.

influencing the outcome" of Chile's ongoing political crisis.⁷⁹ In his book *The Night Watch*, former CIA C/WHD David Phillips recounts the difficulty in managing the CIA effort in Chile. On the one hand the CIA agents were expected to 'ring the bell', or to ensure proper warning to the U.S. government of any attempted coup in Chile—something we can see failed to occur fully. On the other hand, it had been pointed out that in the (arguably inevitable) event of a coup in Chile, the CIA would be accused of complicity. It was ultimately ordered that discretion was to trump forewarning: the CIA wanted to keep its hands clean in a time when the agency was under increased scrutiny.⁸⁰ The result of this policy is what is described above; a difficult and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to gather information from the margins, on very secret coup plots, without leaving any impressions of favouring a coup.

The discretion by the CIA did not pay off. The Church Committee report imputes, without supporting logic or evidence, that the CIA supported and perhaps even helped plot the coup. Mark Falcoff has attempted to refute these claims and does so with remarkable skill. Like many others writing on the topic, Falcoff was limited by not having access to the full range of documents quoted, or more importantly *not* quoted by the Church Committee Report. Access to these documents sheds much needed light on the topic, and subsequently reveals the partisan nature of that report and vindicates Falcoff's rejection of its rhetoric. Moreover, by looking at these documents one is able to determine the exact nature of the U.S. relation with those who launched the coup in September of 1973 in detail not achievable until the declassification of the CIA, NSC and State Department archives. They remove any doubt—a doubt exploited by such works as Hersh's *The Price of Power*⁸¹—to the

⁷⁹ National Intelligence Estimate, "Chile", 14 June 1973. [CIA]

⁸⁰ Phillips, p. 238.

⁸¹ Hersh, p. 295. Here one reads of the famous arrest lists and 'almost daily reports of coups.' Reporting the plots, the CIA's function, is imputed by Hersh to directly correlate with their plotting.

CIA and Kissinger's assertion that they had no connection, and barely any knowledge, of the coup that ousted Allende.

A post-coup CIA intelligence bulletin reported Pinochet's private comment that "he and his colleagues, as a matter of policy, had not given any hints to the US as to their developing resolve to act."⁸² Whether this policy was one of security or one of pride is unknown. Certainly, the Chilean military's *amour propre* would have been offended by the notion that they needed the US to run the coup for them. Several days after the coup, the US military attaché in Caracas was approached by his Chilean counterpart, Chilean army Colonel Hernan Bejares Gonzalez. Reporting on the meeting, the attaché noted that Colonel Bejares was "in good spirits and obviously pleased" that Allende had been overthrown. He delivered what the DOD believed was a message from the Junta to the US:

> We in Chile fully expect other nations and many individual political figures to deplore the coup and also try to link the US with it or somehow blame the US. I feel the Junta would want me to emphasise in the strongest terms that this is purely a Chilean affair. [The Chilean Military] as always welcome the friendship of the United States but we must and shall clean up this mess ourselves.⁸³

The CIA *did* play the central role in U.S. operations in Chile, operations based on the policy of preventing the extinction of Chile's unique democracy, which was under a clear attack by Allende's aggressively Marxist government. The Americans did operate against Allende, but not to engineer his death. William Colby described the American efforts best, in a secret post-coup cable to Henry Kissinger: "While the agency was instrumental in enabling opposition political parties and media to survive and to maintain their dynamic resistance to the Allende regime, the CIA played no direct role in the events which led to the establishment of the new military

⁸² Intelligence Bulletin, "Chile", 13 September 1973. [CIA]

⁸³ Cable, Santiago MAO to Pentagon, 'Part I of USDAO/Caracas 7981', 13 September 1973. [DOD]

government.”<sup>84</sup> In the end, it was Allende’s inability to lead, to manage his party, and so to manage his economy that brought his end. “The real thing that brought Allende down was the economy; at the end of the day, a bankrupt economy” said Jack Devine.<sup>85</sup> While some might dismiss this as being an economically determinist argument, it is less easily refuted than theories of complete US complicity.

<sup>84</sup> Memorandum, Colby to Kissinger, “CIA’s Covert Action Program”, 19 September 1973. [CIA]

<sup>85</sup> Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

Coda:

Post-Coup Operations

Allende's ouster was not an unwelcome event for the Americans. Despite this, it is clear through their lack of full awareness that they were not its motive force. In most of the literature the story ends there: Allende was out, Pinochet was in, and Chile settled down to almost 20 years of dictatorship. Yet this conclusion is predicated on the assumption that the US *was* complicit in the coup and that they sponsored Pinochet in it. Pinochet was in power; ergo, the mission in Chile was over. But there is a further story: for almost a year after the coup the US government, through the CIA, continued to provide funds to the PDC and other political organisations that had been in the anti-Allende opposition. They did this even as it emerged that the junta (increasingly controlled by Pinochet) was going to remain in absolute power for an extended time and suppress all political activity, and that this opposition, which initially welcomed the coup, found itself as the opposition once again. While the coup might seem the logical end to the long period of anti-communist covert action carried out in Chile, this oft-neglected fact—that the US continued this support for the political opposition in Chile for some months after the establishment of the Junta government—lends a new perspective to the US thinking on Chile. Moreover, this residual operation offers numerous observations about the US stance towards Chile in the preceding years, and on the US view towards non-Communist dictatorships.

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## The PDC Dilemma:

One of the striking observations made by most of the people interviewed for this study was that the coup was not expected to be as violent—or permanent—as it turned out to be. John Crimmins, who was stationed in Brasilia in September of 1973, commenting on the several thousand casualties in the first few days of the coup, said "when the coup came, I was surprised it was so violent and appalled that it was so *hate filled*. It was more 'Central American' than I expected."⁸⁶ That violence was part of the greater surprise of the permanency and ambition of the coup. Many, like Dr. Kissinger, believed that the junta would reflect their conceptions about Chile's democratic bent, that "as soon as they came in, once the coup had been made, they would return back to a democratic system in a measurable period of time."⁸⁷ There were no illusions, offered Crimmins, that any of the Marxist parties would continue to exist in these supposed elections. Nonetheless, "no one had any thought that there would be the sort of dictatorship that we got. We thought a temporary government dominated by the military and then another election. Probably one that would be so confined that there would be disqualifications of certain parties, that kind of thing,"⁸⁸ added Crimmins. In chorus with his State Department colleague, Jack Devine offered that "there was an assumption that the army was going to come in, stabilise things, and there was going to be an election a year later."⁸⁹

This sense of the 'Chilean' nature of the coup, that the coup was not launched because the army desired power, but because they reluctantly but patriotically found it necessary due to the mismanagement of President Allende, was held by most middle- and upper-class Chileans. It was beyond doubt that the coup vastly altered the

⁸⁶ Interview, Ambassador J.H. Crimmins, verbal emphasis noted.

