UNCLASSIFIED

[Y]

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

C. Accommodations

All participants will stay at the Woodstock Inn. Your room is 243. The room immediately across from yours has been reserved for the use of your agents, who will be on duty there at night when you are in your room. I will be staying in a motel nearby if it is not possible to arrange a room in the Inn itself. Shall we try and arrange to have a White House telephone, safe and recording machine installed in your room?

Yes __________

No __________

D. Scenario

Each of the five sessions will be held in the Woodstock Room on the ground floor of the Inn. All participants (list at Tab A) will be seated alphabetically in the room; at a dais will be seated the Prince of The Netherlands, Mr. Johnson - European Co-Chairman, Ernst van der Beugel and the three authors of the papers provided for prior reading: Denis Healey, Gabriel Hauge, and Giovanni Agnelli. Simultaneous translations will be provided into French and English. The Prince will announce the opening and closing of each session and times may vary from times indicated in the Schedule section above. Participants will be recognized individually and will be limited to remarks of five minutes in length.

E. Agenda

There are two agenda topics:

(1) "The Contribution of Business in Dealing with Current Problems of Social Instability."

(2) The possibility of a change of the American role in the world and its consequences.

The first ~~topic~~ will be dealt with on Friday. The second topic will be discussed on both Saturday and Sunday. Preparatory reading suggestions will be forwarded separately and I will have them along with me when you depart. The items being forwarded are:

exists at 3 o'clock at which are enclosed!

(1) "The Nixon Doctrine and Future of Europe" by Denis Healey.

(2) "Rewriting the Social Contract" by Gabriel Hauge.

(3) "The Contribution of Business in Dealing with Current Problems of Social Instability" by Giovanni Agnelli.

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

[x]

CONFIDENTIAL

23 - 25 April 1971

Bilderberg/Woodstock

Agenda Item No. 1

REWRITING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
by GABRIEL HAUGE

It must have been like this in Babel: so many voices, so many tongues, so many
causes. Public interest waxes and wanes as Viet Nam, poverty, plight of urban blacks,
crime in the streets, drug use, college unrest, consumerism, women's liberation,
pollution and the environment, each in turn commands attention. There seems to be
no lasting focus, but the issues remain real and they are not settled.

The very diffusion of public attention suggests that these issues are symptoms of
a deeper disturbance. The roots of social instability in the United States are many
and complex but two will concern us here: a new awareness of the side effects of
unprecedented economic growth of the last generation; and the awakening to a new
emphasis on the quality of life which in turn results from the affluence that has been
achieved for most, although not yet by any means for all.

Our society is both beneficiary and victim of a unique growth in quantity. Per
capita income increased eight-fold during the past century, while population grew five-
fold and in cities over one million by seventy-fold. It is no accident that urbanization
and population growth accompanied the gain in productivity. Since 1950 real gross
national product in the United States has doubled, the median education of the adult
population has risen one-third, and the proportion of the labor force in professional
and technical jobs has nearly doubled. Meanwhile, the stock of automobiles, for
example, has more than doubled. Congestion and pollution have increased at least
as fast, while life expectancy has remained virtually unchanged. And so the question
is increasingly debated as to how much the sum of human happines has risen.

-4-

A participatory democracy has always existed on paper, but the conditions for its realization are only now being met. Among them, as Thomas Jefferson well knew, is a citizenry educated and informed as never before. More people have the leisure and opportunity to participate to an extent undreamed of in the nineteenth century: we now have something approaching a town meeting on a national scale. Recent triumphs of technology and the broadening of public policy goals have led many to believe that there are more things in our control than were dreamed of by the Utopians. Belief in the power of organized society to set and reach goals has, in turn, escalated expectations. It has propelled many formerly passive citizens to raise their voices and sometimes their fists. They see business as a major influence on the course of events, and therefore want to take a hand in its direction. The clear separation of roles as worker, as citizen, as consumer, that once characterized Americans, has become blurred. The skilled employee, the manager himself, is today a citizen at work.

The family firm has been largely replaced by the legally immortal (though often financially quite mortal) corporation whose products and markets are constantly changing, as are its technologies, plant locations, employees and stockholders. Nothing about it is very private any more. The owner-founder has mostly been replaced by relays of management teams. These are men of a new breed, professionally trained for their functions, career-minded, often taking as much pride in their own skills as in their firm or product. Lacking a founder's identification with one firm, they are mobile and increasingly view their functions as partaking of trusteeship. They are responsive to several publics, sharing a broad perspective as to the place of their corporation, and of business at large, in society. They generally come out of a background different from that of an older generation of businessmen, and have a somewhat different outlook. Most of the 500 largest

CYJ

March 1, 1971

Mr. Fox:

Please accept for Mr. Kissinger.
Thank you.

Julie

Soestdijk Palace, January 1971

Dear Ms. Kissinger,

I have the honour to invite you to the next Bilderberg Meeting which will be held at The Woodstock Inn at Woodstock, Vermont, U.S.A., on 23, 24 and 25 April 1971.

You will find the agenda for this conference at the inside.

The Prince of the Netherlands

R.S.V.P. Bilderberg Meetings
1. Smidswater, The Hague

AGENDA

I. The contribution of business in dealing with current problems of social instability.

II. The possibility of a change of the American role in the world, and its consequences.

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

WOODSTOCK, VERMONT,
U.S.A.

23, 24 and 25 April 1971

Please return to:
Bilderberg Meetings
Smidswater I
The Hague
The Netherlands

NAME (in full) Henry A. Kissinger

TITLE OR POSITION Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

ADDRESS The White House

Washington, D.C.

Address immediately prior to conference (if different from above)

Address to which correspondence should be sent after April 10...

same as above

1. Date of arrival in North-east U.S.

a) by regular plane (Kennedy Int'l.Airport). Hour & Flight No.

b) by regular plane (La Guardia Airport). Hour & Flight No.

c) by regular plane (Logan Int'l.Airport). Hour & Flight No.

d) other. Please specify details

2. Please indicate below if you wish the Secretariat to arrange air transportation for you from New York or Boston to Lebanon Regional Airport, near Woodstock, on April 22.

a) from Logan Int'l.Airport-Boston ______ desired hour of departure ______

b) from La Guardia Airport, N.Y. ______ desired hour of departure ______

3. If you plan to make your own through travel arrangements, please indicate your means and hour of arrival in the Woodstock area.

a) by regular plane (Lebanon Regional Airport). Hour & Flight No.

b) by private plane (Lebanon Regional Airport). Hour ______

c) by car, direct to Woodstock Inn. Hour of arrival ______

4. Date of departure ______

b) by private plane (Lebanon Regional Airport). Hour & Flight No.

c) by car ______

5. Please indicate below if you wish the Secretariat to arrange air transportation for you either to Logan International Airport (Boston) or to La Guardia Airport (New York City) on Sunday, afternoon, April 25.

a) to Logan Int'l. Airport, Boston ______ desired hour of departure ______

b) to La Guardia Airport, New York City ______ desired hour of departure ______

Mr. Kissinger will have his travel arrangements to and from the Meetings arranged for him through the White House. It is not yet certain what the exact time of his arrival and departure will be.

