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but the European support has been token. The United States and France
are at loggerheads about the role of the United Nations. From Suez to
the Congo, from Yemen to Malaysia, the Western allies have failed to agree
on a common policy towards what has come to be called the Third World,
political unity
over a
European integration has been slowed while various schools of thought
regarding social
debate the relative merits of abstract constitutional concepts like
federation and confederation. Basic issues of strategic doctrine have
gone unresolved for years. The need to maintain a facade of unity has
compounded frustrations.

This impasse has produced some ugly accusations on both sides of
the Atlantic. President de Gaulle has been charged by some of his American
critics with deliberately wrecking allied unity for the sake of old-fashioned
notions of grandeur. His policy is described as being animated by nothing
higher than a 19th century concept of nationalism. French spokesmen--
with limited support elsewhere in Europe--charge the United States with
hiding hegemonic aspirations behind vague notions of Atlantic community.
United States strategic views are said to mask a desire to keep open the

option of a strictly bilateral settlement between the United States and
the Soviet Union over the heads of our European allies.

A debate conducted on this level makes it impossible to face the
real issues. Of course, in an alliance of sovereign states, a measure
of disagreement is inevitable. But current disputes do not concern the
tactics for reaching an agreed goal. What is at stake is basic assumptions
about the nature of Atlantic relationships, the future of Europe and the
relative influence of the various partners. For the first time since
the war there exists an open challenge, not just to the technical imple-
mentation of American plans but to the validity of American conceptions.

The nations bordering the Atlantic have been brought face to face with
two questions not unlike those which each Western society has had to
deal with in its domestic affairs: How much unity do we want? How much
pluralism can we stand? Too formalistic a conception of unity risks
destroying the political will of the members of the Atlantic area. Too
absolute an insistence on national particularity must lead to a fragmenta-
tion of any common effort.

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community of interests was submerged by subsidiary rivalries. Ancient
Greece foundered on this dilemma. Western Europe nearly tore itself
apart before it submerged its rivalries. And now the Atlantic area faces
the challenge of how to combine common action with a respect for diverse
approaches.

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as "provocative," "prone to obsolescence" and "weak."¹ For a considerable period after the advent of the Kennedy Administration, some high officials held the view that on nuclear matters the President might serve as the Executive Agent of the Alliance. Since then, the United States has made various proposals for nuclear sharing, the common feature of which has been the retention of the United States veto over the nuclear weapons of the Alliance. The proposed NATO Multilateral Force is a good example.

However sensible such schemes may appear from the point of view of the division of labor, they would perpetuate American hegemony in nuclear matters within the Alliance. Allies seem to be considered necessary not so much to add to over-all strength as to provide the possibility for applying ability. (Allies are useful because they permit us to aggrandise and means to attack all-land power discriminately. In such a structure, American decisions must continue to be paramount. The policies of our allies must continue to be directed towards gaining influence over essentially American positions. until such time as we can fully realize that the policies of the United States are really the policies of the world.)

In other words, the predominant United States view is a sophisticated

¹ For the classic indictment of Europe's national nuclear forces see Secretary McNamara's speech at Ann Arbor, June 16, 1962, DOD, July 9, 1962, Vol. XLVII, No. 1202, pp. 64-69.

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adaptation of conditions of the late Forties and early Fifties. It is
designed to make our hegemony more bearable, not to alter it.

According to the opposing view, alliances have lost their significance altogether. The French theorist, General Gallois, has argued, for example, that nuclear weapons have made alliances obsolete.¹ Faced with the risk of total destruction, no nation will jeopardize its survival for another. Hence, he maintains, each country must have its own nuclear arsenal to defend itself against direct attack, while leaving all other countries to their fate.

This formula would mark the end of collective security and would be likely to lead to international chaos. In the face of the growing nuclear arsenals of the major protagonists, it would be idle to deny that the threat of nuclear retaliation has lost some of its credibility. The Gallois theory would, however, transform a degree of uncertainty into a guarantee that the United States would not come to the assistance of its

¹Pierre M. Gallois, "U.S. Strategy and the Defense of Europe", ORBIS, VII:2 (Summer 1963), pp. 226-249.

allies, thus greatly simplifying an aggressor's calculation.

