DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON
Rogers/Kissinger
9:20 a.m. 12/15/70

K: I just wanted to call you to congratulate you on the foreign relations vote.
If anyone had predicted that 6 months ago --

R: I wrote the _p_ resident and said chances were only fair. I thought they would kill it by delay. It has greater significance than just the vote because we have split the committee from Fulbright.

K: That's right. Do to your missionary work.

R: When you think we have Church and Pell with us --

K: I didn't realize that.

R: I know Church did. I saw him at the WH and said he had done more to bring them together and he voted for us. His questioning was good and tough. His questioning was good.

K: He is a light weight but he is good. _K._ Even during Cambodia. It would have been so easy for them to kill it or separate the M. E. from the rest and given us a real hot potato.

R: The President is very pleased.

K: Hubert Humphrey _skittered_ said he didn't think it would go through on this session but we could count on him in the next session.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Phil Habib/Mr. Kissinger

11:00 a.m., December 15, 1970

H: I talked to the Secretary. He said he agrees and will speak to the President about it right away.

K: I will have the ground prepared.

H: I said if I have a preference I would prefer to go abroad and have a mission of my own. He didn't ask for any places of interest to me, and I didn't mention any. He said he would speak with the President very soon and talk with me shortly.

K: What do you think of Australia?

H: Tremendous. It's time to put a career guy down there. They would appreciate it, too, from what I understand of it. You come up with something like that -- that's the range we are talking about. I'm leaving it all in your hands. But I will do whatever he wants.

K: You have a friend and admirer here.

H: I would like something before the end of January.

K: I hope you will make me a consultant when I leave government.

H: Okay; providing you learn a little bit. Really, I appreciate your personal interest.

K: I am an admirer of yours. This will be done on merit. If it were done on the basis of personality, you would go to Mali.

H: I understand Pete wanted to do what he is doing.

K: I know that is not true. I am going to bug a little more. But I know it is definitely not so.

H: I didn't talk to him personally, but I heard about it.

K: All right, Phil.

H: Good-bye.

lds

Bv

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCON

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

11:05 a.m.

12/15/70

J: My daughter just arrived and said my doctor is on the phone.

K: How are you doing?

J: Coming along slowly. I will probably have to have surgery.

K: What is it?

J: Prostate.

K: Suddenly?

J: Very suddenly, within a couple of hours. I had an infection with a high fever. They are reducing the fever and infection and next it's probably surgery. When, I don't know. I would like to get it done. If I don't get it done, it will be recurring and I would like to get it over with. They will decide on Friday as to where I go from here. It will probably be several weeks.

K: You are and will be badly missed.

KJ: I am bored as hell. It's the first time I have had anything organically wrong with me.

K: I know it's quite a shock. Let me ask you one question -- it occured to me and I haven't discussed it with the President -- on the foreign service problem. What would the reaction be if each task force chairman were to come over for a report. Would they that please them or would they think it trying to overthrow the foreign service?

J: No, certainly not. I would welcome it. The problem is not so much from the service towards him. I don't think that's serious. I think it runs the other way.

K: That may be true.

J: I frankly do. That's the problem that concerns me. It's one I just keep thinking we have made progress on it and then we seem to fall back for reasons I cannot quite understand. A few newspaper articles that are in large part wrong seem to give him the impression again that the service is out to get him. They have always been against him. It's this attitude I find so hard to deal with. I don't feel that. On the whole the service has served him pretty loyally and ably. I don't know how you deal with it. Ted and I were talking the other day about it. You and I talked about having him speak. Ted and I revived that and having an 8th floor reception -- like we did the businessmen's council in which he spoke informally to them. It went over very well and we thought the possibility of a reception where he could

By NARA, Date 5/26

U. A. Johnson/Kissinger

11:05 a.m.

12/15/70

J: (cont.) speak informally and then shake hands a bit. Rather than a big formal lunch. As far as inviting the task force people over --

K: I have no view on it.

J: We need ideas. If we do the latter I don't know how many he could do. The more he could do, the better. Let them report briefly and let them meet him. That would be very useful if it were not taken as in place of the reception idea in which he would meet many more people.

K: Let me explore both ideas and see what if any he can do. The main purpose of this phone call is to tell you we hope you recover soon. You are badly missed. Whatever we have done in foreign policy fields is in large part do to your professionalism and loyalty.

J: I appreciate that. Whatever I can do. I am having my reading brought out to me.

K: I will check with you from time to time and perhaps next week drop by to see you.

J: And give me a ring if I can contribute too because I am up now.

K: If I start calling you, you will be doing your business from home and it won't help you get well.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Marshall Green/Mr. Kissinger

11:15 a.m., December 15, 1970

G: On Indonesia, you will be getting on your desk shortly a memorandum for the President which is approved by everyone including OMB to authorize the delegation in Rotterdam at the IGC meeting to endorse the $640 million aid requirement, and, secondly, to pledge our fair share of Indonesia's food aid requirement and our fair share of the non-food requirement. We have done our one-third every year. The problem is we have had a telegram from Connor that we should be in a position to make our pledge as in the past. This is the way you get the other countries to follow suit.

K: I will run it by the President today.

G: It has worked successfully year after year.

K: When do you need it? Tonight?

G: As soon as you can.

K: We'll shoot for tonight; at the latest tomorrow morning.

G: Tonight would be best. Tomorrow is the last day. A second subject -- with regard to sending a team out, we have a memo now in draft being typed in which we agree with you that it's a good idea to send a team before General Umir's (phon.) proposed visit next spring so he won't come with inflated expectations.

K: That's what I think.

G: It spells out the general concepts. We will be supporting the Indonesians during the next five years to prepare for eventual regional responsibility as well as help them develop defense-related industries. It shows where our heart is but at the same time tamps down inflated expectations.

K: How about surplus stocks in Vietnam?

G: We gave some LST's on loan, and will give anything in the excess field to supplement our 15 to 18 in the future.

By

NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Mosbacher/Kissinger
11:25 a.m. 12/15/70

K: You are giving me that phone number.

M: Rm. 37H. EL 5-3400(?). How about that? I called because I had an
appointment with Rogers yesterday. I didn't know if I should say anything.
He didn't say anything and neither did I. I wanted to talk about this job.

K: I will see Haldeamn in a few minutes and raise it.

M: He wanted a recommendation for this job. I mentioned Cato the other day
but he isn't enthusiastic about that. I mentioned the possibility of a fellow
who is foreign service -- Jack Kubish in Mexico.

K: He isn't bad but a blow hard.

M: He is aggressive. But he knows the business.

K: He isn't our man.

M: No, I don't think so. In light of yesterday's developments I thought it would
be good to use the job substantively.

K: What developments?

M: David Kennedy as Ambassador at Large. This job could be used in the same
way.

K: Let me see what I can generate today. After talking with Haldeman I will
see if you should call Rockefeller. I think we should keep you and leave you in
a substantive job it's more useful. If you went into private business the last
year that would be fine and then bring you in the last term. You would be at the
top of my list (but you need more substantive work behind you.)

M: Doing something substantive with this job would have to be done with someone
new.

K: What do you have in mind?

M: First, let me say that no one spends more time with these people. If you
are well briefed and more knowledgeable you can get into more depth. Not what
you and the President do, too many try that.

K: Why not? Everyone else does.

M: Whatever could be done in the relaxed atmosphere of the time spent with these
people. Not just chatting and listening. Some conversations are meaningful but

By NARA, Date 5/26

Mosbacher/Kissinger

11:25 a.m.

12/15/70

M: (cont) since it's hard to know what is important on a given situation, it's hard to be able to do anything but listen. After their meetings with the President and Secy. they let down. [Likely] King Hussein on the way to the airport.

K: We could brief you on the issues and let you sit in on meetings and read the briefing book. Personally I think it can be done and if you wanted to stay in your present job under these consideration, that's possible. But for other reasons the OAS job would be better because no one now thinks of Protocol as substantive.

M: That's why I talk with you because you understand more about this.

K: Let me talk to Haldeman and I will be back to you within a day.

By

NARA

Date 5/26

TELCOM

Jos. Alsop/Kissinger

11:33 am 12/15/70

K: Welcome back.

A: It's been a more exhausting trip. Depressed but Nam is worse.

K: They are determined to loose it and prove themselves right. If we can stay where we are and go slowly down for 2 years, we would win.

A: We can win anyway.

K: It's probably impossible to loose.

A: It's possible to loose in Cambodia. We will have to be bold on that.

K: We are keeping it --

A: I told Coby Swank he would get his money and that was voted yesterday. There's a kind of calm. The Senate can snatch defeat from victory and the communists in SVN can do the same thing. The danger is no longer in Hanoi in my opinion.

k; Yes.

A: I want to see you.

K: I would love to see you.

A: When? Would you like a family supper tonight?

K: I might be able to do that. Could I call you early in the afternoon?

A: We have oysters.

K: You don't have to currupt me with the excellent quality of your food. Around 8:30

A: Couldn't you do that earlier?

K: I have to go to a reception here.

A: So do we. Make it 8:15.

K: I will try. I will call you this afternoon.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Under Secretary Irwin/Mr. Kissinger

11:40 a.m., December 15, 1970

K: I just wanted to check on that Ford Company business, so we can make sure we are on the right track there.

I: Which Ford Company business?

K: Remember, Henry Ford's query as to whether he could go to Chile. I understand Meyer is out sick.

I: Yes, he is. Let me check.

K: I will leave it to you that we have a coordinated position.