⁸⁷ Interview, Dr. H.A. Kissinger

⁸⁸ Interview, Ambassador J.H. Crimmins.

⁸⁹ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

political landscape of Chile—there would be none of the strong leftist trend that had won a significant portion of the vote in Chile since the 1930s—but to the PDC, PN and Radicals the demise of these leftist-extremists was not necessarily unwelcome when viewed through the filter of the calamitous Allende years. The suspension of all political activity by the Junta was necessary, all understood, to keep the country calm and to root-out the Cubans, the MIR, and the alphabet-soup of other leftist radical groups that threatened violence. Once they were dealt with, and after a brief period of hopefully benign military rule, a more-or-less pluralistic system would be restored:

> The moderate Christian Democrats (PDC) believe the military junta will remain in power for one to two years and hope to expand their influence... Leaders of the PDC are concerned that the junta will try to remain in power longer, but they hope that support of the political parties will prompt the military to return to civil rule. Therefore, the PDC has avowed complete support of the government and is willing to accept suspension of party activities for the present.⁹⁰

Accordingly, the major non-Marxist political parties saw it in their interests to bide their time, preserve their assets and credibility, and cautiously support the Junta until they could officially re-enter public politics. “The anti-Allende political parties so far are being kept at arms length, but have announced their support for the Junta,”⁹¹ noted the CIA. PDC President Patricio Aylwin encapsulated these ideas in a public statement made shortly after the coup:

> Los antecedentes demuestran que las Fuerzas Armadas y Carabineros no buscaron el poder: sus tradiciones institucionales y la historia republicana de nuestra patria inspiran la confianza de que tan pronto sean cumplidas las tareas que ellas han asumido para evitar los graves peligros de destrucción y totalitarismo que amenazaban a la nación Chilena, devolverán el poder al pueblo soberano para que libre y soberanamente decidan el destino patrio⁹²

⁹⁰ Intelligence Summary, DIA, “Chile”, 25 September 1973. [DOD]

⁹¹ Memorandum, DCI Briefing Note for NSC, “The Situation in Chile”, 14 September 1973.

⁹² Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, “Following is Text”, 14 September 1973. Translated as: “Precedent demonstrates that the Armed Forces and Carabineros do not seek power: their institutional traditions and the Republican history of our country inspires confidence that, once they have completed the tasks they undertook to avert the grave dangers of destruction and totalitarianism that threatened the

Indeed, at the beginning of October the PDC despatched a large delegation of senators and deputies to travel Latin America and Europe on a 'truth tour' to outline the necessity of the coup and to justify their support of it. The words of the junta proved at first to coincide with the hopes of Aylwin and his party. Not ten days after the coup, the junta issued a statement to the effect that a "Traditional democratic system of [government] will be re-established after 'national recuperation' has been achieved,"⁹³ a period which a slightly earlier CIA bulletin had noted as being one year.⁹⁴ By early October Gen Pinochet confirmed to Chileans that civilian government would only be restored after a "more or less long period."⁹⁵ This period of time was not clearly defined by the junta who were reluctant to make promises, but it was still widely interpreted to mean one year.⁹⁶ This generally suited the opposition, who hoped that the junta would take charge of the unpalatable task of cleansing their opposition from Chile. The CIA reported that "Christian Democratic leaders are faced with a dilemma, however... they hope to staff middle-level [junta] posts with their followers in an effort to moderate the government's policies, but they want to avoid being too closely identified with it."⁹⁷ This was understandable in light of the (moderately exaggerated) figures reported to the PDC of 5,000 to 7,000 deaths in the first week of the coup. Hoping at least to moderate the junta and to ensure they were well positioned to transit into power as the junta relinquished control, the PDC sought a champion in the junta who might keep them in mind. Their choice was

Chilean nation, they will devolve power to the sovereign people who will decide freely and with sovereign power the destiny of the nation."

⁹³ Cable, US Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State, "Chile At Work", 20 September 1973. [State]

⁹⁴ Central Intelligence Bulletin, "Chile", 13 September 1973. [CIA]

⁹⁵ Intelligence Summary, DIA, "Chile", 13 October 1973. [DOD]

⁹⁶ Central Intelligence Bulletin, "Chile", 13 September 1973. [CIA]

⁹⁷ Central Intelligence Bulletin, "Chile", 18 September 1973. [CIA]

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perhaps unfortunate, for the PDC "staked its hopes on Army Gen Pinochet, who has emerged as the most prestigious leader."⁹⁸

With democracy still very much on the minds of the PDC who, like most Chileans, were shocked by the building numbers of casualties and the excesses of the now all-powerful military, cautioned the junta in late-October 1973 against imposing dictatorial measures or changing the constitution without a plebiscite. Like the CIA, the PDC had gravely underestimated the sense of righteous vengeance held by the military, and their comments did not impress the junta. It was reported "The military government is annoyed with the stance of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), despite the party's mild statement of support for the junta. The PDC has taken sharp exception to the dissolution of congress, where it had the largest representation."⁹⁹

The junta rebuffed the attempts of the PDC deputies, and on 26 September 'recessed' all political parties (in addition to outlawing the Marxist ones) as a means of promoting 'national unity.'¹⁰⁰ While almost all contemporaries believed that the coup was merely a short-term event designed to reintroduce democracy to Chile, it very quickly became clear that the junta had different ideas. As Mark Falcoff described, the hostility felt in the Chilean middle classes towards any politics (for had not constant politicking only resulted in a communist government and economic collapse?) had infected the largely middle-class military. In seemingly asserting their right to political power after it was the army who had at last moved to prevent dictatorship, the parties were walking on this ice with the junta. Having seen their prosperous and peaceable country destroyed with the acquiescence of the non-Marxist parties, they were not in a charitable mood towards any politician: "The junta blames

⁹⁸ Intelligence Summary, DIA, "Chile", 25 September 1973. [DOD]

⁹⁹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ (?), "The Junta Believes", undated, likely 15-20 September 1973. Misfiled as 9 September 1973.

¹⁰⁰ Central Intelligence Bulletin, "Chile, 177", 27 September 1973.

