KISSINGER, HENRY A.

JAN 19 1970

Dear Abe:

I learned recently that Army Specialist 7 Rudolph Finnie, 498-26-4771, is being ordered to the 537th Personnel Services Company in Vietnam in early February. I wanted to give you my personal assessment of his unique capabilities as a chauffeur.

He is most impressive and a great credit to the Army. In addition to being very courteous, tactful and perceptive, Finnie is highly intelligent, energetic and enthusiastic. One feels completely at ease in the competent hands of this thoroughly reliable and personable individual.

He is ideally suited for assignment as a chauffeur for a high official or ranking guest.

General Creighton W. X. Abrams
Commander, USMACV
U. S. Army Vietnam
APO San Francisco 96222

HAK:JTH:ms:6Jan70

RECEIVED
JAN 1 4 1970
CENTRAL FILES

KISSINGER, HENRY A.

March 25, 1969

Dear Roger:

Your point on John McNaughton is well taken; I'll do what I can to see you or talk to you on the phone. When I simply cannot be reached -- which may be often, if my schedule continues true to present form -- I suggest you talk to Al Haig or Larry Eagleburger in my office. They can pass your messages on to me.

You should know that I have seen your various papers (e. g., on Nigeria/Biafra) and have seen that they went to the relevant staff people for consideration whenever they were not something that I thought you would want closely held.

Much as I think your book merits attention, I am afraid I must ask that my name not be used. I have refused several other requests since January 20 in order to avoid any implication of White House endorsement, approval, etc. It is a policy, and I feel I must stick with it, no matter how highly I may value the product I am asked to endorse.

I hope you will understand the reasons for my decision. I look forward to talking with you soon.

Professor Roger Fisher
Langdell Hall
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

LSE:mz

RECEIVED
MAR 25 1969

CENTRAL FILES

DECEIVED
MAY 5 1960
REDEEMED

L&E:us
Cambridge, Massachusetts 05138
Langdell Hall
Professor Roger Fischer

Henry V. Kissinger

With warm regards,

I hope you will understand the reasons for my decision. I look
the product I am asked to endorse.

I feel I must stick with it, no matter how highly I may value
White House endorsement, approval, etc. It is a policy, and
regardless since January 50 in order to avoid any implication of
ask that my name not be used. I have refused several other
much as I think your book merits attention. I am strick I must
thing that I thought you would want closely held.

at all people for consideration whenever they were not some-
on Nigeria\Bizzi) and have seen that they went to the relevant
You should know that I have seen your various papers (e.g.,
your messages on to me.

Al Hail or Larry Engleberger in my office. They can pass
continue true to present term -- I assure you talk to
cannot be reached -- which may be often, if my schedule
I can to see you or talk to you on the phone. When I imply
Your point on John McNaughton is well taken; I'll do what

Dear Roger:

March 5, 1960

KISSINGER, HENRY V.

ROGER FISHER
LANGDELL HALL
CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 02138

617 868-7600
EXTENSION 4615

March 19, 1969

Mr. Henry Kissinger
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Henry:

When John McNaughton was busy and I phoned, indicating that I thought I had something important to say, he would respond with "All right. I will give you 12 minutes Thursday morning beginning at 7:50 a.m." or "I will phone you at home this evening at 11 p.m." or "Will you have a sandwich with me in the office at 7:30 p.m. Saturday?" or something like that.

In view of your repeated request that you would like me to have some input and the absolute stone wall which Joan has so competently erected outside your door, may I suggest you try the McNaughton approach?

I have one other suggestion as to how you might inject a little of my thinking into the government. Harper and Row is bringing out a book of mine this spring containing in primer form Fisher's ideas of how a government can use reason in the conduct of conflict. It is full of things like "think first about their decision," "give them a yesable proposition," "is the offer credibile," etc. May I suggest that perhaps the best way to get State Department personnel to take this kind of thinking seriously is for you to say a few laudatory words about the book which Harper and Row would be allowed to disclose? For example, "Everyone seriously interested in foreign affairs should read this book" or

"The clearest, simplest book I know on how to think about foreign affairs" or

"The best handbook for statesmen since Machiavelli's Prince" or

"Hereafter no one will be able to ignore such Fisherisms as the "yesable proposition", the "fading opportunity," and the "credible offer."

