U.S.-Japan relations can remain stable without a common policy with respect to China. China is going to play a large role in the world. Dr. Kissinger mentioned its economic advance. I think that we in the U.S. have failed to recognize what has happened there. Between 1979 and 1989 China had the highest rate of per capita economic growth of any nation in the world that I am aware of. Something on the order of 7 or 8% a year accumulated. By the middle of the next century it could have a GNP per capita roughly equal to that of Great Britain's in 1965. Beyond that, China is a political power and we must recognize it as such. Professor Curtis used the word "embed," we must embed China in a relationship among these three powers, and more generally in the Asian region. I strongly support Dr. Kissinger's position. I have supported it publicly in the U.S.

On human rights: it was disgraceful what happened in Tiananmen Square. Not a person in this room would think otherwise. However, we, in the U.S., tend to equate human rights with civil rights. But there is another dimension: the most basic human right is the right to live. If you examine what has happened in China in terms of life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, caloric intake, you will see that change has done more for its people than almost any other major developing nations in the world. We should not forget that.

Professor Kosaka: I agree. We should have had some U.S. Congressmen here probably to make it more interesting.

Dr. Kissinger: I have one quick comment for Professor Curtis. Equilibrium does not necessarily mean conflict, but I think that we have to be careful not to extoll U.S.-Japanese relations in a way that allows everybody

12

(10)

to continue to do exactly what they want to do. As a result, they may get
into the kind of contest with each other that you say we should try to avoid.
We can postulate an abstract congruence of interest that never becomes
apparent in any concrete case. I strongly feel that if in this new situation
every country simply serves its own domestic constituencies—which is the
overwhelming incentive for modern democratic governments—and does not
take a long-range view of where it is trying to go, then one could have an
abstract theory that the world is interconnected and yet find a few years down
the road that we are rubbing up against each other in every specific instance.
Then it will be too late to have the dialogue. If there is no conflict it will
become apparent. We have to try to answer ahead of time some of the
questions that Mr. Saeki raised.

Inaudible
sentence!
Please clarify this
sentence.

In relation between Taiwan and China, it is extremely dangerous for
outside nations to prescribe the course. Not every problem needs to be given
an answer. When we opened to China we found a formula dreamed up by
Marshall Green and Alex Johnson in which we said that the Chinese in the
mainland and in Taiwan agree that there is only one China and the U.S.
does not argue with that proposition. I think that we should continue along
that line. I think that de facto China and Taiwan are now cooperating. I
think that it is unwise for Taiwan to try to force the issue of independence
and that we need to take no further positions than the one we have taken.
Anything else is going to produce a crisis in relationships.

Professor Kosaka: We see that there are many difficult issues involved in
the Asia-Pacific region alone. There are also other complex global issues. Let
us move on to these issues. Mr. McNamara, would you like to lead off?

13

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Mr. McNamara: Today at lunch Prime Minister Miyazawa said that the U.S. and Japan have become so interdependent that we require each other. I agree with that and that as a result of interdependence, we are going to have a strong and lasting friendship. But we each, and I underline each, have a long way to go before we truly function as global partners with respect to the major global issues of security, development and environment. I am going to try to give you two or three examples.

Four days ago, I was attending a meeting in Kampala, Uganda which was discussing with sub-Saharan African ministers how the Western nations can better assist that region, a region in which population is exploding—their population today is about 525 million. The World Bank will estimate in a week or two that it will not stabilize below 2.7 billion. Yet, at the same time, with 525 million, the agriculture is stagnating and the environment is being degraded. Neither the U.S. nor Japan is contributing either to that region or to other developing regions in proportion to their GNP anywhere close to the level of assistance provided by other OECD nations. I read in today's *Japan Times* that the unwillingness of our two countries to support an energy tax is likely to stand in the way of Europeans moving in that direction, an action which clearly would constrain and limit global climate change.

