DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sect. 3.6

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELEON
President/Kissinger

3:30 p. m. 1/14/72

P: I forgot to mention one thing. Before we talked about the fact that the best
fellow to work with us on this is Safire. You feel that way still?

K: Yes.

P: You work well with him?

K: Very well.

P: It will help me on the time problem if you get him in and swear him to secrecy.
No one but Haldeman knows about this. No one on the domestic staff. This is
what is going to be done and any suggestons might sharpen up the language. He
might be helpful on page for the State of the Union. Also get his PR judgment
on the whole thing.

K: I will see him in the morning.

P: I won't talk if you tell him. Say you and I are the only ones who know. I
don't want to hurt us but people have propensity to talk.

K: He is ???? ?? ?.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCOM

Leonard Lyons/Kissinger

5:17 p.m. 1/14/72

L: You don't mind the joke about your saying you hope the President -- no one ? ? ? ? ? as it's a violation of security.

K: It was sweet.

L: The Minister of Culture is not your type.

K: She is the only one I know. And I rose straight to the top.

L: The top is the ballerinak.

K: I don't know any.

L: I will introduce you when the Bolshoi comes here.

K: What are you doing here?

L: Came for dinner at Blairs Sat. night and then preview of "Sugar" at the Kennedy Center. Slyvia says did she hear you are bring her a length of material for a gown?

K: If that's what she would like. Nancy is in town. How about a drink tomorrow afternoon.

L: Tomorrow is tough.

K: Today I can't do it.

L: We are trying.

K: We have to find a time. When are you going back?

L: Sunday morning.

K: Early? What is your schedule tomorrow?

L: Up, breakfast, lunch, and then go to Blairs.

K: Let me call you in the morning after Nancy is here and we will set a time. Maybe late in the morning. I have a lunch date but maybe I can change that.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Min. Zantovsky (Yugo.)/Kissinger
5:22 p.m. 1/14/72

Z: I gave you a 6 week period and promised to call you when you are free for lunch.

K: I just came back from the W. Coast. Could you give me another week and call again?

Z: All right. I will call again. You don't consider it as bothering you?

K: Not at all.

Bv. NARA, Dato 5/26

TELCONE (San Clemente)

President/Kissinger

12:20 p.m. - 1/12/72

P: Hello, Henry. How is it going?

K: Well, we are making progress. I am working on the speech.

P: Fine, how is the Report?

will

K: The Report we are getting into very well. We/have 2/3 done
when we leave here, but we will make the February 8 date.

P: You still have a lot of time on that.

K: Well, we have to get it to the bureaucracy and they have to make
their comments.

P: Tell them they have contributed based on all their papers. Then
they won't change so much when they read it over. How were
they last year in that respect?

K: Except for a few chapters where they made changes, they were
all right.

P: They made the statement last year that it was better than any-
thing that was done in State.

K: Oh, yes. So, I will be back tomorrow, Mr. President.

P: I will be at Camp David, Henry, and I would suggest that you
probably are going to New York over the weekend.

K: No, I won't go to New York, but I have a friend coming into town.
But I could come up on Friday. Let me get the draft to you.

P: Well, you are welcome to come here. It is good to have a chance
to get away. I can think better at Camp David. Do you find that
out there?

K: That is why we are making so much progress.

P: Why do you suppose that is?

K: We are distracted by the short term day-to-day things.

P: Let me ask you one thing that will help me. The two parts
I think, as you pointed out, are the introduction and conclusion
that I will have to work on.

By. NARA. Date 5/26
-2-

K: What, of the speech?

P: Yes, the speech.

K: Yes, I don't think all that much will have to be done, but you may want to put it in your language.

P: Not so much my language, but I want to tell why we are doing it. Do you have a minute now?

K: Yes.

P. Run over for me the reasons for: Why at this point did we decide we are going to break with the secrecy veil and put out this information? Then just to be on the safe side, develop an outline for the questions that are likely to come up on this. Such as (1) Whatever chance there was for negotiations, it completely destroyed the private channel, therefore why did we do it?

(2) If these authors are so good, why don't we make a public announcement? (3) Why don't we bring them out into the open?

(4) Is it a poor move. . . (5) Are we doing this to embarrass the Democrats who opposed us along the line? Now these are questions whereby I can develop the introduction.

K: I think we are doing it for this reason. One always pays a price in perspective public understanding when one has a secret channel but it always has the advantage of enabling a solution with major __________. However, this is justified only if there is not too big a gap between the public and private channel. None of these have been met today. We are being accused by the other side of not responding to the 7 points which are actions in the private channel. We are accused of maintaining a government which has offered to resign. Therefore the price that is paid in public understanding is so enormous that we can no longer do this.

