I - 2

to Soviet attack tempt blackmail? Is the peace best preserved by
threatening an aggressor with the most direct retribution of which we are
capable? Or should we rather seek to keep any conflict that may come out
to the smallest possible proportion? Even more elementary questions
have gone unanswered: What is the meaning of vulnerability? What are
the elements of security? Lacking a clear sense of direction we have
repeatedly held on to familiar shibboleths while a volatile technology has changed
the very framework of strategy. As a result, our peril has been growing
though even while our weapons arsenal has become more potent, with each passing
year.

This is illustrated by the debate over our military policy during
recent years. Critics of the existing military policy insist that our
very existence is in jeopardy. The reply is made that we have never been
stronger. It is charged that we are becoming increasingly vulnerable
to surprise attack. But it is also maintained that we have the capacity
to destroy the Soviet Union several times over. Some argue that there
is both a missile and a deterrent gap. This is refuted with the contention

I - 3

that since no Communist military aggression has occured for nearly a
decade, our current strategic concepts must be valid. Concern is expressed
about our inferiority in missiles. The reply is that it is foolish to invest
in weapons which will be obsolescent in a few years. Since our danger
is permanent, so the argument goes, our military program must have
"balanced" over a period of time. We cannot afford peaks and valleys.
Our procurement must be orderly; our replacement rate well phased.

When experts differ so completely and so violently, the attitude
of the average citizen is likely to be resignation. How can he resolve,
indeed understand, issues which seemingly require so much technical
information? It is therefore difficult to mobilize public pressures
for a change of military policy, particularly one seemingly successful.
The temptation is overwhelming to rely on the superior judgment of those
in positions of responsibility.

Understanding becomes even more difficult because almost all the
assertions listed above are correct. We are stronger than ever; but
we have also never been more vulnerable. We can destroy the Soviet
Union several times over and yet there is serious doubt about the efficacy

["Union several times over and has since had a serious doubt about the efficiency of the system and has\nunderstood because even more difficult because all the\ntogether of responsibility.\nThe competition is overwhelming to read on the superior talent of those\nfor a character of writing before publication, one generally successful.\nInformation: It is therefore difficult to modify public prejudice\nin such a manner, since one cannot possibly relate so much to the public\ninfluences which affect, influence and condition the public taste.", "The competition is overwhelming to read on the superior talent of those\nfor a character of writing before publication, one generally successful.\nInformation: It is therefore difficult to modify public prejudice\nin such a manner, since one cannot possibly relate so much to the public\ninfluences which affect, influence and condition the public taste.\n\nThe competition is overwhelming to read on the superior talent of those\nfor a character of writing before publication, one generally successful.\nInformation: It is therefore difficult to modify public prejudice\nin such a manner, since one cannot possibly relate so much to the public\ninfluences which affect, influence and condition the public taste.", "On another title so completely and so definitely, the attribute\n\"performance\" over a period of time. We cannot allow people to advance\nin benefit of the competition, so the argument then, our written program\nis based, so the argument then, our written program, that one has\nin everyone which will be effective in a low market. Since our program\napplies to our industry in general, the right is that it is followed to invest\nin our interest in industry. The right is that

I - 4

of deterrence. There is no question that the next family of missiles
will be a drastic improvement over our current arsenal. The issue,
however, is what risks we can justify until they are ready.

How can the statements of our strength and our vulnerability be
simultaneously true? How is it possible that our survival is threatened
at a moment when we have the capacity to destroy ~~our opponent several~~ any aggressor
~~several times over? The seeming contradictions are due to the nature of deterrence; the volatility of technology and the ~~automation~~ of the existing strategy. character

The problem of deterrence is novel in the history of military policy.
In the past, the military establishment was asked to prepare for war.
Its test was combat; its vindication, victory. In the nuclear age, however,
has lost its traditional significance. The outbreak of war is increasingly
considered the worst catastrophe. Henceforth, ~~the adequacy of any military establishment in the nuclear age is its ability to preserve the peace.~~ success tested by

The paradoxical consequence is that the ~~utility~~ of military policy
depende on ~~is tested by~~ essentially psychological criteria. Deterrence seeks to prevent
a given course by ~~the opponent by making it seem less attractive than all~~

a given course of action which is not less attractive than all the alternatives of the same order.

The problem of the individual's choice of action is essentially the problem of the criteria of determination of the action. Determination consists in choosing the action which is the most attractive to the individual.

The individual's choice of action is thus the choice of his or her individual will.

In the individual's choice of action, the individual has the choice to preserve the balance.

Consistent with this choice is the individual's choice to preserve the balance.

The individual's choice of action is thus the traditional individualism. The outcome of this choice is increasingly individualism. The individual's choice is thus individualism and individualism is thus individualism.

The problem of determination is novel in the history of military policy.

The volatility of technology and the instability of the existing conditions.

Since our era, the coming contract between the state and the individual has been the rule.

In a moment when we have the capacity to destroy our own species, we must choose between the two alternatives.

The individual's choice is then the choice between the two alternatives.

How can the statesmen of our time and our individuality be

different, in such a way that we can actually live together.

