NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUITE 300, 1225 CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON D. C. 20036

FREDERIC N. CLEAVELAND
President

AREA CODE (202)
296-0903

CONFIDENTIAL

SUMMARY OF THE SIXTH INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT SEMINAR

March 10, 1971

The Seminar focused on "The Elements of National Security in the Coming Decade" and opened with some brief background remarks by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Dr. Kissinger began by discussing the foreign policy-making process as it has developed under President Nixon. He observed that when President Nixon came to office, the only policy-making body that existed was the group of President Johnson's advisors which met every Tuesday for lunch. This gathering met with no agenda, no staff in attendance, and no systematic provision for follow-up. An arrangement such as this has several drawbacks: without an agenda, participants tend to talk "off the top of their heads"; there is a natural proclivity for domination by the President; and, with no explicit assignment of follow-up, policy decisions are sometimes lost or altered, even with the best of intentions.

It was President Nixon's goal to introduce into this informal policy-making machinery three elements: an orderly system of presenting alternatives to the President for his consideration, an end to feeding into the process only what it is thought the President would like to hear, and a systematic follow-up procedure. One solution was a revitalized National Security Council, with major responsibilities divided among six committees. All committees were given the above three functions; no committee is responsible for only one kind of policy decision.

With our bureaucracy, there is a real danger that an unfair consensus of opinion will gell before an issue reaches the President. Under President Eisenhower, for example, the

BOARD OF TRUSTEES: John D. Millett, Chairman James E. Webb, Treasurer Frederic N. Cleaveland, Secretary and President
William T. Golden Roger W. Jones Ronald B. Lee Matthias E. Lukens Kent Mathewson William W. Parsons
Nathan W. Pearson John A. Perkins Elmer B. Staats Charles B. Stauffacher York Wilbern Robert C. Wood

AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

process was such that the President could only approve or
disapprove each recommendation. He did not know the alternatives.
Within the Nixon Administration, this trap is avoided by
directing the various departments to concentrate on finding
out what policy choices there are. The picture of the bureau-
cracy which has emerged from this new procedure is not one of
consensus at the lower levels, but rather one of differing
opinions up and down the line. Forcing the various departments
to present differing views to the President is one of Dr.
Kissinger's roles. Also, since late opinions tend to have only
marginal impact, he must try to see to it that as many inputs
as possible will be available for consideration early in the
decision-making process. The thrust of this system, then, is
not to have Dr. Kissinger make decisions but instead to broaden
the options available to the President and to see to it that
he has all the facts and analyses necessary, within obvious
limitations, to permit him to make the best choice possible.
Contrary to popular speculation, rather than excluding others,
this permits the department to play a larger role in national
security policy formation than previously was the case.

Issues, however, are not presented along departmental lines,
but along analytic lines which cut across departments. For
example, the preliminary budget requests of the Department of
Defense are viewed by the State Department, the Defense
Review Committee, and, as soon as the first fiscal guidelines
exist, the Council of Economic Advisors. In meetings of the
National Security Council, the President is told how each issue
is viewed and what choices he has. In fact, the entire system
was designed to prevent any one individual or group from dom-
inating the decision-making process.

The necessity for a personal staff is clear if an objective
array of choices is to be presented. Yet its very existence
usually causes a political problem. Still, the Chief Executive
must have a few individuals around him who share his point of
view and have his best interests in mind in order to cut across
the tangle of bureaucratic maneuvering that inevitably exists.
This is especially necessary in this country, where the President
is a ceremonial figurehead as Chief of State and Commander in
Chief, as well as Chief Executive of the Government.

