MEMORANDUM

[LC]

To:
* Admiral George Anderson
* Admiral Arleigh Burke
* General Burce Clarke
* General George Decker
* Admiral Harry Felt
* General John Gerhart
* General Victor Krulak
* Admiral David McDonald
* General Thomas Power
* Admiral Arthur Radford
* General Matthew Ridgway
* General Bernard A. Schriever
* General Arthur Trudeau
* General Nathan F. Twining

August 20, 1968

From: Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr.

The following is a partial list of areas of interest for our meeting with Dick Nixon and Spiro Agnew:

1. <u>Vietnam</u>

(a) How do we break the stalemate in Paris?

(b) What military steps should we take if the stalemate continues?

(c) Is the Administration realistic when it talks about turning over the defense of the country to the South Vietnamese?

2. <u>Johnson-Humphrey-McNamara Team</u> List the military blunders of the "team" and what we should do to remedy these errors.

3. <u>National Security Council</u> Is the National Security Council performing its function and if not, how should it be reorganized so as to be an effective agency?

4. <u>Joint Chiefs of Staff</u> Is this concept outdated or has the Administration misused and disregarded its advice?

5. <u>ABM Defense System</u> What should our position be with reference to the ABM defense system--should it be enlarged or abolished?

Memorandum to Military Advisory Committee

Page 2.

6. Veterans While the Veterans' associations are nonpolitical, the fact remains that they and the individual veterans represent a great reservoir of decency and patriotism. The vote of the veterans is important but their support for a strong America is indispensable. How can we enlist their active support?

7. NATO What's wrong with NATO? What do we substitute for it and the other regional defense groups like SEATO, etc., which seem to have outlived their usefulness?

8. D.O.D. Has the Department of Defense under McNamara become an unmanageable bureaucracy with a budget out of all proportion?

9. Missile Gap Is there a missile gap? If so, how do we solve it?

10. TFX What can we do to remedy the damage done by McNamara's TFX? Do we need a follow-on to the B52?

11. Naval Power Is our anti-submarine program, nuclear powered ships, etc., sufficient in view of Russia's build up of its Naval strength?

12. Draft Draft or Voluntary Army?

13. Conventional Forces Are our Reserve and National Guard programs sufficient to support our foreign policy?

14. Russia Is it a fact that Russia not China is the prime support of the North Vietnamese? If so, shouldn't our military and political policy be revised?

15. China Is China a present-day military threat? How do we meet this threat?

16. **<u>Budget</u>** What's wrong with our present military budget?

17. **<u>Strategic Power</u>** During the Republican Administration the U.S. had a clear superiority of strategic power. How can this be regained?

18. **<u>Allies</u>** What can we do to persuade our Allies to support our worldwide efforts for world peace and stability?

19. **<u>Military Assistance</u>** What's wrong with our Military Assistance Program?

20. **<u>Mid-East</u>** What can we do to restore and maintain peace in the Mid-East?

21. **<u>The Pueblo</u>** Why didn't the Administration take more forceful action with reference to the Pueblo? What can we do that is not being done to obtain the release of the ship and crew?

Your comments on the above and any other subjects that should be included will be most welcomed.

[LC]

## 1. Vietnam

We must make the price of their aggression more than the leaders of North Vietnam are willing to pay. Presently, Russia and China, and I presume the Reds worldwide, feel that Vietnam is a very profitable enterprise. They are spending less than $2 billion a year whereas we are spending more than $30 billions a year. No Russian and Chinese are being killed there. Ours and allied casualties are more than 1,000 a week. Obviously, therefore, by their evaluation Vietnam is a profitable Red enterprise in the over-all contest, East versus West. We have the air and sea power to make this an unprofitable enterprise for the Reds. When it becomes unprofitable to them, they will, in my judgment, either fade away, abandon their invasion of the South and return to their former guerrilla tactics, or they will negotiate. We shall never get anything in such negotiations which we cannot win on the battlefield.