Enclosed is the material now in the book, some of which as you see is not yet in type. There are about 20 more Osborn drawings but the enclosed will suggest the flavor.

Now to give you a simple yesable proposition, may I quote you as saying of the book, "Invaluable"? Unless I hear personally from you to the contrary I will assume you have no objection.

As ever,

INTRODUCTION

In form this book is a how-to-do-it guide for statesmen -- a primer on the conduct of that limited portion of international affairs concerned with immediate conflicts. I chose this form for several reasons. First, it directs attention toward basics, toward some of the simple, first principles which should guide the conduct of conflict. Before we disagree about the accuracy of the latest trade figures from Southern Rhodesia or the number of planes needed in Thailand, I believe we should back off and look at some of the big questions about what we are trying to do and how we propose to do it. The concept of a primer, or handbook, lets me suggest without embarrassment a simple framework for thinking. After some twenty years of being professionally concerned with international affairs I find such a framework useful. I hope others will.

Secondly, this approach sharpens facts by confronting them with the cutting edge of choice. I am often told that I spend my time prescribing what decision-makers ought to do while true social science is concerned with what decision-makers actually do. I flatly reject this view that it is more scientific to adopt the vantage point of a pure spectator rather than of a potential actor. For a pure spectator there are no criteria of relevance. On the other hand, trying to answer the question of what ought to be done requires a more perceptive eye on what actually happens than does a factual description of foreign affairs. Adopting the vantage point of an adviser to a statesman engaged in the conduct of international affairs excludes nothing. An adviser is as

2.

[LC]

interested in the actual world of foreign affairs as any social science researcher. To advise a statesman as to how he ought to behave, one needs to know all there is to be known about how other statesmen really behave, about cause and effect, and about the predictable consequences of various courses of action. The handbook form excludes nothing, I believe, but rather tries to marshal the facts in a more useful fashion. This is not to say that I have succeeded, but only to justify the attempt.

A third advantage of the handbook form is that it directs attention to the _conduct_ of foreign affairs rather than to some- thing called "policy". The very concept of foreign policy suggests that the important question to ask is, "What is our policy?" It promotes the belief that the central task of people in the State Department and in other ministries of foreign affairs is to produce a generalized statement of a posture or position which can be maintained over a period of time. A how-to-do-it approach emphasizes that there are things to do as well as policies to produce. It makes it easier to talk about the skills of conflict management and the skills of communicating with governments with whom we differ.

One disadvantage of putting ideas in the form of advice is that the client or reader may get the impression that I think the ideas will "work" in some objective sense. This book is not intended to solve problems, but to identify them, and to suggest an approach. A gardening book will not make plants grow in the face of a drought; a sailing guide will not guide a boat through

3.

[LC]

every storm nor help it win every race; nor will a book on how
to shop for antiques bridge the gap between lofty objectives and
limited resources. A book on how to influence another government
is no exception. Often the only reconciliation between objectives
and resources is to lower one's sights. If a how-to-do-it book
means that it can be done this is really a *some ideas on how-to-
go-about-it book*.

Perhaps the primary advantage of the present format is that
it may be provocative. Advice and conclusions are more quickly
challenged than a theoretical description. Most of my theories
and assumptions are not subject to proof, but neither are the
assumptions upon which governments currently operate. We will
have to battle them out and in this process the more controversy
the better. Some of this controversy may be over the format
itself. I have already been told by one friend in the government,
"Your approach is entirely too abstract and theoretical, and
besides we already do what you suggest every day."

