## WHO IS THE ENEMY?

We build our homes, go to our jobs, raise our children, plan our futures—every moment under the reach of deadly missiles controlled by an unfriendly power; missiles against which we have no defense. We can't be sure how delicate the trigger, or how nervous the finger. We only know that nuclear war could crush our cities to rubble, could by blast and fire suddenly end our lives by the millions, while others suffered toward slow death by radiation. Civilization, as we know it, would lie crippled, perhaps dead. Nuclear war is one enemy that all nations share.

We try to reassure ourselves: “Too horrible.” “It can’t happen.” But we know it could. Meanwhile, one more country, then another may “go nuclear”—more perhaps-uncertain fingers on possibly-unstable triggers. Can we humans find a way to manage our affairs without destroying ourselves in the process?

If our only goal were to survive, our best choice might be to give up our weapons (though we might still feel the effects of nuclear war between other nations). But we have another goal: to remain free from coercion. We want to survive not only in the physical sense but also as a political entity and social community.

What can we do toward that end?

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# CAN WE PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR?

Good intentions are not enough. Neither are visions of horror.

Nuclear nations can stave off nuclear war by understanding and avoiding the ways in which they might be led into its trap: if one nation allows another to see it as a weak, tempting target on the one hand, or as intensely threatening on the other; if one nuclear power drifts into military confrontation with another; if one nuclear nation yields to the temptation to use a few small nuclear weapons to settle a local conflict quickly; if nuclear weapons spread to many countries, multiplying the chances of nuclear confrontations, accidents, miscalculations.

The nature of man may not have changed, but the nature of war has. We can no longer buy enough military power to deprive another major nation of the capacity to devastate us. We must rather attempt to influence a potential adversary's will, so he will not use that capacity. Our defense against nuclear war can't be based on arms alone, but must include arms control.

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# WHAT IS ARMS CONTROL?

In the nuclear age, arms control is a way of looking at national security to fit the fact that we can no longer assure the physical protection of our country. Trying to build forces that outstrip adversaries on the one hand, or simply getting rid of one's weapons on the other, will not make war disappear; either may invite war.

Arms control may include arms reduction, but it includes much more. It does not assume that arms, by themselves, cause war; but it seeks to size and structure military forces so as to make their use less likely. A nation may pursue this goal through unilateral actions or tacit or formal agreements. One of the objectives of SALT (the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) is to reach agreements between the two superpowers that will insure that their strategic nuclear forces will be used for deterrence only and never for war.

Arms control also means efforts to make war less likely by restraining the spread of arms to new areas, as in the Antarctic Treaty of 1959, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Seabed Arms Control Treaty of 1971.*

Arms control means measures to limit the destructiveness of wars that may be fought, despite all efforts to prevent them. A case in point is the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, outlawing the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxic weapons. Another example is the Geneva Protocol of 1925, an agreement that prohibits the use of poison gas in warfare.

Arms control may mean limiting the development or deployment of new types of weapons that would increase the risks of war, as in the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Treaty of 1972—with its limitations on new technical developments—and the 1974 Vladivostok understanding to limit the number of U.S. and Soviet missiles that can carry MIRVs (Multiple Independently-Targeted Re-entry Vehicles). Arms control may inhibit weapon testing, as in the Limited [nuclear] Test Ban Treaty of 1963; on the other hand, it may favor some advances in weapons technology, such as those that make missiles less prone to accidental launching and less vulnerable to surprise attack, because these advances would make for a more stable deterrent force.

Arms control may include disarmament steps that reduce military forces in a balanced and coordinated manner, so that at no time in the process would an adversary be tempted to take advantage through new offensive actions. The Mutual and Balanced Force

*These and other agreements mentioned herein are described in the Appendix.

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Reductions (MBFR) negotiations now underway in Europe provide
an example.

Arms control means creating new opportunities for opposing
sides to understand each other more fully at tense moments, to
lessen the chance of accidental war or war that might arise from
misunderstanding in time of crisis. The "Hot Line" Agreement of
1963 was such a step.

Arms control means finding ways to prevent the spread of the
deadly nuclear weapons to more nations, while still permitting the
transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, as in the 1968
Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Arms control means efforts that nations may make on their own
or by unwritten, tacit agreement. These may be just as important as
signed treaties and executive agreements. What matters is the
impact of a given measure in decreasing the likelihood of war and
decreasing its destructiveness should it, despite all our efforts, occur.

