The Trilateral Commission

345 EAST 46th STREET, NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017 • (212) 661-1180

FEB - 3 1987

January 27, 1987

David Rockefeller
Chairman

J. H. Warren
Deputy Chairman

George S. Franklin
Vice Chairman

Charles B. Heck
President

TRUSTEES &
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

Harold Brown
Zbigniew Brzezinski
William T. Coleman, Jr.
Alan Greenspan
Robert S. Ingersoll
Lane Kirkland
Henry A. Kissinger
Robert S. McNamara
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.
Charles W. Robinson
Henry Rosovsky
William W. Scranton

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
350 Park Avenue - 26th floor
New York, NY 10021

Dear Henry,

A few minutes, literally, before Helena and I left for a two
week vacation with Mitchell and Jeanette Sharp in the Virgin Islands, I
was called by a "facts-checker" for Town and Country about an article
which Robert Moskin had written on the Council on Foreign Relations. I
was told that there could be a couple of factual changes in the article
if necessary, but nothing further at this stage, as the article had
already gone to press. The "facts-checker" said that Moskin had
written that before you agreed to join the Council's staff to write
your book on "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy", you had made two
"demands": one, that you should have sole control of the study group,
and two, that a member of the group would have to be dropped because he
was writing a book on the same subject as yours. I said (1), that you
had not asked for sole control of the group, but merely wanted to
confirm that you would be the sole judge of the contents of your book
-- which was the case with all of the Council authors.

(2), I said that a member of the group -- I did not name him, but my
guess is they know it was Paul, as they had the rest of the story
straight -- was contemplating a book on the same subject as yours, and
he himself thought that he should not continue with the group under the
circumstances. Naturally, I have no idea as to what will actually be
said about these two points in the article, but I hope they will accept
my version.

With best wishes,

:rhm

EUROPEAN OFFICE: 35, avenue de Friedland, 75008 Paris, France

JAPANESE OFFICE: Japan Center for International Exchange, 4-9-17 Minami-Azabu, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan

A côterie of the most powerful men and women in business, politics and the media, the Council on Foreign Relations has long sought to influence U.S. foreign policy, winning the favor of administrations in search of experts and the enmity of extremists on the left and right.

Advise and Dissent

By J. Robert Moskin

The best club in the country," as one member called the Council on Foreign Relations at a recent luncheon, is experiencing the most revolutionary change in its sixty-five-year history. In 1985, this elitist New York power base of the Eastern establishment replaced its chairman, David Rockefeller, and its president, Winston Lord—both scions of wealthy, old-line families—with Peter G. Peterson, the son of Greek immigrants, and Peter Tarnoff, the grandson of Russian immigrants. They are encouraging the Council to expand its activities beyond New York City's posh Upper East Side into the vast American hinterland. "It seemed an opportune time to reassess the Council's role beyond the so-called Northeast Corridor," Chairman Peterson says. "There are some awfully sophisticated people out in the country who care about foreign policy."

David Rockefeller retired from the chairmanship of the Council because he had turned 70 years old, and Winston Lord resigned as president to become the U.S. ambassador to China in Beijing. The new chairman, "Pete" Peterson, is a hard-driving investment banker, and the new president, Peter Tarnoff, is a twenty-one-year veteran of the Foreign Service. They are convinced that the Council cannot confine its activities to East 68th Street if it wants to continue to help shape American foreign policy.

The Council has been called "the biggest exclusive club in the world." Talk among its members is rarely reported in the press; its meetings are rarely open to the public. But its effect can be far-reaching. Members affect policy by persuading—and becoming—decision-makers and by educating influential citizens. For many of its 250-plus members who work in the press, the Council can be especially valuable. James L. Greenfield, a one-time State Department official and now assistant managing editor of the *New York Times*, says: "For me, the Council means I can sit in New York and stay current with people who pour in from all over the world."

To this influential, often secretive organization belong some of the most powerful Americans. But no

sign—not even a discreet bronze plaque—marks the austere limestone mansion at the southwest corner of Park Avenue and 68th Street. No one who does not know the building is expected to enter.

On one typical Wednesday evening at five o'clock, limousines and taxis draw up to the black wooden doors of the townhouse. Inside, only a black welcome mat identifies the Council on Foreign Relations. Nearly a hundred members file through a checkpoint that admits only those whose names are listed. Checked off, they climb the curved marble staircase to the paneled library, there to sip tea out of green porcelain cups. Around 5:30, small groups stroll over to find seats in the large corner salon, whose windows are covered with heavy drapes of burnished gold.

Tonight, the speaker is the leader of six million Zulus, Chief Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, who has been described as "a political figure of royal blood." Chief Buthelezi, wearing a gray London-cut suit and gold-rimmed glasses, melds into the Establishment audience he addresses—off the record, as have heads of state from Charles de Gaulle to Fidel Castro. Chief Buthelezi urges American business not to pull out of South Africa, then parries a barrage of questions until the meeting closes at precisely 6:30.

More recently, the Most Reverend Denis Hurley, Roman Catholic archbishop of Durban, South Africa, addressed a smaller group of Council members at a luncheon in the library, where busts of Wendell Willkie and Elihu Root are on display. Among those who came to hear Archbishop Hurley were Paul Moore Jr., the Episcopal bishop of New York; Alan Pifer, retired president of The Carnegie Corporation; and Richard Hottelet, of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. After sherry and lunch, Archbishop Hurley was introduced by Adele Smith Simmons, the president of Hampshire College. Although the archbishop's speech was, of course, completely off the record, he had already become known across the country as a spokesman for the Catholic Church's opposition to apartheid.

The Council on Foreign Relations' townhouse, Harold Pratt House, is a kind of Roman Forum, where

As new leaders of the Council on Foreign Relations, Chairman Peter G. Peterson (seated) and President Peter Tarnoff succeed David Rockefeller, whose portrait is between those of past officers Coolidge, Armstrong, Davis and Altschul.

154

Town & Country

PHOTOGRAPH BY ARNOLD D. NEWMAN

citizens with clout gather at about 130 luncheons, speeches and dinners each year. Director of Programs Margaret Osmer-McQuade, a former TV producer and anchorman, and veteran staffer Frances Himmelfarb can, in extremis, shoehorn as many as 350 people into Pratt House. When former President Jimmy Carter spoke in 1981, they hired the auditorium of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

In recent years, the Council has been addressed by Zhao Zi-yang, premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China; Rajiv Gandhi, prime minister of India; Robert Muldoon, prime minister of New Zealand; Hosni Mubarak, president of Egypt; Eden Pastora Gomez, commander of the Sandino Revolutionary Front of Nicaragua; José Napoleon Duarte, president of El Salvador; Shimon Peres, prime minister of Israel; Bettino Craxi, prime minister of Italy; Miguel de la Madrid, president of Mexico; and The Most Reverend Desmond Tutu, archbishop of Cape Town. They gave away no secrets, and could return home having met some of the most influential men and women in the United States. Appearances by Rhodesia's Ian Smith in 1978 and the Philippines' Ferdinand Marcos in 1982 ignited demonstrations in the usually quiet street outside Pratt House.

Why are the world's powerful so eager to speak at Pratt House? The reason is clear. Since 1921, by one count, five Presidents of the United States, fourteen secretaries of state and secretaries of defense, and scores of other Cabinet officers have been Council members. During that time, every secretary of state except George C. Marshall has addressed its members—as has virtually every major foreign statesman except Winston Churchill.

The Council also produces a stream of weighty books and the magazine *Foreign Affairs*. The books are products of the Council's Fellows or of its yearly fifteen-to-twenty study groups, which examine U.S. foreign policy issues under the direction of ex-Foreign Service officer Paul Kreisberg. Council leaders identify the problems and then tend to let authors take responsibility for what their books say, although a watchdog review committee must approve a manuscript before it can carry the Council's cachet.

How much power is really concentrated here? Some claim the Council is a secret government; others pooh-pooh it as a boring old guard to whom no one listens anymore. A few years ago, the *Wall Street Journal* headlined it "A Club That Is Ghost of Former Self." But *Foreign Affairs'* Editor William G. Hyland agrees with the consensus that the Council is "the 'old boy network' of foreign policy in the United States." Recognizing the Council's stature, this year the Soviets invited a high-powered group led by Peter Peterson, Cyrus Vance, Henry Kissinger, Harold Brown and Jeane Kirkpatrick to visit Moscow and meet with Soviet leaders.

Today, the Council's membership rolls are studded with names of the powerful and in-

fluential: Secretaries of State Dean Rusk, Cyrus R. Vance, William D. Rogers and George P. Shultz; Secretaries of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Caspar W. Weinberger; university presidents Theodore M. Hesburgh of Notre Dame and Hanna H. Gray of the University of Chicago; press lords Katharine Graham of *The Washington Post*, A.M. Rosenthal and Max Frankel of the *New York Times* and Henry A. Grunwald of *Time* magazine. The bankers, lawyers and professors may be less famous, but they are as powerful. Senior honorary officers include such panjandrums as Arthur H. Dean, Douglas Dillon, Grayson Kirk, James A. Perkins and John J. McCloy.

The dominant figure at the Council for four decades, David Rockefeller retired in the fall of 1985 after fifteen years as chairman of its board, and as his final gesture, helped to raise $15.8 million for the en-

> The Council
> was founded by rich
> New Yorkers. It has
> transformed itself from a New
> York club for men of affairs to
> a national organization
> of professionals interested in
> foreign affairs," says
> John Temple Swing.

dowment fund—$2.7 million of which came from his family and friends—to supplement the organization's $8.5 million annual budget. He follows in the footsteps of international bankers who have been the prime movers behind the Council since its inception, and ranks the Council as his most important international concern after Chase Manhattan Bank. "He is a judicious, balanced person," says one board member. "He brings people along." Rockefeller's close friend, cousin by marriage and Elliot House roommate at Harvard (class of 1936), George S. Franklin, spent twenty-six years on the Council staff, the final eighteen as its executive director.

It was principally because of his long association with the Rockefellers that Henry Kissinger became a force in the Council. The *New York Times* called him "the Council's most influential member," and a Council insider says that "his influence is indirect and enormous—much of it through his Rockefeller connection."

In fact, Kissinger got his first shove up the ladder to fame and fortune at the Coun-

cil. George Franklin asked him to write a book based on a discussion group on nuclear weapons and foreign policy. Kissinger agreed, on condition that he would be the sole author of the book, that he could specify the parameters of the study and that one member of the group—who was believed to be planning his own book—be removed from the panel. The result was Henry Kissinger's first book, *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957). Before he completed the manuscript, he was hired as director of special studies project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund. Later, of course, Kissinger became President Nixon's national security advisor and secretary of state.

Kissinger at present holds no title (except "member"); but both Winston Lord, the now-retired president, and William Hyland were formerly his aides. Lord, who is a member of the Pillsbury family, was Kissinger's right-hand man at the National Security Council and later the director of the State Department's policy planning staff. His wife is Shanghai-born Bette Bao Lord, author of the best-selling novel *Spring Moon*.