I: I will check and if we have anything, I will tell you this afternoon. Will you speak with Dick Helms today? Maybe then he could speak to me, hopefully so I can move ahead and either find out whether that is something he feels we should take into full account or if KONKON FOR SOME reason or other... He was out of sorts the day I spoke to you.

K: He was pretty formal. As I told you, there were other objections.

I: You said there were. You didn't say what they were.

K: I don't know what they were.

I: If we can clear this up, we can go to the other.

K: If it's such a close thing, why force it to a head?

I: It's a question of knowing what the situation is over here. If you could ask Dick...

K: I am seeing him after the meeting. I will check on this

lds

By.

NARA, Dale 5/26

Ron Ziegler/Mr. Kissinger

December 15, 1970 11:40 a.m.

jlj

Z: Henry, what is our position on this Griffin thing?

K: The what?

Z: The Griffin proposal regarding POWs.

K: We are making our proposals in Paris.

Z: That's what I thought - that's what I said.

K: You should say we are making our proposals in Paris and call attention to the fact that South Vietnamese have generously offered the exchange of all their POWs for 800 of their prisoners.

Z: I made that point. 8,000 for 800.

K: You should say that the South Vietnamese made that proposal. Henry, did you know that

Z: Laird supported the Griffin plan today?

K: He is such a son of a bitch. He really is a bastard.

Z: OK Henry.

By

NARA

Date 5/26

TELECON

Mr. Kissinger/ Joe Sisco

11:42 a.m., December 15, 1970

S: Good morning, Henry.

K: Joe, do you still speak to me? Since that seems to be so
dangerous.

S: You know you and I are going to have to live through this
for another two years.

K: I don't.

S: I don't either. I can retire now; I'm losing money by staying
with the government. But it doesn't bother me. I hope it doesn't
bother you.

K: You are not going to take your wife out of here.

S: I will tell her that. Isn't your two-year period... Isn't
Harvard strict about that?

K: Right. I will have to resign in the next few weeks if I don't
go back.

S: You must not go back.

K: Why not?

S: Because of the tremendous role you are filling. You could
argue logically that in terms of the two years you have had, you
have pretty much gotten out what you are going to get; but what a
contribution you have to make over the next two years.

K: I will make up my mind soon. All the animals will come out
of the woodwork in the next two years. Joe, what I wanted was your
sense of where these damn stories are coming from.

S: Are you on the phone alone?

K: I'm telling them now to get off. They can't be an accident --
the intercept with these four stories.

By

NARA, Dato 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

11:42 a.m., December 15, 1970

- 2 -

S: I think they are two different sources. The two Esterbrooke stories emanated from New York in my judgment -- not from Yost himself but someone on his staff or alternatively from a foreign diplomat who has been given this kind of line from a member of our staff at US/UN. The Rowland Evans article -- and you will never get proof positive -- is Mel Laird or alternatively, when Evans doesn't get to Laird, from this guy Baroody in Laird's office. Nine out of 10 times anything Evans prints on the Middle East is direct leak from Laird. It distresses me, and I'm convinced it is coming from there. There isn't a hell of a lot we can do at that level. You can't involve the President.

K: I sure as hell can.

S: You are in a difficult position still. I know it's not the Secretary here. The Secretary does not play that way on this kind of issue.

K: The expel business last summer came out of State.

S: That's a different matter. I am talking about this present series of articles as the relate to the Yost exodus.

K: I didn't even know about it.

S: The reason is the Administration has decided you really need an individual there who gives a little more fizz in terms of public presentation. It's a forum which can be used positively in domestic and in domestic and international terms if a colorful guy is running the show. Did the President ever discuss the Yost business with you?

K: Just briefly. I said if that is what he wanted it could be done. That is the last I heard of it.

S: I don't know to what extent the Secretary was involved.

K: He knew it.

S: I am going to ask you a terribly embarrassing question. I have been asking myself if I should stick around. You know I have been an Assistant Secretary for 5-1/2 years. Do you know what kind of a line the Secretary is taking with the President on me?

K: No. No matter what you hear over there, the Secretary doesn't see the President all that often and talks with him on the phone even less often. The President has the highest regard for you.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

11:42 a.m., December 15, 1970

S: I have felt frankly that I should get out.

K: My strong advice to you is to hold tight and not make any concessions now. These things can all unravel as you and I have seen in many ways. Keep that in mind. The President moves cautiously and slowly but has never failed to get where he wants to go.

S: With regard to my relations with the Secretary, we had a rough period some months ago. In his absence, in that expel business, when I went on NBC and MEET THE PRESS and supported strongly what was said at the White House -- remember, you called me and reported that the President said he bet the Secretary raised hell with Joe. Then we went through a very good period during the Middle East initiative -- there were a couple of rough spots where we disagreed on things. I am frank to say I have the impression that relations are fine.

K: That's my impression, too. He is not up tight now; he is much more relaxed. He is going back to his normal posture -- just close enough but not out in front.

S: That is the impression I have. This is just what I wanted. I wanted to talk to you alone, but this satisfies what I needed.

K: I am almost always there when he talks to the President. He has said nothing derogatory. The President always speaks warmly of you.

S: Frankly, if I am operating in a situation where in the Secretary's mind there is any future option that might arise -- and maybe none will -- I would not want to continue in a situation where I felt in the Secretary's mind a better option would be precluded. But I don't have that impression.

K: I don't either. Keep the longer range in mind.

S: In terms of these leaks, I am convinced that is where they are coming from and it is something which I am afraid is difficult to manage.

K: I have adopted the policy that anyone who touches me will have an explosion on his hands -- to fight me with the President. That will quiet things down or else.

By NARA, Dated 5/26

Mr. Kissinger/Joe Sisco

11:42 a.m., December 15, 1970

S: I understand what you are saying. I understand how you played and played well in the first two years. Just let the chips fall where they may. This damn town is full of stilletos, Henry. You and I have known that all our lives. I honestly feel when Harry Truman said if the kitchen gets too hot, get out. But this just makes me angrier and sore as hell. Where do we stand on the cable?

K: I want the President to address it. I am willing to go almost with it on the total package which I slightly prefer.

S: This is plenty more than the Israelis expect.

K: But I want to tell the President so he feels comfortable.

S: I would like some word. Okay, Henry.

K: Thank you, Joe.

lds

By NARA, Date 5/26

Mr. Haldeman/Mr. Kissinger IO

December 15, 1970 1:27 p.m.

jlj

K: Bob, I had two things. One - how committed are we to our Ambassador in Australia, Rice.

H: I don't know anything about him. Our Ambassador? Why, do you want to change him?

K: Yes. Gorton called the other day and said Rice has been feeding the opposition material from our backgrounders without giving them to him and they are using them against him in the campaign. It is the third complain in the last month of this nature.

H: He is our Ambassador?

K: Yes. He is political so I don't think the State Department would mind if we moved him. Second, are we still thinking of Mosbacher for OAS?

H: Yes.

K: He keeps calling me asking if we are thinking of anything. I think we should look at it.

H: I think we should move on it don't you? Is that post vacant now?

K: Yes. No, it is held by a man named Jover (phonetic) who is not very good.

H: Have you discussed this with State.

K: I haven't said anything to Rogers about it.

H: I will put it on the agenda. I have to go over there and discuss this whole personnel thing with him.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

David Frost/Kissinger

4:20 pm

12/15/70

K: I understand we are heading for a new crisis.

F: You mean I am spending time in Washington.

K: How long are you here?

F: Get in on Friday and do the festivity Friday night.

K: I find to my regret that there's a dinner for me at the Indian Embassy which I have found no way to get out of. I have racial prejudices against only Swedes and Indians.

F: I have to leave mid-Saturday. How about meeting late Friday night or breakfast on Sat.?

K: Or lunch. Is Diahnn going to be with you?

F: I would have loved that but she is felming all that day.

K: Kay Freeman was all equipped.

F: I know. But instead my mother is here.

K: Would you like to bring her?

F: If she's here I would love to.

K: If I get out at a decent hour at the Indian Embassy I may drop by the WH to see what's going on. If I don't run out of conversation by 10:30 with those people, I'm really in trouble.

F: Let's make a lunch on Sat.

K: 12:30?

F: That's fine. I have a plane at 3:00.

K: Do you care where? Jockey Club or Rive Gauche?

F: You know Washington better than I.

K: Let's say the Jockey Club. I may bring someone.

F: That would be delightful.

By

NARA, Date 5/20

D. Frost/Kissinger
4:20 pm 12/15/80

-2-

K: And bring your mother if she's here.

F: Is she anyone I know?

K: I am bringing Nancy Maginnes.

F: That was a great day in Los Angeles. Diahnn --

K: I liked her right away.

F: She is filming that day but she will meet me in Miami Sat. night.

K: Shall I ask the Freeman's?

F: Let's just have a gossip with you. If I haven't seen the Freeman's, whom I adore --

K: Let's keep it as it is. At the Jockey Club.

F: Beautiful. And supper in NY after Christmas with Diahnn. I hear you moonlighte on the TODAY show.

K: Who told you? Barbara Walters? After it I was struck with pangs of conscience.

F: Will we do our in the New Year?

K: Yes. I thought it was 10 mins. and she went on and on.

F: When it on the air?

K: Next week. When you let a woman loose on me I don't know what I am doing.

F: Very sensible. When she had you there she didn't let you go.

K: See you Sat. and I will try to get back to the WH.

F: I will think of you Friday night. Is it a cross section of people there?

K: Yes. Sr. WH staff, etc. Reasonably representative audience.