[x]

# 1. SOCIAL INSTABILITY: UNREST AND VIOLENCE

Marked social instability is the main trait of the period we live in. In fact, how else could we consider either the widespread tendency toward "unrest" from which no Western country seems to be spared, or the more recent diffusion of violence as a political action.

As regards unrest, already in 1969, at our Marienlyst meeting, we considered a number of cases where this situation of unrest sprung from or was directed toward political and social claims. But unrest is not bound to these forms, which are more or less defined and whose modes of expression are known.

In its extreme form, unrest often has nihilistic targets. Its goal is destruction, either because destruction is considered as an end in itself, or in the incredibly optimistic hypothesis that the collapse of the social system will allow the forces of unrest the exclusive ability to invent another, more preferable system in the field.

In another widespread form, unrest often appears to find an end in itself. It seizes whichever pretext is at hand for a target, and when this target is attained, it starts again under the coverage of another pretext. This type of unrest is not actually a "movement to attain something", but rather an erratic display of dissatisfaction.

This is also true of another, more subtle form of unrest which does not give rise to riots and uproars, but slows down the operation of the system and paves the way for the explosions to come. This is the "malaise" felt by so many individuals and groups, whose emotions toward society and civilisation itself range from plain skepticism to distrust, from fear to repressed hate. This "malaise" confines

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individuals into a sort of repressed, idle detachment, from which
they may explode destructively at the first opportunity.

Since 1969, additional manifestations of unrest have appeared over
and above those considered. Among them, of particular concern
is the appearance of symptoms of social instability within the world
of the enterprise itself. In Europe, the traditional demands and
actions of workers, led by the labour unions, have recently been
superseded by the debate on the very institutions, procedures and
criteria which have always been considered as qualifiers of the con-
temporary business system. Within the enterprise we rediscover
the two symptoms described above: the acute symptom, limited in
each instance as to the number of individuals affected, of uncontrolled
unrest for the sake of unrest; and the latent symptom, spread a-
mongst a large number of individuals, which hinders productive acti-
vity and is expressed through absenteeism or the support of agitators.

As to the _use of violence_, this has become increasingly widespread
and intense, especially in the last two years. We were accustomed
to consider violence within a certain logic of power, affirmed either
by those who intend to conquer power or by those striving to main-
tain it at any cost in the face of opponents.

What surprises us today is how violence is utilized within basi-
cally pacifist frameworks, whose objective is not to take over,
but to confront legal power, as a means of revealing the insuffi-
ciency, feebleness and illegitimacy of authority. From now on,
I shall refer to violence in this context.

[x]

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According to Sorel and Pareto, the attraction exerted by violence is directly proportional to the extent of bureaucracisation and centralisation in public life. In almost every part of the world, young people have turned violence into a form of policy, into a manifestation of political action against what they consider an inefficient, abusive, arbitrary system, to be denounced as something which is no longer at the service of the sovereignty of the citizens.

## 2. SOCIAL INSTABILITY AND THE ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

These symptoms cannot be interpreted but as the signs of deep social unrest, whose roots must be analyzed if it is to be treated.

But before attempting any analysis, let me add that in some European countries - among which mine - unrest exhibits particular traits which are not found elsewhere. They result from the existence in these countries of powerful communist parties, whose avowed strategic objective is a radical change of the present economic and social system.

Thus, we might consider that instability in France and Italy, for example, is due for the most part to the existence of these parties, and that it would be useless to analyse the situation any further.

Yet, I do not intend to limit my discussion to an analysis of social instability in Italy and France, and furthermore it seems to me that even in these two countries the success of the communist parties with the electorate is more the result of an as yet non-analysed dissatisfaction, canalized by these parties, than of a conscious adhesion to the objectives of communism. Besides, in these countries a number of violent, extraparliamentary political groups antagonize the communist party, which they consider an oligarchic, bureaucratic

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movement.

In this view, an analysis of the causes of such dissatisfaction appears all the more necessary.

### 3. THE UNEXPLAINED SOCIAL MALAISE

What is "social instability"? At first glance and according to a traditional definition, we might explain it as a perturbation of relations between society at large and certain groups of individuals. Beyond a certain threshold of tolerance, which may vary from one society to another, this perturbation causes conflicts which may constitute a serious menace to the orderly operation of the social system, entails a waste of much-needed resources, and challenges the welfare of society by jeopardizing its economic expansion.

But are we satisfied with this definition of instability, to interpret such widespread and serious social phenomena as those of the past few years?

Personally, I am not. This definition, which may have been valid for the "deviant" attitudes of individuals and small heretic groups of the past, cannot be applied piecemeal to the recent manifestations of protest, confrontation and guerrilla, which are often shared by the largest portion of important social groups (the students, the workers, the tradespeople, the farmers, etc.) in an extended geographic area.

Furthermore, this definition is not applicable to the recent intensification of the political use of violence to denounce the limitations of legal power.

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Perhaps the very concept of "instability" is no longer useful in interpreting these events, because of the practical impossibility to define what we intend nowadays by "social instability".

Only the traditional rural societies and some of the underdeveloped societies are defined as "stable" by the cultural instruments of our age. The principles generally referred to in Europe to indicate a yearning to organize for the future an expanding society unhindered by dramatic interior conflicts, are those of integration, of pluralistic democracy, of balanced and harmonised development.

But if we lack the terms for dependable and unequivocal definitions, let us at least try to reconstruct, synthetically, the genesis of this unrest that worries us today. Let us examine this genesis from the viewpoint of business. To borrow a term from our opponents, let us try to be autocritical for once.

## 4. SOCIAL CHANGE AND HISTORICAL BEHAVIOUR OF BUSINESS

For too long we have remained unaware of the intimate relations existing between our type of economy and social order. Accordingly, we deemed it possible to accelerate the rythm, the dynamism of the economic process, while maintaining the social and institutional structures of a static society.

In Europe, this has meant spreading and intensifying industrialisation, until the level of mass production was reached in a society whose way of life was still too akin to that of a rural society.

In hindsight, it is evident that the objective of economic progress without social disturbance could not be attained. Rural society's

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way of life has been completely disrupted by the massive transfer
of manpower from agriculture to industry, the exodus from the
countryside and the formation of sprawling urban agglomerations,
the race toward the alluring job opportunities offered by the indus-
trialized areas.

