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Secondly, there is the fact that you mentioned that they may assess the situation in South Vietnam differently than we do. They may feel that they can defeat whatever is left behind there.

Thirdly, they may believe that American domestic opinion simply cannot be held for the cause that I have outlined. If this is true, then they will not negotiate. We have no conclusive evidence, either way.

We believe that the advantages of a negotiated settlement would be so great, and the acrimony in the United States that results from the war would be so much reduced that we have to make a major effort to bring it about and, therefore, we do not want to foreclose the possibilities.

But I cannot argue in all candor that reasonable men cannot come to the conclusions that negotiations will not work. I am not sure. None of us is sure. We just feel very strongly that we want to keep the option open, and we are making serious efforts to keep it open.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you, Henry. I know I speak for everyone here when I say we appreciate how you handled this in a very candid way.

* * * *

MR. KLEIN: We would like to first start off this afternoon with Lt. Gen. John Vogt who, on the 23rd of July, will become the Director of the Joint Staff of the Joint Services Chiefs.

You have a summary of his record, and I can only say that he has a very distinguished record in terms of military operations, starting with World War II, a record as a flyer. He has a very deep background in terms of planning and staffing, and various aspects of Government organizations in recent years.

I have heard him brief the President. I have heard him brief the Armed Services Committees, and I can attest to the fact that he is a man with a great deal of knowledge.

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As the President said, he not only has this back-
ground, but he just returned from a trip out there, and I
think what he will have to say will be of a great deal of
interest.

We will go to questions to close out the program
after both of these gentlemen have had a chance to talk.

General Vogt.

GENERAL VOGT: Gentlemen, I would like put in perspective the military facts that underlined the decision to go into Cambodia. To do it, I will have to go back about five years. I would like to take my shirt off and set this up.

A few weeks ago, when I was giving a briefing similar to this to the people at the State Department, a gentleman asked the Secretary of Defense who was with me, "To whom can we repeat this information?"

The Secretary said, "Anybody." I said to the Secretary, "Mr. Secretary, some of this is classified." He said, "It has just been declassified."

Five years ago, about the time the enemy decided to increase its efforts down in South Vietnam, the strength of the forces in North Vietnam was about 250,000. The war in South Vietnam was essentially a guerrilla war. North Vietnamese forces constituted less than 12 percent of the total fighting strength in the first line units in South Vietnam.

As the United States increased its assistance to the South Vietnamese, the enemy found it necessary to increase his participation in the war in the South, a war that had been essentially a guerrilla operation five years ago. Limited participation by first line units of the North slowly began to change its character.

As the enemy introduced more sophisticated weapons and introduced first line regular units of the North Vietnam armed forces, their logistic problems became very great. They were moving supplies down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, down through the passes, Ban Nape, Mugia, Ban Karai, around the end of the DMZ.

They now found it necessary to start using trawlers, junks, and small ships to move their supplies down the coast to land it because a lot of the equipment was now heavy and it was difficult for the Coolies to carry. It could not be moved down the trail on bicycles.

The trail back in those days was rudimentary. We countered this move on their part by establishing coastal surveillance. Vessels patrolled the entire coastline starting with the DMZ all the way around to the Cambodian border.

Within a year of the operation of this particular line the enemy found he was no longer able to move the bulk of supplies necessary to sustain his effort down in this area. On top of that, we had begun the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail at the various checkpoints.

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The enemy then turned to the device of moving his supplies in through the Port of Sihanoukville. He did this, of course, with the agreement of Prince Sihanouk. We have pretty positive evidence that at least 15,000 tons came through this port and was delivered via these lines into what then became the sanctuary areas, the base supply areas of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong along the border of South Vietnam.

This buildup occurred over a five-year period. There were certain controls exercised by Cambodia on the import of goods. Sihanouk was very carefully playing his independence against considerations that he could get if he permitted some of this material to come in.

Q That 15,000 tons, is that per year?

GENERAL VOGT: This is 15,000 tons that we have proof was delivered to the sanctuary areas over this five-year period.

To give you some perspective, we have now captured a little in excess of 8,000 tons. The enemy had now hit upon a great device for supplying the sophisticated weapons, the heavy materials, the heavy mortar shells, the rockets and the other things he had found difficult bringing down the trail and which he had now marked for bringing into the coastal ports.

When Prince Sihanouk lost office as a result of the change of government on March 18, there was a dramatic change in the situation. From a military standpoint it was very tempting to try to make this thing permanent.

The decision was made to take a look at the impact of the change of government on the base supply operations. Of course, it was immediately apparent that Lon Nol, who had taken over, had stopped all resupply in the areas. In fact, he had stopped it some weeks before while Sihanouk was off visiting in Europe.

From that particular time, from March 18 of this year, from a military standpoint, we were content with the status quo, that is, leaving the base sanctuaries untouched, because we had, of course, in our previous plan for Vietnamization expected that these sanctuaries would continue to exist.

We were aware of the fact that the traffic was slowing down because of certain considerations of a political nature. Sihanouk had already complained to numerous governments that he was being oppressed by the North Vietnamese and unreasonable demands were being made on him, and we knew that certain problems were being created there.

We now concluded that the Lon Nol government intended to make stick its decision to stop the supplies.

We were willing to live with the status quo under those earlier circumstances. We carefully watched the intelligence reports to see what would develop if the enemy as he initially did, continued to stay in the base area

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perimeters, we foresaw no problem. And for the first several weeks following the change of government, this is what occurred. He pulled his forces in defensively around the perimeters with an expectation, I presume, of our taking advantage of the situation, or due to attacks being mounted by the Cambodian government or a combination of both.

Weeks went by. Slowly the indicators began to change. The intelligence picture changed. However, up until the time of the President's decision to reduce the armed forces by another 150,000, we were reasonably sure that his position would be to stay and protect the sanctuaries, a condition with which we could live.

Following the President's April 20 speech, there was a dramatic change. The intelligence now indicated that the enemy was moving out of his base areas, fanning out into the countryside, moving down to the coastal ports, moving astride all the major Lines of Communications and, in effect, isolating Phnom Penh.

From a military standpoint it became apparent to us that we were going to be faced with serious problems if he succeeded in securing the communications routes down to the major port area again, or move down to any of these port areas. If, in fact, he was able to open up the supply lines once again without any restrictions.

When it became very clear what he was up to, we commenced our military planning for the operations that were finally undertaken. These plans were done in great secrecy. There was very little consultation within the government, as you are all aware. Our paramount consideration was to achieve surprise.

We knew that if the enemy had any inkling that we were planning this, he could make it extremely costly to us in terms of casualties. He had several simple things that he could do. He could mine all the approaches to the sanctuary extensively, which would result in heavy casualties. Mines have been one of the primary causes of casualties in Vietnam.

He could have boobytrapped all the supplies. This probably would have caused us casualties. He could have deployed his forces in a way that would have made it difficult for us to go in without extensive casualties.

So the planning was done by a small planning group with a few people privy to the planning and the "execute" was given, I think, with surprise.

As you know, the first thrust was made by Vietnamese forces into the Parrot's Beak. The Parrot's Beak is the area from which the Tet offensive had been launched in 1968. The Parrot's Beak was of major concern to the South Vietnamese. It is only 35 miles from the tip of the Beak to Saigon and the South Vietnamese had been living under this threat a long time. They were anxious to get in and clear out this base area from which offensives like the Tet offensive could be launched.

We did not use any air in preparation for the invasion at this point, because we wanted to achieve the big surprise. We have positive evidence now that a surprise

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was achieved; certainly a strategic surprise and a large
measure of tactical surprise. My own estimate is that the
enemy had no more than 12 to 14 hours of advance warning.
He had so little time, in fact, that he was unable to take
any major moves to protect his supplies. He was unable
to redeploy his forces in a defensive position. He did
not have time to do all the other things that I have
discussed that were open to him to make our invasion costly.

A few days later, of course, the President announced
that the United States was going into the Fish Hook area
alone with the South Vietnamese forces, since we had now
lost the strategic surprise as a result of the initial
attack and we did employ TAC air and B-52's to soften up the
Fish Hook area.

Now the objective of this operation from the
very beginning was clearly stated from the very top down
to the lowest GI in the field -- one objective, to move
into the sanctuary areas, destroy the base area and bring
out the supplies or destroy them if we could not remove
them.

A time limit was placed on the operation. We
knew we had to be out by a certain date. We knew the
objective would be to do what I have just described and
nothing more. Some people say we failed in this operation
because we did not get COSVN. It was never our intent to
catch COSVN. COSVN has often been described as a floating
crap game. It is a headquarters of 1,000 to 3,000 people,
and in mobile configuration they move from one base
facility to another and they have been doing this for years.

We did not expect to find them when we got there.
If we had, it would have been a delightful bonus, but
naturally we were exploiting all the opportunities to catch
it. We were doing everything we could of an intelligence
nature to get this bonus. It was not a major objective. We
do not, in the military, consider it by any means a failure
that we have not captured major elements of it.

However, we have caused heavy casualties in the
COSVN organization and we have positive evidence of that.

One of the most significant things about these
operations that were conducted--and as you know, the series
of operations were conducted all along the Cambodian sanctuary
area from a point up here all the way on down--was that for
the first time we were testing the South Vietnamese forces
in large maneuver elements. They were now for the first
time being asked to perform in division size.

Before, they had performed in battalion size and on
one or two occasions, in brigade size. We were now
asking them to operate in division size. It required
a great deal of professionalism. The timing had to be
precise. The supporting arms had to be there on time.
They had to use their air properly, their artillery. The
armor had to be used properly. We were concerned. We
were concerned that the thing not fail. We were concerned

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that the South Vietnamese not lose confidence in their own
ability. For that reason the decision was made to put U. S.
advisors along with the initial Vietnamese elements that
went in.

The operation exceeded all our expectations. The
South Vietnamese performed in a manner which frankly surprised
everyone and delighted all of us. They conducted all their
operations in a highly professional manner.

As a result of this, we have gained increased
confidence in them, they have gained confidence in themselves
and I think we have dealt the enemy a serious morale blow,
because these people, when they got in there, and even after
they had exceeded the range of our advisors -- our advisors
had to stand back while they went beyond the 30 kilometers --
they demonstrated they could handle these operations without
any difficulty.

What it proved to us, the JCS, was that the last
year of intensive preparation and training in the Vietnamiza-
tion program had really made a tremendous impact on the South
Vietnamese capability. We know, from intelligence sources
of all kinds, that the enemy was completely demoralized by
this operation. He lost communication with his units.
Major headquarters were out of touch with the supporting
elements for extensive periods of time. Attacks were
directed by various units against our thrusts.
None of them ever materialized.

The enemy was unable to muster any forces or any
kind of a major reaction. We had to be prepared, of course,
from the beginning, to expect casualties. To this day we
have sustained only 330 U. S. losses in this entire
operation. That is almost unbelievable considering we were
losing anywhere from 140 to 160 a week in South Vietnam in
normal operations.

The South Vietnamese have lost only 700, which
is a small percentage of their normal losses during a
normal period.

On the other hand, the enemy sustained very large losses.
He sustained losses on the order of 11,000 killed. There must
be a large number of wounded which we cannot count, of
course.

