2/18/88

SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

<u>Statement</u>

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Thank you for the invitation to testify about the pending
INF Treaty.

I accepted your invitation with some ambivalence. For
many months I have expressed grave reservations about the
political and strategic implications of the pending agreement,
first directly to responsible officials, in the end, publicly.
I will sum up these doubts below.

Nevertheless, my concerns cannot be removed by the
refusal of the Senate to ratify the agreement. On the
contrary, failure to ratify or attaching conditions requiring
renegotiation, would generate a crisis in the Atlantic
Alliance which would in the end almost certainly lead to
the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Europe and

C/C

2

undermine the cohesion of the Alliance.

My reservations can be summed up as follows:

a) The pending agreement does not reduce in any significant degree the Soviet capacity to devastate Europe with nuclear weapons. ICBM's, SLBM's, and airplanes can carry out the missions assigned to the SS-20's and the shorter range weapons. It is also important to keep in mind that the warheads now on these missiles will remain in being.

b) The American capacity to retaliate against Soviet aggression with nuclear weapons based in Europe is substantially reduced if not eliminated. This view is, I believe, shared by all former NATO commanders.

c) Since NATO is an alliance of 16 nations confronting the threat of a single state, the reliance for deterrence on U.S. weapons based far away creates a psychological and political imbalance which is greatly magnified by

[YD]

3

Soviet superiority in conventional forces.

d) The INF agreement removes from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany the missiles which can retaliate against the source of aggression and leaves only those short-range nuclear missiles which would if used destroy solely German territory and population. This reality has generated pressures within the Federal Republic against modernization and for the denuclearization of Germany. These pressures are likely to increase and become a permanent feature of German domestic politics.

The seeds for strain within the Alliance thereby sown because other NATO countries cannot be expected to run risks in defense of German territory which the Federal Republic is not prepared to run on its own behalf.

I would have preferred the process of nuclear disarmament in Europe to begin at the short range end of the nuclear spectrum. It would in my view also have been

4

better if the INF process had taken place in stages. One
could have begun with a reduction on the order of 50
percent, and made the removal of the remainder
dependent on a withdrawal of substantial Soviet conventional
forces from Central Europe.

But that is not the situation the Committee confronts.
Failure to ratify the treaty or insistence on amendments
requiring renegotiation would not cure its defects; it would
on the contrary vastly magnify all difficulties:

a) The removal of American intermediate range missiles
is now irreversible. The process of negotiation and the
fact of a completed agreement coupled with the associated
briefings has destroyed the public support in Europe for
their deployment. Were the Senate to reject the treaty,
European governments would undoubtedly be forced by public
opinion to insist on the removal. Withdrawal of American
missiles would thus become a unilateral without any quid
pro quo.

5

CYD

b) Confidence in American leadership would be severely undermined. Neutralist sentiment in Europe would gain impetus; the pro-Atlantic element would be further demoralized. The Soviet strategy of dividing the Atlantic Alliance would be greatly enhanced.

For all these reasons, the Senate should consent to ratification.

At the same time I hope that the Senate would exercise its constitutional advisory role to the following effect:

a) Future steps towards nuclear arms control be coupled with measures to remove the Soviet conventional superiority overhanging America's allies. It should be made clear that this cannot be accomplished by vague Soviet hints of asymmetrical reductions. At a minimum, the United States must obtain a concrete Soviet scheme which lays out what it understands by "asymetry".

b) Verification procedures which may be adequate for

6

the INF agreement are almost surely insufficient for the
next stage.

New verification procedures must deal with three issues:

1) The magnitude of a violation necessary to
threaten the strategic equilibrium.

2) American capabilities -- national or as created
by the agreement -- to monitor potential violations.

3) Possible countermeasures.

On-site inspection is not an end in itself. It must
be assessed in relation to the above criteria. It must
also be kept in mind that verification can not make a
bad agreement good. It can only made a good agreement
enforceable.

c) Some relationship must be established between arms
control and Soviet political conduct. Clarity must be
obtained about parallel Soviet political conduct especially
the dispatch of arms and surrogates to regions far from

7

Soviet territory such as Angola and Nicaragua.

d) The strengthening of Atlantic unity must be the highest priority. It requires attention to four components:

1) A common strategy for the decade of the '90s and the next century which includes a relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons and between so-called tactical and strategic forces.

2) A common Atlantic diplomacy towards the East at least with respect to arms control.

3) Agreement on burden-sharing.

4) Coordination of actions outside the NATO area or at a minimum a mechanism to deal with disagreements.

2/18/88

<u>Statement</u>

2

CVD

3

4

a) The removal of American intermediate range missiles
is now irreversible. The process of negotiation and the
fact of a completed agreement coupled with the associated
briefings has destroyed the public support in Europe for
their deployment. Were the Senate to reject the treaty,
European governments would undoubtedly be forced by public
opinion to insist on their removal. Withdrawal of American
missiles would thus become a unilateral without any quid
pro quo.

5

CJD

6

CJD

3) Possible countermeasures.

On site inspection is not an end in itself. It must
be assessed in relation to the above criteria. It must
also be kept in mind that verification can not make a
bad agreement good. It can only make a good agreement
enforceable.

CYJ

7

P.006

CJ

convents to satisfaction.

with same twice slope
its constitutional advisory role

would exercise

Administration to the following effect:

It should be made clear
that this cannot be accomplished by vague Soviet hints of
asymmetrical reductions. At a minimum, the United States must
obtain a concrete Soviet scheme
which understands by
"asymmetry"

while lays on what
it understands by
"asymmetry"

c) = ✓ Verification procedures may be
inadequate
INF agreement are almost surely
appropriate for the next stage.

New

 verification procedures must deal with three issues:
the magnitude
is necessary

1) Need of violation to be
strategic equilibrium.

12/16/88

<u>Statement</u>

Thank you for the opportunity to testify about the pending
INF Treaty.

I do so with some ambivalence. For many months I have
expressed grave reservations about the political and strategic
implications of the pending agreement, first directly to
responsible officials, in the end, publicly. These reservations
are contained in articles which I am attaching and which I will
sum up below.

Nevertheless, my concerns while grave cannot be removed by
the refusal of the Senate to ratify the agreement. On the
contrary, failure to ratify or attaching conditions requiring
renegotiation, would generate a crisis in the Atlantic Alliance
which in all likelihood would lead to the unilateral withdrawal

2

of U.S. missiles.

a) The pending agreement does not reduce in any significant degree the Soviet capacity to devastate Europe with nuclear weapons. ICBM's, SCBM's, and airplanes can replace the two categories of missiles being destroyed. It is important to keep in mind that the warheads of these missiles remain.

b) The American capacity to retaliate from Europe is substantially reduced if not eliminated. This view is, I believe, shared by all former NATO commanders on this subject.

c) Since NATO is an alliance confronting the threat of a single state, the reliance for deterrence on U.S. weapons based far away creates a psychological and political imbalance which is magnified by the Soviet superiority in conventional forces.

CJD

3

d) The INF agreement removes from the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany the missiles which can retaliate against the source of aggression and leaves only those nuclear missiles which if used would destroy only German territory and population. This has inevitably generated pressures against nuclear modernization and for the denuclearization of Germany which are likely to increase. Yet other NATO countries cannot be expected to run risks in defense of German territory which the Federal Republic is not prepared to run on its own behalf. Thus the emphasis on reducing strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe while leaving Soviet conventional superiority untouched strains the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.

I would have preferred the process of nuclear disarmament in Europe to begin at the other end of the nuclear spectrum with short-range weapons. I have also argued that if strategic weapons became the focus of diplomacy it would have been better to begin with a reduction on the order of 50 percent, with the

4

removal of the remainder contingent on a withdrawal of
substantial Soviet conventional forces from Central Europe.

Failure to ratify the treaty would not cure its defects. It
would on the contrary magnify all difficulties:

a) The removal of American intermediate range missiles is now irreversible. The process of negotiation and briefing allies on the agreements has destroyed the public support that existed for their deployment. Were the Senate to reject the treaty, European governments would undoubtedly insist on their removal. Withdrawal of American missiles would thus become unilateral.

b) Confidence in American leadership would be severely undermined. Neutralist sentiment in Europe would gain impetus; the pro-Atlantic element would be further demoralized. The Soviet strategy of dividing the Atlantic Alliance would be enhanced.

5

For all these reasons, the Senate should ratify the
agreement.

I respectfully urge however that the Senate advise the
Administration to the following effect:

b) This cannot be accomplished by vague Soviet hints of
asymmetrical reductions. At a minimum, the United States must
obtain a concrete Soviet scheme of what it understands by that
term.

c) The verification procedures possibly adequate for the
INF agreement are almost surely appropriate for the next stage.

The verification procedures must deal with three issues:

1) Scale of violation needed to threaten the
strategic equilibrium.

6

2) American capabilities--national or as created by the agreement--to monitor potential violations.

3) Possible countermeasures.

d) Some relationship must be established between arms control and Soviet political conduct. Clarity must be obtained about parallel Soviet political conduct especially the dispatch of arms and surrogates to regions far from Soviet territory such as Angola and Nicaragua.

e) The strengthening of Atlantic unity must be the highest priority. It requires attention to four components:

1) Common strategy including relations between conventional and nuclear weapons and between so-called tactical and strategic forces.

2) Common East-West diplomacy

3) Burden-sharing

4) Coordination of actions outside the NATO area.

JAN. 25 '88 11:06 KISSINGER ASSOCIATES N.Y.

These and related issues should receive full consideration
by the appropriate Congressional Committees well before existing
talks reach major decisions.