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# WHAT IS DETERRENCE?

A capability to deter differs from a capability to defend. To defend means to beat back an attack; to deter means to prevent (by the threat of response) an enemy from making the decision to attack.

Mutual deterrence exists between two powers—as it does between the United States and the Soviet Union today—when each knows an attack would bring unacceptable losses to the attacker no matter which side struck first.

Nuclear-armed missiles have brought to the world for the first time the possibility, at least in theory, that one great power could acquire the capability to wipe out within minutes the strategic forces of another, suddenly disarming it so further threats or attacks could be carried out at will.

Thus, between adversary nuclear powers, if one side allowed its forces to become vulnerable, then, in a crisis, the other might be tempted to attack—either to dominate its opponent or to rule out the chance of later being the victim of such an attack. To assure that nuclear weapons between adversary powers will not be used, each power must perceive that even if it struck first it could not gain an advantage.

So long as each side maintains a significant portion of its nuclear forces relatively invulnerable (by hardening, concealment, mobility, or sheer numbers), a massive attack to disarm the adversary becomes so difficult and risky as to be most unlikely. However, other kinds of nuclear attacks are possible. These could be attacks to test the will of an opponent, or to achieve lesser objectives than nuclear domination—for instance, to take control of allied territory.

These kinds of nuclear attack must be deterred as well. For this purpose, the United States maintains the capability for measured nuclear response short of massive retaliation. To have only a capability and doctrine for massive retaliation, particularly against cities and population, might invite lesser nuclear attacks, if the aggressor thought all-out response unlikely.

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IS DETERRENCE ENOUGH?

Deterrence is usually understood to mean dissuading a nuclear adversary from launching an attack on one's own nation. But deterrence might be extended to other forms of attack. Is an attack on our NATO allies—nuclear or non-nuclear—tantamount to an attack on us? The NATO treaty says as much. We have joined with our NATO allies in preparing a conventional (non-nuclear) defense of Western Europe against possible Warsaw Pact or Soviet conventional attack. We have backed that defense with "tactical" nuclear weapons—shorter-range weapons designed to fight invading armies, not to retaliate against the Soviet Union. And the Soviets have deployed similar nuclear weapons on their side. Would conventional warfare in Europe inevitably lead to the use of nuclear weapons? And if so, would this escalate to increasingly destructive attacks?

In most circumstances, surely, the decision to attack our NATO allies would be deterred by the risk of large-scale nuclear war. But the concept of a nuclear response to every kind of local attack is no more credible than it is desirable. Hence we do need and do maintain forces other than the strategic and tactical nuclear deterrent—the so-called "conventional" forces.

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HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH FOR DETERRENCE?

How much military power is enough to provide deterrence? A hundred nuclear missiles? Ten thousand? This is a key question, but for its answer we must look to other questions.

What makes an effective deterrent? First, it must be credible or believable; and second, it must be stable—that is, it must not break down under stress or other changes such as the development of a new weapon by one side.

Credibility

To judge if our deterrence is credible, we ask three questions:

How much destruction would an enemy be unwilling to accept, so that the prospect would prevent him from launching an attack?

Do we have forces that could survive a surprise attack and then cause such destruction?

Can the enemy be convinced we would be willing to cause this destruction, even though he had withheld forces that could bring further devastation on our side?

When we ask these questions about deterring a direct attack on the U.S., the answers to the first two seem fairly clear: The United States does have more than enough nuclear forces to cause damage that would be unacceptable, judged by any rational standard. And those planning nuclear attack could not assume with any confidence that some, or most, of these surviving forces would not be used against them.

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Views differ, however, on how much our forces could be cut back and still credibly deter a direct attack. Some believe that a small missile force that could destroy a few cities in retaliation is sufficient; others believe that forces must be able to cause extremely high levels of damage. And some believe that forces should be such as to produce automatically massive levels of damage (for example, destroy most cities and industrial centers)—a doctrine referred to as “assured (or mutually assured) destruction.”

Others argue that the “assured destruction” of cities is immoral, even as a threat, and would be both immoral and useless if carried out should deterrence ever fail. In short they would want to avoid destroying the aggressor’s cities and minimize killing civilians.