ADDENDUM

An Example

While this book was in gestation, some of its ideas were being tried out in actual international conflicts. At one time, I thought of doing this book by applying the approach to a single international dispute, showing how different techniques would apply as the situation developed chronologically. But the successive drafts, memoranda, and notes on just one ongoing conflict would themselves fill a book. And the chances are that the analytical framework that was in my mind would have been all but swallowed up by discussions of substance and by material reflecting competing perceptions of how diplomacy ought to be conducted. So here, in an addendum, is a sample package aimed at getting one limited but significant yesable proposition before an appropriate decider.

With respect to such an example, one particular perception of diplomacy deserves comment. In considering whether or not to undertake a given diplomatic initiative, one naturally tries to estimate its chance of success. By my standards, one chance in a hundred may be good odds indeed. If exerting only part time effort (an individual) for a week has a slight chance of hastening the end of a war, reducing tension in an inherently dangerous conflict, or directing governmental attention to more constructive pursuits, then his effort is a good investment. It might be compared with drilling an oil well for a few thousand dollars where there is a slight chance of making millions, or with getting a particular sweepstakes ticket for a dollar where there is one chance in a hundred of its winning a fortune. In such circumstances, the question is not "Will my modest investment be wasted?" but rather

2.

[LC]

"Is there a better investment? Is there anything I can do that is more promising, considering the low cost and the possibility of high return?" Government officials tend to apply a different standard, though they are reluctant to try anything which is "probably" going to fail. To a given official, the cost of doing nothing is slight; the cost of trying and failing is likely to seem higher. Rarely is it enough to convince him that he knows of no alternative which holds greater promise and that failure would not work any appreciable damage. He will measure the plan, regardless of its low cost, against a 50-50 standard: unless it is more likely than not to succeed, he will be disinclined to try.

This point is relevant to the following pages which are intended to illustrate the approach suggested in this book. After the book had gone to press, I devoted a couple of days to thinking about the Middle East and produced the following memorandum and attached drafts. If an outside government or some U.N. official wanted to apply the thinking of this book to the Middle East, these drafts suggest a starting point. They try to present such an activist with a yesable proposition making it easy for him in turn to present one to the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) and to Israel, the parties which hold the key to progress in the Middle East. These suggestions might be considered the first move in the application of theory to a given case with which most people are pretty familiar.

3.

I have no illusions that these suggestions provide "the answer" to the Middle East or that they will probably work. Certainly the approach presently being pursued by the United States and most other governments is "not working" either, by any objective standard of performance. The papers below simply suggest an approach which if pursued with sustained effort might have a better than one in a hundred chance of bringing about significant improvements in the Middle East situation. I know of no more promising approach to suggest to third parties who are more interested in reducing the level of conflict in the Middle East than in seeing one party or another "win" -- that is, to those who are more interested in peace and justice than in victory.

4.

MEMORANDUM

March 1969

To:

From: Roger Fisher

Re: Middle East

You encouraged me to put on paper some of my thoughts on the Middle East. Here they are in the form of a memorandum and some operational drafts. It is not my thought that these drafts eliminate the necessity of negotiation. Rather they provide a focus for them.

Certainly there is not going to be a single comprehensive settlement of the Middle East, a "Versailles Treaty" signed by all the governments and others involved which provides us with a once-and-for-all solution to the problems of Suez, the Strait of Tiran, the Jordan River, demilitarized zones in the Sinai, the Gaza Strip, Israel's boundaries, the Golan Heights, repatriation and resettlement of refugees, recognition, diplomatic relations, Jerusalem and the holy places, Transjordan, compensation problems, and United Nations observers and forces.

The Security Council's unanimous Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 lays down the provisions and principles for peace in the Middle East, namely:

- withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the June 1967 war;

- termination of all claims or states of belligerency;

- acknowledgement of the right of every state in the area to live in peace;

5.

[lc]

respect for secure and recognized boundaries;
freedom of navigation through international waterways in
the area;

a just settlement of the refugee problem;
demilitarized zones and other guarantees of territorial
inviolability.

We should, I believe, accept this resolution as providing an
adequate framework for settlement. I see no chance of getting
anything better.