F: Good. I look forward to it. See you and take care of yourself.

By NARA, Date 5/26

T lcon
Secy. Hardin/Kissinger

5:02 pm

12/15/70

H: We just got in from London

K: I hear you did.

H: I think we should get information to the President before he sees the President. Obviously, the matter of agriculture trade will be high on the agenda. We have had stern talks and he will be filled in all talks and pressing the President on this first step entering the community.

K: Do you want to see me tomorrow? I told Haldeman you wanted to see the President -- Ehrlichman told me -- but I don't know if it's possible.

H: If you and I could spend some time. I talked with him before he left and he said take a hard line. I don't know if he knows the details.

K: I know he doesn't. We will set a time tomorrow morning within the next hour. Do suggest to you if you could do a memo so he can handle it. Two pages on ______ and one page on what your recommended position is. If you could do that, it would be a maximum economy of time. I will see you in the morning before noon. I am going to Boston at noon.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Tom Bradon/Mr. Kissinger

December 15, 1970

5:15 p.m.

jlj

B: If you do not want to answer this question don't. I have not seen you in the papers recently. Is this our policy now to bomb the be-Jesus out of them?

K: What do you mean you have not seen me in the papers lately?

B: Just that you have not been in them in the last day or so. What is the policy with regard to this bombing. Is what Secretary Laird said this afternoon our policy?

K: I have not seen what Laird said. At any rate that is not the policy as you described it. Let me see what Laird had to say and I will call you tomorrow morning Tom.

B: OK, Henry.

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Secretary Rogers/Mr. Kissinger

December 15, 1970 5:30 p.m.

jlj

R: Have you been able to reach the President on the telegram to the Prime Minister yet.

K: I just came back from trying to see him but he has left for the reception already. I felt I had to give it to him personally because I had no concept of the political problem. I cannot judge it. . . meet some of their request?

R: I think this goes farther than his letter.

K: On the foreign policy view I would submit to your judgment because of your having talked to them.

R: This goes farther. It tells them that we will continue to give them planes for 6 months. We imply that we expect them to go to the negotiating table.

K: Your judgment is better in this. I will get to him as soon after 7 p.m. as I can.

R: Is there any question about his thinking? If there is I wish you would have him call me.

K: I have no reason to suppose that he will stop it. From the foreign policy view I have no question and I am following your lead as you have done all the talking on this subject. However, I felt I should send it in because of the domestic point of view.

R: If there is any hitch I wish you would have him call me.

K: I will call you.

R: Timing on this because we would like to get them negotiating before the month is out.

K: I will call you after I have talked to him.

R: I don't know if you passed this on or some of your staff that the President is not satisfied with our recommendation on Chile.

K: I did it. The first part of it might have been caused . . .

R: Davis is damn good. I don't know how he got that idea. This Davis used to be in Europe. I wonder if he got it mixed up with another Davis.

By NARA, Date 5/26

-2-

I also heard and I am not sure if this came from your staff or not that the President has decided he is going to Peru and Brazil next year - next fall.

K: That's right. On Brazil he feels very very strongly about it.

R: On Peru I do not think we should make a commitment on it. I think that all plans and visits like that should be considered at one time.

K: I have to check on where the RKKX one about Peru one came from. I think the way this is done is that the Department send over the recommendations and then he selects one which he wants.

R: I think that is the way it should be done. I don't think it should be piecemeal. He should look at the whole thing. He should look at Peru and Venezuela.

K: We have had Venezuela.

R: This was the way he did it last year - we sent it over last year. We sent a list with all of them.

K: I don't know where the Peru one came from and I would have to check into it over here to see how it was presented. I thought it came from you. Brazil he very strongly wanted. Peru I have to check where it came from. I thought there was a consolidated list that was presented.

R: We want to do it again that way this year. Brazil I think is a good idea. We should concentrate on the possibilities and which months.

K: I believe each area recommended a few people and then split it up and each took a few. However, let me look into it Bill. Can I call you on this tomorrow.

By

NARA

Date 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Under Secy. Irwin

6:53 p.m., December 15, 1970

I: Following up on the Secretary's book to you about Davis.

K: Yeah.

I: What he wants me to do is track down the reasons he wants to pass.

K: All right.

I: Have you had a chance to speak to Dick?

K: He wants to think about it for 24 hours. [I'll let you know tomorrow.]

I: Right. If you will let me know, we can see what the President thinks about it and see if he has the right fellow. I'm sorry I had to leave this afternoon, I had to go to the ______ thing.

K: Well, that's all right, we were pretty much at the end of it anyway.

["DECLASSIFIED\nE.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6", "By NARA, Date 5/26", "TELCORN", "Mr. Kissinger/ Robert Evans\n7:20 p.m., December 15, 1970", "K: It doesn't look as if I will be able to make it for the movie.", "E: For the party?", "K: I will do my best.", "E: Wonderful, Henry. Know where it is? Hippopotamus Club,\n154 East 54th Street.", "K: I didn't even know that place existed.", "E: The party is really going to be a swinging party.", "K: That's all I need, some more publicity.", "E: No press is going to be there, no press has been invited.", "K: What time?", "E: Starts about 11:00.", "K: Great, good! If I can't make it, I will let you know. If not, I'll\nsee you between Christmas and New Year's.", "E: I'll see you tomorrow tomorrow tomorrow tomorrow tomorrow

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/ Joe Sisco

7:32 p.m., December 15, 1970

K: You're bugging the lief out of me again, you've got the Secretary after me.

S: I know what he says but I agree with him, if we are going to get them to make a favorable decision, we've got to get it to them.

K: His judgment about Israeli action has been consistently wrong. You can go ahead with this. I have talked to the President and he doesn't want it to show that he rejected their basic request. Make sure -- there is a phrase in there, this phrase about examining the longer term.

S: Why don't we -- I'll change that phrase to we will examine sympathically the longer term. I will call SS and tell them. This will help it on the whole sympathetic point. They won't feel they are getting more than they expected.

K: Anyone who has been doing business with Mel Laird, if they think they are going to get everything they expect, they are crazy.

S: Right, Henry.

wgh

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Secretary Rogers

7:34 p.m., December 15, 1970

R: I just stopped by to see Alex.

K: Is he okay, he sounded a little tired.

R: He isn't ill very much and he is worried about himself. I talked to the doctor, he may have to have an operation.

K: If you have been active all the time, it is hard on you. I talked to the President about this Israeli cable. He had one slight suggestion he wants to make sure it isn't phrased in a way to turn down the basic request which I mentioned to Joe Sisco. It didn't require anything of consequence.

R: Did you the supplemental actually pass today.

K: I was at the Congressional reception. Fulbright is filibustering it. Mansfield is beside himself, he considers this a breach of confidence. Senator Gravel is with Fulbright.

R: Fulbright is making an ass of himself.

K: He is really going crazy, he is going to lose his committee just like you said yesterday.

R: I will give him a call tomorrow, he doesn't have any respect for anyone.

K: His own committee voted against him.

R: I went up to meet with him, he was sitting on the first row and he said are you going to try to avoid the committee or are you going through the regular channels. I told him we were going to go through the regular channels.

K: And you could have avoided it.

R: Now we have done it. Well, I'll get in touch with him. How's the Cambodian thing going?

K: We'll get a report next week from Haig. Oh, you mean the military -- they are all in there.

R: Mel says there will be a lot of publicity.

By.

NARA.

Dato 5/20

5/20

TELCOM

8:10 p.m., December 15, 1970

I: I don't know whether the delegation's proposal helps or doesn't help, no really strong feelings but leaning to going to his suggestion.

K: The President would just as soon not discuss it.

I: No problem at all, my leaning the other way.

K: That was just if it was raised. We don't have any objection at all to the accidental thing.

I: Whatever help it is, we have it leaning this way.

K: I am leaning against it and the President is leaning slightly against it but will go along if the delegation wants it.

I: We will see what comes.

K: Will you let me know how you are going to handle the 4th thing?

I: John Crimmins said Mr. Ford himself had called and told Charley Meyer he would be glad to talk to him further on it. Two of Ford's men telephoned and asked to see Charley on Monday but his office told them he would be in Brazil and of course he's in the hospital now, suggested to see him on the 21st. Molin and Merrick were the names.

K: I would do the same thing.

I: We are going ahead and ...

K: Discourage it.

I: If the lower echelons wants to do it, what we would discourage would be himself. Ford himself.

K: As long as it is sufficiently lower level.

I: Suppose it would be their international area. On Indonesia ---

K: Marsahll told me ...

You are sending a memo up to Goldberg.

By

NARA, Date 5/20

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

10:55 p. m., December 15, 1970

Y: Hello Dr. Jones, this is Yoshida. How are you?

K: I am fine.

Y: At this final stage, I will have a most important message from my friend to your friend tomorrow morning of your time.

K: What time?

Y: As far as my friend is concerned, the outcome of our conversation will depend ...

K: What we do, it depends on this conversation with me?

Y: This is the authority, with you or ...

K: All right, you can call me at 10:00 a. m. my time.

Y: I would like to talk for a half hour or so.

K: Then make it 10:30.

Y: Also by the time I speak with you at 10:30, will you please have with you the text of your proposal which your expert proposed to our expert on December 11th?

K: Should I have Flanigan there?

Y: I would also like to ask you to get some briefing from your expert so that you know what our expert has been talking about.

K: I will do that.

Y: Also have the text of your proposal which your expert proposed to our expert on December 11th. I will have a copy with me myself.