The kill-to-loss ratio in here far exceeded anything
we ever achieved in South Vietnam and stands today at about
10-to-1. This is a very good show. This is true of South
Vietnamese forces in contact with the enemy and U. S. forces
in contact with the enemy and it demonstrates the surprise
we achieved, the fact that the enemy was not able to mount
an effective defense.

Now during this time period, we moved into most
of the major cache areas. We captured, for example, 20,000
individual weapons. We captured over 13 million rounds of
small arms ammunition.

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We have the detailed figures.

From the standpoint of the original objectives, the mission, of course, has been a very great success. In terms of what this would do to equip the enemy, the small arms alone, in the ammunition, the small rounds that we captured, would be enough to equip over 66 battalions of the enemy at 100 percent strength, and the enemy is not, anywhere in South Vietnam, equipped at 100 percent strength. He is equipped at probably 50 percent strength.

## Q For what period of time?

**GENERAL VOGT:** This would be the initial, original equipment. If they had brand new units and resupplied the equipment, they could equip 66 battalions. If we equip them on the basis of their present equippage levels with other standard units, we probably -- I reckon that he could equip over 100 battalions; in fact, in excess of 100 battalions at his normal equippage standards, to give you some idea of the magnitude of the impact on the enemy at that particular time.

I say the operation, from the standpoint of the objectives as we originally stated, was a success. The question, of course, now is: Where do we stand at the moment; and where do we go from here?

The enemy has pulled back from the major base areas. He has pulled back in some cases to a point west of the Mekong River. He is attempting to reestablish supply lines. He appreciates that with these sanctuaries gone, with the cord cut off, the inability to bring supplies in, with the beaches barred, that he must now bring everything for all the four corps areas and for the activity in Cambodia -- an additional burden which he did not have before -- down through this same tenuous trail.

In addition, the rainy season is just beginning down there. His tonnage is dropping off rapidly every day as the rains come in. We are bombing these pass areas heavily, and churning the ground up with bombs, which turns into mud, and mud is the enemy's worst enemy in attempting to bring his supplies down the trail.

He is having extreme difficulty now meeting the requirements of his forces in Cambodia and his forces in South Vietnam. He has moved a large percentage of his forces from Vietnam into Cambodia in an attempt to move quickly against the Cambodian forces while they are still unequipped and still in their early stages of their training.

For example, in the III Corps alone, he has probably moved in excess of 30 percent of his forces into Cambodia and correspondingly large percentages of his forces that were in the IV Corps area. He has not moved extensive numbers from I Corps.

In effect, the battle has moved or shifted from South Vietnam over to Cambodia at the present time. We know that the enemy has to husband his resources very carefully. He is limiting the number of rounds that he can fire. He is living off, we believe at this time, that which he was able to take with him when he pulled out of the sanctuary areas.

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His tactical device was to use all the trucking and
mobile equipment he had available at the time, and to commandeer
civilian vehicles from places like Snoul and other cities, load
them and move them with him.

His forces are operating up in this general area now
from Route 6 and Route 7 north, with isolated activities down
to the south of Phnom Penh, and some isolated activity in this
area of small units, and he is attempting once again to re-
establish his supply lines.

We expect him to attempt to use the river from Attopeu
down into the Mekong itself. He is also making an attempt to
run the supplies down through here, and down Route 12 to join
down this way.

As you know, we cease all ground activity in Cambodia
at the end of this month. As you also know, we will continue
our interdiction efforts against the enemy's attempts to bring
material down and to re-establish these base areas.

We were operating at Kom Pong Thom here the other day.
As you know, there has been a great deal of discussion in the
press about this. Kom Pong Thom is right here in the junction
of this major resupply route they are attempting to establish.
It is logical, of course, that we would be working in this gen-
eral area. We will be working in all these areas with air in
interdiction efforts from this point on.

The South Vietnamese forces are not bound by the
same timetable. They have established forward bases in areas
of Cambodia, and they will operate as necessary to prevent the
re-establishment of these base supply areas.

Now, a word about the Cambodian armed forces. The
Cambodian army, by a design of Prince Sihanouk, has been kept,
from the very beginning, to a small, ineffectual outfit. It
is quite apparent the Prince did not want a military capability
developing in the country which he perhaps could not handle.
It is poorly trained. It had French trainers and advisors. It
is very poorly trained and equipped.

This army really began existing on the 18th of March
when the new government seriously went to work in developing
the armed forces. It has a very small air force, very few
operational planes. They have a few MIG-17's which they are
attempting to keep operational. They have some T-28's which we
gave them a few years ago when we had an AID program there.

As you recall, all aid stopped from the United States
in 1963. They have been keeping these airplanes flying without
any major parts. They have been doing a very good job of it,
and it is difficult. It has run down. It has a long way to
go before it is an effective force again.

The military army forces probably never numbered
more than 30,000 or 35,000. These people have now developed a
substantial standing army. They have no problem getting volun-
teers. This is not a civil war. This is an invasion from the
standpoint of people in this country, and people are flocking
to volunteer for military duty.

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They are attempting to create something on the order of 200 regular battalions. They have virtually all of these now organized, with the manpower on board, and they are currently in the process of attempting to equip them.

As you can imagine, the equippage levels are very low. They are very short on basic weapons. They are very short on firepower. There will be instances when the enemy, with superior firepower, with recoilless rifles and rockets and heavy mortars, will lay down a barrage of fire and these people will withdraw, and the newspapers will say they broke and ran, they are disorganized, and they are not very good.

Under the circumstances, I am afraid most armies would react the same way. However, we are making available to them captured material. They are learning to handle it very quickly, and we have seen some very fine fighting on their part on several sectors of the front.

I visited the General Staff in Phnom Penh just three days ago. I had good talks with them, went over their defense plans and went over their organization equipment plans, and I am very confident that these people have come a long way already and are moving out rapidly.

One more word before I quit: The enemy's intentions: What are they and what do we think he is up to in Cambodia? At the present time we think he is in the process of attempting to secure this major area down to Route 6. He will attempt to reach Route 6 at these major points.

He would like to move into the Tonle Sap lake area. This area has about 100,000 ethnic Vietnamese which he will attempt to get control of to organize into his armed forces. We think after he has done this, he will attempt to move on down into the lower regions.

The strategy of the Cambodian forces, obviously, is to attempt to hold them north of Route 6 and in the northern part of the country. If he is held to a line generally like this, he will control less than 10 percent of the population, no resources, denied the major rice areas, and for all intents and purposes, holding an empty sack.

The campaigns in the next few months could be decisive. Of course, the Lon Nol Government is working desperately to effect a good, sound military defense. We are doing what we can to help with material and equipment. We think he has come a long way.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you very much, General.

Let's go right on to Secretary Sullivan, who is Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Ambassador Sullivan was appointed a Foreign Service Officer in 1947. He has served since then in Bangkok, Calcutta, Tokyo, Rome, and The Hague.

His service in the Department includes: Officer in Charge of Burma Affairs; U.N. Adviser; Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Special Assistant to Secretary Rusk in charge of Vietnamese affairs; Chairman of the International Coordinating Committee on Vietnam.

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He has also served as Deputy and Acting U. S. Representative at the Geneva Conference on Laos. In 1964 he was appointed Ambassador to Laos. In 1968 he was promoted to the rank of Career Minister. Of course, he was appointed to his present post in 1969.

Ambassador Sullivan.

AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN: I thought I might pick up more or less where Henry left off this morning when he was talking of the Nixon Doctrine, and particularly try to relate it to the situation in East Asia as a whole, with specific reference to Southeast Asia.

If we go back 20 years or so, and look at the situation that faced us then, just after the Chinese Communists had taken over on the mainland, we found a situation in which we seemed to be facing in East Asia a nation of 700 million to 750 million people under the iron clamp of the Chinese Communist Party, thoroughly articulated with the motto that all power grows from the barrel of a gun, associated directly with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons, and the Chinese facing out eastward and southward, looking at a series of nations on their perimeter that were without possible hope of maintaining their own defense.

If we think in terms of the flat situation that occurred in Korea after the Korean War, the traumatic defeat of Japan, with the situation on Taiwan, the Philippines, the frittering away of power in Indonesia by Sukarno, the HUK rebellions in the Philippines, the HUK rebellions, the other Communist rebellion in Malaysia, you can see that the odds in the East Asia-Pacific area did not look very good 20 years ago.

So the concept of our deploying our forces out there as a shield, and our using United States economic assistance in an effort to build up these countries on the perimeter of China obviously made sense in the ethic that Henry was talking about this morning.

But if we look at the situation today, and take an accounting of it, I think you can see why it is that President Nixon's statements on Guam have the effect of taking account of reality in the current world, and I would like to try to relate that reality back to Southeast Asia.

Looking first of all at China, the Chinese Communists are not quite the monolithic control that we thought they were or that they thought they were 20 years ago. Since then, they have had the Great Leap Forward, and fallen flat on their face in their efforts at changing their economic situation. They have had the cultural revolution, which has shown up the old fissures and the old cliques and the old traditional rivalries inside China.

I was talking to someone this morning, I think it was you, Tony, about an article in Foreign Affairs this month. There is another one in there written by L. La Dany, from Hong Kong, about China. It is very well worth reading because he points out that China is no longer a nation that you can look at in terms of a central monolithic control. It is not like the old warlordism of the early part of this century, but it still is not that central control.

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The party no longer exists. They no longer have a
President, and they are broken down in terms of smaller units.

The other feature of what has happened in China, of
course, is that instead of being closely allied with the nuclear-
armed Soviet Union, they are toe to toe with the Soviets across
their northern and western frontiers.

The deployments of the Chinese forces in that direc-
tion and the deployment of matching Soviet forces to block them
is probably the greatest single concentration of enemy forces
facing each other on the face of the earth today.

This is not a simple dispute about party dialectics.
This is a fundamental geopolitical dispute between two giant
nations. This keeps the Chinese preoccupied to the extent that
they have not sent forces across their frontier in any numbers
since the Korean War.

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There were minor incursions into the Nefa area of India and into Ladakh, with very short duration and very limited in numbers. Basically, the threat that the Chinese have posed has been a threat of insurgency in the third world, inciting others to take action, but not risking Chinese troops outside the mainland, and the possibility of the threat of the Chinese coming down into Southeast Asia is one we have to rate quite low at this time.

So much then for the threat that has come out of the center of Asia. If we look at the periphery, at the nations that only 20 years ago were in a state of poverty and a state of dishevelment, and in a state, many of them, as Henry pointed out, of searching for some sort of form of government, some sort of system of their own,

We look, for example, at Korea, which has achieved not only a stable political and military posture of its own, but to confound all the economists has moved to a stage in which it is gaining in its gross national product at a rate second only to that of Japan. We will be terminating our supporting assistance to Korea next year. We are even, as you know, engaging with them in certain discussions about the possibilities of changes in troop levels.

If you look at Japan, you have there, of course, the great miracle of these past two decades, a Japan that has come back from being desolated, come back to being the third greatest industrial power on the face of the earth, functioning as a world power again; a nation which has taken on most of its own defense responsibilities.