Targeting our nuclear forces against military objectives might help to avoid killing masses of civilians and yet be just as adequate to deter attack. Indeed, the threat to destroy the aggressor’s military power could be a more direct deterrent, for those who might plan an attack, than the threat to kill innocent bystanders.

Our strategic forces have long had the capability to destroy military targets, and a large portion of our forces have long been targeted in this way. More recently, our defense planners have placed greater emphasis on providing for a range of options to deter the full spectrum of possible nuclear attacks. They do not argue that a strategy of limited response options solves all problems in this realm, but they believe that this capability is nevertheless one of the essential requirements for deterrence. At the same time, they are careful to add that this in no way implies limited nuclear response would be substituted for non-nuclear military power.

## Stability

The formulation of arms control agreements to establish a balance of mutual deterrence is complex, and their negotiation is arduous. No less complex, but vital, is the formulation and negotiation of means to preserve this balance. Hence the provisions in the 1972 SALT ONE agreements: the principle that neither side shall interfere with the other's means of verification; and the Standing Consultative Commission, which provides continuing joint review of the impact of new developments on the SALT agreements. Hence also the growing practice of summit meetings of U.S. and Soviet leaders to review and resolve differences, reach agreements, and agree on principles for further negotiation on still unresolved arms control issues. And hence the importance of continued international arms control negotiations, and the importance of taking arms control objectives into account in national debates and decision-making on matters of military strategy and forces.

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## BUT COULD DETERRENCE FAIL?

Deterrence should never fail for the simple rational reason that the horrors and costs of nuclear war would be so overwhelming that no advantage could be gained by it.

Nevertheless, there are ways in which deterrence could fail:

(1) The irrational can occur.

(2) Accidents can occur.

(3) Third parties—through accidental or deliberate use of nuclear weapons—might ultimately draw the great powers into their war.

## The Rationality of Decision-Making

Our efforts to deter can only be based on our best estimate of the reactions our posture will evoke inside the head of a foreign decision-

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maker. Much as we try to understand him, we can never be certain we have succeeded. A policy of deterrence therefore attempts to deal with this uncertainty by adopting a military posture that we calculate and believe will make attack unattractive even to a decision-maker who might be inclined to gamble.

However strong and however invulnerable we make our deterrent forces, the security they give us depends on the extent to which other nations will act according to (our) reason, and not in ways we regard as irrational. To attempt to insure that they will act so, our deterrent posture must include a continuing effort to make our military capabilities, doctrine and intent—our position, logic and will—clear to our potential adversary.

But the choices of a nation, even a totalitarian one, are made not by an individual "reasonable man", thoughtfully weighing gains and losses. They are influenced by the advice and pressures of various groups and interests. They are influenced by perceptions of past and current events. And the leaders' reactions are conditioned by their own cultural heritage and values, and by their emotional makeup.

All of these elements of decision-making obviously vary among nations, making it somewhat uncertain for one nation to predict another's response.

## The Unpredictability of Accidents

We all know that no matter how much we spend in care and resources, mechanical things, from simple tools to sophisticated systems, can malfunction; that, no matter how much training and supervision and how many organizational checks, discipline can fail and people can do things they are not authorized to do; and no matter how hard we try, and how sincere we are, communication may be flawed and misunderstandings occur, whether because of failure in the medium or in the message. Unfortunately, it happens that nuclear devices and weapon delivery vehicles, with their associated command, control and communications, are among the most complex systems ever devised—and are the first to be required never to fail.

Thus, unremitting effort must also be devoted in our military planning and research—and in our arms control efforts—to reducing the possibility of accidents with nuclear warheads, missiles, planes, submarines, and command and communications systems. And we must make sure that if an accident nevertheless occurs, we do not by reflex action, or for lack of alternative plans, respond with an all-out attack, thus converting a disastrous accident into world holocaust.

## Third Parties: The Dangers of Nuclear Proliferation

Deterrence of nuclear war today depends primarily on the United

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States and the Soviet Union. It is a bilateral relationship. However, other countries are building up nuclear forces, and still others might soon acquire their own nuclear weapons. This "nuclear proliferation" is spurred by the fact that nuclear technology also has its peaceful uses: providing energy to run factories, to purify water, to change geography, and materials and devices with special medical and industrial values. Thus, commercial pressures promote the spread of technological know-how, reactors and nuclear fuel.