K: All right, I will have the text with me.

Y: Also the latest briefing.

K: You have to understand, I have to leave for Boston tomorrow and I can not make it an endless conversation -- I will give you 20 minutes.

OCLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By.

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Rogers/Kissinger
9:26 am 12/16/70

K: Two things. I just talked to the President. Kennedy is going to Indonesia and he thought he should stop in VN and Japan. He wonders if you would want to talk to him about it.

R: Japan is probably good but I don't know about VN.

K: He said economic positions.

R: He doesn't know about it.

K: He wants to do things for him.

R: I just feel sorry for those people out there and especially because this man knows nothing about it.

K: Let's do at least Japan. I will tell the President to agree to Japan and you will explore VN to see what he knows.

R: We have to many people in the act in VN. I must say this whole thing has worked out so well we don't have to strain. Everyone says it was fine to make him ambassador-at-large. And his wife wouldn't enjoy VN.

K: The other thing -- he mentioned the Ivanov matter you mentioned yesterday. He said he had talked with you before the Gromyko visit and Gromyko mentioned it in the EOB office. The President had said you would talk to Dobrynin about it before Christmas.

R: Dobrynin wants to see me so I will do that. I will say we are actively working on it. Sometime in January or February. This fellow is not in jail.

K: He feels that he has a commitment to Gromyko that you will talk to Dobrynin before Christmas. How you work it out --

R: Tell him I will take care of that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON (Tape)

Prof. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., December 16, 1970

K: How are you?

Y: I'm all right, thank you. I have met my friend for about an hour earlier today, and this was perhaps the most serious meeting I have ever had with him. My friend has specifically asked me to speak to you this time on his behalf with full authority. As I informed you a few days ago, he really would like to conclude this already too protracted negotiations within the next couple of days. My friend strongly feels that deadline time has come for the final political decision -- he would like to emphasize the word political decision -- at the highest level within our two governments; that is, between your friend and mine. He expressed again his personal regret for such a long delay in reaching an agreement as he meant to give it much earlier but due to the extremely difficult and highly technical nature of the problem and the very limited scope of what he, himself, and his government can do to impose so-called voluntary restrictions on the industry which is still showing stubborn resistance at home. In spite of all that, my friend does wish to have an agreement out of his personal conviction that this will better serve the interests of our two countries. Now, in order to have an agreement within 48 hours, my friend would like to ask your friend through you to consider the following propositions. This is almost the same basic position I have already explained to you many weeks ago; that is, put in one sentence -- you should take substance and first give us name(?). My friend is fully aware of the fact that your friend made a political commitment to your industry and any agreement must be of that nature and contents; that your friend feels that he has redeemed the minimum requirements of the commitment, even if your industry is not quite satisfied by it.

K: But, of course, one problem is that if our industry isn't satisfied with it, it doesn't help my friend to have met his political commitment.

Y: I see. On the other hand, from our internal point of view, my friend has to dramatize this possible agreement as a product of so-called mutual...

K: Well, why don't you tell me what your friend proposes rather than discuss it theoretically.

Y: If my friend is to survive politically and to implement it effectively by the acquiescence of our industry; if this understanding of the situation of both sides is a correct one, within this basic framework

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Prof. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., December 16, 1970

my friend would like to appeal to your friend through you the following specific points for his consideration and for his overall political judgment, and this is not bargaining at all.

K: Yeah, but can you tell me what they are.

Y: Yes, certainly, I am going right into this. This is the sincere request of my friend in order to have an agreement. First, my friend should like your friend to reconsider and if possible at all to accept our proposal of the description of 17 items in the six groups. Now, we know from our experts meeting, you have to have TQ211 and TQ121. If that is so, would it be possible to have them on the list of the 17 items and drop two other items which your expert considers less sensitive. This is number 1. Second, for the same reason, my friend wonders if you could drop the provision of the tax ceiling on TQ210 and TQ104 described in paragraph 2, subparagraph c., number 3 on page 5. If this is so, my friend hopes to solve this question through consultations as a special case.

K: You understand, I'm in no position to make any commitments on these things because I don't understand them.

Y: My friend is making a request. My friend hopes that we could make some arrangements to solve this question through consultation as a special case. By making these two requests, we are not asking you to reduce the actual coverage of the overall restrictions. My friend appreciates that the overall coverage has to be above 50 per cent as your expert has emphasized to our expert. What my friend needs is the political claim here at home that the U.S. made major concessions by having agreed to our formal proposal of 17 items under six groups. That's all he needs.

K: Otherwise, our proposal is acceptable?

Y: May I mention three more points? Third, with regard to the excessive concentration, we will accept the shifting of 3 per cent within a group as described by paragraph 2, subparagraph c.4. Thereby, essentially we accept categorical restrictions which have been, as you know, a vital issue throughout the negotiations. However, my friend would prefer a different form rather than a formal provision. Would you consider sending a formal letter from your expert to our expert, and our expert would acknowledge it and our government will be bound by it and will honor it. This formula has been discussed

By

NARA, Date

5/26

Prof Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., December 16, 1970

personally by Mr. S, your expert, with our expert in their last
meeting. And this is far more desirable for my friend for home
consumption.

K: Well, I have to check into it but I think there is a possibility
that if we work everything else out that we might be able to do this.

Y: It can be further explored by our experts to the form mutually
acceptable to our two governments.

K: Yeah, I think that can probably be done.

Y: Fourth, with regard to the compensation and the retaliation.
This is the GATT program. We won't accept the substance of the
paragraph 2, subparagraph c. 5 on page 6. We are withdrawing our
previous claim. We will no longer ask you to write on the agreement
that we reserve the right of GATT pursuant to subparagraph c. 2.
Therefore, we would like you to drop this provision from the formal
agreement. If you feel that you have to have something... some
assurance informal, we will certainly consider it.

K: I don't understand what you are saying because under C. 2
it doesn't say anything about GATT.

Y: It doesn't say anything but we will withdraw our request that
we reserve the right under the GATT.

K: Which paragraph do you want us to drop? Do you want us to
drop c. 2.5. I understand that... No 2. c. 5, but I don't understand.
If we drop this, what else do we have to... What would you withdraw?

Y: We will no longer ask you to write on the agreement that we
reserve the right. You see, we would never ask any compensation
or retaliation. So if you feel that you have to have some assurance
informal.

K: Are you prepared to withdraw your request in paragraph 1 that
you reserve the right?

Y: We still insist on having it in our negotiations, but we will not
ask any compensation ...

Prof. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., December 16, 1970

NARA, Dato 5/26

Y: I believe so. So just make the figure -- even a figure of 6.
All my friend is asking is a political compromise.

K: I understand.

Y: Now about the duration. For political reasons of necessary
physical preparations to implement the agreement effectively, in
addition to the political needs to acquiesce the industry at home, my
friend feels that we'll have to start our operation on April 1, 1971, thereby
ending it by September 30, 1973, as you proposed in paragraph 9 in the
last page. So actually the duration will be two years and six months,
exactly as you proposed in your draft. Also we would accept the simple
writing of - I'm just quoting - of this agreement can be terminated on
September 1973 as has been used in your proposal. We will drop
our claim to add a sentence that this agreement will not be extended.
We'll drop this sentence which some of us consider crucial.

K: Okay, now my problem is how are we going to make all of...
How is this going to get back into channels?

Y: If these can be carefully considered by your friend and you,
then our expert will propose it formally and make a request.

K: Okay, so I have to come back to you?

Y: Yes, I'm afraid so. My friend will make a specific order
directly to our expert.

K: I understand, so that it's your proposal we are accepting.
I will need the rest of today to talk to my colleagues here and I have
to tell you. I don't understand most of the issues you are raising
but the willingness to make any further concessions is practically
zero because there is a very strong feeling which I have already
described to you. So I cannot promise you what can be done. But
we will see what can be done, and we understand your friend's
difficulty. So we will approach it in a positive spirit. But I hope
that if it turns out that we have some problems that you will look at
it in a flexible way, too.

Y: And would you please...

K: Yes, I will talk to Mr. Flanigan personally and I will talk to
my friend.

By.

NARA, Date 5/26

Prof. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., December 16, 1970

Y: We must have an agreement if possible at home and also with regard to the Trade Bill. This is an internal affair of yours, and my friend has no right and will not say anything about it. He would be grateful if your friend would let him have an indication how to deal with it when we have an agreement.

K: Well, when we have an agreement, I will give you some idea of my friend's attitudes on the Trade Bill.

Y: Because this would have some very important implications on my friend's political strategy at home.

Y: Okay; right. As I told you, I unfortunately have to go to some meetings and I have your information now and I will see what I can do.

Y: Could you do that and when do I expect to hear from you?

K: Tomorrow morning around 9:00 my time.

Y: Tomorrow morning.

K: 9:00 my time.

Y: Yes; all right. I can be reached at my office or home, either place definitely.

K: I will call you 9:00 my time.

Y: Yes, please.

K: Good. Okay.

Y: Thank you very much. Good-bye.

By NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

Prof. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., December 16, 1970

K: How are you?

