TELCORN

Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973

6:40 a.m.

K: Where did we get you?

D: At home.

K: Are you in Maryland.

D: I am in the Embassy.

K: We have information from the Israelis that the Arabs and Syrians are planning an attack within the next 6 hours and that your people are evacuating civilians from Damascus and Cairo.

D: Syrians and who?

K: And Egypt are planning and attack within the next 6 hours.

D: Yes.

K: And that your people are evacuating some civilians from Damascus and Cairo.

D: Yes.

K: And they want us to tell all interested parties that if the reason is that you are expecting an Israeli attack -- not you -- there is no intention of any attack.

D: What was the last phrase?

K: They have no intention of attacking.

D: Israelis?

K: Have no intention of attacking, if your motives for attacking are defensive. If there is attack they will react very strongly and violently.

D: Yes.

K: I want to add a United States world to this.

D: They asked you to tell us this?

*

Oct. 6, 1973

6:40 a.m.

K: They asked us to tell this. I have just received this message from the Israelis.

D: This is what they said.

K: That is correct.

D: (Unable to hear)

K: The Israelis are telling us that Egypt and Syria are planning an attack very shortly and that your people are evacuating from Damascus and Cairo.

D: Yes.

K: If the reason for your evacuation...

D: For our...

K: Yes. The Soviet evacuation is the fear of an Israeli attack, then the Israelis are asking us to tell you as well as asking us to tell the Arabs.

D: The Israelis?

K: Yes. They have no plans whatever to attack.

D: Yes.

K: But if the Egyptians and Syrians do attack the Israeli response will be extremely strong.

D: Yes.

K: But the Israelis will be prepared to cooperate in an easing of military tension.

D: What?

K: Cooperation in an easing of military tension.

D: Yes

*

-3-

Oct. 6, 1973

6:40 a.m.

K: All right. From us to you. The President believes that you and we have a special responsibility to restrain our respective friends.

D: Yes.

K: We are urging communicating to the Israelis.

D: You?

K: Yes.

D: Communicate to the Israelis?

K: If this keeps up this is going there is going to be a war before you understand my message.

D: I understand. You have communicated with the Arabs and Israelis.

K: Yes and particularly to Israeli warning it against a precipitated move.

D: I understand.

K: And we hope you might do the same thing and use your influence to the greatest extent possible with your friends.

D: Just a minute. This is the end of message.

K: That is right. I would like to tell you as you no doubt -- that this is very important for our relationship that we do not have an explosion in the Middle East right now.

D: What is our relationship?

K: Until an hour ago I did not take it seriously but we have now received an urgent phone call from Jerusalem saying the Israelis believe it will happen within six hours and they are mobilizing.

D: Who? Israelis? Don't you think the Israelis are trying to do something on their own.

F 012958
AM-

D: 07/14/94

*

-4-

Oct. 6, 1973

6:40 a.m.

K: If it is, we are telling them not to do it. I cannot judge it. As of yesterday, our evaluation was that the Egyptians and Syrians were making military preparations but we thought another one of those bluffs. You understand?

D: I understand.

K: As of yesterday, Israelis had made no preparations that we had picked up but as you know they can move fast.

D: I understand and I will transmit this message. I will do it and take all measures necessary.

K: You can assure Moscow we are taking most urgent messages with Israel.

D: I understand and will do it right away. You are where?

K: I am in New York.

D: Very good. I can reach you.

K: Yes. On Chile -- never mind you had better get your message off.

D: Could we use the...

K: Use the White House. Use the hotline and I will tell Scowscroft.

D: On ordinary phone. The military you will tell.

K: Are you coming to the White House.

D: Could I call through the ordinary phone.

K: Certainly. Can Scowscroft get you on the direct line?

D: Yes.

K: On the line that goes to my office. We will move immediately.

D: Thank you very much.

END

*

TELCOM
Min. Shalev/Sec. Kissinger
Oct. 6, 1973
6:55 a.m.

S: Good morning.

K: How are you?

S: All right.

K: We have a report from Keating that you people are expecting military
operations in about six hours.

S: Yes.

K: First of all I must tell you should have come in with your message
yesterday. You should not have relied on doing it in Washington when
I am here.

S: I did not have it at that time. They told me you would not be able
to see me anymore.

K: You must be kidding. Let's not worry about that.

S: Did you not get the message.

K: Yes, but very late at night.

S: We announced fifteen minutes ago that we have taken precautionary
measures and instituting alert of the army which includes mobilization
of some troops.

K: I want to say the following. We are in touch with the Soviet and
the Egyptians uring the utmost restraint. Dobrynin has said they will
cooperate with us. We are setting up special communications. We
would like to urge you not to take any pre-emptive action because the
situation will get very serious if you move.

S: Yes.

K: If you could communicate this.

S: I will do this immediately.

K: We will keep you informed of any responses and of any conversa-
tions we have. You stand by your phone.

END.

Telcon

October 6, 1973; 7:00 a.m.

Foreign Minister (Egypt) Zayad HAK

K: Mr. Foreign Minister, sorry to disturb you. We have had a report, which does seem very reliable, and an appeal from the Israelis to the effect that your forces and the Syrian forces are planning attacks within the next several hours.

Z: Several hours?

K: Yes. We have been in touch with the Israelis. The Israelis have asked us to tell you of the seriousness and that they have no intention of attacking, so that if your preparations are caused by fear of an Israeli attack, they are groundless.

Z: Yes.

K: And on the other hand, if you are going to attack, they will take extremely strong measures. This is a message I am passing to you from Israel. I want to tell you I have just called the Israeli Minister and I have told him that if Israel attacks first we would take a very serious view of the situation and have told him on behalf of the United States that Israel must not attack, no matter what they think the provocation is.

Now, I would like to ask you, Mr. Foreign Minister, to communicate this to your Government.

Z: I will do that.

K: Urgently. And to ask them on our behalf to show restraint at a time when we are at least beginning to...

Z: I will do this immediately although I am very apprehensive that this is a pretext on the Israeli part.

K: If it is a pretext we will take a strong measure against them.

Z: Thanks for calling, and I will take care of this.

K: All right, Mr. Minister.

TELCOM
Yedanov/Sec. Kissinger

Oct. 6, 1973

7:25 a.m.