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all politicians for the conditions leading to the coup. They feel there was an excess of political demagoguery and that Chilean institutions had been over politicised,"¹⁰¹ reported one CIA contact privy to a Junta cabinet meeting.

## The CIA and Funding:

Once the immediate coup crisis had subsided into something that might pass for normality in Chile, the CIA continued to share the assumption of the PDC that the latter were still a political body whose presence was of benefit to US interests in Chile. As the PDC embarked on their Latin American 'Truth Tour', the Ambassador and the Santiago Station immediately offered funding, based on 40 Committee spending approvals made before the coup. This did not go over well in Washington. As a coup had not been figured into their budget forecasting, Langley found itself with a series of projects and funds, authorised by a 40 Committee meeting of 20 August, which many in Washington did not think still applied to the post-coup situation. Ten days after the coup, apparently under pressure from the White House, Langley cabled the Santiago Station and expressed their opinion that the 20 August approval was now entirely irrelevant, and that the station should suggest a new set of programmes to be reviewed and perhaps approved. Langley expressed the belief that they could not "justify [a] continuation of the level and type of subsidy support provided heretofore for opposition stance, but do see a continuing need for intelligence coverage and agent of influence capabilities in these areas."¹⁰² The funding of the PDC 'Truth Team' was conceded as a justifiable use of funds, but Langley "deeply regretted" that they could not allow any disbursal of funds until a

¹⁰¹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Junta Follow-up Activities," 15 September 1973. [CIA] Emphasis added.

¹⁰² Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago, "Consensus Reached", 21 September 1973. [CIA]

new 40 Committee decision.¹⁰³ They suggested the Ambassador appeal to the Secretary of State, to go over the head of Jack Kubisch, the Assistant Secretary at ARA, who was the prime obstacle of further funding. The Ambassador declined such a move, but chose instead to try and “change Mr. Kubisch’s mind.”¹⁰⁴ Jack Kubisch, however, continued to oppose the country-team’s proposals, though no reason was given, despite the submission of a formal request on 9 October 1973.¹⁰⁵ While waiting more than one month for a response to this plan, the CIA reported on the PDC’s first national meeting since the coup, where the party members expressed their concern that the junta was not behaving democratically and that, while they continued to publicly express their unqualified support for the junta, they would move somehow to curb government atrocities, executions and imprisonments.¹⁰⁶ A further request was submitted at the end of November for support to two Radical Party splinters that “continue to function internally and are active in their efforts to expand their influence” despite the ban on political activity.¹⁰⁷ It seems that the CIA grew tired of waiting for 40 Committee approvals of new projects, and Santiago Station was cabled on 20 November that “all political action projects [are] being submitted [to the President] for renewal now without waiting for 40 Committee action… Projects will be amended as appropriate on basis of 40 Committee action.”¹⁰⁸ Funding would continue at least to the end of the fiscal year.

The reasons for Kubisch’s opposition to the CIA proposals became clear only in the last week of November. In discussions with 40 Committee members, Kubisch expressed the belief—an echo of earlier State Department reticence to conduct *any*

¹⁰³ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago, “Realise Authorised”, 24 September 1973. [CIA]

¹⁰⁴ Cable, Santiago Station to Director CIA, “Ambassador does not”, 28 September 1973.

¹⁰⁵ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, “Station Plans”, 04 October 1973.

¹⁰⁶ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, “November 1973”, 12 November 1973.

¹⁰⁷ Memorandum, Chile desk to Acting C/WHD, “Project [deleted] Renawal”, 23 November 1973.

¹⁰⁸ Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago, “All Political Action”, 20 November 1973. [CIA]

covert action—that “political action should only be used as last resort for most compelling ‘US interest’ reasons... [and] kept raising the serious problem spectre if junta discovered we were funding PDC.”<sup>109</sup> On the other hand, there was apparently support from Schlaudeman at State, who argued on behalf of incoming US Ambassador Popper (whose credentials were not presented until some time after the long-delayed US recognition of the junta) that support to the PDC was necessary, “on the grounds that [the US] needed their future good will and abrupt termination of support would lead party leaders to believe we had used them during [the] Allende government and then dumped them as soon as military took over.”<sup>110</sup> Shlaudeman was apparently alone in suggesting that the PDC should at least be given a surge of funding to allow them a less sudden shift to private funds. Clearly, Langley reported, more persuasive arguments would be needed to win even this diminished subsidy.

The CIA reacted negatively to the 40 Committee's and White House's inaction on continued political action in Chile. Writing at the end of November, the Chief of WHD railed at the inaction of the executive at that critical juncture. Their argument is persuasive and pragmatic, arguing that wasting carefully built political assets within Chile's still-functioning (if 'recessed') party system would be a dangerous mistake:

> Since the coup d'état of September 1973 and the assumption of power by military junta, the 40 Committee has vacillated on what subsidies, if any, should be given to the PDC to support its activities under the junta. These subsidies, however, appear to be necessary to maintain the PDC as a viable alternative party to the Communist and Socialist Parties should the junta relinquish power to civilian control under a new constitution. Since much of the financial base of support for the PDC was destroyed by the fiscal policies of the Allende regime, the PDC is heavily dependent on US government funding if it is to

<sup>109</sup> Cable, CIA HQ to Santiago Station, "Following are Results", 26 November 1973.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

compete effectively with the former UP Parties for support among
middle and low income groups."¹¹¹

By the end of December, fully three months after the first requests were submitted, the 40 Committee had granted no authorisation for continued funding to the PDC, nor for the continued publication of an unnamed newspaper, likely *El Mercurio*.¹¹²

Similar to the argument made by the station for political action, the Station believed a sudden ending to the CIA subsidy would cause a break with carefully nurtured propaganda assets which might later prove useful.¹¹³ Without them, the Station would be unable to "maintain our capability for influencing the Junta and moulding Chilean public opinion."¹¹⁴ Jack Devine personally sought to encourage continued support for the Chilean political parties: "I wrote a memo that I assume never went to Washington, probably because the boss wanted to save my career: I said we should be promoting efforts to get Pinochet out of there and get the democratic process on track."¹¹⁵ Essentially, he felt that not to do this was a waste of three years of political effort ostensibly aimed at preserving Chilean democracy from the clutches of dictatorship.

