"Austria has too much respect to permit itself an opinion about the military dispositions of the greatest commander of the century. It was a novel problem, the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had given so many proofs of its inconstancy that even the soberest calculation permitted the assumption that an enterprise so much against all probability as the conquest of Moscow...would induce Alexander to negotiate. But this hope had been disappointed; Russia had found it easy to surrender the interests of its allies; it could not be induced to surrender its own."

"The Emperor of the French seems to have foreseen what is happening today when he told me so frequently that the marriage (to Marie Louise) had transformed the fact of Europe. The moment is near, it may have already arrived, when Napoleon will draw the real advantage from this fortunate alliance."

"When our exalted master learned of the evacuation of Moscow, he summed up the essence of his attitude in these few words: 'The moment has come when I can show the Emperor of the French who I am.' I will confine myself to repeating these words of His Majesty, so simple and at the same time so energetic, and I empower you to communicate them to the Duke of Bassano."

Castlereagh's view of insular position

"Our insular position places us sufficiently out of the reach of immediate danger (my italics) tp permit our pursuing a more generous and confiding policy," Castlereagh wrote in a circular dispatch on 31 December, designed to allay the fears of British representatives regarding Russian motives.

"In the present state of Europe, it is the province of Great Britain to turn the confidence she has inspired to the accounts of peace, by exercising a conciliatory influence.... The immediate object to be kept in view is to inspire the states of Europe... with a sense of the danger they have surmounted by their union, of the hazards they will incur by a relaxation of vigilance...."

"Should the alarms to which the Austrian dispatch points unfortunately be realized, it might be reasonable to suppose that Prussia and France might be disposed, in concert with Austria and Great Britain, to take an active part in opposing (Russia), but there is reason to believe that neither power regard the danger at the present moment to be imminent. In this state of things I...submit to Prince Metternich whether it may not be purdent to moderate the language of alarm."

Metternich's view on British system

"Among the causes of the tremendous confusion characterizing present-day Europe," wrote Metternich in later life, paralleling his profession of faith, "is the transplantation of British institutions to the Continent where they are in complete contradiction to existing conditions, so that their application becomes either illusory or distorted. The so-called 'British school' has been the cause of the French Revolution, and the consequences of this revolution, so anti-British in tendency, devastate Europe today.

Metternich's view on Austria

"Austria is a juridically uniform, but administratively diverse state. It is diverse, not through an act of will, but through fundamental reasons, the most important of which is the difference in nationalities.... The foundation of the Empire is therefore the maintenance of the different legal codes of the various components of the Empire; this is our only protection against the levelling of all concepts which is characteristic of our period."

p.20 A WORLD RESTORED

"If after 1805 Austria was still strong enough to work for the general deliverance...
it will now be forced to seek its security in adaptation to the French system. I need
hardly repeat how little we fit into this system so contrary to all principles
of a rightly conceived policy... But never again can we think of resistance without
Russian help. That vacillating court may awaken more quickly when it can no longer
earn an exclusive merit through its miserable policy... Only one escape is left
to us: to conserve our strength for better days, to work for our preservation with
gentler means--and not to look back."

Things which ought to be taken for granted lose their force when they emerge in the form of arbitrary pronouncements.... The mania of law-making is a symptom of the disease which has ravaged the world for sixty-two years.... Natural, moral or material forces are not fit subjects of human regulation. What would one say of a <u>Charte</u> which side by side with the Rights of Man exhibited the laws of gravitation?.... If there is no God, He will not be created by pronouncements; if He exists, He will not require human recognition to achieve divinity.... Objects mistakenly made subject to legislation result only in the limitation, if not the complete annulment, of that which is attempted to be safeguarded.

The word freedom has for me never had the character of a point of departure but of a goal. The point of departure is order, which alone can produce freedom. Without order the appeal to freedom is no more than the quest of some specific party for its special objectives and will in practice always lead to tyranny. Because I have been a man of order, my efforts were directed towards the attainment of a real, not a deceptive freedom...I have always considered despotism of any kind a symptom of weakness. Where it appears it condemns itself; most intolerably where it appears behind the mask of advancing the cause of liberty.

When the territorial balance of Europe is disturbed, (Britain) can interfere with effect, but she is the last government in Europe which can be expected or can venture to commit herself on any question of an absolute character.... We shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the system of Europe: but this country cannot and will not act upon abstract principles of precaution. The Alliance which exists had no such purpose in its original formation. It was never so explained to Parliament; if it had, most assuredly the sanction of Parliament would never have been given to it.

p.35 A World Restored

" When the territorial balance of Europe is distrubed (Britain) can interfere with effect, but she is the last government in Europe which can be expected or can venture to commit herself on any question of an absolute character . . . We shall be found in our place when _actual danger_ (my italics) menaces the system of Europe: but this country cannot and will not act upon abstract principles of precaution.

