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In "Kissinger and Nixon," a manipulative national security adviser (me) cons a ranting, anti-Semitic Nixon into opening peace talks. Nixon, undercutting his adviser behind his back, participates in a double-cross of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and towards eventual disaster.

The film should be understood for what it is: a fable reflecting the prejudices of writers and producers whose priorities are clearly not historical veracity.

Having been given the script by Ron Silver, I expended much effort to make accurate... *reliable public information*... *and reliable public sources* available to the producers. I sent them a 90-page analysis of the script, together with a 200-page appendix documenting factual errors. I offered additional documents as well as a proposal to join the producers in a Freedom of Information suit to settle the factual disputes. All these offers were rejected.

Not surprisingly, "Kissinger and Nixon" stands history on its head. Its essential falsehoods reside in details--of which I shall give a few examples--than in a melange of untruthfulness, innuendo, and direct misrepresentation, that leaves impressions contrary to the truth. The truth is that, in seeking an end to a war he had inherited, Nixon put forward three fundamental conditions: preservation of the Saigon government, a return of all

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prisoners, and an end to infiltration into South Vietnam. No doubt a Hollywood scriptwriter

can, twenty years after the event, invent better terms. But, at the time, our proposals were

widely attacked as far too tough. Scores of congressional resolutions, editorials, and a

candidate for president demanded either unconditional withdrawal or withdrawal simply in

return for prisoners. There was no contemporary criticism that we had gone too far.

The film brazenly reverses this reality. Its central thesis--that the Nixon

Administration altered its position as elections approached in the summer of 1972--is belied by
the public record demonstrating that the United States never deviated from

the position it put forward in May 1971 and made public on January 25, 1972. Despite the
film's many inconsistencies to the contrary, all these proposals had been approved by President

Thieu, as Nixon announced publicly on January 25 without contradiction from Saigon.

I am represented as wheedling a new proposal out of Nixon for the October 8
breakthrough. That meeting was indeed climactic but for exactly the opposite reason.

The United States made no proposals--new or otherwise; Hanoi accepted the terms we had
put forward 15 months earlier. The record shows that Hanoi, if not Hollywood, understood

what was happening for Le Duc Tho introduced his proposal by saying: "...It is the same
proposal made by President Nixon himself."

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3

The scene in which I urge Nixon to pay "secret reparations" to Hanoi is equally
contrary to the available public record. An economic recovery program for all of Indochina
had been put forward in April 1965 by President Johnson. Nixon publicly repeated that offer
on four separate occasions between 1969 and 1972, and the published Paris agreement had a
( Provision to that effect. The only thing briefly secret was a letter which repeated an amount
already proposed publicly and explained to Hanoi the procedures by which the program would
be implemented including, specifically, approval by Congress. )

The scenes showing Nixon systematically undercutting negotiations he had sustained
for four years insult the memory of the late president. His chief of staff, H. K. Haldeman, is
shown as participating in this, yet his meticulous diaries make no mention of it. Of the same
a
clash is one fanciful scene in which Nixon learns that I have secretly set up a negotiation with
Hanoi without telling him. The producers knew better, having been given the dates of all
communications setting up negotiations, in which Nixon was demonstrably involved. Not
surprisingly, there is no such allegation in the Haldeman diaries.
reference made to any of this in the di

The scene showing my character ranting because the fact that we are negotiating is
reported on television is grotesque since, in the summer of 1972, each negotiating session was
publicly announced the day after it took place.
and was met with my staff

The scenes in which General Haig is presented with a fourth star by Nixon as a reward

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on condition that he stay on my staff for spying on me and remained on my staff for that purpose gratuitously denigrate a distinguished American. Haig received his fourth star after being made Army Vice Chief of Staff and after leaving his post as my deputy four months after the events described in the film. He was never slated until after the end of his first term.

We who inherited the task of ending a war that had lasted nearly ten years and torn apart America had to reconcile North and South Vietnamese goals and American necessities. It was bound to be painful and messy. Serious people were divided on whether America's honor required a conditional or unconditional withdrawal. The wounds caused by this division will never heal if a television company, to serve its own commercial interests, misrepresents it as depicting those who sought to navigate our society through this searing experience as having served not their country but themselves.

