2051 WORDS

8/10/04

Atlantic Times Article

German-American relations have always been close to my heart.

Though the first 15 years of my life brought home to me [mankind's] capacity for evil, they [at the same time] forged emotional ties that [are] part of my being. And I [have watched] German-American relations evolve from the time I returned as an enlisted man with the army of occupation to a devastated country. Those of us who recall the atmosphere of physical and moral [destruction] will always respect the courage and dedication with which Germany faced the [postwar] challenge and [launched] a new period of democracy and progress.

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This is why both Germany and the United States can take pride
in what they have done together in the 60 years since the end of the
Second World War.

Germany's return to the community of nations as an
indispensable and respected member is a tribute to statesmanship on
both sides of the Atlantic. It was a journey marked on the American
side by the Berlin airlift; the Marshall Plan; support for Germany's
membership in NATO and the European Community; close cooperation
in two Berlin crises; support (overcoming initial doubts) for German
reconciliation with the East; leadership in negotiating a final
agreement on access to Berlin; and, finally, unconditional support for
German unification despite the hesitations of other allies, not to speak
of the Soviet Union. Germany's contribution was the courageous
decision to postpone unification, when Stalin offered it in return for

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Germany's rejection of NATO, and its decision instead to tie its future
to European unity and Atlantic partnership. The forging of a common
destiny did not prevent occasional disagreements regarding specific
policies. Indeed, one of my first diplomatic missions was a call on
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in 1962 on behalf of President John F.
Kennedy to reassure the Chancellor about American intentions
regarding the Berlin crisis. But until recently, disagreements [that
arose] were based on differences [over] the appropriate responses to
challenges to what were agreed and essentially undisputed common
interests.

This is why the estrangement of the two countries at least since
the 2002 German election campaign has been so painful. Part of the
reason is that the generation that created the German-American
relationship is passing from the scene. On the American side, its

members came from the Eastern Establishment, leavened by some émigrés. On the German side, the postwar leaders had decisively turned away from a past in which Germany had overreached, partly as a result of totalitarianism but even before that because of an inability to establish national priorities that related Germany's aims to its capabilities.

The new leadership groups that have emerged on both sides have not shared the experience of the war and of postwar reconstruction. They are either not preoccupied with foreign dangers or, to the extent that they are, believe themselves capable of dealing with them outside the Atlantic framework. The Atlantic Alliance, once the centerpiece of policymaking, expanded its membership, thus extending its reach without redefining its purpose. In the United States, the political center of gravity has shifted to regions whose

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representatives have fewer personal connections with Europe and less
experience with its challenges than their predecessors who created the
postwar structure. And they govern in a United States that enjoys
unquestionable military supremacy and is sometimes tempted to
interpret leadership in largely military terms.

Germany has a different perspective. The focus is on domestic
politics rather than on international affairs. European leaders spend
an enormous amount of their time on the technicalities of European
unification - an arcane subject for most American leaders. This
emphasis on bureaucratic, constitutional, and legalistic arrangements
contrasts with a United States that emphasizes the applicability of its
institutions to the rest of the world.

All this has generated a witches' brew of mutual resentments.

In Germany, the media rarely emphasize common transatlantic ties;

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they use the race problem, the death penalty, differences over the
environment, mistreatment of prisoners, as if aberrations reflected the
total meaning of America. German foreign policy not only feels no
special obligation to support the US view, it has with increasing
frequency actively opposed it.

In American opinion, Germany has become the second most
active country opposing American designs, feeding a latent
isolationism.

It is misleading to blame these tensions on the personality of the
American president. If there is a change in the presidency, the basic
direction of foreign policy will not change though the tactics might be
more differentiated.

But this is not an occasion for recrimination. Both sides need to
rise above the mood of the moment and ask themselves whether they

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[Y]

still have a common or at least comparable global destiny. The issue
is not whether policies can be coordinated but whether a set of
common values brings about cooperation to build a world of
compatible values. To achieve this requires a kind of dialogue on
every level that is not taking place today. The world faces three major
challenges:

* militant, radical Islam, which goes under the name of terrorism;

* the rise of China and, a little later, India, which will bring about a shift in the center of gravity of world affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific;

* the emergence of a set of unprecedented challenges of global significance: proliferation of weapons of mass

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destruction, demographic changes, mass migrations,

**global health (?)**

These are accompanied by global changes such as how to bring the
globalized economic world into some relationship to the political
organization of the world into nation-states.