Dr. Kissinger then turned to the general situation
within which foreign policy is trying to be conducted. He
remarked that Richard Nixon did not want to be remembered as a

President who managed crises well, but rather as a President who contributed to the shaping of events. Unfortunately, though, even with this orientation, it has become more and more necessary for the Chief Executive to focus on what is urgent rather than what is important. In the academic world, one's hardest task tends to be to recognize an issue. Once that has been accomplished, it is relatively easy to work toward a solution. But at the top of the Administration, the most difficult task is not to define an issue; it is merely finding the time to do something about an issue. Even a good plan has little real meaning if it fails to get the attention of the top personnel. Since the rarest commodity around remains the time of these top people, many an opportunity tends to be missed.

Any man coming to office in 1968 would have had to understand that the policy reflexes of the postwar period are no longer adequate. They had become outdated by their success and overcome by the developments of the last twenty years. The lessons of World War II were that aggressors are bent upon military conquest and that aggression that had an impact anywhere had an impact everywhere. Thus the principle evolved that aggression must be resisted no matter where it might occur. This has proven inadequate, though, for Communism has become more differentiated, influenced by psychological, military, and political factors. Furthermore, the lessons of the New Deal were that domestic unrest was due to economic causes and that this unrest could be alleviated through economic development. Yet, over the years, such a prescription has been applied and discontent has not been assuaged. Clearly, new policies would be needed for this era.

The people of the United States, however, are deeply confused by the war in Vietnam. It has become our national obsession. This is unfortunate because it is not really the trauma that it is popularly regarded as being. The present Administration is, of course, firmly committed to trying to end this war and to bringing about a lasting peace. The major goal of the Nixon Administration, though, is to infuse new style and new content into American foreign policy. The emphasis is on shifting more responsibility to other countries. The point has been made that it is beyond our capabilities to conduct foreign policy in every part of the globe and that it is not possible for us to act wisely in every case that arises. Also, many other nations do not have foreign policy on their agendas. They spend their energy lobbying behind closed doors to influence United States policy, often only to criticize it out in the open. This situation is demoralizing

for both the United States and these other countries. Shifting
more responsibility to them will help to bring their responsibilities
in line with their capabilities and lead to a more open and,
hopefully, a more stable world.

Our policy toward Communist countries has two goals: to
make clear that we are prepared to deal with them according
to their actions and not according to their ideologies; and
to make clear that the tensions of the last two decades were
not caused by misunderstandings, but by actions. Foreign
policy cannot be intelligently conducted by trying to trick
one's opponent. To be lasting, agreements between nations
must be reached which are in the interest of both parties.

It is important that we build a more permanent structure
for peace than that built in the aftermath of World War II.
This task is very difficult to accomplish when public debate
is focused so exclusively on one single subject and much of
the foreign policy Establishment is openly negative. In fact,
the public mistrust of the Government and the popular belief
that the Government is constantly deceiving the public make
it very difficult indeed to conduct a successful foreign
policy. The Nixon Administration is trying to work, though,
within this environment, to structure a new and less dominant
role for the United States in a more orderly world.

A discussion followed.

It was observed that the new budget review process for
the Department of Defense proved that procedure in and of
itself is not important enough to alter outcome. Next year's
budget for defense, for example, is bigger than this year's. The
aim of the review process, Dr. Kissinger countered, is not to
come up with a lower budget, merely a better budget. The
task of the review committee is to determine what defense
budget is desirable given both domestic needs and international
responsibilities. Force projections were made at various
levels of expenditure and advisors were given a chance to
comment upon these projections. Five levels of expenditure
were examined in regard to what domestic programs would have to
be given up to achieve the various force levels. When President
Nixon came to office, there was an $80 billion budget for the
Department of Defense, and a budget projection for the next
year of $84 billion. This has been reduced sharply, and in
spite of substantial increases and considerable inflation. It
is well to keep in mind that a certain level of expenditure

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exists below which national security disappears. Domestic needs can never take priority over this basic minimum level of adequacy. What this exact level is, of course, can only be a matter of judgment.

