[L]

which we put on the execution of our convictions, I do not think
that technical arms control negotiations by themselves can solve the
problem.

I do not here in a neutral country want to assess ultimate blame,
though I do think that the Soviet system through its tendency
towards stagnation in recent years has certainly complicated
matters. I would say that the fundamental decision the Soviet Union
has to make is whether it is a country or whether it is a cause. If it is
a country, we can have serious, difficult, but ultimately successful
negotiations. If it is a cause that must ferment revolutions and
upheavals everywhere, then an continuation of tensions is nearly
inevitable. If it wants to behave like a great power, we have an
obligation, which I am sure we will fulfill, of meeting its legitimate
security concerns. But: no nation has a right to define security in
such a manner that everybody else is insecure. And if the Soviet
Union is satisfied, as all nations have had to be in history, with
relative security, then I am reasonably optimistic.

In any event, those are the issues which we should be debating
today, not whether there is some gimmick we can put forward to
lure the Soviets back to the negotiating table, or whether we can
invent some new weapon that we can throw on the table. Foreign
policy is not like a detective story in which one side throws out
vague clues and the other one has to guess the answer. Foreign
policy has to be based on realities – the realities will make for
negotiations. Their success will depend on whether we can in a cool,
correct and careful assessment of power relationships and other
factors achieve a balanced agreement, I believe that this is possible.

Transatlantic Relations

America's relations with Europe in the post-war period have been
one of the great success stories of that time. There has been a longer
period of peace in Europe than at any time in modern European
history, and relations between Europe and the United States have
been on the whole constructive and creative. Yet, no relationship
can forever continue on a pattern that was established in different
circumstances, and there are a number of aspects of the current
Transatlantic relationship that require attention.

188

First, there is the issue of strategy. Austria is of course not part of
any military alliances and I speak here of the problem of NATO. –
The problem is this: NATO was developed during the period of
American nuclear superiority. Its strategy relied on the immediate
or at any rate very early use of nuclear weapons. Conventional
forces were created in part to supply a trigger for these nuclear
forces, and throughout the whole period the various countries,
though there have been slight adaptations in the doctrine, have
never deviated from the view or at least the practice that would
imperil an early use of nuclear weapon. At the same time there has
developed what is in effect nuclear parity, which means that a
nuclear war would involve casualties unprecedented in human
history and therefore require decisions which no statesman has ever
had to make before.

Second, there has developed in each country a growing nuclear
pacifism. More and more groups have dedicated themselves to the
propositions that nuclear weapons should be abolished, that their
first use should be renounced, and that the greatest danger to the
existence of mankind are the weapons by which it is defended.
There is a theoretical recognition that conventional defences should
be built up. And it is finally true that in no country of the NATO
alliance you can find a statesman today who would publicly state
what his decisions make necessary, namely (except in America) that
the common defence requires the early use of nuclear weapons. This
creates a situation that in the long run must be disastrous.
Everybody calls for conventional defence and yet nobody
undertakes a serious major effort to bring it about. Many people
condemn nuclear weapons, but they are not prepared to achieve
their alternative. The result is a de-facto-pacifism, a kind of self-
paralysis of the will, which must encourage blackmail over a period
of time.

I am not talking about next year or the year after, I am talking about
a ten year perspective. There is therefore the urgent necessity that
we bring our actions into line with our professions. I have opposed,
and I believe responsible governments must oppose, the facil
declarations that we should renounce the first use of nuclear
weapons. If we renounce this, we are saying that we would rather be
defeated with conventional weapons, and therefore once we have

189

[L.C.]

admitted the possibility of defeat, it becomes a legalistic argument to say that we will resist defeat with one kind of weapon, but not with another. I do not think we should renounce these weapons, but I do think we should put ourselves into a position where we do not have to resort to them at the early stage that present deployments and present efforts make necessary.