Whether a sense of common destiny can be developed will shape
the nature of the international order for the greater part of this
century. If Europe and the United States go their own way, the world
will look very much like [it did] before the First World War: five or six
major states adjusting their relationships on the basis of interest, with
shifting alignments as the occasion requires – only that the units will
be larger, their impact on each other more immediate, the calculations
more uncertain. The achievement of a world order based on more
universal principles should ideally start within a group of nations with

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comparable institutions, histories, and values. But to [succeed] this
requires some resolution of the debate of unilateralism vs.

multilateralism. No nation, no matter how powerful, is strong enough
to organize an international order alone. It is not a task the United
States should undertake without some international framework except
as a last resort and having exhausted all alternatives. The Bush
administration has expressed views such as these in the recent
meetings with the European Union and NATO. Another administration
would, if anything, accelerate this trend.

But an affirmation of multilateralism by itself is not enough. Too
often it is presented as a way to restrain American warlike tendencies.
To be vital, it is not a way to veto so much as an inspiration to
common action. The question thus arises to what extent the allied
leadership is still special – that is, what will they do for the relationship

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beyond the international consensus reflected at the UN. Much of
German media debate implies that the answer is "very little." But that
answer spells the slow disintegration of an allied relationship. The
debate between unilateralism and multilateralism must be resolved
with this perspective in mind. Abstract multilateralism is as
incompatible with a new relationship as abstract unilateralism. The
former absorbs purpose in a quest for a general global consensus, the
latter in overemphasis on a special national character. But NATO, to
be meaningful, needs to have a special character between these two
extremes. It must be able to define common purposes more precise
than the attainable international consensus and more embracing than
the national interest of an individual partner, however powerful.

Those who are concerned about restoring the close ties between
Germany and the United States on both sides of the Atlantic should

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[v]

therefore encourage a deepening of the dialogue between the two sides. The ultimate challenge for US foreign policy is to turn dominant power into a sense of shared responsibility; it is to conduct policy, as the Australian scholar Coral Bell has written, as if the international order were composed of many centers of power, even while we are aware of our strategic preeminence. It implies the need for a style of consultation less focused on selling immediate policy prescriptions than on achieving a common definition of threats and long-range purposes.

By the same token, Europe must resist the temptation of "distinctiveness" for its own sake. Criticism of US culture and policy has been a staple of European opponents of NATO for 50 years. What is unusual now is that governments in key countries are making no efforts to stem the tide, occasionally even stirring it up. The alliance needs a clearer declaration of what is intended by a "European" foreign

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policy and one less geared to pacifying domestic pressure groups.

Europe must be allowed scope for disagreeing with its partner. But if distinctiveness is defined by disagreement for its own sake, the global order will split into a plethora of competing nationalisms.

A topic urgently needing clarification is the issue of preemption.

The defining characteristic of the traditional international system has been fundamentally altered by contemporary ideology and technology.

That system assumed that the domestic jurisdiction of states was beyond international challenge; hence the principal threat to international stability was perceived to be the attempt to change frontiers by force of arms. Neither assumption is still valid.

Terrorist threats challenge the social cohesion, and weapons of mass destruction can alter the balance of power and threaten devastation primarily through technological developments within the

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territory of a sovereign state. In those circumstances, the potential
victims cannot wait until the threat has been implemented.

Preemption is inherent in the technology and ideology of the 21st-
century international system. At the same time, preemption cannot be
left to a single country, however powerful. Nor can it be in America's
interest to encourage every nation to define preemption in purely
national terms. The solution is to develop together some principles of
preemption.

Another subject where German-American - indeed, European-
American - cooperation could yield results is on the Palestinian-Israeli
issue. For decades the stalemate has been deepened because Europe
was perceived to champion the Palestinian side and America that of
Israel. But new objective circumstances permit envisaging how the
two positions can become closer. Israel has implied that settlements

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beyond the security wall are negotiable, the security wall is brought
into a relationship to the 1967 frontiers, and some compensatory
territory from present-day Israel can be discussed. An effort to
develop a common European/American position as part of a
reinvigorated peace process surely deserves exploration.

Beyond these stand-bys of traditional diplomacy, a host of other
issues is waiting: proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; the
implications of demographic changes; the relationship of economic to
political globalization.

