[Lc]

**Versailles:**

--none of the powers achieved their objectives;

--two powers excluded did not accept legitimacy of the settlement and had no incentive to support it;

**Germany and its neighbors: E. Europe**

--(US non ratification was not decisive);

--the only reasonable settlement was balance of power discriminating against Germany not work; UK for the status quo; German disarmament, justified as first step; others to follow; given German power, statesmen set goals to their own disadvantage.

**Two ways of looking at threats:**

--US: wait until threat becomes actual; don't move against hypothetical changes, until become actual; US could do so because of margin;

--Europeans different, narrower margin; therefore precautionary mode of policy act against what might happen; Britain policy in 18th and 19th century.

Thus France in 1919 would have to fight against German rearmament and for special provisions, e.g. demilitarization of Rhineland; Versailles could only be maintained by offensive policy of France; occupation of the Rhineland, but paid price in world public opinion;

US: moralistic policy; considered settlement unjust; tried to conciliate German grievances.

**Ban War:** legal treaties and Locarono treaty; both paradoxical undermined Versailles; if war outlawed then German equality in armaments justified.

**Hitler:**

--policy of maneuver; stress injustices, equality

--attack Versailles not international structure

--rearmament, Rhineland decisive

--whole settlement depended on French offensive, but undercut by marginal line.

"I DO NOT THINK HITLER WILL ACCUSE ME OF BETRAYING HIS CONFIDENCE WHEN I SAY THAT ALMOST THE FIRST WORDS OF OUR CONVERSATION WERE ON THAT PARTICULAR POINT AND I HAVE NEVER HEARD IT SAID TO ME MORE EMPHATICALLY OR MORE MOVINGLY THAN BY HITLER THAT ANOTHER WAR WOULD NEITHER MEAN THE VICTORS OR THE VANQUISHED BUT THE RUIN OF EVERYTHING. OF COURSE HITLER WANTS SOMETHING FOR HIS COUNTRY BUT DON'T OUR STATESMEN. THE FUNDAMENTAL THING IS THAT HE IS AS CONVINCED AS ANY OTHER MAN IN THE WORLD THAT ANOTHER WAR WOULD MEAN THE COLLAPSE AND RUIN FOR EVERYBODY."

Belter Henderson

FOR EXAMPLE, THE DEPUTY LEADER OF THE LABOR PARTY MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT ABOUT HITLER'S SPEECH.

HE SAID, HERR HITLER'S STATEMENT OUGHT TO BE ACCEPTED AT ITS FACE VALUE, HERR HITLER MADE A STATEMENT WITH ONE HAND AND HOLDING OUT AN OLIVE BRANCE WITH THE OTHER WHICH OUGHT TO BE TAKEN AT ITS FACE VALUE. THIS MAY PROVE TO BE THE MOST IMPORTANT GESTURES WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE.

IT IS IDLE TO PRETEND THAT THESE STATEMENTS WERE INSINCERE.

THE DOMINANT PROBLEM OF THE WORLD IS THE PROBLEM OF PEACE NOT THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSE. THE ISSUE NOW IS WHETHER WE SHOULD RESORT TO INCREASED ARGUMENTS OR WHETHER WE HAVE A STATESMAN LIKE QUALITY OF DEALING WITH THE MOST GRIEVOUS PROBLEMS BEFORE MANKIND.

From: Paul Comly French (Editor), *Common Sense Neutrality*, (NY: Hastings House, 1939):

" In view of these competing, collateral emotions -- each one of which tends to dull the tenacity of our resolution completely to insulate America against involvement in this war -- a little time is not misspent if we linger for a brief moment upon the consequences if, through the omission of any act of entangling unneutrality, America once more finds herself pulled into Europe's wars. It may serve to steel our dominating purpose to keep out, regardless of these other considerations; and keep out we must, unless our own American security, sovereignty and our own American security are challenged. Against the possibility of such a challenge, I will join in a national defense which shall be as impregnable and as invincible as we can make it -- a frontier of democracy in this western world which never ban be successfully assailed. But I do not believe it is necessary that the challenge should ever come....

" Europe's imperialistic power politics have been devious with deep intrigue for a thousand years. They always have produced wars, and apparently they always will. They are beyond our ken. We found out in 1917-19 that we did not know what went on behind the scenes in Europe even when we thought we knew. There is even less assurance on that score today."

Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, pp. 230-1.

QUOTES

W.L. Mackenzie King to N.C. 30.9.1938.

"The heart of Canada is rejoicing tonight at the success which has crowned your unremitting efforts for peace. May I convey to you the warm congratulations of the Canadian people, and with them, an expression of their gratitude, which is felt from one end of the Dominion to the other. My colleagues in the Government join with me in unbounded admiration of the service you have rendered manking."

J.A. Lyons to N.C. 30.9.1938.

"My colleagues and I desire to express our warmest congratulations at the outcome of the negotiations at Munich. Australians in common with all other peoples of the British Empire owe a deep debt of gratitude to you for your unceasing efforts to preserve peace."

General Hertzog to N.C. 30.9.1938.

"The news of the outcome of the Conference at Munich was received in the Union with immense relief. May I convey to you my most hearty congratulations on the success of your efforts and those of the other statesmen who took part in it in saving Europe from a conflagration the consequences of which one shudders to contemplate."

Woodrow Wilson:

"... I am interested in neutrality because there is something so much greater to do than fight; there is a distinction waiting for this Nation that no nation has ever yet got. That is the distinction of absolute self-control and self-mastery. Whom do you admire most among your friends? The irritable man? The man out of whom you can get a 'rise' without trying? The man who will fight at the drop of the hat, whether he knows what the hat is dropped for or not? Don't you admire and don't you fear, if you have to contest with him, the self-mastered man who watches you with calm eye and comes in only when you have carried the thing so far that you must be disposed of? That is the man you respect. That is the man who, you know, has at bottom a much more fundamental and terrible courage than the irritable, fighting man. Now, I covet for America this splendid courage of reserve moral force ..." April 20, 1915

"The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right." May 10, 1915

"Neutrality is a negative word. It is a word that does not express what America ought to feel. America has a heart and that heart throbs with all sorts of intense sympathies, but America has schooled its heart to love the things that America believes in and it ought to devote itself only to the things that America believes in; and, believing that America stands apart in its ideals, it ought not to allow itself to be drawn, so far as its heart is concerned, into anybody's quarrel. Not because it does not understand the quarrel, not because it does not in its head assess the merits of the controversy, but because America has promised the world to stand apart and maintain certain principles of action which are grounded in law and in justice. We are not trying to keep out of trouble; we are trying to preserve the foundations upon which peace can be rebuilt. Peace can be rebuilt only upon the ancient and accepted principles of international law, only upon those things which remind nations of their duties to each other, and, deeper than that, of their duties to mankind and to humanity." Oct. 11, 1915

IN 1943, FOR EXAMPLE, TO STOP THE RUSSIANS
ABOLISHED THE COMINTERN AND THEN CONNALLY FROM TEXAS
WHO WAS NOT THEN KNOWN FOR HIS PRO COMMUNIST SYMPATHIES
COMMENTED THAT RUSSIA HAD BEEN STEADILY APPROACHING
THE ABANDONMENT OF COMMUNIST AND THE WHOLE WORLD SHOULD
BE GRATIFIED OF THE HAPPY OUTCOME. THE LONDON TIMES
COMMENTED ON THE FACT THAT THIS WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT
EVENT OF THE WAR, IT LAID TO REST ALL OF THE CHARGES THAT
MIGHT HAVE BEEN MADE, THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE INTERESTED
IN THE COMMUNIZATION OF ANY PART OF EUROPE AFTER THE WAR
AND IT SHOWED THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE AS DEDICATED TO
PEACE AS ANY OTHER OF THE COUNTRIES HAD BEEN AFTER THE
WAR. FORTUNE MAGAZINE, ALSO NOT KNOWN FOR ITS LEFTIST
TENDENCIES, PUBLISHED AN EDITORIAL IN WHICH THEY SAID
THAT AFTER THE WAR RUSSIA WILL PREFER THE PEACE
OF EUROPE TO COMMUNIZATION. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF
THIS CONTENTION ARE THAT TROTSKY IS DEAD AND THAT RUSSIA
WILL BE TOO WEAK FOR AGGRESSION IN EUROPE EVEN IDEOLOGICAL

Ralph Ingersoll. Top Secret (Harcourt, Brace and Company 1946) pp. 62-63.

