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[Y]

October 19th. The day started with a meeting at the Mission Council. The Mission Council is composed of Ambassador Porter, General Westmoreland, and the heads of the economic section, CIA, and of public affairs. The discussion concerned what stand the Embassy should take on any negotiations that might be considered. There was a great deal of talk about what be acceptable proposals. When Lodge asked me to speak I urged that Saigon take a stand on what it thought to be a satisfactory outcome from the point of view of Saigon and let Washington worry about how this fits into global strategy. It seemed to me that if Saigon stopped starting trimming, it would be very difficult for Washington to determine what the local situation was. I took notes of the Council meeting and I will therefore not repeat the major thrust of it here.

At 10 o'clock Ambassador Lodge asked Habib, head of the political section, and I left the Embassy to go to the airport. We were going to take a plane to Nai Frang, where Prime Minister Ky was recuperating from a cold. On the way to the airport Lodge explained to me that his car had bullet-

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proofing underneath and I noticed for the first time that he was both preceded and followed by a squad of MPs. As we entered the military airport and passed a cortege of cars which were carrying caskets drapped in America flags from the military terminal to the civilian terminal where they were being shipped home to the United States. Twenty-five bodies passed us. It was a chilling sight.

We were met at the airplane by Buy Dhie, and the secretary of state in the prime minister's office, with whom I had had dinner the previous Saturday. Buy Dhie is one of the most powerful men in Vietnam, not only because he is the secretary of state in the prime minister's office, but also because he has managed to maintain it through the two years of upheaval after President Diem's overthrown.

The trip to Na Trang took an hour and twenty minutes. I do not think one can appreciate the difficulty of fighting a war in this country until one gets a look at its enormous mountains and jungles. The coastline in Na Trang is very similar to that of California, except that it is more

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heavily wooded with some dramatic islands off the coast. In order to land
at Nha Trang we had to go way out over the ocean and approach the airfield
from across the ocean, because the hills surrounding Nha Trang are VC-
infested and because the pilot did not want to take a chance in having us
shot down. We were greeted at the airport by the provincial governor,
the American general commanding the logistics operation located there,
a Colonel commanding the airfield, and a whole host of Vietnamese. We
were then whisked off in cars under heavy escort by American military
police and Vietnamese military police to the residence of Prime Minister
Ky, which is about five miles outside of town. Nha Trang has been trans-
formed by the United States into a huge logistic base. One of the difficulties
in Vietnam is that all port facilities are over-taxed. For this reason the
ships are unloaded in Saigon or Cam Ranh Bay, where the United States is
building a new port. Their cargo is then transfered onto landing ships
tanks (LSTs), which then deposit the cargo all along the coast. One of the
major installations of this kind is Nha Trang. Practically every road in
Vietnam being impassable, a major coastal shipping is the most effective

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means of communication. After about a twenty minute drive we reached
the villa where Prime Minister Ky was staying, which must have had a
100 military policemen around. Prime Minister Ky and his stunning wife
with a heavy moustache fluently
greeted us at the door. He is a small, dapper fellow/who speaks English /
with a French accent. After asking us to be seated Lodge opened the
conversation in his usual gruff manner, saying that he thought that Prime
Minister Ky would particularly like to see me because I had been looking
into such questions as ceasefire and termination of the war, and Ky might
like to have my ideas, particularly on what would not work. This was a
major gauche for nothing terrifies the Vietnamese more than the notion of
negotiation. Nothing seems more preposterous in this country with the
VC eye everywhere and where I would estimate that about 90% of the
population pay taxes to them in one form or another than a ceasefire. At
any rate Ky looked at me enormously suspiciously. I pointed out to Ky
that we were talking what was going on in Vietnam was of concern to us free
people everywhere. He was aware of the fact that a lot of people were
talking about negotiations and it was only prudent to consider what a

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[N]

satisfactory outcome might be, rather than be surprised by events and
become their prisoner. Ky then launched into a long argument to the effect
that it was absolutely out of the question to enter a political competition
with the Viet Cong at this moment. The Viet Cong had had ten years to
get organized and his government had only come into being. President
Diem had wrecked the political structure of the country and the very basis
simply no possibility now of and one must not put such heavy demands
on his government. A ceasefire under present circumstances would only
mean a takeover by the VC. The Communists would not look at negotiations
as designed to stabilize the situation, but as the beginning of a new contest.
In short, Ky was extremely worried about any prospect of negotiations.

We then moved to the table and I asked where Ky how he envisaged
the future of his government. He said the greatest difficulty in Vietnam at
the moment was to maintain governmental stability; nothing was more
curial than to convince the people that this government had a significant
degree of permanence. He knew believed that the army was the only element

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in the country at the moment capable of maintaining looking at the problem
from a national rather than a sectarian point of view. He did not mean the box
to suggest that the army should rule for all eternity, but that the
immediate problem was to get some kind of political structure going. He
had told his generals that their unity was the only guarantee for the survival
of Vietnam and they would have to subordinate their personal ambitions to
this need for unity. He mentioned in particular the experience of General
Ko. General Ko had recently been relieved as Chief of the General Staff
and had been made Deputy Prime Minister and Minister in charge of War and
Peace, which in effect means that he is in charge of the pacification effort.
This sounds like a grandiose title but in fact Vietnam influence depends not
on the governmental position but on what power it commands. The reason
why Prime Minister Ky has maintained command of the air force, which is
the real source of his strength.

when
At any rate, Ky recalled that/Ko was made Deputy Prime Minister
he was extremely unhappy. Many people came to Ko and pointed out to him

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that he was a Southerner and that the Northerners were dominating the government. They also complained about the fact that as a Buddhist he was being relegated to a meaningless title. Ky had told him that pacification was the most important task that the government had to perform at the moment and also that the future of Vietnam depended on it.