In his recent interview with Mr. Sulzberger of *The New York Times*, President Nixon stated that the public should read his *State of the World Message*. Much thought and effort went into this document and with a particular aim in mind: it was felt that, if the Administration put out the most thoughtful document it could concerning its ideas, then even those who might disagree over parts of its policy would understand that the Administration is trying to grapple with the very issues with which we are all faced. One way to help bring together this divided nation is to take an increasingly philosophical approach to problems. The State of the World Message attempted to enunciate clearly the policy goals of the Nixon Administration rather than merely to explain particular tactics. Sadly, most of the press treated the message as though it were only about Vietnam. This certainly was not the heart of the message. Our policy there remains the same as always, and it has often been communicated before. But it did try to show, among other things, what the Nixon Doctrine means and why it is a step toward structuring regional groups which can work for stability within an area. Dr. Kissinger urged all to read this document as an analysis of the underpinnings of the Administration's view of the world and a blueprint of future foreign policy.

The Nixon Doctrine aims at shifting more of the burden of providing manpower for local defense to our allies. Whether we can also shift more of the dollar cost will depend upon the country in question. In Korea, for example, the only way to lower the number of our troops was to increase the level of expenditure on the Korean armed forces. Eventually these expenditures will go down, though, so that within five years we should be able to provide both fewer troops and less budget support. The Nixon Doctrine, however, cannot be applied mechanically. In Europe, for example, decreasing our manpower would be clearly inconsistent with political realities and other goals. We also cannot decrease our general purpose forces to the extent that we must rely upon nuclear weapons for our principal defense.

The case of Chile provides an illustration of how the Administration makes a foreign policy decision. There was a disability in this particular instance in that the United

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States Government did not foresee the election of the Marxist candidate. However, between the time Salvador Allende received 36% of the vote in the general election and the vote in the House of Parliament, there was a two-month hiatus. Between his official election there and the inauguration there was another three-week period. Thus, the United States gained a little time in which to formulate policy. The issue was first brought before an interdepartmental group headed by the Assistant Secretary of State, with representation from the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of the Treasury. This group reviewed and reported on the situation, supplying a preliminary assessment. The problems they had to deal with were: 1) Do parliamentary and popular elections have the same validity?; 2) If so, who is Allende? Is he a Democratic Socialist, a Leninist, a Castroite, or something else?; 3) What is his ability to achieve his desires? Does the structure of the Chilean Government enable the non-Communists to contain him and will they be able to do so?

The results of this examination then went to a senior review group of Under Secretaries. Their task was to reach an understanding of the situation and to develop realistic options to put before the President. They had to deal with such questions as the extent to which the situation in Chile was contrary to the interests of the United States and how we should relate ourselves to the democratic forces within the country. The issue was then brought before the National Security Council, which eventually came to the following conclusions: 1) If there were a fight to be picked between Chile and the United States, Allende would have to pick it; 2) Our Government would maintain every program which would enable us to deal with the people of Chile; 3) Other long-term aid to Chile would be approached on a case-by-case basis, depending upon how our relationship develops. There was no effort made to influence the people's election and, although parliamentary influence was considered, this was rejected. The option of military intervention was also rejected. The confusion over the *Enterprise* incident was unfortunate but consistent with our aims.

Although Southeast Asia may not be the entire foreign policy picture, this is what the American public looks at every day and this is how the American public judges the Administration's foreign policy. Incidents such as differing reports of helicopter casualties in Laos lend little to the credibility of the Administration's statements. One of the problems inherent

[x]

in having a large bureaucracy is the ease with which such anomalies are often spotted. The matter of miscounting fifteen helicopters is a minor incident. Some subordinate acted unwisely. There would be little incentive for the Administration to deceive the public like this, and to allow it to color one's view of our entire foreign policy posture is probably a mistake. It is simply impossible for the President to control everything that happens in the bureaucracy. For the average person this failing may be an important thing, but for the foreign policy Establishment to ignore the larger issues for this type of criticism is very serious. Jumping upon such insignificant inconsistencies seems to be a national malaise. If this malaise persists, it will be a significant challenge to the Government.