Moreover, in order to protect itself in this new situation, each
country would need to develop not only a nuclear arsenal of its own but
also foolproof procedures for assuring the Soviets that a given nuclear
blow did not originate from its territory. If Gallois is right, and each
country is unwilling to risk nuclear devastation for any ally, it will also
want to prevent itself from being triggered into nuclear war by a neighbor.
Thus each country will have a high incentive to devise methods to protect
itself against attacks based on misinformation. The Gallois theory would
lead to a multiplication of national nuclear forces side by side with the
development of methods of surrender or guarantees of non-involvement.

When views such as these carry influence on both sides of the
Atlantic, it is no accident that much of the debate on nuclear matters
within NATO turns on the issue of confidence. The United States tends
to ask those of its allies possessing nuclear arsenals of their own: If
you trust us, why do you need nuclear weapons of your own? The allies reply:

[Y]

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If you trust us why are you so concerned about our possession of nuclear weapons? Since the answer must inevitably emphasize contingencies where *our allies* either the goals *or the* strategy would be incompatible, the debate on nuclear control within NATO has been inherently divisive.

The concentration of nuclear power in the hands of one country poses one set of problems; the range of modern weapons raises another. In the past, a threatened country had the choice either of resisting or of surrendering. If it resisted, it had to be prepared to accept the consequences in terms of physical damage and loss of life. A distant ally *generally* could be effective only if it was able to bring its strength to bear in the area of conflict.

Modern weapons have changed this. What each member country wants from the Alliance is the assurance that an attack on it will be considered a *casus belli*. It strives for deterrence by adding the strength of a distant ally to its own power. But, equally, each state has an incentive to reduce damage to itself to a minimum should deterrence fail. The range of modern

[y]

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weapons for the first time provides the technical possibility of combining these objectives. In 1914 Belgium could not base its defense on a strategy which transferred to Britain the primary risks of devastation. In the age of intercontinental rockets this is technically feasible.

Part of the strategic dispute within the Alliance, therefore, involves jockeying to determine which geographic area will be the theater of war if deterrence fails (though this obviously cannot be made explicit). A conventional war confined to Europe must appear in a different light to Americans than to Europeans who remember the casualty lists of two world wars and on whose territory such a war would be fought. A nuclear exchange which spares their territory may appear to Europeans a more attractive strategy and the threat of nuclear retaliation a more effective deterrent.

The interests of the Alliance may be indivisible in an ultimate sense, but this does not guarantee the absence of sharp conflicts on methods to reach common objectives.

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the aggressor and the defender would understand what they would confront
and could act accordingly. Wars could not be caused by a misunderstanding
of intentions. They would occur only if the protagonists calculated the
existing power relationships differently.

Traditionally, however, the national interest has not been unambiguous.
Often the aggressor did not know which countries would ultimately be lined
up against it; Germany in 1914 was genuinely surprised by the British
reaction to the invasion of Belgium. Occasionally the defenders could
not be certain of the extent of their potential support--as was the case
with the Allies in both wars regarding U.S. participation. Historically,
the existence of an understanding on this point, tacit or explicit, has
often been the determining factor in the decision to go to war. In the
decade prior to World War I, the staff talks between Britain and France,
which led to the transfer of the French fleet to the Mediterranean, were
one of the key factors in Britain's decision to enter the conflict in
August 1914. (Thus the talks achieved one objective of traditional

["I - 17", "alliances: to commit Britain to the defense of France. They failed in", "another: to make the opposing alignment clear to the potential aggressor.)", "One of the distinguishing features of the nuclear period is that technology andideology andideology andideology

[N]

I - 18

The gap in military strength between the United States and its European allies has in fact widened, not narrowed, in the past decade. What has changed is the use to which this power can be put. The paradox of modern weapons technology is that states have a high capacity to destroy, but their attacks are not always effective. This is because the ability to destroy threats is not related to the ability to survive. So, if only a limited credibility for threats are credible are so clear-cut as to leave little doubt about the commitment of the major partner.