Unfortunately, the countries where industrial growth was later in
coming did not utilize the experience of their percursors to avoid
the causes and consequences of this disruption.

On the other hand, the behaviour of business has been more "aggressive" and structured than we normally think: for example, we ourselves have propounded material prosperity as a social value to be yearned for, whereas its value is at best merely instrumental. This way, we have influenced the choice of society in this direction, thus opening the way to a painful reappraisal of the whole system of fundamental values, upon which social order has rested for several centuries.

If business has chosen to play an active role in the economic transformation of society, it must realize that at the same time it has inevitably played the role of agent of social change. But we have played this second role in a "passive" way, not only because we have not considered it our task to solve the social problems deriving from an acceleration of the economy, but also due to our unawareness of these very problems. We have not even tried to help in the diffusion of culture in order to better understand these problems, nor have we lobbyed for suitable institutions to face them positively and on time.

w

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After all, neither the men of culture, nor the people in charge of social institutions have tried to understand what was happening, what would inevitably take place, and what they should have done to play their rôle in a dynamic and constructive way.

Business - which is intimately connected with mass industry and the industrialized tertiary services - presupposes today a continuously expanding market, open to innovation in all of its productive factors. However, it faces a social environment guided by institutions devised to manage rural societies and a culture oriented toward interpretation of the past and the utopia of an eschatological future, rather than the determination of a possible medium-range future. Finally, it has to cope with value systems providing at best a catechetical guidance suited to repetitive behaviours, rather than a few, fundamental moral criteria favouring the acquisition of new experiences.

All in all, in many European countries business finds itself in conflict with the culture and institutions of society.

And if business finds it difficult to develop in a situation where it can, to a large degree, take the initiative of the protagonist, should we be surprised at the difficulties of others? What about the difficulties of those whose work is tied solely to the continuation of an antiquated culture and outworn institutions? What about the quandary of all the people who, without being protagonists either of change or resistance to change, suffer their consequences, pulled asunder by the two contrasting forces of economic dynamism and cultural and institutional stagnation?

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5. BEHAVIOUR OF INSTITUTIONS AND CULTURAL ATTITUDES

In synthesis, two considerations emerge at this point:

a) In the western world, and particularly in Europe, this period marks the definitive passage from an economically static society, having a basically rural character and a culture oriented toward the past, to a dynamic society based on mass production and the industrialization of tertiary services, with a culture that cannot help but look toward the future.

b) We still aren't sufficiently aware of the cultural and political implications of this change. Consequently, the transformation is being pushed through by the haphazard interplay of pulsating forces, rather than through a continuous process guided by a clearly aware cultural and political leadership.

Thus, we are beginning to realize that the current phenomena of social change are not governed and oriented, on the political and the cultural plane alike.

So, we can reasonably maintain that, if business has not done much to bring about a renovation of culture and institutions, the cultural and political leadership has not shown the necessary vigour and initiative. It may in fact be sustained that certain of the more obviously negative phenomena accompanying the process of economic growth are not the unavoidable consequence of this process, but of the random, disorderly way in which the process has developed.

For example, growth of production and income are linked to industrial growth, and this, in turn, requires a population adapted to an urbanised territory. If urban agglomeration takes place in a state of congestion, of pollution, of anomie, this cannot be ascribed to

9. =

urbanisation and industrialisation per se, but to the way to which
these processes are achieved.

It would perhaps be desirable to be reassured on this issue by the
intellectuals and the people in charge of social institutions. But it
would be even more desirable to try and find some solution to the
mutual deficiencies at the top level of responsibility, instead of
crying over split milk.

The lack of a culture on a level with the problems at hand, of in-
stitutions equal to the task of governing a developing industrial so-
ciety, is, in my opinion, our most serious deficiency. We miss the
scholar who can restore importance to values in themselves, pro-
pose the new priorities in their hierarchy, contribute to devising
new ways through which social groups and institutions (family, com-
munity, nations) may continue to fulfill their cohesive function.
And we miss the men of politics who can propose general objectives
acceptable to individuals and groups alike.

6. <u>PSYCHOSOCIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION</u>

Individuals and groups, when abandoned to themselves, may endure
or react. In any case, tensions emerge which, being without poli-
tical or cultural orientation, cause ever more serious conflicts.

Contemporary sociologists and psychologists have dedicated much
time and effort to this analysis, reaching certain conclusions.

First of all, it seems that the accelerated change from an essential-
ly rural society into an industrial society is at the roots of social in-
stability.

10. =

Change in itself is a factor of instability, because it entails a series
of social movements suffered by the individual against his wishes.
To change one's own habits and way of thinking; to see that know-
ledge often acquired with great effort has become obsolete or in-
sufficient: all this burdens the individual with a task to which he
is not always amenable, which may result in his rejection of a so-
ciety that inflicts such changes upon him without explanation and
often with little or no preparation.

For those past their prime, who are no longer sure of having the
intellectual flexibility and the energy required to face this disarrange-
ment of their life, the change may become a dramatic experience.

This is all the more true in view of the fact that the current mutation,
the incessant evolution of our frame of reference, takes place at an
ever faster pace. For certain individuals, it is above all the pace
of change that brings about anxiety.

This "shock of the future", to borrow the title of a bestseller, this
acceleration in the rythm of history under the impulse of science
and technology, does not only affect those whose reflexes are blunt-
ed: it also causes anguish in the younger generations. In fact, now-
adays, the young people cannot rely as much as the preceding gen-
erations on the help of their elders, as they face a future which often
is more upsetting for the adults than for themselves.

Let's consider a typical example: the father, in the ancient rural
tradition, based part of his moral authority on his educational func-
tion, as it was from him that his son derived the essentials of his
craft. Today, the picture is very different. The father often gives

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the impression of being out of touch with reality, supplanted by
progress, so that one of his own seats of authority is seriously im-
paired. Perhaps this is where we may find the roots of the crisis
of authority, of the wind of confrontation, of the systematic redis-
cussion of all traditions, all customs that hitherto have played
an essential role in the adaptation of the individual to his social en-
vironment.

Thus, the swiftness of change acts as a centrifugal force, isolating
the individuals from the groups that used to be the repository of
tradition - the family, etc., and hurling them toward new
groups, lacking tradition and often definite objectives, whose cohe-
sion is based only on fear and refusal.

Another factor of instability is that society does not seem able to
master the precipitating evolution of science and technology, and
appears to be swept along by it without any control whatsoever.

A classic example of this is nuclear energy, an inexhaustible, pro-
mising treasure, and at the same time direct and immediate threat
to the future of mankind.