The Alliance which exists had no such purpose in its original formation.
It was never so explained to Parliament; if it had, most assuredly the
sanction of Parliament would never have been given to it."

McHernich's
Napoleon's view on equilibrium:

"Isolated states exist only as the abstractions of so-called philosophers. In the society of states each state has interests...which connect it with the others. The great axioms of political science derive from the recognition of the true interests of _all_ states; it is in the general interests that the guarantee of existence is to be found, while particular interests--the cultivation of which is considered political wisdom by restless and short-sighted men--have only a secondary importance....

Modern history demonstrates the application of the principle of solidarity and equilibrium...and of the united efforts of states against the supremacy of one power in order to force a return to the common law....What then becomes of egotistical policy, of the policy of fantasy and of miserable gain?"

### Canning

"It will involve (Britain) deeply in all the politics of the Continent, whereas our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies and then with a commanding force."

### Castlereagh

"The Emperor's policy," Castlereagh told Lieven, the Russian ambassador, in reply to an attempt to use the Alliance to repress a revolution in Naples, "Is a vain hope, a beautiful phantom which England above all cannot pursue....It is proposed now to overcome the revolution; but so long as this revolution does not appear in more distinct shape...England is not ready to combat it. Upon any other question purely political she would always deliberate and act in the same way as all the other Cabinets."

# World War II and Aftermath

## The Unnecessary War

* Illusion that inaction is the safe policy

* Tendency of status quo powers to take refuge in intentions

    * a. Hitler after Rhineland promising E. Locarno

    * b. British policy of appeasement - Inability to come to grips with unlimited objectives

* Obsession with memory of World War I - French doctrine of full mobilization - 1936

* Notion of defensive war

* Blockade - Why should Germany hold still to be starved out ?

* Nazi - Soviet part.

* Not new policy or caused primarily by impatience with West.

* Basic Soviet doctrine. Stalin in 1935: "A great deal depends on the inevitable capitalist war until the capitalists start fighting among themselves."

* Thus war broke out in 1939 - Guarantee of Poland

* Phony war

-2-

Germany's dilemma - Needed quick decision.

Paradoxical fact that it did not fight all-out war until 1943.

Issue of nature of strategy did not arise until Allies had superiority -
i.e. after U.S. entry into the war.

Issue of Balkans vs. Second Front

Issue of Unconditional Surrender - Issue of War Aims.

Basic problem after U.S. entry into the war - war and peace considered
successive phases of policy.

Concern with "purely" military considerations.

Bradley proud that he did not let the British "put one over" by
going into Balkans.

Stalin's concern with Southern France invasion at Teheran.

Arguments against Balkan invasion:

1. Might not have been any more decisive.

2. Might have brought the Russians to Calais in case of German collapse.

3. Might have encouraged separate peace.

-3-

Counterarguments:

1. Communist governments established only where there have been Communist troops.

2. Soviets could not easily have maintained themselves further west than they did in 1945 without bringing on war.

3. Separate peace highly unlikely given Hitler's psychology and war aims.

Question of War - Aims:

To the Soviets it was political war - to us it was military war. - Hopkins
amazement that Stalin in early days of German invasion seemed more con-
cerned with war aims than with aid supplies.

Military bias

1. Affected our attitude towards Germany.

Unconditional surrender - did it prolong war ? Did it affect
peace settlement ?

2. Affected peace settlement - by giving rise to the notion that end of the war would bring end of all problems.- Created a vacuum instead. Had to spend whole post-war period rebuilding.
Teheran discussion of major and minor process as threats to peace.
- Possibility of allied disagreement was never discussed.

Difference

Japan →

Germany

-4-

3. Created notion that Soviet entry into Japanese had to be pursued - basic mistake of Yalta.

4. Notion of Allied Unity as end in themselves. - Reluctence to raise issues which might strain this fabric. - But if it was difficult to get settlement during the war, how much more nearly impossible when the pressure of the enemy was removed.

5. Notion that balance of power was inherently wicked - British in Greece. Nature of Alliance policy during a war - adding enemy or fear of enemy to one side. Side most eager for victory or in greatest danger of defeat at negotiating disadvantage. - This should not have been we.
- Kennan reaction to query whether Soviet aims had changed.