Increase the military pressure on North Vietnam and limit the introduction of weapons, military supplies and food from North Vietnamese allies, principally Russia and Red China. We can stop the delivery of all weapons from China by breaking the Red River Dikes and inundating long stretches of the two rail lines from China to Hanoi. We can stop the introduction of most of the Russian weapons either by mining the Haiphong Harbor and its approaches or by destroying the docks and the dredging equipment in Haiphong Harbor.

Yes, in time. Had not the Administration procrastinated for years in building up the military strength of South Vietnam, they would today be in a position to provide most of the ground force manpower required and a considerable portion of the air force and naval strength necessary. The present Administration should have done what the Russians and Chinese did when it became apparent that the North Vietnamese would not keep the Geneva Agreement and were training and equipping their forces for military conquest of the South. The United States should have begun arming, equipping, and training South Vietnamese forces in sufficient strength to meet this threat.

2. Johnson-Humphrey-McNamara Team List the military blunders of the "team" and what we should do to remedy these errors.

A primary blunder was the policy of assuming that U.S. military superiority over Russia was unsettling and provocative and the chance for world peace would be greater when the two military powers had parity. The fundamental flaw in this is that weapons parity automatically becomes U.S. inferiority, since our policy is to allow the enemy to strike the first blow. No one knows how many of our missiles and bombers will survive that first blow, but it won't be very much now that the bombers have been taken off air alert and the location of all our missile sites are well known. Throughout history, weakness, not strength, has provoked aggression. I believe that Mr. Nixon's stated position that we must return to definite military superiority is the correct course in this case.

Other military blunders of the current Administration include:

(1) Failure to use the defense organization provided by the National Defense Act of 1947, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council as the principal advisers to the Secretary of Defense and the President on defense matters. Instead so-called Special Assistants to the President for National Security (McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow) replaced the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Security Council. The introduction of the young group of intellectuals (whiz kids) as the principal staff and advisory group to the Secretary of Defense and the consequent failure to use the military staff and advisers, as past secretaries have done.

(2) The failure to use military advice in weapons selection. This has resulted in many unwise weapons decisions, such as the TFX fiasco. It has resulted also in providing options instead of weapons.

(3) The use of draftees as the principal source of manpower in Vietnam. All prior studies respecting the relative cost of a professional military force against a conscripted military force have been biased and unrealistic. Actually, it will cost less to have a voluntary military establishment, and, what is more important, the quality of our defense forces will be markedly improved.

(4) The determination to fight a land war in Vietnam. That is like saying to the enemy, "We know you have no Navy and Air Force, so we are sportsmen, we will not bring our preponderant sea and air power against you but will fight you on the ground where every advantage lies with you." We should have trained and equipped the South Vietnamese to provide the necessary land forces and we should have used our air and sea power to make the cost of the invasion from the North prohibitive.

(5) The cancer-like growth of the Federal bureaucracy. The efficiency of the Pentagon would be increased tremendously if its personnel were reduced by 75%. Reduction in military overhead must start with reduction of the Pentagon staff. One Pentagonian can ask enough questions, request enough reports and raise enough hell to keep ten men busy down at the end of the line.

(6) The continued failure of the current Administration to provide new weapons. Not one single important new weapon has been placed in production in meaningful quantities under the present Administration; instead the military has been reduced to such an extent that it will cost many billions to restore the Armed Services to necessary strength and efficiency.

(7) The present Administration, primarily the Secretary of Defense, Mr. McNamara, must share the prime responsibility for the break-up of NATO. It was the high-handed, unilateral decisions of our Secretary of Defense which led the French to pull out of NATO and which reduced the British capability as a strong and worthy ally. This began when Mr. McNamara cancelled the Skybolt missile, which Britain was relying upon as its principal bomber weapon, without consulting the British. Many other instances could be cited where overbearing, uncooperative acts, decisions and speeches of Mr. McNamara hastened the break-up of NATO.

