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7 March 1950

Last week the United States, Britain and France relaxed considerably their controls over Western Germany. The existing Occupation Statute was revised to give Western Germany a greater measure of self-government and permission was granted to the Western Germans to set up their first post-war Foreign Ministry and to establish diplomatic relations with "friendly nations". Optimistic commentators have expressed a belief that those concessions might help considerably to overcome German reluctance to rearm.

Such optimism is due to the erroneous impression that German willingness to rearm depends basically on fulfillment by the Allies of German demands for "equality". In actual fact the attitude of Western Germans regarding the rearmament of their country, the Bonn Federal Republic, is determined by military and strategic rather than by political and ideological considerations.

It is entirely true, of course, that under present conditions Germany can no longer be expected to cooperate actively in the defense of Europe, except on the basis of equality, or near equality, with the other nations of the West. The Germans have indicated that abolition of virtually all the limitations placed on their sovereignty by the occupation Statute would be a condition or, as they prefer to call it, a psychological pre-requisite for their cooperation. They also ask, in the interest of such German units as might eventually be formed, that Germany be granted the right to have a tactical air force of her own and to organize full divisions, instead of the mere regimental combat teams suggested by the French. There can be no doubt that Bonn is genuinely desirous of obtaining these and certain other concessions from the Allies. Yet, the equality issue is little more than a veil behind which there lies hidden an entirely

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different and far more basic problem. Leading Germans, or Americans for that matter, are sufficiently realistic to know that, if Germany were actually to join the Atlantic powers tomorrow in a de facto military alliance, equality would result more or less automatically as a logical, natural and inevitable development. It is no secret, in fact, that virtually complete abolition of the limitations contained in the Occupation Statute was under consideration, even before German Rearmament was talked about seriously.

The question which really weighs on the minds of Western German leaders and which is asked invariably by all Germans discussing rearmament among themselves or with foreigners is this: Is there any sense at all in joining a military effort which, because of the inherent and probably permanent Western weakness in ground forces, would not save Germany anyway, but merely increase her losses in men and spell complete physical destruction for countless towns, villages and farms?

A careful analysis of German opinion leads, in fact, to the inescapable conclusion that German reluctance to rearm—a reluctance which seems to have come as a surprise to many admirers of German military prowess—is not dictated primarily by resentment toward the Allies, by a desire to sell German "aid" at the highest possible price, or by a suddenly acquired pacifism. The key to the situation must be found, on the contrary, in a genuine and deeply ingrained fear that rearmament might involve Germany in a most risky and costly, but at the same time utterly hopeless enterprise. Germans seem virtually unanimous in the conviction that even a Germany restored to full equality should not rearm, unless and until there is incontrovertible proof that Western, especially U.S., ground strength in Europe is being built up to a point where there would be at least a reasonable chance of holding the general area of the Bonn Republic against Soviet aggression.

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It is easy to discover an element of irony in this situation. Called upon to contribute to European defense largely because of their vaunted knowledge and experience in matters military, the Germans now seem to baffle their most enthusiastic sponsors by the very fact that they actually evaluate the possibilities of such defense with the skeptical and experienced eyes of non-long accustomed to think in military terms. Looking anxiously at the dominating positions occupied by Red forces in the heart of Europe, listening nervously to the Great Debate in the U.S. regarding the strategy to be followed by this country, the Germans seem greatly afraid that they may be carnarked for a sacrificial delaying action to be fought between Elbe and Rhine, i.e. on their home territory. Again and again they voice their apprehension that the Allies might have neither the strength nor even the intention to attempt a real stand against Red Aggression anywhere East of the Rhine.

Some time ago Dr. Carlo Schmid, one of the leading Social Democrats of Western Germany, pointedly expressed the entire problem in the following terms: "We prefer to have uninjured people bolshewised in undamaged homes to having them take their Communist lessons as cripples in bomb holes. We Social Democrats will approve German reararmament only if and when we see here in Germany sufficient military forces to resist Russian invasion...There is but one way out: The U.S. must concentrate its greatest possible power in Europe. Halfway measures do not guarantee half the protection, but will result in tenfold destruction. The U.S. and Russia are merely concerned with the last battle. Our very existence, on the contrary, is tied up with the outcome of the first one."