"What was back of the Britons' passionate preoccupation over the Balkan route into Germany, I leave for later conclusions. The coming campaign in Western Europe was to throw light on it. For the present, it is sufficient to say that by the end of 1943, this preoccupation was established beyond dispute. The Balkan route was a positive magnet towards which, however you jiggled it, the needle of British strategy swung."

AGGRESSION AFTER THE WAR. IT IS THE ESSENCE OF STALINISM
TO USE COMMUNISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF LIMITED NATIONALIST
FOREIGN POLICY AND AS AN AID TO RUSSIA, THOUGH SHE HAS
BEEN GRADUALLY EXPANDING FOR OVER A CENTURY IS NOT SO
MUCH LAND HUNGRY AS HUNGRY FOR SECURITY ON ITS NATIONAL
BORDERS AND GIVEN THIS SECURITY SHE IS LIKELY TO FIX HER
ATTENTION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF HER ENORMOUS INTERNAL
RESOURCES. ANOTHER EXPERT WROTE WHAT WILL STALIN DO AFTER
VICTORY? THE NORMAL THING FOR HIM TO DO IS TO RETURN TO
THE VAST PROGRAM FOR HOME CONSTRUCTION SO FAR ONLY INITIATED
WHICH HE HAD ALWAYS CONSIDERED THE GREAT TASK OF HIS LIFE.
IT IS SIMPLE FANTASY TO IMAGINE THAT THE MAN WHO DROVE OUT
TROTSKY ON THE ISSUE OF WORLD REVOLUTION WILL NOW DESERT
TO THE PROGRAM OF HIS ENEMY. NOW THIS WAS THE PREVAILING
VIEW ABOUT STALIN IN THE MIDDLE 1940'S. AND HOPKINS, IN
COMMENTING ABOUT THE YALTA CONFERENCE, SAID "WE CAN RELY
ON THE WORDS OF STALIN. HE IS SINCERELY DEDICATED TO PEACE,

BUT WE CAN NOT BE SURE WHAT SINISTER FORCES MIGHT
BE BEHIND HIM IN THE LABYRINTH OF THE KREMLIN AND
THEREFORE OUR PART AT YALTA WAS TO STRENGTHEN THE
PEACE LOVING SIDE AGAINST THE SINISTER FORCES OF THE
KREMLIN WHO MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN FOMENTING TENSIONS."

IN 1943, FOR EXAMPLE, THE RUSSIANS ABOLISHED THE COMINTERN AND THEN CONNALLY FROM TEXAS WHO WAS NOT THEN KNOWN FOR HIS PRO COMMUNIST SYMPATHIES COMMENTED THAT "RUSSIA HAD BEEN STEADILY APPROACHING THE ABANDONMENT OF COMMUNIST AND THE WHOLE WORLD SHOULD BE GRATIFIED OF THE HAPPY OUTCOME. THE LONDON TIMES COMMENTED ON THE FACT THAT THIS WAS THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENT OF THE WAR, IT LAID TO REST ALL OF THE CHARGES THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN MADE, THAT THE RUSSIANS MIGHT BE INTERESTED IN THE COMMUNIZATION OF ANY PART OF EUROPE AFTER THE WAR AND IT SHOWED THAT THE COMMUNISTS WERE AS DEDICATED TO PEACE AS ANY OTHER OF THE COUNTRIES HAD BEEN AFTER THE WAR. FORTUNE MAGAZINE, ALSO NOT KNOWN FOR ITS LEFTIST TENDENCIES, PUBLISHED AN EDITORIAL IN WHICH THEY SAID THAT AFTER THE WAR RUSSIA WILL PREFER THE PEACE OF EUROPE TO COMMUNIZATION. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF THIS CONTENTION ARE THAT TROTSKY IS DEAD AND THAT RUSSIA WILL BE TOO WEAK FOR AGGRESSION IN EUROPE EVEN IDEOLOGICAL

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Omar N. Bradley. *A Soldier's Story* (Holt and Company 1951) pp. 190-191.

