Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

*

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telecon
Joe Sisco
10/16/70 8:45 a.m.

S: I wanted to give you a fill-in on . . .

K: Our minds, as usual, are working on similar lines. I had just asked my secretary to call you.

S: First, the atmospherics. The atmosphere was very good. Cordial tone, good personal rapport between the Secretary and Riad. Substantively, we made up our minds ahead of time that no proposals would be put forward. All we would do would be to feel out the situation. He let the fellow say everything he wanted. In essence, they deny the violations. The secretary said we've got to do it so cold that any time you want to look at it we'll be glad to show you. Riad gave a general indication of willingness to extend the cease-fire, but there's got to be progress in getting on with the talks. We we came to an extended cease-fire we are more likely to get more of a de facto extension than any other.

K: That might be better.

S: I think so too. XXX The Egyptians indicate they don't want to be held in any formal way. So we're only going to accomplish a de facto extension of the cease-fire. We are not going to get the talks resumed.

K: Why? Because they can't afford to talk now?

S: One, it's a weak crowd, they have no process by which to consolidate their position. Unless it were the most minimal kind of face saver they can't admit that Nasser committed a violation. Even a token rectification would involve an admission. He gave me a very confounded argument. He said he was out of the country. But then when he got back and found that Nasser had agreed, he argued that it was an unfair proposal, and then he proceeded to argue that they didn't violate it.

K: That's like when I was talking with Vorontsov and he said they didn't go in. I said what about the advisors and he said "All the advisors dropped off at the border."

S: Yes. Thank you for the decisions both on arms and credit. The arms decision took care of our problem on the other side.

K: You won your argument about the Assistant Secretaries . . . [had to go off the line to answer a call]

S: I'll call you back tonight.

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telcon
Amb. William Sullivan

16 Oct 70; 10:25 a.m.

S: I have just talked to Bui Diem, who talked with Vice President Ky in Paris. Ky has accepted Diem's recommendation he leave whole question of visit up to Diem to work out. Diam wants to talk with me about it.

K: He shouldn't come until after the election.

S: That part is agreed. The question I am faced with is this. Ky keeps telling people he has an invitation from the President.

K: That is pretty much true. The President has pretty much said we could invite him to an informal dinner at the White House if it comes after the election period.

S: Do we call it official or unofficial?

K: Unofficial.

S: I will of course check with Diem to work out the visit to the military camps where people are being trained. How best to get a date for the dinner - through Protocol?

K: I can get it for you, but it may take a week.

S: If you could get me the date I will put off Diem. But leave date blank except somewhere toward the end of November. Then we could work on the other stuff. You don't have any exception whether visit to military camps comes before or after the elections?

K: No.

S: I will go ahead on that basis and if you could get me a time for the dinner sometime next week then we can make it a little more precise.

I brought you greetings from Denis Healey who regretted missing you. He is now the Shadow Foreign Secretary, you know. He was in great form.

K: He is a great fellow.

S: He said he is not going to hold any debates on the President's initiative because he is [sneaking] these reports.

[making] (?)

ms

By: KHL

NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Telecon

Chuck Bailey (Chi. Sun Times)

10/16/70 10:30 a.m.

K: I read a summary -- I didn't read the original but I read a summary -- of your column in which you say that the Nixon/Kissinger group was crying wolf too much on Cuba. Let me say two things about it. First, what was said was an agreed upon inter-departmental statement. It was a pure accident that I was the first up at the time the question was asked. If I hadn't said it at 2:30, State would have said it at 4:00. It was an agreed position; not a private initiative. Secondly, and I don't want you to write about this; this just for your information, when the facts are out, you will realize that what we did was a minimum reaction. If we could do as well on other things as we did on this . . .

B: I'll agree on that. The Russians went all the way on this, didn't they?

K: If we had let the thing go, we might have gotten into a real confrontation two months from now.

B: But did you have to make it public?

K: Yes, this made it easier for them to say there was nothing there. We said "If it develops into something. . . "

B: And you got it anyway. I think it was good.

K: I don't want to go into what was done privately. But this was done with minimum humiliation for the Soviets.

B: It just looked like part of a pattern, heating up the political atmosphere without much benefit to the international one.

K: We felt it was important that the Soviets realize that they were getting to the edge of what might lead to a reassessment of policy for us.

B: This friend of mine said that there were understandings between Washington and Moscow which underlie all of what has been going on.

K: That's not true. I wish it were. There is nothing we would rather have than an understanding with the Russians. Anyone who's been through the last 25 years realizes there are no victories in confrontation. We are following a policy of trying to come to basic understandings with them. If we don't, sooner or later someone is going to try to face someone down.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

*

Telecon
Chuck Bailey

10/16/70 10:30 a.m. page 2

B: I thought bringing it into the poen sort of poked it into a con-frontation. You know Kennedy said that if you give them Khrushchev an ultimatum . . .

K: But we didn't give them one. We said "If there is a base . . ." they said that there wasn't one and we did not contradict it.

B: Why did they back down?

K: The cost to them of keeping it there. The political atmosphere in this country would have heated up enormously if during SALT they had put a base in there.

B: But they were doing something there?

K: They were making a substantial effort. We wouldn't have been done this if there hadn't been something. I'm not asking you to write about this again. I would just as soon that you leave the record as it is. Leave your criticism on the record, but I just wanted you to know.

B: Thank you for that.

K: I don't think anything is served now by writing about it again. The more low key the better.

B: I have a friend in intelligence who says this is more of a demarche than ever/ indicated. But you think it's better to leave it alone now?

K: Yes.

K: Thank you for calling.

*

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/13/04

Telcon
Albert Wohlstetter
16 Oct 70; 10:45 a.m.

W: Did you have time to read the letter [paper]?

K: I read it. I think it is a superb piece, extremely devastating (?)
Who has seen it? I am told you sent it to Gerry Smith, too.

W: No, absolutely not. I have not sent it to him. Cy has seen it.

K: I am going to insist on the bureaucracy answering the issues you raised.

W: Fine. I am going to be there next week, beginning Wednesday afternoon.

K: Let me see whether we can get together.

W: If meeting late in the afternoon is better for you, that is quite as good for me.

K: Wednesday I will be out of town, but maybe Thursday. Check with David Young.

W: Fine, and does Thursday evening or late in the afternoon look good?

K: Let's try for that.

ms

*

By: KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Ray Price

10/16/70 11:05 a.m.

K: We have redone the UN speech here based on Presidential guidance, departmental drafts, speechwriters' drafts and other things. It is being typed now and I am getting it over to you. I just wanted to tell you where we stood. He doesn't want to use the one percent GNP thing in it.

P: I think it's better not to use it in the speech. Let the word get out ahead of time so the speech will be better received.

K: Exactly.

P: Okay, fine.

*

TELCON
Flanigan/Kissinger
noon 10/16/70

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/13/04

F: Did you see what Sato said to industry? Japanese

K: It's outrageous.

F: I think Sato and Miazawa are playing a game. I had Trezise say we are not playing that game. Ushiba told them back and Miazawa said they should have only said something to the Ambassador. That's nonsesne, of course.

K: Tell Miazawa we have nothing back until they have a proposition. And the President will not discuss it until then.

F: Until there's an agreement firm enough, the President will not speak. The proposition be put through the Embassy is unsatisfactory in terms of textiles.

K: And insulting.

F: I will give you a verbatim when we get it.

*

By: KMH NARA, Dato: 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/The Pres
October 16, 1970 1:15 p.m.
jlj

[paraphrased]

[entered the conversation late]

P: He is a fair fellow and I just wanted to accomplish...

K: Accomplished everything you set out to do. That Soviet submarine tender went on a little maneuver and then stopped at a port on the northern shore of Cuba - the normal port of entry and return. We have no reason to suppose that they will not return. Despite instructions not to say anything the Defense Department put it out that it has returned to a Cuban port.

P: Who the hell over there is doing it? We ordered them not to say a damn thing.

K: Not a damn thing. They released it 1/2 hour after the incoming message had been received.

P: How did they put it out? Did it come from the Secretary's office, or Navy's?

K: Statement. The regular Defense Department briefing.

P: Well be sure that Bill knows this before his briefing tonight. Call him and tell him we want him to know that we did not know anything about it. I am raising [holy] hell about it.

K: They released it after I had put out another directive reminding them not to say a word about it.

P: We must be sure that Bill just knows. I talked to him about announcing the meeting between Gromyko and myself. Told him that any mention of the Summit would be later. That we did not want anything to crack on it.

K: I think he is relaxed mood about this.

P: On this Summit thing. I would have no objection if Gromyko came at him about it but there would be a lot of people in the room, wouldn't there? [Would be better not to have anything said about it.]

K: As long as Bill knows what we know about it then there shouldn't be any problem.

P: This question of who goes first. They would go... I would go. I don't know. If it could come up in a way...

K: I am seeing Dobrynin tomorrow and I will get it straightened out.

By: KHU NARA, Dato. S/12/04

*

TELCON
Frost/Kissinger
1:50 p.m. 10/16/70

K: What plots are you laying now?

F: Why, I don't think the Heath administration will topple, do you?

K: You don't need confine yourself to the country you are in. Once we had Cambodia and then Jordan.

F: I have felt guilty ever since. Long time no see.

K: I am sorry that you felt you had -- are you returning my call or did you have something to ask me?

F: I am delightedly returning your call because I was about to call you.

K: After the President saw me on "60 Minutes" he now wants me to go on other programs. NBC is driving me crazy and I had an understanding with you to do something, so I thought I'd check.

F: Let's do it and you will be free.

K: Let me think about it. When did you want to do it?

F: I am on the coast for 10 days. No hope of your being in San Clemente in the next 10 days?

K: I will be in L. A. on Tues. for a day and then again on the 29th.

F: 29th I fly back. Do you have a supper for 2 or 4 on Tues.?

K: Where are you staying?

F: The Beverley Hills Hotel.

K: So am I. I am getting into L. A. on Mon. night.

F: We will communicate at the Beverley Hills on Tues. morning.

K: You will be there until the end of the following week?

F: Wed. of the xxx following week and then back to London. I want to see that program because I missed it. They say you were smashing. If from your timetable you wanted to do it, we could do it next Tues.

K: I would prefer not to. I want to establish ground rules with you. I don't want to get into the substance of foreign policy.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Frost/Kissinger

1:50 p.m. 10/16/70

-2-

F: Particularly between you and I because we discuss things off the record so we will work out on the record.

K: Right and an hour and a half is a long time.

F: If you want 45 mins. would be easy. And we could work out something over a drink in Calif.

K: Lets get together in Calif. Probably early afternoon is good for me -- at 3:00.

F: Post-lunch date at 3:00. I am addressing the Women's Press Club.

K: And I, a group of tycoons.

F: ? ? ? ? In terms of the program how about after the elections on some -- we wouldn't tape until after that. A couple of suggestions -- Wed. the 4th or the 5th or the following week Mon. - Thurs., 9-12. We tape at the end of the day -- around 6:30.

K: Let's settle that on Tues. I will see you on Tues. at the Beverley Hills. If it's a crisis within 3 days afterwards, as much as I like you I will not see you again.

F: Only 2 days. The 3rd isn't up to me. Look forward to seeing you.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCORN

Bill Leonard/Kissinger

3:00 pm 10/16/70

L: I called to thank you.

K: You did a good job. You kept your promise.

L: It wasn't as good as I wanted it to be. It didn't do you justice. I wish it had more of your mind and less of your body.

K: Everyone has made favorable comments.

L: Only from me.

K: With 5-6 minutes of interviewing they couldn't get into substance.

L: It was good for the country and us and I hope for you.

K: You are nice to say this. It was a dignified and good job. I appreciated the way Mike and Margaret Osmer went at it. It was done with respect and dignity.

L: I know your original trepedition. I am glad we are having this conversation.

K: You have a friend here.

L: I am glad.

By: KHC NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Johnson/Kissinger
3:05 pm 10/16/70

K: Two things -- one, you have the word that you have prevailed as usual and we are inviting the 5 regional people. It's absolutely right.

J: Yes.

K: We have issued a directive on burden sharing and we have asked Laird to re-draft the cable as a result of it. Our views and State's are close on this. Help us police it and don't duck responsibility on us.

J: On the re-draft?

K: Yes. We don't want to blackmail Europe. We want to keep them making military x instead of ______ for us.

J: To the degree we cannot get ______ we will get ______.

K: A financial one because they think they cannot get the cut.

J: I will follow up.

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telcon
Secretary Rogers
16 Oct 70; 6:30 p.m.

(Secretary Rogers talked to General Haig for a few minutes, in Dr. Kissinger's absence.)

R: I have been tied up all day and haven't heard any news. I heard a report that the Pentagon made further comments about the Cuba base.

Haig: What happened is the Navy reported that the tender and the tug had pulled into the Marian base up north, that all Soviet ships come into. They just announced that quietly today which infuriated...

(Dr. Kissinger entered conversation at this point.)

K: I was going to call you to let you know this Defense announcement on Cuba was totally unauthorized. The President went through the ceiling. It was really outrageous. This is the port where they always stop and refuel. This now puts them into the position where they seem to have backed down.

R: It is going to be tough for me to handle tonight with Gromyko.

K: They didn't even give us the intelligence. We learned of it 3 minutes before they put it on the news. I had Al call up and say nothing would be said. They called and said it was already done.

R: What did they actually say?

K: Submarine that left Cienfuegos Harbor has reappeared and now is in another harbor. Gave name of it. Made it sound like not much of a menace. Asked, does that mean they are establishing a submarine base. Answered, we are watching the situation.

R: The Russians are going to wonder whether we are shaking them particularly on the meeting, or my meeting with Gromyko.

K: You are going to announce whenever you think proper the meeting with the President -- right?

R: The President suggested I do it Monday, and I think it much better Monday.

K: That was the President's view to make it look as if it came out of your meeting with Gromyko.

*

By: KML NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Telcon - Rogers (Contd)

R: Gromyko knows about it, does he?

K: Yes. But I didn't tell him the details.

R: Why not tell him we think it is tentative at present but I will have final announcement Monday.

K: I think he may think it goes this week, but you may tell him the details on Monday. And we will announce it Monday. The meeting will be Thursday at 11, the President and you on our side and Gromyko and Dobrynin on theirs.

R: Why not play it that way because I think it much better to do it on Monday.

ms

*

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Secy. Laird

7:20 p.m., October 16, 1970

By: KHL NARA, Dale: 5/12/04

K: Three things, two of which I have to talk around. That thing, ...

L: Yeah.

K: I got a briefing that you mentioned to me.

L: Yeah, right.

K: That one operation, the President wants to go ahead with it. November is suitable.

L: I have it laid on, all I have to do is call it off.

K: He wants it held to you, me and him. Anyone from you that has to know of course.

L: It has been fairly well worked out. What did you think of it?

K: I thought it was outstanding. I told the President you deserved [a lot of credit, that you did an outstanding job.]

L: They are confident they can do it. Once in a while we have to take chances.

K: If it fails, then it shows that we at least tried something. ??? that country a few weeks ago. We want to know before anything is actually done.

L: This is something we haven't done ???? and they shouldn't misinterpret the message we sent them.

K: Right, you shouldn't pull back from that thought. The third thing, that Star story. That is awfully ________ when senior Defense officials can [make those statements. ________] I think I know where it came from.

L: Where do you think it came from Henry?

K: [I don't know and I don't want to be accused of making allegations but I think it came out of ISA.] First of all it was Sisco who said it, not the White House. Without going into the mechanics of it all, Defense and White House have worked very well together. [Now this.]

*

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELECON

L: I have already checked with Dan Henkin and [he couldn't find out who made the statement.]

K: [It was probably] Pranger or one of his people. They are psychosomatic on this issue. I don't think Kelly would write a thing like that unless someone had given it to him.

L: I thought it might have been some of the military that did it. I will call ISA and check it out.

K: You and I have worked so well together [we didn't need this sort of thing.]

L: I went to Dan Henkin and I thought he handled it right.

K: We don't need to say anything more about it.

L: It might be ISA, I will check that out. Have got three or four people that talked to Kelly from the Joint Staff.

K: ???? Actual what happened is Sisco said it but they are attacking the President too and I didn't think ????.

L: I was damn mad and I called Henkin and ______. I'll get to ISA on that tomorrow. Anything else?

K: Not now.

L: I am going to make a ______ in Milwaukee tomorrow afternoon.

K: Are you going there? Are you going to be there with the President?

L: Right, television interview program set up in connection with the visit but I won't get into any trouble.

K: [Don't worry about this story.] ???

L: That really bothered me. Henkin tried to talk to everyone that talked to Kelly.

K: I think it is a reflection ????.

*

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Secy. Laird

7:20 p.m., October 16, 1970 -- page 3

L: Yes, it's a reflection.

K: The President will be sore as hell, he likes these backgrounders. The White House doesn't say anything that he hasn't personally approved before and most of the time he is sitting right there.

L: Nobody in my shop has ever criticized the backgrounders before. I know Bill doesn't like them but he doesn't criticize them. You know they use these damn ploys around town to try and divide us all the time.

K: They can't divide us. Have a good time in Wisconsin, Mel.

L: Will be back and be here Sunday. Might not be able to check that out tomorrow, I may have to wait until Monday.

K: All right Mel.

wgh

*

By KM W

NARA, Dated 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Herb Klein

7:35 p.m., October 16, 1970

HAK: Are you taking advantage of the yokels again.

K: (laughter)

HAK: Not answering questions.

K: Making me self-conscious when I go into my act. I tried to reach Frost.

HAK: He called me today and I told him in principal that you had tried to reach him and I guess he expected what it was all about. He, as it happens will be on the West Coast staying at the same hotel where I will be staying. The thing I don't know, do you think it makes any difference if I do it before the elections?

K: It would be helpful.

HAK: Would have to press him pretty hard.

K: Don't think you want to press him hard. His normal simulation (?) time is two weeks ahead. Did he mention that to you at all?

HAK: No, he said he would be on the West Coast for 10 days. If I pressed him, he would tape on Monday while I was on the West Coast.

K: Don't want to press if it won't be anything good.

HAK: I told him what it was, that I don't want to do an hour and a half and I wanted a veto on the girl that comes on the show after me.

K: What you are saying is you want your type, not his.

HAK: I am coming back Monday and going out to the West Coast.

K: I will check on the packaging time through Westinghouse. I saw what one of your close friends in the Pentago put out.

HAK: What am I going to do, Sisco put this out, not us.

K: Just forget it, if that is all the static you are going to get.

*

By KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Herb Klein

7:35 p.m., October 16, 1970 -- page 2

HAK: These backgrounders work pretty well. [The President likes them and most of the time he is sitting right there.]

K: If this is the only knock we are going to get ?????.?

HAK: I called Laird. Why don't you call Laird while he is still sweating. Really call him and tell him the President likes these backgrounders and that he will really be [outraged].

K: I'll call him ????.

HAK: Can you do it right away and [let me know afterwards].

K: Got to speak at a dinner in a little while [I will do it as soon afterwards as I can].

HAK: Poor sucker, if you wouldn't look seem so kind.

K: I am.

HAK: You don't feel ?????

K: About tonight ..... ???

HAK: Just wait until I am back at Harvard and get into their good graces. They will never forgive your loyalty.

K: I'll get back to you in a little while.

wgh

*

By KHU NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Bill Safire
7:50 p.m., October 16, 1970

K: How is my Press Relations advisor?

S: You have taken over for me. That was the most fantastic show I have ever seen; it not only reflected well on you, but also on the President and the Administration.

K: Oh, really? You liked it? I couldn't judge it dispassionately.

S: The shots with the kids and the touch at the end were great. That was a marvelous, profound statement.

K: I was sorry it was not in my segment, but Mike Wallace explained that it got more listeners that way, because they were tuned in to the news. I didn't look too pompous?

S: No; it made you look human. Barbara XXX Howar was great.

K: She was, but they didn't use her best line. They asked her how she could go with someone of such a different political affiliation? Her reply was, "Politics makes strange bed-fellows."

But my reason for calling is we have done a UN speech here. The President thinks it should have your stylistic hand -- particularly to find a punch line. He hasn't seen it yet. I think it has a lot of six-syllable punch lines.

S: Ray Price was doing that.

K: The sequence was: Ray Price, my shop, then back to Ray Price. But he wants you to look at it. I understand you will be traveling with him tomorrow. When can you look at it?