Will be a great improvement over our current abnegation. The issue

of determination. There is no question but that the family of

I - I

I-5

possible alternatives. It therefore ultimately depends on an intangible
quality: the state of mind of the potential aggressor. From the point of
view of deterrence a seeming weakness will have the same consequences as an
actual one. A gesture intended as a bluff but taken seriously is more use-
ful as a deterrent than a bonafide threat interpreted as bluff. Deterrence
requires a combination of power, the will to use it and the assessment of these
by the potential aggressor. Moreover, deterrence is a product of those factors
and not a sum. If any one of them is zero, deterrence fails. Strength, no
matter how overwhelming, is useless without the willingness to resort to it.
Power combined with willingness will be ineffective if the aggressor does
not believe in it or if the risks of war do not appear sufficiently unattrac-
tive to him.

Similar considerations affect not only the major protagonists--the United
States and the USSR--but also all other countries whose survival is threatened
or whose capacity for action depends on the overall strategic balance. If
a victim of Soviet pressure comes to believe--rightly or wrongly--that the
aggressor is militarily superior to the United States, it will seek an accom-
dation regardless of our resolve to resist. If an irresponsible smaller

dation regardless of our resolve to resist. It is an unreasonable smaller
aggressor in militarily inferior to the United States, it will seek an accom-
pany victim of Soviet brevets come to believe--rightly or wrongly--that the
or whose capacity for action depends on the overall strategic balance. It
states and the USAR--but also all other countries whose survival is threatened
Similar considerations affect not only the major belligerents--the United
 States to win.

not believe in it or in the stake of war do not abate sufficiently any measure
Bower combined with willingness will be ineffective if the aggressor does
matter how overwhelming, is meaningless without the willingness to resort to it.
and not a war. It is only one of them to zero, deterrence fails. Strength, no
by the potential aggressor. Moreover, deterrence is a product of these factors
requires a combination of power, the will to use it and the assessment of these
ful as a deterrent than a potential threat interpreted as fight. Deterrence
actual one. A feature intended as a fight put thus seriously is more nec-
essary of deterrence a seeming weakness will have the same consequences as an
duality: the state of mind of the potential aggressor. From the point of
possible alternatives. It therefore ultimately depends on an intangible

I-2

I-6

country believes itself protected by Communist preponderance, it may taunt
or challenge the United States regardless of the "real" power relationship.
The insolence of Castro's Cuba has been explicitly justified by Raúl Castro
on the basis of Communist military superiority.

In any given situation a country may be inferior militarily but
superior psychologically. It may be able to deter not because it is militarily
stronger but because its values an objective sufficiently highly--or can make
its opponent believe this--so that it can make plausible a threat to exact
a price its opponent is unprepared to pay. We were deterred from intervening
in Hungary even though we were still militarily vastly superior because the
Soviet Union convinced us--and probably without bluffing--that it would/all
risks to maintain its rule. We were deterred not by the threat of defeat but
because of our unwillingness to pay the price of victory.

This suggests that the debate about whether there is a deterrent gap
is inherently misleading. There can be no gap in deterrence. Deterrence
is either effective or it fails. There is no margin for error. Mistakes are
likely to be irremediable. If the gains of aggression appear to outweigh
the penalties even once, deterrence will fail.

The psychological aspect of deterrence becomes especially acute when
technology is volatile. For then the truths of one year become the perils

I - 7

at the time of their conception of another. Policies which were adequate when conceived become obstacles to clear understanding when new conditions arise.

Thus, at the same time that the absence of aggression will create powerful pressures in favor of the prevailing military policy, At the same time, a rapidly changing technology will inevitably transform the conditions which accounted for the seeming success. What makes matters worse is that there is no experience to guide those charged with the final responsibility. In the nuclear age, deterrence is based on conjecture and the significance of unprecedented technological developments, what makes matters worse, one wrong guess can mean catastrophe. importantly, regarding

Deterrence may then fail simply because the opponents interpret available data differently. In the absence of conclusive experience the assessment becomes more significant than the reality. Or rather, the assessment becomes the only reality.

A changing technology has brought about transformations in the strategic situation more rapidly than they could be assimilated into.

I - 8

doctrine and policy. There have been four phases since World War II:
(1) the period when the United States possessed an atomic monopoly and
a monopoly of the means of delivery; (2) the period when our monopoly
of weapons ended but when we still possessed an overwhelming advantage
in the means of delivery; (3) the period when the Soviet Union began to
develop a substantial delivery system but we still retained a decided
advantage because of our superiority in numbers and in the strategic
location of our base system; (4) the period when both in number of
weapons and in the means of delivery the capabilities of the two sides

began to approach each other.--indeed when in some categories the
Soviet Union has pulled ahead.

When defenders of the <u>preventing</u> strategic doctrine speak of our
overwhelming retaliatory power, they use the categories of the first
three phases of the nuclear age—the period of our strategic preponderance.

As long as our strategic striking power was overwhelming, we could indeed
think of deterrence primarily in terms of destructive ability. Then any
increase in the power of our weapons arsenal could be considered as in-
creasing the aggressor's inhibitions. The doctrine of massive retaliation

creating the agencies, institutions. The constitution of active participation
influence in the power of our telephone system can be considered as in-
dicated by reference above, in terms of collective efficiency. Then and
we join our adjustable striking power, as overseas, we can indeed
benefit from the most recent one.—The period of our strategic preposition.

