REMARKS OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER

THURSDAY, AUGUST 8, 1974 - 7:00 P.M.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen, I asked to meet with you because there are a number of actions that have to be taken, and some of your bureaus will have to be working tonight. And so I wanted to explain to you what is going on, and also make a few general observations.

First, it is no secret any more that the President is going to announce his resignation at nine o'clock tonight. Vice-President Ford will be sworn in at noon tomorrow. I have met for two hours with the Vice-President this afternoon. He has told me that he is determined to carry out the main lines of the foreign policy that have characterized President Nixon's administration, and that he wishes to do so on a bipartisan basis, in the national interest, and contribute in this manner to the healing process that is needed in this country.

This puts on this Department several major

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obligations.

First, we must contribute immediately to the transition. And we are working on messages in which we are asking your bureaus to participate, to various key heads of government and all Foreign Ministers around the world.

Secondly, we will be calling in the Ambassadors of various countries and will be meeting with them both in the Department and at the White House over the next two days.

Thirdly, we need briefing materials for the new President, outlining the major issues in each area and enabling him to prepare himself. He has had regular briefings from General Scowcroft and me, so the material is not entirely new to him. But obviously it makes a great deal of difference whether you are briefed as Vice-President or whether you deal with the material as President. He, for the immediate future, will require a daily briefing in the morning, to which this Department must contribute, and which must be done in an analytical manner. That is to say, it must define the issues, it must define the choices, and it must discuss the implications.

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And this will have to continue until the major issues are covered, over, we hope, a period of a week or two.

Those are the major things that have to be done.

I have asked the Deputy Secretary to have overall responsibility for the transition. I have asked Joe Sisco to see to it that the material from the regional bureaus -- to have general responsibility for the regional bureaus. And I have assigned the functional problems of SALT, European Security Conference, MBFR, to Hal Sonnenfeldt. And we will send out particular assignments over the next days -- probably tomorrow.

Now, this is what needs to be done.

But that isn't the only reason that you are here.

I have asked you to come here because in this rather tragic moment in our history, it is up to the Department to help provide continuity and to act in the national interest and not in the Departmental interest.

The first thing you can all do is to prove that we can have a meeting like this without telling your favorite newsman what was discussed. Let us begin now to prove that we are here for public service, and not for

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self service.

I have to brief and meet with the Vice-President
tomorrow morning at 8:15, and therefore I am meeting with
you prior to the Presidential speech and prior to the
announcement of all of the actions that I have described
to you. So I am giving you all great scoops. And I hope
that you will behave like professionals, and remember
that we now have to conduct ourselves with discipline and
in the national interest.

I have seen four Presidents in action. And each
of them sooner or later came to the conclusion that he
would prefer to rely on his personal staff. We have here
an opportunity to remember that the Department works for
the President. The President represents the nation. The
Department does not work for itself. And I think if we
conduct ourselves in this manner, the question of where
the locus of concern should be will not have to be raised
again. And this is especially true if we, in our briefings
and the material that has to be prepared, keep in mind
what the President needs. By this I mean do not push
your favorite ideas of your bureau that have been rejected
for the past year. This is not an opportunity to get hot
items slipped through a complicated process of dealing

with the President. First of all, I will be getting it
at both ends of the street, and it would be extraordinarily
unusual if it succeeded. But more importantly, I think
it is crucially important that when the President reads
something from this Department, it is obviously infused
with the attitude of asking the question of where the country
is going, what we want to achieve, and is consistent with
the solemnity of the occasion.

Now, in this connection, I feel it important
to make one other observation.

I think it would be in extraordinary bad taste,
and it will not be tolerated, if this Department or
any member of this Department now chose to comment in any
way whatever on the departing President. I have had
the privilege of working with him for five-and-a-half years.
And in the field of foreign policy, his achievements have
been notable. And in any event, for the sake of continuity
of our government, for the sake of the dignity of the
United States, I expect everyone in the Department to keep
in mind that the only way we can have continuity is to take
pride in what has been done in our field; and that
this is not the time to compound the suffering by expressing

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any personal views that anybody might have on this or that
aspect of the situation.

The burden on the Department, the responsibility
of the Department, and the opportunity for service of
the Department have never been greater.

I know that you will all work on it with
dedication. I know you will all help us in bringing about
the continuity in the work towards peace and progress
that alone makes it worthwhile for us to be in government.