S: Can you get somebody to bring it to my house tonight?

K: And you would have it back to me in the morning? I have to have it for him Sunday morning.

S: And it needs punchlines and sharpening?

K: Yes; it will have it to you within an hour. Thanks for your comments on the other thing. The President wants me to go on the David Frost show. Should I?

*

By: KHU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/Bill Safi
7:50 p.m., October 16, 1970

- 2 -

S: Lay off for three months. You have had tremendous success with this. If you suddenly go to David Frost, it can't be as good.

K: Don't say things like that; you know my ego.

S: I would hold off on Frost.

K: I think you are right.

S: Until around Christmastime.

K: In time for the next Tet offensive. I can stagger on and, drooling a bit, say... You know, in this show, I wanted to say, "I could never achieve all I do without Rogers' assistance."

Later call: 8:10 p.m.

K: Bill, see if you can reduce the speech to 2600 words -- it is presently about 3000 words. Will you keep that in mind? But the last two pages you can't touch. ■ You can cut all that garbage about racial XXX equality. I have Winston Lord sitting here; he is a bigot in reverse. He doesn't like white people.

S: You have my mouth watering -- I'm dying to see the speech.

K: If we can keep them awake until the last two pages, we will have it made. It is a good rhetorical speech which is all he wanted. It has a few substantive proposals.

Ids

*

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELCONE

Dr. Kraemer/Kissinger
early morning 10/16/70

K: On Tuesday you had a meeting with your top man and also with the master of the (a French term I didn't get) and where representatives of Labor -- George and Jay. This also an interest to Jay where the top man said to call the signals and we will follow you. He said you were quiet and he felt he couldn't speak openly. He thought (again the French term) was unbrilliant.

HAK: It was worse than that.

K: I am using the English understatement. I saw the man for several hours the other night. He is a close friend. He asked me that you call the signals and tell me and we will follow them -- he said you were the only one understanding. He said he would arrange himself to your wishes to have a conversation with you and Gen. Haig and myself and not in your office. They cannot become known as the executors of the will --

HAK: I understand.

K: Think about it and let me know if we could arrange something at your place -- not so good -- or my place. I never, but never, go into any restaurants.

HAK: I cannot go to a g restaurant without being in the newspapers.

K: Everyone tells me that this half hour thing x brought you out nicely in a good way. I didn't see it.

HAK: Lucky the Harvard professors behaved outrageously.

K: They said that. I have my reasons to disturb you on this --

HAK: You never disturb me.

K: Would you look at your calendar ?

HAK: I will be on the West Coast for part of next week.

K: He is generally only here from Mon. - Wed. Then he is in NY.

HAK: I will be out of town Mon. - Wed. Evening. Thurs. evening is dangerous because the President is giving a speech the next day and Fri. I will be with the President in NY.

By KHC NARA, Dale 5/12/04

-2-

K: When can this be --

HAK: Nothing can be done at this end for top level attention before the 3rd.

K: That's just one issue. It's partially an internal matter and should be done before the 3rd.

HAK: Maybe Wed. Evening if I get back in time.

K: You cannot predict your time?

HAK: Around 9:00 -- not for dinner. Maybe it will slip to 9:30.

K: I will say tentatively 9:00 Wed. at my home.

HAK: I will be delighted. I think it's better then my home.

K: I believe that. Your home should be looked after by some people. I talked with Bell Hess the other day and made the point that you had a private home and it doesn't take much to find it. This man said if you hadn't talked to me about him he would only be another professor from the East. He is very reliable for you.

HAK: I know that. I met him through you.

K: Our conversation in my office, I will do everything to help. I will call JL and say tentatively Wed. If he says that night he cannot do it, I will let your secretary know. God be with you.

HAK: Thank you.

*

By: K.M.U NARA, Date: 5/12/04

TELCON
Flanigan/Kissinger

afternoon 10/16/70

F: I understand the head of the Japanese Chamber of Commerce is coming to see Shultz. I have another thought. Since then 2 things have happened. We have this ridiculous proposal from Miazawa and Sato's position in the press conference. To be sure they know how we feel, ask him to come in and tell them how we feel.

K: Silence is the best. They know how we feel. If we get angry, they have more on us. We don't want the trade bill but the more they know, the worse it is.

F: There's a press story in that turns around what you said to Ushiba here. It says you wanted our ____.

K: I would just ignore that.

K: F: Leave it be. If he comes in on his own initiative?

K: Give him hell.

F: There's no statement from them that on this issue of textiles, Sato should not bring it up.

K: Let's wait with that until early next week.

*

GELCON
President/Kissinger
late afternoon 10/16/70

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

R: I have decided that I am so tied up for tomorrow I will not have time to look at the speech today and that will give them another day. He is going tomorrow with me but see if Safire has any thoughts for sharpening up.

K: I sent one copy to Price to make him feel better but Safire gets it into the best language.

P: XXX He may think of a phrase that will catch on. I sent over a little yellow sheet that made the points I made yesterday. The ideas from the two speeches -- not building missiles and so forth. That up-lift theme is very important in the conclusion.

K: It's not true there now. Maybe it's not adequately. Perhaps we can lift it more. We lifted it the ______ one paragraph from it.

P: Don't refer back. Just quote it as if it's new. I want to see it at 10:00 a.m. Sunday. No sooner. The way it's working -- your fellow and Price so we have a montage. In terms of length it cannot be over 2500 words.

K: It's probably a little more now.

P: It's got to be in terms of 2600-2700. I cannot take 3500 words and cut it this weekend. I may want to put something in. I prefer close to 2500. I don't think it requires more than that. What is the general thrust now?

K: I could get a copy now. The general thrust is general words about the UN.

P: I don't have time to fill my mind with it now. In the beginning we want perspective of history.

K: Some of who had seen changes of 25 years.

P: Number of new nations and number of new people since WWII. Number of people born since the UN has come into being.

K: Then there's a section which speaks of need for restraint in international relations and Soviet/U.S. relations and winds up with theme --

P: Of what pulls us together --

K: And first 25 years we were enemies and became adversaries and now let's become competitors. Now we should do something jointly. Prisoners of war, peacekeeping, narcotics. Then a very idealistic section working towards peace.

*

By KLC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

President/Kissinger
late afternoon 10/16/80

-2-

P: What you could do is get in the theme that 25 years ago the U.S. had basically worked together to bring UN into being and hopes of the world were there for the two great powers working together and the great secret (?) in the next 25 years is to work together again. It downgrades the other nations but they know it's the truth.

K: It doesn't have to. It's good.

P: Say with our allies and friends reached a point to meet in San Francisco and we worked together despite differences in ideology and did not impair our working together readily and now we need a framework for victory for peace. We worked together for a military victory, now we need a victory over poverty and that stuff. Give Ray and Safire a crack. I want a final version at 10:00 a.m. Sunday morning. That gives the boys more time.

K: You will have a good product.

P: We may catch the mood in view of the fact that Gromyko meeting was the day before. We may catch the right note and get some credit for the speech. We didn't last year.

K: There was a concerted campaign against you last year.

P: Even though it was a good speech but in comparison to Kennedy's speech -- I was reading the Kennedy speech after the Russians recognized East Germany and he talked about Stalingrad. What rhetoric! And in terms of inflammatory -- talks about wall being built thereafter. I would have built it too! We are standing firm here and there. It was basically as at the inaugural, to move people without the responsibility. Even Bartlett -- do they realize how irresponsible that period was?

K: Not actually but if they ask what they accomplished -- the text ban was 3 years after ____.

P: The test ban was no accomplishment.

K: Put everything underground where it's hard to figure out what they are doing.

P: ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? You are using a lot of Price.

K: Yes.

P: Get Safire to work it but not re-write it. You need one architect.

*

TELECON

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

October 16, 1970 -- late p.m.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

S: Sorry to call so late, but we just finished up.

K: That's okay; I appreciate your calling.

S: Not at all. First, Henry, what was discussed was topics that are familiar -- the Middle East, Indo-China, SALT, Berlin and the Seabeds was just touched upon very, very briefly.

K: Right.

S: On the Middle East, Gromyko dwelled primarily on the non-responsibility theme -- that they weren't responsible; they didn't agree to any of all this.

K: That is, they never agreed to the ceasefire, so it isn't their fault.

S: So none of it is their fault. I think you can summarize ... All we got into... It got into the question of we made clear the notion of going into the General Assembly is no damn good. The Secretary said that rectification was required, and each stuck to his own line, in other words. Nobody changed anybody's mind at this point, although we agreed that in the next meeting on Monday, we would pursue the discussion further.

On Berlin, the Secretary made clear that this last proposal of theirs at this last meeting we didn't like the position they took, and again the talk was quite inconclusive, largely the Secretary reiterating the position in terms of how we see it. They, in turn, did the same. But nothing very concrete -- no movement one way or the other.

On SALT, just a very, very minimal reference -- merely looking towards the beginning of the renewal of the talks and a mutual expression that they would make progress.

On Vietnam, the Secretary started out by saying we had had good worldwide reaction to our proposals; very good unity at home; and took note of the rejection thus far. He didn't ask the Russians to do anything specific, but the conversation turned -- Gromyko turned the conversation into pressing the Secretary on whether we agreed to a coalition government or not. That if we agreed to a coalition government, why maybe the Russians would be willing to be helpful, in effect.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12950, Sect. 3.6

*

By KHLNARA, Date 5/12/04

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinge

October 16, 1970 -- late p.m.

S: (cont'd) The Secretary handled that, I thought, very well. He said, "Who knows what is meant by a coalition government? What do you mean by a coalition government? The other side, in effect, defines a coalition government to mean 'kick out the present crowd in South Vietnam,'" and he concluded by saying that the President had made it clear that whatever propositions that the two parties really agreed to -- you know, if they get together, why we could accept whatever they got together on.

So the whole summary of the evening is that there were no changes on either side.

K: What was the general mood?

S: The mood, I would say, not unfriendly; businesslike; frank, straightforward. Every now and then, Gromyko showed some sensitivity over the fact that we had accused them of cheating; said it had caused difficulties in their government. The Secretary responded that this had caused difficulties in our government -- their cheating. We don't understand it. On Vietnam, he pressed the Secretary, I thought, very hard on the usual Communist strategy. He said, "Do you include a coalition government?" The Secretary said, "We have said we don't like the word coalition government; we don't know what it means; the other side's defined it in this way; but what we have said is we will go along with any proposal the two really can get along with." "Then you do bar a coalition government -- you know that kind of Communist strategy of boring in.

