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Regulation of some aspects of exploratory space travel -- manned or unmanned -- is also likely to be agreed upon (e.g. registration) as long as international regulation does not seriously interfere with efficient national planning, the acquisition of prestige or the exploration of military advantages.

International agreement on where outer space begins (and national control over the upper air space ends) seems to me less likely as long as -- regarding any imposed boundary -- the balance of national advantage or disadvantage appears unclear. However, absence of such agreement may not be very important. The situation in this respect may come to be much like that of disagreement on the extent of territorial waters.

I will not speculate here on the question of whether some outer space activities will be set up jointly by the Great Powers in execution of an agreement on arms control; for instance, the use of satellites for monitoring a bomb test agreement or in line with President Eisenhower's proposals of Jan. 1957 for open sky and space control. Obviously, the probability of *such* joint outer space activity depends entirely on the probability of arms control. However, I would suppose that any international control of military activities would raise appreciably the chances that outer space activities would become subjected to international regulation.

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## Conflict

On the basis of the criteria suggested above, I doubt that the Great Powers will readily agree on advance regulation of space stations on the moon or other planets. The need for doing so now does not seem to be especially compelling or advantageous. The prospect for such an agreement would improve as soon as some of the critical conditions were clearly met; for example, if it were clarified that a moon station would confer no military advantage. But the question that must now be raised is whether the lack of agreement or regulation would be conducive to international conflict.

Suppose, in the absence of advance agreement, one of the Great Powers would succeed in establishing a manned station on the moon. Supposing the United States did so, the most likely situation to develop would be one like that on the Antarctic mass, that is, a kind of truce. But suppose the USSR succeeded in doing so first and declared the moon henceforth to be part of the socialist camp and denied to capitalist exploitation.⁵ What might happen then? This question is important because on the answer depends in large part the likelihood of the USSR pursuing such a course of action.

5. The Soviets might thus revive the 16th and 17th century practice of claiming sovereignty over newly discovered territory on a first-come basis.

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Of course, if one nation did thus claim occupation of, and sovereignty over, the moon (or a planet) — in a sense establishing a new colonial frontier reminiscent of previous centuries — the claim would be either accepted or ignored and effectively challenged then (or subsequently) depending on, first, the value of the object claimed; second, the military power situation on earth; and third, some residual factors such as world public opinion. Indeed, we may generalize tentatively in the following fashion.

If possession of a moon station is of small value, no exclusive claim to moon sovereignty is likely to be made, the prestige of getting there first having been secured in any case. On the other hand, it is hard to imagine that possession of an exclusive lunar base, or exclusive control over the moon, could be a prize so valuable as to justify going to all-out war over it even if the challenging power expected to be "victorious" in such a war. If the challenging power expected to achieve military victory without surprise (!) and without much damage to itself, it would have decisive military supremacy to begin with, and if the problem would arise at all (which is improbable), the challenged power or powers would give in. (By the way, in this case it does not matter whether the challenging power is the one asserting or denying sovereignty over the moon, which shows that relative outer space capability is unimportant under these assumptions.) On the other hand, if the challenging power

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could not achieve military victory without large damage to
itself, the value of sovereignty over the moon would obviously
have to be very great for the challenge to be more than
verbal.

In the more probable situation, control over the moon
is considered of some intermediate value. Suppose A claims
control over the moon after having established a station
there. B will refuse to recognize the claim and protest.
But if A and B can deter one another from going to all-out
war, probably nothing further will happen on earth. This
will be true even if B is marginally more powerful
militarily in the sense that it would receive a lesser degree
of damage than A (marginal superiority being operationally
insignificant.) But what if subsequently B also establishes
a lunar station in defiance of A's claim to sovereignty?

What will then ensue seems to be unpredictable. One
possibility, however, is that limited war will occur in
outer space. Indeed, in some ways outer space is an ideal
theatre for limited war. Under the assumed conditions,
however, the outcome of such limited conflicts would settle
only issues in outer space. They could hardly settle basic
issues on earth. This situation would change only if
military superiority in outer space would give overall
military superiority to one or another great power or
coalition. Until this happens I think it improbable that
outer space rivalry would lead to international global
conflicts being displaced to the spatial periphery of the
international system. If such conflicts occurred, to repeat,

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they would be to settle issue in outer space which could
not be settled on earth (which it would be inconvenient,
or risky, or mutually too destructive to settle on earth.)

Another question relates to national reactions to the
military satellites of another power (or other powers), be
they reconnaissance or missile-launching satellites. I am
unable to discover any criteria on the basis of which
possible responses could be predicted. If I am right in
the foregoing, namely in assuming that reconnaissance
satellites will not be very important militarily, then
there would be no rational reason other than prestige for
a country to consider serious steps against the satellite-
launching power. And the prestige reason would fall by the
board if both powers maintained such satellites. (Inciden-
tally, a Soviet reconnaissance satellite over the United
States would probably be about as valuable militarily as
a United States satellite over the Soviet Union; while the
Soviet Union has better other sources of military intelli-
gence, the United States is less able than the Soviet Union
to camouflage activities which could, say, indicate a new
missile launching site in the midst of a busy mining or
industrial area.)

Concerning missile-launching satellites, if militarily
worthwhile at all, I do not suppose that they would be
responded to differently from launching sites on the
surface of the earth, including the oceans.

(There are sundry other kinds of conflict to which the
exploration and use of outer space might give rise. Some

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of these I am unable to discuss because I do not know
enough about the scientific and engineering aspects. For
example, how would communications satellites affect inter-
national and national propaganda; and, in this respect, the
Iron Curtain? Or would one country's communications system
(civil, military) become so dependent on communications
satellites that this dependency creates a new and important
vulnerability to hostile action? (People who speak hope-
fully of changing the weather also hint at changing the
ionosphere in order to blot out enemy communications.)

Other possible occasions for conflict seem trivial,
at least at this point. It is said, for example, that the
launching of space vehicles will be for many purposes
cheaper from equatorial than from other locations and that
this may lead to a scramble by the space powers for
equatorial space bases -- the Sino-Soviet bloc having no
such sites under its jurisdiction, and the United States
only a few. I mention this problem only because I suspect
it to be representative of the trivial problems. What is
meant here by "cheap" refers, I take it, to propulsion or
some other single technical factor. Ordinarily, however,
costs have many constituents. Surely, conquering and
holding, or buying or leasing sites on the equater will
be "costly"; and any rational government will take such
costs into account before engaging in a scramble for
equatorial satellite ports.)

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## Tentative Conclusion

The chances are, it seems to me, that -- for the next twenty-five years or so -- outer space is pretty much for the birds (meaning the animate variety.) Or, if it were not for the prestige factor, should be so considered. I do not, of course, deny that scientific and technological revolutions do not have tremendous effects on societies and social systems, including the international system. The so-called industrial revolution certainly did affect the international system gradually but drastically (as we are only now beginning to appreciate more fully.) The scientific, technological and industrial revolution is in fact continuing, with outer space activity a part of the process.

Over the relatively short run considered here, space exploration and activity will lead to an extension of the international system, but will probably not disturb it seriously. (Even though the process of innovation is accelerated, we must not forget that modern societies are more geared to absorbing this process than societies were some time ago.) In other words, space exploration and use will probably not, over the period, much affect the intentions of the international actors (though their intentions or goals may be affected and changed by other factors); have only marginal effects on actor capabilities, and hence should not lead to an appreciable modification of the structure and *modus operandi* of the international system.

To repeat, however, this conclusion depends on my initial technological assumptions.