When telephone of the developing strategic telephone system of our

Soviet Union use bristled speeds.
poles to absorb their own energy.--Indeed when in some categories the

speed and in the means of delivery the capabilities of the two types
location of our phone system; (4) the period when both in number of
advantageous means of our telegraph in number and in the attractive
developed a supramundial delivery, thus put us at still retained a decibel
in the means of delivery; (3) the period when the Soviet Union power to
our telephone could put when we still possessed an overwhelming advan-
gage a monopoly on the means of delivery; (2) the period when our monopoly
(1) the period when the United States possessed an atomic monopoly and
did not possess them before since World War II!

8-1

I - 9

was an expression of these views. By threatening retaliation "at
times and places of our choosing" it sought to prevent aggression all
around the Soviet periphery. As long as we were immune from direct
attack, our retaliatory power was a positive deterrent in the sense that
we did not have to make our response dependent on the magnitude of the
threat. Rather our primary concern was to decide that some response
was called for. A strategy of devastation could be reasonably effective
as long as our own invulnerability was raised, no doubt, about our willingness
to resort to it.

we were sufficiently invulnerable so that

> doubts could arise

But those who question the adequacy of our military establishment
do not doubt our destructive capability. They are concerned that our
increasing vulnerability may paralyse our will to use our
power or make an aggressor believe so. Hence deterrence may fail despite
our strength—and, in a curious way, perhaps because of it. With the growth
of the Soviet nuclear and missile force this situation has changed
dramatically. No matter how vast the destructiveness of our weapons
arsenal, the inhibitions against resorting to it must grow with every

station, the individual should receive it when it comes to him, and
therefore, in a manner which he himself indicates, to him who has
influenced him, and who has made him understand it. Henceference may be
obtained by making an effort to do so, and increasing Bibliophily, and
therefore our own, and by making him understand that our
opponents are not the only ones who are interested in the subject, and
that there is another side to the question, and that there is another
way to understand it.

We want to say that we are not speaking of individuals, but of a
group of persons, and that we are speaking of the whole group.

The statement of the statement given above, was called for. A strategy of concentration could be successfully collective in itself. But under such a strategy we do not want to make our reasonings dependent on the weight of the arguments, but rather to make them independent of them. We want to show that there is another side to the question, and that there is another way to understand it. We want to show that there is another side to the question, and that there is another way to understand it.

I - I

I - 10

increase in Soviet retaliatory power—or so the aggressor may calculate, at least. In the age of nuclear plenty and of multiplying retaliatory forces on both sides, destructiveness may be vitiated by paralysis of will or by the low credibility of our deterrent threat. A gap inevitably opens up between deterrence and the strategy we are prepared to implement should deterrence fail. For purposes of deterrence we are tempted to threaten the most dire consequences for aggression. But in order to prevent a catastrophe should deterrence fail, we must be equally concerned to keep open the option of a strategy which reduces our risks. The more fact that the West feels constantly constrained to emphasize that a nuclear conflict is unthinkable may raise serious questions about its resolve to resort to the chief strategy at its disposal.

Similarly none of the Western countries though relying on the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter aggression have taken even the most elementary steps to assure the survival of their populations against nuclear attacks—an omission hardly calculated to enhance the credibility of their threat.

tvest.

maxx violation largely circulated to excuse the credulity of their
elementary steps to secure the survival of theirusciousness against
ot unclean retaliation to detect subtraction have taken even the most
similarly none of the Western countries commonly relying on the threat
its resolve to resort to the quiet strategy at its disposal.

unclean conflict is unlikewise] constantly constrained to emphasize that a
that the West feels [concerned to emphasize that a
the option of a strategy which requires our risks. The mere fact
would deterrence itself we must be eduliously concerned to keep open
consequences for subtraction. But in order to prevent a catastrophe
burdens of deterrence we are tempted to threaten the worst-goes
strategically we are prepared to implement upon deterrence itself. For
terror. A dash inappropriately obvious nd between deterrence and the
pyrrhalde of will or by the few credulity of our deterrent
retrository forces on potential destructiveness may be vitiated
circumstancse of fear. In the sense of unclear blend and of multiplying
increase in Soviet retaliatory power—or so the addressor may

I - 10

I - 12

number of challenges. The reason was psychological, not strategic. The
very enormity of our destructive capability had the paradoxical conse-
quence of creating a threshold below which we were reluctant to commit
our forces. We were in a sense deterred ourselves by the power of our
deterrent arsenal. Even during our atomic monopoly we were usually at-
great pains to insist that the particular issue then confronting us was not the
one for which our nuclear arsenal was designed. This gap between our
deterrent policy and the strategy for fighting a war has been accentuated
with every passing year. A threat is effective only if it is believed,
and a threat which cannot be brought to bear on the issues at stake
loses its credibility.

Thus the phrase "we have never been stronger" is irrelevant to the
concern about our ability to deter. The issue cannot be settled by comparing
our present strength with that of previous years. Deterrence depends on our strength
in relation to that of possible aggressors. Since what has been called
the deterrent--the retaliatory proved inadequate to deter a vast range of
challenges even during the period of our nuclear preponderance, there is a
serious cause for worry when the missile gap approaches. What then of the
missile gap and the strategic problem of deterrence?

matured and the strategic basis of determination?

The issue comes to bear when the military and the subordinates. What is the
outlines can during the period of our nuclear prepositioning? Here is a
the determination—the result of the program intended to deter a nation from
in relation to that of possible aggressors. What must the plan called
our program proceed with? What are our strategy and our plans?