I fear also, and have said so publicly, that if this rationalisation is not achieved over some reasonable period of time, it will be difficult to convince the American people that they must maintain their present deployment in Europe in an unchanged fashion as long as it has no military rational. I would much prefer to give it a military rational. The third problem in Transatlantic relations has to do with the perception of East-West relations. I do not think it is healthy for so many Europeans to create the impression that it is the foolishness and the verbosity of Americans that produce international tensions. We should have a serious dialogue between the two sides of the Atlantic of what we consider to be the elements of danger and the elements of solution, and not exhaust ourselves in finding gimmicks for this or that negotiation.

Fourth, there is the problem of the fundamental relationship between Europe and the United States. I think it is healthier for the Transatlantic relationship for Europe to develop a greater identity; including a greater identity in the defence sphere. The United States cannot be asked to make all decisions around every critical area of the world at every moment of time, as unilateral American policy decisions. I know it is always said that we should consult but consultation is not the same as dealing with a partner who is perceived to have other options. I am not afraid of a Europe that asserts its own identity in the field of defence; I know no rational European who would not prefer co-operation with the United States in the defence field to going it alone, and therefore European political unity, if it cannot be achieved on the basis of the ten, then it must evolve on the basis of the largest group that is achievable. European political unity seems to me an imperative for a successful Transatlantic relationship and a wise America will encourage it, and a confident Europe will try to achieve it. It must achieve it also, because the slow-down or the relative decline in the economic field of Europe has objective causes.

190

In the 19th century the European nation state was the optimum size compatible with communications technology of that period. Europe had a technological advantage and Europe had a monopoly in the production of energy. It was the Saudi Arabia in terms of an energy based on coal. All of these advantages have disappeared, and if Europe is to progress in the economic field, and if Europe is to get the full benefits of the new technologies, at least a nucleus of it has to get the economies of scale that are inseparable from ready union. But I think that these problems are being recognized and are being worked on.

## The Issue of Central America

Last year, over my enormous reluctance I was asked by President Reagan to be head of a bipartisan Commission that dealt with Central America. That Commission included such well-known admirers of President Reagan as Lane Kirkland, the head of the AFL-CIO; Robert Strauss, the former Chairman of the Democratic National Committee; and four other Democratic individuals, who had distinguished themselves by vocal opposition to many policies of the Reagan administration. I mention this because when all was over, that Commission reached unanimous conclusions, and from this you can draw two views: One, that with all the noise you hear in an election year, America is basically healthy and basically united. Two, that when the problem of Central America is studied, objective conclusions will rally around a central core, and that the degree of deviation from it cannot be all that great, unless one is fairly ignorant of what is going on there.

Let me state a few of our conclusions, though I cannot do justice to them. And let me add that I am not involved in the policies on a day-to-day basis.

First: All twelve American leaders involved agreed that Central America represents a vital American interest. This should not be so strange if one looks at a map. It is a region geographically very close to the United States and one in which there are many factors of turmoil, and in which therefore an American abdication or failure would have profound consequences for issues in larger countries, of even more fundamental significance.

191

[L]

Second, there was a general agreement that there are many causes for upheaval in Central America that are not produced by Moscow or by Havana. There is a history of colonialism, there is a history of unwise American policies, there are social inequalities, there are undemocratic governments – in sum, there are many reasons that produce causes for upheaval that must be dealt with.

Our Commission proposed a five-year-program, for which Nicaragua, too, is eligible, which will seek to return Central America by 1990 to the economic conditions it enjoyed in 1978. This is a very ambitious objective, unless you realize that between 1978 and the current period the per capita gross domestic product of these countries declined on an average of 20 per cent. And if that process continues, no policy can possibly succeed. We believe that this program can help alleviate social inequalities and we have tied it to the establishment of pluralistic institutions over a period of five years, in all of these countries. It is a very detailed program which has been accepted by President Reagan and put forward to the countries.

Further, we have proposed a negotiating program to address the two security problems in the area: One, the guerrilla war in Salvador, and two, the problem posed by Nicaragua.