A Chief Executive cannot govern long without some degree of public confidence, because he must necessarily do some ambiguous things. He continuously faces the decision of whether to act when the facts are unclear or to wait for clear facts. Often to do right for the country, he cannot wait for the latter. Here is where he needs the confidence and support of the country. An example of the necessity for ambiguity is a deadline for withdrawal from Vietnam. The United States could establish a deadline for withdrawal and thereby calm the American public by letting them know the war will soon be over. But our goal is to negotiate a settlement which will result in a united country, where clear lines will be drawn and where a new start is possible. One of the best negotiating weapons we have is some degree of ambiguity in Hanoi's mind as to our actions. Another real reason for remaining ambiguous concerning a deadline is our desire to beat any deadline that would be set. It is desirable, therefore, to keep our options open as long as possible. We need flexibility. A military victory is not the answer, for we need a solution that Hanoi will abide by once we have withdrawn from Vietnam. The Administration opposes deadlines, then, not because, as some claim, it has no intention to end the war. It is firmly committed to such a course. It merely seeks to achieve a lasting stability in this area and to do this, it must be free of deadlines.

The President of the United States, then, must have both a substantive foreign policy and the confidence of the American public. To bring us together as a nation, style and rhetoric may be important, but to rely solely upon these would be demagoguery. Similarly, he must be trusted if he is to have the right climate and enough time for his policies to work. Whether one can exist for long without the other is questionable.

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One of the important nations, toward which we have the least defined future policy, is Japan. With its industrial capabilities, Japan is potentially the most powerful nation in Asia. The United States is now trying to stay as close as it can to the evolution of this dynamic country. Mutual defense agreements can probably continue to keep the danger of any hostility on their part low. To cut back our military support, though, may well encourage Japan to increase its own military might. Given its national capability and character, this could be a dangerous situation, especially if they should seek nuclear arms. We are conscious of the need for continued good relations. This is why the United States chose the most conciliatory position advanced with respect to Okinawa. What Japan chooses to do in the future will ultimately depend upon its view of the Asian balance of power and Japan has changed this view in the past. The National Security Council is currently in the midst of a major study on this country. If both the United States and Japan are not wise, the situation could be extremely disturbing in another ten years.

In reference to our other allies, we have been moving more toward a policy of full consultation, but this brings up the problem of whether our fundamental goals are the same. In our relations with Europe we must exercise care not to give these nations the incentive to develop nuclear weapons of their own. We must also avoid a situation in which, as a reaction to the United States' dealing with the Soviet Union, every European nation tries to make its own deal first. In the matter of relations with the Soviet Union and stabilization of European nuclear forces, it can be safely assumed that the interests of the United States and Europe are identical. However, this is not true in regard to other problems, such as Vietnam and the Middle East.

It is clear that in examining United States foreign policy, particular cases must be viewed within a general policy framework. We must neither focus on one area to the exclusion of others, nor apply broad policy without regard for individual circumstances. The Nixon Administration has sought to restructure and clarify the basic national security policy of this country. Unfortunately, though, it has not been as successful either in communicating the dimensions of the policy or in inspiring a sense of confidence in the majority of the American people. These are and should be causes of great concern, for it is difficult to govern a country under such circumstances. How this situation can be remedied is well worthy of greater attention.

Judith E. Kincaid

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

March 9, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY

SUBJECT:

Your Participation in the Industry - Government Seminar of the National Institute of Public Affairs, on "National Security in the Coming Decade" -- Wednesday, March 10

You have agreed to participate in the Industry-Government Seminar of the National Institute of Public Affairs on Wednesday, March 10. The subject of the meeting will be "The Elements of National Security in the Coming Decade."

The scenario will be remarks by you for 10-15 minutes followed by discussion for about an hour. The participants are 35-40 senior executives of business and government. A list of participants at the February meeting of the group (at which Mort Halperin was guest speaker) is at Tab A.