Y: All right, thank you. I have met my friend for about an hour earlier today and this was perhaps the most serious meeting I have had with him. My friend specifically asked me to speak to you this time on his behalf with full authority. As I informed you a few days ago, he really would like to conclude the negotiations within the next couple of days. My friend strongly feels that the deadline time has come for a final political decision -- and he emphasizes political decision -- at the highest level in our two governments; that is, your friend and mine. He expressed again his personal regret for the long delay in reaching an agreement. He meant it to be much earlier, but it was due to the technical difficulties of the problem and the limited scope of what his government can do with regard to voluntary restrictions on the industry. In spite of all that, my friend does wish to have an agreement out of his personal conviction that this would better serve the interests of our two countries. In order to have an agreement within 48 hours, my friend would like to ask your friend through you to consider the following propositions. This is almost the same basic position I have already explained to you many weeks ago. My friend is aware your friend made a commitment to your industry. Any agreement must be of the nature that he has redeemed the minimum requirements of the commitment.

K: One problem is if our industry isn't satisfied with it, it doesn't help my friend to have made his political commitment.

Y: On the other hand, from our internal point of view, my friend has to dramatize this possible agreement...

K: Tell me what your friend discussed.

Y: If my friend is to survive politically and to implement it by acquiescence of our industry -- if this understanding of the situation by both sides is correct -- my friend would like to appeal to your friend the following specific points for his consideration and for his overall political judgment. This is not bargaining.

K: Tell me what they are.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Prof. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., December 16, 1970

Y: It is the sincere request of my friend we need to have an agreement.

First, my friend should like your friend to reconsider and if possible at all to accept our proposal of the description of 17 items under six groups. We know from the formal expert meetings you have to have TQ211 and TQ121. If that is so, would it be possible to have them on the list of 17 items and drop two other items which your expert considers less sensitive.

Two, for the same reason my friend wonders if you could drop the provision of a tax ceiling on TQ210 and TQ104 described in paragraph 2, subparagraph c, number 3 on page 5. My friend hopes to solve the question through consultation as a special case.

K: You understand I am in no position to make any commitments on these things. I do not understand it.

Y: My friend is making a request. He hopes we can make arrangements to solve the question through consultation as a special case. By making these two as a request, he is not asking you to reduce the actual coverage of the overall restrictions. My friend appreciates that the overall coverage has to be above 50 per cent as emphasized. My friend needs the political claim here at home that the U.S. made major concessions by having agreed to our formal proposal of 17 items under six groups. That is all he needs.

Y: Let me give you three more points.

Third, with regard to excessive concentration, we will accept the restriction of three per cent within a group as described by paragraph 2, subparagraph c.4. Thereby, essentially we accept the categorical restrictions. However, my friend would prefer a different form rather than a formal provision. Could you consider sending a formal letter from your expert to our expert. Our expert would acknowledge it, and we would be bound by it and honor it. This formula has been discussed personally by Mr. S, your expert, with our expert in the last meeting, and this is far more desirable for my friend for home consumption.

By. NARA, Dino 5/26

- 3 -

K: I think there is a possibility, if we can work everything else out, we might be able to do this.

Y: It can be further explored by our experts so that it is mutually acceptable to our two governments.

Fourth, with regard to the compensation and retaliation and the GATT problem. We accept the substance of paragraph 2, subparagraph c. 5. on page 6 on withdrawing the previous claim. We will no longer ask you to write on the agreement that we reserve the right of GATT pursuant to c. 2. Therefore, we would like you to drop this provision from the formal agreement. If you feel you have to have some assurance -- informal instead -- this is it.

K: I don't understand -- under c. 2. it doesn't say anything about GATT.

Y: It doesn't say anything -- but we will withdraw our request that we reserve the right under GATT.

K: Which paragraph will you drop? You'll drop paragraph 2.c.5?

Y: That is right.

K: If you drop this, what would you withdraw?

Y: We will no longer ask you to write on the agreement that we reserve the right. We will never ask any compensation or retaliation. If you feel you have to have some assurance, then it can be informal.

K: Are you prepared to withdraw your request in paragraph 1?

Y: We still insist on having it in our negotiations, but we will not ask any compensation.

K: You want the right but you won't exercise it. Is that it?

Y: No, I don't think so. We would like you to drop paragraph 2.c.5. Then you may need some assurance informally. We will certainly do that.

By NARA, Date 5/26

Prof. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., December 16, 1970

- 4 -

K: How are you going to do that?

Y: Our expert can work it out easily my friend feels.

K: Can he put that in a letter? Could he give an informal letter to that effect which we would keep in the White House?

Y: Certainly.

K: Let us explore that.

Y: Fifth, with regard to the annual growth rate, we originally asked 9 per cent as you know, and you proposed 3 per cent for the first year. We will accept that certainly. For the second and third years, your expert asked 5 per cent each. My friend would like to ask you to make it 7 per cent which is a symbolic figure to compromise for the Japanese between 9 and 5 per cent. Personally, I wonder if you could work out somehow technically the figure to this effect without any substantial disadvantage to your side -- the first year, 3 per cent; the second and third years, your expert says 5 per cent maximum. Could you make it 7 per cent just for the figure's sake?

K: What is the base year on which we are operating?

Y: It is not quite clear from the negotiations. We believe the base year is the latest one.

K: October 31 is the base year?

Y: I believe so. Just make a figure. All my friend is asking for is a political compromise. About the duration -- for practical reasons for necessary physical preparations to implement the agreement effectively, in addition to acquiescing the industry at home, my friend feels we have to start our operations of restriction on April 1, 1971, thereby ending it by September 30, 1973, as you proposed in paragraph 9 in the last page. The actual duration is two years and 6 months exactly as you proposed. We will accept that this agreement shall be terminated on September 30, 1973 as is being used in your proposal. We will drop our claim to add a sentence that this agreement will not be extended. We will drop this sentence which some of us consider crucial.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

Prof. Yoshida/Mr. Kissinger

10:35 a.m., December 16, 1970

K: My problem is how are you going to get this back into channels.

Y: Yes. If these can be considered by your friend and you, our expert will propose it formally and make a request.

K: I have to come back to you?

Y: I'm afraid so. My friend will make a specific order to our expert.

K: I will need the rest of the day to talk to my colleagues here. I have to tell you I don't understand most of the issues you are raising, but the willingness to make any further concessions is practically zero. This is a strong feeling. I cannot promise what can be done. We will see. We will approach it in a positive spirit. I hope if it turns out we have some problems, you will look at it in a flexible way, too.

Y: Will you please.

K: I will talk to Flanigan personally and my friend.

Y: We must have an agreement if possible at home and also with regard to the Trade Bill. This is an internal affair of yours, and my friend has no right and will not say anything about it. He would be grateful if your friend would let him know how to deal with it when we have an agreement.

K: I will give you some idea of my friend's attitude on the Trade Bill.

Y: This will have importance on the political strategy at home.

K: I have to go to some meetings. I have your information now and will see what I can do.

Y: When can I expect to hear from you?

By. NARA, Dato 5/20

TELCOM
Laird/Kissinger

11:45 am

12/16/70

L: In the Christmas spirit yet?

K: Not yet but getting there.

L: What I wanted to talk briefly to you about, I want to talk with Geo. Shultz on the 71 budget and I wanted to let you know the problem. You will recall that Geo. and I when Mayo said I had to take a billion dollars, Geo said that was my estimate. Our budget went through. They didn't take that much -- $650 million. Congress deals with authorizations but I am dealing with expenditures. They don't with certain things but it's a funny piece of paper. They took the lead time out but not the expenditures. So I would like to limit reduction to $650 million. I took a cut at the start of the year.

K: I think he will go with that.

L: I think so but I wanted to talk with you. We are letting the stories ride the way they are. Meahan wanted the credit for cutting but it's funny cutting. instead of the billion dollars I thought they might take so I wanted you to have the background. I think Geo. will go along with me.

K: If he doesn't, let me know.

L: I think I should talk with you on Friday or Sat.

K: Let's aim for Friday and if not, then we will do it Sat. Someone tells me you think I talked with Frankel on the bombing halt. That's not true.

L: Bombing halt?

K: Frankel story that we were taken by these and it's not true. Saturday's paper.

L: What's the theme of the story.

K: A tough line.

L: I took a tough line on answering my Pell.

K: I don't object to your line. I like it. But I wanted you to be aware that I haven't given a backgrounder.

L: I said it right out in public. You are saying there are no understandings and we should bomb the North.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Laird/Kissinger

11:45 am

12/16/70

K: We like what you did.

L: There must be some misunderstanding about this. I don't expect this to make you to take the same line I took.

K: I didn't take any line.

L: The only person who said I don't think the WH took no objection was Helms. But not a newspaperman.

K: No, it wasn't a newspaperman. (Good, I just wanted you to be clear that I hadn't talked with anyone.)

By NARA, Date 5/26

Prof. Graubard/Mr. Kissinger

December 16, 1970 11:50 a.m.

jlj

G: Henry, my trip to Philadelphia has been washed out because the man I was supposed to meet with has not done his work. I was wondering if there was some time when you have more time than others and perhaps we could get together. I would be willing to make it Sunday or some time next week if that would be better for you.

K: Steve, let me call you tomorrow. I'm running for a plane now.

G: Fine, Then you will call me tomorrow and perhaps we can arrange something.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Secretary David Kennedy/Mr. Kissinger (not verbatim)

December 16, 1970 11:55 a.m.

jlj

HAK: Dave, two things. One I wanted to tell you personally how sorry I am to see you leave and above all to express my admiration for the way you conducted yourself the other day. It must have been trying and you acted like a great gentleman, not surprisingly but it was a privilege to observe it.

K: It wasn't too bad.

HAK: The President asked me to pass on that he would like you to also go to Japan when you are in Indonesia. Bill Rogers will be talking to you about it but the President wanted you to go as his personal emissary - Presidential - and not just as a State Department representatives.