Ko had not been picked because he was a Buddhist or anything else, but because he was the best man for the job. Ko's successor was again picked because he was the best available division commander. Ky allegedly had left the meeting and told the other generals to go over the list of all available candidates for both positions and determine whether or not these were the best people available. Ky had then returned to the meeting and had found that everyone had agreed that the appointments were the right ones. He thought that this method was the best one that would prove itself in the future.

I asked him whether he expected to continue to govern with a military group indefinitely or whether he was going to try to get the civilian elements connected with it. This caused the Embassy to

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ask about the plan for an assembly which had been rumored two months previously. Ky said that quite frankly he was receptive to the idea of a consulted assembly, but he had other generals had serious doubts about it. They felt that this was a time for action and not for endless talking. For this reason Ky had decided to proceed in the following way:

He had called a meeting of the provincial chiefs and he expected to repeat these meetings every two months. At the same time each corps commander would be encouraged to call an assembly of notables to discuss certain technical problems of what popular needs might be. In this assembly of notables could be a training ground for an eventual consultative assembly.

It gave the military a chance to size up the possible leadership. After these corps assemblies had been meeting for a while, he would then see about getting together an assembly on the national level. The question in turn to the possibility of a coup. Ky said that he was the greatest expert on coups in the country and he had told his fellow officers that he was a man who would unmake rather than make coups as long as he controls the air force. I asked

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[Y]

He said him what did he foresee as the greatest need for Vietnam's governmental stability and American constancy. I asked him what he meant. By saying the government latter. At this point, Habib, the political consult, intervened and said in a rather pompous way, "do you, Mr. Prime Minister, really doubt the American commitment, do you really question that we mean are committed to the end to you and your government?" This is, of course, left Ky with very little in answer to my question, but he had made clear that there was some doubt in his mind about American constancy. See 9A

The conversation might well have gone on, but Lodge is extremely bad at long meetings and is always extremely eager to take his afternoon nap. Therefore at 2:30 he started pressing for us to leave. We went back to the airport and Saigon. At the office I spent some time reading documents, specifically Interrogation reports of Viet Cong prisoners and reports of the provincial representatives of the economic mission to their chief about conditions in their provinces, particularly in the provinces that I am going to visit. I then went to the CIA office and received a briefing about the various teams

[Y]

9A

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- XE -

Addendum to conversation with General Ky (I do not know whether I dictated this before)

When I saw General Ky I asked him how he recruited the officers for the
Vietnamese military. He replied that a baccalaureat was an absolute pre-requisite.

I asked him whether this did not confine the recruiting of the officers to those
families rich enough to send their children to a university. He said yes and it

that had
was a good thing because they are the ones ~~whom he had~~ a stake in the country. I
asked whether it might not be a good thing to let enlisted men rise to officers
ranks. Somewhat unenthusiastically he had pointed out that ~~ whom it had been tried
once with a group and that they would continue to do so but that he was not~~
clearly too taken by the idea.

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that they have operating in the provinces. These teams are three:
(1) a group called the Political Action Team; (2) Census
 sense of Grievance
team; and (3) Counter-Terror teams. The political action team
are operating groups of 40 and live among the villages performing
social services and getting to know the villages. Their purpose is to re-
establish a governmental presence in areas that have not been contested
for nearly a decade. The sense of Grievance teams have the responsibility
of taking a census in every village every three months to determine
the find out what the needs are and also to get a record from people moving
in and out of the area. The Counter-Terror teams belong to the department
of dirty tricks and are not suitable for description on tape.

I then went to dinner at the house of General Westmoreland. Present were Ambassador Lodge, General Ko, the Deputy Prime Minister, General Vien, the chief of the general staff, General Kao, the head of the political warfare section, Ambassador Porater, and various American generals. I spoke before dinner with General Kao, who is in charge of political indoctrination

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[N]

of the armed forces. He outlined said that he wanted to write a
manual of the values which the Vietnamese army were fighting for. I asked
him whether he could give me a brief summary. The gist of it seemed to
me to be that he was very eager to invade North Vietnam. He said that
without the elimination of North Vietnam the war in South Vietnam could
never be brought to a satisfactory conclusion.

During dinner I spoke primarily with General Westmoreland, who told
me that the Marines having arrived in Vietnam with grandiloquent pro-
nouncements that they wanted to kill Viet Cong had now gone overboard to
the other extreme and said that they wanted to engage primarily in pacification
efforts. They were making these so determined on first clearing the
area in which they were based that they were running a danger
of becoming simply an enclave and getting themselves tied down. However,
he thought they would engage in more offensive operations soon. He also
pointed out to me the enormous difficulty of building a logistic base for the
existing and projected build-up.

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[Y]

After dinner I had a discussion with General Cao, which I will record
tomorrow. Before I do I should like to make an observation about why it
is so difficult to judge success of VC or failure in this country. As long as
the infrastructure of the VC is not dominant, there is even many constructive
programs have the practical consequences of supporting the economic base
of the VC effort. In many regions the Viet Cong now govern at least
by night. The estimate by most people of this part is that it is true of 90%
of the villages. This means in effect that the VC can tax these villages. They
do not necessarily impose social services being brought in, but these social
services extend the economic base on which they operate. For example,
XIX Charlie Mann, the head of USOM, the economic program here, told
me that 300,000 tons of
have simply disappeared; the assumption
being that they are used to feed the VC armies north of Saigon.

I should explain what I meant in the preceding dictation by "disappeared".

It means that exports of rice, which had existed previously and were no longer
taking place. At the same time the production of rice in the Delta can be

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assumed to be roughly the same as before the war. Therefore, the chief
economic adviser of the Embassy assumes that the rice was finding its
way into VC channels through VC taxation.

Ko
General <u>Chau</u> began by saying that he had recently been appointed
Minister of War and Peace and Deputy Prime Minister, which in effect meant
that he was in charge of pacification. I told him that this seemed like a very
responsible position. He said at first he had been very unhappy because he
did not wish to leave his command position in the army. In the meantime,
however, he had convinced himself that the future of his country might well
depend on how well he performed this position and he would make every
effort to do <u>xxx</u> well. I asked General Ko what the requirements were for
success. He said that above all there was a need for stability. I replied
that it seemed to me also that under the conditions of Vietnam, government
stability might be the most important problem and in order to give the people
a sense of continuity. General Ko replied that he did not mean governmental
stability at all;; in fact, he could envision many changes in the government.