National leaders could make a major contribution by working out
an agenda of topics on which some common understandings would be
helpful. But political leaders will not have the time to devote to such a
broad agenda. Consideration should be given to the model of
bipartisan commissions that have, on the whole, worked well in

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America. On a number of these topics, commissions of respected men
and women might at least restore the habits of cooperation and, who
knows, come up with some useful suggestions.

A concluding personal word: the German counterpart to this
article is being written by Helmut Schmidt, my colleague, friend, and
teacher for half a century. If he runs true to form, he will scold the
United States for many mistakes. As usual, I will agree with much of
what he writes (which I [will] not have seen) and disagree with some
of his views. But I will always know that we work for common goals.
Old men, such as Helmut and I, run the danger of turning nostalgic.
But they have the advantage that they have seen many issues that
once aroused passion evaporate, and they develop some sense for the
permanent. This is why I have heard Helmut often say that reliability

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is the most important quality in a human being and in a nation. And it
is that confidence that he and I are jointly dedicated to restore.

Henry A. Kissinger

The ‘Made
In Berlin’
Generation

Germany's rift with the United States goes deeper than
American unilateralism and disagreement over Iraq policy.

REUTERS

The Washington Post
Wednesday,

October 30, 2002

German-American relations have been
thrown into crisis by the way Germa-
ny's election campaign was conducted
by its governing party. Other allies have
had reservations about American policy on Iraq.
None has chosen the road of confrontation.

The cause for this sudden deterioration is complex. Some ascribe the quite unexpected shift of German policy to electoral opportunism. But Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's motives are not the issue. For the anti-American campaign clearly appealed to a constituency large enough to transform Schroeder's expected defeat into victory. Hence a kind of anti-Americanism may have become a permanent temptation of German politics.

This is especially painful for those of us who actively nurtured what we consider one of the proudest achievements of American postwar foreign policy: the return of Germany to the community of nations as an equal, respected and indispensable member. It was a journey marked by the Berlin airlift; the Marshall Plan; support for Germany's membership in NATO and the European Community; close cooperation in two major Berlin crises; American support (overcoming initial doubts) for German reconciliation with the East; American leadership in negotiating a final agreement on access to Berlin; and, finally, unconditional American support for German unification despite the hesitations of other allies, not to speak of the Soviet Union. Germany's contribution was the courageous decision to postpone unification, when Stalin offered it in return for Germany's rejection of NATO, and its decision instead to tie its future to European unity and Atlantic partnership.

The forging of a common destiny did not prevent occasional disagreements regarding specific policies. But up to now they were based on differing interpretations of, and responses to, unchallenged common interests. This explains the shock when, without warning or consultation, an election issue was made of American policy on Iraq. German participation in a military conflict with Iraq was rejected and the use of German bases proscribed, even if action is backed by a U.N. vote and whatever the other members of the European Union or NATO might decide—despite the fact that no request for a German military contribution had been made or was likely to be made. This dramatic gesture was proclaimed in behalf of a so-called German way, explicitly defined as being “made in Berlin,” challenging the twin pillars of Germany’s postwar foreign policy: the Atlantic alliance and European unity.

This was accompanied by sharp official criticism of a speech by Vice President Cheney and of the alleged unilateral tactics of President Bush. The comparison of President Bush's domestic methods to those of Hitler by a cabinet minister was an aberration, but it grew out of a mood that had been deliberately fostered. A leading official of the Social Democratic Party compared the American ambassador to the Soviet special representative to East Germany, Pyotr Abrasimov; others described American policies as Caesarean. And the tone deafness vis-à-vis American sensitivities continued after the election when the newly designated state secretary in the German Foreign Ministry, Klaus Schärioth, described the new American strategic doctrine released by the White House as reminiscent of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

The impact of this campaign on the German electorate is shown by the fact that Schroeder's opposition, the historically pro-American Christian Democratic Union, went reluctantly along with the refusal of military cooperation and of the use of NATO military bases located in Germany. This suggests that the causes of the existing rift go deeper than electoral opportunism, American unilateralism and disagreement over Iraq policy.

The end of the Cold War has removed the fear of a common danger. For four decades, German governments treated the American alliance as the key to German security and to the political legitimacy of the new Germany. Today there is no sense of overriding danger, and Germany rightly no longer feels the need to pay a price to vindicate its legitimacy. Thus the issue of Iraq has become a pretext for a reorientation of German foreign policy in a more national direction.