On the one hand, polycentrism is virulent not because the world has ceased to be bipolar, but because with respect to nuclear weapons it essentially remains so. President de Gaulle is convinced that those circumstances in which the United States might be prepared to resort to its nuclear weapons cannot be fundamentally affected by his actions. In other words, the United States commitment need not be purchased by being conciliatory and cannot be jeopardized by intransigence--within very wide limits at least.

Thus President de Gaulle sees little risk and considerable potential gain in political independence. In a curious way, it is possible for him

[y]

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to add American power to his own in pursuit of policies. ~~Measures~~ Policies often contradictory to those of the United States are thus in a sense supported by the American nuclear umbrella--a fact which adds to the irony of the situation and to the annoyance of some American policy-makers. Although traditionally a state's diplomatic influence corresponded roughly to its military strength, this is no longer inevitably the case. Influence can now be achieved by using another country's protection even for policies not in accord with the ally's preferences.

The frequent insistence of United States officials and commentators that in the nuclear age an isolated strategy is no longer possible misses the central point: ~~it is precisely because of this that allies have un-~~
an isolated strategy is indeed impotently precedented scope for the pursuit of their own objectives. And the more the detente--real or imaginary--proceeds, the more momentum these tendencies will gather. We live in a curious world where neutrals enjoy most of the protection of allies and allies aspire to have the same freedom of action as do neutrals.

[Y]

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But is it turn into a test of will. Deterrence becomes as much a psychological as a military problem. It depends on the aggressor's assessment of risks, not the defender's. A threat meant as a bluff but taken seriously is more useful for purposes of deterrence than a "genuine" threat interpreted as a bluff.

Moreover, if deterrence is successful, aggression does not take place. It is impossible, however, to demonstrate why something has not occurred. It can never be proved, for example, whether peace has been maintained because NATO pursues an optimum strategy or a marginally effective one. Finally, the longer deterrence lasts, the more credible becomes the argument that perhaps the Communists never intended to attack in the first place. An effective NATO deterrent strategy may thus have the paradoxical consequence of strengthening the arguments of the quasi-neutralists.

Even when the necessity for a military policy is not challenged, serious disputes are produced by the novelty of modern weapons. / Never before in history has so much depended on weapons so new, so untested, so "abstract." Nuclear weapons have been exploded in wartime

I - 24

only on Japan, which did not possess means of retaliation. No one knows
how governments or people will react to a nuclear explosion under conditions
where both sides possess vast arsenals.

Moreover, modern weapons systems are relatively untested. During the
debate over the nuclear test ban treaty, a great deal of attention was
focused on the adequacy of nuclear warheads. In fact, the other components
of modern weapons systems contain many more factors of uncertainty. The
estimated "hardness" of Minuteman silos depends entirely on theoretical
studies. Of the thousands of missiles in our arsenal, relatively few of
each category have been tested under operational conditions. There is little
experience with salvo firing. Air-defense systems are designed without any
definite knowledge of the nature of the offense. A high proportion of the
phenomena discovered in nuclear testing have been "unexpected."

The novelty of modern weapons gives disputes an abstract, conjectural, the difficulty of forming a plausible conception for their use. almost metaphysical, cast. How does one threaten with solid-fuel missiles?

As these are always in an extreme state of readiness, how does one demonstrate
an increase in preparedness such as historically served as a warning? From a

[Y]

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technical point of view, it is highly probable that missiles can perform
most of the functions heretofore assigned to airplanes. The shift to missiles
and the elimination of airplanes envisaged by the former Deputy Secretary of
Defense Roswell Gilpatric¹ makes a great deal of sense technically. But has
adequate attention been given to the kind of diplomacy which results--parti-
cularly in crisis situations--when the retaliatory threat depends entirely
on solid-fuel missiles in underground silos? During the Cuban missile crisis,
dispersing SAC planes to civilian airports proved an effective warning. What
will be an equivalent move when our strategic forces are composed entirely of
missiles?

Similar intangibles underlie much of the strategic debate between
some of our European allies and the United States. Since 1961 the United
States has insisted that deterrence was best achieved by posing a credible
risk. And it has related credibility to whether the risks were tolerable if
deterrence fails. For a variety of reasons, many Europeans have argued that

¹"Our Defense Needs: The Long View", *Foreign Affairs*, April 1964, p. 313

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paintaking rehearsals, provided for every contingency except the psychological strain on the Commander.