Kissinger served one term on the Council's board but in 1981 was not re-elected. In those days, when members had to choose eight of the nine nominees for the board, more dropped Kissinger than anyone else. ("He took it very badly," says one Council leader who was there. "He was angry and hurt. It was a terrific blow to his ego.") Of the incident, David Rockefeller says thoughtfully, "A lot of members disagree with his foreign policy ideas. He is certainly a controversial figure in the Council, as elsewhere. But he has lots of friends in the Council, and I include myself among them."

Kissinger's feelings of rejection were assuaged when Rockefeller and then-treasurer Peter Peterson raised a million dollars to create a Kissinger Center in one of the Council-owned townhouses adjoining Pratt House and to establish an annual study group in his name. To avoid future embarrassment, the Council revised the election system in 1985; now, the nominating committee chooses only one candidate for each vacancy on the board. Some members feel the new system stifles "democracy," although additional candidates for the board may be nominated by the petition of ten members.

A year before Rockefeller retired, he appointed a special committee, chaired by Council Treasurer Peterson, on the Council's national role. The committee has confirmed that the Council's future lies beyond New York City. Peterson says that "there was a time when the making of foreign policy was only the concern of a very small number of people. There has been a sea change in how foreign policy is made; where it is made and what the issues are; the role of the media; the role of Congress." Now the Council is making a major effort to involve leaders beyond the Eastern establishment, encompassing the various foreign policy power bases that have sprouted up across the country. Interest in foreign affairs is

156

Town & Country

[C]

booming, for example, in Chicago, San Francisco, Houston and Phoenix.

Town-hall-style meetings spotlighting hot issues like the Iran arms controversy and the Iceland summit meeting are adding dialogue and debate to the Council's heavy diet of speeches. Peterson has wondered if Foreign Affairs should include "executive summaries" to make its lengthy articles more accessible.

Peterson asserts that "foreign policy has become more politicized, vocal, polarized, more ideological, more intense, more passionate." He emphasizes that foreign policy is not confined to geopolitics, nuclear power and East-West conflicts; it now includes what he calls "questions of trade and investment in the dollar and the Third World." Last spring, Peterson spoke in Phoenix about the foreign debt. He said: "The U.S. in 1982 was the world's largest creditor nation. In 1985, it was the largest debtor nation. How are we going to finance this external debt? The Third World debt bomb has a fuse on it that is quite short. What happens to foreign policy when they have such leverage on us instead of our having the leverage on them?"

Under Peterson, the Council is exploring telecommunications techniques such as two-way audio and one-way video meetings; teleconferencing will be a mode of the future. Acutely aware of the potential power of television (his wife Joan Ganz Cooney created Children's Television Workshop, which revolutionized programming for children), Peterson hopes to determine the practicality of designing a program that might be similar in format to "Wall Street Week" and "Washington Week in Review."

The man with these forward-looking ideas is only the Council's fourth chairman, following Rockefeller, Morgan banker Russell C. Leffingwell and lawyer-banker John J. McCloy (a former chairman of the Rockefeller-dominated Chase Manhattan Bank). "Pete" Peterson is tall, wears stylish gold-rimmed glasses, speaks softly but is known for his tough-mindedness.

He was born in Kearney, Nebraska, in 1926; his Greek parents owned the Central Cafe, which Peterson remembers was open twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week for twenty-five years. Imbued with the hard-work ethic of an immigrant family, he graduated summa cum laude in business administration from Northwestern University, and while getting a master's degree from the University of Chicago became a friend of George Shultz. Peterson later became president of the electronics firm Bell & Howell. In 1971, he joined the Nixon White House staff and the next year became secretary of commerce. His specialty, economics in foreign policy, led him into investment banking. He was chairman of Lehman Brothers Kuhn Loeb until he was squeezed out in a fight that was the subject of two articles in the *New York Times Magazine*. (Those pieces, highly critical of Peterson, were expanded into a book entitled *Greed and Glory on Wall Street*.) He is now chair-

man of The Blackstone Group, a new private investment bank.

The other half of the new team, President Peter Tarnoff, spent three years running the World Affairs Council of Northern California, in San Francisco. Before he was considered for the presidency of the Council, he had been in Harold Pratt House exactly once. If the directors had wanted a traditionalist to run the organization in the usual manner, he says, "they wouldn't have chosen me."

Tarnoff had been a staff aide for both Republican Henry Cabot Lodge, when he was the American ambassador to Vietnam and then West Germany, and for Democrat Cyrus R. Vance, when Vance was serving as President Carter's secretary of state. Tarnoff became the executive secretary of the State Department, managing the secretary's office from 1977 to 1981, until Secretary

> It is an almost Jamesian form of corruption," says one Council veteran. "People of culture get to meet people from Wall Street and become consultants. Bankers and businessmen are flattered by intellectuals."

of State Alexander Haig moved in.

Born in 1937 in Lenox Hill Hospital—just up Park Avenue from his office today—Tarnoff grew up in Brooklyn. His father was senior vice-president for menswear at Macy's department store. After graduating Phi Beta Kappa from Colgate University, Peter Tarnoff entered the Foreign Service in 1961. In 1973, he was asked to be the deputy chief of mission in Luxembourg. He got that break because the new American ambassador was Ruth Farkas, whose husband owned Alexander's department store; she appreciated a young man who had been brought up in a retailing family.

When the Council was seeking a successor to Winston Lord, the search committee considered a long list of candidates. In the end, there were three finalists. John Temple Swing, the Council's acting president, was the insiders' choice. Robert C. McFarlane, who in late 1985 resigned as President Reagan's national security advisor, was a highly visible candidate, reportedly supported by Kissinger. Tarnoff was Cy Vance's choice. Tarnoff got the job; and Swing, who had

served for thirteen years as the Council's vice-president and secretary, and as acting president after Winston Lord resigned, was promoted to executive vice-president and universally urged to stay on.

To relieve any factional tension over the succession, a carefully arranged dinner was held on April 30, 1986. Both Kissinger and Vance spoke. And, in gentlemanly Council style, the two senior foreign policymakers agreed to cochair a Council discussion group to reexamine the making of foreign policy in the U.S. The committee held the first of six meetings in December and plans to finish its analysis by June.

As an assemblage of people with such power, the Council, not surprisingly, has experienced heated controversies. David Rockefeller was involved in one when he became the chairman fifteen years ago and approached William P. Bundy about becoming president of the Council. Rockefeller and Bundy met upstairs in the home of Nathaniel Pusey, then president of Harvard University, on the morning of the 1970 Harvard-Yale game. Bundy decided he could not be a candidate for the Council presidency—in part because of a possible conflict of interest with his brother McGeorge Bundy, who was president of the Ford Foundation, one of the largest supporters of the Council. He agreed however, to succeed Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who was ready to retire as the long-time editor of *Foreign Affairs*. Rockefeller seized the moment.

William Bundy's appointment raised a storm. During much of the Vietnam war, he had been assistant secretary of state for Asian and Pacific affairs, and had outraged those who opposed American involvement in Southeast Asia. His views, revealed in the Pentagon Papers, made matters worse. The Council itself was bitterly divided on the question of Bundy's appointment—some members even threatened to resign over the issue. But the offer of the editorship held firm ("David was rock-solid," says Bundy). Bundy finally put out his first issue in January of 1973, after Armstrong had closed the magazine's fiftieth anniversary issue. With his able Managing Editor James Chace, Bundy surprised his critics by publishing articles in *Foreign Affairs* that questioned the wisdom of American intervention in Southeast Asia.

Bundy continued the magazine's tradition of editorial independence. He went so far as to turn down an article about the Shah of Iran by Board Chairman Rockefeller, who now admits that "Bill didn't think it held together very well. He was right." In the 1979-80 winter issue of *Foreign Affairs*, Bundy published his brother McGeorge Bundy's brutal criticism of Henry Kissinger's memoirs *The White House Years*. At the time, Kissinger was on the magazine's masthead as a member of its editorial advisory board. No one at the Council will admit a cause-and-effect connection; but by the spring issue, Kissinger's name was no longer on the masthead.

*(Continued on page 208)*

March, 1987

157

CARIBBEAN EASE

(Continued from page 206)

come down during the off season, and that Caroline Kennedy visited before her marriage. Like Nevis' inns, The Golden Lemon and Rawlins are self-contained, with an exception: Leaman's guests occasionally wander down the road to Rawlins for lunch or dinner, and vice versa.

The American community on St. Kitts is meager, a result of the government's tight hold on island land. Americans here are primarily, like Leaman, *hôteliers* and restaurateurs, a tight little group that put its roots down years ago, before the islands gained statehood. Georgiana Bowers, for example, is a New York native who, together with her late husband Noel, opened the Cockleshell Hotel twenty-four years ago—she sold it six years ago—when it was one of two isolated inns at the easternmost tip of St. Kitts, where wild donkeys, monkeys and mongooses scavenge on the palm-ringed beach in the early morning and late afternoon. “At the time,” Bowers recalls, “there were only ten other hotel rooms on the island—there was just nowhere to stay.”

Only six years ago, American Georgiana Bowers restored an elegant Georgian house overlooking picturesque Independence Square in Basseterre and launched a new restaurant there called, appropriately, The Georgian House. Bowers lives on the second floor; the restaurant on the first floor, with exposed brick walls and wood floors, features such West Indian delicacies as eggplant and pumpkin soups.

The social tenor on St. Kitts is really set by the native families who have prospered here for generations. Among the leaders are Mavis and Douglas Yearwood, who owned three St. Kitts sugar estates before the government took over that industry; Douglas was for several years president of the islands' Sugar Association. “My family has been in the Caribbean since the days of Alexander Hamilton and Lord Nelson,” Yearwood says. Mavis, born in St. Vincent, is a startlingly beautiful white-haired woman in her sixties whose hospitality is legendary on both islands. The Yearwoods have a house on Independence Square in Basseterre as well as a small ocean-side estate called Sea Haven on Nevis. On the 100 acres surrounding the estate, the Yearwoods cultivate sorrel, star apples, Surinam cherries, custard apples, citrus fruit, spice guava and rows of pineapple.

The Yearwood's son John, 35, who was educated in England, has returned to the islands to build small, West Indian-style villas on Nevis. With the experience behind him gained from working in development and agricultural economics in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the younger Yearwood is concerned that Nevis, particularly, be developed slowly, with an eye to protecting the environment and the interests of islanders.

"Look around you," he says. "What other islands are left in the Caribbean with the charm of Nevis and St. Kitts?"