K: I know the Ambassador is talking to Moscow. I want him to have some information. Make sure he does not get off the line until we are through. We have just been given an assurance by Israel that at our request they would not launch a pre-emptive attack.

Y: Yes. I see.

K: And we would like Moscow to know this and we would like Moscow to use their influence with Egypt and Syria in this same direction.

Y: O.K.

K: We have assurances behind which we stand.

Y: Yes.

K: All right.

Y: Thank you. I will report to the Ambassador.

END

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E 01/29/73</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 09/29/73</td></tr></table>

Telcon
Roy Atherton/ HAK NYC

October 6, 1973:7:30 a.m.

A: Received a report from Ambassador Keating, speaking to Mrs. Meir a few hours ago. The central thing is she asked that we pass the following message to the Egyptians and to the Soviets:

Israel is not planning to attack Syria and Egypt and is deploying its forces in case of foreign attack and on a contingency basis has called up some reserves. Israel is well aware of the militant feeling of the Egyptians and Syrians. If they attack they will lose although the attacker can cause damage to Israel, which Israel wishes to avoid.

Israel will not repeat not launch an attack, noting that Israel would successfully defend itself if attacked, she emphasized that the Israeli Government wishes to avoid bloodshed.

K: When did we get that?

A: It just arrived on the basis of a meeting the Ambassador had with her at a meeting earlier today.

K: That is the most important part of it. Get it over to Scowcroft right away. And, Roy, can you hush the thing up as tight as we can?

A: Yes, we will do that.

K: And I will get the piece shut up in my shop. OK, thank you.

TELCON
Zayat/Sec. Kissinger

Oct. 6, 1973

7:35 a.m.

K: Sorry to bother you again. I want to keep you informed. I have had
a reply from the Israelis to my request not to initiate any military
operations. They have given formal assurance they will not launch attack
nor initiate military operations. I want to tell you if they break this
promise to us we will take the most serious view.

Z: Thank you. This seems like what happened in 1967. Because
Russians were telling us there was a concentration on the frontier.

K: Are the Russians telling of this concentration?

Z: Yesterday someone from the Delegation told us that there was
concentration on the Syrian front.

K: That is why we should learn from 1967. We now have an Israeli
promis they will not launch a pre-emptive attack and we are giving
you all the information we have. We are doing the utmost to get
restraint by them.

Z: I am sending this by cable and by phone.

K: If you need any more let us know.

Z: We have good communications.

K: We will tell people to get your calls through immediately.

Z: Thank you.

K: I appreciate the spirit with which you are dealing with us on this.
You can be sure we are doing our utmost to prevent a repetition of
1967. If Israel takes pre-emptive attack after this assurance from
them we would oppose them.

Z: May I ask how you are contacting. Is Eban here?

K: The Israeli Ambassador in Washington. His communications
are better. I am now going to contact Eban. Between you and me
connections between the Ambassador and Meir are better than
between Eban. We think speed is more important than protocol.

Z: I see.

RECLAIMED

Author: EO 12958
Date: 06/24/94

D. A. Kissinger

TELCORN

Shaley/Sec. Kissinger

Oct. 6, 1973

7:45 a.m.

K: We have passed the word to the Soviets that you are not planning any pre-emptive moves, and that we have your assurances. We have certain responsibilities if the Israeli's cave.

S: Yes.

K: We are in facilitating communications with the Egyptians to Cairo. The Soviets have talked to Moscow on some of our lines.

S: What about the Syrians.

K: We have no means of communicating with them. The Soviets will have to do that. I may send someone to the Syrian Embassy.

S: Good. I have passed on the other message. I am at your disposal.

K: Good. You can be certain you will be informed of all we do.

END

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E 01285 8</td></tr><tr><td>Subject: ANKARA Doc 6/24/73</td></tr></table>

TELCOM

Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

Oct. 6, 1973

7:47 a.m.

D: I have talked to Gromyko and I sent your message.

K: Have you seen the messages we gave you.

D: Not yet.

K: Not in your hands?

D: No.

K: If I kill some people and get the bodies to you can you get them out of the city.

D: HA.HA.HA.

K: You got the message we have Israeli assurance no pre-emptive attack.

D: Yes. I already have passed that along.

K: The messages that are coming to you are overtaken by events.

D: I have already passed your message and Scowcroft to Moscow.

K: So you are up to date. I have talked to the Egyptian For. Min. and passed on the Israeli message to him. I have also told him about the Israeli assurance that there would be no pre-emptive attack and that we will see to it that that is carried out. He told me he would communicate this urgently to Cairo. We have not been in touch with the Syrians. That is the weak point in this situation.

D: I understand.

K: Our influence in Syria is not as good as it is in Jerusalem.

D: I understand.

RECLASSIFIED

Original

Date 06/29/94

Author: E012958

D: AYAKA Dae

TELCOM

Howe/Sec. Kissinger

Oct. 6, 1973

7:51 a.m.

K: When I ask you to do something, it must be done that second. We have asked that two messages go to the Soviet Embassy and they have not gotten there yet.

H: I will look into it.

K: Get these people off their behinds. What conceivable reason not to have them sent there yet.

H: I don't know unless they have to be sanitized.

K: That is a zerox problem as I understand it.

H: I will take care of it.

K: I want them there and in there hands and a report back.

END.

<table><tr><td>DECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author:</td><td>E 012858</td></tr><tr><td>Date:</td><td>10/24/73</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

Zayat/Sec. Kissinger

Oct. 6, 1973

8:15 a.m.

K: I am getting to be your good friend.

Z: Hope you will stay such.

K: No question about it.

Z: I could not get the President. He is in operation room. I got
this following information. At 6:00 this mornign there was some
navy units and airplane units -- Israelis took some provocation
on the Egyptian borders. We have actually tried to repell them and
are doing so.

K: Did they try to cross the Canan?

Z: In the Gulf of Suez; a maritime action supported by planes. This
is in our territory. It is far way from the Syrian borders and the
Suez Canal. There is a first communique which has been published.

K: Are these Israeli naval units.

Z: He said naval action supported by plans. I don't know exactly.
I have asked for more information. Apparently this military contact
is happening in Egyptian waters in Zafara and Sukhna. Far from the
Suez Canal. South of Canal.

K: O.K.

Z: I see from the Israelis here are calling a meeting of For. Ministers.