The way to rebuild the damage done by these errors is to restore the United States to military superiority; provide new fighters, interceptors and bombers for the Air Force; restore the Air Defense Command to full capability; provide the Navy and the Army with the weapons they require to accomplish their missions; and get on with the deployment of a sound anti-ballistic missile system. Nobody ever has, nor in my judgment ever will, negotiate effectively and satisfactorily with the Reds from a position of weakness.

### 3. National Security Council
Is the National Security Council performing its function and if not, how should it be reorganized so as to be an effective agency?

The National Security Council is not performing the function for which it was created by law, since it has not been used by the current Administration. Instead the current Administration has set up Ad Hoc Special Assistants to perform the duties which should be performed by the National Security Council. There is nothing wrong with the Council as used by President Eisenhower.

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[lc]

4. Joint Chiefs of Staff Is this concept outdated or has the Administration misused and disregarded its advice?

The latter. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as provided by the National Defense Act, should be the principal military advisers of the Secretary of Defense and the President. It is a sound organization, soundly conceived and administered, and used prior to the current Administration.

5. ABM Defense System What should our position be with reference to the ABM defense system--should it be enlarged or abolished?

The best ABM defense system which the state-of-the-art can now develop should be deployed without further delay. The whole purpose of all our defense effort is to provide a creditable deterrence to war or Red aggression. Since Russia has installed and is enlarging its ABM defense system, it is quite obvious they will believe they have a great advantage if we have none, and the creditability of our defense posture will suffer in their eyes.

You are quite right. There is no better segment of American citizenship than the Veterans associations. Their counsel should be sought and their advice heeded in defense matters. My observation of such organizations, extending over 50 years, indicates that they will ardently and adequately support sound defense policies if a wise Commander-in-Chief solicits their advice and support.

I do not agree that NATO, SEATO and other regional defense groups have outlived their usefulness. I think they have fallen into disuse largely because of inept U.S. leadership. In my judgment, they should be revived and restored to strength and use. For example, Japan should be encouraged to strengthen its defense posture and it should be made quite clear that they can no longer rely upon U.S. citizens to bear most of their defense costs. Germany should also bear more of the defense burden in Europe, as should Britain, France and our other principal NATO allies.

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Yes, definitely.

9. <u>Missile Gap</u> Is there a missile gap? If so, how do we solve it?

There is not really a missile gap since Russia has more than 900 and we have only 1,000 ICBMs. We do have currently more submarine launched medium-range ballistic missiles than do the Russians, but they are catching up fast. They also have many more medium range missiles which can dominate Europe. The gap is not in missiles but in the whole arsenal of national security. At the end of the Eisenhower administration we had a strategic force superiority of at least five to one. Presently we are approaching parity and by 1970, if present rates and trends continue, the USSR will have a definite superiority. We solve this dangerous situation by restoring our superiority. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in testimony before the Congress, have clearly indicated the steps needed in this direction, including the weapons which must be procured.

10. TFX What can we do to remedy the damage done by McNamara's TFX? Do we need a follow-on to the B-52?

The TFX should be phased out. Only limited quantities procured and the highest priority should be devoted to providing the Air Force and the Navy with the best type of interceptors and air superiority fighters which the state-of-the-art can provide. Both the Air Force and the Navy have long since submitted programs to DOD to accomplish this job.

Definitely, we need a follow-on bomber to the B-52. The AMSA (Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft) is the appropriate solution. The Air Force presented this request to D.O.D. more than five years ago. It has been brought up to date annually ever since. The new Commander-in-Chief should authorize the earliest possible production of AMSA in quantities recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

11. Naval Power Is our anti-submarine program, nuclear powered ships, etc., sufficient in view of Russia's build-up of its naval strength?

Definitely not, in my judgment. However, Admirals Anderson, Burke and Radford's judgment about how to maintain our naval superiority would certainly be better than mine. I would have complete confidence in what they advise in this area.