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What he had in mind was stability in the ministry that he headed. This indeed had to have continuity; as for the rest of the government he thought some reconstruction and some broadening to include civilians was essential. In other words, General Ko was far from being as modified as General Ky had said at lunch, but was at least giving tacit encouragement to the notion of a political change. Or, to put it another way, if a group were going to try to bring about a political change, I do not think that General Ko as Deputy Prime Minister will oppose it very much. This indeed was borne out the next day.

I then asked General Ko what he thought to be the substance of his task.
Like every leading Vietnamese with whom I have spoken, with the exception
of General Ky, he never spoke of the government, he never used the word
"we", he was always speaking of my plans, my program, my ministry, as if
he were engaged in a solo performance. Ko's basic point was that there was
a big difference in the approach of the Viet Cong and in the approach of the
Americans to the Vietnamese people. The Viet Cong came like doctors looking
at the particular ill and trying to heal a particular difficulty. The Americans

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came like medical aid men rushing in tons of supplies whether they were
needed or not. But it was important to understand that one
what could never
defeat the Viet Cong with material achievements alone. It was no accident
that those parts of the country which had been most resistant to the Viet
Cong were strongly dominated by religious sects--the Hoa Hoa and the Coa
Dei and the Catholics. He noticed that in those regions where the religious
sects were strong there was no need for fences, no need for strategic hamlets,
no need for the paraphernalia of pacification. What was needed, therefore,
in Vietnam was the development of a doctrine to give the people the same sense
of commitment that the Viet Cong were able to establish in their areas of
the country. I told him that the Catholics for one had the advantage of a head-
start of 2000 years. How was he as a general going to go about developing
a doctrine. He said that he didn't know how he was going to develop a doctrine;
he just knew what was needed and he also knew that he was going to do it within
the next year. In the meantime he was consulting with many civilians
politicians and many student leaders. Even if the government did not create

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a consultative assembly, he would create a consultative body in his minister on an informal and ad hoc basis. He would try to speak to the hearts of people. He had meant with a student delegation earlier in the afternoon and they had left him in tears because for the first time a military man had appealed to their spirit.

I asked him about the program of General Tanjg and the various cadres that were established. General Ko said that all of this was terribly important but the most important task was to work on the spirit and to get the correct ideology. It was important to get an ideology of freedom, which was a committing as the ideology of communism.

General Ko is a thin, fairly tall--for a Vietnamese--man with a shaved head and a slight mustache who--like many Vietnamese--smiles quickly, but extremely non-commitally. His views are no doubt sincere, but his actions are consistent with creating a political machine for himself based on all the dissident civilian groups with anything else. He probably does not know himself where his real loyalties lie. This was the end of events on October 19th.

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Unedited notes written down
at the end of each day.

Henry A. Kissinger

October 25 - Hue

I called on Father Demeres, a Canadian, and Father Deleffre, a French priest, who run the Xavier Youth Center and who have been in Hue for three years. Both of them had served in China before then. I found the talk with them among the most interesting that I have had in Vietnam. Father Demeres did most of the talking. I asked them to tell me if they noticed any difference between the Vietnamese and the Chinese. They said the differences were enormous. The Chinese were proud and difficult but once their friendship had been gained they were absolutely reliable. The Vietnamese were trustworthy only in family relationships. No Vietnamese thought anything of betraying even his seemingly closest friend and did not seem to hold a grudge against those who had betrayed him. It was next to impossible to win the confidence of the Vietnamese. They love intrigue and are professional opportunists. They work hard to overthrow almost any government that exists, but they have no idea with what to replace it. To be sure they have reason for their behavior. They view correctly that their government is corrupt and inefficient. The young people that the priests knew join the government forces only when they do not have enough pull to escape the draft or when they are to all practical purposes kidnapped. The concept of loyalty did not exist in Vietnam. One could, therefore, not say that they were for or against the Viet Cong. One had to admire the Viet Cong courage and devotion, which is extraordinary for a Vietnamese and which simply does not exist on the governmental side.

As far as the people on the governmental side are concerned, they fear the VC and they will, therefore, avoid doing anything specific to fight them. Which way they will line up depends entirely on which way

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Henry A. Kissinger

they believe the war is going. This is particularly true of the intellec-
tuals and those living in the cities. For example, last year the real
cause of the riots in Hue against the United States was the conviction of
most people that the Communists would eventually win. Therefore, they
wanted to establish some proof of anti-American activity. The arrival of
the Marines magically changed the attitude toward Americans because it
set up a new set of expectations. The very people who had rioted against
USIS suddenly became very friendly to the Americans. The Fathers did not
want to give the impression that the Vietnamese were liars. One had to
understand that words to the Vietnamese had a different significance than
for the West. They did not have a concept of truth. Words were something
you used to obtain favors or to protect yourself against authority. In
order to understand what a Vietnamese was saying one had to determine what
he was trying to accomplish and his words had meaning only in relation to
that. In short, truth is instrumental. That is, to Westerners the con-
cept of lying means that one knows what the truth is and that one deviates
from it deliberately for some purpose. The first step does not exist in
the Vietnamese mind.

The Fathers said that in Vietnam even Catholics were more
atheistic than Western atheists; that at heart all Vietnamese were animists.
The notion of transcendant sacrifice is incomprehensible to a Vietnamese.
At one point Father Demeres said sadly: "I have the uneasy feeling that
my flock is convinced that Christ did not mount the Cross. Instead, before
being put on it, he was hit from behind by a meat-axe." What the Vietna-
mese believes depends on a balance of forces that they see existing. But

[Y]

Henry A. Kissinger

3

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

the Fathers had to say that this did not seem to apply to the VC.