It has been said that these islands are suspended in time between an English past and an American future. Certainly, British colonial rule, a 365-year saga that ended in 1983 when Nevis and St. Kitts became independent, has shaped attitudes, education and even architecture here. Yet development on St. Kitts's southeastern point—an expanse of rare white sand beaches and land cut by bays and salt ponds known as Frigate Bay—looks very American. Condominiums, all of them in compliance with island law prohibiting buildings higher than three stories, but a golf course and the grounds of the Royal St. Kitts, the only hotel on either island to approximate the big resort hotels found elsewhere in the Caribbean. The Royal St. Kitts even has a casino that is open twenty-four hours a day in high season; local law does not allow residents to gamble, however. Americans and Canadians have enthusiastically invested in the area.

Yet many old-time islanders, deeply ambivalent about development, look askance at showy Frigate Bay. One local cynic suggests it be sealed off from the rest of the island by a Great Wall. Other islanders accept the undertaking as inevitable, even necessary, provided that it is contained. Lady Arrindell, wife of Sir Clement Arrindell, governor general of St. Kitts-Nevis, offers a different assessment of the eastern end activity: “I can’t completely agree with the purists who don’t want any development here. Of course, we must preserve the natural beauty of the island. But one must always maintain a balance with progress.” ☐

Mr. and Mrs. Stephen A. Schwarzman, chairmen of the Mount Sinai Crystal Ball.

ADVICE AND DISSENT

(Continued from page 157)

In the beginning, the Council was a small group of gentlemen concerned with foreign policy. It was created in 1918, immediately after World War I, by thirty leading bankers and lawyers who met each month at the Metropolitan Club under the leadership of Elihu Root, who had been President Theodore Roosevelt's secretary of state. On June 29, 1921, Root's group was joined by a collection of frustrated foreign policy advisors: they had accompanied President Woodrow Wilson to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference only to be totally ignored.

The two groups established the present Council. It held monthly black-tie dinners at the Harvard Club. From its inception, the Council was elitist and internationalist. The country had become a world power barely two decades earlier, when in 1898 it won the Spanish-American War. The New York bankers and lawyers who were its main-stays opposed the isolationism that kept the United States out of the League of Nations; they were interested in doing business abroad, especially in Europe. They stood for active economic and diplomatic involvement in Europe, for leaving the Japanese free to exploit China economically, and for landing the U.S. Marines in Latin America to protect banker members' huge investments there. Although the Council itself never took a position, its members' bias was apparent to all.

Archibald Cary Coolidge, head of Harvard's Widener Library, became editor of *Foreign Affairs* in 1922, and 29-year-old Hamilton Fish Armstrong moved over from the *New York Post* to be his managing editor. Until Coolidge's death in 1928, Armstrong put out the magazine; he then served as editor for forty-four more years. The publication had a reputation for dullness. (One of its most literate contributors was journalist Walter Lippmann, until Lippmann ran off with Armstrong's wife Helen in 1937.) But then *Foreign Affairs* published Armstrong's attacks on Nazism: in January of 1939, after touring Hitler's Germany, he wrote a landmark ninety-three-page article for the magazine warning that war was imminent.

With the outbreak of World War II, the Council stepped out of its role as a private, independent organization and went to work for the Department of State. Armstrong and Walter H. Mallory, the Council's executive director, had a secret meeting at the State Department on September 12, 1939, and agreed to use the Council as a postwar planning agency. The Rockefeller Foundation financed the confidential so-called "War and Peace Studies," which produced hundreds of Council memoranda—some of which exerted considerable influence. And after Pearl Harbor, many Council members found jobs at the State Department.

"It is virtually impossible to pick a group in foreign affairs that doesn't have Council

208

Town & Country

[L]

ADVICE AND DISSENT

(Continued from page 208)

members,” says David Rockefeller. John J. McCloy, who went to work for Secretary of War Stimson in 1940, later remarked: “Whenever we needed a man, we thumbed through the roll of Council members and put through a call to New York.” After World War II, McCloy became U.S. high commissioner to West Germany and built his staff mainly of men from the Council. When Cyrus Vance was called to Washington to be secretary of state in 1977, he took along members of the Council’s staff as well as of a study group on nuclear weapons. He explains: “We work with people at the Council, and know they are good.”

Such recruiting has given rise to the complaint that the Council is a government hiring hall. When, in the spring of 1985, Secretary of State Shultz nominated retired investment banker John C. Whitehead as deputy secretary of state, the *New York Times* said succinctly: “Mr. Whitehead brings to the job no apparent expertise in international diplomacy.... In describing his attributes for the job, Mr. Shultz said that Mr. Whitehead was a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and was regularly invited to dinners given by Henry A. Kissinger, the former secretary of state.”

Still, by the end of World War II, foreign policy was no longer the private preserve of a coterie of New York bankers and lawyers. “The Council was founded by rich New Yorkers. It has transformed itself from a New York club for men of affairs to a national organization of professionals interested in foreign affairs,” says John Temple Swing, the Council’s executive vice-president. “The Council is a networking organization—mainly a network of people who have more than a passing interest in foreign affairs.”

With the advent of the Cold War, an article in *Foreign Affairs* (July, 1947) advocated “containment” of the Soviet Union. By-lined “X,” this became the most famous article the magazine ever published. “X” was George F. Kennan, chief of the new policy planning staff of the State Department.

Later, in a moment of high drama at a televised Council dinner on January 12, 1954, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced a policy of “massive retaliation” against Soviet actions anywhere on the globe.

Both the left and right assaulted the Council during the McCarthy era and afterward. The left said the Council was “a private, even secret, club pursuing the narrow interests of an elite.” The John Birch Society called it a conspiracy that manipulated the government. Senator Joseph McCarthy instigated investigations of more than half a dozen leading Council members.

Today, both extremes continue to lam-

baste the Council. “The far right has always misunderstood the Council,” Swing observes. “They think it is a Presidium in New York that dictates to its members.” During the 1980 election campaign, the extreme right attacked the Council—singling out vice-presidential candidate George Bush, who was a member of the board. Under the heat, Bush resigned from the board and the Council.

In the Sixties, the Council received $1.1 million from the Ford Foundation, which had become its greatest supporter, to produce two series of books: one on the United States and China, and the other on “Atlantic policy.” The Atlantic policy studies re-examined American involvement in Europe—in ten volumes. The idea for the more significant work on Sino-American relations came from the State Department and from Joseph E. Slater of the Ford Foundation, who later became president of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies. One of the study’s important proposals—a two-China policy recognizing both Peking (Beijing) and Taiwan—was daring in a period when the “China Lobby” was making Peking a dirty word in America. A. T. Steele’s study of the American public’s attitude toward the People’s Republic of China gave the U.S. administration confidence that public opinion would support opening relations with China.

Over the issues raised by the Vietnam war, Council membership was divided. Cyrus Vance, who spent part of this period in Paris trying to negotiate a Vietnam peace, says: “It was a wrenching experience for the Council, as it was for the country.” As late as 1970, the Council still avoided the war’s more difficult moral questions. John Kenneth Galbraith resigned from the Council in 1971, calling it “the seat of boredom.... If you want to know what the current cliché is, there’s no better place to find out.”

Wisely, in the Sixties, the Council tried to broaden its constituency. In 1969, by a narrow vote and despite the disapproval of many older members, it opened its membership to women. Among the first admitted were historian Barbara Tuchman and writer Elizabeth Drew, publisher Katharine Graham and economist Marina Von Neumann. Whitman. Two-hundred-and-sixty-eight women have now been elected. The number of black members has increased to ninety-one (out of a total of 131 nonwhite members): the first was U.N. Undersecretary Ralph Bunche, who was soon joined by Roger W. Wilkins, Patricia Roberts Harris, William T. Coleman Jr., Clifton R. Wharton Jr., Andrew Young and Donald F. McHenry.

With a total membership of 2,427, the Council has nearly doubled in size since 1970, and the ratio of nominations to admissions is still five to one. A decade ago, the

*New York Times* said: “If you want to make foreign policy, there’s no better fraternity to belong to than the Council.” Each year, fifty men and women under the age of 35 are elected to “term memberships” of five years. In 1976, Alton Frye opened the Council’s only branch office in Washington; it now has 583 members.

More than 3,800 men and women belong to autonomous local Committees on Foreign Relations, located in thirty-eight cities across the United States, that are associated with the Council. Executive Vice President Swing says the Council seeks “to re-create in each city the elite membership that exists in New York.” At present, 38 percent of its members live somewhere other than New York or Washington. Leaders of the Council recognize that in some parts of the United States “it is relatively unknown and unloved.” They would like to change that.

*Foreign Affairs* is the Council’s biggest window on the world. With circulation at an all-time high of 90,000, it just about breaks even—“a $2 million wash.” William Bundy tried to make the magazine livelier; Galbraith complained its ghostwritten articles “could not be read by anyone.” When Bundy retired in 1984, his successor, Missouri-born William Hyland, aged 58, came out of fourteen years in the CIA. He had spent three years helping Kissinger write his memoirs. A Soviet specialist with no magazine experience, Hyland had a chance to enliven *Foreign Affairs* when McGeorge Bundy offered him an article in which he, Robert S. McNamara, George F. Kennan and Gerard C. Smith attacked President Reagan’s “Star Wars” program. The same group of authors had collaborated on a 1982 article opposing the first use of nuclear tactical weapons by the United States and NATO. The articles gained wide attention.

In addition to the Council’s traditional massive books, Director of Publications and Publishing Director of *Foreign Affairs* David Kellogg is now producing easier-to-read paperbacks. These include *Reagan and Gorbachev*, by Michael Mandelbaum, director of a new three-year Council study on U.S. relations with the Soviet Union, and Strobe Taltott, Washington bureau chief of *Time magazine; A Changing Israel*, by *Foreign Affairs* Managing Editor Peter Grose; and *A Widening Atlantic? Domestic Change and Foreign Policy*, by Ralf Dahrendorf and Theodore Sorenson.

One Council veteran believes that, although the Council has grown enormously, “the great irony is that it is now operating more as a club than years ago. It is the biggest exclusive club in America. It is an almost Jamesian form of corruption. People of culture get to meet people from Wall Street and become consultants. Bankers and businessmen are flattered by the intel-

210

Town & Country

ADVICE AND DISSENT

(Continued from page 210)

mentals. It is an elegant club where you are
under the illusion of getting inside informa-
tion. The informal friendships are more im-
portant than the formal studies, which are
almost always bland. The Council is influen-
tial because people get to know each other."

Some long-time Council members argue that the organization's expansion has weakened its position as a center for like-thinking leaders. During the Reagan-dominated Eighties, Cyrus Vance says the Council's effect on decision making is "somewhat less than it had been two or three decades ago. That's a transient matter. It depends who the decision makers are." But the Council's influence diminishes when, as one staff member puts it, "there is an anti-intellectual crowd in Washington."

When its members have something of
consequence to say, the Council still has
clout; it attracts members concerned about
foreign relations, and draws speakers from
around the globe who want to communicate
their views to Americans who either make
or affect policy. "The environment in which
this institution functions is changing dra-
matically and is likely to change more
radically in the future," says Tarnoff.
"Ultimately," he adds, "the Council is effec-
tive if its members are influential."