Luckily, under the powerful stimulus of the mass media, the citizens
of the more industrialized countries are becoming increasingly aware,
that the improvement of the standard of living brought about by so
many technological innovations of everyday use, is more than upset
by their deadly effects on the ecological balance of the environment
which has made life possible on their planet.

According to the social scientists, the individual translates the pre-

v

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sent crisis of authority, coupled with the acceleration of history
and the ambivalence of progress, into the feeling of being hurtled
along the road on some contraption lacking control and direction.
There is no doubt that images of this sort, simplified as they may
be, are present in the collective unconscious, and underlie the most
disorderly manifestations of the revolt of the individual.

Furthermore, at the same time that it gives the impression of not
knowing where it is going, society increases its anonymous, collec-
tivistic pressure upon the individual, relegating him more and more
to his little niche and taking away his traditional supports.

As Jung wrote in his last work, " as a social unit, the individual of
today is governed, fed, dressed, educated, lodged in standard dwel-
lings..., but he finds himself increasingly deprived of the direction
and responsibility of his own life". The State or the organisation
has taken the place of God, and has not permitted the establishment
with the individual of that covenant that existed between man and his
Creator, that tie which allowed him to endure the physical and moral
power of the secular world.

Political action seems then to have become a condition of existence,
the element allowing the individual to communicate with his fellow-
men and to act historically within the framework of society. As to
power and its negation - violence -, they seem to have become the
only indispensable means of political expression (1). It can be very

(1) "On the political plane, it is not enough to say that power and violence cannot be identified with each other. Power and violence are opposites: when one exists, the other is absent. Violence appears whenever power is in danger, but if we let violence proceed to its extreme consequences, power disappears. Thus, it is incorrect to think that the opposite of violence is non-violence; on the other hand, to speak of "non-violent" power is pleonastic. Violence can destroy power, but it is absolutely incapable of creating it......" (Hannah Arendt, "On Violence").

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easily demonstrated how the human faculty of acting on the political plane, in the modern age, has been exalted verbally, but reduced in practice.

The more progress in a country, the more the power of the administrators becomes removed and anonymous: our societies find their limit of vulnerability in the dimension and anonymity of their centralism. We also witness the birth of a new type of nationalism in the minorities: in a number of European countries, the ethnic groups whose assimilation was at the basis of the constitution of the national states display symptoms of rebellion against the central government.

On his side, the individual tries to recover through violence the faculty of action of which he feels deprived. Ghetto strife and campus rebellion seem to spring from the fact that in these ways the individuals feel they are acting together, frustrated as they are by the decreasing possibility of expressing themselves as a group in normal ways.

In analyzing these motivations, scientists sometimes appear uncertain as to whether these rebellions mark the appearance of something new, or whether they should be considered as the last gasps of a human prerogative that mankind is in the midst of definitively losing.

## 7. THE GOALS OF BUSINESS AND THE FUTURE

One can draw some conclusions from the analysis that has been made by sociologists and psychologists.

1. The impulse of industrial progress has brought about unprecedented economic progress; this accelerated social change is certainly the origin of present unrest.

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It is imperative to change this situation. Some people propose the overall solution of reducing the rhythm of technical and scientific applications in industry, or reducing the rhythm of investments.

I believe that this kind of solution is premature. The present generation, at least, expects other decisions from businessmen. In particular, I think that two things are expected.

Firstly, before they are obliged to do so by law, businessmen should agree to try to resolve the problems that are closely connected to the productive activity which directly contributes to social unrest. I am referring to air and water pollution, to the augmenting wastes, to the elimination of durable consumption goods once they are no longer utilized (for example, cars). I have in mind the destruction of the natural environment by mining, industrial centers and transportation networks. I am also considering the relation existing between the location of jobs and the places where the population lives. In the past there have been several instances where errors have been committed more through bad taste and insufficient cultural sensitivity than for economic reasons.

Finally, I am thinking of the increased consumption of raw materials, which are beginning to run short, and of a concentration of research to discover substitute products.

In my opinion the first task in this field is that of distinguishing the important from the accessory. For example, if, as some say, technological industrial progress is definitely menacing the oxygen reserves on this planet, because of the rarefaction of marine plankton,

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the intensive exploitation of forests, and the rapid increase in oxygen
consumption by industry and its products, the problem is of a much
higher order than that posed by localized pollution.

The possibility of an "oxygen gap", or the progressive disappearance
of marine life, necessitates that we examine whether or not these
hypotheses have a serious basis, and then immediate decisions must
be taken.

Nations, administrations and international organizations have taken
some leadership in regard to the question of pollution. Every now
and then industry is called upon to participate in these efforts, but
on the whole these decisions are taken by others, as if industry's
good faith were suspect. One can certainly not accept the opinion
of those who sustain that industry is incapable of thinking beyond the
problems of its short-term income. I think that industry should not
only directly cooperate in the solution of a problem to which it could
make a constructive contribution; it should also take some initiative.
It should act directly at all levels, but particularly internationally,
because it is here that the solutions to the most important questions
may be found. A proliferation of different norms without real value
from the point of view of the future of humanity would have disastrous
consequences on international commerce, and would undoubtedly
end in a regression of the standard of living.

Secondly, we are waiting for men to become aware of and give mean-
ing to their tasks, going beyond the traditional concept of considering
work as simply a means of earning one's living. Our fundamental
task is to elaborate this concept with all available means. We must
insist upon the social aspect of work, and the value of work as a

[i]

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personal contribution to the solution of problems that are of interest to society. All these elements must have our attention, even when designing machines and selecting the location of plants. I am of the opinion that computers must be employed not only to utilize machines for man's most menial tasks (automation of repetitious tasks), but above all to allow all those who wish to contribute to the improvement of working conditions an a priori verification of the possible effects of their proposals.

In its internal organization, the enterprise is a sort of microcosm; its solutions to increasingly vast problems can contribute to the betterment of its employees, but they can also have value as an example. First of all, increasing the responsibility of every individual at every stage as much as possible, can initiate a reaction to the frustration that individuals feel in regard to their destiny. This implies some attempts at decentralization. Modern electronic means of communication and control permit considerable decentralization of decision-making, while maintaining satisfactory overall coordination. It therefore seems to me that the enterprise must move forward in this way, improving the level of education of its workers until this decentralization is more effective.

Within this perspective of valorization of human resources, it would be necessary to evaluate more systematically the social consequences of working schedules on family and group life, to review the problem of working women, and the age limits in relation to the period of training and reeducation, as well as the social role of the young and the elderly.

Solutions to this last problem are already available, and today

[x]

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everyone talks about permanent education, reeducation, and distribution of educational training over a longer period, with intervals of active integration in the productive process. All these ideas, which could certainly ameliorate this situation and soften "the shock of the future", are only being applied very slowly, as they raise difficult problems. In any case, this is a field in which industry must prepare to work very hard.