While the White House delayed, and the Station pleaded, the net was closing in on Chile's democratic parties. The Station reported in late January that the Junta sought to "broaden the political base of the Junta at the expense of the political parties."¹¹⁶ This was put into effect with Decree Law 1899 of 23 January 1974, which prohibited parties from engaging in any political activity whatsoever.¹¹⁷ In view of the total abolition of political activity, as well as the continued curfews and

¹¹¹ Memorandum, C/WH/? To Acting C/WHD, "Amendment for Fiscal Year", 28 November 1973.
[CIA]

¹¹² Memorandum, WHD[unknown dept] to C/WHD, "Amendment No. 1 to Project", 8 January 1974.

¹¹³ Ibid.

¹¹⁴ Memorandum, WHD[unknown dept] to C/WHD, [deleted] Project, 9 January 1974.

¹¹⁵ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

¹¹⁶ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Had Just Left", 19 January 1974.

¹¹⁷ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Ambassador Popper Will Be", 23 January 1974.

surveillance by the newly-formed Chilean central security agency, the DINA, when the 40 Committee finally met to consider the proposal for continued funding it was a moot point. The last piece of paperwork to mention the funding program came on 1 March 1974, when the Station wrote:

> [Parties] were advised on [deleted] February that the changed political conditions in Chile make it impossible for us to continue to subsidise [deleted] and that we wish to divest ourselves of any responsibility for [deleted]. They were told that with the termination of this fiscal year, all subsidy support for [deleted] would cease. This news came as a shock and a disappointment....

And with that, more than a decade of support and encouragement aimed at preserving Chile's political culture simply faded away due to inaction by the US government and the increasing authoritarian nature of the Pinochet junta. As for the reasons why it was allowed to suffer such an unheralded end, the answer is unclear and the record of decisions entirely incomplete. Jack Devine argued that the reason was one of practicalities, saying that one should not seek "political motivation for not supporting the parties against Pinochet. [The US Government was] just sort of stuck with what they had, the Junta went on longer than we supposed, and Pinochet was *much* stronger and harsher in power than we had ever supposed."¹¹⁸ The permanence of the junta, and of Pinochet's grip on the apparatus of government, became clear to Henry Kissinger in 'late November or December' of 1973. He has argued that by that time US options on Chile had been severely reduced by the realities of the situation: they had not sought a coup, but one did occur, and to subsequently move against the junta would have been folly: "one must judge it in relation to all the other things. We were willing to use our influence to improve the human rights situation, but we were not willing to take the step of overthrowing the Junta. This is because the alternative was the Argentine situation: a civil war, an actual civil war." A civil war meant only

¹¹⁸ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

more killing, and would result in either a confirmed military junta or a new Marxist
one, so there was little point in initiating such a cruel set of events. Even had they
desired, against all geopolitical reasoning, to rid themselves of relatively friendly
Pinochet government there was little the US could do in the short or even the long
term: when faced with a personalised dictatorship "there are only so many things you
can do..."¹¹⁹ Political action with proscribed political parties would do little. Thus,
funding ended due to a mixture of realpolitik recognition of the benefit of a non-
Communist junta, and the sheer inability to do anything about it. But whatever the
reasons for ending its support, the fact that the CIA was arguing in favour of such
continued funding is a clear indication of the Agency's position at the time of the
coup: it was not expected, they had little to do with it and were, they knew even less
about the attitudes and positions of the Junta that orchestrated it, and had not prepared
contingencies for its occurrence. All of these factors argue against US complicity in
the Chilean coup of 1973.

¹¹⁹ Interview, Dr. H.A. Kissinger.

Watching History Unfold

Kristian Gustafson
Downing College
Cambridge

With the failure of efforts to prevent Allende's election and inauguration, the US government as a whole began planning for something that they had always thought as unlikely as it was undesirable: a Marxist government brought to power by electoral means within the western hemisphere. As CIA officer Jack Devine stated in an interview, everyone in the CIA understood Allende's victory and his government to be a significant challenge to US authority in the hemisphere and a defeat in the overall East-West confrontation:

> Everyone saw it as menacing, how menacing might have been the issue. Nobody was looking and saying "oh, this is just another friendly democratic party and nothing is going to happen here." I do not remember too many people in responsible positions being unconcerned. How concerned and what they were prepared to do about it, well, honest people could disagree. But there were not a lot of people running around saying "God Bless Allende! This is a new democratic reform movement just the type they need in Latin America!" This simply did not happen.¹

Precisely what they were going to do about this new government, however, was unclear, for at no point had any contingency plans been prepared for the unlikely eventuality of an Allende government. Yet Chile was not, as various parts of the US government now realised, 'another Cuba,' at least so far. The impetus to this dawning recognition was international opinion. Internationally, the jubilation at Allende's victory was vocal and public throughout much of the populations of the western allies, and even amongst large segments of the US population. To openly threaten Allende was therefore politically risky. The fact that Allende had been elected fairly trumped

¹ Interview, Mr. Jack Devine.

US high-level opinion, shared by Allende himself, that the ballot-box was merely a tactical ploy on the route to a scientific Marxist state. To openly and aggressively undermine a popular, apparently reformist, and *elected* leader would court a diplomatic debacle for the US on par, if not worse, than the Dominican intervention or the Bay of Pigs. This was fully realised by the decision-making organs of the US government, and the policy of how to deal with Allende's government took this understanding as its baseline on the production of its detailed foreign policy plan.

Several other factors reinforced the US inclination to tread softly with Allende. First was the conviction that Allende's economic policies would lead to the destruction of the Chilean economy, and so would either unintentionally invite a reaction by the Chilean army or, if the army would not move, that Allende would at least suffer defeat in the next presidential election. Suddenly, the US realised that Allende was constrained by the same democratic structures of the Chilean constitution that had so frustrated their earlier coup attempts. That Allende could convert Chile into a Marxist state before the next election was a possibility, but one for which they had time to plan. In the mean time the US need only refrain from openly aggressive actions that might bolster Allende's position. 'Cool and Correct' became the new watchwords, and supporting Chilean democratic institutions, not circumventing them, became the main tactic. The uncontrolled disasters of Track I and Track II had forced the US Government—Kissinger, Nixon, and most of the Cabinet—into a more circumspect appreciation of their ability to affect affairs in Chile.