K: As I told you we will oppose any Israeli offensive action by anyone
else.

Z: I got your message.

K: I will work on this immediately. I would urge in the meantime to
show restraint as much as possible and to confine any action to the
place where it has started.

TELCORN

Oct. 6,
8:15 a.m.

Z: Inside Egypt is a bit difficult.

K: If inside Egypt, of course you will want to repell and we are not
urging not to defend your territory but to try to confine and we will
get to Israelis immediately. We will set up if you want to we will
arrange communications to Cairo if you want to get in touch immediately.

Z: I have told them. What kind of communications?

K: Commander Howe will call you or call one of your assistants and
tell you how to have very quick communications.

Z: He should call our Ambassador Meguid.

K: We will contact him and tell him how to get fast communications.
Give my warm regards and we will do what we can.

END

TELCON
Eban/Kissinger

Oct. 6, 1973

8:25 a.m.

K: I have talked this morning since we have received a number of reports. Are you aware of the message given to us last night?

E: Yes. I received a message to the effect of this and what we fear they may be up to both in the North and South. Three hours ago, I was told to stand by and there would be further details.

K: I want to bring you up to day on what I have done this morning. I received a call at 6:00 this morning from Amb. Keating that he had been told there were these authentic reports and urging us to use our influence. I called first the Russians and tole them to use maximum restraint and we established communications for them to Moscow. I have called the Egyptian For. Min. and urged maximum restraint on him. We received a message from the Prime Min. through Amb. Keating in which she assured him the Israelis were taking no pre-emptive attacks. I passed this along to the Egyptians as well as to the Soviets and tole them this was our very urgent recommendation to the Israelis and we were happy to have these assurances and in these circumstances even greater restraint is needed. We set up communications for the Egyptian to Cairo. He has talked to Ismail. He tells me naval action in the Gulf of Suez. If that is the case it would be very unfortunate; it is inside Egyptian waters.

E: What is the naval action.

K: Shooting. Israelis -- air and naval attacks. Given the urgency of the situation, I thought I should talk to you about it. If your people are doing this they will know where it is. I must urge you strongly not to have any Israeli operations in these circumstances.

E: That surprises me. We have assurances of no pre-emptive attacks. Where can I reach you.

K: You can reach me at the Waldorf. If those are busy call the WH.

E: I will be in touch.

K: We are passing all of your information routinely to Washington.

E: Since we are here I would be happy to be in touch with you.

K: Fine.

E: Any information we will pass to you. We will take no initiative without telling you. END

Telcon
Minister Shalev (Israel)/ HAK
October 6, 1973; 8:29 a.m.

S: Just had a call from Jerusalem that while ______ was in session news was received that hostilities were opened by the Egyptians and by the Syrians. Apparently mainly by aerial bombardment along the borders.

K: I have had a call from the Egyptians saying you were undertaking naval actions on the Gulf of Suez on the Egyptian side.

S: Well, I don't know about that.

K: It has not in the past been your preferred method of operations.

S: No.

K: It is not how in the past you have started things. What are you doing?

S: I presume we are taking care about that.

K: Again I would like to urge the greatest possible restraint.

S: I think you have assurances from us that we are not going to open, but it looks that they have already opened.

K: Do you know what has happened?

S: No. This whole thing started only 20 minutes ago.

K: Will you please keep me informed?

S: I will do so.

11-N

TELCON - General Al Haig, Nixon's Chief of Staff, who was
Haig/Kissinger with the President in Key Biscayne

10/6/78

8:35 a.m.

K: We may have a Middle East War going on today.

H: Really.

K: I want you to know what is happening. I am sending a report to the President and to you of the events this morning. We got a report at 6:00 this morning that Israelis were expecting Syrian and Egyptian attack within 6 hours.

H: Yes.

K: First I thought it was an Israeli trick for them to be able to launch an attack although this is the holiest day. I called the Israelis and warned them to restrain. I called the Egyptian For. Min. urging restraint. I called Dobrynin. I gave all of our communications to Dobrynin and he called Moscow. I got a return call from the Israelis giving us assurances that no pre-emptive Israeli would be taken. The Egyptian called me back to say Israelis were launching a naval attack in the Gulf of Suez and 15 mins. later a call came from the Israelis saying that the Egyptians and Syrians were bombarding all along the front and launching air attacks. Now it is not conceivable that the Israelis would launch an attack with single action in the Gulf of Suez. That has to be the prediction and all I want you to know is that we are on top of it here. You should say that the President was kept informed from 6:00 a.m. on and I will let you know what is going on.

H: Have there been any border crossings?

K: As of this moment I just know of a report from Jerusalem relayed to me by the Israeli minister. -- Air attacks all along the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. I don't know what Israeli counter action is. I have a report from the Egyptian that Israeli naval units are shelling them in the Gulf of Suez and they will be driving them off.

H: What is your view of the Soviet attitude?

K: My view is that they are trying to keep it quiet and they are surprised.

H: Do you believe that?

K: Yes. I think it is to insane for them to have started it.

UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED ON 9/9/03 by
NARA on the recommendation of the
NSC under provisions of E.O. 12958

DECLASSIFIED

8/9/1978
An-ASA Date 07/04/78

TELCORN

Haig
10/6/73

8:35 a.m.

-2-

H: You never know. A lot of difficulties here.

K: That is the one factor. I think our domestic situation has invited
this. I think what may have happened is the Soviets told the Egyptians,
that there will not be any
SANITIZED
progress unless there is stirring in the Middle East and those maniacs
have stirred a little too much. It looks to me now that the Israelis
are certainly going to hit back hard. They have already partially
mobilized. Probably, I will be going back to Washington and will decide
in a few hours. I am having Scowscroft call a WSAG meeting. We are
locating the 6th Fleet. No two ships are in any one place. It will
probably take us a week to round up the sailors. We will have to move it by
tomorrow if something is going on.

H: O.K. Henry.

K: Don't let Ziegler shoot off at the mouth without our known. Your
position is that the President is on top of the situation and getting
regular reports, from the UN (New York) this morning. We have
nothing further to say. If there are any announcements to be made
I will check with you as to whether they should be made from here
or the White House.

H: I will say the President received a report at 6:00.

K: Say 6:30. Say I have been in contact with all of these people and
we will give no comment. We have sent message to Saudi Arabia and
Jordan and urged them to restrain.