In the area of specialized training, it seems to me that the enterprise should take more direct responsibility. This seems inevitable, for instance, in periodical updating of personnel.

The above is indispensable if we are to meet the expectations which to a great extent are motivated and inherent to businessmen. This puts into question the role of the enterpreneur, of the businessman that has been given responsibility in administrating human and natural resources, and who must account to society for his actions.

2. A second reason for social unrest goes back to the anguish that men feel toward technical and industrial progress, and its ambivalence; it might bring about improved living conditions, or it could cause catastrophes. What can be done about this? Above all we must not forget that this anguish is the price of man's liberation from the fatal submission to natural forces, which, instead, is the case in rural society. It will be possible to go beyond this idea when man will have really understood that technology is one of his creations and that it can be socially oriented. In a word, when man will have the means to control it, even if he continues to give entrepreneurs the mandate to attain, on the operational level, the aim that he had fixed for himself. In addition, this anguish can be overcome when

18. =

man has abandoned the myth of progress at no cost, and does not
limit himself to the creation of newer, artificial goods, a myth that
has made technical progress something that is reproduced indepen-
dently of man. Even if business must refuse all that could slow
down technological dynamism, the problem of orienting this progress
remains. Consequently, society must make some responsibile and
adequate choices. I insist on the adjectives "adequate" and "respon-
sible" and accordingly I am convinced that in the coming years it
will be necessary to make considerable investments in the manage-
ment of society and culture.

In practice, responsible political choices can only be made when
suitable political instruments are available. The need of adapting
a great number of European political institutions to the new data,
dimensions and rythms of industrial society has already been under-
lined. I believe we agree on the fact that business must cooperate
in this modernization: the goal is to devise the ways whereby busi-
ness can cooperate openly, without this cooperation being considered
the unwarranted interference of a pressure group.

But even though political institutions are important, we should not
underestimate the role of the natural groups and of the associations
through which society is organized. I believe that we should give
much attention to this dimension of social reality. Groups are im-
portant insofar as they represent the social space of the individual,
and a firm point of reference in the large, but ephemeral range of
social relations.

These groups play a role in making interpersonal relations more
continuous and effectual. They may serve as means to mediate

W

19. =

between tradition and innovation, and to favour the personal recognition and awareness of the new values.

As to the problem of making the appropriate choices, this depends on culture. In spite of the enormous quantitative expansion of knowledge, western culture does not seem to be equal to the task of facing the problems posed by industrial society.

The debate on the "two cultures", in which the intellectuals have been engaged in the past few years, shows how much the conflict between "rural society" and "industrial society" has affected the rift between "humanistic" and "scientific" culture.

The fact is that industrial society cannot be deemed consolidate, without the establishment of a new cultural unity based on universally accepted values and on pluralistic experiences.

The enterprise must be able to give its contribution in the definition of these choices, because it represents the most efficient means available to society to achieve certain objectives. Business should be sounded out on whether an objective is technically attainable, on the cost of the operation, and on the means to be employed. Besides, business should be able to suggest how to modify the objectives, in case the means should be insufficient, to avoid the waste of much-needed resources.

Business, politics and culture appear more and more interconnected, and the development of one of them increasingly affects the others.

Another source of unrest at the individual level, which is manifested

[k]

20. =

in the form of either agitation or violence, lies in the individual's
increasing dependence on society, and his feeling of having no con-
trol over his destiny.

I believe that an important step in overcoming violence in contem-
porary society, especially on the part of the young, could be that of
having business contribute to giving psychological assurance to man
through recognition of his dignity in his place of work, without which
he becomes a tool of consumption. This would permit man to exert
his rights as a citizen of a free and democratic society in the most
complete fashion.

Perhaps European democracies are still administrated in too oligar-
chic a fashion, regardless of whether the ruling party is of the right
or left. Today they are seriously menaced by a paradoxical form of
impotence of power. Technological concentration has permitted man
to reach the moon, but we cannot meet our simpler daily needs in
an adequate fashion, as if we were under a sort of spell which per-
mits us to do the impossible on the condition of losing our capacity
to realize the possible.

We could make a valuable contribution to this dilemma if we began
to think with a creative spirit as to how we could serve a market
that is at the same time new and unknown, like that of social demand.
In regard to this, we have an enormous need of ideas, fantasies, and
political and social dialogue.

8. THE ROLE OF BUSINESS

At this point how can we synthetically define the social responsibility
that the enterprise should assume, and the function that it should
claim to guarantee an original role to the development of society?

[i]

21. =

The elements for answering this question have already been mention-
ed.

In regard to social responsibility, the enterprise, and particularly
the large enterprise, can no longer consider its only job to be that of
the production of goods demanded by the market at the minimum pos-
sible cost. Though this still stands as its primary task, today the
enterprise has other obligations to its collaborators and society at
large.

But what is this additional role of the enterprise? In my opinion, it
is that of receiving from society - which has chosen the overall tar-
gets - the mandate to allocate the financial, human and natural re-
sources of society so that these targets can be attained with the maxi-
mum possible efficiency.

Can the business world survive when both society and the internal
environment of the firm are unstable?

The problem that we must solve is not so much that of reaching a
social system that excludes every form of sanction or conflict; rather,
a minimum of smoothness must be granted, that allows dynamics
while keeping the essential coherence of the social system, in such a
way that conflicts find their solutions in a reasonable period of time
and in constructive directions.

Social unrest has serious causes that must be solved as soon as pos-
sible. Business, politics and culture must be aware of this and co-
operate in order to solve the problem. If social unrest increases,
it will not only hinder cultural development, bringing about violence

[u]

22. =

and destroying power, but it will prevent industry from continuing
to develop its productive activities. Now, if industry does not keep
growing at the rhythm that we have known in the last decade, the
catastrophe that demographers predict as a consequence of popula-
tion pressure after the year 2000 will be dramatically anticipated.

Above we have said what business should do in the medium term.
All this opens up a series of operational problems and requires new
inventions which will have to be worked out over the next few years.
It seems to me that a concrete proposal is that of drawing well de-
fined plans and then subdividing the tasks among ourselves.

In the short term, business must be ready to perform its social role
in a flexible and open fashion. It is easy to change organization charts,
but it is rather more difficult to renew modes of production. However,
industry's first duty is to protect the extraordinary instrument which
it has been able to give to society, and to continue using it. In this
sense, it is also important to put a stop to the relative vulnerability
that the large enterprise has recently shown with respect to unrest.

Another short-term duty is to define the role of the market, which is
an irreplaceable instrument because of the elasticity and rapidity
of its reactions. However, its relationship to the increasing needs
of man should be analyzed more deeply. An industrial policy which
uses both the institutions of competition and of planning might be of
use for this purpose.