P: Query: On October 11, 1970, I did say, as many said, here is an election campaign. . .

K: No, that one in fact we put forward a public proposal which in those terms we had in question.

P: Question: Why didn't we make these offers public through our ambassador in Paris?

K: We thought this was the most rapid way of ending the war.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

-3-

In our communication with the North Vietnamese we did this
in order to get the war ended in '71 and we are not breaking
the private channel. We are preparing to resume it when there
is some fire there. _______________ program and we are asking
them to negotiate it. Since they have not done so in the private
channel we are now making it a formal proposal.

P: OK.

K: And I think we should have a very conciliatory conclusion in which we say we know the anguish this has been to many and a lot of people think we have been wrong, but wouldn't it be so much more meaningful if the people could say their government has gone the extra mile?

P: And I could say what would any responsible person ask that we do more than we have done.

K: [Mr. Kissinger read the last part of the speech he drafted]

P: Fine. When you get down to it, I am saying I am now determined, in view of developments and the importance of reaching and negotiating conclusions in this long difficult war, to reveal the serious negotiations that have been taken and an offer that has not been made public, but I will make public tonight.

K: We should consider, Mr. President, bringing Porter back because he doesn't know the details of this yet. So he can go there from a meeting with you.

P: Yes, I'll order it right away. I noticed in a news summary that he is doing a great job.

K: Yes, he is doing a superlative job.

P: Did Lodge know about the private channel?

K: In a sort of half-baked way. He knew about my first meeting.

P: Tell me, there was one on August ____.

K: [Here HAK gave the dates of the meetings.]

By. NARA, Dato 5/26

-4-

P: What a long and tortuous road, every time you went over there and met secretly. It is unbelievable, isn't it?

K: Pretty exhausting.

P: Exhausting - and it's like a movie Henry. OK, I think I have enough guidance.

K: I think it would be helpful and I will have it for you by tomorrow evening. I will get it down to Camp David.

P: One thing I told Haldeman I think it is important for us to down-grade in advance the developments of Laos, Cambodia and the expected defenses in Vietnam. I think maybe I should have Laird hit that open in his.

K: And we think our people can contain it.

P: The Vietnam one?

K: Vietnam.

P: What about Laos and Cambodia.

K: Laos and Cambodia I think we can contain.

P: OK.

K: The tragedy is - if there was a 6 year presidency - we could do it by having a hundred thousand men there and there were more Laos offensives. Then we could do it.

P: Well, we can't do it.

K: It can't even be considered.

P: Maybe Laird should indicate that the...

K: Well, I don't think he should go into any great detail because if we play up the offensives too much it will be like your...

P: Give Laird a call and tell him what you think the tone of his remarks should be. Haig has been working on it.

K: Yes, he has been working with Pursely.

By. NARA, Dato 5/26
- 5 -

P: I will be talking to Laird and I will have Haig with me. Should I have Purseley, too.

K: No.

P: Did you notice in India now the signs went up saying "God forgive Nixon. He knows not what he has done."

K: Well, it's fed by our own people.

P: That's true, but they have fertile soil. I don't know. What did you finally decide to do about India.

K: Well, I think in about a week or so I will go in. . .

P: Maybe Keating should go in and see her.

K: That is useless. The only one they listen to is you or me.

P: You call in the Ambassador. I really feel one thing that has not gotten across. You probably didn't follow my record, but I was Eisenhower's guy who helped get aid to India.

K: I still believe they ~~xxx~~ will respect us more, that what we did will turn out to be the right thing. Whether we like India or not, they are cold-blooded. They are just using the people.

P: I am thinking of American consumption.

K: What we must do is to keep our bureaucracy quiet. That's where its coming from.

P: But I think we can get it under control.

K: Well, I will get ~~JHA~~ in.

P: Also get together with Haldeman in getting this PRC thing done. I don't mean rightaway, but soon.

K: OK, Mr. President.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

TELCORN

Haldeman/Kissinger
12:25 p.m. 1/14/72

H: I had Peterson here when you called. Is there a way you --

K: I am just pointing out what we are up against. Three meetings with Israelis
in one week. No word ahead. Sisco told Haig yesterday he disagreed with the
Secy. But it's not consistent with our strategy.

H: We talked about Israel. Because we could not raise meeting with Rabin with
Rogers, we didn't. We talked about it indirectly. We have gave him ample
opportunity to say he had but he didn't.