Within this context we should concentrate first on the
most easily decidable questions. I would start with the United
Arab Republic and Israel and seek to obtain from each the best
decision which one might reasonably expect to obtain at this
time. I would then go on, step by step and piece by piece, first
identifying in each case an actual document such as a declaration,
an offer, a promise, an invitation, a letter or a request which
would be helpful and which one might be able to obtain, and
then trying to get it.

As an agenda, I suggest the following:

1. Privately review the attached drafts yourself and consult
informally with others who are fully aware of the political
sensitivities of the governments concerned.

2. Prepare clean drafts reflecting suggested improvements.

3. Arrange a meeting with President Nassar. The objective
of this meeting would be to obtain from him the best obtainable
letter addressed to the Secretary General. Oral discussion would
obviously be desirable to convey the proper balance between

6.

yesability and flexibility. The first set of attached documents
is for such a discussion. These documents are:

I. Draft Aide Memoire to be left with President Nassar after the meeting. This summarizes the points which would be made orally and identifies the various working papers used in the discussion, namely

A. The Way Israel May See Its Choice Today

B. Draft Letter from President Nassar to the Secretary General designed to change the choice facing Israel

C. The Way Israel Might Be Persuaded to See Its Choice Later
(Target Situation)

D. The Costs and Benefits to the U.A.R. of Sending the Letter

II. Without waiting for a letter from President Nassar it may be desirable to proceed independently and concurrently with the Prime Minister of Israel, and confront his government with a decidable question in the form of a letter which they might be expected to sign. If you are unable to obtain any letter from the U.A.R. you should certainly try Israel.

A second set of documents should be prepared for such dis-
cussions. Attached, marked II-B, is a draft of a proposed letter
from Israel to the Security General, prepared on the assumption
that no prior letter has been obtained from the U.A.R. The other
documents are not included here but could be drafted on the same
principles as those for the U.A.R. The full set would be:

II. Draft Aide Memoire to be left with the Israeli Prime
Minister after the first meeting. This is comparable to the one
prepared for President Nassar. It would summarize the major points
which would be made orally and identify the various working

7.

[Lc]

papers used in the discussion, namely:

A. The Way the U.A.R. May See Its Choice Today

B. Draft Letter from Israel to the Secretary General designed to change the choice facing the U.A.R.

C. The Way the U.A.R. Might be Persuaded to See Its Choice Later (Target Situation)

D. The Costs and Benefits to Israel of Sending Such a Letter.

6. Further steps would have to be planned in the light of the results of the foregoing, yet work should be done now on drafts which would help identify potential yesable propositions, such as:

— a letter from Jordan to the Secretary General regarding Transjordan.

— a draft of a General Assembly resolution on Jerusalem.

— a draft deed of internationalization of the Strait of Tiran.

— a draft letter from Israel to the Secretary General regarding refugees.

8.

Draft No. I

Aide Memoire

Ambassador _________ met with President Nassar of the United Arab Republic in Cairo on _________ 1969 to discuss the present impasse in relations between Israel and the Arab countries and to propose, in the light of the position presently being taken by the Government of Israel, certain initiatives by the United Arab Republic designed to obtain withdrawal of Israeli forces from U.A.R. territory and progress toward implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967. The Ambassador made the following points:

1. It is unlikely that the United Arab Republic will be able in the foreseeable future to establish through force of arms a durable and satisfactory solution to the problems of the Middle East. No physically imposed solution appears promising. Improvement in the situation will require political decisions of governments, including in particular the Government of Israel.

2. It is unlikely that a complete political settlement can be effected all at once. The number of parties and the complexity of the issues involved appears to preclude a comprehensive document settling all questions and signed by everyone. It would appear to be to the interest of the U.A.R. to focus attention on one issue at a time and attempt to exert influence upon Israel to make a desired decision with respect to that issue. It is far easier to gain international political support behind a clear, simple step than in support of complicated multilateral measures.

3. One step with which the settlement process could begin

9.

[LC]

would appear to be a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from
the Sinai combined with an opening of the Suez Canal. It is
suggested that an effort be made to bring this about.