They said also that the students show a willingness to sacrifice for immediate objectives, but not on the government side. They are willing to work for the poor. And they will work at night in the schools that the Fathers have established. The curious thing though is that after the students have finished their studies they become as opportunistic as everybody else. The Fathers believe that the only convincing religion is animism and even the Catholic ritual had to be adapted to it. The Fathers did not see an indigenous structure capable of withstanding the VC without American support. It would require a powerful and honest man to operate without the Americans and the students and intellectuals would almost surely oppose even him. Democracy was extremely difficult because the country was so much infiltrated by the VC that any free political process was likely to lead to their taking over. The VC were everywhere. The student leaders during the riots last year in Hue had clearly scared the other students into compliance. How could they have done it unless the other students had believed that the VC were behind them? Therefore, elections would bring a VC victory. They would be preceded by accusations, betrayal, purchase--all of this in a countryside completely dominated by the VC. The political infiltration was attempted even in the Catholic church and is especially pronounced among the Buddhists. In the Catholic Church the fear of infiltration is so great that the Church now requires a waiting period of four years before it permits conversion. I asked the Fathers how, under those circumstances, they were not discouraged. They said yes, but that their mission was to save souls and they believed in

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Henry A. Kissinger

October 26 - Hue

For dinner the American Consul, at whose house I am staying, had invited three German doctors who had lived in Hue since 1961 and who have tried to set up a medical school at the University of Hue. They were supposed to tell me about the political mood of the students. But, having met these myself, I turned the conversation to a discussion of the differences between Western and Vietnamese ways of thinking, if any. I had a particularly long talk with a psychiatrist who had been studying the attitude of the Vietnamese toward various problems and the cultural differences between Vietnamese and Westerners. To begin with, the Germans have found that instruction is extremely difficult because the pattern of thinking of the Vietnamese is so different from that of the West. On some levels the Vietnamese are extremely talented. In brute memorizing, for example, they far excel any German students they had ever encountered. It was not rare to find Vietnamese students who remember whole books verbatim. The Vietnamese are also very talented on a very abstract level such as symbolic mathematics. On the other hand, Vietnamese seem incapable of drawing independent conclusions either from what they have memorized by rote or from what they have absorbed on the level of pure abstraction. The reason seems to be that their whole society is oriented toward the Confucian principles of submission and acceptance of authority. Another difficulty with Vietnamese methods of thinking was that the Western notions of causality could not be expressed in the Vietnamese language and thus was foreign to the Vietnamese way of thinking.

This was true even in medicine. For example, the Germans told me

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Henry A. Kissinger

about some medical students who, having been told that some typhoid patients in delerium fell out of bed and broke their arms, said on an examination that typhoid was caused by broken arms. They could not distinguish between symptoms, causes, and consequences.

Part of the reason was that the Vietnamese notion of time was different from Western notions. The psychiatrist told me that it was next to impossible to get relatives of psychotic Vietnamese patients to separate symptoms of incidents that had occurred over a period of time. Events from one incident would be mixed up with events from another which might have occurred four years previously, and they were all described as if they had occurred contemporaneously.

Another thing noticed by the psychiatrist was that some forms of Western psychosis were completely non-existent in Vietnam. For example, the Western form of schizophrenia where threats to identity were perceived, did not exist in Vietnam because the Vietnamese identity was established in a different way, as I will explain in a minute. Similarly, compulsive neurosis did not exist in Vietnam because the family structure provided a frame-work of security. Again, in the West certain forms of melancholy depressions, in which a patient found himself feeling guilty or unhappy as a result of events having happened a long time previously did not exist in Vietnam because the past did not extend backward for the Vietnamese in such an orderly fashion, not, for that matter, did the future. On the other hand, there are characteristic Vietnamese forms of psychosis. Specifically, there is no sharp distinction between hallucinations, vague dreams with mystic overtones, and what is possible. This leads on the one

dreams with chaotic overcomes, and what is possible. This leads on the one
specifically, there is no sharp distinction between pellucidations, vague
On the other hand, there are characteristic Vietnamese forms of beachheads.
Vietnamese in such an orderly fashion, not, for that matter, did the future
did not exist in Vietnam because the best did not extend beyond for the
or unwise as a result of events having happened a long time previously
megranoily depressions, in which a patient found himself feeling guilty
brought a frame-work of security. Again, in the West certain forms of
comprehensiveurope did not exist in Vietnam because the family structure
established in a different way, as I will explain in a minute. Similarly,
did not exist in Vietnam because the Vietnamese identity was
the Western form of schizophrenia where threats to identity were ber-
Western beachheads were completely non-existent in Vietnam. For example,

Another thing noticed by the beachheadiat was that some forms of
they had occurred contemporaneously.

have occurred four years breviously, and they were all described as if
from one incident would be mixed up with events from another which might
exceeds of incidents that had occurred over a period of time. Events
to impossible to get relatives of beachptic Vietnamese patients to separate
different from Western notions. The beachheadiat told me that it was next

tongutah between symptoms, causes, and consequences.
examination that tchboid was caused by broken arms. They could not di-
bate in deferium tell one of bed and probe their arms, said on an
apont some medical students who, having been told that some tchboid

at the end of each day.
Unedited notes written down

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Henry V. Kleinberg

3

Henry A. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

hand to almost hysterical persistence in courses Westerners would consider wildly unrealistic and on the other to something Vietnamese call "lache" which we incorrectly translate as tired. Instead, it is a form of dis-sociation of mind and body, a complete suspension of action; it is the Vietnamese form both of avoiding action and supplying an alibi for inaction. It is no accident that they use the phrase for the state just before death. Again, there is no Vietnamese correlative to the Western sense of guilt in the ethical sense, especially guilt lasting over a period of time. The only thing that Vietnamese could feel truly guilty about, in his expe-rience, was not taking care of the ancestors and ancestral shrines or let-ting down the family.