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12. **Draft** Draft or Voluntary Army?

A Voluntary Army. I have written and spoken in this area for several years and will be glad to furnish additional data, if required.

13. **Conventional Forces** - Are our Reserve and National Guard programs sufficient to support our foreign policy?

No. It would be my recommendation that the Joint Chiefs of Staff be assigned an early priority to advise the new Commander-in-Chief on sound Reserve and National Guard programs and that the Governors of the states and the Adjutant Generals of the states be called in to counsel in this area.

14. **Russia** Is it a fact that Russia not China is the prime support of the North Vietnamese? If so, shouldn't our military and political policy be revised?

Definitely. Both are now supplying the North Vietnamese. Russia at a rate of about $1 billion annually and the Red Chinese at a rate of about $800 million annually. This support can be drastically reduced by a proper application of sea and air power.

15. **China** Is China a present-day military threat? How do we meet this threat?

China presently is not a serious threat to the United States mainland. This threat will grow as the Chinese develop more and more ICBMs with intercontinental range. Within a short time China will have the capability, if in fact she does not now have it, to destroy our forces on some of the Pacific bases, Okinawa for example. There must, therefore, be plans to defend such forces on such bases and for retaliatory strikes against China's nuclear capability in such an event.

16. **Budget** What's wrong with our present military budget?

It has in recent years been prepared by the current Administration without a proper regard to military counsel. There has also been a failure to heed the advice of Congress on military budgets. Many members of Congress, including the Chairmen of the Armed Services Committees, House and Senate, and the Chairmen of the Appropriations Committees, House and Senate, have more experience on military budgets than any civilian in the Pentagon. Their counsel should be sought and carefully considered.

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17. Strategic Power During the Republican Administration the U.S. had a clear superiority of strategic power. How can this be regained?

By heeding the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our
principal military leaders. Actually, these individuals in past
years have earnestly recommended to the President and the Congress
what needs to be done in this area as Congressional Hearings will
divulge.

18. Allies What can we do to persuade our Allies to support our worldwide efforts for world peace and stability?

Be cooperative; ask their counsel; treat them as equals and
not subordinates; bring them into partnership.

19. Military Assistance What's wrong with our Military Assistance Program?

I am not particularly knowledgeable in this area. My feeling is that we have been influenced by the "do-gooders." We have frowned upon military assistance and insisted upon trying to straighten out their economy and land ownership systems and other civil sides of their governments. If we would stick more strictly to military assistance and get away from the socialistic reform side of the business, we would be better off in my judgment.

20. Mid-East What can we do to restore and maintain peace in the Mid-East?

Here again, my knowledge, background and experience may be
of little use. I do feel, however, that we should not abandon
Israel. It seems to me that what the Russians are doing in Egypt
must be considered very alarming. We must make it very clear to
the Russians that we will never remove our fleet from the
Mediterranean or otherwise abandon our Allies in the Middle East.

21. The Pueblo Why didn't the Administration take more forceful action with reference to the Pueblo? What can we do that is not being done to obtain the release of the ship and crew?

I assume that the Administration failed to take proper action
at the time of the Pueblo incident because of its fear that the
North Koreans might invade South Korea. It seems to me absolutely
appalling that the United States should fear North Korea. Here

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again, I believe that firmness on our part was what was called
for instead of a craven do-nothing attitude. What we should have
done, as our Allies in the Pacific have told us, was to have demanded
the return of the Pueblo and crew and when this demand was not met,
we should have seized enough North Korean shipping to have more
North Koreans and ships than the Pueblo and its crew represented.
Then we should have offered to negotiate a mutual exchange. If this
failed, we should have picked up every North Korean ship on the
high seas until the North Koreans got the message. Their fishing
fleet provides much of their food. They could not long have endured
loss of this fleet.