The issue cannot be settled if conducting
concern upon our ability to deter. The issue cannot be settled if the
loss of the balance we have never been strong for is irrevocable to the
deterrence of the enemy.

The loss of the balance we have never been strong for is irrevocable to the
deterrence of the enemy.

and a student should be brought to bear on the issue at issue
at our own expense. A student is objective only if it is defied
by our own expense. But the strategy for fighting a war that has been accumulated
one to which our nuclear students were debarred. The study program out
brings to mind that the belter has to be conducted if we are not to
deterrence students. How can our atomic menhood be maintained
our forces.

To be able to start that the belter has to be conducted if we are not to
deterrence students. How can our atomic menhood be maintained
our forces.

We have in a sense deferred correction of the power of our
deterrence ability. How can our atomic menhood be maintained
our forces. We have in a sense deferred correction of the power of our
deterrence ability. How can our atomic menhood be maintained
our forces.

I - 22

II-2

blackmail all contiguous areas. Even after the missile gap ends, so this
argument goes, our retaliatory force will no longer be able to protect
major portions of the free world. The issue then turns on our ability
to deter all-out war and assuming this problem to be solved, the ability
of the threat of all-out war to deter other forms of aggression.

Turning first to the problem of deterrence, it is important to
understand what considerations are involved in the decision to launch all-
of deterrence
out war. For if a strategy/is to be effective, it must seek to overcome
these motives. A country may launch an all-out war for offensive or defen-
sive reasons. It can set out deliberately to destroy an opponent. Or it may
strike in order to forestall what it believes to be an imminent attack: in other
words, to destroy the opponent before being destroyed.
The former is called a
surprise attack; the latter a pre-emptive attack. A surprise attack is a de-
liberate attempt to eliminate the opposing retaliatory force--regardless of the
intentions of the other side. Its motivation is aggressive. The timing is set

intentions of the other side. If motivation is aggressive, the timing is set
liberate attempt to eliminate the opposing retaliatory force--regardless of the
embarrass attack; the latter a pre-emptive attack. A surprise attack is a de-
ward, to destroy the opponent before he can devote it. The former is called a
strike in order to forestall what it believes to be an imminent attack: in other
five reasons. It can set out deliberately to destroy an opponent. Or it may
these motives. A country may launch an all-out war for offensive or defen-
out war. For it a strategy is to be effective, it must seek to overcome
of deterrence

understand what considerations are involved in the decision to launch all-
turning litig to the problem of deterrence, it is important to
of the threat of all-out war to deter other forms of aggression.

to deter all-out war and (2) assuming this problem to be solved, the ability
to deter all-out war and (3) assuming this problem to be solved, the ability
major portions of the free world. The issue then turns (1) on our ability
argument goes, our retaliatory force will no longer be able to protect
placemant all contiguous areas. Even after the missile gap ends, so this

II-3

II - 3

by the attacker for a moment he considers most propitious. The
motive for a pre-emptive war, by contrast, is defensive. An attack
is made only as a last resort and because it is considered the
only means to avoid disaster. The timing of pre-emptive war thus
depends on the opponent's measures.

In order to launch a surprise attack an aggressor requires
preponderant strength and a high degree of assurance of success.
No country will run the risk of annihilation if there is only
a slight probability of victory. Surprise attack is thus
deterred when the aggressor must calculate that, regardless of
the scale of his attack, he will suffer unacceptable damage in
retaliation.

It is important to remember, however, that the criterion
of unacceptability is the aggressor's and not the defender's.
A level of damage which may seem unacceptable to us may prove
bearable to the Soviet Union and even more so to Communist China.
Deterrence can fail simply because the two sides have different
notions of what constitutes intolerable damage. Or put another

eliminate the aggressor, a incentive to launch a suburb attack in the
unacceptable damage. In the same way, such a degree of readiness will
afford to ride out an attack and still retain the capacity to initiate
minimum if the retaliatory force is so well protected that it can
emotive blow. The motive for a pre-emptive blow is reduced to a
retaliatory force, the less offensive it will have for a pre-
mercy of the opponent. Hence, the less vulnerable a country's re-
destruction of the retaliatory force places one, a country at the
which the devastation which will be incurred as the danger that the
retaliatory force. The risk of suttering a first blow is not so
small.

factors: fear of an imminent attack and the vulnerability of the
two forces are fairly evenly balanced. It is a result of two interacting
pre-emptive war, on the other hand, can come about even when the
"acceptable" damage is lower than theirs.

a bigger effort than the Communique, for properly our level of
alone indicates that to deter suburb attack we may have to make
price for victory which the defender had thought too high. True
way, deterrence will fall if the aggressor is precluded to back a

II-4

II - 5

first place.

Deterrence of pre-emptive strike is psychologically more com-
plicated than deterrence of surprise attack. Casualties which
may seem unacceptably high when the alternative is peace (which is
the situation with respect to the decision to launch a surprise
attack) may become bearable if the alternative appears to be a
war started by the other side. Ten million casualties are at unacceptable
great deal when a country can avoid any by maintaining the peace.

But they may seem to be the lesser of two evils when the choice is
between launching an attack or, receiving a blow that may produce
together with eliminating the retaliatory force, a hundred
casualties. The level of
unacceptable damage required to deter pre-emptive attack is thus
higher than that required to deter a surprise blow.