The Council now enters an entirely new
era. Its leaders recognize that today the old
elite does not control American foreign pol-
icy. Its members range ideologically from
Andrew Young to Jeane Kirkpatrick, and
from Morton Halperin to William F. Buck-
ley Jr. Tarnoff says: "To a certain extent,
this will always remain an exclusive organi-
zation, but we certainly shouldn't be exclu-
sive when it comes to intellectual activity."

Of the Council today, another top officer
says, "We don't take government money
and we don't take government contracts.
We are neutral turf." He adds confidently:
"We are still an elitist organization." ☐

Mrs. Stass Reid, The Honourable Desmond Guinness and Rose Marie Bogley enjoy the farewell dinner for the Argonauts' Club at Leixlip Castle.

Luxury Real Estate

Europe

L'ALPE DES CHAUX, SWITZERLAND

Choice Condos or Chalets in L'Alpe Des Chaux near Villars. Fee simple ownership on a 250 acre private estate. Breathtaking views of the Alps. Only 90 minutes from Geneva. Skiing, tennis at door. Other sports nearby. Quiet international atmosphere. Social and financial privacy assured. Concierge service. Limited availability. Price range US $185,000 to $470,000. Very favorable financing. Offer not valid where prohibited by law. Write or call The Harbor Group, Ltd., 3355 Via Lido, Suite 378T, Newport Beach, CA 92663, (714) 675-1900

DAVOS, SWITZERLAND

An extremely unusual opportunity to permanently own a home in this world renowned resort, and within walking distance of all the exquisite shopping, sports, entertainment and fine dining for which Davos is known. We offer exclusively only ten deluxe view condominiums in the newly built "Bristol at Davos." Quietly located just off the main shopping area, they are within walking distance of the famous Parsennbahn, taking you to the heights of European skiing. The units have one to three bedrooms, fully equipped kitchens; most have fireplaces and are built and finished with typical Swiss craftsmanship. Private sauna and Jacuzzi are in the building. Hotel services available. Financial and social privacy is assured. Priced from about US $200,000 to US $529,000 and financing is available at 6% to qualified buyers. For full information in confidence call or write to:

THE HARBOR GROUP, LTD.

3355 Via Lido, Suite 378T, Newport Beach, CA. 92663
(714) 675-1900

LONDON, SW1
3 Sloane Gardens Club

Nestled in the heart of exclusive Chelsea/Belgravia, this meticulously restored townhouse offers residential living with luxury hotel amenities. Period fireplaces and Victorian decor grace the modern conveniences. And with the nearby underground and taxi rank just one block away, you're even closer to the surrounding central London living.

Information and reservations write or call:
Toll Free 1-800-992-2925 (in Michigan 313/229-7500.)

Represented in the USA by:
HASTINGWOOD ASSOCIATES, LTD.,
225 East Grand River Ave., Brighton, Michigan 48116

Yacht Charters

GREEK ISLANDS
CARIBBEAN-MEDITERRANEAN

Albatross

The Ultimate
Yacht Charter

800-922-4864 NY (516) 867-1957

418 Merrick Ave, Merrick, NY 11566

AEGEAN-GREEK ISLANDS

Italy — Yugoslavia — Rivierra

with
GPS CHARTERS, LTD.

For the most complete yacht charter
information package and arrangements

600H St, Andrews Rd, Phila, PA 19118

Tel: 215-247-3903 Fax: 510-100-0781

1-800-732-6786

212

<table><tbody><tr><td>Nuclear Armed Ships</td><td>39</td></tr><tr><td>The Responsibility of the Democracies in International Affairs</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>Europe and Australia</td><td>41</td></tr><tr><td>Change and the Western Alliance</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>Peace Movements and the Western Alliance</td><td>42</td></tr><tr><td>The Western Alliance and the Soviet Union</td><td>44</td></tr><tr><td>The Appropriate Response to the Invasion of Afghanistan</td><td>45</td></tr></tbody></table>

IV Assessing the world situation

<table><tbody><tr><td>The Importance of a Balance of Forces</td><td>46</td></tr><tr><td>Western Alliance Strategy</td><td>47</td></tr><tr><td>The Management of Strength</td><td>47</td></tr><tr><td>United States' Idealism</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>The President of the United States</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>World Danger Spots</td><td>48</td></tr><tr><td>Arms Control</td><td>49</td></tr><tr><td>Arms Reduction</td><td>52</td></tr><tr><td>The Importance of Conventional Arms I</td><td>53</td></tr><tr><td>China and World Security — I</td><td>53</td></tr><tr><td>China and World Security — II</td><td>54</td></tr><tr><td>The Importance of China</td><td>54</td></tr></tbody></table>

V Working with the Commonwealth, against racism

<table><tbody><tr><td>Realism and the Commonwealth</td><td>55</td></tr><tr><td>What the Commonwealth Can and Cannot Do</td><td>56</td></tr><tr><td>Zimbabwe: Using the Commonwealth to Grasp Opportunity</td><td>56</td></tr><tr><td>Apartheid</td><td>57</td></tr><tr><td>Racialism and Intolerance</td><td>58</td></tr><tr><td>Trading and Sporting Contacts with South Africa</td><td>58</td></tr></tbody></table>

VI Defending Australia

<table><tbody><tr><td>Australia's Defence Policy</td><td>59</td></tr><tr><td>Australia's Defence Policy: The FA-18 Aircraft</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>Multinational Defence Training Exercises</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>The Australian Defence Force</td><td>61</td></tr><tr><td>Defence Force Reserves</td><td>62</td></tr><tr><td>Australia's Security Intelligence Services</td><td>63</td></tr></tbody></table>

[ vi ]

VII Peacekeeping and terrorism

<table><tbody><tr><td>Peacekeeping: Australia a Catalyst for the Sinai Force</td><td>64</td></tr><tr><td>Support for Israel, and Israeli Actions in the Lebanon</td><td>65</td></tr><tr><td>Terrorism: the Assassination of President Sadat of Egypt</td><td>66</td></tr><tr><td>Democracy and Terrorism</td><td>67</td></tr><tr><td>Responding to Terrorism</td><td>68</td></tr></tbody></table>

VIII Trading with the world

<table><tbody><tr><td>Interdependence and the World Economy</td><td>69</td></tr><tr><td>Past, Present and Future</td><td>70</td></tr><tr><td>Australia, Protectionism and World Recession</td><td>71</td></tr><tr><td>The E.E.C., Australia and the World</td><td>72</td></tr><tr><td>Negotiating with the E.E.C.</td><td>73</td></tr><tr><td>Fair Trade: Australia and the E.E.C.</td><td>73</td></tr><tr><td>The 'Most Favoured Nation' Principle</td><td>74</td></tr><tr><td>The U.S. Deficit</td><td>75</td></tr><tr><td>The U.S. Deficit and the Third World</td><td>76</td></tr></tbody></table>

IX Leading Opinion on the North/South issue

<table><tbody><tr><td>The Measure of the North/South Issue</td><td>78</td></tr><tr><td>Political and Economic Problems: Africa, and the Third World</td><td>78</td></tr><tr><td>Relations of North/South to East/West Issues</td><td>79</td></tr><tr><td>Strategic Aspects of Third World Issues</td><td>80</td></tr><tr><td>Long and Short Run Aspects of World Poverty</td><td>80</td></tr><tr><td>Economic Interdependence of the Third World and the West</td><td>81</td></tr><tr><td>Redistribution and Trade</td><td>82</td></tr><tr><td>Access of Developing Countries to Markets</td><td>84</td></tr></tbody></table>

X Reviving world trade

<table><tbody><tr><td>Initiative to Restore Economic Growth</td><td>85</td></tr><tr><td>Further Initiatives to Revive the World Economy — I</td><td>86</td></tr><tr><td>Further Initiatives to Revive the World Economy — II</td><td>87</td></tr></tbody></table>

XI Working in our region

<table><tbody><tr><td>The Role of ASEAN</td><td>89</td></tr><tr><td>Australian/ASEAN Trade</td><td>90</td></tr><tr><td>ASEAN and Australian Protection</td><td>90</td></tr></tbody></table>

[ vii ]

### III The Monarchy

The Monarchy and the Governor-General 141

The Value of the Crown 142

Monarchy and Republicanism 142

### IV The Prime Ministership, Ministers, and Cabinet

The Prime Minister and the Cabinet — I 143

The Prime Minister and the Cabinet — II 144

Collective Responsibility 144

Ministerial Responsibility 146

The Role of Ministers' Private Offices 147

Inputs into Policy Formation 147

Cabinet and its Committee System 149

Cabinet Consultation and Committees 150

The Consequences of Work Pressure on the Cabinet 151

The Cabinet and Officials 152

### V The Constitution and the federal system

Reform of the Constitution 153

Handling Constitutional Reform 154

The Growth — and Deficiencies — of Central Power 154

The External Affairs Power and the States 155

The Commonwealth and the States 156

Federalism and the Territories 157

Local Government and Regionalism 157

### VI The public service

Public Service Advice 158

Executive Privilege 159

Quangos 159

Public Service Staff Ceilings 160

Sunset Legislation 160

The Public Servant and Politics 161

Political Appointments to the Public Service 161

'Jobs for the Boys' 163

### VII Money and politics

Integrity of Government 163

The Issues in Disclosure of Pecuniary Interests 164

Public Funding of Political Parties 166

[ x ]

### VIII The media

The Contemporary Role of Newspapers 166

Newspapers and Politics 167

Local Newspapers 168

The Free Press 169

The Bookseller and Freedom of Expression 170

## CHAPTER FOUR

### RUNNING THE COUNTRY 171

#### I Fighting inflation and unemployment

Economic Management 172

Economic Management and Inflation 173

Inflation and Other Priorities 174

Inflation and Employment 175

Inflation, Democracy and National Leadership 176

The Significance of the Budget 177

Politicians, Productivity and Living Standards 177

#### II Reforming taxation and eliminating the deficit

The Case for Tax Indexation 178

The Experience of Tax Indexation 179

The Three-Tiered Tax Scale 179

Death Duties 179

The Case Against Capital Gains Tax 180

Tax Avoidance 180

'Bottom of the Harbour' Tax Avoidance, Retrospectivity and the Liberal Party 181

The Significance of Reducing Deficits 183

#### III More flexible exchange rates

A Managed Exchange Rate 184

Floating Exchange Rates 185

The Case Against Floating the Australian Dollar 186

#### IV Raising productivity, increasing investment

Raising Productivity 186

Investment in Australia 187

[ x1 ]

<table><tr><td>Exploration and Foreign Investment</td><td>187</td></tr><tr><td>Public and Private Investment</td><td>188</td></tr></table>