Two links make it difficult to separate peaceful from military uses. First, nuclear reactors in producing power also produce plutonium, which can be made into nuclear weapons. Second, peaceful nuclear explosives, desired for, say, digging a canal or exploiting a natural gas field, are similar to nuclear explosives for weapons. Thus, permitting nuclear energy to be used for peaceful purposes, while at the same time preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, requires careful and complex arrangements. Arms control calls for strengthening controls over fissionable materials to insure that none will be diverted from peaceful to weapons use.

Though more nuclear nations would seem inevitably to make the world more dangerous, a non-nuclear nation might decide nevertheless to "go nuclear" for its own reasons of prestige or for local and perhaps temporary military advantage and its political payoff. Such a country might view efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons as an attempt to keep it a second-class power and to interfere in its sovereign right of defense.

In a world of spreading nuclear weapons, local nuclear arms races could start in areas where conflict is intense. The dangers of vulnerability, accident, miscalculation and escalation would multiply. In short, peace could be threatened in ways that our present military and political institutions are not equipped to handle. In such a world, major powers might be pushed or tempted to dangerous actions by intense crises or wars among smaller powers. And should nuclear arsenals spread to many other countries, the maintenance of stable deterrence and arms control would become vastly more complex. Multilateral deterrence would somehow have to take account of alliances among nuclear powers and shifts in alliances which could occur much more rapidly than changes in deterrent forces.

It is for these reasons that the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or "NPT," was negotiated (see p. 16), and that efforts continue to improve its effectiveness.

In addition to the NPT, other arms control initiatives aim to provide further incentives for nations to forego developing their own nuclear weapons.

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CAN WE RELY ON AGREEMENTS?

When arms control measures are not taken by one side alone but
are in the form of agreements between nations, there is an obvious
problem: each party must be able to see that the other is acting
according to the agreed terms. There are no independent enforce-
ment agencies or courts of appeal.

The differences between the open society of the United States and
the closed society of the Soviet Union presents a problem here. In
our open society, violations of an arms control agreement—say, the
deployment of forbidden missiles—would become generally known
and be opposed by our own people in political decisions; but in the
more secretive society of the Soviet Union many military activities are
effectively concealed for long periods, and the legislative and political
inhibitions to violations by top leadership decisions are weaker.

The problem of verifying compliance is a main reason why arms
control agreements are difficult to negotiate even when the parties
agree on goals. On-site inspection, which interferes with military
secrecy, has in general proved unacceptable to the Soviet Union.
Also, for many situations, it is not easy to design an unintrusive high-
confidence inspection system for discovering violations.

Great strides in verification technology in the past decade have
made unilateral verification practical for a large class of arms con-
trols. The 1972 ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on Strategic
Offensive Arms recognized this new fact by relying on "national
technical means of verification"—meaning verification that could be
carried on from outside the borders of the subject nation. And it was
agreed in that treaty not to interfere with these means.

Once an agreement is made, accurate and reliable information on
whether the parties are living up to it is essential. For if an adversary
appears not to be doing so, the other side could not respond directly
without withdrawing from the agreement. And withdrawal from an
international treaty is a serious matter in any circumstances; more-
over, this move in itself might aggravate tensions precisely when one
might wish to ease them. This is why under a regime of agreed limita-
tions, adequate verification—providing reliable information on which
to base considered action—is so important.

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# WHAT HAS ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVED?

Arms control objectives have influenced U.S. force planning and strategic doctrine throughout most of the nuclear age. Examples are the continuing trend toward weapons systems that are invulnerable, the development of safety devices and arrangements, and strategic doctrine designed to promote the stability of U.S.-Soviet deterrence.

More obvious arms control measures have been in the form of agreements signed in the past decade-and-a-half—a period of growing acceptance of the arms control philosophy—of growing momentum toward more extensive and significant agreements.

Agreements that have less impact on a nation's vital interests are, of course, easier to achieve than those that have greater impact. Thus, the 1967 agreement to ban weapons from outer space was far easier to reach than the 1972 SALT agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union: the ABM Treaty, which set permanent, low levels for ballistic missile defenses in both countries, and the five-year Interim Agreement, which set limits on the number of land-based and sea-based missile launchers for each country.

Since each side had developed different types of missiles and warheads, and there were differences in other aspects of the strategic forces on the two sides, balance was judged not only on the basis of missile numbers but also other factors which determine destructive power. Thus, the temporary U.S. lead in MIRV capability (the ability to deliver more than one independently-targeted warhead with a single missile) was taken into account in the Interim Agreement which permitted the Soviets to have more missiles than the United States during the 1972-1977 period.