Accordingly, CIA operations during the subsequent Allende government—well planned, quietly executed—were to prove much more effective than the comic-opera of Operation FUBELT. The mistakes of 1970 facilitated a return to the relatively harmonious inter-departmental planning of the NSC, State Department, CIA

2

and embassy staff, which in turn contributed to the more 'hands-off' approach to Allende. Beginning with a new presidential directive, the behaviour of the U.S. government towards Chile after 3 November 1970 was less than the bloody-minded conspiracy often assumed by historians and commentators since Allende's ouster in 1973. American agents, with the full knowledge of their government, supported opposition parties and media outlets, attempted to sow dissent in the UP coalition, and gathered intelligence from the military. For its part, the U.S. government refused to extend further credit to a bankrupt Chilean government that had already defaulted on most of its loans. From Allende's election to his downfall in 1973, no branch of the U.S. government engaged in coup plotting with the Chilean armed forces or any other domestic political body. The lessons learned from the pre-inauguration period remained in the awareness of the U.S. Government and specifically the CIA throughout the three years of Allende's presidency. Evidence shows that the CIA operated well within the limits of their authority and firmly under the orders of the policy-making branches of the government from November 1970 to September 1973.

## Debates and Discussions

After Allende's inauguration on 3 November, the U.S. government moved quickly to implement a new policy towards Chile. Little time was wasted in taking the pre-inauguration NSC discussion paper on Chile—NSSM 97—and adjusting it towards the new situation of a Marxist government in that country. An executive order on 29 October had the NSC revising NSSM 97 in anticipation of a meeting with the President scheduled for 5 November, 1970.² There were no major changes to the

² Memorandum, Theodore Eliot to Kissinger, "NSC Meeting on Chile", 3 November 1970. [NSC]

3

structure of the document—it still set out four options for American policy towards Chile. The new and improved NSSM 97, however, had changed the options to reflect the fact of an Allende government. The first two options could be reviewed as one, and essentially suggested that the U.S. to maintain an outwardly correct posture while refraining from initiatives that Allende could use to his advantage, while at the same time quietly limiting Allende's freedom of action.³ Option 'C' called for the U.S. to act correctly in a diplomatic sense but make clear their opposition to the emergence of a communist government in South America and act outwardly to restrain Chilean diplomatic and political freedom.⁴ The last option called for an openly hostile posture towards Chile. In order to appreciate the choice of these options requires one to understand the assessment the U.S. government had made of the Allende regime.

The preamble to this options paper outlined their beliefs, and in it they (accurately) predicted the course that the Allende government would follow. Allende's goals, the paper stated, would be: "(a) To bring all significant economic activity under state operation.... (b) to gain control over the security and armed forces; and (c) to dominate public information media."⁵ The initial plan of operations against Chile would be predicated on this estimate of Allende's actions. Overall, NSSM 97 is a remarkably lucid and well-argued assessment of the policy options for Chile and it served as the basis for the Presidential decision that was to follow it on 5 November.

The discussion of NSSM 97 in the White House cabinet office was lively and direct. Present were all the major cabinet officers, as well as Kissinger, Vice President Ford and President Nixon. The minutes of this meeting show the definite concern about Chile already broached before Allende's election. It is clear that there

³ Memorandum, Robert Hurwitch to Secretary of State, "NSC Meeting on Chile", 05 November 1970. [CDP] It is the State Department's interpretation that options 'A' and 'B' were essentially identical.

⁴ Memorandum, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)", 03 November 1970. [NSC]

⁵ Memorandum, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)", 03 November 1970. [NSC]

4

was a definite perception of threat to the national security of the U.S. For instance, there is a clear indication from the Vice-President of concern for the Communist-bloc reaction to the American stance in Chile and Latin America as a whole. Vice-President Ford points out that Allende in Chile forced the Americans to move more carefully in the sale of military equipment to, for instance, Argentina, "which could trigger massive support to Chile from the USSR and China."⁶ This, in turn, might start an arms race and destabilize Latin America as a whole. Nixon was concerned about the implications of Allende on American interests in Latin America and the hemisphere in general. He opined that events in Chile, and the decisions being made in that very meeting, were going to be a watershed for American policy in Latin America.

> If Chile moves as we expect and is able to get away with it—our public posture is important here—it gives courage to others who are sitting on the fence in Latin America. Let's not think about what the really democratic countries in Latin America say: the game is in Brazil and Argentina. We could have moves under the surface which bring over time the same thing.⁷

These discussions of the threat to national interest and security led, as during Track II, to discussion of how to bring about Allende's downfall. Examining the options from NSSM 97, Kissinger noted that the four options listed "basically...amounts to two choices: (1) seek a *modus vivendi* with the Allende Government, or (2) adopt a posture of overt and frank hostility."⁸ He said that the first choice offered a chance for Allende to consolidate his position and then operate against U.S. interests directly, while the second choice would strengthen Allende's appeal to anti-U.S. nationalism. Kissinger then went on to offer a third 'in-between' option: "adopt what is in fact a hostile posture but not from an overt stance, that is, to move in hostility from a low-

⁶ Memorandum of Conversation, "NSC Meeting – Chile (NSSM 97)", 6 November 1970. [CIA]

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

5

key posture."⁹ Nixon went on, integrating the themes of threat to American interests and the proper course to pursue.

No impression should be permitted in Latin America that they can get away with this, that it's safe to go this way. All over the world it's too much the fashion to kick us around. We are not sensitive but our reactions must be coldly proper. We cannot fail to show our displeasure. We can't put up with 'Give Americans hell but pray they don't go away'...We must be proper on the surface with Allende, but otherwise we will be tough. He is not going to change; only self-interest will affect him.¹⁰

At the same time, an openly hostile position was seen as being counter-productive. As Kissinger told the author, "Once Allende was in office, and once the coup efforts had failed, I thought it was a better strategy to prepare for the next election. Anything else might make it easier for Allende to consolidate himself."¹¹ Nixon's displeasure, tempered by Kissinger's astute 'reality check', produced the guidance for the new US policy that emerged from the 5 November cabinet meeting. On 9 November, 1970, the instructions of this cabinet discussion were incorporated into National Security Decision Memorandum 93 (NSDM 93) titled "Policy Towards Chile." It ordered that "within the context of a publicly cool and correct posture toward Chile" various courses of action were to be pursued. First was to ensure that the surrounding nations of Latin America were aware of U.S. opposition to a communist state on the continent. Furthermore, the U.S. was to exclude additional financing guarantees to U.S. firms operating in Chile, and to "bring maximum feasible influence to bear in international financial institutions to limit credit ...to Chile."¹² Additionally, NSDM 93 stressed that no new bilateral aid commitments were to be made with Chile, and those that existed should be delayed or reduced. Nothing is mentioned of any covert action plan to overthrow or assassinate Allende, though there

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Kissinger, Interview.

¹² NSDM 93.