## V Restraining wage increases

<table><tr><td>Wages and Unions, Inflation and Stability</td><td>189</td></tr><tr><td>Wage Entitlement</td><td>189</td></tr><tr><td>Wages and Other Claims on the National Product</td><td>190</td></tr><tr><td>The Arbitration Commission's Responsibility</td><td>190</td></tr><tr><td>Wages Policy</td><td>191</td></tr><tr><td>The 1982-83 Wages Pause</td><td>192</td></tr><tr><td>The 35-Hour Week Campaign</td><td>193</td></tr><tr><td>Business, Unions and Government</td><td>194</td></tr><tr><td>Aboriginal Employment</td><td>196</td></tr></table>

## VI Reforming industrial relations

<table><tr><td>Constitutional and Legislative Change to Improve Industrial Relations</td><td>197</td></tr><tr><td>Secret Ballots in Union Elections</td><td>197</td></tr><tr><td>Liberalism and Industrial Relations</td><td>198</td></tr><tr><td>The Commonwealth's Use of its Limited Industrial Relations Power</td><td>199</td></tr></table>

## VII Reducing regulation and protection

<table><tr><td>Deregulation</td><td>200</td></tr><tr><td>Theory and the Market</td><td>201</td></tr><tr><td>Regulation: Principles and Reform</td><td>201</td></tr><tr><td>Balance in Tariff Policy</td><td>203</td></tr><tr><td>The Reasonable Position on Tariffs and Free Trade</td><td>204</td></tr><tr><td>Protection Policy During Recession</td><td>204</td></tr><tr><td>The Importance and Needs of Small Business</td><td>206</td></tr><tr><td>Home Ownership</td><td>206</td></tr></table>

## VIII Dignity and independence for those in need

<table><tr><td>Social Security to Provide Independence</td><td>207</td></tr><tr><td>Decentralisation and Voluntary Welfare Organisations</td><td>208</td></tr><tr><td>Work or the Dole</td><td>209</td></tr><tr><td>Monitoring Programmes</td><td>210</td></tr><tr><td>The Impact of Family Allowances</td><td>210</td></tr><tr><td>Attitude to the Handicapped</td><td>210</td></tr></table>

[xii]

## IX Developing Australia's energy resources

<table><tr><td>The Global Dimensions of the Energy Problem</td><td>212</td></tr><tr><td>Australia's Energy Concerns</td><td>212</td></tr><tr><td>The Decision to Develop Uranium under Strict Controls</td><td>213</td></tr><tr><td>Nuclear Proliferation</td><td>214</td></tr></table>

## X Protecting Australia's heritage

<table><tr><td>The Stakes in Environmental Issues</td><td>214</td></tr><tr><td>World Conservation Strategy</td><td>215</td></tr><tr><td>Voluntary Conservation Movement</td><td>216</td></tr><tr><td>The Great Barrier Reef and its Environment</td><td>217</td></tr><tr><td>The Costs of Conservation and the Franklin Dam</td><td>217</td></tr></table>

## XI Using science and technology

<table><tr><td>Australia's Technological Potential</td><td>219</td></tr><tr><td>Science Policy Advice</td><td>220</td></tr><tr><td>Funding Principles: Medical Research</td><td>220</td></tr></table>

## XII Realising the value of education

<table><tr><td>Freedom and Education</td><td>221</td></tr><tr><td>Relevance in Education</td><td>221</td></tr><tr><td>The Nature and Objectives of Education</td><td>221</td></tr><tr><td>Choice of Schools</td><td>222</td></tr><tr><td>The Benefits to Education of Independent Schools</td><td>223</td></tr><tr><td>School Curriculums and Job Preparation</td><td>224</td></tr><tr><td>Tertiary Education and Responsibility</td><td>226</td></tr></table>

## XIII Protecting rights

<table><tr><td>Rights in Australia</td><td>227</td></tr><tr><td>The Ombudsman's Value</td><td>228</td></tr><tr><td>The Role of a National Crimes Commission</td><td>229</td></tr></table>

## XIV Celebrating Australia: sport and culture

<table><tr><td>Government Support for the Arts</td><td>231</td></tr><tr><td>Art and Human Values</td><td>231</td></tr><tr><td>Objectives for the National Gallery</td><td>232</td></tr><tr><td>Sporting Achievements</td><td>233</td></tr><tr><td>Permanent Home for the Olympic Games</td><td>234</td></tr><tr><td>Australia's Bicentenary</td><td>234</td></tr></table>

Index 237

[xiii]

[c]

## Foreword

DR HENRY A. KISSINGER

Most statesmen are difficult to imagine separated from the aura of power that surrounds them. To be blunt about it, very few of them are interesting because of their own ideas. Their special skill is the gaining and exercise of power, which inevitably involves the making of decisions, but not necessarily the grasping of their implications. Before the modern political leader achieves office, all his incentives are to attract the media attention without which he is doomed to irrelevance. Afterwards he must manage a bureaucracy wondrously complicated and difficult to control. The modern statesman is usually the apostle of the urgent; he rarely has time to deal with the important. In time, he even loses the sense for it.

Malcolm Fraser was always an extraordinary exception to these generalities. True, he has had a highly developed sense for the realities of power (no political leader can survive without it). But to Malcolm, power was important because of the ends it was designed to serve; the betterment of his people. I have found Malcolm Fraser, both in and out of office, an uncommonly interesting man and thinker.

This volume of excerpts from Malcolm's public statements over the past decade shows why this is so. It is not appropriate for an outsider to comment on Australian domestic politics. But it is no secret that my own convictions are based on a conservatism in the Disraeli tradition — a conservatism that is far more than a sterile defence of the status quo. Rather that it is the duty of the conservative statesman to shape change in a manner that is just and humane and in accord with the spirit of the age. But it is also his duty to encourage private initiative, restrict unnecessary governmental power, and seek to prevent the convulsive upheavals which rend social cohesion and prevent the national consensus without which politics turns into a species of civil war. It is not, therefore, strange that I should find Malcolm Fraser's reflections on the nature of a just society congenial.

[ xv ]

It was in the field of foreign policy that I knew Malcolm Fraser best. Australia is geographically far removed from the sources of tension that form the headlines of the day. It must, as a consequence, be tempting for Australian statesmen to adopt a posture analogous to that of some of the nonaligned, deprecating the role of power, pretending that foreign policy is like a college debate in which an award is given for eloquence rather than the balancing and reconciliation of interests. But such an attitude coming from our Australian allies would contribute to the demoralisation of international politics. It would put a disproportionate physical and intellectual burden on the United States, which would sooner or later encourage a revival of American isolationism. And it would not, in my view, serve Australia's long term interests, since Australia is located in that part of the world experiencing the most dynamic growth. New power centres are emerging throughout the area; they are power centres that inevitably begin to insist on influence commensurate with their perceptions of power. Moreover, the Soviet military presence in the area is steadily expanding. Thus, in something more than a generation, the axis of world politics will shift to the Pacific. At that point Australia will be at the vortex of world affairs. And it cannot then improvise either a theory or relationships to navigate that passage.

Successive Australian leaders of both parties have understood this — none more clearly than Malcolm Fraser. His speeches on the role of the balance of power in the Pacific; his perception of the importance of China; his realism toward the Soviet Union; his understanding of the political and psychological components of Japanese policy; his farsighted approach to South East Asia; and his unwavering friendship for the United States are the elements on which peace in the Pacific must be built in the decades ahead.

Malcolm Fraser is not a practitioner of classical power politics, though he understands the importance of power. In his attitude toward equal justice in Southern Africa, he has consistently made clear that in a democracy foreign policy must reflect the moral convictions of its people.

For all these reasons I recommend this book, and consider it a privilege to have been given this opportunity to pay my respects to a distinguished statesman and friend.

[ xvi ]

[Lc]

Preface

BY THE RT. HON. MALCOLM FRASER, C

David Kemp and Denis White have put together a series of speeches over the years. They have written them to these excerpts, and it has been made possible for them to be used in any way that does not stand still, and much has changed since last two years I have spent a good deal of time in the United States, and I have a lot of future of Australia within the Pacific region.

There are enormous challenges ahead of Australia which will celebrate the year 2020 in a dozen countries in Asia have passed us by. The recognition of the fact that we have made our own region.

I state the challenges in these negative terms because it is a very real possibility for Australia, unless she is ahead of us and are prepared to respond to them, to continue to be a force for good in the Pacific region, and even though in many cases they are more disciplined than we, more determined to achieve their place in the Pacific, and yet arrived and grown soft on the enjoyments of life, we will decline. Those challenges involve coming to a common understanding of the role of the Pacific in the region, and in biological terms. We live, we grow, we expand, and our heritage, or we decline. If Australians ignore the challenges we now face, we will decline. Those challenges involve coming to a common understanding of the role of the Pacific in the region, and even though in many cases they are more disciplined than we, more determined to achieve their place in the Pacific, and yet arrived and grown soft on the enjoyments of life, we will decline. Those challenges involve coming to a common understanding of the role of the Pacific in the region, and even though in many cases they are more disciplined than we, more determined to achieve their place in the Pacific, and yet arrived and grown soft on the enjoyments of life, we will decline. Unless their ways change in material terms, we will decline. The great challenges in front of Australia are the challenges of the Pacific region.

[ xvii ]

[lc]

Preface

BY THE RT. HON. MALCOLM FRASER, C.H.

David Kemp and Denis White have put together a selection from my speeches over the years. They have written their own introduction to these excerpts, and it has been made plain that my main interest has been in ideas and how they might be applied to Australia. Time does not stand still, and much has changed since I left office. In the last two years I have spent a good deal of time with major policy institutes in the United States, and I have been thinking about the future of Australia within the Pacific region.

There are enormous challenges ahead of us. I do not want to see an Australia which will celebrate the year 2000 by recognition that a dozen countries in Asia have passed us by in living standards, by recognition of the fact that we have made ourselves irrelevant to our own region.

I state the challenges in these negative terms because that future is a very real possibility for Australia unless we realise the challenges ahead of us and are prepared to respond to them. What kind of country do we really want for ourselves, for our children? Are we concerned only for an easy life in this country, or do we want to contribute to the wider world? There are responsibilities on all of us. I have always believed that abdication involves decay and decline. A society is a living, vital thing, and in many ways has a life in biological terms. We live, we grow, we expand our understanding of our heritage, or we decline. If Australians opt for an easy life and ignore the challenges we now face, we will become irrelevant, we will decline. Those challenges involve coming to terms with our own region, and even though in many cases the societies are democratic they are more disciplined than we, more hard-working than we, more determined to achieve their place in the galaxy. They have not yet arrived and grown soft on the enjoyment of a material society. Unless their ways change in material terms, they will certainly pass us by within the lifetime of most Australians.

The great challenges in front of Australia are varied. We need to

[XVII]

[LC]

work harder, there is no doubt of that, but above all we need to unleash the motivation, the talent, the initiative and vigour of ordinary Australians in a way that has not been achieved since the early days of settlement. Governments won't overcome the challenge — the people can, and will if governments move out of the way and allow the opportunities to be opened. We should capitalise on our great strengths, mining and rural industries, which are probably the most efficient in the world — if we don't destroy them by the world's highest wage costs, and by becoming the most strike-prone nation in history.