[Beginning of new tape]

S: ...after the meeting.

K: Did you discuss that with them?

S: You mean on the announcement?

K: Yeah.

S: Not in my presence that I recall but, in any event, what...

K: Were they alone PART of the time?

By KHLW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Joe Sisco/Mr. Kissinger

October 16, 1970 -- late p.m.

S: They got off to a corner part of the time, but, Henry, the President's plans are precisely what -- I mean the Secretary's plans are precisely those that were indicated by you and the President; namely, that the Secretary would announce that after Monday night's meeting and not before.

K: Right, as long as the other...

S: There's no misunderstanding on this.

K: No, no; I know you understand it. But do you think the Russians understand it?

S: I'm sure that if they don't understand it at the moment, they will because the Secretary's very clear about it.

K: Well, they wouldn't announce it anyway.

S: No, they wouldn't. That'll work out all right.

K: Okay. Now, how about your doing a little personal memo for me after the second meeting, laying out what you think the President should say, at least in your area.

S: Well, I think we ought to do, if it's agreeable, I think...and also I'll get together with Martin. Frankly, we need to give you... What I'll do...I will cough up and see that the Department as such sends forward a series of talking points on all the key subjects: Vietnam, the Middle East, and on Berlin, and on SALT -- just those four.

K: And as much of a summary of what actually was said...

S: Although we'll send you a cable on this and we'll send you a cable on the Monday night meeting. That'll be plenty of time to digest the two cables before Friday night's meeting.

K: Terrific.

S: All right, Henry.

K: Good, many thanks, Joe. You've been a good friend.

By KHW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04 Textiles

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Professor Yoshida

October 16, 1970 -- late p.m.

K: Hello.

Y: Hello.

K: How are you?

Y: All right; fine. And you?

K: I'm fine.

Y: I'm sorry to disturb you at this hour.

K: No, that's all right. I just got home.

Y: My friend is leaving home for the States tomorrow. I have spoken to him a few hours ago. I should like to convey the following message to you for your information and consideration. First, my friend is looking forward to meeting your friend, and at that meeting, he does intend to raise the issue to your friend and wishes to discuss with him of the problem the sincere hope that this time you can decide when a Solution can be reached between them.

K: It's impossible unless you come with a different proposal. power to state.) in

Y: Definitely; I have the/ (So, between, our specialists are going to be working very hard on that proposal.

K: Yes; you mean your specialists, or your specialists and our specialists?

Y: Could I give you second part of his message?

K: Right. I just want to understand whose specialists will be doing the work.

Y: That's right. For this is directed to my next point.

K: I see; good.

Y: This is a request from my friend. He is now sending to your

By: KHLW NARA, Dalo.

5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/Professor Iosmua

October 16, 1970 -- late p.m.

Confederation

country, Uemura, the President of the KOMU of Economic Organizations, the most powerful organization of all in this field -- to meet with a number of popular business leaders in your country. This gentleman is the highest business leader. He is here in my country often called the Prime Minister of Japanese business community. For everybody knows about this in your country if you are interested in the issue.

K: Oh, yes, I know who he is.

Y: Oh, I see. Who is to usually XDEXX?

K: Right.

the

Y: And holding the key. Now, in fact, he is being sent as X special envoy of my friend. He knows the facts, too, -- the possibility of meeting acceptable solution for this particular issue and also plus other economic problems between them. He leaves here in four hours time.

K: He what?

Y: He leaves here for your country in four hours time from now. This is a very quick, urgent decision, decided by my friend and his "highest aides," specifically Mr. M, Mr. A, and others.

K: Right.

Y: He is first to go to New York to meet some top business leaders of the __________ -- Mr. Kendall and many others. And on to Washington, D. C.

K: When will he be in Washington?

Y: Next week around October 21st or 22nd -- KOMX around that time. This would be a few days earlier than the Stans Committee. Would it be possible for your friend to receive him and to hear his views?

K: I doubt it.

Y: You doubt it.

K: Yes, because my friend will be traveling practically the whole time.

*

Mr. Kissinger/Profess

October 16, 1970 -- late p.m.

By KHW NARA, Date 5/13/04

Y: I see. In the view of my friend, it would be most helpful...

K: Yes, the trouble is my friend will not be in town.

Y: I see. Your friend would be in New York?

K: No.

formal

Y: This could be arranged if ~~KHW~~ KHW request for an appointment would be made through the ordinary channel, and my friend feels that this is the most helpful.

K: Yes. Also, I don't see what my friend could tell him that you don't already know.

Y: I see.

K: We have already told Mr. Chase(?) and we've told everybody what we think. I mean what's the point of repeating it?

Y: I see. But he is the business leader, and we have to have the cooperation of the industry concerned. That is the real difficulty on the part of my friend. If my friend comes here, he can give a directive -- an order. That is very easy, but as long as it's called voluntary, we have to have the cooperation; and now the business as a whole is very much inclined to cooperate with my friend.

K: Well, our problem is that.. Why don't you get them to request the appointment, and I will see what I can do, but I'm not too optimistic. Excuse me a second; can you hold on a second? [A call came through on the other line]

K: Hello.

Y: Certainly, we are thinking that we are going to do that through ordinary channels. already, we are thinking that we are going to do that through ordinary channels. Already, our representative at your place has been given the urgent instruction.

K: Well, we will do what we can.

Y: But, if this could be arranged before Mr. [__] 's departure, my friend would like to give further instructions.

*

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Mr. Kissinger/Profess

October 16, 1970 -- late p.m.

K: Well, it cannot be arranged in four hours. It's the middle of the night here.

Y: I don't have any problem with that. But, if there is some possibility, then my friend would like to give him further detailed instructions.

K: Well, we will do our best. I cannot promise it, but I will do my best.

Y: Fine; I'm sure my friend will greatly appreciate it if you do your best. This gentleman is ready to go anywhere to meet Chief of State.

K: All right; I will do my best.

Y: Could I tell my friend that you will be doing your best, so that my friend could give as much detailed directive and guidance to this gentleman before he leaves here in four hours time?

K: Yes.

Y: And formal request will be made through the ordinary channel.

K: Correct.

is

Y: All right; that's fine. In the meantime, if there/anything I can be of any help because before my friend leaves tomorrow, I can reach him almost instantaneously almost any time, would you please let me know?

K: Well, if anything comes up, I will let you know.

Y: Please.

K: I appreciate this very much.

you

Y: Thank you very much and I hope that we will somehow arrange... This is a different nature.

K: Well, I will do my best, but I must warn you, our people are getting extremely impatient, and do think, in fact, that you really don't want an agreement.

*

Mr. Kissinger/Profess

October 16, 1970 -- late

By KHW

NARA, Dalo S/12/04

Y: I see.

K: It would be very bad if this appointment were to lead to another series of deadlocks.

Y: I see. Is that the feeling of your friend?

K: That's the feeling of my friend. He is, of course, delighted to see your friend, but he is frankly not eager to discuss this particular issue unless there is some prospect of agreement.

Y: Oh, I see.

K: And I will do my best to arrange the other appointment, but I hope that if this other appointment occurs, this man will have some instructions with which he can talk.

Y: Yes, yes. He is an economist; a mystic he is not.

K: Well, my friend is not either.

Y: But this is a big secret; he will only question of technical nature.

K: Yes, but my friend is not equipped to discuss the technical side.

Y: That's true, but it is my understanding that since this XXXXXX XXXXXX are going into a great exchange of ________ on the part of the Japanese business community as a whole.

K: Well, we will do our best.

Y: Tremendous pressure upon the industry concerned.

K: Well, we will do our best, and I will let you know. You make the request through regular channels.

Y: Yes, certainly. Thank you very much. Nice getting in touch with you again. I'll try to keep in touch with you.

K: Please do. Good-bye.

By KHLU NARA, Dato 5/12/04

TELECON

Ambassador Freeman/Mr. Kissinger

10:55 a.m., October 17, 1970

K: First, one official thing. The President says he will be delighted to see the Prime Minister anytime that we can mutually work out. He has a slight preference for California but recognizes the problems. You give us some dates. He really is delighted to see him any time. I take it the Prime Minister doesn't care where it is. Just give us two or three dates and we will work with them.

F: He was intrigued when the President mentioned California.

K: If it's California, it has to be after Christmas. Otherwise, we can do it here or consider doing it at Key Biscayne, but I don't like that very much.

F: I will give you some dates.

K: Katherine kindly suggested doing something for tomorrow. Unfortunately, my brother will be in town and I will be pretty tied up.

F: We have a free day and she thought it would be nice to see you; a good occasion.

K: There doesn't have to be an occasion and I'm sorry I am not able to do it.

lds

By: KHL V NARA, Date: 5/13/04

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/Larry Lynn

12:30 p.m., October 17, 1970

K: How are you?

L: Pretty good.

K: How is academia? It occurred to me after I talked the other day -- I had assumed you wanted to stay a year. If you want to leave before then -- say, at the end of a term -- my offer would be good then, too.

L: I don't like it nearly as well as I thought I would.

K: You are bored to tears. Seriously, I would make you Deputy Assistant for Plans and Programs. If you want to leave earlier, that would be fine, too.

L: I will have to stay a while -- through March anyway. After that I can start thinking about something else.

K: I just want you to know that it is open.

L: I appreciate your saying that, and I would probably like to consider it.

K: I think this is the right place for you.

L: It seems like it now.

K: Elliot Richardson is bored to tears at HEW; he'd give anything to be back as Under Secretary of State.

L: That's terribly interesting. I take it you will be there then?

K: What my situation is... One of these days, they will trigger me and I will walk out.

L: That risk is always there.

K: You can replace me before Sonnenfeldt takes it. I haven't decided 100% -- if I'm here, it's open.

L: Sometime when I'm back, I would like 5 to 10 minutes to chat a little more about. My wife doesn't like it here.

Mr. Kissinger/Larry Ly

12:30 p.m., October 17,

By: KHL NARA, Date: 5/12/04

K: Tell her the suggestion I made the other day is still open. Seriously, I will do something to get her something useful to do.