4. Draft A (attached) suggests the way the withdrawal question may now look to the Government of Israel. If this draft is even approximately correct it is not surprising that Israel has declined to start the withdrawal of its troops. The task for the U.A.R. is to do what it can on the political side to so change the choice with which Israel is faced that withdrawal can reasonably be expected. This will require making it politically easy for Israel to withdraw and politically difficult for them not to. It will require demonstrating to the major powers and other third parties that the U.A.R. has adopted a reasonable position -- has in fact done all that it can reasonably be asked to do at this stage -- and that therefore it is up to Israel to take the next step.

5. An appropriate initiative for the U.A.R. to consider is a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations along the lines of Draft B (attached). Such a letter would keep the United Nations directly involved. It should not be limited to making proposals but should be an operative letter which in itself constitutes action. This will suggest to everybody that it is up to Israel to do something next.

6. The draft letter involves no great change in position for the U.A.R. except that of playing some cards now rather than holding them to be played later. To bring political pressure to bear on Israel it is necessary for the U.A.R. to undercut Israel's statements about Arab objectives and to state clearly

10.

[LC]

an Arab position that is in fact reasonable and will also appear
reasonable to all but the most ardent Zionists.

7. For the U.A.R. to send such a letter would confront Israel with a new choice which would look something like that outlined in Draft C (attached). In these circumstances it might reasonably be anticipated that Israeli withdrawal of its forces would begin, that the existing stalemate will have been broken, and that further measures regarding refugees, the establishment of demilitarized zones, and the completion of withdrawal could more easily be undertaken.

8. While the proposed initiative involves some risks and some costs to the U.A.R., these appear to be less than those involved in allowing the present situation to continue. A rough estimate of the choice with which the U.A.R. is now faced is reflected in the balance sheet shown in Draft D (attached). Although a decision could be postponed, the passage of time is likely to cause increased international acceptance of Israel's occupation of U.A.R. territory as a permanent feature.

9. Should President Nassar send a letter along the lines of the attached draft, efforts would be undertaken by others to persuade Israel to make a constructive response.

[Lc]

12.

I-B

Draft B

His Excellency U Thant
Secretary General
United Nations
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

More than a year of discussions regarding the implementation of the Security Council's Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967 has demonstrated the unlikelihood of the parties themselves reaching agreement on a single, comprehensive document covering all aspects of the implementation of that resolution. Even if agreement on such a document could be reached, one could expect disagreement in turn over its implementation. We believe that the implementation of the decision of the Security Council need not await further formal acceptance or agreement but should be undertaken at once by the United Nations, and should proceed concurrently on all parts of the Resolution.

The United Arab Republic has been blamed by Israel for delay in the restoration of peace in the area. We, in turn, find that the fault lies on the side of Israel. You know the strong resentment we feel over the injustices of the past. You are fully aware of the double standard which condones organized attacks by the Israeli Government against its neighbors and condemns Arab citizens for resisting the illegal occupation of their own countries.

13.

But the time has come to look forward, not back. To facilitate the work of the United Nations in the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 we make this formal statement:

1. The United Arab Republic accepts the General Assembly resolution of 1947 establishing a new state in the Middle East, accepts the fact that that state exists, that it is a member of the United Nations, that like its neighbors it is entitled to all the rights and protections and is subject to all the obligations of the states provided in the Charter of the United Nations, and that that state is called Israel.

2. The United Arab Republic accepts the fact that the international boundaries of Israel are no more restrictive than those provided in the 1949 Armistice Agreement and no more extensive than those of the territory occupied by Israeli forces as of June 4, 1967. The exact location of the final boundaries between these positions is a matter to be settled peacefully through the United Nations. It is a matter as to which the United Arab Republic does not claim the right to use force.

3. As a demonstration of our earnest desire to move forward even before Israeli troops have been fully withdrawn from our territory, we hereby commit ourselves to allow cargo to and from Israel to pass through the Suez Canal as soon as all Israeli

[LC]

14A

by U.N. decision provided that on the Israeli side of the boundary
as well there are fair and reasonable demilitarized zones subject
to the same terms.

6. We suggest that you establish an advisory committee over which you preside, assisted by Ambassador Jarring or another representative chosen by you, to work out proposals regarding refugees, demilitarized zones, international waterways, withdrawal of troops, guarantees and so forth to be submitted to the Security Council in the implementation of Resolution 242. The Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic to the United Nations is prepared to meet at any reasonable time and place with you or your representative together with anyone, including a diplomatic representative of the State of Israel, whom you or your representative may wish to invite to discuss any matter you may wish to have discussed.

16.

[LC]

fact that Hitler's discrimination was against Jews and that Israel's discrimination is in favor of Jews and against Arabs is not a distinction which appeals to Arabs. To ask Arabs to "accept" the government of Israel as it is today is like asking Jews to "accept" the Government of Germany as it was thirty years ago. Today countless refugees are prevented from returning to their homes and their land on one ground only - they are not Jews. They cry out in their misery for help.

Zionist Israel is today a Frankenstein's monster, unwilling to abide by international law or the unanimous decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations. The Government of Israel insists that it may decide as it likes what is right and what is wrong; that it may freely inflict military punishment wheresoever it likes upon whomsoever it likes, for whatever reason seems sufficient to it alone.

We will continue by every peaceful means to work toward the day when Israel will become a modern political state in which all of its citizens, regardless of their race or religion, may freely participate without discrimination. We will work for the day when Israel will respect the standards of decent international behavior, when it will honor its firm commitment to the United Nations to refrain from force or threats of force and to accept the decisions of the Security Council. When that day comes there will be no problem of good relations among the countries of the Middle East.

This letter is written as one step toward that day. We request, as a second step, that the United Nations, through Security Council action if necessary, decide that Israeli troops

17.

should promptly withdraw a distance of 40 km. or more from the
Suez Canal and that the Canal be opened to all ships that went
through it before, but that in addition cargoes to or from Israel
should be allowed to pass through the Canal.

I hope you regard this statement as constructive and that
it will enable the United Nations to proceed more promptly with
the implementation of Resolution 242.

Please accept, etc.

Draft C

18.

I-C

# The Way Israel Might Be Persuaded to See Its Choice Later
## (Target Situation)

The Decision: The U.A.R. letter having been sent and published, shall we, Israel, withdraw our troops 40 km. from the Suez Canal?

### The Consequences
### if we do

+ We start a process which may bring peace and security to the Middle East.

+ The Canal will be re-opened and cargoes to and from Israel will be able to go through.

+ We have face-to-face discussions with the U.A.R., but only under U.N. auspices.

+ We make the U.A.R.'s acceptance of the state of Israel and the 1967 boundaries more binding.

+ We still hold substantial U.A.R. territory as leverage.

+ We can always block the Canal again later if we want.

### BUT:

- We will receive criticism from our own military and other hard-liners.

- It is not certain when and if Israeli flag vessels will be able to use the Canal.

### The Consequences
### if we do not

- The present pattern of terror and reprisals is likely to continue and get worse.

- The Canal remains blocked.

- The Arabs will not talk with us, nor will third parties press them for bilateral talks.

- We risk losing such acceptance of Israel as the U.A.R. has given.

- We will receive heavy criticism from abroad and even from some citizens.

- The U.S. Government may stop sales of military equipment and even consider other measures.

- There is little chance of bringing international pressure to bear on Arabs to make further concessions.

### BUT:

+ We retain control over all of the Sinai and continue to block the Canal.

Draft D

19.

I-D

# The Costs and Benefits to the U.A.R. of Sending the Letter

The Decision: Shall we, the U.A.R., send a letter to the Secretary General along the lines of the suggested draft?

## The Consequences if we do

+ We start a process of Israeli withdrawal from our territory.

+ The Suez Canal opens and we begin to get revenue from it again.

+ Foreign criticism of the U.A.R. is reduced.

+ Foreign political pressure on Israel is increased.

+ We increase the chance of doing something for the refugees.

## BUT:

- We receive domestic criticism from some military and other hard liners.

- We risk dividing the Arab countries.

- We write the letter without knowing for sure what we will get for it.

## The Consequences if we do not

- Israeli occupation of our territory continues.

- The Suez Canal remains closed, and we get no revenue from it.

- Foreign criticism of the U.A.R. continues.

- It will be difficult to get the big powers to exert any pressure on Israel to withdraw.

- The plight of the refugees continues.

- There is little to look forward to but another war which we may not win.

## BUT:

+ The military support the government.

+ The Arabs are more or less united against Israel.

+ We could always write such a letter later.

20.

II-B

Dear Mr. Secretary General:

Upon becoming Prime Minister I reviewed our entire position
to see if there were not some way in which Israel could help move
the Middle East question closer to settlement. Israel continues
to be under attack from Arab terrorists whose actions are condoned
and often supported by Arab governments. The Arab states continue
to refuse to recognize Israel or to meet with us to work out a
peaceful future.

As you know, we believe that the solution to the problems
of the area should be worked out to the extent possible in direct
bilateral discussions. We do not contemplate a master treaty
signed by all the countries of the region nor the imposition of
some comprehensive United Nations plan. The problem will be more
manageable if it is broken up into pieces. This approach should
also allow the parties at one discussion more easily to reach a
solution to a particular problem on its merits. We are prepared
to have such bilateral discussions take place under United Nations
auspices. Some problems, such as that of refugees, would
undoubtedly require meetings among more than two countries.

21.

[lc]

To further the possibilities for settlement and to
inaugurate this process, Israel makes the following formal
statement and proposals with respect to the United Arab
Republic.

1. We ask you to seek now from the United Arab Republic
a written declaration which will include, in substance, the
following language:

"The United Arab Republic accepts the right of the State of Israel to exist, the U.A.R. will never use or condone the use of force to affect or harrass the existence of Israel within borders as they existed on June 1, 1967 or as they may later be agreed upon, and the U.A.R. recognizes the permanent right of Israeli ships and cargoes to pass through the Suez Canal."

2. As soon as you receive and make public such a declaration on behalf of the Government of the United Arab Republic, Israel will immediately order its military forces to withdraw a distance no less than 40 km. from the Suez Canal and will permit the Canal to be cleared and opened to traffic.

3. To reduce the risk of incidents in the immediate future we hereby assure you that during the first year after the Canal has been opened we will be willing, upon your request, voluntarily to refrain from sailing vessels flying the Israeli flag through the Canal except on a few token or symbolic occasions to demonstrate that their right to pass through the Canal has been accepted.

22.

[L]

4. If within the next two months the U.A.R. makes a declaration as provided in paragraph 1, Israel hereby commits itself to the eventual return of all of the Sinai territory to the United Arab Republic, on the condition that a large part of it on the United Arab Republic side of the border constitute a demilitarized zone subject to the presence of United Nations personnel who could not be withdrawn except by agreement, or by decision of the Security Council upon no less than 60 days notice. And under the same conditions Israel is willing to have United Nations personnel stationed in limited, designated demilitarized zones on its side of the border as well. Special arrangements will have to be made with respect to the area bordering on the Strait of Tiran to assure free passage through that waterway.

5. If within the next two months the U.A.R. makes a declaration as provided in paragraph 1 we further undertake to assist in the task of the resettlement of all refugees who formerly lived in areas now in Israel and agree that some of these shall be allowed to return to Israel if they desire to be repatriated here, and that all others who once lived in what is now Israel will receive at least some compensation, either directly or indirectly, to assist in their resettlement.

6. The Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations is prepared to meet with you or your representative at any reasonable time and place, together with anyone including a diplomatic representative of the United Arab Republic to discuss any matter you propose. To facilitate the progress of such talks

23.

we suggest that they be private.

We hope that this statement will serve as a constructive
basis for beginning a process of settlement which will secure
peace in the Middle East.

Please accept, etc.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

September 12, 1970

Memo for Henry A. Kissinger

From: Peter Rodman
Subject: Letter from Grayson Kirk

Grayson Kirk wrote you to invite you to nominate someone to succeed George Franklin as Executive Director of the Council on Foreign Relations. I am not sure this requires a reply, but if you want to send one, I have drafted an acknowledgment at Tab A.

Recommendation:

That you sign the note at Tab A, if you wish to reply to Kirk.

Attachment

COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, I INC.

THE HAROLD PRATT HOUSE

NEW YORK, N. Y. 10021

58 EAST 68TH STREET

CABLE ADDRESS: FORAFFAIRS, NEW YORK

AREA CODE: 212 LEhigh 5-3300

September 3, 1970

Dear Henry:

It is with deep regret that, as President of the Council, I am writing to members of the Board and to other members who have been especially interested in and helpful to the Council to let you all know that George Franklin has decided to resign as Executive Director and to ask your advice about a successor. After eighteen years in this position he believes it is time for the Council to have new leadership. He has not come to this decision without a good deal of travail, but he feels especially that with our current ten-year program and financial plan well past its midpoint, such leadership should be on board early enough to participate fully in the formulation of the new ten-year plan and its presentation to the foundations and should be at least young enough not to reach retirement age before the plan is carried through, whereas George would reach that age even before the middle of the plan. He is ready to remain here, however, while a successor is being chosen.

Because of the unique nature of the role which George has played in the office which he has occupied so fruitfully these past eighteen years, John McCloy, as Chairman, has asked the Nominating Committee to begin a wide-ranging and thorough search for a successor. Because of the extraordinary importance to the Council of the position, Mr. McCloy has augmented the Standing Nominating Committee by adding several other Directors. The Committee, as augmented, now includes Messrs. Hamilton F. Armstrong, Hedley Donovan, Douglas Dillon, Gabriel Hauge, John J. McCloy, Bill Moyers, Alfred C. Neal, David Rockefeller, Robert V. Roosa, and myself.

Their charge is to search widely for the best qualified man, within or outside the present staff and membership. Chief among the attributes they are seeking are an inspired interest in foreign affairs, an ability to stimulate and lead the staff and membership, administrative capability, and intellectual attainment. They want to select a man of respected stature without constricting biases, who is also sensitive to the issues that are troubling the generations now entering the political life of this country and others.

-2-

The effort will take time. But we cannot, however, afford
to make a lesser effort if we are to carry on the momentum of growth,
prestige and service that the Council has experienced under George
Franklin's leadership. We shall have to think carefully, I am sure,
about the structure of his successor's responsibilities, and the
resources at his command.

The augmented Committee has asked John Watts, a member of
the Council, to serve as their executive secretary for this undertaking.
I hope you will pass along to him by telephone, letter, or visit, any
suggestions you may have about candidates, or any aspect of the
Committee's approach. His address is 59 Wall Street, New York 10005,
and his phone is 483-1818, ext. 626. Please feel free as well to dis-
cuss your suggestions with any member of the augmented Nominating
Committee. It would be most helpful if you would relay your suggestions
as soon as possible, since the Committee hopes to proceed briskly with
its deliberations.

To help the Committee with the difficult job of evaluation,
I should like to ask that you accompany your recommendation with a
letter which outlines the particular attributes and accomplishments
which you believe should commend your nominee to the Committee. We
particularly are interested in those subjective evaluations and
opinions which cannot be captured in factual biographical data. If
biographical data are available in one of the standard sources, you
can rely on the Committee to obtain that information. Your comments
about a candidate's leadership qualities, his notable accomplishments
in other posts, his judgment and vision in matters relating to foreign
affairs, his personal stature and his potential for growth in the
unique role which the active leadership of the Council provides, all
will be of keen interest to the Committee. It would also be of help
if you would mention the names of other Council members who are well
acquainted with the individual whom you are recommending.

P. S. Dictated by Dr. Kirk, but signed for him during his absence
in Europe.