Talking to Americans highly placed Germans like to point out that these remarks were made during an electoral campaign in which the Social

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Democratic opposition strove hard to embarrass the Christian Democratic administration of Federal Chancellor Dr. Adenauer who had opened preliminary negotiations with the Allies on the rearmament question. Objective observers do agree, however, that the considerable gains made by the Special Democrats in those elections were due mainly, if not exclusively, to their vociferous stand against rearmament "under present conditions". Even if it were true, therefore, that Dr. Schmid was overstating the case to make political hay, there can be little doubt that his arguments appealed strongly to large sectors of the German electorate. Actually it is difficult to look upon Dr. Schmid's statement, and similar ones made by others, as mere electoral maneuvers. It should be noted, that the statement does not object to rearmament on principle. It merely says that Germany should not rearm as long as Allied forces are insufficient to resist Russian aggression successfully on the spot. There is every reason to believe that this expresses the genuine and innermost opinion of practically all Germans, not excluding Dr. Adenauer and his political friends who negotiate with the Allies most cautiously, not to say hesitantly, and who, especially in private, voice opinions very similar indeed to those of Dr. Schmid, although their utterances may be somewhat less polemic in form.

It is easy to see, though, why German leaders, including even members of Dr. Schmid's own party, should try to reassure Americans by subtle hints that his remarks are largely of the campaign oratory type. Dr. Adenauer, the head of the administration and Dr. Schumacher, the chief of the opposition, as well as their political friends, aides, and advisors, are violently anti-G Soviet. The Socialist Schumacher is reported to have remarked that in case of successful Red invasion he would be hanged by the Russians at least 10 minutes before Adenauer. The ultimate aim of these two most

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influential individuals is and must be: increased Allied military pro-
tection for Germany. This is a sign neither of cowardice nor of any great
love for the Allies, but merely an indication of their realism and utter
distrust of the Kremlin. In view of their urgent desire to see Allied,
especially U.S., garrisons in Germany strengthened, they can ill afford to
leave Americans with the impression that Germany is a hopeless case and that
we cannot, in the end, count on German military cooperation. This explains
why German political leaders who take infinite pains to enumerate the
psychological and political difficulties that stand in the way of German
rearmament, will, almost without exception, give an emphatically negative
answer, if asked by Americans whether, in view of these difficulties, they
would prefer to have the U.S. refrain from further attempts to bring about
German rearmament at least for the time being.

We do not have to assume that the present leaders of Western Germany
are trying to bait us into dispatching more troops to Germany for the protec-
tion of their country while at the same time they are resolved, in their
heart of hearts, not to contribute German military forces for common defense.
It would appear, on the contrary, that Messrs. Adenauer and Schumacher have
few illusions regarding the position of a permanently disarmed Germany in
the world of today. Indications are that realistic and basically patriotic,
even nationalistic, the German chieftains are quite willing to throw their
hat into the ring openly and rear, once they are convinced that sufficient
Allied ground forces are at hand. Their delaying tactics seem motivated,
on the whole, not by Reichsverlanian insincerity, but by an understandable
anxiety to obtain greater military security for Germany before the fateful
step is actually taken.

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This still leaves unanswered two very important questions. First: How many additional U.S., British, French and other Western divisions will have to be stationed in or near Germany to make responsible Germans conclude that there _does_ exist a reasonable chance to defend the territory of the Federal Republic? In this respect, it would be well to discard all illusions that in their present mood the jittery Germans, just awaking from one of the worst defeats recorded in history, will be satisfied with the limited ground force program Western planners seem to have in mind.

Second: If the German leaders finally decide that Allied strength in Europe has been built up sufficiently to warrant German rearmament, will they be able to carry the nation along?