Although there has been clear evidence of several years that the cold war was ending, nations across the globe—particularly the U.S. and Japan—have been slow to revise their foreign and defense policies, slow to strengthen regional and international organizations to reflect that fact. Now, let me just give you one illustration that relates to the U.S.: today, the Congress is considering a defense program—which by the way is likely to become

14

expensive in certain respects than the one proposed by the administration—that in 1997 in constant dollars will provide for defense outlays 15% higher than 21 years earlier, the time when Dr. Kissinger was Secretary of State in the midst of the cold war. Such a defense program is not consistent with my view of a global partnership in dealing with global issues.

Before Japan and the U.S. can respond to the changes in Soviet policy that ended the cold war, we need a vision of a world no longer dominated by the East-West rivalry that for four decades has shaped the foreign and defense policies of our nations. As the Iraqi action demonstrated and as we are seeing everyday in Yugoslavia and elsewhere across the globe, this post-cold war world is not going to be a world without conflict. In that respect, therefore, the world of the future will not be different from the world of the past. Conflicts within nations, between nations, are not going to disappear, but it is also clear, as Dr. Kissinger has pointed out, that in the 21st century, *relations among nations* will differ dramatically from those of the post-war decades.

In the postwar years, the U.S. had the power, and to a considerable degree exercised that power, to shape the world as we chose. In the next century that is not going to be possible. I think that the U.S. will remain the world's strongest nation, but surely we will live in a multi-polar world and surely our foreign policy and our defense programs must be adjusted to that reality.

In such a multi-polar world, clearly new relationships will have to be developed both among the great powers and between the great powers in the third world. At a minimum, such a new order should accomplish four objectives: it should provide to all states protection against external

15

aggression; it should establish a mechanism for resolution to regional
conflicts without unilateral intervention by the great powers; it should
increase the flow of both technical and financial assistance to the developing
countries, the Africas that I mentioned; and it should preserve the global
environment as a basis for sustainable development for all nations. We
should move to a world in which relations among nations would be based on
the rule of law, in which national security would be supported by a system of
collective security and collective action through multilateral institutions. A
world approaching its global problems—security, development, preservation
of the environment—through collective action will need leaders, and the
leadership role will shift among nations depending on the issues at hand.
Often it will be fulfilled by the U.S., but surely at times Japan must also
accept leadership. In such a system, as Dr. Kissinger pointed out, the leader
must yield to collective decision-making. That is going to be very hard for
the U.S. We have not done so in the past, and I doubt that we are going to
come easily to it in the future. Our partners also must share in the burdens
and the costs; and when I say burdens and costs I do not mean just financial
costs, but the political risks and the blood risks, if you will, that go with such
responsibilities.

Japan rarely has been the leader, or even a major participant, in addressing
such global problems. In the future Japan is going to have to take that
leadership, and it is going to be very difficult; culturally Japan has not been
accustomed to leadership. We seldom have seen Japan exercise leadership in
the post-war period. Japan was rarely in the lead and, as a matter of fact,
rarely even participated in such global problems as achieving peace in the
Middle East, terminating the destructive war between Iran and Iraq.

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preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or, as I have suggested, carrying its share in development assistance. Two or three weeks ago I was here in Japan attending a meeting of what was called the Eminent Persons to consider how the world should be joined, how a global partnership should be developed to deal with the problems that will be discussed two or three weeks from now at the United Nations conference on environment and development in Rio. I was delighted by the words of former Prime Minister Takeshita who spoke to us a few minutes ago when he said that demonstrating leadership to solve the global environment problem must be the pillar of Japan's role in the international community. Those were wise, courageous words. They point to exactly the type of action that I would hope to see from Japan's participation in this global partnership.

Professor Kosaka: Thank you Mr. McNamara. Do the other panelists have any comments?

Mr. Saeki: In principle, we are thinking along the same lines. About the global environmental issue, Mr. McNamara said that Japan needs to exert international leadership in this field, and I think that Japanese consensus is moving in that direction. But, as I said earlier, Japan is not exerting leadership in economic assistance to the Asian nations. However, if Japan were to take such leadership in the region, how would the U.S. react?