6

is direction for the various agencies to "consider specific policy issues within the framework of this general posture."¹³

The choice of these options was predicated on the belief, as the paper stated, "that while the Allende government will vigorously pursue its Marxist goals, the economic and political difficulties facing it will place significant obstacles in its path...and overt hostile actions initiated by the United States would work to [Allende's] political advantage."¹⁴ Furthermore, as the State Department urged, there needed to be "a realistic assessment of U.S. capability to influence the situation there...US overt and covert capabilities to force the course of events positively in our favour, short of the use of armed force, are marginal at best...and could be seriously counter-productive."¹⁵ Ambassador John Crimmins gave a more direct definition of the State Department's view of Allende's likelihood of success, and the best posture for the US to take:

> We said, in effect, this is not going to be nice for us but it is not the end of the world. We should not take heroic measures in response to an Allende victory, because that will only reinforce him. We would not do him any favours, we would certainly not approve new OPIC guarantees, or EXIM bank lending, nor would we do anything but oppose IDB and World Bank lending to him. We always thought we would make it to the next election. We thought that in NSSM-97 and throughout, that Allende would fall flat on his face one way or the other, that he could not rule, the economy would run out of control. If he were able to stay until the end of his term, Frei—who we looked to again—would come in as his successor.¹⁶

This was not an overly aggressive, thoughtless posture, but rather one designed to maximize American input on the fate of their economic assets and political position in the region.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Memorandum, "Options Paper on Chile (NSSM 97)", 03 November 1970. [NSC]

¹⁵ Memorandum, Hurtwitch to Secretary of State, "NSC Meeting on Chile", 5 November 1970. [NSC]

¹⁶ Interview, Ambassador J.H. Crimmins.

7

An accurate summation of what the Americans believed they could achieve in Chile is made in a subsequent NSC options paper later in the same month. "Although events in Chile will be determined principally by internal Chilean forces and therefore US influence can have only a marginal effect, the skilful exercise of our influence could be an important factor in complicating Allende's task."¹⁷ Furthermore, many in the U.S. government did not view the President's choice of option 'C,' and the CIA's subsequent action plan, to be final. "The program appears in general to be well-conceived," noted Charles Meyer, "but raises certain questions that should be kept under continuing review. The effect of inter-action between the various elements of the proposed program is particularly important."¹⁸ Unlike the period of Track II, the tone was set for meaningful inter-agency cooperation on Chile.

## Civil Unrest, Part I

The planning and execution of U.S. government operations in Chile happened within the deteriorating social and economic conditions of Chile under the Allende government, whose reign can only be described as ineffective. As predicted by many in the U.S. and in Chile, the various Marxist parties that made up the UP engaged in endless internecine struggles, which rendered the management of government unsuccessful due to inattention and disagreement. Various political components of the UP—most notably *MIR*—began illegal land seizures against the wishes of the UP government. Indeed, as Paul Sigmund has explained, while most of the extreme right had either fled or been imprisoned after the Schneider assassination, 'dissident sectors

¹⁷ Memorandum, "Options Paper for NSC: Chile", 31 November 1970. [NSC]

¹⁸ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Ambassador Johnson, "Covert Action Program for Chile", 18 November 1970. [State]

(c)

of the extreme left continued to insist that only violence could overthrow bourgeois
institutions.’¹⁹ One such party, the Organised Vanguard of the People (VOP)
assassinated Edmundo Perez Zujovic, President Frei’s former Interior Minister, in
June of 1971. Such actions by dissident leftist groups contributed to a growing sense
of physical insecurity in the country. In terms of economic security, after an initial
‘honeymoon’ period with Allende, when large amounts of foreign reserve were spent
boosting wages of public employees (of whom there were more and more due to a
rapid nationalisation process) the population began to grow dissatisfied with the UP’s
management of the economy, and the first major protests began on 1 December 1971
with the 30,000-women ‘March of the Empty Pots.’²⁰ As a direct consequence of the
march, the opposition-controlled congress successfully impeached the first of many
UP ministers, Interior Minister José Tohá. But other factors of luck and policy added
to the troubles. Infighting and incoherency in the UP coalition, rudderless economic
policy, a drop in copper prices and agricultural production, massive inflation, and a
vigorous opposition became an escalating feedback cycle, causing Chile’s social
fabric and its economy to disintegrated almost simultaneously. By 1973, for instance,
inflation was running at 300%, and was projected to hit 400%.²¹ Even the early, less
severe symptoms of economic collapse clearly affected the Chilean population, and
especially the middle class. In mid-1972 there began in Chile a series of violent and
protracted strikes that slowly destabilized the UP government. The first of these
began on 21 August, led by the nation’s independent shopkeepers.²² Several weeks of
wildcat strikes and street violence followed, going on until the police closed off
downtown Santiago after a two-day running street fight between the youth arms of the

¹⁹ Paul Sigmund, *The Overthrow of Allende*, p. 149.

²⁰ Ibid, p. 163.

²¹ Pierre Kalfon, p. 198.

²² Faúndez, p. 237.

9

rival political parties *MIR* and *Patria y Libertad*, and even between UP coalition partners. While this violence was ended by efficient *Carabinero* action, they were unable to control subsequent events.²³ Sparked by a government initiative to nationalize transport in the Southern Provinces, the nation's truckers (mostly small owners of two or three trucks) went on strike beginning 9 October 1972. A wide range of professional and small labour unions soon joined the truckers. The strike went on for three weeks, ending on 5 November, and was estimated to have cost Chile as much as $200 million in lost production. More importantly, it forced Allende's cabinet to resign and brought military officers into the cabinet on 2 November 1972. These strikes, however, were taken only as a last resort by a Chilean population that was generally quite tolerant of its politicians, for as one Chilean commentator has commented "after only twelve months in office and despite its electoral success, the UP was weak and divided...the government had virtually lost its capacity for taking decisions."²⁴ As covert action works best when it is reinforcing existing trends, the US government's operations in Chile found warm seas in which to swim.

## A New Mandate

Before dealing with the development of the CIA's operations plans in Chile, it is helpful to first analyse the State Department's role as outlined in NSDM 93, namely that of financial action against Allende's government. With NSDM 93, the U.S. government had decided to throw its economic weight against Allende. There has been much made of this fact and the U.S. has been fiercely attacked for this economic

²³ Cable, US Embassy Santiago to Secretary of State, "Finale if Aug 21 Violence", 22 August 1973.
[State]

²⁴ Faúndez, p. 222.