The generation that created the German-American relationship is passing from the scene. On the American side, its members came from the Eastern Establishment, leavened by some émigrés. On the German side, the postwar leaders had decisively turned away from a past in which Germany had overreached, partly as a result of totalitarianism but even before that because of an inability to establish national priorities that related Germany's aims to its capabilities.

(over)

Page 2

The new leadership groups that have emerged on both sides of the Atlantic have not shared the experience of the war and of postwar reconstruction. They are either not preoccupied with foreign dangers or, to the extent that they are, believe themselves capable of dealing with them easily. The Atlantic Alliance, once the centerpiece of policymaking, now concentrates on expanding its membership and thus an extending its reach without redefining its purpose. In the United States, the political center of gravity has shifted to regions whose representatives have fewer personal connections with Europe and less experience with its challenges than their predecessors, who created the postwar structure. And they govern in a United States that enjoys unquestionable military supremacy and has reinterpreted its approach to alliances.

As the victim of 9/11 and as the dominant military power, America feels itself responsible for global security. But in Europe, the focus is on domestic politics rather than on international affairs. European leaders spend an enormous amount of their time on the technicalities of European unification—an arcane subject for most American leaders. This emphasis on bureaucratic, constitutional and legalistic arrangements contrasts with a United States that emphasizes its exceptional character and the applicability of its institutions to the rest of the world.

Germany is challenged by these realities in an especially acute fashion. It achieved national unity later than any European country and acquired its present dimensions and structure only a little more than 10 years ago. It therefore has less of a tradition of global foreign policy than the other major countries of Western Europe. Its domestic problems are more severe. It is governed by a coalition whose leaders had their formative experience in the protest against American policy on Vietnam, even participating in some of its more violent phases. In the early post-World War II period, Germany's governing party, the SPD, advocated unity over NATO and overthrew one of its chancellors, Helmut Schmidt, because he was willing to place NATO missiles on German soil. And its coalition partner, the Greens, opposed all military ties to the West until it entered office. To be sure, farsighted leadership in both coalition parties enabled them to govern with programs sustaining Atlantic ties, if not with passion at least on the basis of realistic assessment. But it did leave a residue on the left wing of each governing party, which could be mobilized by appeals to traditional anti-Americanism.

This situation is compounded by the special psychological condition of the eastern part of Germany. East Germany was liberated as much by Western pressure as by the actions of its own internal resistance. And its economic and political reconstruction has taken place under West German aegis. As a result, the East German population takes less pride in economic accomplishments, is more conscious of lingering unemployment and is less tied to the Atlantic Alliance than the populations of, say, Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary, which, also being more afraid of Russia, veer more toward the United States. East Germany went from Nazism to communism without any experience of democracy. Its population tends to view itself as victims of history and, to some extent, of Western globalism. It is not familiar with Western strategic or geopolitical views and seeks its security in an abstract moralism veering toward pacifism, which enables it to feel superior to its powerful ally.

Foreign policy expert Karsten Voigt, in charge of American relations in Germany's foreign office, summed up this new attitude: "We do what makes sense to us; we do nothing with whose substance we disagree." Foreign policy rarely permits such absolute distinctions, however. No country should be asked to act against its interests or its notions of common sense. But Germany, located in the center of the continent, cannot afford a foreign policy that makes no allowance for the views of other societies—and especially of close allies. At the end of the German election campaign, the margin of victory may well have been supplied by a combination of pacifism, left and right nationalism, and an evocation of a specifically German way reminiscent of Wilhelmine Germany. For if Germany can affront the United States, reject U.N. views and act without consultations with the other nations of Europe in the name of a "German way"—"made in Berlin," in the chancellor's words—self-righteous isolation beckons for Germany and a return to pre-World War I conditions for Europe.

The experience of recent months has shaken the nations of Europe almost as much as the United States—though for reasons of geographic proximity they are less ready to say so openly. The nations of Eastern Europe in need of finding a home in a united Europe reemphasize ties to America as the ultimate safety anchor. The nations of Western Europe are taking another look at the previous tendency to seek Europe's identity in distinction from the United States. There is therefore wide scope for a creative American diplomacy. This must include a serious commitment to the rebuilding of the relationship with Germany. Germany is too important to Europe and the Atlantic relationship to let policy be based on recrimination.