Now, are there any questions that I can answer?

Well, in that case, I look forward to cooperating
with you and to your assistance in this period.

Thank you.

--

PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 19, 1974

No. 334A

SIGNING CEREMONY
UNITED STATES-EGYPTIAN COMMUNIQUE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

AUGUST 19, 1974

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I would like to express the gratification of my colleagues, myself, above all, the President for the very fruitful meetings we have had here.

The discussions were in two parts. One concerned the direction of future peace efforts in the Middle East. We found these talks extremely constructive and they will be exceedingly helpful as we jointly plan the next phases of movement towards a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Egypt has played a crucial role in the first phase and we know it will play an equally crucial role in the future phases.

At the same time, we have had very detailed discussions about the bilateral relations that have developed between Egypt and the United States.

We should always keep in mind that it is only ten months since my friend Ismail came here for the first time. I won't say what he is expecting me to say -- (Laughter).

No one could imagine then that such a dramatic turn in our bilateral relations would be possible.

The Administration is strongly supporting the requests we have made to Congress. In addition, we will give the highest priority to Egypt's needs that we can meet under the P.L. 480.

But beyond all the specifics, we consider the growing friendship between Egypt and the United States a cardinal point of our foreign policy which will come to expression in the general area of the Middle East, as well as in our joint effort to strengthen our mutual alliance.

I would like to say, on behalf of the President and all of my colleagues, that the Foreign Minister's visit here has made a very major contribution in all of these respects.

For further information contact:

PR #3344

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Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmy: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of my colleagues of the Egyptian Delegation and in my name, I would like to thank you personally and thank your colleagues for the very constructive and useful discussions which took place between both of us, separately and between our two delegations, on the Joint American-Egyptian Commission.

I can't leave this historical moment without thanking your President for the honor he gave me in receiving me and having a working lunch with him, with your presence. It was a very constructive meeting which I consider is very indicative in the sense that it will build on the friendship between our two countries, and I can assure you from our part we will do our best to cement this friendship.

I am grateful, too, Mr. Secretary, for the reception which was given to me by the members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I am grateful to every individual who participated in one way or another in my mission.

I am grateful to the information media for the coverage they have made to our talks, and I can assure you and assure the American people that we in Egypt have the best of intentions towards the American people. I think I would be very faithful in conveying through this opportunity to the American people the friendship of President Sadat and the Egyptian people, and that we are looking forward for the visit of my President to your country upon the invitation of President Ford, and we are sure that we will work together for a better future from every point of view.

Thank you, very much.

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PRESS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

August 19, 1974

NO. 331

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
THE HONORABLE HENRY A. KISSINGER
SECRETARY OF STATE

AUGUST 19, 1974

#32

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to begin
with a few observations about the tragic death of Ambassador
Davies.

Ambassador Davies has been a close associate
for all the years that I have been in Washington. He
worked closely with me on Middle East problems when he
was Deputy Assistant Secretary. His performance after
he was appointed Ambassador in Cyprus has been outstanding.
I think I can do no better than to read to you two cables
which I sent to him, one on July 22, the other on
August 10.

On July 22 I sent him the following cable.

"I would like to express my thanks for your
performance and that of your staff during the last week.
I relied heavily on your good judgment and on the
excellent reporting from Nicosia. The steadiness and
courage displayed by you and your staff under dangerous

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conditions were exemplary. The Embassy's overall performance
deserves the highest commendation. Please convey my
congratulations and profound thanks to all members of
your staff. Hopefully, and in great measure due to your
efforts, the situation will calm in Cyprus."

Then on August 10, I sent him another cable.

"Art Hartman has just reported to me in
some detail on the magnificent performance of all of you
under the most dangerous and trying circumstances. Your
courage under fire, your accurate, perceptive and calm
reporting, and your continued efforts to further our policy
and protect American citizens with a reduced and over-worked
staff are a credit to you and are in the finest tradition
of the Service."

My associates will tell you that the highest
praise they usually get from me is the absence of
criticism. And I want to call your attention to these
two cables which express the extraordinary performance
of Ambassador Davies. Those of us who have known him
will miss him for his outstanding human qualities.

The Foreign Service, which is often criticized,
has produced no better representative. And his work

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is in the best traditions of a service to which dedication
and the performance of a national duty are the principal
objectives.