6. Concern with Allied unity and "freedom of action" caused us to express such agreements as were arrived at so vaguely that they permitted whichever interpretation was desirable.

Result: Emerged into post-war era with none of the issues settled and our negotiating position increasingly weak.

All the more difficult because we rejected force and relied almost entirely on process of negotiation.

-5-

## Difference with Congress of Vienna:

1. In Napoleonic war Britain and Austria obtained their war aims before the end of the war. In fact Austria threatened to pull out unless its aims were granted.

2. Allied Unity even then did not provide mode for settlement.
Could be achieved only by:

a. Threat of war.

b. Adding France to the concert of powers.

3. Agreement that domestic structures were not incompatible.

## After World War II - Revolutionary power.

Belief in "objective" factors cannot be reassured - mistake of
Roosevelt that he could show good faith.

Distrust of West - Stalin speech in 1946 and interview with Stassen.
War caused by capitalist system. Couldn't see any difference be-
tween German and British system.

Therefore good will gained in war ruthlessly sacrificed - because
it would have been lost anyway. Also no admission of weakness,
for concession can always be made - should not begin with them.

-6-

Security belt - and propaganda campaign to paralyze our strongest weapon. "Ban the bomb."

General MARCH in 1919:

"The program was framed on its merits without any relation whatever to national politics or international politics."

Aided by U.S. psychological unreadiness

Belief in inherent merit of process of negotiation - thus aided

Soviet time wasting.

Concern with Soviet purposes.

What would happen when situation of strength was achieved, was never made clear.

War end. Peace as successive phases of policy.

Therefore never could gain benefit either from unilateral disarma-
ment or from superior force.

Marshall - Would never recommend risking American lives for purely

Political objectives.

Posed many alternatives for ourselves. - Patience and complexity became almost incantation.

-7-

Difficulty also with Containment policy.

1. Notion of successive places. Acheson: "What we must do is create positions of strength; and if we create that strength there will come about a difference in the negotiating position of the parties and out of that there should come a willingness for the side of the Kremlin to recognize the fact."

2. Didn't make clear how position of strength was to be conveyed to Soviet Union.

3. Time wasting policy. - Berlin blockade showed Soviets lengths we were prepared to go to avoid war.

4. Enabled Soviets constantly to maintain initiative.

5. Created the obsession with free world's internal perfection as prerequisite of action. Saw one task in building military position. Soviets felt so safe that they took chance on our atomic superiority.

6. Therefore did well on purely economic policies - Marshall Plan.

7. Penchant of saying problem is "really" something else.

Problem of uncommitted

Also considered in terms of purposes of policy

-8-

Notion that we couldn't "occupy" Russia and therefore couldn't threaten force. - Reluctance to use force shown by one whole posture

- Berlin blockade - therefore Soviets make hay while sun is shining
Not even atom control was "worth" pressure.

- Containment - also time wasting.

Did well where we could concentrate on economic policy measures on our side: Greek - Turkish aid. Marshall Plan.

Not certain that other policies were in fact possible. Very well to say in retrospect that would have forced show-down earlier.

But may have been inevitable. - Could we have lived with ourselves otherwise ?

HENRY A. KISSINGER

# Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy

## I. *The Role of Domestic Structure*

IN THE traditional conception, international relations are conducted by political units treated almost as personalities. The domestic structure is taken as given; foreign policy begins where domestic policy ends.

But this approach is appropriate only to stable periods because then the various components of the international system generally have similar conceptions of the "rules of the game." If the domestic structures are based on commensurable notions of what is just, a consensus about permissible aims and methods of foreign policy develops. If domestic structures are reasonably stable, temptations to use an adventurous foreign policy to achieve domestic cohesion are at a minimum. In these conditions, leaders will generally apply the same criteria and hold similar views about what constitutes a "reasonable" demand. This does not guarantee agreement, but it provides the condition for a meaningful dialogue, that is, it sets the stage for traditional diplomacy.

When the domestic structures are based on fundamentally different conceptions of what is just, the conduct of international affairs grows more complex. Then it becomes difficult even to define the nature of disagreement because what seems most obvious to one side appears most problematic to the other. A policy dilemma arises because the pros and cons of a given course seem evenly balanced. The definition of what constitutes a problem and what criteria are relevant in "solving" it reflects to a considerable extent the domestic notions of what is just, the pressures produced by the decision-making process, and the experience which forms the leaders in their rise to eminence. When domestic structures—and the concept of legitimacy on which they are based—differ widely, statesmen can

503

10

HENRY A. KISSINGER

still meet, but their ability to persuade has been reduced for they no
longer speak the same language.

