[Lc]

When in 1948 at the urgent insistence of Winston Churchill over 600 delegates gathered at The Hague to discuss possible ways for the unification of Europe, the venerated British leader in his inaugural address said: "Europe requires all that Frenchmen, all that Germans and all that everyone of us can give." It was a remarkable address, reintroducing the Germans to the European family of nations.¹ At the mention of the Germans there was a long silence broken at last by applause from the French delegation. At that moment, the new Europe was born. For the Germans present, led by Konrad Adenauer, it was the dawn of a new life.

## 1. The Defeat and its Consequences

Churchill's bold phrasing, welcoming the Germans so soon after the horrors of Hitler's disastrous war, was not only courageous but imaginative. The German delegation, mostly recruited from the American and British Occupation Zones, contained a sizeable percentage of those who were to become the leaders in Germany's activities on behalf of and in cooperation with Europe's new forces. At the same time, French intellectuals had quietly begun (in contrast to their government's avowed policy) to build

2

a bridge to their German brethren. Belonging to that
genuine fellowship of European arts and letters, they
had by the founding of such magazines as Merkur and an
imaginative cultural policy in the universities of their
zone laid the foundations for a new approach which became
manifest in the initiatives of men like Robert Schuman
and Jean Monnet and led to the Council of Europe and
the European Coal and Steel Community. It was a different,
and as events were to prove, a promising approach to
resuscitating among Germans those older strands of
European sentiment which are described below. Christian
Democrats, Free Democrats and Social Democrats, they all
acknowledged the victorious ideology of the Western Allies
as their own, and were soon to accept the Allied proposal
for building a provisional constitutional order under
Allied supervision.² It was a stony road that lay ahead,
and the division of their country loomed as an inescapable
consequence of the estrangement between the Western
powers and the Soviet Union. Inescapable because the
alternative of remaining an Allied pawn was hors de
discussion for all practical purposes. It is necessary
to recall these circumstances because the situation of
a divided Germany provides the peculiar dialectic of

[LC]

3

Germany's complex relation to the new Europe. On the one hand, a united Europe suggested a new community transcending the national communities of the past. As such it could provide a focal point for political activity which ultimately might create the stability and strength from which to negotiate a return to German unity (and freedom for the Eastern part of the country!) as part of a larger European community.³ On the other hand, the Soviet Union and its satellites could use the persistent will for the unification of Germany as a lever by which to put the unification of Europe into jeopardy. There have been successive proposals by the U.S.S.R., its German satellite and other Soviet Bloc countries which implied that the abandonment of its Western and more especially its European ties was the precondition for the unification of Germany.⁴ In the face of such proposals and moves, the Federal Republic's commitment to Europe has remained unshaken and its involvement in the Community of the Six has made her one of the main protagonists, if not in fact the main one, for a united Europe with firm supranational institutions. "The stone that was rejected has become the cornerstone."⁵

4

## 2. The Ancient Roots of European Consciousness in Germany

To interpret this remarkable development is the task of the pages that follow. It is not an easy task, for in some respects this development is more truly miraculous than the economic reconstruction which has been paralleled by similar developments in France, Italy, and other European countries (not to speak of Japan). Germany's share in the building of the new Europe has by now become so much part of the accepted order of things that one tends to forget how extraordinary this many-faceted cooperation, when projected against the background of Hitlerism, actually is. Of course, in a sense even Hitler with his oratory about the greater Germany and fortress Europe himself contributed to a European awareness on the part of many provincial Germans, just as Napoleonic had done at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when he disrupted the ancient and tottering structure of the empire as it had lived on since the peace of Westphalia in 1648. Indeed, it is important to recall that the tradition of the medieval empire created for many Germans a sort of European consciousness quite different from the national traditions of England, France, and Spain.⁶ Only Italy among the larger European

[LC]

5

countries had a similar medieval heritage, associated
with the universal sway of the papacy, carrying on in
its imperial pretensions the half-forgotten glories of
the Roman empire. By contrast, England, France, and
Spain built the image of the modern world in terms of
their national consolidation. It provided them with an
assured sense of self which the Germans and Italians
lacked. Having been at the heart of medieval Europe
the two peoples whose rulers had wielded the two swords
of the medieval order are, in a sense, traditionally
more inclined toward casting their political thought
into a European mould than their Western sisters. All
one has to do is to look at an elementary history book
as used in the schools of Italy and Germany to sense
this divergent outlook and feeling. It would be absurd
to claim that for the average German or Italian such
reflections were a vital part of his interest in European
unification; but it would also be quite superficial to
neglect the role which such sentiments play in the minds
of the intellectual elite.⁷ This elite is more important
in Europe than is generally recognized in the United
States; the hierarchical structure of European intellectual
life even affects the left-wing circles; it is reinforced by their

[Lc]

6

Marxist propensity to think in elite terms.

But whether one considers the so-called elite,
or the common man, there can be little question that
there has been and is today a difference among Germans
as to what is their identity. This difference found
expression in the characteristic contrasting of two
divergent conceptions of a nation: one based on the
territorially defined state and the other on the nation
(Staatsnation and Kulturnation).⁸ It was held by many
that the German nation could only be defined in cultural
terms, because it was scattered over a good part of
Europe, regardless of frontiers. Many Germans, that is
to say German-speaking and German-feeling persons, had
been settled in the countries bordering on Germany for
centuries and could neither be excluded from the German
people nor effectively made a part of the German state.
This situation enticed Hitler to seek by force the
establishment of a Greater Germany which would include
all Germans by enslaving the host peoples or transferring
them. On the rebound, most of these German minorities
to the East have been expelled since 1945 and become
incorporated within the German boundaries. But there
is still Austria and, in a different sense, German-speaking

[Lc]

7

Switzerland. If identity is defined (as modern sociology tends to do) in terms of membership in a reference group rather than in terms of territory, the Germany sense of identity is related to all the people who speak German, and this gives them a greater affinity to identifying themselves with Europe as the home of all Germans. At the same time, the notion of their affinity to the Germanic element of European culture, a heritage of the Romantic age, provides deep roots for a feeling of consanguinity with Scandinavia and Britain. Reinforced by the profound hold which Shakespeare has had upon the German imagination ever since the Classic era of Schiller and Goethe, this feeling makes many Germans sympathetic to a policy of an inclusive Europe which necessarily comprehends the English people as a matter of course; Europe is for them unthinkable without England. If Germans readily respond to inclusion of the Eastern European peoples, seeing themselves as the heartland, they equally determinedly insist upon partnership with Britain. Indeed, one of the main obstacles to German national identity, objectively and subjectively, is the Germans' close bonds with all European peoples; it is England and Scandinavia in the North, France in West

[cc]

8

Germany, Italy in South Germany, and the Slavic people in East Germany. Germany's wide-open frontiers have forced Germans into close contact with their neighbors, in cooperation and conflict. How different is the geographical position of England, France, Spain and Italy, shut off on at least three sides by sea and mountains. Hence such curious and yet highly significant sayings as that "it is non-German to be only German." (es ist undeutsch bloss deutsch zu sein.)⁹ It is this very uncertainty created by an openness in all directions which invites Germans to seek a new identity in being Europeans, even to speak in terms of an emergent European nation. The danger here is suggested by the language of de Gaulle. Against it, strong voices have been raised, especially on the side of Social Democrats. "I think we should not attempt to pool former nationalisms and now to bring them together in the same nationalist spirit to form a common nationalism for two or six countries," the leading spokesman of the S.P.D. in foreign affairs, Fritz Erler, has written. And he added: "Europe should be open to the world and not a closed shop."¹⁰ Such sentiments are in the best tradition of European cosmopolitanism. It was universalist. It

[LC]

9

is now often forgotten that European sentiment in the past thought of humanity as a whole--it naively thought mostly of European nations when speaking of mankind.

The Socialists and more especially the Marxists were the preservers and developers of genuine cosmopolitanism, conscious universalism. The closing sentence of the Communist Manifesto was not spoken in vain.