"TORCH brought the Allies to North Africa on the murky morning of November 8, 1942, when British and American forces landed at Algiers, Oran, and Casablanca in their first large-scale amphibious attack. For TORCH, however, the Allies were to pay a high price. Not only did it force us to cancel ROUNDUP for the following year, but it delayed the ultimate cross-channel attack until 1944. For with this diversion to the Mediterranean, the Allies had branched off on a siding in their strategic offensive. Not until the Combined Chiefs met at Casablanca in January, 1943, was General Marshall able to switch them back to the cross-channel invasion. And even then he was forced to accede to the Sicilian landing. For having, once entered the Mediterranean, the British were reluctant to leave. What that sea lacked in military advantage it offered in political opportunity."

p. 178

The question ΚΗΜ is asked: What will happen when they get the
atomic bomb themselves and have accumulated a large store? You can
judge yourselves what will happen then by what is happening now. If
these things are done in the green wood, what will be done in the dry?
If they can continue month after month disturbing and tormenting the
world, trusting to our Christian and altruistic inhibitions against
using this strange new power against them, what will they do when
they themselves have large quantities of atomic bombs?... No one in
his ΚΗΜ senses can believe that we have a limitless period of time
before us. We ought to bring matters to a head and make a final settlement.
We ought no to go jogging along improvident, incompetent, waiting for
something to turn up, by which I mean waiting for something bad for
us to turn up. The Western Nations will be far more likely to reach
a lasting settlement, without bloodshed, if they formulate their just
demands while they have the atomic power and beofre the Russian Communists
have got it too.

[Y]

N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1946

Three senators called Churchill's speech "shboking" while other congressmen discussed it pro and con, sometimes with considerable heat.

Senator Pepper (Fla.), Kilgore (W.Va.) and Taylor (Idaho) issued joint statement: "Mr. C's proposal would cut the throat of the U.N.O. It would destroy the unity of the Big Three, without which the war could not have been won and without which the peace cannot be saved." "It is shocking to see Mr. C., who rose to power on the repudiation of Chamberlain, aling himself with the old Chamberlain Tories who strengthened the Nazis as part of their anti-Soviet crusade." They added that the speech should warn the American people against "those would-be political statesmen in our country who are counterpart to the Chamberlain-Churchill-Toryspokesman of Great Britain and not let these American tories lead us into another war."

Europe's Capitols Stirred by Speech...

(London's conservative Evening News was for the speech but The Times says:)

"British opinion is far from believing that good relations with Russia are unattainable and that an Anglo-American alliance is the only possible insurance for the future."

George Bernard Shaw... "Winston Churchill's proposal for an Anglo-American alliance was, if successful, 'nothing short of a declaration of war on Russia. Technically, what C. proposes is a recrudescence of the old balance of power policy--a western bloc against the Russian bloc--with a view to a future war.'" The only merit that Mr. Shaw could see in C's speech was that it served as a reminder tha"there are a lot of people in this country who want to make war on Russia."

C. Averell Harriman

New York Herald Tribune, July 18, 1955

"Foremost among the reasons why Russia could greatly profit from a relaxation of tension, these experts (on Russia) say, is its desire for access to supplies in the West of heavy machinery, consumer goods, rolling stock and other materials that would speed both Russia and its principal ally, China, towards their ambitious industrial goals."

Peace with Russia, 1959

"I think Mr. Khrushchev is keenly anxious to improve Soviet living standards. I believe that he looks upon the current Seven Year Plan as the crowning success of the Communist revolution and a historic turning point in the lives of the Soviet people. He also considers it a monument to himself that will mark him in history as one of his country's great benefactors. However, as I have indicated elsewhere, he is finding it difficult to attain the ambitious goals set forth in the plan as long as armaments are making such heavy demands for scientific genius, technical skill and capital investment."

D. Summer Wells, The Time for Decision, 1944

"The present Soviet government has made it clear that world revolution . . . has *at least been* temporarily abandoned. . . Upon the conclusion of the present war, the Soviet government will undoubtedly have to dedicate its chief energies for years to the rehabilitation and reconstruction of its devastated cities and territories, to the problem of industrialization and to the achievement of a rise in the popular standard of living."

strategy must henceforth be merged with military strategy against
Germany. At the same time, the British Chiefs pointed out to
the Americans that the CCS, not Eisenhower, had the responsibility
for deciding European strategy. Furthermore, the British Chiefs
continued, there would not be enough air resources for both Italy
and ANVIL. (1. Msgs 717, and 718, Prime Minister to President,
28 Jun 44, Item 63c, Exec 10. 2.CCS 603/3, 28 Jun 44, title:
Operations To Assist OVERLORD. 3. Msg, Eisenhower, to Marshall,
29 Jun 44, CM-IN 24126).