Our scientific and education institutions need further encouragement. The dull conformity in our tertiary institutions imposed by Commonwealth provision of funds needs to be removed, and institutions encouraged to develop and grow, and to achieve excellence. The best Australians need to know that they will find rewarding and challenging tasks within this country, so that they do not have to go offshore. We need to place a value on Australian nationality. We should identify with the security interests of other countries of our own region. The burden and expansion of government, the high cost of government operations, the inefficiency of government enterprises puts a damning hand across Australia.

The changes needed to ensure that Australia is strong, relevant, participating, and appreciated, as part of the Pacific community in the year 2000 have not been enunciated in a realistic way by any politician, by any political party. To do so would foreshadow a revolution in the life of this country, which none in the public life has yet dared to contemplate. Whilst I was in office I believe I only gropingly saw the challenge, but certainly did not appreciate its significance for this country.

I value greatly what David Kemp and Denis White have done, and I hope it leads to a better understanding of the policies and objectives of my political life.

[XVIII]

MAR 30 1987

[IC]

United States Soccer Federation

Office of the President

ONE VILLAGE ROAD • P.O. BOX 129
HORSHAM, PA 19044

March 26, 1987

Dr. Henry Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
26th Floor
New York, New York 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger:

I have had ongoing discussions with representatives of Anheuser Busch in regards to a Soccer Development Program for the United States with the objective to raise the standard of the National Teams and to bring the FIFA World Cup here in 1994.

In connection therewith, I have also had discussions with the Technical Staff of FIFA and in connection with those discussions, a Technical Delegation of the U.S. Soccer Federation prepared and presented to FIFA a detailed status report of soccer in the United States. This report covered areas such as structure, organization, coaching, refereeing, competitions, marketing and laws of the game.

Since the presentation to FIFA on February 26th and 27th, we have received strong indication that key FIFA officials and personnel are interested for the United States to be the host country for World Cup '94.

Other countries who have indicated interest are Algeria, Benin, Morocco, Brazil and Chile.

I am planning to meet with Dr. Havelange during the latter part of next week or the following weekend, at which time I expect to determine if Dr. Havelange is interested in having the World Cup here or if he is committed to Brazil.

Dr. Henry Kissinger

March 26, 1987

Page 2

In addition, we are talking to a number of corporations in regards to providing financial resources and other support to prepare a successful bid and application to FIFA.

The final decision regarding this application will be made after I have strong indications from President Havelange and other FIFA officials, that they favor the United States and after we have the support of three or four major corporations.

I should know more on this matter by about mid-April, at which time it would be appropriate for us to meet to discuss further steps that need to be taken.

I would sincerely appreciate your involvement in this project, if the decision is made to proceed.

I will keep you posted from time to time and would appreciate if we could meet at a time that is mutually convenient.

Sincerely,
UNITED STATES SOCCER FEDERATION

WF:vn

JUN 31 1987

Leonid Fridman
Harvard University
Department of Mathematics
1 Oxford Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 498 - 4639

June 17, 1987

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
435 E 52 street
New York, NY 10022

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

Our lives in America began in a somewhat similar way: we each came to this
country from Europe at the age of fourteen, graduated Summa Cum Laude from
Harvard College, and continued on at Harvard Grad School.

Now there is a big asymmetry in our fortunes - while my family is in dire plight, it is You who could bring about a miracle that would help us.

Allow me to explain.

My Grandparents, Natan Davydovich Tkach and Etya Borukhovna Podgorskaya, residing at Bolshaya Filevskaya, 59, korpus 2, kvartira 48, Moscow 121433, are in their mid-seventies, very very ill, and have been refuseniks for the past ten years. My Grandmother suffers from myocardial ischemia and pancreatitis, and has undergone several (unsuccessful) surgeries. My Grandfather has an almost complete loss of hearing, suffers from prostate, arthritis, and sclerosis. They are in desperate need of my and my parents' care, of our help.

My parents and I left Russia alone simply in order to get to the States ahead
of the Grandparents and make their adjustment a littled easier. For who would have
thought that two semi-literate elderly people without any special skills or knowledge
(my Grandfather was a manual worker all his life, until he retired 15 years ago, and
my Grandmother was a bookkeeper) would be refused permission while my parents,
professionals, were allowed to leave at first asking?

But when my Grandparents applied for the permission to leave several months
after we left the country (and reapplied eighteen times since), the perverse enigma of
Soviet decision-making revealed itself in full.

[LC]

Of course my mother and I had written letters to everybody in the government, from Rosalyn Carter to our local New York State assemblyman. Yes, my Grandparents' names are in the State Department standard "wish list". But all this was just as effective as hitting our heads against a wall. My Grandparents do not interest anybody: they are not dissidents, nor are they famous physicists. They are two old people who, at the twilight of their lives, got caught in a vicious game of politics and Kafkaesque bureaucracy which they cannot comprehend.

My Grandmother raised me from cradle to mid-teens - she quit her job as soon as I was born to allow my mother to pursue her career, and she gave me, her only grandchild until recently, everything a mother can give her only son, and then some. Now my Grandmother writes to me in every letter that she has only one wish left in her life - to see me again before it is too late, to die peacefully with her family around her. Her health is deteriorating rapidly. We cannot wait any longer. Dr. Kissinger, please help me fulfill the last wish of my Grandmother, please help my family become reunited!

Yes, of course I know that You are not presently in the Government. But Your influence is. I am writing to You because You are the only one I know who, I feel, I have a chance of attracting some personal attention from (hence the obnoxious first paragraph of this letter), and because I truly am despairing. I think that if You took this case to heart You could help us enormously. Please allow me to make an appointment with You - any time, anyplace, New York, Washington, Papua New Guinea if You must. Let me try to present my case in person to You, let me try to move You.

My Grandmother is ending her life in agony, and I need Your help to save her.

Leonid Fridman

2

HENRY A. KISSINGER

March 11, 1987

Dear Bruno:

Your very gracious letter and inscribed
copy of your book arrived while I was
traveling abroad, and limited office time
since my return has created a bit of a
backlog in my correspondence. It was good
to hear from you, and I look forward to
getting started on *Das Prinzip Offenheit*.

My schedule appears to be taking me
everywhere but Zürich in the months ahead,
but should you be planning a trip to the
States, please do let me know.

With appreciation,

Mr. Bruno Fritsch
Eidgenössische Technische
Hochschule Zürich
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
Weinbergstrasse 35
8092 Zürich
Switzerland

SUITE 1021 • 1800 K STREET, N. W. • WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006 • (202) 872-0300

Ecole Polytechnique
Fédérale Zurich

Institut de Recherches
Economiques

Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology Zurich

Center for Economic
Research

Weinbergstrasse 35
Durchwahlnummer 01/256 4717
Telefonzentrale 01/256 22 11
Postadresse:
ETH-Zentrum, CH-8092 Zürich

January 27, 1987

Dr.Henry Kissinger
Suite 400
1800 K Street N.W.
Washington D.C. 20006 / USA

FEB 2 1987

Dear Henry,

This letter is meant to extend to you my best wishes for a successful 1987.
Although delayed I do hope that you will still accept them.

It is now thirty years since we first met. 1957 I was member in your seminar
and it was you who introduced me to the complexity of international problems.
Ever since I was fascinated by that subject. Thanks to your insights and to
your interdisciplinary approach in dealing with these problems I was
stimulated in my research work in many ways.

As a very humble expression of my gratitude to you I am enclosing my latest
book which has at least one merit: it is not too thick.

I am sure that you are as busy as ever; nevertheless, I would be very happy to get together with you for half an hour or so if the occasion arises and the time permits.

With my best wishes and cordial thanks for all I have received from you
I am yours very truly,

Encl.

Offene Gesellschaften sind solche, die den Zugang zur Infor-
mation und zur politischen Macht offen halten. In solchen Ge-
sellschaften ist die Informationsbeschaffung und -verarbeitung
nicht eingeschränkt. Regierungen werden gewählt und wieder
abgewählt, konkurrierende Parteien sind zugelassen, ebenso
eine Vielzahl von Gewerkschaften, Interessenverbänden und
anderen wirtschaftlichen sowie politischen Gruppierungen. Die
Mobilität der Bürger unterliegt keiner staatlichen Genehmig-
gungspflicht. Alles dies scheint uns selbstverständlich zu sein,
ist es aber nicht.

Gegenwärtig beobachten wir einen Trend zur schrittwelsen
Preisgabe dieser Prinzipien. Nicht daß Parteien, Gewerkschaf-
ten oder die Meinungsfreiheit ernsthaft in Frage gestellt würden;
die Wurzeln des Zweifels reichen tiefer. Säkularisierte Funda-
mentalisten schicken sich an, im Namen der Wissenschaft den
wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritt als solchen in Frage
zu stellen. Der verängstigte Bürger neigt unter dem Eindruck
von Umweltproblemen, Arbeitslosigkeit und vermeintlicher
Kriegsgefahr dazu, diesen falschen Propheten Glauben zu
schenken. Er sucht sein Heil in übersichtlichen Kleinräumen,
worin er seine kulturelle und ethnische Identität zu finden
hofft. Dabei nimmt er die Vorteile einer technischen Infrastruk-
tur in Anspruch, die das Ergebnis einer hochgradig arbeits-
teiligen, wissenschaftsintensiven, auf dem Leistungs- und Kon-
kurrenzprinzip beruhenden Gesellschaftsordnung ist. Er nimmt
gerne die risikoabsichernden Sozialleistungen des Staates ent-
gegen, ohne immer zu sehen, daß der Staat — von Ausnahmen
abgesehen — keine zum Leben erforderlichen Güter erzeugt,
sondern sie nur verteilt. Die auf diese Weise geförderte Ten-
denz zum bürokratischen Wohlfahrtsstaat ist die Vorstufe einer
Verbotsgesellschaft. Die Gefahr kommt also von innen her und
nicht so sehr von einer — zwar auch nicht ganz auszuschlie-
ßen, jedoch weniger wahrscheinlichen — Intervention von
außen.

Aufzuzeigen, welche Gefahren unserer noch freien und noch
offenen Gesellschaft von innen her drohen, und darzulegen,
daß sie das eigentlich dem Menschen gemäße Gesellschafts-
system darstellt, ist Absicht der vorliegenden Abhandlung.

CIP-Kurztitelaufnahme der Deutschen Bibliothek

Fritsch, Bruno: Das Prinzip Offentheit: Anm. zum Verhältnis von Wissen u. Politik / Bruno Fritsch. — München: Olzog, 1985.

ISBN 3-7892-7269-8

© 1985 by Günter Olzog Verlag GmbH, D-8000 München 22 — Alle
Rechte vorbehalten — Jeglicher, auch auszugsweiser Nachdruck ohne
Einwilligung des Verlages ist untersagt — Umschlagentwurf: Beate
C. Eberle, München — Gesamtherstellung: Buchdruckerei Franz Wedl
OHG, Melk-Wien.