The last point which I would like to insist upon is that of the contri-
bution that the enterprise can give to the achievement of a universal
society. This contribution cannot be overlooked in the short term

23. =

because this society, encouraged by modern means of communication,
already exists to some extent in the mind of the people, but it does
not exist in fact. This gap between objective and psychological reali-
ty is another factor of uncertainty and social instability.

Business has bypassed political reality. On the one hand, the growth
of really multinational enterprises unites citizens belonging to several
nationalities in a common effort; due to their very existence they
may be a useful seed for the future. On the other, if the existence
of multinational enterprises evolves in an insufficient institutional
and political framework, this gives business great responsibility in
the political and social realm.

But how are the world of business and its managers to equip them-
selves, on the psychological and cultural plane, to operate along the
strategic lines leading to a dynamic, harmonised society?

We are aware that as tensions increase, psychological resistance
becomes of paramount importance. But the necessary preconditions
for this reside not only in the certainty of playing a valid social role:
it is also necessary that we have suitable cultural instruments equal
to the task. Our psychological resistance also stands on the certain-
ty of having at our side a group of collaborators that both share a
basic agreement on overall strategies and ideas, and are complemen-
tary in their functions.

This is far as theory goes. But in practice, all we have is many
gimmicks, and various techniques for group work and for rational,
efficient management. However, all of these are more useful in
solving everyday problems than in facing the problems posed by the

24. =

future. The problem of the future requires a greater commitment: so far we have only been concerned with it on a personal level, if at all, whereas this is an essentially social problem.

Therefore, this is a key subject which requires lengthy discussion on another occasion: if we are objectively bound to strive for the achievement of a dynamic, harmonious society, we must first equip ourselves with the necessary cultural instruments.

What we know as a certainty is that today we must invest our resources in social research and in the philosophy of life itself, just as we have heavily invested in technology and the applied sciences in the last twenty years.

If social philosophy is destined to have such importance for us in the future, we must promote and devise any instrument that could bring about the formation and diffusion of a culture that is able to face the world in a unitary, structured fashion. This culture is to be a "service", an element to balance the exterior and interior aspects of man, allowing him to face the problems of his relationship with others and nature.

We have seen how the development of science no longer appears to coincide with the progress of mankind. As to what we call "knowledge", the never ceasing race toward specialization, toward knowing more and more on less and less, is leading man further and further away from his purpose.

The essence of man lays in the two moments "I want" and "I can", not simply in "I can". Only culture is in the position of bridging this

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

David:

For the Working Papers Section you gave me 4 articles but on page 2 of your memo you say --

"... Preparatory reading for conference attendees consists of three articles which are enclosed." They are then listed (1), (2) and (3). Question: Is the attached "Deluded Strategies in the twilight of the Cold War" by Denis Healey a part of Item 1? If not, perhaps you could then add it to the memo and listing as #4.

You will notice that I have tabbed the Working Papers Section because I removed the staples so that Mr. Kissinger could turn the pages while reading. I hope this meets with your approval.

Wilma

BILDERBERG MEETINGS

WOODSTOCK CONFERENCE

DELUDED STRATEGIES IN THE TWILIGHT OF THE COLD WAR

Mr. Denis Healey, the former Defence Secretary gives
a British view of the changing world order.

For a quarter of a century international diplomacy has been dominated
by the concept of the cold war as it crystallized under Stalin and Dulles.
Mankind was seen as split into two camps - to use Zhdanov's phrase - led
by the Soviet Union and the United States, and inspired by totally
incompatible visions of world order. Sooner or later every country would
have to join one camp or the other. The West believed that the communist
camp would use force to expand its frontiers unless faced by superior
power and the manifest will to use it. The communists believed that the
West would resort to war when faced by its inevitable defeat at the hands
of international revolution.

This picture of the world is still an element in the approach of communist
governments. It has also shown an impressive capacity to survive in the
West. As late as 1960, after the convulsions in Eastern Europe and the
split between Moscow and Peking, Professor Walt Rostow was able to believe
that the Soviet leaders could look ahead "within the bounds of reason" to
achieving "virtually total power, exercised from Moscow" in 10 years; in
the same year Mr. Crossman could write: "We can predict with mathematical
certainty that, as long as the public sector remains the minority sector
throughout the western world, we are bound to be defeated in every kind
of peaceful competition which we undertake with the Russians".

Strategic nuclear posture

In the military field, though even the Pentagon has abandoned the illusion
of American omnipotence, the myth of Soviet omnipotence continues to run
around long after its head had been cut off. The United States's strategic
nuclear posture is still based on the assumption that the Kremlin may
believe everything will go right with a Soviet first strike while
everything goes wrong with America's retaliatory forces. Mr. Heath appears
to believe that four Russian frigates can in some sense dominate 10 million
square miles of Indian Ocean and the continents around it while the six
British frigates he has promised to keep there are barely sufficient to
maintain the Beira patrol.

-2-

Yet in fact the world has changed so much in the past 20 years that the cold war stereotypes are now a very inadequate guide to understanding it. Experience has also shown that some of the strategic assumptions on which western policy was originally based were unnecessarily pessimistic.

So far as nuclear deterrence is concerned, the stability of the Soviet-American balance is insensitive to wide fluctuations in the relative capability of the two sides. Given the appalling destruction which would be inflicted by even a handful of hydrogen bombs, an aggressor must demand a much greater degree of certainty that he will escape retaliation than is conceivable in the foreseeable future. On the other hand the non-nuclear allies of a nuclear power, particularly if they are geographically closer to the potential aggressor, require a high probability that their protector will retaliate in time. Nato's strategic debate in the past 10 years has been concerned mainly with narrowing the gap between the comparatively small degree of credibility which America's nuclear guarantee requires for deterring the enemy and the larger degree of credibility it needs for reassuring the allies.

By revising Nato strategy in 1967 so as to permit a longer period of conventional resistance and by developing guidelines for the initial tactical use of nuclear weapons if that resistance fails Nato had narrowed the gap sufficiently to reassure the European allies without imposing nuclear liabilities on the United States which would be grossly out of proportion to her stake in a conflict. Providing Nato's conventional capability remains as roughly proportionate to that of the Warsaw Powers as it is today, and includes a strong American ground force, Western Europe can and will feel secure.

## The growth of nationalism

Thus understanding of the conditions required for stable deterrence had improved greatly in the past 20 years. Meanwhile the demonology of the early fifties has become steadily less relevant to the political realities of the seventies. Neither camp has proved to be nearly as monolithic as the cold war theory assumed, and neither has made significant headway in winning converts in the third world. Moreover, both Russia and America now face domestic problems which compel them to give a lower priority to world affairs than they might otherwise wish.