I have sent the following message to Ambassador
Davies' children.

"You both have my deepest sympathy in this
tragic time. While there is little that anyone can say
at a moment such as this to lessen the sorrow, I want
you to know that we share your deep sense of loss. Your
father was loved, respected and admired by all of his
colleagues in the Foreign Service and the State Department.
You should be very proud of him; we are. Mrs. Kissinger
and I stand ready to do anything we can to help in the
difficult months ahead."

You know that the White House has already
announced that the President has ordered that a plane
be sent for the children. I have asked our Deputy
Under Secretary of State Brown, whose distinguished
service includes service as Ambassador in Jordan in
very difficult circumstances, to go out with this plane
to represent the United States in Cyprus until we can
appoint an Ambassador and get him in place. The

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designation of an officer of the distinction of Ambassador
Brown leaves no doubt of the importance we attach to a speedy
and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus issue.

This morning also President Clerides called me
to express his personal sorrow at the loss of Ambassador
Davies, whom he described as a close personal and very
trusted friend. I assured President Clerides that the
United States fully understood the lack of responsibility
of the Cyprus Government for this tragic event. I assured
him that the United States would continue a major effort
to bring about peace, and he urged us to make such an
effort. I emphasized to him, however, that these efforts
would not be helped by anti-American demonstrations that
were unjustified by the record, and that could only
create conditions to hamper these efforts.

I also have had an opportunity this morning to
speak with President Ford about the situation in
the eastern Mediterranean. We were in close touch by
telephone yesterday and we have met personally several
times in the preceding days. President Ford has asked
me to make the following statement on behalf of the
United States :

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First -- the United States shall insist
on the strict maintenance of the cease-fire on Cyprus.

Second -- the imperative and urgent need is to
begin negotiations.

Third -- we will continue to support efforts to
bring the parties to the negotiating table.

Fourth -- the United States will play any role
requested by the parties. We are also prepared to support
the able efforts of the British Foreign Secretary Callaghan
in this regard.

Fifth -- in these negotiations, we believe
it will be necessary for Turkey, as the stronger power
on the ground, to display flexibility and a concern for Greek
sensitivities, both in terms of territory and the size
of military forces on the island. I have made this
point directly this morning to the Prime Minister of
Turkey. I have been assured that the Turkish Government
considers the demarcation line negotiable, and that
it will carry out the provisions of the Geneva Agreement
calling for phased reductions of troops on Cyprus.

Sixth -- the United States greatly values
the traditional friendship of Greece. It has the highest

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regard for Prime Minister Karamanlis, and wishes every
success to his democratic government. We will use
our influence in any negotiation to take into full account
Greek honor and national dignity. At the same time,
we assume that all of our allies, including Greece,
join in collective defense in their own interests. We
are willing to strengthen these common alliance ties
and to help the Greek Government in any way possible.
We will not be pressured by threat of withdrawal from
the Alliance, or anti-American demonstrations which in
any event are totally unjustified by our record.

I repeat that this statement has been
gone over by President Ford.

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Q Will we get a copy?

A You will have a copy -- I suppose we will
have a copy available.

Q May I ask, has the President been in touch
with Prime Minister Ecvit?

A I have been in touch with him, and I affirm
that the answer is, "Yes."

Q Will you take questions?

A Reluctantly.

Q Last week, one of your associates described
as plain "baloney" suggestions that the United States has
tilted toward Turkey. Do you share in that view?

And, can you tell us specifically, the consideration
that was given to cutting off arms to Turkey and why arms
were not cut off during the building crisis.?

A With the speaker sitting here and looking
balefully at me, my options as they say, are severely limited.

I completely support the statement of Mr.
McCloskey.

The situation on Cyprus tilted toward Turkey,
not as a result of American policy, but as a result of
the actions of the previous Greek Government which destroyed

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the balance of forces as it had existed on the island.

The United States did not threaten the cutoff of military aid to Turkey for these reasons:

First, it was considered that such an action would be ineffective, and would not prevent the threatening eventuality.

Secondly, as was pointed out in this statement, we are giving economic and military aid as a reflection of our common interest in the defense of the eastern Mediterranean. Once such a decision is taken, it will have the most drastic consequences and not just over a period of time covering a few days, but over an extended period of time.

For all these reasons, it was judged that the United States would be both ineffective and counterproductive to threaten the cutoff of aid.