The Agreement did not cover strategic bombers, missile warheads, or the quality of weapons (such as accuracy or survivability).

Since the Interim Agreement was signed in 1972, the Soviets have shown they can MIRV their own missiles, and have tested new, larger missiles; so it is clear that sometime after 1977, the Soviet missiles permitted under the 1972 Agreement could far surpass the destructive power of those allowed the United States.

At the Summit Meeting in Vladivostok in October 1974, U.S. and Soviet leaders agreed to new negotiations setting new equal ceilings until 1985: 2400 total strategic vehicles-long-range ballistic missiles and bombers-with a limit of 1320 missiles that could be MIRVed. Also, the Interim Agreement limit prohibiting additional "large" ICBMs would be maintained.

Formal arms control agreements which the United States has signed and/or ratified are described in the Appendix.

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WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

Some of the events that urge arms control may also make it more difficult to achieve: the drive of technology toward new weapons such as MIRV, which multiplies the number of warheads, and MARV (MAnoeuvering Reentry Vehicle), which makes them more accurate, complicates the task of finding the point of strategic balance and keeping it; the possibility that one, then another nation might go nuclear threatens to unravel agreements we have already achieved.

Such problems are all the more reason to pursue arms control with all our energy and ingenuity. No one has ever suggested that managing human affairs on earth is an easy or certain business, but developing sound arms control arrangements now will give nations the opportunity, as well as the obligation, to keep searching for better ways to maintain the security of all.

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# APPENDIX I

## ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS SIGNED AND OR RATIFIED BY THE UNITED STATES 1959-JANUARY 1975

**Antarctic Treaty of 1959.** Prohibits military bases and testing of any weapons in Antarctica, and includes provisions for on-site inspections. In force June 23, 1961. Eighteen countries have ratified or acceded to this Treaty.

**The "Hot Line" Agreement of 1963.** Arrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union to provide a Direct Communications Link between the two capitals to lessen the dangers of war from error or misunderstanding. Modernized for satellite communications, 1971. In force on June 20, 1963.

**Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1963.** Bans nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Underground nuclear explosion is also prohibited if it will produce radioactive debris outside the nation conducting the test. In force October 10, 1963. Signed by 107 countries; 104 countries have ratified or acceded to it.

**Outer Space Treaty, 1967.** Prohibits military installation or weapons on celestial bodies and the placing in orbit of any objects carrying nuclear weapons of mass destruction. In force October 10, 1967. Seventy-three countries have signed and 68 have ratified or acceded to the Treaty.

**Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, 1963.** Designed to make Latin America a nuclear-free zone. In force, with Protocols I and II, April 22, 1968. Twenty-two have signed and 19 countries have ratified or acceded to the Treaty.

**Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1968.** Prohibits nuclear-weapon states from transferring nuclear explosives to any non-nuclear-weapon state; each non-nuclear-weapon state agrees not to acquire explosives on its own. In force March 5, 1970. One hundred and nine countries have signed and 94 have ratified or acceded to the Treaty.

**Seabed Army Control Treaty, 1971.** Prohibits weapons of mass destruction on the seabed beyond a 12-mile coastal zone. In force May 18, 1972. Eighty-eight countries have signed and 52 countries have ratified or acceded to the Treaty.

**Accidents Agreement, 1971.** Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Provides for guarding against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; for rapid communications should the danger of nuclear war arise from such nuclear incidents or from detection of unidentified objects; for advance notification of certain planned missile launches. In force on September 30, 1971.

**Biological Weapons Convention, 1972.** Prohibits the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins; and pledges negotiations on prohibiting development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. First disarmament agreement since World War II to provide for the destruction of existing weapons. Entered into force March 26, 1975. Signed by 112 countries, ratified by 52.

**Geneva Protocol of 1925.** Bans the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Ratified by the Senate.

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in December, 1974, and entered into force for the United States on April 10, 1975.

**ABM Treaty, 1972.** The product of two-and-one-half years of bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the ABM Treaty limits anti-ballistic missile systems to two sites in each country. Entered into force October 3, 1972.

**Interim Agreement, 1972.** Also a product of the SALT negotiations, this agreement places five-year limits on land-based intercontinental ballistic missile launchers and submarine-based ballistic missile launchers.