JAN 25 '88 8:14

602 5-212 753 0042 PAGE 006

[x]

Nevertheless, my concerns cannot be removed by the
refusal of the Senate to ratify the agreement. On the
contrary, failure to ratify or attaching conditions
requiring renegotiation, would generate a crisis in the
Atlantic Alliance which would in the end almost certainly
lead to the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. missiles from
Europe and undermine the cohesion of the Alliance.

a) The pending agreement does not reduce in any
significant degree the Soviet capacity to devastate Europe
with nuclear weapons. ICBMs, SLBMs, and airplanes can carry
out the missions assigned to the SS-20s and the shorter
range weapons. It is also important to keep in mind that
the warheads now on these missiles will remain in being.

c) Since NATO is an alliance of 16 nations confronting
the threat of a single state, the reliance for deterrence on
U.S. weapons based far away creates a psychological and
political imbalance which is greatly magnified by Soviet
superiority in conventional forces.

d) The INF agreement removes from the territory of the
Federal Republic of Germany the missiles which can retaliate
against the source of aggression and leaves only those
short-range nuclear missiles which would if used destroy
solely German territory and population. This reality has
generated pressures within the Federal Republic against
modernization and for the denuclearization of Germany.
These pressures are likely to increase and become a
permanent feature of German domestic politics. The seeds
for strain within the Alliance are thereby sown because
other NATO countries cannot be expected to run risks in
defense of German territory which the Federal Republic is
not prepared to run on its own behalf.

I would have preferred the process of nuclear
disarmament in Europe to begin at the short range end of the
nuclear spectrum. It would in my view also have been better
if the INF process had taken place in stages. One could
have begun with a reduction on the order of 50 percent, and
made the removal of the remainder dependent on a withdrawal

2

a) The removal of American intermediate range missiles is now irreversible. The process of negotiation and the fact of a completed agreement coupled with the associated briefings has destroyed the public support in Europe for their deployment. Were the Senate to reject the treaty, European governments would undoubtedly be forced by public opinion to insist on the removal of American missiles. Withdrawal of American missiles would thus become a unilateral without any quid pro quo.

a) Future steps towards nuclear arms control should be coupled with measures to remove the Soviet conventional superiority overhanging America's allies. It should be made clear that this cannot be accomplished by vague Soviet hints of asymmetrical reductions. At a minimum, the United States must obtain a concrete Soviet scheme which lays out what it understands by "asymetry".

b) Verification procedures which may be adequate for the INF agreement are almost surely insufficient for the next stage.

3) Possible countermeasures.

On-site inspection is not an end in itself. It must be assessed in relation to the above criteria. It must also be kept in mind that verification can not make a bad agreement good. It can only make a good agreement enforceable.

c) Some relationship must be established between arms control and Soviet political conduct. Clarity must be obtained about parallel Soviet political conduct especially the dispatch of arms and surrogates to regions far from Soviet territory such as Angola and Nicaragua.

[c]

3

CLAIBORNE PELL, RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., DELAWARE
PAUL S. SARBANES, MARYLAND
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIFORNIA
CHRISTOPHER J. DODS, CONNECTICUT
JOHN F. KERRY, MASSACHUSETTS
PAUL SIMON, ILLINOIS
TERRY SANFORD, NORTH CAROLINA
BROCK ADAMS, WASHINGTON
DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, NEW YORK

GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, STAFF DIRECTOR
JAMES P. LUCIER, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

JESSE HELMS, NORTH CAROLINA
RICHARD G. LUGAR, INDIANA
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, KANSAS
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, MINNESOTA
LARRY PRESSLER, SOUTH DAKOTA
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, ALASKA
PAUL S. TRIBLE, Jr., VIRGINIA
DANIEL J. EVANS, WASHINGTON
MITCH MCCONNELL, KENTUCKY

JAN 20 1988

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6225

January 15, 1988

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Suite 1021
1800 K Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am writing to confirm your appearance before the Committee on Foreign Relations to testify on the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. Your testimony is scheduled at 10:00 a.m. on Wednesday, January 27, 1988, in Room 216 of the Hart Senate Office Building.

Secretary of State Shultz, Ambassador Kampelman, and Ambassador Glitman will have previously testified on behalf of the Treaty. You will appear with Secretaries Vance, Rogers and Muskie. Later in the week, we will be receiving testimony from Ambassador Nitze and the intelligence community. I would hope that, in addition to discussing your views as to the significance of the INF Treaty, you will address the implications of the Treaty for U.S.-Soviet relations, future arms control efforts, as well as for the Alliance.

Your oral presentation should be limited to 10 minutes, but you may submit a longer statement for the record. The oral presentation will be followed by questions and general discussion on this subject. It would be appreciated if you would submit your prepared statement at least two working days in advance of the hearing. You will receive a transcript of your testimony as soon as possible following the hearing and we would appreciate it very much if you could make any corrections and return the transcript within two weeks to allow an early printing of the hearings. If you have any further questions, please let me know or have your staff call Bill Ashworth at 224-9033.