Short of this, however, we made the most repeated and urgent representations to Turkey in order to prevent the military action that happened. We have criticized the action and we believe also that the inflexibility of all of the parties in Geneva contributed to it.

Q Mr. Secretary, I don't know the exact wording

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but back earlier, you said, "the United

States will play -- " this is in the President's statement,
"The United States will play any role requested by the
parties." Is that correct?

You will await some request from them, or do
you have any initiatives to take on your own?

A First of all, I think the exact status of
the statement I read is that it is not a statement "by"
the President. It is a statement approved and directed
by the President -- and I don't know what the distinction
is, but generally, Presidential Statements are made at the
White House.

But the practical consequences are the same
because it has been gone over with the President, and he
has asked me to make it in his name.

Now on, "Have practical steps been proposed?"

It is my understanding that the British Government
is considering an initiative, which we shall support.

We have also made clear to the parties that we are prepared
to use any alternative method that promises results.

As you know, during the last week, we offered

LC

10

to all of the parties a more active American role, and it
is up to them to avail themselves of it.

We have not yet made any specific proposal as to
a particular solution, but you will see in the statement
that I have just read, our view as to the direction in which
the negotiations should go.

Q Can I follow that up, Mr. Secretary?

Has there been any request by the parties to
get you more personally involved by either going there
personally and what would be the reaction if you were asked?

A There has not been any formal request, and
our first effort now, is to get the parties to the conference
table.

We would be prepared to entertain any request that
offered a prospect of success.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been widespread
criticism around the world from diplomats as well as from
public demonstrators, that the United States used "quiet
diplomacy" which was so quiet during the past four weeks
that it was ineffective.

Can you address yourself to whether the United

11

States at an earlier point might have done what it has
done today if it had issued a firm, specific statement?

Also, you have been burned in effigy on Lafayette
Square, I believe, for the first time.

A Well I am honored -- is it really only the
first time? [Laughter.]

Q In Lafayette Square, I believe.

A I hope you all realize that half of the
demonstrators were State Department employees. [Laughter.]

Let us understand the context within which the
negotiations have taken place:

Until early August, until in fact August 8th,
it was the general judgment of all those dealing with the
negotiations, including specifically that of the United
Kingdom, that the conference in Geneva would lead to a
settlement and that in fact it would, after an initial
phase which would be conducted by Foreign Ministers, break
up into working groups that would settle the issue.

Under those circumstances, it would have been
highly inappropriate for the United States to make a public
statement of the solution that it advocated.

After it became apparent that the negotiations in

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Geneva were heading for a stalemate, the United States,
first, responded to every request by the principal mediator,
the British Foreign Secretary, for specific assistance and
specific proposals.

In addition, the United States made many
demarches to Turkey to prevent the threatened military
action.

And it [United States] would have preferred if, perhaps,
some more flexibility could have been shown by all of
the parties in Geneva.

Our judgment was that a public statement would
freeze the positions and that it would not achieve the
objective of thwarting a military attack.

After the event, it is never possible to prove
whether some other course might not have been successful.
Our judgment was that under the circumstances, that
quiet diplomacy would lead to these results. But there
is a limit to what diplomacy can achieve. It cannot
substitute for an existing relationship of forces.

We understand the frustrations of the Greek
community. We understand also the frustrations and
disappointments of the Greek Government -- but it is

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important to remember that the original dislocations were
not of our own making and that the United States while
it will try to be helpful, cannot solve all problems
around the world.

With respect to the demonstrations, it is worth
while to remember that a few years ago the demonstrations
were complaining about excessive American involvement.

Now the complaint seems to be the opposite.

Q Mr. Secretary, has the perception of the
United States as "tilting towards Turkey" regardless of
whether it's correct or incorrect in any way hampered
your efforts to serve as an effective mediator between the
two sides?

A I think that it is understandable that
Greek emotions run very deep at this moment.

I believe that upon calmer reflection, the re-
sponsible Greek leaders will recognize that the United
States has shown deep sympathy for the Greek Government
-- that we welcome the present democratic government in
Greece, and that within the limits of what was possible,

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we have attempted to play a constructive role.

I think the Greek Government will also realize
that the United States' roles can be very important in
bringing about a result consistent with the dignity and
honor of all of the parties -- and we hope it will realize
that anti-American demonstrations and anti-American
gestures, do not contribute to our effectiveness.