## Agreements Not Yet In Force
Between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

**Threshold Test Ban.** Limits underground nuclear weapons tests to 150 kilotons yield—a level that can be independently verified. Provides for separate negotiation of an agreement governing underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes—not yet completed. Test Ban to enter into force March 31, 1976.

**Protocol to 1972 ABM Treaty.** Limits ABM launchers to a single site for each country. (Ratification pending.)

# APPENDIX II

## THE ARMS CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

ACDA (the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) was created by Congress in 1961 to advise the President, the Secretary of State and Congress on arms control matters. Its Director is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

Agency Director Fred C. Ikle has described its "three essential functions" in these terms*

ACDA serves as a catalyst by bringing opportunities for arms limitations and reductions into the fore. This is done through the Director's statutory role in making recommendations to the Secretary of State and the President, through the Agency's role in negotiations, and through the daily staff work with other agencies in a process of cooperation, exhortation, and hard bargaining. For example, ACDA has dramatized the urgency of controlling nuclear weapons proliferation, and in moving our policy forward throughout the government, it has identified various means to this end.

ACDA serves to calibrate the counterbalancing considerations between military security and "arms control security" through its highly competent staff of technical experts. This is where the Agency's analytic function comes in. For example, as the report prepared for the Subcommittee states, ACDA has the only capacity in the U.S. Government outside the Pentagon for detailed quantitative evaluation of military systems and arms control options.

ACDA serves as a conscience to help ensure that short-term tactical considerations will neither obscure nor side-track the long-term national and international interest in sound arms control. Thus, the Agency does not seek agreements "for agreements sake"; it presses for measures that will genuinely limit armaments, or reduce them, and it insists that these measures be designed to lessen the risk of conflict, not just to place a fig leaf over the pre-existing military programs on both sides. In my view, here lies the most

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important and demanding task for the Agency: to serve as a "conscience", so to speak, for United States policy on arms control and disarmament. And I am firmly of the opinion that this task . . . must be shared by the Legislative Branch.

The Agency's staff includes physical scientists, political scientists, military specialists, economists, foreign service officers, lawyers and others. They conduct studies, and formulate and recommend policies, on all aspects of arms control, such as: the impact of arms control measures on foreign policy and the economy; issues and positions in arms control negotiations; means for monitoring agreements that come into force; the impact of new weapons and military policies on arms control; the development of safeguards against nuclear proliferation.

ACDA prepares for and manages U.S. participation in international negotiations of arms control issues.

ACDA is thus far the only government agency in the world devoted exclusively to arms control. (Arms control matters in other governments are generally handled by small subdivisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.)

*Statement of Oct. 3, 1974, to the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives.

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★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 O - 589-773

May 10, 1976

Dear Mr. Ikard:

Secretary Kissinger has asked me to let you know that he is very honored by your invitation to serve with you as Vice-Chairman of tickets for the Wolf Trap Foundation's evening of tribute to Mrs. Jouett Shouse on her 80th birthday. Unfortunately, however, he feels he must decline, as the pressure of his schedule would not permit him to make the commitment to the position that such a splendid occasion deserves.

He is very aware, however, of how much all music lovers in Washington owe to the dedication, creativity, and generosity of Mrs. Shouse, and he hopes that the evening in her honor on June 5th will be a shining success.

Mr. Frank N. Ikard,
2101 L Street, N.W.,
Washington, D. C.

FRANK N. IKARD

2101 L STREET, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037

April 27, 1976

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Wolf Trap Foundation is planning an evening at Wolf Trap, June 5, honoring Mrs. Jouett Shouse on her 80th birthday. I have agreed to serve as Ticket Chairman and would very much appreciate your joining me as Vice-Chairman for this great evening.

As a Vice-Chairman, I would hope that you would be respon-
sible for the sale of a minimum of $1,000 worth of tickets.
The price for tickets is as follows:

$150.00 Box Seat ($125 tax deductible)
100.00 Center Front Orchestra ($82.50 tax deductible)
75.00 Center Rear Orchestra ($62.50 tax deductible)

In addition, there will be a Champagne Al Fresco Supper,
hosted by the Wolf Trap Associates, at $20.00 per
person. We would also welcome donations from those who
cannot join us on June 5.