The President would not yield. He immediately replied to
Churchill unequivocally: "The exploitation of 'OVERLORD,' our
victorious advances in Italy, an early assault on Southern France,
combined with the Soviet drives to the west--all as envisaged at
Teheran--will most surely serve to realize our object--the uncon-
ditional surrender of Germany." Roosevelt reminded Churchill
that Stalin had favored ANVIL and that they would have to inform
the Soviet leader of any change in plans. The President clearly
set forth his position on political objectives: "I agree that
the political considerations you mention are important factors,
but military operations based thereon must be definitely secondary
to the primary operations of striking at the heart of Germany."

"Our many post-war conferences have been characterized too much by attention to detail, by an effort apparently to work on specific problems rather than to establish the spirit and the attitude in which we shall approach them."

Eisenhower

"No one would want to under-estimate the change in the Russian attitude. Without that, nothing would have been possible. . . . But it remains President Eisenhower's achievement that he comprehended the change, that he seized the opening and turned it to the advantage of world peace. Mr. Eisenhower had done even better than defeat an enemy in battle as had been his assignment a decade ago. He had done something to prevent battles from happening. . . . The occasion was, in fact, made for Mr. Eisenhower. Other men might have played strength against strength. It was Mr. Eisenhower's gift to draw others into the circle of his good will and to modify the attitudes if not the policies of the little band of visitors from the other side of the Elbe."

N. Y. T.

"It is indeed an intense sense of relief which unites President Eisenhower with President [ sic ] Bulganin. Neither ever conceived that his own country would launch war. But each giant was quite convinced that the other giant was capable of doing so. It was this conviction which created the climate of cold war and precipitated the rearmament race. The cold war was suddenly called off at Geneva.

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because both sides recognized that these suspicions were entirely
unfounded."

"The chief result of the Geneva conference is so simple and breathtaking that cynics and comma-chasers still question it and Americans, for other reasons, find it a little difficult to grasp. The championship of peace has changed hands. In the mind of Europe, which judges this unofficial title, it has passed from Moscow to Washington."

"Why did this meeting send a thrill of hope and expectation round the world? It wasn't that the discussions were specially remarkable... it wasn't that they reached any very sensational agreement. It wasn't really what they did or said. What struck the imagination of the world was the fact of the friendly meeting between the Heads of the two great groups into which the world is divided. These men, carrying their immense burdens, met and talked and joked together like ordinary mortals. The Geneva spirit was really a return to normal human relations. It meant seeing the other man's point of view. It meant, above all, the human note. I cannot help thinking that last summer's Geneva idyll was not a vague or sham affair."

"Russians for years have been changing their economy and approaching the abandonment of Communism, and the whole Western world will

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be gratified at the happy climax of their efforts."

"The decision announced from Moscow to dissolve the Communist International is a wise step and one of the most important political events of the war. ... [It] refutes the insinuation that the spread of Communism in Europe is the Russian peace aim and the natural sequel of a Russian victory."

"The Russians cannot fight a war as drastic as the one they are engaged in without being changed by it. We can as yet have little inkling of the character or extent of the change. But we can guess that the thoroughgoing organization of the war economy, the civilian resistance, the guerrilla warfare could only be achieved in a war that had become democratic in its inner nature."

"Russia will prefer the peace of Europe to its communization. The arguments in favor of this assumption are that Trotsky is dead and that Russia will be too weak for aggression in Europe, even ideological aggression, after the war. It is the essence of Stalinism to use communism as an instrument of Russian nationalist foreign policy; and as a nation Russia, though she has been gradually expanding for centurieis, is not so much land-hungry as hungry for security on her

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borders. Given this security she is likely to fix her attention on the
development of her enormous internal resources."

"What will Stalin do after victory? We have to wait for the victory,
but perhaps this sketch will offer some answer. The normal thing
for Stalin to do is to return to the vast program of home construction,
so far only initiated, which has been the great task of his life. It is
simple fantasy to imagine that the man who drove out Trotsky on the
issue or world revolution will now desert to the program of his enemy."