Q Mr. Secretary, yesterday, Secretary Schlesinger talked about the arms embargo and the continued Turkish advances and it sounded like it was still an active possibility if the Turks continued their military operations on Cyprus.

Is it? And to what point do we invoke some form
of embargo?

A I do not wish to speak of circumstances
that have not arisen. We have been given assurances by
the Turkish Government that it would strictly abide by
the cease-fire -- and these assurances were reiterated
in my conversations with Prime Minister Ecevit this
morning.

I do not want to consider what our point of view
would be if it turned out that these assurances weren't correct.

[Continued on page C -1]

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15

Q Mr. Secretary, on the question about military
assistance, please, the Foreign Assistance Act stated --

A Where is the question?

Q I am asking the question from back here. The
Foreign Assistance Act states --

A I thought I was looking at Bernie Gwertzman.

Q -- that defense services to any country shall
be furnished solely for internal security and for legitimate
self-defense. It also states that any country which uses
articles which we have given them in substantial violation
of the Act, shall be immediately ineligible for further
assistance.

The question that I am asking is whether or not,
what your understanding of the legal terms of the Act are,
whether or not we are not required under the terms of the
Act to cut military assistance to Turkey?

A Well, I will have to get a legal opinion on
that subject, which I have not done. The considerations
from a policy point of view that were at the mind of the
President and myself have been stated here.

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Q In your conversation with the Prime Minister of Turkey today, just to broaden one of your points, do you have the understanding that the one-third of Cyprus which is now under Turkish control can be significantly reduced in size?

A I have the understanding that it can be reduced in size.

Q But not significantly.

A I did not go into that much detail.

Q Mr. Secretary, in view of the crisis in Cyprus, can you assess, or could you reassess the capability of the United States to stop or limit local wars between smaller states?

A Well, the United States has never claimed, and could not accept the proposition, that it must stop every local war between smaller states wherever they occur.

Secondly, it is also clear that the United States cannot be asked to redress any upset in any balance regardless of how it has occurred, and where it has occurred, by its own military forces.

We are disappointed by the outcome, by the actions of various of the parties at various times on Cyprus.

We chose--in order not to internationalize the issues too much--to support Britain, which had a legal position as a guaranteeing power in its mediating effort.

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We are prepared to continue to do this, and we
are prepared also to make other efforts.

I do not think it is fair to generalize from this
one event, which had a long and complicated history, on a
global basis.

Q Mr. Secretary, earlier you spoke about a new
British initiative. Could you give us an idea as to what
it would be, what would be the direction of it?

A
I saw a ticker before I came
here in which this had allegedly been announced by the
British Foreign Office, and I do not want to go into the
details of it because it has been the subject of confidential
discussions over the weekend. I simply wanted to indicate
the United States' support for it.

Q Mr. Secretary, on the one hand, just a couple
minutes ago, you did not rule out totally the cutting off,
or the possible cutting off, of military aid. You merely
said you didn't want to discuss circumstances which have
not yet arisen. But, on the other hand, you gave us two
very good reasons why the cut-off of military aid would not
be effective anyway. Why can you not rule it out?

A The cut-off of military aid was judged not to

[c]

be effective in the circumstances existing last week. It
is a step we would take only in very extreme circumstances
which, I repeat, have not arisen, and which I do not fore-
see. We cannot rule it out for all time, but we do not fore-
see it, and we are not threatening with it now.

Q Mr. Secretary, what is happening on the nego-
tiations on the Jackson Amendment? Where does that stand?
When do you expect that that will come to a fulfillment?

A As the three Senators said after the meeting
with President Ford the other day, we made good progress
in the negotiations. We hope that we can make further
progress during this week.

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19

Q Mr. Secretary, in your conversations with the parties involved in the Cyprus situation, would you care to characterize the situation now as a winding down, or do you expect it to go on indefinitely?

A No, my impression is that the military operations have substantially wound down. It is, of course, a serious problem for Greece whether and under what circumstances it will enter negotiations. We favor early negotiations because we do not believe that the situation will improve. Indeed, the status quo will tend to be confirmed the longer the negotiations are delayed.

I have stated the American position with respect to the negotiations and with respect to the role we would play in a negotiation, and we expect to have clearer responses about that in the next few days.