The United States-European dialogue on strategy is thus confused by ambiguities which are essentially psychological in nature. The United States tendency to treat political and psychological problems as if they were primarily technical exacerbates disagreements beyond their intrinsic significance. Acquiescence in American strategic hegemony can have two meanings: It can either represent a sincere commitment to Atlantic partnership or disguise a neutralist wish to abdicate responsibility. Many of those who applaud our views may do so for reasons which will not prove very comforting in the long run. For the American nuclear umbrella, now sometimes exploited by President de Gaulle for his own purposes, can also be used--and more dangerously for the West--to support policies amounting to neutralism. In many countries it is the leaders and groups traditionally most committed to national defense who have developed views on strategy which challenge American concepts while some of those most ready to accept

I - 30

itself against foreign danger. Every European country--with the exception of Britain--had known defeat at one time or another during World War II. Every country--again with the exception of Great Britain--had been, at some point, the victim of foreign occupation. Societies were shattered. Europe was dependent on the United States for its material well-being, domestic cohesion and safety from invasion.

United States-European relationships took on their present cast during this period. It has, of course, never been correct to speak of Europe as if it were an entity and as if every country were going through the same process. Considerable differences exist as to the vigor with which European countries attempt to assert their own role in international affairs. But whatever the differences among European countries--some of which are becoming significant now--the trend is clearly in the direction of increased European assertiveness. To be sure, many of the actual disputes which now rend the Alliance have been produced by the strong-willed personality of President de Gaulle. But equally many other Europeans have muted views not too different from those of the French

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President, because they object to his style of government and his
diplomatic methods.

In itself this is not undesirable. For in the immediate post-war
years Atlantic relationships developed on a basis which was psychologically
unhealthy in the long run. Faced with an impotent Europe, the United States
came to deal with its allies on a paternalistic basis. This involved a
certain self-righteousness, impatient of criticism, eager above all to
remove the obstacles to the achievement of whatever plans we might have at
the moment. As a result, the United States and Europe too often conducted
their dialogue over the technical implementation of a blueprint manufactured
in America.

In part this American attitude was both the cause and the product of
some bad habits developed by Europe during the period of unchallengeable
American hegemony. The policy of our European allies essentially consisted
of influencing American decisions rather than developing conceptions of
their own. This in turn, produced querulousness and insecurity. At times,

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our allies seemed more eager to extract American reassurance than to encourage
a consistent United States policy. Excessive suspicion was coupled with
formal pliancy. For a decade, European statesmen showed whatever dis-
agreement they felt by delaying the implementation of agreed measures rather
than by confronting the issues before the Alliance. This led to a negativism
characterized by a greater awareness of risks than of opportunities and by
a general fear of any departure from the status quo.

The period of American hegemony came to an end in the late Fifties
and early Sixties under the impact of four events in which United States
policy had played a major role: European economic recovery, European
integration, decolonization, and the Cuban missile crisis and its aftermath.
Each of these events illustrates that even the most successful policies
create their own dynamism. Results cannot always be judged by the in-
tentions of those who start a historical process, even less by their public
pronouncements.

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European recovery was promoted by the United States in a constructive and far-sighted spirit. Europe was seen as a potential partner which could eventually share with us the burdens and responsibilities of world leadership. Most pronouncements of American purposes reflected our expectation that after its recovery Europe would no longer require American economic assistance but would continue to pursue parallel, if not identical, policies.

This was, however, always unlikely. With the growth of European economic vigor, Europe's traditional political dynamism was bound to return. The trend was given impetus by the existence of an intact younger generation--the first since the carnage of World War I--eager to assert its own view of the world.

The process of European economic integration magnified Europe's new-found assertiveness. The orthodox view of the European Economic Community was that it should be "outward looking" and that its economic strength would buttress all free peoples on a non-discriminatory basis.

[Y]

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politically unified Europe making decisions by some sort of majority voting of the European states would end the current impasse in Atlantic relationships.¹ The experience of the Common Market suggests that this conclusion is far from inevitable and that France might have little to fear from such a system of weighted voting. 86

Then, too, the process of decolonization, in which we often sided against our European allies, has produced a new assertion of European vigor. Ironically, the end of Europe's colonial empire has led to a reversal of roles between us and Europe in many underdeveloped countries. Some European leaders are now repeating the American argument of the Fifties: that the larger interests of the free world are sometimes served by allowing for differing, sometimes even competing, Western approaches to the emerging nations.