H: O.K.

K: You stay near the phone. If you are with the President tell the
switch board to put me through.

END

RECLASSIFIED
Author: EO 12958
Date: 10/6/73
D. A. Harra Date: 10/6/73

Telcon

NYC

Secretary General (UN) Waldheim/ HAK

October 6, 1973; 8:40 a.m.

K: Mr. Secretary General, I wanted to report to you about some events that have happened this morning that may conceivably get out of control. I received a call at 6 this morning from our Ambassador in Jerusalem that the Israelis believed that an attack by Egypt and Syrian forces was imminent, and since then I have been on the phone with the Israeli Foreign Minister, with the Egyptian Foreign Minister several times to urge maximum restraint on all parties and I have received word from the Israelis that they would not launch preemptive action. The Egyptians called back and said there was an Israeli naval attack taking place in the Gulf of Suez which was not the usual method of Israeli attack. As soon as I hung up from that I received a message from the Israelis that Egyptian and Syrian air attacks were going on all along the fronts. No troops had yet crossed at least. This is what I know as of this moment and I just wanted to talk to you and express our cooperation that we are attempting to establish.

W: Thank you very much.

K: I don't know what action is called for yet. I think we should try to calm the situation as much as possible, but it may get out of hand. What would be helpful if you could contact the Syrians before you contact the Egyptians.

Executive and the Foreign Minister

W: I was sitting next to the Syrian/Minister/yesterday, but they did not say anything about this.

K: I was sitting next to the Egyptian Foreign Minister yesterday but he did not say anything.

W: I will contact you again if there is anything further.

K: Thank you, and let's stay in touch.

W: Will you stay here?

K: I will stay for another couple of hours.

W: I shall immediately try to contact these two nations, but I don't know whether I shall be able. Thank you very much for your information.

K: Goodbye.

Telcon NYC
Abba Eban, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs/Sec. Kissinger

October 6, 1973; 8:50 a.m.

E: I got a message a quarter of an hour ago at least that the Syrians attacked at 2 o'clock with artillery and bombs in Golan and Schmona from Syria then, and the next news was that the Egyptians also an air attack on the Canal at a place called in Sinai, and attempts on their part to cross the Canal.

K: Do you have any reports on your reactions yet?

E: No, This was the first news I got.

K: I have a report from the Egyptians alleging that you started everything with a naval attack near Syria near some oil fields.

E: We have nothing on that.

K: I don't myself believe that you would start a general war with a naval attack in one place, but you always do surprising things. Could you get me the facts?

E: They said the first move was a naval attack?

K: They claim the first move...

E: South of the Suez.

K: South of the Canal. The Egyptian Foreign Minister called me and gave me a name but it was an Arabic name. If you were attacking some place you presumably knew where it was.

E: Yes. That is not at all convincing. The news preceding this - there was a very wild exodus of Soviets from _____. Do you have that?

K: I have my news and I have called it to the attention of the Soviets.

E: And couldn't do so and are just leaving headlong in Syria. I have just ascertained that much.

K: The only other thing I have done since we talked is to call the Secretary General and tell him what we have done.

RECEIVED

Authorised E012958
Date 06/04/73
By: A.M. Akbar

TELCOM
Shalev/Sec. Kissinger

Sat.; Oct. 6, 1973

S: The latest I have is there is a full scale battle along the canal with the Egyptians trying to cross in our direction. They have bombed various places in Sinai. The story about a naval battle is a cover-up for their action.

K: Right. I need as many facts as you can give me on the naval battle even if it did not take place. I am quite persuaded, Mr. Minister. I know whatever actions you take will not happen because of their attack, if that is an Arab charge to cover their action. It is clear the dominant action is in the Canal and along the Golan Heights. We would appreciate as much information as possible.

S: I am passing all along that I get. I will pass it directly to you.

K: Good. I have not decided whether to stay up here or go to Washington. I will probably go to Washington during the day. You will be kept informed.

S: Thank you.

END

TELCOM
Eban/Sec. Kissinger

Saturday, October 6, 1973

E: The PM asked me to tell you that the story of naval action by us at the Gulf of Suez is false. Her Hebrew vocabulary is very rich and she poured it out. I asked about our action so far. Our reaction so far has been defensive. I presume this means going on within our area.

K: Are you going to the Security Council?

E: She asked me to wait a little but inform the Sec. General.

K: What is your view about going to the Security Council?

E: I will ask that. It is not unreasonable. If we did so, I think a point for us. I have recommended it and if accepted we should be the injured party.

K: You recommend that we do not do it.

E: So long as there is a possibility of our doing it quickly, I think it a more natural course.

K: Could you let me know. Find out about that.

E: Certainly.

END

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E. F. B. S. AIR Force</td></tr><tr><td>Date: 10/24/73</td></tr></table>

TELCORN

Dobrynin /Sec. Kissinger

Oct. 6

K: Our information is that the Egyptians and Syrians have attacked all along their fronts and also...

D: Is it the canal.

K: The Canal and the Golan Heights. Zayyat is claiming the Israelis launched a naval attack on some isolated spot in the Gulf of Suez and that triggered the whole thing.

D: I saw on a ticker they claim that Israel began attack. Zayyat told you.

K: He told me not along the Canal but in the Gulf of Suez. We are all going to have to be taking formal positions. You and I know that is baloney if they are going to attack they will not launch an attack in the Gulf of Suez and no at the key points. Not their style.

D: I understand.

K: How is it that the Syrians and Egyptians are starting at the same minute -- all along the front from the border If it started with an Israel naval attack, you and I are having a problem in how to get this stopped. We are using our maximum influence with the Israelis to show restraint. So far they tell me they have kept their response to their side of the line and that they have not made any deep penetration of Arab territory. But you no them as well as I do and it will not last much longer.

D: O.K. I will send additional message to Moscow. Really madness.

K: Total madness. I will probably come back to Washington during the day and we should meet urgently. We should, I think use this occasion to first not to have everything we have achieved destroyed by maniacs on wither side and after quieting it down to see what can be done constructively.

D: All right. Thank you very much.

END

Telcon

NYC

The President/HAK

October 6, 1973; 9:25 a.m.

P: Hello, Henry. I wanted you to know I am keeping on top of reports here. The Russians claim to be surprised.