This can occur even when no universal claims are made. Incom-
patible domestic structures can passively generate a gulf, simply
because of the difficulty of achieving a consensus about the nature
of "reasonable" aims and methods. But when one or more states
claim universal applicability for their particular structure, schisms
grow deep indeed. In that event, the domestic structure becomes
not only an obstacle to understanding but one of the principal
issues in international affairs. Its requirements condition the con-
ception of alternatives; survival seems involved in every dispute.
The symbolic aspect of foreign policy begins to overshadow the
substantive component. It becomes difficult to consider a dispute
"on its merits" because the disagreement seems finally to turn not on
a specific issue but on a set of values as expressed in domestic
arrangements. The consequences of such a state of affairs were
explained by Edmund Burke during the French Revolution:

I never thought we could make peace with the system; because it was
not for the sake of an object we pursued in rivalry with each other, but
with the system itself that we were at war. As I understood the matter,
we were at war not with its conduct but with its existence; convinced
that its existence and its hostility were the same.¹

Of course, the domestic structure is not irrelevant in any histori-
cal period. At a minimum, it determines the amount of the total
social effort which can be devoted to foreign policy. The wars of the
kings who governed by divine right were limited because feudal
rulers, bound by customary law, could not levy income taxes or
conscript their subjects. The French Revolution, which based its
policy on a doctrine of popular will, mobilized resources on a truly
national scale for the first time. This was one of the principal reasons
for the startling successes of French arms against a hostile Europe
which possessed greater over-all power. The ideological regimes
of the twentieth century have utilized a still larger share of the
national effort. This has enabled them to hold their own against an
environment possessing far superior resources.

Aside from the allocation of resources, the domestic structure
crucially affects the way the actions of other states are interpreted.
To some extent, of course, every society finds itself in an environ-
ment not of its own making and has some of the main lines of its
foreign policy imposed on it. Indeed, the pressure of the environ-
ment can grow so strong that it permits only one interpretation of

504

pp. 249-250

This divergence was due less to a difference in constitutional principles,
as Castlereagh believed, than to a difference in historical development and,
above all, to the fact that in Great Britain the creation of the national
state had been consummated. On the Continent, liberalism fought under the
banners of the principles of the French Revolution, and doctrinal agreement
superseded political loyalty. In Great Britain, where the French Revolution
was identified with Napoleon, liberalism appeared as an indigenous growth in
the shape of a utilitarian political economy. Attacks on the existing order,
sometimes violent, occurred; but because the feeling of national cohesion
superseded any domestic differences, they were considered internal problems
by both the government and the reformers. On the Continent, a revolution had
a symbolic significance as the application of universal principles. But for
Great Britain, which denied the universality of these claims, a revolution had
only a practical significance, whether it constituted a physical threat. On
the Continent, where the twin movements of nationalism and liberalism could
achieve their objectives only by the overthrow of the international order,
both repression and reform were international problems to be dealt with by
the maxims of foreign policy. In Great Britain, where the quest for reform
was considered an internal problem, repression and reform remained in the sphere
of domestic policy. When Castlereagh spoke of an overriding danger, he meant
an attempt to achieve universal dominion. When Metternich invoked an over-
riding danger, he was referring to social upheaval. No amount of good
intentions could bridge this gap in historical situations, which only Metternich's
distrust of Russian intentions had nitherto obscured.

pp. 227-228

"The problem of an universal Alliance for the peace and happiness of the world," concluded Castlereagh, "has always been one of speculation and hope, but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion may be hazarded...it never can. The idea of an **Alliance Solidaire**...must be understood as morally implying the previous establishment of such a system of general government as may...enforce upon all nations an internal system of peace and justice....Till then, a system of administrating Europe by a general alliance of its States can be reduced to some practical form, all notions of general and unqualified guarantee must be abandoned, and States must be left to rely for their security upon the justice and wisdom of their respective systems, aided by such support as other states may feel prepared to afford them...."¹

p. 218

"If I have discussed some strange matters, it is because I wanted to put an end to the discussion about *biblical subjects* and *religious police* before it fairly got started.... All ideas of the Emperor Alexander always amount to the same thing, to solicit proselytes. For this reason he solicits the Jacobins in Italy and Pietists in the rest of Europe. Today the 'Rights of Man' have been replaced by a concern for Readers of the Bible".¹ The problem of relations with Russia was therefore still the same as at Langres, Troyes, and Vienna; the attempt of one man to identify the European order with his will. "Alexander desires the peace of the world," reported an Austrian diplomat, "but not for the sake of peace and its blessings, rather for his own sake; not unconditionally, but with mental reservations: he must remain the arbiter of this peace; from him must emanate the repose and happiness of the world and all of Europe must recognize that this repose is his work, that it is dependent on his goodwill and that it can be disturbed by his whim...."² It was his consciousness of a mercurial, unstable, meddling Russia which shaped Metternich's policy during Alexander's lifetime.