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854 words

9:30AM 11/23/95

It takes no little nerve to use a doctored record to accuse leaders, who for four years refused to overthrow an ally, of selling out in the face of widespread harassment and vilification. The truth is that, in seeking an end to a war he had inherited, Nixon put forward three fundamental conditions: preservation of the Saigon government, a return of all prisoners, and an end to infiltration into South Vietnam. No doubt a Hollywood scriptwriter can, twenty years after the event, invent better terms. But only in ignorance of the period in which our program was widely attacked as far too tough. Scores of congressional resolutions, editorials, and a candidate for president demanded either unconditional withdrawal or withdrawal simply in return for prisoners.

The producers proceeded with the central fabrication in the face of hundreds of pages of documents proving the opposite of their thesis and despite an offer by me to join a Freedom of Information suit to settle disputed facts.

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23-NOV. 90(1NOV) 14-09

GOLDENHAMMER

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TEL: 01/1-493-0834

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P. VVJ

90-page analysis of the script together with a 200-page
appendix documenting the factual errors and referring to
them in reliable sources. I offered additional documents
as well as a proposal to join the producers in a Freedom
of Information suit to settle the factual disputes, but

these offers were rejected.

Not surprisingly

litany on its lead.

As "Kissinger and Nixon" stands, however, its
essential falsehoods reside less in the details - which

shall be a few examples, but more generally
would be easy to multiply - than in a standard of.

untruthfulness, innuendo and direct misrepresentation
that permeates the entire film and leaves the viewer with
contrary impressions which, whatever their purpose or meaning, do
not represent the truth.

It is this, above all, which I ask viewers to keep
in the forefront of their minds. That the producers have
opted to make this film in the style of dime-store
Romances aiming for cheap entertainment rather than the
sweep and grandeur of a major motion picture capturing

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contrary to the public record made available to the producers. An economic recovery program for all of Indochina had been put forward in April 1965 by President Johnson. Nixon publicly repeated that offer on four separate occasions between 1969 and 1972, ~~I myself had~~ done so twice, and the published Paris agreement had a provision to that effect. The only thing briefly secret was a letter which repeated an amount already proposed publicly and put forward by the producers while the program was still in its infancy. Hanoi on notice that the whole program had to be approved by Congress—specifically by Congress. The scenes showing Nixon systematically undercutting negotiations he had approved—and sustained for four years insult the memory of the late president, Haldeman is shown as participating in this, yet his (meticulous) diaries make no mention of it. Such a plot was contrary to several of Nixon's letters made available to the producers, in one of which he wrote Thieu in October of 1972: "I am personally convinced it is the best we will be able to get." Of the same cloth is one fanciful scene in which Nixon learns that I have secretly set up a negotiation with Hanoi without telling him. The producers knew better, having been given the dates of all communications setting up negotiations, in which Nixon was demonstrably involved. Not surprisingly, there is no such allegation in the Haldeman diaries.

The fact of the matter, the scene showing my character raming because a television report mentions the allusion in the television broadcast is grotesque since, in the summer of 1972, each negotiating session was publicly announced the day after it took place.

NOV-23-1995 09:21 FROM

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10:00PM 11/22/95

In "Kissinger and Nixon," a manipulative national security adviser (me) cons a ranting, anti-Semitic Nixon into opening peace talks. Nixon, undercutting his adviser behind his back, goes along on a double-cross of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and towards eventual disaster. It takes no little nerve to accuse leaders who for four years refused to overthrow an ally, of selling out on the basis of a doctored record in the face of widespread harassment and vilification.

In seeking an end to a war he had inherited, Nixon put forward three fundamental conditions: preservation of the Saigon government, a return of all prisoners, and an end to infiltration into South Vietnam. When Hanoi balked, our domestic critics, insisting we were asking for too much, demanded either an unconditional withdrawal or a withdrawal simply in return for prisoners. I challenge the producers to furnish one serious contemporary document accusing us of asking for too little

"Kissinger and Nixon" simply stands history on its head, even after the producers were furnished hundreds of pages of documentation proving the opposite. They chose to ignore this material and rejected additional documentation as well as my offer to join a Freedom of

A central falsification runs throughout the movie. The final negotiation is presented as a clever ploy by Hanoi which the US fell for out of vanity. In fact, it represented the

NOV-23-1995 09:16 FROM

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acceptance of the American program put forward in the summer of 1971, publicly announced
by Nixon on January 25, 1972, and repeatedly rejected by Hanoi. All the scenes asserting the
contrary are deliberate falsifications: the Politburo meeting at the beginning, my discussions
with Nixon, trying to sell him on Hanoi's offer, the discussions with Le Duc Tho and Thieu's
alleged surprise at the conditions, when the documentary record shows he had approved all
US proposals.