K: The Russians claim to be surprised and my impression is that they were supposed to be surprised because apparently there has been an airlift of dependents out of the area going on for the last 2 or 3 days.

P: I agree.

K: And so our impression is that they knew about it or knew it was possible. They did not warn us.

P: What is happening now? What is the status?

K: Fighting has broken out on the Golan Heights and along the Sinai. The Egyptians claim that the Israelis had launched a naval attack in the Gulf of Suez which triggered the whole thing. That I just can't believe. Why a naval attack? The Israelis claim that so far the fighting is still mostly in Israeli territory and that they have confined themselves to defensive action. My own impression is that this one almost certainly was started by the Arabs. It is almost inconceivable that the Israelis would start on the holiest holiday for the Jews when there is no need to and there is no evidence that the Israelis launched air attacks, and they gave us an assurance which we passed on this morning that they would not launch a preemptive attack and we told the Arabs that if the Israelis launch a preemptive attack that we would oppose them and they should exercise restraint. My view is that the primary problem is to get the fighting stopped and then use the opportunity to see whether a settlement could be enforced.

P: You mean a diplomatic settlement of the bigger problem?

K: That is right. There is going to be a Security Council meeting almost certainly today and we are still debating whether we should call it or the Israelis should. Somebody has to call it in the next hour.

P: I think we should. We ought to take the initiative. Can't we get the Russians to? I think we ought to take the initiative and you ought to indicate you talked to me.

K: Let me call Dobrynin right away on that. In the debate there are going to be a lot of wild charges all over the place.

-2-

P: Don't take sides. Nobody ever knows who starts the wars out there.

K: There are two problems on the immediate thing. The long term I think it is impossible now to keep maintaining the status quo ante. On the immediate thing we have to get the Soviets drawn in on the side of the Arab group - then it would be involved. If they join us in a neutral approach in which both of us say we don't know who started it but that we want to stop it, that would be best. If they make a defense on the part of the Arabs. But first we ought to see if they will join us in a neutral approach - that will be the best.

P: Let me know what develops.

K: We have sent you a report an hour ago, but that is already overtaken. I may return to Washington today.

P: OK, thank you.

TELCORN

Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

Oct. 6,

K: I have just talked to the President and he asked me to make the
following suggestion to you. There will be undoubtedly a security
Council meeting today don't you think?

D: I think so. Because the situation is very dangerous.

K: We would be prepared to take a neutral position in the Council
as to the facts of the matter asking that we don't know who started
what but we are in favor of status quo ante.

D: Your suggestion is restoration of ceasefire line.

K: Restoration of ceasefire line and restoration of ceasing fire and
then have a fact finding commission. We are prepared to proceed with the
disussions which Gromyko and I and the President agreed on on the
settlement.

D: Outside the SC.

K: Yes.

D: Just between us.

K: Right. We are willing to look at the whole situation. Now if you take
the position that the Arabs you will have to defend the Arabs we will be
forced into the position of defending what we believe -- of making clear
we believed the Arabs launched the Attack and we are then in a hell of
a mess. It will affect a lot of our relationships.

D: I understand.

K: Moscow's constructive approach would be if we both took the position
of not the time to discuss who started what. Let's get the fighting stopped
and restore the ceasefire line and call on all parties to observe the
ceasefire line.

D: I think it is a constructive way to start.

K: We will hold up anything until we hear from you. Can you get us
a quick answer.

TELCOM
Scowcroft/Sec. Kissinger

Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973

9:50 am
S: Do you want me to send a plane there.

K: Yes. It should have been done. They will have to come up and stand-by.

S: All right.

K: Whoever kept these messages from me has a heavy responsibility. It is not often you can get a war started.

S: Have you talked to the President.

K: Yes. Have you gotten the messages to Dobrynin.

S: Yes. The messages are with him. There is a WSAG meeting in two minutes.

K: Tell them to stay quiet. Any discussion will be from Key Biscayne or McCloskey. Put the fleet into position; if we want them to move they can move; and find out how long to get them together. What reinforcements are available. Get a plan from Moorer by noon, to see what we can move if this gets out of hand and tell DOD to shut-up about military moves or anything. If they need a presidential order, I will get one for them in writing.

S: Right. I have told DOD and CIA that.

K: CIA is no problem but tell the Chiefs also. From Moorer find out what forces are available for movement throughout the Atlantic and how quickly it could be done.

S: These two carriers probably cannot get the troops back since this is a weekend.

K: Find out by noon how long it will take. Also what additional forces are available. No one is to move anything but they should get ready to move. I would not call troops back until noon. They should get themselves in a position to do it if they get the order.

END

RECLASSIFIED
Original E012858
Date 10/1/87

TELCONE

McIntyre/ Sec. Kissinger

Saturday, Oct. 6

K: I wanted to talk to you about our general state of knowledge of the Middle East problem as you undoubtedly know.

M: Yes.

K: We received an urgent call this morning from our Ambassador in Israel that they thought an attack might be imminent and they were asking us to use our influence and also to assure other interested parties they would not make a pre-emptive attack. We did that and I called the Egyptian Foreign Minister and the Soviet Ambassador, etc. Events seem to have overtaken us. Now we are consulting with various parties and seeing what time is best for a Security Council meeting. We will keep you informed about whatever conclusions we reach. We would be grateful for any conclusions you reach. We would like to get a sense of what would emerge in a SC meeting before we go into one. I am speaking to you very frankly about what we are doing.

M: Thank you very much indeed. I might mention to you that the Israeli Permanent Representative has called me not to ask for a meeting but to simply give me an outline of what happen as he understands it and too he told me he had been speaking to your Mission here and that some- consulting was going on and he promised to keep me informed likewise of anything that developed. That is where we stand. I have not heard anything from the Egyptians or other Arab representatives.

K: I had a brief talk with the Sec. Gen. to bring him up to date on what we have done. Of course, we believe this is a SC matter and not a Gen. Assembly matter.

M: Yes. Where are you speaking from ?

K: From the Waldorf. Where I was preparing a speech devoted to peace on earth if you would like to make some suggestions as to appropriate themes.

M. I shall think about it.

K: It does not have my undivided attention. One thing I did want to say, is if there is a meeting and when there is we will do our utmost and we would appreciate any help we could get to keep it at as high a level as obtainable and avoid any cheap shots. You appreciate this situation which is fraught with exaggeration and we are trying to avoid that.