We have very limited United States forces there now, only a small tactical interceptor air operation, and two bases which are used mostly for our own convenience, for our fleet. The Japanese, of course, rely on us for our nuclear shield and their renewal of the defense treaty the other day just demonstrated that.

But swinging around the horn, coming all the way down through Taiwan and the Philippines, I think the other great change has been Indonesia. Indonesia, which only a few years ago looked as though it was going to totter into the brink of not only Communist control but a Communist Party, the largest outside the Chinese and the Soviets, which was almost completely under the control of the Chinese, which attempted accoup d'etat, which tried to knock off the top army leadership and killed all but two of the senior generals of the Indonesian armed forces. This provoked a sharp reaction--I am not sure the world press understands how sharp that reaction was. About 300,000 Communists and Communist suspects in Indonesia were killed, liquidated, wiped out.

The Indonesian army that has taken over is an army which, of course, is authoritarian, but it has, very much like the Korean army, a peasant base, a commander who rose from the villages, a general sense of turning the utility of that great wealth of Indonesia for the benefit of the people of the country and for the individual kompongs and the individual villages.

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Indonesians have, therefore, resumed the status which was a promise of theirs for some time of being one of the large nations and one of the great nations of Asia.

Coming then around the Horn through Malaysia where their rebellions have been suppressed, where they still have a certain degree of racial tension, but where democracy and prosperity are both in very great vogue, and up into Thailand where they have always had their prosperity and only minor insurgency in the North and Northeastern areas. We can see that except for the immediate area of Indochina that we are talking about, there has been a vast change in the balance of strength and the balance of confidence in Asia.

These Asian nations on the periphery of China not only have the confidence to think in terms of meeting their own responsibilities, but they have achieved the political base, they have achieved the economic capability and in very large measure, except for the nuclear shield, they have the military strength to meet the current sort of threat which is directed against them from out of the East Asian mainland.

Now let's bring this to Indochina itself. I think it is only fair to say that in the whole issue of attempting to build these independent nations and to see these independent nations exist on the perimeter of China that we got off to a bad start in Indochina.

In 1945 and 1946 when the French attempted to return their colonial control to the states of Indochina, they sowed the seed for a good deal of the problems that we have today. The liberation movement, the anti-colonial movement in Indochina, in the period immediately after World War II, was not numerically dominated by the Communists. Ho Chi Minh and the Lao Dong Party had gotten in there first with the organizational base, but by and large there was a possibility that what we might have seen emerging out of Indochina was something that would have been independent, nationalist, and not Communist controlled.

The French intervention pulverized this, produced a situation in which the Lao Dong Party did achieve control, physical dominance in North Vietnam.

I think we should understand what the Lao Dong Party is and what it always has been. It started out as the Communist Party of Indochina, founded by Ho Chi Minh in Hong Kong in 1930. It made quite clear from the beginning that its intention was to control and dominate the area which was then French Indochina.

It had a five-pointed star as their symbol. They labeled each of the points on the star originally, Tonkin North, Annam, Cochin, Cambodge and Laos. They have always retained the star. They have erased some of the labels. They have never changed their tactics.

So when we talk today about the Indochina war, I think we should understand that for the North Vietnamese it has always been an Indochina war. That has always been their intention, and although they prefer to pursue it in a piecemeal fashion, consolidating their priorities as they go, their objectives have always quite clearly been to

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take over all the currently four states of ancient Indochina.

Now facing that, John Vogt has described the military
actions that we have taken and the military history of the
last five years or so, so let's look at what we have
attempted to do on the diplomatic side.

In 1954, there was an agreement, an effort to neutralize Indochina. It failed. It failed because the North Vietnamese did not intend to be bound by this neutrality and were still pressing through subversive means to take over the South and to take over the other countries.

In 1962, in the smaller framework of Laos, we tried once again to do this. That also failed. We are now engaged in another set of negotiations with the North Vietnamese in Paris. I think it might be useful to set forward just what has been put on the table by both sides, because this sometimes seems to be misunderstood.

What we have put on the table is a proposal that there should be, in military terms, a mutual withdrawal of our forces, American forces, and the Free World forces that have come in there with us, on the one hand, and the North Vietnamese forces on the other. In political terms, that the decision for the future of South Vietnam should be left to the determination of the South Vietnamese people themselves and as Henry said this morning, and as I would invite you to do, go back and read the paragraph in the President's speech of April 20, in which he talked about a solution which would produce a distribution of political power as a very generous offer, the terms of the sort of negotiation we are willing to engage in.

The North Vietnamese, on the other hand, have put forward two proposals; one, that there should be unconditional, unilateral withdrawal of United States forces and our "lackeys" as they put them, meaning the Koreans, the Thai, the Australians, the New Zealanders, and two, that as we are leaving we should depose the current government and set up a so-called "peace cabinet" which would be a government more to their liking and one which would be capable of their ultimate domination.

Now this has caused us to reach an impasse in Paris. The question is whether the new situation that has developed militarily in Indochina can produce the possibilities of any better inducement toward meaningful negotiations, any possibilities for a peace that can be negotiated as we wish.

I would say one or two things: One, that first of all, the situation has become clearer in the sense that it is an Indochina situation now and not just a Vietnam situation. But Vietnam, is still at the heart of the problem and still the priority target, of course, of the North Vietnamese.

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The second is that the strain induced upon the North Vietnamese to supply their forces down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, as John has just suggested to you, and the strain that this induces at home upon their limited resources is such that they may be willing to think in terms of a less turgid, hard position than the position that they have taken up until now.

Thirdly, again as Henry re-emphasized this morning, there is the split between the Soviets and the Chinese. Our general impression is that the Soviets are giving them some counsel about seeking to make settlements that would be less than the whole hog they have been asking for.

It is very difficult to discern exactly what the Soviets are suggesting, but the fact is that Jacob Malik's statement which he made in New York on April 16 was doubtless not a mistake; it was doubtless a signal that the Soviets preferred some sort of negotiated settlement. We have had other signals before and since.

The Chinese, on the other hand, are making quite clear that their policy and their suggestion to Hanoi is to fight to the last North Vietnamese. Of course, again, as far as Cambodia is concerned, and to some extent Laos, any fight of that sort would be very largely to the ultimate profit of the Chinese.

So we think that in the diplomatic situation as we now see it, there are mixed possibilities, and there are certainly, in our judgment, more opportunities, more possibilities that the North Vietnamese might find some sort of negotiation enticing to them at this time than they did a few months ago when they were set very confidently on this track of protracted warfare, using their sanctuaries for their main force units, and in the confidence that as we drew down our forces and they built up what they called their "springboard" in-country, they would be able to capitalize on our departures by moving in for the kill.

So we do have a renewed sense of confidence in the possibilities of some moves in the diplomatic track, and we are not without hope that they might reach some fruition.

Now, Henry promised you that I would tell you something about some documents. Since Herb has changed the ground rules somewhat, I have to tell you that this is still a classified document. I have sent some instructions out to Saigon to have it unclassified, fully translated and released to the press, so your people in Saigon will be the original recipients of this, and don't break their rice bowls by springing it from here.

But there are a few items in here which I think bear out some of the points that I have just been suggesting. These are some notebooks that were captured in Cambodia by the First Cavalry Division, and have been translated. They are notes taken by some senior political officers in the COSVN headquarters on lectures that they received in North Vietnam from senior, named North Vietnamese officials.

Among other things, they state that, "The dissension between the Soviet Union and Communist China has deepened, due to the ambitions of those two countries. China has aided us because they wanted to put us in their orbit. The Soviets aided us because they wanted to gain profits from the diplomatic bargaining with the Americans."

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They go on to say that their general offensives, 1968 and 1969, was to consist of three phases. The first phase was to force the enemy into an awkward position. The second phase was to compel the Americans to accept the 10-point solution presented by the Liberation Front, and the third phase was to force the Americans to completely withdraw all their troops in South Vietnam and form a coalition government.

They go on to say that they "failed in this" and they go through a long dissertation upon their failures.

"Our attacks during 1969 were insignificant because of enemy counterattacks. We also committed many errors. The combat capabilities of our troops were poor. Due to our failures, the Americans were able to push the de-Americanization of the South Vietnamese war," and so forth.

Then they go on that "Our mission in 1970 is basically to frustrate the de-Americanization of the South Vietnamese war, to attain a decisive victory. We are not to gain a decisive victory. What we are to attain is to compel the Americans to continue to withdraw their troops."

Somewhere in here there is also a statement that "Enemy defeats" -- that is to say, the American defeats, "were due to the political situation in the United States, and not due to friendly attacks."

There are other little gems, and as I say, this will be released in Saigon, and I think it is better that your people get it from there.

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In summary, I would like to point out that here in Southeast Asia we are facing a situation, given what I said originally about the scope of the political balance which makes the Nixon Doctrine possible, realistic and feasible, we are facing here in Southeast Asia an area that is not directly intrinsically threatened by the Chinese. The threat comes out of North Vietnam.

There are 20 million North Vietnamese. They get all their equipment, supplies, from outside. They get most of their food, most of their basic resources from outside. They are facing 60 million people who are prepared to resist them; 17 million South Vietnamese, 7 million Cambodians, 3 million Lao and 33 million Thai.

Their armed forces are perhaps 350,000 in their home base, perhaps another 150,000 spread out on some very long and tenuous lines of communications. They are facing about 1.6 million forces deployed against them.

The ratios, in other words, are not ratios that are doomed to failure. The possibilities that this can be stabilized and that this can produce a military and political balance in this Southeast Asian peninsula, are there. The essence, of course, is that our disengagement from the area with our combat forces be conducted in such a way that that balance is enhanced and that we leave behind something that is solid and is stable.

We have done it in most of the rest of East Asia. The stickiest, tackiest, the nastiest problem we have ever faced is obviously the one in Indochina. But it can be done.

I think the facts and figures, if you examine them objectively, will add up to a balance in favor of success.

Thank you very much.

MR. KLEIN: Thank you very much.

We will go to questioning now from any one of these three gentlemen. I think it will be good if you specify to whom you want to ask the questions.

Q I would like to ask Ambassador Sullivan if we are doing anything to make Japan a real counterweight to Communist China or are we going to let them continue to have no military strength?

AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN: I think that the presumption that we are the basic element that has precluded, up until now, the Japanese having military strength is not entirely correct.

We were obviously the source of Article 9 in their constitution which precluded them from having armed forces that could function outside their country. But I think that their decision to forego the acquisition of military power in

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favor of building up their economy were very shrewd decision taken for Japanese nationalist reasons.

The new Minister of Defense in Japan, Nakasone, has been for sometime an advocate of Japanese military self-sufficiency. There is a new mood in Japan. I think that mood will move along to the point of the Japanese being able to have an adequate military power to count as a counterpoise to the Chinese with the one exception of the nuclear shield.

I doubt that the Japanese are going to buy the idea of going to nuclear weapons and I assume, therefore, that our security with them specifically in that element, is going to be a continuing and a durable one.

Q Mr. Ambassador, I would like to try on you a question that I tried on Dr. Kissinger and I was not sure I understood his answer and I want to see if I can understand yours.

AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN: Shall I translate from the original German? (Laughter)

Q The substance of what I am asking is, the essence of our problem now is that our disengagement should be such as to leave behind something that is solid, and stable.