My character in the movie wheedles a new proposal out of Nixon for the climactic
meeting of October 8. In fact, no American proposal--new or otherwise--was made. It was
Hanoi that accepted what we had been proposing for two years: Thieu would stay in office,
prisoners would be released, and infiltration would cease. The producers needed no analytical
skill to figure this out since I sent them Le Duc Tho's opening statement which said, inter alia:
"...it is the same proposal made by President Nixon himself"

The scene in which I urge Nixon to pay reparations" ~~separately~~ to Hanoi is equally
contrary to the public record made available to the producers. An economic recovery
program for all of Indochina had been put forward in April 1965 by President Johnson. Nixon

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offer on four occasions between 1969 and 1972 publicly repeated that offer on September 19, 1969, and on January 25, February 9, and May 10, 1972, and I had done so on October 26, 1972 and January 24, 1973. The only thing briefly akermin is that offer secret was a letter which repeated an amount already proposed publicly and put Hanoi on notice that the whole program had to be approved by Congress.

The depiction of my relationship with Nixon's outrageous lie in one fanciful scene, in which Nixon learns that I have secretly set up a negotiation with Hanoi without telling him that I was the producer knew it was, having been given the dates of all this is nonsense, communications setting up negotiations, in all of which Nixon was demonstrably involved. Not surprisingly, there is no hint of any of this in the Haldeman diaries.

The scenes showing Nixon systematically undercutting negotiations he had approved, is known as participating in the lie, insult the memory of the late president. Haldeman's diaries care no mention of this, though the movie shows him as part of the alleged plot. And it was contrary to several of Nixon's letters made available to the producers, in one of which he wrote Thieu in October of 1972, "I am personally convinced it is the best we will be able to get."

The scene showing Nixon leaking the negotiations in order to embarrass me is meant to impair talking, a grotesque since, in the summer of 1972, each negotiating session was publicly announced the day after it took place.

The scenes in which General Hang is presented with a fourth star as a reward for

NOV-23-1995 09:23

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spying on me and retained on my staff for that purpose are an insult to a distinguished American. Haig received his fourth star after being made Army Vice Chief of Staff and after leaving his post as my deputy four months after the events stipulated in the film. It was the last time the two stars in my uniform were used to reconcile North and South. The end of a war lasting nearly ten years was seeking to reconcile North and South

21

Vietnamese goals and American objectives under near-civil war conditions was bound to be painful and messy. But a television company performs no service if it falsifies the record and savages those who, in a difficult situation, tried to serve their country, by:nano:ating

these difficult panagons

P. Finally the line reached to one "you
can't give up if there is none to surrender
to." Lots of leaders a million for a while
and publicity seeking

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862 words

5PM 11/22/95

The story of "Kissinger and Nixon" is an simple as it is. In fact, a manipulative National Security Advisor (me) cons a ranting anti-Semitic Nixon into opening peace talks. Nixon, undercutting his advisor behind his back, goes along in a double cross of the South Vietnamese President Thieu and towards eventual disaster. It takes no little nerve to accuse the leaders, who for four years refused to overthrow an ally, of selling out to a foreign power.

In seeking an end to a war Nixon had inherited, Nixon has put forward three fundamental conditions: preservation of the Saigon government, a return of all prisoners and an end to infiltration into South Vietnam. When those terms had been rejected by Hanoi for three years, our criticszes, noting that we were asking for too much, rejected those conditions and demanded either an unconditional withdrawal or a withdrawal simply in return for prisoners. We were vilified for asking for too much. I challenge the producers to furnish one serious document accusing us of asking for too little.