10

its part, alleges that the collapse of the Chilean economy was caused entirely by U.S.
government.²⁹ This is a dramatic overstatement.

The basic question is this: what had a greater effect, U.S. government policy
or Chile's credit rating? Many of the major banks continued their credits to Chile until
that country declared a unilateral moratorium on debt payments at the end of 1971.³⁰
Furthermore, many banks cut off service to Chile after that state nationalized their
Chilean branches without compensation. To make matters worse for Chile, the price
of copper dropped by 23% in 1971 affecting the ability to import goods, while at the
same time domestic food production dropped necessitating increased imports of
foodstuffs.³¹ When American credit dried up Allende's Chile actually received more
credits from Latin America, Australia, Canada, Japan, Europe and the Eastern block.
Indeed, by 1973 Chile had more available credits, with $574 million, then when
Allende came to power ($310 million).³² The UP was discouraged to find, though,
that much of this credit was tied to purchases in the creditor countries, and
unfortunately there was no economically viable substitute for U.S. machinery,
replacement parts and technology. Much of the credits from the Eastern Block
subsequently went unused.³³ Furthermore, many of the European creditors, like the
U.S., withdrew their credits once the UP government set out to nationalize their
Chilean business ventures.³⁴ Ambassador John Crimmins spoke of the prevailing
State Department view of the evolving relationship with Allende's Chile on economic
matters:

> By the time I left in 1973 we had come to the point where we were
talking to the Chilean government about getting some of the specific

²⁹ *Covert Action in Chile*, p. 29.

³⁰ *Helwege*, p. 220.

³¹ *Goldberg*, p. 109.

³² *Nogee and Sloan*, p. 349.

³³ *The United States and Chile* (Testimony of Crimmins), p. 69.

³⁴ *Davis*, pp. 125-127.

12

bilateral agreements like compensation for expropriation out of the way. We did not vote them any more new credits—we kept humanitarian stuff, as I remember—but no one had any problem opposing new IDB or World Bank lending, that kind of thing.³⁵

Simply, there is nothing in the U.S. economic behaviour affecting Chile that was not covered by American law. The U.S. 'Hickenlooper Amendment' stipulates that any state that nationalizes American property without a fair process of compensation is no longer eligible for US government aid. Even under the presidency of Juan Velasco Alvarado of Peru the amendment was invoked on the nationalisation of the International Petroleum Company, though the State Department softened the blow in favour of this pro-American 'reformist' government.³⁶ Chile, on the other hand, not only expropriated American assets without compensation but also based their entire campaign on the deconstruction of foreign investment in Chile. Allende himself wrote: "The central objective of the UP is to replace the present economic structure and to end the power of monopoly capitalism...in order to begin the construction of socialism."³⁷ Yet the US even then *did not* invoke Hickenlooper, viewing it as too aggressive for their 'cool and correct' approach. As taxing as the Chilean debt payment schedule was, the decision to stop repayments could only have served to assure the reduction of Chile's private-sector credit rating. As one set of authors has stated: "Surely, the UP, given its ideology, could not have been surprised that the Nixon administration was determined to use its economic strength to cut off bilateral and multilateral aid."³⁸ One is presented with a question that cuts to the core of the modern world economic system: Can the U.S. be criticised for not continuing loans to a nation that not only defaulted on existing loans, but also actively and publicly opposed American involvement in their economy? Ultimately, it may not

³⁵ Interview, Ambassador J. H. Crimmins.

³⁶ Lineberry, p. 193.

³⁷ Allende, p. 37.

³⁸ Nogee and Sloan, p. 348.

13

have mattered. One particularly detailed account of Allende's economic policies, by economist Ann Helwege, came to the following conclusion:

> ...the economic roots of Allende's problems also lay in the impossibility of a general increase in consumption without sustained copper earnings and commercial lending. Given the inherent instability of Allende's economic agenda, [American] sanctions added an important destabilizing element. Intervention through CIA covert operations, which hurt US relations elsewhere in Latin America, was probably unnecessary to secure Allende's demise.³⁹

Though the final sentence overestimates the U.S. complicity in the coup, the point is an important one in light of the popular perception of American efforts. Indeed, Helwege even overstates the level of American sanctions, for the U.S. continued, through 1970-1973, to disburse bilateral loans already agreed upon, and U.S. private banks even continued to extend some credit to Chile.⁴⁰ Likewise, the U.S. never imposed an embargo of spare parts or equipment to Chile, and never prevented the shipping companies from carrying them. The Hickenlooper amendment, the only provision that might realistically be viewed as an 'embargo' or 'blockade' was never implemented.⁴¹ The simple fact is that under the Allende government the economic situation deteriorated so dramatically that no Chilean company (of which there were fewer and fewer as Allende nationalized) could afford further loans to finance imports. As Mark Falcoff stated, the Chilean economy was so linked to that of the U.S. that the withdrawal of support on any level was bound to have a significant impact. Having failed to prevent the triumph of Marxism in Chile at the cost of billions in aid and lost U.S. investments, there is little reason to justify why the U.S. "should have ratified its error by throwing good money after bad."⁴²

³⁹ Helwege, p. 222

⁴⁰ Vicuña, ed., *The Balanced View*, pp 142-145. This is a table of IMF, IDB, and IBRD loans and decisions concerning Chile from 1971 through to 1974.

⁴¹ Falcoff, *Modern Chile*, p. 229.

⁴² Ibid, p. 240.

14

Military Assistance

Given this information on U.S. government and private lending, some
commentators have pointed out continued U.S. military aid to the Chilean military
throughout Allende's presidency as a violation by the U.S. of their own policies.⁴³
Likewise, it is possible to assert that the continuation of the Military Assistance
Program (MAP) and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) was a policy meant to promote
military intervention by the Chilean Armed Forces.⁴⁴ A review of the cable and
memorandum traffic about MAP casts some doubt on these assertions.

MAP was one of the first topics broached by the Nixon administration subsequent to Allende's victory at the polls. In the initial frenzy after Allende's plurality, it was tentatively decided to cancel MAP to Chile in order to prompt the Chilean Army to act against Allende.⁴⁵ For the very reason of the transparency of this move, it was decided that "such action by the U.S....would probably become known publicly and interpreted by many both in and out of Chile as overt U.S. pressure upon the Chilean military to take the political situation into their own hands,"⁴⁶ and the decision was consequently reversed. But the public image was only part of the problem. Politically, the U.S. was dealing with a Marxist government, but the military, the branch of the Chilean government that could pose a threat to American national security, was still anti-communist and Western-oriented.⁴⁷ Accordingly: "the elimination of grant military aid, the low limits of MAP sales and the slashing of

⁴³ Paul E. Sigmund, "The 'Invisible Blockade' and the Overthrow of Allende" in Vicuña, ed. *The Balanced View*, p. 118. This summarises the criticism of U.S. military aid to Chile.