Consumer pressures, inseparable from the type of incentives needed to

- 3 -

maintain the momentum of her economic development, are introducing social, economic and cultural changes into the Soviet system which will be reflected in further political evolution during this decade. Once Khrushchev had delivered his ex-cathedral denunciation of the doctrine of papal infallibility the cement of the international communist system was bound to crumble. No communist party in the world now accepts an automatic subservience to the Russian leaders. Their influence outside their frontiers now depends like that of any other government on diplomacy, economics and military force; communism as such will help them in composing their differences with other communist governments as little, or as much, as the initial heritage of common political institutions helps Britain in the modern Commonwealth.

In Eastern Europe, as in parts of the Soviet Union itself, nationalism is growing stronger every year, and there are signs that however much the Russian leaders resent it, they now recognize its force. As we saw recently in Singapore, nationalism in the ex-colonies can provoke a similar nationalism in the ex-imperial power - a dislike of being pushed around by lesser breeds. People who lack selfconfidence and feel their pride at stake may always produce an irrational response to an unexpected crisis. For this reason among many others the west must continue to provide a credible deterrent against Soviet military adventures. But it is equally important to produce a climate in which the military problem is de-emphasized and fears for security play a smaller part. Then both Russia and America will find it easier to adjust their policies to the changes of the past 25 years without the conditioned reflexes of the cold war interrupting the process every time there is an accident or misunderstanding.

In fact, quite apart from the role of nuclear weapons a number of developments combine greatly to reduce the incentives to the use of force by developed countries against one another. No single great power can risk serious damage even for the sake of totally destroying a rival so long as there is a third great power standing by to exploit his weakness afterwards. Thus the emergence of China helps to stabilize relations between the United States and U.S.S.R.

Moreover successful aggression brings fewer benefits at higher cost than ever in the past. Technology has reduced the strategic and economic gains once brought by conquest. The ability of navies to support themselves

[u]

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afloat and the intercontinental range of air power make foreign bases less important and reduce the value of a defensive glacis. Any developed country can now gain much more wealth by exploiting the resources inside its existing frontiers than by using force to extend them. Contraception can abolish the Malthusian pressure for expansion. Since the war Japan has controlled its population growth and by 1965 had built up the third largest steel industry in the world on coal and iron ore which were imported 64 per cent and 88 per cent respectively an average distance of 5,500 miles. Some time this decade Japan, with only half the population, will replace Russia as the world's second industrial power.

Though in some circumstances the interruption of vital supplies of raw materials like oil might threaten the peace, the ability of science to develop substitutes is reducing this risk. The old theory that capitalism must be pushed into imperial conquest by its need for captive markets has been exploded by experience - trade between developed countries grows much faster than trade between developed and undeveloped.

Since 1945 atomic weapons have introduced the risk of incalculable costs into the acquisition of resources by conquest, and, as Britain found at Suez international disapproval may further increase the costs of agression. At the same time the costs of exploiting occupied territory have risen greatly with the spread of nationalism and democracy. There is now available a full spectrum of resistance techniques from going slow and sabotage through kidnapping and hijacking to full-scale guerrilla war, so a determined people can make the occupier's costs rise above his benefits.

The declining role of war as a means of regulating conflicts among the developed powers derives largely from these considerations. The main cause of tension today is the mutual fear of attack. But this fear is most likely to become acute in a crisis arising not from the deliberate policy of the major powers, but from events which they can neither predict nor control.

There are at present two main categories of such events - those which may arise in Eastern Europe if the evolution of Soviet policy fails to keep pace with the growing demand of the local peoples for more national independence and political freedom, and those arising from changes in the undeveloped world which are thought by one side or the other to threaten the global balance of power. The key to peace lies in action to prevent or

- 5 -

prepare against crises in these areas.

For Britain as for her neighbours it is the problem of Eastern Europe which must have priority both because it is more likely to affect our future and because it is more susceptible to influence by our policy; moreover if we really see ourselves as Europeans the unnatural division of our continent must appear increasingly as an intolerable mutilation and impoverishment.

In the immediate postwar period of all the nightmares induced by the cold war it was Orwell's vision of 1984 which was most compelling. Communist totalitarianism seemed bound to become absolute and irreversible in Eastern Europe as a younger generation grew up knowing nothing of another world. Yet the struggle for freedom in Eastern Europe has been led from within the communist parties themselves, and above all by the young. In 1956 Mr. Kadar was universally seen as the brainwashed puppet of the M.V.D.; it is now he who heads the drive for greater liberalism. Although like its counterparts in the West, the Russian establishment at first attributed the demand for change to foreign agitators, there are signs, particularly in their reaction to the recent Polish troubles, that they now recognize that it is a genuine tide of popular feeling which cannot be repressed by military force.

## A challenge to the West

The developments in Eastern Europe present the West with a moral and political challenge which is clearly unwelcome both to the dinosaurs of the cold war and to the ideologues of West European federation. It is also testing for the rest of us. On the one hand we cannot, as President Brezhnev demanded, license the Russians to suppress the freedom movement whenever they think it threatens their hegemony. On the other hand we cannot intervene with force ourselves, so we must not encourage actions which might lead to Soviet intervention. The only contribution we can decently make is to work towards a situation in which Russia may acquiesce in these East European developments because at least she is satisfied that her own security is not affected. That, in my opinion, should be the underlying objective of a European Security Conference, and that is why it would be of doubtful value unless it made possible the discussion of mutual and balanced force reductions.

There are difficult practical problems involved in the negotiation of

- 6 -

acceptable force reductions partly because the geography favours Russia and partly because her forces have a political role in Eastern Europe which is not directly related to the size of NATO forces in Western Europe. But these problems are not more difficult than those created by similar assymetries in the talks on Strategic Arms Limitation. Moreover progress in S.A.L.T. will be easier if it is complemented by progress on arms limitation in Europe. Indeed an early subject for treatment in the machinery set up by a European Security Conference might well be one which America and Russia have found it difficult to handle bilaterally in S.A.L.T. - how to deal with the Soviet missiles trained on Western Europe and the American nuclear systems in Western Europe which can reach the Soviet Union.

At present both Russia and America are uneasy about multilateral negotiations on European security in case they weaken the strength and solidarity of their alliances. Though this is the first time since the war that the West has less to fear than the communist camp in this respect, any real progress towards a new European security system will require changes in western as well as Soviet policy. Fortunately, like the strategic nuclear balance the stability of the military balance in Europe can tolerate larger fluctuations in relative force capability than general staffs will easily admit. So we need only wait for progress on Berlin to make a start.