A pre-emptive attack can be deterred only by meeting two re-
quirements: (1) by avoiding measures which, whatever their intent,
lend themselves to being interpreted as a prelude to surprise

II-7

destruction might prove strategically insignificant because in

a war between major powers the two sides would probably have destroyed each..................

tried each..................
a war between major powers the two sides would probably have des-
dstruction might prove strategically insignificant because in

II-1

II - 9

several hours weather conditions might interfere. Bombing and navigational accuracy could not be fully tested under battle conditions. The defender might detect the attack and launch his force. Or he might destroy a high percentage of the aggressor's planes, or both. In short, in considering whether to launch a surprise attack, there was always a residue of uncertainty to which the cautious element in the aggressor's leadership group could appeal even in the face of seemingly foolproof staff plans.

With missiles, on the other hand, surprise attack can be prepared with a degree of certainty approaching that of an artillery barrage. Tests will have revealed the reliability and the accuracy of the missile involved. Once launched, its flight cannot be impeded except by internal malfunctions whose frequency is statistically known -- at least in the absence of

anti-missile defense whose feasibility many doubt and which, because of the budgetary restrictions of the Eisenhower Administration, cannot now come into existence until 1966. If the targets are

reasonably well-known -- as United States stationary bases are --

[y]

II - 10

it becomes almost a mathematical problem to determine the number of missiles required to destroy them. Of course, this level may not be attainable in the immediate future. The fact remains that for any given force level the factor of uncertainty is likely to be less and the advantage of surprise greater with missiles than with airplanes.

The Pronouncements which seek to relate deterrence to total numbers of missiles and airplanes are highly misleading. For the side on the defensive the numbers prior to attack are essentially irrelevant. The only figure that matters is the number which can be suddenlyLOW survive surprise-attacks. From the point of view of deterrence, the size of our retaliatory force is less important than the number of aiming points it presents to the aggressor. Fewer which are widely dispersed airplanes and missiles well-protected may be strategically more useful than a large force which is highly vulnerable and whose very size may provoke a pre-emptive strike. For a very large and very vulnerable force makes sense only if a surprise attack is

II - 13

learn of them or are able to take countermeasures.

The peril of the defender is magnified by the nature of surprise in the missile age. The speed of missiles and the decreasing time required to launch them will soon make it possible to start an attack with almost no warning. It is unfortunate therefore that so much of our strategic thinking is still geared to the expectation of obtaining tactical warning. In the debate about the proposal to protect the Strategic Air Command by means of an airborne alert - keeping a substantial proportion of our heavy bombers constantly in the air - the Eisenhower Administration claimed that it was time enough to take such a step after the international situation grows tense. In short, they believed that we would always receive sufficient warning to alert our retaliatory force.

Such a view misses the essence of missile warfare. By their very nature, missiles can be launched without extensive preparation. In a few years, when solid fuel missiles become operational, they

In a ten feet, when they met they met with some difficulty, their
back nature, unless they can be leaped without excessive preparation.

Such a view means the essence of weather warnings. If there is no force.

Now, whatever receive sufficient warning to warn our resistless,
national action alone can. In short, they believed that we
obtained that it was time enough to take and a step after the inter-
view themselves consistently in the air ... the Encourage. Abandonment
of an airspeed limit ... keeping a substantial broadcast, or, on
apart the broadcast to protect the strategic Vir Command, means
so the expectation of obtaining technical warning. In the debate
therefore that so much of our strategic thinking in still可行
so start an attack with almost no warning. If it is unfortunate
generating time required to launch them will soon make it impossible
emphasize in the weather age. The above of weather and the de-
the benefit of the detector in magnified by the nature of
fear of them or are able to take consequences.

II - 13

II - 14

will require a count-down of less than ten minutes. In such circumstances, we can be certain that whatever else may happen, a surprise attack will **not** be preceded by a tense situation.

The last thing an aggressor would do is to alert our retaliatory force by disquieting us. There are many technical and political arguments against an airborn alert. But the possibility of obtaining warning is not one of them.

Even if warning is obtained, it is far from clear to what use it can be put particularly as the missile age develops.

When solid fuel missiles become operational, the maximum warning available is likely to be less than fifteen minutes -- during which time information must be obtained, transmitted, evaluated and acted upon. This is hardly an interval making for sober calculation. And in the missile age the penalty of acting on the basis of incorrect information is enormous. Airplanes can be launched as a defensive measure, for they can be recalled if the information turns out to be faulty. The decision to

II - 15

launch a missile is, however, irrevocable. The danger of
accident is therefore high. Yet the effort to reduce this risk
may increase vulnerability. The more carefully and strictly
warning is interpreted, the less useful it may be, to defeat it.
A country the security of whose retaliatory force depends on
the ability to obtain warning will be torn between the Scylla
and still inflict unacceptable losses on the aggressor.

This has been well expressed by General Power the Commanding
General of the Strategic Air Command:

> "The radars have picked up 1,000 objects. The computer says they are ballistic missiles, and they will impact in the United States."

I have about 12 minutes left because it took him at
least 3 minutes to do that.

What am I going to do?

I can launch the alert force.

1. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session, "Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960,"
*Part 2 Financial Statements, Field Commanders, pp. 378 and 379, 1959.

Inventor-Lessert S. Financial Statements, Field Commanders, pp. 378 and 378, 1920.

Department of Defense Appropriations for 1920,"

I can launch the sient force.

Must I do it so?

Test 3 minutes to go that.

I gave about 15 minutes left because it took him at
impact in the United States.

batter they are ballistic missiles, and they will
The require have picked up 1,000 objects. The com-

General of the Strategic Air Command.

This has been well expressed by General Power, the Commanding
and still insufficient acceptable reason on the addressor.

sufficiently insurmountable so that it can rise out an attack
dear its security to the expectation of warning. It must be
proudly. In short in the missile age, a resistless force cannot
of being too cautious and the responsibility of being too trigger
the spirtity to obtain warning will be born between the Schalls
A country the security of whose resistless force depends on
warning is interpreted, the easier it may be to detect it.

May increase animosity. The more carefully and strictly
incident is therefore high. Yet the effort to reduce this risk
Is amount a waste is, however, irrevocable. The danger of

II - 12

II - 16

I will do that without any hesitancy because I know that, if this turns out to be a spurious signal, no harm is done...But in this time period we will also have a button whereby I can send the ICBM's on their way.

I can press that button and send the missiles on their way.

Do I want to do it, assuming I had authority to do so? Because sure as shooting, in another 2 or 3 minutes, this lad will say, 'I am sorry, but those blips have disappeared off the scope.' They were sputniks, interference, or something like that. Therefore, I say the missile will have to ride out the attack.

All of this suggests that the present design of our retaliatory force involves major risks. Its size may appear an overpowering threat to the Soviets while its vulnerability creates constant temptations to remove the source of the danger once and for all. The large gap between our first- and second-strike capability represents a powerful incentive for a sudden Soviet blow. Indeed it erodes the dividing line between surprise attack and pre-emptive war. For it is quite possible that the present design of our retaliatory force may be a

1. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 86th Congress, 1st Session, "Department of Defense Appropriations for 1960," Part 2 Financial Statements, Field Comanders, pp. 378 and 379, 1959.

Bief Commissaire, db. 318 and 319, 1929.
Defense Undergraduate-Box 1900, "Part 3 Business Statements, Representative," 8th Congress, 1st Session, "Department of Justice" before the Subcommittee on Undergraduate" House of

that the present design of our retaliatory force and method of
underlying attack and pre-embassy war. For it is quite possible
enough Soviet power. Indeed it erodes the dividing line between
a strike capability represents a powerful incentive for a
once and for all. The tradeoff between our first and second -
creates constant temptations to remove the source of the gender
overpowering threat to the Soviet wife if its minenesspinity
retaliatory force involves major risks. If its nine wks abbraxs an

VII of this address that the present design of our

have to rise out the attack.
nowing like that. Therefore, I ask the website will
out the acrobatic. They were abhorred' interference, or
they will say, 'I am sorry, but those people have disabused
Because one is so shooting' in snapper 3 or 3 minutes, this
Do I want to go it, answering I had authority to go so?

my.

I can break that button and send the website on their
their my.

also have a button somewhere. I can send the ICM's a ou
no harm is gone...But in the time period we will
I know that, it quite turns out to be a shrunk one slant.
...I will go that without any postpony because

II - 10

II - 17

Soviet attack for reasons which the Government leaders take to be defensive: to eliminate a retaliatory force whose dispositions make sense only as a preparation for attack.

The discussion of the strategic requirement of deterrence has led to three conclusions:

(1) The precondition of deterrence is an invulnerable retaliatory force. Invulnerability exists when regardless of the scale and timing of his attack an aggressor must expect unacceptable damage in retaliation. An invulnerable retaliatory force reduces the risk of accidental war. If it is capable, in General Power's words, to "ride out an attack," its dependence on warning will be greatly diminished. The possibility of error is thereby greatly lessened. The strategic posture will be less tinnx tense and hair-trigger.

At the same time, the retaliatory force should be so designed that, (2) if the goal is stability, invulnerability should be sought through measures, which in so far as possible, convey a defensive intent.²

2. For further discussion see below p. 3: The Problems of Arms Control.

II -18

Invulnerability is not an absolute term. It depends on numbers, dispersal, hardening of bases and mobility of the defending retaliatory force and similar characteristics on the part of the aggressor's striking power. Increasing the numbers of the defending force reduces vulnerability even if each individual weapon is highly vulnerable -- provided dispersal enables each attacking vehicle to destroy only one defending vehicle. In that case, it may be possible simply to out-produce the opponent and to impose impossible force requirements on him.

On the other hand, the attempt to achieve invulnerability through numbers alone would lead to a highly unstable situation. For a retaliatory force of such size would represent a perhaps overwhelming first-strike capability. It may therefore be interpreted as designed for a surprise blow and tempt a preemptive attack. Hence whenever a choice exists, invulnerability should be sought by such measures as dispersal, hardening and above all mobility. The/steps ... ... ... ...

II - 19

increase preferred. They enhance the ability to strike back. They do not improve the ability to strike first. They improve the defensive, not the offensive capacity. They enhance stability because they reduce the incentive for surprise attack without strike. furnishing an additional motive for pre-emptive/anticipatory Each of these measures has advantages and disadvantages.

Dispersal complicates the aggressor's task by multiplying his targets. Its disadvantage is that it complicates the problems of control. The more individual decision points there are, the greater is the chance of an act based on misinformation or overagerness—in short the greater is the risk of accidental mass war.

No PP Hardening means protecting the target against explosion by placing it in some form of shelter. Its effectiveness depends on the attacker's accuracy. Given the power of modern weapons hardening is not a protection against an attack of sufficient precision. Nevertheless it complicates the calculations of the

Hurdling means protecting the target against attack upon being hit in some form of attack. Its effectiveness depends upon the attacker's strategy. Given the power of modern weapons, the attack is the essence of an act based on misdirection or prudence of control. The more individual attack points are used, the greater the advantage is that it possesses the pro-

overtakeuriness—-in short the attacker is the risk of scientific error. The danger is the chance of an act based on misdirection or prudence of control. The more individual attack points are used, the greater the advantage is that it possesses the pro-

diabetes mellitus, a factor which multiplying

each of these measures has advantages and disadvantages.

causing an additional motive for pre-emptive/anticipatory strike.

because they reduce the incentive for wnique attack without
gainful, not the alternative strategy. They enhance spillover
not improve the spillover to strike first. They improve the
frequency—-they enhance the spillover to strike back. They do

JUN16925

II - 19

II - 19

II - 15-2/1

Similarly missiles should be so designed that part of our missile force is constantly shifting position. Some could be moved by rail;-- such as the projected Minuteman;--others by barges on rivers; still others on coastal ships; still others in submarines.

Submarines are more difficult to detect than small coastal ships, but this advantage must be weighed against the lower expense and better communication of the latter. From this point of view, the best use of airplanes is not so much to penetrate enemy territory as to provide a mobile missile launching platform. This implies a requirement for an airplane of moderate speed but great endurance capable of cruising for days just out of range of detection.

The function of a mobile system would be to produce the maximum degree of uncertainty in the mind of a potential aggressor about the chances of a successful attack. To the degree that our retaliatory force cannot be located, it cannot be destroyed.

To the extent that a potential aggressor cannot calculate with

II - 23

to maintain its And it should be sought with full awareness that each
method has its advantages and disadvantages. A price must be paid for
each form of protection. Mobility complicates the aggressor's calcula-
tions but it also makes more difficult the defender's problem of com-
munication and control. A sea-based system probably will be sufficiently
secure so that it does not have to react to warning and can gear its
response to the actuality of an attack. This reduces the risk of ac-
cidental war. On the other hand, the same factor may make it more vul-
nerable to attrition -- the reduction of the retaliatory force through
a gradual whittling away.³ An attack on a submarine at sea is less
likely to evoke all-out retaliation than a blow against a missile within
the continental United States.

Hardening and dispersal avoid the problem of attrition to some
extent while adding others. Dispersal, for example, raises problems of
control. The larger the number of individual decision points, the greater
is the chance of an act based on misinformation or overeagerness -- *ahem*,
short-circumstances, thus, the greater is the risk of accidental war. ... ... ...

3. See below,

II - 24

In short, communications and control. But no single method should be adopted as a "cure-all." Reliance on any one approach increases the vulnerability to a technological breakthrough. Invulnerability is best assured by a "mixed" force relying on various methods of protection and control. Such a force makes it most difficult for an aggressor to calculate his chances of success. To determine the proper "mix" becomes one of the chief goals of strategy.

(3) To maintain deterrence two dangers must be avoided. One is to consider any given strategic relationship as static. The other is to subordinate present readiness to long-term procurement.

The rapid rate of technological change would threaten any (to upset any apparent) equilibrium, no matter how apparently stable. Even highly mobile and well-dispersed retaliatory forces could be overcome by new developments. Improved anti-submarine measures could make the sea-based retaliatory force vulnerable to surprise attacks. Advances in guidance or in the warheads of missiles could overcome almost any conceivable hardening. Successful defense against

# III - The Design of the Deterrent Force

## A. Counterforce or Finite Deterrence

The most fundamental problem concerns the purpose of our re-
talatory force; specifically, What threats is it supposed to deter
and by what methods? The attempt to answer this question has pro-
duced a debate between adherents of what has been termed counterforce
strategy and proponents of what has come to be known as Finite De-
terrence. The issue turns on the design of the deterrent force;
whether its primary goal should be the elimination of the opposing
military establishment or whether the proper target is the aggressor's
war-making potential and civilian population. Proponents of a counter-
force strategy argue that deterrence requires not only the prospect of
damage to industry and civilian population but also of military defeat.
Consequently, the primary target must be the opponent's retaliatory force.
Once this is crushed, victory is assured. A counterforce strategy there-
fore requires a retaliatory force so large and so well-protected that it
can guarantee the destruction of the opponent's offensive power. As the
opposing missile force grows, ours would have to multiply correspondingly
and at a ratio which retains the possibility of victory. In the age of

["and at a ratio which retains the badius of impact. In the case of\nobscure white force flows, one would have to slightly correspondingly\nconcentrate the primary target where the obscure's reflected force.\nOnce this is earned, victory is assured. A counterforce strategy thus-\nconcentrates the primary target where the obscure's reflected force.\nconcentrate to industry and civilian population put out of work, delete.\nforce strategy aims that deterrence requires not only the broach of\nwar-making battery and civilian population. Proponents of a counter-\nforce strategy are those that deterrence requires not only the broach of\nforce strategy but also that deterrence requires not only the broach of\nforce strategy and civilian population put out of work, delete.\nthe force strategy and civilian population put out of work, delete.\nconcentrate to industry and civilian population put out of work, delete.\nconcentrate

III - 3

destroy the striking power of the opponent as to threaten his social substance. Our only options are to deter by threatening the aggressor with catastrophe or to inflict devastation if deterrence fails. We should be able to deprive an aggressor, so the argument goes, of the fruits of his attack. But by conceding the first blow we have also conceded the possibility of achieving victory. Against the background of limited military budgets, many have come to the conclusion that the resources devoted to developing a first strike capability would be better expended on other forms of preparedness. Instead of embarking on the elusive effort to achieve a counterforce capability, we should develop a well-protected striking force which is able to exact whatever level of damage would be considered unacceptable according to the Soviet value system. The proponents of finite deterrence hold that the retaliatory force need not be very large, nor should a heavy investment in bombing accuracy. The basic requirement is the ability to survive a surprise attack and still devastate the Soviet Union. And Accuracy need be adequate only to the mission of maximum destructiveness. The under versions of the finite deterrence/relate the size of the retaliatory force to the number

["The word \"reference\" refers to the size or the relative strength of the nuclear forces of the major powers.", "The word \"reference\" means that the reference force must be equal to or greater than the force that would be required to stop the nuclear forces from working. The word \"reference\" also means that the reference force must be equal to

III - 4

of large Soviet population centers.

The dispute between adherents of a counterforce strategy and finite deterrence repeats essentially the categories of the B-36 controversy of 1949 with the roles reversed.⁵ As in a stately minuet the services have exchanged positions and only the old acrimony has remained. In 1949, the Airforce insisted that deterrence depended on the threat of devastating centers of population and industrial complexes. The Navy described such a strategy as unethical and ineffective and called attention to the moral and strategic imperative to destroy military targets. Today the same arguments are repeated, though the Airforce is following the Navy script of 1949 and vice versa. The irony of this situation should not obscure the deadly seriousness of the issue. For on it depends the shape of our military establishment and the nature of our diplomacy.

The difficulty with the dispute is that our options are often vastly oversimplified. The choice is not between a complete counterforce capability or none at all nor between a strategy of pure devastation or a strategy which guarantees victory in all circumstances. Between these

5. For a description of this controversy see the author's *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1957, p. 35.

["3. For a description of this contract see the appendix, \"Method for Determining Contractual Obligations.\"", "The choice is not between a complete contractor and an unqualified one. The choice is not between a complete contractor and a contractor that has been through a complete contractor's evaluation. The contractor must be able to offer a complete contractor that has been through a complete contractor's evaluation and is qualified to do so. The contractor must be able to offer a complete contractor that has been

III - 5

limiting conditions many other possibilities exist, each with its
own implications for deterrence and for strategy should deterrence
fail. Moreover, we have to consider not only the design of our re-
talatory force but that of the opponent as well. The impact of the
vulnerability and
target systems of the
opposing retaliatory forces on each other of their vulnerability and
determines their types
their target systems affects the kinds of deterrent threats which are
possible, their credibility and their suitability for given objectives.

Finally the utility of the retaliatory force has to be considered
in relation to two kinds of dangers: The threat of general war and
that of limited war. General war for these purposes can be defined as
aggression which if not resisted will lead immediately to the col-
lapse of the victim. A successful attack on our retaliatory force would
enable the aggressor to impose his terms. The victim is reduced to
impotence; it can only survive only at the aggressor's pleasure.

Limited aggression is a threat which jeopardizes survival ultimately.

Victory for an aggressor will lead to a deterioration of our international
position but it will not jeopardize our existence immediately. A

III - 6

Burma
successful attack on, for example, Lao, would undermine the other free
countries of Asia. But our own survival would not be threatened except
indirectly. Resistance would have to be justified with the argument that
the defeat of Burma
Lao
the loss of Lao would set in motion a chain of events which might lead
to our downfall eventually. Obviously the case of Lao presents a
different deterrent problem from an attack on our retaliatory force
both from the point of view of the risks which we may be willing to
run and the kinds of threats which may prove credible. As between
the retaliatory forces of the United States and the Soviet Union
four different relationships are possible.

Table 1: Possible Inter-relationship of U.S. - Soviet Retaliatory Forces⁶

| U.S. | U.S.S.R. | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 1. Vulnerable | Vulnerable |  |
| 2. Invulnerable | Vulnerable | This was the situation during our atomic monopoly. |
| 3. Vulnerable | Invulnerable | One interpretation of missile gap. |
| 4. Invulnerable | Invulnerable | Minimum result of missile gap. |

6. It must be understood that these relationships do not exhaust all possibilities. They are extreme cases which illustrate the problem of deterrence and its complexity.

III - 7

Turning first to the problem of mutual vulnerability, this exists when neither side is able to protect its retaliatory force against surprise attack. **Both sides can win by striking first and they will lose by striking second.** The gap between the first and the second strike capability is complete. Even though both sides may be equally vulnerable, the relationship is not symmetrical. Whoever strikes first waits wins; the side which waits loses. Under conditions of mutual vulnerability, the intentions of a country's opponent's those intentions, for neither side can afford to wait. Where an attack must be disastrous, safety consists in forestalling it.

As a result, a retaliatory force which is vulnerable is also likely to be accident prone. It can survive only if it receives adequate warning —