Now I want to know, can you conceive of a situation in which the South Vietnamese showed such weakness during this pullout period that we would stop the pullout or have we made the decision to get out of there even if there is a question as to whether the South can hold them?

AMBASSADOR SULLIVAN: Well, I think I will have to give you the same dusty answer that Henry gave you, and the answer is that we can conceive obviously of the South Vietnamese losing their political and military muscle and starting to sag again, and this is the very reason that the President wishes to maintain some flexibility as to what our schedule for disengagement will be, because he wants to be able to pause if we have any such problems so corrective actions can be taken.

Corrective action could be economic problems. They could be political problems. It is rather hard to project what they might be. But the answer is that ultimately, smoothing out these bumps, it is our intention to disengage.

Now whether those bumps will be of such problem that would cause stretch-outs or cause contractions is something that we don't want to try to project ahead, because it is just too dicey and chancy and too far ahead for us to see.

Q General Vogt, purely as a military man, if you had your "druthers" would you get out of Cambodia on the 30th of June?

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GENERAL VOGT: I think we have accomplished most of the objectives. It is going to be raining like hell in there in another couple of weeks. And a lot of this good terrain which we are able to use now is going to turn to mud.

There is going to be a natural limit put on ground operations. I frankly think that the timing is good from our standpoint. I think anybody, including the enemy, is going to have difficulty maneuvering in the terrain in the heavy months of rain which are just beginning in the area now.

We will continue, of course, with the air operations. I think the combination of the Cambodian development of its own ground capability coupled with our air capability and that of the ARVN forces used is enough to correct the problem. That is the way it looks at the moment.

Q General, you mentioned several times intelligence reports on Cambodia. Based on the results, how satisfied are you with the caliber of intelligence we had and have in Cambodia?

GENERAL VOGT: It gets better every day. It started initially with lots of holes. We have now developed the capability, and refined it, moved in a lot of sophisticated collectors. The take has gone way up. I have confidence now in the intelligence we are getting.

Now let me qualify that by saying that the intelligence people by nature are pessimistic. They have to be. The first time they tell you that the enemy is weak and they turned out strong and he clobbered you, they are in trouble. The tendency always is to overestimate. A lot of our problem today, I think, in some of the dark pictures we see out of Cambodia, stems from the fact that people are trying not to underestimate. In fact, they are overestimating. I think we are now getting back to a more reasonable view of what is going on and I think some of the panic is going to disappear from the reporting, both from the intelligence side and from the news side here in the next few weeks.

Q Henry, would you discuss the pros and cons currently of a cease fire in its various forms?

DR. KISSINGER: Somebody once asked Anatole France if he had read "Kant" and he said he could not really say he had. He said he had read nine volumes but the verb was in the 10th. Keep that in mind as I launch into my answer.

This is a very difficult question to answer quickly. We have made extensive studies over the last few months on two things: One, to find out as accurately as we could what actually the situation in each of the provinces was. You are familiar from your time there, Barry, of the various indicators and of the HES system. We refined those by trying to establish criteria of who did what at what time of the day in order to gain some picture of what the security was. From that we could then deduce what would happen on the various hypothetical cease fire situations.

With respect to the case fire, you have to distinguish two things: One, what is the consequence of proposing it; secondly, what is the consequence of implementing it and thirdly, what cease fire are you talking about?

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We all agree that we could easily live with a cease
fire which involved the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces.
We could live somewhat less well, but perhaps still with a
cease fire that involved regroupment of main forces into fixed
areas.

The difficulty arises when you speak of a standstill
cease fire, and just exactly how you define "standstill" with
respect to guerrilla units. It is relatively easier to define
what a standstill means when you are talking about large,
organized units. But when you try to draw the distinction be-
tween acts of passion and terrorism, between the police-type
of activity and what verges on political warfare, you get into
the tricky areas.

All I want to say is that the cease fire problem is
one that is receiving the most urgent attention, and we have
studied very carefully, and we don't exclude that a point might
be reached where it might be considered.

But the major problem we have to think about is what
evolution it starts, assuming it were accepted, and what signal
it gives, assuming that it were proposed.

So at this moment, all I can say is that we are look-
ing into it with the greatest care.

Q Dr. Kissinger, we have mutual security pacts in
the 15 nations of Europe and the 21 nations in the Western
Hemisphere, and the 13 other nations around the world. You have
said that our new policies do not permit us to act as a police-
man to the world.

You also say that we will honor our pacts. How do
you reconcile this?

DR. KISSINGER: One of the problems that arises very
often in our public debate is the impression that is created
that we are involved in the world because we have commitments.
I think what we are trying to bring about is the opposite situa-
tion: that we have commitments where we are involved.

Now, it is obviously the case that our formal commit-
ments are of a respect where the vestiges of the old and the
attitudes of the new tend to overlap. The situation that must
be brought about over a period of time is where our commitments
coincide with our interests, so that we have commitments only
in those places where our interests are reinforced.

So let me put it another way: From my observation of
the governmental processes, if the only argument for American milit-
participation in an area is the fact that the United States hap-
pens to have made a treaty some 15 years ago, that would be a
very precarious position for that area and for us from a domestic
point of view.

So there has to be a periodic review of our commitments,
and there has to be a very systematic attempt to define our in-
terests. Now, in most parts of the world this is not a major
problem. For example, I don't think anybody would disagree with
the fact that the countries of Western Europe and Japan repre-
sent essential elements for the security of the United States

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in the sense that if their productive capacity went over into hostile hands, and if their resources, intellectual and otherwise, were joined with those of major enemies, that this would give us a significant problem.

Where the difficulties arise is in the gray areas where historical evolution may take care of some of the requirements. But I don't really believe that our existing commitments are so very much out of line with our interests, but you can be certain that we are taking a look at this problem and that over the term of the Administration, we hope to bring them in line with each other.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the brinkmanship the Russians are practicing now with the missile bases and aircraft, does this indicate that they are now prepared to make the big push; that if the fat drops in the fire they have chosen this time and this place to finally come to grips?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviets are not really practicing brinkmanship with us at this moment, yet. They have been very careful in making their commitments in the Middle East ostensibly of a defensive nature, and the country they have challenged is Israel, not the United States.

The difficulty that arises is that the capability that is strong enough to challenge Israel can, if it remains in place over a period of time, become a threat to American interests, even if that is not its present function or even if that is not its original intention.

So I would not say that they went into the Middle East in order to challenge us. But I would also say this: At the time of the Cuban missile crisis, the United States had 600 missiles and the Soviet Union had less than 60. We had 600 airplanes and the Soviet Union had less than 200.

At that time it was theoretically conceivable that the United States could do to the Soviet Union what Israel did to the Arabs in 1967; that is, they had to be very careful to push the confrontation to a point in which that might trigger an American pre-emptive attack. Therefore, I never believed in 1962 that they would answer our blockade of Cuba with a blockade of Berlin, because the risk to them was much too great.

In the present situation, they have well over 1,000 missiles. Their total megatonnage is superior to ours, and in a local crisis they know that they are not running the risk of having their strategic forces wiped out.

That creates a different psychological balance and makes the local equilibrium of much greater significance than it has ever been before. I would, therefore, not say that they are deliberately challenging us.

On the other hand, I think that they are somewhat more comfortable if a confrontation should develop than they would have been, say, eight years ago. Still, I do not believe that they are in the first instance directing this against us, and this is what gives the ambiguity to their particular thrust. Over a period of ten years, I think we will suffer from it as much as the local balance will if we do not do anything.

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Q General Vogt, I am afraid this is not exactly a quick question, but I thought you made a persuasive argument about the effect of supplies that were captured in Cambodia. But the critics are using some of the same arguments that you are making, saying that the incursions into Cambodia widen the war. They think they will make it more difficult for the South Vietnamese, in the long run, to defend themselves and Cambodia after the United States withdraws.

Are you looking at this from the long run when you express optimism for the future?

GENERAL VOGT: Yes, I am; very definitely. The fact that we removed these supplies, the fact that they cannot replenish them except over a long period of time, has set them back militarily by some considerable degree.

They, in addition, have taken over another enemy force which they were not involved with before. They started with 30,000 Cambodians. It is now developing into 100,000-plus Cambodians. It is going to be even larger than that.

They have been compelled, as I mentioned, to move some of their forces already out of South Vietnam. The level of activity in South Vietnam has dropped to one of the lowest that I have ever seen. There is virtually no activity in II Corps, III Corps or IV Corps at the present time. The war, in effect, has shifted westward.

During this period we will take advantage of the weakened enemy position in South Vietnam and push the pacification program accordingly. I think that you are going to find that we have speeded up the Vietnamization program, speeded up the day that we can actually get out of there, and materially weakened the capability of the enemy to interfere with this Vietnamization program.

Furthermore, I think the Cambodian forces are going to save lives. I think they are going to be able to hold the line, and once they develop a defensive capability, they are going to start moving up into the areas that the enemy now has. That is when his trouble begins.

Q General, I wondered whether, when this Vietnamization program takes place, I wonder if there is any likelihood that Thieu and Ky might decide to pursue and go into the North, as they have spoken of before, and whether we would be a party to that in supplying them to do it?

GENERAL VOGT: I think one of the things that we have seen in the South Vietnamese Government in the last six months is an increased understanding of their limitations.

Now, one would think that today the South Vietnamese would try to exploit the situation down there and run hog wild in Cambodia. This isn't the tendency at the present time. President Thieu is very, very cautious about his approach to what he can or will do in that area, particularly without U. S. support.

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These people have learned that U. S. logistic support, U. S. artillery support, and U. S. air support is very essential yet, at this point in time. Now, they are developing over the months. Next year I think will see a change. But as of the moment, and as we talk today, I see no tendency on their part to do this.

Q We continue to get inquiries from readers asking why, when we are withdrawing troops from Vietnam that we continue to send troops to Vietnam, and in some cases men with previous tours of duty, what is the answer to that?

GENERAL VOGT: As you know, we have fixed tours for everybody down there, and so long as there is a presence, at the present time it exists at 400,000, we have to replenish that figure each year. That means that some people who have been there before will have to go there again.

But there is no way I know of to rotate on a yearly basis that number of people without making heavy demands on the establishment back here in the States. In fact, some boys who have been in there twice will have to come again. However, of course, we are making every effort to see that there are no hardships, and where a hardship case exists, we have made exceptions.

END (At 3:28 P.M. PDT)

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING
(President's Report on Cambodia)

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

WITH DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER,
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

AT 10:05 A.M. PDT.

JUNE 30, 1970

TUESDAY

San Clemente, California

MR. ZIEGLER: I think we can begin. Most of you are here. The groundrules for this briefing I will repeat again. The first section of the briefing will be related to the President's report on the Cambodian operation, which you have. You should confine your questions in the first portion of the briefing to the Cambodian statement. The material in the first portion of the briefing will be for immediate use.

At the appropriate time we will then move to the second portion of the briefing in which Dr. Kissinger will take questions on other foreign policy matters, and what he says at that time will be embargoed for use until 6:00 A.M., Eastern Daylight Time, Thursday. It will be embargoed for wire transmission until after the President's conversation tomorrow night. So we will begin on that basis.