## Russia's South Vietnam

The instabilities in the third world present a problem which is at once less tractable and less dangerous than the problem of European security. The most striking feature of the last 20 years in South Asia, the Middle East Africa, and Latin America is the comparative indifference of the peoples and governments concerned to the cold war and the failure of both Russia and America to make any lasting mark on their development.
Professor Galbraith may be right in describing the third world as the disaster area of American foreign policy, but America's failures have not been Russia's gains. Even in the Middle East where the Israeli problem has given Russia obvious advantages, Egypt is the only country where she can point to direct strategic benefits and these have been obtained as a very high economic and political price. In many respects Egypt can be seen as Russia's South Vietnam.

- 7 -

Both the communists and the West tend grossly to exaggerate their real power to influence events in the third world. Vietnam has demonstrated the impotence of Russia no less than the United States. If the presence of 55.000 British troops in South-East Asia could not deter a handful of communist terrorists from making trouble on the Thai-Malay frontier in 1965 it is difficult to see why a mere 500 British soldiers in Singapore should do so 10 years later. But by the same token, if a large British fleet in the Indian Ocean had so little lasting influence on the internal or external policies of the surrounding states in the sixties why should the West worry even if there were a large Soviet fleet there in the seventies?

Russia like the West can hope to make only marginal and temporary gains in the third world with even the most skilful policies; they are unlikely to have any uniquely important effect on western interests in the long run. After all, the greatest threat to western supplies of Middle Eastern oil since the end of imperialism - far greater than at Abadan or Suez - was posed not by Mr. Brezhnev but by the Shah of Iran as chairman of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries; it was a threat of which the West had no right to complain and to which there was no appropriate military response. So the West had to capitulate as gracefully as possible.

Nevertheless, so long as either side fears that change in the third world may threaten its security by upsetting the global balance, it is worth while seeing whether it is possible to agree on taking no military advantage of such change, whoever may seem to gain politically. Both sides have an interest in limiting their military liabilities in the third world, since the benefits they can hope to gain from accepting liabilities are so uncertain. And since the third world itself prefers non-alignment, the concept of neutralization may have some meaning here.

## Avoiding armed conflict

Previous attempts at neutralization have broken down, as in Indochina, where the external parties have seemed to interpret it as meaning that there should be no political change at all, for neither Russia nor the United States can decide how the Laotian or Vietnamese peasantry will order their affairs for ever. Revolutionary change, often attended by violence, is likely to be a feature of politics in the underdeveloped

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world for many years to come. Since the great powers cannot prevent such
change, it makes sense for them to ensure that it does not drag them
into armed conflict with one another. In Africa, the Middle East, and
South-East Asia they have made some attempts to move in this direction.
They should continue their efforts, while recognizing that even with
goodwill in Washington and Moscow, a determined local power can often
frustrate agreement. It is not much easier for the superpowers to
enforce their will on others when they act together than separately.

In these brief reflections on the twilight of the cold war I am all too
conscious of having said too little on at least three important aspects
of the global balance - the growing economic gap between north and south,
and the imminent emergence of Japan and China as major powers in every
field of international affairs.

In the long run a failure to narrow the economic gap between north and
south may produce the main threat to world peace, since the resulting
situation might make war appear an acceptable option for the south. An
undeveloped country may still believe that it is worth taking the
traditional military short cut to power and affluence, particularly if
it can obtain an adequate nuclear capacity quite cheaply. Moreover the
foreseeable stability of the world power balance depends on governments
continuing to put material well-being before other values. Even if this
assumption remains valid for Russia and the West, it is too soon to feel
confident that all Afro-Asian countries, and even China and Japan, will
conform to the same pattern.

## Japan's probable impact

At present, however, the north-south conflict is unlikely to threaten
world peace unless it becomes mixed up with the conflict between East and
West. And for 10 years at least China is unlikely, unless intolerably
provoked, to initiate any major aggression, while her growing power will
act as a restraining influence on the conflict between America and Russia.

In this decade, it is Japan which is more likely to exert an unexpected
impact on the world balance. If her partners in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development can reach agreement with her on
adjusting the trade system of the developed world so as to accommodate
her mounting production surplus, there is little to fear. If not, the
stability of great power relations will be greatly influenced by whether

- 9 -

Japan diverts her surplus into armaments or welfare, and if the former, on where she chooses to throw her military weight. At present, the Soviet Union seems more aware of the importance of this problem than most countries in the West.

The Times, London Tuesday March 2, 1971.

PROF. DR E. H. VAN DER BEUGEL

DEN HAAG, February 2, 1971.

SMIDSWATER 1
TEL. 070-142563 653850

PERSONAL

My dear Henry,

I sent you a cable to-day in order to see whether there would be a possibility to see each other on Sunday next (February 7th) in New York.

I know that the chance that you can come is probably slight, but nevertheless I wanted to have a try. I have nothing particular to discuss, but I feel very strongly that we have not seen each other for an unusual long time and I just love to have a chat with you and see how you are doing.

The Steering Committee of Bilderberg met this week-end at Soestdijk Palace and you will receive an invitation from the Prince to attend the Woodstock Conference from April 23d to April 26th, probably in the course of this week or in the beginning of next week. Everybody understands how difficult it is for you to commit yourself on such long term, but I want to tell you how very much all of us hope that you will be able to attend.

On Friday we will discuss the role of business in the social instability on the basis of two papers, one by Gabe Hauge

E. H. VAN DER BEUGEL

DEN HAAG, February 2, 1971

SMIDSWATER 1
TEL. 070-113547 65 38 50

- 2 -

and one by Johnny Agnelli.

On Saturday and Sunday-morning we will discuss foreign policy problems on the basis of the paper of Denis Healey. I still don't know exactly what his points will be but we made it very clear to him that we want the discussion to be focussed among other things on the German Ostpolitik and the consequences of the Nixon doctrine for South East Asia.

From the program you will see that if you have to make a choice, because you cannot give two and a half days to Bilderberg the natural thing would be to choose the Saturday and Sunday-morning.

Needless to say that we all sincerely hope that you can stay with us all the time of the Conference and relax a little bit in the Bilderberg club of which you know so many members.

I do think that the group which will come over from Europe is very worth-while.

From the personal area just good news. Miekje is improving very rapidly and has resumed a good part of normal life.

The only thing we don't do is that we do not accept any social obligations till the first of March and till that date she will not travel with me. For the future it means a normal life with certain restrictions which seem to be absolutely bearable.

I sincerely hope to be in contact with you next week.

PROF. DR E. H. VAN DER BEUGEL

DEN HAAG, February 2, 1971.

SMIDSWATER 1

TEL. 070-11-55 67-65 38 50

I will arrive in the Regency Friday evening the 5th and
will stay for approximately four days.

If you cannot make it on Sunday we certainly will be in
contact on the telephone.

Warmest regards and good wishes,

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
The White House
WASHINGTON D.C.
U.S.A.