"The present Soviet government has made it clear that world revolu-
tion has at least been temporarily abandoned. Upon the conclu-
sion of the present war, the Soviet government will undoubtedly have
to dedicate its chief energies for years to the rehabilitation and recon-
struction of its devastated cities and territories, to the problem of
industrialization and to the achievement of a rise in the popular
standard of living."

"Foremost among the reasons why Russia could greatly profit from
a relaxation of tension, these experts on Russia say, is its desire
for access to supplies in the West of heavy machinery, consumer goods,
rolling stock and other materials that would speed both Russia and

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Husseyn

III-3

than to negotiate. If peace ultimately depends on personalities, abstract goodwill may well seem more important than a concrete program. Indeed, the attempt to achieve specific settlements can appear as an obstacle rather than as an aid to peace. "Our many post-war conferences," said President Eisenhower in 1955, prior to the Geneva summit conference, "have been characterized too much by attention to detail, by an effort apparently to work on specific problems rather than to establish the spirit and the attitude in which we shall approach them."

Within two years of assuming office, President Eisenhower, whose party had charged its opponents with being soft towards Communism, found himself engaged in a summit meeting which called forth a flood of self-congratulatory comment, both in America and abroad. After a decade of Soviet intransigence the press was almost unanimous in its assertion that Soviet policy had been followed by the personal charm of one man. "No one would want to underestimate the change in the Russian attitude," said the New York Herald Tribune. "Without

6. New York Times, July 16, 1955.

III-4

that, nothing would have been possible. But it remains President
Eisenhower's achievement that he comprehended the change, that he
7 seized the opening and turned it to the advantage of world peace."

Mr. Eisenhower had done even better than defeat an enemy in battle
as had been his assignment a decade ago," read an editorial in the
*New York Times*, "He had done something to prevent battles from happening...The occasion was, in fact, made for Mr. Eisenhower. Other men
might have played strength against strength. It was Mr. Eisenhower's
gift to draw others into the circle of his goodwill and to modify
the attitudes if not the policies of the little band of visitors
from the other side of the Elbe."

The conviction was widespread on both sides of the Atlantic
that the Cold War had been due largely to personal distrust. Since
this had been removed at Geneva, an era of peace was beginning: "It
is indeed an intense sense of relief which unites President Eisenhower
with President Bulganin (sic). Neither ever conceived that his own
7. *New York Herald Tribune*, Editorial, July 21, 1955.

8. *New York Times*, Editorial, July 22, 1955.

III - 11

There was the inevitable assumption of a Soviet danger: "No one would want to underestimate the change in the Russian attitude. Without that, nothing would have been possible. But it remains President Eisenhower's achievement that he comprehended the change, that he seized the opening and turned it to the advantage of world peace."

There was the conviction both here and in Europe that the Cold War had been due largely to a misunderstanding. "It is an intense sense of relief which united President Eisenhower with President Bulganin (sic). Neither were convinced that his own country would launch a war. But each giant was quite convinced that the other giant was capable of doing so. It was this conviction which created the climate of the Cold War and precipitated the rearmament race. The Cold War was suddenly called off at Geneva because both sides recognized that these suspicions were entirely confounded. (Emphasis added)"

Once more there was the juxtaposition of power and diplomacy, of negotiation as the result of the impossibility of war: "There ain't gonna be any war," said the then Foreign Secretary MacMillan. "This is based upon

* New York Times, Editorial, July 21, 1955.

** Problems of the Garden-Party Peace, New Statesman and Nation, August 13, 1955.

III - 13

of his good will and to modify the attitudes if not the policies of
the little band of visitors from the other side of the Elbe." *

Diplomacy was seen as a public debate between us and the Soviet Union
with other nations occupying the moderator's chair and awarding the
winner's prize: "The Chief result of the Geneva conference is so
simple and breathtaking that cynics and still question
it and Americans, for other reasons, find it a little difficult to
grasp. The championship of peace has changed hands. In the mind of
Europe which judges this unofficial title, it has passed from Moscow
to Washington." **

In retrospect it may be doubted whether the protestations of
our peaceful intentions which were so generally regarded as one of the
main achievements of the Geneva summit conference were an unmixed blessing.
Indeed whether it was not a misconception to believe that after a decade

* *New York Times*, July 25, 1955.

** *Life*, editorial, August 1, 1955.

III - 13

applying the twin pillars concept too inflexibly one forces the Europe that emerges from it into an anti-American mold because its only sense of identity will be what distinguishes it from America?