[10]

27 Aug 68.

FROM: M. B. Ridgway, General, US Army, Rtd.

TO: Franklin B. Lincoln, Jr., Esq

SUBJECT: Your Memorandum, dated 20 Aug 68, to multiple addresses.

In response to above reference, I am:

Answering directly some of the Questions propounded.

Not replying to Questions on which I feel my knowledge and current information is insufficient to insure balanced judgment.

Commenting on what I regard as fundamental areas and problems, whether or not these comments are responsive to specific Questions on your list. These are major areas and problems of a continuing character with which I have had close personal association over the past two decades and with some degree of responsibility.

My specific answers to numbered Questions on your list, and my general comments, follow in that order.

A. ANSWERS.

Question 3: See Encls 2 and 3, letters to Senator Jackson.

Question 4: See my letter to Secretary of Defense, Encl 1.

Question 8: Same as Question 4.

Question 7: NATO is as, or more important now than ever. The Czechoslovakia crisis demonstrates that clearly. NATO was created as a primarily military pact. It must be developed into a basically political alliance which EVENTUALLY, if it is to achieve its primary purpose - safe-guarding Western Democracy - must be vested with the essential attributes of federalism.

Question 12: In this dangerous and brutal era it would be a fantasy to think that an Army of the requisite size and composition to meet our essential needs could be provided on a voluntary basis.

Question 13: Depends on a clear enunciation of what our foreign policy is, i.e., what our objectives are.

Question 15: It is a present day threat - though a relatively minor one - to our forces in the Vietnam area and in Korea. With the passage of time that threat could substantially increase, depending upon the strength and manner of employment of US armed forces on and against the Asiatic mainland. Dependent upon how Communist China employs its armed forces,

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[L]

we might find it necessary to retali ate directly against her.

Question 17: If by "strategic power" you mean nuclear power, then the US did have a clear superiority. It like wise then had a clear superiority in sea power. But in the over-all military sphere of combined GROUND, SEA, AND AIR POWER, the US was clearly deficient in ground strength, and in the cap-ability of transporting its ground forces by either sea or air - a grave deficiency, and corrective action was not taken until the following Administration.

## B. GENERAL COMMENTS.

I attach hereto Enclosures 1, 2 and 3 in which my views were stated several years ago on such topics as the National Secur-ity Council, the JCS, the Military Departments and Civilian vs Military Control. In the interveing years since these views were stated, at the request of a former Secretary of Defense and a US Senator still in Office, nothing has transpired to alter them in the slightest degree. In fact, they are, in my opinion as valid now as then.

## C. UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES.

Those that require, or that may require the commitment of US forces for their attainment, should be limited to those that can be identified as clearly lying within the zone of our vital national interests, and they should be clearly defined. Such objectives include, but are not limited to:

- To prevent Western Europe, outside the Iron Curtain, from coming under Kremlin control.

- To prevent the establishment of a Kremlin dominated government in the Western Hemisphere, an objective which US policies and commitments at RIO DE JANEIRO, BOGOTA and CARACAS solemnly enunciated, and which we then let go by default in the case of CUBA.

- To maintain our forward defense line in the Far East, i.e., the line of: the Japanese Islands - South Korea - the Ryukyus - Taiwan - the Philippines.

The inclusion of SOUTHEAST ASIA within this defense line is a debatable objective. In my opinion, this objective does **NOT** lie within the zone of our vital national interests.

## D. DISPOSITION OF US ARMED FORCES.

From now on and as far into the future as man can see, there will exist the possibility of having nuclear weapons on a large scale used against us. The USSR today has that capability. Tomorrow others powers may have it though to lesser degree.

A

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(L)

27 Aug 69 - Lincoln

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Recognizing that we may find our unquestioned vital inter-
ests challenged to the point where we feel obliged to respond
with armed force, we should ask ourselves now if we are not,
in SOUTHEAST ASIA, so impairing our strength through over-
drawing on our resources - political, economic and military -
(through over-extension, in other words) as to unduly impair
our capability for response to such challenges elsewhere. That they
will arise is practically inevitable. I think we clearly are.