"As for the principle I am alleged to have sacrificed, if you mean a
principle applicable to France and _its_ legitimacy, then I admit that I
subordinate this completely to my specifically Prussian patriotism. France
interests me only in so far as it affects the situation of my country and
we can make policy only with the France which exists ... A legitimate
monarch like Louis XIV was as hostile an element as Napoleon I and if the
present Napoleon should conceive the idea to abdicate ... he would not do
us a favor and Henry V, [the Bourbon pretender] would not be his successor
... As a romantic I can shed a tear for the fate of Henry V; as a diplomat
I would be his servant if I were French, but as things stand, France,
irrespective of the accident of who leads it, is for me a pawn, and an
unavoidable one, on the chess-board of diplomacy, a game in which I have
no other duty than to serve _my_ king and _my_ country [Bismarck's italics].
I cannot reconcile personal sympathies and antipathies toward foreign
powers with my sense of duty in foreign affairs; indeed I see in them the
embryo of disloyalty toward the Sovereign and the country I serve. If
one attempts to adjust diplomatic relations ... to such feelings, then
policy ceases and personal arbitrariness reigns supreme. Not even the King
has the right to subordinate the interests of the state to his personal
sympathies or antipathies."

"Or perhaps you find the principle I violated in the fact that Prussia
must always be an enemy of France ... I could deny this, --- but even
assuming you are right I would still not consider it politically wise to let
other states know of our fears in peace time. Until the break occurs I
would think it useful to encourage the belief that a war between us and
France is _not_ imminent ... that the tension with France is not an organic
fault of our nature on which everyone can count with certainty..."

2.

policy knows no reciprocity; it is an exclusively Prussian peculiarity;
every other government seeks the criteria for its actions solely in its
interests, however it may cloak them with legal deductions."

"How many governments exist in the contemporary world which do not grow on revolutionary soil? Take Spain, Portugal, Brazil...Sweden or England which still prides itself on the Glorious Revolution of 1688...even in our own state we cannot escape using institutions of revolutionary origin...

Before the French Revolution not even the most Christian and conscientious statesman ever conceived the idea to subordinate all his political efforts ...to the fight against the Revolution... and this despite the fact that the Americas as well as the British Revolutions represented the same principles which brought about an interruption of legal continuity in France. I cannot believe that there should have existed before 1789 a few statesmen equally Christian and similarly conservative as we and just as capable of recognizing evil. Nor that the truth of a principle which we assert to be the basis of all policy should have escaped them."

March 22, 1965

From ENCOUNTER March 1965 for Government 180

...could secure forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfortable means of transit to any country or climate without passport or other formality, could despatch his servant to the neighbouring office of a bank for such supply of the precious metals as might seem convenient, and could then proceed abroad to foreign quarters, without knowledge of their religion, language, or customs, bearing coined wealth upon his person, and would consider himself greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the least interference. But, most important of all, he regarded this state of affairs as normal, certain, and permanent, and any deviation from it as aberrant, scandalous, and avoidable. The projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and exclusion, which were to play the serpent to this paradise, were little more than the amusements of his daily newspaper, and appeared to exercise almost no influence at all on the ordinary course of social and economic life, the internalisation of which was nearly complete in practice.

Keynes.

"The policy of Buol (Austria's foreign ministery) is wrong even
from the narrow Austrian point of view, because sooner or later Austia
must come to an agreement with Russia about the fate of Turkey and a moment
as favorable as the present will not soon recur. Every concession exacted from
Russia by Austria will only force Russia to wait for the moment when it will
be able to take revenge as the ally of an enemy of Austria and the latter has
too many conflicting interests in Germany with us, In (Italy), with France
and at home with its own subjects for that moment no to come. . . It is already
a great gain for us that the coalition of Russia, Austria, and the
secondary states, which we had to contend with in our German policy, has
now been dissolved."