This evening provides us the opportunity to thank Mrs.
Shouse for her generosity and to ask the community,
through contributions, to establish a stronger base of
financial support for Wolf Trap. Our goal is to give
Mrs. Shouse the single largest check ever presented as
the result of a benefit.

The Soka Gakkai

32 Shinanomachi • Shinjuku-ku • Tokyo 160 • Japan • Tel.: 353-7111 • Cable: Sokagakkai Tokyo • Telex: TK4446 SOKATYO

Daisaku Ikeda, President

Tokyo, March 24, 1975

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Many thanks for your very kind letter of March 3.
It was gratifying to be told that you had enjoyed our exchange of
opinions during my call of January 13, and I assure you that I
myself enjoyed it very much indeed.

Let me thank you also for taking the time, despite your
heavy schedule, to give careful consideration to my proposals
on peace in the Middle East and to answer so clearly the points
I raised.

This morning I have just learned of the disappointing
breakdown in the peace negotiations you have been carrying on
between Israel and Egypt, and I hasten to urge you not to be too
disheartened by this failure. I myself assess that it was the
failure which, nevertheless, would lead to the cause for a success
in the future. I feel sure that eventually your efforts to achieve
peace in that troubled area will bear fruit in some form or another,
and the groundwork you have laid will certainly be of importance
in any future peace talks.

Ever since our meeting I have watched with great interest
and concern your activities, and I have prayed for your health and
safety as you grappled with the many problems facing you.

I was impressed by your letter how faithfully it reflects
your calm good sense, and I felt that I was looking into the inner
spirit of a man who genuinely feels a responsibility toward mankind
both now and in the future. The letter also has seemed to confirm
my belief that my proposals are in accord with the spirit of your
thoughts.

The Soka Gakkai

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As you continue on your dizzying pace, I sincerely hope that you will take good care of your health and not overstrain yourself. I feel that there is now a strong bond of trust between you and me, and if there should happen to be anything that you would like to consult me about, please feel free to do so at any time. As a representative of the common people of the world aspiring for the lasting peace I shall be happy to help you in any way possible.

I shall also do my best with courage in my limited capacity to act to pave the way for advancement of mankind.

It would also be a great pleasure for me just to have the opportunity of seeing you again.

February 13, 1976

Dear Mr. Ikeda:

The Secretary has asked me to let you know how much he appreciates your sending him your book, *The Living Buddha*. It will be a treasured addition to his personal library, and he very much appreciates your kindness in presenting it to him.

The Secretary was very sorry not to have been able to meet with you on January 30th, but hopes that an appointment can be arranged when you come to Washington this summer.

Mr. Daisaku Ikeda,
President,
The Soka Gakkai,
32 Shinanomachi,
Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo.

The Soka Gakkai

32 Shinanomachi・Shinjuku-ku・Tokyo 160・Japan・Tel.: 353-7111・Cable: Sokagakkai Tokyo・Telex: 232 3224SKGTOK J

Tokyo, January 29, 1976

Office of the President

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

First I would like to offer my hearty congratulations to you on the significant success that you have achieved during the recent round of the SALT II negotiations. The vitally important step with implied lessening of tension, I believe, would certainly raise the renewed hope for the future among the thinking people of the entire world. There may be some criticism or skepticism in the United States against your determined efforts to attain genuine détente, yet I for one will stand firm with full confidence in you and pray that you will continue to do your very best for the great cause of the lasting peace of the world.

I am indeed very grateful for your reply given through your Embassy in Tokyo informing that you would kindly receive me at your office in Washington on January 30 at 16:30.

I would like to express my sincere apologies to you for not having been able to accept it, and, at the same time, to thank you from the bottom of my heart for the cordial invitation that you gave me immediately upon return from the Soviet Union and Europe.

It is all the more disappointing for me to have missed the great opportunity to see you since, as I had written to you before, my primary purpose to visit the United States this time was to have as trusted friends a heart-to-heart talk with you on the vital questions of our mutual concern.

After having given immediate and careful considerations to your thoughtful invitation by exploring every possibility of accepting it, I came to the conclusion, to my profound regret, that I had no other choice but to decline it due to my own commitments here in Japan. So I informed you

The Soka Gakkai

[x]

through your Embassy people in Tokyo who were extremely
helpful to me on this matter. As a matter of fact, while
anxiously waiting for your reply, I was compelled to make
some inescapable additional commitments toward the end
of January, including extensive domestic travels and speaking
engagements at various national and regional conventions
of our organization. Unfortunately, in order for me to
readjust these commitments it was physically not possible
to leave here immediately upon receiving your answer. I
would like you to understand the situation I am placed.