L: Henry, you have been very kind. It's awfully nice of you. We will think seriously about taking you up on this.

K: Do that. I hope to see you soon. All the best to your wife.

L: Thank you. I'm grateful for your call and will think seriously about it.

lds

By KHL NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

TELECON

Charles Meyer/Mr. Kissinger

4:40 p.m., October 17, 1970

M: When do you want the paper for the President?

K: Actually, preferably tomorrow.

M: Tomorrow?

K: Well, if they want to find out. Because he is here tomorrow and and Monday he will be gone again.

M: When you say tomorrow, what does that mean?

K: Tomorrow noon, but any time tomorrow for that matter.

M: All right.

K: While you're on the phone, let me ask you something. How strongly do you feel about getting Korrey back there?

M: Well, I think he ought to go back. He didn't think that if Allende was President that the current ambassador should continue.

K: Right.

M: I think not to send him back would be more difficult than we know how to handle.

K: I just want to make sure we have somebody there who does what he is told.

M: He will, I think, and the reverse of that is to have a headless horse, like the DCMs. They just don't carry the same clout.

K: Well yes. We can have the paper by tomorrow noon?

M: Yes sir.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELECON

Gordon Richardson/Mr. Kissinger

4:55 p.m., October 17, 1970

K: How nice to hear from you.

R: I couldn't come through again without saying "hi."

K: I didn't know you had a daughter here.

R: She married a man working at the World Bank. How are you?

K: I'm fine. How long will you be here?

R: Today, tomorrow and Monday morning. But I'll be back before the end of the year.

K: Let me know ahead of time next time. I have my brother here this weekend.

R: I would love to talk about old times and new times.

K: I'm delighted to know you now have additional reasons for coming to Washington. How have you been?

R: I have been well. I had a bad time a year ago.

K: You had an eye operation. Are you all right again?

R: Exactly on the anniversary, I had another operation. But I'm better than ever.

K: I would imagine an eye operation is the most frightening experience one could go through.

R: It is absolutely awful. I stayed with George Kendall. I had a detached retina, but I'm just as good as ever.

K: I had another friend who had a similar operation who said, for a few days, it was a terrible experience.

R: It is a terrifying experience. I went back to England.

K: We were going to meet at that time; you had to go back.

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

Gordon Richardson/Mr.
4:55 p.m., October 17, 1970

- 2 -

R: May I do that sometime.

K: I am counting on it, in fact. I would like very much indeed
to see you.

R: I would like it awfully. Will do that the next time I come to
Washington.

K: Call me a week ahead and we will arrange lunch or dinner.

R: I didn't call before I came this time because I knew you must
be terribly busy.

K: Call next time; I will make every effort for selfish reasons.
But we understand each other. If for some reason I can't make it,
you will understand.

lds

Mr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissi

October 17/18 (?), 1970

(tape) jlj

By: KHLW NARA, Date: 5/13/04

K: Yes. How are you?

Y: I am all right thank you. I am very sorry to disturb you.

K: No, that's all right.

Y: I got a message from Haig and I got in touch with my friend in New York. He is sending now his business friend, visitor, to see you and Mr. Flanigan on 22nd at your place. Will that be all right?

K: That will be fine.

Y: The request will be made through ordinary channels. So our parliament representative in your place could come along with this gentleman.

K: Right.

Y: The deal why I called you is to get your varied plans on the coming meeting. I talked with my friend just a few hours ago and my friend is concerned about the political climate at your place. Your friend is in the middle of election campaign and during a statement in the press - My friend is concerned what would be the best way to be helpful to your friend in the campaign and if the other tries to reach an acceptable solution we may have to ask just a little of concession from your side and this might be cleared up by your friend's opponents politically.

[Transcriber's note: This conversation was difficult to hear and in transcribing a certain amount of personal interpretation was used to make the conversation track.]

Mr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

October 17/18 (?), 1970

By KHL NARA, Dalo

5/12/04

K: Yes

Y: I don't know -- it is a very, very delicate question and from your friend's point of view rather stick to this trade bill and take very hard provisions might be more helpful to his campaign. We don't know. But my friend, as a politician, is well aware that the timing may not be quite right from your point of view. Just in the middle of elections . . .

K: No. Our election is November 3rd.

Y: Right

K: And, therefore, even if there is an agreement in principle, we could delay the announcement of the details until after November 3rd.

Y: I see.

K: So there is no problem about that. I must say that your side has not come up with anything that we can even consider, before or after November 3rd.

Y: I see.

K: And you could have no idea that we could accept any of Miazawa's proposals after November 3rd. We just won't do it.

Y: I see. The only reason my friend is concerned is that he wants to be of some help, however belatedly, to your friend on this political mission.

K: It would have been of considerable help if there had been some agreement earlier.

Y: Yes

K: An agreement now will not do so much good as it would have done three months ago. But that isn't the main point. We are not discussing it now for political reasons.

Y: No

Mr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinge:
October 17/18 (?), 1970

By KML NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: Your friend could not delay in making proposals because of our elections. We would accept something along the lines of what Haig gave you the other day. But we will not accept less.

Y: I see. Am I right in understanding that what Haig gave me in this way, the major points, were already given to my friend and people through the channels in the only formal way? Am I right?

K: I think that is correct, yes. But I will check it and, if not, I will make sure they are given them tomorrow.

Y: Yes. I think that is very important and I, of course, conveyed what I heard from Haig in Seoul.

K: But I have to tell you, in all candor, our people don't believe you are serious.

Y: I see.

K: Because we are not seeing any concrete results out of our channel. Nothing has ever happened the way you and I talked. This is the difficulty.

Y: Yes, I see. But I hope you will trust me.

K: Oh, I trust you completely.

Y: Because I have been doing exactly what I told you and I believe that my friend is really concerned.

K: Yes, but we have to recognize how it looks to my colleagues. They don't even know you. All they know is that I tell them that I have reason to believe that the following things will happen. Then they never happen.

Y: Yes, that is true. To a large extent, I know, that has been the case.

K: And that is the difficulty.

Y: The gentleman and our parliament representative will probably come to meet you on the 22nd, but if they do not bring any concrete new proposals on our side . . .

Mr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissingel

October 17/18 (?), 1970

By: KHL NARA, Dato. S/12/04

- 4 -

K: That is a waste of time. You can be sure that I will not have a new proposal for them.

Y: No, no proposal for them. Yes, I know. And this political, I mean election campaign, doesn't have much relevance to this present.

K: It has no relevance at all.

Y: Not at all?

K: No

Y: Even after the election, if your proposal made through Mr. Haig the other day . . . I heard from Haig . . . What do you think is the minimum comment on your side? And there is no room for another consideration on your side?

K: That is right.

Y: And that will never change, even after the elections?

K: Absolutely not.

Y: Absolutely not.

K: No

Y: So you will have to go . . .

K: And you better tell your friend something else. I know he is seeing Kendall tomorrow. Kendall does not speak for us. Kendall speaks for himself. And it doesn't make any difference what Kendall or David Rockefeller says. They do not speak for us.

Y: I see. All right. I will convey that. And I want to make quite clear to my friends that even after the election there will be no change of your position.

K: Absolutely not.

Y: Absolutely not.

K: You can be sure, after the election, we will go with the trade bill if we don't get any agreement.

*

Mr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissi

October 17/18 (?), 1976

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

- 5 -

Y: I see. All right, because that is what I wanted to hear very clearly.

K: In fact, we are just not very eager to talk to you any more because we frankly have been very disappointed. But that has nothing to do with the election, it has just to do with general credibility.

Y: I see. Would you be very frank...

K: No. I trust you. We are friends for a long time so you know I am not directing this against you.

Y: Certainly. Will you please tell me very frankly because you see my friend and many of his aides, inspite of my ________ warning, they are not reading your mind correctly.

K: I don't know what they are reading, but I can assure you...

Y: It is very frank and candid, so there is very serious credibility gap.

K: Absolutely.

Y: Is that the feeling of yourself?

K: Yes.

Y: I see. So, (Am I right?) if there would be no agreement by 22nd also then...

K: No that I don't say. If there is no agreement by the 10th then we will go with the trade bill. But we do not want your friend to raise the issue with my friend unless there is an agreement ahead of time that there will be some prospect. We don't want my friend in the position again of making a deal which doesn't happen.

Y: That is right. Then both of them better not talk about that, that particular issue.

K: That is correct.

Y: Be much better off.

K: In any case we will not raise it.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/94

Mr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissing

October 17/18 (?), 1970

Y: That is right.

K: So your friend would have to raise it.

Y: That is clearly understood and he is going to do that.

K: Yes, but he better have something to say.

Y: But that is a question. That is the problem. I think I had better warn him again and . . .

K: I don't think abstract expressions of good-will are going to do much good at this point.

Y: No it won't. Since I know from the very beginning what has been taking place and probably I am the only one who knows the background. I can talk to my friend direct and not - he will be extremely sorry that he has not been able to honor . . .

K: We understand his problem. It is just that we cannot now engage in an endless negotiation again.

Y: No. That is true. But - All right, I will again like to talk to my friend and in the meantime . . . [End of tape]
[Begin new tape - Yoshida talking]

I should be keeping in touch with you again. Because I want to make sure that if there was no such agreement in advance, probably, it is my own personal feeling, probably, my own friend also not raise the question. That only embarrass your friend.

K: That's right.

Y: Don't you think so?

K: That's correct.

Y: So, until the last moment I would like to keep in touch with you and I would like to consult with you, how this particular issue concerns what my friend should do and meet with your friend.

K: Right

Y: I personally feel terrible about this.

Mr. Yoshida/Mr. Kissi

October 17/18 (?), 1970

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: No I understand this.

Y: I will be getting in touch with my friend again and in the meanwhile I would greatly appreciate for you to meet this gentleman, who is the most influential business leader in Japan, Monday. He influence cannot be even more in Japan when ________ industry concerned at home.

K: Right. Well, I will talk to him. And I will listen with interest to what he has to say.

Y: Would you please do that?

K: Right

Y: I am afraid it might be, turn out to be, just with the return of yours but I hope it might do something constructive to pave the way for the settlement but I am getting more and more pessimistic.

K: You are?

Y: Yes. I am afraid so. But I still - I will never give it up and I will try to do my very best to the last moment. And in a way I feel it is my duty because I am the only weakness [witness ?], outside the concern between us. I cannot tell anybody. . . I have never told anybody else but my own friend. I can appreciate your position. How embarrassing for you personally.

K: Well, that is not as important.

Y: We have agreed that something will happen and which has not happened. It is very embarrassing for you.

K: Nor has anything happened anywhere close to what we agreed.

Y: I know that my friend is going to express deep regret to your friend when he meets with him. I know that for a fact because he told me. And that my friend should do certainly. That won't do any good.

K: No it won't. Thank you very much and I shall be keeping in touch with you.

K: Good.

Y: Good-bye for now.

TELCON
Ray Price
1:15 p.m.

Reproduced from the open files
of the Nixon Presidential
Materials Staff
10/18/70

By: KHC NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Ray Price asked if there had been any changes made since the Friday night version; Dr. Kissinger stated that the changes made by Mr. Safire made it a much tighter version. He advised Price not to continue working on it until draft available from Winston Lord, probably tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger asked for Price's comments, suggested that one agreed-upon draft be proposed and if that not possible the alternatives should be presented, and give back to Lord. He added that he thought the Safire changes made the speech "quite good now," and that the draft will not be ready before tomorrow.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telcon
General Haig with Professor "Y"
10/18/70; 4:10 p.m. (ms)

H: This is Haig. I am calling for Professor Jones about your visitor who came over here on Saturday. He has talked to his friend and his friend says he doesn't think this would be a worthwhile meeting since his position was clearly stated and that we should leave it at that. However if the professor wants to meet with someone he could meet with Mr. Flanigan who is very well versed on Dr. Jones' friend's views on this. So I told the Doctor I would call you and convey this message.

Y: Oh, I see. Would you please explain who Mr. Flanigan is.

H: Mr. Flanigan is Dr. Jones' friend's man on this subject. He is here in the same place that Dr. Jones is.

Y: Would it be helpful to meet later with not only Mr. Flanigan, but also with Mr. Jones?

H: I am not so sure. I think Mr. Flanigan and Dr. Jones have worked on this closely together recently and I think at least that may be possible, but I think it is more important that he meet with Mr. Flanigan.

Y: Yes, I see. Fine.

H: It would depend on the date also because Prof. Jones will be out of the city some time this week - tomorrow afternoon and will not be back until Wednesday. But Mr. Flanigan is totally abreast, in fact, he is more intimately acquainted with the situation.

Y: I see. Prof. Jones and his friend would be traveling a great deal this week?

H: Yes. Although Prof. Jones will be back here Wednesday and will stay here for the remainder of the week. He will return late in the day on Wednesday.

Y: He will be available the 22nd and 23rd?

H: Yes.

Y: Fine. You see, the Doctor's friend is at present in very high standing in my country and he is at times the special envoy of my friend, so if it is possible will you please ask Mr. Jones that if possible at all we would very much like Dr. Jones and Mr. Flanigan together to meet the visitor. On the 22nd or 23rd.

H: Yes.

*

By KHW NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Prof. Y - (Contd)

H: This should not pose any problems. They are situated right next to each other here.

Y: Oh, I see. So that is no very big difficulty. Then I will try to convey this message to my friend who is now in New York, as you know. And the visitor is also in New York. And I am quite sure that my friend would tell his envoy, the visitor, right away.

H: Yes.

Y: Would you please tell me very frankly that this gentlemen, Mr. Flanigan, ....if I understand correctly, he can represent the view of Mr. Jones' friend?

H: Yes. Absolutely.

Y: On the part of our side there has been some certain degree of confusion. There has been some discussion of who would really represent the real view of Mr. Jones' friend. On the one hand, for instance, Mr. Stans, Mr. (Cramer ?), on the other hand Mr. Jones always speaks.

H: No, the number one official would be Mr. Flanigan.

Y: I see, so it is very important for the visitor who is in fact a special envoy of my friend, who should meet Mr. Flanigan.

H: Very Important. Yes.

Y: Also would you please tell me whether our side should meet Mr. Stans as well:

H: I don't think so. I would say just Mr. Flanigan and perhaps Dr. Jones.

Y: How about Mr. Johnson of State?

H: No.

Y: Because I don't want any confusion.

H: The best way to avoid confusion is to limit the discussion to the principal individual, Mr. Flanigan.

Y: That is very helpful. It is very important and most useful information for us. On the part of my friend, frankly speaking, there has been confusion whom this gentleman should meet. So am I correct in

Prof. Y (Contd)

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/13/04

understanding that this gentleman should not speak to either Mr. Stans or Mr. Johnson, but just to Mr. Jones and Mr. Flanigan. Am I right?

H: That is correct.

Y: Fine. Then I would like to tell this to my friend now in New York. And this gentleman should be with my friend because they are in very close touch. So would you please ask Dr. Jones that if he is available it is probably both Dr. Jones and Mr. Flanigan jointly receive this gentleman and discuss the matter fully and that would be an extremely helpful for the forthcoming meeting with my friend and Dr. Jones' friend on the 24th.

H: Yes. If your visitor wants to call here I could have him get in touch with Mr. Flanigan.

Y: Fine. Would it be possible for this gentleman to call your gentleman without getting in touch with our representative?

H: Yes, or if he would feel more comfortable going through normal channels.

Y: Yes. But if he would go through normal channel, the normal channel has to go through State, probably Mr. Johnson, and there might be some confusion. So, if it is not very convenient on his part he might try to get in touch with you directly.

H: Yes, that is all right.

Y: I am now fully awakened so I am just repeating so not any misunderstanding. In Washington this gentleman should meet with Flanigan and Dr. Jones, and that would be quite enough.

H: Yes.

Y: He doesn't have to see anyone else on the subject. Am I right?

H: That is correct.

Y: Fine, because in the past there has been some confusion. As you are probably aware, So my own friend was somewhat confused.

H: I think now our position is pretty clear that I gave to you on the phone earlier.

Y: Yes.

Prof. Y-Haig (Contd)

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

H: And I think Dr. Jones' friend feels that he has made it very clear.

Y: Ah, so, all right. Then if this gentleman should come to Washington the 22nd and Dr. Jones and Mr. Flanigan both would be available

H: Yes, on the 22nd Dr. Jones will be here all day. We will work that out.

Y: So this is a rather extraordinary situation. I don't know what my friend feels, but if this gentleman should get in touch with you directly, then you could have arrange an appointment with your gentleman directly.

H: Yes, I could do that.

Y: Because if he should go through this normal channel then there might be some confusion and some red tape.

H: Yes. Well we can avoid that.

Y: Fine, because time is very limited and it is so important that if there should be any room for reaching the basic understanding before the crucial meeting of the 24th, it will be very helpful. So I will get in touch with my friend right away.

H: Very good.

Y: I will let you know. You are there most of the time?

H: Yes, or they know how to reach me on the switchboard.

Y: Thank you very much, probably I shall be talking with you again and we will have to keep in touch with you closely until just before the meeting. And will you kindly keep me informed about the result? I am pretty positive that this gentleman will be calling you through the ordinary channel and this gentleman would discuss the matter...he would like to have some sensitive questions with Mr. Flanigan and, hopefully, with Dr. Jones on the subject. Would you or Mr. Johnson - I would very much like to tell me the result of the conversation from your side.

H: Yes, I understand.

Y: This is very important because I will have to tell my friend directly.

H: We will do that.

Y: What is important is the very frank, honest judgment and assessment of our new position so that I could let my friend know so that there is no confusion between them when my own friend comes to meet Dr. Jones' friend on Saturday.

By KHL NARA, Date 5/12/04

The President/Mr. Kissinge.

October 18, 1970

(tape)jlj

K: Mr. President

P: Henry, I wondered if, unless you thought badly, if we can't do anything usually for this skunk, but I thought I might call Trudeau and express sympathy about the killing of those two . . .

K: I think that would be very wise Mr. President.

P: After all, it is a horrible thing.

K: It is outrageous.

anybody

P: I don't like to have/. . . Don't you agree?

K: It would be a very generous gesture which would be appreciated all over Canada.

P: I'll call him right now then.

K: I think that's the right thing.

Fine

P: Blythe, Henry. I'm just going over now to work on the UN . . . you haven't seen it yet . . .

checked

K: You have it. I/. . . it this morning.

P: Yes I got it. Thank you Henry.

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Ki

October 18, 1970

(tape) jlj

By KHW NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: Bill, how are you?

R: Hi Henry, fine thank you. Met your brother last night...

K: Yes, he told me. He was very pleased.

R: I just want to check because I am going back to NY tonight about the plans for Thursday. Dobrynin said he talked to you last night about the planning but he didn't have a chance...

K: Right, I was going to call you today. The only thing he called about was the length of time and I told him it was between an hour and an hour and a half on the President's schedule. And then who was going to come. And I told him that you were going to make - the announcement was going to be made by you and that all the details, if there were any, other than the ones that he already knew but as I understand it, he is going to cover. . . he said that they may raise again what they had raised with you on the Middle East. And I said fine. . . you know I said that's what I expected. I would suggest Bill the thing to do is for you or Sisco to get the President a paper on what you think the President should respond. That's the only thing.

R: Did he say anything more about the possible Summit?

K: Yes, he said that Gromyko might respond when they talk about general policy. He said what Gromyko would want to do probably . . . he said what they have done in the past is have a general discussion and then all the specific items that had already been discussed with the Secretary. Had always in the past followed this as this time the Secretary's meetings. He said it is conceivable that Gromyko at the end of that might indicate their willingness to have it and . . .

R: Would he put it in terms of willingness to have it or sort of liking to have it?

K: I think - My impression - I didn't want to seem as if we were eager to get it.

R: He raised the subject.

K: He will raise the subject. And my impression is - Oh yes, there is one other othing. The President may want to do, is that he may want to talk for 5 minutes alone at the end of the meeting with Gromyko. But this

By: KHLU NARA, Date: 5/12/04

I haven't told Dobrynin yet. This is just something the President mentioned to me yesterday.

R: What's it about, do you know?

K: Well, I think what it will be about if he does it is that if the Summit meeting comes up - suggestion - comes in a forthcoming way he may want to raise with him whether there should be an announcement or not. And he may want to do it in a way so that if there is a turn down there won't be too many interpreters around. It also would be an opportunity and that we want to talk to you about, if those ships haven't left Cuba yet for him to say something about that.

R: In other words we are not sure whether they are going to leave or not yet? They are still there.

K: I don't think we get another readout before Tuesday. If they - they would normally stop there on their way out.

R: Ya, I know. The only difficulty with it I see with a private meeting is that it will - if it is known and it probably will be known - is that it will raise a lot of questions as to what it was about.

R:

K: We don't have to do it. It hasn't been mentioned to them yet. Well, why don't we just leave it open. If the President - I think as a matter of fact what he could do rather than having a private meeting would be to take him over to the side of the room and we could have coffee or something. In other words have a few minutes with him by himself, on that subject.

K: He could take him into his box little private office for a few minutes.

R: OK. Something like that or pretend he wants to show him something and then talk to him on the side. I have the feeling that the idea of a private meeting would be misconstrued. It will be known obviously.

K: I think that is a good idea. And this is not anything that they are now expecting so there is no problem about it. We can play that entirely by ear. But that's the only - Dobrynin told me that in the past what had happened was that Gromyko would turn to the President and say how - what is your preference and then that the President will say we will discuss general topic first, and so forth. And that then Gromyko is prepared to open and . . .

R: That's what he did with me the other night too. What should be talked about. What order? And I said that I would think these things but what are your views and he said that that coincides with my views except maybe

By KHLW

NARA, Date. 5/13/04

I said fine.

we ought to talk about this. What about a European security conference. /
We sort of agreed on how we would approach it. And you probably do
the same thing. Did he say anything about what we would say after the
meeting?

that's something

K: No. No and you might discuss with him tomorrow night.

R: The way I have been playing it at New York. What I have tried to do
is start off out - the New York Times headline was written before the
meeting, I think - but I think that generally the tone that I wanted to
create was sort of cool and a little bit stiff and then a little bit better,
Monday. You know a little improvement. And when the President meets
with him you know back to reasonably friendly relations and . . .

K: I think that is exactly right.

R: In other words, have some improvement. If we had pretended or
tried to make it appear that there was a lot of progress made the first
meeting. At first-phoney and it would be the wrong way to do it.

K: And also you know they have done a number of things this summer.
that were pretty rough.

R: Interestingly enough, I don't know whether the telegram shows this
KNOXOK or not because I had a private meeting with him - about an hour.
But on the - he got a little tough and I responded in kind and then he
calmed down and I calmed down and he talked about the air corridor.

K: That didn't come across.

did did

R: He said now what do we do, what do we do? And I said you know
damn well what you did. You said that the corridors were going to be
closed and you don't have any right to close the corridors and we are
not about to let you. Then he again sort of said what do we do and I
said I just told you what you did. And he said well we didn't intend it
that way. I said put yourself in our position. How would you have construed
it? I said we were about to have four-power talks. You have done this
in the past and then he said I can tell you that we didn't intend it that way.
And I said are you saying that it was a subordinate's decision, that it was
an accidental? And he said that is what I am telling you. And he said
will you take my word for it? I said that if you say it in that way I'll
take your word for it. I said if you tell me that it was an accident and
it was not intended, that's all right with me, but you can well understand
why we thought it had some significance because that normally you
don't do things that carelessly.

K: Of course.

By KHLW NARA, Dale 5/12/04

- 4 -

R: I said but I will take your word for it. Let's go on to something else -- so that's the way that that damn thing ended. And I think that's probably a pretty good way to put it.

K: I think that's right. It gives them a face saving way out of it. What do you think we should do about ... what do you think the President should do about it? I don't think he ought to get into the details.

R: I don't either. I'll talk to you about that later. After the meeting Monday night. What they argue is that they were not a party to the agreement. And my answer to that was come on, you know, if you are talking about an agreement that the way you would make it with some KNOX shoe merchant and we didn't have everything crossed and dotted. You knew damn well what the agreement was. The agreement was that we would have a standstill and that both sides agreed that neither would improve its military position.

K: They know that if Dobrynin had come in to you at the end of July and said now I hope you understand we are not bound by that agreement that we would have acted differently.

R: I said you go ahead and take that position, that you weren't party to it. I don't care. We know you were. We dealt with you. We obviously communicated *directly* with Egyptians too for obvious reasons but hell, you have 10,000 and more people in that zone. We know it and you can take that position if you want to. It doesn't change our position.

K: Exactly

R: I said I don't see any reason to argue about it in public. If you want to argue about it in public, we'll argue about it in public but what good does it do us.

K: I don't think the President should go beyond whatever you say on Monday night.

R: No, I had pretty harsh words with him and then he changed his tune and the dinner was quite friendly. And he was quite friendly afterwards. I don't think the President should get in that at all.

K: As I told you Dobrynin said they were going to raise the three points that he raised with you. From the cable I didn't know what they were. I assume they were the Jarring talks, the ceasefire and four-power talks. But I don't think the President should go beyond whatever you have said. Do you?

By: KHU NARA, Date: 5/13/04

R: IX No, I don't. And I don't think it would be helpful for the President to get involved in the controversy. But I will have a better idea after tomorrow night. On the Cuban thing. I think that is all right. I don't think we should say anything more about that at the moment.

K: I think we shouldn't be so nervous that every time a ship shows up we call them on it. If it doesn't leave in a week or so I think we can see...

R: What I said to him was this. I want you to know that our government was pleased that you responded about the Cuban situation, that you gave us your assurance privately and publicly that the '62 agreement was still in effect and that you would not violate it. We would as you know consider doing any activity in connection with a submarine base in Cuba is a very serious matter and we are pleased that you told us that that was not your intention. And he just didn't respond.

K: Right

R: I just let it go at that. I didn't say anything more about it.

K: Well, we have put them on enough notice now without it.

R: I think that the two serious problems, of course the Middle East and the four-power talks, in some ways the four-power talks is tougher than the Middle East. They want to get out of that Middle East situation. They don't want to have the ceasefire violated. And we are trying to figure out some device to do that and we'll talk about that a little tomorrow night. But they don't want it any more than we do.

K: One thing that struck me. We had a review group meeting just in general about that which you probably heard about from your people. That I thought about afterwards that it might not be a good idea to have a de facto ceasefire for a month or so before starting the talks again because then one would have decoupled the standstill and ceasefire problem and make it harder to agree again.

[erase?]

R: I think that's right. The difficulty is the Arabs may feel that they cannot accept a de facto ceasefire. That's really. Of course if we could do that, that would be ideal. What we are trying to figure out is some some device of having a de facto ceasefire but not admitting it.

just

K: Well maybe the simplest thing would be a very mild resolution - just reaffirming the '67 one and calling for a ceasefire might do it. Well, that's up to you, the details.

R: But in any event - I don't know if you have seen the intelligence on it

By K.L. NARA, Date 5/12/04

- we got the jump on them and they are really on the defensive because they - everybody in the world thinks that they cheated. And they don't know how to get out of that box.

K: Right. And they are very conscious of it.

R: Really, very defensive. That was the only part of the conversation where he was unhappiest and quite defensive and quite belligerent. And I just said what are you talking about. Your Ambassador told me that the standstill would stay in effect and that was part of the agreement and we wouldn't have entered into it if you hadn't given us that assurance. I don't care what you tell me, your reports show. I don't care. I was there and Mr. Sisco was there and Dobrynin told us this. Dobrynin wasn't there, I didn't want to embarass him.

K: As soon as I learn something Bill I will inform you. You know if the President should decide to keep him for 5 minutes afterwards. But I

R: I think he can do the same thing without having a private meeting. He can take him into the other room and ...

K: I will strongly urge him that he should say why don't you look at my little office where I use to ...

R: Not appear that he is having a separate meeting but just take him aside and talk to him and keep us in there and we will all come out together so it doesn't appear that there was a ...

K: I think that is absolutely right.

R: ... special meeting.

K: And you might raise with Gromyko what should be said afterwards. We haven't - that hasn't been discussed at all.

R: On what I say. I think I will say that Gromyko asked for the meeting sometime back and that the President considered it and had a heavy schedule because of Heads of State and other things but that he did work it out so we would have the meeting on Thursday morning. And I will suggest without saying so that it indicates that our relations really are not cool. I don't want it to appear that its - we've been having unsuccessful meetings and this is an attempt to make them successful so I will make it clear that the request for the meeting was made sometime back.

K: Right. You also shouldn't give the feeling that it is all

By: KHLNARA, Dale S/13/04

K: Right. We also shouldn't give the feeling that it is all - that we have kissed and made up. I...

Oh no,

R: And also, did Gromyko ask for a meeting last year that we didn't arrange?

K: Well, no. What he did last year was he wanted the President to ask for one and the President refused. It never really got to the point - they - he said if Gromyko asked for a meeting he would give it, but Gromyko never asked for one but it's also clear he would have come if we had said please ask for a meeting.

R: Well I can say on that that last year it wasn't possible to arrange a meeting and there was some preliminary discussion at a lower level about a meeting but it didn't work out. And that therefore they thought it adviseable. . . And they there was no doubt about it that Gromyko asked for the meeting this year was there?

K: Exactly. No doubt about it.

R: OK

K: When are you coming back to Washington. On Thursday morning?

R: I'll probably come back Wednesday night or Thursday morning.
Probably Wednesday night.

K: Right. I'll be on the West Coast on Tuesday. I'm giving a talk for some of the President's friends out there.

R: Jack Mulcahy?

K: Oh Jesus no, but almost. Taft Shreiber. They pretend that it isn't fund raising but I am not. . . but I have no illusions what they are really doing. It's to brief them. I told them there could be no fund raising while I was there but I am sure that's what they have in the back of their minds.

R: I don't envy you. Those are miserable.

K: They are. Finch and the President arranged it and I told them I wouldn't do it again.

R: My talks with the Arabs have been very interesting and I think quite successful. God, they are nice people and they are so helpless.

K: Ya. Do you think that Riad is doing a lot of this for public consumption or...

By KHW NARA, Dalo 5/12/04

R: Oh, sure. Either that or he is made to do it by the Russians. I do not think he is a free agent at all. In fact, in discussing it with him he said [tape ends]

[begin new tape] Secretary Rogers talking.

R: You uncomfortable. You know what the facts are. You know you cheated. We saw it happening. Their defense was that they shouldn't have made the agreement in the first place. He wasn't there, if he had been he wouldn't have made the agreement. Secondly, they didn't violate the agreement at all. And third, if they did violate the agreement they were entitled to because it was unfair to begin with. And fourth, even if they shouldn't have made the agreement and even if it was unfair they were very minor violations.

K: Some agreement; that each side claims it ruined its position, isn't it?

R: Ya. OK Henry.

K: Right Bill, all the best, bye.

By KHLW NARA, Date 5/12/04

TELCOM

Haldeman/Kissinger

9:40 am

10/19/70

H: Where does that plan of Blounts for going with the Christmas mail to the POWs stand?

K: I think it's nuts. He was going to make a proposal.

H: He has made the proposal. I am trying to stall him based on --

K: I think it's a cheap gimick but if someone thinks it's a good idea, -- they won't let him in. It makes us look silly.

H: Why?

K: The Postmaster General of the U.S. follows mail into Hanoi.

H: Trying to interject his influence to see that the mail gets to the POWs.

K: It strikes me as a gimick which will be turned down. It will be recognized abroad as a public relations gimmick,

H: If it doesn't hurt us and makes us look good politically with the POW groups, I think it's worth doing. Finch tells me that that's what's getting the most reaction from that speech, the POW part, in his touring around.

K: The foreign policy minus is minor.

H: We have looked foolish before and it won't hurt again.

K: That's my judgment. Can I see the speech?

H: I think Price has it. He said he was sending it back to him last night.

K: I thought for the intention it was good.

H: It didn't have up-lift in it.

K: I am not going to argue it. It isn't making major. Does he realize that because of the time change I will not be back until later afternoon on Wed.?
Will he want to work with me? I have the backgrounder with the L. A. Times which will be until 7:00 pm on Mon. so I thought I would wait until the next morning to leave. I could skip the backgrounder.

H: He has a schedule Wed. He sees Souvanna Phouma and signs Maritime Bill Wed. morning. Maybe you should take the 9:00 back. Would you be here when he sees Souvanna Phouma?

*

Haldeman/Kissinger

9:40 am

10/19/70

By KHC NARA, Date 5/12/04

K: That's not crucial but I should be -- then the rest of the time he will work on the UN thing.

H: I would guess so. Thurs. he sees Gromyko and then working on the UN thing. I wouldn't worry about it.

K: I have to see him on Chile before he leaves.

H: You had better get in there. He will leave at 10:20.

TELCORN
Ray Price/Kissinger

10:40 a.m. 10/19/70

By: KHW NARA, Date: 5/13/04

K: I just talked to the President about that speech. The major thing xx he wants to cut out is the beginning which talks about changes. He forgets he put it in. It wasn't in there to begin with. He wants to go back to where it started before. Then a lot of UN rhetoric. He won;t wx say we have a special responsibility. He will say we will do our part.

P: OK

K: When will you have another draft.

P: I don't know. I am just getting into it now. I have along series of notes from him.

K: I will be on the West Coast tomorrow and I wondered if my office could get a copy to me.

P: Can we dex it to you?

K: Yeah.

P: It will be sometime tomorrow.

K: The morning would be best.

P: I will try.

By KHL NARA, Dato 5/12/04

Telecon
Peter Flanigan
10/19/70 10:45 a.m.

K: I had several more calls from Tokyo, the usual crying thing. I turned off the appointment with the President and told them they would have to deal with you and me.

F: Good.

K: That fellow said after our election they'll get a better deal. I was tough as nails. I'll send you a transcript of that conversation.

F: Good. The posture in which we now have it is that we will not engage in general discussions as a substitute for a textile agreement. And given the complete inflexibility on their part we think there will be no discussions between the President and Sato on textiles.

K: What about Kendall? He is having lunch with Sato today.

F: I told him to say we were dismayed at the lack of willingness on their part to solve the problem and that the Administration is very unhappy and cold on this.

K: You think he's going to do that?

F: You bet. I think that the fact that their ambassador hasn't called back is extraordinary. I'm on Maury's side.

K: They are impossible.

F: They have double-crossed us twice. I don't blame Maury.

K: This guy doesn't even admit there was an agreement. He said only the two principlas and he and I knew there was an agreement. He said he is embarrassed.

F: I don't think they embarrass. I thought they committed Harakiri in situations like this; now they don't even blush. (I suppose they can't blush.) I got another cable from Japan; it says most of the fellow visiting are being discussed in the newspapers. I think your position fits in with that.

K: Oh, they are something. I will send you that conversation.

By KHC NARA, Dato

5/12/04

Telecon

Alex Johnson

10/19/70 12:55 p.m.

K: I talked with the President ... well, he has seen your memo, and I also talked with the Secretary. He said he'd call you. The big problem is that he's reluctant to let Korry run loose. He did not make a very good sale when he talked to the President. This is for your own information. So he disapproves the contact or negotiation with Allende prior to the inauguration. If we could convince him that Korry was only going to warn him he might change his mind.

J: I put it in those terms.

K: I know, but he doesn't think he'll stick to it. Because that's the way he put it to the President. He said "I will get for you" this, this, this, and this. The President said I mumbled something about "if you can get all of this, of course I'm for it" but he was thinking "He can't get it except at an unacceptable price." Let me go through the list. He authorized the phasing out of the air force station.

J: Okay, that can be done.

K: He authorized resumption delivery of previously ... [K read].

J: All right.

K: And that can be started immediately. He authorizes sending Charlie Meyer down with a low-level delegation. He doesn't want to send a message. He was agreeable to a departmental statement.

J: Did he give you language?

K: No, he said you and I should work it out. We might add to the text something indicating we want it understood that the law will be fully applied.

J: Do you take this to extend to the question of Korry going in? You would not want Korry to even make a courtesy call?

K: Let's be honest. Do you think Korry is tameable? There was another thing we all found striking. For the whole week he was selling one line on the deals he was going to get; then on Saturday he switched it to a warning.

J: That's because we gave out in all the discussions we indicated we didn't have elements for a negotiations.

K: I don't know how the President would feel; I didn't raise a pure courtesy call.

By KHC NARA, Date 5/13/04

Telecon
Alex Johnson

10/19/70 12:55 p.m. page 2

J: I don't know. Ed is still here. It's something we could . . .

K: I don't think the Secretary's confidence is overwhelming either.

J: It's not. But I framed this and Korry went along.

K: This is about as serious as anything we are doing. Do you think he'll stick to it or will he wheel and deal himself into a negotiation? I wouldn't ordinarily raise the issue. If it were McBride, I know he would stick to the letter of what he's been told.

J: I think Korry talks a lot better than he writes. I haven't dealt with him previously. But if we had a Dutch uncle talk with him before he left I would have a reasonable degree of confidence.

K: I can't tell you whether the President would disapprove a courtesy call. I think his inclination would be to do it on _______________.

J: If I took it as a fact, and Charlie confirms this, the courtesy call is the normal thing to do and I think I would want to take it. With the absence of any message from the President it would be a hard line statement we would be making. The lack of a courtesy call would be a very powerful signal.

K: That's my instinct too, but I can't get an answer=before Wednesday. But we don't need it before then.

J: We don't need it, but I could talk to Ed before he leaves this evening and tell him where we stand.

K: What other things were there?

J: Let me see. Message from the President, private statement, delivery, Charlie Mayee, _______________ on personal including <u>AVTEK(?)</u>.

K: One other point, the President wants to start talking to the Latin American countries along the lines of what Korry wanted to say to Allende.

J: All right.

K: After the election.

J: Of course, good. All right.

Telecon
Alex Johnson

10/19/70 12:55 p.m. page 3

By KHL NARA, Date 5/13/04

K: And maybe if we could do it a cable that instructs our ambassadors to take it up.

J: I'll do a draft on that. We'll have to tailor it to the posts.

K: Of course. You feel he should make a courtesy call?

J: Yes, and he should talk from the points we have made here I have a feeling Allende will try to enter substantive conversation with him; all the statements about how he wants good relations with us. For Ed to sit mum and just say these are the things involved with our relations.

K: Why can't he say [didn't hear].

J: He can say that, but I would think there would be some value in his being able to say ... The problem is, does he negotiate or stick to his instructions and say these are our points?

K: He is absolutely not authorized to negotiate anything.

J: I am inclined toward that.

K: Why can't we raise that on Wednesday, and you'll get these other things done.

J: Yes, I'll get these other things done.

By KHLU NARA, Date 5/12/04

Telecon
Amb. Sullivan

10/19/70 2:35 p.m.

K: I wanted to check. Is it common customary for them to
send a liaison officer to give the answer?

S: No, this is something different and new. We presume it
is going to have a twist. They are going to drag out the process and
will probably want to register their unahppiness about our not keeping
private things private in the past.

K: But they used to do it on the phone.

S: Yes, this is something new. Their effort to prove something.
Do you have a date for the Vice President yet?

K: No. And we probably won't be able to get his undivided
attention on it for the next couple of weeks.

By KHLN, NARA, Date 5/13/04

TELCORN

U.A. Johnson/Kissinger

3:10 pm

10/19/70

K: I have a chance on this courtesy call business. He will do it if it's the custom if it's understood he isn't the first to go in. And so his instructions are that he wouldn't free wheel. He shouldn't ask for anything or communicate anything.

J: Very good. For As I understand it on this circular to other Latin American countries his thought is that we have other leaders get these things to Allende if they want to do so. So we don't make points to Allende.

K: Get our attitude across.

J: Get it to him and exercise influence with him without our doing it.

K: And more importantly start avoiding any confusion as to where we stand.

J: I get the point. I was thinking this was a week from Wed.

K: I didn't think I could get to the President before this Wed. The NSC will have to be a week or two weeks from Wed.

By KHLW NARA, Dale 5/12/04

TELCON

Gen. Cushman/Kissinger

3:25 pm

10/19/70

K: I forgot one thing -- the President is irate beyond description about the CIA report in the NYTimes today. I wouldn't want to report to you what he said but there would be few people there if we did what he said.

C: We didn't give it to them. There are 70 copies. There was one in May and August.

K: One in Aug. came in response to what I said ? ? ? . Would you send us a report on what you think happened?

C: We don't know who gave it out. It has regular distribution. What we are doing -- is that Times made observations that don't track -- whether that will help us or not.

K: Get it out.