Frederic Cleaveland, the President of the Institute, has sent you a package of material which has been provided to all of the participants as background for the meeting. The basic piece is a paper entitled, "The Elements of National Security in the Coming Decade," prepared by James Robinson, the Director of the Seminar. Robinson's piece and our summary are at Tab B. He also included a list of questions to serve as a guide to the readings (attached at end of Robinson's piece).

The subject of the discussion and the nature of the questions posed by Robinson suggest that the President's Foreign Policy Report is the ideal springboard for you to launch the discussion with your prefatory remarks (Robinson's paper liberally and sympathetically quotes from last year's report). Accordingly, we have enclosed briefing material prepared for you in connection with your TV discussion of the

AREA CODE (207)
296-0303

March 1, 1971

MEMORANDUM

TO: Participants, Second Wednesday Industry-Government Seminar

FROM: Frederic N. Cleaveland President

RE: March 10, 1971 Meeting

The March Industry-Government Seminar will focus on: "The Elements of National Security in the Coming Decade." Brief background materials on this subject are enclosed.

With the firm understanding that future events might prevent his attendance, we are especially privileged to announce that Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, will open the discussion with a brief statement. We request that this information be kept confidential. It should also be emphasized that all proceedings will be off-the-record, and that only regular Seminar participants attend.

At the request of many regular participants, we are slightly changing the format of the evening's activities. The session will now begin with cocktails at 5:30 p. m. in the Mt. Vernon Room of the Madison Hotel. Dinner will be served promptly at 6:30 p. m. and we shall try to start the proceedings at 7:15 p. m. As usual, the meeting will break by 9:30 p. m. in order to permit those who have to catch planes adequate time to do so.

I would appreciate it if you would advise Miss Tartaglione of our staff by means of the attached postcard whether or not you are planning to attend. If we can help with hotel or transportation arrangements, please let her know.

A summary of the February session is being sent you under separate cover.

BOARD OF TRUSTEES:

John D. Millett, Chairman

James E. Webb, Treasurer

Frederic N. Cleaveland, Secretary, and President

William T. Golden

Roger W. Jones

Ronald B. Lee

Matthias E. Lukens

Kent Mathewson

William W. Pursons

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 9, 1971

HAK:

The attached memo suggests that you use the
Annual Review as the springboard for discussion
at the Industry-Government Seminar of the
National Institute of Public Affairs, Wednesday
evening, 10 March.

If you elect to do so, we also suggest that you
take this occasion to distribute copies of the
Annual Review to the participants. If you
agree, we will have copies available for this
purpose.

RTK

Will distribute copies of Annual Review

Yes ____

No ____

NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
INDUSTRY-GOVERNMENT SEMINAR

March 10, 1971

William J. Baroody, Jr.
Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense

Frederic N. Cleaveland
President
National Institute of Public Affairs

James M. Beggs
Under Secretary of Transportation

Samuel M. Cohn
Assistant Director for Budget Review
Bureau of the Budget

Eugene Birnbaum
Vice President and Economist
The Chase Manhattan Bank

Lester P. Condon
Assistant Secretary for Administration
Department of Housing and Urban
Development

Lee H. Bloom
Administrative Vice President
and General Counsel
Lever Brothers Company

John J. Corson
Chairman of the Board
Fry Consultants, Inc.

Herman Boland
Executive Assistant to the President
The Urban Institute

Thomas Dine
Legislative Assistant to
Senator Frank Church

Alan S. Boyd
President
Illinois Central Railroad

Herbert Fales
Manager, International Department
American Security & Trust Company

Karney A. Brasfield
Touche Ross & Company

Edgar R. Fiedler
Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Economic Affairs
Department of Commerce

William H. Bray
National Security Affairs Advisor
Department of the Treasury

Matthew Hale
General Counsel
The American Bankers Association

John A. Carver, Jr.
Commissioner
Federal Power Commission

J. R. Heller III
Partner
Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering