The recent preview of the Carter Administration's five-year plan for the
Defense budget proposed an average annual increase in budget authority of 4.85%.

Despite this policy reversal, the Carter Administration must stand indicted
for ignoring the momentum of the Soviet military buildup and the relative decline
of U.S. forces during its tenure. In October of 1978 and again in March of 1979,
Chairman Brock, speaking for the RNC, called attention to the real decline in
Defense Budget Authority during the Carter Administration, a yearly average decline
of 2% at a time when the Administration was pledged to a 3% annual increase. In
citing the specific areas of deterioration and the particular systems and policies
which needed adoption, Chairman Brock called for "a reasonable and progressive
Five-Year Defense Program" and urged the administration to "reverse this disastrous
course."

President Carter has recently claimed to have inherited this period of decline
from President Ford. This is false. The last Ford Administration budget request,
for fiscal 1978, would have resulted in a 6.3% real growth in defense investment;
that on top of the 5.8% real increase actually appropriated for FY 77. As a
result of policy-directed reductions by the Carter Administration and higher-than-
anticipated inflation, there is now a shortfall of more than $38.6 billion in
budget authority from the January 1977 Five Year Defense Plan.

The cancellation of the B-1 bomber and the deferral of full-scale production
of the MX-missile for three years irreversibly weakened our position in the SALT II
negotiations. The Vladivostok Accords, negotiated by President Ford, which laid
the guidelines for this round of SALT, presupposed both the highly advanced B-1
and earlier deployment of the MX. The elimination and delay of these two weapons
systems by the Carter Administration removes the foundation for America's security
that the Ford Administration had built in to the Vladivostok Accords. Moreover,

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But the learning process is only at the beginning.
One of the main criticisms of Kissinger's policy, and one of
the most valid, was that he did not try very hard to gain
public support for his policy: The military case for the
invasion of Cambodia or for Def Con 3 (during the Yom Kippur
war) was never really made. In view of the lack of evidence
many people assumed, not altogether unnaturally, that the
motives for these actions were domestic rather than foreign
political. It is certainly true that in these two instances,
and probably also in others, more facts should have been given
at the time to justify these actions. But would it have made
much difference? There is still an influential group of peo-
ple which refuses to believe in any real threat to the United
States and which in any conflict, except perhaps with Israel
will put the blame squarely on Washington.

True, no great crowds can be fetched any longer
extolling the virtues of Hanoi and Pyonyang. But it can
still be argued that the U.S., unable to put its own house
in order, has no right to preoccupy itself with the affairs
of other countries. If the Cubans wish to install Russian
bases on their territory, what right does America have to
complain? Some now maintain that the main issue in world
affairs today is frustrated nationalism and that American
foreign policy will succeed only if it identifies itself with
the forces of what they call "radical nationalism" - from
Castro to Khadafi. Others argue that the Soviet Union,
surrounded by enemies, has far more reason to worry rather
than the United States; some of those directly responsible

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for the disastrous involvement in Vietnam now claim that
the U.S. will always behave irresponsibly if it is too
strong, and must therefore be kept in a state of weakness;
yet others, worried that the decline of American (and NATO)
power does not proceed quickly enough and that Mr. Brezhnev's
threats to America's allies are insufficient, make their way
from Washington to Copenhagen to enlist the Danes (that
militarist country *par excellence*) in the struggle against
Western defense.

There is no end to such madness, and there is
method underlying it. The obfuscators have a vital inter-
est that the impotent rage which swept America following
the seizure of the Teheran hostages should remain impotent,
for otherwise they may be swept away from the scene. After
Munich the French people were told by most of its leaders
that it should be happy that peace had been preserved, it
should go home now, enjoy its food and the songs of Tino
Rossi. Similar advice will be given once the present crisis
is over: Iran was an accident, which could have been pre-
vented if America had not stupidly provoked that country
ignoring its legitimate grievances. By acting more prudently
in the future such mishaps will not recur. This kind of
argument could be heard quite often during the recent crisis
and some of the media were, in fact, pioneering it until it
was adapted by Senator Kennedy: Why couldn't the Shah have
looked for another country and why couldn't he be made to
go away quickly? In Victorian England there were many poli-
tical refugees from Marx to Mazzini and Kossuth, among them

WL-24

not a few wanted in their native country for various heinous
crimes. The establishment of Victorian England abominated
most of these wild radicals. But anyone demanding that they
should leave the country would have been regarded as a des-
picable cad - he would not have been able to show his face
in public, or at least in his club. But (it will be argued)
we are no longer in the position of Victorian England, we are
exposed to pressure, and why risk serious complications for the
sake of a not particularly attractive individual with a doubt-
ful record? Nor are we apparently as strong as the Swiss who
gave asylum to Bakunin, Lenin and Trotsky and to countless
political refugees in the decades since.

Giving asylum to someone like St. Francis or Mahatma
Gandhi would no doubt be more popular. Unfortunately, leaders
of third world countries are not usually made of such stuff.
Successive American presidents supported the Shah not because
they thought that he was a good man but because they believed
that there was no prospect for a liberal-democratic regime
in Iran in the near future and that an alternative government
would be firstly worse, and secondly anti-American. As for
the Shah, not the fate of an individual is concerned but a
principle. The reluctance to accept this, is a matter of
serious concern; a society which puts its convenience above
all other values will not remain free for long and it may
deserve its fate.

The obfuscators will be fighting some mighty rearguard
actions in the months to come. Some will tell us that there
is nothing wrong with America's standing in the world, others

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will admit that there is, but that this is largely the
fault of our own aggressive actions in the past and partly
the result of "objective" changes in world politics. Yet
others will appeal to the instincts of cowardice and con-
venience. True, in many ways their work will be cut out
for them but they still may not consider their cause for
lost. Defeatism has not only injured American self-esteem,
it has not only affected its ability to do what is right,
but also the capacity of some of seeing the difference
between right and wrong. The rot has spread widely and
recovery will not be easy. The old foreign political esta-
blishment weighted down with guilt feeling cannot provide a
lead, and certainly not the advocates of the "new politics"
of 1970 who bear their share of responsibility for the
present mess and now wish to hide behind the new cover of a
"moderate center". It is understandable that they wish to
escape the onus for the disaster, but they should not be
permitted to do so. Many of them were, no doubt, genuinely
convinced that they would restore peace to America and the
world. But intentions count for little in world politics,
their misguided actions have been leading to a dangerous
situation in which America may either have to accept, quite
soon, a policy of surrender to massive, ongoing blackmail
from various quarters or prepare itself for armed conflict.
We are now paying the price for their advice and guidance,
for the lack of resolution on one hand and the inability on
the other even to understand the nature of the threats facing
America. This could easily have been averted, but now it may