"Kissinger and Nixon" simply stands history on its head, and after having been furnished hundreds of pages of documentation proving the opposite. The ignored this material and rejected additional material, as well as an

NOV-22-1995 19:10 FROM

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offer by me to join a Freedom of Information suit to settle
factual disputes.

No wonder that the account is so misleading that the
space available does not permit discussing all
falsifications.

The central one runs throughout the movie. The
abandonment of the American demand for mutual withdrawal and
its replacement by a ban on infiltration runs through the
script as an event of the summer of 1972. In fact, it represents
the acceptance of the American program founded in
occurred in the summer of 1971, was publicly announced by
Nixon on January 25, 1972, and had been consistently rejected
by Hanoi. Thus all the scenes that assert the contrary are
deliberate falsifications. The Politburo meeting at the
beginning; my discussions with Nixon, the discussions with
Le Duc Tho and Thieu's alleged surprise at the
documentary record shows he had approved all these proposals,
and of course Nixon's public speech.

Thus the rendition of the meeting of October 8, 1972 is
sheer fantasy, all the more unforgivable because a record of
it was obtainable. The movie has me wheedling a new
proposal out of Nixon. In fact, no American proposal - new
or otherwise - was made. It was Hanoi which signed a
proposal which accepted our previous plan: Thieu would stay
in office, prisoners would be released and infiltration
would cease. The producers needed no analytical skill to

2

NOV-22-1995

19:11

FROM

TO

16108674722

figure this out since I sent them Le Duc Tho's opening
statement which said, inter alia "...it is the same proposal
made by President Nixon himself..."

The scene in which I urge Nixon to pay "reparations"
secretly to Hanoi is contrary to a public record made
available to the producers. An economic recovery program
for all of Indochina had been put forward in April 1965 by
President Johnson. Nixon publicly repeated that offer on
September 19, 1969 and January 25, February 9 and May 8,
1972, and I had done so on October 26, 1972 and January 24,
1973. The only thing briefly secret was a letter that
repeated an amount already put forward publicly and putting
Hanoi on notice that the whole program had to be approved by
Congress.

The depiction of my relationship with Nixon is absurd.
In one fanciful scene, Nixon finds out that I have secretly
set up a negotiation with Hanoi without telling him.
Nonsense, and the producers knew it was nonsense, having
been given the dates of all communications which set up
negotiations, in all of which Nixon was demonstrably
involved. Not surprisingly there is no hint of any of this
in the Haldeman diaries.

The scenes showing Nixon systematically undercutting
negotiations he had approved insult the memory of the dead
President. Haldeman's diaries reflect no hint of this,

3

NOV-22-1995 | 19:16 FROM

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though the movie shows him as part of the alleged plot to thwart the negotiations. And it was counter to several letters by Nixon available to the producers, in one of which he wrote Thieu in October of 1972: "I am personally convinced it is the best we will be able to get."

Nixon's actions during the negotiations in order to balance his position in the negotiations are mentioned on television.

grotesque, since in the summer of 1972 each negotiating session was publicly announced the day after it took place.

The scenes in which General Haig is rewarded, a fourth star as a reward for spying on me and kept on my staff for that purpose are an insult to a distinguished American. Haig received his fourth star after being made Army Vice Chief of Staff, leaving his post as my deputy.

Space does not permit a multiplication of examples. The issue is not in any event in the detail but in the reversal of the historical truth. The end of a war lasting nearly ten years and seeking to reconcile North and South Vietnamese goals and American objectives in near-civil war conditions was bound to be painful and messy. But a television company performs no service if it assaults the public'es and intelligence services of a nation by presenting lies andBS that are clearly false. It also gives the impression that the American people are not responsible for their actions.

4

TOTAL P.04

TOTAL P.01

10:00PM 11/22/95

In "Kissinger and Nixon," a manipulative national security adviser (me) cons a ranting, anti-Semitic Nixon into opening peace talks. Nixon, undercutting his adviser behind his back, goes along in a double-cross of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu and towards eventual disaster. It takes no little nerve to accuse leaders who for four years refused to overthrow an ally, of selling out on the basis of a doctored record in the face of widespread harassment and vilification. The truth is clear

in seeking an end to a war he had inherited, Nixon put forward three fundamental conditions: preservation of the Saigon government, a return of all prisoners, and an end to infiltration into South Vietnam. When Hanoi balked, our domestic critics, insisting we were asking for too much, demanded either an unconditional withdrawal or a withdrawal simply in return for prisoners. I challenge the producers to furnish one serious contemporary document accusing us of asking for too little.

U

2

My character in the movie wheedles a new proposal out of Nixon for the climactic
meeting of October 8. In fact, no American proposal--new or otherwise--was made. It was
Hanoi that accepted what we had been proposing for two years: Thieu would stay in office,
prisoners would be released, and infiltration would cease. The producers needed no analytical
skill to figure this out since I sent them Le Duc Tho's opening statement which said, inter alia:
"...it is the same proposal made by President Nixon himself."

The scene in which I urge Nixon to pay reparations" secretly to Hanoi is equally
contrary to the public record made available to the producers. An economic recovery
program for all of Indochina had been put forward in April 1965 by President Johnson. Nixon

862 words

5PM 11/22/95

The story of "Kissinger and Nixon" is as simple as it is untrue: a manipulative National Security Advisor (me) cons a ranting anti-Semitic Nixon into opening peace talks. Nixon, undercutting his advisor behind his back, goes along in a double cross of the South Vietnamese President Thieu and towards eventual disaster. It takes no little nerve to accuse the leaders, who for four years refused to overthrow an ally, of selling out.

In seeking an end to a war Nixon had inherited, Nixon had put forward three fundamental conditions: preservation of the Saigon government, a return of all prisoners and an end to infiltration into South Vietnam. These terms had been rejected by Hanoi for three years. Our critics rejected these conditions and demanded either an unconditional withdrawal or a withdrawal simply in return for prisoners. We were vilified for asking for too much. I challenge the producers to furnish one serious document accusing us of asking for too little.

ssm-I
think we
forgot a word
here.

The central one runs throughout the movie. The
abandonment of the American demand for mutual withdrawal and
its replacement by a ban on infiltration runs through the
script as an event of the summer of 1972. In fact, it
occurred in the summer of 1971, was publicly announced by
Nixon on January 25, 1982 and had been consistently rejected
by Hanoi. Thus all the scenes that assert the contrary are
deliberate falsifications. The Politburo meeting at the
beginning; my discussions with Nixon; the discussions with
Le Duc Tho and Thieu's alleged surprise <u>about</u> the
documentary record shows he had approved all these proposals
and of course Nixon's public speech.

Thus the rendition of the meeting of October 8, 1972 is
sheer fantasy, all the more unforgivable because a record of
it was obtainable. The movie has me wheedling a new
proposal out of Nixon. In fact, no American proposal - new
or otherwise - was made. It was Hanoi which tabled a
proposal which accepted our previous plan: Thieu would stay
in office, prisoners would be released and infiltration
would cease. The producers needed no analytical skill to

The scene in which I urge Nixon to pay "reparations"
secretly to Vietnam is contrary to a public record made
available to the producers. An economic recovery program
for all of Indochina had been put forward in April 1965 by
President Johnson. Nixon publicly repeated that offer on
September 19, 1969 and January 25, February 9 and May 8,
1972, and I had done so on October 26, 1972 and January 24,
1973. The only thing briefly secret was a letter that
repeated an amount already put forward publicly and putting
Hanoi on notice that the whole program had to be approved by
Congress.

3

though the movie shows him as part of the alleged plot to thwart the negotiations. And it was counter to several letters by Nixon available to the producers, in one of which I wrote Thieu in October of 1972: "I am personally convinced it is the best we will be able to get."

The scenes that have me throwing fits regarding secrecy when the negotiation is mentioned on television are grotesque, since in the summer of 1972 each negotiating session was publicly announced the day after it took place.

The scenes in which General Haig is rewarded a fourth star as a reward for spying on me and kept on my staff for that purpose are an insult to a distinguished American. Haig received his fourth star after being made Army Vice Chief of Staff after leaving his post as my deputy.

Space does not permit a multiplication of examples. The issue is not in any event in the detail but in the reversal of the historical truth. The end of a war lasting nearly ten years and seeking to reconcile North and South Vietnamese goals and American objectives in near-civil war conditions was bound to be painful and messy. But a television company performs no service if it assaults by untruths and innuendoes those who did their best to serve their country.

4

785 words

Noon 11/22/95

The story line of "Kissinger and Nixon" is as simple as
it is untrue: a manipulative National Security Advisor (me)
cons a ranting anti-Semitic Nixon into opening peace talks.
The President, while undercutting his advisor behind his
back, goes along, culminating in a double cross of the South
Vietnamese President Thieu and eventual disaster.

It takes no little nerve to accuse the leaders, who for
four years refused to overthrow an ally, of selling out.
The producers did so, moreover, despite having been sent a
90-page analysis of the script together with a 200-page
appendix documenting factual errors. Additional documents
were offered, together with a proposal to join the producers
in a Freedom of Information suit to settle factual disputes.
These offers were rejected.

The standard of truthfulness is set in the opening
scene. Le Duc Tho, the Vietnamese negotiator, briefs the
Politburo of a clever ploy. Appealing to my vanity, Hanoi
would abandon its previous insistence on the overthrow of
Thieu in return for an American agreement to withdraw its
remaining 27,000 troops while North Vietnamese troops would
remain. There is only one thing wrong with this rendition:
the new aspect of that alleged proposal was that Thieu would
stay; the military provisions had been part of the *American*

program for two years; they had been publicly put forward on
many occasions, the last being by Nixon on January 25 and
May 8, 1972. It did not require appeals to my vanity to
conclude that we would accept our own proposals.

In the next equally fanciful scene, Nixon finds out
that I have secretly set up a negotiation with Hanoi without
telling him. Nonsense, and the producers knew it was
nonsense, having been given the dates of all communications
which set up negotiations, in all of which Nixon was
demonstrably involved. Not surprisingly there is no hint of
any of this in the Haldeman diaries.

The scenes that have me insisting on absolute secrecy
and throwing fits when the fact of the negotiation is on
television are equally grotesque, since in the summer of
1972 each negotiating session was publicly announced the day
after it took place.

The rendition of the meeting of October 8, 1972 at
which the breakthrough occurred is similar fantasy. The
movie has me wheedling a new proposal out of Nixon. In fact
no American proposal - new or otherwise - was made. Hanoi
tabled a proposal, the key elements of which were that Thieu
would stay in office and acceptance of military provisions
previously and publicly made by the US, including no further
infiltration of North Vietnamese troops, all introduced by
saying: "...it is the same proposal made by President Nixon

himself..." All this was available to the producers either
in my memorandum, in my memoirs or through joining a Freedom
of Information suit.

The scene in which I urge Nixon to pay "reparations"
secretly to Vietnam is contrary to a public record made
available to the producers. An economic recovery program
for all of Indochina had been part of the American position
since being put forward in April 1965 by President Johnson.
Nixon publicly repeated that offer on September 19, 1969 and
January 25, February 9 and May 8, 1972, and I had done so on
October 26, 1972 and January 24, 1973. The only thing
briefly secret was a letter that repeated an amount already
put forward publicly and putting Hanoi on notice that the
whole program had to be approved by Congress.

The depiction of Nixon's conduct is insultingly untrue.
The producers were given communications from him urging me
to proceed. The Haldeman diaries contain no references to
his undercutting what he had approved. His position is best
summed up in a letter to me of January 1990 in response to
an article making a similar allegation. "I felt that you
had more confidence in the negotiating process than I had.
On the other hand, once you negotiated the Agreement I had
to admit that you were right and I was wrong."

But the essential falsehood of the movie resides less
in the details - which would be easy to multiply - than on

3

its standing history on its head. In 1972, America's
divisions had produced growing media and Congressional
pressures to leave Vietnam on terms far less balanced than
what was achieved. (A summary had been sent to the
producers.) I challenge the producers to come up with a
single Congressional and media comment that our published
terms, all of which were achieved, were too soft; all
contemporary comments held the opposite view. In 1972
serious people were divided on what American honor required.
But the film should have the decency not to reverse reality.

4

NOV-22-1995 12:36

KISSINGER ASSOC.

212 759 0042

P.01/04

785 words

Noon 11/22/95

The standard of truthfulness is set in the opening scene. Le Duc Tho, the Vietnamese negotiator, briefs the Politburo of a clever ploy. Appealing to my vanity, Hanoi would abandon its previous insistence on the overthrow of Thieu in return for an American agreement to withdraw its remaining 27,000 troops while North Vietnamese troops would remain. There is only one thing wrong with this rendition: The new aspect of that alleged proposal was that Thieu would stay; the military provisions had been part of the American

NOV-22-1995 12:37

KISSINGER ASSOC.

212 759 0042 P.04/04

TOTAL P.04

23-NOV.'95 (THU) 14:09 GOLDHAMMER

TEL:0171-493-0834

3

the wrenching drama of that tragic period of American history is their own affair. But even a medium-budget made-for-television movie about events so near and dear to all our hearts has a responsibility to the American viewing public. In 1972, serious people were divided on what American honor required and, whatever the definition of entertainment, this film should have had the decency not to reverse reality.

NOV-22-1995 11:35

P.01

899 words

The story line of Kissinger and Nixon is as simple as
it is untrue: a manipulative National Security Advisor (me)
cons a ranting anti-Semitic Nixon into opening peace talks,
with Hanoi three months before the 1972 elections. The
underlying President, while railing against his advisor against his
back, goes along, culminating in a dissolute war of the
South Vietnamese President Thieu and eventual disaster.

There is no little piquancy in having me depicted in a
~~Turner movie of carrying out policies previously identified~~
with Jane Fonda in a complete reversal of the historical
truth. But to reach that conclusion, the movie relies on
devices that ~~are factually false and which the producers~~
knew to be ~~factually false.~~

In May I sent a 90-page analysis to the producers
together with a 200-page appendix of documents concentrating
entirely on factual errors. I offered to supply additional
~~we offered together with a segment~~
documents and to join the producer in a freedom of
Information suit to settle factual disputes. These offers
were rejected.

The standard of truthfulness is set in the opening
scene. Le Duc Tho, the Vietnamese negotiator, briefs the
Politburo (which seems to be made up of 100 people) of a
clever plot. Appealing to my vanity, Hanoi would abandon
its previous insistence on the overthrow of the South.

TOTAL P.01

NOV-22-1995 11:30

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reason the Vietnamese was publicly announced the day after it took place.

The meeting of October 8, 1972 at which the breakthrough occurred is similar fantasy. The movie has me wheedling a new proposal out of Nixon. In fact no American proposal - new or otherwise - was made. Hanoi tabled a proposal, the key element[S] of which was [were] that Thieu would stay in office and acceptance of military provisions ~~publicly made by the US~~ including no further infiltration of North Vietnamese troops, [which] it had rejected for three years, all introduced by saying: "...it is the same proposal made by President Nixon himself..." All this was available to the producers either in my memorandum, in my memoirs or through

The movie has urging Nixon to pay "reparations" secretly to Vietnam, as a means of breaking a negotiating deadlock. The fact is that an economic recovery program for all of Indochina had been part of our position since ~~the American~~ by President Johnson President Johnson put it forward in April 1965. Nixon had publicly repeated that offer on September 19, 1969 and January 25, February 9 and May 8, 1972, and I had done so on October 26, 1972 and January 24, 1973. The only thing briefly secret was a letter that repeated an amount already and may yet be made known to notice put forward publicly but insisting that the whole program

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1211 Sixth Ave.
New York, N.Y. 10036
212-852-7500
FAX: 212-852-7470

20 November 1995

Dr. Henry Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
NYC

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

We're delighted to have you in TV GUIDE again.

Enclosed is the tape of the TV movie "Kissinger and Nixon" which will premier on TNT on December 10. We'd like you to comment on it, in about 400-500 words, and you can angle the story however you'd like. Some possibilities are to directly critique this movie, in terms of accuracy and presentation; or, in light of the fact that the Oliver Stone movie is also coming out soon, you might want to consider why there is such a surge of interest in this period in our history right now. Finally, as the insider to all this, you might choose to tell our readers what it's like to see events of your life reinterpreted for television and the movies, and to hear your own words spoken by a Ron Silver.

If you'd like to talk about this, please call me anytime at my office, 852-7452. Otherwise, we'll need your story by next Monday, November 27, to appear as a "Special Report" in our December 9 issue.

All best,