Mr. McNamara: Well I think that it depends on what we mean by economic cooperation in the Asian region. If you mean that Japan would increase its flow of concessional assistance to countries in Asia, particularly poor countries such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, even Indonesia, I think that the U.S. would look very favorably on that. If you mean that Japan

17

(tc)

would exert its leadership beyond the region by dealing with issues of the
region, for example in supporting an energy tax, I think that the U.S. would
look very favorably on that. If you mean that Japan would organize the
region in the form of some economic trading bloc with the implications that
perhaps the U.S. would be at a competitive disadvantage in the region, I am
sure that this would be a divisive issue separating our two countries. I do not
believe we are going to come to that. I hope we are not.

Professor Curtis: Concerning global issues, I do not think that we should
let the opportunity pass to remind ourselves that probably the most
important role that Japan can play in the economic development of
countries both in the region and outside is to make its economy more open
to the products of those regions and to maintain a system of relatively open
and free trade among the nations of the world. That is what the Uruguay
Round is all about. I think many of us who observe Japan closely are even
stunned sometimes by the lack of initiative from the Japanese government
to push forward a negotiation that surely serves Japan's interest as much as
any other nation's, and maybe even more so.

On the issues of development assistance and energy tax and the like, I
have no disagreement with Mr. McNamara, but as an American I am more
struck by the difficulties we seem to have in our country to maintain a role
in development assistance and assistance to build public support for an energy
tax. Surely Japan should be doing a lot more in development assistance. It is,
in a sense, comparative advantage to do more in this area, but I think we in
the U.S. simply have to do much more along these lines than we are.

18

Professor Kosaka: Various forms of economic cooperation have been mentioned. Creating economic blocs is something that Japan is not going to do. Nor do I think that Japan is going to offer concessionary aid to the poorest countries. Japan's thinking, Japan's strategy, is to help develop the country that has a potential to develop. Economic initiatives, economic motivation will be our primary consideration. To Japanese this is realistic.

Mr. McNamara: It sounds to me as though you are writing off the countries that are having difficulty developing. I just came from Africa and I can say that it is a god-awful mess. The easy thing to do is to close one's eyes and ears to it, but there are 525 million people there. Their caloric intake would have to be increased 30% to equal that of China. They are importing food. This is a totally intolerable situation and Japan is contributing essentially nothing. By the way, the U.S. is probably contributing less. I very much agree with Professor Curtis. Western Europe, Japan and the U.S. must share these objectives. I think we do. One is security. Also I believe we share the objective of helping the developing nations move forward to self-sustaining growth, and surely we share the objective of preserving the global environment. Now for objectives there ought to be some general sharing of the burden. The Europeans today are spending on the order of 4% of GNP in support of those three objectives; the U.S. is spending on the order of 5%; Japan, roughly 2%. By God, I do not want to see Japan increase the percent of GNP devoted to those three objectives by raising its military expenditures. Do not misunderstand me; one of my successors suggested that and I totally oppose it. However, I do believe that Japan should raise its official development assistance, its concessional aid as a percentage of GNP at least to

19

the OECD average excluding U.S.-Japan. That would require an increase of
40%.

Mr. Saeki: Not that I take issue with Mr. McNamara, but I would like you to pause and think. Japan became a major economic entity rapidly. We are confused as to the kind of role we should play befitting our economic status. In 1955 at the time of the security treaty revision, the U.S. accounted for 45% of the world's GNP; Japan, only 2.8%. Our economy was one-fifteenth of yours. Only recently have we come to about 60 to 70% of the magnitude of the U.S. economy. I do not think that we are doing enough in the area of economic cooperation, but having grown so rapidly, it is quite difficult to suddenly expand our economic assistance. We have to do that gradually, so that at the same time we can educate our people. Try to bear with us a little longer.

Mr. McNamara: Japan's GNP has grown so rapidly that it has been very hard to increase official development assistance as rapidly. That is the point. And the Japanese have said to me many, many times, "You know that we are quite prepared to increase our concessional aid if you can show us how to do it and ensure that it will be well spent." Well, today I can. So I would like to see it increased.