I can not answer these questions here. I do believe that any viable Atlantic construction must be able to deal with them and provide formulae for the richness of institutions which the variety of challenges requires.

7. It would be wrong to become too obsessed with the difficulties and to concentrate too exclusively on the obstacles. The problems described in these lectures are the result of the vitality and the growing strength of the Atlantic area. They are the inevitable consequence of the emergence of a new international system. These problems will become insuperable only if technique is exalted above purpose. On both sides of the Atlantic it is important to remember that there are two kinds of realists: Those who manipulate facts and those who create them.

The West requires nothing so much as men able to create their own reality, imbued by the conviction that if history has a meaning it is up to us to give it that meaning.

[Y]

March 7, 1964

TO: HAK

FROM: DLB

RE: The Current Status of the Plowshare Statement.

1. The Plowshare Statement is now being held up for further research, but there is every indication that it can go with some minor additions.

2. It was held up because of new testimony by Seaborg and Kelly (Plowshare Director) before the Senate Commerce Committee, which testimony reverts to the position taken at the time of the Test Ban Hearings that the excavation technology and devices would be ready in 5 to 6 years. (This testimony has been went up here to me, in case it was not sent to you also.)

3. As you know, the Plowshare statement was based on a Times reporter's account of Seaborg's testimony before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on February 25. When the testimony of March 4 before the Senate Committee reached Pam Hill she asked that the statement be held up until she sould get the actual testimony of Seaborg's on February 5th to make sure that the Times story was accurate.

4. Through Donna Mitchell and others, the Seaborg testimony of February 25 is now available and is being sent to NYC and here. Cursory looks abt it by Donna Mitchell with phone conversations with Pam Hill lead to the conclusion that the Times story was entirely accurate. Apparently the direct statement to open Seaborg's testimony was about the same in both Committees, but in the Joint Committee Representative Hosmer put Seaborg through some rugged questoning in which he was forced to admit that the test ban treaty was hurting the Plowshare programa etc.

5. Present status: the statement is being held up until we get a chance to see the actual Seaborg-Hosmer exchange and edit or add to the statement accordingly.

--29

communism strives incessantly to open a breach in our bastion.

In the face of this serious threat, the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas, in 1954, made its memorable Declaration of Solidarity of the American States. It declared that the domination or control by the International Communist movement of the political institutions of any American state would threaten us all and endanger the peace of America. Thus again the American Republics marshaled the political and moral force of America against the efforts of an alien despotism to extend its system to this hemisphere and to intervene in our affairs. ("The Interdependence of Independence," address at Pan American Day Ceremonies at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., April 14, 1958; Press release No. 191)

Collective security was the alternative to appeasement:

But it is as certain now, as it was in 1939, that a policy of falling back, of making concession after concession, will not lead to peace, but to war.

The United States rejects that policy.

We are not alone in this rejection. There is a goodly company, comprising the great majority of the free nations, which also rejects the policy of conniving at aggression. Nearly 50 nations of the free world are bound together in collective-security pacts which embody the principle -- "an attack upon one is an attack upon all." ("Foundations of Peace," address to Veterans of Foreign Wars, New York, August 18, 1958)

American policy is guided not by expediency but by the principles of law and peace:

It is difficult for many to understand that the United States should really be motivated by considerations other than short-range expediency. It has been customary, for so many centuries, for nations to act merely to promote their own immediate self-interest, to hurt their rivals, that it is not readily accepted that there can be a new era when nations will be guided by principle.

We seek honestly to try to follow policies that will sustain the basic principles of world law which we believe to be the indispensable foundation for peace. Thus, we acted in 1956 in relation to Suez for precisely the same reasons that led us to act as we did in 1958 in relation to Lebanon, namely, to support, as we saw it, the principles of the United Nations Charter. (Ibid.)

American military power was "held in trust" for the people of the world:

We believe that U.S. resistance to aggression ... constitutes an effective deterrent to breaches of the peace and must be a main reliance until world order can be effectively based on supports that are universal.

Our own military establishment is nothing that we shall ever use for aggressive national purposes. Our military establishment is a power held in trust for the benefit of many nations. ("Principles and Policies in a Changing World," address to World Order Study Conference of the National Council of Churches, Cleveland, Nov. 18, 1958)