The reason for many of these phenomena could be found in the Vietnamese sense of identity which in turn was reflected in the Vietnamese language. In the West, the individual is distinguished by a sense of personality which adapts, creates, and modifies, but which is conceived as having a central core. The Vietnamese personality, by contrast, exists in a series of ever-changing relationships all of which are hierarchical and conceived by analogy to family structure--even linguistically. In Vietnam there does not exist a word for "I" or "you." Each relationship has its correlative pronoun and is transformed into a kind of family relationship. For example, two men of equal status will call each other brothers or cousins. One man of more senior status will, depending on the intimacy of the relationship, either be uncle, or father, or grandfather to the other. Any address, therefore, to another person--even when not related--is in terms of a family relationship that is ascribed to him, and each family relationship has a

family relationship that is ascribed to him, and each family relationship has a
glass, therefore, to another person--even when not related--is in terms of a
teamwork, either peple, or father, or grandfather to the other. And ad-
One man of more senior status will, depending on the intimacy of the rela-
son, two men of equal status will call each other brothers or cousins.
tive brown and is transformed into a kind of family relationship. For ex-
does not exist a word for "I" or "You." Each relationship has its correla-
ced by analogy to family structure--even linguistically. In Vietnam there
series of ever-changing relationships all of which are interrelated and con-
cluding a central core. The Vietnamese personality, by contrast, exists in a
society which abducts, creates, and modifies, put which is conceived as
language. In the West, the individual is distinguished by a sense of her-
Vietnamese sense of identity which in turn was reflected in the Vietnamese
The reason for many of these phenomena could be found in the
ting down the family.

xience, was not taking care of the ancestors and ancestral springs or let-
The only thing that Vietnamese could feel truly guilty about, in his expe-
rience, is in the ethical sense, especially guilt feeling over a period of time.
Again, there is no Vietnamese correlative to the Western sense of

It is no accident that they use the phrase for the state just before death.
Vietnamese form both of avoiding action and attributing an error for action.
sociation of mind and body, a complete submission of action; it is the
which we incorrectly translate as tried. Instead, it is a form of dta-
which are unrealistic and on the other to something Vietnamese cell "I am"
pand to almost hysterical resistance in course Westerners would consider
at the end of each day.

Unspecified notes written down
at the end of each day.

CONFIDENTIAL
3

Henry V. Kieزلج

3

[x]

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Henry A. Kissinger

4

strict hierarchy. For example, the older brother of one's father, that is
the senior uncle, has a different name than the younger brother of the
father, and he in turn has a different name from the brother of the mother.
Under certain circumstances the wife of the older brother of the father
can also get the same title as the senior uncle. In short, for the Viet-
namese everything is seen in terms of family relationships, and outside of
the family relationship loyalties are shifting and dependent entirely on
the requirements of the family.

The Germans have noticed that servants who have been with other
members of their team for many years and had been in tears when they left,
could barely remember them three years later. The German psychiatrist had
also read an interesting story about the first Dutch sailor who had visited
a Vietnamese village and who, when returning ten years later, had already
found himself absorbed into the mythology of the village as having been
associated with it since time immemorial as one of the ancestral gods.

The German psychiatrist said that to the Vietnamese the question
"what do you think" is almost meaningless if one puts the emphasis on the
you, because there is no such thing as a "you" for a Vietnamese--the word
does not even exist in the language. There is only a "he" in relation to
various kinds of situations and various kinds of groupings, and the answer
he would give would depend entirely on the circumstance in which he found
himself. Also, all the Germans agreed that the Vietnamese found it next
to impossible to form hypotheses in the in the Western sense. They had
found that almost any hypothetical statement was immediately transformed
into a concrete, short-term project or it was meaningless. They found that

into a concrete, short-term project or it was meaningless. They found that
found that almost any hypothetical statement was immediately transformed
to unfeasible to form hypotheses in the in the Western sense. They had
himself. Via, all the Germans agreed that the Vietnamese found it next
he would give would depend entirely on the circumstance in which he found
various kinds of situations and various kinds of groundings, and the answer
does not even exist in the language. There is only a "be" in relation to
you, because there is no such thing as a "you" for a Vietnamese--the word
"what do you think" is almost meaningless if one but the emphasis on the
The German barycristal said that to the Vietnamese the question
associated with it since time immemorial as one of the unsatisfactory
began itself separated into the mythology of the village as having been
a Vietnamese village and who, when returning ten years later, had already
also read an interesting story about the first Dutch seller who had visited
could partly remember them three years later. The German barycristal had
mempers of their team for many years and had been in tears when they left.

The Germans have noticed that servants who have been with other
the redunments of the family.

the family relationship loyalties are shifting and dependent entirely on
nameless everything is seen in terms of family relationships, and outside of
can also get the same title as the senior uncle. In short, for the Viet-
under certain circumstances the wife of the older brother of the father
father, and he in turn has a different name from the brother of the mother.
the senior uncle, has a different name than the bombar father of the
strict hierarchy. For example, the older brother of one's father, that is
at the end of each day.

Unspecified notes written down
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry V. Klaarner

4

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger 5

in scientific work almost any hypothetical statement would defeat the Viet-
namese. On the other hand, when things were completely abstract and had no
relationship to physical reality the Vietnamese were extraordinarily gifted.
They had no difficulty whatsoever with mathematics. Their difficulty arose
on the level between extreme abstraction and extreme pragmatism. The only
explanation for the behavior of the VC was that they had combined the
hallucinatory qualities of the Vietnamese with their learning by rote so
that what in South Vietnam is abstract, non-committal almost hallucinatory
thought becomes an almost hysterical project for the Viet Cong.