-2- Oct. 6

McIntyre

M: I appreciate that very much needless to say.

K: I have no question about that. We will be in touch with you later.

M: Do you have any indication of who fired the first shot.

K: Our impression, but it is very personal, is that it is one that the Arabs started. That is our impression, that is not a considered opinion but on the external evidence the fact that it started on the holiest day plus no overwhelming fact for the Israelis to do anything now plus the fact they offered assurance they would not pre-emptive attack. We told them if they launched a pre-emptive attack we would oppose them. It leads me to believe they would have been really reckless if they launched it. It is an impression for your own personal information. Once we have decided on our position on an informal basis we may inform you of it.

M: Thank you Mr. Secretary.

K: Nice to talk to you.

END

<table><tr><td>RECLASSIFIED</td></tr><tr><td>Author: E 01295 8</td></tr><tr><td>DATE: 10/24/94</td></tr><tr><td>TO: KARA DATE</td></tr></table>

Telcon

NYC

Ron Ziegler/HAK

October 6, 1973; 10:10 a.m.

Z: I will check with you and set up the thing with McCloskey. He is with you?

K: He is with me now. What you should say is that I was awakened this morning with a message from Jerusalem that there was an attack made on them and asking for our telling all interested parties they had no intention to launch an attack. I think the best thing is not to go into the details of what happened this morning.

Z: I agree.

K: You should say we received reports on a total situation this morning in the Middle East at 6 this morning. From then on I was in touch with the President, with the Foreign Ministers of Egypt and Israel, and the President as well as with the Secretary General of the UN, and the President was kept fully informed of developments. That's what you should say.

Z: The picture is still unclear and therefore we can't expand.

K: Yes, but you have to be careful. You must not take any position that will prevent us from siding with anybody. Just say it is not yet clear what the extent of the fighting is and therefore it would be wrong, but don't make any comment on who started it.

Z: The picture is still unclear. But we will keep you informed.

K: You can also say there has been a WSAG meeting in Washington.

TELCOM
Waldheim/Sec. Kissinger

Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973

W: I wanted to tell you the following. We got confirmation from our observers in the Middle East saying about what you told me that there is heavy fighting along the Egyptian and Syrian lines. There is no fighting along the Jordanian lines. They indicated they would send more detailed reports as soon as they get more information from our observers. I had a conversation with Zayyat and he is asking for a General Assembly meeting to be convened. I told him that I doubted if it could be technically done. I doubt if we could convene so quickly. I asked him about requesting a meeting of the Security Council. For the time being he has no instructions but will send a document to us and ask for circulating of these documents.

K: Our view is that it should go to the Security Council first.

W: Exactly. I don't think the Gen. Assembly has a chance. It is not technically possible before Monday. I do feel it is a matter for the SC. I asked him this question and he said he had no instructions with this reagrd. I expressed my deep concern and told him they should do everything to calm down the situation. He got rather angry and said "We don't attack. The others do and so on."

K: Our information -- our impression is the opposite. For your personal information and do not share it with others we are talking with the Soviets to see if we can develope a common approach in the SC. Untile we have that I think if there could be a slight delay if anyone pushes for a meeting which has not been the case yet, until we get the Soviet reaction if we are draging our feet a little bit it is to get the Soviet reaction. I understand no one has asked.

W: Nobody.

K: Our point is peace and security issue and it belongs in the SC and a Gen. Assembly meeting would be frivolous and we would oppose it.

W: I rather discouraged Zayyat.

K: We would oppose it even on Monday. I want to make that clear.

W: I'm glad you are telling me.

K: We are trying to come up with a constructive SC meeting and for your personal information what we are trying to do is to see if a common approach could be developed with the Soviets for restoration

TELCON
Waldheim

-2

Oct. 6

of a ceasefire and the ceasefire lines. If that can be done someone
would call a SC meeting.

W: That would be the best approach. Hope it works. If there is
any question I will call you.

K: If you call me and this would give the two governments a chance
to concert their action.

W: Right. I think it important to keep in close contact. Don't
you think the Soviets would be afraid to do that because of their
relations with the Arabs.

K: They also have to worry if they are afraid of their relations
with us.

W: I think the approach very good and I hope for the common
approach.

K: Again speaking privately my estimate is the same as yours --
that they will not agree to it.

W: I know from my experience they are very much interested in
not doing anything which would create the impression that they are
working against the Arabs; or doing anything that would make
their relations with the Arabs negative.

K: I think it so important to try that we should give it a chance.
So far no one has asked for a meeting and we will not ask for one
until we have the Soviet reply. If you can avoid it -- I know your
position. If you can delay a meeting until we have had a Soviet
reply; if anyone should ask...

W: You mean a meeting of the Security Council?

K: Call me when you get a request and we will discuss.

W: If I get a request, I will contact you. I tried very hard to get
the Syrians information number. The Deputy PM left for London
El Zayyat said he tried to get the Deputy but he left for London.
El Zayyat is trying to reach him in London. The Ambassador
cannot be reached because they do not answer the telephone. I
have tried repeatedly and there is no answer.

K: Thank you. END

TELCORN
Gen. Haig/Sec. Kissinger

Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973

10:35 am

K: I wanted to bring you up to date on where we stand and to tell you
my strategy. You may have to calm some people down.

H: Good. I am sitting with the President.

K: O.K. The Egyptians have crossed the Canal at five places and the
Syrians have penetrated in two places into the Golan Heights. This we
get from the UN observers. Our assessment here is re the facts, it is
inconceivable that the Israel's attack would turn in two hours and have
the Egyptians crossing the Canal.

H: No question about that.

K: Inconceivable. We have to assume an Arab attack.

H: I think the President feels that way.

K: The open question is, is it with Soviet collusion or against Soviet
opposition. On that we have no answer yet. I have called first, as for as our
public position, the Sec. Gen. who leaks like a sieve, to tell him about all
of the efforts we have made and I have told him that I have been in touch
with the Soviets. I have been in touch with Dobrynin and said we should
jointly call a Security Council. The Soviets and we. And we jointly offer a
resolution calling for an end of the fighting and return to the ceasefire lines
established in 1967. I have told them this would be a sign of good faith
towards both of us and we would hold up calling for a Security Council
until we hear from them. I have informed the Sec. Gen. of that. The
Soviets said they would get an answer from Moscow. This is designed in part
to smoke them out. If they want the fighting stopped this will stop it fast.
If they refuse to do this then we have to assume some collusion. Now if
they refuse to do it we have two problems. The first is to get the fighting
stopped and the second is the longterm policy. In order to get the fighting
stopped we cannot give the Soviets and the Arabs the impression that we are
separating too far from the Israelis. That will keep it going.