E. VIETNAM.

The prime objective we seem to seek is the development of
a viable, friendly government capable of maintaining its po-
litical independence on its own. Whether or not this is a
chimera remains to be seen.

The sine qua non for attainment of that objective is a
defense establishment capable of defending that political
independence.

The essentials for creating such a defense establishment
are leadership, weapons and training, and in that order of
importance, for without leadership from the top down, the
other two factors will be nullified.

Some of our political and military leaders on the scene
in Vietnam, and some in Washington, profess to believe that
leadership can be developed. If they are right, the supply
of weapons and the attainment of adequate training levels
within a reasonably short time would present no insuperable
problems to us.

Given the leadership and the determination at top South
Vietnamese Government levels, then within a maximum of two
years (though this could well be extended), we could supply
the weapons and insure the training, and within that period
progressively reduce our force levels there.

Perhaps the serving of notice on the South Vietnamese
Government at an early date, that we will allow it a maxi-
mum of two years within which to accomplish this, would serve
as an effective and adequate stimulus.

In any event, some means must be found, and soon, to put
an end to this shackling commitment. BUT, to iterate, as has
been done, that we would withdraw all our forces WITHIN SIX
MONTHS of the reaching of some hypothetical settlement, is
probably unwise, and certainly, in my opinion, a logistical
effort we would find extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Encl 1 - Letter to Sec Def, 6 Feb 58

Encl 2 - Letter to Senator Jackson, 14 Aug 59.

M. B. Ridgway

Encl 3 - Letter to Senator Jackson, 11 Nov 59.

MELLON INSTITUTE

4400 FIFTH AVENUE
PITTSBURGH 13, PA.

6 February 1958

The Honorable Neil S. McElroy
Secretary of Defense
Department of Defense
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This is a further reply to my interim acknowledgment
of your 30 January letter requesting any thoughts I might have "re-
garding the present organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
the Military Departments".

Because of the profound concern with which every thought-
ful American must view a matter so vitally affecting the future of our
people, I trust these views may be of some help to you personally in
the discharge of your responsibilities.

The conclusions which follow, reached years ago through
study and close personal experience with the problems on which they
bear, are deep convictions, the soundness of which recent events amply
confirm. They deal with a few of the vitally important principles re-
lating to the constitutional and legislative structure of our Military
Establishment and the manner in which it should function.

PRINCIPLES

1. CIVILIAN vs. MILITARY CONTROL

To me, civilian control is fundamental and unchallengable,
save only in cases where the exercise of control by civilian authorities

COPY

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY - JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

31 August 1968

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

On Board

<table><thead><tr><th></th><th>Mil</th><th>Total</th></tr></thead><tbody><tr><td>The Secretary of Defense</td><td>2</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>The Deputy Secretary of Defense</td><td>2</td><td>7</td></tr><tr><td>Dir Def Research & Engineering</td><td>170</td><td>554</td></tr><tr><td>Asst Secretary (Administration)</td><td>102</td><td>347</td></tr><tr><td>Asst Secretary (Comptroller)</td><td>20</td><td>397</td></tr><tr><td>Asst Secretary (Int'l & Logistics)</td><td>57</td><td>359</td></tr><tr><td>Asst Secretary (Int'l Sec Affairs)</td><td>88</td><td>303</td></tr><tr><td>Asst Secretary (Manpower & Res Affairs)</td><td>101</td><td>228</td></tr><tr><td>Asst Secretary (Public Affairs)</td><td>121</td><td>217</td></tr><tr><td>Asst Secretary (Systems Analysis)</td><td>57</td><td>196</td></tr><tr><td>General Counsel</td><td>3</td><td>51</td></tr><tr><td>Special Staff Assistants</td><td>65</td><td>156</td></tr><tr><td>Miscellaneous Activities</td><td>43</td><td>81</td></tr><tr><td>31 August 1968 TOTAL</td><td>831</td><td>2903</td></tr><tr><td>Consultant & WAE Clerical</td><td></td><td>19</td></tr><tr><td>(Intermittent)</td><td></td><td>17</td></tr><tr><td>Part Time Clerical (Incl in above tot)</td><td></td><td>9</td></tr><tr><td>Summer</td><td></td><td>65</td></tr><tr><td>YOC</td><td></td><td>18</td></tr><tr><td>YOB</td><td></td><td>1</td></tr></tbody></table>