Q Mr. Secretary, could you explain the American position on the next step in the diplomatic dialogue in the Middle East? Yesterday's U.S.-Jordanian communique said that at an appropriately early date there should be a Jordanian-Israeli disengagement agreement. Does this now mean that the United States sees the next step being between Israel and Jordan?

20

A First of all, let me say that there are many versions of disengagement schemes between Jordan and Israel, and the United States did not imply by this statement that it backed any particular scheme between Jordan and Israel.

As to which negotiation should be next, I think we cannot decide until the round of discussions is completed, which involves the Foreign Minister of Syria, who is arriving this week; the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, who is arriving next week; and we have also invited the Prime Minister of Israel to come here in the first half of September for discussions with the President. It is only after all of these discussions are completed that we can make a judgment as to what the next move should be.

Q Following up on that, do you expect on your scheduled trip to India to stop off in the Middle East to possibly begin some shuttle diplomacy between Amman and Jerusalem?

A I think that as a general practice a foreign government must not expect that every time there is a crisis, the Secretary of State will come rushing into the area and spend all of his time settling that particular crisis. On that basis we could never conduct a consistent

21

American foreign policy. And it cannot become the rule
that every issue is settled by the personal shuttle
diplomacy of the Secretary of State.

I'm prepared to go to the Middle East for a
specific trip. And I may, if there is an especially
critical point, engage in a brief shuttle diplomacy.
But I do not think it is in the U.S. interests nor in
the interests of other countries to expect me personally
to settle every issue no matter where it arises.

So we will support further diplomatic moves,
but one must not expect that the same degree of extended
absences from Washington which characterized the last
negotiations.

Q Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

(The news conference was terminated at 1:35 p.m.)

NEWS
RELEASE

BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Department of State
Office of Media Services

Press Conference:

SECRETARY KISSINGER DISCUSSES CYPRUS
SITUATION, KILLING OF U.S. AMBASSADOR DAVIES

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

August 19, 1974

Press Conference by Secretary of State
Henry A. Kissinger in the Press Briefing
Room of the Department of State
August 19, 1974.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would like to begin with a few observations about the tragic death of Ambassador [Rodger P.] Davies.

On July 22 I sent him the following cable:

"I would like to express my thanks for your performance and that of your staff during the last week. I relied heavily on your good judgment and on the excellent reporting from Nicosia. The steadiness and courage displayed by you and your staff under dangerous conditions was exemplary. The Ambassador's overall performance deserves the highest commendation. Please convey my congratulations and profound thanks to all members of your staff. Hopefully, and in great measure due to your efforts, the situation will calm in Cyprus."

Then on August 10, I sent him another cable:

"Art Hartman [Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman] has just reported to me in some detail on the magnificent performance of all of you under the most dangerous and trying circumstances. Your courage under fire, your accurate, perceptive, and calm reporting, and your continued efforts to further our policy and protect American citizens with a reduced and over-worked staff are a credit to you and are in the finest tradition of the Service."

PR 331/32

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The Foreign Service, which is often criticized, has produced no better representative. And his work is in the best traditions of a service to which dedication and the performance of a national duty are the principal objectives.

I have sent the following message to Ambassador Davies' children:

"You both have my deepest sympathy in this tragic time. While there is little that anyone can say at a moment such as this to lessen the sorrow, I want you to know that we share your deep sense of loss. Your father was loved, respected, and admired by all of his colleagues in the Foreign Service and the State Department. You should be very proud of him: we are. Mrs. Kissinger and I stand ready to do anything we can to help in the difficult months ahead."

You know that the White House has already announced that the President has ordered that a plane be sent for the children. I have asked our Deputy Under Secretary of State [L. Dean] Brown, whose distinguished service includes service as Ambassador in Jordan, in very difficult circumstances, to go out with this plane, to represent the United States in Cyprus until we can appoint an Ambassador and get him in place. The designation of an officer of the distinction of Ambassador Brown leaves no doubt of the importance we attach to a speedy and peaceful resolution of the Cyprus issue.

I also have had an opportunity this morning to speak with President Ford about the situation in the eastern Mediterranean. We were in close touch by telephone yesterday and we have met personally several times in the preceding days. President Ford has asked me to make the following statement on behalf of the United States:

First, the United States shall insist on the strict maintenance of the cease-fire on Cyprus.

Second, the imperative and urgent need is to begin negotiations.

Third, we will continue to support efforts to bring the parties to the negotiating table.