K: I didn't agree with your analysis of the problem. Of whom the problem is.
But election and national interest takes precedence over everything. I wouldn't
lie.

H: It's frustrating talking with you about this. You are putting thoughts
in my head and words in my mouth. I said I didn't think ?? ?? ?? ??? ?.

K: Let me give them an instruction. So they know what we want.

H: He has an instruction. Working agreement based on conversation with John
and me that he is to notify you before he meets with Rabin. If you know he is
meeting with Rabin --

K: It's Sisco.

H: If State does.

K: Rabin called and said he is on his way over. It's the third time this
week.

H: Can we compromise Rabin telling you? Maybe thing is to catch him in the
lie now. Want directive saying have there been any meetings with
Rabin in last week and if so, where's report and understand we would notify
in advance.

K: Tell him we want a slow process.

H: We are compromised again and we shouldn't.

K: Tell him and say we know he has seen Rabin 3 times this week.

H: Don't want to compromise Rabin. Solving one problem for another.

K: Let me talk with Haig. If the President comes to a resting point in the
speech, I want to discuss the Soviets with him. He told Haig he doesn't want to

By.

NARA, Date

5/26

Haldeman/Kissinger

12:25 p. m.

1/14/72

talk with me. He is cut off.

H: That's true.

K: I will send a speech draft to him. He can put his mind to rest about the Soviet thing. I think showing our teeth helps. Things getting back on track.

H: If I can move on Rogers on frontal basis --

K: As long as I have this assurance and raising nitpicks with you.

H: I want to. Only way to do this is to do it.

K: I don't think it's in the Administration's interest to show disaffection at this moment. But if key people do them it is not right for someone to say something. I could see first two or three days when hoping to knock it down. But it's over and that's a question of PR. I will try to prevent public discord.

H: Also private.

K: It's impossible but we can try to mitigate it.

H: I agree it is. But whole question of discipline.

K: If we can do that we will have something out of this affairs.

H: I think Shakespeare is leaving in the next day or two.

K: I will call him this afternoon.

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

TELECON

Governor Rockefeller/Mr. Kissinger

1:00 p.m., January 14, 1972

R: I'm delighted to talk with you.

K: And I'm delighted to talk with you. I wanted to tell you that the Chinese sent back with Haig a little gift for you. They are just opening it up for me. It's probably a piece of carved ivory. I loathe ivory.

R: But it's a token of friendship.

K: I brought them something from here on my first trip which has yet to be reciprocated.

R: That's unbelievable. Henry, you are fabulous. I have been praying night and day that steps are taken to keep your continuity there. I had a long conversation with John and he has the full picture.

K: They are not taking steps. I have to decide -- as long as I am dealing with this sort of person -- whether to put the national interest above this dancing around. They are now placating me.

R: Would it do any good... I know it would be different. I would be simply delighted to make a statement as to what I feel your service to this country means.

K: I know, Nelson, but it is a disgrace that you should have to consider this.

R: I want to. But I wanted to be sure it wouldn't be done in another way.

K: They are trying to work out a treaty with Rogers as if he were an equal to the President. If he gives me this, I will give him that. I said I would give him anything the President asked me to. I have my own policy.

R: What is the hesitancy in making a statement?

K: I have never asked them that.

R: I took it on myself to make very clear what ought to be done. The way it was left was the idea was thought to be very good and on the right

By. NARA, Dalo 5/26

- 2 -

R: [REDACTED] (cont'd) occasion would be done. I suppose an occasion where it came naturally -- plus the departure of Sisco.

K: The departure of Sisco has been definitely dropped. It's never been raised. The other one hasn't even been mentioned to me. I am not going to ask for it.

R: I can't believe it won't be done.

K: I am certain it will not be done. That I am certain of -- or if it is done it will occur at a moment when I don't need it.

R: That is already telling. I thought the columns by Reston and Sulzberger were good.

K: I didn't see the Sulzberger one, but Kraft to my amazement...

R: Look at the day Sulzberger and Reston had columns one over the other. Sulzberger defended the need for secrecy growing out of this situation.

K: There are two problems -- the need for secrecy and whether I was lying. On the second, they haven't given any support even though there are a lot of people in town who know. One of those things State did. I didn't have anything to do with it. But I am willing to take that. But you have already been bothered beyond endurance.

R: But for the country and the future, the situation should be brought into focus. What is going to happen next year will depend on the capacity to preserve your leadership in this key role. Between you and me, there is a very [REDACTED] eminent psychiatrist -- a very able one and a friend of Happy's... She was talking to him about this problem. He said should you depart there would be a major drop in the stockmarket.