⁴⁴ *Covert Action in Chile*, pp. 41-42.

⁴⁵ Cable, Kissinger and Johnson to Ambassador Korry, "Highest Levels Here", 07 October 1970.
[State]

⁴⁶ Memorandum, Johnson and Meyer to Korry, 23 September 1970. [State]

⁴⁷ The Air force, notably, was the only service with a notable American influence. The Chilean Navy was a proudly 'British' service and the Army had a Prussian influence dating back to the mid-19th century.

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training funds...could only lead to the elimination of meaningful U.S. influence on the military."⁴⁸ The NSC's Viron Vaky wrote to Kissinger and asked him to continue MAP, for "if we continue to suspend military aid it will appear we are punishing the military which is the last group in Chile we ought to punish."⁴⁹ At the urging of the relatively dovish Ambassador Korry, it was decided to maintain MAP and associated military aid regardless of Allende's inauguration. After the Schneider assassination, however, the Ambassador was ordered to hold off telling the Chilean army about the restoration of MAP, as "it could be construed as [a] bonus for a job well done."⁵⁰ The U.S. remained very aware of the 'optics' of arms sales to a country where American interests were so publicly challenged.

The change in U.S. posture after the inauguration inevitably affected MAP and FMS. On 6 November, during the NSDM 93 planning process, the Santiago station urged CIA HQ to support continued MAP sales and training. The cable stated:

> Now more than ever, [the] Chilean army needs [the] friendly open hand of U.S.. The Army has U.S. equipment and doctrine. Supply system U.S. oriented. [the Chilean] Army now feels it is alone without friends except for U.S....If U.S. turns its back, Chilean Army will be 'forced' to look elsewhere which it does not want to do.⁵¹

The U.S. government seems to have followed this advice. Adhering to NSDM-93, the U.S. would continue to maintain the pre-election status of the US Military Group (milgroup) of advisors in Chile, would continue MAP, and would not raise the topic of military support with the Allende government unless they did. Furthermore, it was decided that the sale of tanks, air transports and fighter jets to Chile would be

⁴⁸ Cable, Korry to Under Secretary Johnson, 16 September 1970. [State]

⁴⁹ Memorandum, Vaky to Kissinger, "Chile", 18 October 1970. [NSC]

⁵⁰ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "Strongly Urge that U.S.G", 22 October 1970. [CIA]

⁵¹ Cable, Santiago Station to CIA HQ, "There is more confidence", 06 November 1970. [CIA]

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delayed as long as possible but that no announcement would be made that these items
would be embargoed.⁵² This was a cautious first step in continued military support.

Over the course of the subsequent three years, the U.S. extended over $30
million in credits for the purchase of military equipment, including $5 million in
1971, $10 million in 1972 and $12.4 million in 1973.⁵³ These credits were furnished
after "agreement in principle with the GOC on the terms of the rescheduling of the
amounts due..." and were integrated into the U.S. debt negotiations with Chile.⁵⁴ An
extensive 'action memorandum' of February 1973 goes to some length to justify these
FMS credits to Chile:

> The current Chilean Commanders-in-Chief and their staffs have so far successfully maintained the Chilean military's crucial non-partisan stance and its resistance to the governing leftist coalition's efforts to shift their source of military supplies and doctrinal orientation away from the U.S. The Chilean military leaders have resisted offers of Soviet military credits—reportedly up to $300 million...—and other forms of assistance including training....⁵⁵

> The planned visit of a US aircraft carrier and its supporting naval group in September of 1973 is viewed by many as sure proof that the US had, at the very least, contingency plans to support the Pinochet coup with direct, armed force. While it did have some connection with American desires to bolster the opposition to Allende, it had nothing to do with coup plotting and in any case was never actually deployed to Valparaiso. Ambassador Crimmins described how his office at the State Department—normally cautious about such things—actually endorsed the naval visit, to the shock of the NSC:

⁵² Cable, Secretary of State to US Embassy Santiago, "MilGroup and Military Equipment for Chile", 03 December 1970. [State]

⁵³ Memorandum, "Our Public Response to Congressional Inquiries" [unclassified], 22 Feb 1973. [CDP] The Church Committee report provides slightly different figures: $5.7 million for 1971; $12.3 million for 1972; and, $15 million for 1973. See *Covert Action in Chile*, p. 39.

⁵⁴ Memorandum, "Our Public Response to Congressional Inquiries" [unclassified], 22 Feb 1973. [State]

⁵⁵ Memorandum, Charles Meyer to Curtis Tarr, "FMS Credits for Chile", 22 February 1973. [State]

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The Navy was keen to have an aircraft carrier visit [in 1973] and this
was intended to maintain "military to military ties" as they said. As I
remember, the embassy thought it would be all right for that purpose,
and I thought it was alright, but Al Haig went ape, called me and was
very upset that we were even contemplating this. I thought that [the
carrier visit] would be a reassurance to the opposition of a US
presence, but Al Haig thought it would be a terrible mistake.⁵⁶

When reviewing the course of MAP in Chile, one sees not an attempt by the
US to use MAP as a tool to provoke a coup, but rather as a delicate programme which
might keep the Chilean military from becoming a Soviet client. For the latter to
happen would mean an intolerable Soviet encroachment into the American sphere and
so pose a direct threat to American national security in the hemisphere. The
programme, from the American perspective, was a passive attempt to prevent the
disarming or politicisation of the army by the UP. While the MAP programme was
ongoing, the CIA was simultaneously engaging in the active part of the programme,
political action directly against the UP.

## Political Action

With a new mandate from NSDM 93, the CIA set about, in early November of
1970, to produce a covert action plan for implementation in Chile. By 17 November,
the CIA had submitted for approval its 'covert action program for Chile' As described
by Jack Devine and the text of documents, there were two distinct operations involved
in the post-election period: a covert action programme designed to bolster the political
and media opposition to Allende, and a parallel intelligence gathering operation aimed
at the group most likely to stage a coup, the Chilean military. Though discreet from
one another in operational terms, they were of course pursued by the same CIA agents
in the Santiago embassy. It has been argued by contemporary historians that the

⁵⁶ Interview, Ambassador J. H. Crimmins.

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