JOINT CHIEF OF STAFF ORGANIZATION

<table><tbody><tr><td>Office of the Chairman</td><td>21</td><td>36</td></tr><tr><td>Joint Staff</td><td>440</td><td>652</td></tr><tr><td>Other Joint Chief of Staff Activities</td><td>1004</td><td>1261</td></tr><tr><td>31 August 1968 TOTAL</td><td>1465</td><td>1949</td></tr><tr><td>Consultant & WAE Clerical</td><td></td><td>3</td></tr><tr><td>Part Time Clerical (Incl in above tot)</td><td></td><td>13</td></tr><tr><td>Summer</td><td></td><td>6</td></tr><tr><td>YOC</td><td></td><td>4</td></tr></tbody></table>

Inclosure 2

Extract from 11 November 1959 letter to Senator H. M. Jackson
from M. B. Ridgway

* * *

Dear Senator Jackson:

This acknowledges receipt on 5 November of your 4 Novem-
ber 1959 letter and enclosures, to which I have given thoughtful
consideration. I have done likewise with respect to my "spontan-
eous views" furnished in my 14 August 1959 letter, in accordance
with your original request.

That which follows is the result. It is essentially
the same thinking as expressed in my 14 August 1959 letter. How-
ever, those points on which I feel most deeply are not only
repeated, but most of them are specifically related to one or more
of the questions propounded in the enclosure to your letter,
headed "Staff Memorandum, November 1959--What Can Be Done to
Improve State-Defense Coordination?"

Numbered questions in "Staff Memorandum, November 1959":

(3) What guidance does Defense need from State, and
is it being provided? If not, what organizational changes might help
State to provide, and Defense to receive, the needed guidance?

(4) Similarly, what guidance does State need from
Defense, and is it being provided? If not, what organizational
changes might help Defense to provide, and State to receive, the
needed guidance?

COPY

FORM 30

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It *is fundamental* in the relations between great powers that no diplomacy can long succeed without the requisite military strength properly to support it, if challenged.

It *should be fundamental* that no major course of action be decided without adequate assessment, prior to executive decision, that military capabilities could, if necessary, successfully confront the consequences of having the course challenged. We need lose only one war to lose our independence.

In brief, STATE should clearly describe to DEFENSE each contemplated course of action and the foreseeable consequences, if adopted; while DEFENSE should clearly explain to STATE the extent to which the military establishment could support this course and successfully face its most dangerous potential consequences. The extent, if any, to which the military capability is believed to be inadequate, should be defined, and the TIME FACTOR in preparing to exercise that capability should be stated.

The degree to which this exchange of guidance is consummated will go far in determining the future outcome of our diplomacy.

Whatever organizational and operational changes are necessary to insure an effective exchange of such guidance is a must, for otherwise we shall be relying on diplomatic bluff. Sooner or later such a bluff will be called, and when called, our chosen course will either fail or demand excessive and avoidable national sacrifices.

FORM 30

COPY

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(9) In what areas might it be desirable to strengthen staff support for the Secretary of Defense, and how might this be done?

Basic to any sound organization is recognition that as an optimum, an executive should have to deal with no more than six or seven principal subordinates. The office of the Secretary of Defense ignores this principle. Its organization is top-heavy, and the number of Assistant Secretaries with their staff should be drastically reduced.

General:

No more pernicious tendency has developed than that of demanding of the uniformed Chiefs of the Armed Services and of their senior subordinates adherence to some politico-military "party line" during the discussion stage of major problems and prior to definitive decisions being announced by proper authority.

This has been a not infrequent practice in recent years. It has been accompanied and supplemented by the companion practice of withholding from the aforementioned officers knowledge of proposed courses of action profoundly affecting their services until just prior to announcement of a decision, and even in some cases until after the decision had already been reached, though not reported.

FORM 30

COPY

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These practices strike at the roots of the nation's most priceless asset in its military establishment and, if permitted to continue, will inevitably erode and ultimately destroy the integrity of the officer corps. The very core of the faith the American people must have in their top military officers is that they will state their honest convictions on military matters uninfluenced by pressures of whatever nature from whatever source, up to the moment that duly constituted authority announces its decision.

Finally, my dear Senator, I invite attention to the views I earlier submitted* and to which I adhere without change.

With highest respect and kindest personal regards, I am,

* * *

*In my 14 August 1959 letter, another copy of which was enclosed with this letter.

M.B.R.

FORM 30

ARLEIGH BURKE

SUITE 600
810 EIGHTEENTH STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20006

23 September 1968

Dear Frank:

I am concerned about a problem with which Mr. Nixon may be confronted around the first of the year. The probability of this problem occurring may be slight, but even the possibility can have such grave consequences that I feel he should be informed of it.

As you know, the Soviets have approached a position of near parity with the United States strategic attack forces during the Kennedy-Johnson Administration. The JCS has repeatedly expressed concern about this trend. However, they have been unsuccessful in persuading others of the seriousness of the problem. Some of the decisions made about systems and forces may be wrong, and the present process of defense decision-making does not include any reexamination of what could be done if they are wrong. As the result, the adequacy of our strategic forces as compared to the Soviets is in doubt.

Our present state of knowledge about Soviet strategic capabilities includes many unknowns which, if incorrectly estimated by United States intelligence community, could result in the belief by Soviet leadership that United States decision-making would be vulnerable to threat initiatives, especially during the period when the new President and his staff are carrying out reorganizations.

For example:

(1) I don't think anybody can say with confidence to what extent or when the Soviet force of SS-9 ICBMs may be equipped with MIRVs. These missiles carry a much larger payload than our Titan IIs. Test indicators could be misleading concerning MIRV R&D lead times.

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(2) We do not know whether or not the Soviets have deployed mobile ICBMs they displayed at Moscow. They would be difficult to locate if they are operational now.

(3) Confidence of the location of their growing force of ballistic missile and cruise missile submarines leaves much to be desired. The range of the ballistic systems is already 700 miles and soon may reach 2000.

(4) I doubt if anybody knows how many Soviet ICBM silos already may contain Fractional Orbital Bombardment systems that could prevent SAC bombers from taking off in a preemptive attack. Their missile subs could do the same thing but maybe quicker.

(5) Nobody in this country can know about the capabilities of the widely deployed Tallin surface-to-air missile system against our present ballistic systems.

(6) It is possible that the Soviets could believe that they could neutralize our Minuteman force by phased high-altitude bursts, and they might be right. Their knowledge of high-altitude nuclear effects, e.g. X-ray, electronic magnetic pulse, etc. should be well ahead of ours in view of their extensive overt testing experience before the test ban treaty.

I know this sounds like science-fiction, and I have hesitated about writing this letter, but it may be true. If it is, there is no time like the break in the Administrations for the Soviets to put on the pressure during the confusion of a changeover in the high command of government. Also it may be the Soviets don't have this real capability, but they may try to convince our people they do have and use it to blackmail a new Administration one way or another.

If they do put on pressure, they probably won't do it without creating some incidents first, so if incidents start occurring, that is another indication that they may have something in mind.