The issue is not to bridge differences over Iraq—Germany should find its own approach with respect to this issue without American pressure or persuasion. Clearly some confidence has been lost. Still, the environment will produce enough situations in which both sides can test their ability to develop common approaches, and not only in the Middle East—especially as Germany assumes the chairmanship of the U.N. Security Council in February. A sober, realistic approach on both sides is indicated. A major effort should be made to deal with the conditions from which the explosive mix of the German electoral period emerged. Both sides should take seriously the other's concern regarding unilateralism. They should try to answer together the basic issues of the direction of the Atlantic alliance, the relations of Europe and America, the rebuilding of a united Europe, and a definition of the German way that draws the appropriate lessons from history.

During the 20th century, the West tore itself apart over problems importantly revolving around Germany. The United States, its allies and the new German government have an obligation to dedicate themselves to making sure that history does not repeat itself.

*The writer, a former secretary of state, is president of Kissinger Associates, an international consulting firm.*

© 2002 Tribune Media Services International

The Washington Post
Tuesday, December 10, 2002

Henry A. Kissinger

# A Dangerous Divergence

NATO was created more than a half-century ago to protect its members against the threat of aggression, specifically a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. That threat having disappeared for the foreseeable future, NATO is not so much expanding as transforming itself into a different institution. It has become more akin to a collective security organization, like the United Nations, than to a traditional alliance. An alliance defines a casus belli, a dividing line and a specific set of obligations; it assumes an unambiguous threat. Collective security organizations define the threat from case to case and negotiate the method of resistance, if any, in light of circumstances. The various Berlin crises of the Cold War were dealt with in an alliance mode; the anti-terror campaign launched in September 2001 has been handled as a collective security matter, with our allies acting in their national capacities from case to case. NATO as an institution has not been involved.

This tacit transformation creates two potential fiscals within the alliance: between Eastern and Western Europe, and between Europe and the United States. NATO expansion would have proceeded much more grudgingly, if at all, had the European nations still believed in a Russian threat or the possibility of a nuclear war over NATO's new frontiers—in other words, if our European allies had considered the alliance more needed. Moreover, most of Western Europe views Russian membership in NATO as only a matter of time. Meanwhile, a sort of halfway house has been arranged, giving Russia access to the NATO consultative machinery and weakening the purpose of the alliance for many of its new members.

For the attitude of the nations now entering NATO is much the same as the attitude of Western Europe during NATO's infancy. Having lived under Russian rule for decades, the new members see in NATO the instrument to prevent a recurrence of aggression or pressure from the East. Unlike some of their partners from Western Europe, they do not consider NATO a potential brake on American impetuosity; they seek to strengthen America's international commitments, not to restrain them.

Similarly, the new international environment alters the relationship between Europe and the United States. So long as there was a uniform perception of threat, Europe had an incentive to keep up its defense expenditures, though even then, its domestic outlays always exceeded its security spending. But in the absence of such a shared perception, European nations increasingly subordinate defense expenditures to domestic priorities. At the same time, the massive U.S. defense effort does not bolster allied cohesion, for it is widely perceived in Europe to be designed to deal with contingencies not related to European interests. Indeed, it magnifies the fear of many in Europe that the world is becoming unipolar while Europe would prefer it be multipolar.

Recognizing these trends, the Bush administration has abandoned pressures for increasing the overall European defense effort. Instead, it has concentrated on the creation of a relatively small intervention force of 20,000 under the NATO institutional umbrella to confront threats that used to be considered "out of area."

BY MARK WEBER

> If European distinctiveness is defined by disagreement for its own sake, Western civilization is on the road to destroying its substance, as it did in the first half of the 20th century.

But the future of NATO depends less on its military structure than on the ability of its members to develop common political purposes. And therein lies reason for profound concern. European media and some political figures continue to present the United States as the land of the death penalty, rapacious capitalism, unilateral diplomacy and a cowboy mentality. The psychological gulf was evident when, at last month's NATO summit in Prague, so staunch an advocate of Atlantic ties as Czech President Vaclav Havel asked for understanding of "the occasional insensitivity, clumsiness or self-importance that may come with this [global] responsibility." Even the consensus on Iraq at the Prague summit will face a moment of truth when there is a need to define what constitutes a material breach of U.N. resolutions and what remedies are appropriate.