As has been the case in the past, what Dr. Kissinger says you can attribute to White House officials and should not be used for direct quotation.

Q Will some of us be allowed to leave to file after the first portion?

MR. ZIEGLER: There is no need for you to stay after that.

Q You are not going to pause between the two?

MR. ZIEGLER: No, we are not going to pause.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you expand or explain how on Page 14, we shall renew our efforts to bring about negotiations in Paris? What do you have in mind in terms of renewing our efforts to bring about negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the specific steps will become apparent over the next weeks and months. Obviously now that a military phase is over, we believe that is an opportunity for both sides to assess the situation and to draw the conclusion that we have indicated.

There will never be a perfect equilibrium. As long as the war continues, somebody will always either just have

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launched an offensive or just have been the victim of an
offensive. Therefore, we believe that this is a good opportunity
to settle and to negotiate and our actions will be consistent
with those views, but I will not go into any specific statement.

Q You are not foreclosing, then, the possibility
of our putting forth something new as well as expecting a
response from the other side, or are we waiting for them to
take the first step?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I am not foreclosing that we will
discuss proposals. If you remember in the President's April 20
speech we put forward a number of propositions which then
got subsumed in later developments. We still believe that they
offer a reasonable possibility to talk about a political
settlement.

Q Do you have an indication from the other side
up to this point that it has arrived or is in the process of
arriving at the conclusion that you hoped they were, that is,
that this is a good time for negotiations?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, as I have explained to this
group, I think on many occasions, the typical pattern of
negotiations for the other side is that usually the breaks
occur without any great warning. We are used to a negotiating
process in which one goes through a period of adjustment over
an extended number of weeks and a period of compromise. Hanoi's
negotiating procedure is usually to stay reasonable rigid and
then to move from one position quite sharply to another which
then is going to be rigidly maintained for awhile.

So I cannot say that we have had any overt indications
that they view matters in the same light. On the other hand,
we have also had no overt indications that they have committed
themselves to another massive effort.

There has not been a large pick up in infiltration
after our move into Cambodia. They have not yet made a massive
effort to replenish the supplies that have been put into Cambodia.
Their actions are consistent with a pattern of protracted war,
but they are not necessarily an indication that they are heading
for a step up in military activity.

Secondly, they have obviously gone through a period of
considerable re-examination. Several of their Ambassadors from
around the world have been called home. They have had a meeting
of their parliament, something that is an infrequent occurrence
in North Vietnam, and usually indicates that some serious
decisions are being taken.

So the best that I can say is: We believe that they
have gone through a period of re-examination -- in fact, it
would be illogical for them not to -- and we think that
there is a reasonable case to be made for negotiations, even
from their side and we want to test whether we can build on
that.

Q Dr. Kissinger, would you explain the significance
of this point referred to on the April 20 address, on Page 14?
It is the point, "We recognize that a fair political solution
should reflect the existing relationship of political forces."

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DR. KISSINGER: It is obvious that neither side in Vietnam will accept a political solution which leaves it at the mercy of the other. Neither side will accept a settlement in which it has no prospect of achieving, by political means, some of the goals that they have struggled for in a civil war. Therefore, we believe that any political solution in South Vietnam must reflect the existing balance of political forces, otherwise it will not last.

It is unreasonable to expect that people who have fought for 20 years will give up at a conference table what they have not yielded on a battlefield.

Now having made this general proposition, the question is, how do you register an existing balance of political forces in a settlement? This is an enormously complex issue. But the point we want to make clear is: We are not asking that the other side disband its political organization. We have indicated that we are prepared to grant it that degree of political power which its real strength in a free political process entitles it to, and we propose that the negotiations address the question of how you determine the real political strength of contending forces in such a situation, which is an enormously complex problem.

Q. Could you explain the use of the word "guidelines" for future U. S. policy for Cambodia? Guidelines is a rather imprecise word. Did you intend it to be imprecise in saying that we will not go back into Cambodia? It is in the summary.

DR. KISSINGER: That is an imprecise statement. This will be the United States policy in Cambodia and these are the actions that we propose to take and mean to carry out. This was not intended to be a waffle. This was intended to indicate what we will do, but obviously no set of principles can cover every conceivable contingency which may explain the word "guidelines," but there is no imprecision intended.

Q. Can we assume that U.S. air in Cambodia is now free to conduct close support of both South Vietnamese and Cambodian troops, and that U. S. air is free to strike the enemy anywhere he may be found inside Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: If you assume this, you would be wrong. U. S. air in Cambodia has the mission of interdicting the movement of supplies and men relevant to the war in Vietnam and designed to protect the security of our forces. It is not assigned the task of close air support.

There may be a situation in which it is difficult to draw a sharp distinction between those two missions, but those will be the rare exception. The basic mission is the interdiction mission and the purpose of U. S. air will be interdiction.

For this reason, obviously, U. S. air will be used primarily -- I would say almost exclusively -- in those areas which are relevant to interdiction and not in areas from which supplies and men are not likely to move through Cambodia. In short, the assumption which you stated is incorrect.

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Q Could you discuss a bit more the problems in trying to determine just which supplies are supplies that will eventually be going to Vietnam and which ones are supplies that will be used against the Cambodian government?

DR. KISSINGER: That, obviously, is a question of judgment on which it is not easy to establish hard and fast criteria. All the more so because some of the units that may be used in Cambodia can later be also used in Vietnam. It is easier to draw a distinction between close air support and interdiction missions and that distinction we have fairly well elaborated.

Q There were reports over the weekend that the Cambodian sanctuary raids have uncovered, captured, liberated only about 30 percent of the enemy's supplies known or believed to be in that area.

Is that sort of report correct? How successful have we been in percentage of known deposits?

DR. KISSINGER: You know, last year I spent weeks trying to get our intelligence people together on an analysis of just what supplies were in Cambodia and where they came from. There was a wide division of opinion on what supplies there were, where they came from, whether any came from Sihanoukville, something that we have now settled.

I am, therefore, astonished at the precision with which people can now determine what percentage of supplies were in Cambodia when last year, when a great deal depended on us for an accurate assessment, we could not achieve this degree of precision.

The best estimate that we have from the same divided group is that we have something like 60 percent of the supplies that were estimated to be there -- not 30 percent, but 60 percent. Now even that, however, has to be broken down in order to assess its significance.

For example, I don't have the precise figures -- we can get them -- but it is estimated that we have anywhere from 80 percent to 110 percent of the estimated rice supplies; that we have anywhere from 75 percent to 100 percent of the ammunition.

On the other hand, there are other categories in which the percentage of what we have captured, according to our estimate, is much lower of the total. For example, on small arms, the estimate is that we have only anywhere from 12 percent to 20 percent of the amount that was allegedly in Cambodia.

Now I must confess I have two problems. I am not surprised that we have a smaller percentage of small arms, because you would expect retreating troops to carry their small arms with them. I frankly have trouble believing that since we captured something like 23,000 rifles, if you take the lower figure of 10 percent, this would assume that they had 223,000 stored rifles in Cambodia, and I just don't believe that. I don't know how anyone would really know that.

These estimates are made on the basis of gross tonnage observed in trucks moving and some rough breakdown of how we have observed them to break down their stockpiles in the past.

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So I think the accurate total figure is somewhere
close to 60 percent, but in order for its significance to
be assessed, one has to do it by category.

Now in fairness, let me make one other observation.
We got big supplies of rice, maybe close to their total rice
supplies. That is relatively easy to replenish, because
they don't have to bring it down from North Vietnam. Relatively
easy means two to four months, depending on how safe the base
areas are that they can re-establish, how good their logistic
system is and how quickly they can pick up rice in South Vietnam
and bring it to the base areas.

Ammunition, on the other hand, has to be brought down
the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and that will take anywhere from six to
eight months. So in order to make an assessment of what these
figures mean, one really has to do it by category rather than by
the total amount.

Q Why didn't we stay in there until we got all the
supplies or 80 percent or 90 percent or whatever we expected
to be able to find, reasonably?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, because first of all, these
are hypothetical estimates. We do not know how accurate these
estimates are. For example, they don't take account of recent
expenditures in Cambodia and in Vietnam. They are based
on the assumption that they will always keep 14 months of
equipment in their various stockpiles.

Now if it turns out that their doctrine requires only
nine months, then we may have gotten a much greater percentage.
We made a very systematic search of the area that we controlled.
It is now the rainy season, so it would have been rather difficult
to continue these things, and we have explored every probable
cache site and we think that we would have reached a point of
diminishing returns. For example, in the last three weeks,
the weekly total of caches found dropped with every week, even
though we made very systematic searches.

We think that we have got the majority of the ammunition,
the majority of the food and a considerable bulk of the medical
supplies. We assume that they probably carried away much of their
small arms and that, therefore, having stayed longer would not
have been productive.

Q Are there any other indexes of combat potential
that you use that would be helpful to us -- reduced combat potential?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, we have tried to analyze it
for each category and I think I have given you the most essential
ones.

Q How do you answer the claim that this whole
operation in effect has expanded the war into Cambodia and that
you may have engendered there another popular or anti-American
or anti-ally movement by the Cambodian people?

DR. KISSINGER: This, obviously, was a consideration
we had to weigh very heavily before we made the move. The question
that we had to answer to ourselves to the best of our ability
was whether by moving into the sanctuaries we were pushing the
Communists into Cambodia and thereby bringing about what we were
attempting to prevent.

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The best judgment we made was that the Vietnamese Communists had decided to topple the Cambodian government and were embarked on the campaign of turning Cambodia into a Communist base area at the time that we made the decision.

We have listed some of the facts that led us to this conclusion in the President's report. They have done nothing since we have moved into Cambodia that they were not doing already before we moved into Cambodia. They had engaged, before we moved into Cambodia, in a systematic campaign to cut the communications between Phnom Penh and the rest of the country; to harrass provincial towns and take provincial towns; to take over as much of eastern Cambodia as they could and form it into a contiguous base area.

Our judgment was that at the very minimum, if this were to happen, we should destroy the supplies on which they might then base an operation, having conquered a large part of the country.

So we do not believe we have expanded the war. We have followed the war into Cambodia and tried to mitigate its effect. We had some rather clear indications that they had taken a posture of intransigent hostility towards the government in Cambodia, and that they were determined to overthrow it. That was our best judgment.

On the related point about possibly a significantly large movement growing up around Sihanouk, which would constitute an alliance with North Vietnam and so on, and really causing more trouble than it was solving, what about that?

DR. KISSINGER: But the movement around Sihanouk was really in the process of being formed before we moved into Cambodia, Sihanouk had been recognized by both Peking and Hanoi before we moved into Cambodia and that action, the attack on the legitimacy of the government in Phnom Penh, antedated our action, it did not follow it.

On Page 9 and other places in the report, there is stress on counteraction by South Vietnamese ground and U.S. air forces to prevent the rebuilding of Cambodian sanctuaries. Why is it that in view of the difficulty of distinguishing between interdiction and close air combat support, and in view of the fact that there is considerable controversy over the question of whether the United States forces are presently engaged in close air combat support or simply interdiction, why is such great stress being placed on trying to draw this distinction which is obviously a controversial one at a time when you concede that there will be some exceptions to it?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I did not say that there would be exceptions to it. I said, as the Secretary of State said last week, that there can be interdiction missions that also help in a particular combat situation. This does not mean that we would fly direct combat missions.