Inhalt

<table><tr><td>Geleitwort von Ministerpräsident Lothar Späth</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Einleitung</td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Der Wandel unseres wissenschaftlichen Weltbildes</td><td>11</td></tr><tr><td>Die Veränderung unserer sozialen und politischen Lebensbedingungen</td><td>27</td></tr><tr><td>Orientierungsschwierigkeiten</td><td>40</td></tr><tr><td>Ambivalenzen des technischen Fortschritts</td><td>51</td></tr><tr><td>Prognosen — Szenarien</td><td>60</td></tr><tr><td>Mensch — Gesellschaft — Umwelt</td><td>79</td></tr><tr><td>Mensch — Gesellschaft — Arbeit</td><td>108</td></tr><tr><td>Bildung und Demokratie</td><td>131</td></tr><tr><td>Das Prinzip Offenheit</td><td>144</td></tr><tr><td>Literaturverzeichnis</td><td>152</td></tr><tr><td>Personenverzeichnis</td><td>156</td></tr><tr><td>Sachverzeichnis</td><td>158</td></tr></table>

5

Offenheit ist ein vielschichtiger Begriff. Er kann in politischem, philosophischem, kulturellem oder individuellem Sinn gebraucht werden und bezeichnet dabei jeweils unterschiedliche Aspekte und Haltungen. Das gesellschaftliche „Prinzip Offenheit" setzt sich aus all diesen Komponenten zusammen; wo es lebenspraktisch verwirklicht wird, existiert eine offene Gesellschaft.

Die vorliegende Schrift versteht sich als Plädoyer für
eine solche offene Gesellschaft, und sie ist ein überzeugendes
Plädoyer. Der Bogen der Beweisführung spannt sich von
den naturwissenschaftlichen Grundlagen unseres physischen
Seins über die wirtschaftliche und soziale Lebensumwelt
bis in aktuelle politische Fragestellungen hinein. Dies wird
kenntnisreich, faktenreich und unter Ausschöpfung eines
enormen Fundus' an kulturhistorischem Wissen dargelégt.

Was das Buch über die argumentativ hilfreiche Material-
fülle hinaus jedoch in meinem Verständnis zum Glücksfall
macht, ist der Mut des Autors, die grundlegenden Zusam-
menhänge unserer modernen Welt objektiv und doch nicht
auf bequeme Weise wertindifferent aufzuzeigen. Damit
„verstößt" er eigentlich gleich gegen zwei Tabus, mit denen
die Wissenschaft sich lange Zeit gegen kritische politische
und gesellschaftliche Fragestellungen abzuschirmen versucht
hatte: Zum einen, daß der moderne Wissenschaftler seine
Fachkompetenz auf immer kleinere Ausschnitte aus dem
immensen Gesamtkomplex des Wissens konzentrieren müsse,
und zum anderen, daß er dabei streng wert- und meinungs-
frei vorzugehen habe.

In Wahrheit lassen sich diese Postulate nur für den Kern-
bereich der Naturwissenschaften durchführen und rechtfer-
tigen, und auch dort gibt es inzwischen manche Zweifel,
inwieweit der subjektiv messende und beobachtende For-
scher vom Gegenstand seiner Forschungen abstrahiert wer-
den kann. Die Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Politikwissen-

7

schaften aber sind niemals wertneutral gewesen und konnten es auch gar nicht sein, weil sie es mit Bedingungen des menschlichen, also originär wertbehafteten, Zusammenlebens zu tun haben.

Sich dessen bewußt zu sein, ist ein wichtiger Beitrag, den die Wissenschaft zur Vermeidung von ideologiebestimmten — also gerade nicht dem Prinzip Offenheit folgenden — Gesellschaftsordnungen leisten kann. Bruno Fritsch leistet diesen Beitrag doppelt, indem er sich nicht nur zur Werthaftigkeit seiner Studie bekennt, sondern auf der Basis eingehender Analysen auch Vorschläge unterbreitet, wie dem Wert einer zukunftsoffenen Entfaltungs- und Gestaltungsfreiheit Geltung und Dauerhaftigkeit verschafft werden kann.

Im notwendigen Dialog zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik, der lange Zeit darniederlag und erst langsam wieder aufgenommen wird, stellt dieses Buch für beide Seiten eine konstruktive Handreichung dar. Es dient der Orientierung, es gibt Anstöße zum Fortdenken und zum Handeln — und es ist für alle, denen an der Bestandskraft einer humanen, offenen Gesellschaft gelegen ist, ein Zeichen der Ermutigung.

8

## Einleitung

Die vorliegende Schrift faßt einige Überlegungen zum Verhältnis von Politik und Wissen zusammen. In offenen, demokratischen Gesellschaften unterliegt der Zugang zu Information wie auch die Veröffentlichung von Schriften, seien sie politischer, kultureller oder wissenschaftlicher Natur, keinerlei Kontrolle. Das Verhältnis von Wissen und Politik konkretisiert sich sowohl im informellen Gespräch zwischen Wissenschaftlern und Politikern als auch auf der mehr formalen Ebene gutachtlicher Stellungnahmen im Auftrag der Regierung.

Davon können beide Seiten nützliche Einsichten erlangen, denn politisches Wissen ist ein anderes als das Wissen der Wissenschaftler über objektivierbare Tatbestände. Das schließt auch den Gegenstand der politischen Wissenschaft ein. Wie anders das Wissen der politischen Wissenschaft ist als das Wissen der Politiker von der Politik, zeigt sich daran, daß Politologen nur selten erfolgreiche Politiker sind. Nicht jedes Wissen ist politisch umsetzbar. Da der Politiker nicht weiß, wann er welches Wissen politisch einsetzen kann, ist es für ihn vorteilhaft, sich einen Vorrat an abrufbarem Wissen anzuschaffen, zugleich aber den Erkenntnisprozeß in der Gesellschaft zu fördern. Das ist nur in einer offenen Gesellschaft möglich.

Ich versuche darzulegen, daß das Prinzip Offenheit den Lebens- und Erkenntnisbedingungen der Menschen adäquat ist und daß die darauf beruhenden Gesellschaftsordnungen viel größere Entfaltungsmöglichkeiten, bessere Lebensbedingungen und mehr soziale Sicherheit bieten, als es jene Gesellschaftsordnungen vermögen, die die Ergebnisse der wissenschaftlichen Wahrheitsfindung aus ideologischen Gründen verfälschen. Man sollte meinen, eine solche Aussage sei so selbstverständlich, daß sie der näheren Begründung nicht bedarf. Weshalb dies leider heute nicht mehr ganz zutrifft,

9

wird aus der vorliegenden Studie ersichtlich. Ich beziehe
darin Stellung für das Prinzip Offenheit und gegen jegliche
Ideologisierung. Insofern ist die Studie nicht wertneutral.
Ich biete keine fertigen Lösungen an, sondern entwerfe
Szenarien und unterbreite Vorschläge.

Zwei große Problembereiche konnten im Rahmen dieser
kleinen Schrift nicht behandelt werden, obwohl sie ohne
Zweifel wichtig sind: Probleme der Weltwirtschaft und der
Nuklearstrategie. Die Beziehungen von Wissen und Politik
im nuklearstrategischen Bereich sind ohnehin so kompliziert,
daß ich mich beim heutigen Stand meines Wissens zu wenig
kompetent fühle, dazu Relevantes zu sagen.

Das Abwägen unterschiedlicher Argumente ist nicht Sache
des Literaturstudiums allein, sondern geschieht in Gesprächen
und Diskussionen. Die mir von meinen Mitarbeitern und
Kollegen vermittelten Gedanken und Perspektiven waren
für meine eigene Meinungsbildung besonders wertvoll. Ich
möchte ihnen allen, insbesondere jedoch den Mitgliedern der
von Ministerpräsident Lothar Späth eingesetzten Kommis-
sionen, in welchen mitzuarbeiten ich das Vergnügen hatte,
dafür danken. Obwohl einzelne Hypothesen und Konzepte,
die in den Diskussionen mit meinen Freunden und Kollegen
zu Sprache kamen, Eingang in die vorliegende Schrift fan-
den, werden die hier dargelegten Auffassungen selbstver-
ständlich allein von mir vertreten und verantwortet.

Frau L. Meier unterzog sich der Mühe, das nicht immer
leicht lesbare Manuskript in Reinschrift zu übertragen. Ihr
sowie dem Bibliothekar des Instituts für Wirtschaftsfor-
schung der ETH-Zürich möchte ich an dieser Stelle für die
mir gewährte Hilfe bestens danken.

Zürich, im Sommer 1985

Bruno Fritsch

10

Reimar Lüst, damaliger Präsident der Max-Planck-Gesell-
schaft, gegenwärtig Generaldirektor der ESA (European
Space Agency) schreibt im Vorwort zur deutschen Ausgabe
des Buches von Steven Weinberg „Die ersten drei Minuten“:
„Für einen Naturwissenschaftler kann nur das Gültigkeit
haben, was er durch Beobachtungen von der Natur erfährt.
Das Meßbare – und das bedeutet das Nachmeßbare –
führt, geordnet durch ein theoretisches Verständnis, zum
Weltbild des Naturwissenschaftlers sowohl im Mikrokosmos
als auch im Makrokosmos“ (S. 7). Damit weist Lüst auf die
drei konstitutiven Elemente des wissenschaftlichen Erkennt-
nisprozesses hin: (1) Natur als Objekt der Erkenntnis, (2)
nachvollziehbare Messung und (3) Theoriebildung. Diese
prägnante Charakterisierung naturwissenschaftlichen Erken-
nens hat außer ihrer Klarheit den Vorteil, daß man an ihr
sowohl den historischen Entfaltungsvorgang menschlicher
Kognition als auch die innere Dynamik und Beschleunigung
des wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisfortschritts aufzeigen kann.
John Platt hebt, wie viele andere Wissenschaftler, hervor,
daß der wissenschaftliche Erkenntnisprozeß der letzten
vierzig Jahre Fortschritte und Veränderungen bewirkt hat,
die um Potenzen größer sind als alles, was der Mensch in
seiner bisherigen Entwicklungsgeschichte hervorzubringen in
der Lage war. Obwohl eine solche Aussage schwerlich durch
exakte Messung belegt werden kann, dürfte kaum angezwei-
felt werden, daß sich der wissenschaftliche wie auch der
technische Fortschritt vor allem in den letzten Jahrzehnten
beschleunigt hat.

Ich will im Folgenden einige Phasen und Stationen dieses
für die Existenzbedingungen des Menschen grundlegenden
Vorgangs andeutungsweise skizzieren.

11

C4J

HENRY A. KISSINGER

Dear Alton:

I enjoyed reading your two recent
articles and appreciate your bringing
them to my attention. Many thanks as
well for the positive feedback on my
article. It was nice to hear from you.