At the same time, many in the United States see Europe as a region of incipient neutrality, freeing on U.S. defense capabilities and seeking to protect its security by substituting multilateralism for alliance responsibilities. There is a growing insistence on having the United States act as the sole arbiter of the global interest. These attitudes are at the heart of the dispute that goes under the heading of multilateralism vs. unilateralism.

The slogans obscure the underlying reality, which concerns the relative importance to be given to domestic and foreign policy. Europeans are no more willing than Americans to subordinate their perception of vital national interests to multilateralism in the abstract—witness their behavior with respect to the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union. But they define their vital interests in more parochial terms and regard global issues as matters that can be used to gain the support of national constituencies. In this way, European multilateralism often merges with new forms of self-righteous, morbidly nationalistic nationalism.

(over)

21/07/2004 17:22

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ZEIT

WOCHENZEITUNG FÜR POLITIK • WIRTSCHAFT • WISSEN • KULTUR UND Leben

Te Honorable
Dr. Henry Kissinger
350 Park Avenue
Twenty-Sixth Floor
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Fax: 001 212/ 759 0042

JUN 22 2004

Dr. Theo Sommer
Editor-at-Large

21. July 2004

Dear Henry,

you have yourself frequently lamented the current state of German-
American and American-European relations – and for good reason.

Many Germans with unquestionable Atlantic credentials are extremely
unhappy about this situation. We have now decided to do something
about it. The idea is to publish a monthly German paper for Americans –
the *Atlantic Times*. It will be put together in Berlin, printed in New
York, and distributed to 20 000 opinion-leaders all over the States.

The publisher is an old friend of mine, Detlef Prinz, a Berlin
entrepreneur, consultant and media figure. I myself will act as *Herausgeber*, with Rafael Seligmann and Bruno Waltert as Editors.

The project has the enthusiastic backing of Walther Leisler Kiep, Beate
Lindemann and Arend Oetker; of Ambassador Ischinger, Deutsche Bank,
Jürgen Schrempp and many others. They all feel that it is high time to
mend our fences.

According to our present plans, the first issue will be presented to the
public on October 6 at a big party in Washington thrown by Ambassador
Ischinger.

I would like very much to recruit you as a contributor for our Nr. 1.
Helmut Schmidt has graciously consented to write a piece entitled
"A word to our American friends". Would you find it possible to write a
complementary column "A word to our German friends"? The idea is to
have two old and trusted hands tell each other and our respective publics

Zeitwürdiges Gerd Buecker's GmbH & Co. KG

DIE ZEIT, Presse-ub. Spessort 1. 20095 Hamburg, Telefon: 040 / 32 80-0

E-Mail: DieZeit@post.de Internet: www.zeit.de Handelsgespräch Hamburg, MRA 91 128 Umschriften DE-39142459

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# The Atlantic Times
Eine Zeitung aus Deutschland für die USA

Der Verleger

Ab Oktober 2004 soll in wichtigen Städten der USA, vorrangig in Washington und New York, jeden Monat einmal und in englischer Sprache *The Atlantic Times* erscheinen. Als Herausgeber habe ich Herrn Dr. Theo Sommer, Hamburg, gewinnen können. Ihm liegt - wie mir - viel daran, Brücken über den Atlantik zu schlagen.

Ziel von *The Atlantic Times* ist es vor allem, in Politik und Wirtschaft der USA deutsche und europäische Sichtweisen besser bekanntzumachen. Nicht durch Arbeiten mit PR-Einschlag, sondern durch qualifizierte Beiträge unabhängiger Autoren - seien sie angesehene Journalisten oder sonst allgemein hochgeschätzte Persönlichkeiten. *The Atlantic Times* wird sich als überparteiliche und unabhängige Monatspublikation beweisen.

Für Sie als Autor in Stichworten weitere Informationen zu *The Atlantic Times*:

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The Atlantic Times

* Verleger: Detlef Prinz, Berlin

* Herausgeber: Dr. Theo Sommer

* Chefredaktion: Dr. Rafael Seligmann und Bruno Waltert

* Druck in New York

* Finanzierung ausschließlich über Anzeigen und über Abonnements.
Öffentliche Mittel irgendwelcher Art werden zur Finanzierung nicht verwendet

* The Atlantic Times hat einen Redaktionsbeirat, dem vor allem führende Persönlichkeiten aus der deutschen Wirtschaft angehören

Detlef Prinz

Verleger The Atlantic Times

Berlin, 14. Juli 2004