The Germans' view of the attitude of the students was that it
was impossible to tell what the students wanted because their objectives
were constantly shifting. To ask students what they thought would be
defeated by their very uncertain sense of identity. In May, when the
VC seemed to be winning, one of the German doctors said that when he was
walking along the street he heard the students say that the heads of all
Americans had to be cut off. After the arrival of the Marines the attitude
changed. There was not, however, any profound commitment. The German
psychiatrist said he felt that most of the Vietnamese were extremely
xenophobic and that most of the ones he knew wanted to see the Americans
expelled from Vietnam--a point of view which was disputed afterwards by the
American Consul. When walking through a village children sometimes threw
stones at him, the German said. This was not because they hated him but
because to them a white man is a different species whose reaction it was
interesting to observe--much as one would see Vietnamese drop lighted ciga-
rette butts into the mouths of bears at the zoo.

rette puts into the mouth of pees at the soo.

interesting to observe--much as one would see Vietnamese drop lighted cigarettes to them a white man is a different species whose reaction it was because to them a white man is a different species whose reaction it was at once at him, the German said. This was not because they hated him but American Consultant. When walking through a village children sometimes threw expelled from Vietnam--a point of view which was disbursed afterwards by the xenobiotic and that most of the ones he knew wanted to see the Americans beachcomber said he felt that most of the Vietnamese were extremely changed. There was not, however, any profound commitment. The German Americans had to be cut off. After the arrival of the Marines the attitude walking along the street he heard the students say that the heads of all VC seemed to be winning, one of the German doctors said that when he was defeated by their very uncertain sense of identity. In May, when the were constantly shifting. To ask students what they thought would be was impossible to tell what the students wanted because their objectives The Germans' view of the attitude of the students was that it

thought becomes an almost historical project for the Viet Cong.
that what in South Vietnam is abstract, non-commitment almost epidemi-
cal laboratory dualities of the Vietnamese with their learning by rote so
explanation for the behavior of the VC was that they had combined the
on the level between extreme abstraction and extreme dogmatism. The only
They had no difficulty whatsoever with mathematics. Their difficulty arose
relationship to physical reality the Vietnamese were extraordinarily fitted,
nameless. On the other hand, when things were completely abstract and had no
in scientific work almost any hypothetical statement would defeat the Viet-
at the end of each day.

Unwritten notes written down
at the end of each day.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry V. Kleinfelter 2

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry A. Kissinger

The Germans also said that economic aid provided no basis of
gratitude for the Vietnamese, because, first of all, they always explained
to themselves that it was given as an aid for the refugees who were made
homeless by American bombing and, second, it humiliated them. He had
heard many professors say that the Americans were deliberately making
beggers out of the Vietnamese in order to keep them in a dependent rela-
tionship.

tionship.

pegeers out of the Vietnamese in order to keep them in a dependent rela-
ly heard many professors say that the Americans were deliberately making
homeless by American pumping and, second, it humiliated them. He had
to themselves that it was given as an aid for the refugees who were made
gratitance for the Vietnamese, because, first of all, they always explained
The Germans also said that economic aid provided no paste of
at the end of each day.
Unedited notes written down

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Henry V. Kissinger

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

**October 27th.** One of the points which the German psychiatrist made was that for Vietnamese there is no such thing as the notion of a miracle. On the other hand, many of their plans and projects are based on what Westerners would consider the expectation of the miraculous. This is because there is almost a complete association between very abstract almost hallucinatory thinking and then a very concrete short-term project, often carried out by rote.

Another point about Danang. I have learned that one of the tactics of the VC is to fire from outside the Marine perimeter into the Marine perimeter from the direction of the pogoda. The Marines answer immediately with artillery fire. Two pogodas have already been destroyed.

The VC then that the Marines are anti-Buddhist. In short in the Danang area the conclusion is inescapably that the VC are trying to slow down the Marine advances as much as possible in the hope that we will get tired and pull out.

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2

Also, I would not be surprised if at some point the infiltrating units, which are not snipping at our troops from the rear, will face the other way and start lobbing mortar shells into the Air Force base. It seems to me that the present concept of defense of the Marines imperils even the security of the Air Base.

I started the day with a conversation with Honang Van Giau, the former student union president and now a faculty member in the faculty of letters of the University of Hue, the leader of the militant faction of the Hue studnets. It was a very long conversation, but as in all meetings with Buddhists it is extremely difficult to summarize what he said, because some of it was so ambiguous and because for every affirmative statement it would be possible to report an opposite statement. He talked in the manner which seems to be characteristic of Buddhist leaders - his head thrown back, a very soft and gentle voice in a somewhat dreamy fashion. He has an enormously expressive face and speaks French almost without accent and with great plasticity. I have also noticed in my conversations with the Vietnamese

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3

that one of two things happen in conversation: Either they are tremendous
assertive and practically monopolize the conversation and one has the im-
pression that one ~~is simply~~ a's major role is to cue the Vietnamese into
the long monologues which they have already prepared or else they will speak
in a most tentative ambiguous fashion. These may really be two sides of the
same coin--they may be so unsure of themselves that they monopolize the
conversation, they feel they are extremely vulnerable; if they cannot monopolize
the conversation they are so tentative and so unwilling to commit themselves
that it is next to impossible to find out what they are really getting at.

I began my conversation with Giau by asking him what he thought of
the situation in South Vietnam. He said the first thing to remember about
Vietnam is that it is an extremely divided people. There are the Northerners,
the Central people, and the Southerners. The Northerners were a reflective
people, a pensive people; the Southerners were a reflective (frankly, I don't
remember which he called which, and he absolutely refused to define which
define what he meant by those terms, saying that they were self-explanatory.

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4

and a key to their mentality.) The Centralists were the only ones who had a certain sense of *realism* reality. They were the ones who were the administrators and who provided the political organization. Nevertheless he said it was important to grasp that Vietnamese nationalism while fears did not attach to the nation in the Western sense, but to the people. There was a great sense of distinctiveness, but there was not a great sense of political solidarity.