Professor Kosaka: Both Japan and the U.S. should move toward the same objective. The principles behind our work are democracy and the market economy. In order for these shared principles to materialize, Japan, as Mr. Saeki said, should try to match the level of international contribution to that of its economic power. In a nutshell, that is what is expected of Japan. We are faced with many alternatives, and we must prioritize our policies

20

(w)

within the given circumstances. ODA or government assistance is one way to play our role. Opening our economy is another way, as Professor Curtis said; or the Uruguay Round or the global environmental issue. Helping to solve the drug problem; reduction of mass destructive weapons, arms control are other areas. We cannot deal with all these problems simultaneously and immediately in a satisfactory manner but at least we should move forward by setting up a clear, concrete objective. That is important.

Dr. Kissinger: I am impressed by what Bob McNamara, whom I admire greatly, has said and what others have said. However, I think that within all our countries we are moving beyond the point where such general statements are going to do any good. I do a lot of speaking around the U.S. to groups that form the foreign policy establishment, and I find no support whatsoever for what Bob McNamara has said, elevated as it is. Part of the reason is that nobody has explained to the American public why it should be in the U.S. interest to do this. And for that reason it looks like a giveaway program at a time of economic recession. That is the reality. If I could legislate, I would substantially agree with what Bob McNamara has said, but that is not the political reality of the world in which we live, at least not in the U.S.

Secondly, I really do not see much point in saying we can do this, this, this, this—and then not do it. Nuclear weapons, environment, we all know the list that ought to be dealt with. But unless governments explain why it should be done and describe some procedure of how it is to be done and tell the people, who is going to approach it? We are going to be talking like professors which I used to be at one time when I used even longer sentences than now. I am worried when we say Japan can do ten things. Certainly

21

Japan can do them, but it has not done them yet, and we have to know in
what way they are going to get done and for what purpose. We have a
problem of governance in most societies in that the pressure on the
governments is short-term electability. Almost everything you are talking
about will not come home to us for five, six years.

Mr. McNamara: Well, I agree, but we do not want many more ozone
holes. That is the problem. We do have this junction between political reality
on the one hand and on the other hand, some physical realities that we are
beginning to deal with, and some human realities. People dying by the
hundreds of thousands is a reality. I am concerned about it. Destroying our
physical universe beyond repair is a reality. I am concerned about that. I quite
understand what Henry Kissinger is talking about. You cannot raise taxes
today in the U.S. It is absolutely impossible. President Bush is not standing in
the way; American people are standing in the way. I know that. What you
can do is to cut defense to what it was when Henry Kissinger was secretary.
We ought to introduce some reality into our fiscal management, and
promptly.

Professor Kosaka: Let's move on to the management role of bilateral
relations.

Listening to your debate I am perplexed on one account. We used to say "I
can do it, but you cannot do it." But, today, "You are not doing it, and we
can do even less." This is a new climate in our bilateral relationship.

Ambassador Matsunaga: Considering the successful negotiations on the
reversion of Okinawa, despite many difficult problems we were with our

22

(ii)

foresight and wisdom to reach the agreement. Thus, an entirely new horizon
is before us.

Today with the cold war structure having collapsed, our bilateral
relationship is going to have to explore that new horizon. We need greater
wisdom, decisiveness and willingness for action. For the past few years, I have
been involved in our bilateral relationships, mainly in the economic arena.
Economics first, second economics and third economics. Economic
relationships, like economic business activities, have become borderless,
increasingly interdependent with everything meshed together very closely.
However, many, many problems—individual, bilateral, multilateral or global
issues—lie before us. All these problems must be dealt with by us with vigor,
with the best of our energies.

I have no doubt about our exerting a lot of energy to deal with these issues
together. As a mental exercise, with some friends in the U.S. Congress I am
writing a paper and thinking about presenting a joint paper to the whole
world. I would like to share with you what is the thrust of it: how to facilitate
the smooth operation of the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship. What we have
in mind is the formation of a free economic association between our two
countries. Perhaps we are at the point where we can begin talking about its
formation.