A short time ago practically everybody on this side of the Atlantic seemed convinced that the latter question simply did not exist. It was taken for granted that given a chance to arm themselves against the hated Russians the uniform loving Germans would jump at the opportunity. The opinion was frequently heard that among all the people of continental Western Europe the Germans alone could really be counted upon to fight.

In the meantime this misconception has been dispelled to some extent. Only those, however, who are in a position to follow the German press day by day and to listen to Germans in their homes, in their offices, or in the street can fully appraise the shoulder shrugging negativism rampant in event the most decidedly anti-Coviet circles regarding the very idea of rearmament. The German leaders might possibly be willing to take some risks and rearm as soon as the present odds against a successful defense of Western Germany have been improved by the arrival of considerable Allied re-inforcements. The overwhelming majority of the nation at large seems to feel, however, that the military odds are unfavorable beyond repair. The pessimism and skepticism

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of the average German regarding the will and capacity of the Western powers to put into the field ground forces able to match the Red hordes, is almost frightening in its implications.

Typical for the mood of even the conservative upper classes are the remarks of a well known and successful German lawyer, who stated bitterly to an American friend the other day that it would be easy, indeed, to "take the risk of rearmament" for the two thousand or so political leaders, top government officials and other dignitaries who can count on speedy evacuation by U.S. planes in an "emergency". The latest slogan of defeatism which can be heard among intellectuals is to the effect that "the biological substance of the nation must be preserved under all circumstances." Which is a somewhat fancy way of saying that surrender without a battle is preferable to the loss of many lives incurred in a vain attempt to defend the country. It is particularly noteworthy that college students who, in Germany, used to be a rather bellicose element are even less enthusiastic to don a uniform than the rest of the population. Those among them who are veterans of the last war are most eloquent in pointing out the unbalance between Eastern and Western ground forces and, like a majority of other ex-soldiers, they are wont to summarize their overall feelings on rearmament in the by now famous phrase: "Ohne mich!" (Include me out.)

The individual attitude toward rearmament is only to a small extent determined by party affiliations, although members of the conservative parties on the whole are somewhat less antagonistic than Social Democrats. Dr. Gustav Heineman, a leading member of Chancellor Adenauer's Christian Democrats resigned his post as Minister of the Interior in the Adenauer Cabinet, in September 1950, because he disagreed with the Chancellor's proposal, submitted to the Allied, to include German units in a future European army. Dr. Heineman, one of the most influential laymen in the

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German Protestant church and friend of the famous anti-Nazi pastor, Niemoller, has since explained in many speeches and articles that Germany should not further endanger her precarious position by an ill-considered declaration of willingness to become an active military partner of the West. The Niemoller-Heineman opposition against rearmament is generally supposed to stem from religious and political scruples rather than from military considerations. It is all the more significant, therefore, that in a very long anti-rearmament pamphlet the deeply religious Heineman quotes but one verse of the bible in support of his argument, i.e., Luke, Chapter 14, Verse 31: "What King going to make war against another King, sitteth not down first and consulteth whether he be able with 10 thousand to meet him that cometh against him with 20 thousand?"

It is also not generally understood that the German feeling of insecurity and their fear of the Red Army are not assuaged, but increased to the utmost by the strong U.S. insistence that they rearm. This insistence creates suspicion on two counts. It makes the Germans feel that for purely egotistic reasons, we try to high pressure them into a doubtful adventure. It also gives them the impression that our military situation is very much weaker than it is. This would seem the real explanation why General Eisenhower's calm and confident statement that, if need be, the Allies would get along without German military cooperation, had a reassuring effect on the Germans and made them more rather than less eager to join.

Two things, then, are needed to arouse the German will to rearm: a decisive change in the existing unfavorable balance of Eastern and Western ground forces in Europe and greater psychological subtlety in U.S. attempts to induce the Germans to become active military partners of the West.

F. G. A. Kraemer

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