Let me say a word about Nicaragua. Too often in Europe the impression is created as if the United States is driving Nicaragua to communism. The fact is that the United States gave 120 million Dollars of economic aid to Nicaragua in the first two years of its existence. It offered a peace corps and food aid. The victory of the Sandinistas was welcomed by the previous American administration. But the Sandinistas have preferred association with a militant version of Cuba. In Nicaragua today there are more Cubans, East-Germans, Bulgarians, Libyans and others, than the size of the Nicaraguan Army under Somoza – over 10,000 (the Nicaraguan army has grown to a 100,000). We have therefore proposed a substantial disarmament of all of Central America, that all armies be reduced to 1979 levels, that no foreign country (including the United States) introduce new armaments beyond a certain level, and that all foreign countries (including the United States) call back their military advisors. That program has been accepted by the administration. And only in the absence of the

192

achievement of these objectives and in the absence of the end of Nicaraguan intervention in Salvador does the problem of American military assistance become relevant. Until that is achieved we indeed do not believe in any of these gimmicks that would in fact turn over Salvador to the same fate as Nicaragua.

I must tell you if the Europeans want to avoid conflict in Central America, they have to understand that the American concerns have a large measure of reality and that the conclusions of our Commission represent a central view of a vast majority of Americans, not of those who happen to make most noise, but of those who will sooner or later be essential for the conduct of government. We cannot just separate the realities of security and the realities of diplomacy, as is so often done here in the public debate. We cannot use our past failings as an excuse for inaction. If Europeans who have an influence in Central America want to be helpful, let them urge all countries, those on our side as well as Nicaragua, to move towards pluralism, let them urge all sides to reduce their dependence on foreign military advisors, let them urge all sides to stop intervening in neighbouring countries. No European can have an interest in an American failure in Central America. Anybody who knows the situation further south and further north must realize not only that there are potential guerilla movements in many of these countries, but also that the economic problem that is simplified in the words »debt« problem« can easily lead to political upheavals directed against the vital concerns not just of the United States, but also of the world economy. So in this sense what goes on in Central America is of global importance and nobody should believe that the United States can possibly be eager for military intervention, after what we have gone through in Vietnam, and after that we know of the attitudes in other countries. It cannot be an American desire, but it also cannot be in the interest of our friends that we abdicate areas so close to our borders and turn them over to what we believe is an organized movement by a small minority. Certainly the inequalities were not caused by the communists, but that does not mean that the guerilla movements cannot be run by them and that is the central immediate issue in Salvador.

I have described a number of problems. Many of them are extremely

193

difficult, but all of them have a very hopeful side. The hopeful side is this: With respect to East-West relations I think that a fundamental dialogue between the West and the Soviet Union must start in the foreseeable future – not about the adequacy of this or that weapon, but about where we want to be in ten years, and then work our way back from that to concrete solutions. Many of the ideas that I have discussed with respect to Transatlantic relations and European unification are becoming more and more widely discussed and some variation of them is in the process of being implemented. Central America is not some mystery; it is a test as to whether we can combine humanitarian, economic, political negotiations and security concerns into a coherent policy on a unified basis in our country and at least have some understanding from our allies. That too is achievable.

So when you look at the catalogue of the challenges before the industrial democracies, they all are capable of solution by our initiative and by our purpose. I have a Chinese friend, who claims that there is the following Chinese proverb. I say claims, because I'm not so sure that Chinese proverbs really all exist. I think they always make them up to impress us Westerners, but whatever, that proverb allegedly goes like this: "When there is turmoil under the heavens, little problems are treated as if they were big problems, and big problems are not dealt with at all. When there is order under the heavens, big problems are reduced to little problems and little problems need not preoccupy us." The final idea I want to leave with you is that I have every confidence that our country, its allies and its friends have an opportunity over the next decade to bring about order under the heavens.

194

[LC]

Micl
Eu
Eu
un
Un

Gehe
Unte
Gern
wand
darüt
scher
verur
verga
den,
folge
Erste
Nach
von I
nur n
innew
neuer
ge da
sund
Germ
nicht
daß es
war, s
mane!

Die g

In der
weise
dieser