Fourth, the United States will play any role requested by the parties. We are also prepared to support the able efforts of the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, in this regard.

Fifth, in these negotiations, we believe it will be necessary for Turkey, as the stronger power on the ground, to display flexibility and a concern for Greek sensitivities, both in terms of territory and the size of military forces on the island. I have made this point directly this morning to the Prime Minister of Turkey. I have been assured that the Turkish Government considers the demarcation line negotiable, and that it will carry out the provisions of the Geneva Agreement calling for phased reductions of troops on Cyprus.

Sixth, the United States greatly values the traditional friendship of Greece. It has the highest regard for Prime Minister Karamanlis, and wishes every success to his democratic government. We will use our influence in any negotiation to take into full account Greek honor and national dignity. At the same time, we assume that all of our allies, including Greece, join in collective defense in their own interests. We are willing to strengthen these common alliance ties and to help the

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Greek Government in any way possible. We will not be pressured by threat of withdrawal from the [NATO] Alliance, or anti-American demonstrations which in any event are totally unjustified by our record.

Q Will we get a copy?

A You will have a copy — I suppose we will have a copy available.

Q May I ask, has the President been in touch with Prime Minister [Bulent] Ecevit?

Q Will you take questions?

A Reluctantly.

Q Last week, one of your associates described as plain "baloney" suggestions that the United States has tilted toward Turkey. Do you share in that view? And can you tell us specifically the consideration that was given to cutting off arms to Turkey and why arms were not cut off during the building crisis?

A With the speaker sitting here and looking balefully at me, my options, as they say, are severely limited.

The situation on Cyprus tilted toward Turkey, not as a result of American policy, but as a result of the actions of the previous Greek Government which destroyed the balance of forces as it had existed on the island. The United States did not threaten the cut-off of military aid to Turkey for these reasons:

For all these reasons, it was judged that the United States would be both ineffective and counterproductive to threaten the cut-off of aid.

Q Mr. Secretary, I don't know the exact wording but back here earlier you said, "the United States will play --," this is in the President's statement, "The United States will play any role requested by the parties." Is that correct? You will await some request from them, or do you have any initiatives to take on your own?"

Now, on "Have practical steps been proposed?"

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As you know, during the last week, we offered to all of the parties a more active American role, and it is up to them to avail themselves of it.

We have not yet made any specific proposal as to a particular solution, but you will see in the statement that I have just read our view as to the direction in which the negotiations should go.

Q Can I follow, that up, Mr. Secretary? Has there been any request by the parties to get you more personally involved by either going there personally, and what would be the reaction if you were asked?

A There has not been any formal request, and our first effort now is to get the parties to the conference table. We would be prepared to entertain any request that offered a prospect of success.

Q Mr. Secretary, there has been widespread criticism around the world from diplomats as well as from public demonstrators that the United States used "quiet diplomacy" which was so quiet during the past 4 weeks that it was ineffective.

Can you address yourself to whether the United States at an earlier point might have done what it has done today if it had issued a firm, specific statement?

A Well I am honored -- is it really only the first time? [Laughter]

A I hope you all realize that half of the demonstrators were State Department employees. [Laughter]

Until early August, until, in fact August 8th, it was the general judgment of all those dealing with the negotiations, including specifically that of the United Kingdom, that the conference in Geneva would lead to a settlement and that in fact it would, after an initial phase which would be conducted by Foreign Ministers, break up into working groups that would settle the issue.

After it became apparent that the negotiations in Geneva were heading for a stalemate, the United States first responded to every request by the principal mediator, the British Foreign Secretary, for specific assistance and specific proposals. In addition, the United States made many démarches to Turkey to prevent the threatened military action. And it [the United States] would have preferred if, perhaps, some more flexibility could have been shown by all of the parties in Geneva. Our judgment was that a public statement would freeze the positions and that it would not achieve the objective of thwarting a military attack.

After the event, it is never possible to prove whether some other course might not have been successful. Our judgment was that under the circumstances, quiet diplomacy would lead to these results. But there is a limit to what diplomacy can achieve. It cannot substitute for an existing relationship of forces.

We understand the frustrations of the Greek community. We understand also the frustrations and disappointments of the Greek Government -- but it is important to remember that the original dislocations were not of our own making and that the United States, while it will try to be helpful, cannot solve all problems around the world.