K: That was my understanding with the President. I am not sure that Bill understand that but it would give it much more impact if I had more than just the State Department. I have another errand on that trip too.

HAK: The President says if Mrs. Kennedy would like to join you he thinks it would be fine.

K: She probably will. Say Henry, I want you to know that our problems with NSC have not been personal. Staff things are hard to move but I have not considered that personally.

HAK: Of course it isn't personal and I never thought it was. There have been always institutional problems but I have high regard for you.

By

NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM

Colonel Kennedy/Prof. Yoshida

8:00 p.m., December 16, 1970

K: In connection with the telephone call tomorrow morning.

Y: Yes.

K: Dr. Jones would prefer to make the call tomorrow evening -- at about 6:30 tomorrow evening.

Y: Of your time, 6:30 tomorrow evening of your time instead of in the morning.

K: That's correct.

Y: I see, would it be possible to speak with Dr. Jones for just a moment?

K: He is not in the city, I talked with him just a few minutes ago. There has been considerable discussions and they will not be able to talk until tomorrow evening but will be ready to talk at 6:30.

Y: I greatly appreciate your telling me about this because on our side there is some problem with regard to the schedule. We certainly will wait to hear from Dr. Jones at 6:30 of your time. Did you say we have been having some considerable discussions on the subject?

K: Yes, but they will be ready to call tomorrow evening.

Y: Are you involved on this issue?

K: Not directly.

Y: You are not in a position to say anything about the matter, I am wondering if I could just speak for one minute with Dr. Jones or is it physically impossible? Your place is so great, I thought it might be possible.

m

K: He is at a dinner and will not be back into the city until 11:00 o'clock our time.

Y: I see I am a little confused.

K: About three hours from now, by the time he gets home from the airport it will probably be four hours from now.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON

Colonel Kennedy/Prof. Yoshida

8:00 p.m., December 16, 1970

Y: Technical problem, not ...

K: I think that is probably correct.

Y: To get his advice, how can I do that?

K: You can call in the morning.

Y: He can be reached tonight your time at 11:00 do you think?

K: I think it would probably be later than that, he's not expected to arrive back at the airport until 11:00.

Y: I see, not arrive back at his home until ...

K: 12 o'clock.

Y: All right and in the meanwhile he can not be reached.

K: No sir, I think not.

Y: All I need is just one minute of conversation with him to get his advice.

K: Not really sure -- he has been out of the city all afternoon, not sure he knows very much at this point.

Y: I see -- is there nothing about the subject -- all right.

K: I would suggest if you really want to speak to him, you can call him early in the morning, you see.

Y: All right, thank you very much and in any case I may have to get in touch with him at midnight tonight but otherwise, I will hear from him.

K: Tomorrow evening at 6:30.

Y: Of your time.

K: That is in place of the call he was going to make in the morning, I think he was going to call at 9 o'clock.

Y: That is right, thank you very much.

wgh

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Tebcon
Secretary Laird
12/17/70 9:00 a.m.

L: One story you probably say in the paper today is about the use of defoliants; it's a lousy story. They probably can stop using them any time Abrams wants. He doesn't need permission from me. I'm getting that straightened out.

K: The ICBM build-up story was bad.

L: That's been going around this town.

K: Who's peddling it?

L: It probably came out of ACDA. The figures were in the hands of this Getler a guy who works for the Washington Post. He even has numbers in the study made by the intelligence assessment group. We did not confirm or deny; we're just staying away. He has the figures and dates and they are correct. We did not say anything. Just made a statement that there were some indications but his figures are right. We sent you yesterday the response we were going to use. We have a low-hey response. But somebody has given out all of the figures. Did you see it?

K: Yes, and Admiral ADMx Anderson called this morning beside himself.

L: They even have the ______ down to 294. Did you see that?

K: Yes.

L: They were going to try to make this out as a significant new development and we are trying to keep it from the American people. I think someone gave them the whole ball of wax. I think someone in the AP will go ahead on the Yankee ______. There's nothing we can do about these stories but that's also out of that intelligence report. But that's not what I called about. I called about the disposal of the bio agents and weapons. That story is going to be a loser because people are going to find out where the things are stores. On Friday we'll brief on this. But some of these Congressmen and Senators are going to find out for the first time that these things have been in their back yards. We got a request that we sent some Colonel over to the White House to do this rather than having Friedheim do it over here. I think we should keep it out of the White House. The specifics on this thing should not get over there.

By. 80

NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird

12/17/70 9:00 a.m. page 2

K: I agree.

L: If you get into where they are and how they are going to be destroyed. . . I am going to tell Dan and Henken over here to keep it low-key.

K: I don't see much sense in our doing it. Are you ready to go on it?

L: We're going Friday at 11:00. But we've got to start our briefings now and we can't wait too much longer than Friday because it's going to come out and so we've got to start our briefings now.

K: Let me check with Ron. One other thing: what about the stories about the spying on Stevenson and ________. What are the facts?

L: The situation is such that when I came in here there was activity going on on that line. I testified on this last week before the Fulbright committee. I took actions to change that. I couldn't be done without the authorization if the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of the Army. This Staff Sergeant who testified . . . the Army tells me that they had to let him go because he went beyond his authority.

K: On his own?

L: Yes, and I will send you the report on that. I handled that before the Fulbright committee. We put out new orders before the commending officer could authorize such surveillance.

K: Why did they do it?

L: I'll get that over to you.

K: Would it bother you if we condemned it? We would say that a preliminary investigation shows that it was not authorized and we will institute new procedures.

L: We already have. Clifford xxx says that he had no knowledge that the Army agents were used at the Democratic and Republican conventions. That's a bunch of crap. They couldn't be used without the

a

s

By NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Secretary Laird

12/17/70 9:00 a.m. page 3

authority of the Secretary of Defense. There is a law which allows the
Secret Service to borrow from the military when there is a need. And
they will do that again but then they are operating under the direction of
the Secret Service. They are used . . . they were needed at the UN
General Assembly because they had problems. Army agents were used
but under the direction of the Secret Service.

K: Could you send something over here for me?

L: Sure. The Secret Service from time to time needs help but
they have them then operating under their instructions. The check on
Kerner was authorized: we do run security checks on Generals from
time to time to keep in effect their security clearances. But the check
on Stevenson was not authorized.

K: Do you think he did it on his own?

L: He said he did it because . . . I think he did it on his own
but we are checking on that. The Army ordered on June 8 that he
would be for the Secretary of the Army to authorize it and it was never
authorized.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCOM
Secy. Resor/Kissinger

9:21 am

12/17/70

K: You don't have enough for your army ______ w so they are shadowing politicians now.

R: We have been trying for two years to stop that.

K: What happened?

R: We think that the military intelligence ______ in the Mid West on it's own was trying to assess the civil disturbance threat and doing things that they thought were required. On Stevenson we think someone did it on his own. The Col. in charge is on his way here. We put out a specific order last June that there would be no civil investigations except related with civil disturbances.

K: Why in June?

R: It was a follow up to an article in Washingtonian which said our directions were not being carried out as we wanted. In '68 we thought the instructions adequate but found out from the Washingtonian it wasn't so we sent out new instructions. We have this man alledgedly testifying to Sen. Jordan that he did this spying but we don't know if that's on his own or what.

Would ______ if the President said ______? It hurt you/that it was totally unauthorized?

R: We did that yesterday. I wish he would. I will send you the statement. It's not part of our present policy. We don't say this man did it because he may have gone beyond. It cannot be done today without violation of policy and the Under Secretary should know about any incident before it happens.

K: Also, could you send me whatever facts you do have right now?

R: Yes and if there's anything further I can do after you have read these things, please let me know.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Zeigler/Kissinger

morning 12/17/70

K: I think Laird is right. The biological announcement will be a loser.

Z: I will talk to Laird.

K: It has nothing to do with talking with him. My judgment is that it's a loser. I want to register that and will cause more haggling. It's basically a destruction concept.

Z: Our PR planners always jump ______.

K: They are always wrong. Check with me before we cpxx pop off on the army business. We should clearly say it was not authorized.

Z: Do I say wex are getting the facts?

K: We have investigated enough to say if it happened it was totally unauthorized. It cannot be condoned but we are getting all the facts and then we will have something to say.

Z: Are you going to the evening at the WH?

K: No. I have to go to the Indian Embassy. It's a long-standing invitation.

By. NARA. Date 5/26

TELCOM

Minister H. Ehmke
Mr. Kissinger
12:50 p.m., 12-17-70

E: How are you Mr. Kissinger?

K: Fine. How are you?

E: I have a question. When I was in the States, we missed seeing each other and I had hoped we would have a talk and Guido Goldman told me you had the same feeling. I would like to see you rather quickly. Could I see you this weekend?

K: How about Monday?

E: Well, we could do that but the weekend would be easier.

K: I could see you at 9:00 am or 10:00 a.m. on Saturday. Monday would be a little bit better.

E: If Monday is better, let's take Monday.

K: Do you want to do it in my office?

E: Yes. That will be fine.

K: Will that be only you or your Ambassador too?

E: Just me. I have not told the Ambassador about requesting this meeting.

K: Your Ambassador is coming in today. I have heard that you think I have had private conferences with Strauss. That is not true. I want you to understand it was dinner with about 20 guests and I did not know who was on the guest list before I went.

E: We know that. No, that is not the problem.

K: Alright. Shall we say 12 Noon on Monday? And I will make no announcement here.

E: We won't either.

mlh

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Saville Davis/Kissinger
3:04 pm 12/17/70

D: I just returned to the office 10 minutes ago and wondered how I can look you in the eye.