I now plan to visit the United States in order
to attend our NSA's Annual National Convention to be held
in New York City on July 3-4, celebrating the Bicentennial.
I am definitely planning to come to Washington then in the
firm hope that you will see me either toward the end of
June or early July. In due course, I would ask for an
appointment to see you on that occasion.

May I wish you the best of health and every success
in your continued peace-making efforts.

With my kindest personal regards to you.

Very sincerely yours,

The Soka Gakkai

32 Shinanomachi • Shinjuku-ku • Tokyo 160 • Japan • Tel.: 353-7111 • Cable: Sokagakkai Tokyo • Telex: 232 3224SKGTOK J

Tokyo, December 23, 1976

Office of the President

The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of State
Room 7231A, Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Kissinger:

I cannot suppress a certain sadness at the
realization that with the coming change of administrations
in the United States, you will soon be leaving the office
you have filled so admirably. Let me assure you of my
best wishes for your success in whatever field of action
you decide to enter in the future.

During your eight years as Presidential Assistant
and Secretary of State, you have demonstrated an unswerving
determination to secure a lasting peace. I have the utmost
admiration for your courage and your convictions. Your
concept of detente has brought about the first significant
thaw in the cold war between East and West. Without your
endeavor, we would not have achieved the world balance
that exists today. Your dramatic achievement of a
rapprochement between the United States and China, your vital
part in bringing the war in Viet Nam to an end, and your
herculean struggle to maintain peace in the Middle East
will certainly be counted among the most brilliant achievements
in the history of our time.

As you retire from office, I want to say thank
you--thank you from the very bottom of my heart. I
thoroughly appreciate the anxiety and the agony that you
must have experienced from time to time. I am sure,
however, that, having left a distinguished trail of
accomplishment behind you, you will continue to contribute
substantially to the cause of world peace.

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 27, 1976

Dear Nancy and Henry:

Ellie and I are most grateful to you two
for the time and effort you put forward to hold
a farewell reception for us last night. It was
so heartwarming to see so many good friends, and
yet the occasion also caused us considerable sad-
ness to know that we won't see too many of them
again. However, that is the nature of diplomatic
life -- periodic change is a common occurrence and
a characteristic which makes such a career
stimulating and challenging.

Again, Henry, it has been a privilege to
serve with you. It will be of very great interest
to me to read your memoirs whenever you choose to
set in type the events you've guided in internation-
al relations during the past seven years.

Very best regards,

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
and Mrs. Kissinger

NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

2101 CONSTITUTION AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20418

INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE

June 12, 1974

Dr. Henry Kissinger
Secretary of State
United States State Department
2201 C Street, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20520

Dear Dr. Kissinger,

As a dear friend of Max Walter, I want you to know how very much I mourn his passing. Being an Ambassador of Goodwill runs in the family, for Max represented worldwide the very best of his profession as well as the finest qualities of his adopted country. He was a bright, industrious, inquiring, thoughtful individual - virtually unique in our profession. The family can stand enormously proud of Max and his contributions.

You will be interested to know, Dr. Kissinger, that we were having dinner with Max in a Kosher restaurant in London the evening of July 11th, 1971 (our wedding anniversary). Max said with great pride, "Henry will be in Paris tomorrow on his way home from the Far East. I wouldn't be surprised but what he will soon be going to China to arrange a trip there for your President." We had a good laugh at this audacious thought.

Although our offices are only across the street from each other, Dr. Kissinger, my thoughts go out to the entire family on this sad occasion. Would you please extend my condolences to your Mother and Father as well.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 25, 1975

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your gracious hospitality
during my recent visit to Ankara. I want
you to know how much I appreciated the
opportunity to meet with you and your
colleagues. Our discussions concerned
matters of critical importance to both our
countries and I believe served to reaffirm
the friendship and strategic interests which
have linked our two nations for decades.

I would also like you to convey my special
thanks to all those persons in your government
who helped to make this visit pleasant as well
as highly useful.

His Excellency
Dr. Sadi Irmak,
Prime Minister of the
Republic of Turkey,
Ankara.

S:bl

3/15/75