The distinction has been made because we have, from the beginning of the Cambodian operation, and indeed prior to the Cambodian operation, had it as a principle that we did not want to be involved in a situation in Cambodia in which the protection of Cambodia became a direct American military responsibility; and in which we would then have the responsibility

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in Cambodia while our forces were declining in South Vietnam, to try to attempt to replay all the dilemmas that had already been faced in Vietnam.

We attempted to avoid the step-by-step involvement that led us into Vietnam. Therefore, we will do what we reasonably can to support the Asian countries in that area, to protect the integrity and neutrality and sovereignty of Cambodia. We will give them a reasonable amount of military assistance in carrying out some of the principles of the Nixon Doctrine and in taking such military actions as are useful to protect our forces in South Vietnam.

But what we will not do insofar as the dividing line can be drawn, is to fight a Cambodian war with American forces. Now I grant you that it will be difficult to draw an absolute dividing line in every detailed, marginal case that you can imagine, and in this respect, the word "guidelines" has some significance. These are the basic premises of our policy and we are going to carry them out.

Q Can you clarify or contribute to the confusion of what Lon Nol has been asking us to do, because reports out of Phnom Penh seem to be suggesting that he raises the possibility at least of American ground forces going back into Cambodia,

DR. KISSINGER: Did I hear you say you wanted me to contribute to the confusion?

Q I said either clarify or contribute to.

DR. KISSINGER: Can I choose? (Laughter)

You have to remember that the Cambodian army was not distinguished for its combat experience when it was thrown into this situation, and therefore, some of the turns that are very meaningful to you gentlemen may not be so self-evident to the higher officers in the Cambodian army. To them an air attack may be an air attack and the distinction between air support and interdiction may be somewhat illusive.

I think in fairness to the Cambodian government, one has to recognize that Sihanouk kept the army deliberately in a non-fighting condition: One, in order to prevent any conceivable provocation to the North Vietnamese, since he was convinced they would beat them anyway, no matter what condition they were in; and secondly in order to prevent any possible competitor from arising and overthrowing him.

So the Cambodians have been faced with a very experienced opponent while they have attempted to build their own army. Actually, it is an army that is very poorly equipped and has a heterogenous collection of equipment, and considering these handicaps, they have really fought surprisingly well.

They obviously want any help they can get, and with hostile forces hitting all around their capital and attacking their provincial towns, it is only natural that the Cambodian government will sometimes state its wishes as an accomplished fact.

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Obviously they have wanted the maximum amount of American military assistance and they have, at various times, stated goals which were beyond our intention in terms of military assistance -- 200,000, 400,000 and numbers that even were beyond their capabilities had we been willing to give them to them.

Now the same problem arises with respect to air power. They sometimes state objectives which are also not exactly how we would phrase our definition of our policy. They have never put a formal request to us in terms of saying, "Please give us close air support whenever a provincial town is attacked," because they may not know what that involves. But when a town is attacked, they will usually ask for specific help. This is the way it usually comes to us, not as a blanket request for blanket authority, but as a specific request when they are very hard pressed somewhere.

In any event, it is our intention not to fight a theological battle on what authorities we should grant. Our policy is as I have described it here and we intend to carry it out as I have described.

Q Where is COSVN now? How much did we get, and could you review that situation, please?

DR. KISSINGER: Ron has kept me from mentioning a five-sided wooden structure we found.

Q Shack, did you say?

DR. KISSINGER: Wooden structure. You called it a shack. Don't put words into my mouth here. (Laughter)

I think, John, if you read my backgrounder, two hours before the operation started, I said then that we had reason to believe that COSVN headquarters was located in the general Fish Hook area, and we would consider capturing it a bonus, but this was not the primary purpose of the operation.

I said then what we have consistently said, that the primary purpose of the operation was to get the supply dumps and to disrupt the communications. COSVN is not one geographic location. It is located in a general area within which it moves quite frequently.

Now we did get a large amount of supplies. We did disrupt communications importantly. There were many periods between April 30 and the end of May where COSVN was off the air for extended periods, as long as four days at one stretch. The volume of traffic from it was severely disrupted.

Q Radio traffic?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes. And therefore, we did achieve this objective. We also have reason to believe that we destroyed some of the subsidiary elements of COSVN headquarters and it is even conceivable that we destroyed some parts of the main headquarters without knowing it.

But with respect to COSVN headquarters, I think it is fair to say that it would have been an extremely lucky coup if we had just fallen on the personnel with an air drop or something, but it was not the primary purpose of the operation and it would not have justified doing it.

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Q In what area is it operating now?

DR. KISSINGER: It is now operating, to the best of
our judgment, northwest of the area in which it was located
before.

Q Dr. Kissinger, can you tell us what distinctions
there are between the bombing raids that we will undertake in
Cambodia and the bombing raids that the United States undertook
in North Vietnam under Johnson?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, the bombing raids that were under-
taken in the previous Administration were partly interdiction
and partly a strategic campaign to break the war-making
capability and the will to resist of Hanoi. Part of them were
there for interdiction only in a very general sense.

We obviously will conduct our air operations in
order to minimize the impact on the Cambodian population
insofar as we possibly can do so.

Q How can this be done?

DR. KISSINGER: It can be done by targeting them
away from populated areas if this is at all possible, and this
has been the case to a considerable extent, except during the
immediate combat phase.

Q Can you give us any idea of what the volume of
bombing will be compared, let's say, to the volume of bombing
in Laos or the volume in North Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the operation we are planning
to conduct in Cambodia is most comparable to what is going on
on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. It is going to be that type of bombing
operation.

Q In terms of volume, number of missions, strikes?

DR. KISSINGER: Northeast Cambodia, for example,
and the region to which the greatest degree of supplies move,
is an area which is really a geographic extension of Laos. I
cannot tell you what the exact allocation is going to be as
between the Ho Chi Minh Trail and the parts of Cambodia which
are especially relevant to our interdiction campaign, but I
don't believe that we are going to expand the total volume of
our air operations. We are simply going to distribute them
over a different area.

Q Will there be as much bombing in Cambodia as
there has been in Laos?

DR. KISSINGER: In which part of Laos? I told you
it will be roughly comparable to what went on on the Ho Chi
Minh Trail. The northern Laos operation is a separate type
of operation.

Q Do the South Vietnamese feel the same way
we do about a political settlement now?

DR. KISSINGER: They have been fully aware of the
position we are taking and I know they have agreed to the
principle. Now it is not inconceivable to me that their
interpretation of the principle may at one time or another
turn out to be not exactly concurrent with ours, but this is
something only the future will tell.

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Q To follow up on that question, has there been a
refinement in the American negotiating position which Secretary
of State Rogers indicated or hinted at when he was on television
two or three weeks ago, in that the United States is not insisting--
we said previously we would not insist on elections, but are we
now more willing to discuss the possibility of participation
of some kind of a coalition government, not calling it by that
name, in South Vietnam, if the North Vietnamese come in and say
we will control 20 or 30 or 35 percent of the country?

DR. KISSINGER: We have not changed our position on a
coalition government. We have told the North Vietnamese, as
indeed we did in the speech on April 20, that we have offered
nothing on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, and that we are
prepared to be flexible, and therefore, if they have other
proposals on how to determine the allocation of political
power, we are prepared to discuss them together with ours.

Q On the renewal of efforts to bring about genuine
negotiations, as part of this, does the President plan in the next
few weeks to name a successor to Lodge in Paris?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't get into personnel questions.
That is handled by Ziegler and his associates. I would think
that the question of a new Ambassador is one that would have to
be considered as part of any new approach and it is one that
obviously is part of a general review.

Q A new Ambassador in Paris or Saigon?

DR. KISSINGER: What were you asking?

Q In Paris?

DR. KISSINGER: Yes.

Q So you are saying that is under consideration
and it is a good possibility?

DR. KISSINGER: I said it is part of a general review.

Q What is your reading of the military strategy
of the Lon Nol government? There are all sorts of conflicting
reports that range to the North Vietnamese and VC operations
being really hit-and-run raids where they are just trying to cause
as much problem as they possibly can, to the possibility that
the Lon Nol government is in some imminent danger of falling.
Could you clarify that?

DR. KISSINGER: For many reasons, to be quite candid, we had a terrible time finding out what was going on in Cambodia. The only people who seemed to have no doubt were you gentlemen. (Laughter)

It was very hard to get American personnel into the
provinces and to get some idea of the size of the enemy forces.
We were quite dependent on the reports of hard-pressed
Cambodian commanders. When you are hard pressed, you always
think you are being attacked by a colossal force.

We have now taken some steps to improve our own information flow and our own assessment at the moment, which is still, I have to say, somewhat tenuous, is that the North Vietnamese

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units that are moving now in Cambodia, are rarely larger than
2,000 to 3,000 men and very often smaller. They have not,
up to now, shown enormous staying power. It is interesting
that they have not managed to hold any of the provincial
towns that they have taken even against the Cambodian army.

Now, is it because they have not intended to hold it
or is it because the supply problems that I have pointed out before
make it hard for them to take with them more ammunition than
they can carry and resupply them?

So to this, frankly, we have not had a conclusive
answer, and it is compounded by the fact that there has not
been a large inflow of new ammunition and weapons into Cambodia
so far as we can tell, since the operations started.

We are now leaning towards the interpretation that
these are more hit-and-run raids of a psychological nature that
are intended to prevent the Cambodian government from consoli-
dating itself, and intended to create a maximum feeling of
insecurity, and that the major Communist thrust is to
consolidate for themselves a secure area in the North which
they will then use either as a bargaining lever in negotiations
or as a springboard for an offensive in the dry season.

If it turned out that next week they launch a major
attack and take a provincial capital, I would not be astonished,
but this is what the weight of the evidence now seems to suggest.

Q In view of that, what is the essential message
that you are trying to tell Hanoi at this stage? Is it that
the United States has shown how tough it can be and how
prepared it is to pursue this same purpose rather than to be
in a new conciliatory posture at a time when your assessment
shows that they most probably are preparing for counter attacks
on their side?

DR. KISSINGER: Let me take your last point first.
The evidence does not yet suggest that they are most probably
preparing a counter attack. The evidence at this moment
suggests that they are engaged in a reassessment of their
policy, which could easily involve some counteractions.

Also, I would have to say that I would suspect
that during July and August they will probably try to do
something of a spectacular nature to show that they have
some substantial strength left. That would be a pattern
that they have followed in the past, which would still not
be inconsistent with an attempt to negotiate.

Q Going into Cambodia, or anywhere?

DR. KISSINGER: It could be in Vietnam or Cambodia.
I don't have any one particular place in mind, but I am
simply flagging it to point out that this would not surprise
us if it happened.

Now you said, are we trying to show a new conciliatory
attitude? I would have to say that we have shown consistently
since this Administration came into office, an extremely concilia-
tory attitude through many channels, and that therefore, an
attitude of conciliation and willingness to settle is not a
departure for this Administration.