K: You can't.

D: Of course not. May I talk for background.

K: Sure.

D: The story was written by Selover from State Dept. sources. I deal with the WH and stay away from State and he works with State and stays away from the WH. He wrote it except for sections which quote your staff. He doesn't pin it on them and it's done on his authority.

K: I don't agree that those quotes are true. For instance, even I don't know how many choices the President had for Secretary of State let alone my staff.

D: The worst point of the thing are those quotes without clarification of the Kissinger staff. He has had a tremendous amount of pressure from Boston to <u>hardly sharpen up our stories.</u> I am retiring on May 1 and the new bureau chief --

K: I am sorry to hear that.

D: I will be my own boss so I can find out if I have a personality.

K: I wouldn't worry about that.

D: That's irrelevant to this. Because of the set up here where we don't pre-read stories --

K: "The Secretary of State is much too forgiving ? ? ? ?" I don't believe that and my Middle East expert, on deep background, if I have a criticism of him is that he is too pro-Arab so I cannot imagine who could have said this except at State.

D: Except in talking with other people and I haven't had a chance to talk it over some of his information came from another reporter who told him that it came from 2 members of your staff and this other reporter <u>could</u> got the material from these 2 members of your staff. If all this comes from your staff and is covered by wide variety of staff --

K: Present staff or past who are trying to cause trouble.

D: It could be. I am feeling extremely badly.

Saville Davis/Kissinger

10-4 p.m.

12/17/70

-2-

NARA, Date 5/26
By. C

K: Every idea we have had on SALT from here and the idea that ... is outrageous and unfair.

D: I wouldn't have believed it myself.

K: It's the opposite of the truth. The only signal we didn't pick up was not picked up at Gerard Smith's request. On Communist China, I haven't been so outraged -- I know you are a man of honor. I would tell you the truth on deep background -- the truth on these.

D: I would like to see what we can do without that information on it because we don't need it and then we can sit down and talk about it. It was put in by the second string. It was put in the paper in a hurry. No one has the capability of publishing this. I saw the story and hit the ceiling. The new man here hit the ceiling and he really hasn't got a feel for this yet. The person who wrote it is very nice and conscientious. He has obviously gone beyond his depth.

K: Any other newspaper I would question their motives.

D: That's what hurts me. As far as the paper is concerned we are all very distressed about it. The main motives of people who gave the information are a aspect.

K: They are not helping their Secy. either. They think they are by making him the hero and me the villain. I haven't claimed credit for the decisions but this isn't the point.

D: I don't even know what to do about it. I have been sitting here for 10 mins trying to deal it out. I can correct it by presenting a different view of the situation but that never catches up. He is a new man at foreign policy and shouldn't have tried this.

K: Or checked it with me.

D: But it says all staff and the staff must reflect the person who runs the staff.

K: Not fair to speak even about the staff.

D: Right. I agree. These people may not even be on the staff. I don't know the names.

K: On the business of "Chinese experts ? ? ? ? ? and all people believe that this generous attitude is warranted." It's totally wrong. Every initiative on China is started here but I wouldn't claim this contest because it's all one government.

Davis/Kissinger
14 04 Jan 12/17/70

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

D: You haven't mentioned the worst things.

K: SALT --

D: That and others are not good politically.

K: Politically it's all horrible. "Kissinger staff is frankly willing to widen the war."

D: I thought that was perhaps particularly rough.

K: Who on my staff?

D: At this stage I don't know because I haven't talked with Selover. He isn't here.

K: Would you like to think about it.

D: Yes. It's a rough one because you don't know how to correct it but you don't know how and might make more of it but then the record is the record, & I will think about it.

K: Hope to see you soon. You don't have to explain how you feel.

D: Thanks for calling and I will put my thinking cap on.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority F01258
By LARA Date 6/10

Telecon
Dobrynin

12/17/70 4:17 p. m.

D: I just arrived from New York.

K: Did you have a good time?

D: Not exactly -- it was a very short visit.

K: You called me yesterday.

D: Yes because yesterday I was in New York and Vorontsov was with Mr. Davis at State.

K: Who?

D: Mrs. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary dealing with East European affairs. He words for Mr. Hillenbrand.

K: Oh yes, I know who.

D: And he invited Vorontsov yesterday and he mentioned two points. The second, about the gentlemen, you know.

K: Yes, but he doesn't know anything about it. The secretary will talk to you about that next week.

D: He put some conditions on it and Moscow will be very angry.

K: There will be no conditions.

D: He already said it.

K: What are they?

D: That we have to give back Mr. ________ who is a Soviet citizen, an unbelievable demand, and second about the four Americans in East Germany. I told Vorontsov to hold this until I came back to Washington to discuss it with you.

K: Let me discuss it with the President. Don't make this an official thing.

D: Should I drop it with you?

K: Let me talk to the President to make sure.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority Eolaster
By CNARA Date 9/17/70

Telecon
Dobrynin

12/17/70 4:17 p.m. page 2

D: I asked him to hold it because I knew he would send a telegram to Moscow. He put it down in writing.

K: What I communicated to you was the expression of the President with no conditions attached. The only thing I want to confirm -- which I already know the answer to -- is that this was not a change made without my knowing it. Let me call you tomorrow morning.

D: I will hold it till tomorrow morning.

K: Could you?

D: Yes. I was so surprised with these changes of mind.

K: There is no change.

12/17/70 6:10 p.m.

K: I just talked to the President and he asked that you as a favor please tear up that thing.

D: Drop it?

K: Yes. The commitment to you stands and will be implemented in the nearest future -- probably next week. This is based on a bureaucratic confusion and probably over-eagerness by people who figure if you can get something for something why give it away for nothing. We have a commitment which we made voluntarily and it will be implemented in the nearest future. I have to make a few phone calls first which I prefer to have wait till the British Prime Minister has left because I am so busy with him here. If we are going to quarrel, let's quarrel about more important things.

D: What did he say about the first statement?

K: We are releasing Ivanov without conditions except for the arrangement you and I have made which was already agreed upon.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folleser
By CNARA Date 9/17/70

Telecon
Dobrynin

12/17/70 4:17 p.m. page 2

K: Could you?

K: There is no change.

12/17/70 6:10 p.m.

D: Drop it?

Telecon
Dobrynin

12/17/70 6:10 p.m. page 3

D: Anything I would like to ask in connection with this. Ivanov case is in the clear and I am thankful. On the second situation, I asked if it was really on behalf of the White House or the State Department. I would like to know whether it was done with the knowledge of the White House -- the demand from us to return the Soviet citizen to the United States. It was an unbelievable demand. It was an official demand from the US Government to my government. He is a Soviet citizen but the US Government demanded the return of a Soviet citizen. The reaction in Moscow would be very strong.

K: Obviously there is no connection.

D: It is clear now. But was it cleared by the White House?

K: This is strictly between us -- I would be in great trouble if this ... --I was totally unaware of this and so was the President and I don't know how much of a record you want to make of this.

D: It's already in Moscow -- it was sent yesterday.

K: If you have such a thing as an informal communication, I recommend that this be handled in a low-key manner.

D: But how was it on behalf of the US Government to the Soviet government.

K: I don't know how much we want to prolong a naturally fruitless exchange.

D: This is what I am wondering. It is a fruitless base. It's completely hopeless and fruitless.

K: Whatever one may think of what happened and the judgment involved, it is now simply an internal American matter.

D: But now it comes to us.

K: What can be done? We don't want to prolong an exchange on this.

D: It will be dropped if you authorize me to say this was done without authorization.

K: Then what would happen?

D: I could say drop this issue.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority Folsom
By CNARA Date 6/1/67

Telecon
Dobrynin

12/17/70 6:10 p.m. page 4

K: I would like to check that with the President. Personally we
have no interest in elevating this into a formal exchange between
two governments.

D: But you already have.

K: The White House has no interest in doing that. Now
we have to reduce it to an appropriate level.

D: It would be very worthwhile if you could tell me to drop this as
something from a government to government.

K: And then we never get a reply?

D: That is exactly the case.

K: Ask them not to send a reply till I talk to you again. I will check
with the President and we will get in touch tomorrow.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority E1268
By NARA Date 6/1/67

By

NARA, Date

5/26

Telecon

Dobrynin

12/17/70 4:17 p.m.

K: Did you have a good time?

K: You called me yesterday.

K: Who?

K: Oh yes, I know who.

D: He already said it.

K: What are they?

D: Should I drop it with you?

By. NARA, Date 5/20

Telecon
Dobrynin

12/17/70 4:17 p.m. page 2

K: Could you?

K: There is no change.

12/17/70 6:10 p.m.

D: Drop it?

*

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Dobrynin

12/17/70 6:10 p.m. page 3

D: Anything I would like to ask in connection with this. Ivanov case is in the clear and I am thankful. On the second situation, I asked if was it really on behalf of the White House or the State Department. I would like to know whether it was done with the knowledge of the White House -- the demand from us to return the Soviet citizen to the United States. It was an unbelievable demand. It was an official demand from the US Government to my government. He is a Soviet citizen but the US Government demanded the return of a Soviet citizen. The reaction in Moscow would be very strong.

D: But as it was on behalf of the US Government to the Soviet government.

D: But now it comes to us.

K: Then what would happen?

By. NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Dobrynin

12/17/70 6:10 p.m. page 4

D: But you already have.

D: It would be very worthwhile if you could tell me to drop this as
something from our government to government.