Quite the contrary; the people had never been divided. I asked him what was responsible for these divisions. He said that the real problem was that never in the last twenty-five years has South Vietnam had a government that was representative of the will of the people or that had any legitimacy. In fairness

the one had to say that/only legitimate government was that of Hanoi, which had gained its legitimacy by the victory over the French. All others were simply imposed either by foreigners or by themselves. He thought that the major need was to get a government which had the moral right either to prosecute the war or to make peace. I asked him what he thought about the war and he engaged again in a long monologue, which is very hard to summarize. On the

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5

one hand he said that the pre-eminent requirement was to achieve peace.

On the other, he said that peace could have many significations and that one had to specify its conditions carefully. He argued that the present government had no right to make peace, any more than it had a right to make war. And he, therefore, did not need to specify what the conditions of peace might be, because the conditions of peace depended again on the kind of government which would emerge if the popular will ever had a chance to register itself.

I asked him whether he had any personalities or programs in mind for a government that would have this legitimacy. He said that, no, this was a very Western question. He did not feel he had to have a personality in mind and that in any case to ask about personalities is to invite Ceasarism. It was not a question of personalities but of giving the popular will a chance to express itself.

whether what I asked him what he knew about the popular will was or whether he was simply speaking about the opinion of students in Hue;; did he ever go into villages.

This question, he avoided answering this question, but implied, just like

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6

two evenings the rector of the university thought before, that what the villages thought was really relatively less important than what the educated people thought.

He then said that the tragedy of Vietnam was that a global conflict was being fought on its territory at the expense of the Vietnamese people. The real issue was between China and the United States; not between North and South Vietnam. The North Vietnamese were still after all Vietnamese and now the war was decimating the Vietnamese people, while the United States was reluctantly to bomb China and using its B-52s to destroy Vietnamese civilians. We are being punished he said for our own extermination of the Chous--of the people that the Vietnamese replaced on the Vietnamese peninsula. He said also that the United States was making beggars of the Vietnamese. He asked me what I thought of the Vietnamese people, and I said that I was struck by their dignity and by their grace. He said, yes, this is our outstanding quality because we have a great sense of individuality, but go to the garbage dump at Danang where the Americans dump their diposal and see the Vietnamese civilians scrouge around and you will realize what you are

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

7

doing to us. Look at the prostitutes in the streets of Danang and see how
you degrade us. A minute later he was saying, however, that the prerequisite
of stability in Vietnam was the closest understanding between the Vietnamese
government and the Americans. He felt that the present government was
especially deficient. in never speaking to Americans and never
facing the future of Vietnam explicitly with the Americans. I asked him
what he wanted to face. He said, well, it was necessary to recognize
the need for a social revolution and this revolution had to be undertaken jointly
by Americans and Vietnamese. I asked whether there wasn't some danger that
if American was to insist that we would be charged with precisely what he
was accusing us of: reducing the Vietnamese to a second-rate status. He
replied, no, if we were defending the Vietnamese people against the government
everyone would understand. I said that I thought he had said we should do it
with the government. Giau said we should do it with the government, but this
government, being non-representative of the people, could not do it and,

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

8

therefore, to impose the United States might have to impose it on this government. In other words, he was asking us to carry out a revolution against the existing government with very little indication of support if we did do it.

I returned to the question of peace and asked him what he thought would happen under conditions of ceasefire. He said that then we Vietnamese can talk to each other. He said he had no fear about being unable to deal with the Viet Cong under conditions of peace. He said that again that the fact that we were sparing Hanoi and Haiphong indicated that we really wanted to make negotiations and turn it into a global problem overlooking the purely Vietnamese national interest.

To summarize, everything he said was consistent with a tough prosecution of the war. It was also consistent with a peace settlement along neutralist lines. I could cite sentences which indicate the desires for the closest cooperation with the United States. I could also indicate sentences which showed the desire for a neutralist solution to expel the United States. Some

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of the conditions for peace he put were so extreme that they would be con-
sistent with the hardest line in America. But the very extremity of these
conditions is also consistent with a neutralist approach if they happen not
to be met. It seems to me the essential attribute of the Buddhists is
a great sense for power and an enormous ambiguity. Or a sense for power
disguised under ambiguity. At any rate Giau was described to me by the
American Consul as the leader of the anti-American student agitation last
May and June, the leader of the group which sacked USIS who nevertheless
spoke with great warmth of the United States in his conversation with me
and who, after having encouraged kidnapping of American dependents in January
appeared afterwards with the American Consul and told him how delighted he
was that these measures had not proved necessary. I think, in many ways, he
shows the complexity of the problem we face here. The conversation took so
long that we took him to Hue University where he had to give a lecture.
Hue University is housed in three modern buildings which in many respects are
among
/the most solid buildings in town. He was very eager not to be seen with us
entering the building so we let him go in and then followed him because I
wanted to see the physical plant of the University which has been built with

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American funds. I passed the room of the Dean of the Faculty which was open when he and two others who had been at dinner two nights before were sitting over a huge organization chart which they immediately hid as we entered the room. One's mind becomes so attuned to deviousness here that I was wondering whether the organization chart concerned the distribution of ministries after a successful Buddhist coup. At any rate the Recoor of the University then took me through the building as trailed by two or three of his professorial assistants. During this whole period he never once expressed the slightest appreciation for the fact that the building had been put up by American funds. On the contrary he complained about the architectural style which he claimed was inconsistent with Vietnamese tradition, with faulty construction since walls were already cracking and five or six other measures. At one point in the conversation we discussed the general problem of American aid and I told him that some Americans were of the view that really the major effort in Vietnam should be in the economic field and that economic assistance would create a sense of mutual appreciation. The Recoor of the University therupon said the only American aid that the average Vietnamese is getting are American bullets and American shells. Whatever is reconstructed or constructed by Americans

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is the result of if made necessary by what they have destroyed. We called
the Consulate and received a frantic phone call that Tri Quang was desperately
eager to see me at the pagoda where he was visiting from Saigon. The venerable

spiritual
Quang is the/leader of the Hue Buddhists. He was the chief organizer of the

Buddhist which movement which led to the overthrow of Diem. He is also the
person who was mostly responsible for every Buddhist agitation since then.