This attitude, too, was inevitable, even when it bears the marks of de Gaulle's high-handed tactics. Having shed their colonial possessions,

¹See below, Chapter

of 1956. This illustrates that the penalties in foreign policy while inevitable are often deferred and must be paid by people different from those bearing the major responsibility. That this policy reflected a wide consensus at the time should give pause to those who today conduct policies geared to overcoming immediate symptoms of crisis while neglecting the long-run implications of their actions.

Finally, relations with the Communist world have changed dramatically since the Cuban missile crisis. Most of our European allies have drawn the conclusion that the two main nuclear powers will avoid a direct confrontation for an indefinite period. This conviction has been strengthened by the hope in some, and the suspicion in others, that bilateral United States-Soviet dealings are under way. Such an atmosphere of détente removes the previous urgency for Allied cohesion. As the Soviet threat appears to recede, the scope for national action widens proportionately. As the impression grows that bilateral Soviet-United States negotiations are under way, Third Force tendencies in Europe are stimulated. The issue

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[N]

P Some of the strains of Atlantic relationships have resulted from factors and side everybody's center, many reflected the growth in Europe of the very strength and self-reliance which American policy is striving to promote since the end of World War I. Others have been caused by the nature of modern weapons whose distinctiveness is not really convertible into resistance or inhibition.

But perhaps the deepest cause of misunderstanding and the reasons why structural problems have proved so intractable is

## V. Differences in Historical Perspective

One

The problems are相互 independent as regards

Perhaps the deepest cause of transatlantic misunderstandings

is a difference in historical perspective. Americans live in an

environment uniquely suited to an engineering approach to policymaking.

As a result, our society has been characterized by a conviction that any problem will yield if subjected to a sufficient dose of expertise. With such an approach, problems tend to appear as discrete issues without any inner relationship. It is thought that they can be solved "on their merits" as they arise. It is rarely understood that a "solution" to a problem may mortgage the future--especially as there is sufficient optimism to assume that even should this prove to be the case, it will still be possible to overcome the new problem when it materializes. When applied to foreign policy, such an approach tends to consider division of labor as its own justification. Allies are considered factors in a security arrangement; their utility is measured in terms of their contribution to a common effort, whose criteria are often determined abstractly with

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each nation assigned a specific role with little regard to its history
or domestic structure.

But, Europeans live on a continent covered with ruins testifying
to the fallibility of human foresight. In European history, the re-
cognition of a problem has often defined a dilemma rather than pointed
to an answer. The margin of survival of European countries has been
more precarious than that of the United States. Each country--with the
possible exception of Great Britain--has known national catastrophe as
America has not. European reasoning is thus likely to be more com-
plicated and less confident than ours. Our European allies think of
themselves not simply as components of security schemes but as expressions
of an historical experience. Policies that neglect their sense of
identity may destroy the psychological basis of whatever common effort
is attempted to be organized.

This explains some of the strains in Atlantic relationships.
Americans tend to be impatient with what seems to them Europe's almost

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morbid obsession with the past, while Europeans sometimes complain about
a lack of sensitivity and compassion on the part of Americans. In the
fall of 1963, our newspapers were filled with derisory comments about
French maneuvers then taking place. The scenario of these maneuvers
supposed that an aggressor force was attacking France through Germany.
France's allies had surrendered. As the aggressor's armies were approaching
her borders, France resorted to her nuclear weapons.

It is, of course, easy to ridicule this scenario by contrasting
the small size of the French bomber force with the magnitude of the
disaster envisaged. But the crucial issue is not technical. It arises
from the fact that France has undergone shattering historical experiences
with which Americans find it difficult to identify. The scenario of the
French maneuvers recalled importantly--perhaps too rigidly--France's
traumatic experience of 1940, when foreign armies attacked all along
the Western front and France's allies collapsed. The British Fighter
Command remained in England; the fact that this critical decision was wise