D: That is exactly the case.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM
Sen. Curtis/Kissinger
5:00 pm 12/17/70

C: There will be coming up a vacancy on the President's foreign intelligence advisory board. Gov. Connally is on it and he is going to Treasury. I would like to suggest Gen. A. Wedemeyer. He has been a civilian for 20 years. An excellent man. Former 4 star general.

K: I know him well.

C: Wide experience in writings plus he has been a generous, loyal helper of the President.

K: I will give the President his name. I don't work on this.

C: It's in your line of responsibility.

K: I will present his name to the President in the next few days. I know him personally and have had the privilege of talking with him several times. His name will be presented to the President in the next few days.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELECON

The Attorney General/Mr. Kissinger

5:07 p.m., December 17, 1970

K: In the unending saga of the Secretary of State, we now have a real problem connected with the Ivanov case. They were driving us badly for years to do it. Now that we have agreed, they don't want to do it.

M: I understood this to be the case and I was led to believe you concurred. They are concerned about PR in view of the Lithuanian sailor's problem.

K: They called Dobrynin today and told him there were two conditions: that the four Americans held in East Germany be released, and that someone they consider a Soviet citizen be released. Dobrynin is beside himself. He said, 'you are discrediting me and you.' He said he could not send this to Moscow unless he knows the President wants this. If this sticks, I am going to get out of dealing with him in this channel. It is dishonorable, and I knew nothing about it. If the President wants to release this guy, can you do it without State?

M: Yes; they have nothing to do with it.

K: That's all I wanted to know.

M: I'm sorry about this double-dealing operation.

K: I am afraid he figures Rogers had something to do with it. How can I explain it after giving him the word of the President this would. You know how they bugged you.

M: This leaves me speechless. They bugged the hell out of me.

K: Maybe the President will order you to do it.

M: We have no problem with State. They can't do anything one way or the other.

K: Okay, thank you.

lds

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger
Secretary Volpe
12/17/70; 6:30 p.m.

K: How did you get on first? I have an iron rule that you do not get on first.

V: You were already on when I got on -- you were on first. How did it go?

K: Okay. They did not riot, which is progress.

V: I have just reviewed very quickly the summary of the testimony of the situation off Massachusetts. What I would like to do -- I am suggesting -- I would like to send over the transcript of the testimony that was taken -- it's three packages about six inches high -- I would like to send a summary of that testimony which is sufficient with the recommendations and actions proposed by the Board and then attached also would be the recommendations proposed by the Commandant. You or anyone could read the whole thing if you want. I would be happy to discuss this with you. There are several things to be decided -- what kind of covering letter when the announcement is made? Who makes the announcement?

K: I am practically certain it should come from your place. What is the announcement?

V: I am reviewing it with the General Counsel -- two of the men would be court martialed. If they desire to do so, they can retire with reprimand.

K: Who are the two?

V: Ellis and the Captain, who was acting District Commander. The third man gets a reprimand.

K: I think this is in your jurisdiction and you ought to make the announcement and just inform us of it. Let me check with the President tomorrow morning and I will call you. It seems to me that this is in your department and I think you ought to handle it.

V: If that's the way -- okay.

K: I have had an opportunity to say to the President and others you have acted like a man. You did not run for cover and you did not try to pass the buck. I wish I could say that about everyone else involved. You acted like a man.

By. 4

NARA, Date 5/26

Telecon
Mr. Kissinger/Sec. Volpe
12/17/70; 6:30 p.m.

- 2 -

V: Thanks. One more thing. I have written you a letter for your eyes only in connection with the revised US port security program as it affects the Great Lakes. Justice, CIA, State and ourselves worked this out and everybody agreed. It is in order but I am writing you a letter which indicates there are some problems that might arise with regard to some ships that are allowed to come down the Great Lakes -- Canada has allowed them and the US Coast Guard on a reciprocal arrangement has followed the same thing that the Canadians have done. Not too long ago a Russian ship came down and there was a little bit of a disturbance. John Mitchell asked if he could have a copy of the letter I sent to you. I didn't see a problem and I am also sending one to State and CIA.

K: That's absolutely proper. Thank you. Goodnight.

V: Goodnight.

feg

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCON
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida
6:50 p.m., December 17, 1970

K: I have some disappointing news for you.

Y: I see.

K: The problem here is we have been talking to our industry and as you recognize an agreement that they don't like doesn't make any sense. We can make no further concessions on anything, not even face saving ones, that's one of the penalties for the past few years. Suggest that we take a few days to see what we can arrange here and you take a few days to see what is possible on your side -- what is possible in the way of modifications and then we will be in touch early next week. Can't even get our people to make even the slightest face saving concessions.

Y: What should my friend do?

K: Review your counterproposal. If it takes the form you suggested, your friend should see which of the requests you made of me could be eliminated.

Y: Could my friend give our counterproposal to our expert as I told you?

K: He can but he will be turned down. As I told you, it would be better not to make it as a matter of record. What you should do is see if you can slightly modify some of the suggestions you made yesterday so that we can tell our people we got a little more than it looked like. At the same time in the meantime we will begin to work with our people to see if they will be more reasonable next week.

Y: Let them make it formal.

K: A Formal proposal will end the negotiations.

Y: Our expert ...

K: I don't what your expert to do anything. If they present it, we will turn it down.

Y: I understand but you don't mind doing that because -- would you think there are still some steps for another agreement?

K: Early next week we may be able to come up with some suggestions for you that go in the direction that you have had in mind.

TELCORN -- Page 2
Mr. Kissinger/Prof. Yoshida

Page 2 -- 6:50 p.m., December 17, 1970

By NARA, Dato 5/26

Y: Oh, I see. Then I will ask my friend not to use what I told you as a formal proposal but as something very informal. A presentation of a proposal -- not a proposal -- from our expert to yours.

K: I don't see -- it makes no sense, it would be better not to do anything.

Y: Oh, I see.

K: Let your friend study his proposal to me. If you can modify it slightly, you can call me.

Y: In the meantime we don't do anything, that is much better because you see we have this serious question of __________.

K: Don't do anything.

Y: Our expert will not get in touch with yours until I hear from you.

K: Or until I hear from you that you have slightly modified your proposal.

Y: Can you suggest anything on specific points?

K: That's right, until Monday or Tuesday. If there are any modifications, they will help me.

Y: I will do my best and I think my friend will do his very best. Until I hear from you, we don't take any action.

K: Except towards me.

Y: That's right.

K: If you have a change to suggest or you are willing to drop one of your suggestions, you can call me.

Y: If you could make in the meanwhile any specific points ...

K: That's my problem, they rejected them all so I can't tell you which to modify. It would help me if I can go to our industry and say the Japanese indicated their goodwill by doing the following. So any of them that can be dropped would help me, even the relatively unimportant ones.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCORN

Mr. Kissinger/Attorney General Mitchell

7:18 p.m., December 17, 1970

K: Hello, John. If you want to know the latest on the Ivanov case, the State Department has attached two conditions. Dobrynin just called absolutely blubbering. The four Americans held by the East Germans and the return of the Lithuanian we turned over to them.

M: You must be kidding, who is this?

K: It was an official demand from the U.S. government.

M: Incredible!

K: On legal grounds, we have nothing to stand on. An American who no matter how ________.

M: Almost insulating to them on the national basis. Incredible, absolutely incredible.

K: I talked to the President and he has ordered now that the guy be released. I will get the word to the State Department on Monday and I am seeing Dobrynin on Tuesday. It will be done by then. We can do it or not do it but not doing this, we make it worse.

M: Will State tell them?

K: Let's say State will tell you to move on it unless I do.

M: This is incredible. Good God, I can't even fathom.

K: It is beyond belief.

M: What did he say?

K: The President.

M: Yeah.

K: He just said that gives him no choice, he's got to do it.

M: Well Henry, this is one for your memoirs.

K: I won't be writing memoirs. The State Department, if they don't get us into a nuclear war, it won't be because they haven't tried. After prodding us for a year and a half, then they do this. The guy would be better off to remain in the state.

M: I just find it hard to believe.

K: Give mv best to Martha.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/John Osborne

7:38 p.m., December 17, 1970

O: I just wanted to check the open question when I saw you in your office.

K: Okay.

O: You know Husein, written about him. I just wanted to check, is it still open or is it now closed?

K: Not completely closed, I will make the final decision by January 10th.

O: Writing on the second year around.

K: Will you be more friendly if I resign?

O: The week after Christmas I would like to be able to get a statement from an authority.

K: Why don't you check with me before you write the article, maybe by then I can give you at least what is the most probably outcome.

O: The week after Christmas -- I see in the papers that you are going to California.

K: I see you read the society pages.

O: You have to in Washington, D.C., Washington.

K: I read them myself. If I am not here, the same number will reach me in California.

O: Okay.

wgh

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Mr. Kissinger/Amb. Freeman

11:35 p.m., December 17, 1970

K: I just wanted to call you and tell you I opened the Evening Star tonight and saw the ...

F: The George Sherman article. Yes, I saw it myself.

K: Absolutely no basis in fact, it is contrary to our policy and reflects the view of one segment of one department.

F: I recognize that but it was good of you to ring me up. I will see to it that the Prime Minister is told.

K: John Thompson was exposed to that when he was here and I told him not to pay any attention to it.

F: I saw it earlier this evening but it was nice of you to ring Henry.

K: Will you tell the Prime Minister that this is contrary to our policy?

F: Fine, I will tell him that.

K: Okay, John, see you tomorrow.

wgh