Mr. Alton Frye
Council on Foreign
Relations
11 Dupont Circle, NW
Washington, DC 20036

Los Angeles Times

Thursday, July 30, 1987 / Part II

5

# Gorbachev's Zero-Missiles Pitch Covers Six Other Bases

By ALTON FRYE

Remarkable is too mild a word for Mikhail S. Gorbachev's latest maneuvers. In substance, timing and focus they reveal a political brilliance with which the West has not begun to cope. The man is scoring so many points in so many different arenas that it's hard to keep track of them. Like the little tailor in the fairy tale, his shirt should read "seven at one blow."

Consider the several objectives served by Gorbachev's July 22 interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka:

*Score 1:* The obvious, but not necessarily the most significant, objective is the immediate revival of prospects for an agreement with the United States to eliminate intermediate nuclear forces. At a single stroke he removed the last major obstacle to such a bargain by agreeing to a "global zero solution," offering to destroy the 100 INF warheads that Moscow had insisted it would retain in Asia. That accommodates even Secretary of Defense Caspar M. Weinberger's chief complaint against the impending deal and greatly simplifies the problem of verifying compliance with the accord.

*Score 2:* Gorbachev plays the game on more than one level. Not only does he gain credit for another generous concession on arms control, he keeps the United States on the political defensive. Moscow's evident reasonableness puts pressure on Washington to resolve the continuing argument over 72 Pershing 1-A missiles owned by West Germany (for which the United States controls the nuclear warheads). That is bound to breed tension between the two allies and their NATO associates.

*Score 3:* Within West Germany itself, the Gorbachev concession puts the coalition government in a bind. Its Christian Socialist members, backed by a number of Chris-

tian Democrats, have been at odds with the Free Democrats led by Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher, who favors global elimination of INF, even if it means that the German Pershings must go. In the wake of intra-governmental commotions over the previous Soviet offer of a zero option for Europe, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's party seemed to pay a price in some provincial elections. Moscow's newest overture is an invitation to factionalism in Bonn, freighted with concrete risks in the next elections for those seen as impeding progress in arms reductions.

*Score 4:* Asia becomes the primary focus. The medium is a "set-piece" interview—written answers to written questions, glossed by a brief chat—with an Indonesian journalist who is obviously charmed. The occasion is the anniversary of the Soviet leader's speech in Vladivostok laying out his policy toward Asia and the Pacific. It has seemed likely for some time that, just as Gorbachev's earlier moves on INF were aimed at accommodating Europe more than the United States, he would yield the last 100 INF warheads to soothe the sensibilities of Asian countries. The move is well contrived to earn bonus points in that market, even while reinforcing his previous gains in the superpower dialogue.

*Score 5:* He is unusually deft at slipping in the needle, lacing his commentary with not-too-subtle suggestions that the United States is the culprit in most of Asia's problems, from the Tamil violence in Sri Lanka to the stagnation of efforts to reunify Korea. At moments he skirts close to sanctimony, recalling American nuclear tests in the Pacific after World War II and saying that they "took away the health and even lives of many inhabitants of the area." He implies that Soviet attempts to better

relations with some countries are hindered by American intimidation of "small states that are still learning to stand firmly on their feet." Read through Asian eyes as the message of one who has just displayed his good will by offering to eliminate INF weapons, the barbs register; indeed, compared to old-style Soviet propaganda, their very mildness increases their plausibility.

*Score 6:* Gorbachev finds common ground with China by stressing that, by contrast with other nuclear powers, Moscow and Beijing have pledged never to be the first to use nuclear weapons. He lays out a host of ideas to ease the tensions in the region—not only limits on nuclear tests and deployments but also confidence-building measures: Ban sea-based nuclear forces from certain coastal areas; regulate anti-submarine-warfare operations; reduce the number of superpower naval exercises. In short, he plays off the developing anxieties over nuclear weapons and sets an agenda that will have wide appeal among Asian-Pacific countries but little prospect of an affirmative U.S. response.

*Score 7:* Gorbachev makes clear that he is also interested in harnessing Asia's economic energies to participate in Soviet modernization. He applauds the successes of ASEAN (the Assn. of Southeast Asian Nations) and invites prosperous neighbors to join in developing the wealth of Soviet resources beyond the Urals. Although he shows some regret about the course of Soviet-Japanese relations (still troubled by territorial disputes from 1945), he strikes a posture aimed at improving the Tokyo connection, and expresses an eagerness to visit Japan as a state of special weight in the world economy.

It is tempting for Americans to be rather smug in their suspicions about this kind of

performance. Politics is more than public relations, but it would be foolhardy to ignore the consequences of the revolutionary change of style that Gorbachev has brought to the Kremlin. Whether speaking to Asian or European audiences, he strokes all the egos, touches all the sore points, sounds all the idealistic themes and submerges specific concerns in hopeful crescendos.

In doing so he creates situations in which, even if his proposals do not win acceptance, their very rejection produces indirect Soviet gains on other levels. If he does not get the INF deal that he wants, the onus is likely to fall on the United States and West Germany, generating new stresses in the alliance and their own domestic politics. If the Western nuclear powers resist additional restraints on nuclear testing or deployments in the Pacific, governments in that area will come under greater pressure to distance themselves from the West on those issues. If Japan does not come aboard Moscow's train bound for Siberian development, others of the newly industrializing countries may well pick up the investment opportunities in joint ventures with the Soviets.

One need not speculate that Moscow's foreign policy is driven by a need to calm the international waters while *glasnost* (openness) and *perestroika* (restructuring) transform the dilapidated Soviet economy. Judged strictly on their own terms, the artful moves by Gorbachev are giving Soviet diplomacy an impetus heretofore unknown. Machiavelli himself could not have fashioned a more potent form of no-lose politics.

Alton Frye is the Washington director of the Council on Foreign Relations.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL FRIDAY, JULY 24, 1987

North's Abuse of Precedents

By ALTON FRYE

Whatever George Washington said to his daddy about the cherry tree, he surely never claimed the right to lie to Congress. One might have gained the opposite impression from the way the first president's spirit was called into last week's hearing with Lt. Col. Oliver North. Col. North and his allies attempted to drape Washington's ghost over the executive branch's lamen- table habit of duping the legislative branch. The sheet won't fit.

Those eager for exoneration fondly recall that President Washington once refused to convey certain secret diplomatic materials to the House of Representatives. That is less than half the truth and more than half misleading.

Washington did indeed decline a House request to see the negotiating instructions and dispatches associated with the so- called Jay Treaty of 1795, the first treaty negotiated under the Constitution. One must understand that decision, however, in the limited and special context in which Washington made it.

The House request came months after the Senate tendered advice and consent. The treaty had already become the law of the land. Washington's response to the House, which was heavily influenced by Al- exander Hamilton and preoccupied with avoiding a mischievous precedent, indi- cated that he did so because the House's request was relevant to no constitutional function "except that of an impeachment; which the resolution had not expressed." In "War, Foreign Affairs and Constitu- tional Power: The Origins," Abraham D. Sofaer points out that Washington avoided claiming wider power to withhold mate- rial. Mr. Sofaer, a former professor and now legal adviser in the State Department, says in the book that the president deleted from his message an assertion that "a dis- cretion in the Executive Department, when and how to comply with such demands is essential to the due conduct of foreign ne- gotiations."

The more vital precedent preceded this episode. The Jay Treaty was an embar- rassment to Washington. Jay had exceeded his instructions in numerous respects and had fallen far short of the goals the presi- dent had set. Frankly, few American diplo- mats have ever negotiated from such a position of weakness, and it showed.

Nevertheless, Washington overrode the recommendation of his secretary of state, Edmund Randolph, and decided against withholding the awkward information from the Senate. Before the House ever raised the issue, Washington had long since trans- mitted to the Senate the same material— Jay's negotiating instructions and dis- patches, together with other confidential information requested by the upper cham- ber. Washington respected the Senate's constitutional claim to the information and the Senate in turn respected the need for secrecy. The president's good faith in shar- ing the papers with the Senate undoubtedly played a crucial role in winning approval by a single vote.

The current hearings have revealed stunning misconceptions about presidential power in a constitutional government.

Those misconceptions are not original to Col. North, but his testimony and that of Adm. John Poindexter offer a compelling occasion to clear them up.

One of them concerns the Supreme Court's famous 1936 decision in *U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* Col. North in- voked it to vindicate his assertion of sweeping presidential authority in foreign policy. It is a citation frequently favored and consistently distorted by advocates of elastic executive power.

What the court actually held in *Curtiss-Wright* was that Congress had acted consti- tutionally in a joint resolution specifically delegating authority to the president to es-

tablish and enforce an embargo against arms shipments dur- ing a war between Bolivia and Par- guay. The court con- cluded that Congress and the president, acting conjointly, had ample authority to employ the fed- eral government's "powers of external sovereignty."

George Washington

To be sure, the court's soaring lan-

guage about "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations" invited the imperial pretentions of later adminis- trations. But Justice Sutherland sur- rounded that exuberant portrayal of presi- dential power by two critical qualifica- tions, noting that the case presented a challenge first of all to "an authority vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power...." He went on to point out that the president's foreign-policy power, "like every other governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitu- tion."

That decision was a major reference for another precedent commonly recalled to justify executive excess in foreign policy. President Franklin Roosevelt's trade of 50 overage destroyers for base rights in sev- eral British territories. It was 1940, and with war raging in Europe, Roosevelt's de- cision was strategically sound. Though po- litically controversial, it was in no way comparable to the extra-constitutional ac- tions of recent months.

The plan was thoroughly rooted in stat- utory authority. The question was whether the president required additional congres- sional authority to proceed. One of its most ardent exponents, Dean Acheson, joined other like-minded lawyers to make clear that, "Whatever might be our views on the law, we would not suggest executive action without Congressional approval if we be- lieved that a majority of the Congress was opposed to such action." That attitude bears no resemblance to one explicitly aimed at defying the expressed view of Congress, much less to a policy denying Congress information on which to base an

independent view. A statute enacted some months later confirmed that Acheson and his friends correctly gauged legislative sentiment.

More important, Roosevelt did not move forward before having the benefit of a careful advisory opinion by Attorney General Robert Jackson. Jackson scrupu- lously circumscribed the executive author- ity described in the Curtiss-Wright case. "The President's power over foreign rela- tions," he wrote, "while delicate, plenary and exclusive, is not unlimited. Some nego- tiations involve commitments as to the fu- ture which would carry an obligation to ex- ercise powers vested in Congress."

Since the agreement with Britain dis- posed of military equipment the president was empowered to transfer and imposed no obligation for the United States actually to exercise the base rights it provided. Jackson found it unnecessary "for the Sen- ate to ratify an opportunity that entails no obligation." It was a measured finding, openly published to enable Congress and the country—then weeks away from a his- toric presidential election—to react as they deemed appropriate. No evasion of ac- countability there.

Precedents are not pretzels. The abuse of precedents is another sad dimension in the sorry tale of executive exaltation still unfolding.

Mr. Frye is Washington director of the Council on Foreign Relations.

ELC]

16