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What we also had to do in the period of May and June was to make clear that there were limits beyond which we could not go. Now the problem that Hanoi faces is whether it wants to open yet another front in the war and get itself into yet another situation of uncertain outcome, even if it has some expectation of being able, over a period of years, to disrupt the Cambodian situation in the process drawing in surrounding Asian countries and opening up a new area of major effort, and to do this while the South Vietnamese army is obviously gaining in strength, at least for certain kinds of activities, and therefore, creating new difficulties for itself in South Vietnam.

I am not saying that they could not decide that they are going to go for an all out protracted struggle and for total victory. I am saying that reasonable men in Hanoi, looking at it from Hanoi's framework could also conclude that this is a period for negotiation and in that case, we are prepared to discuss with them that degree of political settlement which is in conformity with their actual political strength.

This is not a new departure for us, but I think these events may have created a new reality. They have had to see after all, as I pointed out last Friday, that the injunction of the Ho Chi Minh testament, to the effect that only the unity of the socialist countries was required to bring about their triumph, has not been realized either during periods of calm or during periods of tension.

Their appeals for a united front have demonstrably been not realized in Cambodia and as they look down the road they might see a prospect where they will be so weakened by even a successful war that it will be very difficult for them to maintain their autonomy in the face of the more probable long-term historical pressures on them.

Again, I am not saying that they will decide this. I am saying that they could decide this. We cannot make them negotiate. All we can do is help create a framework for it.

Q On Page 12, the President says, "Our understanding of Saigons intention is as follows:" Is that a firm understanding? Is it tacit? How do we come by that understanding?

DR. KISSINGER: We have been in intensive communication with our embassy and our military commanders in South Vietnam over recent weeks, and they in turn have been in communication with the authorities in South Vietnam and this reflects our understanding of what will happen and we believe this to be firm.

Q Do you get any encouragement or discouragement through diplomatic channels in messages that go out to Hanoi?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, explicitness is not Hanoi's forte. People usually find what they are looking for in the delphic communications with which Hanoi favors its opponents and some of its friends, as well. It is mixed. We get some indications one way and some indications another for which the probable explanation is that Hanoi has not made up its mind.

When Murrey talked to Le Duc Tho last year, it was unambiguous that they were not going to negotiate. No one could have deduced then that there were factors,

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countervailing factors. They were then in a period of stonewalling. Perhaps it was because Ho Chi Minh was dying or whatever the reason. It is not that sort of situation now. However, it would be dangerous to go to the other extreme and say They have made a commitment in the other direction.

Q The President seems to have made it rather clear today that the future of Cambodia, whether it goes Communist or stays neutral and independent, will be left to the Cambodians and the other free nations without U. S. troop help--military supplies and so on--but not U. S. troop help. Doesn't that seem to be a rather inflexible position for this Government to take when you have said it is very important to preserve flexibility in your negotiating stance?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, we will give some military aid and we will encourage them. It is not self-evident why 17 million South Vietnamese, 7 million Cambodians, and 30 million Thais cannot between themselves organize enough forces to resist 20 million North Vietnamese who are already fighting in two other places and who are at the end of a 500 or 600 mile supply line.

So we believe that it is possible to organize a defense, at least of essential parts of Cambodia, without American ground forces. This is in conformity with the Nixon Doctrine as enunciated in Guam and we believe that the alternative course would get us into the same dilemmas that we are facing in South Vietnam, where sooner or later we would then have to go through a Cambodianization program of turning the war back to the Cambodians.

We believe it is not a shortage of manpower that is the missing ingredient and we are not yet convinced that Hanoi is embarked in the new constellation of forces. We do not believe that with the present forces they have in Cambodia that resistance is impossible and if they were to launch a massive attack with their metropolitan army against Cambodia, then indeed we would face a new situation. But that is, in our judgment, extremely unlikely for many reasons.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on Page 14, getting back to this question of the political solution reflecting the relationship of existing political forces, the President uses this language, "We pledge to abide by the outcome of the political process agreed upon by the South Vietnamese." What kind of suggestions do you have as to ways that you can measure the agreement of the South Vietnamese and is it possible that any of this agreement could be done without the agreement of President Thieu specifically?

DR. KISSINGER: What we meant was, we will abide by whatever political process is decided on and since that political process is supposed to determine the preferences of the South Vietnamese population, we will abide by that political process.

Now is it conceivable that it will be done without President Thieu? President Thieu is an essential part of the agreement, as long as he is President of South Vietnam. We have no preference, and by that I mean we have no preferred candidates in the Presidential elections.

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Q To what extent is the security of U. S. forces a function of the security of ARVN forces that are deployed on Cambodia? That is, under what circumstances might we be called upon to protect them or save them in a Cambodian operation?

DR. KISSINGER: I can see no circumstances in which we would send American forces to rescue ARVN forces.

Q Can you see any circumstance of any kind in which we would re-enter Cambodia?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't foresee any right now, but you know, you might construct horror stories. In the situation as I see it now, I can foresee no circumstances.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how does the success of this operation affect the prospects for speeding up the rate of troop withdrawals from Vietnam?

DR. KISSINGER: We will take a look at that at periodic intervals, and we will be able to judge over the course of the summer whether the impact of the sanctuary operations on activities, especially on III and IV Corps, have been as severe as some of the people expected, and in that case, we can make a new judgment.

THE PRESS: Thank you, sir.

END

(AT 10:50 A.M. PDT.)

[LC]

This Copy For

BACKGROUND BRIEFING

EMBARGOED FOR RELEASE UNTIL
6:00 A.M., EDT, JULY 2, 1970.

EMBARGOED FOR WIRE TRANS-
MISSION UNTIL 11:00 P.M.,
EDT, JULY 1, 1970.

AT THE WHITE HOUSE

AT 10:51 A.M. PDT.

JUNE 30, 1970

TUESDAY

San Clemente, California

MR. ZIEGLER: We will go now to the second portion of the backgrounder. Dr. Kissinger will take questions on matters not relating to the President's statement on Cambodia and South Vietnam. What Dr. Kissinger says you can attribute to White House officials and you should not use direct quotations.

The groundrules on this particular session: It is for 6:00 A.M., EDT, this coming Thursday. Wire transmission is embargoed until after the President's conversation on Wednesday night.

Dr. Kissinger.

Q I just wanted to ask you, I think you talked about the Middle East or rather refused to talk about the new initiative in this document. Has anything happened since Friday which would give us any additional hope that something may come of this latest initiative?

DR. KISSINGER: Nothing very specific has happened, but the absence of specificity is in itself a very significant development. In the past, the various contenders in the Middle East have been at pains to reject anything that gave them anything less than 100 percent of their demands.

The interesting aspect of this present Middle East initiative is that no one has really yet rejected it. They have nagged away at it and they have reserved their options and they have indicated that their enthusiasm is not total, but as I pointed out in that briefing which you have, the best we can hope for in the Middle East is a settlement that makes everyone equally unhappy.

So the fact that there has not yet been a clear cut rejection, the fact that the Soviet Union has not indicated any hostility; that other countries have worked for it behind the scenes, and that even the radical Arab states, while flexing their muscles have stopped way short of rejecting it, gives us still some hope.

Q Could I follow it with just the question of whether Nasser's trip there was in any way, in your judgment, related to the political move?

DR. KISSINGER: The trip to Moscow was scheduled before.

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Q On Page 22 of the long transcript you said "We are trying to give the Arabs enough of a sense of dignity" and trying to create demilitarized zones around Israel in order to minimize some of these dangers.

There was a lot of confusion last week as to whether a proposal for a DMZ around the Suez was included in our peace proposal and it finally came out that it was not. Have we formally or informally proposed this?

DR. KISSINGER: You have to distinguish proposals that might be made to separate the contending forces along the dividing lines and schemes which would separate the forces along -- in the phrase of the United Nations resolution -- "secure and recognized boundaries."

We have not made a proposal to separate the contending forces along present dividing lines. We have had it as part of our proposals all along that there should be some demilitarized zones at the finally agreed borders so that hostile forces would not move right up into the vacated territory.

So, I would have to make that distinction. We have always had proposals for demilitarized zones. We did not make a new one as a part of this proposition.

Q Isn't the Suez Canal part of the border? That would be a barrier in this settlement.

DR. KISSINGER: I would doubt this very seriously, unless Nasser suffers from a complete collapse of will. No, the Suez Canal will not be a border in a new settlement because the Egyptians will not accept relinquishing all of Sinai to the Israelis. So, wherever the border is, it will not be on the Suez Canal.

Q Can you realistically expect Nasser to accept a demilitarized zone that will in any way require his moving back even further or relinquishing more?

DR. KISSINGER: No, from the Suez, no. This is not the proposal. The proposal is as Israel moves back to whatever borders are agreed upon, that not all of the territory it relinquishes be available for the deployment of Arab armies, but rather some or much or most of the territory which is relinquished become demilitarized. No one can propose to the Arabs that they move back further to create the zones.

Q Can you amplify what you meant when you used this in the backgrounder to the editors?

DR. KISSINGER: What we meant was that it was part of our general approach that there should be demilitarized zones in the Middle East around the borders that are finally agreed upon, to enhance the feeling of security that Israel might feel in these new borders, or to put it another way, so that the issue does not have to be considered simply in the military terms of giving up territory to an advancing hostile army. But the size of these demilitarized zones, how they are to be policed, and indeed whether they should extend on only one side of the border or not -- that has not been agreed upon.

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Q Can you tell us anything at all about what the United States has in mind about the often mentioned "just settlement" of the refugee problem?

DR. KISSINGER: As I pointed out in that briefing on Friday, really, the Middle East is the area which has conceptually much harder problems than even Vietnam. On the one hand, the Arabs insist on the right to return to what they call Palestine. The Israelis obviously cannot permit the uncontrolled return of large numbers of Arabs, partly because of the danger that this would shift the population balance and partly because of the danger of importing a guerrilla movement into their own country.

So, I will not go into details, but there have been various schemes which attempt to reconcile the principle of free return with the actuality of a quota or some other restraints so that the return would be on one level symbolic and that those who do not return will receive some other compensation towards resettlement, but above all, so that the refugee camps are eliminated and that the Palestinians are absorbed, a small minority in Israel and a large majority in the other Arab countries.

Q Henry, in the briefing you said the President made very generous offers on April 20th in which he considerably modified some emphasis on our peace proposal and you say despite this the enemy moved deeper into Cambodia and started an attack in Laos.

Is the President now modifying some emphasis in our peace proposal and secondly, if you have some of this negative reaction on April 20, why should you not necessarily have it now?

DR. KISSINGER: Two things: One, the reaction to the April 20 statement was subsumed in the larger reaction to the Cambodian operation which followed it shortly afterwards. Therefore, there was no extended test of their reaction.

Secondly, we are always under pressure to come up with some new proposals, but I think what one has to keep in mind is the necessity of balancing the unquenchable American desire for novelty against the necessities of a bargaining situation.

If you are negotiating with an opponent who knows that if he produces a stalemate, sooner or later there will be pressures on you to break it with a new proposal, you are giving him an incentive not for settlement, but for a stalemate.

Therefore, while it is accepted in our folklore that you must always come up with a new proposal, the reality is that if the other side knows that no matter how unreasonable their position, you will always be under pressure to come up with a new proposal, you will be at a great disadvantage in negotiations. If you look at the record of the term of this Administration, every new proposal in Paris has come from us.

Therefore, when we say we are launching new initiatives, this does not mean that we are scrapping all our previous positions. What it means is that we will try to see whether, within the established framework we cannot develop a formula.

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The big issue in Vietnam is whether the other side is willing to accept a political settlement which will give it a chance at a political outcome, but no guarantee of a political outcome. This is the big issue. What they have asked from us up to now is that we destroy the existing government and pull out our forces unconditionally; knowing very well that if we destroy the organized non-Communist forces in South Vietnam there will be no forces left politically to oppose the NLF.

Now, if they are prepared to discuss a reasonable political contest, so are we.

I don't believe the full possibilities have been explored, primarily because the other side has never been willing to engage in a serious negotiation on that issue.

Now, we will attempt to find ways of engaging them in serious discussion and perhaps finding ways of expressing these general principles. But I am not saying that we are going to come up with some spectacular, totally new approach which might well be counterproductive.

MR. ZIEGLER: We have just spent an hour on Cambodia and South Vietnam. The purpose of this backgrounder is for other foreign policy matters. Confine your questions to that, please.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how valid is the proposal made by the Israelis that their casualties are 85 or 75 percent larger than the Arabs?

DR. KISSINGER: I have not seen, actually the Israeli figures on this, but I think it is fair that in proportion to the population one has to multiply Israeli casualties by 85 to get some sense in our terms of the impact of the present war on the Israelis. I have not seen how this projects. I would not be surprised if it turned out to be larger than the Vietnam casualties. But it is much larger than the cold figures would suggest.

Q How would you appraise, Henry, the Soviet role in trying to reach some solution in the Middle East? Do you have anything that gives you cause for hope that they might somehow collaborate or have you been discouraged by the introduction of the Russian missiles and pilots?

DR. KISSINGER: The Soviets, as everybody else, are in a complex situation in the Middle East. They are trapped by necessities that they did not necessarily create, but which nevertheless may provide opportunities for them which they may not have sought, but which could be of profound significance.

Therefore, one has to distinguish the long term implications of the Soviet presence in the Middle East from the motives that brought them in there to begin with.

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Now, it is not inconceivable to me, indeed I think it is probable, that the Soviets entered the Middle East with combat personnel last winter and spring in order to prevent the collapse of Nasser and that they thought the choices that presented themselves to them were the collapse of a client state or some military engagement.

On the other hand, the introduction of Soviet personnel, of some Soviet combat personnel, into the Middle East objectively created a new reality. The advantage that the Israelis had had before was an advantage in quality manpower. That was erased with one blow by the introduction of Soviet combat personnel. So, it had a profound impact on the Arab-Israeli military balance.

Secondly, it created a situation in which whatever got them in there to begin with, a Soviet combat base that becomes a permanent feature of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean may produce, over a period of time, increasing and perhaps intolerable pressures on the moderate regimes in that area by freeing the radical Arab states to conduct a more aggressive policy under the umbrella of Soviet military power, even if the Soviet military power does not become directly engaged.

Of course, it has military consequences vis-a-vis us. It would be a difficult matter to operate in the Eastern Mediterranean against a large Soviet air presence. So, for all these reasons the Soviet military presence is a serious matter. This has both positive and negative aspects. The positive aspect is that the Soviet Union is aware of the geopolitical impact of its action, may for a while still be prepared to treat it as a bargaining counter and may try to accelerate an Arab-Israeli settlement in order to prevent us from confronting them over this change.

Over a longer period of time, I think the worrisome problems that I have indicated will exist.

Now, they have shown some increased interest in a Middle East settlement. I think their incentive is in part the danger that their presence may be challenged by the Israelis or us if it continues to escalate.

Q At the same time you say on the bottom of Page 23, "We are trying to expel the Soviet military presence, not the advisers so much, but the combat pilots and the combat personnel, before they become so firmly established."

How is that done? How do you plan to do that? Have you discussed that with them and have you formally protested or asked them to leave?

DR. KISSINGER: "Expel" is a strong world. If my associates had fully let me in on everything that would face me I would have chosen a more waffling phrase drawn from my Harvard vocabulary. It is a fair estimate of what we would like to bring about. It is fair to say that our preference in this respect has been made clear to the Soviets.

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Q How does one accomplish this in a long view?
How does one accomplish the removal of Soviet pilots and
combat personnel?

DR. KISSINGER: You know the fellow who said during
the war that the way to deal with the German submarines was
so to heat the ocean and boil it and bring them to the surface.
Somebody said, "How do you do that?" He said, "I have given you
the idea. The technical execution is up to you. (Laughter.)

Q Can you elaborate a little on the comments
you made a few moments ago about the increasing Soviet interest
in a Middle East settlement?

DR. KISSINGER: I think the Soviets realize that if
they expand their military presence the point will be reached
where they must be challenged by the Israelis. The Israelis
cannot permit themselves to sit there and strangle gradually.

Given our commitment to the existence of Israel at the
minimum we will be forced to putting Israel in a position where
it cannot be destroyed by the build-up of Soviet and other
forces.

Therefore, the Soviet build-up at this stage is
not without risk. This is leaving aside anything that we
might do in various ways. Therefore, in the discussions on the
Middle East the Soviets have indicated at least a general
interest in bringing about a solution. They have not yet
married that to very many detailed specific formula, but it
is certainly an area in which they seem to be willing to
talk seriously.

Q Dr. Kissinger, how do they indicate a general
interest? What does that mean specifically? Do they say
"We are generally interested" or "We don't want to talk about
it anymore"?

DR. KISSINGER: They have indicated more than that.
They have indicated that they are prepared to discuss it. But
we have not yet got to the point of either side developing the
complete formula to bring this about, partly because it is a
purely theoretical exercise unless we get a modicum of
consensus established among the Arabs and Israelites on
issues to be discussed.

Q Do you think both sides can work one out?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't know whether they can work one
out but I think they may try.

Q What about the reports of Mohammed Riad being
here for discussions?

DR. KISSINGER: What about them?

Q Is he here? Has he had meetings with the
Secretary of State?

DR. KISSINGER: He was in New York, to the best of
my knowledge. I don't want to go into any specific discussions
he may have had.

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Q Was that encouraging?

DR. KISSINGER: At this stage I don't think any of the Arab states have yet made up their mind. He has also gone to Moscow.

Q I take it that you don't agree with the Alsopian theory that the Russians are beguiling Americans, especially the Russian representation in Washington, into the belief that it is interested in a general settlement in the Middle East when in fact it is acting the way it is, which would seem to be to the contrary.

DR. KISSINGER: Maybe it is. If they are just trying to beguile us, this is not a riskless course for them. I think whether they are or not will also depend in part on our actions. At this stage there is no clear evidence of that. There is slight evidence that they generally do want to talk about a settlement. What price they are willing to pay for the settlement, that remains to be seen.

Q How hopeful have the developments in the SALT talks been so far and can you look down the road and see the prospects there? How does it look to you at this point?

DR. KISSINGER: If you keep this briefing going much longer you will even ask me how things look this afternoon. (Laughter)

I think we can say already that simply as an intellectual negotiating exercise the SALT talks have been more constructive than any comparable talks that have been held with the Soviet Union.

If one compares them with the tedious discussions that used to go on, on the subject of general and complete disarmament one is really in a different era. That doesn't mean we have agreed on anything, but it does mean that the issues they have raised are not frivolous issues. They are issues that have to be addressed. The issues we have raised have not been negotiating gimmicks, but have been our best judgment of the situation.

I think we have both put on the table how we would look at a comprehensive settlement; given the difference in geography, history, weapons deployment and types of weapons, obviously major differences do exist.

Now, the problem that both sides face is whether one wants to continue pursuing the comprehensive settlement or whether one can break out isolated parts of it in which there is a larger area of agreement and move those towards a solution if one does break out isolated parts, how big a chunk you want to break out.

The danger of breaking out too small a piece is that you may wrap up into the smaller piece all the incentives that exist for the total package and thereby get a very limited agreement that may not lead anywhere else.

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But I think we are at a stage where over a
reasonable period of time, certainly within a year, one
can foresee very clearly whether a limited agreement is
possible and I would lean on the side that it is.

Q Several times in his Cambodian report the
President takes cognizance of recriminations at home. Is
this also a factor in your thinking about the Mideast? If
we get involved there, what is the reading you have on
objections at home and controversy about it?

DR. KISSINGER: The pressures we face in the Middle
East work in the opposite direction from the pressures that
work on us in Vietnam. Many of those who are most insistent
on removing us from Vietnam are most vocal in encouraging a
greater American role in the Middle East.

We have to make these decisions on the basis of
the best judgment that we can made of what is in the long-
term national interest of the United States and in the
interest of peace.

The President has avoided in both areas, I think,
the easy, cheap shot at popularity on the theory that the
public will not forgive its leaders for producing disasters,
even if these are caused by actions that they seem to have
promoted.

So, of course, we have to take cognizance of public
opinion. But if we are convinced that something that public
opinion urges on us would produce a disaster two years down
the road in one direction or another, we have to follow our
best judgment on the long-term consequences.

Q Dr. Kissinger, if I read what you have said
essentially, we are in a position where, should, hypothetically,
Russia's presence in the Arab countries become what we consider
to be overwhelming, we would be in the position of having to
establish almost an equal American presence on behalf of
Israel, would that become necessary.

DR. KISSINGER: Who said that?

Q I am asking if I am interpreting you right
because you talk of our necessity to challenge their presence,
our necessity to insure that Israel will not be intimidated
into non-existence, if I understand you right. How do we do
this if the eventsshould become a fact, if their presence
indeed is overbearing and strangling Israel? Precisely what
are we talking about?

DR. KISSINGER: At this moment I don't think we
should lose our sense of perspective. For the foreseeable
future what would be needed in terms of American support to
prevent this from arising does not add up to an overwhelming
American presence in the Middle East.

Secondly, at some point of the Soviet presence in
the Middle East there will be some indigenous Arab forces that
will have their own reasons for not wanting to substitute
one colonialism for another. So, this is a very extreme
situation that you have described, but if the Soviet build-
up continues in the Middle East, there will have to be some
American counteraction, but that will not be an overwhelming
American presence, necessarily.

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Q Do you see any possible threat to our Western oil interests in the Middle East as a result of Soviet pressures?

DR. KISSINGER: The oil interests have to be seen really on two levels. Ninety percent of the Japanese oil, and I think 75 percent of the Western European oil comes from that area which again is one reason why we can have an overwhelming interest in preventing this area from being dominated by the Soviet Union.

In addition, there are substantial American investments in this area, and of course we do not want to have those hazarded to every political upheaval.

On the other hand, it is dangerous to permit yourself to be blackmailed with your economic interests because what is considered intolerable at one moment, if it works, can then simply lead to another series of demands. Therefore, as long as we are physically located there, we have to be very careful in being excessively nervous about this sort of blackmail. But obviously, if American actions produce predictable volatile reactions, this would be one of the factors that has to be considered.

THE PRESS: Thank you, Dr. Kissinger.

END (AT 11:35 A.M. PDT)