H: Right.

K: Therefore, as to the facts of the issue, if the Soviets could cooperate
with us we will take a neutral position. We will say we don't know the
facts but they should stop fighting. You see what I mean?

BETWEEN
8/21/73 10:35 AM

AUTHORitatIvE
D. K. M. D.

-2-

Haig/
Oct. 6

H: Right.

K: If the Soviets do not cooperate with us and whole heartedly back back the Arabs on the immediate issue of the fighting we, in my judgment, have to lean toward the Israelis.

H: Right.

K: For these reasons: 1) In order to get the fighting stopped; 2) to prevent the Soviets from coming in at least with (bluster and get a cheap shot) and 3) to put some money in the bank with the disassociation with the Israelis in subsequent efforts to get a settlement. All depends now on the Soviet reaction. Then after we get the fighting stopped we should use this as a vehicle to get the diplomacy started. Now there is no longer an excuse for a delay. The return to the ceasefire will have two aspects. If today the problem means the Arabs would have to give up a little territory - my estimate is that starting tomorrow evening the (Arabs) will have to give up territory. My view is if the Israelis make territorial acquisitions we have to come down hard on them to force them to give them up. You see.

H: Yes.

K: We have to do that in case of the Arabs but I think it is an embarrassment and we won't have very long.

H: Yes. Unless we have had a terrible erosion there.

K: That is the strategy that I am proposing. I think we have no choice. I think the worst thing we could do is to now take a sort of neutral position while the fighting is going on, unless the Soviets take a neutral position with us. If they take one with us, we should take a neutral position. That is ideal. If they don't join us and go to the other side we have to tilt.

H: Sure.

K: You see what I mean?

H: Absolutely.

REDACTED

8/5/79

D. AMARA DIOCESE OF JEDediah

-3-

Haig

Oct. 6, 1973

K: If the Soviets are all out on the other side we have a mischievous case of collusion and then we have September 1970 all over again and we had better then be tough as nails.

H: The President is seriously considering going back to Washington.

K: I think that a grave mistake. There is nothing we can do right now. You should wait to see how it develops. Wait until at least this afternoon. So far not even a Security Council meeting has been called.

H: He agrees with that. His problem is if it is an all out war for him to be sitting down here in this climate would be very, very bad.

K: Let's wait for the Soviet answer. If the Soviets refuse to cooperate with us, we will know we are in a confrontation and he should then take leadership.

H: I think he will be comfortable with that.

K: If the Soviets do not face us, then I think he should stay down there.

H: Right. O.K.

K: You will make sure that the President is comfortable with this strategy. I think it is our only possible course and it has to be seen in the general context of his ability to act and of what follows afterwards.

H: Is there any effort to get the fleet in a decent posture. The President is concerned about that.

K: That is right. The fleet has been instructed into a position just short of calling them back to ship. They are to locate their people and move on several hours notice.

H: He does not want them assembled as soon as possible for appropriate action if needed.

K: That is being done but we wanted to wait until reports are confirmed and that will be issued within the hour. They need that much time to locate their people.

H: I will be back after discussing it with the President.

END

RECLASSIFIED

Original

Date: 06/14/73

Attn: DCS-12958

TELCONE
Min. Shalev/Sec. Kissinger

Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973

S: The Prime Minister wants to give you a personal assurance on the basis of the trust that exists between you and her that the attacks were initiated by others.

K: That is our assessment too and I have just said this to the President.

S: About the specific questions of a naval engagement the Egyptians talked about. There is no truth to that at all.

K: I cannot believe that you would start a naval engagement and have the Arabs cross the Suez Canal.

S: She will go on the radio in just a few minutes.

K: I want to inform you on a personal basis only for the Prime Minister that we have proposed to the Soviets that we jointly call -- the US and the Soviets -- a Security Council meeting and return to the ceasefire lines. An attempt to smoke them out to see if they were behind it and ask give us a basis for leaning toward your position in the actual debate. This is only for the Prime Minister.

S: I will pass that on. You have had no reply on that.

K: No. I will call you the minute I get a reply.

S: One think, I wish to raise -- our military people have submitted a list of urgent items that they need very much in a hurry.

K: I am coming back tonight and we had better discuss that in person.

S: Thank you.

K: Bye.

END

2.

Javits

Oct. 6, 1973

K: Not that we got any reports. The first report we got that seemed remotely dangerous was at 8:00 last night and we were still checking it when I was awakened with an appeal from the Prime Minister giving us authority to approach other countries to restrain themselves. I got up immediately and did it. I saw Eban at 4:30 on Thursday and he thought the situation very calm and when I said we should consider a diplomatic move after the election he said you should consider whether it could ever be calmer than it is now.

J: There security was very high.

K: Not a case.

J: That is on the Syrian side.

K: For your information I was reading reports and asking for special intelligence information. As late as Wednesday and assessment both from the Israelis and our own intelligence that there was nothing to it. Not that we knew it and were sitting on it.

J: Of course. I think we had better see what goes on. I will not say anything.

K: I am in New York now but I will go back to Washington as soon as I see a break.

J: Has the President had any reaction.

K: I have talked with him and if he agrees that it looks like Soviet collusion we have to do Sept. 1970 again. If there is Soviet collusion, we will come down hard. If they pull away from the Arabs we will pull away and stay neutral from them. We are assuming that the Israelis can take care of themselves. If that is wrong we have to go back to the drawing board.

J: What I have heard did not make me very happy.

K: We are keeping in closest touch with the Israelis. We are not making a move without discussing it with them.

J: May I feel free to call you again.

K: Where.

J: I am home.

K: Leave your number when you move with the White House board., END

TELCORN

Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

Oct. 6

K: I am checking about the SC. I was told that the Egyptians asked for the GA meeting. But it is impossible to get the GA until Monday and in any event it is a threat to the peace and security and we will not have it in the GA.