K: I will not do anything to upset the national interest if I can possibly avoid it. I will think about this matter another 10 days to two weeks. If I decide to make a move, I will talk to you first.

R: I want to continue my conversations with John.

K: John thinks he's settled it. I was disgusted. I can't negotiate a treaty with the President of the United States. As a man I have been working with for three years who doesn't know what he has to do to back

By.

NARA, Dalo

5/26

K: (cont'd) up his chief advisors, I feel if they say we both have to make a deal, I will say let the President tell me what he wants and as long as I am here I will do it.

R: It burns me up so because the whole world is in a period of restructuring. In that period, you are for our country and the President the person who is shaping that restructuring, and this can have implications for years to come. If it should fall by the wayside now, our position of readjustment of power could take a skid.

K: I don't think there is any point in talking with John Mitchell. He thinks he has handled it masterfully. He tells me I have to show Rogers more things. I will show him whatever the President wants me to, but that isn't the problem. It's not even relevant.

R: It is a moral issue in terms of leadership.

K: You are right. That is the only issue.

R: I don't understand what the reluctance is.

K: It is psychiatric.

R: What would the reaction be if I were to make a strong statement? Would it be detrimental?

K: Let me ask Haig about it. He has a good sense of this.

R: I feel so strongly. My worry is in terms of next fall. How do I support this kind of situation? I am being very frank. It's my own inner feelings of respect.

K: Well, it is a complex situation. There's no doubt about it. The thing that bothers you -- you are the only ~~ person who understands. I don't give a damn what they do to Rogers. If anyone had said to me at this point it was a moral issue and a problem of leadership and we have to ~~ do it, then they would be on my wave-length and we could talk. But when they discuss who can give backgrounders... And next week they are going to reveal my role in certain negotiations, and they will put me on national television for an interview. I told them I worked for you for 15 years, I never saw the press and I was delighted. I don't do this for publicity. I never saw one when I worked for you. That issue was never raised in my presence when I was on your staff.

By. NARA, Date 5/26

1:00 p.m., January 14, 1972

R: Would it be misunderstood if I talked to the leader?

K: Yes. What galls him is he knows my personal feelings for you which are not necessarily matched. There is respect and loyalty but not necessarily affection. If you talk to him, he will think I put you up to it. And it will hurt yourself.

R: All right. I understand what you are saying. The big thing now is the moral issue of leadership and the character of leadership/

K: It is XX literally the only issue.

R: There is the national interest issue.

K: The only way we can do this difficult enterprise is if we have a certain moral understanding. If we continue with these petty things, I will be degraded to the level of so many of my associates and it won't do any good. The thing you have managed to do -- and up to now I, too -- our opponents have understood there is a certain moral seriousness in our efforts, and that mustn't be lost.

R: I just had a two-hour press conference on the budget with 90 reporters and editors. I am getting away with things because people trust me. You can't do these things if they don't trust you.

K: That has been my position, and I learned that from you. That is the essence of leadership. You cannot program these things, and you cannot contrive them. That is the big issue right now.

R: Integrity is another word I would like to use, too.

K: I will ask Haig's view of your making a statement.

XX R: Will you do that? Because I feel terribly strongly about this. I am very concerned and I have a strange feeling that a lot of people's faith will be shaken if it is not handled right.

K: If I should feel the national interest would be affected by my leaving, I might stay anyway.

R: But I am talking in an area which to me is...

K: I am not going to wind up as an Ehrlichman -- an errand-boy in the White House.

BY NARA, Date 5/26

XX

R: That is only important in relation to your ability to serve the country. That is the issue.

K: That is the issue. It has nothing to do with me personally. The issue is whether when you have got big things to do, if there is not a minimum of trust and a great deal of moral confidence... I just looked at your present and you made a bad deal. It was not a good exchange but the thought is nice.

R: The thought is the important thing. These guys, I honestly believe, don't have a plethora of good things like we have over here.

K: I am sure they don't.

R: I bought a horse and camel in a recent auction in London.

K: I saw the horse. It's magnificent.

R: Henry, listen, you know what I think about you and feel.

K: Nelson, you have been my inspiration and friend.

R: I'm still your friend. What you have done has far surpassed expectations. You have done what I dreamed about doing and was never able to make it. I have gotten my satisfaction -- vicariously -- through your role.

K: It's what we were talking about for 10 years.

R: You are fabulous, and keep in touch.

K: I will. Love to Happy.

R: And she sends it to you. Take care.

lds