### 3. Marxism's Contribution

Marx and Marxism have been a potent factor in the growth of European sentiment in Germany.¹¹ While the traditionalist and conservative may be thinking in romantic terms of the by-gone glories of "Gothic Man," the forward looking rationalist and progressive who is the typical Social Democrat would adopt an international outlook. Such an international outlook was essentially European. When Marx and Engels exhorted the proletarians of all the world to unite in order to throw off their chains, they thought of the world as primarily a European world. The First and Second Internationales were predominantly European organizations, and the international solidarity was a solidarity among the nations of Europe, including Russia, of course. That this remained true down to the First World War can be

[1c]

10

shown by numerous passages in letters and speeches. 12
One knew that there existed in the world another vast
proletariat which was being subjected to imperial
exploitation, but it remained for Lenin, stimulated by
the ferment among British Liberals, to sound the trumpet
against imperialism and thus to universalize the
essentially European slant of Marx' and Engels' original
approach. 13 The "culture-bound" orientation toward
Europe found mute expression also in the failure to
produce any sustained thought on the subject of how so
radically European a program as the Marxist one could
be adapted to the needs of people of a different, a
radically different general outlook and belief. But
this very limitation of Marx' basic analysis helped to
make a powerful ingredient in the transformation of
Germans into Europeans. If the enemies of German
socialists denounced them as "comrades without a father-
land," (vaterlandslose Gesellen), the German socialist
could well respond that Europe was his fatherland, and
when Socialists from all over Europe embraced each other
at their successive international gatherings, they laid
the emotional foundation for a future political order
which today is aspired to by a Spaak, a Mollet and a

[Lc]

11

Schmid (not to speak of the older generation of the
Herriots, Bernsteins, Bauers and Renners) in common and
persistent effort. It is too often forgotten that the
weakness of Marxism in Britain is part of Labour's
hesitation about joining hands with their continental
comrades, in this and in other tasks. But because of
the German empire's strident nationalism, this European
sentiment became a more powerful emotional force among
German socialists than elsewhere. To be sure, the talk
of "Kaiser Bebel" rightly hinted at the fact that German
socialists did not remain unaffected by the currents
against which they struggled. In vain do we look among
German socialists for a figure like Jean Jaures, the
martyred advocate of Franco-German reconciliation and
European solidarity. But there were very ardent advocates
of Europe and Franco-German reconciliation, such as
Eduard Bernstein, who in the midst of World War I could
issue a call for the new Europe. As a conclusion of a
set of articles he reprinted a sharp critique of a
manifesto of the Social Democratic majority which had
proclaimed that the party "supports everything that is
calculated to lead the European states onto the road of
a closer legal, economic and cultural community," not

[lc]

12

because he objected to it, but because he thought that
the majority resolution was too weak.<sup>14</sup>

### 4. Paneuropa and German Self-criticism

If the postwar era did not bring any immediate revival of the European mood, this temporary eclipse of European initiatives must be attributed to two trans-European and indeed universalist thrusts. First and foremost there was the Wilsonian internationalism, world-wide in its scope, American in its inspiration and institutional ideas.<sup>15</sup> Second, and hardly less important, there was Communist internationalism, now also worldwide in scope, but Russian in inspiration and its revolutionary institutional proposals, such as sovietism. In reaction and response to these there was the revival of nationalist notions, epitomized at first in the vindictive policies of Clemenceau and Poincaré, but afterwards radicalized in the Fascist movement and carried to criminal excess in the National Socialist holocaust.

In fact, National Socialism built upon a strand of strident nationalism which had been growing in Germany ever since the Napoleonic wars at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Stimulated by the sentiments aroused by the French revolution and hardened in the fight

[c]

13

against the foreign invader, nationalism in Germany was
so fierce precisely because it was not shared by a good
many men who remained primarily attached to their local
governments, such as the Bavarian monarchy, even when
they did not cherish the cosmopolitanism of a Goethe. ¹⁶
There was none of that natural self-assurance and quiet
assumption of superiority which characterized British
and French nationalism. Instead there was aggressive
compensatory pride (Ueberheblichkeit) coupled with a
feeling of insecurity and a sense of urgency to make up
for lost time. Yet, until 1848 this emotionalism of
German nationalism, akin to Italian sentiments and to
the more recent passions in other emergent nations,
remained so strongly linked to liberalism and democracy
that it still seemed to befit the people of "thinkers
and poets." But when the Revolution of 1848 failed and
the task of unification was taken over by Prussia under
the leadership of Otto von Bismarck, this aggressive
nationalism became increasingly associated with militarism
and the imperial policies of a Kaiserreich which rested
upon the power of Prussian arms. Bismarck had known how
to curb its excesses in the interest of a policy of
balance of power, but under his feeble successors including

[LC]

14

the emperor William II who responded to its longings with a number of oratorical outbursts it became increasingly heady and expansive. Having met disastrous defeat in the First World War, it turned into the revolutionary undercurrent of the Weimar Republic. The latter's avowed Europeanism and internationalism, discredited by economic disaster consequent upon the peace treaties, was swept away by the rising tide of uncompromising nationalism.

Before these disasters engulfed Europe and the world, the immediate European response was a first flowering of European attempts at unification associated with the names of Aristide Briand and Gustav Stresemann and given vivid intellectual expression in the work of Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, entitled *Pan-Europa* (1923). Germany, emerging from the devastations of the postwar inflation, was swept by a veritable wave of European sentiment in the sequel to the Locarno treaties which seemed to herald the emergence of a united continent, united in an identity which separated it from the revolutionaries in Moscow and Washington.17 This new Europe was argued over in the restaurants and convention halls of Geneva, until the world economic crisis engulfed it. Stresemann and Briand died and the new spirit died

[LC]

15

with them. Germany after 1930 became increasingly attracted to Hitler's ideology of German hegemony in terms of obscurantist racist notions of Aryan supremacy. Geneva and the League of Nations became a symbol of alienation and decay, even though Europe remained the meaningful stage of political aspiration. The "world" that Hitlerism recognized was the world of Europe rather than the world of Asia, America, and Africa, and the Germans were to be the masters of this Europe which would continue to dominate the globe. ¹⁸ The exigencies of wartime propaganda have obscured this facet of Hitlerism and the appeal which it contained for many men in France, and other European countries. The skillful subversive diplomacy of an Abetz was built upon it. The Diary of a Gide mirrors it. Some of Gide's passages on Goethe ¹⁹ provide as startling a testimony on "Germany and Europe" as do the searching evaluations of modern French literature by an Ernst Robert Curtius. ²⁰ While Hitler was readying his legions for the Blitzkrieg that was to settle the problem of European unity by blood and iron, French, German and Italian intellectuals were discussing their common heritage in the inns of Switzerland. Switzerland herself

[LC]

16

appeared then as she always had been the paradigm of that Europe of which the Germans were at once the "heart" and the nemesis.

It is not without interest at this point to remind oneself that some of the greatest Germans, Goethe, Hegel, Nietzsche, have been among the most bitter critics of their people. Unlike critics in France and England, their hostile comments have recurrently been cast in terms of derogatory comparisons of Germany with other European nations. Goethe's and Hegel's admiration for France and Napoleon are well-known. Neither man displayed any marked enthusiasm for the movement of national liberation which did so much to consolidate German national sentiment prior to the overthrow of Bonaparte's imperial domination of Germany. Neither Goethe nor Hegel had any patience with sentiments which would have the world get well by imbibing the Germany spirit ("und es mag am Deutschen Wesen einmal noch die Welt genesen," as E. Geibel was to write).²¹ Yet they saw Europe and the Europeans as the pinnacle of humanity, as the true heirs of Greece and Rome. And Nietzsche, the tormented seeker of greatness, the prophet of the superman to come and rule the world, contemptuously brushed aside

[LC]

17

the Germans as hopeless pedants and proclaimed a future ruled by Britons, Russians and Americans. These were the peoples who possessed the grandeur to produce men of superhuman stature. These Britons, these Russians, even these Americans were of course Europeans, destined to guide the future of mankind.²² Perhaps even more significantly, Hegel before Tocqueville had argued that the world spirit would one day seize upon the Russians and Americans to guide man in his future evolution.²³

## 5. The Slavic Ingredient of German Culture

The appearance of the Russians in these prophetic utterances suggests another facet of Germany's relation to Europe, and that is her deep involvement in the Slavic world. In the Western perspective Germany has largely been seen as the antagonist of the Slavic peoples and their aspirations. The eastward thrust of the Austrian, Prussian and Saxon monarchies in the generations after Westphalia has blurred the historical vision. More particularly has it obscured the fact that Germany is herself a partly Slavic country and her people have emerged from a mixture with Slavic cultural elements. Indeed, German history can, in this perspective, be described in terms of two great processes of cultural

[Lc]

18

adaptation and interpenetration: its first part down to
1500 characterized by the amalgamating of Germanic and
Latin elements and producing the distinctive culture of
late medieval German city life; the culture of Frankfurt
and Augsburg, of Cologne and Nürnberg, of Hamburg and
Strassburg. The second part of this complex process
was initiated in the later Middle Ages and brought a
mixture of this Western German culture with its Eastern
component, containing significant Slavic elements. The
University of Wittenberg which provided Martin Luther
with the main setting for his prodigious intellectual
labors was a focal point of this process of acculturation;
Breslau and Koenigsberg were to follow. But even more
important, Slavic elements entered into and became part
of the German tradition in Saxony, Bohemia and the several
parts of the Hapsburg realm. Indeed, in many ways the
distinctive features of Saxon and Austrian as well as
Bohemian contributions to German culture were the result
of such Slavic ingredients, whether in music, poetry or
law. Many "German" place names are of Slavic origin, as
are the names of German families, including those of
great noble families. It may come as a surprise in this
connection to learn that e.g. the two volume family history

[Lc]

19

of the Bülows proudly starts with giving their original
ninth century *Stamvater* as a West Slavic chieftain.

It is altogether a most unfortunate distortion of the
historical situation to talk of a permanent conflict
between Germans and Slavs in the centuries before the
modern era. To write, as a recent study does, that
"the German-Slav battle through the ages had been a grim
and barbarous struggle for life and land,"²⁴ is quite
misleading and amounts to an anachronistic backward
projection of later nationalist relations. In the Eastern
kingdoms, whether under Slavic or German rulers, many
nationalities lived peacefully side by side, intermingled
and yet retained their separate cultural traditions.

How else could one explain the fact that the Poles chose
the king of Saxony to be their ruler even as late as
the eighteenth century? Of course, national sentiment
played its role in such conflicts as the Hussite wars
or the Bohemian war with which the Thirty-Years War
commenced; but did not Czechs, Slovaks and Germans of
Protestant persuasion heartily cooperate in fighting the
Hapsburg rulers and in electing Frederick V of the
Palatinate their king?²⁵

[lc]

20

These are just hints to suggest the intense
symbiosis and the lasting cultural relationship between
Germans and other Slavic peoples throughout the territories
which are at present within the Soviet orbit. Basically,
they are all part of Europe and a large percentage of
their peoples consider themselves Europeans.

It is therefore no accident, but the fruit of
deeply rooted historical antecedents that most of this
world now belongs to the Soviet orbit. Germany tends
to think of herself as the heart of Europe precisely
because she has for long been ready to see the Slavic
peoples as an integral part of Europe. To change
similes, Germany for all her antagonism to Slavdom which
is richly reciprocated by Poles, Czechs and other
Western Slavic peoples is nonetheless the bridge between
East and West. In recent years, that link has been
concentrated in the German Democratic Republic's intimate
ties with the Soviet Bloc, but it extends far beyond
this temporary political situation. 26

It is a curious and highly significant feature of
German history that the large and expansive states of
Austria and Prussia were formed in this context of the
intertwining of Germans and Slavs, this "Slavic Germany."

[LC]

21

More especially the divisions of Poland are evocative of the essentially trans-national character of these two states. They both lay beyond the confines of the old Germany of the Holy Empire and their elites were schooled in ruling over "alien" populations. Hence both were characterized by an emphasis on the military and coercive.

The deep suspicions which the enthusiasm for national unification evoked in such men as Metternich were closely bound up with the multinational character of their political orders. Austria and Prussia were states built upon imperial dominance rather than national consensus.

With the forward march of democratization, both lost the raison d'etre of their existence. In the case of Austria, the fact that Slavic nations remained intact within the imperial framework enabled these separate peoples to break away and form independent states, leaving a German rump to reconstitute itself as a separate entity. It was rather natural that this entity should have sought to "re-enter" Germany and become part of the political order that was Germany. Only the determined veto backed by arms could prevent this **Anschluss**. It was afterwards forcibly brought about by the Austrian Adolf Hitler, only to be undone again by

[Lc]

22

external force. It is necessary to recall this background
in order to appreciate the complex position of a neutralized
Austria vis-a-vis a new Western Germany within the
European unification process. For within a unified
Europe the ancient issue might eventually be resolved,
if both participated in supra-national community. Only,
it would give the "Germans" two votes rather than one in
a federal senate based upon the equality of component
states.

Even more important is the fate of Prussia. In
the days of the Weimar Republic, some of the democratic
leaders who appreciated the inherently anti-democratic
implication of Prussia's very existence like Hugo Preuss,
advocated its dissolution. Purely expedient considerations
vis-a-vis French annexationist policies and Rhineland
separatism prevented such views from prevailing. Even
so, the constitution of the Weimar Republic greatly
weakened Prussia's role and set in motion an evolution
which was to dissolve Prussia into its component parts,
an evolution which was consummated by force of Allied
dictate after World War II.<sup>27</sup> Hitler had, however,
already destroyed the identity of Prussia. This was
logical enough, considering how remote his demagogic

[L.C.]

23

mass movement with its emotional paraphernalia was from
the puritanical discipline of the Black-and-White
tradition of the Prussia of Frederick the Great. This
great admirer of the French *esprit*, fluteplayer and
military genius would have had nothing but contempt for
the great "drummer" from Austria and his brownshirted
followers. The sober and hard-headed Prime Minister of
Prussia throughout the Weimar days, Otto Braun, was much
more nearly a man of his ilk, as are indeed some of the
key men of present Social democracy. But Frederick had
been an utterly lonely man; the military and the
bureaucratic elite who had ruled Prussia under him were
based upon the land-owning gentry. The term *Junker* has
become so sloganized in Western propaganda that one
hesitates to use it in this connection; yet properly
understood and recognized in its opposition to much that
Frederick and his successors stood for, this "class"
in the term's most precise meaning constituted the rock
upon which the political order of Prussia was built. It
was also the rock upon which the ill-constructed ship of
the Weimar state foundered. This ruling class of officers,
administrators and their imitators in business and
industry remained in power after 1918, reinforced by their

[lc]

24

numerous following in intellectual life and the universities.
They did until the advent of Hitler.²⁸

## 6. The Old and the New Elites

It is little appreciated that the National Socialist leadership was of a very different cast. They not only were not drawn from these former elite cadres, but they made short shrift of what opposition developed. When the conservatives first persuaded the aged president, Field Marshal Hindenburg, to allow Hitler to form the government in January, 1933, they had done so in the expectation that they would be able to manipulate him as they had the disunited party leaders of the Weimar Republic. Little did they appreciate the autonomous power that democratic procedures offer a leader who has a solid backing behind him. Even less did they realize the ruthless, revolutionary determination which animated Hitler and his lieutenants. The National Socialist proceeded at once to liquidate the former strongholds of Germany's Prussian and Prussian-inspired masters. In short, they made up for the failure of the moderates who had organized the Weimar Republic.²⁹ This revolutionary transformation of the ruling elites, in a sense democratizing or perhaps more correctly popularizing

[LC]

25

what had formerly been a strongly aristocratic ruling
groups helps to explain, incidentally, the decisive role
which Prussian officers and administrators played in the
several resistance plots, and more particularly their
share in the attempt at killing Hitler and overthrowing
his regime on July 20, 1944. The strongly moral cast
of the conscious motivation of its leaders reflects the
clash of values and convictions which separated the
National Socialist movement from the elites of Germany's
past. The blood bath which Hitler ordered after the
attempt on his life had failed was accompanied by violent
denunciations of the old aristocracy. It also was rendered
more macabre by the humiliating methods employed in
executing men of the older order who with all their faults
had cherished convictions of honor and gentlemanly behavior
utterly alien to the proletarian Hitler.³⁰

The task which the National Socialists had begun
and which culminated in the execution of over two thousand
suspected participants in the plot, many of whom were
scions of the old ruling class--this typical revolutionary
enterprise of physically destroying the old elites--was
completed by the victorious red armies when in the spring
of 1945 they swept across most

[10]

26

of the old Prussia to the Elbe river. The drama of Hitler's suicide in the Berlin bunker amidst the ruins of his destroyed capital has overshadowed the politically much more important destruction of the Prussian land-owning class and their military and bureaucratic following. Not only were the estates burned and the land divided and collectivized, but many thousands perished or fled as virtual paupers to the West, men, women, and children. The more able and hard-working members of this genuine aristocracy have since been integrated into the busy life of Western industrial Germany. But as a class, they have been eliminated as the French aristocracy was eliminated by the Great Revolution. One highly competent observer has recently asserted that the old class structure has passed away. 31

In their stead, a very different elite formation has been emerging, or rather re-emerging in Western Germany. It is the ancient elite of Germany's city culture, long submerged by the Prussian predominance. If one goes through the "Who is Who" of the Federal Republic, he is confronted with a group of men who belong to the tradition of the great cities of Western Germany: Hamburg, Bremen and Cologne, Frankfurt, Augsburg and

[LC]

27

Nuernberg. Reinforced by the leadership of the German Social Democrats, until 1945 the only solidly democratic group in Germany, these men have rapidly constituted themselves as a new elite far different in their values and beliefs from the old ruling class. 32 At the same time, the German business leadership which formerly inclined to follow the military and bureaucratic rulers in outlook and behavior has now come to be oriented toward American traditions. For the typical German businessman today the American, even if he is not as yet a partner, tends to provide the image by which he shapes his own conduct. Such an orientation is often combined with sharp criticism of American business practices--just as the German businessman of former days often was sharply critical of military and bureaucratic leadership, even while he adopted their values and modes of behavior. 33 The consequence of this striking transformation has been a very different conduct of German government and diplomacy than characterized them in the past. Gone is the pre-occupation with prestige and the minatory gesture--the proverbial arrogance of the Prussian --and in their stead one finds readiness to compromise, concern with the substance of political advantage and a

[LC]

28

striking caution in the face of the many Hobsonian choices
with which German politics is confronted. The desperate
impotence in the face of the country's forcible division
which seems to provide a perfect seedbed for the emotional
mass nationalism of the Fascist type has actually
persuaded this new elite to adopt a policy of European
and world-wide cooperation and accommodation. 34 It is a
policy with a sound anchorage in Germany's historical
past, and it provides one of the mainstays for America's
policy of containment in Europe. At the same time it
offers the Germans a practical and appealing goal for
political activity which may yet in the end provide the
setting for a solution to the "German problem." To the
detailed elaboration of the background of this policy we
must now turn. It needs to be discussed on three levels:
the level of foreign policy, the level of domestic
politics, and the level of popular participation through
organized and unorganized effort.

7. The Division of Germany as a Bridge
Between East and West

As far as the foreign policy level is concerned,
the Adenauer government since its inception in 1949
pursued a steady course. This course was characterized

[lc]

29

by the search for rapprochement and eventual friendship
with France through close cooperation with the United
States as the essential precondition for full participa-
tion in European political activities.³⁵ The forward
march of this foreign policy and the realization of its
goals have been remarkable and far exceeded what could
be expected at its start. It may be divided into several
phases. The first of these phases covers the period
until 1954, when full sovereignty was recognized; its
primary European aspects were Germany's entry into the
Council of Europe (1951), the establishment of the
European Coal and Steel Community (1952), and the struggle
over and eventual failure of the European Defense
Community (1953). The second phase, after recovery from
the depressing effects of this failure had been achieved
at Messina, culminated in the establishment of the
European Economic Community and its counterpart for
Atomic Energy (1957/1958). The third phase is dominated
by the working out of and unexpected success of the
Common Market, testified to by British efforts to join,
but halted by the rejection of these plans (January,
1963); and the fourth and most recent phase is characterized
by diplomatic maneuvers to overcome the shock and to

[LC]

30

negotiate a political union.

Germany's foreign policy has throughout these four phases been directed toward what might be called a maximum of Europeanization. In the first phase Germany favored a more active Council; she cooperated vigorously in building the E.C.S.C. under and after Jean Monnet; she accepted the Defense Community and the proposed Political Community.36 In the second phase, she vigorously exerted herself on behalf of the *relance*, and she accepted very serious disadvantages especially regarding France, in order to facilitate French acceptance of the European Economic Community, afterward providing steady support for its German chairman, Professor Walter Hallstein, who next to Jean Monnet has become the most effective protagonist of European unification.37 During the third phase, Germany also supported British entry with all the means at her disposal, yet when de Gaulle imposed his will in rejecting the British, Adenauer who had been the dominant architect of Germany's foreign policy, proceeded with the Franco-German treaty of friendship and won parliamentary support, in spite of the indignation aroused among his own followers, as well as the opposition by the French president's one-sided action.

[LC]

31

In the general discussion, the commitment of Germany to a policy of European unification was the key argument for seeking to overcome the conflict which de Gaulle's decision had precipitated.<sup>38</sup> Finally, in most recent months Germany's foreign policy has repeatedly been actively seeking to overcome the obstacles in the way of progress toward a political unification which is stymied by the conflict between French determination to proceed without Britain, and Dutch and Belgian determination to keep the door open for British entry. A number of issues have created difficulties and tensions between France and Germany, due to Germany's determination to maintain the closest working relation with the United States even in the face of French challenges to United States leadership in the West.<sup>39</sup>

8. Foreign Policy Developments and the U.S.S.R.

The entire course of this complicated policy of German adherence to European unification must be seen also in its juxtaposition to the Soviet Union's persistent efforts at interfering with this development.<sup>40</sup> In this connection Germany's participation in NATO is of crucial importance. Soviet propaganda has continually stressed the "danger" of Germany, and in view of past events such

[lc]

32

views find a ready echo not only among the Russian masses,
but also among the satellites and throughout Europe.

Actually, the Soviet Union is of course not afraid of
the few divisions of Germany, armed to the teeth as the
U.S.S.R. is. But the Germans when working in close
cooperation with the United States, Britain and France
are another matter. By attacking the weakest link, by
a never-ending repetitive propaganda campaign, the
Soviets have been hoping to break the chain of Western
containment and continue to do so. Germany's participa-
tion in Europe and European unification is only a part
of this over-all Western orientation of German foreign
and defense policies, which the Soviet Union has been
at pains to counteract at every turn. From Stalin's
proposal for an independent united Germany in the spring
of 1952, presumably intended to disrupt the negotiations for a
European Defense Community, to the recent pressures for
the international recognition of the Ulbricht regime in
Eastern Germany, the Soviet Union has put forward one
proposal after another that she had no intention of
implementing and which she dropped as soon as there
appeared any significant inclination in Germany or among
the other Allies to take it up. 41

[Lc]

33

In Germany, as in other European countries, there
is a lively sense that this European integration is by
no means only or even primarily a response to the threat
of Soviet domination. There is a general awareness that
besides the paramount need of larger markets in an age
of advanced industrialization, the disintegration of
European colonial domination has not only deprived
Europe of dependent markets, but in its sequel has
brought the emergence of new political units of vast
size and great potential power. There is notable through-
out the world a trend for comprehensive cultural units
to consolidate into groupings of a more or less closely
knit federal kind. Germans are more and more conscious
of these trends. The challenge of assisting the under-
developed countries has met with considerable response,
especially among the younger generation. The trend has
been further stimulated by de Gaulle's constant reminders
that Europe must cooperate in order to play an effective
role in the world at large--a line of argument which he
manages to combine in skillful oratory with older senti-
ments of nationalism. Paneuropa thus fits into a world-
wide agitation of pan-movements all of which seek wider
horizons than the older parochial order of national states
could provide.⁴²

[LC]

34

This study is not the place to analyze this policy
of shadow boxing in any detail; the elaborate maneuvers
in Berlin alone would carry the analysis beyond the scope
of this discussion. But some comments are in order. The
original proposal for the establishment of a "free"
city, not of Berlin, but of the Western sectors of
Berlin, was so patently not put forward with any
expectation that great powers would accept it--it did
not offer any *quid pro quo*--that the question of why it
was made is a very real one. No doubt the belief on the
part of the Soviets that they had achieved a nuclear
balance encouraged them. In any case, it seems clear in
retrospect and after all the threats have been revealed
as hollow ones that the purpose was to advance the
recognition of the East German so-called Democratic
Republic and to disrupt NATO. For NATO was at the time
exhibiting very serious weaknesses and internal disagree-
ments which the Soviets might well have hoped to aggravate
by throwing the apple of discord which was the defense of Berlin
among the Allies. It must be remembered that de Gaulle
had only recently become president of France and might
therefore (especially in light of his role in 1944/1945)
be expected by the Soviets to refuse to defend a city

[LC]

35

which in French ears had had a very minatory sound. The
ruse did not work and in fact NATO was temporarily
strengthened by this frontal attack of the Soviets. Yet
the D.D.R. (German Democratic Republic) unquestionably
achieved greater international status, including the
recognition by Tito, even though formal recognition by
the Western Allies did not occur. 43 There can be little
question that Moscow's handling of the Berlin issue, and
especially the forcible erection of the "wall" in contra-
vention of solemn commitments, have had the effect of
making the division of Germany into two states, if not
three, seem more and more permanent as the years have
passed. But this procedure, while producing some voices
in Germany and throughout Europe in favor of plans which
would terminate Germany's participation in Europe, have
for most Germans and Europeans had the opposite effect
of hardening their determination of seeking in and through
a united Europe the eventual peaceful solution to this
Soviet-enforced anomaly of the two Germanies--an anomaly
which at least the Poles should realize cannot last. 44

[10]

36

9. Domestic Politics: The Strange Case of the S.P.D.

Berlin and its trials are the key to the Social
Democratic Party's complex attitudes toward the European
policy of the government. That policy itself has been
centrally shaped by the need of defending the freedom of
Berlin. But the Socialists had special reasons to be
concerned. The city, or rather its Northern, Western,
and Southern parts under Allied occupation, has been
governed by a coalition of both parties under Social
Democratic leadership. First Ernst Reuther, then Otto
Suhr and finally Willy Brandt have provided a succession
of outstanding men who have played a dominant role not
only in the Berlin government, but also in the councils
of the party for which two of them have actually provided
the leaders. It is therefore natural that NATO and the Com-
munity of the Six should have become increasingly part of
Social Democratic thinking, as they in turn became involved
in the defense of Berlin.⁴⁵ The invidious "wall" stands
as a symbol not only of Communist failure in Eastern
Germany, but also as a symbol of the strength of the
West and especially the emerging Europe. Berlin has, in
a sense, served to integrate the German Socialists into
a general outlook that sees Germany as a part of Europe.

[Lc]

37

At the same time, the very anxieties resulting from the Berlin situation, and the constant confrontation with the realities of the D.D.R. as part of the Soviet Bloc have induced the Social Democrats to be promoters of a broad conception of Europe which includes Britain and the Scandinavian social democracies along with conservative France and the other countries of the Community of the Six. 46

This trend is apt to be reinforced with a Labor Government in power in Britain, especially if that regime can be won over to a more positive approach to European unification than British Labor has been inclined toward in the past. The *appertura a sinistra* in Italy has served the same purpose and Jean Monnet's Committee for a United States of Europe has done its share in aiding this re-conversion of German party and trade union leaders to a position which historical antecedents and inherent logic predisposed them toward anyhow. 47 The internal evolution of German Social Democracy toward a less Marxist and ideologically dogmatic position which was consolidated by the Godesberg Party Congress in 1959 has greatly aided this reconversion; for it necessitated a more constructive approach toward foreign policy in general and the rapidly developing European ties in

[lc]

38

particular ⁴⁸ Efforts on the part of the Soviet Union to interrupt this evolution only served to hasten it. The ill-conceived denunciation of Socialist leaders as helpmates of German Fascists could, in the light of the role German Communists and Stalin had played vis-a-vis Hitler, only reinforce these trends.

The rapidly increasing links between German, French, and other European business concerns did their share in "Europeanizing" German labor; for wherever such a business merger or even close cooperation occurred, the workers in the plants were not slow in establishing corresponding contacts for effective cooperation. Recent research has been able to show the numerous specific steps that were taken through such contacts to further Franco-German trade union cooperation. One key observer noted a number of years ago that "a far greater degree of ideological cohesion has been achieved by labour than is true of the trade associations," although it would of course be too much to assert that "all pre-existing national differences among unions have been blunted and that a supranational ideology has emerged..." In fact, the really important forward step has been accomplished, when the workers in particular

[1c]

39

plants through their union representatives have established
cooperative arrangements. Typically, the French unionists
have been concerned in such situations to sharpen the
ideological awareness of their German comrades, while the
Germans have urged greater concern with working conditions
and wages in French factories. Significant differential
wage increases have been the result. ⁴⁹

Similarly, it has become quite usual for
representatives of labor in the several countries to
take part in the meetings of the national parties and
unions. Such fraternizing ought not, of course, be
overestimated in its political implications. A breakdown
in the E.E.C. could seriously damage such links. But
Germany and France are reaching a point where these
bonds are also becoming of such strength that a breakdown
may be prevented by vigorous counteraction in the
political field.⁵⁰

10. The Popular Level of Participation

Popular interest in European integration and a
measure of popular participation have been strong from
the beginning. In saying this, one should not assume of
course that every man in the street is enthusiastically
in favor of uniting Germany with other European countries.

[LC]

40

There are, however, substantial bodies of telling evidence to support the general proposition. Even before there was any official link of the Federal Republic with the emerging European institutions, the constitution adopted in 1949 and cautiously called Basic Law by its makers provided in its Article 24 that the new republic was prepared to cede to a European government any powers associated with sovereignty which other European nations were willing to transfer. The discussion of this particular article in the constitutional convention shows that it was non-controversial, except for technical juridical aspects and was broadly supported.⁵¹ In keeping with this early start, it has been good electoral politics for a candidate to public office to present himself as a good European. Indeed, few and far between are the instances of men who in electioneering found it advisable to oppose European unification, and even fewer are those who with such a plank succeeded in getting elected. As the saying now goes: everybody is for Europe. An examination of the German press since 1950 yields a similar result. The Communists apart--and they constitute a very small percentage of the German electorate --every newspaper has found it desirable to appeal to its

[Lc]

41

readers in terms of European unity. There are, of course,
degrees of concern and enthusiasm and some leading
editorial writers have from time to time preferred to
counsel caution.⁵² In recent years, the formula of
General de Gaulle who has spoken of Europe in terms of
fatherlands (Europe des patries) and who generally
inclines toward a policy which leaves the national
sovereignties intact, has been supported by some German
papers and magazines.⁵³ But when the French president
decided to reject British entry into the Common Market,
the general German reaction was one of dismay and sharp
criticism. This constellation represented a curious
reversal of the days when French political
opinion inclined to feel that France could only afford
to participate in a Europe in which Britain would be
available to counterbalance Germany. In recent months
the German public and its press have fairly generally
supported the Erhard government's recurrent efforts at
forwarding political unification.

## 11. European Movement

To these general attitudes correspond more
specific organizational activities. The European Move-
ment which unites a considerable number of more specialized

[LC]

42

groupings which share a common concern in the unification of the continent has always had a substantial German branch. Its major shortcoming has been its tendency simply to echo the government's line of approach, instead of developing a more outspoken position which would support the government, but would also urge the government on to more far-reaching efforts. There have, of course, been smaller organizations, as in other countries, which have been prepared to do this kind of work, but their success has been limited by the rather stodgy tendency of the main organization. Though provided with ample means and possessed of branches throughout the country, the German branch of the European movement has been inclined to resist rather than to stimulate popular support for the kind of approach which would build a United Europe from the "grass-roots."⁵⁴ For a number of years a further difficulty arose from the Social Democrats' reluctance to support a policy which might jeopardize the chances of German unification (see below). Thus the men who were the most logical advocates of European unity often held back, arguing that those who were claiming to promote Europe failed to realize its revolutionary implications. Even so, there were groupings

[Lc]

43

of German Socialists who in cooperation with their comrades in other countries maintained the more radical federalist position.

Generally speaking, the general public and its press were, as in other countries, not so much divided on the question whether to unite Europe, but on that of the pace and the form of such unification. This debate is typically cast in terms of whether Europe should be federal or confederal, and whether in seeking either a federal or a confederal Europe one should proceed "functionally" that is to say by developing specific fields of common activity, or constitutionally, that is to say by devising a general political structure. In this many-faceted debate which is likely to continue for quite a while, the federalists are apt to be constitutionalists, while the functionalists are usually confederalists.⁵⁶ The Germans in light of their long and rather checkered experience with different kinds of federal order are in this debate in an odd position, as far as party lines are concerned. For on the whole the conservatives are, as in other countries with a federal system, inclined toward "states' rights" while the progressives (if this more inclusive term may be allowed here) are for strengthening central

[LC]

44

authority. This is logically the position of those who seek to extend the range of collective activity. Yet, in regard to Europe the roles tend to be exchanged.

The progressives, realizing the difficulty of forwarding socialism on a European level, incline toward retaining a maximum of decisional authority for the national states, while the conservatives, aware of the relative weakness of European governmental organs, incline toward the transfer of authority to them. There are many exceptions to this general rule--notably de Gaulle is one--and it may radically change, if a majority of European countries are governed by Socialists. Yet at the moment, it has broad application to the approach of Germans toward European unification. In any case, there is as yet no solid majority in German public opinion for a federal and constitutional approach to European unification, even though it is gaining ground.⁵⁷

Another specific of the German attitude, arising from their own experience, is the tendency to attach major importance in the federalizing process to administrative, rather than legislative procedures. German and Swiss federalism, in contrast to American and much other federalism, has always sought to reinforce federalism

[LC]

45

through administrative delegation; that is to say by
providing for the states (or cantons) to carry out and
apply federal legislation, rather than provide the states
with broad legislative authority. Some well-known
studies of federalism, not taking this tradition into
account, have grievously misjudged these traditions.
It is natural that the Germans, in their approach to
European unification should therefore favor this process
of administrative "acculturation," and even advocate
a council composed of administrators rather than a
federal legislature as the primary mode of achieving
federal union. This, obviously, is not a broad popular
view, but it is generally held among political and
bureaucratic elites in Germany. Not a European Senate,
but a European Council would thus become the mainstay of
a supranational government.⁵⁸

12. The Linking of Universities and Cities

The general public is disinclined to enter into
such juristic issues, even though it does in fact tend
to take positions that are in line with them. There are
some rather distinct areas in which this general outlook
manifests itself with considerable force. I am speaking
of local governments and universities. In the past,

[LC]

46

direct personal contact between universities was infrequent. The old gag about the international character of scholarship held true only for the sciences and medicine. In the humanities and social sciences, the romantic notion of national cultures reigned supreme, with contact abroad confined largely to the particular specialists, Romance languages, say--or Slavists. A radical change has been taking place in recent years and constitutes an important part of the background for saying (as politicians are now fond of doing) that one can be a good European while being a good German. To the Germans, this kind of formula appeals more readily because for many years it has been applied inside their federal country: to be a good Bavarian or Saxon did not prevent him from being a good German. But such general sentiments are reinforced, especially among the younger generation, by close personal contacts among faculty and students. Reinforced by an agreement on cultural relations (Kulturabkommen), French and German universities are starting to recognize each other's academic degrees, and accept the prior schooling of each other; they also permit students to "count" periods of study spent in the other country. Beyond that, each German university is liked with a French one in a

[LC]

47

jumelage or sisterhood, e.g. Munich and Paris, Heidelberg and Montpelier, Frankfurt and Lyon. These bonds lead to a continuing and lively exchange with delegations of faculty and deans visiting each other and exploring common problems. No one who has personally participated in these recurrent encounters can doubt their efficacy in completely changing the atmosphere among faculty and students. Especially the younger generations incline, as a consequence, to break down the barriers of "national" scholarship. This is of course especially important in such fields as history and politics, but it is bearing fruit in law and sociology and many others as well.⁵⁹

As a natural consequence of this development, there is an increasing inclination in German universities to call scholars from other lands to their academic chairs.

At Heidelberg, full professorships are now occupied by scholars from Switzerland, Belgium, Greece, Italy, and the United States; others will no doubt follow. Germany has perhaps gone further than any other European country in this direction of opening up its academic halls to European influence and cooperation. Fortunately, its federal decentralization of cultural policy which places the universities under the authority of the respective

[10]

48

Land ministries stimulates experimentation and allows for a measure of diversity which the fixed and centralized systems of France and Italy have been slow to follow (in neither country can a non-national hold a professorship to this day). This dispersion of cultural authority has, of course, also its serious difficulties; the above-mentioned cultural agreement was held up for many months because the right of the Federal Republic's foreign office to conclude such an agreement was contested by several Lander and agreement between them had to be sought before it could become effective. Yet the advantages on the whole outweigh the disadvantages and the Europeanization of Germany is helped by her federal diversity.

To the *jumelages* of universities correspond similar sisterhoods among cities and towns. The movement for such a building of Europe from the grass-roots was initiated some fifteen years ago by a Swiss local government enthusiast, Professor Gasser, and the great European and mayor of Lyon, Edouard Herriot. It led to the founding and rapid development of the European Association of Municipalities (*Europäischer Gemeindetag*). This all-European organization is, of course, especially

[Lc]

49

strong in the Community of the Six, notably in Germany and Italy. The strong tradition of local self-government prevalent in some parts of Germany and only temporarily submerged by Hitler's centralist state has, as a matter of fact, had the effect of stimulating demands for greater local autonomy in France and Italy, especially since it is reinforced by the tradition in the Low Countries.

What is more, the overall organization is reinforced by linking towns in the several countries, and particularly towns in France and Germany in a permanent *jumelage* which offers the chance to build a common sentiment and European consciousness through continuing exchange of persons and ideas. Often the *jumelage* of town and university parallel each other, as in the case of Heidelberg and Montpelier. But town linkages are much more numerous to date, and they vary greatly in vitality and significance. Where the towns match each other in social structure and political outlook and orientation, the *jumelage* is more apt to work satisfactorily. It is obvious, or ought to be, that two mining towns like Herne and Lens-Henin-Lietard have more to say to each other, than if one were a center of agricultural trade. Two cities with a socialist mayor,

[LC]

50

like Frankfurt and Lyon, are more apt to find common
concerns to talk over and work out in mutually fruitful
discussions than two towns in which the leadership belongs
to opposite camps. A curious problem arises where a
Communist mayor in France confronts a non-Communist in
Germany; this happens because the Communist party is
outlawed in the Federal Republic. In some of these
towns there exists, to complicate matters further, a
_jumelage_ with an East German city. It is only natural
that the French Socialist and the German Socialist may
engage in fairly sharp, even if comradely exchanges, but
the experience in Amiens and Dortmund seems to suggest
that they too contribute to a widening of European
horizons, thus resembling the trade union contacts
described above. 60

Something in between the links of cities and
universities is provided by the _stages_ or work conferences
which have been organized by the International Center
for European Education in which Germans vigorously
participate. These conferences of a week's duration
bring together Europeans of various professional back-
grounds, teachers, lawyers, engineers, and so forth for
discussions of their particular problems in relation to

[LC]

51

the emerging European community. Along with numerous institutes, established at various German universities, and devoted to the exploration of European problems in terms of the several social sciences, there exist quite a few adult education centers specifically concerned with educating members of the several professions in an understanding of European problems. All these conferences contribute to the rapid expansion of the number of those Germans who have more than a tourist's notion of the several European countries and their problems. It would take many pages to list and describe all the organized activities which today devote themselves to making Europeans out of Germans, many of them the result of private initiative. The only major sector of German life which has not as yet been to any marked extent Europeanized is the farming population. This failure to include farmers has recently produced very serious difficulties for the German government in connection with negotiating the decisions needed in the agricultural field of the Common Market.⁶¹

[L.C.]

52

## 13. Germany's Role in European Institutions

The numerous activities and movements discussed in the preceding paragraphs are reinforced by the participation of Germans in the various European institutions. No detailed studies have attempted to identify any distinctive "national" contributions to these institutions, but it is to be assumed that these vary to some extent at least in terms of the particular national traditions. In legislation, in administration and in adjudication, Germany's traditions differ from those of France, Italy, and the Benelux countries. In all three areas, a considerable process of acculturation is going forward, as Germans find themselves obliged to work with their European confreres. They come to the task trained only for German official work which means predominantly a legal training with the Continental European emphasis on formal jurisprudence. There can be little doubt that in due course the Germans will have to reform their training program for the public service along lines which have already been tested in France; including a substantially larger amount of the social sciences, especially political science and economics in their curriculum. It is, of course, a great advantage of the E.E.C. that all six

[lc]

53

countries belong to the civil law tradition; it has rarely been sufficiently considered what problems would be presented by the addition of Englishmen trained in the Common Law. Clearly, only the analytical social sciences offer an eventual opportunity for resolving some of these difficulties. 62

There is general agreement that in both administrative and parliamentary institutions the Germans have cooperated fully and effectively. The outstanding leadership provided by men like Hallstein, Brentano, Carlo Schmid, Furler and Erler, to mention only a few who have occupied key posts, is matched by the quiet work in commissions and offices performed by hundreds of parliamentarians and officials on all rungs of the hierarchy. These German participants in the work of building a united Europe have been praised and blamed, and there is no need for quoting these appraisals here in extenso. A detailed scholarly analysis of the cultural issues presented by multinational operations remains to be developed, though some stimulating beginnings have been made. On the whole, Germans have not found it more difficult than others to enter into supranational activities; indeed, for many of them the European symbolism has been

[Lc]

54

more appealing than the national one, so deeply dis-
credited by their recent history.

14. The Two Germanies and the Future of Europe

So far we have largely discussed the problem
"Germany and Europe" as if the Federal Republic
constituted all of Germany, although in historical back-
ground references the larger Germany including the people
of the German Democratic Republic (D.D.R.) was implied.
It is vain to speculate about what the attitudes of
East Germans might be toward these developments of
European unification. There are some indications that
they are concerned, lest such unification might deepen
and make more permanent the division of the country and
their separation from the rest of Germany. Also, in the
Draft Constitution for a European Political Community,
provision was made for the eventual reunification, and
there can be little question that if ever such reunifica-
tion of the B.R.D. and the D.D.R. became feasible--that
is to say would be permitted by the U.S.S.R.--it would
create very serious issues for the relation of Germany
to Europe, both within the Community of the Six and the
Council of Europe; but so would the possibility of Poland
or Czechoslovakia rejoining Europe. One should not forget

[LC]

55

in this connection that just as Western Germany has become
an integral part of Western Europe, so Eastern Germany
has become an integral part of Eastern Europe and of
Comecon. The bitter hostility of the Soviet Union's
Western Satellites--which should in view of recent develop-
ments perhaps be called Allies--toward Western Germany
is not, at least officially, matched by any corresponding
hostility toward Eastern Germany. In a curious way,
therefore, the division of Germany serves to provide a
bridge and may conceivably at some point become the bond
of a broader Europe which, if it does not extend to the
Urals, might yet extend to the boundaries of Russia.
The brief allusions we have made earlier in this paper about
the Slavic background of Germany serve to reinforce these
speculations.<sup>63</sup>

The record to date of the emerging Europe clearly
shows Germany, the Federal Republic of Germany, to be a
European community member. The disruption of this
community would have far-reaching and possibly fatal
consequences, politically, economically, culturally. If
the corresponding role of the German Democratic Republic,
less active and in other respects minor--it is much
smaller than Poland and about the size of Yugoslavia--but

[Lc]

56

nonetheless economically vital and culturally significant, is taken into account, Germany's role as the bridge and the "heart" of Europe is certainly undeniable. In a world of emerging great cultural wholes, many of them federally organized, this European Community forms one of the major members. In terms of the combination of industrial development and human resources, it is only second to the United States of America; once fully organized and enlarged by Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries, it may well surpass the U. S. (as it did in the recent Olympics). This Europe forms in turn the bridge between the United States and the Soviet Union and its Western Satellites. They in due course may well become part of it again, as originally envisaged by Strassburg. As such, Europe is more vitally interested in the maintenance of peace in the nuclear age than any other one of the emergent wholes because its small size and wide open frontier toward the Soviet Union would condemn it to almost immediate and total destruction.

The Germans, after the frightful lesson of the two world wars which they helped so materially to break out, are perhaps more fully aware of this need for peace than any other people. Europe, especially when confronted by

[lc]

57

under-developed Africa, provides the more adventurous
and enterprising among them a very large field for
peaceful activity for many years to come. As part of
the vast new melting pot that Europe is becoming, these Germans
may well be turned away from their unfortunate and in
many ways tragic past, dominated as it was by the
Eastern monarchies with their military-bureaucratic
elites. Instead, an older and in many ways saner
tradition, cosmopolitan and commercial, as epitomized
in Goethe's Frankfurt, is re-emerging to provide Germany
and Europe with a leadership embodied in the men of
politics, economics, labor and culture who have cooperated
fully in building the new Europe.

[LC]

58

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(As Notes)

¹Quoted in "European Union in Theory and Practice" in *Internationalism and Democracy: Essays Personal, Historical, Political in Memory of Charles E. Payne*, 1949, p. 158.

²Edward H. Litchfield, "Emergence of German Governments," Carl J. Friedrich and Herbert Spiro, "The Constitution of the German Federal Republic," Richard M. Scammon, "Political Parties" in *Governing Postwar Germany*, ed. Edward H. Litchfield, 1953; Peter H. Merkl, *The Origin of the West German Republic*, 1963.

³Cf. Ludwig Erhard, *Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik*, 1962, pp. 189ff., 450ff., 530ff. and *passim* for an authoritative voice. For a general analysis, cf. J. Stohler, "Neoliberalism und Europäische Integration," *Europaarchiv*, 1962, pp. 99-118.

⁴Karl Dietrich Bracher, "The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany" in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Foreign Policies in a World of Change*, 1963, pp. 115ff. especially at pp. 131/2, 138/9.

⁵Math. 21, 42.

⁶Heinz Gollwitzer, *Europabild und Europagedanke-Beitraege zur Deutschen Geistesgeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts*, 1951, especially pp. 119ff. and 130ff. Cf. also J. B. Duroselle, "Europe as a Historical Concept," in *European Integration* (ed. C. Grove Haines, 1957), pp. 11-20, and Hans Kohn, "Nationalism and the Integration of Europe," *ibid*, pp. 21-34. The problem was treated from three different perspectives in papers by Marcel Beck, "Europa als historische Einheit," Carl J. Friedrich, "Die Einigung Europas in amerikanischer Perspective," and Russell Kirk, "Das gemeinsame Erbe Europas und Amerikas," in *Europa-Besinnung und Hoffnung* (ed. Hunold) 1957; these papers are found on pp. 29-88. For contrast and comparison see Henry Cord Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action, 1815-1945*, 1955, especially Chapters VII-X, wherein the author shows how European thought was intertwined with German expansionism.

[LC]

59

⁷In this connection it is perhaps worth mentioning that there have been published in recent years a large number of very interesting volumes showing the unity of Europe, for example the beautiful *Europa-Sein Wesen im Bild der Geschichte*, 1960 (also in French) with a searching introduction by Carl J. Burckhardt and an epilogue by Friedrich Heer.

⁸Cf. footnote 16.

⁹Cf. J. E. Erdmann, *Das Nationalitaetsprinzip*, 1862.

¹⁰Fritz Erler, *Democracy in Germany*, 1965, p. 127.

¹¹Gollwitzer, op. cit. pp. 269ff. Here Marx is treated as a follower of Hegel.

¹²John H. Kautsky, *The Political Thought of Karl Kautsky*, unprinted doctoral dissertation, Harvard, 1951.

¹³Lenin, *Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (in *Collected Works*, Vol. XIX); cf. also Alfred G. Meyer, *Leninism*, 1953, Ch. 11.

¹⁴Arthur Rosenberg, *The Birth of the German Republic*, 1931; Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917*, 1955. For a recent assessment see Mireille Marc, "Marxisme et Federalism" in *L'Europa en Formation*, V, 1964; also W. Birkelbach, "Die Europäischen Sozialisten und die EWG," *Europaarchiv*, 1962, pp. 139ff.

¹⁵See *The Philosophy and Policies of Woodrow Wilson*, ed. Earl Latham, 1958, Part III, "Wilson's Foreign Policies," with contributions by Link, Langer, Seymour and Osgood.

¹⁶Friedrich Meinecke, *Weltbuergertum und Nationalstaat*, 1922, is the classic treatment, especially Ch. 1 containing a general review. Cf. also Dietrich Schaefer, *Deutsches Nationalbewusstsein im Lichte der Geschichte*, 1884, for a typical statement and analysis by a prominent German historian of the nationalist school.

[lc]

60

17**William E. Rappard, *Uniting Europe*, 1930; C. J. Friedrich, *Foreign Policy in the Making*, 1938; Edward H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis-1919-1939*, p. 139. Cf. also Carl H. Pegg in *Europaarchiv*, 1962, pp. 749-758, 783-790, 865-874.

18**Friedrich, op. cit. Ch. 5; Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, *The Appeasers--The Decline of Democracy from Hitler's Rise to Chamberlain's Downfall*, 1963; Alan L. C. Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny*, 1952 and later; Walter Hofer, Ed. *Der Nationalsozialismus: Dokumente, 1933-1945, 1957; H. B. Gisevius, Adolf Hitler, 1963, especially Chs. 3-5;* Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee, *Hitler's Europe--Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1945*, 1954.

19**Andre Gide, *Journal, 1939-1942*, 1946; e.g. on June 24, after having expressed his dismay at a broadcast of Petain, "Ne suffit-il pas à la France d'être vainvaincue? Faut-il en plus qu'elle se déshonore?" he notes: "Seules les *Conversations avec Goethe* parviennent à distraire un peu ma pensée de l'angoisse."

20**Ernst Robert Curtius, *Die literarischen Wegbereiter des Neuen Frankreich, 1919*. Cf. also e.g. Friedrich Sieburg, *Gott in Frankreich? 1929; Paul Distelbarth, *Lebendiges Frankreich*, 1936.

21**Emanuel Geibel, *Heroldsrufe-Deutschlands Beruf*. 1861. The idea is, of course, older; it appears e.g. in Fichte.

22**Friedrich Nietzsche, *Wille zur Macht*, paragraph 958.

23**G. W. F. Hegel, *Die Vernunft in der Geschichte Einleitung in die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte* (ed. Lasson) p. 200 (cf. the English edition by Sibree, Dover, 1956, p. 86).

24**Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Germany's Eastern Neighbours, 1956; cf. also Zoltan Michael Szaz, *Germany's Eastern Frontiers, 1960*. The literature dealing with these issues is unfortunately deeply affected by political prejudice on both sides, and suffers from propagandistic implications. One of the most sane on the German side is Hermann Raschofer,

[LC]

61

Die Sudetenfrage, 1953.

<sup>25</sup>See for a general account Ch. VIII "The Eastern Dynasties..." of my *The Age of the Baroque 1610-1660*, 1952, and the further literature cited there.

<sup>26</sup>This aspect of German history has never been adequately developed, except in the field of literature.

<sup>27</sup>Merkl. op. cit. pp. 4ff.

<sup>28</sup>Hans Rosenberg, *Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy-The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815*, 1958, *passim*.

<sup>29</sup>Dietrich Bracher, Wolfgang Sauer, Gerhard Schulz, *Die Nationalsozialistische Machtergreifung*, 1960, pp. 207ff., 490ff., 732ff.; Hans Bernd Gisevius, *Adolf Hitler, 1963, passim*.

<sup>30</sup>Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler*, 1948, much expanded German edition 1958; Gerhard Ritter, *Carl Goerdeler und die Deutsche Widerstandsbewegung*, 1954, abbreviated English edition, 1959; G. v.S. Gaevernitz, *They Almost Killed Hitler*, 1947; Hans Royce, Erich Zimmermann, *Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (eds.) 20. Juli 1944. Fourth Edition*, 1961. Cf. also Wolfgang H. Kraus and Gabrield A. Almond on the resistance in *The Struggle for Democracy in Germany*.

<sup>31</sup>Alfred Grosser, *Die Bonner Demokratie-Deutschland von draussen gesehen*, 1960, p. 421. He is primarily speaking of the middle class. Cf. Marion Graefin Doenhoff, *Namen die Keiner mehr nennt-Ostpreussen-Menschen und Geschichte*, 1962.

<sup>32</sup>Ralf Dahrendorf, *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society*, 1959. Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers*, 1959.

<sup>33</sup>Gabriel A. Almond and Verba, Sidney, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, 1963, especially Ch.

[LC]

62

³⁴This new elite is typified by Konrad Adenauer and his followers; perhaps the most adequate assessment to date is Fritz René Allemann, *Bonn ist nicht Weimar*, 1956. A collective approach is found in Walter Stahl (ed.) *The Politics of Postwar Germany*, 1962; cf. especially B. Vogel and W. Kralewski, 'State and Society,' pp. 1-24, and P. D. G. Brown, "How Enduring is the Present Democratic System?" pp. 277-284. Cf. also A. J. Heidenheimer, *The Governments of Germany*, 1961; Elmer Plischke, *Contemporary Government of Germany*, 1961; Alfred Grosser, *La Democratie de Bonn*, 1958 (German ed. 60); William Henry Chamberlin, *The German Phoenix*, 1963, Ch. XIII of which contains a sound appraisal of the first work cited.

³⁵A competent overall assessment is found in Karl Dietrich Bracher, "The Foreign Policy of the Federal Republic of Germany," in Joseph E. Black and Kenneth W. Thompson, eds., *Foreign Policies in a World of Change*, 1963, 115-148. Gerald W. Freund, *Germany Between Two Worlds*, 1961.

³⁶Cf. *Europaarchiv*, January, 1956, pp. 850-96.
Arnold Bergstraesser, "Frankreich, Deutschland und Europa."

³⁷For this phase see e.g. the German review *Aussenpolitik*, 1956, and later which represents a kind of semi-official voice. Along with it, the pages and editorials of *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* in this period are instructive.

³⁸H. von Brentano, "Kontinuitaet und Dissonanzen der deutschen Politik nach dem Abbruch der Verhandlungen ueber den Beitritt Grossbritanniens zur Europaeischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft," *Europaarchiv*, 1965, pp. 119-125.

³⁹Alfred Grosser, "France and Germany in the Atlantic Community," in *The Atlantic Community-Progress and Prospects* (ed. F. O. Wilcox and H. Field Haviland, Jr.) 1963, pp. 32-55.

⁴⁰Freund, op. cit. (footnote 35) and Allemann, op. cit. (footnote 34). Cf. also Drew Middleton, *The Supreme Choice-Britain and Europe*, 1963, and U. W. Kitzinger, *The Politics and Economics of European Integration-Britain, Europe, and the United States*, rev. ed. 1963, especially Ch. V.

[LC]

63

⁴¹Cf. for this Marshal D. Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*. 1963; pp. 18ff., 64ff., 191ff.; Vernon C. Aspaturian, "Soviet Foreign Policy" in *Macridis, ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics, 1962*; the official Soviet line is well set forth by V. M. Khostov "The Foreign Policy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" in Black and Thompson as cited (footnote 35), where we read: "...one of the chief guarantees of a stable peace should be a demilitarized and democratized Germany as envisaged at Potsdam." Why? Because it would be an easy prey for a Soviet Communist take-over. A very interesting and diversified approach to the problems of Soviet-German relations was offered in a special number of *Survey*, October, 1962, entitled "Russia and Germany"; note especially the article by Melvin Croan.

⁴²This story has never been adequately told the official German view has been ably presented by Wilhelm G. Grewe, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit*, 1960, especially pp. 169-199, 228-240, 258-281, and 426-432, and Appendix I. Cf. also Hans Speier, *Die Bedrohung Berlins-Eine Analyse der Berlin-Krise von 1958 bis heute*, 1961, especially p. 21ff. For a thorough study of the Berlin issue, W. P. Davison, *The Berlin Blockade*..., 1958.

⁴³Cf. my paper "Panhumanism, Culturism and the Federal Union of Europe" read at the Basle Congress *Europe-Monde* (under the auspices of the Council of Europe) on September 29, 1964; a German version appeared in *Europaarchiv*, December, 1954; it will be published in the *Festschrift* for William E. Hocking, ed. Roumer, 1965.

⁴⁴This became clear at the time of the Geneva Conference on Germany in the summer of 1959, when a virtual equality (Gleichstellung) with the Federal Republic was forced by the Soviet Union. Cf. Grewe, op. cit., pp. 282ff.

⁴⁵Cf. the brilliant analysis by Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Peaceful Engagement in Europe*, 1965, Columbia University School of International Affairs confirming this position.

64

⁴⁶This development culminated in the decisions of the party congress at Karlsruhe in 1964. Cf. concerning this congress the printed report SPD Parteitag 1964 vom 23. bis 27. November, 1964, in Karlsruhe, un-corrected protocol, 1964 (Bonn).

⁴⁷The most impressive exponents of this position are Fritz Erler and Carlo Schmid. Both have stated their position repeatedly and effectively.

⁴⁸Karlheinz Koppe, "Projekt der europäischen Union" in Europaarchiv, 1962, pp. 263-268; *ibid*. pp. 581-595; G. Schroeder, "Grundprobleme der Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland."

⁴⁹This line was clearly developed at the party congress cited above in footnote 46. It declared that the SPD "bekreftigt ihren Willen, die Europäischen Gemeinschaften zu staerken und so auszubauen, dass ein Vereinigtes Europa ein gleichwertiger Partner der USA innerhalb der Atlantischen Gemeinschaft wird. ...Die Mitwirkung Grossbritanniens und anderer beitrittswilliger europäischer Staaten ist...dringends erforderlich."

⁵⁰The conclusions are supported by a research report furnished by Dr. Schierwater for the European Community Formation Project, 1965. Cf. also Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, 1958, Ch. 10, where the quote is found on p. 386/387.

⁵¹This sort of reaction could be observed in both countries in November and December, 1964, when on the one hand de Gaulle's threat to leave the E.E.C. and on the other Germany's reluctance to compromise on the grain price produced strong public reactions in the trade associations of both countries.

⁵²Cf. von Mangoldt, *Das Bonner Grundgesetz* (no date, but published around 1950) who reports that the relevant provisions were already part of the preliminary draft--so-called Herrenchiemsee draft--and that they had very wide support. The first two paragraphs of article 24 read: "(1) Der Bund kann durch Gesetz Hoheitsrechte auf zwischenstaatliche Einrichtuggen uebertragen. (2) Der Bund kann sich zur Wahrung des Friedens einem System

[1c]

65

gegenseitiger kollektiver Sicherheit einordnen; er wird
hierbei in die Beschraenkung en der Hoheitsrechte einwilligen,
die eine friedliche und dauerhafte Ordnung in Europa und
zu den Voelkern der Welt herbeifuehren und sichern."

⁵³This is particularly true of men like the chief
editorial writer of Die Welt, Hans Zehrer, and of Die
Zeit, Grafin Marion Doenhoff.

⁵⁴Cf. Andre Fontaine, "De Gaulle: Frankreich soll Frankreich bleiben," _Aussenpolitik_, XIV, 1963, pp. 739ff.; Stanley Hoffmann, "De Gaulle, Europe, and the Atlantic Alliance," International Organization, XVIII, 1964, pp. 1-28; Michael P. Haegele, "Deutschland-Frankreich im Jahre 1963," _Aussenpolitik_, XIV, 1963, pp. 151ff.

⁵⁵Typical for the more radical "federalist"
opposition is the journal _Der Foederalist_, edited by
Dr. Schoendube since 195 ; its basic approach is closely
related to that of the Italian UEF, as set forth in the
writings of Altiero Spinelli, especially

⁵⁶See above Birkelbach as cited in footnote 14.

⁵⁷Haas, op. cit. (footnote 50) pp. 19ff. cf. also C. J. Friedrich in _Federalism, Mature and Emergent_ (ed. MacMahon) 1955, Ch. 26. Recent federal theory has been increasingly inclined to transcend this dichotomy by adding a dynamic dimension and treating it in terms of a "federalizing process." On this, cf. Friedrich,

⁵⁸Carl A. Ehrhardt, "Staerkung oder Rueckschritt fuer Europavertraege?" in _Aussenpolitik_, XV, 1964, pp. 231-242.

⁵⁹Cf. C. J. Friedrich and R. H. Guttmann, "The Executive" in _Studies in Federalism_, 1954, Ch. 2 (also in French, etc.)

⁶⁰Daniel Villey, "Erziehung zum Europaeischen Denken" in _Europa-Besinnung und Hoffnung_ (ed. Hunold) 1957. (Other references to follow.)

66

⁶¹The cultural agreement between France and Germany is found in *Europaarchiv*,

⁶²Carl J. Friedrich, "The Grassroots Base of the Unification of Europe," in *Public Policy*, XII (ed. Friedrich and Harris) 1963, pp. 23-40; Adolf Gasser, *L'Autonomie Communale et la reconstruction de l'Europe*, 1946. Some of the details are from a forthcoming study on informal community formation to which R. Grauhahn contributed the research report on the *communes*.

⁶³Cf. the publications of the CIFE (Centre International de la Formation Europeenne) and more particularly their journal *Europe en Formation*, published since 1950. The pointedly federalist orientation of this work can be gauged from the writings of its directing promoter, Alexandre Marc, e.g. *Europe-Terre Decisive*, 1959.

⁶⁴On these problems, cf. *Der Europäische oeffentliche Dienst* (an international colloquium held at Saarbruecken, and edited by Georges Langrod). The several contributions have lost none of their actuality. Cf. also the publications of the E.E.C. itself.

⁶⁵Melvin Croan and Carl J. Friedrich, "The East German Regime and Soviet Policy in Germany" in *Soviet Satellite Nations: A Study of the New Imperialism* (A symposium ed. by John H. Hallowell, 1958); cf. also C. J. Friedrich and associates, *The Soviet Zone of Germany*, printed as a manuscript by the Human Relations Area Files, Yale University, 1956; reference might also be had to the study by Heidenheimer, supra, note 26. Cf also footnote 45.