He was given asylum in the American Embassy for two months after Diem's police
raided the pagoda where he was installed in the main conference room and it
is fair to say charmed all Embassy personnel in contact with him. TXXXXXXXXX

Tri Quang received me in the pagoda at the outskirts of Hue where I
had seen the local leader of the Buddhists the day previously. On the way
there I told the provincial reporter who was accompanying me as interpreter
that if the VC were TXXXXXXXXX in fact as pervasive as the situation indicated
it would be an easy matter to knock us off on the way there. Negroponte replied
that (1) the VC never engaged in indiscriminate assassination, that if they
shot at us we would have the consultation of knowing that we had been singled out
for specified targets and that it was unlikely that they had time enough to plan
an attempt in the two days we were in Hue. They were meticulous organizers who

[N]

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usually rehearsed their attacks several times before they carried them out.

Secondly, and most importantly, he said that if he had to be in a safe place in Hue he would go to Tri Quang's pagoda. The VC were reluctant to tangle with the Buddhists either because they had infiltrated them or because they thought the Buddhists were too powerful. He did not say which. Incidentally while I was at the University the Dean told me that I should visit the tomb of an Emperor which is located four kilometers outside of Hue which is supposed to be extremely beautiful. It also happens to be the area where the situation was the area of heaviest VC concentration.

I told the Dean that I understood the VC were particularly active in that area and that it might not be safe for me to go in there. In fact, the American sector adviser had told me that it would take three platoons of soldiers to get me into that area. I did not give him those figures but this is what was in the back of my mind. The Dean said that it might be true that there were VC in that area and that if I went with one of these students leaders he could guarantee my safety. As it happened, I did not have the time to test it and I am probably not heroic enough to have tested it in any event. But

[N]

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it does illustrate that there is at least some **COMMUNICABILITY** kind of a tacit
understanding between the **Buddhists** students and the **VC**

Tri Quang received me in the reception hall of the pagoda. We sat around a square a table--he facing me the interpreter at his side. Max Like most Vietnamese he is a rather short and with an enormously impressive face constantly smiling, a powerful personality as almost every demagogue is, very skillful at answering questions and a master more systematic mind that most Vietnamese. He made not attempt as other Buddhists had done to assume a dreamy pose. He was **precise** when he chose to be and evasive when he chose to be. His evasiveness did not take the form of deliberate ambiguity but of a deliberate attempt to avoid the question much as somebody in the West would do. I had been told by the American Embassy that Tri Quang was the Buddhist who best understand the American mentality. When he had something to communicate to the United States he would march into the Embassy or call up the Embassy to sent somebody and he would then say I have the following three points: (1), (2) (3), tick them off and refuse to say anymore except that his refusal took the form of endless monologue to which one had to get used to. TXI

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Tri Quang began the conversation by saying that the Buddhists professors and students who had met me had been very impressed and had urged him to see me. He had been out of town the day before and he had been afraid he would miss me. In fact we called the pagoda several times the day before and we had been unable to get any answer as to his whereabouts. I asked him what the most important problem in Vietnam was and he said without any question the most important issue was that of peace. There was a moral weakness in the Western position in the sense that the Americans had several times indicated their readiness to engage in unconditional discussions. But unconditional discussions by definition were insincere. There had to be conditions and it was considered by many Vietnamese simply to be a trick to avoid negotiations altogether. For the Vietnamese people the most important problem was peace and not the war.

I asked Tri Quang to tell me what he would consider reasonable conditions. He then launched into a long discussion about the difference between conditions and outcomes and the point of which was not exactly clear. He said that, in fact, the President had stated some conditions but they were immersed in somuch

["PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL", "- 15 -", "other verbage that the point wasn't clear. I asked him what conditions he\nhad in mind and he said end of Communist infiltzation and end of subservience\nof Hanoi to Peking. I told him that the latterxMME certainly could not be a\ncondition of a settlement because I don't know how one would formulate it and\nhow one would measure *XXEXXEXXEXXEXXEXXEXXEXXEXXEXXEXXEXX

because the Americans were not prosecuting it energetically enough.

prosecution of the war and (b) with an excuse to get out of the war
people of South Vietnam. This remark of course was somewhat (a) with a
would seem to him that China was a better target for American p Somers
Hanoi and
were not being pumped and that China had remained immune. It
a specifically he had in mind and he stressed that it was after all significant.

bailing their bunches at the expense of the Vietnamese people. I asked him what
area for a war between China and American in which moreover both sides were
after all combatants and that it was painful to see the country become the
we had to remember that for the Vietnamese the people from the North were
prosecuting the war until these objectives were achieved. He then said that
objective that we ought to achieve. I asked whether he was in favor of
he was not formulating a negotiating position he was trying to formulate an
how one would measure Vietnamese compliance. XXXXX Trt Qungs said that

condition of a settlement because I don't know how one would formulate it and
of Hand to Beijing. I told him that the lattermost certainly could not be a
had in mind and he said end of Communist infestation and end of supervision
other verbatim that the point wasn't clear. I asked him what conditions he

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[x]

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I asked him then about the impact of American troops in Vietnam. He said there was no question that they had improved the military situation.

On the other hand, they had brought about difficulties in which many Vietnamese were losing the sense of responsibility and no longer felt that it was their war. In flat contradiction with that statement he then said that what was really needed was a more intimate collaboration between Americans and Vietnamese because he thought that the weakness of the present Vietnamese government made it impossible for them to collaborate honestly with the United States. On the other hand, he went on to say, the United States was taking very many unilateral decisions which were wounding to the Vietnamese sense of dignity. Indeed he said it was not an issue of sovereignty but an issue of dignity. I asked him to give me an example but he said the military payment certificates had been introduced without the knowledge and without consultation with the Vietnamese government. He did not blame Americans for this because the military who were running the government were so insecure and were so unfamiliar with civilian government that they neglected the most pressing needs. He said there was a crucial need for a social revolution to identify the people with the government. And he did not think that the military