In reality, it is difficult to achieve this, but, as Dr. Kissinger said, it is
difficult to solve big issues by taking up individual ones. So we must change
our approach. We must tackle the whole thing from a whole new approach.
What we need in this effort to form an economic association is to ask the
nations in Asia and the Pacific region to join if they wish. It is especially

23

[c]

important to keep the door wide open to any countries in Asia and the
Pacific region who might at any time wish to participate.

I think this is the sort of new thinking which our two countries should
start talking about together.

Professor Curtis: I will limit myself to just four or five points. First, unlike some others, I do not believe the U.S.-Japan relationship is in crisis; it is not about to collapse. There surely are serious problems, but there are many reasons to be cautiously optimistic.

Ambassador Matsunaga made a point which I would state somewhat differently. Looking back at Okinawa, what strikes me as so impressive was that the reversion was brought about because of what we could call a sense of enlightened self-interest. The U.S. was in the middle of Vietnam war. The bases on Okinawa were important to that war. There was nonetheless a view, a long-term view, of what was in the U.S. interest over the long run, and in the interest of the Japan relationship. This sense of enlightened self-interest rather than a very narrow, short-term, immediate sense of self-interest is what is lacking today—lacking in Japan as well as in the U.S. Therein rests the point about the need for some vision, about where we are to go. It seems to me that the age in which the U.S. can define the burdens and then ask weaker allies to take on certain costs in carrying those burdens is over and gone. Our allies, particularly Japan, have to get into the act of defining what burden, and that means enlightened self-interest. That means getting over the short-term views to longer-term ones.

At the same time, we need to focus on specific issues in the U.S.-Japan
relationship. I have no argument with the rhetoric of global partnership, but

24

it seems to me the question is what five, six, seven things can we do
together—not some grand scheme that does not seem to have much
content. We need to focus on specifics with a long-term and develop an
enlightened sense of what our national interests are.

The next point—I think that perhaps the most important thing to
improve the U.S.—Japan relationship—is to focus on the importance of
solving our domestic problems. If the U.S. and Japan dealt seriously with
their domestic issues, a good part of the problems in this relationship would
be ameliorated. The most skilled diplomats in the world will not be able to
manage the relationship effectively if the U.S. does not come to grips with
its budget deficit, its education problems and its various social problems. We
have to become more inward looking without becoming isolationist. We
need to be internationalist but look inward to deal with our problems at
home. Clearly the challenge for Japan is quite the opposite: to make its
society more outward looking, more open and more a part of the world
community. Focusing on these domestic issues is absolutely key.

The next point, as I suggested earlier, that the U.S.—Japan security treaty
relationship remains as important, in some ways more important, than ever.
The Soviet threat was a reason for drawing it up, but the treaty provides and
serves other functions. It is the key to political stability in Asia, for it reassures
every other country in Asia that the U.S. and Japan will not engage in rivalry
for political dominance in the region. Given the more fluid and unstable
situation that could easily emerge in this region, that kind of reassurance is
very important.

25

(L)

Second, the treaty is a framework for cooperation on much more than just the military side. And third, the security treaty and the number of U.S. bases or the size of the U.S. force in Japan are not related, and there is no reason why, over the coming years, that cannot be reduced while retaining and, indeed, strengthening the security relationship. We need to embed this relationship in a larger context. The difference between Asia and Europe is that Japan is alone in Asia; Japan is not integrated into Asia in the way that countries in Western Europe are integrated with each other. It is in both U.S. and Japan's interest to create a more integrated region that is open, not exclusive, and has more coherence.

Finally, I want to make a point about culture. We hear a lot about how different Japanese and American culture is. That is true, but the point can be exaggerated or lead people to wrong conclusions. In my view, culture conditions everything we do, and it determines nothing. It sets the context in which people make decisions. However, range of decisions to be made is a political not a cultural issue. The questions are what will political leaders do and how will they convince their publics to do it. Culture is an excuse for inaction that is sometimes exercised. It is not a reason for containment or some other silly prognosis based on a misunderstanding of what it means.

But there is the issue of "style." Culture has much to do with *how* people communicate with each other, a point that was raised earlier. Both the U.S. and Japan have to put a much more effort into dealing with this aspect—that is, communication—than either country has done so far. There have been some important efforts, the Trilateral Commission which all of us on the U.S. side here have been involved with, has tried to build webs of personal

26

relationships. Given the needs, particularly in the U.S., this is really very
small potatoes. American business has basically just given up on the idea of
doing anything to improve U.S. understanding of Japan. A great deal more
needs to be done in our country to increase the number of people who can
operate comfortably in Japan; there is much that needs to be done in Japan as
well. If, in fact, a cultural problem exists, it is a problem of communication
and style, not that culture somehow makes it impossible for Japan to do this,
that, or the other thing, and for us to do something else. If there is a real
problem in the U.S.-Japan relationship today, it is the absence of the political
will to do what needs to be done.

Professor Kosaka: The U.S.-Japan relationship has changed in many ways
from what it was 20 years ago. Twenty years ago in order to better the U.S.-
Japan relationship, we simply had to focus on the bilateral relationship. Now
if we want to improve our relationship, we have to discuss domestic issues,
global issues, multilateral issues as well—which means we have to spend more
time talking. The topics also become more complex.

Mr. Matsunaga: I agree with you that the discussion has become more
complex. Listening to Professor Curtis, I was reminded of something that
Foreign Minister Watanabe said: American children do not speak Japanese
and Japanese children do not speak English. Even the onomatopoeia is
different. The Japanese dog says, "Wang-wang," and the American dog says,
"Bow-wow." But this does not prevent an obstacle to the children playing
together and having fun. The difference in culture does not become an
obstacle to communication and friendship. Good will is necessary and effort
is necessary; political good will is important.

27

Mr. Saeki: Henry Kissinger emphasized the need for dialogue to improve understanding between Japan and the U.S. Whether we discuss diplomacy or diplomatic policy, Japan and the U.S. also need the ability to look inward to reflect on history. Otherwise the dialogue will not make any sense.

Another point is that to maintain and strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance given Japan's economic power today, we must adjust the imbalance which exists in the area of defence. We need to correct the asymmetry. Mr. McNamara mentioned, for example, the dispatch of Self-Defense Force troops to help the PKO operations. Is that enough? Do we need to do more? We need to think about these questions.

Adjusting the asymmetry of the political roles played by Japan and the U.S. is not enough. We must strengthen the U.S.-Japan relationship, and we need policies to achieve a stronger fundamental relationship.

Dr. Kissinger: It is all very well to call for dialogue but you have to know what you want to talk about. There was a distinguished foreign service officer, Trip Bohlen, who used to say, "If you do not know where you are going, any road will get you there." And I really think that you cannot call upon the cure-all of improved dialogue and more consultation if you do not know what the agenda is and have not defined what issues need addressing. I will say something sacrilegious: we can say democracy and free markets are going to solve all the problems in the world so that we do not need to think about foreign policy at all any more; we all can become reformers and go around the world like foundations and not like countries, but I do not believe it is as simple as that. We need an agenda of the issues to be resolved intellectually and of the programs. Then we can see where Japan and the

28

U.S. stand in relation to the agenda; otherwise, we will be using dialogues as bromides.

Professor Kosaka: We need both good will and will power. I agree that we need an agenda. You may have noticed that U.S. participants have been arguing among themselves. There are some Japanese politicians here. So, let me finish by arguing among the Japanese, among ourselves.

Japanese politicians think their job is to solve problems after the problems have been presented to them. They think it is the job of God or the Lord Buddha or Mr. America to work up an agenda. It is a habit we must break. But I still remain cautiously optimistic. We do have common interests between us, and I believe that we have every reason to be optimistic. However, when it comes to specific concrete actions, we need both prudence and will power.

Now we conclude our Symposium. Thank you very much for your cooperation.

Mr. Yamamoto: Professor Kosaka and distinguished members of the panel, thank you. I hope all of you will continue your dialogue on a more personal level.

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