D: I understand.

K: It is a grievous suggestion. We cannot accept it!

D: I understand.

K: I have talked to the President again and he wanted me to call you and to underline again his very grave concern that this not be used to destroy everything that it has taken us three years to build up.

D: By whom.

K: By any of us.

D: Who really?

K: If you take the position of support all out for the Arabs that would be in effect encouraging what seems clearly to us and Arab attack no one in their right mind believes that the Egyptians could have been crossed the canal in five places. I would be glad to have your military analysis on that part. Since all of the fighting on Israel territory I think the facts are clear. We are prepared before the SC to take a neutral position if you do and we are prepared to make a joint resolution just calling for ceasefire lin.

D: I understand and I have sent that.

K: Today the Arabs are on Israeli territory but we don't believe this will last 72 hours and after that the problem will be to get the Israelis back to the ceasefire line. If we agree on this course no matter what the military operations no matter how successful the Israelis may be we will stick to this proposal and we will be prepared to oppose them.

2
Dobrynin/Sec. Kissinger

Oct 6

D: As you say back to the ceasefire line, I understand.

K: Right.

D: This is essentially what you mentioned.

K: We have not responded to an urgent Israeli request for additional military supplies. If it gets out of hand we will be forced to do that. For all of these reasons it will be important to our own relationship that it be handled as much jointly as we can and you should say this to the Sec. Gen. on behalf of the President. He just got through talking to me. I am coming back to Washington this afternoon and I will be in touch with you then.

D: O.K.

K: The reason I am hopeful we will settle it is that you did not leave town.

D: If I did not receive your call until 9:00 I would have gone today. We planned to take quite a nice dinner at our Maryland estate and we were leaving for vacation. You see how it happens. I hope we can handle it.

K: Your Arab friends were terribly deceitful. Zayyat told me there would be at least the 3 months of quiet and he would meet me again in November and he wanted to come to Washington next week and since our conversations and the President's conversation with Gromyko we thought we had this time period to make a reasonable approach.

D: My impression too.

K: We are taking this matter extremely seriously. If you will let your colleagues know we would appreciate it as quickly as possible.

END

TELCOM,NNeklin
Sir Don/MaeLean/Sec. Kissinger

Saturday, Oct. 6, 1973

11:35 am

K: I just received your message about your views on the Security Council. I wanted you to know that we have approached the Soviets to take with us a joint position asking them to return to the ceasefire line and a ceasefire ant to take a neutral position.

M: Absolutely.

K: We wonder if you would agree until we have heard from the Soviets that we try to defer a meeting.

M: I see the argument.

K: There is one problem in our mind. As we do establish the facts it may be more difficult to get that kind of resolution. There seems to be no question in our mind that the Arabs started this one.

M: Quite likely. Our government without cutting across any consultations or any bilaterals outside...

K: Our proposal is to do it in the Security Council.

M: Our feeling is while we are doing this if we could show ourselves in business and call for a ceasefire and return to the original line and go into recess to allow our real work to go on.

M: I am not sure the Soviets will go along with that. But when were you thinking of doing this?

K: We felt we should not let today pass.

M: I agree on this.

K: We are not rushing into anything this morning. I was thinking about something in the course of the afternoon.

M: I am in agreement with you on that if you could say...

K: I am trying to get back to Washington and I am trying to get a quiet two hours in which to do it. As a general proposition if you felt inclined say two or three o'clock to call for a meeting would not sound unreasonable to us.

M: That is what we had in mind.

-2-
MacLean

Oct. 6

K: We wanted a couple more hours today.

M: I would not interfere with that. We felt it would be wrong for the world to know these large scale operations to go on and we have not shown our heads.

K: No problem with us on that.

M: Thank you very much and I will keep in touch with your people.

K: You do that and let us know ahead of time what you do.

M: I will.

K: If we hear from the Soviets before that we will let you know. If you would lean on the Soviets in that sense Sir Donald we would favor that. You don't have to wait until then to tell them what your view is.

M: I am about half way through in my consultations and with that knowledge I see no problem with that.

K: Thank you.

M: Good bye.

END

Telcon NYC
Minister Shalev/HAK

October 6, 1973; 11:55 a.m.

K: I have talked to the President again and to the Soviets. I want you to know what we are doing. We are getting our fleet together in the Mediterranean and start moving it toward the Eastern Mediterranean. This will take us about 12 hours and we will start going moving it toward the Eastern Mediterranean. We will almost certainly approve tomorrow the military equipment within reason that you may need, especially if the Soviets line up with the Arabs, then we will certainly do it.

S: You will do it.

K: If the Soviets line up in the UN with the Arabs we will sure do it and if not we will probably do it, but we just want to see. But we would appreciate from you as much of the true military situation as you feel you can give us so we can make our evaluations, and also any plans you may have. We are going to propose when there is a Security Council meeting, whether or not the Soviets agree, that there should be a restoration of the ceasefire and a restoration of the ceasefire lines.

S: And you are doing that irrespective of their agreement or not.

K: We will wait a few hours to get their agreement. If not, we have concerted with the British and they will call a meeting and we will then propose this.

S: All right.

K: Do you have any views on the subject?

S: Well, I know there isn't and wasn't any decisions yet on whether to ask for a Security Council.

K: I think it is better if you don't.

S: I think so at one stage we wanted you to wait before calling one.

K: We are waiting still.

S: Good.

K: We are not going to do it until about 2 or 3 this afternoon for a meeting 5 or 6 this afternoon. And all we will do is ask for a ceasefire and we ask for a return to the ceasefire lines. The British are prepared to say they think the Arabs started this.

S: I think it is quite clear. The UN observers have also reported that from both fronts.

K: To all practical purposes there is no question.

S: The information I have on the military situation is that in the Syrian front the attempt by the Syrians to advance have been halted. On the Egyptian front I know about 16 Egyptian planes down, some of the Egyptian troops crossed the Canal and our people are dealing with that now. I wouldn't like to be in the shoes of those that are being dealt with.

K: (laughs) Well, that is what we are counting on.

S: You shouldn't worry.

K: We are operating on the assumption that you will win.

S: There isn't the slightest doubt.

K: But it would be helpful to us if you kept me informed.

S: Yes, all right.

K: Thank you.

S: Thank you, sir. Goodbye.